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The Rise and
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US. Ground Forces in Vietnam, 1965
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The Rise and Fall
of an
American Army
U.S. Ground Forces in Vietnam
1965-1973
Shelby L. Stanton
Copyright 1985 by Shelby L. Stanton
Published by Presidio Press
31 Pamaron Way, Novato CA 94947
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or uti-
lized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including
photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval
systems, without permission in writing from the Publisher. Inquiries
should be addressed to Presidio Press, 31 Pamaron Way, Novato, CA
94947.
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Stanton, Shelby L., 1948-
The rise and fall of an American army.
Bibliography: p.
Includes index.
1. Vietnamese Conflict, 1961-1975 United States.
2. United States. Army History Vietnamese Conflict,
1961-1975. L Title.
DS558.S73 1985 959.704'342 84-26616
ISBN 0-89141-232-8
Printed in the United States of America
Dedicated to the United States Soldiers and Marines
who served in Vietnam, Thailand, Cambodia,
and Laos from 1961-1975.
"The Call To Arms", by Auguste Rodin
Contents
Foreword x
Introduction xv
PART ONE: 1965
Chapter 1. Advisors and Special Forces 3
1. Advisors at War 3
2. Special Forces at War 8
3. Special Forces Under Siege 11
Chapter 2. An Army Girds for Battle 18
1. An Army Enters Vietnam 18
2. A Battle for Troops 24
Chapter 3. Marines at War 29
1. "Send in the Marines!" 29
2. The Marines Land 31
3. The First Battle 35
4. A Battle in the Monsoon 40
Chapter 4. An Army Goes to War 45
1. The Rock Regiment 45
2. The Eagle Brigade 48
3. The 1st Cavalry Division Goes to Vietnam 52
4. The la Drang Valley Campaign 56
PART TWO: 1966
Chapter 5. The Build-Up 65
1. Higher Headquarters and More Battalions 65
2. The 1st Marine Division Arrives 67
3. The 4th Infantry Division Goes to War 69
4. The Raising of the 199th Infantry Brigade 70
5. The 25th Infantry Division Deploys 71
VI
CONTENTS vii
6. The llth Armored Cavalry Adds Armored Punch 74
7. The 196th Infantry Brigade Is Diverted 76
8. The 9th Infantry Division Goes Over 78
Chapter 6. The Area War 81
1. 1966 Campaign Strategy 81
2. Army Tactics in 1966 85
3. Air Assault 88
4. Helicopters at War 91
5. A Crisis of Pilots 95
Chapter 7. The Central Front 97
1. Battles for Base Camps, Plantations, and Roads 97
2. Battles for Jungles, Valleys, and Plains 109
Chapter 8. The Northern Front 117
1. The Marine Offensive 117
2. Trouble in I Corps Tactical Zone 120
3. Guarding the DMZ 125
PART THREE: 1967
Chapter 9. The Year of the Big Battles 133
1. 1967 Command Performance 133
2. A Matter of Muscle 137
3. The 101st Airborne Division Flies In 140
Chapter 10. Battle for the Saigon Approaches 142
1. Saigon Defense and the Iron Triangle Attack 142
2. Into War Zone C 147
3. Enterprising in Long An Province 153
Chapter 11. Battle for the Highlands 157
1. Western Battles 157
2. Guarding the Border 164
3. The Battle of Dak To 168
Chapter 12. Holding the Line 179
1. The DMZ Spring Campaign 179
2. The DMZ Campaign Continues 183
3. The Marine Coastal Campaign 189
Chapter 13. Battle for the Coast 191
1. A Task Force Named Oregon 191
2. Battle for the Bong Son Plains 197
viii CONTENTS
PART FOUR: 1968
Chapter 14. Year of Crises 205
1, 1968: Military Posture in Vietnam 205
2, 1968: Military Posture at Home 211
3, Other Vietnam Military Considerations 215
Chapter 15. The Battles of Tet-68 219
1. Tet-68: Saigon 219
2, Tet-68: Capitol Command Battles Beyond Saigon 227
3. Tet-68: I Corps and Hue 231
4, Tet-68: Countrywide 240
Chapter 16. Siege and Breakthrough 247
1. Khe Sanh: The Siege Begins 247
2. Khe Sanh: The Pressure Mounts (Lang Vei) 250
3. Khe Sanh: Siege and Relief 254
Chapter 17. Counteroffensive 260
1. Into the A Shau Valley 260
2. Action Along the DMZ 264
3. Incidents on the Northern Front 269
4. Mini-Tet and Beyond 273
PART FIVE: 1969
Chapter 18. One War 283
1. One War and Vietnamization 283
2. The 1969 Post-Tet Offensive 287
3. Convoy Battles 289
4. Decline of an Army 293
Chapter 19. One War in the Northern Provinces 295
1. Guarding Borders 295
2. Guarding the Coast 303
Chapter 20. One War in the Southern Provinces 308
1. Guarding the Cambodian Frontier 308
2. Guarding the Saigon Approaches 319
3. 1969 Army Field Performance 323
PART SIX: 1970-1973
Chapter 21. A Changing War 335
1. Cross Border Attack 335
CONTENTS ix
2. War at Large 342
3. An Army in Transition 346
Chapter 22. An Army Departs the War 350
1. Into Laos 350
2. "Dynamic Defense" 355
3. An Army Retreats 361
4. Conclusion 363
Guide to Unit Organization and Terms 369
Sources and Bibliography 371
Index 395
MAPS
Annual Campaign maps (following Part openers):
Part 1 South Vietnam, 1965
Part 2 South Vietnam, 1966
Part 3 South Vietnam, 1967
Part 4 South Vietnam, 1968
Part 5 South Vietnam, 1969
Part 6 South Vietnam, 1970-1973
Battle Maps (following page 368):
U.S. Military Presence in Vietnam
The DMZ Front
Hue and the A Shau Valley
Phuoc Ha-Que Son-An Hoa Valleys
la Drang Valley
Junction City and Cedar Falls
The Dak To Battlefield, 1967
The Saigon-Bien Hoa-Long Binh Area
Khe Sanh Area and Lam Son 719 Offensive
FOREWORD
On the wall of the War Plans Directorate in the Army General
Staff used to hang a poster of a World War II infantryman with
fixed bayonet advancing against the enemy. Underneath was the
caption, "At the end of the most grandiose plans and strategies
is a soldier walking point." It was a warning that if the soldier
leading the attack could not carry the day, or if the mission was
beyond his capabilities, then the plans and strategies were
worthless. One of the terrible tragedies of the Vietnam war was
that the reverse of that saying also proved to be true. No matter
how bravely or how well the soldier on the point did his job,
if the plans and strategies were faulty, all the courage and
bloodshed were for naught.
Since the end of the war, several works have been published
examining the grievous faults of America's Vietnam war plans
and strategies. Some of these accounts written, it is important
to note, by self-proclaimed "experts" who never set foot in Viet-
nam itself, much less on the battlefield have unconscionably
extended these faults to the soldiers who fought the war. Tarred
with the brush of America's defeat, their bravery, their dedi-
cation, and their sacrifices have been denied, ignored, and for-
gotten. Now for the first time Captain Shelby L. Stanton, a
Vietnam combat veteran decorated for valor and now retired as
a result of wounds suffered on the battlefield, gives us the full
story of those soldiers on the point.
In so doing, Captain Stanton exposes some of the more per-
nicious myths that have distorted our understanding of the Viet-
FOREWORD xi
nam-war battlefield. Born at the highest levels, these myths be-
gan to develop even before Army combat forces were committed
to Vietnam. By the early 1960's, guerrilla war had become ro-
manticized and quite fashionable among intellectual circles. Per-
ceived as "a whole new kind of warfare," it was to be met with
an equally romanticized response counterinsurgency. Subse-
quently ordered into execution in 1962 by President Kennedy
himself, then Army Chief of Staff General George H. Decker
tried to explain to the President that "any good soldier can han-
dle guerrillas." The President responded that "guerrilla fighting
was a special art," and soon thereafter General Decker was re-
moved from office. But from a lifetime as an infantry officer,
General Decker knew something that President Kennedy's so-
phisticated civilian advisors could never know: that for the ri-
fleman, there is only one kind of war total war where the
stakes are kill or be killed. In Washington and in higher military
headquarters, the fine academic distinctions between general war,
limited war, revolutionary war, or guerrilla war may make some
sense, but at the foxhole level such distinctions are meaningless.
But because these realities of war were dismissed as old-
fashioned and out-of-date, the mythology of guerrilla war col-
ored America's perception of the war. It created the impression
that the war in Vietnam was a relatively minor struggle against
simple, black pajama-clad peasants armed with bamboo stakes.
However, with his series of vignettes on actual battlefield op-
erations, Captain Stanton vividly illustrates that front-line com-
bat in Vietnam was remarkably similar to the battles fought by
those soldiers on the point who charged the Bloody Angle at
Spotsylvania, who stormed the Nazi fortifications along the Sieg-
fried Line, who broke through the Japanese defenses before
Manila, and who assaulted the Chinese and North Korean en-
trenchments on Pork Chop Hill. The casualty figures tell the
story. The 1st Cavalry Division, for example, suffered some 30,253
troopers killed or wounded in action during the Vietnam war,
half again as many as the combined casualties it suffered during
World War II and the Korean War. The 1st Infantry Division,
which had led the assault in North Africa, Sicily, and the D-
Day Invasion in Normandy during World War II, suffered more
casualties in Vietnam than it did in that war. The 101st Airborne
xii FOREWORD
Division, which had won fame for its jump into Normandy and
who held the line at Bastogne during the Battle of the Bulge,
suffered twice as many casualties in Vietnam as it did in World
War II.
Another reality of war dismissed as old-fashioned and out-of-
date was the histories and the traditions of the units involved.
But just as Caesar's legions fought and died for their Imperial
Eagles, so soldiers and Marines in Vietnam fought and died for
the honor of their regiments. As Captain Stanton puts it, "These
divisions and combat brigades had distinctive personalities which
somehow reflected their essence. . . . Soldiers could sense it,
and often these collective divisional and brigaded entities seemed
tied to destinies which predetermined their combat perfor-
mance/' Bringing this critical and too often overlooked moral
force to life, Captain Stanton draws on his earlier masterpiece,
Vietnam Order of Battle, to describe not only the battles these
units fought but the heritage of the units themselves.
One of the important but unstated conclusions of The Rise
and Fall of an American Army is that General Decker was right,
a fact too long obscured by the mythology of guerrilla war. Cap-
tain Stanton's compelling narrative of battle actions in Vietnam
makes clear that "any good soldier" could, and did, "handle
guerrillas," and American Army and Marine infantrymen han-
dled this enemy the same way they had always handled the en-
emy not by any new and esoteric techniques of guerrilla war
but by the age-old infantry method of closing with the enemy
and destroying him by fire and maneuver. Much has been made
of the "horrendous" use of American firepower against poor, de-
fenseless peasant revolutionaries. But, as Captain Stanton points
out, the truth of the matter was that at the fighting level the
war in Vietnam usually involved infantry assaults against well-
armed Viet Cong or North Vietnamese Army forces entrenched
in fortified positions. The terrain in Vietnam, as in the hedge-
rows of Normandy in World War II, gave the defender an enor-
mous advantage. Fields-of-fire, invisible to advancing infantry-
men, could be cut in the dense jungle undergrowth only a few
feet off the ground. Caught in such "killing zones," entire com-
panies could be wiped out in a matter of seconds. As in World
War II, tactics changed from the traditional method of using
FOREWORD xiii
firepower to fix the enemy and hold him in position so that he
could be destroyed by maneuver i.e., by infantry squads at-
tacking on his flanks to a tactic of using maneuver to find the
enemy fortifications and then using massive firepower to destroy
them.
The results of such tactics were revealed by the North Viet-
namese Army's battlefield commander General Vo Nguyen Giap
himself in a 1969 interview with the Italian journalist, Oriana
Fallaci. Giap admitted that from 1964 to 1968 the North Viet-
namese had lost over 500,000 soldiers killed in action on the
battlefield. As a percentage of their population, University of
Rochester Professor John Mueller has pointed out, this was a
casualty rate "probably twice as high as those suffered by the
fanatical, often suicidal Japanese in World War II."
For those on either side involved in fighting it, Vietnam was
not a minor war. With his gripping descriptions of the Vietnam
battlefields, Captain Stanton has not only shed new light on the
ferocious intensity of the war, he has also reminded us of the
timeless nature of the infantry. Too often fascinated by bright
and shiny technologies of war, it is well to be reminded that it
was the infantry what has been called "the old-fashioned sol-
dier on foot, the ancient and unglamorous 'Cinderella " of war
who, for the United States and the North Vietnamese and Viet
Cong as well, proved to be the decisive force on the battlefield.
The yet-to-be-built monument to the Korean war, no matter
how artistic or well constructed, can never hope to equal the
memorial provided by T. R. Fehrenbach's This Kind of War.
Written ten years after the war by a former tank platoon leader
and company commander in combat there, this memorial honors
the men who fought and died in Korea much more than any
stone monument ever could. While the stone monuments to the
war in Vietnam including the monument in our Nation's cap-
ital now complete with its "Three Fighting Men" statue are
important remembrances of our fellow countrymen who served
with honor and distinction in that unpopular war, the enduring
memorial to that war is only now coming into existence. But
with the publication of The Rise and Fall of an American Army,
the foundation has been laid. Writing, like Fehrenbach, ten years
after the end of the war, former Special Forces advisor and
xiv FOREWORD
combat infantry platoon leader Shelby Stanton has provided a
lasting tribute to the men who fought and died in Vietnam. Those
who served there and those who would understand those who
served there owe him an enormous debt of gratitude.
HARRY G. SUMMERS, JR.
Colonel of Infantry
Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania
7 December 1984
INTRODUCTION
The Rise and Fall of an American Army is a battlefield history
of the United States ground forces in the Vietnam war from
1965 through 1973. This book covers both the U.S. Marine Corps
and the Army, since the term American Army is being used in
a larger sense to signify the combined military land forces of a
nation.
This battlefield history concentrates on how the United States
Army and Marine Corps raised combat units and deployed them
to Vietnam, and then how these units were employed and fought
during the war. The book highlights significant military factors
which affected unit performance in Vietnam. To provide conti-
nuity within the framework of overall United States military his-
tory, the historical backgrounds of most line regiments fielded
in Vietnam have been briefly summarized in the footnotes. Thus,
matters of smaller unit heritage do not infringe upon the nar-
rative, but are still readily available for the interested reader.
Although the fall of Saigon and the fall of an American Army
are two separate themes, the allied efforts in Vietnam were so
intertwined that they directly impacted on American combat
performance. The South Vietnamese actions and operations de-
scribed in this work are believed necessary to tell the complete
story.
The book is arranged chronologically, so that each of its six
parts covers a specific span of time. The first chapter within a
part gives the overall strategic campaign background for that pe-
riod. The remaining chapters are divided so that each covers
XV
xvi INTRODUCTION
military activity during that time in a certain region of the coun-
try. Although this arrangement is somewhat imperfect, since
January events in the northern sector of Vietnam are discussed
after December battles elsewhere are concluded in a previous
chapter, the geographical pattern of area warfare in Vietnam was
most appropriately described using this organization.
Casualty statistics for specific actions and operations have been
deliberately avoided in this narrative because of their general
unreliability. Accurate assessments of North Vietnamese Army
and Viet Cong losses were largely impossible due to lack of dis-
closure by the Vietnamese government, terrain, destruction of
remains by firepower used, and the fact that allied ground units
were often unable to confirm artillery and aerial "kills." The en-
tire process of accumulating valid casualty data was also shrouded
by the shameful gamesmanship practised by certain reporting
elements under pressure to "produce results." American losses
were subject to statistical manipulation as well. For instance,
dying soldiers put aboard medical evacuation helicopters were
often counted as only wounded in unit after-action tables. The
author has relied instead on describing the intensity of a given
battle, and quoting valid munitions expenditures to give the
reader a fair gauge of the severity of actions included in the
text.
The information in this book was derived primarily from the
original unit records of the United States Army and Marine Corps.
I owe a great debt of gratitude to the able personnel of the
military history detachments who served in the Vietnam War.
All sources utilized are arranged by chapter and section in a
special section at the back of the book, where original Vietnam
materials are further identified with their individual document
accession codes. In this manner background data is fully de-
scribed for each section without resort to extensive footnoting
within the main narrative.
I also wish to acknowledge the assistance and suggestions
given by the staffs of the Army Chief of Military History and
Marine Corps History Division; the Directorate of Freedom of
Information and Security Review of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense; Dr. John Henry Hatcher; Mr. T. M. Colkitt; Ms. Wanda
Radcliffe; Brigadier General E. H. Simmons, U.S. Marine Corps;
INTRODUCTION xvii
Dr. Jack Shulimson; Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr., U.S. Army;
Lieutenant Colonel John F. Sloan, U.S. Army, Retired; Colonel
Robert V. Kane, U.S. Army, Retired; and Mr. Richard W. Marsh,
Jr. Finally, this book would not have been possible without ex-
pertise of my editor, Adele Horwitz; the encouragement of my
father, Samuel Shelton Stanton; and the loving cooperation of
my wife, Kathryn.
SB*
in.,*" 1 V
PART 1
1Q65
DMZ
Bo HoSu
Ben Hai River
Hue ,
Phu Bai
. Hai Van Pass
Da Nang
' Monkey Mountain
Marble Mountain
Phuoc Ha
Valley
Hiep Due
Route 534
JTiang Binh
Ky
Chu Lai
Van Tuong
Peninsula
/
Ba Gia
Quang Ngai
Highway 19
Pleiku
la Drang Valley I Due Co
An
KEY TO OPERATIONS
1 - STARLITE
2 - HARVEST MOON
3- HUMP
4 - GIBRALTAR
5 -SILVER BAYONET
LZ X-Ray ^
Chu Pong Massif I
Camp An Khe
Holloway Qui Nhon \
Plei Me
Thuan Loc Rubber Plantation
Dong Xoai
9 Song Be
Cam Ranh Bay
War Zone C
Bien
[War Zone D
Saigon
BinhGia
Phan Thiet
Vung Tau
Soc Trang
5,0
100
scale miles
Map by Shelby L Stanton
-N-
South Vietnam - 1965
CHAPTER 1.
ADVISORS AND SPECIAL
FORCES
1. Advisors at War
To many Vietnamese, their narrow S-shaped strip of land
stretching along the seaward rim of Southeast Asia resembled a
dragon facing the equator. The head and mane formed the
southern region, with front legs thrust out into the Gulf of Siam,
and the slender body curved around the Gulf of Tonkin to coil
its massive tail against China in the north. Since the Geneva
Conference on July 21, 1954, this dragon had been chopped in
half, divided at a line of demarcation along the 17th parallel.
This was the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) separating North and
South Vietnam. Vietnamese geomagicians were quick to point
out that, in the position described, the Vietnamese dragon was
a portent of national reunification.
Vietnam's southern half was officially the Republic of Viet-
nam, a thin 1,500-mile crescent-shaped country more commonly
known as South Vietnam. Its long outer coasts are washed by
the Pacific Ocean, and its interior mosaic of mountains, jungles,
plains, and swamps are hedged in by the spine of the Chaine
Annamitique, a western mountain range, which fades south into
a vast alluvial plain created by the delta of the Mekong River.
Palm-lined white sand beaches fringe coves and bays where
coral reefs can be clearly seen through the glassy sea. A vibrant
4 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
green mantle of rice paddies extends inland. These stretch al-
most endlessly across the flat delta, crisscrossed by ribbons of
canals. At the time of the war, many areas of South Vietnam
remained a wild and exotic wilderness. Mountain slopes dropped
deep into luxurious growths of tropical flora, bracken, tuft-twisted
bamboos, and majestic jungle trees. Silver rivers and waterfalls
laced the deep rain forests. These were steeped in a wonderful
variety of folklore and legend. Large rubber and coconut plan-
tations stretched across rolling plains, and tigers stalked pine-
forested plateaus.
Tropical monsoons allowed only two seasons; hot and dry
and hot and rainy, and the alternation of the monsoons and dry
seasons determined the pattern of life. The majority of the
eighteen million inhabitants lived in the open lowland plains and
rice-bearing deltas. Their hamlets and villages were generally
self-governing. An old proverb states that the Emperor's law stops
at the village gate. The people had existed through the centu-
ries by cultivating rice on lands irrigated by primal pumps and
sluices. The rugged uplands region was left to the ethnically
alien and primitive mountain tribes.
South Vietnam was at war with a North Vietnamese-spon-
sored Viet Cong insurgency that was aimed at toppling the Sai-
gon regime. The death of South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh
Diem and the collapse of his regime in the military-led coup of
November 1963 ushered in a series of coalition governments re-
plete with successive plots and counterplots. These political up-
heavals crippled central authority, while the division of military
leaders between opposing cliques caused fatal turmoil in the
armed forces. In the meantime, the Viet Cong were scoring ma-
jor victories on the battlefront. The South Vietnamese Army's
morale was wrecked, and its combat effectiveness was practically
nil. In the majority of rural areas where governmental authority
had collapsed altogether, the Viet Cong enjoyed firm control.
As 1965 was being ushered in, a newly formed and well-
equipped VC division overran Binh Gia near Saigon and then
stood its ground to challenge and destroy counterattacking South
Vietnamese units during a four-day period. 1 In previous en-
1. The 9th VC Division attacked and captured Binh Gia on December 27,
ADVISORS AND SPECIAL FORCES 5
counters the VC had withdrawn shortly after attacking, and such
a bold success was deeply troubling to South Vietnam's principal
ally, the United States.
America's field advisory element of its Military Assistance
Command, Vietnam (MACV), contained over 4,700 officers and
sergeants during 1964, and their professionalism and dedication
was the glue holding the South Vietnamese Army together as
the year closed. They could be seen accompanying ARVN sol-
diers on routine patrols and in combat assaults, their tall lanky
figures crowned with maroon berets or faded green, sweat-soaked
baseball caps; while strapping shoulder holsters and World War
II carbines. Wearing utility shirts adorned with brightly colored
Vietnamese and American rank insignia crowding their gold-let-
tered U.S. ARMY tapes and white name tags, they represented
an era that was rapidly slipping into oblivion on the eve of the
"big war," These were the pioneers of a rising United States
involvement in Vietnam, the pathfinders in a war destined to
consume an entire American Army.
The military advisor's job was incredibly difficult and haz-
ardous. The very nature of his work exposed him to constant
political pressures and extremely dangerous situations. His re-
sponsibilities often extended beyond pure instruction to include
combat planning, linking up needed communications, assuring
the availability of medical assistance, and arranging for logistical
support. He was given no command authority yet often had to
provide direct leadership on the battlefield. In the midst of
combat he was depended on to provide cool-headed advice and
a steadying presence, as well as to ensure critical liaison with
decisive American airpower. In many cases it fell upon his
shoulders personally to rally units on the brink of panic.
One of these advisors was Capt. Donald R. Robinson, who
was attached to the 51st ARVN Regiment's 1st Battalion, part
of an undeclared war that was looming larger and more dan-
gerous every month. A company of the battalion, dwarfed by
oversized American helmets and clutching cumbersome Amer-
1964. Despite intense American helicopter gunship attacks, the Viet Cong
demolished the 33d ARVN Ranger Battalion, which managed to reach the
edge of the village, and the 4th VNMC Battalion sent in to assist.
6 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
ican Ml rifles, nonchalantly patrolled a road near the small hamlet
of Ba Gia west of Quang Ngai on May 26, 1965. Captain Ro-
binson's Son Tinh district was one of those backwater areas that
had not seen battle, and he had been told the Viet Cong in the
region were a bunch of ragtag guerrillas incapable of sophisti-
cated military action. He had been gravely misinformed.
The Viet Cong of the 1st Regiment, Region V Liberation Army
had carefully prepared their attack positions. They had estab-
lished a series of strategically placed ambush zones designed to
annihilate this battalion as well as expected relief columns. When
the lead company walked into the killing zone, the peaceful drone
of tropical insects was shattered by a deafening fusillade of com-
bined rifle and machine-gun fire which cut through the frail
company ranks like a scythe.
Even at this point the trouble seemed to be little more than
a hit-and-run ambush, which by 1965 could be expected any-
where in the Vietnamese countryside. The battalion command-
er immediately dispatched a second company to the scene of
combat, but midway there it was bushwhacked from another di-
rection. Leaving a small reserve behind, the rest of the five
hundred-man battalion now went to the relief of its two engaged
companies. The VC closed in from all sides, and the battalion
disintegrated under a hailstorm of grenades and automatic weap-
ons fire. In less than twenty minutes it had been wiped out.
Only sixty-five soldiers and three advisors managed to escape.
It wasn't until four days later that a three-battalion ARVN
relief force finally sauntered out of Quang Ngai, escorted by a
mechanized troop of armored personnel carriers. The battalions
advanced in three widely separated drives, intending to con-
verge on the original ambush site. The Viet Cong were well
prepared for any countermoves and had covered each approach
route.
The 39th ARVN Ranger Battalion moved into its selected
objective area without incident on May 30, but at two o'clock
in the afternoon it was subjected to a furious barrage of recoil-
less rifle and machine-gun fire. The 2d Battalion of the 51st ARVN
Regiment was ordered to reinforce the rangers, but before it
could move it was also attacked. When the 3d South Vietnam-
ese Marine Corps (VNMC) Battalion came under simultaneous
ADVISORS AND SPECIAL FORCES 7
attack all three battalions were effectively locked in isolated bat-
tles for survival.
Throughout the rest of the day each separate battalion pe-
rimeter was hit by numerous ground assaults. Viet Cong 75mm
pack artillery howitzers sent shells crashing into the broken de-
bris of foliage and toppled trees. Fallen soldiers from the 51st
ARVN Regiment's second battalion were strewn all over the
roadway. The tracked carriers hammered the tree line with heavy
machine-gun fire as they coughed out clouds of engine exhaust
and clanked into reverse. The infantrymen stumbled backwards,
some exchanging desultory rifle fire but others tossing away
weapons in dazed discouragement. Using the armored personnel
carriers as cover, the decimated battalion managed to break away
and retreat toward the town.
The other battalions were unable to pull back. Their circular
defensive positions, hastily set up in fallen timber and clumps
of vegetation, were caving in as the Viet Cong pressed their
relentless attacks. With the onset of darkness, mortars began
pounding the provincial capital of Quang Ngai and its airfield.
The 39th ARVN Ranger Battalion had suffered particularly high
losses. Swarms of Viet Cong, some clutching German burp guns,
charged forward through the shattered thickets and into the
shrunken ranger lines. They stormed past the dead and wounded
defenders of the center company and overran the battalion
headquarters.
Since that afternoon fighter aircraft had been roaring down
to hurl bombs in the burning jungle below. Next came strafing
runs over the forested battlefield. These aerial attacks continued
throughout the night. Finally, just before daylight and after en-
during 446 aircraft sorties, the VC broke off further combat. Air-
power alone was credited with saving the South Vietnamese force
from complete annihilation. This battle convinced Captain Rob-
inson of the military proficiency of the Viet Cong and of the
swiftly changing nature of the Vietnam War.
Viet Cong formations were attacking targets throughout the
country, and the deteriorating South Vietnamese armed forces
were being beaten in a series of sharp reverses. The United
States decided to remedy the alarming situation by introducing
large American combat formations in early 1965. This decision
8 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
would stave off the total defeat of the Republic of Vietnam for
ten years.
2. Special Forces at War
The United States Army first sent its Special Forces com-
mando-advisors to Vietnam in 1957 as the vanguard of American
front-line military assistance efforts. For nearly a decade they
had been waging a localized guerrilla war through the battle-
scarred tropical forests and delta marshlands of South Vietnam.
There they had forged a lengendary reputation as one of the
finest, yet most unorthodox, formations of the United States
military. The new year of 1965 brought the realization that their
antiguerrilla tactics were hopelessly outclassed by the increased
tempo of conflict. The former, limited "Special Forces war" was
ending, and they were now caught up in the full hurricane of
conventional warfare.
The Army Special Forces was popularly known simply as the
"Green Berets," in tribute to its trademark the green beret
awarded in 1961 by President John F. Kennedy. President Ken-
nedy's enthusiasm had been the guiding force behind its crea-
tion as the elite nucleus of his counterinsurgency strategy. How-
ever, the Special Forces was not the ranger strike force that its
heritage implied. 2 Instead it was a flexible grouping of highly
trained sergeants and officers, designed to carry out a novel mil-
itary doctrine being labeled "unconventional warfare." This
complex program of guerrilla wars and countersubversion quickly
translated into a very ancient military policy; the art of training,
advising, and supporting foreign regular and irregular armed
forces. The Army's Special Forces proved to be just the right
combination for implementation of these training missions on a
global basis, and so it came early to the tropical rice-and-jungle
countryside of South Vietnam.
In the shadowy years of 1961 through 1964, before massive
American military intervention in Vietnam, the Army Special
2. In its zeal to give the new Special Forces a solid heritage of special unit
lineages upon its creation in 1952, the Department of the Army bestowed
upon it the honors and lineage of the joint U.S. -Canadian mountain com-
mando 1st Special Service Force ("Devil's Brigade") and the ranger battalions
of World War II.
ADVISORS AND SPECIAL FORCES 9
Forces had evolved into a unique and invaluable extension of
American combat power. Traditional Special Forces orientation
was the training of resistance forces in enemy territory. In Viet-
nam, the Special Forces mission was to teach government-spon-
sored forces in "friendly" territory. Instead of practicing guer-
rilla warfare, it found itself defending conventional fortified camps
against Viet Cong insurgents. Slowly its influence permeated the
remotest areas of South Vietnam, and the Special Forces be-
came a mainstay of American presence. It was able to affect the
battlefield in an all-encompassing manner unknown to conven-
tional strategy.
The fundamental Special Forces responsibility throughout the
Vietnam War was actually the Civilian Irregular Defense Group
(CIDG) program, which had been started on November 1, 1961,
under the operational control of the U.S. Central Intelligence
Agency. 3 Begun as an experimental effort with the Rhade tribe
of Darlac Province, the aim of the program was continued to
gain the loyalty and cooperation of the isolated ethnic minority
groups of South Vietnam, over which the Saigon regime had
little or no control, and to create paramilitary (i.e., nonregular
army) forces from their ranks. Hardworking teams of stalwart
Special Forces members living under the most primitive con-
ditions, disdainfully suspected as having "gone native" by senior
military authorities, transformed hamlet militia and tribal bow-
men into their beloved CIDG "strikers." By sharing common
bonds of danger and hardship, a rare and lasting personal re-
lationship was cemented between the gruff, burly Special Forces
Americans and the small, wiry tribesmen.
The trend toward establishing Special Forces camps closer
to Vietnam's rugged frontiers had been initiated by a U.S. Cen-
3. The CIDG (pronounced sid-gee) was the South Vietnamese country-wide
Civilian Irregular Defense Group, civilian irregulars recruited from the local
areas around the camps on a paramilitary basis by Special Forces. They were
capable of conducting local security and limited reconnaissance operations,
and were organized into 150-man light infantry companies. Their performance
varied greatly depending on the amount of training and equipment they had
received. While the 5th Special Forces Group in Vietnam boasted of 19,900
CIDG under arms at the beginning of 1965 (and 28,200 by year's end), these
forces lacked the fire support, motivation, and inherent leadership to qualify
them as conventional units.
10 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
tral Intelligence Agency border surveillance program cranked up
in June of 1962 and dumped in the laps of the Special Forces
a year later. The Montagnard tribal "trailwatchers" and "moun-
tain scouts" inherited with this new mission were assimilated
into a kaleidoscopic array of Special Forces-led native contin-
gents. The four CIDG border surveillance camps of November
1963 had mushroomed to eighteen by mid-1964.
By the fall of 1964 the Vietnam War had heated up to the
point where the Army decided to transfer the 5th Special Forces
Group (Airborne) from the pines of Fort Bragg, North Carolina,
to Nha Trang, Vietnam. The personnel of the group wore a solid
black cloth "flash," or recognition patch, on their coveted green
berets. The colors of the South Vietnamese flag were now sewn
diagonally across the black background of the flash. The 5th
Special Forces Group (Airborne) became synonymous with Spe-
cial Forces duty in Vietnam. 4 There all training was put to the
actual test of war. Already by the beginning of 1965, three out
of every four Special Forces soldiers assigned to the group had
a previous tour of combat in Vietnam behind them. They had
received the best antiguerrilla experience possible by fighting
the Viet Cong guerrillas themselves.
In its formative years the CIDG program had been defen-
sive in nature, the small camps being susceptible to overruns
by swift Viet Cong attack. In 1965, in tune with the Army's
buildup and offensive posture, the Special Forces role and the
CIDG effort assumed an increasingly aggressive stance. "Eagle
Flight" reserves designed to reinforce camp defenses were soon
expanded to larger mobile reaction forces called "Mike Forces."
Special missions, such as the long-range reconnaissance patrol-
ling under Project LEAPING LENA, were formalized as part
of the expanding hand of trump cards Special Forces could play.
LEAPING LENA became Project DELTA, and a headquarters,
4. The 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) was a Regular Army unit which
was activated at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, on September 21, 1961. By that
time Special Forces personnel were heavily engaged in action in South Viet-
nam. In September 1962 there was enough need for a group-sized Special
Forces presence that the U.S. Army Special Forces, Vietnam (Provisional),
was established. The 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) arrived in Vietnam
on October 1, 1964, and took over the missions and assets of the old pro-
visional group, which was discontinued.
ADVISORS AND SPECIAL FORCES 11
Detachment B-52, was organized in June to control it. Project
DELTA operations would range throughout South Vietnam dur-
ing the course of the war locating NVA/VC units and installa-
tion, gathering information, directing air strikes, conducting
special raids, reinforcing camps, and performing a host of top
secret assignments.
In theory the U.S. Army Special Forces was supposed to
advise a South Vietnamese clone called the LLDB (Lac Luong
Dae Biet), which would actually run the CIDG program. In reality
the ineptitude of the South Vietnamese Special Forces permit-
ted the Americans no choice but to continue full leadership
themselves. Although it improved during the war and there were
numerous individual exceptions, the LLDB in general suffered
from a number of deficiencies, among them lack of training and
capability. However, the American Green Beret soldiers most
resented the unwillingness of LLDB personnel to lead CIDG
soldiers in battle, and the racial animosity and distrust the Viet-
namese expressed toward the Montagnards and other tribal mi-
norities. These factors prevented the planned successful turn-
over of the CIDG program to the Saigon regime. The envisioned
ability of the U.S. Army Special Forces to "work itself out of a
job" never really materialized. When, in 1970, the 5th Special
Forces Group (Airborne) was finally forced to turn over its camps
and formally return to the United States, it left much unfinished
and unresolved.
The Special Forces also worked a serious drain on the Ar-
my's leadership resources, which the Army could not afford after
the big Vietnam buildup. The retention of thousands of excel-
lent sergeants in such an elite organization, especially after the
Army's expansion (which had created a grave shortage of non-
commissioned officers), deprived the Army's regular units of valu-
able combat leadership at a most critical time. The hardship
was so acute that the lack of available line sergeants, with their
potential discipline and experience, ended up being a major fac-
tor in the Army's decline.
3. Special Forces Under Siege
By the summer of 1965, the blazing perimeters of Special
Forces garrisons glowed throughout the length of South Viet-
12 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
nam like brushfires under the darkening storm of total war. On
the overcast night of May 10 a heavy barrage of mortar and
recoilless rifle fire crashed into the compound of Special Forces
Control Detachment B-34 at Song Be. Behind this wall of ex-
ploding dirt and steel four battalions of Viet Cong regulars surged
through the town and overwhelmed the scattered positions of
the 36th ARVN Ranger Battalion.
The Special Forces defenders put up a resolute defense of
the American compound, sandwiched between the ARVN ranger
barracks and the province chiefs home, but one sapper squad
was able to fight its way across the barbed wire and storm the
mess hall. The mess hall had been converted into a medical aid
station and was now filled with aidmen frantically working on
the wounded. Suddenly the Viet Cong squad burst inside where
the fighting continued with grenades and pocket knives.
The low cloud cover had negated initial air support, but heli-
copters had flown through the swirling mists and were now
overhead. However, they were initially unable to direct their
rockets and aerial machine guns due to the smoke and confusion
of the raging battle below. Around the compound hand-to-hand
combat was deciding the outcome, and as dawn filtered through
the cloud-banked sky the Special Forces was able to evict the
Viet Cong who had broken through. A sudden spasm of action
erupted around the mess hall as the VC squad survivors were
killed making a break for open ground.
The Viet Cong force retired inside the center of Song Be
where it entrenched itself in the town market and temple area.
A hasty charge conducted by the reconsolidated 36th ARVN
Ranger Battalion failed to dislodge the defenders. A reinforced
two-battalion South Vietnamese reaction force cautiously ap-
proached the town the next day. En route a ranger battalion
detected and avoided an elaborate ambush trap two miles in
length. While the main infantry force was not ambushed, it did
have to fight a running engagement with another VC force. After
further combat, punctuated by repeated air strikes, the Viet Cong
finally withdrew from Song Be.
On June 9, 1965, another successful Viet Cong attack was
made, this time on the Dong Xoai Special Forces camp in the
same province. The camp was defended by Operations Detach-
ADVISORS AND SPECIAL FORCES 13
ment A-342, backed up by local Vietnamese and tribal contin-
gents with several artillery howitzers and six armored cars, and
a U.S. Navy Seabee construction team. Just before midnight an
intensive mortar barrage blanketed the post, followed by a ground
assault a half hour later.
The mixed Special Forces and Vietnamese troops, native sol-
diers, and American sailors manned their gun pits and foxholes,
firing furiously as detonations rocked the blazing skyline. Al-
ready groups of Viet Cong sappers were cutting through the
mesh of barbed wire entanglements wrapped around the com-
pound. Machine-gun fire riddled the Viet Cong assault pi-
oneers, but others leaped forward to take the places of the fallen.
Black-garbed bodies draped the broken wire, and crew-served
weapons on both sides barked across the perimeter. Then ban-
galore torpedoes were shoved into the protective barrier and
exploded.
The VC stormed through the smashed wire at 2:30 that
morning. A hail of gunfire and exploding grenades blasted the
air as the tumult spilled into the camp itself. Half of the ar-
mored cars were damaged and inoperable, but the Viet Cong
scrambled into the other three. They spun crazily through the
camp, raking it with machine-gun and cannon fire. Later on
aircraft were used to destroy them. The surviving defenders
fought backwards into a small cluster of positions. By daybreak
this final defensive perimeter within the camp was closely sur-
rounded.
At 9:40 that morning helicopters set soldiers from the 1st
Battalion, 7th ARVN Regiment, into a landing zone north of
Dong Xoai. These infantrymen were quickly overrun in a savage
fifteen-minute skirmish. The remainder of the battalion then be-
gan airlifting into the Thuan Loi rubber plantation farther north.
There the helicopter crews had to abort the landings after put-
ting only eighty men on the ground, due to the terrific volume
of mortar and automatic weapons fire directed against them.
Within just twenty minutes all contact with the landed force was
lost.
The 52d ARVN Ranger Battalion was landed on the road
south of the compound following an intensive aerial bombard-
ment late that afternoon. As they approached the camp the
14 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
rangers came under heavy fire. A series of air strikes were called
in on the camp's ruins, and then the rangers charged forward
to take it, after a final sharp skirmish. On the morning of June
11, the 7th ARVN Airborne Battalion was helicoptered in near
the recaptured compound and moved, against scattered resis-
tance, to the ill-fated landing zones of the previous day. By this
time the Viet Cong, subjected to continuous aircraft bombing
and strafing, had started to withdraw. The district town of Dong
Xoai was once again in South Vietnamese government hands.
Both battles had been extremely significant as they not only
underlined the deepening crises in South Vietnam, but also
highlighted the upgraded Viet Cong tactics of using large forces
to overrun and hold district and province towns and setting up
well-prepared ambushes to destroy relieving units. In such an
atmosphere the Special Forces, tactically limited as training ad-
visors, had to expand and conventionalize its combat resources
in order to survive.
The Battle of Plei Me, fought in the fall of 1965, marked
the first transition of the Vietnam battlefield from guerrilla clashes
to a war between national armies. Instead of Viet Cong, the
32d, 33d, and 66th NVA Regiments would be used to assault
this Special Forces campsite thirty miles south of Pleiku. In re-
sponse the newly arrived American 1st Cavalry Division would
be pitted against North Vietnamese regulars in the la Drang
Valley, fully engaging the American military in another major
war.
The Special Forces camp at Plei Me was garrisoned by the
twelve-man Operations Detachment A-217, fourteen LLDB
troops, and 415 Jarai, Rhade, and Bahnar tribal CIDG soldiers.
On October 19, 1965, the camp had a large combat patrol of
eighty-five CIDG strikers led by two Americans sweeping the
area to the northwest. Local warning security was provided by
five eight-man ambush teams and two regularly posted twenty-
man outposts.
After nightfall had cloaked the surrounding tree line in dark-
ness and introduced a new cycle of jungle noises, a muffled clat-
ter of rifle fire suddenly erupted and then died away. An ad-
vancing NVA infantry column had brushed past one of the ambush
positions. Later another distant crash of gunfire exploded the
ADVISORS AND SPECIAL FORCES 15
tropical night, this time accompanied by a barrage of mortar
shells and recoilless rifle rounds sending up geysers of dirt
throughout the compound. The NVA overran the southern out-
post in barely twenty minutes. Shortly after midnight the North
Vietnamese charged the camp itself.
The North Vietnamese shock troops ran forward, shouting
and firing rapid bursts from their assault rifles. The bunkered
machine guns rattled out concentrated bursts of grazing fire aimed
at the first wave of sappers busily piercing the perimeter's bar-
riers. Pith helmets and kit bags rolled across the open prewire
zone as the bullets picked up running figures and flung them
to the ground in writhing agony. Bodies were piling up like
driftwood around the bent posts and bails of twisted barbed wire.
Swiftly the NVA rammed explosive-filled pipe sections through
the obstacles, and a series of detonations shook the fringes of
the camp.
The NVA came pouring through the smoking gaps pitching
grenades and blazing away with their submachine guns. Red tracer
lines of machine-gun fire murderously converged to hammer
against these packed clusters of onrushing attackers. Scores of
men were skimmed from their ranks, collapsing and staggering
as they fell behind to topple onto the battered earth. Flares and
rockets flashed brilliant mixes of shifting colors and crossed
shadows as they lighted the blackened landscape. At 3:45 A.M.
the afterburners of jet engines could be seen darting through
the darkened, overcast skies. Exploding yellow- white globular
balls of jellied gasoline spewed over the jungled outskirts of the
camp.
The northwest corner bunker was under direct assault. Its
defenders desperately fought off each charge from behind shrap-
nel-riddled sandbags and blood-washed logpiles. A red dawn
smeared with smoke and haze flooded the battlefield with the
half-light of morning. At six o'clock a recoilless rifle round burst
through the bunker aperture. Splintered wood and limbs were
thrown into the air, and a final NVA lunge for the key position
was made, The exhausted Special Forces, their jungle fatigues
ripped and their webbing stripped of grenades, ordered tired
and bloodstained tribesmen into the breach. The bunker man-
aged to hold.
16 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
At daybreak a flight of unmarked medical evacuation heli-
copters arrived, escorted by several gunships. They descended
into the smoldering camp to drop off a surgeon and pick up
some of the wounded. Suddenly one of the hovering helicopters
was hit and spiraled into the jungle below, The weary Special
Forces team scratched together a rescue party, and sent it out
in a vain attempt to reach the downed aircraft. After a harrow-
ing encounter with an NVA machine-gun nest, during which one
of the Special Forces sergeants was mortally wounded, the shaken
survivors fell back into camp. By contrast the larger combat sweep
patrol was notified to rejoin the camp and walked back through
the gates without incident.
Maj. Charlie A. Beckwith's Special Forces unit known as
Project DELTA, reinforced by two companies of the special 91st
ARVN Airborne Ranger Battalion, received word to reinforce on
the afternoon of October 20. They closed into Pleiku airfield at
five o'clock that evening, just thirty minutes after a 1,200-man
ARVN mechanized relief force headed south on Highway 14. 5
The mechanized group would run into a major ambush halfway
to Plei Me, would suffer considerable personnel and vehicular
losses, and would not reach the camp until October 25. Lack
of helicopter lift forced Major Beckwith to spend the night plan-
ning. On the morning of October 21, Project DELTA was air-
lifted by a series of three flights into the thick tropical forest
four and a half miles outside Plei Me.
Major Beckwith wisely decided to move his men due east a
few miles before turning south toward the camp. The force slowly
cut its way through the dense, vine-tangled jungle. The tortur-
ous trek was extremely difficult, and soon broken arms and heat
exhaustion were reducing the strength of Beckwith's command.
In mid-afternoon they ran into a three-man NVA recoilless rifle
crew. As a result they turned deeper into the jungle. By five
o'clock they were only thirty-five minutes from Plei Me, but the
rangers couldn't decide what to do. Major Beckwith personally
went forward with his machete and started cutting trail to con-
5. The relief force consisted of the 3d ARVN Armored Cavalry Squadron with
M41 tanks and M8 armored cars, the 1st Battalion of the 42d ARVN Regi-
ment, and the 21st and 22d ARVN Ranger Battalions.
ADVISORS AND SPECIAL FORCES 17
tinue the advance. As night fell they formed a perimeter and
prepared to enter camp the next morning.
At 1:40 A.M. on October 22, an Air Force A-1E Skyraider
was shot down over the camp. The pilot was seen parachuting
out but was never found. A second plane was lost, but its pilot
was eventually rescued. Early that morning Project DELTA
pushed through a brief firefight to move into the camp, where
Major Beckwith took over command. At one o'clock in the after-
noon a three-company force from the camp passed their wire
and got into a skirmish line to clear a nearby hill. A bypassed
heavy machine gun suddenly ripped into them, throwing the
force into confusion, killing Special Forces Captain Thomas Pus-
ser and twelve indigenous soldiers, and wounding scores more.
The rest of the composite clearing force retreated.
The 91st ARVN Airborne Ranger Battalion's shortcomings
continued to plague their performance the next day. During an
assault on two other machine-gun positions, one NVA soldier
suddenly charged the force. Before he was killed, the rangers
fled back in disorder. On October 24, a recovery party managed
to pull in the bodies from this botched attack. On the morning
of October 25, a commando squad, led by two Special Forces
flamethrower sergeants, charged light machine guns surround-
ing the camp. Although the flamethrowers malfunctioned, the
commandos destroyed one of the bunkers. That evening the ar-
mored-infantry task force from Pleiku arrived in the camp.
Although clearing operations would continue for several days,
the battle was over. The morning after the ARVN mechanized
force showed up, a helicopter touched down at the camp car-
rying several United States Army combat officers. Col. Elvy B.
Roberts, commander of the 1st Brigade (Airborne), 1st Cavalry
Division (Airmobile), stepped onto the sun-scorched clay of the
Plei Me Special Forces camp at nine o'clock on the morning of
October 26, 1965, for a full briefing. He had moved an entire
American infantry brigade to Camp Holloway outside Pleiku, and
the rest of the division was now located at An Khe. The conflict
in Vietnam was no longer a Special Forces affair. The 1st Cav-
alry Division's full-fledged efforts to punish the North Vietnam-
ese attackers at Plei Me would transform it into a "big unit war,"
and the future conduct of miltary operations in Vietnam would
leave the Special Forces in the background.
CHAPTER 2.
AN ARMY GIRDS FOR
BATTLE
1. An Army Enters Vietnam
The beautiful South Vietnamese landscape, agrarian nature, and
tropical climate posed a tremendous headache to American mil-
itary planners faced with increasing support requirements as the
expanding war erupted into full-scale conflagration. They be-
moaned the lack of ports, terminals, warehouses, communica-
tions facilities, industrial complexes, or transportation networks,
The United States had been fielding military advisors to South
Vietnam since the French had pulled out ten years earlier. This
military advisory effort was at the forefront of a massive Amer-
ican investment of money and material in an attempt to create
a viable South Vietnamese state. However, the modern United
States armed forces were tied to complex logistical considera-
tions and a level of sophistication that required the overseas im-
port of all supplies, equipment, and trained manpower. As more
advisors, signal units, aircraft, aviators, and Special Forces were
sent into the countryside, their support became increasingly dif-
ficult,
A logistical command, for U.S. Army Military Assistance
Command Vietnam (MACV), had been recommended for Viet-
nam when the military had created the top headquarters there
on February 8, 1962, but nothing had been approved. By the
18
AN ARMY GIRDS FOR BATTLE 19
end of that year over twelve thousand American military tech-
nicians, advisors, and pilots were assigned to Vietnam duty. 1 At
the beginning of 1965, Gen. William C. Westmoreland's MACV
command had grown to over 14,700 Army and 700 Marine per-
sonnel, 2 and the need for immediate and responsive combat ser-
vice support became more urgent.
American units were still principally located in the cities.
They occupied the bustling capital of Saigon and adjacent Bien
Hoa, the northern anchorage of Da Nang tucked underneath
Hai Van (Clouds) Pass, the southern delta rice-farming town of
Soc Trang, the beautiful beach town of Nha Trang, and the misty
Central Highland crossroads of Pleiku. 3 These forces were mainly
helicopter units, which were used to ferry ARVN troops and to
provide aerial rocket and machine-gun fire in their support. It
was just a matter of time before the Viet Cong would strike
back at the bases housing these aviation resources.
In the early Sunday morning darkness of February 7, 1965,
a cascade of mortar rounds blasted the American compound of
Camp Holloway and the airfield of Pleiku. Viet Cong sappers
charged through the flare-lighted night to hurl demolitions charges
into barracks and planes. Nine servicemen were killed and 128
wounded, and scores of aircraft destroyed or damaged. Three
days later the Viet Cong exploded the hotel billets in Qui Nhon,
killing twenty-three American soldiers and wounding twenty-two
others.
For years MACV headquarters had been urging that Amer-
ican combat units be sent to Vietnam to protect U.S. bases there.
These two Viet Cong attacks had graphically demonstrated this
1. In December 1962 the major U.S. forces in Vietnam were U.S. Army
Special Forces, Vietnam (Provisional), 45th Transportation Battalion, Utility
Tactical Transport Aviation Company, and Marine Task Force Shufly (the ma-
rine medium-helicopter squadron HMM-163). The last three were helicopter
outfits.
2. Gen. William C. Westmoreland had replaced Gen. Paul D. Harkins as
MACV commander in June 1964.
3. Major U.S. forces in January 1965 were the Marine Unit, Vietnam (the
Shufly force consisting of medium-helicopter squadron HMM-365), and the
Army 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) and 13th, 14th, 52d, and 145th
Aviation Battalions.
20 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
need. The United States government also believed that strong
American forces in South Vietnam would defeat the Viet Cong
and discourage North Vietnam from continuing the war. On
February 11, 1965, the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided that the
173d Airborne Brigade on Okinawa would be alerted for emer-
gency Vietnam duty, and that a brigade of the 25th Infantry
Division in Hawaii would be sent to Thailand.
General Westmoreland wanted a number of port and airfield
centers along the coastline defended with American fighting
troops. Ammunition and supplies could be dumped into these
areas, artillery cannon and antiaircraft missiles installed, and for-
tifications carved out. Such enclaves would insure that a United
States presence could be maintained in Vietnam, even if the
South Vietnamese Army crumbled to the point of total ineffec-
tiveness. American units could then take over offensive activity
from such bastions while the South Vietnamese armed forces
were rebuilt. This strategy was tagged the "enclave concept"
(the troops called it "ink blot") and it was adopted despite Pen-
tagon misgivings that it might lead the South Vietnamese forces
to relax and lose interest. Da Nang would be garrisoned by Ma-
rines first, but plans were under way for other enclaves at Sai-
gon, Bien Hoa, Vung Tau, Qui Nhon, Nha Trang, Tuy Hoa,
Phan Thiet, and Chu Lai. To guard vital central Highway 19,
which stretched through the jagged ridgelines from Pleiku to
Qui Nhon, the llth Air Assault Division (Test) at Fort Benning,
Georgia, was targeted for insertion at An Khe.
The first Army troop arrival in response to the buildup de-
cision was the 716th Military Police Battalion, which was flown
into Saigon March 1921, 1965, several days after two Marine
combat battalions had landed at Da Nang. A platoon was im-
mediately dispatched to each of Vietnam's four corps tactical
zones. It heralded the arrival of a rapidly escalating number of
regular Army combat formations in South Vietnam.
The increased American involvement had created a logistical
nightmare, which was being resolved on a temporary emergency
basis since planning envisaged an early reduction of this military
commitment. Supply lines from Hawaii and Okinawa, six thou-
sand and two thousand miles away, were already stretched to
the limit. Suddenly an about-face was ordered. As the military
AN ARMY GIRDS FOR BATTLE 21
situation deteriorated during 1965, logistics planners were di-
rected to prepare for expanding troop levels instead of the ex-
pected withdrawals. They were also served notice that America
expected to keep up the material comforts of its soldiers. The
necessary facilities and bases would have to be built.
Practically overnight a major logistical foundation would have
to be created in an undeveloped country, where all areas were
subject to Viet Cong observation and attack. United States con-
tingency plans for global situations requiring large-scale military
response, which the conflict in Vietnam now threatened to be-
come, assumed the National Guard and Army Reserves would
be placed on active service. These were counted on to provide
most of the special support units the Army would need in war-
time. Even in the United States, combat units relied on a post's
civilian supply and maintenance facilities. The Army's few mo-
bile logistics units were oriented for a European battlefield, not
tropical terrain.
President Lyndon B. Johnson announced on July 28, 1965,
that United States forces in Vietnam would be expanded im-
mediately to 125,000 men. The administration made it clear that
it intended to meet these growing overseas requirements with-
out mobilization. New soldiers would be gained through more
drafting and increased enlistments. This political decision en-
gaged the military in a major war without any of its anticipated
National Guard or Reserve component assistance. The peace-
time standing Army had a very thin crust of engineers, signal-
men, logistics supervisors, and service units. Soon a crisis de-
veloped in supply and support of the combat formations going
to Vietnam. The adverse consequences were legion, but this ba-
sic governmental policy never really changed. 4
The ammunition situation was so chaotic that the 173d Air-
borne Brigade arrived in Vietnam with only fifteen days' worth
of bullets. Daily cargo flights from Okinawa were instituted just
to keep rifle magazines full. Ammunition for other deploying
units was being sent on ahead and off-loaded, a good practice
4. Even the "mini-mobilization" that transpired after the Pueblo Incident in
April 1968 only affected a small fraction of National Guard and Reserve com-
ponents, hardly alleviating a chronic shortage of skilled manpower in critical
service support jobs.
22 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
which was undone whenever the units were diverted from their
original destinations. As a result ammunition crates and stacks
of shells were piled up all over the beaches at Cam Ranh Bay
and aboard leased sampans and barges floating on the Saigon
River. The lack of transportation truck companies, another type
of basic logistical unit, prevented ready transfer of such stock-
piles to where they were needed.
A number of mad scrambles typified early logistical experi-
ences in Vietnam, One of the worst happened during the sum-
mer deployment of the 2d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, from
Fort Riley, Kansas, to Vietnam. The unit was directed to secure
the coastal town of Qui Nhon, where a natural harbor promised
an ideal enclave site. Supplies were loaded by truck and aircraft
at Saigon and hauled 250 miles north. Two days before arrival
in Vietnam, the ships were diverted so that the brigade could
secure the Saigon area. 5 A battalion was off-loaded to defend
Cam Ranh Bay until the programmed American garrison (the
1st Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division) could get there, and
the rest of the brigade then proceeded to Bien Hoa. A frantic
last-minute relocation of supplies was made in an effort to get
the tons of materials back south. The 1st Infantry Division's 2d
Brigade arrived at Bien Hoa, located on the banks of the Dong
Nai River outside Saigon, on July 16, 1965, minus large quan-
tities of its supplies.
The only port worth its name in Vietnam was the bustling
commercial dock fifty miles inland at Saigon. Its deep draft piers
were in such demand that freighters were soon anchored the
length of the channel for weeks on end. Warehouses and storage
areas were scarce, and sabotage and pilferage abounded. Over-
worked logistical personnel often spent days searching through
mountains of general cargo dumped at dockside for specific ur-
gently needed items. Viet Cong sappers were having a field day
destroying massive quantities of supplies, but no one could mea-
sure the losses. Without inventory control no one knew what
was there. At Saigon the entire logistical command and control
5. Qui Nhon was secured briefly by the Seventh Fleet Special Landing Force,
the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, from July 1-7, 1965. It was then relieved by
the 2d Battalion of the 7th Marines, which stayed until relieved in turn by
Korean troops on November 4, 1965.
AN ARMY GIRDS FOR BATTLE 23
structure consisted of a U.S. Army major allotted one jeep and
a briefcase, and he was seeking authorization to hire a driver.
The Vietnamese were uncooperative. When the first ship ar-
rived at Cam Ranh Bay with desperately needed provisions, the
South Vietnamese stevedore union balked at sending people to
unload it. The entire ship was emptied by one transportation
lieutenant and a handful of engineer soldiers dragooned from
the local American garrison.
As the American buildup continued through the year, the
ratio of service support units to combat forces kept slipping. At
the Honolulu Conference of September 27, 1965, MACV de-
cided to accept maneuver formations as they became available,
even though their initial logistical support would be marginal.
By December this calculated risk could no longer be accepted.
All further tactical unit deployments were delayed as support
components were rushed to Vietnam.
The 1st Logistical Command had unfurled its flag in South
Vietnam on the last day of March 1965. It eventually grew in
size to become one of the largest Army organizations in the world.
Its superb support efforts soon dumped stacks of paper plates,
hot meals, ice cream, and mountains of beer and soft drinks in
the forward battle areas. The American Army quickly lost its
appreciation of the harsh demands of a combat environment.
The insistence upon large, luxurious base camps with snack shops
and swimming pools erased the spartan lifestyle of the early ad-
visors and Special Forces troops. In the end it greatly eroded
the soldier's willingness to forego such comforts in extended field
operations.
Even in the hard-driving line units, where the foot-slogging
infantryman was not privy to such conveniences, too much of
everything eroded combat prowess. In direct contrast to early
ammunition shortages, a wealth of ordnance began to choke for-
ward supply points. The American Army was making unbridled
use of firepower. One could always find the officer who bragged
that he would use any amount of supporting fire to save one
American soldier. Since it sounded great, no one was ever faulted
for saying so. However, casualties were taken while loading, un-
loading, transporting, and protecting the massive amounts of
munitions required for such prodigious firepower. It led to cat-
24 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
astrophic accidents in ammunition storage sites throughout the
war, So many munitions were fired that alarming accident rates
developed. Ammunition often killed or maimed the soldiers it
was designed to protect. Commanders developed the habit of
calling for artillery, gunships, and fighter-bombers to silence even
the lightest opposition. More often than not, by the time this
support was coordinated and arrived, the NVA or VC were gone.
The expanding American Army in Vietnam built a frightfully
expensive but magnificent support system, capable of providing
the wealth of resources needed to avoid any material sacrifice,
la fact, its logistical achievement was unparalleled in the history
of warfare. In so doing, the Army helped bring about its own
decline.
2. A Battle for Troops
The United States Army had 970,000 soldiers worldwide on
January 1, 1965. Just over half of them were stationed in the
continental United States and the rest in various overseas lo-
cations scattered from Korea to Germany, including South Viet-
nam. 6 The Army was technically in a state of national emer-
gency, still in effect since Korea, and depended mainly on draft
calls for its soldiers. At this point the Army was in very good
shape, having been put into fighting trim by three recent crises
of the first magnitude: the Berlin crisis of 1961, the Cuban mis-
sile crisis of October December 1962, and the assassination of
President John F. Kennedy in November 1963. Each of these
had placed the Army on a virtual wartime footing.
Generous budgetary allocations had produced high quality
training programs, an expensive test division being personally
6. In January 1965 the U.S. Army had its major forces disposed as follows:
Continental United States 1st and 2d Armored Divisions, 1st, 2d, and 4th
Infantry Divisions, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized), llth Air Assault Di-
vision (Test), 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions, 194th Armored Brigade, 197th
Infantry Brigade, llth Armored Cavalry (Regiment), and 3d, 6th, and 7th
Special Forces Groups; Panama Canal Zone 193d Infantry Brigade and 8th
Special Forces Group; Alaska 171st and 172d Infantry Brigades; Hawaii
25th Infantry Division; Okinawa 173d Airborne Brigade and 1st Special Forces
Group; Korea 1st Cavalry Division and 7th Infantry Division; Vietnam 5th
Special Forces Group; Germany 3d and 4th Armored Divisions, 3d, 8th,
and 24th Infantry Divisions (Mechanized), 2d, 3d, and 14th Armored Cavalry
(Regiments), and the 10th Special Forces Group.
AN ARMY GIRDS FOR BATTLE 25
pushed by Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara, quantities
of helicopters and other aircraft, and very modern technical
equipment. The Army also had a considerable number of com-
bat-experienced leaders and pilots, the result of years of advi-
sory efforts in Vietnam. Senior officers and sergeants had World
War II and Korean experience under their belts. While the Army
still considered its most likely threat to be the European arena,
its new airmobile doctrine being field-tested by the llth Air
Assault Division (Test) was unmistakably Asia-bound.
Basic and advanced individual training of soldiers was the
responsibility of the Continental Army Command. The Army of
1965 had been on the brink of possible global war for the last
four years. Recent experiences had led to emphasis being placed
on realistic battle training. As a result instruction was serious,
strenuous, and thorough. Although units were still expected to
fight on a conventional European battlefield, their training was
applicable to any combat situation. The best- trained units would
be the first ones into Vietnam. However, the combat-experi-
enced personnel of these initial units were lost after their first
year in country. From then on units were filled over and over
again by new replacements fresh from the States.
The military's training programs were geared in case of war
to rely on mobilized Reserves and the federalized National Guard
to provide sufficient cadre. This support never materialized, and
as the war lengthened, the entire system of training soldiers in
the Continental Army Command had to be altered. A major ef-
fect was the tremendous expansion of training facilities, their
raison d'etre now being the production of battlefield proficiency
in the jungles and tunnels of Southeast Asia. Even as barracks
doors stood ajar in posts across the United States, the former
garrisons having departed for overseas service, "smokey bear"-
hatted drill sergeants marched rows of fresh trainees down as-
phalt camp streets. U.S. Army infantry training center brigades
dominated ten installations by the height of the Vietnam War. 7
7. In February 1969 Army infantry training center brigades were located at
Fort Benning, Georgia; Fort Bragg, North Carolina; Fort Campbell, Ken-
tucky; Fort Gordon, Georgia; Fort Dix, New Jersey; Fort Jackson, South Car-
olina; Fort Lewis, Washington; Fort McClellan, Alabama; Fort Ord, Califor-
nia; and Fort Polk, Louisiana.
26 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
Training courses were chopped several weeks in order to as-
sign trained soldiers rapidly to alerted units. While wartime
conditions in Vietnam put more emphasis on training, they also
produced a number of problems. Training still enjoyed very high
priority, but now the number one priority for the Army was
unquestionably the ongoing war in Vietnam. Sergeants and of-
ficers needed for training purposes were in even more demand
for leading soldiers through the rice paddies and jungles of
Southeast Asia. Training standards slipped due to rapid turn-
over. Many career soldiers even avoided training duty as not
the choicest of assignments. Compressed and accelerated train-
ing programs became the order of the day, a situation further
aggravated by the declining quality of incoming recruits as the
war progressed. 8
As the seemingly interminable Vietnam War dragged on,
personnel turbulence grew more prevalent throughout the Army.
Individual morale and discipline suffered. Stateside units, al-
ready skeletonized by the war's incessant replacement demands,
were undermined by further demands from Continental Army
Command's training establishments. Units in Europe, Alaska,
Hawaii, and Panama were ruthlessly stripped. The battle-ready
Army of 1965, its spit-shined shoes gleaming and full-color in-
signia neatly stitched on starched fatigues, had been replaced
by a war-weary Army by 1969, with dull boots and peace beads
draped under rumpled tunics.
Specialized training suffered most. One of the major hin-
drances to successful advisory performance was the absence of
any requirement to communicate in Vietnamese or French.
Vietnamese proved very hard for the few United States advisors
who endeavored to learn it. While syntactically simple, it was
a tonal language that proved to be phonetically difficult for
Americans. Even those who diligently took lessons for months
could only produce toneless, hence unintelligible, utterances.
General Cao Van Vien stated, "Even later, over the war years,
8. The Marine Corps also reduced recruit training time from twelve to eight
weeks beginning September 1, 1965, in an effort to process 30,000 additional
men newly authorized without an increase in instructors or existing facilities.
The Marines began drafting in January 1966.
AN ARMY GIRDS FOR BATTLE 27
I know of no single instance in which a U.S. advisor effectively
discussed professional matters with his counterpart in Vietnam-
ese." 9
Equitable management of many critical skills was impossible.
Some expertise required in Vietnam could not be filled by short-
term training, and comparable civilian occupations were nonex-
istent. As a result individuals were ordered on involuntary sec-
ond and even third tours of duty in Vietnam. Units fought over
the limited skilled people available. Helicopter units urgently
needed in Vietnam competed for the same quality personnel
sought by equally needed aviation maintenance units. The lack
of mobilization was soon taking its toll on the continued effi-
ciency of the regular armed forces.
The one universal troop factor throughout the Vietnam War
was the fixed "hostile fire area" tour, the combat zone service
requirement of one year. The Army found it increasingly diffi-
cult to sustain this fixed tour length as the war dragged on. Unit
readiness in the rest of the world was eroded, and personnel
retention and combat effectiveness in Vietnam suffered. Many
argued that just as a soldier was becoming a skilled tropical war-
rior he was yanked out, to be replaced by a green soldier who
had to learn it all from the beginning. A popular military adage
summed it up: the United States never fought in Vietnam ten
years, it fought in Vietnam one year ten times over.
The American soldier tried to adapt to the climate and ter-
rain of Vietnam and to fight courageously against a tough and
battle-wise adversary. For the most part, he continued to ex-
hibit good morale despite an inequitable draft system, training
problems, high personnel turnover rates, occasional inadequate
leadership, racial and drug problems, and a growing lack of pub-
lic support at home. These took a larger toll of the American
Army as the years exacerbated the effects, dulling the Army's
fighting edge and ultimately reducing the combat potential of
entire divisions and brigades.
For the individual American soldier, the overriding concern
was how much time he had remaining in Vietnam. Daily "short"
9. General Cao Van Vien et al., The U.S. Advisor, U.S. Army Center of
Military History, Washington, D.C., 1980, p. 31.
28 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
calendars were meticulously ticked off on everything from hel-
met covers to pin-up posters, Barring death or serious injury,
every soldier knew his exact departure date as soon as he stepped
on Vietnamese soil. His primary purpose became simply to reach
his personal DEROS (date expected to return from overseas)
intact. The fixed length of the hostile fire tour, for all its draw-
backs, had undeniably overwhelming morale value.
The eager soldier of 1965, anxious to earn his Combat In-
fantryman's Badge, was replaced by the hardened but decorated
Vietnam "survivor" of later years. By that time the privates and
junior officers of the pre-Vietnam Army were the platoon ser-
geants and battalion commanders.
CHAPTER 3.
MARINES AT WAR
1. "Send in The Marines!"
The United States Marine Corps, the nation's amphibious strike
force, is the corps d 'elite of the American military, As a premier
fighting organization, the Marines also have the role of pro-
tecting American interests on a global basis.
This dual responsibility has produced a rich and varied leg-
acy extending from the first Marine landing in the Bahamas in
1776 to the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. In between, the Ma-
rines had captured a pirate fortress at Tripoli, taken the Mex-
ican national palace, participated in the Civil War, defended
Shanghai and Peking, cleared entrenched German troops from
French forests, fought through a maze of Caribbean conflicts,
stormed Japanese island bastions, landed on Korean shores, and
defended Lebanon. This heritage had produced a common gov-
ernmental response to military emergencies throughout the
country's history: "Send in the Marines!"
As the situation in Vietnam began to unravel, the Marines
were in a very high response posture. This was largely due to
the triple crises of Cuba, Thailand in 1962, and the assassination
of President John F. Kennedy the following year. During 1964,
Marine capability was further tested and sharpened by a series
of rigorous exercises extending from Norwegian Tremso, three
hundred miles inside the Arctic Circle, to mock battles with
French Marine commandos in the Mediterranean. That year
training was conducted in Corsica, Sardinia, Spain, Norway,
29
30 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
Puerto Rico, Cuba, Panama, North Carolina, New York, Cali-
fornia, Hawaii, Taiwan, and the Philippines.
Gen. Wallace M. Greene, Jr., who became commandant of
the Marine Corps on January 1, 1964, stated on March 26 that
the Marine Corps had "reached its best state of readiness in
many years." On New Year's Day 1965, actual Marine strength
stood at 188,505. They were poised for action anywhere in the
world. l
In late 1964, the Pentagon considered strengthening the
northern portion of South Vietnam by moving the Seventh Fleet's
Marine Special Landing Force and a Marine antiaircraft missile
battalion to guard Da Nang. Once the colorful French colonial
city of Tourane, constant war had reduced it to a squalid, ref-
ugee-packed town. The crucial military significance of Da Nang
was obvious. Its bay, hemmed in by the Chaine Annamitique
spur of the Hai Van Mountains and Mon Ky (Monkey) Moun-
tain, was one of the few good deep-water harbors in the coun-
try, and its single ten thousand-foot concrete runway was con-
sidered a major air base. By mid-February of 1965, MACV
determined that the South Vietnamese military was no longer
able to defend the area's installations against determined attack.
It was imperative that the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade,
on board naval ships in the South China Sea, be moved to Da
Nang. The 1st Marine Brigade at Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii, pre-
paring to outload for Exercise SILVER EAGLE in California,
would be sent to Okinawa as backup.
The U.S. Marines became responsible for the five northern
provinces known as I Corps Tactical Zone. At the upper bound-
ary was the demarcation line separating North and South Viet-
nam. This was marked by the Song Ben Hai River until it reached
Bo Ho Su, from which point the line ran straight to the border.
1. In January 1965 U.S. Marine Corps infantry was disposed as follows: Con-
tinental United States 1st Marine Division (1st, 5th, 7th Marines) and 2d
Marine Division (2d, 6th, 8th Marines); Okinawa 3d Marine Division (3d,
9th Marines); Hawaii 1st Marine Brigade (4th Marines); Mediterranean Sea
1st Battalion Landing Team, 2d Marines; Caribbean Sea 3d Battalion Land-
ing Team, 2d Marines; South China Sea 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade
(1st and 3d Battalion Landing Teams, 9th Marines); Vietnam Company D,
1st Battalion, 3d Marines.
New flags are unfurled during the official activation ceremonies for
the 199th Infantry Brigade (Light) at Fort Benning, Georgia, on June
24, 1966, as the United States Army goes to war. (Fort Benning Signal
Photograph Laboratory)
Helicopters arrive over Camp Shelby, Mississippi, to ferry soldiers of
the 199th Infantry Brigade (Light) into their final training exercise on
October 1, 1966, prior to departure for Vietnam. (Fort Benning Sig-
nal Photograph Laboratory)
Marine Ontos vehicle, mounting six recoilless rifles, rolls ashore at Da
Nang during the landing of the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, on March
8, 1965. (U.S. Marine Corps)
U.S. Army soldiers disembark from a medium landing craft at Cat
Lai in 1966. (U.S. Army)
^V^^^-IV-ri''-:,^ .-/I ' '!'! .- ,-
^^^
Marines of the 2d Battalion, 9th Marines, come under fire while mak-
ing an assault during Operation HARVEST MOON on December 12,
1965. (U.S. Marine Corps)
A recoilless rifle mounted on top of an amtrac of the 1st Amphibious
Battalion, with the 3d Marine Division, fires at opposition west of Da
Nang on August 19, 1965. (U.S. Marine Corps)
Paratroopers of the 173d Airborne Brigade combat assault near Bien
Hoa in 1965. (Bell Helicopters)
Infantrymen of the 1st Infantry Division take automatic weapons fire
from a treeline during an early search and destroy mission on October
4, 1965. (U.S. Army)
MARINES AT WAR 31
Precipitous border mountain ranges, with peaks eight to ten
thousand feet high, formed the region's western frontier. This
natural barrier reversed the monsoon seasons from what the rest
of Vietnam experienced. Summers were mainly hot and dry, but
the winters were warm and rainy.
I Corps Tactical Zone was also physically and culturally sep-
arated from the rest of South Vietnam. A series of ridges ex-
tended to the sea, dividing the inhabited coast into small moun-
tain-ringed valleys wherever rivers washed out to sea. The old
Mandarin Road, now called Route 1, connecting Da Nang to
Saigon, had most of its bridges down. The trans-Vietnam Rail-
way had large sections of track removed throughout its length.
I Corps Tactical Zone was also traditionally part of old Annam,
aloof from lower areas once known as Cochin China. The largest
city of the region, Hue, was once the splendid Annamese im-
perial capital when Saigon was just a backward fishing hamlet.
The South Vietnamese commander and military governor of
I Corps Tactical Zone was the former parachutist brigade leader,
two-starred Gen. Nguyen Chanh Thi, the "Warlord of the North."
Headquartered in the handsome yellow- and brown-trimmed
French colonial compound near the Da Nang airfield, he had
placed his 1st ARVN Division in the upper two provinces near
the DMZ and the 2d ARVN Division in the lower two. The
separate 51st ARVN Regiment was posted to central Quang Nam
Province.
The 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade landed at Da Nang
on March 8, 1965. On April 10, a second landing force of Ma-
rines went ashore and began building a base farther north at
Phu Bai. Nearly a month later, on May 6, still more Marines
landed and began their southernmost installation in I Corps Tac-
tical Zone at Chu Lai. By the end of the year they had estab-
lished three operational enclaves, and the largest Marine force
to be in combat since World War II was fully engaged in South
Vietnam.
2. The Marines Land
The landing craft carrying the drenched Marines of Brig. Gen.
Frederick J, Karch's 9th Expeditionary Brigade bobbed in the
rough waters of Da Nang Bay. Overhead a cold, cloudy sky sent
32 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
a stiff wind with drizzling rain across the harbor. An armada of
warships clustered around the flagship USS Mount McKinley
(AGC-7) disgorging tank-laden boats and amphibious tractors into
ten-foot swells. Battle-equipped Marines grimly clambered down
violently swaying nets. Mooring lines were snapping between
the pitching landing craft and their mother ships.
The 3d Battalion of the 9th Marines had been embarked in
naval ships off the Vietnamese coast for two months. On March
8, 1965, twenty years after the "Striking Ninth" had hit the
beaches of Iwo Jima, four assault waves of the battalion landed
through high surf in Vietnam. 2 They were greeted on the beach
by General Thi, surrounded by a bevy of pretty college girls
who draped the Marine vanguard, including Brigadier General
Karch, with garlands of flowers. As the Marines were landing
across the beach another battalion, the 1st Battalion of the 3d
Marines, was en route from Okinawa in Marine KC-130 cargo
planes. Since the territory just to the south of the airstrip was
controlled by the Viet Cong, any aircraft approaching Da Nang
had to run a gauntlet of VC ground fire. The planes flew past
sniper rounds to begin landing the battalion at one o'clock that
afternoon.
The Da Nang airfield, located in the middle of a densely
populated area, was overcrowded with quantities of airplanes of
all descriptions. These included Marine helicopters, stationed
there since September 1962, and their company of Marine se-
curity. A Marine antiaircraft battalion had arrived that Febru-
ary. 3 Now it was becoming even more glutted with Marine in-
2. The 9th Marines had been part of the great expansion of the Marine Corps
during World War I. It was activated November 20, 1917, at Quantico, Vir-
ginia, and posted to Cuba and then to Galveston, Texas. During World War
II it fought in Bougainville, the northern Solomons, and Guam, before land-
ing on Iwo Jima February 24, 1945. There it had captured Motoyama Airfield
#2, broken the main line of Japanese resistance on the Motoyama Plateau,
and made the final breakthrough to the island's northeastern shore. In 1948
it occupied Tsingtao and Shanghai, China, and had been posted between Ja-
pan and Okinawa since 1953, training in Korea, Formosa, and Borneo. In
May-July 1962 elements had been sent to Udorn, Thailand, to counter the
worsening situation in Laos.
3. The 1st Light Antiaircraft Battalion was activated at Twenty Nine Palms,
California, as the Marine Corps's first HAWK missile battalion on May 2,
1960. It had been shipped from the United States for Vietnam duty in De-
cember 1964 but was held up in Okinawa due to facility construction costs.
MARINES AT WAR 33
fantry and artillery. Two companies secured hilltops enabling
several HAWK missile batteries to leave the congested airbase
and move beside them.
The five-thousand-man 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade sent
to Da Nang was assigned a single task; defend the airfield. The
air base fence line was generally the boundary between friendly
control and a strong pro- Viet Cong population. For several weeks
the entire brigade had to subsist on fifteen days of rations one
battalion had brought ashore and one emergency airlift from Sai-
gon. The Marines felt besieged, A nearby undisciplined ARVN
firing range, which routinely sent shots in their direction, and
the scorching heat made them uncomfortable. Despite repeated
pleas to extend aggressive patrolling, General Thi denied per-
mission for the Marines to go outside a narrowly confined de-
fensive perimeter. The only visible accomplishment seemed to
be the revived sales of marble ashtrays, made from nearby Mar-
ble Mountain seven miles to the south and sold as souvenirs.
On April 10, the Marines in Da Nang were reinforced by
the 2d Battalion of the 3d Marines, fresh from training in south-
ern Thailand, followed by the regimental headquarters of the
3d Marines out of Okinawa. The reinforced 3d Battalion of the
4th Marines arrived from Hawaii via Okinawa on April 14. They
were helicoptered to garrison Phu Bai, seven miles south of Hue,
where a critical MACV electronic spy station and communica-
tions facility was located.
Another important enclave was established at Chu Lai, about
sixty miles south of Da Nang, where the Marines were ordered
to build an airstrip. 4 The headquarters of the 4th Marines along
with its 1st and 2d battalions and the 3d Reconnaissance Bat-
talion landed on the beaches May 7, 1965. A large sign had
It was on a firing exercise when President Lyndon B. Johnson announced
over national television he had ordered it to Vietnam, After a hectic drive
through the morning rush hour, it was shoved aboard planes at Naha Air Base
and landed in Da Nang February 8, 1965.
4. The site had been selected by Marine Lt. Gen. Victor H. Krulak, the
commanding general of Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, on a 1964 inspection
tour. The naval officer with him agreed the place looked good, but it wasn't
marked on the map. Krulak gave him the Mandarin Chinese characters for
his own name, saying it was called Chu Lai. The name stuck.
34 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
been put up by the Ly Tin district Army advisors which read,
"Ahoy Marines! Welcome Aboard, Area Secured." The area looked
deceptively like Marine Camp Lejeune in North Carolina, but
the terrible heat and bottomless, sugary sands ended the sim-
ilarities as equipment was struggled ashore. Five days later they
were joined by the 3d Battalion of the 3d Marines.
General Westmoreland had told the Marines to rename their
headquarters, as the word expeditionary was unpalatable to the
Vietnamese because of its French colonial association. The 9th
Marine Expeditionary Brigade was folded down. The III Marine
Amphibious Fox-ce (MAF) assumed control of Marine activities
in Vietnam on May 7, 1965. The previous day the command
group of the famed 3d Marine Division had arrived in Vietnam
from Okinawa. Maj. Gen. Lewis W. Walt arrived in Vietnam
at the end of the month to assume command of both III MAF
and the division.
The 3d Marine Division was the westernmost United States
Pacific response division. Originally formed in 1942 for World
War II service, the division was highly regarded for its fierce
1945 battle at Iwo Jima, where it had earned the Presidential
Unit Citation, Deactivated that December, it was reraised in
California in 1952 and went to Camp Gifu, Japan, the next Au-
gust. Since February 1956 it had been stationed at Camp Court-
ney, Okinawa. Known as a hard-training division, its proximity
to Korea, Taiwan, South Vietnam, and Thailand had always kept
troops and material at a high level of readiness. It was naturally
the first American division into combat during the Vietnam War.
At 1:30 A.M. on July 1, a Marine sentry near the Da Nang
air base fence line heard a suspicious noise. He tossed an il-
lumination grenade into the darkness. It exploded, triggering a
furious VC mortar barrage that swept across the Air Force side
of the field. A squad of Viet Cong sappers, with an officer from
the 3d Battalion, 18th NVA Regiment, dashed through the pe-
rimeter fence and heaved satchel charges into a number of parked
aircraft. As the demolition team scurried away, several groups
of Marines scrambled over the concrete ramps toward the fence
line. A short gunfight broke out between the Marines and Viet
Cong. Two Marines were hit and went down. A recoilless rifle
round crashed into a bunker. Then suddenly it was over. Flares
MARINES AT WAR 35
and burning aircraft lit up the broken wire and bloodied grass
in the blazing aftermath of the spectacular attack.
That month unrestrained authority for Marine offensive op-
erations was granted. The headquarters of the 9th Marines landed
in Da Nang on July 6, and the headquarters of the 7th Marines
and the two remaining battalions on Okinawa were landed at
Chu Lai on August 14. The III MAF now had four infantry
regiments, and planned to swing immediately into action against
the Viet Cong. Operation STARLITE was about to begin. 5
3. The First Battle
For five months after the Marine landings at Da Nang, the
Viet Cong had carefully avoided combat. However, by midsum-
mer a major clash between the Marines and Viet Cong main
force units was inevitable. The III MAF had steadily expanded
its tactical enclaves at Da Nang, Chu Lai, and Phu Bai. The
area actively patrolled by the Marines had grown from eight
square miles in March to over six hundred square miles by Au-
gust.
The Marine battalion, built to be part of a self-sustaining
landing team designed to assault and hold a beach, was ideally
suited for the fluid area warfare of Vietnam. A carefully struc-
tured and powerful force, it could be projected at considerable
distance by the Marines's own helicopters and covered by the
Marines's own jet aircraft. However, the Marines had been un-
able to employ their battalions this way in Vietnam. Then they
were given an extremely crucial bit of intelligence information.
The 1st VC Regiment was pinpointed by a Viet Cong deserter
on August 15, 1965. It was occupying hamlets in the vicinity of
Van Tuong Peninsula, just fifteen miles south of Chu Lai.
The headquarters of Col. Oscar F. Peatross's 7th Marines
with its 1st Battalion had just arrived to reinforce Chu Lai. The
battalion was posted to base defense, but the command group
5. The infantry dispositions of III MAF would remain basically unchanged
from mid-August until the end of 1965. These were Phu Bai 3d Battalion,
4th Marines; Da Nang 1st and 2d Battalions, 3d Marines; 1st, 2d, and 3d
Battalions, 9th Marines; Chu Lai 3d Battalion, 3d Marines; 1st and 2d Bat-
talions, 4th Marines; 1st Battalion, 7th Marines; Qui Nhon 2d Battalion, 7th
Marines (under Army control); Special Landing Force 3d Battalion, 7th Ma-
rines.
36 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
of the 7th Marines was put in charge of the operation to hit the
peninsula. The ground troops would be the seasoned Marines
already in Chu Lai. Plans were drawn up to make a regimental
assault. One Marine company would move overland from the
north and dig in along the Tra Bong River as a blocking force.
Shortly after dawn the next day a battalion would be landed by
helicopter, simultaneously with a battalion hitting the beach in
tracked amphibian vehicles. The Viet Cong would be driven be-
tween the seaborne and heliborne forces either into the block-
ing force or up against the coastline, where they would be trap-
ped and eliminated.
A floating reserve battalion landing team could be provided
by the Seventh Fleet Special Landing Force, but it was at Subic
Bay in the Philippine Islands. Major General Walt insisted the
reserve be present. The operation was scheduled to kick off based
on its anticipated arrival off the coast of Vietnam. That would
be daybreak, August 18. Fortuitous naval shipping for the sea-
borne attack battalion was readily available; a host of vessels were
unloading reinforcements at both Chu Lai and Da Nang. They
were quickly mustered for the operation. Plans were frantically
put together, and in the rush the operational code name SAT-
ELLITE got mistakenly altered to STARLITE by a clerking er-
ror, the result of typing by candlelight after the electrical gen-
erators went down.
D-day for the seaborne assault battalion of the 3d Marines
was August 18, 1965. 6 Marine A-4 Skyhawks repeatedly strafed
the landing beaches as gargantuan forty-ton amtrac landing ve-
hicles wallowed toward shore. The morning light reflected off
the combing waves as the square-hulled titans thrashed across
the beach, churning sand and grass as they moved inland. The
machines jerked to a stop, their eleven-foot-high silhouettes
towering stark against the rising sun like massive stone blocks
6. The 3d Marines was activated December 20, 1916, at Santo Domingo,
Dominican Republic, where it served six years until deactr Cation, Raised again
for World War II service, it was rapidly deployed to the Pacific, assigned to
the 3d Marine Division, and invaded Bougainville and the northern Solo-
mons. The 3d Marines went on to recapture Guam and take Iwo Jima in
extremely hard fighting. It later occupied North China until 1949, and had
been in Okinawa since March 1957.
MARINES AT WAR 37
left by some giant at water's edge. Dozens of green-clad war-
riors ran out of the gaping frontal ramp jaws. The men of the
3d Battalion, 3d Marines, formed up in long lines and advanced
in open formation toward the seaside clusters of thatched huts,
but there were no Viet Cong.
Out to sea, Marine-crammed landing utility craft backed out
the well deck of the USS Cabildo (LSD-16), their dirty exhaust
fumes mixing with salt spray to cloud the stern of the landing
ship. Two other landing craft had sailed under their own power
to the beaches and swung down their ramps. Big fifty-ton M48
main battle tanks and M67 flametanks rumbled onto shore, their
turrets grinding around to swing long gun barrels from side to
side. Nimble nine-ton beetlelike Ontos vehicles scurried down
the beaches, their slender-barreled recoilless rifles balanced in
triple mountings on each side. Vietnamese fishermen were put-
ting their wooden boats into the water. Marine supplies were
stacking up on the dunes, and already it was becoming a swel-
tering tropical day. Except for occasional pesky sniper fire, the
operation was proceeding smoothly on the seaward side.
Company K was steadily advancing up the coast when it came
under intense fire. VC machine guns and mortars were nestled
into a fortified hill just ahead of it, and company attempts to
maneuver forward were brought to a standstill. Company L was
sent in to help, along with naval gunfire. The six-inch guns of
the light cruiser USS Galveston (CLG-3) carefully measured but
direct shots, each blast lighting the ship's tall array of antennas
and lattice masts. The shells crashed against the hillside in dev-
astating upheavals of dirt and timber.
The heat was unbearable. The noon sun beat down merci-
lessly on the sweltering Marines as they prepared to charge again.
They refixed bayonets snugly into rifle sockets, and pulled spare
bullet-filled magazines out of shirt pockets drenched in sweat.
Then they surged forward through a smoking rubbish of vege-
tation, running past smashed trees riddled with shards of steel
shrapnel. Suddenly a hail of deafening automatic weapons fire
exploded from the Viet Cong trenchworks. Men sagged and
dropped as bullets tore into them. The Marines leaped into the
first VC trenchline where individual rifle shots and knifepoint
dispatched the defenders. Dead Viet Cong gunners and Marine
38 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
riflemen clogged the bottoms of weapons pits. The wounded from
both sides, moaning for water, littered the collapsed trenches.
The Marines continued to fight their way up the hill, and by
mid-afternoon it was secured.
Action was intense on the landward side also. Early that
morning the 2d Battalion of the 4th Marines had clambered
aboard squat, green UH-34 helicopters for the flight to its west-
ern landing zones. The craft skimmed over flat rice paddies and
dry fields dotted with hamlets, streams, and little wooded hills.
The helicopters set down on three scattered sites, shortly after
the first assault waves had crossed the beaches two and three
miles distant. Company E immediately ran into a Viet Cong
ridgeline off the landing zone. The Marines fixed bayonets on
their M14 rifles and went into the attack. After a brief firefight
the hill was taken.
First Lt, Homer K. Jenkins's Company H choppered in be-
side a small knoll, unaware that it had practically landed on top
of a VC battalion occupying the adjacent hilltop. The first hel-
icopters landed safely, but a furious fusillade of mixed rocket-
propelled grenades and machine-gun fire met the next group.
Jenkins pulled his men back into a small perimeter while Army
helicopter gunships rocketed and strafed the wooded rise. He
sent a platoon against the hill, but it was quickly pinned down
by entrenched automatic weapons and couldn't get up the slope.
Three tanks and three Ontos vehicles were brought up, and
jet aircraft roared down to send bombs plummeting into the dense
shrubbery. Then Company H attacked again, working its way
up the steep hillside against direct machine-gun fire. Grenades
and bursts of rifle fire marked the advancing Marines as they
closed the summit. Hill 43 had been taken, and Jenkins now
advanced east with his tracked armor between two other small
hamlets.
The hamlets, Nam Yen #3 and An Cuong #2, were strongly
fortified with tunnels and trenchlines weaving through hedge-
rows laced with bamboo thickets. The latter had already been
cleared, but Jenkins thought both were in Marine hands. 7 Mid-
7. Company I of the sea-landed 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, had secured An
Cuong #2, the other hamlet in Jenkins's area. Capt. Bruce D. Webb's men
MARINES AT WAR 39
way across the rice paddy fierce machine-gun fire suddenly cut
down the rear squads. A withering mortar barrage then rolled
across the unit. The armored tanks and self-propelled recoilless
rifles were bogging down. Jenkins desperately formed a mobile
defensive circle with the vehicles and retreated back to the
landing zone. Casualties had been heavy, and one platoon was
cut off trying to reach medical evacuation helicopters. However,
the separated group happened across another detachment of
Marines sent after a downed helicopter. They combined into
one defensive perimeter.
Meanwhile an amtrac resupply force with three flame tanks
was moving inland from the beach to resupply Company I of
3d Battalion, 3d Marines, which was now pulling back from An
Cuong #2. The column became disoriented in the maze of trails
and ambled into a Viet Cong ambush. A series of jarring ex-
plosions swept the column, followed by an intense barrage of
self-propelled grenades, recoilless rifles, and mortars. A hur-
riedly gathered task force of Marine infantry from Company I,
several Ontos vehicles, and one M48 battle tank sallied out to
rescue the beleaguered column. This relief group was also hit
by concentrated fire as it neared the ambush area. The M48
tank was knocked out, and dead and wounded piled up as Ma-
rines attacked the fortified villages and tree lines. By the end
of the action, Company I had taken so many losses it had to be
pulled out of the battle. The supply column managed to hold
its positions through the night, killing scores of Viet Cong sol-
diers who tried to overrun the amtracs and tanks.
The reserve Special Landing Force, the 3d Battalion of the
7th Marines, had arrived offshore on the helicopter carrier USS
Iwo Jima (LPH-2) that morning. Companies from this unit were
flown off the decks and helicoptered beside the other Marine
units pushing steadily forward toward the coast. During the night
the Marines halted on line. Naval warships fired star shells to
keep the darkness flooded by artificial candles until morning.
moved into the innocuous-appearing village, but as they searched the huts a
VC grenade was tossed into the midst of the command group, killing him
instantly. An intense spasm of grenades and gunfire erupted, but the Marines
were already inside the hamlet and took it after a sharp firefight.
40 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
The next day saw pockets of last-ditch resistance mopped up as
the Marines pushed to the ocean.
Operation STARLITE had been a resounding Marine suc-
cess. The 1st VC Regiment had been taken by surprise and
pushed against the sea, where it was systematically destroyed
by Marine infantry, air power, and naval gunfire. The inherent
flexibility of Marine doctrine was underscored by the timely in-
sertion of the Special Landing Force, a move which completed
the entrapment. The operation was also significant because it
was the first battle between the United States and Viet Cong
main forces. It was followed by Operation PIRANHA, another
regimental amphibious-heliborne assault mounted on September
7, 1965, by the same Marine force, which was highlighted by
the destruction of a large Viet Cong cave. 8
Following Operations STARLITE and PIRANHA, Viet Cong
main force units successfully avoided large scale engagements
with the Marines for two months. That December the Marines
would again clash with a revitalized 1st VC Regiment on the
battlefield, this time in the Phuoc Ha Valley in an operation
called HARVEST MOON.
4. Battle in the Monsoon
By November the monsoons, which had arrived in I Corps
Tactical Zone the previous month, had washed out roads and
flooded facilities. Gray, misting clouds rolled down lush moun-
tainsides to disgorge torrential sheets of rain that blotted out the
horizon and socked in entire valleys for weeks. In this season
of overcasts and downpours, the Viet Cong began a renewed
offensive. On October 27, a night sapper raid hit the Da Nang
airfield, causing heavy damage.
The district capital of Hiep Due was overrun on November
17 as cloudbursts soaked the battlefield. Two battalions of the
5th ARVN Regiment were airlifted into landing zones that hap-
pened to be right under the heavy machine guns of an NVA
flak battalion, sited on a commanding ridgeline. Twenty of thirty
8. Marine engineers exploded the cavern on Batangan Peninsula after the
Viet Cong inside refused to surrender. While 66 Viet Cong were killed in
the blast, six Marines searching it afterwards were overcome by oxygen star-
vation.
MARINES AT WAR 41
Marine helicopters involved were shot up by the 195th NVA
Antiaircraft Battalion attached to the 1st VC Regiment. After a
raging two-day battle, the 5th ARVN Regiment was ordered back
to Quang Ngai, abandoning hard-won Hiep Due in the process.
The VC moved on into their base area in the Phuoc Ha Valley,
and the Marines planned to trap them there.
Operation HARVEST MOON was to be a combined Marine-
South Vietnamese search and destroy mission, the largest Ma-
rine operation since their arrival in Vietnam. Briefly, the plan
called for three ARVN battalions to move overland from Thang
Binh southwest into the Phuoc Ha Valley on December 9. At
the same time two Marine battalions would be helicoptered to
the rear and flanks of the Viet Cong, completing their entrap-
ment. Another battalion of Marines, serving as the fleet Special
Landing Force, would be a ready reserve on naval warships just
off the coast of Vietnam.
The South Vietnamese forces were unable to make the road
march into the area without getting ambushed. On the after-
noon of December 8, the column was moving down both sides
of Route 534, the llth ARVN Ranger Battalion on the right and
the 1st Battalion, 5th ARVN Regiment, on the left. Suddenly
the right-hand battalion was hit by a withering concentration of
machine-gun fire and grenade blasts. Waves of VC then charged
them from all sides, firing assault rifles into the midst of the
startled rangers. Ranger dead and wounded fell in twisted clumps,
rifles and helmets clattered to the ground, and in fifteen min-
utes the battalion had disintegrated. The ranger commander was
wounded, hit again, and carried out on the back of an American
advisor. In another fifteen minutes the broken rangers were
streaming to the rear, and the battalion was no longer in the
war.
The 1st Battalion of the 5th ARVN Regiment couldn't get
across the road. The roadway was exploding under a wall of up-
turned clay and chunks of pavement hurled through the air by
an intense VC mortar barrage. Screams, shouted orders, and
small arms fire mixed in a din of crashing shells and roaring
jets. Marine fighter-bombers thundered down to pound the other
side of the road with cannon fire and an onslaught of exploding
bombs. The 1st Battalion of the 6th ARVN Regiment was heli-
42 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
coptered into the positions held by the remnants of the ranger
battalion, and the Viet Cong broke off the action during the
night. The next morning both of the other South Vietnamese
battalions were assaulted. The 5th ARVN Regimental head-
quarters and its 1st Battalion were overrun. The regimental
colonel was killed in the desperate fighting.
At 10:00 A.M. the Marines stepped in. The flak-vested 2d
Battalion, 7th Marines, was air-assaulted five miles from the bat-
tle to occupy a key hilltop and get behind the Viet Cong. Find-
ing few VC there, they consolidated. That afternoon the 3d Bat-
talion, 3d Marines, was helicoptered into a landing zone slightly
south of the fragmented South Vietnamese positions, and pushed
overland in an attempt to reach the 5th ARVN Regiment's lines.
Company L immediately ran into a running engagement, which
lasted until evening when firing ceased. The next morning the
Marines linked up with the remnants of the South Vietnamese
regiment.
The Marine counterattack continued early on the morning
of December 10, as the two Marine battalions continued to
compress the Viet Cong from two directions. Resistance was
heavy, and the advance over hedgerows, jungle-covered hills,
and rice paddies was slow and difficult. It was decided to com-
mit the Special Landing Force. The men of the 2d Battalion of
the 1st Marines donned full battle dress, drew rifles, and grabbed
extra magazines of ammunition. They scrambled onto the flight
deck of the old World War II aircraft carrier USS Valley Forge
(LPH-8), which had since been converted into a helicopter car-
rier. This fresh battalion of reserves was to be inserted halfway
between the two Marine battalions already on the battlefield.
Loaded with the accoutrements of war, their rifles held firmly
in their hands, they marched across the open deck in the stiff
sea breeze to climb into fifteen UH-34 helicopters.
Captain James F. Page's Company F went in first. The heli-
copters whirled over flooded rice fields outlined by long dikes,
neatly dividing them into an assortment of liquid boxes. The
landing zone had been bombed and rocketed in advance, but
as the troop-laden helicopters hovered close to earth they were
met by a hail of Viet Cong machine-gun fire. The Marines dived
MARINES AT WAR 43
out into a spray of bullets, and lunged into the shallow paddy
water behind earthen berms. Mortar rounds started dropping
among them. Crumpled bodies were strewn over the muddy
fields, among them Captain Page. (He was left for dead but the
next day medical corpsmen, checking through the bodies, picked
up a very faint murmur of a possible heartbeat and flew him
out. He later recovered.) The Marines desperately called for re-
inforcements, but the rest of their battalion had landed to the
west.
Company E of the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, fought its way
forward to the pinned company. It took heavy losses, but finally
managed to get a position to support the depleted Marines with
covering fire. The trapped Marines wriggled back toward the
relief force in bounds from dike to dike, Machine guns and rifles
were waterlogged but still firing. Boots, open flak jackets, and
shirts were drenched a muddy brown. Their painful withdrawal
was marked by a trail of doubled-over comrades half sunk in
the paddy ooze, and groups of naval corpsmen clustered over
wounded propped up half out of the water beside dikes. Finally
the two battered companies joined up and formed a defensive
perimeter. Another reinforcing company arrived as darkness fell.
Throughout the next two days all three Marine battalions
continued their steady advance against the southern rim of the
valley. The Viet Cong pulled out of the entrapment, conducting
effective harassing fire tactics. Four B-52 strategic bomber strikes
were made December 12-14. Marines inserted to check out the
effects of these bombings met only slight resistance. However,
they uncovered extensive VC tunnel complexes containing large
amounts of supplies and manufacturing equipment. Repeated
sweeps of the entire operating area continued to draw only light
Viet Cong fire. The battle was over except for one last parting
shot.
On December 18, 1965, the 2d Battalion of the 7th Marines
was ambushed by a large Viet Cong force west of Tarn Ky, but
a violent Marine counterattack and liberal use of artillery and
air support routed the VC. Operation HARVEST MOON marked
the Marines's last battle of the year, as well as their last major
engagement during the rainy season. The 3d Marine Division
44 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
was already drawing on elements of the 1st Marine Division,
which had the 7th Marines and two battalions of the 1st Marines
committed to Vietnam. The next year MACV planned to bring
in the rest of the division as part of a continuing Marine buildup
in an expanding war.
CHAPTER 4.
AN ARMY GOES TO WAR
1. The Rock Regiment
Brigadier General Ellis W. Williamson's 173d Airborne Brigade
on Okinawa was the Army's own compact, two-fisted response
force for the western Pacific, designed to drop in under cano-
pies of silk and seize immediate objectives until something big-
ger could reinforce the situation. Its two fists were the 1st and
2d Battalions of the 503d Infantry (Airborne), which was the first
parachute infantry regiment into the Pacific during World War
II. There it had pulled off a dramatic parachute assault on top
of fortified Corregidor Island, known as The Rock. This service
gave the 503d Infantry a Pacific legacy and the appellation "The
Rock Regiment." 1 The 173d Airborne Brigade enjoyed a close
camaraderie, and in Vietnam would always be known to the troops
as "The Herd," while its high percentage of blacks and racial
cooperation would add another shibboleth, Two Shades of Soul.
General Westmoreland wanted the elite 173d Airborne Bri-
gade in Vietnam as part of his enclave concept at once and got
the green light on April 14, 1965. There was one proviso. The
1. The 503d Parachute Infantry was activated at Fort Benning, Georgia, on
February 24, 1942, and arrived in Australia that November. It fought in New
Guinea, Leyte, Luzon, and the southern Philippines. Its dashing airborne
assault onto the small but well defended Japanese fortress island of Corre-
gidor on February 16, 1945, was one of the most daring paratrooper assaults
of history. The battalions were assigned to the separate 173d Airborne Bri-
gade when it was formed on March 26, 1963. In Vietnam the brigade was
later expanded to contain all four battalions of the 503d Infantry (Airborne).
45
46 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
brigade was understood to be in Vietnam merely on temporary
duty and would later be replaced by another airborne brigade
from the States. The paratroopers arrived in Vietnam on May
5, heavy duffel bags swung over their shoulders and full-color
"flying butterknife" (a winged bayonet) shoulder patches on their
sleeves. The first order of the day was rolled-up sleeves; the
tropical heat blasted them like an open oven.
The brigade was the first Army ground combat unit to arrive
in South Vietnam. It was headquartered at Bien Hoa, outside
Saigon, where it expected to be used as a countrywide fire bri-
gade. Instead, one battalion was detained to pull guard duty at
Vung Tau, the landing point for Army units arriving by sea, and
its other battalion dug in around the Bien Hoa air base as se-
curity. Then in early June the brigade was put back together,
given a third maneuver battalion, the crack 1st Battalion of the
Royal Australian Regiment, and ordered to start training for of-
fensive combat.
The paratroopers had to be turned into a new kind of sky
soldier: the airmobile infantry. They rehearsed day and night.
They learned how to jump off helicopters and dash toward the
tree lines in the right direction, firing from the hip. They learned
to trust the helicopter gunship pilots zooming in just over their
heads. They stopped mistaking the rain of falling cartridge links
for bullets tearing into their own positions.
