The revolt in Arabia

Glass li eOg^^

Book L._Lii7_

GoBTigM}!:^

CCFYRIGHT DEPOSE

THIS VOLUME

TDK I-ROI'KRTY OI' Tlllv

LIBEARY OF CO^M^tEESS

WASHINGTON.

IS LENT TO

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

KOR rPK AT

THE PEACE CONFERENCE

By C. Snouck Hurgronje

The Holy War, Made in Germany

Mohammedanism

The Revolt in Arabia

The
Revolt in Arabia

By

Dr. C. Snouck Hurgronje

Professor of the Arabic Language in the University of

Leidea; Councillor to the Dutch Ministry

of the Colonies, etc.

With a Foreword by
Richard J. H. Gottheil

Columbia University, New York

G. P. Putnam's Sons

New York and London

trbe ftnfcFierbocFter press

1917

Copyright, 191 7

BY

C SNOUCE HURGRONJE

FEB 20 19(7

Ube ftnicltecbocfter pxest, tKcvf Kork

IG1,A455G06

FOREWORD

A LL those interested in Mohammedan
^^ affairs were much surprised to learn,
through a despatch from Cairo on Jtme
22, 19 1 6, that the Emir of Mecca had re-
volted from Turkish overlordship. Much
speculation was indulged in regarding
the causes for such an uprising and its
probable or possible outcome; for there
are few parts of the habitable globe about
which the ordinary student of inter-
national affairs knows so little as he does
about Arabia. Life there has remained in
much of its mediaeval primitiveness;
and even scholars who are specially
concerned about Mohammedanism, and
about the several hundred millions of its
devotees, are little better situated in

iv Foreword

receiving accurate information of that
which is occurring in the "Holy Land"
of Arabia.

No one living knows its history better
than does Professor Snouck Hurgronje
of the University of Leiden. To his vast
knowledge upon all subjects connected
with Mohammedanism and gained from
an extensive reading of its literatiu'e, he
has added personal observation during
the year that he spent in Mecca and
Jiddah. He has been able to get an in-
sight into the various questions involved
in its tangled history at the present day,
and to learn at first hand of the parties
which are rivals for leadership there. In
the Dutch newspaper Nieuwe Rotter-
damsche Courant, July 14, 191 6, Professor
Snouck Hurgronje gave a lucid expla-
nation of the situation created as he saw
it, by the proclamation of the Emir.
The following pages contain a translation

Foreword v

of these articles. I have added, as an
appendix, the official proclamation of the
Shereef to the whole Moslem world as it
appeared translated into English in The
Near East for August 25, 1916.

Since these articles were published in
Holland we have heard very Httle as to
what is happening in and aroimd Mecca.
News has come that an attempt at admin-
istrative reconstruction has been made at
Jiddah; that the new Shereef has appoint-
ed a special agent at Cairo in the person
of Omar Bey al-Faruki; and that the
new government has decided to publish
a weekly paper called Elkihlah, which is
to be edited by Fuad Effendi Khatib
of Gordon College, Assuan. What is of
greater importance is the alleged assist-
ance offered to the Emir Husain by the
Emir Abd al-Aziz ibn Sa'ud, the head of
the Wahhabites in the Nejd — the district
east of Medinah — and by the Zaidite Im-

vi Foreword

am Yahyah in the Yemen against the
Turkish troops stationed there.

Richard Gottheil.

Dec. 23, 1916.
Coltimbia University.

CONTENTS

PAGE

Foreword iii

I

The Shereefate of Mecca . . i

II

The Shereefate of Mecca {Continued) i6

III
Shereef and Caliph .... 29

Note 41

APPENDIX
Proclamation of the Shereef of Mecca 43

THE REVOLT IN ARABIA

THE SHEREEFATE OF MECCA

HOW the public insists upon making
a snap judgment on the signifi-
cance of passing events is shown by the
haste with which speculations are given
out, speculations that are purely hypo-
thetical because the truth of the reports
that reach us can, as yet, be verified
only approximately.

According to a Reuter despatch, the
Great Shereef of Mecca has revolted
against Turkish authority and, at the
head of his Arabs, has succeeded in forc-
ing the capitulation of the garrisons of

2 The Revolt in Arabia

Mecca, Jidda, Ta' if, and Medina, and
has seriously hampered the movements
of Turkish troops, menacing to him, by
the destruction of a section of the railroad
from Medina to the north. Wolff's
Bureau, on the other hand, spreads a
report of the "Milli Agency" — the Turk-
ish National Agency — that a troop of
Arabs, to whom robbery was no unac-
customed calling, had been persuaded by
their captain, he being instigated by
English marines, to bombard Mecca,
that the Turkish troops had, however,
speedily restored order, and that the
raiders themselves, when it was proven
that their leader had been seduced by
English money to act thus basely, had
delivered the miscreant to the Turkish
authorities.

If the German-Turkish statement be
correct, the occurrence was insignificant
and not deserving attention. If Reuter

The Revolt in Arabia 3

be right in the main point, then it is well
worth while to consider what may be
the possible consequences of the Arab
movement.

In either case, to comprehend the mat-
ter rightly, the political significance of
the Shereefate of Mecca should be under-
stood and the reading public should have
a clearer idea of what the title "Grand
Shereef of Mecca" covers than is pos-
sessed by the majority.

