Rise of the Spanish-American republics as told in the lives of their liberators

SEP 3 1942

Si^GiCAL

F14-1Z '

,"R&5

Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2016

https://archive.org/details/riseofspanishameOOrobe

RISE OF

THE SPANISH-AMERICAN
REPUBLICS

r *

% • <

El Libertador

(Pietro Tenerani’s Statue of Simon de Bolivar at Bogota)

RISE OF
THE SPANISH-AMERI
REPUBLICS

AS TOLD IN THE LIVES OF
THEIR LIBERATORS

BY

WILLIAM SPENCE ROBERTSON, Ph.D.

ASSISTANT PEOTESSOE OF HISTOEY, X7NTVEESTTY OF ILLINOIS

ILLUSTRATED

D. APPLETON-CENTURY COMPANY

INCORPORATED

NEW YORK

1942

LONDON

Copyright. igi8, by
D. APPLETON AND COMPANY

Rights of translation reserved

All rights reserved. This book, or parts
thereof, must not be reproduced in any
form without permission of the publishers.

Printed in the United States of America

TO MY

HISPANIC-AMERICAN FRIENDS

I

PREFACE

Years ago, while an undergraduate at the University of Wis-
consin, I was seized with a desire to study the history and politics
of Hispanic America, the vast region inhabited by the wayward
children of Spain and Portugal. The first fruit of this desire was
an essay upon that knight-errant of Venezuela, Francisco de
Miranda, who championed the independence of the Spanish col-
onies from the motherland. My study of Miranda’s romantic
career naturally aroused w’ithin me an interest in the lives of his
South-American compatriots, Bolivar and San Martin. One day,
while browsing in the library of Yale University, I stumbled
across some musty and forgotten manuscripts pertaining to Agus-
tin de Iturbide: that incident stimulated my interest in the move-
ment which separated New Spain from Old Spain. From time to
time other influences have aided me to form the mold of the pres-
ent volume, which, in a series of lives, tells the story of the move-
ments that separated most of the Spanish colonies in America —
the Spanish-American colonies as I have uniformly designated
them — from the motherland. For criticisms concerning these
biographies I am indebted to Professor W. F. Dodd, now of the
University of Chicago, and Professor E. B. Greene, of the Uni-
versity of Illinois, both of whom read the entire manuscript.

The collecting of source material for these biographical studies
has been attended by no small difficulty. Although in recent years
a number of libraries in the United States have been purchasing
books upon Hispanic-American history, yet in few, if any, cases
have complete collections been made of the learned publications,
books, and pamphlets concerning any special epoch of Spanish-
American history. In the preparation of this volume, it has con-
sequently been necessary for me to use many libraries. For
courtesies extended to me I am especially indebted to the University
of Illinois Library, the British Museum, the National Library of
Spain, and the National Libraries of Mexico, Venezuela, Colom-
bia, Chile, Paraguay, and Argentina, as well as the Mitre Museum
at Buenos Aires. In various ways my labors have been aided by
scholars in America and Europe. In North America my labors

vii

PREFACE

viii

were aided by Mr. Gaillard Hunt of the Division of Manuscripts
of the Library of Congress. Certain investigations in Spain were
facilitated by Professor Rafael Altamira of the University of
Madrid, and by Sr. D. Pedro Torres Lanzas, chief of the Spanish
archives at Seville. My investigations in England were assisted
by Hubert Hall, Esq., long connected with the Public Record Of-
fice. Among Mexican scholars, I mention with appreciation Sr.
Genaro Garcia, formerly director of the National Museum of
Mexico, and Sr. Luis Gonzalez Obregon, formerly director of the
General Archives of Mexico. Among South-American scholars,
I must mention with gratitude Sr. Romulo Zabala of the Mitre
Museum, and Srs. Diego L. Molinari and Carlos I. Salas of Buenos
Aires; Professors Domingo Amunategui Solar and Samuel Lillo
of the University of Chile; Sr. Isidro Lopez, Sr. Diego Mendoza
and Sr. Antonio Gomez Restrepo of Bogota; Sr. Manuel Segundo
Sanchez, director of the National Library at Caracas, and Sr.
Vicente Lecuna, president of the Bank of Venezuela, who has
charge of the archives of Simon de Bolivar.

My aim throughout has been to base this volume upon the
sources. I have profited, however, by the use of many secondary
accounts, largely because of the source material which they con-
tain. If indeed it had not been for the numerous contributions —
bibliographies, documentary collections, and secondary accounts —
of Spanish-American scholars to the knowledge of the revolu-
tionary period, par excellence, of their history, this book could not
appear in its present form. Fortunately for my literary plans,
that period has occupied the attention of many prominent scholars
of Spanish America. Among these scholars three great writers,
who have passed away, linked their names forever with the liter-
ary history of the revolution, Jose Maria Restrepo of Colombia,
Diego Barros Arana of Chile, and Bartolome Mitre of Argentina.
While preparing this book I have become acutely aware of the
different opinions of Spanish-Americans in regard to the respec-
tive merits of their national heroes of the revolutionary age.
Mexican writers have generally been inclined to overestimate the
historical significance of Hidalgo. South-American historical
writers who live in Bogota do not always agree concerning the
respective merits of Bolivar the liberator and Santander, “the
organizer of victory.” Even at the present day the scholars of
Argentina and Uruguay are at variance in regard to the historical
import of the career of Artigas. The historical scholars of Buenos
Aires are loath to accept the views of scholars in Caracas respect-

PREFACE

IX

ing the roles of San Martin and Bolivar. As one who, so to
speak, lives in a realm apart, I have viewed the various revolu-
tionary heroes with sympathy and without any conscious parti
pris: it is believed that, in contrast with many other volumes
which deal with the heroic age of Spanish-American history, this
volume is subjective.

I brought my labors upon this volume to a close after more
than a year spent in South America during which I revised my
views concerning the liberators by the use of rare material which
reposes in the libraries of certain South-American capitals. From
a veritable legion of books and pamphlets and studies which I
have consulted during my investigations I have carefully selected
the most useful works and included them in an annotated bibliog-
raphy. As some of the problems which confronted me were partly
solved by the use of manuscripts that repose in certain archives
of America and Europe, I have included in the select bibliography
a brief list of important manuscript collections which will suggest
the wealth of archival material that concerns my theme.

Certain difficulties inherent in the complexity of the theme,
which deals with the emergence of eleven republics, have, in my
judgment, been lessened by the use of what may be styled the bio-
graphical method. I firmly believe that the history of the Spanish-
American revolution can be clearly told in the lives of its notable
men. This method of narration has enabled me more easily to
handle, and will, I trust, aid the reader more readily to compre-
hend, the details of that far-reaching movement, or rather that
series of movements. For, during the Spanish-American revolu-
tionary epoch, as rarely in history, certain figures occupied the
foreground of the stage. From those figures I selected certain
leaders for detailed consideration and other leaders for subor-
dinate treatment. Another writer might perhaps have employed
a different emphasis; some other writer might indeed have made
a somewhat different selection. My choice of salient personalities
has had special regard to the role which they played in the origin
and progress of the revolution in certain sections of Spanish
America. In general, each chapter of this volume is not so much
devoted to a single individual or to a single rising state, as to a
revolutionary movement in which a commanding personage played
the most important role. Rightly to portray these personages,
other figures have of necessity been sketched more lightly. Among
the minor characters of the great revolutionary drama — as Artigas,
Francia, Santander — Bernardo O’Higgins, in particular, was an

X

PREFACE

attractive figure, who appeared more significant, however, in his
relations to the early revolt in Chile and to the establishment of
an independent government there, than to the broad sweep of the
South-American revolutionary movement.

To me a significant figure was Francisco de Miranda, often
styled “the great precursor” of the Spanish-American revolution.
In Mexico there were two personages of paramount importance:
Miguel Hidalgo y Costilla, “the father of Mexican independence,”
and Agustin de Iturbide, who should be styled the liberator of
Mexico. In southern South America, the career of Mariano
Moreno, the democrat and scholar, furnished an introduction to
the troubled politics of the viceroyalty of la Plata. The struggle
for Argentine independence was logically continued in the life-
story of Jose de San Martin, a founder of Argentina, Chile, and
Peru. And the fight for the establishment of Peruvian inde-
pendence was ultimately crowned with success largely through
the achievements of two Venezuelans, Simon de Bolivar and
Antonio Jose de Sucre, who, after their native state had been
liberated from the Spanish yoke, cooperated in the founding of
independent republics in Peru and Bolivia. There were some
queries which arose in my mind regarding the exact order in
which the lives of these so-called liberators should be presented
to the reader. Should the order be topical, or chronological, or
geographical ? At last, I decided upon a sequence which, with
advantages that seemed to outweigh its disadvantages, in reality
constituted a compromise: a sequence which began with the great
precursor and permitted me to consider consecutively the two
most important leaders of Mexico, — a sequence which made it
possible for me to treat successively four great personages of the
South-American revolution.

The Rise of the Spanish-American Republics aims to furnish
to English readers an outline of the movement which culminated
in the establishment of independent states in the Spanish Indies, as
traced in the biographies of notable leaders. While considerable
attention has necessarily been devoted to campaigns, battles, and
capitulations, yet a deliberate and sustained attempt has been made
to present the political ideals of Spanish-American leaders, as
expressed in their declarations of independence, important con-
stitutions, and speeches. Accordingly frequent quotations — gen-
erally my own translations — have been made from the literary
productions of the liberators. In particular, are there many quo-
tations from the significant productions of Simon de Bolivar, the

PREFACE

XI

most formidable military and political giant of Hispanic America.
Whenever it seemed advisable to make a rather free translation,
I have adopted the practice of enclosing the excerpts in single
quotation marks; otherwise, I have followed the American custom
of using double quotation marks. This book deals with a distinct
period in the history of Spanish America, the transitional epoch
from 1808 to 1831, which may be said to lie between the colonial
period proper and the distinctly national period. It is an intro-
duction to a dramatic period which furnishes a background for
the national history of the Spanish-American republics.

William Spence Robertson.

Urbana, Illinois.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER

I.

The Historical Background

PACE

, I

II.

Francisco de Miranda

. 26

III.

Miguel Hidalgo y Costilla

. 73

IV.

Agustin de Iturbide .

. 107

V.

Mariano Moreno

. 142

VI.

Josi DE San Martin .

. 176

VII.

Sim6n de BolIvar

. 217

VIII.

Antonio Jose de Sucre

. 267

IX.

Conclusion

. 314

Select Bibliography .

Index

• 333

ziii

LIST OF

ILLUSTRATIONS AND MAPS

El Libertador (Pietro Tenerani’s Statue of Simon de Boli-
var at Bogota) Frontispiece

FACING PAGE

Map of Spanish America on the Eve of the Revolution , . i6

Francisco de Miranda (Frontispiece of Antepara’s “South

American Emancipation”) 26

Miguel Hidalgo y Costilla (From Alaman’s “Historia de

Mexico”) 74

Agustin de Iturbide (From a Painting in the Hall of Am-
bassadors of the National Palace, Mexico City) . .112

Mariano Moreno (Manuel Moreno’s “Vida del Dr. Moreno,”

London, 1812) 142

Francia and Artigas (From Portraits by Bonpland in Demer-

say’s Atlas, “Histoire du Paraguay”) .... 176

Jose de San Martin (Medallion by Simon) .... 182

Bernardo O’Higgins (From a Portrait in the Collection of

Sr. Carios I. Salas, Buenos Aires) 194

Simon de Bolivar (Medallion by David d’Angers) . . 218

Antonio Jose de Sucre (From a Portrait by Tovar in the

Federal Palace, Caracas) 268

Plan of the Battle of Ayacucho (From the “Memoirs of

General Miller”) 284

Francisco de Paula Santander (Medallion by David

d’Angers) 314

The Hispanic-American States in 1831 328

XV

RISE OF THE

SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

CHAPTER I

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

During the first quarter of the nineteenth century the vas\
empire of Spain in America broke into fragments. In various
parts of the Indies the people proclaimed their independence
of the motherland. The protracted drama which transformed
the Spanish colonies upon the American continent into free,
sovereign, and independent states, was started by the usurpa-
tions of Napoleon in the Iberian peninsula. Here and there
in Spanish America, with loud protests of loyalty to their king,
some colonists asserted the right to manage their own affairs.
That this dissident movement developed into a far-reaching
rebellion was due in no small measure to the activities of cer-
tain leaders who played important roles in the revolution —
leaders who may be styled the liberators of Spanish America.
The fortunes of the Spanish-American revolution were also
affected by the economic and political conditions which pre-
vailed throughout Spain’s dominions. It is the purpose of this
chapter to sketch the background of the great revolution in the
Spanish Indies.

On the eve of the revolution the king of Spain claimed title
to territory in the New World which stretched from the sources
of the Mississippi River to Cape Horn. That territory in-
cluded about seven million square miles, — almost one-half of
the area of the Three Americas. “Within this vast region,”
said Henry Clay, “we behold the most sublime and interesting

2 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

objects of creation: the loftiest mountains, the most majestic
rivers in the world ; the richest mines of the precious metals, and
the choicest productions of the earth.” It was while musing
over that magnificent domain which Spain had irretrievably
lost, that the exiled minister, Manuel de Godoy, the Prince of
the Peace, spoke of Spain under Charles IV. as the Queen of
the Two Worlds.

In the reign of Charles IV., 1788-1808, Manuel de Godoy,
the secretary of state and the voluptuous favorite of Queen
Maria Teresa, exercised a baneful influence at the Spanish
court. For many years Charles IV., good-natured, fond of
the chase, with small political ability, allowed the Prince of
the Peace to govern Spain and to confer favors upon fawning
politicians. Selfish reasons induced Godoy sedulously to foster
an estrangement between the royal couple and their eldest son,
Ferdinand, Prince of Asturias, — a prince who was portrayed
by contemporaries as a superstitious, self-willed youth, with a
poor intellect. This heir to the crown of Spain and the Indies
was given no opportunity to learn the art of government ; and,
when at a delicate crisis in the fortunes of the Spanish people,
Ferdinand became king, events demonstrated that he was
neither gifted with political talent nor animated by a liberal
spirit.

Under Charles IV. the administration of the government
was entrusted to the secretaries of state, justice, war, marine,
and finance, who managed the affairs of the Indies as well as of
Spain. By virtue of their offices those secretaries were mem-
bers of the royal council of state in which important matters
of policy were discussed. Over that council — which other
governmental officials were at times invited to attend — the king
presided. In the administration of the Indies, Charles. IV. was
aided by special institutions in the peninsula and in America.
The most important institution in the peninsula was the “Royal
and Supreme Council of the Indies.”

The council of the Indies was composed of fourteen mem-
bers selected by the king from persons who had held office in

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

3

America. That council had administrative, legislative, and ju-
dicial powers. It advised the king on commercial and political
affairs relating to the colonies. It promulgated decrees which
served as laws for the Indies. It was tlie tribunal of last
resort for cases appealed from the highest courts in Spanish
America, the audiencias. The council met regularly at the
capital ; the king might preside over its sessions. Evidently
this council possessed a more extensive authority over the
Spanish Indies than the board of trade possessed over the
English colonies in America. In the eighteenth century a
minister of the Indies was created, who assumed some of the
functions of the council of the Indies, and who managed the
voluminous correspondence between Spain and Spanish
America.

Legally the title to the Indies was not vested in the Spanish
people ; for that glorious heritage was viewed as the property
of the Spanish monarch. Spain and her American colonies
were not joined in an organic union but in a personal union.
His Catholic Majesty was the connecting link. With more
justification than the dissatisfied subjects of England in the
thirteen colonies did some Spanish colonists later contend that
they owed allegiance only to the king.

In America the most important agents of the Spanish mon-
arch were the viceroys who ordinarily held office at his pleas-
ure. The first viceroy appointed to rule over the Spanish do-
minions in North America was sent to the region which had
been won by the sword of Hernando Cortes. In 1535 Antonio
de Mendoza became the viceroy of New Spain ; he established
his capital at Mexico City, upon the site of the ancient capital
of the Aztecs. The viceroy of New Spain, or Mexico, was
originally considered to have jurisdiction over the Spanish
possessions in North and Central America. The earliest vice-
roy who was sent to South America represented the Spanish
monarch in the region which had been conquered by Francisco
Pizarro and his followers. In 1543 a viceroy was appointed
for Peru ; his capital was established at Lima, the city founded

4 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

by Pizarro. Originally the viceroy of Peru was granted juris-
diction throughout Spanish South America. But in 1718 the
northern part of South America was erected into a separate
administrative division, the viceroyalty of New Granada, with
its capital at Santa Fe de Bogota, — a viceroyalty which was
abolished in 1723 but reestablished in 1739. It stretched along
the Pacific coast from the Isthmus of Panama to Tumbez, a
short distance south of the equator. The royal cedula which
delimited the viceroyalty of New Granada declared that its
provinces should be subordinated to the viceroy just as the
provinces of Mexico and of Peru were subordinated to their
respective viceroys. In 1776 another administrative division
was carved out of the region which had originally been assigned
to the Peruvian viceroy : that division constituted the viceroy-
alty of la Plata, which had its capital at Buenos Aires. The
western boundary of the Platean viceroyalty was the Andean
range ; on the northwest it included an extensive region known
as Upper Peru. Thus the viceroyalty of la Plata stretched
from the mouth of the Rio de la Plata to the Pacific Ocean.
On the east the viceroyalties of la Plata, Peru, and New Gra-
nada were skirted by the Portuguese colony of Brazil.

Originally a viceroy was vested with regal authority. In
the vast region entrusted to his care he was the civil and mili-
tary commander, the secular head of the Church and its patron,
and the superintendent of finance. From time to time instruc-
tions and orders were sent to the viceroy which he was ex-
pected to observe. Each viceroy was supposed to keep the
Spanish government informed in regard to the condition of his
viceroyalty. Early in the nineteenth century provision was
made that, in case of the disability of a viceroy, his successor
should be the person who had been named as substitute by the
government. By that time, however, the viceroy had ceased
to be a vice-king. There is, perhaps, no better way to illus-
trate the position of the viceroy in Spanish America at the end
of the colonial r%ime than to consider the commission which
was given to the viceroy of New Spain on March 16, 1816.

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

5

By this commission King Ferdinand VII. conferred upon
Juan Ruiz de Apodaca the post of viceroy, governor, and cap-
tain general of New Spain during his pleasure. It stated that
the viceroy should consider God’s service as well as the king’s,
promoting the settlement and civilization of the region under
his control. The viceroy was to provide that the Indians
should be well treated, taught the mysteries of the Catholic
faith, and ensured justice. The members of the royal audi-
encia of Mexico City were to receive from the viceroy the ac-
customed oath that he would faithfully perform his duties.
The officials of the audiencias of Mexico City and Guadalajara,
the members of cabildos, noblemen, gentlemen, and all other
inhabitants of the viceroyalty were commanded to obey Apo-
daca, just as they would obey the Spanish monarch. This in-
strument suggests the extensive powers over the people of New
Spain which the viceroy retained in i8i6; it indicates his
threefold position as governor, captain general, and viceroy.
As governor, he was the chief magistrate of the provinces
under his control. As captain general, he was the commander
in chief of the military and naval forces of these provinces.
As viceroy, he was vested with a supervisory authority over
the other administrative officials within his jurisdiction. In
particular, was he the presiding officer of the royal mdiencia
at Mexico City.

The authority of the American viceroys was gradually cur-
tailed by the appointment of captain generals who were placed
in charge of subdivisions known as captaincies general. Al-
though at first in some particulars a captain general was ordi-
narily subordinated to the viceroy from whose dominions his
captaincy general had been carved, yet in other respects he was
a viceroy in miniature. In fact, a captain general controlled
many affairs of an extensive district which was located at a
considerable distance from the capital of the respective viceroy-
alty. In the reign of Charles IV. there were four captaincies
general in the Spanish Indies: Cuba, Guatemala, Venezuela,
and Chile. Toward the end of the colonial regime, the power

6 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

of the captain generals in Spanish America increased. Al-
though the relations between the viceroys and the captain gen-
erals have not yet been studied in detail, still it appears that on
the eve of the revolution the captain general of Guatemala was
practically independent of the viceroy of New Spain. A royal
order of 1742 relieved the captain general of Venezuela of any
dependence upon the neighboring viceroy. Before the end of
the eighteenth century the Spanish government had declared
that the captain general of Chile was completely independent
of the viceroy of Peru. While the authority of a viceroy ordi-
narily extended over a region in which there were two audien-
cias, the power of a captain general was confined to a district
assigned to one audiencia. Thus the captain general of Chile
exercised authority over the territory under the control of the
audiencia of Chile, which had its seat at Santiago de Chile;
and the viceroy of Peru controlled the provinces which were
under the jurisdiction of the audiencias located at Cuzco and
Lima.

The administrative and judicial institution known as the
audiencia had been transplanted from Spain to certain colonies
during the age of the conquistadores. Gradually that institu-
tion had been established in important cities throughout the
Indies. At the opening of the nineteenth century there were
twelve audiencias in Spanish America. The audiencia of Cuba
was at Havana. In the viceroyalty of New Spain there were
two audiencias: one was located at Guadalajara, and the other
at Mexico City. The audiencia of Guatemala had its seat at
Santiago de Guatemala. The audiencia of Venezuela was lo-
cated at Caracas; the audiencia of New Granada was at Bo-
gota, while the audiencia of Quito was in the city of that
name. As has been mentioned, there were two audiencias in
the viceroyalty of Peru, and one in the captaincy general of
Chile. In the viceroyalty of la Plata there were two audien-
cias : one was located at the city of la Plata — commonly called
Chuquisaca — in the province of Charcas in Upper Peru ; and
the other was in the city of Buenos Aires.

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

7

An audiencia, which was composed of magistrates selected
by the king, acted as a court of appeal within a district which
had been roughly delimited by the council of the Indies. It
also served as an advisory council to the personage, ordinarily
a captain general or a viceroy, who presided over its meetings.
In a district where a viceroy or a captain general did not re-
side, the audiencia also e.xercised some political authority. For
example, the audiencia which was located in the city of Quito,
although subject to the viceroy of New Granada, was never-
theless vested with governmental authority in certain affairs.
The audiencias located at Guadalajara, Quito, Cuzco, and Chu-
quisaca — in districts where a captain general or a viceroy did
not reside — were in a sense governments within governments.
As the circumjacent areas were under control of the jurists
who presided over the meetings of the audiencias, officials
known as presidents, these regions were specifically desig-
nated as presidencies.

The presidency which was located at Chuquisaca in the
viceroyalty of la Plata — sometimes designated as the presi-
dency of Charcas — has a peculiar interest. For the region un-
der the jurisdiction of the audiencia of Charcas, known as
Upper Peru, was nominally subject to the viceroy of Buenos
Aires. At the beginning of the nineteenth century there regu-
larly belonged to that audiencia, besides the president who was
lieutenant general of the royal forces within its jurisdiction,
five oidores, or judges, an attorney, and some minor officials.
When the office of president fell vacant, the audiencia tempo-
rarily assumed governmental control of the presidency. In the
important capitals of Spanish America there were more judges
in the audiencias.

Vested as the audiencias were with the right to correspond
directly with the Spanish monarch, they served as a check upon
the powers of both viceroys and captain generals. A more
efficacious check upon these officials, however, were the in-
tendants, who near the end of the eighteenth century were
placed in important towns and cities throughout the Spanish

8 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

Indies. In other words, the viceroyalties and captaincies gen-
eral were divided into districts called intendancies which were
placed in control of officials known as intendants. In 1782
intendants were introduced into the viceroyalty of la Plata 7
and soon they were introduced into Peru and Chile. According
to the ordinance of intendants promulgated for New Spain
in 1786, that viceroyalty was carved into twelve districts. Each
district was entrusted to an intendant who was given charge
of matters relating to justice, war, police, and finance within
his district. The Mexican intendants were also given author-
ity over certain officers in the cities, towns, and villages of
their respective intendancies. That intendant who resided
in the city of Mexico exercised a supervisory authority over
other intendants of the viceroyalty of New Spain. It will
accordingly be seen that the establishment of the system of
intendants in the Indies restricted the judicial authority of the
audiencias and reapportioned the governmental power in the
captaincies general as well as in the viceroyalties. There is no
doubt that in some parts of Spanish America — as in New
France — there were conflicts of authority between the intend-
ants and the other governmental officials.

In 1776 the Spanish government took measures which
aimed to curtail greatly the power of the viceroy of New
Spain. By a decree of August 22, 1776, a new division was
carved out of Spain’s over-sea dominions. That decree pro-
vided that the provinces of northern New Spain should be
placed under the military and political control of a command-
ant-general, who was declared to be absolutely independent
of the viceroy of New Spain. As arranged in 1804 those
provinces were to be divided into two districts: the interior
provinces of the east, and the interior provinces ol the west.
The provisions of the Spanish government concerning the ad-
ministrative organization of the interior provinces indicate
that that government realized the need of a better system of
colonial control ; but the reform was not completely carried
out. In fact, before the interior provinces were placed under

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 9

commandants, the revolution against Spanish authority had
begun.

Although the institutions of colonial control located in the
Spanish peninsula presented a semblance of unity that was
markedly absent from English colonial institutions, yet the
series of conflicting or overlapping jurisdictions which existed
in Spanish America made it difficult to fix responsibility.
Those diverse jurisdictions fostered discord among officials.
Perhaps the most important political difference betweer the
English colonies in America and the Spanish colonies in the
middle of the eighteenth century, was the absence in the latter
of any institutions comparable to the colonial legislatures of
North America. In the early nineteenth century, there was only
one institution existing throughout Spanish America which
bore any resemblance to the self-governing institutions of an
Anglo-Saxon community, — that was the cabildo.

The cabildo, or ayuntamiento, was the council of a city, or
of a town. The most important officials composing the ca-
bildo were the alcaldes, or justices, and the regidores, who
may be styled aldermen. The laws of the Indies contained a
provision that there should be no more than two alcaldes in a
cabildo; that in the chief cities there should be twelve regi-
dores; and that in other cities and towns there should be no
more than six regidores. In the early nineteenth century there
belonged to the cabildo of the city of Caracas two alcaldes who
were elected annually by the regidores, twelve regidores who
had secured their offices by purchase from the king, and four
regidores — natives of Spain — who held their positions by royal
appointment. At rare intervals certain American cabildos had
revived the mediaeval Spanish custom of holding a cabildo
abierto (open council), — a meeting which prominent citizens
who did not have seats in the cabildo were invited to attend.
But a cabildo abierto, which by a flight of the imagination
may be compared with a New England town meeting, could
not be summoned without the consent of a representative of the
king. According to the laws of the Indies, the meetings of a

10 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

cabildo could only be held in the casa de ayuntamiento, or
town hall. It was only natural that, when circumstances ap-
peared auspicious, the cabildo, and especially the cabildo
abierto, should have been used as an instrument by those colo-
nists who dreamed of separation from Spain.

The laws of the Indies were composed of the cedulas, in-
structions, and ordinances which the Spanish government had
from time to time promulgated concerning its colonies in
America. In 1680 a digest of those laws was published in a
code called the Recopilacion de Leyes de los Reinos de las
Indias. These laws necessarily dealt with a vast variety of
subjects, such as the Church, universities, the council of the
Indies, viceroys, fortifications, public works, mines, fisheries,
Indians, negroes, and taxes. There was a clause in the code
which declared that, as the kingdoms of Spain and the Indies
belonged to the same monarch, their laws should be as much
alike as possible. Another elastic clause provided that the
code was to be supplemented by the laws of Castile. This
meant, after 1805, that the laws of the Indies should be sup-
plemented by the Spanish laws which had been codified by or-
der of Charles IV., the Novisima Recopilacion de las Leyes
de Espana. That revised code contained only those laws of
Spain which were actually in force, — the legislative institu-
tion known as the cortes was not even mentioned. There is
no doubt that in certain sections of the Indies some of the
humane provisions in the Spanish laws relating to America
were habitually ignored by agents of the crown.

The number of people who were under the jurisdiction of
the laws of the Indies, it is impossible to determine with ex-
actness. According to the estimates of Alexander von Hum-
boldt, in the early nineteenth century there were in Spanish
America about seventeen million inhabitants. He calculated
that of those people about seven and one-half million were
Indians, three and a quarter million were whites, three-quarters
of a million were negroes, and more than five and one-quarter
million were of mixed race. In general the population in the

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

II

American colonies of Spain was composed of two distinct
classes, freemen and slaves. Whites and Indians, or their de-
scendants, were usually considered free; negroes and their de-
scendants, unless they had been emancipated, were slaves.
The negro slaves occupied a subordinate position : they were
often ignorant, superstitious, and licentious, while the negroes
who had been set free did not always enjoy the rights of
colonial Spaniards. The Indians were composed of two some-
what distinct classes : those Indians called civilized, and those
considered independent. In certain parts of Spanish America,
as in the viceroyalty of Mexico, the Indians were a special
menace to the rule of Spain.

In various sections of Spanish America, there had been
much mingling of Indian, negro, and white blood. As exam-
ples of the resulting blends may be mentioned the mestizos,
the offspring of Indians and Spaniards; the mulattoes, de-
scendants of whites and negroes; the sambos, descendants of
Indians and negroes ; and the pardos, descendants of whites
and mulattoes. From the intermixture of those groups there
sprang a large number of ethnic types. In general the mixed
classes, the colored people, and the Indians were densely ig-
norant. Although in some parts of Spanish America the vari-
ous classes had not hardened into castes, yet these classes
often furnished a basis for the formation of factions. The
white inhabitants of Spanish America belonged to two dis-
tinct groups : the Spaniards who had been born in the penin-
sula; and the so-called creoles, persons of Spanish descent
who had been born in the Indies. The policy which Spain
pursued toward her colonies often illustrated the maxim divide
et impera, for the European Spaniards — in Mexico vulgarly
called the Gachupines — although relatively small in numbers,
were appointed to most of the important offices in Church and
state. In consequence the proud creoles viewed the peninsular
Spaniards with jealousy: — indeed, the preference accorded the
peninsular Spaniard over the creole was often considered by
the colonists as a crying grievance.

12 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

The aristocracy of the Spanish colonies in America was
largely composed of creoles. Some of the leading creole
families indeed traced their descent from the followers of the
conquistadores. The laws of the Indies declared that the
descendants of the conquerors and the founders of cities and
towns were to be considered as hijosdalgo and as persons of
noble descent with all the privileges of nobles of a similar class
in the kingdom of Castile. Some wealthy descendants of later
colonists anxiously sought titles of nobility despite the fact
that sometimes they were not of pure Spanish blood. In the
words of the Mexican historian and publicist, Lucas Alaman,
“A title of count or marquis, a cross of Santiago or Cala-
trava . . . was an object of ambition for the person who had
become rich by commerce, or who had found a bonanza in the
mines.” There was a tendency to consider the descendants
of Spaniards as entitled to special privileges with regard to
the learned professions : a royal cedula sent to the viceroy
of Peru on July 14, 1758, declared that “sambos, mulattoes,
and other low castes” should be prohibited from practicing
the legal profession. The members of the social or intellec-
tual aristocracy of the Spanish Indies resided mostly in the
capitals of viceroyalties and captaincies general : this aris-
tocracy was composed largely of the lower clergy, landowners,
merchants, and local office-holders. From that self-conscious
group of the creole aristocracy there sprang many partisans of
the Spanish-American revolution. Each one of the seven
salient leaders considered in this book was a creole.

A certain feature of Spain’s colonial policy affected even
the barbarous Indians, — that is, the complicated system of tax-
ation. Some of the most important sources of the king’s
revenue were : the alcabala, or the tax upon the sale of articles
according to their price ; the king’s share of the tithes, the duty
upon the product of the silver, quicksilver, and gold mines,
the income arising from governmental monopolies, the tribute
levied upon the Indians, the excise duties upon the manufac-
ture of intoxicating liquors, and the duties upon imports and

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 13

exports. In many particulars the system of taxation was mere-
ly an application of the Spanish commercial policy.

The commercial policy which Spain followed toward her
colonies resembled the colonial policy of France. It was ani-
mated by a spirit of monoply and paternalism. Here, again,
a few illustrations must suffice. At various times the viceroys
were instructed to promote the cultivation by the Indians of
hemp and flax. In 1595 the extension of grape culture was
prohibited in the Indies. Further, the Peruvian viceroy was
not to allow the vineyards within his jurisdiction to be re-
planted, while the owners of these grapevines were to pay a
tax of two per cent annually upon the products. In the early
seventeenth century Peruvian viniculturists were further
hampered by a prohibition which was laid upon the exporta-
tion of their wines. Obviously the government of Spain thus
aimed to prevent Peruvian wines from competing with Spanish
wines in certain colonial markets. Another illustration of the
spirit of Spain’s colonial system may be found in a decree of
1595 which instructed the viceroys of Peru that neither mer-
chandise nor slaves from any part of the Portuguese dominions
should be allowed to enter Peru by la Plata River. A decree
of 1614 provided that tobacco might be freely sown in Spanish
America, on the condition that the tobacco which was not
consumed in the colonies should straightway be transported
to Seville. Early in the nineteenth century the wool produced
in the colonies was allowed to enter Spain free of duty, but a
heavy tax was laid upon its exportation to foreign countries.

At first the privilege to trade with the Spanish colonies in
America had been restricted to the merchants of Seville. At
a later date the merchants of Cadiz had the preference. By
various regulations Spain attempted to prevent foreigners
from engaging in commerce with her colonies. In general no
commerce whatever was permitted from other than Spanish
ports. For a long period there were only a few ports in
Spanish America which enjoyed the privilege of trading direct-
ly with Spain. On October 12, 1778, however, a law was

14 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

promulgated which modified the regulations concerning com-
merce between Spain and the Indies. The law opened several
Spanish ports to American trade ; it also opened a number of
ports in Spanish America to Spanish trade. That reform law
still aimed to encourage Spanish shipbuilders and shipowners,
for it provided that vessels used in the commerce with Amer-
ica should be Spanish-built and Spanish-owned. But in con-
sequence of this reform goods could be carried in Spanish
vessels directly between a number of ports in Spain and ports
in various sections of the Indies. In important cities of Spain
the commercial activities were managed by local organizations
which were called consulates. Those organizations were regu-
lated by ordinances of the Spanish monarchs which contained
provisions regarding such matters as the trial of commercial
disputes. Among these ordinances the most important were
the Ordenanzas de la villa de Bilbao issued by King Philip V.
in 1737. This institution of consulate was also established in
important cities in the Indies, where the ordinances of Bilbao
j)ften served as a species of commercial code.

The tariff policy of Spain in the early nineteenth century
considered the financial needs of the government, the neces-
sities of Spanish America, and the protection of Spain’s in-
dustries. Depons, an observant Frenchman who resided for
some time at Caracas, divided the goods entering Venezuela
into three classes. The first class included those products
raised or manufactured in Spain: such products were desig-
nated as “free articles,” because the duties levied upon them
appeared insignificant in comparison with the duties which
were laid upon other classes of goods. The duties upon ar-
ticles of this class on leaving Spain and entering America
amounted to about nine and one-half per cent. The second
class included articles which were produced abroad, but fin-
ished in Spain: such articles paid duties amounting to about
twelve and one-half per cent on leaving Spain and entering
America. The third class included all goods of foreign manu-
facture, which paid duties on entering Spain that amounted

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

15

to fifteen per cent, on departing for America seven per cent,
and on arriving there seven per cent, besides various port du-
ties which “increased the price of all foreign merchandise, im-
ported from the mother country, about forty-three per cent.”
With the exception of cacao, colonial productions paid only
“inconsequential duties’’ on leaving America, and on entering
Spain; and they were generally exempt from duty when ex-
ported from Spain for foreign markets ; but all “unwrought
materials’’ that went to supply foreign manufacturers, “paid
heavy duties on their exportation’’ which gave the Spanish
manufacturers an advantage.

Accordingly it is clear that although in the beginning of the
nineteenth century Spain’s commercial policy had been con-
siderably modified, yet the faith of her statesmen in the mer-
cantile policy had not been destroyed : the Spanish colonies
were still considered as estates which should be exploited for
the benefit of the mother country. In certain parts of the
Indies the monopolistic policy of Spain was sometimes rudely
disturbed by smugglers. In 1797 a merchant of Caracas al-
leged that every man in that city from the captain general
down to the humblest citizen was clad in contraband clothing.

The financial burdens which Spain imposed upon her colon-
ists were made heavier by the venality of her officials. In con-
sequence there were many Spanish-Americans who felt that
the fiscal policy of Spain was oppressive. That policy was
largely responsible for several uprisings against Spanish rule.
In 1780, alleging that the taxes were oppressive and that
the misgovernment by Spain’s officials was unendurable, Tupac
Amaru, a lineal descendant of the Incas, led a formidable in-
surrection of the Indians against Spanish rule in Peru. In a
manifesto attributed to Tupac Amaru, which was widely dis-
tributed in South America, that chieftain apparently pro-
claimed himself “Don Jose I., by the grace of God, King of
Peru, Quito, Chile, Buenos Aires, and the continents of the
South Sea.” This rebellion caused much consternation among
the Spaniards, but it was suppressed, and its leader was con-

l6 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

demned to a horrible death. Again, in April, 1781, the inhabi-
tants of certain towns, or comunes, in New Granada rose in
revolt against the Spanish officials. Those revolutionists de-
clared that the main reason for their discontent was the griev-
ous burden imposed upon them by the tobacco monopoly, the
alcabala, and other taxes. In June, 1781, certain representa-
tives of the Spanish government agreed to the requests of the
rebels for economic and financial reforms and the tumult
was stilled. But the pledges of reform were not kept. Con-
sequently fresh signs of discontent were soon manifested ; in
January, 1782, the audiencia of New Granada condemned a
number of the conspirators to an ignominious death. The re-
volt of the comuneros, as well as other revolts which may not
be mentioned here, left embers of discontent smouldering in
northern South America. In 1783 certain conspirators in that
region actually dispatched an emissary who laid their revolu-
tionary projects before the government of England.

The dissatisfaction of some Spanish colonists with the
fiscal policy of the motherland was occasionally fomented by
English officials in America. A striking illustration of that
influence is found in the action of Governor Picton of Trini-
dad. In June, 1797, when England was at war with Spain,
Picton spread broadcast upon the adjacent coast of South
America a proclamation which assured the inhabitants that
they would find in the island of Trinidad a commercial em-
porium. He also assured the Spanish colonists that, whenever
they were disposed to resist the authority of Spain, they would
receive succor from the English government. This incendiary
manifesto undoubtedly fomented a revolutionary spirit among
the Venezuelan colonists.