On June 27, 1965, the brigade's three battalions divided into
hundreds of small clusters on the runway at Bien Hoa. Dozens
of helicopters warmed their engines on the airstrip as the first
lifts began soaring into the dense, humid skies. It was the larg-
est airmobile operation to date in the Vietnam War, involving
144 helicopters, the 173d Airborne Brigade reinforced by two
ARVN airborne battalions, and the 48th ARVN Regiment. They
were helicoptered into the jungles of War Zone D, a large swath
of Viet Cong-controlled territory just to the north of Bien Hoa,
which no allied unit had entered in over a year.
The 173d Airborne Brigade stayed in the area until June 30.
It simultaneously pulled out of three different landing zones within
close distance of each other. It was a hectic experience for the
green brigade. Artillery rounds sailed through the air to crash
into the thick forests, troop helicopters flew underneath to pick
AN ARMY GOES TO WAR 47
up shrinking bands of infantry deliberately collapsing their pe-
rimeters, and gunships orbited in tight circles firing machine
guns and rockets. As the young paratroopers clambered into the
wildly vibrating open cargo bays of the Huey helicopters, their
helmets sprouting rather exotic combinations of tropical leafage,
they grinned at the door gunners. There hadn't been much ac-
tion, but they were now veterans. That August the new sky
troopers were taken off temporary duty orders. The brigade was
in Vietnam on a permanent change of station.
The 173d Airborne Brigade had made another excursion into
War Zone D on July 6 in conjunction with the 48th ARVN Reg-
iment. The brigade was moved to Pleiku on its first mobile re-
sponse mission on August 10, after the attack on the western
border Special Forces camp of Due Co. There it held Thanh
Binh Pass on Highway 19 as South Vietnamese units retreated
through it on August 17. After other sweeps around Kontum it
moved back to Bien Hoa on September 6. A month later on
October 8, back in War Zone D, the brigade pushed through
heavy jungle and the shattered remnants of rain forest, where
B-52 bombing strikes had reduced massive timber to broken
deadfall littering gigantic craters torn out of the earth. Constant
sniper fire and occasional ambushes plagued the sweltering
paratroopers.
By the time the 173d Airborne Brigade went into War Zone
D on its fifth incursion November 5, 1965, the exhilarating edge
of war had long worn off. The pugnacious soldiers even gave
the operation a petulant title, HUMP. The soldier's term for
marching under the heavy weight of rucksacks crammed with
extra rations, water, and ammunition, their straps biting into
shoulders already burdened by equipment harnesses loaded with
pouches, canteens, and grenades, was "humping." The search
and destroy missions to find, fix, and destroy Viet Cong per-
sonnel, supplies, and installations were becoming instead long
and exhausting "walks in the sun."
The operation began with two airmobile assaults by the 1st
Battalion of the 503d Infantry (Airborne) and the Australian bat-
talion. The two units established separate fire bases without any
major contact. For several days they toiled through the dense
forests, finding tunnel systems, fortifications, and abandoned huts,
48 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
but no Viet Cong. At eight o'clock on the morning of November
8, the 503d Infantry's 1st Battalion ran into the VC in force in
thick jungle composed of trees 250 feet high. The soldiers fought
in a hail of fire raking their lines from the wall of jungle. Pla-
toons were cut to pieces by close range machine guns and
charging swarms of VC soldiers. Snipers aloft fired down with
automatic weapons and pitched grenades. Rockets exploded,
showering dirt and steel through the ruins of vine and torn bark.
The battle rapidly escalated in brutal intensity. The para-
troopers desperately called in for air support. All that could be
granted were blocking fires; the fighting was too close. They
radioed for immediate employment of 2d Battalion, the brigade
reserve. Reinforcements were impossible; there were too few
helicopters to fly them in. Soldiers grappled in hand-to-hand
combat, swinging axes and entrenching tools as ammunition ran
out. The perimeter became a jagged ring of paratrooper squads
flat against the roots of jungle trees. Assault after assault was
made by the Viet Cong against the battalion's lines.
In the late afternoon the Viet Cong attacks began subsiding.
Although the battalion sustained heavy fire for the rest of the
day and through the night, they were able to hack out a landing
zone on November 9 for evacuation of the wounded. By seven
o'clock that night the entire battalion had been extracted, and
the 173d Airborne Brigade's first battle in Vietnam was over.
Over 117 Air Force tactical air strikes and 1,747 helicopter sor-
ties had been used. By this time, however, the 173d Airborne
Brigade wasn't the only American paratrooper force seeing heavy
combat in South Vietnam. They had been joined in the mean-
time by the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, which had
originally gone to Vietnam so that the 173d could return to Oki-
nawa.
2, The Eagle Brigade
When the 173d Airborne Brigade was expedited to South
Vietnam in May of 1965 the Pentagon planned to pull it back
to reconstitute the Pacific response force, as soon as another bri-
gade from the United States could get into country. The 1st
Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division was selected by General
Westmoreland as its permanent replacement, and it arrived at
AN ARMY GOES TO WAR 49
coastal Cam Ranh Bay on July 29, 1965. Like the 173d, this
brigade was fully paratrooper-qualified, but it was somewhat
stronger, having three intrinsic airborne infantry battalions.
The 1st Brigade was part of one of the most famous divisions
in the United States Army; the 101st Airborne Division, which
had held the key town of Bastogne during the German Ar-
dennes counteroffensive of World War II. The paratroopers wore
a Screaming Eagle shoulder patch, an insignia so lionized that
the division never adopted a subdued version when the Army
mandated that all formations adopt camouflaged insignia in com-
bat. Eventually the entire division would be committed to Viet-
nam, but initially only one brigade was called for. The division
sent three of its finest battalions, among them the 2d Battalion
of the 502d Infantry (Airborne). 2
Col. James S. Timothy moved his brigade north in August.
His orders were to open up the stretch of Highway 19 between
Qui Nhon on the coast and the inland town of An Khe. This
clearing operation was designed to permit the 1st Cavalry Di-
vision (Airmobile) to deploy peacefully to An Khe one month
later. The paratroopers moved to An Khe and began Operation
HIGHLAND. The sweep proceeded smoothly and the operation
concluded without incident. However, a Viet Cong main force
battalion of the 2d NVA Regiment had been reported in the Song
Con River valley to the north of An Khe Pass, and Colonel Tim-
othy wanted to get a crack at it. On September 18, 1965, he
set Operation GIBRALTAR into motion.
The ground arm of the operation was to be a mechanized
column, which would move north beside the Song Con River.
The airmobile force consisted of the 2d Battalion, 502d Infantry
(Airborne), under Lt. Col. Wilfrid K. G. Smith. It was to air-
assault the jungled hinterlands near An Ninh, consolidate its
landing zone, and then push the Viet Cong into the advancing
armor of the other task force. As it turned out, the air-assault
battalion became heavily engaged and needed rescue, but the
2. The 502d Parachute Infantry had been formed from a battalion activated
at Fort Benning, Georgia, on July 1, 1941, and was one of the 101st Airborne
Division's original components of World War II. It had gained fame making
a spectacular bayonet charge at Carentan, France, shortly after parachuting
in on D-Day in 1944.
50 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
composite armored-infantry force couldn't get to them. It en-
countered great difficulty moving its armored personnel carriers
and heavy tanks forward in the soggy terrain.
The paratroopers of the 2d Battalion, 502d Infantry (Air-
borne), boarded a medley of Army and Marine helicopters for
the air assault. The airmobile force made a swift morning flight
and set down on the marshy rice paddy landing field which had
been selected near An Ninh. Lieutenant Colonel Smith and
Company C unloaded the craft shortly after seven o'clock and
established a perimeter to await the second lift. Occasional rifle
shots rang through the air.
The second flight of helicopters swung low into the approach
and started to set down. Their blades twirled impatiently through
the dank air as door gunners crouching behind pedestal-mounted
machine guns nervously scanned the tall trees. The paratroopers
began to scramble out. Suddenly intense automatic weapons fire
swept the landing zone. Splashing water and dirt exploded among
the wobbling helicopters as their brownish frames were ham-
mered by shells. Doors and windows were shattering, and pilots
slumped in blood-splattered seats. Paratroopers were being killed
and wounded as they tumbled out of the helicopters and fell
into the thrashing water. Dead and dying mounds of equip-
ment-laden men were peppered by the storm of ground fire.
Other men slithered desperately across the flat killing zone.
Helicopters struggled into the air as door gunners fired fe-
verishly back into the surrounding jungles, their smoking guns
cranking through long belts of linked ammunition. Other door
guns were silent, swinging jerkily to the motion of the helicop-
ters gaining altitude, the gloved arms of their crewmen dangling
out the cabins.
The additional helicopters carrying the rest of the battalion
had to be waved off, aborting what remained of the rest of the
planned airmobile assault. The commander of Company B had
been hit before he could get off his craft, and the single sur-
viving officer was a second lieutenant who took over the deci-
mated company. Capt. Robert E. Rawls of Company C directed
him to use his men to plug gaps in the perimeter. Without air
reinforcement they would have to hold on to the landing zone
until the ground column reached them. Then the combined force
could clear the area sufficiently to permit safe evacuation.
AN ARMY GOES TO WAR 51
Lieutenant Colonel Smith looked about the field. Smoking
helicopters sat dizzily in the water, broken skids and shattered
blades tilting them like capsized boats. He had exactly 224 men,
many of them wounded, in a tattered circle of paddy dikes and
tree line. Their positions were pounded by concentrated mortar
barrages. A platoon that had clawed out some room on a nearby
ridge was forced to pull back to an earthen berm on the side
of the rice field. Then another platoon was brought back in to
the shrunken perimeter. As it was being maneuvered, Captain
Rawls was killed. Armed helicopters overhead maintained a shield
of rocket detonations and machine-gun fire all around them. Ar-
tillery was called in to form a barrier of exploding shells. At
nine o'clock Air Force fighter-bombers arrived to begin their
incendiary bombing runs.
Twenty minutes later another air assault to the south was
tried by Company A and the aborted portion of Company B.
They were only able to get thirty-six live soldiers on the ground,
and in the process the battalion lost another company com-
mander. They were forced to form a separate perimeter, which
was held until morning when rescued by paratroopers advancing
overland. Three more helicopters were added to the ground
wreckage. The others were nursed back to the takeoff point at
Khu Pho, often by crewmen or severely wounded pilots. Short
of power and riddled with bullets, many helicopters were strug-
gling just to make the fifteen-minute return flight. Some crashed
on landing. Every one of the twenty-six helicopters of the failed
reinforcement attempt had to be scrapped or grounded due to
battle damage.
The hill was now becoming the center of a prolonged series
of charges and counterattacks as the VC fought to get in closer
to the Americans. Medical evacuation helicopters continued to
try to dash in during slack periods, pick up wounded, and race
out before concentrated fire was directed at them. During one
such attempt the crew chief of a Marine Sea Knight helicopter
was killed and the copilot wounded. Late that afternoon another
battalion and the ARVN rangers were air-landed over a mile
away without incident, and began moving overland to link up.
Throughout the night, flares kept up illumination. Although
the perimeter was probed, it was never attacked en masse. As
morning arrived, the Viet Cong withdrew, and at 6:15 A.M. the
52 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
ground force reached Smith's lines. During the battle over a
hundred tactical fighter sorties had been flown and some eleven
thousand artillery rounds fired. Two shattered companies of the
1st Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division had managed to hold
on to their perimeter against heavy odds. While the United States
government was labeling its Vietnam involvement a "police ac-
tion," early Army operations like GIBRALTAR quickly dem-
onstrated that the American Army was actually caught up in a
full-scale war.
3. The 1st Cavalry Division Goes to Vietnam
At Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara's insistence a
new test formation, tentatively titled the llth Air Assault Di-
vision, was formed in February of 1963 at the infantry school
post of Fort Benning, Georgia. McNamara was convinced that
a new type of division could move rapidly about using large
numbers of helicopters. He wanted the test unit (actually a bri-
gade in size) built so he could "fill in the facts and figures" as
justification for it. Many senior Army generals were adamantly
against the idea. They weren't sure helicopters were thick-skinned
enough to survive on the battlefield, but they were sure such
a conglomeration of expensive gadgets would eat up the Army's
budget. There was also a nagging fear that the Air Force was
somehow scheming to get in the picture.
The Defense Department never gave the Army a chance.
The Howze Board was set up under a couple of high-ranking
believers, and McNamara handed out deadlines so short the Army
couldn't do anything but say yes. One of the staunch supporters
was Maj. Gen. Harry W. O. Kinnard, handpicked by the Sec-
retary of Defense to head up the project. He would later take
the first air assault division into the maelstrom of war and make
airmobility a household Army word.
The Army staff was both right and wrong. The llth Air As-
sault Division turned out to be frightfully expensive, but on the
other hand, the new production models of Bell helicopters, being
called Hueys, were proving fairly dependable. The division
members worked day and night with their three carefully nur-
tured battalions and crusading nucleus of officers and sergeants.
This was their baby. They took it up to the pines of North Car-
AN ARMY GOES TO WAR 53
olina in the cold fall of 1964, and then moved back to Fort Ben-
ning to prepare for spring and summer exercises in the northern
swamps of Florida. The plans for this third-phase test, called
Operation GOLDFIRE, were never used. The division would
receive its final test instead in the western Highlands of Viet-
nam.
Fort Benning was filled with soldiers in June of 1965. The
2d Infantry Division, the school's 197th Infantry Brigade, the
llth Air Assault Division (Test) with its associated 10th Air
Transport Brigade, and the parachute school swelled the post's
green-fatigued legions. Then came the first call for Vietnam
troops. It barely shook the Army tree and never touched the
reserves, but it whirled through Fort Benning like a hurricane,
leaving it a naked oak stripped of every leaf. Later Vietnam would
send its gales through other posts, then through cities, and fi-
nally through every hometown in America.
On June 29, 1965, the flag of the 1st Cavalry Division at
Tonggu, South Korea, was put on a plane and presented to the
small band of test soldiers of the llth Air Assault Division at
Fort Benning on July 1. The test unit finally had a Regular Army
name; it was redesignated the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile).
The ex-cavalrymen in Korea were handed the Indian head patches
of the 2d Infantry Division; they now became the new 2d In-
fantry Division. The 2d Infantry Division at Fort Benning dis-
appeared in one gulp as the embryo 1st Cavalry Division (Air-
mobile) filled to wartime strength. The parachute school was also
denuded; the new airmobile division needed pathfinders and
enough parachutists to make its first brigade "airborne." 3 The
only unit left -intact at the post was the school's own brigade,
the 197th Infantry Brigade. It was turned upside down for every
deployable soldier, "recycled" with the nondeployable ones the
1st Cavalry Division couldn't use, and became known as the
3. The airborne brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division ended soon enough in
Vietnam. With the inroads the 5th Special Forces Group was making on para-
troopers, the Army was hard pressed to keep its two airborne brigades al-
ready there (173d Airborne Brigade and 1st Brigade of the 101st Airborne
Division) filled. Things were made worse by the fact that paratroopers liked
to fight, which meant that they usually got killed and wounded faster, and
that more replacement paratroopers were needed to replace the higher losses
in their units.
54 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
"Dollar Ninety-Worst" 197th Infantry Brigade. It never went
overseas.
Soldiers hurriedly tacked on their new, oversized 1st Cav-
alry Division insignia. The big patch shields featured a horse
head over a diagonal black bar slashing through the bright cav-
alry-yellow cloth. Functionally designed by an officer's wife to
be large enough to be spotted through the Fort Bliss, Texas,
dust which the horses used to kick up, it was a reminder of the
days when the 1st Cavalry Division was truly cavalry. As a re-
sult the division was sometimes known as the Blanket Division.
Officers and sergeants frantically in-processed soldiers into com-
panies, out-processed them for overseas duty, inventoried
equipment, organized units, and drew up training schedules. The
Army had given them only thirty days to get the entire division
formed and ready to go overseas.
Every shortcut possible was used or invented as the division
rushed to meet its deployment date. Soldiers arrived at all hours
on buses and planes. They were dispatched to the divisional
replacement center, given a hot meal and forms to fill out, and
were then trucked off to their assigned companies almost as fast
as they turned in their trays. Some arrived with orders in hand
and their families at their sides. They inquired about housing,
looking forward to a comfortable change of station at Fort Ben-
ning. The dependents were advised to go back home; the sol-
diers would be overseas in a month.
The men of the 1st Cavalry Division heard about their ul-
timate destination on television two weeks before the Army told
them officially. Less than twenty days before the division shipped
out, some were still on emergency riot duty in the Dominican
Republic. They were quickly rushed back to Georgia. Three
hundred critically needed new aviators arrived July 15. Their
manifest of origin represented almost every Army post, arsenal,
and depot in the world, even some the sergeant majors hadn't
heard of. They shook their heads in bewilderment; the Army
must have scoured the entire globe for them. In fact the Army
had done just that. There was already an aviator shortage and
the war was just starting.
Actual training was largely out of the question for the time
being. Weapons firing and even squad tactics would be re-
AN ARMY GOES TO WAR 55
hearsed on the decks of ships carrying them across the Pacific
Ocean. Things got worse during out-loading. The accommoda-
tion assignments led to hopeless overcrowding on the naval
transport ships MSTS Kula Gulf (T-AKV-40) and Card (T-AKV-
8), old World War II merchant hulls converted to escort aircraft
carriers and now finishing their days unceremoniously as cargo
ferries. Last-minute transfers had to be made in the mass con-
fusion at dockside. To alleviate crowding, the Army decided to
utilize unused portions of the crew billeting area. The civilian
crews balked and refused to sail. The Army relented. The di-
vision literally sailed into the sunset, heading west on the high
seas toward the Republic of Vietnam.
Brig. Gen. John M. Wright, the divisional assistant com-
mander, was already in Vietnam with a small advance party. He
was told the division was going to safeguard the rugged central
heartland of the country, the western badlands of Pleiku and
Kontum provinces. He decided to locate it outside a small town
along key Highway 19 near the Mang Yang Pass where excellent
flying weather usually prevailed. The town was called An Khe,
presently occupied by a Special Forces camp that had seen hard
fighting that February.
The division advance group decided its base camp would have
to be heavily fortified, accommodate a heliport for the division's
four hundred fifty aircraft, and yet be as small as possible. Within
three days they had laid it out. On August 25, one thousand
advance troops of the 1st Cavalry Division arrived and were put
to work with shovels and picks building the camp. Everyone
from full colonels to privates toiled clearing brush. The com-
position of the advance party was rank-heavy with senior ser-
geants and officers who had at least one thought in common.
They all wished they had sent over the engineers first.
On September 21 the bulk of the division arrived at the new
campsite. Soon a full division and a borrowed engineer battalion
were constructing everything from showers to mess halls. Five
wire barriers and two cattle fences were strung around the new
base. When Maj. Don G. Radcliff became the first person from
the division to lose his life in Vietnam, it became Camp Rad-
cliff. On October 1, 1965, the 1st Cavalry Division assumed re-
sponsibility for its new An Khe base and most of Highway 19.
56 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
The men continued to build. On October 19 they received word
that a Special Forces camp at Plei Me had been hit hard by
the NVA. At last the relabeled llth Air Assault Division was
about to undergo a combat test of the airmobile concept.
4. The la Drang Valley Campaign
Maj. Gen. Harry W. O. Kinnard's 1st Cavalry Division (Air-
mobile) was providing traffic security along Highway 19 with both
heliborne and dismounted sweeps, when it was called into ac-
tion as a result of the North Vietnamese Army attacks against
Plei Me, south of Pleiku. The division would call it Operation
SILVER BAYONET, but its airmobile actions over the fifteen
hundred-square mile battlefield of western South Vietnam would
be registered in military history as the la Drang Valley cam-
paign.
The Chu Pong massif marked the southwestern corner of the
division's area of responsibility. Dense tropical forests, extensive
grasslands, and red clay typified the geography. Clear blue,
cloudless skies and starry nights offered optimum weather for
massive helicopter flights which typified the air cavalry's most
successful engagements. On October 23, the division committed
a battalion, which was quickly reinforced to a brigade. Four days
later, this force was told to search and destroy everything be-
tween Plei Me and the Cambodian border. The 1st Cavalry Di-
vision (Airmobile) was at war.
The 1st Squadron of the 9th Cavalry, the division's air re-
connaissance arm, was unleashed across the landscape. The scout
helicopters swarmed over the woods and streams of the rolling
country, spotting and firing at isolated bands of soldiers below
who sometimes fired back. The NVA were moving back to their
base camps in the Chu Pong Mountain area, and were taking
considerable harassment from the ranging aerial cavalrymen.
However, they were unsure of what to do about it. This air-
mobile screening was as new to them as it was to the Ameri-
cans.
On November 9, 1965, Col. Thomas W. Brown's fresh 3d
Brigade with its three cavalry battalions arrived in the area of
operations to relieve the 1st Brigade. By now the North Viet-
namese regiments had returned to their mountainous base area.
AN ARMY GOES TO WAR 57
The new brigade would have to go in after them to execute the
destruction phase of its assignment. The first few days were spent
flying battalions around to get them into position for further of-
fensive movement. Just before midnight on November 12, the
brigade command post and aviation refueling point were sub-
jected to a heavy mortar barrage. The next day was uneventful,
and on November 14 Lt. Col. Harold G. Moore, Jr/s 1st Bat-
talion of the 7th Cavalry landed at Landing Zone X-Ray, adja-
cent to the Chu Pong range.
The 7th Cavalry was perhaps the most well-known Army unit
in American history. It was the one that went down at Little
Big Horn River, in Montana, in what is known to the public as
Ouster's Last Stand, when it dared attack the Sioux Indian bands
of Chiefs Crazy Horse and Sitting Bull during the Indian Wars. 4
Now in Vietnam, deep in NVA territory, it was about to undergo
another jarring experience.
Just before eleven o'clock in the morning, Company B touched
down at LZ X-Ray, and an hour later most of the battalion had
joined it. With Company C securing the landing zone, Capt.
John D. Benin's Company B moved north and west up a heav-
ily jungled ridge extending from the Chu Pong hill mass. Shortly
after noon one of the platoons was pinned by heavy ground fire,
and another platoon was sent in to assist. This second platoon,
led by Lt. Henry T. Herrick, spotted some other NVA soldiers
along a well-traveled jungle trail and decided to pursue.
His soldiers crossed a dry creek bed and were moving for-
ward toward a large anthill when a volley of automatic weapons
fire ripped into them. Several soldiers were spun around by the
bullets and thrown to the ground. The other cavalrymen man-
aged to dive into the red dirt as the hail of bullets tore through
shrubbery and grass only inches above them. Many were hit in
several places and painfully wounded. The officers and senior
4. The 7th Cavalry had been formed on September 21, 1866, at Fort Riley,
Kansas, for the express purpose of fighting Indians. Actually, only Troops C,
E, F, I, and L under the command of Lt. Col. G. A. Custer were destroyed
on June 25, 1876. Troops A, B, D, G, H, K, and M under Maj. M. A. Reno
took heavy losses but survived. The regiment later participated in the Mex-
ican Expedition of 1916-17 and fought as foot infantry in the Pacific in World
War II and in Korea.
58 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
sergeants were either dead or so badly wounded they were un-
able to move. The men laid their rifles flat against the ground
and sprayed the grass in front of them whenever they heard
movement. All attempts by Captain Herrin's company to force
its way across the creek bed and link up with the pinned pla-
toon were repulsed with heavy losses. This westerly platoon would
remain an isolated island of resistance until it was retrieved the
next day. Although several night attempts to overrun them were
made, intensive artillery protective fires formed a ring of blazing
steel that broke up the North Vietnamese attacks.
As Company B became heavily committed to securing its
separated platoon, mortars started shelling the landing zone and
rocket-propelled grenades slammed into the cavalry lines. Com-
pany A was moved into position alongside Company B and be-
came tied down in a firefight countering an NVA infantry assault
across the tall grass. The firing was so furious that the rest of
the battalion helicopters had to be waved off.
Company C moved off the landing zone to the east. Machine
guns opened up and two companies of North Vietnamese reg-
ulars charged them. Company D was thrown into the fray. Air
strikes and massed artillery were frantically called in, almost up
to their positions. This horrendous series of closely packed, earth-
filled explosions from rockets and shells shattered the NVA as-
sault. By three o'clock the rest of the battalion landed and was
fed into the eastern fringes of the landing zone. They began
digging in. Company B from the 7th Cavalry's 2d Battalion was
helicoptered into the fire-swept landing zone after dark and held
as the battalion reserve, Ringed by the NVA, the cavalrymen
formed a tight circular defense around LZ X-Ray. Parachute
flares floated gently through the night sky, casting moving shad-
ows on the ground, underneath the shifting variety of colored
lights.
At first light, the battalion ventured small scout teams out
immediately in front of its positions. Shortly before seven o'clock
that morning Company C's lines were swept by heavy automatic
rifle fire and then stormed by the North Vietnamese. The charg-
ing groups of NVA infantry bounded forward through the ex-
plosions of rocket artillery and into the American positions. There
the combat was hand to hand,
The other portions of the perimeter were also under attack
AN ARMY GOES TO WAR 59
and the landing zone itself was in a crisscross of grazing fire.
The reserve was thrown into the breach of Company C's crum-
bling ramparts. Thick colored smoke was set off to mark the
battle line's forward edge. Helicopters strafed and rocketed as
artillery was used to form a curtain of explosions just yards from
the billowing clouds of pinkish smoke. The fresh cavalrymen
moved in firing short bursts from their rifles and then resorted
to knives and shovels in close-quarters combat. American dead
and wounded lay sprawled across the dirty, bloodstained khaki
of North Vietnamese bodies. Every one of Company C's officers
had been killed or wounded.
By nine o'clock that morning the threat against Company C's
portion of the perimeter had subsided. The shambles of smoking
grass and scalloped dirt in front of its positions was strewn with
broken corpses and equipment. About one o'clock that afternoon
the 2d Battalion of the 5th Cavalry, which had trekked overland
to reach the beleaguered 7th, walked in from the east. The 66th
NVA Regiment had left, and the battle of LZ X-Ray was over.
Strategic B-52 bombings were made on November 17. That
day the 2d Battalion of the 7th Cavalry, less elements lost at
LZ X-Ray, was sent out through dense jungle to skirt the B-52
strike area and then turn north to a grassy clearing coded LZ
Albany, It was temporarily loaned Company A from the 1st Bat-
talion of the 5th Cavalry as substitution for its missing compo-
nents. The new company was put to the rear of the file. It hacked
and cut its way through the tropical foliage, picked up two NVA
prisoners too startled to offer resistance, and reached the pre-
determined landing zone site.
The lead elements passed through the clearing without in-
cident. Then a sudden fusillade of machine-guns mixed with ri-
fle and grenade fire cut into the 7th Cavalry's column. Soldiers
toppled lifelessly to the ground. Others quickly dropped to fire
back with automatic rifles, light antitank weapons, and their own
machine-guns. The North Vietnamese regulars came charging
across the brush, shouting and firing their assault rifles from the
hip. They ran straight into Companies C and D and fought their
way through the battalion's ranks. Company A and the recon-
naissance platoon made a stand on the landing zone itself. The
rear of the column was cut off.
Soldiers desperately fought individual battles at point-blank
60 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
range. Helicopters circled helplessly, unable to call in tactical
air support or artillery because of the general melee going on
below them. Slowly the Americans started falling back into clus-
tered perimeters, and the spotting aircraft could distinguish
enough semblance of the flow of the battle to call in air strikes.
The first runs were made by low-flying, rocket-spitting helicop-
ter gunships which raked the NVA soldiers still pressing the
attack. Then fighter-bombers swooped down to discharge loads
of napalm, which tumbled through the tree lines and engulfed
at least one entire North Vietnamese company in rolling balls
of jellied fire.
Lt. Col. Robert A. McDade, Jr/s battalion remnants had
formed a tight circular perimeter on LZ Albany. Company B
was helicoptered in after dark, when the firing against the smol-
dering clearing had slackened. The perimeter experienced gun-
fire and periodic assaults, but illumination by Air Force flare
ships and a continuous ring of artillery fire held the NVA at
bay. Groups of soldiers made a number of forays outside their
perimeter during the night. They carried back scores of Amer-
ican wounded. From midnight to dawn there was sporadic snip-
er fire, but the major threat was over.
It had been a sanguinary initiation for the 1st Cavalry Di-
vision. A smaller attack was mounted November 18 against an
artillery fire base, which proved to be the last contact of the la
Drang Valley campaign. It had lasted thirty-five grueling days,
during which time the division had used its airmobile flexibility
to the utmost advantage. The NVA regiments had been forced
from the area and defeated in open combat. Despite damage to
fifty-nine helicopters, the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) had
demonstrated that its sturdy aircraft could survive on a modern
battlefield. The division's bold tactics and hard-fighting resolu-
tion displayed during the first big Army battles gained it a nick-
name it would carry throughout the Vietnam War: the First Team.
On November 26, 1965, the air-assault troopers moved back
to An Khe. They left behind fields littered with empty C-ration
tins, expended ammunition boxes, and water cans. Even as the
last helicopters droned drowsily into the distance, North Viet-
namese Army soldiers cautiously moved back to reclaim the ter-
ritory. However, the American Army was not attempting to
AN ARMY GOES TO WAR 61
physically occupy Vietnam's trackless wilderness. Instead, for-
mations like the 1st Cavalry Division were seeking battlefield
destruction of NVA and VC units wherever they could be found.
The la Drang Valley campaign proved that punishing blows could
be swiftly administered in retaliation for assaults made on allied
installations, even in remote areas such as the Plei Me Special
Forces camp. MACV hoped that enough military victories of this
nature would cause North Vietnam to desist in its war against
the South.
PART 2.
1966
Helicopter Valley
Mutter's Ridge -
Dong Ha
Phu Bai '
AShau
Special Forces camp^
KEY TO OPERATIONS
1 -CRIMP (Ho Bo Woods)
2 - MASTIFF (Boi Loi Woods)
3 - MALLET
4 - UNIONTOWN
5- ABILENE
6- BIRMINGHAM
7 - LEXINGTON III (Rung Sat Special
8 - EL PASO I and II Zone)
9 - ATTLEBORO
10 - MASHER-WHITE WING /
DAVY CROCKETT /
Da Nang
> Chu Lai
An Hoa
Quang Ngai
THAYER / IRVING
la Drang Valley
Chu Pong Massif
11 -GARFIELD
12 - PAUL REVERE
13 - HAWTHORNE
14 - CRAZY HORSE
15 - DOUBLE EAGLE
16 -NEW YORK
17 -TEXAS
18 -HASTINGS
19 -PRAIRIE
KEY TO TOWNS
a - Quan Loi
b - Minh Thanh and Minh Thanh Road
c - Dau Tieng
d - Bien Hoa war zone c <, Loc Njnh
e - Long Bmh \ Route 13 ffi^ S rok Dong
-HonQuan
Pleiku
DragoTTMtn.
Due Co
Plei Me
Mtns
AnKhe
Qui Nhon I
Tuy Hoa ,
Vung Ro <
Ban Me Thuot
NhaTrangJ
Tay Ninh^
Route 22-
Go Dau Ha :
I War Zone D
Xuan Loc
Tan Son Nhut Airbase^T
IV Corps Tactical Zorv
(Mekong Delta)
Vung Tau
50
100
-N-
scale miles
Q Saigon
Map by Shelby L. Stanton
South Vietnam - 1966
CHAPTER 5.
THE BUILD-UP
1. Higher Headquarters and More Battalions
After the la Drang Valley campaign, the North Vietnamese Army
avoided further major confrontation during the 196566 dry sea-
son, and concentrated instead on expanding and rehabilitating
its forces. Since the American military was engaged in the same
process, and both sides were trying to formulate acceptable stra-
tegic doctrine to cope with the military capabilities of the other,
1966 was spent largely in mutual buildup.
The United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam,
already had 116,700 Army soldiers and 41,000 Marines in Viet-
nam as 1966 began, and more battalions and troops would con-
tinue to pour in throughout the year. To the 3d Marine, 1st
Cavalry, and 1st Infantry Divisions would be added, in the course
of the year, the 1st Marine, 4th Infantry, 9th Infantry, and 25th
Infantry Divisions. To the separate Army 1st Brigade of the 101st
Airborne Division and 173d Airborne Brigade would be added
the llth Armored Cavalry Regiment, and the 196th and 199th
Infantry Brigades. As a result, MACV spent much of 1966 re-
aligning the assets represented by this flood of American combat
forces and getting new units settled in. The huge buildup of
1966 set the stage for large-scale field operations and escalating
combat levels on the eve of 1967.
Vietnam had been blocked off into four military areas, the
U.S. Marines responsible for the north and the South Vietnam-
ese for the far south. This left the Army with one field force
65
66 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
headquarters handling the two middle regions. II Field Force,
Vietnam, became operational March 15, 1966, at Long Binh to
work the III Military Corps Zone, which included Saigon. These
larger headquarters were being designated "field forces," in-
stead of corps to avoid confusion with the Vietnamese corps zone
concept, as well as being flexible command-and-control forma-
tions not tied to particular size limitations. 1 Personnel for this
new field force were pulled out of the III Corps headquarters
at Fort Hood, Texas. The Army gave this new structure the
lineage of the old XXII Corps of World War II Europe fame,
and the main shipment of men arrived in Vietnam on March
28. The commander of the 1st Infantry Division, Maj. Gen. Jon-
athan O. Seaman, was promoted to head the new headquarters,
which was given initial control over his old division, the 25th
Infantry Division, the 173d Airborne Brigade, and an artillery
and an aviation group (the 23d and 12th). At the same time the
previous field force, already in Vietnam since the preceding No-
vember under Maj. Gen. Stanley R. Larsen, was redesignated
as I Field Force, Vietnam, at Nha Trang.
The fighting edge of this enormous American buildup leaped
from the twenty-two Army and thirteen Marine infantry and tank
battalions of January 1966 to fifty-nine and twenty-four, respec-
tively, by the end of the year. President Johnson and Defense
Secretary McNamara had decided by mid year to reject any call-
up of the reserves due to political ramifications, but still planned
to have 390,000 troops in Vietnam by the end of 1966. The
commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen. Wallace M. Greene,
Jr. , mirrored the sentiments of many high-echelon military lead-
ers when he later stated that the decision not to use the re-
serves was a "fatal mistake." 2
The Marines and the Army shared a common dilemma: there
wasn't enough manpower. In addition to new units being raised
or brought up to strength and shoved into the combat zone,
1. The Army was also probably copying the title of the successful III Marine
Amphibious Force, which seemed to have harmonized easily with its in-
creased command, advisory, and Vietnamese counterpart responsibilities in I
Corps Tactical Zone.
2. Jack Shulimson, U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1966, An Expanding War,
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Washington, D.C., 1982, p. 283.
THE BUILD-UP 67
individual replacements still had to be provided for those al-
ready there. Due to shortages of critical skilled personnel, cer-
tain scheduled aviation and logistical units could not be formed
or deployed on time. Combat units were forced to operate in
the field with far fewer riflemen than they were authorized to
have. For example, 1966 saw many Marine infantry companies,
with a normal strength of six officers and two hundred ten en-
listed men, down to one officer and only one hundred ten men.
Already the ability of the United States to respond on a global
basis was being largely negated, and in Vietnam combat re-
sponse was being hampered. Furthermore, the continued dizzy
deployment of divisions and brigades into Vietnam was absorb-
ing the cadre needed to sustain the training base in America.
This vicious cycle threatened future military posture as well as
any Vietnam replacements or reinforcements.
In the meantime, 1966 witnessed a steady flow of new units
into the Vietnam battlefield. These divisions and combat bri-
gades had distinctive personalities that somehow reflected their
essence. This would vary from war to war, and from commander
to commander. It could even be manipulated by replacement
policies and compositional changes. However, their larger being
was a product of so many years and so much tradition that it
became almost fused into a soul-like quality. Soldiers could sense
it, and often these collective divisional and brigaded entities
seemed tied to destinies which predetermined their combat per-
formance.
2. The 1st Marine Division Arrives
Maj. Gen. Lewis J. Fields's 1st Marine Division headquar-
ters had transferred from Camp Pendleton, California, to Camp
Courtney, Okinawa, in August 1965, At the beginning of 1966
the division already had its 7th Marines, with artillery support,
and two battalions of the 1st Marines in Vietnam. 3 Late in 1965
the Secretary of Defense had recommended doubling Marine
forces in Vietnam during 1966, and the 1st Marine Division was
tagged for Chu Lai.
3. The 1st and 2d battalions of the 1st Marines were actually in Vietnam as
part of the Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, intratheater rotation system, allowing
two other Marine battalions to be rested and refitted.
68 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
The 1st Marine Division, called The Old Breed in the Corps,
was not only a premier Marine division, but also one of the
finest formations of the United States military. It was the direct
descendant of the Marine Advanced Base Brigade activated at
Philadelphia in 1913 to serve in the troubled Caribbean area.
There it had engaged in the Banana Wars from Vera Cruz, Mex-
ico, to Haiti and the Dominican Republic. It was given its pres-
ent title on February 1, 1941, at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, as
the first division in Marine Corps history. The 1st Marine Di-
vision initiated the ground offensive against territories held by
the Imperial Japanese forces of World War II. It gained im-
mortality on Guadalcanal and went on to victory through eastern
New Guinea, New Britain, Peleliu, and Okinawa. Afterward it
participated in the occupation of North China and the Korean
War, and had sent elements to assist in the Cuban missile crisis
of 1962. The 1st Marine Division's six years in Vietnam would
confirm its reputation as a first-class fighting formation.
The division embarkation officer was alerted to the sched-
uled deployment at a Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, conference
held in Honolulu during December 1965. He briefed General
Fields five hours after arriving back on Okinawa on December
27. Some thirty ships would be needed over a 2 l /% month pe-
riod. There were doubts whether the Navy could in fact provide
such support. These matters were resolved at a later meeting
between division representatives and the Seventh Fleet Am-
phibious Force at Subic Bay, Philippines. The Navy indicated
the job could be done "with judicious scheduling." The 1st Ma-
rine Division met every shipping date and deadline and arrived
in Vietnam exactly as planned.
The incremental deployment of the 1st Marine Division into
Vietnam heightened the buildup of forces in southern I Corps
Tactical Zone. The insertion of this division freed the 4th Ma-
rines from the Chu Lai sector to counter a new NVA threat in
the Phu Bai area. That sector was also reinforced by two bat-
talions of the division's 1st Marines and the Korean 2d "Blue
Dragon" Marine Brigade, enabling Marine reinforcements to
continue flowing undiverted into Da Nang and Chu Lai. On
January 17, 1966, the headquarters of the 1st Marines arrived
at Chu Lai to reinforce the 7th Marines which had been there
THE BUILD-UP 69
since August 1965. Throughout the first three months of the
year more elements of the division continued to arrive. Plans
to establish a division rear headquarters on Okinawa were dropped
in order to avoid administrative and fiscal complications. Major
General Fields moved his command post to Chu Lai at the end
of March, and the 5th Marines arrived in April.
By June, the 1st Marine Division was firmly planted in the
Chu Lai vicinity and busily engaged in numerous small-unit ac-
tions that typified activities there during late spring. Less a bat-
talion serving as the Seventh Fleet's Special Landing Force and
a regiment dispatched to the Da Nang area, by June 1966 the
division had over seventeen thousand men to include all its ar-
tillery, engineer, tank, amphibious tractor, antitank, and recon-
naissance elements. Ill MAF finally had the two-division ground
force with which it would fight during the major part of the
Vietnam War.
3, The 4th Infantry Division Goes to War
The 4th Infantry Division was a good, solid Regular Army
outfit popular with its men. For ten years, since 1956, it had
been stationed at Fort Lewis, at the southern end of Washing-
ton's Puget Sound region. There, in the tranquil wooded fringes
of the snow-topped Olympic Mountains near Tacoma, it had
trained for atomic and mechanized warfare. Its shoulder patch
was of World War I vintage and featured four green ivy leaves.
This design gained it the simple title Ivy Division, which the
troops fondly modified to the Poison Ivy Division. Its other
nickname, The Famous Fourth, had likewise been modernized
by the soldiers to The Funky Fourth. The 4th was a dignified
veteran of two world wars, and at first it appeared that Vietnam,
like Korea, would leave it undisturbed.
The 3d Brigade of the 25th Infantry Division had been rushed
into its future area of operations, the Central Highlands around
Pleiku, in December 1965. The Hawaii-based 25th was the Pa-
cific response force, and one infantry brigade had been deemed
large enough to tame that portion of Vietnam wilderness. The
war in Vietnam heated up fast, however, and Westmoreland's
incessant demand for more battalions soon tagged the western
highlands as requiring the presence of a full American division.
70 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
In April 1966, the 4th Infantry Division commander, Maj. Gen.
Arthur S. Collins, received word his division was going over.
By July 11, the division's advance planning party was set up in
Vietnam, and the three brigades were dispatched as soon as they
could be shipped.
The division move unfortunately put them into their new
base camp at Dragon Mountain outside Pleiku in the midst of
torrential rains and fog brought by the southwest monsoons. The
2d Brigade was airlifted into Pleiku in August, and the rest of
the division arrived by early October. Its 3d Brigade was di-
verted south, its last units arriving at Dau Tieng on October 18,
1966. It was being exchanged for the 25th' s 3d Brigade, which
had already been posted to the highlands where it was now well
established. By August 1967, after some Army infighting over
lineage considerations, the swap became permanent. Maj. Gen.
William R. Peers was officially slated to take command of the
4th Infantry Division on January 3, 1967. His command later
included three full brigades a complete division and he was
anxious to gain mastery over Pleiku and Kontum provinces.
4. The Raising of the 199th Infantry Brigade
In the hectic summer of 1966, a new Army separate brigade
was formed at the infantry school post of Fort Benning, Geor-
gia. The 199th Infantry Brigade (Light) was activated that June
expressly for Vietnam duty. The Army's timetable scheduled the
unit to be overseas that November. Things became too rushed
as a result. To save time, the Army raised the unit without the
usual cadre development period, The brigade was created in a
confused spasm of simultaneously activating, equipping, and
training.
The newborn brigade command post was, /planted in the pines
on the post's remote Kelley Field. In the red clay, dust, and
sweltering heat, the serious business of training for real war be-
gan. The grueling program kept its soldiers in the field every
week, with one third of their time spent on night exercises. At
the beginning of September everyone was piled into commercial
buses and sent off to the rejuvenated World War II post of Camp
Shelby, Mississippi. There the brigade crashed through ad-
vanced unit training, although handicapped by lack of assigned
THE BUILD-UP 71
soldiers. One of its battalions, the 3d of the 7th Infantry, had
less than half of its authorized personnel.
However, the brigade was now rapidly starting to take shape.
It was given its own shoulder patch, a flaming spear, and was
dubbed the Redcatchers, a macho nickname so ludicrously self-
exalting that it stuck. Under intense pressure to deploy as close
as possible to schedule, its men moved by sea and by air in five
groups. It arrived through the port of Vung Tau and closed its
Long Binh staging area on Christmas Day. Since a permanent
base-camp site was lacking, the brigade would remain at Long
Binh indefinitely.
Despite the fact that the brigade's heavy equipment was still
in transit and would not arrive until January, its battalions were
farmed out immediately in Operation UNIONTOWN. There in
Vietnam the brigade continued its wartime preparation on the
field of battle. For example, its very first airmobile mission was
an actual combat air assault conducted December 17 by the 4th
Battalion of the 12th Infantry in Vietnam itself.
5. The 25th Infantry Division Deploys
The Army's Pacific reserve was the 25th Infantry Division,
stationed at time-honored Schofield Barracks on the diamond-
shaped Hawaiian island of Oahu. The post was pleasantly sand-
wiched on the central plateau between two volcanic mountain
ranges. It was built to protect the Pearl Harbor naval base, ten
miles distant, from possible enemy landing on the northwest coast.
The 25th Infantry Division was a lineal descendant of the old
Hawaiian Division established in 1921, and it had been thrust
into World War II twenty years later by Japanese aircraft de-
scending to strafe its neat palm-lined barracks parade fields. The
division had earned a rugged reputation for hard jungle fighting
in that war, from Guadalcanal through Luzon in the Philippines
which was summed up by its proud nickname, Tropic Light-
ning. Its destiny irrevocably tied to United States interests in
the Pacific area, it was rushed into the Korean conflict from
occupation duty in Japan. It had returned to spend two decades
again in Hawaii, where it had been modernized for trouble-
shooting throughout the Orient.
It was no secret that the 25th Infantry Division was slated
72 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
for some sort of Southeast Asian duty; the only question was
where. While it had been providing helicopter door gunners to
Vietnam since January of 1963, the division as a whole was pre-
paring for deployment to Thailand where it had briefly posted
a battle group in 1962. MACV proposed the division be moved
to Vietnam at once, but there was concern over stripping the
Pacific reserve, which couldn't be replaced for two years. How-
ever, when a stateside airborne division was slated to assume
this role, the green light was given for accelerated deployment
of the 25th.
Fifty-five tons of maps that had been issued for other con-
tingency areas were burned as the division's 3d Brigade boarded
planes for direct airlift into Pleiku Province, central Vietnam,
on December 23, 1965. There it would shore up the highlands
region, which had seen heavy fighting against the 1st Cavalry
Division that fall. As the planes taxied off the runways, the di-
vision's Hawaiian Jungle and Guerrilla Warfare Center was put-
ting the 2d Brigade through twelve Vietnamese village training
sites on a crash basis. The 2d Brigade boarded ship just after
the New Year, landed at Vung Tau during the last week in Jan-
uary 1966, was airlifted to Bien Hoa, and was then trucked on
to Cu Chi. The 2d Brigade was immediately committed to com-
bat to secure the base area, which would be used by the di-
vision to guard the western approaches to Saigon for the next
five years.
Back in Hawaii the Dependents' Assistance Center was
working on a twenty-four-hour basis, and soldiers were turning
in their private cars around the clock at a special "vehicle bone-
yard" with or without "post decals." Almost one hundred pilots
and fifty-seven aircraft were requested at once to make up for
shortfalls. Meanwhile various other division elements continued
traveling all over the Pacific in the hectic but upbeat rhythm of
a major force optimistically heading toward a new war. The 1st
Battalion of the 69th Armor arrived in Ryukyuan Okinawa on
February 6 where it was outfitted with new M48 Patton tanks
and armored personnel carriers. Two new battalions arrived in
Hawaii from midwinter Alaska to join the 1st Brigade on Jan-
uary 30. Both were at full strength with high morale, and the
moderate Hawaiian climate provided an ideal intermediate ad-
THE BUILD-UP 73
justment en route to Vietnam. 4 The remaining original divisional
infantry battalion in Hawaii, the 2d Battalion of the 14th Infan-
try, had been stripped to fill vacancies in the 2d and 3d Bri-
gades. Now it was refilled with new replacements.
On January 23, General Westmoreland requested that the
rest of the 25th Infantry Division be speeded up to Vietnam,
with special emphasis on the cavalry squadron and the engi-
neers. Two of the cavalry troops had already been sea-lifted to
Okinawa and were being given brand-new tracked Ml 13 vehi-
cles. When the hastily refreshed 1st Brigade arrived in Vietnam
on April 29, it completed the move of Maj. Gen. Fred C. Wey-
and's division into country some five months ahead of the orig-
inal schedule.
The only real confusion was occasioned by MACV's indeci-
sion regarding the employment of the armor. Initially the 69th
Armor's 1st Battalion had been programmed for Pleiku, but in
mid-February it was decided to move it, less a company, to Cu
Chi. This was due as much to the VC threat there as to traffica-
bility and divisional integrity considerations. Late in April,
alarmed at NVA strength in the highlands region, MACV or-
dered the battalion to proceed from Cu Chi to Pleiku at once
in order to beat the upcoming southwest monsoon season.
Major General Weyand vehemently protested. He had in-
sisted on deploying his armor battalion to Vietnam in the first
place over the loud howls of Army staff planners in both Viet-
nam and the Pentagon. Through his foresight a valuable asset
had been brought over, and it was being yanked away from him.
He was told simply that the decision had already been made.
The tanks reached Pleiku on May 22. As the monsoon season
approached, however, General Westmoreland decided to give
Weyand the needed tank battalion at Cu Chi after all. To do
so, Westmoreland now asked that the armor battalion from the
deploying 4th Infantry Division be diverted to replace the one
that had gone to the highlands.
4. These were the 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry from the 171st Infantry Brigade
and the 4th Battalion, 23d Infantry, from the 172d Infantry Brigade. At the
time these were the two combat brigades stationed in Alaska, and each was
reduced to provide a full battalion for Vietnam service.
74 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
6. The llth Armored Cavalry Adds Armored Punch
General Westmoreland's concept for the use of army tanks
in Vietnam dated from 1965, when the llth Armored Cavalry
stationed at Fort George G. Meade, Maryland, had been re-
quested for highway security along Route 1 operating out of Xuan
Loc as part of the 1966 buildup. Since he now desired to use
this regiment on missions beyond road security, he became con-
cerned over its organization, maintaining it was too heavy for
Vietnam's heavy rains, difficult terrain, and shaky bridges. Late
in 1965 he suggested that the Department of the Army replace
its medium tanks with M41 light tanks (or armored personnel
carriers in its cavalry platoons), substitute armored cars for cer-
tain other armored personnel carriers, and delete the armored
vehicle-launched bridges. The Pentagon replied that since its
scheduled deployment was already fixed as mid-1966, such a
radical equipment change was out of the question. They also
agreed with Pacific command that such modifications were prob-
ably unnecessary anyway.
General Westmoreland replied that in that case he preferred
a mechanized infantry brigade in Vietnam instead of the ar-
mored cavalry. He stated flatly he had no need for two more
tank battalions, which the 132 tanks of the regiment in fact rep-
resented. Continental Army Command noted that the 199th In-
fantry Brigade, then training at Fort Benning, could be mech-
anized, but in turn the llth Armored Cavalry would have to be
inactivated. As this would cost additional training time and cause
greater complications to the programmed assembly of units for
Vietnam duty, the Pentagon compromised. The llth Armored
Cavalry would go, but with certain changes that had the effect
of cutting its strength down to fifty-one tanks. The warning or-
der that it was going to Vietnam was sent to the llth Armored
Cavalry on March 11, 1966.
The llth Armored Cavalry was known as The Blackhorse
Regiment, and a rearing stallion dominated the red and white
shield of its patch. It had been organized at Fort Myer, Vir-
ginia, in March of 1901, saw service in the Philippines and ren-
dered notable service along the Mexican border in 1916. During
World War II, this cavalry regiment was used as a basis for the
THE BUILD-UP 75
llth Armored Regiment of the 10th Armored Division, and a
new cavalry group by the same number was raised thereafter.
Both saw extensive combat service across France, Belgium, and
Germany. After the war they were consolidated as the llth Ar-
mored Cavalry, since the the Army combat arms regimental sys-
tem had dropped the use of the word regiment as part of titles.
This official Army directive on terminology was usually ignored,
and the unit in fact always continued to refer to itself as the
llth Armored Cavalry Regiment often shortened to the pop-
ular abbreviation, llth ACR.
The Blackhorse Regiment was, at one-third strength, busy
training 988 newly assigned soldiers and trying to get its re-
cently reactivated 2d Squadron in shape. It was headquartered
at Fort George G. Meade, Maryland, twenty miles equidistant
from Baltimore, Annapolis, and Washington, D.C. Its orders to
Vietnam came simultaneously with a reorganization directive
the second since the previous October. The substitution of up-
gunned armored personnel carriers for tanks was not well re-
ceived by most armor officers, and in fact the alteration was
later regretted as an unfortunate diminishing of needed armored
shock power in the Vietnam War. Still short over eighteen
hundred men, its updated April orders to achieve personnel
readiness by May 7 were simply scoffed at. It continued intense
but scattered training at Camps Pickett and A. P. Hill, Virginia,
since any stateside maneuver room was now at a premium. One
of the many last-minute equipment switches did prove most
beneficial: everyone was issued a brand new black, lightweight
rifle called the M16.
By June a regimental planning team was in Vietnam. Hosted
by the 1st Infantry Division, the 919th Engineer Company ar-
rived by air August 16 to prepare a base site. The main portion
of the regiment went to Friendship Airport outside Baltimore
and got on planes bound for Oakland, California. There they
boarded three transport ships and, after several weeks at sea
debarked at the port of Vung Tau on September 7-19, 1966.
Surmounting serious problems due to lack of consistent guid-
ance, constant changes in personnel deployment criteria, and a
drop in morale due to the loss of over four hundred individual
finance pay records, the llth Armored Cavalry was firmly in
76 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
Vietnam by the end of the month. It was a highly potent com-
bat force of tremendous value. Now forty-two hundred strong
with attachments, the regiment was moved to Long Binh under
Col. William W. Cobb, a World War II veteran of the 503d
Parachute Infantry in the Pacific.
The llth Armored Cavalry would become one of the Army's
finest units in Vietnam. It rapidly moved beyond conventional
expectations regarding armor's ability to cross difficult tropical
terrain. Often parceled out in squadron increments to avail larger
commands of its precious armored firepower, the regiment would
see action in many areas, with many different units. A series of
excellent commanders and aggressive flak-vested cavalrymen
would ensure that the llth ACR gained an enviable combat rep-
utation far out of proportion to their actual numbers. Combined
with the exploits of the 1st Cavalry Division, the handful of air
cavalry squadrons, and divisional and brigade components, the
prestige of modern cavalry, whether in a ground or air mode,
would reach a new zenith as a result.
7. The 196th Infantry Brigade Is Diverted
The 196th Infantry Brigade was activated as the Army's first
light brigade on September 15, 1965. The unit was designed to
be an infantry stability force for peacekeeping duty in the Do-
minican Republic. The 196th was organized at the wooded, lake-
dotted Massachusetts post, Fort Devens, forty miles inland from
Boston. It was given two thousand recruits from Fort Knox,
Kentucky, and Fort Dix, New Jersey, along with a depleted tank
battalion turned into infantry and artillerymen from the rem-
nants of the 2d Brigade, 5th Infantry Division. 5
While awaiting the arrival of the first recruits in mid-Octo-
ber, the brigade tried to prepare for its anticipated training dif-
ficulties, The billets and training areas were prepared for the
influx of new soldiers. To eliminate unnecessary administrative
processing, prior arrangements were made with the two recep-
tion stations on post. The brigade's small cadre was hopelessly
insufficient for the task at hand. The shortage of basic unit lead-
5. The other two infantry battalions of the 2d Brigade, 5th Infantry Division,
at Fort Devens were being shipped out for Vietnam service with the 1st
Infantry Division.
THE BUILD-UP 77
ers was so acute that selected recruits had to be immediately
promoted to privates and privates first class, to take the place
of missing noncommissioned officers. The colorful patch being
issued to the raw trainees of the new brigade featured a yellow
twisted match on a blue shield enflamed at each end, symbol-
izing the old matchlock musket days when the match was lighted
at both ends to ensure readiness.
Personnel problems were further aggravated when three high
priority levies stripped the brigade of 120 critical sergeants and
officers who were doing most of the training. Since the ranges
and training areas at Fort Devens were too cramped for brigade
preparation, Camp Edwards on Cape Cod had to be used to
provide the expanded terrain necessary for advanced training re-
quirements. In late December, 1965, the 196th Infantry Brigade
was secretly alerted to begin planning for possible overseas
movement, contingent on the results of upcoming June elections
in the Dominican Republic. There it would replace elements of
the 82d Airborne Division, which the Army wanted off the is-
land. While the brigade was told to be combat ready by May
15, the expected pace of Caribbean duty lessened any opera-
tional anxiety. The Secretary of Defense intended to make the
move on July 15, 1966.
The entire unit reported to Camp Drum, New York, on
March 30. There it rehearsed brigade maneuvers on the vast
training site, assisted by a U.S. Army Special Forces Opera-
tional Detachment A for added realism in counterguerrilla war-
fare. The 196th returned to Fort Devens on May 17. After many
months of training, it assembled as a full brigade for the first
time to march in the Armed Forces Day parade. By now its
movement to the Dominican Republic was well known, and all
ship-loading plans and movement schedules were finalized on
June 23. However, a week earlier the Defense Department de-
cided that the 196th was no longer required in the Caribbean
area and offered it to MACV either in substitution for the 199th
Infantry Brigade or in addition to it. Such an unexpected boost
to Army strength in Vietnam was considered a godsend by Gen-
eral Westmoreland. He immediately replied that the unit could
be accepted as soon as it was available, and that it should be
in addition to the 199th. True to form, he also asked that its
closure date be expedited.
78 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
On June 24 the brigade was told it was going to Vietnam.
Three weeks of frantic activity followed. Soldiers were offered
preembarkation leaves; nondeployable personnel were reas-
signed; radios were exchanged for more modern types, and M14
rifles were traded in for M16s once qualification on the new
weapons was completed. The brigade had to be practically re-
built in a matter of days. The main body left Boston on the
USNS Patch and the USNS Darby July 15, 1966, and arrived
at Vung Tau a month later.
Meanwhile MACV was happily deciding where to place this
unexpected reinforcement. It had been initially slated for the
security of Tuy Hoa. However, it was decided better use of the
brigade could be made in the Tay Ninh area where it could
open and secure Route 22 from Go Dau Ha to Tay Ninh city,
and prepare for large-scale operations in War Zone C. Its pres-
ence in that vicinity could add further pressure against the Viet
Cong northwest of Saigon, allowing the 25th Infantry Division
to concentrate on what was proving to be a very troublesome
Hau Nghia province. By August 16 the brigade had been air-
lifted to its Vietnam camp at Tay Ninh, and the 25th Infantry
Division's 1st Brigade provided initial security and joint training
as the 196th prepared its base site.
8. The 9th Infantry Division Goes Over
The 9th Infantry Division was the first Army division acti-
vated, organized, equipped, and trained for deployment into a
combat theater in two decades. Formed for operations in the
Mekong Delta, it had originally been scheduled under the coded
designation Z Division. Approval for activation of the division
was issued by the Department of the Army on January 26, 1966,
and Maj. Gen. George S. Eckhardt was placed in command.
The division began organizing at Fort Riley, Kansas, on the first
day of February as a standard infantry division with eight in-
fantry battalions and one mechanized battalion. That Septem-
ber, as a last-minute predeployment change, the 2d Battalion of
the 47th Infantry was reorganized to a mechanized mode, giving
the division two mechanized battalions.
The 9th Infantry Division was known as The Old Reliables,
a fitting salute to its Regular Army background. The florid oc-
THE BUILD-UP 79
tofoil shoulder patch represented the heraldic symbol of the ninth
son. The Vietnam generation of soldiers referred to the strange-
looking design as Flower Power, or the Psychedelic Cookie. The
9th was in training for World War I but an outbreak of Asian
flu prevented its deployment overseas. It was reconstituted at
Fort Bragg, North Carolina, in 1940, and became one of the
Army's finest divisions in World War II. The 9th Infantry Di-
vision participated in the campaigns for Algeria, Tunisia, and
Sicily, and landed in France during June, 1944, to fight into
Germany. After postwar service at Fort Dix in New Jersey,
Germany, and Fort Carson in Colorado, it was inactivated in
1962. Four years later it was being raised again, this time on
the historic post of Fort Riley, Kansas. Its final selection as the
planned Z Division was largely a result of General Westmore-
land's extensive service with the division in World War II. He
had commanded the 60th Infantry Regiment and had served as
divisional chief of staff.
Due to a shortage of men and equipment, the division was
formed in increments. The division headquarters, support com-
mand, and brigade headquarters were activated first. Battalions
of each brigade were phased for activation according to a sched-
ule commencing in April for 1st Brigade, May for 2d Brigade,
and June for 3d Brigade. The division began training on April
4, but the post staff of Fort Riley had to double as divisional
staff until late June. The division was very short on signal equip-
ment and ammunition during training.
The authorized cadre strength of 3,301 was insufficient and
serious training problems resulted. By late March only nine
hundred had been provided, and many were inexperienced, low
in rank, and of low physical quality. Fortunately, during Feb-
ruary two thousand soldiers being trained at Fort Riley for as-
signment to Fort Carson, Colorado, were transferred into the
division. Most of these were placed immediately in schools and
used to fill vacancies not provided by cadre allocations. Another
two thousand unprogrammed soldiers arrived in March and April
and alleviated a crisis in forming the 15th Engineer Battalion.
Initially the 9th Infantry Division was formed as an ordinary
stateside division. However, some officers assigned directly from
Department of the Army staff knew that it was being built to
80 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
serve in the southern wetlands and canal-crossed marshes of
Vietnam. As a matter of fact, its training schedule was com-
pressed by shaving off twelve weeks in order to move the di-
vision to Vietnam in December 1966, so that arrival in the Delta
area would be at the beginning of the dry season. In early May
the division was formally alerted for movement to Southeast Asia
at the end of 1966. Its 15th Engineer Battalion had to be in
Vietnam by September to help prepare the base camp.
Meanwhile, in Vietnam, increasing NVA pressure in I Corps
Tactical Zone was causing MACV to have second thoughts on
its delta deployment. It considered diverting the division in its
entirety to the northern portion of the country, and by the mid-
dle of October some sort of decision on location was becoming
urgent. Finally, it was decided to move it in as originally planned.
The majority of the division arrived aboard eight troop trans-
ports. On December 19, 1966, as divisional support personnel
debarked from the USNS Barrett at Vung Tau, the 9th was of-
ficially declared completely in Vietnam.
The 9th Infantry Division marked the last major unit arrival
for the year. For MACV, 1966 had been a year of great expan-
sion and critical choices. While many of these concerned troop
deployment, decisions had also been reached regarding area
warfare strategy and the use of military airmobility. These are
discussed in the next chapter.
CHAPTER 6.
THE AREA WAR
1. 1966 Campaign Strategy
The battlefield of Vietnam was far different from the continuous
fronts of both world wars and the Korea War. Traditional mil-
itary doctrine, based on seizing and holding a series of succes-
sive terrain objectives, was largely inapplicable. The multidi-
rectional, nonlinear nature of military operations in Vietnam was
being given a new label, "area warfare/' Since Army dogma and
training were still oriented toward conventional warfare, Army
strategy had to be redefined, Exactly how area warfare would
be fought was still evolving, and additional tactics and tech-
niques were being assiduously developed. Goals were redefined
and inevitable setbacks experienced. Such directional changes
were questioned by civilian government policy interpreters, who
frequently cited operational failures. In actual fact Army strat-
egists were simply trying to adjust to the conflicting demands
and novel principles of area warfare.
Army combat commands arrived in Vietnam eager for open
confrontation with the VC and the NVA. They wanted to bring
superior American firepower and new airmobile flexibility to bear
on the open battlefield, winning a decision in the classic sense
where they could "find, fix, and finish" the enemy. The frus-
tration of warfare in Vietnam stemmed from the inherent dif-
ficulties posed by antipartisan warfare. While Americans looked
to French and British experiences in subduing native revolt, the
war of liberation in Vietnam was no longer a squabble between
81
82 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
midnight partisans and colonial police. Both North Vietnamese
and United States armed forces represented excellently equipped,
professional modern armies. By 1966 the war in Vietnam had
moved well beyond the guerrilla warfare skirmishes that typified
the pre-1965 battlefield, although there was just enough local
Viet Cong activity to compound problems. It was now a regular
war being fought between two main-force armies with divisional
establishments, although the basic "frontless" nature of it con-
founded traditional linear-bound solutions,
MACV strategy from 1965 through 1966 was dictated by the
initial necessity of supporting and protecting its buildup. This
consisted of unit deployment matters, protecting the multitude
of military installations being constructed, organizing logistical
support, and securing main lines of communication. Until late
in the year this essentially static posture was broken only by
limited "spoiling attacks/' Available forces had to ensure stabil-
ity in selected areas first. 1 Only with the advent of additional
large combat formations would MACV have enough battalions
to mount any truly punishing offensive. Despite the desire to
break away and openly confront the NVA and VC main force
elements, the United States military was tied to base and lines-
of-communication considerations.
As 1966 began the South Vietnamese armed forces were
largely combat-ineffective. The string of 1965 military defeats,
lopsided combat losses, skyrocketing desertion rates, and wide-
spread draft evasion had deteriorated ARVN manpower further.
Military inefficiency and corruption were rife. Food and clothing
allowances were being embezzled, Much time would have to be
spent in rehabilitation to bring units up to levels of basic combat
proficiency. The Vietnamese had a saying, "Using a man is like
using wood." All wood, whether rare, common, hard, or soft,
is beneficial if used properly. However, from 1965 through 1968
a lot of wood was disappearing, and good wood was being wasted.
1. At the beginning of January 1966 major U.S. forces in Vietnam consisted
of 3d Marine Division (reinforced), 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), 1st In-
fantry Division, 173d Airborne Brigade, 1st Brigade of the 101st Airborne
Division, 3d Brigade of the 25th Infantry Division, and 5th Special Forces
Group. The 1st Battalion of the Royal Australian Regiment and Korean Cap-
ital Division and 2d Marine Brigade were also in Vietnam.
THE AREA WAR 83
A Joint General Staff Honor Battalion and the regimental-sized
crack Palace Guard, all under the Capital Security Group, were
guarding the Independence Palace, various guest quarters in plush
vacation camps, and the president's house.
The ten regular ARVN divisions were little more than static
security formations. The latest, titled the 10th Division in a so-
ciety where the number ten had come to signify the very worst
imaginable, and under a commander who relied on an inept as-
trologist for military advice, was sent to a critical area near
Cambodia outside Cu Chi. Its performance was so miserable that
it later had to be withdrawn to Xuan Loc, redesignated the 18th
Division, and completely overhauled. The marginal 5th and 25th
ARVN divisions were also ineptly led, and both suffered from
a steady stream of deserters to the capital, a situation so com-
mon it was being termed "the Saigon syndrome." 2 Even the re-
liable 1st ARVN Division was to be seriously undermined by
the political furor in Hue and Da Nang that spring. 3
Taking all these factors into consideration, the annual com-
bined United States/South Vietnamese Campaign Plan coded AB-
141 went into effect on the last day of 1965, with the optimistic
hope that serious inroads could be made into NVA and VC com-
bat capacity by the end of 1966. Four "national priority areas"
were established in heavily populated regions inclusive of Sai-
gon and adjacent areas, the middle of the Mekong Delta, and
two selected coastal plains areas around Qui Nhon and Da Nang.
The American military would establish and defend major bases,
serving as a shield while South Vietnamese units were tasked
with defending governmental centers and resource security. Of
2. The South Vietnamese commanding general of the 25th ARVN Division
was so upset at adverse reports about his unit that he published an order of
the day castigating his senior advisor, which ended quoting a poem referring
to the Vietnamese expulsion of the Mongols, interpreted as a reference to
the Americans.
3. In July 1966 the regular South Vietnamese military consisted of the Air-
borne, 1st, 2d, 5th, 7th, 9th, 10th, 21st, 22d, 23d, and 25th Divisions, Palace
Guard (Regiment), 51st Regiment (Separate), lst~7th and 10th Armored Cav-
alry Squadrons, lllth and 301st LLDB Groups, lst-5th Marine Battalions,
twenty ranger battalions (llth, 21st-23d, 30th~39th, 41st-44th, 51st, and 52d),
six separate artillery battalions (28th, 34th-38th), and five separate infantry
battalions (JGS-Honor, 10th, 12th, 14th, and 16th).
84 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
that army, only the airborne, ranger, and marine battalions were
to be consistently employed in offensive operations. Except for
special circumstances, other ARVN battalions would serve on
garrison duty and support rural development. The exception was
IV Corps Tactical Zone the Mekong Delta area where the
South Vietnamese would continue full offensive operations,
However, during 1966 the low, flat, and poorly drained Mekong
Delta experienced major flooding which curtailed military op-
erations there.
During the Honolulu Conference of July 1, 1966, the Sec-
retary of Defense outlined six major goals in Vietnam by year's
end for Adm. U.S. Grant "Oley" Sharp, the Commander in Chief
Pacific, who replied that the first three were hopelessly far-
fetched under current conditions. By the end of 1966, the NVA
and VC forces were to be attritioned at a rate as high as their
capacity to place men in the field, Forty to fifty percent of all
North Vietnamese and Viet Cong base areas were to be elimi-
nated and fully half of all critical roads and railways were to be
opened, Sixty percent of the South Vietnamese population was
to be secured, the four national priority areas were to be paci-
fied, and finally, defense was to be insured over all military bases,
political and population centers, and food-producing areas under
governmental control as of February 8, 1967.
Guidance concerning restrictions on border operations in the
DMZ and Cambodian and Laotian frontiers was fragmentary and
tardy. After July, the Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized aerial, na-
val, and artillery bombardment of, and troop incursions into,
the southern half of the DMZ if it was in actual or imminent
danger of enemy contact provided no public disclosure was made
and the Pentagon was immediately notified of each case. Ad-
ditionally, in December permission was granted for artillery
counterbattery fire across the DMZ,
At the beginning of 1966, no rules of engagement had been
established for combat operations near the Laotian border.
Therefore, unit commanders operating in the area were told that
with prior approval they could act in "self-defense" against any
attack launched from Laos. In emergency situations, as deter-
mined by the field commanders, no prior approval was re-
quired. Washington was to be kept closely informed of all in-
THE AREA WAR 85
stances in which American troops returned fire, attacked Laotian
towns, or maneuvered troops into Laos under this guidance, and
this information, or knowledge of it, was to be highly safe-
guarded, Guidance covering Cambodia issued by MACV in the
last month of 1965 was similar, except that restrictions on at-
tacking populated areas were tighter.
In the fall of 1966 the United States first field-tested its new
search and destroy pattern of area warfare. Coded Operation
ATTLEBORO, it was designed to penetrate War Zone C in
northwestern Tay Ninh Province along the Cambodian border
and root out NVA and VC forces located to the west of the
Michelin plantation. Initiated by a single infantry brigade, the
196th, on September 14, 1966, it rapidly expanded to include
the 1st Infantry Division, the 3d Brigade of the 4th Infantry
Division, the 173d Airborne Brigade, and the llth Armored
Cavalry Regiment. Terminated toward the end of November, its
results led to the foundation of a new strategic cornerstone. Search
and destroy operations on a multidivisional corps level might
provide a key to solving the riddle of area warfare, thereby en-
suring military success in South Vietnam. The test would come
in 1967.
2. Army Tactics in 1966
Wider area warfare strategy faded on the actual battlefields
themselves, as American soldiers approaching, or inside, tree
lines found themselves face-to-face with Viet Cong or North
Vietnamese Army Regulars. In these instances, ten-man squads
and thirty-man platoons (often at half strength) decided the out-
come of skirmishes by fire and maneuver. Their faces soiled by
the heat and toil of combat, infantrymen huddled around twisted
brush and fallen trees, blazing away with rifles and grenade
launchers. This was the "base of fire." Standing fast and often
reinforced by comrades, they waited for any stoppage or slack-
ening in enemy return fire. They crawled or dashed forward by
bounds; advances often measured six yards at a time. With enough
firepower, teamwork, and luck the advance would either drive
the enemy from their defensive positions or close with them.
Even a small drive could result in a toll of dead and wounded.
Actions were finished by point-blank rifle fire, grenade, and
86 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
knifepoint. The Army called the means to accomplish this hell-
ish job, "tactics," and tactical proficiency could only be gained
by battle rehearsal, time, and actual combat exposure.
In 1966 the United States Army was still striving for tactical
proficiency. Statistically, Army operational reports revealed 88
percent of all fights were being initiated by the NVA or the VC,
and half of these (46 percent) began as ambushes. These reports
also showed that some 63 percent of all encounters were against
bunkers and fortified trenches. Units collided into combat against
North Vietnamese and Viet Cong entrenched in streams laced
with foxholes, rice field dikes lined with spider holes, and even
nests in giant anthills. The NVA and VC forces were able to
seek or break off combat with relative freedom, using rocket and
mortar attacks if their front-line losses became unacceptable in
a given area. Their aggressiveness resulted in bushwhacked
landing zones and halted units unable to move forward, yet they
also possessed an uncanny ability to fade into nearby woods and
avoid a fight. The American military found the situation mad-
dening; the battlefield initiative was still in the hands of the
enemy.
Actually, the real problem was that the American soldiers
being fielded were simply green, and faring poorly as a result.
Lessons had to be learned the hard way. Command groups,
readily identifiable by collections of radio antennae protruding
out of tall grass and dense undergrowth, took critical losses until
they dispersed. Treetops had to be liberally sprayed with au-
tomatic weapons and grenade fire to shake out sniper teams.
Close jungles compressed companies into single files with ex-
posed flanks. Soldiers were frozen and pinned by the unex-
pectedly heavy fire initially received in engagements, and their
equally inexperienced officers and sergeants were not taking
charge. Unpredictably high ammunition expenditures forced sol-
diers to rely on their machetes and cutting tools instead of bul-
lets midway through fierce firefights. Even medical evacuation
of wounded sometimes led to panic on the line if nearby sol-
diers thought they had missed getting word to withdraw.
Slowly the military adjusted its tactics to cope with this new
battlefield. Soldiers learned to accept the fact that the Viet Cong
would usually have the advantage during the first five or ten
THE AREA WAR 87
minutes of any clash, since they were initiating the combat from
prepared positions at a time and place of their choosing. Officers
and sergeants became firm as they called in air strikes and heavy
artillery, and the combat odds began to shift rapidly in their
own favor. The profusion of American technological firepower
became a casualty-preventing mainstay, and burning napalm,
phosphorous, and exploding steel were used in mass quantities
to shatter resistance.
Some lessons were harder. Viet Cong snipers capitalized on
the American habit of immediately going to the aid of injured
comrades by deliberately wounding a soldier and then killing
several would-be rescuers. In the midst of combat it was found
that little more could be done for casualties beyond foxhole help.
In order to keep the perimeter intact and every available man
shooting, wounded were evacuated later. Since the Viet Cong
were well versed in delay tactics, which allowed time for further
preparation of ambush and defensive positions or escape, the
Americans learned to press the attack. Sergeants had to use all
their forceful professionalism to drive wearied troops on. Situ-
ation miscalls and underestimations of enemy strength were in-
evitable and produced unfortunate results. Ability to guess en-
emy capability or intentions intelligently could only be gleaned
from fighting experience.
Battalion and company commanders learned to expect water
obstacles and other hazards, not shown by maps or observable
from the air, underneath jungle canopies. Night positions had
to be constantly patrolled. Large captured rice caches impossi-
ble to remove were found to be destructable if gasoline, diesel
oil, or artillery powder was mixed in. Work priorities in defense
became digging positions and cutting fields of fire.
The 1st Infantry Division was having difficulties reminiscent
of its first experiences in North Africa in World War II, when
it was trounced by German desert warriors at Kasserine Pass in
1943. The division was also painfully assimilating jungle warfare
experience through trial and error. Lack of divisional battle
prowess caused several unfavorable situations where on-hand re-
serves were either unprepared for immediate commitment, not
under control, or lacking altogether. Personnel turnover, illness,
and battlefield losses threatened to undo the lessons mastered.
88 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
In March 1966 General Westmoreland put his MACV chief of
operations, Maj. Gen. William E. DePuy, in command. General
DePuy immediately began relieving so many subordinate offi-
cers that the Army Chief of Staff expressed open concern. De-
spite a temporary loss of morale, the 1st Infantry Division slowly
mastered its tactical problems. Under Maj. Gen. DePuy, the
"Big Red One" was soon living up to the combat performance
expectations it had earned in two World Wars, and became one
of MACV's hardest-fighting outfits.
3. Air Assault
Perhaps the most novel tactical innovation of the Vietnam
War was the air assault. In these attacks the smoldering green-
gray wash of earth and sky would tilt dizzily as helicopters banked
into their final approaches toward the blazing, smoking landing
zone ahead. Huddled four to a side on the edge of doorless
cargo compartments, legs dangling into space, young American
infantrymen sucked in deep gasps of the charred jungle air as
they flipped their rifles off Safe onto Full Auto. Eruptions of
artillery could be clearly seen exploding down one side of an
assault corridor while last minute air strikes ripped up the other
side with fragmentation bombs and intense 20mm-cannon straf-
ing. Armed helicopters lazily suspended in the sky poured con-
centrated rocket and machine-gun fire into the far and rear ap-
proaches. Sergeants had explained this landing zone preparation
and how it had to be of critical intensity to maximize shock ef-
fect. At a time like this, though, all their teaching slipped past
senses too dazed to think. The blurred tropical landscape flashed
by eyes singed by burning gunpowder. Ears were pounded by
the roar of whirling rotor blades and detonations. For the vet-
erans of previous "hot LZs," battle instinct surfaced, but, for
the newer soldiers, whatever rudimentary drill they had re-
ceived in stateside training mills had to suffice. Such superficial
training became overwhelmed by the impact of actual war.
Flak-vested door gunners hammered the blazing tree lines
with a steady stream of tracer-laced machine-gun fire. The air-
crews secretly prayed that nervous grunts wouldn't accidentally
fire their weapons or drop loose grenades. Many helicopters had
been lost due to careless rifle discharges through cabin roofs or
THE AREA WAR 89
unsecured grenades rolling across metal floors. As the helicop-
ters slowed and descended, some soldiers lowered themselves
to stand on the outboard skids while still clinging to the aircraft
sides. Then the soldiers leaped out and the transport helicopters
swiftly left the corridors by executing roundabout turns and tak-
ing off downwind in the same direction they had entered.
The sudden availability of rugged, dependable helicopters in
mass quantity allowed these craft to dominate the battlefield.
They became the basis of a new doctrine airmobility a po-
tentially devastating means of battlefield technology. Slightly over
fifty aviation companies and air cavalry troops had been sent to
Vietnam by the end of 1965, and they would be joined by twenty-
two more in 1966. Most of these were helicopter units, and for
the first time ground commanders were being offered massive
vertical assault capabilities, extra aerial firepower, and a degree
of mobility never before experienced in warfare. Airmobility
meant attacking from any direction, striking targets in otherwise
impossible terrain, overflying barriers, bypassing enemy posi-
tions, and achieving tactical surprise. It was counted on to re-
solve the problems of area warfare since the rapid tempo of
fighting operations, unhampered by normal ground restric-
tions even in marginal weather gave the U.S. commanders
great flexibility in employing their soldiers very quickly from a
variety of distant locations,
Bold and aggressive use of massive combat power, linked
with a choice of unexpected times and places for attack, had
been instrumental in securing success for the 1st Cavalry Di-
vision in the la Drang Valley campaign of 1965. As a result,
airmobile tactics were perfected quickly, and all Army maneu-
ver battalions became skilled in their use. Soon throngs of green-
clad warriors, garbed in rip-stop cotton and loaded with ban-
doliers of ammunition, were departing their base areas on waves
of helicopters. Shepherded by armed helicopter escorts, they
assaulted predetermined landing zones which were already un-
der artillery and aerial fire bombardment. Like everything in
Vietnam, this airmobile thrust entailed considerable risk, since
it could lead to an unwanted general engagement under unfa-
vorable conditions if it mistakenly tripped a hornets' nest.
Airmobility was most effective when it was used as the cav-
90 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
airy it had replaced had been used. It reigned supreme in ex-
ploitation and pursuit, after an enemy force had been broken
or enveloped. Its purpose then became to destroy the oppo-
nent's ability to reconstitute and conduct an organized defense.
While small-scale exploitations seemed insignificant, especially
if local setbacks were experienced, their cumulative effects could
be decisive, Introduced whenever the enemy was perceived as
having difficulty maintaining its position, ruthless execution could
block withdrawal and complete the destruction. The NVA and
VC became adept at avoiding entrapment this way by abandon-
ing ground at opportune times, Flexibility, speed, and a hunch
for enemy intentions were required to maintain pressure on such
a proficient adversary.
One of the finest scout formations that excelled in this type
of work was the 1st Squadron of the 9th Cavalry, the air re-
connaissance arm of the 1st Cavalry Division. Descended from
the famed "Buffalo" cavalrymen of the Indian Wars and previ-
ously an all-Black unit, it was the first air cavalry into Vietnam. 4
On August 19, 1966, two light observation helicopters from Troop
B spotted ten NVA soldiers hiding in tall grass beside a trail.
Two helicopter gunships joined them four minutes later, and
the troop's rifle platoon was sent aloft. The troop commander
raced into his helicopter and was overhead in fifteen minutes.
He marked a landing zone 150 feet away by dropping smoke,
and the riflemen who arrived ten minutes later were set down.
Meanwhile the two scout helicopters kept the NVA corralled.
One made a low orbit, keeping them in constant sight, while
the second flew a wider circle. The scout observer in the first
craft discouraged two attempts at escape by firing short bursts
from his M16 rifle.
The rifle platoon formed a diamond with its four squads and
moved up to within fifty meters of the NVA, guided by the
scout helicopter crew, who could see both groups. The platoon
then swiftly fanned out into a line with one squad dropping back
4. The 9th Cavalry had been first organized in October 1866 at Greenville,
Louisiana, and fought Comanches and Utes out West. It garrisoned Texas,
New Mexico, and Colorado until 1881, when it moved to secure Kansas and
Indian Territory. It had also seen action in the Spanish- American War, the
Philippine Insurrection, and in Korea.
THE AREA WAR 91
for rear security, and charged the pinned NVA soldiers. Thirty
modern cavalrymen lunged forward with guns firing from the
hip, and the cornered North Vietnamese infantrymen blasted
back. One trooper fell dead in the charge but the others pressed
forward. Through the din of battle, the helicopters whisked
overhead and radioed instructions. Two hours and twenty min-
utes from the first sighting the skirmish was ended. Sixteen NVA
lay dead and nine wounded gave themselves up.
Scouting and screening were natural helicopter missions, and
entire air cavalry squadrons exclusively dedicated to this func-
tion were raised and dispatched to Vietnam in 1967. To the 1st
Cavalry Division's 1st Squadron of the 9th Cavalry, would be
added another divisional aerial reconnaissance cavalry squadron,
the 2d Squadron of the 17th Cavalry, for the 101st Airborne
Division (Airmobile). Three separate air cavalry squadrons also
served: the 7th Squadron of the 1st Cavalry, and the 3d and
7th squadrons of the 17th Cavalry.
4. Helicopters At War
For the Army, the widening war in Vietnam promised to be
like no other in its potential airmobile success over nearly all
terrain restrictions. With enough helicopters and their intrinsic
lift capacity, there seemed no end to the possibilities. Every
Army concept seemed to mesh with their remarkable versatility,
from troop and cargo hauling to firepower assistance and sur-
veillance. Commanders were quick to cram their cargo com-
partments with radios and use them as airborne command posts.
Soon the squat, olive drab Army aerial workhorse, the ever
present Bell Corporation Huey helicopter, became an integral
part of nearly all Vietnam missions. The incessant, pulsating
whoosh of their rotor blades labored continually through the hu-
mid Southeast Asian skies.
Armed helicopters were especially reassuring to the "crunch-
ies," the ground infantrymen who depended on them to deliver
accurate supporting fire whether conducting raids or in "deep
serious" trouble trying to disengage. In their own peculiar jar-
gon, the soldiers called the UH-series Huey gunships Hogs, and
the later, sleeker AH-1G Cobra attack helicopters Snakes. Both
delivered high concentrations of destruction whether using run-
92 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN AIRMY
rung fire delivered in forward flight, hovering fire, or stationary
fire while grounded. Their armament came in various combi-
nations of dual or singular machine guns, 2.75-inch rocket
launchers, 40mm grenade-launching systems, 20mm automatic
guns, miniguns, and mine dispensers. These weapons were fit-
ted onto the helicopters using side mounts to nose turrets.
In fact the armed helicopters were so powerful, fast, and
effective that they created control problems that became ex-
tremely critical, especially in poor weather. In an effort to guide
the lethal and rapid fire into enemy targets and safely around
friendly forces, soldiers used smoke grenades, visual panels, flare
devices, all types of star clusters, tracer ammunition, and radio
communications .
To command and control the tremendous Army aviation forces
in Vietnam, the 1st Aviation Brigade was created in May 1966.
It eventually became one of the largest military commands there,
with over 24,000 men and 4,230 aircraft of all descriptions or-
ganized into a multitude of aviation groups and battalions as well
as air cavalry squadrons. During the course of the conflict some
142 separate Army aviation companies and air cavalry troops
participated in the most lavish airmobile effort in history, but
its toll of helicopter personnel was staggering. Nearly six thou-
sand helicopter pilots and crewmen were killed in aircraft losses
over Vietnam.
While the advent of airmobility allowed the Army unparal-
leled ability to surmount many of Vietnam's jungled obstacles,
flying conditions often remained severely restricted. Weather and
geography were foremost in determining range and power. South
Vietnam's landscape varied from the flat, open rice fields of the
Mekong Delta, where lack of dense vegetation gave antiaircraft
gunners excellent opportunities, to the rugged mountains of the
Central Highlands where suitable landing zones were difficult
to select and high trees presented numerous flying hazards. The
coastal plains resembled delta areas except for their fewer and
poorer roads and the east-west mountain ridges extending in-
land from the shore. Added to these terrain difficulties were the
northeast monsoons between September and April, and the
southwest monsoons between April and September. The former
brought heavy clouds along the coastal mountains and hot, dusty
THE AREA WAR 93
conditions to the Delta and mountain areas, while low cloud
ceilings and poor visiblity prevailed over the Central Highlands
and the Delta during the southwest monsoon period.
The maximum distance airmobile units could travel was based
on the helicopter's ability to deliver its assault forces and then
return to the nearest refueling or rearming point. In Vietnam
such operations were conducted anywhere from less than a mile
up to roughly forty miles from pickup to landing zone. Seldom
was there enough aviation available to meet demand, and con-
trol between ground and air units was often difficult. Aircraft
fuel was consumed in tremendous quantities; for example, a utility
aircraft on an average day consumed over four thousand pounds
of fuel. Ammunition was expended rapidly. Maintenance was a
major effort that received the highest command emphasis in
Vietnam. As a result the 34th General Support Group was formed
at Tan Son Nhut air base in January 1966, specifically to handle
aviation supply and support. Due to the lack of qualified mili-
tary personnel, the group had to be heavily augmented with
civilian mechanics hired on a contractual basis.
All those associated with airmobility faced grave personal
hazards apart from enemy action and mechanical failure. In or-
der to achieve surprise and escape ground fire, helicopter pilots
were forced to skim over Vietnam at treetop level. The Army
termed this "nap of the earth," or terrain/contour, flying, and
all agreed it left little margin for error. Other general hazards
became associated with helicopter employment. Hovering heli-
copters wallowed in their own toxic engine exhaust gases, mag-
nified by downward rotor wash. Crew members had their
breathing stifled by the visible haze and cordite odor of side
machine-gun fire, despite ventilation through open cargo doors.
Pilots suffered from spatial disorientation episodes, magnified by
a helicopter's peculiar ability to produce total viewing changes
instantly. Shuddering helicopter motions produced vibrations that
played havoc with eyesight. Main rotor noise swamped low fre-
quency ranges and combined with higher frequency antitorque
system noise to devastate eardrums, which were further aggra-
vated by sounds from open doors and windows. Loss of auditory
response threatened the safety of soldiers in battle, as leaders
might not be heard or orders understood.
94 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
Early on, the helicopter was employed to evacuate the
mounting toll of combat wounded. By locating three litters on
each side of the transmission support structure, six seriously in-
jured soldiers could be carried and the center forward-facing troop
seat used for the medical attendant. Two blood-bottle hangers
were placed on the inside of the cabin roof and electrical re-
ceptacles furnished direct current for heated blankets. Addition-
ally, rescue hoists with electrically operated winches and "forest
penetrator" litter devices were installed to allow extraction of
wounded from jungles where landing was impossible. Resusci-
tators, telescoping splints, and surgical instrument sets were
shoved into the aircraft in an effort to save soldiers suffering
from shock, severe bleeding, multiple burns, and wounds to the
head, chest, or abdomen. In such circumstances survival was
directly linked to the skills of aidmen and crew chiefs, working
feverishly to open air passageways or tie tourniquets, and to the
flying ability of pilots who shaved minutes off the time sepa-
rating their wounded from medical facilities. The feats of these
"Dust-Off" crews, so called in tribute to the call-sign of the first
medical evacuation helicopter lost in Vietnam, were legendary
and resulted in a number of awards of the Medal of Honor, the
highest United States decoration for valor.
Special medical air ambulance companies and detachments
were introduced as fast as crews and helicopters became avail-
able. Each company consisted of four air ambulance platoons
totaling twenty-four helicopters, while detachments contained
six aircraft. These units operated in conjunction with ordinary
helicopters on call, and soon Americans hit on the battlefield
had a good chance of receiving quicker first-class medical aid
than highway accident victims back home. However, problems
constantly hampered this airmobile answer to prompt medical
evacuation. Not only did surrounding terrain and climatic con-
ditions limit lift capacity, but pressured ground troops often called
in urgent requests before the wounded were collected, or in
areas too small for the helicopters, or not yet clear of enemy
fire. This sometimes resulted in downed medical helicopters and
more casualties.
Whatever advantages airmobility had, the fighting soldier
valued the promise of speedy medical evacuation the highest.
THE AREA WAR 95
He realized that a wounded man's condition could worsen in
seconds, that shock was quick to set in, and that only aerial
evacuation could prevent potentially overwhelming death rates.
Line units were suffering grievous casualties in close combat,
and these were occurring in some of the most rugged terrain
on earth. The soldier viewed helicopter evacuation as an abso-
lute necessity and its ready availability became an accepted,
overriding morale consideration.
5. A Crisis of Pilots
If aviation was the key component of airmobility, then cer-
tainly the number of available pilots was a key determinant of
the possible extent of airmobile presence. MACV was already
aware that its airmobile potential wasn't keeping pace with
growing troop strength because of a widespread shortage of avia-
tors. Now this lack of personnel was so acute that the entire
promise of airmobility was in danger of foundering. Already field
operations were being premised on the amount of helicopters
on hand, rather than on whatever objectives or enemy threat
existed.
In January 1966, the Department of the Army had informed
General Westmoreland that all aviation sources had been ex-
hausted, and that nearly five hundred aviation-qualified Vietnam
veterans were being recycled back overseas. The rapid deploy-
ment of Marine aviation units had likewise precipitated a critical
shortfall. By October the Marine Corps was deferring both re-
leases and retirements and shortening its helicopter courses.
The Army squeeze was underlined by the 9,700 pilots on
hand compared to its June requirement for 14,300. A rash of
letters went out begging previous aviation personnel to come
back as part of a voluntary recall, but the response wasn't prom-
ising. Of nearly two thousand individual letters mailed in the
first half of 1966 inviting nonactive aviators back in, only sixty
were answered. In Vietnam itself urgent steps were taken which
trimmed any aviator requirements in nonflight jobs, and posted
everybody up to and including the rank of major in actual flying
assignments.
Still more drastic measures were required beyond stepped-
up pilot training and abbreviated flying courses. In order to beef
96 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
up the Southeast Asian war zone, the Defense Department re-
duced global manning levels in other areas to only a fourth of
that authorized. Even this dangerously low profile was sliced by
a further emergency withdrawal from Europe and Korea in May.
By the end of spring, for instance, there were only thirty-four
Army pilots on the entire Korean peninsula. Any aviator below
the rank of lieutenant colonel was informed that his time be-
tween Vietnam tours was being cut to a year.
At this point the Army's aviation school at Fort Rucker, Al-
abama, was geared solely to cranking out as many pilots as pos-
sible for Vietnam duty. The Army was now desperately seeking
officer pilot material from all sources. Graduates in the upper
portion of advanced individual training courses were being called
into the offices of their training commanders. There they were
reviewed as potential volunteers for flight training. Some re-
called the questions being hardly more than whether they could
read, see without glasses, and ever thought about racing cars or
flying. If response was positive, they were packed off to Fort
Rucker as new warrant officer candidates.
To the Army's surprise, these young soldiers who often
possessed no college background or career aspirations, but only
the desire to fly proved to be just the answer. Full of zeal,
and bold to the point of recklessness, young and unmarried,
they became the best helicopter pilots in the business. As young
as eighteen, their chests soon adorned with dozens of distin-
guished flying crosses and air medals, they were heroes to the
military, district, and province chiefs of South Vietnam, to the
front-line combatants and support personnel, to unit command-
ers and planners, and to anyone else connected with the allied
cause. Their efforts and dedication enabled airmobility to flour-
ish, and by mid-1968 increased school output and force leveling
combined to alleviate the pilot crisis.
CHAPTER 7.
THE CENTRAL FRONT
1. Battles for Base Camps, Plantations, and Roads
The American military focused its 1966 campaign efforts in the
critical regions north and west of Saigon, on securing base areas
for its incoming units, and opening lines of communication
through threatened areas. Regular Army forces were summoned
into battle wherever outlying South Vietnamese and U.S. Army
Special Forces garrisons were threatened, and maintained as much
pressure against known VC sanctuaries as assets permitted. As
the year progressed and more units became available, larger op-
erations were initiated in suspected Viet Cong fortified zones.
In the Central Highlands and coastal areas the swift and pow-
erful 1st Cavalry Division conducted all-out efforts to locate and
destroy NVA and VC concentrations.
The "Tropic Lightning" 25th Infantry Division was emplaced
west of Saigon at the start of the year, and its 2d Brigade as-
sumed operational responsibility for the future divisional base
camp near Cu Chi. The division's placement directly challenged
the prime Viet Cong lifeline to Cambodian supply points, which
was guarded by a maze of VC fortifications and tunnel networks.
Hau Nghia and Tay Ninh provinces represented a dangerous
slice of terrain covered by swamp and jungle, which was never
effectively subdued throughout the length of the Vietnam War.
The security of the Cu Chi vicinity had top priority. The 2d
Brigade contained the famed 27th Infantry "Wolfhounds," whose
1st Battalion was tasked with clearing the southwest portion of
97
THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
the perimeter to a distance sufficient to prevent any mortaring
of the compound. 1 Thus a large abandoned village a mile west
of the base camp became a battalion objective. The village con-
tained rows of bamboo thickets around each hut, as well as an
elaborate tunnel system. For four days the battalion's companies
took turns assaulting the village, and each was repulsed and took
heavy losses in turn. Although air and artillery bombardment
would precede the infantry, each charge would inevitably be
met by withering machine-gun and automatic rifle fire and
stopped cold. Then the Viet Cong would break off the action
by splitting into small groups and fading in the jungle. Return-
ing later from another direction, they would suddenly shoot up
soldiers trying to search through the empty houses.
Company B was determined to clear the place once and for
all. Air Force fighters, helicopter gunships, howitzers, and bat-
talion mortars were called in. The infantrymen advanced toward
the village behind a moving curtain of exploding artillery rounds.
The Viet Cong rapidly lobbed their own mortar shells to burst
among the Americans, and the line started to waver because
men suspected their own artillery was falling short. The cool-
ness of a platoon sergeant prevented a rout, and slowly the vil-
lage was closed. As suspected hot spots around it were hit by
continued artillery fire, the soldiers began pitching thermite
grenades into the structures. Aerial rocket fire was directed at
bamboo thickets containing snipers. The company then with-
drew behind a smokescreen which was mixed with high explo-
sive shelling to prevent VC use of its concealment. A stay-be-
hind ambush team was left in place to discourage Viet Cong
return.
The clearing process was slow and tedious. In late July the
1. The 27th Infantry was one of the most renowned Regular Army regiments.
Its traditional designation, "The Wolfhounds," commemorated its service in
Siberia after World War I, and the insignia of the American Siberian Ex-
peditionary Force a giant wolf head and the motto Nee Aspera Terrant
(Frightened by No Difficulties) were embossed on the regimental shield. Or-
ganized in February 1901 at Plattsburg Barracks in New York it had rendered
outstanding service during the Philippine Insurrection, especially in the Lake
Lanao Expedition. Assigned to the Hawaiian Division in 1921, it had been
part of the 25th Infantry Division in the Pacific during World War II and
the Korean War.
THE CENTRAL FRONT 99
division's base camp was struck by an intense recoilless rifle and
mortar attack. In the meantime, other "Wolfhound" elements
were probing deeper into Viet Cong territory. On July 19, 1966,
Company A of the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry, was airlifted to
the edge of the Ho Bo Woods. They immediately ran into en-
trenched elements of the 1st Battalion, 165A VC Regiment,
complete with camouflaged uniforms and steel helmets, and a
furious five-hour battle resulted. The length and intensity of these
early encounters convinced Army planners that the Viet Cong
would fight tenaciously if forced to defend their base areas. This
experience later shaped operational directives, which massed al-
lied formations against certain areas in the hope of inducing de-
cisive engagements.
MACV directed the 1st Infantry Division and the 173d Air-
borne Brigade into several other western areas of III Corps Tac-
tical Zone. The paratroopers of the 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry
(Airborne), from the airborne brigade, air-assaulted into sharp
action along the Oriental River during the first week of the year
(Operation MARAUDER), and on January 8 they stabbed into
the Ho Bo Woods (Operation CRIMP). The 1st Infantry Division
swept the Boi Loi Woods (Operation MASTIFF) and the Long
Than district (Operation MALLET) in February. "The Herd"
173d Airborne Brigade ventured into the Be River area north-
west of Saigon on March 7, which triggered a fierce four-hour
counterattack. In these early 1966 encounters the price of entry
was costly, but then the pace of action fizzled out. The slow
and deliberate clearance of bunkers and tunnels, always a haz-
ardous and painstaking procedure, began. The large amounts of
material captured and earthen fortifications razed seemed to in-
dicate that Viet Cong capabilities were being seriously eroded.
The violence of sudden firefights in the sunless, vine-choked
tropical forests cheered MACV into believing they were offering
the VC no respite,
Company C of the 1st Infantry Division's 2d Battalion, 16th
Infantry, was decimated by the D800 VC Battalion in deep jun-
gle on April 11 while engaged in Operation ABILENE sweeping
coastal Phuoc Tuy Province. 2 They had been hacking their way
2, One of the traditional regiments of the 1st Infantry Division, the 16th
100 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
through the jungle against sporadic rifle fire when a "friendly"
artillery round fell short and burst in the tree-masked canopy
overhead, spraying their ranks with shrapnel. The company halted
to evacuate the two dead and twelve wounded Americans, un-
aware that they had selected a spot only yards from the VC
battalion's base camp. Automatic rifle and grenade fire suddenly
swept their perimeter. During the night the soldiers desperately
fought off three main charges as 1,086 rounds of artillery plum-
meted down through the trees in support. Reinforcements were
pushed toward the beleaguered company but were forced to wait
for first light before attempting a linkup. Early the next morning
engineers and medical personnel reached the unit, descending
through the jungle canopy on "Jacob's ladders" dropped from
the rear of hovering CH-47 Chinook helicopters. Only then were
the engineers able to carve out a landing zone so the wounded
could be lifted out by evacuation helicopters.
The 1st Infantry Division, the "Big Red One," went north
of Tay Ninh in Operation BIRMINGHAM commencing April
24, but only squad- and platoon-sized encounters were made.
MACV considered minor actions only irritants and directed the
division to make more substantial contact with the Viet Cong.
The climax of the drive was to be a four-battalion surprise in-
fantry air assault on the suspected South Vietnamese communist
headquarters May 7-9, secretly coded HOLLINGSWORTH. The
hot, parched weather suddenly evaporated into a violent series
of thunderstorms which dumped so much rain that helicopter
operations had to be suspended. With that cut in mobility, MACV
was forced to cancel out.
The division sent units into some of the most inaccessible
regions of Vietnam as it strived to produce significant combat
results. The infantrymen of the 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry,
sloshed through mud up to their hips during Operation LEX-
Infantry had a long history of desperate fighting. At the Wheatfield and Dev-
il's Den in Gettysburg during the Civil War, it had lost approximately 50
percent of its effective strength. It had been initially formed in Massachusetts
in February 1862, and was consolidated as the 16th Infantry from the llth,
16th, and 34th Infantry Regiments in 1869. It had also seen intense combat
during the storming of Fleville, France, on October 4, 1918, during the Meuse-
Argonne Offensive of World War I.
THE CENTRAL FRONT 101
INGTON III, fought April 17-June 9, 1966, in the mangrove-
choked swamps of the Rung Sat Special Zone. While sampan
kills proved easy in the murky nightly marsh gloom, results were
limited since the companies had to be rotated every other day
to avoid immersion foot. Finally, with the approach of the sum-
mer monsoons, the 1st Infantry Division was urged to deal a
punishing blow somewhere, in order to forestall a suspected VC
offensive with the onset of the rains.
In early May a Viet Cong lieutenant was killed southeast of
Loc Ninh, and a search through his possessions turned up a
plan to attack both the town and its Special Forces camp. As a
result the 1st Infantry Division spent the month fruitlessly
sweeping the area in Operation EL PASO I. Maj. Gen. William
E. DePuy was looking for battle, so he decided to strike deeper
into Viet Cong-dominated territory. With the commencement of
June he pushed his 1st Infantry Division into War Zone C. This
operation, EL PASO II, was designed to block the 9th VC Di-
vision from taking the offensive northwest of Saigon during the
upcoming monsoon season. The area heated up fast, and in less
than a week the 9th VC Division had sprung into action, de-
termined to repel this major United States intrusion.
On the afternoon of June 8, Troop A of the 1st Squadron,
4th Cavalry, was churning down Route 13 with its tanks and
armored personnel carriers. As the cavalry passed through Tau-
O toward Hon Quan, the 272d VC Regiment conducted a mas-
sive ambush. Troop A's lead tank was hit by recoilless rifle fire,
and the rear of the column was also disabled. The Viet Cong
then charged the vehicles trapped in between. Fierce combat
raged for four hours before the assault was finally broken off.
Three days later action erupted at the rubber plantation
northwest of Loc Ninh. Company A of the 2d Battalion, 28th
Infantry, was ordered to clear plantation village #10 by a com-
bined ground-air assault. The day promised to be fair and hot,
but heavy morning fog delayed the helicopters two hours. After
it dissipated, helicopter gunships made a five-minute "gun run"
across the landing zone, followed by two platoons which were
airlifted in. The remainder of Company A moved into the area
by foot to establish blocking positions. Rifle fire from a small
hill wounded three of these advancing soldiers and the battle
102 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
was on. Before it ended the entire 2d Battalion of the 28th In-
fantry became involved. 3
Company A immediately fired off a barrage with its light
mortars, while the heliborne troops shifted their village ap-
proach to move against the hill. By now bunkered machine guns
were causing trouble, and the company hurled an attached South
Vietnamese CIDG platoon, led by one Special Forces advisor,
into the attack. This impromptu charge was repulsed. Company
C was alerted to join the fight, but it ran into more entrenched
defensive positions on another hill. At noon the battalion's re-
connaissance platoon was ordered in to assist. The 28th Infantry
was up against a dug-in battalion of the 273d! VC Regiment.
