17 103
THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
AND THE
MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES
REVOLUTIONARY WAR
AND THE
MILITAEY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES
BY
FRANCIS VINTON GREENE
sStewwssu rfW "
GRADUATE OF THE TJ. S. MILITARY ACADEMY
MAJOR-GENERAL OF VOLUNTEERS IN THE WAR WITH BPAIN
AUTHOR OF
The Russian Army and Its Campaigns in Turkey in 1877-78 (1879). Army Life
in Russia (1880). Improvements in the Art of War (1882). The
Mississippi Campaigns of the Civil War (1883). General
Greene : Great Commanders Series (1885).
The United States Army (1901)
NEW YORK
CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS
1911
rr, 1911. ZJTT
CHARLES SCRIBNER/S SONS
;PubIisfced May, 1911
TO THE
OFFICERS AND MEN
THOSE NOW LIVING AND THOSE WHO HAVJS GONE BEFORE
OF .THE
UNITED STATES ARMY
WHO HAVE
CARRIED ITS COLORS TO VICTORY
ON MANY FIELDS AND IN MANY CLIMES
HAVE COMPELLED THE SURRENDER OF ITS AHMED FOES
AT
SARATOGA AND YORKTOWN
VERA CRUZ AND THE CITY OF MEXICO
DQNELSON, VICKSBURG, APPOMATTOX AND DURHAM'S STATION
SANTIAGO AND MANILA
AND WHO
IN THE INTERVENING YEARS OF PEACE
HAVE
STTBDUED THE SAVAGE
EXPLORED THE WILDERNESS
PREPARED THE GREAT WEST FOR THE
TEEMING MILLIONS WHO NOW INHABIT IT
CONTRIBUTED TO THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE
ABATED THE TROPICAL PESTILENCE
DIRECTED THE NATION'S PUBLIC WORKS
CONSTRUCTED THE PANAMA CANAL
THIS BOOK
IS
"WITH PROFOUND ADMIRATION AND WARM-HEARTED AFFECTION
RESPECTFULLY DEDICATED
PREFACE
THE purpose of the book of which this is the first volume
is to present, within the limited space of three small volumes,
the essential facts in our military" history, and to make such
analyses of these facts and such comments upon them as may
be useful for the future and interesting for the present.
The army has always been a factor of prime importance
in our national life. It was due to the skill of Washington
at Trenton and Yorktown, and the fortitude of his officers
and men at Valley Forge and elsewhere during eight long
years, that the labors of Samuel and John Adams, Patrick
Henry and Thomas Jefferson did not prove fruitless, and that
the Declaration of Independence became an immortal docu-
ment instead of passing into the waste-basket of forgotten
revolutionary pronunciamentos. The success of Scott on the
Niagara frontier in aid of the wonderful victories of the navy
in the second war with Great Britain compelled the British
to relinquish their control over our commerce through the
right of search and acknowledge our rightful lines of frontier.
The territorial expansion on the Gulf and the Pacific would
have been impossible if the armies of Scott and Taylor had
failed. The Union would have been disrupted and slavery
perpetuated, in spite of the eloquence of Webster and Phil-
lips and Sumner and the consummate genius of Lincoln, if
Grant and Sherman had not understood the art of war.
Finally, it was not alone the unanimous resolution of Congress
that made Cuba free and incidentally brought us Porto Rico
and the Philippines, a commanding position in the Orient
and the recognition of our greatness as a world power, but
vii
Vlll
PREFACE
also the skill, valor and endurance of the officers and men,
ashore and afloat, who carried our arms to victory on both
sides of the globe in a few short months of 1898.
From the beginning, one hundred and thirty-six years ago,
the army has been the willing and faithful subordinate of the
civil power, and the indispensable instrument for carrying
into effect the will of the people as expressed by their chosen
representatives. In recent wars it has become an efficient in-
strument for that purpose. In 1812-15 we paid the deserved
penalty, at Detroit and Sacketts Harbor, Bladensburg and
Washington, of twelve years' deliberate neglect of the military
service, due to the popular belief that a well-trained army
was not a necessary factor in our scheme of government. It
is not likely that we shall again make that mistake. Our
army is to-day no larger in proportion to population, and
much smaller in proportion to wealth, than after the close of
any of the wars of the last century; but there is a constant
effort to make it efficient; and while much remains to be
done for the improvement of the militia, yet it is better organ-
ized and equipped than ever before in its history. The value
of military instruction was never so widely recognized as it
is to-day. The prejudice against a "standing army," which
our ancestors brought over from England nearly three centu-
ries ago, and which so long survived any reason for its exis-
tence, is at last almost extinct. The good conduct of the
aray, regulars and volunteers, and the inestimable value of
their services, have nearly overcome this prejudice. We shall
always have an army. There is every reason to believe that
it will be efficient. To be so, it must study its past history
and draw from it the lessons which are applicable to the
future.
In the hope of aiding to some extent in this study, the
following pages have been written.
A few words about the making of this book may not be
out of place.
PREFACE ix
1st. As to Purpose. I have had it in mind to write such
a book for more than twenty-five years, but various circum-
stances have caused constant postponement. I had originally
intended to condense the entire history of our military opera-
tions, from Lexington to Pekin, into one volume of not over
400,000 words. Experience has shown that such extreme
condensation would crush the life out of the book, and it is
now evident that three volumes will be necessary. Under
these circumstances I have decided to publish the first volume
without waiting for the others.
2d. As to Text. My private library includes nearly all the
books named in the two lists of authorities. Those which
are out of print and unpurchasable have been obtained from
the Library of Congress, the State Library at Albany, the
New York City Public Library, and the Library of Colum-
bia University. I desire to express my thanks to the officers
in charge of these libraries for the facilities which they have
afforded to me in the use of their ample resources.
The book has been written with these authorities at hand,
and citation is given for every fact. The opinions are my
own, although I confess to being influenced by the simple,
clear style and accurate thinking of the late John Fiske, and
also in a minor degree by the brilliant, sympathetic and at-
tractive history of Sir George Otto Trevelyan.
3d. As to Maps. All, except one, of the maps in this vol-
ume have been previously published in Avery's "History of the
United States and Its People," and it is to the courtesy of my
fellow-graduate in the Class of 1870 at West Point and life-
long friend, Mr. Charles William Burrows, President of The
Burrows Brothers Publishing Company, of Cleveland, that I
am indebted for the great privilege of making use of them.
They are the only maps of the Revolution that are accurate.
They have been prepared in the only way in which accurate
maps can be made viz., by using careful topographical sur-
veys (in this case those of the United States Geological Survey)
x PREFACE
as the basis, and placing on these the positions of the troops
as stated in the official reports of the commanding generals,
reconciling the discrepancies between different reports as well
as possible. Most of them were drawn by Lieutenant Joseph
Baer, United States Army, while on duty in the Department
of Drawing at West Point in 1904.
The only map not taken from Avery's History is the map
of Harlem Heights, which was drawn under the direction of
Professor Henry P. Johnston for his admirable monograph
on "The Battle of Harlem Heights/' It is used by per-
mission kindly given by him and by the Columbia University
Press.
Prepared in this way all the maps have been engraved and
printed at the Matthews-Northrup Works in a manner that
leaves nothing to be desired.
4th. As to Proof-Reading and Indexing. I am indebted
to Captain Frederick W. Lewis, 29th Infantry, for valuable
assistance in reading the proofs and comparing the texts with
the maps. The Index has been prepared by the Publishers.
FKANCIS VINTON GREENE.
May 1, 1911.
CONTENTS
PART I THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
CHAPTER PAQB
I. BOSTON, 1775-76 1
Lexington,. April 19 3
Bunker Hill, June 17 7
Siege of Boston, July, 17^75-March, 1776 13
Dorchester Heights, March 4 18
Evacuation of Boston, March 17 19
Invasion of Canada, September, 1775- July, 1776 .... 21
II. NEW YORK, 1776 28
British Plans for the Campaign of 1776 28
Washington Marches to New York, April 31
Howe Arrives at New York, July August 33
Battle of Long Island, August 27 35
Washington Retreats from Long Island, August 29 ... 42
Action at Kip's Bay, September 15 46
Battle of Harlem Heights, September 16 49
Howe's Flank Movement through Westchester, October . 51
/Battle of White Plains, October 28 52
Battle of Fort Washington, November 16 57.
Retreat through New Jersey, November December ... 62
Washington Crosses the Delaware, December 25 .... 66
Battle of Trenton, December 26 67
\ Battle of Princeton, January 3, 1777 70
Winter Quarters at Morristown, January 7 72
III. PHILADELPHIA, 1777 75
Howe's Plans for 1777 . . . . 76
Burgoyne's Plan, Approved by the King 78
The Danbury Raid, April 25 SO
xi
xii CONTENTS
CHAPTEB
The Middlebrook Manoeuvres, May, June 80
Howe Sails for the Chesapeake, July 1 82
Washington Confronts Him When He Lands, August 25 . 83
Battle of the Brandywine, September 11 85
Paoli Massacre, September 21 88
Howe Takes Philadelphia, September 25 88
Battle of Germantown, October 4 90
Defence of Fort Mercer, or Red Bank, October 22 ... 93
Capture of Fort Mifflin, November 15 94
Evacuation of Fort Mercer, November 20 94
Washington at Valley Forge, December 19 95
IV. THE HUDSON, 1777 96
Burgoyne Arrives at Montreal, May 14 100
Capture of Ticonderoga, July 6 103
Battle of Hubbardton, July 7 104
Engagement at Skenesborough, July 7 104
Action at Fort Ann, July 8 105
St. Leger's Expedition from Oswego, July-August .... 106
Battle of Oriskany, August 6 107
Siege of Fort Schuyler (or Stanwix), August 4-22 .... 108
Defeat of St. Leger, August 22 108
Schuyler Retreats Down the Hudson, July-August .... 109
Battle of Bennington, August 16 113
Battle of Freeman's Farm, September 19 116
Capture of Forts Montgomery and Clinton, October 6 . . 121
Battle of Bemis' Heights, October 7 123
Surrender of Burgoyne at Saratoga, October 17 127
V. THE FRENCH ALLIANCE, 1778-81 132
Valley Forge 132
Conway Cabal 134
Greene Appointed Quartermaster-General 136
Steuben Appointed Inspector-General . 137
British Peace Commission 138
Skirmish at Barren Hill, May 20, 1778 140
Evacuation of Philadelphia, June 18 141
Battle of Monmouth, June 28 144
Court-Martial of Charles Lee, July 4-August 12 148
Arrival of the French Fleet, July 14 149
Newport, August 29 153
CONTENTS xiii
CHAPTBB FAG B
Stony Point, July 16, 1779 158
Paulus Hook, August 19 160
Penobscot Expedition, July 25 161
Springfield, June 23, 1780 164
West Point Arnold's Treason, September 21 167
New London, September 7, 1781 170
Movements of d'Estaing, 1779 171
Arrival of the Second French Expedition, July 10, 1780 . . 172
French Army and Navy Blockaded at Newport, July, 1780,
to July, 1781 173
The Revolution Nearly Exhausted . 174
Mutiny of the Pennsylvania Line, January 1, 1781 . . . . 176
Mutiny of the New Jersey Line, January 20 177
John Laurens's Mission to Paris, February 13 178
VI. BRITISH CONQUEST OF THE SOUTH, 1778-80 . . 180
British Plans for Dividing the Colonies 182
Militia Conflicts 183
Great Bridge, Va., December 9, 1775 183
Moore's Bridge, N. C., February 27, 1776 183
Defence of Charleston, June 28 * 186
Capture of Savannah, December 29, 1778. 191
Conquest of Georgia, January 29, 1779 192
Action at Beaufort, February 3 193
Engagement at Kettle Creek, February 14 194
Battle of Briar Creek, March 3 195
Battle of Stono Ferry, June 20 198
Siege of Savannah, September 23 202
Assault at Savannah, October 9 203
D'Estaing Returns to France, October 20 205
Clinton's Expedition to the South, October 26 206
Siege of Charleston, April 10, 1780 208
Surrender of Charleston, May 12 210
Action at the Waxhaws, May 29 212
Action at Ramsour's Mill, June 20 213
Action at Williamson's, July 12 213
Action at Hanging Rock, August 8. 213
Action at Rocky Mount, July 30 214
Action at Green Spring, August 1 214
Action at Hanging Rock, August 12 214
xiv CONTENTS
CHAPTEB PAGE
Gates Takes Command, July 25 215
Battle of Camden, August 16 218
Action at Fishing Creek, August 18, 1780 219
VII. BRITISH DEFEAT AT THE SOUTH, 1781-82 ... 220
Greene Takes Command, December 4, 1780 222
Battle of King's Mountain, October 7 224
Action at Fish Dam, November 9 225
Action at Blackstocks, November 20 225
Battle of the Cowpens, January 17, 1781 229
Retreat to the Dan, January, February 232
Passage of the Catawba, February 1 233
Passage of the Yadkin, February 8 234
Passage of the Dan, February 15 ". 235
Action at Wetzell's Mill, March 6 237
Battle of Guilford, March 15 239
Cornwallis Retreats to Wilmington, April 7 242
Greene Marches to South Carolina, April 244
Battle of Hobkirk's Hill, April 25 246
Rawdon Evacuates Camden, May 10 248
Capture of Fort Motte, May 12 248
Capture of Orangeburg, May 11 249
Capture of Fort Granby, May 15 249
Siege and Capture of Augusta, May 22-June 5 249
Siege of Ninety-Six, May 22-June 19 250
Battle of Eutaw Springs, September 8 255
Evacuation of Savannah, July 11, 1782 ...*... 257
Evacuation of Charleston, December 14, 1782 257
VEIL YORKTOWN, 1781 . . . . 259
Cornwallis Marches to Virginia, April 260
Situation in ylrginia, May 261
Lafayette Retreats from Richmond, June 262
Steuben Retreats from Charlottesville, June 262
Arrival of Wayne, June 10 263
Battle of Jamestown, July 6 263
Clinton's Instructions to Cornwallis, June-July 266
Cornwallis at Yorktown, August 2 267
Allied Army Moves Toward New York, June 268
Allied Army Marches to Virginia, August 270
Movements of French and English Fleets, August . . . 270
CONTENTS xv
CHAPTER
^
Naval Battle off the Chesapeake, September 5 273^
Clinton Sails to Relief of Cornwallis, October 19 .... 273
Siege of Yorktown, September 28 274
Capitulation at Yorktown, October 19 275
End of the War, November 25, 1783 278
Washington's Ability as a Soldier 279
PART II THE MILITARY POLICY OF THE
UNITED STATES
Ancient Origin of the Prejudice against a Standing Army . . . 286
Formation of the Continental Army, 1775 288
Washington's Opinions on the Defects of the System in Use During
the Revolution, 292
The Constitutional Powers of Congress 295
The Manner of Raising Troops for the War of 1812 297
Secretary Calhoun's Reports, 1818-20 299
Volunteers and Militia for the Florida War, 1835 301
Calling Out Troops for the Mexican War, 1846 305
The Enormous Levies for the Civil War, 1861-65 307
Reduction of the Army after the Civil War 311
Report of the Buraside Committee in 1878 312
New Methods Adopted for Raising Troops in the War with Spain,189S 315
United States Volunteers for the Philippines, 1899 319
Secretary Root's Reports and Resulting Legislation, 1901-03 ... 320
Organization and Duties of the General Staff 325
The Militia Act of 1903 327
The Necessity for a Definite Military Policy to Meet Existing Con-
ditions ' 331
APPENDIX .337
INDEX 343
MAPS
PA.CING PAGE!
Lexington and Concord, April 19, 1775 4
Bunker Hill, June 17, 1775 . . 6
Boston, July, 1775-March, 1776 12
Invasion of Canada, September, 1775 July, 1776 20
Arnold's March, September 5-November 13, 1775 22
Quebec, December 31, 1775 24
New York, April-November, 1776 28
Long Island, August 27, 1776 36
Harlem, September-October, 1776 48
White Plains, October 28, 1776 52
Movements of Nathan Hale, September 10-22, 1776 52
Fort Washington, November 16, 1776 56
Retreat through New Jersey, November-December, 1776 .... 60
Trenton, December 25, 1776 66
Trenton and Princeton, January 2-4, 1776 66
Philadelphia, August-December, 1777 70
Fort Washington, November 16, 1776 80
Danbury Raid, April 25-26, 1777 SO
Brandywine, September 11, 1777 84
Fort Mercer, October 22, November 20, and Fort Mifflin, November
15, 1777 84
Germantown, October 4, 1777 92
Arnold's Naval Engagement, October 11-13, 1776 96
The Hudson, July-October, 1777 96
Ticonderoga, July 6, 1777 102
Hubbardtown, July 7, 1777 102
Bennington, August 16, 1777 102
Freeman's Farm, September 19, 1777 116
Bemis Heights, October 7, 1777 122
Fort Schuyler, August 3-22, 1777 126
xvii
xviii MAPS
*'t riNO PAGE
Forts Montgomery and Clinton, October 6, 1777 120
Surrender of Burgoyne, October 17, 1777 126
Valley Forge, December 19, 1777-June 17, 1778 132
Philadelphia Evacuated, June 18, 1778 132
Barren Hill, May 20, 1778 146
Monmouth, June 27, 1778 140
The French Alliance, Movements between New Jersey and Newport,
1778-1781 150
Springfield, June 23, 1780 152
Penobscot, July 25, 1779 152
New London, September 7, 1781 152
Newport, August 29, 1778 152
Sullivan's Indian Campaign, 1778-1779 15(i
Stony Point, July 16, 1779 15S
Tryon's Raid, July 5-8, 1779 158
Arnold's Treason. Andre's Capture, September 20-25, 1780 . . . 166
Boston to Savannah, 1776-1781 186
Sullivan's Island (Charleston), June 29, 1776 186
South Carolina, 1779-1780 192
Savannah, October 9, 1779 202
Charleston, April 10-May 12, 1780 202
King's Mountain, October 9, 1780 218
Camden, August 16, 1780 218
Campaign of 1781 226
Retreat to the Dan, January-February, 1781 232
Cowpens, January 17, 1781 238
Guilford, March 15, 1781 238
Hobkirk's Hill (Camden), April 25, 1781 246
Ninety-Six, May 22-June 5, 1781 246
Eutaw Springs, September 8, 1781 254
Virginia, 1781 258
Petersburg, April 25, 1781 260
Chesapeake, September 5, 1781 . . 260
Richmond, January 6, 1781 260
Yorktown, September 30-October 19 1781 274
AUTHORITIES
A. THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1. Force's "American Archives/' 4th series, 6 vols.; 5th series, 3 vols.,
1774-76 (Amer. Archives).
2. Journals of Congress, edition of 1823, 4 vols., 1774-83 (Jour. Cong.).
3. Journals of the Continental Congress, edition of 1906, 15 vols.,
1774^-79 (Jour. Cont. Cong.).
4. Sparks's "Writings of Washington," 12 vols. (Sparks).
5. Sparks's "Letters to Washington," 4 vols. (Sparks, Letters).
These 44 volumes correspond in some measure (though much less
complete) to the Official Records of the War of the Rebellion.
They contain the greater part of all the original documents that
have been published on the American side, except such as have
been brought out in memoirs and biographies of the minor char-
acters of the Revolution.
6. Dawson's "Battles of the United States," vol. I (Dawson).
7. Lossing's "Field-Book of the Revolution," 2 vols. (Lossing).
Dawson is valuable on account of the copious references he makes
to original documents. Lossing visited every battle-field of the
Revolution between 1847 and 1850.
8. E. J. Lowell's "The Hessians in the Revolution" (Lowell). This is
founded upon original German authorities.
9. Eelking's German Allies in the American Revolution (Eelking).
10. Heitman's "Officers of the Continental Army" (Heitman). This
contains a brief account of every regiment and every officer of
the Continental army, as shown by the records of the War
Department.
11. Frothingham's "Siege of Boston" (Frothingham).
12. H. P. Johnston's "Campaign of 1776 Around New York and
Brooklyn" (Johnston, 1776).
13. H. P. Johnston's "Battle of Harlem Heights" (Johnston, Harlem).
14. H. P. Johnston's "Stony Point" (Johnston, Stony Point).
15. H. P. Johnston's "Yorktown Campaign" (Johnston, Yorktown).
16. Stryker's "Trenton and Princeton" (Stryker).
17. Moore's "Treason of Charles Lee" (Moore).
18. Keim's "Rochambeau" (Keim).
19. I. N. Arnold's "March to Quebec" (Arnold's March).
20. I. N. Arnold's "Benedict Arnold" (Arnold).
21. Kapp's "Steuben" (Kapp, Steuben).
22. Kapp's "Kalb" (Kapp, Kalb).
23. D. Schenck's "North Carolina 1780-81" (Schenck).
These nineteen books are exhaustive memoirs which contain probably
every original fact and figure which is knownf concerning the respec-
tive events of which they treat.
xix
XX
AUTHORITIES
24. Howe's "Narrative, 1781" (Howe).
25. Burgoyne's "Narrative, 1780" (Burgoyne).
26. "Clinton-Cornwallis Controversy," B. F. Stevens, 1888 (Clinton-
Cornwallis).
27. Tarleton's "Campaigns of 1780 and 1781" (Tarleton).
28. RiedeseFs "Memoirs," 2 vols. (Riedesel).
29. Hansard's "Parliamentary History of England," vols. XVII-XXIII,
1775-83 (Hansard).
These, together with Force and Dawson, are the chief sources of
British official reports and maps. Stevens's compilation of the
documents relating to the campaign of 1781 is unique.
30. Stedman's "American War," 2 vols., 1794 (Stedman).
This was written by a very competent officer who served in the
British army from Boston to Yorktown. Its maps are valuable
as historical documents although inaccurate as to topography.
31. Winsor's "Reader's Handbook of the American Revolution," 1 vol.,
1879 (Winsor).
In this full bibliography the librarian of Harvard University gives
a chronological list of the events of the Revolution and, as to
each event, a reference to the volume and chapter of every book
and every map of any value which had been published in re-
lation thereto. He properly styles it "a continuous foot-note to
all histories of the American Revolution."
The standard histories Gordon, Ramsay, Botta, Hildreth, Bancroft,
Fiske, Avery and (most brilliant and, I believe, most accurate
of them all) Trevelyan; the contemporary journals of Moultrie
Henry Lee, Thacher and Simcoe; the earlier biographies
Sparks's "American Biographies," Marshall's "Washington,"
Irving's ft Washington," Johnson's "Greene," G. W. Greene's
"Greene," Drake's "Knox," Reed's "Reed," Bowen's "Lincoln,"
Stark's " Stark"; all these are well known. Probably no one has
read them all; certainly I have not. I have, however, consulted
each of them as to their opinions on certain important events.
They are all founded on the original documents above listed,
or on personal recollections, but are not in themselves original
authorities. In addition to these there are, of course, hundreds
of other books on the Revolution, the bibliography of which is
very voluminous.
B. MILITARY POLICY
1* Force's "American Archives," 4th series, 6 vols.; 5th Series, 3 vols.,
1774-76 (Amer. Archives).
2. "American State Papers, Military Affairs/' 7 vols.
These stout quartos, 16 volumes, about 1600 pages per volume,
18,000,000 words in all, were published by Peter Force, under
authority of Congress, in the years 1837 to 1853. They are the
chief repository of facts and figures relating to military affairs
from 1774 to 1830.
3. "Journals of Congress," edition of 1823, 4 vols., 1774-83 (Jour.
Cong.).
AUTHORITIES xxi
4. " Journals of the Continental Congress/ 7 edited by Worthington C.
Ford, and published by authority of Congress in the years 1904
to 1909. They number 15 volumes and contain a verbatim copy,
including interlineations, erasures and corrections, of the original
journals in the archives of the State Department for the years
1774 to 1779. The copying and printing of the journals for the
succeeding years is now in progress (Jour. Cont. Cong.).
5. Sparks's "Writings of Washington," 12 vols., 1858 (Sparks).
6. Sparks's "Letters to Washington," 4 vols., 1853 (Sparks, Letters).
7. "Military Laws of the United States." Compiled by J. F. Callan,
1862 (Mil. Laws).
8. "Military Laws of the United States." Prepared by Lt.-Col. Geo.
B. Davis, Dep'y Judge Advocate General, U. S. Army, 1897
(Mil. Laws, 1897).
. "Military Laws of the United States," 4th edition, 1901. With
supplement to March 4, 1907, prepared by Major John B. Por-
ter, Judge Advocate, U. S. Army (Mil. Laws, 1907).
10. Henry Adams's "History of the United States, 1801-1817," 9 vols.,
1890 (Adams).
11. Provost Marshal General's Report. War of the Rebellion, Official
Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (War Records).
This report contains complete statistics on all matters relating to
the recruiting of the Northern armies and the enforcement of the
Conscription Laws of 1863.
12. Reports of the Commissioner of Pensions (Com. Pensions).
13. Upton. "Military Policy of the United States." Written in 1880.
Published (after General Upton's death) by the War Department
in 1904 (Upton).
14. Burnside Committee Senate Report 555. 45th Congress, 3d Session,
Dec. 12, 1878 (Burnside).
15. "Messages of the Presidents." Compiled and published by J. D.
Richardson, 9 vols. (1898), under authority of Congress (Mess.
Presidents).
16. Revised Statutes of the United States. 1878 (Rev. Stat.).
17. Army Registers. 1860 to 1910 (Army Reg.).
18. Register of the Graduates of the U. S. Military Academy (Grad.
U. S. M. A.).
19. Cullum's Biographical Register of the Graduates of the U. S. Mili-
tary Academy (Cullum).
20. Report of the Secretary of War, 1898 (Sec. War).
21. Report of the Adjutant-General U. S. Army, 1898 (Adjt.-Gen.).
22. Reports of the Chief of Staff (Chf. Staff).
23. Reports of the Secretary of War, 1899-1903, reprinted in one volume,
1904 (Sec. War)
PART I
THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
"The problem, that a nation can be defended against a perma-
nent force, by temporary armies, by occasional calls of the hus-
bandman from his plough to the field, was completely disproved;
and, in demonstrating its fallacy, the independence of America had
nearly perished in its cradle."
JOHN MAKSSALL.
CHAPTER I
BOSTON 1
THE relations between England and her American cor- 1775
onies, which had been growing more and more strained concord and
during the twelve years following the close of the French Lexinsrton
war in 1763, reached a crisis on an April morning when April 19
the royal troops were sent out from Boston to destroy
military stores at Concord and incidentally to arrest
Samuel Adams and John Hancock, on the way, at Lex-
ington. The political consequences of that day were stu-
pendous. In a military sense its importance was due
to the fact that the grenadiers and light infantry, ex-
celled by none in the British army for training, discipline
and military experience, after killing eight farmers on
the Lexington Common, met such a sturdy resistance
from the rustic militia at Concord that they beat a hasty
retreat to Boston; and on the way back, although rein-
forced by a brigade of regulars under command of the
eldest son of the Duke of Northumberland, were so sur-
rounded, ambushed, outflanked and assaulted by the
hordes of gathering militia, that they barely escaped
1 The story of Lexington and Concord and Bunker Hill has been told
many thousand times in books and orations. The one exhaustive and com-
plete account, vivid in narrative and replete with official documents, is that
given in The Siege of Boston, by Richard Frothingham, published by
Little & Brown in 1849 and reprinted in 1903. The notes and references
in that book to the original authorities are so copious that a general ref-
erence to Frothingham only is necessary here. The original authorities
are quoted there in every instance.
3
4 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1775 complete capture, and left 73 killed, 174 wounded and 26
missing on the road; a total loss equal to 15 per cent of
their strength.
Within a week the British troops were shut up and
rmy k eg j e g e( j ^ Boston by a force of nearly 20,000 " minute-
men" that portion of the Massachusetts militia, one in
four, who were designated to answer any call at a minute's
notice. But the minute-men, determined as they were
and actuated by intense patriotism, came and went ac-
cording to their own estimate of the relative importance
of their agricultural and military duties; the Massa-
chusetts Congress thereupon began the formation of an
"army," whose strength they thought should be 30,000
men, of which their own colony should furnish 13,600.
The adjoining colonies were asked to contribute their
quota, and New Hampshire, Connecticut and Rhode
Island promptly responded. The troops were enlisted
until the end of the year, were organized into regi-
ments, and Artemas Ward was appointed general and
commander-in-chief . *
The British The garrison of Boston, which remained closely be-
sieged until its evacuation nearly a year later, consisted
at this time of eleven infantry regiments, many of which
became famous under Wellington's command nearly forty
years later, some artillery and a few marines from the
squadron of several men-of-war then lying in the harbor
under command of Admiral Graves. It numbered about
3,500 men, organized into three brigades, under Brigadiers
Earl Percy, Pigott and Jones. The commander-in-chief
was Major-General Thomas Gage, who had been a lieu-
tenant-colonel under Braddock, had served through the
French war and then been promoted and assigned to
command all the troops in America. He hivd visited
Concord
Afuf^k Lexington
ir " il : "' aboutfimls.
LEXINGTON AND CONCORD
April 19, 1775
Courtesy of The Burrows Brothers Company, Publishers, Cleveland, Ohio
BOSTON 5
England in 1773 and returned in the spring of 1774 as 1775
Governor of Massachusetts, in addition to his military
duties.
Six months after his arrival he reported to the Secretary
for the Colonies that "if the misunderstandings proceed
to the last extremity, to begin with an army of 20,000
men will in the end save Great Britain both blood and
treasure." But the minister considered what was trans-
piring in Massachusetts to be "the acts of a rude rabble,
without plan, without concert, without conduct"; 1 and
he thought a smaller force quite sufficient, if used promptly
and vigorously. Later, however, he so far changed his
mind as to send out three major-generals, Burgoyne,
Howe and Clinton, all of whom had had military experi-
ence and were also sitting as Members of Parliament.
They brought with them several additional regiments, May 25
carrying the total strength of the garrison to about
10,000 men.
Gage had previously thrown up some earthworks near
Boston Neck, on the site of what is now Dover Street,
commanding the road over the narrow causeway which
connected Boston, then almost an island, with the main-
land. As soon as Ward's regiments began to arrive, they
also undertook the construction of field-works, covering
all the roads leading to the west and south of Boston,
and designed to prevent any further incursions of the
British troops like that of Concord. These works were
skilfully located, planned and constructed under the
direction of Colonel Richard Gridley, chief engineer, who
was now sixty-four years old, but had lost none of the
great reputation he had acquired at the siege of Louis-
burg, thirty years before. The works were not fully
Sparks, III, 506-507.
BOSTON 7
winter's snow and sledges before they could be trans- 1775
ported. They then arrived in time to compel the evacu-
ation of Boston.
While these fortifications were progressing, Gage issued June 12
an insulting proclamation/ said to have been draughted
by Burgoyne, and - the Massachusetts Committee of
Safety responded by a resolution 1 that Bunker Hill, June 15
which commanded Boston on the north, ought to be
occupied. Gage was also planning to occupy this hill,
and news of his intention had reached the Colonial army.
Both sides were eager to fight, the Americans to answer
Gage's proclamation and the British to avenge the dis-
aster at Lexington. A bloody battle was the result.
On theT^ening of June 16, Colonel Prescott was sent Battle of
from Cambridge with three regiments and a fatigue party
to fortify Bunker Hill. Either through mistake, or from
a desire to place his redoubt as near Boston as possible,
he passed over Bunker Hill and selected Breed's Hill.
Colonel Gridley, chief engineer, laid out a square redoubt
about 40 yards on a side, and the work began about mid-
night. Before daylight the parapets were 6 feet high,
with banquettes of wood and earth from which the men
could fire. A breastwork of similar height, about 100
yards long, extended from the north-east angle of the re-
doubt toward the Mystic River. The site of the redoubt
is that on which Bunker Hill monument now stands.
The operations had been conducted so quietly that cage's pian of
they had not been detected by the British. At dawn,
about 4 A.M., the redoubt was observed, and fire was
opened on it by one of the men-of-war and by the battery
on Copp's Hill, in Boston, Gage called a council of war,
and rejecting the advice of Clinton, determined to assault
1 Amer. Archives, 4, II, 968, 1354
8 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
L775 the works in front, instead of cutting them off in the rear.
The assaulting party was to be under the command of
General Howe, and to consist of the grenadier and light
infantry companies of ten regiments supported by four
full regiments, 5th, 38th, 43d and 52d. The 47th Regi-
ment and a battalion were to assemble at the North Bat-
tery prepared to cross, if necessary. While the troops
were crossing the river and forming for attack, a furious
cannonade was to be opened from the works at Boston
Neck in the hope of creating a diversion, and preventing
reinforcements being sent to Bunker Hill from Cam-
bridge.
These movements were all made as planned. About
noon the troops embarked at Long Wharf and North Bat-
tery, and were rowed to Morton's Point and landed with-
out opposition, under cover of the guns of Copp's Hill and
the six men-of-war, which at a range of 800 to 1,000
yards swept the ground on all sides of the redoubt but
without doing much damage. About 2 o'clock the boats
were sent back to North Battery and there embarked* the
47th and the marines, landing them, however, near the
present navy-yard, about 500 yards to the left of Howe's
main body.
Prescott meanwhile completed the work on his forti-
fications and strengthened a rail-fence and hedge extend-
ing from the end of his breastwork to the shore of the
Mystic, with a re-entrant angle which gave cross-fire in
its front. He also asked for reinforcements, and Ward
sent him two additional regiments from Cambridge, and
a little later portions of several other regiments. With
them came as volunteers Generals Putnam, Pomeroy and
others who fought with muskets, and just before the at-
tack opened Joseph Warren, President of the Provincial
BOSTON 9
Congress, the active spirit of the Committee of Safety, 1775
who had been appointed a major-general by the Provin-
cial Congress three days before, also arrived and took
his place within the redoubt. The command, however,
remained with Colonel Prescott, a most gallant and
capable soldier.
Howe's men were in dress uniform, with knapsacks, Howe's
three days' rations, cartridge-box, ammunition and mus-
ket, the total load being estimated by Stedman 1 at 125
pounds; doubtless it weighed less, but it probably seemed
as much in the excessive heat of the cloudless summer day.
Howe leisurely formed his command in three lines at a
distance of" 600 yards, and at 3 o'clock in the afternoon
began the attack. Personally he advanced with the right
wing against the rail-fence, while Brigadier Pigott with
the left wing marched against the breastwork. The
houses in Charlestown were set on fire by carcasses from
Copp's Hill, but a gentle breeze from the north blew the
dense smoke to one side so that it did not conceal the
attacking troops. These came forward in fine order, the
advance being covered by the fire of their ^artillery, and
the infantry occasionally firing, but without effect. The
Americans were restrained by their officers from firing
until the British lines were within forty yards from the
redoubt on one side and the rail-fence on the other.^
Then they opened fire, deliberately, with careful aim and
with terrible effect. The British loss was enormous,
particularly among the officers, who led their men with
great gallantry and at this short range could easily be
distinguished. The line hesitated, recoiled and then
turned in hasty retreat back almost to the point whence
it had started.
1 Stedman, I, 127.
10
THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1775
Second As-
sault
Third Assault
American Re-
treat
Howe reformed his men and led them forward a second
time, in the same manner, firing as they advanced, and
stepping over the bodies of those who had fallen in the
first assault. This time the Americans held their fire
until the British were within twenty yards (for powder
was scarce and precious) and then delivered it with the
same fatal effect. The British stood it for a few minutes,
returning the fire with spirit, but the losses were so great
that they were again compelled to retreat. Clinton, who
had been observing the battle from Copp's Hill, now
crossed the river with a second battalion of marines and
some other troops and aided in rallying the regiments as
they retreated to the beach.
Howe was determined, notwithstanding his enormous
losses, to renew the assault, and in spite of reluctance on
the part of some of his officers and men, he formed them
for a third attack. The men were ordered to throw off
their knapsacks, to move forward in column, reserve their
fire and rely on the bayonet. Again in person Howe led
the grenadiers and light infantry against the breastwork
and rail-fence on his right, while Pigott accompanied by
Clinton assaulted the redoubt on his left. This time he
succeeded. The Americans had fired about thirty rounds
in the two preceding assaults, and now had only two
rounds left, made up by tearing open what remained of
the artillery cartridges. They reserved their two rounds
to the last, but when these had been fired they were help-
less, for they had no bayonets. The British came over
the parapet of the redoubt from three sides at once, there
was a hand-to-hand fight, and then the Americans were
forced out of the redoubt, Warren being killed just after
the retreat began. It continued in fairly good order,
Putnam covering the rear with his Connecticut regiment;
BOSTON 11
the principal losses on the American side occurred during 1775
the retreat over Bunker Hill, the British keeping up a
vigorous fire to which the Americans could not reply for
lack of ammunition. About 5 o'clock the British halted
their pursuit at Charlestown Neck, and the battle was
over. The Americans filed into their lines on Prospect
Hill and Winter Hill, expecting to be attacked there;
but Howe decided that such an attack would be unwise.
In the eight years of the Revolution there was no bat- Results of
tie more bloody, none more important. The Americans,
without proper organization, equipment or supplies, had
fought the best regular troops of Europe, and had re-
pulsed them until their ammunition gave out. All the
advantages of victory were on their side, and they were
convinced that they could do it again and that regular
organization was not necessary a conviction which they
tenaciously held throughout the Revolution; and then
transmitted it to their descendants, who have believed
in it almost to this day. On the British side, as soon as
news of the battle reached England, Gage was recalled in
disgrace and disappears from history. Howe, who had
showed the greatest personal gallantry and exposed him-
.self perhaps unnecessarily, was said to have been com-
pletely unnerved. Of the eleven officers on his staff, all
were wounded, and ten died of their wounds within a few
days or weeks. The memory of the carnage on that hot
summer's afternoon never left him. He failed to press
home his victory at Long Island; he was slow in pursuing
Washington through New Jersey; he was cautious and
timid in his manoeuvres at Middlebrook; he did not reap
the full advantage of his victories at Brandywine and
Germantown; and he made no effort to attack Wash-
ington at Valley Forge. While his personal courage
12 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1775 did not flinch, he lacked moral courage, initiative and
vigor throughout the two years in which he exercised
supreme command after Gage's departure.
Gage's report says that he sent 2,000 men into action
and that his losses were 1,054, or 53 per cent. Doubtless
he underestimated the number engaged, for the losses
were in 14 regiments of infantry, 1 of artillery and 2
battalions of marines. Their numbers could hardly have
been less than 3,500. There were, according to his own
report, 228 killed and 826 wounded, and about 1 in 10
were officers. On the American side all or parts of 15
regiments were engaged, 12 from Massachusetts, 2 from
New Hampshire and 1 from Connecticut. Their numbers
were never accurately ascertained, but were estimated at
from 1,500 to 5,000; probably there were about 3,500,
the same as the British. Their losses were 441: 140
killed, 271 wounded and 30 prisoners. Five out of slx~
pieces of artillery were lost.
Military arm- On both sides there is ground for criticism of the mili-
tary movements. In the unorganized condition of the
Massachusetts army it was most unwise to bring on a
general engagement; the British were shut up in Boston,
and every road leading into the country was well guarded
and fortified. The proper course to pursue was that fol-
lowed by Washington after he arrived, viz., to await
attack within their lines. In such an attack all the
advantages would have been on the American side.
On the other hand, Gage's plan of attack was most
faulty. He had the co-operation of the navy, with 7
vessels and 200 guns. 1 The Mystic and Charles Rivers
were navigable for these ships, and they enveloped the
Charlestown peninsula, which was then connected with
1 Stedman, I, 123.
r
BOSTON 13
the main-land by a narrow causeway. Had Gage landed 1775
his troops near this causeway, in Prescott's rear and under
the protection of the fleet with such a vast preponderance
of artillery, the capture or annihilation of the American
force would seem to have been inevitable. In place of
that he decided on an open assault, the first in a long list
in our history of direct assaults over an open country
against field intrenchments. Some of these assaults have
succeeded, but the most have failed. In this case it was
unjustifiable because unnecessary other and better plans
being available.
Both sides were, in fact, spoiling for a square stand-up
fight, and this overruled all other considerations. Like
Bull Run, eighty-six years later, Bunker Hill cleared the
air, and showed to all concerned that there was a desper-
ate struggle ahead. The Americans, more than .ever if
that were possible conscious of the justice of their cause,
were now confident of their ability to win it. And the
British were equally amazed and depressed by the obsti-
nate and masterful resistance which they had encountered.
While these events were in progress at Boston, the congress
Continental Congress, in session at Philadelphia, was o>Si3?
arranging to assume control of the contest on behalf of all
the colonies. It took over the armies of Massachusetts,
Connecticut, New Hampshire and Rhode Island, assem-
bled at Boston, as the "Army of the United Colonies/ 7
appointed Washington its commander-in-chief, adopted
rules and regulations for its government (the first edition June is
of the Articles of War), called upon the other colonies to
raise reinforcements for the army, adopted measures for
the manufacture of saltpetre and gunpowder and the
casting of cannon, appointed a Board of War, authorized
THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1775
Appointment
of General
Officers
The Major-
Generals.
the raising of $2,000,000 by bills of credit and took other
steps to carry on the contest, including the appointment
of four major-generals and eight brigadiers. 1
The selection of Washington was due in part to the
reputation he had gained in his service under Braddock,
but perhaps even more to the fact that he was the
most influential man in Virginia. His appointment was
brought about by John Adams 2 in the hope that it would
bring Virginia and other Southern colonies to the aid
of New England. No one could then foresee that in
the next few years "Washington would display those pre-
eminent qualities as soldier, leader and statesman which
have made him immortal.
The major-generals were Artemas Ward, Charles Lee,
Philip Schuyler and Israel Putnam. Ward was selected
out of deference to Massachusetts, whose troops he com-
manded; he remained through the siege of Boston and
then resigned. Lee was supposed to be an accomplished
soldier of large experience, but proved to be an advent-
urer, a charlatan and a traitor, Schuyler was one of the
most prominent men in New York, had served with credit
in the Indian wars, and was a capable soldier, ultimately
forced out of the army by the intrigues of Gates. Putnam
had served at Ticonderoga and Montreal and Havana,
and had a great reputation for intrepid daring as well as
for his popular manners. Although at the time of his
appointment he only commanded a regiment, he held a
commission as brigadier-general from Connecticut.
The brigadiers were Seth Pomeroy, William Heath and
John Thomas, of Massachusetts; Richard Montgomery,
of New York; John Sullivan, of New Hampshire; David
1 Jour. Conk Cong., II, 91, 93, 99.
1 Morse's Life of John Adams, 92, 100; Sparks, III, 479-480.
BOSTON 15
Wooster and Joseph Spencer, of Connecticut; and Na- 1775
thanael Greene, of Rhode Island. Geographical and po- The Brigadier-
litical, as well as military considerations, controlled these enera s '
selections. The youngest of them, Greene, then thirty-
three years old, was without military experience, but was
destined to become the most famous soldier, after Wash-
ington, of the Revolution. He was at Boston in com-
mand of the Rhode Island "army" of three regiments.
Pomeroy, Wooster and Spencer were between sixty and
seventy years old, veterans of former wars. Pomeroy
declined his appointment, being dissatisfied that Putnam
should be chosen over his head to be a major-general; but
a year later he went out with the militia to the Hudson
River, and died there of sickness contracted in camp.
Wooster served for a while in Canada, but was considered
inactive and inefficient, and resigned. He also went out
with the militia in the following year, and was mortally
wounded in a skirmish near Danbury, Conn. Spencer's
service was inconspicuous, and he resigned in the spring of
1778 to go to Congress. Thomas was also a veteran. He
rendered good service at Boston, and after Montgomery's
death was sent to command the troops in Canada, and
died there in 1776. Montgomery, Sullivan and Heath
were all under forty years of age when they ^received their
appointments. Montgomery had been an officer in the
British army, had fought under Wolfe, and had resigned
and emigrated to America three years before. He was a
splendid soldier, and his death, in the assault on Quebec,
in the first year of the war, was a great loss. Sullivan and
Heath were too young to have served in the previous
wars, and had no military experience when appointed.
But they soon learned their trade, and rendered good
service throughout the war.
16
THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
General.
The Quarter-
master-Gen-
1775 At the same time that these appointments were made,
The Adjutant- Horatio Gates, of Virginia, was appointed adjutant-
gei^eraL He also had been an officer in the British army,
had served with Braddock, and on the conclusion of the
last war had settled in Virginia. He intrigued Schuyler
out of his command, received the surrender of Burgoyne
after Arnold had done all the hard work, tried without
success to displace Washington, made a complete failure
of his Southern campaign and then disappeared from
public life. Mifflin, of Pennsylvania, who accompanied
Washington to Cambridge, was made quartermaster-
general. He was thirty-one years old, a merchant in
Philadelphia, and successful in politics, both before and
after the Revolution. But he was not a soldier, was a
failure as quartermaster-general and joined Gates in his
intrigues against Washington.
On the whole, remembering that the Colonies at the
beginning of the Revolution had no military organiza-
tion, these first appointments to the chief places in the
army were very judicious. Excepting Lee, who had no
standing except such v as was created by his own gascon-
ade, all were men of importance in their respective com-
munities, and eleven of the fifteen had been in active
campaigns as regulars or volunteers. Two of them the
commander-in-chief and the youngest brigadier were
destined to place their names forever in the list of great
soldiers; and it is pleasing to remember that from the
day they first met at Boston there was never jealousy,
discord or ill feeling between them, but always loyalty,
friendship and sympathy, growing ever stronger and
firmer until the death of Greene eleven years later.
Arrival of Washington arrived at Cambridge on July 3, inspected
juiy 10 n ' the troops, examined the lines and made his report to
BOSTON 17
Congress. The army numbered 20,242 officers and men, 1775
of whom 17,215 were present for duty. There were 35 The contin
regiments, of which 26 were from Massachusetts and^3 talArmy
from each of the other New England colonies. These
men knew how to shoot, from long practice, but they had
no other military knowledge; they were of high character,
intensely patriotic, fiercely independent and extremely
impatient of the restraints of discipline. Their terms of
enlistment would all expire within six months. Powder
was extremely scarce, there were only a few pieces of
artillery, there was no cavalry and hardly any organized
supply departments. The fortified lines, previously de-
scribed, were only partially constructed.
For the next eight months Washington's task was to
organize this army; to replace it, within cannon-shot of
the enemy, by another army, when the enlistments ex-
pired at the end of the year; to extend and complete his
fortifications; to be prepared at every moment to repel
an attack by the British should Howe decide, as every
one supposed he would, to venture forth from Boston.
Public opinion, ignorant of the difficulties with which
he was surrounded, demanded that Washington attack
Boston; and he himself shared the longing to do so.
Four times Washington called his generals, Ward, Lee, sept, u
Putnam, Thonoas, Heath, Sullivan, Spencer, Greene anff Oct. is
Gates, in council of war, and submitted the question
whether Boston should be attacked, and each time in 1776
such a manner as to suggest an affirmative answer. But Jan. w
each time they advised, unanimously, against it. There Feb. is
can be no question that their advice was judicious.
Finally, however, in March when Washington had en-
listed and organized a new army, and had procured the
temporary services of ten regiments of militia; when
18 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1776 Knox had dragged the heavy cannon through the snow
from Ticonderoga; when the privateers had captured an
abundance of powder from the incoming British supply
ships; when the fortifications were completed so as to
furnish rallying-points in case of defeat the time for
taking the offensive under favorable conditions had
arrived, and Washington eagerly seized the opportunity.
His plan was to send Thomas with 2,000 men, supplied
with intrenching tools, fascines, etc., from the Roxbury
lines to seize and fortify Dorchester Heights what is now
seizure of called Telegraph Hill, in Thomas Park, South Boston.
He[|ht e s ster These heights, at an elevation of about ninety feet, com-
manded the channel and the south-eastern side of Boston,
If occupied, with the large guns from Ticonderoga, they
made Boston and its connections with the sea untenable.
Howe knew this, and had long contemplated an attempt
to seize these heights. That he did not venture during
all the long months of the siege to put his thought into
execution shows the paralysis which had been inflicted
upon him and his troops by the losses at Bunker Hill.
The movement was carried out exactly as planned. For
March 2 two nights the batteries at Cobble Hill, Lechmere's Point
March 3 and Roxbury kept up a furious cannonade against the
March 4 British lines, and on the third night, about 8 o'clock,
Thomas moved out, occupied the Dorchester Heights, and
under protection of advanced guards sent out toward
Nook's Hill and Dorchester Point to protect him against
possible attack from Boston or Castle Island, his men
under Gridley's direction dug up the frozen ground, and
before daylight had finished two very substantial redoubts.
Howe was amazed. He wrote to Lord Dartmouth that
it must have required the work of 12,000 men (the fatigue
party in fact numbered 800), and is said to have remarked
BOSTON 19
that his whole army could not have done as much in a
month. But the forts were there, and his only alterna-
tive was to attack and capture them or to evacuate British plan
Boston. He immediately decided on the former, and as- Attack nter "
sembled 2,400 men, under Earl Percy, to embark in trans-
ports, rendezvous near Castle Island, and the next night
attack the Dorchester Heights from the east. His prep-
arations were plainly visible from the heights where
Washington had gone in person. To meet them Wash-
ington ordered a reinforcement of 2,000 men for Thomas,
and simultaneously assembled 2 brigades at Cjtmbridge,
about 2,000 men each, carefully selected, under Sullivan
and Greene, and ordered them to embark in boats which
had been previously collected in the Charles River, cross
the back bay, force their way through Boston to the works
at Boston Neck, which were too strong to be assaulted in
front, attack them from the rear, open the gates and let
in the troops from Roxbury. Jjhit a furious gale came
up during the afternoon and continued through the night
and the next day, so that neither plan could be carried March 5
out, and Percy's troops returned to Boston. Howe then Evacuation of
decided to evacuate the town. Ten days elapsed, how- Boston
ever, before the embarkation was complete^ In the
meantime, Washington kept up an almost constant can-
nonade from all his batteries, strengthened his works on
Dorchester Heights, and after several unsuccessful at- March is
tempts, finally succeeded in building batteries on the
north-eastern side of the Dorchester peninsula, and also
on Nook's Hill, nearly a mile nearer to Boston than Dor-
chester Heights. The next morning Howe completed his March i?
embarkation, and accompanied by the men-of-war his
transports dropped down to Nantasket Roads, and a
few days later sailed for Halifax. Washington's troops
20
THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1776
April 4
Results of
First Year of
the War
entered Boston by Charlestown Neck and Boston Neck
within a few hours after Howe had embarked.
Howe took away with him about 11,000 soldiers and
seamen and 1,000 loyalist refugees. He left behind a
prodigious amount of supplies and military stores of all
kinds, in excellent condition and most welcome to Wash-
ington's straitened army; he threw most of his powder
into the bay, and he abandoned 159 cannon, most of
which had been rendered useless by spiking or breaking
the trunnions. Washington's force, as shown by his
morning report of March 9, numbered 1,254 officers and
15,767 men present for duty in the infantry regiments,
640 in the artillery and 6,838 in the Massachusetts mili-
tia. He returned the militia to their homes and ordered
five regiments to march for New York the day after he
entered Boston. The rest of the army, except five regi-
ments left as a garrison under General Ward, followed as
soon as the British fleet left Nantasket Roads. Wash-
ington himself started for the same point in less than
three weeks after the evacuation.
The first year of the war (less one month) had thus
terminated. It had the same characteristics as the suc-
ceeding years. On the one side were the best regular
troops of Europe, commanded and led by generals of
wide experience and personal courage, but of not more
than average ability, well equipped and supplied from
the ample resources of a wealthy nation, whose animat-
ing motives were a sense of duty, allegiance to the king
and contempt for what they called the rustic rabble
which had broken out in rebellion. On the other side
was an irregular force, enlisted for a short period and
constantly changing, without military training or dis-
cipline, without arsenals, factories or depots of supplies,
V st.1
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From A very 's History of the United States
and Its People
ARNOLD'S MARCH
Sept. s-Nov. 13, 1775
St.Manrice ,
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12
Tlcolet
Courtesy of The Burrows Brothers Company, Publishers, Cleveland, Ohio
From A very 's History of The United States and Its People
BOSTON 21
and without money or financial credit; but animated
with a fiery passion for liberty, a profound belief in the
righteousness of their cause and a firm determination to
redress their grievances at any sacrifice; commanded by
a soldier and statesman of lofty character, inflexible in
purpose yet diplomatic in argument and free from any-
thing like intolerance, with varied military experience
and military instincts and ability of the highest order,
capable of pursuing a Fabian policy with infinite patience
so long as conditions imposed it, and then striking with
extraordinary rapidity and sagacity when the conditions
were favorable for the offensive; gaining and holding the
confidence of his followers in an almost unrivalled degree.
What one side lacked, the other possessed. The odds
were about even, and the contest was not unequal. It
took eight long years to 'decide it, of which nearly seven
were filled with active hostilities.
The operations at Boston were not the only military
events of the first year. A daring offensive campaign
had been carried on in Canada. Benedict Arnold, whose
career ended in infamy but whose military ability, en-
ergy and reckless daring cannot be denied, had written 1775
from Ticonderoga to the Continental Congress, 1 suggesting May 23
an invasion of Canada; to which Congress responded by
requesting Governor Trumbull, of Connecticut, to appoint
"a person in whom he can confide " 2 to command at
Ticonderoga, and by passing a resolution that no expedi-
1 In J. N. Arnold's Life of Benedict Arnold and in Justin H. Smith's
Arnold's March to Quebec there are voluminous references to and ex-
tracts from journals and other original documents; so that no reference is
necessary for the next six pages further than to say that the statements of
facts herein made are founded on those documents.
2 Jour. Cont. Cong., II, 74.
THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1775
June 27
July 18
July 31
Aug. 17
Arnold's Plan
Sept. 5
tion ought to be made into Canada. But shortly Con-
gress changed its mind in consequence of news that the
tory governor of New York was trying to engage the Ind-
ians in the Mohawk Valley to attack the posts on Lake
Champlain. Congress thereupon appointed Schuyler to
command the Northern army/ to take personal com-
mand at Ticonderoga and to invade Canada, if practicable
"and not disagreeable to the Canadians." Schuyler pro-
ceeded to Ticonderoga. His own colony was dilatory in
raising troops, but he found there 1,352 men, mostly
from Connecticut, under command of Colonel Hinman.
They were as deficient in every military requirement as
those at Cambridge. But Schuyler began immediately
the construction of boats and advised Washington of his
intention to cross the lake and invade Canada. Mont-
gomery reported to him as second in command, and by
the end of August the expedition was ready to start.
Meanwhile Arnold had returned to Cambridge and had
laid before Washington a plan to invade Canada by way
of the Maine wilderness and capture Quebec by surprise.
It was a most daring almost foolhardy project. Yet
it came astonishingly near to success. Arnold had learned
that in all Canada there was only one regiment, and
the greater part of this was with Governor Carleton at
or near Montreal. Quebec was entirely undefended.
Washington carefully considered the project, and finally
adopted it and gave detailed instructions for the conduct
of it. 2 A detachment was made up for Arnold of 1,050
men, infantry from New England and riflemen from
Pennsylvania and Virginia, all selected for their knowl-
edge of woodcraft, and none ordered except those who
had volunteered. Among the officers were Christopher
1 Jour. Cont Cong., II, 109. a Dawson, 113-115.
BOSTON 23
Greene, Daniel Morgan, Aaron Burr and Henry Dearborn. 1775
The expedition marched from Cambridge to Newbury- sept, n
port, there embarked in ten small transports, sailed to
the Kennebec and up that river almost to Bath, disem-
barked and, provided with 200 boats for the portages,
plunged into the wilderness.
At that date Schuyler was confined to his bed in Ticon- sept. 25
deroga with a bilious fever, but the expedition under
Montgomery, about 1,200 men and four 12-pounders, had
crossed Lake Champlain, descended the Sorel (or Richelieu) deroga
River and laid siege to St. John, a fortified town garrisoned sept, i
by a portion of the 26th Regiment under Major Preston. 1
While the siege was in progress Montgomery was rein-
forced by several hundred men from New Hampshire and
New York and by a battalion of Canadian patriots under
command of his wife's kinsman, Colonel James Living-
ston. Ethan Allen with a small force was sent to gain
recruits in Canada, and while so engaged undertook to
capture Montreal. In the skirmish which resulted, Allen
and about half his party were taken prisoners, and Allen sept. 25
himself put in irons and sent to England. A little later
another expedition was sent out which captured Fort Oct. is
Chambly, lower down on the Sorel, with its garrison of
168 men; among the spoils were six tons of powder, the
most valuable commodity on the continent. A few weeks
later St. John surrendered, with 400 regulars and 100 NOV. s
Canadians. Montgomery immediately pressed on to capture of
TIT j. i i- t_ -I-L j. j * j Montreal
Montreal, which was without defence, and was surren-
dered by a committee of its citizens; Carleton escaping NOV. 12
in a small boat on the St. Lawrence to Quebec.
On the day that St. John surrendered Arnold was about
1 See Operations in Canada. Appendix to Sparks's Letters, 1, 460-549.
This contains the official reports and correspondence of Schuyler, Arnold,
Montgomery, Wooster, Sullivan and Gates.
24 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1775 30 miles from Quebec, after a march of incredible
Arnold's hardships and hunger through 200 miles of what is still
the'wfldSSS a mountain wilderness, the best hunting ground for big
game east of the Rocky Mountains. He had sent a
oct. 13 letter to Schuyler by an Indian, but the letter was given
to Governor Carleton, who thus first learned of Arnold's
approach, and immediately began to remove all the
boats in the river so as to prevent Arnold's crossing. But
NOV. 10 Arnold pushed on and when he arrived at the river he
collected canoes and dugouts, and although delayed three
days by a severe gale and by the presence of a frigate
and a sloop of war, he succeeded in crossing on the fourth
NOV. is night; and landing at the same place where Wolfe had
landed sixteen years before, he climbed the cliffs to the
Plains of Abraham and marched toward the western
Arnold gates of the city. He had about 650 half-naked men,
the rest having perished in the wilderness; and they had
barely 400 unbroken muskets between them, and five
rounds of ammunition. Arnold promptly demanded the
surrender of the city; but he was in no condition to
enforce his demand, for the place was strongly fortified,
had an abundance of heavy guns and was garrisoned by
about 1,900 men, regulars, irregulars and seamen, who
had within ten days been gathered for its defence. Had
Arnold arrived two weeks earlier, or had his letter to
Schuyler not been delivered to Carleton, it is quite pos-
sible he would have surprised and captured the place.
Situated as he was, there was nothing to do but fall back
NOV. 19 about twenty miles, up the river, to Point aux Trembles,
and await the arrival of Montgomery, to whom he had
already written.
When Montgomery received his letter he made instant
preparation to march to his assistance. After leaving
BOSTON 25
detachments at St. John and Montreal, and sending home 1775
men whose enlistments had expired, he could only take
300 men with him, but with these he set out in transports NOV. 2*
which he had captured at Montreal, and made his way Dec. 3
down the river, joining Arnold at Point aux Trembles, Montgomery
and handing over for his ragged and half-clothed men JomsArilold
a year's supply of clothing which he had found in the
military depots at Montreal. Their combined forces
numbered less than 1,000 men, but they forthwith laid
siege to Quebec. The Canadian winter was already upon
them, and in a few weeks the enlistment of most of their
men would expire. They were more than 300 miles from
their own base of supplies. Their only chance was in
a vigorous assault. Montgomery's plan was to send
Livingston's Canadian battalion to make a feint on the
upper town while the main assaults were to be made on
the lower town by Arnold and himself; he following the
road under the cliff from Wolfe's Cove to Cape Diamond,
and Arnold coming by the St. Roque road from the
opposite direction. If they gained possession of the
lower town with all its magazines, they hoped to induce
Carleton to surrender the upper town without further
resistance.
The troops moved out at 2 o'clock on a winter morn- Dec. si
ing, the weather intensely cold and a driving snow-storm
in their faces. On reaching Cape Diamond, Montgomery
at the head of sixty men attempted to carry a stockade
with a rush. He was instantly killed, together with his Assault on
aide and ten others; the rest of his party fled. Arnold
reached the Palace Gate, on the other side of the town,
just before daybreak. He, too, led the storming party,
and fell at the first fire, severely wounded in the leg.
Had the wound only been mortal, his name would have
26
THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1775
1776
April 1
May 1
Retreat from
Quebec
May 30
June 7
gone down in history side by side with that of Wolfe
and Montgomery, instead of being forever the synonym
of treason. Morgan, with the main body, was close
behind Arnold, but in the narrow, crooked streets his
retreat was cut off and he was compelled to surrender
with 426 men. The remnants of the two columns made
their way back to camp.
Arnold was carried to a hospital, from which he directed
the command of the few hundred men still left to him, but
he wrote to Schuyler for reinforcements and he ordered
no retreat; nor did Carleton attack him while his little
band remained shivering in their camp to the west of the
city. The reinforcements arrived three months later,
and with them General Wooster, who assumed command.
A sort of siege was undertaken, but it was not effective.
He was soon superseded by General Thomas. And then
reinforcements began to arrive for the garrison the first
detachment of the British and Hessians who had just
arrived from Europe under command of Burgoyne.
Thomas raised the siege and retreated to theSorel, (Riche-
lieu), marching up its banks to Chambly, where he died of
small-pox. General Sullivan, who had already been
ordered to supersede Thomas, arrived a few days later.
Reinforcements brought his strength up to 2,500 men,
and he made an attack on Three Rivers, but was de-
feated. Sullivan's army numbered 5,000 on paper, but
less than half that number fit for duty; they were com-
pletely discouraged and demoralized, "the small-pox,
famine and disorder had rendered them almost lifeless."
Burgoyne, who had commanded in person at Three
Rivers, was daily receiving reinforcements. There was
no alternative for Sullivan but a hasty retreat, and he
brought the remnants of his force to St. John and Isle-
BOSTON 27
aux-Noix, and thence across Lake Champlain to Crown
Point, where Montgomery had set forth just ten months
before.
In the lack of proper returns and the disorder of the Results of the
retreat, it is impossible to say just how many men were S X
sent on this expedition, and how many were lost. But
it appears that from first to last not less than 8,000 men
served in Canada, and barely 3,000 returned fit for duty.
It was a bold expedition, possibly beyond the resources
of the Colonies at that period; but Washington considered
it with the utmost care, gave it his full approval and
felt confident of its success. And Montgomery and Ar-
nold showed, in its earlier stages, how apparently insur-
mountable difficulties can be overcome by a judicious
combination of skill, energy and daring. Had Mont-
gomery lived, or had Arnold been left in command when
the reinforcements came to Quebec in April, perhaps it
might have succeeded. But the generals who were sent
in succession to take command, Wooster, Thomas and
Sullivan, were none of them equal to an enterprise of this
character. 1 Had it succeeded, it would probably have
united Canada to the Thirteen Colonies, and changed the
whole course and outcome of the war.
1 See the interesting analysis of Sullivan's character in Washington's
letter of 17 June, 1776, to the President of Congress. Sparks, III, 426;
IV, 364.
CHAPTER II
NEW YORK
1776
for Carrying
on the War
THE war had begun in an attempt, from the British
British pians stand-point, to put down a local insurrection in Massa-
chusetts; but when the news of Bunker Hill and the
siege of Boston reached London, it was evident that
there were thirteen colonies to subdue, occupying more
than a thousand miles of sea-coast, and a hundred miles
or more into the interior. To carry out this subjugation
more men were needed and a more comprehensive plan
for their operation.
Parliament had provided in December, 1774, for an
army of only 18,000 men, 1 and when it met in the follow-
ing year more than two-thirds of this force was cooped
up in Boston. It now provided for 12,000 additional
seamen and an army of 55,000 men. 2 But as this largely
increased force could not be raised immediately, and as
allies were not to be had, George III and his ministers
arranged to buy soldiers for cash. Treaties were made
with the Duke of Brunswick, the Landgrave of Hesse-
Cassel and other petty German rulers by which they
undertook to furnish a large body of troops, to serve
under their own officers in America. For each soldier
killed England was to pay $35, and for each wounded,
$12; England was also to pay all expenses of every char-
acter, and in addition to pay to the Landgrave personally
$550,000 per annum, and to the other princes in propor-
1 Amer. Archives, 4, I, 1479. 2 Ibid., 4, VI, 143.
28
1776
Oct. 26
1776
Jan. 9
The Hessians
78 j^'
NEW YORK CAMPAIGN
OF 1776
o Va ! ? a * ? s
ENGUSU.gTATUTE.MILES
American Troops
American Works of Defense. * -^
British Troops
Hessian Auxiliaries.
Encampments of British Forces
Strategic movements are shown
in broken blue (American) and
red (British) lines, the direction
being indicated by arrow heads.
The dates are all of the year 1776
Courtesy of The Burrows Brothers Company,
Publishers, Cleveland, Ohio
From Avery's History of the United States
and Its People
NEW YORK
April Nov., 1776
NEW YORK 29
tion. While the employment of mercenaries was an
ancient practice, yet there were special features in these
treaties 1 which made this bargain quite unique in its
infamy and degradation. The number of such troops
sent to America was 29,867, of whom about 1,200 were
killed or mortally wounded, 6,354 died of other causes,
5,000 deserted, and 17,313 returned to their homes nearly
eight years later, 2 About 60 per cent came from Hesse,
and these mercenaries were thus known under the gen-
eral name of Hessians.
The last of the 6 treaties relating to these transactions
was ratified by Parliament and the first contingent,
numbering about 17,000 men, together with 7 British
regiments, were ready to sail early in the year, and more
were to be ready in the spring, A British regiment at Feb. 5
that time consisted of 2 battalions, 12 companies, about
50 officers and 672 men. One company in each battalion
remained at home, and a regiment took something under
600 men to America.
The preparations were thus made to send out about
20 regiments or 12,000 men from England, and 17,000 British Force
TT 1-1 i ii i ^ in j. ji j TT for the New
Hessians, which, added to the 19 regiments that Howe campaign
had at Boston and the 3 in Canada, would make a force
of about 42,000 men which was thought to be ample
for the purpose. The first detachment under Burgoyne
(who had gone to England on leave in December) ar-
rived in the St. Lawrence in April, and pushing its way
through the ice reached Quebec in time to drive back the
Americans there under Sullivan, as we have seen. 3
In preparing a plan for the operation of their troops,
the British generals were mindful of the topographical
1 Printed in full, Amer. Archiyes, 4, VI, 271-278.
2 Lowell, 20, 300. 3 Ante, p. 26.
30 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1776 features of the Atlantic seaboard, which had already
determined the line of military operations during the
wars with the French while the latter still possessed
Canada. The valley of the Hudson and the northern
lakes pierces the range of mountains which extends from
New Hampshire to Georgia, and affords a natural low-
grade line of communication from Montreal to New York.
The Hudson played the same part in the Revolution as
the Mississippi in the Civil War. If the British could
take and hold this line it would cut off New England from
the dther colonies. In the former the war had its origin
pian of and its most ardent supporters; in the latter were three-
campaign founts O f the population and the seat of government.
While New York itself did not then possess the relative
importance it now has the colony being seventh in
population and the city being exceeded in the number
of its inhabitants by Philadelphia, and almost equalled
by Boston 1 yet the harbor was unrivalled, the river
was navigable for the ships of the day almost to Albany,
and Great Britain had complete control of the sea, the
incipient American navy consisting only of a few small
privateers. Howe and Burgoyne had long resented the
humiliation of being shut up in Boston, which was not
easy of defence and whence no offensive movements could
be undertaken to advantage. They desired to transfer
the seat of war to New York, capture that city, and seize
and hold the line of the Hudson. The new campaign
was planned on that basis.
The British did not follow out this general plan, of the
soundness of which there can be no question, but allowed
themselves, as we did later in the Civil War, to be drawn
into diversions, in the hope of restoring their authority
1 A Century's Growth of Population. Census Bureau, 1909, pp. 9-11.
NEW YORK 31
in certain localities, forgetting that the way to gain solid me
results in war is to destroy the opposing army and not
merely to occupy territory. They thus planned a side side issues
issue against Charleston, in South Carolina, where Clinton
had been sent with 2,000 men from Boston and where he 1775
was to be joined by a reinforcement of 7 regiments under Dec. 16
Cornwallis, convoyed by a fleet under Admiral Parker. 1
Similarly, the imminent danger in Canada led to sending
Burgoyne to reinforce Carleton at Quebec. Clinton failed
at Charleston and then joined Howe at New York. Bur-
goyne, however, instead of reinforcing Howe and thus
concentrating a force of such strength as would crush all
opposition, moved on along an eccentric line to Montreal,
and in the following year crossed Lake Champlain to
Ticonderoga, intending thence to move down the Hudson.
He could not act in concert with Howe, being separated
from him by hundreds of miles of wilderness. The result
of acting on such widely divergent lines, instead of con-
centrating every available man at New York, was that
Burgoyne lost his entire army. ,
On his way to Charleston, Clinton had stopped at New Movement of
York, and as soon as Washington heard of this he sent Army to r _ n
Lee to collect such militia as he could in Connecticut,
New York and New Jersey and organize the defence of me
New York. 2 A resolution of Congress 4 then sent Lee to Jan. s
command the newly formed Southern Department; but
* Post, p. 184.
2 Two exhaustive monographs have been published by Prof. Henry P.
Johnston of the New York City College, one on the campaign of 1776
around New York, having special reference to the battle of Long Island, and
the other on the Battle of Harlem Heights. Like Frothingham's Boston
and Arnold's March, they are filled with references to original documents
and copies of a great many of them. These documents have been followed
in this chapter and it seems unnecessary to make specific references.
* Jour. Cont. Cong., IV, 180.
32
THE REVOLUTIONARY WAE
1776
Mar. 1
March 16 to
April 13
Lee's Plan
April 29
May 12
Fortifications
of New York
June 10
Washington soon arrived with his army, which had left
Boston as soon as Howe's fleet had sailed from Nan-
tasket Roads.
Lee had reported that the situation of New York, sur-
rounded by deep water, afforded no possibility of defence
against an enemy having complete command of the sea.
His plan of defence was to build a few small batteries at
salient points on North and East Rivers, but to concen-
trate the main defence in an intrenched camp on Brooklyn
Heights, which commanded the navigation of the East
River* Washington approved this plan, and ordered
Greene's brigade to occupy these heights and the brigades
of Heath, Spencer and Stirling to be stationed just out-
side of what then constituted the city of New York, viz.,
from the Battery to St. Paul's Church. These positions
were taken up early in May and all hands worked hard
to complete the fortifications. After deducting the 5
regiments left in Boston and 16 sent to Canada, Wash-
ington had only 19 left for New York. Their returns
showed a strength of 589 officers and 9,963 men, of whom
7,952 were present for duty. 1
The plans of the fortifications were somewhat modified
and enlarged after Washington's arrival, and their con-
struction was carried out and the guns placed in them
under direction of Colonel Henry Knox, who had been
Gridley's assistant at Boston and now commanded the
Regiment of Artillery. As finally completed the works
consisted of no less than 21 redoubts with 121 guns, one-
quarter of which were 32-pounders (the largest siege-gun
then in use) and one-half larger than 9-pounders. These
guns had come from Ticonderoga, from Boston, from the
Bahamas (where they had been captured by Commodore
Sparks, III, 493.
NEW YORK 33
Ezek Hopkins) and from the gun foundries in various me
colonies. While Congress had erroneous views about the
length of enlistment and the organization of armies, it
displayed extraordinary energy in the manufacture of
cannon, small-arms and powder.
The two works on Governor's Island and Red Hook,
with 12 guns, guarded the approach from the Bay to the
East River. A battery on Paulus Hook, with 8 guns,
was intended to protect the Jersey shore of the North
River. On Manhattan Island there were 11 redoubts,
with 79 guns, situated on slight eminences adjacent to the
water, from the vicinity of Chambers Street around the
Battery and up the East River to 86th Street opposite
Hell Gate. On Long Island, in front of Brooklyn (then a
hamlet of a dozen houses, just east of the present Borough
Hall), there were 7 redoubts, mounting 29 guns, stretching
across the ridge which extends from Greenwood Cemetery
to the Brooklyn Reservoir, and which at the point fortified
was about a mile in width between the swamps of Wall-
about Bay on the north and Gowanus Creek on the south.
The first squadron of the British fleet arrived from Arrival of the
Halifax, bringing Howe and his Boston troops; next ntis ^
came Clinton and Cornwallis, who had been defeated at
Aug. 1
Charleston ; and finally Lord Howe, the naval commander- Aug> 12
in-chief, with the Hessians, and the Household troops
from London. It was an imposing array, more than 400
transports and 32,000 soldiers the largest expedition that
England had ever sent abroad; convoyed by 10 line-
of-battle ships and 20 frigates, manned by more than
10,000 seamen, and armed with about 1,200 guns, many
of them 64-pounders and 74-pounders, which completely
outclassed the guns which had been collected with so
much difficulty by Knox.
34
THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1776
12
June 3
As the successive detachments arrived they went into
camp on Staten Island just inside the Narrows. Wash-
ington viewed their arrival with no little anxiety; which
was increased when two of the men-of-war sailed up the
North River, under a furious cannonade which failed
either to stop them or do them any serious damage.
These ships anchored in the broad Tappan Zee, forty
miles above New York, thus cutting off all communica-
tion by water with the Northern army. 1 His position
was indeed precarious. Heroic efforts had been made
to increase his force. Sullivan had brought back his
Continental regiments, or what was left of them, from
Ticonderoga, and Congress had passed a resolution call-
ing out 13,800 militia for the defence of New York. 2 By
the returns at the end of August, 3 Washington had 25
regiments of Continentals and parts of 75 regiments of
militia, with a paper strength of 33,363, of whom there
were "present fit for duty" 20,328. Opposed to these
hastily collected and untrained troops was the greater
part of the military and naval force of England, supple-
mented by all the mercenaries that it could hire.