It was probably a desire for commercial conquest which,
in 1806, prompted the English captain. Sir Home Popham,
with a few vessels bearing a small force of soldiers under Gen-
eral Beresford to sail from his station on the Cape of Good
Hope for South America. In the end of June the small fleet
sailed up la Plata River. The terrified viceroy, the Marquis

Spanish America on the Eve of the Revolution

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

17

of Sobremonte, offered only a weak resistance to Beresford’s
spirited attack. On June 27 British redcoats entered the gates
of Buenos Aires. The conquerors soon announced that Buenos
Aires would enjoy the same freedom in regard to export trade
as the English West India colonies ; and they reduced the du-
ties on imports about twenty per cent. While Beresford was
waiting for reenforcements, the citizens of Buenos Aires
took steps to expel the invaders. Juan Martin de Pueyrredon,
the son of a Frenchman who had settled in Buenos Aires,
organized a squadron of huzzars. Cornelio de Saavedra, a
prominent creole, was made the commander of a volunteer
company of infantry. On August 12 the colonial soldiers
commanded by Santiago de Liniers, a French officer who had
fought under the Spanish banner in North Africa, forced
General Beresford to surrender. A cabildo abierto soon se-
lected De Liniers to be the military commander of Buenos
Aires in place of the recreant viceroy. About two months later
by a royal order De Liniers was appointed the viceroy of la
Plata. On July 5, 1807, under the direction of De Liniers, the
citizen soldiery repulsed a fresh attack of the English under
the command of General Whitelocke. Although the English
failed in their attempts to conquer the southern part of South
America, yet their attacks upon the viceroyalty of la Plata
were not without influence ; for they broke down the commer-
cial barriers which surrounded that colony, and furnished
some colonists a training in the art of war. A Spanish-Eng-
lish journal, the Star of the South, which was founded in Mon-
tevideo during the English occupation, stimulated a spirit of
hostility to the Spanish regime.

Many laws of Spain and the Indies contained provisions
in regard to the colonial Church. Since the age of Charles I.,
the Spanish monarchs had acted as the spiritual lords of
America. The Pope could not communicate directly with the
faithful in the Spanish colonies : bulls could only be circu-
lated in Spanish America after having been approved by the
council of the Indies. As the Catholic faith progressed. Span-

i8 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

ish America had been carved into bishoprics which were not
always coterminous with the secular subdivisions. American
archbishops and bishops were appointed by the king; and the
problems that arose respecting the patronage were decided in
the council of the Indies. The ordinances of American church
councils could only be published after being approved by the
omniscient council at Madrid. In Spanish America members
of the secular clergy were found in those towns where Span-
iards constituted a large part of the population. Among the
Indians on the frontiers, Dominican and Franciscan friars
often served as missionaries. Throughout the Indies an enor-
mous amount of property had fallen into the hands of the
Church : thus the influence of the clergy was steadily aug-
mented. Largely because of the intimate relations which ex-
isted between the colonial clergy and the king, in many sections
of Spanish America the Church was a great buttress of royal
power. Nevertheless, some creoles who belonged to the lower
clergy were animated by liberal ideas.

The conservative influence of the clergy in Spanish America
was sometimes reenforced by the inquisition. Tribunals of
the holy office were located at Carthagena, Lima, and Mexico
City. Those tribunals strove to suppress witchcraft, blas-
phemy, and heresy, as well as to prevent the circulation of pro-
hibited books. In a list of more than five thousand volumes
which Depons mentioned as being prohibited in South Amer-
ica at the opening of the nineteenth century, there are found
works of Rousseau, Montesquieu, Diderot, Helvetius, Hume,
Addison, and De Foe. Although at the end of the colonial
regime edicts were still published and officials of the inquisi-
tion still acted as censors, yet the holy office in Spanish Amer-
ica was in a decadent condition. Count Segur, a French mili-
tary officer who visited Venezuela early in 1783, quoted a
Spanish officer as saying :

Here the Inquisition does not . . . order any auto-de-fe,
nor light any fires, but it endeavors to extinguish every ray
of light. I, as well as several of my friends, burn to read the

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

19

works of the celebrated writers of France; but the intendant
forbids their importation under the severest penalties, as if
they were infected with the plague.

An illustration of the attitude of the Spanish authorities
toward the publication of books may be had from the annals
of the viceroyalty of Peru. In an official report which Teo-
doro de Croix, viceroy of Peru, wrote for his successor in
1790, he said that certain prohibited books had been seized
and burned.

A proclamation has been published declaring that no printer
shall publish any paper whatsoever without a license under
penalty of severe punishments. An order has been sent to the
royal university that neither the disputations customarily held
on the arrival of the viceroys, nor the panegyrics ordinarily
delivered before those officials, nor the Latin orations with
which the university is annually opened, nor any paper what-
soever, can be printed without the examination and the license
of this viceregal government.

In spite of the efforts of the inquisition, which were sup-
ported by the secular authorities, prohibited books circulated
secretly in the viceroyalty of Peru. In the viceroyalty of la
Plata certain colonists were influenced by the Declaration of
Independence of July 4, 1776. Some Spanish-American col-
onists considered the Constitution of the United States as a
grand exemplar. Further, the political opinions of the intel-
lectual aristocracy were greatly influenced by the revolutionary
philosophy of France. The “pestiferous” Encyclopedie was
smuggled into Peru. Jean Jacques Rousseau’s Le Contrat
Social was read by enterprising colonists in Mexico, Vene-
zuela, and la Plata. Count Segur stated that in Venezuela a
physician led him to the most secluded part of his house, where
he showed him “with infinite satisfaction the works of J. J.
Rousseau and Raynal, which he kept concealed as his most
precious treasure in a beam scooped out for that purpose.” The
Declaration des Droits de I’Homme, translated into Spanish
and printed by Antonio Narino, an enterprising creole of New

20 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

Granada, was clandestinely circulated in Peru, New Granada,
and Venezuela. Copies of French revolutionary documents
were found among the papers of Manuel Gual, a leader of the
insurrection against Spanish rule which broke out in Vene-
zuela in 1797. But although the French philosophy, in par-
ticular, became a source of inspiration for conspirators who
dreamed of revolutionizing Spanish America, yet it is only
reasonable to suppose that a large majority of the inhabitants
of the Spanish Indies remained entirely unaffected by the
revolutionary leaven.

For to them the educational facilities furnished by print-
ing presses and schools and colleges remained more or less
unknown. Although printing presses were set up in Mexico
and Peru during the sixteenth century, yet, as has been shown,
books and pamphlets could not be printed openly without the
sanction of the civil and ecclesiastical authorities. A few
books were printed surreptitiously by Jesuit fathers in South
America. About 1780 a printing press was brought to the city
of Buenos Aires from the dismantled Jesuit college at Cordoba.
The first capital of Spanish America in which a periodical reg-
ularly appeared was Mexico City, where the Gaceta de Mexico
was published during a large part of the eighteenth cen-
tury. In 1785 there was published at the capital of the vice-
royalty of New Granada the first number of la Gaceta de
Santa Fe. In 1790 there appeared the first number of El
Diario erudito, econdmico, y comercial de Lima. The Gaceta
de Caracas, which began to appear in 1808, was evidently
printed upon a small press which Francisco de Miranda had
left in the West Indies after his unsuccessful attempt to revo-
lutionize Venezuela. A notable colonial periodical was the
Mercurio Peruano de historia, literatura, y noticias piihlicas,
which was founded at Lima in 1791. Such periodicals or-
dinarily contained only a small amount of news, besides the
reports of governmental activities. While they helped to pre-
pare the minds of certain intellectual leaders for a new order,
they did not reach the common people, because elementary edu-

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

21

cation was much neglected. For example, in Venezuela the
creole boys of the better class were taught to read miraculous
tales and instructed in the rudiments of Latin grammar. A
well-informed Venezuelan said of his educated fellow-country-
men : “They fancy that all the sciences are contained in the
Latin grammar of Nebrija, the philosophy of Aristotle, the
institutes of Justinian, the Ctiria Philip pica, and the theological
writings of Gonet and Larraga. If they can make extracts
from these works, say mass, display the doctor’s badge, or
appear in the dress of a priest or a monk, they consider that
they are sufficiently accomplished.”

In the sixteenth century universities were founded in the
viceroyalties of Mexico and Peru. As early as 1551 Charles I.
issued a cedula which provided for the establishment of uni-
versities at Lima and Mexico City. The chief subjects of
study in the University of San Marcos at Lima were theology,
civil and canon law, and certain sciences. Perhaps the most
famous of the colonial institutions of learning was the “Royal
and Pontifical University of Mexico.” The prologue of its con-
stitution, as printed in 1775, declared that it had granted about
thirty thousand degrees. According to this constitution, the
administration of the university was vested in a rector, who
was elected annually by a board of councilors. At that univer-
sity, in addition to the subjects which have been mentioned
as being studied at the University of San Marcos, some at-
tention was given to Indian dialects. In the constitution of
the University of Mexico there were many interesting pro-
visions concerning matriculation, prerequisites for certain
courses, student lodging-houses, and methods of teaching. The
teachers were to spend one-half of each hour in dictating to
the students; and the other half in making explanations in
Latin: if the subject was very difficult, the teachers were to
elucidate the matter in Spanish. On the roll of its graduates
this university numbered many men who had acquired
distinction in public life and in professional employ-
ments. Besides the universities at Lima and Mexico City,

22 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

universities, or colleges, were founded by decrees of Spanish
monarchs, or by the action of beneficent ecclesiastics, at many
other points in the Indies, notably at Buenos Aires, Cordoba,
Chuquisaca, and Caracas. At some of these colleges, as Cor-
doba, the teachers for a time were Jesuit padres. It was at
the universities and colleges which sprang up in important
cities of Spanish America that the favored sons of the colonial
aristocrats — the counts, marquises, officeholders, and land-
owners — were mostly educated.

The policy which the government of Spain adopted in re-
gard to the Jesuit order injured the cause of learning in the
New World and lowered the prestige of the crown. The in-
defatigable disciples of Ignatius Loyola had established mis-
sions and planted colleges in various sections of Spanish
America. Although the members of the Society of Jesus kept
the Indian neophytes in a state of subordination which re-
sembled serfdom, yet in many other respects their influence
was beneficial. But in the course of generations, a consider-
able amount of property passed into their possession, and they
incurred the jealousy of other religious orders. Worst of all,
they were suspected of being disloyal to the king of Spain.
Hence, early in 1767, the Spanish council of state decided that
the Jesuits should be expelled from the dominions of Spain in
both hemispheres. On February 27, 1767, Charles III. signed
an order providing that the members of the Society of Jesus
should be expelled from his possessions in Spain, the Indies,
and the Philippines, and that the property of the society should
be sequestrated. A short time afterwards it was provided that
the Jesuits should be deported from the Indies to Europe.
Governors, or other civil magistrates, were to be given com-
mand over the Jesuit provinces in America, while the missions
were to be placed under the care of the members of other re-
ligious orders. A royal decree dated April 5, 1787, provided
that the income accruing from the confiscated property should
be used to pension the exiled Jesuits. It has been estimated
that in consequence of those decrees, about five thousand Jesuit

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

23

fathers were transported from the Indies to Italy. After the
expulsion of the Jesuits the missions decayed, and the neo-
phytes relapsed into barbarism. Further, some colonists re-
sented the harsh measures which had been adopted by the
Spanish government. In the viceroyalty of Mexico the dis-
affection which was produced by the expulsion of the Jesuit
fathers stimulated thoughts of separation from Spain.

In the Papal states some of the embittered Jesuit exiles
dreamed of subverting the royal authority in Spanish America.
Father Juan Pablo Viscardo y Guzman wrote a stirring pam-
phlet entitled Lettre aux Espagnols atncricains par un de leur
compatriots. In the pamphlet the exile declared that the his-
tory of Spanish rule in America could be epitomized in four
words, “ingratitude, injustice, slavery, and desolation.” He
likened the title which the Spanish colonists had acquired to
America during the era of conquest to the title which the
Goths had acquired to Spain by the conquest of the Iberian
peninsula. In a scathing denunciation of the colonial policy
of Spain, he affirmed that, even in times of peace, wine was
so scarce in the city of Carthagena that mass could be cele-
brated only in one church. The spirit and the argument of
this remarkable pamphlet will be suggested by the following
excerpts :

The pretension of Spain to blind obedience to her arbitrary
laws is based mainly upon the ’gnorance which she has per-
mitted and encouraged, especially in regard to the inalienable
rights of man and the imprescriptible duties of every gov-
ernment. Spain has attempted to persuade the common peo-
ple that it is a crime to reason upon matters of the greatest
importance to every individual ; and consequently that it is
always a duty to extinguish the precious flame which the
Creator gave us for enlightenment and guidance. But despite
the dissemination of such fatal doctrines, the entire history
of Spain bears witness against their truth and legitimacy, . . .
Nature has separated us from Spain by immense seas. A son
who found himself at such a distance from his father would
doubtless be a fool, if, in the management of his own affairs,
he constantly awaited the decision of his father. The son is

24 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

emancipated by natural law. In a parallel case should a
numerous people, who are not dependent upon another nation
whom they do not need, remain subject to it like the vilest
slave ?

Our distance from Spain, which proclaims our independ-
ence, is, however, less significant than the difference in inter-
ests. We imperatively need a government in our midst for
the distribution of benefits, the object of the social union.
To depend upon a government two or three thousand leagues
distant, is to renounce these benefits; for such is the policy
of the court of Spain, that it aspires only to give us laws
which monopolize our commerce, our industry, our property,
and our persons, and which sacrifice them to her ambition,
her pride, and her avarice. . . .

In fine, in whatever aspect our dependence upon Spain is
considered, one will see that every obligation impels us to
terminate it. We ought to do so because of gratitude towards
our ancestors who did not waste their sweat and their blood
in order that the theater of their labors and their glory should
become the scene of our miserable servitude. We owe that to
ourselves because of the indispensable obligation to preserve
the natural rights granted by our Creator — precious rights
which we cannot alienate — rights which no one can wrest
from us without committing a crime. Can man renounce his
reason, or can this be taken from him by force? Personal
liberty is not less essentially his property than reason. The
free enjoyment of these natural rights is the inestimable heri-
tage which we ought to transmit to our posterity. . . . The
valor with which the English colonists in America fought for
the liberty that they gloriously enjoy shames our indo-
lence. . . . There is no longer any pretext to excuse our resig-
nation; and, if we longer endure the vexations which over-
whelm us, people will truthfully declare that our laziness has
merited them : our descendants will burden us with impreca-
tions, when, champing the bit of slavery, — a slavery which
they inherited — they remember the moment in which ... we
did not wish to become free.

The writer can think of no expression of colonial grievances
with which this document can be more aptly compared than
Thomas Jefferson’s Summary View of the Rights of British
America. The Jesuit’s pamphlet was an exceptional expression

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

25

of sentiment, which was indubitably intended to serve as an ap-
peal to the inhabitants of Spanish America to cast off the
Spanish yoke. It was composed in Europe about 1790, and
published posthumously at Philadelphia in 1799. In some
manner a copy of this pamphlet fell into the hands of Fran-
cisco de Miranda. When, in 1806, that expatriated Venezue-
lan led a filibustering expedition against the coast of South
America, he printed Viscardo y Guzman’s pamphlet in Spanish
and distributed it among his fellow-countrymen. A biographi-
cal sketch of Francisco de Miranda will furnish an outline of
the early revolution against Spain in the captaincy general of
Venezuela. His career will also show clearly the attitude
of the English government toward the Spanish empire in
America during the epoch which preceded the usurpations of
Napoleon in tlie Iberian peninsula.

CHAPTER II

FRANCISCO DE MIRANDA

A VAST hive of revolution, the captaincy general of Vene-
zuela extended along the Atlantic coast of South America
from the gulf of Maracaibo on the northwest to the Essequibo
River on the southeast. That administrative division was
bounded on the south and west by Dutch and Portuguese
Guiana and by the viceroyalty of New Granada. Near the
center of the captaincy general was the province of Caracas
which was under the immediate control of the captain general
who acted as the governor of the province. The capital of
the province of Caracas, and also of the captaincy general,
was the city of Caracas: when our story begins it was the
seat of an audiencia and of a consulate, as well as the resi-
dence of an archbishop and an intendant.

Francisco de Miranda, the promoter of Spanish-American
independence, was born in the city of Caracas on March 28,
1750. His mother was Francisca de Espinosa, who, in 1749, had
married Sebastian de Miranda. In an autobiographical sketch
written in early manhood, Francisco declared that his ancestors
were men of pure descent and orthodox faith, who had often
held honorable offices in Spain. On his father’s side, Fran-
cisco de Miranda was apparently a descendant of the noble
family of Miranda, which had its ancestral home in Asturias.
According to a mediaeval Spanish chronicler, in the ninth cen-
tury Alvaro Fernandez de Miranda, the founder of the Mi-
randa family, rescued five Christian maidens from the Moors
' — this adventure was commemorated by granting to him a coat
of arms which bore heraldic symbols of his chivalrous deed.
In the last half of the eighteenth century, Sebastian de Mi-

26

Francisco de Miranda

(Frontispiece of Antepara's "South American Emancipation”)

FRANCISCO DE MIRANDA

27

randa, who had emigrated from the Canary Islands to South
America, was a thriving merchant of Caracas, who had won
the esteem of the captain general of Venezuela by faithful
service as the captain of a volunteer militia company.

The education of Francisco de Miranda began in the
schools of his native city. Whether or not he graduated from
the College of Santa Rosa at Caracas, Miranda evidently ac-
quired some knowledge of Latin, philosophy, and law. When
a mere lad, Francisco showed a fondness for the profession
of arms; for he sailed from Venezuela for Spain, where, in
1772, he secured by purchase a commission as captain in the
Spanish infantry company of the Princess. The young cap-
tain received his baptism of fire while fighting the Moors on
the coast of northern Africa. He then spent many months in
dull Spanish garrisons, where he employed part of his leisure
in study. According to his own story, the officials of the in-
quisition threw some of his favorite books into the flames.
It is certain that the high-spirited youth had an acrimonious
dispute with one of his superior officers. Incidents in Mi-
randa’s career in Spain indeed suggest that he became dis-
satisfied with his employment and pined for other scenes of
activity.

The French alliance with the revolting colonists of Eng-
land in North America opened to Miranda the door of oppor-
tunity. This alliance drew Spain into the American revolu-
tion, for that nation was bound to France by the treaty known
as the family compact. An expedition was accordingly pre-
pared in Spain to cooperate with the French in an attack upon
the English dominions in America. Captain Miranda, who
had been transferred to the company of Aragon, returned to
the New World with that expedition in 1780. Soon after ar-
riving in the West Indies, he was made the aide-de-camp of
General Juan de Cagigal, the governor of Cuba. With this
general, Miranda participated in the capture of Pensacola,
West Florida, and of Providence, the capital of the Bahama
Islands. He won the confidence of Governor Cagigal, who

28 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

breveted him colonel and urged the minister of the Indies,
Jose de Galvez, to promote him. Other Spanish officials in
the West Indies, however, disliked and distrusted Miranda ;
and, when occasion offered, they sent to Madrid venomous
complaints against him.

Those complaints centered around a trip which Colonel
Miranda made from Cuba to Jamaica in 1781. He was com-
missioned by Cagigal to arrange for an exchange of prisoners
between the Spanish and the English forces in the West In-
dies. While on this errand, Miranda quietly gathered informa-
tion in regard to the military condition of Jamaica : in fact,
he acted as a spy. At the same time, he gave to Governor
Balling of Jamaica a detailed description of the various expe-
ditions which the Spaniards had fitted out against Pensacola.
Further, on returning to Cuba, Miranda brought back a quan-
tity of merchandise. He was soon denounced to the govern-
ment of Spain because of the arrangement which he had made
for the exchange of prisoners with the English, even though
that agreement had been approved by Governor Cagigal. He
was accused of having connived at the covert inspection of
the fortifications of Havana by the English general, John
Campbell, who visited Cuba while on a voyage from Pensa-
cola to New York. He was also accused of having smuggled
goods into Cuba. Accordingly, in March, 1782, a royal com-
missioner, Juan Antonio de Vrunuela, was sent to Cuba to in-
vestigate Colonel Miranda’s conduct.

In December, 1783, Vrunuela pronounced judgment against
Miranda. He declared that even the carts, the oxen, and the
horses which had conveyed the contraband goods from Guan-
tanamo to Havana were to be confiscated. Colonel Miranda
was to be heavily fined, deprived of his military commission,
and banished for ten years. A strange light is cast upon this
judgment by the fact that the council of the Indies afterwards
fully exonerated the disgraced officer. Even before Vrunue-
la’s judgment was pronounced, that officer had closed ten years
oi service under the Spanish banner by a secret and hasty

FRANCISCO DE MIRANDA

29

flight. When departing from the West Indies, Miranda wrote
to his true friend, Governor Cagigal, to inform him that he
intended to appeal to King Charles III. for justice. Further,
he declared that he wished to improve his education by a tour
of the United States and Europe. He said that ‘the only way
in which he might complete the great work of making himself
a sound and useful man was to study carefully the laws, gov-
ernment, agriculture, military condition, navigation, sciences,
and arts of the most wise and virtuous societies in the uni-
verse.’

The ten years spent as a Spanish military officer consti-
tuted a formative period in Miranda’s life. He gained some
knowledge of the art of war, and became aware of the crying
evils of Spain’s colonial system. In 1772 he was a loyal
youth. By 1783 he had become a resentful man. Whether
Miranda was deliberately disloyal to his king or not, it is clear
that the Spanish government viewed him as a dangerous con-
spirator. Several years later he asserted that it was during his
sojourn in the West Indies that he first received representa-
tions from certain discontented inhabitants of northern South
America. According to his own statements, at least as early
as 1783 he possessed a collection of papers, maps, and plans
concerning the Spanish colonies. It was probably during his
military service in the West Indies — when he was fighting for
the independence of England’s revolted colonists — that Miran-
da first harbored the thought which was to dominate his life.
As was suggested by a writer in the Editiburgh Review — who
evidently secured his information from Miranda himself — in
a scene where the cause of liberty was the object of men’s
desires, and in a country which somewhat resembled South
America, it was only natural that a design to liberate his native
land should have been suggested to Miranda’s mind.

After the treaty of peace had been signed between England
and the United States, Miranda visited that country. In a
vain-glorious autobiographical sketch written in 1785, he de-
clared that, while traveling through the United States, he

30 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

visited the scenes “of the most important operations of the
revolutionary war, and conversed at length with the heroes
and sages who had promoted that immortal work.” It is cer-
tain that the fugitive from Spanish justice visited Charleston,
Philadelphia, New York, and Boston. In June, 1784, Miranda
was in New Haven, Connecticut, where he called on President
Stiles of Yale College, and visited some of the college classes.
The South American described to President Stiles the educa-
tional system of Mexico, and characterized Mexican learning
as “inferior, trifling, and contemptible.” Miranda not only
impressed Stiles as being too free-spoken and too liberal-
minded to live in either Old or New Spain, but he also con-
vinced the latter that he had “a perfect acquaintance with the
policy and history of all Spanish America.” Of the bustling,
self-important South American, President Stiles wrote in his
diary that he was “a learned Man and a flaming Son of
Liberty.”

Colonel Miranda doubtless became acquainted with many
other citizens of the United States. Among them were
Thomas Paine, the ardent lover of liberty, Stephen Sayre,
who soon took a keen interest in Spanish America, and Rufus
King, who became an enthusiastic champion of Miranda’s
revolutionary schemes. Possibly the South American also met
General Washington; he certainly became acquainted with
Alexander Hamilton and Henry Knox. About twenty years
later, Miranda apparently asserted that those three generals
had promised to cooperate with him in the revolutionizing of
Spanish America, — an assertion that is not supported by the
•evidence which is available. Nothing has been found to show
that Miranda even discussed this topic with General Wash-
ington. There is no doubt, however, that the ardent South
American talked to both Hamilton and Knox regarding the
liberation of America from Spanish rule, and that, for the
time being, they were interested. To judge by letters which
Miranda sent to Knox, these two men held several symposiums
in regard to the liberation of Spanish America: and, when

FRANCISCO DE MIRANDA

31

Miranda left Boston, he entrusted Knox with the key to a
secret cipher. But in later years, when Miranda tried to get
Generals Hamilton and Knox to cooperate in his revolutionary
designs, their interest in Spanish America had cooled.

In February, 1785, Miranda had reached the British Isles.
He soon visited the Spanish Ambassador in London, Bernardo
del Campo, and tried to get an honorable dismissal from
Spain’s military service. To promote that object, on April 10,
1785, Colonel Miranda addressed to King Charles III. a long
petition, which was accompanied by justificatory documents.
In this petition that officer spoke of his long service to the
Spanish king. The petitioner attributed the shabby treatment
which he had been given in the West Indies to the undermin-
ing influence of jealous enemies. He gave his version of the
events which had caused his flight from Cuba, alleging that
false accusations had been brought against him. He declared
that he labored under the disadvantage of being a creole :

I am tired of struggling with powerful enemies, inveterate
prepossessions, and the jealousies of all classes; for the tri-
umphs of a creole, however complete they may be in theory,
can never repay him for the injuries which they cause him in
honor, in estate, and in time — the most precious of all — from
which inestimable advantages may be drawn if it is dedicated
to the solid studies and useful occupations which are most
suitable to his genius. I humbly beseech your Majesty to dis-
miss me from the office which I enjoy in the army by your
royal bounty, — an office which, by this petition, I lay at your
royal feet. I merely desire your Majesty to know that, in the
matters entrusted to me, I have always proceeded with purity
and have always been animated by the lofty desire to promote
the service and glory of my king, without allowing jealousies,
persecutions, or the threats of commanders and ministers to
alter my intentions, or to incline my spirit to indecorous sub-
mission. I also desire, if it please your Majesty, to be reim-
bursed the amount of eight thousand pesos, the price of the
office of captain in which I began to serve in the army; so
that I may be recompensed for the serious injuries which I
have recently suffered.

32 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

But the court of Madrid did not accept Miranda’s version
of the suspicious events in the West Indies. Although Bernardo
del Campo told Miranda that his petition might be granted,
yet that ambassador tried to spy upon Miranda’s movements
and to seize his precious papers. In fact, the Spanish govern-
ment would doubtless have made a formal demand upon the
government of England for the person of Miranda, if the
laws of that country and the attitude of her cabinet had prom-
ised success. Although the quick-witted creole soon suspected
that the Spanish ambassador was trying to hoodwink him, yet
it is unlikely that he laid any plans for the liberation of
Spanish America before the English cabinet at this juncture.
Nevertheless, Miranda must have aired his views concerning
the Indies in the English metropolis ; for, in the summer of
1785, the Political Herald and Review declared that there was
then in London a Spanish-American of “great consequence and
possessed of the confidence of his fellow-citizens,” who aspired
“to the glory of being the deliverer of his country.” The
review declared that that “distinguished character” had spent
many years in the study of politics and government, and that
he was a man of sublime views and penetrating under-
standing, skilled in the ancient and modern languages, con-
versant with books and acquainted with the World.” That
personage had proceeded from North America to England,
which he regarded as “the mother country of liberty, and the
school for political knowledge.” There is no doubt that Fran-
cisco de Miranda had posed for this flattering portrait.

In August, 1785, Miranda proceeded from London to
Harwich. He then traversed the continent from the meadows
of Holland to the Russian steppes, visiting Prussia, Austria,
Italy, Turkey, Russia, and Sweden. Possibly he also visited
Egypt and Asia Minor. While in Italy he met some of the
Jesuits who had been exiled from South America and con-
ceived the idea of using those embittered exiles to promote his
revolutionary projects. It is likely that Miranda communi-
cated his views concerning the liberation of Spanish America

FRANCISCO DE MIRANDA

33

to Empress Catherine II. He returned safely to London in
June, 1789, having cleverly outwitted various agents of Spain
who had tried to ensnare him.

The observant tourist profited greatly by his trip through
the United States and Europe. He had acquired a better
knowledge of the English and French languages; he had be-
come acquainted with adventurers and statesmen in two hemi-
spheres, and had observed the condition of the military art at
several European capitals. In his retentive memory Miranda
had stored many anecdotes of courts and camps with which he
later regaled the politicians, merchants, philanthropists, and
vagabonds whom he sought to interest in his conspiracies
against Spanish rule in America. Even though he may not
have pleaded for American independence at every court which
he visited, still he must have interested many people in Spanish
America.

From 1790 to 1808 the plans which Miranda had been
gradually maturing for the separation of the Spanish colonies
from the mother country were laid before various cabinets.
He generally took advantage of events which threatened to
involve Spain in a war. In 1790, when the Nootka Sound
controversy arose out of the conflicting claims of Spain and
England to territory on the northwest coast of North America,
Miranda first formally presented his designs to the English
government. At that juncture he proposed to the prime
minister, William Pitt, that England should liberate the In-
dies from the rule of Spain.

In the first plans which Miranda laid before Pitt, he pro-
posed that one independent government should be established
in the vast region stretching from the sources of the Missis-
sippi River to Cape Horn, from Brazil to the Bay of San
Francisco. The system of government which he thought
should be introduced into South America was analogous to
the government of Great Britain. The executive power was
to be “represented by an Inca with the title of emperor.”
That office was to be hereditary. The power to make laws

34 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

was to be vested in a bicameral legislature. The upper house,
or senate, was to be composed of a fixed number of senators,
or caciques, selected by the Inca from citizens who had held
important offices. The senators were to hold office for life.
The members of the lower house, or “chamber of communes,”
were also to be selected by the Inca. They were to hold of-
fice for five years ; they might, however, be reappointed. The
members of the federal judiciary were likewise to be chosen
by the Inca. Ordinarily they were to hold office for life.
Provision was also made for the choice of censors, ediles, and
questors for five-year terms. The questors and the ediles
were to be eligible for reelection. The two censors, nomi-
nated by the citizens and confirmed by the Inca, were to watch
over the morals of the youth, of senators, and of educators.
They might expel a senator from the legislature, if they
thought such a step necessary for the public welfare. The
ediles were to be nominated by the senators and confirmed
by the Inca. They were to take care of ports, canals, public
monuments, national vessels, and national feasts. The ques-
tors, selected by the chamber of communes and confirmed by
the Inca, were to take charge of the finances of the empire.

Various provisions were made regarding the amendment
of this constitution. No law contrary to the spirit of the
constitution was to be valid. The fundamental law of the
projected state might be modified in two ways: either an
amendment to the constitution might be proposed by two-
thirds of both houses of the legislature and should become
operative if approved by three-fourths of a council composed
of the Inca and the judges presiding over the high tribunals
of justice; or an amendment to the constitution might be made
by two-thirds of this council, if approved by three-fourths
of both houses of the legislature. Obviously, the framer of
this constitution, who could have been no other person than
Miranda himself, had borrowed suggestions from various
sources. The clauses concerning the amendment of the con-
stitution were patterned after the Constitution of the United

FRANCISCO DE MIRANDA

35

States. The provisions for an hereditary executive and for
the upper house of the legislature were modeled upon English
institutions. The provisions regarding questors, censors, and
ediles were derived from the constitution of Rome. The pro-
ject of a vast Spanish-American monarchy ruled by an Inca
was evidently suggested to Miranda by the papers which he
possessed concerning the revolution of Tupac Amaru.

In some particulars Miranda’s plan for a monarchy in
America was supplemented by a proclamation found among
Pitt’s papers, which provided for the establishment of a pro-
visional local government that was to replace the institutions
of the Spanish regime. A “Native and Noble Citizen of
South America’’ was temporarily to assume the powers of the
Spanish viceroy or captain general. That provisional governor
was to hold his office for five years ; he was to govern with the
advice of a council of thirty-five members who were to be
chosen for five years by indirect election. Twenty members of
the council were to constitute a quorum; and a majority of the
members present was required for the sanction of any measure.
In the case of a tie, the governor was to cast the deciding vote.
The governor and the council were to have the power to ap-
point judges, to make laws, and even to negotiate alliances
with foreig^n powers. The laws of the Indies were to remain
in force, unless altered by the action of the governor and
council. The tithes and properties of the church were to be
preserved. The Spanish taxes were still to be levied, but the
revenue accruing was to be “the property of the nation.’’ If
possible, the governor and council were to diminish the duties,
taxes, and contributions. Monopolies were to be swept away.
The capitation tax levied upon the Indians was to be “im-
mediately abolished.” The inquisition, having become unnec-
essary, was to be “abolished forever.”

To enable Pitt to judge the attitude of the inhabitants of
the Indies toward Spanish rule, Miranda sent to that minister
his papers relating to the insurrection of Tupac Amaru. The
agitator apparently believed that these papers would convince

36 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

Pitt that the majority of the South Americans were ready for
emancipation, if care were taken to adjust properly the deli-
cate problems concerning their religion and independence. He
submitted to that minister his plan of attack and operations,
elucidating his ideas with the aid of maps and plans. In ad-
dition to the information derived from Miranda, the English
government gathered data regarding strategic positions in
Central America, Mexico, and the Philippine Islands. On his
part, the revolutionary promoter tried to enlist the sympathy of
General Knox, who had become secretary of war for the
United States,

Nothing came of Miranda’s elaborate designs in 1790;
for the Nootka Sound dispute was adjusted peacefully, and
the far-reaching schemes which England’s great prime minister
had been contemplating were laid aside. Soon afterwards
Miranda went to France. There is reason to believe that he
hoped to interest French leaders in his designs ; as his papers
concerning the Nootka Sound controversy followed him to
Paris.

Through letters of introduction, and by other means, Mi-
randa soon became acquainted with some of the French leaders,
notably Brissot de Warville, leader of the Girondists, and
Joseph Servan, minister of war. His arrival in Paris was
opportune ; for certain Frenchmen were contemplating an at-
tack upon the Spanish colonies in America. Brissot soon
selected Miranda as the best leader for such an attack with
Santo Domingo as a base. On December 13, 1792, Brissot wrote
to Miranda to suggest that the French forces at that island
would be aided in the project by a large number of valiant
soldiers from the United States, who were “sighing for this
revolution.’’ Brissot declared that he had presented his views
“to all the ministers,’’ who had appreciated the advantages
proposed. His plan was that Miranda should be appointed
governor of Santo Domingo from which he might direct the
revolution. Miranda was so far interested in the scheme that
he held a conference regarding it with Lebrun, the minister

FRANCISCO DE MIRANDA

37

of foreign affairs. The French plan to employ Miranda in the
revolutionizing of Spanish America was most fully presented
in a letter of Brissot to General Dumouriez dated November
28, 1792. So we will quote that letter here :

It is necessary to promote this revolution in the Sjianish
peninsula and in the Indies at the same time. The fate of the
revolution in Spanish America depends upon one man; you
know him, you esteem him, you love him; that is, Mi-
randa. . . . He will soon check the miserable quarrels of the
colonies; he will soon pacify the whites who are so trouble-
some ; and he will become the idol of the people of color.
And then with what ease will he not be able to revolutionize
either the islands of the Spaniards or the American continent
which they possess. At the head of twelve thousand brave
troops of the line which are now at Santo Domingo, and of
from ten to fifteen thousand brave mulattoes that our colonies
will furnish him, having besides a squadron under his orders,
with what facility will he not be able to invade the Spanish
possessions, while the Spaniards have no forces with which to
oppose him. The name of Miranda will be worth an army:
his courage, his genius, — all promise success. But in order
to ensure success, there is not a moment to lose. It is neces-
sary that he should leave upon the Capricieuse which sails for
Santo Domingo; it is necessary that he should depart before
Spain discovers our plans. I know well that his nomination
will strike Spain with terror and confound Pitt with his poor
dilatory politics; but Spain is impotent, and England will not
move.

Further, Brissot assured Dumouriez that all of the minis-
ters had agreed to the choice and that Monge, the minister of
marine, had promised to make Miranda the governor of Santo
Domingo, if Dumouriez would consent. Apparently Dumou-
riez was interested in the execution of Miranda’s “superb
project.” In the meantime Miranda again turned toward the
United States ; for he hoped to engage General Knox and
Henry Lee in the scheme. In all likelihood Lebrun, as well as
Miranda, hoped to enlist some American leaders in the cam-
paign against Spanish America. But perhaps because of the

38 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

belief of certain French leaders that Spain was trying to
maintain an attitude of neutrality towards the war between
France and other powers, in January, 1793, France laid the
project aside. From this ambitious project, however, the
revolutionary mission of Citizen Genet to the United States
took its origin.

While his favorite project was being considered at Paris,
Miranda had become a soldier of France. His thrilling ex-
periences during the French revolution may only be suggested.
On April 20, 1792, France had declared war on Austria. In
September, 1792, Miranda was placed in command of a
division of the French army that was operating in the Austrian
Netherlands under General Dumouriez. Early in the follow-
ing month, he was made brigadier general. General Miranda
soon distinguished himself by capturing Antwerp ; and a
dazzling future seemed to open before him. But he refused
to enter into the treasonable designs of General Dumouriez.
After the inglorious defeat of the French soldiers at Neer-
winden, where the South American commanded a wing of
the army, he was recalled to Paris, partly because of the ac-
cusations of his former friend, Dumouriez. There he had to
stand trial before the revolutionary tribunal. After being
triumphantly acquitted, Miranda retired to the suburbs of
Paris, where he lived in the midst of books, pictures, and
other mementoes of his travels. Suspicion soon gathered
around him, however, and in July, 1793, he was cast into the
prison La Force. Despite his vehement protests, it was the
beginning of 1795 before he was set at liberty. Miranda soon
essayed to formulate a policy and to suggest a frame of gov-
ernment for France: he published his views in a pamphlet
entitled Opinion du General Miranda sur la Situation Actuelle
de la France et sur les Remkdes convenahles d ses Maux. A
short time afterwards Miranda was denounced to the con-
vention ; hence, on November 27, 1795, he was again imprisoned.
But nothing could be proven against him, and he was soon set

FRANCISCO DE MIRANDA

39

free. It appears that General Miranda was again accused of
engaging in intrigues, or was distasteful to the government,
for he was soon ordered to leave the soil of France. While
being conveyed to the frontier, he audaciously left his escort,
and returned to Paris, where he publicly petitioned the gov-
ernment to pay him for his military services. Although
Miranda’s name was inscribed on the list of emigres, yet he
continued to live in seclusion near Paris until the beginning
of 1798, when he crossed the Straits of Dover disguised as a
merchant.

On January 16, 1798, Miranda signed a letter to William
Pitt which was couched in these words :

The undersigned, principal agent of the Spanish-American
colonies, has been chosen by the junta of deputies of Mexico,
Lima, Chile, Buenos Aires, Caracas, Santa Fe, etc., to present
himself to the ministers of his Britannic Majesty; in order to
renew in favor of the absolute independence of these colonies
the negotiations which were begun in 1790 and to conduct
them, as quickly as possible, to that stage of maturity which
the existing circumstances appear to favor, completing them
by a treaty of amity and alliance which should resemble (so
far as circumstances permit) the treaty concluded by France
with the English colonies of North America in 1778. That
example can serve as an apology in the absence of strict legal-
ity in the present case. . . . The spirit of frankness and loy-
alty which animates his compatriots and which attaches them
to the interests of Great Britain is best expressed in the
instrument that serves the undersigned as powers and instruc-
tions for this important commission.

Miranda declared that he was happy at being able to claim
“by a lucky chance” the “protection of the English nation in
promoting the independence of his country and in negotiating
a treaty of amity and alliance which would be useful and ad-
vantageous to both parties.” He expressed his confidence in
“the importance and the reciprocal utility of his mission.” He
affirmed that circumstances favored his project, because Pitt
had declared to him that a war between Spain and England

40 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

would furnish the occasion for the revolutionizing of Spanish
America.