After intensive artillery bombardment and considerable anti-
sniper work, Company C got into line formation and assaulted
the Viet Cong trenchlines on the second hill. The recon platoon
was attached as ordinary infantry to bolster the left side of the
advance. The platoon started receiving intense automatic weap-
ons fire. As grenades showered down from the rubber trees they
began to fall back in disorder. The VC quickly moved around
them, and sited a machine gun by the trenchline occupied by
reconnaissance members providing covering fire for their re-
treating comrades. The gun suddenly fired down the trench and
killed all its occupants. A serious reverse was avoided as Com-
pany C threw its reserve platoon into the fray. By late afternoon
the Viet Cong had been pushed off the hill.
Meanwhile, repeated attacks by Company A had failed to
dislodge the Viet Cong on the first hill. Another CIDG unit, a
company that happened to be wandering nearby on patrol, was
grabbed to help encircle the Viet Cong position. During mid-
afternoon Lt. Col. Kyle W. Bowie committed his final reserves,
Company B. At this juncture the interpreter of Company A's
attached CIDG platoon was killed by VC gunfire, and the pla-
toon bolted from the battlefield. The Special Forces sergeant
3. The 28th Infantry was officially known as "the Lions of Cantigny," having
been the attacking regiment at Cantigny in the ancient province of Picardy,
France, during World War I. The regiment had been formed in Vancouver
Barracks, Washington, during March- June 1901 and sent to the Philippines.
It fought in World War I with the 1st Expeditionary Division (later 1st Di-
vision), but served with the 8th Infantry Division in World War II.
THE CENTRAL FRONT 103
stayed to fight with Company A, but a gap had been created
around the hill.
Following a sixteen-volley artillery barrage, accompanied by
an equal number of sorties from Air Force and Navy aircraft
dropping incendiary and fragmentation bombs, the fresh troops
of Company B charged the hill. Bunkers were stormed in fu-
rious hand-to-hand combat. The Viet Cong scattered, many
making their escape through the hole that the missing CIDG
platoon had created. The battalion consolidated, evacuated casu-
alties, resupplied its ammunition, and policed the charred sham-
bles of the plantation.
The next encounter, on June 30, was destined to be one of
the classic engagements of the Vietnam War, the Battle of Srok
Dong. For the previous two weeks the 2d Battalion, 18th In-
fantry, combined with the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry, to sweep
the Quan Loi vicinity. A destroyed bridge on Route 13 limited
this ability, and the banks of the stream had to be prepared to
support an armored vehicle-launched bridge near the demol-
ished structure. A threefold operation was planned in order to
get the bridge site repaired. Lt. Col. Leonard L. Lewane, the
cavalry squadron commander, was given the mission. 4
Both sides of the road were heavily forested, the only open-
ings formed by rice paddies and streams, where chest-high grass
grew up to the edges of the road. The tropical weather was
clear and hot as the armored scissors bridge arrived at the stream.
Troop B was returning down Route 13 to Loc Ninh when re-
coilless rifle and machine-gun fire ripped through the column
as it crossed a rice paddy. Wearing a variety of khaki, green,
and black uniforms, the 271st VC Regiment had lined the west-
ern side of the road and was firing from log piles and the thick
tangle of jungle hardwood. The troop's four tanks were quickly
4. The 4th Cavalry was one of the Army's finest. Formed in March 1855, at
Jefierson Barracks in Missouri to fight Indians in Kansas, it was involved
throughout the Civil War where it gained honors storming the entrenchments
at Selma, capturing Hood's artillery, and routing Confederate cavalry at Mur-
freesborough. The Bud Dajo campaign against the Philippine Moros was still
represented by a triumphant sabre across the volcano on the 4th Cavalry's
regimental crest. As a mechanized cavalry group it had seen action across
northern Europe in World War II.
104 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
neutralized by repeated hits which blasted the turret-top cu-
polas, decapitating commanders and killing or wounding their
crews.
The armored personnel carriers of Troop B replied with heavy
machine-gun fire. Artillery was called in and armed Huey and
Chinook helicopters made strafing and rocket passes up and down
the fringes of the road. The armored personnel carriers of Troop
C raced toward the action, with infantrymen piled on top. A
sudden rain of mortar shells started blowing soldiers off the ve-
hicles. A checkpoint with some armored mortar carriers and in-
fantrymen had been established earlier at a crossroad. This road
junction was under mortar fire and jammed with vehicles from
Troop B, bringing in wounded and replenishing ammunition, as
well as Troop C vehicles trying to maneuver through.
As Troop C's vehicles pulled around the clogged checkpoint
to reach the ambush area, the turret of the lead tank took a
direct hit. The seriously wounded commander and loader were
taken out, and the tank-led line of carriers continued on. The
brush was so thick on both sides of the road that the vehicle
crews just lobbed grenades over the sides. The tank was hit a
second time, and the gunner was wounded badly. He was re-
moved and the tank driver kept going. Troop C's column finally
arrived at the tail of Troop B's stranded position. All power to
the tank turret was gone, but three more men joined the ser-
geant inside. With a replenished crew, the tank stormed through
the burning wrecks in the ambush site. The sweltering substi-
tutes manually swiveled the cannon around to point northwest
and fired off all sixty rounds of ammunition. Meanwhile the rest
of the reinforcing armored personnel carriers rumbled along both
narrow shoulders of the road to form a shield around the bat-
tered remnants of Troop B.
Troop B's operable vehicles retreated to the checkpoint. There
a lieutenant of Troop C had been left behind with several ar-
mored personnel carriers to guard the crossroad and assist in
the evacuation of dead and wounded. He now moved his mech-
anized platoon forward to clear a landing zone for troop-laden
helicopters arriving to reinforce the battle area. As he stood in
the hatch, a VC bullet hit him in the chest. Several more men
were wounded and the armored personnel carriers were unable
THE CENTRAL FRONT 105
to break contact. A mechanized flamethrower rammed through
the snarl of underbrush and high grass and lashed the VC strong-
point with a fiery tongue of spray in an effort to extract the
lieutenant's vehicles.
For a week prior to the battle, the 2d Battalion of the 18th
Infantry had kept Company B on thirty-minute alert to reinforce
any armored cavalry trouble spots. After a mix-up getting heli-
copters, they hopped in twelve small 3/4- ton trucks and drove
to Quan Loi. Helicopters had already lifted Company A, which
was there previously, into the battle. Company B turned its trucks
north on Route 13 and headed to an alternate pickup zone.
However, it was full of medics frantically collecting dead and
wounded, and medical evacuation helicopters buzzing in to re-
trieve them. The company was diverted to another spot and fi-
nally lifted into action. One of the helicopters landing in the
last lift struck a dud cluster bomblet and burst into flames. Its
crew and passengers managed to scramble out. The company
went into action, but by this time the Viet Cong were already
leaving the battlefield.
Lieutenant Colonel Lewane pushed Companies A and B across
the smoking road. They soon ran into sharp resistance at a nearby
creek. Two more infantry battalions, the 1st Battalion, 2d In-
fantry, and the 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry, arrived in the battle
area the next morning. July 1-2 would be marked by continued
sporadic fighting, accented by nocturnal attacks on American
overnight positions. As contact faded, the Battle of Srok Dong
was declared ended. Major General DePuy would brief General
Westmoreland in July:
This was a complete surprise .... U.S. forces nearly lost this
battle. However, air superiority proved to be the deciding factor
and inflicted severe losses on the enemy.
On July 9 the cavalry went out again, this time as bait. A
feint was made to the northeast with a B-52 bombing strike,
and information was leaked through the local Vietnamese that
one cavalry troop would be coming down the road. However,
two cavalry troops with infantry were sent, and the result was
the Battle of Minh Thanh Road. The mixed column of tanks and
106 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
troop-filled armored personnel carriers waited until fog and
overcast dissipated, moved out, and was hit one hour before
noon right where expected. Due to the tremendous volume of
fire from the vehicles and the denseness of the jungle, the over-
head command helicopters were initially confused as to the main
direction of the 272d VC Regiment's attack. As the column com-
pressed under the fury of the onslaught, the helicopters darted
out of the way so that a wall of artillery fire could blanket the
north side. One CH-47 Chinook helicopter was brought down
but managed to force-land on the roadway to the southwest. It
was later retrieved by a CH-54 Flying Crane.
The second troop moved back, closing the column by dou-
bling it. While 22,200 rounds of artillery saturated its targeted
area, 99 air strikes blasted the south. At one time five flights
of Air Force fighter-bombers were stacked up waiting for their
turn to go in. The Viet Cong dug deep into foxholes with over-
head cover and used the roadside drainage ditches as fire lanes.
The 1st Infantry Division prepared to move three reaction bat-
talions into the battle the 2d of the 2d Infantry by road, the
1st of the 28th Infantry by air, and the 1st of the 18th Infantry
overland. The latter immediately set out on a difficult cross-jun-
gle trek that pitched them right into a web of Viet Cong for-
tifications. The soldiers of the 18th Infantry, just back from nearly
two months of swamp combat, started doggedly fighting their
way forward. 5 Meanwhile action in the ambush site continued
unabated, and the VC swarmed out to charge the stranded ve-
hicles. One tank and four armored personnel carriers were com-
pletely destroyed, and many others were crippled by this time,
The other tanks replied with devastating canister fire.
The 1st Battalion of the 28th Infantry had been moving par-
allel to the road to reinforce but had also run into strong de-
fensive works. The 1st Battalion of the 16th Infantry was now
brought forward to try to close a ring around the battle area.
5. The 18th Infantry was organized for Civil War duty in July 1861, at Camp
Thomas, Ohio. After campaigning in that war with Sherman through Atlanta
and the southern heartland, it went to Wyoming. It was posted back south
for a ten-year span of occupation duty and returned west to Montana in 1879.
It later fought in the Spanish-American War, in the Visayas during the Phil-
ippine Insurrection, and in the Soissons Offensive in World War I. It was
one of the traditional regiments of the 1st Infantry Division.
THE CENTRAL FRONT 107
In a sharp engagement in the forested tangle of undergrowth,
its commander, Lt. Col. Rufus G. Lazzell, was wounded. The
2d Battalion, 2d Infantry, finally closed the area by road march.
They then discovered the dust had completely clogged their new
M16s, and cursed the absence of their old trusted M14 rifles.
The Viet Cong, however, had failed to overwhelm the column
and were now rapidly retreating from the battlefield. The heavy
jungle enabled their escape from a tightening ring of advancing
American infantry struggling in from different directions. By the
next day the battle had faded into a series of inconsequential
running skirmishes.
The 9th VC Division moved into well-concealed base areas
and was rebuilt with North Vietnamese Army replacements. In
early November it moved back around Michelin plantation, west
of Tay Ninh, where it planned to attack the Special Forces camp
at Suoi Da and other targets in the province. Instead it collided
into the 196th Infantry Brigade (Light), which happened to be
in the area searching for Viet Cong rice and sundry supplies
under a new concept being called search and destroy. The en-
suing battle, fought through the snarled thickets of War Zone
C, highlighted both Operation ATTLEBORO and the Army's
1966 campaign in III Corps Tactical Zone.
Operation ATTLEBORO had been initiated by Brig. Gen.
Edward H. DeSaussure's light infantry brigade with a single
battalion air assault by the 2d Battalion, 1st Infantry, on Sep-
tember 14, 1966. Only light contact resulted, and the brigade
shifted its attention to operations around Dau Tieng. A month
later,, on October 19, the brigade reentered the area to look for
more supply caches. The next day considerable quantities of rice
were discovered and continued probing uncovered even larger
amounts. Acting on documents found in a sweep of the Ten Cui
plantation on the last day of the month, the 196th moved jnto
deeper woods. The attached 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry, had its
Company C cut off in high elephant grass after it had landed
uneventfully but then stumbled into the 9th Reconnaissance
Company of the 9th VC Division on November 3.
Moving down a trail through gnarled jungle forest to aid
Company C, Company A itself ran into a well-concealed bunker
line. It was suddenly engulfed in a furious hail of machine-gun
108 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
and rocket fire that took down scores of Americans, wiped out
radio contact, and prevented anyone from reaching them. After
several hours of hard fighting, the company continued its push
forward. These clashes of November 3 rapidly absorbed the
available reinforcements (both battalions of the .attached 27th In-
fantry "Wolfhounds" from the 25th Infantry Division), and by
the next day all American companies on the operation were en-
gaged in heavy fighting.
November 4 brought increasing action. The 1st Battalion of
the 27th Infantry was engaged in a grisly, sustained battle for
survival. By afternoon its commander, Maj. Guy S. Meloy III,
had been wounded, and Company A fought for its positions
against three major frontal assaults. Lt. Col. William C. Barott,
who had just taken over the sister 2d Battalion of the 27th In-
fantry that August 22, was killed leading a squad in an attempt
to link up the battalions. A full company of his battalion had
been isolated and surrounded by Viet Cong regulars. When
medical evacuation helicopters descended into the shattered lines
after dark, they flicked on landing lights. An immediate mortar
attack resulted. Major Meloy angrily told them to come in blind
and land by flashlight or wait until morning. The response from
the helicopter pilots was typical of their dedication: the landings
were made blind.
Shortly after midnight the Suoi Cau Regional Force camp
was attacked by the 272d VC Regiment. Bangalore torpedoes
and satchel charges were carried in a pitched charge, but the
assault was repulsed. The 196th Infantry Brigade command post
was also plastered by mortar fire. The Wolfhounds held on as
combat renewed on November 5. Six massed Viet Cong frontal
assaults surged out of fortified bunker lines to crash against the
1st Battalion, 27th Infantry. Infantrymen of the brigade's 2d
Battalion, 1st Infantry, and 4th Battalion, 31st Infantry, navi-
gated toward the 27th Infantry by the sound and smoke of bat-
tle. By now the 70th 9 271st and 272d VC Regiments and the
101st NVA Regiment were in action. Losses were mounting, and
help was needed at once.
The 1st Infantry Division dispatched a battalion, then a rein-
forced brigade, and by moving all night managed to assemble
near Dau Tieng. It took over direction of the battle and sent
two of its own brigades into action on November 6, keeping
The elite 1st Squadron of the 9th Cavalry, the aerial reconnaissance
arm of the 1st Cavalry Division, picks up troopers in Quang Ngai
Province during summer operations north of the Bong Son Plains on
June 9, 1967. Helicopter is a Bell Huey. (U.S. Army)
The hazards of aeromedical evacuation clearly demonstrated by the
loss of this Bell Huey helicopter during 25th Infantry Division oper-
ations in Long An Province on September 26, 1966. (U.S. Army)
A fo#at;t/ Zi/t CH54 Sky crane helicopter prepares to pick up a 5-ton
truck loaded with equipment for movement with the 101st Airborne
Division (Airmobile). (U.S. Army)
Powerful gunship support to ground troops was offered by rocket-
firing AH-1G Cobra helicopters such as this one from the 1st Squad-
ron of the 10th Cavalry (4th Infantry Division) west of Ban Me Thuot.
(Army News Features)
Tfte Bflfo of Minh Thanh Road, fought July 9, 1966, by the 1st In-
fantry Division, was one of the years roughest encounters. The downed
CH47 helicopter mentioned in the text is clearly seen after force-land-
ing on the roadway. (Author's Collection)
Armored Personnel Carriers of the 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry, move
up to reinforce the Battle of Minh Thanh Road on July 9, 1966. (Au-
thor's Collection)
Marines of the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, struggle up "Mutters Ridge"
(Nui Cay Tre) during Operation PRAIRIE in September, 1966. One
Marine carries forward a rocket round while his comrades work their
radio and compass in the heat of action. (U.S. Marine Corps)
Casualties are lifted out on the double by the 2d Battalion, 7th Ma-
rines, after combat near Due Pho on December 30, 1966. (U.S. Ma-
rine Corps)
THE CENTRAL FRONT 109
another in reserve. The 3d Brigade of the 4th Infantry Division
and the 173d Airborne Brigade (reinforced by two ARVN bat-
talions) also arrived, and the 25th Infantry Division moved up
to screen. With such overwhelming concentration of force now
mustered on the scene, the 9th VC Division refused further
combat and retreated west. By November 15, contacts were
sputtering out, and late that month Operation ATTLEBORO,
the harbinger of things to come, was over.
For the hastily deployed 196th Infantry Brigade, diverted at
the last minute from its expected Caribbean duty, Operation
ATTLEBORO had been a particularly rough initiation to full-
scale Vietnam combat. By the closing days of the battle, MACV
reluctantly came to the conclusion that the brigade had "cracked,"
posted Brigadier General DeSaussure to field force artillery, and
appointed Brig. Gen. Richard T. Knowles to command of the
196th on November 14, 1966. The American Army, forced to
rush more and more units into Vietnam without the benefit of
orderly mobilization planning or reserve component assistance,
was already beginning to show signs of strain under fire.
2. Battles for Jungles, Valleys, and Plains
The twelve provinces of II Corps Tactical Zone remained
untamed, and a host of operations were unleashed on the region
during the year. These were designed to safeguard installations
and to secure the national priority area of Binh Dinh Province.
Some, conducted in the thick bamboo and forested slopes of
rugged mountain valleys, would result in bloody battles of great
violence.
Maj. Gen. Harry W. O. Kinnard's 1st Cavalry Division (Air-
mobile), stationed at Camp Radcliff outside An Khe, was or-
dered to clear four important valleys located along the coastal
plains of northeastern Binh Dinh Province. Reinforced by the
ARVN Airborne Brigade, 22d ARVN Division, and the 1st Reg-
iment of the Korean Capital Division, Col. Harold G. Moore
Jr.'s 3d Brigade entered combat there on January 25. It was
followed by the 2d and, later, 1st brigades. On February 4, Op-
eration MASHER was redubbed WHITE WING to mollify
President Johnson's concern over public opinion. Militarily it
would become known as the Bong Son campaign.
For forty-two days the First Team division hopped across
110 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
the mountain ridges crowding the South China Sea, the waves
of helicopters depositing battalions of cavalrymen into sandy for-
tified villages and lush, verdant jungle strongholds. In marginal
weather typified by driving rain, skirmishes abounded, and the
2d VC and 18th and 22d NVA Regiments fought with determi-
nation against the aerial onslaught. Company C of the 2d Bat-
talion, 7th Cavalry, air-assaulted January 28 into a hamlet-stud-
ded landing zone at Phung Du. It was quickly pinned by a vicious
cross fire from a battalion of entrenched Viet Cong, and its sis-
ter company, Company A already decimated by the loss of forty-
two members killed in a C-123 aircraft crash on the operation's
first day at Deo Mang Pass had a hard time getting across an
intervening rice paddy. The next morning both companies had
to be bailed out by the 2d Battalion of the 12th Cavalry. Mas-
sive heavy artillery barrages using delayed fuses and tear gas
were employed to root out such entrenched village defenders.
On the morning of February 15, Company B of the 2d Bat-
talion, 7th Cavalry, encountered opposition along a jungle-banked
stream off the Soui Run River in the Son Long Valley. Two
platoons were rapidly locked in an escalating firefight against
entrenched and well-camouflaged positions. As artillery and aer-
ial bombing runs were directed on the defensive works, the
company's 3d Platoon fixed bayonets and prepared to attack. Just
before noon, as the shuddering echoes of the last bomb explo-
sions reverberated through the battered landscape, the signal
was given and the men stood up and bounded forward. At a
point only forty yards from the VC line they surged together at
a dead run, yelling at the top of their lungs, their bayonets
gleaming starkly in the sunlight. The unnerved Viet Cong broke
and ran into a lethal cross fire laid down by the supporting pla-
toons. Their position was quickly rolled up.
The operation was terminated on March 6, 1966, as the di-
vision completed its full circle of airmobile sweeps around Bong
Son to arrive back in the Cay Giap Mountains. As a grand finale
cavalrymen rappelled on ropes and clambered down Chinook
helicopter-launched Jacob's ladders, dropped through holes
bombed out of the jungle canopy of this suspected mountain
fortress. The NVA had already left the vicinity, but the division
was destined to return several times throughout the year in Op-
THE CENTRAL FRONT 111
erations DAVY CROCKETT, CRAZY HORSE, IRVING, and
THAYER.
The other American formations in the zone, the 3d Brigade
of the 25th Infantry Division at Pleiku and the 1st Brigade of
the 101st Airborne Division near Tuy Hoa, were also active.
The former dallied northwest of Ban Me Thuot in the Darlac
Plains during Operation GARFIELD, instituted shortly after its
arrival in Vietnam, and then struck west toward the Chu Pong
Mountains on the Cambodian border. Already General West-
moreland had requested permission to maneuver troops around
this range and into Cambodia to block escape avenues, but was
refused. Now I Field Force, Vietnam, requested permission again
to employ this option for Operation PAUL REVERE. In view
of State Department sentiments on widening the war, MACV
decided against making a further request to Washington. There
would be no major Cambodian incursions until 1970.
Operation PAUL REVERE was initiated by the brigade on
May 10, 1966, to counter possible NVA offensive activities dur-
ing the southwest monsoon season against Special Forces border
camps at Due Co and Plei Me, It was the first time large Amer-
ican units had entered the Chu Pong-la Drang River area since
the campaign of 1965. The 1st "Yellow Star' NVA Division was
all around the U.S. forces, but resorted to long-range obser-
vation and light contact. On June 24, the 1st Battalion of the
35th Infantry got into a heavy firefight, but disengaged due to
the proximity of the international border. A platoon of Company
B, of the same battalion, which had been further divided into
patrols, was surrounded and cut up in early July, A mechanized
assault with armored personnel carriers enabled the rest of the
company to combine into one defensive perimeter. Survivors from
both patrols were extracted with help of liberal artillery and air
power. On August 1, the 1st Cavalry Division was called in to
assist and Operation PAUL REVERE II began, later followed
by III and IV.
The elite 1st Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division com-
bined with the tough Korean 2d "Blue Dragon" Marine Brigade
to protect the Tuy Hoa rice plains as the Korean Capital Di-
vision closed its last elements into Qui Nhon. In May, Brig.
Gen. Willard Pearson's paratroopers scoured the vicinity around
112 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
Phan Thiet, but contacts were negligible. Minus a battalion (the
2d of the 327th Infantry operating around Tuy Hoa), the air-
borne brigade was moved west into Kontum Province to begin
Operation HAWTHORNE on June 2. The brigade mission was
to withdraw the Tou Morong Regional Force outpost back to
Dak To.
The separate 24th NVA Regiment had the locality completely
surrounded; a normal pullout was impossible. The 1st Battalion
of the 327th Infantry (Airborne) was helicoptered northeast of
Tou Morong, and the 1st Battalion of the 42d ARVN Regiment
and the 21st ARVN Ranger Battalion fought past moderate re-
sistance by June 6 to rescue the garrison and truck them out.
This left the battalion of the 327th Infantry (Airborne) alone at
the abandoned camp that evening, with a detached company
and artillery battery farther out 2 1/2 miles away in the adjacent
jungle. 6
The detached company was commanded by Capt. William
5. Carpenter, Jr., who in West Point had been an All- American
football player nicknamed the Lonesome End. Beginning on the
evening of June 6, his company was attacked with mortar and
grenade fire, and waves of NVA regulars incessantly stormed his
positions. The situation rapidly worsened and Captain Carpenter
called in air strikes on his positions. Fighter-bombers streaked
down to blast the jungle battlefield with rolling, exploding balls
of napalm. Americans and North Vietnamese alike were singed
and burned in the blazing inferno, but the NVA assault was
defeated, By 8:45 on the morning of June 7, the NVA had pulled
back. 7
The rest of the 1st Battalion of the 327th Infantry (Airborne)
6. The 327th Infantry (Airborne) was the "Bastogne Bulldogs," a title officially
bestowed by the Army in recognition of its defense of the encircled town of
Bastogne during the German Ardennes counteroffensive in December 1944.
It was considered one of the finest units in the United States Army. The
327th Infantry had been originally formed for World War I duty in Septem-
ber 1917, at Camp Gordon, Georgia, and served in the St. Mihiel, Meuse-
Argonne, and Lorraine campaigns. It was reorganized in August 1942 as a
glider infantry regiment, and after World War II as a paratrooper unit.
7. Capt. ? William S. Carpenter later received the Distinguished Service Cross,
America's second-highest award for valor, for his heroism.
THE CENTRAL FRONT 113
formed two columns and plunged into the twisted jungle to cut
through to the isolated company. Immediately they ran into well-
entrenched NVA soldiers. The 2d Battalion of the 502d Infantry
(Airborne), in reserve at Dak To, was air-assaulted to the north
and closed into the battlefield. To ensure better odds against
the North Vietnamese regiment, the 1st Battalion of the 5th
Cavalry and a provisional brigade paratrooper company were in-
serted into the action, as well as a rifle company from the 2d
Battalion, 327th Infantry (Airborne), flown in from Tuy Hoa.
Unrelenting combat continued against the tropical earthworks as
the combined forces hacked through tangled undergrowth to take
out NVA strong-points one at a time. A total of 463 air strikes
were delivered around the clock.
Trimming safety margins to a bare minimum, thirty-six stra-
tegic B-52 bombing sorties were used. On June 13, the brigade
dumped nine hundred CS gas grenades in the center of one
North Vietnamese Army position. Then, for twenty-seven min-
utes B-52 bombers pounded the target with high explosive bombs,
which shook the entire jungle with their earth-shattering deto-
nations. Within thirty minutes after the last bomb fell, the bri-
gade was on top of the NVA lines and finished the killing task
with rifles and axes. On June 20, 1966, as NVA resistance crum-
bled and the regiment withdrew, Operation HAWTHORNE was
ended.
The 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Brigade, then turned its at-
tention to coastal Phu Yen Province, securing the Vung Ro Bay
vicinity during August and guarding the rice harvest around Tuy
Hoa that September. Labeled Operations JOHN PAUL JONES
and SEWARD, respectively, the latter would be marked by an-
other company mishap. Operation SEWARD was typified by
saturation patrolling through the mountainous jungles, rolling
hills, sandy beaches, and rice paddies, and a lot of stay-behind
night ambushing. On the night of September 17, the command
post of Company B, 2d Battalion, 327th Infantry (Airborne) was
suddenly overwhelmed by a surprise attack from an estimated
VC company and overrun. Among the dead were the company
commander, executive officer, and artillery observation officer.
Maj. Gen. John Norton took over the 1st Cavalry Division
on May 6, 1966, as Operation DAVY CROCKETT was under-
114 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
way. It recombed the same area near Bong Son fought over in
earlier Operation MASHER/WHITE WING. Again the NVA and
VC offered resolute resistance, often entrenched or firing out of
large, hardened clay anthills. This operation terminated May 16.
The day previous, a local CIDG patrol had ambushed a Viet
Cong mortar team, discovering plans for an attack against their
Vinh Thanh Special Forces camp. Under threatening storm clouds
the next day, the 2d Battalion of the 8th Cavalry air-assaulted
its Company B into a patch of elephant grass on the highest
nearby mountain. As it walked the ridgeline, the forward pla-
toon suddenly had a squad overrun, and the company was rap-
idly engulfed in combat. Operation CRAZY HORSE had begun.
Capt. John D. Coleman's command group of Company B
was also under fire as he tried to deploy more men to assist 3d
Platoon, which was now in full retreat. Dead and wounded were
all over the place, and local counterattacks to retrieve them were
defeated by concentrated automatic weapons fire. A heavy
downpour washed out the horizon, but two helicopters of the
division's 2d Battalion, 20th Artillery, edged up the side of the
mountain and discharged volleys of rockets just yards from the
trapped company's collapsed perimeter. That broke the attack
long enough for sister Company A to reach them after nightfall.
Early next morning the position was blasted with recoilless rifle
and grenade fire, and for two hours ground assaults closed the
weakening lines. Only the approach of a relief column from
Company C saved the force from ultimate annihilation.
The 1st Cavalry Division had entered the most difficult ter-
rain in the province. Steep forest-cloaked mountains peaked to
razor-backed summits three thousand feet above sea level. Heli-
copter landing zones were often suitable for only one craft at a
time, and descents through the triple-canopy jungle resembled
sudden elevator drops to the cavalrymen. Many insertions were
made using Chinook helicopter Jacob's ladders. The big prob-
lem was determining how long such operations were beneficial.
Though it was obvious the Viet Cong were there, the division
would shut down the operation on June 5. Moving on to Kon-
tum and Phu Yen Provinces, it would leave Binh Dinh Province
until fall.
On September 18, the 1st Cavalry Division returned to Binh
THE CENTRAL FRONT 115
Dinh Province. It commenced activities there in Operations
THAYER I and II, and IRVING. The latter was aimed at clear-
ing out the Phu Cat Mountain area, and the THAYER series
kept pressure on the 5th NVA Division. These operations would
continue to spark heavy combat in Binh Dinh Province through-
out the rest of 1966. One of the fiercest battles occurred when
the 22d NVA Regiment nearly overran the 1st Cavalry Division's
Landing Zone Bird on December 27.
Landing Zone Bird was established as an artillery support
site southwest of Bong Son. It contained two howitzer batteries
and a depleted company of infantry recovering from intense pre-
Christmas combat. 8 The uneasy Christmas Truce of December
24-26 was spent with the knowledge that the NVA was planning
something for immediately after the truce, and both batteries
had been warned of impending attack. As a result, December
26 had been spent firing blindly at the surrounding palm trees
in an effort to break up possible troop concentrations.
The North Vietnamese soldiers crawled up to edge of the
landing zone's perimeter by evading two outposts, slicing the
thin wires leading to command-detonated claymore mines, and
silently defusing trip flares. At one o'clock on the rainy morning
of December 27, they surged forward with fixed bayonets as a
concentrated mortar barrage smothered the American positions
under the swift impact of multiple explosions. The NVA quickly
overran the cavalry lines and charged into the gun positions,
where combat was hand-to-hand. Several howitzer crews were
overpowered making last stands around their weapons, and the
defenders were forced back to final defensive positions around
the three remaining howitzers. At that point a battery executive
officer fired two Beehive rounds point-blank into a dense throng
of NVA preparing to charge. 9 That stopped the assault, and the
North Vietnamese retreated as helicopters arrived overhead and
began dropping flares.
8. Units stationed at LZ Bird were Battery C, 6th Battalion, 16th Artillery
(155mm); Battery B, 2d Battalion, 19th Artillery (105mm), and Company C,
1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry.
9. The Beehive was a 105mm shell composed of 8,500 steel flechettes. De-
signed after the Korean War to stop massed infantry assaults, its powerful
burst maimed and killed in a most devastating manner.
116 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
The action had lasted one hour, but LZ Bird was in sham-
bles and losses had been severe. While all three units were later
presented the Presidential Unit Citation in light of the remark-
able valor displayed against overwhelming odds, larger ques-
tions of adequate security and preparation remained unsettled.
The American Army ended its 1966 campaign on a somber note,
and similar incidents continued to plague its performance for
the duration of the Vietnam War. Military laxity and combat
inexperience, the latter a product of the one-year tour policy,
continued to invite surprise attack. In many such cases, total
disaster was only averted by superior artillery munitions and
readily available air support.
CHAPTER 8.
THE NORTHERN FRONT
1. The Marine Offensive
The Marine 1966 campaign was centered around the defense of
the three northern I Corps Tactical Zone base enclaves of Chu
Lai; Phu Bai, outside Hue; and Da Nang. The Marines were
also actively engaged in combat operations in Quang Ngai Prov-
ince just south of Chu Lai and, as more reinforcements arrived
during the year, guarding the Demilitarized Zone in upper Quang
Tri Province against North Vietnamese Army units moving south
across the border. During the year the security of the Marine
zone would be jeopardized by a large South Vietnamese upris-
ing in I Corps Tactical Zone against the Saigon regime, and the
loss of key Special Forces camps on the western frontier.
The Marines initiated the campaign from its Chu Lai base
enclave, which was garrisoned by two reinforced regiments, the
4th Marines and the 7th Marines. The area surrounding Chu
Lai was a Viet Cong stronghold and contained at least two North
Vietnamese Army divisions, the 2d, to the west, and the 3d, to
the south. The Marines assembled a three-battalion amphibious
strike force to move into Quang Ngai Province just below Chti
Lai in conjunction with the 2d ARVN Division. The operation
was coded DOUBLE EAGLE. It was to be launched as part of
MACV's converging efforts to entrap large NVA and VC forces
in a vise between the Marines and the ongoing Army 1st Cav-
alry Division/22d ARVN Division operations in the next prov-
ince to the south, Binh Dinh.
117
118 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
The battle started on the Marine front on January 10. The
1st Force Reconnaissance Company, searching the extremely
rugged western portion of the upcoming operational area, fought
a savage jungle action on Hill 829. As a result DOUBLE EA-
GLE was launched on the sullen, rainy, overcast day of January
28, Landing craft buffeted by heavy seas unloaded two Marine
battalions on the rocky sand coast at Thach Tru, twenty miles
south of Quang Ngai. Huge bow-doored LST landing ships nosed
onto the beach in worsening weather as amtracs and dozers,
half-buried by mounds of sand, struggled to discharge their cargo.
Two days later the Marine Special Landing Force battalion was
helicoptered off the rolling decks of the USS Vattey Forge (LPH-
8) into an old French fort five miles west of the beaches. 1
The Marines moved inland through punji-filled gullies and
steep forested slopes, their rain ponchos draped over flak vests.
The operation was hampered by foul weather, which prohibited
the widespread use of helicopters until it cleared toward the
end of February. The ponchos disappeared. Sleeves were rolled
up and extra canteens were strapped onto web belts. The Ma-
rines then split into helicopter search teams, which bounded
from hilltop to hilltop, striking deep into suspected Viet Cong
regions of southeastern Quang Ngai Province. Sniper fire was
intermittent as the Marines toiled up grassy knolls, bent under
the weight of mortar baseplates and tubes, recoilless rifles, and
ammunition shells strapped to their packboards. At the begin-
ning of March, after weeks of frustrating searches and few solid
contacts, DOUBLE EAGLE was terminated.
The Marine enclave at Da Nang had been heavily mortared
at the end of January. The Marines stationed at Phu Bai saw
hard fighting barely a month later. A composite Marine battal-
ion known as Task Unit Hotel (built around the 2d Battalion,
1st Marines) had been formed there as a special reserve for the
1. In the early years of Marine involvement in Vietnam, battalions from dif-
ferent regiments were often put together in composite task forces. The sea-
landed battalions were the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, and the 2d Battalion,
4th Marines. The 2d Battalion, 3d Marines, was serving as the Special Land-
ing Force. Part of a fourth Marine battalion, the 2d Battalion of the 9th Ma-
rines, was moved in to search B-52 bomber strike areas after the weather
cleared several days later.
THE NORTHERN FRONT 119
1st ARVN Division in nearby Hue. On the evening of its ac-
tivation, the division had scrambled the unit into an emergency
night heliborne air assault on an objective that proved deserted.
In less than twenty-four hours, on the night of February 27, the
South Vietnamese were calling again for its immediate employ-
ment. A battalion of the 3d ARVN Regiment was in the thick
of battle with the 810th VC Battalion on "pacified" Phu Thu
Peninsula, just outside Phu Bai, and needed help. The Marines,
tired and hungry, had just returned to their base when they
were alerted for a second night air assault. They wearily shuffled
back to their helicopters, silhouetted in the glare of airfield
floodlights. The mechanical birds lifted vertically into the dark-
ness and then set down just two miles away under the illumi-
nation of multicolored flares. Operation NEW YORK was on.
It was two o'clock in the morning of February 28 as the
Marines arrived on the battlefield. The South Vietnamese troops
stepped aside; they were assigned blocking positions. The three
Marine companies formed up in one frontal skirmish line and
began moving across the peninsula's powdery sand, sparse grass,
and pine barrens. The Marines on the right began taking sniper
fire, which was mixed with a rising crescendo of mortars, ma-
chine guns, and rocket grenades. The Viet Cong, who were dug
into strong defensive positions, held their fire until Marine squads
had advanced nearly on top of them. Then they cut loose with
a heavy dosage of bullets and grenades that sent the exhausted
Marines into the dirt. The depleted groups of Marines returned
fire, called in artillery and fighter-bombers, and slowly crawled
forward to clean out the opposing weapons nests.
Bunker after bunker was methodically assaulted. The ex-
pertly camouflaged, earth-level logworks were arranged in a maze
of mutually supporting positions, which often caught advancing
Marines in lethal cross fires. The Marines discovered the bunk-
ers extended to a depth equal to the length of two football fields.
As the artificially lighted night faded into a murky, smoking dawn,
the VC battalion withdrew. The operation dwindled to sporadic
contacts as the peninsula was searched for another week.
The Marines began encountering North Vietnamese Army
infantrymen in early March south of the Chu Lai base. Several
Marine battalions were air-assaulted into Operation UTAH,
120 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
northwest of Quang Ngai city, after South Vietnamese para-
troopers had helicoptered into a hot landing zone brisk with ma-
chine-gun fire on March 4. More Marine and ARVN reinforce-
ments finally forced the 36th NVA Regiment to retreat after a
hard two-day battle. 2
Another battle, Operation TEXAS, was triggered on March
19 in the same area when the 1st VC Regiment attacked the
South Vietnamese Regional Force outpost of An Hoa, just fif-
teen miles south of Chu Lai. Marine helicopters became in-
volved immediately, delivering ARVN reinforcements and evac-
uating wounded. By evening it appeared doubtful that An Hoa
could hold through the night. Nevertheless, plans were made
to reinforce the garrison with Marines and paratroopers at first
light, After dawn on March 20, the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines,
and the 5th ARVN Airborne Battalion were landed and went
into action. When the Viet Cong started withdrawing, the 2d
Battalion of the 4th Marines was quickly helicoptered south of
the fort to intercept, The VC were sandwiched between the al-
lied units and largely decimated in the ensuing battle.
2. Trouble in I Corps Tactical Zone
The mobile Marine success in rapidly eliminating NVA/VC
threats against vital areas on the northern front was countered
by two crises in early spring. The most serious was caused by
the South Vietnamese and imperiled all American efforts in the
northern five provinces.
In April 1966, political violence and civil disorders erupted
in Hue and Da Nang due to Premier Ky's dismissal of Major
General Thi, the result of severely strained relations between
Saigon and I Corps Tactical Zone. Near the large Marine bases
there were riots, demonstrations, and confrontations between
Vietnamese that verged on combat. Not far distant, South Viet-
namese regular military units refused orders and exchanged fire
with other South Vietnamese Army units. The 1st ARVN Di-
vision, long considered the second-best division in Saigon's in-
2. Marines engaged, in order of insertion, were the 2d Battalion, 7th Ma-
rines; 3d Battalion, 1st Marines; 2d Battalion, 4th Marines; 1st Battalion, 7th
Marines; and a company of 2d Battalion, 7th Marines.
THE NORTHERN FRONT 121
ventory (the Americans judged the ARVN Airborne Division as
first), declared itself in sympathy with the antigovernment
"struggle forces." To their shock and dismay, all United States
advisors were pulled out. The division was out of the war for
the time being. Divided South Vietnamese forces made moves
and countermoves in the Da Nang vicinity. There was deep
concern over the worsening situation at the highest levels in
Washington.
On April 9, South Vietnamese planes struck a dissident
mechanized column moving toward Da Nang. This reckless act
infuriated the Americans; the vital United States military facility
was surrounded by anti-Saigon ARVN troops. The Marines insis-
ted that the airfield not be used for such purposes, and the
South Vietnamese Air Force resentfully consented. Meanwhile,
the mechanized column was blocked from moving its 155mm
howitzers within range of the Da Nang air base by a Marine
truck deliberately blocking the bridge. The South Vietnamese
gunners broke out ammunition and started fusing rounds. Their
commander, Col. Dam Quang Yeu, was told that if he fired on
the airfield, he would endanger American lives and Marine ar-
tillery would fire on his artillery. By that time Marine rounds
had been chambered and Marine F-8 Crusader jets were flying
overhead. Colonel Yeu, a Harvard-educated officer very con-
versant in English, threatened to fire. Marine Captain Reckew-
ell replied, "I'll see those 155s and raise you two F-8s." After
about an hour the Vietnamese leveled two howitzers at the truck
blocking the bridge instead. The Marines then aimed the re-
coilless rifles of two Ontos vehicles at the howitzers. After a
brief but tense period, the ARVN gunners elevated their tubes.
The incident was over.
The political turmoil continued to affect adversely all Marine
operations throughout the next three months. The Marines took
an active part in defusing a number of potential flash points as
the troubled weeks continued. Ammunition dumps and bridges
became scenes of standoffs which were only settled by Marine
intervention. During the March-June crisis, the Marines evac-
uated American civilians once from Da Nang and twice from
Hue.
Heavy street fighting costing hundreds of lives erupted in
122 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
Da Nang on May 12, That same day the new III MAF com-
mand headquarters was hit by eight South Vietnamese mortar
rounds, wounding eight Marines. On May 21, the building was
"accidentally" strafed by South Vietnamese aircraft. Six days later
the United States Consulate in Hue was sacked and burned.
These events proved to be the high-water marks of outward anti-
American activity, and by June 19, continued organized resis-
tance to the Saigon regime had collapsed.
The North Vietnamese also forced the abandonment of sev-
eral Army Special Forces camps along the western border, and
wrested control of the A Shau Valley from the allies. Although
the Marines initially considered this setback an "Army prob-
lem," the NVA developed the remote region into an important
staging base for strong incursions into the populated cities of I
Corps Tactical Zone. MACV never regained control over the
valley and in later years had to resort to massive raids contin-
gent on favorable weather. Some of these became milestone hat-
ties of the Vietnam War.
The isolated A Shau Army Special Forces border surveil-
lance camp was located two miles from Laos, in the southwest-
ern corner of Thua Thien Province, It sat astride three major
NVA infiltration routes leading east into the A Shau and A Loui
valleys. The only inhabitants in the region were highly secretive
and hostile Katu tribesmen. Tbe camp and its Operations De-
tachment A-102 had always been in imminent danger. The South
Vietnamese LLDB had already abandoned two nearby camps at
A Loui and Ta Bat on December 8, 1965.
The A Shau Special Forces camp was surrounded by old
minefields, long since overgrown by the dense, eight- and twelve-
foot high elephant grass that covered the entire valley floor. Steep
jungle-covered mountains towered above to disappear into a vault
of rain-swollen clouds, the parting storms of the monsoon sea-
son. The camp was shrouded by thick ground fog in the morn-
ings. Patrols and overflights detected increasing NVA buildup
around the site, and the camp commander, Capt. John D. Blair
IV, requested reinforcements. 5th Special Forces Group (Air-
borne) headquarters at Nha Trang dispatched a mobile strike
force company, which was flown into the compound on March 7.
THE NORTHERN FRONT 123
With them Captain Blair had exactly 434 people. 3
In the morning darkness of March 9, just before 4 A.M., the
carnp was blanketed by a heavy and accurate mortar barrage
which lasted for two and a half hours. The Special Forces team
house, supply area, and water supply were blown to pieces.
Communication was temporarily lost. Casualties had been heavy;
a quick count tallied ten dead, including two Special Forces ser-
geants, and forty-seven wounded. Two companies of North Viet-
namese regulars stormed the south wall a half hour after the
mortaring started, but they had been quickly repulsed by heavy
machine-gun fire. Sniper and mortar fire continued through the
gloomy daylight.
Since A Shau was beyond the range of friendly artillery, the
camp defenders had to rely on air support. Heavy antiaircraft
fire and marginal visibility made this extremely difficult, An Air
Force AC-47 "Puff the Magic Dragon" fire support plane was
shot down in flames that day. Two light observation planes man-
aged to fly through the low cloud ceiling to attempt an emer-
gency ammunition resupply and medical evacuation. They took
intense ground fire and were only able to get one wounded master
sergeant out. Two UH-34 Marine helicopters also got into the
camp, but one was hit in the oil line and crashed. The other
Marine helicopter picked up the downed crew and managed to
whisk them away to safety. Three resupply drops were made by
CV-2 Caribou aircraft, but the parachutes drifted both inside
and outside the camp. Recovery parties, braving constant au-
tomatic weapons fire, were only able to retrieve part of the pre-
cious water and ammunition that had fallen beyond the wire.
Just before dark an Air Force CH-3 helicopter lifted out twenty-
six more wounded.
The overcast night sky of March 10 was lit by continuous
flares. Then, at four o'clock in the morning the camp received
another pasting from extremely accurate mortar and close-in
3. The camp defense strength was 17 Army Special Forces members, 51 ci-
vilians, 6 LLDB, 7 interpreters, 143 indigenous Mike Force, and 210 CIDG.
Of this total, 172 would be known dead, 248 missing or presumed dead, and
the rest wounded. As the Katu tribesmen were all Viet Cong, Captain Blair's
CIDG company members were not natives of the area.
124 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
57mm recoilless rifle fire. Most structures were leveled, and over
half the defenders' mortars and machine guns were knocked out.
One hour later, a massive NVA ground assault swept across the
runway and onto the east wall. The south wall was hit at the
same time, Many CIDG company irregulars manning the south-
east corner of the perimeter suddenly turned their weapons on
their Special Forces sergeants and other camp defenders. The
Americans and Mike Force soldiers made a fighting withdrawal
to the north wall and communications bunker, a hard three-hour
struggle in which they fought hand to hand against both North
Vietnamese regulars and former Vietnamese comrades.
Armed with machine guns, M16 rifles, and two mortars, the
camp survivors defeated another mass attack on the bunker that
came at 8:30 A.M. Captain Blair was forced to request bombing
and strafing of the entire camp, including the American bunk-
ered strong-point. Although a heavy volume of ground and mor-
tar fire continued to blast the remaining Special Forces portion
of the compound, the ground attacks stopped. The Special Forces
and Mike Force soldiers then made several local counterattacks
to regain the southern wall but were defeated. By afternoon it
was apparent the camp was lost. The cornered defenders not
only lacked the ability to retake lost areas, but their very sur-
vival was questionable. They had been without sleep, food, or
water for thirty-six hours, and their ammunition was about out.
At three o'clock that afternoon Captain Blair decided A Shau
would have to be abandoned. Marine helicopters made a har-
rowing rescue approach underneath the cloud bank and im-
mediately came under intense ground fire. Two helicopters were
shot out of the sky, and twenty-one of the twenty-four others
were so badly shot up they later had to be scrapped.
An ugly episode awaited them on the ground. The South
Vietnamese panicked, dropped their weapons, and stormed the
descending helicopters, trampling over the wounded. The hys-
terical pack of Vietnamese reached the craft and started clawing
and shoving among themselves to get on. One wounded Amer-
ican was yanked out of a helicopter and thrown to the ground.
The Special Forces began clubbing them with rifle butts in or-
der to restore order. Finally both Army Special Forces and Ma-
rine crewmen began firing into the mob. Sixty men were evac-
THE NORTHERN FRONT 125
uated that day, including seven downed Marine airmen and one
Special Forces defender.
The next morning the Marine helicopters returned to lift out
more of the camp personnel. Another panic-stricken South Viet-
namese dash ensued. It ended when one of them pitched a gre-
nade into a mass of struggling fellow soldiers, killing ten in the
explosion. By March 12, the rescue mission was over, having
taken out 186, mostly wounded, defenders. Marine helicopters
scouring the camp and vicinity for another few days could not
locate any further survivors.
3. Guarding the DMZ
The Marines were soon forced to focus attention on the crit-
ical military situation developing along the Demilitarized Zone.
In July the 324B NVA Division moved across the Ben Hai River
into Quang Tri, the northernmost province of South Vietnam.
The thrust of Marine combat activity now shifted from the
southern tip of Quang Ngai Province north to the DMZ almost
250 miles away. Guarding this region would become a prime
Marine mission, with large conventional formations confronting
each other in reference to a fixed battle line. During 1966 the
Marines resorted to mobile fire brigade tactics, sending units
into action in response to specific intrusions.
Both Quang Tri and Thua Thien provinces had been watched
closely by the Marines for over a year. Rumors of large North
Vietnamese Army formations infiltrating across the Demilitar-
ized Zone had always been rampant, but evidence was lacking.
Aft er W eeks of combat scouting by the 3d Reconnaissance Bat-
talion, intelligence and captured documents confirmed the ac-
tual presence of the NVA division. The Marines established a
large forward base at Dong Ha on Route 9 and then helicop-
tered forces into Cam Lo, near the seven-hundred-foot pinnacle
of the Rock Pile. Six Marine and five ARVN battalions were
propelled by sea and air into Operation HASTINGS, the largest
combined offensive of the Vietnam War up to that time.
Inside the twin-rotored Marine CH-46 helicopters approach-
ing the Ngan River, rows of Marines adjusted helmet chin straps
and equipment belts, and rechecked watches. They were from
126 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
the 2d and 3d Battalions of the 4th Marines. 4 It was nearly eight
o'clock in the morning on July 15. Preceding them, Marine
F-4 Phantom and A-4 Skyhawk aircraft made their final napalm
bombing and strafing runs over the landing zones.
The helicopters began descending into the Ngan Valley. As
they set down, two collided, their blades spinning off to slice
Marines in half as they scrambled out. Another helicopter
smashed into a tree and yet another was suddenly flamed by
ground fire, The place was christened Helicopter Valley. The
3d Battalion pushed slowly through dense jungle and elephant
grass in the sweltering tropical humidity. Company K was re-
pulsed assaulting across the Song Be River, surrounded during
the night and hit hard by repeated NVA ground assaults. For
two days the two battalions relied on close Marine air strikes as
heavy combat continued.
On the afternoon of July 28, the Marines were leaving the
valley. Foxholes had been filled in. Engineers, protected by
Company K, were preparing to blow up the downed helicop-
ters. Suddenly, after a brief but furious mortar barrage, a massed
one thousand-man NVA human wave assault hit the Marines.
Bugles rang through the air as hundreds of soldiers charged for-
ward, Company K machine gunners and riflemen fired as fast
as they could. The Marines could see banners falling above the
tall grass as North Vietnamese flag bearers ran into the hail of
bullets.
Suddenly the khaki-clothed NVA infantrymen were in the
Marine lines. Groups of bypassed Marines fell back in fire-team
clusters that blazed a bloody pathway through swarms of NVA
4. The 4th Marines were known as the China Marines, one of America's most
colorful regiments, Formed in response to the 1914 Mexican Revolution, the
4th Marine Regiment had been hurled into the Dominican Republic Civil
War and then used as a special western U.S. Mail Guard force during the
robbery epidemic of 1926. It was sent to Shanghai, China, the next year
where it served until November 1941, becoming forever linked with guard
duty at the American settlement and along the international barricades. The
regiment was lost soon afterward at Bataan as Japanese forces captured the
Philippine Islands. Reraised from the crack 1st Raider Regiment in February
1944, the 4th Marines stormed Guam and fought on Okinawa. The regiment
had been stationed at Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii, for ten years previous to its
arrival in Vietnam in 1965.
THE NORTHERN FRONT 127
regulars, cutting down North Vietnamese officers who were
blowing whistles and shouting orders. Company K bayoneted,
clubbed, and shot its way back while carrying its wounded. Ma-
rine dead had to be left where they fell. Company L doubled
back to provide covering fire from high ground. The Marines
called in artillery fire and directed napalm as close as fifty feet
away to drive the NVA off. After a four-hour battle the rear
guard Marines managed to retreat and join the two-battalion pe-
rimeter of the 4th Marines. Helicopter Valley was abandoned.
After the battle of July 28, the operation continued in a se-
ries of hill fights and smaller skirmishes. Three more Marine
battalions had reinforced the battleground, while the Seventh
Fleet Special Landing Force secured the eastern seaward flank. 5
All these battalions saw considerable action, and HASTINGS was
ended on August 3 as further contacts with the 324B NVA Di-
vision faded out. Three Marine battalions remained in the area
to guard against reentry, and the North Vietnamese division at-
tacked again. The battle went into a second round, which the
Marines named Operation PRAIRIE.
As action intensified in early September, the Marines added
a fourth battalion to the PRAIRIE forces, increased their re-
connaissance efforts, and again requested that the east flank be
secured by amphibious assault. On September 16, 1966, the
Special Landing Force, the 1st Battalion of the 26th Marines,
reinforced by the 3d Reconnaissance Battalion, made heavy con-
tact after coming ashore. The battle raged for seven days in the
Cua Viet River valley just south of the DMZ. North Vietnamese
Army fortifications, consisting of covered trenches, bunkers, and
tunnels, were reduced by ground assault; air, artillery, and na-
val gunfire; and direct fire from tanks. On one occasion three
Marine companies launched a coordinated attack under a rolling
barrage to envelop an NVA company. The Special Landing Force
drove the NVA back across the Ben Hai River and the Marines
reembarked on their warships on September 25.
For the other battalions involved in Operation PRAIRIE, the
5. The Special Landing Force, composed of the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines,
landed at Pho Hai. The 1st Marines sent in its 2d Battalion on July 16 and
1st Battalion on July 20. The 1st Battalion, 3d Marines, was committed on
July 22.
128 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
latter half of September would be marked by violent battles
ranging far into central and western Quang Tri, Maneuvering
by helicopter and by foot, the Marines systematically isolated
North Vietnamese groups defending well-prepared strong-points,
One of the fiercest battles was the attack on Nui Cay Tre, de-
fended by elements of the 324B NVA Division. The hill was
nicknamed Mutter's Ridge by the Marines. On September 8,
the 1st Battalion of the 4th Marines had just returned from Dong
Ha to the Rockpile, where it relieved the 2d Battalion, 7th Ma-
rines, on line. On September 15, two of the 4th Marines com-
panies moved out in column toward the ridgeline, with Com-
pany D at the front.
Suddenly an ambush caught Company D halfway through its
file. Men went down in a burst of grenade and automatic weap-
ons fire. Other Marine platoons were shoved desperately into
the fight as Companies B and D formed a defensive circle, dug
in, and tried to carve out a landing zone. Captain McMahon
radioed back, "We have 'em just where we want them, they're
all around us!" The 2d Battalion of the 7th Marines managed to
link up with the two companies on September 18, two and a
half days later.
Mutter's Ridge itself was assaulted on September 22. The
3d Battalion of the 4th Marines was helicoptered in to the east
and struggled for days through dank, vine-tangled triple-canopy
jungle as it approached the heights. Bamboo forests rose to min-
gle with trees eight feet in diameter, forming a solid ceiling of
vegetation, which choked off sunlight. The Marines of point
companies K and L had discarded all equipment except for their
rifle, two canteens, one poncho, and socks stuffed with canned
rations, which were crammed into their pockets. Working their
way up the steep jungled slopes against dogged NVA .rear-guard
resistance, the Marines managed to secure part of the ridge by
September 26.
Company K was counterattacked as it continued the advance
on the morning of September 27. North Vietnamese infantry-
men surged downhill into its lines. The Marines dropped be-
hind bomb-blasted tree trunks, clinging onto branches to keep
from slipping downhill themselves, and opened up at point-blank
range. NVA riflemen tumbled down into the gulleys. Twisted
THE NORTHERN FRONT 129
clumps of scorched foliage broke their fall down the sheer slopes.
Grenades careened down, bouncing madly into the air to spin
into the Marine positions and explode. Machine guns tore splin-
ters out of tattered logs and pitched them through bodies like
wooden stakes. Marines draped with belts of ammunition fed
chains of bullets into their machine guns, which were propped
up at dizzy angles in order to fire uphill. After an hour of hard
fighting the groups of NVA soldiers pulled back to their rein-
forced bunkers, which were built flush into the ground.
Heavy fighting continued for days as the Marines worked
their way up the higher hills composing Mutter's Ridge, using
a wall of advancing artillery to shield their methodical advance.
On October 4, Company M of the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines,
carried the crest of Mutter's Ridge in a sharp fight that ended
at 1:30 that afternoon. The ridge was secured, but Operation
PRAIRIE would continue into 1967.
Marine operations along the Demilitarized Zone in 1966 had
been characterized by a number of small unit engagements, with
occasional large encounters. Well-trained and determined North
Vietnamese regulars were pitted against Marine assault troops
in locked combat. In each case the Marines had sent their NVA
opponents retreating north with heavy losses into areas safe from
pursuit. There they regrouped with fresh manpower and equip-
ment before recrossing into South Vietnam. This pattern set the
tone of the DMZ campaign, which would engage the Marines
in continual combat until their departure from Vietnam.
PART
1967
LAOS"
NORTH VIETNAM
3d Marine
Division
Tchepone
Savannhakhet Route 9
Khe Sanh
Con
Thien
DMZ
Dong Ha
Carn^ ^vTham Khe
Lo
1st Cavalry
Division
Ubon
9
3rd Royal Thai
Division
ARVN Rainbow Division
(Airborne)
} Valley
Highway 1 '
LAOS
Saravane
1st Cavalry
Division it-* ^V
Plateau des Bolovens \j
4th Infantry /v
Division MC
Hill 875^
Chu Lai '
Quang Ngai
, Hill 1338
Dak To
CAMBODIA
Nam Sathay River
Se San River
Chu Coungot Chu Yam Mountains
Projected Operations into Laos Due CO
la Drang Valley
KEY TO OPERATIONS
1 - KLAMATH FALLS
2 - FAIRFAX
3 - ALA MOANA
4 - CEDAR FALLS
5 -JUNCTION CITY
6 - ENTERPRISE
7 - SAM HOUSTON
8 - FRANCIS MARION
9 - GREELEY
10 - MACARTHUR
11 -UNION
12 -UNION II
Plateau Gi
Kontum
Plei Djereng
Pleiku
la Muer Valley
CAMBODIA ) SOUTH VIETNAM
Tuy Hoa (
War Zone C
Iron Triangle
Dong
SXoai
13-MALHEUR
14-PERSHING
e*;
Song Be
War Zone D
Highway 1
/PhuocVinh|
Highway 1
scale miles
Q Saigon
Map by Shelby L. Stanton
South Vietnam - 1967
CHAPTER 9.
THE YEAR OF THE BIG
BATTLES
1. 1967 Command Performance
The new year arrived on a rising flood tide of American ground
forces that had already tasted blood in the limited country-wide
battles of 1966. These had culminated in the multibrigade No-
vember confrontation in Tay Ninh Province during Operation
ATTLEBORO. MACV already visualized that engagement as
providing the key to large-scale destruction of North Vietnamese
Army and Viet Cong main force units, and forged jumbo op-
erational plans as the dominant pattern of strategy for the up-
coming year.
After a decade of military advisors to South Vietnam la-
menting the absence of "just one good American battalion" dur-
ing a multitude of preintervention battles between the ARVN
and VC, General Westmoreland now had seven United States
divisions, two paratrooper and two light infantry brigades, one
armored cavalry regiment, and a reinforced Special Forces group. 1
Two and a half Korean divisions and one mixed Australian-New
1. The U.S. 1st and 3d Marine, 1st Cavalry, 1st, 4th, 9th, and 25th Infantry
Divisions, the 1st Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division and the 173d Air-
borne Brigade, the 196th and 199th Infantry Brigades (Light), the llth Ar-
mored Cavalry Regiment, and the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne).
133
134 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
Zealand force added another excellent boost in combat power. 2
The burgeoning South Vietnamese forces included eleven divi-
sions, a number of separate units, and a welter of territorial
forces, police forces, and the like. 3 He hoped to fuse this poly-
glot military command into a blade honed to a fighting edge of
American units. The very design of the MACV shoulder patch,
which consisted of a white-bladed sword thrusting upwards
through a red field to pierce a yellow wall, incorporated this
symbolism. 4 General Westmoreland confidently looked forward
to wielding this multitudinous force to open Highway 1, cam-
paign along Vietnam's borders, neutralize War Zone C, disrupt
War Zone D, eradicate the Iron Triangle, force NVA and main
force VC contingents away from populated areas "into a vul-
nerable posture," and police the South Vietnamese population.
1967 would be the year of the big battles.
II Field Force Vietnam, the headquarters with geographical
responsibility for that slice of country including the targeted war
zones and triangle area, planned to begin with a major excursion
into War Zone C. After some last-minute wrangling over ob-
jective areas, and against the advice of his 1st Infantry Division
commander, Lieutenant General Jonathan O. Seaman substi-
tuted a preliminary thrust into the Iron Triangle January 8-26.
Dubbed Operation CEDAR FALLS, it represented the first
corps-sized American mission of the war as well as the first ma-
2. The Korean Capital and 9th Infantry divisions and 2d Marine Brigade, and
the 1st Australian Task Force with a New Zealand artillery battery.
3. The South Vietnamese regular military in July 1967 consisted of the Air-
borne, 1st, 2d, 5th, 7th, 9th, 18th, 21st, 22d, 23d, and 25th Divisions, 42d
Infantry Regiment (detached) and 51st Infantry Regiment (separate), Marine
Brigade (six marine and one artillery battalions), Palace Guard (Brigade), 1st-
10th Armored Cavalry Groups (redesignated from squadrons May 1 but still
battalion-sized), twenty ranger battalions (llth, 21st-23d, 30th-39th, 41st-
44th, 51st, 52d), six separate artillery battalions (34th-39th), and the LLDB
Command,
4. The pattern and colors of the MACV command insignia had been carefully
chosen. They also reflected early American military sentiments; the impli-
cations of "red" communist hordes and the "y e U w> ' wall of China being bla-
tantly represented,
THE YEAR OF THE BIG BATTLES 135
jor combined U.S.-ARVN operation involving formal planning. 5
While defoliants, bombings, and land-clearing Rome Plow doz-
ers carved an extensive network of pioneer approaches for fu-
ture area access, this ephemeral foray was insufficient to jeop-
ardize continued Viet Cong utilization.
Operation JUNCTION CITY, the move against War Zone C,
was supposed to follow immediately on the heels of Operation
CEDAR FALLS, but got off a month late. Finally begun on
February 22, it was planned to remedy the deficiencies of its
predecessor. To eliminate a repetition of the Viet Cong escape
apparently managed through the cordon around the Iron Tri-
angle, South Vietnamese presence was reduced (only four ARVN
battalions being trusted to participate). To ensure more lasting
and destructive results, it became a far larger and more ambi-
tious search and destroy operation, lasting a quarter of the year.
The militarily successful results of JUNCTION CITY had
disturbing long-range strategic consequences. Aware that the in-
violability of their base areas in South Vietnam had evaporated,
the main force Viet Cong began moving their supply depots and
headquarters into adjacent Cambodian sanctuaries. Instead of
pushing the NVA/VC into the "vulnerable posture," as MACV
had envisioned, the 9th VC Division had simply been pushed
into Cambodia, where it was immune to any attack whatsoever.
It joined the NVA division base areas already firmly entrenched
along the Laotian and Cambodian sides of the Vietnamese bor-
der, where refurbishment could be effected unimpeded.
Rules of engagement for Cambodia and Laos remained strin-
gent. While the Pentagon gave MACV permission to fire artil-
lery against valid military targets inside Laos beginning Feb-
ruary 23, only in emergency situations requiring force preservation
could U.S. troops maneuver into these nations, and no Cam-
bodian village or populated area could be attacked regardless.
Both during and after the Vietnam War some senior officers
felt that MACV should have been allowed the strategic ability
5. South Vietnamese participation in CEDAR FALLS consisted of the 1st
Airborne Brigade, elements of the 5th Division's 7th and 8th Regiments, and
one ranger battalion.
136 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
to pursue opposing conventional forces to their destruction, pre-
venting their reappearance on South Vietnamese territory. Un-
der the circumstances MACV remained hopelessly mired in a
defensive campaign with the negative aim of wearing the NVA
and main force VC units down through attrition. The larger pa-
rameters of the conflict had been fixed by American govern-
mental policy, and the United States military was limited to a
ground war within the geographical boundaries of South Viet-
nam until 1970. 6
Plans for sealing South Vietnam off from northern attack al-
together had been in the works for years, as well as various
plans for far-reaching ground operations into adjoining coun-
tries. In 1966 General Westmoreland had considered planting
the 1st Cavalry Division on the Bolovens Plateau of Laos for a
drive north toward Saravane and then on to Savannhakhet, while
the 3d Marine Division headed due west along Highway 9 into
Tchepone (the later route of the ill-fated ARVN drive into Laos
during Operation LAMSON 719 in 1971), and the 4th Infantry
Division and an ARVN division pushed into Laos from Pleiku
and the A Shau Valley. On October 27, he began forming the
reinforced ARVN "Rainbow Division," based on a nucleus of the
ARVN Airborne Division, for employment against Laos in case
permission was granted for a South Vietnamese incursion with
the change of presidential administrations foreseen in 1968. An-
other contingency plan was produced for a Laotian invasion in-
volving a Thai division from the west and two ARVN divisions
and one U.S. division from the east. All these plans came to
naught, until the 1970s.
6. Larger strategic questions are considered from a military standpoint by
Gen. Dave Richard Palmer, Summons of the Trumpet, Presidio Press, No-
vato, California, 1978; and Col. Harry G. Summers, Jr., On Strategy: A Crit-
ical Analysis of the Vietnam War, Presidio Press, Novato, California, 1982.
An interesting theoretical military solution to the war proposed by Gen. Bruce
Palmer, Jr., former deputy commander of U.S. Army, Vietnam, is presented
on p. 76 of the latter work. It proposed a tactical offensive along the DMZ
across Laos to tie into U.S. positions in Thailand, thus isolating South Viet-
nam from NVA intrusion. This was claimed as possible without mobilizing
reserves or invading North Vietnam, thus avoiding the risk of Chinese in-
tervention. The logistical reality of this plan and whether it would have en-
tailed indefinite American defensive presence, as still exists on the Korean
DMZ thirty years after that war, are not discussed.
THE YEAR OF THE BIG BATTLES 137
Although the United States was unable to follow retreating
or staging North Vietnamese forces into neighboring lands, nei-
ther could the NVA or VC divisions remain indefinitely in other
countries if victory was to be pursued inside South Vietnam. In
this manner MACVs powerful army well endowed with the
wings of airmobility became committed to ranging throughout
the country in an effort to defeat the NVA/VC wherever their
forces could be found.
The general MACV doctrine of employment tied American
divisions and brigades to specific geographical areas inside South
Vietnam, which were called tactical areas of responsibility.
Whenever a major operation such as JUNCTION CITY packed
several of these formations into a given locality, especially for
any duration, it drew them away from their normal assignments
and exacerbated difficulties elsewhere. 7 An expanded war of big
battalions seeking out NVA divisions inside South Vietnam re-
quired exploiting forces of tremendous flexibility, which could
respond and "pile on" top of contacts. As 1967 began there was
only one airmobile division capable of delivering such concen-
trated punch, the 1st Cavalry Division, Although envisioned as
a country-wide exploiting force, the deteriorating situation around
Khe Sanh had forced its deployment north beginning in Octo-
ber. The commander of MACV wanted a second airmobile di-
vision to back it up.
2. A Matter of Muscle
Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara still favored forming
a second airmobile division either by converting the remainder
of the 101st Airborne Division at Fort Campbell, Kentucky (its
1st Brigade was already in Vietnam), converting an infantry di-
vision in Vietnam, or bringing together three infantry brigades
there. On April 18, 1967, General Westmoreland decided against
converting the 9th Infantry Division, preferring to make a tri-
phibian division out of it (consisting of one brigade of three riv-
erine battalions, one brigade of two mechanized battalions, and
7. The MACV formula for neutralization of war zones required massing 25-
30 battalions in "sustained operations/' but competing requirements for avail-
able units did not permit long-term operations of such magnitude.
138 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
one brigade of four airmobile-capable infantry battalions). The
101st was selected to be this second airmobile division but lack
of aviation resources postponed the full transition until July of
1969, by which time the war in Vietnam had regressed to en-
clave security.
As 1967 began, the III Marine Amphibious Force had its 3d
Marine Division around Phu Bai and the 1st Marine Division
divided between Da Nang and Chu Lai. The Korean 2d Marine
Brigade had been moved to III MAP control on September 1,
1966, and was presently reinforcing the Chu Lai sector. As more
Army forces were moved into the southern portion of I Corps
Tactical Zone the Marines concentrated their forces in the
northernmost three provinces for the DMZ campaign.
The Pacific command reserve in the western Pacific con-
sisted of the two Special Landing Forces of the 7th Fleet. Each
was composed of a Marine Battalion Landing Team and a Ma-
rine helicopter squadron, and their versatile striking power had
been used to conduct forty-four amphibious landings along the
South Vietnamese coast by the end of September 1967. How-
ever, the Special Landing Forces were also charged with main-
taining the ability to respond to contingencies anywhere in the
western Pacific Ocean area. After a special landing force am-
phibiously assaulted Vietnam and completed its mission there,
it would return to sea and resume its readiness posture.
The 26th Regimental Landing Team from Camp Pendleton
and Twenty-Nine Palms, California, had reconstituted the two-
battalion 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade at Okinawa in this sta-
tus on August 21, 1966. This also enabled resumption of the
intratheater battalion rotation system. In April of 1967 its bat-
talions were directed to Vietnam. To provide a controlling reg-
imental headquarters, the headquarters of the 26th Marines was
airlifted to Da Nang on April 25 and attached to the 3d Marine
Division the next day. On May 16, 1967, it was announced that
the Marine intratheater battalion rotation system was again sus-
pended.
To further facilitate Marine buildup along the DMZ, in April
the Army formed Task Force Oregon to secure the southern
portion of I Corps Tactical Zone. However, this stripped the
Army of its II CTZ mobile fire brigade, the 1st Brigade of the
THE YEAR OF THE BIG BATTLES 139
101st Airborne Division. General Westmoreland dispatched the
173d Airborne Brigade to Pleiku on May 24 to fill its place, with
the understanding that it could not be committed to action with-
out his permission. That came soon enough, and the 173d would
be consumed in the frightful Battles of the Highlands and Dak
To before the year was out.
In the meantime the Army was still experiencing great dif-
ficulty in prying soldiers out of rear echelons and replacing losses
in line units. A MACV survey of its divisions found each com-
fortably above authorized strength but the number of foxhole
infantry in combat companies at critically low levels. The 1st
Cavalry Division's 920-man battalions were commonly fielding
less than 550 men, and rifle companies were persistently short
at least a third of their allowances.
The South Vietnamese Army was plagued with grave deser-
tion and leadership problems, but the massive introduction of
American troops and material was shoring up belief in ultimate
victory. As a result its forces began to exhibit better battlefield
performances, and by May of 1967 U.S. advisors were rating
148 out of 153 battalions as combat-effective. During that month
the 2d ARVN Ranger Group conducted an airmobile operation
deep into the rugged jungles of central Vietnam, a feat U.S.
advisors considered an impossibility just six months earlier.
In the fall, the 1st ARVN Division's 2d Regiment was re-
trained to take over a portion of the DMZ defensive line. Far-
ther south in Phuoc Long Province, the 3d Battalion of the 9th
ARVN Regiment successfully staved off a midnight attack by the
88th NVA Regiment at Song Be on October 27. Two days later
half of Loc Ninh fell, but reinforcements from the previously
lackluster 5th ARVN Division managed to pin the Viet Cong in
close combat. The 1st Infantry Division was called in and bat-
tled through adjacent plantations and dense scrub brush, where
the soldiers of "The Big Red One" defeated the VC several days
later.
In Vietnam's delta region, the 21st ARVN Division launched
an attack up the Kinh O Mon Canal near Vi Thanh in Chuong
Thien Province on December 8. Supported by Air Force AC-
47 Spooky gunships and plenty of artillery, the division and its
attached 42d, 43d, and 44th ARVN Ranger Battalions distin-
140 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
guished themselves in a spectacular battle. As a result MACV
decided to reward them with special recognition they would
receive priority on issuance of the M16 rifle.
3. The 101st Airborne Division Flies In
As 1967 came to a close, General Westmoreland, very op-
timistic about the war's progress, became concerned about the
possibility of an extended holiday moratorium over the 1968 New
Year which might result in an agreement between North Viet-
nam and the United States freezing force levels. Before he left
in November for a public relations pitch in the United States,
he wanted the 101st Airborne Division's deployment to Vietnam
accelerated. On October 21, McNamara approved special aerial
flights to get the rest of the division in country as fast as pos-
sible.
Maj. Gen. Olinto M. Barsantfs 101st Airborne Division had
been originally scheduled for departure to Vietnam in June of
1968. Located on the rugged post of Fort Campbell, Kentucky,
five miles north of Clarksville, Tennessee, on the state line, it
had fielded a brigade in Vietnam since July 1965. The 101st
Airborne Division enjoyed a glorious heritage of tough para-
trooper action on the battlefields of France and Germany in World
War II, as well as a close personal connection with General
Westmoreland, who had commanded the division in 1958. The
division insignia consisted of the famous Screaming Eagle shield,
over which a black tab was arched with AIRBORNE lettered in
gold.
When Barsanti received notification on August 2 that the en-
tire division would go over, the 101st was hardly more than a
cadre-level nucleus feeding replacements to Vietnam-based par-
achutist brigades. It was located on two separate areas of Fort
Campbell. Just to fill its two remaining brigades to 75 percent
strength would require more than forty-five hundred men. The
bulk of enlisted filler personnel would have to come from reg-
ular Third Army assets; there was no way to get more para-
troopers. A series of dispatches kept moving up the division's
deployment date, compressing an already tight schedule.
The battalions were filling up quite unevenly. There was
considerable noncooperation from other commands tasked to send
THE YEAR OF THE BIG BATTLES 141
personnel to help fill the 'division. More last-minute frustration
resulted when the Army suddenly levied the division for 450
emergency paratrooper replacements for the 173d Airborne Bri-
gade. These were urgently needed due to that unit's losses in
the Battle of Dak To. The division was unable to meet its pro-
jected deployment strength, but it was going anyway.
MACV meanwhile had tasked the 1st Infantry Division as
its sponsor. The lead brigade of the 101st Airborne Division into
Vietnam was planned to go to Phuoc Vinh, and the second to
arrive would go to Dong Xoai. However, the 1st Infantry Di-
vision couldn't open the road between the two towns. It was
decided to switch the 2d Brigade to Bien Hoa, and truck it to
Cu Chi for in-country training there instead. In view of the
changes, Major General Barsanti now wanted his projected com-
mand post location changed to Bien Hoa. When the last troop-
crammed planes arrived on December 19, 1967, the division
was scattered from Bien Hoa to Phuoc Vinh to Cu Chi, while
its 1st Brigade was off on Operation KLAMATH FALLS in Binh
Thuan and Lam Dong provinces a hundred miles away.
CHAPTER 10.
BATTLE FOR THE
SAIGON APPROACHES
1. Saigon Defense and "Iron Triangle" Attack
The 199th Infantry "Redcatchers" Brigade began patrolling the
villages and hamlets around Saigon during January 1967, Small-
scale airmobility and river transport gave the brigade ability to
seal off villages and search them, sweep around the flat coun-
tryside, and check roads and waterways. However, the brigade
activities were often typified by nothing bigger than extensive
night ambushing. The emphasis was on magic words such as
"revolutionary development" and "pacification," techniques more
suited for the South Vietnamese government than for American
combat units designed to combat the North Vietnamese Army
and main force Viet Cong. The smattering of ARVN airborne,
marine, and ranger battalions in the area were tasked to help
out. This assistance was given another fancy catchword, "the
double force," which meant that for every U.S. unit engaged in
operations, a similiar-sized ARVN unit was also supposed to be
shouldering the load.
The 5th ARVN Ranger Group was given new M16 rifles and
American food, promised a lot of help from artillery and aircraft,
and shoved outside the city gates. The whole thing was called
Operation FAIRFAX, and it lasted throughout the year, phasing
in the South Vietnamese as the primary participants that No-
142
BATTLE FOR THE SAIGON APPROACHES 143
vember. The first test came soon enough. On the night of May
14, a battalion command post of the 50th ARVN Regiment was
overrun by the Viet Cong. The 3d Battalion of the 7th Infantry
had to conduct an airmobile assault to retake the compound.
The resulting "battle" lasted for the next two days, netting a
total of twelve VC killed, Things were so shaky that a combined
force had to be inserted into Tan Binh during a bold night air-
mobile operation on May 20 to protect the western approaches
to the sprawling Tan Son Nhut Air Base. From May 24 to 28
these forces searched through the pineapple area of western Binh
Chanh, destroying empty bunkers and killing less than a dozen
Viet Cong. An antisampan offensive was conducted next.
The brigade found the duty routine, the results elusive, and
any surprises invariably unpleasant. On the afternoon of August
7, Company E from the 4th Battalion of the 12th Infantry, and
a 30th ARVN Ranger Battalion company, jointly air-assaulted into
Nhi Binh in the Hoc Mon district. Upon landing, they were hit
by rifle and automatic weapons fire from a Viet Cong company
of the 2d Local Force Battalion concealed in bunkers and spider
holes around the landing zone. The VC concentrated their fire
on the hovering helicopters, damaging seventeen and destroying
two. Each battalion sent in reinforcements, which reached the
area that evening. Brigade companies ended up spending six
days clearing out a forty-man VC contingent. In this slow and
imperturbable manner the 199th Infantry Brigade continued its
operations outside Saigon. The lethargic pace was one the at-
tached ARVN forces could keep up with, and on September 24
the brigade parted ways with the 5th ARVN Ranger Group and
each returned to independent sweeps. On December 14, the
South ^Vietnamese took over responsibility completely.
The 199th Infantry Brigade's joint 1967 effort with the ARVN
Rangers was one of the earliest experiments in what was to be-
come known two years later as Vietnamization. The brigade's
dual task, training South Vietnamese soldiers to defend Saigon
and ferreting the Viet Cong out of densely populated areas with-
out undue civilian damage, all under the immediate command
scrutiny of MACV, was immensely difficult. The brigade must
be given due credit for good performance under such trying cir-
cumstances. However, the main objective enabling the South
144 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
Vietnamese to defend their own capital was never attained,
General Westmoreland was in too much of a hurry to get the
199th out of the camera s eye so that he could claim the 5th
ARVN Ranger Group responsible for Saigon defense. Only one
month after the 199th left the South Vietnamese totally in charge,
Saigon was subjected to major Viet Cong infiltration and attack
during Tet-68. Unfortunately, MACV never learned from this
early failure at putting the ARVN forces in charge of their own
territory. Later the same inadequate combat familiarization cycles,
teaming up other American formations with counterpart ARVN
units, were repeated in rushed programs aimed at token satis-
faction of political pressure to "Vietnamize" the war.
The 25th Infantry Division was busy trying to keep the Viet
Cong away from the rice-producing areas adjacent to the "Ho
Bo" and Boi Loi Woods, an operation begun on the first of De-
cember, 1966, and coded ALA MOANA in fitting tribute to the
Tropic Lightning Division's Hawaiian home. By the first of the
year, the action had shifted to Due Hoa in Hau Nghia Province.
On February 26, its 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry, and the divi-
sional reconnaissance squadron, the 3d Squadron of the 4th
Cavalry, ran into a tough fight in the Filhol Rubber Plantation.
However, larger events in the area would soon overshadow these
events.
General Westmoreland was going after bigger game. Two
Army divisions, one infantry and one paratrooper brigade, and
one armored cavalry regiment prepared to assault the fortified
Viet Cong sanctuary known as the Iron Triangle. Located fairly
close to Saigon itself, this sixty square-mile chunk of territory
was interspersed with dense forests and wet, open rice lands.
The area had been dominated by the Viet Cong since anyone
could remember, and previous efforts to uproot them had failed.
This time it was determined that systematic destruction of
everything in the Iron Triangle might do the trick. The entire
civilian populatioh was to be evacuated, and twenty thousand
air-dropped leaflets advised them to leave.
The "Iron Triangle" was generally bounded by the winding
Saigon River, Thanh Dien Forest of Binh Duong Province, and
the Song Thi Thinh River. The plan was to move the 25th In-
fantry Division and 196th Infantry Brigade against the Saigon
BATTLE FOR THE SAIGON APPROACHES 145
River to form an anvil. The 1st Infantry Division, 173d Airborne
Brigade, and the llth Armored Cavalry Regiment would then
crash right through the Iron Triangle from its eastern side, split-
ting it in two, and hammer the enemy against the anvil. The
operation was dubbed CEDAR FALLS, The 9th Viet Cong Di-
vision simply eluded the area during the mass American sweep,
rather than get hammered against anything. However, several
significant underground complexes they left behind were un-
covered.
The weather was most favorable in January. For four days
Air Force B-52 bombers devastated the region. On January 8,
twenty battalions moved into the Iron Triangle. Operation CE-
DAR FALLS had begun. The elite paratroopers of the 173d Air-
borne Brigade and the famed 3d "Iron Brigade" of the 1st In-
fantry Division spearheaded the drive, looking for action. The
key Viet Cong fortified village of Ben Sue was the first target.
In the darkness of early morning, January 8, a sergeant from
the 1st Aviation Battalion stood on die Dau Tieng airstrip, armed
with an oversized flashlight and two baton lights. He waved his
beacons and directed the landing, loading, and lift-out of sixty
troop-packed helicopters and their ten armed gunship escorts.
In an airmobile move timed to the second, he safely got all of
them into the air by 7:25 A.M. With twenty minutes allocated
to form two giant V formations, each containing three flights of
ten helicopters, pilots jockeyed their craft over, under, and be-
tween the other ships. The helicopters were less than fifty feet
apart. Then the massed flight headed toward Ben Sue.
The helicopters, loaded with soldiers of Lt. Col. Alexander
M. Haig's 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry, roared over the forests
at treetop level. Skipping the usual preparatory bombardment
to achieve surprise, they landed in the midst of the village and
cordoned it off The Viet Cong were too stunned to react, though
the unit suffered losses from sniper fire and minefields. A thor-
ough search of the hamlet uncovered a massive supply complex.
Three levels of carefully concealed storage rooms were discov-
ered under some houses. Chinook helicopters and South Viet-
namese patrol boats dragged the six thousand villagers away,
and the 1st Engineer Battalion bulldozed their dwellings into
the ground. Viet Cong continued to pop out of the tunnel net-
146 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
works and were taken prisoner. The first objective of Operation
CEDAR FALLS had been accomplished Ben Sue haid ceased
to exist.
The rest of the 1st and 25th infantry divisions sealed off the
other legs of the Iron Triangle. Then the armored personnel
carriers and tanks of the llth Armored Cavalry Regiraeirt plunged
west from Ben Cat; the hammer had swung into acti on. They
were beefed up by advancing paratroopers of the 173d Airborne
Brigade, one company of which was riding captured VC bicycles
found in a cache. Both within the Iron Triangle and on its fringes,
soldiers of most participating units were stumbling across in-
creasing amounts of stored supplies, base complexes, and tun-
nels. Numerous small skirmishes ensued. The 25th Infantry Di-
vision swept along the Saigon River, pushing dowsa Lts waters
in open boats. They probed darkened shores with sesarchlights
and raked riverbanks with machine-gun fire.
On January 19, along the banks of the Rach Son stream near
a rubber plantation, soldiers of the 1st Battalion of tLc 5th In-
fantry, 25th Infantry Division, found elaborately camouflaged
tunnel openings. 1 The battalion formed "tunnel rat" teams to
investigate. These tunnel soldiers carried silencer-equipped .38-
caliber pistols to clear out any remaining Viet Cong, Deep in-
side the tunnels, caverns opened up to reveal rooms for hos-
pitals, mess halls, munitions factories, and living quarters. What
they saw had taken twenty years to build. It was part of the
Viet Cong military headquarters controlling activities throughout
a large portion of South Vietnam, including Saigon. StuEJed among
forty pounds of recovered documents and maps were detailed
diagrams of the U.S. billets in the capital. For six day^s the 5th
Infantry soldiers slowly probed the four-level labyrinth of pas-
sages and chambers carved beneath the jungle floor,
1. The 5th Infantry was one of the Army's oldest, dating back to L 608. It was
also one of the Army's most distinguished Indian-fighting regiments. It had
escorted the Westward movement from Tippecanoe to Montana, amd the only
Civil War action it saw was in New Mexico. Led by the legendary Col. Nel-
son A. Miles, and famous for riding captured Indian war horses, the 5th had
racked up glory for its pathfinding ability to track Indians from S ioux to Co-
manches. In Panama from 1939 to 1943, it was trained as a juntgle warfare
regiment before being sent to Europe in World War II. It also served in
Korea. On January 19, it had been in Vietnam exactly one year to the date.
BATTLE FOR THE SAIGON APPROACHES 147
On January 26, Operation CEDAR FALLS was terminated.
The excursion into the Iron Triangle had turned up significant
finds but few Viet Cong. The VC had successfully avoided com-
bat, and would infiltrate back when the soldiers and helicopters
left. The Army wasn't especially worried about that now. With
the large units now at its disposal, a sojourn under the code-
name JUNCTION CITY was planned less than a month away
in another Viet Cong bastion, War Zone C. It was destined to
be one of the largest U.S. operations of the war, and this time
there would be a fight.
2. Into War Zone C
War Zone C occupied a flat and marshy corner of Vietnam
which gradually faded into thin-forested rolling hills as the re-
gion closed the Cambodian border. Heavy jungle prevailed, and
the solitary 3,235 foot-high Nui Ba Den Mountain dominated
the landscape. Like the Iron Triangle, this war zone had been
Viet Cong-controlled since South Vietnam had been formed. The
military hoped a multidivisional pounding would crush War Zone
C as a continued threat, and evolved a complex plan of attack.
Basically, the 25th Infantry Division would block west along the
Cambodian frontier, and the 1st Infantry Division would block
the eastern side of the zone along Route 4. On the first day of
the operation, the 173d Airborne Brigade and a brigade from
the 1st Infantry Division would move to seal off the northern
portion. When all blocking forces were in place, a giant inverted
horseshoe would result. A brigade of the 25th Infantry Division
and the llth Armored Cavalry Regiment would then be "pitched"
into the horseshoe from the south.
During February, the 1st and 25th infantry divisions posi-
tioned themselves along the east and west sides, and on Feb-
ruary 22, Operation JUNCTION CITY began as the north side
was enveloped. Led by Brig. Gen. John R. Deane, Jr., the 173d
Airborne Brigade jumped its 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry (Air-
borne), out of aircraft over Katum, less than seven miles from
Cambodia. Parachutes blossomed under the tropical blue skies
as the troopers glided to earth without incident. It was to be
the only major U.S. Army combat jump of the Vietnam War,
but some saw it as a "glory" exercise in reminiscence of the last
148 THE RISE AND FALL OF ^N AMERICAN ARMY
big jumps in Korea. Although mass parachute landing was still
a viable military doctrine, as the jpostwar Grenada expedition of
1983 demonstrated, airmobility may have sufficed here.
February 22 witnessed one of "the largest mass helicopter lifts
in the history of Army aviation . Over 249 helicopters were used
in the eight battalion-sized airmoTnle assaults required to com-
plete the northern rim of the horseshoe. The rest of the 173d
Airborne Brigade was helicoptered into its preselected landing
zones. At the same time, the^st Brigade of the 1st Infantry
Division was airmobiled in. The troops had already coined a
phrase for the upcoming battles, They called it "Playing horse-
shoes with Charlie."
The next day the 2d Brigade of the 25th Infantry Division
and the llth Armored Cavalry Regiment swept north. Things
started happening on February 28. The 173d Airborne Brigade
discovered the Viet Cong Central Information Office, complete
with an underground photographic laboratory containing 120 reels
of film, stacks of photographs, an<l busts of communist leaders.
Farther south, toward the westermi tip of the horseshoe, the 1st
Battalion of the 16th Infantry tripped into battle off Route 4
near Prek Klok. The outfit was led by Lt. Col. Rufus Lazzell. 2
Capt. Donald S. Ulm's Company B had been moving over thick
deadfall from trees and jungle brush, and was approaching the
Prek Klok stream, when it clashe d with the 2d Battalion, 101st
NVA Regiment. The point platoo was temporarily cut off, and
Company B was engulfed by connbat
As soon as the company started taking concentrated rocket
and machine-gun fire, Captain LJlm called in artillery and air
strikes. The company formed a. circular defensive perimeter. The
fighting was intense. Airdropped cluster bomb units (CRUs) ex-
ploded with terrible effect at treelop level. The blast waves tore
through the woods and toppled rwien and trees. At around mid-
night, after fifty-four Air Force tactical bombing sorties, the Viet
Cong broke off the action. Air power had decided the firelight,
and the Army had employed this support to good effect.
At Prek Klok, the 168th Engineer Battalion was busy con-
2, Lt. Col. Lazzell had been wounded commanding the same battalion in the
July 1966 Battle of Minh Thanh Eoad; see Chapter 7. After recovery in the
United States, he had asked for lis old command back.
BATTLE FOR THE SAIGON APPROACHES 149
structing a future U.S. Army Special Forces camp and an air-
field. The mechanized 2d Battalion of the 2d Infantry protected
the 168th by forming a giant "wagon train" circle out of its ar-
mored personnel carriers, with foxholes in between. On the night
of March 10, after a thirty-minute mortar and recoilless rifle
barrage, a battalion of the 272d VC Regiment attacked the east-
ern half of the perimeter. It was mowed down by crushing re-
turn fire from the heavy vehicle-mounted machine guns, over
five thousand rounds from the 2d Battalion of the 33d Artillery
inside the circle, and a hundred Air Force air strikes. The night
sky was made brilliant by continuous pyrotechnics and bomb
bursts. Helicopters darted in to deliver ammunition and take
out wounded, their landing light beams stabbing through dust
and smoke. At five o'clock the next morning the lopsided battle
.was finally over. Once again the American Army had utilized
its prodigious artillery and aerial resources to ensure absolute
victory on the battlefield.
On March 18, Operation JUNCTION CITY entered a new
phase. The action shifted east with the construction of a new
Special Forces camp northeast of Tay Ninh. The 173d Airborne
Brigade was pulled out, and a brigade of the 9th Infantry Di-
vision was brought in to substitute. All units involved were now
given sectors and began search and destroy operations. The llth
Armored Cavalry Regiment was escorting about two hundred
trucks a day during convoy runs up Route 13 to An Loc. Along
Route 13 a fire base was posted by Troop A of the 3d Squadron,
5th Cavalry, with six tanks and twenty-three armored personnel
carriers.
The 5th Cavalry was known as the "Black Knights," and its
3d Squadron was the 9th Infantry Division's reconnaissance arm.
It had been in Vietnam barely a month, but circular "wagon
wheel" fights were part of its heritage. 3 The 273d VC Regiment
3. The 5th Cavalry was organized in 1855 at Louisville, Kentucky, and it had
charged Longstreet's Confederate lines at Gaines Mill, Virginia, in 1862 a
charge that saved the Union artillery. After the Civil War, the 5th Cavalry
had a most distinguished career in the Indian campaigns, where it fought just
about every tribe from Comanches and Apaches to Cheyennes. It served in
the Philippine Insurrection, participated in the 1916-17 Mexican Expedition,
helped to clear New Guinea and the Philippines in World War II, and had
served in the Korean War.
150 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
initiated its attack on this unit during the night of March 19 in
a bizarre fashion. A wheel-mounted machine gun was rolled down
a stretch of abandoned railroad track near the destroyed village
of Ap Bau Bang. At ten minutes past midnight it furiously opened
fire on the armored cavalry troop.
Tank-mounted searchlights soon pinpointed it and the gun
was blown to pieces. Then a VC ground assault surged forward
and was met with crippling fire from heavy machine guns, mor-
tars, tank cannons, and artillery. However, Viet Cong soldiers
succeeded in swarming in on the 5th Cavalry lines. Armored
personnel carrier crewmen frantically buttoned up their vehicles
as VC infantry swarmed over them. Artillery cannister rounds
were fired directly at the armored vehicles, and dozens of at-
tacking soldiers were blown off the carriers. Foxholes were being
overrun in hand-to-hand combat. Machine guns were being
stripped off wrecked armored personnel carriers, some of which
were now on fire.
Troop A urgently radioed to its sister troops that it needed
help. They crashed past preset ambushes and blasted their way
in to help sustain the shrunken American positions. Eighty-seven
Air Force bombing runs under flareship illumination pounded
the continuous Viet Cong attacks. The 5th Cavalry held their
lines and repulsed the charge. Again, armored personnel car-
riers packed in a tight laager, liberally supported by artillery
and aircraft, had proved their ability to survive in isolated out-
posts.
The foot infantry was having a more difficult time. Near the
center of War Zone C, near Suoi Tre, Fire Support Base Gold
had been established by the 3d Battalion of the 22d Infantry
and the 2d Battalion of the 77th Artillery. On March 19, heli-
copters began to descend into the jungled clearing, which had
been doused with Agent Orange. As they touched down, five
explosive charges tore through the small open area, destroying
three helicopters and badly damaging six others. Strewn through
the smoldering wreckage littering the landing zone were fifteen
dead and twenty-eight badly wounded Americans.
Throughout the rest of the day the 272d VC Regiment con-
tinued to take helicopters under accurate fire. Claymore mines
were set off against the infantrymen as they dug in positions.
BATTLE FOR THE SAIGON APPROACHES 151
Clearly there would be trouble ahead. On the morning of March
21, a small night patrol of the 22d Infantry was returning to the
fire base, when it was overrun by a mass VC attack behind an
advancing mortar barrage which suddenly blanketed the area.
Heavy return fire, air strikes, and artillery failed to stop the
waves of attackers. Company B on the western edge of the pe-
rimeter was overrun, and artillerymen began desperately ram-
ming Beehive flechette canister rounds into their leveled how-
itzer tubes.
Fire Support Base Gold positions caved in under the melee
of close combat. Fighting was conducted with entrenching tools,
chain saws, and bowie knives. The battalion's crucial quad .50-
caliber machine gun was captured. The Viet Cong scrambled to
turn the four-barreled gun around on the surviving American
positions. The artillery crewmen of a remaining howitzer fran-
tically chambered a round to destroy the swiveling multi-bar-
reled machine gun. The howitzer managed to fire first, and the
threatening gun was destroyed. Other howitzers had created a
wall of steel by continuous Beehive discharges, but now the
precious ammunition was suddenly exhausted. The few rounds
of high explosive were being shot off as a final gesture, when
reinforcements suddenly appeared. Soldiers of the 2d Battalion
of the 12th Infantry took up positions alongside them.
The Viet Cong reassembled and counterattacked the new
American force. Disabled VC soldiers were being carried pig-
gyback into the attack, both bearer and rider firing submachine
guns. The situation was again worsening for the defenders when
a second relief force appeared out of the jungle, this time tanks
of the 2d Battalion of the 34th Armor escorted by an entire
battalion of mechanized infantry in armored personnel carriers.
At 10:45 that morning the battle was ended.
The final large engagement of Operation JUNCTION CITY
was fought on March 31 between Lt. Col. Alexander M. Haig's
1st Battalion of the 26th Infantry, and the combined 271st VC
Regiment and 1st Battalion, 70th VC Guards Regiment. On March
26, under threatening storm clouds, Haig's infantrymen had air-
landed in the tall, meadowlike grass near the Cambodian bor-
der. Signs were found nailed to trees, with warnings in English
not to venture out. Even though they were deep in War Zone
152 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
C, they had obviously been expected. The battalion would shortly
see one of its most violent actions in Vietnam as a result of
relentless pursuit of the enemy. 4
On March 31, the soldiers set out from LZ George to sweep
their assigned area. At noon the battalion's reconnaissance pla-
toon was hit hard, resulting in the loss of the platoon lieutenant,
and everything started becoming unglued. Americans had learned
by now not to advance without a shield of artillery and aerial
support all around them, but due to lack of control, Company
B ran off to assist without proper preparatory fires. Lieutenant
Colonel Haig wasn't aware of the extent of Company B's actions
until he was aloft in a helicopter, Company B was pinned and
unable to move, under intense fire and low on ammunition and
its wounded commander was in shock. Haig was forced to land
in its midst and take over the battle personally and managed to
avert disaster.
Company A was directed in to extract its sister company from
the rapidly worsening firefight, By five o'clock the two compa-
nies were able to break contact and retreat back to the perim-
eter. In the meantime the landing zone had been reinforced by
another battalion, the 1st Battalion of the 16th Infantry. In the
morning darkness of April 1, a mortar barrage heralded a mass
Viet Cong assault on the American lines. Rushing through a hail
of bullets and artillery explosions, the VC quickly engaged the
infantrymen in close combat. Air Force strikes loosing antiper-
sonnel bomblets and napalm, artillery and mortar supporting fires,
and helicopter minigun fire enabled the perimeter to defeat the
attackers soundly.
In mid-April the big-battalion phase of Operation JUNC-
TION CITY ended. A third phase was tacked on, in which a
"floating brigade" composed of a mechanized battalion of the
4. The 26th Infantry was one of those Army units formed at the turn of the
century, which had picked up most of its heritage from World War I. The
insignia of the regiment was dominated by a giant Mohawk arrowhead se-
lected by its World War I commander, Col. Hamilton A. Smith, to indicate
tne regimental spirit of courage, resourcefulness, and relentless pursuit of the
enemy, Colonel Smith was killed shortly afterwards, leading the regiment in
the farst great offensive in which it took part. It later served in World War
11, and had been in Vietnam since October of 1965.
BATTLE FOR THE SAIGON APPROACHES 153
25th Infantry Division combined with an ARVN battalion would
rove throughout War Zone C. For the next month constant
sweeps revealed only . empty countryside, and the operation was
terminated on May 14. The 196th Infantry Brigade, which had
originally been intended to garrison War Zone C, had been sent
north to bolster military efforts in I Corps Tactical Zone.
Operation JUNCTION CITY remained a hallmark of the
Vietnam War. The multidivisional attack was destined to be the
apex of Army efforts in III Corps Tactical Zone in 1967. Al-
though War Zone C was not neutralized, three regiments of the
9th VC Division had been temporarily shattered. Corps-sized
Army forces had demonstrated their ability to mass and use great
mobility in tackling any area of Vietnam. However, due to later
enclave and pacification strategies, the mobile shock power of
such a colossal effort was rarely repeated.
The 25th Infantry Division kept pressure going to the north-
west of Saigon throughout the rest of the year in a series of
operations that were insignificant in contacts produced, but were
marked by extensive jungle-clearing efforts. On December 8,
the major strength of the division was committed through Op-
eration YELLOWSTONE back into War Zone C. Through the
end of 1967, this operation was marked by frequent Viet Cong
mortar attacks but light ground action. However, it did prove
that War Zone C was still being used as a major VC logistical
base.
3. Enterprising in Long An Province
The 39th Infantry arrived in Vietnam in January 1967 as part
of another massive dose of American power injected into South
Vietnam: the 9th Infantry Division. The regiment took its motto
and most of its history from service to France. 5 This French
connection remained unbroken as it entered a country French
interests had shaped, and it prepared to take up the fight against
an old French enemy.
5. The 39th Infantry regimental motto was D'une Vaillance Admirable (With
a Military Courage Worthy of Admiration). Five French Croix de Guerre dec-
orations for heroic action had been bestowed on the 39th from the Maine
front of World War I to Cherence le Roussel in World War II. It had been
formed in June 1917 at Syracuse, New York.
154 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
When its 3d Battalion slipped into Long An Province to the
south of Saigon during February as the first 9th Division force
to dwell there, the area was undisputed Viet Cong territory. As
soon as the Americans planted their flag at Rach Kien they came
under harassing fire, and any platoon or company that moved
350 yards outside the camp could count on a good-sized fight.
The 3d Brigade of the 9th Infantry Division was colocated there,
while the division's mechanized 2d Battalion of the 60th Infantry
was stationed at Binh Phuoc. A long-term operation labeled EN-
TERPRISE was initiated by these elements on February 13, 1967,
to clear Long An Province. During April 9-11, the 3d Battalion
of the 39th Infantry was airlifted into battle just outside Rach
Kien, coming under heavy fire from the 506th VC Battalion upon
touchdown at the landing zone. The 2d Squadron, 10th ARVN
Cavalry, and two battalions of the 60th Infantry were tossed into
this battle along the Rach Dia River. Rapid shifting of forces in
lightning airmobile assaults kept the Viet Cong off balance.
Company-sized sweeps were executed for three days, but the
VC managed to escape despite considerable loss. Six months of
hard combat in the adjacent countryside may have scattered the
Viet Cong, but it hadn't made a dent in their popularity. They
continued to travel at will, depending on local villagers for in-
formation on U.S. movements. Determined to take a swipe at
these farmer-soldiers who melted into the population every twi-
light, Lieutenant Colonel Anderson of the 3d Battalion, 39th In-
fantry, banded together his most trusted sergeants and formed
a "killer patrol" under Capt. Donald Price.
On August 16, 1967, the battalion's Company A made a large
sweep of the rice paddies around Rach Kien. The patrol clam-
bered into a helicopter and landed in the midst of hundreds of
Company A soldiers at one o'clock that afternoon. Captain Price
picked out positions near a suspect cluster of huts and old bunk-
ers near the thickly vegetated Rach Doi Ma River. The men of
the patrol sweated through the afternoon preparing hidden po-
sitions, stringing wires for their claymore mines through the
bushes, and covering up their gear. Meanwhile, the other sol-
diers made a lot of noise and tramped all over the place like a
herd of elephants. The plan was simple but the risk was great.
When Company A left for the night it was hoped nobody would
BATTLE FOR THE SAIGON APPROACHES 155
notice six men left behind and dug into a perfectly camouflaged
ambush site.
At six o'clock that evening six men and women began work-
ing the rice paddies, a signal to the Viet Cong that everything
was safe. An hour later eight VC ambled around them, and shortly
afterward two more entered the area and one of them stayed.
He was armed with an M79 grenade launcher. Crossing the log
bridge, he squatted on the far bank and looked right at Captain
Price and his patrol sergeant, who were standing in the corner
of a hut. Already it was fairly dark. They nervously exchanged
stares, but the Viet Cong couldn't figure out who was there. A
minute later he rose and, keeping his weapon ready, walked
into their hut and squatted down in the far corner. Although
Captain Price had his M16 rifle beside him, he didn't reach for
it for fear the Viet Cong would fire first. He was counting on
his sergeant, who had his AR15 rifle in his hands, to shoot the
intruder. However, the patrol sergeant was shaking so badly when
the VC came in that he didn't know what to do.
