Full text of "Review of the Department of the Navy's investigation into the gun turret explosion aboard the U.S.S. "Iowa" : hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, One Hundred First Congress, first session, November 16; December 11, 1989; May 25, 1990"

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S. Hrg. 101-1064

'REVIEW OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY'S
INVESTIGATION INTO THE GUN TURRET EXPLO-
SION ABOARD THE U.S.S. "IOWA"

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED FIRST CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

NOVEMBER 16; DECEMBER 11, 1989; MAY 25, 1990

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
24-931 WASHINGTON : 1990

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402

S. Hrg. 101-1064

'REVIEW OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY'S
INVESTIGATION INTO THE GUN TURRET EXPLO-
SION ABOARD THE U.S.S. "IOWA"

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON AEMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED FIRST CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

NOVEMBER 16; DECEMBER 11, 1989; MAY 25, 1990

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
-4-9H1 WASHINGTON : 1990

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

SAM NUNN, Georgia, Chairman

JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia
STROM THURMOND, South Carolina
WILLIAM S. COHEN, Maine
PETE WILSON, California
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
MALCOLM WALLOP, Wyoming
SLADE GORTON, Washington
TRENT LOTT, Mississippi
DAN COATS, Indiana

J. JAMES EXON, Nebraska

CARL LEVIN, Michigan

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts

JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico

ALAN J. DIXON, Illinois

JOHN GLENN, Ohio

ALBERT GORE, Jr., Tennessee

TIMOTHY E. WIRTH, Colorado

RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama

ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia

Arnold L. Punaro, Staff Director
Patrick A. Tucker, Minority Staff Director

(II)

BOSTON
PUBLIC
UBRARY

CONTENTS

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
November 16, 1989

Page

Metzenbaum, Hon. Howard M., a U.S. Senator from the State of Ohio 2

Trost, Adm. Carlyle, Chief of Naval Operations 2

Milligan, Rear Adm. Richard D., U.S. Navy, investigating officer, accompa-
nied by Capt. Joseph D. Miceli, U.S Navy, Director, Technical Support
Team; and Robert J. Powers, Director, Criminal Investigations, Naval In-
vestigative Service 23

December 11, 1989

Morning Session
Moosally, Fred P., Capt., U.S. Navy, Commanding Officer, U.S.S. Iowa 105

December 11, 1989

Afternoon Session

Daniels, Anthony, E., Assistant Director, Training Division, FBI; Richard L.
Ault, Jr., Ph.D., special agent, Training Division, FBI; Robert R. Hazelwood,

special agent. Training Division, FBI 190

Ault, Richard J., Jr., Ph.D 193

Hazelwood, Robert, R 198

Nimmich, Kenneth W., Section Chief, Scientific Analysis Section, FBI Labora-
tory 229

May 25, 1990

Conahan, Frank C, Assistant Comptroller General, National Security and
International Affairs Division, General Accounting Office, accompanied by
Martin Ferber, Director, Navy Issues Group, General Accounting Office 245

Schwoebel, Dr. Richard L., director, components, Sandia National Laborato-
ries, accompanied by Dr. Karl W. Schuler, distinguished member of the
technical staff, Sandia National Laboratories; Paul W. Cooper, distin-
guished member of the technical staff, Sandia National Laboratories; and
Dr. James A. Borders, technical supervisor, Sandia National Laboratories .... 272

(HI)

REVIEW OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY'S
INVESTIGATION INTO THE GUN TURRET EX-
PLOSION ABOARD THE U.S.S. "IOWA"

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 16, 1989

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,

Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:36 a.m., in room SH-
216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Sam Nunn (chairman)
presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Nunn, Exon, Dixon,
Glenn, Shelby, Warner, McCain, Wallop, Lott, and Coats.

Other Senators present: Senator Metzenbaum.

Committee staff members present: Arnold L. Punaro, staff direc-
tor; Richard D. DeBobes, counsel; Marie Fabrizio Dickinson, assist-
ant chief clerk; and Richard E. Caswell, printing and documents
clerk.

Professional staff members present: John J. Hamre, William E.
Hoehn, Jr., David S. Lyles, Norman G. Mosher, William H. Smith
and Frederick F.Y. Pang.

Minority staff members present: Patrick A. Tucker, minority
staff director and counsel; Romie L. Brownlee, deputy staff director
for the minority; Ronald P. Kelly, George W. Lauffer and Mark B.
Robinson, professional staff members.

Staff assistants present: Elizabeth Ann Harlow, Lori M. Jackson,
Mary J. Kampo, Kelli J. Pronovost, Melissa A. Ramsey and Debra
A. Rice.

Committee members' assistants present: Jeffrey B. Subko, assist-
ant to Senator Exon; Kenneth N. Luongo, assistant to Senator
Levin; William J. Lynn, assistant to Senator Kennedy; Charles C.
Smith, assistant to Senator Dixon; Milton D. Beach and Donald A.
Mitchell, assistants to Senator Glenn; Leon S. Fuerth, assistant to
Senator Gore; Terrence M. Lynch, assistant to Senator Shelby;
Dale F. Gerry, assistant to Senator Cohen; Dudley L. Carlson, as-
sistant to Senator Wilson; Anthony H. Cordesman, assistant to Sen-
ator McCain; Robert M. Soofer, assistant to Senator Gorton;
Charles G. Pearcy, assistant to Senator Lott and Eric H.
Thoemmes, assistant to Senator Coats.

Chairman Nunn. The committee will come to order.

The committee meets this morning to begin a series of hearings
on matters associated with the explosion on April 19, 1989, in the
center gun of turret II of U.S.S. Iowa which resulted in the death
of 47 Navy personnel.

(1)

In addition to the Navy's investigation, the committee will be re-
viewing the operational planning for utilization of the battleships,
for manning the battleships and for training the crews.

Before we get into that hearing, though, and that is the main
focus this morning; because of the recent accidents that have hap-
pened in the Navy, we have asked Adm. Carlyle Trost to come over
and we will receive a report from him on the recent spate of acci-
dents and what the Navy is doing during the 48-hour stand down.

We look forward to hearing from Admiral Trost this morning. So
he will not have to wait here during the whole investigative hear-
ing on the U.S.S. Iowa, we will start by hearing from him.

But first. Senator Metzenbaum is here. Senator Metzenbaum has
had a real interest in this, and indeed had written us early and
asked for the Armed Services Committee to get into these hearings.
I know he has got another hearing. He is not a member of our com-
mittee, but would you like to lead off? I know you have to leave,
and if you could make it brief, we would hear from you.

STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD M. METZENBAUM, A U.S. SENATOR

FROM THE STATE OF OHIO

Senator Metzenbaum. It will be brief, Mr. Chairman. First, I
want to thank you for conducting these hearings. I did indeed write
to you and Senator Glenn as well. I think the subject of the hear-
ing is particularly important, and of particular concern to the
family of the young man who has been named.

I do have another hearing that I must go to. I expect to return
rather shortly, but I did want to express my appreciation to you in
the first instance for setting up these hearings and going forward
with them and I appreciate your giving me the opportunity to par-
ticipate with you.

Chairman Nunn. Thank you. Senator Metzenbaum.

Admiral Trost, first of all we thank you for being here on such
short notice. We did not give you much time for this and we know
that you have many other things that are pushing you. We wel-
'come you here.

Speaking for myself, I applaud the decision the Navy took to con-
duct this unprecedented review of safety and operational proce-
dures. We are asking you to tell us what you are doing and primar-
ily whether there is any kind of pattern here that indicates serious
underlying problems, or whether that is the basic subject of your
inquiry.

We really are glad to have you here to hear from you about what
the Navy is doing about this series of accidents.

STATEMENT OF ADM. CARLYLE TROST, CHIEF OF NAVAL

OPERATIONS

Admiral Trost. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do appreciate the
opportunity to come before the committee this morning to discuss
the very important topic of operational safety.

As you have noted, as a result of the recent series of incidents we
have had in our Navy, this past Tuesday I issued a directive to my
subordinate commanders that implemented a 48-hour safety stand-
down for all units and activities throughout the Navy.

My intention was that each person in a position of authority or
command take an in-depth look with his people at our operating
procedures that govern how we operate our ships, our airplanes
and other equipment around the Navy.

I also directed that they review safety precautions and proce-
dures to ensure that we were, in fact, fully adhering to operating
procedures which have been learned as a result of operational ex-
perience.

I directed that they leave no stone unturned in trying to deter-
mine if there are some things we can or should be doing better in
order to prevent accidents.

Finally, I asked that the fleet commanders provide to me their
summary of lessons learned, with any suggestions they have, when
the standdown is completed, so that I can promulgate them Navy-
wide and ensure that we reduce our accident rate to a minimum.

The specifics of that standdown order are really as follows: as I
noted it is to standdown. It is to stand down from routine oper-
ations. It does not mean bring ships into port for this period, but it
does mean that safety-related discussions and reviews take priority
over routine operations and administrative functions.

The Navy will continue to operate during this period. Hopefully,
we will come out of this standdown much better informed about
what we are doing, and we will have some indication of whether or
not we are doing something wrong.

Now, this past year has certainly been one of the most publicized
in terms of mishaps in our Navy, starting with the tragic explosion
on board the U.S.S. Iowa in April. In each case, we have conducted
exhaustive investigations into the cause, with the intention of pre-
cluding the possibility of recurrence. To date, those investigations
have revealed no central thread or commonality in the causes. The
accidents have been unrelated. Some have been machinery failure,
some have been acts of God, others have been errors by our person-
nel.

As all of us know, operating warships and high performance air-
craft in the unpredictable and unforgiving environment of the sea
carries a substantially higher level of risk than does most other oc-
cupations.

In today's Navy, we have approximately 592,000 men and
women, many in their twenties, many younger, manning our ships
and flying our airplanes around the globe and around the clock.

Let me give you one example. On the 30th day of September, 219
of our 565 ships were underway, and they were operating. Our avi-
ators on that day flew over 6,200 aircraft sorties from aircraft car-
riers, from other ships and from land bases.

Now, this was perhaps a slightly more stressful day than normal,
but not by much. More stressful, because it was a day that included
PAC EX, the Pacific Exercise just concluded.

PAC EX was a large-scale exercise in which our aircraft flew in
excess of 32,000 hours without a major mishap. Participating units
included almost 100 ships from our Navy and many other foreign
navies. They included three aircraft carriers and their embarked
air wings, two battleship groups and three amphibious units with
their embarked Marine expeditionary units.

I make that comment only to note the magnitude of that oper-
ation, which stretched over a total period of 4 months without a
significant accident. That is precisely why leadership is so very im-
portant and why our Navy has very strict procedural guidelines
and thorough training programs for our personnel, and why we
place strong emphasis on supervisor and officer oversight. Our
Navy people are unquestionably our most precious asset. We are
committed to do what is required to reduce that level of risk to
them as much as possible.

Despite the most recent accidents, which prompted me to take
this unprecedented action of a Navy-wide safety standdown, I think
it is important to note that the overall safety record of our Navy
has been steadily improving throughout the decade of the 1980s.
Operations and training-related major accidents have declined in
each of the past 5 years.

In 1984 the Navy had 118 major accidents. To date this year,
that figure is 67. Operational-related deaths for 1989, if we were to
exclude the tragedy on the Iowa, are also the lowest in the last 5
years.

Our aviation wings and squadrons have set new safety records in
the past 2 years. This is computed on the number of mishaps per
100,000 flight hours. In 1989, that figure was 1.8; that is 1.8 mis-
haps per 100,000 flight hours. Let me try to put that in perspective.
1989 was three times better than 1980, and 33 times better than
when I was a junior officer in this Navy.

Some other specifics: the carrier Ranger just returned from a 6-
month deployment, mishap-free. Five of the last seven carriers that
returned from deployment in the Pacific came home after operat-
ing 6 months each without a Class A mishap. That means no fatali-
ties and no aircraft damage of greater than one-half million dollars
in cost. Our Atlantic Patrol Wings, comprising all the maritime
patrol aircraft on the east coast, recently passed the 1 -million hour
mishap-free flight safety mark.

In the case of the Lexington, a highly-publicized and regrettable
accident that resulted in the loss of a pilot and four others just re-
cently, it is important to note that, prior to this incident, the Lex-
ington had operated for 16 years without a fatality. On balance,
her safety record has been exemplary.

Each accident, each injury, each loss of life is extremely trou-
bling, not only to me but indeed to everyone in a leadership posi-
tion in our Navy, and of course, each one of us always asks our-
selves the question, why?

I have to note, however, that I continue to have the utmost confi-
dence in the officers commanding our ships and flying our aircraft.
I am equally confident in the talent and superior ability of our
men and women to operate their equipment in the safest manner
possible, and I want to assure this committee and the men and
women in our Navy and their families that we are committed to
operational safety at sea and ashoie.

Thank you, sir.

Chairman Nunn. Thank you, Admiral Trost.

Just two or three questions. You said there is no common thread
that you have yet discerned running through these series cf acci-
dents?

Admiral Trost. That is correct. We have looked at every one of
them, and some as 1 noted are due to personnel error— as a matter
of fact, the majority are— and some to equipment failure and some
are totally unexplainable. There will be mishaps, as we well know.
Our goal is to minimize the numbers.

Chairman Nunn. As the Chief of Naval Operations, when you
start seeing this kind of pattern in mishaps and you take the
almost unprecedented step, which I think was warranted here, of
standing down for 48 hours, for the entire Navy, what kind of
common threads would you be looking for? What are the questions
that you as CNO are basically posing to the fleet?

Admiral Trost. The questions I posed are the following: Are we
knowledgeable of and adhering to established operating procedures
throughout the Navy? Are we knowledgeable of and adhering to es-
tablished safety precautions throughout the Navy? Do we become
complacent at the end of an exercise and say, okay, the hard stuff
is over, this is a piece of cake? Are we really conscious of every-
thing going on around us that leads to safe operations?

Chairman Nunn. The questions come to mind as to whether you
are operating at too high a tempo, or are you putting too much
stress on the ships or the men on them? Have you asked that ques-
tion?

Admiral Trost. We did. We asked ourselves that earlier this
month, at the beginning of this month, as a matter of fact, when I
gathered all of my senior commanders over in Annapolis to discuss
this and other Navy operational matters.

We satisfied ourselves that the constraints we placed on oper-
ational tempo back in 1985 are indeed being adhered to with very
few exceptions, and that we are not running our people into the
ground.

We looked at some of the major exercises we have conducted
where the tempo of operations is much higher than in routine
training exercises. Again, we were satisfied that procedures were
being followed, including safety procedures, as evidenced by the
fact that there were no mishaps in these intensive exercises.

That might lead one to conclude that perhaps people are more
safety conscious when the operational tempo increases. We must
then ensure that complacency does not set in after the exercise.

Chairman Nunn. What about the shore time, compared to the
time at sea? Is that any higher than it has been in recent years? Is
there any pattern there?

Admiral Trost. It has remained about the same over the last 4
years. We have had very fine support from Secretary Cheney in en-
suring that commitments do not drive our people into a position of
being over-extended and overly tired.

This support has been extremely helpful to us in that, as de-
mands on the Navy have continued, we have nonetheless been able
to protect our people from excessive personnel time away from
home port and excessive op tempo.

Chairman Nunn. What about the quality of the personnel
coming into the Navy and the quality being retained? Have you
seen any notable difference in that?

Admiral Trost. No. As a matter of fact, we have been rather
pleased with our ability overall to both access and retain people of

the quality we need in today's Navy. This year's experience has
shown that we are in fact getting a sHghtly higher quality of re-
cruit as measured by mental category and high school degree com-
pletion.

We also have seen an increase in retention this year, which my
fleet commanders attribute largely to the fact that we are in the
second year of properly funding our military personnel accounts.
So we are taking care cf our people, and they know it. We are pro-
moting them when due, we are transferring them on schedule, and
they are generally satisfied and staying with us.

Chairman Nunn. I understand the Navy has instituted a new
policy for attempting to retain rather than discharge marginal per-
formers and personnel with minor disciplinary problems and has
directed commanding officers to attempt to motivate such person-
nel through increased attention to leadership. I do not know the
exact beginning date. My impression is the last few months, this
year sometime. I understand this is a new policy, and it has to do
with some recruiting difficulties and some first term retention diffi-
culties. Could you comment on that, particularly whether there is
any relationship here between what some would say is a little loos-
ening of the standards and the accidents we have seen?

Admiral Trost. I would be glad to comment on that since I was
directly responsible for that change. It was motivated not by re-
cruiting difficulty but by the desire to do the job with less money.
If we recruit fewer people, we do not spend as much money.

I looked at our retention picture and noted with concern that
about one-third of our people did not make it through the initial 4-
year-period, from the time of entry into the Navy until reaching
the first expiration of enlistment point and we started asking,
"Why?" We found a number of reasons. We found that we were
losing a large number of people in basic recruit training, where, for
example, you have so much time to learn to swim or else. Well,
some people may not have been exposed to swimming pools before,
so it takes them a little longer to get acclimated. So we did, in fact,
relax our standards in terms of the time it took for an individual to
qualify to swim.

We found that some people who have never worn anything but
sneakers have trouble when they put on boondockers and other
kinds of heavy Navy shoes and they get blisters on their feet, and
then we throw them out as physically disqualified. That strikes me
as stupid.

We found in many of our training schools that instead of taking
someone who had difficulty with one aspect of the course and let-
ting him repeat that part of the course, we were simply saying,
"you did not make it; you are out." We were losing a lot of poten-
tially good, capable, talented people.

We also found that through lack of necessary supervision and
leadership, many young people coming aboard ship were drifting
off after being well indoctrinated during their recruit training or
their basic schooling. Left on their own, they drifted into trouble.
Eventually, we said, "you are a problem, out you go." That is abro-
gating the leadership responsibilities of command, and I have
asked that that be turned around.

We have, in the few short months since that policy has been in
effect, had a quite noticeable positive improvement in our retention
of good people. We are not interested in keeping people who are

not.

Chairman Nunn. Admiral, I am going to defer in just one
moment. My time has expired for questions. I will wait until we
are done with the questions, and then I will get you to introduce
the people who have conducted the investigation on the Iowa. Sen-
ator Warner.

Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral, we wel-
come you here this morning.

You said that you have the utmost confidence in your officers
and men. I want you to know that America has the utmost confi-
dence in you as the senior sailor. You have been an outstanding
Naval Officer since the day you entered the U.S. Naval Academy
and graduated at the top of your class. If fate dictates that the
Navy must for some unexplainable reason experience this incredi-
ble number of serious accidents, then we are fortunate to have
such a fine sailor as you at the helm.

Admiral Trost. Thank you. Senator.

Senator Warner. Now, we support your action. I join the chair-
man in supporting the standdown of the Navy. I think it is the first
time in the history of the U.S. Navy that this has been done on a
fleet-wide basis. Am I not correct?

Admiral Trost. I think you are. We have done it unit-wide many
times, but I do not believe it has ever been done fleet-wide.

Senator Warner. I think that action was prudent for many rea-
sons, but foremost because it is a signal from you to all the families
that the welfare and safety of the men and women who serve in
uniform is your first priority; and you also recognize that those
families bear an equal measure of the risk, of the mystique and the
mystery, of that sea service which your sailors endure every day.

Now we are about to get into the hearing. I think the chairnian
covered as much as we can on the series of accidents. This rnorning
we are about to start our own overview. It is not an investigation;
it is an overview of the work done by the Navy in connection with
the tragedy aboard the U.S.S. Iowa.

I am concerned that there have been some allegations of coverup
by the U.S. Navy, and I would like to ask you whether in investi-
gating not only the Iowa but every one of these instances, have you
found a single incident involving any officer or any man trying to
cover up the facts?

Admiral Trost. Senator, I have not found that, and we would not
tolerate that. Our goal in investigating accidents is to determine
the cause and make sure we do not repeat errors so we can protect
our people.

Senator Warner. I thank you. Admiral.

I hope that we do not, during the course of this hearing, Mr.
Chairman, observe anyone coming in here and alleging a coverup
unless that person can show us the facts to support such an allega-
tion.

Chairman Nunn. I had not seen those charges. Senator Warner,
but I am glad you asked the question.

We certainly are going to be getting into this very thoroughly,
but I think you termed it correctly. This is not an investigation as
such. We are really giving oversight to determine whether the
Navy has done its job. We will be hearing from the General Ac-
counting Office. We will be getting other outside people's opinions,
but we are not doing our own complete, total investigation. Senator
Exon.

Senator Warner. May I ask one further question, Mr. Chair-
man?

The President and the Secretary of Defense have had to accept
the reduced funding levels as provided by the Congress for the De-
partment of Defense for a number of fiscal years now, five consecu-
tive reductions. I am certain that you would not send a ship to sea,
or men or women, as the case may be, into aircraft, should there be
insufficient funding to make that ship safe or that aircraft safe.

In other words, in your judgment, has the retrenchment of the
funding for 5 consecutive years impacted in any such way as to be
a cause for any of these accidents?

Admiral Trost. It has not, in my judgment, impacted readiness
or caused any accidents. In the face of a declining budget over the
past 5 years, we have continued to emphasize safety and operation-
al readiness of the units that have to go out there on the front line.

The cuts we have taken have been in our ability to sustain those
forces over extended periods of time, and in procurement and force
modernization.

Senator Warner. I thank you.

Chairman Nunn. Thank you, Senator Warner. Senator Exon.

Senator Exon. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

Admiral, welcome. Thank you for being here this morning. Let
me just second the general remarks that have been made by the
chairman and the ranking member. I salute you for your distin-
guished career.

I especially thank you for taking the courage to have the safety
standdown that you have announced. I think that is a step in the
right direction. I do not know what that is going to show, but I sus-
pect that because of the high quality of our leadership in the Navy
and our Navy as a whole and the equipment that you operate, we
are probably going to come to the eventual conclusion that as a
group these are things that happened. There are lots of times when
strange phenomena take place.

I cite the example that we have had frequently in history where
we have had three consecutive disasters with regard to commercial
aircraft, and no one knows the explanation for this. You were very
forthright in taking the standdown, and we will be looking forward
to the reports that you are, I am sure, going to give us in that
regard.

In preface to my questions, I also wish to say that I think there
has been no member of this committee that has been as stalwart a
supporter of the U.S. Navy and all the U.S. Navy has done and will
do in the future for our overall national security as this Senator.
Certainly, I have been at the forefront of many of the things that
are critically important to our national security that you, as the
head of the U.S. Navy, and others have been involved in and a

whole series of matters that I will not try to enunciate this morn-
ing.

I do, though, want to go into something that I think we could
only ask you about this morning. I first wanted to know whether or
not you have had a chance to read the story in a leading newspa-
per this morning that indicated that there at least were some pre-
liminary discussions within the Navy to retire the battleships in
their entirety. What degree of truth is there to that, and what do
you know about it?

Admiral Trost. Well, they did not talk to me before they wrote
it. Let me give you my personal view.

We would have no basis whatsoever for retiring the battleships
as the consequence of the accident back in April of this year.

Senator Exon. Let me interrupt you right there. I am not talking
about the actions of last year. I am talking about overall strategy.

Admiral Trost. Overall strategy. Senator, is a difficult one for us
right now because we are awaiting the final appropriations bill for
this fiscal year, and we are engaged in the Pentagon at the present
time in determining those actions necessary to structure the 1991
budget to meet the country's concerns about deficit and the need
for a declining defense establishment.

As we look at the need to shrink the Navy, I cannot give you a
precise answer today as to what its complexion will be. I will tell
you that, yes, everything is up for grabs today as we face a smaller
out year budget projection.

Having said that, our goal for the future is to maintain the maxi-
mum combat readiness in the Navy, even if it shrinks somewhat
smaller.

The battleships have been a major contributor to our power pro-
jection capabilities; they are a factor in many scenarios around the
world. We would have to look very hard before we would decom-
mission any of them. That does not say they are guaranteed to stay
in. They will take their shot with everyone else.

Senator Exon. I guess you know that I was one of those who led
the unsuccessful battle against the battleship reactivation program.
I also led the unsuccessful battle against the home porting issue.

I guess that whether or not my determination at that time was
right or wrong, I would suggest to you that you would be wise,
indeed, to make the in-depth studies that you just mentioned.

I have been extremely disappointed to note that the President of
the United States of all people has said that he could "live with"
the sequester cuts as far as our national security is concerned. I
think this is an ill advised decision by the President of the United
States, but that is one he has made.

I would certainly say that if the sequester would come into being
and with previous testimony that we have from Admiral Edney
that Navy shore establishments had already suffered tremendous
cuts, I suggest that if we have to make substantial cuts in manpow-
er that this is undoubtedly going to have to go into shipboard man-
power.

If this is necessary, would it not seem to be wise to at least con-
sider mothballing some or all of the battleships? It seems to nie
that the cost of maintaining battleships with their large crews is

something that we should look at very carefully if we have to make
some sacrifices in manpower.

Would you generally agree with that statement?

Admiral Trost. We are going to have to make some sacrifices,
without question.

The dilemma I face with the cuts that sequestration poses is
really as follows. To decommission ships in a year when they are
not programmed means there is no money there to lay them up, so
it actually costs us more from a standpoint of the mechanics of de-
commissioning the ship than it does to continue to operate it.

In addition, the people who man the ship do not disappear, so we
continue to pay them. What we would do to reduce numbers, of
course, is involuntary reductions in force to the extent the law per-
mits— which is not very much — and reduction in recruit accessions
during that year which saves you much less money per man, of
course, than it costs to train the skilled people we already have
here.

So it is quite a balancing act for us when we face such a seques-
tration threat, especially when we will not know the exact amount,
if any, until well into the fiscal year in which we have to take the
action.

Senator ExoN. Admiral, thank you. We will get into the battle-
ship Iowa matter with the other people who follow. I thank you for
being here, and thank you for the response to my questions.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Nunn. Thank you. Senator Exon.

As I announced earlier, for members who have come in a little
late, the main purpose of the hearing this morning is to hear from
those who are responsible directly for the investigation of the ex-
plosion of the U.S.S. Iowa. We asked Admiral Trost to come up and
give us his explanation of the 48-hour standdown and what he is
doing. So that is where we are now.

I do not want to cut anyone off on questions, but we do want to
let Admiral Trost go as soon as possible. Senator Wallop.

Senator Wallop. Mr. Chairman, I want to do the same thing and
just as well add a tip of my hat to Admiral Trost for what he has
done and what he is doing.

Chairman Nunn. Thank you. I believe Senator Glenn was next.

Senator Glenn. Yes, just a couple of comments. Admiral Trost,
your figures on aircraft accidents are very interesting. I am getting
old enough to say this. I recall back in the old days that those fig-
ures you gave used to be applicable to 10,000 hours of flight time
approximately in the same ball park, 1.82, 2.2. It went up and
down from year to year, but they were on 10,000 hours. Now those
figures are on 100,000 hours flying time.

Admiral Trost. That is correct.

Senator Glenn. Just to indicate what has happened in the mean-
time. I know we have to get on to the Iowa, but there is something
here I wanted to ask about the Iowa. One of the investigating
teams' reports cites lack of proper supervision of weapons person-
nel, poor adherence to explosive safety regulations, and a lack of
effective weapons training. They went on to say only 13 of the 51
personnel in turret II were fully qualified under the PQS, Person-
nel Qualifications Standards, for their watch station. Neither the

commanding officer, executive officer, weapons officer nor the gun-
nery officer knew of the large number of watch stations being
manned by personnel not fully qualified under the PQS program.

Now when that kind of a pattern was aboard one of our capital
ships, the question I would like to ask is have you looked at the
other ships in the Navy to make sure that that pattern is not fol-
lowed?

I think that was one of the problems that came out of the Iowa,
and we will be getting into more details of that later today. That is
an appalling, appalling situation aboard a capital ship of the U.S.
Navy.

The second question is, with the current rash of problems, are
the O&M funds or lack thereof a problem?

Before you answer those two questions, let me just comment on
the battleships which Senator Exon commented on. I think we
need to remember the battleships were brought out not just to get
some 16-inch guns out there, but we were looking for missile plat-
forms, something that was tough and survivable that would take
the Harpoon and the Tomahawk and be survivable in a combat sit-
uation.

That, as I recall, was the prime reason we brought them out. We
got the 16-inch guns for free because it turned out that those bat-
tleships were the best possible stable platform for what we wanted
to do with missiles. So I think that requirement is still there. I
think too many people just equate the battleship with the 16-inch
guns, and that is not the case.

Would you comment, please, on what was found out of the Iowa
and also other parts of the Navy, and were O&M funds a factor?

Chairman Nunn. Let me say this. Admiral. Answer the question
as you will, but I would not want to get the Admiral in front of the
investigating people on the detailed questions about the Iowa. That
is what I wanted to make clear.

Senator Glenn. I agree with that.

Chairman Nunn. That would turn the hearing upside down, and
I hope that it will be answeied in general terms. We can call Admi-
ral Trost back. He said he would come back on any questions like
that. But first and foremost, I would like to hear from the investi-
gative team.

And with that in mind, Admiral, go ahead.

Admiral Trost. If I may. Senator Nunn, I would like to answer
Senator Glenn in a very general way.

Senator Glenn, and I know that Admiral Milligan can discuss his
findings in great detail. I can discuss in more general terms what
we did about those findings immediately after they were submitted,
and well before the investigation was reported out under my signa-
ture.

We immediately went out to our type commanders and conduct-
ed safety standdowns on all our battleships, thoroughly investigat-
ing safety conditions on each of them. Iowa completed its stand-
down with all deficiencies fully corrected prior to her departure for
the Mediterranean deployment from which she will return prob-
ably sometime next month.

Many of the deficiencies were, I understand, administrative, a
question of documentation, but I will defer to Admiral Milligan on
the specifics.

Let me turn to O&M. The operation and maintenance funding
has been maintained at as high a level as we can put in with the
top line we get because we have, in fact, preferentially funded our
readiness accounts. To date, I cannot tie reductions in operations oi
maintenance accounts to a lack of adequate spare parts or a lack of
adequate maintenance.

That is, however, a concern of mine for the future.

Senator Glenn. But the PQS problem, is that something that is
evident throughout the Navy? Are we operating carriers and de-
stroyers and the other ships with as low a percentage of PQS quali-
fied people in all the different functions aboard ship? That was the
basic question I was asking.

Admiral Trost. The PQS qualification documentation does apply
to every ship in the Navy, and the focus of your question has also
been directed to the fleet commanders. I have gotten no indication
in the last 6 months that we have a problem Navy-wide in the area
of PQS qualification.

Senator Glenn. Do we have an overall Navy figure for what per-
centage of jobs are filled by key PQS people? That is the bottom
line.

Admiral Trost. We do have. I cannot give you that off the top of
the head, but every ship has that, yes.

Senator Glenn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Nunn. Thank you. Senator Glenn. Senator Lott.

Senator Lott. I will pass, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Nunn. Senator Dixon.

Senator Dixon. Well, Mr. Chairman, I have been here since
before the committee hearing began and, frankly, I differ with
some of my colleagues. I am critical of the investigative report, but
I hear what the chairman says, and I think the chairman wants to
get along to the question of what happened on the Iowa, and I
would be delighted to make my statement which is somewhat criti-
cal, frankly, after Admiral Trost has been excused.

Chairman Nunn We will have opening statements on the Iowa
after Admiral Trost departs. Thank you, Senator Dixcn. Senator
McCain.

Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, thank you for your very strong stand, and the decisive
action that has been taken in light of these very serious incidents
and accidents that have taken place over a relatively short period
of time.

I think it is well to point out that every operating unit in the
Navy undergoes a safety standdown at one time or another during
the year. This is, of course, to refocus everyone's attention on a
prime concern in peacetime, and that is safety. Perhaps a Navy-
wide standdown is unusual, but a safety standdown per se is stand-
ard operating procedure throughout the Navy, is that not correct?

Admiral Trost. That is absolutely correct. We normally have a
safety standdown after any incident or any mishap. It is an espe
cially widely followed practice in our aviation community, and it is
not unusual to do that for a single unit or activity.

Senator McCain. With regard to the requirements for battle-
ships, do you not think it is more appropriate to address that in the
overall scheme of whatever force reductions we are required to
make as opposed to a reaction to an accident that took place on one
battleship?

Admiral Trost. I would agree. We will be addressing that as part
of our overall proposed force structure once fiscal guidance is pro-
mulgated. That is why I stress that no (force structure) action on
battleships will be taken as a consequence of that accident. There
is no basis for that sort of action on the basis of that accident.

Senator McCain. I would like to emphasize again that I think it
would be sheer foolishness for us to base whether we should main-
tain the present level of battleships or any battleships in our naval
operating forces on the basis of the fact that an accident took
place. If we did that, I would say that the carriers would be out of
business fairly soon since unfortunately we have not been able to
reduce carrier aviation down to a zero accident rate.

I would like to ask one generic question. All of us are keenly
aware of the fact that there are going to be significant cuts in de-
fense spending. That is clearly what is going to take place, and I
think that some of the decisions that are going to have to be made
are going to be very painful.

One of the decisions that is going to have to be made or one of
the recommendations that will have to be made by you is whether
there will be further cuts in O&M which you said is a matter of
great concern to you or whether we are going to have to cut force
structure. What would be your recommendation in that case. Admi-
ral?

Admiral Trost. Well, Senator, my personal view is that, given a
lesser fiscal top line, our goal should be to reduce our force struc-
ture and maintain the readiness of what remains. That means
Keeping the forces that we have left ready to operate as they do
today, and that includes properly manning those forces.

Senator McCain. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair-
man.

Chairman Nunn. Thank you, Senator McCain. Senator Coats.

Senator Coats. Mr. Chairman, I am going to pass at this point. I
know there is a presentation to be made, and I am anxious to see
that.

Chairman Nunn. Admiral, let me just say that I have made no
conclusion at all about what we ought to do with the battleships. I
supported two of them and opposed two of them, but that is a
matter of history and not a matter of what we ought to do now.

I do not think we ought to make our decision based on one inci-
dent. I do think that there is an intense call for very large num-
bers of personnel in a period of time where the budget is coming
down. They have to be reviewed, as you said, like all the other
ships. In fact, they have so many personnel on them, and they are
intensive and so forth. We have to look at the question of whether
some of the fire power is, indeed, needed, and what the mission of
the ships are in the modern Navy. We are going to be looking at all
those questions in this.

I have not come to conclusions, so we will make that absolutely
clear. Any reference or any story that I have come to a conclusion
is erroneous. I want to make that clear.

Would you please, Admiral Trost, before we get to the panel of
witnesses, tell us what you did when the Iowa accident occurred
and from that point on what has been done by the investigative
team. In other words, would you introduce this panel to us, and
then, because we know you have other business, we will excuse
you.

Admiral Trost. All right, sir. I would be pleased to.

Immediately after we received word of the accident, Vice Adm.
Joe Donnell, who is Commander of Naval Surface Force, Atlantic,
directed Rear Adm. Richard Milligan, who was then Commander,
Cruiser-Destroyer Group 2, to immediately convene an investigat-
ing board and look into the cause of the accident, determine its
cause and corrective action necessary to preclude its recurrence.

Admiral Milligan was especially well suited to that task since he
had commanded four ships, including the battleship New Jersey for
a period of 2 years. He was, therefore, well-suited and knowledgea-
ble of battleship operations as well as extremely experienced in op-
erations at sea. He was the senior investigating officer.

He has, at various times, called in for his assistance, numerous
technical experts; and members of the Naval Investigative Service,
when he was advised that there was a possibility of criminal action
attendant to this particular accident.

He is accompanied this morning by two of those technical ex-
perts; Capt. Joseph Miceli, from our Naval Sea Systems Command,
is one of our foremost ordnance experts and responsible for the
very large number of tests that were run to help ascertain the
cause of the explosion.

He is also accompanied by Mr. Bob Powers of the Naval Investi-
gative Service, who will represent NIS and their part in the inves-
tigation.

Chairman Nunn. Thank you very much. Admiral Trost. We ap-
preciate your being with us and, again, during the course of this
series of hearings on the Iowa explosion, we may need to get you
back. But at this point in time, we will thank you for your testimo-
ny and hear from the other panel. Thank you, sir.

Admiral Trost. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR SAM NUNN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Nunn. I will be making a brief opening statement,
and I will open it for other opening statements since people have
deferred.

Our witnesses on the Iowa oversight hearing will be Rear Adm.
Richard D. Milligan, U.S. Navy, the Investigating Officer; Capt.
Joseph D. Miceli, U.S. Navy, the Director of the Technical Support
Team that was responsible for the various technical testing that
sought to identify the cause of the explosion; and Mr. Robert J.
Powers, the Director of Criminal Investigations of the Naval Inves-
tigative Service, which conducted the criminal investigation into
the explosion.

I know the tremendous amount of effort and time Admiral Milli-
gan and his team spent on this investigation, and we appreciate
your accommodating our schedule. We express to you our thanks
for all of your hard work, you and your entire team.

At the outset on behalf of every member of the committee, I
want to express our deepest sympathy to the families and loved
ones of the members of the crew of the U.S.S. Iowa who died in
this tragic incident. I also want to express our gratitude to the men
and women of the armed services— the Navy and the other serv-
ices—who perform their everyday duties under dangerous circum-
stances to preserve the security of our Nation.

The primary purpose of this series of hearings is to determine if
the dangers implicit in the operation of this class of warship and
others in the fleet have been reduced to the absolute minimum,
and to ensure that the Navy has done all that it can do to achieve
that result.

The Navy's investigation did disclose a number of discrepancies
in the weapons department on board the U.S.S. Iowa. Those dis-
crepancies include: the use of a prohibited mixture of explosive
charge and projectile; the use of an unauthorized round configura-
tion and plans that made the ship essentially a floating research
and development platform; improper pre-fire briefs; lack of compli-
ance with personnel qualification standards referred to as PQSs in
that in turret I only 4 of 55 personnel were PQS qualified, in turret
II only 13 of 51 were qualified, and in turret III only 9 of 62 were
qualified; improper storage of powder in barges; poor adherence to
explosive safety regulations and ordnance safety.

Despite these discrepancies. Rear Admiral Milligan opined that
they did not contribute to the explosion and that the explosion re-
sulted from a wrongful intentional act and that the wrongful inten-
tional act was most probably caused by GMG2 Clayton Hartwig.
This conclusion and others have been challenged, and I know that
Admiral Milligan will address those challenges as will the commit-
tee during our review.

It is also noteworthy that during the course of the investigation,
information was received primarily through the testimony of Cap-
tain Moosally, the commanding officer of the U.S.S. Iowa, and we
will be hearing from him sometime in December, which raised
questions concerning, number one, the priority of officer and enlist-
ed manning and the quality of personnel on board the U.S.S. Iowa
and her sister battleships; number two, the adequacy of training on
the 16-inch guns since there is a lack of hands-on training for per-
sonnel prior to reporting to the battleships; number three, the em-
ployment plan for battleships, and this goes to the overall strategy
in the Navy and the Navy deployment; number four, the respon-
siveness of the Navy to repair requests from the battleship; and
number five, the adequacy of various inspections and surveys con-
ducted on board battleships.

Rear Admiral Milligan was not charged to and did not inquire
into these matters, as I understand it. I have, therefore, requested
the General Accounting Office to look into these matters as well as
to review the Navy's investigation as a whole in an attempt to
assess its adequacy and to validate its conclusions, particularly
those relating to the safety of the ship.

I would ask unanimous consent to insert my letter to the GAO in
the record.

[The letter referred to follows:]

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, October 3, 1989.

Mr. Charles A. Bowsher,

Comptroller General, General Accounting Office, Washington, DC.

Dear Mr. Bowsher: As you may be aware, the Senate Armed Services Committee
is presently reviewing the Report of Investigation into the explosion on U.S.S. Iowa
on April 19, 1989. We are planning to hold hearings as soon as possible after we
complete conference with the House on the Department of Defense Authorization
bill.

My staff has held preliminary discussions of an exploratory nature with personnel
of your office to alert them to a need for your assistance in reviewing the volumi-
nous report in an attempt to assess the adequacy of the investigative effort and to
validate the conclusions of the investigation, particularly those relating to the
safety of U.S.S. Iowa and its gun turrets. One purpose of this letter is to reaffirm
that request for assistance. I realize that this is a major undertaking and thus may
be quite time consuming. I would ask, therefore, that I receive interim reports on a
monthly basis summarizing the actions that have been accomplished and such con-
clusions that may be reached, even on an interim basis, as to the safety of the ship.

I am also concerned with certain issues which arose during the Navy's investiga-
tion, but which were not pursued since they were not considered to be immediately
relevant to the specific task at hand, i.e. the cause of the explosion, once equipment
malfunction and accident had been ruled out. Accordingly, I request that GAO in-
quire into these other "beyond scope" issues both with respect to U.S.S. Iowa and
her sister battleships, such as the priority of officer and enlisted manning; adequacy
of training on the 1 6-inch guns; responsiveness of the Navy to CASREPs and repair
parts requests; adequacy of various inspections and surveys conducted on board; au-
thorization for utilization of the ship for experimental purposes; and the "employ-
ment plan" for battleships. Once again, I realize that this effort may take some time
and I would like to have monthly reports on these issues as well.

I appreciate your assistance in this important matter. The point of contact on my
staff will be Rick DeBobes, who may be reached at 224-7530.
Sincerely,

Sam Nunn, Chairman.

Chairman Nunn. This morning, we want to provide an opportu-
nity for the three witnesses from the Navy to explain their efforts
to identify the cause of the explosion and to evaluate the safety of
the U.S.S. Iowa and her sister battleships.

In the future we will have additional hearings at which we will
receive testimony from other members of the Navy from Captain
Moosally, Commanding Officer, U.S.S. Iowa, the FBI and the Gen-
eral Accounting Office. We will call other witnesses if appropriate.

We hope in the course of these hearings to explore fully all of
the issues I have detailed previously and, in particular, to satisfy
ourselves as to the safety and utility of this class of ship for contin-
ued fleet operation.

Before hearing from our witnesses, I will give Senator Warner
and other members who have an opening statement a chance to be
heard, beginning with Senator Warner.

Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think the record
will reflect that it was the Senator from Virginia who first asked
for this hearing.

Chairman Nunn. I believe that is correct.

Senator Warner. I did so, because of my love for the Navy and
the families that have served it in the past and present and will in
the future.

And, as we conduct this hearing this morning, I hope we will act
with compassion for the men who died in the explosion and for
their families and their friends. Their loss is still felt, their grief is
still with us. And the memory is, indeed, painful for all of us.

We should also remember that the Navy is more than just a
large, faceless organization. It is a living body of individual men
and women skilled and well-meaning, who are trying with their
very best talents and ability to serve their country and to do the
right thing.

Second, we want to be fair. We must let the men and women
who serve in the Navy know that, if they were involved in a simi-
lar situation, that they would receive fair treatment, when their
situation is examined by the Congress.

Our sailors serve in many faraway places, often in situations of
personal risk and danger. As the Admiral and CNO just said, there
are 565 ships in the Navy and over 6,000 aircraft. Safe operations
must be emphasized at all times.

But the sea will always remain a mystical, dangerous environ-
ment. When something goes wrong, when tragedy occurs, then men
and women in the service will demand that we, the Navy and the
Congress, will treat them with fairness. They will expect our delib-
erations to be just that and no more.

Third, we must remember that there were no survivors from the
direct area where this event occurred. Much of the evidence was
destroyed, as a consequence of this accident. And, therefore, the
Navy is faced with examining some direct evidence and a very con-
siderable amount of circumstantial evidence.

And there is no other recourse, but to base your conclusions on a
mix of direct and circumstantial evidence. While we might wish
there were additional or better direct evidence from which stronger
conclusions could be reached with a higher degree of certainty, we
cannot dismiss the fact that you have done your very best, given
the unusual circumstances of the evidence in this case.

So, we hope that as we hear the witnesses and question them
today, we will remember the difficult circumstances under which
this investigation had to be conducted.

Individually, we may not be satisfied with particular findings or
conclusions reached by the Navy. But that does not necessarily
mean these findings or conclusions are in error.

If we find, as a committee, the Navy's investigation is lacking in
some respect, we should demand that that deficiency be corrected.
And the Navy is best qualified to make that correction.

But we cannot merely sit back and announce that we disagree
with a particular finding or conclusion of this report, unless we are
prepared to reach some different finding and conclusion based on
available evidence.

In summary, Mr. Chairman, I hope the committee will choose to
conduct these hearings as if it were an appellate review body.

We should ask if all available evidence has been obtained, consid-
ered, and if the Navy could properly reach its findings and conclu-
sions based on that evidence.

I join you, Mr. Chairman, in welcoming our witnesses here today.

Thank you.

Chairman Nunn. Thank you, Senator Warner. Does anyone else
have an opening statement? Senator Exon.

Senator Exon. Mr. Chairman, just a comment or two.

I thank you for coming here this morning, gentlemen. This is a
very, very serious matter. I guess that many of the questions that I
have will not be answered with this hearing today. There may be
other hearings that are going to have to go on into other areas.

Most of the information that I have on this matter comes from
press reports and press releases. Some of them are official state-
ments from the Navy, and some of them are not, obviously.

So, I am not making judgment on that kind of a basis. However,
this is the beginning of a process that, I think, we have an obliga-
tion to fulfill as members of the Armed Services Committee. We
certainly wanted to be fair and open with you this morning, and
appreciate the testimony that you are about to give.

What concerns me most about all of this thus far, is that there
have been changes in several stories from official and unofficial po-
sitions. There have been accusations made about people who no
longer can defend themselves.

Some of the accusations, I believe, the Navy has proven wrong
with later follow-up testimony. The evidence against Petty Officer
Hartwig is highly circumstantial. And when you are into a highly
circumstantial situation, we are treading on terribly difficult
grounds.

I congratulate the chairman for calling this meeting. And I am
glad that you are here. And we will be listening and answering
questions with great interest.

Thank you very much.

Chairman Nunn. Thank you. Senator Exon. Senator Wallop.

Senator Wallop. Mr. Chairman, let me again welcome the Navy
officials here. And also let me echo the call for fairness. I guess
from somebody from Wyoming's point of view, the best way to be
fair is not to prejudge the Navy's behavior, their investigations, or
their conclusions before hearing and examining them, and before
exploring their conclusions compared to those of others.

I do not think we are in any position to make that judgment at
this moment in time. I expect the Navy to be fair and competent,
and I am sure they will show themselves to have been that way.

Chairman Nunn. Thank you. Senator Wallop. Senator Dixon.

Senator Dixon. Mr. Chairman, there is a very disturbing head-
line on the front page of the State Journal Register today, the
major newspaper in Springfield, the capital city of my State of Illi-
nois. It says, and I quote, "FBI reportedly told to ignore possibility
of accident in Iowa blast."

Springfield has been a second home to me for many years in my
public service. And so I can readily relate to the concern of Spring-
field citizens, as they look at this headline and wonder just what in
the world is going on, and what really happened.

Today we are going to hear from Rear Adm. Richard Milligan,
who directed the investigation of the tragedy on the battleship
Iowa.

This investigation was designed to tell us what caused the explo-
sion that took 47 young lives. Unfortunately, Mr. Chairman, in my
view, the report raises more questions than it answers. The report

IS the culmination of a series of leaks that reflects poorly on the
professionalism of the Naval Investigative Services. And, inciden-
tally, Mr. Chairman, I am informed that the Inspector General's
investigation culminated in a report on file with us, that I have not
yet seen, I must confess, that comments on these leaks by the
Navy.

It is a report that seems based on supposition and guesswork —
that is, the naval report— rather than fact and physical evidence. It
is, in short, in my view a report that seems to be unraveling.

Today's Journal Register headline did not uncover an isolated
flaw in an otherwise admirably conducted investigation. In my
view, it is one of an ever growing series of stories that raise funda-
mental questions about the quality of the investigation, and which
destroys our ability to believe its conclusions.

Mr. Chairman, I think we owe the American people much more
than that. I think we owe the Hartwig family and the families of
all the men who were killed, more than that. I think we owe the
Truitt family more than that. And finally, I think, we owe the
Navy more than that. I do not think we can afford to have this in-
vestigation stand as the truth of what happened.

I think we need to create an investigative subcommittee, possi-
bly, staffed with the resources necessary to do the job right. I think
this subcommittee should have two main tasks, at least. First, and
most importantly, it ought to find out why the 16-inch gun ex-
ploded, if that can be determined. And, second, it ought to review
the investigation the Navy conducted and tell us what was done
wrong, if anything, and recommend how we can handle future in-
vestigations of the kind that we are reviewing this morning.

The subcommittee ought to have the help of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation, both to review the physical evidence, and to con-
sider all of the evidence, so we can determine whether the explo-
sion was a result of a terrible accident, or whether it really was the
result of deliberate actions.

I think it must be done, Mr. Chairman. It should be started, in
my view, just as quickly as possible. And I think really too much
time has passed already.

In conclusion, I have expressed before to the Chair and other
members of this committee my concern about a variety of acci-
dents, principally the Iowa, but others as well. I believe, as the U.S.
Senate Committee authorized by jurisdiction to look into these
matters, we ought not to let these decisions be made internally by
the affected branch of the service that is looking at it. That is my
concern here.

Chairman Nunn. Thank you. Senator Dixon.

I do not know whether you heard my opening statement or not.
Several weeks ago, we asked the General Accounting Office to do a
thorough review of the Navy's review to determine whether they
did conduct an objective analysis.

The GAO has literally hundreds of people. I believe they have
qualified people. If you really are suggesting we have a subcommit-
tee, and hire expertise in that subcommittee to conduct their own
investigation of the complexity of a naval gun situation, I will let
you go with me to Senator Ford to ask for the necessary resources
before the Rules Committee.

We would probably have to hire, at least, 50 or 60 people for that
kind of expertise. I do not recommend that we do that. I think we
have the Navy resources, and I think we have the General Ac-
counting Office resources to be able to make sure we have an objec-
tive analysis.

In addition, our staff, and we do have only one or two people that
have been available, but they have been doing a very fine job of
interviewing witnesses and making sure that we have the perspec-
tive we need to see that the Navy has done its job. So I would not
agree that we should hire our own investigators, which would be
many in number, and would be more or less single purpose. I think
we have to use existing resources, rather than spend that kind of
money.

Senator Dixon. Well, may I say respectfully, if the Chair would
yield for just a moment, that what I am suggesting is that we
ought to have either a subcommittee or an ad hoc committee repre-
senting this committee that would have the jurisdictional authority
to look into these questions. We could use the FBI, the General Ac-
counting Office and other government agencies' expertise, to help
us draw the conclusions that we draw.

I have a problem with the services making their internal investi-
gations and filing reports that many of us have concerns about, Mr.
Chairman.

Chairman Nunn. Senator Dixon, I said in my opening statement
that we are going to have the FBI testify. We have already asked
for the General Accounting Office. They have been investigating
this for several weeks. And we are hearing from the Navy. We also
are thinking seriously of getting the laboratories involved in terms
of the tests. So we are going to do a thorough analysis. We are
going to have outside people. That is already being done, and I
hope I have made that clear.

Are there any other opening statements? Senator McCain.

Senator McCain. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to say that for
about 200 years, when there has been an accident or incident, the
relevant services that had the expertise has investigated with the
oversight of Congress.

Since the Reorganization Act following World War II, it is the
Department of Defense that oversees and reviews. We have, by var-
ious legislative acts, appointed a few hundred inspector generals,
auditors, et cetera, to oversee these things. To now shift that role
and burden to Congress — I believe, we already have about 8,000
staffers around here, I think it would be foolishness to start with.
And second, a clear departure from the traditional oversight role of
Congress.

With all due respect to my friend from Illinois, I understand his
frustration. To take on a burden of that kind of investigation, we
would have to go out and hire people like those that are here
today. This is an incredibly technical area that would require, I
would say a few 100 additional staff, who were competent to inves-
tigate this kind of thing. I do not know what they would do the rest
of the time.

Chairman Nunn. They would have to have their own laborato-
ries too.

Senator Dixon. I think we would have to get some appropria-
tions for a laboratory for the Senate investigating committee as

well.

The reason why it annoys me, frankly, Mr. Chairman, it some-
how impugns the integrity and the judgment of professional people,
who have been involved in this kind of activity for years. I just do
not accept that.

Chairman Nunn. Senator Glenn.

Senator Glenn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank you and Senator Warner for holding the hear-
ing. Senator Metzenbaum and I joined Senator Warner and the
other people who were interested in having these hearings in call-
ing for them.

I believe it is essential we hold these hearings, first, in fairness
to the families of the 47 men who lost their lives. Six of those men
were from Ohio, and in fact three, I' believe, lived within about 10
miles of each other; a tragic loss.

Second, in fairness to those men and women who are at sea
today. And third, in fairness to the Navy, which has the responsi-
bility for the safety of the personnel and the responsibility for en-
suring the combat readiness of our naval forces.

Mr. Chairman, after a briefing by the Navy investigating team
in September, I expressed some reservations about some of the con-
clusions reached by the team. I do not question the thoroughness of
the investigations that were done, but I did question some of the
conclusions. I have basically two related concerns.

First, given the numerous weapons-related safety and training
deficiencies that existed aboard the Iowa on the day of the explo-
sion, the Navy's report describes these deficiencies as, and I quote,
"a foundation for disaster."

Is the Navy correct in concluding then that the explosion was
most likely caused by a wrongful, intentional act? Second, given
these deficiencies, is Gunnersmate Second Class Clayton Hartwig
being unfairly blamed?

Regarding these deficiencies, Mr. Chairman, the investigating
team's own report cites a lack of proper supervision of weapons
personnel, poor adherence to explosives safety regulations, and a
lack of effective weapons training.

One of the most glaring safety deficiencies was the conduct of
live firing experiments by using an unauthorized powder and pro-
jectile load in turret II, all without the knowledge or approval of
the ship's captain. I know experiments and follow-ups have been
done during the investigation in all these areas, but let me cite just
a few more deficiencies.

On the day of the explosion, unauthorized experimental powder
loads were also planned for turret III. The powder that exploded in
turret II had been improperly stored during the spring and
summer of 1988, prior to delivery to the Iowa.

The sailor running the rammer in turret II, the equipment that
pushes the powder into the gun barrel, was not formally qualified
for the job and had never conducted a live firing exercise.

Of the 37 positions manned in turret II involving power-operated
handling equipment or personnel involved with explosive devices.

only 9 of the 37 men had the required annual non-nuclear ord-
nance certification.

Only 13 of the 51 personnel in turret II at the time of the explo-
sion were fully qualified under the PQS system, the Personnel
Qualification Standards, for their watch station. And neither the
commanding officer, the executive officer, the weapons officer, nor
the gunnery officer knew of the large number of watch stations
being manned by personnel not qualified under the PQS program.

It is because of these and other documented deficiencies relating
to leadership and training in explosive safety regulation that make
it difficult for me, at this point, to accept the conclusion that the
explosion was most likely caused by a deliberate act, and to ques-
tion the Navy's finding that Petty Officer Hartwig was the person
most likely to have committed that act.

With the information we have been given, at least so far, that is
a greater leap of faith to a conclusion that I can confidently make.

Now, of equal importance, Mr. Chairman, is the question: Does
the state of operational readiness aboard the Iowa at the time of
the accident reflect the state of readiness of other ships in the fleet
today? A related question is: Does the recent rash of Navy acci-
dents indicate a decrease in fleet operational readiness similar to
the Iowa?

I ran through some of the safety and training deficiencies identi-
fied in the Iowa investigation, but the report also identified a
shortage of key personnel in turret II that concerns me, especially
as chairman of the Manpower and Personnel Subcommittee.

The ship's manning document identifies 90 positions to be filled
in turret II during live gunnery exercises. Now, on April 19, only
56 positions were filled, but allowing for the 9 positions that were
not required on April 19, that still leaves turret II manning on the
day of the accident at 72 percent of required personnel.

Of even greater concern is the shortage of key senior enlisted
ordnance supervisors aboard Iowa — first class and chief petty offi-
cers. The ship's manning document requires a total of 26 senior
petty officers, 11 chiefs and 16 first class petty officers. Aboard the
Iowa on April 19 there were only six chiefs (55 percent of the re-
quirement) and five first class (33 percent of the requirement).

So, Mr. Chairman, on any given day there are an average of
some 235 Navy ships deployed around the world, with approximate-
ly 110,000 sailors and 7,000 marines embarked. These hearings
need to answer the question, "was the state of operational readi-
ness aboard Iowa on April 19 indicative of the readiness of the rest
of the fleet today?"

Another question that needs to be answered is "what can be
learned from this tragic accident?" In this regard, I am reminded
of the terrible accident aboard the aircraft carrier, the U.S.S. For-
restal, in July 1967 in the Tonkin Gulf, in which 134 men lost their
lives. Our good friend and colleague on this committee. Senator
McCain, was aboard the Forrestal that day and was injured in the
fire and the explosions on the flight deck, and retired Navy Capt.
Milt Beach, behind me here this morning, was in an A-4 squadron
aboard that same ship at that time.

My point is that there were many safety and training lessons
learned as a result of the Forrestal tragedy. The implementation of

these lessons has saved countless Navy lives over the last 22 years.
In fact, the outstanding job done by the Iowa 's crew in fighting the
fires and controlling damage is due in no small measure to the fire
fighting and damage control training they received, training that
was expanded by the Navy after the Forrestal fire.

So, like the Forrestal, we must learn from this tragic accident
aboard the Iowa.

Mr. Chairman, I am hopeful we can answer these and other im-
portant questions related to the Iowa tragedy during the course of
these hearings. And again, I want to thank you for holding them,
and look forward to the testimony of our witnesses.

Thank you.

Chairman Nunn. Thank you, Senator Glenn. Any other opening

statements?

Senator Lott. Mr. Chairman, I would like to hear the statement

from the Navy.
Chairman Nunn. I think that is a good suggestion.
Without objection. Admiral Milligan.

STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. RICHARD D. MILLIGAN, U.S. NAVY,
INVESTIGATING OFFICER, ACCOMPANIED BY CAPT. JOSEPH D.
MICELI, U.S. NAVY, DIRECTOR, TECHNICAL SUPPORT TEAM;
AND ROBERT J. POWERS, DIRECTOR, CRIMINAL INVESTIGA-
TIONS, NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

Admiral Milligan. Mr. Chairman, good morning. I appreciate
this opportunity to appear before you today to discuss my investi-
gation into the tragic incident aboard U.S.S. Iowa on April 19,
1989, that cost the lives of 47 of my fellow servicemen.

I have with me on my right, Capt. Joe Miceli, who headed up my
technical support team; and on my left, Mr. Bob Powers, represent-
ing the Naval Investigative Service.

I have a prepared statement, Mr. Chairman, which, with your
concurrence, I would like to enter into the record.

I am prepared, for the benefit of the committee, to present an
overview of the accident and my investigative process, after which
I would be prepared to answer your questions.

Chairman Nunn. All right. We would be delighted to hear what-
ever you have. We do not want you to cut your statement short. So
you go right ahead with whatever you believe we need to know.

Admiral Milligan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will proceed
with my presentation.

On April 19, the day of the accident, I was named by the conven-
ing authority, Vice Adm. Joe Donnell, Commander, Naval Surface
Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, as the investigating officer.

As directed, I was to conduct a "one officer" investigation in ac-
cordance with the manual of the Judge Advocate General. Specifi-
cally, my task was to determine and then use the most effective
means of collecting all relevant information, and then build from
that information my findings of fact, opinions and recommenda-
tions. Our goal, without question, was to search out and find the
cause of this tragic incident so that action could be taken to ensure
that it never happened again. In doing so, I would identify any
fault, neglect or responsibility for the explosion.

It is important to note that for the purpose of a JAGMAN inves-
tigation, findings of fact must be as specific and as indisputable as
possible, supported by evidence as enclosures to the investigation.
Opinions, on the other hand, are those of the investigating office
and are logical inferences or conclusions which flow from the facts.
My investigation report complies with the JAGMAN procedures.

Opinions 55 and 56 of my report state that the explosion on April
19 resulted from a wrongful, intentional act, and that the act was
most probably committed by Gunnersmate Second Class Clayton
M. Hartwig. I will explain what facts led to the formulation of
those opinions.

It must be noted that JAGMAN guidelines require, to the extent
possible, that the investigating officer, in investigations of this
type, identify cause and responsibility for the incident, including
personnel involved and the extent of their involvement.

I arrived on board Iowa on the 20th of April off of Puerto Rico. I
immediately conducted my initial inspection of turret II, and sight-
ing the enormity of the damage, called for technical support in the
form of explosive experts and fire marshals. That team was devel-
oped on the 20th of April and was headed up by Captain Miceli.

It grew to over 50 explosive and ordnance experts, representing
the Army, the Navy, the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the private sector, plus hun-
dreds, literally hundreds of support personnel in the field.

The technical team conducted over 20,000 tests in an unprece-
dented search for the cause of this tragedy.

Simultaneously, my immediate investigating team inspected the
damage in search of a cause, interviewed over 82 witnesses aboard
the ship, reviewed shipboard programs, which I will discuss, and
examined literally hundreds of documents and photographs.

We worked closely together and in coordination with my techni-
cal support team.

I must say, Mr. Chairman and members, that I did not go into
this investigation considering foul play as a reasonable likelihood.

On May 8, 3 weeks into the investigation, with our review of
shipboard programs and our technical effort still ongoing, obviously
we had not found a cause for the explosion, but our efforts were far
from complete, I received a copy of a letter from Mrs. Kubicina, the
sister of one of the deceased. That letter surfaced an insurance
issue.

Specifically, an accidental death policy on her brother's life.
Petty Officer Hartwig's life, for the value of $100,000. Petty Officer
Truitt, a survivor from the magazine in turret II was the benefici-
ary of that policy.

A few days earlier I had learned of Petty Officer Truitt's involve-
ment in an auto theft back in 1987.

I must point out, while Mrs. Kubicina's purpose was to seek help
in getting assistance for her parents to become the beneficiaries of
that insurance policy, I had to consider, with the information I
had, the possibility of a criminal act.

The convening authority at that time. Admiral Donnell, immedi-
ately requested the Naval Investigative Service to open a case with
regard to this incident.

From May 8 on, the efforts of my immediate team, my technical
support team, and the Naval Investigative Service proceeded in
parallel and in coordination. The results of these three parallel in-
vestigation efforts drove me to my investigation conclusions. Let
me review some of the facts.

I know the explosion was initiated in the breech of the center
gun of turret II. I know the breech was open. I will show you short-
ly the situation just prior to the explosion and a loading sequence,
using visual aids and a tape.

I know the 2,700 pound inert projectile had been successfully
rammed into the breech. It is rammed at a rate of 13.5 feet per
second. I also know that five bags of propellant were rammed into
the breech. It is rammed at 1.5 feet per second. I know that the
cradle was extended into the breech. And I know that the rammer,
under the control of the gun captain's hand signals, was extended
42 inches into the breech, 21 inches past the normal powder ram
position. This pushed the five bags of powder up against the base of
the projectile in the breech.

We have conclusive evidence, through duplication of the event,
that initiation of this explosion took place in the area of, or be-
tween, bags one and two, just behind the projectile inside the
breech.

This is a position where procedures call for the placing of two
lead foils that serve as a de-coppering or cleaning agent.

I will now walk through some visual charts and a brief video to
show you the situation in the gun room, just prior to the accident,
and also the loading procedure.

This is the gun room, the typical center gun room, with the
breech open, the tray extended. The platform down nearest to the
breech is where the gun captain, in this case Petty Officer Hartwig,
would be stationed. The platform just aft of that — and we are look-
ing in fi om the back of the gun room — is where the cradle operator
would be stationed.

Over here on the left is the rammerman's position. Down below
in the gun pit is the fourth man of the gun crew, the primerman.

Just prior to this explosion the projectile had been rammed into
this breech, five bags of powder were rammed into this breech, the
cradle was extended as you see it here, and the rammer was also
spread out, the chain across the cradle and the rammerhead 42
inches into the breech.

This door to the left is the door that the powder bags are rolled
out through. That door was closed as it is shown in this picture.

It is very important to understand where the powder bags were
at the time of this explosion. This chart shows two cutaways of the
16-inch barrel. In both cases the projectile is properly rammed into
the breech. In the normal ram, as shown in the lower cutaway, the
rammer would stop 21 inches in from the face of the breech, and
that is where the last bag would be placed. Then when the breech
is closed, the ignition pad on the last bag is right up against the
mushroom of the breech, and you would get the best chance of a
successful firing.

In the case of the Iowa on April 19, as shown in the upper cut-
away, the rammer was 42 inches in past the face of the breech, the
head 21 inches in past where it should have been, pushing the five
bags up against the base of the projectile.

I mentioned the lead foil which serves as a de-coppering and a
cleaning agent. Those lead foil packages are placed in between bags
one and two. That is what the tech manual says is the place to put
those lead foils.

[Admiral Milligan demonstrated using a video tape.]

We are watching a loading sequence. We will get into the fact
that it should have been three or a total of six bags of propellant,
but those two bags are rolled out and the gun captain will then
signal the rammerman to ram the powder home into the breech at
1 y2 feet per second or a slower rate, and you see that happening at
this time.

The rammerman is watching that signal. His position is slightly
elevated. He cannot see into the breech. He follows the hand signal
of the gun captain. The gun captain is charged with loading the
gun.

It is at that point that the explosion took place onboard Iowa on
April 19.

24-931 0-91-2

I mentioned that the explosion took place inside the center gun
inside the breech. It blew out in the form of a shaped charge. It
blew out the after bulkhead or door of the gun room and into the
turret officer's booth position. Simultaneously it blew down
through the powder hoist into the lower level of the turret which is
where 21 of the 25 bags of powder pre-staged for later firings
burned.

So, we had the five bags in the gun explode and 21 bags down at
the lowest level of the turret burn as a result of this accident.

This is a vertical view of the turret. Again, the explosion came
back out aft from the center gun of turret II. It actually blew
through the bulkheads into the other gun rooms and down through
all three powder hoists essentially filling the entire turret instanta-
neously with the heated explosion and the fire.

This was a 2,500 to 3,000 degree explosion with a velocity of 2,000
feet per second and with a pressure of 4,000 pounds per square
inch. The area of the turret, the entire turret, the volume is 47,000
cubic feet. The estimated volume of the blast is 200,000 cubic feet
or four times the volume of the turret to give you an idea of the
pressure that was built up in the turret.

Also, the projectile that was in the gun, the 2,700 pound projec-
tile at the time of the accident, was moved 42 inches up into the
rifling as a result of the explosion.

As I mentioned earlier, my investigation included three parallel
efforts. I will now address the principal issues and facts developed
from each.

Can you hear me, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman Nunn. Yes, if you could just talk as closely as possible,
but I think we can hear all right, thank you.

Admiral Milligan. Our review of shipboard programs looked at
manning, and that has been mentioned here already today. Yes,
there were overall shortages in the manning on board Iowa, but
the ship was manned much the same as all ships in the Navy.

The point is that turret II was adequately manned for the exer-
cise that they were conducting on board Iowa on April 19.

We looked at training which has been mentioned. The personnel
qualifications standards programs, which is the base line training
program in the Navy— yes, we did find significant administrative
deficiencies in the execution of that program within the weapons
department on board U.S.S. Iowa.

However, the gun crew of the center gun was a^qualified or com-
petent crew. The gun captain. Petty Officer Hartwig, and the
cradle operator were fully qualified under the PQS, personnel
qualifications standards program.

The rammerman lacked only the firing of an actual exercise to
be fully qualified under that program, and he has to do it first
sometime. He had, in fact, practiced the ramming procedure, and
he had observed actually 14 live firings from inside the gun room.

The primerman, the last man in the gun room itself, was rela-
tively new on board and was not qualified, but the gun had been
properly primed for this particular firing.

We also found in looking at the training programs that the
damage control people lacked familiarization with the interior of
the turret, and the turret is, in fact, a magazine with explosive pro-
jectiles within the turret.

However, I must point out that the damage control people, many
of them responding almost instantaneously to this accident, per-
formed admirably and some heroically.

We looked at the safety programs on the ship as previously men-
tioned. The pre-fire briefings were not well attended, and they were
not well conducted. Misfire procedures were not briefed.

We know that spark-producing devices which are not allowed
inside the magazine were, in fact, inside turret II on the 19th of

April. The ship was not at general quarters. It was at what we call
gunnery stations. Materiel condition Zebra, which should have
been set was set within the turret, but it was not uniformly set.
There were a couple of violations of materiel condition Zebra.

We looked at the sprinkler system for turret II. One serves the
rotating part of the turret. It is connected to the fixed part of the
ship by a jumper hose. That hose was connected but was not pres-
surized.

The issue with the sprinkler system is that no one activated that
system before the explosion, and we know that conclusively. What
that tells us is that no one in the gun room or in the turret saw or
was aware of any fire prior to the explosion itself.

We looked at procedures. It is well known that turret I, which
had fired before turret II's explosion, did have a misfire.

Chairman Nunn. Admiral, could I ask you one question here.
You say no one knew that anything was wrong, in effect, before it
happened, is that what you are saying, by the sprinkler not
being

Admiral Milligan. What I tried to say, Mr. Chairman, was no
one observed fire in that gun room prior to the explosion, or they
would have activated the sprinkler system.

Chairman Nunn. I do not want to interrupt you, but just one
question on that. That seems to be based on the premise that ev-
eryone in that area could have themselves called in to play the
sprinkler system. Is that the case?

Admiral Milligan. There are a number of places within the gun
room to activate the sprinkler system. All the people in the gun
room have that within their reach.

Chairman Nunn. So, all of them could do it?

Admiral Milligan. Yes, sir, they can, but we know conclusively
that it was not activated because there is a storage tank up in the
turret, and it had not been activated. Had it been activated, that
tank would have been emptied out into the piping, and that had
not been done.

We know there was a misfire in turret I and the fact that during
the action in turret II, turret I had a foul bore in the left gun. That
misfire did not contribute in any way with the accident in turret II.

In my experience as a battleship commanding officer, I have ex-
perienced misfires and I worked the issue with regard to clearing
misfires while I proceeded firing other guns on the ship.

We know that the ship was firing unauthorized loads. They were
firing with five bags instead of six bags of powder, and they were
also using a specific lot of powder, D-846, as you probably have
seen the term, which was not to be used with the large 2,700 pound
projectile. Mr. Chairman and members of this committee— had this
explosion or accident taken place with the breech closed, you would
have to look very closely at that being the possible problem. This
accident took place with the breech open. The fact that there were
only five bags instead of six bags in the breech did not play as a
cause for this accident.

We looked at the watch quarter and station bill. We found an in-
formal manning document for the turret. We were able conclusive-
ly to identify where everyone was on station in the turret, what
their station was, in fact.

We looked at ordnance handling certification and other programs
in the Navy to help us in our safety procedures. We did find that
program in being on the ship, but it was not very well executed.
Many of the people handling ammunition had not been so certified.

While these shipboard program deficiencies are troublesome, the
fact is the explosion took place after the loading process had
reached the point where the propellant was inside the breech. The
gun was loaded with the exception of withdrawing the rammer,
withdrawing the cradle, and closing the breech.

Issues of manning, training, safety programs and procedures
could not and did not cause this accident or the loss of life.

After conducting over 20,000 tests using propellant from the spe-
cific lot from /ow;a's magazine, my technical support team found no
plausible accidental cause for ignition. Specifically we established
that the materiel condition in turret II was excellent prior to the
explosion. There was no mechanical or electrical problem that
could cause ignition.

As I mentioned, we conducted event duplication and proved igni-
tion was between bags one and two behind the projectile inside the
breech. We reconstructed the rammer system and proved the
rammer was still pushing ahead against the propellant bags at the
time of the explosion and that the rammer was, in fact, 21 inches
past the normal ram point.

We tested for propellant stability. We used the powder from the
magazines of the Iowa, the same powder that was stowed on the
barges at Yorktown over the summer months of 1988. We tested
for stabilizer and found no sample where the stabilizer was below
the minimum standards of the Navy.

We also conducted what we call the fume test, the standard
Navy test for propellant stability. That test requires that propel-
lants from the propellant bags be kept under 150 degree Fahren-
heit temperature continuously until they fume. If they fume in less
than 30 days, the life of that propellant is less than 2 years, and it
is removed from Navy inventory.

I would point out that we have never in the history of bagged
guns in the U.S. Navy had to remove any propellant from invento-
ry because of stability. The specific test of the Iowa ammunition,
the same propellant that was on the barges, were put under the
fume test on May 5 and they have not fumed, and we have got to
be on the order of 5 months or over 150 days. If they go past 30, it
is stable— excuse me, 192 days Captain Miceli tells me.

We found the propellant on board Iowa to be stable and to be
safe. Propellant stability was not the cause of the explosion.

We looked at every conceivable ignition source that we could
think of or that was brought to our attention.

The burning ember theory, we ruled that out because turret II
had not fired on April 19. The gun was cold. The gas ejection air
system in the turret was operating properly, and that is a system
that blows hot gases or any kind of debris out of the gun before you
load it. The relative wind that could have, if even conceivably, car-
ried a hot ember from turret I to turret II was such that it would
have blown it past turret II. And also, it was 4 to 8 minutes from
the last firing of turret I and the explosion in turret II, much

longer than a hot ember has ever stayed hot in any of the tests we
have conducted.

Also, the projectile had been rammed into the gun, which would
have smothered anything that was there. We ruled out the burning
ember theory.

We looked at the possibility that the primer could go off and
cause the accident prior to closing the breech. The primer was, in
fact, removed from this gun, and it had not fired.

We looked for hazards to electromagnetic radiation to ordnance
or signals from radars or radios and its impact on the propellant.
We found no hazardous potential at the breech of the gun.

We also looked at ESD. There have been a number of accidents
in the history of bagged ammunition from ESD or electrostatic dis-
charge. All of those previous events took place outside of the gun
while the propellant was being handled inside the cans. Neverthe-
less, we tested an ESD event, 360 kilovolts were put to this propel-
lant, 14 times more than the human body can build up. We did not
get a reaction from that test.

Friction — and friction, I am sure, we will discuss further. We
tested every possible friction event we could, sliding friction, shear
test. We slid bags over propellant in the tray. We sheared propel-
lants. We sheared them in all the different angles, longitudinally,
horizontally, and on an angle. We got no reaction from those tests
that could be duplicated anywhere near the parameters of the gun
system.

The ramming test, I mentioned ramming powder bags over the
black bags. We rammed it over all the different metal surfaces that
are involved in the gun system. We did it dirty and we did it clean.

We did a cocked bag test. We actually rammed the bag and said,
could it possibly have been cocked in the loading process? We
cannot get one to stay cocked, but could that have ever happened?
We just destroyed the bag. We got no reaction from the black
powder or from the propellant.

We tested the bag itself, the silk material and the polyurethane
jacket that goes around it that serves as a lubricant when we fire
the gun. We found we could only light those materials with direct
flame, not through friction. We also found that they had very low
thermal conductivity and would not transfer heat through them
into the propellant within the bag itself.

We did compression tests. Was this an over-ram event? Did v/e
ram the propellant in there too fast and cause it to explode? We
rammed it 100 times at iy2 feet per second, and we got absolutely
no reaction. We did this all up at Dahlgren.

We then rammed it 10 times at 13y2 feet per second, which is
v/ay over the speed that we should use. We got no reaction from
the high-speed ram, other than we rammed the rammer right into
the last bag of the train. We broke the bag. We spread the propel-
lant all over the place, but we did not get any explosive reaction
from either the black powder or the propellant.

We did the drop test. We did it at 40 feet, but we also dropped
from a 100-foot tower onto a steel plate embedded in concrete using
ammunition taken out of the magazines of the Iowa.

The first drop was on the red end of the bag, or the ignition pad,
black powder ignition pad end, and the bag was broken but no re-

action resulted. We then did it on the back end with the same
result. Then we did it on the round side of the bag and we totally
destroyed the bag. However, we got no explosive reaction whatso-
ever.

We looked at personnel error. Could a lighter have been thrown
into the breech? We knew spark-producing devices were in the
turret. We knew that was a violation of ordnance procedures.

So we tested. We tried to ignite propellant and black powder by
putting the lighter in there. We had iy2 minutes, roughly, from the
time of the load order to the time of the explosion, and we could
not get through the bags any ignition of the black powder or the
propellant inside of that time. In fact, the black powder took us 9
minutes to get it to burn with the lighter right underneath it.

Another personnel error issue that I must address is the
rammer, because the position of the rammer, 21 inches too far into
the breech, pushing the propellant bags up against the projectile, is
a very significant issue with regard to this investigation.

Whether that was a deliberate act or an error, the simple ram-
ming of the rammer 21 inches too far could not cause this explo-
sion, and we proved that by ramming it up there 100 times at slow
speed and 10 times at high speed.

Again, after 20,000 tests, we found no plausible accidental cause
for ignition.

Addressing now the Naval Investigative Service investigation
which commenced on May 8, a total of 143 agents world-wide con-
ducted well over 300 interviews.

Initially, they looked at the service records and the personal ef-
fects of all the people in turret II, the survivors as well as the de-
ceased. Because of the insurance issue that had been brought to niy
attention from Mrs. Kubicina's letter, because of what we found in
some of the lockers, and results of some interviews, the Naval In-
vestigative Service early on narrowed the focus of their investiga-
tion down to Petty Officer Hartwig and Petty Officer Truitt.

It is important to remember at this point that the explosion
takes place inside the breech of the center gun. One has to take a
look at who has access and who has opportunity to do something,
and it is the gun captain who has that access and that opportunity.

He is the one who controls the loading of the gun up in the gun
room. He controls the ramming of the propellant and the projectile
with his hand signals to the rammerman. He is the one who places
the lead foils, two of them, in between the first and second bags in
the propellant chain.

We know that Petty Officer Hartwig was technically capable of
building explosive devices. The Naval Investigative Service investi-
gation at this point narrowed down to Petty Officer Hartwig.

Why do I say he was technically capable? We know that he had a
long history of interest in explosives, and that is clearly document-
ed in the report. We know from his personal effects that he had
literature with regard to the construction of explosive devices.

We know that he was a qualified gunnersmate, about a 3.6 to 3.8
sailor, had been to gunnersmate A school, had been to basic elec-
tricity and electronics school. He was a knowledgeable person. He
had discussed with many on how to make explosives.

At that point we put my technical team in support, in direct sup-
port of the Naval Investigative Service effort in trying to deter-
mine what explosive device might have been involved, if there was
one.

On June 22 we got into a very important part of the investiga-
tion, the identification by the metallurgist at the Norfolk Naval
Shipyard that we had found foreign material in the rotating band
of the Iowa projectile.

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Admiral Milligan. What I have here is two projectiles. The one
on the left has not been rammed into the breech, and the one on
the right is the one that has been rammed into the breech and into
the rifling of the barrel.

Down below is a cutaway of the one that is a new projectile, it
has not been rammed, and the cutaway of the rammed one. The
area that we are talking about is this crevice right here that serves
as a seal.

When the explosion takes place in the gun to fire the projectile
out through the bore, it seals the explosive gases behind the projec-
tile and also grooves into the rifling of the barrel to give the projec-
tile the rotation it needs for stability in flight. It is in that crevice,
open at the time of the explosion and closed microseconds later as
the projectile moves forward, that we are looking to find foreign
material.

What Commander Swanson has here is just a part of one of these
rings. The one he has in his hand now is the one that has not been
fired and the crevice is the large groove closest to his body as he
carries it around.

Captain Miceli has another, and this is from a 48-inch long ring
that circles around the 16-inch projectile. The one he has is the one
that has come off the projectile that has been fired up into the ri-
fling then removed from the gun. It is one where the crevice has
been closed.

[Pause.]

Admiral Milligan. Mr. Chairman, we will be able to discuss ex-
actly what that ring does. Let me just finish my remarks — I am
getting near the end — and then we will take your questions.

Having found the foreign material on June 22, we proceeded on.
I will come back to that issue just very briefly here.

In the meantime, the characterization of Petty Officer Hartwig
was building from the hundreds of interviews that were being con-
ducted by the Naval Investigative Service. We found that he was a
person of limited friendships, and you have probably seen this
before, many witnesses saying that he was basically a loner; an
introverted person, a man of somewhat low self-esteem and a man
of professional illusions, and we can get into further details on
those later.

There also is evidence of an alleged suicide gesture back in his
boyhood days, and that he had in fact, with about four people on
his ship, had discussed suicide just as an issue.

What we do have is a profile by an FBI psychologist who opined
that Petty Officer Hartwig took his own life and hoped that it
would look like an accident. That is from an equivocal death analy-
sis by the FBI psychologist, and it is looked at in the overall inves-
tigative process as exactly that — an equivocal death analysis.

We asked the FBI to look at the foreign material as an outside
observer, and the Naval Investigative Service did that. Their report
was basically inconclusive, and it recommended that we do further
scientific scrutiny and further investigative scrutiny of what we
had in our rings before we came to any further conclusion.

We did that. We did much further examination out at the Naval
Weapon Support Center at Crane, Indiana, and it supports strongly
the presence of foreign material with very convincing evidence,

and that report has just recently been released and has been sub-
mitted by myself to the Chief of Naval Operations and on to the
Judge Advocate General.

This further investigation, of investigative scrutiny, so to speak,
has led us to a chemical device as being the device that would most
closely match up to the foreign material that we found in the Iowa
band, and we can discuss that further if you would like.

Mr. Chairman, my summary has been somewhat extensive to
provide the committee with some of the facts of my investigation.
It is these facts, taken in their entirety, that drove me to the con-
clusion of my report and opinions number 55 and number 56. As I
said earlier, I did not seek this conclusion. I was driven to it by the

facts.

I have great sympathy for the families of all of our lost ship-
mates. I can understand the burden experienced by the Hartwig
family, and I wish that I could have come to a different conclusion.

Sir, that completes my remarks and I and my two team members
are prepared to answer your questions.

[The statement of Admiral Milligan follows:]

STATEMENT OF
REAR ADMIRAL RICHARD D. MILUGAN, USN

MR. CHAIRMAN, DISTINGUISHED MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE, I AM
REAR ADMIRAL RICHARD D. MILLIGAN. I WAS THE OFFICER ASSIGNED TO
INVESTIGATE THE EXPLOSION WHICH OCCURRED IN NUMBER TWO
TURRET ON BOARD USS IOWA ON 19 APRIL 1989. I APPRECIATE THIS
OPPORTUNITY TO APPEAR BEFORE YOU TODAY TO DISCUSS THAT
INVESTIGATION.

SHORTLY AFTER THE EXPLOSION, INDEED, ON THE VERY SAME DAY,
VICE ADMIRAL J.S. DONNELL, III, COMMANDER, NAVAL SURFACE FORCE,
U.S. ATLANTIC FLEET, DIRECTED ME TO CONDUCT AN INVESTIGATION INTO
THE TRAGEDY.

SPECinCALLY, I WAS DIRECTED TO CONDUCT A "ONE OFFICER"
INVESTIGATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROCEDURES SET FORTH IN THE
MANUAL OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, CHAPTER V, PART C IN
NAVY JARGON, THIS IS CALLED A JAGMAN INVESTIGATION. THE
PROCEDURES FOR SUCK AN INVESTIGATION DO NOT NORMALLY INCLUDE
THE USE OF A HEARING. I WAS REQUIRED TO DETERMINE AND USE THE
MOST EFFECTIVE METHODS OF COLLECTING, ANALYZING, AND
RECORDING ALL RELEVANT INFORMATION.

IN THAT REGARD, INVESTIGAnNG OFFICERS DETAILED OR APPOINTED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH NAVY JAG MANUAL PROCEDURES ARE NOT BOUND
BY FORMAL RULES OF EVIDENCE. THEY MAY INCLUDE IN RECORDS OF

INVESTIGATIONS ALL RELEVANT MATTERS OF REASONABLE AUTHENTICITY.
IN PERFORMING MY INVESTIGATIVE FUNCTION, I HAD THE AUTHORITY TO
EMPLOY THOSE METHODS I FOUND MOST EFFECTIVE. AS SOON AS
POSSIBLE, I WAS TO REPORT MY FINDINGS OF FACT, OPINIONS, AND
RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING A NUMBER OF ISSUES, INCLUDING THE
CAUSE OF THE EXPLOSION AND ANY FAULT, NEGLECT, OR RESPONSIBILITY
FOR IT.

FOR PURPOSES OF JAGMAN INVESTIGATIONS, THERE IS AN IMPORTANT
DISTINCTION BETWEEN HNDINGS OF FACT AND OPINIONS. FINDINGS OF
FACT MUST BE AS SPECIFIC AND INDISPUTABLE AS POSSIBLE. EACH
FINDING OF FACT MUST BE SUPPORTED BY REFERENCE TO A SPECIFIC
ITEM, OR SPECIFIC ITEMS OF EVIDENCE ATTACHED TO THE REPORT AS
ENCLOSURES. INVESTIGATING OFFICERS' OPINIONS, HOWEVER, ARE
LOGICAL INFERENCES OR CONCLUSIONS WHICH FLOW FROM THE FACTS.
OPINIONS ARE SUPPORTED BY CITATION TO THE FINDINGS OF FACT FROM
WHICH THEY ARE DERIVED. FOR EXAMPLE, A FINDING OF FACT MAY
STATE MERELY THAT A CERTAIN WITNESS SAYS HE OBSERVED AN EVENT.
A RELATED OPINION MAY THEN INFER OR CONCLUDE THE EVENT
ATTESTED TO BY THE WITNESS OCCURRED.

ALLOW ME TO CALL YOUR ATTENTION TO CERTAIN OF MY OPINIONS.
THOSE ARE NUMBERED 55 AND 56 IN MY REPORT, IN WHICH I STATE MY
OPINIONS THAT THE EXPLOSION RESULTED FROM A WRONGFUL
INTENTIONAL ACT, AND THAT THE ACT WAS MOST PROBABLY COMMITTED
BY GUNNER'S MATE GUNS SECOND CLASS CLAYTON M. HARTWIG. I WILL
EXPLAIN WHAT FACTS LED TO FORMULATION OF THOSE OPINIONS.

I ARRIVED ABOARD IOWA ON 20 APRIL 1989 AND IMMEDUTELY
CONDUCTED MY INITUL INSPECTION OF THE DAMAGE TO TURRET TWO.
BASED ON THE ENORMITY OF THE DAMAGE I OBSERVED, I IMMEDIATELY
CALLED FOR ADDITIONAL TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE. IN RESPONSE TO THAT
REQUEST, THE CONVENING AUTHORITY, IN COORDINATION WITH
COMMANDER, NAVAL SEA SYSTEMS COMMAND, PROVIDED ME WITH A
TECHNICAL SUPPORT TEAM UNDER THE DIRECTION OF CAPTAIN JOSEPH
D. MICELI, USN. FOR THE MONTHS TO FOLLOW, THIS TECHNICAL
SUPPORT TEAM CONDUCTED INSPECTIONS, TESTS, AND ANALYSES
DESIGNED TO PROVIDE EVIDENCE THAT COULD ASSIST ME IN
DETERMINING THE CAUSE OF THE EXPLOSION. THE TEAM RECEIVED
SUPPORT FROM OVER 50 EXPLOSIVE AND ORDNANCE EXPERTS IN THE
NAVY AND ARMY, AS WELL AS EXPERTS IN VARIOUS DISCIPLINES FROM
THE ARMED FORCES INSTITUTE OF PATHOLOGY, THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, AND FROM THE PRIVATE SECTOR. IN ALL, MY TECHNICAL
TEAM CONDUCTED OVER 20,000 TESTS IN AN UNPRECEDENTED SEARCH
FOR A CAUSE FOR THIS TRAGEDY.

SIMULTANEOUS TO MY TECHNICAL TEAM'S EFFORTS, I CONDUCTED
INTERVIEWS OF WITNESSES ABOARD AND ASSOCIATED V.TTH USS IOWA,
AND WITH IHE SUPPORT OF A GROUP OF SEVERAL OFFICERS AND
ENLISTED PERSONNEL WHO COMPRISED MY IMMEDIATE INVESTIGATIVE
SUPPORT STAFF, REVIEWED RELEVANT SHIPBOARD DOCUMENTS, RECORDS,
AND PHOTOGRAPHS. EIGHTY TWO WITNESSES EVENTUALLY TESTIFIED,
UNDER OATH, BEFORE ME AS INVESTIGATING OFFICER, AND I
PERSONALLY EXAMINED HUNDREDS OF DOCUMENTS AND PHOTOGRAPHS.

AS THESE TWO INTERRELATED INVESTIGATIVE EFFORTS EVOLVED, I
WAS LOOKING FOR THE CAUSE OF WHAT I SUSPECTED WAS AN ACCIDENT.
SHIPBOARD SAFETY AND ORDNANCE HANDLING PROCEDURES, MANNING,
TRAINING, POWDER STABILITY, AND MECHANICAL ISSUES WERE THE
PRIMARY FOCUS OF OUR INTTIAL EFFORTS. I DID NOT GO INTO THIS
INVESTIGATION CONSIDERING FOUL PLAY A REASONABLE LIKELIHOOD.
THREE WEEKS INTO THE INVESTIGATION, HOWEVER, ON 8 MAY 1989, I
LEARNED THAT A SURVIVOR OF THE IOWA EXPLOSION HAD BEEN LISTED
AS A BENEnCIARY TO A SIZEABLE ACCIDENTAL DEATH INSURANCE POLICY
ON THE LIFE OF ONE OF THE MEN WHO DIED. IN MY MIND, THIS
SUGGESTED THE POSSIBILITY OF CRIMINAL ACT THAT HAD TO BE
THOROUGHLY INVESTIGATED.

AT THIS POINT IN THE INVESTIGATION, THE 8TH OF MAY, NO
REASONABLE ACCIDENTAL CAUSE FOR THE EXPLOSION HAD BEEN
IDENTIFIED, ALTHOUGH TESTING CONTINUED. ALSO, SEVERAL DAYS
EARLIER, I HAD LEARNED THROUGH NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE (NIS)
AGENTS ASSIGNT:D IN NORFOLK, VIRGINU, THAT ONE OF THE SURVIVORS
OF THE TURRET II EXPLOSION HAD BEEN THE SUBJECT OF A FELONY
AUTO THEFT INVESTIGATION A COUPLE YEARS PREVIOUSLY. DURING THE
COURSE OF THE NIS INQUIRY INTO THAT INCIDENT, THE PERSONAL
EFFECTS OF THAT SUBJECT WERE SEARCHED ON BOARD USS IOWA.
BLACK POWDER OF THE TYPE USED IN SIXTEEN INCH GUN POWDERBAGS
WAS FOUND IN HIS LOCKER. THAT SAILOR WAS THE SAME MAN
IDENTIFIED AS THE BENEFICIARY OF INSURANCE PROCEEDS IN THE EVENT
OF ACCIDENTAL DEATH OF GUNNER'S MATE GUNS SECOND CLASS
CLAYTON M. HARTWIG, THE CAPTAIN OF THE GUN THAT HAD EXPLODED.

GIVEN ALL OF THIS, I IMMEDIATELY RECOMME^a)ED TO VICE ADMIRAL
DONNELL, THE OFnCER WHO HAD CONVENED THE JAGMAN
INVESTIGATION, THAT A SEPARATE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION BE
UNDERTAKEN. THAT DAY, HE REQUESTED THE NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE
SERVICE TO COMMENCE SUCH AN INVESTIGATION.

AS NIS BEGAN TO COLLECT EVIDENCE, I RECEIVED ROUTINE PERIODIC
ORAL AND WRITTEN REPORTS OF ITS PROGRESS. IN FACT, I EXCHANGED
INFORMATION WFTH THE NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE AND WITH MY
TECHNICAL SUPPORT TEAM THROUGHOUT THE COURSE OF THE
INVESTIGATION. IN WRHING MY OWN REPORT, I CONSIDERED ALL
EVIDENCE THEN COLLECTED BY NIS ALONG WFTH THE INFORMATION
THEN REPORTED BY THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT TEAM AND BY MY
IMMEDIATE SHIPBOARD TEAM.

TAKEN TOGETHER, THE RESULTS OF THESE THREE PARALLEL
INVESTIGATFVT EFFORTS DROVE ME TO MY INVESTIGATION CONCLUSIONS.
I KNOW THE INITIAL SOURCE LOCATION OF THE EXPLOSION IN TURRET 11
OCCURRED IN THE CENTER GUN. AT THE TIME OF THE EXPLOSION, THE
LOADING PROCESS WAS ONGOING, THE CENTER GUN BREECH WAS OPEN,
THE LOADING OF A 2700 POUND INERT PROJECTILE HAD BEEN
COMPLETED, AND FIVE BAGS OF PROPELLANT (NALC D846) WERE RAMMED
INTO THE BREECH. ALSO, THE GUN'S CRADLE WAS EXTENDED AND THE
RAMMER, UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE GUN CAPTAIN'S HAND SIGNALS,
WAS EXTENDED 21 INCHES TOO FAR INTO THE BARREL OF THE GUN. THIS
PRESSED THE FIVE PROPELLANT BAGS AGAINST THE REAR OF THE
PROJECTILE. IN THE NORMAL COURSE OF EVENTS, THE GUN CAPTAIN
PLACES TWO LEAD FOILS BETWEEN BAGS ONE AND TWO - THAT IS, THE

TWO BAGS FARTHEST INTO THE BARREL AND CLOSEST TO THE
PROJECTILE. THESE LEAD FOILS SERVE AS A DE-COPPERING AGENT AND
HELP TO CLEAN THE GUN. TECHNICAL TESTS WHICH DUPLICATED THE
EVENT HAVE PROVED THE EXPLOSION ORIGINATED IN THE AREA OF BAGS
ONE AND TWO . WHERE THE LEAD FOILS ARE TO BE PLACED - AND WE
HAVE STRONG AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT SOMETHING FOREIGN TO
THE NORMAL PROPELLANT CHARGE WAS IN THAT CHARGE ON THE 19TH
OF APRIL. THROUGH EXHAUSTIVE TESTING, I AM CERTAIN OF THE
STABILITY OF THE PROPELLANT AND BLACK POWDER. WE FOUND NO
TECHNICAL CAUSE FOR THIS EXPLOSION AND ALTHOUGH WE FOUND
DEnCIENCIES IN A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT SHIPBOARD PROGRAMS, WE
FOUND NONE THAT COULD CAUSE THIS ACCIDENT.

