The right method of interpreting Scripture, in what relates to the nature of the Deity, and His dealings with mankind, illustrated in a Discourse on Predestination

':

DISCOURSE

ON

PREDESTINATION,

fyc.

«

r

THE RIGHT METHOD OF INTERPRETING SCRIPTURE, IN

WHAT RELATES TO THE NATURE OF THE DEITY,

AND HIS DEALINGS WITH MANKIND,

ILLUSTRATED,

DISCOURSE

ON

PREDESTINATION,

BY DR. KING,

Hate ILoctr grtfibisfiop 0f Bublm,

PREACHED AT CHRIST CHURCH, DUBLIN, BEFORE THE
HOUSE OF LORDS, MAY IS, 1709,

WITH NOTES

BY THE

REV. RICHARD WHATELY, M. A.

FELLOW OF ORIEL COLLEGE, OXFORD.

Nescire velle quae magister optimus
Docere non vult, erudita inscitia est.

Jos. Scalioer.

s

LONDON,

JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE-STREET.

1821. A

\

'■ 6 I

TRINTKD BY W, BAXTER, 0XF011J).

ERRATA.

Page line

14. 5. from the bottom, for abstracting read abstract

16. 11. from the bottom, for were read was

*7. 3. from the bottom, for discepit read discessit and after sustineo
in the same line strike out the full stop and read summa with
a small s

S9. 6. from the bottom, for §. 7. read §. 12.

31. 2. from the bottom, after capable dele of

54. 12. from the bottom, for oblige read obliges

77. 12. from the bottom, for delecta bonaram read delectu bonorum

89". 9. from the bottom, for neither read either

109. 13. /or proportion read proposition
114. 9. from the bottom, for that read than

117. 10. from the bottom,/or augmentation read argumentation
125. 6. from the bottom, for when read whether

4

PREFACE.

J. HE immediate occasion of editing the
following discourse, is the high com-
mendation very justly bestowed on it by
Dr. Copleston, in the notes to his " En-
quiry concerning Predestination."

The design however had long been
entertained of re-introducing to public
notice in some form or other a work of
such high value, which once enjoyed
such well-merited celebrity, but which
has for many years been undeservedly
forgotten. Considering indeed not only
that the author was a person of no mean
repute in his day, but that this very dis-
course attracted so much attention as to

b

11

pass through at least- six editions ; and
considering also that its subject is by no
means one of temporary interest, and
that it possesses the rare merit of being
calculated for almost all descriptions of
readers ; one is disposed to wonder at its
having so far sunk into oblivion, that a
large majority probably of theological
students have never even heard of it.
Yet it is calculated to afford useful hints
even to the most learned divine — to
furnish the younger student with prin-
ciples which will form the best basis on
which to build his whole system of the-
ology— and to supply even the unlearned
reader with most valuable instruction,
suited to a moderate capacity, on the
most important points. It is ill-calcu-
lated however to gratify those who are
puffed up with the pride of human learn-
ing and ingenuity, and who delight to
display their talents in controversy : for
it tends in a most eminent degree to

Ill

lower a presumptuous, and to soften a
polemical, spirit : and the pride and
bitterness of the arrogant controversialist
are too deeply fixed in the heart to let
him afford a patient and candid hearing
to a professed peace-maker. And this
probably may account in great measure
both for the obloquy to which the author
was exposed at the time, and for this
work being afterwards nearly forgotten.
For some account of the unprovoked at-
tacks made upon it, and for a most
luminous and concise sketch of the
argument, the reader is referred to the
first note on Dr. Copleston's third Dis-
course.

The main objection which has been
brought against Dr. King's view of the
subject is, that if the moral and intellec-
tual attributes ascribed to God in the
Scriptures are not to be understood as
the same in Him that they are in us,
but merely as analogical representations,
b2

the precepts which direct us to imitate
the divine perfections will be nullified ;
for how, it is urged, can we copy them,
if we know not what they are ? It may
be worth while to give a brief summary
of what may be said in reply to this
objection ; referring the reader who is
desirous of a full and satisfactory dis-
cussion of the subject, to Dr. Cople-
ston's note above mentioned.

I. Since attributes, such as those in
question, " have no form or existence of
their own, as the whole essence of them
consists in their relation to something
else";" it is impossible there can, in any
case, be any resemblance between them,
except the resemblance of ratios or rela-
tions; and this resemblance is analogy:
when, for instance, we call God just or
merciful, we can mean nothing more
than his being and acting in relation to

* Copleston's note to Dis. III. p. 128.

v

certain objects, in the same manner as a
just and merciful man would. So that
when we say that the divine attributes
are analogous to ours, we are asserting
the only kind of resemblance which can
exist in such attributes : for when we
attribute, for instance, courage or tem-
perance to two men, we are in fact only
asserting an analogy; since those quali-
ties are perceived only in their effects,
and have only a relative existence. Dr.
King does indeed contend, that, in the
case of the divine attributes, this analogy
is, in degree, incomparably less close and
complete: but this, no one surely will
venture to deny. And it should be re-
membered, that " he asserts in the strong-
est terms his belief in the superior ex-
cellence of the divine nature, and calls
any qualities that are estimable in
man, dim shadows and faint communi-
cations only of those attributes which

VI

exist in God in complete and adorable
perfection1"."

II. The utmost dissimilarity in the
causes is no impediment to the most exact
correspondence in the effects; nor, con-
sequently, is our ignorance of the attri-
butes of the Deity, as they are in Him,
any obstacle to our imitating the results
of them. When Solomon says, " Go to
the ant, thou sluggard, consider her ways,
and be wise," he cannot be supposed
to imply that the ant possesses the very
intellectual qualities which we call, in
men, prudence, forethought, and dili-
gence ; yet it is not for this reason at all
the less fit to be proposed to men as a
model ; for they may be led, from per-
ceiving the beneficial results of that la-
bour to which she is led by instinct, to
practise the like from reason. So also,
of the numerous and studiously varied

b Copleston's note to Dis. III. p. 132.

VII

parables delivered by our Lord, there
is no one in which the analogy will hold
quite closely throughout, and yet no
one in which it is not amply sufficient
for every practical purpose. Nor was
He at all studious in every case to make
the analogy as complete in all its circum-
stances as it might have been. For in-
stance, in the parable of the unjust stew-
ard, a man acting from the basest mo-
tives, is proposed as a model for the
imitation of Christians ; who are taught
to imitate him in the single circumstance
of making a careful provision for the
future ; though the principles from which
their conduct springs ought to be the
very reverse of his. The same may be
observed in numberless other parables
and precepts ; it is to the practical result
that the attention is intended to be di-
rected. For instance, this is the case
even in the precept, to " love thy neigh-
bour as thyself;" for it is only figura-

Vlll

tively that a man is said to love himself0;
the regard which he has for his own hap-
piness being, not in degree merely, but
in kind, very different from any bene-
volent affections towards another ; but
the force of the precept is, that as we
diligently seek to promote our own wel-
fare, without having any further object
in view, so we ought also diligently to
promote the welfare of others, looking
to nothing beyond. And this is prac-
tically sufficient.

In like manner, when we are told to
" be merciful as onr Father which is in
heaven is merciful," the obvious mean-
ing of the precept is, that we should
study to do good to mankind ; and that
we should shew kindness " to the un-
thankful and to the evil," even as we see
that they are partakers of the divine
favours ; though the circumstance which

c Vide Stewart's Outlines, §. 5.

IX

most increases our admiration for such
conduct in a man, cannot be supposed to
exist in the Deity i for what we most
admire in a man is his submitting to
pain and mortification, and suppressing
those irritable feelings which ingratitude
naturally excites in the human breast.

With respect to the general tendency
and practical use of this discourse it
should be observed, that though Dr.
King's primary object is to treat of Pre-
destination and the doctrines connected
with it, we should greatly underrate the
importance of his reasonings, if we sup-
posed them to apply to that point alone :
the principles he lays down are at least
equally applicable to every other mys-
terious doctrine revealed in Scripture.
So that if we admit Dr. King's notions
to be correct, they must be the proper
basis of all sound theology ; and the
discourse might justly have borne the title

c

o\ ■ Ri i m for interpreting rights

THE ScRIPTrRE-ACCOlNTS OF GoD. AND
OF HIS DEALINGS WITH MANKIND. InfaCt,

the difficulties respecting prescience and
the necessity which it implies, are pre-
cisely those which least admit of, and
least need, that mode of explanation
which Dr. King has adopted : as I have
endeavoured to shew in the Appendix,
and as may be more fully seen in
Tucker's most ingenious and accurate,
though prolix and tedious, discussion of
the subject, in the twenty-sixth chapter
of his " Light of Nature:" to which I
am indebted for nearly the whole sub-
stance of the reasonings I have em-
ployed.

It may perhaps be matter of surprise
to some readers, that Dr. King's argu-
ment should be spoken of in terms of
such high commendation, at the same
time that he is charged with a want of
precision in the use of the words " con-

XI

tingent" and " necessary," in treating
of that very point which is the primary
object of his discourse. But, in fact, the
objection to his argument, thus aris-
ing, is greater in appearance than in
reality : the difficulty he is encountering
may seem indeed to vanish when the
precise language of Tucker is applied to
the subject ; but it will be found, in re-
ality, to have only shifted its place and
altered its form : there will still be the
same difficulty in reconciling the respon-
sibility of the creature with the omnipo-
tence of the Creator, which there seemed
to be in reconciling his prescience with
our freedom : and there will therefore be
no less necessity for Dr. King's humble,
forbearing, and practical system of inter-
pretation, than there would have been,
had his view of the difficulty been in all
respects unexceptionable. In Appendix,
No. I. however, the reader will find an
attempt to arrive at a more precise sys-
c2

Xll

tern of phraseology than Dr. King's, on
this part of the subject.

The utility, however, of his mode of
reasoning is (as has been already ob-
served) not confined to this single
point : he himself, by way of illustration,
points out its application to several other
cases : and a reader of candour and judg-
ment may easily learn to apply, for
himself, in a great variety of instances,
the principle which Dr. King lays down.
And in proportion as this plan is adopted,
it may be confidently hoped, that con-
troversial bitterness, and arrogant dog-
matism, will be lessened, and the prac-
tical utility of the doctrines of Scripture
increased.

The obligations I am under to Tucker's
Light of Nature have been already
mentioned. How far I am indebted to
Dr. Copleston, those who have perused
his " Enquiry" will, in part, perceive :
I say, in part, because having long en-

Xlll

joyed the advantage of familiar inter-
course with him, I have derived from
his conversation more instruction than
from his writings ; and more indeed than
it is possible accurately to estimate.
When any two persons have been very
long accustomed to discuss subjects toge-
ther, it is difficult, if not impossible, for
one of them to state precisely which are
his own original ideas, and which are,
wholly, or partly, derived from the other :
and if he is indebted to that other for
almost the whole of his intellectual train-
ing, and has derived from him the very
principles on which his reasonings are
conducted, he will scarcely be authorized,
so far as his views coincide with those
of his instructor, to claim any thought
as entirely his own, but must make a ge-
neral acknowledgment of having drawn
from him, either directly or indirectly,
nearly the whole of his intellectual

stOlCS.

XIV

I beg leave, however, distinctly to state,
that Dr. Copleston is not responsible for
any thing contained in the present pub-
lication; having neither suggested, nor
even perused, any part of it, but having
merely given a general approbation to
the design of reprinting Dr. King's dis-
course.

DISCOURSE

ON

PREDESTINATION,

Sfc.

Romans via. 29, 30.

For whom he did foreknow, he also did predestinate to
be conformed to the image of his Son, that he might
be the first-born among many brethren. Moreover,
whom he did predestinate, them he also called ,■ and
whom he called, them he also justified ,- and whom lie
justified, them he also glorified.

§. 1 . IN these words the Apostle lays down
the several steps by which God proceeds in the
saving of his elect. First, He knows and con-
siders those, whom he designs for salvation.
Secondly, He decrees and predestinates them to
be like his Son Jesus Christ, in holiness here,
and glory hereafter, that he might be the first-
born among many brethren. Thirdly, He calls
them to the means of salvation. Fourthly, He
justifies : and, lastly, He glorifies them. This
is the chain and series of God's dealing with his
beloved ; in which he is represented to us as
first designing, and then executing, his gracious
purposes towards them.

I am very sensible, that great contentions and
divisions have happened in the church of God

about predestination and reprobation, about
election and the decrees of God ; that learned
men have engaged with the greatest zeal and
fierceness in this controversy, and the disputes
have proved so intricate, that the most diligent
reader will perhaps, after all his labour in perus-
ing them, be but little satisfied and less edified
by the greatest part of all that has been written
upon this subject. And hence it is that con-
sidering men of all parties seem at last, as it
were by consent, to have laid it aside ; and sel-
dom any now venture to bring it into the
pulpit, except some very young or imprudent
preachers.

Not but that the doctrine laid down in my text
is undoubtedly true and useful, if we could but
light on the true and useful way of treating it ;
for so our Church has told us in her Seventeenth
Article, where she informs us, "That as the godly
consideration of Predestination is full of sweet,
pleasant, and unspeakable comfort to godly
persons, so for curious and carnal persons, lack-
ing the Spirit of Christ, to have continually
before their eyes the sentence of God's Pre-
destination, is a most dangerous downfal, where-

by the devil doth thrust them either into despe-
ration, or into wretchedness" of most unclean
living."

The case therefore being thus, I shall endea-
vour to lay before you that which I take to be
the edifying part of the doctrine of Predestina-
tion ; and in such a manner (I hope) as to avoid
every thing that may give occasion to ignorant
or corrupt men to make an ill use of it.

$. 2. In order to this I shall,

First, Consider the representation that the
text gives of God, as contriving our salvation ;
and shall endeavour to explain how these terms
of foreknowing and predestinating are to be
understood when attributed to God.

Secondly, Why the holy Scriptures represent
God to us after this manner.

Thirdly, What use we are to make of this
doctrine of God's foreseeing, freely electing, and
predestinating men to salvation.

As to the first of these, you may observe, that
in the representation here given of God's deal-
ing, there are five acts ascribed to him ; fore-

* See Dr. Copleston's Appendix on the Seventeenth
Art. note in p. ?02.

b2

knowing, predestinating, calling, justifying, and
glorifying. And about each of these, great
disputes have arisen among divines, and parties
and sects have been formed on the different
opinions concerning them. However as to the
three last, Protestants seem now pretty well
agreed ; but as to the two first, the difference
is so great, that on account thereof, there yet
remain formed and separate parties, that mu-
tually refuse to communicate with one another :
though I believe, if the differences between
them were duly examined and stated, they
would not appear to be so great as they seem to
be at first view ; nor consequently would there
appear any just reason for those animosities, that
yet remain between the contending parties.

§. 3. In order to make this evident, we may
consider,

1 . That it is in effect agreed on all hands,
that the nature of God, as it is in itself, is in-
comprehensible b by human understanding : and

" Edwards, the opponent of Dr. King, seems to dwell
much (as indeed many other writers do) on the distinction
between the nature of God and his attributes ; a9 if we
could comprehend the latter, though not the former : a

not only his nature, but likewise his powers and
faculties, and the wavs and methods in which he

notion which is fostered by the prevailing custom of
speaking of the " being" and the "attributes" of a Deity,
as two distinct points, to be proved separately; whereas
this is in fact setting up a distinction, where there is not,
as far as our notions and knowledge are concerned, any
substantial difference; by which means confusion is
introduced into our reasonings. For what, in fact, do we
know of any thing, except its attributes? We know just
as much, and as little of it, as we know of its attributes.
Ask any one what his idea of God is, and he will reply
by calling him " the author of the universe," (that is,
attributing to him the creation,) and assigning to him such
and such other attributes: and if any one could clearly
and fully comprehend those attributes, as they are in the
Deity, he would, so far at least, clearly and fully compre-
hend the nature of the Deity.

It is worth observing, however, that imperfectly and
indistinctly as we understand these attributes, the proof of
the existence of a Being possessed of them is most clear
and full ; being in fact the very same evidence on which
we believe in the existence of one another. How do we
know that men exist > (that is, not merely beings having
a certain visible bodily form ; for that is not what we
chiefly imply by the word " man ;" but rational agents,
such as we call men ;) surely not by the immediate evi-
dence of our senses, (si nee mind is not an object of sight,)
but by observing the things performed — the manifest
result of rational contrivance. If we land in a strange

6

exercises them, are so far beyond our reach,
that we are utterly incapable of framing exact
and adequate notions of them. Thus the Scrip-
tures frequently teach us, particularly St. Paul
in his Epistle to the Romans, chap. xi. 33.
" O the depth of the riches both of the wisdom
and knowledge of God ! How unsearchable are
his judgments, and his ways past finding out!"
Ver. 34. " For who hath known the mind of
the Lord, or who hath been his counsellor ?"

§. 4. (2.) We ought to remember, that the
descriptions which we frame to ourselves of
God, or of the divine attributes, are not taken
from any direct or immediate perceptions that

country, doubting whether it be inhabited, as soon as we
find, for instance, a boat, or a house, we are as perfectly
certain that a man has been there, as if he had appeared
before our eyes. Now we are surrounded with similar
proofs that there is a God.

With respect to the kind of knowledge we have of God,
we shall best judge of it by attending to the case of chil-
dren, whose example is in Scripture so strongly put be-
fore us. All the knowledge of children respecting their
parents, and the other objects around them, is relative :
they know not what any thing is in itself, but only the
relation in which it stands to them ; and even that very
imperfectly.

we have of him or them ; but from some obser-
vations we have made of his works, and from the
consideration of those qualifications, that we
conceive would enable us to perform the like.
Thus observing great order, conveniency, and
harmony in all the several parts of the world,
and perceiving that every thing is adapted, and
tends to the preservation and advantage of the
whole ; we are apt to consider, that we could
not contrive and settle things in so excellent and
proper a manner without great wisdom ; and
thence conclude that God, who has thus con-
certed and settled matters, must have wisdom :
and having then ascribed to him wisdom, be-
cause we see the effects and result of it in his
works, we proceed and conclude that he has
likewise foresight and understanding, because we
cannot conceive wisdom without these, and be-
cause if we were to do what we see he has done,
we could not expect to perform it without the
exercise of these faculties.