Washington, however, did not lose confidence. He
issued an impassioned address to his troops, 4 telling them
that "the fate of unborn millions will now depend, under
God, on the courage and conduct of this army/ ' and called
Disposition of upon them to "resolve to conquer or die"; and he dis-
4.Uo m^_~ ^.i. * \
posed his troops to the best advantage^ They were di-
vided into five divisions under Putnam, Heath, Spencer,
Sullivan and Greene (all of whom were now major-gener-
als); and, as the enemy had complete command of the
1 Sparks, III, 469, 475. 2 Jour. Cant Cong., IV, 412.
3 Sparks, III, 493; Amer. Archives, 5, II, 450, 451.
4 Sparks, III, 449.
the Troops at
New York
NEW YORK 35
water and could choose Ms point of landing, three divisions me
were stationed near the southern part of Manhattan Isl-
and, one in the northern part from Fort Washington to
Kingsbridge, and one on Long Island. Greene com-
manded the latter, and for four months had not only di-
rected the construction of the redoubts, but had recon-
noitred every foot of the ground by which they could be
approached, and had compelled strict discipline and vig-
ilance on the part of his troops. Unfortunately, early in
August he succumbed to the malarial fever, with which so
many of his men were prostrated, contracted in the swamps
of Wallabout and Gowanus, adjacent to his works. He
endeavored to direct his command from his bed in camp,
but finally, a few days before the battle, he was at the
point of death, and had to be carried to a house on Man-
hattan Island. Sullivan was sent to take Greene's place, Aug. 20
and four days later, when it seemed probable that the Aug. 24
attack would be made on the Long Island side, Putnam,
the senior major-general, was sent to take command.
Neither of these officers had an opportunity to become
familiar with the situation before the attack was made.
It was made in overwhelming force. Under cover of Battle of
the navy, Howe embarked 20,000 men and 40 pieces of Long Islalld
artillery in small boats at Staten Island and landed them Aug. 22
on the beach of Gravesend Bay. It was eight miles from
the Brooklyn lines, and Washington was in no position
to prevent or hinder the movement. Howe then sent
Cornwallis with the Guards and Hessians to the hamlet
of Flatbush, just south of what is now Prospect Park,
and at the foot of a long ridge, which beginning at the
bay (near Greenwood Cemetery) extends, in a direction
north of east, through Prospect Park to the Brooklyn
Reservoir and many miles beyond. The rest of Howe's
36 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1776 troops were in rear and to the left of Cornwallis, and in
this position they remained for three days; during which
Howe received from the tory farmers of Long Island
complete information as to Washington's position. On
the other hand, Howe's inaction left Washington in doubt
whether the landing on Staten Island might not be a
feint with a part of his troops, whereas the main landing
might be on Manhattan. Washington, however, each
day sent reinforcements to Long Island, in all 10 regi-
ments, bringing the strength up to about 7,000 men, or
more than one-third of his effective force, and, as pre-
Aug. 24 viously stated, sent Putnam to assume chief command.
Aug. 25 He examined the lines in person with Putnam, and on
returning to his head-quarters wrote a sharp letter to the
latter in regard to the lack of vigilance and discipline
among the troops, but he did not give him specific instruc-
tions as to the placing of them. Washington's exact lan-
guage was as follows: 1 "I would have you form proper
lines of defence around your encampment and works on
the most advantageous ground. . . . The wood next to
Red Hook should be well attended to. ... The militia
. . . will do for the interior works, whilst your best men
should at all hazards prevent the enemy's passing the
wood and approaching your works. The woods should
be secured by abatis where necessary, to make the en-
emy's approach as difficult as possible."
It is hardly possible that Washington intended to
spread out his small force along the entire ridge, seven
miles long, from the river road to Jamaica pass. Putnam,
however, seems to have so understood it, although he
gave no definite orders to carry such a plan into effect.
Aug. 23 He appears to have acquiesced in the dispositions made
1 Sparks, IV, 63.
^^CA-^f7"''x^^l3^
nk^^fo^ift.^^' x^
Courtesy of The Burrows Brothers Company,
Publishers, Cleveland Ohio
From Avery's History of the United States
and Its People
LONG ISLAND
Aug. ay, 1776
NEW YORK 37
in Sullivan's orders; 2 regiments "to possess the Plat-
bush road/ 7 2 others "to take possession of the Bed-
ford road," and 2 others of "the road near the river."
The Jamaica pass, five miles to the east of Flatbush, was
not guarded.
Howe's plan was to make a feint along the coast road Howe's
and in front of the Flatbush pass, while a turning column f Battle
of fully half his strength was to make a night march to
the eastward and come in by the Jamaica pass, march
west by the Jamaica road and come squarely in rear of
all the American positions outside of their fortifications.
The movement was carried out in accordance with this
plan. Major-General Grant with 2 brigades, about 5,000
men, moved forward along the coast road; Lieutenant-
General de Heister with 3 brigades, about 6,000 men, Battle of
moved toward the Flatbush pass (Prospect Park); while Longlslaild
Clinton, Percy and Cornwallis with 5 brigades, about
10,000 men, made the turning movement. At 3 o'clock Aug. 2?
in the morning Grant and de Heister were skirmishing with
the American outposts and Stirling was hurried forward
with 5 regiments to meet Grant. A sharp action ensued
in the hills near what is now Greenwood Cemetery, in
which Stirling held his own against superior numbers and
inflicted on the enemy the greatest losses of the day.
As early as 9 o'clock in the morning the turning column Howe's Fiank
was squarely in his rear, and in the rear of Sullivan, who,
with 6 regiments was defending the Flatbush pass against
the feigned attack of the Hessians; and the head of the
column was nearer the fortified lines and main camp of
the Americans than either Sullivan or Stirling. This
turning column light dragoons, Guards, Highlanders, in-
fantry regiments and ten pieces of artillery, in all 10,000
men, under Clinton, Cornwallis and Percy, with Howe
38 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1776 himself in personal command had left Flatbush at 9
26 o'clock the night before, and piloted by tory guides, had
marched to the east and then to the north, and before
dawn had reached the Half Way House (Howard's Tav-
ern) on the Jamaica road on the eastern side of the
Jamaica pass (Atlantic and Vesta Avenues), about five
miles from the American fortifications. The American
army was absolutely without cavalry, and for such
scouting and outpost duty as is usually performed by
cavalry it had to rely upon small parties of officers who
owned horses. Such a party, five in number, was ob-
serving this Jamaica pass. It was surrounded and capt-
Aug. 27 ured by Clinton's dragoons about 3 o'clock in the morn-
ing. The Jamaica road (East Pulton Street) was thus
open, and after resting his troops at the pass until day-
light, Howe marched along that road, coming in the
rear, first of Sullivan and then of Stirling, without warn-
ing. One regiment was posted nearly three miles out
on Sullivan's left flank in the direction of the Jamaica
pass, but it was in the woods and not on the road, and
the British soon surrounded it and compelled the sur-
render of the colonel and most of his men, while the
others scattered and escaped. The three regiments at
the Bedford pass, about a mile to the left of Sullivan,
8.3o A. M. were next uncovered, and after a short skirmish began a
hasty retreat toward the forts. The British moved more
Aug. 27 quickly on the road than these fugitives in the woods,
and Sullivan found himself attacked by Clinton in his
rear and the Hessians in his front at the Flatbush pass
(Prospect Park). He quickly ordered a retreat, which
soon turned to a flight, and Sullivan himself was captured.
Stirling's With all this firing on his left and rear, Stirling saw that
his position was untenable. About 11 o'clock he started
NEW YORK 39
to retreat by the coast road to the Gowanus road and me
thence to the forts, but he had not gone far when he
saw that he was surrounded. On his left were the Gow-
anus marshes, supposed to be impassable, on his right
the main body of the British turning column, and squarely
in front of him was Cornwallis with the Highlanders and
the Second Battalion of the Guards. These were posted
at the Cortelyou house on the Gowanus road where it
climbs the hill skirting the Gowanus marsh (Third Street
and Fifth Avenue).
Stirling promptly decided upon a heroic measure. He Aug. 27,
took Major Gist and part of the Maryland regiment and
advanced to attack Cornwallis, ordering the rest of his five
regiments to make their escape across the swamps and
thus gain the forts. While Stirling and his handful of
men kept up a stubborn fight for half an hour, or more,
the greater part of his men did actually escape through
the swamps, with only six or eight drowned. The Mary-
landers were finally driven back and dispersed, and
Stirling himself was captured.
About this time Washington in person arrived at Cobble Arrival of
Hill, one of the forts. As soon as he heard of the action i2 a M. mgton '
he had ordered 6 regiments across from New York, but
the mischief was done long before they could arrive.
They began filing into the forts about noon, and by 2
o'clock in the afternoon the remnants of the 12 regiments
that had been in the battle had succeeded in reaching
these works. Inside the works were as many more regi-
ments which had not been engaged. Howe's troops were
fatigued with an all-night march and more or less fighting
during a considerable part of the day. He had 20,000
men, less his losses; inside the works, about a mile long,
with both flanks protected by swamps, were about 8,000
40 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
776 men, half of whom had been in action and defeated.
Should Howe assault the works? His men, it is said,
were eager for it, and in his own report Howe says it
required repeated orders to prevent it. If he succeeded
in an assault, it is difficult to see how Washington's army,
Aug. 27, with a deep river at its back, could have escaped capture
Howe'becides or dispersal. Howe says that he thought he would have
not to Assault guccee( j e( j^ but would have sustained heavy loss; and he
was satisfied that he would be able to gain the works,
almost without loss, by siege operations. 1 He therefore
did not assault.
The battle was over. On the British side it was a
Responsibility brilliant victory, skilfully planned and well executed.
tor the eat Q^ ^ American side it was a humiliating defeat. Who
was responsible for it? Volumes have been written on
this question, and it is not easy to answer it in a
sentence.
In the first place, no one exercised general command.
The part played by Putnam, the commanding general,
was insignificant. Sullivan defended the pass, where he
had gone as soon as he heard the firing, as long as it could
be defended, but Putnam had arrived and superseded
him in the chief command three days before, and it is
unjust to hold Sullivan responsible for the conduct of
the battle. 2 Stirling had five regiments and fought splen-
didly with them, and there his responsibility ended.
Putnam, in spite of his well-earned reputation for gal-
lantry at Ticonderoga, eighteen years before, and later
at Concord and Bunker Hill, did practically nothing as
a commanding general; and Washington never again
placed him in a position of high responsibility.
1 Howe's Report; Dawson, 156; Howe's Narrative, 4, 5.
2 Sparks, IV, 517, 518.
NEW YORK 41
Secondly, the American army was surprised, because 177$
it had no cavalry; and was attacked and outflanked
by an army of regular troops of nearly three times its
numbers.
Thirdly, Greene's illness was a terrible misfortune.
He knew his troops and knew the ground, and (as he
showed later on) he possessed extraordinary skill and re-
sourcefulness in similar situations.
Finally, Washington was commander-in-chief; it was
for him to give orders; he had more than once examined
the ground; and Long Island was one of the points from
which he had been expecting an attack for four months.
His letter of August 25 1 to Putnam is quite long, but it
does not give specific instructions in regard to the dis-
position of the troops. It does, however, instruct Put-
nam "at all hazards" to prevent the enemy's approach-
ing his works. Was Washington wise in allowing the
troops to remain outside of their works, in the passes
two or three miles distant where he had seen them on
his visit of the 24th? Considering the quality of his
untrained troops, who had never been in a battle in the
open, but who had shown wonderful resistance behind
trenches, it seems that he made a grave error in not keep-
ing his men in their redoubts, and repeating the per-
formance of Bunker Hill, as they probably would have
done.
Howe's report 2 gives an itemized list of his losses 63
killed, 283 wounded and 31 missing and of the prisoners
taken, 1,097 in all, including 91 officers; and there is no
sufficient ground to doubt the accuracy of his figures.
The dead and wounded Americans were practically all
1 Sparks, IV, 65.
3 Dawson, I, 148, 156; Johnston, 1776, pp. 202-206.
THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1776
Precarious
Situation on
Long Island
Aug. 28
Aug. 28
Preparations
for With-
drawal
Aug. 29
left within the British lines; their exact number is not
known. Washington reported them at " about 1,000." *
Washington may have made a mistake in accepting
battle in the open, but his next movement was an oper-
ation unsurpassed in military skill. It was no longer a
question of defending his forts on Long Island. With
their garrison demoralized by defeat there might be doubt
as to the outcome of an assault; but there was no need
for Howe to make an assault. On the afternoon follow-
ing the battle he began a siege, breaking ground for his
first parallel about 600 yards in front of Fort Putnam
(Washington Park). With complete command of the
sea and an overwhelming superiority in artillery, he could
land troops to take the works in reverse, cut off all com-
munication between New York and Long Island and
compel a surrender. Washington saw that his troops
must be withdrawn from Long Island without a mo-
ment's delay and joined to those on Manhattan; and he
acted with that extraordinary rapidity which was char-
acteristic of him in such an emergency*
The morning after the battle he brought over from New
York three regiments, one of them the "Fourteenth
Regiment of Foot" in the Continental Line, commanded
by Colonel John Glover, and made up almost entirely of
Marblehead fishermen. There were no handier men in
a boat than these in all the world; and they rendered
great service here in the next two days, as well as later
on at Trenton. Washington then sent orders to collect
all the small boats in the Harlem River and the East
River as far as Flushing. In order not to discourage
his men with notice of a retreat, he issued a general order
1 Sparks, IV, 71.
NEW YORK 43
saying that General Mercer had arrived and that he had
fresh troops from New Jersey which were expected that
afternoon; that the sick were an encumbrance to the
army and were to be removed to New York; that these
troops of Mercer's were to take the place of some of those
on Long Island; and therefore all regiments were ordered
to parade "with their arms, accoutrements and knapsacks
at 7 o'clock at the head of their encampments and there
wait for orders." Having made all his preparations,
late in the afternoon Washington called a council of war
of the eight general officers present and laid the facts
before them. 1 They unanimously advised a retreat; and
at dark it began. First the sick were carried down to
the ferry; then followed the militia; and after them the
Continental regiments. Six of the latter, specially selected
under command of MifHin, were left to man the works
until dawn. As the others reached the ferry they found The Troops
a great number of boats, of all sizes and shapes and de- m ar
scriptions, manned by the men of Glover's regiment, and
some from Colonel Hutchinson's Twenty-seventh Foot,
which came from Gloucester. General McDougall, who
had raised the first New York regiment and had lately
been made a brigadier, had charge of the embarkation;
and Washington spent the night riding along the mile or
more of road which is now Fulton Street, from the ferry
to the fortified lines, everywhere encouraging the men
and directing their movements.
It was a very dark night, with torrents of rain and a Aug. 29
north-east gale, which at first made it almost impossible
even for the Marblehead sailors to handle their boats.
Toward midnight the rain ceased and the wind sub-
sided; the crossing then went on rapidly. About 2
1 Amer. Archives, 5, 1, 1246.
44 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1776 o'clock in the morning a blunder was made which might
possibly have wrecked the whole movement. An aide-
de-camp, mistaking his orders, started Mifflin's entire
command for the ferry. Fortunately Washington met
them on the road, and led them back to the works.
Just before dawn, by good fortune, a dense fog settled
down over the river and the works. Under cover of this,
Mifflin's regiments were withdrawn without being noticed
by the British in their trenches close by. They reached
the ferry and were all carried over, Washington himself
accompanying the last of them, in the early morning.
Aug. so A more skilful operation of this kind was never con-
ducted.
Washington's The troops landed near what is now Fulton Street
in New York, and joined their comrades in the city and
' *
in New York . , , , , . ,
its suburbs. In a few days the army was reorganized
into three divisions under Putnam, Spencer and Heath,
and posted at various points along the East and Har-
lem Rivers, from the Battery to Kingsbridge, watching
keenly to see where Howe would cross. The troops were .
greatly discouraged, and the militia, as Washington said
sept. 2 in his letter to the President of Congress, were going off
"in some instances, almost by whole regiments, by half
ones and by companies at a time." * This spread dis-
affection among the Continentals, and Washington did
not hesitate to say that his condition was "still more
alarming." In the midst of his cares he found time to
write to Congress those excellent recommendations,
which will hereafter be quoted, about the formation of a
permanent, regular army. 2 He was not dismayed, nor
did he neglect any precautions. He anticipated that
Howe would move to Westchester and attack across the
1 Sparks, IV, 72. 2 Ibid., IV, 72, 80, 89.
NEW YORK 45
Harlem River, and he therefore posted nearly half of his i7?e
force in the vicinity of Kingsbridge; he ordered the
fortifications at Fort Washington to be completed, and
others to be built at Fort Lee on the opposite Jersey
shore; and he called a council of war and asked the ad- shaii
vice of his generals as to whether New York should be
evacuated. Greene, then convalescent from his fever, g ep t. ?
in a strong and ably written opinion advised that the city
be immediately evacuated and burned/ so that it should
not become a head-quarters and depot of supplies for the
British. Washington had asked the instructions of Con-
gress on this point, and they had instructed him to "have
especial care taken, in case he should find it necessary septs.
to quit New York, that no damage be done to the said
city by his troops on their leaving it; the Congress
having no doubt of being able to recover the same, though
the enemy should, for a time, obtain possession of it." 2
The other generals were divided in opinion, some being
in favor of evacuating; some of defending the city; and
some of the middle course, which was adopted, of leaving
part of the army in the city, part near Kingsbridge and
part at intermediate points. 3 Within a week Greene sept. 12
headed a petition asking for a reconsideration of the
question, and at a new council it was decided by ten to
three to evacuate immediately. 4 A considerable part of
Sparks, IV, 86.
2 Jour. Cont Cong., V, 733. The expectations of Congress were not
realized. New York was the base of operations for the British throughout
the war, and they held it until November 25, 1783. If it had been de-
stroyed in 1776, the course of the war might have been quite different. On
the other hand, the propriety of destroying a city, even to gain so great a
military advantage, might well have been questioned, but apparently it was
not. Such an act is now forbidden by the Hague Conventions of 1899
and 1907.
s Sparks, IV, 91.
4 Amer. Archives, 5, II, 326, 329.
46
THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1776
Sept. 6
British Ships
in the Bast
River
Sept. 15
British Land
at Kip's Bay
the stores had already been moved to Fort Washington
and the removal of the rest was hastened.
Meanwhile the British ships had assembled near Gov-
ernor's Island (which had been abandoned), and one of
the ships had passed up the East River without being
seriously injured, and this was soon followed by others.
Howe had spread his men along the shore of the East
River as far as Hell Gate, leisurely making his prepara-
tions to cross. The crossing was finally made on a
Sunday morning from Newtown Creek to Kip's Bay
(34th Street), the navy covering the landing with a heavy
cannonade. The Americans posted on the shore could
not stand the grape-shot. They retired, and 84 boat-
loads of Guardsmen and Hessians, with Clinton and
Cornwallis and Donop .in the lead, landed without diffi-
culty. Two brigades which were posted as a support on
Murray Hill joined in the retreat toward the Blooming-
dale road. Washington heard the cannonade and gal-
loped from his head-quarters, nearly four miles away, at
the Morris House. 1 He rushed in among the fugitives,
used strong language, drew his sword and fired his pistols
all to no purpose. He could not rally them. In the
melee he narrowly escaped capture, and some thought
that he courted death, 2 as it was with difficulty that his
staff dragged him away.
The retreat was general and speedy; it soon degen-
erated into a panic and rout, affecting even regiments
that had most distinguished themselves at Bunker Hill,
and were hereafter to show intrepid courage at Trenton
and the Brandywine. Putnam's division came up by
the road nearest the North River, and but for the patri-
otic hospitality of Mrs. Murray, who detained Howe and
1 Sparks, IV, 93. ' Ibid., IV, 95.
NEW YORK 47
his principal generals at lunch/ a large part of it would
have been captured. By nightfall the remnants of the Americans
flying army were gathered on the heights north and west
of Harlem, near what is now 130th Street and Manhattan Heights
Avenue. The losses of the day were 17 officers and 350
men. At dark, Howe's troops were posted across the Howe pursues
island from Bloomingdale (97th Street and Broadway) Bio f omSgdaie
through McGowan's Pass (Central Park), to Horn's Hook sept. 15
(86th Street and East River).
Naturally Howe was elated and Washington depressed
by the events of the day; and the spirits of the American
troops were not improved by the heavy rain as they
arrived after sunset on the heights north of the "Hollow
Way," and there bivouacked on the wet ground without
tents. But Washington arranged them in some order,
Putnam's and Spencer's division in the rear (147th Street)
and Greene's division (which had been commanded by
Heath during Greene's illness) in front (127th to 135th
Streets west of Manhattan Avenue). Before he went to
bed Washington had given orders for Colonel Khowlton
and his "Rangers" to reconnoitre in the morning, and sept, is
find out the dispositions of the enemy. These " Rangers "
were a special corps, recently organized, of five picked S an C ce nnois ~
companies from New England regiments, all good shots;
and they were to do constant scouting, in the absence of
cavalry. Their officers were splendid young fellows,
among them Nathan Hale, who at this moment was ab-
sent at his own request, working his way through Con-
necticut across to Long Island and thence to Manhattan,
seeking to gain information for Washington as to the
position and movements of Howe's troops. He was des-
tined to be hanged as a spy about a week later, and to be
1 Thacher, 60.
48 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1776 immortalized by the beautiful statue which now stands
in City HaJl Park.
Knowlton started on his reconnoissance before dawn,
crossed the "Hollow Way," climbed the Claremont Hill
(where Grant's monument stands) and moved along the
edge of the bluff for more than a mile before he met any-
thing. He then ran into the British pickets and the ad-
vance of Leslie's brigade near the Jones house (105th
Street near Riverside Drive). There was a sharp skir-
mish lasting half an hour, and then Knowlton, having
accomplished his object and developed a force greater
than his own, retreated to the "Hollow Way" (130th
Street under Riverside Drive).
Washington was up at daylight, writing to Congress 1
an account of the "disgraceful and dastardly" retreat of
the previous day, and had just finished his report when
he heard the firing. He promptly rode to the front and
there met Putnam, Greene and Reed (who had succeeded
Gates as adjutant-general a few months before). Reed
had been with Knowlton. They made their report to
Washington to the effect that the party which had fol-
lowed Knowlton as he retired did not exceed 300 men.
Washington seized the opportunity, in the hope of re-
deeming the disgrace of the previous day, and reinspiring
his discouraged men. He planned to capture this de-
tachment which was in plain view across the little valley,
sounding their bugles with the fox-hunting calls, as at
the end of a hard run. He reinforced the Rangers with
the Third Virginia regiment, just arrived from the
vicinity of Mt. Vernon, and ordered Kixowlton to try to
get in rear of the British party, while a feint was made
nearer the river by part of one of Greene's Rhode Island
1 Sparks, IV, 95.
NEW YORK 49
regiments 1 under Lieutenant-Colonel Clary. This feint i?76
had the desired effect. The British detachment came
down the Claremont Hill to meet them. Before the
Rangers could get in their rear the British began to re-
treat, followed by Clary on their front and Knowlton fir-
ing on their flank. In climbing the rocks (about 123d
Street and Morningside Park) Knowlton was instantly
killed, and Leitch, the major of the Virginia regiment, re-
ceived a wound from which he died within two weeks.
The British continued to retreat until they reached a buck- Battle of
wheat field (120th Street, between Broadway and River- s e ept. ie
side Drive), where they were reinforced and made a
stand. Washington had also sent in reinforcements, the
greater part of Greene's division, so that there were about
1,800 Americans engaged. Putnam, Greene, George Clin-
ton and Reed, were all in the action and all displayed
great courage, which animated the men. More rein-
forcements came up to the British, including the 42d
Highlanders and some of Donop's Hessians. There was
a sharp engagement in the buckwheat field lasting an
hour and a half. There were no intrenchments on either
side. It was a fight in an open, almost level, field, the
two lines being not more than a hundred yards apart.
Again the British and Hessians retreated, through an
orchard about a third of a mile in the rear, where they
made a short stand; and then finally to the vicinity of
the Jones house (105th Street), more than a mile from
the "Hollow Way," where the action had begun at 11
A. M. It was now about 3 P. M., and Howe had brought
up nearly the whole of Cornwallis's division and the
Hessians, probably 5,000 men. Washington had no
intention of bringing on a general engagement and sent
1 Sparks, IV, 98,99.
50 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1776 an aide to order a retreat. The troops inarched back to
Harlem Heights in good order and without being mo-
lested. Washington's loss was about 30 killed and 100
wounded, and Howe's 14 killed and 157 wounded.
Results of It was not a great battle; yet the numbers engaged
the Action about equal to, and the losses incurred were greater
than, those at Bennington, Stony Point, King's Moun-
tain or Cowpens. Its importance is due to the fact that
the same troops which had fled in a disgraceful panic on
the previous day at Kip's Bay recovered their courage;
drove the British and Hessian regulars before them for
more than a mile; fought them in the open at 40 yards'
range; and finally, when the object of the movement was
accomplished, retreated in good order and without mo-
lestation to their own lines. All this had a wonderful
effect in restoring the morale of the Continental army.
It completely checked Howe's advance. He made no
offensive movement for nearly four weeks, contenting
himself with fortifying the hills from Bloomingdale
through McGowan's Pass to Hell Gate, while Washing-
ton was fortifying the opposing heights north and west
of Harlem. There were three distinct lines of trenches
and redoubts, extending from the Hudson River to
the Harlem Plain, one on the present site of 147th Street,
the next at 153d Street and the third at 162d Street.
On the hill at 182d Street a large pentagonal bastioned
redoubt (Fort Washington) was constructed, the re-
mains of which are still visible. It was capable of hold-
ing 2,000 men; it was 200 feet above the water; it com-
manded a fine stretch down the river as well as across
it; and in connection with Fort Lee on the opposite
Jersey shore and a line of sunken vessels, booms and
chains in the river, it was intended to prevent the British
NEW YORK 51
men-of-war and transports from passing up the Hudson. 1776
Great was Washington's disappointment when it was
shown that these works could not effect that purpose.
Two frigates sailed up the river with a favorable breeze;
and although bombarded by the guns of the forts on both Oct. 9
sides, they passed the obstructions without serious injury.
Howe's next plan was to move past Washington's
flank & movement quite similar to that which Grant Howe's
made on a much larger scale in 1864. The lines which thfo?gh vement
Washington had built on Harlem Heights were very Westchester
strong, and they were defended by 14,750 l men, who
had shown in the engagement of September 16 that they
were still full of fight. Howe wisely decided not to
assault these works. His own lines were now strong
enough to be held by a small force, which would make
New York safe from recapture. Leaving Lord Percy's
division in these works he embarked the rest of his army
in small boats at 86th Street and moved them through
the Sound to Throg's Neck. This movement threatened oct. 12
Washington's communications, but it was not effectual.
Throg's Neck is connected with the main-land by a cause-
way and bridge crossing Westchester Creek. Washing-
ton sent a few regiments to destroy this bridge and take
position on the west side of the creek. Howe could not
have forced the crossing without great loss; he therefore
put his men in boats again and moved them across the
water to Pell's Point, 2 south of New Rochelle. Washing-
ton met this movement by extending Spencer's division oct. is
along the hills behind the Bronx, with their outposts out
on the shore of the Sound in touch with Howe's landing
parties. Three days later Washington arrived at White
1 Sparks, III, 493; Amer. Archives, 5, II, 910.
2 Howe's Report, Dawson, 185.
52
THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1776
Oct. 21
Battle of
White Plains
Oct. 28
10 A. M.
Plains/ about eight miles north of New Rochelle, with
Heath's division; and a few days afterward he was
joined by Sullivan's, Stirling's and Lee's divisions. He
then had at White Plains about 13,000 men his entire
army except about 2,000 men left at Fort Washington,
and 4,500 at and near Fort Lee, which were under
the command of Greene. 2 Howe had a slightly larger
number.
Washington selected a position near White Plains,
fortified it by two lines of intrenchments and there
awaited Howe's attack. The trenches were on slightly
rising ground, the left protected by swampy 'ground and
the right resting on the Bronx River. Beyond the right
was a piece of high ground, called Chatterton's Hill,
which commanded the plain over which Howe would
have to advance. It was occupied by Haslet's Delaware
regiment, with two guns of Captain Alexander Hamilton's
battery, and supported by McDougalFs Brigade; in all
about 1,600 men. 3
Although Howe outnumbered Washington he deemed
it unwise to attack the main position until he had gained
possession of this Chatterton's Hill. He therefore sent
Leslie with his own brigade and three regiments of Hes-
sians, about 4,000 men in all, to dislodge Haslet. They
forded the Bronx and advanced up the hill, their attack
preceded by a sharp artillery fire from thirteen guns posted
on the east side of the Bronx. Such effective resistance
was made by two excellent regiments in McDougall's
brigade and by Hamilton's two guns that the first at-
tack failed. Later it was renewed in front, while Rail,
with one of the Hessian regiments, made his way around
Sparks, IV, 524.
Dawson, 179, 184.
*Ibid.; Amer. Archives, 5, III, 663.
Courtesy of The Burrows Brothers Company,
Publishers, Cleveland, Ohio
From Avery's History of the United States
and Its People
WHITE PLAINS, Oct. aS, 1776
Movements of Nathan Hale, Sept. 10 22, 1776
NEW YORK 53
Haslet's right flank; and this attack succeeded. Me-
Dougall retreated, bringing off the guns and joined
Washington's main position. The British loss was 28
killed, and 126 wounded; 5 officers being among the killed,
and 5 among the wounded; the Hessians lost 77. 1 The
American loss was not reported in detail but was esti-
mated at less than 200.
Howe thus gained Chatterton's Hill, but he did not Oct. so
attack the main lines that day nor the next. On the third
day he was reinforced by two brigades of Percy's division,
which he had ordered up from New York; and by the
second division of Hessians under Knyphausen which had
just arrived from Europe. This brought his strength up
to about 20,000 men, and he determined to attack on the Oct. si
following day. A storm delayed the movement and, NOV. i
under cover of the storm during the next night, Wash-
ington withdrew five miles to a strong position on
the heights of North Castle. Howe did not follow
him. 2
The chief object of Howe's manoeuvre to get in rear
of Washington, and by occupying a line from Long Island
Sound to the Hudson to surround him and cut off his com-
munications with New England had thus failed. He
had, nevertheless, succeeded in dividing Washington's
small force into three bodies, one in New Jersey, at or near
Fort Lee, one on Manhattan Island, at or near Fort Wash-
ington and the third at North Castle. The main body, at
North Castle, and the most important post, at Fort
Washington, were twenty-five miles apart; and Howe
was between them. Moreover, his ships had shown that
they could ascend the river; he could obtain his sup-
1 Howe's Report, Dawson, 18^-185; Lowell, 301.
a Dawson, 186.
54 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1776 plies by water and could concentrate his troops at any
point along the river.
This faulty disposition of Washington's troops invited
disaster, which was not long in arriving. It was due to
the unanimous desire of Congress that the last remaining
point on Manhattan Island Fort Washington should
not be abandoned. Congress sent Washington resolu-
oct. 11 tions 1 to this effect, and these unfortunately influenced
the better judgment of Washington, and also of his gen-
erals.
Early in November there were in service 106 regiments,
of which about one-third were Continentals and two-thirds
militia. They numbered on paper about 2,400 officers
and 40,000 men; 3 but the "rank and file, present, fit for
duty," were only about 19,000. Gates at Ticonderoga
had about 6,000; Heath, in the Highlands, with head-
quarters at Peekskill, had about 3,000; Lee, at North
Castle, on the Croton River, had 5,000; and there were
2,700 at Fort Washington, and an equal number at Fort
Lee, both under command of Greene. Howe, with
nearly 20,000 men, was at Dobb's Ferry on the Hudson,
about midway between Lee and Greene; he had fully
10,000 more at New York and Staten Island. 3 Carleton,
with nearly 10,000 men, was at Crown Point, and had
just defeated Arnold in a spirited naval engagement on
oct. 11 Lake Champlain. 4 After that he retired to Canada and
NOV. 2 went into winter quarters.
As previously stated, when Washington withdrew from
NOV. i White Plains to North Castle, Howe did not follow him.
1 Jour. Cont Cong., VI, 866.
2 Returns of November 3, November 9, November 13. Amer. Archives,
5, III, 499, 663, 702.
8 Sparks, V, 542.
* Sparks, IV, 155; Dawson, 167-174.
NEW YORK 55
On the same day he sent a detachment from his troops
at New Rochelle to occupy the heights north of Spuyten
Duyvil; and a few days later he moved his main body NOV. 5
from White Plains to Dobb's Ferry, Washington imme-
diately saw what Howe's plan was. "That they will in-
vest Fort Washington is a matter of which there can
be no doubt. 1 ... I think it highly probable, and al-
most certain, that he will make a descent with a part of
his troops into Jersey." 2 He prepared to meet this situ-
ation as fully as the force at his disposal would permit.
Greene had written asking for instructions in regard to Oct. 31
Fort Washington, and Washington had replied leaving the
matter to Greene's discretion, only reminding him of the
previous intention to hold the fort to the last. While
Howe was transferring his base from the Sound to the
Hudson River he ordered vessels to come up to meet him
at Dobb's Ferry. A frigate and two transports broke NOV. 5
through the obstructions and passed up the river. Greene
reported this to Washington, 3 and on the same day NOV. 7
Washington advised Greene of Howe's movements, and
his interpretation of them, and said that he should prob-
ably come in person with "the troops designed for the
Jerseys." 4 When Washington, on the following day,
received Greene's report of the passage of the British
ships up the river, he began to doubt the advisability of
attempting to hold Fort Washington any longer. He
immediately wrote to Greene, 5 expressing such doubts,
and saying: "I am therefore inclined to think that it will
not be prudent to hazard the men and stores at Mount
Washington; but as you are on the spot, leave it to you
1 Sparks, IV, 163. Ibid., IV, 159.
Amer. Archives, 5, III, 556. * Ibid., 5, III, 557.
* Amer, Archives, 5, III, 602; Sparks, IV, 164.
56 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1776 to give such orders as to evacuating Mount Washington
as you judge best, and so far revoking the order given to
Colonel Magaw to defend it to the last."
Washington had by this time come to have great con-
fidence in Greene's judgment. Greene was himself the
soul of loyalty. Had Washington given him an order it
would have been promptly obeyed, whatever his own
opinion might have been. Washington not only did not
give an order, but he did not intend to give one. He in-
tended to and did advise Greene that the views he had
previously entertained and had expressed the last time
he saw Greene had been modified by subsequent events,
and without giving any positive orders he left it to
Greene's discretion to act as he thought best. Judged by
the result, Greene decided wrongly.
Oct. 11 Congress had passed urgent resolutions that the fort
Oct. 16 should be held. 1 At a council of war, where sixteen gen-
eral officers were present including every prominent
officer in the army except Greene himself, who was ab-
sent in New Jersey it was unanimously "agreed, that
Fort Washington be retained as long as possible." 2
Colonel Robert Magaw, of Pennsylvania, who commanded
in Fort Washington, and was considered one of the best
regimental commanders in the Continental service, advised
Greene that he could hold the fort until the end of the
year. 3 Greene concurred in this view, believing that the
garrison would make as vigorous a defence as at Bunker
Hill. He therefore exercised, unwisely, the discretion
vested in him by deciding not to withdraw the garrison.
NOV. 10 When Washington arrived the responsibility of de-
1 Jour. Cont. Cong., VI, 866.
2 Amer. Archives, 5, II, 1117; Sparks, IV, 155.
* Amer. Archives, 5, III, 619.
pr :
Courtesy of The Buntws Brothers Compsmv, Publishers, aet eland, Ohio
NEW YORK 57
elding the question rested on Mm. He had left White
Plains, taking Putnam and Mercer and a small body of
troops with him, had crossed the Hudson at King's Ferry NOV. 12
(Stony Point Verplanck's Point), and riding down on the
Jersey side in advance of his troops, reached Greene's NOV. 13
camp at Fort Lee. The matter was fully discussed, but,
as Greene said, "finally nothing concluded on"; 1 and as
Washington said, 2 when three years later Charles Lee
criticised his leadership, the discussion "caused that war-
fare in my mind, and hesitation, which ended in the
loss of the garrison."
Being still in doubt, two days later Washington de-
cided to cross the river and examine the position in per-
son. In company with Putnam and Greene and Mercer, NOV. ie
he was rowed across early in the morning, but just as they
landed the cannonade began, and the attack soon fol-
lowed. Greene's description is quite graphic. 3 "There
we all stood in a very awkward situation. As the dis-
position was made and the enemy advancing, we durst
not attempt to make any new disposition; indeed, we saw
nothing amiss. We all urged his excellency to come off.
I offered to stay. General Putnam did the same, and so
did General Mercer; but his excellency thought it best
for us all to come off together, which we did, about half
an hour before the enemy surrounded the fort." This
was certainly a humiliating position for the commander-
in-chief and his principal officers to be in.
The battle took place in this wise. Howe moved his LOSS of Fort
main body southward from Dobb's Ferry, and the Hes-
sians westward from New Rochelle; he formed his prin-
cipal line on the heights, north and east of Harlem River,
1 Greene to Knox, Knox, 33. 2 Sparks, VI, 329.
*Ibid., 34.
58 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1776 between the Hudson and the Bronx. In advance of
them, the Hessians occupied a position south of Harlem
River at KIngsbridge, and Cornwallis another position
(University Heights) east of the river, both of which they
fortified; while Percy brought part of his division from
MeGowan's Pass up to the "Hollow Way" (125th Street
and Manhattan Avenue). The Americans were thus
surrounded by something more than 13 ; 000 men 1 12
British and 15 Hessian regiments. Thirty flatboats were
NOV. 14 brought up the Hudson from New York, and during the
night succeeded in passing Fort Washington and through
Spuyten Duyvil into the Harlem River south of Kings-
bridge. Howe was fully posted as to the American posi-
tion by the adjutant of Magaw's regiment, 2 who had
deserted two weeks before and given Howe plans of all
the works and the strength of the garrison.
Magaw, on the American side, commanded three regi-
ments: his own and Shee's (now under Cadwalader) from
Pennsylvania, and Rawlings' of Maryland; and detach-
ments from the so-called "Pennsylvania Flying Camp/'
under Colonel Baxter, equal to about three more regi-
ments. Cadwalader was in the lines from 165th Street
south to the "Hollow Way"; Rawlings was in those on
the heights near the Hudson, south of Inwood, Baxter
at Laurel Hill (Fort George) on the Harlem, and Magaw
in Fort Washington. 3
NOV. i6, The attack began almost simultaneously on three
sides, Enyphausen and Rail leading the Hessians in two
columns against Rawlings, Cornwallis landing from the
thirty boats and scaling the heights of Fort George
against Baxter, and Percy crossing the " Hollow Way"
1 Amer. Archives, 5, III, 1058. * Lossing, II, 619.
8 Dawson, 189.
NEW YORK 59
and attacking Cadwalader. The attack was preceded and me
covered by a heavy artillery fire from the east side of the
Harlem River/ Cadwalader made only a feeble resistance
and fell back toward Fort Washington; but Rawlings de-
fended his position with great vigor, and it was only after
two hours of hard fighting and heavy losses that the
Hessians, with their enormous superiority of force, were
able to drive him back, 2 Baxter was mortally wounded,
and his men retired before Cornwallis. Learning that
Cadwalader was retreating, Howe ordered a fourth attack,
which had originally been intended as a feint, to be
made vigorously by the 42d Highlanders, crossing the
Harlem in boats and climbing a steep hill near the
Morris House (165th Street), and trying to intercept
Cadwalader. Magaw sent a detachment to oppose this,
and the Highlanders lost heavily; but they finally car-
ried the hill and captured the detachment. They were,
however, so delayed that they were unable to intercept
Cadwalader, and he succeeded in reaching Fort Wash-
ington. 3
Early in the afternoon all the Americans, more or less
demoralized, had been driven from their outlying works
into Fort Washington. After some parleying Magaw sur-
rendered the entire body to Knyphausen/
Howe at first followed up his victory with energetic NOV. is
pursuit of the troops in New Jersey. Leaving the Hes-
sians with their prisoners, he sent Cornwallis with twelve NOV. 19
regiments across the Hudson at Yonkers, and marching
down behind the Palisades he arrived in rear of Fort
Lee. Greene had detected the movement; and sending
1 Howe's Report, Dawson, 194.
* Ibid., 195; Lowell, 80-84; Eelking, 51.
3 Sparks, IV, 180. 4 Dawson, 191, 195.
60 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1776 report of it to Washington (who was at Hackensac, as-
sembling the men he had brought from North Castle)
Greene brought off the garrison of Fort Lee during the
NOV. 20 night, and reached the Hackensac bridge only a few hours
before Cornwallis. Here he was joined by Washington,
and a brief stand was made to cover the retreat of the
NOV. 23 troops at Hackensac village, behind the Passaic. Then
the retreat was continued to Newark. 1
Howe's losses at Fort Washington were 78 killed, 374
wounded and 6 missing. About three-fourths of the
losses were in the Hessian regiments under Knyphausen,
which attacked Rawlings from the north. The American
loss was 59 killed and 2,818 prisoners, of whom 96 were
wounded. Adding 105 captured at Fort Lee, the total
loss of the Americans was approximately 3,000 men.
The British chief of artillery made an itemized report
of the artillery, 2 ammunition and stores taken in the
two forts; it included 146 pieces of artillery, over 12,000
shot, shell and case, 2,800 small-arms and 400,000 musket
cartridges. The Continental treasury and the limited
resources of the Colonies in gun factories were in no con-
dition to stand such a loss.
From every point of view it was a terrible disaster.
Results of the Had Howe pursued Washington with the same relent-
less energy and well-directed skill that Grant pursued
Lee eighty-eight years later, it is hard to see how the
Continental army could have escaped destruction. Howe
had nearly 30,000 regular troops, as good as any in the
world. He had captured the city of New York and the
line of the Hudson for forty miles above it and that
comprised about all there was of the State of New York
'Sparks, IV, 187, 189. Amer. Archives, 5, III, 1058, 1059.
lourtesy of The Burrows Brothers Company,
Publishers, Cleveland, Ohio
From Avery's History of the United States
and Its People
RETREAT THROUGH NEW JERSEY
Nov. -Dec., 177,6
NEW YORK 61
at that time, the settlements around Albany being little
more than Indian trading-posts. He had complete com-
mand of the river, with over 300 transports protected by
nearly 80 vessels of war. Properly handled, these could
have prevented any of Lee's division from crossing the
Hudson to join Washington, and with their aid a com-
paratively small land force could either have captured
Heath at Peekskill and Clinton at Fort Montgomery, or
driven them away from their posts, and given Howe the
much-desired command of the Hudson to Albany. By
controlling the Hudson and remorselessly following Wash-
ington's few remaining regiments wherever they went,
and keeping the field as long as they kept it, notwith-
standing the season, he could have ended the war before
spring*
Perhaps he did not know the despondency prevailing American
on the American side. John Adams, the most important Despondency
man in Congress President of the Board of War and
member of the committee to seek aid from foreign na-
tions had gone home to spend three months with his Oct. is, 1776,
.-.,,. , , t, , to Jan. 13, 1777
family in Massachusetts. 1 Congress was ready to pass
the resolutions, which it did pass a few weeks later, 2 to NOV. 23
make Washington dictator, and adjourn to Baltimore
where there would probably have been no quorum, if
Washington had failed at Trenton. Washington him-
self wrote to Congress 3 from Newark that "the situation
of our affairs is truly critical," and to his brother, 4 a little
later: "In a word, if every nerve is not strained to recruit Dec. is
the new army with all possible expedition, I think the
game is pretty nearly up."
1 Morse, Life of John Adams, 146; Familiar Letters of John Adams, 233.
2 Jour. Cont. Cong., VI, 1027.
3 Sparks, IV, 190. 4 Ibid., IV, 231.
62
THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1778
Howe Goes
into Winter
Quarters
Dec. 20
Dec. 8
Washington
Retreats to the
Delaware
Nov. 29
Dec. 3
Howe missed his chance. Instead of driving Wash-
ington to Philadelphia and dispersing his army as its
enlistments expired, he halted Cornwallis, first at Bruns-
wick, and then at Trenton; and went into winter quar-
ters, saying (to Lord George Germain) 1 that his in-
tention did not extend beyond getting and keeping
possession of East Jersey, Instead of seizing and hold-
ing the Highlands of the Hudson he sent Sir Henry Clin-
ton, with 6,000 troops and a large part of the navy, to
Newport, intending in the spring to capture Providence
and thus penetrate into New England. 2 There was no
enemy at Newport, and the place was captured without
resistance; the advance to Providence was never made,
and the British troops which spent the next three years
at Newport made the inhabitants miserable but accom-
plished no military purpose.
Howe, having thus completed his plans for a quiet
winter, Washington, by a supreme effort of genius and
daring at Trenton, changed the whole situation. No
second opportunity like that of December, 1776, ever
came to Howe or his successor.
Washington had been only a few days at Newark when
Cornwallis appeared on the opposite side of the river;
simultaneously the Hessians crossed the Passaic above
his left flank, and it was rumored that Howe was em-
barking men for Staten Island, to turn his right by way
of Amboy. 3 Washington therefore retreated to Bruns-
wick and a few days later to Trenton, and took position
behind the Delaware, having taken the precaution to
secure all the boats on the river for 70 miles above Phil-
adelphia. 4 His force was reduced to about 3,000 men, 5
1 Amer. Archives, 5, III, 1316. 2 Sparks, IV, 220. 3 Ibid., IV, 194.
<Amer. Archives, 5, III, 1027, 1120, 1152. 6 7ta2., 5, III, 1035.
NEW YORK 63
whose enlistments would expire at the end of the month. me
With his soldierly instinct he felt sure that Howe would
pursue him with his entire force, attempt to cross the
Delaware above or below him, crush him in action and
push on to Philadelphia. So convinced was he that
Howe would adopt this plan that he wrote to Congress 1 Dec, s.
that "the object of the enemy cannot now be doubted in
the smallest degree." He therefore suggested that Phila- rec. 9
delphia should be fortified, and sent Putnam there to
take charge of the works, and Mifflin along with him to
take charge of the stores and aid in raising the militia,
with whom he had great influence. Congress, after con-
ferring with Putnam and Mifflin, passed a resolution, 2
"That the Continental general commanding at Phila-
delphia be directed to defend the same to the utmost
extremity," and adjourned, to meet later in Baltimore. Dec. 12
There was no stampede on Washington's part* What-
ever he might write privately to his brother, he showed
no lack of confidence to those around him, in his letters
to public officials and in his orders to his subordinates.
At no time in his whole career did he act with more in-
tense energy than during these three weeks in December,
writing almost daily letters 3 to the governors of States
and to Congress, suggesting measures for raising troops
and apologizing for those which he himself had taken if
they should seem to exceed his authority. "A char- tetter to
acter to lose, an estate to forfeit, the inestimable bless-
ings of liberty at stake, and a life devoted, must be my
excuse."
On leaving White Plains he had given Lee formal
and explicit orders in writing as to what Lee should
1 Sparks, IV, 206-208. 3 Jour. Cont. Cong., VI, 1026, 1027.
5 Sparks, IV, 200-264. * Ibid., IV, 235.
64 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1776 do in certain contingencies, and the most important part
NOV. 10 of these orders directed Lee, 1 in case the enemy should
cross the Hudson, to follow "with all possible despatch."
NOV. is After the loss of Fort Washington he sent orders to Lee
to bring his entire force to join him. 2 While at Newark,
Congress authorized him 3 to call upon Schuyler for the
Pennsylvania and Jersey troops, and the instant he re-
ceived the resolution he wrote to Schuyler 4 to send them.
Lee's Dilatory All of these instructions were promptly carried out ex-
cept in the case of Lee. That officer had recently re-
turned from the South, much inflated in his own estima-
tion, as well as that of more judicious men like Jay and
Duer, 5 by the victory at Charleston, the credit of which
in reality was due to Moultrie and not to himself. The
succession of disasters and retreats, from Long Island to
White Plains and from Fort Washington to Newark,
filled his traitor's mind with the thought 6 that perhaps
people could be induced to believe that Congress had
made a mistake in the selection of a commander-in-chief
sixteen months before, and that a soldier who had seen
service under the King of England, the King of Poland,
and the Empress of Russia might be selected as his suc-
cessor. He was therefore in no hurry to join Washington ;
to the latter's repeated instructions to hasten his march
he returned frivolous replies, meanwhile writing to his
friends, 7 Reed and Rush and Gates, wondering if Wash-
ington was such a great man as had been thought. Fi-
nally, however, Washington's orders became so imper-
ative that he dared not disobey, and he put his com-
mand in motion ten days after he had received the first
1 Sparks, IV, 170. *IW., IV, 186, 187, 192, 193.
5 Jour. Cont Cong., VI, 977. * Sparks, IV, 192.
5 Moore, 37. 6 Ibid., 49, 50.
7 Ibid., 38, 42; Reed, I, 255; Sparks, IV, 535.
NEW YORK 65
order. He crossed the Hudson at King's Ferry (Stony me
Point Verlpanck's Point), and had to make a d6tour by Dec. 2
way of Morristown in order to avoid Cornwallis. He
marched as slowly as possible 40 miles in 8 days and
one night, while sleeping at a tavern at Baskinridge, 3 Dec. 12
miles from his command, he was captured by Cornwallis's
dragoons and carried a prisoner to Howe. 1 The latter at capture of
first thought of treating him as a deserter from the
British army; and for this or other reasons Lee under-
took to advise Howe as to the strength and position of
the American army and the best means of compassing
its destruction. He even went so far as to hand to
Howe, in his own handwriting, a plan for the next cam-
paign, 2 which Howe put away among his papers, where
it was not discovered till nearly eighty years later.
Of all this, of course, Washington knew nothing; he
did know, although he could not account for it, that Lee
was very slow in joining him. His troops did finally
arrive under Sullivan, and Heath and Gates arrived Dec. 20
almost at the same time.
Washington seems to have had a very good service of
information; 3 for his letters show that at this time he had
learned, to his surprise, that Howe had gone into winter
quarters, instead of intending to attack him and try to
capture Philadelphia. As soon as he learned this, Wash-
ington determined on his counter-stroke. The rein-
forcements he had received had been partly counter-
balanced by expiration of enlistments and the melting
away of the militia, but he had with him now 30 small
Continental regiments, containing 4,160 men, present for
duty. They were organized into 8 brigades and 2 divi-
1 Moore, 52-59; Sparks, 530-541. * Moore, 84.
* Sparks, VI, 39, 255.
66 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1776 sions, 1 under command of Sullivan and Greene. They
were posted on the west bank of the Delaware, guarding
all the fords for 20 miles above the big bend of the river
at Bordentown. Lower down the river, at Bristol, was
Colonel John Cadwalader with a regiment of Penn-
sylvania militia. Washington's head-quarters were in
rear of the centre of his line, at a hamlet called Newtown. 2
Howe's orders 3 for winter quarters had placed 6 bri-
gades, probably 15 regiments, in Princeton and Bruns-
wick, and 6 regiments of Hessians 4 under Donop, on the
Delaware from Bordentown to Burlington, 3 of them be-
ing at Trenton under Colonel Rail. The total force was
Dec. s about 12,000 men. Cornwallis had attempted, two weeks
before, to turn Washington's left flank by crossing the
Delaware at CoryelPs Ferry, but finding no boats had
Dec. 20 given up the attempt; and when the troops went into
winter quarters had returned to New York, intending to
go to England on leave of absence until spring. He had
Dec. 23 turned over the command to Major-General Grant. 5
Washington wrote to Cadwalader at Burlington,*
Washington "Christmas day at night, one hour before day, is the
time fixed f or our attempt upon Trenton. For Heaven's
sake, keep this to yourself. ... I have ordered our men
to be provided with three days' provisions ready cooked,
with which, and their blankets, they are to march; for
if we are successful ... we may push on." Washing-
ton's plan was to cross the Delaware at McKonkey's
Ferry, nine miles above Trenton; then march down the
east bank in two columns, Sullivan's division on the river
1 Amer. Archives, 5, III, 1401; Sparks, IV, 244.
3 Sparks, IV, 232, 243.
8 Howe to Germain, Amer. Archives, 5, III, 1317.
4 Lowell, 87; Eelking, 59.
5 Amer. Archives, 5, III, 1318. 6 Sparks, IV, 24L
Courtesy of The Burrows Brothers Company. Publishers, Cleveland, Ohio
From
TRENTON AND PRINCETON
Jan. 34, 1776
NEW YORK 67
road, and Greene's division (which Washington accom- me
panied in person) on the Scotch, about two miles to the
left. The two roads entered the village of Trenton from
the south-east and north-west, and, uniting, formed its
main street. Artillery, to the number of eighteen pieces,
was distributed through the two columns. Knox was to
have charge of the crossing, and the boats were to be
manned by Glover's Marblehead regiment. "A pro-
found silence to be enjoined, and no man to quit the
ranks on the pain of death." l
The movement began soon after dark. "The floating Dec. 25
ice in the river made the labor almost incredible. How- Knox's Letter
ever, perseverance accomplished what at first seemed
impossible. About 2 o'clock the troops were all on the
Jersey side; we were then nine miles from the object.
The night was cold and stormy; it hailed with great
violence; the troops marched with the most profound
silence and good order." 2 The Hessians had duly cele-
brated Christmas and were sound asleep. The troops
"arrived by two routes at the same time, about half an
hour after daylight, within one mile of the town. The
storm continued with great violence, but was in our
backs, and consequently in the faces of the enemy.
About half a mile from the town was an advanced guard
on each road, consisting of a captain's guard. These we Battle of
forced, and entered the town with them pell-mell."
Rail and his officers were rudely awakened in the gray Dec. 26
dawn of this cheerless morning but by a distinguished
company. Washington was with the head of column,
Greene by his side, and the advance party was a company
of the Third Virginia, whose officers were Captain William
1 Washington's order of December 25, Stryker, 114.
2 Knox, 36.
68 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1776 Washington and Lieutenant James Monroe, then less
than eighteen years old, afterward President of the United
States. Knox was directing the artillery, and among its
officers was Captain Alexander Hamilton, whose twentieth
birthday would come in a few days. The artillery was
being brought into position to fire down King (now
Warren) Street, and Greene was moving his infantry
down a parallel street, and extending his right to connect
with Sullivan, who simultaneously began the attack.
The Hessians attempted to bring two guns into action,
but the Virginia company charged them and captured
the guns, both Captain Washington and Lieutenant
Monroe being badly wounded in the mSlee. 1
It had been a part of Washington's plan that Ewing,
with a small brigade of militia was to cross at Trenton
ferry, just below the village, and Cadwalader with his
Pennsylvania militia at Bristol ferry, about ten miles
lower down; but neither of them could cross on account
of the ice. The river road from Trenton to Bordentown
was thus left open, and when the Hessians turned out
into the streets in some confusion, a portion of them,
about 500 in number, who were attacked by Sullivan,
made their escape by this road. Rail tried to form the
rest in the streets at the north end of the village, but
these were commanded by artillery, and he therefore
moved out of the village to the east, intending to escape
to Princeton. The movement was detected, and Greene
quickly threw out Hand's regiment of riflemen on his
left flank as far as Assanpink Creek, cutting off all es-
cape in that direction. Rail then called upon his gren-
1 The monograph by W. S. Stryker on the Battles of Trenton and Prince-
ton is of the same character as those of Frothingham and Johnston; and
one general reference to it seems to be sufficient
NEW YORK 69
adiers to follow him in attack at the head of King Street;
but he fell mortally wounded, and the rest thereupon
surrendered. They numbered 32 officers and 886 men,
and about 30 had been killed. The American loss was
2 privates frozen to death during the night march and
2 officers and 1 private wounded. 1
Washington thought best not to push on immediately
to Princeton (as it is said Greene and Knox advised)/
but to retire to the west bank of the river with his prison-
ers, which he did the same evening. The Hessians who
had escaped to Bordentown so alarmed Donop that he
immediately retreated to Amboy, and Cadwalader, who
had succeeded in crossing at Bristol, occupied Borden- Dec, 27
town. He had with him about 1,800 militia, 3 and more
were on their way to join him from Philadelphia, where
they had been raised by the exertions of Mifflin.
The terms of enlistment of Washington's entire force Washington
expired in three days, but by promising them a bounty offensive 6
of ten dollars in addition to their regular pay he per-
suaded them to remain six weeks longer. He then wrote 4
to the commanding officer at Morristown authorizing
him to make the same arrangements with the four regi-
ments at that place, and to Heath 5 at Peekskill instructing
him to march to Morristown, as he was satisfied that Howe
would not attempt anything against the Highlands in
the dead of winter. He then made his plans to take the
offensive a most daring plan considering the weather,
his deficiency in equipment and transportation, the ab-
-sence of any cavalry in his command and the fact that
the enemy largely outnumbered him and was composed
1 Sparks, IV, 247. 2 G. W. Greene, I, 300.
3 Dawson, 204; Sparks, IV, 255. 4 Sparks, IV, 253.
*Ibid., IV, 249.
70 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1776 of regular troops. Washington recrossed the Delaware,
Dec. so the operation requiring two days, owing to the large
Dec. si masses of floating ice in the river. At the same time he
ordered Mifflin 1 and Cadwalader, whose combined forces
of militia now amounted to 3,600 men, to join him, and
he took a position on the hills behind Assanpink Creek,
just east of Trenton, facing west.
1777 Cornwallis, as soon as he heard of the affair at Trenton,
Jan. 2 abandoned his idea of a leave and hastened back to his
main command at Brunswick. 2 He immediately pushed
forward toward Trenton, and with the greater part of his
Jan. 2, force, probably 6,000 men, arrived in front of the Assan-
pink position. There was a vigorous cannonade on both
sides, but the creek was not fordable, the bridge was
well guarded and the day was near its close. Cornwallis
decided to postpone his attack until the next day, when
two brigades which were bivouacking that night on the
road between Princeton and Trenton would join him.
As in the retreat from Long Island, so now in the advance
to Princeton, Washington displayed that marvellous ce-
lerity which he always showed in a critical situation. At
dusk he sent his baggage down the river to Burlington;
large camp-fires were lighted and kept burning all night,
and by their light men could be seen working at the in-
trenchments. At midnight his entire force withdrew,
Battle of Sullivan in the lead, and making a wide detour to the
east, inarching about eleven miles during the night, early
in the morning he struck Colonel Mawhood's brigade of
three regiments, on the road just south of Princeton. 3
They had broken camp and were just starting for Tren-
jan.3 ton to join Cornwallis. Mawhood turned his leading
1 Sparks, IV, 258. 2 Howe's Report, Dawson, 210.
5 Sparks, IV, 259.
NEW YORK 71
regiment (17th) and made a violent attack upon Mer- 1777
cer's brigade, which was at the head of Sullivan's col-
umn. After the first discharge of guns on both sides
the British charged with the bayonet, and as few of Mer-
cer's men had any bayonets, they fell back in some con-
fusion. Then, as at Kip's Bay, Washington rushed into
the thick of the fight, and this time he succeeded in ral-
lying the fugitives. 1 It was a fight at very close quar-
ters for about fifteen minutes; General Mercer, Colonels
Haslet and Potter, and several other officers were killed.
Washington escaped unharmed, and bringing up Hand's
and Hitchcock's and Poor's and Patterson's and Reed's
regiments, all veterans of every engagement since Bunker
Hill, he overpowered the 17th Regiment. After losing
nearly half its strength, 2 the rest of this regiment fought
its way through to the road leading south toward
Trenton and escaped. The other two regiments, 40th
and 55th, were thus cut off from the 17th and from
their brigade commander. They made a stout resist-
ance; but Washington, bringing up his entire strength,
drove them back through the village and the college
grounds at Princeton to and across a small stream
called Millstone River. They continued their retreat to
Brunswick; while Washington after giving a few hours'
rest to his men, who had been marching and fighting for
nearly forty continuous hours, turned to the left and
marched a few miles up the river and halted for the night. 3
Cornwallis had discovered early in the morning that
Washington had evacuated his lines at Trenton, and he
turned back on the same road over which he had ad-
vanced on the previous day, and marched rapidly toward
1 Marshall, I, 132; Lossing, II, 32.
2 Howe's Report; Dawson, 211. 3 Sparks, IV, 261.
72
THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1777
Jan. 4
Jan. 7
Washington
Arrives at
Morristown
Howe
Withdraws
from New
Jersey
Princeton. Washington had not neglected to destroy
the bridges over Stony Creek and Millstone River,
and Cornwallis was delayed so long in repairing these
that the whole day was spent in covering the ten miles
to Princeton. The next day Washington marched seven-
teen miles in the direction of Morristown, crossing the
Raritan near Bound Brook, and selecting a good position
for the night in the hills near Pluckamin. Remaining
there two days, he marched to Morristown and went into
winter quarters with the troops already there, and with
Heath's troops from the Highlands and Lincoln's militia
from New England, who soon joined him. 1 Cornwallis
did not follow or molest him either at Pluckamin or
Morristown. On the contrary, Washington sent out de-
tachments which had skirmishes with convoys on the
lines of communication of both the British and Hessians,
in which they were successful. Howe was apparently so
stupefied at Washington's audacity that he withdrew
entirely from Jersey, except for a few miles along the
Raritan from Brunswick to Amboy, and made no move-
ments of any importance for nearly six months.
Washington's losses at Princeton were never accurately
reported, but they included 10 officers, most of them of
high rank, and 30 men killed, and probably 100 wounded. 2
Howe reported 3 his loss at 19 killed, 58 wounded and 1,000
missing; but of the latter about 100 were killed and 300
or more subsequently found their regiments so that his
actual loss was probably about 700, or five times as great
as Washington's.
To military students no page in history is more inter-
esting, more worthy of study in every detail, than that
1 Sparks, IV, 264, 272. 3 Dawson, 208.
3 Howe's Report, Dawson, 208; Stiyker, 458.
NEW YORK 73
which records the events of those fourteen days in Jersey, 1777
from Christinas, 1776, to Wednesday, January 7, 1777.
Washington had in very truth "snatched victory out of Results of
the jaws of defeat." The planning of such an audacious
stroke, the skill with which every feature of it was exe-
cuted with ill-trained, half-clad, and barefooted troops,
the personal gallantry of the commanding general at a
critical moment all denote the great soldier. Wash-
ington's reckless exposure in the hand-to-hand encoun-
ter on Stony Creek was on a par with that of Napoleon
at Lodi and of Skobeleff at Plevna; it was designed with
the same purpose, and it produced the same effect, of
endearing him to his men.
The astounding but well-deserved results of the whole
movement at once and forever established Washington's
reputation as a soldier. 1
1 Lossing makes the statement (II, 33) that Frederick the Great said:
"The achievements of Washington and his little band of compatriots be-
tween the 25th of December and the 4th of January, a space of ten
days, were the most brilliant of any recorded in the annals of military
achievements/* Stryker copies this (p. 464) but without giving any
authority.
There is also a mythical story, widely believed, that Frederick sent a
sword to Washington with an inscription engraved upon it, "From the old-
est soldier hi Europe to the greatest soldier in the world."
Both stories are entirely without foundation. They have been exhaust-
ively examined and disproved by the State Historian of New York (Preface
to New York and the War with Spain, 1903), Moncure D. Conway (Cen-
tury Magazine, April, 1901), Leland Ha worth (American Historical Re-
view for April, 1904, IX, 460-478), Edward J. Lowell (Hessians, 53-55).
These researches prove that Frederick, while despising his relatives for
selling their subjects "to the English as one sells cattle to be dragged to
the shambles," showed no sympathy for the Americans in their struggle,
and expressed no opinion about Washington. In a letter, dated June 23,
1777, to his brother, Prince Henry, he said, "I purpose to draw out this
negotiation [with the American agent, Arthur Lee] in order to fall in with
the side for which Fortune shall declare herself" (Amer. Hist. Rev., IX,
466).
74 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1777 Nor were the political effects less important. It not
only stopped all of Howe's operations for six months, but
it laid the foundation for the French alliance.
CHAPTER III
PHILADELPHIA
FEOM his position at Morristown, Washington threat- 1777
ened Howe's flank in case the latter moved either toward Advantages of
Philadelphia or up the Hudson. His own communica-
tions were open via Peekskill to New England and via
Trenton to Philadelphia. He continued during the winter
to send out small parties to harass the British troops on
the Raritan and prevent their obtaining supplies, so that
speedily Howe and his staff as well as his soldiers, al-
though in possession of the best harbor and one of the
largest cities on the Atlantic coast, were reduced to the
salt provisions that they obtained from England.
Washington then addressed himself to the annual task Raising*
of raising a new army, for which Congress by its resolu- ew rmy
tion 1 at Baltimore had given him practically unlimited
powers. In spite of extraordinary energy on Washing- 1776
ton's part, recruits came in slowly. The 88 battalions Dec. 27
authorized by one resolution 2 and the 16 battalions of sept. ie
infantry, 3 regiments of artillery and 3,000 light horse
authorized by another, 3 amounted in all to nearly 76,000 Dec. 2?
men. Months after these resolutions had passed Wash- 1777
ington reported to Congress 4 that his force in Jersey was March 14
less than 3,000 fit for duty, all but 981 of whom were
1 Jour. Cont Cong., VII, 1043-1046; Sparks, IV, 550.
* Jour. Cont. Cong., V, 762.
9 Jour. Cont. Cong., VII, 1043-1046; Sparks, IV, 550.
'Sparks, IV, 364.
75
76
THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1777 militia. About 1,000 at a time were being passed through
the hospitals for inoculation against small-pox, for
Washington had wisely determined that his army should
not be destroyed, as the army in Canada had practically
been, by that dreaded disease. Later on, however, the
new regiments began to come forward, and he had 43
regiments, from New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware,
May 24 Maryland and Virginia. They were organized into 10
brigades and 5 divisions, under Sullivan, Greene, Stirling,
Stephen and Lincoln. They numbered 8,378 officers
and men. 1 Other regiments, from New York and New
England, were assembled under Putnam at Peekskill,
whence they could move toward Albany or Morristown,
as circumstances might require.
The difficulty about arms, which at one time was very
serious, because the men as their enlistments expired
carried their guns home with them and refused to give
them up, had been fortunately solved by the arrival of
vessels from France bringing 23,000 muskets 2 and 1,000
barrels of powder, in addition to blankets and other
military stores.
Howe's Plans As the months wore along Washington gave incessant
thought to what Howe's plans would probably be; and
he was convinced that Howe would bring the troops from
the St. Lawrence to join him at New York, attack Wash-
ington with all his strength, and if he succeeded push on
to Philadelphia.
1776 While this was obviously the proper military plan for
NOV. so Howe to follow, yet Howe had different ideas in mind.
He conveyed these to Lord George Germain in a long
letter, which expressed the "hope of finishing the war in
one year." He assumed that the army in Canada would
1 Sparks, IV, 432; Marshall, I, 145. 2 Sparks, IV, 338, 375.
PHILADELPHIA 77
advance against Albany, and for his own troops lie pro- me
posed the following: l "1st, an offensive army of 10,000
men/' to move from Providence and attack Boston;
"2d, an offensive army of 10,000 men," to move up the
Hudson to Albany, leaving 5,000 to defend New York;
"3d, a defensive army of 8,000 men," to be stationed in
Jersey. After the movements against Boston and Albany
had succeeded the entire force was to be united in Jersey
for an attack on Philadelphia the campaign to end the
following winter in Virginia and the Carolinas. To carry
out this programme he asked for 10 additional ships of
the line, and reinforcements of 15,000 more troops, sug-
gesting that they might "be had from Russia or from
Hanover, and other German states."
A few weeks later Howe modified his views, and wrote Dec. 20
to Germain 2 saying that sentiment was changed in Penn-
sylvania, that the people were anxious for peace; he
therefore proposed to abandon the operations against
Boston and Albany; to leave 2,000 men in Newport,
4,000 men at New York, 3,000 on the Hudson, and with
his main body of 10,000 effectives to act offensively in
Jersey and take Philadelphia. Charles Lee had been a
prisoner in Howe's hands for five days prior to the date
of this despatch. Under the threat of being treated as a
deserter, he had told Howe all he knew and more. The
news of the alleged change of sentiment in Pennsylvania
quite probably came from him.
When these despatches reached London, Burgoyne was
again there on leave of absence, and he offered his advice.
His plan 3 was for a movement across Lake Champlain;
1 Howe's Narrative, 9; Amer. Archives, 5, III, 926.
2 Howe's Narrative, 10, 11; Amer. Archives, 5, III, 1317.
8 Burgoyne, Appendix, iii-xii.
78 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1777 a movement from Oswego across Oneida Lake and down
Feb. 28 the Mohawk River; and a movement up the Hudson
all three to be directed against Albany. This plan was
submitted to King George, who wrote on it an endorse-
ment in his own hand, 1 giving it his general approval;
he rejected the suggestion that the troops in Canada
might be brought to join Howe at New York, saying, "I
greatly dislike that idea"; he also said explicitly: "The
force from Canada must join him (Howe) at Albany." 2
This plan was therefore the one adopted so far as the
London authorities were concerned; Burgoyne was
selected to command the two expeditions from Canada;
March 27 and he left London, carrying a despatch to Sir Guy
Carleton, 3 the Governor of Canada, to that effect. No
definite instructions were sent to Howe, but he was in-
March o formed by a despatch, 4 which reached him before the
orders were given to Burgoyne, that it was not thought
necessary to send him so large a reinforcement as 15,000
men; that a smaller number would be sent; and no
objection was made to his plan to proceed against
Philadelphia.
Howe's despatch of December 20 (above quoted) had
stated his intention to attack Philadelphia by the direct
route through Jersey; but later he changed his mind and
April 2 devised a third plan. He outlined this in a confidential
despatch 5 to Germain, written four days after Charles Lee
had put in his hand a written memorandum of the con-
March 29 ditions as Lee thought they existed in the Central and
Southern States, and a plan of campaign based on these
1 The King's endorsement in full is given in Fonblanque's Burgoyne, 487.
3 Ibid.
$ Germain to Carleton, Burgoyne, Appendix, xii-xviL
4 Germain to Howe, Howe's Narrative, 12.
6 Howe to Germain, Ibid., 13.
PHILADELPHIA 79
assumptions. Lee argued 1 that there was a strong tory 1777
sentiment in Pennsylvania and Maryland, and that the Lee's pian
proper line of attack upon Philadelphia was by way
of the Chesapeake. While this written proposition of
Lee's, as previously stated, never came to light until
eighty years afterward, and was not referred to in any
way by Howe, it seems to have been the basis of the plan
which he adopted.
The extraordinary spectacle was thus presented of a
subordinate general going to London and getting the
King's approval to one plan of campaign; of the King's
minister sending full instructions to one general and none
to the other who was to co-operate with him; and of this
other general making his own independent plan on the
advice of a prisoner, who had turned traitor to the coun-
try whose uniform he then wore. This confusion of
plans led to the complete surrender of one British army,
and the ultimate failure of the other; it was a factor of
the highest importance in the ultimate success of the
American cause.
The military situation was, in a striking degree, similar Military situa-
to that in front of Washington eighty-five years later. Beginmn g e of
When McClellan left Johnston at Manassas and went by
a circuitous route to the Peninsula he found Johnston
facing him on his arrival; and when Howe left Washing-
ton in Jersey and travelled 400 miles to the Head of Elk
he found Washington drawn up to meet him. At the
Head of Elk, Howe was 70 miles from Philadelphia,
whereas he had been only 60 miles from it at Bruns-
wick; and the same enemy and same commander op-
posed him, after he had consumed two months of the
best season of the year in making the change. Had
1 Moore, 88-89.
80
THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1777
April 24
Raid into
Connecticut
"Washington
Moves to
Middlebrook
May 29
Howe adopted a plan similar to that of Grant's in 1864,
and insisted on the troops in Canada being sent to join
him at New York; and with the combined force of nearly
35,000 regulars had he attacked Washington's 8,000
newly raised Continentals with the same fierceness that
was shown in the Wilderness, it hardly seems possible
that Washington, fertile as he was in resources, could
have saved the Revolution from being crushed in the
spring of 1777. But, as stated on a previous page,
Howe never recovered from the mental paralysis which
he received at Bunker Hill.
While Washington was at Morristown, keenly watching
for every move of his adversary, Howe made a raid into
Connecticut. Governor Tryon (tory governor of New
York) with 2,000 men landed at Fairfield, marched up to
Danbury, destroyed a large amount of stores which the
Americans could ill afford to lose, encountered the mili-
tia under Arnold and Wooster in a sharp engagement
at Bidgefield (in which Wooster was mortally wounded)
and then returned to New York. This raid had no
effect on the campaign, and it cost the British a loss of
about 200 in killed and wounded. 1
Washington meanwhile kept his eye unceasingly on
Howe, and being more than ever convinced that the
latter would move toward Philadelphia, he broke up his
camp at Morristown and moved about twenty miles
south to the Raritan River, so as to be nearer Howe's
line of march. Here he occupied a strong position,
which Greene had selected, on the heights of Middle-
brook, just back of Bound Brook, about ten miles from
Brunswick. His right under Sullivan was sent out as
far as Princeton. Then followed two months of extremely
1 Dawson, 213-219; Sparks, IV, 404-406.
Courtesy of The Burrows Brothers Company,
Publisher*, Cleveland, Ohio
From Avery's History of the United States
and Its People
DANBURY RAID
April 25-26, 1 777
FORT WASHINGTON
Nov. 1 6, 1776
PHILADELPHIA 81
interesting manoeuvres, carried out on both sides with 1777
excellent skill. First, Howe tried to manoeuvre Wash- Howe's
ington out of the strong Middlebrook position, and get Man(Buvres
him down in the lower open country where he could at-
r June 22
tack TIJTTI to better advantage. He therefore crossed the
Raritan with about 10,000 men and placed himself be-
tween Washington and Princeton on the road to Phila-
delphia. Washington did not leave his position. He
doubted, as he wrote Schuyler, 1 whether this was "a juneie
real move toward Philadelphia"; if it should so prove,
he intended to let Howe get as far as the Delaware,
where he would meet with opposition from the militia
in his front, and then follow rapidly, cut his communica-
tions and attack his rear. Washington having correctly
interpreted Howe's first move, it failed. 2
Howe's second move was somewhat more successful. June 23
He retreated suddenly to Amboy, hoping thus to tempt HOWS second
Washington out of his strong position, and then turn aaceuvre
sharply and attack him. The bait was too tempting;
Washington sent Greene with three brigades in pur-
suit, and himself followed Greene with his entire force.