ONE HAS TO REMEMBER THIS EXPLOSION TOOK PLACE INSIDE THE
OPEN BREECH OF THE CENTER GUN. EVERYTHING UP TO THAT POINT IN
THE LOADING SEQUENCE HAD BEEN SUCCESSFULLY CARRIED OUT. THE
TURRET II CENTER GUN CAPTAIN WAS GUNNER'S MATE GUNS SECOND
CLASS CLAYTON M. HARTWIG. PETTY OFHCER HARTWIG HAD AN
INTEREST IN SHIP DISASTER AND EXPLOSIONS, WAS FOUND TO HAVE
POSSESSED A "HOW TO" MANUAL FOR MAKING EXPLOSIVES AND A BOOK
OF "DIRTY TRICKS," AND FBI PSYCHOLOGISTS CONSIDERED HARTWIG TO
BE A TROUBLED YOUNG MAN. THIS EVALUATION WAS CONSISTENT WITH
OTHER INFORMATION OBTAINED BY NIS THAT REVEALS PETTY OFnCER
HARTWIG WAS NOT ONLY A COMPLEX , BUT, IN THE VIEW OF SEVERAL
WITNESSES, INCLUDING FAMILY AND FRIENDS, ALSO A TROUBLED YOUNG
MAN.

THE SHIPBOARD PROGRAM AND TECHIVICAL PORTIONS OF THIS
INVESTIGATION WHICH I HAVE ALLUDED TO CLEARLY DEMONSTRATE
THAT AN ACCIDENT DID NOT CAUSE THIS EXPLOSION. IT WAS NOT
CAUSED BY UNSTABLE PROPELLANT. IT WAS NOT CAUSED BY A DIRECT
FLAME OR SPARK. IT WAS NOT CAUSED BY FRICTIONAL HEATING, OR BY
IMPACT AND COMPRESSION. IT WAS NOT CAUSED BY ELECTROSTATIC
DISCHARGE. IT WAS NOT CAUSED BY HAZARDS OF ELECTROMAGNETIC
RADUTION. IT WAS NOT CAUSED BY THE KIND OF PROCEDURAL ERRORS
OR NEGLIGENT ACTS CREWMEMBERS MIGHT HAVE MADE.

WE DETERMINED THIS TO BE SO EVEN THOUGH MY SHIPBOARD TEAM
UNCOVERED DEHCIENCIES IN DOCUMENTATION OF SHIPBOARD TR.\INING,
VIOLATIONS OF SAFETY RULES, AND USE OF IMPROPER PROCEDURES.
FOR EXAMPLE, SAFETY RULES PROHIBIT CREWMEMBERS FROM BRINGING
CIGARETTE LIGHTERS INTO THE TURRET. WE FOUND CIGARETTE
LIGHTERS IN THE TURRET. NAVY REGULATIONS REQUIRE
DOCUMENTATION OF TRAINING ACCORDING TO A PERSONNEL
QUALIFICATIONS SYSTEM, WHICH WE CALL PQS FOR SHORT. WE FOUND
DEFICIENCIES IN DOCUMENTATION OF PQS TRAINING. THE GUN WAS
LOADED WITH FIVE BAGS OF PROPELLANT, WHICH WAS OF A LOT, OR
TYPE, AND AMOUNT NOT AUTHORIZED FOR THE PROJECTILE IN USE.
PROPELLANT HAD BEEN IMPROPERLY HANDLED IN LONG TERM STORAGE.
WE FOUND DEFICIENCIES IN SHIPBOARD MANNING, TRAINING, SAFETY,
AND PROCEDURE. EACH OF THESE DEFICIENCIES SUGGESTED A RANGE
OF POSSIBLE CAUSES FOR THE EXPLOSION.

MY TECHNICAL SUPPORT TEAM ANALYZED EVERY CONCEIVABLE CAUSE

AND VARIATION OF CAUSES SUGGESTED BY THESE DEFICIENCIES, AND A
NUMBER OF OTHERS AS WELL. AFTER OVER 20,000 TESTS USING
PROPELLANT FROM THE SPECIFIC LOT FROM IOWA'S MAGAZINES, NO
PLAUSIBLE ACCIDENTAL CAUSE OF IGNIHON COULD BE FOUND.
EXAMINATION OF THE MATERIAL CONDITION OF THE DAMAGED TURRET
DEMONSTRATED IT TO HAVE BEEN IN EXCELLENT CONDITION AT THE
TIME OF THE CASUALTY, WETH NO SIGNinCANT DISCREPANCIES. TESTING
OF PROPELLANT STABILITY SHOWED IT TO BE STABLE AND SAFE.
EVIDENCE OF RELATIVE WIND, TIME, AND GAS EJECTION AIR PROCESS, AS
WELL AS THE FACT THAT TURRET II HAD NOT YET nRED ELIMINATED A
STRAY BURNING EMBER AS AN IGNITION SOURCE. WE FOUND PERSONNEL
WHO HAD RETRIEVED THE PRIMER AND IT HAD NOT HRED. WE
CONSIDERED HAZARDS OF ELECTROMAGNETIC RADUTION TO ORDNANCE,
HERO FOR SHORT, AND FOUND A LACK OF HAZARDOUS POTENTIALS AT
THE BREECH. WE FOUND THE BAGGED PROPELLANT INSENSFTIVE TO
RADIO FREQUENCY ENERGY, AND INSUFFICIENT RADIO FREQUENCY FIELD
STRENGTH TO HAVE DETONATED THE BLACK POWDER.

WE EXAMINED STATIC ELECTRICrTY AS A POSSIBILITY, BUT FOUND
THE AMOUNT NECESSARY TO GET A REACTION COULD NOT BE PRODUCED
BY A HUMAN OR UNDER CONDITIONS WE KNEW EXISTED IN THE TURRET
AT THE TIME OF THE EXPLOSION. WE TESTED NUMEROUS FRICTION
EVENTS AND GOT NO REACTION THAT WOULD PLAUSIBLY REPLICATE
TURRET II CONDITIONS, EVEN TO FORCES MANY TIMES THOSE
CONCEIVABLY AVAILABLE IN THE TURRET. WE CONDUCTED SHEAR TESTS,
IN WHICH W^ CUT THE PROPELLANT AND SUBJECTED IT TO TREMENDOUS
FORCES, AND AGAIN GOT NO REACTION THAT WE PERCEIVED COULD BE

CAUSALLY RELATED TO THE EXPLOSION. EVENT RECONSTRUCTION TESTS
PROVED THE RAMMER WAS 21 INCHES TOO FAR INTO THE BARREL AND
THAT IGNITION HAD OCCURRED IN THE AREA OF BAGS ONE AND TWO. WE
TRIED RAMMING PROPELLANT BAGS FROM THE SAME LOT AS THAT USED
IN TURRET II ON 19 APRIL 1989. WE RAMMED THEM AT THE NORMAL
SPEED AND THEN AT THE HIGHEST POSSIBLE SPEED AND GOT NO
REACTION, OTHER THAN TO CRUSH AND RUPTURE PROPELLANT BAGS. WE
DROPPED PROPELLANT BAGS FROM A ONE HUNDRED FOOT TOWER, ON
THEIR ENDS AND SIDES, AND ALTHOUGH WE SUCCEEDED IN BURSTING
THE BAGS AND SPILLING PROPELLANT OVER THE AREA, THE POWDER DH)
NOT IGNITE, EVEN UNDER THESE EXTREME CONDITIONS. WE TRIED
LIGHTING PROPELLANT BAGS AND IGNITION PADS WTTH LIGHTERS AND
ALTHOUGH WE OBTAINED REACTIONS, THEY TOOK FAR MORE TIME THAN
THE AMOUNT OF TIME WE KNOW WAS AVAILABLE IN THE ACTUAL IOWA
EXPLOSION.

YET, AN EXPLOSION DID OCCUR. THAT IS AN IRREFUTABLE FACT. AS
OPINION, I FORMULATED WHAT I THEN BELIEVED AND CONTINUE TO
BELIEVE WAS THE CAUSE OF THIS EXPLOSION. I RECORDED THAT
OPINION AS OPINION NUMBER 55 OF MY REPORT. A DIFFICULT
EXPLANATION - AN EXPLANATION THAT I PERSONALLY MOVED TOWARD
ONLY WITH THE GREATEST SENSE OF CAUTION AND RELUCTANCE. THE
LOGIC, HOWEVER, APPEARED TO ME AS INEXORABLE AND RELENTLESS: IF
THIS TRAGEDY WAS NOT AN ACCIDENT, THEN IT MUST HAVE BEEN THE
RESULT OF AN INTENTIONAL ACT.

I HAD NOT UNDERTAKEN THIS INVESTIGATION WITH THE
EXPECTATION THAT MY STEPS WOULD LEAD ME ALONG SUCH A PATH OR

TO SUCH A CONCLUSION. I NEITHER SOUGHT NOR EXPECTED TO
DISCOVER A PERSON AS AN INTENTIONAL PERPEDIATOR. IF I EXPECTED
ANYTHING, FT WAS TO DISCOVER THAT SONfE ACCIDENTAL OR
MECHANICAL DISCREPANCY HAD PROVOKED THIS DEVASTATING
CALAMTTY. I DIRECTED THE MAJOR PORTION OF MY INVESTIGATTVE
EFFORTS TOWARD THE DISCOVERY OF JUST SUCH AN ACCIDENTAL OR
MECHANICAL CAUSE. YET, INSTEAD OF DISCOVERING THE EXPECTED
ACCIDENT, THESE EFFORTS ELIMINATED THE POSSIBILTTY. I WOULD HAVE
PREFERRED OTHERWISE, BUT MY PREFERENCES ARE NOT DISPOSTTIVE.
NOW, HAVING RELUCTANTLY FORMULATED ONE DIFFICULT OPINION,
ANOTHER, EQUALLY UNPALATABLE ONE REMAINED TO BE RECORDED.

ON THAT MATTER, I EXPRESSED MY BEST JUDGMENT IN OPINION
NUMBER 56 OF MY REPORT. THE SINGLE COMMON DENOMINATOR TO
KNOWN ANOMALIES DISCOVERED IN THE OPERATION OF THE CENTER
GUN OF TURRET TWO IS THE GUN CAPTAIN, GUNNER'S MATE GUNS
SECOND CLASS CLAYTON M. HARTWIG, IN PARTICULAR, HIS DUTIES,
PERSONALTTY, AND CAPABIUTIES. FULL EVALUAllON OF ALL KNOWN
FACTS CONCERNING HIS ACCESS TO THE GUN, OPPORTUNTTY TO CONTROL
EVENTS, TRAINING, AND TECHNICAL CAPABH^mES, AS WELL AS
INFORMATION CONCERNING HIS OVERALL PERSONAL PROPENSTHES LED
ME TO THE CONCLUSION EXPRESSED IN THAT OPINION. HE HAD AN
INTEREST IN SHIP DISASTERS AND EXPLOSIVE DEVICES. FBI
PSYCHOLOGISTS CONSIDERED HIM A TROUBLED YOUNG MAN AND
SUICIDAL, BASED, IN PART, UPON THEIR REVIEW OF HIS LETTERS AND
STATEMENTS FROM HIS FAMILY, FRIENDS, AND SHIPMATES. HE
CONTROLLED THE RAMMING PROCESS. IN THE NORMAL COURSE OF

EVENTS, HE WOULD HAVE PERSONALLY PLACED A SILK PACKET
CONTAINING LEAD FOIL BETWEEN BAGS ONE AND TWO, THE VERY SAME
AREA FROM WHICH THE EXPLOSION ORIGINATED. AT THE TIME OF THE
EXPLOSION, FOREIGN MATERIAL INCONSISTENT WITH A NORMAL
IGNITION WAS SEALED INTO THE PROJECTILE. NO ONE FACT LED ME TO
FORMULATE THE OPINION. I HAD TO ACCOUNT FOR ALL THE KNO\VN
FACTS. I CAN CONCEIVE ONLY ONE OPINION THAT RECONCILES ALL OF
THOSE FACTS TAKEN TOGETHER.

I REPORTED FACTUALLY AND TOTALLY THE RESULTS OF MY
INVESTIGATION. I KNEW THE CONCLUSION, WHEN MADE PUBLIC, WOULD
BE THE SOURCE OF CONTROVERSY, AND FOR MANY, OF PAIN AND
HEARTACHE. YET I FELT A COMPELLING SENSE OF DUTV, A SENSE OF
RESPONSIBILITY TO THE SURVIVING IOWA CREWMEMBERS AND TO THE
FAMILIES AND LOVED ONES OF IOWA'S LOST SAILORS, TO ALL NAVY
PERSONNEL AND TO THE PUBLIC WHICH THEY AND I SERVE, TO PROVIDE
THE MOST COMPLETE, CAREFUL, AND EVENHANDED REPORT THAT I
COULD. THE DUTIES OF THOSE WHO SERVE IN THE UNITED STATES NAVY
ARE OFTEN UNPLEASANT. MY DUTY WAS TO REPORT MY FINDINGS OF
FACT, OPINIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

WITH REGARD TO THE DISCOVERY OF FOREIGN MATERIAL ON THE
PROJECTILE, I HAVE READ INACCURATE REPORTS IN THE PRESS
CONCERNING FBI FINDINGS. HERE IS WHAT HAPPENED. AN EARLY
WITNESS STATEMENT GIVEN TO NIS SPECIAL AGENTS PROVIDED REASON
TO BELIEVE PETTY OFFICER HARTWIG MAY HAVE POSSESSED A STORE
BOUGHT TIMING DEVICE. TO TEST WHETHER SUCH A TIMING DEVICE

COULD HAVE PRODUCED THE FOREIGN MATERIAL DISCOVERED ON THE
IOWA PROJECTILE, WE WENT TO A COMMERCIAL OUTLET, BOUGHT A
DEVICE SIMILAR TO THE ONE IDENTIFIED, AND LATER RE-CREATED AN
EXPLOSION IN A SIXTEEN INCH BATTLESHIP TYPE GUN BY PLACING THE
TIMER INITIATED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE BETWEEN BAGS ONE AND TWO. WE
DID NOT GET AN EXACT MATCH WITH THE FOREIGN MATERLVL FOUND IN
THE ROTATING BAND OF THE IOWA PROJECTILE, BUT DID FIND
SIMILARITIES. NIS THEN ASKED THE FBI TO PERFORM AN INDEPENDENT
ANALYSIS - A 'SECOND OPINION," SO TO SPEAK.

CONSISTENT WITH THAT REQUEST, NIS PROVIDED THE FBI WITH PARTS
OF FOUR PROJECTILE'S ROTATING BANDS. ONE WAS FROM THE
PROJECnLE FROM IOWA'S CENTER GUN, TURRET H. THE OTHER THREE
WERE FROM TEST SHOOTS DONE BY MY TECHNICAL TEAM. THE FBI
REPORTED TWO CONCLUSIVE DETERMINATIONS. FIRST, POLYMERIC
MATEIUAL WAS FOUND ON THE IOWA PROJECTILE, BUT DUE TO ITS
CHARRED CONDITION, THE FBI COULD NOT IDENTIFY PRECISELY WHAT
THE POLYMERIC SUBSTANCE WAS, THE FBI DID NOT REPORT WHETHER
OR NOT SIMILAR CHARRED POLYMERIC MATEIUAL WAS FOUND ON ANY OF
THE PROJECTILES FROM IBE TEST SHOOTS, AND HAD PREVIOUSLY
INDICATED FURTHER ANALYSIS WOULD BE REQUIRED TO DETERMINE
WHETHER THE IOWA PROJECTILE BAND MATEIUAL WAS DIFFERENT FTIOM
THE TEST PROJECTILES. SECOND, THE FBI CONCLUDED THAT THIS
UNKNOWN POLYMERIC MATEIUAL FROM THE IOWA PROJECTILE WAS NOT
PAINT FROM THE SAME PROJECTILE.

MS ALSO PROVIDED THE FBI WTTH AN ELECTRONIC DEVICE OF A TYPE
SIMII AR TO WHAT THEY THEN BELIEVED MAY HAVE BEEN IN PETTY

OFFICER HARTWIG'S POSSESSION, AND WHICH COULD HAVE BEEN A
SOURCE OF DETONATION. THE FBI DETERMINED THAT POLYMERIC
MATERIAL FROM THE NIS PROVIDED DEVICE DID NOT MATCH THE
UNKNOWN CHARRED POLYMERIC MATERIAL FOUND ON THE IOWA
PROJECTILE. THIS INDICATED THE NIS PROVIDED ELECTRONIC DEVICE
DID NOT CAUSE THE EXPLOSION. IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, HOWEVER, THE
FBI'S REPORT CONFIRMED THE PRESENCE OF UNIDENTIFIED, CHARRED
POLYMERIC MATERIAL ON THE IOWA PROJECTILE. IT WENT LITTLE
FURTHER.

IN ITS INITIAL REPORT, THE FBI HAD SUGGESTED FURTHER ANALYSIS
WAS NEEDED, SO THE TECHNICAL TEAM EXPANDED THE SCOPE OF THEIR
WORK ADDITIONAL TESTING BY THE TECHNICAL TEAM CONFIRMED THE
FBI SUGGESTION THAT THE NIS PROVIDED ELECTRONIC DEVICE DID NOT
CAUSE THE EXPLOSION. THAT DETERMINATION NONETHELESS LEFT THE
TECHNICAL TEAM WITH UNEXPLAINED FOREIGN MATERIAL PRESENT ON
THE IOWA PROJECTILE. MORE TESTS OF INCREASING SOPHISTICATION
WERE CONDUCTED IN AN EFFORT TO IDENTIFY THIS MATERIAL.

TESTING CONDUCTED BY NAVAL SURFACE WARFARE CENTER,
DAHLGREN, NAVAL EXPLOSIVE DISPOSAL TECHNOLOGY CENTER, NAVAL
SHIPYARD, NORFOLK, NAVAL WEAPONS SUPPORT CENTER, CRANE, INDIANA,
U.S. ARMY ARMAMENT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT CENTER, AND NAVAL
ORDNANCE CENTER, LOUISVILLE, RESULTED IN A FINAL TECHNICAL TEAM
REPORT PROVIDED TO ME ON 27 OCTOBER 1989. THIS REPORT
CONCLUDED UNIQUE FOREIGN MATERIAL WAS PRESENT ON THE IOWA
PROJECTILE. THE REPORT IDENTIFIED THE MATERLVL AS IRON WIRES

COATED WITH CALCIUM, CHLORINE, AND OXYGEN, AND STATED THAT
THESE MATEIUALS WERE NOT FOUND ON PROJECTILES USED AS TEST, OR
CONTROL SHOOTS. THE REPORT CONCLUDED THIS FOREIGN RESIDUE,
UNIQUE TO THE IOWA PROJECTILE, COULD NOT BE DUPLICATED BY
SIMPLE CONTAMINATION OF THE GUN CHAMBER WITH STEEL WOOL AND
OTHER CHEMICALS THAT MIGHT REMOTELY BE PRESENT IN A GUN
nRING. THE REPORT INDICATED THAT SOME TYPES OF NONELECTRONIC
EXPLOSIVE DEVICES WOULD PRODUCE THESE FOREIGN MATERIALS ON A
PROJECTILE IN AN EXPLOSION OF THE KIND THAT OCCURRED ABOARD
IOWA.

IN THAT REGARD, I FOUND NOTHING IN THE FINAL TECHNICAL TEAM
REPORT THAT CAUSED ME TO ALTER THE OPINIONS I EXPRESSED IN MY
EARLIER INVESTIGATIVE REPORT. TO THE CONTRARY, THAT FINAL
REPORT WAS CONSISTENT WITH MY EARLIER REPORTED CONCLUSIONS. I
SIGNED MY INITLVL INVESTIGATIVE REPORT ON 15 TULY 1989 BECAUSE,
FOR THE MOST PART, WE HAD CONCLUDED OUR TESTING. I COULD NOT
SEE ANY FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS THAT WOULD ALTER MY FINDINGS OF
FACT, OPINIONS, OR RECOMMENDATIONS. NOW, 3 1/2 MONTHS LATER, I
KNOW OF NOTHING THAT WOULD CAUSE ME TO CHANGE MY REPORT.

MR. CHAIRMAN, DISTINGUISHED MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE, I
WILL CONCLUDE WITH THE FOLLOWING THOUGHTS. WHEN I FIRST
STEPPED ABOARD IOWA ON 20 APRIL 1989, I INTENDED TO CONDUCT A
REVIEW OF PROCEDURAL, TRAINING, AND MECHANICAL FACTORS IN THE
HOPE OF DISCOVERING THE CAUSE OF THIS MAJOR CASUALTY. THAT WAS
MY CHARTER AND MY DUTY. IN THE COURSE OF WHAT EVOLVED INTO A
BROADER INQUIRY, I FOUND NO MECHANICAL DEFICIENCIES OF

SIGNIFICANCE. I DID, HOWEVER, IDENTIFY DEnCIENCIES IN TRAINING
AND PROCEDURES. HOWEVER, I EMPHASIZE THAT WHILE THESE WERE
SIGNIFICANT AND OF CONCERN, I FOUND NO CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN THOSE DISCREPANCIES AND THE EXPLOSION. THE NAVY HAS
ACTED TO REMEDY THOSE DEHCIENCIES. MY INVESTIGATION
ELIMINATED ACCIDENT AND MALFUNCTION AS A CAUSE.

MY INVESTIGATION WAS NEITHER A TRL\L NOR AN INDICTMENT.
SUCH A PERCEPTION IS A PHENOMENON OF THE PRESS. IN EVALUATING
MY REPORT, IT IS CRITICAL TO UNDERSTAND THE JAGMAN PROCEDURE,
AND TO DISTINGUISH FINDINGS OF FACT FROM OPINIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS. THE BASIC REPORT CONTAINS MY OPINIONS. THE
OPINIONS I REPORTED ARE INFERENCES AND CONCLUSIONS DRAWN FROM
THE FACTS. AS PREVIOUSLY STATED, I REPORTED THESE OPINIONS FOR
TWO BASIC REASONS. FIRST, REGULATIONS REQUIRE ME, TO THE EXTENT
POSSIBLE, TO IDENTIFY WHAT I PERCEIVED TO BE THE CAUSE OF THE
INCIDENT. SECOND, AND MOST IMPORTANT, I OWED IT TO THE SAILORS
WHO HAVE SERVED AND WILL IN THE FUTURE SERVE IN THE UNITED
STATES NAVY TO IDENTIFY WHAT HAPPENED IN THAT TURRET ON 19 APRIL
1989. THE PURPOSE OF A JAGMAN INVESTIGATION IS NOT TO CONVICT; IT
IS TO DISCOVER AND LEARN. MY REPORT REFLECTS MY BEST EFFORTS IN
PURSUIT OF THOSE GOALS. YET, IF THERE EXIST BETTER OR MORE
LOGICAL EXPLANATIONS THAN THOSE I HAVE PROVIDED FOR WHAT
OCCURRED ABOARD IOWA ON 19 APRIL 1989, I WELCOME THEM.

I AM READY TO ANSWER YOUR QUESTIONS.

Chairman Nunn. Thank you, Admiral. Do either Captain Miceli
or Mr. Powers have anything they would like to say at this point?
Captain Miceli. No, sir.
Mr. Powers. No, sir, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Nunn. Admiral, you made reference in your state-
ment that your overall code of inquiry basically calls for finding of
fact, and you say that they must be specific and as indisputable as
possible. Is that right?

Admiral Milligan. Yes, sir.

Chairman Nunn. Then you go on to say that opinions, however,
are logical inferences or conclusions which flow from the facts.

Admiral Milligan. Yes, sir. Every finding of fact in my report,
by JAGMAN procedures, must be backed up conclusively by an en-
closure within that report, and my report now totals something on
the order of 298 enclosures that support the findings of fact.

Chairman Nunn. Are you required to come to conclusions, or if
the facts were simply too uncertain and not indisputable, would it
be within your prerogative simply to say, "I have no opinion"?

Admiral Milligan. I am required to come to opinions, but only
those opinions that I, as an investigating officer, feel that I can jus-
tify on the basis of the findings of fact.

Chairman Nunn. What if the facts were so confusing and there
was no definitive fact, would you feel it was within your power
simply to say to everyone concerned, I simply cannot find what
caused it?
Admiral Milligan. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I could say that.
Chairman Nunn. You do not feel pushed to come to what you
call a conclusion based upon your opinion, then?

Admiral Milligan. What I felt obligated to do was to develop all
of the facts that I could, all of the information, and build the find-
ings of fact and then the opinions in the effort, to the best of our
ability, to find the cause of this accident so that we could take
whatever corrective action was required to ensure that we never
experience it again.

Chairman Nunn. But you are not under the code of what we
would use in the courtroom, or what you would use in courts-mar-
tial, are you? You are in a different kind of circumstance in your
investigation, is that right?

Admiral Milligan. It is an administrative process, Mr. Chair-
man, with the goal of developing all of the information as far as
you can possibly go to come to the opinions that are needed.

Chairman Nunn. You do not use criteria like "clear and convinc-
ing evidence," or "preponderance of evidence," or "beyond reasona-
ble doubt"? You are not using either civil or criminal terms for
your conclusions?

Admiral Milligan. It is an administrative process, not a crimi-
nal process. However, all of the findings of fact must be backed up
by very supportive and convincing enclosures, or information in
the report itself, and my report does that.

Chairman Nunn. I do not want to belabor this, but when you
come to an opinion, are you saying that that opinion is probably
what happened, or are you saying that that is possibly what hap-
pened?

Admiral Milligan. All opinions, of course, cite in the report the
findings of fact which those opinions are based on. Some of my
opinions, such as opinion number 56, is a "probably" issue based on
all of the information.

Chairman Nunn. Let us take two specific ones. You say the inci-
dent was a result of a wrongful intentional act. That is an opinion,
is that right?

Admiral Milligan. That is correct.

Chairman Nunn. Then you go on to say, "most probably GMC-2
Hartwig was the individual who caused it."

Admiral Milligan. That is an opinion also.

Chairman Nunn. Those are both opinions.

Admiral Milligan. That is correct.

Chairman Nunn. But they are based upon the facts?

Admiral Milligan. They are based upon findings of fact which
are then supported by all of the enclosures in the investigation.
They are based on literally many, many issues.

Chairman Nunn. Are you excluding the possibility that other
things could have happened or could have caused this, when you
come to those opinions?

Admiral Milligan. The conclusion I come to

Chairman Nunn. Are you saying this is one possibility that
could have happened, or are you saying this is what you believe
probably happened?

Admiral Milligan. I think to answer your question, Mr. Chair-
man, I have to say that we have excluded all other possibilities and
have come to this as the only possible conclusion.

Chairman Nunn. So you have excluded other possibilities?

Admiral Milligan. Yes, sir. All of the programs on the ship, all
of the 20,000 tests that we conducted from a technical viewpoint,
we found no other cause for this accident.

Chairman Nunn. Senator Glenn listed, and I listed in my open-
ing statement, the various discrepancies in the weapons depart-
ment on board the U.S.S. Iowa. There were a number of personnel
discrepancies and a number of things done wrong with a number of
bags, and places the bags were placed, and the differences in length
as to length from the proper location and so forth.

You are saying that you went into those with enough intensity,
or enough scrutiny, to determine none of those were what caused
the explosion?

Admiral Milligan. That is correct, sir, as I tried to say in the
briefmg here.

Chairman Nunn. Were you charged with going further than that
and looking into the ship itself and why all of these discrepancies
occurred, why all of these breaches of Navy procedures occurred?

Admiral Milligan. I was charged to conduct the investigation
with regard to the explosion in turrett II, and I limited my investi-
gation to the weapons department; namely, the 16-inch turrets. I
am convinced that the issues that we found, the somewhat disturb-
ing training and safety issues that we found in the weapons depart-
ment, were not the same in the other departments and that the
other departments on the ship are much better run.

Chairman Nunn. How do you characterize the results of the
FBI's equivocal death analysis? What is that? Is that an opinion?

Admiral Milligan. Well, it is an equivocal analysis from which
an opinion was slated by the psychologist of the FBI.

Chairman Nunn. That is their opinion?

Admiral Milligan. Yes, sir. That is in my report as another data
point.

Chairman Nunn. That is based on facts that you gave them?

Admiral Milligan. That is based upon the Naval Investigative
Service information that was provided to the FBI.

Chairman Nunn. Maybe Mr. Powers could answer this. Were
these findings of fact that you gave the FBI from which they were
to derive their opinion?

Mr. Powers. It was information that we had developed during
our investigation, either statements we had taken from people,
interviews we had done, or letters that we had recovered, writings
that we had recovered that we provided to the FBI.

Chairman Nunn. What I am trying to get at, is if this was a fac-
tual foundation that you gave the FBI, or was it your opinion that
you gave the FBI?

Mr. Powers. Our reports did not contain opinions. They are fac-
tual based on the information we developed through interviews or
seizures of evidence or whatever other means we developed the in-
formation.

Chairman Nunn. So the FBI's death analysis was their opinion
based on the facts that you furnished them?

Mr. Powers. Yes, sir.

Chairman Nunn. Not based on opinions you furnished them?

Mr. Powers. We furnished them no opinions, sir.

Chairman Nunn. Admiral, I just have one more question, and
then I will yield to Senator Warner. How did you determine that
GMG2 Hartwig wound up as the gun captain for the center gun of
turret II when a number of witnesses testified that at morning
quarters on April 19 it was announced that GMG2 Lawrence was
to be the gun captain and the general quarters watch station bill
did not even list GMG2 Hartwig as being in turret II?

Admiral Milligan. Sir, the facts that you stated are all correct
and are understood and were available to me at the time of the in-
vestigation. I have to say that the people who were involved with
that assignment process, of course, were all lost in the accident. I
am talking about the division officer and the senior chief who ran
that turret.

Unfortunately, there was an unauthorized absentee from the
ship at the time they were under way, which left a vacant position
up in the center gun; namely the powder hoist, and the man who
was on the watch bill to be the cradle operator ended up being the
powder hoist operator. That left a man short in the gun room.

This was going to be Petty Officer Lawrence's first live gun shoot
as a gun captain, but he did not have a full team. He had done the
prefire checks. That is document, but there was not a full team in
the gun room. So Petty Officer Hartwig obviously was put in the
gun room or introduced himself to assist and take the position of
gun captain in the gun room to fill out that team.

There is conclusive evidence that he was, in fact, the gun captain
at the time of the incident.

Chairman Nunn. I guess that is what I am asking for. You have
given your opinion, but what was the conchisive evidence that he
was in fact the gun captain?

Admiral Milligan. Well, of course, his remains were found in
the gun room, and Petty Officer Lawrence was on the sound power
phones, which are worn by the cradle operator. So Petty Officer
Lawrence was in fact the cradle operator.

Chairman Nunn. The fact that Hartwig was found in the gun
room and in fact he had been captain before indicates that would
have been his position and excluded all other positions?

Admiral Milligan. He was a qualified gun captain, but there is,
for instance, proof that he was in a position near the gun and what
his position was

Chairman Nunn. The physical location?

Admiral Milligan. Yes, sir.

Chairman Nunn. Thank you. Senator Warner.

Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I commend you for the manner in which you
worked with the witnesses in developing the nature of this hearing.
I would just suggest the Admiral revisit one phrase, "administra-
tive, not criminal."

It is an administrative procedure, which is not a judicial one in
nature; would you say?

Admiral Milligan. That is correct, Senator Warner.

Senator Warner. In my recollection in such examinations as this
you are independent, and the Navy outlines this very clearly in its
manual of regulations; there were no restrictions put on you what-
soever?

Admiral Milligan. Absolutely not. My goal was to find the
cause, and I could do whatever I could think of to do to find that
cause.

Senator Warner. I would like to pick up where the chairman
left off regarding participation by the FBI.

Information has come to me that the FBI analyst described the
quality and the quantity of the information provided by the Navy
as being very good. Does that comport with your understanding?

Admiral Milligan. You are referring to the psychologist?

Senator Warner. Just generally.

Admiral Milligan. I had not heard that, but possibly Captain
Miceli did. He talked to them regularly.

Senator Warner. Perhaps Mr. Powers?

Captain Miceli. I have never heard it before. Is this a recent
statement?

Senator Warner. Yes. It has come to me from a very good
source. Mr. Powers.

Mr. Powers. On the information that we turned over to the be-
havioral science people, I think they were very satisfied with the
information that we had provided them in developing their own
opinion.

Senator Warner. Well, let us turn to another area where appar-
ently there was some difference between the FBI and yourself. Ad-
miral.

The FBI did not— and I repeat, did not— find evidence of foreign
material associated with the detonating device. Now, is this a dis-
crepancy?

Admiral Milligan. The statement is correct.

Senator Warner. Which statement is correct?

Admiral Milligan. That they did not find evidence associated
with a specific detonating device. Their report, I would say, was in-
conclusive and did make specific recommendations that we conduct
additional testing, which is exactly what we did.

I see no disagreement between the Navy and the FBI on this
issue. We carried it on, of course, much further on their recommen-
dation. , /.. J-

Senator Warner. Well, what is the reason for the Navy s finding
of foreign material, and what is the significance of the FBI observa-
tion?

Admiral Milligan. The Navy's strong and conclusive evidence ot
foreign material is based originally on the metallurgist effort at
the Norfolk Naval Shipyard back in the June time frame and then
has been carried on through additional testing up until just recent-
ly here and further confirmed in a very extensive report by the
ordnance activity out at Crane, Indiana.

That foreign material was, indeed, in the rotating band of the
Iowa projectile removed from the gun in question, and that foreign
material best matched the foreign material from a similar band
from a test firing that used a chemical detonator type device as an
ignition source.

Senator Warner. What were the components of this foreign ma-
terial that you believe correlated with the chemical detonator?

Admiral Milligan. Well, there is a number of them. There is
wire, there is chlorine. I will ask Captain Miceli to give you the
specific details. I think he can anwer it more accurately.

Captain Miceli. The iron wire that we discovered was burned
and embedded into the rotating band that we showed you, and on
the iron wire there was calcium, chlorine, and calcium oxide. There
also were chemistries for glycols and Seal-A-Meal baggies. The
glycol, of course, when combined with an oxidizer which is the cal-
cium hyperchlorate, the chemistry of the calcium, chlorine and
oxygen, calcium hyperchlorate or HTH, when you combine the
glycol and the oxidizer you have an intensifier. An analysis of that
residue in our final report reflects those conclusions.

Senator Warner. Admiral Milligan, the powder bags which were
loaded into turret II just prior to the explosion were marked with
directions v/hich said, and I quote, "Do not use these powder bags
with 2,700 pound projectile."

What is the relationship between the use of those bags and the
explosion?

Admiral Milligan. As I had mentioned in the briefing earlier,
had this accident taken place with the breech closed and the gun
fired, you would have had to take a very close look at that relation-
ship. The accident took place with the five bags in the breech with
a 2,700 pound projectile in front of them, but it really made no dif-
ference at this point whether it was a 1,900 or a 2,700 pound pro-
jectile. The breech was not closed, and the explosion took place.

24-931 0-91-3

So although those were procedures that were not proper and the
Navy is looking very closely at that issue and taking appropriate
action, the fact that you used five instead of six packs and the fact
that you used a particular propellant that was not to be used with
the specific projectile really did not play and was ruled out as a
cause of the accident, and very clearly so.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Nunn. Thank you, Senator Warner. Senator Exon.
Senator Exon. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
Admiral, thank you for your interesting presentation. I listened
to it very carefully.

I remember back when the reactivation of the battleships were
under consideration. I was told that 250 men were needed to man
each of the 16-inch gun turrets. Yet, it seems that turret II aboard
the U.S.S. Iowa was manned by 50 or so.
Was I misinformed that 250 men were needed for each turret?
Admiral Milligan. The correct number, Senator Exon, is 90 ac-
tually. Ninety is the correct number for turret II and turret III.
Turret I, I think, is 88 because it does not have a range finder. So
the number is 90.

Senator Exon. The number is 90, but how many men were as-
signed to that particular turret? Fifty; is that right?

Admiral Milligan. There were 56 people on station in turret II,
as I recall, which was below the 90 that would be required. I can
explain.

I looked at that very closely as to did that cause or was that a
possible cause of the accident? Ninety people is a shipmanning doc-
ument number, which is really the number required for full battle
wartime conditions. It includes manning three of the magazines;
putting a lot more people in the annular space around the maga-
zines, in other words, so you could pass powder at a very high rate.
The exercise on board the Iowa on the 19th was a limited
number of firings. Only one magazine was manned. Only three
people were in the annular space, and that is all that was required.
That is all you can get there to do that job for one magazine.
Frankly, the people on the projectile decks probably were not doing
anything because the projectiles that were going to be fired were
already moved into the projectile hoist. So there were more than
adequate people in turret II to conduct the exercise that was being
conducted on April 19.

Senator Exon. Somewhere during the extensive reading that I
have done on this I recall an allegation that the gunpowder used
on the day of this tragedy was gunpowder that was old or older
than normal and had been stored for long periods of time. The
question was raised whether it should have been used in the first
place.

I suspect, because I listened very carefully to your testimony on
this, you have actually tested powder from the same source and
you found no instability or no reason whatsoever to believe that
there was anything unstable about the powder?

Admiral Milligan. That is correct, sir. The powder was actually
mixed and made in the mid 1940s; however, it is still very stable,
and our test convinced us that it was stable and safe.

As I mentioned in the fume test, if it fumes in 30 days we would
discard it. but that powder has been under observation now for 192
days, and it has not fumed yet. So it is way safe from the marginal
level.

Senator Exon. Regarding the psychological reports that were
made after investigation of Hartwig, I am in an area here that I
know little, if anything, about. But when someone wants to comniit
suicide, I would assume that they would want to take their own life
but not the lives of others, in this case, their shipmates.

Were there any psychological profiles that you could uncover
that would indicate that Hartwig was not only suicidal in tenden-
cies but would not care about or be particularly concerned about
taking the lives of others?

In other words, my point is he had to know that if he did what
you believe he did to cause this accident, there would be a consider-
able loss of life. Is that correct?

Admiral Milligan. Yes, sir. He was a capable gunnersmate, and
certainly he would know the impact of igniting five bags of propel-
lant. However, I cannot say that he anticipated that that ignition
would be as far up into the breech and take that long for the igni-
tion to take place.

The force of the explosion, because it was far up into the breech,
was far greater than the impact would have been, say, if it had
taken place at the mouth of the breech because of the confined
area. This propellant burns faster under pressure, and that was
created by the confined area and the fact that the rammer was still
pushing the bags into the breech.

If it had been out on the tray, then you would anticipate that the
accident results would have been many fewer killed than actually
took place on the 19th. This, as I mentioned, was a very high pres-
sure, high velocity, high temperature and high volume explosion
which instantaneously caused the death of 47 crew members.

Senator Exon. This foreign material that was found in your in-
vestigation in the breech or in the gun barrel was finally identified
as some type of a chemical, is that correct?

Admiral Milligan. The best match that we have of the foreign
material found in the crevice of the rotating band of the Iowa pro-
jectile, the projectile taken out of the gun of interest here, is with
foreign material from a similar band from a test firing that we
used a chemical initiator for an explosive device to initiate the ex-
plosion. And that is a very good match.

Senator Exon [presiding.] Thank you. My time is up. I will have
some additional questions in the second round. Senator McCain.

Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Milligan, in your professional opinion, as the investigat-
ing officer, can you think of any other way this explosion could
have occurred? Or has anybody else made a reasonable suggestion
indicating another possible reason for the explosion?

Admiral Milligan. Senator McCain, I have to say in all honesty
that we looked for another possibility for this accident and we
could not find one. And we searched and examined and experi-
mented with every suggestion that came to either my attention or
the attention of any member of my team.

Senator McCain. You have exhausted all possibilities?

Admiral Milligan. Yes, sir.

Senator McCain. Thank you.

Let us get back into the foreign substance one more time that
was found in the rotating band of the projectile. Clearly, there was
a foreign substance found by the Navy.

Admiral Milligan. That is correct.

Senator McCain. Was that substance found by the FBI?

Admiral Milligan. There were, as I recall it, some polymers
found by the FBI, but they could not identify them to a timer-type
explosive device that we were considering at the time.

Senator McCain. But foreign substance was found by the FBI?

Admiral Milligan. Some polymers, but if I recall it, they classi-
fied them as too burned to identify what particular material.

Senator McCain. How do you reconcile the fact that the Navy
was able to find some foreign substance, which gave you clear indi-
cations, and the FBI was unable to? Mr. Powers, maybe you can
illuminate us on that?

Admiral Milligan. Well, let me try first, Senator McCain.

The Navy has, of course, conducted extensive testing on this
issue, and the FBI was looking for specific things for us. They
looked at three 2-inch sections of the 48-inch band. We gave them
half of it, and they looked at three two-inch sections, and after they
had cleaned it, they scraped off some material and examined it.
They then gave us a report that I understood and still understand
as being inconclusive, but not ruling out the presense of foreign
material; saying, you had to do more work to confirm that. And we
proceeded to do that.

Captain Miceli or Bob, if you want to answer.

Senator McCain. But why did you not go back to the FBI and
ask them to conduct further tests of the entire band?

Admiral Milligan. Well, we only had half of the band, because
we had already used half, of course, in our own effort. And they
had the other half of the band.

Senator McCain. Did they test the same material that you
tested?

Admiral Milligan. We invited them, Senator McCain, to do that.
I will let Captain Miceli answer that, because he dealt directly
with them.

Captain Miceli. I worked very closely with the FBI during this
investigation, and I thought that relationship was very profession-
al.

Senator McCain. Good, go ahead.

Captain Miceli. I am here to tell you that we are where we are
today with our analysis because of the advice of the FBI.

Before the FBI signed out their letter, I had told them that,
based on the scientific methods that they recommended informally,
that we were able to rule out the electronic device that was initial-
ly suggested. We could, with repeatability and credibility, identify
the residue from the PC board, and the dopant on the LED glass,
100 percent of the time, in those rings that had electronic devices
fired in them, as part of our replication test.

Based on that information, we were able to rule out conclusively
that there were no electronic devices. And I passed that informa-
tion to the FBI before they signed their letter out.

At the meeting, I also informed the FBI that we were now
seeing, with the additional scientific scrutiny, using our suite out
at Crane, which I believe is the best in the public sector as well as
the private sector in any one collection, we were able to see iron
wires with

Senator McCain. Captain, let me, if I could, interrupt. You are
not addressing my question, and that is, why is the FBI not now
conducting further tests to corroborate your findings?

Captain Miceli. I invited the FBI to come out to Crane to take a
look. We did not officially request the FBI to do anything as far
as

Senator McCain. Do you not think it would be important to do
so, in light of media reports that indicate that the FBI contradicts
your conclusions, even though that may not be the case? "The FBI
fails to find cause of explosion aboard U.S.S. Iowa.'' Would it not
be important to have the FBI follow up and make the same kind of
tests that you did?

Admiral Milligan. Senator McCain, I would have no problem
with the FBI going out and looking over everything we did out
there at Crane.

Senator McCain. Well, I would think you might encourage them
to do so, given the fact that there is an apparent — and I emphasize
apparent — contradiction here between what you are basing your
conclusions or opinions on and what the FBI has found. So I would
recommend that.

Admiral Milligan. Yes, sir. And we have a very extensive tech-
nical report from Crane, Indiana that is very strong and very con-
clusive with regard to foreign material. But we will certainly take
your advice, sir.

Senator McCain. Thank you.

Finally, Admiral, I share the concerns raised by my friend from
Illinois and from Ohio, Senator Glenn particularly, about the PQS,
the qualifications of the individuals who were performing on those
tasks in the gun turrets.

Is it your positive conclusion that while there were probably not
enough qualified people there, that that fact was not a contributing
factor to this accident?

Admiral Milligan. The real principal issue with the Personnel
Qualifications Standards program is the administration of the pro-
gram. I feel very confident that the people who were manning the
individual stations in turret II on April 19 were capable to do the
job that they were assigned to do. However, the administration of
the program was lacking. The paperwork part of it, let us say.

Senator McCain. In other words, you do not conclude that the
lack of qualification was a contributing factor to the accident?

Admiral Milligan. That is correct, sir.

Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Exon. Thank you. Senator McCain. Senator Dixon.

Senator Dixon. Admiral, it is true, is it not, that the media re-
ported to the country at large that Mr. Hartwig was a homosexual?

Admiral Milligan. I have read the same articles that you have.
Senator.

Senator Dixon. Yes.

Now, it is also factual, is it not, that your over 100 investigators,
who have combed the world and talked to over 300 witnesses, have
not one single witness to support that theory?

Admiral Milligan. First of all, my report does not make that
qualification.

Senator Dixon. No, but that is my question.

Admiral Milligan. And we have no hard evidence in any part of
this investigation

Senator Dixon. That Mr. Hartwig is a homosexual?

Admiral Milligan. Of such an act, that is correct.

Senator Dixon. As a matter of fact, the one witness you have or
did have recanted. The evidence shows that Mr. Hartwig, in fact,
dated, I think, an exotic dancer, which is hardly compatible with
the habits of a homosexual. All that is correct, is it not?

Admiral Milligan. That is correct that he had dated a dancer.

Senator Dixon. Yes.

Now, Mr. Truitt, I think it was inferred in the media earlier, was
a homosexual. He is married, is he not?

Admiral Milligan. He is married, yes, sir.

Senator Dixon. He is alive and he has denied any assertion that
he is a homosexual?

Admiral Milligan. Mr. Dixon, I did not classify or even suggest
either one of these gentlemen were homosexuals.

Senator Dixon. And is it not true that his wife, as well, has
denied that Mr. Truitt is not a homosexual?

Admiral Milligan. I have seen those news reports.

Senator Dixon. Now, your original concerns about Mr. Hartwig
began with a letter from his sister, who suggested that a policy of
insurance existed upon which Mr. Truitt was beneficiary, and to
her dismay, not her family. Is that right? That is your testimony
here, that on May 8, I think it was, you first had brought to your
attention, this matter. Is that not true?

Admiral Milligan. I received a copy of the letter from Mrs. Ku-
bicina identifying the insurance policy.

Senator Dixon. Now, would you consider it unusual for a — the
evidence, I think, also warrants a statement that Hartwig and
Truitt were friends, that on leave they generally palled together in
ports around the world, and so forth. Is that not also true?

Admiral Milligan. That is true up to a point in time, but the
evidence will tell you that that friendship deteriorated significantly
in the December 1988 time frame, when Petty Officer Truitt was
married.

Senator Dixon. All right.

You are entitled to draw that conclusion if you want to from the
evidence, but, in any event, it is a fact that they were good buddies,
who spent a good deal of time together as naval persons who took
leaves together. Is that not so?

Admiral Milligan. Up until the marriage of Petty Officer Truitt,
yes, sir.

Senator Dixon. All right.

Now, would it not be compatible with good general practice for a
single person, no wife, no kids, to mention as his beneficiary in a
policy of insurance what, at that time, apparently was his best
friend? Is that inconceivable to you?

Admiral Milligan. I do not know of that as being a common
practice whatsoever.

Senator Dixon. But, would you think it to be uncommon, in view
of the fact that he was an unmarried man without children?

Admiral Milligan. My personal opinion is, if I were an unmar-
ried person without any children, I would leave my family as the
beneficiaries of my own personal insurance policy.

Senator Dixon. Well, you are entitled to do that, if that is the
way you want to do it. I think people could do it another way if
they wanted to. There is nothing the matter with it.

Now, your theory also draws a conclusion that Hartwig, this
strange person, committed this act to commit suicide. Yet, is it not
a fact that all of these investigators, when they looked into this,
found that the very night prior to this occurrence, he spent over
three-quarters of an hour visiting with a friend about the fact that
he looked forward to his next leave in London, and discussing all of
the good times he anticipated having in London?

Admiral Milligan. There is information that he had a long dis-
cussion with another individual, a surviving gunnersmate from the
turret.

Senator Dixon. Yes, the night before.

Admiral Milligan. The night before, concerning— I did not know
it as leave, but a potential reassignment to London and what that
would be like. However, my investigation has found no conclusive
evidence that Petty Officer Hartwig knew he was going to London.

In fact

Senator Dixon. Well, I did not ask you that question. I appreci-
ate your response, and I want the answers to my questions.
Admiral Milligan. Yes, sir.

Senator Dixon. You are certainly a respected investigator and
entitled to draw your conclusions, which clearly are contrary to
mine.

Now, you further conclude that this individual, on the next
morning, having apparently determined the manner of his death,
put into play this highly complex method, by virtue of which he
blew up that gun and set fire in there and killed, in addition to
himself, 46 other members of the Iowa crew.

But the fact is, that that very morning he was not listed to be
the gun captain in that place. Is that not true?

Admiral Milligan. It is true that I concluded what you said.
Yes, that is true. And it is true that he was not on the watch bill.
That is true.

Senator Dixon. And what a remarkable thing, I think, that a
young man who, the night before, spent over three-quarters of an
hour discussing the good time on his next vacation or leave, or
whatever you want to characterize it to be, and who, the next
morning, was not listed to be the gun captain in that turret, some-
how, through some extraordinary manipulation of events, was able
to put into play this terrible tragedy that transpired.

I find that difficult. Admiral Milligan, to understand how that
could occur.

Admiral Milligan. Mr. Dixon, that is what the facts of this in-
vestigation draw you to.

Senator Dixon. But, you see, your own earlier investigation,
before you had the letter on the insurance policy, kind of thought
maybe it was friction.

Admiral Milligan. We looked at friction, afterwards.

Senator Dixon. And were looking at it to the very day you got
the letter.

Admiral Milligan. We looked at it long past the time we got the
letter.

Senator Dixon. And, as a matter of fact, in 1924, when the Mis-
sissippi had a similar accident, it was the conclusion at that time
that it was friction.

Admiral Milligan. There has been no friction event in a 16-inch
gun or a big-bag gun in the story of the U.S. Navy.

Senator Dixon. This is, in fact, the third accident, the Mississip-
pi, a smaller gun on another occasion, and this one. There are at
least three occasions when this happened, two times when Hartwig
was not the gun captain, is that not true?

Admiral Milligan. We have not had an accident like this on our
16-inch guns, no.

Senator Dixon. The Mississippi in 1924 was not a similar acci-
dent, using the same kinds of — —

Admiral Milligan. It was not.

Senator Dixon. It was not a similar accident?

Admiral Milligan. It was not a friction event, as you said it was.

Senator Dixon. But it was a similar accident, was it not, Admi-
ral?

Admiral Milligan. It was an accident in the breech, yes. It was,
either from flare-back or from a burning ember, which we ruled
out in this case.

Senator Dixon. I will pursue this in my next round.

Senator Exon [presiding]. Thank you. Senator Dixon. Senator
Glenn.

Senator Glenn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to go back to your own report on this. Paragraph 58, you
talk about some of the communications just before the blowup. And
let me read from this paragraph 58.

"Shortly before this explosion Burch,"— and I will not read all
the ra^es here every time — but Ziegler who was the turret captain,
Lawrence who was the cradle operator, remember that.

"Shortly, before the explosion, Burch heard Ziegler state over the
XJ circuit, which is the intra-turret circuit, left gun is loaded, good
job. Center gun is having a little trouble. We will straighten that
out."

59: "Mullahey recalls hearing Lawrence state over the XJ cir-
cuit, I have a problem here. I am not ready yet." 60: "Additionally,
Mullahey recalls that shortly after the explosion, he heard over the
XJ circuit Ziegler shout to Lieutenant J.G. Buch," "tell PLOT we
are not ready yet. There is a problem in center gun," or words to
that effect. Mullahey also recalls hearing Lawrence excitedly re-
state, "I am not ready yet, I am not ready yet."

Lawrence, a member of turret II center gun crew, was talking on
the XJ phone circuit, that is 61.

62: "Burch recalls a period of silence on the XJ phone line before
he heard the explosion."

Now, what do we think was going on there? Why do we think
that — do we think that somebody saw Hartwig putting something
in the gun tray? And they went ahead and put the thing in and
choved the round up in there?

What was going on? And why do we rule all that out as being
not indicative that there were other things going on here?

Admiral Milligan. Well, we did not rule it out, Senator Glenn.
That is an important part of the investigation. There was obviously
something awry in the center gun room.

Senior Chief Ziegler in calling to Lieutenant J.G. Buch, who was
the turret captain to tell PLOT we are not ready yet, we have a
problem in the center gun, and I will take care of it. It is hard to
say exactly what was on his mind, what that problem might have
been.

But we are convinced from indisputable evidence that the
rammer was, in fact, 21 inches in past where it should have been
in the gun. And there was something wrong going on in the center
gun room.

I am convinced because no one made any mention of fire, no one
made any mention of the word silence, which is the normal proce-
dure when you have a problem in a gun room, that they were not
aware that they had an imminent explosion, they did not have any
smoke or anything. Because the sprinkler system had not been ac-
tivated.

But there is no question, there was something wrong in the
center gun room. And it was dragging behind the left and right
gun rooms by about 25 seconds in the loading process when the ex-
plosion took place.

Senator Glenn. You see that is where I have always had a prob-
lem coming back and reaching the same conclusion, that you
reached out of this thing.

Because there was something wrong, and if somebody had
watched Hartwig put something in there, wow, that would have
been a reason to stop right then. They would have stopped the
whole works, I would presume.

But there was something else going on. I would presume — I do
not presume, and maybe you do. But I cannot presume. They say, I
am not read> yet, I am not ready yet. And that that would mean, I
have got to do something, because Hartwig put something in there
he was not supposed to put in there.

That requires a leap of faith I have trouble making on that one.

Admiral Milligan. Well, it is a difficult conclusion to come to
with regard to what was wrong in the gun room.

Senator Glenn. No, because to come to the same conclusion the
report came to, though. Admiral, you have to assume that what
was ready, was that Hartwig was doing something that fouled it
up. And they saw it, or they would not have said something on the
intercom.

Admiral Milligan. But that conclusion is not based on just the
information that was received with regard to communications over
the sound powered phones.

That conclusion, or those opinions, opinion 55 and 56, are based
on the entirety of this report. There are many, many, many data

points that drive, or drove me to the conclusion in writing those
two opinions.

Senator Glenn. Well, I understand that. And Senator Nunn
pushed the idea of what was opinion and what was fact here.

But this problem where they say in the turret, the people right
in there, doing the loading, say they are not ready yet, something
is wrong, and in effect, they have got a problem, not ready yet, re-
peated over again, second time excitedly, your narrative says. And
then there is silence, and it blows up.

To come to the same conclusion you came to, I would have to
assume, that their being not ready yet and having a problem was a
result of something Hartwig was doing. And that is where I just
cannot make that leap of reason there.

Admiral Milligan. The nearest thing that I can say right now,
which caused the not ready yet, is the fact that we are sitting here
with the propellant in the gun, the rammer 42 inches into the gun.
and something strange is happening. Because the gun captain is
not having that rammer pulled back out of the gun.

Senator Glenn. No, but at that time the rammer was in, the
powder bags were in.

Admiral Milligan. That is right. And the rammer was up into
the breech. And the next step in that evolution would be to bring
the rammer back out. And the rammer was still ahead at the time
of the explosion.

Senator Glenn. So at that point, they had not seen Hartwig put
something in? And they went ahead with the whole procedure?
And this was after that? Is that right? After the powder bags were
in?

Admiral Milligan. That is not a bad consideration of what took
place. I do not know what Petty Officer Lawrence saw. I do know
that the rammer was 42 inches into the breech and was still ahead
at the time of the explosion. And that was not where it should
have been or under the condition it should have been either.

Senator Glenn. You stated during normal loading sequence
Petty Officer Hartwig would have personally placed a silk packet
containing lead foil between bags one and two.

What is the accountability procedure of these silk packets? Is it
possible that someone else could have placed a detonating device in
one of these packets prior to delivery to turret II?

Admiral Milligan. I certainly understand the question. Senator
Glenn. And the accountability, although the turret is relatively
secure, these packets I believe, in fact, I am sure, have been deliv-
ered in old five-inch powder cans. And they set there in the gun
room, and they are taken out, placed on the shelf, and put into the
gun as the proper time comes to do so.

Where that theory comes apart, however, is that in the gun
room — the rammer was 42 inches into the breech. And that was
controlled by Petty Officer Hartwig.

So that is where the theory of someone else doing it comes apart.
He is the only one who could control that issue. I mean — and that
is a very important issue.

Senator Glenn. My time is up, but let me just ask one more
question here.

Why do we eliminate the other people that were there, that
could have done the same thing? You say Hartwig had a back-
ground, he talked about this, talked about suicide and so on, had a
technical knowledge. You made a special point of that a while ago.

Everybody in that position in the Navy has received some kind of
technical training. A lot of people, and including the other two
there, undoubtedly had a how-to knowledge, if they wanted to exer-
cise it.

Everyone who knows something does not go around talking
about it all the time. Hartwig did. Maybe the others did not. Why
were they automatically eliminated?

Admiral Milligan. Well, I will just start off by saying that the
knowledge with regard to building explosive devices is not neces-
sarily a common knowledge of a gunnersmate in the Navy; they
are not trained in that field. But Petty Officer Hartwig did have a
great interest in that.

Senator Glenn. But do we know the other two did not either,
just because they did not talk about it? They may have had just as
big an interest and just as much knowledge from Radio Shack or
wherever? You do not know. Just because they did not talk about it
does not mean to me that they should be eliminated from consider-
ation.

They were on the spot, fully as capable of putting something in
there as Hartwig was. Were they not?

Admiral Milligan. No, sir. The only one who has the real access
and the real opportunity to put something in the powder train
really is the gun captain.

He is right there at the entrance to the gun. He is the one that is
pushing those bags forward. He is the one that puts the lead foils
in, and he is the one that controls the rammer.

And maybe Mr. Powers would like to add with regard to the
other people in the gun room.

Senator Glenn. Who hands him the foil? My time is up, but who
hands him the foil?

Admiral Milligan. He reaches back and picks it up off the shelf
right behind him. That is the normal procedure.

Senator Glenn. My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Nunn. Senator Levin.

Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

You talked about data points. Is it fair to say that you feel that
there is evidence which raises uncertainty as well as evidence,
which leads you to your conclusion?

Admiral Milligan. There is findings of fact, and evidence, cer-
tainly. There is evidence to support my findings of fact. And there
certainly are findings of fact to support my opinions.

I left my opinion number 56, which is the issue with regard to
Petty Officer Hartwig, as the most probable on the basis that there
was

Senator Levin. Is there also evidence which raises uncertainty?
Those other points, data points you made reference to? There is no
certainty here. Is there?

Admiral Milligan. The totality

Senator Levin. Not the totality. Just, is there evidence that
raises uncertainties in your mind?

Admiral Milligan. There is no evidence that raises uncertainties
with regard to the shipboard program review, with regard to all of
the

Senator Levin. 55 and 56, is there any evidence which raises un-
certainty in your mind relative to 55 and 56?

Chairman Nunn. Tell us what those are. Senator Levin.

Senator Levin. 55 is that explosion resulted from a wrongful in-
tentional act, and 56 is that it was most probably committed by
Hartwig.

Admiral Milligan. No, sir. If there was uncertainty I would not
have made those opinions.

Senator Levin. So, for instance, the material that Senator Glenn
went over with you, that we are not ready yet, I have a problem
here. That does not raise any uncertainty in your mind at all?

Admiral Milligan. They were facts that are in the report that I
considered in my opinions and ultimate conclusion. And they were
of importance.

And I think they gave me some insight into the fact that there
was, in fact, a problem in the gun room. But they do not tell me
what the problem was.

Senator Levin. My question is, does it raise any uncertainty in
your mind? It is a simple question.

Admiral Milligan. No, sir.

Senator Levin. Thank you. You are certain, also, I think at one
point, that the elements found in the timing device and associated
batteries were found under the U.S.S. Iowa rotating band. Have
you changed your view on that?

Admiral Milligan. Let me ask Captain Miceli to answer that.

Captain Miceli. Would you repeat your question, sir?

Senator Levin. You changed your view that elements found in
the timing device and associated batteries were found under the ro-
tating band?

Captain Miceli. Yes, sir.

Senator Levin. You have changed your view on that?

Captain Miceli. In the process of the analysis with help from the
Arrny and the FBI, we have ruled out that there was an electronic
device with batteries.

Senator Levin. That is my whole point. You were certain, back
on July 28, that elements found in the timing device and associated
batteries were found under the rotating band. And now you are
satisfied that that is not so.

Is that correct?

Admiral Milligan. Mr. Levin, let me answer that

Senator Levin. I do not need long answers. I just need really
short ones. Are you now satisfied that that is not accurate?

Admiral Milligan. We are satisfied that it was not an electron-
ics device. I am satisfied foreign material was in the band.

My report is based on foreign materials, sir.

Senator Levin. Yes, but your report of July 28, also said that you
were satisfied that the elements found in the timing device and as-
sociated batteries were found there, which means you were satis-
fied that there was foreign material consistent with an electronic
device.

Is that correct?

Admiral Milligan. If it is read that way, it is not intended that
way. My report is based on the fact that there were foreign materi-
als, something foreign to the normal propellant charge in the
center gun of turret II on April 19. That is the issue.

Senator Levin. You changed your mind in any respect since the
FBI report?
Admiral Milligan. No, sir.

Senator Levin. Now, going back to the FBI report just for a
minute, I understand that you said that you invited them to come
back in and look at your new findings about a chemical device in-
stead of an electronic device.

You used the words, invited the FBI to do that. But you did not
officially request them.

When you invited them to get back involved, as I believe you
should have, since they obviously had an important role here, what
was their response?

Captain Miceli. The discussion as I recall it— and I think it was
checked also by higher authority with regards to the FBI taking a
look at what we were doing— it was an issue of not corroborating
other people's work, or looking at other equipment that was used,
that they were not familiar with.
Senator Levin. Did you invite them?
Captain Miceli. Personally, yes, sir.
Senator Levin. Who was it that you invited?
Captain Miceli. I believe the gentleman's name was Mr. Ken
Nimmich.

Senator Levin. Okay, and he said that they did not think that
they could add anything?

Captain Miceli. What he told me and I believe it was verified
later at higher levels, both the Navy and the FBI, was that they
were not in the business of corroborating other people's work.

Senator Levin. But, they were in the business of looking at your
first tests, though, right?

Captain Miceli. That was their own analysis.
Senator Levin. Did they come in at your invitation?
Captain Miceli. The Navy officially requested the FBI to look at
that band, yes, sir.

Senator Levin. And they did that even though they are not in
the business of corroborating other people's work?

Captain Miceli. That was an analysis that they did at the time
that I invited them to come and look. I asked them to come and
look at the work that I did. And that is what they were objecting
to.

Senator Levin. So, if you had just asked them to come and make
their own independent analysis to see whether, in fact, their own
independent analysis, you think they would have come?
Captain Miceli. I do not know, I expect so.

Senator Levin. And did you send them the Crane, Indiana
report? Did I name it correctly? Was it Crane, Indiana you said?
Admiral Milligan. It is a report from the weapons center at
Crane, Indiana.

Senator Levin. Did you send that report to the FBI?
Captain Miceli. They should get one. I do not know if they have
received it yet or not. It just cleared the CNO a couple of days ago.

They should receive a copy, if they do not already have it.

Senator Levin. But you have not gotten any response from them
relative to it?

Captain Miceli. I am not aware of any, sir.

Senator Levin. Admiral Milligan. Let me just ask you about the
finding 55. You seem to be more certain in finding 55 than you are
in 56. Is that fair?

Admiral Milligan. I said most probably in 56.

Senator Levin. But not in 55?

Admiral Milligan. That is correct.

Senator Levin. And is it also some probability involved in 55?

Admiral Milligan. No, 55 says it was a deliberate act.

Senator Levin. That is not probability, it is certainty?

Admiral Milligan. That is my opinion, yes, sir.

Senator Levin. My time is up. Thank you.

Chairman Nunn. Let me just announce plans here. We are going
to have another round with the committee members. And then,
Senator Metzenbaum, if you would like to ask questions, we will do
that then. But we will have another round right now, with the
people who want to ask further questions. I have a couple of ques-
tions.

Admiral, this has been alluded to several times, but let me make
sure I understand the sequence here. As I understand it, your tech-
nical team initially believed, and maybe this ought to go to the
Captain, initially believed that the explosion was caused by friction
or compression. And then you later believed it was caused by an
electronic device. And you ultimately believe it was caused by a
chemical device.

Now, were these really conclusions you reached as you came
along? Did you change your opinions as you went along?

Admiral Milligan. Mr. Chairman, let me answer that. The effort
was an iterative process. We looked at all of the possible ignition
sources and, yes, at one point in time we were looking very closely
at friction as a most probable cause, but we conducted all those
tests, and we frankly ruled out friction. We could not create a fric-
tion event.

Chairman Nunn. Would it be correct to term that as a prelimi-
nary inference that you had that it was going to be tested and then
you later disproved it after testing, is that the way?

Admiral Milligan. It was a point in the investigation where that
is an area we were looking very closely at, but we ruled it out.

Chairman Nunn. But you never concluded that was it?

Admiral Milligan. Absolutely not. We never concluded friction
was the cause of that accident.

Chairman Nunn. And the same thing about electronic device?

Admiral Milligan. We were looking at that because of some tes-
timony at a time which was later recanted, but we were looking at
it as one possibility. We never concluded that. In fact, my report
does not — is not based upon any specific explosive device as initia-
tor. My report is based on the fact that we found foreign material
in the propellant charge, material that did not belong there, and
not a specific explosive device.

Chairman Nunn. Captain, would you describe the procedures
and actions that were utilized to free the projectile from Iowa s gun
barrel and to remove the rotating band from the projectile?

Captain Miceli. Yes, sir. We had projectiles in the left and right
gun also, and they were easily removed with the 750-pound weight
that is used to remove the Army projectiles during rehearsal.

We attempted to remove the projectile from the center gun with
the same dummy weight, and we were unable to do that. During
this process we had put some break-free in the barrel to possibly
lubricate the projectile and remove it, and we were unable to do

that.

Meanwhile I had received some information from the laboratory
that it would take over a million pounds of force to break it loose,
and what we had done is we had a meeting with the shipyard
design folks, and one of the designers from the shipyard came up
with the idea of drilling the projectile out; so we built a jig with a
high pressure or low pressure air motor and drilling mechanism,
and we drilled, literally drilled the base of the projectile out up
from the rotating band.

When that projectile is in the barrel, it has 14,000 psi radial
force on the rotating band, so we drilled a 5-inch hole 12 inches
deep, and then we expanded it a quarter of an inch each cut, liter-
ally drilling the base of the projectile out and then popped the ring
loose. It took a week to do the drilling.

Chairman Nunn. It took 1 week?

Captain Miceli. Yes, sir.

Chairman Nunn. Would you explain the potential for contami-
nation that could result from those actions and why do you believe
that the contamination did not occur or that it does not undercut
the credibility of the report?

Captain Miceli. The rotating band that I showed you is closed. It
takes over a million pounds of force to engrave the projectile into
the rifling and then when that rotating band is closed, it takes over
a million pounds of force to do that.

The amount of opening in what we call the trap or where the
rotating band is sealed, the amount of opening after it is sealed is
less than five microns. That is equivalent to one grain of fine
talcum powder.

The iron wire which we found which has the calcium and the
chloride on is 60-80 microns. It would be impossible to fit the wire
in the crevice once it is sealed.

Another data point is that the iron wire that we are looking at is
burned. It is burned and it is embedded into the trap where it
closes.

What we also did to rule out possible contamination, we conduct-
ed tests where I had the iron wire put into the chamber. When it
was fired we purposely contaminated the rotating band and con-
ducted a test without a chemical device, and the significant differ-
ence that we see is that the iron wire does not have the calcium,
the chlorine and the calcium oxide or the glycols in the chemistry
of the analysis.

We also ruled out all of the fluids, the AFFF fire fighting foam,
the ethylene glycol and the water tanks for the sprinkling systems.
We looked at the break-free which we had put in the gun as we

used to clean the gun. We looked at the hydraulic fluids in the
turret, and all of those were ruled out.

We looked at every possible contaminant. We pulled 265 projec-
tiles out of the turret. We examined the rings on those projectiles
also to see what types of contaminants were on those rings.

We also found iron wires on those rings, but once again, not
burned, no calcium, no chlorine or no calcium oxide or no glycols.

Chairman Nunn. Were you consulted by NIS, Naval Investiga-
tive Service, in connection with their decision to submit a portion
of the Iowa rotating band to the FBI for an independent analysis?

Captain Miceli. Was I consulted by them?

Chairman Nunn. Yes.

Captain Miceli. At this particular part of the investigation the
hat that I had with regard to this analysis, I was supporting and
working with the Naval Investigative Service.

Chairman Nunn. So, you knew about it?

Captain Miceli. Absolutely.

Chairman Nunn. You agreed with it?

Captain Miceli. Yes, sir.

Chairman Nunn. Why was the FBI not asked to expand their
analysis to include looking for evidence of a chemical ignition
device once your tests ruled out the presence of an electronic
device and pointed toward the presence of a chemical device?

Captain Miceli. As I indicated, I asked them informally before
they submitted their letter, and I do not know. I cannot offer any
information with regard to why they were not requested officially.
Maybe Mr. Powers can.

Chairman Nunn. Mr. Powers.

Mr. Powers. I think that from an investigative standpoint when
you submit evidence for evaluation and examination to the FBI,
they want a first crack at it. They do not want to look at somebody
else's work.

We provided them a piece of the Iowa band that had not been
examined by anybody else, and that is the part that they looked at.

I think what you are asking now is for the FBI to look at the
work that Crane did. I think that would have to be a decision that
the FBI would have to make, because, at least to my knowledge,
and I can't answer for the FBI, it basically runs contrary to their
policy in their laboratory.

Chairman Nunn. You would not object to it, then?

Mr. Powers. I would have no objection at all.

Chairman Nunn. Captain.

Captain Miceli. I would welcome it.

Chairman Nunn. Admiral.

Admiral Milligan. I would welcome it also.

Chairman Nunn. Let me ask, Mr. Powers, there has been signifi-
cant criticism of the Naval Investigative Service in the media con-
cerning this investigation. I want to give you an opportunity to re-
spond. The first one relates to leaks, and the second area has to do
with allegations of improper questioning of individuals such as
threatening one individual with a charge of murder and accessory
to murder if he did not cooperate. Would you first comment on the
leaks allegation? Did NIS leak?

Mr. Powers. I do not believe it was NIS that leaked the informa-
tion.

One of the problems with any type of investigation of this
manner by the first news reports that came out that people are re-
ferring to as leaks, we had already interviewed over 50 people and
done a number of checks at shops and stores in the Norfolk area.
The information could have been gained anywhere.

As a matter of fact, the first information that came out was in-
correct, much of it that came out. We looked at our own procedures
as to how we were handling the information. We tightened them
up independently. It was mentioned that the DOD IG came in and
looked at our investigative effort and the leaks.

Chairman Nunn. Did they find where the leaks had come from
or did they say anything about NIS?

Mr. Powers. They did not, but I believe their report said that
they did not feel the leaks came from NIS.

Chairman Nunn. They really exonerated you in that report?
Mr. Powers. In that report they said that they did not feel the
leaks came from NIS.

Chairman Nunn. Although they did not come to a definite con-
clusion?

Mr. Powers. They did not come to a definite conclusion. I have a

copy of the report. I do not know what their exact wording was.

Chairman Nunn. Did that Inspector General report in effect say

that the leaks did not come from NIS but were more likely to have

come from the naval hierarchy?

Mr. Powers. What they basically said— and I will read it, Mr.
Chairman— "Although it is possible that an NIS employee could
have leaked information in circumvention of organizational safe-
guards, the repeated occurrence of leaks following this dissemina-
tion of investigative results from the Navy suggests the possibility
of release by a person or persons in Navy entities receiving the
case information."
Chairman Nunn. Say the last part again.

Mr. Powers. "Suggests the possibility of release by a person or
persons in Navy entities receiving the case information."
Chairman Nunn. That means Navy hierarchy, does it not?
Mr. Powers. I do not know what the Inspector General meant by
that, but I assume that is what she meant.
Chairman Nunn. Who would have received the information?
Mr. Powers. Our reports went to the investigative team, and
here in Washington they went to the Vice Chief of Naval Oper-
ations.

I do want to point out, though, that in an investigation like this
we are interviewing hundreds of people. We know that people we
were interviewing were being called by the press and were being
badgered by the press.

Chairman Nunn. I have been through that. You do not have to
convince me. [Laughter.]

Mr. Powers. And the reporting was, frankly, not very good.
Chairman Nunn. No comment. I will not say whether I have
been through that or not. [Laughter.]

Let me ask a question about the threat, the allegation that there
was a threat to charge one individual with murder and accessory to
murder if he did not cooperate. You know about that?

Mr. Powers. I have seen the allegation. I have talked to the
agents in this particular instance, and they deny ever making any
such threat, and I do not believe any such threat was made.

Chairman Nunn. So, you found no evidence that that kind of
threat was made?

Mr. Powers. Absolutely not. I know of no — we had no reason to
threaten anybody in this investigation. We were talking to most
people — we talked to everybody on a voluntary basis. We had no
persons who were providing suspect warning to

Chairman Nunn. Admiral, let me ask you one question, then I
will defer. I have been contacted by one of the families of one of
the deceased on the Iowa, and the question they have relates to
whether the Iowa was being used to conduct experiments relating
to time delay detonation of underwater explosives during this
period. Do you know?

Admiral Milligan. I believe there was a projectile that was
being built or tested for that purpose, but it certainly does not play
in any way with this accident.

Chairman Nunn. Was there a timer device on board that could
have been used in any way to cause this explosion?

Admiral Milligan. No, sir, that timer, that would be in the fuse
of the projectile, and it would be a rather large fuse. As a matter of
fact, that timer requires the thrust of the projectile to be activated
and so I do not see any way that that could be a player.

Chairman Nunn. The other question that was submitted to me —
and I want to ask you this question — do you find any evidence that
there was a hairline crack that existed in the barrel of the center
gun of turret II?

Admiral Milligan. No, sir. We found the turret to be in excel-
lent materiel condition.

Chairman Nunn. If there had been a crack, could that have
played any role here?

Admiral Milligan. It would not have played a role. If the gun-
nersmates or — on any inspection a crack was found, it would have
been inspected by the Naval Sea Systems Command, and a deter-
mination would have been made whether or not the gun had to be
relined, but there was no history of a crack to my knowledge.

Captain Miceli says there was — says Louisville did at one point
identify a hairline but insignificant crack in the barrel, but it
would not play in this accident.

Chairman Nunn. In other words, if there was a crack there, it
would not have anything to do with this accident?

Admiral Milligan. No, sir.

Chairman Nunn. Can you tell us why it would not?

Admiral Milligan. Well, it would be up in the liner, Joe, is that
not correct?

Captain Miceli. As I remember the discussion about the crack
with one of the fellows who was on my team from Louisville, Louis-
ville has the responsibility of checking the barrels every 100
rounds, and there is a possibility with the pressure that is achieved
that some fine cracks do develop, but— and they are inspected for

that reason, and I believe that this particular inspection revealed
that the condition of the barrel was satisfactory.

However, the crack is up in the liner, it is up in the rifling, and
it would not have been— as I recall, I do not think the crack would
have been anywhere near the propellant where the ignition oc-
curred.

Admiral Milligan. Mr. Chairman, we will research and I will
provide information for the record on that subject.

[The information follows:]

Cracked Gun Barrel Liner Turrett II U.S.S. "Iowa"

Longitudinal cracks 10-30 inches long. .045 inches deep were discovered in turret
II barrels in the U.S.S. Iowa in December 1986.

Firing of turret 2 guns aboard U.S.S. Iowa was restricted by NAVSEA in January
1987. At the request of Naval Ordnance Station, Louisville (NAVORDSTA, Louis-
ville) metallurgical and fracture mechanics tests were performed by Benet Laborato-
ries to determine service life of the 16" /50 barrel.

Analysis of the Benet tests by NAVORDSTA, Louisville determined that the bar-
rels of turret II U.S.S. Iowa would not catastrophically fail, even if the liner were
cracked through to the gun barrel (the gun barrel is roughly seven times as thick as
the gun liner) (Avg. 2").

Original condemnation criterion were based on monobloc (single piece) gun barrel
design. The Iowa class gun barrels are of liner/ tube construction.

The current condemnation criteria for cracking in gun barrels is stated in the ap-
plicable technical manual regarding serviceability of Naval gun barrels as being the
existence of any crack equal or greater than 3 inches for monobloc barrels. As a
result of the Benet tests, new condemnation criterion were established exclusively
for the Iowa class built-up 16" barrels. These condemnation criterion address depth
of cracks in excess of .25 inches or greater and eliminate references to crack length.

The January 1987 restriction on firing turret II guns was revised in March 1987
to apply only to 2,700 lb. projectiles with full charges D839 and D846. In June 1987,
the restriction was further revised to permit the firing of 2,700 lb. projectiles with
the D839 full charge.

The Navy continues to monitor bore erosion and gun wear aboard all battleships
in accordance with standard policy. When relining of 16" /50 barrels in any battle-
ship is required, liner forgings manufactured from modern gun barrel steel will be
used.

Chairman Nunn. Thank you.

Senator Exon.

Senator Exon. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

Admiral, I am glad that you pursued at great length what it was
that set off the tremendous explosion. It is very clear from your
report how you think it happened.

In questioning today you have indicated that past accidents were
caused by a burning ember or something like that. But you are
convinced that that was not the case in this instance, right?

Admiral Milligan. Absolutely.

Senator Exon. Pursuing that a little bit further, how many sec-
onds previous to this tragedy in the center turret have other guns
fired?

Admiral Milligan. The last gun to fire was the right gun of
turret I, at least 4 and maybe 8 minutes prior to this accident.

Senator Exon. Then that would have pretty much eliminated. Is
there any chance or possibility that had there been a close firing
that an ember from an adjacent gun could have come down the
barrel of this gun? Is that a possibility?

Admiral Milligan. We looked at that, Mr. Exon, and we found
the relative wind from turret I carried the debris from the fire of
turret I clear of turret II.

Senator Exon. So, you did check into that proposition?

Admiral Milligan. Yes, sir.

Senator Exon. Now, I have listened very carefully to the testimo-
ny, and you have indicated that at one time there was an explosion
in the Mississippi, I believe, since 1917. How many accidents of this
type have there been, regardless of the size of the gun? How many
accidents have there been where explosions have taken place as we
now know happened in the Iowa and as you mentioned in the Mis-
sissippi several years ago? How many in total have there been?

Admiral Milligan. If you will let me correct the numbers for the
record later, there have been on the order of 10 bag ammunition-
type accidents on board ship, about half of which have taken place
in the handling of the propellant while in the cans. In other words,
moving cans of ammunition. Those were ESD events. The balance
occurred in the gun rooms.

But all of them, to the best of my knowledge, were caused by
flareback in a situation where the gun has already fired and then
there is a flareback at the time of the loading of the next round.

Chairman Nunn. That is exactly like we have here.

Senator Exon. You never have had an explosion before the gun
was actually fired?

Admiral Milligan. We have had the flarebacks with the ammu-
nition in the tray, but only one, I believe, in a breech. Is that cor-
rect, Joe?

Captain Miceli. Yes, sir.

Admiral Milligan. The Mississippi, and that was a flareback, or
a burning ember.

Senator Exon. So it is, then, the Mississippi was the last accident
of this type before this one?

Captain Miceli. 1943.

Senator Dixon. The Mississippi was 1924.

Captain Miceli. Two of them. One in 1924 and one in 1943. Both
in the Mississippi, the same turret, different guns.

Senator Exon. In both instances what was the cause of the explo-
sion that was determined?

Captain Miceli. In 1924 it was flareback, and in 1943 it was a
foul bore. The investigating officer indicated that it was a foul bore
and a hot ember. I have the two reports here, sir, if your staff
would like to review them.

Senator Exon. Well, let me finish my questioning by returning
to this matter of Hartwig again. Hartwig was not assigned to be
the gun captain the day of this tragedy. If he were not to be the
gun captain, I assume that he would not have been in the gun
turret area, or not?

Admiral Milligan. He was not on any watch bill, so he might
have been in the turret, or he might have been in his berthing
area, or anywhere.

Senator Dixon. In his what?

Admiral Milligan. In his berthing area, or some other work
area.

Senator Exon. In other words, he was not supposed to do duty at
this particular time?

Admiral Milligan. He was not on the informal listing of watch
station assignments. That was actually 2 or 3 months old and had
no date on it, but we determined it was developed around the
March timeframe. He was not assigned a watch station on that
document.

Senator Exon. Now, if he was not assigned, who would he have
to go to to get authority to be assigned, or to be in that particular
place? He would have to have gone to his superior officer of some
type?

Admiral Milligan. He would have to go to the senior chief, who
was the turret captain.

Senator Exon. Did he do that?

Admiral Milligan. The senior chief is one of the deceased in this
accident, and so we cannot confirm that.

Senator Exon. There would not have been any paperwork con-
nected with that?

Admiral Milligan. No, sir. Petty Officer Lawrence did the pre-
fire checks in the morning, or the evening before the accident. He
was anticipating being the gun captain. There was a shortage of
personnel in the center gun room. Under some conditions Petty Of-
ficer Hartwig ended up being the gun captain on that day, but ev-
eryone involved in that decision process was lost in the accident, or
incident.

Senator Exon. You have determined beyond any reasonable
doubt in your mind, obviously, that Hartwig was the gun captain
because, unless he was the gun captain, he could not have done
what you are convinced he did to cause the explosion, is that cor-
rect?

Admiral Milligan. Yes, sir. I am convinced, without a doubt,
that he was the gun captain on April 19.

Senator Exon. Now, in that room that you showed us a picture
of, there was a gun captain and there were, if I remember correct-
ly, two or three other people in that capsule immediately by the
breech. How many were there?

Admiral Milligan. There are three people, the gun captain and
then the cradle operator is behind him, and the rammerman is
across on the left side of the picture, as you looked at it.

Senator Exon. Now, you conclude that Hartwig was the gun cap-
tain that day because of the recovery of a portion of his body there.
Was his body damaged, in a significantly different way than the
other two people in the area?

Admiral Milligan. Without getting into the details of that issue
in an open hearing here, I would say that we have forensic proof
that Petty Officer Hartwig was the gun captain. The forensic anal-
ysis supports the conclusion that he was the gun captain.

Senator Exon. Can you be a little more forthcoming than that?
You have concluded he was the gun captain on what basis? I un-
derstood that you had concluded that on the basis of the location of
his body, the condition of his body and so forth. Is that not correct?

Admiral Milligan. That is true. On the condition of his body,
and also on the fact that the other gentleman on that side of the

gun room was wearing the sound power phones which were worn
by the individual who manned the position of the cradle operator.

Senator Exon. I thank you very much. I have used up my time,
Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Nunn. Thank you, Senator Exon. Senator Dixon.

Senator Dixon. Admiral Milligan, if I understand the nature of
the conclusions you drew, or your staff and you drew, the Navy's
findings are predicated upon basically two things: psychological evi-
dence that Hartwig was disturbed and perhaps suicidal, coupled
with physical evidence from your test concluding that remnants of
an explosive device were recovered from the gun.

But I would tell you that as to the second, the remnants of an
explosive device recovered from the gun, at least at this point in
time the FBI lab takes issue with that and makes no such finding.

Second, with respect to the evidence, the psychological evidence,
that he may be suicidal and so forth, my information is that in fact
the psychologist, the FBI psychologists, were told that they should
eliminate the idea of this having been caused by an accident and
they were given three alternatives: either the gunnersmate Second
Class Hartwig deliberately caused the explosion; in the second al-
ternative, that Truitt planned the incident in order to murder
Hartwig; or on the third that Hartwig planned the explosion to kill
himself and Truitt, who survived, and that on the basis of those
three alternatives given to the FBI psychologists, they found sup-
port for alternative one, that Hartwig deliberately caused the ex-
plosion.

I would have to suggest that if your conclusions are predicated
on those two, what would appear at first to be finite points, that
each is seriously flawed when examined in the context of what the
FBI did.

Admiral Milligan. Well, my conclusions, or opinions, are predi-
cated on many, many more than the two issues that you men-
tioned. For instance, on the foreign material, I did not base my con-
clusion on the explosive device of a timer, or anything like that. I
based it on the fact that we had foreign material in the propellant
charge. Something was in there that should not have been there.

Senator Dixon. That would be on the dummy shell, may I in-
quire?

Admiral Milligan. That would be on the inert projectile that we
removed from the barrel.

Senator Dixon. What ordinary folks would call the dummy shell?

Admiral Milligan. It was a blank loaded and plugged shell.

Senator Dixon. Okay. For the purposes of our discussion, if you
do not mind my calling it a dummy shell, that is where you found
this so-called material and iron wire, some calcium and other
things, that caused you to draw that conclusion. Is that right?

Admiral Milligan. In the rotating band.

Senator Dixon. How long have those shells generally been in ex-
istence?

Admiral Milligan. That shell is probably a large number of
years old. I do not know when it was manufactured.

Senator Dixon. Ten years old?

Admiral Milligan. Possibly.

Senator Dixon. And had been stored v/here, generally, on the
ship would you say?

Admiral Milligan. In the magazine, right in the turret.

Senator Dixon. Could it have been taken from one ship to an-
other? , ,, -x

Admiral Milligan. Probably in the history of that shell, it may
have been moved.

Senator Dixon. Did you ever hear about the rule of law that
when you look at evidence like that you have to exclude the possi-
bility of other possibilities of contamination? I mean, here is a
shell, 10 years old, that has been moved all over the place and you
are concluding that Hartwig put something in the breech, when it
is 10 years old and it has been all over the place?

Admiral Milligan. My conclusion says something was put in the
propellant charge, not on the shell. It got into the shell, into the
rotating band of the shell.

Senator Dixon. But you drew the conclusion from finding it on

the shell?
Admiral Milligan. Absolutely.
Senator Dixon. Absolutely. A shell 10 years old that has been all

over the place. , jj j •

Admiral Milligan. With foreign debris burned and embedded m
the soft copper ring.

Senator Dixon. But the question is, how did it get on there, do
you not see? Let m.e ask you this: you have made a lot out of the
fact that the rammer was, how many inches did you say in? 21?

Admiral Milligan. It was 42 inches into the breech, 21 past
where it should have been.

Senator Dixon. Now, Hartwig did not control that rammer.

Admiral Milligan. He controlled the rammer through the hand
signals to the rammerman.

Senator Dixon. I know that, but he did not control the rammer.
Somebody else controlled the rammer.

Admiral Milligan. My position is, he controlled the loading of
that gun and he controls the rammer by telling the rammer

Senator Dixon. I understand he gives hand signals, but some-
body else put that rammer in there 21 inches too far. Hartwig did
not touch the rammer.

Admiral Milligan. Hartwig is the one who is signaling and tell-
ing that man what to do, and that is the assumption you have to
make. He was the gun captain. He controlled the loading of that
gun.

Senator Dixon. You draw all of your conclusions on the circum-
stantial things that you relate to us in a circumstance, may I say
as a lay person, with all due respect to you, Admiral, where the
Navy is using bags containing highly explosive material in a room
where by your own rules you tell people to not even bring in a cig-
arette lighter, and by your own testimony practically everybody in
there had cigarette lighters.

You predicate this case of circumstantial evidence in the most
volatile situation probably known to mankind, a fabricated bag full
of explosives in a room where everybody had cigarette lighters and
everything else. I think it is a conclusion, on the basis of what has
occurred, remarkable.

I wonder — you have had 10 accidents of this kind with these
ammo bags. I cannot think of anything more explosive than those
ammo bags, or dangerous.

Admiral Milligan. We have had no accidents of this kind with
these ammo bags.

Senator Dixon. May I say that your friend Captain Miceli, our
distinguished naval captain, has indicated that on the Mississippi
in, I think it was 1943, there was a foul bore, a dirty bore with a
spark in it that cause the igniting that transpired.

Admiral Milligan. A foul bore is a bore where the gun has been
fired, and it did not fire. That is a foul bore. It is not a dirty bore.
It is a loaded gun where the primer has fired.

Senator Dixon. My time has expired.

Admiral Milligan. I have to say that my investigation does not
only look at the things that you bring up. It looks at many, many
issues, and you have to have all those facts under consideration to
come to the conclusion, sir.

Chairman Nunn. Senator Warner.

Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, I think it is important just to
follow on with the question there. Since the Iowa class has been
brought out, how many firings have there been of the 16-inch gun?

Admiral Milligan. You are talking about the current reactiva-
tion of the ships?

Senator Warner. That is correct.

Admiral Milligan. Oh, I guess thousands.

Senator Warner. I have heard 12,000 to 14,000.

Admiral Milligan. That sounds reasonable.

Senator Warner. Without incident?

Admiral Milligan. Yes, sir.

Senator Warner. The same basic turret was utilized in World
War II, and again, the Senator referred to that tragedy aboard that
one battleship, but there were literally hundreds of thousands of
firings during that period without incident, am I not correct on
that?

Admiral Milligan. That is correct, sir.

Senator Warner. Now, Admiral, have you had an opportunity
this morning, and the Captain and Mr. Powers, to provide this
committee with all of the pertinent facts that you feel we should
take into consideration?

In other words, we have questioned you, but during the course of
the questioning, do you feel that there is another aspect that you
have not presented in either direct testimony or in the submis-
sions, that you would now like to provide this committee?

I am giving you an opportunity at this time to provide such addi-
tional testimony as you feel might be pertinent — my invitation is
to all the witnesses.

Admiral Milligan. Well, I would like to make a few comments.
Senator Warner. I appreciate the opportunity to do so.

Really, to make sure the record is straight, we have had a signifi-
cant discussion with regard to the FBI equivocal death analysis,
and I need to make it understood that my understanding of equivo-
cal is, it refers to the manner of death in unattended or suspicious
circumstances, not to the strength of the psychologist's report, with
regard to their opinion.

Chairman Nunn. In other words equivocal modifies death and
not analysis, is that right?

Admiral Milligan. Not their opinion. It is more to the unattend-
ed or suspicious nature of the situation, not to the analysis of the
psychologists that conducted the review.

I also have talked many, many times today with regard to the
position of the rammer in the center gun on April 19, and the fact
that the rammer is 42 inches into the breech is really an unex-
plained issue.

The rammer was where it should not have been, and it is a very
significant part of this investigation and it is very conclusive evi-
dence that that rammer was, in fact, 42 inches into the breech.
That is a very important issue, and I would ask Mr. Powers if he
has any comments?

Mr. Powers. I have no comments.

Captain Miceli. I would like to make one.

When the Admiral and I had to make a recommendation that
would allow the CNO to lift the moratorium on the battleships, I
did not make my recommendation with regard to the safety of the
propellant until August 7. At that point in time we not only looked
at the affected lot, but we also examined and critically analyzed
the worldwide inventory of 16-inch propellant. We conducted suffi-
cient sampling, a lot of sampling, to be able to state that we had a
99 percent confidence level that 99.99 percent of the inventory was
safe.

Now why can I not say 100 percent? I would have to test the
total inventory.

Thank you, sir.

Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, I wish to compliment you and
other members of the committee. I asked for this hearing, and I
think we have had a fair and open first session.

The chairman and I have discussed subsequent meetings on this
matter. Of course, that is a matter for the Chair to announce at an
appropriate time.

I think that we are, in the eyes of the American people, off to
what I would call a fair and objective search for such facts as
might bear on this case and have provided the Navy an opportuni-
ty to tell us their story. Now we will provide an opportunity for
others to come in and give their perspective on this case.

This is one that is not only important to the families who suf-
fered these losses, but equally, if not more important to the thou-
sands and thousands of sailors still out there operating these ships
and aircraft all over the world today. They have to understand if
there is a problem that they will be treated in a fair and objective
manner as we are endeavoring to do.

We thank you.

Chairman Nunn. Thank you. Senator Warner. We will be hear-
ing from the captain of the ship sometime in December, and, de-
pending upon when the General Accounting Office completes their
inquiry, we will hear from them also and perhaps from the FBI. So
v/e do plan further hearings.

Admiral, did you make any kind of recommendation regarding
the Navy taking disciplinary action against any of the people on
the ship from the captain right on down?

Admiral Milligan. Yes, sir. My report includes a number of rec-
ommendations with regard to taking principals to nonjudicial pun-
ishment or mast and also with regard to relieving them from their
duty, sir.

Chairman Nunn. Have those all been acted on by the CNO?

Admiral Milligan. There were a couple of modifications in the
endorsement process. Subsequent to that, all of those mast cases
have been held, and the flag officer holding the mast has made his
decision.

Chairman Nunn. Can your recommendations there be made
public?

Admiral Milligan. Yes, sir.

Chairman Nunn. Have they been made public?

Admiral Milligan. The report has been made public. There are
some redactions, but the recommendations, I think, are still avail-
able in the redacted report.

Chairman Nunn. Thank you. Senator Glenn.

Senator Glenn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

At what temperature does the powder normally ignite? Do you
know. Captain?

Captain Miceli. Yes, sir. The propellant at approximately 450 F,
and the black powder at approximately 900 F.

Senator Glenn. Does that change as the powder degrades over a
period of time? Do you run checks on it and say it is still good
powder, but does the ignition requirement change as the powder
degrades over a lengthy period?

Captain Miceli. The test that we ran with regard to stabilizer,
remaining diphenylamine in the propellant, indicates that in a
worldwide inventory the ignition temperatures would be about as I
indicated.

Senator Glenn. So as the powder degrades or as the propellant
degrades, the ignition temperature requirement does not substan-
tially change? Is that correct?

Captain Miceli. I am not aware of that sir. We did not find any
increased sensitivity either in the black powder or in the propel-
lant with regard to

Senator Glenn. It lights at about 450?

Captain Miceli. The propellant does, and the black powder is
about 900.

Senator Glenn. About 900?

Captain Miceli. Yes, sir.

Senator Glenn. In these checks that you ran on different things,
friction being one, electrostatic discharge, if you overram what
would the pressure get up to? As I understand the data, there is
about 2,200 pounds of pressure on the bags. Is that correct?

Captain Miceli. 2,200 pounds of force, not psi.

Senator Glenn. OK, 2,200 pounds of force. What would have
been the temperature rise on the bags just from that force?

Captain Miceli. I do not think there would be any.

Senator Glenn. From an overram, the pressure would not cause
the temperature to go up?

Captain Miceli. I do not think so, sir. If it does, I believe it would
be negligible.

Senator Glenn. Because your volume is not going down? I think
your volume would be going down in that case. This is just a law of
physics. PBT equals PET, as I recall.

Captain Miceli. Yes, sir. I do not think that is a significant issue
with regard to the overram.

Senator Glenn. Did you check that?

Admiral Milligan. We conducted the overram test 100 times.

Senator Glenn. What temperature rise did you get, then?

Admiral Milligan. We did not measure the temperature, to my
knowledge.

Captain Miceli. I do not remember that specifically. I would like
to get back to you with the specifics on that.

Senator Glenn. I would like to know, because there has to be
some temperature rise there. I just cannot imagine there would not
be.