And it doth truly follow from hence, that God
must either have these or other faculties and
powers equivalent to them, and adequate to these
mighty effects which proceed from them. And

8

because we do not know what his faculties are
in themselves, we give them the names of those
powers, that we find would be necessary to us in
order to produce such effects, and call them
wisdom, understanding, and foreknowledge : but
at the same time we cannot but be sensible that
they are of a nature altogether different from
ours, and that we have no direct or proper notion
or conception of them. Only we are sure that
they have effects like unto those that do pro-
ceed from wisdom, understanding, and fore-
knowledge in us : and when our works fail to
resemble them in any particular, as to perfec-
tion, it is by reason of some want or defect in
these qualifications.

Thus our reason teaches us to ascribe these
attributes to God, by way of resemblance and
analogy c to such qualities or powers as we find
most valuable and perfect in ourselves.

c The words " resemblance" and " analogy" are not
used by Dr. King with a sufficiently precise distinction
of their respective senses. On this point, which is one of
great importance in the present question, the reader is
referred to Dr. Copleston's first note on Discourse iii.
p. 122. where will be found the most clear and satisfactory

§. 5. (3.) If we look into the holy Scriptures,
and consider the representations given us there
of God or his attributes, we shall find them
generally of the same nature, and plainly bor-
rowed from some resemblance to things with
which we are acquainted by our senses. Thus
when the holy Scriptures speak of God, they
ascribe hands, and eyes, and feet to him : not
that it is designed that we should believe that he
has any of these members according to the
literal signification : but the meaning is, that he
has a power to execute all those acts, to the
effecting of which these parts in us are instru-
mental : that is, he can converse with men as
well as if he had a tongue and mouth ; he can
discern all that we do or say as perfectly as if he
had eyes and ears ; he can reach us as well as
if he had hands and feet ; he has as true and
substantial a being as if he had a body ; and he
is as truly present every where as if that body
were infinitely extended. And in truth, if all

statement of the proper use, and of the abuse, of those
terms, that has ever appeared. The same note contains
also an analysis and a most masterly defence of the pre-
sent discourse.

10

these things, which are thus ascribed to him, did
really and literally belong to him, he could not
do what he does near so effectually, as we con-
ceive and are sure he doth them by the faculties
and properties which he really possesses, though
what they are in themselves be unknown to us.

After the same manner and for the same rea-
son we find him represented as affected with such
passions as we perceive to be in ourselves, viz.
as angry and pleased, as loving and hating, as re-
penting and changing his resolutions, as full of
mercy and provoked to revenge : and yet on
reflection we cannot think that any of these pas-
sions can literally affect the divine nature. But
the meaning confessedly is, that he will as cer-
tainly punish the wicked as if he were inflamed
with the passion of anger against them ; that
he will as infallibly reward the good as we will
those for whom we have a particular and affec-
tionate love ; that when men turn from their
wickedness, and do what is agreeable to the
divine command, he will as surely change his
dispensations towards them, as if he really re-
pented and had changed his mind.

And as the nature and passions of men are

11

thus by analogy and comparison ascribed to
God, because these would in us be the prin-
ciples of such outward actions, as we see he has
performed, if we were the authors of them : so
in the same manner, and by the same conde-
scension to the weakness of our capacities, we
find the powers and operations of our mind
ascribed unto him.

As for example, it is the part of a wise man
to consider beforehand what is proper for him
to do, to prescribe means and methods to obtain
his ends, to lay down some scheme or plan of
his work before he begins, and to keep resolutely
to it in the execution ; for if he should be con-
ceived to deviate in any thing from his first
purpose, it would argue some imperfection in
laying the design, or want of power to execute
it. And therefore it is after this manner the
Scripture represents God, as purposing and con-
triving beforehand all his works ; and for this
reason, wisdom, and understanding, and coun-
sel, and foreknowledge, are ascribed to him : be-
cause both reason and Scripture assure us, that
we ought to conceive of God as having all the
perfection that we perceive to be in these attri-

c 2

12

butes, and that he has all the advantages that
these powers or faculties could give him.

The advantages that understanding and know-
ledge give a man in the use of them, are to en-
able him to order his matters with conveniency
to himself, and consistency in his works ; so
that they may not hinder or embarrass one an-
other. And inasmuch as all the works of God
are so ordered that they have the greatest con-
gruity in themselves, and are most excellently
adapted to their several uses and ends; we are
sure there is a power in God who orders them,
equivalent to knowledge and understanding ;
and because we know not what it is in itself,
we give it these names.

§. 6. Lastly, the use of foreknowledge with
us is to prevent any surprise when events happen,
and that we may not be at a loss what to do by
things coming upon us unawares. Now inas-
much as we are certain that nothing can sur-
prise God, and that he can never be at a loss
what to do in any event; therefore we conclude
that God has a faculty to which our foreknow-
ledge bears some analogy, and therefore we call
it by that name.

13

But it does not follow from hence that any of
these are more properly and literally in God,
after the manner that they are in us, than hands
or eyes, than mercy, love, or hatred are ; but, on
the contrary, we must acknowledge, that those
things which we call by these names, when at-
tributed to God, are of so very different a nature
from what they are in us, and so superior to all
that we can conceive, that in reality there is no
more likeness between them than between our
hand and God's power : nor can we draw con-
sequences from the real nature of one to that of
the other with more justness of reason, than
we can conclude, because our hand consists of
fingers and joints, that the power of God is dis-
tinguished by such parts.

And therefore to argue because foreknowledge
as it is in us, if supposed infallible, cannot con-
sist with the contingency"1 of events ; that there-

d Dr. King appears not to have taken a sufficiently pre-
cise view of the sense of the word contingency : if we un-
derstand by it (as he seems sometimes to have done) the
dependence of any event on the will and free choice of any
one, then this is not inconsistent even with our foreknow-
ledge : for a man would not be at all liable to mistake ;
for instance, in foretelling that mankind will never forsake

14

fore what we call so in God, cannot, is as far
from reason as it would be to conclude, because

their habitations and betake themselves to the life of brute-
beasts ; though it certainly depends on their will, to do
so or not. But in its ordinary sense, the word " contin-
gent" denotes no quality in events, but only the relation in
which they stand to our knowledge ,• thus, the same thing may
be contingent to one person, and at the same time not con-
tingent (or certain as it is called) to another: for instance,
whether such an one was killed or not in the last battle
that was fought in India, may be a contingency to his
friends in England, but is a certainty to those on the spot.
The admirable reasoning therefore of Dr. King does not
apply in this case : not because contingency implies, with
vs, ignorance of the event, (for that alone would not be n
sufficient ground of exception,) but because it implies no-
thing else : that is the whole meaning of the word : so that
it is a contradiction in terms to speak of the same thing
as known, and as contingent, at the same time, to the same
being; though that may be contingent to us, which is
known to God.

" One example has already been produced in the word
certainty, which properly relates to the mind which thinks,
and is improperly transferred to the object about which
it is thinking. However convenient this transference
of the term may be in common life, it leads to the most
erroneous conclusions in abstracting reasoning : and the
further adoption of a term as opposed to it, for the pur-
pose of denoting another class of events, viz. contingent,
has contributed to fix the error. The same may be said
of the term probable, which is frequently used as if it de-

15

our eyes cannot see in the dark, that therefore,
when God is said to see all things, his eyes
must be enlightened with a perpetual sunshine ;
or because we cannot love or hate without pas-
sion, that therefore when the Scriptures ascribe
these to God, they teach us that he is liable to
these affections as we are.

We ought therefore to interpret all these
things when attributed to God, as thus ex-
pressed only by way of condescension to our ca-
pacities, in order to help us to conceive what
we are to expect from him, and what duty we
are to pay him ; and particularly, that the terms
of foreknowledge, predestination, nay, of under-
standing and will, when ascribed to him, are not
to be taken strictly or properly, nor are we to
think that they are in him after the same man-
noted some quality in the events themselves, whereas it is
merely relative, like certain and contingent, to the human
mind, and is expressive of the manner in which we stand
affected by such and such objects." Copleslon, p. 80,
81.

The reader is referred for a fuller discussion of this sub-
ject to the Appendix, No. I. at the end of this discourse,
on the word " necessary," and those connected with it :
and also to Tucker's " Light of Nature," c. 26.

16

ner, or in the same sense, that we find them in
ourselves ; but, on the contrary, we are to in-
terpret them only by way of analogy or com-
parison.

That is to say, when we ascribe foreknowledge
to him, we mean that he can no more be sur-
prised with any thing that happens, than a wise
man, that foresees an event, can be surprised
when it comes to pass : nor can he any more
be at a loss what he is to do in such a case,
than a wise man can, who is most perfectly ac-
quainted with all accidents which may obstruct
his design, and has provided against them.

§. 7. So when God is said to predetermine' and

e This doctrine is perhaps the more insisted on by the
sacred writers, from the circumstance that the heathen,
from whom so large a portion of their converts were drawn,
seem not to have attributed omniscience to their deities ;
or, at least, to have been doubtful about it.

Thefrequentuseof "shall," by ourBibletranslators,where,
according to the present idiom of our language, " will"
would have been the right rendering, is another circum-
stance (as is remarked by Dr. Copleston, p. 101, note)
which favours, to the English reader, the Calvini9tic
views. If I am going too far in saying, that the word
"will" is never used in that translation to denote simple
futurity, but always volition, at least it may safely be as-

17

foreordain all things according to the counsel of
his will, the importance of this expression is,
that all things depend as much on God, as if he
had settled them according to a certain scheme
and design, which he had voluntarily framed in
his own mind, without regard had to any other
consideration besides that of his own mere will
and pleasure.

If then we understand predetermination and
predestination in this analogous sense, to give
us a notion of the irresistible power of God, and

serted that such is the rule generally observed. Innume-
rable instances might be produced of the use of shall as a
sign of the future tense merely: as, for instance, Obadiah
says to Elijah, (1 Kings xviii. 14.) " Thou sayest, Go, tell
thy lord, Behold, Elijah is here ; and he shall slay me." So
also our Lord says, " The brother shall deliver up the
brother to death." Shakespeare indeed frequently uses
these words according to the present idiom ; but frequently
according to the other also; for instance, (Cymbeline,
Act i. Scene 6.) " Your highness shall from this practice
but make hard your heart :" and again in Troilus and
Cressida, Act iv. Scene 4. " O you shall lie exposed, my
lord, to dangers."

The probability is, that our language was at that period
in a state of transition as to the use of '* will" and " shall ,''
and that the rule which our Bible-translators have, chiefly
at least, adhered to, was that of the older use.

18

of that supreme dominion he may exercise over
his creatures, it will help us to understand what
the sovereignty is that God has over us, the
submission that we ought to pay him, and the
dependence we have upon him.

But it no ways follows from hence that this
- is inconsistent with the contingency of events,
or free will. And from hence it appears what
it is that makes us apt to think so : which is
only this, that we find in ourselves when we de-
termine to do a thing, and are able to do what
we have resolved on, that thing cannot be con-
tingent to us : and if God's foreknowledge and
predetermination were of the same nature with
ours, the same inconsistency would be justly
inferred. But I have already shewed that they
are not of the same kind, and that they are only
ascribed to him by way of analogy and com-
parison, as love and mercy, and other passions
are ; that they are quite of another nature, and
that we have no proper notion of them, any more
than a man born blind has of sight and colours ;
and therefore that we ought no more to pretend
to determine what is consistent or not consistent
with them, than a blind man ought to deter-

19

mine, from what he hears or feels, to what ob-
jects the sense of seeing reaches : for this were
to reason from things that are only comparatively
and improperly ascribed to God, and by way of
analogy and accommodation to our capacities, as
if they were properly and univocally the same in
him and in us.

If we would speak the truth, those powers,
properties, and operations, the names of which
we transfer to God, are but faint shadows and
resemblances, or rather indeed emblems and
parabolical figures of the divine attributes, which
they are designed to signify ; whereas his attri-
butes are the originals, the true real things of a
nature so infinitely superior and different from
any thing we discern in his creatures, or that
can be conceived by finite understandings, that
we cannot with reason pretend to make any
other deductions from the natures of one to that
of the others, than those he has allowed us to
make ; or extend the parallel any further than
that very instance, which the resemblance was
designed to teach us.

Thus foreknowledge and predestination, when
attributed to God, are designed to teach us the
d2

20

obligations which we owe to him for our salva-
tion, and the dependence we have on his favour;
and so far we may use and press them : but to
conclude from thence that these are inconsistent
with free will, is to suppose that they are the
same in him and us ; and just as reasonable as
to infer, because wisdom is compared in Scrip-
ture to a tree of life, that therefore it grows in
the earth, has its spring and fall, and is warmed
by the sun and fed by the rain.

§. 8. And this brings me to the second head
which I proposed to myself in this discourse,
which was to shew you, why God and heavenly
things are after this manner represented to us
in holy Scripture. And the first reason that I
shall offer is, that we must either be content to
know them this way, or not at all. I have
already told you, and I believe every considering
man is convinced, that the nature and perfec-
tions of God, as he is in himself, are such that
it is impossible we should comprehend them,
especially in the present state of imperfection,
ignorance, and corruption, in which this world
lies. He is the object of none of our senses, by
which we receive all our direct and immediate

21

perception of things : and therefore if we know
any thing of him at all, it must be by deductions
of reason, by analogy and comparison, by re-
sembling him to something that we do know
and are acquainted with.

It is by this way we arrive at the most noble
and useful notions we have, and by this method
we teach and instruct others. Thus when we
would help a man to some conception of any
thing that has not fallen within the reach of his
senses, we do it by comparing it to something
that already has, by offering him some similitude,
resemblance, or analogy, to help his conception.
As, for example, to give a man a notion of a coun-
try to which he is a stranger, and to make him
apprehend its bounds and situation, we produce
a map to him, and by that he obtains as much
knowledge of it, as serves him for his present
purpose. Now a map is only paper and ink,
diversified with several strokes and lines, which
in themselves have very little likeness to earth,
mountains, valleys, lakes, and rivers. Yet none
can deny but by proportion and analogy they
are very instructive ; and if any should imagine
that these countries are really paper, because the

22

maps that represent them are made of it, and
should seriously draw conclusions from that sup-
position, he would expose his understanding,
and make himself ridiculous : and yet such as
argue from the faint resemblances that either
Scripture or reason give of the divine attributes
and operations, and proceed in their reasonings,
as if these must in all respects answer one an-
other, fall into the same absurdities that those
would be guilty of, who should think countries
must be of paper, because the maps that repre-
sent them are so.

To apply this more particularly to the case
before us. We ascribe decrees and predestination
to God, because the things signified by these
words bear some resemblance to certain per-
fections that we believe to be in him. But if
we remember that they are only similitudes and
representations of them, and that there is as lit-
tle likeness between the one and the other, as
between the countries and maps which repre-
sent them : and that the likeness lies not in
the nature of them, but in some particular effect
or circumstance that is in some measure com-
mon to both : we must acknowledge it very un-

23

reasonable to expect that they should answer
one another in all things : or because the dif-
ferent representations of the same thing cannot
be exactly adjusted in every particular, that
therefore the thing represented is inconsistent
in itself.

Foreknowledge and decrees are only assigned
to God to give us a notion of the steadiness and
certainty of the divine actions ; and if so, for us
to conclude that what is represented by them is
inconsistent with the contingency of events or
free-will, because the things representing (I
mean, our foreknowledge and decrees) are so, is
the same absurdity, as it is to conclude, that
China is no bigger than a sheet of paper, be-
cause the map that represents it is contained in
that compass.

§. 9. This seems to me a material point, and
therefore I will endeavour to illustrate with an
instance or two more. Every body is satisfied
that time, motion, and velocity, are subjects of
very useful knowledge ; and that adjusting and
discovering the proportions that these bear to
one another, is perhaps all that is profitable in
natural philosophy. How is it then, that we

24

proceed in our demonstrations concerning these ?
It is not by representing time by a line, the
degrees of velocity by another, and the motion
that results from both by a superficies or a
solid ? and from these we draw conclusions,
which are not only very true, but also of great
moment to arts and sciences ; and never fail in
our deductions, while we keep justly to the
analogy and proportion they bear to one another
in the production of natural effects ; neither is
it easy, nor perhaps possible, to come at such
knowledge any other way. »

Yet in the nature of the thing, there is no
great similitude between a line and time ; and it
will not be very obvious to a person, who is not
acquainted with the method of the skilful in such
matters, to conceive how a solid should answer
the compounded effect of time and motion.
But if any, instead of endeavouring to under-
stand the method and proportions used by the
learned in such cases, in order to discover to
them these useful truths, should reject the
whole as a thing impossible ; alleging that we
make time a permanent thing and existing al-
together, because p line which represents it in

25

this scheme is so, we should think that he
hardly deserved an answer to such a foolish ob-
jection.

And yet of this nature are most, if not all, the
objections that are commonly made against the
representations that the Scripture gives us of
the divine nature, and of the mysteries of our
religion.

§. 10. Thus the holy Scriptures represent to us
that distinction which we are obliged to believe
to be in the unity of God, by that of three per-
sons, and the relation they bear to one another,
by that of a father to his son, and of a man to
his spirit ; and those that object against this, and
infer that these must be three substances, be-
cause three persons among men are so, do
plainly forget that these are but representations
and resemblances ; and fall into the same absurd
way of reasoning that the former do, who con-
clude, that we make time a permanent thing,
because a line is so, by which we represent it.