Greene did not advance more than five miles beyond
Brunswick, not wishing to get too far from the main
body, but Stirling on his left advanced almost to Staten
Island Sound. 3
Then Howe made his third manoeuvre. He had taken Howe's Third
part of his troops across to Staten Island; he now sud-
denly recrossed the Kills, drove Stirling back in some une "
confusion, and marched rapidly to Westfield, several
miles west of Railway. He was thus on Washington's
left flank, threatening his communications with the Hud-
son. He hoped that Washington would attack; but
1 Sparks, IV, 462. 2 Ibid, IV, 469. s End., IV, 470, 473.
82
THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1777
June 30
Howe Sails
for the
Chesapeake
July 7
July 21
July 24
Washington
Marches
Southward
Washington returned quickly with his whole force to the
Middlebrook lines. 1
The third manoeuvre having thus failed, Howe re-
turned to Staten Island, put his troops on board trans-
ports and men-of-war, 228 in number, and proceeded to
carry out his main purpose of transporting his army to
the south of Philadelphia.
Washington knew that the troops were on board and
that the ships had dropped down to the lower bay; 2 but
he could not learn positively that they had sailed. At
the same time came reports from Schuyler at Albany
and Putnam at Peekskill which led him to believe that
Howe intended to move up the Hudson. Burgoyne had
crossed Lake Champlain, captured Crown Point and
Ticonderoga and was advancing rapidly on Albany. It
might be that Howe would suddenly bring his ships back
from the lower bay or from outside and sail up the Hudson
to join Burgoyne at Albany. Washington therefore or-
dered Putnam to send two brigades to reinforce Schuyler,
made arrangements to collect shipping to move his own
troops up the Hudson, if necessary, and marched in that
direction himself; first to Morristown, then to Ramapo
and then to the Clove (near Haverstraw Bay), and he
sent two divisions (Sullivan's and Stirling's) to cross the
Hudson at Peekskill. After being three days in the Clove
he received positive information that Howe's fleet had
gone to sea. He rightly surmised that their destination
was the Delaware, and he promptly put his army in
motion to the southward, recalling Sullivan and Stirling
to Morristown. The new battalions had been gradually
Sparks, IV, 475.
2 Washington's despatches to the President of Congress and others de-
scribing his perplexities during these anxious seven weeks are given hi
Sparks, IV, 479-505; V, 1-44.
PHILADELPHIA 83
filling up and his force numbered now about 14,000 1777
men. 1
When Washington reached the Delaware River he juiyao
halted until he should hear of Howe's arrival in the Del-
aware Bay. News of this came the next day, and he
resumed his march to the south, pushing on himself as July si
far as Chester, to reconnoitre. There he learned that Aug. i
Howe's fleet had remained only a day in the Delaware
and had put to sea again. He halted the army in the
vicinity of Philadelphia, and ordered Sullivan's and Stir-
ling's division (which had remained at Morristown) to
march back to PeekskilL Nothing was heard of Howe's
fleet for three weeks. During this time Washington had
moved northward again to the vicinity of the Delaware;
and a council of war was unanimously of opinion that Aug. 21
Howe had gone south to Charleston, that it would be
useless to follow him there, and the army should move to
the North River, with a view possibly to its inarching to
Albany. But the next day came authentic information Aug. 22
that Howe's fleet was at anchor in the Chesapeake. 2
Washington put his troops, "harassed by marching and Washington
j. if- 99 T-xxT.-t/j.i.a Marches South
countermarching, as he wrote to Ms brother, again in through
motion to the southward; marched through Philadelphia
with colors flying and drums beating on a Sunday morn- Aug. 24
ing, exciting no little admiration and animating the
militia to turn out, and reached Wilmington the follow- Aug. 25
ing day. Taking Greene and Lafayette (who had just Howe's Army
jj? -n i. J 1 I^satHead
arrived from France, been commissioned a major-general, of E&
1 Lossing, I, 331.
2 Howe embarked his troops (18,000 in all) July 5, sailed July 23,
reached the capes of the Delaware July 30, sailed from there the same
day, passed the capes of the Chesapeake August 16, and landed at Head
of Elk August 25. Howe's Narrative, 23, 24.
8 See foot-note 2, previous page.
84: THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1777 although a few days less than twenty years old, and
joined the army) and a small escort, Washington rode
forward nearly twenty miles on a personal reconnoissance,
and from a high hill near the Head of Elk saw the British
camp. He decided to post his army behind a small creek
about eight miles south of Wilmington and accept bat-
tle. Howe, after making a feint against this position,
sept, s moved past Washington's right flank with the intention
of crossing the Brandywine, 1 seizing the high ground be-
hind the Brandywine and cutting off Washington's com-
munications with Philadelphia or forcing him to fight at
a disadvantage. But Washington promptly detected the
movement, 2 retreated to Wilmington, crossed the Brandy-
wine, and marching twelve miles up its eastern bank
sept. 10 took position at Chad's Ford. Greene with his own
division and two other brigades was in the centre, op-
posite the ford; Sullivan with his division and those of
Stirling and Stephen was posted about two miles up the
creek with instructions to guard the fords as far as the
forks of the Brandywine; and Armstrong, with the
Pennsylvania militia, guarded the fords on Greene's left.
The total force was about 11,000 men. 3
sept. 10 On the same evening Howe halted at Kenneth Square,
about eight miles south of Chad's Ford.
Howe's Plan Howe's plan for the ensuing battle was substantially
the same as at Brooklyn, and if Washington had not been
present in person, with Greene at hand to carry out his
orders, it would probably have succeeded. He directed
the Hessians to advance to Chad's Ford and make a
feint of attacking there, while the larger part of his army
under Cornwallis was to march up the Brandywine,
1 The Brandywine empties into the Delaware at Wilmington.
2 Sparks, V, 56. 8 Dawson, 278.
BRANDYVVINE
Sept. II, 1777
JB R S
EXPLANATION
s Battery 15 Chevaus de frise
22 Tbc Pearl
33 WrecB of the
Augusta
24 Battery
25 Donop's burial plar
16 The Soiwerset
17 The Roe back
11 The Experiment 18 The Iris
5 Battc y 12 British Sbijis
13 Chevaux de frise 20 "Wreck of the Merlin 26 Wbitall House
14 Passage 21 Corn wall is galley
Courtesy of The Burrows Brothers Company,
Publishers, Cleveland, Ohio
From Avery's History of the United States
and Its People
FORT MERCER, Oct. 2,2, Nov. ao, AND FORT MIFFLIN, Nov. 15, 1777
PHILADELPHIA 85
cross the stream at the forks and come down in rear of 1777
the American position. 1
Howe's army moved at daybreak. Khyphausen with sept, u
his Hessians and two British brigades, about 5,000 men
in all, marched on the direct road to Chad's Ford, arriving Battle of the
there about 10 A. M. He drove back the American out- Brandywme
posts and carried on quite an active artillery duel with
Greene's batteries posted on the heights behind the ford;
Cornwallis with the greater part of the British troops and
some Hessians, about 10,000 men all told, marched twelve
miles up the Brandywine, crossed the forks, and then
turning southward came squarely in rear of Sullivan's
division, posted behind Jones's Ford, almost without
firing a shot. 2 In the four hours which had elapsed since
Knyphausen began skirmishing at Chad's Ford, Sullivan
had received from his "light parties" and had transmitted
to Washington contradictory information concerning the
enemy's movements. The first report 3 was that a large
body of the enemy was marching to the westward a few n A. M.
miles from the Brandywine; Washington immediately
ordered Sullivan to cross the creek and attack that body
in flank, while he in person joined Greene and made
preparations to cross above Chad's Ford and cut off
Enyphausen from the rest of Howe's army. Before
these plans could be carried into effect, Sullivan received
word from a scouting party at the forks of the Bran-
dywine that there was no appearance of the enemy
in that neighborhood. He thereupon discontinued his
movement, and so reported to Washington, who coun-
1 Howe's Report, Dawson, 281.
2 Ibid., 282.
8 Sullivan was much criticised for his conduct at the Brandywine. His
defence, accompanied by copies of the reports from the " light parties," is
given in full in Sparks, V, 456-463.
86 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1777 termanded the orders to Greene. Later came a definite
2P.M. report that the British could be plainly seen forming on
Osborne's Hill, about a mile or more in rear of Sullivan
and to his right. Sullivan promptly withdrew his divi-
sion from the creek, changed front to the right and
formed line across the main road at the Birmingham
meeting-house. His troops were hardly in position when
Cornwallis attacked him with great violence. The fight-
ing around the stone meeting-house (which is still stand-
ing) was very fierce. Sullivan was greatly outnumbered,
and his three divisions in succession gave way, Stirling
making the most stubborn resistance. Finally both
were overwhelmed, and the retreat became a rout. Two
of Sullivan's aides were wounded, and Lafayette got a
bullet hole in his leg which laid him up for several weeks. 1
Washington had meanwhile received the report from
Sullivan 2 of the appearance of the British in his rear;
he ordered Greene to leave Wayne to defend Chad's
Ford, and with his other brigades (Muhlenberg ? s and
Weedon's) to go to Sullivan's assistance. Greene lost no
time, and marching his men four miles in forty-five min-
utes, 3 he formed a line in rear of Sullivan's retreating
5P.M. troops, opened his ranks to allow them to pass through
and then opposed the British with such vigor as to halt
their advance. His position was a strong one, on both
sides of a narrow pass in the road, and flanked by thick
woods. Repeated attacks were made by the British,
but they could not dislodge Mm, and Greene still held
the position when night put an end to the firing. Mean-
1 Many of the houses on the Brandywine battle-field are still standing
(1911) just as they were at the time of the battle; and the Pennsylvania
Historical Society has erected sign-posts indicating the movements of the
troops as well as the spot where Lafayette was wounded.
2 See foot note 3, previous page. s G. W. Greene, I, 449.
PHILADELPHIA 87
while, Wayne, with his small force, was unable to resist ITT?
the advance of Knyphausen; the latter had crossed
Chad's Ford as soon as Greene's main body had gone to
Sullivan's aid. Wayne effected his retreat behind the
rear of Greene's line and gained the road to Chester.
During the night Greene retreated in good order and sept. 12
without molestation. In the morning the army was as-
sembled at Chester and marched to Germantown.
The British losses were officially reported as 90 killed,
480 wounded and 6 missing. 1 The Americans left their
dead and wounded on the field, and no accurate report
of them was ever made. Their loss was estimated at 300
killed and 600 wounded. 2
In this battle Washington had about 11,000 present
and Howe between 15,000 and 18,000. 3 The disparity
in discipline, arms and equipment was even greater. It
has been often questioned whether Washington was justi-
fied in fighting a battle under these adverse conditions.
On the other hand there can be no doubt that public
opinion, in and out of Congress, imperatively demanded
it; and had Washington retreated without a battle the
effect would have been more disastrous than the defeat.
It was indeed a defeat, but Washington saved it from
being a rout.
Neither the army nor its commander was discouraged.
After giving his men only one day's rest at Germantown,
Washington boldly crossed the Schuylkill with the in-
tent of attacking Howe, who had slowly followed him.
The two armies met at Warwick Tavern, about twenty sept. 16
miles west of Philadelphia and fifteen miles from Chad's
Ford. The battle did not take place. Something hap-
1 Howe's Report, Dawson, 278.
3 Marshall's Washington, I, 158. f Lossing, II, 170, 178.
88 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1777 pened of a nature which military commanders no longer
have to take into account in making their plans. The
ammunition in Washington's army, and a large part
of that in Howe's, was totally ruined 1 by a violent rain
storm, which continued unabated during the greater
part of two days. Washington had no recourse but to
retreat across the Schuylkill near Perkiomen, where fresh
supplies could be obtained. During this retreat the so-
paoii Massacre called "Paoli massacre" occurred. Wayne's division,
which constituted the rear guard, was encamped for the
sept. 21, night at Paoli Tavern. He was attacked by three regi-
ments under General Grey, 2 who reached Wayne's camp
without firing a shot, and used the bayonet so effectively
that they claimed to have killed and wounded 300 men
and to have taken between 70 and 80 prisoners, with a
loss on their own side of only 4 killed and 4 wounded. 3
Wayne managed to extricate the rest of his division
and retreat to Chester. He was court-martialled but
acquitted/
Howe captures After this affair Howe manoeuvred against Wash-
Philadelphia -.,.-.,/,! - -.-, , ,1
ington s right flank, causing him to move farther up
the Schuylkill; and then, suddenly countermarching, he
crossed the Schuylkill. at Sweed's Ford (Norristown) and
placed himself between Washington and Philadelphia.
Washington was not in condition to give battle, and
sept. 25 Howe inarched down the Schuylkill and took possession
of Philadelphia, encamping the bulk of his troops at
Germantown. As soon as Washington had obtained
fresh ammunition he followed Howe and went into camp
1 Sparks, V, 66.
2 Great-grandfather of Earl Grey, at present (1911) Governor-General
of Canada.
5 Howe's Report, Dawson, 317*
* Sparks, V, 166; Dawson, 315.
PHILADELPHIA 89
on Skippack Creek, about twenty miles from German- 1777
town. 1
In a campaign of thirty-two days since landing at the Results of the
Head of Elk, Howe had met and defeated his enemy and ampaign
gained possession of their capital, the Congress adjourn-
ing to York. He had a superiority in numbers and im-
mense advantage in munitions and supplies. His move-
ments were well conducted, but they lacked the final
element of success; he had not destroyed his adver-
sary's army. This army, in fact, speedily came forward
to attack him, on a bold and hazardous plan, which came
surprisingly near to success.
Upon taking possession of Philadelphia, Howe posted 2 Howe's
the greater part of his army along the line of the School
House Lane, which ran through the market square of the
village of Germantown, about seven miles from Phila-
delphia. At the market it intersected the road (Ger-
mantown Avenue) which led from Philadelphia through
Chestnut Hill to the open country on the north-west, and
along which for nearly two miles stretched the ancient
village of Germantown. Howe's line was about three
miles long, his left on the Schuylkill, his centre at the
market, and his right on a small stream about a mile to
the north of the market. In front of a large part of his
line was the precipitous gorge of the Wissahickon, nearly
200 feet deep. His outposts were about two miles in ad-
vance, at the end of the village toward Chestnut Hill. His
force numbered about 9,000 men, 3 and he had 3,000 or more
in Philadelphia. The rest of his army had been detached
across the Delaware River in Jersey, and on learning this
Washington deemed the moment auspicious for attack. 4
1 Sparks, V, 73, 77; Dawson, 318. 3 Howe's Report, Dawson, 330.
3 Lossing, 11. * Sparks, V, 78.
90 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1777 His plan was somewhat similar to that which had sue-
Washington^ ceeded so well at Trenton. Leaving his camp on Skip-
pack Creek, nearly twenty miles from the Germantown
market, one column under Sullivan, consisting of his own
and Wayne's divisions flanked by Conway's brigade,
Washington's was to follow the main road and attack the British left;
pian of Attack g^^er co i umn under Greene, with his own and Stephen's
divisions flanked by McDougalFs brigade, was to make a
detour by the Lime-kiln road and strike the British right
beyond the market; the Pennsylvania militia under
Armstrong was to follow the Manatawny road, on the
ridge between the Schuylkill and Wissahickon, and cross-
ing the Wissahickon at its mouth to get in rear of the
British left; the Maryland and Jersey militia under Small-
wood and Forman were to follow the York road, a mile
or more on Greene's left, and fall upon the rear of their
right. Stirling's division formed the reserve, following
Sullivan on the main road through Chestnut Hill. Wash-
ington in person was with Sullivan's column. His entire
force, including some troops recently arrived from Peeks-
kill, numbered only 8,000 Continentals and 3,000 militia.
The four columns were to march all night on separate
roads covering a width of about seven miles, separated
by broken country and deep ravines. These columns
were to converge at daylight and simultaneously attack.
It was indeed a bold plan.
Oct. 3, Leaving their camps at dusk the night march was car-
ried out as directed, and about sunrise the next morning
Conway's brigade passed over Chestnut Hill, and drove in
the British pickets at Mount Airy. 1 These fell back on
Battle of their supports, consisting of a battalion of light infantry
and the 40th Regiment. Colonel Musgrave then placed
1 Sparks, V, 78.
PHILADELPHIA 91
five companies of the latter regiment in a strong stone 1777
house belonging to Chief- Justice Chew. 1 They barricaded
the doors, and firing through the windows they resisted
every effort to dislodge them by infantry and artillery.
They held this position throughout the entire battle.
Finding it impossible to capture this house, Sullivan
pushed on, dividing his command, his own division on the
right of the road and Wayne's on the left. The British
contested every wall and garden, but were slowly forced
back toward the market. The Pennsylvania militia, in-
stead of gaining the rear of the British left, did not cross
the Wissahickon, but contented themselves with firing a
few shots across the ravine and then retreated. Hash's
brigade from Stirling's division was then sent to protect
Sullivan's right. The Maryland and Jersey militia did
not come into action at all. 2
The battle had been in progress for about three-quarters
of an hour before Greene arrived on the left. He had a
longer road to march than Sullivan, his guide lost his
way, and when day broke there was a heavy fog which
soon became so dense that it was impossible to see more
than a few yards. 3 When he did come into action,
Stephen's division on the right of the Lime-kiln road
fired into Wayne's division, mistaking them for the enemy
in the fog. This caused confusion and led to the retreat
of both divisions, uncovering Sullivan's left and Greene's
right flank. The battle, however, continued for nearly
two hours longer; Greene fighting his way along the
Lime-kiln road and driving the British back until he
reached the market house; Sullivan doing the same on
1 This house is still standing (1911) in excellent preservation; and, I
believe, it is owned by the lineal descendants of Chief- Justice Chew.
2 Lossing, II, 111. 3 Sparks, V, 79, 83, 102; Dawson, 328, 329.
92 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1777 the right of the road from Chestnut Hill; and Maxwell's
brigade from the reserve was still firing on the Chew
house, nearly two miles behind Sullivan. Cornwallis was
hastening from Philadelphia with reinforcements; 1 Howe's
mam body had been driven through the entire length of
the village, and it is said that he was making prepara-
oct. 4, tions to retreat to Chester. 2 Then occurred one of those
panics 3 to which all armies are subject, and which are
town Fame neyer ex pi a i ne( j. Possibly it was the fog; possibly the
firing back at the Chew house which led the Americans
to think that they were surrounded; possibly it was be-
cause their ammunition was exhausted. Whatever the
cause, the retreat began suddenly at all points on their
line. Seeing this, General Grant, who commanded on
the British right, rallied his disorganized troops and made
a vigorous attack. In spite of the personal efforts of
Washington, who was again in the midst of the fight, 4 the
Americans gave way at all points and hastily retreated.
By nightfall they reached their camps on Skippack Creek.
They had saved all their artillery. Cornwallis had pur-
sued them for five miles, skirmishing with the rear guard
under Pulaski, and then abandoned the pursuit. 5
Howe reported his losses as 535 killed, wounded and
missing, of whom less than 100 were killed. The losses
on the American side were stated by the Board of War to
be 152 killed, 521 wounded and 400 missing. 6 General
Agnew on the British and General Nash on the Ameri-
can side were mortally wounded, and died a few days
later. General Stephen was tried by court-martial for
1 Howe's Report, Dawson, 330. 2 Sparks, V, 83.
8 Sparks, V, 79, 102; Dawson, 325.
4 Sullivan's letter, Sparks, V, 467.
5 Sparks, V, 80; Wayne's letter, Dawson, 329.
e Dawson, 324.
Courtesy of The Burrows Brothers Company,
Publishers, Cleveland, Ohio
From Avery's History of the United States
and Its People
GERMAN-TOWN
Oct. 4, 1777
PHILADELPHIA 93
"unofficer-like conduct" and intoxication, and was dis- 1777
missed. 1
Washington remained in the camp on Skippack Creek Oct. 29
for three weeks and then moved eastward again to the
hills near the village of Whitemarsh, about four miles
from Chestnut Hill. Howe came out to attack him, but
after an inconclusive skirmish he decided that Washing- Dec. 5
ton's position was too strong. 2 He returned to Phila- Dec.s
delphia and went into winter quarters. Soon after
Washington selected the camp at Valley Forge, twenty-
five miles up the Schuylkill from Philadelphia, and Dec. 19
moved his troops there. 3
In the meantime Howe had gained possession of the Destruction of
American forts on both sides of the Delaware near Phila-
delphia. These works consisted of one redoubt, Fort
Mifflin, on the Pennsylvania side, just below the mouth
of the Schuylkill; another, Fort Mercer, opposite to it,
at Red Bank, on the Jersey shore; and a third, at Billings-
port, about three noiles below, on the Jersey side. In
addition to the redoubts, the channels of the river were
obstructed by chevaux-de-frise. The redoubts were gar-
risoned with infantry and artillery at the time of the
battle of the Brandywine. 4 Immediately after that battle
Earl Howe, 5 commanding the British fleet in America,
sent some of his lighter vessels from the Chesapeake
around into the Delaware. In co-operation with a British
regiment sent across the river at Chester, they removed oct. e
the obstructions and captured the garrison atBillingsport. 6
The next attempt was made against Fort Mercer, and Fort Mercer
here a gallant and successful defence was made. The
1 Lossing, II, 114. 2 Dawson, 368-373.
s Sparks, 522-525. 4 Dawson, 350; Lossing, II, 85-86.
5 Brother of General Howe. 6 Earl Howe's Report, Dawson, 357.
THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1777
Oct. 22
Fort Mifflin
Nov. 10
Nov. 15
Fort Mercer
Nov. 20
garrison consisted of two Rhode Island regiments under
command of Colonel Christopher Greene. They num-
bered not more than 400 men. They were attacked by
Count Donop and 1,200 Hessians, who had crossed the
river at Gloucester (just below Camden). These made
a furious assault but were completely repulsed. Donop
was mortally wounded, 10 other officers and 140 men
were killed and wounded and about 200 were taken
prisoners. The loss in the garrison was only 14 killed and
23 wounded. 1 This brilliant defence brought the warm-
est commendations and the present of a sword from Con-
gress to Colonel Greene.
Howe next turned his attention to Fort Mifflin. It was
garrisoned by a Maryland regiment of 300 men under
Colonel Smith, afterward reinforced by 150 Pennsylvania
troops sent from Washington's camp. Instead of assault-
ing this, Howe reduced it by artillery. He erected shore
batteries with guns taken from his brother's fleet four
32-pounders, six 24-pounders and one 13-inch mortar.
With these he kept up a vigorous cannonade for an entire
day, inflicting heavy losses on the garrison. Next a
combined land and naval attack was made, the shore
batteries being reinforced by 6 men-of-war, carrying 191
guns, besides smaller vessels. The redoubt was battered
to pieces, about 250 of the garrison were killed and
wounded (Colonel Smith being among the latter) and
the rest made their escape during the night to Fort
Mercer.
Finally, Howe sent a strong force against Fort Mercer.
It was commanded by Cornwallis and numbered about
5,500 men. It crossed the Delaware at Chester and
marched up the east bank of the river. -The little gar-
1 Report of Colonel Greene, Dawson, 355; Howe's report, Dawson, 356.
PHILADELPHIA 95
rison was unable to cope with an opposing force of this 1777
magnitude and evacuated the fort. 1 Cornwallis took
possession and dismantled it. Washington heard of this
movement and immediately detached Greene 2 with his
division to cross the river at Burlington and inarch down
to the relief of Fort Mercer; but it was too late. The fort
had been evacuated the day Greene left Whitemarsh.
After some unimportant manoeuvring by Greene and
Cornwallis, both returned to their respective camps. 3
Howe was thus in possession of Philadelphia and in
undisputed communication with his brother's fleet. His
army remained there for seven months, absolutely inac- NOV., 1777, to
tive, gradually deteriorating in discipline, its officers Junetl77S
engaged in the Mischianza and other foolish gayeties.
Meanwhile Washington and his half-clad soldiers were
shivering and almost starving at Valley Forge.
1 Washington's, Howe's and Earl Howe's Reports, Dawson, 364-367.
3 Sparks, V, 167.
1 G. W. Greene, I, 518-533.
CHAPTER IV
THE HUDSON
1776 WHILE Howe had been carrying on his Philadelphia
origin of the campaign, Burgoyne had advanced from Canada along
the line of the Hudson, and had surrendered his entire
army at Saratoga.
The circumstances under which this campaign origi-
nated, and the lack of co-operation between Howe and
Burgoyne, have already been explained. 1 Briefly, Bur-
goyne's plan contemplated a movement of tories and
Indians from Oswego down the Mohawk Valley, and an
advance of British regulars and Hessians from Montreal
through Lake Champlain and the upper Hudson both
to unite at Albany, where Howe was to join him from
New York. 2 No instructions having been sent to Howe, 3
that part of the plan disappeared; the other two move-
ments were undertaken.
1777 The force detailed to Burgoyne consisted of 3 British
July i brigades, 3 Hessian brigades, 38 pieces of light artillery
and 10 pieces of siege artillery. They numbered 7,213
rank and file. In addition there were 250 Canadians
and 400 Indians; so that, counting the officers, Burgoyne
had something over 8,000 men. The expedition from
Oswego was commanded by Colonel St. Leger, and con-
sisted of 900 Indians and 700 white men; the latter made
1 Pp. 77-79, ante.
3 Burgoyne, Appendix IV, 13. s P. 78, ante.
96
Courtesy of The Burrows Brothers Company, Publishers, Cleveland, Ohio
From Avery's History of the United States and Its People
18
ARNOLD'S NAVAL ENGAGEMENT
Oct. 11-13, 1776
THE HUDSON 97
up of tories under Sir John Johnson, and detachments
from two regular regiments. 1
On the American side, the " Northern Department" situation on
was still under the command of Schuyler. When Sullivan ^ e Amerlcan
retreated from Montreal in the summer of 1776, Congress
passed a resolution 2 directing Washington to send Gates
to take command of the American forces in Canada. By
the time Gates arrived the American forces were no June 17
longer in Canada, but had been driven back to Crown
Point and Ticonderoga. Gates interpreted his instruc-
tions to give him independent command of the troops in
the field, leaving Schuyler the nominal command of the
department, but without any real authority. Schuyler
submitted the question to Washington, asking the de-
cision of Congress; and Congress decided that Gates was Relations be-
not to be independent of Schuyler. 3 But their respective
functions were never clearly defined, and much friction
resulted.
There were no military movements in the Northern
Department after Gates's arrival, except Arnold's brilliant
naval battle on Lake Champlain, which, although fought Oct. n
by the army, was a naval engagement. When Washing- Oct. is
ton was hard pressed in New Jersey, Gates was ordered/
with seven regiments, to join him; but on his arrival he Dec. 20
pleaded ill health and received leave to go to Philadelphia.
He thus was not present at Trenton or Princeton, but
spent the next few months in consultation with Congress.
1 Burgoyne, 12-17; Appendix XI, 51.
In 1780 Burgoyne defended himself before a committee of Parliament,
and published a book entitled A State of the Expedition from Canada.
It consisted of his narrative, the evidence and an appendix containing
the official orders, reports, correspondence and returns.
3 Jour. Cont. Cong., V, 448.
!&., V, 526.
4 Sparks, IV, 192,216,222.
98 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1777 That body passed a resolution 1 desiring him to resume
Feb. 20 the duties of adjutant-general, and when Washington
heard of this he urged him to accept. 2 While Gates was
March 25 considering the matter Congress passed another resolu-
tion 3 directing him "immediately to repair to Ticonderoga
and take command of the army there."
March is Congress meanwhile had passed a resolution 4 severely
reprimanding Schuyler on account of a respectful letter
which he had written to it concerning matters affecting
the discipline of his troops. He determined to proceed
to Philadelphia, settle his accounts and retire from the
service. The New England delegation had been at all
times opposed to him; the New England troops had ex-
pressed an unwillingness to serve under him on account
of the controversy between New York and New Hamp-
shire over the territory which became the State of Ver-
mont; he had been criticised and held responsible for
the failure of the expedition to Quebec; he was denounced
as an aristocrat and his loyalty to the United States was
questioned. 5 Twice before he had advised Washington of
his intention to resign, 8 but had yielded to Washington's
urgent entreaty to remain in service. 7 He was now con-
vinced that Congress desired to displace him and that
his opportunity for usefulness was gone.
Aprfl But on arriving in Philadelphia and presenting his
memorial to Congress he was favorably received, was
put in command of the troops there in place of Putnam,
who had just been ordered to Peekskill, his accounts
May 15 were speedily settled, and the Board of War made a re-
1 Jour. Cont Cong., VII, 136. 2 Sparks, IV, 355,
8 Jour. Cont Cong., VII, 202. Ibid.; VH, 180.
5 Sparks, III, 243, 535-540; Irving, 217.
Sparks, Letters, I, 109, 287.
7 Sparks, III, 191, 209, 243.
THE HUDSON 99
port recommending that he be directed to take command 1777
of the Northern Department, and that Gates be offered
his choice of resuming the duties of adjutant-general or
of serving under Schuyler. 1 Congress adopted the first
part of the report, passed a resolution defining the limits May 22
of the Northern Department (including Ticonderoga),
assigning Schuyler to the command of it, and repealing
the resolution adopted two years before by which his
head-quarters were established at Albany. 2
Gates did not accept either of the appointments sug-
gested by the Board of War. He was unwilling to serve
under Schuyler, and obtained leave to withdraw from juneo
the Northern Department, and proceeded to Philadelphia, juiy &
where he continued his intrigues with Congress until that
body passed a resolution directing Him "to repair to
head-quarters and follow the directions of General Wash- Aprfl i
ington." St. Clair, meanwhile, had been selected for Aprs 29
service at Ticonderoga and directed to proceed there
forthwith.
After the loss of Ticonderoga (as related hereafter),
Schuyler again fell under the ban of Congress, and a reso-
lution was passed directing him to report at head-quarters, Aug. i
and Washington to select another officer to command his
department. Simultaneously the New England delega-
tion, headed by John and Samuel Adams, sent a letter
to Washington extolling the merits of Gates and asking
that he be appointed in Schuyler's place. But Washing-
ton wrote to Congress asking to be excused from making
the appointment and suggesting that Congress make its
own selection. Congress then, "by the vote of eleven Aug. 4
States," elected Gates "to command the Northern army." Aug. 19
1 Jour. Cent. Cong., VII, 300, 336, 349, 364.
*Ibid., VIII, 375.
100 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1777 He arrived at the mouth of the Mohawk three days after
the victorious battle of Bennington and relieved Schuyler
of his command. 1
These events have been related in detail because they
were so scandalous, and had such an important relation
to the military operations in the North, to the effort to
displace Washington during the following winter, and to
the subsequent appointment of Gates to command the
Southern army where his career came to an inglorious
end.
The force which Schuyler had at his disposal to oppose
rce the advance of Burgoyne against Ticonderoga and St.
Leger against Stanwix was very small. St. Glair, who
commanded at Ticonderoga, had 2,546 2 Continentals and
900 militia. Outside of this, there were only small de-
tachments of militia at Skenesborough (now Whitehall),
Fort Ann, Fort Edward and Albany.
May 6 Burgoyne had arrived at Quebec as soon as the ice was
Burgoyne out of the St. Lawrence. Sir Guy Carleton, the Governor
of Canada, although practically superseded by Burgoyne,
rendered him every assistance. Burgoyne went on to
Montreal and there found his troops, an enormous train
of siege artillery (in addition to that previously men-
tioned) and an ample fleet to convey his force across
June 20 Lake Champlain. 1 Everything was speedily assembled
June 27 at Cumberland Point (Plattsburg), and a week later he
landed at Crown Point. 3
Topography at Ticonderoga played such an important part in the
icon eroga jj^^k an( j i nc iian wars, the Revolution and the War of
1812, and will have such an essential part should we
ever, unfortunately, be again involved in hostilities with
1 Jour. Cont. Cong., VIII, 540; VII, 217; VIII, 596, 604; Sparks, V, 14.
3 Camngton, 311; Dawson, 231. 3 Burgoyne, 9-11.
THE HUDSON 101
Great Britain or Canada, that it may be well to describe 1777
somewhat in detail the topographical features which
create such importance. From Montreal to New York
the distance (by rail) is 384 miles; and paralleling the
rail and other roads is a navigable water route for the
greater part of the distance 149 miles from New York
to Troy and 147 miles from Whitehall to St. Johns.
Between Troy and Whitehall, the valley of the Hudson
is followed for 49 miles to Fort Edward; thence to White-
hall, 22 miles, there are two low valleys (through which
the Champlain canal has been constructed), the one lead-
ing out of the Hudson and the other into Lake Cham-
plain at Whitehall; and the highest point of the land
between them is only 147 feet above sea level.
This long, narrow depression, between the St. Law-
rence and Sandy Hook, is flanked (in its northern half) by
mountains rising to a height of 2,500 feet or more the
Green Mountains of Vermont on the east and the Adiron-
dacks on the west. It has been a natural highway for
the early explorers, for the Indians, for military opera-
tions and for commerce; it has rare scenic beauty.
For more than 20 miles at its southern end, Lake
Champlain has a width of half a mile or less, and lofty,
rugged hills rise on either side from the water's edge.
Then, as it widens and comes into a more open country,
it passes between two mountains, Mount Independence
on the east and Mount Defiance on the west, which over-
look the country for a long distance to the north; and at
this same point it meets the outlet of Lake George, which
discharges its water through a narrow gorge about 3
miles long, in which there is a drop of about 220 feet.
The surrounding hills are now and always have been
densely wooded.
102
THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1777
Previous
Operations at
Ticonderoga
St. dair's
Garrison
Through this gateway the Colonial militia attempted,
without success, to force their way in their first encounter
with the French in 1690. The French then built a stone
fort on the point at the edge of the lake, just north of
Mount Defiance and Mount Independence, which they
named Fort Carillon. In 1758 Montcalm and Levis sup-
plemented this by intrenchments of wood and earth, with
entanglements of felled timber in front. Against these
Abercrombey hurled 15,000 men in a murderous assault,
losing nearly 2,000 the bloodiest battle ever fought on
this continent prior to the Civil War. In the following
year Amherst attacked it in a more rational manner, by
siege operations; and the French, being largely outnum-
bered, blew up the stone fort and abandoned it. The
English partially rebuilt the ruin and named it Fort
Ticonderoga. They maintained a garrison there until it
was taken by Ethan Allen and Benedict Arnold in 1775,
as we have seen. It was the starting-point of Mont-
gomery's expedition to Quebec in that year, and the rally-
ing-point of Sullivan's retreat in the following year.
During the winter and spring its works had been some-
what strengthened and new works had been built on
Mount Independence. To man them properly a garrison
of 10,000 men was required. St. Clair was authorized
to call on the neighboring States for militia, and could
have raised them if he had had provisions. 1 But his sup-
plies were insufficient for the men he had; and Burgoyne's
advance thus found him with a garrison of barely 3,500
of whom one-third were militia.
They were posted partly at Fort Ticonderoga and
partly in the trenches and works on the sides and summit
of Mount Independence. A bridge had been built across
1 St. Glair's narrative, 240-250.
i Stone Redoubt
z Block Houses
3 French Redoubt
4 Breast Works
5 Redoubts
6 Old French Lines
7 Additions to old lines
8 Block House burnt
by British
9 Barbel Battery
10 Proposed Lines
21 Batteries
12 Pickets /
TlCONDEROGA
July 6, 1 777
upoi
B - Detachment under Earl of Balcarres
C - American Position after Gen. Riedesel arrived
D - British Position after the action
E - House in which wounded were cared for
c=i American Forces
crs ma British Forces ssz ^ German Auxiliaries
HUBBARDTOWN
July 7, 1777
Courtesy of The Burrows Brothers Company,
Publishers, Cleveland, Ohio
From Avery's History of the United States
and Its People
BENNINGTON
Aug. 1 6, 1777
THE HUDSON 103
the lake at this point. The commanding hills of Mount 1777
Hope, on the north-west, and Mount Defiance, on the
south-west, were not occupied, because the force was
insufficient and because Mount Defiance was believed to
be inaccessible.
Burgoyne's journal * shows that after remaining three
days at Crown Point, to bring up the rear of his army, AfiTance
he advanced in two columns; Eraser's brigade, of about June3
3,000 men and 10 guns, on the west side of the lake, and
a Hessian detachment on the east; with the main army
behind them on both shores and on frigates and gun-boats
in the lake. Two days later, Phillips's brigade seized
Mount Hope, which commanded the outlet of Lake
George, and thus cut off St. Clair from all communica-
tion in that direction. 2 The artillery was then landed juiys
and a reconnoissance was made to the top of Mount
Defiance, which was found not to be inaccessible. The
British dragged their artillery to its summit, which com-
manded within easy range the fortifications not only at
Ticonderoga but also at Mount Independence. As soon
as these guns were discovered St. Clair called a council
of war 3 of his principal officers, and they unanimously juiy s
decided that the position was untenable, that Ticonderoga
should be evacuated that night, taking the cannon and
stores to Mount Independence if possible, and that an
immediate retreat should be made from Mount Inde- Evacuation of
pendence to Skenesborough (Whitehall). The heavy ar- lc n eroga
tillery 128 pieces was abandoned; a few lighter pieces
with some provisions and stores were placed on boats
with Long's regiment and sent up the lake to Skenes-
borough, while the rest of the force, under St. Clair, un-
1 Burgoyne, 11, Appendix XXV.
2 Ibid., XXVII. 3 Dawson, 231.
104
THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1777
July 6
July?
Battle of
Eubbardton
Engagement
at Skenes-
borough
July 6
dertook to march to the same point, following a cir-
cuitous route of about 45 miles through Hubbardton
and Castleton, there being no road through the rough
country adjacent to the lake. St. Clair reached Castle-
ton the next evening, but the rear guard, consisting of
Warner's and Francis's regiments, with the stragglers
and infirm about 1,200 men in all was then about six
miles behind, at Hubbardton. 1 Here they were over-
taken in the morning by Fraser's brigade, which had
marched nearly all night. He made a most vigorous
attack, and was soon reinforced by the advance guard of
the Hessians under Riedesel. 2 Warner was defeated,
Francis was killed, their retreat to Castleton was cut off,
and their men dispersed through the mountains to the
eastward. 3 Their losses were never accurately known.
Burgoyne claimed that 200 dead were left on the field
and 600 wounded; 4 Gordon says the total loss was 324,
but does not give his authority. He gives the British
loss as 20 officers and 183 killed and wounded. 5
Meanwhile, Burgoyne in person had pursued Long up
the lake. As soon as the retreat was discovered the naval
vessels had pushed forward and cut a passage through
the bridge, and by 3 o'clock in the afternoon, Burgoyne,
with two frigates and several gun-boats, carrying three
regiments of infantry, arrived in the vicinity of Skenesbor-
ough. 6 The Americans were in a stockaded fort; the
British regiments landed and climbed the adjacent hills
with the intention of getting in rear of the fort and cutting
1 St. Glair's Report, Dawson, 229.
2 Burgoyne, Appendix XXX; Riedesel, I, 363.
8 St Glair's Report, Dawson, 229.
4 Burgoyne's Report, Dawson, 234; Riedesel, I, 363.
fi Gordon, II, 484; Riedesel, I, 363; Burgoyne, Appendix XXXIII.
6 Burgoyne, Appendix XXX; Riedesel, I, 362.
THE HUDSON 105
off the retreat. But before this could be accomplished 1777
the fort and the boats near by in the river were set on fire,
and Long and his men hastily retreated up the valley of
Wood Creek to Fort Ann. Here he was overtaken the Engagement
next morning by the 9th British Regiment, with the at Fort Ann
two other regiments of Phillips's brigade only a short
distance back. Long attacked the 9th Regiment and a
sharp engagement took place, but when the two other
regiments came up he was forced to retire. After setting
fire to Fort Ann he retreated to Fort Edward.
Hearing that Skenesborough was occupied, St. Glair
was forced to retreat from Castleton eastward to Rutland,
and after a painful and circuitous march of seven days
he joined Schuyler at Fort Edward. The remnants of juiyi2
Warner's men remained in the vicinity of Rutland. 1
Burgoyne's campaign thus began with a brilliant vic-
tory. The loss of Ticonderoga created consternation in
Congress and throughout the Colonies. Washington was
then in the vicinity of Ramapo, baffled by conflicting
reports of Howe's movements, and heard the news by
successive reports received from Schuyler at Fort Ed-
ward. He immediately bent every energy to reinforce
Schuyler. He sent Morgan's Virginia riflemen from his
own army, and directed Putnam to send him two brigades
(Nixon's and Glover's); he also ordered Arnold to join Reinforce-
him; he sent Lincoln to organize and command the New
England militia; and he wrote the most urgent letters
to the governors of New York and the New England
States, telling them how critical the situation was, and
calling upon them to use every effort to fill up their Con-
tinental regiments and to call out the militia. 2 As a
1 St. Glair's Report, Dawson, 230.
2 Sparks, IV, 476, 480, 484, 500; V, 17.
106 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1777 result of these measures, reinforcements kept arriving on
the upper Hudson during July, August and September,
until at the time of Burgoyne's capitulation Gates's
morning return showed 13 brigades of infantry besides
artillery and cavalry, with a total strength of 1,698
officers and 18,624 men, of whom 14,914 were present
for duty. 1
The other part of Burgoyne's plan the expedition
under St. Leger from Oswego met with complete dis-
st. Leger aster. The route via Oswego and Oneida Rivers, Oneida
Expedition ^^ ^^ ^^ ^ ^ Mohawk y alley had a ] go
been followed in the earlier French and Indian wars;
and a stockaded fort had been built at the portage be-
tween Wood Creek and Mohawk River, near the present
city of Rome, and called Fort Stanwix. 2 It was more or
less in ruins in the spring of 1777, and Schuyler sent
Colonel Gansevoort of the 3d New York Regiment to
take command. He put the works in as good a condition
May as as possible, and renamed the place Fort Schuyler. He
was soon joined by Lieutenant-Colonel Willett and the
juiy is rest of his regiment. 3
St. Leger arrived at Oswego and began organizing his
expedition. News of this reached General Herkimer,
who commanded the militia in Tryon County, and he
issued a call for every able-bodied man in the county.
They assembled, to the number of about 800, at Fort
Dayton, now the village of Herkimer. 4 Thence they
Aug. 4 marched to the relief of Fort Schuyler, 30 miles to the
westward, before which St. Leger had appeared on the
Aug. s previous day. News of their.approach reached St. Leger,
1 Printed in Burgoyne's narrative, Appendix CIV.
2 Arnold, 141. 3 Ibid., 149.
4 Arnold, 149; Burgoyne, Appendix LXXVIIL
THE HUDSON 107
and he sent all his Indians, under Brant, and a part of his 1777
loyalist militia to ambuscade Herkimer near Oriskany,
about 5 miles east of Fort Schuyler. Here the road, on
which Herkimer was advancing, crossed a deep ravine,
at the bottom of which was a marsh and causeway.
Just as Herkimer's force had passed over the causeway Aug. e
and was climbing the western slope of the ravine, 1 with
their wagons still on the causeway, the Indians sur-
rounded them and attacked with great fury. Herkimer Battle o*
was wounded almost at the first fire, but he caused him- "* any
self to be propped up against a tree, lighted his pipe and
directed the battle for eight hours. 2 It was a bushwhack- e A. M. to
ing fight at close quarters, and the Tryon County militia 2p " lt
were as expert in that kind of fighting as the Indians
themselves; moreover, they personally knew the tory
militia opposed to them, and fiercely hated them. 3 No
quarter was asked or given, and the losses were out of all
proportion to the numbers engaged.
During the morning three messengers from Herkimer, n A. M.
sent to advise the garrison of his approach, succeeded
in reaching Fort Schuyler. Lieutenant-Colonel Willett,
with 250 men, was immediately ordered to make a sortie,
which was completely successful, the tory and Indian
camps being both captured, with a large amount of sup-
plies and all of St. Leger's and Johnson's papers. The
Indians fled to the woods. When news of this reached
the ambuscading party an hour or so later, the Indians
there also fled, leaving Herkimer and his militia in pos-
session of the field. 4
1 The spot is marked by a large monument just south of the New York
Central tracks, 225 miles from New York City.
3 Arnold, 151; Lossing, I, 246.
3 Dawson, 242.
4 Arnold, 152.
108 THE REVOLUTIONAEY WAR
1777 Notwithstanding this success, the siege was not yet
abandoned. Herkimer was carried back to his home
and died of his wounds. About one-third of his militia
had been killed and wounded, and the rest soon retired to
siege of Fort Fort Dayton (Herkimer). St. Leger gathered together
schuyier ^. g ^ or j eg an( j i n( jj ails an( j fog 200 regulars, and closely
invested Gansevoort in Fort Schuyler. Willett was then
sent to ask aid from Schuyler. With one companion he
succeeded in making his way through St. Leger's line and
reached Schuyler, then at Stillwater. Schuyler called the
Aug. 12 usual council of war and explained the importance of
relieving Fort Schuyler. To his astonishment there were
mutterings accusing him of cowardice and treason, and
intimating that he was planning this move in order to
give Burgoyne an opportunity to enter Albany unop-
posed. Schuyler then called for a brigadier to lead the
relieving party, and Arnold, although a major-general
and second in command, instantly volunteered.
With 800 men, all of whom had volunteered for the ser-
Aug. 21 vice, he began his march the following day, and soon
reached Fort Dayton. From this point he contrived to
send men into St. Leger's camp carrying exaggerated
statements of his strength, and was preparing to follow
them and attack St. Leger, when the Indians, alarmed at
these reports and discouraged by the losses at Oriskany
and the sortie, became mutinous and deserted in a body.
AUK. 22 The next day St. Leger raised the siege, and with his
Defeat of st. regulars and the few tories who still remained with him,
261 retreated hastily to Oswego, and later to Montreal. 2
Thus ended St, Leger's expedition.
While these events were in progress others of equal
importance to the success of the Americans were trans-
2 Arnold, 153-162; Dawson, 247; Lossing, I, 243-252.
THE HUDSON 109
piring near the upper Hudson. After the battle of 1777
Hubbardton and the engagements at Skenesborough and July 7
Fort Ann, Burgoyne assembled his entire force at Skenes- Juiy 6
borough and prepared to advance to the Hudson at Fort July s
Edward. 1 He decided to use all his boats to bring his
supplies via Lake George, but to march his men by the
direct route through the wilderness of Wood Creek.
Although the distance was only 22 miles, a road had to
be cut for nearly the entire distance, and the obstructions
which Schuyler's axemen had created had to be removed.
Thus 20 days were consumed in the operation. At the
end of that time Burgoyne arrived at Fort Edward, and
on the same day Phillips took possession of Fort George, juiy 29
at the head of Lake George. Fort George then became
Burgoyne's secondary base of supplies, but although the
distance to Fort Edward was only 15 miles, the country
was so broken and heavily wooded, and the transportation
so poor, that it was with great difficulty that his army
could be supplied. 2
Schuyler's reinforcements had hardly yet begun to
arrive, and his force was too small to oppose any resistance stmwltlr
to Burgoyne. He therefore abandoned Fort Edward and juiy 2?
retreated down the west bank of the Hudson to Still-
water, about 25 miles south of Fort Edward and the
same distance north of Albany, 3
The fatal defect of Burgoyne's plan was the inability Difficulty of
to supply his army. At Fort Edward he was 185 miles
from his base at Montreal. There were 23 miles of land Army
transport at the northern end and 15 miles at the south-
ern end, and the latter was through most difficult country.
The intervening 147 miles was by water, Lakes Cham-
1 Burgoyne, Appendix XXXIV.
2 Ibid., 16-19. 3 Arnold, 140-148.
110 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1777 plain and George, but there was a troublesome portage
between the two at Ticonderoga.
Burgoyne, therefore, began to look for supplies in the
enemy's country. He had heard that Bennington in
the southern part of the "Hampshire Grants," now the
State of Vermont, but then claimed both by New York
and New Hampshire was a great depot of corn, flour
and cattle; that it was defended by only a few militia;
and that the district "abounds in the most active and
most rebellious race of the continent, and hangs like a
gathering storm on my left." 1 He therefore deter-
mined to deliver a blow at Bennington, capture its stores,
disperse its militia, and strike terror to its inhabitants.
Incidentally he expected to obtain horses to mount the
Duke of Brunswick's Dragoons, a project which Biedesel
had much at heart. If the move succeeded, he thought
it would prevent the sending of any American reinforce-
ments to the relief "of Fort Schuyler, and would enable
St. Leger to join him in a triumphant entry into Albany. 2
For this expedition Burgoyne detailed the Brunswick
dragoons (unmounted), Captain Fraser's selected marks-
men, some tory militia and some Indians, and 2 field
guns, the whole numbering about 600 men under com-
mand of Lieutenant-Colonel Baume. 3 To facilitate the
said toward operation and to be ready to take advantage of its sue-
Bennmgton ceg ^ g ur g y jie move d down the east side of the Hudson
Aug * 14 and built a bridge near Saratoga (now Schuylerville). 3
Schuyler fell back to the islands at the mouth of the
Mohawk. 4
Baume left the Hudson at Saratoga, and moving up
the Battenkill crossed the hills to Cambridge and thence
e, Appendix XLVI; Riedesel, I, 368-372.
a Burgoyne, XLIV. 3 Ibid., XLI. Arnold, 163-165.
THE HUDSON 111
to the Hoosick River at the mouth of Walloomsac 1777
Creek. There he encountered a small party of American Aug. 14
militia, and he soon learned that Burgoyne had based 9A * M *
his plans upon quite erroneous information. 1 There was,
in fact, a body of New England militia, under General
John Stark, far exceeding his own force in numbers,
posted at the village of Bennington, about 7 miles up the
Walloomsac, 2 and the remnants of the regiments which
had fought under Warner at Hubbardton seven weeks
before were now resting and recruiting at Manchester,
about 20 miles to the north. Baume sent a messenger Aug. 14
to Burgoyne with a report of these facts. 3
Stark had served in the French and Indian wars, had
taken a New Hampshire regiment to Boston in time for
Bunker Hill, had been colonel of the 5th Continental
Regiment in the following year, and had served in all the
engagements under Washington, including Trenton and
Princeton. Then several promotions were made over
his head at which he took offence, resigned and retired
to his farm. When Ticonderoga fell, the New Hamp-
shire legislature made him a brigadier-general and asked
him to raise the militia for their defence. They had no
confidence in the officers who commanded under Schuyler,
and when Lincoln, sent by Washington to organize the
New England militia, ordered Stark to join Schuyler at
Stillwater, Stark refused point-blank, and said it was at
his own option whether he acted in conjunction with the orders
Continental army or not. 4 When Congress heard of this
it sent the correspondence to the New Hampshire legis- congress cen-
lature, with a resolution saying that Stark's action was
1 Baume's Report; Burgoyne, Appendix LXX.
a Stark's Report, Dawson* 260.
5 Burgoyne, LXX. 4 Stark's Memoirs, 10-50.
112
THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
And Then
Gives Him a
Vote of
Thanks
Oct. 4
1777 " destructive of military subordination/ 7 and requesting
Aug. 19 that he be instructed to conform to the "same rules
which other general officers of the militia are subject to
whenever they are called out at the expense of the
United States/ 7 This was three days after Stark had
gained the victory at Bennington. On hearing of this
Congress expressed its appreciation of what Stark had
done, and later passed a resolution giving him a vote of
thanks and appointing him a brigadier-general in the
Continental army. 1
Seldom has such rank insubordination produced such
excellent results. In this case it resulted in placing Stark,
with superior force, at the very point where Baume was
going to collect stores and horses ; as the latter approached
Stark sent word to Warner to march at once to his relief,
and in spite of a drenching rain Warner arrived in time
to be of assistance.
Burgoyne received Baume's report during the night,
and immediately ordered Lieutenant-Colonel Breyman,
with the Brunswick grenadiers and other Hessians, 642
men in all, with 2 field guns, to reinforce Baume; and
marching as rapidly as he could over the bad roads in
the heavy rain, Breyman arrived while the battle was in
progress. 2
After spending a day at Van Schaick's mill, Baume
Aug. 15 moved forward the next morning, the advance guard of
the militia retreating before him. But after he had
moved up the north bank of the Walloomsac about four
miles, the militia were reinforced by Stark's main body,
coming down the creek from Bennington. Baume hesi-
tated to attack, and selecting a good position, spent the
1 Jour. Cent Cong., VIII, 656; IX, 770.
3 Burgoyne, XLIII; Riedesel, 127-133.
Aug. 14
Burgoyne
Sends Re-
inforcements
to Baume
THE HUDSON 113
rest of the day in intrenching. His unmounted dragoons 1777
were loaded down with immense hats, boots, swords and
muskets; and on a hot August day in a thinly settled
country, with bad roads and torrents of rain, were ill
equipped to match the New Hampshire farmers in their
shirt-sleeves and with no impedimenta except a gun
and cartridge-box/
Early the next morning Stark sent out these farmers, Aug. 15
whom Baume at first did not recognize as soldiers, to
surround the Hessians; 200 under Colonel Nicholls by the
right, 200 under Colonel Herrick by the left; while the
main body, under Stark himself, moved down the creek Battle of
to attack them in front. Before Baume realized it he
was surrounded by double his numbers all good marks-
men. His Indians fled at the first shot, but the Bruns-
wickers fought hard and used their two little field-guns
to the best advantage. Two hours of incessant fighting
followed, which finally became a hand-to-hand encounter
after the ammunition was exhausted. Baume was mor-
tally wounded, a large part of his force had been destroyed,
some surrendered, and the rest escaped down the creek.
Stark's men divided their attention, some plundering
the Hessian camp and some pursuing the retreating
dragoons. When the pursuit had gone about half-way
to Van Schaick's mill, Breyman arrived from one direction
and Warner from tho other; the battle was fiercely re-
newed and Breyman lost almost as heavily as Baume
had. Abandoning his artillery 2 and wagons at dusk, he
hastily retreated to the Battenkill and Saratoga.
1 Stark, 50-75; Lossing, I, 391, 399.
2 The history of these four guns is interesting. They were of French
manufacture, were taken by Wolfe at Quebec in 1759, captured by Stark
at Bennington in 1777, surrendered by Hull at Detroit in 1812, retaken
at Niagara in 1813. Fonblanque's Burgoyne, 273.
114
THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1777
Burgoyne's
Precarious
Position
July 29 to
Aug. 20
Sept. 13
Burgoyne
Advances
Stark's force, including Warner's men, numbered about
2,000; Baume and Breyman had about 1,300. The
American losses, according to Stark's report, were only
30 killed and 40 wounded; he also reported that there
were 207 Hessians dead, a large number wounded and that
he had taken 700 prisoners. The Hessian accounts put
the number at somewhat less; but even these admit the
loss of 596 men, exclusive of the loss among the British. 1
Thus the Hessian detachment on the east and St.
Leger's expedition on the west were practically de-
stroyed, almost at the same time. Burgoyne's position
immediately became precarious. It was just at this
time that Gates arrived and superseded Schuyler. The
army was immensely elated by the two victories, the
militia turned out in large numbers, Stark soon marched
to join Gates, and the reinforcements of Continental
troops were now coming in rapidly from New England
and from Peekskill.
Burgoyne had now been on the Hudson for three weeks,
slowly and with infinite toil dragging his provisions and
boats over from Lake George in the hope of accumulat-
ing a sufficient supply to last him during an offensive
campaign of thirty days, and enough boats to move them
on the Hudson, from one rapids to the next, as he ad-
vanced toward Albany. He continued this work for
three weeks longer, and then believing that he had suffi-
cient supplies, he crossed from the east to the west bank
of the Hudson on the bridge which he had built just above
the mouth of the Battenkill, and moved forward. His
letters to Germain show that he was far from being con-
fident of success. He said: "I yet do not despond." 2
1 Burgoyne, XLIII; Riedesel, 132; Dawson, 259.
2 Burgoyne, XLVIII.
THE HUDSON 115
Nevertheless he knew he was already outnumbered by 1777
the reinforcements which had come to the American
army; he realized that he was far from his base of sup-
plies, that he could not obtain supplies from the enemy's
country and that his communications were in danger of
being cut off. He could probably have saved his army
by a prompt retreat to Ticonderoga. To have done so
would have been to acknowledge the failure of the whole
plan which he had induced the King to adopt. More-
over, he had a lingering, though faint, hope that Howe
would march up the Hudson; and finally the King's
orders of March 16 required him "to force his way to
Albany." As he wrote Germain, he felt that he was not Aug. 20
at liberty to disregard these.
Gates, on his arrival, found the main body of the Aug. 19
American army on the islands at the mouth of the Mo- situation in
hawk, with Poor's brigade 4 miles up the Mohawk on his Arm y mencan
left, Lincoln and Stark at Bennington, 30 miles on his
right, and Arnold on the upper Mohawk, 110 miles on
his left. Arnold, after the relief of Fort Schuyler,
promptly returned and joined Gates just as Burgoyne
was preparing to cross the Hudson. Gates had already sept. 10
issued orders to have everything in readiness to march,
but had made no movement. When Arnold arrived and
was assigned to the command of the left wing, he took
Kosciusko (apparently on his own responsibility), made sept. 12
a reconnoissance of the ground in his front, selected a
position at Bemis' Heights, about 6 miles in advance,
and furnished Kosciusko the men to fortifj r it. 1 The
lines were on a plateau about 200 feet above the Hudson,
with a deep ravine (Mill Creek) in their front, and ex-
tended around three sides of a rectangle more than 2
1 Arnold, 165-178.
116 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1777 miles in length. Gates's army, about 9,000 strong, occu-
pied these lines, Arnold on the left and Gates on the right,
when Burgoyne, after five days of cautious advance,
sept. 19 came in sight. The latter's plan was to send Fraser and
Breyman on his right to move around the head of the ra-
vine and attack the American left; he himself with the
Battle of main body of the British was to cross the ravine, and,
Trepan's ^ploying O n the southern side of it, to attack the centre;
while Phillips and Riedesel were to move along two
roads near the Hudson and protect his left. His force
had been reduced by losses to a strength of about 6,000
men. As his columns on the march were widely separated
in a broken country, their arrival in position was to be
1 p. M. to announced by the firing of signal-guns, and these were
2 P ' M * heard early in the afternoon.
These movements had been observed for more than
three hours, but Gates gave no orders. Arnold at
length, after much entreaty, obtained permission to send
Morgan's riflemen against the Canadians and Indians
who formed Eraser's advance. Morgan attacked with
such impetuosity that his men got out of hand, and when,
after driving back the Indians and Canadians, he came
upon Eraser's main body, he was in turn driven back with
considerable loss. Seeing this, Arnold, without waiting
s P. M. for further orders, brought up his entire force, and lead-
ing them in person he made a furious assault upon Fraser.
The fighting continued at close quarters and often hand
to hand for about four hours. Arnold applied for rein-
forcements to Gates, but Gates refused to send them for
fear that he would expose his camp. Phillips and Rie-
desel, finding that Gates did not advance against them,
marched to the sound of the guns and Arnold had nearly
the whole of Burgoyne's force opposed to him. Not-
English Statute Jlilefi
Roads a&he time
Courtesy of The Burrows Brothers Company,
Publishers, Cleveland, Ohio
From A very 's History of the United States
and Its People
FREEMAN'S FARM
Sept. 19, 1777
THE HUDSON 117
withstanding the superiority of the force opposed to him, 1777
he held his ground until sunset, and then returned within
his lines. The British lay upon their arms, where they
were when the fighting terminated.
The losses on the American side were 65 killed, 218 Report of
wounded and 33 missing; on the British side more than
500. One regiment, the 62d, which left Canada 500 era '
strong, came out of this battle, according to Burgoyne,
with only 60 men and 5 officers. 1
This was the first of the Saratoga battles, sometimes
called Freeman's Farm and sometimes Bemis 7 Heights.
Instead of attacking, as he had intended, Burgoyne had
been thrown on the defensive from the beginning of the
action. The next day he began intrenching on the north
and east sides of the Mill Creek ravine, about a mile or
more distant from the American lines; and he remained
there until the second battle, eighteen days later. The
Americans, meanwhile, continued to strengthen their
lines.
On the second day after the battle, Burgoyne received sept. 21
word from Sir Henry Clinton advising him of his inten-
tion to attack Fort Montgomery, opposite Peekskill; 2
and Burgoyne sent back the same messenger that night,
and followed this by two other messengers. They all
carried the same message, viz., that Burgoyne could hold
out until October 12, and he urged Clinton to come to his
assistance before that date. All three reached Clinton oct, s
in safety, and the latter sent them all back. The return oct. 9
trip was not so successful. The bearer of one message,
Sergeant Taylor, was captured at Kingston and hung as
a spy; Captain Campbell, who carried the second, is
^awson, 285-290; Riedesel, 144-150; Arnold, 170-190.
3 Burgoyne, 24.
118 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1777 said by Lossing to have delivered it to Burgoyne on the
Oct. i? night before the surrender, although Riedesel does not
mention this; Captain Scott, who bore the third, was
unable to reach Burgoyne, and after the capitulation
escaped down the river and joined the British fleet.
Oct. s The message which was intercepted was written at
Fort Montgomery, and was in these words: "Nous y
voici, and nothing now between us and Gates. I sin-
cerely hope this little success of ours may facilitate
your operations. In answer to your letter of 28th of
September by C. C. [Captain Campbell] I shall only say,
I cannot presume to order, or even advise, for reasons
obvious. I heartily wish you success." l
This indifferent reply, sent to a brother general who
had just informed him how desperate his situation was,
shows that Clinton's point of view in regard to the Hud-
son campaign was very different from Burgoyne's.
On the American side, Gates now became intensely
jealous of Arnold. He did not mention his name in the
sept. 22 report which he made to Congress (not to Washington)
of the battle; and his adjutant-general, Wilkinson, was
circulating reports that Arnold had not been on the field.
The feud was stimulated by the fact that Schuyler's staff
officers had remained with the army and were serving
with Arnold. Finally Arnold, whose mind was ill-
balanced, although he was a brave and skilful soldier,
became so incensed that, after a stormy interview with
Gates, he foolishly applied for permission to leave the
army, which Gates promptly gave him. But Arnold
was very popular with his troops, and they begged him
to remain. Arnold decided to do so, but Gates then re-
fused to allow him to resume command, and announced
Sparks, V, 131; Lossing, I, 684.
THE HUDSON 119
his intention to assign Lincoln, as soon as he should ITT?
arrive, to command his division. When the second
battle came on Arnold was in camp without any defined
position. 1
Meanwhile^ Lincoln was collecting the militia near
Bennington, but before marching to join Gates he sent
a detachment under Colonel Brown on a raid against sept, is
Burgoyne's communications. Brown marched via Hub- American
bardton to Mount Independence and captured that hill,
while part of his force went by way of Skenesborough to mumca
Mount Defiance. Brown took 293 prisoners, released 100
Americans and captured all the outlying posts, but was
unable to take the fort at Ticonderoga. He then re-
joined Lincoln, and the latter brought his troops, about sept. 27
2,000 in number, to Gates's camp. 2 Gates now outnum-
bered Burgoyne more than two to one, but he made no
move against him; and Burgoyne remained on the de-
fensive, hoping from day to day to hear of Clinton.
No news came. 3 Clinton, however, was moving up the
Hudson. His expedition was undertaken under the fol-
lowing circumstances. Although Germain had failed to
give Howe any instructions to co-operate with Burgoyne, 4
yet the latter had written to Howe three letters from
Plymouth in April, from Montreal in May and from
Crown Point in June 5 in each of which he had advised
Howe of the instructions he had received to force his
way to Albany and effect a junction with him* Howe
received all three letters at New York; and just before
sailing for the Delaware, he sent Burgoyne a brief and
indefinite reply saying that " after your arrival at Albany,
the movements of the enemy will guide yours; ... Sir
1 Arnold, 190-195. 3 Lossing, 150. 8 Burgoyne, 25.
4 See page 78, ante. 5 Burgoyne, 9, 11.
120
THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1777 Henry Clinton remains in the command here, and will
act as occurrences may direct." But after arriving in
the Delaware and before sailing to the Chesapeake, Howe
decided to write to Clinton, suggesting that he make a
diversion in Burgoyne's favor, if he could do so with-
out endangering the security of Kingsbridge. The date
when Clinton received this letter is not known. It was
prior to September 12, the day on which he wrote Bur-
goyne of his intention to attack Fort Montgomery. But
Clinton did not move until the long-delayed reinforce-
ments arrived from England, nearly three weeks later.
Then he started up the Hudson with three columns,
one of which marched from Kingsbridge to Tarrytown
and the other two proceeded to the same point by water.
The total force was about 3,000 men, and it was con-
voyed by several ships of war. At Tarrytown the entire
force was put on boats and landed again at Verplanck's
Point, threatening Putnam at PeekskilL 1
Putnam had about 1,200 Continentals and as many
militia. They garrisoned the forts, which had been built
at great expense early in the year, at the southern en-
trance to the Highlands; Fort Independence on the east
side and Forts Montgomery and Clinton on the west.
The river was obstructed by a boom and chain opposite
Fort Montgomery, and two frigates were on the north
side of the boom to protect it. When Putnam saw this
strong force approaching the eastern shore he retired to
the hills behind Peekskill, and brought over a part of the
Oct. s force stationed on the west shore. A few hours later the
British galleys had advanced far enough up the river to
prevent any further communication between the two
shores, so that Putnam, when he desired on the following
1 Clinton's Report, Dawson, 344.
Oct. 3
Clinton Moves
up the
Hudson
Oct. 5
American
Force in the
Highlands
THE HUDSON 121
day to send men to the relief of the forts on the west shore, 1777
was unable to do so. 1 In reality Clinton's move at Ver-
planck's Point was only a feint; his real objective was
the west shore. He seems to have been well posted in
regard to these forts, and his dispositions were skilfully
made. At daybreak the next morning his entire force Oct. 6
landed above Stony Point, and was pushed forward
through the deep valley behind the Dunderberg until it
came within about a mile of Fort Clinton. Here the
advance, consisting of the 52d and 27th Regiments and
some tory militia, about 900 in all, under Colonel
Campbell, marched around Bear Hill into the valley of capture of
Peploap's Kill, 2 which empties into the Hudson between
the two forts, to attack Fort Montgomery. The main Clmion
body, about 1,100 men under General Vaughan, which
CSinton accompanied in person, was to attack Fort Clin-
ton from the south. The rest of his force, under Gen-
eral Tryon, was in reserve, keeping up communication
with the fleet, and ready to support either column if
necessary. 3
The two forts were under command of General James
Clinton. His brother, General George Clinton, 4 recently
elected Governor of New York, was attending a session
of the legislature at Kingston. Hearing that a move-
ment up the river was projected, he adjourned the legis-
lature and hastened to his brother's assistance, bringing
with him such militia as he could gather, which carried
the total strength of the garrison to about 800 men.
He arrived two days before the British landed. On
1 Putnam's Report, Dawson, 341.
8 So named on the map in Stedman, vol. I; now called Popelopen Creek.
8 Clinton's Report, Dawson, 345.
4 Fort Clinton was defended by James Clinton and George Clinton, and
captured by Sir Henry Clinton.
122 THE REVOLUTIONARY. WAR
1777 Sunday evening he sent out a reconnoissance to the
oct. s south and it returned the next morning with the infor-
mation that the British had landed. Governor Clinton
despatched as many men as he could spare to scour the
roads to the south. They soon met the British and were
driven back. The British attack was then made by
both columns, and though it encountered a spirited de-
fence, the assailants entered both works about sunset.
Part of the garrisons surrendered and the rest escaped
over the hills and across the river. The British loss was
about 40 killed and 150 wounded; that of the Americans
about 250 killed, wounded and missing. The two Ameri-
can frigates were burned by their crews, who escaped
to the east shore. The boom and chain across the river
were destroyed. The British ships sailed up the river
and attacked Fort Constitution, opposite West Point,
and it was hastily abandoned. Putnam, with the men
who had been at Peekskill, retreated up the river to Fish-
kill. The Americans lost 67 cannon in the various forts
and 30 on the frigates, besides a large amount of powder,
ordnance stores and provisions. 1
It was a signal success on Sir Henry Clinton's part, and,
as he wrote to Burgoyne, there was nothing between him
and Gates. If he had pushed on quickly to Albany he
might have changed the whole situation. But instead
1777 of doing so he wrote to Burgoyne a trifling letter, 2 sent
oct. s Vaughan up the river on a marauding expedition as far
oct. is as Kingston, which was burned, and then returned with
his entire force to New York. He attempted to justify
Bee, 16 ' his action on the ground that he could not take any
1 Reports of Governor Clinton, Sir Henry Clinton and Putnam, Dawson,
341-346; Sparks, V, 88, 91, 471-476.
3 P. 118, ante.
Euylish Statute Miles
Roads at the time
of the Revolution
Present Roads
Courtesy of The Burrows Brothers Company, , T
Publishers, Cleveland, Ohio Zl
From Aver> *s History of the United States
and Its People
BEMIS HEIGHTS
Oct. 7, 1777
THE HUDSON 123
chances at New York. The excuse was not sufficient, 1777
for he had 8,500 men, and there was no enemy nearer
than Putnam, whom he had driven away from Peekskill,
and Washington, who was in front of Philadelphia con-
fronted by a superior force under Howe. Clinton ac-
knowledges that he understood from Captains Campbell
and Scott how desperate Burgoyne's situation was.
That under these circumstances he was so concerned
about the safety of New York can only be explained on
the theory that Washington's wonderful exploit at Tren-
ton and Princeton in the preceding winter had made Clin-
ton attribute to Washington almost supernatural powers.
Burgoyne's situation was indeed desperate. He had
written to Clinton that he could hold out until the 12th. situation?
On the 3d he put his men on half rations, and on the 7th,
still hearing nothing from Clinton, he determined to at-
tack; but his advance was made in a half-hearted fashion,
for the purpose, as he said in his report to Germain, of
discovering " whether there were any possible means of
forcing a passage, should it be necessary to advance, or
dislodging him, for the convenience of a retreat." l Hav-
ing started the battle, he lost control of it, and Arnold
fell upon him with fury, inflicting a terrible defeat.
Leaving the greater part of his force in the intrench- Battle of
ments which he had constructed on the north and east
sides of Mill Creek, Burgoyne in person took 1,500 regulars Oct. 7
and six pieces of artillery, and attempted to go around the n A. M
head of Mill Creek ravine and attack the American left.
His movement was detected, and before he reached the
American lines Gates had sent Morgan's riflemen to attack
his right, and a strong force consisting of Poor's brigade,
two New York regiments and the Connecticut militia to
1 Burgoyne, LXXXIX.
124
THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1777
2 P.M.
Burgoyne's
Retreat
Oct. 8
9 P.M.
assail his left. Severe fighting was the immediate result;
Fraser was mortally wounded, and Burgoyne, abandon-
ing his artillery, was driven back across the ravine and
into his lines. Arnold, although deprived of all com-
mand, had gone into the fight with his troops, leading
them and inspiring them. Finally he took entire charge,
brought up all the troops he had lately commanded and,
himself in the van, hurled them against the lines held by
Earl Balcarras in the centre, and later against a strong
redoubt held by Breyman on the extreme right of the
British lines. The fighting continued throughout the
autumn afternoon. Balcarras made a successful defence;
but Breyman was killed, a large part of his men were
taken and his works captured just before sunset. Arnold
was wounded as he entered the redoubt.
Night put an end to the fighting, which had resulted
in a loss on the American side of only 150 men, whereas
the British had lost about 600. There was no question
of Burgoyne's defeat, and during the night he abandoned
his lines and part of his tents and provisions, retreated
about a mile across a creek to the north of Mill Creek and
took refuge in three redoubts overlooking the Hudson
which he had previously constructed. 1 Gates did not
appear on the field, but remained in his tent, spending
a good part of the day in discussing the merits of the
Revolution with Burgoyne's aide who had been wounded
and captured.
The next day there was skirmishing in front of these
redoubts, while three columns in succession were sent
past his right flank to capture the fords of the Hudson in
his rear. Detecting these movements during the after-
noon, he abandoned his hospital and wounded and re-
'Burgoyne, XC-XCII; Arnold, 196-211; Dawson, 301, 307.
THE HUDSON 125
treated five miles to Saratoga (Schuylerville), where on 1777
the second morning lie assembled his men and began the oct. 10
construction of new lines on the heights above Fish
Creek. Gates followed him and soon completely sur- oct. u
rounded him, the main body of the Americans on the
south of Fish Creek, Poor's and Learned's brigades and
Morgan's riflemen on the west of the British camp,
Fellow's brigade on the heights across the Hudson and
Stark in Burgoyne's rear at Fort Edward.
Burgoyne then called a council of war, himself, oct. 12
Phillips, Riedesel and Hamilton, and submitted five pos-
sible movements to his associates; but the only one that
was seriously considered was a prompt retreat to Fort
Edward. To accomplish this a start of four miles, un-
observed, was deemed essential* Scouts were sent out,
and on their return reported that the army was so sur-
rounded that it would be impossible for it to march
without being immediately discovered.
Burgoyne then called a second council of war, "con- oct. is
sisting of all the general officers and field officers and cap-
tains commanding corps," and asked them whether an
army was justified "in capitulating in any possible situ- Negotiations
ation," and whether "the present situation is of that
nature." Both questions were unanimously answered
in the affirmative. An officer was then sent to Gates
with a letter from Burgoyne asking a "cessation of arms" oct. u
long enough to enable Burgoyne to state the terms "by
which in any extremity he and his army mean to abide."