Captain Miceli. Let me check, and I will get back to you on that

right away.
Senator Glenn. All right. If you would, I would appreciate it.
[The information referred to follows:]

Temperature Increase During Ramming

Specific tests were done to measure whether any temperature increase occurred
in any portion of a bag charge during ramming into the gun. Thermocouples were
used to measure the temperatures at several locations in the propellant bag, at two
locations in the black powder ignition pad, and at two locations between the silk bag
and the polyurethane foam liner. A total of 8 rams were done, with 5 being at the
bag charge ramming speed of 1.5 feet per second and with 3 being done at an inter-
mediate speed of 5-6 feet per second. The bag charges were rammed until they were
stopped by the projectile, and the pressure was held on the charges for several sec-
onds. The maximum temperature rise measured in any of these tests was 3 degrees
F, which is considered negligible.

Senator Glenn. I was wondering, too, did you test any combina-
tions together? I was wondering whether if you had a pressure rise
because of this, did you then at the same time put in any electro-
static discharge? Did you put in any friction heat? Were there any
combinations run?

I know you cannot carry this out to ridiculous extremes perhaps,
but were any combinations run where things could have acted to-
gether? This is not an either/or type situation. You had a lot of dy-
namics working on that gun all at one time.

Captain Miceli. We looked at all the different possible combina-
tions that we could think of.

Senator Glenn. Such as you ran the electrostatic discharge or
friction and the pressure all at the same time?

Captain Miceli. We ran the propellant test on the propellant
grains. We ran the propellant test on the ground-up propellant
grains. We ran propellant tests with anywhere from 450 psi of pres-
sure to 20,000

Senator Glenn. That is not my question. My question is did you
run all of these combinations on the dynamics that were occurring
on that gun at that time? Where you had some friction, you meas-
ured friction? You had ESD, you measured ESD? You had pressure
rise because of the rammer going in too far. All these things were
occurring, but there was no test end run on combinations thereof;
is that correct?

Captain Miceli. Yes, sir, there was. I will be happy to provide
the specifics to you.

Senator Glenn. I would like to have that, because I think it is
very important.

Captain Miceli. We ran field tests, the actual conditions, the en-
vironment that existed in the gun with the overram, on propellant,
on black powder, on broken pellets, on crushed black powder, and
we also ran the laboratory test to stress the condition to determine
what kind of a possible ignition could occur.

Senator Glenn. Well, can we say with any absolute certainty
that a combination of these things would not have combined to get
this up to ignition temperature?

Captain Miceli. I ran combinations with ether, pressure, ESD,
hero, friction, compression, and I would like to share all of those
with your staff, sir.

[The information referred to follows:]

Tests Combining Possible Causes

A number of tests were run which combined various possible causes as identified
in the cause and effect analysis. A summary of these is provided below.

1. A new test fixture was devised to simulate the effects of the ramming process
on loose propellant and black powder. The test was designed to simulate loose pro-
pellant grains, ground up propellant grains, or black powder either on the cradle or
in the chamber during the ramming cycle. This was primarily a friction test, but
other possible environments were added as well. All tests were done with propellant
and black powder from bag charges of the same lot involved in the incident offload-
ed from the Iowa.

a. Both the propellant and the black powder were tested with (1) silk bag material
and (2) polyurethane wear reducing liner material, both soaked in ether, as one of
the frictional surfaces (the other being steel).

b. A number of "contaminants," including sand, rust, iron filings, glass beads, and
Break Free CLP were used to coat the steel surface. Whole propellant grains,
ground repellant, black powder, and ground propellant and black powder mixed to-
gether were tested with these contaminants. Three combinations of frictional sur-
faces were used: steel on steel, silk bag material on steel, and polyurethane wear
reducing liner material on steel. The silk and polyurethane materials were also
tested soaked in ether.

2. Full scale ramming tests were done at both the projectile ramming speed (14
feet per second) and at the bag charge ramming speed (1.5 feet per second). These
tests subjected the propellant and black powder to a combination of the following
environments: friction, impact, compression, ether (the ether remaining in the air
inside each bag charge after removal from the powder tank), and the electrostatic
charge built up on each bag charge during handling and ramming.

3. Electrostatic discharge tests were done on full bag charges in a sealed test
chamber immediately after removal of the charges from the powder tanks in order
to preserve the ether atmosphere inside the bags.

No reactions occurred in any of these tests.

Senator Glenn. All right.

Senator Nunn asked about the delay fusing on this thing, and I
do not want to get into experimental delay fusing but I want to
clear that up. I do not believe that was being used at this time.
Was this a dummy load?

Admiral Milligan. It was a blank, loaded and plugged inert pro-
jectile.

Senator Glenn. So this could not have been a factor in this thing
at all?

Admiral Milligan. That is correct.

Senator Glenn. One other thing. When you are gunlaying, when
you are on target, the gun is stabiUzed no matter what the ship is
doing rolHng around under it; right?

Admiral Milligan. That is correct.

Senator Glenn. Is that an electrical circuit, or is that a hydrau-
lic circuit?

Admiral Milligan. That would be electrical. It is trained and
elevated with electrical motors.

Senator Glenn. Once it is trained and laying on target, then at
that point that is all electrical circuitry that keeps it trained no
matter what the roll of the ship is underneath it?

Admiral Milligan. Yes, sir. It does not roll very much, sir.

Senator Glenn. But it rolls some, enough to throw you off target.
If you are firing at something 20 miles away, it does not take but a
millimeter or two to throw you clear off target.

Admiral Milligan. The elevation and train are electrically
driven.

Senator Glenn. Was that activated so we know there was no
electrical circuitry that got into this from the gunlaying? Was that
stabilization system on during this firing?

Admiral Milligan. Yes, sir. The gun was in full operation.

Senator Glenn. Was that a factor, and did you look at that as to
whether that particular turret might have had antiextraneous cir-
cuits because of the gunlaying?

Admiral Milligan. We looked for any possibility of an electrical
short that might have caused this accident and could find nothing.

Now the gun was on a target

Senator Glenn. Including the stabilization? Because when you
run it on shore at Dahlgren, you would not have gun stabilization
on.

Admiral Milligan. Yes, sir. That is true. For this particular gun
it was in a load position, so it was not under the stabilization at
that time. Once a gun is loaded and put back into automatic, it
comes up to the target elevation and then is stabilized at that ele-
vation.

Senator Glenn. Just one other comment, and then my time is
up.

There were so many people on this thing in the chain of com-
mand, the captain, executive officer, weapons officer, gunnery offi-
cer, not knowing that this was a nonstandard loading and that
there were unqualified people doing a live firing exercise.

Now Admiral, you are not CNO yet, I know. But because of the
state of readiness at that time aboard the Iowa, I hope we can get
some assurance from you that this is not representative of the
readiness of other ships in the fleet.

When you had the New Jersey, was this considered normal oper-
ation as to what the readiness was on the Iowa and the prepara-
tion of the officers and the crew? Was this normal operations?

Admiral Milligan. No, sir. The condition on the New Jersey, I
certainly would hope, was not this way, and as best I recall it was
not.

Senator Glenn. How do we know this is not going on throughout
the whole fleet right now? That is my major concern.

Admiral Milligan. We have continuous inspection programs,
and we are doing everything we can to maintain our readiness.
Some of these programs are difficult, but there is no question in
my mind that in the weapons department — and I leave it only with
the weapons department on board the Iowa — there were some
major problems with regard to the administration of that depart-
ment.

I think it has to be known. Those were laid out very clearly right
m the open in this report. Everything that I did in this investiga-
tion is right out in the open. We made recommendations with
regard to those problems. The Chief of Naval Operations had di-
rected action to make sure that they are rectified as a matter of
urgency. They are not acceptable, sir.

Chairman Nunn. Thank you, Senator Glenn.

I believe Senator Levin is next.

Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Back to this difference between the electronic and the chemical
timer issue. Admiral. One of your findings, number 230F, I believe,
said that all three rotating bands had been examined under a scan-
ning electron microscope, an SEM, and then it says the overall
SEM spectra shows a close comparison between the Iowa ring and
the ring from the test firing employing a timer control explosive
device.

Is that an electronic explosive device? Is a timer control explo-
sive device an electronic explosive device?

Admiral Milligan. Yes, sir.

Senator Levin. At the time you wrote these findings, it was your
belief based upon some kind of a microscopic examination that the
foreign material that you found there looked like it could have
come from an electronic timer; is that correct?

Admiral Milligan. At the time I signed my report. Senator
Levin, that was the closest match we saw in our analysis; but I
have to restate the basis of my report is on the fact that foreign
material was found in the propellant charge, not the specific type
of initiator.

Senator Levin. Except there was a specific finding of fact?

Admiral Milligan. There was a finding of fact. It is an opinion, I
believe — is it a finding of fact?

Senator Levin. I do not know.

Admiral Milligan. If it is 220-something, it is a finding of fact.
The best match on that was with the electronic timer or the resi-
due from a test shot using an electronic timer.

Senator Levin. It is that finding which the FBI report precluded;
is that correct?

Admiral Milligan. The FBI analysis of the residue could not
find an electronic timer device, nor could we in our further analy-
sis.

Senator Levin. So the FBI finding was inconsistent with your
finding 230F?

Admiral Milligan. At that point in time. But right now our find-
ing is consistent with the FBI, that we did not have an electronic
timer.

Senator Levin. My question is, was the FBI finding inconsistent
with your finding 230F?

Admiral Milligan. It was inconclusive, that is correct.

Senator Levin. That is not my question. Did I say inconclusive? I
misspoke. ! thought I said inconsistent.

Admiral Milligan. Their finding was inconclusive. Ours was
that we had the residue there, so they were inconsistent. There is
no qaestion.

Senator Levin. Well, then, let me ask my question again. Was
the FBI finding inconsistent with your finding 230F?

Admiral Milligan. I would have to say yes.

Senator Levin. When I asked you before, I think on my last
round, whether there were any inconsistencies between the FBI
findings and yours, you said no, but now I think you are agreeing
that at least in that one area, that the FBI findings are inconsist-
ent with your finding, 230F.

Admiral Milligan. The FBI did not find any fingerprints of a
chemical -excuse me — of a timer device, and this finding of fact, in
my report, says that the residue in the Iowa band most closely
matches with the residue from a test firing band that used a timer
device as the source of ignition.

That is the issue there.

Senator Levin. I am not sure I understand the difficulty here in
saying that, yes, the FBI finding is inconsistent with your finding,
230F. Why is that a complicated thing for you to acknowledge?

Admiral Milligan. I do not have any problem acknowledging
that. They did not find it. And, at this point in time, we did not
either.

So, I guess in that, we are consistent. But not at the time I
signed the report. I signed the report on the basis that we had for-
eign material, not that we had a timer device.

Senator Levin. I am not sure how you are answering my ques-
tion. I am no longer sure. And I will ask it again.

Admiral Milligan. Okay, sir.

Senator Levin. Was the FBI finding inconsistent with your find-
ing 230F?

Admiral Milligan. Yes.

Senator Levin. What troubles me, I must tell you, is not so much
your conclusion. I think people can differ on conclusions, and you
had an obligation to reach the best conclusion you could. You do
your duty the way you see it, and that is what you have got to do,
that is what you take an oath to do, and I think you have done a
good job of carrying out your oath. What bothers me is the certain-
ty of your conclusion that you do not acknowledge that there are
some factors which raise some doubts.

Now, you can resolve those doubts the way you have, and I un-
derstand that. Whether I agree with it or not is not the point, but
you can in good conscience, I believe, reach the conclusion you
have and resolve the doubts in the way you have. But what trou-
bles me is that you do not acknowledge the existence of any doubt.
And even in a criminal trial a jury can convict, although there is a
doubt, not if there is a reasonable doubt, but a doubt.

There are factors pointing in different directions here which
trouble me, including the fact that he was not assigned to be there
that day. That is a troubling fact for me.

Admiral Milligan. He was there and we have conclusive evi-
dence he was there.

Senator Levin. A premeditated, purposeful act of suicide when
you were not supposed to be there is a little difficult for me to
accept. It raises a doubt in my mind. That is all I am saying. I
might resolve the doubt the same way you resolve the doubt.

Admiral Milligan. I understand.

Senator Levin. But you do not acknowledge any information at
all that raises a doubt, even though you have resolved your doubts
the way you have. What troubles me about your conclusion is that
it is so absolute and unacknowledging of any factual material
pointing in a different direction.

If you had said, look, I have got 250 facts, 220 of them point this
way, and I have got 10 of them, or whatever, pointing the other
way, I resolved it that way. If you had done that, I would feel a lot
more comfortable. But the inability to acknowledge any doubt is
what troubles me.

Also, I do not know why the question about the inconsistency be-
tween your finding and the FBI finding cannot just simply be ac-
knowledged. It is not something which is not explainable in the
way you have tried to explain it, but there is an inconsistency.

So you went back and looked and sent out this material to a dif-
ferent lab, and they came back with a different conclusion, which
still supports your ultimate conclusion. That seems to me to be the
way to answer that question.

I am just expressing my own feeling. I think you have carried
out your duty according to your best conscience, and that is what
you are supposed to do. And it is a tough job, and I think all of us
ought to, by the way, appreciate that you have got a very difficult
job and you do not relish the finding that you have made. It comes
through very clearly in your testimony and otherwise. And I think
we have to acknowledge you have a very, very difficult job.

Those are my difficulties with your conclusions. Thank you.

Chairman Nunn. Did you want to respond, Admiral?

Admiral Milligan. Well, I would say that this was very difficult,
but I feel a very thorough, and maybe unprecedented investigation,
with regard to the depth that we went into all aspects of the inves-
tigation. And I would tell the committee, Mr. Chairman, that the
conclusion or the opinions that I come to were very painful to even-
tually settle on. It was not an easy job whatsoever. I knew what my
task was, and that was, to the best of my ability, to find out what
caused this accident, as I said earlier, so that it would never
happen again. And I believe that is what we did.

And every fact, every bit of information that was available to me
is in this report. And when I put it all together, I made the only
opinion that I could. And as painful as that was, believe me, I have
the deepest sympathy with the family of Petty Officer Hartwig for
what this has come down to.

I wish it could have been a different way.

Chairman Nunn. Thank you.

Senator Dixon, do you have any other questions?

Senator Dixon. Admiral, getting back to that rammer, my under-
standing, as a lay person, of your testimony, is that the rammer

was 21 inches beyond the position it should have been in at the
time. Is that a layman's correct interpretation of your testimony?

Admiral Milligan. That is correct.

Senator Dixon. Now, I am advised that the rammer had a con-
siderably bad performance record in the immediate past; that, in
fact, it accelerated sometimes and sometimes it stuck, and that
there was substantial mechanical difficulty in the past with that
rammer. Is that information available to you?

Admiral Milligan. Our inspection of the turret and all of the
maintenance records associated with turret II show no materiel
problems in that turret.

Senator Dixon. But did you have information from other mem-
bers of that crew who had operated that rammer in the past, that
they had difficulty with that rammer?

Admiral Milligan. None that I recall, but I would have to go
back and review all of that, it has been a long time.

Senator Dixon. I wish you would reexamine your record. My in-
formation is that there are personnel who suggested that it acceler-
ated sometimes, sometimes it stuck, and that it had technical diffi-
culties.

Admiral Milligan. I guess I would only add to my comments at
this point, I will go back and look at the testimony. But we re-
moved that entire system from the ship after the accident. We then
reconstructed the entire rammer system over at the Norfolk Naval
Shipyard, and that system worked absolutely perfectly. The only
damage to it was that the chain and the rammer head were miss-
ing.

Senator Dixon. Well, I reference the precise rammer involved in
the incident.

Admiral Milligan. That is the rammer I am talking about.

Senator Dixon. Yes. Okay.

I would like for you to look into that. Our information is that
that rammer had been one that did not function well. What would
be the significance of that?

Chairman Nunn. Senator Dixon, there is some information, I be-
lieve, that there was a rammer in another turret that did not func-
tion, that they had some problem with.

Senator Dixon. But then it is not uncommon for a rammer to not
function well?

Admiral Milligan. As I just mentioned — no, it is uncommon, be-
cause they are a very reliable system.

Senator Dixon. Can rammers accelerate too much and some-
times jam? Do they do that?

Admiral Milligan. I know of no history of that happening.

Senator Dixon. But it does happen sometimes?

Admiral Milligan. I know of no history of it happening.

Senator Dixon. What was the significance of that rammer being
21 inches too far in, to you?

Admiral Milligan. It does a number of things. One of them is it
pushes the five bags up against the base of the projectile, so that is
a very significant issue.

If the rammer is not that far in and you have a problem, say, it
is right near the face of the breech and you have a problem, you
can in fact extract the cradle, it will send the rammer up into the

24-931 0-91-4

overhead of the gun room, but you could extract the cradle and
shut the breech real fast if you had a problem. With the rammer
42 inches in the breech you could never do that.

So it really had the system locked into where it was at the time
of the explosion.

Senator Dixon. And I have information that sometimes they put
that pad — forgive me for using lay terminology — between bags four
and five; that it is not always put between one and two. What is
the significance of that distinction?

Admiral Milligan. There is testimony that the gunnersmates
who — the gun captains do not always put the bag in between bags
one and two. I can just tell you that the technical manual and a
competent gunnersmate — the technical manual says and a compe-
tent gunnersmate would put it in the right place. And we have
every reason to believe that Petty Officer Hartwig was a competent
gunnersmate.

Senator Dixon. Well, on the basis of everything I have heard
from you so far, I come to these conclusions. By your own state-
ment here, this turret at least was not functioning as well and op-
erated as well as you thought you did on the New Jersey. So there
were troubles with the operation.

We have all the statements about missing personnel, inexperi-
enced personnel and unqualified personnel there. We have highly
explosive material, powder in fabric bags. We have cigarette light-
ers in there. We have all of these conditions that could have con-
tributed to any multitude of different accidents or acts of God of
some sort or another that could cause this same terrible tragedy.

And notwithstanding every single, solitary one of those things,
and the flaws in the factual train concerning Hartwig himself that
has been gathered by your staff and others, you still come to the
conclusion that it has to be Mr. Hartwig.

Admiral Milligan. Well, everything you mentioned there are all
issues that we pursued, investigated very thoroughly. And when
you take those and the hundreds of other issues that this investiga-
tion got into and resolved, you can only come to the conclusion that
I came to in my report.

Senator Dixon. Then I will ask you finally this question. From
the perception of the American public that always wants to know
the truth about all of these incidents, and with absolutely no reflec-
tion upon you as a man of integrity, or anybody assigned to this
very difficult task with you, would you not concede that for the
service to examine its own problems in situations of this type, it
always makes the ultimate result somewhat critically received by
many in the public at large who wonder how the conclusions can
be drawn?

What I am trying to arrive at from you is whether it is not a fact
that some other independent, separate agency ought not to make
these investigations and draw these conclusions?

Admiral Milligan. Mr. Dixon, these are our people, these are
fellow service members of mine who we lost in that accident. I do
not know who could be more interested in finding the actual cause
of this accident than the Navy itself It is our problem. We are very
safety conscious. And as I know I have said in the earlier part of

this hearing, our only goal is to find out what happened in this
case.

Senator Dixon. But you would not concede that some might ex-
trapolate from that, that it is in the interest of the Navy to find
that it was purposely done with someone, so people would not draw
the conclusions that these dangerous accidents can occur in the
future and that other things ought to be done, maybe with the
fabric, maybe with the explosives, maybe with the rammer, maybe
with the staff, maybe with a lot of other things that I can think of,
all of which occur to the mind of any lay person that listens to
this?

Do you not think that is a possibility?

Admiral Milligan. I would hope that the general public would
look at the Navy as being the one body who would be most con-
cerned about this problem and would do the most thorough job in
the investigation. And, sir, that is what I feel we did.

Senator Dixon. I thank the chair.

Chairman Nunn. Let me just ask one follow-up question on that.
Admiral. What kind of resources would a group of people have to
have to conduct the kind of investigation that you have gone
through here?

Admiral Milligan. Well, Mr. Chairman, your question is very
apropos, because we in the Navy really are the ones who have the
best resources to do the testing that we did to support this investi-
gation. I do not know who else has those kinds of resources, such as
our ordnance laboratories and such as our metallurgical capability.

Chairman Nunn. Does the FBI have all the capabilities that you
have?

Admiral Milligan. Well, certainly not to do all the testing that
we did with regard to the propellant.

Chairman Nunn. Even if there was another agency in charge,
would you not, indeed, with your equipment and your personnel
and your know-how, would you not have to supply most of the ex-
pertise as well as most of the equipment?

Admiral Milligan. I would think they would have to come back
to us for the majority of the effort, yes, sir.

Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman— I think the Chief of Naval Op-
erations, based on your findings, has authorized the battleship to
go back to live firing. Am I not correct?

Admiral Milligan. That is correct, sir.

Senator Warner. And that decision would not have been made
were it not predicated on everything that could have been done—
has been done in this particular case. And you have concluded that
these turrets are safe to operate?

Admiral Milligan. Yes, sir, that is the conclusion of the report,
and I am very convinced of it.

Chairman Nunn. Admiral, we thank you. Captain, we thank
you, and Mr. Powers, we thank you. We may call you back at some
point, but at this point in time you have been very patient and we
thank you for being here. We appreciate you undertaking a tough
job. We know it is not an easy job; it is very difficult.

Whether we may agree with every single one of your findings
and every one of your opinions, I do not know whether anybody
would do that, but I do agree. Admiral, with your last statement. I

think the Navy, more than any other group of people, has a vital
stake and a personal interest and a dedicated commitment not to
let this happen again if you can possibly prevent it. And the way
you avoid that is to find out what happened here. So, I would cer-
tainly, in my opinion, agree with you on that point.

Do you have any other comments before we close?

Admiral Milligan. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate
the opportunity to appear before your committee with my cohorts
here, and we look forward to your committee's efforts and will sup-
port it in every way possible as you look at our efforts.

Chairman Nunn. Captain.

Captain Miceli. No, sir.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Nunn. Thank you.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator Alan Dixon

friction theory

Senator Dixon. The Navy's technical investigative team in a May 25 report stated
that they thought friction had caused the explosion in the gun turret. Why was this
theory rejected?

Captain Miceli. The May 25 report ended with the following statement: "While
friction is now considered the most likely cause of the initiation, this and other po-
tential causes including unstable propellant are still being thoroughly investigated,
by experiment and simulation when possible. All significant test results will be re-
ported as they become available."

When the May 25, 1989 report was written, not nearly all of the testing had been
completed, and the investigating team was in the process of identifying mechanisms
which might have caused the event. After all of the tests had been completed, the
results showed that neither the propellant nor the black powder could be ignited by
friction under the conditions which could be achieved in the turret. As a result, fric-
tion was eliminated as a probable cause of the incident.

breech explosion on u.s.s. "Mississippi" in 1924

Senator Dixon. I understand that there was a similar explosion in 1924 on the
battleship Mississippi and that the Navy's findings back then indicated that friction
caused this open breech explosion. Yet now the Navy says that explanation was in
error. What facts subsequently developed by the Navy led to this change in conclu-
sions?

Captain Miceli. The Court of Inquiry into the 1924 accident on the Mississippi
concluded that the cause was a flareback of combustible gases or a foul bore, which
ignited the bag charges during the loading process. The ship was steaming into and
firing into a strong wind. The right gun of turret 2 had trouble with its gas ejection
air system just prior to the accident. The actual event was a fire, not an explosion
as on the Iowa.

There was a second accident on the Mississippi, which occurred in 1943. The
Court of Inquiry into the accident concluded that the cause was a foul bore. As in
1924, the event was a fire, not an explosion as on the Iowa. In its review of the
report of the Court of Inquiry, the Navy's Bureau of Ordnance gave an opinion that
the accident "probably resulted either from a foul bore or from friction, etc., of the
powder bags against the moving rammer. To study this latter hypothesis, mixtures
of black powder and smokeless powder were ignited by friction. But only negative,
although not conclusive, results were had from elaborate and extensive tests with
an actual rammer." The Bureau then endorsed the report of Court of Inquiry.

At no time in 1924 or 1943 did the Navy conclude that either accident had been
caused by friction. The Bureau of Ordnance did testing in 1943 to evaluate the possi-
bility of a friction event but did not find any supporting evidence. There was no
change in the conclusions of the Navy as to the cause of either accident at any time.

DUPLICATION OF "iOWA" EXPLOSION CONDITIONS

Senator Dixon. Has the Navy been able to duplicate the conditions on the Iowa in
the gun turret using the supposed chemicals found by the Navy labs without exter-
nal power sources being used?

Captain Miceli. Yes, the Navy has been able to duplicate the Iowa event using
the chemical device described in our final report. In both open breech burning tests
where the chemical device was used to initiate the explosion, no external power
sources were used. The chemical device was inserted into the train of bag charges,
and the reaction began when the device was crushed by the ramming action, allow-
ing the two chemicals to mix together.

MOVEMENT OF PROJECTILE ON "iOWA"

Senator Dixon. I understand that in a test done on May 7, five bags were ignited
near the projectile and no movement of the projectile was noted. In a test done on
May 16 five bags were ignited, and the projectile moved forward 269 inches. In the
actual event on the Iowa, the projectile moved forward 155 inches. Why the vari-
ance in these test results?

Captain Miceli. The test on May 7 was done with an extra ignition pad sewn to
the front of the first bag charge; the gun barrel used for the test was 93 percent
worn, not 20 percent worn as was the Iowa barrel. It was this ignition pad, which
was between the first bag charge and the base of the projectile, which was ignited
by the squib. As a result, the ignition event and flame spreading would be backward
toward the open end of the gun chamber, tending to push ths bag charges out of the
gun. This would result in a lower pressure on the base of the projectile and reduced
projectile movement. There was no test conducted on May 16; there was a test con-
ducted on May 12 in which the final position of the projectile was 269 inches, trans-
lating into a total projectile movement of 182.75 inches (again, the 93 percent worn
barrel was used). In this particular test, ignition was done with a soldering iron in
the propellant at the front of the bag closest to the projectile. Without the black
powder ignition pad to provide quick flame spreading, the ignition would be very
like igniting the ignition pad between bags 1 and 2. This accounts for the large pro-
jectile movement. In the actual event on the Iowa, the projectile movement was 44
inches; the final position of the projectile was 155 inches.

As to why there are variations in the projectile movement measured from shot to
shot with the same ignition location, the ballistic characteristics of an event such as
this are inherently variable. The propelling charges are designed to be ignited in a
closed chamber with the ignition source (the output of the MK 15 PRIMER) imping-
ing perpendicularly on the rearmost ignition pad. With the breech down and the
chamber open to the atmosphere, the burning characteristics of the mass discrete
propellant grains in the bag charges, which are designed to burn anaerobically
(without external oxygen) in a closed chamber, will necessarily be variable. The ig-
nition portion of the event would also be expected to be variable. Whether using a
MK 15 primer or a squib or some other means, the output of the igniter in these
tests would not be impinging on the ignition pad in the designed mode. Combining
this change with the open chamber and the uncertainty as to the exact orientation
of the ignition source after ramming into the gun, the ignition portion of each event
would be expected to be somewhat variable. Thus, it was not expected that a test
would necessarily result in exactly 44 inches of projectile travel even if the ignition
location were exactly right. Obtaining the right magnitude or projectile travel com-
bined with the proper characteristics of the event was the best that could reason-
ably be expected.

RESULTS OF NAVY TESTS SIMILAR TO ACTUAL EXPLOSION

Senator Dixon. Did any of the tests by the Navy or anyone else ever obtain a
similar result of the actual event (close to 155 inches of forward movement of the
projectile, buckling of beams, destruction of the rammer head and chain)?

Captain Miceli. The average of the 3 tests done in a 20 percent worn barrel (the
same wear characteristics as the actual barrel on the Iowa) with ignition between
the two bag charges closest to the projectile was projectile movement of 44 inches
(final projectile position of 155 inches), matching that actually measured in the Iowa
event. These tests also provided a violent reaction judged sufficient to cause the
damage observed in the Iowa turret. The Navy concludes that the event has been
replicated.

NEWS LEAKS

Senator Dixon. As I said in my statement, I feel that there were unconscionable
news leaks by investigators for the Navy. To your knowledge, what is the Navy
doing to find and punish those people responsible for these leaks?

Admiral Milligan. The Navy concurs that the news leaks that occurred during
this investigation were unconscionable. We abhor the leaks as counter-productive to
this investigative process and view them as a disservice to the Navy as well as the
families of both deceased and surviving Iowa crew members. Given the enormous
scale of effort and scope of the Navy's investigation into the Iowa incident, however,
it was determined that a formal inquiry into the leak issue would be an enormous
undertaking with little possibility of success. The following factors were considered
and are germane: The Iowa investigation resulted in interviews of over 400 people.
Thousands of documents were retrieved and reviewed. Civilian and military person-
nel from several different Navy and Army commands as well as representatives
from other Federal Agencies and the civilian sector assisted with or were consulted
on matters related to the Navy's inquiry. Our society is an open one and the current
era is one of aggressive investigative reporting; source information is provided to
the news media by many different sources. Because of these factors, it was decided
that a full scale leak inquiry would not be conducted. If however, the identity of a
leak or media source was made known, appropriate action would be taken.

u.s.s. "iowa" gun turret explosion

Senator Dixon. In the information given to the FBI for a psychological profile of
Petty Officer Hartwig, I understand that the Naval Investigative Service said that
Hartwig was a homosexual, based on a report from a sailor which was later recant-
ed by that sailor. Did the Naval Investigative Service inform the FBI that the sailor
had recanted his story?

Mr. Powers. The Naval Investigative Service provided a briefing and documenta-
tion to the National Center for Analysis of Violent Crime, Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation (FBI), Quantico, Virginia, that included interviews of witnesses and family
members who expressed their opinion that Petty Officer Hartwig may have been
homosexual or exhibited homosexual tendencies. "The FBI was informed that a sailor
who had provided two statements concerning Petty Officer Hartwig had recanted
portions of his statement.

chemical analysis of copper band

Senator Dixon. The Navy says that the copper band is an uncontaminated "time
capsule" of the explosion. If that is so, why has the Navy been unable to come up
with any chemical device whose chemical analysis matches that of the Iowa Band?
Why is there no exact match?

Captain Miceli. The Navy conducted two open breech burning tests in which a
chemical device (calcium hypochlorite, brake fluid, and steel wool) was used to initi-
ate the explosion. The iron fibers found in the rotating bands from these tests had a
coating of calcium, chlorine, and oxygen. The analysis also identified the glycols
from the brake fluid as well as the polyethylene from the plastic bag used to con-
tain the chemical device. The iron fibers found in the rotating band of the Iowa pro-
jectile had the same coating of calcium, chlorine, and oxygen. Three glycols, two of
which have no identifiable source in any material used in the ship, as well as plastic
fragments identified as polyethylene-polyethylene terephthalate were also found in
the Iowa rotating band. The Navy concludes that a good match to the chemical
analysis of the residue in the Iowa band has been provided by the tests using a
chemical device.

chlorine in "iowa" band

Senator Dixon. In Captain Miceli's August 11 report, a chart shows that there is
no chlorine in the Iowa band. Yet, in the final September 7 report the Navy says
there is chlorine in the Iowa band. Why the difference between the two charts?

Captain Miceli. The analysis by the Norfolk Naval Shipyard laboratory had
found chlorine in the Iowa band, but the focus of their analysis was on other ele-
ments. The fact that chlorine was not shown in the chart in the August 11 report
was simply an oversight. A copy of the spectra from the scanning electron micro-
scope analysis by the shipyard of a particle from the Iowa showing the presence of
chlorine is attached. Also, the shipyard did not investigate the iron wire. The results
which were available at the time of the August 1 1 report were those from the Ship-
yard's analysis. The Crane analysis, which had only started by the time of the

August 11 report, was where the strong evidence of the chlorine was found. This is
why the chlorine was shown in the September 7 chart.

21-JUN-a9 13:
RATE- OCPS

FS- 2220CNT
A -FIGURE 5

1 2

2 O

E D A X

T I M E -

p n s T -

READY

1 O 0 L S E C
OFF

2.00
2 3 3 C N T

4.00
5 ,

O O K

6.00
E V

a.oo

lOeV/ch A

E D A X

FOREIGN ELEMENT QUANTITIES

Senator Dixon. Can the Navy please provide the exact quantities of each foreign
element found on the Iowa band, as well as the quantities of each element found
bands — both timing device and chemical device?

Captain Miceli. A quantitative comparison of the foreign elements found in the
Iowa band and in the bands from open breech shots fired with a timing device can
be provided from the analysis done by the Norfolk Naval Shipyard. A summary
table with these data is attached. Similar data cannot be provided for the bands
from the shots using a chemical device. The reason for this is that the FBI advised
the investigation in early August that simple differences in levels of chemical ele-
ments were not adequate proof of the presence of a device. Their advice was that it
was necessary to find distinctive materials (a chemical compound, a fiber, a piece of
glass, etc.) which could be traced to a device. Thus, in the subsequent analysis con-
ducted by the Naval Weapons Support Center, Crane, the focus was on demonstrat-
ing the presence or absence of such distinctive materials. Further quantitative ele-
mental analysis, similar to that done early in the investigation by the Shipyard, was
not continued. The Navy's conclusions as to the cause of the incident are not based
on an elemental analysis but on the presence of foreign (distinctive) materials in the
Iowa band.

Comparison of Quantitative Analysis of Foreign Cfiemical Elements

[By the Norfolk Naval Shipyard]

Level of
barium [ppm]

Level ol
calcium [ppm]

IOWA Band

Electronic device initiated test bands..

565

1250
725

[ppm]: parts per million.

contamination of IOWA BAND

Senator Dixon. Is it true that there was so much contamination on the Iowa band
from "Break Free" that it is likely that at least some of the foreign elements m the
band had to have been introduced during the removal of the band from the gun.

Captain Miceli. The foreign materials (not elements) which the Navy s mvestiga-
tion has found (iron wire coated with calcium, chlorine, and oxygen; glycol chemical
compounds; plastic materials; and others) could not have been introduced by the

100

Break Free CLP during the removal of the projectile from the gun barrel. All of the
open breech burning tests conducted as part of the investigation included the use of
Break Free CLP to clean the barrel. In one control test, steel wool was placed m
with the bag charges as a contaminant. The iron wires found in the rotating band
after the test did not have the matching coating to those found in the Iowa band.
We have carefully checked all materials which might have been present as potential
sources for the foreign materials found in the Iowa band.

As regards the introduction of contaminants during the removal of the projectile,
it must be remembered that a force of approximately 1,000,000 pounds was exerted
on the projectile to engrave it into the rifling during incident. The radial pressure
on the rotating band from the gun barrel was over 14,000 pounds per square mch
after the event was over. This resulted in the opening into the "trap" area of the
band being only 5 micrometers or less. The iron wires found in the trap area were
60 micrometers or greater in diameter; they could not have been introduced into the
trap area after the event was completed (i.e., during removal of the projectile). In
addition, the iron wires were actually imbedded into the ring, which could only have
happened when the copper metal of the ring was soft from the heat of burning pro-
pel lant gases.

u.s.s. "iowa" gun turret explosion

Senator Dixon. Did the Navy ask the FBI to determine whether the Iowa incident
was an accident or not? Or, did the Navy ask the FBI to determine whether
Hartwig or Truitt was lesponsible. What exactly was the charge to the FBI?

Mr. Powers. The FBI at the National Center for Analysis of Violent Crime, Quan-
tico, Virginia, was not asked to determine whether the Iowa incident was an acci-
dent. The FBI was advised that no accidental cause for the accident had been dis-
covered at the time FBI assistance was requested. The Naval Investigative Service
did not ask the FBI to determine whether Hartwig or Truitt was responsible. After
the FBI was briefed on the investigation, they were asked to provide some insight
into Hartwig's personality. The FBI was asked to provide a profile of Hartwig and
to determine if Hartwig was capable of committing such an act.

Senator Dixon. Did the Navy tell the FBI that Hartwig had been turned down for
a new assignment in London? Had he? Or had he been approved for the posting?
Was he being considered? What was the status of his transfer application, and what
did he know about it?

Mr. Powers. The FBI was provided with all the information that NIS had devel-
oped in regards to Hartwig's possible transfer or assignment to London. That infor-
mation was confusing in that inquiries on the Iowa disclosed that Hartwig had been
told that he was not eligible for such an assignment; however, NIS inquiries at the
Naval Military Personnel Command (NMPC) indicated that his transfer was still
being processed. Unfortunately, Hartwig's file at NMPC, which was held by detail-
ers handling the transfer, was destroyed when Hartwig was identified as one of the
casualties on the Iowa. No orders had been issued to Hartwig assigning him to
London.

Senator Dixon. How much of the NIS information did the FBI actually take into
its possession? Could you please furnish a list of this material? Was the FBI in each
case provided with the recantations by witnesses who changed their testimony prior
to the initial writing of the report?

Mr. Powers. The following is a listing of the dates NIS met with the FBI agents
at the National Center for Analysis of Violent Crime and the information provided
at each meeting:

May 23, 1989— Copies of memo and steno pads which passed between Hartwig and
Truitt were provided to FBI.

June 2, 1989— Exhibits provided to FBI (from June 21, Report of Investigation):
165— Harry D. Freeman, 168— Mark S. Elkins, 39— Edward J. Stark, 71— D.P. Mc-
Elyea, 159,160— Adam Jason Zion, 104— K.L. Truitt, 78— Charlene Meter— All let-
ters to and from Hartwig, 8— Evelyn S. Hartwig, 72— Brian Hoover, 7— K. Kubicma,
77— Pam G. Hartman, 73— Angel Baker, 107— Carol Truitt, 100,101— John Mullahy,
149,150— Joseph Glynn, 80,81— Michele Poling— All letters to and from Hartwig,
10 — Photographs of Hartwig's room in Cleveland, OH.

June 15, 1989— Exhibits provided to FBI (from June 21, Report of Investigation):
146— Poem "Disposable Heroes," 153,156— David Smith.

August 2, 1989— Exhibit provided to FBI (from August 29, Report of Investiga-
tion): 20 — Nathan A. Estey — transcript.

The only individual that has recanted a portion of his statement to NIS is David
Smith. The FBI was advised of Smith recanting a portion of his statement on June
15, 1989.

[Whereupon at 1:16 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

REVIEW OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY'S
INVESTIGATION INTO THE GUN TURRET EX-
PLOSION ABOARD THE U.S.S. "IOWA"

MONDAY, DECEMBER 11, 1989

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,

Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:08 a.m., in room SH-
216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Sam Nunn (chairman)
presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Nunn, Dixon, Warner,
and Cohen.

Committee staff members present: Arnold L. Punaro, staff direc-
tor; Richard D. DeBobes, counsel; and Marie Fabrizio Dickinson, as-
sistant chief clerk.

Professional staff member present: Norman G. Mosher.

Minority staff members present: Patrick A. Tucker, minority
staff director and counsel; John E. Mansfield and Mark B. Robin-
son, professional staff members.

Staff assistants present: Lori M. Jackson; Kelli J. Pronovost; Me-
lissa A. Ramsey; and Debra A. Rice.

Committee members' assistants present: Jeffrey B. Subko, assist-
ant to Senator Exon; William J. Lynn, assistant to Senator Kenne-
dy; Charles C. Smith, assistant to Senator Dixon; Milton D. Beach,
assistant to Senator Glenn; Terrence M. Lynch, assistant to Sena-
tor Shelby; Dale F. Gerry, assistant to Senator Cohen; and Charles
G. Pearcy, assistant to Senator Lott.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR SAM NUNN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Nunn. The committee will come to order.

The committee meets this morning for the second of a series of
hearings on matters associated with the explosion on April 19, 1989
in the center gun of turret II on the U.S.S. Iowa which resulted in
the deaths of 47 Navy personnel. The first hearing in this series
took place on November 16 and included the testimony of Rear
Adm. Richard D. Milligan, the investigating officer, and the testi-
mony of the director of the technical support team and the director
of criminal investigations of the Naval Investigative Service.

This morning we will receive the testimony of Capt. Fred P. Moo-
sally, Jr. of the U.S. Navy, Commanding Officer, U.S.S. Iowa. Cap-
tain Moosally assumed command of the U.S.S. Iowa in May 1988.

The U.S.S. Iowa is the second of four battleships that were re-
commissioned during the 1980s at a total cost of about $1.5 billion.

(101)

102

She was previously commissioned in February 1943 and then again
in April 1951. The purpose of this series of hearings is to attempt
to assess the adequacy of the Navy's investigative report and also
to assess the accuracy of its conclusions. Additionally and on a
broader scale, we intend to explore the adequacy of the Navy's sup-
port and employment plans for the U.S.S. Iowa and her other sister
battleships.

I outlined in my opening statement at our last hearing the prob-
lems found by the investigating officer in the weapons department
of the Iowa. It must also be noted that testimony was received
during the course of the overall Navy investigation that cast doubt
on the Navy's support for the U.S.S. Iowa and, by implication, for
the other three battleships. The Navy's investigation did not in-
quire into these matters, but we will this morning. They include:

First, the priority of officer and enlisted manning and the quality
of personnel on board the U.S.S. Iowa;

Second, the adequacy of training on the 16-inch guns since there
is no hands-on training for personnel prior to reporting to the bat-
tleships;

Third, the employment plan for battleships, how they will be
used tactically and strategically;

Fourth, the responsiveness of the Navy to repair and repair part
requests for battleships; and

Fifth, the adequacy of various inspections and surveys conducted
on board the battleships.

As indicated at our last hearing, I have requested the General
Accounting Office to look into these matters as well as to review
the Navy's investigation as a whole in an attempt to assess its ade-
quacy and to determine whether its conclusions are correct.

I am pleased to note that the Sandia National Laboratories has
agreed to assist in this endeavor by analyzing the rotating band
that was removed from the projectile that was in the barrel of the
gun in which the explosion occurred. Sandia' s analysis will attempt
to determine the presence and nature of foreign materials on the
rotating band. Additionally, they will attempt to determine if the
Navy's hypothesis as to the detonators and the initiation of the ex-
plosion are consistent with any materials that may be found.

This afternoon we will have witnesses from the Federal Bureau
of Investigation who will testify as to the results of the analysis of
the rotating band performed by their laboratory and the equivocal
death analysis prepared by the FBI's National Center for the Anal-
ysis of Violent Crime.

Let me make sure I am pronouncing that correctly. Moosally?

Captain Moosally. That is close, sir. That is good enough.

Chairman Nunn. Close is good enough for a southerner, I guess.

This morning we want to give Captain Moosally an opportunity
to respond to the finding of the Navy's investigation and to explain
his testimony during the investigation as to the lack of support to
the U.S.S. Iowa in connection with manning, training, repair and
inspections and surveys as well as his perspective on the Navy's
employment plan for battleships.

Captain Moosally is appearing in his individual capacity as the
commanding officer of the U.S.S. Iowa, and the committee will, of
course, expect you, Captain, to give your personal views. We are

103

not asking for the Navy's views today. We are asking for your
views individually.

I should note at this point that the Iowa returned just last
Thursday from a 5-month deployment to the Mediterranean.

Captain Moosally, we certainly appreciate your presence here
this morning, particularly in view of the fact that you have just re-
turned from what must have been a very difficult and demanding
deployment, since it took place so soon after the tragic explosion of
April 19.

I also want to point out at this time that the Navy's investiga-
tion found that in the aftermath of the explosion, "the damage con-
trol efforts of the ship's crew were extraordinary."

Senator Warner, why don't you give your opening statement, and
then I will have another announcement about plans for the com-
mittee that have nothing to do with this hearing.

Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you in wel-
coming the Captain. The Captain is no stranger to Capitol Hill.
You served here in the capacity of a liaison officer for many years.
This is the first opportunity for you publicly to express your views
about this tragedy, and I know that you will do so in a manner
which is consistent with the unusual situation that the Navy is in
at the present time.

We have seen a series of tragic accidents throughout the Navy.
In my own opinion, they are not linked in any way, but what you
say here today will have a heavy impact on thousands and thou-
sands of families who are waiting for their sailors to return home
from deployments across the oceans of the world. I hope, therefore,
that you, as the others have, will exercise great care in the expres-
sion of your opinions about this tragedy.

The committee is anxious to determine whether or not in its
judgment the Navy acted properly. I spoke with the Chief of Naval
Operations this morning. He stated, first, that he welcomed this
hearing and the fact that we would be able to get your testimony
public; and second, he stands foursquare behind the work that has
been done thus far by the Navy on this particular case.

So we welcome you this morning, and we wish you well.

Chairman Nunn. Thank you, Senator Warner. Senator Dixon.

Senator Dixon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman,
today's hearing is the second this committee will conduct on the
Iowa tragedy. We will be hearing this morning from Captain Moo-
sally, the commander of the Iowa at the time of the accident, and
this afternoon we will hear from representatives of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation.

As I pointed out previously, there seems to be reason to believe
that the training of the crew of the Iowa was lacking in significant
respects. Captain Moosally, in his statement before Admiral Milli-
gan's accident investigation board, indicates that when he took
command of the Iowa there were major problems in the gun tur-
rets, such as, and I quote directly, "hydraulic leaks all over the
place, lighting that did not work. They had 25 watt bulbs in be-
cause they were afraid they'd blow fuses at the 50 watt level."

The Captain further indicates that there had been a misfire in
turret I. The Iowa had shortages in trained manpower, and that

104

when he inquired about replacements he was told his ship was 37th
on a priority list for replacements.

Captain Moosally indicated that there was not even a Navy
school for training on 16-inch guns. He stated that he was given
"dopers" and poorly-trained officers and enlisted men to operate
the Iowa.

Captain Moosally is not going to be able to testify on the actual
investigation of the accident, Mr. Chairman, but I do think his tes-
timony concerning the conditions on the ship at the time of the ac-
cident will help this committee form a better picture of the situa-
tion on the ship. The Captain's appearance, therefore, is essential
to our review of the Iowa tragedy.

Mr. Chairman, my staff along with Senator Metzenbaum's staff
has reviewed the FBI's death analysis report which Admiral Milli-
gan seems to have relied on as support for the conclusion that
Petty Officer Hartwig was responsible for the disaster.

Because the Naval Investigative Services failed to provide the
FBI with complete information, however, the Bureau's conclusion
that "Hartwig died as a result of his own actions, staging his death
in such a fashion that he hoped it would appear to be an accident"
in my opinion is very much open to substantial and considerable
doubt.

Mr. Chairman, Senator Metzenbaum wanted to be at today's
hearing but because of a previous commitment cannot be here.

I look forward to hearing the facts today. I want to personally
thank the chairman for his usual careful evaluation of all matters
concerning our armed services, and I thank him for the opportuni-
ty to be here for this hearing today.

Chairman Nunn. Thank you very much. Senator Dixon.

Captain, we will turn to you in just a minute. Let me first make
an administrative announcement.

Tomorrow morning at 9 a.m. in this hearing room the committee
will conduct a hearing on the issue of warning time in central
Europe and the impact of any changes on U.S. defense force struc-
ture and budgets. We will be asking particularly about the recent
studies that have been publicized in the news media.

Our principal witness will be Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy, Paul Wolfowitz. He will be accompanied by senior military
and intelligence officials.

I have also asked Secretary Wolfowitz to address the process by
which the Department of Defense is assessing the changes and the
threats, making adjustments to our military strategy and our de-
fense force structure and budgets.

Our focus will not be precisely on what they are concluding. We
do not believe they have reached a lot of conclusions yet, but
really, we are going to focus on how they are going about it. Of
course, whatever conclusions they have reached and whatever in-
formation they have that can be made public we have urged them
to do so at this hearing.

Committee members received advance notice of this hearing last
Monday.

The second hearing was announced on November 29. The com-
mittee will be conducting a hearing on Tuesday, December 19 at 2
p.m. in Senate Russell 253 with outside witnesses on the nomina-

105

tion of Mr. Victor Stello to be Assistant Secretary of Energy for De-
fense Programs. There will be several panels of witnesses including
Mr. Stello. I wrote each member on November 29 with this infor-
mation.

Captain, we are delighted to have you this morning. Again, we
thank you for coming. I know you have just gotten back. You have
had a weekend, but not much time to recover from a long stay at
sea. We appreciate your being here today, and we look forward to
receiving your testimony.

STATEMENT OF FRED P. MOOSALLY, CAPTAIN, U.S. NAVY,
COMMANDING OFFICER, U.S.S. "IOWA"

Captain Moosally. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Senator
Warner, Senator Dixon. I am Captain Moosally, the Commanding
Officer of the battleship Iowa. I was born and raised in Youngs-
town, Ohio, and graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1966.
For 23 years I have dedicated my life to the naval service, serving
on six ships and previously commanding the U.S.S. Kidd.

I want to thank the committee for the opportunity to be here
today to discuss with you the battleship Iowa.

Mr. Chairman, you have before you a paradox, a tale of two
ships. One ship is this Iowa you read about in the newspapers, a
ship of laid back attitudes, failure and ineptitude. The other Iowa
is the Iowa that I command, an Iowa that is well trained, well
maintained and professional.

You have heard many things about the other Iowa, but the one I
command is an Iowa to be proud of, with a crew that deserves
much more credit than they have been given.

I assumed command of the Iowa in May 1988, and over the last
19 months my crew and I have proved that Iowa is one of the best
ships in our Navy. Mr. Chairman, this is a fact, not because I say
so, but because Iowa 's track record of proven performance in every
area of naval operations prior to April 19, on April 19, and every
day since April 19 says so.

We men of the Iowa are proud of our ship. I hope that today I
can convince the Congress, the American public, and most impor-
tant, the families of our fallen shipmates, some of whom are here
today, that the Iowa described in the press never existed.

Having completed a 6-month deployment for America, we ask
that America give us the chance to set the record straight. We
have earned that right.

Prior to the explosion on April 19, I took the ship through an ex-
tended shipyard period; workups to deployment that included four
weeks of dedicated, intensive refresher training at Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba; an operational propulsion plant examination; naval
gunfire support qualifications; a major planned maintenance in-
spection; a nuclear weapons acceptance inspection; a major fleet ex-
ercise; and an in-depth materiel inspection by the Board of Inspec-
tion and Survey.

Iowa was on track and had completed all predeployment hurdles
the first time with flying colors.

106

After the explosion, I directed the heroic efforts of Iowa 's crew as
they courageously fought fires and recovered their fallen ship-
mates.

I witnessed both the tragedy where 47 of our shipmates died, and
the birth of hundreds of heroes. I stood with my crew as we rebuilt
our ship in the face of overwhelming emotion and grief.

During the weeks that followed, Iowa worked with investigators
providing hundreds of hours of testimony while rebuilding our
ship. At a time normally associated with liberal leave and liberty
in preparation for a 6-month deployment, the crew selflessly devot-
ed thousands of additional manhours, working side by side with
workers from Norfolk Naval Shipyard, to evaluate the extent of
damage and restore vital systems in turret II.

Throughout this period, there was an air of uncertainty as to
whether we would be allowed to deploy. This only made our Iowa
crew double their efforts to ensure that we would not only be
ready, but ready on time. We maintained this superhuman effort
despite the flood of media who came to our homes and tried to
interview us in town or just outside the naval base gate.

Iowa was front page news. Speculation, innuendo and out-of-con-
text quotes were rampant. We even had to endure media inter-
views with Navy deserters, one of whom appeared on television
with a pillowcase over his head, claiming to be an expert on our
ship. Still, we remained silent and continued our predeployment
preparations.

We made the necessary sacrifices under the most stressful, ad-
verse, and unusual conditions ever encountered in a peacetime en-
vironment. Just 7 weeks after a devastating explosion aboard our
ship, we deployed.

That fact alone reflects the high level of leadership, morale,
readiness and training aboard our ship prior to and after April 19.
It also supports my conviction that Iowa 's command standards are
solidly built on a commitment to excellence.

Two months into our deployment we were in Marseilles, France,
when the message came to sortie to the eastern Mediterranean in
response to the murder of Colonel Higgins. As in every time in her
history, Iowa answered the call. Steaming at 25 knots, we arrived
off the coast of Lebanon in 3 days.

Because a large number of contingencies might include long-
range gun strikes, the fleet commander gave permission to ready
our turrets and begin extensive drills, including live firings.

It was a difficult decision to order the first rounds loaded and
shot, without knowing with certainty the cause of the April 19 ex-
plosion.

Confident in our training and our safety and our readiness, we
fired 108 rounds of 16-inch 50 ammunition during the month of
August. Our training readiness was dramatically validated during
one of these gun shoots, when our 16-inch guns hit a 10-foot diame-
ter target balloon on the third round at 18,000 yards, or 9 miles.
I submit that you cannot do these things without good leadership
and a well established, effective training program. Exactly 3
months after our deployment began, just 2 days prior to its formal
release, we got our first chance to look at the official investigation

107

report. Prior to this, we relied on the media and our families for
information.

Chairman Nunn. Captain, could you repeat the date you got a
chance to look at that? I did not get that.

Captain Moosally. That was 2 days prior to the release of the — I
think it was on the 5th of September. It was the Labor Day week-
end.

Chairman Nunn. Thank you.

Captain Moosally. Prior to this, we relied on the media and our
families for information. When I received the report I was horrified
to learn that the explosion was caused by a wrongful, intentional
act. It is very difficult for any family to accept that one of its own
could do such a thing.

In the days following the release we were dismayed with the re-
port's emphasis on the apparent shortcomings of my command.
While these shortcomings had no causal effect on the explosion,
they were difficult to separate from the actual conclusion of the
report and have become the source of much confusion.

I would thus like to clarify a number of misconceptions by focus-
ing on some critical facts, which appear to have been lost in the
shuffle. These facts are based on close inspection not only by
myself and my crew, but from competent outside sources, both uni-
formed and civilian, including fleet commanders, senior Navy civil-
ians, the Navy Inspector General, and the Government Accounting
Office.

Fact number one: Iowa was and is well trained. Much has been
said about Iowa 's PQS program. PQS is a list of minimum knowl-
edge and skills required to perform certain duties.

Let me set the record straight. Our men had the skill, training
and experience to perform their assigned tasks. Our only deficiency
was in maintaining a formal record of these skills.

Let us look at the record of Iowa 's contribution to 16-inch gun-
nery to put things in perspective. Iowa gunners were the major
contributors to the revised 16-inch 50 PQS standard book being
used in the fleet today. In other words, we wrote the book on PQS.

Iowa gunners were instrumental in setting the standards in 16-
inch gunnery in the Navy. Iowa was a major contributor to the
Navy's 16-inch gunnery handbook. Iowa developed the grading cri-
teria for the Navy's 16-inch 50 naval gunfire support exercises.
Iowa also wrote the combat systems assessment 16-inch 50 test
questions for the type commanders combat systems mobile training
team.

Our demonstrated expertise in shooting and excellent materiel
condition are indicative of the high level of leadership, training
and safety on Iowa.

Six months prior to the explosion, Iowa successfully completed a
month-long refresher training in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. In De-
cember, we successfully completed an ordnance handling safety
assist team visit, which cited our gunners' knowledge, procedures
and accountability as excellent.

We completed naval gunfire support training in Puerto Rico and
achieved a final average of 88 percent, the highest ever on a battle-
ship.

108

We also successfully completed a nuclear weapons assist team
visit, and a nuclear weapons acceptance inspection.

A NAVSEA explosive safety review team also visited Iowa and
remarked on our high quality training in the turrets, particularly
in turret II.

One of the inspectors stated that he found the personnel well
versed in their professional certifications for 16-inch guns, and the
training records all well documented and maintained. He examined
12 records in-depth for turret II, in particular, and found no defi-
ciencies in their certification program for non-nuclear ordnance.

These records were maintained within the turret.

In March 1989, Iowa was visited by the COMNAVSURFLANT
Combat Systems Assessment Team. The team cited Iowa as being
clean and professional, with all areas inspected reflecting good
leadership and management. All main battery officers were given
written examinations and all were graded as satisfactory. Also
cited was the crew's obvious pride in their equipment and systems.

The team also indicated that they reviewed all weapons depart-
ment administration and PQS and found them satisfactory for all
weapons systems. In fact, the chief inspector of the team indicated
to me that we were better than most ships with respect to PQS
training, and he had no negative comments.

The weapons department was cited by the team for its meticu-
lous attention to detail and its administrative programs. The
team's findings were no surprise to me.

We constantly train on our guns, shooting as often as we can. Be-
tween August 1988 and April 1989, we conducted 38 firing exer-
cises, shooting 574 rounds of 16-inch ammunition at various targets
ashore and at balloons.

This is real training and proven performance by well trained and
motivated gun crews towards that one real goal, to safely put ord-
nance on target.

In May, just 1 month after the explosion, the Commander of
Naval Surface Forces Atlantic Fleet directed my squadron com-
mander to conduct an additional inspection of Iowa 's PQS. A Navy
captain personally conducted the inspection. Iowa successfully
passed. His report found the training to be what we had said all
along.

The Commander of Naval Surface Forces sent his own combat
systems inspection team to the ship the next day to verify the re-
sults. They found the same thing. Iowa's program was pronounced
effective with 100 percent review of instructions, personnel service
records and oral boards. This team found Iowa's non-nuclear ord-
nance handling program the best on the water front.

In other words, the same personnel in turrets I and III, who were
found administratively not qualified during the investigation, were
found fully qualified by two different inspection teams on June 1,
without any training or shots fired since April 19. And as I have
always said, turret II was my best turret.

I will also state right here that the administrative documenta-
tion or paperwork deficiencies found during the investigation were
corrected aboard the Iowa in 2 days. These facts, along with previ-
ous inspection results, are testimony to an established and effective
training program already in place aboard our ship on April 19.

109

Fact number two: Iowa was and is well maintained. After com-
pleting refresher training in November 1988, we successfully com-
pleted an extensive operational propulsion plant examination.
Then after the first of the year, Iowa completed a comprehensive
planned Maintenance System inspection which resulted in a re-
corded accomplishment rate of 99 percent. Within Iowa's turrets,
100 percent of the spot checks done by the inspectors were graded
satisfactory.

Again in March 1989, just 3 weeks prior to the April 19 explo-
sion, our ship completed one of the most difficult inspections in the
Navy conducted by the Board of Inspection and Survey. In that one
inspection, all ship systems and equipment were inspected to deter-
mine their fitness for further service. This was the first time Iowa
had successfully completed this inspection since her commissioning
in 1984.

This time, the inspection team rated Iowa fit for further service,
finding that the entire ship from stem to stern, including the ship's
turrets, were in satisfactory materiel condition. Iowa's engineering
plant met every test, including a full power run where the ship
reached a sustained speed of 34 knots. The team's findings prompt-
ed a "well done" from COMNAVSURFLANT to Iowa's weapons de-
partment, among others, for its performance during INSURV and
specifically for being the first battleship to pass the anti-air war-
fare detect to engage test.

Finally, I know Iowa's condition through personal inspection.
Each day I walk through the sections of the ship to see the crew
and to look at the spaces. There is not one of the ships' 1,500 com-
partments which I have not been in, most of them numerous times.

We also conduct biweekly zone inspections aboard Iowa. This in-
spection requires my officers and chief petty officers to inspect and
note deficiencies on every compartment aboard the ship. The com-
bination of shipboard and Navy inspections provides a good refer-
ence as to the condition of the ship at any time.

Iowa's materiel condition belies her age. She is in excellent
shape. The fact that we deployed for 6 months with no mainte-
nance availability is testimony to our sustainability and our self-fix
capability.

Fact number three: Iowa did not experiment. Let us set the
record straight. There was never a shot fired during my command
that was not safe and sanctioned by the appropriate authorities.
The fact is, Iowa fully supported 16-inch 50 gunnery improvement
and worked closely with the Navy's ammunition experts.

The purpose of Iowa 's main battery is to put ordnance on target
at maximum range with the highest possible effectiveness. We con-
stantly work at precision prior to every shoot. We discipline our-
selves to perform all the scientific calculations to know the precise
initial velocity of the projectiles.

From taking the temperature of the powder to calculating atmos-
pheric anomalies, we are able to make predictions about projectile
gun performance and consistently place initial rounds within a few
yards of the target.

The Naval Sea Systems Command, Naval Surface Warfare
Center, Dahlgren, and other commands have asked us on numerous
occasions to fire rounds or powder combinations that have been

110

thoroughly tested ashore. The reason we are asked to do this is for
the reasons I have stated before. Iowa consistently does the home-
work necessary for accurate shooting every time. The ordnance ex-
perts know we will give them the most accurate data and know
that we will do the job safely.

In addition, these operational tests help the Navy to check the
land-based test results and to devise procedures for their use in the
fleet. Special 16-inch rounds were tested aboard Iowa from 1987
under the full approval of the Naval Sea Systems Command. When
tested, the crews were fully briefed, and NAVSEA and Dahlgren
personnel were aboard for the tests.

In November 1987, Iowa conducted operational tests using five-
bag DD-846 incremental charges with 1,900 and 2,700 pound pro-
jectiles. Eighteen rounds were shot. Incremental charges are
powder loads less than a full charge, which is six 110 pound bags of
propellant. The tests were conducted with NAVSEA personnel on
board.

The use of incremental charges are not without precedent. Range
tables for incremental charges were developed in World War II.

In March 1989 at the annual Battleship Improvement Conference
hosted by Naval Sea Systems Command, the advantages of using
incremental charges were discussed in detail as a method to dra-
matically increase the accuracy of the 16-inch gun system and sub-
stantially reduce gun wear. This procedure is viewed safe by
NAVSEA personnel, and firing the five-bag incremental charge, in
my view, is not unsafe, as bore pressures generated are well below
the allowable proof pressure of the 16-inch gun. We have been told
that testing at Dahlgren subsequent to the explosion on Iowa con-
firms this fact.

On April 19 my weapons department personnel believed that the
firing of the five-bag incremental charge was fully sanctioned, and
they planned to fire it from turret II. They failed, however, to brief
me properly, and the firing plan I signed indicated we would be
firing reduced charges, six bags of 55 pounds each from both tur-
rets I and II. Turret III was never planned to be fired.

I would not have allowed the firing of incremental charges be-
cause, although they had been fired aboard Iowa before I took com-
mand, there is no formal authorization for this method of firing.
Needless to say, I was disappointed with my subordinates for pre-
empting my command prerogative. As you know, they have been
punished for their actions.

Having said the above, I want to make it clear that the actions of
these men were out of character. They have before and after April
19 been completely loyal, supporting and obedient subordinates.
Their only objective was to prove that the variety of applications of
which the 16-inch 50 gun is capable. What they were doing was not
unsafe. Their error was that they did not properly brief me on
what they wanted to do and get formal approval.

Fact number four: Iowa was and is well led and well managed.
The officers and chief petty officers serving under me are real pro-
fessionals. They are well disciplined and knowledgeable in their
fields. I cannot praise them enough.

After the release of the investigation, my sworn personal testi-
mony was taken apart and used out of context. I described very di-

Ill

rectly the conditions I found in specific areas when I assumed com-
mand. Those conditions do not exist aboard Iowa today.

At one point my testimony was used to indicate that I was not
happy with my crew. Nothing could be further from the truth. The
truth is I was asked specifically why I had certain personnel in tur-
rets who had disciplinary records. In that case I did reply that I
had to work with what I got from the Navy. I have little control
over the people who come to my command, and, yes, I have an obli-
gation to provide leadership to my men.

Still, I have had to send some men out of the Navy who were not
doing their jobs and who refused to change. Those men who make
an effort are a welcome part of the Iowa family.

The bottom line on leadership in Iowa is that we have it in
spades. My officers, chiefs and leading petty officers get into their
spaces daily to assess the progress of our crewmen for themselves. I
have always believed that if you expect extra effort from people,
then you should make the extra effort to go to the spaces and see
their work, show them that you are interested and care for them.

That is why I personally make daily trips around the ship. It
allows me to know my crew, to see their work and to take action
on areas I see that need extra effort. I invest a lot of time in these
daily tours, and I believe that the crew of Iowa has a high morale
and accomplishment record because the ship's leadership does take
the time up front to care for our people.

Again, I submit that if you review our record of performance and
measure what it takes to overcome tragedy, to deploy on time, to
have the meaningful deployment we had in the face of tremendous
stress brought on by the investigation and unfavorable press re-
ports that followed, you cannot help but conclude that Iowa is well
led.

Fact number five: Iowa was and is ready. Just look at the re-
sponse to the explosion itself to assess our readiness. On April 19
the crew fought bravely to put out the fire from the explosion. The
response was immediate. We were able to contain an explosion and
fire which might have destroyed any other vessel. The crew then
tirelessly worked throughout the night and the next day to dewater
the spaces and recover their fallen shipmates. With that accom-
plished, we went back to work and made our deployment. We were
ready.

These, however, are not the only areas for judgment. One can
look at how Iowa was progressing toward deployment to see that
she was ready. Iowa had passed every exam prior to April 19. She
had proven herself in test after test. There is no better gauge of a
crew's readiness than a ship being able to meet her commitments,
passing all three deployment examinations. All these things, Iowa
did and did well.

Iowa is still ready. We proved our readiness again in the eastern
Mediterranean when, after a 4-month moratorium on firing our 16-
inch guns was lifted, we safely fired 108 rounds to prepare for con-
tingency operations. Within the first few shots we were on target.
Such feats cannot be accomplished by an ill-trained, unready crew.

They do, however, graphically demonstrate the true character of
Iowa 's professionals. We maintain our high capabilities because we

112

take pride in our abilities and we are unwilling to accept second
best.

Adm. J. D. Williams, Commander of the 6th Fleet, has often com-
mended Iowa. I am making available a letter he wrote to our fami-
lies in which he stated, "There is precision and pride in everything
Iowa does. Iowa guns are always on target." Admiral Williams also
stated that he considers Iowa a major national asset with an out-
standing and truly remarkable crew. These are observations made
after 3 months of wide-ranging operations.

Finally, Iowa has pride and endurance. It has been painful to
watch so-called experts slowly erode the Nation's confidence in our
ship and in us. We have worked together to prove to others that we
can do the job, and we are here today to tell you that we are the
best team on the best strike platform in the Navy.

The fact that Iowa had an unmatched capability to deliver ord-
nance on target was a major factor in the recent approval of a gap
in the aircraft carrier presence in the Mediterranean. There is a
plaque mounted on our bridge which states, "We are battleship
sailors. When it's getting too tough for everyone else, it's just right
for us." You can believe it.

Recently GAO investigators joined in praise of our ship. They
saw the courage and training of our crew and the sturdiness and
order of Iowa. They echoed the sentiments of our prior inspectors
and said that they, too, would be willing to go to war with us.

They proved their confidence by joining us in the gun rooms of
the turrets while we fired. There is no higher testimony to a crew
or ship.

Admiral Howe, the Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces
Europe, summed it up when he said oi Iowa, "The real winners are
those who can take a hit and come back strong. You are true win-
ners." This is the Iowa I command. The Iowa you read about in the
press does not exist. The real Iowa and her crew are here today,
well trained, well disciplined, well lead, and ready for your person-
al inspection.

Many in Congress know the Iowa I command. They have come
aboard to see her firsthand and already know the pride we have in
our ship and ourselves. It is something that is apparent immediate-
ly upon setting foot aboard.

We invite you to visit us anytime to see our ship and talk to us. I
believe you, too, will come away with the same pride that I feel in
this crew every day. They have proven themselves worthy of
praise, worthy of support, and worthy of the pride we ourselves
share in our Nation's cause. Together we are the Iowa.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Nunn. Thank you very much. Captain.

We are going to rotate the questioning this morning and take
about 6 minutes each. Let me just start by quoting some of the tes-
timony that you gave. When was your interview with Admiral Mil-
ligan?

Captain Moosally. It was right after we got back, sir. I am not
sure of the exact date.

Chairman Nunn. Does May 1 sound about right?

Captain Moosally. Around about that time, about 2 weeks after
the explosion.

113

Chairman Nunn. Where did that take place, Captain?

Captain Moosally. It took place initially in one of our state-
rooms on the ship and then over at the Naval Legal Service Office
in Norfolk.

Chairman Nunn. Do you recall who was present during that
interview?

Captain Moosally. Well, the major players— there were a few
people. The major interviewers, of course, were Admiral Milligan
and Commander Swanson, the legal officer, and Captain Messina,
who was the assistant to Milligan.

Chairman Nunn. Was that sworn testimony?

Captain Moosally. Yes, sir, it was sworn testimony. I was given
my rights, and it was sworn testimony.

Chairman Nunn. And you had a reporter with a transcript?

Captain Moosally. Yes, sir.

Chairman Nunn. Did they tell you the conditions of the testimo-
ny, whether it would be made available or could be made available
in any kind of proceeding after?

Captain Moosally. No. If I had known that, I do not think I
would have stated some of the things I said there if I had known it
would be a matter of public record.

Chairman Nunn. They did not tell you that it would be?

Captain Moosally. No.

Chairman Nunn. Let me just quote a couple of things you said
and get your reaction to them or amplifications, see if you recall
exactly the context.

You stated, quoting, number one, "When I came here, you know,
when I first came on here, you know, we had a NMP." Tell us
what NMP means.

Captain Moosally. Navy manning plan.

Chairman Nunn. Continuing, "Of 118 and I was 37 gunners-
mates short at the time, I have messages where I sent messages out
requesting. I also found out through EPM AC"— could you tell
us

Captain Moosally. That's EPMAC, the enlisted detailers— not
detailers, but the enlisted distributors of enlisted personnel.

Chairman Nunn. And BUPERS?

Captain Moosally. Bureau of Personnel.

Chairman Nunn. So, quoting you again, "I also found out
through EPMAC and BUPERS that the reason I wasn't getting any
more gunnersmates was because I was 37th on the priority list.
The basic word I was getting was that, 'Hey, you are not going to
get anybody there, Captain, because you are so low on the priority
list, you are never going to make it.' "

Did you so testify?

Captain Moosally. Yes, sir.

Chairman Nunn. Now, tell us the context of that. Do you want
to amplify it?

Captain Moosally. Yes, sir. The context was that I think the
manpower issue had come up. The personnel issue and the num-
bers of people on board and, I guess, what I was doing about it.

When I came on the ship, as you stated, I found that we were
short on gunnersmates at the time. It was 37 at the time, and I was
mainly concerned about shortages in the senior ratings.

114

Chairman Nunn. And you were trying to do something about it?

Captain Moosally. I was trying to do something about it. I sent
out a message on it to the proper authorities that said we were
short and we needed to get more gunnersmates.

Chairman Nunn. And your response you got back was what?

Captain Moosally. Well, the response I got back via the phone
was well, you are low on the priority list. You are 37th on the pri-
ority list, and it is going to be a while before you see anybody.

Chairman Nunn. Going on and quoting you further,

I have felt like the battleship has been not — kind of out of it, no employment
plan. The only employment I had on my schedule was this — of termination of
August of this year, no concept of operations.

Are those your words?

Captain Moosally. Yes, sir.

Chairman Nunn. Tell us the context of that.

Captain Moosally. Well, when I got orders to the battleship
back in, I think, December 1987, like anybody going to a ship, when
I started my pipeline training I was interested in the long-range
schedule of the ship, and I got a copy of the long-range
CINCLANTFLT employment schedule and it was indicated on
there that there were a lot of blank spaces, and the only thing I
saw long-range was — was the Display Determination exercise in
August, which we just participated in on this deployment, and that
was about a 2-month window.

The rest of the schedule after the work-ups through January was
blank, so I was very concerned that we were not properly being
employed and, of course, all this ties into your manning priority.

Chairman Nunn. You went on to say.

So, I felt like we were kind of — if we would go away and hide somewhere, it would
be fine with everybody, and I felt that to be 37th on the priority as the biggest gun
ship in the world was kind of incredulous.

Are those your words?

Captain Moosally. Yes, sir.

Chairman Nunn. Tell us a little more about that.

Captain Moosally. Well, the first thing I want to say is if we
would put this in perspective, it was a very emotional time for me.
I just had 47 of my men die. I was being called in and given my
rights, and I was very emotional about it, and when I saw what
was going on in the room there — but, as I saw it, coming to the
ship once again, looking at our employment schedule, and my gen-
eral feeling was that we were not being employed the way the bat-
tleship should be employed.

I did not feel like manpower-wise we had the priorities we should
have. I was talking as the CO of a ship, and my job as CO of a ship
is to ensure we get the proper manning that we ought to have, that
we are in good materiel condition. So, that was my perspective as
the CO of the Iowa.

Chairman Nunn. Quoting you again,

So, in summer, you know, the battleships, you know, where they do fit in as far as
manning priority? You have got a tremendous ship there, a big ship, a complicated
ship, and in my view the toughest ship in the Navy to run because of the age and
the scope of the job, and I do not think it is properly supported as far as priority
manning in the enlisted area or in any officer area.

115

I get the impression the Navy has one foot in the water and one out, not really
sure how the hell long they are going to stick around. We do not want to make any
commitments.

Do you want to amplify that any?

Captain Moosally. Sir, I think that was kind of my feeUng at
the time as the CO of the Iowa.

Chairman Nunn. You just felt like you were not being given pri-
ority?

Captain Moosally. I looked at my manning once again. For ex-
ample, in June 1988, if you take a snapshot, I was supposed to have
eight E-7's. I had one, and that was a problem. The problem was in
the E-5 and above ratings, and I did not feel like for the scope of
the work that the battleship has with all the gun systems we have
that we were getting the personnel we should have had in the gun-
nersmate rating.

Chairman Nunn. You went on to say, quoting you again,

I found out that the Type Commander is taking billets from me to man an MTT.
Now, I do not have anything to say in that. That is all being done sub rosa that I do
not know anything about. I was never asked my input on anything.

Now, what is an MTT?

Captain Moosally. That is a mobile training team. At the time,
they were trying to man up a mobile training team.

Chairman Nunn. You felt like that was a misplaced priority?

Captain Moosally. If it were taking billets away from me, I
thought it was. Here I was, you know, commander of the Iowa, and
I am trying to protect my assets, and I am looking around seeing
what job has to be done, and I want it to be manned as all COs do
in the way it should be manned.

Chairman Nunn. Let me go ahead and quote you again. If I
could get a few more minutes, I want to finish this one line of ques-
tioning. Then I will yield.

I must say another thing, you know.

This is quoting you —

I must say another thing, you know. There is no school that I went to. I tried to
dig books out of a PCO course up there on 16-inch guns. There are not any. I did not
go to any school or an)rthing that gives me an input on what 16-inch gunnery is all
about. I got it from what I read from books. There is nothing that the XO went to,
the weapons officer or otherwise. There is no schooling for these chiefs. They throw
them out there without the proper training. There has got to be some kind of in-
route training for these people.

Are those your words?

Captain Moosally. Yes, sir.

Chairman Nunn. You still feel that way?

Captain Moosally. Pretty much, yes, sir. I think there needs to
be some kind of pipeline training for officers going to battleships,
especially a weapons officer.

Chairman Nunn. So, basically you are saying that as captain of
the ship when you came on board you had not nearly enough gun-
nersmates. You did not have the right billets, and most of the
people there had not gone through any kind of formal training, so
it was up to you to do all the training, is that right?

Captain Moosally. That is correct, yes, sir.

Chairman Nunn. So, all the training on battleships is having to
be done there, on the ship?

116

Captain Moos ally. All except for a C school out in San Diego,
which is a paper course, an administrator course, which is given to
lower rated personnel, mostly third class petty officers coming out
of the gunnersmate A school. They then go to the C school for a
few weeks, but there is no hands-on training. It is basically a paper
course. There are no mock-ups or visits to the ships.

Chairman Nunn. And you believe that ought to be corrected?

Captain Moosally. Yes, sir. I think that the chief petty officer
should have some kind of enroute training. I think myself as the
CO and certainly the weapons officer ought to have some enroute
training to be introduced to the 16-inch gun.

Chairman Nunn. You went on to say.

People have lost interest in these ships p.fter they were initially manned, and I
am rather disgusted. It is from the Type Commander. My feeling during the whole
time here is if I could go away somewhere— and I have had people ripped off me to
go to other ships— they think they have got too many people down there.

Captain Moosally. Yes, sir.

Chairman Nunn. Tell us a little bit more.

Captain Moosally. Well, I just felt that once again, I am sitting
there as the CO of a battleship. I do not have a deployment. I have
got manning problems, and I do not just want to talk about the
gunnersmate rate. I had problems. I had a gap in my weapons offi-
cer billet. So, these were the kind of things that were weighing on
my mind that we did not have a deployment. We had manning
problems.

There was an indication that the battleship in some quarters was
viewed as a money sump, as a personal sump, and as the CO of the
ship I felt very strongly and even more strongly today after finish-
ing the deployment that a battleship is a wonderful ship that we
ought to have in our Navy, and those views that I gave there are
as the CO.

Chairman Nunn. You went on to say,

I have been told to keep my mouth shut as far as employment goes. When I
pushed to get the ship on the deployment because I saw if I did not get one, that I
would never be high on the manning priority list.

Now, you are saying you tried to get some employment plan?

Captain Moosally. Yes, sir. The Coral Sea Battle Group was de-
ploying in May 1989, and I was trying to get the Iowa into that
battle group because of what I thought was a good concept, that
the Iowa was a very good complement to the Coral Sea Air Wing,
and Coral Sea Battle Group, so I pushed to get into that battle
group, and I was told not to do that.

Chairman Nunn. Did you have a feeling that the battleships
were just not a part of the Navy plan? Is that what you are basical-
ly saying?

Captain Moosally. Well, I had a feeling that they were not part
of a concept of operations in an employment plan.

Chairman Nunn. You went on to say

Captain Moosally. Now, let me caveat that by saying, I am just
talking about the east coast. On the west coast battleships, they
have a regular employment schedule over there. And I cannot talk
to that — so I am just talking about the east coast here.

Chairman Nunn. We have got two on the east coast?

117

Captain Moosally. Yes, sir.

Chairman Nunn. What is the other one on the east coast?

Captain Moosally. The Wisconsin.

Chairman Nunn. And which two are on the west coast?

Captain Moosally. Missouri and New Jersey.

Chairman Nunn. You went on to say,

I addressed the overall quality of the wardroom as a whole with the placement
officer many times, and directly to Admiral Borda, because I am concerned then
and I am concerned now with the type of officers I am getting.

Do you mean that you were not getting the kind of officers that

you needed?

Captain Moosally. Well, that is a tough issue. That one issue m
that testimony there is the one that hurt me, hurt my wardroom
and hurt my ship more than anything else that has been revealed.
And I really do not want to discuss specifics about the wardroom
and personalities here.

Let me say that

Chairman Nunn. I will not get into names, I just want to get a
general description.

Captain Moosally. Yes, sir.

Well, the general problem was, when I got to the ship, coincident
with my relief, there was a relief of the weapons officer. Myself
and my predecessor decided that the incoming weapons officer did
not have the qualifications. So we then had to accept a gap in the
weapons officer billet.

We had trouble getting a relief And I wanted to get a relief in
there as soon as I could. I think I ended up getting a relief in
August— this was in May— from May until the end of August we
had a gap in the weapons officer billet.

And then the gunnery officer broke his shoulder, so then I had a
gap in the gunnery officer.

And it seemed like we had a hard time getting people in there to
fill key billets, especially in the weapons department.

We have a mix of officers from various backgrounds. I am very
happy with the wardroom I have today. So I think that we do not
have that problem, but I was more concerned about the gaps in the
billets and the fact that we seemed to have a hard time coming up
with relief for people.

Chairman Nunn. You went on to say, quoting again:

I will tell you the message I am getting from the Navy hierarchy is that we can
straighten these guys out, but we are kicking some of these people out of the Navy
which I have kicked over, I think, in the hundreds out since I have been there. 1
have got guys that were dopers, marginal, per— constant UAs. I have not been easy
on these guys.

Captain Moosally. Yes, sir. When I came to the Iowa we were
averaging about 25 to 30 UA's a day.

Chairman Nunn. UAs is unauthorized absence?

Captain Moosally. Unauthorized absentees.

Chairman Nunn. Twenty or 30 per day?

Captain Moosally. Twenty to 30 a day.

I was not happy with the standard that had been set on Iowa-
standards in a lot of areas. I was not happy with the standards in
the area of discipline. When I started taking people to mast, I was
going through records and found people who had multiple infrac-

118

tions or disciplinary problems. People I thought should not have
been continued on in the Navy, were continued, so I started clean-
ing those people out.

As I have said, those conditions do not exist today. As a matter
of fact, our drug cases went from a level which I really cannot de-
termine— I am just looking at a graph in my head — down to zero.

So my point was that there are some people you cannot turn
around. After the second or third time, then they have got to go.

Chairman Nunn. And you were getting rid of them, right?

Captain Moos ally. I was getting rid of them. They were the ones
that I thought were no longer going to be useful to the ship. And
once again, the UA rate, I got that back by holding mast every day.
Every day I had captain's mast. And that went from 25 to 30
people a day down to 10, and at times, below that.

So I just did not like the standards that had been on board as far
as discipline went.

Chairman Nunn. Were a lot of your unauthorized absences
caused by drug abuse?

Captain Moosally. No. They were just guys who did not want to
show up for work on time, basically.

Chairman Nunn. The response you got back, I guess, was reflect-
ed in this quote,

I get the sense from the traffic from the fleet commander, the type commander,
that hey, we have got to do a better job, because we are losing too many guys, and
you better keep some of those jerks around because you can straighten them out if
you are a good leader.

Captain Moosally. Well, yes, sir. We are losing, I think, one out
of three people before their enlistment is up. And the idea is to
keep — you know, the more you lose, of course, the more you have
got to assess. And these people, some of them are trained, and it is
a problem.

I think that we are keeping those that we can turn around. We
make attempts to turn people around, but when

Chairman Nunn. But your fleet commander is basically saying
you are kicking too many out and you need the people?

Captain Moosally. Well, that is right. Our attrition rate is too
high. And, like I said, one out of every three is too high.

Chairman Nunn. But, as a captain of a ship, it is better to have
too high an attrition rate than it is to keep people that cannot do
the job, is it not?

Captain Moosally. In my opinion, yes, sir.

Chairman Nunn. You went on to say, quoting you:

At the rate I am going right now, I will have a 48 percent turnover in my crew
this year. I think this is a major detractor, and I have said this on the record to my
boss, of crew instability and training. I will say it again in very strong terms that I
think the battleship has not been properly taken care of as far as manning goes, in
the wardroom or the enlisted area.

Captain Moosally. Yes, sir.

Chairman Nunn. Is that still your feeling?

Captain Moosally. Not anymore. I think we have a lot of people
now. Today I have eight of nine gunnersmate chiefs instead of the
1 out of 11 I had back in June 1988. We have plenty of people
today.

Chairman Nunn. Now, this was given in May 1989, though?

119

Captain Moosally. Yes, sir.

Chairman Nunn. As of that date, does that accurately reflect
your opinion?

Captain Moosally. Yes, sir.

Chairman Nunn. Thank you.

Senator Warner, I have gone over my time. Why don't we each
take 10 minutes, and we will rotate back and forth.

Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Well, Captain, I think you have defended your ship, crew, and
the families that support men who go to sea. I think what concerns
me most was one of your responses here, that had you known your
statement would have gone into the public domain, you might have
said something differently.

Captain Moosally. Yes, sir.

Senator Warner. Now, I view the purpose of this hearing as not
to redo the job the Navy is required to do in the case of an acci-
dent, but to determine did the Navy, in an accurate, and in a fair,
and in a thorough manner, bring to light every single fact that
could bear upon the conclusion. Not that we agree or disagree with
the Navy's conclusion, but was the procedure correct?

We have a tremendous obligation, first and foremost, to the fami-
lies who lost the sailors; and I think second, to families who contin-
ue to support that ship; and the families who support sailors at sea
all over the world today.

Is there any fact that you have, or that you know that someone
else has, that could be brought to light that might help get a clear-
er picture of what happened?

Captain Moosally. No, sir.

You know we have agonized, and I personally have agonized over
this thing for almost 8 months now. It has been a terrible burden
for us who are here carrying the load of our fallen shipmates. I
mean, we grieve; the emotion is unbelievable. If there was a simple
answer, I wish I had it. I have been gone for 6 months. I am not
privy to a lot of things that the Navy investigation team has found
out since I left the States in June.

Senator Warner. Well, that is an important part. Why are you
not privy to that? Because you might have evidence that either cor-
roborates those facts or does not corroborate those facts.

Captain Moosally. No, sir. I do not think there is any new evi-
dence that we would have on board the ship that would corroborate
anything differently.

Senator Warner. Why would a part of this examination be with-
held from your scrutiny?

Captain Moosally. Well, I was part of the investigation; I was
party to the investigation. I was given my rights.

Senator Warner. I understand that. But presumably the Navy,
in stating its conclusions, has divulged the pertinent facts that sup-
port those conclusions.

Captain Moosally. Yes, sir.

Senator Warner. Do you think there are some facts which have
not been brought to public light?

Captain Moosally. Not that I am aware of, no, sir.

Senator Warner. Well, then, why is it that you are not privy to
some of the information?

120

Captain Moosally. Well, I am. As of the time in September, just
before the investigation was released, I was given a copy of parts of
the investigation report, and I have read that. But all the other de-
tailed lab reports, the forensic reports and things of that nature, I
am not.

Senator Warner. Wait a minute, you are not what?

Captain Moosally. I have not read those documents.

Senator Warner. Well, are they being withheld from you?

Captain Moosally. No, I have not asked for them.

Senator Warner. So, in other words, you do have access to any
of the facts?

Captain Moosally. Yes, I think I do. Yes.

Senator Warner. Well, somehow I think that is different than
what you initially said.

Captain Moosally. I think what I initially said was that, up
through September, I had not been given — my first look at the in-
vestigation report was 2 days before its release.

Senator Warner. Do you think the Navy's examination of this
tragedy was accurate and fair, and was done in a spirit which
brought forth all the facts, irrespective of the conclusions? Did the
procedure itself develop the factual base on which, presumably,
reasonable men and women could reach a just conclusion?

You are the Captain of the ship; in your judgment was the proce-
dure followed by the Navy fair? Was it accurate and thorough?

Captain Moosally. I think, generally speaking, yes. There are
facts with regard to shipboard deficiencies, findings of fact, which I
do not agree with.

Senator Warner. Facts, but I am now asking about the proce-
dure which the Navy has followed.

Captain Moosally. As far as I can tell, yes, sir. As far as I can
tell, the procedures have been correct.

Senator Warner. And you know of no other facts that you think
should be brought forth and made public at this time?

Captain Moosally. Not that I am aware of, no, sir.

Senator Warner. Do you know of any other person that has
facts that could be

Captain Moosally. No, sir, I do not.

Senator Warner. Much has been said about this ship being 37th
on a priority list. What is the total number on any such list? Is it
the 560-plus ships that are active in the fleet today?

Captain Moosally. Yes, sir.

Senator Warner. Thirty-seven, in terms of 560, seems pretty
high.

Captain Moosally. Well, it is not high if you are not going to — I
mean it is a relative number, and if you do not get anybody with
any number, it does not make any difference.

Senator Warner. Well, do you feel that your ship was singled
out unfairly, or is this a problem that is endemic to the entire
Navy, the shortages in manning billets?

Captain Moosally. There are some shortages. My point on the
manning issue was I needed some petty officers, senior petty offi-
cers, to be supervisors on my ship and, as I said, when I came to
that ship, I had one chief petty officer assigned all three turrets.

121

Senator Warner. It is clear that you had a deficiency. I am just
trying to compare your ship against say, the other three battle-
ships and other ships in the fleet. Were you singled out, do you
think, in any way in terms of manning shortages?

Captain Moos ally. No, sir, I do not think I was singled out. I
think — you know, I do not know what went through the manning
authority's mind. I do not know how the priorities were set. I
cannot answer that question.

Senator Warner. I yield at this point to other members, but I
would like to come back.

Chairman Nunn. Thank you. Surely you will have an opportuni-
ty. Senator Dixon.

Senator Dixon. Captain Moosally, let me say first of all that I
have carefully read your statement given on a prior occasion when
this investigation was taking place. I think it is a completely truth-
ful and straightforward statement that addresses the concerns as
you saw them as captain of that ship. Everything that I've read
and everything I've inquired about concerning your command of
that ship and your entire record thoroughly convinces me that you
are a first class officer in every way and that you did exactly \yhat
you should have done in every instance as captain of that ship. I
want to make that perfectly clear. No question that I ask you is
directed against you as an individual. It is a question designed to
search for the truth.

Those questions the chairman has previously asked are questions
I had already underlined and would have asked myself concerning
matters that you brought up in your statement.

One thing that stands out to me is your statement already
brought to the attention of the public by the Chair that there
really has been no training for the handling of these 16-inch guns
in the Navy. I take it that it is the responsibility, of course, on
every ship to do the best that one can to develop the kind of hands-
on training that is required by both officers and crew, to handle
these guns.

But I would again ask for the record, in fact, there is no true
hands-on school training for the handling of these 16-inch guns
right now or there has not been up until the occasion of what
happen on the Iowa.

Captain Moosally. The only hands-on training is aboard the

ship.

Senator Dixon. I ask this to you as a layperson, but it occurs to
me that this is an exceedingly cumbersome and relatively danger-
ous type of operation in the first instance. These big powder bags
and all of the things attendant upon the firing of the 16-inch gun.
For a layperson, I understand that you have special expertise.
Would you concede that is the case?

Captain Moosally. No.

Senator Dixon. You do not think it is especially dangerous?

Captain Moosally. No. I think that the 16-inch gun system is a
very simple system. Most of the jobs down there, the billets down
there, are mule hauling-type jobs loading powders, and there's very
few skilled positions in that turret. That gun is one of the safest
guns ever built, and I could read you a list of safety interlocks and

122

safety devices which are comparable to those found in a nuclear
power plant.

The people who designed that thing in the thirties were, I think,
geniuses.

Senator Dixon. Let me ask you this. Did you have some concern
about the powder?

Captain Moosally. No.

Senator Dixon. Well, in the report you say the Yorktown mes-
sage, the Yorktown is where the powder bags were kept on covered
barges. You say on the powder,

I mean, I don't have a lot of faith after reading the OP —

That is the ordnance publication —

that the powder is very good.

Captain Moosally. Oh, you are talking about the powder that
was on the barges then? The powder that was on the barges I had a
concern about because it had been improperly stowed for 3 months.
Yes, I had a concern for that, yes, sir.

Senator Dixon. And did you have a concern again in the same
way that the chairman handled this? I will not deal in names, but
did you have a concern about those who had been given the respon-
sibility in connection with the operation of these guns?

Captain Moosally. No. No, because I think the people we had
were well trained people, so I had complete confidence, and every-
body that has come on that ship has told me the same thing.

Senator Dixon. Well, there is this statement of yours.

So, all these things are coming together. That is when the Admiral called me and
said, "X really wants to get out of what he is doing. He is good at what he does. He
is never going to be a superstar, but he is good at being a gunnery officer," so I
accepted him.

Captain Moosally. Right.
Senator Dixon [reading]:

I got to tell you, looking back on it, I do not know what X has told you, but X is a
basket case right now. He completely collapsed on me during this whole thing. He
had to see a psychiatrist. On the way back, he was totally useless. I think to this
day whatever the outcome of this thing, he would have a hard time continuing on
with his job. I do not have any confidence in him because of his mental state. I
mean, if you asked X if he killed his mother right now, he would say yes, I did. So,
he came on board, and I have addressed the wardroom issue to the Admiral in a
letter, the whole wardroom issue.

Well, that does not sound like a very good gunnery officer to me?
Captain Moosally. No, sir.

Senator Dixon. Now, what about the chief, the master chief,
without mentioning his name — and I quote about him.

I think he belongs in a laboratory somewhere. He drives me nuts. I can only stand
to spend about 5 minutes with him. I think he could be a loose cannon.

Captain Moosally. Yes, sir. That individual in my book is one of
the best and most knowledgeable people on 16-inch gun systems.
He does have to be kept in a box. But having said that, he is very
useful, and I do not know what I would have done without him on
this deployment.

Senator Dixon. Well, again, in fairness to you, you did not pick
these men. I am not saying that. I am asking about the facts as
they existed on the Iowa.

123

Now, is it not a fact that you were 36 gunnersmates short?

Captain Moosally. I think I said 37.

Senator Dixon. I apologize, 37. And did you say that on turret III
there was a mess, hydraulic leaks all over the place, lighting that
did not work. They had 25 watt bulbs in because they were afraid
they would blow fuses at the 50 watt level?

Captain Moosally. Yes, sir, those are the conditions that I found
when I came aboard the Iowa. As I said, those conditions do not
exist today. They did not exist on April 19. We fixed those things.

Senator Dixon. Did you indicate that you addressed the overall
quality of the wardroom as a whole with the placement officer
many times and directly to the Admiral, "because I was concerned
then and am concerned now with the type of officers I am getting."

Captain Moosally. Yes, sir. I talked to the placement officer, as
I said in the statement to Admiral Borda, about the overall quality
in the wardroom, but I do not know what the point is.

Senator Dixon. Well, may I ask another question on another
issue. Was there a misfire in turret I?

Captain Moosally. On April 19? Yes, sir, there was.

Senator Dixon. Just for the record, my understanding, which is
limited on the subject because obviously it is not a thing on which I
pretend to have any particular expertise, is that the history of the
situation is that from time to time there are accidents with respect
to these guns, are there not?

Captain Moosally. No. On the /ow;a-class battleships there have
been 22,000 rounds shot, since their commissioning, and there has
not been one accident before the Iowa.

Senator Dixon. Well, what was the nature of the misfiring in
turret I?

Captain Moosally. We have misfires on ships. We had a misfire
when GAO was out there. Sometimes the primer does not fire, and
we do not know actually what happened in this case. Sometimes on
reduced charges, which was in turret I the bag sags, and you do not
get the bag coming up against the firing pin. But it is not some-
thing that you need to be overly concerned about. I mean, you have
to follow the proper procedures, but it happens. That is why we
have nine guns. You go on to the next gun.

Senator Dixon. Now, speaking about those bags, on page 19 I
read to you from the inquiry.

Question. So, when you were briefed verbally at the time you saw the firing plan?

Answer. I was not briefed that it was going to be five bags reduced charge.

Question. Would it surprise you to learn that they intended to fire turret III with
four bags of powder?

Answer. Very surprising, very alarming.

Question. There has been more than one bit of testimony that would indicate that
was the plan. Have you been made aware of that now?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Now, why would that be alarming?

Captain Moosally. It is alarming because to break out powders,
you have to have my permission. The CO has to give his permission
to break out powders in the magazine, and the fact that I had not
approved turret III to fire and turret III was not going to fire, so
they should have never broken anything out.

124

Senator Dixon. As a matter of fact, on the morning in question
Hartwig was not even listed on your operations schedule for that
day as the gunnery captain, was he?