Mecca, the birth-place of the Prophet
Mohammed, was not the centre from
which he extended his sovereignty over a
great part of Arabia. The capital of the
realm founded by him was Medina, situ-
ated a ten-day caravan journey to the
north. Moreover, when, about twenty
years after his first appearance as Allah's
messenger, Mohammed conquered Mecca,
he did not think of transferring the seat
of government thither. He had his own

4 The Revolt in Arabia

good reasons for this, which we can pass
over here. Still weightier were the rea-
sons that influenced his successors in the
administration of the theocracy of Islam
from such a step. Mecca was far too
remote from the then existing centres of
civilisation to be a convenient vantage
point for the world conquest considered
by Islam as its appointed task, and as a
capital from which to administer the
empire which the first Caliphs were able
to establish by force of arms. Even
Medina seemed unsuited for the purpose,
permanently. Then, when the Persian
Empire, Syria, Egypt, North Africa, and
Spain were subjected to Islam, Arabia, re-
garded politically, became a remote terri-
tory with a steadily decreasing significance.
The residence of the Caliphs was re-
moved first to Damascus, later to Bagdad,
where they remained established for five
centuries — down to 1250 A.D.

The Revolt in Arabia 5

Still the Arabian peninsiila, arid though
it is in the main, retained its prestige in
the Moslem world, not only as the father-
land of the conquerors, but also as the
Holy Land of Islam. Mecca might be
ill adapted for a political capital, but
it was, in the eyes of the faithful, the
earth's centre, where the first human
pair had walked, where Abraham had
founded the first House of God, theKaba,
where every normal Mohammedan was
bound to go once in his life to take part
in the religious festival annually cele-
brated there.

While Mecca had already long been a
religious centre for the heathen Arabians,
after Mohammed's death Medina was
classed with it as a spot where the foim-
dations of Moslem theocracy were laid,
where the Prophet had built his first
mosque, and where he was buried. The
lieutenants of the Caliphs in West Arabia

6 The Revolt in Arabia

(the Hijaz), with Medina as the first,
Mecca as the second, capital, thus had the
chief sanctuaries of Islam entrusted to
their care, and they were bound to provide
for the preservation of order at the
enormous international gatherings for
which the two holy cities had furnished
a stage every year since Mohammed's
death.

Truly, the task was no easy one. The
inhabitants of Mecca and Medina were,
usually, at odds, and unanimous only in
obstinacy and insubordination. The
nomads of the intervening district con-
tinued to be, under Islam, the anarchists
that they had been from time immemorial.
Only a very strong hand could bridle the
disorders native to the Holy Land. And
a strong hand had always been lacking.

Very soon after its rise, the great empire
of Islam fell asunder and the continuous
contests between the state and statelets

The Revolt in Arabia 7

into which it dissolved made the central
authority of the Caliph a mere fiction,
incapable of efficient exercise of power.
Even the states, prominent from their
position and thus better situated to
maintain order in the Holy Land, as it
was their interest to do, could not spare
the military force essential for the gov-
ernor of the Hijaz (West Arabia). Thus
the holiest, the least productive, and most
difficult-to-rule portion of the Moslem
Empire was practically given over to
confusion as its natural vital element,
and the more vigorous Mohammedan
countries limited themselves to the pro-
tection of the pilgrim caravans which
set out from their realms for Arabia, and
of such of their own subjects as had
settled there.

Out of the chaos in West Arabia, re-
sulting from the disintegration of the
Islamic Empire, was bom the Shereefate

8 The Revolt in Arabia

of Mecca. From the extraordinarily nu-
merous posterity of Mohammed, issue
of the union of his daughter Fatima with
his nephew AH, many remained settled
in Arabia as owners of date gardens, as
robber knights at the head of Bedouin
clans, or as speculators in the gradually
increasing superstitious adoration of the
Mohammedans for the Prophet's blood.
Outside of Arabia, the descendants of Ali
participated in political revolutions on
greater or lesser scale, or had their hands
filled by the governors of the Moslem
lands. Their short-sighted avarice and
their common lack of political talent,
however, hindered them from carrying
any important project to completion.
Any success which they achieved was
always transient. The universal con-
dition of things in Arabia afforded the
opportunity of turning a portion of the
Holy Province into a personal domain.

The Revolt in Arabia 9

In about 1000 a.d., the heads of certain
families among the descendants of All
began to make themselves powerful in
the Hijaz and held their groimd.
From 1200 A.D. to the present time, one
line of these children of AH, that of
Katada, has succeeded in maintaining
supremacy in Mecca.

The names sharif — anglicized as shereef
— that is "The Noble," and say y id signi-
fying "Seigneur" or "Lord," have be-
come, little by little, titles of nobility
throughout the entire Mohammedan
world, especially among the posterity of
the Prophet. The head of the reigning
family in Mecca is "The Shereef of
Mecca" par excellence, and the people
call him Sayyidana, that is "Our Master"
(or Our Lord). How far the realm of
these Shereef s was extended beyond Mecca
depended, as long as the petty dynasties
existed, entirely on the chances of

10 The Revolt in Arabia

circumstance; the more that confusion
reigned in the surrounding Mohammedan
realms and the greater the energy mani-
fested by the ruling head of the family,
the greater the portion of the Hijaz that
came under his authority. The reverse
was equally true. The defects of the
most respected race of Islam were, to a
great extent, the peculiar characteristics
of the Mecca branch. They were in-
capable of carrying out any great under-
taking.