§.11. Again, if we were to describe to an ig-
norant American what was meant by writing,
and told him that it is a way of making words
visible and permanent, so that persons at any

E

26

distance of time and place may be able to see
and understand them ; the description would
seem very strange to him, and he might object
that the thing must be impossible, for words are
not to be seen but heard : they pass in the
speaking, and it is impossible they should affect
the absent, much less those that live in
distant ages. To which there needs no other
answer than to inform him, that there are other
sorts of words beside those he knows, that are
truly called so, because equivalent to such as
are spoken ; that they have both the same use,
and serve equally to communicate our thoughts
to one another ; and that if he will but have
patience, and apply himself to learn, he will
soon understand, and be convinced of the pos-
sibility and usefulness of the thing : and none
can doubt but he were much to blame, and acted
an unwise part, if he refused to believe the
person that offered to instruct him, or neglected
to make the experiment.

And sure when any one objects against the
possibility of the Three Persons of the Trinity in
one God, it is every whit as good an answer' to

' The word Person, in the sense here alluded to, being,

27

tell such an objector that there are other sort of
persons besides those we see among men, whose

as every one knows, not a Scriptural term, but introduced
for the purpose of guarding against heresies, by a precise
statement of Scriptural doctrine; it would be perhaps, in
this case, a more satisfactory answer, to say, that the
Greek term " Hypostasis," and the Latin " Persona,"
were resorted to as the best that could be found to ex-
press the belief of the Church in the Divinity of the Fa-
ther, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, in such a manner as
to keep clear of the supposition of her teaching that there
are three Gods, or three parts of the one God, or three
properties merely, or agencies of God ; it being her mean-
ing, that though the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are one
God, yet there are certain attributes of each of these three
respectively, which would not apply to anyof the others: for
instance, though each and all of these three may be properly
called " God," yet when we call the Son our " Redeemer"
and "Mediator," these are attributes which do not belong
to the Father or the Holy Spirit, as such; and in like
manner, when we call the Holy Spirit our " Sanctifier,"
that is an attribute which does not belong to the Father
or the Son, as such.

The word Persona, which was employed to express this
distinction, had come (from its original signification of a
mask, such as was used on the stage) to signify the ficti-
tious character itself which the actor sustained ; and after-
wards, any character whatever, real orfictitious. "Itaque
cum ille discepit, ires personas unus sustineo. Summa
animi aequitate, mean), adversarii, judicis." Cic. de Oral.
b. ii. §. 24.

e2

28

personality is as truly different from what we
call so, as a word written is different from a word
spoken, and yet equivalent to it. And though
three persons, such as men are, cannot be in one
human nature, as a word spoken cannot be
visible and permanent; yet what we call three
persons by comparison and analogy, may con-
sist in the unity of the Godhead.

And after the same manner we ought to an-

In the ordinary sense of the English word person,
which always implies a distinct substance, Persona does
not I believe once occur in the pure Latin Classics. It
is perhaps rather unfortunate, considering what is the or-
dinary use of our word person, that it should have been
adopted as a translation of the Latin word Persona, since
the point in which the senses of these two words differ
is one of such high importance: no imputation however
can fairly be cast on the doctrine of our Church; which
distinctly teaches that the Son is "of one substance with
the Father," thus plainly indicating, that the word " Per-
son," as employed by her, is not to be understood in its
ordinary sense, since that implies a distinct substance. It
is therefore a most unfair cavil, to represent the Trinita-
rians as holding that God is Three, in the same sense in
which he is one : which would indeed be a contradiction:
and it is weakness to allege that there is any contradic-
tion in holding that what is three in one sense, may, in
another sense, be one.

29

swer those who object against the foreknow-
ledge and decrees of God, as inconsistent with
the freedom of choice, by telling them, that
though such foreknowledge and decrees as are in
our understanding and wills cannot consist with
contingency, if we suppose them certain ; yet
what we call so in God may, being quite of a
different nature, and only called by those names,
by reason of some analogy and proportion which
is between them. s

And if men will but have patience, and wait
the proper time, when faith shall be perfected
into vision, and we shall know even as we are
known ; they may then see and be as well satis-
fied that there is no absurdity in the trinity of
persons, or foreknowledge of contingency, as the
Indian is, when he has learned to read and write,
that there is no impossibility in visible perma-
nent words.

§. 7 • Lastly, It is observable, that no care,
industry, or instruction, can ever give a person
born, and continuing blind, any notion of light;
nor can he ever have any conception how men
who have eyes discern the shape and figure at a
distance, nor imagine what colours mean : and

30

yet he would, I believe, readily (on the account
he receives from others, of the advantage of
knowing these things) endure labour and pain,
and submit to the most difficult and tormenting
operations of physic and chirurgery, in order to
obtain the use of his eyes, if any reasonable hope
could be given him of the success of such an
undertaking. And why then should not we as
willingly submit to those easy methods which
God has prescribed to us, in order to obtain
that knowledge of his nature and attributes in
which our eternal satisfaction and happiness
hereafter is in a very great measure to consist ?
And it is certain we now know as much of them,
as the blind man, in the case supposed, does of
light or colours ; and have better reason to seek,
and more certain hope of attaining in the next
life to a fuller and more complete knowledge,
than such a man can have with relation to the
use of his eyes, and the advantage of seeing.
And then will he not rise up in judgment
against us, and condemn us ? Since he endures
so much to obtain sight on the imperfect repre-
sentations of it made to him by other men,
whilst we will not believe and endure as much

31

for eternal happiness, on the testimony of
God. »

§. 13. If it be asked, why these things are not
made clear to us ? I answer, for the same reason
that light and colours are not clear to one that
is born blind, even because in this imperfect
state we want faculties to discern them : and we
cannot expect to reach the knowledge of them
whilst here, for the same reason that a child,
whilst he is so, cannot speak and discourse as
he doth when a grown man ; there is a time
and season for everything, and we must wait for
that season. There is another state and life for
the clear discerning of these matters ; but in
the mean time we ought to take the steps and
methods which are proper for our condition :
and, if we will not do so, we can no more expect
to arrive to the knowledge of these necessary
truths, or that state which will make them plain
to us, than a child can hope he shall ever be able
to read and write, who will not be persuaded to
go to school, or obey his master.

This analogical knowledge of God's nature and
attributes is all of which we are capable of at
present ; and we must either be contented to

32

know him thus, or sit down with an entire igno-
rance and neglect of God, and finally despair of
future happiness. But it concerns us frequently
to call to mind the Apostle's observation, 1 Cor.
xiii. 12. " For now we see through a glass
darkly ; but then face to face : now I know in
part; but then I shall know even as I am
known." Though our present knowledge of
divine things be very imperfect, yet it is enough
to awaken our desire of more ; and though we
do not understand the enjoyments of the blessed,
yet the description we have of them is sufficient
to engage us to seek after them, and to prose-
cute the methods prescribed in Scripture for
attaining them.

§. 14. And therefore let me offer it as a se-
cond reason why God and divine things are thus
represented to us in Scripture e, viz. That such
knowledge is sufficient to all the intents and
purposes of religion ; the design whereof is to

* It has been objected, that Dr. King's representation of
the divine attributes does away the force of those pas-
sages of Scripture, which command us to imitate the
divine perfections : for some remarks on this subject, see
Preface.

33

lead us in the way of eternal happiness, and in
order thereunto, to teach and oblige us to live
reasonably, to perforin our duty to God, our
neighbours, and ourselves, to conquer and mor-
tify our passions and lusts,- to make us benefi-
cent and charitable to men, and to oblige us to
love, obey, and depend upon God.

Now it is easy to shew that such a knowledge
as I have described, is sufficient to obtain all
these ends : for though I know not what God is
in himself, yet if I believe he is able to hurt or
help me, to make me happy or miserable, this
belief is sufficient to convince me, that it is my
duty to fear him. If I be assured that all his
works are done with regularity, order, and fit-
ness ; that nothing can surprise or disappoint
him; that he can never be in any doubt, or at a
loss what is proper for him to do ; though I do
not comprehend the faculties by which he per-
forms so many admirable and amazing things,
yet I know enough to make me adore and
admire his conduct. If I be satisfied that I can
no more expect to escape free, when I break
the laws and rules he has prescribed me, than a
subject can who assaults his prince in the midst

F

34

of all his guards ; this is enough to make
me cautious about every word I speak, and every
action I perform, and to put me out of all hope
of escaping when I offend him.

If I am convinced that God will be as steady
to the rules he has prescribed for my deport-
ment as a wise and just prince will be to his
laws ; this alone will oblige me to a strict obser-
vation of the divine commands, and assure me
that I must be judged according as I have kept
or transgressed them.

If a man be convinced that by his sins he has
forfeited all right and title to happiness, and
that God is under no obligation to grant him
pardon for them ; that only the free mercy of
God can put him into the way of salvation ; and
that he may as well without imputation of
injustice pardon one, and pass by another, as a
prince may, of many equal malefactors, reprieve
one for an instance of his mercy and power, and
suffer the rest to be carried to execution : if a
man, I say, finds himself under these circum-
stances, he will have the same obligations of
gratitude to his God, that the pardoned offender
owes to his prince, and impute his escape en-

35

ti rely to the peculiar favour of God, that made
the distinction between him and others without
any regard to their merits.

If we believe that there is a distinction in the
manner of the subsisting of the divine nature,
that requires such particular applications from
us to God as we pay to three distinct persons
here ; and that he has such distinct and really
different relations to himself and to us on this
account, as three men have to one another ;
that is enough to oblige us to pay our addresses
to him as thus distinguished, and to expect as
different benefits and- blessings from him under
this distinction, as we expect from different per-
sons here : and it can be no hindrance to our
duty, that we are ignorant of the nature and
manner of that distinction.

Let us consider how many honour and obey
their prince, who never saw him, who never had
any personal knowledge of him, and could not
distinguish him from another man if they should
meet him. This will shew us, that it is not
necessary that we should personally know our
governor, to oblige us to perform our duty to
him : and if many perform their duty to their

F2

36

prince without knowing him, why should it seem
strange that we should be obliged to do our
duty to God, though we do not know any more
of his person or nature but that he is our Creator
and Governor.

Lastly, To shew that this kind of knowledge
is sufficient for salvation, let us suppose one who
takes all the descriptions we have of God lite-
rally, who imagines him to be a mighty King
that sits in heaven, and has the earth for his
footstool ; that at the same time hath all things
in his view which can happen ; that has thou-
sands and thousands of ministers to attend him,
all ready to obey and execute his commands ;
that has a great love and favour for such as
diligently obey his orders, and is in a rage and
fury against the disobedient: could any one
doubt but he, who in the simplicity of his heart
should believe these things, as literally repre-
sented, would be saved by virtue of that belief,
or that he would not have motives strong enough
to oblige him to love, honour, and obey God ?

If it should be objected that such representa-
tions do not exactly answer the nature of things,
I confess this is true ; but I would desire you

37

to consider, that the best representations we can
make of God are infinitely short of the truth,
and that the imperfections of such representa-
tions will never be imputed to us as a fault,
provided we do not wilfully dishonour him by
unworthy notions; and our conceptions of him
be such as may sufficiently oblige us to per-
form the duties he requires at our hands.

And if any one farther allege, that he who
takes these representations literally, will be in-
volved in many difficulties, and that it will be
easy to shew that there are great inconsistencies
in them, if we understand them according to the
letter ;

I answer, he is to be looked upon as very
officious and impertinent, that will raise such
objections, and put them in the heads of plain,
honest people, who by the force of such com-
mon though figurative knowledge (as it may be
termed) practise the substantial and real duties
of religion, that lead them to eternal happiness.

It is true, when curious and busy persons by
the unreasonable abuse of their knowledge have
raised such objections, they must be answered :
and it is then necessary to shew in what sense

38

these representations ought to be taken ; and
that they are to be understood by way of com-
parison, as condescensions to our weakness.

But though these objections are easily an-
swered, yet he who makes them unnecessarily is
by no means excused, because they often occa-
sion disturbance to weak people. Many that
may be shocked by the difficulty, may not be
capable of readily understanding the answers:
and therefore thus to raise such scruples, is to
lay a stumbling-block in the way of our weak
brethren, and perplex them with notions and
curiosities, the knowledge of which is no way
necessary to salvation.

We ought therefore to consider that it was in
great mercy and compassion to the ignorance
and infirmity of men, that the holy Spirit vouch-
safed to give us such representations of the
divine nature and attributes. He knew what
knowledge was most proper for us, and what
would most effectually work on us to perform
our duty : and if we take things as the Scripture
represents them, it cannot be denied but they
are well adapted to our capacities, and must
have a mighty influence on all that sincerely

39

believe them ; in truth, greater than all those nice
speculations that we endeavour to substitute in
their place.

§. 15. But, thirdly, if we consider seriously the
knowledge that we have of the creatures, and
even of those things in this world with which
we are most familiarly acquainted, it will appear
that the conceptions we have of them are much
of the same sort as those are which religion
gives us of God, and that they neither represent
the nature or essential properties of the things
as they are in themselves, but only the effects
they have in relation to us. For in most cases
we know no more of them but only how they
affect us, and what sensations they produce
in us.

Thus, for example, light and the sun are the
most familiar and useful things in nature : we
have the comfortable perception of them by our
senses of seeing and feeling, and enjoy the
benefit and advantage of them ; but what they
are in themselves we are entirely ignorant.

I think it is agreed by most that write of
natural philosophy, that light and colours are
nothing but the effects of certain bodies and
motions on our sense of seeing, and that there

40

are no such things at all in nature, but only in
• our minds : and of this at least we may be sure,
that light in the sun or air, are very different
things from what they are in our sensations of
them ; yet we call both by the same name, and
term that which is only perhaps a motion in the
air, light ; because it begets in us that concep-
tion which is truly light. But it would seem
very strange to the generality of men, if we
should tell them, that there is no light in the
sun, or colours in the rainbow ; and yet, strictly
speaking, it is certain, that which in the sun
causes the conception of light in us, is as truly
different in nature from the representation we
have of it in our minds, as our foreknowledge is
from what we call so in God.

$.16. The same maybe observed concerning
the objects of our other senses, such as heat and
cold, sweet and bitter, and which we ascribe to
the things that affect our touch and taste.
Whereas it is manifest, that these are only the
sensations that the actions of outward things
produce in us. For the fire that burns us has
no such pain in it as we feel, when we complain
of its heat ; nor ice, such as we call cold.

Nevertheless, we call the things, whose actions

41

on our senses cause these sensations in us, by
the same name we give to our conceptions of
them, and treat and speak of them as if they
were the same : we say the fire is r?bt, because it
produceth heat in us ; and that the sun is light,
because it affects our eyes in such a manner, as
enables us to frame that thought wliich we then
perceive in ourselves. But in the mean time
we are altogether ignorant what it is parti-
cularly in the fire and the sun that has these
effects on us, or how it comes thus to affect us.
And yet this ignorance of ours doth not hinder
us from the use or advantage that nature de-
signed us in these sensations ; nor does our
transferring to the objects themselves the names
that we give our own perceptions of them draw
any evil consequences after it ; on the contrary,
they serve the uses of life, as well as if we knew
the very things themselves. The sun, by giving
me the sensation of light, directs and refreshes
me, as much as if I knew what its nature and
true substance are. For, in truth, men are no
farther concerned to know the nature of any
thing, than as it relates to them, and has some
effect on them. And if they know the effects

G

42

of outward things, and how far they are to use
or avoid them, it is sufficient.

If then such knowledge of natural things, as
only shews the effects they have on us, be suffi-
cient to all the uses of life, though we do not
know what they are in themselves ; why should
not the like representation of God and his attri-
butes be sufficient for the ends of religion,
though we be ignorant of his and their nature ?

Every one knows, that steadiness, regularity,
and order, do always proceed from wisdom.
When therefore we observe these in the highest
degree in all the works of God, shall we not say
that God is infinitely wise, because we are igno-
rant what that really is in itself which produces
such stupendous effects ? though after all, wis-
dom, as in us, be as different from what we call
so in God, as light in our conception is different
from the motion in the air that causes it.

§. 17. We all of us feel a tendency to the
earth, which we call gravity, but none ever yet
was able to give any satisfactory account of its
nature or cause; but in as much as we know,
that falling down a precipice will crush us to
pieces, the sense we have of this effect of it is

43

sufficient to make us careful to avoid such a fall.
And in like manner, if we know that breaking
God's commands will provoke him to destroy
us, will not this be sufficient to oblige us to
obedience, though we be ignorant what it is we
call anger in him ?

§. 18. I might go through all the notices we
have of natural things, and shew that we only
know and distinguish them by the effects they
produce on our senses, and make you sensible
that such knowledge sufficiently serves the pur-
poses of life. And no reason can be given why
the representations given us in Scripture of God
and divine things, though they do only shew us
the effects that proceed from them, should not
be sufficient to answer the purposes of religion.

Particularly we ascribe foreknowledge to God,
because we are certain that he cannot be surprised
by any event, nor be at any loss what he is to
do when it happens. And thereby we give him
all the perfection we can, and assure ourselves
that we can not deceive him.

After the same manner we ascribe predesti-
nation to him, and conceive him as predeter-
mining every thing that comes to pass, because
g 2

44

all his works are as steady and certain, as if he had
predetermined them after the same manner that
wise men do theirs.

We farther represent him as absolutely free,
and all his actions as arising only from himself,
without any other consideration but that of his
own will ; beeause we are sure, the obligations
we owe to him are as great as if he acted in this
wise. We are as much obliged to magnify his
free mercy and favour to us, to humble our
minds before him, and return our tribute of
gratitude to him, as if our salvation entirely
proceeded from his mere good will and pleasure,
without any thing being required on our part in
order to it.

§. 19. Let me in the fourth place observe, that
as we transfer the actions of our own minds, our
powers, and virtues, by analogy to God, and
speak of him as if he had the like ; so we pro-
ceed the same way in the representations we
make to one another of the actions of our minds,
and ascribe the powers and faculties of bodies
to the transactions that pass in them. Thus
to weigh things, to penetrate, to reflect, are pro-
per actions of bodies, which we transfer to our

45

understandings, and commonly say, that the
mind weighs or penetrates things, that it reflects
on itself or actions ; thus to embrace or reject,
to retain or let slip, are corporeal performances,
and yet we ascribe the first to the will, and the
last to the memory. And it is manifest that
this does not cause any confusion in our no-
tions : though none will deny but there is a vast
difference between weighing a piece of money
in a scale, and considering a thing in our minds;
between one body's passing through another,
which is properly penetrating, and the under-
standings obtaining a clear notion of a thing
hard to be comprehended. And so in all the
rest, there is indeed a resemblance and analogy
between them, which makes us give the same
names to each : but to compare them in all
particulars, and expect they should exactly an-
swer, would run us into great absurdities. As
for example, it would be ridiculous to think
that weighing a thing in our minds should have
all the effects, and be accompanied with all the
circumstances, that are observable in weighing a
body.