Captain Moosally. No, sir.

Senator Dixon. Who was?

Captain Moosally. I think it was Petty Officer Lawrence, who
was going to shoot to get his final qualification. Part of the qualifi-
cation

Senator Dixon. If I may interrupt, is it not a fact that Lav/rence
was not fully qualified?

Captain Moosally. You can interrupt, but the final qualification
on many of these jobs is to actually do the task, and to get the final
qualification he was supposed to have fired the gun.

Senator Dixon. There was no problem in your eyes with Law-
rence being the man to fire the gun that day?

Captain Moosally. No, sir.

Senator Dixon. He was scheduled to do it?

Captain Moosally. Yes, sir.

Senator Dixon. If you know, when did that change? Do you
know?

Captain Moosally. Well, I cannot know everything but I have a
good feeling what changed. We had a couple of unauthorized absen-
tees, and we had to fill in some spots. Petty Officer Hartwig ended
up filling in as the gun captain.

Senator Dixon. So at that moment he may have filled in?

Captain Moosally. It is my belief that he was in the turret at
the time of the explosion as the gun captain.

Senator Dixon. But the point is at that moment he may have
filled in for Lawrence with no prescheduling of the event at all?

Captain Moosally. I cannot say that.

Senator Dixon. But it could have happened?

Captain Moosally. We had been under way for a number of
days, and I am sure it was known who the absentees were. I cannot
tell you when in time the senior chief

Senator Dixon. But the schedule for that day showed Law-
rence

Captain Moosally. No, sir. That watch bill was not made up on
that day. That watch bill was made up before we got under way.

Senator Dixon. That day it was to be Lawrence?

Captain Moosally. Originally it was to be Lawrence.

Senator Dixon. But as far as you know, nothing was done at
your level or through your command and there is no paper trail to
show a change from Lawrence to Hartwig?

Captain Moosally. No, and I would not expect any.

Senator Dixon. So that Hartwig could have gone in there almost
at the precise moment that the drill was to take place?
Captain Moosally. I doubt it.
Senator Dixon. But it is possible?

Captain Moosally. Yes, sir, it is possible, but I doubt it seriously.
Chairman Nunn. Senator Cohen.
Senator Cohen. Just a few questions, Mr. Chairman.
Captain, you were asked earlier if you would characterize your
earlier testimony, your private statement, differently had you
known it would be made public?

125

Captain Moosally. Yes, sir.

Senator Cohen. The question I have is, was it a question of lan-
guage or substance that you would change?

Captain Moosally. I would change the language. I would have
protected people who I think got hurt by making my statement
public. I certainly would have changed my language. Had it not
been under the circumstances of my being under a very stressful,
emotional period, I think I overstated myself in some areas.

So yes, I would have definitely not said things in the context in
which they were said in that statement. If I could have retracted a
lot of those things and the hurt they gave some of the people, espe-
cially in my wardroom, I would not have said them.

Senator Cohen. Was it a situation in which you were angry per-
haps that you were put in charge of a ship on which you saw clear
deficiencies?

Captain Moosally. I would state that I felt like the good Lord in
the Garden of Gethsemani when I looked around and saw the vari-
ous problems that I was facing materielwise and some of the stand-
ards in training. If you go through my written statement I submit-
ted to the investigating office, I had trouble in the engineering de-
partment. I had an engineering officer quit on me. I had to relieve
my damage control assistant because of the poor training that I
found there.

So it was a ship on which I had my work cut out for me. Plus,
before I got to the ship I knew that Iowa had been found not fit for
service in 1986 because of the failure to pass the INSURV inspec-
tion. So my goal was to get the ship in shape to pass INSURV, and
in the process, of course, we did that, and we did it in fine fashion.

Senator Cohen. Basically, the language that you used in your
statement reflected the obvious sense of, I would say, anger

Captain Moosally. Yes, sir.

Senator Cohen [continuing]. That you are put on a ship, you are
out there, you are on duty.

Captain Moosally. It was anger and the stress. Like I said, the
47 — no commanding officer wants to lose a man on any ship, and to
lose 47 men in such a tragic explosion is devastating; and then to
be given your Article 31 rights and to be accused of dereliction of
duty after all the things that you had done to make this ship one of
the best in the Navy really hurts; and you do become angry, yes,
sir.

Senator Cohen. So when you were asked the question about the
gunnery officer, in essence you said he was unfit?

Captain Moosally. Well, once again, everybody will basically
know who the gunnery officer was. He had tremendous emotional
problems after the explosion. He could not cope, and that is why I
suggested that we needed to get him off the ship.

Senator Cohen. I think you referred to one of the mates as need-
ing to be kept in a box?

Captain Moosally. Right, our master fire control gunner. If you
keep him in the box, he is a heck of an asset. I would go to war
with him anytime.

Senator Cohen. What do you mean by that?

Captain Moosally. He is an expert on putting ordnance on
target, and this is one of the reasons Iowa

24-931 0-91-5

126

Senator Cohen. I meant by keeping him in the box.

Captain Moosally. Well, he likes to push the system to the max-
imum extent that he can. I am not saying he wants to do anything
unsafe. He just likes to exercise the system in every aspect of
which it is capable.

Senator Cohen. Captain, there was a report that the battleship
did not fire accurately off Lebanon a few years ago. What was the
problem then?

Captain Moosally. I can only say what I know. It was the New
Jersey. They had problems putting ordnance on target because of
spotter problems, chart problems and so forth. This is really the
genesis of why Iowa had a close relationship with the field activi-
ties of NAVSEA, Dahlgren and so forth. Iowa came back in 1984
and conducted a series of firing tests down at Vieques to prove the
accuracy of the 16-inch gun and did very well. There is a report on
this subject. That is basically the genesis of this close relationship
between Dahlgren, NAVSEA and the Iowa.

Senator Cohen. Senator Warner asked you a question as to
whether you felt the Navy's investigation of the procedures insti-
tuted by the Navy for their investigation were fair, accurate and
thorough, and you said yes but that you disagreed with some of the
facts.

Would you just explain whether you meant facts or conclusions
or both? I did not hear your earlier testimony.

Captain Moosally. I disagree with some of the findings of fact
with regard to shipboard deficiencies. There are a number with
which I disagree.

The thing that I think may be missing here is that this was an
informal JAG investigation. It is basically one man's opinion.

Senator Cohen. Was that a fair procedure?

Captain Moosally. Well, I would like to have had the opportuni-
ty to comment on some of their findings of fact, and I did not get
that opportunity.

Senator Cohen. How do you characterize procedures being fair,
then?

Captain Moosally. That is the way we do business. I think it
was fair in the context of the way we do business as far as JAG
investigations go.

Senator Cohen. Do you think the way you do business is fair?

Captain Moosally. Well, I will say that the ship was not given a
fair shake in commenting on findings of fact with regard to ship-
board deficiencies.

Senator Cohen. If you have an investigation that is under way
and you have procedures which are instituted and you do not have
an opportunity to comment, that procedure can be characterized as
being Navy but can it be characterized as being fair?

Captain Moosally. I do not know, sir.

Senator Cohen. Were there any other conclusions with which
you disagreed in the Navy's investigation?

Captain Moosally. No, sir.

Senator Cohen. You agree with the conclusions but not the find-
ings of fact?

Captain Moosally. I believe that, for me, the only conclusion
that counts is that there was a wrongful intentional act, and I

127

agree with that conclusion. I think that is the only real major con-
clusion of the report that is meaningful.

Senator Cohen. Could you list for me the factual differences that
you have with the Navy's investigation?

Captain Moosally. I can provide those to you, sir.

[The information referred to follows:]

128

INTRODUCTION

The Commanding Officer, USS IOWA, has reviewed the
"Investigation into the 19 April 1989 Explosion in Turret II USS
IOWA (BB 61)'. The attached contains his comments regarding a
number of the Investigation's Findings of Fact and Opinions.

Findings of Fact CFOF')

FOF 18: Pre pre-fire briefs are to cover exercise procedures,
ammunition types to be employed, misf ire/hangf ire
procedures, hot gun procedures, and general safety
precautions dealing with magazine safety.

Comment: There is no requirement for a "pre pre-fire' brief,
much less a requirement directing what subjects are
to be discussed. The requirement for "pre-fire"
briefs is contained in Type Commander's policy
COMNAVSURFLANTINST 3500. 2E, CH. 1, Paragraph 8303.
Paragraph 8303 provides, "The preparation and
publication of a firing plan and conduct of a
prefiring conference are mandatory before all weapons
firing exercises." No format for the firing plans or
pre-fire conference is specified by COMNAVSURFLANTINST
3500. 2E, paragraph 8303, and there is no requirement
for what subjects are to be discussed during the pre-
fire conference. IOWA briefs her personnel at a pre
pre-fire brief and then again at a pre-fire brief
where the key personnel are again briefed along with
CO, XO , and Bridge personnel. These key personnel then
brief their individual crews So that all personnel are
briefed. All of the subjects referenced in FOF 18
were covered in the pre-fire briefings and subsequent
briefings of the individual crews.

FOF 19: Weapons D«p»ptm«nt policy p«quir«d all gunn«ry, fip«
control, ammunition handling taama , and control
parsonnal to attand pr«-pp«-firc brlafa.

Comment: There was no written IOWA or Weapons Department policy
on 19 April that specified which personnel were
required to attend pre-fire or pre pre-fire briefs or
who was to attend. Historically, personnel directly
involved in the exercise, i.e., Turret Officers,
Turret Captains, Gun Captains and Petty Officers in
charge of various areas (Powder Flats, Magazines,
etc.) attended these briefs. Additionally, all other
Turret Crew members could attend, but no requirement
was ever levied. Only about 15 positions in each
Turret, including Six from Fire Control and two from
Qun Control Stations could be considered critical and
require a formal pre pre-fire briefing. Only the
Turret Officer, Turret Captain, Gun Captain and
Rammerman are involved in Misfire Procedures. Today
on IOWA, only the critical positions are briefed at
a formal pre pre-fire brief. They in turn brief their
individual crews so that all personnel are briefed.
This same procedure was done for the 19 April firings.
It worked before and it still works.

129

FOF 20: If all personnel assigned to the above positions had
attended the 18 April 1989 pre pre-fire brief, the
actual number of service members in attendance would
have exceeded 100.

Comment: See comment to FOF 19. In addition, IOWA found that
trying to do a pre-fire brief for up to 300 crew
members (3 Turrets) was inefficient and ineffective.
A smaller pre pre-fire brief for critical billet
personnel with a follow-on brief on Station for
remaining Turret personnel when Gun Quarters/GQ is set
is the most effective method of briefing safety,
exercise conduct and misfire procedures. The fact that
the additional personnel (non-critical) attend pre
pre-fire briefs and are again briefed on station only
further demonstrates lOWA's dedication to safe weapons
f ir ings .

FOF 21: IOWA procedures did not ensure safety briefs were
systematically conducted with all Main Battery
personnel for gunnery exercises.

Comment: To the contrary, lOWA's safety briefs were
systematically conducted with all Main Battery
personnel for all gunnery exercises. Prior to any
gunshoot aboard USS IOWA, including that on 19 April
1989, the following on-station briefs are given:

A. Gun Captain - Assures range, checksight and firing
zone are clear; assures positive communication with
all stations (Batteries released criteria). Assures
all personnel are in battle dress. Assures emergency
egress is clear and that all fire fighting equipment
is operative. Also covers broken powder bag, smoking
powder bag, misfire, fuze setting and general safety
procedures and takes muster. Assures ZEBRA is set in
his area.

B. Petty Officer in Charge of Projectile Decks -
Assures personnel are in battle dress. Assures that
emergency egress is clear and that fire fighting
equipment is operative. Covers smoking powder bag,
fouled parbuckler, toppled projectile and general
safety procedures and takes muster. Assures ZEBRA is
set in his area.

C. Petty Officer in Charge of Powder Flats - Assures
personnel are in battle dress. Assures that emergency
egress is clear and that fire fighting equipment is
operative. Covers powder passing, broken powder bag,
smoking powder bag and general safety procedures and
takes muster. Assures ZEBRA is set in his area.

130

FOF 24:

Comment ;

FOF 37:

Comment ;

FOF 70:

D. Petty Officer in Charge of Annular Space - Assures
personnel are in battle dress. Assures emergency
egress is clear and that fire fighting equipment is
operative. Covers broken powder bag, smoking powder
bag, and general safety procedures. Assures
annunciator, gas ejection and magazine sprinkler
valves are operative and takes muster. Assures ZEBRA
is set in his area.

E. Magazine Supervisor - Assures personnel are in
battle dress. Assures that emergency egress is clear
and that fire fighting equipment is operative. Covers
broken powder bag and general safety procedures.
Assures annunciator is operative and takes muster.
Assures ZEBRA is set in his area.

When the foregoing briefs are completed, the
responsible petty officer then reports he is 'manned
and ready .

At the pre pre-fire brief, personnel were not
mustered, but approximately 40 servlcemembers
attended .

No muater reports <or pre pre-flr« confer«nc«a ar«
r«quir«d. For a discussion of lOWA's method of
conducting pre-fire briefs, see comments to FOFs 18-
21.

After reloading center and right guns, personnel in
Turret I again attempted to fire left gun. A second
misfire occurred. Center and Right gun then fired one
round sequentially. Left gun was reprimed,
superelevated , and returned to target elevation for
the second time and misfired for a third time. The
firing sequence proceeded to Turret II. Exact timeg
for Turret I firing aequence waa not recorded.

There is no requirenwnt in any inatruction or
publication to raoord th« tim« that •>oh round it.

pupi lotiAon tio rwooro ^<n» T/iin» i<n»^i »«on rouno i«.

iirmi or >n »tt«mpt to iiv la in«d> , unlaaa > miafiri.
oooura ■ When a misfire occurs. Gun Control, Gun Plot
and the Turret Officer note the time of misfire to
determine safe time for carrying out misfire
procedures. No purpose would be served to record each
time a gun is fired except for misfires. IOWA noted
the times of the misfires referenced in FOF 37.

Operating directives indicate lead foil, used as a
decoppering agent, are to be removed from the rough
silk envelopes in which they are packaged and inserted
between the first and second powdar bags prior to each
gun firing. The general practice on board IOWA,
however, was to leave the lead foil in their silk
envelopes. Moreover, IOWA Main Battery gun captains
did not uniformly place the lead foil in its proper

131

position or use lead foil patches for each firing.
Nevertheless, lead foil had been inserted in center
gun Turret II prior to detonation on 19 April 1989.

Comment: NAVSEA Ordnance Publication SW 30- AA-MMO-0 10 Pg 3-51
states that lead foil Should be removed from
silk envelopes. This procedure has no relationship to
any safety issue. The silk bag on the lead foils is
designed to burn up during firing which will leave no
residue. Lead foila hav no r«lationahlp whataoaver

to ordnanoa a><«tv but *r« atrlotly uamd — aj — ».

daooPDTln* a<ant In the Hun.- The SWOP also states
that the lead foil should be placed MilhlU. the first
or second section of powder not between the first and
second bag as stated in FOF . Additionally, the
publication states that if the flashless feature of
the powder is desired, the use of the lead foil is
left to the discretion of the Fleet.

FOF 83- Although undated, enclosure (106) (Turret II Battle
Bill) was distributed prior to the explosion. Such
documents are not formally promulgated Weapons
Department watchbills. Rather, they are documents
initiated and distributed by Turret Officers to notify
turret personnel of assigned stations. No other
written Turret II station assignments were presented
to or found by the investigation officer.

Comment: Thor.» is no requirement for a formal watchbill fox-
Turret firings^ Watchbill assignments are fluid basea
on qualified personnel availability due to Gunner s
Mates (GMG) personnel shortages and Under Instruction
(U/I) training requirements for PQS signoffs. In
addition, Watchbills are not required to be signed by
the Weapon* Officer by any Havy Ingtruction.

FOF 139: On 10 April 1080. remote operation o'_ T""** "
hydraulic sprinkler .y-tem wa« not po««ible from
Turret I annular apace. Similarly, the Center Qun
Turret II Powder Hoist had to be stopped manually vice
automatically as designed and aa possible in both
right and left gun powder hoists. Although these
discrepancies existed for an indeterminate but lengthy
period prior to 19 April, no CASREPS were submitted.

Comment: a. There ia no Indication from any aource that thg.
rem^tr^^^i^t.i^n of Turr»t II hvdrau.H r ayatem waa not
poaaible from Turret I prior to the exploaion. Thg.
r^^rm^r^Y of ailOl Mortenaen (Turret I LPO) atated hg.
KlT-f^problem wit>' aorinkler BVBtem acti vat ions uaUJ.
the exDloaion. (FOF 140 substantiates the operation).
If there was I failure caused by the explos ion . Turret
II system could still be activated remotely from DC
Central and Turret II annular space.

132

FOF 143;

Comment ;

b. Th« dl8or*p>ncy with C«ntT PowdT Holgt in Turrat.
II_l* un«ubatantiat«d. Th« dl«ar«p»noy waa r«PQrt«d
by > S«»m>n 'SW who h«>rd It f rom >noth«r 8N. n«lth«g.
who work«d In th« turr«t-- No one in the Weapons Chain
of Command was aware of any problem with the Center
powder hoist. Likewise, the INSURV Inspection
conducted in March 1989 found no such discrepancy.
Turret II personnel had been adjusting powder hoist
safety latches the night before the explosion, but
this did not affect operation of the powder hoist.

Po«t-inoid*nt inspection of Turrot II indicatca
Material Condition Zabra waa not unlfsrmly aat
throughout tha Turrat.

Zabra waa raportad aat prior to conunancamant of_
axarclaa in Turrat II. Ona of Turret II aurvivora. YM3
Marshall, reporta that Zebra waa aet in the Turret on
April IQth. The FOF waa baaed on a atateraent by LT
ROPER of the Investigation Team who toured the Turret
2 days after the aooident. This tour was the basis of
his oonoluslon. During the post explosion damage
control efforts, Zebra was broken throughout the
Turret. This FOF is pure speculation.

FOF 146/

Opinion

13)c)/18:

Comment ;

FOF 150;

Comment :

FOF 162:

The Turret II intraturret sprinkler system was not,
as a matter of practice, charged by Turret II
personnel during gun operations.

The charging of the Turret II intrasprinkler system
hose or any Turret intrasprinkler hose was and is a
trip safety hazard on the powder flatg.. The position
of the charged hose requires powder handlers to step
over it while carrying bags of powder. IOWA brought
this fact to NAVSEA's attention. NAVSEA concurred
(COMNAVSEASYSCOM) 172222Z OCT 89) and is reviewing a
new design to eliminate the hazard. The protection
provided by the charging of the hose is minimal
compared to the potential hazards it causes.

Numerous crew members in the initial response effort
were not in full battle dress.

This FOF has no relevanov to the investiHatlon. Tlje
ship was not at Oeneral Quarters (GW) . therefore thost.
personnel not at ^un quarters would not have been in
battle dress . The initial effort was to put out fires,
save lives and save the ship. The crew did not have
the time to get in full battle dress prior to initial
damage control response. Fire parties relieving
initial response crew members were in compliance with
all firefighting safety requirements.

Simultaneously, Repair II was manned and their fire
fighting and damage control efforts commenced. The
Repair VI ordnance repair party was not manned on 19
April 18BB and as a matter of routine, is never manned

133

Comment :

during gunnery evolutions, General Quarters or not.

In accordanc* with IOWA R«pair Party Manual, which

"«•■ COMMA YiSUBFLAHTmST 3541. IB %« if hi>«y

inatruction. Repair VI la applicable only to nriii««T.gi^ .
Sine* R«p»ir VI la not raquir»d o.'> Battleahipa lAW
CNSLINST. and the majfazinea can ba remotely op«rat«4
from DC Central. Repair VI waa not manne^. Repair VI,
when manned, works for Weapons Control and is tasked
to effect repairs to electrical and sound powered
telephones, render first aid, transport personnel to
battle dressing stations, and control and extinguish
fires as directed. Additionally, Repair VI personnel
are tasked to make emergency ordnance repairs, assist
repair parties and operate magazine sprinkler systems
and other ordnance systems.

FOF 186:

Comment :

Qn 19 April IOWA did not have the senior ordnancg

personnel to man Rppair VI. ShnrtagPB of GMG ' s
required that experienced personnel man the Turrets
vice Repair VI . Ordnance Repair is done by a senior
GMG stationed in each Turret. Naval Warfare
Publication (NWP) 62 states that in combatants not
using Repair VI, ordnance repair is done by the teams
within the Combat Systems Casualty Control
Organization as is done on IOWA. With the manning
levels of GMG's now approaching Ship Manning Document
(Sh4D) , a Repair VI organization has been implemented
on IOWA.

Once final PQS qualification has been achieved.
Division Officers are responsible for ensuring that
appropriate entries in members' service records Page
4 (NAVPERS 1070/604) are made to reflect final
qual ification.

This statement creates the false impression that
Division Officers have an obligation to assure that
page 4 entries are made as soon as PQS qualifications
are completed. In fact, such entries need be made only
upon transfer of the individual from his command.
Until that time, it is perfectly proper and ordinary
to record final qualifications in divisional records.
Even worse, this statement is used subsequently to
imply that the absence of a page 4 entry means that

the individual was not qualified for a particular

task .

FOF 190: The COMNAVSURFLANT Combat System Mobile Training Team
(CSMTT) conducted a Combat Systems Assessment (CSA)
in IOWA during March 1989 in conjunction with
Tomahawk/Harpoon Cruise Missile Tactical
Qualification. A CSA is a one day 'snapshot' of Combat
Systems Readiness and includes a PQS review covering
PQS administration and a spot check of watch station
qualification progress. The PQS review conducted as
a part of the CSA in IOWA was evaluated as
satisfactory, but did not include the 16' turrets as

134

part of a spot check of watch station qualifications.

Comment: This statement is misleading because it omits three
crucial facts. First, the Commanding Officer, USS
IOWA was informed by the CSA inspectors that all
lOWA's weapons PQS was in good shape. Second, the
inspection was supposed to cover the 16" turrets as
is shown by the statements of the inspectors, each of
whom thought someone else was responsible for the
turrets. Third, reviewing a battleship's weapons PQS
and not looking at the 16" turrets is like going to
Niagara and not looking at the falls. You can do it,
but you're missing the point.

FOF 191: There were three methods of watchstation
■qualification" being employed in lOWA's Main Battery
turrets prior to 19 April 1989:

a. The under instruction watchstander was allowed to
perform the duties of the new watch station under the
direct supervision of a qualified watchstander in the
space for the sole purpose of observing the under
instruction watchstander.

b. The under instruction watchstander was allowed
to perform the duties of the new watch station under
the supervision of a qualified watchstander. However,
the qualified watchstander was not in the space solely
to observe the under instruction watchstander. The
qualified watchstander would also perform duties at
another watch station in close proximity to the under
instruction watchstander.

c . A de facto qualification procedure was conducted
in each turret whereby a training and qualification
process was implemented independent from strict PQS
standards and compliance. An individual was
characterized as "qualified" (i.e. capable of
performing the assigned task) if he could demonstrate
sufficient operational skill to perform the duties of
the watch station to the satisfaction of a qualified
watchstander .

Comment ;

The methods of watchstation qualification employed in
IOWA'S Main Battery Turrets prior to 19 April were
valid. Most servicemembers obtain training and become
PQS qualified by performing a job under the
supervi s ion of a previous ly trained and qualified
member . Nowhere does Navv policy state that the
qualifier cannot be engaged in other work at the same
time . Indeed, in tight spaces such as the gun rooms,
the only way a qualifier can be present is if he is
filling one of the other positions. FOF 191 attempts
to discredit this means of qualifying a member by
lumping it together with a plainly invalid method,
which is described in subparagraph C. as being used
'in each turret." The implication is that this "de

135

facto' procedure was generally recognized and accepted
throughout the ship. This conclusion is not supported
by the cited enclosures nor is it true. lOWA's method
of qualification used the supervision of a qualifier
in another position. This is a valid and proper
method to qualify gun crews.

FOF 193: Only thirteen (13) of fifty-one (51) watch stations
actually manned in Turret II requiring formal PQS
qualification were filled with PQS qualified personnel
at the time of the 19 April 1989 explosion in Turret
II. There were some personnel assigned to watch
stations in Turret II whose PQS books could not be
obtained. These books were either destroyed by fire,
never existed, or have not been located, accordingly,
if no PQS book was found for a deceased service
member, findings are based exclusively on service
record page four entries.

Comment: This extremely misleading FOF is based on two
previously discussed false premises. First, there is
ao requirement that pa^e 4 entries record

POg

qual i f ications until the individual is detached from
his command. Second, there is nothing improper about
having a person who is working on his PQS filling a
position under the instruction of a qualifier.
However, by disregarding these facts and listing as

qualified only those individuals whose recordg^

survived the explosion and who were not learning a new
posi t ion , the FOF gives the impression that most of
the turret was unqualified, untrained, and unsafe --
an impression which is demonstrably not true. The FOF
is also contrary to statements made to me by members
of five different inspection teams, both immediately
prior to and after 19 April, including a statement
made by Mr. Robert Stilson, head of the Explosives
Safety Review Team, that none of the records he
examined in depth for Turret 2 had any deficiencies
in their certification program for non-nuclear
ordnance. Finally, the FOF is contrary to my personal
observations .

FOF 196:

C o mme n t :

Applicable Navy directives indicate a Chief Gunner's
Mate (Quns) is the appropriate rate to fill the Main
Battery Turret Captain station. On 19 April 1989, QMa2
Keerl was Turret I's Turret Captain with QMG3 Cline
serving under instruction.

There is no requirement that this station be filled
with a Chief Gunner's Mate. Due to the shortage of
Chief Petty Officers on board IOWA during this time,
I used aMa2 Keerl as Turret I's Captain. There is
nothing improper about having an outstanding,
experienced, fully-qualified petty officer such as
GMG2 Keerl as Turret Captain. No evidence of any kind
exists to show that he performed in less than a
superlative manner both before and after the mishap.
FOF 196 is a gratuitous slap at a fine petty officer

136

and has no bearing whatsoever on the Turret II
explosion. Petty Officer Keerl , though not a Chief
Petty Officer, was the best, most qualified man for
the position, period.

FOF 198;

Comment :

In IOWA, Ensigns and Lieutenants (junior grade) served
as Weapons Department Division Officers. In fact, ENS
Garrett, who had been on board IOWA for only sixteen
(16) days, was the only officer in Turret I on 19
April 1989. The G- 1 Division Officer, (LTJG Meyer),
who normally acts as the Turret Officer for Turret I,
was standing the Junior Officer of the Deck watch on
the bridge. ENS Garrett was not familiar with turret
operations, safety, misfire or hangfire procedures.

FOF falsely creates the impression that a bran^
Ensign was running Turret I. There is no
rement that the Turret Officer be a commissioned
er. As the investigator knew perfectly well , GMGl
nsen , one the finest and most experienced
r's mates in the fleet, was serving as Turret
er and Ensign Garrett was there to learn and
ve . The statement that he was not familiar with
y and the operation is true; that is what he was
to learn.

This
new

requi
of f ic
Morte
gunne
Of fie
obser

saf et
there

FOF 203: The Commanding Officer, Executive Officer, Weapons
Officer and the Gunnery Officer were not aware of the
current qualification status of personnel assigned to
the 16"/50 caliber turrets. None were aware of the
large number of watch stations being manned by
personnel not qualified under the PQS program.

Comment :

FOF 208:

This statement is based on the false assumption that
the current qualification status of these personnel
had to be determined by whether the status was
reflected in the Page 4 entries. As discussed
previously in the comments of FOFs 186 and 193, there
is no requirement that Page 4 entries record PQS
qualifications until the individual is detached.
Thus, the finding that a large number of watch
stations were being manned by personnel not qualified
under the PQS Program is incorrect. To the contrary,
both internal and external inspections conducted prior

to and after 19 April demonstrate that lOWA'g^

The Weapons Officer did not authorize the 16"/50
caliber turret Division Officers to suspend the
Weapons Department PQS program during the transition
from 16"/50 caliber PQS book (NAVEDTRA 43415) to the

f\ / r\ -t ,

137

C o nune n t :

revised edition (NAVEDTRA 43415A).

There was no suspenaion of the PQS pro^^ram on USS lOW^
at any time. Turret I was in the process of adapting;
to a revised PQS system and the paperwork entries were
not being placed in the new records until the
transition was completed.

FOF 210: PQS Boards in all three turret divisions were not
updated weekly as required by NAVEDTRA 43100- IC and
had not been since 1988.

Comment: There is no requirement for a "PQS BOARD."

FOF 212: (LTJQ Hunt) the G-3 Division/Turret III Officer,
without permission, suspended the PQS program in
Turret III from November 1988 until 19 April 1989,
while awaiting arrival of the new 16'/50 caliber PQS
book. Specific examples of PQS accomplishments not
forwarded include GMG3 Edge, GMG2 Barker, GMG3 Unger ,
GMG3 McDaries, and GMG3 Kilbury.

Comment: Turret III had stopped making entries because of the
Division Officer's lack of confidence in some of the
qualifying signatures, in his division records. This
was a conscious decision and the proper thing to do.
At no time did the process of training or qualifying
slowdown in any turret. Personnel PQS accomplishment
was recorded in a notebook maintained by LTJG Hunt.

FOF 227 c: Spark producing devices, including six lighters, were
found on the remains of the deceased. A charred soda
can containing a cigarette butt was found on the
projectile deck in post incident clean up. No smoking
apparatus (lighters, etc.) were found in the Center
Gun room after the explosion.

Comment: Cigarette lighters were not permitted in the Turret.
Their prohibition was stressed as a regular part of.
the safety training aboard IOWA. No step short of body
searches, however, can guarantee that a sailor does

not have a lighter in his pocket. The lighters hacji

nothing whatever to do with the casualty.

Keys, knives and dog tags are not flame, heat or spark
producing devices as that term is used in NAVSEA OP
4 (2-25) .

The Turret Officer's Booth was regarded as outside the
area of the magazine and pre-incident policy permitted
smoking in the booth during those periods when gunnery
evolutions were not ongoing. No personnel could be
found who ever saw smoking in the magazine or inside
the Turret (except in the Turret Booth) .

Comment: Regulations in effect at the time of the explosion did
not prohibit smoking in the booth except when gunnery_
evolutions were occurring. No one has alleged that

FOF 227 d&e :

138

FOF 227 g:

there was smoking in the booth when gunnery evolutions
were ongoing. Moreover, the FOF states that there
were no known incidents of anyone smoking in the
magazines or turrets. Smokinn had nothinU whatevr
to do with th« OBualty.

In the past, torn powder bags have been discovered

during loading operations. Personal judgment

controlled whether torn bags were loaded or placed in
immersion tanks.

Comment: Not one witneas evr saw a torn ba>{ in the <un rooma .

Regulations do not require immediate immersion of bags
with minor tears. Even leaking bags can be used if
"practicable" although none were used on IOWA.

Opinions

Opinion 13a: Proper attention was not given to preventing flame and
spark producing items from being taken into the
magazines .

Comment: Ordnano* instruotlona require no flame or apark
producing devicea be brought into Magazinea. On 19
April the Turret waa not conaidered a magazine by any
ordnance publication or Instruction. FOF 200 (e)
atated that no peraonnel could be found who ever aaw
smoking In the magazinea or inaide the turret
(excepting the Turret Booth - Not a magazine) .
Opinion 51 atatea that amoklng waa not allowed In the
Turret during Gunnery Exerclaea. At the time of the
Turret II explosion there were no spark or flame
producing devices found in any powder magazine. On 19
April the Turrets were not considered a magazine by
any ordnance publication. As stated in FOF 206 (f) -
No smoking apparatus (lighters, etc.) were found in
the center gun after the explosion.

Opinion 13e. Standard Safety briefs were not given.

Comment :

Safety briefs

were

provided

dur

ln« a P

re-fire brief

on April

18th

and

during on-

-sta

tlon br

iefs

on April.

leth once

stations

were manned as regul

red

by Turret

Pre-f Ire

list
on c

Turret I .

II.

and

III

Officers

Initialed

heck

sheets on 19

April

that

thifl had

been aooompllShed. These briefs were in accordance
with instructions received at Refresher Training in
GTMO during the fall of 1989. Briefs of the various
spaces are conducted by Petty Officers' in Charge
(POIC's). Although the content of a safety brief is
not stated in any publication, IOWA conducts safety
briefs before firings and holds safety brief lectures
on station eve.n when not firing but when stations are
manned .

Opinion 15: IOWA utilized her Main Battery Guns to engage in
unauthorized research and development.

139

Comment: This statement is incorrect. it is a false
description of authorized gunnery improvement
activities in process onboard IOWA. All such

»ptivit^t«« isiili tht wxcaption of th« ua» r.f_

lnop«in«ntal gharMt (5 ba<a) waa Banotlon.d by hl^h«r
•uthorlty. Th« urn* of « flv« b»i oh>r<« w>« a>f« an^
mtt all crlt«rlft for um« In * IflVBe nyn Moreover,
IOWA personnel believed at the time that its use was
also sanctioned as it had been shot 18 times in
November 1987 with NAVSEA personnel embarked.

(a) EX 146 ICM round waa authorized by NAVSEASYSCOM.

~ RADM Meinig approved the testing.

- The test plan was provided by NAVSEASYSCOM.

- NAVSEA/ DAHLQREN personnel were onboard for test.

<b) The 224e lb. oroleotile extended ran|!e proieatllp
was approved aa a test proitram by NAVSEASYSCOM.

- CINCLANTFLT was kept fully assessed of the
pro j ect .

- DAHLQREN personnel were onboard for the testing.

- NAVSEASYSCOM approved the configuration for at-
sea testing without formal safety approval.

- NAVSEASYSCOM and COMNAVSURFLANT endorsed the use
of an extra 501b. "baglef during the test and for
fleet use afterwards as requested by CINCUSNAVEUR .

- COMNAVSURFLANT 041446Z DEC 86 requested NAVSEA
support for conduct of project and modification of
MK-145 projectile.

- COMNAVSURFLANT provided the test plan.

(d) Incremental Charges were tested onboard IOWA prior
to 19 April .

- Due to previous firing; by IOWA in November 1087^,

the availability of incremental chapte ran({9

tablea in World War II. numerous diacuasiona with
NAVSEASYSCOM on the advantages of incremental

char^^es and planned NAVSEA incremental charge

firin<a. IOWA Weapona personnel fully believej
that the firin.<a had been sanctioned by thg
appropriate naval authorities.

- Tests were conducted on 5 and 7 November 1687
using 5 bags per round of D846 and one HICAP
projectile, D882 . A total of six rounds were

140

fired. On 7 November 1987, firings were conducted
using a 5-bag charge of D846 and one 2700 lb. BL&P
projectile D881 per round. A total of 12 rounds
were fired using this configuration. MAYSKA
r«pr«a«nt>tlv Mr. Jtpv Lltt«l mma onboTd durinj.
th« tmat.

Range tables for incremental charges were
developed during World War II and were available.

- Incremental charge advantages were discussed at
Battleship Improvement Conference with
NAVSEASYSCOM and DAHLQREN personnel in March 1989.

- INCREMENTAL CHARGES WITH 2700 lb. projectiles
provide a high degree of accuracy while
maintaining gun bore pressure well below design
limits.

- USS IOWA NAVGRAM 8034 Ser 007 14 March 89,
discussed incremental charges and non-standard
configurations including 50 lb. "baglets."
COMNAVSURFLANT endorsed lOWA's recommendations on
incremental charge usage.

- A copy of a memorandum receivd bv IOWA from MWS
D»hl<r«n (Cod* Q-12) In th« fall of 1080 «t*t««.
that th« findings of th« NAVSEA Weapons Svatam
Exploaiv Saf«ty Ravlaw Board In Au<u«t 1080^

cltad that thara waa historical praoadanoa fox.

firinn 16' projectiles with other than Six bags.
Tha board aaw no problam with thaaa Idaaa but.
daoidad that no additional firlnH ba oonduotad
without an approved program.

- 5-ba< incramantal charXas of DB46 with 2700 Ib^
proJaotilaa wara taat-f irad by KWS DahKran during
tha mimm«t» 19B9. Tha results showed — iun — borft

praaauraa «xpari«need ware axtramaly — £lo44 — ta.

those pradicted by USS lOWA's Fire Control Qunnar
prior to the April 19th accident. Pressures listed
below are derived from NWS Dahlgren's published
figures .

Sarvlca praaaura of naw 10 V 59 aun 40.700 pal

Nominal proof pressure: 53,800 psi (lOWA's new gun
proof pressure 55,930 psi)

6 bags of D846/2700 lb. proj : 53,100 psi 5 bags:
37,500 psi (pressure with copper crusher gauges, new
guns )

6 bags of D846/2700 lb. proj: 49,400 psi 5 bags:
35,000 psi (pressure with pressure/ time gauges, new
guns)

141

6 bags of 0846/2700 lb. proj: 49.199 pai 5 h»fM:
3a.8gg V>»L (pressure with copper crusher gauges,
lOWA's 20% wear guns)

6 bags of D846/2700 lb. proj: 45,825 psi 5 bags:
30.600 psi (pressure with pressure/time gauges , IOWA'S
20% wear guns)

- Baaed on the above information. th« firinX of.
inor«m«ntal ehargaa of 0846 with 2.700 lb. proiactilea
ifl aafa.

- In the center gun of Turret II, the breech was
never closed, and the firing voltage was never
appl led .

Opinion 26: lOWA's Turret Crews were not properly prepared for the
Main Battery shoot on 19 April 1989.

Comment: This opinion is based on the unsubstantiated finding
that the pre-fire briefing methods used prior to the
19 April gun shoot were inadequate. As discussed
under the comments to FOFs 18-21, lOWA's turret crews
were properly prepared for the Main Battery shoot on
19 April. Crltloal bill«t PTaonn*! wt« bri«f«d at
th« pra pr«-flro bri«f on IB April aa to tht typ« oS
axarolaa to ba ahot >nd »t tha Pra-fira briaf *a to.

the tvpft o* aiW""""ltio" »"<* BAlStl^ — proceduraa — by.

Waapona Offloar.., Turrat Orawa In non-oritloal billatg,
ware bri«fed on atation bv tha POIC's aa to conduct
of tha mx^raif and aafatv prooaduraiL. These briefs
are and were part of the pre-fire check sheet for each
turret .

Opinion 52: The investigation into and the analysis of all
potential causes of the tragic explosion of Turret II
have been complicated by the (a) laauaa of Improparlz

loadad munltlona in tha Cantar — flim (NALC CMl

pralaatila ttth fiv« full ba<a vioa alx) ■ (b) l»qfc g?

affactiva. proparly auparvlaad aaaKnmant and.

Quallf loatlon procaat and (c) poor adharanoa — tfi.

axploaiva aafatv ra<ulations and ordnanca 8»iaty •

While those and other personnel error related issues
were not the cause of the explosion and did not
provide an ignition source, they cast the proper
operation of gunnery system in USS IOWA (BB 61) in a
poor light.

Comment: Dua to pravioua firlnga by IOWA in Movambar 1987. tha
availability of inoramantal oharga ranga tablaa In
World War II, numaroua dlacuaalona with NAVSEASYSCOM
on tha advantagea of incremantal chargaa and plannad
NAVSEA incramantal charge firings, IOWA Waapona
paraonnal fully ballavad that tha flringa of
Inoramantal chargaa had baan aanctlonad by tha
approprlata Naval authorltlaa. In the Center Gun of
Turret II, the breech was never closed, and the firing
voltage was never applied.

142

- A copy of a nfmorandum recelvd by IOWA from WWg.
Dahlnren (Coda 0-12) atates that the flndin<ta of
th« WAVSEA W«>pon« Sytem Sxploalv Safaty R«v1«m
Board In Amtuflt 1989. cited that there wag
hiatorical precedence for flrln^t 16' proiectilea
with other than alx baga . The board aaw no probleg
with theae Ideaa but decided that no additional
firlni be conducted without an approved pronram.

- IOWA 'a turret crewa were well trained and fully
capable of puttinU ordnance on tarHet. GMCS
Ziegler was a totally competent and effective
leader .

- The 16"/50 weapons system, is simple to learn
and operate .

- 574 rounds were fired between August 1988 and 19
April 1989.

- IOWA' a demonatrated expertlae in 8hootlni< an4
excellent material condition haa been validated
during numTou* inaptotiona.

- Three PQS/Mon-Nuclear Ordnance Reviews on 1
June/2 June and 18 September 1989 stated lOWA's
programs were 'In full compliance with all PQS and
Non Nuclear Ordnance Inatructiona . . . properly
lnBt>ll«d. opT*tln< •ff«otivly >nd thoroughly.
docum*nt«d • These results were obtained with no
further training conducted between April 19th and
the inspection.

- Deflclenciea found In PQS documentation during
the invtlgatlon were fully corr«cted in two
working day. Indicative of a PQS program that waa
•atabliahed, dynamic and executed by a well-
trained crew.

- IOWA meeta and exceeda all exploalve aafety and
ordnance aafety regulatlona and certlf Icationa aa
validated by numeroua inapectiona and aaaiat
villi*:

- Two highly experienced inspectors of the NAVSEA
Explosive Safety Review Team attested to the high
quality of training in all three turrets and
particularly in Turret II.

- One of them, Mr. Robert Stilson, provided a
sworn statement^ that during an ESR in September
1988, he found. . . "The turret, projectile flata and
powder m*g>«lnea were in very good condition. . .The
peraonnel wre well veraed in their profeaalonal
certification for the 16' guna . . . and inaofar aa
the traininl recorda for the turreta. they were

143

all well document«d and wll maintainad. I lookad.
at 12 recordg. in depth for turr>t two, and foun^
no d%tiai»nai%B In th«lr oTtHlcation program for
non nuclear ordnance. I made similar chacka foy
the other turreta. '

The Ordnance Handling Safety Aaaiat Team
(CmCLAMTFLT ordnance handllnx experta) . in
December 1988. cited knowledge, procedurea t.nd.
aocountablllty na EXCELLENT.

- To enaure that only the moat reliable peraonnel
•re permitted to handle Mon-Nuolear Ordnance . IOWA
developed the Mavy'a firat and only Non-Nuclear
Ordnance Peraonnel Reliability Program (PRP) . Thp
program requirea all potential ordnance handlerg^
to be screened in a proceaa aimilar to the Mavy ' g^
Nuolear PRP program.

- The Combat Systems Assessment ("CSA") Team
( COMMA VSURFLANT CSMTT) in March of 1989 (one month
prior to mishap) cited overall combat aystemft
»aaea«ment »« SAT.

- IOWA was cited by the CSA inspection team as
being ..." clean and professional, all areas
inspected reflect good leadership/management and
obvious pride of the crew in their
equipment /system.

- The CSA Team indicated that they reviewed all
Weapons Department administration and PQS and
found the entire department SAT for all weapong
ayatema .

- INSURV (LANTFLEET Board of Inspection and
Survey) in March 89 (three weeks prior to mishap) ,
stated that, 'The ship's 16-inch turrets were
found in satisfactory material condition.'

- Following the inspection, COMNAVSURFLANT gave a
special 'well done" to lOWA's Weapons Department
for its performance during INSURV.

- IOWA aeta, maintaina and routinely valldatea ita
Intarnml programa and detailed knowledge of
requirementa . IOWA haa paaaed every teat and.
Ingpeotion and haa demonstrated unpreoedented.
auatainablllty and high oombat readineaa at aea-

144

Senator Cohen. That is all I have right now, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Nunn. Thank you, Senator Cohen.

Let me get back to one point that we were talking about a few
minutes ago. Captain, and then I want to ask you some of the
detail differences between your views and the conclusions to which
Senator Cohen was just alluding.

In your testimony you talked about the Navy's lack of a concept
of operations or employment plan for the battleships. Does that
mean that essentially you are saying that battleships are better
than the Navy thinks they are and that they are not being used as
they could be used? Is that what you are saying?

Captain Moosally. No. I am generally saying I think there are
many in the Navy who think that the battleship is as good as I
think it is. This is, again, on the east coast.

I think that the fact that the Iowa employment has done much
to prove or analyze the real worth of the battleship.

When we went to the 6th Fleet and operated with the 6th Fleet,
I think all those kinds of doubts went away. Without getting into
classified matters, the battleship was really kind of the centerpiece
over there for the contingency operations that took place in con-
junction with the reaction to the murder of Colonel Higgins.

When you analyze this ship and you sit down and look at it, it is
not just another cruiser or destroyer. This ship has got a place for
32 Tomahawk missiles, 16 Harpoon missiles, which is double the
number on any other Navy ship. It has the 16-inch guns which are
a tremendous capability. Eighty-five percent, I believe, of the
world's population are in range of those guns. That means a lot of
economic targets are in range of those guns. It is a lot of ordnance.
It is, I think, over 832 rounds.

The big factor for me, when you have to get in close is the battle-
ship is the most survivable ship, along with an aircraft carrier,
ever built. A lucky Exocet missile hit or a lucky 130 millimeter
shot from a battery ashore is not going to put that ship out of com-
mission. That ship is highly survivable, highly sustainable. It can
go fast. It can sustain itself.

For example, we refueled in Augusta Bay, Sicily on November
17. We arrived back in the States on December 7 without refueling
with over a million gallons of fuel left. You can sail that ship for-
ever and ever, but the key thing, once again, is this ship can deliv-
er ordnance on target very accurately. It can survive a lucky hit; it
can survive most Third World scenarios. To me, it is one of the
greatest assets this country has in reaction to Third World crisis.

Chairman Nunn. How does the lack of appreciation of how that
ship should be employed manifest itself on a day-by-day basis?

Captain Moosally. Well, let me say today I think there is a
greater appreciation of the battleship. I think it was there before.

The problem was in the execution of the policy set by higher au-
thority, and the manifestation, back when I came aboard the ship,
as I saw it, was in the manning that we had and I think the actual
employment of the ship. That is about it.

When I yelled to get things fixed, they were fixed. When I point-
ed out things that needed repair, such as the fluorescent lighting
that we got down in the turrets now, when I spoke up and had a
plan to fix things, we got the cooperation and they were fixed.

145

Chairman Nunn. Captain, getting back to what you consider the
most important finding for a moment, you do agree with the find-
ing of the investigation and Admiral Milligan's opinion that the ex-
plosion resulted from a wrongful intentional act, is that right?

Captain Moosally. Yes, sir.

Chairman Nunn. Do you base that on having read the Admiral's
conclusion?

Captain Moosally. When I read the report and read the NIS in-
vestigation, that is the conclusion I come to.

Chairman Nunn. You think they are right in that?

Captain Moosally. Yes, sir.

Chairman Nunn. Was that your intuition before this report was
ever laid out?

Captain Moosally. No, sir. I would never have thought of some-
body doing a wrongful intentional act in these circumstances — not
only taking their own life, but taking the life of 46 other people.

Chairman Nunn. Do you agree with the conclusion that GMG2
Clayton Hartwig most probably committed that act?

Captain Moosally. Well, Mr. Chairman, I have not read, in
detail, the lab reports, the forensic reports. As I said, I have been
away for 6 months commanding a ship that was on a deployment.

I would not come out and say that. I would not make an unquali-
fied statement that Petty Officer Hartwig is the guy who commit-
ted the wrongful act. I do not think I can do that.

Chairman Nunn. You, yourself, cannot do that?

Captain Moosally. No, sir.

Chairman Nunn. Do you believe that Admiral Milligan, based on
the investigation he conducted, is in a position to have made that
conclusion?

Captain Moosally. I cannot answer that question, Mr. Chair-
man.

Chairman Nunn. You are saying you, yourself, cannot judge
that?

Captain Moosally. I am saying myself, I cannot.

Chairman Nunn. Let me give you an opportunity to go on record
as to your feelings of some of the findings that you say you dis-
agree with.

One of the opinions, listed as number two on page 54 of this
report says "Iowa's commanding officer did not (a) establish an ef-
fective PQS organization; (b) effectively use the PBFT to monitor
the PQS programs; (c) maintain overall cognizance of the PQS pro-
gram; (d) ensure that the PQS coordinator submitted monthly re-
ports or conducted periodic inspections; and (e) adequately deter-
mine the extent and significance of the various PQS reviews con-
ducted by the Iowa PQS coordinator in support of the standdown
by the training command in support of TRE and by the CNSL's
CSMTT during CSA."

I do not know what all those initials mean, but could you com-
ment on that in general and tell us what, particularly, the key ini-
tials mean? PQS means personnel qualification?

Captain Moosally. Yes, sir. As I said, PQS is a personnel qualifi-
cation program. It in itself is not a training program, it is a list of
minimum requirements and skills of any position on board ship.

146

When I came to Iowa, I found that the PQS program was not in
the greatest of shape. I had a new instruction written. I conducted
an internal PQS audit. I found at that time that we had some prob-
lems.

We then got into the preparation for Guantanamo Bay, going to
Cuba. We had a TRE, which is a training readiness evaluation,
done prior to going to Guantanamo Bay to see what your shortcom-
ings are, so they can concentrate on those when you get there.

At that time, I was told that, I think— I forget the numbers, but
like 75 percent of the spot checks they did on PQS, where they go
down and actually go down and actually check their records, was
satisfactory.

We did another PQS standdown in November, internal stand-
down on PQS, and found that we still had some problems. All the
time this was going on, of course — and once again I am not trying
to make excuses. From my statement, you can see the things we
were doing. It was one inspection after another.

We did talk about — I do not attend the planning board for train-
ing, that is the executive officers' board, but we did emphasize
PQS. When I went on my tours of the ship, I checked out PQS
charts that were in things like the turrets and other spaces, and it
appeared to me that we had a program which was training people.

Chairman Nunn. You disagree with this finding, then?

Captain Moosally. No, sir, I do not disagree with all those find-
ings. I had a monthly report I was supposed to get. I did not get it.
I made a determination that I would get oral briefings from the ops
officer who was the PQS coordinator, so I did not take the monthly
training reports.

In March, the Combat System Assessment Team, as I stated in
my statement, came aboard and did an evaluation of PQS in the
weapons department. At that time, the Chief Inspector told me
that our PQS was satisfactory for the entire weapons department.

The criteria for a satisfactory mark was that you have a fully-
implemented PQS program, so him having told me that — he said,
your program is as good as any on the waterfront.

What they failed to do, they failed to properly check the 16-inch
gunnery system, and if you read the testimony of the inspectors,
one inspector thought the other inspector was going to do it, and in
fact neither one of them checked 16-inch gunnery PQS, so they
kind of gave a false impression as to the status of the PQS adminis-
tration.

One of the assumptions here in the investigation is that a page
four service record entry has to be made in order for somebody to
be PQS-qualified, and in fact the PQS management manual specifi-
callj' says that a PQS record entry does not have to be made until
the individual leaves the ship, so in that regard some of the statis-
tics with regard to PQS-qualified people to me is not valid.

Chairman Nunn. Let me ask one other question. On finding 13,
it states here, "Ineffective enforcement of safety policy and proce-
dures was the norm within turret II. Specifically: (a) proper atten-
tion was not given to setting and maintaining materiel Condition
Zebra; (b) proper attention was not given to preventing flarne- and
spark-producing items from being taken into the magazine; (c)
proper attention was not given to maintaining the integrity of the

147

magazine sprinkler systems; (d) proper attention was not given to
the wearing of battle dress; and (e) standard safety briefings were
not given."

Would you like to comment on that finding?

Captain Moosally. Yes I would. Yes, sir. I will take them one at
a time. The setting of Condition Zebra. From what I have read in
the report, that was based on a lieutenant on the investigating
team who, two days after the explosion, went through the turret
and decided that Zebra was not uniformly set. I do not know how
you do that.

We have other investigators — Captain Miceli, who was before
this committee here a few days ago, told us on his last visit to the
ship that in fact Zebra was set.

Chairman Nunn. Tell us what you mean by "Zebra."

Captain Moosally. Well, Zebra is a materiel condition. We have
different hatches and doors on the ship, the lowest rating is X-ray,
and those are things that are normally shut all the time. Those are
things that are near watertight voids. X-ray fittings are closed.

The normal configuration for a ship is Materiel Condition Yoke.
This means that all settings, X-ray and Yoke, are closed dogged
down— what we call dogged down tight, and they provide water-
tight integrity. If you have a flood, and so forth, only one compart-
ment gets flooded. You do not have what they call progressive
flooding. It is also used to set up fire boundaries.

Generally, when you go to General Quarters you set Condition
Zebra, and that means that that is the highest level of materiel
condition of General Quarters. That compartmentalizes the ship
more than any other setting.

During a gun shoot we are not at General Quarters, we are at
what we call Condition 3 Steaming, which is a semi-watertight foot-
ing, but you do not have everybody at General Quarters.

When we go to gunnery stations, however. Zebra is set in the
turrets, and so part of the check-off list for reporting "ready to
fire" is that Condition Zebra is set in the turrets, that people are in
battle dress.

So we did get the report that Condition Zebra was set in the
turret, and the basis for the finding for the investigation team was
that this lieutenant went through the turret 2 days after the explo-
sion, after we had removed bodies and so forth, and had deter-
mined that Condition Zebra was not uniformly set. I contend that
you cannot do that.

As far as flammable devices, yes, we were wrong there. I think
six people were found with cigarette lighters on their person. None
of them were in the magazines, as far as I know. Prior to the explo-
sion the turret booth, which is the aft section of the upper part of
the turret, was considered a smoking area because until you go to
General Quarters or fire the guns there is no ammunition in the
upper part of the turret.

The magazines are way below this area and it was generally con-
sidered okay to smoke there. We have since changed that policy,
but that was the general policy on Iowa and I think the other bat-
tleships before the explosion so some of those devices may have
been in that area.

148

So yes, there were six people in there that had cigarette lighters,
and they should not have been there, and we emphasize that all
the time, but to say that there were no safety briefs given to me
does not hold up under the facts. At the pre-fire briefing that was
given by our weapons officer, safety procedures were given, and
when we go to General Quarters stations in the turrets a safety
briefing is given by the turret officer and the petty officers in
charge.

As a matter of fact, I have a signed pre-fire check-off list signed
by Lieutenant Buck, the turret officer, which indicates that he in
fact gave safety briefings to the people in the turret.

Chairman Nunn. So you disagree with that finding?

Captain Moosally. Yes, sir, I do.

Chairman Nunn. Number (c), we did not get to, was the integrity
of the magazine sprinkler system.

Captain Moosally. Yes, sir. The one thing that they pointed out
there— there are two things. One was the fact that the remote op-
erator from turret I, after the explosion did not operate— the
remote operator for initializing the sprinkler system from turret I
for turret II.

The conclusion that it did not work came from a seaman who
talked to another seaman. Every indication I have from the petty
officers who were knowledgeable on this system indicated that the
system in fact worked prior to the explosion.

The other discrepancy on the sprinkler system was the intra-
turret jumper hose which is hooked up on the powder flats for Gen-
eral Quarters. We did not energize that, although the check-off list
says they energized it, because the hose becomes a trip hazard for
people handling powders.

As a matter of fact, we have sent a message to Naval Sea Sys-
tems Command who agrees that it is a trip hazard, and it is going
to be done away with. That is the reasoning why that piece of hose
was not energized.

Chairman Nunn. How about, "Proper attention was not given to
wearing of battle dress"?

Captain Moosally. Well, I'm not sure where that comes from
either, Mr. Chairman. There was a comment that the ship went to
General Quarters and the people were not in battle dress. I can say
that there was no time to get into battle dress.

I mean, when your house is on fire you do not stop and put on
your best suit to get ready to go outside, and I think that we react-
ed in the best possible way. I would not expect people to be in
battle dress who were not in the turrets at the time, because the
rest of the ship was not at General Quarters.

Chairman Nunn. Thank you. Senator Warner.

Senator Warner. Let me start with a preliminary question, and
then I will refer to the findings momentarily. As a follow-on to
those series of questions already asked — as I understand it, your
personal opinion is that this tragedy was the direct result of a de-
liberate act?

Captain Moosally. Yes, sir.

Senator Warner. But that you disagree with the finding of the
investigating officer which implicated a specific sailor, Hartwig?

149

Captain Moosally. I do not disagree with that, Senator Warner.
What I was saying is I cannot come to the conclusion myself.
Senator Warner. Let me read it. It is opinion number 56 —

Based on this investigation report and after full review of ail Naval Investigative
Service reports to date, the wrongful intentional act that caused this incident was
most probably committed by Clayton Hartwig.

Now, do you agree or disagree with that conclusion?

Captain Moosally. I do not agree or disagree. What I am saying
is I, as the commanding officer of Iowa, from what I have read, I
cannot come to that same conclusion.

Chairman Nunn. You are saying, as I understand it, that you do
not have the expertise, the knowledge, or the investigative knowl-
edge to come to that conclusion?

Captain Moosally. Yes, sir, that is correct.

Senator Warner. Let me just follow up on it. Do you entertain
or consider or have in mind any other plausible or reasonable ex-
planation for what happened?

Captain Moosally. No, sir, I do not.

Senator Warner. Again, I am going to follow up on what the
chairman just said. Once again, why is it that you cannot agree
with that?

Captain Moosally. I said I do not have the expertise or the
knowledge to agree or disagree with it.

Senator Warner. Well, now, you have had 23 years of naval
service and have commanded other ships. How is it that you lack
the expertise to either agree or disagree with that conclusion?

Captain Moosally. Well, I have not had time. Senator Warner,
to study all the laboratory results, forensic results, the various
tests that were done with regard to this investigation.

Senator Warner. Well, then, you have the expertise, presum-
ably, as a professional naval officer

Captain Moosally. No, sir. I am not a munitions expert. I am
not a munitions expert.

Senator Warner. Well, is the admiral who prepared this report
an expert?

Captain Moosally. He is an expert certainly in some areas. He
is not a munitions expert.

Senator Warner. So, primarily, you have not had the time to go
over the body of evidence?

Captain Moosally. Yes, sir, I have not had the time.

Senator Warner. And I am not in any way disputing that you
had to press on with your duties for the ship's deployment. You
have not had the opportunity to go back over the evidence. What I
am trying to bring out is whether or not the reason that you do not
agree with this is based on some other plausible explanation.

Captain Moosally. No, it is not, no, sir.

Senator Warner. So there is no mystery out here that we have
not penetrated?

Captain Moosally. No, sir. I have no revelations on any of this.
If I did, believe me, I would have come forth a long time ago.

Senator Warner. Thank you.

Senator Cohen. Would the Senator yield?

Senator Warner. Yes.

150

Senator Cohen. I am still not clear in terms of the response be-
cause I think what the captain is saying is— let me pose it this
way— assuming you had time to read all of the evidence, that you
read the forensic material, that you looked at the pathology re-
ports, I understand from your testimony you still would not have
an opinion as to whether or not a particular individual committed
the act or not?
Captain Moosally. Yes, sir.

Senator Cohen. So, it is not a question of not having time. What
you are saying is you do not have the expertise to reach a conclu-
sion as to a specific individual?
Captain Moosally. That is correct.

Senator Cohen. And given all the time— take the next 6 months
off duty and review the evidence— you would not be in a position to
affirm the results or the conclusions reached by the Navy?
Captain Moosally. Yes, sir.

Senator Cohen. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Nunn. I want to follow up on that. Do you believe Ad-
miral Milligan had that expertise? Do you think he is qualified to
make that judgment based on the report? You said he was not a
munitions officer, either. What makes him better qualified than
you?

Captain Moosally. He has a team, and he has all the inputs.
Chairman Nunn. You are saying maybe his team had that capa-
bility?

Captain Moosally. I think his team does, yes, sir.
Chairman Nunn. You think his team had the capability?
Captain Moosally. Yes, sir.

Senator Warner. Well, then, if I might resume on my time, you
agree the team had the capability and they assembled the facts,
then reached the conclusion, but you still do not agree with it? I
mean, it almost infers that somehow the procedure of putting to-
gether these complex facts and drawing this conclusion is faulty.
Captain Moosally. No, sir, I am not saying that it is. I cannot
make those judgments. I mean, I just cannot make those judg-
ments.

Senator Warner. Suppose you were given the job of examining
this accident, as was the Admiral. What would you have done dif-
ferently or would you have done anything differently?

Captain Moosally. I would have to look at what has been done
and make that decision. I could not answer that.

From what I know right now at this time, what I would have

done differently

Senator Warner. Well, do you have any recommendations as to
how this committee might broaden or extend these hearings in an
effort to try and make certain that nothing is left uncovered, to de-
termine whether or not the Navy acted properly?

Captain Moosally. No, sir. I think that you are doing everything
from what I have seen, and in talking to the General Accounting
Office personnel who visited the ship, I think that everything that
can be done is being done.

Senator Cohen. Would the Senator yield further.
Senator Warner. Yes.

151

Senator Cohen. One further point to try to clarify this. Captain,
if you were not a captain but simply a juror, we have jurors who
are empaneled every day who have no expertise, certainly, in fo-
rensic science or pathology or anjdhing else, and they are called
upon to make decisions, the prosecutor gets up, the plaintiffs attor-
ney, whatever, makes a presentation of the evidence.

Under those circumstances if you were just a juror and the evi-
dence presented to you, and you had an opportunity to review all
of that evidence, are you saying that you would not be in a position
to either come to a conclusion as to a specific individual without
looking at your background and saying you are an ordinary layper-
son looking at the evidence the Navy has assembled and presented
to you? Would you be in a position at that point to reach a decision
as to whether the Navy points to a specific individual or not?

The question we have is are you afraid of a lawsuit or the Navy?

Captain Moosally. No.

Senator Cohen. So, you can answer the question, then?

Captain Moosally. Probably I could if I was a juror and all of
the evidence was brought. Yes, I could make a decision.

Senator Warner. You would have the expertise to do it then?

Captain Moosally. I would have the decision-making expertise
to make judgments.

Senator Dixon. What would your decision be then, if my col-
leagues would yield?

Captain Moosally. I do not know because I have not seen all the
evidence.

Senator Warner. Well, Mr. Chairman, one of the reasons you
have not seen it — we understand this — is you have been busy.

Captain Moosally. Yes, sir.

Senator Warner. But earlier you said you felt perhaps we ought
to go back — not we, the Congress, but the Navy Department — and
review the procedures for this type of investigation, which are time
tested and time honored so as to allow the skipper of a ship to
make comments on the findings of fact before the tribunal of the
investigation draws its conclusions.

Captain Moosally. Well, I do not think. Senator, I said I wanted
to change the procedures other than the fact that I would like to
have had the opportunity to comment on the findings.

Senator Warner. I think that is one constructive observation.

Captain Moosally. Yes, sir.

Chairman Nunn. Senator Dixon.

Senator Dixon. Captain Moosally, if I could just go over a couple
of things for clarification in the record. I am looking at page 22 of
the inquiry in which you talked about the lack of a gunnery officer,
and you indicated a number of different people had come aboard
and one broke a collarbone and so forth, and then you say, and I
quote you directly,

So, I am down to the third team. I am looking for somebody to relieve him. So, I
am there, what, 3 months basically without a weapons officer.

That is your testimony?
Captain Moosally. Yes, sir.

Senator Dixon. That is not a reflection on you. That is the situa-
tion you found and you were trying to work with it and improve it?

152

Captain Moosally. Yes, sir.

Senator Dixon. Then you go on to talk about a fellow that you
finally got. You did not pick him. That is who you got, and this is a
fellow that troubled you about his mental state.

Captain Moosally. After the explosion, yes, sir.

Senator Dixon. On page 23 or 24, of course.

Captain Moosally. I do not think that is a damnation of the in-
dividual. I mean, a lot of people, including myself, underwent a lot
of emotion that day and a lot of grief. People handle it differently.

Senator Dixon. No one would question that, my dear friend. I
understand that perfectly. But, in reviewing the whole thing, the
record, I think, is fairly clear that as the captain you were dis-
charging your obligation as the commander to try to find the right
man and at least at that point in time you had not personally been
satisfied that you had that man.

Captain Moosally. I do not know if I can say that.

Senator Dixon. You do not think that is a fair expression,
though. Captain, in all fairness to you now of what you are saying
on those pages?

Captain Moosally. What I am saying on those pages is the indi-
vidual that I got at the time of the explosion had difficulty coping
with it. He became very emotional.

Senator Dixon. Now, I want to talk a little bit about

Chairman Nunn. Senator Dixon, would you yield on that and
make sure we are clear on this. Captain, are you saying that this
officer did not have a problem before the explosion?

Captain Moosally. No, sir, he had some problems. He had some
problems, but not of this magnitude. I mean, he did not have any
major emotional problems like he did after the explosion.

Chairman Nunn. You felt he was qualified before the explosion?

Captain Moosally. Yes, sir.

Senator Dixon. Now in all fairness. Captain, I am returning to
page 23. So all these things are coming together. You are talking
about the fact that you are down to the third team still trying to
find a guy. That is when the Admiral, who I am not going to name,
''called me and said" X "really wants to get out of what he is
doing. He is good at what he does. He is never going to be a super-
star but he is good at being a gunnery officer", in your testimony,
"so I accepted him. I got to tell you, looking back on it, I don't
know what" X "has told you, but" X "is a basket case".

Captain Moosally. Yes, sir. You are talking about the gunnery
officer, who is not the weapons officer. You are talking about the
number two guy in the department.

I was looking for a gunnery officer, and I had initially rejected
this individual to come to the ship. This is when, in my testimony
you bring out, I got the phone call saying that he would be a suita-
ble guy.

Senator Dixon. You see, this is no reflection on you. I want to
clarify that again if there is any question on that.

Captain Moosally. I thought he was a suitable guy up until the
explosion.

Senator Dixon. Now let me talk a little bit about this. Here, in
all fairness to every one of us and certainly in all fairness to you,
we are dealing with a highly complex tragedy. In truth, at least

153

this Senator thinks that there is probably no explanation for it and
that the truth will never be entirely known. I say that with no re-
flection on anybody.

Now I am looking at page 30, and I quote you. "Yes, sir. Well,
my assumption is, from what I know, that the five bags were in the
tray. They said my understanding from what people have told me
is 'wait, we're not ready', and there was no indication of a problem,
I thought that was maybe because we had a guy that, a little later,
making sure he was all checked out on the rammer.

The only thing I can think of is that the black powder got loose
there somewhere, there was some kind of ignition process where it
went off due to friction or something else.

You know, somebody told me this thing about ember coming
down the muzzle, and I have a hard time believing that, so I don't
know what happened. I wish to hell we'd find out what happened
up there. I'm offloading tomorrow, and" blah blah blah and so
forth.

But the fact is, you were giving some thoughts about what you
thought could have happened. It is your thinking at the time.

Now the fact is, there are other places in here which I am not
going to bore you with reading, but there was a lot of discussion in
here about smoking in there.

Captain Moosally. No, I do not think there was any.

Senator Dixon. I mean the question of whether it could take
place. I am not saying anyone did, but you were concerned about
people smoking in there.

Captain Moosally. We are always concerned about that.

Senator Dixon. Sure; and having cigarette lighters in there. In
other words, this stuff is flammable.

Captain Moosally. There was no evidence of anybody ever smok-
ing in the turrets.

Senator Dixon. I did not say there was. I did not say there was.

Captain Moosally. And there were no cigarette lighters in the
powder magazines.

Senator Dixon. No. But the reason you keep all those things out
is because it is flammable in there?

Captain Moosally. Absolutely.

Senator Dixon. Sure.

Captain Moosally. I think anybody who would bring a cigarette
lighter or something like that in there would have to be scared out
of his mind.

Senator Dixon. Yes, because it is dangerous.

Now I read from page 31. "Petty Officer Fisk was supposed to be
the cradle operator, I believe, and Petty Officer Lawrence was sup-
posed to be breaking in the first time ever as gun captain, and I'm
just concerned that maybe Petty Officer Lawrence, since he's the
one who did the prefire checks, signed them as a gun captain. He
may have been the one at the prefire and possibly at the prefire
brief." Then you go on.

In fact, at that time, people still thought Petty Officer Lawrence
was in charge of that gun when you made this testimony on page
31 that day.

Captain Moosally. Yes, sir. That is before the forensic evidence
came in.

154

Senator Dixon. Yes.

Captain Moos ally. Petty Officer Lawrence did the prefire checks
because that is part of the final quahfication of being gun captain.

Senator Dixon. Sure.

Now I understand from all the testimony I have read here that
the chief, whom I will not name, that was in charge of the guns,
the so-called gun expert, had no formal training in gunnery or bal-
listics; is that true?

Captain Moosally. I cannot believe that is true. No, I do not
think that is true.

He is not in charge of the turret. You are talking about another
fellow who was the fire control chief. He is not a gunnersmate. You
are talking about the fire control chief.

Senator Dixon. The fellow that drove you nuts, I am talking
about.

Captain Moosally. Master chief fire controlman.

Senator Dixon. Well, according to his own testimony, in the Re-
serves for a living he sold pots and pans.

Captain Moosally. All I know is Master Chief Skelly wrote the
16-inch gunnery handbook.

Senator Dixon. Yes. He is the fellow that

Captain Moosally. He is a very knowledgeable guy. He is a very
knowledgeable guy in 16-inch gunnery. He is, as far as I am con-
cerned, one of the best, probably the best fire controlman when it
comes to 16-inch gunnery.

Senator Dixon. So that is our expert?

Captain Moosally. I think he is pretty much an expert.

Senator Dixon. Was it brought to your attention, Captain, that
certain members of your ship had indicated that there had been a
rammer problem in turret II?

Captain Moosally. No, I know of no rammer problem in turret
II.

Senator Dixon. I want you to have an opportunity to correct the
record if there is any question about it. Is it correct to say that
prior to this occasion you were concerned about the overall quality
of the wardroom as a whole and the replacement officers you were
receiving?

Captain Moosally. The placement officer is the individual I talk
to to get — he is the one who handles my account, so to speak, when
it comes to manning the wardroom with officers.

I had some concerns, yes, sir.

Senator Dixon. If your testimony still stands as it was given on
the occasion when you talked to Admiral Milligan, you addressed
those concerns with the Admiral?

Captain Moosally. Yes, sir.

Senator Dixon. Now I do not wish to belabor a point to which
nobody knows the answer, but is it not a fact that what you are
saying here is you do not know? Is it not a fact that anything that
is a conclusion drawn from all of this is highly speculative in char-
acter based upon the complexity of the situation and what had oc-
curred there?

Captain Moosally. I would not make that statement, no, sir.

Senator Dixon. You, yourself, would not draw a conclusion about
what happened?

155

Captain Moosally. No. I do not have all the facts.

Senator Dixon. You were the captain of the ship.

Captain Moosally. Yes, sir, but that does not mean that — as I
have said, I have been away. I left June 7. I deployed on June 7,
and this investigation was still going on and did not finish up until
after I was gone across the Atlantic.

Senator Dixon. Would you again tell us as you did once before.
The NMP is the Navy Manning Plan.

Captain Moosally. Yes, sir. The Navy Manning Plan is based on
the total number of people in the Navy in a certain rating. NMP is
your fair share, a ship's fair share of those people.

Senator Dixon. The NMP says there should be 130 gunners-
mates?

Captain Moosally. No, the SMD said there should be 130. The
Ship's Manning Document.

Senator Dixon. The NMP says 118?

Captain Moosally. 118, yes, sir.

Senator Dixon. You had 88?

Captain Moosally. On that day, I had 85.

Senator Dixon. Excuse me. You had 85.

Captain Moosally. The Navy Manning Plan changes depending
on the number of gunnersmates in the Navy. So in April my Navy
Manning Plan said I should have 100 gunnersmates. I had 85.

Senator Dixon. Now, it has been indicated to me, Mr. Chairman,
that my time has expired. If I may ask one more question, Mr.
Chairman.

You have indicated that, in fact, whatever training takes place in
connection with manning these 16-inch guns takes place aboard the
ship.

Captain Moosally. Most of it.

Senator Dixon. Now I will ask you, was this the kind of training
session that is the ordinary kind of session commensurate with
training people for firing these guns?

Captain Moosally. You are talking about the April 19 firing?

Senator Dixon. Yes.

Captain Moosally. Well, every time we fire, of course, it is a
training session.

Senator Dixon. For instance, for Lawrence that day, had he been
the one there instead of Hartwig, that would have been his final
time to qualify him so that whatever characteristics technically
qualify him to be in that status would be met; is that right?

Captain Moosally. That is correct.

Senator Dixon. So do I understand it to be the fact, then, that in
this training what happens is that you do this normally in the
same way it was done that day. You have this powder and these
bags and so forth, and you go through the whole procedure?

Captain Moosally. Yes, sir.

Senator Dixon. There is no school training of a type such as I
have seen where you see these pilots training in these— what do
they call those, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman Nunn. Simulators.

Senator Dixon. Simulators. All of us on the Armed Services
Committees have seen these pilots training in simulators and
things.

156

Captain Moosally. No, sir. Once again, I would like to reiterate
that the 16-inch gun system is a very simple system, and most of
the jobs there, the tasks there, are mule hauling jobs, loading pow-
ders. The hoist consists of pushing three different buttons. If you
can operate an elevator, you can operate the projectile hoist.

The skilled positions such as cradleman and rammerman are ba-
sically three-step operations. So they are not complicated.

Senator Dixon. But, in fact, you use these bags of powder?

Captain Moosally. Certainly. They weigh 110 pounds for the full
charge and 55 pounds — they are heavy bags.

Senator Dixon. They are explosive powders. They are flammable.

Captain Moosally. Yes.

Senator Dixon. There is no simulated activity at some occasion
prior to the

Captain Moosally. Oh, yes, sir, there is. We have dummy
powder bags in the turrets, and we load those. In all the drills we
have on the ship when we are not firing, we go to general quarters,
and the turrets are manned. We do dummy powder loading drills
constantly. That is what we did when the moratorium was on;
when we could not shoot.

Senator Dixon. I see.

On this occasion and on other occasions as well, I take it, you use
actual powder?

Captain Moosally. For training, for loading drills, no, sir.

Senator Dixon. You did on this occasion.

Captain Moosally. When we are firing, of course we use actual
powder.

Senator Dixon. Now, just one last time for the record I will ask
you, this testimony of yours that was given under oath, let me say
in candor to you as an old trial lawyer and as a person who can
appreciate the circumstances, I understand what you are saying
when you are saying that you did not know this would go public.
There are some things in this I am quite satisfied you would have
tempered had you known it was going to see the light of day, and I
would be the first to understand that.

Captain Moosally. Yes, sir.

Senator Dixon. But I will ask you whether there is anything in
this statement that you gave under oath that— let us put it this
way, is everything you said in this statement under oath, on the
occasion when you gave it, the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
but the truth, as you see it now?

Captain Moosally. I would say that it reflects my thinking at
the time that I gave the testimony.

Senator Dixon. And you would stand by it?

Captain Moosally. Yes.

Senator Dixon. I would ask, at the appropriate point, Mr. Chair-
man, if it has not already been done, that the full statement given
by Captain Moosally at 13:22 hours on May 1, 1989, inquiring into
the circumstances surrounding an explosion in turret II on board
the U.S.S. Iowa on April 19, 1989 to the appropriate naval officers
be reproduced in the record in full.

Chairman Nunn. Without objection.

[The information referred to follows:]

157

Interview of Captain Fred P. Moosally, U. S. Navy, conducted at 1322 hours,
1 May 1989, inquiring into the c i:ri;umstances surrounding an explosion in
Turret II on board USS IOWA on 1? April 1989.

Captain Fred P. Moosally, U. S. Navy, was called as a wltiess by the
investigating officer, was sworn, and testified as follows:

Questions by CDR Swanson:

'^. For the record could you sta^i; your full name.
A. Fred P. Moosally.

■) Captain, United States Navy?
A. Captain, United States Na\'y.

Q. Commanding Officer

A. Commanding Officer, USS IOWA.

Q. Sir, at this time 1 would li<"; to re-advise you of your rights under
Article 31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
A . Okay .

Q. You're advised that you're sjrspected of tho. offense of dereliction <3f duty
as a violation of Uniform Code of Military Ii.istice. Ydu understand?
A. Yes, I do.

Q. You have the right to remain silent. Do you undeijitard?
A. Yes.

Q. Any statements you do make c:uld be used as evidence agains'; you, uLthnr
in a trial by court-martial or other disciplinary proceedings. Do you
understand, sir?
A. Yes.

Q. You have the right to consult with lawyer/counsel prior to any
questioning. This lawyer counsel may be a civilian lawyer retained by you at
your own expense, a military lawfiT appointed to act as ccuasel without cost
to you, or both. Do you understand, sir?
A. Yes, I do.

Q. You have the right to have s.ich r?t3ined civilian lawyer ani/or appointed
military lawyer present during tiis interviow. Do you unc.erstand, sir?
A. Yes, I do.

Q. You have the right to terminate this interview at 'iny time. Do you
understand, sir?
A. Yes, I do.

Q. Okay. As I understand it, sir, you understand your rights, you expressly
desire to waive your right to re.ti.iin ?ileiit. Is that c.oriect?
A. That's correct.

Q. You expressly desire to make a statement Ts that correct?
A. Yes, I do.

Q. As I understand it, you have :wo appointed military cou-isel that you

consulted with and they are?

A. Commander Burnett and Lieutenant Hansen.

Q. And they're both with you here today?
A. They're here today, yes, they are.

Q. So you expressly do desire t: have these lawyers with you present during
this interview. Is that correct?
That's correct.

24-931 0-91-6

158

Q. Okay. This acknowledgement and waiver of your rights is made freely and

voluntarily by you, without any atomises or threats having been made to yon,

or pressure or coercion of any kind having been used against you. Is that

correct?

A. That's correct.

RADM Milligan: Captain, I have your submitted statement. Do we need to get
that for the record?

WITNESS: (Inaudible response.)

CDR Swanson: Okay. Let me lay 3 foundat;ion for that.

Questions by CDR Swanson:

Q. Captain, as I understand it, you've submitted a written staTzemcnt to the

investigating officer earlier to:)-3y or Into yesterday aftfrnoor. Is that

correct?

A. Yesterday. 1 understand it -ras handed to you by Commender Uurnett .

Q. Was it yesterday? Time's blurred.
A. Yes.

Q. As I understand, sir, you'd like thai: to become part of the record?
A. That's correct.

Q. And your written statement will complemont and supplement your oral
testimony here today. Is that c:rrect?
A. That's correct. Yes.

CDR Burnett: Admiral, I was wond•^rinB; if I could just interject a couple of
comments?

RADM Milligan: Sure.

CDR Burnett: I handed you a copy of this; document and I don t mean to havn
you read it or anything like that, but T thought I'd explain. [ know that
it's been a great concern to you to try to get on with this investigation as
fast as possible and I have some extra copies for the other members. I don t
think you really need to read it. I wanted to explairi to you, though, that
I've been the one responsible for the delay in Captain Mocsally testifying,
basically, because I've had to try and get up to speed on the general subject
area here. I don't feel that I ;an even advise my counsel (sic) unless I have
a basic feeling for, you know, what 16-inch guns do and so on, and that has
taken awhile. So, I hope you understand that.

I did, quite frankly, through :onversat ions with Commander Swanson, try and
6.it more documentation and discovery. I knew, for example, you had about 600
exhibits, but I'm told that that';; not really available. I understand that
it's not available, although, I've tried to basically persuade Commander
j.vanson, you know, in terms of basic fairness, that it might be appropriate
for the commanding officer. But my client wants to go ahead and testify, in
any event, because he has nothins to hide and wants to try and clear the air
on whatever it is that you desir;.

. I have to say that anytime someone- -and I ask the question, "Well, what are
the possible adverse consequence; here?" And Commander Suanson very honestly
and distinctly told me that Captain Moosal ly was at risk. Something like
that, where there are 47 people dead, quite frankly, is a vsry scary word and
it's very hard, quite frankly, not having had a lot of time to work on this
case, to feel comfortable with that many deaths. But, nonetheless, I lio not
think and, I guess, I have to clarify that basically I've been the brakes on
this whole system. I mean, I've been the one sayiYig, "Whoa, whoa, whoa, I'm
not sure, I'm not sure." It's net been the captain. I guess I wanted to just
clarify that with you so that yoj understood who's accountable, if you like.

159

RADM Milligan: Okay. I understand your comments. Are we going to malce this
part of the record?

CDR Swaiison: Yes, sir. I think we should nttach this.

RADM Milligan: Okay. We'll mak; your written remarks part of the record so
it becomes, officially, as such. I would only add to that, yes, we do want to
get on with the investigation to find the ultimate cause for what happiined
down there and make those recommendations required to makf sure this doesn't
happen again on any other ship ot IOWA. But, by no means, are we in a hurry
to get on with this investigation in order to get it over with. We will take
whatever time it takes to do this iob thoroughly and as; completely as we
possibly can. Okay.

CDR Swanson: Do you want me to start, sir?

RADM Milligan: No, I'll start.

Questions by RADM Milligan:

Q. Captain Moosally, I've read :ver your statement. I haven't had the
opportunity to go through all of the exhibits or enclosure's, a] "hough, I vo
seen some of them prior to this. [ do hnvp some questions to eisk at this
point and certainly ask you to offer up whatever comments you have on any

subject as we go along that might help us to

A. Yes, sir. I would also like to make some, whatever, if it doesn't come
out in the testimony, make some ;omments of my own at the end.

Q. We'll ask for that, for certain.
A. Okay.

Q. You're well aware, of course, that we'v*' been looking into the training
situation on the IOWA quite cIos;ly, mainly, qualifications of people on the
duty stations in Turret II and other turrets, as a matter of fact, at the time
of the accident.
A. Yes, sir.

Q. We've gotten into PQS quite deeply. One of the requirements in the PQS
program is that the PQS coordinator for the ship submit to the commanding
officer, on a monthly basis, a PQS summary to advise the commanding officer of
how PQS is being managed and handled on the ship.
4. Yes, sir.

Could you tell me the last time you've seen such a monthly summary?
Monthly summary?

Yes. Monthly report, I guess.
I have not seen a monthly re:ort.

Q. Okay. You understand that

A. I have been briefed on monthly reports. I have seen what monthly reports
look like, but I have not demanded that I get a monthly report.

Q. Okay. Do you think having had a monthly report-- rirst Df all, let me say
we, at this point or at this juncture of the investigat ior, hav.i reason to
believe that a number of people were on watch stations in Turre-: II and tho
other turrets who were not qualified and certainly, formally, in the
administrative process PQS-wise.
A. Well, I'd like to get into that, if I could.

Q. Okay. This is your time. Why don't you go ahead. Er.lightun us.
A. Okay. Thank you. Okay, 1 will. One, when I came to IOWA I relieved, as
in my statement, in May of '88. Through my policy statement, which you also
have, and when I came on here, I .?raphasir,ed PQS. I had emphasi:ied PQS on my
last command. I believe in PQS. I found that the PQS on IOWA was in pretty

160

poor shape. As a matter of fact, [ had reason to believe that the ESWS
Program was gun-decked prior to ^ny arrival there. By that, I mijan everybody
had answers to the questions. It was kind of like, "We'll give you a bunch of
lectures, give you a test everybody has the answers for, find th^sn you're ESWS
qualified." There was a number of people who used to come-. PAD there to get
ESWS qualified, so I put a stop to that. After 1 got my feet on the ground in
August of '88, I asked for an internal rtn'iew. I ordered the >'.0 to do an
internal review of our PQS Progrim at that Lime, and T also mac'2 that part of
the record, I believe, in my attachment, so T think I emphasized my concern
about PQS.

I also made the statement in my battleship standards and every time I had a
meeting with the XO, department heads wardroom and the chiefs, that my rule
was that you couldn't stand a watch unless you were qualified to stand the
watch. If you're under instruction, you had to be observed by a person who
was qualified.

And, in time, as I said in my statement, 1 honed in right away during the
relieving process, on our sound and security watch, fire partie.s, cold iron
watch. At the time, we were going into dry dock, I wasn't overly concerned
iiout the status of people standing watch in the turrets. I ended up firing
the DCA due to the fact that I fcund out he was non-PQS. Watch standers,
didn't know how to light off indjctors, so on and so forth. I gave him until
■.a got out of dry dock to do that, and when I checked the day we got out of
dry dock, they weren't qualified. I went down and asked why he didn't do that
and he said, "Well, we've never done that before on here" so he kind of
ignored my order. At that time, [ relievpH the DCA.

I must also tell you, it's not in my statement, the engineering officer left
shortly thereafter, turned in his papers, because he couldn't stand the
pressure of what I was doing as far as raising the standards on IOWA, so he
turned in a letter to me saying ie could no longer take it. I used to have
weekly visits by the Chaplain on his regard, saying he couldn't take any more.
So he left shortly thereafter and Commander Kimberlane, my iPA, filled in ns
the engineer until I could get s-mebody new on board.

Anyway, getting back to August, I also--and I'll get into the weapons safety
thing later, I know you're going to ask me about that, but as far as PQS goes,
I think I've made it perfectly clear on the ship what my policy was. Now, how
do you enforce that? Well, in AJ:?ust I did. Am I doing okay? In August, I
did an internal survey which pointed out problems around the ship as far as
PQS went. Those--that survey was given back to the department heads who wore
supposed to take it for correr.tiii'j action.

Then we got into the TRE business, was getting ready for GTMO. The TRE r.aine
aboard and, at that time, they i.idicated to me that there was no negative
comments on my PQS program. As I go around the ship, I check P()S charts to
see if, in fact, guys were doing their PQS, that we had a viabhj program. We
went down to GTMO and I know there was extensive training down in the turrets
as far as weapons safety, handlir.g of ammunition with the handling teams, T
think, up to four times a week. We had a lot of GQ's down there. GTMO turned
into, basically, an engineering [.TT becauso of problems in engineering, a
problem which was my major focus ^t the time.

I knew that during those GQ's the weapons guys were doing their training. I
feel that the training was being done throughout this whole thing. I think
that we, in fact, had people PQS qualified guys there. Vc. had a PATLAT team
visit during that period, also, to check our admin, and it was brought out
that "Hey, yes, you've got--you taven't caught up with--the PQ? hasn't caught
up with the service record entries" so T emphasized that nt the.: time. I
think that was in the. September time frame prior to going to GITIO. It may
have been earlier, I can't say f:r sure.

161

I felt all the time that, hey, rraining is being done. Looking at the
people I had in the weapons depaciment , I can get into later, tlie fact that I
ended up not having a weapons officer for a period of time, due to poor
detailing by the Naval Military r'ersonnel Command Center and thren some
accidents that happened to him- -the guy that was incumbent. I'd like to get
into the Weapons Department officer business a little bit later.

Then, of course, we came back, liad NWAI right after GTMC whicli was one, only
one, discrepancy. They checked all the surface records. I know it wasn't--
they did check those people for training, it wasn't people in turrets. I had
-.omplete faith that the turret training was going on. I had what I thought
was --Commander Kissinger, I think he was the number one commander over at
SURFLANT, finally reported aboard. He had Impressed me as being a pretty
savvy guy. Admiral Glenn had called me and asked me to take Ken Costigan,
when I wasn't going to take him because I knew he was passed ovur, and I was
trying to upgrade the wardroom o^ there, and I refused to take liim until
Admiral Glenn asked me to take him. He said he's no--he's not going to be CO
of a battleship, but he knows tha weapons systems and he'll do you well as a
gunnery officer, so I took him.

I felt that 1 had qualified people down there and I had a lot of faith in
Senior Chief Ziegler who had, yoj know--T went down to Turret HI when I came
on there. I was ready to put Ziegler in charge of both Turrets II and III
because Turret III was a mess. 'Iliis is where I found the hatch that had been
laying on the side for 2 years, lydraulic leaks all over ths pliice, lighting
that didn't work. They had 25-w9tt bulbs in because i.hey ware afraid they'd
blow fuses at the 50-watt level, which those things are supposed to take, so I
felt like I was taking action all the time to get those things corrected.

I was stuck with an SRA when I got there that really wasn't really well
thought out, so I added a lot of extra things there to fix that. I fought
NAVSEA to get the proper lighting done in those spaces. I think I did
everything I could to upgrade the weapons safety in those spaces and the
training. I demanded that they train...! found out that they w<}ren't in the
5-inch gun area. Same thing. I found that--I called the master chief that
they had sent off to teach school, 5-inch 38 School, back to the ship because
I found that those guys weren't being supervised.

I mean, there were people that were left off--let to go somewhere else
without supervision that I called back. There were officers who were let go
without reliefs. Frankly, I'm kind of rambling here, I knew that the officer
wardroom had been mismanaged on that ship for 2 years.

Questions by RADM Milligan:

Q. Well, let's get into the officer manpower thing a little bic later. Let's

get

A. Okay. Get back to training. PQS. Okay. Anyway, PQE , I thought 7;hat the
PQS program, from what I had seen, we were on the right track. Now, in
November, the type commander sail that we had to do a PQS stanc-down, and we
did that. We have an instruction, we put out a 5050 notice, vie assigned
chiefs and officers to inspect tho PQS in each area. We vent tlirough i:here
and we found that PQS was improving. There was a big improvement from the
last time.

And then the next thing was, you know, in ^arch, the CS^ guys came on board
and they told me that PQS is "Sac." It's right in the message, PQS is "Sat,"
no negatives. So with all the t i ings I had going on the ship, i had no
indication from any outside inspjotor^, groups ... that we uere nothing, but
just as good as anybody else and, if not, better. Those are thtj words that I
heard from Commander Conley from the CSA team. Matter of fact, he said this
as early as or late as a couple days ago, "You were as gcod or better than
mybody on the waterfront when It came to PQS." So I had no reason to
believe, as a CO, that PQS was e jsroblem thnt I had on the ship

162

0. Let me ask for a couple definitions of what you just said. I can go back

into your battleship standards pamplilet hero where it says "...no one will

stand a watch unless he's qualified to stand that watcii.
A. Yes, sir.

Q,. What does "qualified" mean?
A. That means PQS qualified.

Q. How about "U/I." You use ths term "under instruction."
A. Yes, sir.

Q. I understand what under instruction means, but how do you see under

instruction

A. I see "under instruction" as somebody that

Q. in the gun room?

A. In the gun room. I see that as carrying out an evolution supervised by a
PQS qualified petty officer, or :>fficer or whatever. In ether words, this
individual has to be observed by a qu'Jlif ied--PQS qua'ifird individual. I
mean that's, you know...

Q. Well, the problem I'm having here, and I'll be right hoaest with you, you
have people under instruction but you don't have qualifiea peop'Le who are
solely there to man that watch and instruct that individual. You take the gun
room of the 16-inch turret, you :nly have four people in the gun room itself?
A. Yes, sir.

Q. The gun captain, the cradle operator,
A. Yes, sir.

rhr> rammer, and the primer?

Q. So my example would be, if y:u were brooking in a new cradl'j operator, who
would be his supervisor?

A. A qualified--a PQS qualified--! see, in other words, you're telling me it
shouldn't be somebody that's doing the job. I say, you knoa, if the guy is
there observing him, you know, this is a step function evolution. I m^jan 16-
inch gunnery, loading gunnery, is not a very complicated thing. It's a very
straight- forward thing and if a guy-being that it's a step function, I hnve
no problem with a gun captain wat ihing a rammerman. f metm, he s--that s kind
of what he's doing. That's his job, you know, he's down there waving che
powder on, so I don't have a proclem with him doing that.

Q. So you're saying then that a watch stander under instruction can take the
full--he can take that watch by himself and be supervised by someone who's
standing another watch in the saiee gun room?

A Yes, sir, but I don't look o.t it as a watch. Admiral. [ think these are,
like I said, it's a step series function where, in fact, I'm supervising a
fellow who is ramming, as a gun ;aptain, I'm overall in charge. I am
qualified. If I'm a gun captain, I'm a qualified rammer and a cradleman so,
therefore, I can supervise those people.

Q. How about

A. And there's only so much rooir in thosr spaces. I mean, you can't get a
bunch of people in there. I thi.ik that's one of the things in a 16- inch gun
turret that I see. You have to have a guy that's in a one man --powder hoist
operator for example. And you cen't fit n lot of people in there to do the
thing and also let him do it.

q. I share your comments with regard to space and it sounds like safety is an

issue.

A. No, sir.

Q. I'm not sure I share your comments with regard to the series of the
operation because, when the three bags of powder roll out of the powder cart,
three people are intimately involved in that evolution.
A. Yes, sir.

163

Q. Certainly not only one with two watching. It takes all three to make that

happen safely, so

A. Yes, sir.

Q. It might be difficult at that time to bp s\ipervis i tig someonu under

instruction.

A. Also, I'd like to say that we have a chief in there who is watching

evolutions and, if he's aware that somebody's under instrt.ction, he certainly

should be watching that. And also a turret captain, the first class that's in

there, should be watching along -» ith the turret officer. So there's plenty

of people in that area to supervise.

Q. But they would normally be ortside of rlip gun room looking Ln?
A. Absolutely, but they're available.

Q. You talked about your August PQS survey that you gathnred all the data
from and- then turned around and sant it out to the department heads to makp
corrective action where required.
A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do you recall if the 16-inch turret PQS Program was of any significant
notice at that time?
A. No, it was not.

Q. How about in the November stsnd-down?

A. No, sir. If it was, I would have taken action. I have no--nobody came up
to me and said "Hey, the 16-inch "iO PQS is a problem," just the opposite, you
know, that it's okay, and then I get a guy that comes aboard in March that
tells me the same thing.

Q. Well, at the time of the CSA, was the comment that the

16-inch PQS Program is "Sat" and "Great," or was it just that "Our evaluation

of PQS is Sat?"

A. Our evaluation of PQS is Sat.

Q. Because we're having a little trouble really determining exactly who

looked at the turret PQS Program.

A. I hope they did look at it. I mean, that's part of their job.

Q. I understand, and we'll work on that is.<;ite.
A. Yes, sir.

RADM Milligan: Captain, do you nave any comments on PQS? Any questions?

CAPT Messina: No, sir, I don't think so.

CDR Swanson: Were you going to r.ove on from PQS, totally, sir?

RADM Milligan: We could come back at any time.

CDR Swanson: I think there are a couple questions I

RADM Milligan: Okay.

Questions by CDR Swanson:

Q. Captain

A. Uh huh.

Q. Subsequent to the 19th of April 1989, have you had an opportunity now to
review the PQS qualifications status for Turrets I, 11 and III?
A. Yes, I have.

164

Q. And what have, you found, sir?

A. Well I found, you know, you 2.uys are-- 1 think you guys are telling ine I
haven t got guys qualified. What T found was the paperwork was not up to
speed with what the actual qualifications are. J think that we actually have
qualified people in those turrets and it hasn't been properly documented. I
think that, you know, here's what the weapons officer gives me today, which is
completely different from what I saw. He's got Turret I--Christ, he's got all
kinds of qualified people in there, according to this (holding up a report.)