Gates replied, naming his own terms, and granting a
cessation of arms until sunset. The sixth article re-
quired Burgoyne's army to be paraded in their camps,
ground their arms and be marched to the riverside on
their way to Bennington. The council was reassembled
126 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1777 and unanimously rejected this article. An officer was
sent back and at sunset delivered this ultimatum to
Gates: "If General Gates does not mean to recede from
the 6th article, the treaty ends at once. . . . The cessa-
tion of arms ends this evening." He also delivered the
terms which Burgoyne was willing to accept. To the
Oct. is surprise of every one, the next morning Gates sent an
officer to Burgoyne, practically accepting the latter's
terms, but stipulating that the conquered army should
leave its position at 2 o'clock on that day. Gates had,
in fact, just learned of the capture of Fort Montgomery
and Fort Clinton and the advance of Vaughan up the
Hudson. He was disposed to take the best terms he
could get. But the stipulation about moving before 2
o'clock made Burgoyne suspicious. He determined to
gain time, and appointed commissioners to arrange
terms. Their negotiations continued until 11 P.M., at
which hour the articles were agreed upon, the British
commissioners giving their word that they would be
Oct. 15 signed by Burgoyne. But when they returned to their
camp at midnight Burgoyne had just learned from a
deserter that Fort Montgomery had been captured and
that part of Clinton's army had reached Kingston. Bur-
goyne thereupon called his council together again and
asked whether it was honorable to withdraw from a
treaty definitely agreed upon by authorized commission-
ers; fourteen officers thought it was dishonorable and eight
that it was not. Burgoyne refused to be bound by their
decision, and agreed with the minority. 1 He then asked
1 The minutes of the council are given in Burgoyne's narrative, Appen-
dix, pp. cii to cv. General Riedesel also wrote out, on September 18,
his memorandum of the negotiations. Riedesel's Memoirs, pp. 175-184.
Stedman (I, 385-392) gives verbatim the letters that were exchanged
between Gates and Burgoyne.
"1-3 British three gun batteries t
a " four mortar battery j
4 Redoubts to cover batteries [
5 Lines of approach J
FORT SCHUVLER
Aug. 3-22, 1777
Courtesy of The Burrows Brothers Company,
Publishers, Cleveland, Ohio
From Avery's History of the United States
and Its People
FORTS MONTGOMERY AND CLINTON
Oct. 6, 1777
SURRENDER OF BURGOYNX
Oct. 17, 1777
THE HUDSON 127
whether the army would defend their position to the last IT-TV
extremity. On this the opinions were conflicting, the
majority inclining to the opinion that they would not.
In order to gain more time, Burgoyne sent word to Gates
early in the morning that he had heard that some of the
American army had been sent to Albany, and in order to
assure himself that he was surrounded by a force three or
four times as numerous as his own, he wished to send one
of his own officers to examine his force. This was more
than Gates would stand, and he replied declining his re-
quest, saying that he would show his army after the con-
vention was signed, warning Burgoyne of the consequences
of refusing to sign the articles agreed upon by authorized
commissioners, and telling him if they were not signed Articles of t
within an hour he would resort to extreme measures, signed 1 n
Another council was then summoned, and, although opin-
ions were still divided, Burgoyne decided to yield. He
signed the articles 1 and sent them to Gates, who signed
them in turn.
The British and Hessians marched out of their camp Oct. i?
the following afternoon, laid down their arms and then
marched through the American camp, where the troops
were paraded under arms and then on toward Albany.
The return, drawn up that day, showed 341 officers, 586 strength of
non-commissioned officers and 4,836 privates, a total of <iered
5,763. 2 Burgoyne gives a detailed statement of his total
losses during the campaign, amounting (among the regu-
lars, exclusive of Canadians and Indians) to 415 killed,
911 wounded and 1,169 prisoners, a total of 2,495. 3
The garrison of Ticonderoga and Crown Point escaped
1 The original document is in the possession of the New York Historical
Society.
2 Dawson, 300. 3 Burgoyne, LI.
128 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1777 to Montreal. The Hudson was free down to Spuyten
Duyvil.
Ten times has the United States army received the
capitulation of the armed force opposed to it, viz.: at
Saratoga, Yorktown, Vera Cruz, City of Mexico, Donel-
son, Vicksburg, Appomattox, Durham's Station, Santiago
and Manila. Saratoga was the first, and it gave rise to
an unfortunate controversy which was not the case in
any of the others. In his first proposals Gates stipulated
that Burgoyne's army "can only be allowed to surrender
[as] prisoners of war/' But later he agreed to a "Con-
vention" instead of a "Capitulation," and its thirteen
articles said nothing of prisoners of war. The essence of
the convention was that all the troops, of whatever coun-
try, under Burgoyne's command were "to march out of
their camp, with the honors of war," and lay down their
arms "by word of command of their own officers"; were
then to march to Boston, and as soon as Howe should
send transports to receive them, were to sail to England,
controversy "on condition of not serving again in North America
"contention during the present contest," unless they or any part of
Troops them should be exchanged by cartel. 1 As a matter of
fact they were never sent to England, but were kept at
Boston for a year, then sent to Charlottesville, Va., and
after that to Lancaster, Pa., and other places. Mean-
while each side charged the other with bad faith and a
breach of the convention.
The real trouble was that under the convention it was
possible to send Burgoyne's army back to England for
garrison duty, releasing fresh troops for service in Amer-
Oct. 20 ica. Burgoyne wrote a private letter to Germain, three
lf The convention in full is printed in Dawson, 303, 304; Riedesel, I,
184-186.
THE HUDSON 129
days after the surrender, calling attention to this possi- 1777
bility, and claiming great credit for "saving the army." l NOV. s
Gates seems not to have seen this point, but Washington's NOV. is
clear mind saw it the moment he read the document, and
he wrote to Heath, 2 who commanded at Boston, pointing
it out to him, and requiring him to insist on a rigid com-
pliance by Burgoyne with his part of the terms. Howe
did not like to send his ships so far away from New
York, and presently he asked to have the point of em-
barkation changed to Newport; but Washington refused
to make any change. 3 If Howe could send his ships to
Boston, and spare them for the long voyage to England,
well and good; but there should be no change whatever Dec. IT
in the terms. The matter presently came up in Congress,
and that body resolved that the embarkation should not
take place until the convention was explicitly ratified by
the court of Great Britain. It charged that Burgoyne 1773
had not surrendered all his "arms," because he had re- Jan.s
tained or concealed his cartridge-boxes and colors, and
Riedesel admits that he took the colors off their staffs,
burned the latter and put the colors in his trunks. 4
Howe complained that the prisoners were suffering for
food and shelter, and Congress insisted that the British
should pay for the provisions, and in gold at that, not in
Continental currency. 5
It was an unseemly controversy and many of the posi-
tions taken by Congress were not tenable; but it all arose
from the trick by which Burgoyne tried to outwit Gates
by a surrender which would result in bringing an equal
number of fresh troops from England as fast as ships
1 Burgoyne, XCVII. * Sparks, V, 144.
* Ibid., V, 234, 535-538. * Madame Riedesel's Memoirs, 161
* Jour. Cont. Cong., IX, 1032; X, 35.
130 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1777 could cross the ocean and back. The controversy dragged
on for nearly four years, Burgoyne meanwhile going to
England on parole, and taking his seat in Parliament
where he defended before a committee his conduct while
in America. More than four years after the surrender, in
Dec. 17, i78i a debate in the House of Commons on the American war,
he complained that he was still a prisoner of war. 1 Dur-
ing all these four years the subject of "convention troops "
was in controversy both in and out of Congress. Finally
Congress turned the whole matter over to Washington. 2
In the meantime most of the officers and a large part of
the men had been gradually exchanged; and others, par-
ticularly the Germans, were allowed to escape and settle
in America, where they permanently remained, but some
of them were still prisoners when peace came in 1783.*
The surrender of Burgoyne was of signal advantage to
the American cause. It hastened the French alliance; it
left the Hudson permanently in American control; it put
out of action more than one-fourth of the King's forces
in America. It has been sufficiently pointed out that
Burgoyne's plan, which he persuaded the King and the
ministry to adopt, although the latter failed to advise
Howe of his part in it, was inherently wrong and inevi-
tably doomed to failure. With the means of transporta-
tion then existing an army could not operate in a hostile
country when separated from its base of supplies by 180
miles of wilderness. Even if Howe had carried out the
part originally assigned to him, the British disaster might
have been greater than it was; for, remembering what
Washington accomplished at Trenton and at Yorktown,
1 Hansard, Parl. Hist, of England, XXII, 862.
3 Jour. Cong., Ill, 46, 218.
8 Sparks, VI, 257; Riedesel, II, 175.
THE HUDSON 131
it Is quite possible that in the event of Howe going up ms
the Hudson to join Burgoyne, Washington might have
taken New York, cut Howe off from his ocean base and
captured his army as well as Burgoyne's. The plan
which offered the greatest chance of success in the spring
of 1777 was the one that King George "greatly disliked " *
and that Washington, with clear military insight, antici-
pated and dreaded, viz. : to bring every man in America
to New York, and with this overwhelming force to crush
Washington. Could his army have been destroyed or
scattered, the conquest of the Hudson and the separa-
tion of New England from the Middle States would have
been an easy task.
1 P. 78, ante.
CHAPTER V
THE FRENCH ALLIANCE 1
1778 THE site of the encampment at Valley Forge is now an
Military historical park owned by the State of Pennsylvania,
of t v h a e n p a o?itiou The house occupied by Washington and the other stone
houses in the vicinity are in substantially the same con-
dition as they were during the terrible winter of 1777-
78; the lines of intrenchments and the redoubts in or
adjacent to the works can still be distinctly traced. 2
They follow the contour of wooded hills ; which rise at
their highest point to an altitude of 354 feet above the
waters of the Schuylkill on the north and Valley Creek on
the west. To the eastward the hills slope gently into an
open country, to the north the slope is more abrupt
and to the west it is precipitous. The length of the
"inner line 77 of intrenchments was about a mile and a
half, and they enclosed an irregular triangle of about 500
acres between Valley Creek and the Schuylkill. But a
large part of the troops were encamped, or hutted, out-
side of these lines for a distance of two miles to the east-
ward. From these positions, in case of attack, the troops
x The statue of Rochambeau in Lafayette Square, Washington, was
unveiled in 1902; and in connection therewith Congress has published an
elaborate memoir, edited by George de B. Keim, under the title of Rocham-
beau, which contains much original data, not hitherto available, concern-
ing the French troops and ships.
3 See Annual Report Valley Forge Park Commission, 1906.
132
VALLEY FORGE
Dec. 19, 1777 June 17, 1778
Courtesy of The Burrows Brothers Company,
Publishers, Cleveland, Ohio
From Avery's History of the United States
and Its People
PHILADELPHIA
Evacuated June 18, 1778
THE FRENCH ALLIANCE 133
could quickly retire within the main lines behind which 1773
a very strong defence could be made.
The distance, following the windings of the Schuylkill,
from the mouth of Valley Creek to the Middle Ferry (now
Market Street bridge in Philadelphia) was twenty-one
miles; and by road, from Washington's outposts at Port
Kennedy (at the mouth of Trout Creek) to those of
Howe at Germantown, it was about sixteen miles.
In this position, easily defensible, with a rich and long-
settled agricultural region at his back from which to ob-
tain supplies, and in which were already the crude begin-
nings of what is now the great mineral and manufacturing
district of Reading, Washington was on Howe's flank as
he had been the previous winter at Morristown, and was
prepared quickly to follow Howe should he make any
move.
The American army remained at Valley Forge just six Dec. 19, 1777,
months months of intense anxiety for the commander- is! 116 18f
in-chief and of terrible suffering for his men. It was
destitute of shoes, clothing and provisions; it was not
properly organized; it was deficient in knowledge of drill
and manoeuvres; it had no proper system of account- Principal
ability; its regiments and battalions were mere skele-
tons and recruits were not forthcoming to fill them up. 1
While Washington was working with all his energy to
remedy these defects the wretched Conway Cabal was
equally active in contemptible intrigues with Congress,
the purpose of which was to displace Washington and
substitute Gates as commander-in-chief .
These were also months of great events in Europe; the
1 The terrible winter at Valley Forge has been described in every history
of the Revolution. Perhaps the most vivid picture of it is that given in
Trevelyan, III, 294-302.
134
THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1778
Feb. 6
March
April
Feb. 8
March 8
March 21
Dec. 22
Dec. 23
Conway Cabal
conclusion of the French alliance; the adoption by the
British ministry and King of measures offering to the
Colonies everything they had asked for except indepen-
dence; the despatch of commissioners to treat with Con-
gress for peace on these terms; the resignation of Howe
and the appointment of Sir Henry Clinton in his place;
and the sending of instructions 1 to Clinton that "the war
must be conducted on a different plan/' the offensive to
be abandoned, part of his force to be sent to the West
Indies to attack the French at St. Lucia, part to Florida
to retain the British possessions there, part to harry the
New England coast towns, Philadelphia to be evacuated,
everything to be concentrated at New York, and if in
danger there scuttle for Halifax. 2
The campaign of 1777 marked the end of all active
operations by the British in the Northern States. The
war was to last five years longer, but the British strength
was to be frittered away in disjointed movements at
great distance from each other; and although the force
at New York was to be maintained at a strength always
at least fifty per cent greater than the Continentals under
Washington, it was to remain all those years strictly on
the defensive.
At the beginning of the winter Washington wrote to
Congress 3 two letters which conveyed a most graphic
picture of his starving and naked army. Congress ap-
pointed a committee 4 to go to Valley Forge; it remained
there for several months, and in concert with it Washing-
ton formulated plans for overcoming the defects above
enumerated. As to the Conway Cabal, it was a contest
of pygmies against a giant. Washington shattered and
1 Sparks, V, 395, 548-551.
*Ibid., V, 192-203.
3 Germain to Clinton, Sparks V, 550.
4 Jour. Cont. Cong., IX, 1052.
THE FRENCH ALLIANCE 135
destroyed it by the sheer force of his lofty character and 1773
great services. Gates, indeed, had strength enough to
secure his appointment two years later to the command
of the Southern army, where, having no Arnold to lead
his troops as at Saratoga, he speedily proved, to the com-
plete satisfaction of all concerned, his shallowness and
incapacity. But Mifflin, Conway and the rest were more
quickly disposed of; Mifflin being without military em-
ployment for nearly a year, then resigning and going to
Congress where he had no influence; Conway, wounded
in a duel, resigning his commission in the army, writing
an abject apology to Washington and finally returning
to Europe and disappearing forever from public view. 1
No one ever ventured again to dispute the fact that
Washington was the one indispensable man for the suc-
cess of the Revolution, or to suggest any other name for
the position of commander-in-chief .
As to the more distinctly military problems at Valley
Forge, Washington solved them one by one, so that when
the army moved in June it was in a condition of military
efficiency which it had never before approached. The
most pressing questions were food and clothing. The
country was not deficient in either, and the responsibil-
ity for the destitute condition of the army was partly due
to the unwise action of Congress and partly to the
hopeless inefficiency of the quartermaster's department.
The delegates in Congress, seldom more than twenty-five 1777
present, were very jealous of a standing army, but they
did not hesitate to pass the most despotic resolutions. 2 sept. IT
Among others they ordered Washington "to take, wher- Nov - 14
ever he may be, all such provisions and other articles Dec - 10
1 Sparks, V, 517. 3 Hnd., V, 187, 406.
136
THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1777
Greene Ap-
pointed
Quartermaster-
General
March 23
1778
Washington
to Greene,
August 15,
1780
as may be necessary for the comfortable subsistence of
the army, under his command, paying or giving certifi-
cates for the same"; 1 but it made no adequate provision
for paying the certificates. To enforce this impressment
with the utmost rigor was to deprive the army of the sup-
port of the people. Washington exercised the despotic
powers conferred upon him by this and previous resolu-
tions with great prudence and much less vigorously than
Congress demanded. 2 Such supplies as he did seize were
never at the place wanted, for Mifflin, the quartermaster-
general, had for six months practically abandoned the
duties of his office, 3 and his department was in com-
plete disorder. 4 In concert with the committee, Wash-
ington prevailed upon Congress 5 to make better provi-
sion for payment of the certificates; and jointly they
persuaded Greene, much against his will, to perform
the duties of quartermaster-general without vacating his
position in the line. 6 Having accepted the task, he bent
every energy to its successful accomplishment. Before
the army moved in June he had established a line of
depots or magazines of supplies in rear of the army from
the Head of Elk to the North River, 7 and as Washington
expressed it, "by extraordinary exertions you [he] so
arranged it as to enable the army to take the field the
moment it was necessary, and to move with rapidity
after the enemy." 8
The deficiencies in drill, organization, discipline and
1 Jour. Cant Cong., VIII, 752; IX, 905, 1014.
'Sparks, V, 187, 188. 3 G. W. Greene, II, 20, 43, 49.
4 Report of committee of Congress, February 12, 1778. Original is in
handwriting of Joseph Reed; a complete copy is published in Life and
Correspondence of Joseph Reed, I, 360.
5 Jour. Cont Cong., X, 210, 223, 224, 325.
6 IUd., X, 210. 7 G. W. Greene, II, 57.
* Sparks, VII, 153.
THE FRENCH ALLIANCE 137
accountability were overcome by the fortunate arrival of
a thoroughly competent man, Steuben, who had served Feb. 23
at Prague and Rossbach and the other battles of the Seven
Years' war, on the personal staff of the great Frederick, steuben
He joined Washington as a volunteer, and later, when he
had proved his entire competency for the position, he
was appointed inspector-general of the army. 1 He in- May 27
troduced a definite plan (which Congress subsequently
approved) of organization in the infantry, artillery, cav-
alry and engineers; he devised a system of accounta-
bility for public property which resulted in enormous
saving; he taught the troops how to take care of their
arms; he gave them their first drill-book 2 and regulations
for troops in active service; he personally drilled them
until they could execute manoeuvres with creditable ex-
actness. 3 It was to do these things that he had been
selected and sent over by the French ministers/ In
view of their plans to aid the American cause with men,
munitions and money, they wished to improve the mili-
tary efficiency of the American army. There was proba-
bly not a man in the whole world more competent for
this task than Steuben.
In order to increase the strength of his army, Wash-
ington succeeded, in spite of much insubordinate opposi-
tion on the part of Gates and Putnam 5 in bringing to Washington
Valley Forge the greater part of the Continentals that Nov
had been at Saratoga. The militia, which had formed
more than half of Gates's army, went home soon after
1 Kapp, Steuben, 52, 192-273; Sparks, V, 526, 529; Jour. Cont. Cong.,
XI, 465, 514, 538, 543, 550.
2 Kapp, Steuben, 200-214.
11 Ibid., 52, 192-273.
Ibid., 68, 69; Sparks, V, 527.
'Sparks, V, 125, 161, 162; Sparks, Letters, II, 536-544.
138 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
surrender. Moreover, these Continentals, like those
May s already at Valley Forge, were depleted to a mere fraction
of their normal strength. In order to fill up the ranks,
Congress, which had hitherto "recommended" to the
States to furnish their quota, now undertook to "require
forthwith" the States to do this by means of a draft. 1
May is Effectually to carry out a draft required powers and ad-
ministrative organization far beyond those possessed by
the Congress under the Articles of Confederation; and
it is probable that the personal appeals which Washing-
ton made all through this winter and spring to the
governors of States, Jonathan Trumbull in Connecti-
cut, George Clinton^ in New York, Thomas Wharton in
Pennsylvania, Patrick Henry 2 in Virginia, and others,
i had more effect than the resolutions of Congress, how-
ever commanding their language might be* Between
them all, however, a certain number of recruits were
obtained. The committee of Congress led Washington
to believe that the 104 battalions (16 Continental and
88 State "line") which existing laws then authorized
would produce an army of 40,000 men for the year's
campaign. 3 In fact they produced barely half that
number.
As for the British Peace Commission, headed by the
Earl of Carlisle, which arrived at Philadelphia, it was two
years too late. The French alliance bound each country
not to make peace without the consent of the other, nor
without acknowledgment by Great Britain of the inde-
Barren pendence of the United States. 4 Congress refused to
1 Jour. Cont Cong., X, 200.
3 Sparks, IV, 477; V, 9, 146, 239, 252.
I&uL, V, 314.
4 Treaty of Alliance, February 7, 1778. Treaties and Conventions of
the United States, 308.
THE FRENCH ALLIANCE 139
treat on any other terms, 1 and the mission was a ridieu- 1773
lous failure.
The motives which induced France to make the Feb. 6
alliance cannot be discussed here. The signing of the
treaty was due to the campaign of 1777, resulting in the
capture of Burgoyne's army on the Hudson and to the
fierce, if inconclusive, battles around Philadelphia. It French
necessarily involved the prompt despatch to America of iance
a considerable land and naval force by France.
At the beginning of June, therefore, Clinton, who had May u
relieved Howe in the command, began to make prepa-
rations for evacuating Philadelphia. Washington was
watching him like a hawk. As at Trenton, his service
of information seems to have been remarkably efficient.
Everything of importance that transpired in Philadelphia,
either in the way of events or of plans under discussion,
came to the knowledge of Washington within forty-eight
hours or less. 2
At this time the British force in the United States strength of
Opposing
numbered 33,756; made up of 18,174 British regulars, Armies
11,007 Hessians and 4,575 Provincials; and they were
stationed, 19,530 at Philadelphia, 10,456 at New York March 26
and 3,770 at Newport. 3 The American regular force, or
"Continental line 77 and the State "lines," according to
the returns which Washington laid before a council of
war, were about 15,000, of whom 11,800 were at Valley
Forge, 1,400 at Wilmington and 1,800 on the Hudson.
Washington thought that he could get enough additional
recruits to bring the entire force up to 20,000. At this
1 Jour. Cont. Cong., XI, 701, 702.
* Sparks, V, 377, 393, 409.
8 The returns of the British army, copied from the State Paper Office in
London, at various periods from 1777 to 1782, are given in Sparks, Writings
of Washington, V, 542-545.
140 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1778 council, after a long discussion, it was decided not to
May s attack Philadelphia, but to wait events. 1 The army at
Valley Forge was organized into four divisions under
Greene, Stirling, Lafayette and Wayne. Lee, who had
recently been exchanged, was again on duty as second
in command. Steuben was inspector-general.
May is With a view to watching the first move in the expected
evacuation of Philadelphia, Washington threw out an
advance guard between the Schuylkill and the Delaware. 2
It was composed of Lafayette's division, numbering about
2,100 men and 5 guns. They advanced to a hamlet
known as Barren Hill, about 11 miles from Valley Forge
and only 2 miles from Clinton's outposts at Chestnut
Hill. In selecting Lafayette, who was not yet twenty-
one years old, for this important duty, Washington doubt-
less intended a compliment to France. But within forty-
eight hours he was in mortal dread lest the outcome
might be anything but pleasing to France. For, from
the top of the high hill at Valley Forge, he saw, across the
rolling ground between him and Barren Hill, the smoke
of skirmishes and the dust of marching columns, which
showed that the young marquis was in full retreat toward
a ford on the Schuylkill and in imminent danger of being
cut off.
Clinton had, in fact, planned to capture Lafayette and
came very near doing it. He had sent Grant with about
5,000 men via Whitemarsh to come in rear of Lafayette's
skirmish at left, Grey with about 2,000 men to cross the Schuylkill
and come behind Lafayette's right, while with a consider-
able force under his own command he marched through
Germantown and Chestnut Hill to attack Lafayette in
1 Sparks, V, 360.
2 Washington's instructions to Lafayette, Sparks, V, 368.
THE FRENCH ALLIANCE 141
front. These movements were made during the night; i??a
and early the next morning Lafayette was nearly sur- May 20
rounded by a force about five times greater than his own.
He extricated himself from this dangerous situation with
no little adroitness; 1 and although Grant was nearer to
Matson's ford (now Conshohocken) than Lafayette was,
the latter, by skilful feints of his rear guard against both
Grant and Clinton, marched by the longer road (through
Manatawna), got past the head of Grey's column and
crossed Matson's ford (Conshohocken) in safety. He
took a strong position on the heights on the south bank
of the Schuylkill, while Washington assembled every
man at Valley Forge to march to his assistance. Thanks
to Steuben's drills, they were all under arms in fifteen
minutes. But notwithstanding his enormous superiority
in force, Clinton did not cross the ford nor attack. He
retired almost immediately to Germantown; and Lafaj^
ette returned to Valley Forge. Clinton lost 2 men killed
and 7 or 8 wounded, and Lafayette's losses were about
the same.
The foolish Mischianza in honor of Howe took place the May is
same day that Lafayette moved to Barren Hill; and a May 25
week later Howe sailed for England. Clinton began
loading his transports with his heavy baggage, and early
in June several vessels had dropped down the river.
Washington was fully informed of this; he was more
than ever on the alert; frequent councils of war were
held; and preparations were made to move promptly as
soon as Clinton made any movement. 2
Finally, the transports being loaded with all they could Evacuation of
iv i j J.-U A T. x Philadelphia
carry, including some cavalry and the Anspach regiment,
1 Sparks, V, 377, 546; Irving's Washington, III, 407.
2 Sparks, V, 393, 395, 39S, 403.
142
THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1778
June 18,
3 A. M.
10 A. M.
June i9 f
vaiiey Forge
which it was feared would desert on the march/ Clinton
assembled his troops just south of Philadelphia, crossed
the Delaware to Gloucester Point and marched out to
Haddonfield, 5 miles/ Washington had information of
this within a few hours; and early in the afternoon 6
brigades, 3 under Lee and 3 following under Wayne, had
marched from Valley Forge. Washington with all the
rest of his army inarched at 5 o'clock the next morning.
T ^ g wag ^ ^^ ^.^ ^ G reene ' s wor k ^ quartermaster
and Steuben's as drill-master.
Washington believed that Clinton would move to New
Brunswick, cross the Raritan, then march to Amboy and
cross the Kills to Staten Island. 2 Such was exactly
Clinton's plan. It was therefore a race for New Bruns-
wick, and a very pretty race it was. The distance was
58 miles from Philadelphia, 66 miles from Valley Forge.
The roads were rather better on Washington's line of
march; the weather was the same for both intense
heat (the thermometer exceeding 100 F. in the sun)
alternating with violent showers.
On the sixth day Clinton had advanced only 34 miles,
and was in the vicinity of Allentown, 2 about 10 miles
east of Trenton. Washington was squarely in front of
him, 3 having marched 47 miles, crossing the Delaware at
CoryelFs ferry (Lambertville), 15 miles above Trenton;
his main body was north and east of Princeton, and Max-
well's brigade and the New Jersey militia were in contact
with Clinton/ breaking down the bridges, blockading the
roads and otherwise obstructing his march.
Clinton therefore had to change his plan and make
Sandy Hook instead of New Brunswick his objective.
1 Lowell, Hessians, 212. 2 Clinton's Report, Dawson, 415.
8 Sparks, V, 409, 411, 416, 422-423. 4 Ibid., V, 423.
THE FRENCH AULIANCE 143
He put all Ms baggage, wheeled vehicles and pack-horses 1773
under Knyphausen; and turning to the right at Allen- The TWO
town he sent them forward on the road which leads contact
through Freehold village, or Monmouth Court House, to
Sandy Hook. Hitherto he had been able to move his
columns on parallel roads, but now he had only a single
road, and his impedimenta stretched out for a length of
12 miles. The armed force with Knyphausen consisted
of a regiment of cavalry, a battalion of light infantry, 2
brigades of British, 2 brigades of Hessians, and some
Provincials. In spite of the heat and the deep sandy
roads, Knyphausen reached Freehold 19 miles on the
second morning. 1 Clinton followed him 2 with a regiment
of cavalry, a battalion of light infantry, 3 battalions of June 25
grenadiers and 3 British brigades. He arrived at Free-
hold the same afternoon.
The whole force then rested a day in a fairly strong de-
fensible position on both sides of Monmouth Court House, 2 June 2?
their flanks protected by pine woods and their front by
streams and morasses.
Washington on the previous day was at Cranberry, 8
miles east and south of Princeton, with his main body;
and his advance guard of nearly 4,000 men, under Lafay-
ette, was on the Monmouth road about 5 miles in rear of
Clinton, with orders to attack their rear guard. But as
Lafayette was too far separated from the nrnin body,
Washington drew him off to the north toward English-
town, 6 miles west of Monmouth. At Lee's request
Washington sent him with two more brigades to join
Lafayette; and on his arrival Lee, as senior officer, was
in command. 3
1 Clinton's Report, Dawson, 415.
2 Sparks, V, 424. - */&<?., V, 423.
144
THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1778
June 27
June 27
Battle of
Monmoutfa
June 28
5 A. M,
8 A. M.
10 A. M.
11.30 A. M.
At the close of this day, therefore, the positions were as
follows: Clinton and Knyphausen, about 15,000 men,
on the Momnouth plain and the hills just south of it,
facing west; Lee with the advance, 5 ; 000 men and 12
guns, at Englishtown; and Washington with his main
body, 6,000 men, between Cranberry and English-
town.
About 10 or 12 miles north of Monmouth (Freehold)
the country is broken, the Middletown hills rising to an
altitude of about 400 feet and affording a number of good
defensible positions. Washington was very anxious to
attack Clinton while he was still in the low ground and
before he could reach these hills. He therefore sent ex-
plicit orders 1 that evening to Lee to have his men in
readiness for attack, intending to march with the main
body at daylight to his support.
The next morning Knyphausen resumed his march,
and as soon as his column was stretched out Clinton
followed. 2 Washington heard of it and put his own
troops in motion at sunrise, at the same time sending an
order to Lee to attack Clinton. Lee moved forward rather
leisurely, and began a skirmish with Clinton's rear guard
about a mile north of the Court House; but instead of
making a vigorous attack he gave a number of contra-
dictory orders and then ordered a retreat. 3 The officers
and men were astonished, and fearing that something
was wrong the retreat soon became disorderly. Wash-
ington, galloping ahead of his main body, met the fugi-
tives about three miles east of Englishtown 4 and the same
distance west of the Court House where Lee had had his
1 Sparks, V, 420, 424, 425.
2 Clinton's Report, Dawson, 416.
3 Sparks, V, 420, 424, 425.
7K&, V, 419.
THE FRENCH ALLIANCE 145
skirmish. He soon encountered Lee, and there is little
doubt that Washington's passionate nature ; which he Battle of
usually controlled by his strong will, for once got the ?une^s uth '
better of him. All accounts agree that strong language
was used, but the exact words are in dispute. Dawson
quotes Lafayette as saying on his visit to Vice-President
Daniel D. Tompkins at his house in New York on August
15, 1824, forty-six years after the event that Washington Meeting of
called Lee "a damned poltroon." * If ever profanity is andc
justifiable, it was then. Here were the fruits of Washing-
ton's labors with the committee of Congress to establish
the army on an efficient basis, of Greene's work as quar-
termaster to put it in condition to march, of Steuben's
instruction in drill and discipline all in danger of being
lost by the combined incapacity, cowardice and treason
of this damnable Charles Lee. While Arnold, two years
later on the Hudson, planned an infamous stroke which,
had it succeeded, might have proved serious, yet what
Arnold actually accomplished in injury of the American
cause was but a slight fraction of the mischief caused by
Lee on this hot Sunday morning at Monmouth. In spite
of Clinton's numerical superiority, had Lee attacked him
vigorously and held him at the Court House until Wash-
ington came up, Washington would have passed around
Clinton's right flank between Monmouth and Middle-
town, penetrated between Clinton and Knyphausen and
in all probability have captured a large part of Clinton's
command.
But the mischief was done, and, without wasting more
words on Lee, Washington rode forward toward the rear
of the retreating troops and personally halted and re-
formed them, establishing a line, north and west of the
1 Dawson, 408.
146
THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1778
Battle of
Monmouth,
June 28
1 to 5.30 P. M.
parsonage, between the two morasses. 1 Clinton mean-
while had turned back all his own force and had sent to
Enyphausen for a regiment of cavalry and a brigade of
infantry. 2 With this combined force he deployed on
both sides of the road from Monmouth to Englishtown
and attacked the line which Washington had established
between the two morasses. 3 But the main body had now
arrived; and it went into action, Greene on the right,
Stirling on the left and Washington himself in the centre,
on the road. Severe fighting continued throughout the
blazing afternoon so intense was the heat that many
men on both sides dropped dead without being wounded. 4
Clinton first tried to turn the American left, then their
right; each time without success. Finally, Lieutenant -
Colonel Monckton led his grenadiers in a fierce assault
against Wayne, who was posted in an orchard on an
eminence on the north side of the road, about 400 yards
north of the parsonage. Monckton was killed and the
attack failed. 5
Toward sunset the British retired a short distance to
reform and take up a strong defensive position with
both flanks protected by small streams. Simultaneously
Washington withdrew to the west side of the west morass
or ravine, intending to reform his men and attack Clinton
1 Most of the maps in Sparks's Writings of Washington are fairly accurate.
But the one in Vol. V, p. 430, is very defective in topography and otherwise.
It was copied into Lossing, Irving and other histories and was probably
the cause of much of the difficulty expressed by various writers as to under-
standing the battle of Monmouth. The accompanying map gives the
topography as delineated on the maps of the U. S. Geological Survey; and
the positions of the troops are based upon Dawson's and Carrington's
analyses of the testimony at the court-martial of Lee.
2 Clinton's Report, Dawson, 416; Carrington, Battles of American
Revolution, 423-449.
3 Clinton's Report, Dawson, 416.
Spaxks, V, 426, 427. - 6 Lossing, II, 157.
HJLL
May 20, 1778
Courtesy of The Burrows Brothers Company,
Publishers, Cleveland, Ohio
*,^,.^- From A very 's History of the United States
MOUTH J and Its People ^^
June 27, 1778
THE FRENCH ALLIANCE 147
on both flanks. But night came on before these disposi- me
tions could be perfected, and the attack was postponed
until morning.
When day broke the British had disappeared; 1 they
had moved at midnight and were well on their way to the
Middletown heights. Although in close contact with the
enemy, the American troops had slept so soundly, ex- pes
hausted with the intense heat and the battle of the
previous day, that they had not heard the British as
they moved away. In the broken country of the Mid-
dletown heights there was no chance of successful as-
sault, and Washington therefore did not pursue. Clinton
reached Sandy Hook in safety, 2 and simultaneously Lord
Howe arrived with his ships from the Delaware. On these
the troops were transported up the bay to New York. 3
Clinton reported his losses at 124 dead, 170 wounded
and 64 missing; and he claimed that nearl} r half his dead
had perished from the heat. But Washington stated
that the number of British buried '"according to the re-
turns of the parties assigned to that duty" was 249 *
He wrote to Arnold who, on account of his wound re-
ceived at Berois' Heights, was unable to move with the
army and had been sent into Philadelphia to take com-
mand and perserve order there that Clinton's losses
during his retreat must have been at least 2,000, includ-
ing 600 Hessians who had deserted during the march and
gone back to Philadelphia, thenceforth to become good
American citizens. Washington reported his own losses
at 58 killed, 161 wounded and 131 missing. 4
Washington's army remained a few days at English-
town, and thence moved by easy marches through Bruns-
1 Sparks, V, 427, 428, 429. 3 Clinton's Report, Dawson, 417.
3 Mahan, 360. * Sparks, V, 428; Dawson, 415.
148 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1778 wick and Paramus to the Hudson, crossed the river at
21 Haverstraw and established itself at White Plains.
court-Martial Charles Lee was promptly put in close arrest and
of charies Lee Bought to r i a i f or disobedience of orders, misbehavior
before the enemy and disrespect to the commander-in-
chief. 1 The court-martial moved with the army, hold-
ing its sittings from day to day for a period of six weeks.
The court found him guilty of all three charges, and im-
posed the ridiculously inadequate sentence of suspension
from rank for twelve months. The proceedings went to
Congress for ratification, and that body held it under
Dec. s consideration for nearly four months. Then, by a vote
of 16 to 7 (Massachusetts, under the lead of Samuel
Adams, and Georgia voting No; New Jersey, Maryland
and Virginia being divided and casting no vote, and six
States, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, Pennsyl-
vania, North Carolina, South Carolina voting Ay), Con-
gress grudgingly directed the sentence to "be carried
into execution." 2 Just as his sentence was expiring,
Lee committed the heinous offence of writing a disrespect-
ful letter to Congress, whereupon that body, without a
Jan. 10, 1780 roll-call, unanimously passed a resolution that they
"have no further occasion for his services in the army of
the United States." 3 Lee retired to his farm in Virginia
and occupied the remaining six years of his life in
making scurrilous attacks upon Washington and writing
a blasphemous will. 4
While Clinton was retreating from Philadelphia to New
York and for many weeks before & French squadron
1 Court-Martial of Charles Lee, printed by order of Congress, August 21,
1778. Reprinted in 1823 and 1824. Jour. Cont. Cong., XII, 1287.
3 Jour. Cont. Cong., XII, 1195.
3 Jour. Cong., Ill, 421.
* Sparks, V, 552-558; VI, 309; Life and Memoirs of Charles Lee, 160
THE FRENCH ALLIANCE 149
of 12 ships of the line and 5 frigates, mounting 834 guns 1773
and carrying 4,000 soldiers, was on its way across the
Atlantic. It had sailed from Toulon and after a voyage A Pr u is
of 84 days had arrived at the capes of the Delaware. 1 juiys
Lord Howe, who commanded the British fleet and trans-
ports, had been gone 10 days. 1 He knew that the French
fleet was on the way, and he had thrown into the work of Arrival of the
loading Clinton's transports and moving them to New reac
York that necessary energy of which his brother Sir
William had shown so great a lack. The commander of
the French fleet was Comte d'Estaing, who had served in
the army until his thirtieth year and then been trans-
ferred to the navy "with the premature rank of rear-
admiral." He lacked the sailor's training, and his cap-
tains were jealous of him, 2
After sending the French minister up the Delaware in imy u
one of his ships, d'Estaing sailed northward and anchored
in the ocean just south of Sandy Hook. Washington
sent his aides, 3 first Laurens and then Hamilton, to wel-
come d'Estaing and explain his views as to co-operation*
Lord Howe, having carried Clinton's army to New York,
hastened back to his ships and anchored inside the Hook.
The two fleets were in plain view of each other, across the
low narrow strip of sand just south of the Hook. Lord
Howe had only 9 ships of the line to d'Estaing's 12, and
534 guns to his 834; but he was a sailor as d'Estaing
was not 4 and he was determined to dispute the entrance
of the French fleet to the last.
D'Estaing remained there eleven days. In letters to
Washington and to Congress, filled with profuse com-
1 Mahan, 359, 360; Sparks, V, 440.
2 Chevalier, Hist, de la Marine Fran^aise, quoted by Mahan, 37L
3 Sparks, VI, 1-5. 4 Mahan, 360, 363, 364.
150 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1778 pliments, he explained the difficulty of crossing the bar,
and said that he offered the pilots 50,000 crowns 1 if they
would promise success. But Mahan says that "d'Es-
taing's heart failed him under the discouragement of the
pilots; he gave up the attack and stood away to the
southward." Mahan intimates that with Nelson or
Farragut in d'Estaing's place, the result might have
been very different. Probable it is that if d'Estaing
had smashed the British fleet in New York and united
his 4,000 soldiers to those of Washington on the north
side of Harlem River, Clinton's army on Manhattan
Island and without ships would have been caught like
rats in a trap, and not a man would have escaped.
Attack on It had been arranged between d'Estaing and Wash-
" ewport ington's aides 2 that if it was not feasible to cross the bar
at Sandy Hook a combined land and naval movement
should be made against Newport, where General Pigott
was in command of about 3,000 men, part of those who
had captured Newport under Clinton in 1776. 3 D'Estaing
July 29 sailed thither and at the end of a week anchored off Point
Judith. 4 Sullivan had been in command at Providence
since the adjournment of the court which had inquired
into his conduct at the Brandywine and on Staten Island
juiy n and had acquitted him. He had about 1,000 Continentals
under his command, and Washington wrote to him "to
apply in the most urgent manner in my [his] name" to
the New England States to raise 5,000 militia or more.
The militia turned out so promptly that within thirty
days Sullivan had 7,000 of them, with John Hancock at
July 22 their head. Washington then put Lafayette in com-
J Sparks, VI, 12.
2 Sparks, VI, 12; Sparks, Letters, II, 155, 159.
3 Page 62, ante. * Mahan, 361.
THE FRENCH ALLIANCE 151
mand of two brigades and directed him to march to 1773
Providence; and a few days later he sent Greene to Juiy27
Rhode Island (his own State) and instructed Sullivan that
his entire force, Continentals and militia, was to be
divided into two divisions, of which Greene would com-
mand one and Lafayette the other. 1
The result of these dispositions was to assemble a force
of about 10,000 men under Sullivan's command. Un-
fortunately they did not arrive until about ten days after
d'Estaing; and when d'Estaing sailed into Narragansett
Bay, between Newport and Jamestown, and was pre- Aug.s
paring to land his soldiers a few miles north of Newport,
and join Sullivan who had brought his troops to the
same point, Lord Howe appeared off Point Judith. 3
With his customary energy he had sailed from New York
for Newport as soon as he heard that d'Estaing had gone
there. When the latter saw the masts of Howe's ships
in the distance, he promptly decided to fight the British
fleet before aiding Sullivan. Sullivan protested, but the
French captains were a unit in insisting upon it; and
when the wind changed to the north-east d'Estaing Aug. 10
sailed out to meet Howe. 3 He carried his 4,000 soldiers
with him; but why he should have wished to be encum-
bered with them in a naval action has never been ex-
plained. The two fleets manoeuvred off Block Island Aug. 12
for the weather-gage for nearly two days, and then a
furious gale arose and scattered both French and- English
ships. Several ships were dismasted, and the damage
was so serious that Howe had to return to New York.
D'Estaing came back to Newport, but only to announce Aug. 20
1 Sparks, VI, 6.
3 Mahan, 361-364; Sparks, 29, 40, 41; Sparks, Letters, II, 176-179.
8 Sparks, VI, 29.
152 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1778 Ms intention of proceeding to Boston for repairs. 1 Greene
and Lafayette urged him to land his troops and attack
the British; after that he could refit his squadron either
Aug. 22 in Newport or in Boston. But d'Estaing would not
yield, and sailed away. 2
Dissension Bad blood was thus stirred up between the allies at the
Aiiies eei1 e very start. Washington, with his usual calmness and
good judgment, tried to restore good feeling; and Greene
and Lafayette ably seconded his efforts. But Sullivan
was so angry that he was most indiscreet. He not only
filed a written protest with d'Estaing, but he published
Aug. 24 an order to his troops expressing the hope that America
would be "able to procure with her own arms that which
her allies refused to assist her in obtaining." 2 When
the militia read this they made up their minds that the
expedition would fail and that they might as well go
home; and more than 5,000 of them went off within a
few days.
Aug. 15 When d'Estaing had gone out to meet Howe, Sullivan
had decided not to delay his operations; 3 and he ad-
vanced his men to within two miles of the British lines
just north of Newport. During the ensuing week he
prosecuted siege operations against the British redoubts
and lines in the vicinity of Easton's Pond, and for several
days a vigorous artillery fire was exchanged between the
two lines. But when d'Estaing's fleet sailed away and
the militia went home there was nothing for Sullivan to
do but to extricate himself from his difficult position as
Aug. 28 best he could and without delay. Accordingly he re-
treated during the night to the northern end of the
island, and there took position in the lines which had
J Mahan, 362-364.
2 Sparks, V, 41, 45, 47. Sullivan's Report, Dawson, 439.
American Forces in Blue
British Forces in Red
First Position in battle M
Second Position in battleca ^
Courtesy of The Burrows Brothers Company. Publishers, Cleveland, Ohio
From A very "s History of the United States and Its People
PENOBSCOT
July 25, 1779
Advance of
. British Army from Staten Island
SPRINGFIELD
June 33, 1780
Encampment-
around.^'eiv York
THE FRENCH ALLIANCE 153
originally been fortified by the British, just south of ms
Butt's Hill. 1 At daylight Pigott moved after him in Battle of
two columns, the British on the east road and the Hes- hodel ^
sians on the west road. As soon as he came up with Aug. 29
Sullivan's outposts and "light parties," skirmishing
began. These were driven back and then Pigott made
a vigorous attack by the west road against Sullivan's
right flank, which was commanded by Greene. The
firing continued here for several hours and the British
brought their entire force into action and supported it by
a flanking fire from some ships in the bay. 2 But Greene
had two veteran brigades Glover's famous Marblehead
fishermen and Varnuin's Rhode Island regiments which
had marched to Cambridge more than three years before
and been in constant service ever since; in addition
to these was Cornell's militia and a regiment of Rhode
Island negroes commanded by Christopher Greene.
They all made a good defence, and the whole force of
British and Hessians could not dislodge them. During
the afternoon the firing ceased. Both armies remained
within a short distance of each other during the night
and following day. 3 Pigott sent back to Newport for Aug. so
his artillery and intended to attack again as soon as it
arrived. 4 But during the morning Sullivan received a
letter from Washington telling him that Lord Howe had
sailed from New York with reinforcements; and later in
the day report was received that the British fleet had
been sighted off Block Island. He decided to withdraw
to the main-land, and during the night succeeded in doing
so without loss, a portion of his force crossing to Bristol,
1 Sullivan's Report, Dawson, 439. 2 Pigott's Report, Dawson, 442.
3 Sullivan's Report, Dawson, 440, 441; Sparks, Corr., II, 179-204.
4 Pigott's Report, Dawson, 442, 443.
154
THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
Nov. 4
Departure
of the French
Fleet.
1778 but the greater part to Tiverton. His losses were 30
lolled, 137 wounded and 44 missing; and those of Pigott,
38 killed, 210 wounded and 12 missing. 1
Aug. si Within a few hours of Sullivan's retreat to Tiverton,
Lord Howe's fleet, carrying Sir Henry Clinton and 5,000
of his men, dropped anchor in Newport harbor. This
increased the strength of the British garrison to about
11,000 men. The rest of Sullivan's militia now went
home, and with his 1,200 Continentals he withdrew to
Providence. Clinton made no attempt to follow him,
but taking part of his men on the ships, he harried the
towns along the shores of Long Island Sound. 2
D'Estaing finally completed the repairs of his ships at
Boston and then sailed for Martinique, still keeping his
4,000 soldiers with him. 3 And on the same day Ginton
despatched from New York to St. Lucia the 5,000 men
which he had been ordered to send there. During the
winter Lafayette, after vainly endeavoring to secure
Jan. 11, 1779 Washington's approval to a project for the reconquest of
Canada, sailed back to France. 4
The close of the year thus saw the French and English
renewing their ancient strife, and the seat of war trans-
ferred to the West Indies,
The French alliance, which many thought would
promptly end the war, brought at first little but distrust
and recrimination. Whether the French admiral had
instructions similar to those given the minister of France
to be guided by French and not entirely by American
interests is not known; but Gerard had been his guest
on his flag-ship for twelve weeks, and it is probable that
Sullivan's Report, Pigott's Report, Dawson, 438, 444.
5 Sparks, VI, 63.
1 Mahan, 365. Sparks, VI, 190, 545-556.
THE FRENCH ALLIANCE 155
d'Estaing knew his instructions. 1 To have brought peace irrs
so quickly and without an attempt to regain Canada for
the French would perhaps not have accorded entirely
with the French plans. Nor have we the slightest ground
to complain of this. Every nation must act for its own
interests first, and even exclusively. It was our good
fortune that it was the interest of France to aid America
in order to injure Great Britain; and its aid was of im-
mense value in enabling America to gain what it desired. 2
The military operations of the next four years at the
North were of minor importance and can only be briefly
summarized.
The British army occupied New York and Newport
during the first winter; and Washington disposed his
troops in cantonments at Middlebrook (now Bound Brook) Mlddlebrook
Elizabeth, Ramapo, West Point, Fishkill and Danbury. 3
They were dispersed in this fashion for the purposes of
subsistence, but they were in supporting distance, and
could be concentrated quickly if Clinton made any move
into New Jersey, up the Hudson or into New England,
The cantonments formed a semicircle of forty miles 7
radius around Clinton at New York; and they guarded
1 Mahan, 359.
2 Lafayette's plan for the reconquest of Canada was submitted by him to
Congress, and received the formal approval of that body October 22, 1778.
Precise instructions were sent four days later to Franklin to govern his
conduct as minister in France; and among these instructions were the
complete plans for the invasion of Canada. At the same time Congress
asked Washington for his views on the subject. In a far-sighted letter,
dated November 14, 1778, he replied, opposing the project with such un-
answerable arguments that it was abandoned. In this letter Washington
uses these words as true and as significant to-day as the day they were
'written "It is a maxim, founded on the universal experience of mankind,
that no nation is to be trusted further than it is bound by its interest"
Sparks, VI, 107, 110; Jour, Cont Cong., 1039-104S.
* Sparks, I, 306; VI, 124, 135, 153, 158, 167.
156
THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1778
Oct.
Capture of
Stony Point
1779
May si
June e
June 25
juiy 21
the vital points in the Highlands of the Hudson through
which communication was kept up between New Eng-
land and the Middle States. The fortifications in the
Highlands were meanwhile strengthened, West Point
being the centre of the system instead of the forts eight
miles below which had been captured by Sir Henry
Clinton. An outpost, however, was planned at Stony
Point, and this was in process of fortification when
Clinton attacked and captured it. At the same time he
took possession of the fort at Verplanck's Point on the
opposite side of the river. 1
For this purpose Clinton had brought about 6,000 men
up the river; 2 and the possession of Stony and Verplanck's
Points cut off King's Ferry, which connected the two points
and which had been the usual and most convenient place
for crossing the Hudson. An attack on .West Point was
likely to be the next move of Clinton. 3
Washington therefore left Middlebrook, which had been
his head-quarters for the last six months, and moved first
to the Clove (near Haverstraw), then to New Windsor
(Newburg) and finally to West Point, where he remained
until the close of the year. Nearly 5,000 of his Conti-
nental troops had recently been sent under Sullivan to
punish the Indians who had committed the massacres in
the Wyoming valley of Pennsylvania during the preceding
summer. 4 This left him not more than about 8,000 men.
This was insufficient for an attack on New York, for which
there was a tempting opportunity had he had sufficient
force, or had d'Estaing with his fleet and his soldiers
1 Clinton's Report, Dawson, 526; Sparks, VI, 269.
2 Clinton's Report, Dawson, 345.
3 Sparks, VI, 164, 264, 272, 304.
4 Sullivan's Indian Expedition, 1779, published by the State of New
York, 1887.
THE FRENCH ALLIANCE 157
been in that vicinity instead of in the West Indies. The 1779
most that Washington could attempt, therefore, was the
recapture of Stony and Verplanck's Points. The former
was intrusted to Wayne 1 and the latter to McDougall. 2
Through some misunderstanding or miscarriage of orders
McDougall made no serious attempt; but Wayne carried
out his part of the project in the most brilliant manner.
For this attack Washington placed under Wayne's Recapture of
command the light infantry of the army, about 1,200 in st<my Pomt
number, and after reconnoitring the approaches in person
he gave Wayne instructions to make the attack with un-
loaded muskets and to rely solely on the bayonet. As
the usual hour for such enterprises was just before dawn,
and on that account the watch was more strict at that
hour, Washington enjoined Wayne to make the attempt
about midnight. Muhlenberg's brigade of about 300 men
was to follow Wayne and be in position to reinforce the
attack, if necessary; or to form a rallying-point in the
retreat, if the enterprise should prove unsuccessful.
Wayne began his march from Fort Montgomery at
noon; and crossing the mountains in rear of Stony Point
he arrived within a mile and a half of the enemy's lines
at 8 o'clock; 3 here he formed his troops in two columns,
1 Sparks, VI, 289. 3 Ibid., VI, 288, 298, 299.
3 Washington was generous enough to report to Congress (Sparks, VI,
298) that Wayne "improved upon the plan recommended by me [him] and
executed It in a manner that does signal honor to his judgment and to his
bravery."
Wayne's Order of Battle, drawn up by him on July 15 and submitted
to Washington before it was read to his troops late that evening, is a model
for a document of that kind clear, definite, explicit, brief but lacking in
no detail It contained two paragraphs which showed the serious nature of
the business on hand; and the understanding by his men of this serious-
ness was possibly one of the chief causes of the brilliant success which
followed.
"If any soldier presumes to take his musket from his shoulder to fire
or begin the battle until ordered by his proper officer, he shall be instantly
158 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1779 each preceded by an advance guard of about 150 volun-
teers, and in front of these a party of 20 picked men and
an officer. 1 After carefully reconnoitring the ground
over which the advance was to be made, Wayne placed
himself at the head of the right column, and shortly
jmy is after midnight both columns moved forward. 1 Not a
Wayne's Re- shot was fired on the American side. Wayne "gave the
port, jmy 17 tro0 p g ^ mog po^ed orders not to fire on any account,
but place their whole dependence on the bayonet, which
order was literally and faithfully obeyed. Neither the
deep morass, the formidable and double rows of abatis
nor the strong works in front and flank could damp the
ardor of the troops, who, in the face of the most tremen-
dous and incessant fire of musketry, and from cannon
loaded with grape-shot, forced their way at the point of
the bayonet through every obstacle, both columns meet-
ing in the centre of the enemy's works nearly at the same
instant." Wayne was wounded at the abatis, but his
men pressed on into the fort, and all of the garrison who
had not been killed or wounded were taken prisoners. 1
Wayne's loss was 15 killed and 83 wounded. The
British lost 19 killed, 74 wounded, 58 missing and 472
prisoners 623 in all. 2 The captured cannon were ap-
put to death by the officer next to him; for the misconduct of one man is
not to put the whole troops in danger or disorder, and be suffered to pass
with life "
After promising rewards to the first five men to enter the works, he adds:
"But should there be any soldier so lost to every feeling of honor as to
attempt to retreat one single foot, or to skulk in the face of danger, the
officer next to him is to immediately put him to death, that he may no
longer disgrace the name of a soldier or the corps or State he belongs to.
"As General Wayne is determined to share the danger of the night, so
he wishes to participate in the glory of the day in common with his fellow-
soldiers."
1 Wayne's Report, Dawson, 525.
2 Wayne's Report, Clinton's Report, Dawson, 527; Johnston, Stony
Point, 206.
A- Right Column under Wayne
B. Left Column under Murphy
and Butler
C. British guard at Causeway
D. Reserve under Miihlenberg
STONY POINT
July 16, 1779
Courtesy of The Burrow, s Brothers Company, 2S From A very '5 History of fhe United States
Publishers, Cleveland, Ohio ' and its People
TRYON'S RAID
July 5-8, 1779
THE FRENCH ALLIANCE 159
praised at $158,640 and that sum was distributed by 1779
order of Congress 1 among the officers and men of the
storming party, in proportion to the pay of each; and
the further sum of 1,500 was divided among the first
five men to enter the works. Congress also ordered
three medals to be struck in honor of Wayne, and of
Fleury and Stewart who commanded the two columns.
Sir Henry Clinton immediately brought reinforcements July 17
from New York up the river to Dobb's Ferry; and Wash-
ington made a personal examination of Stony Point. He
was convinced that it could not be held by less than
1,500 men; 2 it was nearly 20 miles, following the winding
roads through the mountains, from his main position at
West Point. He therefore determined to evacuate the Evacuation of
post, and the cannon and stores were removed and the " toni
works destroyed during the following night, the troops July is
retreating to West Point. Clinton brought up his whole
force from Dobb's Ferry and regained possession of
Stony Point the next morning. 3 He retained possession July 19
of it only a short time, however. Finding that he could
not draw Washington into a general engagement south
of the Highlands, and not feeling any confidence in his
ability to capture West Point, he soon afterward deter-
mined to transfer the war to the south and to accompany
the expedition himself. 4 In anticipation of this he with-
drew his troops from both Verplanck's and Stony Points.
In the following month Major Henry Lee, who com- Oct. 21
manded the "Light Horse," requested permission to capture of
attack the British post at Paulus or Powle's Hook on
the Jersey shore (just behind the present site of the Jersey
1 Jour. Cent. Cong., XIV. 890-891. 3 Sparks, VI, 300, 301, 302.
8 Clinton's Report, Dawson, 526.
4 Stedman, II, 152; Sparks, I, 328; Clinton to Germain, Sparks, VI, 327.
160 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1779 City station of the Pennsylvania Railroad). Lee had been
in the supporting party at Stony Point and he was keen
to undertake a similar enterprise on his own account.
After some hesitation 1 Washington gave his consent,
but stipulated that not more than 300 men should be
engaged, and that no attempt should be made to hold
the post. The purpose was to surprise the garrison and
bring off as many prisoners as could be secured.
AUS. is, Lee set out from Paramus (now Ridgewood), 21 miles
north-west of Paulus Hook, with part of his command
4p.M. and was joined by the rest at Hackensack. Through
the treachery or ignorance of a guide several hours were
lost during the evening and part of his men were sepa-
rated from him. With the remainder, something less
than 300 in number, he reached the marsh, which sepa-
rated the fortified position on the Hook from the main-
AU?. 19, land, not long before dawn. The tide was rising, the day
soon break and the arm-munition was ruined in
wading through the marsh. Not a moment was to be
lost, and the men rushed forward as at Stony Point
without firing a shot. They cleared the abatis, crossed
the ditch and entered the works. There was a short
hand-to-hand fight, in which it is said that Lee lost only
2 killed and 3 wounded, whereas the British loss was
about 50, and then the greater part of the garrison sur-
rendered. Daylight was coming on and Lee immediately
began his retreat, bringing with him 158 prisoners. On
his way back he was attacked in flank by a portion of the
British garrison which was on a foraging expedition near
Aug. i9. Weehawken; but Lee beat them off and arrived in safety
11 00 A M "
at the Hackensack Bridge, after twenty-seven hours of
continuous marching and not a little fighting. Here a
1 Sparks, VI, 317, 318.
THE FRENCH ALLIANCE 161
supporting brigade under Lord Stirling received him, 1779
and the next day the entire force returned to Para- Aug. 20
mug. 1
Lee's exploit was justly applauded and he received the
thanks of Congress 3 and a gold medal. Its military im-
portance was that which results from an "insult" to the
enemy and from the encouragement it gave to our own
army.
Stony Point and Paulus Hook were the only two mili-
tary events of the year at the North. Clinton had, in- May 9
deed ; sent a marauding expedition of 2,500 men, under
Matthews, into the Chesapeake, which captured Norfolk,
destroyed a number of ships at Suffolk and carried away Imec
a considerable quantity of stores, including 3,000 hogs-
heads of tobacco, 3 Later a similar expedition, under
Tryon, was sent along the Sound; it destroyed the ship- Julys
ping and set fire to the towns from New Haven to Nor- July u
walk. 4 These raids angered the population, but had no
effect whatever on the issue of the contest.
On the other hand, about 1,000 Massachusetts militia
undertook an independent expedition against Castine, Expedltloa
at the mouth of the Penobscot 5 River in Maine, where
about 800 British troops had been sent from Halifax to
cover parties engaged in getting masts and spars for the
British ships. The expedition was a failure, the naval juiy25
and military commanders quarrelled, the attack was re- Aug. n
pulsed, a portion of the British fleet arrived from New
York, the ships (24 transports and 20 armed vessels
carrying 344 guns) were burned and the members of
the expedition made their way home through the wilder-
1 Lee's Report, Dawson, 549-552.
3 Jour. Cent. Cong., XV, 1100. Sparks, VI, 261, 262.
* Tryon J s Report, Dawson, 514; Sparks, VI, 285, 293.
6 Sparks, VI, 307, 350; Stedman, II, 147, 151.
162
THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
Dec. 7
Winter Can-
tonments for
1779-80
1779 ness, in small groups amidst terrible hardships, during
the autumn. 1
This expedition was undertaken without consulting
Washington, 2 and is an example of that lack of central
control which prevented the successful application of our
military resources during the Revolution.
As winter came on Washington moved his head-quar-
ters to Morristown. Sullivan's force had returned from
the Indian campaign, but it was necessary to send a con-
siderable reinforcement to the South. His little army
was disposed in cantonments much as in the preceding
winter at Morristown, in northern New Jersey, in the
Highlands and in Connecticut. 3 It was a winter of ex-
treme severity,. North River and a part of New York Bay
being closed with ice strong enough to bear artillery. 4
The sufferings of the men for lack of food and clothing
were but little inferior to those at Valley Forge two
years before; and it soon became necessary to resort to
impressment in order to obtain food. The ever-present
difficulty of obtaining recruits gave Washington the great-
est anxiety, and in several of his letters he expressed
the opinion that the prospect of final success was never
March 9 so discouraging as at that time. Congress had consoli-
dated 5 the 104 battalions (16 Continental and 88 State
"lines") into 80 battalions. The return of October
showed a paper strength of 27,099, of whom 14,998 were
enlisted for the war and the others for various periods
which would expire during the coining spring and summer.
Washington urged an annual draft to fill up the battalions,
the payment of a Continental bounty to such of the
^hacher's Military Journal, 170; Stedman, II, 152.
3 Sparks, VI, 350. Ibid., 408, 411, 420, 438.
4 Kapp, Kalb, 183. Jour. Cont Cong., XIII, 298.
THE FRENCH ALLIANCE 163
drafted men as would enlist for the period of the war, 1779
and the abolition of State, county and town bounties. 1
The States and towns, however, continued to exercise
their own judgment about bounties, and there was much
dissatisfaction among the men who three years before
had enlisted for the war. The recruiting was never thor-
oughly organized and systematized; but a certain num-
ber of recruits was obtained by Washington's incessant
appeals.
On the British side, Newport was abandoned, and the Evacuation of
only post retained was New York. Cornwallis arrived bct W 25 rt "
with reinforcements, and these, added to the troops
brought from Newport, carried the garrison of New York Dec. i
to 28,756. Of these 13,848 were British regulars, 10,836
were Hessians and 4,072 were Provincials. Washington
had only 10,400 effective in all his cantonments; 3 but
Clinton did not feel strong enough to attack him. He
preferred the plan of sending a large part of his force to
the South.
Some months after Clinton had gone to the South, i7so
Knyphausen, who was left in command at New York, offensive
determined on an offensive movement in New Jersey. 3
He had heard that two regiments at Morristown had
mutinied because they had received neither food, cloth-
ing nor pay, and that the population of New Jersey were
disaffected to the American cause. He thought that if
the British troops appeared in New Jersey the people,
the militia and possibly the mutinous regiments would
rally to their support. He therefore took two brigades,
Matthews' and Stirling's, with about 5,000 men, crossed
the Kails from Staten Island to Elizabeth and marched
1 Sparks, VI, 402, 403. 2 Ibid., V, 543; MI, 6.
3 Stedman, II, 240, 241; Sparks, VII, 76.
164
THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1780
June?
Skirmish at
Springfield
Battle of
Springfield,
June 23
toward Morristown. But he was quickly undeceived as
to the temper of the inhabitants. They fired upon his
troops from their houses and from the woods; Stirling
was fatally wounded; the militia gathered quickly in
front of him, and when after a march of eight miles he
reached the village of Springfield, he found one of the
regiments which had mutinied drawn up in line to op-
pose him. Only a few shots were fired, and then the
British column began a retreat, which seems to have been
unnecessarily precipitate, to Elizabeth. They would
have crossed to Staten Island, but the low tide prevented
their getting their cavalry to the bridge of boats which
they had built across the Kills where it joins Newark Bay.
They therefore stopped on the Jersey shore, and threw
up intrenchments, in the nature of a bridge head, for
their protection. 1
A few days later Clinton returned to New York from
South Carolina, and he determined to do something to
redeem this fiasco. He therefore put some of his troops
on transports and made a feint of moving up the Hud-
son. Washington promptly started toward Ramapo and
the Clove with a part of his force, leaving Greene in com-
mand at Morristown. Greene with about 1,000 Con-
tinentals and the Jersey militia under Dickinson took
position behind the stream at Springfield, about 10 miles
in advance of Morristown. 2
Knyphausen left Elizabeth early in the morning with
about 5,000 infantry, a considerable body of cavalry and
18 pieces of artillery. Marching rapidly, he soon reached
the Elizabeth River, about 3 miles east of Springfield,
and there divided his force into two columns; sending
'Stedman, II, 240, 241; Sparks, VII, 76.
a Ibid., II, 243, 244; ibid., VII, 85, 87, 506-508.
THE FRENCH ALLIANCE 165
Matthews forward on the road to Springfield, while he 1730
himself took the Vauxhall road on the right, intending to
turn Greene's left flank. Greene sent Henry Lee with
his cavalry and a regiment of infantry to defend the
Vauxhall bridge, and posted the rest of his Continentals
.at the two bridges in front of Springfield. The militia
were placed on the flanks. While these troops were far
inferior in strength to the British force, they made so
.spirited a defence at the bridges that they delayed the
.advance of Knyphausen until late in the afternoon, and
gave Greene time to withdraw his force to a strong posi-
tion in front of Short Hills, where the Vauxhall and
Springfield roads came together. Here he awaited an
.attack; and a brigade, sent back by Washington as soon
as he heard of the fight, was momentarily expected. But
instead of attacking, the British set fire to the houses in
.Springfield and late in the afternoon began a hasty
retreat so rapid that Stark's brigade, which was sent
in pursuit, was unable to overtake them.
Greene's loss was 13 killed, 62 wounded and 9 missing.
The loss of the British was supposed to be somewhat
larger, but was never accurately known.
Knyphausen remained at his bridge head near Eliza-
beth until midnight and then crossed over to Staten
Island, taking up his bridge of boats at daylight. 1 The June 24
British troops never again attempted any serious opera-
tions in New Jersey. 2
Washington did not return to Morristown. He thought
that Clinton would attack the forts in the Highlands,
.and he moved his army to the northern part of New
Jersey; and moved his own head-quarters, in succession,
1 Sparks, VII, 506-508; Dawson, 596-600.
2 Stedinan, II, 244.
166
THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1780
July 26
Washington to
President of
Congress, April
14, 1779
March 16, 1779
Nov. 24, 1779
Arnold in
Command at
West Point
Aug. 4
Arnold's
Treason
Feb. 3, 1779
May I, 1779
Jan. 20. 1780
to Ramapo, to Peekskill and to West Point. Greene,
worn out with the vexatious relations with Congress in
his uncongenial and thankless task as quartermaster-
general, finally resigned that post 1 and resumed his
duties in the line, being now second in command to
Washington. Washington, conscious of his own strength
and rectitude, waived all consideration of the innuendoes
and unjust criticism of him which Gates was constantly
sending to his friends in Congress. He had offered
Gates the command of Sullivan's expedition against the
Indians, which Gates curtly declined. As the com-
mand in the Highlands seemed now the most important
station in the army, Washington offered this to Gates; 2
he again declined, and obtained leave to retire to his
estate in Virginia. Arnold then applied for the com-
mand at West Point and his application was supported
by some members of Congress, After considering the
application for several months, Washington granted it,
and Arnold took command. 3
This application was made with treasonable intent,
for, as was afterward learned, Arnold had been in corre-
spondence with Clinton under an assumed name for nearly
eighteen months. While in command at Philadelphia,
he lived beyond his means and got into debt; 4 he also
gave offence to the Council of Pennsylvania and they pre-
ferred charges against him. Washington promptly or-
dered a court-martial, but the council were slow in pro-
ducing their witnesses, and the trial dragged through the
year. It was finally concluded, and the court found hi
censurable on two of the charges and sentenced him to a
1 SpaAs, VII, 91, 131, 150, 304, 512, 515.
3 Ibid., VI, 188, 189, 214-223, 409.
L, VII, 95, 139, 140, 265, 521.
* Arnold, 239.
Courtesy of The Burrows Brothers Company,
Publishers, Cleveland, Ohio
From Avery's History of the United States
and Its People
ARNOLD'S TREASON
ANDRE'S CAPTURE
Sept. 20-25, I 7^
THE FRENCH ALLIANCE 167
reprimand. 1 While he was a brave and skilful soldier,
his mind was ill-balanced; and brooding over his griev-
ances and the slights which he fancied had been put upon
him ever since the capture of Ticonderoga in 1775, he
thought he would duplicate the parts which had been
played in the past by Monck and by Marlborough 2 to
their great profit and would deliver the American army
into the hands of the British and restore the allegiance of
the Colonies to the 'British crown.
When Clinton learned the identity of his anonymous Meeting of
correspondent he turned him over to Andre, his adjutant- And, an
general. The correspondence continued, and at Arnold's
request and under his passport Andre went up the river,
and met Arnold late at night, on the west shore a few
miles below Stony Point. Arnold delivered to him vari-
ous documents, some of them in his own handwriting
a detailed statement of the troops, 3,086 in number,
stationed at various posts in the Highlands; a complete
description of the forts in the Highlands and the arma-
ment and ordnance stores at each; the standing orders
to the garrison as to what they should do in case of
attack; and a copy of the proceedings of the council of
war held at West Point a short time before. 3 What
1 The language which Washington used in this reprimand is classic.
"Our profession is the chastest of all; even the shadow of a fault tarnishes
the lustre of our finest achievements. , . I reprimand you for having
forgotten that in proportion as you have rendered yourself formidable to
our enemies, you should have been guarded and temperate in your de-
portment toward your fellow-citizens. Exhibit anew those noble qualities
which have placed you on the list of our most valued commanders. I will
myself furnish you, so far as it may be hi my power, with opportunities of
regaining the esteem of your country." (Arnold, 261.)
2 Monck delivered the Roundhead army to Charles II ; Marlborough
deserted during the night from James II to William of Orange, and aided
in establishing William on the throne. See Wolseley's Marlborough, where
the question of Marlborough's honor is discussed at length.
8 All the essential letters are given in Sparks, VII, 520-552.
168 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1780 plans were verbally discussed at this midnight meeting is
not a matter of record; but it was universally believed,
and doubtless correctly, that they included the details
of an attack by Clinton and a surrender by Arnold; and
that this would take place either during the next two days
or later, during an expected movement of Washington
against New York, concerning which Washington was at
that moment in conference with Rochambeau at Hartford.
sept. 22 The next morning Arnold returned to his head-quarters
capture of at the Robinson house, opposite West Point, and Andre
se n pt*23 started to return to New York. He was captured near
Tarrytown with the above-mentioned documents in his
boots. The officer to whom Andr was brought sent word
of the capture to Arnold, and despatched the documents
by messenger to meet Washington on the road back from
Hartford. Arnold received the intelligence while at break-
sept. 25 fast. He immediately left the house and escaped in his
barge, which rowed him down the river below Verplanck's
Point, where he arrived safely within the British lines.
Washington arrived at the Robinson house, on his
return from Hartford, an hour after Arnold had left. He
crossed to West Point and inspected the works, and re-
turned to the Robinson house about noon. There the
messenger, who had missed Washington on the road,
arrived with the documents and a letter from Andre.
Hamilton was at once sent off in the hope of capturing
Arnold, but the latter had so many hours the start that
pursuit was fruitless. Simultaneously orders were sent
to Greene, who had been left in command of the army at
Tappan during Washington's absence, to march the left
wing to King's Ferry so as to be in position to dispute
any attempt of Clinton to come up the river. 1
1 Sparks, VII, 520-552; also VII, 205, 212, 214-221, 235, 241, 256.
THE FRENCH ALLIANCE 169
The unfortunate Andr^ 1 was first brought to West ITSO
Point and then to Tappan. A- board of fourteen general Trial of Andre,
officers, with Greene as president, and including Stirling, ept ' 26
Lafayette, Steuben, James Clinton, Knox, Glover and
Stark, was convened to try Andre. The board found sept.29
that "under a feigned name and in a disguised habit he
passed our works," . . . that he was captured "in a dis-
guised habit," while on his way to New York, and "when
taken he had in his possession several papers which
contained intelligence for the enemy." The board was
therefore of opinion that he "ought to be considered a
spy from the enemy, and that agreeably to the laws and
usage of nations, it is their opinion he ought to suffer
death." Washington approved the sentence, and Andre Death of
, , A 1 J T- A 1J J ' Ct ' 2 '
was hanged. Appeals were made by Arnold and.Clm- 12 M,
ton, 1 and the latter sent up the tory chief-justice to
argue that Andre was not a spy; it is said that Arnold
offered to Clinton to take Andre's place, but Clinton de-
clined to allow it; and Andre himself, in a touching letter,
appealed for the privilege of being shot instead of dying
"on a gibbet." * But there was too much at stake; the
proof of his being a spy was incontrovertible, and Wash-
ington deeply affected as he was was inflexible that
he should die the death of a spy.
Forty years later his body was disinterred, carried to
England and buried in Westminster Abbey near a monu-
ment which had already been erected to his memory, in
the company of England's greatest men. The author of subsequent
his misfortunes, the man who tempted him, received for Arnold
his treason a commission as brigadier-general in the
British army, and fought against his former comrades
during the campaign in Virginia. He was then brought
1 Arnold, 307, 311, 335, 343, 348; Sparks, VII, 534, 540, 542, 543.
170 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
i78o north and led an expedition of tories and Hessians against
New London New London, not many miles from Ms birthplace. It
sepT^TS! was the last engagement of the war at the North. He
captured Forts Trumbull and Griswold, burned the town
and massacred the garrison. Soon after he was sent to
England, and received 6,315 in money for himself, a
pension of 500 a year for his wife and 100 a year for
each of her children. Subsequently the King gave him
a grant of 13,400 acres of land in upper Canada. He re-
mained in the British army until his death twenty years
later; but the British officers despised him; he fought a
duel in resentment of their insults, got into debt, lost
his fortune and died in poverty. 1 It is said that he died
in the uniform of an American major-general, which he
had on at the time he escaped from the Robinson house
and which he had always preserved.
The actual damage which he succeeded in doing to the
American cause was slight; but it was not for lack of
intention. His name has been a synonym for infamy
during 130 years, and it seems probable that it will so
continue so long as history is written.
Meanwhile, what of the French alliance? What were
the French ships and soldiers doing during the two years
and more which had elapsed since the signing of the treaty?
Fej>. e t 1778 The answer, in brief, is that they were fighting the com-
mon enemy, England, in the West Indies. They thus
created a diversion by causing British ships and soldiers
to be sent from New York to St. Lucia and elsewhere;
and to this extent they aided the American cause. But
while the French were primarily concerned with French
interests, Washington was keenly alive to American in-
terests. He thought that as much harm could be done
1 Arnold, 348, 363, 378, 389, 393, 395.
THE FRENCH ALLIANCE 171
to England, and more benefit conferred on America, if
the French would concentrate their strength at New York.