With this letter Miranda submitted a copy of the document
which he declared served him as his instructions. That docu-
ment was composed of articles purporting to be drawn up
by a South-American revolutionary junta at Paris on December
22, 1797. The junta professed to be composed of deputies
from the principal provinces of Spanish America, who had
been sent to Europe to concert with Miranda a plan for the
liberation of their native land from the rule of Spain. The
instructions affirmed that the Spanish-American colonists,
having unanimously resolved to proclaim their independence
and to place their liberty upon a firm basis, addressed them-
selves to the British government, which they invited to join
them in the enterprise. Spanish America, it was declared,
agreed to pay England for her assistance. The aid demanded
of England was not to exceed twenty-seven vessels, eight
thousand infantry, and two thousand cavalry. It was declared
that a defensive alliance of England, the United States, and
Spanish America was “the only hope which remained to
liberty, that had been so boldly outraged by the detestable
maxims” avowed by France. It was suggested that a treaty
of alliance be entered into by England and Spanish America,
which, although not granting monopoly privileges, should be
conceived in terms most advantageous for Great Britain. A
proposal was made for the construction of a canal between
the Atlantic and the Pacific oceans by way of Lake Nicaragua,
as well as by the Isthmus of Panama. The freedom of such
transit was to be guaranteed, although not exclusively, to Eng-
land and the United States. It was provided that, after the
independence of Spanish America had been established, depu-
ties from various sections of America were to meet in a general
representative body in order to make arrangements for com-
mercial intercourse within the liberated territory. It was
pointed out that the relations which the bank of London would
be able to form with the banks of Lima and Mexico would

FRANCISCO DE MIRANDA

41

not be the least advantage which the alliance with Spanish
America would secure to England. The thirteenth article
of the instructions intrusted the military operations on the
American continent, as well as the negotiations with England,
to Francisco de Miranda. Certain blank passages in the in-
structions concerning the amount to be paid England for her
assistance and the disposition of the insular possessions of
Spain in America, were to be filled out when an agreement
had been reached by negotiations.

These instructions constitute the most explicit authoriza-
tion which has been found for Miranda’s activities as a pro-
moter of Spanish-American independence. They bear the
signatures of Jose del Pozo y Sucre, Manuel de Salas, and
Francisco de Miranda. It appears that Sucre and Salas were
expatriated Jesuits; but no evidence has been discovered to
support the statement that they were the authorized agents of
certain inhabitants of Spanish America. Still it is possible
that the signatories may have been authorized by a group of
revolutionary agitators from Spanish America composed of
such men as Antonio Narino. Those agitators may have had
some authorization from their revolutionary sympathizers in
Spanish America. Such authorization, however, could hardly
have been more than an expression of the desire of a minority
of the inhabitants of certain sections of America to free them-
selves from the odious rule of Spain. Viewed in this light,
the instrument of December 22, 1797, was a farcical document.
Furthermore, it seems likely that the document was, in the
main, an expression of Miranda’s ideas. To a large extent,
Francisco de Miranda was a self-constituted agent.

Following the plan which he had outlined, Miranda soon
attempted to engage the aid of the United States. He first
approached his friend, Rufus King, the American minister
in London, to whom on January 30, 1798, he partly disclosed
his scheme. The South American declared that, if England
and the United States should be driven to oppose France,
nothing would be easier than for these powers by joint opera-

42 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

tions to separate the Indies from Spain. In the Spanish set-
tlements on the American continents there were ten million
people who were civilized and “capable of being happy as
members of a polished Society." Everything was ripe for
the completion of the plan : Spain had given to the United
States good reasons for going to war with her. When King
visited Miranda, on February 8, the creole further explained
his plan. The attack which he projected was to be made on the
east side of the Isthmus of Darien. He wished to secure from
England eight thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry —
seasoned West Indian troops — besides a naval squadron which
should be sent to the Peruvian coast. From the United States
Miranda desired five thousand woodmen, or soldiers who
understood new countries. He entertained sanguine hopes
of cooperation from the Spanish soldiers stationed near the
isthmus; for many of the officers, he declared, were in sym-
pathy with his plan. Miranda declared that England was to
be paid thirty million pounds for her aid, while England and
the United States were to enjoy the trade of liberated Spanish
America. Goods from England and the United States which
passed across the Isthmus of Panama were to pay lower tolls
than the goods of other nations. There is a likelihood that
Miranda had in his possession at this time a copy of a Spanish
map of that isthmus and the adjacent section of South
America, which delineated the strategic positions where forti-
fications should be constructed.

For a time, Miranda considered the attitude of England
toward his plan as favorable. But Lord Grenville, the Eng-
lish secretary for foreign affairs, expressed himself to King
unfavorably in regard to Miranda’s designs. He stated that
he did not favor the plan presented by Miranda, fearing that
it might lead to “scenes of wretchedness’’ on the American
continent like those which had characterized the French revo-
lution. By the middle of February, the English ministers had
apparently reached a tentative conclusion in regard to the
revolutionizing of Spanish America. For Grenville informed

FRANCISCO DE MIRANDA

43

King that “if it was really to be apprehended that Spain should
fall beneath the control of France, then it was their intention to
prevent France from gaining to her cause the resources of
South America." At that juncture, they would “immediately
open their views and commence a negotiation upon the subject
with the United States."

Meanwhile, Miranda and King were attempting to interest
the United States in the ambitious design. On March 24
Miranda addressed a letter to President Adams, inclosing a
copy of his instructions. He expressed the opinion that Eng-
land’s exasperating delay was due to her expectation that the
United States would break definitely with France and to her
desire to cooperate with the United States in achieving “the
absolute independence” of Spanish America. He hoped that
six or eight vessels and four or five thousand men, which
were needed to begin the attack on Spanish America, could
easily be secured in England and the United States. Miranda
also wrote several letters to Alexander Hamilton, asking for
his cooperation in the attack on Spanish America. Rufus King
also wrote to Hamilton suggesting that the spread of French
revolutionary doctrines upon the European continent made it
necessary for the United States to take offensive measures :
“The Destiny of the new world, and I have a full and firm
persuasion that it will be both happy and glorious, is in our
hands." In August, Hamilton wrote to King declaring himself
in favor of the enterprise, and wishing that the United States
would furnish the land forces which should be commanded by
himself. At the same time, Hamilton wrote to Miranda declar-
ing that he could not participate in the scheme unless it was
patronized by the government of the United States, and that
such aid could hardly be hoped for then. Still, he declared
that in a short time the project might mature, and “an effec-
tual cooperation” by the United States might take place. Ham-
ilton’s letters evidently encouraged Miranda to entertain san-
guine hopes in regard to the outcome of his plans. He wrote
a letter to Hamilton declaring that it was agreed in England

44 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

that the auxiliary land forces were to be exclusively Amer-
ican, while the naval forces were to be entirely English. “All
is approved, and we await only the Hat of your illustrious
President to depart like lightning.”

The revolutionary ardor of Miranda had led him to dis-
regard the facts; as the contingency of the absorption of
Spain by France was still the pivot on which English policy
toward Spanish America depended. It is possible, of course,
that, if President Adams had decided to favor Miranda’s de-
signs, England might have equipped a squadron for an attack
upon South America. However, the government of the United
States — largely because of the reluctance of President Adams
and of his secretary of state, Timothy Pickering — did not even
reply to Miranda’s impassioned pleas. The agitator was con-
sequently compelled to dismiss the hope of linking together
the two Anglo-Saxon nations in his pretentious designs.

The regret which Miranda entertained at this outcome was
profound. On March 19, 1799, he addressed a memorial to
William Pitt reviewing his relations with that minister. An
extract from a copy of that document which is preserved in
the papers of Timothy Pickering will suggest his mood:

What will be the result when, in place of the long-expected
succor which has been so often promised the Spanish-Amer-
icans, they learn that England, after having made them wait
in expectancy for several years, and after having promised
more than fourteen months ago to the agents of Spanish
America who were in London an immediate and frank re-
sponse, has not furnished the slightest succor? It is difficult
to judge the effect which despair will produce in such cir-
cumstances; but it is certain that the wise and intelligent
persons, who hoped to see established throughout the Amer-
ican continent a system of order and morality which might
counterbalance the destructive maxims propagated by France,
will be deprived of their hopes and will be lowered in the
estimation of the Spanish-American people. It is certain that
the interests and the future security of the United States of
America will be gravely compromised. And that the advan-
tages which would accrue to Great Britain through commerce

FRANCISCO DE MIRANDA

45

and by virtue of an alliance with the immense American con-
tinent will be a real loss to her. If, on the other side, one
supposes that the varied genius of the French directory is
capable of successfully executing its plans for a general inva-
sion and of extending its perfidious vengeance to the United
States as well as to Great Britain, in view of the colossal
and revolutionary power which it possesses at the present
moment, one naturally trembles in contemplating the fate of
the human race.

From 1799 to 1805 “the agent of the Spanish-American
colonies,” as Miranda sometimes styled himself, resided for
the most part in London. He urged his revolutionary plans
upon English ministers whenever circumstances seemed pro-
pitious. On certain occasions the cabinets of Pitt and Ad-
dington listened to him. Among the persons who became
interested in his project was Sir Home Popham. In October,
1800, Miranda crossed the English Channel and succeeded in
reaching Paris, where he probably hoped to interest General
Bonaparte in his designs. But the former general of the
French republic, who was now an indigent soldier of fortune,
was viewed with suspicion. He was soon thrust into prison ;
and, in April, 1801, he left French soil without having been
able to present his views concerning Spanish America to Bona-
parte. Miranda finally became much dissatisfied with the
attitude of England toward his plans; in June, 1805, he wrote
a letter to Pitt, which shows that he was discredited. Speak-
ing of Miranda, a fellow-conspirator, Joseph Pavia, later de-
clared that “Mr. Pitt, who knew him well, kept a strict eye
upon him, but granted him protection from no other motive
than that of giving uneasiness” to the Spanish government
which was always “afraid of his freaks and plans to revolu-
tionize America.” This narrow interpretation of Miranda’s
relations with the English government is probably most cor-
rect in regard to the period from 1799 to 1805. It seems im-
possible to determine the exact amount of aid or encourage-
ment which that government gave to Miranda when, in the
end of 1805, he sailed from England for North America.

46 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

At that time, Miranda entertained great expectations of
aid from the United States, because of the differences existing
between that nation and Spain. After landing in New York
City, he tried to interest certain Americans in his plans. He
made a hasty trip from New York to Washington to solicit the
aid or sanction of the government of the United States for
his revolutionary undertaking. In the capital city he met
President Jefferson and James Madison, the secretary of
state. To use Madison’s own words, Miranda “disclosed in
very general terms his purpose of instituting a revolution in
a portion of Spanish America.” But the government of the
United States would not cooperate. Meanwhile the misleading
representations of Miranda’s agents in New York City in-
duced a number of adventurous individuals to join an expe-
dition which was destined to attack the Spanish colonies. In
February, 1806, the armed vessel Leander sailed from New
York City, bearing two hundred men, munitions of war, and
Miranda. Years of agitation by Miranda had culminated in
a filibustering expedition which was directed against his
native land.

After the Leander reached the high seas, the commander
in chief appeared on deck. According to one of his followers,
he was attired in a red gown and slippers. The commander
soon interested the ship’s company by telling marvelous tales
of his own adventures. The real object of the voyage became
known to all; the recruits were drilled in the manual of arms;
and many speculations were made regarding the attitude of
England and the United States toward the enterprise. The
expedition first proceeded to the West Indies. There Miranda
gathered a few more recruits, and secured the cooperation of
some English naval officers, notably Admiral Cochrane. In
the meantime the Spanish officials in northern South America
had been warned of Miranda’s approach by the Marquis of
Casa Yrujo, the vigilant Spanish ambassador in the United
States. Partly because of those warnings, the first attempt
of Miranda to land in the captaincy general of Venezuela

FRANCISCO DE MIRANDA

47

failed ; and some of the filibusters fell into the hands of the
Spaniards. The unfortunate captives were summarily tried
and sentenced to imprisonment or death. Miranda’s second
attack was more successful ; for the invaders captured the
town of Coro, and marched a short distance into the interior.
The tribunal of the inquisition at Carthagena proclaimed that
Miranda was a traitor to God and his king, while the captain
general gathered a small, motley army to repel the invaders.
The colonists did not join the filibusters; so that Miranda soon
decided to withdraw. When the English naval commanders
who were stationed near northern South America declined to
aid him, the expedition was disbanded, and the discredited
leader took refuge in the British West Indies. The first at-
tempt which Miranda made to revolutionize South America
had completely failed, mainly because the inhabitants did not
rally to his standard of red, yellow, and blue.

As soon as circumstances seemed auspicious, Miranda sent
agents to London to present his views to the English govern-
ment again. On June lo, 1807, Miranda addressed from
Trinidad to Lord Castlereagh, who had become secretary of
war and the colonies in the Portland ministry, a letter con-
cerning Spanish America:

The present situation and disposition of the People in the
whole Province of Caracas is very favorable to this under-
taking yet, notwithstanding the terror that the Government
tries to inspire by a few executions, and the tremendous pur-
suits of the Inquisition, made an absolute political tool on
this occasion. The general Orders given to the Commanders
of the principal Towns in this Province, with the exception
of La Guayra and Puerto Cabello, is to evacuate them in case
of my landing with any substantial force, and the inhabitants
to retire into the Country; but these have sent me informa-
tion, that they will do no such thing, when the opportunity
arrives. ... I really perceive an incalculable mischief in the
delay of the proposed operation, for if we do not subtract and
protect the Continent of South America now, from the influ-
ence and domineering ambition of France, the whole will
very soon and ultimately be absorbed in the same fatal and

48 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

universal dominion. ... I beseech You, My Lord, on these
considerations, to take some prompt and definitive measure
that may put a stop to this incalculable evil ; or release the
American People from the dangerous exertions in which they
are embarked, by opposing the French and Spanish Govern-
ments’ views, which ultimately must be fatal to themselves,
if not efficaciously supported by the Government of Great
Britain. . . . My own exertions in this Island are almost at
an End, if I do not receive the promised support from G. B.

Miranda’s hope for aid from England, which was at war
with Spain, the ally of France, soon induced him to return
to London. On January lo, 1808, he addressed to Castle-
reagh a long letter which was accompanied by illustrative
documents. Miranda averred that the inhabitants of New
Granada and Venezuela still favored independence, but that
their anxiety had been aroused by rumors that Spain had
secretly ceded Cuba and Porto Rico to France. He expressed
serious apprehensions in regard to the prospective cession of
the captaincy general of Venezuela by Spain to France in
return for Portugal, and besought from the English govern-
ment the assistance which, he declared, it had so often prom-
ised, to promote Spanish-American independence. He de-
clared that among the Spanish-American people there was no
difference of opinion in regard to emancipation from Spanish
rule, if independence was fairly and openly offered to them,
and if “the delicate point of their religion’’ was respectfully
attended to.

With regard to the political organization of independent
Spanish America, Miranda now proposed that four states
should be established upon the “Colombian Continent’’ ; the
first state should include Mexico and Guatemala; the second.
New Granada, Venezuela, and Quito; the third, Peru and
Chile ; and the fourth, la Plata. He declared that the people
of Spanish America had not shown a leaning towards “any
particular form of government,’’ but expressed a belief that
the identity of language, religion, and civil administration
would greatly decrease the difficulty of changing the form of

FRANCISCO DE MIRANDA

49

government “without convulsions.” Among Miranda’s volu-
minous papers there probably reposed an elaborate project of
government for his compatriots.

Miranda wished that an attack on the Spanish dominions
should begin in northern South America. If the military opera-
tions in Venezuela and New Granada were successful, and, if
the governmental arrangements were “wise and acceptable to
the people,” he thought that the movement would soon spread,
on the one hand, through the Isthmus of Panama and Guate-
mala to Mexico, and, on the other hand, through Quito to
Peru and Chile, and even to la Plata. He believed that an
army of ten thousand men with a cooperating naval force
would be sufficient to execute this plan of operations. Sir
Arthur Wellesley, a military officer who had served with dis-
tinction in India, became deeply interested in Miranda’s
projects. He drew up several memoranda concerning a revo-
lution which was “to establish an independent government in
a part or the whole” of Spanish America. After carefully
weighing the advantages and the disadvantages of an attack
upon Mexico or upon Venezuela, Wellesley decided in favor
of an expedition of ten thousand soldiers to execute Miranda’s
designs. Early in June, 1808, thousands of redcoats
bivouacked on the Irish coast; a fleet was gathered at Cork;
and Wellesley was selected as the commander of an expedi-
tion which was to start a revolution in northern South
America.

But at this critical juncture, when it seemed that Miranda’s
hope of English aid to revolutionize Spanish America was at
last to be realized, Napoleon’s attempt to crush England by
extending the continental system to the Iberian peninsula,
changed the face of politics. In November, 1807, the invasion
of Portugal by French soldiers forced the royal family of
Braganza, including the heir to the Portuguese throne. Prince
John, and his wife, Carlota Joaquina, the daughter of Charles
IV. of Spain, to flee precipitately from Lisbon to Rio de
Janeiro, escorted by an English squadron. In the following

50 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

year French soldiers seized fortresses in northern Spain; a
popular tumult at Aranjuez forced the Prince of Peace from
power; and Charles IV. temporarily relinquished his right to
the Spanish throne in favor of his eldest son, Prince Ferdi-
nand. In May, 1808, by a treaty signed at Bayonne Charles
IV. renounced his right to the crown of Spain and the Indies
in favor of Napoleon, while Ferdinand VII. was forced to
abdicate his right to that crown. Those Napoleonic usurpa-
tions provoked a national uprising among the Spaniards, which
was stimulated by the news that on June 6, 1808, Napoleon
had arrogantly proclaimed his brother Joseph, King of Spain.
Juntas, or local assemblies, sprang up, as if by magic, from
Oviedo to Granada. On May 25, 1808, the patriotic junta of
the principality of Asturias sent two envoys to beseech aid
from England against Napoleon. Early in the following
month — when Wellesley’s soldiers were bivouacking on the
coast of Ireland — these envoys were promised munitions and
soldiers by England’s foreign secretary, George Canning. On
July 4, 1808, England published a formal proclamation of
peace with Spain. In the speech of King George III. to
parliament on that day, it was declared that, because of the
resistance of Spain to the usurpations of France, the Spanish
nation could “no longer be considered as the enemy of Great
Britain ” but was recognized by his Majesty as “a natural
friend and ally.” It was expressly declared that the king
had “no other object than that of preserving unimpaired the
integrity and independence of the Spanish monarchy.”

When England thus decided to aid the Spanish patriots
against Napoleon, Miranda’s project to revolutionize Spanish
America was discarded. Sir Arthur Wellesley was deputed
to tell the Venezuelan agitator of the change in England’s
military plans. Twenty-seven years afterwards, the Duke of
Wellington thus described the dramatic scene which ensued;

I think I never had a more difficult business than when the
Government bade me tell Miranda that we would have nothing
to do with his plan. I thought it best to walk out in the streets

FRANCISCO DE MIRANDA

51

with him and tell him there, to prevent his bursting out. But
even there he was so loud and angry, that I told him I would
walk on first a little that we might not attract the notice of
everybody passing. When I joined him again he was cooler.
He said: “You are going over into Spain. . . . You will be
lost — nothing can save you; that, however, is your affair; but
what grieves me is that there never was such an opportunity
thrown away.”

To attempt to suggest the outcome of Miranda’s plans, if
they had been executed by England, is to discuss what might
have been. The result might have been to found independent
states in Spanish America. On the other hand, viceroyalties
of Spain might have been transformed into dependencies of
England. Some South American patriots might have reviled
Miranda, the apostle of Spanish-American independence.

But in July, 1808, Sir Arthur Wellesley embarked for the
Iberian peninsula to engage in those campaigns which were
to play so great a part in thwarting the ambitions of Napo-
leon. The rapprochement between England and the Spanish
patriots was an insuperable obstacle to the execution of Mi-
randa’s favorite design. His highest hopes of English coopera-
tion sailed away with the soldiers of Wellesley. On January
14, 1809, in the name of Ferdinand VII., the central junta
located at Seville and the English government cemented their
relations by a formal treaty of peace, friendship, and al-
liance. For several years England devoted her energies to a
life-or-death struggle with Napoleon upon the European
continent.

This is a convenient place to notice some common features
of the schemes which Miranda urged upon various govern-
ments from 1790 to 1808. Against Spanish rule in America
he brought the charge that the colonists were “excessively
oppressed.” As proof of the accusation, Miranda was accus-
tomed to cite the insurrections which had occurred in Spanish
America, for example, the revolt of Tupac Amaru. Ordinarily,
he assumed that many Spanish-Americans were dissatis-

52 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

fied with the colonial regime. He was accustomed to argue
that the inhabitants of South America would rise against
Spain, if he appeared on its coast with a liberating expedition
•^an argument which was not substantiated by the attitude of
the Venezuelans towards the expedition of 1806. In general,
he maintained that the Spanish-Americans were not able to
cast ot¥ the heavy yoke of Spain without assistance. Ac-
cordingly Miranda tried to interest one or more important
nations in his venture. Burdened with letters, maps, and
plans, the enthusiastic creole would appear in the capital of
a nation at a crucial juncture in its relations with Spain. Tena-
cious of purpose, if he failed to interest ministers, he turned to
private individuals, merchants, philanthropists, and adven-
turers. Thus he traveled from court to court, offering, though
he knew it not, a New World to European nations for con-
quest. Miranda argued that, if her colonies were liberated,
Spain would be grievously injured. Sometimes he offered her
enemies special commercial advantages ; such as lower import
duties on articles sent to the liberated colonies. After 1797, the
upshot of his argument to England was that only the revolu-
tionizing of the Indies would thwart the designs of France
upon those dominions. To the imagination of patriot and fili-
buster, Miranda suggested the alluring vision of a continent
of freedmen.

The first objective point of the proposed attack on Spanish
America was Miranda’s native land. A map found among
some papers in the French archives proves that on one oc-
casion, at least, he aimed to get a foothold in northern South
America, to secure control of the Isthmus of Panama, to for-
tify himself there, and gradually to extend the area of free-
dom. His design was far-reaching, for he glibly talked of
ultimately emancipating all the subjects of Spain in America
from Tierra del Fuego to the northern limits of the Mississippi
Valley. The ambitious scope of these designs tempts one to
compare Francisco de Miranda with the anti-slavery fanatic,
John Brown.

FRANCISCO DE MIRANDA

53

It is easy to exaggerate or to underestimate the influence
of Miranda upon certain leaders of the revolution in Spanish
America. His apostolic role favors the interpretation that
he promoted the revolts which broke out in i8io from Mexico
to Buenos Aires, but contemporary evidence concerning the
influence which he exerted upon his compatriots from 1783 to
1810 is fugitive. The evidence shows that Miranda persistently
tried to correspond with certain agitators who played a more or
less mysterious part in the revolutionary movements in dif-
ferent parts of Spanish America: as illustrations may be cited
Manuel Gual of Venezuela, and Saturino Pena of the vice-
royalty of la Plata. While in London Miranda met Bernardo
O’Higgins, a young Chilean, Pedro F. Vargas, a revolutionist
who had fled from Caracas, Pedro J. Caro, a conspirator from
Cuba, and Simon de Bolivar. On these men, and on other
Spanish- Americans, Miranda doubtless exerted a stimulating
influence which cannot be measured. There is no doubt that
Miranda’s abiding-place, whether in London or Paris, served
as a rendezvous for discontented Spanish-Americans. Some
students of Hispanic history have asserted that Miranda found-
ed in Europe a secret revolutionary association, or lodge,
which was transplanted to various sections of South America.
But this story, which, in its most ample form, would make
Miranda the revolutionary godfather of Mariano Moreno,
Bernardo O’Higgins, Jose de San Martin, and Simon de
Bolivar, is at present hardly more than a legend.

Amid all the fluctuations of fortune Miranda preserved an
interest in learning. His leisure was often employed in the
study of government and politics and war. A quondam asso-
ciate declared that the South American learned Greek when
forty years of age. There is also a tradition that he wrote a
history of France. Nevertheless he was a dilettante scholar;
Joseph Pavia not inaptly said of Miranda that he “deemed him-
self an adept in every science and art ; indeed he was a specious
smatterer.” While living in London Miranda possessed a
choice library. A part of that library which was sold at public

54 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

auction several years after his death contained histories of
European countries, voyages and travels in various parts of
the ^vorld, books on art and art galleries, and a number of
Spanish books concerning North and South America. At his
elbow Miranda otten had a secretary who took charge of his
extensive correspondence. At least during a part of his ca-
reer, he kept copies of his own letters which were filed with
the epistles received from his widely-scattered correspondents,
who often occupied prominent positions in public and private
life. Vanity, or literary ambition, incited Miranda at times to
keep a journal, and to collect papers which concerned himself,
his family, and his projects.

The following description of Miranda was written by James
Biggs, who took part in the expedition of 1806:

He is about five feet ten inches high. His limbs are well
proportioned; his whole frame is stout and active. His com-
plexion is dark, florid and healthy. His eyes are hazel col-
ored, but not of the darkest hue. They are piercing, quick
and intelligent, expressing more of the severe than the mild
feelings. He has good teeth, which he takes much care to
keep clean. His nose is large and handsome, rather of the
English than Roman cast. His chest is square and prominent.
His hair is gray and he wears it tied long behind with powder.
He has strong gray whiskers growing on the outer edges of
his ears, as large as most Spaniards have on their cheeks.
In the contour of his visage you plainly perceive an expres-
sion of pertinaciousness and suspicion. Upon the whole with-
out saying he is an elegant, we may pronounce him a hand-
some man. He has a constant habit of picking his teeth.
When sitting he is never perfectly still; his foot or hand
must be kept moving to keep time with his mind which is
always in exercise. He always sleeps a few minutes after
dinner, and then walks till bed time, which with him is about
midnight. He is an eminent example of temperance. A
scanty or bad meal is never regarded by him as a subject of
complaint. He uses no ardent spirits; seldom any wine. . . .
He is a courtier and gentleman in his manners. Dignity and
grace preside in his movements. Unless when angry, he has
a great command of his feelings; and can assume what looks

FRANCISCO DE MIRANDA

55

and tones he pleases. In general his demeanor is marked by
hauteur and distance. ... In discourse he is logical in the
management of his thoughts. He appears conversant on all
subjects. His iron memory prevents his ever being at a loss
for names, dates, and authorities.

For two years after Wellesley's departure for the Iberian
peninsula, Miranda lived in London and attempted the role
of a propagandist. Although the English ministers — mindful
of their pledges to Spain — warned the South American to
desist from his revolutionary correspondence with the Indies,
yet he busied himself dispatching incendiary letters and pam-
phlets to certain Spanish-Americans and to the cabildos of
Buenos Aires, Havana, Mexico, and Caracas. Perhaps his
most important letter was addressed to the Marquis of Toro
of Caracas and the cabildo of that city on October 6, 1808.
In that epistle Miranda expressed his fear that a fatal conflict
would soon be precipitated between the Spanish officials and
the people of Spanish America. He affirmed that, because of
the lack of a representative organization, the Spanish patriots
were compelled to establish an imperfect system of govern-
ment; and that afterwards they hardly had time to concert
a plan for the general defense before the kingdom was over-
run by French soldiers. He declared that although he did not
consider the Spanish people capable of enjoying a rational lib-
erty, yet he believed the V^enezuelan people capable of enjoying
it, for they had not been corrupted. That his fellow-country-
men might be prepared for an emergency, he transmitted a
“sketch of a representative organization and government’’ for
Spanish America.

The plan of government which Miranda transmitted to the
cabildo of Caracas is worthy of careful consideration. Doubt-
less it embodied his ripest ideas concerning the government of
independent Spanish America. It was probably based upon
the plan which he had ready to take with him to South America
in June, 1808. In October of that year Miranda recommended
to the Spanish-Americans a provisional scheme for a federal

56 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

government. In the provisional scheme he proposed to use
the cabildos as local organs of government. Extraordinary
cabildos were to select the members of provincial assemblies,
which were to legislate for the province and to supervise the
provincial administration. Each provincial assembly was to
choose two citizens called curacas, who were to exercise the
executive authority in their respective provinces. During the
war, the armed forces of the patriots were to be commanded
by a citizen called the hatunapa, who was to be nominated
by the general assembly and confirmed by the local assemblies
of the provinces. All the existing laws were to remain in
force, except those imposing a personal tax. Customs duties
were to be levied at the uniform rate of fifteen per cent on
importations, and twenty per cent on exportations. All laws
relating to the “odious tribunal” of the inquisition were to be
swept away. Roman Catholicism was to be the national re-
ligion of the Colombian people, but religious toleration was
to be observed as “a principle of natural right.”

The most significant part of Miranda’s plan was the scheme
for a general government, which was to be of a federal type.
The provincial assemblies were to choose the members of the
unicameral legislature, or “Colombian council,” which was to
make laws for “the entire American federation.” In regard
to the executive power, it was provided that the council was
to select from the citizens two persons at least forty years
of age, the owners of two hundred acres of land, who had held
one of the great offices of the empire. Those two citizens
were to serve as chief executives for ten years: “They shall
be called Incas, a name venerated in the country. One of the
Incas shall remain constantly where the legislature is in ses-
sion at the federal capital, while the other shall traverse the
provinces of the empire.” As in the plan of 1790, special
provision was made for the choice of an executive in perilous
times :

In extraordinary circumstances, the council will decree
the choice of a dictator, with the same power which he had at

FRANCISCO DE MIRANDA

57

Rome: this officer will hold his position for one year; but he
may be dismissed before the expiration of that period. The
Incas will name the personage who is to fill this sacred of-
fice: he must be at least forty-five years of age, and must
have occupied at least one of the great offices of the empire.

Careful provisions were made for a provincial and for a
national judiciary. Jury trial was to be introduced. It was
provided that the federal supreme court was to have juris-
diction over cases relating to the law of nations, those arising
from treaties with foreign powers, or from the misdeeds of
federal magistrates. Both the provisional and the federal
schemes contained age and property qualifications for office-
holders, which varied according to the importance of the
position.

In 1808 Miranda evidently aimed to include more territory
in the projected state than the captaincy general of Venezuela,
for this constitution provided that the capital, which was to
be named Colombo, should be built at the most central point in
the territory of the state, “perhaps on the Isthmus of Panama.’’
Although the plan for a federal government did not designate
the boundaries of the projected state, yet Miranda probably
desired to include within its limits New Granada as well as
Venezuela. The plan of 1808 constituted an attempt, in part,
to evolve from the colonial institutions of Spanish America
a representative government of a monarchical type. This plan
proposed to found in Spanish America not a democracy, or a
federal republic, but an empire, or an imperial republic. In
1808 Miranda wished to sponsor an autocratic regime.

Miranda was probably the chief author of the governmental
plan. In the letter which he sent to Caracas, enclosing a copy
of the plan, he declared that it had been approved by Ameri-
cans and Englishmen who were well versed in such matters.
Perhaps Pitt was partly responsible for some of its pro-
visions. Certain parts of the plan had probably been modi-
fied as the result of the suggestions of Sir Arthur Wellesley.
Some provisions of the imperial constitution, like the earlier

58 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

products of Miranda’s pen, show that he had borrowed sug-
gestions from various governmental systems. As in the project
presented to Pitt, careful provisions, resembling those in the
constitution of the United States, were made for the amend-
ment of the fundamental law. Unlike the project of 1790,
however, the plan of 1808 provided that the national legisla-
ture should be composed of only one house.

In letters which Miranda sent to certain cabildos of Span-
ish America after England had discarded his revolutionary
designs, he urged those bodies to seize the reins of govern-
ment. Likewise he strove to incite the people to rise against
the rule of Spain. But the Spanish-Americans could not al-
ways appreciate his advice; when the Marquis of Toro received
such a letter, he transmitted it to the captain general of Vene-
zuela, and denounced Miranda as a traitor. Meanwhile, that
inveterate revolutionist turned some of his energy into jour-
nalistic channels. He inspired an article which appeared in
the Edinburgh Review in January, 1809, entitled South Ameri-
can Emancipation. That article was a review of Viscardo y
Guzman’s Lettre aux Espagnols-Americains. The author of
that review, who evidently drew a part of his information
from Miranda, took occasion to consider at length the struggle
between France and England, the advantages which would re-
sult to England if she revolutionized Spanish America, and
the persistent efforts of Miranda for the emancipation of his
native land. The English people were taken into confidence
regarding a subject which for a long time had been “almost
exclusively the nursling of Ministers.’’

Then, too, in March, 1810, a Spanish journal, El Colom-
biano, was founded at London under Miranda’s auspices. The
second number of that journal, dated April i, 1810, discussed
the extension “of the monstrous power of Napoleon’’ over
the European continent. The hope was expressed that Provi-
dence might preserve America from that “most oppressive
system.” The third number of the journal, dated April 15,
1810, published a decree of the Spanish council of regency

FRANCISCO DE MIRANDA

59

to which the central junta had transferred its authority. In
the editorial columns the mode in which the central junta had
directed the war against France was criticised. The junta was
described as an illegal body which did not possess sovereign
authority, A quotation from the article will suggest Miranda’s
reasoning.

Even if the assumption is made that the junta was legiti-
mate, can one rightly infer that this body could transmit
sovereignty? Sovereigpity resides solely in the people, and
when they deposit that power in an individual, that individual
does not acquire the right to dispossess himself of it, or to
transfer it without the consent of the people. . . . How can
the council of regency say that the supreme junta, without
the participation of the nation, is able to create a sovereign
authority and to transfer the sovereignty to five individuals,
who have no right whatever to it? To admit that sovereigpity
may be transferred without the consent of the people would
not only be absurd, but would also be in contradiction to the
actual conduct of the Spaniards themselves.

This number of Miranda’s journal, at least, reached Spanish
America; for, on October 4, 1810, Mariano Moreno published
the above excerpt in the Gaceta de Buenos Aires. These two
numbers of El Colombiano — numbers which have been found
in English archives — indicate that the purpose of Miranda
was to make the people of Spanish America dissatisfied with
the French regime in Spain by spreading broadcast a hatred
of Napoleon. Qearly he also strove to disseminate surrepti-
tiously among the Spanish- Americans a spirit of dissatisfaction
with the government of the Spanish patriots. Thus in one way
or another he hoped to foment a revolutionary spirit.

In 1810 there was also published in London under the
nominal editorship of J. M. Antepara, a native of Guayaquil,
a book entitled “South American Emancipation, Documents,
historical and explanatory, shewing the designs which have
been in progress, and the exertions made by General Miranda,
for the attainment of that object during the last twenty-five
years.” In the introduction to the volume Antepara stated

6o RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

that the documents had been selected from a large collection of
manuscripts in Miranda’s archives. These papers were evi-
dently chosen with a view to rehabilitate Miranda, as well as
to inform the public of the real scope of his designs. Antepara
reprinted in “South American Emancipation’’ the article from
the Edinburgh Review concerning Viscardo y Guzman’s Lettre
aux Espagnols-Americains. The conclusion is irresistible that
Antepara must have prepared the book under the supervision
of Miranda himself.

At that time Miranda became the leader of a coterie which
was seriously interested in the fortunes of Spanish America.
Among its members were Lady Hester Stanhope, the erratic
niece of William Pitt, Jeremy Bentham, the philosopher, Wil-
liam Wilberforce, the reformer, and Joseph Lancaster, the
educator. In i8io there were added to the group three fellow-
countrymen of Miranda: Andres Bello, Luis Lopez Mendez,
and .Simon de Bolivar.

These men appeared in London because of a movement
in Miranda’s native land which was provoked by Napoleon’s
usurpations in Spain. After Napoleon had deposed Ferdinand
VII., he sent vessels to the Indies bearing the news of the
accession of Joseph Napoleon to the Spanish throne. Napo-
leon’s agents who brought the news of the dynastic changes
to Venezuela were spurned by the people of Caracas. Soon
afterwards leading citizens of Caracas vainly expressed their
desire to form a provisional junta in imitation of the Span-
iards. Some of the leaders in this movement were evidently
loyal to Ferdinand VII., while others probably cherished
thoughts of a separation from Spain. The ferment was pro-
moted by the policy of the Spanish patriots. On January 22,
1809, the central junta announced that the American posses-
sions of Spain were not colonies, but that they constituted an
integral part of the Spanish nation with the right to represen-
tation in the junta. On February 14, 1810, the council of re-
gency addressed a proclamation to the inhabitants of Spanish
America which invited them to select delegates to a national

FRANCISCO DE MIRANDA

6i

cortes. The regency declared that the colonists were now ele-
vated to the dignity of freemen, that they would no longer
be viewed with indifference, or vexed by stupid officials, or de-
stroyed by ignorance, and that their destinies did not depend
upon ministers, viceroys, and governors but upon themselves.
On April 19, 1810, after agents arrived in Caracas with orders
that the Spanish regency should be recognized, a cabildo abi-
erto deposed the weak captain general and established a pro-
visional junta, which loudly professed to act on behalf of
Ferdinand VII. The junta of Caracas soon deposed other
colonial officials, organized certain administrative departments,
and initiated various political and social reforms. On April
27, 1810, the junta sent a manifesto to the cabildos of the
important cities of Spanish America inciting them to rise
against King Joseph, to declare in favor of Ferdinand VII.,
and to promote the formation of a Spanish-American con-
federation. In reality, the proceedings of April, 1810, in
Caracas constituted a revolution in disguise. A short time
afterwards the provisional junta addressed a manifesto to the
Spanish regency boldly disavowing its authority. Rightly did
the junta of Caracas style itself a “new government.”

This junta had commissioned Bello, Mendez, and Bolivar to
proceed to the court of London. They were instructed to
solicit the English cabinet to recognize that junta; at least they
were to secure from England a promise of aid for the new
government of Venezuela. But the alliance between England
and the Spanish patriots prevented Marquis Wellesley, who
had become the English secretary for foreign affairs, from
recognizing the provisional government of Venezuela, or from
promising aid to the Venezuelans except to protect them
against France. Nevertheless the mission of Bolivar and
Mendez to London was important, for it brought Miranda into
direct touch with the secessionist movement in his native land,
and enabled him to meet Simon de Bolivar. A short time
after meeting the Venezuelan commissioners, in October, 1810,
Miranda started for South America by way of Curagao.

62 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

When he disembarked in Venezuela in December, i8io, he
found that his fellow-countrymen, in accordance with the pro-
visions of the junta, were selecting the delegates to a con-
gress.

Since Miranda had left his father’s house the conditions in
Caracas had changed, for his compatriots had taken a great
step along the road toward independence from Spain. The
role which Miranda attempted in Venezuela was difficult; for
he was imperfectly acquainted with conditions there; and the
list of his friends or acquaintances was not long. Some of
the Venezuelans, who were just awakening to political self-
consciousness, hailed General Miranda as a gift of favoring
Providence, while others considered him an adventurous sol-
dier of fortune. Although he was fifty-four years of age,
yet he had not lost his youthful enthusiasm for liberty. There
was no Spanish-American leader of this era who was better
fitted than Miranda to transmit to South America the spirit,
the doctrines, and the methods of the French revolution.

For some time after the arrival of Miranda in Venezuela,
he partly eclipsed Simon de Bolivar, who had landed there sev-
eral days before him. The ability and prestige of General
Miranda enabled him to become the most influential leader ef
the independent party in his native land. He was a prominent
member of the patriotic society of Caracas, — a society which
resembled the Jacobin club. Further, he was selected as the
delegate for the district of Pao in the Venezuelan congress.
There he became the eloquent champion of an immediate dec-
laration of independence from Spain. On July 3, 1811, he
made two harangues in congress in favor of independence.
In his first speech Miranda argued that the formation of a
republican government was inconsistent with an acknowledg-
ment of the sovereignty of Spain. In his second speech he dis-
cussed the advantages that a declaration of independence
would afiford to Venezuela in her diplomatic relations with for-
eign powers: “We ought to declare our independence; so that
we may enjoy the advantages of it : in order that European

FRANCISCO DE MIRANDA 63

nations may make alliances with us, which will aid us by en-
gaging directly the forces of our enemies.”