Suddenly the Viet Cong realized who the strangers were and
with lightning speed fired a grenade at them and bolted for the
door. The 40mm round bounced off the sergeant's leg and cut
through the wall of the hut without exploding, since it never
had time to arm. 6 The sergeant leaped behind the running VC
and shot him twice in the back. The enemy soldier fell, mortally
wounded, and the two men dragged him back into another cor-
ner.
Another team member who heard the gunfire had the sick-
ening feeling his comrades had been hit. He was in the middle
of tall grass and very nervous. When they had set up in the
daylight he had been confident. After dark the whole thing looked
different, and he wasn't sure he could see everything necessary.
After getting no response to several whispered calls he crawled
over to talk to the patrol sergeant and then went back to his
own position. Everybody was now set for more Viet Cong, and
fifteen minutes later two came down the eastern dike. Captain
6. The American 40mm grenade round was deliberately set to arm at a cer-
tain distance from the launcher, a result of early Vietnam experiences with
rounds that bounced off trees and flipped back into Army positions during
close jungle righting.
156 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
Price had claymore mines set in position to kill them, but never
triggered the electrical devices because he was hoping the VC
would enter the main hut. There he had planted a GI rucksack
and several Playboy magazines as bait, and he was hoping they
would call in more of their friends.
The two Viet Cong walked right past the hut and the patrol's
lieutenant spotted them next, fifteen yards from his own posi-
tion. He could see their faces clearly in the moonlight. He picked
up his .45-caliber automatic pistol and followed them for five
feet. Then he thought to himself, "Naw, I can't hit the broad
side of a barn with a AS." So he turned around, picked up his
M16 rifle, and followed them another five feet until he realized
they were entering another claymore mine killing zone. He
dropped back and in the dark had to guess when to fire his
mines. He set off the device but they had stepped off the dike.
The explosion dazed and wounded them, but both were able to
run away.
The explosion apparently discouraged any more Viet Cong
activity in the area that night. The patrol members quietly lis-
tened to the familiar night noises of the delta frogs croaking,
crickets, and rats moving about in the rice paddies. That morn-
ing the patrol laid out their one kill and rifled through his pock-
ets. The wallet had pictures of his friends, a girl, and a certif-
icate honoring him for killing nine American soldiers. When the
patrol sergeant was later asked if he thought the killer patrol
tactic was valid, he could only quip, "I hope so; it took a lot
out of me."
The 3d Battalion of the 39th Infantry continued its partici-
pation in Operation ENTERPRISE, though contact with the Viet
Cong was to remain at a low level throughout the year. As their
French associates had already experienced, time ran out for the
men of the 9th Infantry Division long before a war of attrition
could ever pay dividends.
CHAPTER 11.
BATTLE FOR THE
HIGHLANDS
1. Western Battles
Major General William R. Peers took command of the 4th In-
fantry Division two days after it had marked its first New Year's
Day in Vietnam. He moved it into the western portion of the
Central Highlands plateau, a dangerous area occupied by both
1st NVA and recently formed 10th NVA Divisions. Tagged as
Operation SAM HOUSTON, two infantry brigades would be
pushed into the steep-walled valleys and rugged jungles falling
off the Chaine Annamitique mountain spine which marked the
Cambodian border,
The 4th Infantry Division was one of those divisions that
mirrored the distinctive slogan officially bestowed upon it. The
motto, Steadfast and Loyal, reflected the division's image per-
fectly. It was dignified, traditional, and definitely Regular Army.
Perhaps that was needed in the rough, mountainous western
wilderness of South Vietnam, Anyway, in case more gunslingers
were needed to help out, the paratroopers of the elite 173d Air-
borne Brigade could always be slammed in.
The first phase of the operation was a piece of cake. Con-
ducted over the rolling tropical plains of Pleiku and Kontum
provinces, the only resistance encountered was occasional mor-
taring and road mines. January was spent uncovering tunnel
157
158 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
complexes and fortifications and then demolishing them. Ar-
mored cavalry personnel carriers hauled in captured rice, and
infantrymen spent their time pitching riot-gas grenades into the
mouths of caves. February began with the division dispatching
a tank platoon to Due Co, a Special Forces camp located in the
southern portion of the Kontum plateau astride Highway 19.
There the U.S. Army Special Forces was engaged in a confron-
tation with their South Vietnamese LLDB counterparts inside
the joint compound. Only intervention on February 3 by high-
ranking officers on both sides restored order. However, General
Peers was determined that his "steadfast and loyal" 4th wasn't
going to be a glorified police division. He looked northwest to-
ward the mist-shrouded ridges of the Cambodian border to de-
termine the future axis of advance. In mid-February a brigade
was moved into the heavy jungle west of the Nam Sathay River
to fight the NVA. There the battles that would typify Operation
SAM HOUSTON were decided.
This region contained some of the most difficult tropical ter-
rain in the world, consisting of continuous rain forests with huge
250-foot hardwood trees seven feet in diameter, which crumpled
chain saws and defied small clearing explosives. Where the sun-
light filtered through the canopy of trees, the jungle floor was
covered with dense undergrowth restricting visibility to a matter
of yards and making any movement extremely difficult. Valleys
intersected the area, caged in by jagged mountains rising as far
as six thousand feet above them. Daylight temperatures soared
above 105 degrees, and nighttime temperatures could plunge to
45 degrees. Since it was the end of the dry season there was
very little available water except in the valleys, and the troops
were forced to carry at least a two-day supply with them. Wad-
ing through the seasonably low waters of the Nam Sathay, men
of the division's 12th and 22d Infantry entered NVA territory.
On February 15, soldiers from Company C, 1st Battalion of
the 12th Infantry, began patrolling around their landing zone
across the river. 1 As the men moved outside their new fire base,
A T n 6 J 2 ^ Infa * tr y was a g od A y regiment, forged at the beginning of
M 6 n v ^ ^ here !t f ecured fame durin its first engagement at Gaine's
Mill, Virginia. Twin moline crosses still decorated its insignia, representing
the iron fastening of a millstone and recalling the crushing losses it had sus-
BATTLE FOR THE HIGHLANDS 159
the jungle exploded with intense automatic rifle fire. One squad
was trapped in a ravine and unable to move for an hour. Only
the heroic actions of one wounded private, killed covering the
others, enabled the rest of the squad to rejoin its company.
Dozens of NVA soldiers now charged the surrounded landing
zone. Concentrated rifle fire tore through their ranks. Artillery
and air strikes were called in closer and closer to the belea-
guered defenders, and the attacks were finally beaten back. The
rest of the 12th Infantry's first battalion was now airlifted into
the battle. Helicopters coming in were subjected to murderous
ground fire, but eventually another company was landed. Com-
pany B immediately sallied forward but was hit hard and soon
had two of its own platoons cut off and pinned down.
By late afternoon Company A, accompanied by the battalion
heavy mortars, had been successfully landed. It charged forward
to form a corridor through which Company B could evacuate its
dead and wounded. Fighting was especially fierce in the gath-
ering twilight, and soldiers used knives and entrenching tools
as ammunition supplies ran out. Earth and vegetation was thrown
into the air by blocking fire from the battalion's mortars. By
eight o'clock that night the battered companies had managed to
pull themselves back to the landing zone. To keep the NVA at
bay through the night, the jungle around them was saturated
by artillery and bombing runs.
The next day, in another sector of the battlefield, a platoon
of the 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry, came under enemy fire at noon.
Underestimating the force being engaged, the soldiers returned
fire and began moving forward. In minutes the platoon was being
swept by a storm of bullets and grenade shrapnel. It gathered
in a tight circle and desperately called for artillery, but the thick
morass of twisted jungle made accurate placement impossible.
Charging NVA soldiers were killed in close combat. Only the
efforts of the platoon sergeant, who was slain in the action, saved
the unit from total annihilation. A relieving company was soon
tained that day in June 1862 over 50 percent of its strength. It served in
the Indian Wars, captured the blockhouse at El Caney, Cuba, during the
War with Spain, participated in the Philippine Insurrection, and assaulted
France during D-Day in World War II.
160 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
hard-pressed itself by well-equipped NVA concealed in the jun-
gles. Air strikes were called in so close that deadly fragments
rained down on both sides.
Elsewhere other soldiers, this time from the 22d Infantry,
were moving west. The point squad ran into an NVA unit mov-
ing east. Taking advantage of the extremely dense undergrowth,
the North Vietnamese opened up with a hail of submachine-gun
fire and sent snipers aloft into the trees. Soon the entire com-
pany was taking casualties. The Army had issued the grenadiers
the new dual purpose rifle with grenade launcher located un-
derneath (the XM148), promising the advantages of both meth-
ods of fire. Now they were having great difficulty loading, cock-
ing, and firing the launcher portion. Cursing the loss of the
traditional M79 and its trusted firepower, they were reduced to
ordinary riflemen. Napalm and cluster bomb units shattered the
jungle in front of them, and a relief force was able to link up.
The tempo that dominated the battle for the highlands had been
set.
Every day more soldiers, their torn jungle fatigues frayed
and drenched with salt and sweat, went forward. They were
under constant physical strain and mental pressure, painfully
aware that every step in the jungle could bring death if they
didn't react quickly enough. Individuals were overloaded by
rucksacks crammed with additional ammunition, extra gear, ra-
tions, and water; and survival equipment such 1 as mosquito re-
pellent, head nets, and ponchos. Minimized "essential loads" still
required each soldier to "hump" from forty to sixty pounds. The
constant exertion demanded of troops hacking and moving through
dense jungle day after day exhausted their fighting ability. Search
patterns had fancy military names, "cloverleaf," "starburst," and
"zig-zag," but the infantrymen only cursed as they struggled to
push on ahead and keep within sight of their comrades. To keep
oriented in the deep forests, units were forced to periodically
drop artillery rounds along their route of advance.
Thin olive drab ribbons of men moved like ants, slowly toil-
ing through the natural maze of green jungle. They were care-
fully tracked by NVA reconnaissance teams and trailwatchers,
often moving behind them or in parallel directions. Snipers would
suddenly open fire, the sharp crack of their rifles reverberating
BATTLE FOR THE HIGHLANDS 161
through the foliage. Bursts of submachine-gun fire also sprayed
advancing personnel, dropping key leaders and radiomen. The
soldiers responded with a fusillade of automatic rifle fire and
shotgun canister rounds that tore through the trees. Splintered
branches, leaves, and other debris were hurled through the air.
Such skirmishes could last for hours, caused serious delays, and
often masked larger NVA troop movements.
At the end of each day, the weary, aching soldiers had to
dig in and construct individual shelters consisting of at least one
layer of overhead sandbags to ward off the inevitable nighttime
mortar attacks. Only then could they settle down to a night too
frequently punctuated by the terror-filled cries of "Incoming!"
followed by the crash of dreaded explosions. Deprived of decent
sleep and drained of energy, the soldiers had to move out every
morning. Sergeants maintained brutal pressure to keep their men
combat-ready. Accidents became more frequent, and the haz-
ards of jungle warfare increased. Throughout February, fire-
fights were sudden and unexpected, engulfing units in a whirl-
wind of death and confusion.
The 4th Infantry Division's 1st Brigade was helicoptered into
Plei Djereng, and two full brigades were now committed in the
area. The new brigade assumed responsibility for the lower Plei
Trap and Nam Sathay valleys, while the 2d Brigade pushed far-
ther west toward the Cambodian border. Throughout the rest
of February and March, the American units experienced the most
dreaded pattern of Vietnam jungle marching and fighting. The
North Vietnamese Army regulars would attack moving rifle com-
panies at times and locations of their own choosing. The assault
would close too quickly for the defenders to call in effective
supporting fire. Mortars and snipers would try to drive the sur-
rounded unit into smaller fragments. Invariably, counterattack-
ing the prepared NVA brought intense flanking fire from posi-
tions established in depth to the right and to the left. The entire
2d Battalion of the 35th Infantry was subjected to such an attack
on March 12. Only after dark would the NVA break off the bat-
tle, using short ropes and hooks, if needed, to retrieve their
dead and wounded comrades.
These actions only lasted from one to six hours, but the vi-
olent force of the enemy attack, combined with a feeling of
162 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
claustrophobia resulting from the dense jungle, created an un-
bearably high degree of tension. This strain worsened with prox-
imity to the Cambodian border. Americans found they could no
longer count on massive dosages of firepower to break resis-
tance. As usual, generous use of available artillery and air power
was made, but its effectiveness was diminished by the rugged
terrain. Smoke grenades and flares could not penetrate the tri-
ple-canopy jungle, and units could not be located by aircraft
seeking to deliver supporting ordnance.
Although thirty-one B-52 ARC LIGHT bombing runs were
brought against the NVA, even this formidable weapon failed to
assure results when needed. The NVA knew that a troop safety
distance of three thousand meters was required before the B-
52 bombers could be used, and initiated close-quarters combat
inside these bounds. They also took full advantage of the Cam-
bodian border to rush a few companies into Vietnam, mount
mortar barrages, and get back across. One of the fire bases was
hit by twelve separate mortar attacks in a day and a half, taking
three hundred rounds.
There were so few suitable areas for landing helicopters that
North Vietnamese Army forces could pick them out and prepare
them in advance. Pilots soon expected every landing site to be
"hot and mined." NVA ingenuity was remarkably efficient. One
device had several grenades tied to a ten-foot board with a charge
placed underneath. As the helicopters descended for landing,
the charge would be set off by an observer, tossing the grenades
up to explode in the midst of the aircraft. Strong bunkers were
dug in around the periphery of open areas, ringed by command-
detonated mines. In fact, the jungle was so heavy that a road
had to be constructed westward to establish a series of fire bases
from which operations near the Cambodian border could be
supported. Only the airlifting of D-4B dozers into remote areas
made this effort possible.
From March 16 through the end of the month, both bri-
gades moved back east from their areas west of the Se San River
in the face of continued ambushes and firefights. When they
moved, units habitually left their fire bases cluttered with ac-
cumulated litter ranging from empty ration boxes to shell car-
BATTLE FOR THE HIGHLANDS 163
tridges. NVA forces then entered such areas to clean up the
wealth of material left behind, much of which was put to good
use. All efforts to educate Americans to this fact failed, and de-
serted bases remained piled high with "trash." The military fi-
nally decided to take advantage of it. For the first time, anti-
personnel mines were sewn across selected areas by Air Force
A-1E Skyraiders. Recondo patrols were inserted to report on
the losses the NVA suffered as a consequence of entering the
freshly abandoned fire support sites.
The next major action of the operation erupted when radio
contact with a reconnaissance patrol was lost on March 21, and
the 1st Battalion of the 8th Infantry was sent to search for it
the next day. At 7:30 in the morning Company A, moving in
two columns, suddenly came under intense machine-gun fire.
While trying to maneuver their company, the captain and the
artillery forward observation officer were both blown to pieces
by a direct hit from a B-40 rocket. Without leadership, com-
munications, or the ability to direct supporting artillery fire, the
company broke in two. Men discarded equipment and rucksacks
and fought from separate perimeters.
The company first sergeant raced over to the point of heav-
iest contact and adjusted the lines. He then directed artillery
fire and aircraft by running over to a clearing where he could
be spotted, climbing a tree, and tying an identification panel
from its highest branches. A relief column, composed of Com-
pany B, moved toward them on line, keying on the sound of
battle for direction. Then it too came under attack. It was also
split, but managed to reconsolidate. The NVA eventually left
the field, but losses had been heavy.
The 4th Infantry Division's extra tank battalion, the 1st Bat-
talion of the 69th Armor, was useless in the jungled mountains.
During Operation SAM HOUSTON it was engaged in road se-
curity to keep Highway 19 open. The tanks were also used to
drive cattle from villages to new relocation sites.
The foot soldiers of the 4th Infantry Division were thor-
oughly fatigued. On April 5, Company C of the 3d Battalion,
8th Infantry, was firing mortars when a deflection error sent the
rounds exploding in American positions. Twelve U.S. service-
164 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
men were wounded as a result. Operation SAM HOUSTON was
terminated that midnight. The division's after-action report rue-
fully commented:
The most difficult tactical problem found in fighting the NVA in
large areas of difficult terrain is finding the enemy. That is, find-
ing him without having tactical units shot up and pinned down
by automatic weapons and snipers, also armed with automatic
weapons, at close range.
2. Guarding the Border
With the advent of the summer monsoon season, Major
General Peers nestled two brigades of his depleted 4th Infantry
Division up against the Cambodian border in the flat rolling hills
of western Pleiku Province south of the Se San River, The 1st
Brigade covered the area from Due Co north across forested
plains into the rugged Chu Goungot-Chu Yam massif and Plei
Djereng, while the 2d Brigade worked south of Due Co through
the la Drang Valley. There he hoped to stop the 1st and 10th
NVA Divisions if they tried to push into South Vietnam's west-
ern heartland. This frontier guard duty turned out to be arduous
and costly, but it did stifle NVA attempts to cross large forces
through that particular area during most of 1967.
The 4th Infantry Division relocated in these areas on April
6, 1967, the day after Operation SAM HOUSTON ended. The
new operation was labeled FRANCIS MARION, and before it
ended in October the division would fight eight hard battles. It
must be mentioned that in April many soldiers who had de-
ployed with the division were scheduled to rotate home. Line
companies were fielding less than one hundred men, and almost
all the officers and sergeants were brand new. This would have
considerable impact on combat in the coming months.
Border brushes with NVA recon parties became common in
late April. The 2d Battalion of the 8th Infantry was being mech-
anized that month and was trying out its new armored person-
nel carriers. The 8th Infantry had never been spectacular, but
BATTLE FOR THE HIGHLANDS 165
it enjoyed a reputation for steady dependability. 2 On the last
day of April, Company A got off its tracked vehicles and began
moving slowly along the la Muer River on foot.
Early that morning one of its platoons scattered thirty NVA
by hasty ambush, the stunned North Vietnamese soldiers pick-
ing up their wounded without firing a shot in return* The rest
of the company moved up to destroy an apparently small enemy
patrol on the run. The NVA tried to set up a defense line in
order to treat those injured, but the pursuit was so hot that the
casualties were abandoned. The chase continued toward a tree
line which suddenly spattered the field with machine-gun fire,
pinning two squads in the open. Half the company became en-
gaged in the searing tropical heat, and over three hours were
spent trying to pull back the dehydrated squad members.
After napalm and bombs blistered the tree line, a combined
late afternoon attack was made behind two armored personnel
carriers of the battalion scout platoon. They were almost to the
trees when a volley of automatic weapons fire ripped across the
company front. The soldiers scrambled back as the tracked car-
riers shifted into reverse. They were up against the 2d Battal-
ion, 95B NVA Regiment. All night long, artillery explosions lit
up the forest. Captain William R, Harvey used the darkness to
bring up all his armored personnel carriers, as well as two tanks
from Troop B, 1st Squadron, of the 10th Cavalry.
After intensive air and artillery preparation, the company
moved forward in the morning, passing through the initial am-
bush site of the previous day. Sniper fire erupted over the noise
of diesel engines, and the tanks roared into line beside each
other, their steel tracks tossing back clods of dirt. Two squarish
armored personnel carriers, top-heavy with cupolas and gun-
shields, kept up on the left, and four churned alongside to the
2. The 8th Infantry was organized in Detroit, Michigan, in July 1838 and
served in both Mexican and Civil wars, occupied the Carolinas, and moved
to fight Indians in Arizona during 1872. It invaded Cuba during the war with
Spain, and in June 1913 fought the four-day Battle of Bagsak Mountain on
Jolo Island, Philippines, which ended the long struggle against the fierce Moro
pirates. It assaulted Normandy, France, in World War II and deployed to
Vietnam in August 1966.
166 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
right. One of the carriers threw a track and drunkenly ground
to a stop. Its soldiers scrambled out, quickly dismantled its guns,
locked hatches and doors, and clambered onto other advancing
vehicles.
As the war machines relentlessly neared the tree line, NVA
soldiers raced out to heave grenades under their tracks. The
medium tanks blasted back with powerful 90mm cannister rounds,
throwing out great clouds of smoke-filled death which chopped
through men and shrubbery, Personnel carriers swung their ar-
mored cupolas around to hose clinging NVA soldiers off other
vehicles with machine-gun fire. Resulting sparks flew wildly off
the sides of blood-streaked tank turrets, Tanks looked like iron
beasts emitting electrical discharges in the thick haze of the bat-
tlefield. Their crushing weight beat down the dense under-
growth, and the company drove through the tree line.
The mechanized onslaught carried them into a large bunker
complex. NVA soldiers desperately tried to aim anti tank rock-
ets, but the dense jungle and the flow of battle obstructed their
efforts. Cannister discharges and machine guns swept the foliage
like scythes, and slaughtered gunners were strewn like broken
dolls over unused B-40 rockets. Topside bunkers were blown to
pieces by point-blank cannon fire. The mechanized infantrymen
periodically opened the back doors of their carriers and emerged
to stalk the jungle and grenade remaining lunkers. Mechanized
firepower had given the men of the 8th Infantry a mailed fist.
Its sister 1st Battalion of the 8th Infantry, was normal foot
infantry. On May 18, Company B \vas trudging through the un-
dergrowth of light tropical forest, composed of trees ranging from
fifteen to seventy-five feet in height. A platoon was detached to
check out a well-traveled trail, spotted a lone khaki-clad NVA
soldier, and started pursuit. Lieutenant Allen, the company
commander, radioed the platoon to rejoin him. A "lame duck"
ambush was then triggered by the K4 Battalion, 32 d NVA Reg-
iment between them, and the platoon was trapped. The rest of
Company B was unable to break through to the isolated men.
Seven platoon soldiers ran over to a small creek bed where
all but one were immediately killed by a machine-gun. The NVA
initially tried to overrun the rest of the platoon from the creek,
but were repulsed. Continuous machine-gun fire raked the pinned
BATTLE FOR THE HIGHLANDS 167
men, and the platoon lieutenant, sergeant, and radioman died
in rocket explosions. The NVA then moved across the shattered
platoon in perfect line formation, firing as they advanced. They
stopped at each body, kicked it several times in the back and
ribs, and then searched through clothing and rucksacks. Hands
were stripped of watches and rings. They spent forty minutes
gathering weapons, ammunition, canteens, and other gear. The
only survivors were seven soldiers who played dead or were
unconscious from their wounds. Company B had a total of twenty-
nine killed, one never found, and another thirty-one wounded.
The next two days passed with only light contact. On the
night of May 20, however, the entire battalion was attacked in
its hilltop defensive positions. After an intense mortar barrage,
three waves of soldiers from the K5 Battalion of the 32d NVA
Regiment stormed up the slopes bathed in the ghostly, discor-
dant flarelight. Planes illuminated the battlefield. The shifting
glare of their airborne searchlights swept the hill. Blinding bursts
of ignited powder silhouetted broken wire, heaving earth, and
maimed men. The assault was defeated at heavy cost to the 1st
Battalion of the 8th Infantry.
The neighboring 3d Battalion of the 12th Infantry was or-
dered to link up and reinforce the 8th Infantry. As the men left
their defensive positions on the morning of May 22, they were
showered by enemy mortars. Soldiers of the 66th NVA Regi-
ment then charged down from a high ridgeline. Under concen-
trated grenade and rocket fire, infantrymen were shifted from
one side of their perimeter to the other to meet the onslaught.
Soldiers dropped under the furious shelling as they dashed over,
but enough made it to shore up the line and prevent a breach.
They were dangerously low on ammunition and requested im-
mediate resupply. As U.S. artillery fire was temporarily shifted,
Air Force fighters arrived and made low-level bombing runs.
Helicopter gunships followed, strafing and rocketing the jungle
up to the very edge of the perimeter. After the gunship attack,
artillery fire was brought back all around the perimeter, and
helicopters delivered two loads of vital ammunition. Shortly af-
terwards, the North Vietnamese broke off their attack.
The NVA initiated a series of mortar and rocket attacks against
strategic Pleiku city itself beginning on June 9, but the 4th In-
168 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
fantry Division refused to budge from the Cambodian border.
Fierce actions there continued, and on July 12 in the rock-cov-
ered hills south of Due Co two companies from the 1st Battalion
of the 12th Infantry ran into a hard fight again with the 66th
NVA Regiment. Company B was attempting to reinforce a sur-
rounded platoon. Instead, it was drrven from the field toward
its fire base position, The rest of the battalion combined to stop
the NVA assault.
The last significant encounter of tie operation took place on
a torrid July 23, when a platoon oat of the 3d Battalion, 8th
Infantry, became separated from its company just south of Due
Co. Both the platoon leader and the radioman were killed by
NVA riflemen aiming at radio antemnae, and the platoon was
practically wiped out. A battalion of the 32d NVA Regiment
charged forward, and the shattered company dodged behind
bushes in the light forest. They hastily set up extra claymore
mines, which were detonated in the face of the NVA attack.
Twice the North Vietnamese charged their lines. Jet fighters
darted through the clear skies to pulverize the massed NVA bat-
talion in great explosions of spewing: napalm and phosphorous.
Both attacks were hurled back, and a second rifle company rein-
forced their position. Twelve Air Force fighter strikes were used
during the course of the action, ^hich not only demolished the
attacking NVA battalion, but also annihilated the reserve bat-
talion just a thousand yards away.
This border guard duty was destined to remain under the
code name FRANCIS MARION only until October 12. By Oc-
tober it was apparent that the main North Vietnamese Army
effort was being made in western Kontum Province, directly to
the north. Consequently, FRANCIS MARION was consolidated
vrith Operation GREELEY, taking place there. Both tasks then
became Operation MAC ARTHUR., which encompassed the
greater portions of Kontum, Pleiku, and Phu Ban provinces.
History would subordinate the name MAC ARTHUR to its piv-
otal battle which decided the highlands campaign: the Battle of
Dak To.
3. The Battle of Dak To
The opening rounds of the Battle of Dak To actually started
in June 1967 when the U.S. Army Special Forces camp at Dak
BATTLE FOR THE HIGHLANDS 169
To, situated in the towering mountains of central Konturn Prov-
ince, was pounded by mortars. Then its local garrison sent out
a patrol force which was bushwhacked. The monsoon season
blanketed the region with low clouds and moving ground fog,
but two paratrooper battalions of the crack 173d Airborne Bri-
gade managed to airlift into Dak To on June 17. The operation
would be initially tagged GREELEY. It would span a rugged
wilderness covered by thick double- and triple-canopy jungle.
The only clearings in the mountainous primeval rain forest were
choked with bamboo fifteen to twenty feet high.
On June 22, a company of the 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry
(Airborne), clashed with the 6th Battalion, 24th NVA Regiment
in one of the most violent battles of the Vietnam War. That
morning, Company A left its night position in the triple-canopy
jungle and began threading its way down a steep ridgeline. It
planned to reach the brigade command post at Dak To that
afternoon. The point squad collided with a North Vietnamese
Army force, and the battle quickly engulfed the parachutists.
Artillery fire crashed down and helicopter-delivered rockets
pierced the dank green foliage. All failed to check the assault.
Two platoons were fed into the tangled jungle cauldron. At eleven
o'clock all contact was lost with the forward platoons. Then a
band of disheveled, wounded troopers stumbled into the com-
pany lines. Their shredded tropical combat uniforms, the cloth
jump wing insignia blackened and bloodied, and exhausted faces
told the story. The rest of the company scrambled back up the
smoking ridge, and began frantically cleaving a landing zone out
of the thick vegetation.
Companies B and C were ordered forward at once. The for-
mer air-assaulted a distance away, but was shot up as soon as
it tried to leave the clearing. Company C was able to reach the
area by two o'clock that misty afternoon. However, when the
fresh company tried to get down to the overrun area of the lost
platoons, heavy fire repulsed it. The next day the weary para-
troopers managed to sweep the area where the platoons had
made their last stand. Littering the trampled underbrush, bro-
ken trees, and the clutter of war debris, were the crumpled
bodies of seventy-six dead parachutists.
The rest of Brigadier General Deane's elite brigade moved
to Kontum city a week later, along with Colonel McKenna s 3d
170 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
Brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division. The hard-fighting South
Vietnamese paratroopers of the 5th and 8th ARVN Airborne
Battalions and a battalion of the 42d ARVN Regiment were also
moved in. A forward tactical command post of the 4th Infantry
Division was set up to control activities. The gunslingers that
General Westmoreland needed to subdue the Central Highlands
had arrived.
The next few months were spent in grueling marches into
the western depths of Kontum Province, where the NVA were
firmly entrenched in bunker complexes. The paratroopers suf-
fered mounting losses in attacks on these fortifications. The
bunkers were always covered by mutually supporting machine-
gun positions, undetectable until they suddenly blazed into life.
The supporting 299th Engineer Battalion struggled through tor-
rential rains to replace the blown bridges along Route 14, the
single road linking Kontum and Dak To. Despite its best efforts,
the monsoons turned land routes into impassable quagmires. At
times Dak To had to subsist on aerial delivery of supplies for
days on end. Aircraft crashed and burned with alarming regu-
larity.
A particularly grisly aspect of this fighting involved the con-
stant discovery of human skeletons from past battles. On June
20, 173d Airborne Brigade paratroopers found the osseous re-
mains of two Special Forces, eight of their indigenous CIDG
strikers, and one NVA soldier. Three days later the bones of a
missing radioman from one of their own patrols was found. Still
more skeletal corpses of Army Special Forces and their CIDG
soldiers were discovered throughout the period. Ghosts seemed
to haunt every tropical mist-shrouded sepulcher, and the un-
nerved parachutists freely admitted the whole area "spooked them
out."
The 3d Brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division systematically
searched north of Kontum throughout July. A combined Special
Forces-CIDG force working out of its Plateau Gi camp am-
bushed a withdrawing NVA unit on July 12. 1st Cavalry Divi-
sion artillery supported the action. Near Dak Seang, on August
3, the South Vietnamese airborne battalions helicoptered into
combat. A battalion of the 42d ARVN Regiment was hung up
on a bunkered hilltop it had assaulted. In a sanguinary night
BATTLE FOR THE HIGHLANDS 171
engagement on August 6, the tough South Vietnamese para-
troopers of the 8th ARVN Airborne Battalion threw back five
mass attacks of the 2d Battalion, 174th NVA Regiment. Ten days
later the combat-fatigued ARVN airborne battalions left Kon-
tum, followed by the bulk of the 173d Airborne Brigade which
departed for coastal Tuy Hoa. On October 11, Operation
GREELEY was folded into Operation MAC ARTHUR. At the
end of the month, the 1st Brigade of the 4th Infantry Division
was air-landed at Dak To. Attached to it was the 4th Battalion
of the 503d Infantry (Airborne) from the 173d Airborne Brigade.
The decisive Battle of Dak To was about to commence.
The town of Dak To lies on a valley floor next to a river,
ringed by mountains covered by tall, thick trees capped by tri-
ple-canopy jungle soaring a hundred feet off the ground. These
peaks and ridges sloped steeply up to elevations of over four
thousand feet. Throughout the first two weeks in November,
west and southwest of Dak To, a series of attacks would be
launched against the well-prepared, fortified NVA positions on
the ridgelines. At the beginning of the battle only five battal-
ions, two of them ARVN, were stationed near Dak To. By mid-
November the numbers had tripled, and Dak To became a ma-
jor logistical support site.
On November 4, at a spot only a thousand yards from the
173d Airborne Brigade's fierce June action, the 3d Battalion of
the 12th Infantry from the 4th Infantry Division ran into an NVA
position on a high ridge. Since the unit was unable to take it
frontally, forty air strikes were used to paste the area. The sol-
diers then advanced over the shattered defensive works. Mean-
while, on November 6, the 4th Battalion of the 503d Infantry
(Airborne) got into heavy combat on Hill 823. Losses were mak-
ing major inroads into combat power; one 164-man company was
down to 44 men.
Brigadier General Leo H. Schweiter, who had taken over
the 173d Airborne Brigade on August 24, moved his paratroop-
ers back into Dak To at once. Along with the brigade came
eleven teams of the 39th Scout Dog Platoon. The dogs were
used as part of point elements. These scout dogs went ahead of
the point man in open terrain, while in tropical forest they moved
just behind him. In this manner the canines' energy was saved
172 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
by having the trail broken for them. Their endurance was also
stretched by having handlers carry them over more difficult jun-
gle obstacles. The dogs kept up a lively interest in these varied
regions, and alerted their masters to enemy presence, tunnels,
food caches, and bunkers. Once a battle was joined, the dogs
were moved to the rear as the din of mortar, artillery, and
bombing nullified their keen hearing.
The 4th Battalion of the 503d Infantry (Airborne) had suf-
fered so many losses south of the Ben Het Special Forces camp,
that the decision was made to replace it. The paratroopers of
its sister 1st Battalion had to fight through entrenched NVA
bunkerworks just to get to them. On November 12, the 2d Bat-
talion was also combat-assaulted into the spreading battle. That
night the North Vietnamese began mortaring the lucrative tar-
get that supply-packed Dak To airfield now presented. On No-
vember 14 the confrontation was enlarged as the 42d ARVN
Regiment crashed into NVA forces northeast of Dak To. It was
promptly reinforced by South Vietnamese paratroopers of the
elite 2d and 3d ARVN Airborne Battalions.
The 4th Infantry Division was pushing its 3d Battalion, 12th
Infantry, from ridge to ridge. By the time the soldiers reached
Hill 1338, they resorted to standard procedures: after striking
bunkered positions, massive air and artillery fire were used to
obliterate hilltops. The 173d Airborne Brigade was also moving
down one ridge, crossing a valley, and then climbing up the
next ridge. Riflemen strained under full rucksacks crammed with
extra ammunition, smoke grenades, trip flares, and claymore
mines.
On November 13, Company B of the 2d Battalion, 503d In-
fantry (Airborne), was checking out a potential mountainside for
a suitable night defensive position. They were taking the usual
intermittent sniper fire, when two bunkers were spotted. They
had been carrying a large 90mm recoilless rifle and twenty-two
rounds of ammunition for it, a real hardship in the mountain
jungles. Now they saw their chance to put it into action and
brought the gun forward. After one cannister round was fired
into the NVA bunker, the gunners looked back toward one of
their squad members. He was sitting on his rucksack to make
sure no one was in the back-blast area of the gun. Suddenly he
BATTLE FOR THE HIGHLANDS 173
tipped sideways and fell over, shot through the head. A furious
barrage of small-arms and rocket fire swept through the entire
company. Radiomen and officers were quickly gunned down. The
remaining men managed to set up a hasty perimeter as the 3d
Battalion, 174th NVA Regiment attacked.
The 90mm recoilless rifle crewmen quickly shot off their last
rounds as hand grenades exploded around them. They crawled
back to a pile of logs which was already being clipped by vicious
cross fire. North Vietnamese soldiers tried to close in on the
logs. One private got off a shot which missed, raised his head
to fire again, and was shot between the eyes. Another para-
trooper was hit in the chest and died as a medic administered
first aid. Then the log pile was shaken by the blast of a B-40
rocket, and the NVA bounded forward. Again the paratroopers
repulsed the charge.
Hand-to-hand combat, rocket and grenade blasts, and clat-
tering automatic weapons filled the bamboo thickets and shrub
brush. The right flank of Company B collapsed under the NVA
assault. Shouted orders to withdraw were impossible to execute;
breaking contact was no longer a viable option. American stand-
bys such as artillery and air support were useless in such close
combat. The bamboo was so thick many parachutists believed
their M16 bullets weren't penetrating the jungle. Company A
fought its way inside the perimeter to help hold it as darkness
descended.
All night long the two companies were raked by heavy NVA
weapons. Ammunition was air-dropped into a large bomb crater
near the position's center by helicopters, which were guided in
by flashlight. Both sides tried to recover their wounded com-
rades from the fringes of the battle line, and more dead were
added in the thin space separating the two forces. No flares were
fired for fear of silhouetting positions. At dawn the NVA with-
drew. The fighting had been so intense that one log was found
in the morning with six dead paratroopers on one side and four
dead NVA soldiers sprawled out on the other side. At the end
of the log were two more NVA, one of them an officer who still
clutched a captured M16 rifle taken from one of the Americans.
On November 15 a major U.S. setback for the ongoing Bat-
tle of Dak To occurred when a mortar attack on the Dak To
174 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
airfield touched off the ammunition dump there. Exploding ord-
nance threatened the entire base camp, and the accumulated
ammunition supplies required to continue the battle were lost.
Additionally, two C-130 cargo planes were destroyed. Disaster
was averted by emergency airlift of massive quantities of re-
placement ammunition during the next few days. Heavy fighting
on both sides of Dak To flared up again on November 17 and
soon became centered on Hill 875. The fight for Hill 875 would
ultimately climax the Battle for Dak To, as well as the 1967
campaign for the highlands. The weather was now excellent, but
mountain temperatures still ranged from a daytime 91 degrees
to lows of 55 degrees at night.
On November 18, the 26th Special Forces Mobile Reaction
(Mike) Company ran into a large North Vietnamese Army force
entrenched on the east slope of Hill 875, about twelve miles
west of Dak To. Encountering a complex system of intercon-
necting bunkers and trenches manned by the 174th NVA Reg-
iment, the company quickly retreated. It was later determined
that these defensive works even included tunnels between
bunkers and had been constructed three to six months previ-
ously, allowing ample growth of concealing natural vegetation in
the meantime. The next day Lt. Col. James R. Steverson's 2d
Battalion of the 503d Infantry (Airborne), the combat-jump vet-
erans of the parachute assault into War Zone C that February,
drew the tough mission to "move onto and clear Hill 875."
Companies C and D of the battalion tackled the tree- and
bamboo-covered northern slope of Hill 875 on the morning of
November 19. After four hours of increasingly heavy return fire,
they were abruptly assaulted by waves of North Vietnamese Army
infantrymen of the 174th NVA Regiment, the hill's defenders.
The paratroopers dropped their rucksacks and retreated in the
thick underbrush. Desperately they clawed into the ground with
knives and helmets to carve out a defensive line. The NVA gave
them no respite, rushing the troopers in groups of twenty to
thirty men. The NVA attackers were well camouflauged, their
faces painted black and their weapons wrapped in burlap. Ma-
chine guns, rifle grenades, mortars, and well-placed snipers rid-
dled the paratroopers of the two lead companies.
BATTLE FOR THE HIGHLANDS 175
Company A was in reserve at the bottom of the hill cutting
a landing zone out of the jungle. Waves of screaming North
Vietnamese Army regulars charged through its positions in such
force that two platoons simply evaporated. Now split and under
fierce assault, the battalion's reserve was in imminent danger of
being overrun as well. Most of the paratroopers there were al-
ready dead when the six-man command group was completely
wiped out in hand-to-hand combat.
The rain of steel was mowing down parachutists so fast all
seemed lost. A sergeant was hit and the medical specialist dragged
him over to a tree, where the latter was shot through the head
himself. One private had his M60 machine gun blown out of his
hands by a rifle grenade. Their lieutenant tried three times to
get to the sergeant and was hit each time. The sergeant died
crying, "For God's sake, Lieutenant, don't come out here; there's
a machine gun behind this tree!" He had been shot seven times.
With scores of paratroopers already killed, many missing, and
hundreds wounded, the survivors of the shattered battalion tried
to shore up their front with an emergency perimeter.
As fallen and severely wounded men were being dragged
into the relative safety provided by the center of the perimeter,
a bomb from an Air Force fighter plummeted into their midst.
There it exploded in a horrendous blast which tossed limbs and
pieces of clothing over the entire area. Twenty men literally
disintegrated, and another thirty were horribly wounded. The
battalion had lost most of its leaders; even the chaplain was
mortally wounded.
As fast as the paratroopers fired, the NVA appeared in more
numbers on all sides. The 335th Aviation Company had six of
its helicopters shot out of the sky as they started to descend.
Supporting artillery fire was now starting to hit the battalion,
and a platoon sergeant went from shattered radio to radio until
he found one that worked. Frantically he turned the frequency
knob, trying to raise any friendly station. He happened to turn
it to the artillery fire direction center network and was able to
adjust the errant shells.
The night was filled with more terror. Soldiers hollered on
both sides and tossed grenades across the burning boundaries
176 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
of the perimeter. The NVA were yelling, "Now You Chieu Hoi,
G.I.T 3 The sister 4th Battalion, spent the night preparing to
move up Hill 875 to break through to its fellow paratroopers.
They stuffed their rucksacks and pockets full of ammunition.
Everything else was left behind except for one meal, one can-
teen, and one poncho for carrying dead and wounded.
On the morning of November 20, Lt. Col. James H. John-
son's 4th Battalion started up the slope. They found it littered
with empty C-ration tins that the NVA had captured. Bloodied
Chinese first-aid dressings and expended ammunition cans dot-
ted the hillside. By one tree a young paratrooper was found
dead in a pile of empty shell casings, still clutching his jammed
M60 machine gun. They began passing so many dead Americans
that soon some of the advancing men wondered openly if there
was anyone left alive to link up with. However, there was no
resistance and seven thousand yards up the hill the 4th Battal-
ion reached the worn perimeter at ten o'clock that night. The
survivors of the 2d Battalion openly cried as the union was fi-
nally made.
The following day a new landing zone was cut out of the
twisted jungle, and for the first time the brigade was able to
lift out its wounded from the November 19th battle. For seven
hours Hill 875 was plastered with every artillery and air asset
available. Air strikes streaked in every fifteen minutes, scorch-
ing the crest with seven and a half tons of burning napalm. Then
the paratroopers made an afternoon attack. They prepared to
advance by forming ranks behind a wall of last-minute artillery
fire which pounded the hillside. Suddenly an NVA mortar coun-
terbarrage rained down. The men dove into their foxholes as
the explosions tore through their positions. Crowded six or seven
to a hole, direct hits decimated the attackers before they could
even begin the climb.
At three o'clock the attack began, but return fire reduced
the advance to a crawl. The paratroopers found themselves up
against mutually supporting bunkers built flush to the ground,
with up to fourteen feet of protective dirt and logs piled over-
3. Chieu Hoi was the "open arms" program promising clemency and financial
aid to guerrillas who stopped fighting and returned to live under South Viet-
namese government authority.
BATTLE FOR THE HIGHLANDS 177
head. These defensive works were usually spotted only after they
opened fire, and then had to be painfully reduced one by one.
Ordinary grenades, flamethrowers, and recoilless rifles proved
useless. One group of troopers fired twelve antitank rockets di-
rectly into a bunker aperture and then charged forward to clear
it. They were met by a hail of grenades and submachine-gun
fire from the bunker occupants, who had taken refuge in a con-
necting tunnel during the rocket attack. The battalion resorted
to sending individuals forward to heave twenty-pound satchel
charges through bunker openings or dump concentrated napalm
mixture inside and then ignite the substance with grenades.
The tenacious NVA defenders responded by firing rockets,
which skidded along the ground and slid into the paratroopers
who were huddled behind logs and mounds of dirt. There they
went off, killing and wounding dozens. Fortunately for the
Americans, the Chinese grenades also sprinkling their pinned
ranks were almost all duds. The NVA even managed to charge
the flanks and rear of the battalion. After two trenchlines were
captured in close combat, the advance finally ground to a halt
within 250 feet of the top of the hill. After darkness the word
to "hold in place" changed to "fall back." More intensive air and
artillery bombardment was used the next day.
Throughout November 22, continuous air strikes pummeled
Hill 875 and the surrounding area with bombs, napalm, and
rockets. The top of Hill 875 had been blown bald by the terrific
bombardment, which continued throughout the night. The 4th
Battalion was reinforced by fresh soldiers airlifted into the valley
near the southeast slope. These infantrymen were from two fresh
companies helicoptered in from Darlac Province by the 4th In-
fantry Division's 1st Battalion of the 12th Infantry. They com-
bined and spent the night under mortar fire preparing to assault
the hilltop the next morning. They prepared for the renewed
attack by checking weapons and distributing more ammunition
and satchel charges.
The final attack was launched against Hill 875 on November
23. The paratroopers and infantrymen started back up the hill,
but this time there was hardly any opposition. They scrambled
past empty man-deep trenches and huge bunkers. The NVA had
left, their covering mission completed. At 11:55 that morning
the paratroopers reached the abandoned summit. They cheered
178 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
with the chants they yelled when jumping out of aircraft, slo-
gans inherited from the victories of World War II "Airborne!"
and "Geronimo!" However, their shouts were tempered by the
realization that many gold-starred veterans of Vietnam's only
parachute assault were now dead. Other soldiers reaching the
hilltop simply sat down in the dust and charred wood splinters
around them, opened their cans of C-ration turkey loaf, and had
lunch.
The Battle for Hill 875 was over, and by November 28 it
was obvious that the 1967 Battle for the Highlands was over
also. The battered 1 st NVA Divisions 32d and 66th Regiments
had retreated beyond the South Vietnamese borders, shielded
by the division's Laotian War veteran 174th Regiment. From
October 25 through December 1, a tremendous military effort
had been waged by some of the Army's best units. They had
crossed some of the most hostile territory in South Vietnam and
battled against some of the finest light infantry in the world.
The expenditures matched the stakes involved; 151,000 rounds
of artillery, 2,096 tactical air sorties, and 257 B-52 bombing strikes
had been used. The losses had been high also. The 179th Avia-
tion Company, which flew recovery Chinook helicopters, picked
up over forty carcasses of downed helicopters.
The Battle of Dak To had driven the NVA off the field of
battle into Laos and Cambodia. The Army had secured victory
by surmounting great logistical difficulties to close with and de-
feat an entrenched first-class opponent. As 1967 closed, the abil-
ity of the NVA to stage major operations in the Central High-
lands had been largely negated. However, as events in 1968
were to prove, the long-range effects were less satisfactory. The
setback the NVA had sustained was temporary, and the 1967
Battle for the Highlands had caused extremely heavy losses to
both the 4th Infantry Division and the 173d Airborne Brigade.
CHAPTER 12.
HOLDING THE LINE
1. The DMZ Spring Campaign
On February 26, 1967, Army heavy artillery planted on the
scraped laterite of Hill 158, at the Con Thien Marine fire base
two miles below the Demilitarized Zone, unleashed a deafening
cannonade that stirred up miniature whirlwinds of red dust. The
174-pound projectiles were being fired over the DMZ, and the
North Vietnamese counterbatteried the next day. Con Thien and
Gio Linh were shelled, while Camp Carroll farther south was
subjected to a fierce rocket attack. These opening salvos initi-
ated a savage artillery exchange that would last throughout the
year, thunderclaps in the storm gathering over the northern
fringes of South Vietnam.
The entire Marine DMZ campaign was hinged on the com-
bat bases hugging the length of Route 9, from western mist-
shrouded Lang Vei, past Khe Sanh, the Rockpile, Camp Car-
roll, and Cam Lo, to the key Marine command post of Dong
Ha. Four Marine battalions had been skirmishing in the terri-
tory beyond this line since the previous August as part of Op-
eration PRAIRIE. Only two fortified outposts had been thrust
closer to the DMZ, Con Thien and Gio Linh, both forward gun
positions under the shadow of the zone itself. Desultory local
actions were waged against the 324B NVA Division through the
drenching winter monsoons, but the tempo quickened as the
artillery duels intensified and the dry season approached.
The North Vietnamese Army periodically infiltrated large
179
180 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
combat formations directly south into Quang Tri Province through
the DMZ. The 3d Marine Division, lacking the strength phys-
ically to cover the length of South Vietnam's northern border,
resorted to a mobile defense. It depended on a roving advance
guard to detect crossing NVA forces, which were counterat-
tacked by Marine elements stationed at the major bases along
Route 9. In this manner a reconnaissance patrol from the 4th
Marines tripped over the advancing 812th NVA Regiment in the
scrub brush outside Cam Lo on February 27. One of the tanks
accompanying the relief company (Company L, 4th Marines)
threw a track in the dense undergrowth, forcing the advancing
Marines to laager overnight deep in hostile jungle.
Daybreak was accompanied by an intense mortar barrage
which sent geysers of dirt tearing through the Marine positions.
As clumps of earth and grass were still falling to the ground,
waves of North Vietnamese soldiers stormed out of the jungle.
Rocket-propelled grenades exploded against two tanks, setting
one on fire. The Marine defenders defeated three determined
NVA infantry charges with the help of massed close artillery
support. The North Vietnamese pulled away as Lt. Col. Victor
Ohanesian of the 2d Battalion, 3d Marines, reached the stranded
company with reinforcements later that morning.
Another company of the 4th Marines had also been sent in
from another direction. It was now ordered to take a hill block-
ing the suspected North Vietnamese withdrawal and unwittingly
sallied up the slope directly into perfectly camouflaged fortifi-
cations. The NVA abruptly opened up at point-blank range, kill-
ing the company commander and forcing the Marines back un-
der a vicious cross fire. Another line company was helicoptered
north of the hill and began moving toward the stricken unit.
That afternoon Ohanesian's group also set out toward the new
scene of action. Since the disabled tanks were still stuck, Com-
pany L was left in place as security.
Lieutenant Colonel Ohanesian's column was beset by a thick
snarl of jungle and began moving down a trail just beyond Com-
pany Us lines, confident that the NVA forces had departed. The
North Vietnamese triggered a massive ambush along the trail,
showering the Marines with a hail of grenades and machine-gun
fire which tore the entire column in shreds and killed both
HOLDING THE LINE 181
Lieutenant Colonel Ohanesian and his Sergeant Major. Tightly
bunched in platoon clusters and under heavy fire from the dense
walls of vegetation on each side, the Marines desperately crawled
over abandoned equipment and dozens of dead comrades, drag-
ging their wounded back to Company L. The North Vietnamese
then kept the armor-supported perimeter under such devastat-
ing rifle and grenade fire that medical evacuation helicopters
were unable to land.
Marine units throughout the area were redirected toward the
remnants of Ohanesian's group. The North Vietnamese soldiers
left the battlefield, and the Marines consolidated without inci-
dent. They swept the entire vicinity, but the tropical forest around
Cam Lo was now deserted. Maj. Gen. Bruno A. Hochmuth took
over the 3d Marine Division on March 20, as the Special Land-
ing Force battalion came ashore south of the Gio Linh fire base.
That battalion fought a week-long battle through a maze of in-
terconnecting North Vietnamese tunnels between Gio Linh and
Con Thien.
The next threat that Hochmuth's division faced was sparked
along the western part of Route 9 near Khe Sanh. The Khe
Sanh combat base consisted of an airstrip carved from a small
plateau overshadowed by Dong Tri Mountain. The surrounding
territory was composed of a tangle of piedmont hills with jungle-
webbed slopes, which disappeared in groves of bamboo and saw-
toothed elephant grass. Four peaks covered by sixty-foot-high
tropical hardwood trees dominated the most advantageous
northwest approaches, Hills 558, 861, and 881 North and South.
Khe Sanh was being defended by solitary companies on a ro-
tating basis, which pushed reconnaissance patrols into the rug-
ged hills around it. On March 16, 1967, a platoon from Com-
pany E of the 9th Marines was ambushed returning from an
overnight patrol position on nearby Hill 861. Another platoon
was sent to help, and both were badly shot up trying to get
casualties out of an emergency landing zone. The opening shots
in the incipient struggle for Khe Sanh had been fired.
On April 24, a Marine forward observation party from Com-
pany B, 9th Marines, was bushwhacked in a bamboo thicket on
the slope of Hill 861. The action engulfed several platoons in
heavy combat on the hillside, and a company from the 3d Ma-
182 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
rines was sent in from the Rockpile. The new Marines were fed
into the battle the next day, but the well-fortified NVA bunkers,
supported by mortars on the reverse slopes, stopped all further
advances. Instead of another brief patrol engagement it devel-
oped into the first of The Hill Fights, which lasted until mid-
May.
After Khe Sanh was heavily shelled during the night of April
25, it became apparent that the 325C NVA Division was also in
command of other hills overlooking the base. The next morning
another company from Camp Carroll joined in the attack up Hill
861, but it was also repulsed. In the meantime Company B had
also attempted to link up, but was decimated and pinned in
place. The battalion pulled back down the hillside at sundown
and was able to extract the remnants of Company B under the
cover of rain showers and night fog.
Colonel John P. Lanigan, commander of the 3d Marines, ar-
rived at Khe Sanh to take charge. The regiment's 2d Battalion
was made available from the Quang Tri area by closing out its
role as Special Landing Force. Together with several companies
of the 9th Marines, he had roughly three rifle battalions com-
mitted. 1 They were outfitted with an unfamiliar weapon, which
was about to undergo its first Marine test in battle. The 3d Ma-
rines had exchanged their reliable wooden M14 rifles for light-
weight black M16s.
More Marines slipped into muddy positions on the battle
line in the nightly downpours. Incessant air strikes and heavy
artillery pounded Hill 861 into a smoking, cratered heap of up-
turned earth and shrapnel-riddled, branchless tree stalks. The
North Vietnamese soldiers abandoned their positions, and the
Marines met no resistance as they marched to the hilltop on
the afternoon of April 28. The 3d Battalion of the 3d Marines
tackled the next NVA strong-point, Hill 881 South, on April 30.
It had also been worked over by intensive bombardment. Two
platoons had almost reached the summit when perfectly cam-
1. The exact Marine units and arrivals in The Hill Fights were Company M,
3d Marines (April 27); 2d Battalion, 3d Marines with Companies E, F, G, H
(April 26); 3d Battalion, 3d Marines with Company K (April 25); Company
B, 9th Marines (already at Khe Sanh); Company E, 9th Marines (May 1);
Company K, 9th Marines (April 25); and Company M, 9th Marines (April
HOLDING THE LINE 183
ouflaged, earthen-timber casemated defensive works struck the
Marines on all sides with machine-gun and grenade fire. Men
were spun around and thrown into the broken ground before
they could return a shot. Mortars added to the carnage, and
snipers finished off the screaming wounded. Helicopter gun-
ships and fighter-bombers carved out a channel of exploding
ordnance, through which the battalion managed to retreat down
the hill. Company M of the 3d Marines had been rendered
combat-ineffective .
Another day was devoted to massed aerial and artillery dev-
astation, which raked the hill and flattened scores of bunkers.
The battalion attacked again and took Hill 881 South on the
afternoon of May 2. That same morning, after extensive clearing
skirmishes, the 2d Battalion had worked its way into attack po-
sitions against the single remaining NVA hillsite, Hill 881 North.
The Marines toiled up the slippery clay in driving rain. NVA
machine guns and rockets suddenly blazed through their ranks
and the attack faltered, then stalled, and finally stopped for the
night.
In the early morning darkness of May 3, the battalion suf-
fered a sharp reverse. A North Vietnamese Army counterattack
overwhelmed Company E and reoccupied several bunkers. More
waves of North Vietnamese attackers were disclosed under flare-
light, and direct Marine 106mm recoilless rifle fire was used to
break up the charge. The battalion spent the next day painfully
reducing each recaptured bunker with close-in assaults and
demolition charges. Hill 881 North was plastered by air and ar-
tillery bombardment, and the Marines pressed to its summit in
the afternoon of May 5. Mopping up and final destruction of
the extensive fortified positions continued for another week, but
The Hill Fights were over. On May 13, 1967, the 1st Battalion
of the 26th Marines took over the defense of Khe Sanh, and
they were reinforced by the 2d Battalion the next month. Their
mission would become a harrowing ordeal when the regiment
was besieged there during 1968.
2. The DMZ Campaign Continues
Con Thien, the Marine forward artillery post perched on a
small knoll near the DMZ, soon developed secret strategic sig-
nificance in addition to its crucial observation role. It was des-
184 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
tined to be the western terminus of an infiltration barrier ex-
tending to Gio Linh, which Defense Secretary Robert S.
McNamara planned to stretch across Vietnam and eventually Laos.
Initially coded Project PRACTICE NINE, but popularly known
as the Electric Fence, this mine-sewn, sensor-saturated, obsta-
cle-swamped swath of bulldozed land was to be backed by a
feed system of elaborate strong-points. 2 The Institute of Defense
Analysis had sold the idea to the Defense Department, and
General Westmoreland noted it could potentially substitute for
additional troop requirements.
The Marines were bluntly opposed to the whole concept,
which they considered impractical and immensely expensive, and
which relegated them to building and manning futile static de-
fenses. However, the McNamara Line had the highest national
priority, and a trial segment was ordered emplaced by the end
of the year. The 3d Marine Division began devoting most of its
energy to the preparatory clearing and construction of this pre-
liminary section. The enormous construction resources required
placed a tremendous strain on Marine logistical support. That
April, Army Task Force Oregon had been created at Chu Lai
to free several Marine battalions for mobile area warfare. In-
stead, barrier security consumed all additional Marine man-
power assets made available.
Con Thien, conceived as a key PRACTICE NINE Barrier
strong-point, quickly developed into a magnet for NVA shellings
and maneuvering. It dominated operations in the DMZ area,
and an entire line battalion was stationed there to guard the
engineers razing the surrounding countryside. On May 8, 1967,
the base was hit by a predawn mortar barrage followed by a
sapper-led ground assault. North Vietnamese soldiers pierced
the perimeter wire with bangalore torpedoes and raced through
a hail of automatic weapons fire to leap into the trenches of
Company D, 4th Marines. NVA flamethrowers scorched bun-
kered machine guns as close-quarters combat raged through the
Marine lines. Two armored amphibious tractors sent into the
breach were knocked out by satchel charges and rocket-pro-
2. Project PRACTICE NINE was relabeled ILLINOIS CITY in June 1967,
and DYE MARKER on July 14, 1967.
HOLDING THE LINE 185
pelled grenades. The Con Thien defenders managed to eject the
assailants after a bitter fight lasting most of the morning.
The Marines began large sweep and clearing operations for
the PRACTICE NINE barrier in the second half of May. For
the first time in the war, a multibattalion attack was launched
into the southern half of the Demilitarized Zone. The drive be-
gan early on May 18 under an umbrella of helicopter gunships
and fighter-bombers. 3 To the east a motorized South Vietnamese
force dashed straight up Highway 1, reached the border and
Ben Hai River at first light, and wheeled around to sweep back
south. Shortly after the South Vietnamese jumped off, the Ma-
rine Special Landing Force Battalion hit the beaches near the
mouth of the Ben Hai River and drove inland against en-
trenched resistance.
The western prong of the drive was launched by Marine bat-
talions near Con Thien north into the zone, while another bat-
talion air-assaulted just south of the Demarcation Line. Its ma-
jor purpose was to evacuate the civilian population from this
region so that the barrier could proceed. Hard fighting devel-
oped immediately. Bunker complexes and fortified hills, well built
and camouflaged to blend into the ground, presented formidable
obstacles to the Marine advance, but the NVA pulled back un-
der pressure. After two raging battles on Hills 117 and 174 dur-
ing the last week of May, the operation was successfully con-
cluded.
The Marines continued to scour the southern DMZ after-
wards, pulverizing massive bunker and tunnel emplacements
through early June. Afterwards, company-sized ambuscades pre-
vailed in the lower zone area. Lt. Gen. Robert E. Cushman,
Jr., took over III Marine Amphibious Force on June 1, and
throughout the summer and fall the main arena of conflict re-
mained Con Thien. Increasing artillery and rocket barrages against
3. The South Vietnamese portion, consisting of five battalions, was called Op-
eration LAM SON 54. The Special Landing Force Alpha (1st Battalion, 3d
Marines) portion was Operation BEAU CHARGER. The western prong was
Operation HICKORY, executed by the 2d and 3d Battalions, 9th Marines,
and 2d Battalion, 26th Marines, from the Con Thien, with an aerial insertion
of the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, north near the Ben Hai River. Later the
2d Battalion, 3d Marines, was also committed. The NVA 31st, 32d, and 812th
Regiments were engaged.
186 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
Marine fire bases were coupled with violent infantry clashes.
Operation BUFFALO was among the fiercest.
Capt. Sterling K. Coates's Company B of 1st Battalion, 9th
Marines, was ambushed along hedgerow-lined Route 561 within
earshot of Con Thien on July 2. North Vietnamese soldiers of
the 90th NVA Regiment, backed by flamethrowers and massed
artillery, shattered the Marine attempts to disengage. Pinned
platoons were rapidly cut up and in minutes the company was
destroyed. The rest of Lt. Col. Richard J. Schenning's tank-sup-
ported 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, counterattacked. Tanks ex-
ploded in minefields, ferocious mortar barrages blistered heli-
copter insertions, and artillery on both sides blasted infantry
movements. After considerable fighting, the Marines reached the
remnants of Company B. Staff Sergeant Leon R. Burns reported
to the relief column, "Sir, this is the company, or what's left of
it." Out of three hundred men, only twenty-seven shaken sur-
vivors were able to walk out. With the company suffering nearly
two hundred severely wounded and another hundred dead, it
had been one of the worst Marine battle disasters of the Viet-
nam War.
Colonel Schenning's battalion was still locked in heavy com-
bat, and two more battalions were shoved into the battle (3d
Battalion, 9th Marines, and 1st Battalion, 3d Marines). Heavy
artillery exchanges continued as the Marines swept north. One
152mm shell impacted directly on top of a 9th Marine battalion
command post on July 5. The violent ground fighting culmi-
nated in a massed NVA regimental attack on July 6. Aircraft
swooped down to strafe and bomb lines of fully combat-equipped
North Vietnamese regulars. Artillery shellfire blanketed the bat-
tlefield with smoke and burning powder. Many North Vietnam-
ese soldiers reached Marine positions despite horrendous losses,
hurling blocks of TNT before they were gunned down or stabbed.
Two days later the battle was over, leaving hundreds of torn
North Vietnamese corpses and acres of demolished equipment
crushed into the smoking earth.
Dong Ha was subjected to a fierce rocket and artillery attack
in August which exploded both the ammunition and fuel dumps,
and left them burning for days. Marine medium helicopter
squadron HMM-361 had so many of its aircraft destroyed and
HOLDING THE LINE 18?
severely damaged that it was temporarily put out of business.
As a result, III MAF was forced to relocate Marine Aircraft Group
16 (Forward) to Quang Tri, which was outside NVA artillery
range.
By the end of August, the Marines had completed much of
the test barrier section, but work on this massive undertaking
continued. In September events moved to a climax at Con Thien.
During the month the Marine fire base was pounded by one of
the most intense shellings of the Vietnam War. In one week,
that of September 19-27, Con Thien was lashed by 3,077 rounds.
Occasional NVA ground attacks struck the base but were stopped
at the wire. Outside the perimeter several Marine battalions tried
to keep the NVA forces at a safe distance from the base. These
efforts produced frequent, sharp firefights.
In the fading twilight of September 10, 1967, the 812th NVA
Regiment, garbed in Marine helmets and flak jackets, struck the
perimeter of the 3d Battalion, 26th Marines, near Con Thien.
Circling aircraft flashed across the darkening sky, tumbling bombs
that crashed across the attacking formations in gushing explo-
sions of jellied napalm. As the NVA infantry ran forward a me-
dium battle tank and a flame tank unleashed a torrent of can-
nister projectiles and scorching fire. Both armored vehicles were
rocked with salvos of rocket-propelled grenades. The flame tank
disintegrated in a tremendous blast which left its hulk blazing
through the night. The other tank rolled into a ditch. The Ma-
rines hammered the onrushing North Vietnamese soldiers with
claymore mines, machine guns, and automatic weapons. The
Marines fell back to a final defensive position and called in a
solid curtain of protective shellfire, which broke the NVA at-
tack.
At the end of the month the bombardments of Con Thien
began tapering off, and on October 4, 1967, MACV declared
that the siege of Con Thien was over. One segment of the
McNamara Line section was largely implanted before the mid-
October torrential monsoon rains drenched the northern prov-
inces with flooding waters. Roads were turned into red ooze,
and mud caked equipment and weapons. While fighting became
light and intermittent the next month, the 3d Marine Division
lost its commander. Major General Hochmuth's helicopter ex-
188 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
ploded and crashed en route to Dong Ha on November 14, 1967,
and two weeks later Maj. Gen. Rathvon McC. Tompkins arrived
to take his place.
The last action of the 1967 DMZ campaign occurred in late
December when the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, ran into a heav-
ily fortified beach village in trouble-plagued Operation BADGER
TOOTH. Naval landing craft had brought the Marines ashore
the previous day to search several seaside hamlets in southern
Quang Tri Province. Captain Thomas S. Hubbell's Company L
spent the night at Tham Khe and then moved out to search
other villages. At noon it was ambushed trying to reenter Tham
Khe. Two companies of the 716th NVA Regiment had infiltrated
behind them.
Although the village was literally in the middle of the Ma-
rine battalion, there was an inordinate amount of confusion trying
to coordinate an attack. The fighting was intense, several com-
panies were stuck, and NVA mortar fire was blocking attempts
to link up. Company L was cut off and unsure of its exact lo-
cation, precluding fire support. Its captain had been killed and
communications were gone. After a bitter, bloody struggle the
battalion managed to consolidate at midnight. The North Viet-
namese had slipped back out in the meantime. Shortly before
noon on December 28, 1967, after a nightlong aerial and naval
bombardment, the Marines entered the demolished village.
Several NVA attempts to shove large units south of the DMZ
had been defeated in heavy combat. The Con Thien section of
the barrier designed to prevent such incursions had been re-
named PROJECT DYE MARKER and had been emplaced at
great cost. Defense Secretary McNamara envisioned the bar-
rier's installation in successive stages with an air barrier pro-
jected across Laos and the first land stages stretching from Cua
Viet to Dong Ha, thence westward. However, the barrier was
never realized. The system's ultimate doom was sealed by the
loss of western Route 9 after the fall of Lang Vei and the aban-
donment of Khe Sanh the next year. The results of the massive
scientific effort supplementing the barrier plan, especially in the
field of electronic monitoring devices, were later placed to ex-
cellent use elsewhere on the Vietnam battleground.
HOLDING THE LINE 189
3. The Marine Coastal Campaign
During the DMZ border battles the 1st Marine Division was
heavily engaged in the rice plains and coastal sands of the lower
three provinces of I Corps Tactical Zone. The Viet Cong strong-
hold in that area was between Chu Lai and Da Nang in the
densely populated, fertile Phuoc Ha Valley, which by 1967 was
an old Marine battlefield. 4 Isolated South Vietnamese forces had
been consistently cut up trying to outpost the area. The Marines
lacked the assets to control the valley and placed a reinforced
company (Company F of the 1st Marines) on a critical hill mass
overlooking it. On April 21, this company was moving along a
ridgeline when it was hit by concentrated volleys of automatic
weapons and grenade fire from the 3d NVA Regiment outside
Binh Son.
The division responded by air-assaulting two battalions from
Da Nang into action the next morning. One of them was air-
mobiled into a hornet's nest of North Vietnamese infantry and
was forced to fight a major action getting beyond its landing
zone. The reinforcements reached Binh Son, but combat was so
intense all along the front that another battalion was helicop-
tered in from Chu Lai that evening. Operation UNION, under
direction of the 5th Marines, had commenced. 5
Fighting was heavy through April 25, and then the North
Vietnamese began exfiltrating the battlefield. The Marines pur-
sued, but contacts were infrequent. Then, on May 8, the 1st
Battalion of the 5th Marines ran into steadily increasing resis-
tance on the northern side of the valley. Hill 110 was taken on
4. Also called the Que Son Valley or Nui Loc Son Basin, this area was the
operational confines of both 1965 HARVEST MOON and 1966 COLORADO.
It was located just south of the border between Quang Nam and Quang Tin
provinces near Tarn Ky and became the haunt of the 2d NVA Division.
5. The 5th Marines had gained fame storming the German trenches at bay-
onet-point in Belleau Wood during World War I. It was activated in June
1917 at the Philadelphia Navy Yard, and had fought in France, Nicaragua,
Guadalcanal, New Guinea, New Britain, Peleliu, Okinawa, and Korea. It had
been in Vietnam since March-May, 1966. Initially the 1st and 3d battalions,
1st Marines, and 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, were involved in Operation
UNION. On April 25, the 5th Marines took over entirely.
190 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
May 10, but NVA troops entrenched in nearby caves and sugar-
cane fields chewed up several other Marine companies coming
to assist. In a fierce daylong battle, marred by accidental aerial
rocketing of Marine positions, the battalion pushed the North
Vietnamese out of their defensive positions.
Three days later the 5th Marines entered a running battle
with NVA companies and platoons in the valley basin. On April
15, the 3d Battalion encountered another fortified bunker area.
Marine air strikes and artillery pummeled the complex while
the riflemen pushed into assault positions. The fight continued
through the evening and then gradually subsided as the Marines
overran the main entrenchments around midnight. Two days later
Operation UNION was terminated.
Operation UNION II was designed to trap the 21st NVA
Regiment in the same general area, and was initiated with a
main heliborne assault on May 26, 1967. Driving south from
their landing zone, the Marines ran into the main trenchworks
of the North Vietnamese regiment the first day, located on the
hillsides north of Thien Phuoc. The 3d Battalion of the 5th Ma-
rines charged up the fire-swept slopes to overrun the North Vi-
etnamese lines at bayonet-point. Another large battle developed
June 2 in the rice fields and hedgerows outside Vinh Huy, and
a day after Maj. Gen. Donn J. Robertson took command of the
1st Marine Division, he was forced to commit an emergency
composite battalion into the action. This extra reinforcement
tipped the ground firepower scales, and the NVA broke contact.
It was the last engagement of the UNION operations.
The Marines continued the campaign against the 2d NVA
Division through airmobile drives closely coordinated with am-
phibious assaults conducted by the Seventh Fleet's Special
Landing Force. However, at this stage strong Army forces were
also taking on this same North Vietnamese division in the Chu
Lai area, as Task Force Oregon tackled the rugged inland jungle
and numerous fortified villages hugging the coast.
Soldiers of the 1st Infantry Division push deep into War Zone D dur-
ing June of 1967. (Author's Collection)
Soldiers of Lieutenant Colonel Alexander M. Haigs 1st Battalion of
the 26th Infantry (1st Infantry Division) mark their forward fighting
positions with smoke during the battle of April I, 1967, in Operation
JUNCTION CITf in War Zone C near the Cambodian border. (Au-
thor's Collection)
Soldiers of the 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry (4th Infantry Division) guard
their perimeter after repelling a North Vietnamese Army attack in the
mountains west of Kontum near the Cambodian border. (Army News
Features)
Soldiers from the 1st Battalion of the 16th Infantry (1st Infantry Di-
vision) collect their dead and wounded on a battlefield near Xom Do
in War Zone D during June, 1967. (Author s Collection)
Massed helicopter insertions, such as this one by the 2d Battalion of
the 8th Cavalry on October 29, 1967, typified 1st Cavalry Division
operations during Operation PERSHING in the coastal provinces. (U.S.
Army)
Grim paratroopers of the 173d Airborne Brigade prepare to continue
the assault up Hill 875 during the Battle of Dak To in November,
1967. (U.S. Army)
Marines of the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, take cover as Viet Cong
automatic weapons open up on January 27, 1967, in Quang Ngai
Province. (U.S. Marine Corps)
This M67 flamethrower tank engages North Vietnamese Army posi-
tions with fire as it supports Marine infantry of the 1st Battalion, 3d
Marines. (U.S. Marine Corps)
CHAPTER 13.
BATTLE FOR THE
COAST
1. A Task Force Named Oregon
In February 1967, action promised to become intense along the
DMZ, and MACV decided shock troops like the U.S. Marines
should be freed from all coastal security duties. One of the
problem areas of the Marine district was the southern half of I
Corps Tactical Zone, more specifically, the Viet Cong-infested
Quang Ngai Province. The Marines needed more troops on the
Demilitarized Zone, where major battles were being waged
against North Vietnamese Army regulars.
In February 1967, General Westmoreland decided to throw
together three orphan Army brigades into a containing force for
southern I Corps, to relieve the Marines of secondary problems
in that portion of their zone. The task force was coded Oregon,
and with any luck it would provide security in the coastal area,
open Route 1 and the railroad, and relieve pressure in northern
Binh Dinh Province as well. To replace the Marine presence as
well as was possible with Army troops, it was decided to build
the framework of this divisional-sized force around elite stiff-
ening. The separate 1st Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division
was used for this purpose. In early April, the 196th Infantry
Brigade was yanked out of Operation JUNCTION CITY and sent
to Chu Lai. The 3d Brigade of the 25th Infantry Division, al-
191
192 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
ready in the area under the control of the 1st Cavalry Division,
was ordered to Chu Lai by the end of the month. Odds and
ends from all over Vietnam were logistically scraped up to sup-
port Task Force Oregon, and on April 20, the package was given
to III Marine Amphibious Force.
On May 11 the task force launched its first combat opera-
tion, MALHEUR, with its airborne brigade near Due Pho. Sup-
ported by generous air strikes, the paratroopers fought eighteen
separate firefights and uncovered large food and ammunition
caches. Light fighting typified by ambushes and vigorous pa-
trolling continued through July. However, MALHEUR II was
concluded August 2 without any success in coming to grips with
the elusive VC and NVA forces in the area.
Both the 196th Infantry Brigade and the 3d Brigade of the
25th Infantry Division were in poor condition. The former was
filled with green replacements as its initial veterans headed home,
and the latter was severely short of sergeants and interpreters.
That brigade was hastily beefed up with extra aviation and tanks
and then directed to move against Viet Cong main forces ce-
mented in Quang Ngai Province.
Although the 2d ARVN Division was stationed at Quang Ngai
itself, the Viet Cong enjoyed free run of this, as well as two
adjacent, provinces. In fact, scores of weapons-toting VC were
defiantly crossing the fertile rice paddies in broad daylight, much
to the chagrin of local MACV advisors. This kind of insolent
behavior not only mocked the Saigon government, but also dis-
rupted travel along national Highway 1 and menaced various
other activities. Most of these Viet Cong belonged to the com-
bat-hardened 2d VC Regiment. The 3d Brigade would end up
fighting them throughout the year.
The brigade discovered that the regular Viet Cong were highly
trained and ready to fight. Their fortified villages contained
communications trenches, air-raid tunnels, and fighting bunkers,
embellished by booby traps and punji pits. The initial fighting
in April was light and sporadic. Relentless pressure by large
groups of American infantrymen, usually mechanized or heli-
coptered in from out of nowhere and accompanied by fierce na-
val bombardment and pounding B-52 bomber strikes, finally
caused many of the regular VC to disperse into the nearby jun-
BATTLE FOR THE COAST 193
gle-covered mountains. Afraid and tired, some of the local vil-
lage Viet Cong began turning themselves in.
Many villages continued to resist. A tank-riding reconnais-
sance platoon of the brigade was searching the beachside village
of An Tho on the breezy, clear morning of August 20, 1967.
Shortly after eleven o'clock a resupply helicopter was buffeted
by ground fire, and the American tanks rumbled north after two
Viet Cong running toward the nearby hamlet of An Thach. There
a sixty-man company of the 97th Battalion, 2d VC Regiment oc-
cupied a maze of trenchlines winding among the bamboo thick-
ets and cactus hedgerows, which boxed in small plots of open
farmland.
The tanks' steel-encased machine guns opened fire and cut
down one of the VC dodging into the sandy brush. Then the
hidden trenchline spewed out an uneven racket of automatic ri-
fle fire. Although the Viet Cong had no antitank weapons, they
were determined to defend the village with grenades and other
weapons. The rest of the combined force at An Tho was swiftly
pushed into the skirmish. Suddenly one of the tanks was jarred
by an explosion. Although the tank itself was undamaged, its
crew had been wounded by the force of the blast. Helicopter
gunships hovered above the tanks and infantry as they worked
in close conjunction to clear the first trenchline. The crescendo
of machine-gun fire was periodically stifled by the boom of tank
cannonade slamming point-blank into the hedgerows.
Lt. Col. Norman L. Tiller decided to airlift two more com-
panies of his 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry, into An Thach. The
35th Infantry was particularly well suited to this combat; its reg-
imental shield was emblazoned with a giant cactus and its nick-
name was the Cacti, derived from its original service along the
Mexican border. Now the unit was heavily engaged amidst the
bloodstained cacti surrounding An Thach. 1
The Viet Cong were fighting desperately from bunkers and
trenches to hold on to their positions. As they became com-
pletely encircled they realized their predicament and decided
1. The 35th Infantry was organized in July 1916 at Douglas, Arizona for
guard duty against Mexico and moved in 1922 to Hawaii. Since then its des-
tiny had been in the Pacific, where it fought through both World War II and
the Korean War. It had been in Vietnam since January 1966.
194 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
to break for the west. They moved from trench to trench, paus-
ing only long enough to fire a few bursts before moving again.
Through the haze of close combat they saw more and more heli-
copters discharging green-clad, equipment-laden Americans who
were closing off all exits. Low-flying helicopters buzzed down
the fortified avenues, their machine guns ripping up earth and
structures into whirlwinds of dust and smoke. Some Viet Cong
clutched their automatic rifles and made frenzied charges against
the hated armor-plated monoliths which dominated the square
patches of open ground.
The soldiers of the 35th ruthlessly pressed forward as the
lopsided battle inevitably deteriorated. The Viet Cong company
was broken into smaller fragments under the weight of the tank-
infantry assault. Several VC were killed hiding in holes under-
neath their houses. About two o'clock the gunfire rose to a brief
climax as Army riflemen and machines rammed through the last
real resistance, a cluster of fourteen soldiers who died in close-
quarters combat. Thereafter, the afternoon was punctuated by
bursts of rifle fire at ten-minute intervals as surviving VC were
flushed out. A flurry of helicopter activity overhead finished eight
Viet Cong trying to flee across open rice paddies. Only a single
five-man bunker was left by evening. The reinforcing companies
had already started shuffling back to their helicopters, which took
them to the beach to spend the night.
The Viet Cong company had been annihilated. The day's ac-
tion was typical of those military victories in Vietnam in which
the Army could muster overwhelming power and crush an op-
ponent incapable of meaningful response or flight. This was war
as it had existed in every century: uneven, cruel, and reduced
to a ritual of slaughter. The warriors' success was measured by
violent destruction, in which prompt and systematic elimination
of the enemy meant the loss of fewer comrades. The terror and
shock of bayonet-point battlefield reality remained the ultimate
finishing school of first-class soldiers.
The 1st Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division was search-
ing for the Viet Cong inland through saturation patrolling and
ambushing. Companies were air-assaulted into multiple landing
zones and, once on the ground, patrolled in three or four areas
which were within mutual striking distance in case reinforce-
BATTLE FOR THE COAST 195
ment was required. To allow the companies to fade into the
tropical rain forest, up to seven days' rations were issued before
operations. The brigade seldom moved at night since controlled
movement through the jungle became very difficult. During hours
of darkness, the paratroopers settled into ambush positions along
trails that they had found during the day.
Task Force Oregon was being transformed by mid-August
The 3d Brigade of the 25th Infantry Division was redesignated
as the 3d Brigade of the 4th Infantry Division, and this change
of title brought it a step closer to rejoining the latter division
in the Central Highlands. With the 1st Brigade of the 101st
Airborne Division looking forward to recuperating at its Phan
Rang home base, only the 196th Infantry Brigade was left with-
out a sponsor. Although the 23d Infantry Division (Americal)
had its genesis in Task Force Oregon, only the 196th served
both. Daily contacts between small opposing groups continued
under a variety of code names well into November. During that
time, however, Task Force Oregon was becoming a legitimate
Regular Army division.
On September 22, 1967, Task Force Oregon was redesig-
nated the Americal Division. The name Americal was chosen
partially in deference to Marine Corps-Army working relation-
ships. The old Americal Division of World War II had been
formed from Army units on New Caledonia to support the Ma-
rine offensive on Guadalcanal. The name was derived by com-
bining the words American and Caledonia, and it became offi-
cial. The name Americal had another connection. It was the only
division during World War II to be formed outside United States
territory, an act being repeated in Vietnam by the conversion
of Task Force Oregon. 2
The Chu Lai security 196th Infantry Brigade initially had to
serve as the backbone of the new division. Resulting problems
that the Americal Division experienced stemmed mostly from
2. The military in Vietnam also was attracted to the notion that it was the
Army's only named division, but this was not strictly the case. The Depart-
ment of the Army had assigned it the numerical designation 23 after World
War II, and Americal was now only an agnomen which could be placed in
parentheses. MACV conveniently ignored this officialese whenever it could,
and the division was simply known in Vietnam as the Americal Division.
196 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
the two poorly trained brigades added as soon as they landed
in Vietnam. The 198th Infantry Brigade, another castoff in-
tended for police duty in the Dominican Republic, was given
to the Americal Division after it was nixed for duty on the Ca-
ribbean island. The llth Infantry Brigade arrived to join the
division in late December. The brigade had been formed to re-
constitute the Pacific reserve on Hawaii. The unit was not fully
trained or equipped when it suddenly received orders for de-
ployment to Vietnam. This extremely tight scheduling pre-
cluded smooth transition to a battlefront role. Predeployment
inspections revealed over thirteen hundred men incapable of
deploying. Many filler personnel were hastily added to the bri-
gade to meet these shortfalls, and in fact replacements contin-
ued to arrive up until the very date of departure. The turmoil
and confusion were detrimental to both its predeployment prep-
aration and its ultimate combat performance.
On Thanksgiving Day of 1967, as paratroopers and infantry-
men were scrambling up Hill 875 in the Central Highlands, the
196th Infantry Brigade was fighting another fortified position in
Quang Tin Province near the South China Sea. The morning
was overcast with light misting rain as the 4th Battalion, 31st
Infantry, 3 moved out against Hill 63. The hillock island, rising
from the flat rice paddies, was covered with thick brush and
jumbled boulders. Numerous small houses on these hillocks were
surrounded by dense ten-foot high hedgerows dividing vegeta-
ble plots.
The hill was defended by soldiers of the 2d NVA Division
entrenched in foxholes and hedgerows. Sudden bursts of close-
range submachine-gun fire started cutting down the advancing
armor-vested infantrymen. Tanks from the 1st Squadron, 1st
Cavalry and armored personnel carriers from Troop F, 17th
3. The 31st Infantry was known as the "Polar Bears," a title gained after
service in the ill-fated Siberian expedition of 1918-19. Formed in the Phil-
ippine Islands in 1916, it had surrendered to the Japanese 14th Army on
Bataan early in World War II. Reorganized in Korea after the war, where it
stayed until inactivation in 1957, the regiment did not set foot in the United
States until 1965 when it was reformed in Massachusetts as part of the 196th
Infantry Brigade. The 4th Battalion had been sent overseas again, to Vietnam,
less than a year later. Large, menacing polar bears still decorated the unit's
distinctive insignia.
BATTLE FOR THE COAST 197
Cavalry, plowed forward. A rocket-propelled grenade struck the
ammunition box on one vehicle and a spectacular explosion rocked
the area. By noon the fighting had become general and more
infantry and armored reinforcements were committed. Some tanks
became mired in the monsoon mud.
The battle degenerated into a deadly game between infantry
and bunkered positions. The foot soldiers encountering a bunker
fired tracer rounds into it, showing the tank commanders where
to aim. The tanks resorted to firing two rounds per bunker: a
high explosive round with a delayed fuse to kill the NVA inside,
followed by another high explosive "superquick" shot to open
up the bunker's sides. Their tracked tonnage crushed in many
defensive works. One particular bunker held out for over an
hour. Finally, some soldiers tied eight pounds of TNT to a twelve-
foot bamboo pole and shoved it in the rear entrance. The blast
caved the bunker in on its occupants.
Fifteen tons of bombs and ten tons of napalm plastered the
surrounding countryside, as the infantrymen were taking fire from
across the rice paddies also. The next day dawned cloudy and
humid, and the mission was expanded to clear the rest of the
islands. Early that morning heavy automatic weapons fire ripped
into the armored-infantry teams, announcing the NVA's contin-
ued presence. Artillery and air strikes saturated the area, in an
attempt to block all avenues of escape. Sweeps across many is-
lands failed to disclose all the hidden positions. Bypassed NVA
gunners would fire point-blank into the backs of soldiers moving
beyond them. By November 25, the North Vietnamese had been
pushed out of the area, and the battle was over. The 196th In-
fantry Brigade and the new Americal Division would continue
to face a determined, resilient foe for the duration of their ef-
forts in Vietnam.
2. Battle for the Bong Son Plains
Maj. Gen. John Norton's 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile)
had been fighting against the 3d NVA Division in lush, densely
populated Binh Dinh Province since early 1966. As 1967 opened,
the cavalry was engaged in Operation THAYER II, part of a
continuing series of maneuvers designed to maintain pressure in
that coastal province. Reinforced by a 25th Infantry Division
198 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
brigade, it continued to comb the rice and sugarcane fields around
the Bong Son lowlands and its adjacent valleys. The North Vi-
etnamese and main force Viet Cong were highly elusive, and
contact was difficult. As a result, opposition remained light dur-
ing the operation, and the only notable action occurred on Jan-
uary 27. The 2d Battalion of the 12th Cavalry air-assaulted into
a hornet's nest four miles northwest of Bong Son while con-
ducting a reconnaissance sweep. Its descending helicopters came
under fire from two battalions of the 22d NVA Regiment, and
the rest of 2d Brigade leaped into action. However, the North
Vietnamese quickly fled the battlefield before blocking forces
could reach the scene.
On February 11, during the Tet 1967 holidays, Major Gen-
eral Norton kicked off Operation PERSHING, with the avowed
purpose of finishing off NVA forces in northern Binh Dinh Prov-
ince. Reinforced by swarms of news camera teams, his division
began sweeping hamlets and flushing the VC out of tunnels,
wells, and hidden bunkers. Light skirmishing also flared along
the high ground to the west of the Bong Son plains. During the
first week of March, the 2d Brigade tangled twice with the 18th
NVA Regiment in the Crescent Mountain area. On March 19,
the 1st Battalion of the 8th Cavalry clashed unexpectedly with
a large North Vietnamese force, and two battalions of the 5th
Cavalry joined the three-day battle before the North Vietnam-
ese slipped away.
All three brigades of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile)
were concentrated in Binh Dinh Province on Operation
PERSHING soon after Maj. Gen. John J. Tolson III took com-
mand of the division on the first day of April. With the excep-
tion of one detached battalion, the entire division was together
for the first time in over a year. At the same time the attached
brigade from the 25th Infantry Division was freed to join Army
Task Force Oregon. During the next month the cavalry's 3d Bri-
gade pushed north into the former Marine trouble spot of Quang
Ngai Province. Embedded in the jungled, cave-studded hills it
found Viet Cong strongholds which often covered the flat, open
rice paddies with grazing fire.
The 2d Battalion of the 8th Cavalry air-assaulted into the
BATTLE FOR THE COAST 199
Viet Cong bastion of Song Re Valley on August 9. 4 Following a
brief artillery barrage, one company of cavalrymen helicoptered
onto a ridgeline which turned out to be bristling with camou-
flaged North Vietnamese fortifications. Immediately upon touch-
down they were greeted by a combined onslaught of heavy au-
tomatic weapons, mortar, and recoilless rifle fire which blasted
several helicopters out of the sky. Close combat raged for more
than four hours before the troopers were able to pull back far
enough to call in supporting air strikes. After forty-six tactical
Air Force sorties and concentrated aerial rocket fire, the NVA
withdrew. Cavalry reinforcements were unable to regain con-
tact.
During September, a number of firefights erupted in both
the Bong Son and An Lao valleys. The newly arrived mecha-
nized 1st Battalion of the 50th Infantry was attached to give the
1st Cavalry Division some armored firepower. By November,
Operation PERSHING was reduced to a holding action as the
division channeled forces in to bolster the Battle of Dak To.
During the last month of the year the division returned to win
an important victory over a fortified village complex near Tarn
Quan, along the seacoast of Binh Dinh Province.
Scout helicopters from the 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry, spot-
ted a radio antenna sticking out of the ground near Tarn Quan
on December 6. When the flight leader fired rockets at it, he
was answered by machine guns. One of the squadron's aerial
rifle platoons was landed at once astride Highway 1. It reached
the edge of Tarn Quan village before being pinned down by
accurate fire from trenchlines interlaced with spider holes which
were covered by logs and dirt. The hamlet was situated on a
large paddy island covered by palm trees and dense bamboo
thickets separated by numerous hedgerows, and the trench net-
work was constructed along the edge of this island. Another rifle
platoon was air-assaulted into an adjacent rice paddy, but it also
4. The 8th Cavalry was one of the Army's post-Civil War regiments raised
at the Presidio of San Francisco to tame the West. It fought Apaches, Co-
manches, and other Indians, most notably in Arizona. After twelve years of
Texas duty to 1888, it served in Cuba and the Philippines and fought in both
World War II and in Korea with the 1st Cavalry Division.
200 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
became pinned in place as night was approaching.
The 1st Battalion of the 8th Cavalry was air-assaulted into
the maelstrom to extract the two platoons just prior to dark. As
the cavalrymen moved out, the Viet Cong suddenly opened fire
from well-concealed spider holes. Company B consolidated on
its landing zone as night fell, and armored personnel carriers
from the 1st Battalion, 50th Infantry, were added around its pe-
rimeter. Deep ditches around the paddy island had prevented
the tracked carriers from getting around resistance. The sky was
illuminated by constant flares and aircraft searchlights, and the
aerial cavalry scouts were able to pull back under fire to the
laager. As standard insurance, continuous artillery fire was used
to pound the surrounding area.
The next morning rocket-firing helicopters doused the vil-
lage with nonlethal riot-control gas, and self-propelled antiair-
craft Duster guns lumbered in to use their automatic twin 40mm
guns to rip through the thick shrubbery concealing the defend-
ers. Artillery fire softened up the objective. The 40th ARVN
Regiment pushed south of Dai Dong to complete the encircle-
ment. At nine o'clock the 1st Battalion's cavalrymen, bolstered
by several armored personnel carriers, charged across the marshy
rice paddies. They were battered and repulsed by fierce inter-
locking defensive fires. More artillery bombardment was di-
rected into the fortifications. That afternoon two flame-throwing
armored personnel carriers arrived, and the battalion was sent
in again to dislodge the entrenched Viet Cong.
The cavalrymen went forward with two companies on line
and armored personnel carriers interspersed through their ranks.
Recoilless rifle fire and rocket-propelled grenades slammed into
the advancing troops. One carrier exploded, but a gush of smoke
from the backblast of the Viet Cong antitank rifle exposed the
weapon site. A burst of flame from one of the special armored
personnel carriers scorched the position. As the troopers closed
in to the first line of bunkers, dozens of grenades bounced off
the rumbling vehicles. Many VC were crushed by the grinding
mechanized tracks clanking over the trenches. Combat engineer
bulldozers churned into the area to throw a causeway over the
soggy battlefield, bury trenchlines, and clear areas for aerial
medical evacuation.
BATTLE FOR THE COAST 201
That same afternoon a company of the mechanized infantry
tried assaulting the nearby village of Dai Dong, They crossed a
wide rice paddy but were quickly bogged down in the dikes
around the hamlet. The battle raged for the next several days,
the Americans pulling back each evening to night laagers ringed
with armored vehicles. Reinforcements were urgently required,
and the 1st Battalion of the 12th Cavalry had to be airlifted into
the fight all the way from Dak To. Dai Dong was finally overrun
on December 9 as the VC defenders were splintered into small
groups that were methodically eliminated in small firefights
throughout the area. The battle continued across the Bong Son
River where the last organized resistance was crushed at An
Ngheip by the 2d Battalion of the 8th Cavalry. This final en-
gagement was marred by the inability of the armored personnel
carriers to cross the swift-flowing, mud-banked river.
The Battle of Tarn Quan was costly to both sides. Only three
Viet Cong surrendered, and hundreds of bodies were uncovered
in the charred wreckage of bunkers and collapsed trenchlines.
Army and ARVN forces had suffered grievously as well. How-
ever, as a result of 1st Cavalry Division efforts during Operation
PERSHING, Binh Dinh was one of the least affected provinces
in Vietnam during the upcoming NVA/VC Tet-68 Offensive.
..iff
PART 4
1968
* Con Thien
-Nhi Ha Dai Do area
Dong Ha
Camp Evans
Hue
Hoa Vang
KEY TO OPERATIONS
1 - YELLOWSTONE
2 - NEVADA EAGLE
3 - WHEELER / WALLOWA
Filhol Plantation
FSB Pope
Dau Tieng
FSB Burt
Ben Cui Rubber Plantation
FSB Buell
Tay Ninh
Trang Ban
CuChi
Phu Bai
Phu Loc
A Shau .
Da Nang
Hoi An
Tam Ky *
Chu Lai
Son My My Lai
Ben Cat
Phu Cuong
I yLam Son
.* i/ Bien Hoa
I Xuan Loc
Hoi* O V. LongBinh
Tan An. Can Duoc /ongjhanh
MyTho. ^J^.BaRIa
Phan Thiet
**
Van Kiep Naval Training Center
5,0
100
scale miles
Saigon
Map by Shelby L Stanton
South Vietnam - 1968
-N-
CHAPTER 14.
YEAR OF CRISES
1. 1968: Military Posture in Vietnam
The Vietnam Tet Offensive hit the American military like a
thunderbolt. MACV had been expecting trouble, but not on a
country-wide scale. On the eve of Tet-68, January 31, the United
States had nine divisions, one armored cavalry regiment, and
two separate brigades committed to Vietnam. This force totaled
331,098 Army soldiers and 78,013 Marines, concentrated in a
hundred infantry and mechanized battalions. 1 MACV also had
several strong formations from other countries in Vietnam, most
notably the 1st Australian Task Force, a Royal Thai Army Reg-
iment, two Korean divisions (the Capital and 9th), and a Korean
Marine Corps brigade.
During January MACV's concerns in Vietnam were riveted
on the northernmost provinces, upon which the high command
had developed a fixation. The Marine Corps had already in-
vested twenty-one infantry battalions, of its total thirty-six
worldwide, into this I Corps Tactical Zone. The 3d Marine Di-
vision was defending parts of Defense Secretary McNamara's
1. The U.S. forces and their actual strengths on January 31, 1968, were 1st
Marine Division (22,466); 3d Marine Division (24,417); 1st Cavalry Division
(18,647); 1st Infantry Division (17,539); 4th Infantry Division (19,042); 9th In-
fantry Division (16,153); 23d Infantry (Americal) Division (15,825); 25th In-
fantry Division (17,666); 101st Airborne Division (15,220); 173d Airborne Bri-
gade (5,313); 199th Infantry Brigade (4,215); llth Armored Cavalry Regiment
(4,331); 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) (3,400).
205
206 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
Project DYE MARKER barrier, and stretched out along the Route
9 trace of strong-points that paralleled the DMZ. The 1st Ma-
rine Division was emplaced in Da Nang, Phu Bai, and Quang
Tri. One regiment of the 5th Marine Division, the 26th Ma-
rines, had garrisoned the western anchor bastion of Khe Sanh.
General Westmoreland had been reshuffling his deck of
available combat resources northward for some time. The trend
had been set as early as August 1966, when the Korean Marine
Brigade had been shipped into Chu Lai. By 1967, major op-
erations in the rest of Vietnam were being curtailed, as field
forces sacrificed major units in the rush to shift more Army for-
mations north. Alarming year-end intelligence reports of a major
NVA effort brewing in the border province of Quang Tri were
followed by events at Khe Sanh. There the frightening results
of a mid- January patrol action verified that the Marine combat
base was surrounded by at least two dug-in NVA divisions. With
the 26th Marines cut off at Khe Sanh, and both 1st and 3d Ma-
rine divisions tied down in hard combat, the situation in I Corps
Tactical Zone appeared to be fast shaping up as a major disaster
unless enough reinforcements could be pushed into the area
during January to secure it.
The Army s new 23d Infantry (Americal) Division, charged
with taming the two southern provinces of the zone, was still
forming and did not carry much offensive clout. Its most recent
component was the poorly trained and equipped llth Infantry
Brigade (Light), which had just disembarked in Vietnam in De-
cember. Already divisional soldiers were calling it "The Metre-
cal Division sponsored by General Foods," hardly a phrase re-
flective of high morale. During the height of the Tet-68 offensive,
Marine commanders balked at General Westmoreland's recom-
mendation to use it to reinforce Da Nang.
Airmobile striking power was rammed north when the crack
1st Cavalry Division in Binh Dinh Province was moved to III
Marine Amphibious Force control. The 3d Brigade had been
helping the Americal Division there since October, and it re-
joined the divisional headquarters and 1st Brigade in the Hue-
Phu Bai area on January 21, 1968. The division's other brigade
did not move north until March, so the 2d Brigade of the 101st
Airborne Division arrived as a temporary supplement. The 1st
YEAR OF CRISES 207
Cavalry Division immediately began operations around Quang
Tri.
If any Army unit could perform airmobile magic, it was this
one. Known as the First Team, it was a division forged precisely
for the Vietnam style of area warfare. Led by the dynamic Ma-
jor General Tolson, a paratrooper who had made almost every
Pacific jump of World War II, it had been beefed up well be-
yond average divisional power with lavish amounts of aviation.
It was the only division with its own helicopter group, hundreds
of assault and rocket-firing choppers that excelled in lifting the
veteran sky troopers into the hottest landing zones in Vietnam.
The 1st Cavalry Division not only had dash and experience,
but more importantly, its men demonstrated an uncanny will-
ingness to knock heads with the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong.
The division enjoyed a reputation for repeated success on the
battlefield. Popularly known as Sky Cav, the division staged sur-
prise air assaults so startling that VC mortar crews had been
caught firing unarmed rounds, the shipping plugs still inserted,
at the cavalrymen pouring out of helicopters. The 1st Cavalry
Division's umbrella of aerial war wagons mauled the NVA at
Quang Tri, helped crush the opposition in Hue, and leaped into
Khe Sanh during the spring of 1968.
However, divisions of the 1st Cavalry Division's caliber were
the exception by this time. The famed 101st Airborne Division
had recently arrived in Vietnam, but it was airborne in name
only and a shadow of its prewar eminence. Drained by years of
maintaining its top-notch 1st Brigade in Vietnam, the division's
ranks contained a mere sprinkling of parachutists. On January
10, U.S. Army, Vietnam, completed a paratrooper availability
study which projected difficulties in retaining even the 173d
Airborne Brigade in such a mode. The Army decided to take
the 101st off jump status and turn it into a second airmobile
attack division, but at the moment requisite aviation and train-
ing for such a conversion were lacking. In the meantime, the
steady influx of ordinary soldier replacements both in Kentucky
and Vietnam had transformed it into a standard division. 2
2. The Department of the Army redesignated both the 1st Cavalry Division
and the 101st Airborne Division on June 27, 1968, as the 1st and 101st Air
Cavalry Divisions, respectively. This created a lot of fuss and bother among
208 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
The "Screaming Eagles" 101st Airborne Division had ini-
tially been programmed as a concentrated shot in the arm for
III Corps Tactical Zone. However, it became an early candidate
for General Westmoreland's northern buildup. A brigade flew
north to reinforce the 1st Cavalry Division in January. At the
same time other units of the division searched around Song Be
and probed the southern part of War Zone D and the Filhol
plantation. On February 19, 1968, the division headquarters and
1st Brigade scurried north to the vicinity of Hue, allowing the
1st Cavalry Division to get into position to relieve Khe Sanh.
On that day the Army divisions in the area outweighed the Ma-
rine divisions three to two. The big move left III Corps Tactical
Zone with only the 3d Brigade, which had been parceled out
in several Tet-68 reaction battles.
This 3d Brigade then became the basis for one of MACV's
most ambitious surprise moves to bag the North Vietnamese in
central South Vietnam. It was alerted to an undisclosed location
in the highlands. The anticipated move was so secret that the
contingency plans were not mentioned to "foreign" personnel.
All divisional patches were ripped off and helicopter and other
markings erased. The 3d Brigade deployed to Kontum on May
25, but all its deceptiveness failed to impress or entrap any-
body, and in fifteen days it was on its way back south. In Oc-
tober the entire division was put back together in I Corps Tac-
tical Zone.
Due to the accelerated northern buildup, 1968 operations in
the central portion of South Vietnam were generally relegated
to a holding pattern. During January, "The Herd" 173d Air-
borne Brigade continued to }>rush against light opposition in the
mountains as it phased into the former 1st Cavalry Division base
camp at An Khe. After serving as a general Tet-68 fire brigade,
the elite paratroopers scoured the coastal plains of Binh Dinh
Province during March. The experienced "Ivy" 4th Infantry Di-
vision continued its security of the Central Highlands against
light and scattered resistance, broken only by the fierce Tet bat-
the traditionalists, and on August 26, 1968, the Army Chief of Staff altered
the titles to 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) and 101st Airborne Division (Air-
mobile).
YEAR OF CRISES 209
ties at Pleiku and Kontum. The Korean Capital and 9th "White
Horse" divisions maintained effective control of the coast from
Phan Rang to Qui Nhon.
Two brigades of the "Tropic Lightning" 25th Infantry Divi-
sion had gone back into War Zone C to locate Viet Cong in-
stallations in December of 1967 in Operation YELLOWSTONE.
At midnight on New Year's Day, Col. Leonard Daems's 3d Bri-
gade got into a bad scrape at Fire Support Base Burt The pe-
rimeter was defended by the armored personnel carriers and
men of the 2d and 3d Battalions, 22d Infantry, against an all-
out assault by soldiers of the 271st and 272d VC Regiments
charging behind a wall of machine-gun, recoilless rifle, and rocket
grenade fire. 3
The fighting was savage and desperate, lasting throughout
the night with plenty of Beehive rounds and massive, close-in
aerial napalm strikes. Tracked carriers and self-propelled 40mm
antiaircraft guns were burning fiercely as the Viet Cong blasted
their way into the infantry lines. Reserves rushed from other
sides of the perimeter managed to hold the circular wagon wheel
defense intact, and at dawn the VC withdrew. Operation YEL-
LOWSTONE ended on February 24, 1968. The division's 2d
Brigade was involved in heavy fighting along the Cambodian
border south of Tay Ninh during this time.
The "Big Red One" 1st Infantry Division had just driven a
wedge between War Zones C and D as it finally succeeded in
opening Route 13 to Quan Loi. It would continue to secure this
highway and sweep around the Saigon area during the upcom-
ing storm of Tet-68. The "Redcatchers" 199th Infantry Brigade
had turned over security responsibilities for the greater Saigon
area to the 5th ARVN Ranger Group. The brigade then sortied
into War Zone D in Operation UNIONTOWN, a mission which
placed it in excellent defensive positions near Bien Hoa and in
proximity to the llth Armored Cavalry Regiment.