Questions by RADM Milligan:

Well, let's talk about center gun room of turret II on the 19th of April.
Okay, Turret II. There it i=, right there.

On the 19th of April.
Uh huh.

The gun captain. Who do you ."jay was thf gun captain?
Hartwig.

Qualified?
Qualified.

The cradle operator?
Lawrence, qualified.

Our information would support both those comments. Rammerman?
Backherms . Backherms, under instruction.

Yes. Okay. Primerman?
I forget his name

Johnson.

Johnson, but he was qualified.

How about the upper

The powder car guy?

Powder car operator?

I don't know who the hell thet was.

CAPT Messina: Well, we're pretty sure it's Fisk.

Q. To the best of our ability, and we' 11 do some more testing with the
forensic information when we get it all, but the best I can assume is that--
determine at this point in time, is that it was Boatswain's Mat<i Secomi Class
Fisk.
A. Yes.

Q. Who'd been aboard the ship f:r about, I believe, 2 or 3 weeks, and to be
qualified to be the upper powder cart operator, you've already got'-you' ve got
a lot of PQS that has to be signed off before that... way far pest whatever
Petty Officer Fisk could ever have done.
A. True.

Q. As a matter of fact, it's out understanding that ihe day before or 2 days
before the exercise. Petty Officer Fisk was taken from the deck force, from
his deck work station, and taken up by Senior Chief Ziegler and Petty Officer
Hanyecz and shown how to operate the iippf^r powder cart station and returned to
his work station afterwards, and that was tho extent of his training up to
that point in time.
A. I didn't know that.

165

Q. Now, the question of whether Petty Officer Fisk was ac^tually the one in
that station is still yet to be confirmed, hut T think that's relevant.
Seaman Johnson had been aboard th^a ship for n short period of time, 3 months
I believe. How long?

CAPT Messina: About 33 or 34 days.

Q. Petty Officer Backherms . . . .

CAPT Messina: Backherms had been there about 90 days.

Q. About 90 days. So there is a lot of qtiestion about whether those people
were. . .were qualified, and we're still running that to ground, but qualified,
in my view, is not only had you 'Jone the PQS but it's been properly signed off
and it's been properly administratively bro\ight up to the service record and
everything, until they can run a system t.hot you can have any confidence in.
i. Right.

RADM Milligan: And, obviously, that was not always the case. We' 11 continue
to pursue it to make our records of who was and who was net qualified as
accurate as we possibly can.

Questions by CDR Swanson:

Q. Captain, again, you indicated that you have some more, some additional
information. I would indicate tiat we've gone through the PQS cjualif ications
for each of the turrets and our information discloses some largu number of
personnel in each of the turrets uhat were not PQS qualif.ied fc:: the stations
that they were manning on the 19th of April 1989. So, if there's something
you have that's more current that you think would be of benefit to us, we
probably should look at that, but directing your attention to Turret III...
A. Uh huh.

Q. Our information is that there was no one in Turret III that was actively
engaged in signing off PQS qualifications and that, in point of fact, the
turret officer in his testimony, has indicated that hi.s view wa:3 , at Lsast his
view as of 19 April 1989, that t.ie PQS Program was in a state of suspension
and had been in the state of suspension for a period of ap^proxiinately
6 months or, possibly, even greater. Could you comment on that, sir?
A. I don't think that's the casa. I think what happened there, what I
understand happened, we had a--triat's been my problem turret --had a Petty
Officer Martinez, I think, that I threw out of there. My under:;tanding is
that the PQS had been done. Chief Miller, the new chief, wanted to validate
the fact that it wasn't gun-decksd, that they were waiting for the new books
to come in, I think, which came in 2 or 3 weeks ago, which changed the PQS
books, and that all these guys had been signed up through the book, but had
not submitted to the weapons officer becausf they were waiting to get them all
signed off at the same time.

Q. Who do you believe was signing off the PQS qualifications for Turret III?
A. I think Chief Miller was.

Q. Do you believe he's PQS qualified?

A. Do I believe Chief Miller's PQS qualified? Probably.

Q. Would you be surprised if I told you Hp was not?
A . No , I wou 1 dn ' t .

Q. Would you be surprised to learn that he does not "ven have any scheduled

PQS goals?

A. I would be surprised, yes.

Q. You would be, or would not?

A. I would be surprised, yes, bscause I think Chief Miller's a very
knowledgeable guy. He's probably, now that 7,ieg]er's gone, proliably the most
Kj ow 1 edgeab 1 e .

166

Questions by RADM Milligan:

Q. I don't believe Chief Miller came to this ship with previous 16-in(;h
experience, did he?
A. No, sir.

Q. And I don't think--or, I do think, if you go into the recor<l, you'll find
that he has not had any PQS signed off, to this date, and had no goals for a
time as to which he would achieve qualification as a turret captain which,
obviously, would have to be his oltlmate watch station there.
A. Right.

Q. Well, the questions, of course, on PQS, come from the ship's instruction
with regard to the commanding officer's policy of PQS, and that's where we're
coming from. The monthly report that we alluded to earlier, and we have
copies somewhere here of the G-1, G-2--well, actually, it's all G-2 reports
for about 6 months and, if I understand those reports correctly and if I'm
wrong I'll certainly stand to be corrected, but it shows in tha^ report in one
column the number of people in G-2 assigned to specific we.tch stations, and
the next column it shows the num:er of people who are PQS qualified for that
watch station. That report, if I understand it, would highlight quite
vividly, early on, that there's 9 lot of stations in the turret that are not
PQS qualified.

A. Yes, sir. Like I said, I think a lot of that is that they .ire--there are
PQS qualified and it's not--the paperwork hasn't been entered. You know, when
I look at the proficiency of those crews, the other indicator I had on PQS was
they kept getting better and better and we shot a lot of rounds, and I saw
increased proficiency as we came out of tho shipyard and continued shooting,
that they were very good at what they did.

CDR Burnett: It might be useful to show t.hem what the weapons officer gave
you.

WITNESS: Well, this is what the weapons officer gives me. He's telling me
that, "Hey, I got all these guys ap there that are PQS qufilified. I mean
there s tons of them" and you're telling me something elsf:?

Questions by CDR Swanson:

Q. Well, we're specifically looking at the stations thosf- people were manning

on the 19th.
A. Uh huh.

Q. Now, they might have PQS qualification for other than that position that
they were standing, obviously. Captain, in terms of the PQS Program, the

instruction, PQS instruction is one that y<ni promulgated

A. Right, in August.

Q. Since you

A. In August, after what I found to be problems there, yes.

Questions by RADM Milligan:

Q. Okay. I want to shift over Co another subject, at least for the time
being, specifically, the exercise on the 19th of April.
A. Yes, sir.

Q. We have a lot of testimony on the details of the firing plan and
everything, but my understanding Is you were going to fire Turret 1 and then
Turret II. They were bcth briefed as being in the exercise as part of the
firing plan. Turret III probably would have fired had you had a successful

day

A. Not on my watch, it wouldn't have. It wasn't in the firing plan. I had
no intentions of shooting Turret Til.

167

Q. Well, a lot of people thought you did, so

A. Well, they might have thought that, but it certainly wasn't briefed to me.
It's not in the firing plan and '*liat I was briefed is, we were going to shoot
Turrets I and II. That's what I planned on shooting. I had nc intention of
shooting Turret III.

Q. How many rounds were you going to firr out of Turrots I and II?

A. I think there was a total of 22 rounds in the firing p'lan that we \.;ere

going to shoot.

Q. Do you know how many of them ^^^ere going to start?
A. No, sir.

Q. Well, explain to me or describe for me, the series of events from the
commencing of the firing run for Turret I.

A. Okay. We were going to shoot --we shot--my understanding was we were going
to go Turret I, left gun; Turret [, center gun; Turret I, right gun. Oz , I
don't know the exact thing, but *e were going to shoot split salvo on Turrets
I and II. We shot left and right gun, Turret T, and then we had a misfire on
left gun, Turret I. Then I made the decision, let's fire, that's the -jnd of
that mission. While they're doing misfire procedures, let's go to Turret JI
and shoot a salvo out of Turret H, continue the exercise.

Q. Testimony here before would have had us to understand that the Turret J
plan would have been, if I can find ray proper notes hi:rp (perusing notes)
'two, two, two" in Turret I, whirl I would fissume would hfve be^jn
left/center/right , left/center/r i.ght .

A. Right.

Q. Here before, I've been under the understanding that the first gun to be
fired would have been the left gon of Turret I and it misiired.
A. And it did misfire.

Q. It did misfire?

A. I don' t--that' s not vivid in try mind.

Q. Okay. Then you went--well, [ need to get to a point here. Then you went
to center and right, and then center and right for a total of four rounds out
of Turret I. Your statement says two. 1 think, if you'll go back, you'll
find it was four.
A. I don't remember.

Q. And then 1 believe you probacly tried to clear the misfire out of Turret

A. I certainly did.

q'. Failing to do so, shifted to Turret II. which I cfsrtainly don't have any
problems with, it's done all the :ime. What I really would lik.i to try to get
a better handle on is the time fnat you best recall, because th.> logs do not
give us the information. We hav3 the time that you commerced fire in Turret
I, and we have the time of the explosion in Turret II. I can narrow that dovrn
to a number of minutes, but how long do you estimate it. was between the last
round fired out of Turret I and the explosion in Turret II?
A. I would say 10 or 15 minutes, something like that. It wasn't very long.

Questions by CAPT Messina:

Q. As long as 10 or 15 from the last round

A. I think so, yes, because we had the marines up there end th.;y were going
through their spotting thing, th?y were going through their RT procedures for
spotting. We were doing it by mission and the thing was, you kjiow, end of
mission Turret I, new mission foe Turret II. I lost count, lost track of
time, because I was talking to Admiral Johnson. I didn't rash .inybody, it
was--they were loading up Turret I and, in the meantime, I was over talking to
Admiral Johnson ready to tell hirr: "Hey, what a great--this is my best turret

168

and watch these guys shoot" and that's when the explosion happen. You know, I
had given them permission to fir? because they met all the parameters for
range clear, and that's when they're allowed to load. As soon .is I give
permission to fire, they go dowr in the load position and start loading.

Questions by RADM Mllligan:

So you released the Turret II battery then?
Yes, sir.

At which time the load order was given to load 1 eft/cf-nter/ right?
That's correct.

Q. And what was your intention vith regard to firing those thr.se loaded guns?

A. Well, my intention was to do .i split salvo. Now, 1 did mei.uion to the
weapons officer that at some tim?, if we could, I d like to do an all three-
gun salvo for Admiral Johnson. [ didn't say 1 was going to do it then, I said
I'd like to kind of...

Q. So your intent was, once all three guns were loaded, would be to fire the

left gun spot

A. Yes, sir, left gun spot.

Q. Center and right.
A. That's right.

Q. And you think it was about 1] to 15 minutes betwe^^n

A. I think so, Admiral. I can't, you know, it's a blur to me because I was
not--as they were loading, 1 was talking to Admiral Johnson. 'Vou know, thoy
were setting, plot was getting raady, and they had given them the mission and
I was over there telling Admiral .Johnson, explaining to him how the loading
procedure went because I'd been jp there myself and observed thum loading the
gjin. As a matter of fact, I intended to do that with him later on, but that s
kind of what I was doing, so 1 tiink at least 10 or 15 minutes went by.

Q. We're trying to rule out some of the potential causes fDr ignition in
center gun. Turret II. About 10 minutes or a 15 minute irterval there, it's
important to me to try to narrow down to the most exact number T can get, with
regard to the so- called burning ov hot cinder philosophy, and that s why I
mention that question. 1 cannot get it from the logs.
A. Yes, sir.

RADM Milligan: Do you have any questions on the issue of Turret I before J go
on?

CAPT Messina: The XO covered pr3tty much the safety aspects. I don't think
we

CDR Swanson: Are you talking about the firing plan ar> it relat'is to Turrets I
and 11? Is that what

Questions by RADM Milligan:

Q. Well, I understand what the captain's saying about the firing plan. It
definitely does call for 22 rounJs. My understanding that was ;;ix, ten, and
six for the three turrets, with six for Turret ITI.

A. I m not saying that the weapons officer or somebody else di<in t think
that. It was never in my mind. In my mind, we were only going to shoot two
turrets. That's what I'd been briefed, that 's what was in the firing plan.

Q. Well, the briefing was to shoot to port, as well. Tht: original plan was

to shoot to port

A. Shoot to port.

169

Q. Turret III was out of the gane.

A. As you know, plans change. t'ou comp up with an anchcrage- -or somebody
and it changes. I had a problem with my- -you know, we prefer to shoot that
way because of, you know, what damage it's done and things to that nature.

CDR Swanson: Were you going to talk load configuration, sir?

RADM Milligan: Oh, yes. Okay.

Questions by RADM Milligan:

Q. The firing plan also calls for, along with 22 rounds, 44 cans of powder.
?our statement addresses, to som; degree, the firing with less than six bags
of powder.

A. I say it there. 1 mean, it ^.isn' t clear to me we were firing with less
;.han six bags. I looked at that and saw "reduced charge" and, In my mind, it
was six bags of reduced charge powder.

Q. Well, I guess I would ask yoj, and T think you just tcld me, what your
definition or understanding of definition of reduced charge is. It's a NALC,
it's six bags, probably 55 pound

charge

A. It was my understanding, you know, I had not in mind that vn were going to
shoot the five-bag reduced--their definition, my guys' definition of that...

Questions by CDR Swanson:

Q. Sir, you said you did, or did not...
A. Did not.

Questions by RADM Milligan:

Q. Was that briefed at the pref i re briefing?

A. Well, I wasn't at the prefirs briefing because I was on a conference--!
was briefed separately. I was, you know, f read the thing, signed it, was
briefed separately by the weapons officer. During the prefire brief in tho
wardroom, I was on a conference '»ith--we were some kind of figh-ing the war up
in STRIKE and I couldn't get out of there because we were on a conference call
with Admiral Macke. He'd called all the CO's in there, seme kind of "fighting
the war" so, when the time came for that, T couldn't get down "here.

Questions by CDR Swanson:

Q. To clarify, when you say "fief.iting the. wnr." you'r<> talking about the
Fleet Exercise 389?
A. 389, yes.

CDR Burnett: I don't know. Something that hasn't been expressly mentioned,
but the actual IOWA notice concerning the firing thing, only talks about
Turrets I and II.

RADM Milligan: I understand

WITNESS: He knows that, the Admiral

Questions by RADM Milligan:

Q. It talks about Turrets I and (1. I understand it talks about 22 round and
44 cans of powder, and I also havie a lot of testimony that they intended and
were going to shoot six rounds OJt of Turret I, ten rounds out of Turret II,

and the six, I can only assume, would be for Turret III

A. Yes, sir. I think, Admiral, I--having lalked--rve get to l)e honest with
you, I haven't even talked to- -I think they may have intended that, but they
never cleared it through me and I never approved it, and I wouldn't let it
Happen.

170

Q. Absolutely right. It's not over your signature because Turret III is not

mentioned.

A. That's right. Yes, sir. So T never planned on shooting Turret III.

Q. But nor is the reduced charg=, so to speak, of five bags

A, That's correct. I have never shot that on this ship before. I know it's
been shot, I know you've had testimony that it's been shot. I don't see,
personally see, a danger in doing that but 1 had not approved it, and when I
saw reduced charge to the firing plan, to mo, that meant six bags of reduced
powder .

Q. So when you were briefed, verbally, at the time you sew the firing plan

A. I was not briefed that it was going to be five bags reduced charge.

Q. Would it surprise you to leatn that they intended to fire Turret III with

four bags of powder?

A. Very surprising, very alarmiag.

Q. There's been more than one bit of testimony that would indicate that was
•\the plan. Have you been made aware of that now?
\A. Yes, sir.

CDR Burnett: You might want to Ttention what the weapons officer. . . .

WITNESS: Well, he told me I never told you. He said I never told you about
the five-bag, I never told you about the fonr-bag.

Q. Who, really, has got to give you the authority to shoot anything but the

standard load out of the turret?

A. I would think that we would have to havo authority from, you know, in

this--l'll tell you, good question. You know, I've

got--I think you saw my letter from George Minegan there about shooting that

X-146 round. Everybody seemed tC' be aware of that to a point of offering

up. . .CINCUSNAVEUR requested me to take up 30 rounds of it to Europe when I go

there. The--I felt everybody had known about the DX-149 thing, that NAVSEA

was aware of that and the long-shot, the super-chargeil ba^;, and I felt

comfortable that higher authority was aware of what wo weie doing.

Q. Well, I think you did have ajthority Lo shoot the suptr-charge or the

baglet.

A. Yes, sir, and I looked at th ? five-bag thing, then I saw th.; paper on

that. It's like, you know, some 3ody gave a briefing but it was never finally

approved. Up to this point, I h9ve never shot a five-bag thing on here.

Q. And I can understand the pressure issue with regard tc so many thousand
pounds of pressure that would be built up in the breech with five vice six
bags. My concern, in having soms experience in the field, is that there are
other things that happen in addition to pressure and, I don't know what they
.'ire. For instance, the subject of ringing has been brought to my attention
with regard to pressure waves.

A. Yes, sir. My understanding is th-^t's not a problem with the BL&P 2700
pound, BL&P, it could have been

Q. Ringing effects, fuzing, so it makes common logical sense but, at the
same time, how about a 2700 pound AP, would we do it with that?
A. No, sir.

q'. It's just a matter of USS lOVA is not a R&D platform, it's .i fleet ship--"
A. Right.

171

Q. A lot of these things that I'm hearing nbout, it seem? to mu they woulH
rightfully belong somewhere other than at sea, at least, intil ;hey're
approved through all the shore testing and directed t-.j be conducted at sea
A. Yes, sir.

RADM Milligan: That's where we're coining from on that is5ue. [t's of some
concern. Did you have anything slse?

Questions by CAPT Messina:

Q. The other issue with that particular five-hag situation in Turret TT is

that those are 2700 pound projectiles

A. Uh huh.

Q_ were loaded into the. thing and all the D-846 is clearly labeled and

has a card in it and an envelope that says "Don't use thit powder," and I

think

A. I understand that. I think that pertains to a six-ba^; load, I think
that's why they went to five bags.

Q. If that was their motivation for going to five, is

A. Exact--well, that's not the :/nly motivation. The other motivation is for,
you know, better accuracy on the gun.

Questions by RADM Milligan:

Q. They wanted to drop the IV?
A. Right.

Q. But they made the assumption that dropping from six tc five bags and
dropping the pressure was the only reason why that powder was prohibited with
one heavier projectile. Now, I didn't write that prohibition, so I don't know

what all the reasons are, but I do know that

A. My understanding is it's because of the pressure that's built up with the
six-bag charge and that five bags is not a problem.

Q. Let me go a little further, low, up until the timf; of tie explosion, and I
understand pretty clearly what took place on the bridge witi regard to
response. We've gotten into great detail talking to many, many of the people
who responded so bravely on the deck and throughout the shiD. Your statement
refers to the first, and then se:ondary and, possibly, tertiary explosion.
A. Yes, sir.

Q. Can you give me any estimate i5f the times of those?

A. Well, I would say it was a m-atter of--the whole thing was a matter of 30
seconds. As I think I said in m; statement, when the initial explosion went,
I was on the starboard bridge wi tg with Admiral Johnson and I saw the terrible
e^cplosion, the smoke pouring out. I ran over and immediately o::dered--
sounding general quarters at that. As I was running over, I think, is when I
heard a second explosion. When I walked- -then I came around tc the front of
the bridge wing on the port side -o the center polaris, I think I heard a
third explosion at that time, s; it was well within n minute or less.

Q. We have testimony from one of the earlier people to get into the turret,
in fact, it was the first one in ;hat, upon entering the turret, was thrown

back up against the bulkhead, which could have been a

A. Well, there was certainly a ciflashes that went on within the hydraulic
systems .

Q. Okay. Why don't we give you the opportunity, Captain, to go into the ^ WJ./?'-'

issue with regard to the officers, or manning.

A. Well, yes, sir. Number one, when I first came on here, you know, we had

an NMP of 118 and I was 37 gunner's mates short at the time. I have messages

where I sent messages out requesting...! also found out through the EPMAC nnd

the SUPERS that the reason I wasn't getting any more gunner's mates is

./2

172

because I was 37th on the priority list. The basic word 1 was jjetting was
that, "Hey, you're not going to git anybody there. Captain, bec.iuse you're so
low on the priority list that yoj're never going to make it."

I think a lot of that was due to the fact that IOWA was
not--well, let me go back. You <now, siricp I went through the )3ipelin<5 and
got on my way to the ship, and since I got on the ship, I have felt like the
battleship has been not--kind of ^jut of it, no employment plan. The only
employment I had on my schedule vas this--of termination of August of this
year, no concept of operations.

So I felt like we were kind of--if we would go away and hide somewhere, it
would be fine with everybody, ai\i I felt that to be 37th cm the priori-y list
for the biggest gun ship in the vorld was kind of credulous. 1 kept pounding
away at that, that we needed to e.^t people in there. As you krow, not having
the chiefs and the first classes ■ind--thflt we were suppos€:d to have, there's a
deck plate leadership problem thsT becomes very difficult when you're talking
about 16- inch gunnery.

I also had offered--! also fouid, of course, most of the training is on the
job training that we have. . .had offered to be a school ship at one time, and
nobody wanted to do that, we didi't have money to do that.

As far as the--when I first cair.e to the ship, the weapons officer was being
relieved concurrently with my relief, by a guy named Commander Honey.
Commander Honey, as I went through the TOMAHAWK school, I heard from there
thet he was not a very good student, didn't think much of him. I checked into
his record, found that he was not EOOW qualified, command qualified, and was
obviously going to be a non-selectee for command and was going to be a "failed
' " islact" commander here, shortly. This incumbent CO, Captain Sequist,
agreed with me. Commander Honey was detached after about a weelc.

The next guy I had was the acting--thc gunnery officer, as a matter of fact,
Lieutenant Commander Lasowski. I have the sequence of dates here. Lieutenant
Commander Lasowski--well, Commander Honey came on the 24th of Miiy, I got tliere
on the 16th, relieved on the 26t.T. Kosmich, who I tried to keep Kosmich
aboard, he wanted to stay aboard but Admiral Butcher was c.eputy CINCLAtfTFLT,
he wanted him over there for what'iver he's doing. Lieuterant Commander
Lasowski then became the weapons officer on the 30th of Mey, acting weapons
officer. On the 5th of July, he broke his collarbone and he was not declared
unfit to be the weapons officer because he couldn't g<!t aiound "he ship, and
you got to get down in these spares. I thought he was a pretty decent guy.
So, on the 7th of July, he was relieved by Lieutenant Commandei Ruthrick. So
I'm on the third team, already.

And then I'm hurting for a gunnery officer, right? So they said they'd make
Buch the gunnery officer. I dor't--I think Morales was actually the guy that
we put in there, who^ J hfld—kieke^-omrTST"*^ gang, /by the way, because he
screwed that up, so I'm down to the third team. I'm looking for somebody to
relieve him. ^ — i

They looked at a few people and they came up with Kissinger who arrived on
the 24th of August. So I'm there, what, 3 months, basically, without a
weapons officer.

Q. Off-loaded this entire time, right?

A. Yes, sir. Off-loaded. But a lot of critical work going on, a lot of
things. I had spent a lot of tine down in the weapons department during SRA
to get things fixed. At the same time, T think you saw in ny statement, to
show my intensity of my rag on ths Weapons Department, Master Chief Hickman
and the guy I called back, Fulcher, who I beat up about the condition of the
5 -inch mounts which really were in pretty bad shape, J yanked him back there,
and they had both wanted to come; up and see me and teM me: "Why are you
picking on us, the Weapons Department?"

I outlined why I was doing it, because of their PQS, thrir PM;3, the

173

condition of their material, the condition of their mounts:, and I said "Do you
have any more questions?" and they put their tail between their legs and
walked out of there, so much so, that Fulchnr tried to get off the ship early
because he couldn't take the heat I found out about that and 'ixed him up,
made him go down to GTMO with us, and wouldn't let him leave until the last
day of the month.

So Kissinger comes aboard, ver/ highly regarded. S'lRFLANT, I was told, he
was number one out of 24 command 5ts over there. [ guit.ss had been your XO on
the. . .HAYLER seemed like a very jood guy to me. [ mean, he--I r.till think Bob
Kissinger's a well- meaning, intalligent guy. Then we searched for relief as
the gunnery officer and that s wien Costigan's name came up. Initially, as I
told you, 1 rejected him because of the fact I didn't want a wardroom full of
passed over guys who are not going to go anywhere.

As I told you, 1 had also relijved the DCA. The engineer had caved in on me
and I must tell you that my focus for coming out of the shipyard was in
engineering and the weapons area, engineering first, and damage control. At
the same time this is going on, [ made statement in there about having to go

; over myself and fighting fires ojer in the trainer there, because 1 had guys

j throwing down hoses and walking cut of the place.

I So all these things are coming together. That's when Admiral Glenn called
I me and said "Costigan really wants to get out of what he's doing, he's good at
I what he does, he's never going to be a superstar but he's good at being a

gunnery officer" so, I accepted him. I got to tell you, looki)ig back on it,
I don't know what Ken Costigan ha:; told you. but Ken Costigan is a basket
case, right now. He completely collapsed on me during this whole thing. He
had to see a psychiatrist. On tie way back, he was totally useless.

I think, to this day, whatever the outcome of this thing;, he'<l have a hard
time continuing on with his job. I don't have any confidence in him because
of his mental state. I mean, if you asked Ken Costigan if he killed his
mother right now, he'd say, "Yes, I did." So. he came on board. And I have
addressed the wardroom issue to Vimiral Borda in a letter, the whole wardroom
issue.

In command screening, all thres department heads failed the screen.
Kissinger, they told me, because of his department head tour. [ have my ops
officer who ran a mine sweeper aground, back when he was lieutenant commander.
Other than that. Bob Finney's an-ther. I think a very good officer. Jan Coor
is a guy that came to me, you know, I had a gap in relief as an engineer. If
I had to rank those guys right nrw. before this accident, he wculd have been
three of three. He's the only guy that tias n chance for gettin.? screened for
a command.

So that's my wardroom, plus, I've got a lot of ex-amphibers , AE guys. I
talked about the wardroom LORTARF . The placement officer told me he had not
received the LORTARP from the lOVA in 2 years and 1 found it very difficult to
find out who was doing what on there. When T came aboard. I ordered that that
be corrected immediately, and the XO put out a LORTARP so we could start
managing the wardroom which had not been done, in my book.

The SWO program was kind of screwed up and T think we got that on track.
I've got four or five of those gi;ys that just qualified. You h.ad people who
were running over the 2-year point that really had not--I think we got a
handle on that now. But as far ^r^ the quality level in the wardroom, I m not,
you know, I've got an assistant ops officer who was ops on the FFG, and they
tol ;". me he wasn t worth a damn on there and I've got him.

So, in summary, you know, the battleships, you know, where dc they fit in as
far as r.amiing priorities? You're got a tremendous ship there, a big ship, a
complicated ship and, in my view, the toughest ship in tli; Na\'>- to run becnuse
of the age and the scope cf the job. and 1 don't think it's pro])erly
supported as for as priority manning in the enlisted area or any officer area.

174

! get the impression that the Navy has onr foot in the water and one o\it, not
reallN sure how the hell long they're going to stick around. Wr don't want to
make any commitments.

That's tne--I have made initiatives, incentives for keeping people in tho
gunner's mate rate on there, keeping people, giving incentives to BT's and
machinist's mates, double sea di.^y, more caps for the CO, because you got n
lot of guys who are on there that are proud of being there, but I don't think
you'd get many of them to come back, or BT's and gunner's mates, too damn
hard. There's some real incentive problems there. There are manning
problems there. I just don't feel that I've had the commitment of CNO on the
priority list for manning those things.

Q. \VTiat is your opinion or position with rfgard to your P-1, G-2 and G-3
division officer and your turret officers, <ns opposed

A. Admiral, I think you know I'd certainly like to have more senior people in
there if they were available. Tnat's another thing that brings to mind things
that happen. You get downgraded, billets get downgraded and you don't even
get any input to it. This is an example, T think the turret officer thing--
the Chaplain's got downgraded to lieutenant commanders, I didn't know that.
The NMP changes without any inputs. As a matter of fact, the St-fD study we
just did said we should have 130 gunner '.«; mates, not 118. Now, our NMP is 88.
I don't know how in the hell--you know, there's no input from me on that.

I found out that the type commander is taking billets from me to man an MTT.
Now, I didn't have any say in that. That's all being done sub rosa that I
don't know about it. I was never asked my input on anything.

Q. Well, your NMP is not the fu.iction of...thp SMD says you need

A. It's a fair share. I don't see how my fair share can be 86 gunner s mates
when I got--that's not--what I'm telling yon is. T felt that T was short to
begin with and it come from 118. They solvrH the problem, I'm now 88. Thfit's
how many I'm allowed now.

Questions by CAPT Messina:

Q. Your NMP would be your fair share, of however many billet.";. HIvery time your
billet gets cut, then you lose...
A. Right.

Questions by RADM Milligan:

Q. Well, that's true.

A. 1 think it would be good. I look upon--! don't think there's any
qu" i 1 f ication for turret oificer; as tar as PQS qualification tliat I m aware
of. I must say another thing, you know, there's nc bchool tnat I went to--I
tried to dig books out of a PCO :ourse up there on 16- inch guns. There isn't
any. I didn't go to any school or anything that gave me an input on what 16-
inch gunnery is all about. I got it from what I read from books. There s
nothing that the XO went to, the weapons officer, or otherwise. There's no
schooling for these chiefs. They throw them on there without the proper
training. There's got to be some kind of en route training for these people.

Q. Were you aware that on the morning of the 19th, the turret officer, or--I
shouldn't say "turret officer," but the only officer up in Turret I was Ensign
Garrett who had been aboard ship for 16 days.

A. No, I was not aware of that. After the fact, 1 was aware of it but I
wasn't aware at the time, that tn^it was the plan to do that.

Q. Well, I don't know if it was the plan because, if you go tc your firing
plan, Mr. Meyer is the one who is listed as the Turret T cfficer.
A. That's who I would expect tc be up there.

Q. He was on the bridge.
A. I didn't. . .

175

Q. How about Master Chief Hickman? You know, 27 years in the rservice, Master
Chief Petty Officer, not that mu:h training in 16-inch gurs, but qualified as
a turret captain on this ship, and yet he doesn't seem to have a big
involvement right now in the turrets, or the training of the turret crtjws. He

seems to be the admin

A. He does a lot of admin things. . .he gets down--I make him go down in the
turrets. He's been down in the turrets. I -nean, I dragged him down there for
material problems in the turrets.

Q. He hasn't been in a turret when they fired for a year, I don't believe.
A. I'm not aware of that. I don't believe that. Admiral, because he':5 taken
guests down through the turrets vhen we were firing.

Q. Is that right?
A. Yes, sir.

Q. I thought it had been a long time. 1 may be wrong in saying a year.

A. I mean up--we had SECNAV. I know he took SECNAV down through the turrets

while we were in the process of firing. Hp'"^ the guy <ip to the phone talkf^r
on the bridge.

Q. Is he a competent master chief?

A. I think he's a very competent master chief. He knows the weapons area, he
was stationed at Yorktown before "lere. He was called, I think, some of the
best records ever seen by the CS*. I rate two master chiefs, 1 think I only
got one.

Q. Well, that's another issue. ('ve been trying, since I arrived here, to
get a handle on the number of powder bags that were taken from magazine A-'^15-

M and passed on to the powder haidling flats, and that's a very difficult

thir.fc to track dowTi because he e.tpended 18 cans in his ATF at the end of tnis _

whole evolution. I can only takj what testimony I havf as to how many
^;nburned bags were thrown over tie side.
A. Yes, sir.

Q. There were a number of them that were wet that were removed by EOD and
your shipboard personnel, so it's a little bit difficult to figure what the
exact number of bags were down in the magazine at the time of the accident.
A. Yes, sir.

q. I don't know whether 18 cans is the right number or net.
A . I don ' t know .

Q. That's what was reported. Hew about Master Chief Skelly, i:; he coir.petnnt?
A. I think he's competent. I tiink he could be a loose cannon. Master Chief
Skelly, I think, had a special rslationship with my predecessor on her.i--that
I'have kind of shunned him off. ['m sure, if you would have asked him before
this explosion, he would probablj; say that I wasn't his favorit.; CO. I keep
trying to put him where he belongs, you know, in his placf then;.

I think he's a very intelligent guy. I think he's an expert on 16-inch
gunnery. I think he belongs in s laboratory somewhere. He keeps, you loiow,
God bless him, he keeps trying t: make the system better, you know, his
heart's in the right place. He vants to make 16- inch gunnery b-itter and
better. I think Master Chief Sk-lly's a very competent, goad guy, for the
Navy. He has to be kept under ccntrol.

Q. So he was working directly with the weapons officer with regard to the

number of powder bags that --his :rogram

A. Yes, sir. Yes, sir.

Questions by CAPT Messina:

Q. Did he ever specifically brief you on any of these calculations that he's
making for

176

A. No, Master Chief Ske] ly drives me nuts. T can only stand t(5 spend about 5
minutes with him.

CAPT Messina: I understand that.

Questions by CDR Swanson:

Q. Have you ever reviewed his service record, sir?
A. No.

Q. Do you know how many years of active duty service he lias?
A. Nine, I think.

Q. Do you know whether he's PQS qualified for any of the 16- inch gun

positions?

A. No, I don't, no.

Q-iestions by RADM Milligan:

Q. Do you have anymore on the manning issue?
A. No, sir.

Q. With regard to the data, when these ships were originally reactivated, the
billets for the G-1, G-2, G-3, 85 best as T can recall, were li<iutenant
billets, certainly, second tour.

A. I think that's what happened. People have lost interest in these ships
after they were initially manned and we're-'l'm rather disgusted. I don't
want to use some terms here but, as far as you know, it's from the type
commander. My feeling during this whole time here is, if I could go away
somewhere- -and I've had people ripped off me to go on other ships, they think
we've got too many people down tiere.

,1 have felt like somebody thin/is they havo people growing on trees down
there. I've been told to keep my mouth shut as far as employment goes, when I
pushed to get the ship on a deployment, because I saw that, if I didn t get
one, that I would never be high en the manning priority list. As soon as we
got a deployment, I started seeing people come in. Now, they ni not trained
people and we have to train them on there hut, at least, I'm starting to get
some chiefs, first class, and so forth.

Q. Well, how about damage control. Do yo>i want to make f.ny comments with

regard to--l've read your statement and

A. Yes, sir.

Q. I've certainly heard an awful lot from a lot of people with regard to how
that was handled, and I look at it as a mass conflag, and it certainly seems
to be the way it was handled.
A. That's the way I handled it.

Q. I don't know if that word was ever passed over the IMC

A. I didn't say "mass conf lag". . . had in my statement that I felt it was a
mass conflag and that I had to take control. I've had guys telling me that
they were scared out of their minds, and when I got on the IMC, it calmed them
down. I mean, they said, well, "Hey, the Captain's up there, his's in charge."

There was never any doubt in my mind of tho picture that I had through the
investigators. I felt comfortable with what was going on and l'm--I really
never felt anything was out of control after the initial r-.xplos ion, th'j
flooding of the magazines and, once the investigators got on th^jre, I felt
like we had complete control of the situation.

I was concerned at times about the- -when somebody told me that the
bulkheads, like they were quavering there, T mean, they had pro.gressive
flooding, of course, we took action to shore those immediately. As it turned
out, it really wasn't a problem.

177

After that, I felt, of course, rhe toughest part foi me was the realization,
as time went by, that there was W peoplf- dead down in that turret. Tliat was
the hardest thing to cope with.

Q. Are you aware that groups thf"»h and four flooding systems wore energized
before you made the announcement over the IMC?
A. After the fact, yes.

Q. Does that disturb you, or do you think that was proper action?

A. That disturbs me, because I tliink that's a command prerogative. I think

that; certainly, if these guys hid seen things way out of control, then I

would applaud it. Okay. "You took action." We teach people delegation of

authority and when there is a res I problem, yes, take action an<l take care of

It.

That was never--as I still remember, Tnn'tt, for example, coming up in an
OBA briefing me on the flooding and where the water was, all that other kind
of stuff, it was never mentioned vo me that he had done anything or whatever
to energize, before I gave the word to do it.

Q. Well, by the time he saw you, you probably already had passud the word.
A. I had--well, I think it was like 7 minutes after the ex-olosion when I
passed the word.

Q. It was probably not more thai 3 minute.s before that

A. Yes, sir.

Q. that he went up to DC ceitral to do that. Any more comments on damage

control?

A. No, sir. My only comment is that the training that we accomplished on
there in the past, and me being 9 stickler on damage control, firing the old
DCA, I did all the right things. 1 thought that--l thank God that I put that
much effort into it.

Q. Any lessons learned?

A. Lessons learned is, those proximity suits they had were, yon know, we just
got those a couple weeks before, and guys that had the trc.ining, my God, it
really paid off, big time. We're going to put together a "lessons learned"
message. I don't have anything, off the top of my head.

Q. Familiarization of the lay-ojt of turr'^ts for damage control type

personnel, that would be a lessor, learned.

A. That would be helpful. That's one of tho miracles of this whole thing, in

my book, is the fact that nobody was injured, seriously ir.jured, in the fire

fighting.

Q. It's pretty incredible.
A. Yes, sir.

Q. There is a lot of testimony you will obviously see. in time., that infers
that some of these guys were in the turret for the first tiTie in their lives.
A. Yes, sir.

RADM Milligan: In less than optimum conditions.

'; -r^: ions by CAPT Messina:

o, Just one quicky. With respect to your experience at Guantanamo Bay in

damage control, did you feel like you got sufficient preparation

A. Absolutely.

Q at damage control? Ther; is some discussion over--on the staff on

hc»,.'3 an adequate period of tim; for a battleship at Guantanamo Bay, and 1
recall there is a number of 57 days

178

A. Well, I can tell you it's not adequate if you got to do all the things.
'.:■. ay view, battleships should g: to Guantanamo Bay for DC and engineering,
period. You can do some of the ether stuff on the side, like navigation, do
that just coming in and out of pert. I think battleships shouldn't have the
LTT approach, myself.

Q, Plus LTT for the other selective areas.
A. Right.

CAPT Messina: I don't know if w; have LTl"'s that can support you. That's, I
guess, the question.

Questions by RADM Milligan:

Q. We mentioned flooding the magazines. What is your assessment of what your
understanding was, with regard t: the condition of your sprinkliir system,
prior to the incident?

A. My understanding was the sprinkler system was in great shapci. I had no
indication- -there was nothing. I review my 8 o'clock reports, I had no
CASREPs. I told everybody that I don't want any surprise?. I know that Chief
Ziegler--that we had a magazine sprinkler check not too long before this thing
happened, and I understand that Chief Zieglor told Master Chief Hickman that
everything had checked out okay, ;50 ray understanding was it was in good shape.

Q. Are you familiar with the jutiper hose required for the inner turret

system?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do you have any comments as to whether or not your crew has taken and
hooked up that hose and pressurized that hosn?

A. I would think they do. I car.'t personally .judge that. We've had trouble
with the 5-inch magazine sprinkler system which, you Imow, the valves ilidn t
operate properly and which I highlighted to the system. And, a:5 a matter of
fact, the WISCONSIN, they found :ut had the same prob.'.em, that you couldn't
turn the remote valves in the 5-inch sprinkler. I took action to get that
fixed.

Q. How about taking a few minutes, now, to give me what you think is your
assessment of what took place in the center gun of Turret II. Make thu
assumption that the whole incident started right there.

A. Yes, sir. Well, my assumpti:n is, from what I know, that the five bags
were in the tray. They said--my understanding, from what peopln have told me
is, "Wait, we're were not ready" .-^nd th<^rp was no indication of a problem. I
thought that was maybe because w= had a guy that- -Backhern.s was up there- -a
little later, making sure he was .ill checked out on the rammer.

The only thing I can think of is that the black powder got loose there,
somewhere, there was some kind of ignition process where it went off due to
friction or something else. You know, somebody told mo this thing about an
ember coming down the muzzle and I have <-i hard time believing that, so I don't
K.n' V what h-ippened. I wish to hall we'd find out what happened up there.
I'm off-loading tomorrow and, yoj know. 1 looked at the Ycrktown message on
the powder. 1 mean, I don't hav^ a lot of faith after reading the OP that
that powde is very gcoa .

g We're having some special te.u.s made on it. You're probably well aware of
that, and a few others?

A. Yes, sir, I saw your message. You know, 1 don t know wiiat happened, _
Admiral. I--that the breech was opened and they put the powder in, couldn t
get it to close in time. God, I don't know.

Q. Well, we don't really know who all showed up at some of the pre-prefire
and prefire briefs. You know, tiere was n fellow by the name of Williams
Seaman Williams, who was supposed to be in the upper powder car station who

179

didn't sail with the ship.
\ Yes, sir.

Q. His absence was recognized, I assumed, nt least 2 days before the
exercise, because that's when Petty Officer Fisk, apparently, was trained,
rather rapidly, to man that station. Petty Officer Fisk uas sujiposed to bf
the cradle operator, I believe, and Petty Officer Lawrence was supposed to be
breaking in, the first time ever, as gun captain. And I'm just concerned
that maybe Petty Officer Lawrenc3, since hp's the one who did the prefire
checks, signed them as a gun captain. He may hnvf been tiie one at the pre-
prefire and, possibly, at the prsfire brief.

So then I can build the scenario where, nil of a sudden. Petty Officer
Hartwig was brought in there and Lawrence put. him in as cradle operator, which
he's qualified for, so he could irove Fisk over to the carriage operator. And
Hartwig takes over as gun captai i and. up conies the powder, and out comes thu
two and the three bags to add to five. You know, initially, if he hadn't beiin
briefed on that, then he's got a question and 1 don't think he':; going to rant

it home. He probably never fired five bags in his life. So that's

A. We've fired that. I'm sure lu was aboar-1 that conf igurat icn befoni.

Q. I'm not sure he was the one that fired or he's even aware cf it.
A. He may not have been, yes, sir.

CDR Swanson: You mean, in Novem3<5r of '87, sir?

WITNESS: Yes.

Admiral: He'd been aboard a Ion? time ns long-time qunlifisd gun captiiin.

CAPT Messina: I believe he was aboard somol imp in '86.

WITNESS: He was getting ready t: detach in August, I thirk

CAPT Messina: He was getting ready to leave.

Questions by the Admiral:

Q. So I don't know if that's th= problem wo have or not. And ;hen, finally,
we resolved the fact that we're soing to do it with five. Ther-j's no
correspondence, there's no commu-i icat ion ovor any net on that, so that kind of
rules it out. You would think you would hoar something over tho, circuit.
A. Exactly. "Hey, why do I onl; hav'3 five here?"

Q. You don't see that at all. I'ou know, what we have the is problem and ^I
don't—you're on the bridge theri. were yon getting to the point of being
so-newhat concerned to see the ce^ter gun. there was 26 seconds iind beh.ind the

right gun?

A. I was at that—about ready t: leave Admiral Johnson and com.i over and ask

him, you know, "What's wrong her??" when tho thing happened.

Q. So, we have a problem, a little bit out of the ordinary, and the next
thing you knew, the massive explosion, or something. It s going to be tough
for us to continue to pursue the solutions that were causing this to happen.
A. Yes, sir.

Q. Okay. Any other comments?
A. No, sir.

Questions by CAPT Messina:

Q. Ziegler. How well did you kxiow Senior Chief Zieglcr?

A. Very well. 1 tried to get him to stay in the Navy. He--I don t know if
he is German or not, but he approached mo.. He impressed me as being v.jry
precise, attention to detail. He had the best turret when I walked around the
turrets there. When I first cams aboard, T^.rret TIT was in the worst shapr,

180

and Turret I and Turret II were in very good shape, and I attributed that to
his leadership. And he knew, he was very concerned--he wes concerned that
when we ran down the ammunition and we didn' (.--"Captain, we need to get more
ammo on here." He was a stickler on PMS safp.ty. He was just a no-nonisense
guy.

As I said, recognize--we did ti'? ranking. We're required to <io chiefs
ranking this year for the first time. He was ranked one of al] the senior
chiefs, and that was based on inputs from .ill department heads .and his peers.
I had complete faith in the man. I think, as I said to Acjniral Johnson, it's
mv best turret, and I felt that he was the biggest part of that. He didn't
mess around. I mean, he was a kind of guy of a--he was a moody guy. The fact
that, if you did something that cut of the--that wasn't by the book, he'd get
pissed and he would say something to you about it.

He--I had him convinced. He hf?d put in Ins papers to retire .and I talked to
him about it, "Hey, why don't yoj stay, yon know, you ought to really--you
ought to stay." His wife was an invalid in i wheelchair, and I think that's
the primary reason that he was getting out, that she has MS. She s a
wonderful woman. I met her at the memorial service. And he we:; a geographic
bachelor, as she lives up in New York. And T said, he--you know--he was just
dedicated to what he did. He was the best at everything he did. He was t)ie
best watch bill coordinator. He'd jumped on guys for safety things. He was a
tough, good guy, but I think the troops liked him down thf.re.

He then--he took his--he withdr'sw his retirement and, thinkin,; about it, and
took them out again. He didn't » ant to come up and tell nie thtt, he just did
it. He was the kind of guy, if i->- didn't want to offend yoj or didn't want
to--he wanted to please, I think, if he saw you coming down the passageway, he

ild go to another passageway. He couldn't face me with the fact that he.

- af,nin, put in his retirement [.apers. Thai's the V.ind jf guy he was.

woi

Q. Well, with respect to his su3i;rvision in qualified pecple then, you would

expect --

A. I would expect the best. I 3:<pect the best.

Q. You've fired nearly 400 rounis ir, tho last few months. Anybody ever
report broken bags?
A. No, never.

The only other issue is a smsking issue We're trying, I guess, we've
pretty much covered it . . . .
A. You moan smoking in the turr-?ts?

Q. Smoking in the turret booths.

A, You know, the rules are pretty plain. !'fr,--you know, W3 thought--!
haven't had anybody to mast for smoking in n turret. I've had but one guy to
mast for awhile back, for gun-de:king the magazine temperfitare. They ve
brought him to mast and I've bust.jd him. 1 made it perfectly clear to
everybody that stood the watch, and I'd catch a guy sleeping on the watch, and
I'd have an after-steering once in awhile or down in the cold-i :on wat.;h, T
took them to mast. I didn't maks any bones about it. To me, that was the
most important thing in the world, and I would suspect that you can never be
anywhere all the time, but I would suspect that Ziegler would b-j the kind of
guy that would not put up with sefety violations.

Q. Well, I'm not so sure that tney did put up with safety violations. I
think what they've done is they' J .J sort of established this policy that, when
there was no ammo there, you can :;moke in the back of the turre': booth, way
back from the beginning, as the ..ay I understand it, now.
A. Yes. I wasn't aware of that.

Q. But noone--there was never ariy discussion on it, of this being the

problem, I guess, is that

A. That's right.

181

Questions by the Admiral:

Q. There is some indication that Zieglpr wnsn't probab]y as gC'od as he could
have been. Battle dress wasn't '« nat it should have been, lthou,|h, he should
have been in the battle dress, according to the firing plfin.
A. Yes, sir.

Q. Ziegler shou]d have been set jp for \t . On the other side of the coin, if

Ziegler hadn't been sent down to the annular ring, you would tf^jlly have a

problem.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Okay. I don't ha\'e any other questions right now. Captain. I'll try to
pursue the ultimate cause of this thing. Anytime yo\i've got anything to offer
that you feel may be helpful, we'd appreciatR it that vou make it available to
ur> .

CDR Swanson: Anything furtlier th.ii you wouid liko to ndd, ^ii?

WITNESS: No.

CDR Swanson: Okay, you're excus ?d

Admiral: Are you going to warn nim?

CDR Swanson: I don't think I ha ,11? to warn him.

The witness departed at 1A39 hours, 1 May tlHO.

Senator Dixon. I thank the chairman.

Chairman Nunn. Let me just ask you a few more questions, Cap-
tain, along the line I was asking a few minutes ago, relating to
these findings.

On page 56 of this report, finding number 15 says, "As a result of
the efforts of Skelly, working informally with employees of NAV
SWC Dahlgren, Iowa utilized her main gun battery to engage in
unauthorized research and development."

What do you say to that finding?

Captain Moosally. Well, I do not agree with that. There was a
number of projectile powder combinations that we shot. And every
one of them were authorized in writing by a proper authority,
Naval Sea Systems Command or whatever.

We shot what they call the EX-146 round, which is a sub-muni-
tion round; we shot the ASW round before I got there; we shot the
24-mile shot down at Vieques with the 2,240 pound round. Those
were all fully sanctioned and authorized. The only real issue is the
five-bag incremental charge. I have stated in my statement, that
was not formally authorized. It was, however, fired on Iowa in No-
vember 1987, 18 rounds of it were fired. It was discussed at the bat-
tleship conference in March 1989 as a good thing to do, to improve
the accuracy of the guns.

And I believe that there was implicit, if not formally-written au-
thority, there was implicit authority that that was okay to do that.
But there was not formal authority.

And as I said, the five-bag incremental shot should not have been
planned to be fired that day. It did not have my approval. I was not
properly briefed. And it did not have formal approval of higher au-
thority. But I do not agree that we were an unauthorized research
and development laboratory.

182

Chairman Nunn. You are saying that one incident, you believe,
was an aberration, rather than a pattern?

Captain Moosally. Absolutely. It never happened before when I
was in command — since I have been in command. It happened
before I took command in November 1987. And I think there was a
feeling on the ship by people in the weapons department that it
was okay to do it.

Chairman Nunn. Let me ask you now on finding number 23,
which is page 57, quoting from the report, ''Iowa's commanding of-
ficer did not effectively oversee the planning in preparation for the
gun shoot on April 19, 1989. Specifically ..." I will ask you about
each one of them as we go.

Captain Moosally. Yes, sir.

Chairman Nunn. "Specifically, A, he did not know that ENS
Garrett was the only officer scheduled to be in turret I during the
gunnery exercise."

Captain Moosally. Can I answer that?

Chairman Nunn. Yes, we will take them one on one. You go
ahead.

Captain Moosally. Yes, sir. Ensign Meyer is the turret officer;
Ensign Garrett is his relief. Ensign Garrett was up there, but
Ensign Garrett was not the turret officer. Petty Officer Mortenson,
who is probably the — as a matter of fact, wrote a lot of the PQS
manual for the Navy for 16-inch gunnery, was the acting turret of-
ficer. GMG2 Krell was the turret captain.

So, although Ensign Garrett was in there, he was there to ob-
serve and to learn, he was not the turret officer. GMGl Mortenson
was the turret officer. So I do not see a real problem for him being
up there.

Should they have informed me that he was going to be up there?
I am not so sure that was necessary.

Chairman Nunn. All right. "B, he was not informed of the unau-
thorized load configuration used in turret II, which had been co-
ordinated by FCCM(SW) Skelly, and approved by the gunnery offi-
cer and the weapons officer."

. iiCaptain Moosally. That is correct. And I made that point
myself.

Chairman Nunn. That is what you said in your statement?

Captain Moosally. Yes, sir.

Chairman Nunn. "C, he was not informed of the following with
respect to turret III. Number one, that turret III personnel had
been briefed that they would shoot if time permitted during the
gunnery exercises."

Captain Moosally. Yes, sir. That C-1, 2, and 3, I could address
that by saying, no, I was not properly briefed, and neither was the
weapons officer. And that was a fantasy of some people who
thought they could shoot that day.

Turret III was not in the firing plan that I signed and approved.
And it was never going to be shot.

This is a case of some over-ambitious people who wanted to get
some shooting in that day, but, in fact, were not going to shoot. It
was never approved; turret III was not going to fire.

Chairman Nunn. All right.

183

Number C-2, "The turret III personnel were moving powder and
projectiles in preparation for the gunnery shoot."

Captain Moosally. That is correct, yes, sir. They did that. And
these are the things that, once again, my subordinates were taken
to mast for and punished. That is correct. They are not allowed to
move projectiles or munitions of any kind without my permission.

Chairman Nunn. Number C-3, "An unauthorized load configura-
tion was to be employed by turret III, which had been coordinated
by Skelly and approved by the gunnery officer and the weapons of-
ficer."

Captain Moosally. I do not agree that it was approved by the
weapons officer. The weapons officer had no knowledge of this. And
if he had, he would have told me. My weapons officer is a very
truthful naval officer who has a lot of integrity. And if he had
known about it, he would have told me.

Chairman Nunn. And then number 24, "On April 19, 1989, lax
command oversight and ill-defined main gun battery ordnance han-
dling procedures resulted in the unauthorized movement of powder
and projectiles in turret III."

Captain Moosally. Well, that is a repeat of finding of fact 23, so
I do not know why they had to have a fact 24.

Chairman Nunn. The same answer to that?

Captain Moosally. Yes, sir.

Chairman Nunn. You agree that it happened, but I guess you
would disagree with lax command authority?

Captain Moosally. I do not think — no, sir, I do not think there
has been any lax command authority since I have been in com-
mand oi Iowa.

Chairman Nunn. Captain, let me see if I can summarize your
testimony, and you tell me where I go wrong if this is incorrect.

Captain Moosally. Yes, sir.

Chairman Nunn. I am not trying to capture the whole, I am just
trying to summarize these particular points.

You still believe that there was no employment plan for the
lowal

Captain Moosally. At the time that I gave the testimony and
came on the ship, that is correct.

Chairman Nunn. Second, the ship was not properly supported by
the Navy in both officer and enlisted manning?

Captain Moosally. I would put the emphasis on the enlisted
area, Mr. Chairman, in the quality area, not numbers, but quality.

Chairman Nunn. Quality.

Captain Moosally. By that I mean the chief petty officer, the
first class petty officer and the second class petty officer. That is
the area that I was complaining about the most, because that is the
area that you need to have what I call deck-plate leadership.

Chairman Nunn. At the time of your testimony, there was a
lack of appreciation in the chain of command, at least on the east
coast, for the capability and utilization of the battleships?

Captain Moosally. Well, I would say only as reflected in our em-
ployment schedule.

Chairman Nunn. Thank you. Senator Dixon.

Senator Dixon. I just want to clarify two more things, and then I
will conclude. Captain.

184

I am told, and I would like you to correct me if I am in error,
that the guns are supposed to be cleaned after every firing, but
that it is a dirty job and that many times guns, in fact, are not
cleaned after every firing. Is that a fair statement?

Captain Moos ally. That is not true. That is categorically not
true. As a matter of fact, these gunnersmates take great pride in
getting out there and swabbing out those barrels after every shoot.

Senator Dixon. So, if any testimony is in the record here to that
effect, it is in error?

Captain Moos ally. As far as I am concerned it is, yes, sir.

Senator Dixon. All right.

I am told that there is testimony that indicates that the rammer-
man had only been trained for 2 days prior to the April 19 firing.

Captain Moosally. No, I do not agree with that.

Senator Dixon. Okay.

Captain Moosally. If I can find it here, that individual had been
in training I believe since January, had been in five — I have got it
right here — he had been in five gun shoots and shot 13 rounds.
And if you talk to the individual who is out of the Navy now who
trained him, who NIS interviewed, he indicated he was one of the
best rammermen that he had trained.

Senator Dixon. Is it possible there could be a problem with the
rammer that would not be reported to you? I mean that would not
get to that high a level? I do not know, I am just asking.

Captain Moosally. Everything is possible, but I certainly do not
think there was trouble with the rammer.

Senator Dixon. Well, I want to thank you, Captain Moosally, for
your very forthright testimony. I want to thank the Chair for the
very interesting hearing that we have had, and for his dedication
to arriving at the truth in these matters, and congratulate him on
the job he has done.

Chairman Nunn. Thank you very much. Senator Dixon.

One final question. Captain, if I can capture your testimony on
the crucial finding as you described it. Do you agree with the find-
ing of the Navy that the explosion occurred as a result of a wrong-
ful, intentional act?

Captain Moosally. Yes, sir.

Chairman Nunn. But you do not believe you have the knowledge
to come to a conclusion as to who committed that act?

Captain Moosally. That is correct. Yes, sir.

Chairman Nunn. Thank you.

Senator Dixon. If I may follow that up. Why would you come to
the conclusion that it has to be a wrongful, intentional act, in view
of all the complicated circumstances surrounding the firing of
these guns, and the fact that accidents of this kind have historical-
ly happened in the past?

Captain Moosally. Well, they have not historically happened on
the Iowa-class battleship.

Senator Dixon. But they have historically happened. It happened
with other battleships. Captain. The facts are in the record.

Captain Moosally. Yes, sir, I am just talking about Iowa-class
battleships.

Senator Dixon. Well, I understand that. I did not say the Iowa.

Captain Moosally. I am saying Iowa-class.

185

Senator Dixon. Are you saying that this accident never hap-
pened before?

Captain Moosally. This type of accident has never happened on
an /ow;a-class battleship is what I am saying.

I come to that conclusion based on my observations of the proce-
dure up there in loading that gun. And that is the only conclusion
I can come to.

Senator Dixon. Would it occur to you that it would be easier for
the Navy to suggest that someone had intentionally done this than
to live with the fact that it is an accident that can occur, has oc-
cured in the past, and may very well occur again in the future?

Captain Moosally. No, sir, I have not. I hope that is not the
case. I do not think it is the case.

Senator Dixon. I would warrant that a majority of the American
public believes it to be the case.

Captain Moosally. Well, I must say this, that I would not have
gotten — number one, in August, when we fired the rounds after the
moratorium, I would not have ordered my men in there and I
would not have gone in there — and I went in there with them. And
that is how much faith that I had and we had as a crew in those
guns, in their safety, in our equipment, and in our own training.
And, believe me, I would not have ordered our men to go back in
those turrets had I thought it was an accident that could happen
again.

Chairman Nunn. Captain, could I ask you one final question
that is not related to this specific incident, but goes to your experi-
ence at sea, having just been there, having gone through a lot of
the exercises, as well as been part of a deployment plan in a cru-
cial area of the world?

Captain Moosally. Yes, sir.

Chairman Nunn. I want to say that I am proud of all the men
and women on your ship for what you all have been able to do, par-
ticularly since this tragedy happened. I think to go back out in
those circumstances is most commendable and I congratulate you
and your whole crew on that.

Based on your own experience, based on the problems that you
have had in manning and so forth, which we have gone through
this morning, do you believe now that we have a Navy that has too
many ships to properly man?

Personal opinion.

Captain Moosally. Personal opinion? My personal opinion is we
are the best Navy in the world, number one. I do not think there is
any question of that. And our enlisted people are the heart of that.

Chairman Nunn. I agree with that.

Captain Moosally. Because they are the technicians and the op-
erators, and that is what sets us apart from the Soviets and other
navies. They are the backbone of the fleet.

My biggest concern is the high turnover rate that we have on
ships, which approximates 45 percent. In our case it was 46 per-
cent. That concern is only that you have to pay constant attention
out there, because training has to go on and on and on. Forty-six
percent to us last year equated to over 600 new faces on the Iowa.

186

So, the CO has to be more involved today than at any other tinie
since I have been in the Navy, has to be tremendously involved in
every evolution.

Every evolution has a risk be it a gun shoot or coming alongside
an oiler for refueling, and certainly going into a port where you
are going into shallow waters, going through a strait, any evolution
that has risk in it.

But, you cannot be everywhere, all the time, and this is where
these leaders that I was talking about before, the E-7, E-6, E-5
and above become important, because they have got to carry that
policy that you have about direct involvement and supervision all
over the ship.

So, I would say that that is my major concern as a commanding
officer, that it seems like you have really got to be tremendously
involved in every evolution, more so than ever before because of
the fact that you have a pretty high turnover in people.

Chairman Nunn. You are saying we do not have enough senior
enlisted personnel in the qualifications you need?

Captain Moos ally. I can say I did not have enough when I first
came to the ship. I certainly have them today. And I cannot speak
for the entire Navy, whether that is a problem Navy-wide or not.

Chairman Nunn. Is it a problem you think ought to be a concern
of the Navy at this juncture?

Captain Moosally. I think the turnover rate ought to be of con-
cern. I do not know what to do about that, and I cannot speak to
the ratings as far as how many chief petty officers we have or E-6,
E-5 petty officers we have for the fleet.

Senator Dixon. Mr. Chairman, would you indulge me by making
one final comment.

Chairman Nunn. Certainly.

Senator Dixon. I would simply want to say as you and the Cap-
tain have both said, that we have the greatest Navy in the world.
We have the finest officers and fighting men and crews, and every-
one believes that, and there is a risk, and the American public ac-
cepts the fact that there is a risk.

I think the problem that we have here is that it strains the intel-
ligence of most people to draw a conclusion that one person inten-
tionally carried out this act that brought about this terrible trage-
dy when so many thousands of different things could have brought
about this result, and I do not believe that the American public
generally believes that one individual intentionally caused this act
that brought about this great tragedy.

I think most people believe there are a variety of things that
could have caused the accident. This Senator thinks there are a va-
riety of things that could have brought about the accident, but I do
not know why we have to tell the American people that we draw a
conclusion that flies so strongly in the face of what I consider to be
all of the facts in the case. I say that with due respect to every
person involved in the investigation.

We have a great Navy, great people in it, and we want to contin-
ue to be the greatest naval power in the world. I support that en-
thusiastically. We do not need, I think, to come to the conclusion
that one person intentionally did this to continue to support having
these battleships, these 16-inch guns in a great Navy.

1 187

Chairman Nunn. Thank you, Senator Dixon. We will be hearing
more on this this afternoon from the FBI. We will be getting right
to the point that Senator Dixon just alluded to — as to whether the
evidence is sufficient to establish a wrongful act, number one, and
second, was the evidence sufficient to establish a probability that
the Navy concluded putting that act on the responsibility of one
person.

Captain, I hope you are able to get a few days off now. I know
that the weekend was one of preparation.

Captain Moosally. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate being
here.

Chairman Nunn. I hope you will express our appreciation to all
of the men and women in your command for the job they have
done for us.

Captain Moosally. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Nunn. We will be here at 1:30 this afternoon. We had
announced at 2 o'clock. It will be at 1:30 this afternoon with the
FBI.

[Whereupon, at 11:28 a.m., the committee adjourned, subject to
the call of the Chair.]

REVIEW OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY'S
INVESTIGATION INTO THE GUN TURRET EX-
PLOSION ABOARD THE U.S.S. "IOWA"

MONDAY, DECEMBER 11, 1989

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,

Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:32 p.m., in room
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Sam Nunn (chair-
man) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Nunn, Dixon, Warner,
and Cohen.

Committee staff members present: Arnold L. Punaro, staff direc-
tor; and Richard D. DeBobes, counsel.

Professional staff member present: Robert G. Bell.

Minority staff members present: Patrick A. Tucker, minority
staff director and counsel; and Mark B. Robinson, professional staff
member.

Staff assistants present: Kelli J. Pronovost and Mickie Jan Wise.

Committee members' assistants present: Charles C. Smith, assist-
ant to Senator Dixon; Milton D. Beach, assistant to Senator Glenn;
Terrence M. Lynch, assistant to Senator Shelby; Dale F. Gerry, as-
sistant to Senator Cohen; and Charles G. Pearcy, assistant to Sena-
tor Lott.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR SAM NUNN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Nunn. The committee will come to order.

The committee meets this afternoon for the third of a series of
hearings on matters associated with the explosion on April 19,
1989, in the center gun of turret II on board the U.S.S. Iowa which
resulted in the deaths of 47 naval personnel.

The committee heard this morning from Capt. Fred Moosally,
the commanding officer, U.S.S. Iowa. Last month, we heard from
Rear Adm. Richard Milligan, the Navy's investigating officer, and
from other Navy witnesses who assisted in the investigative report.

This afternoon, we will hear from Mr. Anthony E. Daniels, the
Assistant Director for the FBI for Training and from special agents
Richard L. Ault, Jr., and Robert R. Hazelwood. Mr. Ault and Mr.
Hazelwood prepared the FBI's "equivocal death analysis" which
contains their opinion, quoting from that, "Clayton Hartwig died as
a result of his own actions, staging his death in such a fashion that
he hoped it would appear to be an accident." The equivocal death
analysis was a key element in the Navy's opinion that GMG2

(189)

24-931 0-91-7

190

Hartwig most probably committed the wrongful intentional act
that took his own life and the lives of 46 other naval personnel.

We will also hear from Mr. Kenneth W. Nimmich, who is the
Section Chief of the Scientific Analysis Section of the FBI's Labora-
tory Division. The FBI laboratory conducted an analysis of the ro-
tating band from the projectile that was in the barrel on April 19
in an attempt to determine the presence of any foreign material.
The FBI's analysis was inconclusive.

As I indicated this morning, at the committee's request, Sandia
National Laboratories will be conducting an independent analysis
of the remainder of the rotating band.

We will proceed this afternoon by first hearing from Mr. Daniels
and special agents Ault and Hazelwood on the equivocal death
analysis, and then, after we are finished with their testimony, in-
cluding questions, we will proceed to Mr. Nimmich on the technical
analysis.

Senator Warner, do you have any comments?

Senator Warner. Just briefly, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, I have worked over your statements here, and I urge
you to provide as much background as possible for what it is you
are about to provide to the committee.

I spent 5 years as an Assistant U.S. Attorney and tried many,
many cases. This type of evidentiary material is relatively new in
the trial of cases, and of course this is an administrative proceeding
of the Navy, but nevertheless there is a certain parallel.

A lot of people are listening to this, and I am concerned about
the families of the victims, concerned about the families of those
who are still at sea, and I just hope that you can convey as clear a
picture as possible, without being too technical, so that a lot of
people have a very broad understanding about your contribution to
this case.

Thank you very much.

Chairman Nunn. Thank you. Senator Warner. Mr. Daniels, I be-
lieve you are going to give us an introductory background and then
we will hear from Mr. Ault and Mr. Hazelwood, is that correct?

Mr. Daniels. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Nunn. We are glad to have you.

STATEMENT OF ANTHONY E. DANIELS, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR,
TRAINING DIVISION, FBI; RICHARD L. AULT, JR., Ph.D., SPECIAL
AGENT, TRAINING DIVISION, FBI; ROBERT R. HAZELWOOD,
SPECIAL AGENT, TRAINING DIVISION, FBI

Mr. Daniels. Thank you, sir. Glad to be here. I have submitted a
copy of this statement for the record, sir, and with your permission
I would like to just give a summary of that statement.

Chairman Nunn. Without objection, it will be included as part of
the record.

Mr. Daniels. Thank you, sir. My name is Anthony E. Daniels of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and I am the Assistant Direc-
tor in charge of the FBI Training Division, which is located on the
Marine Corps base in Quantico, Virginia.

By way of background, the training division is responsible for
conducting and coordinating all training for FBI personnel. It also

191

provides training assistance upon request to local, county anc
law enforcement personnel throughout the United States. In
tion to providing investigative and operational support to the .xcia,
the training division historically has functioned as an international
forum for seeking and identifying solutions to current and emerg-
ing problems facing the entire criminal justice system.

To assist the Academy staff in the continued development of
quality training and educational programs, the training division
has maintained a formal affiliation with the University of Virginia
since 1972. In addition to providing course accreditation and aca-
demic certification for instructor personnel, the University of Vir-
ginia provides technical and instructional resources.

In conjunction with the training division's nation-wide efforts to
address the violent crime issue, the National Center for the Analy-
sis of Violent Crime was established at the FBI Academy in July
1984. This Center is a law-enforcement-oriented behavioral science
and data processing center designed to consolidate research, train-
ing and investigative/operational support functions for the purpose
of providing expertise to any legitimate law enforcement agency
confronted with unusual, bizarre and/or repetitive violent crime.

Through the expertise of its staff of crime analysts, psychologists,
sociologists, criminologists, political scientists, computer scientists,
and police specialists, the Center brings a multidisciplined ap-
proach to a wide variety of investigative problems. The Center is
an integral part of the FBI Academy at Quantico, Virginia, and its
members are adjunct faculty with the University of Virginia.

Research activities include multidisciplinary studies in serial and
violent crimes such as homicide, rape, sexual sadism, child abduc-
tion, arson, and counterintelligence matters. Joining in such re-
search projects with the staff of the Center are faculty from major
universities, members of the mental health and medical profes-
sions, and other law enforcement representatives.

The Center provides investigative support to Federal, State,
county, and city law enforcement agencies through its criminal m-
vestigative analysis program. This program provides the support,
through consulting on major violent crimes, such as the Atlanta
child murders, Tylenol poisonings, and the Green River serial
murder case, constructing profiles of unidentified offenders, plan-
ning case investigative strategies, providing expert testimony, and
furnishing interview techniques.

Now, having outlined the goals and missions of the Academy and
the Center, let me provide you with the insight and definitions that
would be applicable in this matter. As I indicated, the Center s re-
search and assessment activities are provided in a wide variety of
cases, including equivocal deaths. An equivocal death is a death
whose manner (homicide, suicide or accident) has not been resolved
through normal investigative activities.

Another aspect of our process is indirect personality assessment,
a behavioral oriented analysis of all available material about an in-
dividual. This process is included in equivocal death evaluations.

It should be noted that this equivocal death analysis should not
be confused by another service provided by the National Center,
criminal personality profiling, currently defined as criminal inves-
tigative analysis.

192

Criminal investigative analysis is a process which would review
and analyze, at the request of the law enforcement agency in-
volved, crimes of violence in which the offender has not been iden-
tified. The focus of criminal investigative analysis includes a
review of the crime scene photographs, autopsy report and complet-
ed investigation conducted by the submitting law enforcement
agency. Its objective is to provide the investigative agency with
characteristics and traits of the unidentified offender.

In equivocal death, there is a known decedent, and information
is available about the deceased. The equivocal death analysis spe-
cifically focuses on determining the manner of death: homicide, sui-
cide or accident.

When the National Center provides these services to law enforce-
ment agencies, the only restriction imposed by the FBI on the use
of the report is that dissemination be limited to individuals or
agencies having a legitimate investigative or prosecutorial interest
in the matter.

I'd like to introduce two members of my staff to you, supervisory
special agents Richard L. Ault, Jr., Ph.D., and Robert R. Hazel-
wood. These individuals are staff and faculty members assigned to
the National Center. Normally, an individual case would be as-
signed to one supervisory special agent. In this particular case, be-
cause of the significance of the matter. Dr. Ault and Mr. Hazel-
wood were requested to conduct separate analyses and then jointly
provide an assessment.

With your permission, I would like to ask Dr. Ault to provide an
overview of the process of this specific analysis, following which we
would be happy to respond to any questions you may have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Daniels follows:]

Prepared Statement of Anthony E. Daniels, Assistant Director, Training
Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Good morning/afternoon ladies and gentlemen. I am Anthony E. Daniels of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). I am in charge of the FBI Training Division
which is located on the Marine Corps Base in Quantico, Virginia.

The training division is responsible for conducting and coordinating all training
for FBI personnel. It also provides training assistance, upon request, to local,
county, and State law enforcement personnel throughout the United States. In addi-
tion to providing investigative and operational support to the field, the training divi-
sion historically has functioned as an international forum for seeking and identify-
ing solutions to current and emerging problems facing the entire criminal justice
system.

In 1972, a new and modern academy complex consisting of 401 acres, 23 major
buildings, six firearms ranges and dormitory space was completed. The FBI Acade-
my personnel complement now consists of 127 special agents and 321 support and
wage grade employees.

To assist the academy staff in the continued development of quality training and
educational programs, the training division has maintained a formal affiliation with
the University of Virginia since 1972. In addition to providing course accreditation
and academic certification for instructor personnel, the University of Virginia pro-
vides technical and instructional resources.

Assignment as an FBI Academy faculty member requires 5 years' investigative
experience as a law enforcement officer. Depending on the nature of the instruction-
al or research responsibilities, selected staff members must also possess a graduate
degree or other unique professional preparation in specific academic disciplines.

In conjunction with the training division's nationwide efforts to address the vio-
lent crime issue, the National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime (NCAVC)
was established at the FBI Academy in July, 1984. The NCAVC is a law-enforce-
ment-oriented behavioral science and data processing center designed to consolidate

193

research, training, and investigative/operational support functions for the purpose
of providing expertise to law enforcement agencies confronted with unusual, bizarre
and/or repetitive violent crime.

Through the expertise of its staff of crime analysts, psychologists, sociologists,
criminologists, political scientists, computer scientists, and police specialists, the
Center brings a multidisciplined approach to a wide variety of investigative prob-
lems. The Center is an integral part of the FBI Academy at Quantico, Virginia, and
its members are adjunct faculty with the University of Virginia.

The educational and training activities of the Center includes courses, seminars,
symposia, and conferences, as well as a 10-month fellowship for police officers in
criminal investigative analysis. The courses and seminars are conducted at the FBI
Academy and at a variety of locations throughout North America; the fellowship,
conferences, and symposia take place at the FBI Academy.

Research activities include multidisciplinary studies in serial and violent crimes
such as homicide, rape, sexual sadism, child abduction, arson, and counterintelli-
gence matters. Joining in such research projects with the staff of the Center are
faculty from major universities, members of the mental health and medical profes-
sions, and other law enforcement representatives.

The Center provides investigative support to Federal, State, county, and city law
enforcement agencies through its Criminal Investigative Analysis Program (CIAP)
and the Violent Criminal Apprehension Program (VICAP). The CIAP provides this
support through consulting on major violent crimes, such as the Atlanta child mur-
ders, Tylenol poisonings, and the Green River serial murder case, constructing pro-
files of unidentified offenders, planning case investigative strategies, providing
expert testimony, and furnishing interview techniques. Additional support is provid-
ed through the use of indirect assessment in other selected cases.

Having outlined the goals and mission of the Academy and of the Center, let me
provide you with the insight and definitions that would be applicable in this matter.
As I indicated, the Center's research and assessment activities are provided in a
wide variety of cases including equivocal deaths. An equivocal death is a death
whose manner (i.e., homicide, suicide, or accident) has not been resolved through
normal investigative activities. Another aspect of our process is indirect personality
assessment, a behavioral oriented analysis of all available material about an indi-
vidual. This process is included in equivocal death evaluations.

It should be noted that an equivocal death analysis should not be confused with
another service provided by the National Center, that is, criminal personality profil-
ing, currently defined as "criminal investigative analysis." Criminal investigative
analysis is a process which would review and analyze, at the request of the law en-
forcement agency involved, crimes of violence in which the offender has not been
identified. The focus of criminal investigative analysis includes a review of the
crime scene photographs, autopsy report, and completed investigation conducted by
the submitting law enforcement agency. Its objective is to provide the investigative
agency with characteristics and traits of the unidentified offender. In an equivocal
death there is a known descendent and information is available about the deceased.
The equivocal death analysis specifically focuses on determining the manner of
death (i.e., homicide, suicide, or accident).

When the National Center provides these services to law enforcement agencies,
the only restriction imposed by the FBI on the use of the report is that dissemina-
tion be limited to individuals or agencies having a legitimate investigative or pros-
ecutorial interest in the matter.

I would like to introduce two members of my staff to you. Supervisory Special
Agents Richard L. Ault, Jr., Ph.D., and Robert R. Hazelwood. These individuals are
staff and faculty members assigned to the National Center. Normally, an individual
case would be assigned to one supervisory special agent. In this particular case, be-
cause of the significance of this matter. Dr. Ault and Mr. Hazelwood were requested
to conduct separate analyses and then jointly provide an assessment.

With your permission, I would like to ask Dr. Ault to provide an overview of the
process of this specific analysis.

STATEMENT OF RICHARD J. AULT, JR., Ph.D.

Dr. Ault. With your permission, I would like to just expand a
little bit on some of the remarks of Mr. Daniels and give you a
little history of the unit to lay the groundwork for what we do.

Our unit was established formally in 1972, as he said, and our
original purpose was teaching police officers and law enforcement

194

officers from around the world the concept of behavioral science as
it applies in a practical way to law enforcement investigations.

Needless to say, with police officers you sometimes get a skepti-
cal bunch, and what they started doing was asking us to apply
what we were teaching them to unsolved cases, usually bizarre
cases, and inevitably unsolved old cases.

We did well at it and as we began to grow with this business of
looking at how you applied behavioral sciences to a homicide inves-
tigation, to rape cases and so forth, we began doing something that
I think even today is very unusual in the behavioral science field.
We began looking at crime scenes and trying to describe the kind
of individual who might have done this sort of crime. That original-
ly was called profiling. That is what we did from 1975, when I got
there, and 1976 when Mr. Hazelwood got there.

We became very successful at it. At the same time, we started
research in those areas, particularly homicide— what we call serial
murders today — violent crimes like rape, arson, child molestation
and so forth. At the same time, we began moving into more and
more the limelight with this process we found that there was an-
other step that we had to take.

People would find out that we could do pretty well, that we
would match our profiles, as it were, to the crime scene very well,
that it appeared to be a good match in many cases, and it appeared
to be almost like a mystical process.

They assumed by our results that we knew what we were doing.
The next step, of course, was could we tell them, when they find a
suspect, about interviewing the suspect or about doing whatever
they had to do to get the suspect to talk, or how could we best talk
to this individual.

That process is indirect assessment; that is, taking information
about individuals without talking to them and applying that infor-
mation to learn as much as you can about the person; to see what
kind of individual they are, what makes them tick.

The process of equivocal death analysis— that is, looking at a
death to determine the manner, whether or not it was a suicide, an
accident or homicide — utilizes indirect assessment as well.

So what we began to do, then, was grow in that regard, and we
found that we were not only doing profiling but that we were doing
other things as well. Our unit is a fairly small unit, but anything
that revolved around unusual behavior came to us. Once the Na-
tional Center was opened, then we began to get even more of a
broad international picture of violence in all of its forms and as-
pects.

We apply our skills in teaching and in practical ways to things
as: hostage negotiations (we no longer do that now); hypnosis; coun-
seling; interpersonal violence such as rapes and child abuse; and
violent crimes, the serial murders I mentioned, kidnap, homicides,
poison deaths and equivocal deaths. We are also involved in both
consultation and research in crimes like arson, as Mr. Daniels
mentioned earlier. As he said, we also engage in the research. We
found early on that we just do not find in academia the research
that we need. The academic community does not have the depth
that we needed to provide us with answers that we must have

195

when we take this behavioral science and put it in a practical
format.

So we began to initiate our own research. With the orientation
that we had, we felt that a lot of our research was best applied
through the methodology of going into the prisons and talking to
the offenders themselves, obtaining the answers from them in a
practical way. We are not talking about a clinical application par-
ticularly. We are talking about practical things; how an individual
who kidnaps children can lure a child out of a shopping mall, these
sorts of things.

As a result, in addition to the arsons and the child molestation,
we got involved in research on assassinations, poisonings, sadistic
murders and so forth.

Our expertise is applied when other leads are finished. We are a
tool. We are a very small tool in the repertoire of a detective. We
are not detectives ourselves. We do not pretend to be. We are pro-
fessionals in the area of behavioral sciences. When they begin to
run out of other things to do, standard types of investigative tech-
niques, then they turn to us, so that when they have questions
about people that they need answered, when they have these kinds
of assessment processes that they need to do, they come to us.

The process is very simple by and large, if I may sort of divorce
myself from this business of profiling and talk about the assess-
ment job itself or the equivocal death analysis.

It is very simple. We work directly with whoever the investiga-
tors are. We sit down with them when it is at all possible, and we
usually insist that we do that. We view all the evidence that they
have to provide us, and then we form an overview. Once we have
formed an opinion and overview, then we will look back and see
what it takes to support it. We will go back to the formalities of
the paperwork, as it were.

We sometimes arrive at our conclusions by different roads, but
the interrater reliability of those roads is very high. We find that
we agree generally in most areas when we are doing these kinds of
analyses. We are not compelled to arrive at a conclusion; that is,
the idea is that the process of say, indirect assessment is a prob-
lem-oriented process. They have to come to us with some kind of a
problem to be resolved, "can you tell me if this death is a suicide,
homicide or an accident," or "can you tell me if this individual will
do such and such."

We are not required to give an answer to that question. If in the
course of our analysis of the evidence we see things that we do not
believe lead us in a direction that they are thinking of, we do not
mind saying that. We are disinterested observers. So if they are
asking, for example, "was it a death by suicide or by homicide" and
we see clearly in our opinion that it is an accident, then we will so
state.

The unit, as Mr. Daniels said, is made up of special agents who
have at least 5 years of experience and a minimum of a master's
degree in the subject that they teach.

Senator Cohen. Mr. Chairman, may I ask just one question for
clarification?

Chairman Nunn. Surely.

196

Senator Cohen. It is unclear to me. You are saying that the in-
vestigators come to you after they have exhausted their normal in-
vestigative techniques?

Dr. AuLT. Yes, sir.

Senator Cohen. Is that the case here? They come to you after
they have gone through their analysis and they are in doubt, or do
you work with them up front?

Dr. AuLT. We can do it anywhere along the way.

Generally speaking, though, they are pretty well through. Our
product requires forensic evidence. We have to have as much foren-
sic evidence as the investigation has developed. For example, in a
normal homicide, if there is such a thing, you would want to know
what the blood type was. You would want to know what the autop-
sy protocol reads and so forth. When I say toward the end of it, I
am saying that most of the leads that are normal or standard, have
been covered, and now they are looking for other directions. They
have run out of other leads.

Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, might I also just ask a prelimi-
nary question?

How do the criminal courts treat your work product? Is it evi-
dence? Is it opinion? In this instance, how did the Navy treat your
work product?

Dr. AuLT. Our product, as it says in there, is strictly opinion
based upon the expertise that we have acquired over the years of
doing this and our own backgrounds. We give opinions.

Chairman Nunn. Are you called on to testify in various criminal
proceedings?

Mr. Hazelwood. Yes, sir. I have testified in four murder trials as
an expert in violent death and equivocal death analysis.

Chairman Nunn. When you do testify, you have the attorney for
the State or whoever is using you go through your qualifications,
establish your credentials as an expert in this area, I assume, and
then you state your opinion as an expert witness?

Mr. Hazelwood. Yes, sir. We are also cross-examined by defense
attorneys, and the judge makes a ruling as to whether or not we
may testify as expert witnesses. In every instance where I have tes-
tified, I have been ruled an expert witness.

Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. AuLT. In this particular case we were contacted by the mem-
bers of the NIS, the investigators and one of the officers with the
Naval Investigative Service who asked that v/e take a look at the
evidence that they had and provide them with answers to some of
the questions that they posed, three of which included at that
time

Senator Cohen. Would you specify the time when you were first
contacted?

Dr. AuLT. Surely. The first time was May 23, 1989. The contact
was prior to that, but we had met with them the first time on May
23, 1989. The second time was June 2, 1989. The third time was
June 15, 1989.

Chairman Nunn. All right. Go ahead.

Dr. AuLT. Thank you.

During the course of that, we sat down with them and went over
all of the evidence that they had, which included the information

197

concerning the physical layout of the turret in which the explosion
occurred and the physical location of each man in the gun room,
letters v/ritten by GMG2 Clayton Hartwig and others, several
photos, copies of the writings by GMG2 Hartwig to one of his ship-
mates, the results of the interview with the family and associates
of the victim and Hartwig's personal history as well as activities
leading up to his death. Those were provided in the form of NIS
reports, transcripts from taped interviews, pictures, photographs
and so on.

Senator Dixon. May I make an inquiry at this point, Mr. Chair-
man?

Chairman Nunn. Certainly.

Senator Dixon. If I could clarify that. Dr. Ault. If I understand
what you are saying, from the moment of the Navy's intercession
with your bureau about this question, all of the information they
gave you, the exhibits which I understand to be some 25 statements
they made, and other things related to Mr. Hartwig. Is that true?

Dr. Ault. No, sir, not all Mr. Hartwig. We had some related to
Mr. Truitt as well.

Senator Dixon. Truitt and Hartwig?

Dr. Ault. Truitt and Hartwig; I believe so.

Senator Dixon. So from the inception here of the relationship
with the Naval Investigation Team, you understood that their in-
quiry directed its attention to those individual players?

Dr. Ault. We were told originally that they had ruled out acci-
dent as a cause of death.

Senator Dixon. You were told they had already ruled out acci-
dent?

Dr. Ault. Yes, sir.

Senator Dixon. May I follow up with one more question, if the
Chair will indulge me?

I do not at all question your qualifications or those of Mr. Hazel-
wood and others, which are clearly established, but as an old trial
lawyer I feel compelled to ask you, is it not a fact that you do not
make the fmal decision, the jury makes the final decision about the
facts and determines guilt, innocence and other things? You
present your expertise about various questions relating to the sub-
ject matter upon which you have that special qualification?

Dr. Ault. This is an opinion, yes. That is just what we have said,
yes, sir.

Senator Warner. Now Mr. Chairman, the Navy in no way re-
stricted you from pursuing another avenue of thought or hypothe-
sis?

Dr. Ault. As I said earlier, sir, we are not compelled to parrot
what the Navy may want us to parrot.

Senator Warner. You had a free hand in taking the facts that
were provided you and making such conclusions and opinions as
you wished?

Dr. Ault. Absolutely, yes, sir.

Chairman Nunn. I suggest we go ahead and let him complete his
presentation. I believe he will have some of these questions an-
swered. Then we will come back.

Dr. Ault. Let me just go ahead and finish this.

198

As I said, we looked at the case. They had three concerns. We, of
course, addressed those concerns first. The first was whether it was
a possibility of homicide by one of his shipmates. The second was
the potential for a suicide/ homicide, and the third was, of course, a
suicide by Mr. Hartwig.

We eliminated the first two. There is a complete report, as I un-
derstand, of our opinion in front of you that goes into those rea-
sons. We concentrated on the third because we were told that there
was no accident involved.

One of the first things that we do in this equivocal death analy-
sis is pay attention to the forensic evidence. It is a maxim for us
that we do not run in the face of that evidence. Then we begin to
concentrate on Mr. Hartwig.

Looking at his "picture," looking at everything that we could
find about him and taking from that and painting a "portrait," as
it were, of him the way we see him based on the material that was
presented to us. Mr. Hazelwood has a summary that is based on
the report that you have in front of you. I would like to have him
read from that. Perhaps that will lay some of the background for
you and state some of the reasons why we have arrived at our opin-
ion.

Chairman Nunn. Fine. Thank you. Mr. Hazelwood.

STATEMENT OF ROBERT R. HAZELWOOD

Mr. Hazelwood. The victim and 46 other men died as a result of
the explosion, which occurred, as you know, in turret number 2
aboard the U.S.S. Iowa. The naval authorities, when they came to
us, had ruled out the possibility of this being an accidental explo-
sion, and we proceeded with that point in mind.

And again, as Dr. Ault has stated, we tried to determine, number
one, whether or not this was a homicide on the part of one of
Hartwig's shipmates; number two, whether this was a suicide and
homicide attempt by Hartwig; and finally, whether it was a suicide
on the part of Hartwig.

It was our opinion that the least likely scenario involved a ship-
mate in a homicide directed at Hartwig. We felt that was the least
likely scenario.

The second scenario involved Hartwig, with the secondary goal of
killing his shipmates. We felt it was immaterial as to whether or
not he intended to kill anyone else, he did in fact kill other people,
in our opinion.

So, therefore, what we had to address was, did he intend to kill
himself with the explosion, and if so, why?

We arrived at the conclusion that he did.

I have the summary of the victimology of the person involved,
Hartwig, if you would like for me to go into that.

Chairman Nunn. I think so, yes.

Mr. Hazelwood. The victim, Clayton Hartwig, was a 24-year-old
single white male, who was a 6-year veteran of the U.S. Navy, who
had attained the rank of Gunnersmate Second Class. He was as-
signed as a gun captain in turret number two aboard the U.S.S.
Iowa at the time of his death.

199

He was the youngest of three children, born 12 years after the
second child. Both of his siblings were female. One of his sisters re-
ported that during his childhood he spent the majority of his time
in his room, and was considered to be a loner with no friends, and
was largely estranged from other family members.

He was non-athletic and preferred solitary pastimes. She stated
that she had never known him to lose his temper, and that over
the years, as a youngster, he had accumulated a knife collection —
combat-style knives — a somewhat smaller gun collection, and a
large number of Soldier of Fortune and other adventure-type maga-
zines.

He also owned many books on World War II and warships. He
had no steady girlfriends. And from the information available, it
appears as though he was asexual in his developmental years.

While in the 11th grade at a private school, he formed his first
close friendship with a male who was in the 9th grade. This friend
purportedly took a knife from Hartwig, who was making a suicidal
gesture with the weapon. Hartwig considered that this action had
saved his life, and for that he owed a great deal to his friend.

He wrote a will leaving all of his earthly goods to the friend,
which was found by NIS agents. Naval Investigative Service
agents, subsequent to Hartwig's death, in one of his Bibles in his
room in his parent's home.

After joining the Navy, Hartwig gave $200 a month to his high
school friend for approximately IVa years. He ceased giving that
money to — it was on a monthly allotment form — he ceased giving
that money to his friend when the friend advised him that he had
sexual relations with a young female who was a mutual acquaint-
ance of theirs. Hartwig reportedly took the news very badly, and
stopped giving the money to that individual.

After graduating from high school, he joined the Navy. As a
young adult he was reticent in close personal relationships with
either men or women, preferring to utilize letters and notes for in-
timate communication.

He would correspond with those people he liked and considered
to be friends. His letters reflect a great deal of egocentricity, and
he described himself as being shy.

While in the Navy, he was described as not sufficiently aggres-
sive to be a good leader, immature, and lacking in other leadership
skills. He had low self-esteem and was unable to verbally express
his emotions.

At the time of his death he had a total of $34 in the bank, very
few civilian clothes, and a poorly maintained vehicle.

While in the Navy he developed only two close friends, one
whom he knew while at Guantanamo Bay from 1984 till 1986, and
the other with whom he served aboard the U.S.S. Iowa.

In January 1988, Hartwig took out a $50,000 double-indemnity,
life insurance policy and named his friend aboard the Iowa as the
beneficiary. That policy was in effect at the time of Hartwig's
death.

This friend married in December 1988 and Hartwig was reported
to be deeply depressed as a result of that marriage. Hartwig stated
in his letters, and interviews with others aboard the Iowa after the
explosion confirmed the fact that he and his friend ceased all com-

200

munication with one another, other than Hartwig giving orders in
the line of duty. However, he did not cancel the life insurance
policy.

He was due to reenlist or be discharged from the Navy in late
1989, but had not indicated his intentions to the personnel respon-
sible for reenlistment.

He was a shy, lonely individual who lived a fantasy life of power
and authority far different from the reality of his actual life. He
was much more adept at communicating with people via the writ-
ten word than in person, and was not known to have been involved
in an intimate way with any of his female associates.

We arrived at the following conclusions: that he was a loner, and
that can be documented by several statements. Even though he
wrote letters to other women, he had only three close female ac-
quaintances. He was dissatisfied with his life as he lived it.

We believe that he had good reasons for not returning from the
cruise aboard the Iowa in May 1989. We believe that he had good
reasons in his own mind for damaging and potentially sinking the
U.S.S. Iowa. We believe that he had a history of immature reac-
tions to change in his life and interpersonal problems.

He was also known to carry a grudge against those whom he be-
lieved wronged him. We believe that he was experiencing a
number of stressors at the time of his death. And we believe that
Hartwig had suicidal ideation.

Finally, we believe that GMG2 Hartwig possessed the knowledge,
ability and opportunity to cause the explosion that occurred aboard
the U.S.S. Iowa.

It is our final opinion that he did in fact commit suicide and
hoped that his death would appear to be an accident.

Chairman Nunn. Thank you, Mr. Hazelwood.

Let me lead off here. In coming to your conclusions, you state
that he had reasons or motives, I am not sure of the exact words,
for sinking the U.S.S. Iowa.

That is sort of the bottom motivation. But in your recitation of
facts I did not hear facts that linked up to that conclusion.

Mr. Hazelwood. Yes, sir, we have that right here.

Chairman Nunn. What do you base that on?

Mr. Hazelwood. Okay, sir, if I may have 1 minute to find it
right here.

Chairman Nunn. What do you base his suicidal

Mr. Hazelwood. Ideation?

Chairman Nunn. Yes.

Mr. Hazelwood. All right, sir. Suicidal ideation, first of all, he
had made a suicidal gesture at the age of 17 or 18, and he had dis-
cussed suicide

Chairman Nunn. How old was he at the time of death?

Dr. AuLT. Twenty-four.

Mr. Hazelwood. Twenty-four years of age.

Chairman Nunn. All right, this was 7 years before?

Dr. AuLT. Yes, sir.

Mr. Hazelwood. Yes, sir.

Dr. AuLT. From our perspective, however, that is given a lot of
weight. The fact that he was thinking even back then or even
toying with it, however lightly, is very important.

201

Mr. Hazelwood. He also discussed suicide with a sailor named
Truitt and a sailor named Smith aboard the U.S.S. Iowa.

Second, approximately 1 week prior to tiis death he discussed sui-
cide and various methods to commit suicide with David Smith.
That can be found in the interview of May 28, 1989.

Third, a female acquaintance of his advised that the last letter
she received from Hartwig closed with, "Love always and forever,
Clayton." He had previously closed his letters with simply, "Clay."

He also specifically told her in that letter, "I am sorry I did not
take you home to meet my mother." Also, in an interview with
Kendall Truitt, Truitt stated that when Hartwig discussed killing,
he talked in terms of extreme violence, with total annihilation and
mutilation.

When asked by a shipmate what his goals in life were, Hartwig
told him that his goal in life was to be a petty officer in the Navy
and that he had achieved that goal. Having achieved his final life
goal he apparently could not envision a future for himself.

On May 22, 1989 another female acquaintance, a casual friend,
advised she had met Hartwig approximately 4 years previously,
and they had exchanged three or four letters, but had not been in
touch in the past year. A few days after the explosion, she unex-
pectedly received a letter from Hartwig, and remembers that he
"did seem down," and that he "did not talk about his future, which
he normally did."

She remarked how funny it was that he had waited so long to
write, and the letter arrived after his death. We know that it is not
uncommon for individuals who commit suicide to communicate
with people they have not communicated with in some time.

Another female acquaintance provided a letter from Hartwig
dated April 8, 1989, which stated in part, "I do not think the 1,200
men that went down on the U.S.S. Arizona were hiding," she had
stated in the letter he should quit hiding in the U.S. Navy. He goes
on to say, "or the 37 sailors that were killed on the U.S.S. Stark in
the Persian Gulf in 1986! I could become one of those little white
headstones in Arlington National Cemetery any day! Damn, I am
sorry I went off on you like that, I guess I was venting my anger on
you."