July 5, 1811, was a glorious day for Miranda. On that
day the congress composed of delegates from seven provinces
of the captaincy general of V'enezuela voted in favor of a
declaration of independence from Spain. Two days later, the
formal declaration of independence was sanctioned by con-
gress. In the declaration the delegates only suggested some
of the evils of the Spanish colonial regime ; for, in a charitable
spirit, they drew a veil “over the three hundred years of Span-
ish domination in America.” They affirmed that the usurpa-
tion of the throne of Spain by Napoleon had restored their
rights and had summoned Spanish America to a new exist-
ence. The delegates denounced the policy which the govern-
ment of the Spanish patriots had adopted toward America.
They affirmed that war had been declared against them as
revolutionists ; that their coasts had been blockaded, and their
representation in the cartes reduced to a mockery. They said
that the hostile and unnatural conduct of Spain had forced
them out of a position of “political ambiguity.” They spoke
of the imprescriptible rights of a people to destroy “every
pact, convention, or association” that did not fulfill the purpose
for which governments were established. Accordingly, the
representatives of the United Provinces of Venezuela, as they
styled themselves, solemnly declared that those provinces were
and ought to be “by act and right, free, sovereign, and in-
dependent states.” In this manner the inhabitants of the cap-
taincy general of Venezuela formally proclaimed their inde-
pendence of the mother country. Venezuela was thus the
first of the revolted Spanish colonies formally to declare her-
self independent of Spain. While some phrases of the Vene-
zuelans suggest the phraseology of the Declaration of Inde-
pendence of July 4, 1776, yet the Venezuelan declaration con-
tained neither a philosophy which justified the revolution nor
a terrible indictment of the motherland. Nevertheless, the

64 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

declaration of independence dated July 5, 1811, voiced the
sentiments of Venezuelan radicals.

Miranda became a member of the committee of congress
which was chosen to select the design for the flag of the new
nation. He succeeded in having the colors red, yellow, and
blue which had fluttered from the masthead of the Leander,
selected for the Venezuelan ensign. When a counter-revolu-
tion broke out in Valencia, General Miranda was ultimately
entrusted with the army which was sent to subjugate the royal-
ists. He also acted as a member of the committee which was
charged with the task of framing a constitution for Vene-
zuela. There is reason to believe that Miranda urged the
committee to adopt the plan which he had brought with him
from London vesting the executive authority in two Incas.
With his intimate friends Miranda pleaded earnestly for the
adoption of his imperial constitution. But his arguments were
in vain. On September 2, 1811, Francisco Javier de Ustariz
laid a federal plan of government before the constituent con-
gress. Only fleeting references to the congressional debates
concerning that plan are available. It is evident that a ma-
jority of the delegates, influenced by the example of the United
States, favored the adoption of a federal constitution. For,
in spite of the opposition of Miranda in congress and of
Bolivar outside of congress, on December 21, 1811, that assem-
bly adopted a constitution which provided a frame of gov-
ernment for a federal republic.

In this constitution the provinces of Venezuela were treated
as states composing a confederation. In some respects the
pacto federal was modeled after the Constitution of the North-
American Republic, while many clauses showed the influence
of the French Declaration of the Rights of Man. Neverthe-
less, Roman Catholicism was declared to be the religion of the
state. The executive authority was vested in the hands of
three persons, who were styled the supreme executive power.
The legislative authority was entrusted to a senate and a house
of representatives. The judicial power was given to one su-

FRANCISCO DE MIRANDA

65

preme court and other inferior courts. The constitution con-
tained a provision for the admission into the union of any
other province of Spanish America.

Meantime, emissaries had been sent from Caracas to the
United States to plead for aid and recognition. In July, i8ii,
Venezuela was represented at Washington by Telesforo de
Orea and Jose R. Revenga. Those envoys became the first
diplomatic representatives to the government of the United
States from an Hispanic-American state which had proclaimed
its independence of the motherland. Orea promptly sent a
copy of the Venezuelan declaration of independence to James
Monroe, the secretary of state of the United States, and tried
to secure the recognition of Venezuela’s independence by that
government. The utmost that Orea could obtain, however,
was an assurance in December, i8ii, that the ministers of
the United States in Europe had been instructed that their
government viewed with interest the rise of new states in
Spanish America. This friendly attitude was perhaps partly
due to the interest of France in the independence of Venezuela.
Unofficially, Serurier, the French ambassador in Washington,
assured Orea that a Venezuelan envoy would be favorably re-
ceived by Napoleon. But the French interest in Venezuela
declined when the progress of the revolution was checked.

Events soon demonstrated that the constitution of i8ii was
not adapted to Venezuelan conditions. The formation of an
independent government inevitably provoked the animosity of
a loyalist party. The ambitious designs and intriguing dis-
position of Miranda, who apparently aimed to form a party
devoted to himself, stimulated jealousy and factional strife.
The ship of state might have been wrecked even though na-
ture had not conspired against her. On March 26, 1812, an
earthquake visited Venezuela, which destroyed towns, crushed
patriot soldiers, and inspirited the loyalists. The priests, many
of whom were fanatically opposed to independence, harangued
the panic-stricken people, and told them that the disastrous
earthquake was a punishment from God because they had for-

66 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

saken their king. After that visitation, the royalist soldiers
made rapid progress under the Spanish general, Domingo
Monteverde. Treason thinned the ranks and thwarted the
plans of the patriots, while it increased the strength and as-
surance of their enemies. On April 23 the congress of Vene-
zuela appointed Miranda commander-in-chief of the army;
and soon afterwards it entrusted him with the nation’s funds.
A strange chance thus clothed Miranda with powers similar
^o those of the dictator in his own governmental projects.

The first dictator of Venezuela pursued a Fabian policy.
Instead of immediately making an attack on the enemy, which
might have resulted in the discomfiture of the royalists,
Miranda paused to gather soldiers and munitions. He sent
agents into neighboring provinces to recruit soldiers and to
plead for aid. His secretary, Thomas Molini, was sent on
a special mission to London, while Pedro Gual, one of
Miranda’s comrades, was selected as envoy to Washington.
But the followers of Miranda were soon disheartened by the
news that the fortified city of Puerto Cabello, which had been
entrusted to Colonel Simon de Bolivar, had been captured by
the royalists. In a letter to Miranda, Bolivar profoundly re-
gretted the loss of the city, expressing his despair that he had
not been left lifeless “under the ruins of a city which ought to
have been the last refuge of the liberty and the glory of Vene-
zuela.” The dismal news of the fall of that port might well
have evoked from Miranda the remark which, many years
later, Gual attributed to him, “Venezuela is wounded to the
heart.” The loss of Puerto Cabello, the increasing desertions
in the patriot army, and a dislike for bloodshed, evidently
influenced Miranda to enter into negotiations with Monteverde
for peace.

The outcome was the treaty of San Mateo, July 25, 1812,
which was signed by Monteverde and Miranda’s agents. That
treaty provided that Venezuela was to be relinquished to the
Spaniards; but it explicitly stipulated that the persons and
property of the Venezuelans were to be respected. Contem-

FRANCISCO DE MIRANDA

67

poraries and historians alike have questioned the wisdom of
the treaty : General Miranda has even been accused of trea-
son to Venezuela because he authorized a capitulation which
was not absolutely necessary. A story has been told that he
capitulated because he was given a thousand ounces of gold
by a royalist, the Marquis of Casa Leon, but there is scant
evidence to support this legend. There is no doubt that
Miranda planned to take the national funds with him on de-
parting from Venezuela; but he probably intended to use
the treasure to renew the struggle for South American in-
dependence, using New Granada as a base of operations. Pos-
sibly he may have wished to profit financially by the treaty of
San Mateo. It appears, however, that, under the circum-
stances, this capitulation was a wise step, if the Spaniards had
kept their faith.

But Monteverde, who arrogantly assumed the authority
of a captain general, treated Venezuela as a conquered prov-
ince. He ruthlessly thrust some revolutionary leaders into
prison, and deported others to the Spanish peninsula. The
property of Miranda’s followers was confiscated. Such a
flagrant violation of the faith of treaties cast a stigma upon
the capitulation of San Mateo.

A number of Miranda’s companions were so dissatisfied
with his actions that they conspired against him. When he
was about to embark at La Guaira for the West Indies in an
English vessel, the Sapphire, which bore his books, papers,
and money, he was forcibly detained by Manuel Maria de las
Casas, Miguel Pena, and Simon de Bolivar. The discredited
general was thrown into a filthy dungeon. There Monte-
verde found him, after Las Casas opened the gates of La
Guaira to the jubilant royalists. The betrayal of Miranda
to the Spaniards is a peculiar incident, which some writers have
considered a foul stain upon Bolivar’s fame. The writer thinks
it likely that Colonel Bolivar took this action in a fit of re-
sentment. One of that officer’s intimate friends said that
“to the last hour of his life’’ Bolivar rejoiced because of

68 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

Miranda’s betrayal, which he always asserted was designed
“to punish the treachery and treason of Miranda,” who had
capitulated to an inferior force, while he intended to embark,
knowing that “the capitulation would not be observed.” It is
only just to compare with this version of the tragical climax
of Miranda’s career another account given by Louis Delpech,
a follower of the dictator, who rightly declared that much time
would be required to respond to the calumnious charges which
had been brought against Miranda. Delpech also said that
people often judged events “by their results; they have said
that Miranda was a traitor because the villain Monteverde in-
fringed the Capitulation, and all the people of property have
been delivered up to the assassinous dagger of the infamous
Spaniards, but without discussing those unfounded assertions,
I venture to believe that, if Miranda had been a traitor, he
would certainly not have deceived himself by partaking of the
fate of those whom they say he sold to Monteverde ; and if I
did not have the conviction that he was incapable of such a
base action, I would say that it is impossible, that a man who
labored all his life for the independence of America was able
at the end of his career to forget this glorious enterprise, to
stain his white hair, and to dishonor forever his memory in
descending to the Tomb, and in return for so much ignominy
and crime to receive no other recompense than chains and
death.”

At last the government of Spain had the arch-conspirator
within its grasp. For a short time he was confined in a loath-
some prison at La Guaira. Then he was transferred to a
dungeon at Puerto Cabello. From that place, on March 8,
1813, he addressed a lengthy memorial to the audtencia of
Caracas protesting vigorously against the scandalous violation
of the capitulation of San Mateo. About the middle of 1813,
Miranda saw the mountain peaks of his native land fade from
view, for he was suddenly transferred from Puerto Cabello
to Morro Castle in the island of Porto Rico. In vain did
Miranda protest against the infraction of the treaty of San

FRANCISCO DE MIRANDA

69

Mateo. In vain did Mendez ask the English cabinet to inter-
cede with the Spanish government; England, the faithful ally
of Spain, could not aid the imprisoned agitator. After lan-
guishing in a dungeon in Porto Rico for more than a year,
he was transported to Spain, where he was incarcerated in
the arsenal of la Caracca on the island of Leon.

After reaching Spain, Miranda carried on a correspondence
with friends in England who were anxious to help him. The
old revolutionist wrote many letters pleading for gold and
plotted ceaselessly to regain his liberty. But the restless man
did not succeed in escaping from his island prison: his robust
frame broke down; and he died early on the morning of July
14, i8i6. Long after Miranda had been hastily interred in the
cemetery of la Caracca near Cadiz, strange rumors were cir-
culated concerning the mode of his death. In distant Vene-
zuela it was suggested that Spain had used foul means to get
rid of an arch-enemy. Thus Francisco de Miranda became a
martyr.

This martyr of Venezuelan independence had an interest-
ing personality. His friends were generally faithful and de-
voted, while his enemies were often bitter and relentless.
Miranda could make himself at home whether in the parlor
or on the field of battle, at the council-table or in the prison
cell. He was a good conversationalist and a persuasive, if not
an eloquent, speaker. In the attempt to carry out his master-
purpose he displayed a remarkable perseverance. So much
of an idealist was Miranda that he has been likened to Don
Quixote. Somewhat unscrupulous in regard to methods, he
was inclined to exaggerate or to prevaricate in order to pro-
mote the success of his designs. There is reason to suspect
that Miranda occasionally had amours with women; but the
material has not been found to tell the entire story of his pri-
vate life. South American writers are not always in agree-
ment concerning the mother of Miranda’s children. Ricardo
Becerra, the Venezuelan biographer of Miranda, asserted that
his children were the offspring of a lawful union with a Miss

70 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

Sarah Andrews. But a letter written by Francisco’s son,
Leandro Miranda, in 1850 — which alluded to a fortune be-
queathed to Miranda’s children by Lady Hester Stanhope —
has been interpreted by C. A. Villanueva to mean that Lady
Hester was Leandro’s mother.

The life of Miranda indeed furnishes many riddles. A
significant query is : what were Miranda’s means of support
during his long career as a revolutionary promoter? His fa-
ther’s silver undoubtedly purchased for him the captaincy in
the company of the Princess. So meager were Miranda’s re-
sources after leaving the Spanish military service that he had
to borrow money to make his tour of America and Europe.
When the South American visited Empress Catherine, she
evidently gave him a purse of gold. It does not appear that
General Miranda was ever paid for his military services to the
French republic. On the one hand, occasionally Miranda was
almost a beggar; on the other hand, he sometimes lived in
luxury.

During many years Miranda undoubtedly lived upon Eng-
lish gold. For the government of England paid Miranda
money in order that it might take advantage of his services, if
it decided to attack the Spanish dominions in America. There
is no doubt that Miranda was granted money by Pitt in 1790;
that he was paid a pension by England from 1801 to 1805 ;
and that in June, 1808, he was again placed upon England’s
pension roll. In September, 1810, Miranda was enjoying a
pension of seven hundred pounds per annum. Incidents in the
career of this chronic revolutionist indeed raise the query
whether or not he was engaged in the attempt to liberate Span-
ish America for selfish gain.

Two sharply contrasted views of Miranda’s character may
be entertained; that he was a mercenary soldier; or that he
was a pure-minded patriot. On one side, the view may be
taken that Miranda merely sold his services to the best bidder.
His career may be interpreted to mean that he was a shifty
adventurer, who betrayed the liberty of his fatherland for

FRANCISCO DE MIRANDA

71

gold. That conception of Miranda would place him on a level
with a soldier of fortune. On the other side, the view may
be taken that Miranda was an exalted patriot. Under the in-
fluence of this conception, some writers have overemphasized
Miranda’s services to the cause of South-American independ-
ence. One Spanish-American writer characterized Miranda
as “the Nazarene of Spanish-American independence,’’ while
another writer called South America “the world of Miranda.’’
Such hero-worshipers would place him on a level with Wash-
ington. The writer takes an intermediate view : there were
many occasions when Miranda must have been impelled by
mixed motives ; resentment towards Spain mingled with love
for Venezuela. With Miranda the revolutionizing of Span-
ish America became a profession, — he was a patriot-filibuster.

The biography of Miranda demonstrates that certain Euro-
pean powers were interested in the fate of Spanish America
long before the outbreak of the great revolution. Frequently
he stimulated this interest by appealing to commercial motives.
He often directed the thoughts of European and American
publicists to the Spanish Indies. On the one hand, the epic
of Miranda’s life indicates that, at a stormy period in the
history of Europe, Spanish America was sometimes viewed
as a makeweight in the political balance. On the other hand,
the epic of Miranda’s life is a part of the history of South
America. The prince of filibusters, the chief of the apostles of
Spanish-American independence, and one of the founders of
the republic of Venezuela, Francisco de Miranda will long live
in song and story. In accordance with a decree of the Vene-
zuelan government, the inscription on one side of a cenotaph
which was unveiled in the national pantheon of Venezuela
at Caracas on July 5, 1896, at the right of the stately monu-
ment to Simon de Bolivar, thus epitomizes Miranda’s career :
“He took part in three great political movements of his age:
the independence of the United States of North America; the
French revolution; and the independence of South America.”

The patriot-filibuster, who figured in the history of both

72 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

America and Europe, is a type. He had forerunners, compan-
ions, and followers. The great precursor of independence, he
was the foremost representative of those Spanish-Americans
who suffered imprisonment because of their liberal principles,
or who wandered through Europe to solicit succor in the task
of liberating their native land from Spanish domination. The
career of this knight-errant of Venezuela has fired the imagi-
nation of many filibusters and revolutionists. The mantle of
the unfortunate Miranda fell upon the shoulders of Simon de
Bolivar.

CHAPTER III

MIGUEL HIDALGO Y COSTILLA

In 1808 the viceroyalty of Mexico stretched from the
Isthmus of Tehauntepec northward to the British possessions.
That viceroyalty was composed of twelve provinces, or inten-
dancies. The capital of the viceroyalty, Mexico City, was
situated in a beautiful valley on the central plateau. This me-
tropolis was the viceroy’s residence, the capital of the province
of Mexico, the residence of the chief intendant and of the
Mexican archbishop. On the eve of the revolution the viceroy
of Mexico was a venal military officer named Jose de Iturri-
garay.

The news of the abdication of Ferdinand VII. profoundly
stirred the inhabitants of Mexico City. At the instance of
Viceroy Iturrigaray, on August 9, 1808, a junta composed of
leading citizens assembled in the viceregal palace. This junta
framed and published a manifesto which proclaimed that, until
Ferdinand VII. was restored, it would not obey any orders of
the French emperor, or of any other personage who was not
authorized by its legitimate sovereign. Suspicions that Iturri-
garay was scheming to separate New Spain from Old Spain
soon caused his deposition. On September 15, 1808, conspira-
tors led by Gabriel de Yermo, an influential Spanish landowner,
dragged the viceroy from his palace and thrust him into a dun-
geon. Shortly afterwards the deposed viceroy was deported to
the Spanish peninsula. On September 16 the audiencia pro-
claimed that the viceregal power was vested in Pedro Garibay,
an old military officer of Spain.

When Viceroy Iturrigaray was deposed, Francisco Primo
Verdad, Melchor Talamantes, and several other persons were

73

74 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

imprisoned. They were suspected of conspiring to promote the
independence of New Spain. It was found that Talamantes,
a learned monk, had entertained revolutionary ideas. Among
his papers there was found a project entitled “The National
Representation of the Colonies,” which discussed the circum-
stances that would justify Spain’s colonists in separating from
the motherland. But in May, 1809, this monk died in the
dungeons of San Juan de Ullua. It was reserved for another
member of the Mexican clergy, Miguel Hidalgo y Costilla,
to start the great revolution against Spanish rule in Mexico.

On August 5, 1750, in the Mexican province of Guanajuato,
Cristobal Hidalgo y Costilla married Ana Maria Gallaga y
Villasenor. From this marriage there sprang several children.
The second son was born on May 8, 1753, on the hacienda of
San Diego Corralejo, which was situated in the parish of
Penjamo. On May 16, 1753, this child was baptized Miguel
Gregorio Antonio Ignacio. The ancestors of Miguel for sev-
eral generations had been born in the viceroyalty of New
Spain : on his mother’s side he came of Vizcayan stock ; and the
patronym Hidalgo — meaning the son of somebody — indicated
that his father’s family was of noble descent.

In 1753 Cristobal Hidalgo was managing the hacienda of
San Diego Corralejo which belonged to a widow named Josefa
Carracholi y Carranza. It appears that Cristobal had studied
for the priesthood, but that a disease of the eyes had compelled
him to relinquish his plan of entering the service of the Church.
Instead of becoming a priest he engaged in agriculture. Only a
few years ago, there could still be seen in the district of
Penjamo the crumbling ruins of Hidalgo’s home. At that time
there could also be seen a chapel which was erected on the
Carracholi estate while Cristobal Hidalgo was its manager.
Cristobal Hidalgo was fairly prosperous ; for he encouraged his
sons to prepare for the learned professions : Jose Maria pre-
pared to practice medicine ; Manuel Hidalgo became a lawyer ;
while Jose Joaquin became a priest. Obviously Miguel Hidalgo
y Costilla, as he is commonly called by Mexican writers, passed

f

i

i

!

Miguel Hidalgo y Costilla
(From Alaman’s Historia dc Mexico)

f

I

MIGUEL HIDALGO Y COSTILLA

75

his boyhood days in the shadow of the Roman Catholic Church.

The education of Miguel Hidalgo began on the hacienda
of San Diego Corralejo. The years which Hidalgo spent on
that estate gave him a great fondness for agricultural pur-
suits. During this period he acquired a sympathy for indus-
trial laborers and learned to appreciate the viewpoint of
Mexicans belonging to the lower classes. When Miguel was
about fourteen years of age his father decided to send him to
the College of San Nicolas Obispo at Valladolid — the city
which was later rechristened Morelia. This college, founded in
the sixteenth century, had become a seminary for the sons of
Mexicans belonging to the middle class. Hidalgo’s sojourn
in Valladolid must have influenced him greatly, for this city
was the capital of the important province of Michoacan and
the intellectual center of an extensive region. Of Hidalgo’s
life as a student in Valladolid hardly anything is known with
certainty, except what has been gleaned from the archives of
the metropolitan university.

In March, 1770, Hidalgo took the examination for the
degree of bachelor of arts in “the Royal and Pontifical Uni-
versity of Mexico.’’ It appears that Hidalgo had prepared
himself for this examination at the College of San Nicolas in
accordance with a clause in the constitution of the University
of Mexico which provided that, if the students of certain pro-
vincial colleges had attended the arts’ courses of those col-
leges for three years, they might become candidates for the
bachelor’s degree at that university. Hidalgo evidently passed
a satisfactory examination before the committee of teachers
selected by the rector of the metropolitan university, and he
must have defended his thesis in the right fashion ; for, under
date of March 30, 1770, the archives of the University of
Mexico record that Miguel Hidalgo was granted the degree
of bachelor of arts. It appears that Hidalgo remained in
Mexico City after receiving this degree in order to study
theology. On May 24, 1773, he was granted the degree of
bachelor of sacred theology by the University of Mexico. Ac-

;6 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

cording to the mediaeval formula customarily used in con-
ferring that degree, Hidalgo was given the right to teach sacred
theology, as well as the right to hold, use, and enjoy all the
privileges and exemptions that were granted to bachelors of
theology by the University of Salamanca. To judge by the
stipulations regarding that degree in the constitution of the
University of Mexico, Hidalgo had taken courses of study
in theology, in the Holy Scriptures, and in the writings of
Thomas Aquinas.

Several years after he left the University of Mexico, there
seemed to be opening before Hidalgo a promising career. He
became a teacher in the College of San Nicolas: at first, of
Latin and the arts, and later, of theology. He continued to
be a student of theology; for in 1784 he won twelve silver
medals which the dean of that college. Dr. Jose Perez Calama,
had offered as a prize to the student who would submit the
two best dissertations — one in Latin and the other in Castilian
— on the proper method of studying scholastic theology. In
a letter written to Hidalgo on October 8, 1784, to inform him
that he had carried off the prize in the contest. Dr. Calama
enthusiastically declared :

Both dissertations prove that you are a young man in
whom genius and industry are honorable rivals. Hence-
forward, I shall always call you “the diligent ant” of Minerva,
without forgetting that other epithet of “the industrious bee,”
which knows how to suck from flowers the most delicious
honey. With the greatest joy in my heart, I foresee that you
will become a light placed in a candlestick, or a city set upon
a hill.

Perhaps partly because of his success in the prize contest,
about 1791 Hidalgo was made rector of the College of San
Nicolas. Of his activities as rector we know little beyond an
allegation made by a commissioner of the inquisition that
Hidalgo introduced certain textbooks of philosophy and theol-
ogy into the college which merited the censure of the holy
office. There is, however, no evidence to show that the holy

MIGUEL HIDALGO Y COSTILLA

77

office noticed those innovations during the brief period when
Hidalgo served as rector.

For some unknown reason, Hidalgo relinquished the rec-
torate of San Nicolas and became a priest in a remote parish.
On March 24, 1792, he became the curate of a church at Co-
lima, near the Pacific coast. There he remained only about
eight months. In January, 1793, he became the curate of the
village of San Felipe in the bishopric of Michoacan where he
served until 1803. Some of the actions and words of the
curate of San Felipe aroused suspicion, for he was placed
under the surveillance of the inquisition. The first evidence
lodged with the inquisition against Miguel Hidalgo was a
denunciation made on July 16, 1800, to the commissioner of the
holy office at Valladolid by a friar called Joaquin Huesca.
Subsequently Hidalgo was denounced by other persons. In
some particulars the various denunciations lodged with the
inquisition against Hidalgo were not consistent. Let it suf-
fice to mention here some of the worst charges. Among the
objectionable statements which were ascribed to Hidalgo was
the declaration that God did not chastise with temporal punish-
ments. Furthermore, it was alleged that he studied the Holy
Scriptures critically; that he spoke disdainfully of the Popes;
that he showed little respect for the apostles and for Saint
Teresa; that he doubted the virginity of the Mother of Christ;
that he declared fornication to be no sin ; and that he lived an
immoral life, forgetting the obligations of priesthood and in-
dulging in music, dances, and games. Several persons averred
that the home of the curate of San Felipie was known as
“little France.”

A glimpse of Hidalgo’s political ideas at this time may per-
haps be obtained from some of the other accusations which
were filed in the archives of the inquisition. It was alleged
that Hidalgo desired to see French liberty established in
Spanish America; that he had provoked an argument as to
whether a republic was a better form of government than a
monarchy ; and that he had declared monarchs to be despotic

78 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

tyrants. The exact amount of truth in those accusations, it
is impossible to determine. Yet it seems reasonable to suppose
that the decadence of the holy office made possible Hidalgo’s
escape from condign punishment. Then, too, it seems likely
that the alert curate of San Felipe may have heard of the ac-
cusations which were being made against him, and that in
consequence he temporarily reformed his manner of life.

In 1803 Miguel Hidalgo succeeded his elder brother, Jose
Joaquin, as curate of the congregation of Our Lady of the
Sorrows in the village of Dolores, which was located in the
northern part of the province of Guanajuato. Hildago served
as the curate of that substantial church until September, 1810.
There the versatile curate found his mission. At Dolores —
now known as Dolores Hidalgo — the curate displayed a keen
interest in industrial pursuits : he promoted viniculture and
apiculture and sericulture. Lucas Alaman declared that, in
the middle of the nineteenth century, there were still flourish-
ing at Dolores eighty-four mulberry trees which Hidalgo had
planted for the culture of the silkworm. The curate of
Dolores also established a factory where pottery and bricks
were made and where leather was tanned. In a history of
Dolores a Mexican writer has published a plan of the factory
which indicates that it included a carpenter shop, a black-
smith shop, a room devoted to the silk industry, and several
rooms used in the manufacture of pottery. On that plan the
very spot is marked where, according to the recollections of
a contemporary, Hidalgo was accustomed to sit while watching
the laborers of the factory. Another contemporary, Carlos
Maria Bustamante, who was a prolific writer on the Mexican
revolution, made the assertion that Hidalgo intended to es-
tablish at Dolores a settlement similar to the colony attempted
on the pearl coast of South America by Bartolome de las
Casas, the Protector of the Indians.

The home of Miguel Hidalgo at Dolores was a one-story
house containing more than a dozen rooms. Certain of these
rooms were reserved for ecclesiastical purposes, while others

MIGUEL HIDALGO Y COSTILLA

79

were used by Hidalgo and his family. For there lived with
Hidalgo at Dolores his younger brother Mariano, another
relative named Santos Villa, and the curate’s two illegitimate
daughters, Josefa and Micaela. Hidalgo’s factory was the
industrial center of the parish ; his home was the social center
of the community. We are told that to the entertainments
and dances in the curate’s house there came rich and poor,
Indians and white men. In that place some foreign and
domestic literature was read ; and problems of the day were
discussed. The curate of Dolores also associated with certain
prominent men of the adjacent region: he was on confidential
terms with Manuel Abad y Quiepo, bishop elect of Michoacan ;
he was on friendly terms with the intendant of Guanajuato,
Juan Antonio Riano, and with Antonio de Labarrieta, the
curate of Guanajuato.

Hidalgo’s industrial activities apparently crowded his re-
ligious functions into the background. Alaman averred that
the curate of Dolores shared his salary, which amounted to
eight or nine thousand pesos a year, with a priest named
Francisco Igleaas, who performed many of the duties else-
where performed by the curate. Certain contemporaries of
Hidalgo even alleged that he became so indifferent with regard
to his priestly functions that neither did he preach, nor read
mass, nor pray. This is probably an exaggeration: Jose M.
de la Fuente, the recent Mexican biographer of Hidalgo, has
somewhat repaired his hero’s reputation by the statement that
three manuscript sermons are still extant which were written
by the famous curate of Dolores.

Unfortunately very little evidence has come down to us
from Hidalgo himself concerning his literary interests at this
time. Evidently he read the Gaceta de Mexico. There is no
doubt that he read such books of interest as were available.
Here, again, a glimpse of the truth may be gained from the
records of the holy office. The officials of the inquisition were
informed that Hidalgo was accustomed to read the following
books : Fleury’s “Ecclesiastical History,’’ Buffon’s “Natural

8o RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

History,” Andre’s “History of Literature,” Clavijero’s “Hos-
tory of America,” Rollin’s “Ancient History,” Bossuet’s “De-
fence of the Clergy,” the works of Muratori, and the orations
of Demosthenes and Cicero. At least one of the persons who
denounced Hidalgo alleged that he had translated into Spanish
some of Moliere’s comedies, which had been presented upon a
stage at Dolores in a rustic fashion. The iteration and re-
iteration of certain charges against the curate of Dolores in the
inquisitorial records furnish some ground for the view that in
his critical mind doubts had arisen as to the historicity of
cardinal doctrines of the Roman Catholic Church, if indeed he
did not entertain beliefs which were heretical.

The curate of Dolores was endowed with a strong per-
sonality. Alaman described him in the following words;

He was of medium height, with stooping shoulders; his
complexion was swarthy; his eyes were of a lively green
color; his head inclined somewhat toward his breast; and
he was as white-headed and bald as though he had already
passed sixty years of age. Although he was neither active
nor prompt, yet he was vigorous in his movements : a man of
few words in ordinary conversation, when he entered into the
heat of a dispute — after the fashion of a collegian, he be-
came animated in his argumentation. He was not elegant in
his dress, for he wore no other clothes than those which were
ordinarily worn by the curates of small towns.

The costume of a village curate in Hidalgo’s day ordinarily
consisted of a cloak or long coat of black cloth, a round som-
brero, short trousers, and a jacket of Chinese wool, with a
clerical collar and neckcloth. The portraits of Miguel Hidalgo
which are extant do not necessarily help us to imagine his
outward appearance, for some of them may be spurious. His
portrait which once hung in the curate’s house at Dolores
might well have depicted a philosopher. The most authentic
picture of Hidalgo, which was first published by Bustamante,
suggests that he was a dreamer, a doctrinaire, who possessed,
however, some practical talent. His countenance bore the

MIGUEL HIDALGO Y COSTILLA

8i

impress of mingled benignity and craftiness. An anecdote has
indeed survived the Mexican revolution to the effect that
Hidalgo’s associates at the College of San Nicolas nicknamed
him “the fox.” This tradition suggests that possibly Hidalgo’s
manifold activities at Dolores were intended to conceal certain
ulterior designs.

From the smoke of the conflict which has been waged
among historical writers of Mexico regarding the respective
parts played by certain men in the early Mexican revolution,
the curate of Dolores has emerged as the chief conspirator.
But the exact time when Hidalgo first entertained revolution-
ary designs is still somewhat uncertain. La Fuente inti-
mates that Hidalgo probably cherished the idea of revolu-
tionizing Mexico in his youth. Alaman holds that Hidalgo
contemplated a rebellion against Spain in January, i8io; for,
at that time, he was devouring books on war and conspiracies.
There is some contemporary evidence which indicates that
Hidalgo may have dreamed of a revolt against Spanish rule as
early as 1808.

While Hidalgo was meditating over the distracted condition
of his native land, Viceroy Pedro Garibay had been succeeded
in July, 1809, by Francisco Javier de Lizanza y Beaumont,
archbishop of Mexico, who had been appointed viceroy of New
Spain by the central junta. During the rule of Lizanza y
Beaumont there were signs of discontent with Spanish rule.
Rumors were rife of projected insurrections. One abortive
insurrection will serve as an illustration. In December, 1809,
a conspiracy was discovered in Valladolid which apparently
aimed to establish a junta that was to rule on behalf of Fer-
dinand VII. On September 13, 1810, Francisco Javier Vene-
gas, lieutenant general in the Spanish army, assumed the heavy
responsibilities of viceroy of New Spain. Three days later a
revolutionary conflagration was kindled by the curate of
Dolores.

In the revolution of 1810 there were associated with Hi-
dalgo a number of discontented Mexicans. Most prominent

82 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

among those was Ignacio Allende, who, according to Alaman,
had descended from a native of Vizcaya. Allende was a
strong man with a bold spirit. Early in September, i8io, he
was captain of a provincial regiment of dragoons which was
stationed at San Miguel el Grande — a town later named San
Miguel Allende. A fellow-conspirator of Allende was Juan
Aldama, a lawyer and a captain in the same regiment. An-
other officer of that regiment who entered the plot was Mariano
Abasolo, the prosperous son of a Vizcayan. Miguel Domin-
guez, the corregidor of Queretaro, was involved in the con-
spiracy, and also his resourceful wife, Josefa Ortiz de Do-
minguez. Another conspirator was Jose Mariano Galvan, an
official in the postoffice at Queretaro. In that city some of
the conspirators had occasional meetings. There is no doubt
that Hidalgo corresponded with the leading conspirators and
visited them secretly. It is clear that the conspirators planned
to spread the discontent with Spanish rule throughout other
sections of Mexico, and that they employed laborers to make
lances clandestinely. A day was set for the revolution to
begin. Placards were printed bearing the motto : “Americans
be alert and do not be deceived. Today all the Gachupines
are to be killed, September 29, 1810” — a date which appears
to have been changed to October i. So carefully did Hidalgo
and his fellow-conspirators conceal their plot, that investiga-
tors have not yet discovered how far its ramifications ex-
tended.

A short time before the conspirators had perfected their
plans, rumors of their activity reached the government. Early
in August, 1810, a report in regard to the stealthy meetings
of conspirators in Queretaro had been addressed to the vice-
roy. On September 1 1 a long report concerning the plot was
sent to the viceroy by Juan Ochoa, an alcalde of Queretaro.
That report contained the names of the leaders, mentioned
certain preparations which they had made, and declared that
Hidalgo was the chief conspirator. A few days after Ochoa’s
report was written, rumors of the projected insurrection

MIGUEL HIDALGO Y COSTILLA

83

reached Jose Gabriel Armijo, a commander of the soldiers
of the viceroyalty. Meanwhile a rumor that the conspirators
had been denounced to the government reached Miguel Do-
minguez, hence it became his official duty to gather evidence
concerning the conspiracy and to incarcerate the leaders.

At this juncture the wife of Dominguez stealthily sent a
message to the conspirators that their plot had been di.scovered.
The news reached Captain Aldama late at night on September
15. Startled by the warning, he galloped from San Miguel
cl Grande to Dolores: early on the morning of Sunday, Sep-
tember 16, he reached the curate’s home, where Allende was
sojourning. According to the story told by Aldama, when
the curate of Dolores was aroused from his slumbers and in-
formed of the discovery of the conspiracy, he exclaimed,
“Gentlemen, we are lost: there is now no other recourse than
to seize the Gachupines!” Other members of Hidalgo’s house-
hold joined the excited group; and armed men appeared upon
the scene. It has been alleged that Hidalgo himself led his
partisans to the village gaol, put a pistol to the head of the
gaoler, and set the prisoners free. Near the curate’s house
there soon gathered priests, musicians, laborers, watchmen,
and soldiers, who were armed with pistols, swords, lances,
clubs, and stones. Some of Hidalgo’s followers were on foot,
while others were on horseback. With that small, undisci-
plined, and motley band Hidalgo audaciously dared to initiate
a revolt against Spanish rule.

It appears that the church bell which ordinarily called the
parishioners to mass now invited them to take up arms against
Spain. There is a tradition that, in response to a harangue
from Hidalgo, a cry arose from the people for America and
against the bad government. In a short time that battle-cry,
or a similar one, became known throughout Mexico as the
Grito de Dolores. This uprising at the obscure village of
Dolores signalized the beginning of a war which did not en-
tirely cease for eleven years — a war which crimsoned the soil
of Mexico with blood. Many years afterwards, the bell was

84 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

taken from the tower of the church of Our Lady of the
Sorrows at Dolores and hung in the fagade of the national
palace at Mexico City. The bell of Hidalgo’s church became
known as the independence bell of Mexico.

Why did Hidalgo and his comrades thus throw down the
gage of battle to Venegas ? Various motives have been ascribed
to those men by different writers. Carlos M. Bustamante al-
leged that Hidalgo was enraged because the Spanish govern-
ment had prohibited the manufacture of wine from the grapes
of Dolores. Alaman scouted this explanation: he jauntily
dismissed the inquiry with the vague statement that the curate
of Dolores was animated by “reasons of general convenience.”
The historical student who reads the statements made by
Hidalgo and Allende after their capture by the royalists will
find that both these men asserted that they were provoked
because of the reports of the invasion of Spain by Napoleon’s
soldiers. They argued that there was imminent danger of
New Spain falling into the hands of the French and affirmed
that they wished to preserve their native land from Napoleon.
When on trial for their lives, both Allende and Aldama said
that they had contemplated the formation of a provisional
junta in New Spain, while both Allende and Hidalgo ad-
mitted that they had thought of making Mexico independent
of Spain. Allende boldly avowed that the conspirators had
decided to take up arms, should their schemes be discovered,
for they anticipated that, if they were cast into prison, they
would be at the mercy of the enraged Spaniards. When cross-
examined Hidalgo declared that he had not decided upon any
plan of government for emancipated Mexico. Perhaps the
best contemporary statement in regard to the designs which
the conspirators entertained is found in the report made to
the viceroy by Juan Ochoa: “Captain Allende is the person to
whom they give the title of general. Dr. Hidalgo, the curate
of Dolores, is the chief conspirator; and the person who fur-
nishes the ideas: his plan, in brief, is independence.”

As in Venezuela, so in Mexico, the pretext used to justify

MIGUEL HIDALGO Y COSTILLA

85

the insurrection was the necessity of defending the rights of
Ferdinand VII. The Mexican insurgents, however, soon ap-
pealed to another sentiment besides loyalty to the king. While
the motley band was marching from Dolores to San Miguel
el Grande, an insurgent — according to some writers the curate
himself — took from the sacristy of a chapel at Atotonilco a
picture of the Virgin of Guadeloupe, the patron saint of the
Mexican Indians, and bore it off in triumph. This revered
picture was made the standard of Hidalgo’s army: the Virgin
of Guadeloupe thus became the patron saint of the Mexican
revolution. The rallying-cry of the revolutionists soon be-
came : “Long live religion ! Long live our most Holy Mother
of Guadeloupe ! Long live America ! Down with the bad
government!’’ The story of the spread of the insurrection
will indicate that Alaman was not animated solely by a mali-
cious spirit when he described that revolutionary battle-cry
as “a monstrous union of religion with assassination and
plunder.”