§. 20. Now to apply this, let us consider that

46

love, hatred, wisdom, knowledge, and foreknow-
ledge, are properly faculties or actions of our
minds ; and we ascribe them to God after the
same manner that we do reflection, penetrating,
discovering, embracing, or rejecting, to our in-
tellectual actions and faculties, because there is
some analogy and proportion between them.
But then we ought to remember, that there is
as great a difference between these, when at-
tributed to God, and as they are in us, as
between weighing in a balance and thinking; in
truth, infinitely greater ; and that we ought no
more to expect that the one should in all re-
spects and circumstances answer the other, than
that thinking in all things should correspond to
weighing. Would you not be surprised to hear
a man deny, and obstinately persist in it, that
his mind can reflect upon itself, because it is
impossible that a body, from whence the notion
is originally taken, should move or act on itself ?
and is it not equally absurd to argue, that what
we call foreknowledge in God, can not consist
with the contingency or freedom of events, be-
cause our prescience, from whence we transfer
the notion to the divine understanding, could

47

not if it were certain ? And is it not equally
a sufficient answer to both, when we say that
the reflection of bodies, though in many circum-
stances it resembles that action of the mind
which we call so, yet in other particulars they
are mighty unlike ? And though the foreknow-
ledge that we have in some things resembles
what we term so in God, yet the properties and
effects of these in other particulars are infinitely
different.

Nor can we think that whatever is impossible
in the one, must be likewise so in the other.
It is impossible motion should be in a body,
except it be moved by another, or by some other
external agent ; and it requires a space in which
it is performed, and we can measure it by feet
and yards ; but we should look on him as a very
weak reasoner, that would deny any motion to be
in the mind, because he could find none of those
there. And we should think that we had suffi-
ciently answered this objection, by telling him
that these two motions are of very different
natures, though there be some analogy and pro-
portion between them. And shall not the same
answer satisfy those that argue against the

48

divine foreknowledge, predestination, and other
actions attributed to God, because many things
are supposed possible to them, which are im-
possible to us ?

§. 21. It may be objected against this doc-
trine, that if it be true, all our descriptions of
God and discourses concerning him will be
only figures and metaphors ; that he will be
only figuratively merciful, just, intelligent, and
foreknowing : and perhaps in time, religion and
all the mysteries thereof will be lost in mere
figure.

But I answer, that there is great difference
between the analogical representations of God,
and that which we commonly call figurative.
The common use of figures is to represent
things that are otherwise very well known, in
such a manner as may magnify or lessen,
heighten or adorn, the ideas we have of them.
And the design of putting them in this foreign
dress, as we may call it, is to move our passions,
and engage our fancies more effectually than the
true and naked view of them is apt to do, or
perhaps ought. And from hence it too often
happens, that these figures are employed to de-

49

ceive us, and make us think better or worse of
things than they really deserve.

But the analogies and similitudes that the
holy Scriptures or our own reason frame of
divine things are of another nature ; the use of
them is to give us some notion of things whereof
we have no direct knowledge, and by that means
lead us to perception of the nature, or at least of
some of the properties and effects of what our
understandings cannot directly reach, and in this
case to teach us how we are to behave ourselves
towards God, and what we are to do in order to
obtain a more perfect knowledge of his attri-
butes.

§. 22. And whereas in ordinary figurative re-
presentations, the thing expressed by the figure
is commonly of much less moment than that
to which it is compared : in these analogies the
case is otherwise, and the things represented by
them have much more reality and perfection in
them, than the things by which we represent them.
Thus weighing a thing in our minds is a much
more noble and perfect action, than examining the
gravity of a body by scale and balance, which is
the original notion from whence it is borrowed ;

50

and reflection as in our understandings is much
more considerable, than the rebounding of one
hard body from another, which yet is the literal
sense of reflection. And after the same man-
ner, what we call knowledge and foreknowledge
in God, have infinitely more reality in them,
and are of greater moment than our understand-
ing or prescience, from whence they are trans-
ferred to him ; and, in truth, these as in man
are but faint communications of the divine per-
fections, which are the true originals, and which
our powers and faculties more imperfectly imi-
tate than a picture does a man : and yet if we
reason from them by analogy and proportion,
they are sufficient to give us such a notion of
God's attributes, as will oblige us to fear, love,
obey, and adore him.

If we lay these things together, I suppose,
they will furnish us with sufficient reasons to
satisfy us why the holy Scriptures represent
divine things to us by types and similitudes, by
comparisons and analogies, and transferring to
God the notions of such perfections as we ob-
serve in ourselves, or other creatures : since it
appears that we are not capable of better ; that

51

such knowledge answers all the designs of re-
ligion ; and that when the matter is duly ex-
amined, we hardly know any thing without our-
selves in a more perfect manner.

I shall therefore proceed to the third and last
thing I proposed, which was to shew the uses
we ought to make of what has been said, par-
ticularly of God's foreknowing and predesti-
nating his elect to holiness and salvation.

§. 23. And first, from the whole it appears
that we ought not to be surprised, when we find
the Scriptures giving different and seemingly
contradictory schemes of divine things.

It is manifest that several such are to be found
in holy writ. Thus God is frequently said in
Scripture to repent and turn from the evil that
he proposed against sinners ; and yet in other
places we are told, that " God is not a man that
he should lie, neither the son of man that he
should repent." So Numb, xxiii. 19. Thus,
Psalm xviii. 11. God is represented as dwelling
in thick darkness : " he made darkness his secret
place ; his pavilion round about him were dark
waters, and thick clouds of the sky." And
yet, 1 Tim. vi 16. he is described as " dwelling
h2

52

in the light which no man can approach unto,
whom no man hath seen, nor can see." And,
1 John i. 5. " God is light, and in him is no
darkness at all." Thus in the second Com-
mandment God is represented as " visiting the
iniquity of the fathers upon the children unto
the third and fourth generation of them that
hate him." And yet, Ezek. xviii. 20. " The
son shall not bear the iniquity of the father,
neither shall the father bear the iniquity of the
son;" and ver. 4. "The soul that sinneth, it
shall die."

After the same manner, we are forbid by our
Saviour, Matt. vi. 7 • "to use vain repetitions as
the heathen do ; or to think that we shall be
heard for our much speaking ; because," ver. 8.
" your Father knows what things ye have need
of, before ye ask him." And yet, Luke xviii. 1.
we are encouraged " always to pray, and not to
faint :" and this is recommended to us by the
parable of an importunate widow, who through
her incessant applications became uneasy to the
judge, and by her continual cries and petitions
so troubled him, that to procure his own ease
he did her justice: ver. 5. "Because this widow

53

troubleth me, I will avenge her, lest by her
continual coming she weary me."

Thus it is said, Exod. xxxiii. 1 1. "The Lord
spake unto Moses face to face, as a man speak-
eth to his friend." And yet, in ver. 20. he de-
clares to the same Moses, " Thou canst not see
my face : for there shall no man see me and
live." There are multitudes of other instances
of the like nature, that seem to carry some ap-
pearance of a contradiction in them, but are
purposely designed to make us understand, that
these are only ascribed to God by way of resem-
blance and analogy, and to correct our imagin-
ations, that we may not mistake them for per-
fect representations, or think that they are in
God in the same manner that the similitudes
represent them, and to teach us not to stretch
those to all cases, or farther than they are in-
tended.

§. 24. We ought to remember, that two
things may be very like one another in some
respects, and quite contrary in others ; and yet
to argue against the likeness in one respect
from the contrariety in the other, is as if one
should dispute against the likeness of a picture,

54

because that is made of canvas, oil, and colours,
whereas the original is flesh and blood.

Thus in the present case, God is represented
as an absolute Lord over his creatures, of infi-
nite knowledge and power, that doth all things
for his mere pleasure, and is accountable to
none ; as one that " will have mercy on whom he
will have mercy, and whom he will he hardens ;"
that foresees, predestinates, calls, justifies, glo-
rifies whom he will, without any regard to the
creatures whom he thus deals with. This gives
us a mighty notion of his sovereignty, at once
stops our mouths and silences our objections,
oblige us to an absolute submission and de-
pendence on him, and withal to acknowledge
the good things we enjoy to be entirely due to
his pleasure : this is plainly the design and effect
of this terrible representation ; and the meaning
is, that we should understand that God is no
way obliged to give us an account of his actions ;
that we are no more to inquire into the reasons
of his dealing with his creatures, than if he
really treated them in this arbitrary method.
By the same we are taught to acknowledge,
that our salvation as entirely depends on him,

55

and that we owe it as much to his pleasure, as
if he had bestowed it on us without any other
consideration but his own will to do so. Thus,
James i. 18. " of his own will begat he us with
the word of truth, that we should be a kind of
first fruits of his creatures." And that we might
not think there could be any thing in our best
works, the prospect whereof could move God to
shew kindness to us, the Scriptures give us to
understand, that those good works are due to his
grace and favour, and the effects, not causes
of them. So Ephes. ii. 10. " for we are his
workmanship, created in Christ Jesus unto good
works, which God hath before ordained that we
should walk in them."

§. 25. All which representations are designed
as a scheme, to make us conceive the obligations
we owe to God, and how little we can contribute
to our own happiness. And to make us appre-
hend this to be his meaning, he has on other
occasions given us an account of his dealing
with men, not only different, but seemingly con-
tradictory to this. Thus he frequently repre-
sents himself, as proposing nothing for his own
pleasure or advantage in his transactions with

56

his creatures; as having no other design in them,
but to do those creatures good; as earnestly de-
siring and prosecuting that end only. Nay, he
represents himself to us as if he were as uneasy
and troubled when we failed to answer his ex-
pectations, as we may conceive a good, merci-
ful, and beneficent prince, that had only his
subjects' happiness in view, would be, when they
refused to join with him for promoting their own
interest. And God, farther to express his ten-
derness towards us, and how far he is from im-
posing any thing on us, lets us know that he
has left us to our own freedom and choice ; and
to convince us of his impartiality, declares that
he acts as a just and equal judge, that he hath
no respect of persons, and favours none, but re-
wards and punishes all men, not according to
his own pleasure, but according to their deserts :
" and in every nation he that fears him, and
works righteousness, is accepted with him." Acts
x. 35.

§.26. Whoever is acquainted with the holy
Scriptures, will find all these things plainly deli-
vered to them. Thus to shew us that God pro-
poses no advantages to himself in his dealings

with us, he is described as a person wholly dis-
interested. Job xxii. 2, 3. "Can a man be pro-
fitable unto God, as he that is wise may be pro-
fitable unto himself? Is it any pleasure to the
Almighty that thou art righteous ? or is it gain
to him that thou makest thy ways perfect ?" And
chap. xxxv. 6, 7 • " If thou sinnest, what dost
thou against him ? or if thy transgressions be
multiplied, what dost thou unto him ? If thou
be righteous, what givest thou him, or what re-
ceiveth he of thine hand ?" And as to his leaving
us to the liberty of our own choice, observe how
he is represented, Deut. xxx. 19. "I call heaven
and earth this day to record against you, that I
have set before you life and death, blessing and
cursing; therefore choose life."

And as to his earnest concern for our salva-
tion, he orders the prophet Ezekiel to deliver
this message from him: chap, xxxiii. 11. " Say
unto them, As I live, saith the Lord God, I have
no pleasure in the death of the wicked, but that
the wicked turn from his way and live. Turn
ye, turn ye from your evil ways ; for why will ye
die, O house of Israel ?" And Hosea xi. 8.
" How shall I give thee up, Ephraim ? How

i

58

shall I deliver thee, Israel ? How shall I make
thee as Adnah ? How shall I set thee as Zehoim ?
Mine heart is turned within me, my repentings
are kindled together.

Every one may see how distant this view of
God, and of his dealings with his creatures, is
from the former : and yet if we consider it as a
scheme framed to make us conceive how gra-
ciously, mercifully, and justly God treats us,
notwithstanding the supreme and absolute domi-
nion he has over us, there will be no incon-
sistency between the two. You see here, that
though the creatures be in his hand, as clay in
the potter's, of which he may make vessels of
honour or dishonour, without any injury, or
being accountable ; yet he uses that power, with
all the passionate love and concern that parents
shew towards their children : and therefore we
are to conceive of him as having all the tender-
ness of affection that parents feel in their heart
towards their young ones ; and that if he had
been so affected, he could not (considering our
circumstances) have gone farther than he has
done to save us j that our destruction is as en-
tirely due to ourselves, as if we were out of

59

God's power, and absolutely in the hands of our
own counsel.

§. 27- If we take these as schemes designed
to give us different views of God, and his trans-
actions with men, in order to oblige us to dis-
tinct duties which we owe him, and stretch them
no farther, they are very reconcilable. And to
go about to clash the one against the other, and
argue, as many do, that if the one be true, the
other cannot, is full as absurd as to object
against that article of our belief, that Christ sits
on the right hand of God, because Scripture in
other places, and plain reason, assure us that
God hath neither hand nor parts.

And whilst a thing may in one respect be like
another, and in other respects be like the con-
trary ; and whilst we know that thing only by
resemblance, similitude, or proportion, we ought
not to be surprised that the representations are
contrary, and taken from things that seem irre-
concilable, or that the different views of the
same thing should give occasion to different, nay
contrary schemes.

*. 28. We ought farther to consider, that
these are not so much designed to give us
i 2

60

notions of God as he is in himself, as to make
us sensible of our duty to him, and to oblige us
to perform it. As for example, when the
Scriptures represent God as an absolute Lord,
that has his creatures entirely in his power, and
treats them according to his pleasure ; as one
that is not obliged to consider their advantage
at all, or any thing but his own will ; that may
elect one to eternal salvation, and pass over
another, or condemn him to eternal misery,
without any other reason but because he will do
so ; when we read this, I say, in the holy
Scriptures, we ought not to dispute whether
God really acts thus or no, or how it will
suit with his other attributes of wisdom and
justice to do so ; but the use we ought to
make of it is to call to mind what duty and
submission we ought to pay to one who may
thus deal with us if he please, and what grati-
tude we ought to return him, for electing and
decreeing us to salvation, when he lay under
no manner of obligation to vouchsafe us that
favour.

Again, when we find him represented as a
gracious and merciful Father, that treats us as

61

children, that is solicitous for our welfare, that
would not our death or destruction ; that has
done all things for our eternal happiness, which
could be done without violating the laws of our
creation, and putting a force upon our natures ;
that has given us free-will, that we might be
capable of rewards at his hands, and have the
pleasure of choosing for ourselves ; which only
can make us happy, and like unto himself, in the
most noble operations of which a being is
capable; that has given us all the invitations and
encouragements to choose well, that mercy
could prompt him to, or that the justice which
is due to himself and creatures would allow, and
that never punishes us, but when the necessity
and support of his government requires he
should : when we hear these things, we are not
so much to enquire whether this representation
exactly suits with what really passes in his mind,
as how we ought to behave ourselves in such a
case towards him that has dealt so graciously
with us.

§. 22. And though these representations be
but descriptions fitted to our capacities, through
God's great condescension towards us ; yet it

62

is certain, that there is as much mercy, tender-
ness, and justice in the conduct of God, as this
scheme represents ; and on the other hand,
that we owe as much fear, submission, and
gratitude to him, as if the first were the method
he took with us.

We make no scruple to acknowledge, that love
and hatred, mercy and anger, with other pas-
sions, are ascribed to God ; not that they are
in him, as we conceive them, but to teach us
how we are to behave ourselves toward him, and
what treatment we may expect at his hands.
And if so, why should we make any difficulty
to think that foreknowledge, purposes, elections,
and decrees are attributed to him, after the
same way, and to the same intent ?

§. 30. The second use that I shall make of
this doctrine, is to put you in mind, how cau-
tious we ought to be in our reasonings and de-
ductions concerning things, of whose nature we
are not fully apprized. It is true, that in mat-
ters we fully comprehend, all is clear and easy
to us, and we readily perceive the connection
and consistency of all the parts ; but it is not so
in things to which we are in a great measure

63

strangers, and of which we have only an imper-
fect and partial view, for in these we are very
apt to fancy contradictions, and to think the
accounts we receive of them absurd.

The truth of this is manifest from innumerable
instances : as for example, from the opinion of the
Antipodes : whilst the matter was imperfectly
known, how many objections were made against
it? How many thought they had proved to a de-
monstration the impossibility and contradiction
of the thing ? And how far did they prevail with
the generality of the world to believe them f
And yet how weak, and in truth foolish, do all
their arguments appear to men that know, and
by experience understand, the matter ?

Others will say the same concerning the mo-
tion of the earth, notwithstanding the great con-
fidence with which many have undertaken to
demonstrate it to be impossible ; the reason of
which is the imperfect knowledge we have of
the thing: and as our understanding of it is
more and more enlarged and cleared, the con-
tradictions vanish.

Ought we not then to think all the contra-
dictions we fancy between the foreknowledge

64

of God and contingency of events, between
predestination and free will, to be the effects of
our ignorance and partial knowledge ? May it
not be in this, as in the matter of the Antipodes,
and motion of the earth ? May not the incon-
sistencies that we find in the one, be as ill-
grounded as those that have been urged against
the others ? And have we not reason to suspect,
nay believe, this to be the case ; since we
are sure that we know much less of God and
his attributes, than of the earth and heavenly
motions.