One of his sisters advised on May 10, 1989 that durmg the
summer of 1988 he visited home and brought some explosives from
his ship. During that visit he told the family that he was assigned
to the safest place on the ship from attack from the outside. He
stated, however, that if an accident occurred inside, no one would
live to tell the story.

This same sister advised that after Hartwig's death, she went to
his room and found in his typewriter a list of men permanently as-
signed to the gun turret. She believed he had typed that list while
at home on leave in December 1988, and thought this was strange.

It was noted, by the way, that this was a list of the members per-
manently assigned to that gun turret. And he had left it in his
typewriter at Christmas, his last visit home.

Another male acquaintance advised on May 28, 1989 that he and
Hartwig had discussed death aboard ship.

The male friend stated, "We came to the conclusion that the
quickest way we had ever seen anybody die, by explosion. He just

202

said he imagined that he would not feel a thing and he would
never know it. He said he kind of knew what I was going through
because he had tried to commit suicide at one time.

"So we kept talking and talking, and when he confided in me
that some — you know, he still thinks about it some time. The last
couple of — you know, up until the last day he was fine, he was just
quiet. He looked tired, he looked exhausted. He just looked like he
was tired. He told me that he had problems, but he would not ex-
actly state what his problems were."

Another instance, a chief petty officer discovered a piece of paper
captioned "Disposable heroes" in the sleeping area occupied by
Hart wig, Truitt, and others. The author and the date written are
unknown, yet the contents make it worthy of note, because wheth-
er or not it was written by Hartwig, it is quite likely that he saw it.

"Sailor boy, made of clay, now an empty shell, finished here.
Greetings, death, you coward, you servant, you patriot," under-
lined, "more death means another crew."

During home leave during Christmas 1988, he behaved much dif-
ferently than he had before. He was reportedly much more relaxed
and more outgoing than usual. Before he returned to his ship he
left a note to his parents on the bed in which he told them how
much he had loved them, an action that was described by his sister
as being unique.

In another situation, he discussed the subject of suicide with yet
another individual, who stated, "Hartwig appeared to have suicidal
tendencies because he had discussed that the easiest method to kill
himself would be an explosion."

By the way, the individual making that report also attempted
suicide himself in the past.

Another one of his shipmates indicate that death was a frequent-
ly discussed topic by Hartwig. He had checked out a book, "A
Glamorous Way to Die: The Kamikaze Mission of the Battleship
Yamoto," and stated that the Yamoto was on a suicide mission
that resulted in the death of more than 2,500 crewmen. That is
from an interview conducted on June 10, 1989.

That is not the first indication of his fascination with ship disas-
ters. Further documentation of this was revealed by the discovery
of a photo album by NTS agents in Hartwig's room at his parents'
home on June 7, 1989. That album, contained nothing but newspa-
per clippings reporting on various ship disasters during the period
1979 to 1980.

Hartwig also told a shipmate he wanted to die in the line of duty
and be buried in Arlington Cemetery. Those, sir, are our reasons
for arriving at the idea of suicidal ideation.

Dr. AuLT. Those are just a few of the reasons.

Mr. Hazelwood. There are more which we can go through.

Dr. AuLT. To preface this just a bit, this report is composed of
things that we pulled out that supported the overall opinion. These
items do not in and of themselves comprise the whole package.
There is more there in the interviews, in his writings and every-
thing else. We could have gone on for quite a while.

Chairman Nunn. These are the highlights, though?

Dr. AuLT. Yes, sir.

203

Mr. Hazelwood. You asked about why he had reason not to be
aboard this ship when it left, I believe, Senator Nunn. Reason for
damaging this ship, I'm sorry.

Chairman Nunn. I'd like to know the reason for damaging the
ship. That was one of the conclusions.

Dr. AuLT. He, according to one shipmate, had referred to the
ship as a damned pig; disliked intensely his previous captain, ap-
parently; had been the object of ridicule and rejection aboard that
ship by many of his shipmates who knew him; and had at one time
been the subject of a captain's mast.

One other interview subsequent to the time that we wrote this
report with a shipmate indicated that he and his shipmate had a
tremendously negative outlook toward the Iowa. Those would be a
few of the reasons.

Chairman Nunn. Did you compare that to the other people on
board the ship? Is there any young sailor on a ship that doesn't at
some time or other say something derogatory about the ship?

Dr. AuLT. Pardon?

Chairman Nunn. Did you compare it to anybody else?

Dr. AuLT. If I may, one of the things that we're looking at here
that has come up time and again in talking with your staffers is
the fact that it is perfectly normal, having been a serviceman
myself, to grouse about the particular unit that I'm established
with. It's perfectly normal for some people to have a gun collection
or a knife collection. It's perfectly normal to write some of the
things that he wrote. All of those things are things that you see in
other people.

What we are looking for in terms of the overall picture of some-
body's disposition or predisposition towards a suicide or homicide is
sort of a macro view of this individual's personality.

There are a lot of normal things in the world. The example that
I used which I may modify for the purpose of this hearing is sort of
like Ault's ship personality theory.

If you take a bridge— a bridge in the Navy is a fairly normal
thing to see. There are bridges on your carriers and on your battle-
ships and so forth. If you took a bridge and put it aboard a destroy-
er escort from the Iowa and mounted it on the destroyer escort— if
one took a 16-inch gun off the Iowa and put it on the destroyer
escort, they would both be normal weapons, but they would be to-
tally out of place on that particular type of ship.

And so, when we look at the picture, what we are concentrating
on, sir, is the bits and pieces. We are taking this as a whole. It is a
gestalt, if you like, the whole picture.

Chairman Nunn. Let me ask one other question and I will defer
to my colleagues.

How did you go about ruling out murder? I believe when the
Navy first approached you, they had received evidence of the exist-
ence of an insurance policy on the life of Hartwig in which he had
established another sailor as a beneficiary. I believe that was one
of the reasons that the Navy came to see you, and they ruled out
accidental causes. How did you go about ruling out murder?

Dr. AuLT. At the time the motive given for the murder was obvi-
ously money. There may have been others. They were not speaking

204

to one another. These two individuals were afraid of one another,
and so forth.

It has been our experience, certainly, in certain types of individ-
uals who are motivated, ideologically, or whatever, do not much
care about their own lives as long as the objective is met, but that
the individual in this case who was suspected of the homicide is not
that type of person.

If he is the type of individual who is going to — as someone who is
monetarily motivated, he is generally going to be more inclined to
look out for his own safety. You know, why kill somebody for the
money if you are going to go with them, and so partially on the
basis — in fact, predominantly on the basis of the fact that it just
does not fit with human nature, unless he were psychotic, and we
do not have any evidence that this shipmate was psychotic. I do not
think he killed Hartwig.

Mr. Hazelwood. Just to elaborate on it for a moment, that indi-
vidual who was suspected of homicide was located, I believe, five
stories below where the explosion took place in the powder maga-
zine which would be, in my opinion, the most unimaginable place
to be if you are going to set off an explosion above you. So we took
that into consideration.

There are much simpler ways to kill aboard ship — throw the in-
dividual overboard. There are much safer ways than to set off an
explosion while being in the powder magazine.

Chairman Nunn. Let me ask one other broad question without
getting into the detail, but to get the background of this. When Ad-
miral Milligan did his report, he based his most controversial opin-
ions— namely that the explosion was the result of a wrongful inten-
tional death and that Hartwig most probably committed that act —
on several facts. He labels them facts — and I will not recite them
all — one relates to turret personnel not taking emergency action
such as activating the sprinkler system.

GMG2 Hartwig was the center gun gun captain, whose job was to
control the ramming action, to insert a lead foil. The turret II
equivalent was operating properly. All possible accidental causes
ruled out. It goes on to list about seven different "facts." Then he
lists as a part of that list the FBI's equivocal death analysis con-
cluded that Clayton Hartwig died as a result of his own actions,
"staging his death in such a fashion that he hoped it would appear
to be an accident."

Do you believe it is proper to list your equivocal death analysis,
which was your conclusion and your opinion, as you testified, as a
fact?

Dr. AuLT. Its existence is a fact. The opinion itself is just that, it
is an opinion.

Mr. Hazelwood. We had no problem with his listing it as part of
the reasoning, his reasoning process for arriving at his conclusion.
We do not believe it was improperly utilized.

Chairman Nunn. Did you go back over and try to determine if
the Navy was correct in ruling out accident?

Mr. Hazelwood. No, sir, we did not. We do not have expertise in
that area.

Chairman Nunn. So that was strictly their assumption that you
used?

205

Dr. AuLT. Yes, sir.

Chairman Nunn. If they had not given you that assumption, if
accident had been a possibiUty, how would you have changed your
own analysis?

Mr. Hazelwood. Well, to begin with, sir, we would have referred
this case to scientific personnel rather than ourselves as far as
looking at it as an accidental explosion.

Chairman Nunn. In other words, if they had not ruled that acci-
dent, you would not have taken the case at all?

Mr. Hazelwood. No, sir, we did not say that. I said we would
have referred the accidental nature of it to experts; that is, explo-
sives experts, powder load experts, and we would have at least con-
sulted with those individuals, yes, sir.

Dr. AuLT. In the area of conjecture, if they had ruled that it were
accident, in fact, obviously the forensic evidence would have had to
support that and we would not have done anything. If they had not
ruled out that it was not an accident in terms of procedure, we
may well have looked at it to see if we could determine whether or
not this individual was suicidal for them should they desire that
question answered.

Remember, I had mentioned earlier, this is a problem-oriented
process. We will still be happy to answer the questions they may
have.

Chairman Nunn. What I am asking, is if they had not ruled out
accident, could you have come to your conclusion?

Dr. AuLT. If they had not ruled out it was an accident, but had
not sustained that it was, in fact, an accident?

Chairman Nunn. If they had come to you and said we have got
four possibilities— accident, murder, suicide, suicide-murder— if ac-
cident had been in that list instead of murder, suicide, suicide-
murder, could you have come to a similar conclusion?

Dr. AuLT. I would have, yes.

Mr. Hazelwood. Yes.

Dr. AuLT. Looking at this gentleman in his entirety, I would
have leaned in the direction of suicide had all four probabilities in
some "best world" been equally probable.

Chairman Nunn. Senator Warner.

Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First a follow-up to
my earlier questioning. I think it is incumbent on the committee to
determine just exactly how the Navy treated this opinion and the
extent to which they accorded weight to it in its ultimate finding,
because I have read through the documents, as has the Chair and
others, and it is not altogether clear.

This individual rose through the ranks and became a second
class petty officer. That requires a certain amount of skill, knowl-
edge, and leadership. It is not automatic. I have had some modest
experience in gun turrets, and it takes a pretty tough individual to
sit down in there, particularly a 16-inch gun turret when those

guns fire. . ^ , , , .

I see your points. I carefully listened to your points, but what
about the other side of the scale? You obviously weighed this indi-
vidual as a human being. You have given us what I would charac-
terize as those factors which largely are negative, that tilt the
scales to reach your opinion.

206

What was on the other side? Again, he had been in the Navy
sometime. He had achieved rank, was made a gun captain. It was
not totally tilted one way. There must have been some facts on the
other side. What were those facts showing — possibly that he was a
normal sailor?

Dr. AuLT. Sir, at one point I asked the investigating officers if
they had any mitigating circumstances, interviews, anything at all
that would show that this guy had been a happy camper.

Senator Warner. What? Happy what?

Dr. AuLT. Camper. Sorry, it is a slang term. We desired some-
thing to show that the facts about the individual which we had in
front of us were somehow mitigated. They said no.

We did check a couple of things. For example, if you will exam-
ine the pictures in his room, you will see that he has a stack of
Bibles there in his bookshelf. That is very important, obviously, to
explore, and we explored it.

It would have been nice to report that once he was in the Navy
that he had both faithfully attended services and that he was
active in a church somewhere and so forth to offset some of this,
but they could not even do that.

The subsequent investigation apparently showed that he just was
not

Mr. Hazelwood. He also wrote to Kendall Truitt that he was
able to hide his hurt and his anguish inside. He was able to project
another self to those about him.

Yesterday, I took the opportunity to go over 21 different inter-
views.

Senator Warner. Twenty-one out of how many?

Of the bulk of evidence in this case, what percentage of it did
you examine as it relates to Hartwig to reach your determination?
Can you quantify that?

I am told there are hundreds of interviews. What percentage of
them did you look through?

Dr. AuLT. We could not quantify it, sir. Enough to know that we
feel very confident in our opinion.

Senator Warner. Well, there is no doubt that you are solid in
your opinion. It is there, it is clear, it is all in writing. But I am
just trying to establish what was on the other side of the scales be-
cause if it was so one-sided, I am concerned that the Navy did not
spot this individual.

I mean, a gun turret team can become quite personal. The men
who are in it get to know each other in a manner that is quite
close.

Dr. AuLT. The concepts of suicide, I think, are inexplicable. If we
knew more about it, obviously, we would be better off.

Senator Warner. In other words, you found in all this evidence
really very little or an inconsequential amount to indicate he was a
normal human being?

Dr. AuLT. No, sir, I would not put it that way at all. We found
very little evidence to indicate in favor of his not committing sui-
cide.

Normalcy is not a term we would use here. A lot of the stuff that
goes into his makeup is normal.

207

Suicide, like I said, is a funny thing. You do not know when
somebody is going to do themselves in.

Senator Warner. Let me just proceed again to this particular
document dated June 16, 1989, entitled Hartwig, which was pre-
pared presumably by you, although it does not have it on the thing.

An5rway, it says, "This analysis contains information of a confi-
dential nature and it should not be disseminated except to individ-
uals or agencies having a legitimate investigative and prosecutorial
interest."

What is the restriction on the dissemination of this material or
inclusion of it in our report? Have you worked that out with our

staff?

Dr. AuLT. We have. The problem is, it contains a great deal of
third party information that we did not collect. The names and so
forth in there from our agency's view should be protected.

Senator Warner. Is there any material in here which led to your
conclusion that ought to be eliminated from our public record?

Dr. AuLT. I am not sure I understand the question.

Senator Warner. You have reached an opinion. Are any of the
facts on which you base your opinion to be eliminated from our
record in order to protect other people?

Dr. AuLT. Just the mention of third parties I think, sir.

Senator Warner. What is the involvement of Truitt in this case?
He is the beneficiary of life insurance. I fmd it very puzzling that
Hartwig had family and sisters and that he left his policy to an-
other individual.

Dr. AuLT. I am sorry, sir, we precluded Truitt early in the analy-
sis. The only question that arose with him was concerning the po-
tential for homicide. We just ignored him after that.

Senator Warner. What about Hartwig's giving an insurance
policy to Truitt?

Dr. AuLT. Personally I fmd it to be a little strange, but I under-
stand that that was a common thing to do among shipmates back
in the Navy during World War II.

Mr. Hazelwood. Hartwig also had written an earlier will leavmg
everything to another individual that he met at the military acade-
my. That was a handwritten will.

He also gave a $200 monthly allotment to another individual.
This, I think, is in keeping with his personality.

Senator Warner. Does this then indicate he was somewhat alien-
ated from his family, who would be the logical beneficiaries of his
property?

Dr. AuLT. I would say so.

If you are looking at a macro view, it shows several things.
Again, a certain amount of immaturity. He forms these friendships
and immediately goes overboard to solidify the friendships. He s
not leaving his family a thing.

Senator Warner. You mentioned an interview, I think, with one
sister. There are two, are there not?

Dr. AuLT. Yes, sir.

Senator Warner. Did you talk to the other sister?

Mr. Hazelwood. We did not talk to anyone, sir.

Senator Warner. Did you read the transcript of her interview.'

208

Dr. AuLT. I do not even know what her name is. I do not beUeve
we did.

Senator Warner. In other words, was there any difference of
perspective among the family members' statements that you re-
viewed?

Dr. AuLT. The family members, from the information that we
gathered, the family members seemed to be fairly united in their
opinions.

Senator Warner. And what was their opinion?

Dr. AuLT. Concerning Hartwig, sir?

Senator Warner. Yes.

Dr. AuLT. There were a lot of things. One, that he was a
loner

Senator Warner. Well, do not repeat anything you have gone
through. You have got it all in the record.

Dr. AuLT. That his behavior was different, that he was a differ-
ent fellow, I think, overall.

Senator Warner. They are not experts, but did they indicate
they felt he might have had suicidal tendencies?

Dr. AuLT. We did not see any of that in there, no, sir. Not in the
reports we received.

Senator Warner. Did you wish to add something, Mr. Daniels?

Mr. Daniels. No, sir.

Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Nunn. Senator Dixon.

Senator Dixon. Dr. Ault and Mr. Hazelwood, my understanding
of this is that the information that you had in the form of exhibits,
statements and other things was given to you by the NIS, the
naval investigative team. You did not develop those yourself?

Dr. Ault. No, sir.

Senator Dixon. The FBI did not gather this information. It was
given to you by the naval investigative team, is that correct?

Dr. Ault. Yes, sir.

Senator Dixon. My second understanding is that you did not re-
ceive, as we have seen some of it, the raw interrogations of individ-
uals with the questions and answers, that you were given a subjec-
tive analysis of that by the naval investigative team, is that cor-
rect?

Dr. Ault. No, sir. We received transcripts and heard tape record-
ed interviews in several cases.

Senator Dixon. In most cases did you receive subjective analysis?

Dr. Ault. In most cases, no. It was their report, our equivalent of
what we call a 302, was ostensibly a related interview. I do not be-
lieve they analyze it in any respect. All they do is relate in written
format the results of their interview.

Senator Dixon. I see. Now, I am told there were 267 exhibits
which I hold in my hand. I am told that your analysis involved 25.

Dr. Ault. Twenty-five exhibits?

Senator Dixon. Twenty-five separate interviews.

Dr. Ault. There were probably more than 25, sir. There were
some done a couple of times, and so on, plus photographs and
others.

Mr. Hazelwood. Plus letters and writings of Hartwig.

209

Dr. AuLT. There were other things that they brought down with
them that we did not copy and that we just simply looked at and
gave back to them.

Senator Dixon. But, in any event, what they gave you was what
the Navy gave you. That is what you dealt with?

Dr. AuLT. Yes, sir. We did not do our own investigation.

Senator Dixon. And it is clear, I think, that the Navy did not
give you everything. My information is that there were at least 267
exhibits. You had nothing like that number that you dealt with.

Mr. Hazelwood. But, sir, the question I would respond with is
how many of those exhibits dealt with the explosion itself rather
than the behavior of the decedent.

Senator Dixon. I am not prepared to go into that yet, but I think
I am correct in my statement about the circumstances.

Dr. AuLT. At the time of the interview, though, we were assured
that what we had was what they had in essence. They were doing
interviews even as we conducted our session, but we had most of
what they had.

Senator Dixon. And all of you have testified in support of the
statement that I have in writing from the FBI. I asked after the
first hearing that the Navy ask the FBI to determine whether the
Iowa incident was an accident or not or did the Navy ask the FBI
to determine whether Hartwig or Truitt was responsible. What ex-
actly was the charge to the FBI?

The Navy answered that the FBI at the National Center for
Analysis of Violent Crime, Quantico, was not asked to determine
whether the Iowa incident was an accident — was not asked that.

The FBI was advised that no accidental cause for the accident
had been discovered at the time the FBI assistance was requested.

The Naval Investigative Service did not ask the FBI to determine
whether Hartwig or Truitt was responsible after the FBI was
briefed on the investigation. They were asked to provide some in-
sight into Hartwig' s personality.

The FBI was asked to provide a profile of Hartwig and to deter-
mine if Hartwig was capable of committing such an act. That is the
answer I received in writing from the FBI. Is that substantially re-
sponsive?

Mr. Hazelwood. Yes, sir, with the exception of the word profile.
This is not a profile as we clarified it at the beginning. This is an
evaluation.

Senator Dixon. Have you ever seen the poem "Disposable
Heroes" that you referred to?

Mr. Hazelwood. Yes, sir.

Senator Dixon. Is it in your possession?

Dr. AuLT. A copy of it is.

Senator Dixon. Is it in handwriting?

Dr. AuLT. Part of it.

Senator Dixon. Have you analyzed the handwriting in your FBI
analysis laboratory to determine who wrote the poem?

Dr. AuLT. No, sir, we did not do any of the investigation at all.
That would have been the Navy.
Senator Dixon. Has anybody?

210

Mr. Hazelwood. I believe, yes, sir. I believe that the NIS had
their experts look at it and were unable to determine whether it
was Hartwig's handwriting or not.

Senator Dixon. Well, surely the FBI could make that determina-
tion, you know, that there is evidence here that another person
who was tragically killed in that tragic accident was known by ev-
eryone in the crew to be a fellow who assiduously worked at writ-
ing poems all the time, and it is the general view of the people in
the crew that "Disposable Heroes" was not the handiwork of
Hartwig at all, but another member of the crew.

Mr. Hazelwood. As we said in our reports here, whether or not
he wrote it really had no bearing on the fact. The point was that
he did have the potential of seeing it because it was posted in the
area where he slept?

Senator Dixon. It was posted in an area where he slept?

Mr. Hazelwood. In the area where he, Truitt and the others
slept.

Senator Dixon. How many slept there?

Mr. Hazelwood. I do not know, sir.

Senator Dixon. Well, how many who were killed slept there?

Mr. Hazelwood. I do not know that, sir.

Senator Dixon. Forty-seven were killed. Some slept there.

Mr. Hazelwood. I do not know how many, sir.

Dr. AuLT. My understanding was that that particular sleeping
area was where they bunked that watch or the majority of the
folks there.

Senator Dixon. In the information that you received — you under-
stand, I am not being critical of your analysis of what you got — did
you receive information we have that, Mr. Hartwig on the occasion
of the accident was not even assigned to that post?

Mr. Hazelwood. Yes, sir.

Senator Dixon. You have that?

Dr. AuLT. We received that.

Senator Dixon. Do you have the information concerning his dis-
cussions that night prior to the occurrence with others about his
plans for vacation, his hopes to go to London to enjoy recreational
opportunities there and other things? You had that?

Mr. Hazelwood. Yes, sir. We heard that. We have never seen
any reports on it.

Senator Dixon. And David Smith, who you mentioned, specifical-
ly, Mr. Hazelwood, in your expression of your opinion on the sub-
ject matter, you, of course, know that he has recanted substantial
amounts of his testimony.

Mr. Hazelwood. It is my understanding he has recanted a por-
tion of his testimony, yes.

Senator Dixon. Did you ever subject Mr. Smith to a polygraph?

Mr. Hazelwood. We did not conduct any investigation whatso-
ever, sir, no.

Senator Dixon. Now, it is a correct characterization of what
transpired that the FBI for whom I have the firmest respect as a
fine investigative agency actually itself talked to nobody?

Mr. Hazelwood. That is correct.

Senator Dixon. Interviewed nobody, analyzed no fingerprints,
analyzed no writing, handwriting, otherwise did any investigation

211

concerning the potential for volatility in that situation, an acci-
dent, an explosion, friction which can cause an explosion and has,
we think, by the evidence and other occurrence in the past, a varie-
ty of things, none of that was done?

Mr. Hazelwood. We do not do that type of investigation in this
type of request, sir.

Senator Dixon. You took, as you probably should, what the Navy
investigative team gave you with the understanding at the time
that all of this documentation was handed to you, that the Navy
had excluded by its own careful evaluation and investigation the
possibility of any accident of any kind, leaving you with three al-
ternatives, murder, suicide, and I do not remember the other one
right now, and analyzed on the basis of that?

Dr. AuLT. They did not leave us with three alternatives here. We
are not compelled by anybody's questions to answer just those ques-
tions.

Senator Dixon. But they asked those two questions?

Dr. AuLT. They asked those two questions, yes.

Mr. Hazelwood. If we felt there was not sufficient information,
we would have gone back and said there is not sufficient informa-
tion to arrive at a conclusion of any one of the three.

Senator Dixon. Now, I am not sure who it was that said it, but I
think, Mr. Hazelwood, it was you that suggested that the relation-
ship, in the view of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, on the
basis of the information they had from the naval investigative
team, between Truitt and Hartwig had soured?

Mr. Hazelwood. Yes, sir.

Senator Dixon. For how long a period of time had that been the
case?

Mr. Hazelwood. That was, what, 6 to 9 months, I believe. Ever
since his marriage. Ever since Kendall Truitt's marriage.

Dr. AuLT. Just before the first of the year of the accident.

Mr. Hazelwood. Yes, that is right. He got married in December
of 1988, yes, sir.

Senator Dixon. So, for a year?

Mr. Hazelwood. No, sir. From about AV2 months.

Dr. AuLT. December through April.

Senator Dixon. So a period of some months had transpired since
the relationship had soured. I think to the extent that one of you
indicated, perhaps you, Mr. Hazelwood, that the attitude was so
hostile that their conversations consisted solely of what was done
in the line of duty aboard the ship?

Mr. Hazelwood. That is what Hartwig wrote himself, yes, sir.

Senator Dixon. It had deteriorated to that extent?

Dr. AuLT. Yes, sir.

Mr. Hazelwood. That is what Hartwig wrote, yes, sir.

Senator Dixon. Would you characterize that as a hostile situa-
tion that existed between the two?

Dr. AuLT. There was more evidence to show that it was even
more hostile than that, according to some of the other reports from
other shipmates, but, yes, sir, that was hostile.

Senator Dixon. And Truitt was not present where Hartwig was
in that gun turret?

Mr. Hazelwood. At the time of the explosion, no, sir.

212

Senator Dixon. Would it be a reasonable thing to presume in
that situation that those in the immediate vicinity to Hartwig
would be those injured or killed or otherwise injured in what tran-
spired?

Now, is it not remarkable that a man who hated a man, who was
hostile to him, would not cancel a cancelable insurance policy re-
warding this enemy, and would contemplate suicide with the full
knowledge that his suicide would benefit this person that he held
this very hostile and adverse relationship with?

Dr. AuLT. No, sir, I do not think so.

Mr. Hazelwood. I do not think it is remarkable.

Senator Dixon. It happens all the time?

Dr. AuLT. No, I would not say that either. But I think that the
concept of taking your own life is one that requires a great deal of
understanding, in terms of the individual who is taking his life.

There are decisions that are made that, when the investigator ar-
rives on the scene, looks absolutely silly. Why would a man jump
off the bridge and leave his shoes sitting there? Why would a man
shoot himself in the chest, yet remove his shirt first?

The contemplation of suicide is only part of the process. The part
of the process that we are concerned with, that brought us to this
point today, is the impulsive act itself. He has been rehearsing all
his life for violence and death. Along the way somewhere he may
have made his mind up that he was going to do it, our impression
might be back in December when he was at home.

He may have gathered the wherewithal to do it, but never quite
had the actual presence of mind to complete the act until this one
morning when he is assigned unexpectedly to gun captain in that
turret. So we do not find that things like that are necessarily
weighted any heavier than a lot of the other material that we con-
sidered.

Senator Dixon. Is it your information that he was assigned unex-
pectedly that morning, without anticipating it, to the duty that he
held that day?

Dr. AuLT. We had understood that he had found out that morn-
ing that he was assigned to gun captain.

Senator Dixon. That on the prior night he did not know it was
going to occur?

Dr. AuLT. I do not know about that; I just had heard that he
had

Senator Dixon. Well, I believe that to be true.

Dr. AuLT. I do not know, sir.

Senator Dixon. I must concede my time is up, but I would like
one more question.

I have seen the documents you have used, and I recognize, of
course, that this was what was given to you by the naval investiga-
tive team. We have all talked about forensic evidence here. I have
been a State's attorney, assistant State's attorney, and I have been
a defense counsel in criminal cases. I have heard that terminology
a lot of times.

Other than these statements we have alluded to here, and these
letters and other things, the poem, and things of that character, do
you have any hard evidence, any evidence that would support the
idea that Hartwig actually carried out this act?

213

Dr. AuLT. No, sir. This opinion that we submitted is based on a
half scientific, half art form.

Senator Dixon. On a kind of a profile of this whole deal?

Mr. Hazelwood. Based upon a lack of evidence to indicate one
thing or another. In other words, there is no evidence to indicate
homicide, suicide, accident. That is when we are brought in to
render an opinion, when there is no evidence other than the behav-
ior involved.

Senator Dixon. I thank you very much.

Chairman Nunn. Thank you, Senator Dixon, Senator Cohen.

Senator Cohen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

If it had been an obvious suicide, the insurance policy would
have been canceled, is that correct?

Dr. AuLT. I do not know.

Mr. Hazelwood. Under the terms of the contract, it is my under-
standing it would have been.

Senator Cohen. And so this individual, Mr. Hartwig, went to
great lengths to mask a suicide so that the beneficiary of the
$50,000 would collect it?

Dr. AuLT. No, we never considered that.

Mr. Hazelwood. No.

Dr. AuLT. We never considered that as any motivating factor in
there. That insurance policy is a totally separate issue. We never
considered that he would have been thinking about the insurance
benefits to his friend there in the contemplation of the material.

Senator Cohen. A man takes out an insurance policy, under-
stands the terms, makes a former friend, now enemy, the benefici-
ary, and yet that plays no part in the way in which he goes about
killing himself?

Dr. AuLT. We just do not believe— again, this is our opinion, we
just do not believe that thoughts of insurance and beneficiaries
played any part in the major process of his decision to kill himself

Senator Cohen. Do you think that people who kill themselves
have any thoughts about whether or not their policy is going to be
canceled or not?

Dr. AuLT. They have all kinds of strange thoughts.

Senator Cohen. Do they have concerns about whether or not the
policy will be canceled and the beneficiary will receive-^ —

Dr. AuLT. Some go to great extremes to make a suicide look like
an accident or a homicide just for that reason.

Senator Cohen. Precisely for the reason they want the insurance
policy to go

Dr. AuLT. But in this particular case, that had nothing to do with
the process, in our opinion.

Mr. Hazelwood. In our opinion.

Senator Cohen. Okay, we will look at that.

At the time the Navy came to you, had the Navy reached a pre-
liminary decision that Hartwig was responsible?

Dr. AuLT. No, I do not believe so.

Mr. Hazelwood. No, I do not think so.

Senator Cohen. They just came to you and said, look, we do not
think it was an accident?

Dr. AuLT. We do not think it was an accident, and their concern
was— because apparently this was close to the time when the letter

214

had surfaced to the Navy concerning the insurance, they wanted to
know about the possibility for it.

I think their initial concern was homicide on the part of his ship-
mate.

Senator Cohen. Okay. The point that I am getting at is the Navy
said, we do not think it was an accident, period?

Dr. AuLT. Yes, sir.

Senator Cohen. We do not know who did it, right?

Dr. AuLT. No.

Senator Cohen. Did they indicate to you that they had a predis-
position that Mr. Hartwig had in fact

Dr. AuLT. Yes. Yes, in fact, they did.

Senator Cohen. Well, that is what I am asking.

Dr. AuLT. What they said to us was that there was something
that happened very quickly; the forensic evidence shows that some-
thing happened very rapidly in that turret and in that particular
gun room. And that the only one in position at that point to make
those things happen was Clayton Hartwig. Would we take a look at
him.

Senator Cohen. Did they indicate to you that they had a prelimi-
nary disposition to Mr. Hartwig having committed the act?

Dr. AuLT. They did not say it that way, no.

Mr. Hazelwood. They were also concerned about the possibili-
ty

Senator Cohen. Well, they did not say it that way, is that not the
way you pursued it?

Dr. AuLT. No, that is not the way we perceived it.

Mr. Hazelwood. They were also concerned over the possibility
that it may have been a homicide on the part of Kendall Truitt.

Senator Cohen. Did you have access to the records of all the
others who were in the turret?

Mr. Hazelwood. No, sir.

Dr. AuLT. No, sir. We did not even ask for them.

Senator Cohen. You did not request them?

Mr. Hazelwood. No, sir.

Senator Cohen. Why not?

Dr. AuLT. Because — I just told you, something happened very
quickly. The forensic evidence showed the only person in position
to make that something happen quickly — this is what the Navy
told us

Senator Cohen. Would you stop for a moment. I asked you ini-
tially the question of what happens, at what point in the process do
you come in to the scene. After the normal investigative process
has been exhausted and there is a question mark, and they want to
call upon your expertise?

You indicated at that point that you could confirm certain facts
or conclusions; you could modify them, reject them, tell them they
are going in a completely wrong direction, right?

Dr. AuLT. That is right.

Senator Cohen. In this particular case, you did not review the
statement that they thought it was not an accident, you assumed
that?

Dr. AuLT. No, no. We were told that.

Senator Cohen. And you accepted that?

215

Dr. AuLT. We accepted it.

Mr. Hazelwood. Yes, sir.

Senator Cohen. Okay. So you accepted their proposition that it
was not an accident?

Dr. AuLT. Right.

Senator Cohen. We think that it must have been a dehberate
act?

Mr. Hazelwood. On the part of someone.

Dr. AuLT. On the part of someone.

Senator Cohen. On the part of someone.

And then they say we have this one unusual situation here,
pointing to an insurance policy, was that it?

Mr. Hazelwood. What we have is a relationship between two in-
dividuals that has obviously soured, we think it is either a possibili-
ty of a homicide on the part of

Senator Cohen. Who said we think, the Navy?

Mr. Hazelwood. The Navy.

Dr. Ault. The Navy thought that.

Mr. Hazelwood. We think it is either a homicide on the part of
Kendall Truitt or it is a possibility of a suicide-homicide, or a sui-
cide on the part of Hartwig. We would like for you to look at the
materials we have available.

Senator Cohen. In your judgment, if there were other individuals
who were inside the gun turret, as professionals, would it not have
been of interest to you to make an assessment as to whether or not
there were other individuals who had different types of personality
profiles?

Mr. Hazelwood. No, sir.

Dr. Ault. No.

Mr. Hazelwood. Whenever we are required or requested to do a
case for an investigative agency, we make the assumption we are
dealing with a professional investigative agency. They provide us
with materials for review. That is what we review.

Senator Cohen. On the issue of the poem, "Disposable Heroes,"
is there, in your experience, a feeling among the men in the Navy
that they might feel like disposable heroes?

Dr. Ault. I imagine that is not just confined to the Navy.

Senator Cohen. Anyone wearing a uniform who might be in the
way of harm?

Dr. Ault. Yes, sir.

Senator Cohen. In other words, if someone is out on a ship and
they read about the U.S.S. Stark, and say, hey, that could happen
to me?

Dr. Ault. That is right.

Mr. Hazelwood. This is right. Yes, sir.

Senator Cohen. And so it is not unusual at all to have people in
our military services have a sense of either impending danger or
death?
Dr. Ault. Certainly not, sir.

Senator Cohen. As a matter of fact, that is a fairly strong bond-
ing feeling that develops with one or two close friends, exposure to
danger, is it not?

Dr. Ault. You are absolutely right. Sure.

216

Senator Cohen. Now, if someone else writes a poem and they
post it on a bulletin board or in an area where others sleep can you
use that as an incriminating or damaging piece of information?

Dr. AuLT. No, sir. We use that as one of a large body of informa-
tion, starting with his high school days and moving all the way for-
ward to the time of the explosion. And certainly we threw that in
because you never know what the triggering incident is going to be
in a case like this. You never know whether or not just reading
that poem and saying, that is it, you know, that might have been
the thing that sparked some decisions on his part. We included it
for that reason, not as a single indictment.

Senator Cohen. Maybe he never even saw it?

Dr. AuLT. That could be. That is what we state in our report.

Senator Cohen. You indicated that he had a stack of Bibles on
his bookshelf?

Dr. AuLT. Apparently his mother had made his room up, and one
shelf had seven or eight Bibles on it.

Senator Cohen. What relevance is that?

Dr. AuLT. None now. At the time, the fact that those existed or
were there along with all the other books that he had concerning
violence and war and ships and explosives and his Soldier of For-
tune things and everything, it was very important to explore a po-
tentially mitigating circumstance, the fact that he

Senator Cohen. What does the relevance of having seven Bibles
on one shelf have to do with suicide?

Dr. AuLT. It has nothing to do with suicide. It has something to
do with the other side of the coin. If, in fact, the individual was a
strong practitioner of a certain faith, then I would want to know
that to make my opinion. In this case he was not, so we precluded
it.

Senator Cohen. I do not understand what you are saying.

Dr. AuLT. I am not sure we are communicating. Let me try
again.

When we look at an individual

Senator Cohen. Dr. Ault, let me put it this way. I have seven or
eight Bibles sitting on my shelf up in my office.

Dr. Ault. Yes, sir.

Senator Cohen. Of what relevance is that to my particular per-
sonality?

Dr. Ault. Well, I am not sure. I have not seen the rest of your
books or what you do in private or anything else, so I cannot begin ||
to tell you, sir.

Chairman Nunn. The rest of them he wrote himself. [Laughter.]

Senator Cohen. Mr. Chairman, that is very gracious. I have
about 1,500 books in my office, and they are not all by me.

Dr. Ault. Let me try to put it in a context for you. In his room,
when we looked at the pictures of his room, there were all kinds of
books on violence, a lot of books that dealt with violence, dealt
with the Navy. Again, in the course of normal things that would be
fine. Those would be nice aspirations.

This individual's whole life, however, revolves around the aura of
violence and death. Everything he does from the reading of Soldier
of Fortune magazines to his war games that he played in

217

Senator Cohen. If someone reads Soldier of Fortune magazines,
that indicates that they are predisposed toward death?

Dr. AuLT. Well, what else is the purpose?

Mr. Hazelwood. You are taking one item.

Senator Cohen. I am going to go through one by one to see exact-
ly the rationale used. The fact that someone has seven Bibles on
his bookshelf and does not go to church services means nothing to

me.

Dr. AuLT. It does to me. I am the individual who gave this opin-
ion.

Senator Cohen. Well, tell me what it means to you, then. I want
to hear this.

Dr. AuLT. I am tr3dng to.

Senator Cohen. Well, I am trying to listen.

Dr. AuLT. What I was saying was that this man's whole record
that we had in front of us reflects a preoccupation with death and
violence. He made bombs. He blew them up. He read Soldier of
Fortune magazines. He collected knives that were oriented toward
killing people. He carried a 9 millimeter with him. Everything in
his makeup shows that he is oriented toward death.

When we go through the room and we look at the collection of
his books to see kind of what he read and what he thought, we see
books on death and violence, and we see Bibles. Now if he had gone
from that room into a seminary

Senator Cohen. How much death and violence do you find in the
Bible?

Dr. AuLT. Sir, I am not here to argue that with you. I am neither
a theologian nor am I really prepared to respond to the question. If
you want to include that, fine.

What I am saying is if you went to a seminary from that point
on, then I would be inclined to rule or to form an opinion that
something less than suicide was a potential for this guy; but he did
not. He went from that room into the Navy, worked as a gunman.
He continued with this process of death and violence, this fascina-
tion which some people may think of as normal, until he reached
the point where an explosion occurred in the turret where he was
in charge.

Senator Cohen. Is it abnormal for members of the Navy to have
subscriptions to Soldier of Fortune magazine?

Dr. AuLT. I do not know.

Senator Cohen. Would it be a relevant factor?

Mr. Hazelwood. It depends on what we are looking at them for.
Yes, sir, it may or may not be relevant.

Dr. AuLT. I recall very few of my fellow marines who subscribed
to Soldier of Fortune magazine.

Senator Cohen. Very few of your fellow marines were given to
violence?

Dr. AuLT. That is the limit of it.

Senator Cohen. Do they not teach you a lot of violence in Marine
boot camp?

Dr. AuLT. They teach us to hate the enemy.

Senator Cohen. Carry knives, use them?

Dr. AuLT. Absolutely, and to talk about survival rate.

218

Senator Cohen. Let me go back, if I may have a bit more time,
Mr. Chairman.

He was a loner. Is that one of the significant factors, someone
who Ukes to keep to himself?

Dr. AuLT. Yes, sir. Not only a loner but unable to communicate
with people, bottling up his own feelings, incapable of communicat-
ing with others.

Senator Cohen. How many people do you think there are like
Ihat in society who tend to be shy, introspective, and not able to
articulate their feelings openly?

Dr. AuLT. If I could answer your question, if I go back to the idea
that what you are talking about item by item are relatively normal
things. We have a lot of this. In Montreal last week we had some-
body who had those same normal characteristics kill 14 women. It
was a terrible tragedy.

We are punctuated with those kinds of incidents where people
who seem to be loners and so forth suddenly act out in that way.

What I said earlier was that we have a lot of normal things that
look normal in a personality that goes out and acts normally. If
you take something as normal, for example, in my example as the
bridge on the Forrestal and you place it on a destroyer, then the
whole thing is no longer normal. It looks lopsided, and that is what
we are talking about here.

Senator Cohen. I do not find that analogy relevant here in terms
of placing a bridge on a destroyer. What I want to do is go through
and analyze.

You indicated, for example, he sent letters to women. He had
three close women friends?

Dr. AuLT. Only three close women friends.

Senator Cohen. Is that unusual? I do not think I have three close
women friends. What is unusual about that? You have a man in
the Navy, which is exclusively male oriented out on the ships, no
ladies out there. He has a close relationship with one good friend,
maybe one or two others. They have arguments from time to time.
He may have a grudge against this one individual. He has three
close women friends, and that is unusual?

Dr. AuLT. With whom he had never had any sexual contact as
far as we have been able to determine.

Mr. Hazelwood. By whom he felt betrayed, also.

Dr. AuLT. By whom he felt betrayed. One woman he proposed to
on his second date. She turned him down.

Senator Cohen. At what age?

Dr. AuLT. Twenty-three.

Senator Cohen. Where had he been? Out on the ship for 6
months?

Dr. AuLT. We are talking about the relationship with three
women friends.

Senator Cohen. What is unusual about that? What were the cir-
cumstances in which he proposed to one woman?

Dr. AuLT. He probably just picked her up from the bar, I am
sure. I do not know.

Senator Cohen. You do not know the details of it?

Dr. AuLT. I do not have the details.

Mr, Hazelwood. She was a dancer in a strip joint.

219

Senator Cohen. Is it unusual for sailors to propose to women
dancers in strip joints?

Mr. Hazelwood. On second dates, I would think so, sir.

Senator Cohen. Is it unusual on the first date?

Mr. Hazelwood. I would think so, sir.

Senator Cohen. But there are some sailors who go out after
having been out at sea for considerable lengths of time, who end up
seeing someone who is attractive, who might be a stripper in a
strip joint and make a proposal, maybe under the influence, maybe
just suffering from lack of companionship?

Mr Hazelwood. That is quite possible. As far as that girl, when
he corresponded with her she advised him that she was now en-
gaged to another person.

One of his other close female friends was the one that had sex
with his friend at the academy.

Senator Cohen. Is that one of the close friends that you listed?

Mr. Hazelwood. Yes, sir. These are the three.

Senator Cohen. Who was the second one?

Mr. Hazelwood. Another one that he was a close friend with he
claimed had had sex with his friend he had been sending $200 a
month to. When he found that out, he ceased the allotment and in
fact wrote that same girl and accused her of letting him down, and
the world about him was changing.

Senator Cohen. Would you find that an extraordinary reaction?

Mr. Hazelwood. Would I find it an extraordinary reaction sir? I
would find it a very unusual reaction.

Senator Cohen. He finds out a friend is having relations with
someone that he thinks is a friend of his, that he has some attach-
ment to

Mr. Hazelwood. And ceases a $200 a month allotment? Yes, sir,
that is kind of

Dr. AuLT. I would find the initiation of the allotment and every-
thing else unusual, but the ceasing of it for those reasons is also
unusual.

Senator Cohen. I am not sure I understand this. He is having at
least an emotional relationship with a given individual?

Dr. AuLT. Apparently a male individual.

Mr. Hazelwood. I do not think it is an emotional relationship
with a female. I think it is a correspondence relationship with a
female.

Senator Cohen. That is the other one he was close to?

Mr. Hazelwood. Yes, the one that had sexual relations that
caused him to break off the $200 monthly allotment to the male
friend, yes, sir.

Senator Cohen. What you are saying by implication is that he
had at least either an overt or latent homosexual relationship with
him?
Mr. Hazelwood. No, sir, I did not state that.
Senator Cohen. You are not saying that?
Mr. Hazelwood. No, sir, I am not.

Senator Cohen. Let me get down now to the other characteriza-
tions. He carried grudges against those who he felt had wronged
him?
Mr. Hazelwood. As reported by his sister, yes, sir.

220

Senator Cohen. Is that unusual?

Dr. AuLT. It depends on the extent of the grudge.

Senator Cohen. Or what happens with the grudge. In this case,
what kind of grudges did he bear?

Mr. Hazelwood. As a matter of fact, his sister stated he carried
grudges for long periods of time. She felt it was unusual enough to
mention it to the NIS investigators.

Senator Cohen. So if you carry long grudges, that is one of the
factors you take into account?

Mr. Hazelwood. His sister certainly thought that was unusual,
yes, sir.

Senator Cohen. His grudge was not so long in this particular
case against his friend that he wanted to cancel an insurance
policy?

Mr. Hazelwood. Four and a half months.

Dr. AuLT. The grudge was iVz months, and they were threaten-
ing to kill one another, and they did not speak to one another
during that time, which seems a little excessive.

Senator Cohen. So he carried the grudge right to the very end
then?

Dr. AuLT. I would say so.

Senator Cohen. But not stopping to cancel the insurance policy
that is going to benefit the friend.

Dr. AuLT. It is a strange thing.

Senator Cohen. You drew some significance from the fact that
he signed one of the letters "Clayton" rather than "Clay"?

Dr. AuLT. I think he said "love always and forever".

Mr. Hazelwood. "Love always and forever, Clayton", and the re-
cipient of that letter found that to be very unusual.

Senator Cohen. Excuse me. You indicated that you drew a dis-
tinction between Clayton versus Clay.

Mr. Hazelwood. The recipient did.

Senator Cohen. What is the distinction?

Mr. Hazelwood. "Love always and forever, Clayton", much more
formal than simply "Clay", as he had signed his letters in the past.
With "forever", no "love", nothing, just "Clay". He had signed his
letters, he had signed his letters in the past.

Senator Cohen. Another factor I think you drew that was nega-
tive was that he said he could hide his hurt inside and never reveal
it?

Mr. Hazelwood. That is what he said, yes, sir.

Senator Cohen. Is that unusual?

Mr. Hazelwood. When you combine that with the fact that
people reported never seeing him angry, never seeing him violent,
that, to us, is a danger sign to us, that people do not ventilate their
hostility or their anger. We have seen too many occasions where
they have just stored it up and stored it up and stored it up and
then went out and murdered 14 people in a college or then blew up
a ship or then killed people in a shopping center, yes, sir.

Senator Cohen. By contrast, you have also seen individuals who
explored emotionally venting their anger, and then you use that as
evidence that he had an irrational reaction to a situation?

Mr. Hazelwood. Not necessarily. It depends on the situation.

Dr. AuLT. It depends on the situation.

221

Senator Cohen. I find that there is an awful lot of reaching here
in terms of saying someone hides the hurt inside. I mean, one of
the things that we train ourselves as professionals, as you do and
we do as lawyers, is do not get emotional, do not overreact, do not
vent your anger. Anger blows out the lamp of the mind. Be cool.
Keep it inside.

Mr. Hazelwood. How many of us are successful at that, sir?

Senator Cohen. There are a few of them sitting right here that
are pretty successful at it.

To quote another poet, we all prepare our face to meet the faces
that we meet. Most people in this life wear masks. Every one of us
in this life wears a mask of one dimension or another.

There is an article in one of today's papers that indicates that
you found a photograph showing Hartwig dressed as a Naval com-
mander somewhat negative, the implications being negative. Would
you explain that?

Dr. AuLT. That is what the newspaper said.

Mr. Hazelwood. That is what the newspaper said we said, sir.

Dr. AuLT. I would like to know where they got it from.

Senator Cohen. I know nothing about the photograph. Why not
just tell me what it was?

Mr. Hazelwood. This is from the Washington Times, December
11, 1989. "Hartwig's profile based on two photos." That is basically
it, a picture of him as a young boy wearing military insignia.

Senator Cohen. You never saw this?

Mr. Hazelwood. I have never seen this picture before.

Dr. AuLT. We never saw the photographs.

Senator Cohen. It never played any role in your analysis?

Dr. AuLT. No, sir.

Senator Cohen. Mr. Chairman, my time is up so I will defer for
the time being.

Senator Warner [presiding]. Gentlemen, I am going to ask one
question. I have tried as best I can to be absolutely fair and to
allow all the evidence to come out from all the witnesses thus far,
and I would like to make this statement. If anybody has some evi-
dence which can help solve this mysterious case, please come for-
ward and let the Chairman and myself know. That is the bottom
line, and that includes the family.

I am quite taken with some of the evidence that the family had
provided. As a matter of fact, I have asked whether or not there
are some positive things, and you all have indicated that there is
very little, that it is more negative. I think, you know, the Navy is
on trial here in a certain way, and I think it is about time we
brought out just how rough some of these statements are and how
tough and presumably accurate these statements are that the
family made about this young man.

Am I correct that they were rough and tough?
Mr. Hazelwood. Yes, sir.

Senator Warner. Would you mind articulating a few? I have
asked for both the good and the bad. Let us get it out.

Dr. AuLT. Are you talking, sir, about the statements that the
family related to the NIS agents?
Senator Warner. That is right.

24-931 0-91-8

222

Dr. AuLT. I am not sure it is our place to do that, sir. That is the
NTS investigation.

Senator Warner. We will have to make an assessment on how to
get this information out, because it appears that maybe somebody
is holding something back.

Dr. AuLT. I would be happy to answer it. It was not our investi-
gation to begin with.

Senator Warner. We will deal with it maybe in another manner,
but I am not going to sit by and let the Navy take it in the teeth in
this case when there is evidence in here which in my judgment
could bear on the conclusions and findings.

Mr. Brusnahan [from the audience]. Senator, I hate to interrupt.
I am here on behalf of the family. I am their attorney. If there is
any family member that you would personally like to talk to or
question today, we are here, and we would be delighted to answer
your questions.

Senator Warner. Make that known in writing to the chairman,
and I thank you.

Senator Cohen. A couple more questions, Mr. Ault and Mr. Ha-
zelwood. I am being a skeptic here, just trying to put you to a test
to satisfy myself.

One of the negative factors that you mentioned was that he had
achieved his goal to be a petty officer. Does that mean, therefore,
since he is lacking in higher aspiration that that was another
factor that goes into this overlay on the mind of the individual?

Mr. Hazelwood. It is another factor, yes, sir.

Senator Cohen. In a letter, Mr. Hartwig said, "I could become
one of those headstones any day?"

Dr. Ault. Yes, sir.

Senator Cohen. Why is that so unusual?

Mr. Hazelwood. I think what was unusual, sir, not only with
that statement but the fact that he also discussed it with another
person — that is the letter that he wrote to which you are referring
to, but it was in response to the point that the young lady that was
corresponding with him had asked him why he was hiding in the
Navy, and it was an overreaction on his part. I am not hiding in
the Navy, and he goes on to describe one ship disaster and, of
course, the disaster in Lebanon with the Marines, and then going
on saying that he could become a headstone in Arlington Ceme-
tery.

Combine that with the statement that he made to a shipmate of
his where he would like to be killed on duty and be buried at Ar-
lington, then the statement becomes significant, yes, sir.

Senator Cohen. I must tell you, I find it hard to arrive at that
judgment. You take a young man. He is out on sea duty. He is
writing to a woman who says he is hiding out, whether emotionally
or physically hiding out. He writes back and says, hey, wait a
minute, I am not hiding from anyone, I am out here working with
X thousands of people in a very dangerous environment, and I
could become like any one of those hundreds of other headstones
that occurred in Beirut or the U.S.S. Stark.

Then he makes a statement to a friend and says if I go I want to
go in the line of duty. Is that unusual for a soldier or sailor to

223

make a statement, if I am going to be taken out I want to do it in
the line of duty and end up in Arlington?

Mr. Hazelwood. I was in the Army 11 years, and never once did
I or any of my friends make a statement that I would like to die in
the line of duty. No, sir. I did not want to die in the line of duty.

Dr. AuLT. I do not believe any of us are trained to die in the line
of duty particularly.

Senator Cohen. Given a choice of this individual saying if I am
going to die I want to do it in the service, let me put it this way,
service of my country. Is that different?

Mr. Hazelwood. He did not say that, sir.

Senator Cohen. What does "line of duty" mean if it does not
mean service to the country?

Mr. Hazelwood. He did not say that. He said "I want to die in
the line of duty."

Dr. AuLT. The point that we look at is, again, the whole fabric of
his personality is death and destruction. His hobbies seem to re-
volve around that. His writings revolve around it. His makeup
seems to be oriented toward it.

Senator Cohen. I was in a helicopter down in El Salvador. I was
on one of these fact-finding missions, and I was in a helicopter. We
experienced some malfunction of the chopper at 10,000 feet over
San Salvador. We were in danger of going down, and I yelled over
to my Marine escort imagine this, here I am all the way down in
El Salvador, and I am going down without a shot having been fired
in anger.

Mr. Hazelwood. But you did not say "I would like to go down."

Senator Cohen. Was the implication not that if I am going down,
better to go down due to an act directed toward the United States
as opposed to a simple piece of equipment malfunctioning on a heli-
copter? Do you draw something from that?

Dr. AuLT. I would if you had been in your office, if you had said
that in your office.

Senator Cohen. But his office is out on the sea. He is out in the
line of fire.

Dr. AuLT. But from the 10th or 11th grade on we have seen his
kind of ideation and his kind of thinking process all the way
through. He has moved into a form of employment that certainly
reinforces everything that he sought all his life. It would be a natu-
ral thing, and he has moved all the way up to the point of the ex-
plosion in that process. We have a broad picture of a young fellow
whose whole orientation is death and violence.

Senator Cohen. The Bible figures in that?

Dr. AuLT. The Bible figures it out. If he had gone out of that
room and put behind all the violence, gone into a seminary, it
would have been a different orientation entirely, a different conclu-
sion.

Senator Cohen. But because he had seven Bibles and did not go
to church services, that was another indication that he was given
to death and destruction?

Dr. AuLT. That would be a very small part of my reasoning, yes,
sir.

Mr. Daniels. Senator, if I might, let me qualify it by saying I am
not the expert here, nor do I pretend to be, but it would appear to

224

me that each one of these forms of behavior that you cite and ask
the question is this highly abnormal, I would dare to say that it
may be inherent in people in this room.

From what I have been able to gather from my review of this
matter, however, is there is a preponderance of behavior, not one
or two incidents, that has led these two gentlemen to their conclu-
sion, and I would submit to you it is a preponderance of behavior,
not each individual one.

You ask the question, is this unusual, is this

Senator Cohen. Mr. Daniels, what I am suggesting is that they
are given a very narrow framework within which to work. They
come to Mr. Ault and Mr. Hazelwood and say that they have
reached a decision preliminarily that this was not due to an acci-
dent.

Mr. Daniels. We could have very easily gone back, Senator, and
said we have no behavior

Senator Cohen. Let me finish. They come and say we are of the
opinion that this was no accident. Mr. Ault and Mr. Hazelwood cor-
rectly said that they do not have the expertise to challenge that.
We accept that.

They also give you a situation which indicates or at least points
in the direction of a specific one or two individuals, and they say,
now, tell us what you think. You go back and you construct a pro-
file, picking up these individual pieces, not one of which we all
agree would be particularly damaging. I think you would find
many of these characteristics in a good cross-section of the Ameri-
can people.

When you put them all together, however, you say given the fact
that the Navy does not think this happened accidentally and given
the fact that we have excluded the friend who was not there, we
now have this one individual, we look at his personality profile,
and we conclude that the probability is that he committed an act of
suicide.

I am saying what if you had the personality profiles of a dozen
other people, the number who were in the gun turret itself? There
was evidence that you could have reviewed, not that you requested
it. You were given a very narrow job to do in this particular case.

I am simply suggesting that there may have been other individ-
uals inside that turret. You are shaking your head, Mr. Ault.
There may have been other individuals inside the turret who had
precisely but quite consistently the same kinds of personality traits
as this individual.

Maybe we have some statistics on this, but if you went down, for
example, and took a look at the personality traits of the individuals
who volunteer, let us say, for the Navy or the Marine Corps or the
Air Force, I suppose you could go down through and take a pretty
healthy cross-section and find a number of loners who look to go
into the military for a variety of reasons.

You would probably find that during their childhood they have
played with toys and pistols and collected them. You may even find
that they were members of the Boy Scouts or the Pathfinders.

You may have found a series of traits leading individuals who
want to go into the military, which if you look in a post factor,
take a review looking backward, say wait a minute, gee, this guy

225

was quiet, he was shy, he did not get along with women very well,
only had three close women friends, did not handle the sexual
aspect particularly well, talked a lot about death, though he might
become a victim out on the open seas. I think you would probably
find a pretty broad cross-section to which that could apply.

Dr. AuLT. Sir, the whole turret may have been full of suicidal
people. The evidence that we accepted from the Navy that there
was no accident was also the same kind of evidence on which they
stated that the only guy in a position to do any damage was Clay-
ton Hartwig. That is why we looked at Hartwig only.

The forensic evidence, which we do not reject, states that
Hartwig was the only person in position to do the kind of damage
that happened. It is as simple as that.

Senator Cohen. You had no basis to challenge that?

Dr. AuLT. No, sir. We assume that they are a professional organi-
zation.

Senator Cohen. What conclusion did you draw of the fact that he
was collecting statistics on, or information on battleship disasters
in the year 1979 to 1980?

Dr. AuLT. Just again, it is sort of a thread in the whole personali-
ty.

Senator Cohen. Was that before he went into the Navy?

Dr. AuLT. I presume it was.

Mr. Hazelwood. He was 24 when he died. He would have been
about 16 — 15 or 16.

Dr. AuLT. That, combined with the book that he checked out on
the Yamamoto disaster, combined with

Senator Cohen. If he were planning a career in the Navy, do you
think it is unusual that he might be concerned about how many
disasters there are at sea?

Dr. AuLT. In this case, I would think it was unusual. I would try
not to think about that.

Senator Cohen. Do you think he was planning, as early as 1979,
1980, to engage in a battleship disaster at that point?

Mr. Hazelwood. No, sir. I think he was fascinated by violence as
early as 15 and 16. If he had been planning on entering the Navy
at that time, which he may very well have been, I would have
found it not at all unusual if he collected articles on ships, period.
But just ship disasters, that is all he had in that three-ring binder.
Nothing on U.S.S. Kennedy coming home, nothing on the launching
of a ship, nothing on the battles of a ship. Simply, disasters of
ships. That is all he had in that three-ring binder— articles on dis-
asters of ships.

Senator Cohen. Do you interpret that as being potentially suici-
dal?

Mr. Hazelwood. I interpret that as being fascinated by violence.

Dr. AuLT. In a broad background of experience in violence in
general, we find people who are predisposed to a certain kind of
violence often collect material on that kind of violence. Some mur-
derers collect information on pornography, for example — I do not
want to surface that issue separately, but will collect certain types
of reading material that orients toward the violence the way they
commit it. So we built that into the picture.

226

Senator Cohen. I think we better go back and do a survey of our
military personnel to find out what the traits are of all those going
into the military, whether they have ever collected information on
violence or played with handguns, or collected guns.

Dr. AuLT. It would seem to fit that if I had a predisposition
toward violence I would drift into the kind of work that would best
exercise that predisposition. If I were a klismaphiliac and loved to
give enemas, I would want to work in a hospital where enemas
could best be delivered.

The same is true with violence. If I am predisposed toward vio-
lence, and that is the way that I think and that is the stuff I like to
do and I like to make bombs, then I would probably wind up in
that kind of employment.

Senator Cohen. Those are the only questions I have for now, Mr.
Chairman.

Senator Warner. Just speaking for myself here, I am still con-
cerned about the process we are following in this hearing.

We are doing the best we can to assess certain aspects of this
case which are available for public scrutiny and public assessment;
yet, there are other aspects to this case which while it may not
have been important in some of your assessment, or the Admiral's
assessment, in this Senator's assessment I think they are germane,
and somehow we are going to have to get at the bottom of them;
but in the absence of the chairman I am not able to do that.

Senator Cohen. Could I ask one other question that intrigued
me? You also indicated his letters show he was extremely egocen-
tric, or there is an egocentricity to be found in his letters. What do
you mean by that? Give me some examples.

Dr. AuLT. Self-absorbed, narcissistic.

Senator Cohen. Those are words. Tell me what reveals that he
was self-absorbed and narcissistic.

Dr. AuLT. In the extent of the letters here, we see that his worry
was about himself, that while he was outwardly very generous in
some cases there, concerning those situations where he himself
would benefit we have posited from the letters that we read there
that he was in fact a very self-centered guy, narcissistic. It adds
again to the weight.

Senator Cohen. Rather than characterizing it, can you give us an
example of what you would call being narcissistic?

Dr. AuLT. The letter where he describes, "am I really good look-
ing," and so forth, confirmation that way. My bumper sticker
theory of personality holds that the kind of a person ^yho would be
narcissistic would be the one who says "if you do not like the way I
drive, stay off the sidewalk." The person who is capable of slapping
you in the face and then not really understanding why you are
angry.

Senator Cohen. You are giving me bridge metaphors again. Give
me an example of what he says in the letters. I have not read the
letters.
Dr. AuLT. The fact that he says, "so your friends think that I am

good looking, huh?" in one case. In another, he writes

Senator Cohen. You have got to be kidding me. You are telling
me, because he is writing a letter to a friend and says "you think I
am good looking"

227

Mr. Hazelwood. We are not kidding you, sir. We are trying to
answer your questions.

Senator Cohen. This is a 24-year-old, relatively immature indi-
vidual, who says "so your friends think I am good looking," and
that is egocentricity? Here is a man looking for compliments. Is
that unusual in a 24-year-old sailor?

Mr. Hazelwood. That is one example, sir. Fishing for compli-
ments, not just looking for compliments. Fishing for compliments.

Senator Cohen. Most of the U.S. Senate would stand indicted for

that.

Mr. Hazelwood. I have no comment on that, sir.

Senator Cohen. I am looking for an answer, Mr. Chairman. If
that is one of the factors involved with egocentricity

Dr. AuLT. Sir, that is one of the many factors involved. Okay: the
exaggerated status of his life, the bragging that he was going to be
assigned as a VIP bodyguard in a special SEAL unit when in fact
he was not, those kinds of things, are indicative of the kind of an
individual who is ego-oriented.

Let me see if I can find some other stuff here, too. The letters
that he wrote, his constant threats to some of his shipmates that
he could kill them and dispose of the bodies with no problems, the
taking of all the insults to him as a very personal thing.

When his one friend marries, immediately the world ceases. He
pulls in all of his beneficience to this individual. When a second
friend marries, he ceases to speak to him. That would be indicative
of an egocentric person.

I mentioned the bragging. Other things in his letters that he
talked about with one of his girlfriends, "I have probably bored you
long enough, right?" "Do I fit the image of what you think a petty
officer should be like?" These are separate quotes from different
letters. "So all your friends are still drooling over my picture?"

He asks a third person, a person with whom he had had a brief
date, if she would miss him and asked if she would write to him,
even after he had kind of insulted her.

Mr. Hazelwood. When she did, he wrote back saying that his
current girlfriend did not want him to correspond with her any
more. He had no current girlfriend at that time.

Senator Cohen. I have no more questions, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Warner. One wrap-up question here. You mentioned
that the man was apparently, in your judgment— I do not know
quite how you characterize it — alienated from his family. Clarify
that for me.

Dr. AuLT. I believe that somebody else— the chairman, or some-
one else — used that term "alienated" sir.

Senator Warner. Then what was your characterization of the
evidence, of how you put it in your opinion?

Mr. Hazelwood. Yes, sir, one of his sisters advised that no one in
the family knew him very well. As a child, he was a loner. He
stayed in his room, in his attic room, as his sister referred to.

Dr. AuLT. He had no friends. The sister herself stated, in an
interview, that he was largely estranged from other family mem-
bers.

228

Senator Warner. But the testimony of the family somewhere in
this record, and I will eventually find it — to NIS, I expect — con-
demns him, and is rough and tough on him, is that not correct?

Mr. Hazelwood. Yes, sir.

Senator Warner. Yet he goes back home at Christmas.

Mr. Hazelwood. For the first time in 5 years.

Dr. AuLT. In addition to that, leaves a letter stating that he loves
them, after all this alienation. Then we see this kind of behavior,
this unusual behavior, where he says — leaves a note on their bed
that says that he loves them. He did not say it face-to-face. He left
a note behind, apparently said that he loved them.

Senator Warner. To what extent is this relationship with his
family — and I will let you characterize it — was that a part of your
assessment and figured into the opinion, the conclusions and so
forth?

Mr. Hazelwood. It is another form of rejection.

Senator Warner. So it was a fairly significant part of the factual
data that you used for the hypothesis?

Mr. Hazelwood. A part of it, sir. Just a part of it.

Senator Warner. I think we had best get on with the next wit-
ness.

Senator Cohen. Just this one point. He goes home for Christmas
after 5 years. Was there a reconciliation?

Mr. Hazelwood. Not to our knowledge, sir.

Dr. AuLT. We never heard of one.

Senator Cohen. Then why did you draw any implication that he
signed a note saying "I love you."

Mr. Hazelwood. Because it is the first time he had ever done it,
the first time he had ever left a note to his parents expressing love.

Senator Cohen. Would that be any indication that there might
have been a reconciliation? The man ran off to go in the Navy, he
had some hard times with his family, comes home after 5 years,
leaves a note for mom and dad, "I love you"?

Dr. Ault. It might be an indication he had decided he was going
to do himself in, that he had had enough problems. It could be a lot
of things. We chose to conclude that it was probably an indication
that he had begun to make up his mind that he was not happy
with his life and wanted to end it.

Senator Cohen. So if he did not say an5rthing, that would have
been a normal reaction to his going home for Christmas?

Dr. Ault. If he had not said anything, we would not have any-
thing to work with at all.

Mr. Hazelwood. But that is what he had done in the past, yes,
sir.

Senator Cohen. So it would have been a more normal course of
conduct for him to continue the alienation with his family?

Mr. Hazelwood. Yes, sir.

Senator Cohen. Thanks. That is all.

Senator Warner. Thank you, gentlemen. It hac been a tough job
that you have had to perform.

The committee will now hear from Kenneth W. Nimmich, who is
the Section Chief of the Scientific Analysis Section of the FBI Labo-
ratory Division. The FBI laboratory conducted an analysis of the
rotating band from the projectile that was in the barrel on April 19

229

in an attempt to determine the presence of any "foreign material."
The FBI's analysis was inconclusive.

As the chairman indicated this morning, at the committee's re-
quest, Sandia National Laboratories will be conducting an inde-
pendent analysis of the remainder of the rotating band. Thank you
very much, Mr. Nimmich.

STATEMENT OF KENNETH W. NIMMICH, SECTION CHIEF,
SCIENTIFIC ANALYSIS SECTION, FBI LABORATORY

Mr. Nimmich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and committee mem-
bers.

I am Kenneth W. Nimmich. I am chief of the scientific analysis
section of the FBI Laboratory.

And the FBI Laboratory is the only full-service Federal crime
laboratory in the United States. If you have no objection, sir, I
would like to enter my statement into the record.

Senator Warner. Without objection.

Mr. Nimmich. The Director of the FBI is charged to "operate the
Federal Bureau of Investigation Laboratory to serve not only the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, but also to provide, without cost,
technical and scientific assistance, including expert testimony, in
Federal and local courts for all duly constituted law enforcement
agencies which may desire to avail themselves of the service."

The services provided include scientific and technical support to
investigations, examinations of physical evidence, court testimony
and forensic science research and training.

Direct scientific and technical support is frequently provided at
crime scenes in major FBI cases, and sometimes to State and local
and other Federal law enforcement agencies in cases which achieve
national recognition or involve expertise not available to local ju-
risdictions.

Our primary objective is to maintain a highly professional and
thoroughly competent team of forensic experts with a broad range
of capabilities to support the varied needs of the Nation's criminal
justice system.

The FBI Laboratory is a national resource which has earned a
reputation for excellence based on over 50 years of quality service.

Over the years the FBI Laboratory has examined evidence in
hundreds of explosions. Through our experience in these cases we
have developed a systematic approach to identify the makeup of an
improvised explosive device, to include the explosive used, the ele-
ments of the initiation system, and any container or housing of the
device.

Our system includes a thorough examination of as much materi-
al from the scene of the explosion as possible. These examinations
take place in the following units. The explosives unit conducts
visual and microscopic examinations of bomb remains, commercial
explosives and blasting accessories, as well as military explosives
and ordnance items, with the goal of reconstructing the explosive
device utilized.

Tool mark examinations of bomb components are also performed
in the explosive unit.

230

The materials analysis unit utilizes intrumentation such as infra-
red spectroscopy, x-ray diffractrometry, pyrolysis gas chromatogra-
phy/mass spectrometry, and other advanced instruments for identi-
fication or comparison of the compositions of paints, plastics, explo-
sives, cosmetics, and tapes.

The elemental and metals analysis unit analyzes a variety of ma-
terials for their elemental composition. Among the techniques uti-
lized by this unit are scanning electron microscopy/energy disper-
sive spectroscopy, inductively coupled plasma atomic emission spec-
troscopy, and neutron activation analysis.

This unit utilizes SEM/EDS to determine the structural and ele-
mental characteristics of a variety of materials. This technique is
non-destructive and permits analysis of individual particles at high
magnification.

This technique is used frequently and with much success in fo-
rensic science examinations, and has been used in significant inves-
tigations, such as product tampering cases.

As a service to and at the request of the Navy, on May 16, 1989,
an explosives and hazardous devices specialist from the FBI Labo-
ratory explosives unit examined the explosive damage remaining
on the U.S.S. Iowa following the April 19, 1989 explosion.

Upon completion of the initial inspection of turret number two,
the FBI specialist noticed explosive damage consistent with the def-
lagration of a large quantity of smokeless powder propellant. No
explosives or components which could be associated with an impro-
vised explosive device or initiator were located.

On June 21, 1989, the Naval Investigative Service delivered evi-
dence to the FBI Laboratory which consisted, in part, of propellant
samples, improvised timing devices, and portions of four projectile
rotating bands. Two of these rotating band samples were obtained
from test firings using a timing device, one from a test firing with-
out a timing device, and one from turret number two of the U.S.S.
Iowa.

The Navy advised that their scientific examinations demonstrat-
ed the presence of residue from a timing device in the U.S.S. Iowa
explosion. The FBI Laboratory was requested to analyze the sub-
mitted evidence in an attempt to independently confirm this find-
ing.

Components of the timer as well as contaminants from the pro-
pellant sample were analyzed using the scanning electron micro-
scope. Material from between the fin and the slot was sampled
from three locations on each of the submitted projectile rotating
bands. This material, while still on the band, was examined using
light microscopy. The material was then removed from the areas
under the fin and separated in a solvent using an ultrasonic clean-
er to disperse the particles.

The samples were then filtered and examined using the scanning
electron microscope/energy dispersive spectroscopy. One hundred
relevant particles from the three separate locations on each of the
rotating bands were analyzed for their elemental composition. Par-
ticles that were found to occur frequently in a given sample, such
as copper particles, were noted as occurring frequently and were no
longer recorded.

This is what is meant by the term relevant.

231

The 1,200 particles thus analyzed were grouped by elemental
composition, and the results examined for significant similarities
or differences between particle populations.

Particles consisting of aluminum were found frequently on bands
fromx the test firings, both with and without devices. However, only
one such particle was found on the band from the U.S.S. Iowa. This
demonstrates that differences and similarities between particle
populations can exist that are independent of the introduction of a
timing device.

Therefore, any such differences or similarities require additional
scientific scrutiny, such as further characterization of the particles
before any significance is attached.

In addition, further investigative scrutiny, such as determining
other possible sources for any particles found, is also necessary. No
other significant similarities or differences were detected.

Therefore, it could not be determined from this method and this
sample whether residue from a device, such as the submitted
timing device, was present between the fin and slot of the U.S.S.
Iowa rotating band.

Polymeric material was found in the U.S.S. Iowa band, but due
to its charred condition, a definite conclusion concerning its identi-
ty could not be made. Because our analyses did not detect any sig-
nificant differences or similarities between the particles analyzed
from all submitted bands, we identified the need for further test-
ing.

We communicated this to the Navy, and they advised that fur-
ther testing by another laboratory had yielded significant results.
They requested that we conduct no further examinations, and they
retrieved the unexamined portions of the rotating bands.

Based on the limited analyses we performed within the scope of
the Navy's request, no conclusion can be drawn by the FBI Labora-
tory as to the presence or absence of an initiating device in the
items of evidence from the U.S.S. Iowa.

Senator Warner. If I could ask for a word of clarification, Mr.
Chairman. By initiating device, you mean really foreign niaterial,
as such, that would not ordinarily have been used in loading and
firing this gun?

Mr. NiMMiCH. Well, sir, it is hard to tell, because there was for-
eign material there, but we could not determine where that may
have originated.

Chairman Nunn [presiding]. Let me just ask you a couple of
questions here. If I understand what you are saying, you are saying
the FBI Laboratory was unable to detect either similarities or dif-
ferences among the rotating bands, is that right?

Mr. NiMMiCH. Yes, sir.

Chairman Nunn. You could not tell any difference between the
ones that were involved in the Iowa explosion, the two bands that
were on projectiles involved in explosions deliberately seeded with
electronic timing devices, and a band from a projectile involved in
an explosion without any timing device or other foreign material?

Mr. NiMMiCH. That is correct, sir. Therefore, we asked the Navy
for further tests.

Chairman Nunn. You are not saying the Navy was wrong?

Mr. NiMMiCH. No, sir.

232

Chairman Nunn. You are not saying they were right?

Mr. NiMMiCH. That is correct, sir. I am saying, from the tests
that we performed, we could not make a determination.

Chairman Nunn. Does that mean that your methods are not as
thorough as the Navy's? What does it mean?

Mr. NiMMiCH. Well, sir, we had several questions

Chairman Nunn. Do not use the word thorough. Do you have the
capabilities that the Navy has? Do you have equivalent capabilities
of the Navy? Do you have more capabilities in this testing area, or
do you have less?

Mr. NiMMiCH. We had a question arise, sir, to tell us whether we
did have the capabilities or not. Our examination failed to tell any
differences, even between those bands which had a device placed in
it, and those which did not.

We therefore asked several questions: Did the device or residues
of the device go out the back end of the weapons, because the
chamber was open? Are the residues of the device focused within
the 360-degree circle of the ring? Or are they present in minute
enough quantities that our equipment is not sensitive enough to de-
termine that?

Chairman Nunn. What did you decide?

Mr. Nimmich. Well, we asked the Navy to conduct an additional
test for us. At that time they said they had another laboratory
working on it, and that no further testing would be necessary from
us.

Chairman Nunn. You asked the Navy to do another test you felt
you needed to have for your own basis?

Mr. Nimmich. Yes, sir.

Chairman Nunn. Does that mean you did not have the capability
of doing that test yourself?

Mr. Nimmich. That is correct. It was a test-firing of a 16-inch
weapon.

Chairman Nunn. There have been all sorts of stories written. I
am just trying to assess whether the public has gotten the full
story and the accurate story of what you are saying here.

Let me ask you again, do you think the Navy has more sophisti-
cated, more state-of-the-art capability in this testing area than you
do, or less?

Mr. Nimmich. The Navy has much more sensitive instrumenta-
tion than we do for the testing that they have done, yes, sir.

Chairman Nunn. Okay. So if they have got more sensitive in-
strumentation, then the fact that you could not determine it, one
way or the other, would not really tell us an3rthing, would it?

Mr. Nimmich. That is correct, sir.

Chairman Nunn. Could you have done more testing than you did
do? Was there any other practical steps that you could have taken
that you did not take?

Mr. Nimmich. We could have, however, the general consideration
would be to do as minimal damage to the items of evidence as pos-
sible. So, therefore, our approach to this was to find out whether
we were capable of determining or finding any of that residue.
That was the additional test that we asked from the Navy.

233

At that point, we found that our equipment would not detect the
materials that were left, then we would have to say that we were
incapable of doing that.

Chairman Nunn. Did the Navy actually carry out the test that
you asked them to carry out?

Mr. NiMMiCH. I am sorry, sir, I do not know.

Chairman Nunn. They never did get back with you after that?

Mr. NiMMiCH. That is correct.

Chairman Nunn. Would there have been a need for them to get
back to you?

Mr. NiMMiCH. No, sir, we were providing a service; they said
thank you for the service.

Chairman Nunn. In other words, if you could not go any further
with your testing, even if they did the tests that you asked for,
there would not be any need for them to get back to you?

Mr. NiMMiCH. That is correct.

Chairman Nunn. You are not saying there is anything the Navy
has done wrong, then?

Mr. NiMMiCH. No, sir, I am not saying that.

Chairman Nunn. In your statement you indicated that you re-
turned portions of the Iowa rotating band to the Navy. As I earlier
indicated, I believe this morning, Sandia National Laboratories will
be analyzing those portions of the band in an effort to independent-
ly determine if there are foreign materials present.

How much of the rotating band is left? Is there enough left for
Sandia to do a test?

Mr. Nimmich. We received approximately 16 inches of copper ro-
tating band during our testing procedure. We cut it approximately
in half. The Navy retrieved half of that during their testing proc-
ess.

The other one half was one we ran during our testing. We had
opened the slot. I believe it is approximately 10 inches long, and
that has been returned to them without further examination.

Chairman Nunn. Do you think that is enough for Sandia to con-
duct a test?

Mr. Nimmich. I believe that is all that there is, sir.

Chairman Nunn. I know that is all there is, but that still does
not answer the question. Based on your own expertise, do you
think there is enough left for them to do a meaningful test?

Mr. Nimmich. Yes, sir. I think we did minimal disturbance to
any material that was in there and, yes, they can examine it.

Chairman Nunn. Do you have concern that the rotating band
might have been contaminated either prior to or subsequent to the
explosion?

Mr. Nimmich. Not so much a concern. We were advised at the
time we began our examination that in order to remove the projec-
tile from the 16-inch gun on board the Iowa that a material called
a Break-free was applied to the inside of the barrel.

As we opened the flap or the fin, lifted the fin, the material un-
derneath there was somewhat oily, which was not true with the
other three rotating bands. So that there was some material that
had been added to it.

Chairman Nunn. During testimony from the Navy witnesses last
month, they stated that the description of the tests and test results

234

from the Navy's testing at their activity in Crane, IN, had been
made available to the FBI. Is that correct?

Mr. NiMMiCH. That is correct, sir.

Chairman Nunn. Are you up to date, then, on what the Navy
has done?

Mr. NiMMiCH. I have read the report from Crane. However, I
have to qualify that by saying, but I am not competent in the tech-
nology that they have applied to it and, therefore, I am not in a
position to be able to say that the work is correct or not.

I am assuming that Crane is a very reputable laboratory.

Chairman Nunn. So, you are really not in a position to tell us
your opinion about their testing methodology and results?

Mr. NiMMiCH. No, sir, I am sorry I am not.

Chairman Nunn. Thank you very much. We appreciate your
being here.

[The statement of Mr. Nimmich follows:]

Prepared Statement of Kenneth W. Nimmich, Section Chief, Scientific
Analysis Section, FBI Laboratory

function of the FBI LABORATORY

The FBI Laboratory is the only full service Federal crime Laboratory in the
United States and the Director of the FBI is charged to "Operate the Federal
Bureau of Investigation Laboratory, to serve not only the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation, but also to provide, without cost, technical and scientific assistance, includ-
ing expert testimony in Federal or local courts, for all duly constituted law enforce-
ment agencies, which may desire to avail themselves of the service." The services
provided include scientific and technical support to investigations, examinations of
physical evidence, court testimony and forensic science research and training.

Direct scientific and technical support is frequently provided at crime scenes in
major FBI cases and sometimes to state and local and other federal law enforcement
agencies in cases which achieve national recognition or involve expertise not avail-
able to local jurisdictions.

Our primary objective is to maintain a highly professional and thoroughly compe-
tent team of forensic experts with a broad range of capabilities to support the varied
needs of the Nation's criminal justice system. The FBI Laboratory is a national re-
source which has earned a reputation for excellence based on over 50 years of qual-
ity service.

Over the years, the FBI Laboratory has examined evidence in hundreds of explo-
sions. Through our experience in these cases, we have developed a systematic ap-
proach to identify the make-up of an improvised explosive device, to include the ex-
plosive used, the elements of the initiation system, and any container or housing of
the device. Our system includes a thorough examination of as much material from
the scene of the explosion as possible. These examinations take place in the follow-
ing units:

The Explosives Unit conducts visual and microscopic examinations of bomb re-
mains, commercial explosives and blasting accessories as well as military explosives
and ordnance items with the goal of reconstructing the explosive device utilized.
Toolmark examinations of bomb components are also performed by the Explosives
Unit.

The Materials Analysis Unit utilizes instrumentation such as infrared spectrosco-
py, X-ray diffractrometry, pyrolysis gas chromatography /mass spectrometry and
other advanced instruments for identification or comparison of the compositions of
paints, plastics, explosives, cosmetics, and tapes.

The Elemental and Metal Analysis Unit analyzes a variety of materials for their
elemental composition. Among the techniques utilized by this unit are scanning
electron microscopy/energy dispersive spectroscopy (SEM/EDS), inductively coupled
plasma atomic emission spectroscopy and neutron activation analysis.

This unit utilizes SEM/EDS to determine the structural and elemental character-
istics of a variety of materials. This technique is nondestructive and permits analy-
sis of individual particles at high magnification. This technique is used frequently

235

and with much success in forensic science examinations, and has been used in sig-
nificant investigations such as product tampering cases.

REQUESTS BY THE U.S. NAVY REGARDING THE U.S.S. IOWA

As a service to, and at the request of the Navy on May 16, 1989, an Explosives
and Hazardous Devices Specialist from the FBI Laboratory Explosives Unit exam-
ined the explosive damage remaining on the U.S.S. Iowa following the April 19,
1989 explosion. Upon completion of the initial inspection of turret number two the
FBI specialist noted explosive damage consistent with the deflagration of a large
quantity of smokeless powder propellant. No explosives or components which could
be associated with an improvised explosive device or initiator were located.

On June 21, 1989, the Naval Investigative Service delivered evidence to the FBI
Laboratory which consisted, in part, of propellant samples, improvised timing de-
vices and portions of four projectile rotating bands. Two of these rotating band sam-
ples were obtained from test firings using timing devices, one from a test firing
without a timing device, and one from turret number two of the U.S.S. Iowa. The
Navy advised that their scientific examinations demonstrated the presence of resi-
due from a timing device in the U.S.S. Iowa explosion. The FBI Laboratory was re-
quested to analyze the submitted evidence in an attempt to independently confirm
this finding.

ANALYSES AND FINDINGS

Components of the timer, as well as contaminants on the propellant sample, were
analyzed using SEM/EDS. Material from between the "fin" and "slot" was sampled
from three locations on each of the submitted projectile rotating bands. This materi-
al, while still on the band, was examined using light microscopy. The material was
then removed from areas under the "fin" and separated in a solvent using an ultra-
sonic cleaner to disperse the particles. The samples were then filtered and examined
using SEM/EDS. One hundred relevant particles from the three separate locations
on each of the rotating bands were analyzed for their elemental composition. Parti-
cles that were found to occur frequently in a given sample, such as copper particles,
were noted as occurring frequently and were no longer recorded. This is what is
meant by the term "relevant."

The 1,200 particles thus anlayzed were grouped by elemental composition, and the
results examined for significant similarities or differences between particle popula-
tions.

Particles consisting of aluminum were found frequently on bands from the test
firings both with and without timing devices. However, only one such particle was
found on the band from the U.S.S. Iowa. This demonstrates that differences and si-
milarities between particle populations can exist that are independent of the intro-
duction of a timing device. Therefore, any such differences or similarities require
additional scientific scrutiny, such as further characterization of the particles,
before any significance is attached. In addition, further investigative scrutiny, such
as determining other possible sources for any particles found, is also necessary.

No other significant similarities or differences were detected. Therefore, it could
not be determined from this method and this sample whether residue from a device
such as the submitted timing devices was present between the "fin" and "slot" of
the U.S.S. Iowa rotating band.

Polymeric material was found in the U.S.S. Iowa band but due to it's charred con-
dition, a definite conclusion concerning it's identity could not be made.

Because our analyses did not detect any significant differences or similarities be-
tween the particles analyzed from all the submitted bands, we identified the need
for further testing. We communicated this to the Navy, and they advised that fur-
ther testing by another laboratory had yielded significant results. They requested
that we conduct no further examinations and they retrieved unexamined portions of
the rotating bands.

Based on the limited analyses we performed within the scope of the Navy s re-
quest, no conclusion can be drawn by the FBI as to the presence or absence of an
initiating device in the items of evidence from the U.S.S. Iowa.

Chairman Nunn. I want to thank all of our witnesses today. The
committee will conclude this day's hearing, but we will be deliber-
ating further on this subject in the future.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

236

Questions Submitted by Senator Alan Dixon

Senator Dixon. Does the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) Behavioral Sci-
ences Department always work just off synopses of interviews?

Mr. NiMMiCH. The Behavioral Sciences Units (BSU) of the FBI's National Center
for the Analysis of Violent Crime (NCAVC) uses a variety of sources of factual infor-
mation when doing an assessment. Sources of factual information include, but are
not limited to: the reviews of investigators' records of interviews; reviews of tran-
scripts of interviews; analysis of laboratory and/ or for nsic reports of evidence; re-
views of medical reports; interviews and further tasking of investigators conducting
the investigation.

The Naval Investigative Service (NIS) interview reports are, in fact, very similar
in format to reports that the FBI has used successfully in court for years to record
the results of interviews. They are obviously once removed from the actual conver-
sation. However, because their purpose is to assist the memory of the individual
who did the interview — and we spent a great deal of time with those individuals — it
was easy enough for us to ask the interviewers themselves for clarification of any of
the parts that needed elucidation. Thus, we could eliminate material that, in our
experience, was not important to the assessment. We have found our assessment
technique to be successful and utilize it in the cases presented to us for analysis.

While the Smith and Esty interviews provided further confirmation of our opinion
that Cla5i;on Hartwig committed suicide. An additional value of the transcript of
the total interviews, as opposed to the investigator's reports of interviews, was that
we could see and, in some instances, actually hear recorded interview techniques of
the NIS Agents. Our conclusion was that their interview techniques were very good.
A review of the transcript indicates that the questions were open ended and not
leading. The interviewer did not attempt to place words in the mouth of the subjects
of the interview. It gives us reason to place faith in the total interview process.

It is our opinion that the NIS Agents did not write their interview synopsis in a
subjective manner. The method utilized by NIS in summarizing interviews is quite
acceptable within the criminal justice system to include courts of law.

Senator Dixon. Hartwig had also indicated in letters and in a conversation the
night prior to his death that he was going to work in the Navy's physical security
program. Maybe he would have been made just a security guard on a gate. But
would he not have been given special training by the Navy because some of the
duties for this type of assignment require exactly what he claimed he was going to
be trained to do?

How did you come to the conclusion that he was not going to have the job he
wanted?

(If they say the Navy NIS told them Hartwig was not going to have this assign-
ment):

Who told Hartwig he was not going to this new assignment?

If Hartwig was, indeed, told by someone in Naval personnel that his next assign-
ment was going to be in physical security, then he was not lying, and would that
not negate your theory?

Mr. NiMMiCH. The U.S. Navy is the appropriate organization to comment on spe-
cial training for Navy personnel.

The information provided to the BSU in our first meeting with NIS investigators
is that Hartwig was not eligible for "shore assignment in physical security" because
he had been the subject of a Captain's Mast. Special Agent Ed Goodwin, NIS, con-
firmed this information again on February 1, 1990. Goodwin further advised us that
Hartwig's chances for transfer to a physical security £issignment were knov/n to be
nonexistent by Navy personnel who would have processed his request.

Part of the second question addresses the idea that "Maybe he would have been
made just a security guard on a gate." The implication of the question appears to be
that even if he were assigned somewhere near what he wanted, somehow he would
not be exaggerating or prefabricating. The point is that Hartwig, even if he were
going to be assigned to some protective duty, would know that what he described in
his own letters was not reality, but self aggrandizement. His statements in his let-
ters were at least exaggerations, if not more.

Whether or not Hartwig knew about the results of his transfer, the fact is that he
made an effort to change career fields from a gunner's mate to what he perceived as
a more prestigious position in physical security, continuing his life in the same vein
as before; the desire to be what he was not — a mysterious and heroic person in a
violent profession.

Senator Dixon. Given the fact that you were provided both selected and mere syn-
opses of interviews which were really subjective judgments of the NIS Agents, don't

237

you think you should review all the complete interviews and use them to reevaluate
your equivocal death analysis, or that this committee should have the GAO take all
the interviews and have them reviewed by other outside experts? In other words,
what is it going to take to get the full and complete story about what happened on

the Iowa! ,■.

Mr. NiMMiCH. As we have stated in our testimony, the quality and quantity of
information provided to us by the NIS in this investigation was excellent, based on
our 14 years experience in this field. The format of the information is consistent
with law enforcement reporting, and the quality of such a nature that we were able,
based on our experience in violent crimes, to provide an equivocal death analysis

based on facts.

As we have further testified, we not only had the investigative results to analyze,
but we also met with the investigators on three separate occasions, each meeting
lasting several hours. They answered in detail any questions we had about what ex-
actly was said in any given interview, and they provided us with detailed verbal
background on the family. To date, we have maintained communication with NIS
about the results of their investigation, and we have seen no new facts which would
cause us to change our opinion.

We encourage the committee to have the interview results reviewed by outside
experts. The experts used by the committee should be qualified to do an analysis in
this type of case, and they should have access to the interviewers so that they can
get an accurate account of the interviews.

The U.S. Navy's complete report on the U.S.S. Iowa should be the best assessment
of what occurred.

[Whereupon, at 3:41 p.m., the committee adjourned, subject to
the call of the Chair.]

REVIEW OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY'S
INVESTIGATION INTO THE GUN TURRET EX-
PLOSION ABOARD THE U.S.S. "IOWA"

FRIDAY, MAY 25, 1990

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,

Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:06 a.m., in room SH-
216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Sam Nunn (chairman of
the committee) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Nunn, Levin, Bingaman,
Glenn, Gore, Warner, and Cohen.

Also present: Senator Metzenbaum.

Committee staff members present: Arnold L. Punaro, staff direc-
tor; Andrew S. Effron, general counsel; Richard D. DeBobes, coun-
sel; and Marie Fabrizio Dickinson, assistant chief clerk.

Professional staff members present: Richard E. Combs, Jr.,
Creighton Greene, John J. Hamre, William E. Hoehn, Jr., David S.
Lyles, and Frederick F.Y. Pang.

Minority staff members present: Patrick A. Tucker, minority
staff director and counsel; Romie L. Brownlee, deputy staff director
for the minority; George W. Lauffer and Mark B. Robinson, profes-
sional staff members.

Staff assistants present: Barbara L. Braucht, Kelli J. Pronovost,
Debra A. Rice, and Mickie Jan Wise.

Committee members' assistants present: Kenneth N. Luongo, as-
sistant to Senator Levin; John Gerhart, assistant to Senator Binga-
man; and Terence M. Lynch, assistant to Senator Shelby.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR SAM NUNN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Nunn. The Armed Services Committee will come to
order.

The committee meets this morning for the fourth in a series of
hearings on matters associated with the explosion on April 19, 1989
in the center gun of turret II on board U.S.S. Iowa which resulted
in the death of 47 naval personnel.

The committee first heard on November 16, 1989 from Rear
Adm. Richard Milligan, the Navy's investigating officer, and from
other Navy witnesses who assisted in the investigative effort. We
then heard from Capt. Fred Moosally, the commanding officer of
the U.S.S. Iowa at the time of the explosion. Finally, the committee
heard from three witnesses from the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion concerning the FBI's "equivocal death analysis". At that last

(239)

240

hearing we also heard from the chief of the FBI's laboratory on the
FBI's analysis of the rotating band from the projectile that was in
the barrel on the day of the explosion.

This morning, the committee will hear from Mr. Frank C. Cona-
han, Assistant Comptroller General, National Security and Inter-
national Affairs Division of the General Accounting Office; Dr.
Richard L. Schwoebel, Director of Components, Sandia National
Laboratories; and Mr. Paul W. Cooper and Dr. Karl W. Schuler,
who were both members of Sandia's technical team that conducted
the effort that was headed up by Dr. Schwoebel.

The committee asked the GAO first of all to assess the adequacy
of the Navy's investigation into the explosion and to evaluate the
Navy's conclusions, particularly those relating to the safety of the
U.S.S. Iowa and its gun turrets. We also asked the General Ac-
counting Office to inquire into certain other issues that arose
during the course of the Navy's investigation, but which were not
pursued by the investigating officer. Those issues related to the
U.S.S. Iowa and her sister battleships and involved the priority of
officer and enlisted manning and the quality of personnel; the ade-
quacy of training on the 16-inch guns; the responsiveness of the
Navy to repair and repair part requests; the adequacy of various
inspections and surveys; the authorization for utilization of U.S.S.
Iowa for experimental purposes; and the "employment plan" for
battleships.

Last October I asked the General Accounting Office to provide
interim reports on a monthly basis and for any conclusions that
may be reached even on an interim basis as to the safety of the
ship. We appreciate the General Accounting Office doing that and
working hand-in-hand with our staff during this period.

In November 1989 Senator Warner, Senator Bingaman, and I
then urged Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque, New
Mexico to assist the General Accounting Office by undertaking a
technical analysis of the Navy's tests, since we viewed it as ex-
tremely important for the Navy's technical findings to be evaluated
by an expert independent source. I ask unanimous consent that our
letters to the General Accounting Office and to Sandia National
Laboratories be entered into the record. Without objection, they
will be entered into the record.

[The information referred to follows:]

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, October 3, 1989.

Mr. Charles A. Bowsher,

Comptroller General,

General Accounting Office, Washington, DC.

241

be quite time consuming. I would ask, therefore, that I receive interim reports on a
monthly basis summarizing the actions that have been accomplished and such con-
clusions that may be reached, even on an interim basis, as to the safety of the ship.

I am also concerned with certain issues which arose during the Navy's investiga-
tion, but which were not pursued since they were not considered to be immediately
relevant to the specific task at hand, i.e. the cause of the explosion, once equipment
malfunction and accident had been ruled out. Accordingly, I request that GAO in-
quire into these other "beyond scope" issues both with respect to U.S.S. Iowa and
her sister battleships, such as the priority of officer and enlisted manning; adequacy
of training on the 16-inch guns; responsiveness of the Navy to CASREPs and repair
parts requests; adequacy of various inspections and surveys conducted on board; au-
thorization for utilization of the ship for experimental purposes; and the "employ-
ment plan" for battleships. Once again, I realize that this effort may take some time
and I would like to have monthly reports on these issues as well.