As Hidalgo marched, his nondescript army increased stead-
ily. Many Indian laborers, or peons, flocked to the sacred
banner. The intendant of Guanajuato soon wrote to the vice-
roy and declared that the inhabitants of Dolores, San Miguel
el Grande, Celaya, Salamanca, and Irapuato were joining the
insurgents, while disaffection was spreading rapidly in the
city of Guanajuato. After the insurgents entered San Miguel
el Grande, Allende publicly recognized Hidalgo as the chief
of the revolution. Soon afterwards the revolutionists marched
towards Celaya; and on September 19 Hidalgo and Allende
summoned the cabildo of that town to surrender. In a post-
script to the summons, the cabildo was warned that, if the
revolutionists were fired upon, seventy-eight Spanish prisoners
would be at once put to death. The cabildo yielded ; and the
curate of Dolores entered Celaya. Soon afterwards the war-
rior-curate was acclaimed captain general of the army; Ignacio
Allende was given the title of lieutenant general, while in-
ferior titles were conferred upon other leaders.

86 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

What was the attitude of the Mexican people toward this
insurrection? Clearly, it was supported by many persons be-
longing to the lower classes. But it was vigorously opposed
by numerous officials of the viceregal government ; by some
members of the clergy, especially the higher clergy; and by
many landed proprietors. Protests against Hidalgo’s revolt
and declarations of loyalty to Ferdinand VH. were frequently
printed in the Gaceta de Mexico. The ayuntamientos of sev-
eral towns and cities denounced the rebels and proclaimed
their fidelity to the viceregal government. The rector of the
University of Mexico assured the viceroy that the rebel,
Miguel Hidalgo, had not received the doctor’s degree from
that institution. A corporation of Mexican lawyers erased
from its roll the name of Ignacio Allende, the rebel.

Viceroy Venegas soon took various measures to quell the
revolt. On September 23 he issued a manifesto against the
followers of Hidalgo, whom he described as “men deluded
by false ideas.” Venegas stated his belief that peace would
be restored to the viceroyalty when royalist soldiers appeared
in the revolutionary districts ; and he expressed regret that the
first measure of his administration should be the suppression
of a rebellion. A few days later the viceroy published a
manifesto instructing the loyal inhabitants of the viceroyalty
to defend themselves against attacks by the rebels and offer-
ing a reward of ten thousand pesos to those individuals who
might secure the persons of Hidalgo, Allende, and Aldama,
dead or alive. On September 26 the garrison of Mexico City
marched toward Queretaro under the command of the Count
of Cadena, while other forces were brought to the capital city.
Colonel Diego Garcia Conde, military commander of the prov-
ince of Michoacan, and the Count of Casa Rul, commander
of the provincial regiment of infantry of that province, were
ordered to leave the capital city and to proceed to their re-
spective commands. Further, on October 5, Venegas pub-
lished a decree of the Spanish regency which declared that
the Indians were no longer to pay tribute. As an anti-revo-

MIGUEL HIDALGO Y COSTILLA

87

lutionary measure, the viceroy extended the decree so as to
include mulattoes and negroes who remained loyal to the
government and who helped to subjugate the insurrection.
X’enegas tried to cast odium upon the curate of Dolores by
declaring that he was a tool of Napoleon.

The reports of Hidalgo’s insurrection startled the Mexican
Church. On September 24, 1810, Bishop Abad y Quiepo
issued a proclamation which declared that Hidalgo, “a pastor
of souls, a priest of Jesus Christ, a minister of the God of
peace,” had raised the standard of rebellion and seduced a
number of innocent people. Hidalgo and his followers were
denounced as disturbers of the peace who had broken their
faith to King Ferdinand VII. The indignant bishop pro-
claimed that as Hidalgo, Aldama, Abasolo, and Allende had
imprisoned several priests, they had incurred the pain of ex-
communication. All persons were prohibited from giving them
aid or comfort. Similar proclamations were issued by the
bishops of Puebla, Guadalajara, and Oaxaca, as well as by
the archbishop of Mexico. The officers of the inquisitorial
tribunal at Mexico City ransacked the archives of the holy
office for evidence which would besmirch the character of
the curate of Dolores.

After some recruits had joined the army at Celaya, on
September 23, Hidalgo led his untrained soldiers toward the
city of Guanajuato, which was set in a beautiful valley amid
mountains that contained rich silver mines. Here the royalists
had stored their treasure in the Alhondiga de granaditas, or
public granary, — a fortress-like structure which commanded
the main entrance to the city. Urgent appeals for aid were
sent by Riaho to Felix Maria Calleja, the experienced military
commander who was stationed at San Luis Potosi. On
September 28, Hidalgo summoned Riano to surrender in the
following words :

On the plains near Celaya, the large army which I com-
mand elected me to be captain general and protector of the

Mexican nation. The city of Celaya, in the presence of fifty

88 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

thousand men, ratified this election, — an example which has
been followed by all the towns through which I have passed.
These events will show you that I am legitimately authorized
by my nation to undertake a beneficent project which is as
advantageous to the Americans as it is to the Europeans who
have decided to reside in this kingdom. In brief this project
is: the proclamation of the liberty and independence of the
Mexican nation. Accordingly I do not view the Spaniards
as enemies; but only as obstacles to the success of our enter-
prise. Be so good as to make known this project to the
Spaniards who have gathered in the Alhondiga; in order that
they may decide whether they will declare themselves as our
enemies, or will agree to become prisoners who will receive
humane treatment — like those already in our company — until
Mexican liberty and independence are achieved. At that time,
such persons will become Mexican citizens entitled to the
restitution of their properties, which we use at present because
of the exigencies of war. If, however, those Spaniards do
not decide to become our prisoners, I shall use every force
and stratagem to destroy them without any thought of
quarter.

The project embodied in the summons to Guanajuato shows
how Hidalgo tried to induce Spaniards to join his cause. This
summons is of further significance because it indicates the
rudimentary character of Hidalgo’s plans with regard to the
independence of Mexico from Spain. It furnishes no evi-
dence that he was formulating a plan for the government
of independent Mexico.

Riano replied to the summons in a manly fashion. He
declared that he recognized no other captain general than the
viceroy, and that he would fight Hidalgo as became a soldier.
At eleven o’clock on the forenoon of September 28 the in-
tendant sent his last appeal to Calleja, declaring that he was
attacked at that very moment. The besiegers were aided by
many inhabitants of Guanajuato, who had openly forsaken the
intendant. Hidalgo’s followers soon swarmed upon the heights
which overlooked the Alhondiga. Shortly after the assault
began, Riano was killed; the plans which he had formed for

MIGUEL HIDALGO Y COSTILLA

85

the city’s defense were abandoned ; and dissensions appeared
in the ranks of the defenders. They were soon forced to take
refuge in the Alhondiga. There is a story that, during the
fierce assault upon the building, a brave insurgent distinguished
himself by climbing to the door of the citadel and setting fire
to it amid a storm of missiles. That dramatic episode has been
immortalized by a Mexican artist in a statue of the hero bear-
ing in his right hand a fiery torch.

The Alhondiga has been compared with the Bastile. The
fall of the Alhondiga was certainly followed by the merciless
massacre of the royalists. The treasure stored in that building
was seized, while the mines and the haciendas around the city
were looted. Hidalgo’s undisciplined soldiers became an In-
dian mob. In the words of Alaman, who as a boy must have
witnessed the sack of the city :

Guanajuato presented a most lamentable picture of dis-
order, ruin, and desolation. The plaza and the streets were
full of fragments of furniture, of the remains of merchandise
which had been taken from shops, and of liquors that had
been emptied after the conquerors had drunk their fill. The
insurgent soldiers abandoned themselves to all kinds of ex-
cesses: the Indians of Hidalgo presented the strangest fig-
ures; for they had drawn over their own scanty apparel the
clothes which they had stolen from the homes of Spaniards.
Among these clothes were the uniforms of the regidores of
the city; and when the barefooted Indians had bedecked them-
selves with the embroidered coats and the ornate sombreros of
these regidores, they were in a complete state of ecstasy.

Even Hidalgo and the sacred banner of Guadeloupe could
not check the frenzied Indians. The capture of Guanajuato
— the capital of one of the richest intendancies of New Spain —
was followed by an orgy of robbery, murder, and lust, the
horrors of which no pen could depict.

After making arrangements for a rudimentary city govern-
ment in Guanajuato, Hidalgo marched towards Valladolid
Thus he withdrew his followers from their dangerous position

90 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

between the royalist soldiers under Calleja at San Luis Potosi
and the forces under the Count of Cadena which had just
arrived at Queretaro. As Hidalgo approached the city of
Valladolid, the royalist leaders departed, and the inhabitants
relinquished all thoughts of resistance. On October 17 Hidalgo
entered that city. Bustamante declared that while the curate
was conversing with Manuel Gallegos, a militia officer who
had joined the insurgents, this officer frankly advised Hidalgo
that, if he wished to defeat the Spaniards, he should retire
with fourteen thousand of his followers to the sierra of
Patzcuaro : “In two months,” said Gallegos, “I will return these
men to you disciplined and serviceable ; if such a step is not
taken, you will be left alone in the first reverse which you
suffer, for all your followers will fly away like doves.” If
that sound advice was actually given to Hidalgo, unfortunately
for the revolutionary cause, he disregarded it.

In the meantime, the holy office was studying Hidalgo’s
past. On October 10 the officials of the inquisition at Mexico
City made a report to the tribunal respecting the curate of
Dolores. They declared that Hidalgo was a partisan of French
liberty, a libertine, a formal heretic, a Judaiser, a Lutheran, a
Calvinist, a rebel, a schismatic, and a suspected atheist. Three
days later the inquisition issued an edict concerning Hidalgo.
In that proclamation certain denunciations which had been
quietly reposing in the inquisitorial archives were published as
damning evidence. Hidalgo was accused of denying that God
chastised with temporal punishments. He was accused of
speaking disdainfully of the Popes and of intimating that a
certain Pope who had been canonized ought to be in hell. He
was accused of accepting the doctrines of Luther in regard to
the eucharist and auricular confession. With apparent incon-
sistency, he was accused of denying the authenticity of certain
portions of the Bible. Further, it was alleged that Hidalgo
had described fornication as a natural and innocent act, and
that he had made a compact with a woman to foster that crime.
It was stated that Hidalgo had declared war on God, his holy

MIGUEL HIDALGO Y COSTILLA

91

religion, and the fatherland. Under pain of excommunication,
the accused priest was summoned to appear before the inquisi-
torial tribunal in Mexico City within thirty days. It was pro-
claimed that, if he failed to appear, his trial would proceed m
absentia. The edict concluded by announcing that all persons
who supported the revolution, who received revolutionary
proclamations, who maintained relations with Hidalgo, who
failed to denounce him, or who promulgated revolutionary
ideas, would be punished by a heavy fine, by excommunication,
and by the other punishments provided by canon law and papal
bulls.

In reply to that edict Hidalgo issued a manifesto from Val-
ladolid on December 15, 1810. With a glint of humor he
averred that he had never renounced any doctrines held by the
Roman Catholic Church:

I have always been thoroughly convinced of the infalli-
bility of her doctrines. ... I am accused of denying the ex-
istence of hell : and, in the same edict, I am accused of affirm-
ing that one of the canonized Popes is in that place. How
can these two statements be reconciled: to say that there is
a Pope in hell, and at the same time to deny the existence of
such a place? In a similar fashion, I am accused of having
denied the authenticity of the Bible; and I am accused of hav-
ing accepted the perverse doctrines of Luther; if Luther de-
duced his errors from the Bible which he believed to be in-
spired by God, how can one who denies the authenticity of
the Scriptures be a Lutheran? . . . My beloved fellow citi-
zens ! You may be certain that, if I had not undertaken to
liberate our kingdom from the evils which oppress it and
from the greater evils which threaten it, . . . never would
I have been accused of heresy.

Thus did Hidalgo rightly intimate that the fulminations
from the inquisition had been caused by political motives. In
this manifesto he also said :

Mexicans, let us break the bonds of ignominy with which
we have been so long bound! To break these bonds we need

92 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

only to unite. If we do not fight among ourselves, the war
will be terminated, and our rights will be saved. Let us then
unite all those persons who have been born on this happy
soil ; let us consider as strangers and as enemies of our pre-
rogatives all persons who are not Mexicans. Let us estab-
lish a congress composed of representatives of all the cities,
towns, and villages of this country. The principal object of
that congress will be to maintain our holy religion and to
frame wise and beneficent laws adapted to the circumstances
of each community. Our lawmakers will rule us with the
tenderness of parents. They will treat us like brothers; they
will banish poverty; they will check the devastation of the
kingdom and the exportation of its money; they will en-
courage the arts ; and they will cause industry to revive. We
shall make free use of the richest productions of our fertile
soil ; and, in the course of a few years, the Mexicans will en-
joy all the delights which the sovereign author of nature has
bestowed upon this vast continent.

The manifesto responding to the inquisition is of im-
portance because it contains Hidalgo’s clever reply to some
of the accusations which had been brought against him. It is
significant because it contains the most definite statements
which the curate of Dolores ever made in regard to a plan of
government for emancipated Mexico. Obviously, he intended
to summon a congress of delegates which should frame laws
for the Mexican people.

During the sojourn of Hildago at Valladolid his army
swelled greatly. His followers were evidently rewarded for
their services by the rich booty which had been secured and
by the contributions which had been levied during the cam-
paign. With his large, undisciplined host, Hidalgo decided to
march upon the capital of the viceroyalty. From Valladolid he
proceeded towards Mexico City by way of Acambaro, Mara-
vatio, and Toluca. The royalist general, Garcia Conde, who
was a captive in the rebel camp, estimated that, at a review of
the army which was held at Acambaro, there were present
about eighty thousand men. Near that town the officers for
the army were selected : the curate of Dolores was made gen-

MIGUEL HIDALGO Y COSTILLA

93

eralissimo, Allende was made captain general, while Aldama
and other leaders were made lieutenant generals. In the mean-
while Colonel Torcuato Trujillo, a cruel and crafty officer
who had accompanied Venegas from Spain, had been sent
with about eight hundred soldiers to watch Hidalgo. Near
the crest of the ridge which bounded the valley of Mexico on
the west, the royalists, who had received reenforcements, sta-
tioned themselves on the Monte de las Cruces, which com-
manded the road from Toluca to Mexico City. The stately
domes and towers of the capital city were only about six
leagues away. On October 30, a fierce and bloody conflict
took place at the Mount of the Crosses, after which a small
band of royalists cut their way out of the revolutionary sol-
diers and retired upon the capital. Although the royalists were
forced to retreat, yet the encounter had upon them some of
the effects of a drawn battle, for the royal artillery had
wrought great havoc among the Indian hordes.

The reports of the battle caused much excitement in Mex-
ico City. Attempts were actually made to convey the im-
pression that it was a royalist victory. The merchants of
Vera Cruz struck off a medal to commemorate the glorious
action. At this time Viceroy Venegas directed that an image
of the Virgin in the sanctuary of Los Remedios should be
transferred to Mexico City. On October 31 the revered image
was accordingly taken to the metropolitan cathedral, where
Venegas formally declared it to be the patron saint of the
royalist troops. The Virgin of Guadeloupe was thus appar-
ently balanced by the Virgin of Los Remedios : a Mexican
writer has said that the Mother of the God of the Christians,
like the gods of The Iliad, alternately protected two contend-
ing parties.

The so-called battle of Las Cruces opened the road to the
capital city. But instead of marching forward immediately,
Hidalgo halted for two days. Then he decided not to march
against the castle of Chapultepec which guarded the capital.
Upon the only occasion when Hidalgo mentioned that momen-

94 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

tous decision, he declared that his determination not to march
forward was due to a scarcity of munitions. Because of that
decision some Mexican writers have stigmatized Hidalgo as
timorous, declaring that he thus lost the fruits of his campaign.
However, if Hidalgo had led his undisciplined and demoral-
ized soldiers upon Mexico City it is by no means certain that
the capital would have fallen.

For, while Hidalgo had been marching toward the capital,
Calleja had been ravaging the revolutionary districts with fire
and sword. At Queretaro he received despatches from the
viceroy informing him of the battle of Las Cruces and urging
him to march toward Mexico City. The royalist commander
accordingly marched from Queretaro toward the capital by the
very road along which Hidalgo was retiring from the Monte
de las Cruces. The two armies met at Aculco on November 6 ;
the conflict which ensued on the following day was a victory
for the royalists : the artillery, munitions, and provisions of
the rebels were captured by Calleja. In his hour of triumph,
the jubilant royalist commander exaggerated the victory, for
he informed the viceroy that the insurgents had lost ten thou-
sand men. On their part, the insurgents tried to belittle the
royalist victory, for they said that the engagement was merely
a skirmish. The truth is that the followers of Hidalgo were
dispersed. In the disorderly retreat Hidalgo and Allende
were separated: the curate finally turned up at Valladolid,
while Allende made his way to Guanajuato. At this crisis
in the revolution, a breach between these two chieftains became
apparent. But in spite of that breach and the defeat at
Aculco, the revolution was still formidable, for it was spread-
ing like wildfire in the region west and south of Mexico City.
On the other hand, on November 25, Calleja reconquered the
city of Guanajuato, whence Allende fled towards Guadalajara.

In the end of November, 1810, Hidalgo entered the city of
Guadalajara amid the plaudits of the inhabitants. While in
this city, he published some decrees which indicated that he
was forming an administrative policy. On November 29 he

MIGUEL HIDALGO Y COSTILLA

95

issued a decree providing that the owners of :laves should lib-
erate them within ten days upon pain of death. The decree
also provided that the tribute which had been laid upon the
castes and upon the Indians should be abolished. The Spanish
laws and regulations in regard to the use of stamped paper
were also abrogated. The restrictions upon the production of
tobacco and wine, as well as the powder monopoly, were swept
away. To secure revenues for the government, it was pro-
vided that an alcabala should be levied upon the agricultural
products of Mexico and of Europe. On December i Hidalgo
issued a decree which aimed to prevent his soldiers from ar-
bitrarily impressing supplies. Four days later another decree
provided that lands belonging to Indian communities should be
cultivated only by Indians. These decrees embody some of
Hidalgo’s ideas concerning the reforms which were impera-
tively needed in New Spain. Among the revolutionary leaders
of Spanish America, he was the first to strike at negro slavery.

At this stage in the revolution, Hidalgo began to scatter
revolutionary doctrines broadcast. On capturing Guadalajara,
he had gained possession of a small printing press. Thus he
was enabled to found a periodical, the Despertador Americano,
which became the organ of the revolution. As the editor of
the periodical, Hidalgo selected Francisco S. Maldonado, who
had been the curate of Mascota. The first number of the
journal, issued from the press on December 20, 1810, con-
tained a proclamation appealing to the inhabitants of New
Spain. Both creoles and Spaniards were urged to march to
the field of battle under “the new Washington,’’ Hidalgo, “that
grand soul, full of wisdom and goodness, who has enchanted
our hearts with his admirable combination of popular and re-
publican virtues.” The excesses which had been committed
by the insurgents were ascribed to soldiers of the lower class :
it was affirmed that Hidalgo’s government had not only dis-
approved of such actions, but had taken steps to check them.
Further, it was declared that the insurgents desired to make
Mexico an asylum for the Christian religion and that they de-

96 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

sired to preserve the rights of Ferdinand VII. The suggestion
was also made that they expected to negotiate an alliance with
a foreign power.

In fact, just a week before the first number of the Desper-
tador Americano was published, Hidalgo had selected Pascasio
Ortiz de Letona — a Central American who had joined the revo-
lutionary cause — as agent to the government of the United
States. His credentials, dated December 13, 1810, declared
that he was made ambassador and plenipotentiary to the con-
gress of the United States. The envoy was authorized to ne-
gotiate with the United States a treaty of alliance, offensive
and defensive, and a commercial treaty which would be useful
and advantageous to both nations. But Letona’s credentials
— which displayed the ignorance of the Mexican revolutionary
leaders in regard to diplomatic procedure — were never filed
in the archives at Washington ; for before Letona reached Vera
Cruz, he was detained by a royalist officer and thrust into
prison, where he seems to have committed suicide. The mis-
sion of Letona demonstrates that the first Mexican revolu-
tionists hoped to secure succor from the North. Evidently
some Mexicans considered the United States as their natural
ally. Although in 1810 the government of the United States
did contemplate sending an agent to Mexico, yet many years
elapsed before a commercial agent was actually sent t'^'^re.

The credentials of the unfortunate Letona were dated at
"the national palace of Guadalajara.” Among the officials who
signed his papers were Hidalgo, generalissimo of America,
Ignacio Allende, captain general of America, Jose M. Chico,
minister of justice, and Ignacio Rayon, general secretary.
Those titles show that Hidalgo had established two rudimen-
tary executive departments : in charge of the department of
justice he had placed Chico, a young lawyer of Guanajuato;
at the head of the department of state he had placed Rayon,
who had acted as his secretary. No documents have been
found to indicate that the organs of Hidalgo’s revolutionary
government developed beyond the stage reached at Guadala-

MIGUEL HIDALGO Y COSTILLA

97

jara. It seems unlikely that any further growth took place,
for the insurgents and the royalists soon met in a decisive
struggle.

While Calleja led his soldiers toward Guadalajara where
he planned to join forces with General Jose de la Cruz,
Hidalgo was preparing for the battle to which, despite the
arguments of Allende, who favored a guerrilla warfare, he
had decided to entrust the fortunes of his cause. As the
march of La Cruz was delayed by an encounter with the
soldiers of the insurgent leader. Colonel Mier, Calleja had to
fight the insurgents under Hidalgo without the aid of that
general. When the news of Calleja’s approach reached Guada-
lajara the insurgent forces, amounting to about ninety thou-
sand men, marched several leagues east of the city and camped
on a range of hills near a bridge over the river Calderon : this
strategic position controlled the road to Guadalajara. On
the eve of battle, we are told, the warrior-priest made this
boast: “I go to breakfast at the bridge of Calderon, to dine
in Queretaro, and to sup in Mexico City.” This was not al-
together an idle boast ; for Hidalgo’s army vastly outnumbered
the royalists, who perhaps had no more than ten thousand
men. However, those were disciplined and well-armed soldiers
directed by a valiant and skillful commander. More than once
did the scale of battle incline toward the insurgents, but a
disastrous fire finally broke out in the revolutionary camp;
so that, after a conflict lasting about six hours, the insurgents
were compelled to retire precipitately. The retreat of the in-
surgents was soon turned into a rout, and the revolutionary
leaders fled in a northerly direction. The battle of Calderon,
January 17, 1811, was thus the turning-point of Hidalgo’s
revolution.

The defeat at the bridge of Calderon shattered the prestige
of Hidalgo. While the revolutionists were trying to escape
from Calleja’s soldiers, Allende evidently determined to take
the leadership of the enterprise from the discredited curate.
According to a statement made by Hidalgo, it was at a hacienda

98 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

located between Aguascalientes and Zacatecas that he was
forced to transfer his authority to Allende. Thenceforward
the deposed commander was watched by the adherents of
Allende, who threatened him with death, if he, or any of his
friends, should dare to leave the insurgent army. With the
dejected generalissimo in his train, Allende led the disheart-
ened revolutionists into Zacatecas.

The new generalissimo soon decided to march into the
provinces further north, where many inhabitants had declared
in favor of the revolution. In consequence, early in February
a small force under Allende left Zacatecas for Saltillo. At
that point Hidalgo received a proposal of pardon which was
made by General la Cruz in accordance with a decree of am-
nesty issued by the Spanish cartes. In response to the pro-
posal Hidalgo declared that he considered himself pledged to
the Mexican patriots not to lay down his arms ‘until the
priceless jewel of liberty had been torn from the hands of the
oppressors.’ He firmly declared that he would enter into no
negotiations with Spain which did not have as their basis the
recognition of the liberty of the Mexican nation. He ex-
pressed a belief that Calleja would yet be humbled by the
revolutionists, for Mexico was in a condition of ferment.
“Pardon,” said Hidalgo, “is intended for criminals and not for
defenders of their native land, especially if they posse®® forces
which are superior to their enemies.” Despite the sanguine
tone of the response, Allende and his companions evidently
realized that they were in a desperate plight. In their hour
of extremity, they turned again to the North. Evidently they
contemplated marching into the province of Texas, or even
into the United States. Ignacio Aldama was selected to
proceed as their agent to that country. According to state-
ments made by Juan Salazar, a Franciscan friar who accom-
panied Aldama, the latter was instructed to solicit aid from the
government of the United States. Whatever was the exact
nature of the mission, it was frustrated; for on March i,
Aldama, who carried with him a quantity of silver, was im-

MIGUEL HIDALGO Y COSTILLA

99

prisoned at Bejar, Texas, by Jose M. Zambrano, the leader
of an anti-revolutionary movement. Many Mexicans now
turned their eyes from the Virgin of Guadeloupe to the Virgin
of Los Remedios.

Among the soldiers of the revolution who secretly passed
over to the camp of the royalists about this time was Colonel
Ignacio Elizondo, who had become disgruntled with Allende.
Elizondo soon placed himself at the head of a band of royalists
and laid plans to intercept Hidalgo and Allende, who were
journeying northward with a small escort. On the morning
of March 21, as the revolutionary caravan was crossing the
arid plains near Monclova, it fell into an ambuscade which
had been laid by Elizondo. The military leaders were dragged
from their coaches, while Hidalgo, who was at the rear of the
caravan, surrendered. By that exploit Elizondo captured about
nine hundred men, twenty-four cannon, a small sum of silver
money, and a considerable quantity of bar silver. Besides the
curate of Dolores, Elizondo captured Mariano Hidalgo, Ig-
nacio Allende, Juan Aldama, Mariano Jimenez, and Mariano
Abasolo. Generals, lieutenants, and friars were alike con-
veyed to Monclova, where the leaders were fettered and cast
into prison.

On March 26, under the escort of Colonel Manuel Salcedo,
the principal prisoners began the long journey to Chihuahua
which was the residence of Nemesio Salcedo, the commandant
of the interior provinces. After a tiresome journey, on April
23, the caravan reached Chihuahua. There the prisoners of
state were incarcerated in a building which had once served
the Jesuits as a college. On May 6 Nemesio Salcedo appointed
a military junta of seven men to try the conspirators; about
the same time he commissioned Juan de Bustamante and Angel
Abella to examine them. We know that before the trial began.
Viceroy Venegas had sent to Calleja the mandate that the
insurgent leaders should be punished as traitors. Technically,
the case for the government was based upon the statements
of the accused men.

loo RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

After the minor conspirators had been examined, the legal
counselor of the military junta, Rafael Bracho, wrote his
opinion, and the junta passed judgment. It declared that
eighteen men were traitors, and decreed that they should be
shot in the back. In this ignominious manner, on June 26,
Ignacio Allende, generalissimo, Mariano Jimenez, captain gen-
eral, and Juan Aldama, lieutenant general, were executed.
About the same time that the judgment was announced, Ignacio
Aldama and Juan Salazar were brought from Texas to Mon-
clova, where they were executed. Mariano Abasolo, who tried
to absolve himself from the charge of treason, was condemned
to life imprisonment in Spain : about five years later he died
in a prison at Cadiz. Many of the priests who had joined
the curate of Dolores were taken to Durango, where they were
degraded from the priesthood and executed as traitors.

The trial of the chief conspirator was the last to terminate.
On May 7, 8, and 9 Hidalgo was skillfully cross-examined by
Abella. Although the curate of Dolores was unfrocked, dis-
graced, and manacled, yet he bore himself with fortitude. He
displayed much ingenuity and acumen in his responses to
Abella’s forty-three questions. The patriot, the dialectician,
and the priest were reflected in the answers which his mortal
foes preserved. Those answers indicate that Hidalgo did
not try to shift the responsibility for the leadership of the
insurrection from his own shoulders, — quite otherwise. Al-
though he apparently admitted that the thought of inciting
a revolution against Spain had originated with Allende, yet
he boldly declared: “I placed myself at the head of the revo-
lution, raised armies, manufactured small arms and cannon,
appointed chiefs and officers, directed a manifesto to the na-
tion, and sent to the United States a diplomatic agent, Ortiz
de Letona, who, as I know, died before he reached his destina-
tion.” Evidently, Hidalgo averred that the object of the
revolution was to preserve the viceroyalty of New Spain from
conquest by the French. In vain did Abella try to make Hi-
dalgo admit that he had been incited to revolt by Napoleon’s

MIGUEL HIDALGO Y COSTILLA

lOI

emissaries. More than once did the prisoner avow that it
had been his purpose to establish the independence of his
native land. He declared that he had not adopted any plan
of government for emancipated Mexico. He acknowledged
that he was partly to blame for the executions and murders
which his followers had committed. Relentlessly, Abella drove
Hidalgo from one response to another. The priest’s answers
to the last interrogatories, which concerned the doctrines of
the Church, showed signs of regret for the evils which his
revolt had brought upon New Spain : — at last Hidalgo besought
pardon from the bishop, the viceroy, and the inquisition. Ap-
parently, the pardon which Hidalgo thus solicited was rather
for the evils which his rebellion had brought upon the people
of Mexico than for his attempt to establish in New Spain a
government independent of Old Spain.

It is in the light of this apparent repentance that the
writer would view the manifesto of Hidalgo dated May i8,
i8ii, addressed “To All the World’’ — the authenticity of
which has sometimes been questioned. Extracts from that
curious confession will suggest the mood into which the re-
pentant priest had apparently fallen:

Who will furnish water for my head and fountains of
tears for my eyes? Who will cause to exude from the pores
of my body the blood which flows through my veins in order
that I may mourn day and night for those Mexicans who
have died, and that I may bless the never-ending mercy of
the Lord? . . . The night of darkness which blinded me has
been changed into luminous day; and, in the midst of the
prison which I have deserved, the evils which I have brought
upon Mexico are presented to me so clearly that sleep de-
serts my eyes and repentance prostrates me upon my bed.
Not far distant I behold the scene of my sacrifice. I exhale
each moment a portion of my soul. I feel as though I might
die a thousand times because of regret for my wickedness
before I die once. ... I see that the supreme judge has
written down charges against me which fill me with bitter-
ness. He wishes to destroy me because of the sins of my
youth. What then will be my astonishment when I see enu-

102 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

merated the many sins which I committed as the leader of the
insurrection? Oh, Mexico, my beloved fatherland! Oh, Mex-
icans ! my compatriots ; Europeans'! my progenitors, pity me !
I see the devastation of this country which I have caused, the
ruins of the properties which I have destroyed, the infinite
number of orphans whom I have made desolate, and the blood
which I have shed with so much profusion and temerity. I be-
hold . . . the multitude of souls that will sink into the bot-
tomless pit because they followed me. . . . Now I see that,
if you, deluded insurgents of Mexico, wish to practice the
perverse doctrines of revolution, my sins will increase and
the resulting evils for America, and more particularly for the
Mexicans, will have no end. . . . Know ye that the person
who resists the lawful authorities, resists the will of God;
lay down your arms; throw yourselves at the foot of the
throne; fear not prison or death: fear rather him who has
power to consign the soul to hell after it has departed from
the body!

Lastly, Hidalgo declared himself to be a Roman Catholic.
He abjured whatever he had said against the Church; and he
asked the faithful to pray that God might have mercy upon
his soul. If indeed Hidalgo wrote the manifesto willingly, and
signed it in sincerity, perhaps he did so with the secret hope
that his judges might Be merciful unto him.

Early in June the examination of Hidalgo by the military
junta terminated. Then the bishop of Durango, at the in-
stance of Commandant Salcedo, named Fernandez "Valentin, a
canon of Durango, to judge the accused priest on behalf of the
Church. On June 14 Valentin expressed his approval of the
trial and directed that Hidalgo’s case be turned over to Rafael
Bracho. On July 3, Bracho wrote his opinion of the case,
pronouncing Hidalgo a traitor whose punishment was pre-
scribed by the laws of Spain : “Hidalgo is a conspirator guilty
of high treason and an instigator of treacherous murders.
Therefore he should be put to death. According to the laws
of Spain, his property should be confiscated. His proclama-
tions and seductive papers should be cast into the fire publicly
and ignominiouslv.” Bracho declared that the most shameful

MIGUEL HIDALGO Y COSTILLA

103

mode of execution would scarcely satisfy the vengeance of the
government. The traitor, however, being a minister of the
Almighty, was entitled to merciful treatment. The judgment
of Bracho was that, after having been degraded from the
priesthood by the ecclesiastical authorities, Hidalgo should be
shot as a traitor. Accordingly, on June 19, Hidalgo was clad
in the garb of a priest. Then the curate of Dolores was
publicly stripped of his sacred vestments by an agent of the
bishop of Durango. Whereupon the condemned priest was
turned over to Manuel Salcedo, president of the military junta,
and he was informed of the death sentence, which, in ac-
cordance with Bracho’s judgment, had been pronounced
against him on July 26. A confessor was brought to Hidalgo,
in order that he might prepare “to die like a Christian.”

The ominous news of his death sentence did not humiliate
the condemned man, who evidently had recovered his remark-
able poise. Francisco de Jauregui, an eyewitness of the solemn
ceremony of degradation, declared that, when Hidalgo was
being ignominiously stripped of the priestly vestments, he bore
himself with such serenity that the priests engaged in the
ceremony were horrified. Further, this observer declared that,
when the sentence of death was read, Hidalgo received it with
surprising indifference, and, that when he was asked if he had
anything to say, he blandly requested that an attendant should
bring him some sweetmeats. “During the entire day,” said
Jauregui, “he spoke of unimportant matters; he slept well at
night, breakfasted with pleasure, and showed few signs of
repentance.” Hidalgo’s keepers evidently treated him hu-
manely, for, on the eve of his execution, he expressed his
gratitude to the gaolers in two stanzas of poetry which he
scrawled upon the walls of his dungeon. Early on the morn-
ing of July 30, after being quietly escorted out of his cell into
the courtyard of the prison, Hidalgo was shot by a squad of
soldiers. Many years later. Lieutenant Armendariz, who com-
manded those soldiers, declared that Hidalgo died while hold-
ing aloft a crucifix.

104 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

The bodies of Miguel Hidalgo, Ignacio Allende, Juan Al-
dama, and Mariano Jimenez were interred at Chihuahua. Their
heads were sent to Guanajuato. And, enclosed in iron cages,
they were displa3’^ed at the four comers of the Alhdndiga for
ten years. At the principal entrance to that building was
placed the following inscription : “Here are the heads of
Miguel Hidalgo, Ignacio Allende, Juan Aldama, and Mariano
Jimenez, who were notorious imposters and the chief leaders
of the revolution. They sacked and robbed the Church of
God and the royal treasury; they brutally shed the blood of
faithful priests and just magistrates ; they were the cause of
the disasters, the disgraces, and the calamities which we suf-
fered,— occurrences which all the inhabitants of this integral
part of the Spanish monarchy lament and deplore. Their
heads were placed here by order of Sehor Brigadier Don Felix
Maria Calleja del Rey, the illustrious victor of Aculco, Guana-
juato, and Calderon — the restorer of peace to Mexico.”

Even after Hidalgo had been shot, the holy office did not
cease to persecute him. More than a week after Hidalgo’s
body had been interred at Chihuahua, a report was made to
the inquisitorial tribunal in which opprobrious epithets were
applied to the dead priest. It was not until March 15, 1813,
that the tribunal closed the famous case by ordering that the
documents concerning Hidalgo should be deposited in the
archives of the holy office.

The role of Miguel Hidalgo in the drama of the Mexican
war for independence is thus suggested in a history of Mexico :
“By his admirers, Hidalgo has been termed an angel of light;
by his enemies, a bloodthirsty rebel whose sole delight was in
revenge and cruelty.” There is some truth in both of these
characterizations. The excesses committed by Hidalgo’s fol-
lowers, however, were due rather to his defects as a leader
than to a preconceived design. These defects naturally re-
sulted from his lack of ability as a military organizer and from
his ignorance of the art of war. Among the glaring mistakes
of that shepherd of souls was his failure to formulate a pro-

MIGUEL HIDALGO Y COSTILLA

105

gram of action for the people of Mexico. Unlike Miranda,
the curate of Dolores was not a framer of constitutions. In
light of the subsequent history of Mexico, it would be vain
to suppose that, if Hidalgo had promulgated a project of a
constitution, he would have solved a grave political problem;
but he probably would have secured the support of some Mex-
icans of the upper classes, who held studiously aloof from his
movement for independence. Then, too, at times he utterly
failed to manage his own turbulent followers. His lack of the
power to command masses of undisciplined soldiers, coupled
with his ignorance of military tactics, undermined his prestige ;
for his voice lacked authority at the council-table, and he could
not, like Morelos, inspirit his soldiers upon the field of battle.
An experienced military commander would scarcely have
risked the fate of a revolution, as Hidalgo did at the bridge
of Calderon, upon a pitched battle between undisciplined peons
and the experienced soldiers of Spain.

It is only fair to Hidalgo to say, however, that the royalists
in Mexico were so strongly entrenched that even a brave and
experienced military commander might have failed to plant
the revolutionary banner upon the summit of Chapultepec.
Then, too, it must be said that the schemes which the curate
of Dolores formed were sometimes blighted by untoward cir-
cumstances. But in spite of Hidalgo’s defects and mistakes
and misfortunes, the truth is that he still has an enduring claim
to the title given him by the Mexican people, — “the Father of
Mexican independence.” For, although that priestly iconoclast
did not indeed originate the idea that Mexico should be sep-
arated from the Spanish monarchy, yet at the psychological
moment he awoke the slumbering spirit of discontent with
Spanish rule. The spirit of Mexican nationality may be said
to date from the rebellion of Hidalgo; for, at his behest,
thousands of Mexicans flocked to the revolutionary standard.
In 1810 the creoles and the Indians of Mexico measured their
strength against the soldiers of Spain upon the field of battle.
But the victories which were won by the insurgents at the

io6 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

opening of the Mexican revolution were won at an extrava*
gant price, the price of anarchy. In the lurid background of
Mexican national history, there may be discerned standing
beside the sacred banner of Guadeloupe the figure of the
curate of Dolores, — the daring but unfortunate leader of a
bloody revolt of the lower classes in Mexico against the domi-
nant aristocracy. At his death, the curtain falls upon the
first act of the Mexican revolutionary drama.

CHAPTER IV

agustIn de iturbide

In March, 1812, a cortes which the council of regency had
summoned at Cadiz promulgated a constitution for distracted
Spain. According to the constitution, the executive authority
was vested in a monarch ; and the legislative power was to re-
side in the king and a cortes. The unicameral legislature was
composed of deputies chosen from the provinces in Spain and
the Indies. Provision was made for several secretaries of
state, including a secretary for the colonies. The government
of each province, peninsular or transatlantic, was vested in a
superior political chief selected by the king, — the office of vice-
roy was not mentioned. Among the reforms embodied in the
fundamental law was an article providing that all Spaniards
were to have the liberty to write and to publish their political
ideas. In May, 1812, the cortes decreed that an oath of alle-
giance to this constitution should be taken throughout the
Spanish dominions in both hemispheres.

On September 30, 1812, at Mexico City, the viceroy, mem-
bers of the audiencia and of certain corporations solemnly
swore to observe the new constitution. A similar ceremony
took place in other cities of Spanish America which remained
loyal to Spain. Periodicals which ridiculed the viceregal gov-
ernment soon burst forth from the emancipated press of
Mexico. In consequence the superior political chief of New
Spain, Venegas — who still used the title of viceroy — soon sus-
pended the constitutional guarantee of a free press. In cer-
tain parts of New Spain the promulgation and partial revoca-
tion of the liberal constitution of 1812 stimulated the spirit of
dissatisfaction with the existing regime.