The pilgrims, except when escorted
by an imposing military force, were piti-
lessly stripped of their every possession
by the Shereef and his satellites. Like
the Bedouins through whose territory
the hajjis or pilgrims had to pass, who
counted all money and property as
God -given booty, the Shereefs con-
sidered themselves justified in making
Allah's guests at Mecca submit to every

The Revolt in Arabia ii

kind of bleeding, and the latter had no
remedy.

Further, there were among the members
of the noble race one quarrel after another
about their heritage, so that it was almost
the normal state of affairs for one head
of two rival branches of the family to fill
the Shereefate while the other besieged
Mecca or rendered the roads thither
unsafe. The stable population of Mecca
were sacrificed to this struggle for mastery;
the blessings of peace were an imknown
luxury to them.

When the Hijaz was still actually
governed from the political centre of
Islam, Medina was the appointed capital.
For an independent local principality,
such as the Shereefate, Mecca had the
advantage of not being so accessible to
the military forces of powers that might
trouble themselves about the Hijaz.
Only occasionally could the Shereefs of

12 The Revolt in Arabia

Mecca control Medina at the same time,
as the intervening distance was too great
for the transportation facilities of the
coimtry. The alpine city Ta'if, two or
three days' journey east of Mecca, where
many people from Mecca resorted for
the summer, and the port Jidda, one
to two days' journey to the west, ordi-
narily fell under the Shereef. Several
smaller ports were also included under
his rule. The connection with the inte-
rior, mainly inhabited by nomadic tribes,
varied according to the personal relations
of the Shereef with the head of the Be-
douin clan.

The Shereefate of Mecca differed from
most of the states and principalities into
which the great Islam Empire was divided,
because it had not been developed gradu-
ally from a governorship to a condition of
greater independence, but was bom, spon-
taneously, during a period of confusion.

The Revolt in Arabia 13

At Bagdad, as well as in other neigh-
bouring capitals, people had accepted the
change as ^.fait accompli. The Shereefate
was neither expressly recognised nor
expressly objected to as unlawful. Its
century-long existence attained, moreover,
a sort of virtual legitimacy through its
acceptance by many Moslem tribes, who
were represented in the Holy City by
the annual deputations of pilgrims.
These visitors were constantly exposed
to ill treatment on the part of the
Shereef. Yet, in spite of that, they
held to a belief that domination over
the Holy City belonged rightfully to
a branch of the Holy Family. The
fact was simply accepted as irrefut-
able.

The chief Islam powers have always
attached a certain reservation to their
tacit recognition of the Shereefs of Mecca
which the latter have found themselves

14 The Revolt in Arabia

forced to accept. He was never an inde-
pendent ruler and, in the long run, had
to recognise the suzerainty of the protect-
ing states.

II

THE SHEREEFATE OF MECCA — Continued

] T was to these accidents of origin that

the Shereefate of Mecca owed its

peculiar standing. Its status was not a

little enhanced by the unique significance

of the city of Mecca for the Mohammedan

world at large. From the tenth century,

no one of the foremost Islam princes

possessed the machinery to keep West

Arabia under an administration even

approximately orderly. On two points

they were alike determined — first, to have

their names introduced into the official

prayers at the official ceremonies of

Mecca, each desiring to take precedence

of the others; second, that their deputies

at the annual festivals should take rank
15

1 6 The Revolt in Arabia

in accordance with their pretensions. In
the prayers, the name of the CaHph was
given first place, without question, even
after his power had become a phantom.
The descendants of the Prophet, wielding
authority at Mecca from about the year
1000 to 1200 A.D., managed the required
homage with a certain impartiality. At
their command, there were prayers, now
for the official Caliph at Bagdad and
again for the heretical opposition Caliph
in Egypt, according to the puissance
manifested or the bribes offered by the
one or the other. The Shereef family,
ruling at Mecca from about 1200 a.d. to
the present time, were soon freed from
the difficulty of choice when an end was
made of the Fatimide Caliphate in Egypt
and when the Mongol storm swept away
that of Bagdad in 1258. In the centuries
following these events, the Sultans alone
were mentioned in the prayers. And it

The Revolt in Arabia 17

was thus, in the prayers, that there was
the first formal expression of the relation
between the Shereefate and the chief
power of Islam.

Egypt long held an imcontested posi-
tion so that it is correct to speak of a pro-
tectorate exercised by her Sidtans over
the territory of West Arabia from the
thirteenth to the sixteenth centuries.
The Hijaz (West Arabia) was dependent
on the Nile-land for the importation of
foodstuffs and other necessities. The
Mameliike Sultans permitted the con-
tinuance of the Shereefate and did not
interfere in the endless petty wars of
succession fought by the claimants to
the office. When it became necessary,
it cost the Sultans little exertion to turn
the scale in some of these contests with
the help of a detachment of regular
troops, and to enforce obedience. It
was always an unequal strife between

1 8 The Revolt in Arabia

the trained soldiers of a great Moslem
power and the Shereef's little force, con-
sisting as it did, of a few himdred slaves,
the same number of mercenaries, and
the timely aid of a few Bedouin clans.
Domestic dissension, moreover, always
assured the punitory leader of the coope-
ration of one party within the disturbed
territory.