§.31. Even in the sciences that are most
common and certain, there are some things
which, amongst those that are unacquainted
with such matters, would pass for contradictions.
As for example, let us suppose one should hap-
pen to mention negative quantities among per-
sons strangers to the mathematics ; and being
asked what is meant by those words, should
answer, that he understands by them quantities
that are conceived to be less than nothing ; and
that one of their properties is, that being mul-
tiplied by a number less than nothing, the pro-
duct may be a magnitude greater than any as-

65

signed. This might justly appear a riddle, and
full of contradictions, and perhaps will do so to
a great part of my auditors. Something less
than nothing in appearance is a contradiction ;
a number less than nothing has the same face :
that these should be multipliable on one an-
other, sounds very oddly ; and that the product
of less than nothing upon less than nothing should
be positive, and greater than any assigned quantity,
seems inconceivable. And yet, if the most igno-
rant will but have patience, and apply themselves
for instruction to the skilful in these matters, they
will soon find all the seeming contradictions
vanish, and that the assertions are not only cer-
tain, but plain and easy truths, that may be con-
ceived without any great difficulty.

Ought we not then to suspect our own ig-
norance, when we fancy contradictions in the
descriptions given us of the mysteries of our
faith and religion ? And ought we not to wait
with patience till we come to heaven, the pro-
per school where these things are to be learned ?
And in the mean time, acquiesce in that light
the holy Spirit has given us in the Scriptures ;

K

66

which, as I have shewed, is sufficient to direct
us in our present circumstances.

§. 23. hThe third use I shall make of this
doctrine is to teach us what answer we are to
give that argument that has puzzled mankind,
and done so much mischief in the world. It
runs thus ; " If God foresee or predestinate that
I shall be saved, I shall infallibly be so ; and if
he foresee or have predestinated that I shall be
damned, it is unavoidable. And therefore it is
no matter what I do, or how I behave myself in
this life." Many answers have been given to
this, which I shall not at present examine: I
shall only add, that if God's foreknowledge were
exactly comformable to ours, the consequence
would seem just ; but inasmuch as they are of
as different a nature as any two faculties of our
souls, it doth not follow (because our foresight
of events, if we suppose it infallible, must pre-
suppose a necessity in them) that therefore the
divine prescience must require the same necessity
in order to its being certain. It is true, we call

h See Appendix, No. I. at the end of this discourse, on the
use of the word necessary, and those connected with it. .

67

God's foreknowledge and our own by the same
name j but this is not from any real likeness in
the nature of the faculties, but from some pro-
portion observable in the effects of them ; both
having this advantage, that they prevent any
surprise on the person endowed with them.

Now as it is true, that no contingency or
freedom in the creatures can any way deceive
or surprise God, put him to a loss, or oblige
him to alter his measures ; so on the other hand
itis likewise true, that the divine prescience doth
not hinder freedom ; and a thing may either be
or not be, notwithstanding that foresight of it
which we ascribe to God. When therefore it is
alleged, that if God foresees I shall be saved,
my salvation is infallible, this doth not follow ;
because the foreknowledge of God is not like
man's, which requires necessity in the event, in
order to its being certain, but of another nature
consistent with contingency : and our inability
to comprehend this arises from our ignorance of
the true nature of what we call foreknowledge
in God; and it is as impossible we should com-
prehend the power thereof, or the manner of its
k2

68

operation, as that the eye should see a sound,
or the ear hear light and colours.

Only of this we are sure, that in this it differs
from ours, that it may consist either with the
being or not being of what is said to be fore-
seen or predestinated. Thus St. Paul was a
chosen vessel, and he reckons himself in the
number of the predestinated, Eph. i. 5. " having
predestinated us to the adoption of children by
Jesus Christ to himself;" and yet he supposes
it possible1 for him to miss of salvation; and
therefore he looked on himself as obliged to
use mortification, and exercise all other graces,
in order to make his calling and election sure ;
lest, as he tells us, 1 Cor. ix. 27. " that by any
means when I have preached to others, I myself
should be a cast-away," or a reprobate, as the
word is translated in other places.

^. 33. The fourth use I shall make of this
doctrine is to enable us to discover what judg-
ment we are to pass on those that have ma-
naged this controversy : and for mine own part

' See Appendix, No. I. at the end, on the word necessary.

69

I must profess, that they seem to me to have
taken shadows for substances, resemblances for
the things they represent ; and by confounding
these, have embroiled themselves and readers in
inextricable difficulties.

Whoever will look into the books writ on
either sider will find this to be true. But be-
cause that is a task too difficult for the generality
of men, let them consider the two schemes of
the Predestinarians and Freewillers, in the pre-
sent Bishop of Sarum's Exposition of the Seven-
teenth Article of our Church ; where they will
(as I think) find the opinions of both parties
briefly, fully, and fairly represented, and withal
perceive this error runs through both.

As for example, the great foundation of the
one scheme is, that God acts for himself and his
glory, and therefore he can only consider the
manifestation of his own attributes and perfec-
tions in every action ; and hence they conclude
that he must only damn or save men, as his
doing of one or other may most promote his
glory.

But here it is manifest that they who
reason thus are of opinion, that the desire of

70

glory doth really move the will of God ; whereas
glory, and the desire of it, are only ascribed to
God in an analogical sense, after the same man-
ner as hands and feet, love and hatred are ; and
when God is said to do all things for his own
glory, it is not meant that the desire of glory is
the real end of his actions, but that he has or-
dered all things in such an excellent method,
that if he had designed them for no other end,
they could not have set it forth more effectually.
Now to make this figurative expression the
foundation of so many harsh conclusions, and
the occasions of so many contentions and divi-
sions in the Church, seems to me the same kind
of mistake that the Church of Rome commits,
in taking the words of Scripture, " this is my
body," literally ; from whence so many absurdi-
ties and contradictions to our senses and rea-
son are inferred.

§. 34. Secondly, If you look diligently into
these schemes, you will find a great part of the
dispute arises on this question, What is first or
second in the mind of God ? Whether he first
foresees and then determines, or first determines
and by virtue of that foresees ? This question

71

seems the more strange, because both parties
are agreed, that there is neither first nor last in
the divine understanding, but all is one single
act in him, and continues the same from all
eternity. What then can be the meaning of the
dispute ? Sure it can be no more than this,
Whether it be more honourable for God, that
we should conceive him as acting this way or
that, since it is confessed that neither reaches
what really passes in his mind : so that the ques-
tion is not concerning the operations of God, as
they are in themselves, but concerning our way
of conceiving them, whether it be more for his
honour to represent them according to the first
or second scheme ; and certainly the right
method is to use both on occasion, so far as they
may help us to conceive honourably of the
divine Majesty ; and to deal ingenuously with
the world, and tell them, that where these
schemes have not that effect, or where through
our stretching them too far, they induce us to
entertain dishonourable thoughts of him, or en-
courage disobedience, they are not applicable
to him. In short, that God is as absolute as
the first represents him, and man as free as

72

the last would have him to be : and that these
different and seemingly contradictory schemes
are brought in to supply the defects of one an-
other.

§. 35. And therefore, thirdly, the managers of
this controversy ought to have looked on these
different schemes as chiefly designed to inculcate
some duties to us ; and to have pressed them
no farther than as they tended to move and
oblige us to perform those duties. But they,
on the contrary, have stretched these represent-
ations beyond the Scripture's design, and set
them up in opposition to one another ; and have
endeavoured to persuade the world that they are
inconsistent : insomuch that some, to establish
contingency and free-will, have denied God's
prescience ; and others, to set up predestination,
have brought in a fatal necessity of all events.

k And not content therewith, they have ac-
cused one another of impiety and blasphemy,
and mutually charged each the other's opinion with

k A most admirable specimen of the temper, modera-
tion, and reverent caution which should appear in treat-
ing of such subjects, is to be found in Mr. Sumner's ex-
cellent treatise on " Apostolical preaching."

73

all the absurd consequences they fancied were
deducible from it. Thus the maintainers of
free-will charge the predestinarians as guilty of
ascribing injustice, tyranny, and cruelty to God,
as making him the author of all the sin and
misery that is in the world ; and, on the other
hand, the asserters of predestination have ac-
cused the others, as destroying the independency
and dominion of God, and subjecting him to the
will and humours of his creatures : and if either
of the schemes were to be taken literally and
properly, the maintainers of them would find
difficulty enough to rid themselves of the conse-
quences charged on them ; but if we take them
only as analogical representations, as I have
explained them, there will be no ground or reason
for these inferences.

^. 36. And it were to be wished, that those
who make them would consider, that if they
would prosecute the same method in treating
the other representations, that the Scriptures
give us of God's attributes and operations, no
less absurdities would follow : as for example,
when God is said to be merciful, loving, and
pitiful, all-seeing, jealous, patient, or angry ; if

74

these were taken literally, and understood the
same way as we find them in us, what absurd
and intolerable consequences would follow ; and
how dishonourably must they be supposed to
think of God, who ascribe such passions to him?
Yet nobody is shocked at them, because they
understand them in an analogical sense. And
if they would but allow predestination, election,
decrees, purposes, and foreknowledge, to belong
to God, with the same difference, they would no
more think themselves obliged to charge those
that ascribe them to him with blasphemy, in the
one case, than in the other.

It is therefore incumbent on us to forbear all
such deductions, and we should endeavour to
reconcile these several representations together,
by teaching the people, that God's knowledge is
of another nature than ours ; and that though
we cannot in our way of thinking certainly fore-
see what is free and contingent, yet God may
do it by that power which answers to prescience
in him, or rather in truth supplies the place of
it: nor is it any wonder that we cannot conceive
how this is done, since we have no direct or
proper notion of God's knowledge ; nor can we

75

ever in this life expect to comprehend it, any
more than a man who never saw, can expect to
discern the shape and figure of bodies at a dis-
tance, whilst he continues blind.

§. 37- The fifth use we are to make of what
has been said, is to teach us how we are to
behave ourselves in a church, where either of
these schemes is settled and taught as a doc-
trine: and here I think the resolution is easy;
we ought to be quiet, and not unseasonably dis-
turb the peace of the church ; much less should
we endeavour to expose what she professes, by
alleging absurdities and inconsistencies in it.
On the contrary, we are obliged to take pains to
shew that the pretended consequences do not
follow, as in truth they do not ; and to discharge
all that make them, as enemies of peace, and
false accusers of their brethren, by charging
them with consequences ^hey disown, and that
have no other foundation but the maker's igno-
rance.

For in truth, as has been already shewed, if
such inferences be allowed, hardly any one attri-
bute or operation of God, as ascribed in Scrip-
ture, will be free from the cavils of perverse men.
l2

76

It is observable, tbat by the same way of
reasoning, and by the same sort of arguments,
by which some endeavour to destroy the divine
prescience, and render his decrees odious, Cotta
long ago in Cicero attacked the other attributes,
and undertook to prove that God can neither
have reason nor understanding, wisdom nor
prudence, nor any other virtue. And if we
understand these literally and properly, so as to
signify the same when applied to God and to
men, it will not be easy to answer his argu-
ments : but if we conceive them to be ascribed
to him by proportion and analogy, that is, if we
mean no more when we apply them to God,
than that he has some powers and faculties,
though not of the same nature, which are ana-
logous to these advantages which these could
give him if he had them, enabling him to pro-
duce all the good effocts which we see conse-
quent to them, when in the greatest perfection :
then the arguments used by 'Cotta against them

1 Qualem autem Deum intelligere nos possumus nulla
virtute prseditum ? Quid enim ? prudentiamne Deo tribu-
einus ? Qua; constat ex scientia rerum bonarum et mala-
rum, et, nee bonarum nee malarum? Cui mali nihil est,

77

have no manner of force ; since we do not plead
for such an understanding, reason, justice, and
virtue, as he objects against, but for more valu-
able perfections that are more than equivalent,
and in truth infinitely superior to them ; though
called by the same names, because we do not
know what they are in themselves, but only see
their effects in the world, which are such as
might be expected from the most consummate
reason, understanding, and virtue.

And after the same manner, when perverse
men reason against the prescience, predesti-

nec esse potest, quid huic opus est delectu bonarum et
malorum ? Quid autem ratione ? quid intelligentia ? qui-
bus utimur ad earn rem ut apertis obscura assequamur.
At obscurum Deo nihil potest esse. Nam Justitia, quae
suum cuique distribuit, quid pertinet ad Deos ? hominum
enim societas et communitas, ut vos dicitis, Justitiam pro-
creavit : temperantia autem constat ex praetermittendis
voluptatibus corporis; cui si locus in coelo est, est etiain
voluptatibus. Nam fortis Deus intelligi qui potest ? in
dolore, an in labore, an in periculo > quorum Deum nihil
attingit. Nee ratione igitur utentem, nee virtute ulla
praeditum Deum intelligere qui possumus ? Cic. de Nat.
Dear. lib. iii. sect. 15.

78

nation, and the decrees of God, by drawing the
like absurd consequences, as Cotta doth against
the possibility of his being endowed with reason
and understanding, &c. our answer is the same
as before mentioned. If these be supposed the
very same in all respects when attributed to God,
as we find them in ourselves, there would be
some colour, from the absurdities that would
follow, to deny that they belong to God ; but
when we only ascribe them to him by analogy,
and mean no more than that there are some
things answerable to them, from whence, as
principles, the divine operations proceed ; it is
plain, that all such arguments not only lose
their force, but are absolutely impertinent.

It is therefore sufficient for the ministers of
the Church to shew that the established doctrine
is agreeable to Scripture, and teach their peo-
ple what use ought to be made of it, and to
caution them against the abuse ; which if they
do with prudence, they will avoid contentions
and divisions, and prevent the mischiefs which
are apt to follow the mistaken representations
of it.

79

§. 38. This is the method taken by our
Church in her Seventeenth Article, where we
are taught, that " predestination to life is the
everlasting purpose of God, whereby, before the
foundations of the world were laid, he hath con-
stantly decreed by his counsel, secret to us, to
deliver from curse and damnation those whom
he hath chosen in Christ out of mankind, and
to bring them by Christ to everlasting salvation.
And that the godly consideration of predesti-
nation, and our election in Christ, is full of
sweet, pleasant, and unspeakable comfort to
godly persons, as well because it doth greatly
establish their faith of eternal salvation, to be
enjoyed through Christ, as because it doth fer-
vently kindle their love toward God." And yet
we must receive Gods promises, as thev be
generally set forth to us in holy Scripture."
Here you see the two schemes joined together :
and we are allowed all the comfort that the con-
sideration of our being predestinated can afford
us : and at the same time we are given to under-
stand, that the promises of God are generally
conditional ; and that notwithstanding our belief

80

of predestination, we can have no hope of ob-
taining the benefit of them, but by fulfilling the
conditions. And I hope I have explained them
in such a way, as shews them to be consistent in
themselves, and of great use towards making us
holy here, and happy hereafter.

APPENDIX.

No. I.

ON THE VARIOUS USES OF THE WORD " NECESSITY,"
AND THOSE OF THE SAME CLASS.

Words are the counters of wise men, and the money of fools.

HonBES.

X HE utmost precision in the use of the word neces-
sity, and others of a correspondent meaning, is of so
much importance, in discussing that which is the main
subject of Dr. King's discourse, and so much of the
unsatisfactory and perplexed character of almost ever}'
argument on these points, (not excepting some parts
even of Dr. King's,) may be traced up to undetected
ambiguity in that quarter, that it appears worth while
to explain more fully than could be done in a note,
the various senses of these words.

First, the original meaning of the word necessity
appears to have been, " an intimate connexion," or
"conjunction ;" as is indicated both by its etymology,
as if from " necto," and by the use of " necessitudo,"
and " necessarius," to denote close intimacy. Hence,
food is called " necessary" to life, because of the con-
nexion between the two; life never continues without,
that is, separately, from food. And on the same prin-
ciple we speak of the " necessity" of a cause to its
effect'. Death again is a matter of " necessity" to

a That we are unable to perceive any efficacy in what are called
" physical causes," to produce their respective efl'ects, and that all we

M 2

84

man, because no man continues exempt from it. The
truth of a conclusion follows " necessarily" from the
premises, because their truth does not exist separately
from that of the conclusion6; they are never found
to be true without its being true also.

It being a constant connexion that is expressed
by " necessary," the word is commonly used, in gene-
ral assertions, as nearly equivalent to "universal;"
and " not-necessary," to occasional : for instance, a
rupture of the spinal marrow " necessarily" occasions
death; (that is, in all cases;) the inhabitants of hot
countries are not necessarily negroes, (that is, not
universally.) In this way, " necessary," and " not-ne-
cessary," may, with propriety, be applied to any class
of things, in any general proposition: but neither of
them can be thus applied to individual events ; the
assertions respecting which, being what logicians
call singular propositions, cannot be more or less gene-
ral, nor, consequently, can need or admit of any such
limitation, as is expressed by "not-necessary." It
would be perfectly unmeaning to say of any " singular"
proposition, (for instance, the banishment of Buona-

do perceive (and consequently all we really indicate, in the^e cases, by
the word causation) is a constant conjunction — a connection in point
of time and place, is the doctrine not of Hume alone, (uho has de-
duced illogical and mischievous conclusions from it,) but also of Bar-
row, and Butler, as well as D. Stewart.

b In this case " necessity" is opposed to a contradiction and absur-
dity; in the former instances, to a violation of the order of nature.

There are several modifications of meaning comprehended under this
first head, of which I am now speaking; but there is no need to enter
into any full discussion of these beyond what concerns the main object
proposed.

85

parte,) that it is true without any exception, or that it
admits of exception. The words "necessary" and
" not-necessary" therefore, when applied to indi-
vidual cases, must (if not wholly unmeaning) be
employed with some different view: thus we say,
" the confinement of Buonaparte is " necessary,"
namely, " to the peace of Europe."