3. The 22d Infantry was redesignated in September 1866 in the Dakota ter-
ritory from units raised at the end of the Civil War. It was a veteran of
numerous Indian campaigns from the Dakotas to Montana, later fought in
Cuba, and was shipped to the Philippines in February 1899. The regiment
missed World War I but served in Europe during World War II. The two
battalions had been in Vietnam since October of 1966.
210 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
The 9th Infantry Division had shifted to cover the southern
approaches to Saigon, while its mobile riverine force had fused
with Navy Task Force 117 to cover the northern watershed of
the delta. The 1st Australian Task Force commenced its first
operation outside Phuoc Tuy Province just east of Bien Hoa on
January 24 with Operation COBURG. This incidentally placed
it in excellent response positions to several Tet-68 trouble spots.
The Royal Thai Army Volunteer Regiment was also operating in
Bien Hoa Province.
The extent and fury of the NVA/VC Tet-68 Offensive at the
end of January caught the American military off guard, with its
resources stretched to the limit by the logistical and tactical strain
of the northward shuffle. At the same time eventual success in
the northern provinces seemed assured by this large infusion of
extra Army assets in the area. MACV responded to the large
battles raging there by sending in unprecedented amounts of
war materials and additional manpower. Over sixty-five logistical
and support units alone were moved north during January and
February.
General Westmoreland's deputy and successor, Gen.
Creighton W. Abrams, flew to the Hue-Phu Bai vicinity on
February 9, 1968, to set up an emergency advance headquarters
tagged MACV Forward. He brought an entourage of logisti-
cians, statisticians, and tacticians garnered from the multitude
of desks and chart rooms of Pentagon East. The critical situation
called for drastic measures, and General Abrams made it clear
that it wasn't business as usual, although his loud pronounce-
ments about slicing "nonessentials," such as PX items, beer, and
furniture, were mitigated by the provisional company of per-
sonal limousines that he brought along for headquarters use.
Front-line losses in the aftermath of the Tet Offensive of 1968
were staggering. United States combat deaths climbed 56 per-
cent in 1968 to 14,592, while total Army and Marine helicopter
losses were up 53 percent, with heaviest losses incurred during
the intense combat of Tet-68 and Mini-Tet. The number of
American deaths was already running twice the number in-
curred in 1967, the year of the big battles. The magnitude of
Tet-68 was also reflected in aircraft destruction, which had dou-
YEAR OF CRISES 211
bled over the previous year. NVA/VC determination and combat
capability were considered most ominous. The allied combat re-
sources on hand in Vietnam were transfixed by the conflagra-
tion. As a result, MACV suddenly made a grab for anything that
could be stripped out of the United States. These demands were
personally handed to Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, the chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, during his February 22-25 visit to South
Vietnam. At the top of the list was a requirement for the im-
mediate deployment of twelve maneuver battalions and eight
tactical fighter squadrons. However, in the United States the
military cupboards were already almost bare as a result of the
spreading quicksand of the Vietnam War.
2, 1968: Military Posture at Home
While the war had escalated into a major conflict, the De-
fense Department was coping with the possibility of internal in-
surrection in the United States itself. Increasing racial and civil
disturbances at home continued unabated. During the first nine
months of 1967, over 150 cities reported disorders ranging from
minor demonstrations to the major crises of Newark, New Jer-
sey, and Detroit, Michigan. In most cases the National Guard
had been able to handle the situations, but in several incidents
federal troops had to be employed.
One of the worst city riots had erupted on July 23, 1967,
with its own ironic connection to the raging Vietnam War. A
predawn police raid was made on the Blind Pig, an upstairs
speakeasy in the black ghetto of Detroit, Michigan, where a party
was being hosted for several servicemen, two of whom had just
returned from Vietnam. A crowd began pitching rocks at the
police, who were putting the club's patrons into police wagons.
The rioting quickly spread over eleven square miles, and by the
next afternoon Lt. Gen. John C. Throckmorton had forward bat-
talions of both the 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions on the scene.
The Detroit riots lasted ten days before the paratroopers unfixed
bayonets and withdrew from the fire-swept, sniper-threatened
urban ruins. Another five days would pass before the area would
completely return to civil authority. It had been a grisly, ugly
212 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
confrontation with a great deal of command and control confu-
sion and a high death toll. 4
Army and Marine troops went into action again during the
Anti-Vietnam Demonstration at the Pentagon in October 1967.
The major attack of the massive demonstration was made by a
two thousand-strong group, some of whom wore gas masks and
were armed with ax handles. They stormed the east side of the
Pentagon behind a barrage of rocks and bottles and crashed
through the lines of the 30th and 504th Military Police Battal-
ions. They were repulsed at the entrance to Corridor 7 of the
Pentagon underneath billowing clouds of tear gas. 5
The Department of Defense was not only plagued with dis-
sension across the country, but the beginning of January un-
leashed a wave of military hostilities in Korea. Trouble along its
demilitarized zone had been heating up through 1967, and the
2d Infantry Division north of the Imjin River was suffering heavy
losses as patrols were ambushed, trucks were mined, and North
Korean hunter-killer teams grenaded and machine gunned out-
posts. 6 On January 23, 1968, the North Koreans captured the
USS Pueblo and its crew.
Then Vietnam exploded. Immediately following the NVA/VC
Tet Offensive, General Westmoreland pleaded for additional forces
to stem the tide. Since June of 1966 the Marines had been
struggling to get their newly activated 5th Marine Division in
shape at Camp Pendleton, California. The 26th Marines had been
yanked out first, and now MACV was insisting on another in-
fantry regiment, the newly formed 27th Marine Regimental
Landing Team. The 27th Marines was whisked out of El Toro,
4. At the height of the Detroit, Michigan, riots on July 29, 1967, a total of
15,339 federal and national guard troops were stationed at Detroit, and 9,613
had been committed into action.
5. During the Pentagon Riots of October 21-23, 1967, a total of 10,346 Ma-
rine and Army troops were placed in the Washington, D.C., area. Three
battalions were posted inside the Pentagon itself. The United States Strike
Command flew in the 1st Brigade of the 82d Airborne Division from Fort
Bragg, North Carolina.
6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved recommendations for combat pay in
certain areas of Korea on February 27, 1968, and the House Appropriations
Committee made it effective from April 1, 1968.
YEAR OF CRISES 213
California, on February 17, 1968, and landed at Da Nang. It
remained in defense of the key port until withdrawn from Viet-
nam that September.
The elite, all-volunteer 82d Airborne Division was drilling
on the icy pine-fringed lanes of Fort Bragg, North Carolina. It
was preparing for another hard year of riot control. With the
exception of the 82d, the United States had only two under-
strength Marine and four skeletonized Army divisions left state-
side by the beginning of 1968. The 82d Airborne Division was
the sole readily deployable strategic reserve, the last real ves-
tige of actual Army divisional combat potency in the United States
left to the Pentagon. 7 It was composed of tough paratroopers
who constituted a fanatically reliable formation, which became
indispensable to the government during the racial and political
revolts of 1968.
Suddenly, in the wake of Tet-68, even the 82d Airborne Di-
vision was no longer immune to MACV's incessant appetite. The
fiction of paper flags on senior officer briefing maps was fast
folding, and the Department of Defense could not spare the
most reliable Army division in its inventory. Clearly, the ability
of the armed forces to react was being stretched to the breaking
point. The Pentagon finally compromised and agreed to release
one third. As the 3d Brigade was being jumped on a routine
training exercise over Florida on January 22, their orders for
immediate Vietnam duty were being stenciled. The entire di-
vision was stripped to round out one full-strength paratrooper
brigade, and the advance party left a cold, wind-swept Pope Air
Force Base next door to Fort Bragg on February 13. On the
afternoon of Valentine's Day, the huge emergency airlift of men
and equipment went to Chu Lai.
The division had been so rushed to get this brigade to the
7. Forces in the United States in January 1968 were the 2d Marine Divi-
sion Camp Lejeune, North Carolina; 5th Marine Division (partial) Camp
Pendleton, California; 1st Armored Division (partial) Fort Hood, Texas; 2d
Armored Division (partial) Fort Hood, Texas; 5th Infantry Division Fort
Carson, Colorado; 6th Infantry Division (partial) Fort Campbell, Kentucky;
82d Airborne Division Fort Bragg, North Carolina; 6th Armored Cavalry
Regiment Fort Meade, Maryland; 194th Armored Brigade (School Sup-
port) Fort Knox, Kentucky; 197th Infantry Brigade (School Support) Fort
Benning, Georgia.
214 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
battlefront that it ignored individual deployment criteria. Para-
troopers who had just returned from Vietnam now found them-
selves suddenly going back. The howl of soldier complaints was
so vehement that the Department of the Army was soon forced
to give each trooper who had deployed to Vietnam with the 3d
Brigade the option of returning to Fort Bragg or remaining with
the unit. To compensate for the abrupt departures from home
for those who elected to stay with the unit, the Army authorized
a month leave at the soldiers' own expense, or a two-week leave
with government aircraft provided for special flights back to North
Carolina. Of the 3,650 paratroopers who had deployed from Fort
Bragg, 2,513 elected to return to the United States at once.
MACV had no paratroopers to replace them, and overnight the
brigade was transformed into a separate light infantry brigade,
airborne in name only. Many of those returning would be fight-
ing in Washington, D.C., that April, huddled in burnt-out laun-
dromats and returning sniper fire from open jeeps, as their com-
rades pushed through dense tropical jungle against bunker lines
overseas.
With the February 26 arrival of the 7th Squadron of the 1st
Cavalry (First Regiment of Dragoons), a welcome 850-man heli-
copter search and attack unit from Kentucky, the immediately
available military resources in the United States were com-
pletely exhausted. Two more major units were still programmed
to go to Vietnam, where they were needed to bolster the ex-
treme northern provinces. The 1st Squadron of the 18th Ar-
mored Cavalry, a California National Guard unit, was ordered
into active federal service at Burbank on May 13, 1968, and
scheduled to arrive in Vietnam that August. There was consid-
erable political and antiwar turmoil in California, and MACV
canceled the request for the California cavalry on September 25,
1968. The 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) at Fort Carson,
Colorado, was tasked to send its 1st Brigade to replace the 27th
Marines. The division became embroiled in the Chicago and
Washington, D.C., riots of April, and was hard pressed to get
its brigade reorganized and combat-ready. The brigade was rushed
to Vietnam's I Corps Tactical Zone on July 25 in order to meet
Army scheduling deadlines. It moved to the Quang Tri area but
was not deemed combat-ready until September 1, 1968.
YEAR OF CRISES 215
Events in the United States slipped from bad to worse. At
the end of March, President Johnson announced over national
television that he would not campaign for a second term. In
April of 1968, seething racial unrest in Washington, D.C., Chi-
cago, and Baltimore flared into major violence following the as-
sassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. The forces needed
to subdue the resulting large-scale riots in all three cities in-
cluded most of the Regular Army formations left in the United
States, as well as massive numbers of National Guard troops. 8
The year also tapped large Army contingents at events such as
the Democratic National Convention in Chicago during August,
although local authorities quelled the disorders without the need
of actual federal intervention.
Changes of the guard were taking place both in Washington
and in Vietnam. On March 1, 1968, Clark M. Clifford became
the new Secretary of Defense as Robert S. McNamara stepped
down. One of the most profound changes of the conflict in Viet-
nam transpired when General Westmoreland departed as MACV
commander to become the new Army Chief of Staff on July 3,
1968. General Abrams would bring far-reaching directional
changes to the Vietnam battlefront, primarily in an effort to re-
duce United States combat losses and get the South Vietnamese
Army back into the war's mainstream.
3. Other Vietnam Military Considerations
Military strategy in Vietnam during 1968 was still directed
toward sustained offensive operations to defeat the NVA/VC
forces, although much of its momentum was in reaction to NVA/
VC-initiated events on the ground. City security became a ma-
jor concern following the battles of Saigon and Hue. Although
large offensive operations continued in certain critical areas, these
operations were tempered in less essential areas as die military
went on the defensive (termed "economy of force"). To com-
pensate for exorbitant American casualty rates in the first six
8. Major Regular Army units involved in April 1968 riot combat were: Chi-
cago-ad Brigade, 1st Armored Division; 3d Brigade 5th Infantry Division;
Baltimore-XVIII Corps Artillery; 197th Infantry Brigade; Washington D.C.-
82d Airborne Division; 2d Brigade, 5th Infantry Division; 6th Armored Cav-
airy Regiment.
216 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
months of the year, operational zeal slackened in order to re-
duce U.S. losses. However, most significant was an April 16,
1968, directive to the Joint Chiefs of Staff announcing that the
Defense Department had embarked on a course of gradually
shifting the burden of the war to the South Vietnamese military.
Although the word Vietnamization was not coined until 1969,
the planning had already started.
The South Vietnamese armed forces were not militarily self-
sufficient, a problem rooted in years of U.S. technical and com-
mand control and in America's direct conduct of the war since
1965. The South Vietnamese had started to perk up after it be-
came apparent that the United States might do the lion's share
of the fighting. War weariness set in again after the blows of
Tet-68, which fell hardest on the ARVN defenders. This con-
dition was manifested by crippling desertion rates and little ag-
gressive battlefield leadership. The South Vietnamese Army was
still lacking essential modernization. For example, at the begin-
ning of 1968 only the ARVN Airborne Division, Marine Bri-
gade, 51st Infantry Regiment, and 21st, 30th, 33d, 37th, and
39th ranger battalions were equipped with M16 rifles, which
allowed firepower equal to the communist assault rifles.
The South Vietnamese force structure was strengthened as
the year progressed. The llth ARVN Airborne Battalion, which
had been cut up by the Tet attacks on Van Kiep Naval Training
Center, was declared operational March 30 and sent to Saigon.
This completed the expansion of the elite ARVN Airborne Di-
vision. On October 1, the dependable and rugged South Viet-
namese marine establishment, which had been operating two
three-battalion brigades, was given a little extra artillery and re-
designated a division.
The ten regular South Vietnamese divisions continued to
perform *wy unevenly during 1968, though in some cases heavy
losses accounted for declining abilities. The 1st ARVN Division
at Hue maintained its reputation as one of the best. The 2d
ARVN Division at Quang Ngai, historically prone to high de-
sertions, displayed so little combat spirit during Tet that it was
tagged as a major problem. The Lam Son-based 5th ARVN Di-
vision was considered barely effective, a rating shared by the
7th ARVN Division at Can Tho. The 9th ARVN Division posted
YEAR OF CRISES 217
to Sa Dec was the poorest of all. The trouble-plagued 18th ARVN
Division at Xuan Loc remained combat-ineffective despite close
command scrutiny. The 21st ARVN Division, located at Bac Lieu,
was one of Saigon's better divisions. Both the 22d ARVN Di-
vision at Ba Gi and the 23d ARVN Division at Ban Me Thuot
had problem regiments (the 41st and 44th respectively), but there
had been aggressive assaults on well-entrenched VC positions
north of Pleiku city. The 25th ARVN Division at Due Hoa im-
proved once it was issued M16 rifles and M60 machine guns.
MACV had also been directed to start a civilianization pro-
gram on September 15, 1967. South Vietnamese workers would
be substituted for U.S. military support personnel in certain lo-
gistical units. There were many advantages. American man-
power could be trimmed as technical expertise was shared.
However, MACV was dismayed at the prospect of losing its sol-
diers in exchange for labor problems and potential sabotage.
Most large construction, and many service, projects in Viet-
nam were already in the hands of civilian companies. For ex-
ample, Pacific Architects & Engineers, Inc., handled the repair
and utilities support for the Army, and employed over twenty-
four thousand civilian personnel. Other examples were the Vin-
nell Corporation, which built and maintained central power plants
and electrical systems, the Philco-Ford equipment yards, and.
the Alaskan Barge and Transport Company, which provided
stevedore, trucking, and intracoastal barge service.
Work stoppages and contractual disputes were already a con-
stant headache requiring frequent Army intervention. As an ex-
ample, in late 1967 some two thousand Korean employees of
the Vinnell Corporation began rioting at the major installation
of Cam Ranh Bay. The primary cause appears to have been dis-
satisfaction with the food served them, particularly the shortage
of rice. The Koreans refused to eat their Saturday evening meal
on November 18, and went to the Vinnell mess hall where they
turned over tables and attacked several Americans. They forced
the American project manager to eat some of their food to show
him how bad it was. A Vinnell Corporation civilian took out his
gun and shot three Koreans. He was then mobbed and severely
injured, and a Korean shot another American.
The Army military police stormed the area, but the Koreans
218 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
counterattacked with bulldozers and trucks which they rammed
into trailers and buildings. Military guards on the vital power
ships (converted T-2 oceanic tankers) anchored in the harbor,
posted against VC combat-swimmers, managed to repulse Ko-
rean attempts to take over the vessels. However, Korean em-
ployees in Nha Trang hijacked a number of medium landing
craft, and sailed to Cam Ranh Bay harbor in support. The riots
were finally broken four days later, following intervention by
the Korean Embassy and senior Army officers.
Fighting to retain its level of military authorization in com-
bat service support units, MACV was openly dismayed with civ-
ilianization inroads. Much of this attitude stemmed from adverse
experiences in Tet-68, during which the majority of the Viet-
namese laborers never showed up for work at American instal-
lations. By the end of February, radio and television spot an-
nouncements were begging the Vietnamese to return to their
United States contractors. An important incident occured on May
9, when 90 percent of the 1,046 local employees at the 506th
Field Depot in Saigon left work in mid-afternoon without no-
tice. Shortly thereafter (and not so incidentally according to Army
reports) the Newport Bridge in Saigon was attacked by the Viet
Cong.
The Army was fighting another losing battle. Civilianization
was an inevitable by-product of Vietnamization, and as large
numbers of Army support units were withdrawn from Vietnam
commencing in 1969, civilianization replaced the majority of their
functions.
CHAPTER 15.
THE BATTLES OF
TET-68
1. Tet-68: Saigon
MACV had decided as a matter of political feasibility to shift
responsibility for Saigon area security to the South Vietnamese.
As a result Saigon was only defended by the South Vietnamese
5th Ranger Group, and three regional forces, two service, and
two military police battalions. The 1st and 8th ARVN Airborne
Battalions, the last South Vietnamese high command reserves,
had been programmed to move north to I Corps Tactical Zone
on MACVs insistence that the DMZ be reinforced for the Tet
period. However, a shortage of aircraft had delayed their out-
flights, leaving both parachutist battalions fortuitously in Saigon
when the crucial Tet offensive started.
On the night of January 30, 1968, the capital of Saigon was
alive with the celebration of the Vietnamese Tet Nguyen Dan
lunar new year holidays, Throughout the city thousands of tra-
ditional firecrackers were noisily popping. The long government
wartime ban against fireworks had been lifted to heighten the
festivities. Large imported Hong Kong Specials, a favorite with
the wealthier Vietnamese, boomed incessantly with a grenade-
like din. Chains of smaller linked firecrackers went off in a rat-
tling spectrum of tumultuous sparks that sounded faintly like
distant machine-gun fire.
219
220 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
There had been scattered indications of an imminent Viet
Cong offensive. However, any reports of major Tet truce vio-
lation, much less of attacks on cities, were discounted by South
Vietnamese officials, President Thieu departed Saigon on Jan-
uary 29, 1968, to celebrate Tet with his wife's family in My Tho.
In view of disturbing intelligence reports, he reluctantly agreed
to cancel the truce in the extreme northern part of the country.
Even after the tocsin of country-wide attack sounded as Da Nang,
Nha Trang, Ban Me Thuot, Kontum, and Pleiku were struck on
January 30, alert orders to ARVN units in Saigon were issued
without any sense of urgency. Orders canceling leaves either
came too late or were simply disregarded. Soldiers on special
Tet passes mixed in holiday reunion with their families in Sai-
gon, far from their barracks and weapons.
The people, of Saigon reveled in joyous enthusiasm, reflect-
ing boundless optimism as the Vietnamese Year of the Monkey
was ushered in. American assistance had brought a great boom
in jobs and prosperity. The fortunes of war apparently now fa-
vored South Vietnam, and government-distributed gift parcels
contained Munchausen horoscopes promising the brightest of fu-
tures. War and politics always took a back seat to the excite-
ment of the Tet celebrations, and Saigon itself always seemed
aloof from any battlefront.
Just before midnight, fully armed soldiers in palm-leafed
helmets and Binh-Tri-Thien black rubber sandals jostled through
crowds of jubilant Saigon celebrants, then disappeared down al-
leys, slinking back into the shadows. The people shrugged, per-
haps another coup was under way. The first flashes of gunfire
in the early morning of January 31 simply faded into the crash-
ing echo of Tet fireworks. The Viet Cong had achieved com-
plete surprise as they initiated simultaneous rocket, mortar, and
ground attacks against buildings and installations throughout the
capital. 1
At two o'clock in the morning a bus came to a sudden stop
in front of Gate #5 of the ARVN Joint General Staff compound.
A score of VC sappers scurried out. Already their comrades were
1. Initial Viet Cong attacks in the Saigon-Cholon area were conducted by the
1st, 3d, 4th, 5th, and the 6th, 267th, 269th, 506th Local Force Battalions,
2d Independent Battalion, and C-10 Sapper Battalion.
THE BATTLES OF TET-68 221
in supporting positions inside the Long Hoa Pagoda. The gate
had momentarily swung open for a South Vietnamese general,
but as the sappers dashed across the street to rush the guard-
house, a U.S. military police jeep happened along. The Viet
Cong opened fire, the jeep spun to a stop, American military
police from a nearby building ran out to join the gunfight, and
the ARVN sentry slammed the gate and returned fire from his
bunker. The botched attack on Gate #5 fizzled into a general
exchange of gunshots.
At 9:30 A.M. the 1st and 2d VC Battalions knocked down
northern Gate #4 with B-40 rockets. They charged into the Joint
General Staff compound, a vital installation defended by the
ARVN Honor Guard Battalion and a company of tanks. In the
initial confusion the Viet Cong could have occupied vital com-
munications and command centers. However, they were con-
fronted with a host of fancy general headquarters signs marking
the location of the headquarters support company, which they
mistook as the main complex. They dug in to defend their prize,
and elements of the 8th ARVN Airborne Battalion arrived to
counterattack. Finally, after the paratroopers were reinforced by
South Vietnamese marines and more tanks, they cleared the oc-
cupied buildings. By 10:30 A.M. on February 1, the Viet Cong
had been chased out into the neighboring city blocks.
The C-10 VC City Sapper Battalion was composed of Saigon
inhabitants, including cyclopousse and taxicab drivers. Nineteen
members .had been given a most important mission: seizure of
the United States Embassy on Thong Nhat Boulevard. The two
American flak-vested military policemen managed to close the
gate after a taxi opened fire on them, but the Viet Cong breached
the ambassadorial wall with satchel charges. They killed the
guards, but the heavy teakwood entrance doors slammed shut,
leaving the assailants to pepper the main chancery building with
rocket-propelled grenades and automatic weapons fire. The
company-sized U.S. Marine Saigon Guard Detachment and
American government officials held the VC at bay^by firing sub-
machine guns and revolvers from open windows. 2
2. The Marine detachment was armed with 9mm Beretta submachine guns,
Smith and Wesson .38-caliber revolvers, and 12-gauge Remington shotguns
loaded with 00 buckshot shells.
222 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
At 5:00 A.M. helicopters from Bien Hoa tried to land a pla-
toon from Company C, 1st Battalion of the 502d Infantry (Air-
borne), on the embassy roof. Army military police, crouched be-
hind trees across the avenue, watched as heavy gunfire exploded
from the courtyard. The helicopters took several hits, a door
gunner was wounded, and the airmobile assault was postponed.
Finally, at eight o'clock the helicopters managed to make the
insertion, and within one hour the entire band of sappers was
annihilated.
Another platoon of the same VC battalion, occupying a high-
rise hotel under construction on Nguyen Du Street, hit the staff
entrance gate of Independence Palace with B-40 rockets and
machine guns. The Presidential Security Brigade, national po-
lice, two tanks, and a contingent of U.S. military police cor-
doned off the unfinished building. The minisiege lasted two days
before the Viet Cong were flushed out.
The Viet Cong temporarily seized Saigon's National Broad-
casting Station, 3 shelled American officer quarters at Splendid
Hotel and three other locations, and attacked the Korean Em-
bassy as well as the Vietnamese Naval Headquarters. The Phil-
ippine Chancery was held briefly. Two district police stations
had fallen in Cholon, the Chinese sector of the capital.
The reinforced 716th Military Police Battalion was charged
with antiterrorist security and law enforcement in the greater
Saigon-Cholon-Tan Son Nhut metropolitan area. Its duty uni-
forms consisted of starched fatigues and glossy helmets banded
with wide red and white stripes blocking off large "716'* nu-
merals. Its main concerns were static guardposts, VIP escorts,
traffic accidents, and the Saigon Police Boy Scouts Association.
When the first reports of Viet Cong activity started flooding
the switchboards, Lt. Col. Gordon D. Rowe, the battalion com-
mander, implemented the "disaster plan." Tet-68 in Saigon was
certainly a disaster, but the plan was designed for emergencies
such as riots or isolated bombings. Platoons of twenty-five men
with sketch maps were dispatched on open trucks into unknown
situations throughout the largest city in South Vietnam. One of
3. The actual transmitting portion of the station was located at Quan Tre
several miles away. The power to the Saigon studio was quickly shut down,
and broadcasting continued from an alternative studio with prerecorded pro-
grams, enabling Radio Saigon to function without interruption.
THE BATTLES OF TET-68 223
the first groups was immediately wiped out when their 2V2-ton
cargo truck was rocked by an explosion, followed by a hail of
machine-gun bullets, satchel charges, and grenades hitting the
troop benches. On the night of January 30, 1968, the battalion
was blasted into the front lines of the Vietnam War.
After the battle began, the 716th Military Police Battalion,
already responsible for over a hundred buildings housing Amer-
icans scattered all over Saigon, received calls from dozens of
unknown government billets, villas, and private dwellings. In
many cases the military police took losses just trying to locate
and gain entrance to them, The individual occupants, often ner-
vous and under no one's apparent direction, soon produced every
conceivable type of weapon in response to perceived threats to
their billets. A pandemonium of gunfire erupted everywhere.
Indiscriminate shooting was being directed at streets, buildings,
rooftops, fellow Americans, military police, most South Viet-
namese, and even dogs scrambling down alleys. The military
police found it just as dangerous to try to tell the occupants to
stop firing as to confront the Viet Cong. This problem was never
resolved until the firing died of its own accord several nights
later.
The 89th Military Police Group sent two V-100 commando
cars to reinforce Saigon, giving the military police their first real
firepower. In one instance a VC machine gun in the upper floor
of a building had two joint patrol jeeps pinned down. The ar-
mored cars "buttoned up," drove around a large traffic circle
with rounds ricochetting off their sides, and charged the build-
ing with their turreted twin machine guns blazing. As soon as
one car was alongside the structure, a crew member popped out
of his hatch and fired his M79 grenade launcher directly into
the window, The explosion set the room on fire, silencing the
machine gun.
The hectic nightmare of city combat eradicated the nocturnal
celebrations. By daybreak Viet Cong forces had effectively pen-
etrated much of western and southern Saigon, and were in firm
control of several precincts in Cholon. Helicopter gunships
greeted the dawn with renewed aerial rocket sorties against sus-
pected VC strong-points. A pall of smoke hung over the smol-
dering urban sprawl of greater Saigon.
Early that morning the Viet Cong assaulted the Quan Trung
224 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
infantry training camp in the urban suburbs between Hoc Mon
and Go Vap, and swept through the central police station and
the Co Loa artillery base. Although twelve 105mm howitzers
were captured, the retreating South Vietnamese had dismantled
the firing blocks. By ten o'clock the Armored Command head-
quarters was also in VC hands. They had brought along specially
trained personnel to use the tanks ordinarily stationed there,
but all the armor had been removed two months earlier. The
4th VNMC Marine Battalion regained the artillery and armor
areas by nightfall. However, the going was tough in downtown
Hoc Mon district. There the 1st Battalion of the 27th Infantry
was air assaulted into combat during the afternoon, but unable
to make much headway against the stiff resistance.
The Phu Tho racetrack had been seized by the 6th VC LF
Battalion. The hub of several main roads, it was a good rallying
point for Viet Cong unfamiliar with the city, and its use as a
helicopter landing zone was denied to the Americans. It became
the focus of another battle. Brig. Gen. Robert C. Forbes's 199th
Infantry Brigade (Light) was hard pressed defending the huge
Long Binh complex, but he dispatched Company A from the 3d
Battalion, 7th Infantry, to regain the racetrack. 4 At eight o'clock
on the dismal morning of'January 31, eight armored personnel
carriers from the brigade reconnaissance troop and several trucks
moved the soldiers downtown toward the objective.
Six blocks from the racetrack, heavy automatic weapons fire
opened up from rooftops and houses lining the boulevard. The
column gingerly went forward another two blocks as the Viet
Cong fire intensified. A rocket slammed into the lead tracked
command carrier, killing the cavalry platoon leader and two
crewmen. Company medics and truck drivers, aided by the bat-
talion chaplain, frantically evacuated dazed and wounded sol-
4. The 7th Infantry was an old frontier regiment organized in 1812 in Ten-
nessee, Georgia, and adjacent territories and known as the Cottonbalers, hav-
ing once stood behind cotton bales to mow down marching British Redcoats
at the Battle of New Orleans in the War of 1812. It was famed for strong-
point assaults at Telegraph Hill during the Battle of Cerro Gordo in the Mex-
ican War, and against the stone wall at the Battle of Fredericksburg in the
Civil War, It also served in the Indian Wars and the Spanish-American War,
on Samar in the Philippine Insurrection, in Europe in World Wars I and II,
and it saw intense action in Korea.
THE BATTLES OF TET-68 225
diers out the back side as flames spread through the demolished
vehicle, cooking off belts of linked ammunition. Viet Cong small
arms, machine-gun, and grenade fire hammered the column as
the advance continued. Dismounted infantrymen fought from
building to building. Recoilless rifles blasted holes through walls,
grenade launchers were fired through the jagged cavities, and
then soldiers clambered into the smoking entrances.
Hundreds of panic-stricken civilians fled past the armored
carriers as the battle raged on. The column continued to contest
the Viet Cong in fierce house-to-house fighting as it pressed closer
to the racetrack. Gunships swooped down to blast apart struc-
tures with minigun and rocket salvos. By one o'clock that after-
noon the company had advanced two more city blocks. Then
the Viet Cong withdrew to positions dug in behind concrete
park benches, backed up by heavy weapons located in concrete
towers on the spectator stands inside the racetrack itself.
The men of Company A reloaded their rifles and machine
guns, pushed helmets low over their foreheads, and charged the
barricades. A deafening crescendo of machine-gun fire and gre-
nades swept the avenue, leaving it clogged with fallen riflemen
and discarded equipment. The first American charge had been
repulsed, but the company grimly regrouped to try again. Clus-
tered in squads around their sergeants, they lit cigarettes with
bandaged hands. The grueling city fighting had soiled and frayed
their jungle fatigues, and cotton ammunition bandoliers sagged
heavily across their tunics. 5 Some still had light antitank weap-
ons strapped across their backs, but most of the single-shot, dis-
posable tubes had already been expended.
The company decided to charge the racetrack from the
southeast. Gunships and recoilless rifles pounded the VC posi-
tions as the sweating infantrymen surged forward. At 4:30 that
afternoon the Viet Cong, overwhelmed by this tremendous sup-
porting firepower, fled the field. Just after dark, Companies B
and C of the 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry, were airlifted into the
5. Soldiers were still experiencing high malfunction rates with their M16 rifles
during normal field operations. Many problems could be traced to dirt and
mud which accumulated in their ammunition magazine pouches. As a result
cotton bandoliers were issued, but these were difficult to obtain in early 1968
and often used beyond the point of serviceability.
226 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
Phu Tho racetrack to set up the battalion's forward command
post. The next day, February 1, they were reinforced by two
companies of the mechanized 5th Battalion, 60th Infantry (from
the 9th Infantry Division), and the 33d ARVN Ranger Battalion.
This composite group then ventured out to subdue the general
racetrack vicinity.
The combined allied force cautiously moved down the city
blocks surrounding the racetrack. Company B of the mecha-
nized battalion was moving along a narrow street three blocks
away. Suddenly the last three armored personnel carriers were
hit by heavy machine-gun fire and rockets from an adjacent
graveyard. Two were destroyed and one was heavily damaged
and on fire. However, its crew stood at their machine guns fir-
ing into the tomb markers until their dead and wounded were
removed. Company B backed out of the ambuscade, and joined
Company C in response to a frantic call for assistance at the
Phu Tho racetrack. A large Viet Cong force was attacking from
the west. The added firepower of the two arriving armored-in-
fantry companies broke the counterattack. The fighting around
the racetrack ebbed and flowed for several days as the Viet Cong
troops continued to attempt to rally there. Eventually personnel
from every Viet Cong unit in the Saigon offensive was identified
in the area.
Clearing operations in Saigon were originally designed to be
a South Vietnamese show, with American units limited to block-
ing actions and screening operations in the suburbs. By Feb-
ruary 5, 1968, ARVN forces had taken the offensive in Saigon
coded Operation TRAN HUNG DAO. Action was particularly
intense in the densely populated Cholon area assigned to the
5th ARVN Ranger Group. 6 Large fires at the government rice
depot at Binh Duong and a paper mill at Phu Lam sent billow-
ing clouds of black smoke across the city, hindering aerial ob-
servation and fire support.
The 3d Battalion of the 7th Infantry had been pulled out of
6. By February 3, 1968, principal ARVN forces in the Saigon area were the
30th, 33d, 35th, 38th, and 41st Ranger Battalions; 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, and 6th
VNMC Battalions; and 1st, 3d, 6th, 8th, and llth Airborne Battalions. At
this time the U.S. Army had one military police, seven infantry battalions
(one mechanized), and six artillery battalions engaged.
THE BATTLES OF TET-68 227
the Phu Tho racetrack in accordance with South Vietnamese de-
sires. By February 9, the South Vietnamese high command was
calling for its reinsertion, and the battalion returned to the race-
track and the Cholon battlefront. On February 12 this unit, act-
ing on ARVN intelligence, found the main Viet Cong command
post in the Phu Lam communal temple. Surrounding it, the bat-
talion destroyed the VC defenders and claimed to have killed a
top communist general. 7
Although a renewed Viet Cong assault was made February
17-18, with fifty-seven rocket shellings and ten firefights erupt-
ing inside Saigon and Cholon, the second wave effort quickly
sputtered out. The Tet-68 Battle for Saigon ended after a final
fierce battle between ARVN rangers and main force Viet Cong
in the Cholon sector on March 7. The Vietnam War had come
to Saigon with a vengeance, and it would be hit again that May
on a smaller scale. This latter Mini-Tet counteroffensive would
be defeated almost exclusively by South Vietnamese capital de-
fense forces.
2. Tet-68: Capitol Command Battles Beyond Saigon
The Long Binh area fifteen miles north of Saigon was a cru-
cial American military logistical and headquarters complex, con-
taining the command posts of both II Field Force, Vietnam, and
the III ARVN Corps. The 199th Infantry Brigade (Light), backed
by a mechanized battalion from the 9th Infantry Division in re-
serve, was i n charge of the areas defense. 8 At 3:00 A.M., Jan-
uary 31, the Viet Cong attack was heralded by an intense rocket
and mortar barrage directed against the infantry and field force
headquarters. A half hour later the mechanized reserve was or-
dered forward. The 275th VC Regiment launched a ground as-
7. Supposedly they had killed General Tran Do, the communist political chief
who was in command of all Viet Cong forces attacking Saigon. A subsequent
fingerprint check on the body proved this to be untrue, but the results were
never made public to avoid dampening ARVN spirits. See Col Hoang Ngoc
Lung, The General Offensives of 1968-69, U.S. Army Center of Military His-
tory, Washington, B.C., 1981, p. 74.
8. The 2d Battalion of the 47th Infantry (Mechanized) near Bear Cat was the
mechanized battalion. During the actions described, Company A swept Ho
Nai village, Company B secured the ammunition storage area, and Company
C was sent to the relief of III ARVN Corps headquarters.
228 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
sault through Ho Nai village across Highway 1 against the
northern perimeter of Long Binh. At the same time U-l VC LF
Battalion engaged the eastern perimeter in order to divert at-
tention from sappers who penetrated the main ammunition dump.
The Long Binh bunker line returned fire, and the 199th In-
fantry Brigade counterattacked both on foot and from armored
personnel carriers. Helicopter gunships (from the 3d Squadron,
17th Cavalry) blasted Viet Cong foxholes and crew-served weap-
ons in front of the soldiers. The VC were also attacking in other
areas, but were slowed by thick bamboo between the compound
and the ammunition dump, and defeated in an attempt to over-
run the runway of the 12th Aviation Group. 9 Meanwhile, tracked
vehicles of the mechanized reserve, escorted by military police
gun-jeeps, protected the main Long Binh compound. However,
sappers had infiltrated the ammunition dump there. Army ex-
plosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams frantically worked under
the cover of armored carrier machine guns to strip demolition
packages off the ammunition pads. Despite their efforts four
bunkers in the one hundred-pad storage area detonated at eight
o'clock that morning.
Company B of the 4th Battalion, 39th Infantry, was forced
to make a helicopter assault under fire on the grassy helipad
across from the II Field Force, Vietnam, headquarters building.
The infantrymen quickly cleared the area and moved against an
adjacent village which was taken after a daylong struggle. Aside
from Viet Cong resistance in the hamlet, the battle at Long Binh
was concluded as daylight ground sweeps were accompanied by
aerial and artillery bombardment. With the arrival of the llth
Armored Cavalry Regiment that evening, after a twelve-hour
forced road march, the Long Binh area was secured from fur-
ther danger.
At the same time Long Binh was first struck, the Bien Hoa
air base received twenty-five rockets followed by a mortar-sup-
ported ground attack. The 274th VC Regiment charged into the
east bunker line, which was manned by a platoon of South Vi-
etnamese and the U.S. Military Police base reaction force. The
9. MACV later had Rome plow dozers destroy the bamboo grove "to remove
the concealment offered near friendly installations." Ironically, this bamboo
had slowed the momentum of the Viet Cong attack during Tet-68.
THE BATTLES OF TET-68 229
Viet Cong breached the perimeter wire, but did not get onto
the airstrip. At daybreak the 2d Battalion, 506th Infantry, ar-
rived by helicopter to reinforce the strategic airfield. The bat-
talion attacked out the east gate to clear the surrounding area.
The nearby III ARVN Corps headquarters was under attack
by the 238th VC LF Battalion, and armored personnel carriers
of the reserve mechanized battalion were dispatched into the
battle. The column fought right through the middle of the 275th
Regiment astride Highway 1 and plowed into the flank of the
274th Regiment attacking Bien Hoa air base. Heavy machine guns
on the armored personnel carriers sent blazing paths of tracered
light careening into the Viet Cong, who fought back with rocket-
propelled grenades. Explosions and flares ripped through the
darkness as the tracked cavalry roared onto the battlefield.
Meanwhile another mechanized cavalry troop of the 9th In-
fantry Division fought a running battle past roadblocks and ex-
ploding bridges down Highway 1 into Bien Hoa. The mecha-
nized cavalry inflicted and suffered heavy losses, but managed
to link up with the 2d Battalion of the 506th Infantry. The latter
battalion then teamed up with the llth Armored Cavalry to sweep
Ap Than, adjacent to the air base, against the blocking positions
of the South Vietnamese 58th Regional Force Battalion. The vil-
lage was taken house by house in heavy fighting on February
1. This cleared the last pocket of organized VC resistance be-
tween Bien Hoa and Long Binh.
At the same time Long Binh and Bien Hoa were hit, the
Viet Cong D16 and 267th Battalions and a battalion from the
271st Regiment occupied the Vinatexco textile mill directly across
Highway 1 from the sprawling Tan Son Nhut airbase. They em-
placed heavy weapons in the doors and windows and posted flak
guns on the roof. At precisely 3:21 A.M. they attacked the air-
field. While secondary assaults were hurled against eastern Gate
#10 and northern Gate #58, waves of Viet Cong stormed the
fence line at western Gate #51. Rockets slammed against the
bunkered guardhouses and smashed down the gateway. The
massed assault force poured into the breach. Surging past the
wreckage of wire and concrete, three full VC battalions spilled
into the airport and raced toward the main runway.
The commander of the Tan Son Nhut "Sensitive Area" des-
230 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
perately scratched together one of the oddest battle groups ever
fielded, and shoved it forward to defend the airstrip. 10 After fu-
rious fighting, this heterogeneous defense began to fall back un-
der the sustained Viet Cong onslaught. At 4:15 A.M., Tan Son
Nhut requested urgent reinforcement, but most of the ARVN
airborne strategic reserve had already been parceled out in other
emergency firefights throughout the city. Only two companies
of the 8th ARVN Airborne Battalion were left, and they were
ordered to counterattack immediately.
The South Vietnamese paratroopers charged over the open
expanse of the runway right into the onrushing Viet Cong. Gre-
nade blasts and streams of bullets tore gaping holes in their ranks.
Dozens of men pitched forward as their weapons clattered across
the concrete. Then the frenzied countercharge closed the VC
lines. The black uniforms of Viet Cong and bright green cam-
ouflage of the paratroopers clashed in a vortex of hand-to-hand
combat. Losses were extremely heavy, but the momentum of
the Viet Cong attack was blunted. In the meantime, just as any
American Western pulp novel would have it, the U.S. Cavalry
was on the way to the rescue.
Lt. Col. Glenn K. Otis's 3d Squadron of the 4th Cavalry was
the armored reconnaissance unit of the 25th Infantry Division.
Just before dawn, he ordered Troop C, stationed at Cu Chi fif-
teen miles away, forward at once. It raced down Highway 1 as
Colonel Otis flew overhead in his command helicopter dropping
flares and guiding it around possible ambush sites. The tanks
and armored personnel carriers suddenly crashed right into the
rear of the Viet Cong at Gate #51. Rocket-propelled grenades
and machine guns raked the steel-hulled vehicles, and the col-
umn screeched to a halt. The thunder of multiple explosions
jarred the front vehicles. Crewmen leaped out as flames shot
into the air, and hastily cut loose with automatic weapons fire
from roadside ditches. Four tanks and five armored carriers were
lost and one third of the column destroyed. However, they had
10. The Tan Son Nhut battle group was composed of the U.S. Air Force
377th Security Police Squadron, two platoons of U.S. Army Vietnam head-
quarters guards, and a mixed bag of South Vietnamese units including na-
tional police, the 52d Regional Force Battalion, the 2d Service Battalion, and
Vice-President Ky's bodyguard.
THE BATTLES OF TET-68 231
succeeded in cutting off the trailing VC battalions from their
source of weapons and ammunition in the mill. This proved to
be the deciding action which defeated the main Viet Cong as-
sault on the Tan Son Nhut air base.
As the morning light flooded the smoldering battlefield an
armada of low-flying helicopter gunships darted through the skies
to rocket and strafe targets throughout the area. Run after run
was made on the Vinatexco plant, leaving it in shambles. Troop
B of the cavalry squadron arrived to finish off the Viet Cong
around it. Shortly past noon an American master sergeant ral-
lied a mixed contingent of U.S. and South Vietnamese soldiers
and led a final counterattack against the decimated Viet Cong
inside Tan Son Nhut. As the contingent reached Gate #51, the
battle for the air base ended.
3. Tet-68: I Corps and Hue
The Tet-68 Offensive swept the length of South Vietnam like
a cyclone, ripping through cities and military installations in a
three-day cataclysm of furious proportions. The national capital,
36 of 44 provincial capitals, 5 of 6 autonomous cities, and 64 of
242 district capitals were hit by its violence. South Vietnamese
units, assigned defensive duties near populated areas as part of
"pacification," bore the brunt of this onslaught. Due to the Tet
holidays they were universally undermanned, averaging 50 per-
cent understrength.
The very shock of such a massive Viet Cong coup de main
produced incredulity before rational response. When one of the
first Tet hammer blows struck Da Nang shortly after three o'clock
in the morning of January 30, South Vietnamese Col. Nguyen
Duy Hinh frantically telephoned Lt. Gen. Hoang Xuan Lam,
the commander of I ARVN Corps. General Lam kept inter-
rupting him over the phone, "Baloney! Baloney!"
Da Nang had been pelted the night before with 122mm
rockets, and the Marble Mountain Marine air base had been
mortared. Now elements of the 2d NVA Division, spearheaded
by the 402d Sapper Battalion, were striking the I ARVN Corps
command building. A Marine combined action platoon and the
headquarters duty staff were forced to defend alone until rein-
forced by a smattering of South Vietnamese and Marine military
232 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
police. The sappers were driven back in a chaos of gunfire and
individual combat. Two Marine battalions (3d Battalion, 5th Ma-
rines, and 2d Battalion, 3d Marines) intercepted other division
elements before they could reach the amorphous firefight.
Hoi An, the provincial capital of Quang Nam nineteen miles
to the south, was held only by the determined resistance of the
102d ARVN Engineer Battalion in the early morning darkness
of January 30. A tumultuous seesaw battle ensued. The 1st Bat-
talion, 51st ARVN Regiment, pushed the Viet Cong out, but the
VC regained and lost the town again on February 5. Other I
Corps clashes on the eve of Tet occurred at Hoa Vang and Chu
Lai. Lunar New Year's Day was spent in prompt repulse of these
intrusions, but Tet night on January 31, 1968, brought another,
more forceful wave of Viet Cong attacks.
Quang Ngai, Tarn Ky, and Quang Tri were successfully de-
fended. In the latter town, the 1st ARVN Regiment and 9th
ARVN Airborne Battalion waged a fierce city battle against the
812th NVA Regiment and 10th VC Sapper Battalion. Col. Don-
ald V. Rattan's 1st Brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division (Air-
mobile) took advantage of the worsening situation to execute a
swift, classic airmobile counterthrust. He airlifted two battal-
ions, the 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry, and the 1st Battalion, 12th
Cavalry, out of dense fog to smash into the rear of the attackers
the next day, and the battle was over by noon on February 1.
A bizarre spear-rifle attack was mounted February 1 on the
Ba To district headquarters by some seven hundred Viet Cong,
about half of whom were only armed with spears and knives.
The camp strike force from Special Forces Operations Detach-
ment A-106 joined the Regional Forces defenders, but they were
unable to prevent the breach of the town perimeter. After de-
stroying the province chiefs home and several bunkers, the VC
withdrew, leaving behind twenty spears, thirty-five knives, and
one carbine.
The third largest city in South Vietnam, the ancient walled
imperial capital of Hue, was infiltrated and seized just after the
Tet New Year midnight rites. Unlike the struggle for most Tet
objectives, the battle for Hue was protracted from January 31
through March 2, 1968. Two North Vietnamese Army regiments
and two Viet Cong sapper battalions would be pitted against
THE BATTLES OF TET-68 233
eight American and thirteen South Vietnamese infantry battal-
ions in one of the most savage battles of the Vietnam War. 11
Although the NVA/VC realized their hold on Hue was subject
to ultimate defeat by vastly superior forces, the gamble to make
a battleground of Hue was well reasoned, and based on the
knowledge that great propaganda value would accrue to that force
able to seize and hold, however temporarily, the cultural and
religious center of the nation. The furor of the Tet-68 Offensive
would become symbolized by the catastrophic destruction in-
curred in this grim city struggle.
The determined North Vietnamese and Viet Cong soldiers
were in excellent condition, backed by prodigious stockpiles of
ammunition and supplies already in place. Large elements ap-
pearing in Hue on January 31 had been there for some time,
while others were surreptitiously infiltrated into the city, masked
by the normal Tet crowds. The well-coordinated plan achieved
complete tactical surprise. Key positions were simultaneously
taken within the city, as more reinforcements entered under the
early-morning mortar attack signaling the assault.
As in all Tet-68 attacks, timing coincided with the holiday
leave of the bulk of ARVN troops and national police. Within
Mang Ca compound inside the northeast corner of the city, Brig,
Gen. Ngo Quang Truong's 1st ARVN Division headquarters staff
and the elite Hac Bao (Black Panther) reconnaissance company
were at less than half strength. The 3d ARVN Regiment, which
would fight harder than almost any other unit and absorb crip-
pling losses in the upcoming battle, was located five miles to
the northwest, similiarly undermanned.
In a matter of hours after the first volleys reverberated through
the city, the NVA/VC controlled all of the Citadel (with the ex-
ception of 1st ARVN Division headquarters), and that part of
Hue below the Perfume River, which contained the MACV
compound, the provincial administration facilities, public utili-
ties, the university complex, and a densely packed residential
section. Well armed with mortars, rockets, and automatic weap-
11. The initial NVA/VC forces employed at Hue were the 4th and 6th NVA
Regiments, and the 12th VC and Hue City VC Sapper Battalions. Addition-
ally, a total of 2,500 prisoners were released from the local jail, and over 500
of these joined the Viet Cong ranks.
234 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
ons, and confident other coordinated attacks throughout the
country would inhibit any rapid allied countermove, the NVA/
VC consolidated their gains and waited for major reinforcement,
They were clearly prepared to stay, and at eight o'clock that
morning raised the flag of the National Liberation Front on the
stately Midday Gate's majestic flagpole.
The defense of Hue, like that of most cities, was a South
Vietnamese responsibility, and General Lam initially intended
to recapture it with ARVN forces. A South Vietnamese response
force convoy fought its way to the battlefront through a major
ambush at An Hoa. Badly battered, a troop of the 7th ARVN
Armored Cavalry Squadron and two airborne battalions, the 2d
and the 7th, managed to reach sector headquarters that after-
noon. Half of the 3d ARVN Regiment was safely off-loaded at
riverside piers toward evening after being ferried down the Per-
fume River, but its other two battalions traveling by road were
decimated fighting their way out of an encirclement.
Ill Marine Amphibious Force was concerned about the im-
mediate danger to the MACV compound, and rushed two rifle
companies from the nearest Marine base at Phu Bai by heli-
copter and truck. These were joined by tanks and went into
combat under the control of the headquarters of 1st Battalion,
1st Marines. 12 They cleared the MACV compound area and then
tackled the adjacent Truong Tien Bridge extending across the
Perfume River into Hue. In spite of heavy losses, the Marines
secured the bridge at 4:15 P.M. The city was enclosed by the
Citadel wall, twenty feet thick and thirty feet high, surrounded
by a water-filled zigzag moat. Past this barrier was an inner brick
wall. Attempts to gain these fire-swept earthen stone ramparts
were repulsed, and the Marines turned over their hard-won
bridge sector to South Vietnamese troops. They returned to
southern Hue at twilight. Plans were made to attack at dawn,
12. The 1st Marines was one of the most illustrious regiments in the Marine
Corps, having battled tropical fortifications and ambushes from the Caribbean
Banana Wars to the Pacific in World War II. It was activated at Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, in November 1913, being first designated as the 1st Marines
in 1930. It fought in Vera Cruz, Mexico, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic
from 1914-1924; in Guadalcanal, Eastern New Guinea, New Britain, Peleliu,
and Okinawa in World War II, and throughout the Korean War.
THE BATTLES OF TET-68 235
destroy the citadel defense, and recapture the city by nightfall
the next day.
At first light on February 1, the combined American-South
Vietnamese counterattack against Hue was launched. The two
South Vietnamese airborne battalions and the 7th ARVN Cav-
alry Squadron recaptured the Tay Loc airfield. Two Marine
companies attacked southwest to secure the areas south of the
Perfume River, while South Vietnamese forces moved into the
Citadel from the north. Fierce resistance from well-selected for-
tified positions during the initial hours of the assault soon va-
porized illusions of any speedy reconquest. More Marine rein-
forcements would be required immediately. During the next two
days heliborne arrivals increased Marine strength to battalion
size, and this force was doubled again within another forty-eight
hours. South Vietnamese stakes were raised by two more air-
lifted battalions. 13 On February 4, the 1st Battalion of the 3d
ARVN Regiment stormed the An Hoa gate, taking the north-
west wall.
As the misting drizzle turned into a cold, soaking downpour,
the four Marine rifle companies maintained the momentum of
an attack measured in yards. They grimly advanced house by
house down lanes choked with demolished brick, timber, and
wreckage toward the provincial headquarters and jail. Many
homes in the residential area were surrounded by barbed wire-
laced hedgerows, covered by sinister crew-served weapons jut-
ting out of windows and doorways, Backed up by mortars and
recoilless rifles, the riflemen maneuvered to isolate them and
finish them off with grenades and rapid M16 bursts. By Feb-
ruary 6, they had recaptured the Thua Thien sector headquar-
ters, prison, and hospital. However, that night a North Viet-
namese counterattack using grappling hooks drove the 4th
Battalion, 2d ARVN Regiment, off the breastworks on the re-
cently recaptured southwest wall.
13. Company A, 1st Marines, and Company G, 5th Marines, entered combat
at Hue on January 31. Companies F and H, 5th Marines, arrived February
1 and 2. By February 4, the command group of Col. Stanley S. Hughes's 1st
Marines, the 2d Battalion of the 5th Marines, and Company B, 1st Marines,
were also present at Hue. South Vietnamese reinforcements on February 2
included the 9th ARVN Airborne Battalion from Quang Tri, and the 4th Bat-
talion, 2d ARVN Regiment, from Dong Ha.
Soldiers of the 716th Military Police Battalion maneuver closer to the
United States Embassy during the Viet Cong attack on Saigon, Jan-
uary 31, 1968. (U.S. Army)
Military Police move forward behind a V100 Commando Car to clear
Viet Cong out of a bachelor officer barracks during the fighting in
Saigon on January 31, 1968. Note the open cargo truck which had
been ambushed while carrying U.S. reinforcements. (U.S. Army)
The formidable Viet Cong defensive bastion at the Phu Tho racetrack
in Saigon had to be frontally assaulted by the 3d Battalion of the 7th
Infantry during Tet-68. (U.S. Army)
Soldiers of the 199th Infantry Brigade, having captured the Phu Tho
racetrack in Saigon, grimly sweep the densely populated areas around
it on February 5, 1968. (U.S. Army)
A gutted M48 main battle tank stands as mute testimony to the fury
of combat during the Battle of Hue on February 16, 1968. (U.S Ma-
rine Corps)
A Marine rifleman prepares to assault through a blasted wall during
heavy action in the Battle of Hue on February 4, 1968. (U.S. Marine
Corps)
Lieutenant Colonel Daniel
Schungel presents an in-
terim Bronze Star Medal
for Valor to Sergeant Al-
len on February 24, 1968,
as the survivors of the
Lang Vei battle are hon-
ored. (Author's Collec-
tion)
The Army Special Forces camp at Lang Vei the morning after being
overrun, showing one demolished North Vietnamese tank outside the
ruined command bunker where several Special Forces soldiers held
out. (Author's Collection)
236 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
The Marines resorted to tank guns, aerial rockets, and air-
craft 20mm cannon strafing, but initial restrictions ruled out
heavier firepower, since General Lam had requested city de-
struction be minimized. The use of artillery, bombs, and napalm
during the first three days of the battle was precluded, but any
sentiments of forbearance were soon abandoned. Beginning on
February 5, the awesome warship guns of the Seventh Fleet
were used in sledgehammer blows to pound Hue with an av-
erage of two hundred shells a day. Marine naval gunfire spotters
radioed targets as armor-piercing rounds fired up to fourteen
miles away zoomed overhead like express trains to obliterate de-
fensive bunkers virtually impervious to other weapons. By the
end of the battle 4,780 naval shells and 48 Marine aircraft attack
sorties would be used.
The 1st Cavalry Division's 3d Brigade helicoptered into
blocking positions to the west of the city on February 2. The
foot cavalry sloshed through muddied paddy water as they ad-
vanced east toward Hue. The 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry, was
given the mission of making a forced march through the chilly,
fog-shrouded night of February 4 behind Viet Cong lines to seize
a critical hill. 14 Exhausted and many shaking with fever, the
cavalrymen reached the hilltop the next day. From its summit
four miles west of Hue they could see the entire valley before
the city, and all major VC infiltration routes feeding the raging
battle.
On February 7, the 5th Battalion of the 7th Cavalry smashed
into the first of a series of Viet Cong trench networks. The 2d
Battalion of the 12th Cavalry was called forward, passed through
the 7th Cavalry's lines, and charged into fortified Thong Bon
Tri. At daybreak on February 21, the 12th Cavalry men re-
newed the assault in the La Chu area as the brigade advanced
on a four-battalion front behind air strikes, naval gunfire, and
14. The 12th Cavalry was organized February 8, 1901, at Fort Sam Houston,
Texas, and had cut its teeth on Moro kampilan knives and war clubs during
the Philippine Insurrection, returning to those islands in World War II as
part of the 1st Cavalry Division. Inactivated in 1949, it missed the Korean
War, but was reactivated in 1957 with the same division. Two battalions had
been in Vietnam since September of 1965.
THE BATTLES OF TET-68 237
heavy artillery which pulverized VC defenses. By dark they were
three miles from the city, and still facing strong opposition.
In the meantime, the Marines had reclaimed southern Hue
by February 9.. On the north side of the Perfume River, at-
tacking South Vietnamese units controlled three fourths of the
Citadel. The NVA/VC forces were still in firm possession of the
southeastern portion of the Citadel, including the key Imperial
Palace, and manned a series of strong-points along the west wall.
The Marines began firing CS tear gas rounds, and the NVA re-
sponded with their own mortar-delivered CS. Hue was one of
the few battles in the Vietnam War in which both sides fought
wearing gas masks. Streets were barricaded by overturned trucks
and piles of household furniture. Civilians had been impressed
into service digging fighting holes and bunkers, and local cadre
wearing red arm bands directed North Vietnamese regulars
scurrying through the maze of alleys and residential courtyards.
Additional replacements were funneled into the city by travers-
ing the waterways and fortified hamlets to the west. Although
this area was covered by the advancing 3d Brigade of the 1st
Cavalry Division (Airmobile), these reinforcement and supply
avenues were never effectively sealed off.
The defenders constantly lashed back against the attackers.
In one spectacular night attack Viet Cong combat-swimmers used
floating mines to drop two spans of the Truong Tien Bridge. On
February 10, a strong counterassault was made against the 1st
ARVN Division, effectively destroying one of its battalions. Two
days later the 1st and 5th VNMC battalions were moved from
the fighting at Go Vap in Saigon by naval transport and un-
loaded at the Bao Vinh landing in Hue. The South Vietnamese
Marines moved into line and relieved the mauled airborne bat-
talions. The same day the 1st Battalion of the 5th Marines was
landed by helicopter and river-assault craft at the Citadel, join-
ing ARVN forces pushing through the staunchly defended heart
of metropolitan Hue.
The 3d ARVN Regiment and Hac Bao (Black Panther) Com-
15. Fresh units infiltrated into Hue during the battle included elements of
the 416th Battalion, 5th NVA Regiment, and 324B Division.
238 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
pany were placed in the center and given the signal honor of
recapturing the Imperial Palace. In order to appease South Viet-
namese concerns over the sacred "Throne of Kings," U.S. Ma-
rines were prohibited from entering the palatial grounds. The
Marines moved on the left into the Citadel's tough eastern sec-
tor, and the South Vietnamese Marines were assigned the right,
western flank. Attacking generally to the southwest, the com-
bined force encountered fierce resistance at every turn, from
gateways to schoolhouses. The 4th VNMC Battalion arrived from
the Battle of My Tho in the Delta to reinforce the allied drive
on February 16. Marine eight-inch howitzers, Ontos recoilless
rifle vehicles, and aircraft were supporting all South Vietnamese
attacks.
The Marines moved forward through rain and fog, fighting
at bayonet-point as they assailed ruined houses and stark, smol-
dering city parks. Marine medium tanks, holed several times
and driven by replacement crews, lumbered forward in the ur-
ban shadows as flak-vested riflemen, crisscrossed by ammunition
bandoliers, followed in their wake. Machine-gun fire and rocket-
propelled grenades ripped into the grime-caked machines and
cut down drab green-uniformed men as they clawed their way
forward a block at a time. Flamethrowers snuffed out NVA strong-
points with tongues of liquid fire. Marine scout-sniper teams
waged individual contests to the death against accurate NVA
snipers nested on both the Citadel and palace walls.
The swift, dependable Ontos, mounting twin triple-tubed re-
coilless rifles, proved crucial in close city assault. Suddenly ap-
pearing in debris-clogged streets, the sturdy little vehicles would
instantly blast bunkered positions with their six-gun volley, then
dash behind corners. The NVA developed a respectful distaste
for their bold direct-fire tactics, and the Ontos became prime
targets. Sometimes return rocket fire would catch these stinging
self-propelled weapons. One Ontos of Company A, 1st Antitank
Battalion, was detracked by a chance round and hit by eleven
more B-40 rockets. It stood its ground before finally disappear-
ing in a tumultuous explosion.
The carnage of close combat was typified by the casualties
taken among the platoon leaders of the 1st Battalion, 5th Ma-
rines. The battalion had been continuously committed in the
THE BATTLES OF TET-68 239
Phu Loc area twenty-four miles south of the city since Decem-
ber 29, when it was thrown into the Hue fighting on February
12. It assaulted the rows of shattered buildings held by the 6th
NVA Regiment. Nine days later its ten rifle platoons were being
led by three second lieutenants, one gunnery sergeant, two staff
sergeants, two buck sergeants, and two senior corporals.
Each overmastered bunker took its toll. The forward edge
of the battle line relentlessly pressed on through the shambles.
Slain attackers were aligned in poncho-draped rows across muddy
street puddles. Medical collecting points were reduced to triage.
The Marines reached the inside wall and water-filled moat of
the Citadel on February 21. General Lam had first authorized
bombing of the Citadel on February 5. On February 22, he
decided air strikes would have to be used against the Imperial
Palace. Early that morning, a massed NVA charge had surged
out of the southwest wall and caught the leading South Viet-
namese contingents before a storm of artillery fire tore it apart.
By the end of that day, the Marines had terminated organized
resistance in their zone of action, and the 21st and 39th ARVN
Ranger Battalions arrived to sweep the island across Dong Ba
Bridge and Eastern River.
The following night soldiers of the 2d Battalion, 3d ARVN
Regiment, made a surprise attack along the citadel wall at a
dead run. Although the North Vietnamese quickly recovered,
the charge sallied past their weapons pits. Fighting hand to hand
in the light of wild tracer streams, flares, and explosions, they
reached the imperial courtyard. At 5:00 A.M., February 24, 1968,
the battered battalion tore down the Viet Cong banner and raised
the South Vietnamese flag over the Citadel.
That afternoon the Hac Bao (Black Panther) Company suc-
cessfully assaulted and seized the Imperial Palace. At the same
time the South Vietnamese Marines compressed the last de-
fending remnants into the southwest corner of the Citadel, and
the Army's 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry, advanced to link up. Mop-
ping up continued, but Hue was declared secure on February
25. For another week, until March 2, Marine, Army, and South
Vietnamese troops continued to crush isolated pockets of strag-
glers in the general vicinity. Once the most beautiful city in
Vietnam and previously unscarred by the war, Hue had been
240 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
blasted into corpse-strewn rubble. The battle became one of the
fiercest city actions the American military had fought since World
War II.
4. Tet-68: Countrywide
The critical central twelve provinces of South Vietnam were
under the military control of I Field Force Vietnam, where ten
major ground attacks of the Tet Offensive rolled through seven
provincial capitals, the autonomous city of Dalat, and the two
key military towns of An Khe and Ninh Hoa. With the excep-
tions of Phan Thiet and Dalat, all were cleared during the first
week of fighting. 16
At Tuy Hoa a battalion of the 95th NVA Regiment attacked
the airfield, the provincial prison, and American artillery posi-
tions. By dawn on January 30, 1968, a paratrooper company from
the 4th Battalion, 503d Infantry (Airborne), reinforced by a bat-
talion of the Korean 28th Regiment, had reached the scene of
action. In a sharp twenty-four-hour firefight they surrounded and
destroyed most of the North Vietnamese soldiers. Two battal-
ions of the ARVN 47th Regiment moved against the remaining
North Vietnamese stronghold in the center of Tuy Hoa on Feb-
ruary 5 and captured it the next day.
At Ban Me Thuot the 33d NVA Regiment, supported by the
301E VC LF Battalion, attacked the 23d ARVN Division head-
quarters, the MACV compound, both airfields, and numerous
other targets including the bank. Initially they were only op-
posed by local South Vietnamese militia (a Regional/Popular
Forces training center was located there) and Special Forces
Operations Detachment B-23. By midday on January 30, the 8th
ARVN Cavalry Squadron and the 45th ARVN Regiment were
also engaged. The house-to-house fighting was so intense that
the 23d ARVN Ranger Battalion was committed February 1. The
rangers were quickly consumed by the slaughter, and the next
16. The ordei of the city battles in II Corps Tactical Zone and their dates
were Tet Eve, January 30 Ban Me Thuot (Jan. 30~Feb. 6), Kontum (Jan.
30-Feb. 4), Nha Trang (Jan, 30-Feb. 1), Ninh Hoa (Jan. 30-Feb. 4), Qui
Nhon (Jan, 30-Feb. 5), Pleiku (Jan. 30-Feb. 4), Tuy Hoa (Jan. 30-Feb. 6);
Tet Night, January 31 An Khe and Bong Son (attacks on installations only),
Phan Thiet (Jan. 31-Feb. 23); Second Tet Night, February 1 Dalat (Feb.
1-11). The italicized battles are summarized in this section.
THE BATTLES OF TET-68 241
day American paratroopers of the 1st Battalion, 503d Infantry
(Airborne), were flown in from Pleiku. Four major NVA assaults
were hurled against Ban Me Thuot during the course of the
battle, but by February 6 the town was cleared. Over one third
of the city had been reduced to smoking rubble.
Pleiku was stormed by the Viet Cong 15H LF and 40th Sap
per Battalions, crossing an expanse of open field at great cost.
Heavy fighting raged around the Pleiku sector headquarters, the
MACV compound, 71st Evacuation Hospital, the prisoner-of-war
compound, both airfields, and a Montagnard training center. The
3d ARVN Cavalry Squadron and the 22d ARVN Ranger Battal-
ion, backed up by a company of medium tanks from the 1st
Battalion, 69th Armor, responded immediately. Two mobile strike
force companies from Company B, 5th Special Forces Group
(Airborne), were added to the street fighting. Finally the 4th
Engineer Battalion doubled as infantry, grabbed machine guns,
and hastened into the inferno of close combat. By February 3
this amalgamated force was mopping up.
Kontum was also struck early on January 30 and the 24th
NVA Regiment, the 304th VC Battalion and the 406th Sapper
Battalion crashed into the MACV compound, post office, air-
field, and 24th ARVN Special Tactical Zone headquarters. Some
of the most ferocious combat of Tet-68 transpired in Kontum
city. The initial assault was met by two Montagnard scout com-
panies, which were rapidly brushed aside, and the 2d Battalion
of the 42d ARVN Regiment, which fell back. The compound of
Special Forces Operations Detachment B-24 was penetrated at
several points. At noon the Americans rustled up the ground
crews of the aerial 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry, fused them with
the 1st Battalion of the 22d Infantry, and gave them tanks from
Company C of the 1st Battalion, 69th Armor. This composite
task force was shoved into the heart of the city, but the fierce
tempo of urban fighting was sustained five more days.
The city perimeter of Phan Thiet in lower Binh Thuan Prov-
ince was assaulted by the Viet Cong 482d LF and 840th MF
Battalions just after 3:00 A.M. on January 31, 1968. The MACV
compound, water point, and sector headquarters were all hit.
The 3d Battalion, 506th Infantry, and two battalions of the 44th
ARVN Regiment were soon forced to counterattack in various
242 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
other sectors as well. Several school buildings in the northern
part of the city and a large pagoda in the western portion be-
came focal points of extended fighting. The heaviest fighting was
over by February 4, but sporadic skirmishing flared over the
next six days. A renewed VC assault carried the city prison on
February 18. After another grueling week of block-by-block
combat the Viet Cong were ejected from the town.
The final city to be struck in the region was the innocuous
mountain resort town of Dalat, nestled in the pine forests of
Tuyen Due Province. The Viet Cong 145th and 186th Battalions
attacked one hour after midnight on February 1. They quickly
entered Dalat and took the central marketplace. Two armored
cars, two regional forces companies, engineering cadets, and a
helicopter gunship repelled the VC, who then retreated to for-
tified positions in the Pasteur Institute. Combat was renewed
when the depleted 23d ARVN Ranger Battalion arrived Feb-
ruary 5. It was backed by the camp strike force company of
Special Forces Operations Detachment A-233 from Trang Phuc.
A week later the llth ARVN Ranger Battalion also arrived. Dalat
was finally declared secure on February 11. By that date only
Hue and Saigon were still embroiled in continuing Tet combat.
In the lower half of South Vietnam the Tet-68 Offensive had
hit numerous other localities in addition to the Capital Military
District. Major ground attacks in the surrounding provinces of
III Corps Tactical Zone were initiated against Ben Cat and Due
Hoa on January 31, 1968. On February 1, the Viet Cong launched
three more attacks, against the engineer school at Phu Cuong,
and the towns of Cu Chi and Ba Ria. The latter locality was
retaken by various South Vietnamese elements spearheaded by
the 3d Battalion of the Royal Australian Regiment on armored
personnel carriers. That afternoon a Viet Cong assault on Xuan
Loc, headquarters of the 18th ARVN Division, was broken up
by concentrated artillery fire and air power. The next day an-
other, similiar attack on Xuan Loc was defeated the same way.
On the night of February 3, the 273d VC Regiment, already
battered from an unsuccessful attack on Thu Due the previous
day, attempted to blow up the large Newport Bridge linking
Saigon and Bien Hoa. The Viet Cong were able to overrun a
number of bunkers and took the eastern end of the bridge. A
THE BATTLES OF TET-68 243
relief force composed of elements of the 720th Military Police
Battalion, fighting as infantry and backed by a mechanized com-
pany of the 5th ARVN Cavalry Squadron, counterattacked the
key structure. At 2:50 A.M., in heavy combat lighted by a bril-
liant cross fire of tracers and burning houses reflected in the
lampblack waters, Newport Bridge was recaptured.
Tay Ninh city was targeted for February 6, but by that date
the Viet Cong were expected. Their advancing columns were
ambushed and the survivors stung by orbiting helicopter gun-
ships. They fled the field, leaving it strewn with parade banners
for the victory march. The second wave of Tet attacks, which
befell Saigon and Cholon, also struck Song Be, Tan An, and An
Loc. They were feeble by comparison to the first round of Tet
attacks.
The 1st Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile)
was operating in the Song Be area when the 211th and 212th
VC Infiltration Groups captured the western portion of the city.
The 31st ARVN Ranger Battalion, assisted by the 2d Squadron,
17th Cavalry (Armored), and 1st Battalion, 506th Infantry, de-
feated the Viet Cong in acrid combat fought block by block
through the hovel-choked town. Song Be was practically de-
stroyed in the process.
The defense of the low, marshy plain known as the Delta
had always been the primary responsibility of the South Viet-
namese. Although devoid of NVA troop support, the Viet Cong
Tet-68 Offensive was most extensive in this area. Within the
Delta region thirteen of the sixteen province headquarters were
attacked within the first forty-eight hours. 17 The main highway
in the Delta, Route 4, was interdicted at sixty-two locations and
six bridges were dropped. It wasn't until a final mud roadblock
was cleared on May 15 that Route 4 was reopened along its
entire length.
At My Tho in the upper Delta region the Viet Cong em-
ployed their 261st, 263d, and 514th Battalions to pin the 32 d
17. Major attacks in IV Corps Tactical Zone were made on the night of Tet,
January 31, at Cai Be, Cai Lay, Can Tho, My Tho, Soc Trang, True Giang,
and Vinh Long. Other attacks the same night or shortly thereafter were con-
ducted at Chau Phu, Moc Hoa, Phu Vinh, Quan Long, Rach Gia, Sa Dec,
and Tri Ton.
244 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
ARVN Ranger Battalion outside town and enter the city. There
they fought to within two hundred yards of the 7th ARVN Di-
vision command post before being beaten back. Navy Task Force
117 landed the 2d Brigade (Riverine) of the 9th Infantry Divi-
sion on the southern edge of My Tho on the morning of Feb-
ruary 1. The South Vietnamese lashed back in conjunction with
the 3d Battalion, 47th Infantry. The mobile riverine troops were
subjected to the harsh house-to-house fighting that typified Tet-
68. Supported by massed artillery fire and air strikes, they ad-
vanced room by room and from door to door under intense ma-
chine-gun and rocket fire. By nightfall the western half of the
city had been cleared to the main canal. The following day the
3d Battalions of both the 47th and 60th Infantry attacked north
astride the city reservoir. At 6:00 P.M. on February 2 they had
linked up with South Vietnamese forces, and My Tho was once
again in allied hands.
True Giang was attacked on Lunar New Year's Day by the
S16th and 518th VC Battalions, which took the town and sur-
rounded its MACV compound. The reinforced 3d Battalion of
the 39th Infantry airmobiled into a landing zone south of the
city on the night of February 1, and broke through to the be-
sieged American camp. The Viet Cong were eliminated inside
the city two days later, but True Giang's environs were not
cleared until the middle of the month.
The 9th ARVN Division guarding Vinh Long was considered
a weak division, with two of its regiments rated as only mar-
ginally combat-effective. On January 31 the Viet Cong 306th,
308th and 857th Battalions attacked Vinh Long city and its air-
field. Both South Vietnamese reinforcements and the 2d Bri-
gade (Riverine) of the 9th Infantry Division were required to
regain the area. On February 4 the mobile riverine force an-
chored north of town on the Mekong River. The 3d Battalion
of the 47th Infantry conducted river-assault probes while the 3d
Battalion of the 60th Infantry conducted an airmobile assault south
of the city. Two days later, two companies of this battalion, sup-
ported by helicopter gunships and assault patrol boats, made
beach landings on the banks of the Rach Cai Cam. After heavy
combat, the city was retaken on February 8.
The 21st ARVN Division was busy defending both Can Tho
THE BATTLES OF TET-68 245
and Soc Trang. A major four-day engagement, in which Com-
pany D of the 5th Special Forces Group took an active part,
shattered Can Tho. On February 5, the Viet Cong were routed
out of the university buildings, and the battle was terminated.
Chau Phu, a provincial capital on the Cambodian border, was
infiltrated by small groups of Viet Cong who established them-
selves in key locations. They were opposed by some of the
roughest allied combatants in Vietnam, who were posted there
on special missions. The counterattack was made by small but
lethal teams from Detachment B-42 of the Army Special Forces,
a provincial reconnaissance unit of Project PHOENIX, and a Navy
SEAL contingent. The fight lasted a tough thirty-six hours; mass
civilian casualties resulted and a fourth of the city was burned
to the ground, but the Viet Cong were utterly defeated.
The country-wide NVA/VC Tet-68 Offensive achieved a pos-
itive psychological effect and worldwide publicity, but only tran-
sient success on the ground. The Viet Cong had performed most
of the assaults and took such heavy losses that they were largely
destroyed as an effective military menace to the South Vietnam-
ese government. Thereafter, VC activities would be confined to
minor ambushes and raids, and main force Viet Cong formations
had to be completely rebuilt using regular North Vietnamese
replacements. All chances of "liberating South Vietnam from
within" were thoroughly defeated with the bloody military re-
verses suffered by the Viet Cong in Tet-68.
The South Vietnamese forces had taken the brunt of the Tet-
68 attacks and had been shaken and cut up by its unexpected
violence. Although a considerable number of soldiers returned
to their units as soon as practicable, desertions in February sky-
rocketed. The superb South Vietnamese Airborne and 1st Divi-
sions, as well as the llth, 21st, 23d, 37th, and 39th Ranger
Battalions, had so many casualties that they were out of com-
mission for most of the year, Throughout the ARVN military,
losses in key officers and sergeants had been severe. However,
the South Vietnamese armed forces had performed well consid-
ering the intensity of combat and confusion resulting from the
surprise. In many regions of the country it had been the heav-
iest combat ever experienced. Tet-68 thrust the ARVN back into
the forefront of the war, and a General Mobilization Law pro-
246 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
mulgated on June 19, 1968, allowed the army to slowly regain
its cohesion.
The American forces had wreaked absolute havoc on the North
Vietnamese and Viet Cong attackers, bringing superior arma-
ments and mobility to crush entire units. Although Tet-68 had
been a great military victory, most of its potential as such was
lost, since the American public never got over its initial shock
at the apparent ability of the Viet Cong to strike and hold tar-
gets throughout Vietnam. The battles fought during those hectic
weeks had been vicious and costly, but the strategic possibilities
raised by their successful conclusion were lost to a government
dazed by the surface carnage. As a result, great pressure was
brought against the military to curtail further casualties. This
command desire to cut further losses inhibited any chance of a
ruthless follow-up campaign aimed at finishing off the VC rem-
nants and discouraging future NVA activity in South Vietnam.
CHAPTER 16.
SIEGE AND
BREAKTHROUGH
1. Khe Sanh: The Siege Begins
The ambush of a platoon from Company I, 3d Battalion, 26th
Marines, on January 19, 1968, on a ridgeline just south of Hill
881 North, was like a recurring nightmare of the previous year's
ambuscade in the same area, which had touched off The Hill
Fights around Khe Sanh. This time, however, both reinforced
304th and 325C NVA Divisions were in the immediate vicinity.
Instead of the localized firefights of 1967, the resulting battle
for Khe Sanh would become the highest strategic military con-
cern of the United States government.
Colonel David E. Lownd's 26th Marines defending the key
Marine combat base of Khe Sanh were thinly spread, protecting
both the main bastion and several nearby hills deemed critical
to its survival. 1 These hill strong-points had been carved out of
the tree-splintered, upchurned earth left by the massive Amer-
ican bombardments used in taking them the previous spring.
The trees had been so riddled with metal shrapnel shards that
1. The 26th Marines had been forged in the heat of World War II at Camp
Pendleton, California, in January 1944, and its heritage consisted of only one
battle, Iwo Jima. There the regiment's valiant performance on Nishi Ridge
earned it fellowship with older Marine units. It had been deactivated in March
1946 and called back to the colors to fight in Vietnam, where elements had
been quickly lifted into Khe Sanh.
247
248 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
engineers attempting to cut them for bunker timber only ruined
their chain saw blades. The Marines had ringed Khe Sanh and
its hills with triple rows of wire, deep trenches, and sandbagged
mortar-proof bunkers. The men struggled through torrential
monsoon rains which washed away barrier obstacles, collapsed
trenches, and caved in bunkers. They toiled under sniper fire
to string barbed wire and razor-sharp German wire, emplace
mines and personnel detectors, and shore up fortifications. They
sent out daily patrols into the jungled ravines and elephant grass
in constant sweeps that often brought sudden death, and then
sent other patrols to retrieve the bodies and avenge the fallen.
The six hilltops guarding Khe Sanh were themselves exposed
islands of resistance tenuously connected by helicopter airlift only.
Already their slopes were cluttered with aircraft wreckage. Heli-
copters alighting on the elevated landing zones dumped cargo
and lifted out seriously injured Marines in seconds, as intense
mortaring bracketed them with geysers of dirt, Casualties were
run out on stretchers carried by Marines who sometimes had to
be evacuated with the wounded, as the helicopter-evoked shell-
ings inevitably injured the litter bearers as well. When the hill-
tops were buried in cloud cover they were totally isolated,
sometimes for weeks.
In the night mists of January 20, the North Vietnamese at-
tacked up Hill 861. Sappers ran bangalore torpedoes into the
defensive barriers, and soldiers poured through the gaps. Mor-
tar explosions tore into the packed groups of onrushing men as
the Marine defenders flayed them with red tracer-lined streams
of machine-gun fire. Fougasse barrels splattered the attackers
with burning concoctions of diesel fuel and gasoline. Twisted
fencing and barbed wire were piled high with smashed bodies
riddled by hot steel, hideously lighted by brilliant flashes of det-
onating shellfire. More NVA infantry dashed up the slippery mud
as explosions erupted along the entire slope, and jumped into
the trenchlines of Company K, 26th Marines.
The Marines desperately fought back in close-quarters com-
bat, knifing and clubbing the North Vietnamese in a melee of
individual fighting. Some bludgeoned assailants were flung over
the sides of the ditches and rolled to their deaths down the fire-
SIEGE AND BREAKTHROUGH 249
swept hill. Other Marines, relying on their flak vests, simply
dropped grenades as the attackers swarmed over them, and curled
up to absorb the shrapnel fragments in their legs and armor.
Marine mortar tubes on supporting hills were overworked until
they glowed red in the dark. Finally the North Vietnamese at-
tack broke, and Hill 861 remained in Marine hands.
At dawn on January 21, the North Vietnamese plastered Khe
Sanh airstrip with a barrage of rockets and mortars. Almost
everything above ground at the base was flattened or damaged
by the combination of the shelling and the destruction of the
main ammunition dump, which burned furiously for two days.
The 1st Battalion of the 9th Marines was flown to Khe Sanh the
following day. On January 27, the 37th ARVN Ranger Battalion
arrived at the camp, a symbolic gesture from the South Viet-
namese government. 2 These five battalions would endure the siege
of Khe Sanh, along with artillery, five tanks, two Ontos pla-
toons, and a CIDG company with their Special Forces advisors.
The bleak situation had many of the overtones of Dien Bien
Phu, the great communist battlefield victory which had closed
the curtain on French rule in Indochina and created the two
Vietnamese states. There was widespread fear that this Marine
base might be overrun also, giving North Vietnam a similar mil-
itary and political triumph. Although the situation was not a car-
bon copy of the former siege, since the Marines at Khe Sanh
were entrenched on a small plateau and controlled adjacent high
ground, the parallels were certainly there. The Marine predic-
ament at Khe Sanh was extremely precarious. They were sur-
rounded by at least two crack North Vietnamese divisions, one
of which was the home guard 304th NVA Division, which had
fought at Dien Bien Phu (and was destined to conquer Da Nang
2. Concerning the commitment of the 37th ARVN Ranger Battalion, Col Hoang
Ngoc Lung states, "Not until the fighting had been in full progress did the
RVN decide to deploy one ARVN Ranger battalion to the base, more for
political than tactical reasons, evidently." (The General Offensives of 1968-
69, U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, D.C., 1981, p. 11).
General Westmoreland was more blunt: "To assure ARVN participation in
what I deemed to be an important fight, I insisted that the South Vietnamese
contribute an ARVN Ranger Battalion." (A Soldier Reports, Doubleday &
Company, 1976, p. 339).
250 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
on March 30, 1975). Since Route 9 had been cut, the base had
to subsist entirely on aerial resupply, a chancy business in the
monsoon season.
Hill 861A was assaulted in the morning darkness of February
5. Exploding bangalore torpedoes ripped through the wire and
the North Vietnamese surged up the slope. Captain Breeding's
Company E of the 26th Marines unleashed an unrestrained tor-
rent of machine-gun, claymore mine, and grenade fire to an-
nihilate the first groups storming through the sapper lanes. Then
the NVA gained the summit and took the northernmost trench-
line. They stopped momentarily to loot the dead Marine de-
fenders, giving the rest of Company E a chance to reform and
counterattack. The assault was so sudden that the North Viet-
namese had no time to react. The savage fighting was hand to
hand as searing grenade blasts lighted the fisted blows, kicks,
and knifings in white-hot, blinding flashes. The fury of the as-
sault ejected the North Vietnamese from the redoubts.
Two days later, the North Vietnamese would overrun an Army
Special Forces camp only six miles to the west along Route 9.
This time they would use tanks for the first time in Vietnam.
2. Khe Sanh: The Pressure Mounts (Lang Vei)
The Special Forces camp of Lang Vei, located along Route
9 only a mile and a half from the Laotian border, was just south-
west of the Khe Sanh base. Although the camp was not part of
the Marine defenses, it was tied into Marine artillery and re-
action forces for support. Lang Vei was the last Special Forces
border surveillance camp along the northwestern Vietnam bor-
der, and its loss terminated fixed American presence in that
critical region. Its destruction by North Vietnamese armor also
marked the final transition of the war from one of guerrilla tac-
tics to a classic, conventional struggle between national armies.
The camp was unexpectedly reinforced by the 33d Laotian
Volunteer Battalion (Elephant) on January 24, 1968. They had
been overrun the previous day at Ban Houei San in Laos. Al-
though there had been disturbing reports of North Vietnamese
tanks, Capt. Frank C. Willoughby, the commander of the Lang
Vei Special Forces Detachment A-101, did not expect the armor
actually to attack the camp except in a fire support role from
SIEGE AND BREAKTHROUGH 251
the jungle. As a result training with the hundred light antitank
weapons was limited to a dozen Americans and ten indigenous
troops, leaving seventy-five of the one-shot, disposable weapons
on hand. 3
Special Forces Lt. Col. Daniel F. Schungel had been posted
to the camp on February 6, after the Laotian colonel there re-
fused to listen to lower-ranking Americans. He arrived to ex-
perience an intense camp mortaring at six o'clock that evening.
One hour before midnight two North Vietnamese PT-76 am-
phibian tanks escorted by infantry from the 66th NVA Regiment
rumbled over the outer wire. Their headlights swept the ground
in front of them as they fired their cannon and machine guns
at the camp defenses. CIDG riflemen shot out the lights, and
a Special Forces-manned 106mm recoilless rifle swiveled around
to destroy each tank in turn. Three more tanks then swung into
view, roared around the disabled vehicles, and rolled over the
camp's ramparts.
Lt. Col. Schungel led bands of Special Forces troopers, armed
with light antitank weapons, chasing after the clanking tanks.
They exploded one tank and gunned down three crewmen clam-
bering from the smoking hatches. However, more tanks were
now appearing on the road leading into camp, and the antitank
rounds were either misfiring or scoring direct hits with little
effect. A fourth tank was destroyed by the 106mm recoilless rifle
position. It then fired three rounds of Beehive ammunition be-
fore being knocked out. By 2:00 A.M. the sole remaining re-
coilless rifle position was also destroyed. Special Forces and in-
digenous troopers were desperately climbing the sides of the
fifteen-ton steel vehicles and trying to pry open hatches to gre-
nade them. Most were killed or wounded by North Vietnamese
shock troops following behind them and firing assault rifles. NVA
sappers were using satchel charges, tear gas grenades, and
flamethrowers to tear into the inner compound.
The outer fringes of the camp were overrun despite a tough
3. On February 7, 1968, Lang Vei Special Forces camp had 1,007 troops: 24
Special Forces, 14 LLDB, 161 Mike Force, and 282 CIDG Bru tribal sol-
diers, 6 interpreters, 520 Laotian Ca tribal soldiers, and 2,200 Laotian civil-
ians. Not counting the Laotians (the reports are blank as to their fate), the
camp forces suffered 219 killed (10 U.S.) and 77 wounded (13 U.S.).
252 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
defense (with the exception of the Laotian Ca tribal soldiers,
whose commander wanted to "wait to fight until morning"). The
cloud cover and rolling ground fogs combined with communi-
cations difficulty to preclude accurate air support. Sergeant First
Class Ashley, five other Special Forces sergeants, and fifty CIDG
soldiers kept low to the ground as the tanks lumbered past them
and then escaped outside the wire to hide in bamboo clumps
and dry creek beds. When the Special Forces troops tried to
organize a counterattack from the outside, using the throngs of
panicked indigenous soldiers now streaming out of the camp,
no one stopped at their orders.
Lieutenant Colonel Schungel and several Special Forces and
LLDB personnel ran back to the main bunker looking for more
light antitank weapons. They were surrounded by sappers. The
LLDB troops dodged into the bunker, but Lieutenant Colonel
SchungeFs Americans manned positions behind dirt- and stone-
filled fifty-five-gallon drums around the fortification. A tank
rumbled to a stop in front of the barricade. The Americans fired
a light antitank round, but it bounced off. The tank blasted back
with its 76mm main gun. The force of the explosion knocked
Schungel down, tossed a barrel on top of a lieutenant, and blinded
another Special Forces soldier with flying gravel. The men pulled
back to sandbags at the bunker entrance. An LLDB officer nearby
realized that the bunker was a prime target and that defending
it was hopeless. He dashed off looking for a better place to hide.
The lieutenant colonel and the lieutenant tried to follow, but
the tank prevented their movement.
It was 3:00 A.M. The tank began clanking around the bunker
and shooting at the abandoned observation tower, which refused
to collapse. Schungel pitched two grenades under the tank. The
explosions did not harm it, but the tower structure fell over. At
that point someone hit the tank with a light antitank weapon,
and its turret hatch suddenly popped open. A hand appeared,
and then slipped back inside as flames started shooting out the
hatchway.
Lieutenant Colonel Schungel and the lieutenant, both badly
wounded, then killed a five-man sapper squad and managed to
crawl underneath the dispensary. They hid for the rest of the
night under a blanket of sandbags, while a platoon of North
SIEGE AND BREAKTHROUGH 253
Vietnamese set up positions overhead. Meanwhile, Captain Wil-
loughby and the small group of Americans and LLDB in the
underground level of the main bunker now believed they were
the only ones left alive. They had no communications, as all
their outside antennae were cut down by the victorious North
Vietnamese swarming over the compound. The men, covered
with splinters and rubble, positioned themselves behind over-
turned furniture.
The NVA kept pitching incendiary and riot gas grenades into
the bunker, and the defenders either had to put on gas masks,
handkerchiefs, or vomit. Then they shouted out in Vietnamese,
"We are going to blow up the bunker, so give up." At this com-
mand the LLDB captain and his four LLDB soldiers in the
bunker walked out with their hands up and were summarily ex-
ecuted. Although the NVA kept tossing grenades in the door-
way, they never stormed the bunker interior. Captain Wil-
loughby, seriously wounded, lost consciousness at 8:30 A.M., still
holding a flak jacket in front of him.
Meanwhile Sergeant Ashley and two other Special Forces
troopers were walking up Route 9 pleading with fleeing Laotians
and CIDG Bru tribesmen to counterattack the camp. They fi-
nally mustered sixty Laotian volunteers and twenty CIDG, got
in touch with aircraft by radio, and attacked. The Bru native
warriors bolted after receiving machine-gun fire and had to be
coaxed back. Sergeant Ashley's composite contingent assaulted
three different times attempting to reach the main bunker. Each
time they were repulsed. Fighter-bombers were raking the in-
side of the camp with rockets and cannon fire.
At 9:30 A.M. Schungel and the lieutenant decided that the
NVA had vacated the dispensary because there was no longer
return fire against the air strikes hitting the camp. They pain-
fully hobbled out and saw two blackened tank hulks, apparently
hit by aircraft, standing just outside the doorway. Both men
walked out the east gate of the camp. A half hour later the main
bunker reestablished outside communications, and at eleven
o'clock Captain Willoughby, whom everyone had thought dead,
regained consciousness. By this time Sergeant Ashley's group
was in its fourth try to break through. Between each assault the
Americans had to round up the reluctant CIDG soldiers, and
254 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
each attack stalled as the indigenous soldiers ran off again down
the road. On the fifth and final assault, Sergeant Ashley was hit
in the chest and mortally wounded.
The camp survivors were now ordered to evacuate the com-
pound, which was only lightly held after hours of blistering air
attacks. The bunker group stumbled out of its position in a move
closely coordinated by radio with Skyraider fighters, which were
making final bombing and strafing runs. Captain Willoughby's
dazed and bloodied column reached the main gate at Route 9.
There the LLDB officer was waiting in a jeep. He had been
captured by the North Vietnamese, had escaped, and had then
run all the way to old Lang Vei (450 yards from the present
camp) where he had found the vehicle.
The Americans, South Vietnamese, and Bru and Laotian Ca
warriors assembled on the old Lang Vei landing strip for aerial
extraction. The Marine helicopters landed, but attempts at or-
derly evacuation were rendered impossible when the Laotians
and indigenous soldiers mobbed the Marine helicopters. How-
ever, the Marine aircraft managed to get the wounded and the
Americans on board. They flew back, suffering considerable
damage from ground fire despite continuous overhead fighter
cover.
The rest of the Laotians and a horde of civilians, some six
thousand strong, descended on Khe Sanh itself at eight o'clock
on the morning of February 8. They had walked the entire dis-
tance along the road. Behind them the North Vietnamese en-
joyed full possession of Lang Vei, a critical Route 9 location. 4
3. Khe Sanh: Siege and Relief
At daybreak on February 8, 1968, the 101D NVA Regiment
attacked Hill 64, held by Second Lieutenant Terence R. Roach,
Jr/s platoon of Company A, 9th Marines. They rolled over the
barrier wire on top of canvas and rushed the western trenches.
Using liberal air and tank support, the rest of Company A re-
captured the hill in vicious fighting later that morning.
4. Army Special Forces reports were sharply critical of Air Force and Marine
response, which was hampered by weather and larger tactical considerations
as well as the ambush-prone nature of Route 9 connecting Khe Sanh to
Vei.
SIEGE AND BREAKTHROUGH 255
The siege then became an extended standoff as the North
Vietnamese began constructing entrenched approach works, sni-
pers patiently waited for careless targets, constant shelling con-
tinued, and Marine aircraft struggled to keep the base supplied.
The weather and hostile fire mandated a total of 679 supply drops,
as landings were prohibited. The air space above Khe Sanh was
always crowded with droning cargo planes, whirling helicopters,
darting light observation Birddogs, propellered Skyraiders,
thundering Spooky aircraft, and shrieking jet fighter-bombers.
The earth constantly rumbled with the distant mass explosions
from B-52 bombers flying beyond sight and sound. The lush
green hillsides, which had once supported the finest Southeast
Asian coffee plantations, had been reduced to charred ochre slopes
of cratered mud.
Action intensified late in the month when Khe Sanh en-
dured the heaviest barrage of the siege on February 23, and
the loss of two patrolling squads from Company B, 26th Ma-
rines, by ambush two days later. The 37th ARVN Ranger Bat-
talion, defending the southern outer perimeter of the main base,
was hit by a major ground assault on the night of February 29.
The North Vietnamese infantry launched two assaults from three
trenchlines in front of the ranger barrier wires. Both attacks were
obliterated by the response to frantic South Vietnamese calls for
protective fire which sent a devastating firestorm of artillery shells
exploding over the entire front. This massive artillery barrage
annihilated three waves of NVA soldiers before they could get
past the barbed wire. Airbursts created an equally lethal hail-
storm of shrapnel, which also swept throught the trenches and
killed many of the soldiers before they could "go over the top."
In March, blue skies replaced the monsoon clouds above Khe
Sanh, bringing a consequent increase in air activity. The Ma-
rines and the South Vietnamese rangers began vigorously
sweeping the base perimeter. An upbeat mood prevailed with
the change in weather and the decline of North Vietnamese
pressure. The military looked forward to relieving the siege of
Khe Sanh. Provisional Corps Vietnam, the precursor of XXIV
Corps, had been activated at Phu Bai on March 10, 1968, under
Lt. Gen; William B. Rosson, to continue the missions of MACV
Forward. Although planning was stymied by a major interser-
256 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
vice squabble over tactical aircraft direction and Army- Marine
problems of coordination, it continued to direct the elimination
of the Hue pocket, control the additional Army formations in-
serted in "Marineland," stockpile war supplies, and prepare a
breakthrough to Khe Sanh.
General Westmoreland, dissatisfied with Marine air support
arrangements for certain Army formations, demanded that the
Seventh Air Force provide all tactical aircraft direction. A major
high-level squabble erupted in the midst of the Tet Offensive,
the Battle of Hue, and the Siege of Khe Sanh. The proposal
became a focal point of Pentagon, Pacific Command, and MACV-
III MAP bickering. Doctrinal debate exploded, General West-
moreland considered resignation, and its final resolution (Air Force
management of fixed-wing missions) came on March 8, 1968, as
all three engagements were ending. Actual Air Force control
was not implemented until April 1, 1968.
The long-awaited allied drive on Khe Sanh, Operation PEG-
ASUS/LAM SON 207, began at 8:00 A.M. on April 1, 1968. The
jump-off point was the supply-packed staging fortress of Ca Lu,
fifteen miles away from the Marine combat base. Columns of
armor-vested, helmeted riflemen of the 2d Battalions of the 1st
and 3d Marines trudged along both sides of Route 9 through
thick morning ground fog. Behind them roared Marine dozers,
trucks, and cranes of the llth Engineer Battalion, which would
have to build culverts, emplace bridges, and carve out bypasses.
The heavy construction vehicles and equipment of the Navy
Seabees followed.
To the rear of the moving frontage of men and vehicles was
Landing Zone Stud, which the Seabees had turned into a major
airfield. Although wrapped in foggy haze that delayed flight op-
erations, it was a hub of hectic activity. Rows of helicopters were
parked the length of the airstrip. That afternoon, crammed with
battle-hardened troopers of the 7th Cavalry, they soared into
the low-hanging clouds. Throngs of Marines marching along the
roadway lifted their heads as the throbbing pitch of helicopters
resonated over the clatter of equipment and the noise of vehicle
engines. Waves of 1st Cavalry Division Hueys were racing over-
head. In one spectacular hop the 3d Brigade launched a massive
three-battalion heliborne assault directly into the critical terrain
SIEGE AND BREAKTHROUGH 257
midway between Ca Lu and the Khe Sanh combat base. The
landings were virtually unopposed.
The airmobile pace of Major General Tolson's 1st Cavalry
Division quickened on April 3, as three battalions of the 2d Bri-
gade helicoptered southeast of Khe Sanh. Again there was little
resistance. The only firefights resulted from the North Vietnam-
ese determination to retain certain high ground positions north
of Route 9, in order to cover the withdrawal of their major forces
to the south and west.
At daybreak on April 4, Lt. Col, John J. H. CahilFs 1st Bat-
talion of the 9th Marines attacked Hill 471, a critical piece of
real estate two miles south of Khe Sanh that overlooked much
of the valley. It had been occupied by NVA forces since Jan-
uary, but the Marines were on top of it by late afternoon. They
found only a few bodies of those killed by the artillery and air
strikes delivered prior to the assault. The next day a battalion
of the 66th NVA Regiment made a predawn attempt to retake
the hill. After two hours of fighting on the slopes, the Marines
mounted a savage, artillery-supported counterattack which re-
pulsed this effort. Enjoying excellent fields of observation and
fire from Hill 471 covering the advance of the cavalrymen, the
Marines continued to attack to the northwest,
Actions were delayed April 6, as the 2d Battalion of the 7th
Cavalry fought west along Route 9 in a continuous day of com-
bat against the North Vietnamese. The 1st Battalion of the 5th
Cavalry ran into a strong-point at the Old French Fort, the last
obstacle between the Army and the Marines at Khe Sanh. The
position fell to the 5th Cavalry's 2d Battalion the following day.
South Vietnamese paratroopers of the 3d, 6th, and 8th ARVN
Airborne Battalions airmobiled to the west of Khe Sanh near the
Laotian border on April 7. Meanwhile, the 2d Battalion of the
26th Marines cleared bunkered resistance between the combat
base and the northwestern outposts on Hills 861 and 881 South.
Another objective was secured April 10. On that day the 1st
Battalion, 12th Cavalry, swept into the ruins of the Lang Vei
Special Forces camp.
During the second week of April, the North Vietnamese
launched only one major attack, an early morning attempt on
April 8 to overrun the ARVN command post five miles south of
258 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
Khe Sanh. Supported by artillery and Marine fighter-bombers,
the South Vietnamese paratroopers fought off the battalion-sized
assault. The same day, the relief of the Khe Sanh combat base
was formally accomplished as the 1st Cavalry Division helicop-
tered Colonel Campbell's 3d Brigade command post inside the
Marine compound. As the llth Engineer Battalion closed the
base on April 12, it marked the first time since September 1967
that an operational traffic lane existed over the forty-two road
miles connecting Dong Ha to Khe Sanh.
Wide-ranging air cavalry units continued to uncover large
supply caches and other evidence of hasty withdrawal into
neighboring Laos. The final battle occurred on Easter Sunday,
April 14, in the same saddle between Hills 881 South and North,
where the Battle of Khe Sanh had begun in January. Preceded
by an extensive air and artillery bombardment, the 3d Battalion,
26th Marines, attacked at first light and, after heavy fighting up
the fortified slopes of Hill 881 North, secured the summit at
2:28 P.M. Through the end of April, the Marines continued to
clear the Khe Sanh vicinity in numerous slow and difficult com-
pany- and battalion-sized operations. These sweeps uncovered
abandoned North Vietnamese weapons and many dead, and
generated sporadic contact with NVA stay-behind units. The forces
that remained in western Quang Tri were small but well armed,
and derived substantial combat advantage from the hundreds of
well-prepared positions located throughout the Khe Sanh area.
The siege had lasted seventy-seven days, during which time
staggering amounts of war materials had been expended. Be-
tween January 20 and the end of April, 110,022 tons of bombs
had been dropped, 142,081 rounds of artillery fired, and over
14,000 tons of supplies had been air-delivered. However, the
end of the siege marked the end of Marine interest in retaining
Khe Sanh. General Westmoreland deferred the touchy decision
to his successor, Gen. Creighton W. Abrams. When he nodded
approval, the Marines had already been dismantling the base
for some time. By July 5, it was razed to the ground, and all
the recently refurbished bridges along Route 9 were systemat-
ically destroyed.
Its abandonment created a storm of military debate and pub-
lic furor. This was a natural consequence of the officially stated
SIEGE AND BREAKTHROUGH 259
military reasons for its defense in the first place, which had been
put out largely as propaganda during a wartime siege. The real
basis for its abandonment was the demise of Defense Secretary
McNamara's barrier dream. The Marines, a mobile shock force
by design and tradition, had an ingrained distaste for static de-
fense, which was heightened by the Khe Sanh experience. While
the destruction of Khe Sanh eradicated a strong-point of
McNamara's extended DYE MARKER plan, it also promised a
return to Marine mobility. However, by mid-1968, although
limited tactical offensives abounded, the United States military
participation in the war would soon be relegated to a strategic
defensive stance. The South Vietnamese forces would shortly be
directed to carry the burden of offensive combat.
CHAPTER 17.