When Egypt was conquered in 151 7
by Sultan Selim, Turkey, automatically,
took over the protectorate of the Holy
Land. The Turkish Sultans styled them-
selves, with unassuming pride, "the serv-
ants" of both holy cities. At the same
time, their garrison in Mecca was an
outward and visible sign that they did not
intend to share the service with anyone.
From that epoch on, their names im-
mediately preceded that of the Grand
Shereef in the official prayers. Later,
the significance of the honour was en-

The Revolt in Arabia 19

hanced by the addition of the title of
Caliph assumed by the Turkish Sultans
as sign and seal of their unrivalled power
in Islam.

The Osmans made as little effort to re-
form the hopelessly muddled administra-
tion of the holy cities as their predecessors
in the Protectorate had done. By that
date, the Shereefate had obtained for
more than three centuries, and no Mo-
hammedan thought of questioning either
the legality or the desirability of the
institution.

The administration methods of the
Osmans were as little adapted for per-
manent centralization as those of the
earlier Mohammedan empire had been.
The provinces speedily assimied the char-
acter of feudal holdings, each possessing
a large measure of independence. The
Pashas of Cairo, of Damascus, of Bagdad,
vied with each other for the first rank

20 The Revolt in Arabia

at Mecca. From this rivalry the Sher-
eefate profited, just as the suzerains of
the Holy Land had reaped advantage
from the family disputes of the Shereefs.
In the eighteenth century, the Shereefs
were not troubled by the pressure of a
heavy hand from without, but they were
forced to depend on themselves, and their
inadequate equipment was a source of
danger to them when an unexpected op-
ponent threatened to destroy their power.
The Wahhabis of Central Arabia, roused
by a puritanic zeal to protest against
what they declared was the dishonour of
Islam, launched out on a campaign of
reform. This "holy war," directed, pri-
marily, against the Turkish domination,
succeeded in exciting a religious fervour
throughout a great part of Arabia,
similar to that awakened by Mohammed
twelve centuries earlier, and, at the turn
of the eighteenth Into the nineteenth

The Revolt in Arabia 21

centuries, these Wahhabis succeeded in
obtaining the mastery of the Holy Cities
and in forcing the Shereefs to recognise
their authority. With infinite difficulty
the Pasha of Egypt, Mohammed Ali,
later the first Khedive, succeeded in ful-
filling the mission entrusted to him by
the Sultan of Turkey and in reconquering
the Holy Land in his turn.

The then Shereef was punished for his
inefficiency in repeUing the Wahhabis
from his realm, by banishment, together
with several members of his family, while
the head of another branch of his kinsfolk
was appointed to his vacated post. At
this crisis, too, there was no talk of
abolition of the Shereefate.

With the expulsion of the Wahhabis
from the Hijaz in 1813, begins the latest
historical phase of the Shereefate. The
Protectorate exercised by the first Khed-

22 The Revolt in Arabia

ive of Egypt down to 1840, partly in
cooperation with, partly in opposition
to, Turkish authority, was completely
effective and so, as the Sultan was regu-
larly represented in the Holy Land by
a governor sent from Constantinople,
the good old tumultuous times did not
return for this free dynasty.

The imderstanding between the Sher-
eefs and their protectors at Stamboul
were, however, never cordial; the aspira-
tions and interests of the two parties were
too far asunder for that. The Sultans
of Turkey considered the Shereefate as a
necessary evil that prevented them from
making the Hijaz into an ordinary
wilayet or province. They stationed there
mihtary and civil officials similar to those
in other wilayets, but the functions of these
subordinates were hampered by the im-
restricted power of the Shereef. After
the Wahhabi war, this ruler was selected

The Revolt in Arabia 23

by the suzerain and the rival kinsmen
could no longer oust an incumbent of the
hereditary office by force of arms. They
were obliged to resort to the weapons of
intrigue with the Sultan and the Sublime
Porte. Still, even with this appearance
of stable administration, it was not until
1880 that the Shereef finally relinquished
as fruitless all armed resistance to the
Sultan's deputies. The theory had been
that the Sultan was to be obeyed, but that
his servants in the Hijaz were unfaithful
and could not be accepted. At Constan-
tinople, meanwhile, certain members of
the Shereef's family were kept in a kind
of honourable captivity, partly as hostages
for the good faith of the reigning Shereef,
partly to relieve him from the burden of
having rivals in his vicinity, and also
it was a convenience to have those rivals
in readiness in case the Shereef proved
imtrustworthy.

24 The Revolt in Arabia

The Turkish governors of the Hijaz
had no easy task. An energetic Shereef
would always be on the alert to reduce
the governor's authority to the smallest
measure. A weak Shereef might be sub-
missive, but then he was powerless to
control the ill-disposed elements in his
family and make them innocuous, and
often he would be sacrificed to the wiles
of the opposition. Cooperation between
the two authorities for the maintenance
of peace was not dreamed of. The roads
from Mecca to Medina, to Jidda, to
Ta'if , were in a chronic state of insecur-
ity, and it was not seldom that the ra-
pacious Bedouins rejoiced in the secret
support of the Shereef.