107

io8 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

In that viceroyalty some of Hidalgo’s surviving follow-
ers kept the revolutionary fire burning. At the very time when
the cortes was framing a constitution for the Spanish mon-
archy, certain revolutionists were planning a congress for New
Spain. The movement for a new government in Mexico was
initiated by Ignacio Rayon, who, after the execution of Hi-
dalgo, became a revolutionary chief in the rugged region south
and west of Mexico City. In August, i8ii, in the picturesque
hamlet of Zitacuaro, a group of revolutionists created a coun-
cil composed of three men, which styled itself “the supreme
governmental junta of America.” The president of the first
Mexican junta was Ignacio Rayon. The three members of
the junta took a solemn oath to support the Church of Rome
as well as the king of Spain. Not all of the Mexican revolu-
tionists, however, were satisfied with the actions of this junta.
The resourceful leader of the revolutionary soldiers, Jose Ma-
ria Morelos, strongly disapproved of its professions of loyalty
to Ferdinand VII.

Jose Maria Morelos was born at Valladolid on September
30, 1765. As his parents were poor, it was not until Morelos
had reached manhood that he entered the College of San Nico-
las at Valladolid, where in 1795 he received the degree of
bachelor of arts. A few years later he became a village priest ;
in 1810 he was the curate of Caracuaro in Michoacan. No
sooner did Morelos hear of the Grito de Dolores than he
sought Miguel Hidalgo. The latter soon commissioned the
curate of Caracuaro to recruit soldiers and to lead the revo-
lution in the coastal region south of Mexico City. In a bril-
liant campaign Morelos eventually drove the royalist soldiers
from the district between Acapulco and the valley of Mexico.
In his military exploits Morelos was aided by the valiant mem-
bers of the Galeano and Bravo families, notably the youthful
Nicolas Bravo; by Mariano Matamoras, the little curate of
Jantetelco; and by the unyielding revolutionist who became fa-
mous under the sobriquet of Guadeloupe Victoria. Morelos

AGUSTIN DE ITURBIDE

log

elucidated Ids political ideals to a congress which assembled
in September, 1813, in the village of Chilpancingo.

The congress of Chilpancingo was originally composed of
only eight delegates. In the regions dominated by the in-
surgents the delegates had been chosen by revolutionary sym-
pathizers: elsewhere they had been selected by Morelos. To
those delegates that leader expressed a wish that Mexico should
be independent of all nations; he declared in favor of the Ro-
man Catholic religion without the toleration of any other faith ;
he argued that sovereignty was vested in the people ; and he
proposed that a new Mexican government should be formed.
He suggested that there should be three departments in the
revolutionary government. He maintained that only Mexicans
should hold office, and that slavery, torture, monopolies, and
alcabalas should be abolished. The measures which were vig-
orously championed by Morelos naturally gained favor in con-
gress. In October it issued a manifesto written by the Yuca-
tanese scholar, Andres Quintana Roo, denouncing Spain’s colo-
nial policy and avowing that the Mexicans desired independ-
ence.

On November 6, 1813, despite the opposition of Ignacio
Rayon, seven members of the congress of Chilpancingo signed
an act which declared that Mexico was independent of Spain.
This act, which was the first Mexican declaration of independ-
ence, asserted that the decision to take such an important step
was due to conditions in Spain which had restored to Mexico
the exercise of her usurped sovereignty and had forever ended
her dependence upon the Spanish king. The declaration pro-
vided that no religion except the Roman Catholic was to be
tolerated publicly or secretly ; the government was to protect
that religion and to guard the purity of its faith. Further,
congress appointed Morelos the commander-in-chief of the
revolutionary army and the chief executive of the Mexican
state. After accepting these appointments which conferred
upon him the title of highness, Morelos used with that title
the modest phrase, “servant of the nation.” Thus, under the

no RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

inspiration of Morelos, the Mexican revolutionists in the con-
gress of Chilpancingo took measures which clearly indicated
that a new nation was being created. But the political and
military prestige of the warrior-priest soon began to wane.
About two months after the declaration of independence was
signed the soldiers of the viceroy forced the revolutionary
congress to flee from Chilpancingo.

While the Mexican congress was seeking a refuge from
the royalists, “the sword of Wellington” restored Ferdinand
VII. to the throne of Spain. At Valencia the faithless Ferdi-
nand issued a decree dated May 4, 1814, proclaiming his in-
tention to disregard the constitution of 1812 and the decrees of
the liberal cortes. Thus Spain again fell under the sway of
an absolute king. On August 16 the decree of Valencia was
published in Mexico City. Four months later, Felix Maria
Calleja, who had succeeded to the viceregal authority, issued a
decree which provided that the ayuntamientos established ac-
cording to the constitution of 1812 were to be abolished. Cal-
leja also ordered that no person should criticise the royal pre-
rogative, and that the language of the constitution should be
suppressed in all documents, public and private. Copies of the
decree of Valencia were sent to various officers and digni-
taries throughout the viceroyalty. By such measures Calleja
strove to restore the administrative system of the viceroyalty as
it had existed before the deposition of Charles IV.

In the meantime the revolutionary congress was framing a
fundamental statute for independent Mexico. On October 22,
1814, in the remote hamlet of Apatzingan, the congress adopted
a provisional constitution enunciating certain political princi-
ples and providing a government for the revolutionists. The
constitution declared that the sovereignty of the people was
vested in congress and that the religion of the state should
be Roman Catholicism. The governmental authority was
vested in an executive composed of three persons, each of
whom was to serve as the president for four months; in a
congress composed of deputies from the provinces; and in a

AGUSTIN DE ITURBIDE

III

national judiciary chosen, like the executive, by congress. Un-
der this constitution a government was soon established : Jose
M. de Liceag^, Morelos, and Doctor Cos being chosen to act
as the executive power. There was a provision in the consti-
tution to the effect that, after peace with Spain was estab-
lished, a constituent congress was to assume the sovereign au-
thority. To most Mexicans, however, the constitution of Apat-
zingan remained a paper constitution, for Spanish soldiers still
patrolled the larger part of the viceroyalty.

About a year after this constitution was promulgated, while
he was convoying the migratory congress from Ario to Te-
huacan, Morelos was captured by the royalists. In November,
1815, the jubilant Spaniards thrust him into a cell of the in-
quisition in Mexico City. The trial of Morelos ha » been de-
scribed by Henry C. Lea as “the most expeditious in the annals
of the Holy Office”: on November 24, the inquisitorial tri-
bunal accused Morelos of being a heretic and an insurgent ; two
days later, it announced the judgment which condemned the
curate of Caracuaro to degradation and execution. On Decem-
ber 22, 1815, after being stripped of his priestly vestments,
the “invincible” Morelos was shot in the back by the soldiers
of the viceroy. The execution of Morelos, the ablest military
commairler that the Mexican revolution had produced, was
a heavy blow to the cause of independence.

Another phase of the early Mexican revolution may be
suggested by the career of Francisco Xavier Mina, a brave
native of Navarre. Utterly disgusted at the absolute rule of
Ferdinand VII., Mina fled from Spain to England, where he
dreamed of promoting the cause of liberty and independence in
New Spain. In April, 1817, with a small band of daring fili-
busters, recruited mainly in the United States, Mina landed
at Soto la Marina on the Mexican Gulf. With a part of “the
auxiliary division of the Mexican republic,” as he styled his
soldiers, Mina marched into the interior of Mexico. Although
he gained some signal successes against the royalists, yet he
failed to secure the sincere cooperation of the Mexican insur-

1 12 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

gents led by a local chieftain, Padre Torres; he was captured
by the royalists and executed on November ii, 1817. The
prestige of the revolutionists sank still lower after Mina’s exe-
cution : the publication of insurgent periodicals was suspended ;
and a number of prominent revolutionary leaders, among them
Quintana Roo, accepted the pardon which was offered by Fer-
dinand VII.

Although Hidalgo, Morelos, and Mina had failed to estab-
lish the independence of Mexico, yet they had not died in vain.
Hidalgo’s memory was revered by many Mexicans. The ca-
reer of Mina indicated what a capable military commander
might accomplish. The political achievements of Morelos pre-
saged the founding of an independent nation. The sequel will
show that many Mexicans were ready to take up arms against
the motherland, if, at an auspicious moment, a resolute leader
appeared with an attractive political program. Such a man was
Agustin de Iturbide, who, during the early Mexican revolu-
tion, had served under the Spanish standard.

Agustin de Iturbide, the son of Jose Joaquin de Iturbide
and Maria Josefa Aramburu, was born in the city of Valla-
dolid, Mexico, on September 27, 1783. His mother’s family
was evidently of Vizcayan origin. Ag^stin’s father, a pros-
perous landowner, was a native of Pamplona, the ancient capi-
tal of Navarre. On October i, 1783, in the cathedral of Valla-
dolid, the son of Jose de Iturbide was baptized Agustin Cosme
Damian. There is a tradition that the name Agustin was be-
stowed because a pious Augustinian friar had prayed for the
safe delivery of the child. At present the early life of Agustin
de Iturbide cannot be reconstructed with fullness, for only a
few prejudiced documents and some traditions of varying de-
grees of authenticity have come down to us in regard to that
period of his career. Various documents show that his mother,
who had been educated in a convent, was throughout life a de-
vout Roman Catholic. Accordingly we may safely assume that
Ag^Jstin grew up in a home where the Catholic Church was

(Copyrightfi byC.B. Waitf)

Agustin de Iturbide

(From a Painting in the Hall of the Ambassadors of the National
Palace, Mexico City)

AGUSTIN DE ITURBIDE

”3

regarded with veneration. Although the boy passed his early
years in a city which was one of the intellectual centers of
Mexico, yet he did not profit greatly by its educational advan-
tages. Alaman alleged that Agustin was not a studious youth,
and that he never acquired more than the rudiments of an
education. Vicente Rocafuerte, a bitter political enemy of
Iturbide, asserted that, although the youth was sent to college
in his native city, he did not complete his course of study be-
cause of idle and vicious habits. Those assertions evidently
embody a belief which was current in Mexico during the
revolutionary epoch to the effect that the education of Iturbide
had been somewhat neglected, — a view which is borne out by
the marks of illiteracy found among his papers.

At an early age Iturbide displayed an interest in military
affairs. The earliest report of his military services preserved
in the archives of Simancas shows that, on October i6, 1797,
Iturbide was given a provisional appointment as ensign in the
provincial regiment of infantry of Valladolid. On July 6,
1798, that appointment was confirmed by a royal order. In
a report of Iturbide’s military services which was written in
December, 1800, the following statements were made: that
he was of noble descent ; that his health was good ; that he pos-
sessed application and ability ; and that he was unmarried.
It was in 1805 that Agustin de Iturbide married Maria Huarte,
who belonged to a well-known family of his native city. By
the end of December, 1806, Iturbide had been promoted to a
lieutenancy in his regiment. Service in a militia company did
not engross Iturbide’s time; for Mexican militiamen were
ordinarily required to do little more than to attend occasional
reviews. During his early manhood Iturbide evidently spent
considerable time helping his father to manage the haciendas of
the family. As early as 1809 the dissatisfaction with Spanish
rule attracted Iturbide’s attention. Jose Michelena, the leader
of a conspiracy which was formed against the viceregal gov-
ernment at Valladolid, obviously referred to Iturbide when he
later declared that a young creole, who became aware of

1 14 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

the plot, had denounced the conspirators. In an autobio-
graphical sketch written thirteen years later, Iturbide thus de-
scribed his situation in life when the Grito de Dolores was
heard :

In the year i8io, I was simply a subaltern officer, a lieu-
tenant in the provincial regiment of Valladolid, my native
city. . . . When the revolution set on foot by Don Miguel
Hidalgo, curate of Dolores, broke out, he offered me the rank
of lieul “nant-general. The offer was one which might have
tempted any young man without experience, and at an age
when his ambition might be excited. I declined it, however,
because I was satisfied that the plans of the curate were ill
contrived, and that they would produce only disorder, mas-
sacre, and devastation, without accomplishing the object which
he had in view. . . . The word insurrection in that instance
did not mean independence and equal liberty; — its object was,
not to reclaim the rights of the nation, but to exterminate all
the Europeans, to destroy their possessions, and to trample
on the laws of war, humanity, and religion.

This statement embodies the opinion of conservative Mexi-
cans respecting the insurrection of Hidalgo. Not only did
Lieutenant Iturbide decline to follow the sacred banner of
Guadeloupe, but he took up arms against the insurgents as
“against a lawless band” which “harassed the country.” He
gained distinction under Colonel Trujillo at the battle of Las
Cruces. In June, 1812, he captured the insurgent leader Al-
bino Garcia in the town called the Valley of Santiago. Four
months later he carried a rebel stronghold. Fort Liceaga, by
storm. In April, 1813, he drove the insurgents under Ramon
Rayon from Salvatierra. In December of that year he par-
ticipated in a battle at Valladolid which resulted in the defeat
of Morelos. In September, 1815, Viceroy Calleja rewarded
Colonel Iturbide for these achievements by appointing him
commander of a military district composed of Guanajuato and
Michoacan. In a short time the actions of Iturbide as military
commander of that district caused great dissatisfaction among
its inhabitants. Because of this discontent, early in April.

AGUSTIN DE ITURBIDE

115

1816, Calleja ordered Iturbide to leave his command and to
proceed to Mexico City. In an official report of Iturbide’s case
which was printed in the Gaceta de Mexico on Septembei
I, 1816, it was stated that although there was not enough evi'
dence to convict the accused officer, yet the appearance of new
and adverse witnesses made it seem advisable not to restore
him to his command. Apparently Colonel Iturbide was neithei
dismissed nor reinstated. In April, 1816, the hero of many
bloody engagements ceased to fight imder the Spanish standard.

While the royalist commander who had won an unsur-
passed reputation for cruelty and bravery was nursing his real
or fancied wrongs, events occurred in Spain which influenced
Spanish America profoundly. In 1819 Ferdinand VII. pre-
pared to quell the insurrection in America. A fleet was brought
to Cadiz. Thousands of soldiers bivouacked in that city. But
discontent with Ferdinand’s absolute rule and a conviction that
the soldiers destined for America constituted a forlorn hope,
provoked an uprising. On January i, 1820, Rafael Riego,
the colonel of an Asturian regiment, boldly proclaimed his
adherence to the constitution of 1812. A wave of revolution
swept over Spain ; Ferdinand VII. was compelled to relinquish
his absolute authority: on March 7 he proclaimed his inten-
tion to support the liberal constitution. A short time after-
wards he solemnly swore to observe this constitution and ac-
cepted liberal statesmen as his ministers.

News of the Spanish revolution startled the citizens of
Vera Cruz in April, 1820. In the end of the following month,
Juan Ruiz de Apodaca, who had become viceroy of New Spain
shortly after Iturbide was recalled from his command, di-
rected that the officials and corporations of Mexico City should
take an oath to support the new regime. About the middle of
June the freedom of the press was again proclaimed in Mex-
ico City. On June 24 Apodaca addressed a circular to the
inhabitants of New Spain informing them that they were to
take an oath to support the constitution of 1812. In Septem-
ber, 1820, deputies were chosen to represent Mexico in the

ii6 RISE OF SPANISH- AMERICAN REPUBLICS

Spanish cortes. In September and October, before these dep-
uties sailed from Vera Cruz, the cortes passed some de-
crees which disturbed many Mexicans. On the one side, it
passed a decree providing that when the American rebels who
lived in regions that had been pacified took the oath to support
the constitution, they were to be pardoned. On the other side,
it passed decrees suppressing certain religious orders and re-
stricting other religious orders. Consequently many members
of the higher clergy became apprehensive of the results which
constitutional government might have upon the Mexican
Church. Further, the promulgation anew of the constitution
of 1812 encouraged liberal ideas and stimulated discussion in
regard to the best form of government for Mexico. There
is perhaps no better contemporary statement of the conditions
than that which was made by Iturbide.

The new order of things, the ferment in which the Penin-
sula was placed, the machinations of the discontented, the
want of moderation amongst the supporters of the new system,
the vacillation of the authorities, and the conduct of the gov-
ernment and Cortes at Madrid, (who, from the decrees which
they issued, and the speeches which some of the deputies pro-
nounced, appeared to have determined on alienating the colo-
nies), filled the heart of every good patriot with the desire of
independence, and excited amongst the Spaniards established
in the country, the apprehension that all the horrors of the
former insurrection were about to be repeated. ... In such
a state of things the richest and most beautiful part of Ameri-
ca was about to become again the prey of contending factions.
In every quarter clandestine meetings took place, for the pur-
pose of discussing the form of government which ought to
be adopted. Among the Europeans and their adherents, some
wished for the establishment of the Spanish constitution. . . .
There were some who conceived that it ought to undergo
modifications, inasmuch as the constitution framed by the
Cortes at Cadiz was inapplicable to “New Spain." Others
there were who sighed after the old absolute government as
the best support of their lucrative employments, which they
exercised in a despotic manner, and by which they had gained
a monopoly. The privileged and powerful classes fomented

AGUSTIN DE ITURBIDE

117

these different parties, attaching themselves to the one or the
other, according to the extent of their political information, or
the projects of aggrandizement which their imaginations pre-
sented. The Americans wished for independence, but they
were not agreed as to the mode of effecting it, still less as to
the form of government which they should prefer. With re-
spect to the former object, many were of opinion that in the
first place, all the Europeans should be exterminated, and their
property given up to confiscation. The less sanguinary would
have been contented with banishing them from the country,
thus reducing thousands of famihes to a state of orphanage.
The moderate party suggested only that they should be ex-
cluded from all public offices, and degraded to the condition
in which they had kept the natives of the country for three
centuries. As to the form of government, one party proposed
a monarchy, tempered by the Spanish, or some other consti-
tution; a second party wished for a federative republic; a
third for a central republic ; and the partisans of each sys-
tem, full of enthusiasm, were impatient for the accomplish-
ment of their different objects.

In 1820 only a few bands of Mexicans still followed the
standard of independence. Most of the insurgents were wag-
ing a guerrilla warfare against the royalists in the region south
of the capital city. The operations of the royalists in that
quarter had been entrusted to General Jose Gabriel Armijo.
To the chagrin of Apodaca, that general had not made much
progress in subjugating the enemy. When in the end of 1820,
Armijo relinquished his command, Apodaca looked for a man
who might complete the pacification of Mexico. His eyes
finally fell upon the renowned and discredited commander,
Agustin de Iturbide, to whom he offered an appointment as
commander of the royalist forces in the field. On November
9, Colonel Iturbide accepted the appointment. About a week
later he left Mexico City obviously charged with the task of
terminating the revolution. Viceroy Apodaca has been se-
verely criticised because he selected Iturbide for this com-
mand : it has been alleged that the latter owed his appoint-
ment to the influence of certain members of the clergy who

ii8 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

secretly hoped to use him in the execution of their disloyal
designs. But the writer has found no evidence to indicate that
Apodaca was animated by any other motive than a desire to re-
establish the authority of Spain throughout the length and
breadth of his viceroyalty.

The insurgent leader against whom Iturbide marched in
November, 1820, was Vicente Guerrero. Little is known of
Guerrero’s early career. It appears that this leader was bom
in 1782 of humble parents at Tixtla in the province of Mexico.
His parents were of Indian race, or, at least, had some In-
dian blood in their veins. Vicente Guerrero spent his early life
as a laborer: Julio Zarate, the historian of the Mexican revolu-
tion, declares that he was employed for a time as a mule-
driver. Guerrero seems to have entered the revolutionary
ranks in 1810 under a subordinate of Morelos. After the exe-
cution of that warrior-priest, Guerrero became the soul of the
Mexican revolution. If it had not been for Guerrero’s repu-
tation as a sincere, daring, and valiant man, in 1820 the re-
volt against the rule of Spain in Mexico might have been little
more than a memory.

Instead of making war on Guerrero, as he had warred upon
other patriot leaders, Iturbide, without informing the viceroy,
soon entered into negotiations with that leader for the pacifi-
cation of Mexico. The upshot of the negotiations was an
agreement between Iturbide and Guerrero to join forces and
pacify Mexico. Their agreement was embodied in a plan
which Iturbide first published in the obscure hamlet of Ig^ala
on February 24, 1821.

The Plan of Iguala — an original copy of which the writer
has seen in the Mexican archives — was a unique document.
That plan was a crude pronunciamiento which contained not
only a declaration of independence from Spain but also a
sketch of a provisional government for New Spain. The pre-
amble of the plan, addressed to Mexicans of all races — Eu-
ropeans, Africans, and Asiatics — suggested that the indepen-
dence of Mexico from Spain was destined to be established in

AGUSTIN DE ITURBIDE 119

the natural course of events. It declared that the viceroyalty
of Mexico had been for three hundred years under the tutelage
of the most pious, heroic, and magnanimous of nations, but
that the evils which naturally arose because of the distance of
that viceroyalty from the government at Madrid could only
be remedied by the absolute independence of Mexico from
Spain. The branch of the tree was now as large as the trunk.
Only a general union of Europeans, Indians, and creoles would
furnish a solid basis for the happiness of the Mexican people.
An appeal was made to their spirit of nationality in these
words: “The moment has arrived when you should manifest
a common sentiment. You should show that our union is the
powerful hand which emancipates America without any for-
eign aid. At the head of a determined and valiant army, I
have proclaimed the independence of Mexico.”

In twenty-three articles, which were not always perfectly
consistent with each other, suggestions were made in regard to
the system of government that Iturbide proposed to establish.
One article provided that only the Roman Catholic religion
should be tolerated in Mexico. The members of the regular
and secular clergy throughout the country were to be protected
in all their rights and properties. In form the new government
was to be a monarchy, but it should be regulated by a consti-
tution suitable to the condition of the country. The monarch
of Mexico was to be Ferdinand VII., a member of his family,
or a member of some other ruling dynasty of Europe. Until
the emperor was selected, the governmental authority was to
be vested in a junta, which was to frame regulations for the
election of delegates to a Mexican congress. Until the arrival
of the Mexican monarch, this congress, or cartes, was to de-
cide whether the junta should govern or be replaced by a
regency. As soon as the cartes assembled, it was to frame
a constitution and to make laws for the state. All the inhabi-
tants of the empire, without any distinction of race or class,
were declared to be citizens of Mexico who were entitled tc
protection in their persons and properties. According to their

120 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

merits, they were to be eligible to all the offices of the new
empire. The existing governmental bureaus were to remain
intact, but those officials who opposed the Plan of Iguala were
to be replaced by men who were distinguished by loyalty, vir-
tue, and merit. The new government was to be sustained by
the army of independence. That army should be called the
army of th. three guarantees : — it was to sacrifice itself, if
need be, for the preservation of the Roman Catholic religion,
the establishment of independence, and the maintenance of the
union of Mexicans and Spaniards.

These three principles, or guarantees, as they were desig-
nated by Mexican contemporaries, — religion, independence, and
union, were the distinctive features of the project, as viewed
by Mexicans of the revolutionary era. In reality the Plan of
Iguala was a bid for the support of the various classes or
castes of New Spain : royalists, insurgents, creoles, Indians,
peninsular Spaniards, and clergy. To the rulers of Old Spain
the Plan of Iguala apparently offered a mode of adjustment
with New Spain which provided that the titular sovereignty
over Mexico might be vested in a Spanish prince. According
to that scheme for a constitutional government in Mexico, a
person born there could not become its monarch. With what
seems like a lack of wisdom, when the liberal cortes of Spain
heard of Iturbide’s revolution, that body scarcely entertained
the thought of accepting the Plan of Iguala as a solution for
the vexatious colonial problem. To many Mexican insur-
gents this plan was attractive because it embodied some of the
political ideals of Morelos. ■

The Plan of Iguala differed from the Declaration of Inde-
pendence of July 4, 1776, because it did not present an indict-
ment of the mother-country. Neither did it contain a philoso-
phy of the revolution. It did, however, formulate a definite
scheme of government for the revolutionists. According to
Iturbide’s own statement, the Plan of Iguala was formed after
he had made a careful study of conditions in Mexico. He ex-
plained the origin and the purpose of the plan in these words:

AGUSTIN DE ITURBIDE

I2I

A pamphlet, which I have seen, has asserted that the pro-
ject was the work of a club of serviles, who held their meet-
ing at the Profesa, a building belonging to the congregation
of St. Philip, in Mexico. Any person who reads the docu-
ment must be convinced, from its contents alone, that it
could not have been dictated by servilism; I put out of the
question the opinions of those persons to whom it is attributed,
and shall only say that they are matters upon which the multi-
tude is very commonly mistaken. . . . After the plan had
been drawn out, I consulted upon it with distinguished in-
dividuals of different parties; not one of them disapproved of
it; it was not modified in any manner; nothing was added or
erased.

In tracing out this project, my aim was to give independ-
ence to my country, because such was the general desire of
the Americans; a desire founded on natural feelings, and on
principles of justice. It was, besides, the only means by which
the interests of the two nations could be secured. The Span-
iards would not allow themselves to be convinced that their
decline began with their acquisition of the colonies, while the
colonists were fully persuaded that the time of their emanci-
pation had arrived.

The Plan of Iguala guaranteed the religion which we in-
herited from our ancestors. To the reigning family of Spain,
it held out the only prospect which survived for preserving
those extensive and fertile provinces. To the Mexicans, it
granted the right of enacting their own laws, and of having
their government established within their own territory.

The sagacity which Iturbide had shown in framing the
Plan of Iguala was soon demonstrated. This plan received the
support of many members of the clergy who had remained stu-
diously aloof from Hidalgo. A large number of royalist sol-
diers were attracted by the movement because of Iturbide’s
prestige as a royalist commander, while the acceptance of the
Plan of Iguala by Guerrero guaranteed the support of many
revolutionists. Thus, because of one motive or another, sup-
porters of that plan soon appeared in various parts of Mexico.
On March 29, 1821, the garrison of Vera Cruz, which was
commanded by Captain Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna, pro-

122 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

claimed its adherence to Iturbide’s program. Nicolas Bravo,
who had just been released from prison by Apodaca, soon be-
gan to recruit soldiers for the army of the three guarantees.
Vicente Filisola, an Italian who had been a comrade-in-arms
of Iturbide, joined his adherents. Meanwhile Iturbide had
invested his native city: on May 22, after a brief siege, he
entered Valladolid amid the rejoicings of his fellow-towns-
men. On June 28 Queretaro fell into his hands. In the ga-
zette of Iturbide’s army and in his official newspaper, the
Diario Politico Militar Mejicano, reports were regularly pub-
lished of the progress of his arms and of the viceroy’s declin-
ing power. The first number of that newspaper, September
I, 1821, spoke of Iturbide’s “just, liberal, and beneficent gov-
ernment.”

Iturbide had evidently hoped that Viceroy Apodaca would
accept his scheme as the basis for an adjustment between
Mexico and Spain. For the Plan of Ig^ala provided that
Apodaca should become the president of the provisional junta.
But Apodaca refused to join hands with Iturbide. On March
8 he issued a manifesto exhorting the Mexicans to support the
constitution and the laws; on March 14 he published a proc-
lamation announcing that Iturbide was an outlaw. Apodaca
also took various measures for the defence of the capital city:
soldiers were gathered and placed under the command of a
royalist officer named Pascual de Linan. Early in June the
viceroy felt compelled to impress soldiers whom he called “the
defenders of the integrity of the Two Spains.” However,
when reports reached the capital of the capture of Valladolid
and Queretaro by the soldiers of the three guarantees, the
discontent of the royalists became intense ; and hence the chief
military officers in Mexico City insisted that Apodaca should
relinquish his office. The hapless viceroy yielded to the storm :
— on July 6 he resigned his command in favor of General
Francisco Novella.

Like the last titular emperor of Rome, the last titular vice-
roy of New Spain was deposed by a mutiny of his own sol-

AGUSTIN DE ITURBIDE

123

diers. The deposed viceroy soon journeyed to Vera Cruz
where he embarked for the Spanish peninsula on the ship
Asia. It seems odd that this vessel had just brought to Mexico
General Juan O’Donoju, the last representative of the Spanish
monarchy to exercise viceregal authority in North America.

In January, 1821, General O’Donoju had been appointed
captain general of New Spain. In accordance with the consti-
tution, he was given the title of superior political chief. If
any detailed instructions were written by the liberal statesmen
of Spain for the guidance of O’Donoju, investigations by the
writer in the Spanish archives have not brought them to light.
In view of the extraordinary conditions in Spain, it is possible
that O’Donoju was not given any instructions regarding the
policy which he was to follow as captain general of New
Spain. At the critical juncture when rumors of the revolu-
tionary projects of Iturbide reached Madrid, O’Donoju was
nearly ready to leave the Spanish peninsula for the New
World. The commander of New Spain left Cadiz for America
on May 20, 1821, accompanied only by a few military officers.
Two months later he reached the fortress of San Juan de
Ullua. When O’Donoju discovered that many of the impor-
tant towns and cities of Mexico had proclaimed their adher-
ence to the Plan of Iguala, that the army of the three guaran-
tees had besieged the capital city of the viceroyalty, and that
Vera Cruz had actually been attacked by the soldiers of Itur-
bide, his amazement was prodigious. It seemed as though a
magician’s wand had almost transformed the ancient viceroy-
alty of New Spain into an independent state.

The Iturbidista revolution indubitably influenced the policy
which was adopted by O’Donoju, the liberal. From Vera Cruz
on August 3 the captain general issued an address to the inhabi-
tants of Mexico in which he frankly declared that if his gov-
ernment did not suit the Mexicans, at the first sign of disgust
with his rule he would relinquish his post and quietly allow
them to select their own ruler. He suggested, however, that
the Mexicans should suspend their projects until they re-

124 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

ceived fresh tidings from the Spanish peninsula. A few days
later, perhaps at the instance of the wily insurgent, Santa
Anna, O’Donoju sent to Colonel Iturbide two agents who were
empowered to propose the negotiation of a treaty which might
ensure tl e pacification of New Spain.

Those agents soon made arrangements for an interview
between O’Donoju and Iturbide. The interview was held in
the town of Cordoba. There, on August 24, the comnaander
of the army of the three guarantees and the superior political
chief of New Spain agreed to a treaty. The preamble of the
treaty of Cordoba alleged that O’Donoju desired to reconcile
Old Spain and New Spain by untying the bonds which had
united them. O’Donoju agreed that New Spain was to be rec-
ognized as a sovereign and independent nation. The govern-
ment of the new nation was to be a monarchy limited by a con-
stitution. With regard to the monarch, article three of this
convention provided that Ferdinand VII. was first to be offered
the throne of Mexico. If the king of Spain declined to accept
that throne, it was next to be offered to his brother. Prince
Charles; if Charles did not accept the kingship, the throne was
then to be offered to Prince Francisco de Paula ; if that prince
did not wish to accept the Mexican throne, it was then to be
offered to Prince Charles Louis, Duke of Lucca. In case no
one of those personages accepted the kingdom of Mexico, then
the cortes of the Mexican empire was to elect a monarch who
should erect his court in Mexico City. His Catholic Majesty,
Ferdinand VII., was to be solicited to promote the selection
of a prince of his dynasty to reign in Mexico.

Meanwhile, “in accordance with the spirit of the Plan of
Ig^uala” — so ran the treaty — a junta was to be formed from
the leaders of the Mexican empire, including O’Donoju. This
junta was to be styled the provisional governmental junta. It
was to select its own president, to inform the people that depu-
ties were to be elected to a Mexican cortes, and to choose a
regency of three persons who were to constitute the supreme
executive authority until a monarch grasped “the scepter of the

AGUSTIN DE ITURBIDE

125

empire.” Until the cartes assembled, the provisional junta was
to legislate in accordance with the existing laws that harmon-
ized with the Plan of Iguala. The regency was to convoke a
constituent cartes for Mexico. The treaty of Cordoba also
contained a provision that ihe Spaniards might freely depart
from Mexican soil with their families and property, whereas
those officials who were notoriously opposed to Mexican inde-
pendence might be compelled to leave the empire. The occupa-
tion of Mexico City by Spanish soldiers being an obstacle to
the fulfillment of the treaty, O’Donoju agreed to use his in-
fluence to secure the peaceful evacuation of that city by an
honorable capitulation.

This epitome of the treaty of Cordoba shows that it con-
firmed the Plan of Iguala, with some modifications. Of spe-
cial significance was the clause which provided that in case
none of the personages designated in the treaty deigned to
accept the throne of Mexico, the emperor should be chosen
by the Mexican cartes. The treaty contained no provision to
the effect that the monarch must be selected from a reigning
dynasty of Europe. Thus the road was cleared for the choice
of an emperor who had been bom in Mexico. It is not strange
that some writers should have considered that the treaty of
Cordoba embodied a plan which prepared the way for the
selection of the aspiring commander of the army of the three
guarantees as emperor of Mexico.

After Iturbide and O’Donoju had affixed their signatures
to the convention of Cordoba, there was a tilt between O’Don-
oju and Novella; for the latter maintained that O’Donoju was
not authorized to sign such a convention, while O’Donoju de-
manded that Novella should place the garrison of Mexico
City at his disposal. In the end Novella was reluctantly in-
duced to recognize O’Donoju as the rightful commander of
the royalist soldiers. In accordance with O’Donoju’s wishes,
on September 14, Novella transferred his military authority
to Pascual de Linan and bestowed his civil authority upon
Ramon Gutierrez del Mazo. A few days later the grenadiers

126 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

of Iturbide took possession of the fortress-palace of Chapul-
tepec. His troops displaced the peninsular soldiers who had
garrisoned the city. Elaborate preparations were made for the
entry of Iturbide and his followers into the capital. On Sep-
tember 27, 1821 — his thirty-eighth birthday — Iturbide marched
into the city from Chapultepec at the head of the victorious
army of the three guarantees. As the triumphal procession
wended its way into the city, it deeply impressed the inhabi-
tants. The first number of the Gaceta Imperial de Mexico,
which replaced the Gaceta de Mexico, declared that Iturbide
was hailed by the people of Mexico City as ‘the father of his
country, the liberator, and the tutelar genius of New Spain.’
In the enthusiasm of the moment that gazette exclaimed that
‘Rome had never witnessed such a triumph.’ The ayunta-
miento of Mexico City, says Bustamante, presented Iturbide
with a key of gold upon a platter of silver. These demonstra-
tions of joy signalized the termination of the struggle for the
independence of Mexico from Spain, — a struggle which Hi-
dalgo had begun on September 16, 1810. By what may rightly
be characterized as a bloodless revolution the author of the
Plan of Iguala had overthrown Spanish rule in the region
that had been conquered by Hernando Cortes and his follow-
ers. In the words of Iturbide himself, “Six months were suf-
ficient to untwist the entangled knot which had bound the
two worlds.’’

While the royalist soldiers were evacuating the capital,
Iturbide was selecting the members of the provisional gov-
ernmental junta provided by the Plan of Iguala. Among the
leaders selected to serve on the junta were Iturbide, O’Donoju,
and Antonio Joaquin Perez, the bishop of Puebla. On Sep-
tember 28, this junta met in a hall of the former viceregal
palace. The members soon elected Iturbide as president. They
chose as their secretary Juan J. de los Monteros, one of Itur-
bide’s intimate friends. After solemnly swearing to support
the Plan of Iguala and the treaty of Cordoba, they signed
“the act of independence of the Mexican Empire.’’ The act

AGUSTIN DE ITURBIDE

127

proclaimed that Mexico had just emerged from three hundred
years of oppressive rule : “the heroic efforts of her sons have
been crowned with success; f’^is measure consummates an
eternally memorable enterprise which a hero who is worthy of
admiration, praise, love, and glory began in Iguala and brought
to a successful termination in spite of almost insurmountable
obstacles.” The declaration of independence announced that
Mexico was a sovereign nation independent of Spain with
which she would maintain friendly relations as prescribed by
treaties. In contrast with the first Mexican declaration of in-
dependence framed under the inspiration of Morelos, this dec-
laration announced to the world that Mexico was an empire.
The governmental junta provided that the inhabitants of the
Mexican empire were to swear to support its declaration of
independence.

The junta soon appointed a regency to serve as the execu-
tive body until an emperor was elected. The members of the
executive power were Agustin de Iturbide, Juan O’Donoju,
Manuel de la Barcena, Jose Isidro Yanez, and Manuel Velas-
quez de Leon. When he became president of the regency,
Iturbide relinquished the presidency of the junta. The regency
soon conferred upon Iturbide the command of the army with
the grade of generalissimo and the title of highness. That
body also established four secretaries : a secretary of state, of
justice and ecclesiastical affairs, of war and the navy, and of
the treasury.

On February 24, 1822, the congress which had been con-
voked in accordance with the treaty of Cordoba assembled. At
once it declared that the provisional junta had ceased to exist
and that the legislative authority was vested in itself. In a
short time it sent a decree to the regency providing that all
the cities, towns, villages, and corporations of the Mexican em-
pire should take a solemn oath to recognize the sovereignty of
the nation as represented by congress. The regency ordered
that this decree should be observed by Mexican civil, military,
and ecclesiastical authorities of whatever class or dignity.

128 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

Nevertheless a struggle soon began between congress and the
regency for the supreme authority. Some members of con-
gress desired the establishment of a republic in Mexico. “The
Republicans were hostile to me," said Iturbide, “because they
well knew that they could never bring me to contribute to the
establishment of a government, which, whatever might be its
attractions, did not suit the Mexicans.” Another group of
Iturbide’s opponents was composed of persons who wished to
see that provision of the Plan of Iguala carried out which ar-
ranged for the coronation of a Bourbon prince as emperor of
Mexico, — a provision which the action of Spain rendered
nugatory.

According to an article of the treaty of Cordoba, O’Donoju
selected two commissioners to carry the news of that agree-
ment to the court of Madrid. He entrusted those commission-
ers with a dispatch addressed to Ferdinand VII. In this dis-
patch O’Donoju expressed the opinion that the independence
of Mexico from Spain was inevitable; he described the unex-
pected pleasure with which he had witnessed Iturbide sign the
treaty of Cordoba, and pointed out that a prince of Spain might
still become emperor of Mexico. But the treaty of Cordoba,
which became known to the Spanish government in November,
1821, was given a cold reception. On December 7, Ramon
Pelegrin, the secretary for the colonies, addressed a circular
to various ayuntamientos, audiencias, and archbishops in the
New World declaring that neither O’Donoju nor anyone else
had been authorized to agree to a convention which recognized
the independence from Spain of any transatlantic province.
In the same month Juan Moscoso, who had been employed
in the Spanish service in the West Indies, was quietly ap-
pointed captain general of New Spain to replace O’Donoju.
Early in 1822 the treaty of Cordoba was laid before the Span-
ish cortes. After an interesting debate, on February 13, 1822,
the extraordinary cortes passed a decree which solemnly de-
clared that the recognition of the independence of any Spanish
colony by a foreign state would be considered as an act

AGUSTIN DE ITURBIDE

129

hostility toward Spain. The Spanish ambassadors in Europe
were soon instructed to make known to the governments to
which they were accredited the views of Spain regarding the
independence of Spanish America Thus did the members of
the liberal cortes — which had rejected the Plan of Iguala —
spurn a convention by which Spain might have held Mexico
as an appanage.