Secondly, our attention being most called to the
connexion of such things as we may in vain wish or
endeavour to separate, the word " necessary" hence
comes to be limited, and especially applied to cases
of compulsion ,- to events which take place either
against one's will, or, at least, independent of it; to
things, in short, which we have no power to prevent if
we would, or to prevent, without submitting to a worse
alternative1. Hence we speak more especially of the
necessity of death, because all animals aimd it as long
as they are able; and of the necessity of throwing
over goods in a storm, because it is what we are
averse to in itself, and though we might refuse to do
it, we could not, without incurring shipwreck. In
this sense it is that necessity is pleaded, and allowed,
as an excuse for doing what would otherwise be blame-
able. But in the primitive and wider sense of the
word, it may be applied to cases where there is no
compulsion, nor opposition to the will : for the close
connexion, above spoken of, exists between the will
of any agent and that which is conformable to his
will : thus foreign luxuries are " necessary" for grati-

d Hence inyitmn, which is literally " neocssary," is often so used
as to be nearly equivalent to " unpleasant," or " disadvantageous."

86

Jication to him who delights in them: and the word
is often thus employed : only that, in this case, it is
proper, in order to avoid mistake, to state for what
they are necessary : they are not called simply f* ne-
cessary," (which would imply that they were so in the
secondary and more limited sense, which has been
last mentioned, that is, independently of our will and
choice,) but "necessary for so and so."

Thus also we say, that whatever is willed by an
omnipotent Being, " necessarily" takes place : not
meaning that he is under compulsion, but merely that
there is an universal connexion between the power to
obtain the fulfilment of one's will, and the actual ful-
filment of it,

From confounding together the primary and wider
sense of " necessity," and that secondary and more
limited sense, which implies compulsion or unwilling-
ness, have arisen most of the disputes and perplexities
that have prevailed on this subjecte. Thus, Dr. Paley
says, " in our apprehension, to be under a necessity
of acting according to any rule, is inconsistent with
free agency ; and it makes no difference which we can

e If any one would see a specimen of the degree to which an intelli-
gent writer may be bewildered, by not attending to the ambiguity of
words, and by mistaking them for things, he will find a remarkable one
(among many others) in a note by Law, the ingenious editor of Dr.
King; (chap. v. §. 1. subs. 5 note s,) in which " certain" and " in-
fallible" being regarded as properties o£ events themselves, (which is
as if we were to consider " visible" and " invisible" as intrinsic pro-
perties of eclipses,) and being supposed to ba inconsistent with freedom,
and the words "may," " must," &c. beiug used without any steady
attention to their ambiguity, the whole is involved in inextricable con-
fusion.

87

understand, whether the necessity be internal or exter-
nal, or that the rule is the rule of perfect rectitude'."

It will be seen from what has been said, that I have
regarded all necessity as conditional; that is, as im-
plying always the connexion of one thing with another;
so that whatever is said to be " necessary," is so
called in consideration of something else: and this,
I apprehend, is always the sense conveyed by the word,
even when those who employ it are not distinctly
aware of this ; and hence springs much of the prevailing
confusion of thought. Mr. D. Stewart has pointed
out, what certainly men were not generally aware of
before, that the " necessity" of mathematical truths
is merely conformity to the hypothesis, viz. to the defi-
nitions. For instance, that the angles of a triangle
arc equal to two right angles, may be spoken of in
lofty language as an independent, eternal, self-existent,
" necessary" truth; but this necessity is in fact merely
the connexion between the definition of a triangle and
the equality in question. So, the existence of the
Deity is called " necessary;" an expression which,
when it conveys any distinct idea at all, (which is not
always the case with those who employ it,) signifies
merely the connexion between the existing universe,
and a Being who is the Author of it ; the former idea
is always, in a rational mind, accompanied by the
latter.

Thirdly, There is also another use of the word
" necessary" and of those connected with it : for, as it
has been above remarked that our attention is espe-
cially raited to those connections which we may vainly

f Moral Philosophy, t>. v. c. ii. p. 10, 41.

88

endeavour to destroy, so our attention is likewise parti-
cularly called to those connections which we under-
stand, or at least are aware q/'8. And since of two
things connected together, if the one which is the
hypothesis or antecedent be given, the consequent is
also given, it follows that we know, or are certain of,
the consequent, when we know the hypothesis: and
hence arises the confusion of certainty with M neces-
sity ;" the former of which belongs properly to our
own minds, and is thence, in a transferred sense, ap-
plied to the objects themselves. When we know, first,
the connexion between two things, (which is properly
necessity,) and, secondly, the existence of one of them,
we thence come to know " certainly," that is, with-
out any room for doubt, the existence of the other;
which we sometimes therefore call " certain," some-
times " necessary:" for instance, we say, such a district
is " necessarily," oris "certainly," overflowed; because
■re; are certain, first, that such a river has risen so many
feet, and, secondly, that that rise is connected with
the overflowing of the district in question.

Being thus accustomed to apply to those things
especially the word " necessary," which we know to
be connected with and dependent on such others as
we know to exist, we thus come to fancy a sort of co-
incidence between " necessity" and " knowledge:"

S As " necessary" in the sense just above noticed, is opposed to
" voluntary,*' so in the sense I am now speaking of it is opposed to
" accidental" or " contingent ;" (words which, as has been formerly
remarked, do not denote any quality in events themselves, but only the
relation in which they stand to our knowledge ;) neither of these two
senses is, properly speaking, opposed to the primary sense of '* neces-
sary," but rather they are limitations of it.

89

for instance, we say that a loaded die must necessarily
turn up one particular side ; but that an unloaded one
does not necessarily fall on one side rather than an-
other : the one die therefore has turned up, suppose, a
six, necessarily ; the other, accidentally.

In reality however, the only difference (as far as
concerns the present question) is relative to our know-
ledge : the fall of the latter die being connected with,
and dependent on, the various impulses it received in
the box, &c. as much as that of the other, with the
gravitation of the weight it was loaded with ; only the
operation of the one influence was, or might be, known
to us ; the other could not. Let it be borne in mind
therefore, that when we say the cast of this die was not
necessary, we only mean in fact (if we attach any
precise meaning to our words) that we do not know
why it was necessary ; that is, do not fully know the
operation of the causes which produced it ; for scarce
any one would say it happened without any cause at
all ; and should he explain his meaning in saying this
to be, that if the box had been shaken in some other
way, the cast might have been different; the answer
is, that, on that principle, the other is not to be called
necessary neither ; since if the other die had not been
loaded, or had been loaded differently, the cast of that
also would have been different. In neither case could
the result have been other than it was, supposing all
the circumstances connected with it to remain the same.
When indeed we speak of events in which man's
agency is concerned, as not necessary, and say that
they might have happened otherwise, we sometimes
mean that the agent acted not from compulsion, but

N

90

willingly, and had it in his power to act otherwise;
sometimes, again, that we do not know, or did not
know beforehand, what the compulsion was, or under
what inducements he acted.

The word " necessary" then is used, first, sometimes
to denote the universality or constancy of the con-
nexion between any two things, and consequently, in
any general assertion, to imply merely that what we
say is true without any exception or qualification:
secondly, sometimes to denote compulsion, or inde-
pendence of our will : thirdly, sometimes to denote our
knowledge respecting the matter in question, and our
having no room for doubt about it.

What has been said may serve as a clue to explain
the confused notions of many of the advocates for the
system of necessity, and, I may add, of many of its
opponents also. " If God foresees our actions," it is
said, " they are necessary;" and if they are " neces-
sary," we are not " free." Now in this second clause
the word " necessary" is transferred to the secondary
sense of " compulsory" or " involuntary ;" whereas
the " necessity" (if we choose to call it so) which is
implied by the event's being foreknown, only means,
if we employ the phrase with any kind of precision,
the correspondence of that event to that knowledge8;
its being such as it is known to be; so that " neces-
sary," is here, merely equivalent to " real," in oppo-
sition to " ideal" or " imaginary." If, in any case,
it depends on ush to do, or to abstain from doing, any

E See Dr. Copleston's first Disc. p. 6, 7-

h The Greek expressions iq? nf&iv and «w« i^' hfuv are more precise than
those commonly employed in our language. Vide A rist. Eth. Nicom. b. 8.

91

tiling, and we have a decided inclination — a predomi-
nant will, to do it, then it is (in the primary sense of
the word) a " necessary" consequence that we do it ;
and whoever knows that we have this power and this
will, knows that we shall do so : this knowledge im-
plies necessity in one sense, but not in the other; it
implies the connexion between the cause and the
effect — between our power and our will, and a certain
action; but not any compulsion and opposition to
our will.

But if it be impossible for me to act otherwise than
I do, which it is, if God foreknows my action,
how can I be " free?" This is but the very same
fallacy, in another form of expression ; for " impos-
sible" and " necessary" correspond throughout all
their senses, and arc constantly opposed : and as " ne-
cessary" is sometimes employed to denote compulsion
to do any thing, so is " impossible," to denote re-
straint or absence of power to do it; (which last indeed
seems to be the original meaning of impossible;) but it
is also often used, so as to correspond with another
sense of the word " necessary" to imply merely the ab-
sence of all room for doubt, or (as we often express it)
of all " chance" and " contingency :" for instance, we
say, " such an one, since he possesses the utmost
courage, will necessarily stand to his post;" or it is
" impossible he should fly :" not meaning that he is
under any restraint ; so far from it, the very ground
of our pronouncing it impossible for him to fly, is our
knowledge that it depends on him to do which he
pleases, and our knowing at the same time from his
character, that he has no such inclination.

n 2

92

If then this be all that is meant when one speaks of
the " impossibility" of a man's acting otherwise than
he does, it is plain that it does not at all infringe on
liberty ; since it is evidently possible in the other
sense, for instance, for the brave man to run away ;
that is, he has the power to do so, and may if he chooses :
according to this sense of the word, therefore, we ad-
mit the position, but deny the inference. But if on
the other hand it be meant that the divine prescience
implies impossibility in the other sense, that is, im-
plies that it is not in our power in any case to do
either this or that, according to our choice, the an-
swer is to deny the position; which rests, in fact, on
the fallacy of ambiguity, and which contradicts the
evidence of each man's consciousness.

Those who wish for a more full exposition of this
ambiguity, and of the perplexities and confusion of
thought which have arisen from overlooking it, may
find the subject copiously and clearly treated in
Tucker's "Light of Nature," chap. 26. But Dr.
Copleston has condensed, with his usual perspicuous
conciseness, nearly the very same explanation into
the compass of a single page : " ' Another import-
ant example of the same kind is in the use of the
words possible, and impossible. These are equally
ambiguous with the others, as being applied some-
times to events themselves, and sometimes used with
reference to our conceptions of them — but of these it
is observable that their primary and proper applica-
tion is to events, their secondary and improper to the

' Copleston, p. 81, 82.

93

human mind. Thus we say that a thing is possible
to a man who has the power of doing it — and that is
properly impossible which no power we are acquainted
with can effect. But the words are also conti-
nually used to express our sense of the chance there is
that a thing will be done. When we mean to ex-
press our firm conviction that a thing will not happen,
although there are powers in nature competent to pro-
duce it, we call it impossible, in direct opposition to
those things which we are convinced will happen,
and which we call certain. And thus there are many
things which in one sense are possible, that is, within
the compass of human agency, which again according
to our conviction are absolutely impossible."

The same ambiguity which attends the words pos-
sible and impossible, belongs also to " may," " must,"
" can," and all words of that family: that is, they are
sometimes employed when we are speaking of the
power, or " want of power," to produce any effect,
and sometimes, on the other hand, when we mean to
express the constant or occasional " connexion" of
any two things, or, our certainty or uncertainty re-
specting that connexion : for instance, in the former
sense we say " the King ' may' pardon all criminals ;"
and that " he ' must' submit to sickness and death,
like other men :" in the latter sense, that " either of
two contending armies may be victorious;" and that
he who is fainting with thirst in a desert and has no
reason for abstaining, must eagerly drink when he
comes to a spring. Now these being the very words
commonly employed by writers to explain their mean-
ing when there is any perplexity respecting the use

94

of "possible" and impossible," and yet being them-
selves liable to the very same ambiguity, it thus often
happens that the confusion is increased by the very
means used to clear it up. And this very confusion
is often mistaken by the writers themselves for a sign
of the profundity of their own speculations; they
fancy the stream deep, because it is not clear ; and
not aware that they are bewildered in idle logoma-
chies, exult in their own ingenuity, which is appa-
rently developing important mysteries. Dr. Cople-
ston accordingly expresses a very well grounded
" apprehension of incurring the displeasure of those
who, if my speculations are well-founded, will appear
to have lost their time in logomachy, and to have
wasted their strength in endeavouring to grasp a
phantom, or in fighting the airk."

The arguments and systems which have been thus
reared, remind one of the fog-banks, which at sea
so often delude the anxious mariner ; he fancies him-
self within view of new coasts, with promontories,
and bays, and mountains distinctly discernible; but
a nearer approach, and a more steady observation,
prove the whole to be but an unsubstantial vapour,
ready to melt away into air, and vanish for ever.

And let it not be thought that when we have once
clearly perceived and explained the ambiguity of any
term, we are thenceforth safe from its influence : far
otherwise : it is not without long and habitual atten-
tion to its different meanings, and assiduous vigilance
in the use of it, that we can counteract the ever be-

k Preface, p. xvi.

95

setting tendency to mistake, as Hobbes would say the
" counters" for the " money," the word for the thing,
and to fancy, while we are sliding insensibly from
one meaning into another, that we are still speaking
of the same thing, because we are employing the
same sound.

But some may say, " have I the power of choosing
among several motives, at once present to my mind?
or must I obey the strongest ? for if so, how can I
enjoy free-will ?" Here again is an entanglement
in ambiguous words: "must," and "obey," and
" strongest," suggest the idea (which belongs to them
in their primary sense) of compulsion, and of one person
submitting to another; whereas here, they are only
used figuratively ; the terms " weak" and " strong,"
when applied to motives, denoting nothing but their
less or greater tendency to prevail (that is, to operate,
and take effect) in practice; so that to say, " the
stronger motive prevails," is only another form of
saying, " that which prevails, prevails." " Must,"
again, denotes here no compulsion, but only, that it
would be unmeaning and contradictory to call that the
weaker motive, which (singly) prevails over another ;
and " obey" is used analogously only, to denote the
conformity of the action to the will, which corresponds
to the conformity of a servant to his master's direc-
tions.

We should recollect that when we speak of " incli-
nations," "motives," " will," " reason," " thoughts,"
Sec. operating on the mind, we are not literally stating
the fact ; (as Locke imagined, in his system, of ideas,
which is in truth a metaphysical theory built on a

96

figure of speech ;) for all these are not distinct things
existing in the mind, but states or conditions of the
mind itself; so that it would be more correct, in phi-
losophical discourses, to speak (as Dr. Beattie recom-
mends) of "the mind desiring," "the mind willing,"
" the mind thinking," &c. than of " desires," " will,"
" ideas," &c. Now compulsion or coercion, in the literal
sense, always implies two agents ; whereas the mind,
if we consider rightly, is but one : it is only by a me-
taphor that we are said to " compel ourselves," or to
be " restrained by ourselves1."

A man will often say indeed that he " cannot help
doing so and so, though he knows it is wrong :" but
this is a figurative expression ; and it is of great im-
portance in practice, steadily to bear in mind that it
is so; for no man is blamed or punished (nor could
be, to any purpose) for doing what he, literally,
cannot help ; whereas, when he follows his inclination
in doing what he knows to be wrong, the common
sense of all mankind has decided, and proved by
experience, that it is just, or at least expedient, to
punish him. That "necessity" can alone be pleaded
as a justification, in which a man acts against his
will.

In fact, there is no set of terms more ambiguous
than " self," and the other equivalent expressions :

1 This is illustrated in some degree by the varied use of " shall" and
" will," according to the person in which they are employed. The
practical mode (generally speaking) of conjugating them is. as has often
been remarked, " I will, thou shalt, he shall," and " I shall, thou
■wilt, he will." See however the note on the words " will" and
"shall," p. 16, 17.

97

for instance, if I say that sucli a one " was afflicted
with long illness — that he died — that he was buried in
such a spot — and that I trust he is in a happy state,"
I speak of him in this one sentence in three differ-
ent senses ; namely, as the body alone, as the soul
alone, and as the compound of the two. And more-
over when we are speaking of the spiritual part, mind
or soul, alone, we often reckon one of, what are called,
the parts of this mind, as more especially a man's
" self" than the rest; namely, the "reason" or "con-
science;" for instance, we say, "this man (meaning
his reason) has overcome his passions," or " is over-
come by his passions :" never, that he " has overcome
his reason," or, " is overcome by his reason." Yet
on the other hand, we do sometimes say, that " he
has stifled his conscience," or is " overcome by con-
science." Let it however be steadily kept in mind,
that all these are but figurative expressions m; for we
have no ground for supposing that any of these are
literally parts of the mind, or things existing in it, but
only states, and, as it were, postures, of the mind itself.
For a man to complain then that he is not free be-
cause his conduct is conformable to his own chnrac-

m The absurd theory of Realism, which attributes an independent real
existence to genera and species, seems to have sprung from (he undue
influence on our thoughts, of this kind of language : " When any gene-
ral idea," they said, "as, for instance, that of a triangle, is present to
a multitude of different minds at once, there must surely be some real
thing which all these minds are acting on." The answer is, that when
two men are said to have the same " idea" in their minds, the true
meaning of this expression is, that they arc both thinking alike: just as
when several men are said to be in one and the same bodily posture,
this only means that they are all placed alike.

O

98

ter, and because he cannot voluntarily act against
his own inclination, is (as Tucker remarks) the same
absurdity as to " complain that he cannot walk with-
out walking, or sit still without sitting still." He
may lament indeed that his inclinations are not more
virtuous, his disposition better constituted; and may
be unable to comprehend how he should be respon-
sible to the Author of his being"; and if he is prac-
tically sensible of the frailty of his nature, he may
have the wisdom to apply for the sanctifying grace of
God's holy Spirit, instead of perplexing himself with
an insuperable difficulty : but this difficulty, however
great, belongs not to the present question : the com-
plaint cannot, without an abuse of language, be made
of a want of freedom, since that want consists, accord-
ing to the common sense of mankind, not in follow-
ing our inclination, but in acting against it. If this
principle be once given up, there is no stopping
short of the most absurd results : for instance, I re-
member an ingenious disputant driven, in this way, to
the conclusion, that " that being could alone be free,
who should be the voluntary author of his own first
will :" this he could not deny to be a palpable con-

n Or he may perhaps boldly and impiously complain of his Maker, if
he be in the temper of mind in which Adam after the fall is represented
by Milton :

Did I request thee, Maker, from my clay
To mould me man ? did I solicit thee
From darkness to promote me, or here place
In this delicious garden ? As my will
Concurred not to my being, it were but right,
And equal, to reduce me to my dust.