If they could command the sea and land only a few of
their troops, he pledged himself to "bring 25,000 effective
men into the field"; and with these he felt confident
that he could capture the city and its garrison and put
an end to the war. All through the year 1779 he tried May i, 1779
to bring this about* He had conferences with Gerard, sept. 16
the French minister, and his successor, Luzerne. He oct.4
wrote to d'Estaing; he called on the governors of the oct. 2
nearest States for 12,000 militia and they began to as- sept.is
semble; he stationed Henry Lee, and later Duportail oct. 10
and Hamilton, on the Jersey coast with letters to be
handed to d'Estaing as soon as he reached the Delaware
capes. 1
But d'Estaing never came. Although he had written Movements of
that he would be on the coast of Carolina in May, he re- dEstamg
mained in the West Indies to capture St. Vincent and June ie
Grenada. Then he went to San Domingo and thence juiy4
to Georgia. But instead of making short work of the
British there as he had anticipated, and then proceed-
ing to the Delaware and New York, he became involved oct. 9
in a siege at Savannah, and finally in an assault, in which
he was repulsed and wounded. Then he sailed away to oct. 20
France. 2 Washington heard of this at the close of the
year; he dismissed the militia and put his Continentals NOV. 20
into cantonments as previously stated. It was a bitter
disappointment.
A few months later Lafayette rejoined Washington at May 10. ITSO
Morristown, after an absence of sixteen months in France.
While the responsible French ministers had an eye single
Sparks, VI, 61, 62, 237, 368, 371, 373, 378, 409, 540.
'Mahan, 367, 376; Sparks, VI, 320, 361, 368, 409.
172 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
i78o to the interests of France as they understood them, and
used their ships and their men to protect their interests
in the West Indies rather than in an attack upon New
York this enthusiastic young nobleman cared nothing
about the West Indies, but was wholly and disinterestedly
devoted to America, and to Washington personally. It
was due chiefly to his persistent and persuasive appeals
during his absence in France that the King was induced
to send a new and larger expedition to America, and to
give explicit instructions to its commander that he was
to act under Washington's orders. 1
Arrival of The expedition consisted of 7 ships of the line under
Second French nm j * /.< -n * .
Expedition de Teinay convoying transports carrying 6 full regiments
May 2 (6,000 officers and men) under Rochambeau. It sailed
jmy 10 from Brest and landed at Newport. It was to be followed
by a second expedition of 4 regiments; but this was block-
aded in Brest by a British squadron and never arrived. 2
Lafayette had brought to Washington full information
in regard to the French expedition and copies of the in-
structions; which were that the French troops should
act as a unit, under Washington's orders, should " co-
operate in the most effectual manner" and that the plan
of campaign should be left to Washington. Before
Rochambeau arrived Washington had prepared his plan
which was an attack on New York had completed his
own arrangements for supplies and for calling out a large
body of militia. He sent Lafayette to confer with Ro-
chambeau, carrying with him detailed instructions, both
written and verbal, in regard to the movement against
New York. 3 This was to begin immediately, and the
1 Spaifes, VI, 368, 497, 545-556; VII, 511.
*/&<*., VII, 171, 176, 520; Mahan, 382, 394.
"IKeL, VII, 142, 171, 496-498, 510.
THE FRENCH ALLIANCE 173
allied troops were to meet just north of the Harlem River
about August 5.
But this plan was upset by the British naval com-
manders. It was a fundamental part of the plan that
the French should have a naval superiority. 1 They had
this when de Ternay arrived. But within ten days they
lost it. De Ternay had been followed across the Atlantic July is
by six British ships under Admiral Graves, who arrived
at New York a few days after de Ternay reached
Newport. 2 This restored the British superiority on the
sea; and the combined fleet under Admiral Arbuthnot
promptly sailed for Newport and anchored off Point
Judith.
Clinton followed this with 6,000 troops which left New
York and proceeded down the Sound with the intention
of attacking Newport. But Washington instantly met
this move by crossing his army from New Jersey at
Dobb's Ferry, and marching down toward Kingsbridge
to attack New York. Clinton thereupon returned to
New York, the British fleet, however, still remaining off
Point Judith, blockading the French and intercepting or
turning back their despatch-boats. News of Clinton's
movement reached Rochambeau and he immediately
called upon Heath, who commanded in New England,
for militia to aid in his defence. Several thousand turned
out quickly and went to his assistance on Rhode Island. 3
Within a month after its arrival, therefore, the French French Army
expedition of 1780, far from aiding Washington in any Blockaded in
offensive movements, found itself cooped up in New-
1 "A naval superiority being essential to every enterprise in these States,"
Washington to Quicken. (Sparks, VII, 196.) "A decisive naval superiority
is to be considered as a fundamental principle," Washington to Lafayette.
(Sparks, VII, 509.)
2 Sparks, VII, 113, 127, 169. 3 Ibid., VII, 113, 127, 131, 138.
174
THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1780
Sept. 21
The Revolu-
tion Nearly
Exhausted
March IS
port and relying on the New England militia for its
protection.
After Clinton had returned to New York the militia
were gradually sent home; but the British fleet remained
on the blockade. Washington went to Hartford and
discussed the situation with de Ternay and Rochambeau.
All were agreed that the French army could not leave its
fleet until sufficient ships should arrive to establish their
naval superiority; and while there was a large French
fleet in the West Indies at all times during the years
1780 and 1781, yet for various reasons no part of it came
to America until late in the summer of the latter year. 1
Nothing, therefore, could be done. The French army
remained inactive at Newport for eleven months after
its arrival. 2
During this time the Revolution came near to expir-
ing from sheer exhaustion. Its credit was exhausted;
paper money had been issued by Congress to the extent
of $241,000,000 and by the States to $209,000,000; and
no provision had been made for its redemption. 3 Con-
gress attempted to fix its value at 40 to 1 in specie, but
the market rate was soon 1,000 to I, 4 and finally it had
no value whatever. 5 Having neither money nor credit,
Congress then attempted to collect supplies from the
States in kind. The response was such as each State
saw fit to make. 8 What was furnished, together with
2 Rochambeau, 391.
4 Jour. Cong., 442.
Sparks, VII, 195, 203, 207, 509.
'Lossing, I, 316-321.
'Fiske, Amer. Rev., II, 197, 198.
8 Washington wrote to Congress (April 3, 1780) that this system "has
proved in its operation pernicious beyond description"; and to Joseph
Jones in Congress (May 31, 1780): "One State will comply with a requisi-
tion of Congress; another neglects to do it; a third executes it by halves;
and all differ either in the manner, the matter or so much in point of time
that we are always working uphill." (Sparks, VII, 13, 67.)
THE FRENCH ALLIANCE 175
what was obtained by impressment was barely enough to
keep the troops from starving. In clothing there was a
similar destitution; and in powder the supplies were so
low that Washington endeavored through Lafayette to
negotiate a loan 1 from the French of 30,000 pounds of
this indispensable article. As to recruiting, matters were
in the same unsatisfactory condition that they had been
in for the last five years. The 104 battalions authorized
in 1776 had been consolidated into 80 battalions in 1779, March 9, 1779
and were now further consolidated into 50 regiments of Oct. a, mo
infantry, with 4 regiments of cavalry, 4 of artillery and 1
of artificers. 2 Their organization was to be substantially
that which had been prepared by Steuben and approved
by Congress in 1778; enlistments were to be for the war;
but if the States could not fill up their quota with recruits
for the war, then they were recommended to fill them up
with recruits enlisted for one year. 3
Resolutions were passed at intervals of a few months, May 20
-sometimes "requiring" and at others " requesting" or sept. 21
" recommending" the States to fill up their quota. 4 If oct.s
this had been done the strength of the army (including Bee. 22
officers) would have been 35,850 infantry, 2,720 artillery ineffective
and 2,020 cavalry. 5 But it was not done. The regi-
ments seldom had more than one-third of their author-
ized strength. The response, by States or individuals,
to the resolutions of Congress was feeble. The war had
been in progress nearly six years, and ardor for enlist-
ment was greatly diminished. The French alliance was in
itself a detriment to recruiting. The average man could
1 Sparks, VII, 118. 3 Jour. Cong., Ill, 223, 432, 532, 538.
3 On Washington's recommendation this was modified, October 21, so
as to provide "that the whole of the troops be enlisted for the war"; but
the States continued to enlist recruits for one year. (Jour. Cong., Ill, 538.)
< Jour. Cong., Ill, 458, 521, 532, 557. * Ibid., Ill, 538.
176 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
i78i not comprehend the importance of the command of the
sea, and he could not understand why more soldiers were
required when 6,000 well-trained and well-equipped French
infantry were doing nothing at Newport. Finally the
sufferings and destitution of the half-starved and half-
naked men who had enlisted were not such as to tempt
others to share their fate. This winter the troops
were cantoned, as before, from Morristown, through the
Highlands, to Connecticut. 1 It was the fourth winter,
counting from Valley Forge, in which each time the
suffering had been almost beyond endurance.
At last the troops resolved that they would stand it no
longer, and a mutiny broke out. The six Pennsylvania
Jan. i, regiments, forming Wayne's division, stationed at Morris-
town, began the new year by parading under arms, and
under command of their sergeants marched off toward
Mutiny of the Philadelphia. In attempting to control them one officer
pemisyhama ^^ tilled and several were wounded. Wayne, who not
only at Stony Point but at Monmouth and elsewhere had
shown the most intrepid courage, rushed in among his
men and drew his pistol; but they merely placed their
bayonets against his breast and would have killed him
if he had persisted. They inarched off; and the next
day he followed and overtook them at Princeton. They
stated their grievances no pay for the last twelve
months, insufficient food and clothing, expiration of ser-
vice (on the ground that they had enlisted for three
years or the war, and were held for the war after the
three years had expired). Wayne was powerless to
give any relief in these matters, and the men continued
their march to Trenton. Three emissaries, despatched
by Clinton as soon as he heard of the trouble, attempted
Sparks, VII, 313, 318.
THE FRENCH ALLIANCE 177
to induce them to go over to the enemy. But they in-
dignantly turned these over to Wayne, and after a sum- Jan. 10
mary trial assisted in hanging them. At Trenton they
were met by a committee of Congress, by the President
of Pennsylvania and by a force of 1,000 men under St.
Clair, sent by Washington to oppose their crossing the
Delaware. They stated their case, and the committee
promised them prompt payment of portion of their pay,
immediate supply of certain specified articles of clothing
and discharge forthwith of all those who had not enlisted
for the entire war the term of enlistment to be estab-
lished by each man's oath. They were practically all
discharged, and their arms and ammunition were sent
to Philadelphia. They were then asked to -re-enlist for
the war, receiving the bounties then paid to recruits; and
almost all of them did so within ninety days. 1 They
were soon sent to Virginia and rendered good service in
the Southern campaign.
The success of this mutiny led to another the three
regiments of New Jersey, stationed at Pompton. They Jan. 20
similarly marched off one evening, under their sergeants, Mutiny of the
for Trenton. But Washington, who had by this time Line
satisfied himself that he could rely upon the main body
of his troops, determined to handle this affair in a differ-
ent manner. He placed a detachment of New England
troops under command of Major-General Robert Howe, of
North Carolina, and directed him "to compel the muti-
neers to unconditional submission/' and "to grant no
terms while they are with arms in their hands in a state
of resistance." Howe carried out these instructions to
the letter. He surrounded the camp of the mutineers at
Ringwood, disarmed them, selected one ringleader from
Sparks, VII, 350, 359, 364, 387, 436.
178 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
i78i each regiment, tried them by summary court and hanged
Jan. 28 them on the spot. The others promptly submitted and
returned to duty. 1
Washington had repressed these outbreaks with a stern
hand, but at the same time he wrote to the governors
of States calling upon them to take steps to redress the
well-founded grievances of the men in the matter of pay,
clothing and food, 2 with the result that their conditions
were to some extent improved and a few dollars in real
money were paid to them.
He realized, however, that the country was nearly at
the end of its resources, or, as he expressed it (in the
letter to Laurens), "the people are discontented; but it is
with the feeble and oppressive mode of conducting the
war, not with the war itself." 3
In order to bring the war to a close it was essential to
raise some hard money. For this purpose Lieutenant-
Colonel John Laurens, of South Carolina, one of his aides,
was selected; and Congress appointed him a special
minister to France. 4 Washington gave Laurens a letter
Jan. 15 of instructions, written in that clear, impressive and
Laurens's . .. . ' 3 r
Mission to forcible style of which he was so complete a master. In
this he set forth the actual situation in America, the
cause of her financial difficulties, the great natural re-
sources which would enable her to repay a loan and the
imperative need of two things a loan of money and "a
constant naval superiority on these coasts/' With this
Feb. 13 letter 5 Laurens sailed from Boston; he landed there on
Aug. 25 his return six months later. Vergennes was of opinion
1 Sparks, VII, 380, 386, 560-566. 2 Ibid., 381.
8 Sparks^ VII, 373. <7&rf., 368.
5 The original, in Washington's handwriting, is in the Archives of the
Foreign Office in Paris. A complete copy is printed in Sparks, VII,
368-373. ^
THE FRENCH ALLIANCE 179
that the manner in which he pressed his case savored more
of the camp than of diplomacy. 1 However that might
be, he induced the French ministers to make a loan of
6,000,000 francs; 2 he converted some of this promptly
into arms, ammunition and clothing, all of which he
brought back with him, together with 2,500,000 francs
in hard cash. 3 His representations and Washington's
letter also led to the sending of the French fleet from
the West Indies to Yorktown, thereby establishing the
French naval superiority, and enabling Washington to
carry out his long-deferred plans for making the French
alliance really effective.
1 Sparks, VII, 526; Diplomatic Correspondence of the Revolution, IX,
211.
2 Vergennes stated that the amount which the French King had ad-
vanced to America, to the close of 1781, was 20,000,000 francs, exclusive
of the cost of maintaining the French army and navy in America.
(Sparks, VIII, 526.)
3 The financial assistance of France was far more effective than its
military co-operation. In the list of Combattants Fran9ais de la Guerre
Americaine, furnished by the French Government, and published by the
United States Senate in 1905, there are more than 47,000 names the offi-
cers and men of 62 naval vessels and 13 regiments, who at one time or an-
other landed on our shores or cruised in our waters. But like the American
militia they came and went at their own will; the greatest number ashore
at any one time was 8,400; they took part in two battles only, Savannah
and Yorktown; their battle losses were 637 at Savannah and 186 at York-
town. In a military sense they were more than offset by the German
troops who fought with Great Britain. These numbered 29,867, of whom
only 17,313 returned. Their effective strength from 1777 to 1782 was
never less than 12,000. They were always subject to the orders of the
British general, and, hirelings though they were, they fought well; they
were in 9 principal battles and 11 minor engagements, and their killed
and wounded numbered 2,200. (Lowell, 301; Sparks, V, 542-545.)
CHAPTER VI
CONQUEST OF THE SOUTH
1775 AT the time of the Revolution; Boston was about as far
removed from Savannah as it now is from Manila. By
sea the distance was 1,100 miles; and the time, depend-
ing on wind and weather, was from 8 to 30 days. The
British controlled the sea and that avenue of communica-
tion was not open to the Americans. By land, the roads
were so bad that troops could not make the march in less
than 60 days, and a courier riding "express" consumed
fully 20 days. In fact the letters exchanged between
Washington and Greene, after the latter had assumed
command in the South, were usually 30 days old when
they reached their destination.
The Thirteen Colonies were divided, by topographical
conditions as well as by political affiliations, into three
groups, whose interests were by no means identical.
The dividing lines were the Hudson River and the
Potomac River and Chesapeake Bay. The four New
England Colonies had a population of less than 750,000,
and were engaged in agriculture and ocean commerce,
with the beginnings of some struggling manufactures;
the five Middle Colonies had a population of not quite
1,000,000; they were almost wholly agricultural and
furnished the food supplies; the four Southern Colonies,
with a population of more than 1,000,000/ were also
1 Census Report on Growth of Population, 1909, p. 9.
180
CONQUEST OF THE SOUTH 181
agricultural, but their chief product was tobacco (the 1775
cotton planting being then only just introduced and the
cotton-gin being not yet invented), and the greater part
of this was raised for export.
These elementary facts must be considered in order
properly to understand the military events of the Revolu-
tion. The Northern and Southern Colonies were so far
separated that they were not within supporting distance;
and by its command of the sea 1 England was able to move
its troops in attack upon one or the other in one-fourth
of the time that the Americans could move from one to
the defence of the other. The Northern and Southern
campaigns were therefore entirely distinct and separate;
and each section, for the most part, relied upon itself for
its defence. Moreover, the lack of identity in interest
between the three groups of Colonies produced jealousies
in the small body of Congress, where the vote was always
by States; and these jealousies prevented the utilization
of the full military resources of the country* 2 While
Congress did not possess any specific power to enforce
its resolutions, yet in those matters where the States
were in unanimous accord, the State government was
quite ready to exert its sovereign power to carry these
resolves into effect. But where there was only a narrow
majority, each State carried them out or not as it saw
fit; 3 and each State was keenly alert, both in Congress
and in its own legislature, to see that the effect of any
measure did not give to one State an advantage over
another. Against this sectionalism, which applied to
1 Sparks, VH, 169, 170, 196, 337, 371; Mahan, 397-400,
8 Sparks, VII, 67, 167, 225, 298, 333, 391.
3 " One State yields obedience, and another refuses it, while a third
mutilates and adopts the measure in part only, and all vary in time and
manner." (Washington to Custis, Sparks, VII, 442.)
182 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1775 the assembling and movements of troops as well as to
other matters, Washington's letters contain a series of
protests, made year after year in temperate and judicious
but none the less strong and forcible language. But they
were all in vain.
British pians Asjfche. State of Virginia contained neaxly one-fifth_of
" the entire population, and the four Southern States about
'* forty per cent of it, the British constantly sought to de-
"'tach these States from their allegiance, to the cause of
the United Colonies; hoping to accomplish this, first by
conquest and after conquest by conciliation. The true
military principle for suppressing the Revolution was to
defeat, crush and disperse Washington's army, wherever
it was, and to capture or kill Washington. Had the
British adhered to this principle, and successfully carried
it into effect, there is slight reason to doubt that the
Revolution would, at that time, have failed. But they
did not adopt this principle. Their plans were always
based on acquiring territory and re-establishing piecemeal
the authority of the crown. Thus they took New York
and held it as their base of operations; captured Phila-
delphia and then lost it; occupied Newport with a view to
retaking Boston, but never carried out that part of the
plan; tried to take Charleston and failed; sent Burgoyne
on an abortive expedition down the Hudson in the hope
of detaching New England from the Central States; and
then abandoned all aggressive movements at the North
and attempted to wear out the Revolution by petty
raids into Connecticut, New Jersey and Virginia. Fi-
nally, when the war had been in progress for four years
without producing any substantial results except the
establishment of a base at New York, it was determined
to make the South the principal theatre of operations, in
CONQUEST OF THE SOUTH 183
the hope that if the North could not be subdued, at least 1775
its importance could be greatly diminished and its ex-
pansion prevented by restoring the populous Southern
Colonies to British allegiance, and thus creating a barrier
on the south similar to that of Canada on the north. 1
The war began at the South in much the same fashion
as at the North. The attack at Lexington and Patrick
Henry's eloquence caused ~tEe four Southern Colonies to
break'but into such open resistance that three of the
royaL^gp.Yemors. found .it necessary to seek refuge on
British ships of war, and to write home asking that regular
troops be sent to their assistance. Pending the arrival Miutia
of these there were conflicts .with the militia. The first
of these was in Virginia, at the Great Bridge over the va? at nuge '
Elizabeth River, about nine miles from Norfolk. 2 In
this encounter the British were defeated and their com- Dec. 9
manding officer fell, pierced by fourteen bullets. The
militia pursued them and took possession of Norfolk. 2
Soon afterward the royal governor, from his ships, called 1773
on the town to surrender; and this being refused he bom- Jan. i
barded it for three days, set fire to it and reduced it to Jan. 4
ashes. 3
The next clash was in North Carolina, at Moore's Moore's Bridge,
- wl - 1 . . . S -r~. 3 ' N C
JBrJdge r over a Branch of the Cape Fear River, near the
site of the present town of Fayetteville. The contestants Feb. 27
were about 1,500 tory militia, raised by the royal governor,
1 There were ten principal battles at .the North, with aggregate losses of
about 24,000 men; and eleven at the South, with losses of. about 18,QOO._.
In numbers, importance and losses the battles in the South were about
equal to those at the North; the duration of the campaigns in each section
was about the same four years. The crQ^vning victory at Yorktown was
due in about equal measure to the previous campaigns, on each side of the
Potomac, and to the skill with which Washington profited by the results
of both.
2 Dawson, 122-126. 3 Dawson, 122-126.
184 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1776 and 1,000 Colonial militia, called out by the Provincial
Council and commanded by General Moore. It was dis-
astrous to the tones; 30 of them were killed or wounded,
their leader and 850 men were captured and the rest
fled; the Colonials lost only two men slightly wounded,
and they captured a large quantity of supplies, including
1,500 rifles and a military chest containing 15,000 in
specie. 1
Meanwhile the regular troops which had been called
for were on their way. Cornwallis, with 7 regiments,
Feb. is convoyed by a squadron of 2 ships of the line and 6
Mays frigates mounting in all 230 guns, sailed from Cork and
jan, < w> arrived at the mouth of the Cape Fear River. Clintou
.; was already there, having been despatched from Boston
with parts of 2 regiments. He was senior to Corn-
June 4 wallis and took command of all the troops. He decided
June 9 to proceed to the attack of Charleston, where he arrived
outside the bar, and soon after landed part of his troops
on Long Island, 2
^ On the American side preparations were not lacking to.
. defend the South.,. By successive resolutions Congress
areson '"""requested North Carolina to raise 2 battalions, South
- Carolina 3, Georgia 1, and Virginia 6 all to be on the
June 26 tot G
Continental establishment. 3 It was some time before
these troops were raised, but meanwhile South Carolina
was taking energetic measures for its own defence.
Several months before Congress passed its resolutions the
May State had raised 4 regiments of its own; and having
learned, by intercepted despatches 4 to the royal governor,
first that it was intended to send regular troops to coerce
the South, and later that Cornwallis with his 7 regiments
1 Dawson, 128-134. ' j^ 135y 140j 142 .
3 Jour. Cont Cong., II, 107, 325, 463. * Lossing, II, 543.
CONQUEST OF THE SOUTH 185
was about to sail from Cork, the State began the con-
straction of elaborate fortifications to defend Charleston
harbor. 1 These were not quite finished when Parker's
fleet with Clinton's and Cornwallis's soldiers appeared
off the bar. Simultaneously 2 battalions arrived from June
Virginia and 1 from North Carolina, carrying the total
strength of the garrison (including militia) to more than
6,000 men. 2 Ch&rles Lee, who had been sent from Boston
by^ Washington, arrived at the same time and took com-
mand. The fortifications were constructed on Sullivan's
Island, on the north side of the entrance to the harbor;
on James Island, on its south side; at HaddrelFs Point,
nearer to the city; and on the wharves of the city itself. 3
In all they mounted nearly 100 cannon; and there was a
good supply of powder on hand, part of which had been
purchased in the West Indies a year before and part of
it captured from a British supply ship at St. Augustine,
by a cruiser which the gentlemen of Charleston had fitted
out for that purpose. The principal fort was on the
southern side of Sullivan's Island; and under the name
of Fort Moultrie that point has ever since been strongly
fortified. In 1776 its fort had 4 bastions and was made
of soft palmetto logs and earth, with a deep ditch, and
parapets 16 feet thick mounting 30 guns. It was large
enough for a garrison of 1,000 men, but its defenders
numbered only 344, the 2d South Carolina Regiment,
under command of Colonel William Moultrie. 4 The 1st
Regiment, Colonel Gadsden, was at Fort Johnson on
James Island, and the 3d Regiment, Colonel Thomson,
was on the eastern end of Sullivan's Island; he was to
1 Moultrie's Memoirs of the American Revolution, I, 140.
2 Marshall's Washington, I, 72. s Moultrie, I, 142, 146.
* Gordon, II, 283; Lossing, II, 544-546.
186 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1776 oppose any attempt of Clinton's men to cross the inlet
known as the "Breach/ 7 which separated Long Island
from Sullivan's. The rest of the defending force was
distributed at Haddrell's Point, where Lee had his head-
quarters, and in the city. 1
Defence of The soul of the defence was Moultrie. 2 Lee arrived
three weeks before the attack began and gave a great
many orders, most of them foolish; but his reputation
was so great on account of his alleged services in various
European armies that he was looked up to as a great
soldier and cheerfully obeyed. He gave it as his opinion
that Fort Moultrie would be a "mere slaughter pen" and
would have to be abandoned; and in the orders which he
kept sending to Moultrie, 3 he impressed daily upon him
the importance of securing his retreat and Ms impa-
tience that a bridge of boats, which he had ordered to be
built, was not finished. Moultrie built the bridge as or-
dered, but he remained in the fort; and he afterward
wrote that he " never was uneasy on not having a retreat"
because he did not imagine that the enemy could force
him "to that necessity." 4
jtme 4 Three weeks were spent by Parker and Clinton in
June 28 m getting the ships over the bar, landing the troops on
Long Island and making other preparations. 5 Finally
June 28 the attack was made. Two ships of the line and two
Attack on f rigates were to sail in under topsails and anchor off Fort
island" 1 s Sullivan; three frigates were to pass them on the west
and anchor between Fort Sullivan and the city where
1 Gordon, II, 283.
* Fiske, Amer. Bev., I, 198, 199; Amer. Archives, 4, VI, 1191.
8 More than twenty of these have been preserved. (Amer, Archives, 4, VI,
1186.) *Lossing, II, 547.
5 Stedman, I, 186; Lee's Report, Sparks, Letters, I, 243-247; Lossing,
II, 548-550.
SULLIVAN'S ISLAND (CHARLESTON)
June 0.9, 1776
3
Courtesy of The Burrows Brothers Company,
Publishers, Cleveland, Ohio
From Avery's History of the United States and Its People
CONQUEST OF THE SOUTH 187
they could enfilade the fort and bombard its western side me
which was not quite finished. A bomb-ship, or mortar-
boat, escorted by the remaining frigate was to anchor
south-east of the fort and bombard it from that side.
Clinton's troops were to cross the "Breach" inlet from
Long Island, in boats or by fording, drive back Thom-
son's regiment and take the fort in the rear.
The ships went in as ordered; but Clinton's men never
got across the inlet* It proved to be full of sand-bars, on
which the water was only a few inches deep, and the boats
ran aground; and between these were deep holes where
the men sank in up to their necks. Thomson's regiment
also opened fire on them. They returned to Long Island
and took no part in the battle.
The action thus devolved entirely on the navy. For Juness,
ten hours they bombarded the fort, and the fort replied 9 P A M*"
with equal spirit. In the middle of the action the flag-
ship (Bristol) swung around so as to be exposed to en-
filade, and Moultrie's men swept her decks so effectively
that every man on them was killed or wounded. 1 The
ships were at such close range that musketry fire was
used with deadly effect. The mortar-boat was disabled
early in the action; and the three frigates, which were to
pass the rest of the squadron and take position between
the fort and the city, grounded on the "Middle Shoal"
(where Fort Sumter was afterward built). Two of them
got off after a few hours, but the third stuck fast, and was
abandoned and blown up the following morning.
After darkness had set in and the tide was running ebb,
having made no impression on the fort Parker withdrew
out of range to his former anchorage in the "Five Fathom
Hole." He had lost 64 killed and 161 wounded; one of
1 Parker's Report, Dawson, 141.
188 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1776 his ships had been struck 70 times, one was abandoned
and the others were so seriously injured that it was
several months before the repairs were completed. The
loss in the fort had been only 17 killed and 20 wounded. 1
Parker and Clinton remained for three weeks, repairing
juiy 19 damages. Then Clinton sailed north convoyed by the
one frigate that was in condition to go to sea. He ar-
Aug. i rived on Staten Island in time to take part in the attack
on New York. 2
Results of the The defence of Charleston was a brilliant victory.
British Defeat J
at Charleston Seven newly organized regiments, which had never before
been under fire, had beaten off 7 regiments of regulars
and 8 ships of war whose guns outnumbered 6 to 1 those
of Fort Sullivan. It inspirited the South, cheered the
whole country and disheartened the British. They made
no further movements in the South for two and a half
years. The Continental battalions of the four Southern
States, which in 1777 were increased to 31 in number, 3
were duly organized; and in the absence of military
operations near their homes they were available for ser-
1777 vice under Washington. The entire quota of Virginia
Feb. 19 and North Carolina (24 battalions) were ordered to join
Feb. o Washington; they were engaged in the battles around
Philadelphia, and they remained with him until the
British began anew their attack on the South.
1778 This renewal began in the winter of 1778-79. Wash-
ington was then at Middlebrook, 4 with his troops in can-
tonments through the Highlands to Connecticut. Clinton
had 27,803 men 5 (exclusive of officers) at New York and
5,789 at Newport. Before leaving Philadelphia he had
1 Lee's Report, Dawson, 139. * Sparks, IV, 27.
8 Jour. Cont Cong., VII, 90, 133. Ante, p, 155.
5 Sparks, V, 542.
CONQUEST OF THE SOUTH 189
received instructions, due to tlie French alliance, to
send 5,000 men to St. Lucia and 3,000 to Georgia or
Florida; to abandon offensive operations at the North;
and in the following winter to make an attack on the
Southern Colonies. "Georgia should be first taken, and
the passage into South Carolina will then be compara- March s
tively easy." * March 21
The retreat to New York and the operations at New-
port delayed for several months the execution of these
orders; but toward the close of the year these expeditions
left New York for their destinations, the first for St. NOV. 4
Lucia and the second for Georgia. The latter consisted NOV. 27
of 2 British battalions, 2 Hessian battalions, 4 battalions British Troops
of New York tories under Cruger and De Lancey and a Georgia
detachment of royal artillery numbering in all about
3,500 men, and commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Archi-
bald Campbell of the 71st Highlanders. Convoyed by
a British squadron under Commodore Hyde Parker, it
arrived safely at Tybee Island, at the mouth of the Dec. 23
Savannah River. 3
These movements were not made without the knowl- Partisan
edge of Washington and of Congress; and it was also in p o?orgia s
known that the predatory warfare which had been car-
ried on during the last two years between the Georgia
loyalists who had taken refuge in Florida, on the one
side, and the Colonial militia of Georgia and South Caro-
lina under Major-General Robert Howe, on the other
side, had resulted adversely to the latter; and that the
former were now preparing to invade both Georgia and
South Carolina. Congress thereupon passed resolutions
requesting the Governor of Virginia to forward 1,000 men Oct. IT
1 Germain to Clinton, Sparks, V, 549.
z Campbell's Report, Dawson, 477.
190
THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1778 and the Governor of North Carolina to send 3,000 men,
sept. 25 for the defence of the other two Southern States; and at
the same time directed Howe to repair to Washington's
head-quarters and Lincoln to take his place as commander
of the Southern Department. 1 These resolutions were
passed without consulting Washington, but he fully con-
curred in the selection of Lincoln in whom he had the
Dec. 19 highest confidence. When Lincoln arrived at Charleston
situation at the situation was as follows: Campbell with 3,500 men
wLa Lincoln on transports was approaching the mouth of the Savannah
Took com- jy ver . p r evost with 2,000 men was moving north from
Florida, part of his force marching by land and part of
them being transported by water; these two forces were
to effect a junction and under Prevost's orders were to
conquer Georgia first and then South Carolina; 2 Robert
Howe, with about 1,000 (1st and 2d Georgia, 3d and
4th South Carolina and some Georgia militia) was at
Fort Sunbury (the site of Fort McAllister in the Civil
War), about 20 miles south of Savannah; Lincoln was
at Charleston, with perhaps 1,500 men (1st and 2d South
Carolina and some militia); the North Carolina and
Virginia troops were assembling, and part of them were
on the march but none of them had yet arrived. 3
Aboui Dec. 25 Howe heard of the arrival of Campbell off the Savannah
River and of the approach of Prevost from Florida at
the same time. Leaving part of his force at Sunbury, he
quickly marched back to the defence of Savannah. On
arriving there he posted his little force as follows: the
Georgia regiments on the east of the town with their
left flank on the river; the South Carolina regiments
across the road leading into town from the south-east,
1 Jour. Cent Cong., XII, 950, 951, 1021; Sparks, VI, 74, 83.
2 Germain to Clinton, Sparks, V, 549. * Lossing, II, 525.
CONQUEST OF THE SOUTH 191
their right flank protected by a swamp, and one com- 1778
pany in advance on a hill about two miles down the river;
the Georgia militia in observation on the main road lead-
ing into town from the south. 1
While Howe was making these dispositions, Campbell capture of
had reconnoitred the river and captured some citizens vanna
who gave him quite accurate information in regard to
the situation at Savannah and the small force opposed
to him. He decided to attack without waiting for a
junction with Prevost. Accordingly the ships came
over the bar, sailed up the river with a flood tide and
anchored about two miles below the city. At daybreak Dec. 23
the debarkation began, and the first troops who landed Dec. 29
climbed the bluff (where Fort Jackson was afterward
built) and were received by a smart fire from the com-
pany of the Carolina regiment, in which 3 Highlanders
were killed and 5 wounded. But this company was
completely outnumbered and driven back and the de-
barkation then proceeded. When this was completed, 2 P.M.
Campbell moved forward to within 1,000 yards of Howe's
position; he then made a feint against Howe's left, near
the river, and at the same time sent his light infantry
supported by one of the New York tory battalions accom-
panied by a negro guide, who led them along a blind path 3 p. M.
through the swamp on Howe's right. These came out
of the swamp on the main Ogeechee Road, and brush-
ing aside the Georgia militia they were directly in rear
of Howe. Simultaneously Campbell attacked Howe in
front. Completely overpowered by such superior num-
bers, Howe and the two Carolina regiments made their
escape through the town and across the swamps to the
west of it. But the Georgia troops, who were on
1 Dawson, 474; Campbell's Report, Dawson, 478.
192 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1778 Howe's left, were less fortunate and were nearly all
captured.
Campbell's losses were only 7 killed and 19 woundfcd;
he captured 38 officers and 415 men, besides 45 cannon,
23 mortars and a large amount of ammunition and stores.
He states that 83 Americans were found dead in Savannah
and 11 wounded; a considerable number were drowned
in attempting to escape through the swamps. 1
The British victory was complete. Howe was tried
by court-martial, 2 but was acquitted and served under
Washington until the close of the war. 3
Meanwhile Prevost was marching north through Geor-
gia. 4 He met with slight resistance at Fort Sunbury,
1779 and captured the place and its garrison of 200 men with-
Jan. 6 out difficulty". Then he pressed on to 3avannah ; effected
Jan. 19 his junction with Campbell, took command of the united
conquest of forces and promptly sent Campbell up the river 120 miles
Georgia ^ Augusta. This place was also taken without serious
Jan. 29 opposition, the Provincial militia retreating as Campbell
approached. Leaving a garrison at Augusta, Campbell
proceeded to establish posts at various places in western
Georgia. 5
Within six weeks from the time Campbell landed at
Savannah the conquest of Georgia was complete, and the
royal governor was requested to return from England
and resume his government. 8
1 Dawson, Campbell's Report, 477-479.
3 Sparks, V, 451.
*IUd., VI, 299; VII, 74-88, 94, 363, 382, 563; VIII, 457.
4 If contemporary accounts are to be relied upon, the damage to private
property on this march, and the one which soon followed it from Savannah
to Charleston, was even greater than that on the more famous march
through Georgia eighty-six years later. (See Gordon, III, 259, 261.)
'Stedman, II, 106-108.
'Lossing, H, 528.
in black lines; British are ^ <
shown in red. oi,
Operations in 1778 and 1779 are
designated by broken lines.
Operations in 1780 in
continuous lines.
Gen. Gates ^
Sir Henry Clinton and
Earl-Corawallis -.,,.,-
Movements of partisans and
of small bodies of troops
are shown in fine lines
Arrows indicate direction
x Battles and skirmishes
THE M.-N. WORKS, BUFFALO. N. Y,
Courtesy of The Burro ws Brothers Company, '
Publishers, Cleveland, Ohio
From Avery's History of the United States
and Its People
SOUTH CAROLINA
1779-1780
194
THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1779
Engagement
at Kettle
Creek
Feb. 14
Lincoln Tafces
the Offensive
Feb. 27
part of Georgia, 160 miles from the sea-coast, the tory
militia under Colonel Boyd had a collision with the Pro-
vincial militia under Colonel Andrew Pickens. The
locality was on Kettle Creek, Wilkes County, beyond
Augusta. Boyd was severely wounded, more than 40 of
his men were killed, a large number wounded, 75 were
captured and the rest dispensed. The captives were
all tried for treason and 5 of them were hanged. Pickens
lost only 9 killed and 23 wounded. 1 The tory militia of
the Carolinas never afterward assembled in sufficient
numbers to give any trouble.
Encouraged by these successes, Lincoln, whose force
had increased to between 6,000 and 7,000 men by the
arrival of North Carolina and Virginia troops and the
gathering of militia, now felt strong enough to take the
offensive. For this purpose he sent Ashe with 1,500
men up the east bank of the river to attack Augusta. 2
Prevost then realized that his force was too much scat-
tered; he drew in the outlying garrisons in the upper
part of the State, and uniting them with that of Augusta
under Campbell marched them all down the west bank
of the river, intending to concentrate his entire force at
Ebenezer. 3 When Lincoln heard of this he ordered
Ashe to follow Campbell down the west bank; and Ashe
did so, going into camp in the angle between Briar Creek
and the river, about 53 miles above Savannah.
Then Prevost planned and carried out an admirable
counter-stroke. He sent his younger brother, Lieutenant-
Colonel Prevost, with portions of the 60th and 71st
Regiments, some light infantry, a troop of cavalry and
some Provincials in all about 900 men to make a
1 Dawson, 481. * Ibid., 487.
* Ibid., Lincoln's Report, 492; Prevost's Report, 493.
CONQUEST OF THE SOUTH 195
detour of about 50 miles, crossing Briar Creek far above 1779
Ashe's camp and coming down on his rear. In order to
divert Ashe's attention from the real movement a demon-
stration was made against his front by one battalion of
the 71st Regiment.
The movement was carried out as smoothly as at an Battle of
annual manoeuvre. Ashe was completely surprised and
ignominiously defeated. Only 450 of his men rejoined
Lincoln's army. The rest more than two-thirds of the
whole force were lost. About 150 were killed or
wounded; as many more were drowned in attempting
to cross the river; 27 officers and nearly 200 men were
taken prisoners; nearly 600 succeeded in escaping and
went home. Young Prevost lost 5 killed and 11 wounded. 1
Ashe was tried by court-martial and severely cen-
sured; he was soon after taken prisoner, contracted
small-pox and died. He was a patriot of the highest
character, but without military experience or instinct. 2
This brilliant action of the British destroyed the pos- Lincoln Ad-
sibility of recovering Georgia at that time. But Lincoln,
whose courage and determination were perhaps greater
than his military skill, did not think so. He determined
to cross the Savannah River, cut off the enemy's com-
munications with the back country and protect the leg-
islature which had been summoned to meet at Augusta. 3
Leaving about 1,000 men under Moultrie on the lower
river, at Purysburg and the Black Swamp, with the other
4,000 men of his command he marched up the river,
crossed it and moved on toward Augusta. 3 In so doing
he uncovered the road to Charleston, unless Moultrie
could hold Purysburg.
1 Dawson, 489-491; Lincoln's Report, 493; Prevost's Report, 494.
2 Dawson, 494. 3 Ibid., 495, 496.
196 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1779 As soon as Prevost detected the movement he advanced
April 29 against Purysburg, intending at first only to make a
demonstration which would bring Lincoln back. But
as Moultrie's force was too small to oppose him, and as
Prevost met less resistance than he had anticipated, he
Ad- pushed on to Charleston, driving Moultrie before him.
Expresses had been sent to Lincoln begging him to re-
turn; but he believed that Prevost's movement was only
a feint and he was not to be deterred from his intention
of going to Augusta.
May 10 Finally, Prevost crossed the Ashley River and appeared
before Charleston. The situation there was desperate,
but the people were energetic; the fortifications had all
been on the side toward the sea, but during Prevost's
advance lines were laid out on the land side, between the
Ashley and Cooper Rivers, and their construction vigor-
ously pushed; the slaves were armed; the entire able-
bodied population turned out as militia. Fortunately,
Feb. 2 Pulaski's Legion, 1 which had been ordered by Congress
from New Jersey to the South, had just completed its sixty
May 11 days' march, and arrived at the same time as Prevost. 2
May 12 The next day Prevost summoned the town to surren-
der, and some rather discreditable proposals were put f or-
1 Pulaski was a Polish revolutionist who had been obliged to flee from
his own country in 1771, and after serving in the Turkish army had come
to America in 1777. Congress made him a brigadier-general, and he
served at the Brandywine and Germantown. By resolution of March 28,
1778, Congress authorized him to raise and command "an independent
corps of 68 horse and 200 foot, the horse to be armed with lances and the
foot to be equipped as light infantry/' It was called "Pulaski's Legion,"
and was independent of and additional to the regular military establish-
ment planned by Steuben and adopted by Congress, May 27, 1778. Con-
gress considered this legion as under its special orders, and by frequent
resolutions ordered it from one point to another. (Jour. Cont. Cong., X,
291; XII, 983; XIII, 132.)
3 Dawson, 496-498.
CONQUEST OP THE SOUTH 197
ward by the defenders that South Carolina should remain 1779
neutral during the rest of the war and its status be de- Charleston
termined by the treaty of peace when made; Prevost surrender
rejected this and demanded an unconditional surrender.
This was refused, and the town prepared to receive an
assault. 1
Prevost, however, did not assault. Lincoln was al-
ready marching to the relief of Charleston; he had per-
sisted in his intention of going to Augusta, but the news
he received there from Charleston convinced him that
Prevost intended something more serious than a feint,
and he was now hurrying back with all possible speed.
Prevost intercepted a letter from Lincoln to Moultrie
telling of his approach, and he also knew of Pulaski's
arrival; his force was less than 3,000 men, far inferior to
that of Lincoln; the defenders' trenches were strong, and
could not be carried without heavy loss.
Prevost therefore determined to withdraw from Prevost with-
Charleston. 2 As Lincoln was advancing by the road oSSieston 1
from Savannah, Prevost was forced to retire by the
islands which, with numerous marshes and inlets, form
the sea-coast from Charleston to Savannah. He had
abundant shipping to facilitate such a movement. He
therefore crossed the Ashley River during the night, May is
marched over to Stono Inlet, crossed that and estab-
lished himself on John's Island. To protect his position
and permit him to withdraw gradually and without
molestation to Savannah, a bridge-head was constructed
on the main-land at Stono Ferry. It consisted of three
strong redoubts, with heavy~ abatis in front; and in its
rear was a bridge of boats to John's Island.
Cordon, III, 257; Leasing, II, 554; Marshall, 1, 299; Stedman, II, 112.
2 Dawson, 498, 499; Stedman, II, 112-115.
198
THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1779
June 20
Battle of
Stono Ferry
7A.M.
The troops were gradually sent back through the Sea
Islands to Savannah, until finally only the rear guard re-
mained at Stono Ferry. It consisted of one battalion of
the 71st Highlanders, the Hessian regiment Von Trum-
bach, a detachment of artillery andj some Carolina
loyalists in all about 900 men. All the boats but one
had been taken away in connection with the withdrawal
of the other troops through the Sea Islands, and this
rear guard was thus in a somewhat perilous position.
Lincoln determined to attack and if possible capture it.
He now had between 6,000 and 7,000 men in Charleston,
but he only brought 1,200 men into action. His plan
was to send Moultrie, "with all the troops that can be
spared from Charleston," to make a demonstration on
James Island so as to prevent reinforcements from com-
ing to the assistance of the rear guard, and if circum-
stances were favorable to land his men on John's Island
and cut off their retreat. The real movement was under
Lincoln's own direction, and was an attack on the main-
land against the bridge-head. 1
Lincoln crossed the Ashley River soon after midnight
and began his march across to Stono Ferry, a distance of
about 8 miles. His left wing consisted of the South
Carolina Continentals under Huger; his right, of the
Carolina militia; in the reserve were the Virginia militia;
and he had 6 pieces of artillery and a small body of
cavalry. He had to advance through a dense growth
of pine saplings on one flank and "an open forest of
stately pines" on the other flank; and it was difficult to
maintain connection between them. But a little after
sunrise he approached the redoubts. The Hessians re-
treated; but 2 companies of the Highlanders made
, 499, 500; Lowell, 241; Lee's Memoirs, 130, 131.
CONQUEST OF THE SOUTH 199
such a stout defence that, according to Stedman, only 1773
11 men succeeded in making their retreat, all the rest
being either killed or wounded. 1
The entire British force was then brought into action,
and there was stiff fighting at close quarters, and some-
times hand to hand with the bayonet, for about an hour.
Then reinforcements from the western end of John's
Island came in sight. It was to prevent this that Moul-
trie had been sent by way of James Island; but through
some misunderstanding there was delay in Moultrie's
movements and he did not arrive in time. 2
Lincoln therefore ordered a retreat, and he moved
back to Charleston in good order. The British followed
him a short distance and then abandoned the pursuit.
The Americans lost 146 killed and wounded and 165
missing. The British loss was 26 killed, 103 wounded
and 1 missing. 3
Lincoln did not again molest Prevost, and the latter
retired slowly from island to island, and finally reached
Savannah. An outpost was left at Beaufort, on Port
Royal Island.
The sickly season and intense heat put a stop to all
military operations for the next two months. During
this interval, Governor Rutledge, Lincoln, the French
consul and the citizens of Charleston all wrote letters
to d'Estaing, begging him to come to their assistance.
D'Estaing had promised to be on the American coast in
May, but he stayed in the West Indies to capture St.
Vincent and Grenada. 4 Then he sailed for Haiti, and
there the letters from Charleston safely reached him. 5
1 Stedman, II, 117. 2 Dawson, 500; Prevost's Report, 503.
* Dawson, 500; Prevost's Report, 503.
* Ante, p. 171. 5 Sparks, VI, 359.
200
THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1779
Sept. 4
T'Estaing
Returns to
America
Sept. 9
D'Estaing
Lands
Sept. 12
Sept. 13
He decided to sail for Savannah. His arrival was so
unexpected that off the mouth of the river he captured
a British ship of the line, a frigate and two supply
ships. 1 Prevost promptly called in his outlying detach-
ments, at Sunbury and Beaufort, and prepared for de-
fence; and Lincoln with equal alacrity marched toward
Savannah.
D ; Estaing brought with him 6,000 soldiers and a
squadron of 37 ships with over 2,000 guns. 2 Compared
with this the British ships on the Southern coast were in-
significant. Prevost had less than 3,000 men. 2 Lincoln
had about 1,000 Continentals, 2 and a few months before
he had gathered together nearly 5,000 militia. Adding
these to the 6,000 of d'Estaing, Prevost was outnumbered
4 to 1. With good leadership and prompt action there
was now an opportunity to capture Prevost ; s entire force;
then proceed to the North, fight the British fleet, which
was inferior to d'Estaing's, unite with Washington in an
attack on New York and end the war. But these proved
to be idle dreams; for the leadership was poor and the
action was slow.
D'Estaing had sent some of his ships in advance to
Charleston to concert plans with Lincoln; when his
main body anchored off Tybee Island; small vessels were
arriving from Charleston to aid in landing his troops, and
Lincoln was on the march from Charleston.
It was decided to make the landing through Ossabaw
Sound, about 12 miles south of Tybee Island; the troops
came ashore at a plantation called Beaulieu, about 8
miles due south of Savannah. D'Estaing landed only
3,500 men, but with these he inarched to Savannah the
next day and demanded a " surrender to the arms of
1 Dawson, 563; Stedman, II, 122-123. 2 Keim, 255.
CONQUEST OP THE SOUTH 201
the King of France." 1 Prevost asked for twenty-four 1773
hours to consider it, his object being to gain time till
the arrival of the Beaufort garrison; he then declined
to surrender. Some skirmishing took place during the sept. ie
next three days, and then Lincoln arrived, having crossed Lincoln joins
the river several miles above Savannah. He brought savanna! at
with him, however, only 600 Continentals and 750 mili-
tia. 2 His militia came and went at their own will, and
rendered obedience and not much of that only to the
State officials. On four days' notice it was probably not
possible for Lincoln to despatch a larger force.
Twelve days had now elapsed since d'Estaing's fleet Defence of
had first been sighted, and during that time Prevost and
his engineers and other officers had been working with
tremendous energy. 2 The 4 men-of-war had retired up
the river; their guns and sailors were being landed to
take positions in the trenches; 2 of the ships and 4
transports had been sunk in the river, blocking the
channel below the town; smaller vessels had been scuttled
and a boom stretched across the river above the town to
prevent fire rafts from coming down; gangs of 4,000
negroes had been working in reliefs, night and day, under
the direction of the soldiers, in throwing up redoubts and
trenches, cutting timber and building abatis. 3 The line
extended from the swamp on the west of the town
around to the river on the east. It was about 1,100
yards long, and there were five strong redoubts made of
soft wood and earth and connected by trenches, with
traverses at suitable intervals. In these were posted the
regulars and Provincials which Campbell had brought
1 Dawson, 563; Stedman, II, 123-124.
2 Ibid., 564; ibid., II, 125-133; Lossing, II, 530.
3 Ibid., 565; t&uZ., II, 125-133; Moultrie, II, 33; Gordon, III, 328-332;
Lee's Memoirs, 55-60; Lossing, II, 528-531.
202 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1779 from New York and Prevost from Florida. Prevost
states their numbers at only 2,360 effective, but it is
hard to reconcile this with the official reports of six
months before when they numbered over 5,000, and in
the meantime they had had no severe losses. Including
the sailors, the volunteers from the transports and the
negroes whom he armed, he probably had in the trenches
fully 4,000 men.
siege of Moultrie recorded his opinion that if the works had
been assaulted the day after the Americans joined the
French they would have been carried. D'Estaing and
Lincoln thought differently, and decided on a siege. 1
Artillery had to be landed from the ships and brought up
from Beaulieu with insufficient transportation. A week
sept. 23 went by before ground was broken for the approaches
and ten days more before the artillery opened fire.
In the meantime Prevost had made two small sorties
which were repulsed. This was of small consequence. The
important thing was that he had gained in all eighteen
more days for his negroes to work on the trenches and his
sailors to mount their guns. When the allies made their
junction he had only 12 guns in place; when their artil-
lery was ready he had mounted 76 guns pieces of 6, 9
and 18 pounds.
Oct. 4 Finally the cannonade opened and continued almost
Oct. a without interruption for five days. Some houses were
damaged and a few persons injured in the town; but no
harm was done to the trenches or their defenders.
D'Estaing then became anxious. He was impatient
to send some of his ships back to the West Indies and
the rest to France. He had already been five weeks on
the American coast. His engineers told him that it
1 Prevost's Report, Dawson, 566.
f" Americans M
. ) British "
J A. WUkin's Battery, 16 Gnns
\ -B. Gibb's Battery, 9 Gnus
*C. Ferguson's Battery. 5 Guns
D. Old Magazine, 5 Guns
E. Citadel, 66 Guns
F. Where garrison laid down
arms
G. Gadsden's Wharf, 7 Gnns
HOld Indian Wharf. 5 Gun
I. Governor's Bridge, 3
J. 4 Guns
K. Darrell's, 7 Guns
* Bedoubts
Vessels behind Boom
L'Aventure, 24 G
Boston, 32 Guns
LePolaqne, 16 Gnns
Banger, 20 Gnns
Pro^dence, 32 G
Five Galleys
Courtesy of The Burrows Brothers Company,
Publishers, Cleveland, Ohio
Avery's History of the United States and Its People
CONQUEST OF THE SOUTH 203
would take ten days more to complete the sap which was 1779
about 300 yards from British trenches just south of the
town. He would not wait. It was either raise the siege
or make an assault. 1 He decided on the latter.
The allied camp was about 1,200 yards south of the The Ames
British lines; the French on the right, the Americans on British Lines
the left. The plan of assault was to send Huger with the
South Carolina militia to make a demonstration against
the works on the east or left of the British line; while
the main attack was to be made on the opposite flank,
in two columns. One of these, under Count Dillon, was
to make its way along the base of the bluff and on the
edge of the swamp, where it would be protected from
British fire, and when near the river it was to climb the
bluff and attack the Sailor's Battery, which formed the
extreme right of the British lines. 1 The other column
was to be led by d'Estaing and Lincoln and was to at-
tack the Spring Hill redoubt, at the south-west angle of
the lines, where the road from Augusta rose to the bluff
from the causeway across the swamp. There were 3,500
French and 850 Americans in the two columns. The
troops were to move at 4 o'clock in the morning so as to
make the assault at dawn.
There was delay, however, in getting started, and it oct. 9
was broad daylight when Dillon, who had lost his way in
the swamp, was discovered. He was not near enough
to the bluff to be sheltered from fire, and after losing
heavily he retreated to camp without having reached the
enemy's lines at all.
The other column made a fierce attack and was warmly
received. That portion of the lines was commanded by
iDawson, 565; Stedman, II, 125-133; Moultrie, II, 33; Gordon, III,
328-332; Lee's Memoirs, 55-60; Lossing, II, 528-531.
204 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1779 Lieutenant-Colonel Maitland, the competent officer who
had so successfully defended the bridge-head at Stono
Ferry four months before. A Charleston sergeant who
had deserted the day before had told him of the prepara-
tions for the assault, and while Maitland's force (one
battalion of 71st Regiment, one battalion of 60th and a
company of marines) was far inferior in numbers to the
assailants, he was ready to make a vigorous defence.
The attack was made with the greatest gallantry. Al-
though the column was exposed to the direct fire of the
Spring Hill redoubt and to the cross-fire of the works on
either side of it, yet the men pressed on until the colors
of France and Carolina were planted on the parapet. A
desperate hand-to-hand encounter continued for fifty-
five minutes. D'Estaing was twice wounded, although
not severely. Pulaski was horribly mangled, receiving
wounds from which he died in a few days. The troops
that did not reach the parapet were crowded in the ditch
and on the glacis"; and the Highlanders came out of
their trenches on the left of the redoubt and mowed
down the assailants with a terrible enfilade fire. Three
standard-bearers of the Carolina colors, two lieutenants
and a sergeant were killed in succession on top of the
parapet.
-^ u * *ke British did not yield an inch. They had
driven back Huger when he made his demonstration on
the opposite flank, and they now began to bring reinforce-
ments from that flank to support Maitland. The losses
of the French and Americans were so heavy that they
were finally forced to yield, and they retreated to their
camps.
The British loss was 40 killed, 63 wounded and 52
missing. The allies lost 16 officers and 228 men killed
CONQUEST OF THE SOUTH 205
and 63 officers and 521 men wounded, a total of 837 1779
nearly six times as many as the defenders. 1 It was the
severest fighting since Bunker Hill a fierce assault and
a splendid defence. The loss of officers, particularly the
Americans, shows how gallantly they led their men, and
seems to justify Moultrie's opinion that if the assault had
been made when the allies made their junction three weeks
before, and when the British works were only partially
completed, it would have succeeded.
The assault having been tried, and having failed, Lin-
coln was for continuing the siege; but d'Estaing would
not hear of it. He raised the siege at once and returned The Ames
to his ships. Sending some of these to the West Indies, siege 3
with the others he sailed for France 2 on the same day Oct. 20
that Washington wrote to Lafayette: "We have been in
hourly expectation, for the last fifteen days, of seeing France*
Count d'Estaing off Sandy Hook." 3 Henry Lee and Du
Portail and Hamilton were on the Jersey coast watching
for d'Estaing's arrival in order that they might deliver
the letters which Washington had addressed to him in
regard to joint operations after his arrival. 4 But he did
not come their way.
When d'Estaing left Savannah Lincoln was, of course,
forced to march back to Charleston.
D'Estaing mismanaged affairs at Savannah as badly
as he had at Newport in the previous year. The feeling
against him was very bitter. The South was terribly
disheartened; and the militia, which had been .gathering
in large numbers at Charleston, went home. The British
were correspondingly elated.
1 Dawson, 565; Stedman, II, 125-133; Moultrie, II, 33; Gordon, III,
328-332; Lee's Memoirs, 55-60; Lossing, II, 528-531.
3 Dawson, 569. 3 Sparks, VI, 383. Ante, p. 171.
206
THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1779
Oct. 25
Clinton's Ex-
pedition to
the South
Dec. 26
1780
Jan. 30
When Clinton heard of cTEstaing's arrival on the
Southern coast he recalled to New York the 6,000 men
who had so long been doing nothing at Newport; and as
soon as news arrived of d'Estaing's defeat and departure
for France, he determined to leave Enyphausen in com-
mand at New York, while he himself went to the South,
taking Cornwallis with him as second in command, to
try a second time to capture Charleston, believing that if
successful he could complete the conquest of the South
and restore the entire section to the British crown. He
also planned to operate on an entirely different line from
that which he adopted in 1776. Having now a base at
Savannah, that was his destination; and from there he
intended to move along the islands, following in an op-
posite direction the route of Campbell in the summer of
1779, and attack Charleston from the rear with his army,
while the fleet assailed it in front. 1
His expedition was of no small proportions 90 trans-
ports and supply ships, carrying 8 British and 5 Hessian
regiments, besides Provincials and artillery and cavalry,
in all about 8,500 men. They were convoyed by a fleet
under Admiral Arbuthnot, consisting of 5 ships of the
line and 9 frigates, with 650 guns and crews numbering
probably 5,000 men. 3
The. ships sailed at a bad season, and off Hatteras
encountered the winter gales; so that it was more than
thirty days before the ships began arriving at Tybee
Island. They had been scattered and dispersed on the
voyage; an ordnance ship had foundered; a ship con-
taining Hessians was driven across the ocean to be
beached on the Cornwall coast of England; most of the
1 Sparks, VI, 486; Lee's Memoirs, 62-75; Dawson, 570; Tarleton, 4, 35.
3 Dawson,570,571.
CONQUEST OF THE SOUTH 207
artillery and cavalry horses perished; the stores, of which ITSO
there was a plentiful supply, were damaged. 1
After making a few of the most urgent repairs the fleet cimton Lands
sailed up to North Edisto Inlet and the troops were tS? r oharles "
landed on John's Island about 30 miles south of Charles- Feb. n
ton. Within a few days advance guards had crossed
John's Island, and seized Stono Ferry, James Island,
Wappoo Cut and the west bank of the Ashley River op-
posite Charleston. Lincoln at that time had only 1,400
Continentals and 1,000 militia. Clinton had more than
8,000 regulars. Had he acted with the same celerity
which Campbell displayed at Savannah the year before,
he could have captured Charleston and its small garrison,
conquered the whole of South Carolina and then marched
northward to the Chesapeake. But whereas Campbell
captured Savannah in six days from the time his ships
arrived off the mouth of the Savannah River, Clinton
did not cross the Ashley River and begin serious opera- March 29
tions against Charleston until seven weeks after he was
ashore.
In the meantime he had brought 1,200 men from
Savannah and had sent about half of his transports
back to New York for reinforcements; and the lighter
ships of Arbuthnot's squadron had crossed the bar and
anchored in Five Fathom Hole, to the south of Fort
Moultrie. 1
Lincoln had been doing whatever was possible with preparation
, . , , m-i ,1 i for Defence of
his slender resources. The lines across the peninsula, Charleston
from the Cooper to the Ashley Rivers, were completed
and strengthened. Washington had already sent all the
1 Dawson, 570-578; Lee, 62-75; Tarleton, 1-84; Stedman, II, 176-195;
Lowell, 244-247, 301; Eelking, 176-184. The reports of Clinton and
Arbuthnot, the articles of capitulation and other official documents are
given in full in Tarleton.
208 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1779 North Carolina and Virginia Continentals which he had
NOV. 23 in his army; 1 and these arrived while Clinton was mak-
Dec. 10 ing his preparations to cross the Ashley River, or during
1780 the siege. The American squadron under Commodore
Feb. 20 Whipple 9 vessels and 248 guns were at first disposed
to contest the entrance of Arbuthnot's ships into the
harborf but it was not deemed strong enough for that
April? purpose, and it was therefore withdrawn to the city;
some of the guns were carried ashore and placed in the
trenches, and 4 of the frigates and several merchant-
ships were sunk in the two channels on either side of
Shute's Folly (where Castle Pinckney was afterward
built) at the mouth of the Cooper River. Their masts
were connected by boom and chains, and chevaux-de-f rise
were placed on their decks. The passage into the Cooper
River was thus effectually blocked; and behind the bar-
rier was the rest of the squadron 5 vessels and 124 guns. 2
Lincoln was thus enabled to preserve his communications
with the main-land and keep open a route for the rein-
forcements which were expected, or for a retreat, if that
should be decided upon.
Finally, Clinton had completed his preparations, crossed
the Ashley River in force and opened his first parallel
at 1,800 yards from Lincoln's works. A few days later
APHIS Arbuthnot, with 7 frigates and 216 guns, ran by Fort
Moultrie, with a loss of 27 men, and anchored between
James Island and the city. 1
10 Clinton and Arbuthnot united in a demand for sur-
render, and Lincoln sent back a brief but spirited refusal.
The siege then began in earnest. 3 Clinton had lost 60
1 Sparks, VI, 415. * See footnote, p. 207.
8 The most complete account of the siege of Charleston is that given in
Moultrie's Memoirs of the American Revolution, II, 65-106, and Tarleton,
1-84.
CONQUEST OF THE SOUTH 209
days in getting ready, and Lincoln had not been idle.
Charleston was now surrounded by a series of redoubts siege of
and trenches, forming an irregular triangle whose three
sides had a total length of nearly five miles. On the
water sides were 9 batteries with 60 guns. 1 On the land
side there was a large hornwork astride the main road,
"the Citadel," with 66 guns; in front of this a strong
line of trenches, extending from river to river, and with a
redoubt at each flank like a bastion, giving a flanking fire
in front of the trenches; in front of this again, a wet ditch
or canal, with a dam to retain the water at low tide; and
in front of the canal a line of abatis and trous-de-loup.
The siege was carried on according to the scientific
rules of the day, under the able direction of the chief
engineer, Colonel Moncrieff, who had gained great repu-
tation at the defence of Savannah. There were first,
second and third parallels; saps, double saps and flying
saps; and a sortie, in which 15 of the enemy were killed
and 12 taken prisoners. Finally, on the twenty-eighth Mays
day, the counterscarp had been gained, the canal had
been drained and the besiegers were ready to crown the
scarp. Then Clinton sent a second summons to sur-
render. Lincoln replied, proposing impossible terms in
order to gain time.
He was now nearly surrounded, and his communica- Charleston
tions with the North were practically severed. These urr - un e
communications had been maintained through a post at
Monck's Corners, 30 miles north of Charleston, which
was occupied by a detachment of Continental cavalry
and some militia under Huger. Against this Clinton
sent about 1,400 men; and a portion of this force under
Tarleton surprised Huger and dispersed his command,
1 See foot-note, p. 207.
210
THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1780
April 14
May 6
April 18
April 24
Surrender of
Fort Moultrie
May 7
Surrender of
Charleston
May 12
of which they captured about 100 officers and men and
400 horses the latter being very useful in replacing the
horses of "Tarleton's Legion" which had been injured
and thrown overboard on the rough voyage from New
York. Tarleton then pressed north ; and at the crossing
of the Santee River he defeated the mounted militia
which was gathering at that point, inflicting on them a
loss of 41 killed and wounded and 67 taken prisoners. 1
Lord Rawdon, 2 meanwhile, had arrived from New York
with a reinforcement of 2,500 men, and had been as-
signed to the command of all the force operating on the
east of the Cooper River; he soon captured the works at
HaddrelFs Point, and Arbuthnot then landed sailors and
marines to assault Fort Moultrie from the land side
while he bombarded it with his ships from the water side.
When these preparations were completed the fort was sur-
rounded, and it surrendered with its garrison of 291 men.
Lincoln was thus completely surrounded by a force
which (including the reinforcements from New York and
Savannah and the sailors who had been landed to man
the siege-guns) numbered about 14,000 men. Further
resistance was hopeless, and he signed the articles of
capitulation which Clinton offered. The return of pris-
oners, signed by John Andre, deputy adjutant-general,
numbers 7 generals, 290 other officers, 5,169 rank and
file, including Continentals, militia and armed citizens
5,466 in all. The return of captured ordnance shows
391 guns of different calibres, 5,316 muskets, 15 regimental
colors, 33,346 rounds of small-arms ammunition, 8,394
round shot, 376 barrels of powder besides grape and
case shot, cartridges, etc., by the thousand.
1 See foot-note, p. 207.
* Afterward Earl of Moira and Governor-General of India.
CONQUEST OF THE SOUTH 211
Lincoln's losses during the siege were 92 killed and 146
wounded; those of Clinton were 76 killed and 179
wounded. 1
It was the greatest disaster sustained by the American
army during the war or, in fact, at any time; for on no
other occasion (except at Harper's Ferry) have 5,000 men
of the United States laid down their arms to an enemy. 2
Lincoln was sent North on parole and immediately
asked for a court of inquiry. 1 But it was never held.
Washington was at first disposed to think that Lincoln
should have retreated North as soon as the Arbuthnot
ships crossed the bar; but when he learned all the cir-
cumstances he held Lincoln blameless. 1 The latter was NOV. 7
soon exchanged, resumed his military duties under
Washington's direction, rendered excellent service for a
year and was then appointed to the newly created office
of secretary of war, 3 filling that office until after the oct.so
treaty of peace had been signed. In fact, serious as was
the disaster, there is but little ground for criticism of
Lincoln and much for commendation. The idea of re-
treating was fully discussed in two councils; at the second Apni 21
of these, a large number of citizens broke in and declared Apra se
that "if he attempted to withdraw the troops and leave
the citizens, they would cut up his boats and open the
gates to the enemy." The greater part of his force was
militia and armed citizens; his Continentals were from the
Southern States, and disposed to render allegiance to
State rather than Continental authority. 4 The command-
1 See foot-note, p. 207.
a The surrender of 11,000 men under General White, near Harper's Ferry,
on Sept. 15, 1862 was, in view of the magnitude of the struggle then in progress,
comparatively unimportant.
3 Jour. Cong., Ill, 471, 683; Sparks, VII, 102.
* Moultrie's Memoirs, II, 97.
212
THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1780 ing general was the only Northern man in the army.
If he had ordered a retreat his orders would not have
been obeyed, and there would have been dissension on
the part of the civil authorities which would have prob-
ably carried the State back to its British allegiance. The
prudent course of Lincoln preserved its adhesion to the
United States.
On strictly military grounds a retreat was out of the
question, Clinton had 12,500 soldiers well equipped
in every particular. Had Lincoln crossed the Cooper
River with his 2,000 ill-equipped Continentals and at-
tempted the long march without adequate transporta-
tion to join Washington in New Jersey, he would prob-
ably have been overwhelmed and destroyed before he
reached the Santee. In place of that he made a sturdy
defence remarkably so, in view of the slender resources
at his disposal and in so doing he delayed the conquest
of South Carolina for at least two months.
Having taken Charleston, Clinton sent out detachments
to occupy various points in the interior of the State. One
of them under Tarleton, a most energetic cavalry leader,
overtook, near the North Carolina boundary, the 3d
Virginia Regiment, about 300 men under Colonel Buford.
on at the which was marching from Virginia to Charleston. The
cli&ws
29 ' engagement was short but destructive, the Americans
losing 113 killed, 150 wounded and 53 prisoners; while
Tarleton's losses were only 9 killed and 12 wounded* 1
Believing that the State was now fully conquered,
Clinton returned to New York, taking with him about
one-third of his troops/ and leaving with Cornwallis,
1 Dawson, 582-585; Tarleton, 30; Stedman, II, 193.
2 Ante, p. 164; Sparks, V, 544.
June 5
CONQUEST OF THE SOUTH 213
who hereafter commanded in the South, 6 British, 1 i?so
Hessian, and 6 Provincial regiments in all 8,345 men. Return of,
The main body was at Charleston, but there were strong Aug " l
detachments at Savannah and Augusta in Georgia; and
there was a chain of posts in South Carolina, from Ninety- Disposition of
Six on the West, through Rocky Mount, Camden and
Cheraw, to Georgetown on the coast, 1 The intense heat cSSSston. 01
precluded active operations, and it was Cornwallis's in-
tention to rest his troops during the summer, and as soon
as the crops were gathered, and he could have the aid of
the tory militia, to march northward and conquer North
Carolina and Virginia. 2
Active operations had now been in progress in the
South continuously (except as interrupted by the summer
heat) for about eighteen months. Savannah and Charles-
ton, the two principal cities, had been captured; Georgia
and South Carolina had been conquered and were every-
where under British control; the authority of the United
States was not recognized nor were there any Continental
soldiers except prisoners of war in any part of either
State. Large numbers of the citizens had returned to the
British allegiance; a greater number, however, adhered
to the United States. Each side furnished its militia
and they fought each other furiously; in one rough-and- June 26
tumble encounter with clubbed muskets, about 400 men Hanging Rock,
on a side, more than one-third of the combatants were s ' c " Aug " s
killed and wounded; in another of a similar character,
with about 800 men on each side, the tory losses were
fully fifty per cent, those of the Americans not being re-
corded. 3 In a smart skirmish between 75 men under Williamson's
Colonel Bratton, one of Sumter's partisan chiefs, and a
1 Dawson, 592; Tarleton, 87; Stedman, 195; Lee, 78.
'Tarleton, 86. 3 Dawson, 592-596, 601-603, 608-611.
214 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
i78o scouting party from "Tarleton's Legion" with some of
the tory militia 115 men in all the latter was surprised
and destroyed, only 12 men escaping. Soon after, Sum-
Rocky Mount, ter himself, with 600 men, assaulted a British fortified
post but was repulsed with a loss of 13 men, the de-
fenders (New York volunteers) losing 12. Two days
later, at a point about 60 miles distant; in the north-west
corner of South Carolina, Colonel Clarke, of Georgia, with
Green spring, 196 men, met and defeated Captain Dunlap, who was
scouting with a detachment of 210 men dragoons and
mounted riflemen. The losses on each side were about
Hanging nock, 15 per cent. A week after that, Sumter, with 800 men,
again attacked a British stockaded post just north of
Camden. He was again unsuccessful and was forced to
retreat, but only after a severe fight lasting nearly four
hours, in which he had inflicted on the enemy a loss of
about 130 men. 1
These partisan encounters were soon succeeded by
events of a more serious character. Four months pre-
viously Washington had ordered the Continental line of
Maryland and Delaware with a regiment of artillery and
12 guns to proceed to Charleston. Baron de Kalb, who
had come from France with Lafayette, was assigned to
the command. 2 The force numbered 2,000 men, and the
transfer of such a body for a distance of nearly 800 miles
was a serious matter. The troops started from Morris-
th?soutn town and marched to Head of Elk, where the infantry
April 16 embarked on boats and proceeded through Chesapeake
May 3 Bay and James River to Petersburg, where it was joined
June 6 by the artillery which had gone overland. Here De Kalb
June 20 learned of the surrender of Charleston. He continued his
march, however, and crossing the border of North Carolina
1 Dawson, 604-605. 3 Sparks, VII, 7, 15.
CONQUEST OF THE SOUTH 215
finally came into the theatre of operations and encamped
on Deep River, about 50 miles north of the British post July e
of Cheraw. He had called on the governors of Virginia
and North Carolina for reinforcements of militia and for
supplies of all kinds and transportation. But he received
almost nothing; and, in fact, the States had little or
nothing to give. More than once on their march the
troops were in danger of starvation. 1
The news of the fall of Charleston had reached Wash- June i
ington, through his secret service in New York, 2 earlier Gates AP-
than it did De Kalb, and he had at once informed Con- command the
gress. That body, without consulting Washington, ap-
pointed Gates to command the Southern army. 3 Six
weeks later Gates arrived at De Kalb's camp and took July 25
command.
De Kalb was an experienced soldier, and he had care-
fully studied the situation and formed a definite, careful
plan of operations. It was submitted to Gates, with the
approval of all the senior officers. 4 But Gates declined
to consider it and forthwith issued an order for the juiy26
army to march immediately against Camden, the prin-
cipal British post. This march of about 120 miles was
accomplished in about two weeks, and in the course of it
Gates was joined by 1,200 North Carolina militia under
Caswell and by a few small detachments from the North. 5
His movements were not unknown to Rawdon, who
commanded at Camden. He called in his outlying de-
tachments, reported the facts to Cornwallis and urged
1 Kapp's Kalb, 195-199. * Sparks, VII, 69.
5 Jour. Cong., Ill, 465.
4 Kapp's Kalb, 206-209; narrative of Williams, Johnson, I, 486.
5 Dawson, 612-619; Tarleton, 102-153; Stedman, 204-218; Lee, 94-
103; Kapp's Kalb, 220-238. The official reports are given at length in
Tarleton.