COUNTEROFFENSIVE
1. Into the A Shau Valley
Following the Tet-68 onslaught of shock attacks, MACV moved
to sweep and secure the regions adjacent to cities and instal-
lations that had been targeted, and also launched several coun-
teroffensives into suspected NVA/VC base camps along the bor-
der. The devastating Battle of Hue convinced General
Westmoreland of the need to strike deep into the North Viet-
namese Army staging area of A Shau Valley, on the westernmost
fringes of Thua Thien Province, in order to preempt the mass-
ing of further attacks on the crucial city. The highly mobile 1st
Cavalry Division, just north of the valley as a result of its spec-
tacular Khe Sanh relief, was chosen as the sword of vengeance.
The remote A Shau Valley was one of the most rugged and
inaccessible regions straddling Vietnam's haunting western fron-
tier. The valley itself was a flat strip of bottomland, masked by
trackless, man-high elephant grass and deep, verdant tropical
rain forest. It had been carved out of the jungle-wrapped, mist-
ing mountain ranges towering five thousand feet on either side
of the Rao Loa River, which flowed past the bones of the over-
run A Shau Special Forces camp at its southern end to loop at
Ta Bat and then west into Laos. This corner of highland wil-
derness had been a haunt of the North Vietnamese since early
1966, and MACV was unsure of the extent of fortification there
or whether the NVA would stand fast and defend it. Since the
valley's rocky outcrops and steep slopes were reinforced with
260
COUNTEROFFENSIVE 261
batteries of heavy antiaircraft guns, the division would be facing
the most concentrated air defense encountered in South Viet-
nam up to that time.
Aerial scout teams of the 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry, started
working the area in mid-April. Scores of glassy, bubble-light ob-
servation helicopters, sleek Cobra gunships, and slender Huey
aerial workhorses darted alongside the valley walls in three days
of excellent flying weather. Behind their whirling cameras and
flashing machine guns came hundreds of Marine and Air Force
jet fighters spilling napalm and bombs. B-52 stratofortresses
pummeled the valley with a high-altitude heavy bombing blitz.
The intensity of unsuppressed antiaircraft fire in the central
valley caused Major General Tolson to shift his opening assault
to the northern end with his division's 3d Brigade. On an over-
cast April 19, troop helicopters filled with riflemen of the 1st
and 5th Battalions of the 7th Cavalry helicoptered over the jag-
ged peaks of several Chaine Annamitique ridgelines, and swung
toward two landing zones being rocketed and strafed by last-
minute air strikes and rocket runs. The helicopters veered into
their final approaches, abruptly dipping like runaway roller coaster
cars. The cavalrymen felt their stomachs flutter as they held onto
the lurching aircraft and flipped their rifles onto firing mode.
Many squad privates were raw stateside recruits; the division
had absorbed some 6,104 replacements since the beginning of
February as a result of hard fighting at Hue and Khe Sanh.
These first air assaults of Operation DELAWARE/LAM SON
216 planted the airmobile infantry near a valley trail on a nearby
hillside. Explosives and engineer tools flattened trees and veg-
etation, and soon the red earth was pitted by foxholes and lit-
tered with piles of sandbags and munitions boxes. Then the NVA
gunners suddenly opened up with their accurate 37mm and 23mm
antiaircraft guns as more aircraft descended through the low-
ering clouds. Flak bursts and machine-gun fire laced the thick
humid air. Ten helicopters were shot down and another thirteen
damaged. As drizzling rain set in, the division aborted the lift-
in of a second artillery firing battery. That night the 7th Cav-
alry's 5th Battalion spotted a large convoy of nearly a hundred
trucks near their landing zone, and took it under fire with light
artillery.
General William C. Westmoreland
from June 20, 1964 to June 1968
(U.S. Army)
General Creighton W. Abrams from
July 2, 1968 to June 1972 (U.S.
Army)
President Lyndon B . Johnson bids farewell to paratroopers of the 3d
Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, as they are rushed as emergency re-
inforcement into Vietnam from Fort Bragg, North Carolina. (Author's
Collection)
Soldiers of the 2d Battalion, 47th Infantry, 9th Infantry Division ad-
vance on the Y-Bridge during the Mini-let Offensive in Saigon on
May 11, 1968. The flak-vested soldier in the center carries the M79
grenade launcher, while the soldier on the far right carries an M60
machine gun. Others are armed with MI 6 rifles. (U.S. Army)
Soldiers of the 101st Airborne Division rappel into broken jungle as
the Army takes the post-Tet offensive into Vietnam s border regions.
(101st Airborne Division Information Office, Vietnam)
Wounded troops of the 101st Airborne Division are rushed to medical
evacuation helicopters as mopping up operations continue south of Hue.
(Author's Collection)
Armored Personnel Carriers of the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division
(Mechanized) cross over sixty-foot span of an Armored Vehick Launched
Bridge near Khe Sanh. (U.S. Army)
The flexibility of the Mobile Riverine Brigade of the 9th Infantry Di-
vision is demonstrated as soldiers of the 3d Battalion, 60th Infantry,
land from Armored Troop Carrier vessels in Kien Hoa Province of the
Delta. (U.S. Army)
262 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
For the next four days a late-season monsoon front passed
through, bringing vile weather which jeopardized the entire op-
eration. Dense fog and intermittent thundershowers obscured
the rain-soaked jungle, and clouds blanketed the valley, Heli-
copters leaving Camp Evans with supplies and reinforcements
climbed through the murky mist on instruments, leveled out
above the clouds, and then flew to the mountain peaks rising
above the overcast like craggy islands. The young aviators of the
llth Aviation Group then descended through the clouds and
antiaircraft fire, and groped through the gloom at near zero vis-
ibility to seek out American troop positions. Flights into the val-
ley became impossible past noon of each day. In this harrowing
manner the rest of the brigade was airlifted into the valley by
April 23. Finally, when the weather improved, the low daytime
ceilings never lifted above two or three thousand feet, covering
the higher elevations.
Meanwhile, the foot cavalry pushed out from their landing
zones and began finding ammunition stocks and abandoned anti-
aircraft guns mounted on flatbed trucks. The 7th Cavalry's 1st
Battalion made a cross-country trek to secure an abandoned air-
field outside A Loui, enabling the 1st Brigade to land there on
April 25. The North Vietnamese soldiers were slipping away with
as much material as possible, using their mobile flak guns to
discourage close airmobile pursuit, and the cavalrymen were
rapidly frustrated by these evasive tactics. A brief, indecisive
skirmish on April 26, the result of a 5th Battalion company from
the 7th Cavalry accidentally brushing against departing NVA in-
fantry, was the first solid ground contact of the A Shau Valley
sweep.
Three days later the Americans secured Ta Bat in the mid-
dle of the valley. The 3d ARVN Regiment was flown in to this
site on the first day of May. They started moving along the Rao
Loa River toward the old A Shau Special Forces camp, uncov-
ering fresh stocks of ammunition, spare parts, and communi-
cations equipment. The 1st Cavalry Division continued to re-
connoiter the area and find more caches. The 8th Engineer
Battalion repaired the A Loui airfield for use by fixed-wing cargo
planes, but daily thunderstorms washed it out by May 11. The
COUNTEROFFENSIVE 263
division was forced to evacuate the valley the same way it en-
tered, by helicopter alone.
As the rains increased, the division began destroying its fire
bases and preparing to leave. The first in were the first out,
and the 3d Brigade departed May 10 followed by the South Viet-
namese. The 1st Brigade's aerial extraction was completed by
the middle of the month. Operation DELAWARE was over, and
the Army quickly claimed a resounding success by citing bun-
dles of captured war materials, including one PT-76 light tank.
The actual results were less satisfying. The cavalrymen were ex-
posed to intense North Vietnamese rocketing and heavy artillery
shelling, and the helicopters had suffered grave losses due to
weather and severe flak. Again the NVA had chosen not to fight,
being content to offer only token resistance as the cavalrymen
freely roamed the valley. By willingly giving up a quantity of
military stores, they had gained the advantage of maneuvering
their fighting forces elsewhere while the highly mobile 1st Cav-
alry Division was occupied in the A Shau Valley.
Major General Melvin Zais's 101st Airborne Division was or-
dered into the A Shau Valley next. MACV hoped to bag North
Vietnamese troops reentering on the heels of the cavalry raid.
The planned operation, SOMERSET PLAIN/LAM SON 246,
was delayed three days by unsuitable weather, but on August
4 the clouds cleared enough for the division's 1st Brigade to
airmobile in. They were guided by a troop from the ubiquitous
1st Squadron of the 9th Cavalry, and brought along the 1st ARVN
Regiment. The air assaults had to run the gauntlet of intense
antiaircraft fire. Four gunships, one observation helicopter, and
one Phantom fighter-bomber were shot down, and another four
gunships and seven troopships were heavily damaged. The sol-
diers were dropped off in the old northern and central cavalry
sectors around A Loui and Ta Bat. The NVA resorted to delay-
ing and harassing tactics, but did not carelessly leave many large
weapons or ammunition caches behind. General Zais's divisional
long-range reconnaissance team had to be content with emplac-
ing booby-trapped mines and sensor devices. The allied force
boarded outbound helicopters August 18-19.
Both operations were feats of airmanship and logistics con-
264 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
ducted over some of the world's most difficult tropical terrain.
They were entirely air-supported and stand as milestones in
evolving airmobile tactics. However, neither neutralized the tar-
geted area, since North Vietnamese forces in neighboring Laos
quickly moved back into the valley upon allied departure. The
ephemeral excursions continued throughout the next year as
MACV kept up the pressure against a permanent NVA return
to the valley. Each operation was highly dangerous because of
the unpredictable weather and the uncertainty of NVA reaction.
Although the North Vietnamese usually retreated, American
commanders could never be sure what reception their airmobile
infantry would receive, and in 1969 the NVA chose to^ fight.
2. Action Along the DMZ
Throughout 1968 the Marines continued to seal the Demili-
tarized Zone, blocking NVA movement south across it by coun-
terattacking out of their fixed bases along Route 9. Since the
American rules of engagement still permitted Marine sorties up
to the demarcation line itself, the 3d Marine Division was get-
ting ready to slam into the DMZ as part of MACV's Tet-68
counteroffensive effort. Before the Marines could strike, the North
Vietnamese hit first.
The advancing 320th NVA Division was detected only four
miles from the major Marine base at Dong Ha on April 29,
1968. The 2d ARVN Regiment became enmeshed in a six-day
road fight with elements of the division, but other North Viet-
namese troops pushed around that battle and got into Dai Do
village, over two miles closer to Dong Ha, on April 30. The
NVA were then able to block an important logistical channel,
the Cua Viet River, with mortar and rocket fire as well as long-
range artillery from North Vietnam. A Marine battalion, sent to
reinforce the Dong Ha area, was battered by a major ambush.
The Marines attacked Dai Do with another battalion (2d Bat-
talion, 4th Marines) from road and riverbank, supported by tanks
and amphibious tractors.
On May 1, the Army's 196th Infantry Brigade (Light), on
loan as an emergency reserve from the Americal Division, air-
mobiled its 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry, into blocking positions
COUNTEROFFENSIVE 265
northeast of the battlefield. 1 The battalion prepared to seal off
the northeastern exits of the battleground, but became involved
in a protracted battle at the fortified hamlet of Nhi Ha. They
pressed their attack for two days through trenches and bunkers,
supported by plenty of Marine aircraft. Nhi Ha fell May 4, but
soon after the Americans left the NVA reoccupied it and con-
structed new blockhouses and entrenchments.
The Marines fighting near Dai Do began to make better
headway after air observers put Marine jets on top of an NVA
artillery spotting team on the morning of May 1. The riflemen
rolled a barrage through the village, charged in behind it, and
dug in positions on the northern side. The North Vietnamese
soldiers counterattacked the Marines in force late in the after-
noon, running forward behind a shield of artillery and mortar
support. The Marines answered with machine guns, rifles, gre-
nade launchers, and tank cannons, and desperately called for air
strikes and heavy shelling. During the height of the action al-
most every American artillery tube in northeastern Quang Tri
Province was either firing counterbattery concentrations or cre-
ating a wall of final protective fires in front of the Marines. The
NVA assault ploughed through the fiery detonations and into
the Marine lines, where it was defeated after a four-hour melee
of hand-to-hand combat.
The 320th NVA Divisions thrust toward Dong Ha was
checked at Dai Do on May 2. That afternoon the NVA mounted
a second counterattack against Dai Do. Artillery was active on
both sides, and Marine aircraft made fourteen sorties. The Ma-
rines repulsed the charge and followed in pursuit. The North
Vietnamese troops suddenly turned and made a third counter-
attack, the most violent of the battle. The 4th Marines fell back
into a hasty perimeter as rocket and mortar explosions ripped
through their ranks. Supporting air strikes were brought in as
close as possible as napalm and cluster bombs tore through the
L The 21st Infantry soldiers were known as the Gimlets. The regiment had
been formed in occupied Virginia after the Civil War, and had fought its way
west from Arizona in the Indian Wars, across the Zapote River in the Phil-
ippine Insurrection, in Luzon in World War II, in Korea, and finally into
Vietnam.
266 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
jungle. The battalion held its ground through the evening in
furious combat waged at close quarters. The following day the
1st Battalion, 3d Marines, relieved them and continued the drive,
meeting only fragmented opposition. The last major firefight oc-
cured on May 5, when the Marines took final organized NVA
positions in a daylong engagement. Although mopping up op-
erations were characterized by several sharp company-sized ac-
tions against rear-guard detachments, the 320th NVA Division
successfully broke contact.
Two weeks later, after refurbishment, the 320th NVA Di-
vision returned and began advancing toward Dong Ha again.
Aerial reconnaissance spotted North Vietnamese troops on May
25, 1968, and a Marine company was sent to investigate. The
Marines were stopped cold by the entrenched forces which had
renewed the defenses at Nhi Ha. A classic frontal assault, made
behind a rolling artillery barrage, carried the strong-points, but
most of the defenders were able to escape through the swamp-
ish bogs. The South Vietnamese had also run into units of the
same division less than two miles from Dong Ha. Commencing
May 26, the 3d and 9th Marines drove against each flank of the
division, and after a week of bitter fighting the North Vietnam-
ese abandoned their Dong Ha approach.
The fixed Marine base camps guarding the Demilitarized Zone
were frequently shelled but never to the extent that Con Thien
had been during September 1967. However, daily patrols re-
sulted in frequent skirmishing, and the Marines were looking
forward to a promised mail-fisted Army brigade, being mustered
in the United States to muscle up the eastern DMZ sector. 2 The
open, grassy plains were ideal tank country, and Col. Richard
J. Glikes's arriving 1st Brigade of the mechanized 5th Infantry
2. The 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) was stationed at Fort
Carson, Colorado. It had just commenced reorganization for Vietnam duty on
March 25, 1968, when it was assigned riot control tasks during Operation
GARDEN PLOT April 7-13. After hurried combat training a flotilla of C-141
Starlifter transports flew the entire brigade to Da Nang by July 31, where
other aircraft immediately moved it to Quang Tri. The brigade shipped a total
of 1,072 vehicles from its home base, and once in Vietnam it was given 140
armored personnel carriers and 8 mortar carriers from Fort Hood, Texas; 25
M48 medium tanks from Fort Knox, Kentucky; and 42 M48 medium tanks
from the Letterkenny Army Depot at Chambersburg, Pennsylvania.
COUNTEROFFENSIVE 267
Division contained one tank battalion and two infantry battal-
ions, one of them mounted on armored personnel carriers. His
formidable armored shock force was envisioned as an excellent
deterrent to invading formations of North Vietnamese light in-
fantry, and was moved to the front lines during August.
The Marines were also delighted with the offshore arrival of
the sixteen-inch-gunned battleship USS New Jersey (BB-62) on
September 29, 1968. Her nineteen-hundred-pound shells could
reach twenty-four miles, practically to Camp Carroll. On Oc-
tober 4, the 2d Battalion of the 26th Marines ran into bunkers
north of the Rockpile. The battleship rendered its first fire mis-
sion in direct support of ground combat in Vietnam. The bunk-
ers were flattened.
The mechanized brigade got into real action about the same
time. Although some elements started shooting on August 12,
the unit was still completing shakedown. This had been com-
plicated by the September monsoons, which washed out the main
bridge along the line of communications to Cam Lo, temporarily
cutting the unit off except by aerial resupply. When the tankers
and soldiers of the 5th Infantry Division began sustained combat
operations, their impact was immediate. The North Vietnamese
in the DMZ vicinity had never battled true armored formations
that combined mechanized momentum. Their experiences were
limited to fighting Marine infantry who used occasional tank
support. Initially the NVA tried to stand fast in their earthen
fortifications, which led to violent firefights and certain destruc-
tion.
One of the roughest encounters took place northeast of Con
Thien in response to a reconnaissance report on October 25.
The 1st Battalion of the 61st Infantry (Mechanized) found itself
opposed by a North Vietnamese bunker complex. 3 The mech-
anized infantrymen dismounted their carriers and blasted their
way into the trenches under a hail of machine-gun and rocket
3. The 61st Infantry was formed in June 1917, at Gettysburg Park, Pennsyl-
vania, and had served in World War I with the 5th Infantry Division, where
it made a distinguished crossing of Meuse River near Dun in November of
1918. Afterward it had been axed in the peace cuts and never served in World
War II or Korea. Elements were reactivated as part of the combat arms reg-
imental system in 1962,
268 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
fire. In a seven-hour struggle, tanks of Company B, 1st Battal-
ion of the 77th Armor, crushed the trenches and finished off
bunkers at point-blank range.
The North Vietnamese Army had suffered some serious de-
feats along the Demilitarized Zone in 1968, but late in the year
gained several advantages regardless. On November 1, 1968, all
U.S. offensive operations were ordered discontinued inside the
DMZ, with the exception of squad patrols (with platoon backup
in case extraction assistance was required), which were permit-
ted in the southern portion until December 4, 1968. The NVA
formations had also learned to avoid pitched battles with the
mechanized brigade. The pace of warfare slowed to the patrol
and sweep actions typical of the rest of the country. Bold as
ever, the mechanized soldiers began spreading their tracked ve-
hicles out on line and covered the gaps with small four-man fire
teams. They hoped to block continued NVA infiltration through
the tropical savannah by such picketing, and depended on the
speed of nearby armored carriers to bail out any team in trou-
ble. The DMZ campaign had slowed to an indefinite stalemate,
which was only broken by the American withdrawals later in the
war.
3. Incidents on the Northern Front
Throughout South Vietnam, MACV's counteroffensive was
typified by hundreds of battalion-sized operations and literally
thousands of small unit actions conducted each week attempting
to locate and destroy NVA/VC units. After the Battle of Hue,
the 1st Marine Division initiated mobile sweeps in Thua Thien
and Quang Nam provinces, taking advantage of the newly ar-
rived 27th Marines reinforcing Da Nang. The division swept the
provincial borders and secured the razor-backed Hai Van Moun-
tain Pass area of Highway 1. The North Vietnamese were still
able to get several combat units within the Da Nang area by
August 18, 1968. On that day sapper and rocket attacks blasted
several localities as the Marines were suppressing a major three-
day riot in the III MAP detention compound. A lively action
followed on August 23 when the 402d VC Sapper Battalion seized
one half of Highway 1's key bridge leading into Da Nang. They
had been stopped by the Marine 1st Military Police Battalion,
COUNTEROFFENSIVE 269
and the city garrison's 1st Battalion of the 27th Marines drove
the Viet Cong out.
The 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) commenced Oper-
ation NEVADA EAGLE on May 17, 1968, in Thua Thien Prov-
ince. Several days later, just after midnight on May 21, the di-
vision base camp five miles southeast of Hue was pounded by
an intense mortar and rocket barrage. The helicopters quickly
scrambled into the air, and an NVA battalion stormed the length
of the 1st Brigade perimeter. They broke through the outer pe-
rimeter wires with exploding bangalore torpedoes and demoli-
tion charges. As the North Vietnamese soldiers rushed the bunker
line, the Americans frantically replied with machine-gun, heli-
copter, and direct Beehive artillery fire. The attack was thrown
back by first light.
The division's field activities were typified by infrequent
contact and increased booby-trap losses, punctuated by sharp
clashes during airmobile assaults in the nearby mountains. Em-
phasis was placed on protection of rice, scattered ambushing of
suspected Viet Cong pathways, and offensive sweeps along roads.
This tempo of fighting would continue into the next year.
As American airmobility became commonplace in the north-
ern provinces, the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese soldiers were
adapting to the tactics. By the middle of June, the level of air
activity and the NVA/VC response was a far cry from the daz-
zling 1st Cavalry Division intrusion of January. American heli-
copters were no longer readily picking on opportune targets.
The NVA started using small groups of men as bait. When at-
tacked, these men would entice the gunships to fly over well-
concealed sections of deadly antiaircraft machine guns. The
Americal Division air commanders retorted by calling in massed
artillery alongside any close air support. Helicopter losses were
mounting in all units, but many of the crews survived the crashes.
Often their lives depended on the speed and luck of units at-
tempting to retrieve them.
A 101st Airborne Division OH-6A light observation helicop-
ter was overflying Thua Thien Province on the morning of Oc-
tober 4, 1968, on a visual reconnaissance mission southeast of
Phu Loc. In addition to the warrant officer pilot, an artillery
captain was aboard. The helicopter was following a ridgeline which
270 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
was crowned with four clusters of thatched dwellings. Farther
down the slope the captain thought he saw a bunker with over-
head cover, and several well-used trails connecting all the struc-
tures. While turning back to fly over the area and adjust artil-
lery fire on the huts, the little helicopter was suddenly peppered
by four rounds of AK47 automatic rifle fire. The bullets all hit
the engine compartment, and the craft nosed over to crash up-
side down on a nearby hillside.
The pilot had been knocked unconscious by the crash, which
had broken his right leg, and was wedged in the helicopter's
smashed cockpit. The artillery captain was in terrible pain with
a fractured left leg and a right leg burned by hot gasoline from
a ruptured fuel line. The captain pulled the pilot out of the
wreckage, and after the latter had regained consciousness they
crawled two hundred yards from the aircraft. They hid under a
log in some thick underbrush, armed with only their .45-caliber
pistols. As the tropical sun's torrid heat sapped their strength,
they cut banana stalks and sucked out the scant moisture.
Throughout the day, close artillery shelling and air strikes
kept the Viet Cong away from their hiding place. After dark the
two men crawled to a nearby stream and fell asleep on its banks.
At various intervals throughout the night, they heard the faint
noise of a hand-cranked generator being used to power a radio
using morse code. With the coming of daylight the wounded
pilot and observer crawled sixty more yards downstream and hid
in a hollow under the mud ledge of the streambed. Later that
morning the warrant officer saw a helicopter flying back and forth
in the sky and crawled out into the open and waved his hand-
kerchief and map in the air. He then hobbled back and dragged
out the captain so the helicopter could see both of them.
That afternoon gunfire erupted at a distance. They realized
it was an American patrol fighting on the ridgeline. They stayed
hidden in the streambed and counted the distinct noises of light
machine guns and a few crackling rifles, guessing that only one
VC delaying squad was involved. Nightfall descended and they
moved to a flat area ten yards away and fell into a broken, ex-
hausted sleep.
At nine in the morning on October 6, they heard a group
of Vietnamese voices. A half hour later they waved again at an-
COUNTEROFFENSIVE 271
other helicopter and then crawled back to their sheltered po-
sition by the stream bank. The morning passed slowly. Then
firing started again in the afternoon along the ridgeline, accom-
panied by rifle shots from a downstream direction. At 5:00 P.M.
another helicopter guided riflemen of the 2d Battalion, 505th
Infantry, to their location. Both officers were put on a medical
evacuation helicopter and flown directly to the 22d Surgical
Hospital at Phu Bai.
Maj. Gen. Samuel W. Koster's Americal Division was ac-
tively patrolling the southern two provinces of I Corps Tactical
Zone, including the beautiful but dangerous, cave-studded Phuoc
Ha Valley. The division's primary operation was the yearlong
WHEELER/WALLOWA, but there were several others. These
sweeps were characterized by light, scattered contacts with a
high rate of sniping, mine, and booby trap incidents. Villages
were found to be fortified and deadly, but it was difficult to pin
down the elusive Viet Cong. Battalions in the field encamped
their artillery and headquarters on high ridges. From such fire
bases their rifle companies would venture into the surrounding
jungle, carrying a single 81mm mortar and always keeping within
range of the fire base artillery. This was called "reconnaissance
in force." If the companies ran into resistance they called in as
much artillery, helicopter gunship, and Air Force tactical sup-
port as possible. The battalion commanders usually arrived over
trouble spots in command helicopters within five or ten minutes
to direct actions personally, and the troops began calling them
"flying squad leaders." Usually operations ceased at dark and
contact with the NVA/VC was broken off as quickly as possible.
The companies either returned to the fire base or set up in
place. Each man in a company carried eight empty sandbags,
and these were filled and pooled at night into three-man posi-
tions. In this way, field fortifications of sorts were constructed
rapidly, with less digging required. Small combat outposts would
then be emplaced by company patrols, which were euphemisti-
cally labeled "ambushes."
The Americal Division suffered from grave command and
control problems, stemming from poor training and a lack of
leadership, from division down to platoon level, which permitted
civilian mistreatment. Some elements of its llth Infantry Bri-
272 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
gade (Light) were little better than organized bands of thugs,
with the officers eager participants in the body count game. In
March the brigade conducted a series of atrocities along the coast
of Quang Ngai Province in Son My village, which the division
and brigade staffs covered up by suppressing information or con-
ducting sham investigations. When the rape, torture, and
slaughter of civilians in what became known as the My Lai in-
cident were finally exposed, it marked the first of a string of
disasters that would blight the Americal Division's combat rec-
ord. Meanwhile, in the field the llth Infantry Brigade had al-
ready been ordained the Butcher Brigade by the soldiers.
The Army discovered serious problems that stabbed at the
very heart of the disciplined war machine that had initially gone
into Vietnam. Within the Americal Division, dereliction of duty,
ignored regulations, and hoodlum activity were more common-
place than the Army had ever imagined. Although the official
Army board of inquiry came up with a list of thirty persons,
mostly officers (including the division's commanding general),
who had known of various war crimes, the military submitted
charges against only fourteen of them. Additionally, four of the
officers and nine more enlisted men were charged with war crimes
or crimes against humanity. All had their charges dismissed or
were acquitted, with the exception of the most junior officer,
1st Lt. William L. Galley, Jr., who was found guilty of mur-
dering at least twenty-two civilians. His platoon alone was es-
timated to have killed some two hundred innocent women, chil-
dren, and old men.
Actually, the My Lai massacre itself reflected the stark ter-
ror of a war of attrition, in which military success, for lack of
terrain objectives, was measured statistically by counting corpses.
While casualty counts are valid measurements of war, in Viet-
nam they unfortunately became more than yardsticks used to
gauge the battlefield. Rather than means of determination, they
became objectives in themselves. The process became so ghoul-
ish that individual canteens were accepted as authorized sub-
stitutes if bodies were too dismembered to estimate properly.
Guidelines were even issued by MACV on factoring additional
dead based on standard percentages by type of encounter and
terrain. This appalling practice produced body counts that went
COUNTEROFFENSIVE 273
largely unquestioned, and were readily rewarded by promo-
tions, medals, and time off from field duty. For example, Gen-
eral Westmoreland had issued a special commendation to the
llth Infantry Brigade based on its claim of 128 enemy killed at
My Lai.
4. Mini-Tet and Beyond
Following the Tet-68 Battle for Saigon, American and South
Vietnamese forces started scouring the countryside around Sai-
gon in eleven separate operations. MACV consolidated all these
ongoing operations under the TOAN THANG (Complete Vic-
tory) Campaign, which started April 8, 1968, and would become
the mainstay of all allied activity in that area for the duration
of American combat presence in Vietnam. The major goal of
TOAN THANG was the prevention of future armed incursions
into Saigon, and a huge ring of units was formed around the
capital. Some forty-two American and thirty-seven South Viet-
namese infantry and tank battalions were immediately assigned
to the task, and this initial investment was soon increased.
When American and North Vietnamese negotiators an-
nounced forthcoming peace conversations in Paris on May 3,
defense of Saigon was heightened. The 3d Brigade of the "Old
Reliable" 9th Infantry Division was given the screening respon-
sibility for the southern approaches in Long An Province, a job
which it held until departure from Vietnam years later. The
"Tropic Lightning" 25th Infantry Division was operating as usual
to the west of Saigon in the Cambodian border provinces. The
199th Infantry Brigade "Redcatchers" patrolled beyond Bien Hoa
to block movement from War Zone D, and the "Big Red One"
1st Infantry Division guarded the northern approach. The 1st
Australian Task Force at Long Thanh patrolled the eastern front.
The South Vietnamese forces were deployed within the Capital
Military District Command itself. With few exceptions, all the
American troop assignments remained permanent until final re-
deployment back to the United States.
The jarring explosion of a taxi filled with a hundred pounds
of TNT outside the Saigon television and radio station on May
4, 1968, signaled the next Viet Cong onslaught against Saigon,
which became known as Mini-Tet. That night several bombard-
274 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
ments were followed by attacks on the key Saigon-Bien Hoa
Highway Bridge which connected the two vital centers. South
Vietnamese marine units repulsed these efforts throughout the
next day. On May 6, the 25th Infantry Division and air cavalry
formations trounced attacks on two villages near the Tan Son
Nhut air base. All eyes were riveted on VC intentions in Saigon
itself, and the following day another intensive struggle began in
Cholon. The 267th VC LF Battalion, well equipped with flak
guns and antitank rifles, seized a vital crossroad in Phu Lam
district and dug in. The 38th ARVN Ranger Battalion would spend
days of hard fighting trying to pry it out. The nearby Binh Tay
Distillation Plant and the bridge at Binh Tien were also taken
by the Viet Cong, and the 35th ARVN Ranger Battalion re-
quired several days of tough combat to clear the built-up area.
Tv^o Viet Cong local force battalions attacked the critical Y-
Bridge over the Kinh Doi Canal, which separated downtown Sai-
gon from the urban Nha Be district. The 9th Infantry Division
sent two mechanized battalions, the 2d Battalion of the 47th
Infantry, and the 5th Battalion of the 60th Infantry, into har-
rowing city combat to counter this dangerous situation. 4 Every
day the house-to-house fighting raged, and upgunned armored
personnel carriers slowly churned through the debris-strewn
streets. Entire blocks of buildings were in ruins and the four-
lane bridge itself severely damaged. The infantrymen struggled
forward under heavy machine-gun cross fire to take out one
strong-point at a time. The Viet Cong defenders occupied multi-
story buildings and strategic choke points in the rubble. They
used great quantities of accurate B-40 rockets, but the American
mechanized-infantry assault slowly crushed defensive positions.
The tracked carriers fired their topside recoilless rifles in direct
support of the advancing infantry assault teams. This methodi-
cal, determined assault finally cleared the well-defended city
blocks around the bridge site, allowing it to be recaptured. The
successful six-day battle to regain the Y-Bridge marked the
4. Both the 47th and the 60th Infantry had been organized in June 1917 for
World War I service, and they had both served with distinction in the St.
Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne offensives. Later the two regiments fought side
by side from French Morocco and Algeria to the heartland of Germany in
the second World War.
COUNTEROFFENSIVE 275
toughest city combat American troops encountered during the
Mini-Tet Offensive.
The South Vietnamese Battle for Cholon was renewed May
25 after the third wave of Viet Cong attacks on Saigon. In the
violent inner-city clashes progress was measured in yards, and
VC counterattacks often canceled hard-won gains. In the midst
of this raging battle, on June 2, a technical mishap caused an
American helicopter gunship to misfire two rockets which then
struck a large group of senior South Vietnamese officers watch-
ing the battle from positions in the Thuong Phuoc high school.
Among those killed were the commanders of the Saigon police
and of the 5th ARVN Ranger Group: Several other key person-
nel were seriously wounded. At the time there was widespread
belief among the South Vietnamese that the rockets had delib-
erately cut down these officers, who were all confidants and ap-
pointees of Vice-President Ky, in order to allow President Thieu
to fill the slots with people of his own choosing. The unfortunate
incident marked a new low in the Vietnamese public image of
American assistance that was not easily erased. The battle con-
tinued into early June in some old familiar sectors, including
the Phu Tho racetrack vicinity, before South Vietnamese units
finally crushed all remaining resistance. The combined victories
in the capital fighting during the spring of 1968 assured the se-
curity of downtown Saigon from all but rocket attacks for the
next seven years.
Mini-Tet had been, like the main Tet Offensive before it, a
dismal failure for the participating NVA/VC ground troops. Much
of the impact of Mini-Tet was negated by the success of Amer-
ican formations in interdicting and destroying many Viet Cong
elements before they could reach their targets. The Saigon in-
cursions had been decisively defeated in the Cholon sector by
South Vietnamese troops with minimal American support. Most
other localities in the country suffered only rocket or mortar
barrages, some 433 being recorded nationwide, since the VC no
longer had the strength to mount widespread ground attacks. In
fact the VC tactics displayed during Mini-Tet reflected their ma-
jor Tet losses. Units broke down into small groups rather than
risk large assaults with attendant casualties, and avoided direct
attacks on American installations altogether. This second prac-
276 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
tice reaped a certain communist advantage, as it further
strengthened popular Vietnamese suspicions that the United States
and North Vietnam were negotiating behind South Vietnam's
back. The South Vietnamese leadership was already disdainfully
calling the war "talk-fight/'
In August, the 9th Infantry Division's 1st Brigade fought
several major battles. These culminated in an encirclement ac-
tion fought by the 2d Battalion, 39th Infantry, on August 12
southwest of Can Duoc. Massive air strikes and artillery fire-
power were used to annihilate a battalion of Viet Cong. The
25th Infantry Division was engaged in several fire base defen-
sive battles during the same month, notably at Fire Support
Base Buell on August 18, and on August 24 at a battalion night
defensive position west of Dau Tieng. These battles were all
fought in conjunction with the last NVA/VC offensive of 1968,
a weak thrust made in mid-August which was only a shadow of
Tet or Mini-Tet. Fifteen ground attacks were managed, but only
two of them involved battalion-sized units. Again, there was heavy
reliance on rocket bombardments, with ninety-five initiated
throughout the country, but Saigon was rocketed on just one
day, August 22.
The 9th Infantry Division had dedicated its 2d Brigade as
the Army's unique mobile riverine force. This force was de-
signed to work the canals and waterways of the upper Mekong
Delta. Most of the regional villages were clustered along the
banks of these twisting brown streams, and the dense forests
and swampland were usually VC territory. Land traffic was im-
possible during rainy periods and the Viet Cong used the water
channels for movement of supplies and troops. The Army mo-
bile riverine force was conceived and tailored to use this same
water system to reach the Viet Cong, and to bring American
military presence into these untamed areas.
Dredges were put to work pumping mud from the bottom
of the My Tho River into adjacent rice paddies, and soon a six
hundred-acre division base was established in the tropical delta
swales. The riverine force itself was housed on Navy barracks
ships, which provided air-conditioned billets and operations cen-
ters, topped with helicopter platforms. Barges tied alongside were
used to deploy the soldiers on and off the host of smaller craft
COUNTEROFFENSIVE 277
which actually took them on operations. They were transported
along the network of waterways by armored troop carrier "tango"
boats, and escorted by assault-support patrol boats and moni-
tors. These gunboats sported exotic armaments ranging from
howitzers and 40mm guns to twin flamethrowers. Riverine ar-
tillery, Army 105mm howitzers mounted on barges and landing
craft, also reinforced naval gun power. Some strategists ques-
tioned these operations as expensive Army experimentation. The
floating brigade seemed to offer little advantage over airmobile
infantry in reaching objectives. Others saw such a concept as
potentially more rewarding with Marine Corps assets.
While these land and river battles were being waged, smaller
firefights prevailed throughout the year. Action in the Ben Cui
rubber plantation west of Dau Tieng in August was representa-
tive of these fierce skirmishes. A mechanized infantry company
of the 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry, was sent into the plantation
to sweep along the southern side of Route 239, the main supply
road to Tay Ninh. It left the base camp and crossed the Saigon
River with fourteen armored personnel carriers. As the company
advanced through the rubber trees, the battalion's scout platoon
and composite American-South Vietnamese Combined Recon-
naissance-and-Intelligence Platoon, with a self-propelled 40mm
Duster flak gun, moved down the road itself.
Upon entering the dense rubber plantation's undergrowth,
the troops dismounted and fanned out in a classic V formation,
led by a three-man scout dog team. The armored personnel car-
riers were arranged in a formation that gave the best support
with their shielded machine guns to the walking infantry. Sud-
denly at 8:30 A.M., the scout dog on the point alerted, and his
handler informed the captain of nearby VC personnel. The com-
mander halted the formation and relayed the information to a
senior battalion staff officer overflying the unit in an observation
helicopter. The helicopter then dropped down to conduct a low-
level reconnaissance. The company lobbed several rounds of
mortar fire into the suspected area as a precaution and then
continued the advance.
As the mechanized infantry force continued west they saw
a red star cluster rising over one of the villages. They had been
in constant radio contact with the scout and recon platoons, which
278 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
had moved through the villages a short distance away. The road
group radioed that they had found no Viet Cong but had dis-
covered several buildings used recently as sleeping quarters, and
a classroom for combat instruction. One contained a drawing of
an armored personnel carrier with two antennae. Shortly before
noon the company started receiving sporadic rifle fire, which
quickly increased in tempo. Then the forward troops began to
see VC dodging from tree to tree and firing as they advanced.
The company radioed immediately for helicopter fire support.
The infantry fell back to the protection of the armored car-
riers as the company swung into defensive positions. Firing was
now at a high level, but there were difficulties getting clearance
to fire artillery due to the proximity of populated villages. The
company marked its positions with purple and yellow smoke for
helicopter recognition, but combat elsewhere delayed aerial
support. The unit held its initial position for thirty minutes. After
three armored personnel carriers were knocked out by point-
blank rocket-propelled grenade fire the company began a fight-
ing withdrawal. Only eight vehicles made it to the new defen-
sive positions. The infantry were desperately shooting off mag-
azines as the remaining tracked carriers spit out concentrated
heavy machine-gun fire. The dual antiaircraft gun was firing from
the roadway across the company front with direct rapid-cannon
fire. This withering firestorm had allowed the mechanized com-
pany to regroup. Finally, heavy artillery rounds started falling
on top of the advancing VC.
The Viet Cong pressed their assault and three more armored
personnel carriers were exploded by direct hits. These deto-
nations caused the loss of the company commander as well as
both artillery and mortar forward observers. A lieutenant took
over as helicopter gunships appeared overhead to begin strafing
and rocketing in front of their lines. The unit then retreated out
of the rubber and into a clearing where it was joined by the
road element. The concentrated artillery and aerial firepower
forced the VC to break off the attack rather than pursue.
Several battles erupted in the southern provinces of III Corps
Tactical Zone during the fall. On September 3, the 3d Brigade
of the 101st Airborne Division ran into a tough fight at a hot
landing zone just east of Trang Bang which developed into a
COUNTEROFFENSIVE 279
three-day engagement. Fire Support Base Pope of the 25th In-
fantry Division was assaulted and successfully defended on Sep-
tember 1. Late in the year, III Corps Tactical Zone and the Sai-
gon area were reinforced by the addition of two important
American formations. The 3d Brigade of the 82d Airborne Divi-
sion arrived in October to tighten the protective ring around
the capital, followed a month later by the powerful 1st Cavalry
Division. This airmobile division deployed south to take up du-
ties facing the Cambodian border.
The United States military began tagging its efforts as the
Accelerated Pacification Campaign on November 1, 1968. As
peace negotiations got underway in Paris, MACV increased its
efforts to maximize the number of villages under Saigon control
and to develop the South Vietnamese armed forces. Ground
combat operations were becoming concentrated on pacification
through village cordons and area security, and by keeping the
North Vietnamese and Viet Cong main force units out of pop-
ulated areas by a "protective shield of containment/* The strat-
egy of attrition was abandoned as the American Army's conduct
of the war took a new direction.
PART 5
1969
KheSanh^CaLu
"V
Hill 937 (Ap Bia Mountain) r j
Go Noi Island
4
Barrier Island
Ky
Lai
KEY TO OPERATIONS
1 - SCOTLAND II
2 DEWEY CANYON
3 - Task Force Remagen
4 - MASSACHUSETTS STR IKER
5 - APACHE SNOW
6 MONTANA MAULER
7 -FREDERICK HILL
8 -DEFIANT STAND
9 MONTANA RAIDER
10 - ATLAS WEDGE
1969
Hoa Valley ___
Que Son Valley O
Hiep Due
FSB Siberia
Tien Phuoc
Highway 19
*^^
Qui Nhon
Task Force South
HAWK Patrol Action
o
Phuoc Vinn
Phu Loi
Bien Hoa
Long Binh
o DiAn
Phu Hoa Dong
Night Ambush of 9 March 1969
= Critical Convoy Battle Routes
50 100
Michelin Plantation -.
LZ Jamie
LZ Grant
LZ Carolyn
Dau Tieng
Patrol Base Diamond
FSB Crook
FSB Frontier Cit
Patrol Base Krotc
5th Cavalry Battle of 8-9 March
Navaho Warhorse
scale
Saigon
Map by Shelby L. Stanton
miles
-N-
South Vietnam - 1969
CHAPTER 18.
ONE WAR
1. One War and Vietnamization
In early 1969 General Abrams decreed that the largely separate
war of the big battalions would be fused with pacification and
territorial security in the One War concept. Both the MACV
1969 Combined Campaign Plan and Pacification and Develop-
ment Plan were consolidated into this One War plan, which be-
came effective on February 1, 1969. In actuality, MACV control
over battlefield strategy was already subordinated to the pow-
erful Washington triumvirate composed of President Richard
Nixon, Defense Secretary Melvin Laird, and National Security
Advisor Henry Kissinger. They speedily implemented the Nixon
doctrine and its new Asia approach, which hinged on a rapid
buildup of the South Vietnamese military so that American forces
could be quickly withdrawn. An active political campaign of ap-
peasement and negotiation was simultaneously conducted with
North Vietnam.
During the year, MACV's highest priorities shifted away from
U.S. combat operations against the NVA/VC, and toward Viet-
namization the accelerated improvement and development plan
for the South Vietnamese armed forces. The broad program gov-
erned the conduct of the war through the Army's final phaseout
from the country. The transition year of 1969 intensified this
trend as plans for further American divisional withdrawals were
hastened and joint training operations with South Vietnamese
units accelerated.
283
284 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
On the battlefront, critical priority was shifted to provincial
protection for territorial pacification programs, and city security,
a concern added as a result of the Tet-68 confrontations. Con-
centrated offensives were to be mounted against NVA/VC troop
and supply bases, with heaviest pressure directed toward the
DMZ and the border regions of Cambodia and Laos. American
formations were given orders to heighten border surveillance and
reaction operations, and paired off with assigned ARVN units to
perform combined operations. In the field these ARVN units
were familiarized with American battle techniques, especially fire
support. Beginning in 1969, the South Vietnamese military was
to be given prime responsibility for maintaining the "protective
shield of containment" within their country.
The One War plan largely limited American military partic-
ipation to a mobile defensive stance while preparing the South
Vietnamese forces to take over their areas of responsibility. To
do this job, MACV had a total of 359,313 Army soldiers and
80,716 Marines in Vietnam on January 1, 1969. They were di-
vided into 110 infantry and tank battalions. 1 On June 10, in line
with low NVA/VC activity and the apparent success of both South
Vietnamese pacification and mobilization efforts, President Nixon
announced the start of U.S. troop withdrawals. The initial mil-
itary response to the redeployment directives was slow, forcing
Defense Secretary Laird to insist on daily troop reduction charts
to meet deadlines in view of high public pressure in the United
States.
The first Army unit home was the 3d Battalion of the 60th
Infantry from the 9th Infantry Division. On July 8, it was flown
to McChord Air Force Base outside Seattle, Washington, pa-
raded through town, and sent to Fort Lewis where it was im-
mediately folded up. The bulk of the 9th Infantry Division fol-
1. Major U.S. forces in Vietnam on January 1, 1969, were the 1st and 3d
Marine, 1st Cavalry (Airmobile), 101st Airborne (Airmobile), 1st, 4th, 9th,
23d (America!), and 25th Infantry Divisions; 1st Brigade of the 5th Infantry
Division (Mechanized) and 3d Brigade of the 82d Airborne Division; 173d
Airborne and 199th Infantry Brigades; llth Armored Cavalry Regiment; 5th
Special Forces Group (Airborne); and three separate battalions: the 1st and
2d Squadrons of the 1st Cavalry, and 1st Battalion, 50th Infantry (Mecha-
nized).
ONE WAR 285
lowed, being inactivated in either Hawaii or Washington. A
further troop pullout was announced by President Nixon on Oc-
tober 16. This time most of the units were simply inactivated
in Vietnam, although larger elements usually sent flag escorts
home for ceremonial purposes. By the end of the year most of
the 3d Marine Division was also out of Vietnam.
The Vietnamization program was initially intended to build
up the South Vietnamese military to the point where it could
fight VC insurgent activities, once the major North Vietnamese
and allied armies had left the country. After the June 1969 Mid-
way Conference, Washington informed the Pentagon that the
Saigon regime would be given responsibility for all aspects of
the war, even if current NVA/VC levels persisted. As a result,
Defense Secretary Laird revised all Vietnamization goals toward
producing a self-sufficient South Vietnamese military capable of
coping successfully with the combined NVA/VC threat.
These were tall orders, since the war-weary South Vietnam-
ese armed forces were still wracked with alarming leadership,
morale, and desertion problems. Authorizations for new units,
to expand the size and power of the ARVN, only offered paper
solutions. 2 During the year there were over 107,000 deserters,
a manpower loss equal to ten divisions. VNMC desertions were
the highest, while ARVN desertions remained at crippling lev-
els, especially in the Delta (IV CTZ) where they faced the Viet
Cong largely alone without American combat presence. The South
Vietnamese still lacked the technical know-how and logistical so-
phistication necessary to absorb and properly use the massive
quantities of American equipment now being thrust upon them.
MACV thoroughly diagnosed the state of the South Viet-
namese military during the year in a series of in-depth studies.
It found that the South Vietnamese Army's fighting spirit was
2. Major South Vietnamese combat units as of July 1969 were the Airborne,
Marine (six VNMC battalions), 1st, 2d, 5th, 7th, 9th, 18th, 21st-23d, and
25th Divisions; 42d and 51st Regiments (Separate); sixteen armored cavalry
squadrons; and twenty ranger battalions. By the end of June 1970, the Marine
Division would be brought up to full strength at nine battalions. Total ma-
neuver battalions (including divisional armored cavalry squadrons) increased
from 173 in 1968 to 185 in 1969, and to 189 in 1970. Artillery battalions
climbed from 30 in 1968 to 47 in 1969, and to 58 in 1970. During the ex-
pansion, the biggest gains were in Air Force and logistical units.
286 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
low, a fact reflected in the devastating desertion rates. Lack of
aggressive leadership remained prevalent, and combat staff sup-
port, planning, and coordination was practically nonexistent.
Promotion was slow and imbalanced. Most company command-
ers were lieutenants, and battalions were still led by captains.
Desertion losses forced trainees directly into the front lines as
replacements. While some junior officers were confident of the
ARVN's ability to replace U.S. troops, most of the experienced
generals expressed open pessimism over South Vietnam's chances
of survival without substantial American combat support. Most
officers were only concerned about their welfare, and the en-
listed men were discontented and discouraged. Neither ex-
pressed much interest in either Vietnamization or the larger
conflict.
By 1969, the Vietnamization of the capital military district
was essentially complete. All U.S. troops had been withdrawn
except for a small number of radar and generator operators. In
the northern I CTZ, the 1st and 2d ARVN Divisions and 51st
ARVN Regiment were already initiating multibattalion opera-
tions independent of American support. In the Central High-
lands, South Vietnamese forces had assumed responsibility for
Kontum Province. For example, the Battle of Ben Het in that
province had been fought by ARVN ground troops supported
only by some U.S. combat support and service elements.
The results of Vietnamization on the battleground were mixed
during the year but held promise. Large-scale issuance of M16
rifles and M2 carbines was made in an attempt to upgrade the
regional and popular militia forces (RF/PF), long held in utter
disrepute. This gave them firepower equal to the Viet Cong,
but their combat ability remained uneven. At the same time,
RF/PF assumed an increasing share of pacification security. With
fewer security missions, ARVN units could get into the field on
combat operations. Likewise, a number of formations that had
been problem units or that had reputations for chronic poor per-
formance, namely the 2d, 5th, 9th, 18th, and 23d ARVN Di-
visions, showed some improvement.
The 1st Logistical Command became almost totally dedi-
cated to redeployment matters, technical schooling of ARVN
ONE WAR 287
logisticians, and equipment transfer to the South Vietnamese
military. While the majority of the equipment required to outfit
the new ARVN units came directly from the United States, many
American units (especially artillery and engineer units) were
promptly relegated to fulfilling this need. As Vietnamization came
to dominate U.S. efforts, more and more units were identified
in a phased process to provide specialized training and turn over
their material. After the units had been stripped, their flags were
flown home.
The American Army was subordinated to a supporting role,
in which it provided much of the required material, technical
experts, and advisors. The job of actually fighting the war was
rapidly turned over to ARVN units, and U.S. forces were either
given diminished combat assignments or began standing down
for redeployment. A reevaluation of advisory assistance efforts
led to a direct increase in the number of sergeants and officers
assigned and to a reorganization of their tactical advisory ele-
ments. This further eroded the capabilities of those American
units that remained in the field.
2. The 1969 Post-Tet Offensive
The North Vietnamese Army had taken advantage of the U.S.
Presidential decision that had halted all bombing on November
1, 1968, to rush supplies south for a renewed offensive. MACV
made sure that a powerful group of units ringed Saigon to pre-
vent a repeat of the Tet-68 episode. This effort involved three
and a half American divisions matched by an equal number of
South Vietnamese military assets. These formations were kept
in the field seeking military caches and sweeping known ave-
nues of infiltration from Cambodia. There were only a few skir-
mishes in January and early February, since both sides were
restricting combat activity to extensive reconnaissance.
The NVA/VC offensive was finally initiated, as predicted by
allied intelligence, on February 23 and consisted largely of a
week-long series of scattered rocket and mortar shellings across
the country. In III CTZ only two significant ground attacks,
against Long Binh and Bien Hoa, were made by the 9th and
288 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
5th VC Divisions, respectively. 3 Both were handily defeated. On
March 6, a more powerful NVA tank-supported thrust was made
toward the Ben Het Special Forces camp, near Kontum in II
CTZ. The fighting at Ben Het lasted until July, when the at-
tackers were forced to withdraw.
The 1969 Post-Tet Offensive was primarily aimed at dis-
rupting the allied support network. This strategy was designed
to retard the South Vietnamese Army rearming process, as well
as deny combat units some of their mobility and reaction po-
tential, As a result, attacks were concentrated on logistical in-
stallations and supply lines. The NVA/VC avoided major con-
frontations with allied troops, as the swift response and firepower
of American tactical forces had defeated their Tet-68 attempts.
The Post-Tet Offensive consisted mainly of attacks on shipping,
convoy ambushes, pipeline interdiction, ground sapper assaults,
and rocket barrages. It resulted in minimal damage to MACV
support sites and caused light casualties. However, it did place
many American logistical troops once again on Vietnam's front
lines.
Beginning in 1969, more service units found themselves hav-
ing to defend their own areas as the American combat draw-
down gathered momentum. Most soldiers in supply and service
organizations were specialists inexperienced in tactical opera-
tions, and the 1st Logistical Command initiated crash training
programs to prepare them for combat contingencies. Provisional
security units were hastily formed, but the situation only wors-
ened during the years of declining American presence in Viet-
nam. Too often the rear-echelon guards manning bunkers and
perimeters were unqualified to operate the machine guns, rifles,
and grenade launchers they were armed with. The increased
exposure of once-secure logistical support sites, coupled with a
rising inability to properly defend them, was a problem faced
by rapidly retreating armies throughout history.
3. The Viet Cong divisions were largely filled by regular North Vietnamese
soldiers, since mounting wartime losses culminating in Tet-68 had left them
VC in name only. The few actual Viet Cong forces involved were main force
units, since most local force guerrilla organizations had been destroyed at this
stage of the war.
ONE WAR 289
3. Convoy Battles
The 1969 Post-Tet Offensive singled out logistical targets for
attack and renewed the convoy battles. In II CTZ the most fre-
quently ambushed route remained the Qui Nhon-Pleiku High-
way 19 axis, while in III CTZ the Long Binh-Tay Ninh/Dau
Tieng road net received the most attention. On April 15, on
Highway 19 west of Cha Rang, a Korean convoy going west and
a 54th Transportation Battalion convoy heading east were am-
bushed while passing each other. Two weeks later a 48th Trans-
portation Group convoy on Highway 13 south of An Loc was
hit hard by rocket-propelled grenades and automatic weapons.
At the beginning of the Vietnam campaign, American wheeled
logistical convoys offered lucrative targets with minimal risk to
the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese. The ambuscade expertise
of the NVA/VC threatened most overland lines of support. The
United States had not encountered this type of warfare to any
extent either during World War II or the Korean War. In those
more conventional wars the vast majority of Army convoy op-
erations had been conducted behind the front lines in relative
safety.
MACV considered military traffic and road security critical.
Most inland installations depended on convoy supply, and their
disruption hampered ongoing field operations. Truck movement
provided most of the support for more than a million Army troops
dispersed over sixty-six thousand square miles. Airlift was only
capable of emergency and temporary high-priority cargo deliv-
ery. Convoy protection had to be improvised, as the military
police that the Army assigned were too few in number to give
adequate security. Early efforts were marked by a variety of
transportation security measures, including attempts to make
convoys too costly to attack and reliance on mobile reaction forces,
which were geared to the MACV red-amber-green road classi-
fications. Red lanes required infantry and engineer support to
4 The 48th Transportation Group ambush of April 28, 1969 was particularly
fierce Five fuel tankers, an ammunition truck, one armored car an armored
personnel carrier, and a gun-jeep were destroyed. Numerous other vehicles
were damaged. Two helicopters were also lost, one of them a Cobra gunship
and the other a medical evacuation chopper. The 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry,
reinforced the scene of combat and broke the attack.
290 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
open them; amber lanes were frequented by NVA/VC activity
and demanded high security; and green lanes could be used by
vehicles during daylight hours with less caution.
Beginning in September of 1967, the 8th Transportation
Group took heavy losses from repetitious large-scale ambushes
along Highway 19 connecting the port of Qui Nhon with the
rugged interior city of Pleiku. It cleared large amounts of brush
and undergrowth along the roadway and resorted to the "hard-
ened convoy": cargo trucks were fitted with side and frontal ar-
mor plating and sandbagged, while even the beds of the larger
ones were floored with armor. The ideal support ratio was one
gun truck for every ten cargo vehicles. These specially fitted
gun truck escorts were jerry-rigged with heavier armor and fea-
tured exotic combinations of weapons systems and quadruple
rnachine-gun mounts. The gun trucks changed positions in the
convoys daily and were supplemented by V-100 armored cars of
the 18th Military Police Brigade. Normally only two of these
excellent scout cars were available per convoy, since the mili-
tary police were stretched thin throughout the country. This
limited amount of standard protection was insufficient to cover
convoys which were normally broken down into three or four
serials to avoid road congestion. Gun truck conversions also ef-
fectively meant a loss of one light truck company per transpor-
tation group. Assignment of transportation personnel as ad hoc
infantry further diminished operational manpower.
Helicopters added a new dimension to available transporta-
tion protection, but it was impossible to overfly every convoy.
Helicopter gunships were normally placed on ground alert at
their airstrips, but communication difficulties often prevented
their timely appearance. Convoy commanders under fire were
hard pressed to maintain continuing radio control of their con-
voy, direct counterambush measures with their gun trucks, and
give precise locational data for helicopter and artillery support.
The internal order of the convoy was rearranged to minimize
losses. Trucks loaded with subsistence items were put up front.
This enabled the refrigerated "reefer" trucks to avoid convoy
dust and allowed them more off-loading time at destination.
Trucks loaded with clothing, construction materials, and mis-
cellaneous items were placed next in the column. Trucks car-
ONE WAR 291
rying petrol, oil, and ammunition were put in the rear. In this
manner explosive cargo detonations did not block other vehicles
on the highway.
The Viet Cong used ambush tactics against the Americans
that had been perfected during the French-Indochina War. Ini-
tial fire was concentrated on several vehicles within a convoy in
order to destroy them and block further traffic. Trucks in the
center were the preferred targets. Once segments of the convoy
had been brought to a standstill by the swift and violent attack,
mortar and rocket fire were directed against immobilized indi-
vidual vehicles. Road ditches and adjacent brush were often mined
to cause losses among dismounting troops trying to gain better
defensive positions. Sometimes ground attacks were staged to
overrun trapped portions of a convoy. Drivers were told to keep
moving through sniper fire and to contact security forces at the
first sign of trouble, but the military was working on better con-
voy defensive weapons.
When Troop A of the "Blackhorse" llth Armored Cavalry's
1st Squadron prepared to make a sweep down Route 13 past
An Loc on January 11, 1969, its six armored personnel carriers
were secretly reinforced by a seventh machine just introduced
to Vietnam; the Vulcan. This particular stretch of road was well
known as an ambush alley, but this time the regiment intended
to unleash a surprise of its own if the column was bushwhacked.
Midway down the highway, the troop's vehicles were sud-
denly hit by a storm of automatic weapons fire from both sides
of the lane. Within the first fifteen seconds rocket-propelled
grenades slammed into five of the square-hulled carriers. They
skidded to uncontrolled stops under the onslaught of rapid fire
and detonations hammering against their tracks and armor-plated
sides. Several burst into flames, and none were firing back. The
entire column was pinned by the gauntlet of VC attack.
The third vehicle in line started churning jerkily around its
immobilized sisters. It stopped to spin its sinister six-barreled
gun to the rear. Aiming back down a drainage ditch, the weapon
flashed continuously with devastating bursts of concentrated 20mm
cannon fire. Inside the beleaguered armored personnel carrier
Lieutenant Wright radioed headquarters that they were under
attack. He knew another Vulcan was stationed there and could
292 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
provide timely ammunition resupply. The ultimate fate of the
stranded column depended on the singular ability of his weapon
to break the ambush.
He continued to fire the new Vulcan, designed for antiair-
craft work, at the "slow" rate of one thousand rounds per min-
ute, the recommended dosage for ground use. Within fifteen
minutes the other Vulcan appeared down the road. Already Viet
Cong fire from the ambush positions along the ditch had ceased.
Other fire peppering the stricken column was becoming spo-
radic. Both Vulcan carriers moved back to back. The Vulcan gun
turret on Wright's vehicle was elevated to 45 degrees and trav-
ersed over the driver's hatch, silent for the first time. As the
second Vulcan flared into action and spit out a constant stream
of packed steel, rear ramps were dropped and spare ammunition
belts were rushed over to Wright.
The Viet Cong ambush force was silent. Crippled and shocked
by the intense volume of return fire from a previously unknown
weapon, it had fled. This innovative weapons system had prom-
ising convoy security potential, since the introduction of the
powerful Vulcan rapid-fire antiaircraft gun could ensure a high
degree of vehicular firepower. Its slow and tedious development
seemed worth the wait, but it remained strictly experimental
and was never made available for general use in Vietnam. The
soldiers angrily suspected that the Army was simply using the
battlefield as a testing ground, afraid to expose critical weapons
to possible loss or capture in a war which, by 1969, was ob-
viously dwindling in national importance.
Convoy ambushes, sniping, and mines plagued 1st Logistical
Command supply efforts throughout the year. The last major
attack occurred on November 22, when a three-hundred-vehicle
mixed engineer-48th Transportation Group convoy traveling north
from Long Binh to Song Be was struck. However, attacks against
Army convoys continued until the U.S. pullout absented them
from the roads of Vietnam. The bravery of the long-haul drivers
became so commonplace that MACV recognized a special, un-
official Line Haul tab which was worn proudly over their 1st
Logistical Command patches. One sergeant of the 48th Trans-
portation Group earned the Medal of Honor during a late-1968
ambush near Ap Nhi The convoy battles, which ranged from
ONE WAR 293
catastrophic defeats of entire convoys to botched failures to hit
a single vehicle, became a legacy of American security and sup-
port in a frontless war.
4. Decline of an Army
Vietnamization had a profound impact on American troop
morale. The U.S. soldier was poorly indoctrinated with respect
to changing national goals and generally did not understand his
continued exposure to combatant conditions during the long
withdrawal period. Since no one wanted to be the last killed on
the way out, an understandable reluctance to engage in contin-
ued front-line activity developed.
The state of the American Army was showing other signs of
stress and combat fatigue as well. The Selective Service system
had produced a working class army heavily weighted toward the
lower income groups, since it permitted easy draft avoidance by
the more privileged members of society. Such serious and in-
equitable flaws caused resentment among active-duty soldiers.
Project One Hundred-Thousand, a social experiment designed
to shove people of low intelligence into the armed forces (where
most ended up as riflemen in Vietnam), and the willingness of
many judges to send misfits and criminals into the Army for
"rehabilitation," created severe disciplinary problems. The fact
that a disproportionate number of ethnic minority members were
drafted increased racial strife.
The reserve components were largely filled with personnel
avoiding active duty, and there was trouble when forty-three
Reserve and National Guard companies and detachments were
finally ordered to Vietnam for one-year tours. The units proved
to be unsatisfactory upon alert and required extensive retrain-
ing. Several, such as the 1002d Supply & Service Company,
challenged the legality of their call-up. Although Justice William
O. Douglas held up the unit's deployment to Vietnam in Sep-
tember of 1968, the Supreme Court ruled the mobilization legal
and it arrived in country on October 20. Once in Vietnam, where
they remained through most of 1969, most of these components
rendered a good account of themselves.
The officer corps, which had been comprised mostly of West
Point or college Reserve Officer Training Course (ROTC) grad-
294 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
uates when the war started, had lowered standards in response
to Vietnam escalation. The unpopularity of the war among uni-
versity students caused a drastic reduction in ROTC enrollment
and led to the outright expulsion of thirty-eight ROTC units from
1969 through 1972. To fill the void, the Army resorted to in-
creased outputs from the Officer Candidate Schools (OCS), which
tapped persons of generally lower educational background.
The noncommissioned officer corps had suffered an alarming
quality decline in the rush to produce enough junior sergeants
to fill expanding needs. Stateside "Shake V Bake" courses rushed
promising privates directly through twenty-one weeks of ad-
vanced training and slapped from three to four stripes on their
uniforms upon completion. These young buck and staff ser-
geants had considerable difficulty leading combat troops, and
tended to be lax in efforts to win over their men. However,
there were still not enough sergeants to go around, and many
squads in Vietnam were simply led by specialists, fourth class
a rank many enlisted men achieved either before or shortly after
they arrived in country.
By 1969 the U.S. soldier in Vietnam usually represented the
poorer and less educated segments of American society. He was
often being led by middle-class officers and inexperienced ser-
geants, creating a wide gap between attitudes, abilities, and mo-
tivation. This combined with increased idleness the result of
lowered combat activity and overall frustration with obscure
national goals, to produce severe morale problems. Continuing
personnel turbulence, resulting from the combat-tour rotational
policy, destroyed any of the stiffening that wartime unit cohe-
sion traditionally offered. Once America began to pull its troops
out of Vietnam, the average soldier simply wanted to get home
alive and cared little for the ultimate fate of his formation or
the accomplishment of the country's mission. Medals lost their
gloss, officers forced to falsify after-action reports in order to
preserve their careers or favorably reflect unit activities lost their
confidence, soldiers lost interest, and the Army lost its fighting
edge. The decline of the American Army was well under way
by the end of the year.
CHAPTER 19.
ONE WAR IN THE
NORTHERN PROVINCES
1. Guarding Borders
At the beginning of 1969, some of America's toughest fighting
units were lined up inside the hotly contested northernmost
provinces under Lt. Gen. Richard G. Stilwell's XXIV Corps. It
contained the crack 3d Marine Division along with the tank-
spearheaded 1st Brigade of the 5th Infantry Division (Mecha-
nized) and the helicopter-endowed 101st Airborne Division (Air-
mobile). With this force MACV felt confident that General S til-
well could guard the DMZ while conducting major excursions
deep into NVA base camp areas along the remote western fringes
of the country.
In late January, Maj. Gen. Raymond G. Davis's 3d Marine
Division picked up the pace of combat near the rugged Laotian
border. The 4th Marines stalked the Khe Sanh region in Op-
eration SCOTLAND II, and the 9th Marines initiated Operation
DEWEY CANYON against a main North Vietnamese supply route
which crossed into Vietnam and curved through both the upper
Da Krong Valley and the A Shau Valley just below it. Since the
DEWEY CANYON operational area consisted of high mountain
plateaus covered by dense double-canopy jungle, the reinforced
9th Marines planned to jump off from two fire support bases on
its northern rim and move south in a three-pronged advance.
296 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
When they reached the limit of artillery support coverage, they
would build new fire support bases and keep moving south.
On January 22, 1969, the 2d Battalion of the 9th Marines
air-assaulted into the upper valley, followed by the 3d Battalion
three days later. Opening moves were relatively easy, and two
landing zones were hacked out only four miles from the Laotian
border. Shortly after the Marines moved into the jungle, nine
days of foul monsoon weather locked the valley in. The Marine
pilots depended on sheer flying heroics to keep the operation
going despite thunderstorms and dense cloud cover. On the
ground, squads maneuvered in the steaming jungles as the tor-
rential downpours continued. The advance was stepped up once
the weather cleared. On February 10, the 1st Battalion was
committed in the center of the line, and the Marines pushed
farther out from their fire bases toward the Laotian border.
MACV intelligence had indicated that the North Vietnamese
had ringed deeper landing zone sites with sophisticated antiair-
craft weapons, A foot approach would be slow and laborious but
it would negate the fearsome NVA flak advantage. The Marines
began a tortuous overland trek, sticking to the ridgelines and
toiling through the primeval rain forest overgrowing each jagged
tor. The relentless tropical heat began taking its toll of the
marchers, as men dropped from stroke and exhaustion. The Ma-
rine advance continued inexorably forward.
Only two ground attacks were mounted on the Marine fire
bases. In these actions, the North Vietnamese sappers used
bamboo mines and satchel charges to blast through the perim-
eter wire, but both attacks were quickly repelled. Action inten-
sified on February 17 as the Marines stumbled into vicious local
counterattacks and fixed defenses. The 1st Battalion was halted
by an extensive bunker system on February 23. Artillery and
air strikes saturated the defenders with fire and shards of ra-
zored steel, and then Companies A and D seized the fortifica-
tions in heavy combat. The Marines were in no mood to con-
done privileged NVA movements. On the night of February 21,
Company H, 9th Marines, moved across the twisting Laotian
border and bushwhacked a truck convoy on Route 922. General
Abrams granted authority two days later for further limited Ma-
rine operations across the boundary, and the 9th Marines con-
ONE WAR IN THE NORTHERN PROVINCES 297
tinued search and destroy missions on both sides of the border
through early March.
Marine perseverance was rewarded with some of the largest
caches captured during the Vietnam War. Over 525 tons of
weapons and ammunition were uncovered, including twelve large
122mm cannons the first ever seen inside South Vietnam and
probably brought down during the bombing halt imposed by
President Nixon the previous November. That cessation of
bombing had taken effect at the beginning of the dry season,
enabling tremendous quantities of material to be moved unhin-
dered and stockpiled throughout the NVA infiltration network.
The Marines had surmounted great logistical difficulties at-
tempting to destroy some of the buildup. Over thirteen thou-
sand sorties had been flown under severe weather conditions.
These often necessitated the use of special Marine-devised ra-
dar-guided parachute supply drops. When the operation ended
on March 18, the 9th Marines could justifiably claim a major
setback had been meted out to the North Vietnamese.
Lieutenant General Stilwell's XXIV Corps sent a mechanized
task force to check out Route 9 as far as the Laotian border,
which would also protect the northern flank of allied forces in
the Da Krong and A Shau valleys. The 1st Brigade (Mecha-
nized) of the 5th Infantry Division formed Task Force Remagen
around the 1st Battalion, 77th Armor, and swung it out of Ca
Lu down the dirt roadway toward Khe Sanh on March 16. l
The task force was led by an engineer-reinforced scout pla-
toon which gingerly picked its way through antitank mines on
the upward-winding road. The tracked vehicles built bypasses
around washouts, clanked up the narrow defiles , and spanned
streams with their armored vehicle-launched bridges. Since there
were no extra soldiers to guard the passes and the unfordable
streams, the bridges were mechanically lifted back onto their
1. Task Force Remagen was composed of two mechanized infantry companies,
a tank company, a self-propelled 105mm artillery battery, armored engineers,
and self-propelled antiaircraft guns. Later the 1st Battalion, 77th Armor, was
replaced by the 1st Battalion, 61st Infantry. Remagen was named in honor
of the March 7, 1945, crossing of the Remagen Bridge over the Rhine River
by the 9th Armored Division, which spearheaded the breakthrough into Ger-
many during World War II.
298 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
carriers after the column crossed. This isolated the advancing
task force from overland resupply; causing it to be completely
fed, fueled, and equipped by helicopters. Major repairs and
overhauls were accomplished under arduous field conditions and
eventually included replacing twelve engines, eighteen sets of
tracks, and seven transmissions. Army and Marine cargo heli-
copters airlifted all material. Precious fresh water was placed in
containers ranging from "lug-a-lug" three-gallon collapsible drums
to empty shell casings.
Four days later, Task Force Remagen reached the aban-
doned Khe Sanh Plateau. They encamped for the night, and
then the tanks and armored personnel carriers rumbled west
through the abandoned Special Forces campsite at Lang Vei on
March 20. The column reached the Vietnamese border and looked
across at the sinister Co Roc, a granite ridge running along the
Laotian side of the boundary and overlooking the Khe Sanh
Plains. The task force prowled around the region until the end
of April. Only light resistance was encountered, but the mech-
anized infantry was continually harassed by accurate mortar fire
directed from the Co Roc ridge.
In February, MACV Intelligence had reported another flurry
of bunker and way station construction in the forbidding A Shau
Valley. The "Screaming Eagles" 101st Airborne Division (Air-
mobile) built two fire bases on the valley's edge, emplaced ar-
tillery, and waited for a break in the weather. On March 1,
1969, the day Operation MASSACHUSETTS STRIKER com-
menced, rain and fog prevented airmobile assaults. However as
the clouds cleared, a company of the 1st Battalion, 502d Infan-
try, helicoptered into an immediate fight. The firefight promised
good hunting in the A Shau Valley, but the hunting proved too
good before the year was out. The 2d Brigade lifted four more
battalions into the southern end of the valley. The first major
items the soldiers discovered in the heart of the jungle were
thirteen trucks on jacks. The engines and tires were removed
and buried nearby. Further searches revealed a major depot
stocked with everything from signal equipment to cod-liver oil.
Throughout April, Maj. Gen. Melvin Zais's 101st Airborne
Divison (Airmobile) kept finding more caches and evidence of
considerable North Vietnamese logistical investment. On May
ONE WAR IN THE NORTHERN PROVINCES 299
1, the 1st Battalion of the 502d Infantry uncovered a well-sup-
plied field hospital and a heavy-machine repair shop. When Op-
eration MASSACHUSETTS STRIKER was concluded on May
8, MACV decided to mount a bigger expedition into the North
Vietnamese stronghold. Two days later the division's 3d Brigade
teamed up with the 9th Marines and 3d ARVN Regiment to go
back into the northern part of the valley under Operation
APACHE SNOW.
On May 10 a classic helicopter assault was made into the
thickly jungled mountains along the Laotian border west of the
A Shau Valley. The division also established a fire support base
at Ta Bat, an abandoned village in the valley's center. There
were only scattered bursts of gunfire the first day as the troops
began sweeping eastward through the valley.
The next day Company B of the 3d Battalion, 187th Infan-
try, was pushing toward a series of ridges cloaked in lush, trop-
ical forest. Platoon leaders checked their maps and found it
marked Hill 937, known to the Vietnamese as Ap Bia Mountain.
The soldiers took advantage of the orientation stop to readjust
the straps of their rucksacks, which were loaded with canteens,
ponchos, trip flares, and smoke grenades. Soldier slang would
shortly dub the prominent terrain feature Hamburger Hill.
The sergeants waved the men forward, and the soldiers
pressed their M16 rifles close to sagging ammunition bandoliers
as the advance resumed, The careful approach march up the
tree-covered slopes was suddenly shattered by a fusillade of con-
centrated machine-gun fire. It erupted from unseen bunkers,
ripped through a snarl of vegetation, and cut down dozens of
men in the lead ranks. Rucksacks were dropped as the soldiers
fired back with light antitank weapons and rifles. They desper-
ately dragged out their seriously wounded comrades as officers
ordered them away from the hillside. Fortified positions would
be doused with aerial and artillery bombardment first. The ten-
day battle for Ap Bia Mountain had begun.
Heavy artillery began its merciless pounding of the hillsides,
and through the clouds of grayish smoke, jet fighters unleashed
a rain of incendiary and high explosive bombs. Hour after hour
through daylight and darkness the terrific shelling continued.
Meanwhile, the soldiers of the 187th Infantry "Rakassans" grimly
300 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
prepared to attack up the mountain again. 2 On May 13, two
companies of the 187th Infantry's 1st Battalion stormed the
northwest ridges of the mountain. They were repulsed by rocket
and heavy automatic weapons fire from the tenacious bunker
occupants of the 7th and 8th Battalions of the 29th NVA Reg-
iment. They had built their practically indestructible fortifica-
tions flush to the ground with deep overhead cover and had
designed them to mutually converge and interlock their fire.
During the night and early morning, artillery and aircraft again
pummeled the ridgeline with high explosives and searing na-
palm.
The full battalion was sent up against the entrenchments on
May 14, but the lead company commander was wounded and
the radio silenced. The soldiers again retreated and called for
heavy shellfire. At that point the 187th Infantry's battalion was
reinforced by two other divisional battalions (1st Battalion, 506th
Infantry, and 2d Battalion, 501st Infantry). A battalion of the 3d
ARVN Regiment was also grabbed and thrown into the fight,
and these forces were posted around the hill to seal it off. On
May 18, after thirty-six straight hours of artillery barrage and
tactical air strikes, two battalions frontally assaulted the heavily
fortified North Vietnamese positions still controlling the moun-
tain slopes.
The 187th "Rakassans" pushed up the southeastern side and
the 506th took on the northern slope. By mid-afternoon some
platoons had reached the summit but a thunderstorm drenched
the hill, visibility dropped to zero, and the soldiers were unable
to keep their footing in the mud. A fourth withdrawal was then
ordered. Finally, on May 20, after intensive cannon and aerial
rocket bombardment, all four battalions attacked and the North
Vietnamese were driven off the mountain fortress.
2. The 187th Infantry had a proud heritage of amphibious assaults on the
Philippines during World War II, and parachute assaults in Korea. The 187th
Glider Infantry was activated for World War II service in February 1943, at
Camp Mackall, North Carolina. It had been reorganized as the 187th Air-
borne Infantry in 1949 and had made spectacular parachute drops at Sukchon
and Munsan-Ni in the Korean War. Part of the 101st Airborne Division since
1956, its battle groups had been considered some of the finest components
of the Screaming Eagles.
CH47 Chinook helicopter brings ammunition, sandbags, food, and other
supplies to the 173d Airborne Brigade in the Central Highland* of
Vietnam during January of 1969. (173d Airborne Brigade Information
Office)
A UH1D Huey helicopter rests upside down on Ap Bia Mountain after
being hit by machine gun fire while attempting to carry reinforce-
ments into the May 1969 battle, (Author's Collection)
Typical Fire Support Base, this one named Lorraine I northwest of
Saigon, as seen from the air. Note all-around defenses and artillery
howitzers positioned in the center of the complex. (U.S. Army)
Standard fighting bunker at a typical fire support base, this one named
Picardy, northwest of Saigon, has frontal berm to deflect direct fire,
firing ports, full overhead cover, and a low silhouette. The sleeping
quarters were dug in directly behind the position. A water trailer is
in the background. (Author's Collection)
Weary soldiers of the 3d Battalion, 187th Infantry (101st Airborne
Division), search through the debris on top of Dong Ap Bia Mountain
("Hamburger Hill") after the Battle of May 20, 1969, in the A Shau
Valley. (U.S. Army)
Machinegunner of the 3d Battalion, 187th Infantry, of the 101st Air-
borne Division (Airmobile) during the fighting in the A Shau Valley.
(Author's Collection)
A XXIV Corps yire support base on Hill 88 in Thua Thieu Province
contains self-propelled artillery and aviation assets. (U.S. Army)
Colonel George S. Pattons llth Armored Cavalry Regiment attacks
toward the Michelin Rubber Plantation in Operation ATMS WEDGE
during March of 1969. (Author's Collection)
ONE WAR IN THE NORTHERN PROVINCES 301
The Battle of Ap Bia Mountain, or "Hamburger Hill," ig-
nited a storm of public controversy over military objectives and
tactics in an increasingly unpopular war. The soldiers had fought
bravely and had suffered heavy losses for an objective that was
abandoned soon after being taken. The entire action seemed
senseless and irresponsible, and many in the division could not
understand their sacrifice. Zais claimed a tremendous victory,
but his explanation sounded hollow:
The only significance of Hill 937 was the fact that there were
North Vietnamese on it. My mission was to destroy enemy forces
and installations. We found the enemy on Hill 937, and that is
where we fought them.
Soon after the battle, disgruntled soldiers placed a $10,000 re-
ward offer in an underground division newspaper for the assas-
sination (or fragging) of officers giving orders for such attacks.
Actually, the battle was part of the 1969 campaign to keep up
mobile pressure against NVA staging bases, by destroying ma-
terials and defenses in these strategic areas. Lacking the assets
to physically occupy the terrain, MACV had hoped that the South
Vietnamese would take over such chores as their muscle in-
creased. Five days after the fall of Ap Bia Mountain, Maj. Gen.
John M. Wright, Jr., assumed command of the division, and
Major General Zais was promoted to command XXIV Corps. The
rest of Operation APACHE SNOW consisted of extensive re-
connaissance and search operations extending to the Laotian
border. There was little action, and it was brought to a close
on June 7, 1969.
Action along the Demilitarized Zone itself was generally light
during the first three months of the year, with the usual smat-
tering of mortar and rocket rounds delivered nightly against de-
fensive positions and landing zones. In late March, Col. James
M. Gibson's "Red Devil" 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division
(Mechanized), began meeting heavy NVA resistance just west of
Con Thien as part of Operation MONTANA MAULER. The bri-
gade was under 3d Marine Division control and served as a re-
sponse force in case North Vietnamese forces were encountered
in Quang Tri Province after crossing the DMZ. Its 1st Battalion
302 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
of the llth Infantry was the airmobile reserve. 3 On March 26,
the battalion became involved in sweltering fighting against well-
defended trench networks, uprooting North Vietnamese fortifi-
cations in temperatures of 105 degrees. Supporting air strikes
were subjected to heavy automatic weapons fire as the battle
went into its second day.
A costly dawn assault cleared some bunkers, but a company
that had air-assaulted north of the defenses was blocked by mor-
tar fire and heavy resistance on Hill 208. A full armored cavalry
squadron (3d Squadron, 5th Cavalry) had to be sent against the
hill to assist the stranded company. The other battalion infan-
trymen frontally assaulted more trenchlines that afternoon, but
as each trench was taken a fierce counterassault was immedi-
ately hurled back against the newly won ramparts. By that eve-
ning one of the attack companies had lost all its officers and was
being led by the artillery observer. The next day the infantry-
men settled for destroying some of the bunkers that had already
been isolated.
The 2d ARVN Regiment agreed to airlift a battalion to the
battlefield on March 29. That proved to be the last day of heavy
fighting. Bunkers were taken at rifle-point and lead platoons were
chopped off by sudden NVA charges. Hasty reinforcements and
plenty of air support assured eventual American success. The
South Vietnamese changed their landings to safer spots, meeting
only sporadic rifle fire as the action ended.
The DMZ front remained stable, although punctuated by
scattered firefights. The level of combat dropped dramatically as
bad weather set in during the last quarter of the year. During
the second week of November, the 5th Infantry Division's 1st
Brigade got into another scrape southwest of Con Thien. In the
meantime the old DMZ frontier guardians, the 3d Marine Di-
vision, departed Vietnam and redeployed to Camp Courtney,
3. The llth Infantry had broken Santana's Kiowan arrows during its Western
Indian fighting in 1874, and matched Filipino bolo knives in the Visayas dur-
ing the Philippine Insurrection of 1900. It had been consolidated in 1869 from
several previous units of Civil War vintage, spent seven years fighting Com-
manches in Texas and Indian Territory, and then served a decade in Dakota
and Montana. The regiment fought in Cuba, the Philippines and Europe in
World Wars I and II.
ONE WAR IN THE NORTHERN PROVINCES 303
Okinawa. However, the overall level of combat activity re-
mained very low and continued to taper off through December.
2. Guarding the Coast
The northern coastal regions were being garrisoned by two
American divisions, the 1st Marine and Army Americal, which
were engaged in small-unit patrolling and security operations.
The NVA/VC Post-Tet Offensive of February 23, 1969, initiated
the first real combat of the year. The Post-Tet Offensive, com-
posed of a hundred rocket and mortar attacks scattered across
the country, was not a large effort. However, the allied fuel and
ammunition dumps at Da Nang were largely destroyed.
Maj. Gen. Charles M. Gettys's Americal Division, based at
Chu Lai, reacted to several Post-Tet Offensive incidents with
its 196th Infantry Brigade and excellent armored cavalry ele-
ments. Some of the heaviest fighting transpired as a result of
the 3d NVA Regiment's attack upon Special Forces Detachment
A-102's compound at Tien Phuoc, considered the most threat-
ened 5th Special Forces Group camp in I Corps Tactical Zone.
The 1st Battalion of the 52d Infantry was dispatched into attack
positions along the Song Bon River, southeast of Tien Phuoc. 4
It slugged its way forward against cleverly concealed North Viet-
namese bunkers built to cover the high ground. Bitter fighting
continued for eight days. On March 6, the 3d Battalion, 21st
Infantry, was sent in to help. After three more days of intense
combat, two more battalions were helicoptered in to the battle
area, and the 196th Infantry Brigade took command.
The battle was like many unwelcome affairs in Vietnam.
Combat was waged under the direct fire of skilled NVA gunners
dug into carefully selected positions with plenty of overhead cover
and connecting trenches. The 196th Infantry Brigade responded
with predictable American backup in the form of massive tac-
tical air strikes and artillery. The 1st Battalion of the 46th In-
4. The 52d Infantry was known as the Ready Rifles, a regiment raised at
Chickamauga Park, Georgia, in June 1917 for service in World War I, where
it had fought in Alsace. It was broken up into the 27th, 52d, and 60th Ar-
mored Infantry Battalions in October 1943 and fought in Europe during World
War II with the 9th Armored Division. The 1st Battalion had been in Viet-
nam since February of 1968.
304 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
fantry joined the fight to take the place of the 52cTs worn bat-
talion and made a hasty river crossing in an attempt to block
NVA escape routes. 5
The main attack was pressed in advances that were met with
intense fire from strong-points which held their fire until the
soldiers were only ten yards distant. Combat engineers and in-
fantrymen with flamethrowers crawled forward to demolish one
bunker at a time. The Americal infantry methodically reduced
the critical positions, and after the key terrain was captured, the
North Vietnamese soldiers began withdrawing in small groups.
Contact became sporadic, and by March 22 only snipers re-
mained. The immediate threat to Tien Phuoc had been elimi-
nated and the Americal Division pulled its units out.
The Americal Division also saw heavy fighting in the Tarn
Ky vicinity where it had posted its attached 1st Squadron, 1st
Cavalry, to clear VC in the wake of the Post-Tet Offensive. 6 The
armored cavalry squadron fought another battle in the Tarn Ky
vicinity on May 12-19, 1969, during Operation FREDERICK
HILL. It was ordered to move against a hilltop where the 1st
VC Regiment had overrun a critical militia outpost. When initial
counterattacks failed, the 3d Battalion of the 21st Infantry, old
hands at destroying fortifications in the Demilitarized Zone, was
air-assaulted into the battlefield. After air strikes and artillery
literally blew the top of the hill off, the mixed armored-infantry
force made several assaults up the fire-swept slopes and finally
recaptured it.
5. The 46th Infantry was known officially as the Professionals. Like the Ready
Rifles, it was another tough old armored infantry veteran of World War II,
having crashed through Normandy, the West Wall, and the Hurtgen Forest.
It was organized at Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana, in June 1917, but missed
World War I. In September of 1943 it had been broken up as the 15th, 46th,
and 47th Armored Infantry Battalions of the 5th Armored Division for World
War II service. The 1st Battalion had been in Vietnam since October 1967.
6. The 1st Cavalry was organized in 1833 as the Regiment of United States
Dragoons from the Mounted Rangers of the Black Hawk War. It had fought
through Mexico, the Civil War, almost every Indian War, the Spanish Amer-
ican War, the Philippine Insurrection, and World War II (as the 1st Armored
Regiment and later 1st Tank Battalion). It was still technically part of the 1st
Armored Division, having been detached from Fort Hood, Texas, for Vietnam
service as a boost for Pacific theater armor assets in August 1967.
ONE WAR IN THE NORTHERN PROVINCES 305
Combat in the Americal Division sector was light during the
summer months as Maj. Gen. Lloyd B. Ramsey took command
of the division. He established common brigade-regimental tac-
tical areas with the 2d ARVN Division and colocated their com-
mand posts at the same base camps. The division began con-
ducting combined operations and joint protection of supply lines.
The Americal Division was transformed into a training security
division and remained in this capacity until it was closed down
in Vietnam.
The few heavy actions fought by the division during the rest
of the year transpired in the Hiep Due sector. There the 196th
Infantry Brigade was matched up with the 5th ARVN Regiment
in Operation FREDERICK HILL. On August 18, the 4th Bat-
talion, 31st Infantry, ran into strong VC trench networks east
of Hiep Due in two separate firefights. The battle became more
than a grisly contest to capture dug-in positions. As the ground
action was raging, a command helicopter carrying the battalion
commander, Lt. Col. E. P. Howard, and several other key per-
sonnel including an Associated Press correspondent, was hit by
heavy machine-gun fire, exploded in midair, and crashed.
Two companies of the battalion immediately combat-
assaulted near the downed helicopter site but were blocked from
reaching it by interconnecting machine-gun nests. The soldiers
were pinned down until the evening of August 20. The follow-
ing day several companies from 1st Battalion, 46th Infantry, and
elements of the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, were airmobiled into
the battle. Two more days of fierce fighting ensued as the sol-
diers and Marines pushed forward through heavy resistance. At
8:25 A.M. on August 24, the Viet Cong fire began to slacken,
and Company C of the 21st Infantry battalion found the downed
aircraft and recovered the bodies. Fighting continued for five
more days before the battlefield was cleared.
The Americal Division's last major engagement of the year
occurred in the FREDERICK HILL sector on September 11,
1969, the day after the communist cease-fire honoring the fu-
neral of Ho Chi Minh ended. The 4th Battalion, 31st Infantry,
repulsed a 60th VC Main Force Battalion attack on Fire Sup-
port Base Siberia outside Hiep Due. Afterwards, the level of
combat dropped dramatically as Typhoon Doris brought heavy
rains and severe flooding.
306 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
Maj. Gen. Ormond R. Simpson's 1st Marine Division cov-
ered the approaches to the vital city of Da Nang during 1969.
This brought the Marines into considerable combat in the An
Hoa and Que Son valleys and mandated extensive sweeps in the
"rocket belt/' The belt area, guarded by the 1st and 5th Ma-
rines during the year, was the strip of territory within NVA rocket
range of Da Nang. Over a span of time incessant patrolling of
the booby-trapped fields and villages produced a lot of casual-
ties. Fighting in the valleys was more conventional.
On April 21 a reconnaissance team from the 1st Battalion of
the 7th Marines spotted a large Viet Cong force crossing the Vu
Gia river northwest of An Hoa. The squad ambush held its fire
as they called in artillery. Several fire support bases responded
in quick succession, and an onslaught of concentrated steel sud-
denly descended on the river crossing, catching the VC in sam-
pans and on foot as they waded through the stream. The am-
bush position joined the slaughter by firing automatic weapons
into the confused mass of men and churning water. Hundreds
of Viet Cong were killed by fire or drowned in the swift cur-
rent.
Later that month a grass fire touched off the entire am-
munition supply point at Da Nang, demolishing thirty-eight
thousand tons of munitions and twenty thousand drums of fuel.
This dealt a major blow to operational stocks, but the 1st Ma-
rine Division was soon relegated to guarding rice harvests in the
An Hoa basin. The operation was marked by only a few skir-
mishes. Ground action soon dwindled to extensive patrolling and
occasional reconnaissance attacks by both sides.
The Marines also worked over some islands that were ha-
vens for Viet Cong activity along the coast south of Da Nang,
islands suspected of being rocket crew refuges. In these tedious
searches they were assisted by Korean Marines and South Viet-
namese troops. On May 26, the Marines joined forces with the
51st ARVN Regiment and the 2d Korean Marine Brigade to storm
Go Noi Island, only twelve miles from Da Nang. The region
was ringed and traversed by a maze of rivers and streams com-
bined with a labyrinth of tunnels, caves, and trenches. Previous
operations in the area had been unsuccessful at eradicating the
Viet Cong installations and materials on the island. This time
ONE WAR IN THE NORTHERN PROVINCES 307
the Marines sent in engineer land-clearing equipment which razed
6,750 acres, geographically transforming the whole island.
The Seventh Fleet made its final combat landings on Viet-
namese soil on another island sandy, squalid Barrier Island,
thirty-four miles south of Da Nang. The 1st Battalion, 26th Ma-
rines, had the landing force duty and attacked the island three
times during the year, in early May, in June, and in September.
Again joint amphibious exercises were conducted- with the Ko-
rean Marines and the ARVN forces to attempt clearance. This
last operation, DEFIANT STAND, transpired on September 7.
This time the big amphibian tractors churning through the surf
toward the beaches were carrying a battalion of Korean Ma-
rines. The last of sixty-two Seventh Fleet Special Landing Force
operations in Vietnam was also the first amphibious assault con-
ducted in the twenty-year history of the Korean Marine Corps.
The Special Landing Force air-assaulted inland while patrol craft
cut off escape routes. The Viet Cong offered only light resis-
tance and stayed low during the massive sweep. The next time
U.S. Marines would use the Seventh Fleet offensively in In-
dochina would be to evacuate American, Vietnamese, and Cam-
bodian citizens as the capitals of Saigon and Phnom Penh fell
in the spring of 1975.
CHAPTER 20.
ONE WAR IN THE
SOUTHERN PROVINCES
1. Guarding the Cambodian Frontier
In Vietnam's southern provinces the Army's formations were in-
creasingly engaged in joint training operations with the South
Vietnamese Army as the year progressed. Along the Cambodian
frontier this mission was tempered with the additional task of
garrisoning the border areas and preventing large NVA incur-
sions. The 4th Infantry Division screened the Central Highlands
portion of the Cambodian front, while the 173d Airborne Bri-
gade was fragmented under its Pair-Off mission between the 22d
and 23d ARVN Divisions in II Corps Tactical Zone. The 1st
Cavalry and 25th Infantry Divisions were committed along the
Cambodian border in III CTZ, and by the end of the year both
were primarily dedicated to combined static security roles. Bor-
der defense remained a top MACV concern and produced some
significant battles in the first half of 1969.
Maj. Gen. George I. Forsythe's 1st Cavalry Division (Air-
mobile) had been stationed northwest of Saigon across three
provinces, and most of its line battalions were strung along the
Cambodian border. Their triplex mission entailed covering the
NVA infiltration routes, destroying forces encountered, and pro-
tecting the vital Saigon-Bien Hoa area from westward attack.
The 1st Brigade had one of the toughest areas, coded NAVAJO
WARHORSE, a stretch of dry rice fields covered by six cavalry
308
ONE WAR IN THE SOUTHERN PROVINCES 309
battalions on one side squared off against several secure North
Vietnamese divisions on the other. The brigade posted its bat-
talions in Indian-fighting style, safeguarding the frontier with
screening patrols backed up by fire support base strong-points
in lieu of wooden stockades. This was why Capt. David L. Par-
ker's Company B of the 2d Battalion, 5th Cavalry, was posi-
tioned near the southern tip of a protrusion of Cambodian ter-
ritory jutting into Vietnam known as the Angel's Wing.
Major trouble started brewing on March 5, 1969, and from
that date the battalion area sparked with sudden ambushes, light
skirmishing, and fresh sightings of NVA soldiers. Three days later
Company D had a tough run-in with the 272d VC Regiment
north of Phuoc Lu, and a warning was flashed to all cavalrymen
in the sector to expect combat, especially at night, with well-
armed, fresh, aggressive North Vietnamese infantry coming out
of Cambodia.
Lt. Col. Jerry J. Burcham, commanding the 5th Cavalry's
2d Battalion, told his company commanders to keep roving am-
bushes moving at night and to change company locations after
dark. It was hoped that night movement and deception would
combine with ground radar to give his cavalrymen a continued
advantage, one which could be rapidly reinforced by rocket-fir-
ing helicopters, lots of artillery, and fighter-bombers. Foot mo-
bility in the open paddies was rapid, and the companies would
select their overnight positions during the day. They would move
away from them, have hot chow flown in, rest, and then march
to the predetermined locations at dusk.
At sundown on March 8, Company B moved into its night
perimeter and started breaking up. The 3d and Weapons Pla-
toons began digging in and siting their ground radar and mortar.
They also had brought along a big 90mm recoilless rifle with
Beehive and high explosive rounds, and counted their firepower
better than average. Unfortunately, neither radar nor recoilless
rifle had been checked, and both proved inoperable.
The 1st and 2d Platoons, with twenty-seven men each, moved
out in different directions to their roving ambush sites. As the
troopers prepared to leave the company lines they checked gear.
Each carried twenty full magazines for his M16, two hand gre-
nades, one smoke grenade, three heat tablets, and one trip flare.
310 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
The nine squad claymore mines were divided among the men.
Each of the platoons also had three machine guns with nine
hundred rounds each, three grenade launchers, two radios, and
one starlight scope. The cavalrymen slowly moved through the
heavy ground haze to the sites and dug chest-high foxholes. The
haze lifted at midnight and a cool, pleasant tropical breeze wafted
through the starry darkness. Under the full moon even distant
paddy dikes were stark and visible.
Both platoons radioed the company headquarters that they
were set up, but the 1st had great difficulty making the report
because its radio was cranky. First Lieutenant Powell of 2d Pla-
toon made his first spotting report a half hour after midnight;
six suspects were approaching his lines. He called in a salvo of
forty artillery rounds, and five North Vietnamese soldiers ran
from the explosions right toward his position. A trip flare was
thrown for illumination and the platoon fired for a solid minute.
Then all was quiet, and the troops guessed that they had killed
some but that others might have gotten away. The men decided
not to change their position for the rest of the night so they
could get a body count at first light.
At 2:45 A.M. a private scanning the horizon from the anthill
in 1st Platoon's perimeter spotted another five-man group that
seemed to be coming out of a tree line. He awoke his com-
mander, First Lieutenant Stevenson, who looked across the field.
He saw the entire tree line moving, a huge mass of troops com-
ing right at them. They quickly radioed for Blue Max, the rocket
helicopters, and heavy artillery. A moment later they got a re-
sponse. The helicopter was refused because they were not yet
in contact. The cavalrymen watched breathlessly as the large
force, numbering over two hundred men, stopped at a road and
sent out scouts to secure a crossing. Suddenly a crashing wall
of artillery rounds began exploding between the platoon lines
and the NVA.
The forward observer at the company site began walking the
salvos into the North Vietnamese, who were now scrambling to
get out of the shellfire. He tried to keep the artillery between
the outlying platoons and the NVA. Then NVA mortar rounds
began falling on the ambush platoons, and the forward observer
ONE WAR IN THE SOUTHERN PROVINCES 311
made a desperate gamble. He shifted the artillery to try to knock
out the NVA mortar tube. Five minutes after the second urgent
call for Blue Max, the armed helicopter was hovering overhead
and requesting the platoons to mark their locations. For some
unknown reason the helicopters were not on the right fre-
quency, and radio contact was impossible. It was another one
of those details bound to go wrong in a battle, a phenomenon
often expressed as Murphy's Law. The howitzers had to stop
firing as soon as the rocket helicopter was on station to avoid
hitting it.
Lieutenant Colonel Burcham got in his helicopter and was
overhead also. He could see the platoons were not marking their
postions well, and radio trouble was cropping up again. A Spooky
aircraft was also in the air but having difficulty seeing the bat-
tlefield for another reason. The lingering haze was reflecting the
illumination. Colonel Burcham ordered the Spooky aircraft mini-
guns to suppress machine-gun fire being aimed at the Cobra
gunships.
Five minutes after the helicopter had arrived, the 1st Pla-
toon was pinned by heavy mortar and rocket-propelled grenade
fire. Several men were seriously wounded and the radio was
knocked out for good. Lieutenant Stevenson and his platoon ser-
geant used the protection of the anthill to see a battalion's worth
of flickering lights coming at them: machine guns, rockets, and
assault rifles. Then two NVA suddenly ran at a foxhole and were
brought down inside the perimeter. An instant later a B-40 rocket
hit the lieutenant's foxhole and disintegrated the occupants. Pla-
toon Sergeant Martinez took over and told the men to conserve
their ammunition and to fire only at NVA who actually breached
the perimeter. That was all he had time to say; the first mass
assault was hurled against the platoon as NVA radio traffic echoed
eerily through the fiery half-light of night battle.
The troopers fir^d off their claymores and took well-aimed
shots at the incoming waves of charging soldiers. Every time
they flipped on automatic, a fusillade of B-40 rockets would strike
in their direction. The NVA were obviously trying to knock out
any automatic weapons. Sergeant Martinez was desperately trying
to get the Spooky's attention, but the trip flares were three feet
310 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
The nine squad claymore mines were divided among the men.
Each of the platoons also had three machine guns with nine
hundred rounds each, three grenade launchers, two radios, and
one starlight scope. The cavalrymen slowly moved through the
heavy ground haze to the sites and dug chest-high foxholes. The
haze lifted at midnight and a cool, pleasant tropical breeze wafted
through the starry darkness. Under the full moon even distant
paddy dikes were stark and visible.
Both platoons radioed the company headquarters that they
were set up, but the 1st had great difficulty making the report
because its radio was cranky. First Lieutenant Powell of 2d Pla-
toon made his first spotting report a half hour after midnight;
six suspects were approaching his lines. He called in a salvo of
forty artillery rounds, and five North Vietnamese soldiers ran
from the explosions right toward his position. A trip flare was
thrown for illumination and the platoon fired for a solid minute.
Then all was quiet, and the troops guessed that they had killed
some but that others might have gotten away. The men decided
not to change their position for the rest of the night so they
could get a body count at first light.
At 2:45 A.M. a private scanning the horizon from the anthill
in 1st Platoon's perimeter spotted another five-man group that
seemed to be coming out of a tree line. He awoke his com-
mander, First Lieutenant Stevenson, who looked across the field.
He saw the entire tree line moving, a huge mass of troops com-
ing right at them. They quickly radioed for Blue Max, the rocket
helicopters, and heavy artillery. A moment later they got a re-
sponse. The helicopter was refused because they were not yet
in contact. The cavalrymen watched breathlessly as the large
force, numbering over two hundred men, stopped at a road and
sent out scouts to secure a crossing. Suddenly a crashing wall
of artillery rounds began exploding between the platoon lines
and the NVA.
The forward observer at the company site began walking the
salvos into the North Vietnamese, who were now scrambling to
get out of the shellfire. He tried to keep the artillery between
the outlying platoons and the NVA. Then NVA mortar rounds
began falling on the ambush platoons, and the forward observer
ONE WAR IN THE SOUTHERN PROVINCES 311
made a desperate gamble. He shifted the artillery to try to knock
out the NVA mortar tube. Five minutes after the second urgent
call for Blue Max, the armed helicopter was hovering overhead
and requesting the platoons to mark their locations. For some
unknown reason the helicopters were not on the right fre-
quency, and radio contact was impossible. It was another one
of those details bound to go wrong in a battle, a phenomenon
often expressed as Murphy's Law. The howitzers had to stop
firing as soon as the rocket helicopter was on station to avoid
hitting it.
Lieutenant Colonel Burcham got in his helicopter and was
overhead also. He could see the platoons were not marking their
postions well, and radio trouble was cropping up again. A Spooky
aircraft was also in the air but having difficulty seeing the bat-
tlefield for another reason. The lingering haze was reflecting the
illumination. Colonel Burcham ordered the Spooky aircraft mini-
guns to suppress machine-gun fire being aimed at the Cobra
gunships.
Five minutes after the helicopter had arrived, the 1st Pla-
toon was pinned by heavy mortar and rocket-propelled grenade
fire. Several men were seriously wounded and the radio was
knocked out for good. Lieutenant Stevenson and his platoon ser-
geant used the protection of the anthill to see a battalion's worth
of flickering lights coming at them: machine guns, rockets, and
assault rifles. Then two NVA suddenly ran at a foxhole and were
brought down inside the perimeter. An instant later a B-40 rocket
hit the lieutenant's foxhole and disintegrated the occupants. Pla-
toon Sergeant Martinez took over and told the men to conserve
their ammunition and to fire only at NVA who actually breached
the perimeter. That was all he had time to say; the first mass
assault was hurled against the platoon as NVA radio traffic echoed
eerily through the fiery half-light of night battle.
The troopers fii4d off their claymores and took well-aimed
shots at the incoming waves of charging soldiers. Every time
they flipped on automatic, a fusillade of B-40 rockets would strike
in their direction. The NVA were obviously trying to knock out
any automatic weapons. Sergeant Martinez was desperately trying
to get the Spooky's attention, but the trip flares were three feet
312 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
outside the foxholes. The men squirted insect repellent on the
ground and lit it with matches, but this effort was met with such
intense fire that it had to be abandoned.
As the North Vietnamese moved steadily closer, setting up
new rocket and firing positions, Sergeant Martinez and three
men moved to new locations. Two were killed and the sergeant
was severely wounded. The remaining man dragged him back.