99

tradiction in terms: so that it would follow, that the
words "voluntary" and "free," and the correspond-
ing terms in all languages, which have been employed
by all men in every age, have no meaning whatever!

Let us not then be driven by any such metaphy-
sical quibbles, to give up the plain, broad, and practi-
cal distinction between voluntary and involuntary
actions; a distinction on which the whole conduct of
life must rest, because it alone leaves an opening for
the influence of admonition, exhortation, threats, pro-
mises, examples, &c.

If a man is likely to meet with any good or evil, in
consequence of his being tall or short, his being born
a negro or a white, his knowing this beforehand can
make no difference in the result; if, on the contrary,
he is likely to meet with any advantage or disadvantage
in consequence of his being diligent or idle, virtuous
or vicious, his knowledge of this circumstance will be
likely to affect the result. This grand distinction,
which is obvious to a child, is precisely all that we
want for every practical purpose.

Let then necessarians of all descriptions but step
forth into the light, and explain their own meaning;
and we shall find that their positions are either ob-
viously untenable, or else perfectly harmless, and
nearly insignificant. If in saying that all things are
fixed and necessary, they mean that there is no such
thing as voluntary action, we may appeal from the
verbal quibbles, which alone afford a seeming support
to such a doctrine, to universal consciousness; which
will authorize even those, who have never entered into
such speculations as the foregoing, to decide on the

o 2

100

falsity of the conclusion, though they are perplexed
with the subtle fallacies of the argument.

But if nothing more be meant than that every event
depends on causes adequate to produce it, that nothing
is in itself contingent, accidental, or uncertain, but is
called so only with reference to a person who does
not know all the circumstances on which it depends;
and that it is absurd to say any thing could have hap-
pened otherwise than it did, supposing all the circum-
stances connected with it to remain the same.- then the
doctrine is undeniably true, but perfectly harmless;
not at all incroaching on free-agency and respon-
sibility, and amounting in fact to little more than an
expansion of the axiom, that "it is impossible for the
same thing to be and not to be."

When however I say that the doctrine is harm-
less, I mean only to those who can keep their minds
stedfastly fixed on this its true interpretation;
for it is very liable to be misapprehended ; and the
errors thus produced are most mischievous. The
generality of men, if told that any thing takes place
necessarily, and could not have been otherwise, will
be apt to consider this necessity as independent of the
very circumstances which give rise to it; and to lose
sight of the equal necessity of these. Thus it is that
Mahomet seems to have taught predestination to his
followers ; and in this sense, it appears, on some oc-
casions they practically adhere to it; as, for instance,
in neglecting to take precautions against the plague.
Thus also the vulgar among us will be apt to say, " If
God foresees I shall be saved, I shall be, live how I
mav ; if, that I shall not be saved, nothing I can do

101

will avail." They will often be unable to perceive
that there is just the same connection between the
conditions and the end, between our own efforts and
our salvation, as there would have been, had no being
existed who could foresee either. It is better there-
fore to tell them that their salvation is contingent;
which is no deceit; for in fact it is so, in the only
sense in which any thing can be contingent ; that is,
we are ignorant respecting our final doom, except so
far that we know it rests with each man to accept
the offers made, or to reject them, and that each will
fare accordingly.

Nor would I say that it is expedient for any one,
even of those who do not mistake the doctrine in
question, to dwell very much, habitually, and exclu-
sively, on this view of the Divine omniscience. The
mind, which is chiefly devoted to such thoughts, is
likely to lose its practical energies. We shall be
going too far if we maintain, without any limitation,
the maxim, that the knowledge of whatever is true
can be no impediment, but rather an aid, to practice;
this holds, in those truths only whose nature we can
fully comprehend, understanding also the whole
system of which they are a part. The contemplation
of any truth that is partially, or that is indistinctly,
known, may prove detrimental in practice : for in-
stance, if a clown could be brought to believe that
the sun stands still, without being also taught that
the earth moves, he would, by the contemplation
of this truth, be far more perplexed than before,
since the vicissitudes of day and night would be quite
at variance with his scanty theoretical knowledge.

102

In like manner, to contemplate very diligently and
habitually the truth, that God has no passions —
cannot literally feel pity for our sufferings, nor take
delight in any glory we can bestow — cannot suffer
any pain from our misconduct, nor be dependent for
enjoyment and gratification on our praise and obe-
dience— on many persons at least, might have an
effect rather hurtful than salutary ; not because. the
doctrine is not true, or ought not to be believed;
but because it relates to so incomprehensible a sub-
ject, that it affords but a partial glimpse of the truth.
In fact, though the Deity cannot have these passions,
there must be something else in Him corresponding
to them, and working analogous effects ; and what
that something is, we are not capable, in our present
state at least, of fully comprehending : and till we are
thus capable, to dwell very much on this partial and
imperfect view of the subject may be inexpedient.

It were to be wished that Calvinistic writers would
universally keep this principle in mind; which it
must be acknowledged many of them have done, with
most laudable caution ; for which very caution, how-
ever, they have in many instances incurred censure.

And here it may be worth while to remark, that,
in inculcating the duty of humility, there is an im-
portant distinction to be observed between two dif-
ferent offices of it, or, as some would express it, two
different kinds of humility, which are not always
found in the same person. The one consists in form-
ing a modest estimate of one's own individual powers
and worth, compared with that of the rest of man-
kind ; the other, in not overrating the human facul-

103

ties — in estimating, as humbly as we ought, the
powers and capacities of man in general. Now there
are many who observe one of these rules, but violate
the other : partly perhaps from not attending to the
difference between them. A man may be entirely
free from personal arrogance — from all undue pre-
tensions to superiority over others — and may, so far,
be justly regarded as a modest and humble-minded
man ; — and yet may err most grievously in exercising
his faculties on subjects which lie out of their reach ;
reasoning and dogmatising on things beyond reason,
and presumptuously prying into the mysteries of the
Most High": nor will he be at all checked in this
fault by any admonitions against despising others and
overrating himself in comparison of them. On the
other hand, a man may be personally arrogant, and
yet form a just and modest estimate of the human
powers ; which appears to have been the case with
Warburton.

On the whole, it may safely be asserted, that the
two chief sources of error in theological and me-
taphysical discussions, are, presumptuous speculation on
mysterious subjects, and inattention to the ambiguities
of language.

0 Thus nullifying, in fact, the duly of faith, so much insisted on
in Scripture : for, doctrines which can be fully comprehended and clearly
explained, there would be no great virtue in believing. See Appendix,
No. II.

No. II.

ON DR. KING'S TREATISE OF THE ORIGIN OF EVIL.

Of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat.

Gen. ii. 17.

THE very high terms in which I have spoken of Dr.
King, and indeed the very circumstance of republish-
ing this discourse, may seem to call for some notice
of his larger work, on the Origin of Evil, by which in-
deed he is much better known. It may be expected,
as that is so nearly connected in many points with
the present work, if it be not republished at the same
time, that either some analysis of the argument should be
given, or at least some reason assigned for omitting it.
The fact is, that I cannot form the same high judg-
ment of that work as of the one before us; nor can ad-
mit that he has accomplished the object proposed.
That there is much ingenuity displayed in the con-
duct of that argument, and also a candid disposition,
is undeniable, and is indeed what every one would
confidently expect, who has perused the present dis-
course. But a treatise of that description, like an
algebraical calculation, docs not admit of many dif-
ferent degrees of value : if there be some such funda-

p

106

mental flaw in the argument as vitiates the whole sys-
tem, the intrinsic worth of the materials is but trifling,
when the edifice they belong to is overthrown.

Now in the opinion of the ablest and most candid
judges, the origin of evil is a mystery still unexplained,
and which most of them (I may add) think will ever
remain so, to such creatures as we now are*. To the
authority of all these therefore I may appeal in sup-
port of my assertion, that there must be some flaw in
the argument which professes to explain it. Mr. D.
Stewart indeed acquiesces in the same mode of ex-
planation as that adopted by Archbishop King, with
the air of one who thinks it too obvious and easy to
need much argument11. " The question," he says,
" how comes evil to exist?" resolves itself into this,
" why was man made a free agent?" but he will not,
I fear, find many, of even half his own depth of
thought and sagacity, who will be so easily satisfied.

1 " That evil exists, and that God is not the author of it, although the
author of every thing else, undoubtedly carries with it as great a difficulty
as the other question we were considering." Copleston's Discourses,
p. 93.

" The only solution of this difficulty I apprehend must be taken from
the imperfection of our understanding; for we have observed in a former
place, that infinite goodness and infinite power, considered in the ab-
stract, seem incompatible : which shews there is something wrong in
our conceptions, and that we are not competent judges of what belongs,
and what is repugnant, to goodness. But God knows though we do not,
and is good and righteous in all his ways ; therefore whatever method
he pursues is an evidence of its rectitude beyond all other evidences that
can offer to us for the contrary." Tucker's Light of Xature, c. xxvi.
p. 987.

•• See Stewart's Outlines of Moral Philosophy, Part II. c. ii. §. 1.
art. 2. p. 895 — 499.

107

Dr. King's argument is substantially the same;
though he considers it as requiring an elaborate train
of reasoning.

He endeavours to establish as the basis of his sys-
tem, as far as regards moral evil, (what the majority
probably would be disposed to admit,) that a greater
sum of good is produced by the creation of agents
acting freely and by their own will and choice, than
could be, if none such existed. This being granted,
he proceeds to argue that beings who have this free
choice, (at least created, and consequently imperfect
beings,) must needs be liable to do wrong : we need
not therefore be surprised, under such circumstances,
at the existence of sin ; and moral evil being thus
admitted, there would remain, to most minds, no diffi-
culty in comprehending the existence of any other
kind of evil. This I conceive to be (though I have
not adhered to his arrangement) a fair account of the
real sum and substance of the whole argument;
several other expressions, which are introduced in the
course of it, being in reality merely equivalent to that
one, of " liable to sin."

Considering the eminent candour and good inten-
tion of the writer, the importance of the object he
had in view, and, I may add, the satisfactoriness of
his argument to many minds, it is not without sincere
regret that I am compelled to state my conviction,
that the whole argument rests on the use made (un-
designedly I have, no doubt) of ambiguous words.
Truth however is not only intrinsically valuable, but
is always in the long run expedient. That the de-
tection of the fallacy which runs through this argu-

p2

108

ment should be likely to lead some to a disgust for the
religion itself, which they fancy to depend upon it, is
what I should be inclined antecedently to conjecture,
even if I had not happened to know by experience
that such has been the fact.

The fallacy lies in the expression " liable to sin ;"
and there is a corresponding ambiguity in the words
" must," " possible," " impossible," " contingent," &c.
which are brought in to explain it ; a circumstance
which involves those who have overlooked the am-
biguity in the first instance, in continually increased
confusion the further they advance.

What this ambiguity is, I have already endeavoured
to explain in the dissertation on the word " neces-
sity." When it is said, that, for an agent to be free,
and act according to his own choice, it must be
" possible" for him to act wrong, and that therefore
he must be " liable" to sin, &c. this is undoubtedly
true, if understood to signify merely that he is left at
full liberty to do what he chooses — that it must be in
his power (and in that sense, possible) to do right or
wrong — and that it must depend on himself, not on
any external compulsion, how he shall act : but then
this I fear does not explain the difficulty; which is
not why men should have the power, but why they
should have the will to do wrong, and why they
actually do it.

But if when it is said that a free agent must be
" liable to sin," it is meant that he must be such as
may actually be expected to do so, this would indeed,
if admitted, solve the difficulty ; but it is in fact beg-
ging the question : nor is there any ground (in our pre-

109

sent state of knowledge) for admitting it. We can
conceive a free agent, not indeed destitute of the
power to sin, but destitute of the inclination, or having
a stronger inclination to do right; and for such a
being it would be in one sense possible, and in the
other sense not possible, that he should do wrong.
The whole argument in fact turns on this ambiguous
use of the word " possible," and of those related to it.
c But then, it is said, " must not a created, and conse-
quently imperfect being be liable to sin, if left free?"
The word " imperfect," again, is no less ambiguous;
if it be understood to mean faulty, sinful, and frail,
the proportion is identical; but if by an imperfect
being is meant merely one who has not the highest
conceivable excellence of intellectual faculties — whose
knowledge and whose power are limited, and who is
subject to pain, &c. it does not appear how such
imperfections are inconsistent with faultless morality :
in fact, even in the world as it is, we do not find that
those whose intellect is the highest, and who in that
sense are the nearest to perfection, are always the
most virtuous; many men of very moderate capacity
come often much nearer to perfection in the per-
formance of their duties.

That the power to do any thing does not imply that
it may be expected actually to take place, and that
consequently the power to do wrong, which a free
being is implied to have, does not explain the actual
existence of that wrong, is evident, if we either reflect
on the difference of the senses in which " possible" is

' Sc; c. v. is. v. subsect. ii. U 14. of Dr. Kind's Origin of Kvil.

110

used, or if we look around us at what is actually passing.
For instance, are not mankind at full liberty, if they
choose it, to quit their houses and clothing, and to
crawl about among the brutes, and feed on the grass
of the field ? Surely it is in that sense " possible" for
them to do so ; that is, it depends on them whether
they will do this or not : but does any one therefore
expect that they will? On the contrary, every one
would pronounce it to be " impossible;" that is, what
can never rationally be looked for ; because, though
men have it in their power, they have no such dis-
position: they are not restrained by any compulsion
from acting thus, but only by their internal conviction
of the absurdity of it: and no one holds himself the
less free, on account of his rejecting that absurdity.
Now if we consider that sin is in truth a much greater
absurdity, it is, as far as we can judge, conceivable
(though it is but too much unlike what we are used
to see,) that a being perfectly free might perceive as
strongly this absurdity, and act as constantly on that
perception, as men now perceive, and avoid, the ab-
surdity of living like brutes.

If it be said that such a being would not be in a
state of trial, we should remember that man cannot
be, literally, tried by his Maker, (since trial, in the
literal sense, always implies that he who makes the
trial does not know the result:) but according to the
principle so admirably laid down in Dr. King's ser-
mon, that we are said by analogy to be in a state of
trial, because as a master who is making trial of his
servant, how he will perform his duty, rewards him if
he does well, and punishes him if he does ill ; so we

Ill

may expect to be rewarded or punished according as
we choose to act well or ill, just as we should, if God
were really uncertain how we should actd. This
analogous sense is the only one in which we can be
said to be in a state of trial; and in that sense, such
a being as I have supposed may be conceived to be
no less in a state of trial. Nay, he might even be
exposed to temptation ; that is, might have some in-
clinations, which if gratified indiscriminately, and un-
controlled by reason, would lead to evil; but which
his reason would always be strong enough so to con-
trol : just as a kind mother, (indeed almost every
mother,) may be confidently expected, if she has but
a scanty portion of food, to impart a portion of it to
her child, though she not only has the power to let it
starve, by attending only to her own supply, but also
is solicited by hunger to do so.

In fact, there actually have been, and are, we
trust, many, whose lives have been such, not indeed
as to merit salvation, but to permit and ensure their
attainment of it according to God's promises: though
we cannot suppose but that these persons were ex-

d It may perhaps be worth while to observe, that the word trial
is employed in two senses; namely, with reference to the future, and
to the past : we make trial, for instance, of a servant, to see what his
conduct w Hi be; (in this sence the word "prove" n more commonly
nsed by our Bible-translators than *' try;") and we bring to trial one of
whom we would ascertain what his conduct has been. These two
senses are perhaps sometimes confounded together, in our application of
the word to God's dealings with mankind. It is a matter however of no
practical consequence, provided we remember, that analogically the
word may be thus so applied in both senses, but literally, in neither ;
since both senses imply uncertainty in the person who makes the trial.

112

posed to temptations, and tried, in the only sense in
which a creature can be understood to be tried by his
omniscient Creator.

But should it be said, "that if the world were stocked
with beings thus exempted, (though not by compul-
sion and restraint, yet by the strength of their reason
and purity of their nature,) from all chance of sin,
there would then be no room for the practice of what
we now call virtue ; this is most undeniably true, and
ought studiously to be borne in mind. This truth
cannot be better expressed than in the words of Dr.
Copleston, which I will take the liberty of citing:
* As without the presence of danger it is not easy to
conceive any proof of courage, or of temperance with-
out lust, or of obedience without temptation to do
wrong, so there is no room for the exercise of for-
bearance, forgiveness, and generosity, without stif-
fering wrong. Without pain and privation there
can be no patience — without distress in others, no
sympathy in ourselves — no occasion for pity, for
relief, for succour, for consolation, for any of those
acts of love and charity, which are perhaps the most
efficacious towards our own improvement, and to-
wards fitting us for the enjoyment of a higher state
of being*." And we had much better stop here, than
attempt to pry any further into the inscrutable plans
of the Deity. That it was impossible for man to be
so constituted as to attain the highest happiness with-
out this kind of moral discipline, I most firmly and
reverently believe, simply because God has ordained

e Page GO, CI.

113

things as they are, not because I can perceive why it
was impossible : that any such sinless being as I have
above supposed, actually exists, or can possibly exist,
I am far from asserting : " To suppose that kind of
moral excellence, which leads to higher and higher
degrees of happiness, to be attainable without previous
trial, may, for aught we know, be as absurd as to sup-
pose a circle with unequal radii; and to suppose trial
without evil seems to be equally absurd f:" all I con-
tend for is, that we cannot perceive or prove (as Dr.
King maintains we can) any thing contradictory in
such a supposition ; and that, for aught we know, such
an agent might be as free as ourselves. But that
there is some good reason for our not having been so
constituted, though that reason is not known to us,
is a doctrine in which I most humbly acquiesce; and
surely it is better frankly to acknowledge our igno-
rance, provided we do so in patient humility, not suffer-
ing it to lead us to irreverent objections and arrogant
scepticism, than to dogmatize concerning mysteries
beyond our reach, and bewildering ourselves and
others with the subtleties of logomachy, lay the found-
ation of incurable and most mischievous perplexity,
to those who shall in time perceive the failure of our
attempts to explain what we profess to regard as ex-
plicable.