Pelegrin’s circular disavowing the treaty of Cordoba was
printed on March 28, 1822, by the Gaceta Imperial de Mexico,
the official organ of Iturbide’s government. In commenting
upon that circular the gazette intimated that the Mexicans
would never bow their necks to the Spanish yoke again. The
truth of the matter is: that to Iturbide’s adherents the policy
announced by Spain appeared to make effective the article
of the treaty of Cordoba which provided that, in a certain con-
tingency, the Mexican nation might elect its own sovereign.
The dramatic sequel was not long delayed. On the night of
May 18, 1822, Pio Marcha, a sergeant in Iturbide’s old regi-
ment, and the rabble in the streets of the capital city, with loud
shouts which were accompanied by a rattling fire of musketry,
proclaimed Iturbide as Agustin I., Emperor of Mexico. Ac-
cording to Iturbide’s own version of the affair, his first im-
pulse was to decline the imperial dignity which the people so
unceremoniously thrust upon him:

If I restrained myself from appearing before them for that
purpose, it was solely in compliance with the counsel of a
friend who happened at the moment to be with me. “They
will consider it an insult,’’ he had scarcely time to say to me,
“and the people know no restraint when they are irritated.
You must make this fresh sacrifice to the public good: the
country is in danger; remain a moment longer undecided, and
you will hear their acclamations turned into death-shouts.’’
I felt it necessary to resign myself to circumstances; and I
spent the whole of that night allaying the general enthusi-
asm, and persuading the people and the troops to give time
for my decision, and in the meanwhile to render obedience to
the Congress.

130 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

On May 19, Iturbide was invited to attend an extraordi-
nary session of congress. When he was ready to proceed
there, some enthusiastic Mexicans unfastened the horses from
his coach and drew him triumphantly through the streets to
the hall of congress. The building was surrounded by his tur-
bulent soldiers, while excited civilians crowded into the gal-
leries. Nevertheless, the proposal to proclaim Iturbide the
supreme ruler of Mexico provoked a spirited opposition. Only
after a debate which lasted several hours did a majority of
the members of congress who were voting announce them-
selves in favor of Agustin de Iturbide as emperor of Mexico.
On the same day congress passed an act which asserted that,
as certain members of the ruling dynasty of Spain had re-
nounced the crown of Mexico or had refused to accept that
crown, in accordance with article three of the treaty of Cor-
doba, it had selected as “the constitutional emperor of Mexico,
Agustin de Iturbide, first of that name, according to the bases
proclaimed in the Plan of Iguala, which was generally sup-
ported by the Mexican nation.” On May 20 congress formu-
lated an oath of fidelity to the imperial government of Mexico.
On the following day Iturbide took that oath in the halls of
congress. After this ceremony Emperor Agustin I. appar-
ently made an address declaring that he was fettered with
chains of gold.

Bells were rung in the city of Mexico when the election of
Iturbide as emperor was proclaimed. Felicitations were
showered upon Agustin I. by various individuals and corpora-
tions. He was congratulated by the ayuntamiento of the capi-
tal city and by the leading military commanders, notably by
Guerrero and Santa Anna. At Guadalajara and at Valladolid
the accession of Iturbide to the throne of Mexico was celebrat-
ed by public rejoicings. Congress soon passed important meas-
ures concerning the Iturbidista dynasty. On June 22 it passed
a law providing that the Mexican monarchy was to be moder-
ate, constitutional, and hereditary. The successor of Emperor
Agustin I. was to be his eldest son, Agustin, who was to be

AGUSTIN DE ITURBIDE

131

styled Prince Imperial ; the other children of the emperor were
to be called princes or princesses of Me.rico; his father was to
be entitled Prince of the Union ; and his sister was to be styled
Princess Iturbide. In accordance with the provisions of con-
gress elaborate preparations were made for the coronation of
the newly elected emperor. On July 21, 1822, in the stately
cathedral of Mexico City, in the presence of several bishops
and a large concourse of people, Iturbide was ostentatiously
crowned emperor of Mexico. After the ceremony of corona-
tion was completed, medals were scattered among the populace
which bore on one side the bust of the emperor and on the
other side the inscription : “Agustin, First Constitutional Em-
peror of the Mexicans.”

Emperor Agustin I. soon established an imperial court with
pages and chamberlains and almoners and ladies-in-waiting.
He also instituted a military order, the imperial order of
Guadeloupe, ostensibly to reward the soldiers who had fought
for Mexico’s emancipation. Agustin I. became the grand
master of the Order of Guadeloupe. Many other leaders in
the Iturbidista revolution, as well as some of the friends or
relatives of the emperor, were decorated with the grand cross,
the insignia of the order.

In 1821 and 1822 the authority of the Mexican empire
was extended southward far beyond the confines of the vice-
royalty of New Spain. On September 8, 1821, a junta in the
province of Chiapas, which was situated within the captaincy
general of Guatemala, swore to support independence from
Spain in terms which indicated an intention to adhere to the
Plan of Iguala. A week later a junta at Campeche, Yucatan,
declared that province to be independent of Spain ; and at the
same time it expressed a hope that the system of independence
embodied in the treaty of Cordoba was not contrary to civil
liberty. On September 15 the members of a junta convoked
by Gavino Gainza, the captain general of Guatemala, in Guate-
mala City, declared in favor of independence from Spain. On
September 28 in Comayag^a, the capital of the province of

132 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

Honduras, a junta declared that province to be independent
alike of Spain and of Guatemala. In the same month similar
action was taken in the province of Nicaragua. On December
27, 1821, Agustin I. ordered Vicente Filisola to take command
of a military expedition, which, “in accordance with the Plan
of Iguala,” was to protect the provinces of the captaincy gen-
eral of Guatemala. After Filisola marched for Guatemala,
the provinces of Salvador and Costa Rica also decided in
favor of independence from Spain and union with Mexico.
On September 5, 1822, orders were sent out from Mexico City
to the effect that Agustin I. should be proclaimed emperor in
the principal towns of Guatemala, according to the ceremony
which had been used in proclaiming the Spanish monarchs.
Agustin I. thus became the titular ruler over an immense em-
pire. In 1822 his dominions included the former viceroyalty
of New Spain and almost all of the former captaincy general
of Guatemala, or Central America. At its greatest extent the
first Mexican empire stretched from “Great Colombia” —
which had just been founded by Simon de Bolivar — to the
forty-second parallel of north latitude, the southwestern
boundary of the United States of North America.

Joel R. Poinsett of South Carolina, who was sent to Mexico
by President Monroe to investigate conditions in that empire,
thus described Emperor Agustin I :

I was presented to His Majesty this morning. On alight-
ing at the gate of the palace, which is an extensive and hand-
some building, we were received by a numerous guard, and
then made our way up a large stone staircase, lined with
sentinels, to a spacious apartment, where we found a briga-
dier general stationed to usher us into the presence. The em-
peror was in his cabinet and received us with great polite-
ness. Two of his favorites were with him. We were all
seated, and he conversed with us for half an hour in an easy
unembarrassed manner, taking occasion to compliment the
United States, and our institutions, and to lament that they
were not suited to the circumstances of his country. He
modestly insinuated that he had yielded very reluctantly to

AGUSTIN DE ITURBIDE

133

the wishes of the people, but had been compelled to suffer
them to place the crown upon his head to prevent misrule and
anarchy.

He is about five feet ten or eleven inches high, stoutly
made and well proportioned. His face is oval, and his fea-
tures are very good except his eyes, which were constantly
bent on the ground or averted. His hair is brown with red
whiskers, and his complexion fair and ruddy, more like that
of a German than of a Spaniard. ... I will not repeat the
tales I hear daily of the character and conduct of this man. . . .
In the interval between the defeat of the patriot cause and
the last revolution, he resided in the capital, and in a society
not remarkable for strict morals, he was distinguished for
his immorality. His usurpation of the chief authority has
been the most glaring, and unjustifiable; and his exercise of
power arbitrary and tyrannical. With a pleasing address and
a prepossessing exterior, and by lavish profusion, he has at-
tached the officers and soldiers to his person, and so long as he
possesses the means of paying and rewarding them, so long
will he maintain himself on the throne; when these fail he
will be precipitated from it. It is a maxim of history, which
will probably be again illustrated by this example, that a gov-
ernment not founded on public opinion, but established and
supported by corruption and violence, cannot exist without
ample means to pay the soldiery, and to maintain pensioners
and partisans. Aware of the state of his funds, and of the
probable consequence to himself of their failure, he is making
great exertions to negotiate loans in England ; and such is the
infatuation of the monied men in that country, that it is pos-
sible he may effect his object. The conditions of a loan
have been agreed upon, and an agent has lately gone to Lon-
don— another is preparing to set out for the same destination
with all the pomp of an embassy — and the professors of Bot-
any and Mineralogy told me with great dismay yesterday, that
they had received orders from his Majesty to prepare col-
lections to be sent to England. . . .

To judge Iturbide from his public papers, I do not think
him a man of talents. He is prompt, bold and decisive, and
not scrupulous about the means he employs to obtain his ends.

After Iturbide had been crowned emperor of Mexico, he
no longer dreamed of inviting a European prince to occupy

134 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

the throne of the new state. It is evident, however, that he
still hoped to make an amicable arrangement with the mother-
land. The policy which he wished to follow is suggested in
an official memorandum concerning the choice of an envoy to
the court of Madrid. The memorandum declared that Mexico
was anxious to establish friendly relations with Spain and
desired to enter into an offensive and defensive alii nee with
her. Nevertheless, Mexico considered as an indispensable pre-
liminary to all negotiations, the acknowledgment of her inde-
pendence from Spain and the recognition of Agustin I. as her
legitimate emperor. About the time that this memorandum
was written, the liberal government of Spain sent two com-
missioners to New Spain to enter into negotiations for the
pacification of that country. Spain’s commissioners informed
the Mexicans that they were empowered to terminate the dis-
sensions between Old Spain and New Spain by frank and
amicable negotiations. The Mexican empire selected commis-
sioners to negotiate cautiously with the Spanish agents. Those
commissioners were instructed not to agree to a treaty with
the Spaniards until the absolute independence of the Mexican
empire from Spain was recognized. However, the negotia-
tions for a treaty of peace between imperial Mexico and lib-
eral Spain came to an end when the emperor abdicated.

No attempt will be made here to consider in detail the
events which precipitated the downfall of Agustin I. Let it
suffice to say that republicans and Bourbonists alike opposed
his policies. Congress became the focus of opposition to his
domination. Hence, by an imperial decree dated October 30,
1822, the emperor dissolved congress, having already incar-
cerated some leaders of the opposition. To replace congress
the emperor invited certain congressmen to serve as members
of a junta. That body tried to improve the finances by au-
thorizing forced loans and by issuing paper money. These
measures increased the discontent with imperial rule. At Vera
Cruz on December 2, 1822, Santa Anna issued a pronuncia-
tniento against the government. Soon afterwards General

AGUSTIN DE ITURBIDE

135

Guadeloupe Victoria joined him. While in southern Mexico,
Bravo and Guerrero supported the anti-imperialistic move-
ment. Agustin I. sent a detachment of soldiers under General
Echavarri against Santa Anna, but the imperial commander
failed to crush the insurrection. Instead Echavarri ultimately
joined hands with Santa Anna and agreed to support the Plan
of Casa Mata. This plan, signed at Casa Mata on February
I, 1823, was a proclamation by a group of military officers
against the autocratic rule of Agustin I. and in favor of rep-
resentative government. In a short time the plan found ad-
herents in many parts of Mexico. Iturbide strove in vain
to reach an adjustment with the leaders of the republican
movement. In his memoirs he said:

I repeatedly solicited a private interview with the princi-
pal dissenting chiefs, without being able to obtain anything
more than one answer in a private note from Echavarri. . . .
The events which occurred at Casa Mata united the republican
and the Bourbon parties, who never could agree but for the
purpose of opposing me. It was as well, therefore, that they
should take off the mask as soon as possible, and make them-
selves known, which could not have happened if I had not
given up my power. I re-assembled the Congress, I abdicated
the crown, and I requested permission, through the minister
of relations, to exile myself from my native country.

I surrendered my power, because I was already free from
the obligations which irresistibly compelled me to accept it.
The country did not want my services against foreign ene-
mies, because at that time it had none. As to her domestic
foes, far from being useful in resisting them, my presence
might have proved rather prejudicial than otherwise, be-
cause it might have been used as a pretext for saying that
war was made against my ambition, and it might have fur-
nished the parties with a motive for prolonging the conceal-
ment of their political hypocrisy. I did not abdicate from a
sense of fear; I know all my enemies, and what they are able
to do.

In a letter to congress abdicating the imperial dignity, on
March 19, 1823, Iturbide declared that, as he wished to pre-

136 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

vent his name from being made a pretext for civil war, he was
willing to expatriate himself. After some debate, on April 7,
1823, congress passed a decree announcing that, as the corona-
tion of Iturbide was the work of violence, that action was
therefore null and void. The laws which coiigress had passed
regarding the succession to the throne, as well as all acts of
the empire from May 19, 1822, to March 29, 1823, were de-
clared null. Further, congress made provision for the trans-
portation of the ex-emperor from Mexico : it voted a pension
of twenty-five thousand pesos annually to Iturbide, on the ex-
press condition that he should reside in Italy. On April 8 con-
gress passed another decree announcing that the provisions of
the Plan of Iguala and the treaty of Cordoba were null and
void in so far as they made arrangements for a governmental
system, but declaring that the other stipulations of the Plan
of Iguala which concerned religion, independence, and union
were still valid. On April 16 it decreed that anyone who might
call Iturbide emperor of Mexico should be considered a traitor.
It also provided that in all governmental offices the word im-
perial should be replaced by the word national. Lastly, on
May 31, congress issued a decree providing that delegates
should be chosen to a constituent congress which was to frame
a federal republican government for Mexico. In the mean-
time a provisional government was established composed of
three persons, known as the executive power.

On May ii, 1823, the ex-emperor, with his family, ac-
companied by a few loyal friends and dependents, sailed from
Mexico on the English vessel Rawlins for Italy. In a country
house near Leghorn Iturbide lived a quiet and secluded life for
a few months. Meanwhile, an army sent into Spain by France,
acting as the informal agent of that mysterious association of
European powers known as the Holy Alliance, overturned the
liberal government and restored Ferdinand VII. to the pleni-
tude of his power. A short time after the restoration of the
absolute king, apparently because of a dread that the Holy
Alliance was intriguing against him, Iturbide decided to leave

AGUSTIN DE ITURBIDE

137

Italy. In December, 1823, he traveled hastily across the con-
tinent to Ostend, where he took ship for England. Early in
January, 1824, the ex-emperor reached London. In that city
a secret agent of the Mexican government spied upon the
exile’s movements and sent reports to Mexico in regard to his
supposed designs. While in England Iturbide evidently re-
ceived letters from misguided adherents in his native land
urging him to return. On February 13, 1824, he sent a me-
morial to the constituent congress of Mexico offering to place
his sword at its disposal: congress replied to his overture on
April 28, 1824, by a decree announcing that, if the ex-emperor
dared to set his foot on Mexican soil, he was to be considered
a traitor and an outlaw. Without any knowledge of the de-
cree of death, on May ii, 1824, Iturbide, accompanied by his
wife, his two youngest children, a few servants, a printer, two
faithful friends, and two priests, left England on the vessel
Spring bound for America.

Why did the proscribed man thus return to his native land ?
An address written while on shipboard suggests his motives.
In this paper Iturbide expressed a fear that Spain, with the aid
of the Holy Alliance, was conspiring to re-conquer Mexico.
He also expressed a hope that he might be able to act as a
mediator between dissenting factions. “My sole object,” said
Iturbide, “is to contribute by my voice and by my pen to the
support of the liberty and the independence of Mexico.”

On July 12, 1824, the Spring cast anchor near Soto la Ma-
rina in the province of Tamaulipas. Three days later, with one
companion, the ex-emperor landed near that town incognito.
He was soon recognized, however, and detained by General
Felipe de la Garza, the military commander of the district.
That commander submitted Iturbide’s case to the judgment
of the legislature of Tamaulipas which was assembled at
Padilla. The legislature ordered that the decree of the na-
tional congress dated April 28 should be enforced immediately.
At the request of the condemned man, his execution was
postponed for a short time in order that he might prepare

138 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

to die like a Christian. After he had confessed his sins,
heard mass, and made his wi’’, Iturbide was shot at Padilla,
on July 19, 1824. He seems to have met his fate with the
fortitude becoming a soldier who had so often faced death
upon the battle-field. According to a comrade who was present
at the execution, Iturbide objected to an attempt to bandage
his eyes, but when told that this was necessary “the ex-em-
peror drew forth his handkerchief and bound it on with his
own hands; this done he knelt down, and having received
two balls in his forehead, and two in his breast, fell dead.
They instantly removed the corpse and deposited it in a chapel
for the purpose of interring it the ensuing day. It was then
buried with all the propriety and solemnity which could have
been expected in a small inland town; the Legislature and
all the public authorities followed his remains to the grave and
assisted in consigning the Liberator of Mexico to his last
abode.”

In his last words Iturbide evidently denied that he was a
traitor to Mexico and declared that he forgave his enemies.
Unfortunately for the student of history, after the execu-
tion of Iturbide many of the papers which he had brought
with him were burned by the Mexicans. But among Iturbide’s
posthumous papers there is found a memorial addressed to
the Mexican congress which serves as his apology.

I asked if it was a crime to form the Plan of Iguala and to
organize the army of the three guarantees which rapidly trans-
formed the country from a state of serfdom to that of in-
dependence. I asked if it was a crime to have established the
constitutional system in Mexic'o and to have assembled a con-
gress which gave her laws suitable to her own wishes and
convenience. I asked if it was a crime to have twice de-
stroyed the plans which were formed after the year 1821 to
elevate me to the position of a king. I asked if having ac-
cepted the crown when I was not able to avoid doing so, thus
making a great sacrifice to liberate Mexico from the threat
of anarchy, constituted a crime. I asked if it was a crime not
to have given offices to my nearest relatives or to have aug-

AGUSTIN DE ITURBIDE

139

merited their fortunes. ... I asked if it was a crime that,
when the nation had scarcely indicated through two or three
provincial deputations and a part of the army the desire for
a new government, I voluntarily relinquished the crown which
I had been compelled to accept. ... I asked if it was a crime
to leave my honorable, virtuous, and venerable father in need
and to depart from Mexico with my wife and eight children
for a country two thousand leagues distant where it was very
probable that I would have to beg a livelihood. ... I asked if
it was a crime for me to risk the threats of the Holy Alliance
and to prepare to return to my country when that alliance
was conspiring against her. ... I beseech your Highness not
to consider me as an enemy, but as the truest lover of his
native land.

Although the appr^ensions of Iturbide concerning the
designs of the Holy Alliance upon Mexico appear to have
been almost without foundation, yet similar sentiments were
entertained by many American contemporaries.

When on September 30, 1824, the Gaceta de Madrid pub-
lished the news of the execution at Padilla, it not inappropri-
ately said that upon Iturbide the attention of both worlds was
focused. Among the prominent leaders of the revolution in
Spanish America, just one man, Agustin de Iturbide, was
granted not only the office of chief magistrate by the nation
which he had founded, but also the ephemeral dignity of a
crowned monarch. Far from blameless in his private life,
extravagant and despotic as emperor, yet the martyr of Pa-
dilla had played the most important role in the protracted
drama of the Mexican revolution. From the standpoint of
Mexican independence, Iturbide’s part as emperor of Mexico
shrinks in contrast with his majestic role as liberator. When
the revolt against Spain in Mexico had reached a critical
stage, Iturbide seemed to essay the part of a pacificator. This
role culminated in a movement which severed forever the
political bonds that had united Mexico to Spain. It is indeed
one of the riddles of Mexican history that an illiterate mili-
tary commander should have proclaimed a plan which so

140 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

readily won the support of the discordant and belligerent
classes — a plan that laid the foundations for a new order in
Mexico. Thus did Iturbide bear to triumph the banner which
Hidalgo had raised. In singular contrast with the treatment
which the Mexican people have graciously accorded to Hi-
dalgo, they have been peculiarly ungrateful to Colonel Iturbide,
who rightly deserves the title of liberator of Mexico. It is
significant that Iturbide’s plan for the independence of Mexico
from Spain unwittingly resembled a design for the liberation
of Peru which, as will be shown in chapter six, was cherished
by Jose de San Martin.

While Iturbide was pining in exile, the state which had
been liberated by his sagacious plan had broken into two parts.
On July I, 1823, a congress of delegates summoned by Gen-
eral Filisola from certain Guatemalan provinces proclaimed
the independence of the United Provinces of Central America.
In the following year a constituent assembly adopted a con-
stitution for these provinces which, in some respects, was
modeled upon the Constitution of the United States. The
confederation of Central America, which stretched from Mex-
ico to the Isthmus of Panama, did not include all the territory
which had been under the control of Captain General Gainza,
for the province of Chiapas remained a part of Mexico. Con-
sequently, even after the secession of Central America, the
state of Mexico extended south beyond the boundary of the
former viceroyalty of New Spain, while on the north its
boundary remained as under Agustin I. About three months
after the death of Iturbide, on October 4, 1824, the constituent
congress of Mexico promulgated a constitution for the Mexi-
can republic, — a constitution which, in some particulars, was
patterned after the Constitution of the United States. The
constitution of the "United Mexican States” provided for a
government which was to be republican, democratic, and
federal. A short time afterwards. Generals Bravo, Negrete,
and Victoria, who had composed the executive power, re-
linquished their authority, and General Guadeloupe Victoria

AGUSTIN DE ITURBIDE

141

was inaugurated as the first president of the Mexican re-
public.

On July 19, 1823, the congress of Mexico decreed that
Hidalgo, Allende, Aldama, Jimenez, Morelos, and other rev-
olutionary leaders were benemeritos de la patria and provided
that their remains were to be transferred to Mexico City.
There, on September 17, 1823, their bones were solemnly de-
posited in a crypt of the great cathedral. In 1838 the remains
of Iturbide were likewise transferred to the capital city and
interred in a chapel of the same cathedral. The mortal re-
mains of the greatest leaders of the revolutionary period in
Mexico thus at last reposed together within the city which
had witnessed so many scenes in the strange pageant of
Mexican history.

CHAPTER V

MARIANO MORENO

The name at the head of the chapter is not familiar to
English readers. Of the seven w^orthies who are sketched
in this book, Mariano Moreno is probably the least known.
But his meteoric career furnishes a good illustration of the
course of the early revolutionary movement against Spain
in southern South America. On the eve of the revolution
the fair viceroyalty of la Plata, which was composed of eight
provinces, stretched from the viceroyalty of Peru to Cape
Horn. The most important of these districts was the littoral
province of Buenos Aires. The capital of that province, as
well as of the viceroyalty, was the city of Buenos Aires. That
metropolis was the heart of the viceroyalty: it was an eco-
nomic center of southern South America, for much foreign
commerce passed through its custom-house; it was also the
political focus of the viceroyalty, for there was the residence
of the viceroy and the chief intendant.

In the latter half of the eighteenth century an enterprising
Spaniard called Manuel Moreno, a native of Santander, sailed
from Cadiz for South America. After arriving in the vice-
royalty of la Plata, he secured a position in the royal service
in the capital city. There he married Maria Valle, a native
of Buenos Aires. From that union there sprang a number
of children: the first-born child is the subject of this study.
At present the chief source of our information concerning
the early life of Mariano Moreno is a biography written by
his brother, Manuel. According to that biography, Mariano
was born in the city of Buenos Aires on September 23, 1778.

142

Mariano Moreno

(From Manuel Moreno’s Vida del Dr. Mariano Moreno, London,
1812. Illustration furnished by the Museum Mitre)

MARIANO MORENO

143

His education was beg^n at home, and, as his father was in
moderate circumstances, it was continued in the best schools
of Buenos Aires. Manuel Moreno declared that his eldest
brother became so fond of books that his father prohibited
him from reading them after the family had retired to rest.
It appears that Mariano gained some distinction in the study
of Latin, theology, and philosophy in the local College of
San Carlos. An estimable friar became so much interested
in the studious youth that he allowed him to browse in the
library of the Franciscan monastery.

Mariano’s worthy parents wished to consecrate their eld-
est son to the service of the altar. In 1799, encouraged by
a priest from Upper Peru who was sojourning in Buenos
Aires, Mariano Moreno made a toilsome journey to Chu-
quisaca where he entered the University of San Francisco
Javier, a center of legal and theological study in South Amer-
ica. At that university one of his favorite studies was theology.
Manuel Moreno declared that Mariano was granted the de-
gree of doctor of theology by that institution. While attend-
ing the University of San Francisco Javier the earnest student
won the friendship of Canon Terrazas, a prominent ecclesi-
astic, who gave him access to his library. As prohibited
books sometimes found their way to Chuquisaca, Mariano
Moreno extended his knowledge of foreign authors: he read
the works of Montesquieu, Raynal, and other celebrated
writers of France.

For some reason or other, Mariano Moreno discarded
the design of becoming a priest. Instead he undertook the
study of law. According to his brother’s story, two years after
completing a course of study in tneology, Mariano was granted
the degree of bachelor of law. Certain it is that in 1802, as
a candidate for a degree in law, he presented to the Carolinian
academy of Chuquisaca — an institution which appears to have
been affiliated with the University of San Francisco Javier —
a dissertation which explained and interpreted a mediaeval
Spanish law that contained provisions concerning the disposi-

144 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

tion of the property of a woman who married more than
once. After completing his preparation for the legal pro-
fession, Mariano Moreno began to practice law in the city
of Chuquisaca. The ambitious young advocate evidently con-
tinued to extend his knowledge of men and books; when
describing that period of his brother’s career, Manual Moreno
said:

Never would he have been contented with the humble
studies of an ordinary advocate. A presentiment that his na-
tive land would some day employ him in important affairs
coupled with a noble ambition to gain celebrity, caused him
to study with the greatest care oratory, politics, history, and
geography. Because of the situation and the relations of its
master, the house in which Mariano lived became the resort
of society and the center of affairs for the people of Upper
Peru. These circumstances served to give him a singular
dexterity in the management of affairs and an exact knowl-
edge of the human heart. His observations were indeed so
exact and so penetrating, that seldom did he fail rightly to
judge men and to divine their interests or their passions. This
ability helped to promote his success in the courts of justice
and in the position of magistrate with which he was subse-
quently entrusted.

As this statement was written after Mariano Moreno had
achieved fame, it must be considered with a grain of salt.
His brother also declared that the zeal of the eloquent advo-
cate in the cause of justice soon provoked such powerful
enemies that Mariano decided to leave Chuquisaca. In the
latter part of 1805, Mariano Moreno returned to his native
province. There his genuine ability was soon recognized,
for he was appointed legal counselor of the royal audiencia
at Buenos Aires. While he was serving in that capacity the
viceroyalty of la Plata was attacked by Beresford’s soldiers.
In a patriotic memoir Moreno declared that he “wept more
than anyone else” when English redcoats were quartered in
the fortress and throughout his native city. Manuel Moreno
assures us that as an adviser of the cabildo of that city his

MARIANO MORENO 145

brother inspired some of the acts which had their fruition in
the defeat of General Whitelocke.

In the second and third chapters the influence of Napo-
leon’s usurpations in Spain upon Venezuela and Mexico was
discussed; in this chapter the influence of those usurpations
upon the Spanish colonists in southern South America must
be considered. To the viceroyalty of la Plata Napoleon sent
the Marquis de Sassenay as agent. On his arrival in the city
of Buenos Aires the emissary was publicly informed by De
Liniers that the colonists desired no other ruler than Ferdi-
nand VII. When news of the startling changes in Spain be-
came known in that city, the populace was agitated, many
people loudly professed their loyalty to Ferdinand VII., and
substantial contributions were made to the cause of the Span-
ish patriots. Nevertheless in Buenos Aires, as in Caracas,
there were some alert colonists who thought that the acces-
sion of a new dynasty to the Spanish throne had radically
altered the relations between Spain and her colonies. In the
viceroyalty of la Plata discontent with the existing regime was
also stimulated by the proceedings of Carlota Joaquina. In
the latter part of 1808, there was circulated in South America
a proclamation of Carlota Joaquina asserting that she was
the presumptive heir to the throne of Spain and the Indies.
A group of conspirators was soon formed in the Platean
viceroyalty who seemed to support Carlota’s pretensions.
Among the members of the secret coterie were Manuel Bel-
grano, a young lawyer of Italian descent who had been edu-
cated in Spain, his friend Juan Jose Castelli, who belonged to
the same profession, Nicolas Rodriguez Pena, a merchant of
Buenos Aires, and Juan Hipolito Vieytes, a friend of Pena
who was a manufacturer of soap. It is significant that several
leaders who in 1808 seemed to favor the establishment at
Buenos Aires of a monarchy ruled by a scion of the Bourbon
dynasty at a later time advocated the separation of the vice-
royalty of la Plata from Spain.

At this critical juncture, to replace the valiant De Liniers

146 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

as viceroy of la Plata the central junta selected Baltasar
Hidalgo de Cisneros, lieutenant general of the Spanish navy.
The new viceroy reached the banks of la Plata in July, 1809.
The economic condition of the viceroyalty was deplorable ;
for the Spanish colonial system, as it had existed before the
English invasion, had been restored. In general commerce
and agriculture were languishing, while illegal trade was flour-
ishing, and the royal treasury was being cheated of its rev-
enues. Consequently many colonists clamored that the ports
of the viceroyalty should again be opened to English com-
merce regularly. When he became acquainted with economic
conditions. Viceroy Cisneros favored a reform in the tariff
regulations. On September 30, 1809, a memorial on behalf
of the discontented landowners of la Plata basin was pre-
sented to the viceroy by their advocate, Jose de la Rosa: —
after the uprising of 1810 the real author of this Represen-
tacion became known; for it was published in Buenos Aires
with the statement that it had been written by Mariano
Moreno.

Some excerpts from this memorial will indicate the eco-
nomic condition of the fertile viceroyalty of la Plata. Moreno
declared that when Cisneros became viceroy the treasury was
so depleted that proper measures for the defence of the vice-
royalty could not be taken.

In this sad plight there is no other remedy than to grant
English merchants permission to introduce their goods into the
city of Buenos Aires and to export the products of the coun-
try. Thus the revenues accruing to the treasury will be im-
mediately increased from the duties upon this double ex-
change, and an impulse will be given to our declining trade.
. . . Since the English expedition appeared on our coasts in
1806, the merchants of that country have not lost sight of
the Rio de la Plata in their speculations. A continuous series
of commercial adventures have been carried on which have
provided almost entirely for the consumption of this country.
Large importations made in defiance of the law and in spite
of repeated prohibitions have met with no other obstacles

MARIANO MORENO

147

than those necessary to deprive the treasury of customs duties
and to rob the country of the advantages that it might have
received from the exportations which would result from a free
exchange.

The effect of this system has been to allow the English the
exclusive privilege of providing the country with all the mer-
chandise that it requires, while the treasury has lost the reve-
nues which the importation of such a large amount of mer-
chandise and the consequent exportations should have pro-
duced, because of a scrupulous regard for laws that were
never more flagrantly disregarded than at the very time when
their observance was insisted upon by the merchants of the
capital. Sir ! what can be more ridiculous than to hear a
merchant clamoring for the enforcement of the laws which
prohibit the introduction of foreign merchandise at the door
of a shop that is filled with English goods imported clan-
destinely ?

To the gain which the government will derive from the
lawful introduction of foreigfn goods should be added those
advantages which the country will receive from the free ex-
portation of its products. Fortunately the products of this
province are all valuable; their yield is constant; and most of
them are today necessities. With what rapidity would our
agriculture progress, if the ports were opened for the ex-
portation of our products, so that the farmer could count
with security upon a lucrative sale.

Moreno denounced the monopoly of colonial commerce
which had been enjoyed by the merchants of Cadiz. He de-
clared that events in Spain had “destroyed all the pretexts
which supported the prohibitory laws.” To meet an argument
of Miguel de Ag^ero, the representative of the consulate of
Cadiz, to the effect that to legalize trade with the English
would loosen the bonds which united the Platean provinces
to Spain, Moreno praised “the loyalty of the Spanish-Ameri-
cans,” declaring that Spain had never needed “any other
guarantee for the security and preservation” of those prov-
inces. He declared that the repulse of the English attacks
upon the viceroyalty should make the colonists “the envy of
the Spanish people” ; for the English still viewed “with re-

148 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

spect the victors of July 5,” while the Spaniards would not
soon forget that the people of la Plata had defended “the
land in which they were born, shedding their blood for a
regime which they loved and venerated.” Moreno also pre-
sented an argument drawn from the writings of the Italian
publicist, Gaetano Filangieri, to the effect that a dependent
role became unendurable to colonies only when it meant misery
and oppression, the Roman colonies being cited as an exam-
ple. He quoted Filangieri approvingly as follows : “The

same reasoning could be applied to modern colonies. Happy
under the rule of their mother, they would not dare to throw
off a light and easy yoke in order to seek an independence
which would deprive them of the protection of their mother
without assuring them of the power to defend themselves
against the ambition of a conqueror, or the intrigues of a
powerful citizen, or the perils of anarchy. It was not an
excess of riches and prosperity which made the English colo-
nies revolt: excessive oppression caused them to turn against
their mother those very arms which they had so often em-
ployed in her defense.”

In this argument there may indeed be found a subtle sug-
gestion that in the viceroyalty of la Plata a revolutionary
spirit was being stimulated by economic discontent. Still, it
requires a lively imagination to liken Mariano Moreno’s Rep-
resentacion to Thomas Paine’s “Common Sense.” In fine, the
lengthy and important memorial which Moreno prepared for
Viceroy Cisneros declared that commerce with English mer-
chants should be allowed by law; that such a reform would
destroy the commercial monopoly which had been enjoyed
by the merchants of Cadiz ; that it would relieve the misery
of the inhabitants of the pampas ; that it would stimulate agri-
culture and commerce ; that the revenues accruing from the
import and export duties would replenish the depleted colonial
treasury; and that Spain could then be given substantial aid
in her critical struggle with Napoleon. To suppose that
Moreno argued for free trade in the ordinary sense is to mis-

MARIANO MORENO

149

interpret his plea: what he sought was such freedom of trade
as would permit the inhabitants to obtain English goods legally,
and as would permit them to export the produce of their
fertile plains. Whether or not Moreno’s memorial had much
influence upon the viceregal government, it is clear that, acting
upon the advice of a junta, early in November the viceroy
issued a decree which provided that vessels of friendly or
neutral powers laden with products of their respective coun-
tries might be admitted into the port of Buenos Aires accord-
ing to special regulations. But despite the assurances of
colonial loyalty which Moreno voiced in his argument for
freer trade, it is evident that when this reform was actually
made the loyalty of some prominent citizens of Buenos Aires
declined.

As suggested in the second chapter, the increasing dis-
affection in Spanish America was partly due to the policies
adopted by the changeling governments of Spain. The dis-
affection in Buenos Aires was not diminished by the temporiz-
ing policy of Viceroy Cisneros. On May 15, 1810, he pub-
lished a proclamation which was addressed to “the loyal and
generous citizens’’ of his viceroyalty. In that proclamation
Cisneros spread broadcast the recent and startling news from
Spain: he declared that French soldiers had swept over Anda-
lusia, and that they were approaching Cadiz where the cen-
tral junta had taken refuge. Foolishly did the viceroy vaunt
that even though the peninsular Spaniards should lose their
liberty, still France could not enslave the entire Spanish
nation. He boasted that “within the confines of the American
continent the liberty and independence of the Spanish mon-
archy would be preserved.’’ He even announced that if the
central junta should be subverted by French soldiers, he would
take no measures which were not approved by a representa-
tive assembly of the citizens of Buenos Aires. This indis-
creet proclamation furnished tinder for the revolutionary
fires which were smouldering within the capital city.

The organ of the discontented citizens of Buenos Aires

ISO RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

was the cabildo. On May 21 it asked the viceroy for per-
mission to summon a cabildo abierto which might voice the
popular will. With some reluctance Cisneros granted its
request. Prominent citizens, both clergy and laity, were ac-
cordingly summoned to meet with the cabildo to consider
political affairs. On May 22 those citizens met as an open
council in the hall of the cabildo. There many different views
with regard to the proper course of action were expressed.
Some citizens proposed that Cisneros should be left in com-
mand but that two military officers should be selected to aid
him m the government. Colonel Saavedra proposed that the
viceroy’s powers should be temporarily assumed by the cabildo.
Among those citizens who supported Saavedra’s proposal were
Mariano Moreno, Manuel Belgrano, Juan Jose Castelli, and
Bernardino Rivadavia, a talented leader of Italian descent.
After an exciting debate, the cabildo abierto voted that the
cabildo itself should decide what action should be taken con-
cerning the government. Whereupon the cabildo voted that
the viceregal authority should be temporarily vested in itself.
Perhaps that council was trying to steer a middle course ;
for Cisneros was soon made the president of a provisional
junta, installed on May 24, which was declared to be the re-
pository of governmental authority.

It was probably the discontent of the people, as well as
the machinations of conspirators, which induced the cabildo
again to promote the insurrection. For that council soon
formed a new junta composed of nine members from which
the deposed viceroy was excluded. Both Castelli and Belgrano
became members of this junta. Saavedra was made its presi-
dent, while Juan Jose Paso, a graduate of the University of
Cordoba, and Mariano Moreno became its secretaries. On
May 25, 1810, on bended knees, the members of the new
junta solemnly swore to preserve the integrity of the prov-
inces of la Plata River for their beloved sovereign, Ferdinand
VII. Salvos from English vessels celebrated the junta’s in-
auguration. This kaleidoscopic scene was a revolution in

MARIANO MORENO

disguise. In reality the establishment of the provisional junta
of May 25 was a step towards the formation of an independent
government. When describing the choice of Mariano Moreno
as a secretary of the junta, Manuel Moreno ascribed the fol-
lowing remarks to his brother:

I know the perils which a magistrate will have to over-
come in order to manage affairs during such a critical period.
The present change should not end with the displacement of
viceregal officials and the imitation of their corruption and
indolence. The new government must destroy administrative
abuses, display an unprecedented activity, remedy the evils
which afflict the state, stimulate and direct public spirit, edu-
cate the people, destroy their enemies, and give new life to
the provinces. If the government evades this task, it will fol-
low in the footsteps of its predecessors, sanctioning confusion
and corruption in the execution of the important functions
which have been entrusted to it. Accordingly to avoid the
obstacles with which despotism, venality, and prejudice have
for centuries prevented the happiness of this continent, the
government will have to pursue an untrodden path. After
the new government shall have escaped the attacks to which
it will be exposed simply because it is new, it will have to
encounter attacks due to the passions, the interests, and even
the inconstancy of those persons who now promote the re-
form. A just man who is in charge of such a government
will become the victim of ignorance or of jealousy. The
tranquillity which I have heretofore enjoyed in the midst of
my family and my books will be interrupted. But none of
these apprehensions will deter me in the least, if the people
invite me to take a part in the administration of their affairs.
If I am needed, I cannot deny my country the sacrifice of my
tranquillity, my profession, my fortune, and even my life.