The Shereef Aim, incumbent of the
dignity from 1882 to 1905, was of the
energetic type, but he was, at the same
time, an avaricious tyrant, whose actions
suggest Caesar's mad ambition. One

The Revolt in Arabia 25

governor after another had to yield, and
had to sit in his shadow. Ahmed Ratab
alone succeeded in holding on from 1892
to Ann's death in 1905, by shutting his
eyes to the Shereef's ill deeds and con-
tenting himself with a share in the profits
that accrued from the malfeasance in
office. Ann's brother, Abdullah, then
living in Constantinople, was appointed
his successor but died before he began his
journey to his native land. Then the
Sultan appointed Shereef AH, a nephew
of Aun, as "Amir of Mecca." Such
was the title given to these princes by
the Turkish chancery, out of respect
for a possible sensitiveness on the subject.
Both Shereef AH and the governor,
Ahmed Ratib, succimibed when the great
Turkish Revolution broke out in 1908.
Ratib had to submit to financial extor-
tions and to exile, while the deposed
Shereef settled down in Cairo. His cousin

26 The Revolt in Arabia

Husein, son of Aun's brother Ali, took
his place as Shereef. It soon became
apparent that this Husein intended to
profit by the turn of events to retrieve the
reputation and status of the Shereefate.

It is well known that Arabia has con-
tributed her share to the many difficulties
with which the Young-Turk Government
has had to battle from its inception.
Thus the latter found it advisable to let
the Shereef, appointed as he was by the
new regime, to go his own gait and Husein
made ample use of his freedom.

During the Turco-Italian War, Turkish
occupation was in a disturbed condition,
especially in the southern part of Arabia
and the Tin-kish Government asked
Shereef Husein for help in relieving the
besieged Turkish garrison of Obha in the
rebellious Asir territory. With an old-
time Shereef-army, composed of slaves,
mercenaries, and Bedouins, Husein un-

The Revolt in Arabia 27

dertook a campaign which did, possi-
bly, help secure the safe retreat of the
beleaguered Turkish garrison of Obha,
but which also, undoubtedly, tempered
the Shereef's sense of dependence on
Turkish authority.

The same National Turkish News
Agency (Milli Agency) contradicted by
Renter in regard to the revolt in Arabia,
which it had reported as "a quickly
suppressed uprising of roving robber
bands in the pay of England" — tele-
graphed later that Shereef Husein was
deposed and that Shereef AH, appointed in
his stead, had already set out for Mecca.
Here the nattiral queries arise whether,
by the "roving robber leader" of the
first Milli report, was meant Shereef
Husein himself, and whether the pro-
posed journey of Shereef Ali will pass
without incident. Whether the newly

28 The Revolt in Arabia

appointed Shereef , that is the man with
whose aid the Turkish Government is to
try to suppress, once for all, "robber raid-
ing," is the same who was replaced by
Husein, some time ago, is not made
clear in the Milli-despatch, but it is very
probable that it is. In that case, Shereef
AH must have left Cairo before the war
and betaken himself to Constantinople.

Here we have a repetition of the old
game of playing off one Shereef against
another, just as it was played in the past.
And the outcome will depend on which
of the two can gather the greater force
of "robber raiders" under his standard:
Ali, supported by the Turks and their
friends, or Husein, aided by their op-
ponents.

Assuredly either alternative proves the
significance that a serious revolt against
Turkish authority would have under
present circumstances.

Ill

SHEREEF AND CALIPH

A SSUMING that the "robber raiders'*
of the Tiirkish-German despatch
and the Shereef of Mecca, referred to in
the Renter telegram are one and the
same person, and that, accordingly, Sher-
eef Husein, Emir of Mecca, has raised
his standard against the Turkish domina-
tion, then the question arises, **What
does the Shereef mean by his op-
position?"

Various writers on Islam have com-
mented on the impropriety, according to
Mohammedan law itself, of the assump-
tion of the title of "Caliph" by the
Sultan of Turkey. It was, indeed, for

more than nine centuries, regarded by
29

30 The Revolt in Arabia

the Moslem world as obligatory for the
Caliphs to be able to trace their descent
from the Arabic line of Koreish, the line
from which Mohammed sprang. The
pretensions advanced by the Sultans
since the sixteenth century have never
been generally approved. That they did
not excite any vehement open opposi-
tion was partly owing to the imposing
puissance of the Turkish Empire at the
moment when the Sultans decorated
themselves with the name, and partly to
the circtimstance that the usurped dignity
had no practical sequence. The Caliph
added no patch of ground to the territory
that the Sultan had conquered with the
sword, and spiritual authority has never
been ascribed to the Caliph by the Mos-
lem congregations. With the assump-
tion of the highest appellation that could
be worn by a Moslem regent after Mo-
hammed, these Sultans simply announced

The Revolt in Arabia 31

to all Moslem princes that none of them
would be allowed to consider themselves
his equal.

Such Moslems as were under Turkish
authority were not affected by the Cali-
phate of their Sultan. The relation of
subjects to their rulers in Mohammedan
realms not subordinated to Turkey were
even less affected; and least of all did
the matter signify to those followers of
Islam ruled by non-Mohammedans.
These are numerous and have steadily
increased during the last centuries. An
effective Caliphate, however explained,
presupposes the political luiity of all the
faithful.