I appreciate your assistance in this important matter. The point of contact on my

staff will be Rick DeBobes, who may be reached at 224-7530.

Sincerely,

Sam Nunn, Chairman.

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, November 22, 1989.

Dr. Albert Narath,

President, Sandia National Laboratories,

Albuquerque, NM.

Dear Dr. Narath: We are writing to you concerning a matter which is of signifi-
cant interest to the Committee on Armed Services. The Committee is conducting a
series of hearings on the U.S. Navy's investigation into the explosion that occurred
on April 19, 1989 in the center gun of turret II on board U.S.S. Iowa resulting in the
death of 47 Navy personnel.

In order to enable the Committee to fully explore this matter, the assistance of
the General Accounting Office (GAO) was requested. A copy of Chairman Nunn's
letter to GAO is enclosed. The GAO, in turn, by letter of October 26, 1989 to Dr.
Schwoebel has requested the assistance of Sandia National Laboratories in review-
ing technical aspects of the Navy's investigation. As we understand it, GAO has de-
termined after extensive consultation that Sandia is the best place to assist with the
technical aspects. The committee staff has been advised that Sandia is reluctant to
uncipT'tfiKP tills DroiGct

It is extremely important to the Committee that the Navy's technical findings be
evaluated by an independent source. Additionally, the Navy's technical teams' final
report has now been received and it has been ascertained subsequent to the submis-
sion of the GAO letter that a ten inch segment of the rotating band from Iou>as
projectile is available for analysis. Independent analysis of the band to determine if
foreign material is present would be of significant assistance to our effort.

Accordingly, we request that you reconsider GAO's request and we strongly urge
you to agree to analyze the Iowa 's rotating band and perform such other technical
analysis as may be possible with respect to GAO's request as it is being made on
behalf of this Committee.
Sincerely,

Sam Nunn,
Chairman.
John Warner,

Ranking Minority Member.
Jeff Bingaman,
Committee Member.

Chairman Nunn. The purpose of this morning's hearing is to re-
ceive testimony as to the results of both GAO and Sandia's efforts
to date. I want to emphasize that the Navy has been cooperative
throughout this period with our committee, the General Account-
ing Office and with Sandia. This has been particularly true at the
working level of the Navy. It would have been impossible for GAO
and Sandia to have accomplished very much without the assistance
of the Navy. As will become clearer as the morning goes on, addi-

242

tional action on the part of the Navy will be essential for Sandia's
work to be carried to its logical conclusion. In this connection, I
would like at this point to enter into the record my letter of May
14, 1990, to the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Trost, which I
wrote to emphasize the importance I attached to Sandia's findings
which were brought to the committee's attention on May 11. With-
out objection, that letter will also be entered into the record.
[The information referred to follows:]

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,

Washington, DC, May U, 1990.

Admiral C.A.H. Trost, USN,
Chief of Naval Operations,
The Pentagon, Washington, DC.

Dear Admiral Trost: I understand that the then Vice Chief of Naval Operations,
Admiral Leon A. Edney, USN, was made aware on May 11, 1990 of the recent find-
ing by Sandia National Laboratories that the explosion on board U.S.S. Iowa may
have been caused by a high-speed overram of the bag charges and impact sensitivity
of the propellant. Pursuant to this Committee's request, Sandia National Laborato-
ries is performing an analysis of the Navy's technical investigation.

As soon as the Committee staff director, Arnold Punaro, was informed on May
11th of Sandia's findings, he directed Rick DeBobes of the Committee staff to con-
tact Admiral Edney directly to ensure that Admiral Edney was personally aware of
Sandia's findings and concerns. This information was initially provided by the
Sandia project director. Dr. Richard L. Schwoebel, to Captain Joseph D. Miceli,
USN, Director of the Technical Support Team for the U.S.S. Iowa investigation, in
view of Dr. Schwoebel's concern with the safety of continued operation of 16-inch
guns in the fleet.

I further understand that the Navy's initial reaction, as conveyed to Committee
staff, was that Sandia's laboratory tests and findings, since they were not performed
on 16-inch guns, were not relevant and that no action need be taken vis-a-vis the
deployed battleship, U.S.S. Missouri.

"The purpose of this letter is to ensure that the Navy is seriously considering San-
dia's findings in making judgments relating to the safety of the crews of the battle-
ships. At a minimum, I want to ensure that the Navy will actively and expeditiously
conduct all necessary tests to determine if Sandia's tests can be duplicated on the
16-inch gun and its associated equipment. I strongly recommend that Sandia person-
nel be involved in these tests in view of their expertise and experience and so they
can independently verify any additional Navy tests.

The Committee is not in a position at this time to make a judgment as to the safe
operation of 16-inch guns in the fleet. We do intend to hold hearings in the near
future to inquire further into this matter. I am sure that you share my concern that
the paramount interest is the safety of the crews of the battleships.
Sincerely,

Sam Nunn, Chairman.

Chairman Nunn. On May 11 after receiving this information,
the committee immediately notified the Navy. We wanted to make
sure that those responsible for the safety of the battleships had
access to this information immediately. I stressed the need for the
Navy to seriously consider these findings and to expeditiously con-
duct additional tests with the involvement of the Sandia experts.

We had originally planned only one witness from Sandia this
morning. In view of the test results that occurred at the Navy's fa-
cility at Dahlgren yesterday, we have also asked Mr. Cooper and
Dr. Schuler to testify. They participated in those tests which were
based upon the data that Sandia provided to the Navy and were
part of the follow-up effort the committee requested based on the
Sandia theory that will be outlined this morning.

The testimony we will hear this morning will expose significant
shortcomings in the Navy's investigation into this tragic incident.

243

The testimony also documents serious deficiencies in the Navy's
treatment of the battleships, both in terms of officer and enlisted
manning and in terms of the training given to the crews who man
the 16-inch guns. The testimony will cast grave doubt on the
Navy's finding concerning the presence of foreign material in the
rotating band of the Iowa projectile. As those who followed this
matter will recall, this was a key element in the Navy's foundation
for finding that the explosion occurred as a result of a wrongful
and intentional act. The testimony today will essentially eviscerate
the Navy's conclusion that the explosion on the U.S.S. Iowa was
the result of a wrongful intentional act.

Finally, I would note that the effort of this committee has been
directed towards finding out what happened so that the appropri-
ate action can be taken to ensure that it will never happen again.
In other words, our primary concern has been and is the safety of
the crews on our ships.

Gentlemen, we welcome you here today, and we look forward to
your testimony. We will hear first from Mr. Frank Conahan, and
we will then hear from Dr. Schwoebel.

Before hearing from the witnesses, however, I would ask Senator
Warner for any opening remarks he would like to make.

Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, first I wish to commend you
and members of this committee for certain initiatives that you
have taken which have led to the production of this evidence which
we will consider today. In my judgment, however, it is far too early
to jump to any conclusions. The evidence that we will receive today
represents certain tests taken first by Sandia and subsequently by
the Navy, and we need an additional period of testing.

The Secretary of the Navy has directed at least 2 more weeks of
testing, within which time you have to establish the key fact: Is
there a linkage between your discovery that the powder will ignite
under certain mechanical pressures and certain geometric orienta-
tion of the capsules of powder within the bags, and the operation of
this particular gun mount and mounts like it, which have operated
in the U.S. Navy since the close of World War II tens of thousands
of times without such a problem?

So, Mr. Chairman, I regret that certain elements of the media
have used the words that there has been a "cover-up" and that the
Navy should apologize. It is far too early to make such pronounce-
ments or reach such conclusions. We must — in the sense of fairness
to the families, to the emotions that are evoked by this continuing
investigation, to the sorrow they have suffered, to the Navy itself,
to the reputation of the Navy — not jump to these conclusions too
quickly.

I think the Secretary of the Navy and the senior officers made a
prudent decision yesterday to discontinue further training using
these 16-inch guns and to reopen the investigation to receive the
evidence which you have produced thus far and will continue to
produce in the weeks to come.

I commend you for what you have done, but in a sense of fair-
ness let us not leap to conclusions.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Nunn. Thank you. Senator Warner. Senator Cohen,
did you have a statement?

244

Senator Cohen. Just a few comments, Mr. Chairman.

If I could follow up on what Senator Warner has said. The pur-
pose of this hearing is not to gloat or to try to humiliate the Navy
because the Navy, after all, is in the business of protecting our na-
tional security and the safety of all of us. I think it will hopefully
seek a measure or touch of humility.

In my judgment there clearly was a rush to judgment. A possibil-
ity was wrapped up by investigators and psychological architects
into probabilities that were then paraded around as certitudes.
Faulty equipment was ruled out, and that left only human error.
Human error took on the dimensions of a disturbed and unbal-
anced young man who murdered 46 of his shipmates.

I must tell you, Mr. Chairman, that I was astonished to listen to
the evidence that was presented to justify the conclusion that a
sick and twisted soul was in all probability responsible for this dis-
aster. As I sat here during the course of that hearing, the words
kept going through my mind — the expression that through jaun-
diced eyes everything looks yellow. I think that was the situation
that I heard during our previous hearing.

Guilt was established, according to one writer, by gestalt, and I
think it is important that we take care. We are now debating an
anticrime bill with very serious penalties imposed upon individuals
who are convicted under that particular legislation. Whenever
someone's liberty or life is at stake, we must take great care in ar-
riving at our conclusions.

I would like to point out I do not believe that was the case here.
As a consequence, at least the lives of other sailors may have been
jeopardized as a result. We do not yet know, and we will reserve
judgment on that. Certainly reputations were ruined. It was a very
famous poet who said that someone who steals your purse from you
steals nothing but trash, but when you filch from me my good
name you rob me of that which does not enrich you but leaves me
poor indeed. That is what occurred, I think, with respect to Mr.
Hartwig and certainly Mr. Truitt.

As Senator Warner has indicated, perhaps the most melancholy
wounds of all are those that are self-inflicted; indeed, perhaps even
to the Navy itself, because if in fact the evidence shows that it was
something other than a deliberate act, I think that the Navy will
have to do a great deal to rehabilitate itself in terms of its investi-
gative activities.

So I withhold judgment as well, but I must tell you that the case
that has been presented to date left a good deal to be desired, in
my mind.

Chairman Nunn. Thank you very much. Senator Cohen.

I do think that not jumping to final conclusions as to what
caused this are in order here. I do not know that we are going to
find today what the cause was. I think that we are going to find
that the previous findings are in very serious question.

Any other opening statements? Senator Bingaman.

Senator Bingaman. Mr. Chairman, I do commend you and Sena-
tor Warner for continuing to pursue this matter. I think it is very
important and a matter which the committee has taken a very re-
sponsible role in. I think GAO and Sandia deserve great credit for

245

the work they have done. Obviously the Navy has been very coop-
erative.

I agree that the purposes of the effort at this point are first to
ensure that it does not occur again and, second, to clear the record,
correct and clear the record of Seaman Clayton Hartwig. If the evi-
dence is as I understand it to be, I believe that clearing the record
is essential as part of this. I am looking forward to the testimony.

Chairman Nunn. Senator Thurmond has asked that his prepared
statement be made a part of the record.

[The prepared statement follows:]

Prepared Statement of Senator Thurmond

Mr. Chairman, I join you in welcoming Mr. Conahan and Dr. Schwoebel to this
hearing on the continuing investigation into the tragic incident aboard the battle-
ship/ou'a.

Since that tragic day in April, the people of this Nation have been subjected to
speculative reports regarding the cause of the explosion in the gun turret. I have
been dismayed over these reports, and expect that they have caused additional
mental anguish to the families of the 47 sailors killed in the explosion.

Yesterday's dramatic announcement that the Navy suspended all live firing of the
battleships' 16-inch guns because of an unexplained ignition of powder bags adds an-
other perspective to the incident. Although we should not jump to conclusions, I be-
lieve the Navy's action, coupled with the findings of the Sandia National Laborato-
ry, jeopardizes the Navy's original findings on the explosion.

Mr. Chairman, this committee, under your leadership, directed the General Ac-
counting Office to conduct the follow-up inquiry that contributed to this significant
turn of events. Although it may take some time to determine the actual cause of the
explosion, I believe yesterday's action is a first step in clearing the name of the
sailor so maligned by the Navy's findings.

We cannot bring back the lost lives; however, we can ensure that all the facts
behind the accident are identified and that corrective action is taken to preclude a
recurrence. I hope the Navy does not dally in this effort, so we can get this tragic
incident behind us.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Nunn. Thank you. Mr. Conah'in.

STATEMENT OF FRANK C. CONAHAN, ASSISTANT COMPTROLLER
GENERAL, NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL AF-
FAIRS DIVISION, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ACCOMPA-
NIED BY MARTIN FERBER, DIRECTOR, NAVY ISSUES GROUP,
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE

Mr. Conahan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. With me this morning
is Mr. Martin Ferber, who is the Director of our Navy Issues Group
at the General Accounting Office.

I would like to point out at the outset we have a corollary work
underway concerning this matter for Mary Rose Oakar over m the
House of Representatives and Senator Metzenbaum, and I would
like to recognize that some of the work we have done, and perhaps
some of the things we will be saying today, was done as a result of
their interest in this matter as well.
Chairman Nunn. Thank you.

Senator Warner. But there is no separation, as such, between
what you will report as a consequence of their initiatives and the
initiatives of Chairman Nunn?

Mr. CoNAHAN. No, sir. ,. , r u

Senator Warner. The facts are the same that will be forthcom-
ing?

246

Mr. CoNAHAN. Correct. Yes, indeed.

Chairman Nunn. Thank you.

Mr. CoNAHAN. As you mentioned at the outset, Mr. Chairman,
we were asked to (1) conduct an independent investigation of the
Navy's technical analysis and the likely causes of the explosion; (2)
review the safety aboard the battleships; (3) examine manning and
training issues raised by the Iowa commanding officer after the ex-
plosion; and (4) review the battleship's employment plans and mis-
sion.

Working with this committee, we arranged for the Department
of Energy's Sandia National Laboratories, to conduct a technical
analysis and review the adequacy of the Navy's technical investiga-
tion. Dr. Schwoebel and his colleagues are here today to discuss
why Sandia's analysis could not corroborate the Navy's finding and
their conclusion of another plausible cause for the explosion.

I will look forward to their discussion on that matter and then
briefly discuss the other matters that you asked us to address, Mr.
Chairman. First, I would discuss a series of safety issues which
indeed do raise concerns about the general safety of the ship. I will
then discuss manning and training issues that raise questions con-
cerning general readiness of battleships. I would like to say a few
words about the mission of the battleships, that you requested us to
review, we address particularly in our changing world environ-
ment, and finally the utility and supportability of the two remain-
ing battleships after the presently planned retirement of the other
two battleships.

First, a few words about safety. The Navy's investigation of the
explosion found that safety policies and procedures simply were not
being followed aboard the ship. There are a number of examples of
that. Perhaps one of the better examples is that although no spark-
producing items are allowed in the turrets, items such as cigarette
lighters, rings, and keys were found in the remains of the deceased
sailors.

The Navy's investigation at the time also noted that Iowa per-
sonnel had improperly approved and were conducting gunnery ex-
periments. Ship personnel were loading inappropriate projectile
and powder combinations when the explosion occurred. The Navy
Inspector General subsequently investigated and reported the ex-
periments, and concluded that the firings in question on the Iowa
were, in fact, improperly authorized and contrary to Navy proce-
dures. His report concluded that the safety hazard posed to the
Iowa's crew by the experiments was at best undetermined. I expect
that that conclusion needs further exploration, particularly in view
of what we will hear a little later on this morning. My prepared
statement discusses other safety and serviceability issues, but let
me move on to the manning and training issues that you referred
to.

We found that battleships, in comparison to other surface ships,
were not assigned an equal share of authorized enlisted supervisory
personnel or personnel in ratings associated with gun turret oper-
ations. Additionally, the personnel assigned on battleships rated
lower by several measures than those assigned to other ships.

The battleships, to include the Iowa, deployed with significant
lower percentages of their authorized enlisted supervisors and

247

turret-related journeymen. The other surface ships which we sam-
pled deployed with an average of 101 percent of their authorization
for supervisory enlisted personnel while the Iowa and the battle-
ships deployed with 92 and 93 percent respectively.

These differences are more pronounced with respect to gunners-
mates and fire control men. The impact of manning for gunners-
mates aboard the Iowa was highlighted at the time of the explo-
sion. In turret II, two of the three journeymen-level gun captain po-
sitions normally manned by E-5s were filled by E-4 apprentices.
The center gun captain was the only journeyman gun captain at
the time. All three of the gun captain positions in turret I were
filled by E-4 apprentices.

We have been told repeatedly that the Navy has had difficulties
in filling billets in battleships. Other surface ships that we sampled
had excess gunnersmates and fire control at the journeyman and
supervisory levels, primarily because personnel are promoted faster
at these ships, or at higher rates. We were also told that personnel
who were assigned to the battleships and who reenlist frequently
request duty elsewhere to enhance their promotion opportunities.
Similarly, they prefer to go to schools other than the 16-inch gun-
nery school so as to get training in more technologically advanced
areas to advance their prospects for future promotion and civilian
employment.

We found that battleship personnel fare worse in advancement
opportunities. This is true for both officers and enlisted personnel.
My prepared statement gives the percentages, the comparisons as
between the battleships and the other ships that we sampled. The
other surface ships that we sampled included destroyers, cruisers,
and so on. I do not need to go into those comparisons right now.

Also, there is a higher rate of disciplinary actions among battle-
ship personnel. For example, the battleships' nonjudicial punish-
ment rate per 1,000 was approximately 25 percent higher than the
ship sample rates. I might say that about 70 percent of the battle-
ships' manning consists of personnel in grades E-1 through E-4.
Battleships have a lower level of supervisory personnel than the
ships in our sample. Navy officials agreed these factors probably
have contributed to the higher disciplinary rates aboard the battle-
ships.

Now a few words about training. The adequacy of traming on the
Iowa itself became an issue because the Navy's accident mvestiga-
tion report on the explosion said that unqualified personnel were
manning the turret. However, the former commanding officer of
the Iowa said the crew was trained, just that the records were not
up-to-date. Since the training records for the deceased crew were
destroyed in the explosion, never existed, or have never been locat-
ed, we were unable to reconcile this conflict.

We found, however, that oversight inspections which should have
assessed the Iowa's personnel qualification standard program failed
to do so during the 18 months preceding the explosion. Priorities
were placed on other areas during the review, or the review team
lacked the expertise to evaluate the 16-inch qualification program.

Also, weaknesses exist with the Navy's formal training program
for 16-inch gun operations and maintenance. Our visits to the 16-
inch school disclosed that limited hands-on training was being pro-

248

vided due to the lack of training aids. Training films being used at
the school were basically 1940s vintage, and I might say that no
improvements were noted as recently as 2 weeks ago by our staff in
the structure or available training aids since the time of the explo-
sion. While the Navy developed a draft training plan to improve
the 16-inch training courses in September 1989, the plan still
awaits final approval and implementation.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, in response to your request we reviewed
the Navy's concept of battleship employment. While the battle-
ships, of course, are very capable weapons platforms and have been
included in deployment schedules and operational plans, emerging
conditions limit their utility. The battleships were reactivated to
alleviate existing force structure shortfalls and to help meet the
600-ship goal using existing platforms.

The battleships provide an imposing array of fire power. The
Tomahawk missile gives them a significant capability for attacking
both land and other surface ships. The Harpoon missiles also con-
tribute to the battleship's capability, and the 16-inch guns are the
best source of naval surface fire support for an amphibious assault.

Because of the imposing size and configuration, the Navy be-
lieves, also, a battleship's presence can be a strong deterrent in a
third world scenario. While the battleship's Tomahawk and Har-
poon missiles capability is imposing, I need to point out it is not
unique within the Navy. Many other Navy vessels, submarines as
well as surface ships, carry these same weapons, and the battle-
ships' contribution to future amphibious warfare may be limited
because of the distances of current scenarios versus the capability
of the guns.

Furthermore, with only two battleships, personnel tempo restric-
tions will limit future deployments. Current policies, for example,
preclude a ship from deploying for an additional 12 months after it
returns from a 6-month deployment. Thus, with only two ships in
the active force, it is unlikely one would be available on short
notice should a crisis erupt. The battleships are also labor-inten-
sive, requiring a crew of about 1,500, compared, for example, to a
crew of about 360 on an Aegis cruiser.

Chairman Nunn. Do you have that broken down as to how many
of that crew are related to using those big guns as opposed to the
other parts of the crew? One of the main reasons for bringing those
battleships back was not necessarily the guns. That was one
reason, but also the cruise missile capability, to put on a platform
that had a lot of survivability, more survivability than most Navy
ships. Do you have a breakdown between the number of personnel
required for the 16-inch guns versus the people required to run the
ship if you did not have those guns at all?

Mr. CoNAHAN. I do not have the number before me, but I think I
can give it to you before this hearing is over. I think it is around 10
percent, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Nunn. Only 10 percent relate to those guns?

Mr. CoNAHAN. Something like that, but let me give you that
number before the hearing is over.

[The information follows:]

At wartime manning levels, about 16 percent of the Iowa's crew man the 16-inch
turrets and magazines.

249

Mr. CoNAHAN. Finally, reducing the number of battleships to
two, especially with one home-ported on each coast, will compound
the manning and training problems that I discussed earlier and
further limit availability.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, I do not have to remind anyone here of
the budget situation that we are facing generally and the pressures
to reduce the defense budget. That leads me to say that because
the battleships are costly to maintain and difficult to man, and be-
cause of the unanswered safety supportability and mission-related
questions, the two remaining battleships seem to be top candidates
for deactivation as we look for ways to scale back U.S. forces.

That conclusion, that thought on our part, came out of the em-
ployment work that we did, sir.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Conahan follows:]

250

statement Of
Frank C. Conahan
Assistant Comptroller General
National Security and International Affairs
Division

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee:

I appear before the Committee today to discuss the results of our
work concerning several issues pertaining to the April 19, 1989,
explosion of the center gun in Turret II aboard the USS Iowa. The
explosion killed 47 sailors. Since the Navy's September 1989
report on its investigation of the explosion, concern has been
expressed on the adequacy of the investigation and the continued
safety of battleships.

Our work was based on requests received from you; The Honorable
Mary Rose Oakar, Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Economic
Stabilization, House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban
Affairs; and the Honorable Howard M. Metzenbaum, United States
Senate. We were asked to (1) conduct an independent investigation
of the Navy's technical analysis of likely causes of the explosion,
(2) review the safety aboard battleships, (3) examine manning and
training issues raised by the Iowa ' s Commanding Officer after the
explosion, and (4) review the battleships' employment plans and
mission. We engaged the Department of Energy's Sandia National
Laboratories to conduct a technical analysis and review the
adequacy of the Navy's technical investigation. We addressed the
other issues.

RESULTS IN BRIEF

Before discussing in detail our findings in each of the areas
reviewed, let me briefly summarize.

251

Technical Analysis

Sandia's analysis could not corroborate the Navy's technical
finding that an improvised chemical device initiated the
explosion. Furthermore, Sandia has identified a potential
hazard -- the impact sensitivity of the gunpowder in combination
with an overram at higher than normal speeds which could have
caused the explosion. Sandia believes that further testing on this
is needed to confirm its finding.

Safety and Serviceability

As discussed in the Navy's report on the explosion and the
subsequent Navy Inspector General's report on the gunpowder
experimentation that was taking place at the time, safety policies
and procedures were not being followed at the time of the
explosion. Both Navy reports concluded, however, these violations
did not cause the explosion. We examined various equipment,
ammunition, and personnel safety records for the four battleships
and did not find anything to lead us to believe that the
battleships had experienced safety or material problems different
than those experienced by other naval ships.

Manning and Training

we found that, as a result of the Navy's assignment process, the
Iowa and the battleships were assigned a disproportionably low
percentage of enlisted supervisory personnel, including gunners
mates and fire controlmen, when compared to a selected sample of
other Ships. Also, we corroborated the Iowa's former Commanding
Officer's perception that the quality of manning on the battleships
was lower than that for naval ships on average.

We a

ISO identified some specific training issues. However, because

252

training records were destroyed in the explosion, we could not
reconcile the conflicting statements from the former Commanding
Officer that his personnel were adequately trained on the day of
the explosion and the Navy's accident investigation report that
said they were not.

Battleship Missions

The battleships, with their combination of weapons, provide an
imposing array of firepower. They perform a strike mission with
their cruise missiles and their 16-inch guns are the best source
of naval surface fire support for an amphibious assault. Also,
according to Navy officials, the battleships can be a strong
deterrent in a third-world scenario. However, other ships with
cruise missiles provide excellent strike warfare capability and the
changing world security environment brings into question the Navy's
need to maintain the battleships to support a large scale
amphibious assault.

Moreover, the planned retirement of two battleships, including the
Iowa , raises questions about the usefulness and supportabi lity of
the other two ships in the active fleet. A deployed battleship's
presence in overseas theaters will be limited because of the effect
of peacetime operating and personnel tempo restrictions on the two
remaining battleships. Manning and training problems will also be
compounded by a smaller pool of experienced 16-inch gun-related
personnel .

It is inevitable that the defense budget will be reduced over the
next several years. Given the unanswered safety-related questions,
the manning situation, the mission-related questions, and the
usefulness and supportabi 1 i ty concerns, the two remaining
battleships seem to be top candidates for decommissioning as we
look for ways to scale back U.S. forces.

253

SANDIA'S REVIEW OF NAVY TECHNICAL FINDINGS

When we were asked to obtain technical assistance to review (1) the
issue of evidence of foreign material in the rotating band of the
projectile lodged in the gun barrel in which the explosion
occurred, which the Navy interpreted as being from a detonating ■
device, and (2) the stability of the gunpowder, we counseled with
the National Science Foundation and the Office of Technology
Assessment. Both stated that the Department of Energy's
laboratories, especially Sandia National Laboratories, were capable
sources of conducting an independent analysis.

At our request, Sandia performed an analysis concentrating on two
areas. First, Sandia explored whether the Navy's finding of
foreign material in the rotating band of the projectile lodged in
the Iowa's gun and the Navy's analysis of such material indicated
that an improvised chemical detonator ignited the powder and caused
the explosion. A major constraint to Sandia's analysis was that,
after the Navy's and the FBI's analyses, there was no longer any
part of the Iowa ' s rotating band that had not been subjected to an
analysis or examination. Furthermore, the Navy could no longer
locate a significant piece of evidence-- the iron fibers with
encrusted material that the Navy said came from a detonating
device. However, Sandia was able to build upon the Navy's analysis
and to obtain parts of the band to examine. It is confident in its
findings, which conclude that the foreign materials that the Navy
found were not inconsistent with the nominal levels found
throughout gun turrets and were consistent with the maritime
environment. For example, calcium and chlorine — two elements in
the Navy's postulated detonator--were readily detectable in both
Turrets I and II (the turret in which the explosion occurred) on
the Iowa and in turrets on the battleships New Jersey and
Wisconsin. Therefore, Sandia could not corroborate the Navy's
finding that such foreign material was evidence of a detonator.

24-931 0-91-9

254

Second, Sandia explored whether the explosion cculd have been
caused by an accidental ignition of the powder. Sandia agreed
with the Navy accident investigation report that the powder was
stable and confirmed that a significant overrarr of the powder
charge occurred. However, Sandia has raised a question regarding
the Navy's statement that impact and compression of the bag charge
were not contributing factors to the Iowa incident,

Sandia believes that a possible alternate scenario to the Navy's
finding of a deliberate act is that an unintentional high speed
overram of the powder bags combined with the impact sensitivity of
the powder led to the explosion. Suggestion of an unintentional
high speed overram comes from (1) the Navy's accident investigation
report which noted that the rammerman was conducting his first live
firing and there were reports of an unidentified problem with the
center gun immediately before the explosion and (2) Sandia's
postulation that the car which brings the powder to the gun room
had not returned, which it normally could have during the time of a
normal speed ram. Sandia does not consider its study complete, in
the sense that a clear and definite cause of the explosion has
been identified, and it recommends areas of further investigation
by the Navy.

The Executive Summary of Sandia's report is included as an appendix
to this statement and its printed report will be available on
June 4, 1990. Mr. Schwoebel , who directed Sandia's work, is with
me today to discuss Sandia's analysis.

SAFETY AND SERVICEABILITY

According to the Navy's investigation report, approved procedures
to ensure the safe firing of the 16-inch guns were not followed
aboard the Iowa on April 19, 1989. Subsequently, the Navy
Inspector General also concluded that the experimentation with

255

gunpowder conducted aboard the Iowa was "at worst not safe and at
best undetermined in its safety." To further investigate the
safety and serviceability of battleships we reviewed reports of
equipment problems, ammunition mishaps and malfunctions, and
personnel-related injury data for all four battleships and compared
them to Navy ships in general. This data disclosed no systemic
problems with the material condition of the guns or the ammunition
components involved in the explosion, or on the battleships, in
general, that warrant any corrective action.

Safety Violations

The Navy's investigation of the explosion found that safety
policies and procedures were not being followed. For example,
although no spark producing items are allowed in the turrets,
items such as cigarette lighters, rings and keys were found on the
remains of the deceased sailors.

The Navy's investigation at the time of the explosion also believed
that Iowa personnel had improperly approved and were conducting
gunnery experiments. Ship personnel were loading an inappropriate

projectile/powder combination when the explosion occurred. This
involved 5 bags of an authorized type of powder with a 2,700-pound
projectile rather than 6 bags of the authorized type of powder.
Improperly authorized combinations were fired on at least two
other occasions. The Navy believed that neither the presence of
spark producing devices nor the experimental firing caused the
explosion.

The Navy Inspector General subsequently investigated the reported
experiments with 16-inch projectiles and propellant and concluded
that the firings in question on the Iowa were, in fact, improperly
authorized and contrary to Navy procedures. His report concluded

256

that the safety hazard posed to the Iowa's crew by the experiments
was, at best, undetermined.

No Prior Indications of

Safety or Serviceability Problems

We reviewed reports of equipment problems, ammunition mishaps and
malfunctions, and personnel-related injury data for all four
battleships since their reactivation. For example, we examined the
equipment failure reports that ships submit for all equipment
failures that affect their ability to perform their mission and
that cannot be corrected within 48 hours. All of the equipment
failure reports the battleships submitted for equipment failures
affecting the 16-inch turrets since their reactivation were
categorized as having only a minor impact on the ships' primary
missions. We also noted no trend or pattern in the reported
equipment failures that indicated systemic problems with the guns
and other turret equipment.

We also compared the battleships' equipment failure experience to
that of other surface ships to determine if the battleships present
any undue material or supply support problems. They do not appear
to do so. Between 1984 and 1989, for example, the battleships
operated without any major equipment failures for a substantially
greater percentage of time than did surface combatants as a whole.
There were no distinct differences in the percentages of the
equipment failure reports submitted because the necessary repair
parts were not available on the ships.

Previous Ammunition Mishaps/Malfunctions

We also examined several data sources, including ammunition mishap
and malfunction reports and investigations. We found no
indications of preexisting problems with the type of propellant

257 '•^^-.

involved in the explosion. However, ammunition problems have been
encountered with other 16-inch ammunition components in the past.
For example, there were problems with split powder bags. A program
is underway to correct that problem. Other problems, which have
been addressed, were encountered with earlier versions of the
primers used to ignite the powder charges because the primers
deteriorated in storage.

Susceptibility to Inadvertent Detonation

Concerns were raised after the explosion over the ammunition's
sensitivity to the effects of electromagnetic radiation,
frequently referred to as HERO. Communications and radar
transmitters can transmit radiation that can cause ammunition
components containing electrical circuits to detonate. The primer
was the only ammunition component involved on April 19 that
contains an electrical circuit and it requires only moderate
protection from electromagnetic energy; it cannot be within 56 feet
of a transmitting AN/WSC-3 antenna for example. Turret II is about
100 feet from that type of antenna, so HERO should not have been a
concern. In their investigations, Sandia and the Navy ruled out
the primer as the cause of the explosion.

While 16-inch ammunition components do not fully meet the Navy's
criteria for i nsens i t i vi ty to unplanned heat, shock, or impact
stimuli, the current inventory ranks 19th among the 25 munitions of
greatest concern to the Navy. The ammunition does not meet the
Navy's standards because it demonstrates some susceptibility to
sympathetic detonation--detonating in response to a near-by
detonation of another explosive item. The requirement to meet the
standards has been waived for the current inventory, however,
because the Navy considers that the 16-inch inventory poses a
relatively low danger compared to other ship board munitions and
because modifying other munitions has a higher funding priority.

258

Personnel Injury Experience

We also reviewed the reports of personal injuries and deaths
occurring on board the battleships and compared the results to
injury rates on all surface ships to determine if this would reveal
any systemic gun or ammunition problems. They did not.

Any accident resulting in a fatality, a lost workday, an
electrical shock, a person overboard, or a chemical or toxic
exposure must be reported to the Navy Safety Center. We found that
the injury rates for the battleships were lower than the rates of
other ship types in 1987 and 1988. The battleships' 1989 rate was
higher than that for surface ships overall, but it would have been
lower if the Iowa explosion was excluded from the statistics.
While the Iowa had the highest injury rate of the four battleships
in 1989 (again, due to the turret explosion), its injury rate was
not the highest among the four battleships in 1987 and 1988.

Other than the Iowa's turret explosion, none of the reported
accidents aboard the battleships involved firing the 16-inch guns.
One sailor, however, was injured in a turret during a training
drill, and another was injured in a 16-inch magazine while
conducting an operational test. Most of the accidents involved
injuries such as toxic inhalation, contusions, and fractures
incurred during routine operations. For example, sailors slipped
and fell on decks and ladders, had hatches closed on their hands,
or were injured handling heavy equipment or supplies.

Additionally, none of the reported accidents involved electrical
shocks in the 16-inch turrets.

MANNING

We found that battleships, in comparison to other surface ships
were not assigned an equal share of authorized enlisted supervisory

259

personnel or personnel in ratings associated with gun turret
operations. Additionally, the personnel assigned on battleships
rated lower by several measures than those assigned to other ships.

Low Manning Level of
Supervisory Personnel

We compared peacetime authorizations to on-board manning for the
battleships with the average of 17 surface ships at various times
in the deployment cycle. We did not include the battleship
Wisconsin because it had not deployed since its reactivation. The
17 surface ships included destroyers, cruisers, and amphibious
assault type ships. We found that the overall percentage of
authorized enlisted personnel assigned to the battleships was
comparable to that of the sample ships. However, manning levels of
all battleship enlisted supervisors, including gunners mates and
fire controlmen associated with the 16-inch turrets were generally
lower than those of the other ships in our sample.

The battleships and the Iowa deployed with significantly lower
percentages of their authorized enlisted supervisors and turret-
related journeymen. The ships in the sample deployed with an
average of 101 percent of their authorization for supervisory
enlisted personnel (pay grades E-7 through E-9) , while the Iowa and
battleships deployed with 92 and 93 percent, respectively. These
differences were more pronounced for gunners mates and fire
controlmen, as table 1 shows. The situation was similar with
regard to journeymen (pay grades E-5 and E-6) in the gunners mate
and fire controlman ratings.

Conversely, as the table shows, the battleships were assigned a
higher percentage of their authorized apprentices in pay grades E-1
through E-4.

260

Table 1: On-board Percentages of Gunners Mates and Fire

Controlmen Compared to Billets Authorized Levels at
Deployment

Iowa Battleships Ship Sample
(percent)

AllSuoer visors 92 93 101

Gunners Mates:

Supervisors 73 77 100

Journeymen 88 82 135

Apprentices 94 92 73

Fire Controlmen:

Supervisors 92 88 120

Journeymen 89 92 128

Apprentices 106 109 85

The impact of manning for gunners mates aboard the Iowa was
highlighted at the time of the explosion. In Turre*- II, two of the
three journeymen level gun captain positions, normally E-5s, were
filled by E-4 apprentices. The center gun captain was the only
journeyman gun captain. All three of the gun captain positions in
Turret I were filled by E-4 apprentices and a journeyman was
filling the supervisory turret captain's position, which is
normally filled by an E-7,

Chief of Naval Personnel officials recently told us that they had
difficulties in filling billets on battleships. The officials also
said that the ship sample had excess gunners mates and fire
controlmen at the journeymen and supervisory levels because their
personnel were promoted at higher rates. Also, personnel promoted
during a deployment are not reassigned, even though on-board
excesses develop. Since the school terms for tho-^e ratings on the
sample ships are longer than those for the 16-inch-related schools,
the personnel tend to be a higher grade when reporting to ships of
the types in our sample.

The officials also noted that personnel who are assigned to the
battleships and who reenlist frequently request duty elsewhere to

261

enhance their promotion opportunities by gaining practical
experience in the more common gun weapon systems. Similarly, they
prefer to attend schools for other gun weapons systems to enhance
their promotion opportunities and, because the other guns have
newer electronic technology to enhance their prospects for future
civilian employment. Sailors aboard the Iowa expressed similar
views to us.

Battleship Personnel Fare

Worse In Advancement Opportunities

As of December 1989, battleship officers had been selected at a
lower rate, compared to officers in the sample of other surface
warfare ships for leadership positions such as executive officer
and commanding officer. Only 23 percent of the commanders serving
on battleships were considered qualified for commanding officer
compared to 88 percent of the commanders on the sample ships. For
lieutenant commanders be considered to serve as executive officers,
the figures were more comparable — 53 percent of battleship
lieutenant commanders were considereJ qualified compared to 56
percent on the sample ships. However, the Iowa had only 25 percent
considered qualified.

Battleship enlisted personnel also fared worse during the March
1989 promotion cycle than did personnel aboard other ships in our
sample. Battleship personnel overall scored lower on the promotion
tests, a key element in the promotion eligibility process. Gunners
mates and fire controlmen failure rates for battleship and Navy-
wide personnel were similar. However, the battleship gunners mates
and fire controlmen failure rates of 11 and 6 percent,
respectively, were significantly higher than the ship sample's
failure rates of 0 and 1 percent, respectively.

Among those who passed the test, fewer battleship personnel in the
gunners mate and fire controlmen ratings were selected for

262

promotion. For example, 53 percent of the gunners mates on board
the battleships was promoted compared to 65 percent for the ship
sample and 58 percent Navy-wide. For fire controlmen, the results
were 8 percent for the battleships, 15 percent for the ship sample,
and 13 percent Navy-wide.

Higher Rate of
Disciplinary Actions

During fiscal year 1989, battleship personnel experienced a higher
rate of disciplinary actions, including non-judicial punishments
(NJPs), courts-marital, and punitive discharges. For example, the
battleships' NJP rate per thousand (195) was approximately 25
percent higher than the ship sample rate (158 per thousand) and
185 percent higher than the Navy-wide rate (69 per thousand).
While the Iowa had the lowest rate (173 per thousand) among
battleships, its NJP rate was still 150 percent higher than the
Navy-wide rate. Similar results were noted for the battleships'
and the Iowa's courts-martial and punitive discharge rates.

About 70 percent of the battleships' manning consists of personnel
in grades E-1 through E-4. Battleships also have a lower level of
supervisory personnel than the ships in our sample. Navy officials
agreed these factors may have contributed to the higher
disciplinary rates aboard the battleships.

PROBLEMS IN 16-INCH TRAINING

The adequacy of training on the Iowa became an issue because the
Navy's accident investigation report on the explosion said that
unqualified personnel were manning the turret. However, the former
Commanding Officer of the Iowa said the crew was trained, just that
the records were not up to date. Since the training records for
the deceased crew were destroyed in the explosion, never existed,
or have not been located, we are unable to reconcile this

263

conflict. We found, however, that oversight inspections, which
should have assessed the Iowa ' s 16-inch Personnel Qualification
Standard (PQS) program, failed to do so during the 18 months
preceding the explosion. Priorities were placed on other areas
during the review or the review teams lacked the expertise to
evaluate the 16-inch PQS program. Additionally, the Navy had not
approved a training plan for the battleship class and the advanced
training school had limited hands-on training aids for operation
and maintenance instruction.

While the Iowa had a PQS program for the personnel assigned to its
turrets, insufficient records were available after the explosion to
provide an overview of the individuals' qualifications. The Navy's
accident investigation report criticized the Iowa for a lack of
documentation, especially service record entries, for determining
the qualifications of assigned personnel. We found, however, that
service record entries, while preferable, were not required until
personnel were transferred to another command. The Iowa and its
type commander's regulations now require such entries upon
completion of assigned PQS tasks. Our review of service records
for selected turret positions in November 1989 found the new
requirements had been implemented.

using reconstructed data, Iowa officials attempted to evaluate the
qualifications status of the personnel assigned turret positions
on April 19. Personnel were considered to be "operationally
qualified" based on the number of gun fire exercises and training
drills in which they had participated. While the information they
developed indicated that the personnel assigned in the turret were
experienced, we found weaknesses in the analysis. In our opinion,
the crew's proficiency cannot be verified because the information
merely shows that the crew members were assigned to a position
within the turret during the exercises and drills but does not
document that they actually performed the responsibilities. For

264

example, one person was classified as operationally qualified, even
though he was serving in his assigned role for the first time on
April 19. In another case, the status of one individual serving in
Turret II was not included in the analysis.

The Iowa ' s Turret II was authorized five personnel who are required
to have completed training at the Navy's formal school for 16-inch
gunners. However, on the day of the explosion, only two of the
positions were filled with individuals who had attended the
school .

Weaknesses exist with the Navy's formal training program for
16-inch gun operations and maintenance. Gunners mates aboard both
the Iowa and the New Jersey were very disappointed with the Navy's
formal school for 16-inch gunners because it lacked actual turret
equipment and they believed it offered little practical
instruction. The crews believed that they learned their jobs
through on-the-job training. Likewise, both the school's internal
evaluations and the Navy's draft training plan for the battleships
noted the problems caused by the lack of training aids. Our visits
to the school confirmed that limited hands-on training was being
provided due to the lack of training aids. Training films being
used at the school were basically I940's vintage. No improvements
were noted in the structure or available training aids since the
explosion. While the Navy developed a draft training plan to
improve the 16-inch training courses in September 1989, the plan
still awaits final approval and implementation.

BATTLESHIP MISSIONS

In response to your request, we reviewed the Navy's concept of
battleship employment-- what are the ships' wartime missions and
how they are scheduled for peacetime deployment. My remarks will
be brief since much of the detailed information is classified.

265

While the battleships are very capable weapons platforms and have
been included in deployment schedules and operational plans,
emerging circumstances limit their utility. The battleships were
reactivated to alleviate existing force structure shortfalls and to
help meet the 600-ship goal using existing platforms. The
battleships, with their combination of 9 16-inch guns in 3 turrets,
8 5-inch twin gun mounts, 16 Harpoon antiship cruise missiles, and
32 Tomahawk cruise missiles, provide an imposing array of
firepower. The Tomahawk missiles give them a significant
capability for attacking land targets and other surface ships. The
Harpoon missiles also contribute to the battleships' capability to
operate against hostile surface ships. The battleships' 16-inch
guns are the best source of naval surface fire support for an
amphibious assault and are, in fact, the only guns larger than 5
inches remaining on Navy ships. When compared to air support in an
amphibious operation. Navy officials said the 16-inch guns, within
their range limitations, can deliver more firepower under a wider
variety of weather conditions. Because of its imposing size and
configuration, the Navy believes a battleship's presence can be a
strong deterrent in a third-world scenario.

While the battleships' Tomahawk and Harpoon missile capability is
imposing, it is not unique within the Navy. Many other Navy
vessels, submarines as well as surface ships, carry those same
weapons. Also, the battleships' contribution to future amphibious
warfare also may be limited. The current maximum range of just
over 23 miles of the battleships' 16-inch guns (their only unique
weapon system) impairs the ships' ability to provide effective
naval surface fire support within the context of an "over the
horizon" amphibious assault — one launched from 25 to 50 miles
offshore and extending far inland.

Furthermore, with only two battleships, operating and personnel

266

tempo restrictions will limit future deployments. Current
policies, for exarnple, preclude a ship from deploying for an
additional 12 months after it returns from a 6-month deployment.
Thus, with only two ships in the active force, it is unlikely one
would be available on short notice should a crisis erupt. The
battleships are also labor intensive, requiring a crew of about
1,500 compared, for example, to a crew of about 360 on an Aegis
cruiser. Finally, reducing the number of battleships to two,
especially with one homeported on each coast, will compound the
manning and training problems discussed earlier and further limit
avai labil ity .

There is current pressure to greatly reduce the defense budget,
which led to the decision to retire two battleships. Because the
battleships are costly to maintain (about $58 million to operate
annually according to the Navy), and difficult to man, and because
of the unanswered safety and mission-related questions, they should
be actively considered in budget trade-off decisions currently
being explored by the Department of Defense.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my prepared remarks and I would be
happy to answer any questions.

267

APPENDIX I APPENDIX I

Executive Suininar>

Executive Summary

This repon describes work by Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) relevant to
three aspects of the explosion that occurred in the center gun room of Turret 2 of
the USS IOWA on April 19, 1989, killing 47 crewmen. Our studies began in
December 1989 with initial contacts and information exchange with the United
Slates Navy (USN). Technical work began in January 1990 and continued to May
15, 1990.

The essential results of our study are as follows:

(1) We could neither prove nor disprove the presence of a chemical ignitor
proposed by the USN. The interpretation of evidence for a chemical
ignitor is complicated by the fact that some chemical constituents of such
an ignitor are found throughout 16 in. gun turrets, not only on the USS
IOWA, but also the USS WISCONSIN and the USS NEW JERSEY.
Forms of these constituents are either commonly used in the turrets or are
a part of the maritime environment. Steel wool was another component of
the proposed ignitor. We found iron fibers in the rotating band that could
be steel wool, but we were unable to clearly identify a source of fibers of
their diameter. We believe evidence for the presence of a chemical ignitor
is inconclusive.

(2) Our analyses indicate that the propellant stabilizer was within acceptable
limits. We also found only a very remote possibility that this propellant
could be initiated in the breech by friction, electrostatic discharge, or
electromagnetic radiation. Similarly, we conclude there is only a very
remote possibility the black powder could have been initiated in the
breech by any of these mechanisms. Ether/air combustion cannot be
achieved because minimum necessary concentrations are precluded. Even
if the minimum concentrations are achieved and combustion occurs, our
analyses show that the propellant cannot be ignited. These findings are in
general agreement with those of the USN.

(3) We confirmed that the powder bags were overrammed against the
projeaile and determined that the extent of the overram was
approximately 3 in. greater than that established by the USN. Our
analyses indicate that the bag charges were under a compressive load of at
least 2800 pounds at the time of the explosion. There may have been even
higher transient forces due to dynamic loading resulting from a greater
than normal ram speed. While the rammer is capable of a speed of 13.9
ft/s, we could only establish that the rammer speed was at least 2 ft/s.

(4) The cause of the explosion was not conclusively determined. However, an
important factor may have been the increase in impact sensitivity of a
powder bag with a reduced number of pellets in its trim layer. (The trim
layer is an incomplete layer of pellets lying on their sides in the front of the
bag and just behind the black powder pouch on the next bag.) Our half-
scale experiments indicate that reducing the number of these pellets lying
next to the powder pouch increases impact sensitivity enough that an
explosion could have been caused by an overram at a higher than norma!
speed. Our studies indicate that impact initiation depends on two key
factors: the number of pellets in the trim layer, and the speed of the
overram. However, these experiments must be extended to actual 16 in.
gun conditions to establish the validity of this ignition mechanism.

268"

Navy personnel were most helpful in providing information and materials germane
to this study. In particular, we are grateful to Captain Joseph D. Miceli, USN,
Director of the Technical Support Team, Naval Sea Systems Command, who
responded without fail to a host of requests that grew out of our study. This
included arranging for information gathering visits aboard the USS IOWA and two
other battleships; extensive interactions vtith personnel at the Naval Surface
Warfare Center (NSWC-Dahlgren), Dahlgren, VA; Naval Weapo.^ Support
Center (NWSC-Crane), Crane, IN; Naval Ordnance Station (NAVORDSTA),
Indian Head, VA; Norfolk Naval Shipyard (NNSY), Norfolk, VA; Naval Ordn^.nce
Station (NAVORDSTA), Louisville, KY; and access to numerous reports and the
testimony of several crewmen at the Judge Advocate General manual
investigation. We are also indebted to the USN for arranging for us to speak with
Gunner's Mate (Guns) First Class Dale E. Mortensen, who drew on his extensive
experience to provide us with firsthand information regarding 16 in. gun
operations.

The USN investigation of the accident was extensive and included a variety of
studies that were conducted in considerable depth. Our studies drew heavily on
that work. It served as a valuable basis on which to extend certain elements of this
investigation, and made our studies more productive than they would otherwise
have been.

Our studies focused on: 1) debris and any foreign materials in the rotating band of
the projectile in the center gun; 2) their possible relation to or consistency with the
hypothetical ignitor described by the USN; and 3) stability and sensitivity of the
propellant and black powder contained in the individual bag charges used on the
USS IOWA. The rotating band is located toward the rear of the projectile and, by
engaging the rifling of the barrel, spins the projectile to ensure stability in flight.

Studies of debris from the rotating band had been performed by the USN and, to a
much more limited extent, by the FBI. Evidence from the rotating band is
considered [>otentially important because the omnelure of the band was exposed to
the initial pari of the explosion, and then closed as the projectile was propelled
partway up the barrel of the gun. (The caruielure is a groove in the rotating band
of the projectile.) That is, any foreign material found in the sealed cannelure
legion of the rotating band might contain important evidence regarding the
initiation process. The stability and sensitivity of propellant is of interest because
of its age at the time of the explosion (approximately 44 yrs) and the possibility of
unforeseen effects of storage at elevated temperatures that occurred during part of
the life of this material.

SNL personnel had access to an approximately 10 in. length of the USS IOWA
rotating band. (The remaining approximately 40 in. of band had been consumed in
experiments by the USN in its studies.) The 10 in. length of the band forwarded to
us had originally been sectioned into several pieces and the cannelure opened and
examined by the FBI. Accordingly, our studies are based on regions of the
cannelure that had been opened, examined, and stored some months before.

The USN reported the presence of ca'cium (Ca), chlorine (CI), polyethylene
terephihalaie (PET) film fragments, certain glycols and iron fibers in the rotating
band of the projectile. The USN reported that these were foreign materials and
evidence for the presence of an ignitor device composed of steel wool, brake fluid,
and an oxidizing chemical (calcium hypochlorite), placed in a plastic bag.

We find that Ca and CI are readily deteaable throughout the entire region of both
Turret 1 and Turret 2 of the USS IOWA, Turret 2 of the USS NEW JERSEY, and
Turret 2 of the USS WISCONSIN. The presence of these elements is consistent
with the maritime environment and the cleaning operations carried out in the
turrets. We found these elements on two iron fibers that we extracted from the
rotating band from the USS IOWA. We also observed an additional four small
iron-fiber fragments that could not be removed from the rotating band for analysis
without destroying them. The surfaces of three of these iron-fiber fragments had
concentrations of Ca and CI that were similar to the two that were extracted. (The
fourth fiber was retained for another analytical procedure.) The occurrence of

269

these elements on the various fibers does not clearly establish the presence of an
ignitor device because the concentrations of these elements are withii) the
statistical variation of Ca and CI levels on metal fibers found elsewhere in the
turret.

The USN had previously removed and analyzed several iron fibers from the USS
IOWA rotating band. One of these fibers was described in the NWSC-Crane
repon to have crusted regions containing high concentrations of Ca and CI. It was
the analysis of this fiber that was the basis of the USN's assertion that iron fibers
with abnormally high concentrations of Ca and Q were found in the rotating band
of the projectile of the USS IOWA. When we visited NWSC-Crane to examine
this fiber, we found that it, along with some others, could not be located. SNL
personnel worked jointly with NWSC-Crane to examine and analyze several other
fibers that were retained by NWSC-Crane. All of those fibers were free of crusted
regions, as were the six fibers we had previously either extracted or observed in the
rotating band at SNL.

The surface concentrations of Ca and CI on all the fiber samples that we have
analyzed, both at SNL and jointly with USN personnel at NWSC-Crane, were of
nominal levels, not greatly different from levels of these elements on fibers found
in other turret locations. In fact, the concentrations of Ca and CI observed by both
ourselves and the USN were very similar, i.e., only small quantities of Ca and CI
were measured. We could not clearly identify any of the fibers that we extracted as
remnants of steel wool. However, these fibers were found to have low (< 0.6 at. %)
bulk carbon concentrations consistent with steel wool, which is commonly made of
iron fibers.

The USN also reported steel wool in the rotating bands of other projectiles stored
aboard the USS IOWA. Those fibers could not be located so we were unable to
analyze their surface composition. We identified some steel fragments in a brush
used to clean the guns in Turret 2, but our analyses indicate that those high-carbon
steel fragments came from bore liners inside the barrels. (A bore liner is the inner
surface of the gun barrel and in direct contact with the projeaile.)

The diameters of fibers found in the USS IOWA rotating band by both the USN
and SNL were very similar. The USN states that the fibers found on other
projectiles stored aboard the USS IOWA were of smaller diameter. We have not
corroborated that observation because those fibers could not be located.

Two glycols in the rotating band of the projectile were identified by the USN as
"significant foreign materials," possibly constituents of brake fluid used in the
hypothetical ignitor device. Our studies show that the first of these glycols is a
constituent of a cleaning and lubricating fluid (Break-FreeTw) routinely used in the
turrets. Our analyses indicate that the USN identification of the second material
is a glycol is incorrect. The material is aaually phenol, which is also a constituent
of Break-FreeTM. a third glycol, not considered to be a "significant foreign
material," was identified by the USN as a constituent of a marker pen. We agree
with that identification, but we find that it is also a constituent of Break-FreeTM.

The USN found a single fragm^^it of a polymer film in the cannelure and identified
it as a possible residue of PET. The USN proposed that a plastic bag of this
material was used to contain the hypothetical ignitor device. We also identified
fragments of this material in the brush used to clean the guns in Turret 2. PET is
known to be chemically equivalent to DacronTM and MylarTM. Accordingly, such
fragments could have come from several sources, including the bore socks used for
gun cleaning and ordinary clothing. We observed the presence of many polyrneric
species in the cannelure of the rotating band, but not PET. Because polymeric
fragmenu can be found in various regions of the turret, their occurrence is not a
unique indication of the presence of the hypothetical ignitor device.

SNL personnel also examined cannelure debris from a test at NSWC-Dahlgren in
which ih- bag charges were ignited by a chemical ignitor similar to the one
proposed by the USN. This ignitor used steel wool, but we found no iron fibers or
fragments of iron fibers in the limited length (-8 in.) of the rotating band that we

270

examined. The USN found five fibers in the entire band (-50 in.) from another
test of this same kind. Apparently there can be considerable variation in the
quantity and distribution of fibers from such experiments.

The USN provided us with twelve bags of propellant with black powder pads from
the same lot as that aboard the USS IOWA at the time of the explosion. In
addition, the USN provided access to its extensive studies and background
information on this propellant and black powder.

The propellant used in the bag charges for the 16 in. guns contains a stabilizer
(DPA) that scavenges decomposition products that are oxides of nitrogen. The
stabilizer helps maintain uniform performance of the propellant over time. The
USN stated that the level of stabilizer in the propellant aboard the USS IOWA was
within specification. We also find that the average level of stabilizer is near the
level reported by the USN. There is a small change in propellant sensitivity over
the range of stabilizer concentration that we measured in pellets from the USS
IOWA bag charges. We have not yet completed our investigation of the
significance, if any, of this change.

The manufacture of propellant involves the dissolutionof nitrocellulose in a
mixture of ether and alcohol. Some ether remains in the propellant and
evaporates over an extended period of time, suggesting a potential fire hazard.
Our analysis shows that the probability of initiating an explosion by ether/air
burning in the breech is so remote as to be practically impossible. Calculations
show that the maximum temperature increase of the propellant that could occur in
the burning of an optimum mixture of ether/air is only 30C to 40>C. Initiation of
the propellant requires a temperature increase of at least \10°C. However, the
thermal ignition of finely crushed black powder by ether/air combustion remains
an unresolved issue requiring additional study. Our studies also indicate that it is
virtually impossible to initiate the propellant or black powder in the breech by
electrostatic discharge, friction, or electromagnetic radiation at levels found within
the turret.

An interior ballistics model was developed for the open-breech explosion. The
model involves the high-speed flow of both hot propellant gases and pellets from
the open breech. The model was used to calculate the time variation of pressure at
the base of the projectile depending on the point of initiation along the five powder
bags. It predicts with some accuracy the movement of the projeaile up the barrel
following the explosion. Our results indicate that the initiation site was most likely
between the first and second bag charge, which agrees with conclusions reached by
the USN in its field tests.

The USN reports that the propellant bags were overrammed into the breech of the
center gun of Turret 2 by a distance of approximately 21 in. The USN
interpretation was based in part on an analysis which assumed that parts of the
rammerhead gouged the spanning tray. In our analysis we show that the gouges
were caused by the ranrmer chain. Using this analysis, we found that the overram
was more nearly 24 in. That is, the rammer moved approximately 24 in. beyond
the point it would normally reach in placing the bag charges in the breech of the
gun. Therefore, a significant overram and compression of the powder bags
occurred.

The USN reports that "impact and compression (of the bag charges) were not
contributing factors in the IOWA incident." Our results regarding the impact
sensitivity of the propellant raise the possibility that initiation occurred by impact.
Our one-half-scale (8 in.) experiments indicate that the fracture of propellant
pellets lying transverse in the trim layer at the forward end of the bag can lead to
initiation of the powder train. Initiation apparently occurs when the fractured
pellets in the trim layer release burning particles from the fractured surfaces,
igniting the black powder pouch of the adjacent bag. Ignition of the black powder
then rapidly propagates the ignition throughout the rest of the powder train.
Therefore, the ignition process involves the trim-layer pellets of one bag and the
adjacent black powder pouch of the next (forward) bag.

271

We believe the probability of this initiation process depends on two key factors: 1)
the number of trim pellets in the foruard-most layer and 2) rammer speed. If
there are a reduced number of trim pellets and the rammer is operated at higher
speeds, the initiation process during an overram becomes more probable. For
example, if there are twenty pellets in the trim layer, we estimate there is a
probability ranging from approximately one in two to one in three that the
propellant can be initiated at energy levels attainable when the rammer is operated
at 13.9 ft/s, its maximum speed. However, propellant initiation by impact is a
complex phenomena and much more work needs to be done to verify this estimate,
particularly in actual 16 in. guns or systems that closely duplicate the 16 in. gun.

During a number of inspections in conjunction with USN persoimel, we found that
the powder hoist, powder door, rammer, and other mechanisms in the gun room
appeared to be in proper operating condition at the time of the explosion. We
concur with the USN that mechanical operations appear to have been normal and
not associated with the explosion.

As established by the USN investigation, the door to the powder hoist was closed
and locked, but the powder car had not been lowered at the time of the explosion.
Immediate lowering of the car on closure of the powder door is the standard
procedure. This suggests to us that the ramming occurred soon after the closing of
the powder door and took place at high speed. That is, if a slow ram of 1 to 2 ft/s
had occurred followed by 15 or 20 s of sustained overram as proposed by the USN,
the upper powder hoist operator would have had approximately 20 to 25 s to begin
lowering the powder car. However, if a high-speed ram occurred, there would
have been little opportunity for the upper powder hoist operator to begin lowering
the powder car. A high-speed overram seems consistent with these considerations.

A factor that may have contributed to the overram was an undefined problem in
the loading operation. This undefined problem, reported through the ship's phone
system by a member of the gun crew, led to a delay in loading the center gun
relative to both the left and right guns in Turret 2. This undefined problem and
delay could have created confusion during the powder-loading phase.

We conclude that a plausible cause of the explosion aboard the USS IOWA was a
higher-than-normal speed overram of the bag charges into the rear of the
projectile, imtiating one of the forward bag charges that contained a reduced
number of pellets in the trim layer. The fact that the bags were moved to a
position substantially beyond the normal location is evidence supporting a higher-
than-normal speed overram.

Our experiments of initiation by impact are incomplete and more work needs to be
done on larger assemblies of pellets than we were able to accomplish in the short
time available. Nevertheless, it appears from our present models that the
probability of initiation of an explosion by impact is such that measures should be
taken to insure that overrams do not occur at any speed.

These studies of the explosion aboard the USS IOWA represent a brief but
concerted effort by SNL personnel to supplement the USN's investigation. Our
starting point was the extensive work by the USN, and those studies were helpful in
several phases of our study.

We do not consider this study to be complete in the sense that a clear and
definitive cause of this explosion has been identified. There are several open
issues that should be further explored, and the Recommendations section of this
report lists areas we believe warrant further investigation.

272

Chairman Nunn. Thank you, Mr. Conahan. Is Mr. Ferber going
to have anything to say at this point?

Mr. Conahan. No. He will answer questions as they come up.

Chairman Nunn. I suggest to members of the committee we go
ahead and hear from our next witness and then come back and ask
questions to both of them, including Mr. Cooper and Dr. Schuler.
So Dr. Schwoebel, we will hear from you next.

STATEMENT OF DR. RICHARD L. SCHWOEBEL, DIRECTOR, COM-
PONENTS, SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES, ACCOMPANIED
BY DR. KARL W. SCHULER, DISTINGUISHED MEMBER OF THE
TECHNICAL STAFF, SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES; PAUL
W. COOPER, DISTINGUISHED MEMBER OF THE TECHNICAL
STAFF, SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES; AND DR. JAMES A.
BORDERS, TECHNICAL SUPERVISOR, SANDIA NATIONAL LAB-
ORATORIES

Dr. Schwoebel. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee,
as you heard, seated with me are Mr. Paul Cooper and Dr. Karl
Schuler of Sandia. Their contributions and important factors in
Sandia's study of the explosion on the U.S.S. Iowa gave rise at
least in part to the experiments at Dahlgren. One of those experi-
ments yesterday is germane to the discussion today, and they can
provide some insight to that experiment later on.

Our intent today is to go ahead with the presentation as we had
originally planned it. It represents, I think, a real background for
what has taken place, including yesterday. We agreed that the
questions that you raise are not settled wholly in the scientific and
technical sense. A lot more work needs to be done, and Sandia is
very happy to continue to work with the Navy to help resolve this
issue. We have had excellent relations with the technical team of
the Navy, very open, candid, and they have been extremely helpful
to us in every possible way.

I am not going to present a statement about Sandia. That is con-
tained in your handout. I would simply suggest that that be includ-
ed in the record for the day.

273

* Introduction

* Foreign iVIateriais
^ Propellants

* Overram Analysis

* Impact Initiation
of Propellant

* Recommendations

The outline of my presentation is shown on the visual to your
left. At the end of each of those major topic areas, the four central
topic areas there, I will present one of the four conclusions of our
work to that point. The visuals are also contained in your handout,
and I think that they are in the proper order or within one or two
of that.

274

Focus of the Sandia Studies

Foreign material in the rotating band of the projectile
from the USS Iowa

The possible relation of this foreign material to the
hypothetical ignitor described by the USN

• Stability and sensitivity of the propellant and black
powder in the bag charges used on the USS Iowa

This visual shows the focus of the Sandia studies, and these are,
as you can see, a prescribed list of things that we were asked to
review. The first of these relates to the foreign material that was
pointed out by the Navy from their perspective that was in the ro-
tating band of the projectile from the U.S.S. Iowa.

The second part of our work is related to the possible relation of
this foreign material to the hypothetical or proposed chemical ig-
niter that was described by the Navy.

The third is the stability and sensitivity of the propellant and
black powder in the bag charges used on the U.S.S. Iowa; how we
would reevaluate those factors from our perspective.

Now the first topic that I am going to deal with is one that is
concerned with the foreign materials as they were referred to by
the Navy. There are four important subtopics.

To orient you again to bring us up to date, let me mention first
two visuals that will take us back into the actual gun situation.

275

16 in. GUN TURRET

The first of these is a cutaway view of the turret in which we
see, starting from the bottom, the magazines, the powder flats,
moving upward the projectile decks, the equipment decks and the
gunroom area. Of course, it is in the gunroom that the explosion
occurred.

ROTATING BAND NOMENCLATURE
USED IN MATERIALS ANALYSIS

■; - ';V;C Projectile Body ' I'Y^-Sli

Most Iron Fibers Found
in This Region

Rotating Band Cross
Section as Loaded

Rotating Band Cross
Section as Recovered

276

The second of these two orientation viewgraphs is a cross-section-
al view of the rotating band. As you will recall, the rotating band
is a circumferential band that goes around the rear of the projec-
tile and engages the rifling and is used to spin up the projectile to
provide stability.

You will notice that in that rotating band in the figure on the
left there is an open region, the cannelure, and as the projectile
moves through the barrel that cannelure region is folded over in
such a way that it partially seals off foreign material that may
have been trapped in the cannelure.

In the case of the projectile aboard the U.S.S. Iowa, the projectile
moved up the barrel in this open breach explosion about 40 inches,
so that that cannelure was in part sealed. The idea, then, is to ex-
amine that region for any foreign materials that may bear on the
cause of the explosion.

FOREIGN MATERIALS

• Calcium and chlorine -* (HTH - Calcium Hypochlorite)

• Two glycols -^ (brake fluid)

• Steel wool

• Polyethylene terephthalate (PET) film -* (container)

The first topic that I am going to discuss deals with these foreign
materials. If we take a look at those, we will see that basically
there are these four things that are involved. The first of these is
the calcium and chlorine detected by the Navy and associated by
them with the presence of HTH, a swimming pool cleaner or chem-
ical, one constituent of the proposed chemical igniter.

The second major constituent was two glycols identified by the
Navy and related by them to brake fluid, the second major compo-
nent of the initiator.

The third component, steel wool, is something that can fuel this
interaction and make it take place at a higher rate and with more
intensity, increasing the surface area.

The fourth is the presence of a polymer film, a fragment of poly-
mer film which they proposed was associated with a way to contain
and then open by an intentional overram the proposed initiator.

I am briefly going to discuss each of the four elements of this
rather complex topic.

277

Ca AND CI BACKGROUND IN USS IOWA
CLASS BATTLESHIPS'

Location Ca CI

Magazine Y Y

Powder Flat Y Y

Projectile Deck Y Y

Gun Room Y Y

Rotating Bands Y Y

USS Iowa Incident Y Y

Rotating Band

(Y = Yes, Present; N = Not Detected)

The first of these discussions relates to the presence of calcium
and chlorine within these battleships. This visual depicts a survey
of the presence of these two elements in turret I of the U.S.S. Iowa;
that is, the forward turret. We took approximately 50 or 60 sam-
ples throughout that turret. Note that calcium and chlorine are
readily detectable everywhere throughout the turret and could
arise from a number of sources. For example, seawater is a potent
source of both chlorine and calcium. The fluids that are used to
maintain the guns contain calcium, chlorine, barium and a number
of other species. Also cleaning agents will contain some of these
materials.

So the existence of calcium and chlorine in the rotating band is
not in itself a fingerprint of the presence of HTH in the igniter
that was proposed by the Navy.

The real question, then, is how much calcium and chlorine were
present in the band, and do these quantities significantly depart
from the concentration of these elements that you may normally
see elsewhere in the turret?

Our report goes into this aspect in some detail, too much detail
to really capture here in a short presentation. We find that with
one exception our and the Navy's concentration measurements of
calcium and chlorine are quite comparable.

We find the presence of calcium and chlorine is to be expected in
this maritime environment and with the cleaning materials that
are used. We find that the concentrations of calcium and chlorine
on fibers in the U.S.S. Iowa rotating band appear not to be marked-

278

ly different from fibers from other parts of the turret. Fibers from
the band are not unique in calcium and chlorine concentrations.

GLYCOLS

• Glycol #1 Sandia result:

^. . ^^ These materials are all

• CDlycol nz constituents of the fluid

routinely used to clean

• Glycol #3 and lubricate 1 6" guns

Part two of the foreign materials section deals with the gly-
cols

Chairman Nunn. Dr. Schwoebel, if I may ask you a question
right there so we can understand this. As you go along, if you can
tell us where you may not be in complete agreement with the
Navy's findings, particularly on the first section. Could you do that
for us?

Dr. Schwoebel. Yes, I certainly will.

The second section deals with the glycols.

Chairman Nunn. Now on the first section, was there any point
of fundamental disagreement?

Dr. Schwoebel. There is one point of disagreement in terms of
one of the samples, or one kind of sample, and the measurement of
the calcium concentrations. I will come back to that in a moment.

Chairman Nunn. All right, fine.

Dr. Schwoebel. In the area dealing with the presence of glycols,
the Navy pointed out the presence of glycols. I have just listed
them as numbers one, two and three. In our studies we find that
glycol number two is not actually a glycol. It is actually a phenol.

In any case, each of those three species, number one, number two
and number three, are all constituents of the fluid that is routinely
used to clean and lubricate these 16-inch guns. So in other words,
these materials are normally present in the guns as constituents of
the fluid used to maintain the gun. These glycols, then, are not for-
eign materials but are altogether expected materials. This connec-
tion between the glycols and the presence in the fluid used to
maintain these guns was not made before our investigation.

279

IRON FIBERS

• Sandia identified six fibers and the USN identified 30 fibers
in different sections of the USS Iowa rotating band.

• The concentrations of calcium and chlorine determined by Sandia
and the USN on USS Iowa and field test fibers are very similar - with
one exception.

• That exception is a fiber (s) from the USS Iowa described by the USN to
have "crusted" regions of high calcium. Sandia was not able to analyze
that fiber(s) because it could not be located.

• Iron fibers found on other projectiles stored on the USS Iowa were
reported by the USN to be of smaller diameter than those in the rotating
band. Those fibers also cannot be located. Sandia has not identified an
obvious source for fibers of such diameter.

The third part of our work deals with iron fibers. Again, I have
tried to summarize some important points in this single visual.
Again I would point out that this is a very complex topic that
cannot be simply conveyed in a few moments. It is dealt with ex-
tensively in our report.

First, I would like you to note up at the top that we identified six
fibers, and the Navy identified 30 fibers in different sections of the
U.S.S. Iowa rotating band. Now these fibers are on the order of 2.5
thousandths of an inch in diameter, and if you take the lengths
and add them all up you have on the order of maybe an inch or so
of material. So we are dealing truly with microscopic material. I
think it is very important to understand that.

The second feature is that the concentrations of calcium and
chlorine determined by Sandia and the Navy on the U.S.S. Iowa
band and also field test fibers are very similar with one exception.
That exception is a fiber or a few fibers from the U.S.S. Iowa that
were described by the Navy to have crusted regions of high calci-
um. Sandia was not able to analyze that fiber or fibers because it
or they could not be located. Now we understand that within the
last few days the Navy has located these fibers, so I presume that
we may be able to examine them at some time in the future.

Last, iron fibers found on other projectiles stored on the U.S.S.
Iowa were reported by the Navy to be of a smaller diameter than
those in the rotating band; that is to say, in the Navy survey they
did find steel wool-like fibers on other projectiles aboard the U.S.S.
Iowa, and they made the distinction that those fibers were of a dif-
ferent diameter. They were of a smaller diameter than fibers found
in the rotating band of the U.S.S. Iowa. These smaller fibers also
cannot be located at this time.

280

Sandia has not identified an obvious source for fibers of the
larger diameter that were found in the U.S.S. Iowa rotating band.
No obvious source.

Chairman Nunn. When you say they could not be located, does
that mean the Navy has not stored those or does not know where
they have stored them? What is your understanding of that?

Dr. ScHWOEBEL. Part of my emphasis in pointing out that these
are microscopic materials is that since they are very small, these
fibers could be in a very well-constrained area, but it may take
some effort and time to go back and search through the whole set
of sample supports, for example, and find that particular item
again.

As I said, I think that in the case of the crusted fibers, that clear-
ly was the case. They have now relocated those.

So we have not identified a source for the larger fiber. I would
point out, however, that steel wool was, we understand, used in
cleaning the turret after the explosion and before the projectile
was removed. So we are still exploring the use of steel wool during
the cleanup operation as a possible source of contamination.

Chairman Nunn. Dr. Schwoebel, let me just ask you this ques-
tion. I do not know what is routine here and what is unusual. If
Sandia had conducted the investigation, when you got through
with important fibers, would you have a way of storing them where
you could retrieve them?

Dr. Schwoebel. I think that we would obviously work very hard
to maintain crucial evidence of that sort.

Chairman Nunn. So if somebody came to you after you had com-
pleted an investigation and said where are the fibers, would you
expect your people to be able to locate them?

Dr. Schwoebel. I would expect them to be able to locate them.

Chairman Nunn. What would be your reaction if they could not
locate them?

Dr. Schwoebel. That would be disconcerting to me.

POLYMER FILM (PET) FIBERS

• Sandia has identified PET fibers in the brush
used to clean the guns in Turret 2.

• PET is the polymer from which Mylar^'^
and Dacron^" are manufactured.

• Sources of PET fibers include the
Dacron^" bore socks used in
gun cleaning and also clothing.

The last part, the fourth part of the foreign materials area, deals
with the polymer films, the PET. Sandia identified PET fibers in
the brush that was used to clean the guns of turret II. It is impor-

281

tant to recognize that PET is the polymer from which Mylar is
made as the film, or Dacron is made as the fiber. And sources of
PET fibers that are normal to the gun environment include, for ex-
ample, the Dacron cloth, the bore sock, that is actually used to
clean the gun.

This, I think, is very significant. That is, there are normal
sources of PET that exist in the turret. In fact, we found definitive
evidence of PET fragments that we could relate directly to the bore
sock that is used to clean the gun.

Chairman Nunn. Now tell me again how this differs from what
the Navy had before you got into this?

Dr. ScHWOEBEL. There was no mention of other sources of this
sort of fiber in the turret.

Chairman Nunn. So the Navy had not mentioned other possible
sources?

Dr. ScHWOEBEL. That is right.

Chairman Nunn. And they had labeled this foreign material?

Dr. ScHWOEBEL. That is correct.

Now, again, I would point out that the Navy's investigation was
very broad in scope, and it covered many, many different topics,
much broader than anything that we did.

Chairman Nunn. Right.

Dr. ScHWOEBEL. Our study was rather circumscribed, and so we
were able to probe these areas in great detail.

Chairman Nunn. But, of course, this foreign material became a
very crucial part of the Navy's finding in the final analysis?

Dr. ScHWOEBEL. Correct.

We could neither prove nor disprove the presence of a chemical
ignitor proposed by the USN.

The interpretation of evidence for a chemical ignitor is complicated
by the fact that some chemical constituents of such an ignitor are
found throughout 1 6" gun turrets, not only on the USS Iowa, but
also the USS Wisconsin and the USS New Jersey. Forms of these
constituents are either commonly used in the turrets or are a part of
the maritime environment.

Steel wool was another component of the proposed ignitor. We
found iron fibers in the rotating band that could be steel wool, but
we were unable to clearly identify a source of fibers of their
diameter.

We believe evidence for the presence of a chemical ignitor is
inconclusive.

So our first conclusion is, as indicated in the next visual, can nei-
ther prove nor disprove the presence of a chemical igniter proposed
by the Navy. Prove or disprove in the scientific sense, now, is what
I am saying. The interpretation of evidence for a chemical igniter
is complicated by the fact that some chemical constituents of such
an igniter are found throughout 16-inch gun turrets, not only on

282

the U.S.S. Iowa, but we also did sampling aboard the Wisconsin
and the New Jersey. Forms of the constituents are either commonly
used in the turrets or are a part of the maritime environment.

Steel wool was another component of the proposed igniter. We
found iron fibers in the rotating band that could be steel wool, but
we were unable to clearly identify a source of fibers of their diame-
ter. So that is the single species we could not make an obvious con-
nection to a normal source.

We believe evidence for the presence of a chemical igniter is in-
conclusive.

Chairman Nunn. Now, let me ask on that point, because I guess
that is one of the key findings you made here. If you had access to
the other fibers that are not now available to you that we have just
enumerated, could that make any difference in your conclusion
here?

Dr. ScHWOEBEL. It could. We would have to examine those and
understand what is the constituency of those and put those in con-
text with the rest of our observations.

Chairman Nunn. How important were those missing fibers in
the Navy's determination that there was unexplained foreign mate-
rial present?

Dr. ScHWOEBEL. Well, we would like to make that comparison,
because that really is a departure from what we have seen. We
would like to see these fibers with the high calcium content.

Chairman Nunn. Was that a key part of the Navy's finding, that
foreign material

Dr. ScHWOEBEL. It was important to them, yes. And it is set out
in their discussion as an important feature. That is correct.

Our analyses indicate that the propellant stabilizer was within acceptable
limits.

We also found only a very remote possibility that this propellant could be
initiated in the breech by friction, electrostatic discharge, or electro-
magnetic radiation. Similarly, we conclude there is only a very remote
possibility the black powder could have been initiated in the breech by any
of these mechanisms. Ether/air combustion cannot be achieved because
minimum necessary concentrations are precluded. Even if the minimum
concentrations are achieved and combustion occurs, our analyses show
that the propellant cannot be ignited.

These findings are in general agreement with those of the USN.

The second topic that I am going to discuss deals with the studies
of the propellant and the black powder in the bag charges. Our
findings here very closely parallel the results of the Navy. And be-
cause of that, I am going to go directly to the summary conclusion
here, and then just pass on to another topic.

Chairman Nunn. Before we leave that last chart, if you could
put it back up there, just so we get this as we go along, because it
is complicated. Your finding is we believe evidence for the presence
of a chemical igniter is inconclusive. Tell us in your own words
how that differs from the Navy's finding.

283

Dr. ScHV/OEBEL. Well, I think that our findings are that — and I
hesitate to speak for the Navy, but our findings are that if— for ex-
ample, if the initiator were present, and we looked at the kinds of
backgrounds that we would find, we would expect to find calcium
and chlorine and the glycols and so on.

On the other hand, if the igniter were not present, we would also
expect to find calcium, chlorine, and glycols. So that, in a scientific
sense, we can neither prove nor disprove that an igniter was
present.

Chairman Nunn Right. But you understand what the Navy
found. Tell us what your understanding is of what they found.

Dr. ScHWOEBEL. My understanding is that they felt that there
was a very high probability of a chemical igniter being included in
the system at the time of the explosion, and that they considei ed
their evidence to be very strong. That is my understanding.

Chairman Nunn. And you do not agree with that?

Dr. ScHWOEBEL. No, we do not agree with that.

Chairman Nunn. What they found to be strong evidence you
found to be inconclusive?

Dr. ScHWOEBEL. That is correct.

Senator Cohen. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question?

Chairman Nunn. Yes.

Senator Cohen. Is the steel wool something that is used to clean
and scrub the turrets?

Dr. ScHWOEBEL. That is a question that

Senator Cohen. Could you explain what the significance of the
presence or absence of steel wool is?

Dr. ScHWOEBEL. Senator Cohen, that is a question that we have
frequently asked. We understand that steel wool is not an author-
ized cleaning material. Whether it is in fact used is unknown to us.
We cannot tell.

Senator Cohen. So the implication is that if steel wool were in
fact found then that would be evidence that something had been
placed there as part of an ignition or igniter?

Dr. ScHWOEBEL. It would depend on comparing the kind of steel
wool that was used, for example, in cleanup operations, to what
has been observed in the bands. You would have to look at the de-
tails.

Senator Cohen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Nunn. Thank you.

Dr. ScHWOEBEL. Now the third topic is the overram analysis.

284

OVERRAM SITUATION AT TIME OF IGNITION

1^42.25'

Sprocket J.

Gear -^Vq

Roller #1 at TM*
PosHlon Whan Rammer Is
Retracted In Stow
Position

Pro)ectlle

Front Face of
Rammer at
Stow Position

Spanning
Tray

Breech Face

of Gun

Position of

Front

Face of Rammer

Buffer at Time

of Explosion

Position of y

Rammer at End \
of Pro)ectlle \

Ram \

Base Position of
Seated Projectiie

What we put up here is a schematic of the rammer. The rammer,
as I think you will recall, consists of a rather heavy rammer head,
weighing 150 pounds or so, a massive chain, and a hydraulic drive
that is controlled by the rammerman with a hand lever that oper-
ates like an accelerator or a throttle.

The rammer is used both to seat the projectile, which weighs, in
this case, 2,700 pounds, and the powder bags, which, in this case,
weigh about 500 pounds. The Navy determined that an overram oc-
curred in loading of the powder. That is, the rammer pushed the
powder about 21 inches too far into the breech. Their analysis was
based on discoloration of the chain and sprocket and some other
things that were associated with the explosion and fire.

The Sandia analysis of overram was based on a review of how
the chain links of the rammer, those chain links that you see
there, how they were blown out backward in the explosion, and
how they gouged the spanning tray that is used to guide powder
bags into the breech.

285

DETERMIIMATIOrM OF OVERRAM DISTANCE

GOUGE MARKS ON SPANNER TRAY

Here is a picture of that spanning tray with these gouges. Here
we are looking forward on that spanning tray, and you see gouges
in those areas that are indicated.

24-931 0-91-10

286

DETERIVIIIMATIOINi OF OVERRAM DISTANCE

CLOSE-UP OF GOUGE MARKS ON SPANNER TRAY

Here is another view of that. Here you see some of those gouges
in more detail. And in the foreground you see the links of the
rammer chain. It is a rather massive chain. Those links are not
identical to one another. There are two different kinds of links, and
that is shown on the next visual.

287

DETERMINATION OF OVERRAM DISTANCE

.375"

375"

LINK ASSEMBLIES

These links are of two different kinds. They have somewhat dif-
ferent dimensions at the base, as you can see indicated there. And
also there is a characteristic spacing between the base of adjacent
links.

Karl Schuler of our group determined that the marks on the
spanning tray could be associated with specific links in the chain.
This is indicated in the next visual.

288

DETERMINATION OF OVERRAM DISTANCE

INITIAL POSITION

OF LINK 5 FEMALE (2)

FORWARD

MALE (7)
FEMALE (6)

GOUGE MARKS ON SPANNER TRAY

The gouges that you see in this schematic are actually now asso-
ciated with specific link numbers. From this analysis he was able
to rather precisely determine that the overram was 24 inches,
about 3 inches greater than that determined by the Navy. Now
that is very important. With a 21-inch overram, the powder bags
were moved too far forward into the breech, but they were not
quite at the projectile.

In an overram of 24 inches, this means that the powder bags
were not only moved up to the projectile, but they were actually
jammed into the projectile. And that is quite an important point.

We confirmed that the powder bags were overrammed against the
projectile and determined that the extent of the overram was
approximately 3 inches greater than that established by the USN.

Our analyses indicate that the bag charges were under a compressive load
of at least 2800 pounds at the time of the explosion. There may have been
even higher transient forces due to dynamic loading resulting from a
greater than normal ram speed.

While the rammer is capable of a speed of 1 3.9 ft/ sec, we could only
establish that the rammer speed was at least 2 ft/sec.

So this leads to our third conclusion. And again, let me go
through that. We confirmed that the powder bags were over-
rammed against the projectile and determined that the extent of

289

the overram was approximately 3 inches greater than that estab-
Hshed by the Navy.

Our analyses indicate that the bag charges were under a com-
pressive load of at least 2,800 pounds at the time of the explosion.
There may have been even higher transient forces due to dynamic
loading, resulting from a greater than normal ram speed. That is
to say, if the ram were moving at some speed it would jam these
bags against the projectile and create peak loads that were greater
than 2,800 pounds.

While the rammer is capable of a speed of 13.9 feet per second,
we could only establish that the rammer speed was at least 2 feet
per second. That was based on physical evidence related to the po-
sition of the rammer handle and valve positions in the hydraulic
system, and things of that nature.

The last major topic deals with impact initiation of the propel-
lant. This ties very directly into this idea of the overram that was
just discussed which actually forced the propellant bags into the
rear of the projectile. The Navy reported that — and I quote —
"Impact and compression of the bag charges were not contributing
factors in the Iowa incident."

Our results raise some real questions about that statement. We
have conducted experiments that indicate that the fracture of pel-
lets of the propellant can lead to initiation. The arrangement of
pellets in the bag in shown in the left-hand side of this visual. The
pellet bag, is a right cylinder, as you can see.

Note that most of the roughly 1,800 pellets are arranged in eight
stacked layers, very neatly arranged in hexagonal, close-packed
arrays. Some additional pellets are located in the trim layer at the
top of the bag. These trim pellets are used to adjust the total
weight of propellant, and these pellets lie on their side at the top of
the bag.

Note the black powder pouch is at the end of the bag shown
here.

Now in an overram situation in which the bags are impacted and
compressed against one another, the load can be concentrated into
this area of that incomplete layer. Moreover, the pellets that are
lying on their side like that are much more easily fractured than
those that are standing in the upright orientation. We have done
mechanical studies of these pellets to verify that.

290

D-846 POWDER BAG CONFIGURATION

93.6 lb of 16-45 Inch Pellets in 8 Stacked Layers
(^225 Pellets) + 1 Trim Layers («35 Pellets)

Suidia B hidi Array

1 \

'siauliledBaifll

Bkc* Pomla l^ililai Hi

In order to assess the effects of impact, Paul Cooper set up the
experiment which is shown on the right-hand side of this visual. If
we look at the upper part of that figure, Paul's experiment at the
8-inch size shows an 8-inch array of these pellets, and we are look-
ing down on that 8-inch array. And then on the top of that array is
the trim layer — in this case, seven pellets located in that array.

This array models the forward end of the bag. And this was
placed beneath a counterpart of it that models the aft part of the
next bag, which includes the black powder pouch. So that you see
at that interface the black powder ignition pad and the trim layer
adjacent to it.

This assembly was located in a fixture in one of our explosive
test sites and a weight was dropped on this combination from vari-
ous heights to simulate various overram situations. As the height
of the weight was gradually increased, one eventually got to the
point that these trim layer pellets were fractured. And moreover,
they gave off burning particles that ignited the adjacent black
powder pouch.

The ignited black powder pouch then rapidly ignited the rest of
the pellets in the experiment. That is, there is a kind of important
interaction here that occurs, a sort of a synergism that takes place
between the fractured trim layer pellets and the adjacent black
powder pouch.

291

We have a short video of one of these experiments that we would
like to show you.

[Video is shown.]

In this experiment you can see that the 8-inch array of these pel-
lets have been grouped together. They are put on top of a piece of
lucite which represents the rest of the pellets on down in the
system.

Now the video shows that the trim layer pellets were added— in
that case there were seven, then a layer of silk that represents the
end of the bag, a layer including the black powder pouch, another
set of pellets, and then the lucite. This assembly was put into the
fixture that Paul Cooper had designed and was tested in a way that
will be shown in just a moment.

I am going to fast forward through a section of the test that is
not germane to the discussion. But you will see now that the fix-
ture there; the smaller part almost right in the center represents
the fixture that I just described. The upper part represents weights
that have a mass which is like the inertial mass of the rammer
used aboard these battleships.

Now the idea is

Chairman Nunn. Would you tell us now — are you trying to get
as close as you can with this kind of rigging to the

Dr. ScHV^OEBEL. Yes, that is the idea. We are trying to develop as
much similarity as we can. However, there are some real questions
of how you extrapolate these things, but I will get into that as we
go along.

Chairman Nunn. Okay.

Dr. SCHWOEBEL. The weight then was raised, and as I think most
of you saw, it initiated the system and there were some explosions
that took place.

Chairman Nunn. Would you run that back and let us take a
look at that?

Now what we are seeing there is the ignition?

Senator Bingaman. Could I just ask for clarification. That is the
pellets going off after the powder has been ignited, is that what is
happening there?

Dr. ScHw^OEBEL. The pellets are being fractured by the compres-
sive load of the weight. When they fracture they give off burning
particles. Those burning particles ignite the black powder pouch
which is lying adjacent to it. And that black powder pouch then
rapidly propagates the ignition through the rest of the system.
That is the idea.

292

CONFIGURATION OF D-846 BAGS
AT TIME OF EXPLOSION

Jbndia Analysis
«5i- to

Senator Bingaman. Thank you.

Dr. ScHWOEBEL. In the 16-inch gun situation, the bags would be
arranged in this manner. There are five bags there, as you can see.
The trim layers are as indicated. The most sensitive interface is
the interface between bag one and bag two. The number of pellets
in the trim layer is an important factor, as is the rammer speed.
That is, the energy that you put into this system.

Now the number of pellets in the trim layer there, if you might
indicate that in the visual, the number of pellets is not a constant.
It varies, because these pellets are not all of the same length.
When you adjust the bag weight that number can vary. And we
understand from the technical team of the Navy that it varies be-
tween roughly 20 and 60.

We are getting some actual statistics on the number of trim pel-
lets so that we will understand that a little bit better.

Senator Warner. That variable is introduced to make the weight
of the bags uniform?

Dr. Schwoebel. That is correct.

Senator Warner. And you just add so many pellets to bring up
each bag to, what is it, 98.6 pounds?

Dr. Schwoebel. It's 93.6 pounds.

Senator Warner. So that is the reason for the variation in the
number of those pellets.

Senator Cohen. Mr. Chairman, could I ask one other question?

Chairman Nunn. Certainly.

Senator Cohen. Has that historically been the situation from
World War II forward? I know Mr. Conahan said that they are still
using basically the same training manuals as they were in World
War II. And my question was, well, what has changed, if they are
using the same system that they had in World War II? And the
question I would have is, has that been the process that has been
used over the years with these pellets at the top, which fragment
easily because they are loose?

293

Dr. ScHWOEBEL. As far as we know this same system has been
used for many years. I believe the correct weight is actually 93.4
pounds.

So the number of pellets then varies. It is not a constant. Also,
the rammer speed can be varied by the rammer operator. And so
that is also a variable in this system.

Paul Cooper has extrapolated his results to the full size of the
bag charge used in the 16-inch gun. I would hasten to add that
these are extrapolations at this point, and there are uncertainties
associated with those kinds of things, but, nevertheless, we felt that
they were very germane.

PROBABILITY OF IGNITION VS. IMPACT VELOCITY
EXTRAPOLATED TO A 16" FIXTURE

1.0
0.9
0.8

I °^
!> 0.6

0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0

5 TRIM PELLETS

20 TRIM PELLETS

I I
I I
I I
I I
I I
I I
I I
I

I I

'2
/<

I
I

I I

35 TRIM PELLETS

I I

^1 I I I I I 'I — I — r— T-

Impact Velocity (ft/sec)

The results shown here are of the extrapolation in this data for
the probability of initiation, versus the speed of the rammer for
trim layers of different numbers of pellets. This graph is not as
complicated as it looks.

The probability of ignition is indicated on the vertical axis on the
left. The impact velocity is indicated on the axis along the base.
Those bands that you see, like 35 trim pellets, is the extrapolation
for that group of the probability versus speed. Then for 20 trim pel-
lets and last, for five pellets, that band.

Chairman NuNN. You go from one-tenth up to one. What does
the probability of one mean?

Dr. ScHWOEBEL. One means that it is a certainty.

Chairman Nunn. A certainty.

Dr. ScHWOEBEL. Now note that if the velocity is 2 feet per second,
down in the normal range of what is authorized for these ramming
operations, that even if an overram occurred, even if you moved

294

the bags too far up against the projectile, that apparently, from our
extrapolations, with almost any number of trim pellets, the proba-
bility would be extremely low that anything would happen.

So for an authorized operation, following the prescribed proce-
dure, there should be no problem. However, for the case of high
speed overram, it is quite different. If we go up to 14 feet per
second, which is that vertical line, the maximum ram velocity, and
if we have 20 pellets in the trim layer, as indicated there, and that
is in the low range of what is actually observed in these bags, we
find that the probability of initiation varies between about one in
two to one in three. So it becomes a significant probability in this
extrapolation.

Again, I say that these are extrapolations from one-half scale ex-
periments, and we need to establish that such an extrapolation is
justified.

Senator Glenn. Mr. Chairman, could I ask a question?

Chairman Nunn. Senator Glenn.

Senator Glenn. Would not the area of the trim layer that you
are impacting on be a key factor there? And that has not been fig-
ured in.

In other words, if you took your trim layer down to a point, say,
like that, obviously the pressure on that and the ignition likelihood
would be tremendous. It would be — you know, you could ignite any-
thing with that kind of pressure almost. The area that is spread
over would be very key to this. And what is your average bag,
then, that has a trim layer in it, what is that area? And did you
figure that in? I think that would be a key element on what you
are figuring here.

Dr. ScHWOEBEL. Yes. You are absolutely right. And the area of
the trim layer is really established by how many pellets that you
have there. That represents the areal density. So you are absolute-
ly right.

Now if you group those in different ways on that upper surface,
there may be an effect associated with that.

Senator Glenn. Do they get out of line? Say you have little
points even sticking out off of the trim layer itself, which would
make, in effect, a point that you are concentrating on, is that a
factor?

Dr. Schwoebel. We have not had access to a large number of
these bags so that we can look at trim layers in great detail. Our
studies dealt with some of the larger grosser features of these trim
layers. For example, how many pellets that you have in the trim
layer, and how that affects the initiation probability.

What you point out may be quite important, in fact, but we have
not actually determined that.

Senator Glenn. I think that would be a rather key factor on
knowing what the bags contain — you would want a certain number
in the trim layer because that absorbs your energy over a flat sur-
face, right?

Dr. Schwoebel. That is correct. And in fact it suggests that
maybe one might even like to do away with the trim layer alto-
gether so that you do not have the susceptibility built into the
system.

295

Senator Glenn. Just one other question. The trim layer — is that
figured into the explosive capacity of the bag? Because when you
are trying to trim this thing down to a very fine level or find explo-
sive capacity per 92.6 or whatever it is, does your trim layer then
have a variation of explosive capability that is not the same as the
rest of the bag?

Dr. ScHWOEBEL. No, the pellets are identical to those that are
used in the rest of the bag. It is just a way of making sure that
when you add up all of those pellets that you end up with exactly
the right weight of pellets.

Senator Glenn. And when we talk about pellets in this case, we
are not talking about double-aught buckshot size or something like
that, we are talking about what, square grains, or what size?

Dr. ScHWOEBEL. These pellets are about the size of your thumb,
about three-quarters of an inch in diameter and a couple of inches
long.

Senator Warner. Geometric orientation of those added pellets is
also a factor, is it not?

Dr. ScHWOEBEL. Yes, that is correct. The pellets will fracture
more easily when they are lying on their side. And that is because
of the extruded nature of the material.