There is no kind of wisdom more valuable,
and unfortunately none more rare, than the right
estimate of the weakness of our own faculties, and of
the limits of our knowledge : nor can reason be

1 Cop'etton, p. 61.

2

114

better employed than in deciding where her opera-
tions must be stopped.

Nescire velle quae magister optimus
Docere non vult erudita inscitia est

But so far are men in general from perceiving this,
that they are apt to consider him as the wisest, who
professes to explain the most, and him as the most
ignorant, who is the most ready to confess his igno-
rance ; and what is still more remarkable, they are
usually less offended with one who professes to un-
derstand what they cannot, than with one who con-
fesses his inability to understand what they profess
to find intelligible. In the former case, they flatter
themselves that they may hereafter understand the
matter as well as he does ; or that they might do so,
if they would devote their attention to it ; in the
latter case, they feel galled by a sort of insinuated
reproach, as if they were obliquely accused of satisfy-
ing themselves with an unsound explanation, and
•either stupidly overlooking, or insidiously disguising,
their own ignorance.

I fully expect therefore to incur more censure from
many bold explainers, that if I had advanced the
most rash hypotheses, and ventured on the wildest
speculations: but I hope to have credit with the
moderate and candid, (even if they think they can
comprehend what I have acknowledged to be beyond
my reach,) for a sincere desire at least " to prove all
things, and hold fast that which is good."

It is painful to be obliged to bring a charge of any
thing like presumptuous speculation against such an

115

author as Dr. King ; whose present discourse contains
perhaps the most forcible and judicious cautions
against it that are any where to be found. But
candour compels me to admit, that the very rules he
has here so admirably laid down, are but too often
transgressed throughout his treatise on the origin of
evil. To take one passage (and one out of many) as
a specimen, let the judicious reader, who has perused
the foregoing discourse, decide for himself whether
the principles laid down in it are not violated by
such language as the following. " We have seen in
the former subsection, that some things are adapted
to the appetites by the constitution of nature itself,
and on that account are good and agreeable to them ;
but that we may conceive a power which can produce
goodness or agreeableness in the things, by conform-
ing itself to them, or adapting them to it : hence
things please this agent, not because they are good in
themselves, but become good because they are
chosen. We have demonstrated before, how great a
perfection, and of what use such a power would be ;
and that there is such a power in nature appears
from hence, namely, we must necessarily believe that
God is invested with it.

" II. For in the first place, nothing in the creation is
either good or bad to him before his election, he has
no appetite to gratify with the enjoyment of things
without him. He is therefore absolutely indifferent
to all external things, and can neither receive benefit
nor harm from any of them. What then should de-
termine his will to act? Certainly nothing without
him ; therefore he determines "himself, and creates to

22

116

himself a kind of appetite by choosing. For when
the choice is made, he will have as great attention
and regard to the effectual procuring of that which
he has chosen, as if he were excited to this endea-
vour by a natural and necessary appetite. And he
will esteem such things, as tend to accomplish these
elections, good; such as obstruct them, evil"."

1 It is not to the argument of the foregoing passage
that I am at present wishing to call the reader's at-
tention, but to the confident tone in which it treats

k Dr. King, c. v. §. 1. subs. 4. p. 284.

1 The peculiar notions of Dr. King respecting fiee-will, although
he builds much upon them, I have not thought fit to examine, because
it appears to me, that if all he says concerning it be admitted, (keeping
clear however of the ambiguity of the word "possible,") we should not
be the nearer to a solution of the difficulty in question. Of the exist-
ence of" free-will," in the popular sense of the word, no rational doubt
can be entertained : it is applied, I apprehend, to those cases where ft
man acts agreeably to his wishes, in contradistinction to th6se where he
chooses the least of two evils: for instance, if a soldier puts his captives
to death by the order of bis commander, though he himself would
rather have spared them, he is afree agent indeed, for he might submit
to be punished himself instead of obeying ; but be is said to act against
his will: but if he exercises the same cruelty without any orders, he
is said to do it of his own free-will. Dr. King however uses the term
in a widely differeut meaning, and one to which 1 must confess I have
never been able by the most patient attention to attach any precise
sense.

But be this as it may, if this " free-will of indifference" take place
only when we choose between two or more objects, of which neither
has any claim to a preference ; as, for instance, which of two duplicate
copies of the same book we shall read in ; then as there is no right or
wrong in the choice, this will not explain the origin of moral evil : but
if it be contended that a man is ever led, by this free-will, to do what
he knows to be wrong, without any other, or any other adequate, tempt-
ation, so far is this from explaining the difficulty, that (if we admit the

117

of the nature and workings of the Divine mind, as if
we were capable of forming distinct notions on such
a subject.

The same air of confidence appears in numberless
other passages of the same book; though no one has
given a more judicious and forcible warning against
it than the author himself. This should teach us
not to rest satisfied with having merely admitted, once
for all, but also to keep steadily in view, the necessity
of a most reverent and trembling caution and self-dis-
trust, when we speak of " the secret things that be-
long unto the Lord our God." Dr. Copleston's very
just remark on the presumptuous language of another
writer, is but too applicable in this case also : " the
boldness with which things that the angels desire to
look into, are in this manner treated, as if they were
the proper subject of human augmentation, is no
slight evidence of the unsoundness of those opinions
which it is employed in supporting"1."

I cannot dismiss the subject without a few practical
remarks relative to the difficulty in question.

First, let it be remembered, that it is not peculiar
to any one theological system : let not therefore the
Calvinist or the Arminian urge it as an objection
against their respective adversaries; much less an
objection clothed in offensive language, which will be

fact) onr astonishment is naturally increased at the existence of such
a depravity of disposition as can thus prefer evil for evil's sake. But
Dr. King appears to be throughout entangled in the ambiguity of the
words " possible," &c. which he seems never clearly to have perceived,
or at least nut to have steadily kept in view.
m Coplcston, p. 98.

118

found to recoil on their own religious tenets, as soon
as it shall be perceived, that both parties are alike
unable to explain the difficulty; let them not, to
destroy an opponent's system, rashly kindle a fire
which will soon extend to the no less combustible
structure of their own.

Secondly, let it not be supposed that this difficulty
is any objection to revealed religion. Revelation
leaves us, in fact, as to this question, just where it
found us : reason tells us that evil exists, and shews
us how to avoid it : revelation tells us more of the
nature and extent of the evil, and gives us better
instructions for escaping it ; but why any evil at all
should exist, is a question it does not profess to clear
up ; and it were to be wished that its incautious ad-
vocates would abstain from representing it as making
this pretension ; which is in fact wantonly to provoke
such objections as they have no power to answer. In
truth, revelation cannot fairly be complained of for
not solving the difficulty : its object is manifestly not
to gratify speculative curiosity, but to meet the wants
and guide the conduct of believers : now, supposing
the same actual existence of evil, it does not appear
how an explanation of its origin should be requisite
in order to instruct us in guarding against it. And
this actual existence of evil, if admitted at all as an
objection, must lie no less against natural than against
revealed religion. Now the plain common sense and
good principle of every right minded man will guard
him against admitting it as an objection to religion
universally ; or at least such an objection as to justify
atheistical doctrines: for,

119

Thirdly, our notions of the moral attributes of the
Deity are not derived (as Dr. Paley contends they
are") from a bare contemplation of the created uni-
verse, without any notions of what is antecedently
probable, to direct and aid our observations. Nor is
it true (few indeed would now, I apprehend, assent
to that part of his doctrine) that man has no moral
faculty — no natural principle of preference for virtue
rather than vice — benevolence rather than malice ; but
that being compelled by the view of the universe to
admit that God is benevolent, is thence led, from pru-
dential motives alone", to cultivate benevolence in him-
self, with a view to secure a future reward. The truth
I conceive is exactly the reverse of this ; viz. that man
having in himself a moral faculty, or taste, as some
prefer to call it, by which he is instinctively led to
approve virtue and disapprove vice, is thence disposed
and inclined antecedently, to attribute to the Creator
of the universe, the most perfect and infinitely highest
of beings, all those moral (as well as intellectual)

n " The proof of the divine goodness rests upon two propositions,
each, as we contend, capable of be;ng made out by observations drawn
from the appearance of nature," &c. &c. Paley 't Nat. TAeol. c. S6.

°" We conclude, therefore, that God wills and wishes the happiness
of his creatures. And this conclusion being once established, we are at
liberty to go on with the rule built upon it, namely, that the method
of coming at the will of God, concerning any action by the light of
nature, is to enquire into the tendency of that action to promote or
diminish the general happiness." Paley' a Moral Philosophy, vol. i. b. ii.
c v. p. 79- See also c. 5. b. i. and c. 3. b. ii. of the same work.

P Whether we regard this wilh Dr. Butler, and Mr. D. Stewart, as an
original faculty — one of the simple principles of our nature— or with
A. Smith, as resulting necessarily from the original and uni\ ersal principle
of sympathy, is of no practical consequence in the present discussion.

120

qualities which to himself seem the most worthy of ad-
miration, and intrinsically beautiful and excellent:
for to do evil rather than good, appears to all men
(except to those who have been very long hardened
and depraved by the extreme of wickedness) to imply
something of weakness, imperfection, corruption, and
degradation. I say, " disposed and inclined," because
our admiration for benevolence, wisdom, &c. would
not alone be sufficient to make us attribute these to the
Deity, if we saw no marks of them in the creation ;
but our finding in the creation many marks of con-
trivance, and of beneficent contrivance, together
with the antecedent bias in our own minds, which
inclines us to attribute goodness to the supreme
Being q — both these conjointly, lead us to the con-
clusion that God is infinitely benevolent, notwith-
standing the admixture of evil in his works, which

1 " The peculiar sentiment of approbation with which we regard the
virtue of beneBcence in others, and the peculiar satisfaction with
which we reflect on such of our own actions as hare contributed to the
happiness of mankind ; to which we may add, the exquisite pleasure
accompanying the exercise of all the kind affections, naturally lead us to
consider benevolence or goodness as the supreme attribute of the Deity.
— In this mannner, without any examination of the fact, we have a
strong presumption for the goodness of the Deity ; and it is only after
establishing this presumption a priori, that we can proceed to examine
the fact with safety. It is true indeed, that, independently of this pre-
sumption, the disorders we see would not demonstrate ill intention in
the Author of the universe; as it would be still possible that these might
contribute to the happiness and the perfection of the whole system. — But
the contrary supposition would be equally possible ; that there is no-
thing absolutely good in the universe, and that the communication of
suffering is the ultimate end of the laws by which it is governed."
Stewart's Outlines of Moral Philosophy, part ii. c. ii. §. i. Art. ii.
1[ 887, 288. page 908.

121

\vc cannot account for. But these appearances of
evil would stand in the way of such a conclusion, if
man really were, what Dr. Paley represents him, a
being destitute of all moral sentiment, all innate and
original admiration for goodness : he would in that
case be more likely to come to the conclusion (as
many of the heathen seem actually to have done r) that
the Deity was a being of a mixed or of a capricious
nature ; an idea which, shocking as it is to every well-
constituted mind, would not be so in the least, to such
a mind as Dr. Paley attributes to the whole human
species. To illustrate this argument a little further,
let us suppose a tasteful architect and a rude savage to
be both contemplating a magnificent building, un-
finished, or partially fallen to ruin ; the one, not being
at all able to comprehend the complete design, nor
having any taste for its beauties if perfectly exhibited,
would not attribute any such design to the author of
it, but would suppose the prostrate columns and rough
stones to be as much designed as those that were erect
and perfect ; the other would sketch out in his own
mind something like the perfect structure of which he
beheld only a part ; and though he might not be able
to explain how it came to be unfinished or decayed,
would conclude that some such design was in the
mind of the builder : though this same man, if he were
contemplating a mere rude heap of stones which bore
no marks of design at all, would not in that case draw

r In consequence, partly, of the depravation of their moral faculty,
partly of the gross ignorance which kept out of their sight so much of
the beneficent contrivance to he perceived in the universe.

If

122

such a conclusion. Or again, suppose two persons,
one having an ear for music, and the other totally des-
titute of it, were both listening to a piece of music im-
perfectly heard at a distance, or half drowned by other
noises, so that only some notes of it were distinctly
caught, and others were totally lost or heard imper-
fectly; the one might suppose that the sounds he heard
were all that were actually produced, and think the
whole that met his ear to be exactly such as was
designed ; but the other would form some notion of a
piece of real music, and would conclude that the in-
terruptions and imperfections of it were not parts of
the design, but were to be attributed to his imperfect
hearing : though if he heard, on another occasion, a
mere confusion of sounds without any melody at all,
he would not conclude that any thing like music was
designed.

The application is obvious: the wisdom and
goodness discernible in the structure of the universe,
but imperfectly discerned, and blended with evil, leads
a man who has an innate approbation of those attri-
butes, to assign them to the Author of the universe,
though he be unable to explain that admixture of evil ;
but if man were destitute of moral sentiments, the
view of the universe, such as it appears to us, would
hardly lead him to that conclusion.

The defect which I have noticed in Dr. Paley's
" Moral Philosophy" is now pretty generally acknow-
ledged : but it is not so generally perceived that his
" Natural Theology" is (as it could not but be) infected
with the same : and that by this means he has left a
flaw in that, otherwise most admirable argument.

123

In defence of the justness of these conclusions,
which have been drawn respecting the divine benevo-
lence, it is worth while to observe that they derive no
inconsiderable weight from Authority; i. e. from
the authority of mankind at large, considered as ra-
tional beings. Who are those that consider their
God or Gods as malevolent, or as capricious, and
subject to human passions and vices? The rudest and
stupidest and most degraded savages. Now we judge
of what is bitter and sweet, by the taste, not of a
feverish patient, but of one in the most perfect health:
we call that good music, which is approved by those
who have cultivated and brought to perfection the
musical faculty : and we reckon that the proper and
natural mode of growth and produced a plant, which
it exhibits, not in the greatest number of cases, but in
the soil and climate best adapted to it, and such as are
best fitted to bring it to perfection. It is without
good ground therefore that the savage life is called a
state of nature s: civilization is rather the natural
state of man, since he has evidently a natural tendency
towards it. And it would be most extravagant to sup-
pose that his advance towards a more improved and
exalted state of existence should tend to obliterate true
and instil false notions. Those therefore must be the
natural sentiments of man, which are the sentiments

* It i3 remarkable that savages are so far from leading a natural
life, that they scarcely ever suffer even the human form to attain its
fair and natural proportions, but disfigure and mutilate it by .some
devices of their own ; either compressing the skull, flattening the nose,
elongating the ears, crippling the feet, or tattooing the skin, &c.

H 3

124

of civilized man. The Mahometan nations, who are
considerably advanced in civilization, give a far more
amiable representation of the Deity than the rudest
Pagans : but the fullest conviction of the most sublime
and perfect moral excellence in the Author of the
universe, is the most completely established among
that portion of the human race who possess the most
knowledge, intelligence, and cultivation. Surely it is
in this way that an appeal to the reason of mankind
ought to be conducted; viz. not collecting the votes
numerically, but looking to the judgment of the
wisest and best : and an appeal so conducted must
have very great weight with every rational mind.

Fourthly, the doctrine of man's responsibility is not
impaired but rather confirmed by resting it, not on
presumptuous explanations of the divine justice, but
on its true basis, viz. first, the natural and, as it may
be called, instinctive principle of conscience ; which
leads all men (and led even those of the heathens who
thought nothing about the divine justice) to feel self-
reproach, and self-approbation — an inward sense of
their own ill -desert or good-desert, for certain actions,
respectively, even where they have no clear expec-
tation of punishment and reward. Secondly, the
analogy of nature, so well pointed out by the great
Butler; which leads us to conjecture that, as a ge-
neral rule at least, virtue will always lead to the
greatest share of happiness, and vice, of misery.
Thirdly, and chiefly, the express declarations of Reve-
lation, which, though it does not give any explanation
how man comes to be responsible, is so clear as to the

125

fact, as to leave no rational doubt in the mind of any
one who believes the Scriptures '.

Lastly, let the preachers of the Gospel bear in
mind that the object of that Gospel is not to ex-
plain the causes of moral evil, but to remedy its effects.
Let them, after being satisfied that the Scriptures are
the word of God, seek for such instruction respecting
his nature, and his dealings with man, as they afford 1
Let them remember, themselves, and sedulously warn
their flocks, that it was the craving after FORBIDDEN
KNOWLEDGE which expelled our first parents from
paradise; a temptation which still besets their posterity.
Let them remember, that though Scripture invites
enquiry into questions within the reach of our facul-
ties, (for our Lord bids the Jews " search the Scrip-
tures," to ascertain when He were indeed the foretold
Messiah,) it demands faith, implicit faith, in mysteries
which it does not attempt to clear up ; and insists on
faith as the fundamental point of religion. Let them
shun those therefore who profess, by simplifying and
explaining these mysteries, to make faith easy, and

1 " When this author (Edwards) asks, ' How can men know they
shall be rewarded or punished in a future state but from the consi-
deration of God's justice ?' I answer confidently, we know it from
the Scriptures, and we could know it in no other way." Copletton,
p. 139.

u '■ Let us keep to Scripture : and Scripture so understood will never
lead us beyond our depth. It is only by going out of Scripture, by
building theories of our own upon suhjects of which we must have an
imperfect knowledge, that such apparent contradictions are produced.
If we set up these notions of our own as the standard of faith, and
require a peremptory assent to all the inferences which appear to flow
from them, we quit the true, the revealed God, and betake ourselves
to the idols of uir own brain." Cnplcsion, p. 141.

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