The Caliph is the very personification
of such unity and is, primarily, the leader
of Islam's armies against the foes of the
Faith, or he bears a name bereft of all
significance. In international life there
is no room for mediaeval structures, and

32 The Revolt in Arabia

Turkey can live in peace with other
states, especially with those possessing
Mohammedan subjects, only if Caliphate
pretensions be honestly put aside, even
though the title be maintained as a formal
one. This was well imderstood by Turk-
ish statesmen of later times, and they
either banished the Caliphate idea in all
their international discussions, or they
permitted their European colleagues, who
mistakenly regarded the Caliph as a sort
of pope — a prince of the Church — to
continue to entertain this false conception
as it was harmless.

Unlettered Mohammedans, who, ignor-
ant of the modem point of view, went
on assigning an important place to the
Caliphate legend in their framework of
the political system, were, however, often
presented with panislamic visions in
order to retain, fictitiously, at least, what
had long vanished from real life. And

The Revolt in Arabia 33

these visions were often big with am-
bition.

How completely at odds the Caliphate
idea is with modem international rela-
tions appeared when the Turkish Gov-
ernment, seduced by its aUiance with
Germany, brought it to the fore, anew.
The first outward and visible sign of the
renaissance of the CaHphate was the
declaration of the "Holy War," accom-
panied by an appeal to all the Moham-
medans in the world to participate therein,
irrespective of the political authority
they were bound to obey. Next came a
series of official and officious publica-
tions, all based on the hypothesis that
the Turkish Sultan-Caliph is the man
who, under all circumstances, controls the
political policy of the Mohammedans.

Taking all these points into considera-
tion, it becomes hardly needful to reply
to the question as to how the Shereef of

34 The Revolt in Arabia

Mecca might, perhaps, try to become a
rival of the Sultan Mehmed Reshad as a
pretender to the Caliphate.

A Caliphate, no matter who holds the
dignity, is wholly incompatible with mod-
em political conditions. And this will
be as true after the present war as it was
before. Only as an empty title can it be
tolerated at all.

For the rest, it can be seen, from
what we have already written about the
history and the current condition of the
Shereefate, that any lofty aspirations
would be especially ill adapted for local
principalities. The idea of a Caliphate of
the Shereefs of Mecca has been venti-
lated, more than once, by this or that
European writer on Islam, but, in the
Moslem world, it has never been
broached, and no one of the Shereefs
from the House of Katada — rulers in
Mecca and in varying portions of West

The Revolt in Arabia 35

Arabia ever since the year 1200 A.D. —
ever thought of such a thing. It is im-
probable that even foreign influence
could prevail on a Shereef of Mecca to
attempt to gamble for the Caliphate.
They all know too well how little chance
of success there would be in such an
attempt, and they feel themselves limited
by tradition and by their resources to
the Hijaz.

Perhaps it is not superfluous to contro-
vert another error into which many fall,
— the opinion, namely, that the wresting
of the Hijaz from Turkish domination
would, automatically, end the Turkish
Caliphate, since the Caliph bases his
claim to the title partly on his protection
of the Holy Cities. This opinion is sup-
ported by neither Mohammedan law
nor by Mohammedan history. Mecca
and Medina have known periods when,
for instance, they were in the hands of

36 The Revolt in Arabia

the unbeHeving Karmathians, when again
they submitted to the heretical Fatimide-
Caliphs, when all relations with the seat
of the Caliphate were suspended, when
the Wahhabis drove the Turks from the
Holy Land; on none of these occasions
did it occur to a single Moslem to ques-
tion the right of the Caliph to his dignity.
The Caliphate and the Holy Land have,
more than once, existed independently
of each other.

Quite apart from high political aspira-
tions, there are reasons enough which
might have excited Husein to renounce
obedience to the Turk. It is well known
that the relations between Sultan-Caliph
and the Shereef have been perfunctory
and never cordial. The Shereef s have
invariably felt the protectorate as an
oppressive bond, and the Turks have
never been able to appeal to the popula-
tion in the name of the blessings that

The Revolt in Arabia 37

they, the conquerors, have bestowed on
the land. They have given nothing and
have never been in a position even to
assure the safety of the roads leading to
the Holy Cities during the few weeks of
the pilgrimage. In Arabia as little as
elsewhere have the Turks tried to affiliate
with the people. They are unpopular
in the highest degree.

The Committee of Union and Progress,
in whose hands Turkey has been since
1908, has by no means made itself idolised
by the Meccanese and their hereditary
princes. Visitors to Stamboul from Mec-
ca, since 1908, came away scandalized
at the methods and ideals of Young Tur-
key. All Mecca subsists on the pilgrim-
ages, and the interest of all is centred on
the gains accruing to them from the
hajji (pilgrim) , just as that of an agricul-
tural people is intent upon the prospects
of the harvest. The Committee that

38 The Revolt in Arabia

inscribed Liberty, Equality, and Frater-
nity on their standards and then pro-
ceeded to adopt despotic methods in
administration, equivalent to those of
Abdul Hamid, is regarded at Mecca as
the cause of Turkey's participation in the
war of which the palpable result for the
Holy Cities was the absence of pilgrims
and the restriction of the importation
of foodstuffs. Even the people of West
Arabia, who had heartily accepted
Turkish sovereignty as such, now curse
the present Turkish regime. No wonder
that they were ready to appeal to a power
that was foe to Turkey's ally, Germany!
The latest Reuter telegram, according
to which trade at Jidda, is again on a
normal basis, indicates in its informa-
tion one of the main causes of the
Anti-Turkish movement.