By now everyone in the platoon had been killed or wounded.
The North Vietnamese were slipping in and overrunning fox-
holes. Two troopers were unable to return fire at one such at-
tack because of a berm. They heaved grenades which landed
short on the berm just as the North Vietnamese popped up to
emplace a heavy machine gun. The grenade blasts wiped the
NVA crew out.
Two assaults were made before daybreak. Both were re-
pulsed by steady, deliberately aimed defensive fire. Frequently
NVA soldiers simply walked forward in groups, and at other times
they charged wildly. In the midst of the battle a crazy incident
happened. A group of North Vietnamese soldiers suddenly ran
across the battlefield, yelling and laughing at each other. The
Americans watched in amazement as NVA officers tried to reach
out and get them back in line. Firing stopped on both sides for
a few seconds, At daybreak the North Vietnamese pulled back
and broke off contact. The platoon expended all its ammunition
and was down to the last magazines taken off the dead.
The 2d Platoon underwent an equally vicious assault. There
the men were badly hit in the opening mortar explosions and
made a mad scramble for a drainage ditch that seemed to afford
better protection. This sudden retreat abandoned the claymore
mine protection as well as the trip flares which might have marked
their positions. One machine gun was then destroyed by an-
other mortar round. However, they suffered no wave assault.
The NVA were using advance-by-bounds techniques, firing and
moving in the manner of professional drill sergeants at Fort Polk.
The platoon sergeant kept crawling up and down the ditch, giv-
ing encouragement and assisting the growing number of wounded.
Then the cavalrymen hit upon a marking solution. They be-
gan stripping, taking off their shirts first and pouring insect re-
pellent over them. After setting them afire, they heaved the
ONE WAR IN THE SOUTHERN PROVINCES 313
burning clothes into the air. Each time a flaming shirt left the
ditch, a B-40 round screamed in on the man who threw it.
However, the trick worked. Cobra gunships began strafing in
front of their lines and broke the attack.
With dawn the North Vietnamese began to withdraw. The
battlefield was a smoking shambles. While losses had been very
heavy, both platoons had managed to hold by sheer determi-
nation and calm marksmanship. Many of the things that had gone
wrong were serious, but errors and gremlins always pop up in
the heat of battle. The cavalrymen were experienced enough to
expect serious difficulties and innovative enough to work around
them.
Later it was discovered that the 1st Platoon had some un-
intentional help in holding its perimeter. The North Vietnamese
had also committed a grave blunder. The group attacking the
2d Platoon was advancing in a direction uncoordinated with the
other group. Rockets that sailed over the target were ripping
into the other soldiers advancing on 1st Platoon. It was perhaps
the only time in the war when an American platoon was re-
ceiving effective direct support from NVA gunners. Battlefield
reality remained a bloody constant throughout the prolonged
American withdrawal from Vietnam.
In mid-April, two brigades of the division initiated a series
of operations commencing with MONTANA RAIDER against the
1st and 7th NVA Divisions in the heavily fortified jungle of cen-
tral War Zone C, while the 3d Brigade sortied into War Zone
D against the 5th VC Division. Patrols and ambushes were
overshadowed by larger field operations as Maj. Gen. Elvy B.
Roberts assumed command in May. These operations were de-
signed to follow in the wake of massed B-52 bombing runs, as
infantry was air-assaulted into the stricken areas to seek out North
Vietnamese supply and assembly points. These raids were part
of the 1969 One War plan to maintain pressure on NVA base
areas, and the 1st Cavalry Division was considered MACV's pre-
mier mobile attack formation for these offensive assignments.
Several NVA attempts were made to overrun isolated heli-
copter landing sites, most notably at LZs Carolyn, Grant, and
Jamie, in May, as the cavalry spent the wet, humid summer
searching through trackless, arboreal wilderness. There well-for-
314 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
tified strong-points tested the fortitude of the American front-
line soldier. The bunker sets were invariably constructed in thickly
vegetated bamboo groves and often bypassed due to their per-
fect camouflage. When the bunker gunners abruptly opened up,
leading company elements were often only able to break contact
by exploding bangalore torpedoes dropped from helicopters. These
ripped apart enough foliage to allow accurate counterfire with
machine guns and light antitank weapons used for bunker
suppression.
Immediate retreat was required to save casualties, and men
pulled back under heavy automatic weapons fire, dragging se-
riously wounded and dying troopers with them. Positions were
marked with all available smoke and white phosphorus, cre-
ating smoke screens which both covered the withdrawal and en-
abled aircraft to spot locations. Helicopters raked targets with
rockets and riot gas bomblets. Then artillery shelled the area
until Air Force fighters arrived with napalm and 750-pound
bombs. After intensive bombardment the foot cavalrymen would
have to go back in and assault the charred, blasted ruins at rifle-
point.
The 1st Cavalry Division enjoyed an excellent reputation for
aggressive conduct under fire, but it too was in a transitional
stage. By the end of the year II Field Force, Vietnam, had mated
the ARVN airborne regiments with the division's brigades. The
elite South Vietnamese parachute division was paired up with
the crack 1st Cavalry Division to gain experience utilizing its
large number of helicopters and sophisticated airmobility doc-
trine. This task placed the 1st Cavalry Division in a sponsor
capacity, which overshadowed its combat role as MACV'S mo-
bile response force. Battlefield incidents became increasingly
sparse as the year closed out.
Maj. Gen. Ellis W. Williamson's 25th Infantry Division was
also entrusted with a share of the Cambodian border duty. His
division was paired with its adopted sister, the 25th ARVN Di-
vision, west and north of Saigon in Tay Ninh and Hau Nghia
Provinces. The "Tropic Lightning" division was engaged in some
heated rubber-field fights, convoy skirmishes, campsite battles,
and extensive riverine operations along the Saigon and Vam Co
rivers. However, its main task was identical to that of the 1st
ONE WAR IN THE SOUTHERN PROVINCES 315
Cavalry Division: security of the western approaches to Saigon.
Throughout the early part of 1969, the division's 1st and 2d
Brigade border area patrol bases weathered several attacks. These
started with the Post-Tet Offensive attack on Patrol Base Dia-
mond I, occupied by the 2d Battalion of the 27th Infantry, on
February 23. It was subjected to ten minutes of mortaring fol-
lowed by a massive ground assault. In spite of tons of aerial
bombs, rockets, and artillery shells, the North Vietnamese blasted
their way through the perimeter wire and took three bunkers.
Direct fire from artillery within the camp finally broke the as-
sault. Elements of the same battalion again employed plenty of
artillery, air strikes, and aerial rockets to break up a North Viet-
namese Army probe against Patrol Base Diamond II on April 5.
Capitalizing on the proximity of the Cambodian border to
produce combat, the division established its fifth patrol base
within two miles of the border. Patrol Base Frontier City was
a well-entrenched company-sized outpost built in a flat, open
area where observation was only hindered by two small wooded
areas and a stream lined with dense brushwood, located over
five hundred yards away. It was manned by Company C of the
9th Infantry's 4th Battalion. 1 MACV had resorted to giving every
inhabited area of Vietnam a report card called the MACV Ham-
let Evaluation System Report, based on loyalty to the Saigon
ime. In the latest report the nearby village of Long Khanh
had only gotten a C. The division was looking forward to
trouble.
Work on the base began on the morning of April 24, and
all defensive preparations were completed by dark. One dozer
was brought in by a CH-54 Flying Crane, and the other was
floated down the Vam Co River and the Rach Bao Canal on a
raft, and then driven into camp. The position of the base was
1. The 9th Infantry's motto Keep up the Fire! commemorated the marks-
manship and guts demonstrated by the regiment at the Wagon Box Fight
near Fort Kearney, Wyoming, on August 2, 1867. Thirty 9th Infantry soldiers
had repulsed a mounted charge by 2,000 Sioux, killing several hundred In-
dians while suffering only three casualties. It was first organized at Fort Mon-
roe, Virginia, in March 1855, and participated in the Civil and Indian wars,
fought in Cuba, the China Relief Expedition, the Philippine Insurrection, World
Wars I and II, and the Korean War. The 4th Battalion had been in Vietnam
since April 1966.
316 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
selected and an engineer stake was driven at the center. A 130-
foot rope was tied to the stake and walked around to form the
circular trace of the bunker line. Twenty-four standard packages
were helicoptered in and dropped off around the perimeter. Each
contained a shaped demolition charge, two sheets of pierced steel
planking, and a bundle of sandbags. After the explosives created
the initial bunker holes, the infantrymen tackled the hard job
of squaring off the hole and using the packaged materials to build
their nine-foot bunkers. All twenty-four were completed in nine
hours.
As the bunkers were being completed, the dozers were
pushing up berms of dirt between them. Other soldiers were
busy clearing fields of fire, stringing rows of triple concertina
wire, and setting up three hundred claymore mines. A prefab-
ricated twenty-foot observation tower was flown in and set up
in the middle of the patrol base. The tower was sandbagged and
crowned with both a radar and starlight scope. Finally, two
howitzers were flown in. Twenty-one sorties of Chinook heli-
copters had been used to bring in the fortification packages, crew-
served weapons, and ammunition. By sundown all barriers, mortar
and howitzer pits, ammunition bunkers, troop positions, and the
observation tower were ready for combat.
Late in the night of April 25, the observation tower radar
began to detect movement southwest of the base. As the move-
ment increased, the defenders called for artillery fire on the woods
southwest of the patrol base. Three Air Force Spooky and one
Shadow minigun aircraft, twenty-two Cobra and Huey helicop-
ter gunships, and four fighter-bombers arrived and started
bombing, napalming, and rocketing all suspected approach routes
to the American position. The NVA responded with a barrage
of rockets, mortars, grenades, and antiaircraft fire. Illumination
rounds blossomed into bursts of light over the battlefield as flares
drifted through the clear night.
One hour after midnight, a battalion of the 271st NVA Reg-
iment charged across the open ground. Helicopters of the 25th
Aviation Battalion rolled in to strafe the attackers as AC-47 fire
support aircraft decimated targets marked with white phospho-
rous rounds fired from the base mortars. Waves of North Viet-
namese soldiers were mowed down, but eleven made it to the
ONE WAR IN THE SOUTHERN PROVINCES 317
wire, threw in a bangalore torpedo, and started to cross. The
defenders then set off their claymore mines and took them un-
der fire with a 90mm recoilless rifle and two machine guns. The
attackers were killed in the hailstorm of combined weapons fire.
Patrol Base Frontier City was receiving only sporadic rounds as
the slaughter subsided. The 9th Infantry had only suffered one
casualty, a man lightly wounded by shrapnel.
The 25th Infantry Division had been experimenting with im-
proved battlefield surveillance devices and armed Night Hawk
helicopters equipped with night observation devices and xenon
searchlights. These were put to the test during the all-out North
Vietnamese Army assault against Fire Support Base Crook, de-
fended by the 3d Battalion, 22d Infantry, on June 6-7, 1969.
It was located northwest of Tay Ninh city about four miles from
the Cambodian border in a flat but forested area. While dense
jungle surrounded its northern and eastern sides, abandoned rice
paddies extended in other directions. All approaches were cov-
ered by sensor devices made available by the abandonment of
McNamara's DMZ barrier, as well as radar mounted on the ob-
servation tower. These detected large movement in the tree line
around the base on the night of June 5. Artillery was imme-
diately fired into those areas, and things quieted down until three
o'clock in the morning, when the base began taking a heavy
concentration of rocket and mortar fire. Most of the rockets sim-
ply sailed over the base and went off outside the wire on the
other side. One soldier was killed by a mortar round as a lis-
tening post was pulled in, but within the base there were only
minor injuries and little damage.
The 272d NVA Regiment then charged the base from the
south and east. The defenders answered with intense machine-
gun fire as the base howitzers fired directly into the North Viet-
namese attackers with lowered gun tubes. Heavier artillery
pounded the woods and pathway of the assault. This concentra-
tion of explosions and bullets dropped dozens of soldiers, but a
sixteen-man group managed to breach the outer wire with ban-
galore torpedoes before being killed by claymore mines and rifle
fire. Although the charge had faltered, the majority of the NVA
remained on the field and kept firing their assault rifles and
rocket-propelled grenades. One hour after the attack started AC-
318 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
47 and AC-119 aircraft came overhead and started circling Crook's
perimeter, lacing it with devastating direct minigun and cannon
fire. Helicopter gunships and fighter-bombers also arrived and
annihilated the remainder of the exposed North Vietnamese
troops, who had remained defiantly in the open.
The next night the radar and seismic sensor devices detected
an identical pattern of activity. The Americans were bewildered
at the prospect that the North Vietnamese would try a second
time after the overwhelming destruction of the first attempt.
However, they grimly manned their bunkers as mortar and di-
rect howitzer fire slashed into the tropical forest again. At two
o'clock in the morning a Night Hawk helicopter detected large
groups of soldiers moving toward the base on a road, and ar-
tillery was shifted to shatter this formation. An hour later a re-
newed barrage hit Fire Support Base Crook at the rate of 150
rockets and mortar shells a minute. Three U.S. soldiers were
wounded by this initial volley. For the next hour and a half the
barrage kept up, but at a diminished pace. Then two battalions
of the 88th NVA Regiment attacked from two tree lines in the
north. As the North Vietnamese troops appeared out of the trees,
they were strafed immediately by helicopters which had been
hovering overhead.
The base defenders replied with heavy automatic weapons
fire and antipersonnel cannister fire from the lowered howitzer
tubes. Again AC-119 aircraft blasted the area with minigun fire,
as heavy artillery sent a torrent of rounds slamming into the
path of the attack. One wave of attackers was broken up short
of the wire, but the other force got into the first wire barrier
before the last attacker was stopped. A retreat was attempted,
but the violence of automatic weapons and bursting munitions
chopped through the survivors while they were still in the open.
By 5:30 A.M., those NVA soldiers that could had withdrawn,
leaving the fields strewn with hundreds of dead.
Then the unbelievable happened. On the night of June 7,
an artillery barrage testing the same woods around the base
prompted the North Vietnamese to make a third try. This
halfhearted attack was quickly eradicated, and Fire Support Base
Crook remained secure. Vietnam had reconfirmed the old World
War I axioms governing the futility of charging fixed defenses
ONE WAR IN THE SOUTHERN PROVINCES 319
without strong armored or firepower backup. However, as the
experiences of the 1st Cavalry Division had demonstrated dur-
ing the spring, American tactics were premised on tremendous
quantities of aerial rockets, bombing, and shellfire as a preface
to assaults on far less sophisticated, earthen bunker systems.
The 25th Infantry Division was fully engaged in the Dong
Tien Progress Together program with its counterpart 25th ARVN
Division by the latter part of the year. Combat fizzled out across
the Cambodian frontier front as this joint training and opera-
tions effort consumed the division's resources. Plans were un-
derway to accelerate U.S. withdrawal schedules, and the 25th
Infantry Division was tagged for return to Hawaii the following
year. However, MACV was already drafting operational orders
for a final, massive strike across the border to destroy the NVA
staging bases inside Cambodia. It would take place in the spring
of 1970.
2. Guarding the Saigon Approaches
While the 1st Cavalry Division and the 25th Infantry Divi-
sion held down the western border approach, the remaining Sai-
gon approaches were guarded by other large American forma-
tions. The three provinces directly north of the capital were
covered by the "Big Red One" 1st Infantry Division, reinforced
by the bulk of the "Blackhorse" llth Armored Cavalry Regi-
ment and the 5th ARVN Division. The southern approach through
Long An Province was watched by the 3d Brigade of the 9th
Infantry Division, which employed small-unit reconnaissance and
special night patrols to saturate its sector throughout the year.
In the meantime the rest of the 9th Infantry Division departed
Vietnam, and the 25th Infantry Division absorbed control of the
separate 3d Brigade. The eastern approaches to the city were
covered by the 18th ARVN Division, the 1st Australian Task
Force, and the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force. Major Gen-
eral Warren K. Bennett's 199th Infantry Brigade was heavily
engaged in upgrading the 18th ARVN Division and pacification
projects. It also conducted daily operations with South Vietnam-
ese territorial militia and warded off small-scale attacks against
hamlets and "Ruff-Puff" outposts northeast of Saigon.
All maneuvers in III Corps Tactical Zone revolved around
320 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
Operation TOAN THANG II. This security operation had been
going on since June of 1968 when it replaced the first serial by
that designation, The 1st Infantry Division, the 3d Brigade of
the 9th Infantry Division, the 199th Infantry Brigade, and the
llth Armored Cavalry Regiment were all dedicated by MACV
to its support. The operation entailed static defense of desig-
nated tactical areas of responsibility, as well as limited recon-
naissance expeditions to discourage NVA campsites and rocket
positions within striking distance of Saigon.
The biggest unit in the area was Maj. Gen. Orwin C. Tal-
bott's 1st Infantry Division. During most of the year, combat
was relatively light, and he focused on joint field operations with
the 5th ARVN Division. The division watched over suspected
hamlets as part of the pacification-imposed population control
around Di An and Phu Loi. In mid-January the "Big Red One"
became heavily involved in road clearance, as the 1st Brigade
began an engineer-backed effort to open the route from Phuoc
Vinh to the provincial capital of Song Be. The road had been
closed for three years due to Viet Cong activity, necessitating
the airlift of all supplies to several critical towns and bases. The
division covered combat engineers as they cut 250-yard-wide
swaths out of the vegetation on each side of the dry-weather
single-lane pass, while other road construction engineer crews
transformed it into a major highway. This was accompanied by
extensive infantry patrolling in the Iron Triangle. When the her-
culean effort was completed six months later in mid- June, it
marked one of the division's major achievements in Vietnam.
In March, Col. George S. Patton's llth Armored Cavalry was
alerted that the 7th NVA Division was infiltrating toward Saigon
through the Michelin rubber plantation. While the Michelin
plantation was a typical rubber tree area, a lot of scrub brush
had grown up between the trees since its abandonment. It was
surrounded by thick jungle, but the month of March was hot
and dry and the regiment took advantage of the excellent tank
weather to initiate Operation ATLAS WEDGE on March 17,
1969. Colonel Patton's observation helicopters were sent up in
the clear blue skies and looked down to see large groups of
North Vietnamese troops bicycling through the rubber. They
made little or no attempt to hide and were clearly in a march
formation, not expecting battle.
ONE WAR IN THE SOUTHERN PROVINCES 321
Throughout the rest of this first day the low-flying light ob-
servation helicopters dodged return fire to bring artillery and
tactical air strikes down on the soldiers. On the morning of March
18, the helicopters returned but only spotted squads moving be-
low. Closer examinations were met by intense antiaircraft fire,
which wounded one observer. Armored personnel carriers of the
1st Squadron moved off Fire Support Base Holiday Inn and drove
west through the "great swath" cut by Rome Plow dozers, lead-
ing from Highway 13 into the Michelin plantation. The 3d
Squadron followed right behind. The vehicle movement was
slowed at a ford as combat engineers carefully checked for mines.
The tracked carriers and tanks were soon skirmishing in the
marshy woods as they responded to helicopter sightings. Troop
H was hit by delaying antitank teams which hit two of its battle
tanks with rocket-propelled grenades. One tank blew up in flames
and had to be abandoned. Troop L was hit in midstream, but
the NVA antitank gunners did not have clear fields of fire, and
most of the rounds exploded in the trees. In the process of ma-
neuvering around this position two troopers were wounded, and
a landing zone had to be cleared for their evacuation. The North
Vietnamese concentrated intense fire on this site as the medical
evacuation helicopter arrived. A lieutenant was killed and nine
others were hit. As darkness fell, Troop L established a night
defensive position at the landing zone. Troops B, C, D, and M
also ploughed through underbrush in sharp action during the
first day's drive, and laagered overnight next to their landing
zones.
Under an umbrella of Cobra gunships and observation heli-
copters, the armored vehicles moved out on the morning of March
19, a day marked by tedious fighting against bunker complexes
which had to be destroyed one by one. The action continued
into the night, fought in the glare of headlights and aircraft spot-
lights. The battle intensified the following day. Troops L and
M of the 3d Squadron became involved in a pitched battle after
an aero rifle platoon became pinned down in two bomb craters
by a large horseshoe-shaped fortification complex of the 320th
NVA Regiment. A number of medium battle tanks arrived on
the scene and began churning through the bunker-studded woods
in a wide circle. The platoon leader's tank was suddenly hit by
a rocket-propelled grenade which sent shrapnel over the turret
322 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
and blinded the lieutenant. The tank lurched into a large B-52
bomb crater on the far side of the bunker line, where it was
stranded. Three more tanks were quickly destroyed by close-in
rocket-propelled grenade fire.
The one remaining tank no longer had a working radio. The
squadron commander, Lt. Col. Lee D. Duke, landed his heli-
copter and dashed over to order a last attack in the lengthening
afternoon shadows. He directed the armored personnel carriers
to go on each side of the tank and placed the infantry in line
to the rear of the vehicles. The colonel then mounted the rear
deck of the tank and with a wave of his arm the advance began.
His center tank, flanked by tracked armored carriers, rumbled
right into the midst of the North Vietnamese bunkers. A gre-
nade was heaved on the tank's engine compartment, where it
exploded and wounded Colonel Duke, but he continued to di-
rect the mechanized infantry force through the bunkers and then
back again. They passed the burning hulks of the tanks that had
already exploded and one that was still blazing furiously as its
ammunition cooked off. It was close to evening and the troopers
pulled back to a night defensive position, recovered the tank in
the bomb crater, and called in medical evacuation helicopters.
The 1st Squadron took over the attack on March 21. By now
only three light observation helicopters remained flyable and Huey
troopships were being used for scouting. The fresh armored cav-
alry unit took over the job of destroying the remaining bunkers
in the base complex encountered the previous day. For the next
five days, the llth Armored Cavalry continued to thrash through
the Michelin plantation, but the battle was over. It also marked
the last big operation for Colonel Patton, as that April he turned
over the reins of the regiment to Col. James H. Leach.
Maj. Gen. Albert E. Milloy took over the 1st Infantry Di-
vision in August. It was heavily involved in upgrading the 5th
ARVN Division, and most combat operations were of a com-
bined nature. They consisted of small-unit ambushes, and ground
reconnaissance, airmobile, and water operations along the Sai-
gon, Thi Tinh, and Song Be rivers. Operations were typified by
the cordon of Phu Hoa Dong during September 15-26 in south-
ern Binh Duong Province. The 2d Brigade joined forces with
the 7th ARVN Regiment and South Vietnamese field police to
completely seal off the village and conduct night ambushes and
ONE WAR IN THE SOUTHERN PROVINCES 323
reconnaissance throughout the area. Each house was thoroughly
searched as aerial broadcasts were made from helicopters, leaf-
lets were dropped, and ground speakers set up to blare down
the streets. For eleven days the villagers were confined to one
of the four hamlets. During that period the Americans served
2,200 noon rice meals, distributed sixteen bags of flour and four
bags of meal, gave away 475 school kits and 3,200 bars of soap,
and passed out fifty patriotism packages. The vilagers sat through
fifteen hours of movies, sixteen hours of band music, two ma-
gician shows, and a lottery in which nine pigs were given away.
The children were carted off on three trips to the Saigon zoo.
Since there had been an opening firefight trying to get into the
village, which had destroyed several homes, the Americans also
dumped sheets of tin and plywood off before leaving. Whether
or not such pacification projects succeeded became irrelevant
within five years. North Vietnam gained control over the south
through military invasion, and population sympathies "the hearts
and minds" long deemed central to all allied (and Viet Cong)
efforts were in the end of no consequence to either side.
The "Big Red One'* was alerted to begin a new operation,
KEYSTONE BLUEJAY, on December 15. On that date, Major
General Milloy received official word that his division was going
home. KEYSTONE BLUEJAY was the first welcome operation
in four years of combat. It governed equipment turnover and
plane scheduling for return to the United States by April 15,
1970.
3. 1969 Army Field Performance
The One War plan produced fewer large-scale operations and
more small-unit patrolling and reconnaissance. The Vietnam
conflict had always demanded a higher level of tactical capability
than most conventional wars, since mobile area warfare doctrine
broke normally massed formations down into independently op-
erating battalions, companies, and platoons. The real tempo of
the battlefield was at the platoon level, and Army proficiency
was primarily measured in bands of five-man squads mustered
into twenty-man platoons. The advent of Vietnamization intro-
duced combined operations, and by mid-1969 most purely
American combat missions became small-unit ambuscades.
One of the better line units in the Army was the 25th In-
324 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
fantry Division's "Wolfhounds": its two battalions of the 27th
Infantry. The 2d Battalion was using scattered patrol bases to
detect and ambush North Vietnamese Army elements crossing
the border from Cambodia. Company B had been operating its
three rifle platoons on a staggered three-day cycle which con-
sisted of a daytime reconnaissance followed by a night ambush,
a day of defending the local militia outpost, and a day of rest
and training.
On October 12, the nineteen-man 1st Platoon was alerted
that some action against Patrol Base Kotrc seemed imminent,
and they spent the day reconnoitering the muddy rice paddies
and scattered hedgerows for prospective ambush sites. The sol-
diers then returned to their outpost for supper, grabbed three
South Vietnamese Popular Force militiamen, and grudingly set
out into the darkness at seven o'clock that evening. Morale was
low because the platoon had been making nocturnal sorties for
months without contact against its highly elusive North Viet-
namese adversaries.
The platoon soldiers moved through the countryside just off
a trail that they knew by heart. They had been in the area so
long that they navigated by moonlight, spotting the familiar sil-
houettes of fish screens and traps. The lieutenant set up the
ambush north of the planned location because the soldiers had
found a wide dry area near the trail with several rice dikes con-
verging on it. The platoon set up in a rough triangle composed
of the three squads, with machine guns in the corners sited to
cover the dike approaches. Claymore mines were set up in a
circle at fifteen paces, and by ten o'clock that night the platoon
was silently in position.
One hour later one of the machine-gun crews saw six North
Vietnamese running along the rice dike leading directly into the
position. The Americans waited breathlessly until the ammuni-
tion bearer cut loose with his M 16 at a distance of only six yards,
chucked out the spent magazine, and shoved another one in the
rifle. He went through fifteen magazines back to back. The ma-
chine gun clattered into action at the first shot, and grenadiers
joined the action by firing illumination rounds into the sky.
Claymore mines were detonated at once. The M60 jammed after
going through 150 rounds, but the gunner quickly realized that
the ammunition belts had become crossed. He unscrambled the
ONE WAR IN THE SOUTHERN PROVINCES 325
tangled bullet chains and had his machine gun firing again in
seconds. He fired continuously for two minutes.
Four of the North Vietnamese soldiers fell in the initial fu-
sillade, and the last two soldiers ran off in different directions.
Two of the fallen had been wounded and hobbled away. For
another eight minutes the platoon fired in the direction of the
escaping survivors. The grenadiers switched from illumination to
regular high explosive rounds, as the rest of the platoon was
sending up dozens of star clusters and parachute flares. A "Night
Hawk" helicopter arrived overhead and flicked on its powerful
searchlight. Its door gunner began blazing away at the ground.
In fifteen minutes a shower of howitzer shells plummeted into
the flat, open fields.
The helicopter then radioed the platoon to check and see if
the NVA soldier they had targeted was still alive. The lieutenant
organized a "killer patrol" of five men who sallied from the pla-
toon ambush site, passed the two broken bodies near the dike,
and turned north. About a hundred yards out they saw one of
the soldiers trying to crawl away, opened fire with everything
they had, and quickly killed him. Another platoon "killer patrol"
had gone south into the rice paddies and followed the helicop-
ter's searchlight to another wounded soldier. They went over
and found that he had been shot in the chest and landed the
helicopter to perform a medical evacuation, The evacuated pris-
oner later died from his wounds.
After breakfast the next morning, the company commander
led 3d Platoon into the area, along with several volunteers from
the ambush platoon. They found the three bodies that had been
located the night before and a fourth dead soldier. They also
picked up homemade grenades, assault rifles, and ten bamboo
field launcher tripods for 122mm rockets. The six who had been
ambushed were part of an ammunition supply party. The 27th
Infantry claimed a totally successful ambush. There had been
no U.S. casualties. In fact, not one shot had been fired in re-
turn.
In late 1968 the Army had established a new composite unit
to guard the boundary of II and III Corps Tactical Zones called
Task Force South. One battalion of the rugged 173d Airborne
Brigade was detached to join it, and the paratroopers brought
their concept of hunter-killer HAWK operations with them.
326 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
HAWK teams of squad size or larger were designed to search
for and attack targets within their capability, while smaller teams
sought out information or captives. Companies or platoons were
assigned areas, which they patrolled with HAWK missions, backed
with reaction forces. These teams were essentially night ambush
positions.
On March 29, 1969, the twenty-five-man 1st Platoon of
Company B, 3d Battalion, 503d Infantry (Airborne), led by an
experienced paratrooper platoon sergeant, was given a routine
HAWK assignment. It had two rifle squads and a weapons squad
with two machine guns, as well as a command section. Addi-
tionally it had a forward observer from the battalion mortar pla-
toon, a senior aidman, and a scout dog team. However, the han-
dler had just acquired a new dog and was not yet familiar with
him.
The platoon members swept the jungle for seven days with-
out contact. On April 5, the dog put them onto twenty Viet
Cong moving along a trail, dressed in brand new uniforms and
carrying new rucksacks. They called in artillery and began fol-
lowing the trail, hoping to catch them. That night the platoon
split into two HAWK teams, but^there was no combat.
The next day they continued to follow the trail. At noon
they discovered an old base camp and a shallow grave. They
destroyed all the bunkers and then advanced. The scout dog
was very nervous and kept alerting them, but they could see
no one. The handler reasoned that the canine was agitated sim-
ply because of the old base camp. Early in the afternoon, a
soldier in the rear of the unit suddenly spotted a uniformed Viet
Cong and both opened fire at each other. Nobody was hit. By
mid-afternoon the platoon found itself on a well-traveled path-
way. After stopping for water, the sergeant moved back to the
ridge to establish a night position along the trail.
The following day they were due to be resupplied, so he
decided to maintain the platoon in one defensive perimeter. The
paratroopers constructed four bunkered positions and several
foxholes well before dark, making plenty of noise as they dug
in. This was not in line for HAWK procedure, which was to
move into smaller clandestine ambushes as silently as possible.
The bunkers had no overhead cover, and no listening posts were
set out beyond the perimeter. Two machine guns were placed
ONE WAR IN THE SOUTHERN PROVINCES 327
in two separate positions covering the trail, and five men were
assigned to each emplacement. The two rifle squads were put
in two positions on the other side of the trail. The platoon ser-
geant and the others set up a command section in the center
and set up trip flares and claymore mines beyond the perime-
ter,
The scout dog was beside himself by this time, and the han-
dler had trouble trying to calm him. The dog's behavior made
the troops nervous, but they decided not to fire illumination
rounds. It rained off and on during the night, and several para-
troopers thought they heard voices around them. At first light,
the platoon sergeant made his rounds of the position through
the dense morning fog that had rolled over the hill. The dog
began to growl and the sergeant ordered some of his men to
check beyond their lines. At this instant a trip flare went off,
and the Viet Cong surged out of the jungle. They were wearing
red bandanas and fresh uniforms, firing assault rifles and heav-
ing grenades as they charged. They tried to rush the machine-
gun position but were cut down. Then more VC began attacking
the entire position. The forward observer called for artillery, but
South Vietnamese howitzers were in support and could not fol-
low his directions to adjust their round impacts. Throughout the
battle, the ARVN artillery fell off in the distance. The observer
was killed still trying to shift fire. Although there were three
radios in the platoon, no one ever bothered trying to regain
communications contact.
As the attack continued, the paratroopers began to run out
of ammunition. One of the machine guns ran out completely,
and the other was hit by a B-40 rocket. The platoon sergeant
ordered a retreat to the north. He was gunned down as he tried
to muster the men. Another staff sergeant took over as grenades
and automatic weapons fire laced the thick tropical vegetation
with shrapnel and bullets. In the meantime the battalion com-
mander had been alerted to the action by the artillery liaison
section, and scrambled into a helicopter to locate them and de-
termine a landing zone site for reinforcement. It was now twenty
minutes since the action had started and all communications with
the HAWK platoon had been lost.
One half of the position was overrun, and the new platoon
sergeant retreated down the ridge to the stream with the rest.
328 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
Only thirteen wounded men and the dog were left alive, and
as they withdrew, the Viet Cong stopped their attack and broke
contact. One of the wounded was unable to keep up and was
left on the trail. Since the VC were not following, the Ameri-
cans later found him still alive where he had collapsed.
The battalion commander spotted the platoon remnants from
the air when they began pitching smoke grenades, and imme-
diately landed. He wanted to counterattack at once, but every-
one was out of ammunition. He agreed to use the helicopter
instead to lift out the seriously wounded. At eight o'clock that
morning Company C was landed and moved back to the over-
run American positions. They found most of the dead still in
their foxholes. The rucksacks had all been quickly ransacked,
but many valuable items had been left. Both machine guns and
their crews were found where they had been close assaulted.
One machine gun was covered with spent brass and had clearly
gone out of ammunition. The other one still had 150 rounds left
to fire.
Numerous searches of the area by the battalion over the next
several days failed to locate any Viet Cong, although they un-
covered some grave sites and a camp area with hot coals still
glowing. It had been a hard lesson in the unsoundness of mixing
conventional tactics with ambush practice. The ambush derived
its security from secrecy, whereas the defensive position derived
its security from strength and defensibility. By attempting to
combine the two, the platoon leader had sacrificed the security
afforded by either. In appropriate ceremonies, the dog was later
awarded the Purple Heart for wounds received in action.
The Army was also sending patrols into the rice fields near
Saigon. The 1st Battalion of the 2d Infantry was one of the Ar-
my's oldest and proudest formations and, by March of 1969, was
considered an old timer by Vietnam standards having arrived
in October 1965, with the "Big Red One" 1st Infantry Division. 2
However, the 1st Infantry Division was in its last year of Viet-
2. The 2d Infantry originated in Pennsylvania in 1808, fought in both the
War of 1812 and the Mexican War, garrisoned in California in the 1850s,
battled from Bull Run to Petersburg in the Civil War, engaged Indians rang-
ing from Seminoles to Nez Perces, fought in Cuba during the Spanish Amer-
ican War, in the Philippine Insurrection, and during World War II, when it
occupied Iceland and then fought from Normandy to Czechoslovakia.
WAii IN 1HK SOUTHERN PROVINCES 329
nam service and, like most Army formations of that year, was
war-weary. The draftees in its ranks were already calling it the
"Big Dead One." The commander of its 3d Platoon of Company
D was an experienced and dependable first lieutenant who had
served a previous Vietnam tour as a staff sergeant in the 1st
Cavalry Division. When his outfit was selected to pull night am-
bush duty in the Delta countryside outside the capital, nothing
unusual was expected.
The platoon helicoptered in and began a grueling march, ag-
gravated by bizarre tides and tropical riverbanks, toward the se-
lected area, the junction of four streams in unknown territory.
This trek through knee-deep and waist-deep mud was so diffi-
cult that a rubber boat was flown to the twenty-nine men. The
soldiers finally reached the site that evening and chose a pinch
of land jutting out into the Rach Giong tributary which was cov-
ered with scrub and dominated by a lone tree. The lieutenant
and his platoon sergeant, a national guardsman, took three ra-
diomen and a medic and planted themselves under the tree.
Surrounded by rice paddies and painfully aware of being in the
middle of "Viet Cong country," the men settled into a tight egg-
shaped ring of six fighting positions. Tired as they were, some
soldiers nervously tried to differentiate between the sounds of
lapping water and possible human movement along the water's
edge. There, under a full moon, the platoon passed a restless
but uneventful night.
Early in the morning a Landing Craft, Mechanized (LCM),
picked up the platoon and ferried it over to the rest of Company
D. 3 The recombined company patrolled until noon, when it split
up again. Directed back to its night ambush spot, the platoon
sloshed across the river at low tide and spent the afternoon pa-
trolling near a sandy graveyard behind its old positions. Several
soldiers excitedly dug up graves and stuffed bones into their
packs, an act which infuriated their officer. He ordered the graves
covered up and, with several hours of daylight left, ordered the
men into their previous area. During this time someone found
a Sony transistor radio, tuned to a Vietnamese station, dangling
from a bush.
3. The LCM were used widely by the Army for lighterage and inland water-
way traffic. The Army had approximately 150 of these 113-ton aluminum ves-
sels in Vietnam at the time.
330 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
One of the platoon's radiomen, a Specialist Fourth Class,
mentioned the tree as they hunkered back down beside it. As
was standard practice on ambush, no one dug in, but rather
crouched or lay behind shrubs. "Well, you're right," the lieu-
tenant replied. "It's sort of an aiming stake." But no one moved.
Due to tidal conditions, protective claymore mines were only
placed facing one direction, across the stream. The two machine
guns were sited as before, with one covering the water and the
other right next to the command post at the base of the tree.
The exhausted men relaxed in their compact grouping. The last
perimeter check the lieutenant made was a half hour before
midnight, and he found several soldiers sleeping on guard.
The Viet Cong had carefully surveyed the vicinity during the
platoon's absence, and now took advantage of tall grass and bushes
for their approach early in the morning of March 9. They also
found the singular tree a most convenient reference point, and
signaled the attack by slamming a rocket-propelled grenade into
it. Hand grenades and automatic rifle fire ripped through the
American positions at close range.
"What was that?" the radio specialist on watch exclaimed as
the first round exploded against the tree trunk. Dazed, he blurted
out again, "What was that?" By now the firing was intense and
the lieutenant scrambled past him, telling him to get away from
the tree. The specialist could rot get to his radio; it was being
peppered by enemy bullets. He then noticed that everyone in
the command post was either dead or wounded.
The sergeant in charge of rear security was a "shake 'n' bake,"
like all the squad leaders in the platoon. 4 The blasts of several
explosions jarred him awake, and he yelled to return fire. His
seven-man squad blazed away with their M16 rifles and M79
grenade launchers, but no one actually saw any Viet Cong. The
intensity of the action lasted only ten minutes. It was later ob-
vious to him that the Viet Cong had preselected their targets
and had come up so quickly and quietly that the platoon never
stood a chance.
The platoon leader awoke to the deafening explosion in the
tree, which showered fragments through men and vegetation.
4. "Shake 'n' Bake" was the term popularly describing a sergeant who earned
his rank quickly through noncommissioned officer schools or other means with
little time overall in the service.
ONE WAR IN THE SOUTHERN PROVINCES 331
Several grenades sailed into the position, and the platoon ser-
geant lunged to hurl one back as it spun around on the ground.
Still trying to regain his senses, the lieutentant stumbled over
to the rear security squad sergeant, whom he noticed was re-
turning fire. He checked another squad next, but most of the
men were seriously wounded, including the platoon's Kit Car-
son scout. Both machine guns were out, and this surprised him,
since these were manned by particularly good soldiers with over
six months of combat experience behind them.
Then he heard a loud "No, don't!" from the direction of one
of the silenced machine gun positions. Hollering at the top of
his voice, the lieutenant dove forward and was hit immediately.
For fear of hitting possible American survivors, he did not re-
turn fire. The Viet Cong had gone forward to finish off the crew
before slipping away with the captured weapon. After being hit
a second time, he retreated back to a radio and called for heli-
copter gunships which were overhead in minutes. A later count
showed nine M16 rifles also missing.
The attack had lasted only fifteen minutes. The Viet Cong
melted away with the approach of rocket-firing, fire-spitting sup-
port helicopters. Nine U.S. soldiers lay dead and eleven were
wounded, and medical evacuation aircraft worked the next two
hours taking them out. The 3d Platoon of Company D was shat-
tered as a combat-effective organization, and the 2d Infantry's
1st Battalion had suffered a sharp reverse. No casualties had
been inflicted on the Viet Cong, who were credited with pulling
off another classic raid on an ambush position.
When the action was analyzed by Army staff, the lessons
were only too clear: the selection of the same site two nights
in a row with plenty of opportunity for VC observation in the
interval, a command post situated under an obvious point of
reference, the bunching of positions exposed to concentrated fire.
The real problem was much more ominous the same mistakes
and complacency indicative of untried troops were being made
late in the war by experienced officers and men of good, solid
American units. Although realistic Vietnam-oriented stateside
training had fused with rigorous in-country unit combat courses
to produce efficient jungle soldiers by 1969, field performance
was being hampered by lowered morale, lack of motivation, and
poor leadership.
PART 6
197O-1973
N^ Con Thien
DMZ
Tchepone
iong Ha
Quang Tri
Tan My
Hue
Phu Bai
Chu Lai
KEY TO OPERATIONS
1 - TOAN THANG #43
2 - TOAN THANG #44
3-BINHTAY I
4 - DEWEY CANYON II
5 - LAM SON 719
6 - TEXAS STAR
7 -JEFFERSON GLENN
Snoul
Route 7 /J t ' Bu Dop
An Loc
scale
Saigon
Map by Shelby L Stanton
South Vietnam - 1970-1973
CHAPTER 21.
A CHANGING WAR
1. Cross Border Attack
The year 1970 was marked by the headlong rush to get the South
Vietnamese Army into big actions, and the American formations
out of the country. Even with U.S. forces withdrawing as rap-
idly as possible, the actual flow of the war expanded as major
offensives were flung into Cambodia and planned for Laos. United
States military goals in Vietnam for 1970 were fixed in sharp
contrast to those set out in 1965. The top objective, Vietnam-
ization of the war, was seconded by a duty to lower the number
of U.S. casualties. Third in importance was the continued with-
drawal of forces on schedule, while at the bottom were Amer-
ican combat operations. These were only conducted if designed
to "stimulate a negotiated settlement." There was no more men-
tion of military victory. The first two goals were actually inter-
twined since the casualty rate dropped as the Army became less
active due to Vietnamization. The year was to be highlighted
by the combined American- South Vietnamese cross-border op-
erations into Cambodia, but characterized elsewhere by de-
creased and smaller contacts with the NVA/VC.
MACV still possessed a powerful striking force of 330,648
Army soldiers and 55,039 Marines in Vietnam as 1970 began.
These were concentrated in eighty-one Army infantry and tank
battalions. However, many of these were either preparing to
leave the country or expected to in the near future. As a result
335
336 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
many units were not actually available for combat during a great
part of the year. 1
By the spring, MACV had several U.S. divisions poised in
short range of the Cambodian border, which had been drilling
their counterpart ARVN formations in combined offensive ma-
neuvers for over a year. With the exception of the 1st Cavalry
Division, these American formations were already programmed
to depart Vietnam. The allied command felt ARVN line units
were now capable of sustained operations and was willing to put
Vietnamization to the crucial test of open battle against the North
Vietnamese Army on its own ground.
Several large NVA/VC divisional base areas and support de-
pots were located across the flat expanses of the Cambodian
frontier within equally short striking distance of Saigon. They
had been used as immune staging and supply points for NVA
and VC activity in the south for years, and continued to pose
a dangerous threat to South Vietnam's security. Intelligence re-
ports verified recent stockpiling, and it was obvious North Viet-
nam anticipated renewed employment of these strategic locales
in future invasions after American military departure.
MACV believed that a massive joint U.S. -ARVN "spoiling
attack" would destroy the bases, gain maximum utilization of
American combat assets prior to redeployment, and put Viet-
namization to the ultimate test of battle. The American units
were envisioned as cracking the tough early-on resistance, mak-
ing the big depot finds, and providing the necessary support the
ARVN forces would initially need. The large South Vietnamese
formations that participated in the cross-border assault would be
able to savor victory on a grand scale, since the Americans
including advisors were only going in nineteen miles (thirty
kilometers), on a limited time schedule. The ARVN forces would
1. Major U.S. forces in Vietnam in January of 1970 were the 1st Marine, 1st
Cavalry (Airmobile), 101st Airborne (Airmobile), 1st, 4th, 23d (Americal), and
25th Infantry Divisions; 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized), and
3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division; llth Armored Cavalry Regiment; 173d Air-
borne and 199th Infantry Brigades; 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne); 1st
Battalion of the 50th Infantry (Mechanized); 1st and 2d Squadrons of the 1st
Cavalry, and 3d Squadron of the 5th Cavalry.
A CHANGING WAR 337
stay and continue to operate as long as required to accomplish
the mission.
The primary goal of the Cambodian venture was the eradi-
cation of the sanctuaries and destruction of the NVA/VC regular
forces defending them. This would free much of South Vietnam
from future military danger once the U.S. combat forces had
left. Additionally, it had the potential of favorably demonstrating
the South Vietnamese Army's ability to challenge even the most
critical NVA strongholds. The resulting favorable psychological
impact promised great rewards in cementing a new foundation
of pride and accomplishment for the South Vietnamese Army.
As a collateral bonus, American units would have a tangible ob-
jective which would invigorate morale and a sense of mission.
Time was of the essence. The Cambodian border region was
a low area, and its grassy fields and rice paddies were subject
to swift inundation by monsoon rains. At the beginning of April
the scattered, majestic palm trees lining the paddy dikes were
starting to bake under the tropical sun. The large NVA head-
quarters, rest areas, and supply centers were nestled into the
jungles, light, leafy forests, and brackish swamps. Mobile op-
erations capable of reaching them could only be conducted in
the dry period during April and May.
The South Vietnamese kicked off a preliminary three-day of-
fensive in mid-April against the Angel's Wing. On April 29, sev-
eral ARVN battalions went into the Parrot's Beak, the tip of the
Cambodian land protrusion, located only thirty-five miles from
the capital. The results were reminiscent of the frustrating
searches through the old Vietnamese lettered war zones, and
the NVA proved elusive and cagey. MACV consoled itself with
the belief that the large number of overflights and reconnais-
sance missions, which had preceded the drive, had tipped them
off to allied intentions. However, it also served fiotice that the
Cambodian border was no longer inviolable to conventional at-
tack, and the North Vietnamese were quick to pack up in the
face of potentially overwhelming offensives.
At daybreak on May 1, 1970, heavy artillery boomed across
the Cambodian border as the last bomb from six B-52 bombing
runs crashed into the earth. Then the tanks and armored per-
338 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
sonnel carriers of Maj. Gen. Elvy B. Roberts's 1st Cavalry Di-
vision (Airmobile), clanked onto Cambodian soil. Task Force
Shoemaker s Operation TOAN THANG #43 had as its objective
nothing less than the field command headquarters for all com-
munist activities in South Vietnam. 2
Overhead the sky was filled with scout helicopters of the 1st
Squadron, 9th Cavalry, buzzing over the patches of jungle and
rolling landscape. First blood was drawn once they had spotted
and destroyed several vehicles below. To the west, fighter-
bombers zoomed through plumes of smoke drifting over the grassy
plains. An armada of troop helicopters was already ferrying South
Vietnamese paratroopers and American cavalrymen of the line
battalions inland to pop ahead of the racing armor. Their land-
ing zones were blasted out by colossal, earth-shattering Com-
mando Vault fifteen-thousand-pound bombs. The troops landed
and consolidated their positions. All along the front the only
resistance was scattered rifle and desultory automatic weapons
fire.
The initial impression that Operation TOAN THANG #43
would bring the NVA into open battle soon gave way to the
realization that the North Vietnamese were evading again. Large
groups of fleeing North Vietnamese troops were spotted by aer-
ial observers throughout the day, and Cobra gunships raced to
rocket and strafe them. However, they were already too far ahead
to be caught by the allied infantry. The expectations of crushing
battlefield victories vaporized as the long-awaited Cambodian in-
cursion became a matter of seizing and destroying massive aban-
doned supply dumps. The sizes of the depots being uncovered
were beyond belief. One depot complex contained so many mil-
itary stores and foodstuffs that it was promptly dubbed the City.
The large storage areas were packed with incredible amounts of
2. Participating forces in Operation TOAN THANG (Total Victory) #43 were
the llth Armored Cavalry (Regiment) and 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division
reinforced by the 2d Battalion, 34th Armor (25th Infantry Division), and 2d
Battalion, 47th Infantry (9th Infantry Division). The 1st ARVN Armored Cav-
alry and 3d Brigade, 1st ARVN Airborne Division, composed the South Viet-
namese portion of the operation. The task force was named after its com-
mander, Brig. Gen. Robert H. Shoemaker, who was the deputy commander
of the 1st Cavalry Division.
A CHANGING WAR 339
new supplies and cargo trucks, neatly arranged and obviously
abandoned in a hurry.
Major General Roberts's 1st Cavalry Division had reinforced
its commitment to the operation with another brigade, and had
thirteen tank and infantry battalions rolling across Cambodia
within a week. Col. Donn A. Starry's llth Armored Cavalry
passed through the ARVN lines and attacked straight up Route
7. The tanks and armored personnel carriers raced past a string
of rubber plantations at speeds up to forty miles an hour. In
the mechanized trek they bridged three unfordable streams, the
last after Colonel Starry found a suitable vehicle-launched bridg-
ing site by personal reconnaissance. The 2d Squadron smashed
into the grubby town of Snoul on May 5 and came under .51-
caliber antiaircraft and rocket-propelled grenade fire on the local
airstrip. The 3d Squadron joined the battle against the flak po-
sitions, which were soon captured after a spectacular battle marred
only by the accidental rocketing of forward armored cavalry ele-
ments by a Cobra gunship.
Maj. Gen. Edward Bautz Jr/s 25th Infantry Division ad-
vanced its 2d Brigade over the border on May 9 against frag-
mentary opposition. North Vietnamese rocket and mortar at-
tacks, accompanied by some ground probing, were launched in
greater intensity against night defensive bases about a week later.
The NVA had regrouped, but overall action remained low be-
cause U.S. forces were not going farther than nineteen miles
beyond the Vietnamese border. The captured stocks were in-
ventoried and carried out or destroyed, and by June 30 the op-
eration was over. Although finds had been significant, the major
communist headquarters had not been neutralized.
The 25th Infantry Division prepared to cross its 1st Brigade
into Cambodia on May 6 under Operation TOAN THANG #44.
Tactical air power pummeled the border regions, and huge Air
Force Commando Vault bombs were again used to blast out hel-
icopter landing zones in the dense jungle. Two battalions were
air-assaulted, one into the heart of the base area and one just
across the shoreline boundary of the Rach Beng Go River. A
float bridge was quickly thrown across and the 2d Battalion, 22d
Infantry, roared into Cambodia the next day. Helicopters of the
3d Squadron, 17th Cavalry, were busy gunning down the re-
340 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
treating NVA soldiers as the division advanced west. The only
ground action consisted of brief but violent skirmishes between
small groups of fast-moving riflemen, and the operation was ter-
minated on May 14.
On May 6, the 1st Cavalry Division leaped into Cambodia
on its second thrust by air-assaulting two battalions northeast
of Bu Dop. Another huge depot was uncovered, and engineers
had to build an overland road so the materials could be hauled
out. It took nine days to empty and contaminate this supply
area, which was nicknamed Rock Island East. Fire Support Base
Brown was attacked May 12. It was defended by the 5th Bat-
talion, 12th Infantry (199th Infantry Brigade), which repelled the
determined ground assault, suffering only one fatality. The cav-
alry division had sent every battalion into the front by the first
week in June, and supplies were still being found faster than
troops could be provided to eliminate them. Another fire sup-
port base was hit by a ground attack in the second week of
June. Rocket and mortar bombardments of American positions
became general, and on June 20, the 1st Cavalry Division began
pulling out.
On May 6, Operation BINH TAY (Tame the West) I, car-
ried out by Maj. Gen. Glenn D. Walker's 4th Infantry Division,
reinforced with the 40th ARVN Regiment, marked the third
MACV wave of Cambodian assaults. Six devastating B-52 bomb-
ing runs preceded the thrust, but the 3d Battalion, 506th In-
fantry (attached to the division), was driven away from its in-
tended initial landing zone by heavy fire. Other units of the 4th
Infantry Division also met fierce receptions at their opening
landing zones and were forced to retire. The 3d Battalion of the
8th Infantry ran into trouble after it had put only sixty men on
the ground. One helicopter was shot down and two more dam-
aged before the landing could be completed.
In the face of more hot LZs, the division either landed at
alternative sites or simply postponed the insertions. Once on
the ground there was only one significant firefight, and the sol-
diers searched out numerous caches. However, after only ten
days the Americans bailed out and left the South Vietnamese to
continue the operation on their own. There had been a noted
lack of divisional aggressiveness in following through with air-
A CHANGING WAR 341
mobile assaults if opposed by any ground fire. While the divi-
sion was under the usual MACV restraints on avoiding U.S.
losses, the "Funky Fourth" seemed to be suffering from almost
total combat paralysis.
All American units were out of Cambodia by June 29, 1970,
although several South Vietnamese operations continued. The
operation had been militarily successful despite the fact that NVA/
VC main force units simply eluded the advancing allies. Large
amounts of war booty had been captured or destroyed, buying
as much as a year in South Vietnam's survival. Vietnamization
was enhanced, but not to the degree that would have been
achieved by a solid combat victory. Behind the facade of re-
newed South Vietnamese military confidence and morale were
laid the seeds of South Vietnam's ultimate defeat. Most South
Vietnamese units performed in a timid and cautious manner,
and overall command and control was still lacking. Much of this
lack of ardor could be attributed to its being a new army still
unsure of itself on the battlefield. Victory was still directly
premised on the ready availability of an umbrella of American
air power, something that the ARVN forces would not have in
the spring of 1975.
Vietnamization was still proceeding at a rate so rapid that
the problems manifested during the Cambodian incursion were
virtually ignored. Such deliberate disregard of lessons learned
would invite disaster during the following year's Laotian incur-
sion. This crash program to mold the South Vietnamese military
overnight into an image of the self-sufficient, highly technical
U.S. armed forces was doomed to failure. While MACV insisted
on complex units in the ARVN inventory, such as long lines
signal battalions, South Vietnamese field units were still expe-
riencing difficulties in basic artillery support coordination.
The Cambodian campaign gave the American Army a wel-
come relief from routine operations and put a capstone on the
service of several units scheduled for pending departure from
Vietnam. While American aviation and armor played a vital and
aggressive role, many infantry companies avoided combat and
were hesitant in moving out to new locations. This was the last
combat operation for many participating American units, and there
was a considerable effort to minimize losses. Ironically, Maj. Gen.
342 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
George W. Casey, who had taken over the 1st Cavalry Division
on May 12, was flying on July 7 to visit wounded soldiers when
his helicopter crashed, killing all aboard.
2. War at Large
While Cambodia grabbed the headlines, the northern five
provinces of the country situated underneath the Demilitarized
Zone in Military Region 1 were considered the most dangerous
and contained the largest numbers of American troops. 3 On March
9, 1970, the III Marine Amphibious Force was subordinated to
the XXIV Corps, since the twenty-five Army maneuver battal-
ions in the region outnumbered the nine remaining Marine bat-
talions. Maj. Gen. Edwin B. Wheeler's 1st Marine Division
guarded the greater Da Nang area. During the summer the di-
vision lashed out again at the Que Son Valley, silencing it until
Marine departure from Vietnam.
While combat continued to decrease through 1970, there were
still many violent actions in the region, but they mostly in-
volved South Vietnamese units, The North Vietnamese Army
tenaciously defended its mountain fortresses and waged battles
throughout the lowlands. Rocket and mortar attacks against cit-
ies and isolated fire support bases were common. Fierce fighting
flared against an American unit on April 3 when the 1st Brigade
of the 5th Infantry Division was hit in defensive positions south-
west of Con Thien. The attacks were repulsed with air support.
The next morning the night defensive position of the 3d Squad-
ron, 5th Cavalry, near Cam Lo was hit by rocket-propelled gre-
nades and automatic weapons fire. The firefight lasted nearly
three hours before the NVA broke off the action. A Sheridan
tank and two armored personnel carriers were destroyed, and
several other vehicles were damaged.
The Americal Division was engaged in security operations in
Quang Ngai Province, and was taking a frustrating number of
losses from booby traps and mines, including 250-pound bombs
rigged as antitank mines. Just after Maj. Gen. Albert E. Milloy
took over the division on March 22, one of the nastier surprise
3. On July 2, 1970, the I-IV Corps Tactical Zones were redesignated Military
Regions 1-4.
A CHANGING WAR 343
traps was set off. On the afternoon of April 15, a soldier from
the 4th Battalion, 3d Infantry, tripped a 105mm artillery shell
converted into a booby trap just south of Due Pho. The re-
sulting explosion caused two 81mm mortar rounds to explode,
which in turn caused claymore mines in some of the soldiers'
packs to detonate, killing fourteen and wounding another thirty-
two.
American military strategy in Vietnam by 1970 hinged on
fire support bases, which were self-contained islands of artillery
firepower located on critical terrain features. Army units became
so reliant on their security that they ceased to operate at any
great distance from such artificial fortress islands, a condition
dubbed "fire base psychosis." Army mobility and operational
flexibility were generally lost as a result.
The fire bases were deceptively efficient. They not only
backed up infantry operations but served as ideal observation
posts, and were often deliberately set up in remote areas to
command approach routes or likely avenues of infiltration. They
relied completely on helicopters for their construction, suste-
nance, and evacuation. Fire support bases were often set up,
occupied for a while, and then left. Departure from a fire base
was commonly dictated by weather conditions, requirements for
resources elsewhere, or NVA activity that exerted more pres-
sure than the fire base was worth. Fire bases closed down were
often reopened at later dates, especially if their closures had
been determined by monsoon cycles. In some cases they were
built with only future occupancy in mind and called Howard
Johnsons by the troops. Mobile area warfare required a fluid,
flexible system of interlocking fire bases that could be set up or
left as circumstances warranted.
Once the site for the future fire support base had been cho-
sen and planned out, the combat engineer party was the first
to be inserted. These rugged teams contained six to ten men
armed with power saws, demolitions, and other tools. If a hel-
icopter could not set them down, they rappelled in or used rope
ladders. In most cases an infantry platoon was assigned as pro-
tection. As the force touched down the foot soldiers moved into
covering positions, and the engineers fanned out to cut defen-
sive fields of fire and blast out foxholes. Immediately afterwards
344 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
they would clear a rough landing zone and crater the gun pit
areas with explosives to ease future dozer work. Next a Flying
Crane helicopter would bring in a mini-dozer, and a Chinook
followed, carrying the dozer blade and a drum of diesel fuel.
The sweating engineers and infantry would manhandle the blade
onto the dozer, which then began clearing the hilltop of debris
and carving out the first gun pit. Meanwhile, a combined mini-
scooploader/backhoe was helicoptered in to start construction of
the earthen ammo berms.
Waiting helicopters were radioed in once the gun pits were
dug. The aircraft brought in the first cannoneers with their shells,
artillery pieces, and fire direction equipment. The howitzers were
set up and often ready to fire within five hours after the assault
engineers had first arrived. As the howitzers were emplaced,
the mini-dozer and scooploader were busy improving the land-
ing zone, constructing bunkers, and digging trench networks.
Soldiers and engineers joined together to string wire and set out
mines. Soldiers stationed at a fire base were always toiling at
the never-ending job of upgrading the habitability and defensive
protection of their fortifications.
Fire Support Base Ripcord was built in April 1970 by the
101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) about twenty-five miles west
of Hue in Thua Thien Province. It was a key forward artillery
base in the division's summer offensive plans against the A Shau
Valley. Like most fire bases, Ripcord was built as part of a net-
work of individually isolated posts which garnered mutual pro-
tection because they were within artillery range of each other.
On March 13, after delays due to foul weather, Company A of
the 2d Battalion, 506th Infantry, air-assaulted onto the future
Ripcord hill. As soon as the unit landed, it was struck with in-
tense mortar, automatic weapons, and recoilless rifle fire. The
company evacuated the hillsite two days later. On April 1, after
another period of bad weather Company B of the same unit air-
assaulted onto the hill and was greeted with the same hostile
reception. It moved off the hilltop and rejoined the battalion,
which was operating close by.
The 506th Infantry's 2d Battalion teamed up with the 1st
ARVN Regiment to sweep the vicinity around Fire Support Base
Ripcord for the next week. Then Company C went to the top
A CHANGING WAR 345
of the hill on April 11. On the same day engineers and the
battalion command post were helicoptered in. For five days rain
and clouds prevented helicopters from delivering the artillery.
After the guns were brought to the hill, the battalion con-
structed a fire support base. They worked unmolested until July
1, when daily mortaring and rockets began to bombard them.
By that time the positions were solid and impervious to all but
the heaviest artillery.
That day the base received a light peppering by mortars,
but the next day a nearby night defensive position of the bat-
talion was hit hard by elements of the 803d NVA Regiment, which
used assault rifles, rocket propelled grenades, and satchel charges.
It was a bitter firefight with high losses to both sides. Increased
barrages and ground movements quickly disclosed North Viet-
namese interest in knocking the base out. Fire Support Base
Ripcord became the center of attention in Military Region 1
during July.
On July 18, a Chinook helicopter carrying a sling load of
howitzer ammunition was shot down by antiaircraft fire while
approaching the base. It crashed into the ammunition storage
area, triggering an inferno which touched off a series of awe-
some explosions. Six 105mm howitzers of the 2d Battalion, 319th
Artillery, were destroyed and thousands of shells went off. Two
recoilless rifles and the counter-mortar radar were lost as well.
In the meantime American patrols around the hill were taking
considerable losses in a number of sharp skirmishes. It was ob-
vious by July 22 that the NVA were all around Ripcord in force,
and another Khe Sanh-like siege was imminent.
Maj. Gen. John J. Hennessey, commanding the 101st Air-
borne Division (Airmobile), had no choice but to fold up the
fire base. Further defense of an artillery post set up to cover a
summer operation was foolish in view of the North Vietnamese
buildup. Area warfare doctrine called for extraction. During the
night of July 22-23, over 2,200 rounds of artillery pounded the
adjacent hills and valleys. Navy, Air Force, and Marine fighter-
bombers began flying seventy strikes commencing at daybreak
on July 23. Fourteen Chinook helicopters dashed in to begin
lifting out the 2d Battalion, 506th Infantry.
Everything went smoothly at first, but at 7:40 A.M. antiair-
346 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
craft fire scored against one of the helicopters. It crashed into
the fire base and began to burn and explode, preventing the
other helicopters from lifting out the rest of the artillery and
heavy equipment. The infantry was being slowly pulled out by
Huey helicopters. The heavy mortaring forced them to dart in
one at a time to pick up the soldiers. The Ripcord extraction
claimed four more Chinooks, shot up so badly they had to be
scrapped, and another four were heavily damaged. Fire Support
Base Ripcord was left abandoned to the North Vietnamese at
2:07 P.M., July 23, 1970,
Just northwest of Fire Support Base Ripcord was Fire Sup-
port Base O'Reilly, which was on top of a critical mountain in
Thua Thien Province eleven miles west of Hue. Beginning on
August 6, 1970, NVA rockets and mortars increased the tempo
of their attacks on O'Reilly, and by September 13 the fire base
had sustained ninety-two barrages. The hilltop resembled a
moonscape. Since this was the area of operations of the 1st ARVN
Regiment, it had a battalion guarding the American howitzers.
The North Vietnamese attacked uphill on September 9 on a
probing mission. Four days later another assault was launched.
At this time a tactical emergency was declared, and 137 tac-
tical air missions were flown to pulverize the area around it.
Nineteen B-52 bombing missions were flown to pound the North
Vietnamese further off. Soon four battalions of South Vietnam-
ese infantry were flown in to the hilltop, but bad weather com-
menced on September 15. Dense clouds and thunderstorms could
easily cut off the fire support base, and already a number of
nearby fire bases were being closed down due to the monsoon
storms. Fire Support Base O'Reilly was abandoned accordingly
on October 7, 1970. Typhoons Kate and Louise wreaked havoc
in the latter part of the year, and heavy monsoon rains curtailed
activities throughout Military Region 1 during the last two months
of the year.
3. An Army in Transition
Withdrawal during 1970 accelerated at a dizzying speed, tak-
ing out formations that had served so long in Vietnam that they
seemed an indelible part of that tropical landscape. Now at last
they were coming home. The "Big Red One" 1st Infantry Di-
A CHANGING WAR 347
vision left the 5th ARVN Division in charge of its territory north
of Saigon and went back to Fort Riley, Kansas. There it swapped
pennants with the 24th Infantry Division to fill up again with
new soldiers, draftees who would probably never see combat.
The shadow of the "Ivy" 4th Infantry Divison never fell again
over the woods it had left in Washington state. It turned over
the Central Highlands to the 22d ARVN Division, and by De-
cember had assumed a new posting near the foot of the Rockies
at Fort Carson, Colorado.
The "Tropic Lightning" 25th Infantry Division gave its Cam-
bodian border sector to the 25th ARVN Division and went back
to its halcyon Hawaiian station. There Schofield Barracks pa-
tiently waited for its return from the latest of three overseas
wars. The 199th Infantry Brigade, formed in the dust and heat
of the big Vietnam buildup, reappeared at Fort Benning, Geor-
gia, like a denizen. Its flag was folded up and its combat jour-
nals, faded with the sun and mildew of a thousand days of pa-
trolling the rice paddies around Saigon, were sent to the
underground records vaults at Suitland, Maryland.
The last brigade of the 9th Infantry Division returned and
passed into temporary oblivion. Later the Army would reraise
the 9th at Fort Lewis, Washington, but time had molded a new
Army filled with volunteer men and women on the leading edge
of modern warfare concepts. The 9th would become an ad-
vanced test bed as the first Army High Technology Light Di-
vision. Its Vietnam days of riverine combat and sniper teams
seemed as ancient as the Union riverine expeditions of the
Cumberland River during the Civil War. The 7th and 26th Ma-
rine Regimental Landing Teams also came home in 1970, the
latter to be scrubbed and the former to assume a new role in
national defense. It relocated to Panama in mid-1972 as the first
Marine regiment outside the United States in the post-Vietnam
era.
For those units that remained, the war was typified by pro-
tective security and static defensive missions as levels of combat
throughout the country dropped off and more South Vietnamese
units assumed offensive field operations. These military tasks in-
cluded guarding installations, towns, and roads. However, many
troop units were still actively engaged in high-intensity combat
348 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
sweeps and mobile reconnaissance efforts to detect NVA/VC forces
before they could reach such areas. Infantry and tank forces were
backed up by an array of artillery, tactical airpower, and massed
B-52 bombing raids which could deliver overwhelming concen-
trations of firepower on any threatened battlefield.
The American Army of 1970 in Vietnam was unraveling like
the war around it, and morale and discipline were steadily de-
teriorating. With the loss of offensive combat missions, units were
withdrawn into enclaves on the coast or into populated areas
where they began processing for return to the United States.
Boredom and corruption manifested themselves in increased crime
rates, drug use, and racial tension. The Army tried to ease
problems with a more tolerant attitude toward troop concerns.
The previous seven-day rest and recreation (R & R) vacations
to selected Oriental and Australian cities, permitted once during
a combat tour, were extended to two weeks and included visits
to the United States.
The front-line soldiers of the 1970 Army in Vietnam were
still tough, young, and lean. The Army did not experience
breakdowns in unit cohesion until the final withdrawal period
of 1971-72. The Cambodian incursion, as predicted, gave a re-
newed sense of purpose to the soldiers. There they could be
seen advancing with M60 machine guns strapped over their
shoulders to hang at hip-level, their jungle fatigue shirts open
in the sweltering heat to expose fashionable peace beads or re-
ligious chains dangling across chests caked in dust and polished
with sweat, with cut-down "bush hats" crunched over long hair
that was tolerated as a front-line privilege. Line units were com-
posed of men in excellent fighting trim, who exhibited great
courage, resourcefulness, and dedication. Their insular unit
scoffing (Electric Strawberry instead of Tropic Lightning, or
Puking Buzzards instead of Screaming Eagles) turned to fierce
fraternal pride when they were confronted by outsiders. Since
Vietnam was a "frontless" area war, many soldiers outside the
traditional combat branches shared the deep pride of battle-tested
loyalty, from truck drivers in the long-haul convoys to signalmen
on remote mountaintop relay sites. Perhaps some of the most
dangerous duty during the war was that performed by advisors,
combat engineers, and explosive ordnance disposal teams.
A CHANGING WAR 349
However, overall Army combat efficiency was continuing to
slip compared to its record of performance prior to 1969. Added
to the adverse impact generated by personnel discontinuity and
loss of battle experience as a result of the one-year tour limit,
was the ugly stain of combat disobedience. In the elite 1st Cav-
alry Division (Airmobile), a unit carefully nurtured by the 90th
Replacement Battalion to represent the better side of soldiering,
there had been thirty-five instances during 1970 of refusal to
fight. Some had involved entire units.
The ingredient necessary to check the Army's decline, good
leadership, was conspicuously absent. Senior officer attention was
on the latest buzzword: Vietnamization. During the years of troop
buildup and big battles, the prestige and promotions inherent
in American unit assignments had taken many good officers and
sergeants away from advisor duty. By 1970, however, the em-
phasis was back on the advisory role as the crucial instrument
of Vietnamization. Army advisors were being assigned in in-
creasing numbers to modernize all facets of the ARVN struc-
ture, from line battalions to logistical training schools. The
American Army was competing for the same leadership re-
sources, but coming in second behind the Army of the Republic
of Vietnam.
The site of the Viet Cong raid on the ambush position set out by the
1st Battalion, 2d Infantry, on March 9, 1969. (Author's Collection)
Aerial view of Phu Hoa Dong village which was cordoned off by the
1st Infantry Division during September 15-26, 1969, and discussed in
Chapter 20. (Authors Collection)
Armored Personnel Carriers from the llth Armored Cavalry push to-
ward Snoul inside Cambodia, spearheaded by M551 Sheridan recon-
naissance vehicles. (U.S. Army)
The llth Armored Cavalry Regiment rolls into Snoul against scattered
resistance on May 5, 1970. (U.S. Army)
fp^p**.. *<y.;;T^ /,! ', ^_;",_ . jt ..%!.'. \*ii*
Fire Support Base Ripcord, the beleaguered 101st Airborne Division
artillery base finally abandoned to the North Vietnamese Army on July
23, 1970. (Author's Collection)
'
Typical late-war fire support base of the 101st Airborne Division in
Military Region 1 of Vietnam's rugged interior. These came to rep-
resent the final static bastions of American combat presence in that
country. (Author's Collection)
S^iaP
Buddhist religious rites bless new 175mm guns before they are added
to the arsenal of the 1st ARVN Division on November 15, 1971. (Au-
thor's Collection)
United States Army instructors supervise basic training of South Viet-
namese Regional Force soldiers at Cat Lai. (U.S. Army)
CHAPTER 22.
AN ARMY DEPARTS THE
WAR
1. Into Laos
The destruction of the Cambodian dumps had already paid
handsome dividends in lowered NVA activity level throughout
Military Region 3, and MACV was now planning a Parthian shot
at an even bigger prize. In order to gain the most combat mile-
age from remaining American formations, a hasty plan was thrown
together using American aviation and artillery resources to bol-
ster a South Vietnamese drive into the Laotian panhandle be-
fore withdrawal made the U.S. supporting assets unavailable. A
staged series of attacks would bring a powerful combined force
to the Laotian border. From there the South Vietnamese would
drive across to destroy stockpiles of war materials being staged
in the Tchepone vicinity.
The chance for success seemed bright, and a swift blow to
NVA war stocks accumulated in Laos would also bring increased
combat experience and confidence to the South Vietnamese mil-
itary. Planners were optimistic that this thrust, like the Cam-
bodian incursion, would be lightly opposed. Since vehicles and
aircraft required dry season conditions, and American withdraw-
als would leave little left by next dry season, nothing could be
postponed. The rush impelled by impending American depar-
ture, coupled with the desire for secrecy, gave units extremely
350
AN ARMY DEPARTS THE WAR 351
short fuses for planning purposes. When the South Vietnamese
went onto Laotian soil, for the first time American advisors would
not be on the ground with them. Since the advisors were the
conduits of essential air support, Vietnamese military interpret-
ers were placed in each forward air control team and center.
The plan called for the Americans to open Route 9 to the
border. A South Vietnamese armored drive would then roll down
Route 9 toward Tchepone. Inside Laos, the dirt road followed
the east-west Xe Pon River through a narrow valley littered with
boulders and rocky outcroppings and hemmed in by high, jun-
gled mountains. The flanks of the road advance were to be cov-
ered by a number of airmobile, leapfrogging fire support bases
to be established by South Vietnamese paratroopers helicop-
tered on the north side, and airmobile infantry paralleling the
road to the south. An abundance of American airlift and aerial
fire support, as well as the reinforced 108th Artillery Group,
was made available. 1
While no specific mention was made of termination dates,
it was generally understood that the ARVN troops would scour
the area and clean out caches until the start of the rainy season
in early May. Tchepone was only an intermediate objective, be-
cause a further advance would be necessary to actually reach
the main North Vietnamese logistical complexes. Serious resis-
tance was not expected; if fighting was required, the terrain past
Tchepone meant pushing uphill through dense jungle and thorny
bamboo thickets against probable bunker lines.
The preliminary phase was the American Operation DEWEY
CANYON II, designed to make Route 9 passable for heavy traffic
all the way to the Laotian frontier. In the predawn darkness of
January 30, the mechanized 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division,
moved an armored cavalry-engineer task force down the road-
way toward Khe Sanh. A dozer led the column with its head-
1. The U.S. ground forces engaged in direct support of LAM SON 719 were
the 108th Artillery Group (four battalions); 45th Engineer Group (two bat-
talions); 101st Airborne Division with 3d Brigade reinforced with an engineer
task force, and 1st Brigade in reserve; 101st Aviation Group (six battalions);
1st Brigade of the 5th Infantry Division reinforced with two mechanized, one
cavalry, one tank, and one airmobile infantry battalions; and the llth Infantry
Brigade of the Americal Division with two infantry battalions.
352 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
lights on full beam. The column soon had large numbers of 14th
Engineer Battalion soldiers tearing out obstacles and toiling over
bridges and culverts. The brigade's infantry helicoptered into
the Khe Sanh area after daybreak, while armored personnel car-
riers of the 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry, raced up to reconnoiter
the border. By February 5, the road was secured behind them.
The engineers were also active hacking a secondary pioneer
road from mountainside cliffs paralleling Route 9, which was
nicknamed Red Devil Road. The brigade protected the tracked,
self-propelled long-range guns of the 108th Artillery Group, which
began moving toward their forward support sites. The 101st Air-
borne Division (Airmobile) launched a feint assault into the
dreaded A Shau Valley. The preliminary stage of the offensive
was going extremely well, and signs were bright for a splendid
confirmation of Vietnamization on the Laotian venture.
At 7:00 A.M. on a misting February 8, 1971, after a massive
artillery bombardment and eleven B-52 bombing missions, the
cross-border attack began. The South Vietnamese armor rum-
bled into Laos against light resistance, churning around the
ditches and craters in the roadbed. American helicopters ranged
the mountains destroying guns and vehicles. Helicopters of the
158th Aviation Battalion with paratroopers of the ARVN Air-
borne Division set down at their first landing zones, as the 223d
Aviation Battalion carried in a regiment of the 1st ARVN Div-
ision. Poor weather usually ruled out morning airlifts, but the
drive was only lightly opposed, casualties were few, and the
westward road march seized many of the initial objectives.
Air cavalry in the meantime was inflicting massive damage
on staging depots, weapons sites, and moving troop columns,
but the nature of the territory and weather impeded target de-
struction. The highly mobile and modern North Vietnamese an-
tiaircraft system was very active and was causing considerable
difficulties. Helicopter missions flew in the face of intensive air
defense fire which demanded that even single resupply helicop-
ters be escorted by armed gunships. Lt. Col. Robert F. Moli-
nellf s 2d Squadron of the 17th Cavalry was soon spotting so
many tanks that it was running out of ammunition before it could
strike them all. On February 18, his helicopters exploded two
AN ARMY DEPARTS THE WAR 353
giant petroleum pipelines, sending balls of flame shooting high
into the air.
Then the outer flanks of the advance started to come under
counterattack. The 39th ARVN Ranger Battalion was mauled in
a savage battle on February 19, and fire support bases were
subjected to heavy antiaircraft, artillery, and rocket fire. Tank-
supported North Vietnamese infantry stormed Fire Support Base
Delta in another violent attack on February 25, and all dreams
of easy conquest quickly faded. It was going to be a hard fight.
South Vietnamese morale was still high as the offensive contin-
ued to grind toward Tchepone, With ARVN troops grimly hang-
ing on to the outer fire bases, and combat sharply escalating, it
was decided to slam into Tchepone before momentum was lost.
On March 3, a battalion of the 1st ARVN Division was air-as-
saulted into a landing zone near Tchepone with the loss of eleven
helicopters shot down and forty-four more hit by ground fire.
Three days later the 2d ARVN Regiment airmobiled into the
ruined ghost town of Tchepone, but there was only sporadic
gunfire.
Good flying weather and further discoveries of several sup-
ply caches presented good reasons for the ARVN units to search
out the area, but they were ready to leave on March 7. The
determined North Vietnamese defense ruled out further ad-
vances toward the supply belt of the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Sus-
tained artillery barrages were already threatening the continued
existence of several fire support bases, and there were signs of
more NVA reserves massing to counterattack. Since Tchepone
had been reached, President Thieu could claim political victory.
One of the most difficult tactical maneuvers in war is orderly
withdrawal under heavy enemy pressure. This is the true mark
of a professional army, but the quickest undoing of an unfin-
ished one. Vietnamization had come too fast, with too little
foundation, ever to give the South Vietnamese military a chance
at executing an organized pullback under such perilous circum-
stances, The withdrawal became a disorderly retreat, and finally
collapsed into an uncontrolled rout. The fate of rear guards was
typified by the early experience of a 1st ARVN Infantry Regi-
ment battalion annihilated along the river while engaged in a
354 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
covering assignment. As spirits plunged, other units fought less
well, or simply ran away.
The March 19 ambush of an armored convoy on the road
set panic in motion. Tanks, engineer equipment, and artillery
howitzers were abandoned. Helicopter gunships were desper-
ately called in to destroy the vehicles before they fell into North
Vietnamese hands. The Vietnamese armor was too restricted by
terrain to maneuver adequately, and suffered the devastating
consequences. The next day U.S. fighter-bombers, B-52 stra-
tegic bombers, and helicopter gunships made thousands of sor-
ties into the skies to lend all possible support. One battalion of
the 2d ARVN Regiment was lifted out, but twenty-eight of the
forty helicopters were damaged in its extraction. Plans to lift out
another regimental battalion were aborted when the first heli-
copter was exploded making the approach.
The VNMC battalions were hanging on to several fire bases
by their fingernails, and only the heroics of Army helicopters of
the 14th Aviation Battalion kept them supplied with ammuni-
tion. Route 9 was now littered with abandoned vehicles, and
the fleeing armored force had to break jungle to get back into
Vietnam. The "elite" ARVN Airborne Division, the showpiece
of Vietnamization, performed so miserably that it not only lost
key fire bases, but utterly failed in its flank security mission on
the way out. The Vietnamese Marines abandoned several critical
areas after halfhearted resistance, and were unable to control
their elements. Panic seized several marines and paratroopers
defending bases to the rear, and Army helicopters became
mobbed.
Only the bold, decisive use of American air power enabled
the South Vietnamese forces to reach Tchepone and get back.
Helicopters provided cover overhead, resupplied ammunition,
and retrieved survivors by flying through a wall of flak. In the
process, ninety-two aircraft were lost and over six hundred dam-
aged. Twenty-five Commando Vault bombs were used to break
up NVA troop concentrations and to cut landing zones.
For the Saigon regime, the projected victory of LAM SON
719 turned out to be a sour defeat, exposing grave deficiencies
in planning, organization, leadership, motivation, and opera-
tional expertise. The absence of calm, reasoned leadership can-
AN ARMY DEPARTS THE WAR 355
celed the tactical proficiency and gallant service of some indi-
vidual ARVN units. Operation LAM SON 719 was a dismal failure
that boded poorly for future encounters with the able NVA light
infantry and tanks. Vietnamization had not brought the South
Vietnamese military to the point where it could safely challenge
NVA-defended base territory.
2. "Dynamic Defense"
The Laotian offensive of 1971, like the Cambodian incursion
of 1970, dominated the military history of the year. MACV con-
tained fifty-four American infantry and tank battalions when the
year started, but most of these would shortly stand down in an
exit posture. 2 Most of its 330,648 Army soldiers and 25,394 Ma-
rines would spend the year helping prepare their units for the
KEYSTONE series of redeployment operations. Only the unit
flags were being sent home in most cases; a lot of closeout pa-
perwork and equipment and property to be transferred to the
South Vietnamese remained.
Throughout 1971 there was little action inside South Viet-
nam as the withdrawal continued. Some hunting expeditions were
managed by the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) against NVA
forces in the rugged Vietnamese frontier regions, but the latter
remained too evasive for meaningful contact. The NVA units were
still suffering from the combined Cambodian-Laotian shocks and
making only a few highly selective rocket and mortar attacks.
In Military Region 3, American contacts with the NVA were
fleeting, except for encounters against bunker complexes, and it
was obvious the NVA was avoiding Americans as a matter of
policy.
MACV stretched remaining combat assets through the final
years of American redeployment by implementing another im-
portant strategic change. The area warfare concept of "tactical
2. Major U.S. forces in Vietnam in January 1971 were the 1st Cavalry Di-
vision (Airmobile), 23d Infantry (Americal) Division, 101st Airborne Division
(Airmobile), 1st Marines, 5th Marines, 1st Brigade of the 5th Infantry Divi-
sion (Mechanized), 2d Brigade of the 25th Infantry Division, 173d Airborne
Brigade, llth Armored Cavalry Regiment, 5th Special Forces Group (Air-
borne), and three separate battalions: 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry; 3d Squad-
ron, 5th Cavalry; and 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry,
356 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
areas of responsibility" was modified. These had always diluted
available U.S. assets by requiring constant sweeping and pa-
trolling of large slices of countryside. The campaign plan of 1971
gave American commanders "tactical areas of interest" instead,
which allowed them to focus on specific trouble spots. Vietnam-
ization enabled territorial forces and ARVN line units to assume
wider defense responsibilities in the larger regions assigned to
the remaining Army and Marine units. The American soldiers
noticed the change as their formerly far-ranging patrols were
scaled down, and more South Vietnamese troops became visible
stalking the brush.
After the LAM SON 719 campaign, the 101st Airborne Div-
ision (Airmobile) gradually disengaged from direct contact with
North Vietnamese Army units in the jungled western regions,
in consonance with the decreasing combat role of U.S. units.
The division was actively engaged in Operation JEFFERSON
GLENN, a long-term effort which had begun in September of
1970. Three battalions established a series of fire bases around
the coastal lowlands of Thua Thien Province. At the end of July,
the operation was renamed OPORD 13-70, and it was termi-
nated on October 8, 1971, as the last major American ground
combat operation.
The main scope of ground activity for U.S. units was con-
centrated in patrolling and sweeping the rocket belts of various
critical installations. Rocket belts were strips of land from which
the NVA/VC could launch barrages into the cities. This security
role was dubbed "dynamic defense" by the Army, and by the
end of the year all U.S. formations had been phased into this
new mission near critical installation complexes.
In early March, the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) of-
ficially returned to Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Most of its per-
sonnel actually remained in South Vietnam. They were ab-
sorbed into a number of special units raised quickly to train the
latest foreign army (from Cambodia), and continued conducting
reconnaissance missions and raids under MACV's special oper-
ations group.
The "Blackhorse" llth Armored Cavalry Regiment began
preparations to leave South Vietnam in the first week of Feb-
ruary and departed during March. The 14th Armored Cavalry
AN ARMY DEPARTS THE WAR 357
Regiment, on German frontier duty, was retitled as the new
llth, now oriented toward "modern" urban and mechanized
warfare. By 1971 the Army had begun readjusting all its training
and emphasis back toward the traditional European battlefield.
It was rapidly extricating itself from Southeast Asia and seeking
a return to the former worldwide responsibilities and status it
had enjoyed prior to the big Vietnam buildup in 1965. How-
ever, the disengagement was made with great difficulty.
The Army had become extremely permissive as it tried to
cope with changing societal attitudes, and standards of soldier-
ing eroded proportionately. In Vietnam serious disciplinary
problems resulted in disintegrating unit cohesion and opera-
tional slippages. In the field, friendly fire accidents became more
prevalent as more short rounds and misplaced fire were caused
by carelessness. There was an excessive number of "accidental"
shootings and promiscuous throwing of grenades, some of which
were deliberate fraggings aimed at unpopular officers, sergeants,
and fellow enlisted men. Redeploying units gave vent to years
of frustration as their speeding army vehicles tore down the fre-
quently ambushed highways, shooting and hurling rocks, cans,
and insults at the Vietnamese alongside the roads.
Widespread breakdowns in troop discipline forced the mil-
itary police into a front-line role serving as assault troops against
other soldiers. These actions were typified by two instances.
Composite military police Whiskey Mountain Task Force was
engaged in a rather spectacular standoff on September 25, 1971.
Fourteen soldiers of the 35th Engineer Group had barricaded
themselves in a bunker and were holding out with automatic
weapons and machine guns. A homemade explosive device was
exploded in the rear of the bunker, and all fourteen surrendered
and were treated for wounds. Chinook helicopters had them in
Long Binh Stockade the next day. A month later, on October
27, 1971, another military police strike force air-assaulted onto
the Praline Mountain signal site near Dalat. Two fragmentation
grenades had been used in an attempt to kill the company com-
mander two nights in a row. Initial escorts had proved insuffi-
cient protection, and military police had to garrison the moun-
taintop for a week until order was restored.
MACV launched its Drug Abuse Counteroffensive in the
358 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
summer of 1971. On June 17, President Nixon announced that
the military effort in the drug program, as part of the national
effort, would include the identification of heroin users in Viet-
nam, By early July, Army sampling surveys disclosed high usage
rates in many Vietnam-based units. Drug Treatment or Reha-
bilitation centers were established in all regions. On July 7, the
Army began testing units rotating back to the United States,
and on August 1 expanded the testing to cover amphetamines
and barbiturates. A secure drug abuse holding center was placed
into operation at Long Binh on September 24 for recidivist drug
abusers.
The military police were soon stretched thin guarding the
facilities. For example, on June 21, the 6th Convalescent Center
established a Drug Treatment Center at Cam Ranh Bay. By mid-
August, the 97th Military Police Battalion had to be reinforced,
and finally the separate 127th Military Police Company was per-
manently assigned. It was charged with protecting the lives of
volunteer patients and medical staffers, preventing the entry of
drugs and other contraband, stopping unlawful exits prior to de-
toxification, and maintaining order at the center. Static guard
posts had to be manned along all fence lines, and police ar-
maments at gate entrances were increased to shotguns and sub-
machine guns. The company guarded messing areas, occupied
patient wards at night, and built a separation ward with one-
and two-man cells.
Lowered troop morale and discipline were manifested in in-
creased crime, racial clashes, mutinous disregard of orders, anti-
war protests, and monetary corruption in black market currency
exchanges, as well as drug use. At the same time, some units
tightened control and actually improved combat efficiency. The
separate 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, and the two with-
drawing brigades of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), con-
tinued to function brilliantly from February through March, up
to the very day of their withdrawal from the jungle to their base
camps for stand-down. In the last nine days before stand-down,
with every man in the battalion knowing the exact date, the 1st
Battalion of the 5th Cavalry fought fifteen skirmishes with the
NVA.
The 2d Brigade of the 25th Infantry Division rejoined its
AN ARMY DEPARTS THE WAR 359
parent division on Hawaii in April, the same month that the
bulk of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) departed for Fort
Hood, Texas. There the famed First Team was transformed into
a test "triple capability" (Tricap) division composed of a mix of
armor, helicopters, and infantry. The division left behind the
very large seven thousand-man 3d Brigade in Vietnam, which
became separately assigned to II Field Force, Vietnam, on the
last day of March (passing to direct U.S. Army, Vietnam, con-
trol on April 14, 1971). It was charged with operational security
of northeastern Military Region 3, encompassing the arc of Binh
Tuy, Long Khanh, and Phuoc Tuy provinces around Xuan Loc.
The NVA was already stepping up activity in Military Region
1. A devastating 122mm rocket bombardment pulverized Fire
Support Base Charlie 2 in Quang Tri Province, causing a large
number of U.S. losses. Three separate attacks were made against
Da Nang during the first week in June, accentuating the re-
duced security following the final departure of the 1st Marine
Division. The first major Army unit to deploy from the region
was the 1st Brigade of the 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized),
at Quang Tri just south of the DMZ. It was notified on June
12, 1971, that it was going home and immediately began the
difficult job of disengaging while still subject to front-line action
against the NVA. Hard work and close scheduling enabled it to
make a smooth break from combat and to transfer over one
hundred miles to Da Nang for exit from Vietnam by the end of
August. The new 3d ARVN Division, formed in October, took
over its sector. The brigade rejoined its parent division, which
had moved to Fort Polk, Louisiana.
The unfortunate Americal Division was folded down in Viet-
nam at the end of November, still in disgrace over its latest
fiasco, the Fire Support Base Mary Ann incident, with its com-
manding general and several other officers being recommended
for punitive action. Fire Support Base Mary Ann had been hit
on March 22, 1971, southwest of Tarn Ky in Quang Tin Prov-
ince. The 196th Infantry Brigade's 1st Battalion of the 46th In-
fantry failed to safeguard the perimeter, enabling fifty North
Vietnamese Army soldiers to overrun the outpost. They roamed
through the fire base, destroying one 155mm howitzer and dam-
aging another, throwing satchel charges in the command bunker,
360 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
knifing Americans in their sleeping bags, and wrecking the com-
munications equipment. They killed and wounded nearly half
the 250 soldiers there, who got only ten in exchange because
they were cringing in their bunkers. After the defeat, the acting
battalion commander flew into a rage and had five NVA bodies
burned in the trash dump. General Westmoreland personally
took over the investigation and found there was clear dereliction
of duty, lax defensive posture with officers not in charge. Army
Secretary Resor took formal disciplinary action against six offi-
cers, including the division and assistant division commanders.
For most of the year the Americal's llth Infantry Brigade
continued dynamic defense operations in conjunction with the
2d ARVN Division. During August it attempted to locate the
Quang Ngai VC provincial headquarters without success. At the
same time, the division's 198th Infantry Brigade was placed in
a dynamic defense status inside the rocket belt area around Chu
Lai. The 196th Infantry Brigade was selected to occupy the area
adjacent to Da Nang, which had been vacated by III Marine
Amphibious Force early in the year.
The Americal Division was so jinxed that it could not even
turn over its huge Chu Lai base to the 2d ARVN Division with-
out severe damage. The base camp took the brunt of Typhoon
Hester on October 23. The surprise storm was the worst ex-
perienced by Vietnam in twenty-seven years. It flattened half
the buildings and destroyed the airfield "typhoon-proof" han-
gars, along with most of the divisional helicopters. These had
been desperately needed by the llth Aviation Group. Once the
Americal Division was shut down, XXIV Corps chose to retain
the 196th Infantry Brigade as a separate dynamic defense guard
force for the Da Nang rocket belt.
In Military Region 2, "The Herd" 173d Airborne Brigade,
left the country in August and was inactivated in January of 1972.
This elite formation, retained as a fully qualified paratrooper unit
throughout its Vietnam service, had long represented the best
in American fighting spirit. It had been the first Army combat
brigade into the country, and its departure hastened the real-
ization that the American Army was in full retreat from the
Vietnam War.
AN ARMY DEPARTS THE WAR 361
3. An Army Retreats
A major three-pronged, six-divisional North Vietnamese in-
vasion was made into South Vietnam at the end of March 1972,
and became known as the Nguyen Hue Offensive. It raged
through Quang Tri Province, smashed into Kontum, and stabbed
toward Saigon. The Battle of Quang Tri itself commenced on
April 27, and by May 1 most U.S. advisors were evacuated by
helicopter, although eighteen elected to stay with their South
Vietnamese units. Quang Tri was taken later that evening, and
the entire province was in NVA hands the following day. While
U.S. Marine and Army helicopters saw extensive action, and
American installations at Da Nang were severely rocketed, U.S.
ground forces were prohibited from participation. The 196th In-
fantry Brigade was rushed up to reinforce Phu Bai and Tan My,
but it was not in good disciplinary shape. Morale was low, and
on April 12 a company of its 2d Battalion, 1st Infantry, refused
to conduct a patrol into the hills around Phu Bai. Finally, after
a lot of pleading and cajoling, the company conducted its mis-
sion.
The shattered 3d ARVN Division was rebuilt at Phu Bai as
the 1st ARVN Division counterattacked into Quang Tri Province
on May 5. The ARVN Marine Division conducted amphibious
and airmobile insertions, and by the first week in July the ARVN
Airborne Division had reached Quang Tri city. A prolonged bat-
tle ensued, with organized NVA resistance inside the Quang Tri
Citadel finally crushed by South Vietnamese paratroopers and
marines on September 15. The North Vietnamese had still gained
a considerable chunk of territory south of the DMZ and retained
possession of Dong Ha and the old Marine Route 9 defensive
lines.
The North Vietnamese also won a major victory in the Kon-
tum Battles and entrenched their forces in the northern Central
Highlands. The NVA offensive northwest of Saigon had been
blunted during the three-month siege of An Loc. The main as-
sault on An Loc, May 10-15, was broken by massed American
B-52 and tactical air strikes and helicopter gunships. Losses had
been heavy, and Brig. Gen. Richard J. Tallman was killed by
362 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
artillery there July 9, while visiting to finalize plans for relieving
the 5th ARVN Division with the 18th ARVN Division.
The U.S. Army continued to pull out throughout the midst
of the Nguyen Hue Offensive, and it was apparent that Wash-
ington now considered the war a Vietnamese affair. The
"Screaming Eagles" 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), began
its redeployment from Vietnam in November of 1971 and closed
rapidly out of Da Nang just prior to the NVA invasion. The
division formed a self-sufficient security force to cover its own
withdrawal. This "roll-up force" turned over Camp Eagle and
outlying protective firebases to the 1st ARVN Division and hur-
riedly passed through Phu Bai. The division was reduced to one
color-bearing battalion-sized increment, which departed Viet-
nam in March and returned to Fort Campbell, Kentucky.
Most of the men from the 101st Airborne Division were ac-
tually sent south to the separate 3d Brigade of the 1st Cavalry
Division. During January and February that brigade absorbed
an average of five hundred soldiers a week and pushed them
through its Combat Training Center, regardless of "bush time,"
for shipment to field units. The unit was still seeing some scat-
tered action. On January 3, 1972, in a skirmish northeast of Xuan
Loc, the airmobile cavalry reaction force, gunships, and medical
evacuation helicopters all received heavy fire. Later that month
the brigade was tapered to five thousand men and relinquished
control of its operational area to the 18th ARVN Division. The
1st Cavalry Division's 3d Brigade was assigned the dynamic de-
fense mission of securing the critical Bien Hoa-Long Binh-Sai-
gon rocket belt.
The United States had been engaged in secret negotiations
to end the war since August 1969, a period marked by increased
governmental stress on the urgency of disengagement and the
general decline of the American Army. President Nixon made
these negotiations public on January 25, 1972, and remaining
Army combat elements were hastened out of Vietnam. The 3d
Brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division departed on June 26, only
a week past the resumption of the Paris discussions to end the
war. The 196th Infantry Brigade in the northern part of the
country was closed down three days later. Both left small gar-
rison battalions which redeployed that August. The 3d Battalion
AN ARMY DEPARTS THE WAR 363
of the 21st Infantry and the 1st Battalion of the 7th Cavalry,
which departed within a day of each other, thus happened to
be the last American infantry battalions to serve in Vietnam.
The 1st Battalion of the 7th Cavalry remained in Vietnam
until August 22, 1972. On that day the battalion colors were
carefully furled and placed on an outbound plane for Texas. The
flag was draped with campaign streamers harking all the way
back to a hot summer day in June of 1876 when its troopers
had fallen at the Little Big Horn River during Custer's Last
Stand. Intermingled with the dazzling array of multi-colored rib-
bons representing its service in a half dozen wars, were five
silken blue Presidential Unit Citation streamers awarded for
highest valor on the battlefield, One was embroidered simply
PLEIKU PROVINCE, 23 OCTOBER-26 NOVEMBER 1965.
The band of silk represented the terror-filled, searing tropical
day when Lt. Col. Harold G. Moore's cavalrymen hurled back
wave after wave of NVA infantry at Landing Zone X-Ray in the
la Drang Valley of the Central Highlands one of the first big
battles fought so valiantly by a rising American Army.
The Paris Agreement, designed to settle the war, was signed
January 27, 1973. Accordingly, all American Army presence in
Vietnam was terminated at the end of March. Two years later
a major NVA invasion overran the south, and the Republic of
Vietnam ceased to exist as a nation on April 30, 1975.
4. Conclusion
In 1965, twenty years after the great allied victories of World
War II, and just ten years after checking the advance of a hos-
tile army into South Korea, the United States committed its
regular ground forces to safeguard an ally in Southeast Asia.
The Regular Army and Marine Corps of 1965 represented
the active tip of a much larger potential national ground military
machine. Behind this battle-ready crust of front-line forces were
the National Guard and Reserve components, which had been
programmed to provide the necessary round-out and backup in
case of war. While the latter did not represent the instant fight-
ing capability of the main force armed forces, they were counted
on to serve as a training base in case of required expansion and
to provide certain critical support elements.
364 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
The United States government, for domestic political rea-
sons, never mass -mobilized its reserves to fulfill this intended
role. The country's active armed forces were sent into Vietnam
and forced to expand quickly to meet the increasing require-
ments for more troops. The resulting rapid expansion placed such
severe strain on limited technical, logistical, and leadership per-
sonnel, that the American Army became seriously impaired in
its ability to carry out its combat missions.
The American Army of 1965 was headstrong with confi-
dence, sharply honed to a lethal fighting edge by years of ser-
vice on the brink of global war and national crises, and well
equipped with modern weapons. Spearheaded by an elite Spe-
cial Forces and advisory effort on the forefront of international
"New Frontier" policies, it was eager to field-test its newly ac-
quired wings of airmobility. When the armed forces were sent
to South Vietnam they had the relatively limited, simple objec-
tive of providing a shield of protection while the South Viet-
namese Army was rebuilt. This initial military objective was ful-
filled, and in 1968 and 1969 a rejuvenated ARVN reentered the
main battlefield.
Once in Vietnam, the American Army began to pursue a
policy of defeating the NVA and VC forces throughout the coun-
try. This objective was hampered by the territorial confines of
the war, since United States ground forces were prohibited from
striking outside South Vietnam's borders. The NVA and main
force VC were able to escape battlefield annihilation and retain
intact supply channels through their access to cross-border ma-
neuver. This self-imposed restraint effectively negated any pos-
sibility of conventional military victory.
America's military objective in Vietnam was now directed to-
ward defeat of the NVA/VC through combat attrition. This re-
quired more and more battalions, which the armed forces could
not provide without increased draft calls. In the meantime, the
government failed to declare a war, minimizing the real emer-
gency, or explain its goals in Vietnam to the American public.
The draft system safeguarded the affluent from the burden of
military service, and the Army increasingly came to represent
the poorer and more disadvantaged segments of society. The
Army's own expansion and its insistence on the luxury of elite
AN ARMY DEPARTS THE WAR 365
units diluted available leadership resources. Although logistically
it never lacked for material goods, the inefficiency and cost sur-
rounding their acquisition and distribution further sapped the
Army's strength.
Although the American Army was still winning battlefield
victories, combat was bitter and difficult against what proved to
be a resolute, determined opponent. The American military was
fighting well below its potential as a result of several factors,
one of which was the one-year combat tour policy. This led to
constant unit discontinuity and lack of combat proficiency. Dur-
ing 1967, the year of the big battles, the war was a standard
contest being waged between national armies using conventional
tactics. At the same time, policy planners in Washington con-
tinued to misread battlefield reality. They remained mesmerized
by "counterinsurgency," which had effectively been terminated
with the large-scale introduction of NVA and U.S. divisions to
the battlefront in the previous year.
As a result of Tet-68, the American Army finally won a
crushing ground victory and largely eliminated the local force
VC as an effective military threat. However, the shock of the
communist offensive further dismayed the American govern-
ment and public, and the reaction against the war more than
offset any allied military gains. General Abrams, the new MACV
commander, gave up attrition and pursued a policy of phasing
South Vietnamese units into American tactical areas of respon-
sibility. With the exception of a few selected attack divisions,
this fixed U.S. units in place and canceled responsive mobility.
By 1969, the American Army had been ordered to start
withdrawing its combat forces from the war. Vietnamization was
introduced, a concept designed to turn the war over completely
to the South Vietnamese. This process was accelerated regard-
less of the consequences, and America's military sword which
had been thrust so quickly into Southeast Asia became dulled
and eroded. Morale and discipline caved in on an escalating ba-
sis, and combat performance declined. In 1970, by the time
America had finally decided to penetrate NVA/VC sanctuaries
in Cambodia, concern over losses brought a halt to aggressive
Army tactics.
Vietnamization proceeded at a breakneck pace, and the South
366 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
Vietnamese Army was abandoned before it had a chance to
properly assimilate American equipment and military doctrine,
In the last years of the Army's retreat, its remaining forces were
relegated to static security. The American Army's decline was
readily apparent in this final stage. Racial incidents, drug abuse,
combat disobedience, and crime reflected growing idleness, re-
sentment, and frustration. Already the Army was looking toward
a "modern volunteer army" to ease the many problems it placed
squarely on the country's draft system. Actually, the draft for
all its faults was not the culprit. Public dissatisfaction with the
war was simply evident in its war machine, which was still a
democratic institution reflecting national attitudes.
The military was faced with a terrible nightmare, an army
pinned in the muddy, fiery jungled rim of Asia which consumed
its own uniformed masses from every one of its ramparts and
bastions. In an effort to fuel wartime operations with the Reg-
ular Army and Marine Corps alone, the preparedness of the pre-
Vietnam Army to meet its overriding security obligations was
sliced to the thinnest margins of national safety. Deprived of the
anticipated skilled manpower base that the reserve components
represented, the Pentagon swelled its thin ranks of regular troops
beyond their ability to absorb the drafted multitudes, and un-
dermined the overall readiness posture of the military.
More and more battalions were fed into the Vietnam caul-
dron until, by mid-1968, the entire United States armed forces
were reduced to nearly worldwide combat ineffectiveness out-
side the Vietnam theater itself. By that year in Europe, only 39
percent of the 465 reporting units had a personnel readiness
equal to even their deliberately diminished assigned capability.