216 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1780 him to come in person with reinforcements from Charles-
. is ton. Cornwallis did so, and arrived at Camden three
days before the battle. 1
The situation was then as follows: Gates was at Ruge-
ly's Mills, 13 miles north of Camden, with a force which
he imagined numbered 7,000 men, but in reality, as his
adjutant-general informed him on the following morning,
numbered 3,052 present fit for duty. They consisted of
the Continentals of Maryland and Delaware, the militia
of North Carolina and Virginia, 8 pieces of artillery, Ar-
mand's Legion and Porterfield's Light Infantry. The
militia had been recently assembled and had never been
in action or received any military training. There were
no less than 13 general officers present, the greater part
of them belonging to the militia. With this force Gates
intended to attack the British post at Camden, of which
he had no adequate knowledge, either by reconnoissance
or otherwise. He seems to have thought that he could
repeat the brilliant capture of Stony Point, and his order
for a night march was in some degree copied from Wayne's
famous order. In the afternoon before the march he
issued to his men a full ration of corn-meal and fresh
meat, and, having no rum, he distributed (from the hos-
pital stores just arrived from Virginia) a gill of molasses
per man. 2 The food was hastily and badly cooked, and,
washed down with molasses, it was more powerful than
a compound cathartic. The men were in great distress
during the night march and when the battle began were
in an enfeebled, weak condition. 3
Opposed to Gates, the force under Cornwallis should
have numbered about 4,000; but the intense heat of
1 See foot-note 5, p. 215. 2 See foot-note 5, p. 215.
3 Narrative of Colonel Otho Williams, Johnson, I, 494.
CONQUEST OF THE SOUTH 217
summer had produced a good deal of sickness; more than i?so
800 were in the hospital, and, including the reinforcements
which Cornwallis brought from Charleston, the morning
report showed only 122 officers and 2,117 men fit for
duty. About half the force was well-seasoned regulars,
23d, 33d and 71st Regiments; there were two tory regi-
ments raised in New York, the Volunteers of Ireland
and the British Legion, who were almost as good as
regulars, and -two regiments of Carolina militia, Corn-
wallis (like Gates) believed that the American army
numbered 7,000 men. Nevertheless, he determined to
attack them, relying upon the superior discipline and
greater experience of his troops. 1
Both armies, therefore, moved out at 10 o'clock at night, Aug. is
each intending to surprise the other. About 2 o'clock in Aug. ie
the morning the advance guards came in contact at a
point 9 miles north of Camden, where the road after
crossing Saunder's Creek passes through an open forest of
pines about a mile wide, flanked on each side by an im-
passable marsh. Armand's Legion, at the first fire, was
thrown back on the main body in some confusion. But
Cornwallis did not pursue, as he did not wish to risk the
uncertainties and accidents of a night engagement. He
leisurely deployed his force, the light infantry, 23d and
63d Regiments on the right, Irish Volunteers, Legion
and North Carolina Regiment on the left, 71st in re-
serve and Tarleton's cavalry in the rear; and when the
deployment was completed he waited for daylight.
Gates also deployed in similar manner, 2d Maryland
and Delaware on the right, North Carolina and Virginia
militia on the left and 1st Maryland in reserve. The
distance between the lines was about 200 yards. 1
1 See foot-note 5, p. 215.
218 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1780 At daylight Cornwallis began the action by a vigorous
Aug. is attack from his right, 1 The British regulars struck the
Battle of Carolina and Virginia militia; the latter, in their weak-
ened condition, due to the improper diet which Gates
had prescribed, without any experience of battle and
commanded by untrained officers, threw away their arms
and fled. 1 Armand's foreign legion went with them, and
they broke through the left flank of the 1st Mary-
land, throwing that brigade into confusion, and, sweeping
Gates with them, carried him off the field so that he was
not again heard from for several days. But the Mary-
landers restored order in their ranks, made a partial
change of front to the left, arrested the British advance
and, on the right, under the gallant leadership of De Kalb,
took the offensive. Rawdon's Irishmen made a stout
defence, and there was fierce fighting in the woods for
nearly an hour. Then De Kalb fell, mortally wounded;
the 23d and 33d Regiments turned the left flank of
the Maryland brigades; and Cornwallis, perceiving that
there was no cavalry opposed to him (Armand hav-
ing fled), sent Tarleton with the cavalry of his legion
still farther around their flank and in their rear. The
whole line then gave way, and the retreat was soon
a rout. 1
The American force was destroyed. It lost all its
artillery, all its baggage, all its supplies and nearly all
its muskets and ammunition. 1 The militia scattered in
every direction and in small groups worked their way
home; the Delaware regiment was almost annihilated;
the remnants of the 6 Maryland regiments, about 700
men in all, came together at Hillsborough about ten days
after the battle. 1 Gates covered the 60 miles to Char-
1 See foot-note 5, p. 215.
Courtesy of The Burrows Brothers Company
Publishers, Cleveland, Ohio
From Avery's History of the United States
and Its People
CAMDEN
Aug. 1 6, 1780
CONQUEST OF THE SOUTH 219
lotte on the day of the battle, and in the next 48 hours ITS?
another 100 miles to Hillsborough. Flight of
Cornwallis lost 68 killed, 245 wounded and 11 missing. 1
Gates's army was thus destroyed; but Sumter and his AU?. is
partisans were still intact a few miles away. On the day Aug. is
before the battle Gates had sent him a reinforcement of
400 men, and on the day of the battle Sumter had inter-
cepted and captured a considerable amount of supplies Aug. ie
and their escort which were coming up from Charleston
and had nearly reached Camden. 1 Hearing of Gates's
defeat, Sumter began his retreat northward to his home
country in the Catawba settlements. Tarleton went Action at
after him in hot pursuit, surprised him in his camp and Aug."!!
destroyed him. Sumter himself escaped without hat,
coat or boots; of his men, 150 were killed or wounded,
300 taken prisoners and the rest dispersed. The prison-
ers and supplies which Sumter had taken two days before
were recaptured. Tarleton's loss was only 6 killed and
9 wounded. 1
1 Dawson, 623.
CHAPTER VII
BRITISH DEFEAT AT THE SOUTH
THE conquest of the South seemed now to be complete.
Greene AP- The only armed force of the Americans south of New
command the Jersey was the remnants of Gates's army, about 700 in
A?my em number, which were assembling at Eillsborough, in the
northern part of North Carolina. Nevertheless, Con-
gress did not despair. As usual when disasters came
thickly it turned to Washington. Having itself chosen
the three commanders, Howe, Lincoln and Gates, under
whom Savannah and Charleston, Georgia and the two
Carolinas had been lost, it now called upon Washington
to select a commander for the Southern army. 1 Wash-
ington selected Greene, 2 who, in the language of John
Fiske, "in every campaign since the beginning of the war
had been Washington's right arm; and for indefatigable
industry, for strength and breadth of intelligence, and
for unselfish devotion to the public service, he was scarcely
inferior to the commander-in-chief ." 3
Oct. 22 Greene received his orders 4 and letters from Washing-
ton while in command at West Point after Arnold's
treason, and in accordance with his instructions pro-
ceeded immediately to Philadelphia for conference with
Congress. Steuben was sent with him, 5 to be second in
1 Jour. Cong., in, 534. 3 Sparks, VII, 257.
Fiske, American Revolution, II, 250. * Sparks, VII, 271, 272.
5 Fiske, 11,251.
220
BRITISH DEFEAT AT THE SOUTH 221
command, and to be president of the court which Greene
was ordered to convene to inquire into Gates's conduct.
Congress approved and ratified Washington's selection Oct. so
and adopted resolutions conferring upon Greene extraor-
,dinary powers. His army was to consist of all the Con- Oct. 3
tinental regiments raised or to be raised from Delaware Oct. 21
to Georgia, inclusive (the number of such regiments
having been fixed by previous resolutions at 24, with an
authorized strength of 36 officers and 681 men each); he
was to organize and employ his army as he should judge
most proper, subject to the control of the commander-
in-chief, whose control at a distance of 800 miles, with
no railroads or telegraph, was merely nominal; he was to
have all the powers heretofore conferred upon Gates in
regard to appointments and promotions, and in addition
was to have the power 1 of making exchanges of prisoners,
which hitherto had been conferred only upon Washington;
the legislatures and governors of the six States above
named were "earnestly recommended" to "afford every
assistance and support, in men, clothing, money, arms,
intrenching tools, provisions and other aids and supplies " ;
and the heads of the several staff departments were
"directed to furnish" on his order "such articles as, upon
inquiry, he shall find cannot be obtained in the Southern
Department." 2 In short, every power that Congress
could put on paper was given to him. He was to carry
on the Revolution in the distant South and regain the
conquered States.
Had Congress been in position to make good its reso-
lutions, Greene's task would have been an easy one.
But the 24 regiments of the Southern States, from Dela-
ware to Georgia, with an authorized strength of 17,000
1 Jour. Cong., Ill, 538, 540, 541. 2 Ibid., Ill, 541.
222 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1780 men, had no existence, except in the remnants of Gates's
army at Hillsborough. That of Georgia had never been
raised; those of the two Carolinas and most of those of
Virginia had been captured at Charleston.
/ Greene undertook the task in a hopeful if not confident
spirit. 1 He left an agent at Philadelphia to see that sup-
plies were sent to him in case Congress had any; and on
his way south he left Steuben in Virginia to organize all
the troops that Governor Jefferson would call out, both
Continental and militia, and forward them to the South.
Several of the best officers in the army made applica-
tions to go with him Steuben/ Lafayette, 3 Henry Lee 3
(father of Robert E. Lee) and John Laurens. 3 Wash-
ington had different plans for Lafayette, but the others
were sent. 4 On his arrival at the South, Greene soon
gained the loyal and hearty support of the famous
partisan leaders Morgan, Marion, Sumter, Pickens and
William Washington. "
Dec. 4 - When Greene took command at Charlotte, the paper
'-strength of his "army" was 2,307, of whom 1,482 were
Greene present, and not quite 800 were equipped and fit for duty. 5
He succeeded, with Steuben's efficient help, in increasing
this, within three months, to 4,441 present for duty, of
whom 1,651 were Continentals, although most of them
were new levies who had never been in battle. 6 It never
again reached that number. This was the force, aided
by the partisans of Sumter and others, which varied in
1 G. W. Greene, III, 35; letter to Congress.
3 Kapp, Steuben; Sparks, VII, 316, 361, 404.
3 Sparks, VH, 316; Sparks, Letters, III, 140.
4 Laurens on arriving at Philadelphia was selected for the special mission
to Prance (ante, p. 178), but he joined Greene as soon as he returned.
5 Greene to Lafayette, G. W. Greene, III, 70; Gordon, IV, 27.
6 G. W. Greene, UI, 190; Gordon, IV, 54.
BRITISH DEFEAT AT THE SOUTH 223
numbers at various times, from nothing to perhaps a
maximum of 2,000, with which Greene reconquered the
South. The returns in the British Record Office show
that in 1781 and 1782 the British force in the Caro-
linas and Georgia varied from a minimum of 8,141 to a
maximum of 10,859* effective, fit for duty, exclusive
of officers and non-commissioned officers. About three-
fourths of them were regulars, British and Hessians, and
the rest were tory regiments from New York and New
Jersey, which had seen four years 7 service, and were fully
as well organized as and infinitely better equipped and
supplied than the few Continentals in the Southern
army.
In the interval between the battle of Camden and the Aug. ie
date wlfen Greene assumed command, Cornwallis had Dec - 4
not been idle. He had marched, unopposed, into North ^P*- 8
Carolina as far as Charlotte; and Clinton had sent 3,000 ^ 22
men under Leslie from New York to the Chesapeake, 2 Occ ' :!6
there to act under Cornwallis's orders and either effect a
junction with him as he marched north, or to create a
diversion in his favor and prevent the sending of reinforce-
ments to the South. These plans miscarried; for, soon ciinton sends
' after Cornwallis reached Charlotte and before Leslie had to the south
sailed from New York, a force of backwoodsmen, between
900 and 1,500 strong, wlio lived in the mountains from
Virginia to Georgia, suddenly appeared almost as if they
had sprung out of the ground, and surrounded a party
of regulars and tory militia, about 1,100 in number, on (
King's Mountain. This force was commanded by Major
-Ferguson, of the 71st Regiment, a gallant and skilful .
officer. He had been posted in the foot-hills of the Alle- Battle of
ghanies, on Cornwallis's left flank, about thirty miles from Mountain
1 Sparks, V, 542. 3 Tarleton, 170, 199; Sparks, VII, 269.
224
<THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1780
Oct. 7
Oct. 14
Results of the
Battle of
King's ",
Mountain.
Charlotte. He was to keep down the patriot militia in
that neighborhood. Hearing of the approach of Colonel
Williams and the others, he took a defensive position on
the top of King's Mountain, a wooded hill just north of
the boundary between North and South Carolina, Here
he was surrounded by the mountaineers about 4 o'clock
on an autumn afternoon. The battle was not very
scientific, but it was effective. Dismounting from their
horses, these frontiersmen climbed the hill on all sides,
using their hunting rifles with great effect. Ferguson
made a gallant defence. Three times he beat them back,
using the bayonet. After an hour of hard fighting Fer-
guson was killed and his men surrendered. He had lost
224 killed and 163 wounded; 716 were taken prisoners.
On the American side 28 were killed (including Williams)
and 60 wounded. 1 The Americans dispersed almost as
quickly as they had gathered.
The news of this extraordinary action spread fast in
all directions; it brought out the militia of North Carolina
and the new levies in Virginia; it carried discouragement
i to the tories in both Carolinas. It took place on the edge
of Mechlenberg County, where the hostility to Great
Britain was fierce, and whence a declaration of indepen-
dence had been launched a full year before that of Phila-
delphia. Surrounded by such a hostile population, dis-
appointed in the hopes he had formed that North Carolina
would rally to his support as he advanced and stunned
by the blow at King's Mountain, where 121 of his regu-
lars and nearly 1,000 of his militia had been destroyed,
Cornwallis not only halted his invasion but retreated,
in some haste, to South Carolina. He marched-back 90
miles, and took station at Winnsboro, between Camden
'Dawson, 628-632; Tarleton, 164, 192-196.
BRITISH DEFEAT AT THE SOUTH 225
and Ninety-Six. Here he fell ill of a fever which incapac-
itated him for several weeks. During this time Rawdon Oct. 24
was in command, and he received a letter .from Clinton
advising him that Leslie had sailed for the Chesapeake
and was to act under Cornwallis's orders. Rawdon at Leslie sent to
once wrote to Leslie 1 requesting him to come by water to corawaSs
the Cape Fear River in North Carolina. Leslie was de-
layed by gales and did not reach the Cape Fear River in
less than six weeks. On arriving there he found instruc- Dec. 14
tions from Cornwallis to come to Charleston, where he i78i
arrived safely, and thence marched to Camden. 2 He Jan. 4
brought with him 2,500 men a brigade of the Guards,
the regiment of Bose, the Hessian Yagers and some
Provincials. This carried Cornwallis's strength, accord-
ing to Clinton, to 11,306 effective, 3 exclusive of officers.
The number of posts which he felt obliged to occupy *
made it impossible to take more than 4,000 men when he
resumed his march into North Carolina.
Until Leslie arrived at Camden, nearly three months Action,
after King's Mountain, Cornwallis remained idle at Ford,
Winnsboro. The partisan troops, however, were inces-
santly on the move Sumter in the Catawba district
and Marion, "the Swamp Fox/ 7 on the lower Pedee. The
latter penetrated to within a few miles of Georgetown
but was driven back into the swamps. Sumter was at-
tacked/ at a point on the Broad River about 25 miles
north-west of Winnsboro, but held his own. Then the
ever restless Tarleton was recalled from his pursuit of
Marion in the low country and sent to destroy Sumter. Action at
Blackstocks,
Tarleton was worsted, losing more than 100 men; the NOT. 20
1 Sparks, VII, 347. a Tarleton, 184, 243.
3 Clinton-Cornwallis, I, 282.
*Dawson, 633; Lee, 112; Tarleton, 173, 200.
226
THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1780
Greene Takes
the Offensive,
Dec. 16
success, however, was counterbalanced by the fact that
Sumter was wounded * and was not able to take the
field again for several weeks.
^fWhile Cornwallis was at Winnsbpro^ waiting for Leslie,
-Greene had taken the offensive^ He was so inferior in
s numbers to Cornwallis that battle was out of the question
until he could raise and equip a larger force; his only
plan now was to carry on a partisan warfare, threatening
. Cornwallis's flanks, breaking up his communications and
intercepting his supplies. 2 In pursuance of this plan he
divided his force, small as it was, and sgnt Morgan/with
about 600 men Maryland line, Virginia militia and the
remnants of the 1st and 3d Dragoons under William
Washington to cross the Catawba, join Sumter and other
partisans and move South, threatening Ninety-Six and
, Augusta. 3 The rest of his force, about 1,100 in number
under JEugery was sent to the Pedee and took position at
Cheraw, where Rawdon had maintained a post prior to
the battle of Camden. In this position they supported
Marion, threatened Camden and wereuiearer to Charles-
Jon than Cornwallis was at Winnsboro. Greene accom-
panied Huger's column*
It was a risky movement, for the two,, detachments
were 140 miles apart, with. ^Cornwallis between then*,,
and a good chance for him to beat them in detail. C If
Cornwallis attempted this Greene expected by a rapid
retreat to unite the two detachments in North Caro-
lina, 4 and he sent his chief engineer, KosciuskQ,4nd his
quartermaster, Carrington/back to reconnoifre r the fords
1 Dawson, 635-637; Lee, 114; Tarleton, 173-180.
2 G. W. Greene, III, 130; Greene to Washington, Sparks, Letters, III,
189, 214, 217, 225.
3 Johnson, I, 346.
* Greene to Varnum, Johnson, I, 350.
Scale of Statute Mies
Movements of Americans are shown
in Blue, and of British in Red lines,'
arrows indicating direction.
Greene before Cornwallis: - ^
Greene's return to South Carolina: -
Earl Cornwallis: <
LordEawdon: *
Movements of Partisans and of
smaller bodies of troops are
acJ shown in fine lines.
' ^Battles or Skirmishes.
i. \^' oj j-X
Courtesy of The Burrows Brothers Company,
Publishers, Cleveland, Ohio
From Avery's History of the United States
and Its People
CAMPAIGN OF 1781
BRITISH DEFEAT AT THE SOUTH 227
on the various rivers, 1 collect boats and obtain wagons
for transporting them from one river to the next. While
at Cheraw, Lee's Legion arrived from the North and
was sent to join Marion and make another demonstration
against Georgetown,
Meanwlnl6>_Clinton, at New York, was supporting
Cornwallis by every means in his power, in the hope of Jan. 12
making a Complete job at the South. As soon as he
heard that Leslie had been ordered from the Chesapeake
to Charleston, he sent another expedition to the Chesa-
peake^ljCOO men under Benedict Arnold^ now a briga-
dier in the British .service. Arnold arrived at Hampton ITSO
Roads, went up the river to Jamestown^ marched 800 Arnold sent
men to Richmond and burned the town. His instruc-
tions were to cut Greene's communications and destroy
his supplies at Petersburg;^ but Steuben rallied the Virr Jan 3
^inia militia and Arnold retreated down the James River Jan 7
to Portsmouth and waited for reinforcements from New Jan 19
York. This movement into Virginia led Washington to
^end^ Lafayette thither witlx.l,200.men. 3 The entire en- Feb. 20
ergies of both sides were thus concentrated on the South. . -
The successive reinforcements of the British were all
'placed under,.Cprnwallis's orders, and those of the Amer- ;
4cans under Greene; but the distance was so great and
the means of communication so slow that the Virginia
campaign was carried on by the local commanders inde-
pendent of their nominal chiefs.
To return to Cornwallis: the audacity of Greene's move-
ments dividing his inferior force had the desired effect,
It led Cornwallis to scatter his forces. Had Cornwallis
military importance of these rivers, which played so important a
part in Sherman's campaign in 1865 as well as in Greene's campaign of
1781, is evident from a glance at the map.
* Sparks, VII, 348. 3 Ibid., VII, 417-423.
228 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
i7so quickly concentrated and attacked first one and then
the other of Greene's detachments, he might have de-
stroyed both. Instead of this he sent Tarleton to attack
Morgan; directed Leslie to march to Camden to protect
that post against a possible attack by Huger; and kept
his main body at Winnsboro, which was 70 miles from
Tarleton on the one side and separated by a deep river
(Wateree) from Leslie on the other side. Instead of his
beating Greene in detail, Greene's right wing under Mor-
gan destroyed ComwalHs's^e&chment under Tarleton.
i78i Tarleton crossed the Broad River, and moving rapidly
Jan. 2 up its western branches he came in contact with Morgan
Jan. 16 at the Cowpens an enclosure for cattle just south of the
line between North and South Carolina and about 20
miles west of King's Mountain. Morgan had about 1,000
men, the force with which he left Charlotte having been
increased by about 400 .militia. Tarleton's command
numbered about 1,000 men British Legion and parts of
the 7th, 16th and ftstTnfantry and 17th Dragoons. 1 He
reconnoitred Morgan's position and found that he was
posted in an open wood, hi flanks unprotected and the
i Broad River at his back. Tarleton was of opinion that
the position was very advantageous for him and disad-
vantageous /or Morgan. He anticipated an easy victory.
^jMoigan^ however, thoroughly understood the troops
under his orders, and as a commander of light troops
he was unexcelled perhaps unrivalled. He posted his
force in three lines: in front, 150 expert riflemen; then
about 315 militia, many of whom had served in the Con-
tinental line; in rear of these, on a slight eminence, the
Maryland regulars who had survived Camden, and more
militia, about 430 in all; behind this eminence the cav-
1 Tarleton, 250; Johnson, 367.
BRITISH DEFEAT AT THE SOUTH 229
airy, 125 strong, under William Washington. The men
had slept well, had ea,ten a good breakfast and were in
fine spirits. Morgan had harangued them in satisfactory
fashion, and had instructed them to reserve their fire
until the enemy was within 50 yards, then to take careful
aim at those who wore epaulets, and while continuing
their fire to retire to the second line of militia, which was
under command of Pickens. After firing two rounds,
carefully aimed, Pickens's line was to retire to the left
of the regulars. All these orders were carried out with
remarkable exactness.
Tarleton began his march during the night and made Jan. 17,
such slow progress that five hours elapsed before he came
_in sight of the first line of the militia. He then deployed; 8 A " M "
light infantry and legion infantry to the right, 7th In-
fantry to the left with the 71st in reserve behind its left
flank, legion cavalry in the second line and a troop of
dragoons on each flank. In this order they advanced, Battle of the
without firing. At 50 . yards the militia delivered their
,fire with murderous accuracy and fell back as ordered;
the British returned the fire and continued their advance,
the 71st being brought into line on the left of the 7th.
/An attempt was made by the dragoons on the right to
turn Morgan's left flank, but William Washington with his
cavalry came out from behind the eminence where he
had been under cover and drove them back. The British
continued to advance, and soon came on the main line
the Marylanders. These received them with very delib-
erate fire, delivered kneeling, and aimed low. The 71st
outflanked the American right, and to meet this an order
was given to the companies on the right to change front.
This was not well executed, and the whole line began to
retreat. Tarleton thought the day was won and sent
230 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
i78i orders to the legion cavalry to come up on the left and
' charge. Before this could be done Morgan gave an order,
"Face about and fire once more." This was performed
r , with great coolness, and simultaneously the militia which
had retreated as ordered at the beginning was just fin-
ishing a complete circle of the whole battle-ground and
coming up on the American right. The British were
staggered at first and then ran. They were experienced
troops, most of whom had served throughout the war and
been in many battles. A panic set in quite similar to
that which seized the Americans at Germantown, and
their officers could not stop them. More than half the com-
mand surrendered and the rest fled. William Washington
charged in pursuit, but Tarleton managed to collect 14
officers and 40 horsemen and checked the pursuit suffi-
ciently to enable him to escape and rejoin Cornwallis.
The battle lasted less than an hour. Tarleton lost 100
killed, 229 wounded and 600 prisoners not wounded,
about 85 per cent of his entire command. The firing at
the epaulets was very effective, for 39 of his officers were
killed or wounded. Morgan's loss was only 12 killed and
50 Bounded. 1
This was one of the most interesting battles of the
whole war. It shows what can be done with militia
provided they are good marksmen and are commanded
by competent officers who understand them. Horgan,
Pickens, William Washington and Clarke, of Georgia,
were all experts in their respective lines.
'It had been suggested by Tarleton two weeks before
the battle that while he advanced against Morgan's front
the main body under Cornwallis should simultaneously
advance to Kong's Mountain to cut off his retreat.
1 Dawson, 646-653; Tarleton, 214, 250; Johnson, 370-384.
BRITISH DEFEAT AT THE SOUTH 231
Cornwallis replied: "You have . . . understood my
intentions perfectly." 1 But Cornwallis did not do his Jan. 5
part. He seems to have been nervous about his right
flank, which was threatened by Huger and the main
body of Greene's little army on the Pedee. Cornwallis
moved a few miles from Camden and then waited a week
until Leslie had crossed the Wateree. He then slowly Jan. 14
moved northward, but on the day of the battle instead
of being at King's Mountain in Morgan's rear he was 25
miles to the south. Hadjie been in rear of Morgan, he
might have destroyed him or driven him westward into
the mountains, notwithstanding Morgan's victory over
Tarleton, for Cornwallis outnumbered Morgan nearly
four to one. 1
Morgan had no illusions as to his position after the Morgan Re-
battle. He buried the dead, left the wounded of both
sides under a flag of truce and, picking up his captured
cannon, ammunition, 800 muskets and prisoners, before
noon he began his retreat and crossed the Broad River.
He was so encumbered with prisoners and captured stores
that his progress was slow, but it was fast enough to
keep ahead of Cornwallis; and at the end of a week he
had marched nearly 90 miles and had passed the Catawba.
The next day Cornwallis arrived at Ramsour's Mill (now Jan. 24
Lincolnton) on the Little Catawba, 20 miles to the rear. Jan. 25
It was a week before the news of Morgan's victory jan.24
reached Greene, on the Pedee. He also learned that
f'^MBWwJ-^ -. - --- * * - >
Morgan was retreating and Cornwallis advancing, and he
saw that the thing to do was to unite Huger and Morgan
as quickly as possible. He therefore called in Lee, who Jan. 25
was scouting on the sea-coast near Georgetown, and or-
dered Huger to march to Salisbury; and personally he
Tarleton, 246.
232 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1781 rode across the country, 125 miles, with only an aide
and three orderlies, and joined Morgan on the Catawba. 1
Greene joins Comwallis was on the opposite side of the river, delayed
ian. so ' in crossing by a sudden rise of the river. When he had
arrived at Ramsour's Mill and realized that Morgan was
20 miles ahead of him, he made up his mind to divest
himself of everything that could impede rapid move-
Jan. 26 ments. He spent two days in burning up all his tents,
Jan. 27 baggage and extra clothing and supplies, keeping only
his ammunition, hospital stores and such rations as could
be carried on the person. The destruction of the rum,
then the choicest article on the ration list, seemed to the
officers to be an extraordinary act of self-abnegation.
He also destroyed all his wagons except a few which
were to be used for the sick and wounded, and he
mounted some of his infantry on the horses thus made
available.
Retreat to the ipj^ began a retreat 2 (on the American side), one of
the most memorable in the annals of war 3 ; the numbers
were small but the stake was great, and there was abun-
dant military skill on both sides.
Jan. 29 Leaving Ramsour's Mill (Lincolnton), Cornwallis ar-
rived at the Catawba on the afternoon of the second day.
It was too late for a crossing, and during the night came
the rise in the river due to a winter's rain. Cornwallis
had no boats and it was necessary to wait for two days
Jan. 29 f or the river to subside sufficiently to be f ordable. Dur-
ing this interval Greene arrived and immediately made
^0^80^394-403.
2 Gordon, IV, 36-45; G. W. Greene, III, 151-175; Johnson, 403-
432; Greene to Washington, Sparks, Letters, III, 225, 233; Tarleton,
218-229, 249-264; Stedman, 325, 333.
3 " Every measure of tibe Americans, during their march from the
Catawba to Virginia, was judiciously designed and vigorously executed."
(Tarleton, 229.)
ro 43 so aa oo
Scale of Statute Miles
Courtesy of The Burrows Brothers Company,
Publishers, Cleveland, Ohio
From A very 's History of the United States
and Its People
RETREAT TO THE DAN
Jan.-Feb., 1781
BRITISH DEFEAT AT THE SOUTH 233
the following dispositions: Pickens with the militia was
to take tha.Cowpens prisoners through the mountains to
CharljDttesville, where the Saratoga prisoners were now
kept; Morgan, was to retreat at once to the Yadkin; the
fords on the Catawba were to be watched by 300 North
Carolina militia under Davidson, who had just joined the
army; Huger was to hasten his march to Salisbury.
The next day the river had fallen sufficiently to be ford- Feb. i
able, and Cornwallis forced a passage at two fords, dis- Passage of
persing the militia, but only after they had inflicted on
him a loss of 4 killed and 36 wounded and their own
leader, Davidson, had been killed. He pushed forward
during the afternoon, and one of Tarleton's scouting
parties ca^e^near capturing Greene, who had remained
with the militia until they dispersed and had then ridden
rapidly toward Salisbury. He stopped to pass the night Feb. i
at Carr's house, and from there wrote to Huger counter-
manding his orders of the previous day in so far as to
require him to keep on the east side of the Yadkin and
not to attempt to reach Salisbury. It was evident that
a junction with Morgan there was impossible.
Morgan, having a day's start, easily reached the Yad- Feb. 2
kin before Cornwallis could come up with him. The Feb.s
river was swollen with rains, but Carrington was there
with the boats, on which the foot troops and supplies
were ferried across, while the mounted men swam their
horses. Greene joined him during the crossing, and just
as it was completed toward sundown the advance of
Cornwallis's army came up. They had no boats and
could not cross. All they could do was to bring up their
artillery and bombard the American bivouac; the troops
were easily put under shelter, and the only harm done
was to shatter the hut in which Greene was writing his
234 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
i78i despatches one of which directed Huger to leave the
Yadkin and march for Guilf ord.
Cornwallis was thus forced to move twenty-five miles up
kb. s m> the Yadkin where the fords were more shallow ; and this he
did during the next few days. His intention was to put
himself between Greene and the fords on the upper Dan,
believing that Greene could not cross the lower Dan and
that he could thus force him to fight at a disadvantage.
As this movement developed Greene/ with MorgajEt; re-
tired slowly to Guilf ord (near Greensborough) ai^d thgre
was joined by the rest of his army under Huger knd Lee/
Feb. s Hfe, army, being reunited, Greene was disposed to
Feb. 9 * accept battle. He carefully selected a good position at
Guilford. Unless he could rally the militia he was still
too weak in numbers to expect success. His efforts to
bring out the militia were fruitless; moreover, every
day's retreat brought him nearer to Steubep and rein-
forcements in Virginia, and carried Cornwallis farther
from his base. A council of war decided unanimously
against a battle. 1
Greene therefore determined to continue the retreat
and put himself behind the Dan. Carrington had already
collected the boats on that river in the vicinity of Boyd's
Feb. 11 Ferry; Kosciuskq was sent there to throw up trenches
to defend the crossing; a body of 700 picked men under
Feb. n Williams was sent to get in front of Cornwallis and retard
his advance as much as possible. With the main body
jind. the supplies Greene left Guilford, and three days
later crossed the Dan at Boyd's Ferry, about 10 miles
above the junction of the Dan with the Roanoke, and
about 30 miles below the present city of Danville. The
following day Williams^ who had carried on a continuous
~"' Johnson, 11,425.
BRITISH DEFEAT AT THE SOUTH 235
series of skirmishes with Tarleton for the last four days,
also safely crossed the river, his men in the boats and the
horses swimming as at the Yadkin. Cornwallis's own Feb. is
letter accurately describes the movement: "I tried by Greene
a most rapid march to strike a blow either at Greene
(Huger) or at Morgan before they got over the Dan, but ' Virgima
could not effect it."
What was now to be done? Cornwallis was 230 miles comwaiiis
fromJiis-base; he had no boats to cross the Dan or the Hmsbor
Roanoke on Greene's left flank. If he attempted to
cross higher up Greene would meet him at whatever
point he selected, and the crossing would be difficult if
not impossible. Should it succeed Greene would retreat
into Virginia and soon effect a junction with Steuben,
and then Cornwallis would be outnumbered. Cornwallis
^therefore decided to inarch back into North Carolina,
occupy Hillsborough, where the Provincial legislature had
lately been in session, "raise the royal standard " and try
to gather the tory militia. His army soon reached Hills-
borough. It was exhausted with its long march, during
which it had lost about 250 men; and the lack of sup-
plies which had been burned up at Ramsour's Mill four
weeks ago was now keenly felt.
Greene's army was also exhausted with the long inarch
in the dead of winter, over roads alternately frozen and
deep in mud, with a succession of snow-storms and rains,
which inflicted a greater hardship on his men than on the
British, because they were insufficiently clad, had neither
tents nor blankets and many of them were barefooted.
His army was intact and by no means despondent. Re-
inforcements from Steuben speedily began to arrive. ;
In the face of extraordinary difficulties, Steuben: had
raised and equipped 400 Continentals, and the militia of
236 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
i78i the southern counties of Virginia at last realized their
Greene danger and began to assemble. Pickens had returned
SSen5 em " from taking the prisoners to Virginia and was now back
on the Catawba rallying the militia which had dispersed
at the crossing of that river. The Governor of North
Carolina was using every effort to bring out the militia
in other parts of the State. From all .of these sources
Greene's army, which numbered ..only 1,430 , when it
crossed the Dan, was increased within the next three
weeks to 1,715 Continentals and a force of militia which
has been variously estimated at from 2,800 .to 3,900
men. His total force at the battle of Guilford was be-
tween 4,500 arid 5,700 men, 1 His own returns, two days
before the battle, give the number as 4,444. 2
Feb. is / He.moved in pursuit of Cornwallis before the reinforce-
Feb.23 inents began to arrive. The day after Cornwallis left
the Dan to inarch to Hillsborough Greene sent Williams
across the river, and he followed with the main body
a few days later. In scouting around Hillsborough Lee
(whose legion was part of Williams's command) fell in with
the first body of tory militia which responded to Corn-
Destruction of wallis's proclamation. It numbered 300 men, was com-
y e s manded by Colonel Pyle, was marching from Guilford to
Hillsborough and was about midway between the two
hamlets. By a stratagem Lee got in immediate contact
with it before his identity was discovered; when the firing
began Lee's men cut the tories to pieces, 90 of them being
killed, nearly all the rest wounded and only a few escap-
ing. 3 Lee did not lose a man. The news of this encoun-
ter travelled fast and it put a decided damper on rallying
Feb. se to "the royal standard." The next day Cornwallis left
" * * . - - -- .
1 Schenck, 310-312. * Gordon, IV, 54.
3 Dawson, 658-660; Lee, 154-157; Tarleton, 231-233.
BRITISH DEFEAT AT THE SOUTH 237
Hillsborough and marched westward to meet Greene. 1731
The two armies came in touch on the Haw River. Both March 2
were anxious for battle, but Greene wanted to postpone it
until his reinforcements arrived. Constant manoeuvring
followed for ten "days, and there was a smart skirmish 1 in Action at
which about 50 men were lost on each side. Finally the MUI '
reinforcements arrived, and as soon as he could organize
them Greene marched to Guilford, intending to accept March 10
battle on the ground which he had carefully selected
during his retreat. His force numbered, as already stated,
between 4,500 and 5,700 men; but of these less than 500
had ever been in battle. Cornwallis's return gave 2,253 March 14
fit for duty, exclusive of officers. Every man (except the
North Carolina regiment which was left with the baggage
on the day of the battle) was a veteran regular who had
been in most of the battles at the North as well as at
Savannah, Charleston and Camden. Relying on the
superior quality of his troops, as at Camden, Cornwallis
did not hesitate to attack.
'" The dispositions of the troops on both sides were quite
^similar to those at the Cowpens. Greene had, in fact,
recently received a letter from Morgan 2 giving his advice
in regard to the handling of the militia. 3 Greene had the
highest regard for Morgan and adopted his suggestions.
He posted 4 the North Carolina militia in a line across
the Salisbury road about a mile from Guilford, with ex-
pert riflemen on each flank, the Delaware battalion and
Lynch/s Virginians on the right and the legion infantry
and Campbell's Virginians on the left. About 300 yards
1 Dawson, 661-663.
2 Morgan was obliged by ill health to leave Greene's army in Febru-
ary. He joined Washington just before the surrender at Yorktown.
3 Schenck, 321.
4 Greene's Report, Tarleton, 312-317.
238 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
i78i behind them was a line of Virginia militia, with William
Washington's cavalry on their right and Lee's on their
left. The third line was about 550 yards in rear of the
second and was composed of the Continentals, 2 Virginia
regiments on the right and 2 Maryland regiments on the
left, posted on a slight eminence some distance in front
of the Court-House. The only fault in these dispositions
seems to have been in having the lines too far apart,
about twice the distance they were at the Cowpens.
Doubtless this was made necessary by the nature of the
ground, which was heavily wooded, with occasional clear-
ings of a few acres for cultivation. There was one such
clearing in front of the main line and another in front of
the advanced line, and it was thought that the North
Carolina militia, posted in the woods behind this latter
clearing and their flanks held by expert riflemen, would
make a good resistance although they had never before
been under fire.
Battle of Cornwallis had been encamped for two days on the
Salisbury road, about twelve miles south-west of Guilford.
Hearing of Greene's movement to that point, he left the
North Carolina regiment with the baggage and with his
2,000 regulars broke camp at daylight and marched
toward Guilford. After marching eight miles his ad-
vance under Tarleton came in contact with Lee and a
skirmish ensued, Lee falling back to the main body and
; taking post on the left flank as above stated. About noon
Cornwallis came in sight of the American lines and at once
deployed: Leslie's brigade (71st and Bose) to the right,
Webster's brigade (23d and 33d) and Yager's to the left,
O'Hara's brigade (Guards) in reserve, two pieces of artillery
on the road in centre and Tarleton's cavalry in the rear. 1
1 Cornwall's Report, Tarleton, 303-310.
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BRITISH DEFEAT AT THE SOUTH 239
The battle 1 opened with a cannonade from the two
&jgounders which lasted twenty minutes. Then the
whole line advanced with admirable steadiness across the
first clearing. The air was sharp and frosty and the
British bayonets glistened in the sun of a cloudless day. Battle of
The North Carolina militia had no bayonets. They were GuUlord
armed with hunting-rifles and powder-horns. It took
thx^minutes to . load. They delivered their first fire at
150 yards. When they had reloaded the Highlanders
were within 40 yards; the militia fired their second
round, leaning their rifles on the rail-fence at the edge
of the clearing. Both rounds were carefully aimed and
were effective. B;ut still the British line came on. It is
claimed and also dSspuibed that_ Greene had given the
North Carolina militia the same order that Morgan gave
at Cowpens, to fire two rounds and then retire to the next
line. Whether they had this order or not they retired,
not to the second line, but far beyond the battle-ground.
They ran through the intervals of the Virginia militia and
past its left flank, and most of them were not again
heard of.
The flanking parties did not take part in the flight,
and Leslie's brigade wheeled to the right against Lee and
Campbell and Webster's to the left against Kirkwood
and Lynch; O'Hara's brigade moved forward into the
gap thus created. Kirkwood and Lynch fell back slowly,
contesting their ground, and took post on the right of
the Continentals; William Washington's cavalry with-
drew to the rear of the Continentals; Lee and Campbell
did not yield at first, and it was only after the 1st Bat-
talion of the Guards had been brought up on the right
l Tarleton, 269-279; Stedman, II, 337-347; Johnson, II, 1-22; Lee,
170-180; Dawson, 663-670; Schenck, 292-387.
240 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
of the Bose regiment that they were forced back up the
slope of a hill just behind their first position. The action
f continued here, quite separate and apart from the main
battle, for nearly two hours, and in the course of it Corn-
wallis personally led the Guards battalion and had his
horse shot under him.
March i5th, The North Carolinians having broken and run, O'Hara's
brigade advanced through the woods, with Webster on
its left and the 71st on its right, and fell upon the Vir-
ginia militia the second line. But they made a good
defence, until their right flank was enveloped by the
British left, when it gave way; and soon after Stevens,
who commanded the left brigade, was badly wounded.
Then the whole line gave way and retreated past the left
of the Continentals.
Within half an hour after the battle opened the militia,
whether their numbers were 2,800 or 3,800, were all gone
except the gallant riflemen from Virginia under Lynch
and Campbell, many of whom were old soldiers, but whose
numbers did not exceed 200 men. The North Carolinians
had lost 11 and the Virginians 46, killed and wounded,
and had inflicted probably an equal loss on their oppo-
nents. The hard fighting of the day was yet to come,
and the numbers were about equal 2,000 on each side.
The British troops continued their advance through
the woods and came to the second clearing. Three sepa-
rate and somewhat disjointed attacks were made across
this and against the four Continental regiments posted
on the rising ground in the woods on the opposite side.
Two of them were repulsed the first by Webster's bri-
gade, against the centre of the line between the Virginia
and Maryland brigades. He was driven back with heavy
loss, Webster himself being mortally wounded and his
BRITISH DEFEAT AT THE SOUTH 241
<*-*. -m
brigade forced back across the clearing and separated
from O'Hara. The second was by two battalions of the
Guards under Q'Hara. They struck the left flank the
2d Maryland, a new regiment and it fled almost with- Battle of
out firing a shot. Then the 1st Maryland wheeled to the Guilford
left and took them in flank ; and they were driven back
in great confusion, one battalion losing nearly half its
strength and O'Hara being wounded. They were pur-
sued by the 1st Maryland and by William Washington's
cavalry. Colonel Stewart of the Guards was killed, and
their retreat was only checked by Cornwallis in person,
who brought the two 3-pounders along the road to the
edge of the clearing and ordered them to fire grape over
the heads of his own men, many of whom were wounded
by it.
^]^at,..this tf , i JQEiQment Greene had followed up his sue- March is,
cess by a vigorous attack with the three regiments which
now remained to him, he might have defeated Cornwallis.
The attack might have failed, and if so he would have
lost his whole army and the war in the South would have
ended for there were no more reinforcements to come
from the North. He had previously made up his mind
never to risk the total destruction of his army, and he
abided by this determination. He therefore reformed
his men in their first position on the wooded hill; and
Cornwallis brought up the 71st and the battalion of the
Guards which had been fighting against Lee and Camp-
bell on the extreme right, reformed his lines and prepared
for a final assault with the seven battalions which he now
had. As he began to move forward Greenejjfdecided to save
his army while it was still in his power to do so. He placed
the 1st Virginia, which had not been engaged, iiTposfiSon
to"ncovef his retreat, and retired in good ordfef. Corn-
242
THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1781
March 16
March 17
Cornwallis
Retreats to
Wilmington
March 18
March 28
wallis followed him only a short distance,^ and J)ef ore
f mcynrng Greene had takeiT a "good defensive position be-
liind the Haw River, about ten miles from the battle-
field. He had lost 78 killed and 183 wounded; when the
returns~were made up, 1,046 of the militia were missing ;
tHe others had straggled into camp. He had inflicted
upon Cornwallis.a loss of 93 filled, 413 wounded aii3f 2*6
missing, nearly 30 per cent of his strength. 1
The retreat to the Dan and the battle "of Guilford were
* to the South what the retreat through New Jersey and
,,^he battles of Trenton and Princeton were to the North,
-,. They, turned the tide; and each attracted equal atten-
tion in Europe. Greene lost the battle but won the cam-
paign, and the first step toward Yorktown was taken.
., Cornwallis's losses were so great and his situation so pre^
earious at such a distance from his base that a retreat
: was imperative. The only question was in what direc-
tion he should go. The distance to Camden was about
160 miles. To return there was to acknowledge the total
failure of his campaign. The distance to Wilmington
was about 200 miles. There he would have the support
of the British ships; and possibly he might draw Greene
after him, and after he had refitted his army engage him
in battle again and meanwhile the posts in South Caro-
lina would be safe. 2
He determined to retreat as far as Cross Creek (Fay-
etteville) where he had ordered supplies to be sent from
Wilmington. Giving his men two days' rest and aban-
doning his wounded, he began his march. Greene in-
stantly started in pursuit. He came up with Cornwallis's
rear at Ramsay's Mill, on Deep River, but did not feel
1 Dawson, 669, 670.
2 Tarleton, 278, 322-327; Stedman, II, 350-353.
BRITISH DEFEAT AT THE SOUTH 243
strong enough to attack him. Cornwallis then went on
unmolested to Cross Creek, and finding no supplies there April 7
continued his retreat to Wilmington. 1
Greene did not follow Mm beyond Deep River. Corn-
wallis being out of the way, he decided to march to South
Carolina and endeavor to regain that State. 2
He remained at Ramsay's Mills a week, reorganizing March 29
his army and perfecting his plans. The Virginia and Aprils
Noii^Carolina militia had been called out for six weeks and
their time was up; they had been with him just twenty-
three days, and they had been of real service for they had
enabled hrm to fight the battle of Guilf ord even though
they had failed at the critical moment. He released
them all with thanks and sent them home. His army
was then reduced to the four Continental regiments 1st
and 2d Virginia, 1st and 2d Maryland, Lee's Legion and
William Washington's dragoons in all about 1,450 men.
Under a curious order of the "Council Extraordinary"
which then administered so much of the Provincial gov-
ernment as existed in North Carolina, all of the six weeks'
militia who had fled from Guilford were "sentenced to
twelve months' duty as Continentals." 3 An effort was
made to round them up, and later a few hundred of them
joined Greene and did good service, as did other skeleton
regiments which were raised as speedily as possible in
North Carolina. Tha force with which Greene began his
march into South Carolina was less than 1,500 men.
He designed to aid these to the utmost by utilizing fully
the partisan corps under Sumter/ Marios, and Pickens. .
While Greene was not as successful as Morgan in getting
the most out of the militia on the battle-field, he was
'Tarleton, 278, 322-327; Stedman, II, 350-353.
3 Greene, Letters, Johnson, II, 37-40. 3 Schenck, 394.
244 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
i78i ! far more successful than any other commander at the
South in securing the co-operation of these irregular
leaders, who abhorred discipline, considered obedience
as synonymous with servility and made it a practice
to submit their plans to their followers for approval
before putting them into execution. Notwithstanding
these eccentricities they rendered valuable service.
Sumter was now on the Broad River, recovered from
his wound and recruiting his men; Marion was hiding in
the Pedee swamps, but ready to emerge when conditions
were favorable; Pickens was on his familiar ground in
western South Carolina. Greene communicated with all
of them, requesting their assistance, and they cheerfully
gave it sometimes according to Greene's plans and
sometimes according to their own.
On the British side, Rawdon had been left in command
when Cornwallis marched North. He was at Camden,
whose garrison was 1,400 men, of whom 500 were at the
moment detached in the hope of catching Marion. In ad-
dition to the two main posts of Charleston and Savannah,
there were others at Augusta, Ninety-Six, Port Granby,
Orangeburg, Fort Motte, Fort Watson and Georgetown,
whose garrisons varied from 120 to 630 men. Exclud-
ing Charleston and Savannah, Rawdon had about 3,500
effective men in the various other posts, and in the two
States 8,141.'
Greene With his 1,500 Continentals and such assistance as he
Marches to
Carolina could get from the partisan leaders and any militia that
might join him, Greene., set .out to capture these, posts
and reconquer. South Carolina. With the main body
he marched to Camden; he kept Lee on his left flank,
to give warning if Cornwallis should come toward South
Sparks, V, 545.
BRITISH DEFEAT AT THE SOUTH 245
Carolina, and if not then to effect a junction with Marion
and attack Fort Watson, below Camden; Sumter was
requested to join the main body at Camden, and Pick-
ens to advance against Ninety-Six on his right.
Greene marched to Camden, 140 miles in 14 days, of Apru 6-20
which 3 were spent in collecting boats to cross the Pedee.
During this time Lee had joined Marion at a ferry lower Apra w
down on the Pedee, and the two had proceeded to besiege
Fort Watson, a stockaded post on the Santee about half-
way between Camden and Charleston. After a siege of 8 capture of
days the place was captured 1 by the expedient of cutting
rees and erecting (during the night) a tower, from the
top of which a plunging fire was delivered inside the
stockade which rendered it untenable. Its garrison of Apm 15-23
120 men was captured, with the loss to Marion and Lee
of 2 killed and 4 wounded. They then moved to the High
Hills of Santee in the hope of intercepting Colonel Watson,
who with 500 men of the Camden garrison had been sent
to catch Marion in the Pedee swamps and after a fruit-
less chase was now returning to his post. He managed
to evade Marion and Lee and joined Rawdon at Camden,
but not until after the battle had been fought.
Greene had approached Camden from the north and May?
had hoped to surprise it, but the tories gave warning of Apni 20
his approach. Not having men enough either to assault
or to surround and besiege it, he retired to a rising ground
about two miles north of the village and took up a de-
fensive position. The ground was wooded like nearly
all of the battle-grounds in the Southern campaign. Its
right was protected by the Wateree, its left by a rivulet
and swamp; the high-road from Camden to the Waxhaws
passed through the centre. The troops were disposed as
n, 672; Lossing, II, 501.
246 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
i78i follows: the 2 Virginia regiments on the right, the 2
Maryland on the left and 2 guns on the road between
them; a body of North Carolina militia which had just
joined were placed in the second line, thus reversing the
dispositions made at the Cowpens and at Guilford.
William Washington's cavalry was in rear of the left and
the Delaware battalion was stationed as an outpost at the
foot of the hill about 500 yards in advance of the main
line. The men bivouacked in this order night and day,
expecting an attack. Greene's strength, Lee's Legion
being detached, was 1,174 Continentals and 248 North
Carolina militia. 1
Battle of Hob- Rawdon decided to attack without waiting for Watson,
? 25 ' as he feared that Marion and Lee might join Greene if he
delayed. Marching out of his fortified village early in
the morning, he circled to the right through the woods in
order to approach the hill from the south-east where the
slope was least steep. He had 1 regular regiment
63d and 3 regiments of New York tories (Volunteers of
Ireland, King's American and New York Volunteers),
with a detachment of South Carolina tories and a few
10 A. H, dragoons. As he came in contact with the Delaware
battalion he deployed with 3 regiments in the first line
and moved forward to attack the hill.
Greene seems to have been overconfident, and instead
of waiting to receive the attack in his chosen position on
the crest of the wooded slope he took the offensive.
Rawdon's front being narrow, he endeavored to envelop
him on both flanks while he made a vigorous attack on
his centre. Campbell with the 1st Virginia was to turn
his right flank, Ford with the 2d Maryland his left;
Johnson, II, 72-95; Stedman, 356-362; Dawson, 680-684; G. W.
Greene, III, 239-255.
tt&
1.
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gPurination. for assault
"2 Final Position
.American 1st Position
T Anif rtcan 2nd Position
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April 25, 1781
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. Court House
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NlNETTY-SlX
IVIay 2.2 June 5, 1781
From Avery's History of the Unite'd. States and Its People
BRITISH DEFEAT AT THE SOUTH 247
Gunby with the 1st Maryland and Hawes with the 2d
Virginia were to charge with the bayonet against his
centre; the artillery were to use grape; and William
Washington with his cavalry was to sweep around his
left flank and attack him in rear.
It was too ambitious a programme. Rawdon quickly
extended his front by bringing up the Irish regiment,
and in the sharp fighting which ensued Captain Beatty
of the 1st Maryland was killed, his company began to re-
tire and Gunby ordered the regiment to fall back to
reform. In doing so this regiment which had fought
so gallantly at Camden, the Cowpens and Guilford, and
in nearly every battle since Long Island became de-
moralized -and could not be rallied. Rawdon's men
charged up the hill, and the 2d Maryland, seeing the
retreat of the 1st, and their colonel, Ford, being mortally
wounded, also began to retreat; and this brought Raw-
don on the left flank of the Virginia regiments. Greene
saw that the day was lost and immediately withdrew the
Virginia regiments and the artillery. His little force re-
treated five miles and took up another position, but Raw-
don did not pursue. He returned within his lines at
Camden that same afternoon.
Greene's losses were 19 killed, 115 wounded and 136
missing, and Rawdon's about the same, 258 killed,
wounded and missing. 1
v T^ujjs Greece ..lost his., second battle, and he was
somewhat disheartened, writing to Luzerne, the French
minister (in a vain appeal for help from the French
soldiers cooped up in Newport): "We fight, get beat,
rise and fight again." 2 As at Guilford, the ultimate
advantages were all on his side; for Rawdon, unwill-
1 Dawson, 684. 3 See also Sparks, Letters, III, 299,
248 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
i78i ; ing to risk a second engagement, soon retreated to
Charleston. 1
May 7 At the time of the battle, Pickens on the extreme right
was approaching Ninety-Six; Marion and Lee on the left
were at the Santee Hills, trying to intercept Watson on
his return from Georgetown to Camden; andj&imter, in-
stead of joining Greene as requested had .started on an
independent expedition against Fort Granby (Columbia).
Watson managed to elude Marion and join Rawdon in
Camden. Greene then sent Xee against Fort Granby,
Marion against Fort Motte, 30 miles south of Camden,
and with his main body retired 6 miles to Rugely's Mill.
Rawdon was thus surrounded and every one of his
posts threatened. Notwithstanding the reinforcement
May 10 brought by Watson, he did not feel strong enough to at-
tack Greene, and he decided that his only safety was in a
Rawdon retreat to Charleston. He therefore burned the stock-
camden ades at Camden and such stores as he could not carry,
and retreated to Monck's Corner, about 30 miles from
May 24 Charleston.
capture of While he was on his retreat Marion surrounded Fort
Fort Motte
Motte. 2 This was a post, garrisoned by 150 men, at the
point where the Congaree and Wateree Rivers unite to
form the Santee. With Fort Watson, lower down on the
Santee, it maintained the communications between Cam-
den and Charleston. The post consisted of an old colo-
nial mansion, in a commanding situation, which had been
fortified. It was captured by the novel .expedient of
shooting arrows carrying firebrands against the dry shin-
gles on the roof, by which the house was set on fire. The
May 12 garrisoned soon surrendered. 3
^tedman, 11,361.
2 Dawson, 689-692; G. W. Greene, III, 278. 3 Lossing, II, 480.
BRITISH DEFEAT AT THE SOUTH 249
Lee then went on to Fort Granby, where Sumter had
abandoned his attack in favor of a more promising expedi- capture of
tion against Orangeburg, about thirty miles to the south. May*!! urg *
Rawdon had already given orders for the evacuation of
Orangeburg, but Sumter arrived before the order was
executed, and with slight difficulty captured the garrison
of 350 men. He then retraced his steps to Fort Granby capture of
and on his arrival was annoyed to find that Lee had ar- May 15*" y '
rived the day before and had compelled its surrender, with
its garrison of 240 men. Sumter felt that Lee had stolen
his glory and complained to Greene of Lee's conduct,
stating that he considered it "for the good of the public
to do it without regulars." * Greene replied that Lee had
acted in accordance with his orders; whereupon Sumter
sent in his resignation. Greece diplomatically persuaded
him to withdraw it, and he afterward rendered excel-
lent service, in co-operation with Lee, in the vicinity of
Charleston. 2
.All the interior posts in South Carolina were now capt- May s
ured except Ninety-Six. As soon as Rawdon evacuated
Camden, Greene marched rapidly toward Ninety-Six,
sending Lee some North Carolina militia, who had just
arrived, to join Pickens who had collected a considerable
body of militia in the vicinity of Augusta. On his way May 21
Lee captured a large amount of supplies collected for dis-
tribution to the Indians at a point on the Savannah
River, about twelve miles below Augusta. He then
crossed the river and late on the same day joined Pickens
on the west side of Augusta.
This village was defended by two stockaded forts, one siege of
in the village and the other about half a mile up the river. Maylsuo
Its garrison numbered 630 men, under Lieutenant-Colonel
1 Johnson, II, 122. a G. W. Greene, III, 290, 295, 298.
250 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
i78i Browne. The garrison of the upper fort was composed of
Georgia loyalists. They attempted to escape to the main
fort and nearly half of them were killed by the Georgia
militia of Colonel Clarke. The siege of the principal
fort lasted fourteen days. Browne made a stiff defence.
To the first summons to surrender he returned a spirited
refusal. He made two vigorous sorties. The besiegers
finally won by the same device as at Fort Watson a
wooden tower from which to deliver a plunging fire within
June 5 the stockade. Browne was finally forced to yield, and
signed articles of capitulation in which his garrison was
definitely surrendered as "field prisoners of war." *
siege of Pickens and Lee hastened to join Greene, who had
May 22 1? 1 begun the siege of Ninety-Six. This place had been elab-
orately and somewhat curiously fortified with stockades
and deep ditches. Its garrison numbered 550 men, a
tory regiment from New York, another from New Jersey
and some South Carolina loyalists all commanded by
Lieutenant-Colonel Cruger, of New York. He also made
a spirited defence. Greene had xmly 984 men prior to
the arrival of Pickens and Lee and it was impossible to
surround the place. Ei engineer, Kosciusko, opened
May 23 his first parallel at 70 yards! Cruger punished this "in-
sult" the next morning by a vigorous sortie supported by
the fire of three 3-pounders. The intrenching party was
routed and lost most of their tools. Kosciusko then began
a new first parallel at "a more respectful distance," 400
yards, and from this the besiegers gradually worked their
way up to the ditch of the Star Fort. There were con-
stant sorties; there were the same devices of a wooden
tower for plunging fire and arrows carrying firebrands
to set fire to the beleaguered buildings; the source of
1 Dawson,673, 679; G. W. Greene, 300-302; Stedman, II, 363.
BRITISH DEFEAT AT THE SOUTH 251
water supply was captured, and the besieged suffered 1731
terribly from thirst. 1
While the siege was in progress reinforcements from June 3
Ireland arrived at Charleston, three full regiments, 3d,
19th and 30th, and a number of recruits for the Guards.
Rawdon determined to march to the relief of Ninety-Six.
Marion was operating near the coast, and hearing this
news sent a courier to notify Greene, who in turn sent
explicit instructions to Sumter an3llarion to place them-
selves in front of Rawdon and retard his advance, as
Williams and Lee had so skilfully done on the Dan.
. JRawdpn managed to evade them, and was approaching
with 1,800 infantry, 200 cavalry and a body of South Caro-
lina loyalists. To conclude the siege before his arrival Assault at
was impossible, and Greene determined on an assault. jESTis 81 *
Campbell with picked detachments from the Virginia
and Maryland regiments was to attack the Star Fort,
and Lee with the legion infantry the redoubt; the rest
of the command was to man the wooden tower and the
trenches from which they were to concentrate their fire
on the Star Fort. Axes were provided to cut down the
abatis, fascines to fill up the ditch and long poles with
hooks to pull down the sand-bags of the besiegers' trenches.
At noon the assault began, preceded by an hour's can-
nonade from Greene's four guns. The storming parties
rushed forward and gained the ditch. Then the besiegers
poured into the ditch from the sally-port of the main
stockade. A desperate hand-to-hand struggle resulted
and the assailants were driven out. Lee was more suc-
cessful and carried the redoubt, and was preparing to
attack the village stockade from the rear. Greene, how- July 20
iDawson, 692-697; Stedman, 364r-373; G. W. Greene, 303-317;
Johnson, II, 138-154.
252 THE EEVOLUTIONAEY WAR
i78i ever ; adhering to his resolution never to submit his little
force to the risk of total destruction, decided not to renew
the assault^ but to raise the siege, and preceded by his
wounded he moved across the Broad River in the direc-
tion of Charlotte.
He had again lost the battle, but won the campaign, for
Ninety-Six was speedily evacuated and never again 'occu-
pied by the British.
His losses during the siege were 57 killed, 70 wounded
and 20 missing. Cruger lost 27 killed and 58 wounded. 1
June 21 Rawdon arrived the following day after an exhausting
march of 180 miles. As quickly as possible he started
in pursuit of Greene, but finding that the latter had
crossed the Broad he returned to Ninety-Six and made
Evacuation of preparations for its evacuation. Leaving Cruger there
?u\ n y 3 y " Sl *' to arrange for the departure of the numerous loyalists
residing in the vicinity, Rawdon marched first to Fort
Granby and then to Orangeburg, where he was joined
by the 3d Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Stewart, from
Charleston, and soon after by Cruger, from Ninety-Six.
This carried his strength to nearly twice that of Greene;
and the latter decided on account of the intense heat to
march his men to the high hills of Santee, about 30
miles below Camden, for a short but much-needed rest.
Leaving Stewart in command in Orangeburg, Rawdon
took 500 men and returned to Charleston, pursued by
Sumter and Marion and Lee to within 5 miles of the city.
Rawdon then left for England on leave of absence, but
his ship was captured by de Grasse and he was carried
a prisoner to Yorktown. Stewart followed Greene and
went into camp facing him., with the Congaree between
them. Greene's main body was on the Santee Hills;
'Stedmaa, II, 373.
BRITISH DEFEAT AT THE SOUTH 253
Sumter took station on his right near the site of Fort
Granby (Columbia), Marion (who had captured George- capture of
town while Greene was at Ninety-Six) on his left at Nel-
son's Ferry on the lower Santee, and Pickens returned to
his old recruiting-ground near Ninety-Six. 1
Bkjraa- not quite eight months since Greene had taken
command at the South. At jfchat time everything south
of. North Carolina was in the enemy's possession. Now
they tad lost all of Georgia except Savannah and all
but a small portion of South Carolina. In the interval
Grogie's Jittle army had marched 950 miles, fought 3
battles and a score of minor engagements, conducted 5
sieges, captured 9 posts and taken nearly 3,000 prisoners.
His army had no organized commissariat or transport
system, BO tents or camp equipage, and only insuffi-
cient clothing. He had no base of supplies, but lived
off the country which, although in the main friendly
to him, was filled with a very substantial minority of
intensely bittefr loyalists. The enemy outnumbered him
three to one, and was composed of the best British
.regulars and Hessians, the well-organized and veteran
tory regiments of New York and New Jersey and a nu-
merous body of local partisans, all well equipped and sup-
plied, and supported by an ample military chest of ready
money.
Battles_were lost because the troops lacked training
and that steadiness which only experience under fire will
bring; but the campaigns were won by tireless marches
skilfully planned and directed. These were carried on,
with extraordinary fortitude on the part of the men,
through the .snows and cold rains of the winter and the
fierce heat of a Southern summer.
'Stedman, II, 372-383; Johnson, II, 162-178.
254 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
i78i \ Greene gave his little army six weeks' rest in the com-
Aug. 23 - paratively salubrious region of the Santee Hills. Dur-
ing that time he received some fresh levies from North
Greene Carolina (the Guilford runaways, "condemned " to twelve
months, service as Continentals), carrying his strength
to something over 2,000 men. He then resumed the
offensive, and marched to attack Stewart.
Aug. 28 It would have been difficult, if not impossible, to have
forced a passage of the Santee; and Greene therefore
made a circuit of about ninety miles, crossing the Wateree
near Camden and the Congaree below Fort Granby
(Columbia), and picking up the militia of Pickens and
Henderson (formerly Sumter) on his march. Having
thus crossed the rivers, he approached Stewart from the
north-west, and the latter retired about forty miles to
his depot of supplies at Eutaw Springs.
sept. 7 Greene slowly followed him, and a week later was
joined by Marion on his return from a very successful
raid on the Edisto near Charleston. The next day
Greene moved forward in two columns, ready for deploy-
ment as soon as the enemy was encountered. He had
2,300 men of whom 1,254 were Continentals and the rest
militia.
Stewart had an equal number, but all veterans; 6 regi-
ments 3d, 63d, 64th, Grenadiers, New York Volunteers
and New Jersey Volunteers. They were encamped in a
clearing, on both sides of the main road, a few hundred
yards from the Santee; and in rear of the camp was a
sept, s substantial brick house and palisaded garden which
s A. M. played a very important part in the battle.
About four miles from the camp Lee's cavalry came
in contact with a "rooting 7 ' party (sent out to dig sweet-
potatoes) and its escort. There was a skirmish in which
Courtesy of The Burrows Brothers Company,
Publishers, Cleveland. Ohio
From Avery's History of the United States
and Its People
EUTAW SPRINGS
Sept. 8, 1781
BRITISH DEFEAT AT THE SOUTH 255
about 40 prisoners were taken and the rest rushed back
to camp to give the alarm. Stewart promptly formed
his men in a single line, 3 regiments on each side of the
road and 2 pieces of artillery on the road.
Greene moved forward and, as he approached the Brit- Battle of
ish position, deployed in two lines; the militia in front,
Marion on the right and Pickens on the left and the North Sept " 8
Carolina militia in the centre; the Continentals in the
second line, the two new North Carolina regiments on the
right, the 1st and 2d Virginia in the centre, 1st and 2d
Maryland on the left; two pieces of artillery in the centre
of each line; Lee's Legion on the right flank and Hender-
son's (Sumter's) partisans on the left; William Washing-
ton's cavalry and the Delaware battalion in the rear.
The firing began at 150 yards and was soon very heavy. 10 A. M.
The militia, under the guidance of Marion and Pickens,
fought well and held their ground for some time; and
when they were forced back Sumter's two North Caro-
lina regiments came into line with them and the ground
was regained. Soon afterward they were again forced
back, and Greene then ordered Campbell and Williams
with the Virginia and Maryland regiments to move for-
ward without firing, relying on the bayonet; and at the
same time sent Lee and William Washington to charge
with their cavalry on both flanks. There was soon des-
perate fighting along the whole line. ^William Washing-
ton came to grief. In the wooded ground his dragoons
were defeated with a loss of nearly half their strength,
their leader himself being wounded and taken prisoner.
The infantry and Lee's cavalry on the right were en-
tirely successful. They drove the British regiments (after
a desperate struggle, in which Campbell was killed and
Henderson and Howard were wounded) to and through
256 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
i78i their camp. Stewart succeeded in rallying his men at
the cross-roads in rear of his camp, and a portion of them
Battle of took refuge in the brick house and the adjoining garden;
SDtira and from the windows of the house and from the shelter
of the stout garden fence they poured a very destructive
fire upon the infantry of Lee's Legion and Kirkwood's
Delaware battalion, who had followed to the door.
The Virginia and Maryland regiments stopped in the
camp. It was filled with abundant supplies, including
rum. It was so long since the Continentals had seen such
delicacies that the temptation to partake of them was
irresistible especially as they thought the victory was
already theirs.
12 M . The battle however, was not won. The little party in
the brick house was keeping up a vigorous fight against
the Delaware battalion and Hampton's regiment of
Sumter's men; the four pieces of artillery were brought
into action at close range, but they were unable to make
any impression on the walls. Finally Major Marjoribanks
came out of the garden and made a bold and successful
attack (in which he was mortally wounded), turning
Hampton's left flank and capturing three of the four
pieces of artillery. Meanwhile the Continentals were
enjoying the good things in camp, but Stewart was re-
forming his men at the cross-roads. He soon renewed
his attack and the Continentals were in no condition to
receive it. They began to fall back and Greene ordered
a retreat, bringing off his own wounded as well as his
prisoners.
It was a bloody battle; 1 the Americans lost 120 killed,
375 wounded and 8 missing; the British, 85 killed, 351
1 Stedman, II, 377-381; Gordon, IV, 168-171; G. W. Greene, in, 391-
405; Johnson, II, 220-237; Dawson, 711-720.
BRITISH DEFEAT AT THE SOUTH 257
wounded and 430 missing & total of nearly 40 per cent
of their strength.
th sides retreated, Greene on the night of the battle, Results of
i j "*, M i , , ,1 , i * ! the Battle
about 7 miles, and Stewart the next day 14 miles,
leaving behind him a portion of his wounded and 1,000
muskets and destroying such stores as he could not
carry away. As soon. & Greene learned that Stewart sept. 10
had retreated he started in pursuit, but the latter was
soon joined by a reinforcement from Charleston, and
Greene returned to the Santee Hills.
Thus for the fourth time Greene failed to gain a vic-
tory in battle; the British rum unfortunately deprived
him of it at the very moment of success. Again, as on
the previous occasions, the advantages of victory were
on his side, for the British retired to the vicinity of
Charleston. Greene gave his men another short rest at
the Santee Hills and then moved down to the Ashley in Action at
.. Dorchester,
pursuit. After a sharp skirmish at the beginning of Dec. i
winter he drove them within their lines at Charleston;
and, although the garrison was many times superior to
him in numbers, he maintained a strict blockade until
the city was evacuated.
There-was no serious fighting at the South after Eutaw Reestablish-
-TV, ^ f -i sZ 11 mentofthe
Springs. The Carolinas and Georgia were recovered and American
Government
the American governments were re-established. The two in the south
British garrisons remained quietly within the limits of 1782
Savannah and Charleston until they were evacuated and July u
the troops carried by sea to New York. Dec - 14
This d^veu^months 7 campaign January to December,
1781, from the Catawba to the Dan and from the Dan
back to Charleston and Augusta received at the time
the enthusiastic commendation of Washington and his
comrades on the one side and of Tarleton and Stedman
258 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
i78i on the other. It has always been considered one of the
comments most brilliant in American annals, and it has been quite
sSuS e ' s as much praised by English as by American writers.
campaign Though the numbers on each side were small, yet from
the military stand-point it is full of interest and instruc-
tion and well repays examination in all its details.
The marches, the manoeuvres, the sieges, the raids and
the scouting by both Lee and Tarleton, the improvised
pontoon trains, the proper use of the topography of the
country for defence and offence were all admirable.
There was but little artillery on either side, but it was
well handled. The four battles were fiercely contested
and the percentage of loss on both sides was large. The
British had the advantage of well-trained and well-armed
troops, but this was more than counterbalanced by the
superiority of the American generalship. In only one
respect can Greene be criticised, and whether the criticism
is just or unjust it is hard to say. He lost every battle.
Morgan, under similar circumstances, gained a great vic-
tory. If Greene had possessed the same temperament as
Morgan or Wayne he would probably, both at Guilford
and at Eutaw, have made one more effort and risked
everything on the result of it. If unsuccessful, he would
have been destroyed; if successful, he would have hast-
ened by a few months what he finally accomplished.
The general opinion is, and it is probably well founded,
that the circumstances did not justify the risk, and that
his prudence in saving his little army while there was
yet time and after he had, in each case, inflicted such a
loss on his adversary as to compel the adversary's re-
treat was not the least of the many exhibitions of good
judgment which characterized the whole campaign.
CHAPTER VIII
YORKTOWN
WHEN Cornwallis, retreating from Guilford, reached
Wilmington, he was in great perplexity. His letters were
somewhat pathetic. To Phillips: "My situation here is
very distressing; Greene has taken the advantage of my
being obliged to come to this place, and has marched
to South Carolina/ 71 To Clinton: "My present under- /fora as
taking sits heavy on my mind." 2 To Germain: ."If
we are so unlucky as to suffer a severe blow in South
Carolina . . . this "might enable General Greene to hem perplexity of
,., .--.-. I* ... r* Cornwallis
me in among the great rivers and by cutting on
our subsistence render our arms useless. And to re-
main here for transports to carry us off ... would
be as ruinous and disgraceful to Britain as most events
could be/ 73
His view was that if the war was to be offensive it
should be in Virginia; if defensive, at New York. In
either event he had no hope of saving the Carolinas.
He was by no means sure that Clinton would approve
his views. He very much desired Clinton's instruc-
tions, but it would take six weeks or more to obtain
them, and he could not wait that long. He had al-
ready wasted two weeks in thinking about it, and when
he received definite information that Phillips had been
1 Clinton-Cornwallis, I, 428. *Ibid., I, 424.
*Ibid., 1,421,422.
259
260
THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1781
Decides to
March to
Virginia
Aprfl 24
May 20
Situation in
Virginia
1780
Oct. 15
Nov. 25
Dec. 20
1781
Feb. 24
Feb. 15
March 10
March 16
ordered to Virginia he decided to inarch thither and
join him. 1
Having made his decision, Cornwallis marched from
Wilmington; and following what is now the line of the
Wilmington and Weldon Railroad, through Goldsborough
and Weldon, he reached Petersburg 223 miles at the
end of four weeks. 2 Here he found that Clinton had bent
every effort to send a sufficient force into Virginia, via
the Chesapeake, to cut Greene's communications; and
that Washington had stripped his little army of every
man that could be spared, in order to keep these com-
munications open.
Clinton first had sent Leslie with 2,500 men to Hamp-
ton Roads; and when Cornwallis had taken these to
Charleston, Clinton had sent Arnold with 1,600 men to
take their place. Then Washington sent Lafayette with
1,200 men to join Steuben, and at the same time ordered
Wayne with 1,000 men to follow Lafayette, although
Wayne was unable to marc! until three months later.
Clinton met this by sending Phillips with 2,600 men to
reinforce Arnold, and Washington persuaded Rocham-
beau to send 1,200 of the French troops at Newport to
reinforce Lafayette, They never reached him because
1 This decision was approved by Germain, but Clinton maintained that
it was the cause of the loss of his army and the disastrous termination of
the war. His view was that Cornwallis should have gone back to South
Carolina, collected his forces, which, largely outnumbered Greene's, and
beaten him in battle; to which the troops in Virginia would have con-
tributed by cutting off Greene's connnunications with the North. Corn-
wallis maintained that Greene had made it impossible for him to march
back to South Carolina, and that Virginia was the place for the final struggle.
The controversy was maintained, so long as Clinton lived, in almost endless
Narratives and Replies, which by the industry of Mr. B. F. Stevens were
collected, arranged and printed so that every one can now read both sides.
Clinton-Cornwallis, I and II.
2 Tarleton, 291.
I-
"
YORKTOWN 261
the squadron convoying them was met and defeated by
a British squadron, and thereupon they returned to New-
port. Finally Clinton sent three more regiments (1,500 May 23
men) to reinforce Phillips/ and these arrived at Peters-
burg a few days after Cornwallis reached that point. 2
Clinton had thus sent 5,700 men to Virginia 3 ; Washing-
ton could only send 1,200. Cornwallis brought 1,500
with him, carrying his total strength to 7,200. Lafayette
had gathered a few hundred militia; Steuben was in the
vicinity of Charlottesville, trying to raise eighteen months'
men to fill up Greene's new Continental regiments; and
Wayne, although supposed to be marching through
Maryland, had not in fact left York, Pa., at the time that May 24
Cornwallis marched to cross the James.
Cornwallis argued, then and afterward, in favor of "solid
operations in Virginia." Here was his chance. Lafayette
was at Richmond, only twenty miles off, with a force one-
sixth as large as his own. Destroy him, and break up comwaiiis's
Steuben's recruiting depot at the mouth of the RIvanna, Movements
and his march to Virginia would have been justified not
only to Clinton but to all the world. Cornwallis lost
the chance; and Ms movements for the next three months
can only be characterized as feeble far different from
the energy which he had displayed in the Jerseys four
years before.
Lee and Jackson have shown what a general of the
first rank would have done in Cornwallis's situation. Un-
doubtedly either of them would have crossed the James
above Richmond, between Lafayette and Steuben, and
inarched rapidly across the headwaters of the Virginia
1 Phillips died a few days before Cornwallis arrived and Arnold was sent
back to New York soon after.
2 Sparks, VIII, 10, 13, 19, 22, 510-516; Tarleton, 285-292.
3 Clinton-Cornwallis, I, 476-499.
262 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
i78i streams to get between Lafayette and Wayne. With
sufficient celerity of action, all three detachments could
have been either destroyed or dispersed.