In the Great War, the Shereefate of
Mecca cannot possibly take part. The

The Revolt in Arabia 39

forces at its disposal are nothing more
than a bodyguard, a few mercenaries,
and the contribution made by some
Bedouin tribes, difficult to hold together,
undisciplined, imtrained. The popula-
tion of the holy cities furnishes no ele-
ments for the formation of a military
force, and in that population, Shereef
AH, whom the Turks now wish to use,
will assuredly find some adherents. Ara-
bia is still, as it was of yore, hopelessly
divided by conflicting interests and by
century-long feuds. It is not ready for
great undertakings. But, for the moment,
a revolt in West Arabia against Turkey,
under the lead of the Great Shereef and
aided by England, can cause serious
trouble to the Turkish Government, and
all the more, because it is at Mecca,
familiar to, and cherished by, the entire
Mohammedan world. Such a campaign,
well prepared and ably conducted, would

40 The Revolt in Arabia

be a master-stroke in opposition to the
attempt, made by Young Turkey under
German protection, to excite the mediaeval
fanaticism of Islam against other religious
sects and to use it as an incentive to strife.
However that may be, those who abomi-
nate playing with the fire of religious
hate, a measure to which the Young
Turks, in the main non-religious, have al-
lowed themselves, to be persuaded, have
no reason to regret the Arabian uprising.
All that can tend to making an end of
the tinworthy noisy talk of "Caliphate"
and "Holy War" may be regarded as
commanding respect.

NOTE

The following translation of the Pro-
clamation appeared in The Near East:

Since writing his monograph, Professor Hur-
gronje has had reason to doubt his surmise as
to the identity of the new Grand Shereef sent
by the Turkish government to Medina. Prob-
ably it is not the Ali who succeeded to his uncle
Aun and settled in Egypt after his demission.

The proclamation is added as interesting in
connection with Professor Hurgronje's own
articles. He would have preferred to give the
Turkish proclamation as well as this, had this
been possible.

41

APPENDIX

PROCLAMATION OF THE SHEREEF OF MECCA

"In the name of God, the Merciful, the
Compassionate . ' '

This is our general proclamation to all our
Moslem brothers.

"O God, judge between us and our people
in truth; Thou art the Judge."

The world knoweth that the first of all
Moslem princes and rulers to acknowledge
the Turkish Government were the Emirs of
Mecca the Blessed. This they did to bind
together and make strong the brotherhood of
Islam, for they saw the Sultans of the House
of Osman (may the dust of their tombs be
blessed, and may they dwell in Paradise!),
how they were upright, and how they carried
out all the commandments and'ordinances of
the Faith and of the Prophet (prayers be
upon him!) perfectly. Therefore they were
obedient to them at all times.

For a token of this, remember how in A.H.
1322 I with my Arabs helped them against

43

44 Appendix

the Arabs, to save Ebhah from those who
were besieging it, and to preserve the name
of the Government in honour ; and remember
how again in the next year I helped them
with my armies, which I entrusted to one of
my sons; for in truth we were one with the
Government until the Committee of Union
and Progress rose up, and strengthened
itself, and laid its hands on power. Con-
sider how since then ruin has overtaken the
State, and its possessions have been torn
from it, and its place in the world has been
lost, until now it has been drawn into this
last and most fatal war.

All this they have done, being led away by
shameful appetites, which are not for me to
set forth, but which are public and a cause
for sorrow to the Moslems of the whole
world, who have seen this greatest and most
noble Moslem Power broken in pieces and
led down to ruin and utter destruction. Our
lament is also for so many of its subjects,
Moslems and others alike, whose lives have
been sacrificed without any fault of their own.
Some have been treacherously put to death,
others cruelly driven from their homes, as
though the calamities of war were not enough.

Appendix 45

Of these calamities the heaviest share has
fallen upon the Holy Land. The poor, and
even families of substance, have been made
to sell their doors and windows, yea, even
the wooden frames of their houses, for bread,
after they had lost their furniture and all
their goods. Not even so was the lust of the
Union and Progress fulfilled. They laid
bare all the measure of their wicked design,
and broke the only bond that endured be-
tween them and the true followers of Islam.
They departed from their obedience to the
precepts of the Book.

With the connivance of the Grand Vizier
of the Ottoman Empire, the Sheikh-el-
Islam, the Ulema, the Ministers, and the
Notables, one of their papers called the
Ijtihad published in Constantinople un-
worthy things about the Prophet (The
Prayer and Peace of God be upon him !) and
spoke evil of him (God forbid!). Then the
Union and Progress rejected God's word,
"A man shall have twice a woman's share,"
and made them equal. They went further
and removed one of the five comer-stones of
the Faith, even the Fast in Ramadan, by
causing the soldiers in garrison in Mecca,

46 Appendix

Medina, and Damascus to break their fast
for new and foolish reasons, taking no account
of the ordinance of God saying, "Those of
you who are sick or on a journey. ..."
Yea, they went further. They made weak
the person of the Sultan, and robbed him of
his honour, forbidding him to choose for him-
self the chief of his personal Cabinet. Other
like things did they to sap the foundation
of the Khalifate.