Senator Warner. Do you know if there is any uniformity in the
way in which the Navy adds those pellets, in terms of their geomet-
ric orientation? Or is it just a handful of them tossed in there?

Dr. ScHWOEBEL. No, they are laid in this transverse manner, as I
indicated. And the idea is just to bring the weight up to the proper
amount. You keep adding them until you have the proper weight.

Senator Warner. Are they held in place in some way, so that as
the bags are handled they do not change into a different geometric
orientation?

Dr. ScHWOEBEL. No, they are not. They can move around in the
bag.

Senator Warner. So they are free movers in the bags?

Dr. ScHWOEBEL. That is correct.

Senator Cohen. Mr. Chairman, could I ask one other question?
My understanding is the average number of pellets in the trim
layer averages about 25, and that the Navy has not found any bags
that have less than 17. Now, the detonation that took place yester-
day contained five pellets. Are we to draw any conclusions from
that?

Dr. Schwoebel. Well, the result yesterday, I think, is kind of one
point on this curve, that now helps you to understand how you
should better extrapolate these kinds of results to a full size.

Senator Cohen. So if they were bags — let us assume, hypotheti-
cally, that some bags were torn and you had fewer than 17, that
you may have had as few as 5, would that tend to give more cre-
dence to the experiment that took place yesterday?

Dr. Schwoebel. Yes, it would. We talked with some people that
we felt were very knowledgeable in the Navy about the torn bag
situation and the loss of pellets in that way. Our understanding is
that this would not occur with these modern bags, with the wear-
saver on them. A number of people told us they had never seen
torn bags of this nature.

296

Senator Cohen. Did not the Navy's investigation indicate there
were some torn bags?

Dr. ScHWOEBEL. Yes. There was an earlier lot of propellent that
used old material. That is the materials were very old, and those
bags we understand were rather fragile and there were a number
of cases in which those bags did indeed open. But this explosion did
not involve that kind of material.

Senator Warner. That is a key question. Was the test conducted
yesterday using this very low number realistic in view of the fact
that such a low number is not probable? In other words, is that low
number, the probability of there being only four or five pellets,
very, very remote?

Dr. Schwoebel. I will let one of the people who was actually
there

Chairman Nunn. Is this a good time to get into yesterday's test,
because that is where we are heading right now? Does it make
sense to do that now, or would you rather come back on that?

Dr. Schwoebel. I would just have one more thing that I would go
through in about 5 minutes and then we could go right to that.

Chairman Nunn. Why do we not do it that way, and we will
come back and go into whatever detail we need to on vesterday's
test?

Dr. Schwoebel. Okay, very good.

Chairman Nunn. We might want to get this chart back up there
when we get back to yesterday's test.

Dr. Schwoebel. Absolutely.

Now, as you can imagine, we believe that this is an extremely
important result, and clearly more work needs to be done to relate
these results to actual 16-inch gun conditions.

Chairman Nunn. What you showed us really, as I understand it,
is another scenario which could explain the explosion?

Dr. Schwoebel. It suggests a different scenario, yes. It suggests
another way, a simple scenario in which the explosion may have
occurred.

297

FRACTURED PELLET OBSERVED IN USN OVERRAM TEST

I would like to show a picture of a bag that came from a Navy
overram test. What I would like to point out here is that this is one
of the overram tests run some time ago by the Navy. There is a
broken pellet that we can see there, a fractured pellet, and it is ac-
tually sticking right through that black powder pouch. Now that,
to us, would be very suggestive of something that you would like to
avoid at any cost.

Senator Glenn. Mr. Chairman, could I ask one more thing?

Chairman Nunn. Yes.

Senator Glenn. How mobile are these trim layer pellets within
the bag? In other words, if they are jostled, or they are rolled, or
the bag is hit or something like that, do they rearrange themselves
somewhat? Are they pretty much an adjusted flat layer and that is
it, as a trim layer?

In other words, if they are sort of loose in that end of the bag
and can rearrange themselves, you could have points sticking out
all over that might be your focal point of energy and heated up to
an emission level. Do we know whether those things are pretty
solid in there, or can they rearrange themselves with jostling and
maybe get themselves out of whack, where they are going far away
from a flat surface that you would like to have?

Dr. ScHWOEBEL. They can move around, but they tend to stay in
the plane, of course. But if you have one of these bags you can take
your finger along the top part of it, for example, and move a pellet
across that trim layer, or move it to the side. There is no problem
in moving them around.

298

Senator Glenn. Is there enough flexibility in the bag that one
pellet under jostling could have gotten on top of another one, or
something like that, that would make even more of an impact
point?

Dr. ScHWOEBEL. It may be possible. I would think it would be un-
likely.

Senator Glenn. Thank you.

Senator Warner. Well, you know, we are in the area of specula-
tion. This gun has operated 20,000 plus times, and it is this system
that has been utilized, so you said, throughout the history of the
use of this gun; you said it provides a rather simple explanation as
to how an accident could happen, and I wonder if you want to re-
visit the word "simple"?

Dr. Schwoebel. Well, I will revisit that as we go along.

The cause of the explosion was not conclusively determined.

However, an important factor may have been the increase in impact
sensitivity of a powder bag with a reduced number of pellets in its
trim layer. (The trim layer is an incomplete layer of pellets lying on
their sides in the front of the bag and just behind the black powder
pouch on the next bag.)

Our half-scale experiments indicate that reducing the number of these
pellets lying next to the powder pouch increases impact sensitivity enough
that an explosion could have been caused by an overram at a higher than
normal speed. Our studies indicate that impact initiation depends on two
key factors: the number of pellets in the trim layer, and the speed of the
overram.

However, these experiments must be extended to actual 1 6" gun
conditions to establish the validity of this ignition mechanism.

Let us then go to the conclusion that we have. The conclusion is
that the cause of the explosion was not conclusively determined.
However, an important factor may have been the increase in
impact sensitivity of a powder bag with a reduced number of pel-
lets in its trim layer. Our half-scale experiments indicate that re-
ducing the number of these pellets lying next to the powder pouch
of an adjacent bag increases impact sensitivity enough that an ex-
plosion could have been caused by an overram at a higher than
normal speed.

Our studies indicate that impact initiation depends on two key
factors: the number of pellets in the trim layer and the speed of
the overram. However, these experiments must be extended to
actual 16-inch gun conditions to establish the validity of this igni-
tion mechanism. A point that I would make in response to your
question is that certainly there have been many, many loadings
that have been — obviously have gone on without problems. Howev-
er, in this case, it may have been a situation in which you do have
a low number of trim grains.

This case was quite different in that a substantial overram of
some kind occurred, and that clearly falls outside the normal pro-

299

cedures that take place in these gun rooms. What happened here, I
think, was quite abnormal in terms of the operation.

Now, our experiments on initiation by impact are incomplete and
more work needs to be done. Nevertheless, Mr. Chairman, it ap-
pears from our present models that the probability of initiation by
impact is such that measures should be taken to ensure overrams
are precluded at any speed.

Based on our studies of the explosion in the gun turret of the USS Iowa,
we recommend the following:

1 ) A mechanism should be added to these guns to control the speed of
the rammer and the placement of the powder bags.

2) A new bag charge design should be developed in which the weight of
the propellant can be adjusted without the use of a trim layer of pellets.
Such a design would be much more robust and less sensitive to
impact.

3) Studies of propellant-impact sensitivity should be broadly extended
and include both commonly used propellants, D846 and D839. The
objective of such studies should be to fully define the safe limits of
pellet configuration, bag compression, rammer speed, and other
relevant 16" gun and turret operations.

The last visual shows our recommendations and the very first
one of those speaks to what I just said. We believe that a mecha-
nism should be added to these guns to control the speed of the
rammer and the placement of the powder bags. Not only the speed,
but how far the bags are moved into the breech.

Second, a topic that we spoke about a few minutes ago, a new
bag charge design should be developed in which the weight of the
propellent can be adjusted without the use of trim layer pellets.
Such a design, we think, would be much more robust and less sen-
sitive to impact.

Last, studies of propellent impact sensitivity should be broadly
extended and include both of the commonly-used propellants,
D-846 and D-839. The objective of such studies should be to fully de-
termine the safe limits of pellet configuration, bag compression,
rammer speed and other relevant 16-inch gun and turret oper-
ations.

Chairman Nunn. I assume you have made all of these recom-
mendations known to the Navy?

Dr. ScHWOEBEL. This is the first report that we have made to the
GAO and to you people. This information will be published.

Chairman Nunn. It will be made available?

Dr. ScHWOEBEL. That's correct. This concludes this part of the
presentation. Thank you very much for your kind attention.

[The information provided by Dr. Schwoebel follows:]

300

Introduction

SANDIA OVERVIEW

Sandia National Laboratories is operated for the U.S. Department of Energy by Sandia
Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of AT&T, on a no-profit, no-fee, no-cost basis.

Sandia is one of the nation's largest research and development facilities. Its headquarters
and its main laboratory are located on Kirtland Air Force Base on the southeast edge of
Albuquerque, New Mexico. Another Sandia Laboratory complex in the San Francisco
Bay area just east of the city of Livermore adjoins Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory and was established in 1956 to provide a close working relationship with that
lab. Test ranges are operated near Tonopah, Nevada, and on Kauai, Hawaii.

About 60 percent of Sandia's research and development effort involves the
weaponization of nuclear explosives for national defense; the remainder involves energy
programs and advanced military technologies.

Sandia employs about 8,400 persons. Approximately 60 percent are in technical and
scientific positions, and the remainder are in crafts, skilled labor, and administrative
classifications. About 7,250 persons work in Albuquerque and about 1 ,050 in
Livermore. The total includes more than 100 at the Tonopah Test Range, the Nevada
Tests Site, and elsewhere.

Sandia operates a broad range of facilities, many of them unique. They are used for a
wide variety of projects, ranging from basic materials research, a relatively large
program, to the design of specialized parachutes. Assets, owned by DOE and acquired at
a cost of more than $1.1 billion, include about 600 major buildings containing more than
4 million square feet of floor space. They are located on land totaling approximately
562 square miles, most of which is at Tonopah Test Range.

The facilities include state-of-the-art equipment for environmental testing, radiation
research, combustion research, computing, and microelectronics research and production.
Other major facilities include a full-service Technical Library for employees; a Primary
Standards Laboratory;. transonic, supersonic, and hypersonic wind tunnels; and design,
fabrication, and process development laboratories.

A major part of Sandia's activities include the research and development of explosives
technology and componentry. These activities involve the engineering of explosive,
pyrotechnic, and propellant devices including detonators, detonation systems,
deflagration-to-detonation transition devices, gas generators, igniters, rocket motors, and
firesets.

Multi-department activities dealing with experimental and analytical studies related to
initiation, ignition, and detonation phenomenology, together with the development and
application of computer codes and models for analysis and design are also part of the
overall explosive activity. A significant effort is also devoted to the study of materials
behavior and performance as affected by exposure to stockpile and abnormal
environments together with the assessment of aging and compatibility effects.

301

To support these activities, Sandia has c^abilities of testing large quantities of
explosives, in excess of 100 lbs., with a wide range of high quality, state-of-the-art
instnunentation.

USS IOWA INVESTIGATION

The Senate Committee on Armed Services (SASC) investigation of the USS IOWA
Incident resulted in a request by Senator Nurm to the GAO on October 3, 1989 for
assistance in determining the adequacy of the USS IOWA investigation. The GAO, after
consultation with the National Science Foundation, asked Sandia for assistance with this
matter and the SASC joined in this request. On November 22, 1989, Dr. Albert Narath,
President of Sandia, agreed to the Laboratory providing consultation to the GAO and to
imdertaking a technical study providing the DOE authorized the work. Dr. Roger L.
Hagengruber, Vice President of Exploratory Systems, Sandia, was assigned
responsibility for managerial oversight for this activity and for coordination with the
DOE. Dr. Richard L. Schwoebel, Director of Components, Sandia, was assigned the
technical lead. On Febraary 2, 1990, Martin Ferber, Director of Navy issues, GAO, sent
a letter to Robert Y. Lowrey, U.S. DOE, Albuquerque Operations Office, formally
requesting Sandia increase its level of support to include a detailed study of certain issues
related to the Navy investigation. Specifically he asked Sandia to 1) examine pieces of
the rotating band and 16-inch projectile removed from the USS lOWA's gun for evidence
of foreign material that may be related to a detonating device, 2) test gim p>owdcr from
the USS lOWA's magazine and other gun powder of the same lot obtained elsewhere to
ascertain the stability of the material, and 3) review the scope and methodology of the
Navy's technical investigation and other evidence the Navy believes supports their
conclusions about the probable cause of the explosion. DOE and Sandia agreed to
undertake the study; however, it was felt that item #3 was not an appropriate task for a
national laboratory and GAO concurred.

Sandia's principal interfaces in this study included: Richard D. DeBobes, Counsel,
Senate Committee on Armed Services; Martin M. Ferber, Director of Navy Issues,
National Security and International Affairs Division, U.S. GAO; Richard .T. Herley,
Assistant Director, Navy Issues, National Security and International Affairs Division,
U.S. GAO; Tim Stone, Evaluator, U.S. GAO; C^t. Joseph Miceli, USN, Director,
Technical Investigation Team, Naval Sea Systems Command; and Stephen E. Mitchell,
Department Head, Gun/Missile Propulsion, Naval Ordnance Station, Indian Head, MD.

Sandia's approach to this study was to establish an advisory group to help develop the
overall program planning. This group in turn established four technical teams and an
administrative support team to execute the actual study. The technical team included a
chemical analysis team, an explosives studies team, a modeling team, and a fault-tree
arudysis team. A list of the members of the advisory group and team members follows.

Advisory Group

Dr. Richard L. Schwoebel, Chairman
Dr. John M. Holovka, Project Leader

Mark J. Davis

Paul W. Cooper

Dennis E. Mitchell

Project Teams

302

Chemical Analysis

Dr. James A. Borders, Leader
Dr. Suzanne H. Weissman
William B. Chambers
Dr. Samuel M. Myers
Dr. William R. Wampler
Dr. Gerald C. Nelson
Dr. David R. Tallant
Dr. Barney L. Doyle

Explosives Studies

Dr. David H. Anderson, Leader

Dennis E. Mitchell

Paul W. Cooper
Dr. Steven M. Harris

Thomas M. Massis
Dr. Marvin E. Morris

Modeling

Dr. Karl W. Schuler, Leader
Dr. MelvinR. Baer

Kenneth W. Gwirm
Dr. Kathleen V. Diegert

Fault-Tree Analysis

Dr. Arthur C. Payne, Leader
Dr. Steven M. Harris

Support

Linda M. Vigil-Lopez, Leader
Judy K. Jewell
Waylon Ferguson
Marty L. Noland
Carmen G. Drebing

Th. teams were each given objectives based on the GAO tasking, and they in turn
^^l7JZ^s'L the Understanding that these studies were to be -m^^-^ b^
Ia y7 lOQO This allowed for a final report to be avaUable by May 29, 1990 It was
^Lr u:^d?stoI^ h^^rme rLlts would' necessarily be preliminary and smd.es wou^d
^nti^uri^yond May 18 untU GAO, DOE, and Sandia agreed to temunate the stud.es.

Immediately after strucmring the program, the advisory group '^^j^fj! f"/^^ .^,,

ApSTl " -kese interactions were extremely helpful in focusing our smdies.

The technical team concentrated initially on reviewing the results of the Navy
II:eS^on, rch were aided by several visits to various Navy installations, as well as

303

visits to the USS IOWA, and later to the USS WISCONSIN and NEW JERSEY. Navy.
FBI, and Army personnel also visited Sandia to brief us on their respective
investigations. The Navy was particularly helpful by giving the Sandia staff on
January 16-17 a very detailed briefing on their entire USS IOWA investigation.
Throughout the Sandia study, the Navy continued to be very cooperative and
informative. After the initial learning phase, the technical teams concentrated on
independent analyses of areas of interest to the G AO.

VTTAE

VITAE

Dr. Roger L. Hagengruber is currently Vice President of Exploratory Systems, 9000.
He received a B.S. in Physics and American Institutions, an M.S. in Physics, and a Ph.D.
in Physics from the University of Wisconsin. He also did graduate studies in National
Security Management at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces and graduate studies
in International Diplomacy and Law at the University of New Mexico. From 1971-1972
Roger was an Assistant Professor of Physics at the Western Michigan University. He
joined Sandia in 1972, advancing through the management line until he was promoted in
1986 to Vice President, Exploratory Systems. His responsibilities include the
management of national security work at Sandia for all organizations except the DOE.
Roger is also an adjunct professor of Political Science (1976-present) at the University of
New Mexico.

Dr. Richard L. Schwoebel is currently Director of Coit^)onents Organization, 2500. He
received his B.S. (1953) in Physics/Math from Hamline University, and his Ph.D. (1962)
in Engineering Physics fixjm Cornell University. Richard joined Sandia in 1962 as a
Member of the Technical Staff. In 1965 he was promoted to Supervisor, Surface
Kinetics Research Division, and in 1969 to Manager, Materials Research and
Development Department. Further promotion to Director, Materials and Process
Sciences Directorate 1800 followed in 1982. He assumed his present position in the
Components Directorate in September 1988. He is a Fellow of the American Physical
Society, a Senior Member of the American Vacuum Society, and is on the Publications
Committee for the Materials Research Society.

Dr. David H. Anderson is currcndy Manager of the Explosive Component Department,
2510. He received his B.S. (1953), M.A. (1955), and Ph.D. (1959) degrees in Physical
Chemistry from Northwestern University, Harvard, and the University of Illinois,
respectively. Dave joined Sandia in 1959 as a Member of tlie Technical Staff. He was
promoted to Supervisor in 1%2 and to Department Manager in 1971. He has been
directly involved in explosives, pyrotechnic and propellant development and utilization
activities for the past 20 years as Manager of the Explosive Components Department.
Department responsibilities include design and development of detonating and
pyrotechnic components, explosive subsystems and diagnostics in support of DoD and
DOE programs. He is active in the International Pyrotechnics Seminar, the Detonation
Symposium, and is the piimaiy representative on the joint DoD/DOE Explosive Device
Technology Exchange Group.

304

Dr. Meivin R. Baer is currently a Distinguished Member of the Technical Staff in the
Fluid and Thennal Sciences Division, 1512. He received his B.S. (1970), M.S. (1972)
and Ph.D. (1976) in Mechanical Engineering from Colorado State University. He joined
Sandia in 1976 as a Member of die Technical Staff, and was promoted to Distinguished
Member of the Technical Staff in 1989. He has been involved in the modeling of
ignition, deflagration and detonation processes in propeUants, explosives, and
pyrotechnics.

Dr. James A. Borders is currently Supervisor of the Materials Compatibility and
Reliability Division, 1823. He received his B A. in Hiysics from Reed College in 1963,
his M.S. in Physics from the University of Illinois in 1963, and his Ph.D. in Solid State
Physics from the University of Illinois in 1968. He joined Sandia in 1968 as a Member
of the Technical Staff and was promoted to supervisor in 1978. His areas of expertise
include energetic ion analysis, ion implantation, radiation effects in insulators, and
surface characterization of materials.

William B. Chambers is currently a Member of the Technical Staff in the Process
Characterization Division, 1824. He received his B.S. in Biology/Chemistry from the
University of New Mexico in 1973. He joined Sandia in 1985 after 10 years experience
as an analytical chemist in environmental and metallurgical analyses and was promoted
to MTS in 1990. Since joining Sandia he has been involved in compositional and trace
characterization of a variety of materials, primarily by inductively coupled plasma-
atomic emission spectroscopy (ICP-AES).

Paul W. Cooper is currendy a Distinguished Member of the Technical Staff in the
Engineering Projects and Explosives Applications Division, 9333. He received his B.S.
in Chemical Engineering in 1958 from New York Polytechnic University and did
advance degree work at Illinois Institute of Technology. Paul joined Sandia in 1965 as a
Member of the Technical Staff and in 1989 was promoted to Distinguished Member of
the Technical Staff. His work involves basic research in explosives phenomena and the
design and development of explosives and firing components for DoD and DOE weapon
systems. He has prepared and presented several safety courses within Sandia and acts as
a general consultant in explosives safety and security matters for other government
agencies. He has authored and co-authored numerous reports and articles on explosives
utilization and performance.

Mark J. Davis is currendy Manager, Research Engineer, for Metallic Materials
Department, 1880. He received his B.S. in Metallurgical Engineering from the
University of California, Berkeley, in 1960. He received his M.S. in Metallurgy in 1963
from the same institution. He joined Sandia National Laboratories that same year as a
Member of Technical Staff. In April, 1968, he was promoted to Division Supervisor,
Metallurgy Division, and in September, 1969, to Manager, Metallurgy Department. He
managed the Metallurgy Department until March of 1990 when he assumed his present
position. Ehiring his career Mr. Davis has been personally involved in many failure
analyses ranging from rocket motor explosions to volcanic eruptions.

Dr. Kathleen V. Diegert is currently a Distinguished Member of the Technical Staff in
the Statistics, Computing and Human Factors Division, 7223. She eamed a B.A. in
Mathematical Sciences from Rice University in 1972, a M.S. in Operations Research
from Cornell University in 1975, and a Ph.D. in Operations Research from Cornell
University in 1977. She joined Sandia as a Member of the Technical Staff in 1980 and
was promoted to Distinguished Member of the Technical Staff in 1989. She specializes

305

in statistical consulting for weapon reliability analyses and probabilistic risk and safety
analyses.

Dr. Barney L. Doyle is currently Supervisor of Ion-Solid Interactions Division, 1111.
He received his B.S. in Physics from Kansas State University in 1971 and his Ph.D. in
Atomic Physics from the University of North Carolina in 1976. He joined Sandia in
1977 as a Member of the Technical Staff and was promoted to Supervisor in 1987. He
has 20 years experience in accelerator physics and 13 years experience in materials
science and ion-beam analysis of materials.

Carmen G. Drebing is currently Technical Editor with the Technical Communications
Development Division, 3151. She has a B.A. in English from the University of New
Mexico and an M.B.A. from New Mexico Highlands University. Carmen joined Sandia
in 1981 as a Division Secretary in the Stockpile Evaluation Program Division n. She
was promoted to Technical Editor for the Computer- Aided Publishing Division in 1985.

Wavlon Ferguson is currently a Member of the Laboratory Staff in Weapon Budget
Division, 142. He received his B.S. (1975) from Northern Arizona University and a
M.S. in Forest Management (1978) and a M.S. in Financial Accounting (1983) from
Colorado State University. Waylon joined Sandia in 1983 as a Contract Auditor.
Beginning in 1987, he was assigned as Administrative Assistant to the Director of
Components Organization 2500, and was in this assignment until early 1990. In this
position, he assisted the Director and organization personnel in administrative and
technical matters.

Kenneth W. Gwinn is currently a Senior Member of the Technical Staff in the
Advanced Mechanics Division IV, 1524. He received his B.S. degree in Civil
Engineering from Oklahoma State University in 1978 and his M.S. degree in Civil
Engineering from the same university in 1980. Ken joined Sandia the same year as a
Member of the Technical Staff. Major assignments concerned the impact analyses, and
shock and vibration of nuclear waste shipping cask transportation, along with the
chairmanship of two ANSI committees writing standards for this industry. Current
assignments deal with the analysis and design of advanced re-entry vehicles.

Dr. Steven M. Harris is currently a Senior Member of the Technical Staff in the
Detonating Components Division, 2513. He received his B.S. (1982), M.S. (1984), and
Ph.D. (1988) degrees in Mechanical Engineering from Oklahoma State University where
he specialized in heat transfer and fluid flow. He joined Sandia in 1988 as a Member of
the Technical Staff. He has been the project leader on the hazards assessment project
that deals with energetic material responses to abnormal environments.

Dr. John M. Holovka is currently Supervisor of the Advanced Projects Division HI,
9123. He received his B.S. in Chemistry from New Mexico Highlands University in
1965, and his Ph.D. in Physical Organic Chemistry from the University of Utah in 1968.
He joined Sandia in 1970 as a Member of the Technical Staff, and was promoted to
Supervisor in 1984. He has 10 years of experience in polymer materials science and 10
years experience in explosives materials and component development.

■ludv K. Jewell is currently Staff Secretary of the Components Organization, 2500. Judy
worked for eight years as a secretary before joining Sandia in 1979 as a Division
Secretary. She was promoted to Department Secretary in 1983 and Staff Secretary in
1988. In her 1 1 years at Sandia, she has worked in the quality assurance, safeguards.

306

systems research, technical library, and components organizations.

Thomas M. Massis is currently a Member of the Technical Staff in the Initiating and
Pyrotechnics Component Division, 2515. Tom joined Sandia in 1961 as a Staff
Assistant and was later promoted to Member of the Technical Staff. He has a B.S. in
Chemistry from the University of Albuquerque and has done graduate work at the
University of New Mexico. For the past 27 years, he has been involved in explosive
compatibility, aging, stability, and characterization studies. He is also the principal
investigator of failures and problems associated with explosive devices and components.

Dennis E. Mitchell is currently Supervisor of Detonating Components Division, 2513.
He has B.S. (1968) and M.S. (1969) degrees in Mechanical Engineering from the
University of New Mexico and specialized in dynamic response of materials to high
strain rate loading. Dennis joined Sandia in 1969 as a Member of the Technical Staff
and was promoted to Supervisor in 1988. For 16 of the past 21 years he was involved in
all aspects of explosives utilization, performance characterization and application and has
done research in the areas of explosive initiation. The last ten years he has been involved
in explosive component design and several studies related to energetic materials safety.
For the past two years, he has been Supervisor of the Detonating Components Division,
whose primary responsibilities include component design and material sensitivity and
performance characterization.

Dr. Marvin E. Morris is currently Supervisor of the Electromagnetic Analysis Division,
7553. He received a B.S. in Electrical Engineering from New Mexico State University
in 1965, a M.S. in Electrical Engineering from the University of New Mexico in 1967,
and a M.S. and Ph.D. in Applied Physics from Harvard University in 1976 and 1977,
respectively. Marvin joined Sandia in 1965 as a Member of the Technical Staff and in
1984 was promoted to Supervisor. For more than 17 of the past 25 years, he has worked
on electromagnetic problems, with the last ten years concentrated on electromagnetic
radiation, electrostatic discharge, nuclear electromagnetic pulse (EMP), and lightning
vulnerability of nuclear weapons.

Samuel M. Myers is currently Supervisor of Microstructure and Defect Physics
Division, 1 1 12. He received his B.S. (1965) and Ph.D. (1970) in Solid State Physics
from Duke University in North Carolina. He joined Sandia in 1970 as a Member of the
Technical Staff and was promoted to Supervisor in 1983. He has 25 years experience in
materials science and 18 years experience in ion-beam analysis of materials.

Dr. Gerald C. Nelson is currently a Senior Member of the Technical Staff in the
Materials Compatibility and Reliability Division, 1823. He received a B.A. degree in
Physics and Math from St. Olaf College in 1962, and a Ph.D. in Physics fix)m Iowa State
University in 1967. Gerald has used surface analytical techniques to study materials
problems for more than 18 years. He currentiy specializes in the application of surface
analytical techniques to the study of segregation, diffusion, and corrosion of thin films
and alloys.

Marty L. Noland is currently a Communications Consultant in the Technical
Communications Development Division, 3151. She has a B.S. in Applied Arts from
Texas Tech University, an M.A. in Counseling Psychology from the University of Texas
at San Antonio, and a J.D. from Texas Tech University. Marty joined Sandia in 1985 as
a Member of the Laboratory Staff. Prior experience includes advertising art, family and
group counseling, and bankruptcy law.

307

Dr. Arthur C Payne, Jr. is currently a Senior Member of the Technical Staff in the
Reactor Systems Safety Analysis Division, 6412. He received his B.S. (1969), M.S.
(1972), and Ph.D. (1976) in Theoretical Physics from Stevens Institute of Technology,
Hoboken, NJ. He joined the U.S. Navy in 1976 as an instructor at the Naval Nuclear
Power School, Orlando, FL. In 1981 he was appointed head of the Enlisted Physics
Department. In that same year he joined Sandia National Laboratories as a Member of
the Technical Staff. Since joining Sandia he has worked in the area of nuclear power
plant safety analysis and has been a leader in the development of new methods for
probabilistic risk assessment.

Dr. Karl W. Schuler is currently a Distinguished Member of the Technical Staff in the
Applied Mechanics Division H, 1522. He received his B.S. in Mechanical Engineering
from Pratt Institute in 1962 and his Ph.D. in Mechanics from the Dlinois Institute of
Technology in 1967. He joined Sandia that same year as a Member of the Technical
Staff, and was promoted to Distinguished Member of the Technical Staff in 1985. While
at Sandia he has worked on a variety of analytical and experimental programs related to
viscoelastic wave propagation in polymers, dynamic loading of oil shale, and stress wave
propagation in complex we^wns structures. He has designed experimental apparatus for
high pressure research, centrifuge testing of geotechnical models, and hypervelocity
launchers.

Dr. David R. Tallant is currendy a Senior Member of the Technical Staff ih the
Chemical Instrumentation Research Division, 1821. He received his B.S. in Chemistry
from the University of Wisconsin in 1967 and his M.S. in Analytical Chemistry from the
same university in 1968. He served four years in the U.S. Army and was discharged in
1972 having attained the rank of captain. He received his Ph.D. in Analytical Chemistry
from the University of Wisconsin in 1976 and joined Sandia that same year. While at
Sandia he has worked on a variety of projects in analytical chemistry, cleaning and
contamination control, and high temperature materials. His area of expertise includes
Raman and fluorescence spectroscopic techniques.

Linda M. Vigil Lopez is currently Administrative Assistant to Dr. Richard L.
Schwocbel, Director of Components, Organization 2500. She received her B.S. in
Biology from the University of Albuquerque in 1969 and her M.A. in Public
Administration from the University of New Mexico in 1979. She joined Sandia in 1984,
after 15 years of service with the State of New Mexico, the U.S. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, and the U.S. Bureau of Land Management. Her experience at
Sandia encompasses equal err^loyment opportunity analyst and nuclear weapons media
specialist duties. Her present administrative duties include assistance and administrative
advice to management, analysis of budget and other related administrative duties.

William R. Wampler is currently a Senior Member of the Technical Staff in
Microstructure and Defect Physics Division, 1112. He received his Ph.D. in Solid-State
Physics from Aachen University, West Germany, in 1976. He joined Sandia that same
year as a post-doctoral scientist and became a Member of the Technical Staff in 1978.
He has 18 years experience in materials science and 12 years experience in ion-beam
analysis of materials.

Dr. Suzanne H. Weissman is currently Supervisor of the Process Characterization
Division, 1824. She received her B.S. from Oregon State University in 1971, and her
Ph.D. from the University of Illinois in 1975. She joined Sandia in 1980 as a Member of
the Technical Staff with four years prior experience in analytical chemistry, and woriced

308

. in areas of materials characterization and trace analysis. She was promoted to Division
^ i Supervisor in 1986 and is currently working in programs directed at line process
■ monitoring and control, analytical methods development, materials and process
characterization, and quality assurance of chemical data.

Executive Summary

This report describes work by Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) relevant to
three aspects of the explosion that occurred in the center gun room of Turret 2 of
the USS IOWA on April 19, 1989, killing 47 crewmen. Our studies began in
December 1989 with initial contacts and information exchange with the United
States Navy (USN). Technical work began in January 1990 and continued to May
15, 1990.

The essential results of our study are as follows:

(1) We could neither prove nor disprove the presence of a chemical ignitor
proposed by the USN. The interpretation of evidence for a chemical
ignitor is complicated by the fact that some chemical constituents of such
an ignitor are found throughout 16 in. gim turrets, not only on the USS
IOWA, but also the USS WISCONSIN and the USS NEW JERSEY.
Forms of these constituents are either commonly used in the turrets or are
a part of the maritime environment. Steel wool was another component of
the proposed ignitor. We found iron fibers in the rotating band that could
be steel wool, but we were unable to clearly identify a source of fibers of
their diameter. We believe evidence for the presence of a chemical ignitor
is inconclusive.

(2) Our analyses indicate that the propellant stabilizer was within acceptable
limits. We also found only a very remote possibility that this propellant
could be initiated in the breech by friction, electrostatic discharge, or
electromagnetic radiation. Similarly, we conclude there is only a very
remote possibility the black powder could have been initiated in the
breech by any of these mechanisms. Ether/air combustion carmot be
achieved because minimum necessary concentrations are precluded. Even
if the minimum concentrations are achieved and combustion occurs, our
analyses show that the propellant cannot be ignited. These findings are in
general agreement with those of the USN.

(3) We confirmed that the powder bags were overrammed against the
projectile and determined that the extent of the overram was
approximately 3 in. greater than that established by the USN. Our
analyses indicate that the bag charges were under a compressive load of at
least 2800 pounds at the time of the explosion. There may have been even
higher transient forces due to dynamic loading resulting from a greater
than normal ram speed. While the rammer is capable of a speed of 13.9
ft/s, we could only establish that the rammer speed was at least 2 ft/s.

(4) The cause of the explosion was not conclusively determined. However, an
important factor may have been the increase in impact sensitivity of a

309

powder bag with a reduced number of pellets in its trim layer. (The trim
layer is an incomplete layer of pellets lying on their sides in the front of the
bag and just behind the black powder pouch on the next bag.) Our half-
scale experiments indicate that reducing the number of these pellets lying
next to the powder pouch increases impact sensitivity enough that an
explosion could have been caused by an overram at a higher than normal
speed. Our studies indicate that impact initiation depends on two key
factors: the number of pellets in the trim layer, and the speed of the
overram. However, these experiments must be extended to actual 16 in.
gun conditions to establish the validity of this ignition mechanism.

Navy personnel were most helpful in providing information and materials germane
to this study. In particular, we are grateful to Captain Joseph D. Miceli, USN,
Director of the Technical Support Team, Naval Sea Systems Command, who
responded without fail to a host of requests that grew out of our study. This
included arranging for information gathering visits aboard the USS IOWA and two
other battleships; extensive interactions with personnel at the Naval Surface
Warfare Center (NSWC-Dahlgren), Dahlgren, VA; Naval Weapons Support
Center (NWSC-Crane), Crane, IN; Naval Ordnance Station (NAVORDSTA),
Indian Head, VA; Norfolk Naval Shipyard (NNSY), Norfolk, VA; Naval Ordnance
Station (NAVORDSTA), Louisville, KY; and access to numerous reports and the
testimony of several crewmen at the Judge Advocate General manual
investigation. We are also indebted to the USN for arranging for us to speak with
Gunner's Mate (Guns) First Class Dale E. Mortensen, who drew on his extensive
experience to provide us with firsthand information regarding 16 in. gun
operations.

Studies of debris from the rotating band had been performed by the USN and, to a
much more limited extent, by the FBI. Evidence from the rotating band is
considered potentially important because the cannelure of the band was exposed to
the initial part of the explosion, and then clo.sed as the projectile was propelled
partway up the barrel of the gun. (The cannelure is a groove in the rotating band
of the projectile.) That is, any foreign material found in the sealed cannelure
region of the rotating band might contain important evidence regarding the
initiation process. The stability and sensitivity of propellant is of interest because
of its age at the time of the explosion (approximately 44 yrs) and the possibility of
unforeseen effects of storage at elevated temperatures that occurred during part of
the life of this material.

24-931 0-91-11

310

cannelure that had been opened, examined, and stored some months before.

The USN reported the presence of calcium (Ca), chlorine (CI), polyethylene
terephthalate (PET) film fragments, certain glycols and iron fibers in the rotating
band of the projectile. The USN reported that these were foreign materials and
evidence for the presence of an ignitor device composed of steel wool, brake fluid,
and an oxidizing chemical (calcium hypochlorite), placed in a plastic bag.

We find that Ca and CI are readily detectable throughout the entire region of both
Turret 1 and Turret 2 of the USS IOWA, Turret 2 of the USS NEW JERSEY, and
Turret 2 of the USS WISCONSIN. The presence of these elements is consistent
with the maritime environment and the cleaning operations carried out in the
turrets. We found these elements on two iron fibers that we extracted from the
rotating band from the USS IOWA. We also observed an additional four small
iron-fiber fragments that could not be removed from the rotating band for analysis
without destroying them. The surfaces of three of these iron-fiber fragments had
concentrations of Ca and CI that were similar to the two that were extracted. (The
fourth fiber was retained for another analytical procedure.) The occurrence of
these elements on the various fibers does not clearly establish the presence of an
ignitor device because the concentrations of these elements are within the
statistical variation of Ca and CI levels on metal fibers found elsewhere in the
turret.

The USN had previously removed and analyzed several iron fibers from the USS
IOWA rotating band. One of these fibers was described in the NWSC-Crane
report to have crusted regions containing high concentrations of Ca and CI. It was
the analysis of this fiber that was the basis of the USN's assertion that iron fibers
with abnormally high concentrations of Ca and CI were found in the rotating band
of the projectile of the USS IOWA. When we visited NWSC-Crane to examine
this fiber, we found that it, along with some others, could not be located. SNL
personnel worked jointly with NWSC-Crane to examine and analyze several other
fibers that were retained by NWSC-Crane. All of those fibers were free of crusted
regions, as were the six fibers we had previously either extracted or observed in the
rotating band at SNL.

The surface concentrations of Ca and CI on all the fiber samples that we have
analyzed, both at SNL and jointly with USN personnel at NWSC-Crane, were of
nominal levels, not greatly different from levels of these elements on fibers found
in other turret locations. In fact, the concentrations of Ca and CI observed by both
ourselves and the USN were very similar, i.e., only small quantities of Ca and CI
were measured. We could not clearly identify any of the fibers that we extracted as
remnants of steel wool. However, these fibers were found to have low ( < 0.6 at. %)
bulk carbon concentrations consistent with steel wool, which is commonly made of
iron fibers.

311

Two glycols in the rotating band of the projectile were identified by the USN as
"significant foreign materials," possibly constituents of brake fluid used in the
hypothetical ignitor device. Our studies show that the first of these glycols is a
constituent of a cleaning and lubricating fluid (Break-FreeTM) routinely used in the
turrets. Our analyses indicate that the USN identification of the second material
as a glycol is incorrect. The material is actually phenol, which is also a constituent
of Break-FreeTM. a third glycol, not considered to be a "significant foreign
material," was identified by the USN as a constituent of a marker pen. We agree
with that identification, but we find that it is also a constituent of Break-FreeTM.

The USN found a single fragment of a polymer film in the cannelure and identified
it as a possible residue of PET. The USN proposed that a plastic bag of this
material was used to contain the hypothetical ignitor device. We also idenfified
fragments of this material in the brush used to clean the guns in Turret 2. PET is
known to be chemically equivalent to Dacron^M and MylarTM. Accordingly, such
fragments could have come from several sources, including the bore socks used for
gun cleaning and ordinary clothing. We observed the presence of many polymeric
species in the cannelure of the rotating band, but not PET. Because polymeric
fragments can be found in various regions of the turret, their occurrence is not a
unique indication of the presence of the hypothetical ignitor device.

SNL personnel also examined cannelure debris from a test at NSWC-Dahlgren in
which the bag charges were ignited by a chemical ignitor similar to the one
proposed by the USN. TTiis ignitor used steel wool, but we found no iron fibers or
fragments of iron fibers in the limited length (~8 in.) of the rotating band that we
examined. The USN found five fibers in the entire band (-50 in.) from another
test of this same kind. Apparently there can be considerable variation in the
quantity and distribution of fibers from such experiments.

The manufacture of propellant involves the dissolution of nitrocellulose in a
mixture of ether and alcohol. Some ether remains in the propellant and
evaporates over an extended period of time, suggesting a potential fire hazard.
Our analysis shows that the probability of initiating an explosion by ether/air
burning in the breech is so remote as to be practically impossible. Calculations
show that the maximum temperature increase of the propellant that could occur in
the burning of an optimum mixture of ether/air is only 30°C to 40°C. Initiation of
the propellant requires a temperature increase of at least 170°C. However, the
thermal ignition of finely crushed black powder by ether/air combustion remains
an unresolved issue requiring additional study. Our studies also indicate that it is
virtually impossible to initiate the propellant or black powder in the breech by
electrostafic discharge, friction, or electromagnetic radiation at levels found within
the turret.

312

An interior ballistics model was developed for the open-breech explosion. The
model involves the high-speed flow of both hot propellant gases and pellets from
the open breech. The model was used to calculate the time variation of pressure at
the base of the projectile depending on the point of initiation along the five powder
bags. It predicts with some accuracy the movement of the projectile up the barrel
following the explosion. Our results indicate that the initiation site was most likely
between the first and second bag charge, which agrees with conclusions reached by
the USN in its field tests.

The USN reports that the propellant bags were overrammed into the breech of the
center gun of Turret 2 by a distance of approximately 21 in. The USN
interpretation was based in part on an analysis which assumed that parts of the
rammerhead gouged the spanning tray. In our analysis we show that the gouges
were caused by the rammer chain. Using this analysis, we found that the overram
was more nearly 24 in. That is, the rammer moved approximately 24 in. beyond
the point it would normally reach in placing the bag charges in the breech of the
gun. Therefore, a significant overram and compression of the powder bags
occurred.

We believe the probability of this initiation process depends on two key factors: 1)
the number of trim pellets in the forward-most layer and 2) rammer speed. If
there are a reduced number of trim pellets and the rammer is operated at higher
speeds, the initiation process during an overram becomes more probable. For
example, if there are twenty pellets in the trim layer, we estimate there is a
probability ranging from approximately one in two to one in three that the
propellant can be initiated at energy levels attainable when the rammer is operated
at 13.9 ft/s, its maximum speed. However, propellant initiation by impact is a
complex phenomena and much more work needs to be done to verify this estimate,
particularly in actual 16 in. guns or systems that closely duplicate the 16 in. gun.

During a number of inspections in conjunction with USN personnel, we found that
the powder hoist, powder door, rammer, and other mechanisms in the gun room
appeared to be in proper operating condition at the time of the explosion. We
concur with the USN that mechanical operations appear to have been normal and
not associated with the explosion.

313

the powder car. A high-speed overram seems consistent with these considerations.

We conclude that a plausible cause of the explosion aboard the USS IOWA was a
higher-than-normal speed overram of the bag charges into the rear of the
projectile, initiating one of the forward bag charges that contained a reduced
number of pellets in the trim layer. The fact that the bags were moved to a
position substantially beyond the normal location is evidence supporting a higher-
than-normal speed overram.

Recommendations

Based on our studies of the explosion in the gun turret of the USS IOWA, we
recommend the following:

(1) A mechanism should be added to these guns to control the speed of the
rammer and the placement of the powder bags.

m A new bag charge design should be developed in which the weight of the
^^ propeTlam^can be adjusted without the use of a trim layer of pellets. Such a
design would be much more robust and less sensitive to impact.

(3) Studies of propellant-impact sensitivity should be broadly extended and include

^^ both cornmonly used propellants, D846 and D839. The objective of such

studies sZuld be to fully define the safe limits of pellet configurator, bag

compression, rammer speed, and other relevant 16 in. gun and turret

operations.

NOTE: It has been assumed in these Recommendations that the 8 in. experiments
will be extended to full scale studies.

314

Dr. ScHWOEBEL. We can now talk about the tests that took place
yesterday.

Chairman Nunn. I think that would be a good procedure. Would
you suggest, Dr. Schwoebel, that we have Mr. Cooper and Dr.
Schuler go ahead and make their presentation based on the charts,
or do you want to get into questions? Are they prepared to tell us
what happened yesterday? That is the general question.

Senator Glenn. Mr. Chairman, can we clarify, has the Navy
been given this information or not? I was not clear from what you
said a moment ago.

Dr. Schwoebel. We have had an excellent interaction with the
technical team from the Navy and throughout from the very begin-
ning of our work at Sandia we have made the Navy, I think, feel
very welcome to come out to the project meetings that we have
every Friday afternoon. They have tended to come on the order of
once a month, something of that sort. They were out early in May,
the week of May 7, when this work was discussed in considerable
detail, and in fact Mr. Cooper gave them a full set of the data.

Senator Glenn. So the information you have given us today, the
Navy is fully aware of everything? This is not first time out for
some of this information?

Chairman Nunn. My question was to the recommendation. I am
not sure.

Dr. Schwoebel. I think that they have not seen this portrayal of
probability with speed. That would be something that I do not be-
lieve that they have seen, and that is something that we have done
quite recently. The curve that we were just looking at.

Chairman Nunn. Senator Glenn, as soon as we, the committee,
got this information, we got in touch directly with the Navy.

Senator Glenn. I am concerned all this technical data and so on
that is here — which is excellent. I am not questioning it — I am just
sort of surprised at your answer a minute ago, which led me to
think the Navy was being kept a little in the blind on some of this,
if some of this is being released for the first time today. The Navy
then will have to analyze this themselves, of course, and go into it,
and maybe run additional experiments and so on. That has not
been done yet, I know, but I was concerned that they know every-
thing that there is about this. I presumed they already were part
and parcel of the whole operation all the way through.

Dr. Schwoebel. They have been very much aware, as I said, of
what we have been doing. We have made special efforts to make
sure of that.

Chairman Nunn. Senator Cohen.

Senator Cohen. Could I ask Mr. Cooper one question? With re-
spect to the pellets, if you have a low number of pellets and a high
overram, you have a likelihood of an explosion?

Mr. Cooper. Some finite probability.

Senator Cohen. Now, if you have a high number of pellets — let
us say in a range of 17 to 25 — and you have a high overram, what
is the likelihood of an ignition?

Mr. Cooper. Again, there may be some finite probability, but at
this time we cannot put a real number on that. It is certainly less
likely than a small number.

315

Senator Cohen. So the key really is the number of pellets that
are in a bag and the overram? If you have 25 pellets in a bag and
you have a high overram, you have a less likelihood of an explo-
sion?

Mr. Cooper. Yes.

Senator Cohen. It is not the overram as much as the number of
pellets?

Mr. Cooper. You must have the overram first.

Senator Cohen. But if you have an overram with 25 pellets you
are likely to have an explosion?

Mr. Cooper. Right.

Senator Cohen. So the key really is the number of pellets rather
than the overram. You have got to have an overram, but if you
have an overram with a large number of pellets the likelihood of
an explosion is less?

Mr. Cooper. That is correct.

Chairman Nunn. On the other hand, if you have a small number
of pellets and no overram, you do not hnve a problem either, right?

Mr. Cooper. That is correct.

Chairman Nunn. So it is really the combination.

Senator Glenn. Dr. Schwoebel, one key element of this as you
pointed out before, was the 3-inch extra overram, and in your state-
ment you say, "We confirm that the powder bags were over-
rammed against the projectile and determined that the extent of
the overram was approximately 3 inches greater than that estab-
lished by the Navy." How did you establish that? How could you
and the Navy come up with different overram figures?

Dr. Schwoebel. You will recall the pictures of the gouges in the
tray. The determination of the overram was done by relating those
gouges in the spanning tray to the position of the links in the
rammer as they were blown backward.

Karl Schuler was able to make a specific relationship between
those gouges that you saw and link one, two, three and so on along
the rammer chain. This rather precisely positioned the face of the
rammer head at the time of the explosion.

Senator Glenn. Does the Navy agree with you now that there
was an additional 3-inch overram that they misestimated before or
that they were incorrect on before?

Dr. Schuler. I believe they do, because they were there when I
examined that spanner tray at the Norfolk Naval Shipyard. Their
analysis had been based on two different techniques: One, they
looked at the discoloration and distortion of the rollers and the
chain links. This discoloration and distortion presumably was asso-
ciated with the hot gases that were blown out of the breech.

However, the impulse delivered to the chain also pushed the
chain back into its housing. So if you looked at discoloration and
distortion, you may underestimate where the chain was initially
because it takes hot gases some time to discolor the chain before it
slips back into its protective housing.

Senator Glenn. This is different from the Navy investigation.
They agree with your new findings of the overram on this, then?

Dr. Schuler. Yes. The other way they tried to determine where
it was, was to look at the gouges. They thought the gouges were

316

due to the rammer head, which is made of bronze, gouging the alu-
minum.

I felt that in order to gouge the aluminum as deeply as it was
gouged, you would have to use a piece of steel, so I tried to associ-
ate the bottoms of the chain links with the gouges in the alumi-
num tray. It was that association that enabled me to decide where
the rammer head was initially.

Senator Glenn. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Nunn. I am trying to determine now the best way to
proceed. I think we ought to go back to regular order. I guess what
I would like to do if we could is. Dr. Schuler and Mr. Cooper, what-
ever charts you need up there to refer to, if any of them are help-
ful, and just tell us in your own words what the experiment was
yesterday and the results, and tell us about the overall situation.

Dr. Schuler. Yesterday's experiment was a drop experiment in
which five bags were strapped to a steel plate that provided the
weight.

Chairman Nunn. Is that similar to the chart we had up here?

Dr. Schuler. No.

317

CONFIGURATION OF D-846 BAGS
AT TIME OF EXPLOSION

■»- >

. I

"±1

I will try to improvise from this chart.

The tests at Dahlgren, instead of the rammer head on the top,
there was a steel plate about 4 inches thick, and then the five bags
were strapped to that steel plate, so initially they were held up
against it. Instead of there being a projectile, there was a gap be-
tween the bottom bag and the ground, and then that whole assem-
bly was released, hit the ground, and the kinetic energy of the
plate had to be absorbed then by the array of bags.

They had been conducting tests of this nature, I believe, for the
last week. The tests yesterday that we witnessed were the 17th and
18th tests in that series.

Chairman Nunn. The Navy had been conducting those tests?

Dr. ScHULER. Yes.

318

Chairman Nunn. That was basically what you had told them
earlier?

Dr. ScHULER. Yes. I think they felt this was a very quick way for
them to get into full bag testing in a way that they could adjust
the kinetic energy that was put into the bag stack and also adjust
the number of tare grains at the interface between bags one and
two.

When we got there yesterday we witnessed the tests

Chairman Nunn. You just arrived yesterday. You were not there
for the other 17 tests?

Dr. ScHULER. No. When we arrived yesterday we were shown the
videotapes of, I believe, the first 12 or so tests, none of which had
any reactions, some of which there were some broken grains ob-
served. We observed one test — I think it was number 17 — in which
five grains were placed in a tare layer, and the five grains were
placed very closely packed in the center of the tare layer.

On that test there was no reaction. All the grains were fractured
in the tare layer. There appeared to be the possible onset of an
event, but there was no event.

In the next test I suggested that the five grains, instead of being
clustered together tightly in the center of the test, be moved out
slightly. They were arrayed in an arrangement where there was
one grain in the center.

Chairman Nunn. These are the same things we are calling pel-
lets?

Dr. ScHULER. Grains or pellets. One in the center and four ar-
ranged around it in about a 6-inch diameter circle, 90 degrees
apart. That was test number 18 in which the ignition occurred yes-
terday.

Chairman Nunn. Tell us about the ignition.

Dr. ScHULER. Well, from the high speed video, what you see is a
flash of light that apparently came from the trim layer between
bags two and three, and then there was just a cloud or a ball of
yellow flame followed by a large cloud of white smoke. The scene
was obliterated by the explosion going off.

Chairman Nunn. Could you tell us the significance of this, Dr.
Schuler, in your words, and also tell us any shortcomings of it in
terms of being conclusive?

Dr. Schuler. Okay. I think it raises the possibility of an event
occurring due to this mechanism. However, it clearly was a very
severe test in that the trim layer had been depopulated to just five
grains. The five grains had been arranged in what I think is a con-
figuration that would tend to put the maximum amount of energy
into each of those five grains. The kinetic energy that was deliv-
ered due to the drop height was the maximum kinetic energy that
could be delivered by the rammer system. So in that sense it repre-
sents a severe test.

Chairman Nunn. It is severe, but would you also say it is possi-
ble? Was it possible that the conditions on the U.S.S. Iowa the day
of the explosion could have been nearly the same conditions that
you had in that test?

Dr. Schuler. I cannot say that, because I think in my investiga-
tion of the rammer speed, I cannot find any physical evidence that
would say the rammer was operating at 14 feet per second. All I

319

can say is that there is a lower bound. It was going at least 2 feet
per second. So I have no evidence, first, to the rammer speed that
it was going that fast. It could have been but may not have been.
There was definitely an overram, which is a condition that is nec-
essary for this.

I do not believe there is any way of knowing how many trim
grains there were on the bags that were involved in the incident
other than some statistical analysis that may be forthcoming.

Senator Warner. What is the correlation between the kinetic
energy that you applied there in that test yesterday and the ranges
of kinetic energy that could have been applied by the rammer in
the 16-inch mount on the U.S.S. Iowa?

Dr. ScHULER. This test yesterday represented the maximum ki-
netic energy that the rammer system aboard the U.S.S. Iowa could
deliver.

Senator Warner. Now is there any evidence to show that that
maximum energy was in fact utilized in the accident situation?

Dr. SCHULER. No.

Senator Warner. Then why was the test conducted outside of
the parameters of the likelihood of what transpired on the U.S.S.
Iowa? That is my question.

Dr. ScHULER. I believe the reason for conducting the test was to
try to extend our results on scale testing to the full-scale situation;
and, as such, one of the things one wants to do is establish the
probabilities of occurrence. So one has to test at energies that may
be over what you could have achieved on the U.S.S. Iowa.

I point out again, however, that the rammer on the U.S.S. Iowa
could have been going at 14 feet per second. We just have no evi-
dence that it was going at that speed.

Chairman Nunn. You have no evidence one way or the other, do
you? You have no evidence that it was less than that?

Dr. ScHULER. That is correct.

Chairman Nunn. You have no evidence where it was?

Dr. SCHULER. No.

Chairman Nunn. But you know it could possibly have achieved
that.

Dr. ScHULER. That may be going a little bit too far. There is evi-
dence that after the incident the stroking piston of the hydraulic
drive was in a position that would correspond to, I believe, 1.7 feet
per second.

Chairman Nunn. How does that translate into what the kinetic
energy

Dr. ScHULER. The kinetic energy at 1.7 feet per second would be
very low, probably 60 foot-pounds or something like that.

Senator Warner. Far less than the energy used in the test yes-
terday.

Dr. ScHULER. Far less.

Senator Warner. Let me ask this question. Has the Navy been
operating for many years, perhaps since World War II, under the
theory that this particular powder would not ignite as a conse-
quence of overpressure and that it required use of an igniter for
detonation? That seems to me to be a very key question.

Dr. ScHWOEBEL. Yes, and I do not think we can really answer
that. The Navy training, I think, is rather explicit in specifying the

320

speed and distance of a proper ram operation, but I think that the
interaction that Paul and Karl talk about and this mechanism that
we are talking about is basically new ground.

Senator Warner. It seems to me that the design of this propel-
lant and the extensive period and number of times that it was op-
erated safely lends support to the hypothesis that probably the
Navy operated under the assumption that you could kick these
bags around, that the ship could take a direct hit by a 16-inch
round from another ship and still there would not be ignition; it
would require some type of fusing and, therefore, they did not focus
on whatever safety measures were necessary as a consequence of
varying the number of pellets or putting a control mechanism for
speed of the rammer. There was sufficient operating experience to
justify those modes of operation and use of these powder bags.

It seems to me that that has to be revisited, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Glenn. Mr. Chairman, one other factor on this, if I
might.

If I observed your test correctly, it was not in a constrained envi-
ronment? It was not in a breech, or in a barrel, or something that
perfectly constrained it. It was sort of a loose pile of these things
and just held loosely together.

Would the energy and the temperature rise in the barrel or in
the breech where the bags were rammed in? That kind of con-
straint does not let these things squish out at all, and temperature
would go way up from what your test showed. It would be even
worse in a gun barrel than it was in the test that blew yesterday.
Is that correct?

It cannot squish out in a gun barrel. It is constrained, so with the
rammer coming in, that transfer of energy is going to be far more
direct even than it was in your test. So it would be a worst case
situation in the gun barrel. Is that correct?

Mr. Cooper. The reactions here occur so quickly that if the bags
break, they do not break and move out of the way until later in the
chain of events.

Senator Glenn. I was thinking in terms of if whether you had
high or low speed, you would have more of a temperature buildup
in there for your 2 feet per second as opposed to 14 than you would
with the bag over here. You would have a temperature rise period
that would have more impact if you were inside the barrel. Is that
correct?

Mr. Cooper. Once ignition starts, certainly the presence of the
barrel would make it much, much worse. Now the bag diameter is
only a little over 14 inches. The breech diameter of the gun is 18
inches. So there is a tremendous clearance in that system.

Senator Glenn. You have a squish effect inside the barrel, then,
a little bit.

Mr. Cooper. That is one of the mechanisms where the gun ab-
sorbs energy and actually protects against this kind of impact.

The difference between the data that we did in small-scale tests
and in the full-scale gun is the fact that in our tests we deliver all
of the impact energy to the grains. So the data that Dr. Schwoebel
showed represents the minimum energy for ignition.

Senator Glenn. Are there measurements made on how many
trim layer grains are acceptable in these bags and how many are

321

not? Has that ever been a factor in the past? Somebody said there
is an average of 17 in the trim layer.

Mr. Cooper. So far, I think a part of the Navy's inventory has
been sampled, and they found bags running between 17 and 61
grains in the tear layers. The entire inventory has not been sam-
pled, so the statistics are

Senator Glenn. How do they sample that? Do they just feel them
or x-ray them?

Mr. Cooper. You can feel the grains in the bag.

Chairman Nunn. Let me ask this question: I am trying to get the
significance of yesterday's test, because you had made your analy-
sis before that test. I think we ought to make sure that we under-
stand the charts we have all seen before here and the correlations
and the probabilities were before yesterday's test. Yesterday's test
tells us something, but it does not tell us nearly as much as we had
already seen. Is that right?

Mr. Cooper. The previous testing that we had done, as I was ex-
plaining, represents the minimum energy to set off grains during
impact. In a gun, you have a lot of mechanisms where you lose
energy during ramming. The bags buckle slightly, the bags com-
press, pellets move around and bypass each other. All of these are
mechanisms that absorb energy that is no longer available to those
individual grains in the tear layer.

Senator Glenn. Dr. Schuler was going to add something a
minute ago.

Mr. Cooper. So the importance of the testing that the Navy is
doing now is to establish that difference of seeing how much
energy really is lost in the gun and how much of that is now avail-
able for the mechanisms that we were looking at in the small fix-
tures.

Chairman Nunn. I guess what I would like to find out at this
juncture, and then we will open it up, is what was the significance
of yesterday's test? Again, what does it tell us and what does it not
tell us?

Senator Warner. What does it add to the base of technical data
you developed at Sandia?

Mr. Cooper. It gave us two very important pieces of information.
One, it is the first indication of how much energy is partitioned to
the rest of the system as compared to that which can go into the
tare grains, and that piece of information, once it is expanded with
more tests, will help us extrapolate this point of data more accu-
rately.

The second piece of information was that it established that
within the possible operating envelopes of the gun that with a
small number of tare layers and at the maximum ramming speed
that is within the envelope of operation of the gun you could get an
ignition during an overram. I am not saying that is a probable
event

Senator Warner. The tests being conducted at Dahlgren are
really on the threshold of their test cycle, is that not correct?

Mr. Cooper. Yes.

Senator Warner. We are at the very preliminary stages of a
really elongated test cycle, and they have not got to the point of

322

actually making tests associated with an actual rammer and an
actual gun barrel.

Mr. Cooper. That is correct.

Senator Warner. That is why I think we have got to exercise
caution not to leap to conclusions.

Mr. Cooper. Absolutely.

Chairman Nunn. Could you tell us what scenario comes out of
both your previous studies and yesterday? What scenario could we
pose, now, as a possible — not a probable — cause of the occurrence
on the Iowa, the tragedy that took place there? What scenario
could have occurred?

Dr. ScHWOEBEL. One that we have thought about, is a very
simple one that seems consistent with at least several of the facts.
During our review and a number of inspections, in conjunction
with Navy personnel, we found that the powder hoist, the powder
door, the rammer and other mechanisms in the gun room appeared
to be in proper operating condition at the time of the explosion.
That is, there was no malfunction that we could find in the system.

Now, as established by the Navy investigation, the door to the
powder hoist was closed and locked, but the powder car had not
been lowered at the time of the explosion. Immediate lowering of
the car on closure of the door is the normal procedure. That is the
upper powder hoist operator's function. This suggests to us that the
ramming occurred soon after closing the powder door, and may
have occurred at very high speed. The counter of this is as follows.
Suppose that a very slow ram occurred, as postulated by the Navy.
A slow ram of, say, 1 to 2 feet per second, followed by this extended
period of 15 to perhaps 30 seconds of sustained overram while the
igniter is activated. That means that the upper powder hoist opera-
tor would have had on the order of maybe 20 to 30 seconds to begin
lowering this powder car. His job is to do that right away.

However, on the contrary, if a high-speed ram occurred, there
would have been little opportunity for the operator to begin lower-
ing the powder car. So it occurs to us that another way of thinking
about this is a very simple way in which a high-speed overram
occurs, and the explosion takes place so fast that the upper powder
hoist operator has no opportunity to lower the car.

A factor that might contribute to an overram was an unidenti-
fied problem in the loading operation. This unidentified problem
was reported through the ship's phone system by a member of the
gun crew. It led to a delay in loading the center gun relative to
both the left and right guns in turret II, and this undefined prob-
lem might have created confusion, for example, during the powder
loading phase. So we conclude that a plausible cause of the explo-
sion aboard the U.S.S. Iowa, was a higher than normal speed over-
ram of the bag charges into the rear of the projectile, initiating one
of the forward bag charges that contained a reduced number of pel-
lets in the trim layer. The fact that the bags were moved to a posi-
tion substantially beyond the normal position is evidence to us, is
an indication to us, that it may have taken place at a higher than
normal speed, so that in some sense it was not fully controlled.

This is a very simple view that seems to us to be consistent with
the facts.

323

Chairman Nunn. Is it fair to say this is a possible scenario at
this stage?

Dr. ScHWOEBEL. We think it is a possible scenario.

Chairman Nunn. Would you say it would be fair to say it is a
probable scenario?

Dr. ScHWOEBEL. I do not think we can say that.

Chairman Nunn. You do not have enough evidence to say it is a
probable scenario?

Dr. ScHWOEBEL. That is exactly right.

Chairman Nunn. What else do we need to do now? What else do
you believe needs to be done to complete the investigation that you
have underway?

Dr. ScHWOEBEL. What I would like to see happen is for technical
teams from both Sandia and the Navy come together again to dis-
cuss all of these results and continue studies that explore this
range of impact sensitivity and what the key factors are, and ex-
plore those in much more detail. We have only in some sense a be-
ginning of this process, and that needs to go on.

Chairman Nunn. Is it fair to say, though, at this stage, that you
know enough now on probabilities that you believe your recom-
mendations should be taken seriously by the Navy in terms of
changing and eliminating even the possibility of this recurring?

Dr. ScHWOEBEL. We do.

Chairman Nunn. You believe the recommendations you have
made, if carried out, would eliminate the possibility of this recur-
ring in this type scenario?

Dr. ScHWOEBEL. We think these are steps clearly in the right di-
rection.

Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, again I commend you and
others for working to bring this hearing together. Having heard
this evidence today, I have now formed an opinion, and I state it
solely as a recommendation to the Secretary of the Navy, not a di-
rection. It seems to me that the procedures followed thus far by the
Chief of Naval Operations were to appoint a single officer to look
into this situation, make findings, and report; and that has been
done. Now, today we have received new evidence and the Secretary
of the Navy has reopened the investigation.

It seems to me it would be prudent for the Secretary of the Navy
to consider appointing a board of officers, and that board would do
at least three things: number one, go back over all the evidence
that provided the findings of the previous single officer; second,
review this new evidence; and third, determine whether or not
there should be further investigation either of a technical nature
or involving witnesses; and then provide a complete set of findings
based on this review of those three categories.

The Secretary of the Navy, so far as I know, has not signed off
on the original single officer investigation, and it would be within
his purview to now establish a new board composed of several offi-
cers to do at least these three steps.

Chairman Nunn. Senator Warner, I would not disagree with
anything you have just said. I would add one other thing to it,
which I think is very important, and that is to keep Sandia in-
volved as an independent, and I think objective, analytical, techni-
cal capability.

324

Senator Warner. Very clearly, and I accept that, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, first I will ask you, Mr. Conahan, you have had a lot
of experience in looking over situations where investigations have
been conducted by elements of the Department of Defense, other
Government agencies and so forth. Is that not correct?

Mr. Conahan. That is correct, yes, sir.

Senator Warner. Have you found in the ourse of your investi-
gation any evidence whatsoever to indicate the Navy at any time
tried to perform a cover-up of this situation?

Mr. Conahan. No, I do not think that they attempted to do any-
thing in the way of a cover-up. I do think, however, that a close
evaluation of the way that they went about doing their investiga-
tion would come to a conclusion that perhaps too early on in the
investigation they ruled out other possible or plausible cau&v:3 for
the explosion.

Senator Warner. Dr. Schwoebel, in your work, did you find any
facts or information, to indicate that the Navy at any time tried to
cover up or interfere with your testing procedures?

Dr. Schwoebel. Our interactions with the technical team have
been open, and candid. They have helped us in every possible way.

Senator Warner. Fully cooperative?

Dr. Schwoebel. Fully cooperative.

Senator Warner. And the Navy was fully cooperative with the
GAO, I presume, during the course of its inquiry?

Mr. Conahan. Yes, sir.

Chairman Nunn. Senator Warner, I would add the Navy, at our
request, helped pay for the experimentation that took place at
Sandia.

Senator Warner. Yesterday, Mr. Chairman, when I talked with
the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Vice
Chief, they were very forthcoming about all the facts and informa-
tion, so I hope that those persons who want to characterize this sit-
uation would think twice about employing the word "cover up"
which has been used frequently in the last 24 hours. I find no basis
for it, you find no basis for it, and you have made an independent
analysis.

Do you have any recommendations for further technical tests
beyond those scheduled in the next 2 weeks at the direction of the
Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations?

Dr. Schwoebel. V/hat we would recommend is really contained
in number three of our recommendations, and that is for an on-
going study. I think that that is quite important and, that these
questions may not be fully resolved in simply another 2 weeks of
testing.

Senator Warner. I will return to my second line of questions
when the time comes, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Nunn. I believe Senator Bingaman is next.

Senator Bingaman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me again compliment those who worked on this. I think you
have done an excellent and objective job.

Let me just recount my understanding of what occurred. We had
testimony on November 16 in which Admiral Milligan testified as
to his report and his investigation for the Navy and concluded — in
answer to one of your questions, Mr. Chairman, he said, "Mr.

325

Chairman, I have to say we have excluded all other possibilities
and have come to this as the only possible conclusion."

In his prepared testimony then, he said "My investigation elimi-
nated accident and a malfunction as the cause." You are saying
that there is a plausible scenario which would attribute this event
to accident or malfunction? That is what I am understanding you
to be saying here. Is that accurate?

Dr. ScHWOEBEL. Yes, that is correct.

Senator Bingaman. The other conclusion which I understand the
Navy had was

Chairman Nunn. Senator Bingaman, would you yield on that
one point, and I will not take away from your time in any way,
because I think that is very important. In the testimony before our
committee on November 16, Rear Admiral Milligan, who headed
the Navy investigation said, and I quote, "The technical points of
this investigation clearly demonstrate that an accident did not
cause the explosion."

Dr. Schwoebel, from what I understand of your testimony this
morning, you disagree with that?

Dr. Schwoebel. We think, as I have said, that there are some im-
portant phenomenon that were not understood at that time, and
that there are other plausible explanations.

Chairman Nunn. According to Admiral Milligan, he also said,
"No plausible accidental cause of ignition could be found." And in
answer to Senator Bingaman's question you disagree with that.

Dr. Schwoebel. We think that there is a plausible other way in
which the explosion could be initiated.

Chairman Nunn. Thank you.

Senator Bingaman. Let me ask about a couple of other items
that Admiral Milligan identified. He said that the report, and this
is the Navy report, concluded that unique foreign material was
present on the Iowa projectile. And from what I understand you to
be saying, you have not found any such unique foreign material on
the Iowa projectile, is that correct?

Dr. Schwoebel. The unique material, from our perspective, is
the iron fibers of the diameter that have been observed. That is the
one constituent of the system that we cannot tie in a definitive way
to some normal source. And there may be a rational explanation
for that, but we do not have a connection there at this time.

Senator Bingaman. He went on to say here, and maybe this gets
to the point you are making, he says the report concluded that for-
eign residue unique to the Iowa projectile could not be duplicated
by simple contamination of the gun chamber with steel wool and
other chemicals that might remotely be present in a gun firing.
Now you disagree with that?

Dr. Schwoebel. Yes.

Senator Bingaman. Everything you found there can be explained
either by normal circumstances or by what he refers to here as
simple contamination of the gun chamber with steel wool and
other chemicals?

Dr. Schwoebel. We cannot, as I have said, replicate or do we
have an explanation for the presence of those 38 fibers that were
found in the band of that size. We have not made that connection
to some normal source.

326

Senator Bingaman. But you have not found those either? Those
are the ones that are not present?

Dr. ScHWOEBEL. No, those fibers are available. There are some of
those which could not be located, but we have heard from the Navy
people in the last few days that some of those crusted fibers have
in fact been located.

Senator Bingaman. Well, let me ask this in maybe a little less
technical jargon. My understanding is that the Navy concluded
that something was present there which could not be explained
other than by some intentional act of one of the personnel in-
volved. And they concluded that there was some type of homemade
explosive device which caused this occurrence.

Did you find any evidence to support the claim that there was a
homemade explosive device that caused this?

Dr. ScHWOEBEL. We have concluded that we can neither prove
nor disprove the existence of a chemical igniter.

Senator Bingaman. So you found no evidence to prove it?

Dr. ScHWOEBEL. That is correct.

Senator Bingaman. And you found no evidence to disprove it?

Dr. ScHWOEBEL. That is correct.

Senator Bingaman. And then the obvious chain of logic that the
Navy used was since there was not an accident, in their opinion,
and there was not a malfunction, that this must have been — I
think on page 61 of their report they said "the explosion in center
gun turret II of the U.S.S. Iowa resulted from a wrongful, inten-
tional act. And based on this investigative report, and after full
review of all Naval Investigative Services reports to date, the
wrongful, intentional act which caused this accident was most
probably committed by Gunnersmate, Clayton Hartwig."

You are saying that you found no evidence to support the conclu-
sion that there was an intentional act by Gunnersmate Hartwig or
anybody else?

Dr. ScHWOEBEL. Our investigation was, as I have said, circum-
scribed. We looked at the technical aspects of this. A full investiga-
tion, of course, would include many other factors that you are
aware of.

Senator Bingaman. Right.

Senator Warner. You were not looking for evidence of the type
suggested by the Senator from New Mexico, were you?

Dr. ScHWOEBEL. As I said, we can neither prove nor disprove the
existence of an igniter.

Senator Bingaman. I guess the point that I am just trying to nail
down here, first of all, is that you have no evidence that you uncov-
ered in your investigation to support the conclusion that this occur-
rence was the result of an intentional act?

Dr. ScHWOEBEL. We have no evidence of that nature.

Senator Bingaman. And second, you do have, you believe, a plau-
sible alternative explanation for the accident — or for the occur-
rence?

Dr. ScHWOEBEL. We believe that this is a plausible explanation.
To determine the extent of that plausibility depends very much on
continued studies that would be done.

Senator Bingaman. Thank you very much. My time is up, Mr.
Chairman.

327

Chairman Nunn. Senator Glenn.

Senator Glenn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The thing that comes out of this that is very disturbing, of
course, is that blame was placed on Hartwig because of an inability
to find other reasons. That is wrong. Now we find there were other
reasons because there were errors made in how far the rammer
went in. The Navy, you say, now agrees with that. That it can be
another reason for this. And the rush to blame Hartwig was flat
wrong.

I hope we learned something out of this. I am not sure that we
have yet. The rush to use a personality profile, as sketchy as that
was, and come to the conclusions that Senator Bingaman just
brought out, I have questioned ever since this thing started. So I
hope whatever board or whatever we want to do to straighten out
our processes in this thing, among other things, should be done and
done immediately.

When I was talking about the squish effect a while ago, to get on
another subject, Dr. Schuler, you were trying to get the micro-
phone there and I cut off and somebody else got on with question-
ing. What was it you were about to say about that?

Dr. Schuler. That videotape you saw. Senator, showed an assem-
bly that was then placed into a cylinder, so there was confinement
in our tests.

Senator Glenn. There was, but not like the confinement there
would have been in a barrel. But from what Mr. Cooper said here,
too, there is some flexibility effect in the gun barrel itself. So that
would take away some of my concern there.

Did you look at what impact it could have had where there were
five bags used instead of six? I would think that if there were six
bags in a normal load that that gives you a little more flex effect in
there. These are not solid bags, they are not steel, and they are not
even as hard as wood or anything. They are quite flexible.

Would that have had an impact in — the fewer bags you use the
more — the less flexibility factor is going to be in that whole length,
if you follow what I am getting at.

Dr. Schuler. Yes. I think with fewer bags you have less of an
energy dissipation source. You have one more bag that could dissi-
pate energy, that is true.

Senator Glenn. You would have less of a compression factor. So
the temperature would go up even higher, the fewer bags, is that
correct?

Dr. Schuler. If you have less mass of bags, the total kinetic
energy at the maximum rammer speed would be less. But the sixth
bag might provide additional energy losses to compensate for the
greater energy.

Senator Glenn. Mr. Chairman, is there going to be any discus-
sion of what kind of investigation we think the Navy should go into
on this? Senator Warner brought that up a moment ago and I do
not know whether we are going to discuss that today, or is that
going to be subject to further meetings and discussion?

Chairman Nunn. Well, I have talked to Secretary Garrett and I
know Senator Warner has talked to him, and they assured me they
have reopened the investigation and they are going to proceed with
all due diligence to look at all of this new evidence and see where

328

they go from here. And I personally feel strongly that Sandia
should be kept in as an independent observer of this and partici-
pant in it. Beyond that, I guess we will have to wait and hear from
the Navy on their plans.

Senator Glenn. The only other thing I would say, Mr. Chairman,
is that I think the fact that the Navy has been firing these guns for
a long time, and we had all of the World War II experience, if
there is metal fatigue and a wing falls off my airplane, it only
takes once and you are in bad, deep trouble. And that this finally
came out as something that could happen, the fact that it did not
happen over hundreds of thousands of firings through the years
does not mean anything.

But what is most disturbing is that there was a willingness, be-
cause of lack of other information, to go ahead and blame this basi-
cally on a personality profile, and to assign blame and say it could
not have been anything else, when your information here indicates
that it could be, and you do not know for sure that this caused it, I
am not saying that at all, but there are other things that could
have caused that accident. And that is the most important thing
that has come out of this. Now we have got to get on and make
sure it does not happen again.

Thank you.

Chairman Nunn. Thank you. Senator Glenn. Senator Levin.

Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to focus on the foreign materials question for a
minute, because it seems to me that what the testimony this morn-
ing highlights is, number one, that there is an innocent alternative
explanation for what happened which the Navy did not consider.
But it also highlights that the Navy's explanation that there were
unique foreign materials — and that was the basis of their report —
is not accurate.

I want to just go through that a bit with you. I want to start
with Admiral Milligan's testimony before us. When I was question-
ing him last time about foreign materials — it was not last time, it
was one of the times he appeared in front of us — he said: I am sat-
isfied that foreign material was in the band. My report is based on
foreign materials, sir.

His report is based on the presence of foreign materials that are
unique. And again, in response to my question, he said: My report
is based on the fact that there was foreign material, something for-
eign to the normal propellant charge in the center gun of turret II
on April 19. That is the issue, he said.

And then when you read his written statement of November 16,
1989, he said that this report concluded unique foreign material
was present on the Iowa projectile. The report identified the mate-
rial as iron wires coated with calcium, chlorine and oxygen. He
stated that these materials were not found on projectiles used as
test or control shoots.

The report concluded: This foreign residue, unique to the Iowa
projectile, could not be duplicated by simple contamination of the
gun chamber with steel wool and other chemicals that might re-
motely be present in a gun firing.

329

You are telling us, as I understand it today, that these other
chemicals are indeed commonly present, putting aside the steel
wires for a moment?

Dr. ScHWOEBEL. The other chemicals are common to that envi-
ronment.

Senator Levin. So there is a very sharp disagreement on this
point, that the other chemicals that were present there were not
unique. In other words, these were common chemicals commonly
found either in a turret or on a ship; correct?

Dr. Schwoebel. That is correct.

Senator Levin. So that is a big part of the Navy's findings right
there, and I am going to read it again. 'The report concluded this
foreign residue unique to the Iowa projectile," the Admiral said,
"could not be duplicated by simple contamination of the gun cham-
ber with steel wool and other chemicals that might remotely be
present in a gun firing." We have taken care of the other chemi-
cals. They are present in gun firings and on turrets.

Now that gets us to the other element that he found to be
unique, which are those wires that he calls steel wool, by the way.
Are they steel wool?

Dr. Schwoebel. They are iron fibers with a low carbon concen-
tration, and steel wool is commonly made of a low carbon iron.

Senator Levin. Is there any other substance of which those fibers
are part besides steel wool?

Dr. Schwoebel. Not that we are aware.

Senator Levin. Would you then agree that those are steel wool
fibers, or is that also not necessarily an accurate conclusion?

Dr. Schwoebel. I will let our materials expert, Dr. Borders, talk
about that.

Dr. Borders. The fibers that we identified were iron, as Dick has
said, with low carbon and low alloying species. We cannot distin-
guish those from other sources of iron with low carbon and low al-
loying species such as might be found, for example, from shavings
of the blind loaded and plugged projectile that was used in the
center gun at turret II on that day. That is not to say that that was
necessarily the source of them.

There are other possibilities probably too numerous to mention
that are further down on the probability scale, but steel wool is
certainly a very ubiquitous substance that is found in many areas
and, although not specifically authorized for use in the gun rooms,
we were told that it was used in the gun room of center gun turret
II after the U.S.S. Iowa explosion for certain cleanup procedures.

Senator Levin. Would that explain their presence in the band?

Dr. Borders. That is not clear.

Senator Levin. Could they have gotten into the band as part of
the cleanup?

Dr. Borders. There is a slight possibility.

Senator Levin. Is there any other innocent explanation of how
they could be in that turret?

Dr. Borders. We cannot think of one. That is not to say we can
think of everything.

Senator Levin. If steel wool had been used to clean up that gun
at some earlier point, could they have remained in that gun after

330

that gun was fired? Would there be residue left in the band possi-
bly?

Dr. Borders. It is our understanding that steel wool is not used
to clean up in the barrels in normal operating procedures, but with
the lubricants that were used, probably not.

Senator Levin. Finally, what you are saying is this could be steel
wool but it is not necessarily steel wool; is that correct?

Dr. Borders. That is correct.

Senator Levin. That differs from the Navy's testimony that it
was steel wool.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Nunn. Thank you. Senator Levin.

I have asked a lot of questions, so I will defer to Senators Binga-
man and Glenn for other questions. Then I have some wrap-up
questions and a few observations.

Senator Bingaman. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Nunn. Senator Glenn.

Senator Glenn. I believe I have no other questions.

I would just make a statement, though. I think the big mistake
in this whole thing from the beginning is in saying that since we
have found no other possible reasons, it must have been Hartwig.
Now we know there may be other possible reasons, so the original
rush to judgment, as I see it, was very premature.

Let me ask one other question. Let us say that the original
theory that foreign materials were in there, that there was some
sort of detonator or ignition device that was secreted in there in
some way, do you feel that that could have been determined from
the chemical analysis that was done after the accident? Could you
have picked up a detonator presence?

Dr. ScHwoEBEL. We concluded that we could neither prove nor
disprove the existence of an initiator, and that is based on the fact,
of course, that there are a number of these materials which are
commonly there. If there was one present, we would expect to find
calcium, chlorine, et cetera. If there was no detonator there, we
expect to find calcium, chlorine, et cetera, because of the fact that
these materials are present.

Senator Glenn. Did you have full cooperation in getting those
samples?

Dr. ScHWOEBEL. Absolutely. No problems whatsoever. As I have
tried to impress on the committee, I think that the interactions
that we have had with the Navy technical team have been out-
standing.

Senator Glenn. I probably am reading things into this that I
should not, but on page 5 of your testimony, "A major constraint to
Sandia's analysis was that after the Navy and FBI's analysis there
was no longer any part of the Iowa's rotating band that had not
been subjected to analysis or examination. Furthermore", as we
talked about earlier, "the Navy could no longer locate a significant
piece of evidence, the iron fibers with encrusted materials the
Navy said came from a detonating device."

Then the last sentence. "However, Sandia was able to build upon
the Navy's analysis and to obtain parts of the band to examine."
That led me to wonder whether you had to get those through some
surreptitious means. Did the Navy give you those? When you say

331

that you were able to obtain parts of the band to examine, that in-
dicated to me you got them from some other source than a normal
request through channels. Is that correct?

Dr. ScHWOEBEL. Not at all. These samples were provided by the
Navy.

Senator Glenn. All right, fine. Thank you.

Chairman Nunn. Thank you, Senator Glenn.

Mr. Conahan, I want to ask you two or three questions, and then
I will have a couple more for our Sandia witnesses.

Much of the work that GAO did was connected with issues raised
by the testimony of Captain Moosally, former commanding officer
of the U.S.S. Iowa. Based on your testimony, as I understand it, it
appears that much of what Captain Moosally had to say was borne
out in your investigation; that is, about the training and about the
overall priority of the battleship within the Navy. Is that generally
correct?

Mr. Conahan. Yes, we found that as a general condition.

Chairman Nunn. Would you agree that problems you have iden-
tified relating to the adequacy of manning, the quality of personnel
and training may have contributed to the accident? Is that a possi-
bility?

Mr. Conahan. I think certainly there was an environment
aboard the ship which would be consistent with some unfortunate
occurrence somewhere along the way. Certainly the manning on
battleships is considerably lower in terms of experience and, there-
fore, quality than it is on other ships. I think that the violations of
safety procedures that we noted together with such things as unau-
thorized experimentation were taking place on the ship.

Chairman Nunn. You noted that the IG of the Navy concluded
that experimentation had not posed a safety hazard to the U.S.S.
Iowa's crew. Based upon the results you have heard here this
morning on Sandia's efforts; you agree with the Navy Inspector
General's conclusion on that?

Mr. Conahan. I think that we need to do the further testing that
has been talked about here this morning before that conclusion can
stand up. I think that that conclusion is in some jeopardy at the
moment.

Chairman Nunn. The IG's conclusion?

Mr. Conahan. Correct.

Chairman Nunn. With reference to issues like adequacy of man-
ning, the quality of personnel and training, do you believe that the
Navy investigating officer should have inquired into these issues?

Mr. Conahan. I think the Navy investigating officer should at
least have brought them to the attention of higher authority. They
should have been pursued whether as part of this investigation or
not. I would not make a judgment on that, but I certainly think
they were sufficiently serious that they should be pursued so that
corrective action could somehow be recommended and taken.

Chairman Nunn. Your testimony indicated that 16-inch ammu-
nition components do not fully meet the Navy's criteria for insensi-
tivity since it demonstrates some susceptibilities to sympathetic
detonation. Was that brought up in the Navy's JAG manual inves-
tigation?

332

Mr. CoNAHAN. No, sir, it was not. We determined that as part of
our own investigation.

Chairman Nunn. Does that have any possible relevance to the
unfortunate accident on April 19, 1989?

Mr. CoNAHAN. I have no independent judgment on that, but ac-
cording to the Navy that condition is permitted to continue because
they feel that they have greater problems aboard other ships with
respect to ammunition, and budgetary resources need to be applied
to the higher order problems. They rank their problems with re-
spect to ammunition, and the problem that you speak of ranks 19
out of 25 such problems.

Chairman Nunn. You noted that two reviews scheduled to ad-
dress the U.S.S. Iowa's 16-inch training program did not do so, and
you found significant weaknesses with the Navy's formal training
program for the 16-inch gun operation and maintenance. Is that
right?

Mr. CoNAHAN. That is correct.

Chairman Nunn. Based upon your experience in conducting nu-
merous investigations in the past, do you believe that such weak-
nesses are expected deviations from the norm, or would you classi-
fy them as significant abnormalities amounting to what I would
call systemic problems?

Mr. Conahan. I think you could find similar weaknesses in other
training programs. At the same time, in the gunnery field, you will
find that they have better training programs for the more ad-
vanced weapons. One of the problems here is that they do not have
hands-on training in the training programs for the people who are
assigned. That is a difficulty.

And the people that we talked with on shipboard felt that, for
the most part, whatever training they got was on-the-job training
aboard the ship. However, if you take a standard that should be
present with respect to training, they were way shy of it in this
case.

Chairman Nunn. Have any of these problems, like training, been
corrected since the Iowa explosion?

Mr. Conahan. Not in point of fact as of 2 weeks ago. I do not
have anything in the last 2 weeks, but they did prepare a plan to
correct some of these problems. But as far as I can tell, as of 2
weeks ago, they had not.

Chairman Nunn. Let me go back over a couple of points. Dr.
Schwoebel, with you and your team.

As I understand your testimony, your team was able to ascertain
that the overram was actually 24 inches rather than the 21 inches
that the Navy had determined. And you were able to achieve igni-
tion with a high speed overram, whereas the Navy's test at the
highest possible rammer speed did not produce any reaction, until
the one that we had yesterday.

First of all, can you tell us if the extent of the overram had any
effect on the probability of ignition? I believe you alluded to that,
but I want to make it clear.

Dr. ScHULER. I think the extent of the overram clearly shows
that there was compression of the powder bag train. I do not know
what it contributes to the probability of ignition other than you
need an overram to get any kind of probability of ignition.

333

Chairman Nunn. Could you tell us why the Navy's test at the
highest possible rammer speed did not produce any reaction, v/hen
your test did?

Dr. ScHULER. I can only speculate, and I would have to wonder
about how many grains there were in the tare layers.

Dr. ScHWOEBEL. And, also, there may be a certain probability as-
sociated with this process, and you simply have to do enough test-
ing until you fully fill out that understanding of what those prob-
abilities are.

Chairman Nunn. So it could be one in 100?

Dr. ScHWOEBEL. That is entirely possible. And that of course is
part of the reason why it is so important to extend these tests to
understand what the connection is and what in fact are the real
probabilities in the gun environment.

Chairman Nunn. I understand that your tests and analyses were
limited to the D-846 bag powder charge, is that right?

Dr. ScHWOEBEL. Yes.

Chairman Nunn. Is there reason to believe that your findings
would or would not have potential application to other powder
bags? The Navy has several different powder bags, is that right,
and the D-846 is only one of them?

Dr. ScHWOEBEL. Yes, the other one that is commonly used is the
D-839. That uses a somewhat larger pellet. We do not knov/ for
sure what the configuration of that bag is, but we presume that it,
too, may possibly have the trim layer in it. If it does, then it is sub-
ject to the same principles that we have discussed in the case of the
D-846.

Chairman Nunn. Senator Warner, do you have any other ques-
tions or observations?

Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, just to follow up on one of your
important questions. In looking over the training manuals, Mr.
Conahan, was there any warning to operators against the conse-
quences that could occur from overramming?

Mr. Conahan. We do not have an answer for that question right
now. I would provide it for the record.

[The information follows:]

The basic manual for the 16-inch gun turret contains a warning that the powder
should be rammed so that it clears the tip of the cradle tray by about approximately
3 inches. The gunnery handbook states that overramming can cause firing inaccura-
cies. We noted no other cautions or warnings concerning the overramming of the
powder.

Senator Warner. Dr. Schwoebel, in your analysis of training
manuals, did you see any cautionary note to operators against the
consequences of an overpressure?

Dr. Schwoebel. We did not review the training manuals.

Senator Warner. Any of the manuals? It concerns me that the
guns have been in operation for so long, it seems to me the experi-
ence is such that it would have been incorporated into these manu-
als. And I find that to be an important question in this Senator's
mind, in any event.

Gentlemen, I thank you very much. I join with the chairman in
stating that you have made a very valuable contribution to this
tragic mystery. I do not know that further tests can confirm the
probability— and that is a key word that underlines all of this testi-

334

mony in my judgment, probability — that this unusual set of cir-
cumstances could have contributed to an accident, which in fact
might have been the cause for this tragedy.

So much work remains to be done before I think we can weigh
that probability. Would you agree with that, Dr. Schwoebel?

Dr. Schwoebel. I certainly would agree.

Senator Warner. And, Mr. Conahan?

Mr. Conahan. Yes, I agree, too.

Chairman Nunn. I have a few concluding observations, but Sena-
tor Levin or Senator Bingaman, I do not want to cut this off until
you have finished.

Senator Levin. I just have one, Mr. Chairman, if I might, or
really two.

One, it seems to me that the Navy's conclusion has been serious-
ly undermined in two fundamental ways. One is that there is an
innocent explanation, one that they said did not exist. And two is
that their own explanation of a purposeful, intentional act has
been undermined because their conclusion was based, in their own
words, on the presence of foreign materials that could not be ex-
plained in any normal, natural way in that gun turret. And today
we hear that indeed the chemicals, at least, are very common to
the gun turret.

Now before the committee would recommend to the Navy as to
what step they should take next, I am wondering whether or not
the chairman intends to ask the Navy to comment on this informa-
tion. Because I would hope it would be at least possible that the
Navy might take some steps to acknowledge the difficulties with
their own conclusions, even prior to the conclusion of another in-
vestigation on their part.

In other words, I am just wondering whether or not we really
want to suggest to the Navy what their next step should be before
we hear from the Navy in one way or another. And obviously the
chairman will make that decision. But I would ask the Chair if we
should not at least hear from the Navy before making a recommen-
dation to them on what their next step should be.

Chairman Nunn. Senator Levin, I talked to Secretary Garrett
late yesterday afternoon, and I know Senator Warner has talked to
him, and I said that we would afford them an opportunity to be
heard this morning. I did not ask that he come as such. I said if
they wanted to be heard they could be heard. And he suggested to
me that he felt that they needed a couple more weeks of work and
testing, based on what they know now, and that they would much
prefer to be heard at that time.

And so I certainly thought that was a reasonable position. And
they are free of course to make any statement they would like to
before then, before this committee or otherwise, but right now that
is where we stand.

Senator Levin. Well, before the committee makes a recommenda-
tion to them on a three-office panel or anything else

Chairman Nunn. Well, I do not think we have made that recom-
mendation. That was Senator Warner's observation.

Senator Levin. I understand.

Chairman Nunn. And I am sure, as a former Secretary of the
Navy, he carries tremendous weight with the Navy. But I am not

335

sure exactly how they plan to proceed. I have not made a specific
suggestion to them. I just think they ought to conduct a thorough
investigation based on these new findings of Sandia and the rebut-
tal of some of the old findings they made.

Senator Levin. Thanks.

Chairman Nunn. Senator Bingaman.

Senator Bingaman. Nothing.

Chairman Nunn. I want to thank all of our witnesses this morn-
ing; and I want to thank the numerous personnel of both the Gen-
eral Accounting Office and Sandia who contributed to this effort.

At the outset of this hearing, I stated that I anticipated that the
testimony we would receive this morning would expose significant
shortcomings in the Navy's investigation and would cast grave
doubt on the conclusions the Navy drew as a result of their investi-
gation. I believe that the testimony we have heard this morning
has done that. Moreover, this morning's testimony identified a
plausible explanation for the explosion.

I note with approval that the Secretary of the Navy has now di-
rected that the firing of the 16-inch guns be suspended indefinitely
and that the Navy's investigation be reopened. I also urge him to
ensure that the reopened investigation considers all the matters
brought out here today or any other matters that have come to the
attention of the Navy.

I would like to summarize some of my thinking on this matter,
based not only on the hearing this morning, but all the hearings
the committee has had thus far. I want to emphasize very strongly
that these are my first personal views, they are not committee
views and should not be categorized as such. And they certainly do
not necessarily reflect the views of any other member of the com-
mittee.

First, in terms of personnel. There are significant problems relat-
ing to the assignment of key officer and enlisted personnel to the
battleships, in terms of adequate numbers, quality and experience.
These problems are exacerbated by a lack of advancement opportu-
nity for battleship personnel.

Second, in terms of training. There are significant training prob-
lems relating to the 16-inch guns. This is demonstrated by the inad-
equate oversight inspections, the lack of a training plan for the bat-
tleship class, and the significant weaknesses in the Navy's formal
training program.

Third, as to the cause of the explosion. The Navy's conclusion
that the explosion was the result of a wrongful, intentional act is
not supported by reliable, probative and substantial evidence. San-
dia's alternative scenario of a high-speed overram of a powder bag
with a reduced number of pellets in its trim layer is a plausible
explanation, although more testing needs to be done in this area.
And certainly we cannot draw any definitive conclusions as to the
likelihood of that scenario this morning. We will have to get fur-
ther information.

I think the Navy should continue to conduct serious exploration
of the Sandia alternative with the active participation of Sandia
experts, plus any other alternative that may come to the mind of
the experts.

336

I also want to make one comment about the process that was in-
volved here. I think the Navy's investigative effort itself was
flawed. The Navy chose to use an informal, one-officer format,
rather than the type of administrative hearing that is often used to
investigate tragedies of this magnitude when individual responsibil-
ity may be at issue.

If a hearing procedure has been used, the Navy would have des-
ignated persons with a direct interest in the matter as parties, who
would have had the right to representation by counsel, and a
formal opportunity to present evidence, cross-examine witnesses,
and ensure that the proceedings were conducted in a manner struc-
tured to seek the truth. There were many people I think that could
have been named as parties and given that opportunity.

Adversarial relationships in this kind of investigation always
take longer, but in the long run, they may take a shorter time, and
certainly there is a real search for truth that is possible in an ad-
versarial relationship with other people being represented with
cross-examination and so forth, that was not present here.

I think the Navy, in light of this, should conduct a thorough
review of its guidelines for investigations to (1) clarify when formal
hearings should be required, certainly that does not mean they
have to be done in every instance; and (2) also establish a clear
standard of proof, particularly when an individual who is deceased
has been pointed to as the likely perpetrator of a terrible tragedy
of this nature; (3) provide representation for persons who are
unable to represent their interests or reputation due to death or
disability.

So I think the Navy needs to look at the process as well as the
substance.

Any other comments?

[No response.]

I thank all the witnesses for being here.

Senator Bingaman has been bragging on your laboratory out
there a long time, and we know now that he has been telling us a
great deal of truth here. We appreciate your being here.

[Whereupon, at 11:33 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

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Full text of "Review of the Department of the Navy's investigation into the gun turret explosion aboard the U.S.S. "Iowa" : hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, One Hundred First Congress, first session, November 16; December 11, 1989; May 25, 1990"

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