Cornwallis's base was the sea, and he could not forget
it. His communications with New York were via the
lower James, and he was not willing to cut loose and take
the risk of Lafayette's small force getting in his rear.
May 26 He therefore crossed the James 30 miles below Richmond,
at Westover; and his plans extended no further than "to
dislodge Lafayette from Richmond and with my [his]
light troops to destroy any magazines or stores in the
neighborhood" and then "to move to the neck (penin-
sula) at Willia.msburg." l
Lafayette's ] It was Lafayette who acted with the proper celerity.
AS etlc He promptly retreated to Ely's Ford on the Rapidan,
May 27 covering the 70 miles in 7 days. Cornwallis pursued no
farther than the North Anna (30 miles). He then sent
June 4 ,.- his cavalry (which outnumbered that of Lafayette 10 to
1) on two raids, one under Tarleton to Charlottesville
to disperse the legislature, and the other under Simcoe
June i to break up Steuben's depot at Point of Fork, where the
Rivanna empties into the James, 50 miles above Rich-
mond. With the main body he followed leisurely to the
June ? latter point (40 miles in 6 days), and was joined there
June 9 by Tarleton and Simcoe, who had accomplished the ob-
ject of their raids, destroying a great deal of tobacco and
some arms and supplies. Steuben was forced to march
June 10 rapidly southward with his 450 Continental recruits; but
he was not pursued. He halted at Cole's Ferry, on the
Staunton River, and waited for further advices or in-
structions from either Greene or Lafayette. 2
1 Clinton-Cornwallls, I, 488.
8 Tarleton, 295-299; Kapp, Steuben, 448-450.
YORKTOWN 263
Meanwhile, Wayne was marching south with good
speed. He made the 160 miles from York, Pa., to the Arrival of
Rapidan in 14 days, and he joined Lafayette without
any serious effort on Cornwallis's part to prevent it,
although the latter knew that Wayne was on his way to
reinforce Lafayette. As soon as the junction was made,
Cornwallis retreated through Richmond to Williamsburg, June 14-20
Lafayette following him, and Steuben joining Lafayette
on the march. On the outskirts of this little village the
first shot was fired after a month of marching. It was June 9
an inconclusive skirmish between advance guard and
rear guard, with a loss of about 30 men on each side. 1
At Williamsburg Cornwallis received a letter from
Clinton asking him to send about 3,000 men to New York.
Cornwallis thereupon changed his plan of remaining at
Williamsburg and prepared to cross the James and march
to Portsmouth, where the men would embark. As he
approached the river at Jamestown Lafayette pressed Battle of
close to him and a smart engagement 2 resulted in which July e
the Americans lost 26 killed, 99 wounded and 12 missing,
chiefly in Wayne's Pennsylvania regiments; and Corn-
wallis lost 5 killed and 70 wounded.
Lafayette was defeated, but Cornwallis made no at-
tempt to follow him and he retired slowly to Malvern
Hill, below Richmond. The next day Cornwallis crossed July?
the James, and sending on to Portsmouth the troops
designated for embarkation, with the rest he marched as
far as Suffolk. Tarleton was sent on a long raid 3 across jm y 9-24
the State to the mountains and back 400 miles in 15
days to destroy the stores which Steuben had been
accumulating for the Southern army. These had beer
1 Dawson, 698-700. a Tarleton, 354; Dawson, 701-704.
3 Tarleton, 358.
264 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
i78i safely removed and all that Tarleton accomplished was
to burn up a good many hogsheads of tobacco.
A situation then existed on the British side which had
a most important bearing on the issue of the campaign.
It was somewhat similar to that of four years before
which resulted so disastrously at Saratoga. 1
Lack of In London, Lord George Germain probably the most
. incompetent official that ever held an important post at
; a critical moment was Colonial Secretary, charged with
,the conduct of the war under the personal direction of
the King, with whom he was a great favorite. His letters
were sometimes six weeks and sometimes three months
in crossing the ocean, and when they reached their desti-
nation the state of facts on which they were based had
usually changed. Yet he undertook to direct the opera-
tions at this distance and corresponded directly with
Clinton and with Cornwallis frequently giving contra-
dictory instructions.
At New York, Clinton, who was commander-in-chief
of the land forces and peace commissioner as well, was
responsible for the operations; but he had no control
over the navy, whose co-operation was absolutely essen-
tial as all plans were based on the control of the sea.
Sometimes the naval commander was in accord with
Clinton and sometimes he was not; and in the latter
cases he acted on his own judgment, regardless of Clin-
ton's plans.
At the south, from Virginia to Georgia, Cornwallis
was in chief command. His letters reached New York
in from eight days to two months. Clinton's letters to
him were very numerous, and they were such as not to
leave Cornwallis a free hand; neither did they give him
a P. 79, ante.
YOEKTOWN 265
positive orders. Clinton and Cornwallis had different
views as to the proper plan of campaign, and Germain
favored those of Cornwallis. Clinton sent instructions to
Cornwallis, always with a saving clause that if the latter
had other plans in view the instructions were noj^to be
followed. Cornwallis tried to follow these directions,
but every move he made was disapproved. Clinton cen-
sured him for marching north from Wilmington, for not
remaining at Williamsburg, for going to Portsmouth
and 'finally for selecting Yorktown as the naval sta-
tion. Clinton did not give him any positive instructions
nor do his letters contain any clear, definite, matured
plan. 1
With such lack of co-operation and co-ordination
among those in the highest authority, success would
under any circumstances have been difficult.
On the American side military conditions were far Favorable
more favorable. When Greene was sent to the South the American
Congress gave hinx full authority and placed at his dis-
posal all its resources they -were meagre enough, but it
was absolutely everything they had. Washington gave
Greene the benefit of his advice before he left and after
thatjieyer sent him an order, although he continued to
accord him the most hearty and unstinted support. In
hort, the government and the commander-in-chief gave
the local commander every assistance they could com-
^mand and they both left to him -the conduct of the
campaign*
On the American side there was precisely that co-
operation and co-ordination which was so completely
lacking on the British side, and it was one of the prime
factors of success. There were lessons in these opera-
'Clinton-Cornwallis, I, 493; II, 15, 53, 73, 98, 109, 143.
266 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1781 tions of 1781 which if they had been learned and applied
in the Civil War would have saved many lives.
The instructions which Cornwallis received from Clin-
ton always with a reservation as above stated re-
June 11-15-19 peated in three successive letters, were to send about
3,000 men to New York. The reason given was that
Washington and the French allies were approaching New
York, and Clinton feared he had not enough men for its
defence a reason which would override the reservations.
Cornwallis received the first two of these letters at Will-
iamsburg, and crossed the James to march to Ports-
mouth and obey them. While on the march he received
June 28 another letter, of later date, ordering the detachment to
Philadelphia instead of NewTTork. Four days later
came another letter, of subsequent date, ignoring the
orders for Philadelphia, but urging immediate despatch
of troops to New York. Before the troops could be put
n on the transports came a sixth and a seventh letter,
is dated later than the others, directing him to keep all his
troops in Virginia and to occupy Old Point Comfort as
a support for the fleet which was to be sent to Hamp-
ton Roads. Cornwallis at once went in person to ex-
amine Old Point Comfort, taking with him his army
engineers and the naval commanders then present. They
were all of opinion, and so reported in writing, that Old
Point Comfort was not suitable for defence. Inasmuch
as Clinton and Graves (the naval commander-in-chief)
had both urged the supreme importance of establishing
a naval station in the Chesapeake, supported by defen-
sive works on shore, Cornwallis selected the harbor be-
tween Yorktown and Gloucester as the one best adapted
for that purpose. He informed Clinton and Graves of
his decision, as being in accordance with the spirit of his
YORKTOWN 267
orders, and also in accordance with the opinion which
Phillips had given Clinton 1 that Yorktown was the
proper station which opinion Clinton had previously
sent to Cornwallis for his guidance. The transports be-
ing now at Portsmouth, the troops were sent to Gloucester York-town
and Yorktown as quickly as possible, the lines of field
fortifications were laid out and the work of constructing
them was begun.
Some excuse for the vacillating and contradictory Aug. 2
orders that Clinton gave may be found in the masterly
plans that Washington had recently been formulating
and was now putting into effect. For three years, with
infinite patience and tact, Washington had been trying
to obtain some positive, tangible, military benefit from
the French alliance. There was no doubt of its moral, Washington's
political and financial advantage; but as yet the French ans
troops had taken little or no part in the military opera-
tions. In 1778 the French fleet had been blown away
from Newport carrying the soldiers with it. In 1779 it
had to come to Savannah for a short period, only to en-
gage in a disastrous repulse. In 1780 it had got into
Newport, but had been bottled up there ever since.
Now, at last, the diplomatic but incessant arguments of
Washington with Rochambeau at Newport, and the less
diplomatic but effective efforts of Laurens supported by
Franklin in Paris, began to have their effect. A new
fleet was to be sent under de Grasse to the West Indies
and thence to the American coast to co-operate with
Rochambeau under Washington's direction.
As soon as Washington heard of this at his head- May 22
quarters at New Windsor (Newburg) he set out for
Wethersfield (near Hartford) and there met Rocham-
1 Clinton-Comwallis, II, 19, 24, 26, 29, 41, 49, 61, 73.
268
THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1781
The Allies
Move Toward
New York
June 10
July 6
July 2-3
July 20-23
beau. 1 They perfected the details of an attack on New
York the obvious plan, for the accomplishment of
which Washington had so often asked the co-operation
of the French. Washington again sent to the New
England governors 2 the most urgent request that they
fill up their quota in the Continental regiments, for one
season if the men could not be obtained for longer. A
small portion of de Grasse's fleet soon arrived in Boston,
bringing 700 recruits for the regiments at Newport and
announcing what de Grasse's movements would be.
He intended to arrive on the American coast in July or
August. Letters were sent tc him by Luzerne and
Rochambeau, at Washington's suggestion, urgently re-
questing him to bring troops as well as ships from the
West Indies, and to come to New York, stopping on his
way at the Chesapeake, where perhaps he might find an
opportunity for an important stroke. 3
The operations against New York then proceeded.
The French army finally left Newport for Providence
and then marched westward. Washington marched south-
ward from the Highlands, and the two armies came
together, taking a position extending from Dobb's Ferry
to White Plains. An attempt was made by the advance
guard under Lincoln to surprise and capture the posts on
the north end of Manhattan Island, and by Lauzun's
Legion to capture an outpost of Provincials in Mor-
risania; but both failed. 4
Washington then carefully reconnoitred from Fort Lee
in New Jersey and from Chatterton's Hill across the
Harlem, the fortifications of the British on Manhattan
Island where he had himself first laid out the fortified
1 Spado, VIII, 54.
VEX, 64-78.
, VIII, 51-53.
4 Ibid., VIII, 86-98.
YORETOWN 269
lines five years before. They were too strong to be at-
tacked. The French had 4 regiments, Bourbonnais,
Soissonnais, Saintonge and Royal-Deux-Ponts. They
were 10 company regiments and their full complement
was about 65 officers and 1,250 men each. There had
been some sickness, and detachments had been left at
Providence and elsewhere to guard their stores. Their
effective strength was now about 930 each. In addition
there was Lauzun's Legion, the artillery and the engineers.
The entire French force was 4 ; 756. 1 Washington had
little if any more, for his appeal to the New England
governors had brought only a feeble response. Clinton
had in New York about 14,000 effectives, 2 in fortified
lines, to reach which it was necessary to pass one or the
other of the rivers, which were controlled by the smaller
British vessels, while a large squadron was in the lower
bay. Until de Grasse should arrive an attack was out
of the question.
Washington's fertile mind was intently thinking of
alternative plans; to be decided as soon as definite in-
telligence of de Grasse's movements should be received.
He had written to Lafayette directing him to establish jmy is
a line of "expresses" to keep him quickly informed of
any movements of the enemy and similarly to inform
Greene; he now wrote to both Greene and Lafayette, July so
directing both of them to send him the most complete
information they could obtain as to the strength and
position of the British troops in Virginia and at Charles-
ton, and intimating as clearly as he dared, in view of the
possibility of his letters being intercepted as several had
been recently, that a campaign to Virginia or a siege of
Return of June 1; Keim, 389.
2 Sparks, V, 544, 545.
270 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
i78i Charleston might be the outcome of de Grasse's arrival
His later letters showed that he was considering three
projects: if Clinton reinforced Cornwallis, to attack New
York; if Cornwallis reinforced Clinton (as he thought the
most probable), to march to Virginia; and if on arriving
in the Chesapeake the conditions were favorable, to move
by sea to Charleston and besiege it in conjunction with"
Greene. 1
News from While he was thinking of these different plans, definite
deGrasse ^^ G%n& from de Grasse. The letter was addressed
Aug. 14 to Rochambeau and was dated at Cape St. Francis, San
jui y s Domingo. It was clear and concise, very different from
the letters that d'Estaing wrote. -It stated that he would
sail north on August 13; would bring with him 29 vessels
of war and a portion of the garrison of San Domingo, to
wit: 3 regiments, Gatinais, Agenois and Touraine, each
1,000 strong, together with 100 dragoons, 100 artillery-
men, 10 field pieces and several siege cannon and mortars;
he would proceed directly to the Chesapeake and would
sail back to the West Indies on October 15, taking the
troops with him. 2
The Ames Washington made an instant decision; he would march
vS-gSia to the Chesapeake to meet him. Orders were immedi-
Aug. is ately despatched to Lafayette to prevent Cornwallis
escaping to South Carolina; to Heath to take command
Aug. 19 ^ ^ e little force, twelve small battalions, which was
Aug. i? left in the north. A letter was sent by Duportail, the
chief engineer, to de Grasse, explaining his plans, #nd
asking him to send light vessels to Head of Elk in order
to transport the troops down the Chesapeake* 3 And
Aug. 21 then the allied armies were put in motion, crossing the
Hudson at King's Ferry to Stony Point, then marching
1 Sparks, VIII, 116-122. ' Ibid., VIII, 522. Ibid., 127-139
YORKTOWN 271
behind the Palisades to Newark and New Brunswick, im
making a feint against Staten Island, and then on through sept, i
Philadelphia to Head of Elk. So skilfully had Washing-
ton conducted this movement and concealed it from the
enemy that the troops had been 14 days on the march,
and most of them had passed Philadelphia when Clinton
wrote to Cornwallis: 1 "By intelligence which I have
this day received, it would seem that Mr. Washington is sept. 2
moving an army to the southward, with an appearance
of haste, and gives out that he expects the co-operation
of a considerable French armament."
In making this move Washington put everything to Boldness of
the hazard. A vigorous antagonist would have marched j hmstons
up the Hudson, scattered Heath's little force, seized the Aug. n
Highlands and held them. Clinton had just been rein-
forced by 2,500 Hessians, and his own return showed an
effective strength at New York of 16,701 men. 2 Heath
had, at the most, 2,500. Can there be any doubt of what
a man like Grant or Lee would have done in Clinton's
place? Further, if Washington failed in Virginia, New
England was hopelessly separated from the South, and
notwithstanding the Carolinas and Georgia had been re-
gained, the Revolution would have collapsed.
Daring as was the plan, it was eminently wise; for
without a great victory the Revolution would die of ex-
haustion. It was a time as it had been at Trenton
when nothing but audacity would avail; and it indicates
the -extraordinary balance and poise of Washington's
mind that he could wait three long years for the psycho-
logical moment to arrive, and when it did arrive that he
instantly took advantage of it.
^linton-Corawallis, II, 149, 150. 2 Sparks, V, 545.
272
THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
Movements of
the French
and English
Fleets
Aug. si
Aug. so
sept. 5
In boldness of conception and celerity of execution
this march to Virginia was comparable with Napoleon's
famous campaign of 1805, when he suddenly abandoned
the camp which he had formed at Boulogne for the in-
vasion of England and marched to the Danube. The dis-
tance was about the same, 400 miles. Washington cov-
ered it in 28 days, Napoleon in 35 days. Napoleon left
the Channel on August 27, and the capitulation of Ulm
took place on October 15 49 days later. Washington
crossed the Hudson August 21, and the surrender of
Yorktown was on October 19 59 days. Washington's
resources in men, money, equipment, supplies and trans-
portation were but a small fraction of those at Napoleon's
disposal; but the effect on the world's history of Ulm
and Austerlitz was a still smaller fraction of the results
which flowed from Yorktown.
It was an integral part of Washington's plan that the
French should for the time being at least control the sea,
and fortunately the naval commander was of a different
type from d'Estaing. De Grasse came up through the
Bahama Charm el instead of the direct route, and Hood,
who left the Windward Islands in pursuit, thus passed
him without knowing it. After looking in at the Chesa-
peake, Hood went on to New York, and the united fleet,
under Graves, immediately sailed for the Chesapeake,
hoping to intercept de Barras's smaller fleet (which was on
its way from Newport) before it could join de Grasse. In
the interval de Grasse had passed inside of Cape Henry. 1
He at once sent the land troops the brigade of St. Simon
up to the James River and landed them near Williams-
burg, where they were joined two days later by Lafayette
who had marched down from Malvern Hill to meet them.
l Mahan, 389.
YORKTOWN 273
On the day the French troops landed the British fleet
came in sight of Cape Henry. De Grasse went out to Navai Battle
fight them, but, unlike d'Estaing at Newport, he did not Chesapeake
carry his soldiers with him. These were left with Lafaj r -
ette. The naval engagement was inconclusive, both sides
losing heavily in men and guns, and then manoeuvring
for four days without renewing the action. The net
result was very advantageous to de Grasse, for the Brit-
ish admiral found it necessary to take his fleet back to
New York for repairs. De Grasse was left in control of
the Chesapeake, and during the manoeuvring de Barras
slipped in between the capes, bringing with him some
recruits for the French regiments and a large train of
siege artillery. 1
Clinton at New York learned from Cornwallis prior to ciinton Goes
Graves's return that de Grasse was in the Chesapeake, comwSifa*
and saw at once that the only chance to save Cornwallis
was to join him with troops from New York. He there- sept. 6
fore embarked 4,000 men on transports and wrote to
Cornwallis that he would sail with them as soon as the
admiral could furnish a convoy. It was six weeks before
the British ships were sufficiently repaired to furnish a
convoy. Clinton then sailed with 7,000 men, but when he Oct. 19
reached the capes he learned that Cornwallis had already Oct. 24
surrendered, and he retraced his steps to New York. 2
Meanwhile, Washington had joined Lafayette at Will-
iamsburg and his troops continued to arrive during the sept. 14
, , , ^ ,. i i j u j. j.1, j. Arrival of the
next ten days; some marching by land, but the greater Allied Army
number coming down the Chesapeake from Annapolis, Washington
Baltimore and Head of Elk in small vessels furnished by
the French. The entire force 3 the French from New-
*Mahan, 389. s Clinton-Cornwallis, II, 152, 172, 186, 188.
3 Johnston, Yorktown, 112-119.
274 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
i78i port, the Americans from the Hudson, Lafayette's troops
from Virginia and the French from Haiti numbered
about 16,600 men. The Americans were organized into
3 divisions under Lincoln, Lafayette and Steuben; there
were the remnants of 17 infantry regiments from each
of the States from Massachusetts to Virginia, 4 artillery
regiments and 1 of cavalry in all 5,645 Continentals;
and there were 3 brigades of new militia 3,200 men
from Virginia under command of the governor, Nelson.
The French were organized in 2 brigades, and there were
7 regiments of infantry, 1 of artillery and 1 of cavalry
about 7,800 rank and file, effective, in all.
Cornwallis's return gave 5,316 effective. He had 1
Provincial, 4 Hessian and 11 British regiments, besides
artillery and the cavalry of Simcoe's Rangers and
Tarleton's Legion.
siege of As soon as his army was assembled and organized
own Washington moved forward from Williamsburg and sur-
rounded Yorktown, the Americans on the right and the
sept. 28 French on the left. The siege was begun and prosecuted
in thoroughly military fashion. Cornwallis did not feel
strong enough to occupy his outlying works south-east of
sept, so the village, and he therefore abandoned them. They were
immediately occupied by the allies, and from them the
Oct. e first parallel was opened at 600 yards; the siege-guns had
been landed from de Barras's fleet and brought to the
trenches, and were vigorously used. The approaches
were carried forward and the second parallel was opened,
Oct. a at 300 yards. Then a most gallant night assault was
oct. 14 made, Alexander Hamilton in the. lead, and two redoubts
were carried near the river on the British left. The second
Oct. 15 parallel was promptly extended to include these. On the
following night just before daybreak Cornwallis made a
Siege of ITorktown
British
American
French
1000 15 00
"* - - ..' ; )%< Cha ron and 2 transports
Agenais
^StlSimon's
-'"'Qluarters
Baron de .-a
Yiomesnil's
Quarters
Field where British
laid down their arms
Courtesy of The Burrows Brothers Company,
Publishers, Cleveland, Ohio
40
YORKTOWN
Sept. 30-Qct. 19, 1781
From Avery's History of The United States
and Its People
276 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
i78i men and 80 camp followers 8,077 in all. In addition
there were 144 cannon, 6,658 muskets, large quantities
of ammunition, supplies and clothing belonging to the
army and 4 frigates, 30 transports, 15 galleys and several
smaller vessels belonging to the navy. The losses during
the siege had been: British, 156 killed and 326 wounded;
allies, 75 killed and 199 wounded. Two-thirds of the
losses of the allies were sustained by the French.
comment on Could Comwallis have saved his army? The attempt
surrender he made the day before he opened negotiations for sur-
render would almost certainly have resulted in over-
whelming disaster. The celerity with which Washington
. marched to Virginia indicates the vigor with which he
- " would have pursued any such attempt. Cornwallis, fol-
lowed and harassed by an enemy outnumbering him
three to one, the greater part of its troops well equipped
and all of them supported by the French fleet moving
up the Chesapeake, would have had small chance of
ever reaching Philadelphia. There was an opportunity
four weeks earlier when success was possible. When
de Grasse returned within the capes after his engagement
with the British fleet, the allied army was only beginning
sept. 16 to arrive. The force then opposed to Cornwallis was
about 2,000 Continentals under Lafayette and the 3
French regiments from the West Indies. The roll of
these latter shows 187 officers and 3,337 men; 1 but many
of them were sick with scurvy, and it is not probable that
more than 2,200 were effective. Lafayette's total force
was thus not more than 4,200 effective. Cornwallis had
5,100 effective. If he could have defeated Lafayette, or
driven him back to Richmond, he might have crossed the
James and marched to Charleston. Tarleton argues 2 that
1 Keim, 507. * Tarleton, 369.
YORKTOWN 277
this should have been attempted and would have sue-
ceeded. The distance was 420 miles, through a hostile
country all the way, with many rivers to cross, with
Washington and the allies following from the North,
and Greene facing him from the South as soon as he
reached South Carolina. It does not seem probable that
it could have succeeded. Cornwallis did not attempt it,
because he had already received Clinton's letter of Sep-
temper 6 telling him that he was coming to his relief;
and he could not doubt that the British would beat the
French on the sea.
Did Cornwallis surrender too soon? When he opened Oct. 10
negotiations he had 2,089 on the sick report and about
4,700 effective. He had upward of 350,000 * pounds of
provisions; with proper care this would have lasted from
20 to 25 days. Clinton, with 7,000 men, arrived off the
capes within 7 days. The fleet which convoyed him
contained 27 ships of the line; de Grasse had 36. If
Cornwallis had held out 10 days longer, in the naval en-
gagement that would have taken place there was a chance
that the British would have won, and the addition of
7,000 regulars to Cornwallis's force would have changed
the whole situation. Cornwallis had received a week
before a letter from Clinton saying that he would sail on
the 12th. There is ground for argument that neither the
number of his sick nor the state of his food supplies justi-
fied him in surrendering at the time he did, and that he
should have awaited Clinton's arrival and the result of
the naval battle which that would bring on. Cornwallis
gave his reasons as follows: 3 that his works "were going
to ruin/' that it would be "desperate to attempt to main-
tain them," that he "could not fire a single gun," that
^arleton, 457. 2 Clinton-Cornwallis, II, 212, 213.
278 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
i78i his "numbers had been diminished by the enemy's fire,
but particularly by sickness" and that "it would have
been wanton and inhuman to the last degree to sacrifice
the lives " of his soldiers "by exposing them to an assault,
which from the numbers and precautions of the enemy
could not fail to succeed."
On his return to England Cornwallis was never brought
to trial nor even censured except in Clinton's pamphlets.
He lived twenty-five years longer, the greater part of
which was spent as governor-general and commander-
in-chief in India; where in the siege of Seringapatam
and in his campaigns against Tippoo Sahib he conquered
for his country a large part of what is now the Indian
Empire. His contemporaries did not blame him for the
loss of Yorktown, and the general opinion has since been
thafTfhe' surrender was due to the masterly combination
of Washington from which no escape was possible.
End of the The war practically ended with Yorktown. Wash-
War ington tried to persuade de Grasse to join him in an ex-
pedition against Charleston or in one against New York.
The latter, however, insisted on returning to the West
Indies. The troops were then scattered: Wayne and
the Pennsylvania Continentals were sent to reinforce
Greene at the South; Rochambeau remained at Williams-
burg; St. Simon's brigade was sent back to Haiti; Wash-
ington and the New York and New England Continentals
returned to the Hudson; Lafayette went back to France.
In the following spring Clinton was superseded by
Carleton.
Treaty of There were no more military movements. A year
was spent in negotiating the treaty of peace, and during
this, year Savannah and Charleston were evacuated, as
previously stated. When the treaty had been signed
YORKTOWN 279
New York was evacuated. The war was over and the
independence of the United States was established and NOV. 25
acknowledged.
The war had called forth the entire military strength
of Great Britain most of her navy, nearly all of her army
and all the mercenaries that her money could hire. She
sent to America 57 British and 30 Hessian regiments, and
raised in or near New York 12 Provincial regiments
which were thoroughly organized and equipped and
served from three to six years. The number of sea-
men exceeded 40,000, in more than 100 ships, and with
these Great Britain kept control of the sea for the entire
eight years, with the exception of forty-one days in 1779
and sixty-four days in 1781.
Considered in the light of its influence upon the prog- Washington's
ress of mankind, the Revolution was one of the most
important wars in the whole history of the world. The
result was due more than to all other causes combined
to the ability of Washington as a soldier. His political
services were of such surpassing importance and value
that it has long been the fashion to speak disparagingly
or at least apologetically of his military achievements.
If his campaigns are carefully studied, no other conclu-
sion can be reached than that they were most skilfully
conducted; and if Washington had died at any time
between 1783 and 1789 he would have been known in
history as one of the great soldiers of all time/
In his principal battles, Long Island, Brandywine
and Germantown, he, was either defeated or the result
was inconclusive. This was not because they were badly
planned, but because the soldiers by whom they were
fought, while brave and patriotic, were deficient in train-
280 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
1783 ing; experience and discipline were not as efficient in-
struments for accomplishing a specific purpose, plans for
which had been properly made, as were their opponents.
At Momnouth the combined treason and incapacity of
Charles Lee robbed Washington of a well-deserved vic-
tory* At Fort Washington, his own indecision caused a
grave disaster. This is about the only criticism that can
be made of his military acts during eight long years of
warfare.
Against this are the achievements on which his military
reputation securely rests: the marvellous retreat from
Long Island, the audacious attack at Trenton and Prince-
ton, the well-planned movement from Valley Forge, when
Howe evacuated Philadelphia, and the brilliant march
to Yorktown. These four events occurred at intervals
during five years, and between them were periods of
enforced inaction compelled by the poverty of military
resources. Those were the Fabian periods during which
any other policy would have resulted in ruin. The four
offensive events were Napoleonic. Each of them was
characterized by an extraordinary exhibition of daring,
celerity and skill, the three qualities to which both Caesar
and Napoleon owed their classic triumphs. It was in
the domain of strategy rather than of tactics that Wash-
ington's genius was exhibited, and his successes were due
to well-matured plans and rapid marches; the accidents
of battle were nearly always unfavorable to him. He
possessed the gaudium certaminis in a marked degree,
and in the melees at Kip's Bay, Princeton and German-
town his reckless exposure was phenomenal. The placid
benignity which Stuart placed in the portraits which he
painted a few years before Washington's death, and the
austere character which Sparks has embodied in his
YORKTOWN 281
twelve volumes, must not make us forget that during 1733
the Revolution, at the age of forty-four to fifty-one,
Washington had very warm blood in his veins. He was
a man of passionate vigor, intense energy and affection-
ate sympathy. He was a pre-eminent soldier.
PART II
THE MILITARY POLICY OF THE
UNITED STATES
if Regular troops are alone equal to the exigencies of modern
war, as well for defence as offence, and whenever a substitute is
attempted it must prove illusory and ruinous*"
GEORGE WASHINGTON,
CHAPTER I
THE POPULAR FAITH IN AN UNTRAINED
MILITIA
THE usual statement of our military policy is that we
maintain a small regular army in time of peace, raise
large volunteer forces in time of war and maintain at all
times a "well-regulated militia" in the various States.
This policy rests upon certain fundamental principles,
viz., distrust of a standing army, reliance upon untrained
troops and dependence upon voluntary service. It is
a singular fact that while we have been successful; not
only in the general result, but in the specific military
events, in all our wars except the second war with Great
Britain, yet the principles upon which our armies have
been raised and organized have been denounced by pro-
fessional soldiers in every generation, beginning with
Washington, as wasteful, extravagant, inefficient and
wrong.
The policy which we have adopted was not, as Glad- origin of
stone said of the Constitution, "struck off at one time by
the brain and purpose of man/' but, on the contrary, is
due in part to our geographical situation, but chiefly to
racial prejudices which have their roots far back in Eng-
lish history; as far back, indeed, as the very beginning
of English as distinguished from British history, in
the fifth and sixth centuries. The Teutonic tribes which
then conquered Britain and founded England brought
285
286 MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES
with them two ideas of profound significance/ viz., the
ideas of representative government and of voluntary mil-
itary service; and these ideas or principles have never
been abandoned, but have been maintained, developed
and enlarged during nearly fifteen hundred years. They
are the foundation of English civilization, English gov-
ernment and English habit of thought. Our ancestors
brought them to America in the seventeenth century, at
the very time when the Stuart kings were endeavoring
to rule without Parliament, to levy taxes without legis-
lative sanction, to create a standing army for the
destruction of the liberties and the religion of the Eng-
lish people. These twin principles representative gov-
ernment and voluntary military service were the foun-
dation of the state, no less in Virginia than in New
England 2 ; for, while the Puritan looked upon the army
as the instrument of oppression, to the Cavalier the
words "standing army" meant Cromwell's disciplined
troops, who had arrested members of Parliament, stabled
their horses in cathedrals, insulted and robbed the nobility
Ancient and gentry and murdered the king. To both Cavaliers
SuSta? a and Puritans, therefore, as they founded their settlements
Army in America, the name of standing army was hateful, with
a bitterness and intensity of hatred which we can at
this distance hardly appreciate. A hundred years or
more later this hatred was, if possible, still further in-
tensified by the acts of an English king and Parliament,
x "The base of the new English society was the freeman. . . . War
was no sooner over than the warrior settled down into the farmer. . . .
Each little village commonwealth lived the same life in Britain as its
farmers had lived at home. Each . . . made laws in the assembly of
its wise men, and chose its own leaders among the 'earls' for peace or war."
(J. R. Green, Short History of the English People, 12. See also John
Fiske, The Beginnings of New England, 25-30.)
2 John Fiske, Civil Government in the United States, 64-65.
POPULAR FAITH IN AN UNTRAINED MILITIA 287
who again used a standing army to enforce their law for
levying taxes against the will of those taxed. Thus, the
outbreak of the Revolution found our ancestors, North
and South, not only inheriting the hatred of a standing
army, through generations of their own forebears, but at
the instant confronted with a standing army as the in-
strument of the oppression which they were determined
no longer to tolerate. Detestation of the word army
was not alone an inherited prejudice, but a vital funda-
mental principle in the political faith of the day.
Such a prejudice, founded originally on justice, is slow
to die. It survived long after the conditions which gave
rise to it had ceased to exist. It has been slowly expir-
ing in this country during the last hundred years, but
it can hardly yet be called extinct. The debates in
Congress at the last reorganization of the army in
1901 contain much of the same oratorical declamation
about standing armies and the destruction of the liberties
of Greece and Rome that Macaulay 1 so graphically nar-
rates in his account of the debate in Parliament in 1697.
On the other hand, the militia in England antedated Popularity of
the regular army by at least one thousand years; it was
part of the local government, and although derided in
Dryden's witty verse 2 it was always popular with the
great body of the English people. It was essentially the
same in the sixth century as in the seventeenth, and again
in the nineteenth; its members were by turns fishermen,
husbandmen, judges and warriors; they followed the
History of England, V, 54. Debate on the mutiny act
2 " Mouths without hands, maintained at vast expense,
In peace a charge, in war a weak defence.
Stout once a month they march, a blustering band,
And ever but in time of need at hand."
DRYDEN, " Cymon and Iphigenia."
288 MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES
Popularity of
the Militia in
the American
Colonies
1775 trade of soldier, not as their chief occupation; but as in-
cidental and subordinate to some other occupation by
which they gained food, shelter and clothing. Their
service was voluntary, although for the able-bodied
the liability to service was universal; they elected their
own officers; they were part of the people, and not a
class apart. These ideas were also brought to America
in the seventeenth century. Belief in the militia and
reliance upon its sufficiency were as important a part
of the creed of the early settlers as was their hatred
of an army. The militia was organized in every Colony
as soon as the government was established, and was as
essential a part of the governing machinery as the town
meeting in New England or the county court in Virginia. 1
It performed its part, on the whole, perhaps, satisfac-
torily, in the numerous Indian wars and in the French
wars. It was the only military system indigenous to
the Colonies; an army was the system employed by the
"tyrant/ 1 George III.
Naturally, when the Revolution broke out the first re-
liance was upon the militia; but when the battles of Lex-
ington and Concord brought a realization of how serious
the struggle was going to be, the word "army" came to
be used. Massachusetts and other New England Colonies
began to raise their several armies and concentrate them
at Boston; and in June, 1775, the Continental Congress
took them over as a Continental army, appointed Wash-
ington its commander-in-chief and adopted rules and
June 30 regulations for its government. 2 A form of enlistment
was agreed upon which prescribed that the term of ser-
vice was to be "for one year, unless sooner discharged/ 7 3
Origin of the
Continental
Army
June 15
1 John Piske, Civil Government in the United States, 16-67.
2 Jour. Cont Cong., II, 90-111. 3 Ibid., II, 91.
POPULAR FAITH IN AN UNTRAINED MILITIA 289
This legislation was framed upon the Mutiny Act of 1697, 1775
which limited the existence of the British army to one June 14
year, and which had annually been re-enacted. Congress
evidently thought that the liberty of the people might be
subverted quite as well by a standing army as by George
in, and determined to retain the right to disband it at
any moment. But it soon became evident that the danger
was not that of having a permanent army, but of having
no army at all. Congress fixed the strength of the new NOV. 4
army at 20,372 officers and men; 1 but by December 31,
only 9,650 had enlisted 2 and of these large numbers were
absent. On the same date the term of service of the old
army expired. It became necessary to call on the militia
for temporary service in the attack on Dorchester Heights
in March, 1776. Congress attempted to remedy the lack me
of enlistments by calling on the various Colonies to ineffective
furnish a certain number of battalions for the Continental toGoogSS
army, for service until the end of the year, and various
resolutions to this effect were passed between January
and September of 1776. 3 The response was not alto- sept. ia
gether encouraging, and then Congress adopted a resolu-
tion 4 "that eighty-eight battalions be enlisted as soon as
possible, to serve during the war, unless sooner dis-
charged" that each State furnish a certain quota; that
a bounty of twenty dollars be given to each non-com-
missioned officer and private; that a grant of land be
made to each officer and soldier who shall engage for the
war; and that the appointment of all officers below the
grade of general be left to the States. Still the enlist-
ments were not satisfactory, and in November two reso-
1 Jour. Cont. Cong., Ill, 321. 3 Sparks, III, 220.
8 Jour. Cont. Cong., IV, 29, 47, 99, 237, 357, 412; V, 486, 521, 598.
*IUd., V, 762.
290 MILITAEY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES
1776 lutions 1 were adopted, the first requiring the enlisting
officers to offer to recruits their choice of two forms of
enlistment^ one for the war and the other for three years;
the second, a few days later, providing for only one form
of enlistment which read "for three years or during the
Dec. 27 war." The army meanwhile was dwindling down to
less than 5,000 men; 2 thereupon Congress appointed
Washington Washington 3 virtually dictator, authorized him to raise
DiSatoJ 16 battalions, in addition to those already resolved upon,
and 3,000 light horse, 3 regiments of artillery and a corps
of engineers; to appoint and discharge officers and fill
all vacancies, to call on the States for militia, to impress
supplies and to arrest and confine persons who refused
to accept Continental currency or were disaffected to the
American cause.
778 The system of short-term voluntary enlistments thus
Feb. 26 came to grief before the Revolution had been much more
than a year in progress. By Washington's personal
efforts more than from any other cause, acting under any
one of the many resolutions of Congress, the Continental
army was maintained with varying strength from 6,000
to 10,000 men, and the militia of the various States came
from time to time to help out for a few weeks in an emer-
gency. Congress continued to pass resolutions through-
out the year 1777, 4 calling on the States to furnish their
quota, but without much effect; and after a conference
of a committee with Washington at Valley Forge it re-
sorted to the draft. The states were 5 "required forth-
with to fill up by drafts, from their militia or in any
other way that shall be effectual their respective battalions
1 Jour. Cont. Cong., VI, 945, 971. * Sparks, III, 225.
3 Jour. Cont Cong., VI, 1045; Upton, 30.
* Upton, 25-32. Jour. Cont Cong., X, 200.
POPULAR FAITH IN AN UNTRAINED MILITIA 291
of Continental troops." Having no power to enforce its 1773
decree, this resolution of Congress had no more effect
than its predecessors, but Washington's personal appeals,
combined with the news of the French alliance, succeeded
in bringing out enough men to carry on the war.
It continued in this way to the end, Congress passing 1733
futile resolutions and Washington raising men and carry- sept, a
ing on the war by the mere strength of his personal char-
acter. The treaty of peace was signed in 1783 and in the 1734
following year the army was disbanded, 1 except eighty
soldiers retained to guard the public stores at Fort Pitt
and West Point.
The total number of enlistments had been 395,858, 2
and the maximum force in the field at any one time
about 35,000, or one in eleven of the enlistments.
We had succeeded in our main purpose of achieving waste and
independence, and we had accomplished this without a
, ,. , .. - , , , Revolution
standing army, and by means of short and numerous en-
listments, large bounties and grants of lands. The waste
and extravagance were repaired a few years later by the
financial genius of Hamilton. The enormous pension roll 3
was easily provided for from the resources of a land of
rapidly developing wealth. Public sentiment was con- confirmed
firmed in its opposition to a standing army and confidence a standing to
in the efficacy of untrained volunteers and militia was Army
still further strengthened. The one man to whom suc-
cess was due, and who achieved it, not because but in
spite of our defective military policy, thought differently.
Washington's opinions on the subject are worthy of
careful study even at this late day, for his judgments
1 Jour. Cong., IV, 433; Upton, 69. 2 Upton, 58.
8 Total Revolutionary pensions during 126 years (1783 to 1908),
$70,000,000. Report Com. Pensions, 1908, 12, 21.
292 MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES
1784 were the result of long deliberation and were of almost
miraculous accuracy. He had seen service in the Indian
and French wars before he came to take command at
Cambridge in 1775. His knowledge of what took place
between that date and 1783 was unrivalled. He was
pre-eminently qualified as a witness.
His writings on the subject during those eight years,
to Congress, to the State authorities and to personal
friends, form no inconsiderable part of the twelve vol-
umes edited by Sparks. A few of the most pertinent of
those addressed to the President of Congress are here
quoted.
Washington's February 9, 1776 r 1 "To expect the same service from
opinions ^^ aQ ^ undisciplined recruits as from veteran soldiers
is to expect what never did and perhaps never will
happen."
September 24, 1776 : 2 "To place any dependence upon
militia is assuredly resting upon a broken staff. . . . The
jealousy of a standing army, and the evils to be appre-
hended from one, are remote and, in my judgment,
situated and circumstanced as we are, not at all to be
dreaded; but the consequence of wanting one, according
to my ideas formed from the present view of things, is
certain and inevitable ruin."
December 20, 1776 : 3 "Short enlistments, and a mis-
taken dependence upon militia, have been the origin of
all our misfortunes and the great accumulation of our
debt."
August 20, 1780 : 4 "Had we formed a permanent army
in the beginning, ... we never should have had to re-
treat with a handful of men across the Delaware in 1776,
1 Sparks, HI, 279; Upton, 11. 2 Sparks, IV, 113-115; Upton, 16.
Ibid., IV, 234. * Ibid., VII, 162; 3rid., 53.
POPULAR FAITH IN AN UNTRAINED MILITIA 293
trembling for the fate of America; ... we should not 1734
have been the greatest part of the war inferior to the Washington's
enemy, indebted for our safety to their inactivity, en- Opimons
during frequently the mortification of seeing inviting
opportunities to ruin them pass unimproved for want of
a force which the country was completely able to afford,
and of seeing the country ravaged, our towns burnt, the
inhabitants plundered, abused, murdered, with impunity,
from the same cause."
September 15, 1780 :* " Regular troops are alone equal
to the exigencies of modern war, as well for defence as
offence, and whenever a substitute is attempted it must
prove illusory and ruinous/'
It will be observed that in these letters Washington
addressed himself solely to the question of the moment :
the proper method of organizing an army for carrying on
the war. He said nothing about the propriety of main-
taining an army in time of peace. In a letter 2 to John
Banister, of Virginia, delegate in Congress, written from
Valley Forge on April 21, 1778, Washington admits the
justice of the jealousy of a standing army in time of
peace. His words are : "The other point is, the jealousy?
which Congress unhappily entertain of the army, and
which, if reports are right, some members labor to estab-
lish. You may be assured, there is nothing more in-
jurious or more unfounded. This jealousy stands upon
the commonly received opinion, which under proper
limitations is certainly true, that standing armies are
dangerous to a state. The prejudices in other countries
have only gone to them in time of peace, and these from
their not having any of the ties, the concerns or inter-
1 Sparks, VII, 206; Upton, 54.
2 Ibid., V, 328; ibid., 38. 8 Italics as in Sparks.
294 MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES
1784 ests of citizens, or any other dependence, than what
Washington's flowed from their military employ; in short, from their
opinions k e j ng mercenaries, hirelings. It is our policy to be prej-
udiced against them in war, though they are citizens,
having all the ties and interests of citizens, and in most
cases property totally unconnected with the military line."
1783 The final word of Washington, as general-in-chief, on
June s military policy was given in the address 1 which he sent to
the governors of the States from Newburg about six
months prior to resigning his commission. He evidently
thought it either useless or unwise to advocate a stand-
ing army in time of peace, and therefore argued in favor
of making the militia as effective as possible. He stated
that there were four things "essential to the well-being,
I may even venture to say to the existence, of the United
States as an independent power," and one of them was
"the adoption of a proper peace establishment." His
opinion on this was as follows: 2 "The militia of this coun-
try must be considered as the palladium of our security,
and the first effectual resort in case of hostility. It is
essential, therefore, that the same system should pervade
the whole; that the formation and discipline of the
militia of the continent should be absolutely uniform,
and that the same species of arms, accoutrements and
military apparatus should be introduced in every part
of the United States. No one, who has not learned it
from experience, can conceive the difficulty, expense and
confusion which result from a contrary system, or the
vague arrangements which have hitherto prevailed."
While these recommendations were never carried into
effect until 120 years after they were written, to wit,
after the passage of the Militia Act of 1903, and while
1 Sparks, VIII, 443; Upton, 68. 8 Sparks, VHI, 450.
POPULAR FAITH IN AN UNTRAINED MILITIA 295
each succeeding war has found us at the outset with 1737
different systems of formation and discipline, and dif- Military
ferent kinds of arms, accoutrements and military ap-
paratus in the militia of the various States, yet these
views of Washington were adopted in the Constitution
in 1787, and have ever since been and now are the funda-
mental law of the land. As to the navy, the Constitu-
tion gives Congress power "to provide and maintain a
navy," which evidently implies a permanent and con-
tinuing force; but as to the army the power of Con-
gress is "to raise and support armies, but no appropria-
tion of money to that use shall be for a longer term than
two years," which equally implies a temporary force
raised for war or other emergency.
Congress is further given power, 1 "to make rules for
the government of the land and naval forces^ to provide
for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the
Union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions; and
to provide for organizing, arming and disciplining the
militia, and for governing such part of them as may be
employed in the service of the United States, reserving
to the States, respectively, the appointment of the offi-
cers and the authority of training the militia according
to the discipline prescribed by Congress." In order to
emphasize still further the basis of the military policy,
Congress at its first session passed an amendment 2 to the
Constitution, which was promptly ratified by the States,
reciting that "a well-regulated militia" is "necessary to
the security of a free State."
The English tradition, originating in the tyranny of
the Stuarts more than 200 years before, was thus em-
1 Constitution of the United States, I, VIII, 12, 13, 14.
2 Ibid., Second Amendment.
296 MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES
1787
Militia Act
of 1792
Continued
Prejudice
against a
Standing
Army
bodied in our fundamental law. The army was to exist
on sufferance for no longer a period than two years.
Our main reliance was to be on the militia and on such
armies as could be improvised when war breaks out.
It will be observed, however, that it was to be a " well-
regulated militia "; and during the eight years of his presi-
dency Washington made recommendations in each of
his annual messages in favor of measures to make the
militia a really effective force. The only result was the
passage of the Militia Act of 1792, 1 which remained in
force for 111 years, although it was obsolete a few years
after it was enacted. In his message of 1793 2 Washing-
ton called attention to its many defects, and again
pressed upon Congress "the necessity of placing ourselves
in a condition of complete defence. . . . The United
States ought not to indulge a persuasion that, contrary
to the order of human events, they will forever keep at
a distance those painful appeals to arms with which the
history of every other nation abounds. ... If we de-
sire to secure peace, it must be known that we are at all
times ready for war." In his message of 1794 he called
attention to the "striking defects" in the militia law
and resulting "extraordinary expense and waste." He
referred to the subject again in 1795, and in his last
message in 1796 3 he particularly advocated the establish-
ment of a military academy to preserve and transmit a
knowledge of the military art, which he considered "of
great moment to the security of a nation."
These appeals, however, were all unsuccessful. The
memory of the Stuarts and of George III was still com-
paratively fresh in the minds of the people, and the
1 Mil. Laws, 95; Upton, 84.
3 Mess. Presidents, I, 166, 184, 202.
2 Mess. Presidents, I, 140.
POPULAR FAITH IN AN UNTRAINED MILITIA 297
prejudice against a standing army was not to be over-
come even by the arguments of the man who had gained,
almost single-handed, their independence.
With the close of the Revolution, as already stated, 1739
the army was disbanded. Thirty years passed before
we again had a serious war. In the meantime there were
insurrections, such as Shay's Rebellion in Massachusetts
in 1786, and the Whiskey Rebellion in Pennsylvania
in 1794; Indian wars, such as Hannar's Miami expedi-
tion in 1790, St. Glair's campaign of 1791 and Wayne's
campaign of 1794; the probability of war with France
in 1798. 1 These emergencies were met, partly by the
militia and partly by volunteer armies raised for three
years, and by a small but slowly increasing permanent
force of regulars. This latter originated in a force of origin of the
700 men raised for service against the Indians in 1784, u " s * Army
continued for three* years in 1785, again extended for June 2, 1734
three years in 1787 2 and finally recognized by the First A P ru i, 1735
Congress 3 as "the establishment for the troops in the Oct. 3,1737
service of. the United States." The army has existed sept. 29, 1739
continuously from that day to the present, with increas-
ing numbers, and with reorganizations in 1790, 1792,
1795, 1798, 1802, 1808, 1812, 1815, 1821, 1838, 1842, 1846,
1855, 1861, 1866, 1870, 1874, 1898, 1901 or, on an
average, once in six years.
In January, 1812, when war with Great Britain seemed war of 1312
inevitable, the army consisted, under the laws of 1802 and
1808, of 11 regiments. By successive acts/ Congress in-
creased this as follows:
January 11, 1812, to 24 regiments.
1 Upton, 71-77, 79, 83, 86, 87.
2 Jour. Cong., IV, 434, 493, 785; Upton, 69, 71,
3 Mil. Laws, 87; Upton, 75.
< Mil. Laws, 212, 230, 238, 250; Upton, 95, 123.
298 MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES
1812
Second War
with Great
Britain
Feb. 6
April 10
Refusal to
Furnish
Militia
June 26, 1812, to 32 regiments.
January 29, 1813, to 51 regiments.
January 27, 1814, to 54 regiments.
The authorized strength of the latter was about 63,000
men.
But recruiting was always slow. The actual force
varied from one-quarter to one-half of that which the
law authorized. Volunteers were not called for, but the
President was "authorized to accept" * not exceeding
30,000 volunteers. They did not come forward, the total
number during the entire war being only about 10,000. 2
The militia was called out, 3 but not exceeding 100,000
men and for a period not longer than six months. Con-
gress now possessed the power, which the Continental
Congress lacked, to enforce its laws, but it did not exer-
cise that power. All the evils of the Revolution were
repeated in perhaps aggravated form: short enlistments,
successive levies of raw troops, enormous bounties, ex-
travagant grants of lands and liberal promises of pen-
sions. The rolls of the Pension Office show that 527,654 *
men were in service, most of them for periods of less
than six months and more than half of them for less
than three months. Not more than 25,000, or one in
twenty, were in the field at any time. The Pension Office
is still paying pensions to the widows of soldiers of the
War of 1812 (338 in number), and the total pensions of
that war have amounted to nearly $46,000,000. 5
The military operations, as might be expected, were
far from creditable; some of the militia refused, at
critical periods, to cross the frontier. The governors of
Massachusetts and Connecticut refused to call forth the
1 Mil. Laws, 215; Upton, 95.
3 Ibid., 222. */Wa., 137.
2 Upton, 137.
5 Com. Pensions, 1910, 11, 27.
POPULAR FAITH IN AN UNTRAINED MILITIA 299
militia of those States, reserving to themselves the right isi4
to determine when the exigency provided for in the Con-
stitution and in the Act of Congress of 1795 had arisen.
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts sustained them in
this contention, and the question remained in doubt until
1827, when the Supreme Court of the United States de-
cided that it belonged exclusively to the President to
judge when such exigency arises. 1
As soon as the war was over the army was reduced to Mar. s
10,000 men, 2 and six years later to 6,000 men. 3 John C. Mar. 2 1321
Calhoun was then Secretary of War. He held the posi-
tion during the eight years of Monroe's administration,
from 1817 to 1825, and next to Elihu Root was the ablest
administrator among the fifty or more individuals who
have filled that important office. Congress called upon
him for two reports on the army, which he made in Decem-
ber, 1818, 4 and December, 1820. In these he discussed in
the most comprehensive manner the purposes for which eports
we maintain an army, its relation to our political princi-
ples, its strength, organization, equipment, emoluments,
rations and clothing. He pointed out the terrible price
which we had paid in 1812 in consequence of the lack
of a proper military establishment and of suitable prep-
aration in the preceding years; showed that "however
remote our situation from the great powers of the world,
and however pacific our policy, we are, notwithstanding,
liable to be involved in war; and to resist, with success,
its calamities and dangers, a standing army in peace is
an indispensable preparation." He further stated that
"to suppose our militia capable of meeting in the open
field the regular troops of Europe would be to resist the
1 Martin vs. Mott, 12; Wharton, 19; Upton, 96-97.
2 Mil. Laws, 266. 3 Ibid., 306. * Burnside, 139, 144; Upton, 145.
300 MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES
most obvious truth and the whole of our experience as
1820 a nation"; and argued that "if our liberty should ever
be endangered by the military power gaining the ascen-
dancy, it will be from the necessity to retrieve our affairs,
after a series of disasters; caused by the want of adequate
military knowledge," * He laid down the fundamental
proposition that "at the commencement of hostilities
there should be nothing either to new-model or to create:
the only difference between the peace and the war for-
mation of the army ought to be in the increased magni-
tude of the latter, and the only change in passing from
the former to the latter should consist in giving to it the
augmentation which will then be necessary. It is thus,
and thus only, the dangerous transition from peace to
war may be made without confusion and disorder." The
staff should be completely formed in time of peace and
the organization of the line such that when hostilities
begin "the force may be sufficiently augmented without
adding new regiments or battalions." 2
In these documents, so remarkable in breadth and
foresight, Calhoun followed to some extent the principles
formulated by Scharnhorst in Prussia after the battle of
Jena. He anticipated by more than a generation the
system of expansion in war which has since been adopted
for all European armies, and for which this country had
to wait more than eighty years, during the greater part
of which these principles were unsuccessfully advocated
by army officers, until the genius and persistence of Mr.
Root persuaded Congress to adopt them in the legislation
of 1901-3.
Upon these principles, including especially "the desire
to avoid creating new regiments with raw, inexperienced
1 Burnside, 145. 2 Burnside, 146; Upton, 149.
POPULAR FAITH IN AN UNTRAINED MILITIA 301
officers at their head in time of war," * Calhoun worked
out a complete scheme of organization for an army of 1820
544 officers and 6,391 men in peace ; to be augmented to
832 officers and 18,200 men in war, without the formation
of any new regiments. 2
His wise words fell on deaf ears. Congress was then 1321
in the midst of the intensely exciting debate which re- caihoun's Be-
suited in the "Missouri Compromise." Caihoun's report Adopted*
apparently received no attention in Congress; there does Feb. 27
not seem to have been any debate on it; McMasters
makes no reference to the subject; von Hoist does not
mention it in his biography of Calhoun. The law, as March 2
passed, simply reduced the army to 4 regiments of artil-
lery, 7 regiments of infantry and a certain number of
staff officers; the companies were small, each containing
only 42 privates, and the entire authorized force was
542 officers and 5,642 men. 3 No provision was made for
augmenting the enlisted strength in time of war or other
emergency. The old reliance upon militia and untrained
levies was still the popular idea.
No change of any importance was made in the army
during the next seventeen years, except the formation
of a regiment of dragoons, 4 now the 1st Cavalry. The
actual strength was, however, at all times less than what
the law authorized. In November, 1835, the author-
ized strength, 5 including the dragoons, was 7,198 and
the actual strength 3,888.
In 1835 we became involved in the Florida war against isss
the Seminole Indians, which proved a very serious affair, The Florida
lasting more than seven years. The army was altogether
1 Burnside, 146. 3 Burnside, 157.
3 Ibid., 217. 4 Mil. Laws, 329; Upton, 161.
' Upton, 162.
302 MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES
1833
March 3
1S36
May 23
1838
July 5
183T
The Florida
War
insufficient in numbers to cope with it; instead of aug-
menting its enlisted strength, as Calhoun had advised,
the Florida militia was called out and Colonel Clinch,
commanding the few hundred regulars on duty in Flor-
ida, was authorized to call on the governors of South
Carolina, Georgia and Alabama for the militia of those
States. The President was "authorized l to accept" vol-
unteers not exceeding 10,000 men "to serve six or twelve
months." The regular army was subsequently 2 increased
by one more regiment of infantry and an addition of
16 privates to every company of artillery and of 38
privates to every company of infantry. This increased
the authorized strength to 12,539 3 and the actual strength
to perhaps 9,000.
The greatest number of men in the field at any one
time was in November, 1837, when they numbered 5,025
regulars and 4,454 volunteers and militia. 4 The rolls
of the Pension Office show that during the seven years
of this war the total number of men in service was
61,269 5 of whom the greater number served for three
months or less. It was a repetition on a smaller scale of
the methods of the Revolution and the War of 1812; and
it should be remembered that the Indian warriors against
whom these 60,000 or more men went out for a few days
numbered only about 1,200. 6 The waste and extrava-
gance of such methods are in sharp contrast with the
effective work done by the small but well-trained army
in the Indian campaigns after the Civil War.
The jealousy of a standing army was still a living
principle, and Andrew Jackson undoubtedly expressed
1 Mil. Laws, 336; Upton, 168.
5 Burnside, 219.
5 Upton, 190.
3 Ma. Laws, 341; Upton, 181-183.
4 Upton, 175.
&, 194.
POPULAR FAITH IN AN UNTRAINED MILITIA 303
the opinions of a majority of his countrymen when in isss
his seventh annual message as President, in December, Jackson's
1835, 1 he spoke of "the necessity of an efficient organiza- Opimons
tion of the militia/' and defined our military policy in
these words: "To suppress domestic violence and to repel
foreign invasion, should these calamities overtake us, we
must rely in the first instance upon the great body of the
community whose will has instituted and whose power
must support the government. A large standing mili-
tary force is not consonant to the spirit of our institu-
tions nor to the feelings of our countrymen, and the
lessons of former days and those also of our own times
show the danger as well as the enormous expense of these
permanent and extensive military organizations." In
the message of 1836, 2 however, his views were slightly
modified. "While the necessities existing during the pres-
ent year for the service of militia and volunteers have
furnished new proof of the patriotism of our fellow-
citizens, they have also illustrated the importance of an
increase in the rank and file of the regular army. . .
In this connection it is also proper to remind you that
the defects in our present militia system are every day
rendered more apparent."
His successor, President Van Buren, in his message of ISST
1837, 3 spoke of "the necessity of increasing our regular vanBuren
f , , -. re : 11 j.1 Opinions
forces; and the superior efficiency, as well as greatly
diminished expense of that description of troops, recom-
mend this measure as one of economy as well as of
efficiency." But he hastened to add: "It is not, how- \
ever, compatible with the interests of the people to main-
tain in time of peace a regular force adequate to the
1 Mess. Presidents, III, 170. 2 Ibid., Ill, 254.
3 Ibid., Ill, 390.
304 MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES
defence of our extensive frontiers. In periods of danger
and alarm we must rely principally upon a well-organized
militia, and some general arrangement that will render
this description of force more efficient has long been a
subject of anxious solicitude."
In subsequent messages 1 Van Buren referred, with
diminishing interest, to the necessity of an efficient or-
ganization of the militia; but nothing was done. The
subject excited no popular interest until the outbreak
of the war with Mexico.
842 When the Seminole war ended in 1842 the army was
me reduced from 12 >539 to 8,613 2 men, the reduction being
war with ma de in the number of enlisted men in a company, and
Mexico it so remained until 1846.
l Mess. Presidents, III, 497, 537. 'Mil. Laws, 358; Upton, 193.
CHAPTER II
THE GRADUAL GROWTH OF THE REGULAR
ARMY
SEVENTY years had thus passed In which we had had 1846
two wars with Great Britain and numerous campaigns
against the Indians. Throughout this period the popular
faith in an untrained militia remained unshaken.
When, however, it became necessary to make prepa-
rations for the war with Mexico, slightly different ideas
began to prevail. The President was authorized, by suc-
cessive acts of Congress, for the first time, to "call for/ 7 as
well as to "accept," volunteers, the number not to exceed
50,000, and the term of service to be twelve months "or
to the end of the war"; "to employ" the militia for not May 13
exceeding six months; to increase the number of privates
in any company to 100 men; to organize a company of
engineers; to raise a regiment of mounted riflemen; to May is
raise a regiment of dragoons and nine more regiments of May 19
infantry, to serve during the term of the war and no 1347
longer. 1 These various laws provided for an authorized Feb. n
strength of 30,890 regulars and 50,000 volunteers. The
volunteers first enlisted claimed their discharge at the
end of twelve months, and a new force had to be en-
listed; so that the total number of volunteers was
73,532. The rolls of the Pension Office show a total of
regulars and volunteers of 104,284. The greatest num-
1 Mil. Laws, 367-379; Upton, 203-206.
305
306 MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES
1847 ber at any time under Scott's command was 13,500 and
war with under Taylor, 7,000. These figures 1 compare favorably
with the corresponding figures in the Revolution and in
the War of 1812. They show that the army in the field
was nearly one-sixth of the total number of enlistments,
whereas in the previous wars it had been only one-eleventh
or one-twentieth. Considering the results accomplished,
the number of men called out during the Mexican War
was much smaller than in the previous wars. The benefit
of military training was beginning to be felt, and the
small armies of Scott and Taylor were very efficient.
The Military Academy at West Point had sent out,
from 1802 to 1847, no less than 1,368 graduates, 2 and of
these 523 served in the regulars and 36 in the volunteers 3
with the armies in Mexico. Scott, who had had personal
experience of the wretched results due to untrained
troops in the War of 1812 and the Florida war, gener-
ously attributed his success in Mexico to these West
Point graduates, stating his "fixed opinion" that but for
them the war would have lasted four or five years, with
more defeats than victories, whereas with their help
complete victory had been obtained "in less than two
campaigns." 4
1848 The close of the war brought the usual reduction to
juiy 19 10,320 men: 5 but the army was soon increased 6 by add-
isso iag to the number of privates in each company, equiva-
june 17 lent for the whole army, about 4,400 men; and later by
two regiments of cavalry and two of infantry, about
1855 4,000 men, carrying the authorized total to 18,349. At
March 3 no time, however, did the actual strength exceed 15,000. 7
1 Upton, 209, 215, 216. 2 Cullum, II, 206.
3 Centennial of the U. S. M. A., 629-630.
* Cullum, I, XI; Upton, 222. MiL Laws? 2 23, 393.
6 Upton, 223 7 Upton, 224.
GRADUAL GKCXWTH OP THE REGULAR ARMY 307
With these exceptions there was no additional legislation
until the outbreak of the Civil War.
The magnitude of this struggle was not underestimated. President's
A . ', f; . Proclamation,
As in previous wars the militia was first called out; April 15
75,000 men for three montlas. As soon as Congress
convened this was supplemented by two laws, each cal- The civil wai
ling for 500,000 volunteers, and a third law adding to July 22
the regular army 9 regiments of infantry, 1 of cavalry July 25
and 1 of artillery. These laws l were all under debate July 29
at the time of the battle of Eull Run, and were passed July 21
under its influence. The enlistment of volunteers in a
few months exceeded 700, OOO, 2 about one in six of the
able-bodied male population. It was a magnificent ris-
ing in mass of the Northern population. Had this vast
host possessed military training, the rebellion might
possibly have been quickly suppressed. But the "well-
regulated" militia of the Constitution, uniformly armed
and accoutred, trained and disciplined, as Washington
had advised, and possessed of a thorough knowledge of
the military art, did not exist. The training and knowl-
edge had to be gained as the war progressed.
Enlistment in the regular army was not popular. Its
total strength never reacted 26,000, 3 or two-thirds of
what was authorized, and of these a large number were
stationed in the fortifications and on the Western frontier.
The force available for the field was probably less than
10,000, and most of these served in the "regular divis-
ion," forming part of the 5th Army Corps. They formed
an inconsiderable part of the great army by which the
war was carried on.
The strength of the \rolunteer army on January 1,
1 War Records, 3, V, 606; ML IOTS, 466, 471, 473.
2 Ibid., 3, IV, 1264. 3 Upton, 257.
308 MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES
1862 1862, * was about 528,000 men. The War Department
in December, 1861, had directed that no more regi-
ments be raised unless specially authorized, and on April
3, 1862, had discontinued all recruiting. 2 This was
resumed by order of June 6, 1862, and it was soon evi-
dent that large numbers of men must still be raised in
order to make up for the losses in the field. The gov-
ernors of eighteen States thereupon joined in a letter to
the President suggesting that he call for additional men,
i and on July 1 Lincoln made a call for 300,000 men.
ises More than 420,000 3 were furnished. As the war went on
Resort to further calls became necessary, the draft or conscription
conscription ^^ authorized 4 and finally the President was empow-
March s ered 5 to call for such numbers of men as the military
1864 service required. There were in all, between April, 1861,
Feb. 24 and December, 1864, eleven successive calls; six for vol-
1865 unteers for three years or the war; four for militia for
/ three to nine months, and one for regulars for five years.
Number of t The total number call^i for was 2,763,670, and the num-
service ber furnished was 2,778,304. 6 There were a great many re-
enlistments, so that it is difficult to say how many
individuals enlisted. The number was probably in ex-
cess of 2,100,000. The enrollment of April, 1865/ showed
2,245,063 able-bodied men at their homes. From this it
would appear that the number of men available for
military service in the Northern States was something
more than 4,300,000 and of these about 2,100,000, or
nearly one-half, were enlisted.
The national government was victorious, at a fearful
sacrifice; the Confederacy was annihilated. That the
1 War Records, 3, 1, 775. ' Ibid., 3, V, 608.
3 7WL, 3, IV, 1265. * Ibid., 3, V, 611.
5 Ibid., 3, V, 636. Ibid., 3, IV, 1269.
7 Ibid., 3,V,620.
GRADUAL GROWTH OF THE REGULAR ARMY 309
struggle would have been shortened and the loss in lives
and treasure reduced if we had had a larger trained army
at the beginning has often been asserted by military
writers. This is at least open to doubt; for in such case
the South would have had almost the same relative ad-
vantage as the North. The nature of the struggle was
such that it could only be ended by the absolute destruc-
tion of the military strength of the Confederacy, and this
could only be accomplished by the use of almost the en-
tire strength of the loyal States. On the other hand, it Defects of the
is not open to dispute that the strength of the govern-
ment was not employed to the best advantage, but was
misapplied, with accompanying waste and extravagance
almost equal to those of the Revolution and the War of
1812. The same defects appeared: short service, enor-
mous bounties and grants of land and a gigantic pension
roll * destined probably to endure till the last quarter of
the twentieth century.
It is believed that at no other tMle in the history of
the world have so many as 2,000,000 men been brought
into the military service by a single nation in the space
of four years. The failure to realize the full value of so
numerous a force, composed for the most part of such
superb material, was chiefly due to the constant raising
of new regiments of raw recruits and inexperienced
officers instead of keeping the old regiments filled up
to their full strength. The maximum force under arms
at any time was about 970,000 2 men, or the equivalent
of 970 regiments. But the total number of organiza-
tions raised during the war was 1,952 8 regiments, 36
1 The pension bills of recent years more than forty years after Appo-
mattox have been about $155,000,000, of which about $146,000,000 are
paid to the Civil War pensioners.
War Records, 3, V, 137, 1029. 3 Ibid., 3, V, 1029.
310 MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES
battalions and 900 independent companies; this gives a
total equivalent of 2,050 regiments, or more than twice as
many as were needed. Had the quota assigned to each
State been a certain number of regiments, squadrons
and batteries, instead of a certain number of men, with
a requirement that these organizations be kept up to
their maximum, and that the appointment of officers be
limited to men who had seen at least six months of active
service in the ranks, there is little doubt that the final
result would have been accomplished in less time and
with a smaller number of men than 2,000,000. This
method was frequently advocated during the progress of
the war, but always rejected on the ground that troops
could not be raised except for new organizations and
with new officers. We had to come to conscription in
the middle of the war, and enforce it relentlessly for the
remaining two years, and we shall doubtless have to
do the same if we are ever again engaged in a war last-
ing more than two years. A conscription law will be
no more odious, if it contains these salutary provisions
which have received the approval of our greatest soldiers. 1
comparison It must be noted that there was a great improvement
with Previous . . ~. ., _ T . . , , .
wars in the Civil War over any previous war in the relation of
the number of troops in the field at any one time to the
total number of enlistments. We have seen that in the
1 In a series of marginal notes made by General Sherman on an article
by the author, published in Journal of the Military Service Institution in
1883, he says: "There is no doubt that reinforcing by new regiments was
bad in every sense, and that recruits should be sent to old regiments."
The same opinion was more than once expressed by General Grant and by
General Sheridan in conversations with the author. See also Sherman's
Memoirs, Vol. II, 388: "I believe that 500 new men added to an old
and experienced regiment were more valuable than 1,000 men in the form
of a new regiment, for the former, by association with good, experienced
captains, lieutenants and non-commissioned officers, soon became veterans,
whereas the latter were generally unavailable for a year."
GRADUAL GROWTH OF THE REGULAR ARMY 311
Revolution and the War of 1812 this ratio was one in isss
twenty, and in the war with Mexico, one in six; in the
War of the Rebellion it was one in four. The enlistments
were 2,778,304;* in May, 1864, there were 970,710 in
service, of which 662,345 2 were present for duty, in the
field.
The return of the volunteer army to the occupations Disbarment
of peace has no parallel in history. The muster out teer lrmy ua ~
began within three weeks of Lee's surrender, and by
August, 1865, 640,806 had been discharged; by Novem-
ber, 800,963; by January, 1866, 918,722; by November,
1866, 1,023,021. 3
The regular army had an authorized strength in April, isse
1865, 4 of 47,806. It was reorganized 5 so as to consist of July 2$
10 regiments of cavalry;
5 regiments of artillery;
41 regiments of infantry;
4 regiments of veteran reserves;
1 battalion of engineers;
and the various staff corps. The total authorized
strength was 80,258, but the actual strength was 54,581 . 8
In 1869 7 the infantry regiments were reduced from 45 isss
to 25, bringing down the authorized strength to 55,618 March s
and the actual strength to 37,383. 8
In 1870 the number of enlisted men was reduced to *
30,000, and in 1874 to 25,000. 9 There were no changes
of any importance in the organization or strength of
the army until the war with Spain, twenty-four years July is
later.
* War Records, 3, IV, 1269. 2 Ibid., 3, V, 497.
3 Ibid., 3, V, 517, 1012. 4 Army Register, 1865, 106a.
5 Army Register, 1867, 144a. 5 Army Register, 1866, 150c.
* Mil. Laws, 1907, 540. 8 Army Register, 1869, 235a.
9 Mil. Laws, 1907, 187; Burnside, 102.
312 MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES
1874 During the years 1874 to 1878 the question of the
June 17 permanent organization of the army was studied by
successive committees of Congress; and a large amount
of testimony was taken which, however, resulted in no
legislation except the reduction to 25,000 men. In
1878 a committee was formed of three senators and five
representatives, to whom was referred "the whole sub-
ject-matter of reform and reorganization of the army."
1878 The report of this committee 1 is a veritable mine of in-
Dee. is formation on every essential fact connected with the
, history of the army during the preceding 100 years.
General Burnside, then senator from Rhode Island,
was its chairman. All of its members had served in
Report the Civil War, one of them (Senator M. C. Butler, of
South Carolina) as a major-general in the Confederate
army. General Garfield, then leader in the House of
Representatives, and soon afterward President, contrib-
uted two very thoughtful and instructive papers for its
consideration. Prominent survivors of the Civil War,
Hancock, McDowell, McClellan, Terry, Pope, Ord, Hazen,
Hunt and others, were called upon to submit their views
accompanied by a draft of a bill to carry them into
effect* The chiefs of staff departments, Humphreys,
Meigs, ' Townsend, Benet, Marcy, Alvord and McFeely,
contributed exhaustive histories of their several depart-
ments and recommendations as to their proper organiza-
tion and their relations to the Secretary of War and the
commanding general. Most important of all, General
Sherman, then general-in-chief, submitted a history of
the army from 1776 to 1876, accompanied by elaborate
statistical data, extracts from the writings of Wash-
ington and the reports of Knox, Dearborn, Calhoun,
1 45th Cong., 3d Seas., Senate report, 555.
GRADUAL GROWTH OF THE REGULAR ARMY 313
Cass and other secretaries of war, and of committees of 1878
Congress; and finally Ms own matured views as to our
military policy and the proper organization of the army
to carry it into effect. At that time General Emory
Upton, one of the brilliant group of officers who attained
the rank and command of a major-general within a few
years of graduation from West Point in 1861, had just
returned from a trip around the world, undertaken for
the purpose of studying foreign military systems, and
had written his book on "The Armies of Asia and Europe/ 7
to which the committee gave full consideration. He
was then engaged upon his "Military Policy of the
United States," which was not published until Mr. Root tary P Ucy
was Secretary of War in 1904, but the voluminous data
which it contains were available to the committee as well
as his views upon the proper method of organizing our
military strength, and the best system of tactics, or drill
regulations.
These two documents, the report of the Burnside Bumside
committee in 1878 and Upton's book on military policy, Eeport
contain an encyclopaedia of military information, ex-
tracted from hundreds of volumes of state papers and
other archives not readily accessible. Nowhere else is
there to be found so much original information relating
to the army condensed into such comparatively small
space. Full use has been made of these volumes in pre-
paring this chapter, and I desire to express my grateful
acknowledgment of them and to refer all students to
them for fuller details.
The bill 1 which the committee reported followed the
recommendations of the distinguished soldiers who had
given the committee their advice, in certain essential
1 Burnside, 1.
314 MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES
1878 features, as to which these latter were substantially in
accord, viz., a regiment of three battalions in each of the
arms, infantry, artillery and cavalry; the staff depart-
ments, instead of being officered by permanent appoint-
ments, were to be filled by detail of officers from the line,
who would return to the line after the expiration of their
detail, thus giving to line officers a knowledge of staff
duties and to staff officers familiarity with the needs of
the army. The number of enlisted men in a company
was to vary according to the exigencies of the services as
determined by the President, subject to appropriations
by Congress, thus providing a flexible system with small
companies in time of peace capable of immediate and
large expansion in time of war; and there was to be a
"general staff," of somewhat limited functions, such as
those hitherto performed by the adjutant-general's and
inspector-general's departments.
Report not These wise provisions, and others, were enacted into
Adopted j aw more t k an twenty years i aten The Burnside bill
of 1878 failed to pass, and the elaborate labors of the
committee, based upon the experience and advice of the
successful leaders in the greatest war of modern times,
and upon a careful study of the military systems of
Europe, apparently went for naught. The reason was
not far to seek. There was no popular interest in the
subject. Without that no measures can be enacted in
Lack of . this country. The discharged soldiers, North and South,
more than 2,000,000 in number, and constituting about
one in four of the entire voting population, were weary
of the name of war; they were engaged in building up
the industries of the country, in laying the foundations
of that material development which in the succeeding
thirty years has astonished the world; they fondly hoped
GRADUAL GROWTH OF THE REGULAR ARMY 315
that we would never again be engaged in war. Many of
the statesmen of the period, discarding the lessons of
history, did not hesitate to predict with entire confidence
that there never would be another war in this country,
that we should never have occasion to attack another
nation, and no other nation would ever dare attack us.