For this it had been clearly our part and
our necessary duty to separate ourselves
from them and renounce them and their
obedience. Yet we would not believe their
wickedness, and tried to think that they
were the imaginings of evil-doers to make a
division between us and the Government.
We bore with them until it was apparent to
all men that the rulers of Turkey were Enver
Pasha, Jemal Pasha, and Tallaat Bey, who
were doing whatsoever they pleased. They
made their guilt manifest when they wrote
to the Judge of the Sacred Court in Mecca
traducing the verses in the Surah of the Cow,
and laying upon him to reject the evidence
of believers outside the Court and to con-
sider only the deeds and contracts engrossed

Appendix 47

within the Court. They also showed their
guilt when they hanged in one day twenty-
one of the most honourable and enlightened
of the Moslems, among them Emir Omar el
Jazairi, Emir Arif el Shahabi, Shefik Bey
Moajryad, Shukri Bey el Ash, Abdel Wahab,
Tewfik el Bassat, Abdel Hamid el Zahrawi,
Abdel Ghani el Areisi, and their learned com-
rades. To destroy so many, even of cattle,
at one time would be hard for men void of
all natural affection or mercy. And if we
suppose they had some excuse for this evil
deed, by what right did they carry away to
strange countries the innocent and most
miserable families of those ill-fated men?
Children, old men, and delicate women bereft
of their natural protectors were subjected
in exile to all foul usage and even to tortures,
as though the woes they had already suffered
were not chastisement enough. Did not
God say: "No punishment shall be inflicted
on anyone for the sins of another? . . ."
Let us suppose they found for themselves
some reason for ill-treating the harmless
families of their victims; why then did they
rob them of their properties and possessions,
which alone remained to keep them from

48 Appendix

death by famine? And if we suppose that
they had also some excuse for this evil deed,
how shall we find pardon for them for their
shattering of the tomb of our most righteous
and upright Lord and Brother, El Sayed el
Shereef Abdel Kader el Jezairi el Hassani,
whose bones they have polluted and whose
dust they have scattered abroad?

We leave the judgment of these misdeeds,
which we have touched upon so briefly, to
the world in general and to Moslems in par-
ticular. What stronger proof can we desire
of the faithlessness of their inmost hearts to
the Religion, and of their feelings towards the
Arabs, than their bombardment of that
ancient House, which God has chosen for
His House, saying, "Keep my House pure
for all who come to it," — a House so
venerated by all Moslems? From their fort
of Jyad, when the revolt began, they shelled
it. The first shot struck a yard and a-half
above the Black Stone. The second fell
three yards short of it, so that the flame
leapt up and took hold upon the Kiswa.
Which, when they saw, the thousands and
thousands of Moslems first raised a lament-
able cry, running to and fro, and then shouted

Appendix 49

in fierce anger and rushed to save it. They
had to burst open the door and mount upon
the roof before they could quench the flames.
Yet a third shell fell upon the Tomb of
Abraham, and other shells fell in and about
the precincts, which they made a target for
their guns, kilHng every day three or four who
were at prayer within the Mosque, till they
prevented the people coming near to worship.
This will show how they despised His House
and denied it the honour given it by believers.

We leave all this to the Moslem world for
judgment.

Yes, we can leave the judgment to the Mos-
lem world; but we may not leave our religion
and our existence as a people to be a play-
thing of the Unionists. God (Blessed be He !)
has made open for us the attainment of free-
dom and independence, and has shown us a
way of victory to cut off the hand of the op-
pressors, and to cast out their garrison from
our midst. We have attained independence,
an independence of the rest of the Ottoman
Empire, which is still groaning under the
tyranny of our enemy. Our independence is
complete, absolute, not to be laid hands on
by any foreign influence or aggression, and

50 Appendix

our aim is the preservation of Islam and the
uplifting of its standard in the world. We
fortify ourselves on the noble religion which
is our only guide and advocate in the prin-
ciples of administration and justice. We are
ready to accept all things in harmony with
the Faith and all that leads to the Mountain
of Islam, and in particular to uplift the mind
and the spirit of all classes of the people in
so far as we have strength and ability.

This is what we have done according to
the dictates of our religion, and on our part
we trust that our brethren in all parts of the
world will each do his duty also, as is incum-
bent upon him, that the bonds of brotherhood
in Islam may be confirmed.

We beseech the Lord of Lords, for the
sake of the Prophet of Him who giveth all
things, to grant us prosperity and to direct
us in the right way for the welfare of the
faith and of the faithful.

We depend upon God the All-Powerful,
whose defence is sufficient for us.

Shereef and Emir of Mecca,

HUSEIN.

25 Shaaban, 1334.

Jk Selection from the
Catalogue of

G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS

Complete Catalogues sent
on application

Mohammedanism

(American Lectures on the History of
Religions Series)

By
C. Snouck Hurgronje

Author of " The Holy War Made in Germany "
6°. $1.50. By mail, $1.65
A concise account of the main prob-
lems connected with the origin, the
religious and poHtical growth, and the
present state of Mohammedanism, — es-
pecially timely in view of the fact that
the fate of Mohammedanism — the ex-
tension or curtailment of its political
influence — is so closely involved with
the outcome of the war.

G. P. Putnam's Sons

New York London

Deacidified using the Bookkeeper prc._^„
Neutralizing agent: Magnesium Oxide
Treatment Date: Jan. 2003

PreservationTechnologies

A WORLD LEADER IN PAPER PRESERVATION

1 1 1 Thomson Park Drive
Cranbern/ Township. PA 16066
(724) 779-21 1 1

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS

IIIHIMII'I I! I iiM|i|

0 010 240 156 6