Within the eight major combat units posted to Germany, rapid
personnel turnover and shortages of experienced officers and
sergeants prevented four divisions from meeting minimum com-
bat standards. The 3d Armored and 3d, 8th, and 24th Infantry
Divisions were all woefully undermanned. Even more chilling
was the secret December 31, 1968, pronouncement by United
States Army Europe, that none of its major combat units had
met their operational training readiness conditions for the sec-
ond straight year. Yet the state of European defenses worsened
with the withdrawal of the entire 24th Infantry Division, during
AN ARMY DEPARTS THE WAR 367
1969, in a desperate effort to reconstitute the Army strategic
forces in the United States.
The Korean front in 1968 sparked with flashfires of combat,
but the 2d and 7th Infantry Divisions stationed there were des-
perately short of soldiers. The former had to hold its assigned
section of the Demilitarized Zone, but reinforced with the Ko-
rean 98th Regimental Combat Team, a Special Forces A-De-
tachment, and a brigade from the 7th Infantry Division. I Corps
had only five helicopters available for either training or opera-
tions. The 7th Infantry Division, bolstered by a rotational com-
pany of Royal Thai troops, was rated by the Army as only mar-
ginally combat ready.
In the United States itself, the Vietnam war had reduced all
active military formations to understrength holding containers
for Vietnam returnees, or tropical combat schooling mills. Ad-
ditionally, all units were tasked with either actual riot duty or
preparation. In June of 1968, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were forced
to flunk every division and brigade on the continent with the
lowest rating possible in all categories including personnel,
training, and logistics, with the exception of the 82d Airborne
Division (which had a brigade in Vietnam). The 1st and 2d Ar-
mored Divisions, 5th and 6th Infantry Divisions, and 6th Ar-
mored Cavalary Regiment were deemed unsuitable for combat-
ant deployment. Army response had been stretched to the
breaking point. The previous month a limited reserve mobili-
zation brought the 29th and 69th Infantry Brigades onto active
duty in Hawaii and Colorado respectively. Both had to be ex-
tensively retrained, verifying the length of lead time and orderly
processing required to transform reserve components into sat-
isfactory line units.
The dangerous drawdown on American global military ca-
pability was a calculated risk which also impacted on the Viet-
nam battlefield. The rapid deployment of fresh brigades, formed
in haste without the proper training base that mobilization could
have provided, directly impaired their combat performance. Most
notably, the llth, 196th, 198th, and 199th Infantry Brigades and
27th Marines had all suffered from inadequate preparation.
Alarming personnel turbulence, critical shortfalls in leadership
quantity and quality, and erosion of fighting skills were further
368 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
manifestations of the same basic problem: the Regular Army and
Marine Corps were extended far beyond their ability to wage
and control a distant, full-scale war.
The United States soldiers and Marines in Vietnam fought
through some of the most difficult terrain in the world, and won
some of the toughest encounters in American military history.
However, they fought without benefit of the country's larger
military machine programmed for their support in case of war.
The Reserves and National Guard were notably absent in the
Vietnam conflict. The magnificent courage and fighting spirit of
the thousands of riflemen, aircraft and armored crewmen, can-
noneers, engineers, signalmen, and service personnel could not
overcome the fatal handicaps of faulty campaign strategy, incom-
plete wartime preparation, and the tardy, superficial attempts at
Vietnamization. An entire American army was sacrificed on the
battlefield of Vietnam. When the war was finally over, the United
States military had to build a new volunteer army from the
smallest shreds of its tattered remnants.
1 - An Giang
2 - An Xuyen
3 Ba Xuyen
4 - Ban Lieu
5 - Bien Hoa
6 - Binh Dinh
7 - Bing Duong
8- Binh Long
9 - Binh Thuan
10-BinhTuy
11 -Chau Doc
12-Chuong Thien
13 - Darlac
14 - Dinh Tuong
15-GiaDinh
16 -Co Cong
17-Hau Nghia
18- Kien Giang
19 - Kien Hoa
20 - Kien Phong
21 - Kien Tuong
22 - Khanh Hoa
Saigon
Low U.S. military
presence during war
Medium U.S. military
presence during war
High U.S. military
presence during war
23 - Kontum
24 - Lam Dong
25 - Long An
26 - Long Khanh
27 -Ninh Thuan
28 Phong Dinh
29 Phu Bon
30 Phu Yen
31 Phuoc Long
32 Phuoc Tuy
33 - Pleiku
34 Quang Due
35 - Quang Nam
36 - Quang Ngai
37 - Quang Tin
38 Quang Tri
39 - Sa Dec
40-Tay Ninh
41 -Thua Thien
42 - Tuyen Due
43 - Vinh Binh
44 - Vinh Long
DMZ
II Corps Tactical Zone
IV Corps Tactical Zone
IV Corps Tactical Zone
25 50 75
scale miles
Map by Shelby L Stanton
U.S. Military Presence in Vietnam
scale miles
Map by Shelby L Stanton
***-*-* r
Ben Hai River \ *^0
IK// Dl
r^!iA^ A
South China Sea
The DMZ Front
\tf
4 '~ & A -m oi *& "' ^>^V -
a^^-^ s 'W 3?J*is&
KSV-^Vl Taia, ^^^f
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V_W^ ^ 5
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^^"X^sJ^N^cV
J^V ^V-- _ ' ^^TL^^^s ^ C *&<*. * . *^
Lv^2
Special
r _1 %^ LAOS J^ VIETNAM
South China Sea
1 - MACV Compound
2 - Mang Ca Compound
3 -Imperial Palace
Hue and the A Shau Valley
An Hoa
An Hoa Valley
''/// v
Route 534
Khang River
Tien Phuoc Special \ Forces camp
Phuoc Ha-Que Son An Hoa Valleys
Hon Giai
South China Sea
Map by Shelby L. Stanton
la Drang Valley
1 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division
2 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment
3 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division
4 196th Infantry Brigade
5 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division
6 173d Airborne Brigade
7 3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division
cM
A JUNCTION CITY, PHASE I
I JUNCTION CITY, PHASE II
Forest-^-
Boi Loi WK C ^kt^>^.r A
N \ VamCo
/ y *\ Parrot's \ Dong River
Beak
VIETNAM
Map by Shelby L Stanton
JUNCTION CITY and CEDAR FALLS
(War Zone C and the Iron Triangle)
1 J 173d Airborne
3d Battalion, 8th Infantry
| 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry
/J\9th ARVN Airborne Battalion
Dak To Special Forces camp
Met Special Forces camp^\' 1 Jp* i |f ^
The Dak To Battlefield -1967
Vietnamese Joint General Staff Compound
The Saigon-Bien Hoa-Long Binh Ar
Highway 1
Khe Sanh Area and Lam Son 719 Offensive
'' >y /L'~*' - . ". ,-!*"' ''-J,-' ~ "' * ","'''_, J?
-'"J-".'- ^ jt> .:.' "jfr
' i J.f - T'
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^
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. .-v
>\;--^ i". <"'; ' ' -'--,^' : Aioui -/.v :;-.::".&
lia \^"' v v> v;!/^ M jfflft-" : -'<^>/';-^-.i
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V\
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, ^
i
CAQ!A miiAO '-Sr^t-oo 1 ">/' "' !" '" ^- ' "?> ' Jfi'* <S'f 1 j' J '','' l "''-'.' /--' 't' 1 ".^
SCaie miles -.^^^^.V 1 ^^'^-- - -'/'',? /.;" ^> 1 . - -'-*"*! -j ^^fl-
Map by Shelby L Stanton jrfjT^^jV',^,;^ ;;^,^ ' - .,' ,1 ; > ( - ^r', -$>$^ > '^^'*^
liiilif ^^
iv^-^l^^
1 - Hill 881 N
2 . Hill 861
3 . Hill 861 A
4 -Hill 558
5 -Hill 881 S
g - Dong Tre Mountain
7 . Hill 471
ARVN Airborne Division
| ARVN Ranger
Vietnamese Marine Division
1st ARVN Division
Alnha : ' y-i-lBB/"^ -V-*.^"- _: -' Rrmte Q'Jk-'-'afl'-'-'J.y-'. J-' .- .": ^~ ~ - x
Guide to Unit Organization and Terms
This section briefly discusses the general pattern of United
States ground force organization during the Vietnam War as a
basic guide to some of the unit terms found in this book.
The squad, which usually fielded five to ten soldiers in Viet-
nam and was led by a sergeant, was the basic building block of
the military infantry machine. Squad weapons ordinarily con-
sisted of M16 rifles, pistols, and M79 grenade launchers. Weap-
ons squads contained machine guns or heavier weapons, such
as recoilless rifles.
Ideally, there were four squads in each platoon (one of them
a weapons squad), which was led by a lieutenant. Three rifle
platoons and a weapons platoon composed the infantry com-
pany, which was commanded by a captain or a lieutenant. Army
rifle companies in Vietnam were authorized 164 men, but most
operated at half this strength. As an exception to title, cavalry
units retained the use of "troop" instead of "company," and ar-
tillery used the word "battery."
The Army infantry battalion in Vietnam was usually com-
posed of four line companies (Companies A-D), a slightly smaller
headquarters company, and one combat support company (Com-
pany E). Battalions were commanded by lieutenant colonels and
were authorized a total of 920 men. Most of the time they were
lucky to have an assigned strength of five hundred, and not all
of these would be present in the field. Again, cavalry retained
the traditional title of "squadron" instead of "battalion."
Marine battalions were part of regiments commanded by
colonels, each regiment having three battalions. With one ex-
ception (the armored cavalry regiments, consisting of three
squadrons) there were no operational regiments in the Army
during the Vietnam War. Army combat arms battalions had reg-
imental associations, which permitted a continuation of heritage
but the regimental designation in their titles was a matter oi
honorary "paper" distinction.
Army battalions were grouped into brigades, commanded by
colonels. Brigades had from three to four battalions under them.
Three Marine regiments or three Army brigades composed a
369
370 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
division, although there were several separate brigades, inde-
pendent in their own right, which were commanded by briga-
dier generals.
The division was commanded by a major general. It had nine
or ten battalions of infantry, four battalions of artillery, a re-
connaissance cavalry squadron, a combat engineer battalion, and
division support and aviation. Some divisions had brought their
tank battalions with them to Vietnam; others had not. Divisions
in Vietnam varied in size from fifteen to twenty-two thousand
personnel, but most had around seventeen thousand soldiers.
However, since only a fraction were actually line riflemen, their
"foxhole strength" was very low in comparison.
The two Army field forces, III Marine Amphibious Com-
mand and XXIV Corps, were the higher headquarters that con-
trolled these tactical formations in their respective regions of
South Vietnam. They were commanded by lieutenant generals,
and had large artillery and support assets under them.
The U.S. Army Special Forces had a very complicated, unique
structure in Vietnam. Basically its organization was tailored around
a flexible combination of twelve-man (later fourteen-man) Op-
erations Detachments A, or "A-teams," all the team members
usually being sergeants or officers.
Sources and Bibliography
Primary Sources
The majority of material for this book was compiled from the
original documents of Vietnam-based American units, which are
now housed in the Washington National Records Center, Suit-
land, Maryland, by the General Archives Division of the U.S.
National Archives and Records Service. The quarterly opera-
tional reports, combat staff journals, command chronicles, and
after action reports of major Army and Marine units were ex-
amined. These are contained in Records Group 338 (Vietnam
War: MACV/USARV records). To facilitate further research by
interested readers, those original records used as principal sources
are identified by their individual document accession codes and
arranged by chapter and section. Published works listed below
are also fully cited in Section 2, General Sources, Additionally,
the mass of interviews and working papers prepared by the au-
thor during the course of research for his Vietnam Order of Bat-
tle (Washington: U.S. News Books, 1981) was extensively uti-
lized. These notes and tapes are identified as Original Papers,
Vietnam Order of Battle Project,
Chapter 1. Section 1
Principal sources used were Gen. Cao Van Vien et al., The
U.S. Advisor, Indochina Monographs (Washington: U.S. Army
Center of Military History, 1980); U.S. Military Assistance
Command Vietnam RCS J3 Advisory Detachment, After Action
Reports from Son Tinh District and III Corps Tactical Zone Senior
Advisor, 1965; Department of the Army Pamphlet 550-55, Area
Handbook for South Vietnam (Washington: Government Print-
ing Office).
Section 2
Principal sources used were the 5th Special Forces Group
Operational Briefing Narrative, "The Role of U.S. Army Special
Forces in Vietnam," dtd 31 December 1965; Memorandum dtd
22 April 1968, "Development of the CIDG Program, 1964- 1968,"
contained in 5th Special Forces Group, Operational Report, dtd
15 May 1968, OACSFOR-OT-RD 682179; Col. Francis J. Kelly,
U.S. Army Special Forces, 1961-1971, Vietnam Studies (Wash-
ington: Department of the Army, 1973).
371
372 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
Section 3
Principal sources used were 5th Special Forces Group, Com-
mand Report, dtd 15 January 1966, OACSFOR-OT-RD 65008,
and Detachment B-52 Memorandum dtd 15 November 1965,
Subject: Sequence of Events for Plei Me Operation for Period
20-28 October 1965.
Chapter 2. Section 1
Principal sources used were 1st Logistical Command, Com-
mand Report, dtd 15 July 1965, OACSFOR-OT-RD 650063;
USARV, The Logistics Review, 1965-1969, Volumes I-VIII; Joint
Logistic Review Board, Logistic Support in the Vietnam Era
(Washington: Deputy Secretary of Defense, 1970), Volume II
and Monographs 1-13; Lt. Col. William R. Fails, Marines and
Helicopters (Washington: U.S. Marine Corps, 1978), Chapters
2, 5, and 6; Original Papers, Vietnam Order of Battle Project.
Section 2
Principal sources used were the Basic Study and Annexes
A-J of Volumes I-IV, Army Strategic Mobility Requirements
(Washington: Department of the Army, 1965); Thomas C. Thayer,
editor, A Systems Analysis View of the Vietnam War (Washing-
ton: Southeast Asia Intelligence Division, 1975), Volume 2; Of-
fice of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Study of the 12-
Month Vietnam Tour, dtd 29 June 1970; USARV Report, Sum-
mary of Lessons Learned, Volumes I and II, dtd 30 June/ 1966;
Maj. Gen. George S. Eckhardt, Command and Control, Viet-
nam Studies (Washington: Department of the Army, 1974),
Chapter 3; Russell Weigley, The American Way of War (New
York: Macmillan Co., 1973); BDM Corporation, A Study of
Strategic Lessons Learned in Vietnam (McLean, Virginia: BDM,
1980), Volumes III and VII; Gen. William C. Westmoreland and
Adm. U.S.G, Sharp, Report on the War in Vietnam (As of 30
June 1968) (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1968);
Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, U.S. Army Training Base,
1945-1971 (Washington: Department of the Army, 1971).
Chapter 3. Section 1
Principal sources used were A Chronology of the United States
Marine Corps, 1965-1969 (Washington: U.S. Marine Corps,
1971), Volume IV; Jack Shulimson and Maj. Charles M. John-
SOURCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY 373
son, U.S. Marines in Vietnam: The Landing and the Buildup
(Washington: U.S. Marine Corps, 1978), Part I.
Section 2
Principal sources used were Jack Shulimson and Maj. Charles
M. Johnson, U.S. Marines in Vietnam: The Landing and the
Buildup (Washington: U.S. Marine Corps, 1978), Part I; De-
fense Department, United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971), Volume
4.
Section 3
Principal sources used were Jack Shulimson and Maj. Charles
M. Johnson, U.S. Marines in Vietnam: The Landing and the
Buildup (Washington: U.S. Marine Corps, 1978), Chapter 5; Fleet
Marine Force Pacific, U.S. Marine Corps Forces in Vietnam,
Volume I.
Section 4
Principal sources used were Jack Shulimson and Maj. Charles
M. Johnson, U.S. Marines in Vietnam: The Landing and the
Buildup (Washington: U.S. Marine Corps, 1978), Chapters 6 and
7.
Chapter 4. Section 1
Principal sources used were Headquarters, Field Force Viet-
nam, Command Report, dtd 14 January 1966, OACSFOR-OT-
RD 650116; 173d Airborne Brigade, Operational Report for Pe-
riod Ending 31 January 1966.
Section 2
Principal sources used were Headquarters, 1st Brigade, 101st
Airborne Division, Operational Report for Period Ending 31
January 1966; Lt. Col. Albert N. Garland, editor, "Infantry in
Vietnam'' (Fort Benning: Infantry Magazine, 1967), pp. 131-141;
Field Force Vietnam, Command Report, dtd 14 January 1966;
OACSFOR-OT-RD 660116.
Section 3
The principal source used was Headquarters, 1st Cavalry Di-
vision, Quarterly Command Report, dtd 1 December 1965,
OACSFOR-OT-RD 650110.
Section 4
Principal sources used were Headquarters, 1st Cavalry Di-
374 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
vision, Quarterly Command Report, dtd 10 January 1966,
OACSFOR-OT-RD 650109; and MACV Operations Report, Les-
sons Learned 3-66: The Pleiku Campaign, dtd 10 May 1966.
Chapter 5, Section 1
Principal sources used were USARV, Operational Report,
dtd 1 July 1966, OACSFOR-OT-RD 660114; USARV, Opera-
tional Report, dtd 7 September 1966, OACSFOR-OT-RD 660546;
USARV, Operational Report, dtd 10 February 1967, OACSFOR-
OT-RD 660522; USARV, Operational Report, dtd 28 February
1967, OACSFOR-OT-RD 670243; Jack Shulimson, U.S. Marines
in Vietnam: An Expanding War (Washington: U.S. Marine Corps,
1982), Parts I and VII; MACV, Command History, 1966.
Section 2
Principal sources used were Jack Shulimson, 17. S. Marines
in Vietnam: An Expanding War (Washington: U.S. Marine Corps,
1982), Chapter 1; Marine Corps History and Museums Division,
The 1st Marine Division and Its Regiments (Washington: U.S.
Marine Corps, 1981).
Section 3
The principal source used was 4th Infantry Division, Op-
erational Report, dtd 22 December 1966, OACSFOR-OT-RD
6604506.
Section 4
The principal source used was Headquarters, 199th Infantry
Brigade, Lessons Learned, Operational Report for Quarterly Pe-
riod Ending 31 January 1967, dtd 14 April 1967, OACSFOR-
OT-RD 670222.
Section 5
The principal source used was Headquarters, 25th Infantry
Division, Operational Report on Lessons Learned for the Period
1 January 1966-30 April 1966, OACSFOR-OT-RD 660120.
Section 6
The principal source used was llth Armored Cavalry Regi-
ment, Operational Report, dtd 31 October 1966, OACSFOR-
OT-RD 660507; USARV, MACOV (Mechanized and Armor
Combat Operations in Vietnam) Study, dtd 28 March 1967.
Section 7
The principal source used was Headquarters, 196th Infantry
SOURCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY 375
Brigade, Operational Report, dtd 8 March 1967 OACSFOR-
OT-RD 660511,
Section 8
The principal source used was 9th Infantry Division, Op-
erational Report, dtd 8 June 1967.
Chapter 6. Section 1
Principal sources used were Defense Department, United
States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967 (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1971), Volume 5; Gen. William C. Westmore-
land, A Soldier Reports (New York: Doubleday, 1976); BDM
Corporation, A Study of Strategic Lessons Learned in Vietnam
(McLean, Virginia: BDM, 1980), Volume VI; Col. Harry G.
Summers, Jr., On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam
War (Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1982); Gen. Dave R.
Palmer, Summons of the Trumpet (Novato, California: Presidio
Press, 1978); MACV, Command History, 1966; Original Papers,
Vietnam Order of Battle Project.
Section 2
Principal sources used were 1st Infantry Division, Funda-
mentals of Infantry Tactics, dtd 1 February 1968, OACSFOR-
OT-RD 682001; DA Operations Report 1-67, Observations of a
Platoon Leader, dtd 30 January 1967; DA Operations Report 4-
67, Observations of a Battalion Commander, dtd 7 June 1967;
DA Operations Report 6-67, Observations of a Brigade Com-
mander, dtd 27 December 1967; USARV Battlefield Reports, A
Summary of Lessons Learned, Volume III, May 1967.
Section 3
Principal sources used were DA Operations Report 3-68,
Aerial Observation Lessons Learned, dtd 15 July 1968; DA Op-
erations Report 1-68, Summary of Lessons Learned, dtd 1 Feb-
ruary 1968; Headquarters, 1st Cavalry Division, Operational Re-
port for Period Ending 31 October 1966, p, 51, OACSFOR-OT-
RD 660505; Original Papers, Vietnam Order of Battle Project.
Section 4
Principal sources used were Ballistic Research Laboratories
Memorandum Report 2030, U.S. Army Casualties Aboard Air-
craft in the Republic of Vietnam (Aberdeen Proving Ground:
1970); Col. R. L. Cody, "U.S. Army Helicopters as Personnel
376 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
and Material Carriers" and Lt. Col. E. Lail, "Helicopter Evac-
uation in Vietnam," both contained in Aeromedical Aspects of
Helicopter Operations in the Tactical Situation presented to
Sessions I and II of the Advisory Group for Aerospace Research
and Development in Paris, France, May 1967; Col. Spurgeon
H, Neel, An Overall Survey of Helicopter Operations Problems
(Washington: Office of the Surgeon General, 1967); Lt. Gen.
John J, Tolson, Airmobility, 1961-1971, Vietnam Studies (Wash-
ington: Department of the Army, 1973).
Section 5
Principal sources used were DA Study, Aviation Require-
ments for the Combat Structure of the Army, dtd 6 June 1965;
U.S. Congress, Senate, Hearings before the Preparedness In-
vestigating Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services,
90th Congress, First Session, 1967 (Washington: U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1967).
Chapter 7. Section 1
Principal sources used were 1st Infantry Division, Opera-
tions After Action Report: Operation ABILENE, OACSFOR-OT-
RD 66X001; 1st Infantry Division, Combat Operations After
Action Report: Operation BIRMINGHAM, OACSFOR-OT-RD
66X232; Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry, After Action
Report: Operation LEXINGTON III, OACSFOR-OT-RD 66X151;
1st Infantry Division, Operational Report, dtd 15 August 1966,
OACSFOR-OT-RD 660291; 1st Infantry Division, Combat After
Action Report: Operation EL PASO 11/111, dtd 8 December 1966,
OACSFOR-OT-RD 66X043; II Field Force, Operational Report,
dtd 25 April 1967, OACSFOR-OT-RD 670228; Headquarters,
196th Infantry Brigade, Operational Report for Quarterly Pe-
riod Ending 31 January 1967, dtd 7 March 1967, OACSFOR-
OT-RD 670221; Headquarters, 173d Airborne Brigade, Combat
Operations After Action Report: Operation ATTLEBORO, dtd
30 December 1966, OACSFOR-OT-RD 66X009; 25th Infantry
Division, Operational Report: Operation ATTLEBORO, dtd 28
April 1967, OACSFOR-OT-RD 66X012.
Section 2
Principal sources used were MACV Operations Report 2-66,
The Battle of Annihilation and the Bong Son Campaign, dtd 1
April 1966; 1st Cavalry Division, Operational Report, dtd 5 May
SOURCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY 377
1966, OACSFOR-OT-RD 660119; Headquarters, 3d Brigade Task
Force, 25th Infantry Division, Operational Report, dtd 1 June
1967, OACSFOR-OT-RD 660514; Headquarters, 1st Brigade,
101st Airborne Division, Combat Operations After Action Re-
port: Operation HAWTHORNE, dtd 22 July 1966, OACSFOR-
OT-RD 66X102; Headquarters, 101st Airborne Division, After
Action Report: Operation SEWARD, dtd 6 November 1966,
OACSFOR-OT-RD 66X201; Headquarters, 101st Airborne Di-
vision, Operational Report, dtd 10 March 1967, OACSFOR-OT-
RD 660508; 1st Cavalry Division, Operational Report, dtd 15
August 1966, OACSFOR-OT-RD 660292; Infantry Field Histor-
ical Team Alpha, Rattle for LZ Bird, supplement to 1st Cavalry
Division, Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30
April 1967, dtd 27 October 1967, OACSFOR-OT-RD 670473.
Chapter 8. Section 1
Principal sources used were NAVMC Publication 2614,
Professional Knowledge Gained from Operational Experience in
Vietnam (Washington: U.S. Marine Corps, 1967); Jack Shulim-
son, U.S. Marines in Vietnam: An Expanding War (Washington:
U.S. Marine Corps, 1982), Part I; Fleet Marine Force Pacific,
U.S. Marine Corps Forces in Vietnam, Volume I.
Section 2
Principal sources used were 5th Special Forces Group, Com-
mand Operational Report, dtd 10 May 1966, OACSFOR-OT-
RD 660557; Jack Shulimson, U.S. Marines in Vietnam: An Ex-
panding War (Washington: U.S. Marine Corps, 1982), Part II;
Brig. Gen. Edwin H. Simmons, "Marine Corps Operations in
Vietnam, 1965-1966," Naval Review (Annapolis: U.S. Naval In-
stitute, 1968).
Section 3
Principal sources used were Jack Shulimson, U.S. Marines
in Vietnam: An Expanding War (Washington: U.S. Marine Corps,
1982), Part IV; Fleet Marine Force Pacific, 17. S. Marine Corps
Forces in Vietnam, Volume I.
Chapter 9. Section 1
Principal sources used were USARV, Summary of Lessons
Learned, dtd 18 January 1968; USARV, Operational Report 1
Feb-30 Apr 67, OACSFOR-OT-RD 670461; USARV, Opera-
tional Report 1 May-31 Jul 67, OACSFOR-OT-RD 670600;
378 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
USARV, Operational Report, did 20 November 1967, OACSFOR-
OT-RD 674175; USARV, Operational Report, did 24 April 1968,
OACSFOR-OT-RD 681044; Gen. Dave R. Palmer, Summons of
the Trumpet (Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1978); Col. Harry
G. Summers, Jr., On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Viet-
nam War (Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1982); MACV,
Command History, 1967, Volume I; Original Papers, Vietnam
Order of Battle Project.
Section 2
Principal sources used were Thomas C. Thayer, editor, A
Systems Analysis View of the Vietnam War (Washington: South-
east Asia Intelligence Division, 1975), Volume 6; Brig. Gen. Ed-
win H. Simmons, "Marine Corps Operations in Vietnam, 1967,"
Naval Review (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1969); I Field
Force Vietnam, Operational Report, dtd 17 November 1967,
OACSFOR-OT-RD 670486; MACV, Quarterly Command Re-
ports for 1967.
Section 3
The principal source used was 101st Airborne Division, Op-
erational Report, dtd 29 May 1968, OACSFOR-OT-RD 681291.
Chapter 10. Section 1
Principal sources used were 199th Infantry Brigade, Oper-
ational Report, Lessons Learned: 1 August-31 October 1967, dtd
15 November 1967, OACSFOR-OT-RD 674237; MACVJ3-053
Report, Hole Huntin Techniques to Detect, Neutralize and
Destroy Enemy Tunnels, dtd 20 December 1968; II Field Force
Vietnam, Operational Report, dtd 5 April 1967, OACSFOR-OT-
RD 670228.
Section 2
Principal sources used were II Field Force Vietnam, Op-
erational Report, dtd 15 May 1967, OACSFOR-OT-RD 670751;
1st Infantry Division, After Action Report: Operation JUNC-
TION CITY, dtd 8 May 1967, OACSFOR-OT-RD 67X216; 1st
Infantry Division, Operational Report, 1 February-30 April 1967
OACSFOR-OT-RD 670468; DA Narrative, Battle of Ap Cu,
OACSFOR-OT-RD 67X074; llth Armored Cavalry Regiment,
Combat After Action Report: Operation JUNCTION CITY, dtd
1 November 1967, OACSFOR-OT-RD 67XO59.
SOURCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY 379
Section 3
The principal source used was Headquarters, 3d Battalion,
39th Infantry, Combat After Action Report, dtd 16 August 1967
OACSFOR-OT-RD 67X076.
Chapter 11. Section 1
Principal sources used were the 4th Infantry Division, Com-
bat After Action Report: Operation SAM HOUSTON, dtd 28
June 1967, OACSFOR-OT-RD 67X030; I Field Force Vietnam,
Operational Report, dtd 17 November 1967, OACSFOR-OT-RD
670486.
Section 2
Principal sources used were I Field Force Vietnam, Oper-
ational Report, dtd 26 August 1967, OACSFOR-OT-RD 670622;
4th Infantry Division, Combat After Action Report: Operation
FRANCIS MARION, dtd 25 November 1967, OACSFOR-OT-
RD 67X112.
Section 3
Principal sources used were 4th Infantry Division, Combat
Operations After Action Report for Period Ending 11 October
1967, OACSFOR-OT-RD 67X117; 4th Infantry Division, Com-
bat After Action Report: Battle for Dak To, dtd 3 January 1968,
OACSFOR-OT-RD 68X007; USARV, Seminar on Attack of For-
tified Positions in the Jungle, dtd 31 January 1968, OACSFOR-
OT-RD 68X002; I Field Force Vietnam, Operational Report, dtd
15 November 1967, OACSFOR-OT-RD 674078; I Field Force
Vietnam, Operational Report, dtd 15 February 1968, OACSFOR-
OT-RD 681098.
Chapter 12. Section 1
Principal sources used were Fleet Marine Force Pacific, U.S.
Marine Corps Forces in Vietnam, March 1965-September 1967,
Volume I; Maj. Gary L. Telfer and Lt. Col Lane Rogers, U.S.
Marines in Vietnam: The War of Attrition, 1967 (Washington:
U.S. Marine Corps), Chapters 1 and 2; 3d Marine Division,
Command Chronology Reports for February-April 1967.
Section 2
Principal sources used were Maj. Gary L. Telfer and Lt.
Col. Lane Rogers, U.S. Marines in Vietnam: The War of At-
trition, 1967 (Washington: U.S. Marine Corps), Chapters 5, 6,
380 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
and 9; 3d Marine Division, Command Chronology Reports for
May-December 1967.
Section 3
Principal sources used were Maj. Gary L. Telfer and Lt.
Col. Lane Rogers, U.S. Marine Corps in Vietnam: The War of
Attrition, 1967 (Washington: U.S. Marine Corps), Chapters 3
and 7; 1st Marine Division, Command Chronology Reports for
April-June 1967.
Chapter 13. Section 1
Principal sources used were Headquarters, Task Force Or-
egon, Operational Report, dtd 6 August 1967, OACSFOR-OT-
RD 670802; Task Force Oregon, Operational Report, dtd 5 No-
vember 1967, OACSFOR-OT-RD 670580; Americal Division,
Operational Report, dtd 26 November 1967, OACSFOR-OT-RD
674289; 3d Brigade Task Force, 25th Infantry Division, Oper-
ational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967,
OACSFOR-OT-RD 670750; 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry, 3d Bri-
gade Task Force, Combat After Action Report, dtd 20 August
1967, OACSFOR-OT-RD 67X186; USARV, Seminar on Attack
of Fortified Positions in the Jungle, dtd 2 January 1968,
OACSFOR-OT-RD 68X002; Maj. Gary L. Telfer and Lt. Col.
Lane Rogers, U.S. Marines in Vietnam: The War of Attrition,
1967 (Washington: U.S. Marine Corps), Chapter 4; Original Pa-
pers, Vietnam Order of Battle Project.
Section 2
Principal sources used were 1st Cavalry Division, Opera-
tional Report, dtd 8 August 1967, OACSFOR-OT-RD 670226;
1st Cavalry Division, Operational Report for Period Ending 31
October 1967, dtd 20 February 1968, OACSFOR-OT-RD 674236;
1st Cavalry Division, Lessons Learned: Operation PERSHING,
dtd 30 December 1967, OACSFOR-OT-RD 67X199.
Chapter 14. Section 1
Principal sources used were Headquarters, Provisional Corps
Vietnam, Operational Report, dtd 4 June 1968, OACSFOR-OT-
RD 682349; Thomas C. Thayer, editor, A Systems Analysis View
of the Vietnam War (Washington: Southeast Asia Intelligence
Division, 1975), Volume 1; Lt. Gen. Willard Pearson, The War
in the Northern Provinces, Vietnam Studies (Washington: De-
partment of the Army, 1975); MACV Quarterly Evaluation Re-
SOURCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY 381
ports for 1968; USARV, Operational Report, dtd 24 April 1968,
OACSFOR-OT-RD 681044; USARV, Operational Report, dtd
20 May 1968, OACSFOR-OT-RD 682297; USARV, Operational
Report, dtd 12 August 1968, OACSFOR-OT-RD 683312; USARV,
Operational Report, dtd 15 November 1968, OACSFOR-OT-RD
684336; USARV, Operational Report, dtd 13 February 1969,
OACSFOR-OT-RD 691251; MACV, Command History, 1968,
Volume I; Original Papers, Vietnam Order of Battle Project.
Section 2
Principal sources used were Robert W. Coakley et al, Use
of Troops in Civil Disturbances since World War II, Supple-
ment II (Washington: Histories Division, Department of the
Army, 1974); Paul J. Scheips et al., Army Operational and In-
telligence Activities in Civil Disturbances since 1957, revised
edition, OCMH Study 73 (Washington: Department of the Army,
1972); Assistant Secretary of Defense Memorandum, Subject:
Special Pay for Duty Subject to Hostile Fire Korea, dtd 1 April
1968; Headquarters, 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, Op-
erational Report, dtd 12 May 1968, OACSFOR-OT-RD 682329.
Section 3
Principal sources used were Thomas C. Thayer, editor, A
Systems Analysis View of the Vietnam War (Washington: South-
east Asia Intelligence Division, 1975), Volume 6; 1st Logistical
Command, Operational Report, dtd 14 May 1968, OACSFOR-
OT-RD 682276; 1st Logistical Command, Operational Report,
dtd 14 February 1968, OACSFOR-OT-RD 681160; MACV,
Command History, 1968, Volume I.
Chapter 15. Section 1
Principal sources used were 97th Military Police Battalion,
Operational Report, dtd 13 May 1968, OACSFOR-OT-RD
682013; 716th Military Police Battalion, Operational Report, dtd
12 February 1968, OACSFOR-OT-RD 681286; 716th Military
Police Battalion, Operational Report, dtd 8 May 1968,
OACSFOR-OT-RD 681286; 18th Military Police Brigade Re-
port, Lessons Learned During the VC/NVA Tet Offensive, dtd
15 Feb 1968, OACSFOR-OT-RD 682144; 199th Infantry Bri-
gade, Long Binh/Saigon Tet Campaign, dtd 4 June 1968,
OACSFOR-OT-RD 68X018; Col Hoang Ngoc Lung, The Gen-
eral Offensives of 1968-69, Indochina Monographs (Washington:
382 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1981); II Field Force
Vietnam, Tet Offensive After Action Report, 31 January- 18
February 1968, OACSFOR-OT-RD 68X039.
Section 2
Principal sources used were 9th Infantry Division, Opera-
tional Report, dtd 21 August 1968, OACSFOR-OT-RD 682266;
II Field Force Vietnam, Operational Report, dtd 20 May 1968,
OACSFOR-OT-RD 682278.
Section 3
Principal sources used were 1st Cavalry Division, Combat
After Action Report: The Battle of Hue, 2-26 February 1968,
dtd 10 March 1968; 1st Cavalry Division, The Battle of Quang
Tri, OACSFOR-OT-RD 68X050; Fleet Marine Force Pacific,
Operations of U.S. Marine Forces in Vietnam, February 1968;
Col. Hoang Ngoc Lung, The General Offensives of 1968-69,
Indochina Monographs (Washington: U.S. Army Center of Mil-
itary History, 1981); MACV I Corps Tactical Zone Senior Ad-
visor, After Action Report: Tet Offensive, dtd 14 April 1968.
Section 4
Principal sources used were I Field Force Vietnam, Oper-
ational Report, dtd 21 August 1968, OACSFOR-OT-RD 682112;
5th Special Forces Group, Operational Report, dtd 14 August
1968, OACSFOR-OT-RD 682179; II Field Force Vietnam, Tet
Offensive Combat After Action Report, dtd 5 August 1968
OACSFOR-OT-RD 68X039; MACV, Quarterly SEER (System
for Evaluating the Effectiveness of RVNAF) Reports for 1968.
Chapter 16. Section 1
Principal sources used were 3d Marine Division, Command
Chronology Reports, January and February 1968; Capt. Moyers
S. Shore II, The Battle for Khe Sank (Washington: U.S. Marine
Corps, 1977).
Section 2
The principal source used was 5th Special Forces Group,
Battle of Lang Vet After Action Report, dtd 12 August 1968 ?
OACSFOR-OT-RD 68X037.
Section 3
Principal sources used were Capt. Moyers S. Shore II, The
Battle for Khe Sank (Washington: U.S. Marine Corps, 1977);
SOURCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY 383
Provisional Corps Vietnam, Operational Report, dtd 4 June 1968,
OACSFOR-OT-RD 682349; 3d Marine Division, Command
Chronology Reports, February-April 1968; 1st Cavalry Divi-
sion, Operational Report, dtd 13 June 1968, OACSFOR-OT-RD
682337.
Chapter 17. Section 1
Principal sources used were Provisional Corps Vietnam, Op-
erational Report, dtd 20 August 1968, OACSFOR-OT-RD 683363;
1st Cavalry Division, Operational Report, dtd 13 June 1968,
OACSFOR-OT-RD 682337; Lt. Gen. John J. Tolson, Airmobil-
ity, Vietnam Studies (Washington; Department of the Army,
1973), Chapter 9; 101st Airborne Division, Operational Report,
dtd 22 November 1968, OACSFOR-OT-UT 684306.
Section 2
Principal sources used were 3d Marine Division, Command
Chronology Reports for April-December 1968; Fleet Marine
Force Pacific, Operations of Marine Forces, Vietnam, reports
for April-December 1968.
Section 3
Principal sources used were 101st Airborne Division, Op-
erational Report, dtd 24 May 1968, OACSFOR-OT-RD 682315;
101st Airborne Division, Operational Report, dtd 15 August 1968,
OACSFOR-OT-RD 683306; 101st Airborne Division, Opera-
tional Report, dtd 22 November 1968, OACSFOR-OT-RD 684306;
Americal Division, Operational Report, dtd 7 May 1968,
OACSFOR-OT-RD 682332; Combat Developments Command
Trip Report, Combat Tactics of Americal Division, dtd 26 July
1968; Lt. Gen. W. R. Peers, The My Lai Inquiry (New York:
W. W. Norton & Co., 1979); XXIV Corps, Operational Report,
dtd 15 November 1968, OACSFOR-OT-RD 684253; XXIV Corps,
Operational Report, dtd 4 March 1969, OACSFOR-OT-RD
691303.
Section 4
Principal sources used were II Field Force Vietnam, Op-
erational Report, dtd 14 August 1968, OACSFOR-OT-RD 683289;
II Field Force Vietnam, Operational Report for Period Ending
31 October 1968, OACSFOR-OT-UT 684252; II Field Force
Vietnam, Operational Report for Period Ending 31 January 1969,
384 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
OACSFOR-OT-UT 691324; Maj. Gen. William B. Fulton, Riv-
erine Operations, Vietnam Studies (Washington: Department of
the Army, 1973),
Chapter 18. Section 1
Principal sources used were MACV, Quarterly SEER (Sys-
tem for Evaluating the Effectiveness of RVNAF) Reports for 1969;
MACV, Quarterly Evaluation Reports for 1969; USARV, Op-
erational Report for Period Ending 31 January 1969, OACSFOR-
OT-RD 691251; USARV, Operational Report, dtd 31 August 1969,
OACSFOR-OT-RD 693179; MACV, Command History, 1969,
Volume I; Original Papers, Vietnam Order of Battle Project.
Section 2
Principal sources used were USARV, Operational Report,
dtd 11 May 1969, OACSFOR-OT-RD 690248; Col. Hoang Ngoc
Lung, The General Offensives of 1968-69, Indochina Mono-
graphs (Washington; U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1981).
Section 3
Principal sources used were ACTIV Project ACG-78F Re-
port, Vehicle Convoy Operations in the Republic of Vietnam
(Washington: Army Research Office, 29 January 1972); Army
Combat Developments Command Trip Report 8-69, Convoy Se-
curity, dtd 20 January 1969; Army Combat Developments Com-
mand Report, Route and Convoy Security, dtd 5 December 1967;
Combat Developments Command Trip Report 9-69, Vulcan Em-
ployment in a Ground Combat Role, dtd 20 January 1969.
Section 4
Principal sources used were BDM Corporation, A Study of
Strategic Lessons Learned in Vietnam (McLean, Virginia: BDM,
1980), Volumes IV and VII; Douglas Kinnard, The War Man-
agers (Hanover, New Hampshire: University Press of New En-
gland, 1977); William L, Hauser, America's Army in Crisis (Bal-
timore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973); Original
Papers, Vietnam Order of Battle Project.
Chapter 19. Section 1
Principal sources used were 3d Marine Division, Command
Chronology Reports for January-February 1969; XXIV Corps,
Operational Report, dtd 4 June 1969, OACSFOR-OT-UT 692307;
XXIV Corps, Operational Report, dtd 23 August 1969,
SOURCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY 385
OACSFOR-OT-UT 693291; MACV Combat Experiences 3-69,
Task Force Remagen, dtd 7 September 1969; Headquarters, 1st
Brigade, 5th Infantry Division, Operational Report, dtd 30 May
1969, OACSFOR-OT-UT 692327; Headquarters, 1st Brigade, 5th
Infantry Division, Operational Report, dtd 18 September 1969,
OACSFOR-OT-RD 692327; 101st Airborne Division, Opera-
tional Report, dtd 20 August 1969, OACSFOR-OT-RD 693240;
Lt. Gen. John H. Hay, Jr., Tactical and Material Innovations,
Vietnam Studies (Washington: Department of the Army, 1974),
Chapter 5.
Section 2
Principal sources used were Americal Division, Operational
Report, dtd 19 August 1969, OACSFOR-OT-RD 692339; Amer-
ical Division, Operational Report, dtd 30 October 1969,
OACSFOR-OT-RD 693290; Americal Division, Operational Re-
port, dtd 10 November 1969, OACSFOR-OT-RD 694285; XXIV
Corps, Operational Report, dtd 9 February 1970, OACSFOR-
OT-UT 694298.
Chapter 20. Section 1
Principal sources used were 14th Military History Detach-
ment, Combat After Action Report: Battle of The Angel's Wing,
dtd 25 March 1969, OACSFOR-OT-RD 69X005; 25th Infantry
Division, Operational Report, dtd 1 May 1969, OACSFOR-OT-
RD 692282; 1st Cavalry Division, Operational Report, dtd 30
April 1969, OACSFOR-OT-RD 692094; 1st Cavalry Division,
Operational Report, dtd 15 August 1969, OACSFOR-OT-RD
693030; 25th Infantry Division, Operational Report, dtd 18 De-
cember 1969, OACSFOR-OT-RD 693230; II Field Force Viet-
nam, Operational Report for Period Ending 30 April 1969,
OACSFOR-OT-UT 692303.
Section 2
Principal sources used were llth Armored Cavalry Regi-
ment, Combat After Action Report: Operation ATLAS WEDGE,
dtd 10 December 1969, OACSFOR-OT-RD 69X027; II Field
Force Vietnam, Operational Report for Period Ending 31 July
1969, OACSFOR-OT-UT 693332; 1st Infantry Division, Oper-
ational Report, dtd 1 December 1969, OACSFOR-OT-UT 694230;
1st Infantry Division, Operational Report for Period Ending 31
386 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
January 1970, OACSFOR-OT-UT 701235; Headquarters, 2d In-
fantry Brigade, Combat After Action Report: Village Seal of Phu
Hoa Dong, dtd 29 September 1969.
Section 3
Principal sources used were 25th Infantry Division, Combat
After Action Interview Report, dtd 19 November 1969,
OACSFOR-OT-UT 701223; I Field Force Vietnam, Combat After
Action Report: Hawk/Hunter, 1st Platoon, B Company, 3d Bat-
talion (Airborne), 503d Infantry, dtd 15 May 1969, OACSFOR-
OT-UT 69X011; 1st Infantry Division Memorandum, Subject:
Night Ambush by 3/D/1-2 Inf., 9 Mar 1969, dtd 17 March 1969,
as supplemented by 17th Military History Detachment Combat
After Action Interviews.
Chapter 21. Section 1
Principal sources used were USARV, Operational Report,
dtd 23 February 1970, OACSFOR-OT-RD 701046; USARV, Op-
erational Report for Period Ending 31 July 1970, OACSFOR-
OT-RD 703176; II Field Force Vietnam, Operational Report,
dtd 14 May 1970, OACSFOR-OT-UT 702010; II Field Force
Vietnam, Operational Report for Period Ending 31 July 1970,
OACSFOR-OT-UT 703037; 4th Infantry Division, Operational
Report, dtd 20 August 1967, OACSFOR-OT-UT 703083; 25th
Infantry Division, Operational Report for Period Ending 31 July
1970, OACSFOR-OT-UT 703026; 1st Cavalry Division, Opera-
tional Report, dtd 14 August 1970, OACSFOR-OT-UT 703016;
llth Armored Cavalry Regiment, Operational Report, dtd 23
August 1970, OACSFOR-OT-UT 703255; MACV, Quarterly SEER
Reports for 1970; Brig. Gen. Tran Dinh Tho, The Cambodian
Incursion, Indochina Monographs (Washington: U.S. Army Center
of Military History, 1979).
Section 2
Principal sources used were USARV, Operational Report,
dtd 15 May 1970, OACSFOR-OT-RD 702054; XXIV Corps, Op-
erational Report, dtd 23 May 1970, OACSFOR-OT-UT 702217;
XXIV Corps, Operational Report, dtd 12 August 1970,
OACSFOR-OT-UT 703010; XXIV Corps, Operational Report,
dtd 12 November 1970, OACSFOR-OT-UT 704015; Americal
Division, Operational Report, dtd 10 May 1970, OACSFOR-OT-
UT 702210; 101st Airborne Division, Operational Report, dtd
SOURCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY 387
17 May 1970, OACSFOR-OT-UT 702186; 101st Airborne Divi-
sion, Operational Report, dtd 15 August 1970, OACSFOR-OT-
UT 703152; ACTIV Project ACG-80F Report, Fire Support Base
Defense (Washington: Army Research Office, March 1972)- Maj.
Gen. A. E. Milloy, Senior Officer Debriefing Report, dtd 10
March 1971, OACSFOR-OT-UT 71B015; Brig. Gen. Edward H.
Simmons, "Marine Corps Operations in Vietnam, 1969-1972,"
Naval Review (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1973).
Section 3
Principal sources used were Maj. Gen. Verne L. Bowers,
Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel and Administration, Head-
quarters, USARV, Final Report, dtd 10 September 1970
OACSFOR OT-UT 70B038; Maj. Gen. George S. Prugh, Law
at War: Vietnam, Vietnam Studies (Washington: Department of
the Army, 1975); USARV, Operational Report, dtd 15 Novem-
ber 1970, OACSFOR-OT-RD 704181; BDM Corporation, A Study
of Strategic Lessons Learned in Vietnam (McLean, Virginia: BDM,
1980), Volume VII; Gen. William C. Westmoreland, A Soldier-
Reports (New York: Doubleday, 1976); Original Papers, Viet-
nam Order of Battle Project.
Chapter 22. Section 1
Principal sources used were 101st Airborne Division, Final
Report: Airmobile Operations in Support of Operation LAM-
SON 719, dtd 24 April 1971, OACSFOR-OT-UT 71X010; XXIV
Corps, Operational Report, dtd 17 May 1971, OACSFOR-OT-
UT 711180; USARV, Operational Report, dtd 15 May 1971,
DAFD-OTT 711022; Maj. Gen. Nguyen Duy Hinh, Lam Son
719, Indochina Monographs (Washington: U.S. Army Center of
Military History, 1979).
Section 2
Principal sources used were USARV, Operational Report for
Period Ending 31 October 1971, DAFD-OTT 712033; ACTIV
Project ACG-75F Report, Rear Area Security and Base Defense
(Washington: Army Research Office, January 1972); Headquar-
ters, 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division, Operational Report, dtd
19 August 1971, OACSFOR-OT-UT 712182; 23d Infantry Di-
vision, Operational Report, dtd 1 November 1971, DAFD-OTT
712166; 101st Airborne Division, Operational Report, dtd 19
November 1971, DAMO-ODU 712196; Lt. Gen. A. S. Collins,
388 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
Jr., Senior Officer Debriefing Report, did 1 March 1971,
OACSFOR-OT-UT 71B013; Maj. Gen. Thomas M. Tarpley,
Senior Officer Debriefing Report, did 13 July 1972, DAFD-OTT
72B005; 97th Military Police Battalion, Operational Report, did
28 November 1971, DAFD-OTT 712074; Original Papers, Viet-
nam Order of Battle Project.
Section 3
Principal sources used were USARV, Operational Report for
Period Ending 30 April 1972, DAMO-ODU 721090; 196th In-
fantry Brigade, Operational Report for Period Ending 30 April
1972, HQDA Ltr. 525-73-13; BDM Corporation, A Study of
Strategic Lessons Learned in Vietnam (McLean, Virginia: BDM,
1980), Volume VII; Col. William E. Le Gro, Vietnam from Cease-
Fire to Capitulation (Washington: U.S. Army Center of Military
History, 1981); Lt. Col. G. H. Turley, "Easter Invasion, 1972,"
Marine Corps Gazette (March 1973); Original Papers, Vietnam
Order of Battle Project,
Conclusion
United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Annual His-
torical Summary, 1 January to 31 December 1968, RCS CSHIS-
6 (R2); Ltr, USCONARC TO DA DCSOPS, 14 August 1968,
Subject: Major Command Evaluation of Unit Readiness, RCS
CSGPO-265 (R2); Directorate of Operations, J-3, Headquarters,
U.S. Strike Command, Status of Forces; Headquarters, United
States Continental Army Command, USCONARC /USAR-
STRIKE Annual Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 1968, ATOPS-
HST 90507; 2d Infantry Division, Operational Report for Period
Ending 31 July 1968, OACSFOR-OT-RD 683302; 7th Infantry
Division, Operational Report for Period Ending 31 July 1968,
OACSFOR-OT-RD 683365.
General Sources
Barnes, Peter, Pawns, New York: Warner Paperbacks, 1971.
Baskir, Lawrence M., and Strauss, William A., Chance and
Circumstance, New York: Knopf, 1978.
BDM Corporation, A Study of Strategic Lessons Learned in
Vietnam, Volumes I- VIII and Executive Summary, McLean,
Virginia: BDM Corporation, 1980.
Blaufarb, Douglas S., The Counterinsurgency Era: U.S.
Doctrine and Performance, 1950 to the Present, New York: The
Free Press, 1977.
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Bonds, Ray, ed., The Vietnam War: An Illustrated History
of the Conflict in Southeast Asia, New York: Crown Publishers,
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Bouscaren, Anthony T., ed., All Quiet on the Eastern Front,
New York: Devin-Adair, 1977.
Boyle, Richard, Flower of the Dragon, San Francisco: Ram-
parts Press, 1972.
Cash, Maj. John A., Albright, John N., and Sandstrum, Lt.
Col. Allan W., Seven Firefights in Vietnam, Washington: Gov-
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Collins, Gen. James Lawton, Jr., The Development and
Training of the South Vietnamese Army, 1950-1972, Vietnam
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Cortright, David, Soldiers in Revolt: The American Military
Today, New York: Anchor Press, 1975.
Department of Defense, United States-Vietnam Relations,
1945-1967, Volumes 1-12, Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1971.
Dunn, Lt. Gen. Carroll H., Base Development in South
Vietnam, 1965-1970, Vietnam Studies, Washington: Depart-
ment of the Army, 1972.
Eckhardt, Maj. Gen. George S,, Command and Control,
1950-1969, Vietnam Studies, Washington: Department of the
Army, 1974.
Ewell, Gen. Julian J. ? and Hunt, Maj. Gen. Ira A., Jr.,
Sharpening the Combat Edge, Vietnam Studies, Washington:
Department of the Army, 1974.
Fails, Lt. Col. William R., Marines and Helicopters, 1962-
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Fox, Roger P., Air Base Defense in the Republic of Vietnam,
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Fulton, Maj. Gen. William B., Riverine Operations, 1966-
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Gabriel, Richard A. and Savage, Paul L., Crisis in Com-
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Galvin, John R., Air Assault: The Development of Airmobile
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Garland, Lt. Col. Albert N., "Infantry in Vietnam, Fort
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Goff, Stanley, and Sanders, Robert, with Smith, Clark,
Brothers: Black Soldiers in the Nam, Novato, California: Presi-
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Halberstam, David, The Best and the Brightest, New York:
Random House, 1972.
Hauser, William L., Americas Army in Crisis, Baltimore:
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Hay, Lt. Gen. John H., Jr., Tactical and Material Innova-
tions, Vietnam Studies, Washington, Department of the Army,
1974.
Helmer, John, Bringing the War Home: The American Sol-
dier in Vietnam and After, New York: Free Press, 1974.
Heiser, Lt. Gen. Joseph M., Jr., Logistic Support, Vietnam
Studies, Washington: Department of the Army, 1974.
Heitman, Francis B., Historical Register and Dictionary of
the United States Army, Volumes 1 and 2, Washington: Gov-
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Herr, Michael, Dispatches, New York: Avon Books, 1978.
Hinh, Maj. Gen. Nguyen Duy, Lam Son 719, Indochina
Monographs, Washington: U.S. Army Center of Military His-
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Hoopes, Townsend, The Limits of Intervention, New York:
David McKay Co., 1969.
Johnson, Haynes and Wilson, George C., Army in Anguish,
New York: Pocket Books, 1972.
Johnson, Lyndon B., The Vantage Point: Perspective of the
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Just, Ward, Military Men, New York: Knopf, 1970.
Kalb, Marvin and Abel, Elie, The Roots of Involvement: The
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Kelly, Col. Francis J., U.S. Army Special Forces, 1961-1971,
Vietnam Studies, Washington: Department of the Army, 1973.
Khuyen, Lt. Gen. Dong Van, The RVNAF, Indochina
Monographs, Washington: U.S. Army Center of Military His-
tory, 1979.
Kinnard, Douglas, The War Managers, Hanover, New
SOURCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY 391
Hampshire: University Press of New England, 1977.
Kissinger, Henry, White House Years, Boston: Little Brown
& Co., 1979.
Le Gro, Col. William E., Vietnam from Cease-Fire to Ca-
pitulation, Washington: U.S. Army Center of Military History,
1981.
Lewy, Guenter, America in Vietnam, New York: Oxford Press,
1978.
Loory, Stuart H., Defeated: Inside Americas Military Ma-
chine, New York: Random House, 1973.
Lung, Col. Hoang Ngoc, Strategy and Tactics, Indochina
Monographs, Washington: U.S. Army Center of Military His-
tory, 1980.
, The General Offensives of 1968-69: Indochina Mono-
graphs, Washington: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1981.
Mahon, John K. and Danysh, Romana, Infantry, Part I
Regular Army: Army Lineage Series, Washington: Office of the
Chief of Military History, U.S. Army, 1972.
Marshall, Brig. Gen. S. L. A., Ambush, New York: Cowles
Book Co., 1969.
, Battles in the Monsoon, New York: Morrow, 1967,
, Bird: The Christmastide Battle, New York: Cowles Book
Co., 1968.
, West to Cambodia, New York: Cowles Book Co., 1968.
Moskos, Charles C., The American Enlisted Man, New York:
Russell Sage Foundation, 1970.
Oberdorfer, Don, Tetl, New York: Doubleday, 1971.
Ott, Maj. Gen. David E., Field Artillery, 1954-1973, Viet-
nam Studies, Washington: Department of the Army, 1975.
Palmer, Brig. Gen. Dave R., Summons of the Trumpet, No-
vato, California: Presidio Press, 1978.
Palmer, Gregory, The McNamara Strategy and the Vietnam
War: Program Budgeting in the Pentagon, 1960-1968, West-
port, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1978.
Pearson, Lt. Gen. Willard, The War in the Northern Prov-
inces, 1966-1968, Vietnam Studies, Washington: Department of
the Army, 1975.
Peers, Lt. Gen. W. R., The My Lai Inquiry, New York: W.
W. Norton & Co., 1979.
392 THE RISE AND FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY
Polner, Murray, No Victory Parades: The Return of the Viet-
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Prugh, Maj. Gen. George S., Law at War: Vietnam, 1964-
1973, Vietnam Studies, Washington: Department of the Army,
1975.
Rogers, Lt. Gen. Bernard W., Cedar Falls-Junction City,
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Santoli, A1 5 Everything We Had, New York: Random House,
1981.
Schandler, Col. Herbert Y., The Unmaking of a President:
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SOURCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY 393
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Vietnam Veterans Against the War, The Winter Soldier In-
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INDEX
A Loui, 122, 262, 263
A Shau, 122-124, 136, 260-263,
295, 297-299, 344, 352
Abrams, Gen. Creighton W., 210,
215, 258, 283, 365
Air Force, 17, 34, 48, 51, 52, 60,
98, 103, 106, 123, 139, 148-
150, 152, 163, 167, 168, 175,
199, 254, 256, 314, 316
Squadron, 377th Security Po-
lice, 230
Airmobility, 25, 27 46-48, 50-52,
53, 56, 60, 81, 89-93, 100, 101,
137, 142, 148, 207, 261-263,
269, 314, 364
Alaskan Barge & Transport Co.,
217
Allen, Lt, 166
An Hoa, 120, 234, 306
An Khe, 17, 20, 49, 55, 109, 208,
240
An Lao Valley, 199
An Loc, 149, 243, 289, 291, 361
An Ninh, 50
An Thach, 193
An Tho, 193
Anderson, Lt. Col., 154
Ap Bia Mountain, 299-301
Ap Bau Bang, 150
Ap Nhi, 292
Armed forces, United States,
accidents, 24, 100, 110, 126,
161, 163, 170, 175, 190, 275,
339, 357
body count problems, 272
discipline, 11, 26, 27, 86, 87,
223, 272, 293, 294, 301, 348,
349, 357, 358, 360, 365, 366
disputes between, 256
drugs, 27, 348, 357, 358, 366
global posture, 24, 26, 29, 30,
96, 212, 213, 357, 364, 366, 367
leadership, 11, 86-88, 98, 161,
163, 271, 272, 293, 294, 331,
349, 365, 367
logistical problems, 18, 20-24,
33, 67, 72, 82, 93, 123, 136,
158, 160, 167, 170, 174, 178,
184, 186, 192, 210, 217, 218,
263, 264, 288-293, 298, 320,
363-365, 367
losses, concern over, 210, 215,
216, 301, 335, 340, 365
mobilization, 21, 27, 66, 109,
364, 366, 367
morale, 26-28, 75, 86, 95, 160-
162, 170, 176, 206, 292-294,
301, 331, 348, 358, 365, 366
National Guard, 21, 25, 211,
215, 293, 363, 367, 368
organization, 369, 370
personnel shortages, 26, 27, 53,
54, 66, 67, 75, 79, 95, 96, 139-
141, 171, 192, 207, 214, 294,
302, 364-368
personnel turbulence, 25-27,
67, 72, 75, 76, 79, 95, 96, 140,
141, 192, 196, 214, 294, 349,
365-368
proficiency, 85-88, 109, 116,
153, 160-164, 188, 194-196,
206, 263, 271, 286, 288, 293,
323, 331, 340, 348, 349, 357,
358, 365-368
racial problems, 27, 293, 348,
357, 366
readiness of, 21, 24, 25-27, 29,
30, 53, 67, 72, 93, 95, 96, 116,
395
396 INDEX
140, 141, 196, 205, 211-214,
266, 267, 363, 366, 367
reserves, 21, 25, 66, 109, 293,
363, 367, 368
training, 25-27, 46, 54, 67, 70,
74-80, 88, 95, 96, 196, 206,
207, 213, 266, 271, 293, 363,
366, 367
units in Vietnam, 19, 30, 65,
66, 82, 133, 205, 284, 335, 336,
355
withdrawal from Vietnam, 284,
285, 288, 323, 335, 336, 346-
348, 351, 355-360, 362, 363
see also United States
Army, United States, 8, 11, 18-
28, 35, 52-54, 65, 66, 74, 78,
86, 87, 95, 122, 133, 153, 157,
179, 195, 201, 205-208, 211-
218, 226, 239, 266, 284, 335,
341, 342, 350, 355-363, 366,
368-370
see also Armed Forces
Corps, 66
Provisional, 255
III, 66
XVIII, 215
XXIV, 255, 295, 297, 301, 342,
360
Field Forces, 65, 66, 206
I, 66, 111, 240
II, 66, 134, 227, 228, 314, 359
Divisions:
Americal (23d Infantry), 195,
196, 197, 205, 206, 269, 271,
272, 284,, 303-305, 336, 342,
351, 355, 359, 360
1st Armored, 24, 213, 304, 367
1st Cavalry, 14, 17, 24, 49, 52-
56, 60, 61, 65, 72, 76, 82, 89,
90, 97, 109, 111, 113, 114, 117,
136, 137, 139, 170, 192, 197-
199, 201, 205-208, 232, 236,
237, 256-258, 260, 262, 263,
279, 284, 308, 313, 314, 319,
329, 336, 338-340, 342, 349,
355, 358, 359, 362
1st Infantry, 22, 24, 65, 66, 75,
76, 82, 85, 87, 88, 99-101, 106,
108, 133, 134, 139, 141, 145-
148, 205, 209, 273, 284, 319,
320, 322, 323, 328, 329, 336,
346
2d Armored, 24, 213, 367
2d Infantry, 24, 53, 212, 367
3d Armored, 24, 366
3d Infantry, 24, 366
4th Armored, 24
4th Infentry, 24, 65, 69, 70, 73,
85, 109, 133, 136, 157, 161,
163, 164, 170, 171, 177, 178,
195, 205, 208, 284, 308, 336,
340, 347
5th Infantry, 24, 76, 213-215,
266, 267, 284, 295, 297, 301,
302, 336, 342, 351, 352, 355,
359, 367
6th Infantry, 213, 367
7th Infantry, 24, 367
8th Infantry, 24
9th Infantry, 65, 78-80, 133,
137, 149, 153, 154, 156, 205,
210, 226-228, 244, 273, 274,
276, 284, 319, 320, 336, 338,
347
llth Air Assault, 20, 24, 25, 52,
53, 56
24th Infantry, 24, 347, 366
25th Infantry, 20, 24, 65, 66,
69-73, 78, 82, 97, 98, 108, 109,
111, 133, 144, 146, 148, 153,
191, 192, 195, 197, 198, 205,
209, 230, 273, 274, 276, 279,
308, 314, 315, 317, 319, 323,
INDEX 397
324, 336, 338, 339, 347, 355,
358
82d Airborne Division, 24, 77,
211-215, 279, 284, 367
101st Airborne Division, 22, 24,
48, 49, 52, 53, 65, 82, 91, 111,
133, 137-141, 191, 194, 195,
206-208, 211, 243, 263, 269,
278, 284, 295, 298, 336, 344,
345, 351, 352, 355-357
Task Force Oregon, 138, 184,
190-192, 195, 198
Commands, 1st Logistical, 23,
286, 288, 292
Depot, 506th Field, 217
Brigades:
1st Aviation, 92
llth Infantry, 196, 206, 271-
273, 351, 360, 367
18th Military Police, 290
29th Infantry, 367
69th Infantry, 367
171st Infantry, 24, 73
172d Infantry, 24, 73
173d Airborne, 20, 21, 24, 45-
49, 53, 65, 66, 82, 85, 99, 109,
133, 139, 141, 145-149, 157,
169-172, 178, 205, 207, 208,
284, 308, 325, 336, 355, 360
193d Infantry, 24
194th Armored, 24, 213
196th Infantry, 65, 76-78, 85,
107-109, 133, 144, 153, 191,
192, 195-197, 264, 303, 305,
359-362, 367
197th Infantry, 24, 53, 54, 213,
215
198th Infantry, 196, 360, 367
199th Infantry, 65, 70, 71, 74,
133, 142-144, 205, 209, 224,
227, 228, 273, 284, 319, 320,
336, 340, 347, 367
Groups:
8th Transportation, 290
llth Aviation, 262, 360
12th Aviation, 66, 228
23d Artillery, 66
34th General Support, 93
35th Engineer, 357
45th Engineer, 351
48th Transportation, 289, 292
89th Military Police, 223
108th Artillery, 351, 352
Hospitals:
22d Surgical, 271
71st Evacuation, 241
Regiments, Armor:
34th, 151, 338
69th, 72, 73, 163, 241
77th, 268, 297
Regiments, Artillery:
16th, 115
19th, 115
20th, 114
33d, 149
77th, 150
319th, 345
Regiments, Cavalry:
1st, 91, 196, 214, 284, 304, 336,
352, 355
2d, 24
3d, 24
4th, 101, 103-106, 144, 230
5th, 59, 113, 149, 150, 232,
257, 302, 309, 336, 342, 355,
358
6th, 213, 215, 367
7th, 57-59, 110, 236, 239, 256,
257, 261, 262, 363
8th, 114, 198-201
9th, 56, 90, 199, 261, 263, 338
10th, 165, 355
llth, 24, 65, 74-76, 85, 133,
145-149, 205, 209, 228, 229,
398 INDEX
284, 291, 319, 320-322, 336,
338, 339, 355-357
12th, 110, 115, 198, 201, 232,
236, 257
14th, 24, 356, 357
17th, 91, 196, 197, 228, 241,
243, 339, 352
18th, 214
Regiments, Infantry:
1st, 107, 108, 361
2d, 105-107, 149, 289, 328, 331
3d, 343
5th, 146, 277
7th, 143, 224-226
8th, 159, 163-168, 340
9th, 73, 144, 315, 317
llth, 302
12th, 71, 143, 151, 158, 159,
167, 168, 171, 172, 177, 340
14th, 73
16th, 99, 100, 106, 148, 152,
18th, 100, 103, 105, 106
21st, 264, 265, 303-305, 363
22d, 150, 151, 160, 209, 241,
317, 339
23d, 73
26th, 145, 151, 152
27th, 97-99, 107, 108, 224, 315,
324, 325
28th, 101-103, 105, 106
31st, 108, 196, 305
35th, 111, 161, 193, 194
39th, 153-156, 228, 244, 276
46th, 303-305, 359
47th, 78, 227, 244, 274, 338
50th, 199, 284, 336
52d, 303, 304
60th, 79, 154, 226, 244, 274,
284
61st, 267, 297
187th, 299, 300
327th, 112, 113
501st, 300
502d, 49, 50, 113, 222, 298, 299
503d, 45, 47, 48, 76, 99, 147,
169, 171-178, 240, 241, 326
505th, 271
506th, 229, 241, 243, 300, 340,
344, 345
Battalions:
1st Engineer, 145
4th Engineer, 241
8th Engineer, 262
13th Aviation, 19
14th Aviation, 19, 354
14th Engineer, 352
15th Engineer, 79, 80
25th Aviation, 316
30th Military Police, 212
45th Transportation, 19
52d Aviation, 19
58th Transportation, 289
97th Military Police, 358
145th Aviation, 19
158th Aviation, 352
168th Engineer, 148, 149
223d Aviation, 352
299th Engineer, 170
504th Military Police, 212
716th Military Police, 20, 222,
223
720th Military Police, 243
Companies:
127th Military Police, 358
179th Aviation, 178
335th Aviation, 175
919th Engineer, 75
1002d Supply & Service, 293
Utility Tactical Transport Avia-
tion, 19
Platoon, 39th Scout Dog, 171,
172
Army Special Forces, 8-19, 24,
55, 56, 61, 77, 97, 101, 102,
107, 111, 114, 117, 122-125,
149, 157, 168, 170, 172, 174,
INDEX 399
249-254, 257, 262, 288, 298,
364, 367
1st Group, 24
3d Group, 24
5th Group, 9, 10, 19, 24, 82,
122, 133, 205, 241, 245, 250,
284, 303, 336, 355, 356
Detachment A-101, 122, 250
Detachment A-102, 303
Detachment A-106, 232
Detachment A-217, 14
Detachment A-233, 242
Detachment A-342, 13
Detachment B-23, 240
Detachment B-24, 241
Detachment B-34, 12
Detachment B-42, 245
Detachment B-52 (DELTA), 10,
11, 16, 17
6th Group, 24
7th Group, 24
8th Group, 24
10th Group, 24
Ashley, SFC Eugene Jr., 252-254
Australia, 46, 47, 82, 133, 134,
205, 210, 242, 273, 319
B-52 bombing, 43, 47, 59, 105,
113, 118, 145, 162, 178, 192,
255, 261, 313, 322, 337, 340,
346, 348, 352, 353, 361
Ba Gi, 217
Ba Gia, 6
Ba Bia, 242
Ba To, 232
Bac Lieu, 217
Ban Me Thuot, 111, 217, 220, 240,
241
Barott, Lt. Col. William C., 108
Barrier Island, 307
Barsanti, Maj. Gen. Olinto M.,
140, 141
Bautz, Maj. Gen. Edward Jr., 339
Bear Cat, 227
Beckwith, Maj. Charlie A., 16, 17
Ben Cat, 146, 242
Ben Cui Plantation, 277
Ben Het, 172, 286, 288
Ben Sue, 145, 146
Bennett, Maj. Gen. Warren K.,
319
Bien Hoa, 19, 20, 22, 46, 47, 72,
141, 209, 210, 222, 229, 273,
274, 287, 308, 362
Binh Gia, 4
Binh Phuoc, 154
Binh Son, 189
Blair, Capt. John D. IV, 122-124
Boi Loi Woods, 99, 144
Bong Son, 109, 114, 115, 197-199,
201, 240
Bowie, Lt. Col. Kyle W., 102
Breeding, Capt., 250
Brown, Col. Thomas W., 56
Bu Dop, 340
Burcham, Lt. Col. Jerry J., 309,
311
Burns, Staff Sgt. Leon R., 186
Ca Lu, 256, 257, 297
Cahill, Lt. Col. John J. H., 257
Cai Be, 243
Cai Lay, 243
Galley, Lt. William L. Jr., 272
Cam Lo, 125, 179-181, 267, 342
Cam Ranh Bay, 22, 23, 49, 217,
218, 358
Cambodia, 56, 84, 85, 97, 111,
135, 147, 151, 157, 158, 161,
164, 168, 178, 209, 245, 273,
279, 284, 287, 308, 309, 314,
315, 317, 319, 324, 335-342,
347, 350, 355, 356, 365
Campbell, Col., 258
Can Duoc, 276
400 INDEX
Can Tho, 216, 243-245
Carpenter, Capt. William S. Jr.,
112
Carroll, Camp, 179, 182, 267
Casey, Maj. Gen. George W., 342
Cay Giap Mountains, 110
Central Intelligence Agency, 9, 10
Cha Rang, 289
Chau Phu, 243, 245
China, 3, 134, 136
Cholon, 222, 223, 227, 243, 274,
275
Chu Lai, 20, 31, 33, 35, 36, 67-
69, 117, 119, 120, 138, 184,
189-191, 195, 206, 213, 232,
360
Chu Pong Mountains, 56, 57, 111
Clifford, Clark M., 215
Coates, Capt. Sterling K., 186
Cobb, Col. William C., 76
Coleman, John D., Capt., 114
Collins, Maj. Gen. Arthur S., 70
Con Thien, 179, 181, 183-188,
266, 267, 301, 302, 342
Cu Chi, 72, 73, 83, 97, 141, 230,
242
Cua Viet River Valley, 127, 188,
264
Cushman, Lt. Gen. Robert E.,
185
Dalat, 240, 242
Da Nang, 19, 20, 30-36, 40, 68,
69, 83, 117, 118, 120-122, 138,
189, 206, 212, 220, 231, 249,
266, 268, 303, 306, 307, 342,
359-362
Daem, Col. Leonard, 209
Dai Do, 264, 265
Dai Dong, 200, 201
Dak To, 112, 113, 141, 168-174,
178, 199, 201
Dak Seang, 170
Dau Tieng, 70, 107, 108, 145, 276,
277, 289
Davis, Maj. Gen. Raymond G.,
295
Deane, Brig. Gen. John R. Jr.,
147, 169
Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), 3, 30,
84, 117, 125, 127, 129, 136,
138, 139, 179, 180, 183-185,
188, 189, 191, 206, 219, 264,
266-268, 284, 295, 301, 302,
304, 342, 359, 361
Barrier Project, 184, 185, 187,
188, 206, 259, 317
DePuy, Maj. Gen. William E., 88,
101, 105
DeSaussure, Brig. Gen. Edward
H., 107, 109
Di An, 320
Diem, Ngo Dinh, 4
Dien Bien Phu, 249
Dong Ha, 125, 128, 179, 186, 188,
235, 258, 264, 266, 361
Dong Xoai, 12-14, 141
Douglas, William O., 293
Due Co, 47, 111, 157, 164, 168
Due Hoa, 144, 217, 242
Due Pho, 192, 343
Duke, Lt. Col. Lee D., 322
Eagle, Camp, 362
Eckhardt, Maj. Gen. George S.,
78
Evans, Camp, 262
Explosive Ordnance Disposal
teams, 228
Fields, Maj. Gen. Lewis J., 67-
69
Filhol Plantation, 144, 208
Fire Support Base Brown, 340
INDEX 401
Fire Support Base Buell, 276
Fire Support Base Burt, 209
Fire Support Base Charlie, 2, 359
Fire Support Base Crook, 317, 318
Fire Support Base Gold, 150, 151
Fire Support Base Holiday Inn,
321
Fire Support Base Mary Ann, 359,
360
Fire Support Base O'Reilly, 346
Fire Support Base Pope, 279
Fire Support Base Ripcord, 344-
346
Fire Support Base Siberia, 305
Forbes, Brig. Gen. Robert C., 224
Forsythe, Maj. Gen. George, L,
308
Gettys, Maj. Gen. Charles M.,
303
Gibson, Col. James M., 301
Gio Linh, 179, 181, 184
Glikes, Col. Richard J., 266
Go Dau Ha, 78
Go Noi Island, 306
Go Vap, 224, 237
Greene, Gen. Wallace M., Jr., 30,
66
Hai Van Pass, 19, 30, 268
Haig, Lt. Col. Alexander M., 145,
151, 152
Hamburger Hill, [see] Ap Bia
Mountain or Hill 937
Harkins, Gen. Paul D., 19
Harvey, Capt. William R., 165
Helicopter Valley, 126, 127
Hennessey, Maj. Gen. John J.,
345
Herrick, Lt. Henry T., 57
Herrin, Capt., 58
Hiep Due, 40, 41, 305
Hill 63, 196
Hill 64, 254
Hill 110, 189
Hill 117, 185
Hill 158, 179
Hill 174, 185
Hill 471, 257
Hill 208, 302
Hill 558, 181
Hill 823, 171
Hill 861, 181, 182, 248, 249, 257
Hill 861A, 250
Hill 875, 174-178, 196
Hill 881 North, 181, 183, 247, 258
Hill 881 South, 181-183, 257, 258
Hill 937, 299-301
Hinh, Col. Nguyen Buy, 231
Ho Bo Woods, 99, 144
Hoa Vang, 232
Hoc Mon, 143, 224
Hochmuth, Maj. Gen. Bruno A.,
181, 187
Hoi An, 232
Hon Quan, 101
Holloway, Camp, 17, 19
Howard, Lt. Col. E. P., 305
Hubbell, Capt. Thomas S., 188
Hue, 31, 33, 117, 119-122, 207,
208, 210, 215, 216, 232, 233-
239, 242, 256, 260, 268, 269,
344, 361
Hughes, Col. Stanley S., 235
la Drang Valley, 14, 56, 60, 61,
65, 89, 111, 164, 363
Iron Triangle, 134, 135, 142, 144-
147, 320
Jenkins, Lt. Homer K., 38, 39
Johnson, Lt. Col. James H., 176
402 INDEX
Johnson, Lyndon B., 21, 33, 66,
109, 215
Karch, Brig. Gen. Frederick J.,
31, 32
Katum, 147
Kennedy, John F., 8, 24, 29
Khe Sanh, 137, 179, 181-183, 188,
206-208, 247-250, 254-259,
295, 297, 298, 351, 352
King, Dr. Martin Luther Jr., 215
Kinnard, Maj. Gen. Harry W. O.,
52, 56, 109
Kissinger, Henry, 283
Knowles, Brig. Gen. Richard T.,
109
Kontum, 47, 169-171, 208, 209,
220, 240, 241, 288, 361
Korea, 22, 24, 32, 34, 53, 133,
212, 217, 218, 222, 289, 363,
367
Brigades, 2d Marine, 68, 82,
111, 134, 138, 205, 206, 306,
307
Divisions:
Capital, 109, 111, 134, 205, 209
9th, 134, 205, 209, 240
Regimental Combat Team,
98th, 367
Koster, Maj. Gen. Samuel W., 271
Krulak, Lt. Gen. Victor H. 33
Ky, Nguyen Cao, 120, 230, 275
Laird, Melvin, 283, 284
Lam, Lt. Gen. Hoang Xuan, 231,
234, 236
Lam Son, 216
Landing Zone Albany, 59, 60
Landing Zone Bird, 115, 116
Landing Zone Carolyn, 313
Landing Zone George, 152
Landing Zone Grant, 313
Landing Zone Jamie, 313
Landing Zone Stud, 256
Landing Zone X-Ray, 57-59, 363
Lang Vei, 179, 188, 250, 254, 257,
298
Lanigan, Col. John P., 182
Laos, 32, 84, 122, 135, 136, 178,
184, 250-252, 254, 257, 258,
260, 284, 295-299, 301, 335,
350-352, 355
Battalion, 33rd Volunteer, 250
Larsen, Maj. Gen. Stanley R., 66
Lazzell, Lt. Col. Rufus G., 107,
148
Leach, Col. James H., 322
Lewane, Lt. Col. Leonard L., 103,
105
Loc Ninh, 101, 103, 139
Long Binh, 66, 71, 227-229, 287,
289, 292, 358, 362
Long Thanh, 273
Lownds, Col. David E., 247
Marines, United States, 19, 20,
26, 29-44, 50, 51, 65-69, 95,
117-122, 124-129, 138, 179-
191, 195, 205, 206, 208, 212,
221, 231, 234-239, 247-250,
254-259, 264-269, 277, 284,
295-298, 301-303, 305-307,
335, 336, 342, 347, 355, 356,
361, 363, 366, 368-370, see also
Armed Forces
Amphibious Force, III, 34, 35,
66, 69, 138, 185, 186, 192, 206,
208, 234, 268, 342, 360
Divisions:
1st Marine, 30, 44, 65, 67-69,
133, 138, 189, 190, 205, 206,
268, 284, 303, 306, 336, 342,
359
2d Marine, 30, 213
INDEX 403
3d Marine, 30, 34, 43, 65, 82,
133, 136, 138, 180, 181, 184,
187, 205, 206, 264, 284, 285,
295, 301, 302
5th Marine, 206, 212, 213
Brigades:
1st, 30
9th, 30, 31, 33, 34, 138
Group, Aircraft 16, 187
Regiments:
1st Marines, 30, 42, 67, 68,
118, 127, 188, 189, 234, 235,
256, 306, 355
2d Marines, 30
3d Marines, 30, 32-37, 39, 42,
118, 127, 180-183, 185, 186,
231, 256, 266
4th Marines, 30, 33, 35, 38, 68,
117, 118, 120, 126-129, 180,
184, 185, 264, 265
5th Marines, 30, 69, 127, 189,
190, 231, 235, 237, 238, 306,
355
6th Marines, 30
7th Marines, 22, 30, 35, 36, 39,
42-44, 67, 68, 117, 120, 128,
305, 306, 347
8th Marines, 30
9th Marines, 30, 32, 35, 118,
181, 182, 185, 186, 249, 257,
266, 295-297, 299
26th Marines, 127, 138, 183,
185, 187, 206, 248, 250, 255,
257, 258, 267, 307, 347
27th Marines, 212, 214, 268,
269, 367
Battalions:
1st Light Antiaircraft, 32, 33
1st Military Police, 268
3d Reconnaissance, 33, 125, 127
llth Engineer, 256, 258
Squadrons, Helicopter:
HMM-163, 19
HMM-361, 186
HMM-365, 19
Task Force Shufly, 19
Company, 1st Force Recon-
naissance, 118
Detachment, Saigon Guard, 221
Martinez, Platoon Sgt, 311, 312
McDade, Lt. Col. Robert A., Jr.,
60
McKenna, Col, 169
McMahon, Capt, 128
McNamara, Robert S., 25, 52, 66,
137, 140, 184, 188, 205, 215,
259, 317
Meloy, Maj. Guy S. Ill, 108
Michelin Plantation, 107, 320, 321
Military Assistance Command
Vietnam (MACV), 5, 18, 19, 23,
30, 33, 44, 61, 65, 72, 73, 77,
78, 80, 82, 85, 88, 95, 99, 100,
109, 117, 133-137, 141, 143,
144, 187, 191, 192, 205, 208,
210-215, 217-219, 228, 233,
234, 240, 241, 244, 255, 256,
260, 263, 264, 268, 272, 273,
279, 283, 284, 289, 292, 295,
296, 298, 299, 301, 314, 315,
319, 320, 335-337, 341, 350,
355-357
Milloy, Maj. Gen. Albert E., 322,
323, 342
Minh Thanh Road, Battle of, 105-
107, 148
Mini-Tet, 210, 227, 273-276
Moc Hoa, 243
Molinelli, Lt. Col. Robert F., 352
Moore, Col. Harold G. Jr., 57,
109, 363
Mutter's Ridge, see Nui Cay Tre
My Lai massacre, 272, 273
My Tho, 220, 238, 243, 244, 276
404 INDEX
NAVAJO WARHORSE, Opera-
tional Area, 308
Navy, United States, 13, 31, 32,
36, 37, 39-43, 68, 103, 118,
127, 138, 188, 192, 210, 236,
238, 244, 256, 267, 276, 277,
307
New Zealand, 133, 134
Newport Bridge, 218, 242, 243
Nha Trang, 10, 19, 20, 66, 122,
218, 240
Nhi Binh, 143
Nhi Ha, 265, 266
Nihn Hoa, 240
Nixon, Richard M., 283-285, 358,
362
North Vietnam, 3, 20, 61, 140,
249, 264, 273, 276, 283, 323
North Vietnamese Army (NVA),
11, 14-17, 24, 40, 56, 57-61,
65, 73, 80-86, 90, 91, 97, 108,
110-115, 117, 119, 122-129,
133-137, 139, 142, 148, 157-
192, 196-199, 201, 206-208,
210-212, 216, 231-234, 237-
241, 243, 245-255, 257, 258,
260-269, 271, 275-277, 283-
285, 287-290, 295-297, 300-
304, 308-313, 316-318, 320-
325, 335-341, 345, 346, 348,
350-356, 358-362, 364, 365
Divisions:
1st, 111, 157, 164, 178, 313
2d, 117, 189, 190, 196, 231
3d, 117, 197
5th, 115
7th, 313, 320
10th, 157, 164
304th, 247, 249
320th, 264-266
324B, 127, 128, 179, 237
325B, 125
325C, 182, 247
Regiments:
3d, 189, 303
4th, 233
5th, 237
6th, 233, 239
18th, 34, 110, 198
21st, 190
22d, 110, 115, 198
24th, 112, 169, 241
29th, 300
31st, 185
32d, 14, 166-168, 178, 185
33d, 14, 240
36th, 120
66th, 14, 59, 167, 168, 178,
251, 257
88th, 139, 318
90th, 186
95th, 240
95B, 165
101st, 108, 148
101D, 254
174th, 171, 173, 174, 178
320th, 321
716th, 188
803d, 345
812th, 180, 185, 187, 232
Battalions:
195th Antiaircraft, 41
402d Sapper, 231
406th Sapper, 241
Norton, Maj. Gen. John, 113, 197,
198
Nui Ba Den, 147
Nui Cay Tre (Mutter's Ridge), 128,
129
Ohanesian, Lt. Col. Victor, 180,
181
Operations, allied military:
ABILENE, 99, 100
INDEX 405
ALA MOANA, 144
APACHE SNOW, 299-301
ATLAS WEDGE, 320
ATTLEBORO, 85, 107-109,
133
BADGER TOOTH, 188
BEAU CHARGER, 185
BINH TAY I, 340
BIRMINGHAM, 100
BUFFALO, 186
CEDAR FALLS, 134, 135,
145-147
COLORADO, 189
COBURG, 210
CRAZY HORSE, 111, 114
CRIMP, 99
DAVY CROCKETT, 111, 113
DEFIANT STAND, 307
DELAWARE, 261
DEWEY CANYON I and II,
295, 351
DOUBLE EAGLE, 117, 118
EL PASO I and II, 101-107
ENTERPRISE, 153
FAIRFAX, 142, 143
FRANCIS MARION, 164-168
FREDERICK HILL, 304, 305
GARDEN PLOT, see United
States civil disturbances
GARFIELD, 111
GIBRALTAR, 49-52
GREELEY, 168, 169-171
HARVEST MOON, 40-43, 189
HASTINGS, 125-127
HAWTHORNE, 112, 113
HICKORY, 185
HIGHLAND, 49
HOLLINGSWORTH, 100
HUMP, 47, 48
IRVING, 111, 115
JEFFERSON GLENN, 356
JOHN PAUL JONES, 113
JUNCTION CITY, 135, 137,
147-153, 191
KEYSTONE series, 323, 355
KLAMATH FALLS, 141
LAM SON 54, 185
LAM SON 207, 256
LAM SON 216, 261
LAM SON 246, 263
LAM SON 719, 136, 351-356
LEXINGTON III, 100, 101
MAC ARTHUR, 168, 171-178
MALLET, 99
MALHEUR I and II, 192
MARAUDER, 99
MASHER/WHITE WING,
109, 114
MASSACHUSETTS STRIK-
ER, 298, 299
MASTIFF, 99
MONTANA MAULER, 301
MONTANA RAIDER, 313
NEVADA EAGLE, 269
NEW YORK, 119
PAUL REVERE I-IV, 111
PEGASUS, 256
PERSHING, 198, 199, 201
PIRANHA, 40
PRAIRIE, 127-129, 179
SAM HOUSTON, 157-164
SCOTLAND II, 295
SEWARD, 113
SILVER BAYONET, 56-61
SOMERSET PLAIN, 263
STARLITE, 35-40
TEXAS, 120
TEXAS STAR, 334
THAYER, 111
TOAN THANG series, 273,
320, 338, 339
TRAN HUNG DAO, 226
UNION I and II, 189, 190
UNIONTOWN, 71, 209
406 INDEX
UTAH, 119, 120
WHEELER/WALLOWA, 271
YELLOWSTONE, 153, 209
Otis, Lt. Col. Glenn K., 230
Pacific Architects & Engineers,
217
Page, Capt. James F., 42, 43
Parker, Capt. David L., 309
Patton, Col. George S., 320, 322
Patrol Base Diamond I and II, 315
Patrol Base Frontier City, 315-317
Patrol Base Kotrc, 324
Pearson, Brig. Gen. Willard, 111
Peatross, Col. Oscar F., 35
Peers, Maj. Gen. William R., 70,
157, 158, 164
Pentagon (Joint Chiefs of Staff),
20, 30, 48, 73, 74, 84, 135, 212,
213, 216, 256, 285, 366, 367
Phan Rang, 195, 209
Phan Thiet, 20, 112, 240, 241
Philco-Ford, 217
PHOENIX, Project, 245
Phii Bai, 31, 33, 35, 117-119, 138,
206, 210, 234, 255, 361, 362
Phii Cuong, 242
Phu Hoa Dong, 322
Phu Lam, 227, 274
Phu Loc, 269
Phu Loi, 320
Phu Tho Racetrack, 224-227, 275
Phu Thu Peninsula, 119
Phu Vinh, 243
Phung Du, 110
Phuoc Ha Valley, 40, 41, 189, 271
Phuoc Lu, 309
Phuoc Vinh, 141, 320
Plateau Gi, 170
Plei Djereng, 164
Plei Me, 14, 16, 17, 56, 61, 111
Pleiku, 14, 16, 17, 19, 20, 47, 56,
69, 70, 73, 111, 136, 167, 209,
217, 220, 241, 289, 290
Powell, Lt., 310
Prek Klok, 148
Price, Capt. Donald, 154-156
Project PRACTICE NINE/ILLI-
NOIS CITY/DYE MARKER,
see Demilitarized Zone barrier
Pusser, Capt. Thomas, 17
Quan Loi, 103, 105, 209
Quan Long, 243
Quang Ngai, 6, 7, 41, 118, 120,
216, 232
Quang Tri, 182, 187, 206, 207,
214, 232, 235, 266, 359, 361
Que Son Valley, 189, 306, 342
Qui Nohn, 19, 20, 22, 49, 83, 111,
209, 240, 289, 290
Rach Gia, 243
Rach Kien, 154
Radcliff, Maj. Don G., 55
Ramsey, Maj. Gen. Lloyd B., 305
Rattan, Col. Donald V., 232
Rawls, Capt. Robert E., 50
Reckewell, Capt., 121
Rifle, M16, performance, 75, 78,
90, 107, 140, 142, 182, 216,
225, 286
Roach, Lt. Terence R., 254
Roberts, Maj. Gen. Elvy B., 17,
313, 338, 339
Robertson, Maj. Gen. Donn J.,
190
Robinson, Capt. Donald R., 5-7
Rockpile, The, 125, 128, 179, 182,
267
Rosson, Lt. Gen. William B., 255
Rowe, Lt. Col. Gordon D., 222
Sa Dec, 217, 243
Saigon, 19-21, 31, 66, 72, 78, 97,
INDEX 407
99, 142-144, 153, 209, 210,
215, 218-227, 237, 242, 243,
273-276, 287, 307, 308, 314,
315, 319, 336, 361, 362
Schenning, Lt. Col. Richard J.,
186
Schungel, Lt. Col. Daniel F., 251-
253
Schweiter, Brig. Gen. Leo H., 171
SEAL, 245
Seaman, Lt. Gen. Jonathan O.,
66, 134
Sharp, Adm. U. S. Grant, 84
Shoemaker, Brig. Gen. Robert H.,
338
Simpson, Maj. Gen. Ormond R.,
306
Smith, Lt. Col. Wilfrid K. G., 49-
52
Snoul, 339
Soc Trang, 19, 243, 245
Son Long Valley, 110
Son My, 272
Song Be, 12, 139, 208, 243, 292,
320
Song Re Valley, 199
Soui Cau, 108
Soui Da, 107
Soui Tre, 150
South Vietnam, 3-5, 8, 9, 11, 12,
18, 20, 23, 24, 31, 34, 61, 65,
117, 120, 133, 136, 137, 142,
157, 164, 179, 205, 208, 211,
222, 231, 238, 240, 242, 245,
246, 276, 336, 337, 355, 361,
363
South Vietnam, Army (ARVN), 4,
7, 20, 33, 46, 47, 51, 82-84,
109, 111, 117, 119, 120, 124,
125, 133-136, 139, 142-144,
153, 170, 171, 185, 189, 201,
215, 216, 219-222, 224, 226,
227, 231-234, 239-245, 249,
258, 259, 263, 273-275, 277,
279, 283-287, 301, 306-308,
314, 319, 324, 327, 335-342,
347, 350-356, 361, 362, 364-
366
Marine Corps (VNMC), 83, 134,
216, 221, 237, 238, 274, 354
Special Forces (LLDB), 11, 14,
83, 97, 122, 123, 134, 157, 251-
254,
Special Tactial Zone, 24th, 241
Corps headquarters:
I, 231
III, 227, 229
Divisions:
Airborne ("Rainbow"), 121, 134-
136, 216, 245, 285, 314, 338,
352, 354, 361
Marine, 216, 285, 361
1st, 31, 83, 119, 120, 134, 139,
216, 233, 237, 245, 285, 286,
352, 353, 361, 362
2d, 31, 117, 134, 192, 216, 285,
286, 305, 357
3d, 359, 361
5th, 83, 134, 135, 139, 216,
285, 319, 320, 322, 347, 362
7th, 83, 134, 216, 244, 285
9th, 83, 134, 216, 244, 285, 286
10th, 83
18th, 83, 134, 217, 242, 285,
286, 319, 362
21st, 83, 134, 139, 217, 244,
285
22d, 83, 109, 117, 134, 217,
285, 308, 347
23d, 83, 134, 217, 240, 285,
286, 308
25th, 83, 134, 217, 285, 314,
319, 347
Groups:
408 INDEX
2d Ranger, 139
5th Ranger, 142-144, 209, 219,
226, 275
Regiments:
Palace Guard, 83, 134
1st, 232, 263, 344, 346, 352
2d, 139, 235, 264, 302, 352, 353
3d, 119, 233, 234, 235, 237,
239, 262, 299, 300
5th, 40-42, 305
6th, 41
7th, 13, 322
9th, 139
40th, 200, 240, 340
41st, 217
42d, 16, 112, 134, 170, 241, 285
44th, 217, 241
45th, 240
47th, 240
48th, 46
50th, 143
51st, 5-7, 31, 83, 134, 232, 285,
286, 306
Battalions:
Honor Guard, 83, 221
1st Airborne, 219
1st Marine, 83, 226, 237
2d Airborne, 172, 234, 235
2d Service, 230
2d Marine, 83, 226
3d Airborne, 172, 226, 257
3d Marine, 6, 83, 226
4th Marine, 5, 83, 224, 238
5th Airborne, 120, 170
5th Marine, 83, 237
6th Airborne, 226, 257
6th Marine, 226
7th Airborne, 14, 234, 235
8th Airborne, 170, 171, 219,
221, 226, 230, 257
9th Airborne, 232, 235
llth Airborne, 216, 226
llth Ranger, 41, 83, 134, 242,
245
21st Ranger, 16, 83, 112, 134,
216, 239, 245
22d Ranger, 16, 83, 134, 241 ,
23d Ranger, 83, 134, 240, 242,
245
30th Ranger, 83, 134, 143, 216,
226
31st Ranger, 83, 134, 243
32d Ranger, 83, 134, 243, 244
33d Ranger, 5, 83, 134, 216,
226
34th Ranger, 83, 134
35th Ranger, 83, 134, 226, 274
36th Ranger, 12, 83, 134
37th Ranger, 83, 134, 216, 245,
249, 255
38th Ranger, 83, 134, 226, 274
39th Ranger, 6, 7, 83, 134, 216,
239, 245, 352
41st Ranger, 83, 134, 226
42d Ranger, 83, 134, 139
43d Ranger, 83, 134, 139
44th Ranger, 83, 134, 139
51st Ranger, 83, 134
52d Ranger, 13, 83, 134
52d Regional Force, 230
58th Regional Force, 229
91st Airborne Ranger, 16, 17
102d Engineer, 232
Squadrons:
1st Armored Cavalry, 338
3d Armored Cavalry, 16, 241
5th Armored Cavalry, 243
7th Armored Cavalry, 234, 235
8th Armored Cavalry, 240
10th Armored Cavalry, 154
Company, Hac Bao Recon, 233,
237, 239
Special Landing Force, Seventh
Fleet, 22, 30, 35, 36, 39-42,
INDEX 409
69, 118, 127, 138, 181, 182,
185, 190, 307
Srok Dong, 103, 105
Starry, Col. Dorm A., 339
Stevenson, Lt., 310, 311
Steverson, Lt. Col. James R., 174
Stilwell, Lt. Gen. Richard G., 295,
297
Ta Bat, 122, 260, 262, 263, 299
Talbott, Maj. Gen. Orwin C., 320
Tallman, Brig. Gen. Richard J.,
361
Tarn Ky, 43, 189, 232, 304, 359
Tarn Quan, 199, 201
Tan An, 243
Tan Binh, 143
Tan My, 361
Tan Son Nhut Air Base, 143, 222,
229-231, 274
Tau-O, 101
Tay Ninh, 78, 107, 149, 209, 243,
277, 289, 314, 317
Tchepone, 136, 350, 351, 353, 354
Tet-68 Offensive, 201, 205, 206,
208-210, 212, 213, 216, 217,
219, 220, 222, 228, 231-233,
240, 242, 243, 256, 260, 264,
284, 287
Thach Tru, 118
Thailand, 20, 29, 32-34, 72, 136,
205, 210, 319, 367
Tham Khe, 188
Thang Binh, 41
Thi, Nguyen Chanh, Maj. Gen.,
31-33, 120
Thien Phuoc, 190, 303, 304
Thieu, President Nguyen Van,
220, 275, 353
Thu Due, 242
Thuan Loi Rubber Plantation, 13
Tiller, Lt. Col. Norman L., 193
Timothy, Col. James S., 49
Tolson, Maj. Gen. John J. Ill,
198, 207, 257, 261
Tompkins, Maj. Gen. Rathvon
McC., 188
Tou Morong, 112
Throckmorton, Lt. Gen. John C.,
211
Trang Ban, 278
Tri Ton, 243
True Giang, 243, 244
Truong, Brig. Gen. Ngo Quang,
233
Tuy Hoa, 20, 78, 111-113, 171,
240
Ulm, Capt. Donald S., 148
United States,
antiwar movement, 212, 214
assistance to Vietnam, 5, 7, 8,
18, 19, 121, 363
see also Vietnamization
civil disturbances, 211-215, 266
contingency plans, 21, 136, 208,
363
draft, 21, 26, 293, 364, 366
Embassy, Tet attack on, 221,
222
forces stationed in, 24, 30, 65,
82, 211-215
public opinion, 27, 109, 246,
284, 294, 365, 366
rules of engagement, 84, 85,
135, 136, 268, 364
strategy in Vietnam, 7, 8, 11,
14, 17, 19, 20, 21, 52, 60, 61,
65, 81-83, 97, 125, 133, 135-
138, 140, 142, 153, 180, 183,
184, 215, 216, 246, 247, 259,
264, 273, 279, 283, 284, 301,
313, 323, 335, 343, 347, 348,
355, 356, 363-368
410 INDEX
see also Demilitarized Zone
barrier
war crimes, 272
Van Kiep Naval Training Center,
216
Vi Thanh, 139
Vien, Gen. Cao Van, 26
Viet Cong (VC), 4-7, 9-14, 19-
22, 24, 32-42, 46-48, 51, 61,
73, 78, 81-87, 90, 97-108, 110,
113, 114, 117-120, 123, 133-
137, 139, 142-156, 189, 191-
194, 198-201, 207, 209-212,
215, 218, 220-234, 236, 237,
239, 240-246, 260, 268-271,
273-279, 283-285, 287-292,
304-307, 320, 326-330, 335-
337, 341, 348, 360
Divisions:
5th, 288
9th, 4, 101, 107, 109, 135, 145,
153, 287
Regiments:
1st, 6, 35, 40, 41, 120, 304
2d, 49, 110, 192, 193
70th, 108, 151
165A, 99
271st (later NVA), 103, 108,
151, 209, 229, 316, 317
272d (later NVA), 101, 106, 108,
149, 209, 309, 317
273d, 102, 149, 242
274th, 228, 229
275th, 227, 229
Battalions:
C-10 Sapper, 220, 221
Hue City Sapper, 233
U-l Local Force, 228
1st Local Force, 220, 221
2d Independent, 220
2d Local Force, 143, 221
3d Local Force, 220
4th Local Force, 220
5th Local Force, 220
6th Local Force, 220, 224
10th Sapper, 232
12th Local Force, 233
15H Local Force, 241
D16, 229
40th Sapper, 241
60th Main Force, 305
145th, 242
186th, 242
238th Local Force, 229
261st, 243
263d, 243
267th Local Force, 220, 229,
274
269th Local Force, 220
301E Local Force, 240
304th, 241
306th, 244
308th, 244
402d Sapper, 268
482d Local Force
506th Local Force, 154, 220
514th, 243
516th, 244
518th, 244
D800, 99
800th, 119
840th Main Force, 241
847th, 244
Vietnamization, 143, 144, 216,
218, 283-287, 323, 335, 336,
341, 349, 352, 354, 355, 365,
368
Vinh Huy, 190
Vinh Long, 243, 244
Vinh Thanh, 114
Vinnell Corporation, 217
INDEX 411
Vung Ro, 113
Vung Tau, 20, 46, 71, 72, 75, 78,
80
Walker, Maj. Gen. Glenn D., 340
Walt, Maj. Gen. Lewis W,, 34,
36,
War Zone C, 78, 85, 101, 107,
134, 135, 137, 147, 150-153,
209, 313
War Zone D, 46, 47, 134, 137,
208, 209, 273, 313
Westmoreland, Gen. William C.,
19, 34, 45, 48, 69, 73, 74, 77,
79, 88, 95, 105, 111, 133, 134,
137, 137, 140, 144, 170, 184,
191, 206, 208, 210, 212, 215,
249, 256, 258, 260, 273, 359
Weyand, Maj. Gen. Fred C., 73
Wheeler, Gen. Earle G., 211
Wheeler, Maj. Gen. Edwin B.,
342
Williamson, Maj. Gen. Ellis W.,
45, 314
Willoughby, Capt. Frank C., 250,
253, 254
Wright, Maj. Gen. John M. Jr.,
55, 301
Wright, Lt, 291, 292
Xuan Loc, 74, 83, 217, 242, 359,
362
Y-Bridge, 274
Yeu, Col. Dam Quang, 121
Zais, Maj. Gen. Melvin, 263, 298,
301
In addition, tlie text is illustrated with over
fifty unusual photographs, most of them
from the author's private collection, and
fifteen original maps.
About ttie author t
Shelby Stanton was on active duty in the
U.S. Army for six: years. Me served as a
combat rifle platoon leader in the 1st Bat-
talion, 5O8th Infantry (Airborne) of the 3d
Brigade, 82d Airborne Division; with U.S.
Army Special Forces, Thailand, as a
Ranger advisor to the Royal Thai Special
\Varfare Center, and commanded a Special
Forces reconnaissance team in Laos.
\Vounded in action, he retired with the
rank of captain. He then returned to
Louisiana State University where he earn-
ed a Nlasters in Educational Administra-
tion, and a Juris Doctor.
He lives with his wife and four children in
Bethesda, N1D, devoting himself to a full-
time career as military historian. Mis next
book is a complete history of Army Special
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