They could see no need for an army outside of a small
force to protect the settlers against the Indians on the
ever-advancing Western frontier. As to its organization
they were indifferent, considering it a matter of very
minor importance as compared with the development
of railways, the silver question, the Chinese problem, the
disfranchisement of the negroes and other public ques-
tions then pressing for solution.
The final effort of the Burnside committee, the cul-
mination of more than twelve years' discussion about
the army, having resulted in no action, the subject was
dropped. The only point upon which the legislators,
representing public opinion as they always do, were
agreed was that the army should not exceed 25,000* men
in numbers, and this was inserted as a proviso in the
appropriation bill, re-enacted in succeeding years and
then incorporated in the "Revised Statutes," as the per-
manent law.
Twenty years later war came suddenly and almost 1898
out of a clear sky, although its cause the discontent of The war
Cuba under Spanish rule had been in existence for two WIth Spam "
generations and had more than once brought our rela-
tions with Spain close to the breaking-point. The gen-
eration of the Civil War had practically passed away, its
passions had been largely forgotten, there were new
leaders in Congress, new men coming to the front in the
1 Mil. Laws, 1907, 187; Rev. Stat. of 1878.
316 MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES
army. Its faithful service under great hardship, its suc-
cess in settling the Indian question, the aid it had ren-
dered in building up the Great West, its thorough effi-
ciency and the studious attainments of its officers had
made for it a host of friends which it had never possessed
at the outbreak of any previous war. When the law for
raising troops to carry on the war came up in Congress,
April 22 the latter did not hesitate to declare 1 that "The regular
army is the permanent military establishment, which is
maintained both in peace and war according to law."
The law further provided that "The volunteer army
I shall be maintained only during the existence of war, or
while war is imminent . . . that all enlistments for the
volunteer army shall be for a term of two years, unless
sooner terminated, and that all officers and men com-
warwith posing said army shall be discharged from the service of
Spam the United States when the purposes for which they were
called into service shall have been accomplished, or on
the conclusion of hostilities."
March s This and other laws 2 expanded the enlisted strength
April 26 from 25,000 to 63,116, by adding 2 regiments of artil-
lery, making all regiments to consist of 3 battalions
and 12 companies, and the companies to have 106 en-
listed men in the infantry, 200 in the heavy artillery,
173 in the light artillery and 100 in the cavalry.
April 20 In the joint resolution 3 which demanded that Spain
relinquish its government of Cuba, the President was
"directed and empowered to use the entire land and
naval forces of the United States and to call into the
actual service of the United States the militia of the
several States, to such extent as may be necessary to
carry these resolutions into effect." This was substan-
1 Mil. Laws, 1907, 184. 2 Sec. War, 1898, 1, 252-262. 3 Ibid.
GRADUAL GROWTH OF THE REGULAR ARMY 317
tially according to precedent in previous wars. In the isss
law passed two days later there was a more specific warwitu
direction 1 and one entirely novel: "When it becomes Spam
necessary to raise a volunteer army, the President shall
issue his proclamation stating the number of men de-
sired, within such limits as may be fixed by law." The
law then specified in detail how such volunteers were to
be organized. It also authorized another novelty, the
raising of volunteer troops, " possessing special qualifica-
tions/ 7 not from the States but "from the nation at large,"
not exceeding 3,000 men in all, the officers to be ap-
pointed under "regulations to be prescribed by the
Secretary of War." A little later this was expanded so May n
as to provide for "a volunteer brigade of engineers from
the nation at large," and "an additional volunteer force
of not exceeding 10,000 enlisted men possessing immu-
nity from disease incidental to tropical climates/ 7 the
officers of these troops to be appointed by the President
and not by the governors of States. The President's
first call for volunteers was for 125,000 men, and in
order to be sure of getting enough men while the en-
thusiasm was still warm, this was followed by a second May 25
call 3 for 75,000 men.
The President of the United States, William McKinley,
had in his youth trudged through the long marches and
fought in many battles of the Civil War; the Secretary
of War, R. A. Alger, had also served in the same war;
the adjutant-general, Henry C. Corbin, had not only had
the same experience, but was a man of rare executive and
administrative ability and of tireless energy. They used
their utmost efforts, and with success, in persuading Con- Repeated
gress so to legislate that the mistakes of the Civil War
1 Mil. Laws, 1907, 192. 2 Sec. War., 1898, 1, 259.
318 MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES
1898
Prompt
Organization.
War with
Spain
and our previous wars might not be repeated. It will be
noticed that there was no limit except the President's
discretion to the number of men to be called for; that
national volunteers, officered by the President under
regulations prescribing examinations as to their military
qualifications, were provided for. Therefore, when the
second call for volunteers was made, the rule was estab-
lished and rigidly enforced that the recruits should be
sent to fill up existing regiments from every State, and
no new regiments were formed until this had been
done.
The laws passed and the regulations established for
carrying them into effect in 1898 are models for similar
occasions hereafter. It should be noted, however, that
the able-bodied population was then about 13,000,000,
and the number of men called for, about 250,000, was
only one in fifty, instead of one in two as in the Civil War.
It may be a question whether the principles established
in 1898 can be carried out in a war making such a de-
mand on our military strength as did the Civil War.
There seems to be no ground to doubt that they can be,
if the number of volunteers in the first call is sufficiently
large, and if, in case volunteers do not respond, the con-
scription is immediately applied.
There was no such difficulty in 1898. The number
called for was ample, and the response was instantaneous,
not only for the volunteer but also for the regular army.
Within a month the regulars were increased to 44,125,
and the volunteers to 124,804; within ninety days,
regulars to 56,258 and volunteers to 212,094." These
troops were all organized, armed, equipped and in the
field within the dates named. When the peace protocol
*Sec. War, 1898, I, 257, 260.
GRADUAL GROWTH OF THE REGULAR ARMY 319
was signed, on August 12, recruiting was stopped; there
were then 274,717 men in the field, of which approxi-
mately 59,000 were regulars, 16,000 United States vol-
unteers, and 200,000 State volunteers. The army had
numbered only 28,183 l on April 1. The number of Span-
ish regular troops surrendered at Santiago was 13,006
and at Manila about 13,500; 15,000 were dispersed at ;
Santiago, and over 70,000 2 were sent home from Ha-
vana as a result of the Santiago campaign. To have
increased our military force by 1,000 per cent, and to
have defeated, captured or dispersed the armies op-
posed to us all within a period of about four months
shows what can be accomplished with our latent
military strength when it is judiciously applied.
While the ratification of the treaty of peace with Spain
was pending the insurrection broke out in the Philippines.
Under the law the ratification of the treaty required the Apm 22
reduction of the regular army to its previous strength of
about 28,000 men and the discharge of the entire vol-
unteer force. This was done. Congress then enacted 1399
that the regular army might be maintained at not ex- March 2
ceeding 65,000 3 men, and that 35,000 volunteers should
be raised "from the country at large." These new troops 1898
were raised in the course of a few months, and all the National
volunteers and a large part of the regulars sent to the
Philippines. The field officers were selected from the
regular army on their efficiency records, and the com-
pany officers were chosen, under rigid examination as to
their service and qualifications, solely from those who
had served in the war against Spain. These volunteers
took their part side by side with the regulars in suppress-
1 * Sec. War, 1898, I, 253-260. 2 Sargent, Campaign of Santiago, III, 1.
3 Mil. Laws, 1907, 190, 200.
.320 MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES
1899
Philippine
Insurrection
Elihu Root as
Secretary of
War
ing the Philippine insurrection. That they were the
most efficient, the best disciplined and most thoroughly
trained volunteers that were ever mustered into our
service is generally conceded. The individuals had the
same excellent qualities as the volunteers of the Civil
War, but these " volunteers from the nation at large 7 '
were organized on a system immensely superior. It is
not likely that this experience will be forgotten the next
time there is occasion to call for volunteers. It is true
that at the outbreak of the Civil War we discarded the
experience of our previous wars and repeated the same
mistakes. No other system had then ever been tried
and proved. Now that a better system has been actually
used, and the precedent established, it is probable that
we shall adhere to it in similar emergencies hereafter.
The organized force of insurgents was defeated and
dispersed by midsummer of 1900; a guerilla warfare con-
tinued for nearly a year longer, but practically ceased
with the capture of Aguinaldo in March, 1901. Under
the law 1 the army was to be reduced in strength to what
it had been prior to April, 1898, and all the volunteers
were to be discharged prior to July 1, 1901.
In the meantime, in August, 1899, Elihu Root had
become Secretary of War. During the five years of his
administration the army obtained those measures of re-
form and advancement for which its chief officers had
been begging in vain for three generations; and the coun-
try at last saw its military establishment placed on a
footing for which a few of its most far-sighted states-
men, Washington, Calhoun, Cass and others, had argued,
equally without success. Congress finally adopted these
measures chiefly in consequence of four successive annual
1 Mil. Laws, 1907, 190.
GRADUAL GROWTH OF THE REGULAR ARMY 321
reports, 1899 to 1902 inclusive/ of the Secretary of War, 1399
which for clearness of thought, brevity and lucidity of
statement, have probably never been excelled in our state
papers. Mr. Root had never had any military training
or experience, even in a militia company; but he sur-
rounded himself with the best military advisers, officers
fresh from the experience of Cuba, the Philippines and
China, and thoroughly familiar with our military his-
tory and the defects of our military system in the past.
Having absorbed their ideas, weighed them and clarified
them, rejecting some and accepting others, he then pre-
sented the subject to Congress in documents which read
like the arguments in a great cause before the Supreme
Court of the United States.
It fell to Mr. Root's lot to formulate and put into 1901
operation a permanent scheme of government for the
Philippines and for Porto Rico, and a temporary govern-
ment for Cuba, which was followed by evacuation on
conditions which provided for our intervention in case
of mishap (which happened within a few years), all in
accordance with a general plan of which the outlines
only had been suggested by President McKinley. The
organization of this civil government was constructive
statesmanship of the highest order, and the instruments
for carrying his plans into effect were the officers and men
of the army. Simultaneously with the development and
solution of these insular problems, he took up the needs
of the army and secured, between 1901 and 1903, the
reorganization of the army, the formation of the general
staff and the establishment of a " well-regulated" militia.
He obtained the necessary appropriations for completing
i / ? xVo j- J_T_ x x- Mr. Root's
.and arming our sea-coast tortincations, tne construction projects
1 Sec. War, 1899-1903, 328-352.
322 MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES
1903 of which had begun in 1888; he amplified and system-
atized the plan of education at the schools for infantry,
cavalry and light artillery which had been established
by Generals Sherman and Sheridan several years before,
and enlarged the scope of instruction at the pre-existing
schools for the heavy artillery and engineers; he founded
the War College at Washington for advanced instruction
of a limited number of officers; and finally, he organized
the Army Medical School. He persuaded Congress to
appropriate nearly $7,000,000 to rebuild and enlarge the
historic Military Academy at West Point, but for whose
existence during three-quarters of the nineteenth century
the military art in this country would have been lost;
and he procured an increase in the number of cadets
from 384 to' 481.
The arguments in the annual reports, by which these re-
sults were accomplished, are themselves so condensed that
any summary of them is impossible. The key-note is the
proposition, in the report for 1899, "that the real object of
having an army is to provide for war" a truism which
singularly enough had been disregarded for many years.
Reorganization With this object in view it was provided l that the
army should consist of 30 regiments of infantry, 15 of
Feb. 2 cavalry, 1 of engineers, a corps of artillery (of size equal
to 13 regiments) and the staff departments. The artil-
lery was divided into two branches, the coast artillery
and the field artillery, with a chief of artillery in charge
of both. 2 The number of officers was fixed at 3,996 3
l Mil. Laws, 1907, 1048.
2 By the act of January 25, 1907, the field artillery was transferred to
the line of the army and organized into six regiments; the coast artillery
became a corps, under its chief, charged with the care and use of coast
fortifications, including torpedoes and submarine mines.
3 Mil. Laws, 1907, 1048-1060.
GRADUAL GROWTH OF THE REGULAR ARMY 323
and the enlisted strength was left to the discretion of 1903
the President, between 60,000 and 100,000. The ad-
vantage and economy of this flexible system have been
fully utilized by successive executive orders, fixing the
enlisted strength according to the necessities of the year
and the appropriations of Congress; it has varied from
59,866 to 78,782. 1
As to the staff departments, it was provided 2 that
when a vacancy occurred in the position of chief of the
corps or department, it should be filled by detail of any
officer in the army, not below the rank of lieutenant-
colonel, for a period of four years; and as to the other
officers, those then holding permanent appointments were
to retain them and be promoted according to seniority,
but as vacancies occurred, they were to be filled by de-
tails from the line, for a period of four years, under such
system of examination as the President should prescribe.
From these provisions the engineer, judge-advocate and
medical departments, for obvious reasons, were excepted;
but as to all others the rule of details and consequent
interchangeability of service in the staff and line was to
prevail. The system has now been in operation for
nearly ten years, more than fifty per cent of the officers
in the seven other staff departments are detailed from
the line and several hundred officers have already served
their detail in the staff and returned to the line. The
eternal bickering and mutual complaints between the
staff and line which filled the air for thirty years prior
to the passage of this law are no longer heard. The
army is a homogeneous body, each part understanding
and in touch with the others.
The law also provided for the organization of battalions,
1 Army Registers, 1903-1910, a Mil. Laws, 1907, 1061.
324 MILITARY POLICY OP THE UNITED STATES
1903 of which there are now seven, of Philippine scouts, with
majors and captains detailed from the army and lieu-
tenants appointed from officers and enlisted men who
had served in the war with Spain; also for a Porto Rico
regiment, with field officers detailed from the army and
captains and lieutenants appointed from veterans of the
war with Spain or citizens of Porto Rico the latter for
four years, but with provision for reappointment and pro-
motion if found qualified. There are now ten native
officers in this regiment.
Feb. 14 The establishment of the general staff is a landmark in
our military history. Its purpose was to prevent the
recurrence of such confusion in the transport and supply
departments as had accomplished the assembling of
troops at Tampa in 1898, which was then fresh in the
public mind but was by no means unprecedented. The
law 1 provided for the selection by the President of one of
the general officers, to be called chief of staff, and 4
colonels, 6 lieutenant-colonels, 12 majors and 20 cap-
tains, all for the period of four years, unless sooner re-
lieved. The chief of artillery was to be an additional
member of the staff.
General staff The duties of the general staff are briefly but clearly
defined in the law: 2 "To prepare plans for the national
defence and for the mobilization of the military forces in
time of war; to investigate and report upon all questions
affecting the efficiency of the army and its state of prep-
aration for military operations; to render professional
aid and assistance to the Secretary of War and to general
officers and other superior commanders, and to act as
their agents in informing and co-ordinating the action of
all the different officers who are subject under the terms
1 Mfl. Laws, 1907, 1290. 2 Ibid., 1907, 1291.
GRADUAL GROWTH OP THE REGULAR ARMY 325
of this act to the supervision of the chief of staff; and 1903
to perform such other military duties not otherwise as-
signed by law as may be from time to time prescribed by
the President." The officers "subject to the supervision
of the chief of staff" are those of all troops of the line
and of the ten different staff departments the entire
army, in fact. The chief of staff is also required to per-
form such duties as hitherto had been assigned by law
to the commanding general of the army. They were
only two in number ; membership in the Board of Forti-
fications and the commissioners of the Soldiers' Home.
The anomaly of a commanding general in time of peace
attempting to exercise actual command, whereas the
Constitution makes the President commander-in-chief
and the statute designates the Secretary of War as his
agent, thus disappeared, and with it the cause of endless
misunderstanding and resulting inefficiency. It was suc-
ceeded by an efficient system under which one of the
generals is selected as chief military adviser to the Presi-
dent and holds the position at the pleasure of the latter.
The merit of this law was soon tested. In September,
1906, it became necessary 1 to send a force of 6,000 men
to intervene in Cuba. Plans for such a contingency had
been prepared long in advance. They were carried out
with the smoothness and regularity of a drill on parade.
The contrast to the confusion, extravagance and lack
of efficiency in previous movements of our troops in an
emergency was most striking. 2
Deport War Dept, House Documents, Vol. 2, 1906, 458-459.
2 While these pages are going through the press a still larger movement
has been carried out; 20,000 men have been concentrated in Texas, with-
out previous notice, in a period of nine days. Detailed reports are as yet
lacking, but apparently the operation has shown great efficiency on the
part of the general staff.
326 MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES
1903 It is the business of the general staff to be prepared
for similar contingencies, which to the general public
seem unexpected and improbable. All the world knows
what the general staff did for Prussia in 1870. Our
own general staff differs from that of the European armies
in many particulars, but it is believed that it is adapted
to our own requirements and will perform equally valuable
service for us if a similar contingency should arise.
Of its many but important minor duties it is impossible
to speak here in detail. They are fully set forth in regu-
lations 1 prepared by Mr. Root under date of August 3,
1903.
Militia Act of The law 2 "to promote the efficiency of the militia "
1903 directed that the organization, armament and discipline
Jan. 21 of the militia should be the same as in the regular army,
and provided the funds to make this effective. For the
first time in all our history the militia now has the same
arms, equipment, uniforms and drill as the regular army,
and is equipped with tents, cooking apparatus and other
material necessary to take the field at a moment's notice.
The law further authorized the President in time of war
or other specified emergency to call forth any part of the
militia for a period not exceeding nine months; and he
is not required to call upon the governor of a State, but
he may "issue his orders for that purpose to such officers
of the militia as he may think proper/' Every officer
and enlisted man thus called forth shall be mustered into
the service of the United States, and for failure to present
himself for such muster there are heavy penalties. In
other words, when the emergency arises, the President
may order any colonel to report on a fixed date with his
regiment, and all its arms and equipment (which remain
1 Sec. War, 1899-1903, 483. 2 Mil. Laws, 1907, 1249.
GRADUAL GROWTH OF THE REGULAR ARMY 327
at all times the property of the United States), to a mus- 1903
tering officer, and forthwith that regiment becomes a
part of the volunteer army, as defined and provided for
in the law of 1898.
The militia law 1 also requires a certain number of
drills every year, provides for annual encampments and
manoeuvres in conjunction with regular troops, author-
izes the detafl of officers of the army for duty with it,
affords safeguards for the issue and proper care of the
arms and other property of the United States which are
furnished to it and permits the attendance of any of its
officers at any of the army schools, except West Point,
with a view to their becoming officers of the army.
Encampments and joint manoeuvres have been held Muma Act of
under this law every year since 1904, with manifest ad-
vantage not alone to the militia but also to the army.
The law goes to the utmost limit in carrying out
the constitutional requirement of a well-regulated militia.
Its only danger is that it may have gone so far as to
discourage recruiting in the organized militia, commonly
called the National Guard, the strength of which is about
120,000 men. Officers of the army as well as the general
public are apt to forget the full significance of the fact
that the National Guard receives no pay, that its only
material compensation is exemption from jury duty,
that its drills are habitually carried on at night after the
day's work is over, that all its members are engaged in
other avocations in which they gain their living, and
that their military duties are necessarily subordinate
to the chief occupation of their lives. All that the ser-
vice has to offer them is the occasional use of armories
for athletic or social purposes, the physical advantages
1 Mil. Laws, 1907, 1249-1250.
328 MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES
1903 of military drill, the pleasure of handling fire-arms and
becoming proficient in their use and the applause of the
Militia Act of public at parades. As against this they are liable to be
1903 called away from their families, and their business, per-
haps losing their employment, as many did in 1898, on the
President's order for service for any period not exceeding
their term of enlistment and at any point within or with-
out the United States. To remedy this it has been sug-
gested that service in the militia be paid. But this is of
doubtful expediency, for many of the best and oldest
regiments in the National Guard have existed for several
generations solely from pride and esprit-de-corps. To
convert them into paid organizations would be to destroy
their traditions and change the whole character of their
personnel.
It probably will work out in practice that in the sea-
coast cities, where about one-half of the older National
Guard regiments are to be found, they will prove to be
a most satisfactory support to the coast artillery. Even
with the present organization of the army we have less
than half the number of instructed men necessary to
man the guns already in position. To serve in the forts
at the guns, or to be stationed near the forts to defend
them from a land attack, will not take the men far from
their homes. Already several of the National Guard or-
ganizations have been changed from infantry regiments
to coast artillery companies. They have their designated
stations at certain of the ten-inch or twelve-inch guns
in a fort within a few hours' ride by trolley-car or boat
from their armories, and they have been drilling at these
identical guns every summer for several years. That
fort and their particular gun are as familiar to them
as their own armories. That they could render ad-
GRADUAL GROWTH OF THE REGULAR ARMY 329
mirable service there in time of war does not admit of 1903
doubt.
The other half of the National Guard, located at points
distant from the seaboard, would probably respond to
an order for active service with less loss than the regi-
ments in the larger cities. It is equipped as infantry,
and except in case of extraordinary emergency would
probably not be kept away from its home, involuntarily,
for any great length of time.
The scheme formulated in Mr. Root's report for 1902 * Mr. Root's
embraced " plan
1. A regular army of from 60,000 to 100,000 men;
2. A militia, trained and fully armed and equipped
and subject to the President's order, of from 120,000 to
150,000 men;
3. A first volunteer reserve, composed of such portions
of the organized militia as might volunteer for a longer
period than nine months;
4. A second volunteer reserve, composed of officers
and men who have had previous military service;
5. Volunteers organized by the States, as in the Civil
War.
He estimated the number available for immediate ac-
tion, in .the first four classes at 250 ; 000 to 300,000 men,
and stated that the number of the fifth class "has no
limit, except the possibility of transportation and sup-
ply."
No legislation has yet been enacted in regard to the
three classes of volunteers above referred to, although an
act has been drafted 2 under the direction of the general
staff, and has been pending in Congress since 1909* This
* Sec. War, 1899-1903, 286.
2 61st Congress, 2d Session, Senate bill 4003.
330 MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES
isos act is intended to provide in advance for the organiza-
tion of the volunteer army, so that when war is imminent
it would only be necessary for the President to state in his
proclamation the number of men desired in each arm or
corps. The act provides how they shall be organized
and how many general and staff officers shall be ap-
pointed in proportion to the number of men called for.
Briefly, the law contains the following essential provisions,
viz., the period of service is to be for the war,' unless
sooner discharged; all officers of every grade are to be
appointed by the President; the men received into ser-
vice are to be taken as far as practicable from the several
States and Territories in proportion to population; the
organization, arms and equipment are to be identical
with those in the regular army; all volunteer organiza-
tions are to be maintained as nearly as possible at their
maximum strength by means of recruiting depots es-
tablished for that purpose; regular officers are to be
assigned to all organizations not exceeding five to one
regiment; and officers and men in the volunteer army
are to be on the same footing as those in the regular
service.
That these provisions are justified and demanded by
our experience in previous wars does not admit of doubt,
from the professional military stand-point. It is equally
true that they run counter to various political considera-
tions and to many deep-seated prejudices in favor of
rights previously exercised by the governors of States.
Whether these latter can be overcome to the extent
necessary to enact these laws remains to be seen.
system of One other question, brought forward by Mr. Root in
Promotion *?
his first report of 1899, 1 is still pending in Congress; that
1 Sec. War, 1899-1903,61.
GRADUAL GROWTH OF THE REGULAR ARMY 331
is, the system of promotion. In every other military ser- 1903
vice in the world, and in every great corporate organi-
zation employing large bodies of men, the promotion of
officers is based on relative merit and fitness determined
by some specified board or other agency. In our army,
below the grade of general officers, promotion is deter-
mined solely by seniority. Mr. Root proposed that one
vacancy in three should be filled by selection under care-
fully guarded regulations so as to prevent favoritism.
The great majority of officers opposed this so vigorously
that for eleven years they have defeated it. As an alter-
native proposition the general staff has drafted a law,
which has been pending in Congress for two years, based
upon the principle of "elimination/ 7 If vacancies are
less than a certain number in any grade during a certain
number of years, then a definite number of officers in that
grade are to be eliminated by retirement, the selections
for elimination to be made by a board of officers under
proper regulations. Such a measure would stimulate
promotion, but would not accomplish the purpose of
selecting the best men for command. When war comes
and men's lives depend every day and every hour on the
skill of the officers in command, then the rule of strict
seniority is thrown to the wind; the purpose then is to
select the best man, and no claim of vested right to pro-
motion is considered or tolerated. The same principles
should apply when, in time of peace, the army is prepar-
ing for war.
This chapter has already exceeded its intended length, summary
and it only remains to summarize it. It has been my
endeavor to show that our forefathers were imbued with
an intense prejudice against a standing army in time of
332 MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES
1903 peace and a supreme reliance upon untrained militia;
that these prejudices resulted in enormous waste, ex-
travagance and inefficiency in the Revolution and the
War of 1812, and to a minor extent in the Mexican War,
the Civil War and the war with Spain; that neverthe-
less a standing army was found to be necessary and has
existed since the First Congress, gradually increasing in
numbers and efficiency, and slowly, step by step, gain-
ing the confidence of the people; that the strength of
the army has varied from 50 to 120 per 100,000 of the
population, or from 1 per cent to 2J per cent of the
"able-bodied male population," and its annual cost, ex-
clusive of pensions, has been less than 1 per cent of our
national wealth; and that finally, in this 135th year of
our independence, we have an efficient army, and a
militia with uniform arms, equipment, organization and
drill, both respectable in numbers, though small as
modern armies are counted, and both subject to the
instant call of the President. We have built proper
fortifications on our sea-coasts and have placed in them
a reasonable number of modern high-powered guns.
More progress has been made in the improvement of
our army during the last ten years than in all its pre-
vious history. The war with Spain, so brief in point of
time, so slight as regards loss of life, has changed com-
pletely our relations to the rest of the world. It has
brought us into close touch and sharp competition with
the nations of Europe on one side and of Asia on the
other; and with this competition the prospect of foreign
war, which thirty years ago seemed so remote as to be
negligible, is now a contingency that must be kept always
in mind. Abuse of a disciplined regular army and praise
of a patriotic untrained militia are no longer the popular
GRADUAL GROWTH OF THE REGULAR ARMY 333
cries with which demagogues in politics strive to catch 1903
votes. Measures to improve the efficiency of the army
and to put the country in a proper state of defence and
keep it so are no longer approved in the abstract and
neglected in the concrete, but they receive the serious
consideration of Congress, and this consideration leads to
actual legislation.
Our military policy still remains, and is likely to remain,
somewhat different from that of the nations of Europe.
Enormous armies, conscription and universal military
service seem not to be necessary with us. We still rely
upon voluntary service; but universal liability to ser-
vice is the law of the land, and conscription is in the
background if volunteers are not sufficient. Above all,
public opinion is beginning to appreciate the fact that
untrained patriotism is not sufficient and that our chief
reliance must be upon a military force trained in advance
in time of peace for the immensely complex problems of
war.
It would be a mistake on the part of our legislators to possibility
attempt to blink or dodge the fact that among the con-
ditions of our national life at the present time is the
possibility of war with one or another great nation
possessing a trained army of from 300,000 to 1,000,000
men, with ample transport facilities for crossing the
oceans which bound our coasts, and a powerful navy to
protect such transports. If such a war comes, the attack
on our coasts will probably precede the declaration of war.
It is a fallacy to argue that these oceans isolate and
protect us from other nations. That might have been
true when Washington gave his wise advice against en-
tangling alliances; 1 although England crossed the Atr
1 Sparks, XII, 231, 232.
334 MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES
lantic with 30,000 men in 1776, the allies sent 60,000
men through the Mediterranean in 1854 and we moved
12,600 men across the Gulf of Mexico in 1847. In two
of these expeditions the troops were carried in sailing
ships, moving with uncertain speed, from 50 to 100 miles
in a day, and each carrying from 200 to 250 soldiers.
Now they would be carried in great steamers, with 3,000
to 5,000 troops on each, travelling at a certain speed of
400 miles or more every day. More than one great na-
tion can assemble and embark an army much larger
than our own in 10 days and cross the Atlantic in 10
days more, or the Pacific in 20 days. While our prin-
cipal cities are protected by modern fortifications, yet
there are long stretches of beach and several harbors on
both coasts where a landing is feasible unless we have a
mobile army strong enough to prevent it.
These are not theories, but the actual conditions
which confront us in this twentieth century. That we
should ultimately prevail in any such contest, owing to
our enormous resources, our mechanical ingenuity, our
fertility in expedients and, above all, the dominant
character of our race, seems probable unless our race
is decadent, and if that be true then we shall perish.
/ The race which came out victorious from the Civil
1 War will not probably be subdued; but if it wins
it will be at the end of a sacrifice which cannot be
measured.
Such a contingency is among the possibilities under
any circumstances; it goes with the conditions of our
national life. If we are not prepared for it, it becomes
not alone a probability but almost a certainty; for we
are competing with all the world for the trade of the
Orient and of South America, and we must so compete.
GRADUAL GROWTH OF THE REGULAR ARMY 335
If we abandon the competition our prosperity will come 1903
to an end. It is not to be expected that we shall abandon
it, but rather that the trade rivalry for foreign markets
which has recently begun will rapidly increase in the
next few years. In such rivalry the potential causes of
war are numerous and frequent.
The Venezuelan incident has shown that the ties which
bind us to Great Britain are so strong that war with that
country is improbable even under extreme provocation.
But it is idle to deny that there are other nations which
are jealous of our phenomenal growth. Their attitude
toward us, however friendly it may have been in the
past, is now by no means cordial, and at times seems like
thinly veiled hostility. It is well to remember what
Washington wrote in 1778 r 1 "It is a maxim, founded
on the universal experience of mankind, that no nation
is to be trusted further than it is bound by its interest;
and no prudent statesman or politician will venture to
depart from it."
Some people say that the expression of such views inadequate
provokes war. The teachings of history prove that this
is not true, and that war comes to the nation that is not
prepared for it. Especially is this true of a very rich
nation, with abundant resources unorganized. We have }
always been unprepared for war, and we have been at
war one year in every seven since we declared our inde-
pendence. We have a more efficient army and a more
highly organized militia now than at any previous time
in our history; but compared with the possibilities that
confront us and the conditions which have resulted from
the use of steam and electricity, we are about as unpre-
pared now as at any previous time.
1 Sparks, VI, 110.
336 MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES
Necessity It would seem to be incumbent upon those who are
Definite responsibile for our national legislation to study these
facts, to forget the traditions which our Puritan and
Cavalier ancestors brought over from England nearly
three hundred years ago, to realize that what was wise
in the days of the Stuart tyranny has no application in
this twentieth century and to frame a military policy
suited to the conditions under which we are now living.
APPENDIX
THE Medical Department can justly claim an equal share
with the Ordnance Department and the Corps of Engineers
in the valuable contributions to the advancement of science
made by the army in the last ninety years, and particularly
since the Civil War. Among them is the suppression of
yellow-fever in the tropics, which is solely due to the efforts
of the army surgeons, one of whom lost his life in the process.
Aside from the loss of life, the paralysis of business throughout
the Mississippi Valley and the coast of the Gulf of Mexico,
which was an incident to such epidemics as that of 1878 at
Memphis, produced financial loss many times greater than
the entire cost of the war with Spain and the resulting acqui-
sition of the Philippines. From such financial losses and the
appalling loss of life from yellow-fever, we are henceforth,
apparently, immune.
Moreover, it is reasonably certain that but for this great
achievement of the Army Medical Corps and the sanitation
introduced by Colonel Gorgas on the Isthmus, we should not
have been able to construct the Panama Canal. Had we had
such proportionate loss of life among the 45,000 or more
laborers now working on the canal as attended the construc-
tion, by a much smaller force, of the Panama Railroad from
1849 to 1855 (where, as the phrase goes, a laborer was buried
under every tie), or such loss of life as befell the French during
their unsuccessful attempt to build the canal between 1883
and 1892, there is little doubt that this would have created
an adverse public sentiment sufficiently strong, when added to
the sentiment against building the canal on other grounds, to
have led to the abandonment of the entire project.
337
338 APPENDIX
General Wood, chief of staff, has kindly caused to be pre-
pared by Lieutenant-Colonel J. R. Kean, Medical Corps
TL S. A., a condensed statement of the facts in regard to the
suppression of yellow-fever and the connection of the mos-
quito therewith. As the matter is one of world-wide im-
portance, and has a distinct bearing on the enforcement of
any military policy that the United States may decide upon,
the statement is published in full, as follows :
THE CONQUEST OF YELLOW-FEVER
The military occupation of Cuba brought the army in con-
frontation with yellow-fever, a foe which had before been de-
structive to many invading expeditions in the Antilles and
which at Santiago gave General Shafter's army a severe
demonstration of its fatal and demoralizing power. Upon the
recommendation of the surgeon-general, a commission was sent
to Havana to study the question of its cause and prevention, a
task upon which many distinguished scientists had labored in
xain. Major Walter Reed, Surgeon, U. S. A., who was placed
at its head, had recently overthrown the claim of the dis-
tinguished bacteriologist, Sanarelli, to have discovered the
bacillus of yellow-fever, by demonstrating that this organism
was a common one in the United States and having no causa-
tive relation to that disease. The other members of the com-
mission were Acting Assistant Surgeons James Carroll, Jesse
W. Lazear and A. Agramonte, the latter a Cuban by birth
and the only member of the commission who had clinical
experience with yellow-fever and was immune to it. The
time was most opportune for such investigation, as the disease
was at that time prevalent both in Havana and in the town
of Marianao near the camp of the American troops, and it
had become plainly evident that the energetic measures of
the American military government to clean up the towns,
disinfect and enforce other sanitary measures were without
effect in preventing the spread of this mysterious disease.
APPENDIX 339
The transmission of malaria by a certain species of mos-
quito had recently been demonstrated by the English military
surgeon, Major Ronald Ross. Dr. Carlos Finlay, of Havana,
had, since 1881, stoutly maintained that yellow-fever was a
mosquito-borne disease and had fixed accurately upon the
species which was responsible, but his numerous experiments
had failed to demonstrate the truth of his hypothesis, and it
therefore received no more attention or acceptance from the
scientific world than the vast number of other theories which
had at one time or another been advanced with regard to this
peculiar and dreaded disease. Dr. H. R. Carter had observed
that when a non-immune person went into an infected house
he became sick in 5 days or less, but that 15 or 20 days elapsed
before a house became infected after a patient sick with yellow-
fever was carried into it and secondary cases appeared. Carter
drew no inferences from this observation, but to Reed's mind it
suggested that the difference between the period of incubation
and that required to infect a building was due to the fact
that the infective agent had to pass through a stage of devel-
opment in some biting insect as an intermediate host, and
he determined to investigate the mosquito theory of Finlay.
The first attempts were tried secretly on Carroll and Lazear
and other persons at the hospital of Columbia Barracks, but
were failures owing to the same cause that had rendered neg-
ative Finlay's numerous and intelligent experiments on human
beings, namely, that two conditions have to be satisfied for
the transmission of yellow-fever: the mosquito, in order to
become infected, must bite a patient during the first three
days of the disease, and, second, the insect must be kept at
least twelve days before it can transmit the infection. Mean-
while, during a temporary absence of Reed in the United States,
mosquitoes in which both conditions were fulfilled were ap-
plied to Dr. Carroll and to a cavalry soldier, both of whom
came down with yellow-fever, Carroll's case being very severe.
These cases convinced Reed, but they were not sufficient to
convert the scientific world, and it was evident that a series
340 APPENDIX
of fully observed and controlled cases was necessary to con-
firm and define the conditions of this momentous discovery.
He went, therefore, to General Leonard Wood, the Military
Governor of Cuba, to ask permission to conduct such danger-
ous experiments on human beings and for a sum of money to
reward volunteers who should offer themselves for this perilous
experience. General Wood promptly granted both with a ready
appreciation of the importance of the matter which entitles
him to no small share of the glory of the discovery. Havana
was at that time full of Spanish laborers who had come to
Cuba seeking employment, and who all anticipated sooner
or later an attack of yellow-fever, an expectation in which they
were not usually deceived. It was found easy to induce these
men to submit to the bite of infected mosquitoes, although
the consequences were carefully explained to them. They
concurred in the opinion of the board that their chances of
recovery were far better with the skilful care and good nursing
of an army hospital than if the disease were contracted in the
usual way amid the squalor and neglect of their accustomed
surroundings. American soldiers of the hospital corps also
came forward in abundance, so that it was no longer necessary
for other members of the commission to offer themselves for
experiment. Lazear, however, the member who had charge
of the infecting of the mosquitoes, was bitten while so doing in
the yellow-fever hospital in Havana and died of malignant
yellow-fever. In the fall of 1900, after Lazear's death, a camp
named after him was established about a mile from Columbia
Barracks for the conduct of a series of experiments which,
by precision of detail and rigidness of control, would admit
of no uncertainty of interpretation and would be a perfect
demonstration carrying conviction to every scientific and un-
prejudiced mind. Camp Lazear was established November 20
and the subjects for experiment were kept there under rigid
regulations to exclude infection in any way except experi-
mentally. As soon as taken sick the cases were taken to the
isolation hospital of the barracks. One building was con-
APPENDIX 341
structed for mosquito experiments. It was carefully screened
and contained a large room entirely divided across its centre
by a partition of wire gauze which permitted circulation of
air but not the passage of mosquitoes. . In one side of this
screen infected mosquitoes were let loose, and the individuals
who went into that side were bitten and infected. On the other
side of the screen, breathing the same air, slept and lived
non-immunes who remained uninfected. This demonstrated
that the mosquito, not the air, carried the infection. At some
distance away another building was constructed into which
were carried bedclothes and shirts worn by yellow-fever
patients, some even soiled with black vomit and other dis-
charges. In this room, of which the air was kept warm and
moist, slept and lived 6 non-immune American soldiers for
periods of ten days each during a period of two months.
Acting Assistant Surgeon R. P. Cook underwent this re-
pulsive experience with the first 2 soldiers, and although they
daily handled and even slept in this presumably infected cloth-
ing, none of them contracted yellow-fever. Three of them
afterward demonstrated their susceptibility by contracting
the disease by the bites of infected mosquitoes. In these ex-
periments 14 cases of yellow-fever were caused by infected
mosquitoes of the genus Stegnomyia, 5 by injections of blood
of patients in the first three days of their illness and 3 by in-
jections of filtered blood serum, 22 cases in all, of which 15
were Americans and 7 were Spaniards. No deaths occurred
except that of Dr. Lazear above mentioned. In a series of
10 experimental cases at Havana, however, conducted in 1901
by Gorgas and Guiteras, 3 proved fatal, 2 being Spaniards
and 1 an American trained nurse, Miss Clara Louise Maas.
These experiments demonstrated that
1. Bacillus Ictervides of Sanarelli does not cause yellow-fever.
2. Yellow-fever is carried by the mosquito, genus Stegnomyia.
3. That this mosquito cannot convey the disease until the
twelfth day after biting the patient, and then retains the in-
fective power for the rest of its life.
342 APPENDIX
4. Patients can transmit yellow-fever to the mosquito only
during the first three days of the disease.
5. Yellow-fever is not communicable by clothing, etc.
Application was at once made of this knowledge by Major
W. C. Gorgas, Health Officer of Havana, in February, 1901,
and this dread disease was stamped out of Havana and Cuba
for the first time in nearly two centuries. Between the years
1853 and 1900 it has caused 35,952 deaths in the city of Havana
alone. The application at the Isthmus of Panama of the
same knowledge, together with the administrative methods
worked out in Havana, has enabled Gorgas to make healthy one
of the most pestilential countries in the world, and so make
possible the construction of the Panama Canal. This same
discovery has been applied with equal success in other centres
of infection, such as Rio de Janeiro and Vera Cruz, so that
there is now a good prospect of the extermination of this dis-
ease in the western hemisphere.
J. R. KEAST,
Lieutenant-Colonel, Medical Corps, U. S. A.
BOOKS OF REFERENCE
1. Dr. William Osier: "Jilquanimitas" and other addresses. Pp. 118.
P. Blakiston's Son & Co.
2. Dr. Howard A. Kelly: "Walter Reed and Yellow Fever/' McClure,
Phillips & Co., New York.
3. "Major Walter Reed and the Yellow Fever Commission." A com-
pilation prepared by authority of the surgeon-general and published as a
Senate Document.
4. Major J. R. Kean: "The Scientific Work and Discoveries of the Late
Major Walter Reed." Senate Doc. No. 118, 57th Congress, 2d Session.
5. Also Senate Docs. No. 10, 59th Congress, 2d Session, and No. 520,
61st Congress, 2d Session.
INDEX
Abercrombey at Ticonderoga, 1758, 102.
Adams, John, 14, 61, 99; endorses Gates,
99,
Adams, Samuel, 3; writes to Congress
endorsing Gates, 99, 149.
Agnew, General, mortally wounded, 92.
Allen, Colonel Ethan, 6; captured and
sent to England, 23, 102.
Andre", Major, meets Arnold, 167; capt-
ure of, 168; death of, 169.
Anspach regiment sent by transports
feared desertion, 141.
Arbuthnot, Admiral, sails for Newport,
173; with Clinton at Charleston, 208.
Arnold, Benedict, 21, 22; plans to invade
Canada, 22; arrives at Quebec, 24.
25; wounded, 26; might have suc-
ceeded, 27; defeated by Carleton,
54; at Ridgefield, 80; defeats St.
Leger, 108; joins Gates, 115; at-
tacks Fraser, 116; in battle with-
out command, 124; compared to
Lee, 145; gets command at West
Point, 166; meets Andre, 167; es-
capes to British ship, 168; subse-
quent career of, 169; sent South to
reinforce Corn wall is, 227.
Ashe defeated at Briar Creek and court-
mart ialled, 195.
Augusta, siege of, 249.
Balcarras, Earl, at Bemis* Heights, 124.
Barren Hill t skirmish, 140.
Baume, Lieutenant-Colonel, at Benning-
ton, 110; warns Burgoyne, 111;
death of, 113.
Baxter, Colonel, 58; mortally wounded,
59.
Beaufort, action at, 193.
Bennington, battle of, 113.
Boston, besieged, 3; garrison of,, 4; works
completed, 5; evacuation of, 19.
Boyd, Colonel, at Kettle Creek, 194.
Brandywine, battle of, 85.
Brant with St. Leger, 107.
Breyman, Lieutenant- Colonel, at Ben-
nington, 112-113; death of, 124.
Briar Creek, battle of, 195.
British army, 139, 163.
British fleet, arrival at New York, 33.
British plans for dividing the Colonies,
182.
Brown, Colonel, raids Burgoyne's com-
munications, 119.
Browne, Lieutenant-Colonel, defends Au-
gusta, 250.
Brunswick Dragoons at Bennington,
110.
Brunswick, Duke of, 28.
Bunker Hill, Gage's plan of attack, 7;
Howe's formation for assault, 9;
American retreat, 10.
Burgoyne, in command of reinforce-
ments, 26; resented being shut up
in Boston, 30; reasons for the loss
of his army, 31; selected to com-
mand two expeditions from Can-
ada, 77; his plan to reach Albany,
78; his force, 96; arrives at Quebec,
100; advances from Crown Point,
103 ; captures Ticonderoga and pur-
sues Long up the lake, 104, 106;
takes Fort Edward, 109; starts for
Bennington, 110; position precari-
out, 114; at Freeman's Farm, 116;
at Bemis' Heights, 123; negotiates
for surrender, 125; signs terms, 127;
goes to England on parole, 130, 139.
Burnside's report, 312-313; not adopted*
314.
Burr, Aaron, 23.
Cadwalader, Colonel John, with Magaw
at New York, 58; letter to, from
Washington, 66, 67; occupies Bor-
dentown, 69; ordered to join Wash-
ington, 70.
Calhoun's reports, 299; not adopted,
301.
Camden, battle of, 218.
Campbell, Captain, messenger to Bur-
goyne, 117; Colonel, sent to attack
Fort Montgomery, 121.
Campbell, Lieutenant-Colonel Archibald,
sent to Georgia, 189; at Savannah,
191; killed at Eutaw Springs, 255.
Carleton, Sir Guy, Governor of Canada,
at Montreal, 22; escapes in a small
boat, 23; learns of Arnold's ap-
proach, 24; at Quebec, 25; fails
to attack Arnold, 26; reinforced by
Burgoyne, 31; at Crown Point, 54;
renders Burgoyne every assistance,
100.
Carlisle, Earl of, heads peace commis-
sion, 138.
Carrington, quartermaster-general of
Greene's army, 226; meets Morgan
with boats, 233, 234.
Chad's Ford, battle of, 84.
Charleston, preparations for the defence
of, 184; result of the victory, 188;
343
344
INDEX
unsuccessful attack of Prevost, 197;
its siege by Clinton, 209; its sur-
render, 210.
Charlestown set on fire, 9.
Chew, Chief Justice, 91.
Civil War, the, 307; call for volunteers,
307; resort to conscription, 308:
number of men in service, 308; de-
fects of military system, 309; com-
pared with previous wars, 310; dis-
bandment of the volunteers. 311.
Clarke, Colonel, defeats Dunlap, 214; at
siege of Augusta, 250.
Clary, Lieutenant-Colonel, 49.
Clinton, Fort, captured, 121.
Clinton, General George, 49; hastens
to the relief of his brother, 121-138.
Clinton, General James, 61; commander
Forts Clinton and Montgomery, 121.
Clinton., Sir Henry, at Bunker Hill, 10;
failure at Charleston, 31; arrives at
New York, 33; attacks Sullivan on
Long Island, 38; lands at Kip's
Bay, 46; sent to Newport, 62;
notifies Burgoyne of intention to
attack Fort Montgomery, 117; his
message to Burgoyne, 118; moves
up Hudson, 120; fails Burgoyne,
122; in supreme command, 134;
attempts to capture Lafayette, 140;
evacuates Philadelphia, 141; at
Monmouth, 144; escapes, 147;
arrives at Newport, 154 ; captures
Stony Point, 156; reoccupies Stony
Point, 159; sends marauding ex-
pedition up the Chesapeake, 161;
corresponds with Arnold, 167; ap-
peals for Andre", 169; sails for New-
port, 173; returns to New York,
174, 176; at Charleston, 185; his
expedition South, 206; lands near
Charleston, 207; sends reinforce-
ments South, 223; sends 7,500 men
to Cornwallis, 261; instructions to
Cornwallis, 266; goes to relieve
Cornwallis, 273; superseded by
Carleton, 278.
Continental army, 17; movement to
New York, 31-54, 162; ineffective
plans for recruiting, 175 ; origin of,
2SS.
Continental Congress, appoints Washing-
ton commander-in-chief, 13, 75;
adjourns to York, Pa., 89; sends
committee to Valley Forge, 134 ; in-
effective resolutions of, 289; mili-
tary powers of, 295.
Conway, Cabal, 134; wounded^ in a duel,
makes abject apology to Washing-
ton, 135.
Conway's brigade, 90.
Cornwallis, reinforces Clinton at Charles-
ton, 31; arrives at New York, 33;
sent to Flatbush, 35; at the Cor-
telyou house, 39; lauds at Kip's
Bay, 46; at Harlem Heights, 49;
at Fort George, 58; at Fort Lee,
59, 60; captures Lee, 65; his at-
tempt to turn Washington's flank,
66, rejoins his command, 70;
marches toward Princeton, 71, 72;
in battle of the Brandywine, 84 et
seq.; hurrying with reinforcements,
92; attacks Fort Mercer, 94, 163;
with seven regiments at Cape Fear
River, 184; goes South with Clinton,
206; defeats Gates at Camden, 219;
retreats to South Carolina after
King's Mountain, 224; burns his
baggage to pursue Morgan, 232;
gives up the chase, 235; he defeats
Green at Guilford, 240; retreats to
Wilmington, 242; his perplexity at
Wilmington, 259; arrives at York-
town, 267; surrender, 275; returns
to England, 278.
Cowpens, battle of the, 229.
Crown Point, capture of, 6.
Cruger, Lieutenant-Colonel, sent to Geor-
gia, 189; commands defence of
Ninety-Six, 250.
Cuba, occupation of, 338.
Dearborn, Henry, 23.
De Grasse, announces his co-operation,
270; arrives at Cape Henry, 272;
his naval battle with the English
fleet, 273.
De Kalb, Baron, sent South by Wash-
ington, 214; mortally wounded at
Camden, 218.
De Lancey, Colonel, sent to Georgia, 189.
Delaware, Washington crosses the, 66;
forts destroyed, 93.
Dillon, Count, at Savannah, 203.
Donop, General, lands at Kip's Bay, 46;
at Harlem Heights, 49; on the Dela-
ware, 66; retreats to Amboy, 69;
death of, 94.
Dorchester Heights seized, 18.
Duer, William, 64.
Duportail stationed on coast to commu-
nicate with d'Estaing, 171.
Edward, Fort, 109.
Estaing, Comte d', arrives with French
fleet, 149; fans to attack, 150; saila
for Newport, 150; fails to land his
troops, 151; abandons allies at New-
port, 152; sails for Martinique, 154;
movements of, 171; returns with
three expeditions, 200; after fiasco
at Savannah, sails for France, 205.
Eutaw Springs, battle of, 255.
Ewing, Colonel, 68.
Fellow's brigade at Saratoga, 125 f
Ferguson killed at King's Mountain, 224.
Fleury receives medal from Congress.
159.
INDEX
345
Florida war, 301.
Francis killed, 104.
Fraser's brigade, at Ticonderoga, 103; at
battle of Hubbardton, 104; mortally
wounded, 124.
Freeman's Farm, battle of, 116.
French alliance, 132.
Gadsden, Colonel, at Charleston, 185.
Gage, Major-General Thomas, command-
er-in-chief at Boston, 4; issues in-
sulting proclamation, 7; assaults
American works in front, 8; recalled
in disgrace, 11.
Gansevoort, Colonel, sent to Fort Stan-
wix, 106, 108.
Gates, Horatio, appointed adjutant-gen-
eral, 16; called in council, 17; at
Ticonderoga, 54; joins Washington,
65; relations with Schuyler, 97;
elected to command the Northern
army, 99; his strength at surrender
of Burgoyne, 106; relieves Schuyler,
114; refuses to reinforce Arnold,
116; jealous of Arnold, 118; not
on field at Bemis* Heights, 124;
surrounds Burgoyne, 125; grants
armistice until sunset, 128, 137; re-
tires from army, 166; sent South
by Congress to command army, 215;
defeated at Camden, 218.
George III, arranges to buy soldiers for
cash, 28; endorses Burgoyne's plan,
78; plan that the king disliked, 131.
Georgetown, capture of, 253.
Georgia, conquest of, 192.
Gerard, guest of d'Estaing, 154, 171.
Germain, Lord George, 76; had failed to
give Howe instructions, 119; incom-
petence of, 264.
Germantown, battle of, 90; panic of, 92.
Gist, Major, captured, 39.
Glover, Colonel John, regiment of Marble-
head fishermen, 42, 43; his regi-
ment to man the boats at the cross-
ing of the Delaware, 67; brigade
sent to Schuyler, 105; at Newport,
153.
Granby, Fort, capture of, 249.
Grant, Major-General, takes over Corn-
wallis's command, 66; rallies his
troops, 92; at Barren Hill, 140.
Graves, Admiral, 4; arrives with fleet,
173.
Great Bridge, battle of, 183.
Greene, Christopher, 23; gallant defence
of Fort Mifflin, 94; in command of
Rhode Island negroes at Newport,
153.
Greene, General Nathanael, appointed
' brigadier-general, 15; a great sol-
dier, 16; in council of war, 17; at
Boston, 19; ordered to Brooklyn
Heights, 32; at New York, 34, 35;
illness at the battle of Long Island,
41; advocates evacuation of New
York, 45; his division posted after
retreat to Harlem Heights, 47; at
battle of Harlem Heights, 48; in
command of troops at Forts Lee and
Washington, 52, 54; reports the
passage of British ships up the
river, 55; crosses river to Fort
Washington with Washington, Put-
nam and Mercer, 57; brings off the
garrison of Fort Lee, 60; on march
to Trenton, 67; in the attack on
Trenton, 68; advises pushing on to
Princeton, 69; gets one of the five
new divisions, 76; selects position at
Middlebrook, 80; in pursuit of
Howe with three brigades, 81; on
reconnoissance with Washington
and Lafayette, 83; his batteries at
Brandy wine, 85; halts British ad-
vance, 86; nearing the battle of
Germantown, 90; fighting his way
along Lime-kiln road, 91; ap-
pointed quartermaster-general, 136;
organization at Valley Forge, 140;
at Monmouth, 146; at Newport,
153; his loss at battle of Spring-
field, 165; resigns as quartermaster-
general, 166; president of Andre"
court-martial, 169; appointed to
command Southern army, 220; his
successful retreat, 234; receives
reinforcements, 236; marches to
South Carolina, 244; abandons
siege of Fort Ninety-Six, 251; re-
treats from Eutaw Springs, 256.
Grey, General, attacks Wayne, "%&\~'T4.Q.~~
Gridley, Colonel Richard, chief engineer
at Boston, 5; sends guns to Cam-
bridge from Ticonderoga, 6; builds
square redoubt at Breed's Hill, 7;
amazes Howe by night work on
Dorchester Heights, 18.
Guilford, battle of, 238.
Hale, Nathan, absent at his own request,
47.
Hamilton, Alexander, 52; nearing his
twentieth birthday, 68; sent to wel-
come Comte d'Estaing, 149; sent to
capture Arnold, 168, stationed on
Jersey coast to meet d'Estaing, 171;
leads the assault at Yorktown, 274.
Hamilton, General, in council of war with
Burgoyne, 125.
Hancock, John, 3; at head of 7,000 New
England militia, 150.
Hand, Colonel, at Trenton, 68; his regi-
ment at Princeton, 71.
Harlem Heights, battle of, 49.
Haslet, Colonel, 52; killed at Princeton,
71.
Heath, William, appointed brigadier-
general, 14; in council of war, 17;
stationed with Spencer and Stirling,
346
INDEX
32; commands one of the five divi-
sions, 34; after reorganization com-
mands one of the three divisions, 44;
commands Greene's division during
his illness, 47; arrives at White
Plains, 52; head-quarters at Peeks-
kill, 54; might have been captured,
61; ordered to Morristown, 69; goes
into winter quarters, 72.
Henry, Patrick, Washington's appea Ito,
as Governor of Virginia, 138; his
eloquence fires the Southern Colo-
nies, 183.
Herkimer, General, 106; at battle of
Oriskany, 107; death of, 108.
Herrick, Colonel, at Bennington, 113.
Hesse-Cassel, Landgrave of, 28.
Hessians, engagement with, by England,
28; at battle of Long Island with
Cornwallis, 35; loss at White Plains,
53; they attack Fort Washington,
58; at Trenton, 67; they advance
to Chad's Ford, 84; at battle of
Brandywine, 85.
Hinman, Colonel, 22.
Hobkirk's Hill, battle of, 246.
Hopkins, Commodore Ezek, 33.
Howe, Lord, 93; at Sandy Hook to
meet French fleet, 149; at New-
port, 154.
Howe, Major-General Robert, quells mu-
tiny of New Jersey line, 177, 189;
at Savannah, 190; tried by court-
martial, 192.
Howe, Sir William, sent out from Eng-
land, 5; in command at Bunker
Hill, 8; leaves Boston, 20; arrives
at New York, 33; at battle of Long
Island, 37; lands in New York, 46;
flanking movement through West-
Chester, 51; at battle of White
Plains, 52; sends Cornwallis in pur-
suit of Washington, 59; captures
Fort Washington, 60; goes into
winter quarters, 62; withdraws from
New Jersey, 72; sails for Chesa-
peake, 82; at Chad's Ford, 82; at
battle of Brandywine, 85; captures
Philadelphia, 88; attacks Washing-
ton, 93; returns to Philadelphia, 95;
resignation of, 134; sails for Eng-
land, 141.
Hubbardton, battle of, 104.
Hutchinson, Colonel, 27; Fort, 43.
Jackson's opinions, 303.
Jamestown, battle of, 263.
Jay, John, 64.
Johnson, Sir John, 97, 107.
Jones, Brigadier-General, 4.
Kettle Creek engagement, 194.
King's Mountain, battle of, 223.
Kip's Bay, British land at, 46.
Knowlton, Colonel Thomas, ordered to
reconnoitre with his " Rangers," 47;
ordered to get in rear of the British,
48; death of, 49.
Knox, Henry, drags cannon through the
sno'w from Ticonderoga, 18; guns
placed under direction of, 32; his
guns outclassed by British fleet, 33;
his letter of December 28, 67; direct-
ing the artillery at Trenton, 68.
Knyphausen, Lieutenant-General, 53;
his attack at Fort Washington, 58;
Magaw surrenders to, 59; sustained
three-fourths of the losses at Fort
Washington, 60; at Brandywine,
85; Wayne unable to resist his
advance, 87; in charge of Clinton's
baggage, 143; at Monmouth, 144;
expeditions into Jersey, 163; left in
command in New York, 206.
Kosciusko, fortifies Bemis' Heights, 115;
engineer of Greene's Southern army,
226; sent to throw up trenches, 234;
opens first parallel at Ninety-Six,
250.
Lafayette, Marquis de, arrival of, 83;
wounded, 86; commands a division,
140; sent to Providence with two
brigades, 150; sails for France, 154;
member of Andre" court-martial,
169; returns from France, 171; sent
to confer with Rochambeau, 172;
had gathered a few hundred militia,
261; retreats from Richmond before
Cornwallis, 262; returns to France,
278.
Laurens, Colonel John, aide-de-camp,
sent to receive Comte d'Estaing,
149; sent to France to raise money,
178.
Learned 's brigades at Saratoga, 125.
Lee, Charles, appointed major-general,
14; in council of war, 17; sent to
New York, 31; reports situation in
New York, 32; reaches White
Plains, 52; at North Castle with
5,000 men, 54; might have been
prevented from crossing Hudson,
61; Washington gives him orders
in writing, 63; his dilatory march,
64; capture, 65; a prisoner in
Howe's hands, 77; gives traitorous
information to Howe, 78; his dis-
grace at Monmouth, 145; his court-
martial, 148; sent to Charleston, 185.-
Lee, Major Henry, captures Paul us Hook,
1 59 ; sent to defend Vauxhall bridge,
165; stationed on Jersey coast to
meet d'Estaing, 171; captures Fort
Granby, 249; hastens to join Greene
at Ninety-Six, 250
Leitch, Major, wounded, 49.
Leslie, General, 52; sent South to rein-
force Cornwallis, 225.
Lincoln, General, goes into winter quar-
INDEX
347
ters at Morristown, 72; commands
one of the five divisions of new
troops, 76; sent by Washington to
- organize the New England militia,
111; brings troops to Gates's camp,
119; at Beaufort, 193; takes the
offensive, 194; defeated at Stono
Ferry, 198; joins d'Estaing at Sa-
vannah, 201; raises siege, 205; de-
feated at Charleston, 210.
Livingston, Colonel James, 23.
Long retreats before Burgoyne, 105.
Long Island, battle of, 35; Howe's plan
of battle, 37; arrival of Washing-
ton, 39; responsibility for the de-
feat, 40; withdrawal from, 42,
McDougall, General, raises the first New
York regiment, 43; retreats bringing
off the guns at White Plains, 53;
with Greene at Germantown, 90;
fails to attack Verplanck's Point,
157.
Magaw r Colonel Robert, commander at
Fort Washington, 56; commands
three regiments, 58 ; opposes Howe's
fourth attack, 59.
Mahan, Captain, criticises Comte d'Es-
taing, 150.
Marion, on lower Pedee, 225; was hiding
in the Pedee swamps, 244; capt-
ures Fort Motte, 248; captures
Georgetown, 253.
Marjoribanks, Major, sortie at Eutaw
Springs, 256.
Mawhood attacks Mercer's brigade, 70.
Maxwell's brigade, 92.
Mercer, Fort, 94
Mercer, General, reported to have ar-
rived at Long Island as the retreat
began, 43; offered to stay at Fort
Washington, 57; death of, 71.
Mexican War, 306.
Mifflin, Fort, 94.
Mifflin, Thomas, quartermaster-general,
16; left to man the works on retreat
from Long Island, 43; withdrawn
under cover of fog, 44; sent to Phila-
delphia to take charge of the stores,
63; militia raised by his exertions
at Philadelphia, 69; ordered to join
Washington after Trenton, 70; in
Con way Cabal, resigns from army,
135.
Military policy, origin of, 284; necessity
of a definite one, 336.
Militia, popularity of, in England, 287;
popularity of, in American Colonies,
288; act, 296; refusal to furnish,
1814, 298; act Of 1903, 326.
Mischianza, the, 141.
Monckton, Colonel, killed, 146.
MoncrierT, Colonel, engineer at siege of
Charleston, 209,
Monmouth, battle of, 144.
Monroe, Lieutenant James, 68.
Montcalm at Ticonderoga in 1758,
102.
Montgomery* Fort, captured, 121.
Montgomery, Richard, appointed briga-
dier-general, 14; captures Montreal,
23; joins Arnold, 24; death of, 25.
Montreal, capture of, 23.
Moore, General, in command at battle
of Moore's Bridge, 183.
Moore's Bridge, battle at, 183.
Morgan, ranger, defeats Carleton, 230:
retreats to the Catawba, 231.
Morgan's riflemen, sent to Schuyler,
105; attack Fraser, 116; at battle
of Bemis' Heights, 123; in pursuit of
Burgoyne, 125.
Morris House, Washington gallops from,
46; the 42d Highlanders attack, 59.
Moultrie, Fort, surrenders, 210.
Moultrie, 64; in defence of Charleston,
185; won the battle at Sullivan's
Island, 186; records his opinion,
202.
Muhlenberg, 86; at Stony Point, 157.
Murray, Mrs., detains Howe.
Musgrave, Colonel, places five companies
in the Chew house, 90.
Nash, General, mortally wounded at Ger-
mantown, 92.
New Jersey line mutineers, 177.
New London massacre, 170.
Newport, attack on, 150; evacuated by
the British, 174.
New York, defence of, 31; fortifications
of, 33; disposition of troops, 34.
Nicholls, Colonel, at Bennington, 113.
Ninety-Six, siege of, 250; evacuated,
252.
Nixon's brigade sent to Schuyler, 105.
O'Hara at Guilford, 241.
Orangeburg, capture of, 249.
Paoli massacre, 88.
Parker, Admiral, 31; arrives at Charles-
ton, 185; defeated, withdraws, 187.
Parker, Commodore Hyde, sent to Geor-
gia, 189.
Paulus Hook, capture, 160.
Peace Commission, 138.
Pell's Point, 51.
Pennsylvania line, mutiny of, 176.
Penobscot expedition, 161.
Percy, Earl, his brigade in garrison ofi
Boston, 4; to attack Dorchester
Heights, 19; left in New York. 51;
Howe reinforced by two brigades of
his division, 53; attacks Washing-
ton Heights, 58.
Philippine insurrection, 320.
Phillips's brigade seizes Mount Hope,
103; Phillips takes possession of
348
INDEX
Fort George, 109; in council of war
with. Burgoyne, 125.
Fickens, Colonel Andrew, at Kettle Creek,
194; on familiar ground, 244;
hastens to join Greene at Ninety-
Six, 250; returns to his old recruit-
ing-ground, 253.
Pigott, Brigadier-General, 4; attacks at
Lexington, 10; at Newport, 153.
Pomeroy, Seth, 8; appointed brigadier-
general, 14.
Poor. Colonel, 71; after Bennington,
115; at Bemis* Heights, 123; his
brigade helps to surround Burgoyne,
125.
Potter, Colonel, killed, 71.
Prescott, Colonel, fortifies Bunker Hill,
7; completes his breastworks at
Bunker Hill, 8; retains the com-
mand, 9.
Preston, Major, commanding at St. John,
23.
Prevost, Lieutenant-Colonel, at Briar
Creek, 195,
Prevost, General, at Savannah, 190; sum-
mons Charleston to surrender, 196;
withdraws, 197; retires to Savannah,
199.
Princeton, battle of, 70.
Pulaski, 92; at Charleston, 197; mortal-
ly wounded at Savannah, 204.
Putnam, Israel, appointed major-gen-
eral, 14; called in council of war,
17;. given one of the five divisions at
New York, 34; takes command on
Long Island, 35; failure as com-
manding general, 40; Washington's
letter to, 41; commands one of three
divisions, 44; in the retreat from
New York, 46; his division posted
on the heights, 47; meets Washing-
ton on the retreat, 48; in action at
Harlem Heights, 49; leaves White
Plains with Washington, 57; sent
to fortify Philadelphia, 63; at Peeks-
kill, 76; reports from, 82; out-gen-
eralle_d by Clinton, 12O; retreats up
the river, 122; opposition to Wash-
ington, 137,
Pyle, colonel of tories, defeated, 236.
Quebec, siege of, 25; retreat from, 26.
Rail, Colonel, attacks with Knyphausen,
58; in command at Trenton, 66;
rudely awakened, 67; tries to form
his troops, 68; his death, 69.
Rawdon, Lord, at Charleston, 210; de-
feats Greene at Hobkirk's Hill, 246;
evacuates Camden, 248; comes to
the relief of Fort Ninety-Six, 250;
captured at sea by Count de Grasse,
252.
Rawlings* regiment, 58, 60.
Reed, Adjutant-General Joseph, had
been with Knowlton, 48; in action
at Wasn^g* 011 Heights, 49; won-
ders if Washington was such a great
man as he had been thought, 64.
Revolution, nearly exhausted, 174; waste
and extravagance of, 291.
Riedesel, at battle of Hubbardton, 104;
anxious to mount Duke of Bruns-
wick's dragoons, 110; council of war
with Burgoyne, 125.
Rochambeau, 168; arrives with six
French regiments, 172; at Hart-
ford, 174.
Root, Elihu, as Secretary of War, 320 ; his
projects, 321 ; his plan for army, 329.
St. dair, selected for service at Ticon-
deroga, 99; his force, 100; garrison
of, 102; evacuates Ticonderoga, 103;
watches Castleton, 104; sent by
Washington to stop Pennsylvania
mutineers, 177.
St. Leger, commences expedition from
Oswego, 96; advancing on Stanwix,
100; his papers captured, 107; de-
feated by Arnold, 108.
Saratoga, surrender of Burgoyne, 125;
controversy about terms at, 128^
Savannah, capture of, 191; defence of,
201; siege of, 202.
Schuyler, Fort, siege of, 108.
Schuyler, Philip, appointed major-gener-
al, 14; to command Northern army,
22; sick with fever, 23; Arnold's
letter to, delivered to Carleton, 24;
Washington calls on him for troops,
64; reports from, led Washington to
think Howe intended to move up
the Hudson, 82; his difference with
Gates, 97; reprimanded by Con-
gress, 98, 100; reinforcements for,
105; calls council of war, 108; re-
treats to Stillwater, 109.
Scott, Captain, third message to Bur-
goyne, 118.
Second war with Great Britain, 298.
Skenesborough, battle of, 104.
Smallwood, General, 90.
Smith, Colonel, death of, at Fort Mifflin,
94.
South Carolina, defence of, 193.
Spain, war with, 316; mistakes of Civil
War not repeated, 317; prompt or-
ganization, 318.
Spencer, Joseph, appointed brigadier-gen-
eral, 15; called in council, 17;
stationed just outside New York,
32; commands one of the five
original divisions, 34; after reorgan-
ization commands one of the three
divisions, 44; his division at about
147th St., 47; along the hills behind
the Bronx, 51.
Springfield, battle of, 164.
Standing army, hatred of, 286; opposi-
tion to, 291; ibid., 296.
INDEX
349
Stark, General John, at Bennington, re-
fuses to obey orders, 111; receives
thanks of Congress, 112.
Stephen, General, in command of divi-
sion, 76; his division fires into
Wagner's division, 91; court-mar-
tialled and dismissed, 92.
Steuben, Baron, appointed inspector-
general, 137; organization prepared
by, 175; second in command to
Greene in the Southern army, 220;
on the James, 261.
Stewart, with Wayne at Stony Point,
receives medal from Congress, 159.
Stewart, Colonel, of the Guards, killed
at Guilford, 241.
Stewart, Lieutenant-Colonel, reinforces
Rawdon, 252; commanded British
force at Eutaw Springs, 254.
Stirling, General Lord, stationed just
outside New York, 32; his heroic
attack, 38; capture of t 39; fought
splendidly at Long Island, 40; his
division reaches White Plains, 52;
gets one of the five original divisions;
76; driven back by Howe, 81; sent
to cross the Hudson at Peekskill, 82,
made the most stubborn resistance
at Brandy wine, 86; his division
formed the reserve at battle of Ger-
mantown, 90; gets one of the four
divisions at Valley Forge, 140; at
Mo ri mouth, 161.
Stono Ferry, battle of, 198.
Stony Point, capture of, 156; recapture,
157; evacuation, 159.
Sullivan, John, appointed brigadier-gen-
eral, 14; in council of war, 17; to
attack Boston Neck, 19; ordered
to supersede Thomas, 26; not equal
to an enterprise like expedition to
Quebec, 27; driven back at Quebec,
29; had brought back his regiments
from Ticonderoga, 34; sent to take
Greene's place, 35; captured, 38;
unjust to hold him responsible for
the battle of Long Island, 40; ar-
rives at White Plains, 52; guarding
fords of the Delaware, 66; 68, 70, 71,
76, 80, 82, 85, 86, 90, 91; at Provi-
dence, 150.
Sullivan's Island, battle at, 186.
Sumter, 244; captures Orangeburg, 249,
253.
Tarleton, with Clinton at Charles-
ton, 209; his cavalry at Camden,
218.
Taylor, Sergeant, hung as spy, 117.
Ternay, de, arrival with second French
fleet, 172; at Hartford, 174.
Thomas, John, appointed brigadier-gen-
eral, 14; called in council, 17; oc-
cupied Dorchester Heights, 18; re-
inforcement of 2,000 men ordered
for, 19; given command at Quebec
and dies of small-pox, 26; not equal
to the conquest of Quebec, 27.
Thompson, Colonel, at Sullivan's Island,
185.
Throg's Neck, 51.
Ticonderoga, captured by Ethan Allen,
6; topography of, 100; previous op-
erations at, 102; evacuation of, 103.
Tompkins, Daniel D., 145.
Trenton, battle of, 67.
Trumbull, Jonathan, 21, 138.
Tryon, Governor, raid into Connecticut.
80.
United States army, origin, 297; growth
of, 305; reorganization of, 311, 322;
general staff, 324.
Upton's " Military Policy," 313.
Valley Forge, 132.
Van Buren's opinions, 303.
Varnum's Rhode Island regiments at
Newport, 153.
Vaughan attacks Fort Clinton, 121.
Vergennes's opinion of Laurens's diplo-
macy, 178.
War, possibility of, 333; inadequate prep-
aration for, 335.
Ward, Artemas, appointed commander-
in-chief, 4; his regiments construct
field works, 5; sends Prescott rein-
forcements, 8; created major-gen-
eral, 14; in council of war, 17; left
in command in Boston when Wash-
ington went to New York, 20.
Warner's regiment at battle of Hubbard-
ton, 104; Warner, 113.
Warren, Joseph, President of Provincial
Congress, 8; death of, 10.
Washington, appointed command er-in-
chief, 13; arrives at Cambridge, 16,
reaches New York, 33; arrival at
battle of Long Island, 39; retreat
from Long Island, 43; disposition
of troops in New York, 44; tries to
rally retreating brigades at Kip's
Bay, 46; arrives on Harlem Heights,
47, 48; disappointed in Fort Wash-
ington, 51; White Plains, 52; re-
treats to North Castle, 53, 60; re-
treats to the Delaware, 62, 64; he
crosses the Delaware, 66; at Tren-
ton, 67; recrosses the Delaware, 70;
arrives at Morristown, 72; raising
new army, 75; moves to Middle-
brook, 80; marches south through
Philadelphia, 83; returns to Chad's
Ford, 84; fights battle at Brandy-
wine, 86.
Washington, General, at Germantown.
350
INDEX
90; -at Valley Forge, 133; writes
two letters to Congress, -134; brings
Continentals to Valley Forge, 137;
leaves Valley Forge, 142; mutiny
with Lee at Monmouth, 14-5; goes
to White Plains, 148; in camp at
Middiebrook, 155; retires to winter
quarters at Morristown, 162; Wash-
ington approves Andrews sentence,
169; threatens New York to draw
' Clinton from Newport, 173; goes to
Hartford, 174; sends Greene to com-
mand Southern army, 220; he
meets Rochambeau at Hartford,
267; starts for Yorktown, 270;
boldness of, 271 ; strategy compared
to Napoleon's, 272; joins Lafayette,
273; returns to New York,' 78.
Washington, George, his ability as a sol-
dier, 279; dictator, 290; his opin-
ions, 292.
Washington, Captain William, 68; with
Greene's army South, 226; came
up with his cavalry, 229; at Guil-
ford Court House, 238; wounded
aad captured at Eutaw Springs,
255.
Washington, Fort, to be completed, 45,
50; loss of, 57; results of loss, 60.
Watsort, Fort, capture of, 2451
Wayne, Anthony, 86; at Bra'ndywine,
87; at Ge'rmantown, 90; his division
fired into, 91; gets one of the four
, divisions formed at Valley Forge,
140; at Monmouth, 146; at Stony
Point, 157; mutiny of his division,
176; hangs three emissaries from
Clinton, 177; at York, Pa., 261;
joins Lafayette, 263.
Weedon, Colonel, with Sullivan, 86.
Wharton, Thomas, governor of Pennsyl-
vania, 138.
White Plains, battle of, 52.
Willett, Lieutenant-Colonel, at Fort
Stanwix, 106; ordered to make a
sortie at Oriskany, 107; sent to
ask aid from Schuyler, 108.
Wooster, David, appointed brigadier-
general, 15; arrival at Quebec, 26,
27; mortally wounded, 80.
Yellow-fever, conquest of, 338.
Yorktown, siege of, 274; surrender of.
275.