The junta of Buenos Aires, which was installed on May
25, 1810, generally styled itself “the provisional junta of the
provinces of la Plata River.” It soon issued a circular letter
which announced the creation of the junta and invited the
people of the interior provinces of the viceroyalty to select
deputies to represent them at Buenos Aires. The members

152 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

of the cabildo, as well as many viceregal officials and military
officers, took an oath to obey the junta. Soon afterwards
the junta formed certain rules to regulate its own organiza-
tion. It entrusted the administration of the government to
two departments which were placed under the control of
the secretaries. Paso was given charge of financial affairs,
while Moreno was placed in charge of military and political
affairs. Provision was made that in important affairs the
junta, or a part of it, was to take action; in minor matters, the
president of the junta and a secretary were authorized to
act. It also provided that its president should be addressed
as his excellency and otherwise accorded the same honors
as the former viceroy. The junta soon began to exercise
executive and legislative functions; it made ecclesiastical ap-
pointments, provided for the reorganization of the military
forces, and replaced the royal governors of interior provinces
by governors of its own selection. The junta also issued
decrees which reduced the duties on imports and exports and
aimed to prevent smuggling. Further, the junta prudently
arranged that the viceroy and the audiencia should be de-
ported on a vessel sailing for the Canary Islands.

Although Mariano Moreno apparently accepted the posi-
tion of secretary of the junta with considerable reluctance,
yet he performed the duties of that office with zeal and energy.
Being allowed a vote and a voice in the meetings of the junta,
he exercised a potent influence in its deliberations. His facile
pen was probably employed to draft some of its most important
decrees. On June 2, 1810, a decree was issued, signed only
by Moreno, which founded the Gaceta de Buenos Aires. That
decree expressed the opinion that the provisional government
should furnish the people with a knowledge of public affairs.
It declared that the junta had decided to issue from the press
“a new weekly periodical with the title of the Gaceta de
Buenos Aires, which would furnish the people with the
foreign and domestic news which they ought to consider
of interest.” It stated that the Gaceta would publish informa-

MARIANO MORENO

153

tion concerning the foreign relations of the junta, the condi-
tion of the treasury, and measures for the improvement of
the finances. It expressed the hope that this journal might
serve as an organ for the expression of the views of private
individuals on matters of common welfare.

The first number of the Gaceta de Buenos Aires was pub-
lished on June 7, 1810. Of that journal Mariano Moreno be-
came the editor. The Gaceta spread the news of important
events throughout the provinces of la Plata, and became the
junta’s mouthpiece. While under Moreno’s direction, the
gazette contained such items as the following: communica-
tions from citizens of Buenos Aires, lists of persons who
made voluntary contributions to the support of its junta, de-
crees of the junta, orders of the Spanish regency, articles
respecting the French invasion of Spain, documents con-
cerning the revolts in Spanish America, and extracts from
newspapers of Europe and North America. A phrase of
Tacitus, which was adopted as a motto for the gazette, served
as a program: Kara temporum felicitate, ubi sentire quae

velis, et quae sentias, dicere licet. Some of the political arti-
cles which appeared in the gazette were doubtless written by
the editor himself. He contributed a noteworthy article to
the Gaceta on June 21, 1810, concerning freedom of thought.
In this article Moreno pointed out that in all ages men had
been misled by erroneous conceptions and “shameful prepos-
sessions.’’ He declared that it was a worthy occupation for
a writer to attack such prepossessions publicly and pitilessly;
for if liberty of speech were not permitted in all matters
which did not prejudice the Roman Catholic religion or the
policies of the government, the people would continue to
cherish errors and would remain in “a shameful state of stupe-
faction.’’ He asked the people to discard their “antiquated
opinions,’’ for otherwise there could be “no advance in the
arts or in useful knowledge.’’ He urged them freely to allow
the introduction of truth and light and learning. “Truth,
as well as virtue, contains within itself the most convincing

154 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

apology; discussion and CKamination cause their splendor and
luster to become fully apparent. If restrictions are placed
upon speech, the spirit of man will vegetate as does matter:
error, falsehood, prejudice, fanaticism, and stupefaction will
become the devices of the people, and will cause their per-
petual decadence, ruin, and misery.”

Thus Moreno became the champion of free speech in cer-
tain political matters. In the Gaceta he bewailed the decadent
condition of education at Buenos Aires. He eulogized the
famous libraries of antiquity. About the middle of Septem-
ber, when the junta decided to establish a public library at
Buenos Aires, the editor of the gazette was selected to be
“the protector” of the library, that is to say, the director.
Evidently it was at the request of Moreno that popular sub-
scriptions were made for this library and that books were
collected from individuals, colleges, and religious establish-
ments. Accordingly Mariano Moreno may be designated as
the founder of the national library of Argentina. That alert
scholar also promoted the establishment of an academy of
mathematics which was placed in charge of his colleague in
the junta, Manuel Belgrano. So strong an influence did
Moreno exert upon the policy of the junta, that its educational,
commercial, fiscal, and military policies have often been in-
discriminately ascribed to him. In truth, the matters directly
under control of Secretary Moreno were political affairs and
war. To him there evidently belonged a large share of the re-
sponsibility for the execution of De Liniers, who had placed
himself at the head of an unsuccessful counter-revolution in
the province of Cordoba. Moreno evidently opposed the recog-
nition of the council of regency by the junta of Buenos Aires.
This repudiation of the patriot government of Spain led that
junta farther along the thorny path toward independence.

The provisional government of Buenos Aires — which pro-
fessed to rule on behalf of Ferdinand VII. — not only repu-
diated the authority of the patriot government of Spain, but
also attempted to extend its authority over important provinces

MARIANO MORENO

155

of the former viceroyalty of la Plata. To Paraguay and to
la Banda Oriental — the region lying between the Uruguay
River, Brazil, and the Atlantic Ocean — it sent letters inviting
the people to join the movement initiated by the capital city.
It sent commissioners to Asuncion and Montevideo who were
instructed to convert those cities to the cause of Buenos Aires.
But these measures were in vain; and hence the junta soon felt
compelled to take drastic action. Subscriptions were gathered
for the equipment of an expedition to the interior provinces.
At the head of the list of contributors published in the gazette
on June 21, 1810, was the name of Mariano Moreno, who had
donated six ounces of gold. Early in August, i8io, the junta
issued a decree which severed communications between Buenos
Aires and Parag^uay, where Governor Velazco had announced
his fidelity to the council of regency. In September, 1810,
Manuel Belgrano was g;iven charge of a small military force,
which was sent to spread in Paraguay the news of the revolu-
tion of May at Buenos Aires. Although in March, 1811,
Belgrano’s soldiers were checked by the Paraguayans, still
his expedition fomented a seditious spirit in Paraguay. The
junta of Buenos Aires also turned its attention to the Pacific
coast; in November, 1810, it appointed Antonio Alvarez Jonte
agent to a provisional government which, as will be shown
later, had been established in Santiago de Chile. That emis-
sary was instructed to solicit the cooperation of the Chilean
junta to promote the "glorious system” which southern South
America had adopted. Thus, at the very beginning of the
movement which developed into a revolution, the junta of
Buenos Aires tried to incite other parts of South America to
separate from the motherland.

The efforts of the junta of Buenos Aires to disseminate in-
formation concerning the separatist movement were not con-
fined to Spanish America. As early as May 28, 1810, it
wrote to Lord Strangford, the influential English ambassador
at Rio de Janeiro, to inform him of the creation of a new
government at Buenos Aires. In response Lord Strangford

156 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

declared that, as the junta had expressed its loyalty to Ferdi-
nand VII., he would write to it with the same consideration as
though it had been formally recognized by the English govern-
ment. He advised the junta to shun all relations with the
French. He urged it to preserve peace and concord, and
assured it of the pacific intentions of the Portuguese court.
He also expressed his willingness to aid the junta personally
and promised to make a favorable report to the English gov-
ernment regarding its actions. In November, i8io, Strang-
ford confidentially advised Moreno that the junta of Buenos
Aires should preserve the fidelity which it had professed to the
Spanish king and avoid “a premature declaration of inde-
pendence”; for this would preclude amicable intervention by
England in the dispute between Spain and her colonies. The
English ambassador, however, dropped thinly veiled hints that
he was not at heart opposed to the movement for the separa-
tion of Spanish America from Spain.

The correspondence between Moreno and Strangford sug-
gests that the junta of Buenos Aires was confronted by per-
plexing diplomatic problems. Some audacious solutions of
those problems were soon proposed to it. On July 15, 1810,
Manuel Belgrano presented a scheme to the junta which pro-
posed that it should revolutionize la Banda Oriental and
the southern provinces of Brazil, while negotiating secretly
with Spain, Portugal, and England. Further, he recommended
that a committee should be selected to form a diplomatic
program. After some discussion the junta evidently decided
to select Mariano Moreno to formulate a foreign policy be-
cause his “vast knowledge and well-known talent” qualified
him to execute the unique commission. With such secrecy
did Moreno perform his duty that some doubts have been
raised concerning the authorship of the plan, ascribed to him,
which was completed by the end of August, 1810. Apparently
that plan was first printed, in part, by a Spanish historian,
who seems to have secured it from the Spanish archives. Sub-
sequent investigators have not rediscovered the original manu-

MARIANO MORENO

157

script; but among the papers of the archives of the Indies
the writer found a list of inedited documents which at one
time evidently reposed there : in this list was mentioned Mo-
reno’s “Plan of Operations which the Provisional Govern-
ment of the United Provinces of the Rio de la Plata should
Pursue to Consolidate the Great Work of Our Liberty and
Independence.” The ultra-republican spirit of this unique and
elaborate plan of operations is suggested by the following
excerpts :

Let me say here that at times accident is the mother of
events; for, if a revolution is not directed aright, if intrigue
and ambition destroy public spirit, then the state will relapse
into the most horrible anarchy. My fatherland, what changes
you may sufifer ! Where, Oh noble and grand Washington, are
the lessons of your politics? Where are the rules which
guided you in the construction of your great work? Your
principles and your system would be sufficient to guide us: —
lend us your genius so that we may accomplish the results
which we have contemplated !

The foundations of a new republic have never been ce-
mented unless rigor and punishment were mingled with the
blood of all those citizens who might obstruct progress. . . .
If a revolution is not directed aright, if intrigue, ambition,
and egotism smother the spirit of patriotism ; in a word, if
the general welfare is subordinated to private interest, then
the emancipation of a nation will produce all sorts of excesses,
and will cause the upheaval of the social order. . . . Never
will there be offered to South America a better opportunity
than the present for the establishment of a republic upon the
basis of moderation and virtue. The dynasty of the Bourbons
has been brought to the ground; none of its cowardly friends
came in time to lend it a hand : all that is now necessary is
to let it lie and to forget it. . . . Why is liberty pictured to
us as being blind and armed with a dagger? Because neither
an aged state nor a province can be regenerated or purged of
corrupt abuses without rivulets of blood being spilled. . . .
Finally, let us give a most solemn character to our new edi-
fice ; let us look solely to our native land ; and, when the con-
stitution of the state secures to every person the legitimate
enjoyment of the rights of true liberty in practice and in

158 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

quiet possession, without the existence of abuses, then will
an American state solve the true and great problem of the
social contract.

The plan contained certain suggestions concerning the pol-
icy of the junta. Among these were the following proposals.
The provisional government should observe a wise secrecy
with respect to the management of its internal and external
affairs. Adherents of the new order should be punished only
for disloyalty to the sacred cause of liberty. Rewards should
be provided for successful soldiers. Cruel and sanguinary
measures should be used against the avowed enemies of inde-
pendence. Trusty spies should be stationed throughout the
country to watch suspicious characters. Foreigners should
be given governmental offices according to their merits. Caste
distinctions should be swept away. The importation of slaves
should be prohibited. Those slaves who enlisted under the
banner of liberty should be rewarded.

With regard to “the mystery of Ferdinand” — the plea of
allegiance to Ferdinand VII. — the author intimated that in
negotiations with foreign states the junta might advantageously
use that plea to veil its real designs. He sketched a project
for the revolutionizing of la Banda Oriental. His object was
to subjugate Montevideo and to attract the inhabitants of the
adjacent region with seductive proclamations of liberty, equal-
ity, and felicity. By such measures he hoped that la Banda
Oriental might ultimately be incorporated into the Platean
state. Toward Spain he proposed that a policy of dissimu-
lation should be adopted. Memorials to the Spanish govern-
ment should be drawn up by the cabildos of important towns
and cities expressing their intention to preserve la Plata for
“Ferdinand VII. and his successors.” Those cabildos were to
suggest that the corrupt viceregal government had designed to
transfer the colony to France. They were to praise the pro-
visional government for its energy in promoting art, agricul-
ture, and industry. They were to affirm that succor would
soon be furnished to Spain in the struggle against Napoleon.

MARIANO MORENO

159

With these memorials, mutatis mutandis, should be sent simi-
lar representations from towns and villages. The object of
the memorials was to mislead the peninsular Spaniards, while
the people of Buenos Aires screened their real intentions.

Of greater interest were the proposals regarding the diplo-
matic relations of the junta with Portugal and England. The
plan urged that a liberal policy should be followed towards
those nations. Their commerce should be protected. Import
duties on their goods should be reduced. They should be
given preferential treatment. A secret plan should be pre-
sented to England which would point out the advantages that
her merchants might derive from the Platean provinces.
Portuguese intrigues in la Banda Oriental should be foiled
by negotiations with the court of Rio de Janeiro. England
should be induced to preserve a strict impartiality in the
internecine struggles of Spanish America. She should be
asked to make a public declaration that, under no circum-
stances, would she interfere in the political dissensions which
might arise in the Spanish-American colonies, so long as these
colonies demonstrated their hatred of Napoleon and their
fidelity to Ferdinand VII. Agents of the junta were to plead
that England should aid the cause of Platean independence
by selling munitions secretly to Buenos Aires and by convey-
ing the envoys of the junta oversea under the protection of
her flag. These emissaries were to negotiate an offensive and
defensive alliance between England and la Plata. To induce
England to enter into such an alliance, she was to be offered
the island of Martin Garcia at the mouth of la Plata River,
The upshot of the diplomacy was to be the isolation of Portu-
gal from England and the absorption of Brazil by the Platean
state.

Whether or not Mariano Moreno was the author of this
plan, it discloses the thoughts of a leader of the Platean
provinces at a stormy period. It reveals that by means of
spies, intrigues, and subtle negotiations, the author aspired
to found in the broad basin of la Plata River a state which

i6o RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

would be absolutely independent of Spain. Draconian pun-
ishments were to be meted out to persons who obstructed the
crusade for liberty and independence. The new state should
include la Banda Oriental; it should annex Brazil. This
ambitious and visionary project displays the ignorance, as well
as the knowledge, of the author in regard to international
politics. An alliance with England — which was pledged to
maintain the integrity of the Spanish dominions in both hemi-
spheres— was the pivot upon which the author made the policy
of political independence and territorial expansion depend.
The methods which the author of this plan proposed to use
were Machiavellian and the state which he wished to create
was to be the colossus of Hispanic America.

Moreno’s thoughts concerning society and government
were affected by various influences. For a Spanish-American
of the early revolutionary period he was exceptionally well
versed in the literature of foreign lands. Moreno was ac-
quainted with Spanish writers on economic subjects: he praised
the treatise of Caspar Melchor de Jovellanos concerning an
agrarian law. When arguing against the commercial policy
of Spain in his memorial to Viceroy Cisneros, he quoted ap-
provingly from Filangieri. The Argentine writer, Vicente
F. Lopez, declared in his history of Argentina that he had
seen Moreno’s suggestions for that memorial penciled upon
the margins of the writings of Campillo, who was a disciple
of Quesnay, the French physiocrat. To a considerable extent
Moreno was influenced by the physiocratic school of political
economy: he frequently argued that the prosperity of his
native land depended upon the prosperity of agriculture.

Most of all was Mariano Moreno, “the soul of the revolu-
tion of 1810’’ at Buenos Aires, influenced by Jean Jacques
Rousseau. Some time after the provisional government was
established, Secretary Moreno edited a Spanish translation
of Le Contrat Social which was published in his native city.
In the introduction to this work Moreno said that among vari-
ous books composing a precious collection that he wished to

MARIANO MORENO

i6i

offer to his compatriots, he had given the first place to “The
Social Contract.” He characterized Rousseau as an “immortal
man, the pride of his century,” — a man who had “placed in
a clear light the rights of the people,” who “taught them the
true origin of their obligations, and showed them what were
the corresponding obligations which the rulers contracted.”
He declared that Rousseau had taught the people “to seek in
the social compact the root and only origin of obedience. . . .
The study of this book should produce good results in all
classes of readers. . . . Those persons who desire to improve
themselves will find models to kindle their imagination and to
rectify their judgment; those who wish to comprehend the
basis of our society will find its true principles analyzed with
simplicity. The citizen will learn what he owes to the magis-
trate ; similarly, the magistrate will learn what may be required
of him; all classes, all ages, all conditions, will share in the
benefits which this immortal book brings to the world, — bene-
fits which should secure for its author the just title of the legis-
lator of nations. . . . Happy my country, if her sons know
how to profit by such important lessons!”

The political ideas of Moreno were most clearly presented
in a series of articles published in the editorial columns of
the Gaceta de Buenos Aires from November i to December
6, i8io. In those articles he proposed that the citizens of
the former viceroyalty should convoke a congress to consider
certain political problems. In the gazette for November 6
he declared that the laws of the Indies — a collection of pre-
cepts which constituted a monument of their degradation —
could not serve the Spanish-Americans in place of a consti-
tution. He suggested that the proposed congress should frame
a fundamental law. He spoke in favor of a division of powers
in the projected government. Yet he praised the English
government as a model for modem peoples. He intimated
that the former viceroyalty of la Plata constituted a sovereign
state. In an editorial on December 6, Moreno presented his
views regarding a great Spanish- American state :

i62 rise of spanish-american republics

If we consider the diverse origin of the group of states
which forms the Spanish monarchy, we cannot discover a
single reason why they should remain united in the absence
of the king, who was the bond of their unity. The laws of the
Indies declared that America was a part or an appendage of
the kingdom of Castile from which it could never be sepa-
rated. I do not comprehend the legitimate basis of this opin-
ion; but the submission of Castile to the yoke of a usurper
separated our provinces from that kingdom, and our people
entered upon the enjoyment of rights which they had been de-
prived of since the conquest. ... It is chimerical to claim that
all of Spanish America should form one state. How could
we reach an understanding with the Philippine Islands of
which we have hardly any other information than that which
is derived from a geographical chart? How could we recon-
cile our interests with those of the viceroyalty of Mexico? . . .
The colonies should form constitutions; they should do so
for themselves; nature herself has ordained this conduct be-
cause of the products and the boundaries of their respective
territories. Every arrangement which diverts them from this
procedure is a trick to misdirect the enthusiasm of the people
until the occasion is ripe to furnish them with a new master.

I hear much talk of a federal government as being the
most suitable to the present circumstances and to the condi-
tion of our provinces; but I fear that its advocates are ig-
norant of the real character of such a government, and that
without discernment they ask for a system which they would
consider unsuitable when they became acquainted with it. . . .
This system is perhaps the best which has ever existed among,
men, but it would be difficult to apply such a system to Span-
ish America. At what point would the general assembly
meet so that this body might conveniently receive instructions
from distant peoples in regard to the urgent needs of the
state? I desire that the provinces would restrict themselves
to the limits which they have had up to the present time; that
they form separately the constitutions adapted to promote the
happiness of each of them; that they always observe the just
maxims of mutual aid and succor; and that, postponing all
thoughts of a federal system which under present conditions
is not suitable and may be injurious, they consider only the
formation of close alliances which would encourage the fra-
ternity that should always reign, and which is the only thing

MARIANO MORENO

163

that can save us from domestic passions, — a more terrible
enemy to a state that is in process of formation than the arm-
ies of foreign nations which oppose it.

Thus Moreno evidently wished to promote the formation
in Spanish America of several democratic states. In the
provisional junta his democratic ideas provoked the opposition
of a clique led by President Saavedra, — a clique which cher-
ished some customs of the viceregal regime. Moreno’s ad-
herents even suspected that the partisans of Saavedra wished
to acclaim him viceroy, or emperor, of la Plata. When the
impetuous Moreno decided that the provisional government
should be stripped of the vestiges of viceregal days, the radical
and the conservative factions clashed. On December 6, 1810,
Moreno triumphed, for upon that day the junta adopted a
decree abolishing the honors which had been previously ac-
corded to President Saavedra and declaring that the members
of the junta were equal. Secretary Moreno probably wrote the
decree which contained the following expression of democratic
sentiment :

The liberty of the people does not consist in words, nor
should it merely appear in documents. Any despot can force
his subjects to chant hymns to liberty, — mechanical hymns
which accord with the chains and the oppression of the sing-
ers. If we desire that the people should be free, we should
scrupulously observe the sacred dogma of equality. If I con-
sider myself equal to my fellow citizens, why should I present
myself in a garb which indicates that they are less important
than I am? My superiority consists only in the exercise of
the functions of magistrate w’hich have been confided to me :
in the other activities of society, I am a citizen without the
right to any other consideration than that which I deserve
because of my virtues.

After the passage of the decree depriving Saavedra of his
cherished titles and honors, his discomfited friends evidently
schemed to retaliate by diminishing the power and influence
of Moreno. An opportunity for revenge was afforded when

i64 rise of spanish-american republics

there appeared in the city of Buenos Aires nine deputies from
the interior provinces who were led by Dean Funes of Cordoba,
an aggressive ecclesiastic. With a show of legal right, those
reactionary deputies, who had been chosen in accordance with
the junta’s decree of May 27, demanded to be incorporated
in the junta. Evidently the demand was favorably received
by several members of the provisional government. Moreno,
however, opposed such action and advocated that a congress
should be convoked to regulate governmental affairs. The
enemies of Moreno achieved a triumph when, on December 18,
the members of the junta decided to allow the provincial
deputies to vote with them on the question as to whether
or not those deputies should be incorporated in the provisional
government. Only the secretaries of the junta ventured to
vote against such action, maintaining that it was contrary to
law and opposed to the welfare of the state. After the deci-
sion was reached to incorporate the provincial deputies in the
provisional government, Moreno, who seemed to consider this
action as an attack upon himself, resigned his position as secre-
tary, declaring that “a discredited magistrate” should not re-
main in office.

This decision checked the democratic movement in the
Platean provinces. It initiated a protracted struggle between
the citizens of Buenos Aires and the inhabitants of the country
provinces, — the portehos and the provincianos. Moreno’s pro-
posed congress did not assemble. Viceregal honors were re-
stored to Saavedra. Several years passed before the provinces
of the Rio de la Plata discarded the plea of allegiance to
Ferdinand VII. and adopted a declaration of independence
from Spain.

In December, 1810, the junta of Buenos Aires selected
Moreno to act as its diplomatic agent in certain foreign coun-
tries. Originally, the junta intended that Moreno should nego-
tiate with the Portuguese court, with Lord Strangford, and
with the cabinet of England. On December 25 the junta
signed Moreno’s credentials as its diplomatic agent to Rio

MARIANO MORENO

165

de Janeiro. On January 17, 1811, that junta wrote a letter
to Lord Strangford declaring that the addition to it of the
deputies from the interior provinces had furnished the best
opportunity to promote its relations with foreign powers. The
quaint translation of the letter which is preserved in the Eng-
lish archives runs as follows:

Under these Notions it resolved to send its Secretary D.
Mariano Moreno to the Courts of London and Brazil, to the
End, that making known in each Court, the true sentiments
of this Junta, he might conclude arrangements upon solid
and lasting Principles. However, as an assurance of his
personal safety was wanting on the part of Brazil, it was
finally resolved that he should refrain from proceeding there
until such an assurance should be obtained for him by the
Mediation of Your Excellency; and that he should without
delay, prosecute his Voyage to the former Place.

The Junta has furnished him with sufficient Powers for
the purpose of treating with the Ministers of His Royal High-
ness, and of conferring with Your Excellency, but persuaded
that this object is not to be obtained, in consequence of Cap-
tain Elliot having refused to grant him the protection of the
British Flag, the Junta entreat Your Excellency to recom-
mend him and the object of his Mission which is in no man-
ner opposite to the Interests of Great Britain.

The indefinite statements of this letter with regard to the
purpose of Moreno’s mission are supplemented by a letter
which the junta addressed on December 24, 1810, to Marquis
Wellesley, the English secretary for foreign affairs. That
letter declared that the “close friendship” between Great
Britain and the provinces of la Plata which had been pro-
moted by the provisional government had produced “the most
sincere satisfaction in the minds of the deputies of the prov-
inces.” As those deputies desired to promote that friendship,
they had conferred “all their power and authority upon Doctor
Don Mariano Moreno” ; so that he might proceed to the court
of London to inform the English king and his ministers “of
the real desires of these provinces.” The letter affirmed that,

i66 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

as the wishes of Buenos Aires were “intimately related to the
interests of the British nation,” the junta expected “a favorable
hearing” from the British government. The junta declared
that Moreno carried documents to show the actual condition
of la Plata provinces and that he was vested “with all the
powers” necessary “to establish the political relations between
those provinces and Great Britain which the existing circum-
stances imperiously demanded.” The hope was expressed
that Wellesley would receive Moreno as “a legitimate repre-
sentative” of the junta, “a trusty medium of its intentions, a
depositary of its confidence and of its most intimate senti-
ments.” The instructions to Moreno said that he should
declare the fidelity of the junta to Ferdinand VII., while avow-
ing that, in case of his decease, the junta would consider itself
empowered to manage the government on behalf of a people
who had reassumed their sovereign rights. Moreno was di-
rected to negotiate a commercial treaty with England and to
solicit munitions. On January 2, i8ii, the junta voted that
besides an allowance for the expenses of the trip to England,
Moreno should be granted eight thousand pesos per annum.
Mariano’s brother, Manuel, and Tomas Guido, who held
offices under the provisional government, were made the sal-
aried secretaries of the junta’s diplomatic agent.

The attendant circumstances of the mission of Mariano
Moreno raise the question as to whether or not the junta in-
tended thus to consign him to political exile. On that question
the available documents emanating from the provisional gov-
ernment are almost silent: in his credentials Moreno was in-
deed styled the secretary of the junta. Manuel Moreno merely
declared that his brother was extremely depressed when he
started on the voyage to England. But, in a letter to Marquis
Wellesley on February 20, 1811, the vigilant Strangford trans-
mitted the rumor that “the Talents and Influence of Moreno
had begun to excite the jealousy of his Colleagues,” and that
the diplomatic mission was “merely a pretext to remove him.”
Possibly the junta was animated by mixed motives. It would

MARIANO MORENO

167

certainly have been difficult for that body to have selected a
more capable agent to speak for Buenos Aires at the court of
London than the author of the memorial of 1809.

In the end of January, 1811, the first important embassy
from southern South America to the Old World left the city
of Buenos Aires. Accompanied by his secretaries, Moreno
embarked on an English vessel en route for England. It
soon appeared that the harassing cares of a revolutionary mag-
istrate had injured Moreno’s health ; he was unable to endure
the stormy voyage, and was soon prostrated by a violent illness.
According to his brother’s account, Mariano Moreno died in
the arms of his secretaries, exclaiming, “Long live my country
although I perish!’’ Early in March, 1811, at a point south of
the equator, the corpse of Moreno, which seems to have been
shrouded in the English flag, was lowered into the sea. On
hearing the news of the sudden death of his protagonist.
President Saavedra is said to have ejaculated, “It took so much
water to extinguish so much fire !’’

Manuel Moreno and Tomas Guido proceeded to London.
Whatever approaches Moreno may have made to the English
ministry were fruitless : that ministry had formulated its policy
in regard to Spanish America to the Venezuelan commis-
sioners. Guido soon returned to his native land, where he
promoted the revolution against Spain. For a time Manuel
Moreno eked out a scanty livelihood in the busy English
metropolis, and then he also proceeded to Buenos Aires. To
Mariano Moreno’s widow — a woman whom he had married
while living in Upper Peru — the provisional government
granted a pension.

Information concerning Moreno’s private life is not plenti-
ful. Our knowledge of the personality of Mariano Moreno
must be drawn almost solely from the biographical sketch
which was written soon after his death by Manuel Moreno.
In its pages Mariano is portrayed as a man who did not pos-
sess a robust constitution, but who was endowed with a strong
will and a fine intellect. Somewhat fanatical in his religious

i68 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

opinions, he was fond of the Church and revered her doctrines.
In Chuquisaca and Buenos Aires Moreno’s home was the
scene of animated political discussions. In his professional
duties Moreno was animated by a stem love of justice and
by a desire to protect the innocent from oppression. His
love for learning was displayed during his career at Chuqui-
saca. While living in Upper Peru he had become vividly
impressed with the evils of Spain’s colonial system. Moreno
resented Spain’s policy of subordinating the creoles to the
peninsular Spaniards. A contemporary estimate by an Eng-
lishman is afforded by a letter from Strangford to Marquis
Wellesley, February 20, 1811, in which the former described
Moreno as “a man of extraordinary Merit, and of a virtuous
and honorable Character.” The following passage written in
1855 by Tomas Guido contains a somewhat extravagant eulogy
of Mariano Moreno’s services during his brief public career:

As eloquent as Mirabeau, as ardent as Camille Demoulins,
as republican as Junius Brutus, he was endowed with a re-
markable faculty for the transaction of administrative af-
fairs. His comprehensive intelligence appreciated all the cir-
cumstances of a situation which was beset with difficulties.
The light of the junta, he dispelled doubts, and calmly promul-
gated the most audacious reforms. Under the guidance of
his surpassing talent and copious knowledge, the press freely
scattered ideas upon all subjects concerning which the Ameri-
can people were summoned to act when extricating themselves
from the rule of Spain. An indefatigable worker in the or-
ganization of the government, familiar with the history of
modern times, and enriched by the philosophy of the an-
cients, he realized his sublime mission. With undaunted
front he fought prejudices, attacked abuses, and laid the foun-
dations of the Argentine republic.

There remains to indicate how Paraguay separated from
Spain. As already suggested, Belgrano’s expedition stimu-
lated a spirit of dissatisfaction with Spanish rule in that
province. Further, the apprehensions of Paraguayan leaders
were provoked by the suspicious designs of the Portuguese.

MARIANO MORENO

169

Consequently, in the middle of May, 1811, certain Para-
guayans quietly deprived Governor Velazco of the supreme
authority and installed a provisional government at Asuncion.
On June 20 a junta of five members with a secretary was estab-
lished. In July, 1811, the Paraguayan junta announced its
decision to suspend the recognition of the Spanish cortes and
the regency; it declared in favor of common action with
Buenos Aires in support of Ferdinand VII.; and it expressed
its intention to govern Paraguay. The leaders of this junta
were Pedro Juan Caballero, Jose Rodriguez de Francia, and
Fulgencio Yegros. Tradition properly ascribes an influential
role in the revolution which thus altered the political status of
Paraguay to Jose Francia, a doctor of theolog^y of the Uni-
versity of Cordoba, who had gained a reputation in Asuncion
for being a capable and upright lawyer. A story has been
preserved that, soon after the junta was installed, Francia
stalked into the midst of some officials who were considering
the policy which should be pursued toward Spain, and, laying
two loaded pistols upon the table, he declared, “These are the
arguments which I bring against the supremacy of Fernando
Septimo.”

A short time after the inauguration of that junta, Francia
retired from its council table. But he forsook his country
villa when the junta at Buenos Aires dispatched Nicolas
Herrera as emissary to Asuncion ostensibly to promote closer
relations with Paraguay. At Francia’s suggestion a congress
was convoked at Asuncion to consider Paraguayan affairs.
To that motley assembly Francia presented a plan of govern-
ment, which, on October 12, 1813, it adopted by acclamation.
This constitution provided that the supreme power of Para-
guay should be vested in “two citizens, Don Fulgencio Yegros
and Don Jose Caspar Francia, with the titles of Consuls of
the Republic of Paraguay.” The title of brigadier in the
Paraguayan army was also conferred upon each of these men.
Each consul was to wear the consular insignia, “a sombrero
decorated with a blue fringe and bearing the three-colored

170 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

cockade of the republic.” These magistrates were to possess
equal authority; they were to sign every act of the govern-
ment. Their primary duty was to preserve and defend the
republic: the soldiers of Paraguay were to be under their
joint control. They were to hold the supreme power alter-
nately for a period of four months: the first term of this joint
investiture was to be filled by Francia. If one of the consuls
died, or was unable to act, the survivor was to convoke a con-
gress within one month. A congress was to be assembled
annually to consider the measures which were necessary for
“a free and sovereign people.” It is apparent that Francia
was aping the government of Rome in this constitution which
transformed the province of Paraguay into the republic of
Paraguay. The Paraguayan historian. Bias Garay, alleges
that on October 12 the constituent congress declared that
Paraguay was absolutely independent.

Two decrees which were issued by Francia and Yegros
during their joint consulate will suggest the policy which they
adopted toward the Spaniards. On January 5, 1814, they is-
sued a decree announcing that all peninsular Spaniards re-
siding in Paraguay who were in the capital should appear in
the plaza at a fixed hour in order that a register of Spaniards
might be formed and declaring that those Spaniards who did
not appear should be put to death immediately. A decree
of March 1 provided that henceforth no marriages should be
solemnized between peninsular Spaniards and Paraguayan
women of Spanish descent under penalty of exile and confisca-
tion of property for the priests or curates authorizing such
marriages and the imprisonment of the offending Spaniards
for ten years with the confiscation of their property. Penin-
sular Spaniards, however, might marry Indian women, mu-
lattoes, and negroes. Evidently it was the intention of the
consuls to diminish the prestige of Spaniards. One year after
the fantastic republican constitution was adopted, a subservient
congress which assembled at Asuncion made the first consul
dictator of Paraguay. On June i, 1816, another congress ap-

MARIANO MORENO

171

pointed Francia the ruler of the republic for life. That
unique authority was conferred by congress upon Francia
in these words: “Because of the complete confidence which
Citizen Jose Rodriguez de Francia has justly merited of the
people, he is made perpetual dictator of the republic during his
lifetime in the position of a personage without any equal. . . .
The republic will have a congress whenever the dictator con-
siders it necessary.” The congress proposed that the bishop of
Asuncion should direct the prelates and priests of Paraguay
that in all future masses they should replace the word king by
the word dictator.

After congress thus made Francia dictator of the republic,
he ruled over the state with an increasingly despotic sway.
In 1819 he issued a decree depriving the bishop of Asuncion —
because of alleged lunacy — of his ecclesiastical authority, ap-
pointing in his place a provisor and a general vicar, and pro-
viding that no profession of religious faith should be valid
without the consent of his government. As the printed records
of Francia’s administration are incomplete, at present our
knowledge of his policy depends largely upon the reminiscences
of foreigners who ventured into his dominions. European
visitors described Dictator Francia as an extraordinary char-
acter: a man of good education and remarkable ability, but
inordinately vain, ambitious, cruel, and despotic. As the dic-
tator became obsessed wfith the idea that his subjects were
conspiring against him, he developed an insidious system of
espionage : Asuncion became a whispering gallery. Those ill-
fated persons who were supposed to be disaffected toward the
supreme ruler were manacled and thrust into filthy prisons.
They were whipped, tortured, and exiled from their homes,
or put to death in a revolting manner under the windows of
Francia’s palace. It has been estimated that thousands of
Paraguayans were arbitrarily executed during this prolonged
reign of terror, when decrees and judgments were written at
Francia’s dictation. Although Francia was at times aided by a
secretary and other officials, yet, for the most part, his method

172 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

of administration was personal; he was not only the chief
executive and the legislator but also the supreme court of
Paraguay and the virtual head of the Church.

But there is another side to the shield besides that harsh
picture drawn by some foreign visitors to Paraguay. To
an extent the rule of Francia was animated by a paternalistic
spirit like that which marked the administration of the Jesuit
missions among the Guarani Indians. Under Francia’s auto-
cratic rule, the Paraguayans were almost completely isolated
from the world, politically and commercially. The most strik-
ing exception to his jealous policy of isolation was the nego-
tiation of a convention between Brazil and Paraguay in April,
1823, which stipulated that trade might be carried on between
these two countries through Encarnacion, provided that the
traffickers were persons addicted to the sacred cause of liberty.
By one method or another, Francia gave an artificial stimulus
to agriculture, cattle raising, and primitive manufactures.
During his administration the Paraguayans evidently enjoyed
a comparatively large measure of economic prosperity. A
frugal administrator, at his death Francia left a surplus in the
coffers of the Paraguayan state. It is possible that when
a thorough and scientific investigation of Francia’s administra-
tion shall have been made, the future historian may feel
fully justified in appreciating him as a South American type
of the benevolent despot. In any case, it is only just to Francia
to realize that the rich province of Paraguay owed her inde-
pendence of the neighboring nations, as well as of Spain,
largely to his influence: — this remarkable character was the
founder of Paraguayan nationality, as well as the historical
antecedent of the Lopez dynasty.

In an account of the rule of the Paraguayan dictator, John
Rengger, a Swiss physician, thus described his first meeting
with Francia:

On July 30, i8ig, we disembarked at Asuncion, and some
days afterwards were presented to the dictator. He is a man
of medium height, with regular features, and those fine black

MARIANO MORENO

173

eyes which characterize the creoles of South America. He
has a most penetrating look, with a strong expression of dis-
trust. On this occasion he wore his official costume, which
consisted of a blue laced coat — the uniform of a Spanish
general — waistcoat, breeches, stockings of white silk, and
shoes with gold buckles. . . . Dictator Francia was then six-
ty-two years of age, though he did not appear to be more than
fifty. He asked me with a studied haughtiness of manner,
several questions, by which he sought to embarrass me; but
he soon changed his tone. Having opened my portfolio to
take out some papers which I had to present to him, he per-
ceived a portrait of Bonaparte, which I, aware of his admi-
ration for the original, had designedly placed there. He
took it up, and examined it with great interest, when I told
him whose likeness it was. He then began conversing fa-
miliarly upon the political affairs of Europe, with which he
seemed to be better acquainted than I could have supposed.
He asked me for news from Spain, for which country he ex-
pressed the most profound contempt. Louis the Eighteenth’s
charter was not to his taste; he admired much more the mili-
tary government and conquests of Napoleon, whose down-
fall he deplored. . . . But the principal subject on which he
talked, was the monks. He reproached them with pride, de-
pravity of manners, and every species of intrigue; and de-
claimed, particularly, against the tendency which the clergy
in general have to reject the authority of government. The
better to make known his principles upon this point, he said,
“If his holiness the Pope should come to Paraguay, I should
make him merely my almoner.” ... In speaking of the eman-
cipation of Spanish America, he warmly declared his devo-
tion to that cause, and his firm resolution to defend it against
any attack.

The ideas he expressed relative to the manner of gov-
erning these new states, as yet but little advanced in civiliza-
tion, appeared to me sufficiently reasonable; but, unfortunately,
he had himself put none of them into practice. He conde-
scended to show us his library ; it was small, indeed, but it was
almost the only one existing in Paraguay. I saw in it, be-
sides the best Spanish authors, the works of Voltaire, Rous-
seau, Raynal, Rollin, La Place, etc., all of which he had pro-
cured since the revolution. . . . He dismissed us with these
words : “Do here whatever you please, profess the religion

174 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

you wish, — no one shall molest you; but take care not to
meddle with the affairs of my government.” . . .

I am inclined to think 'that, at first, his intentions were
good; at least his public life, before the revolution, and the
use which he, in the beginning, made of his power, would
lead to that belief. But soon hurried on by the love of sway,
and giving way to his suspicious and violent temper, he
strayed from the right path and became a veritable tyrant ;
at the same time that he justified his conduct to himself by
the maxim, that liberty should be in proportion to civilization;
and that to a people who felt not the want of it, it could only
prove injurious.

Rengger’s account impresses the writer as a discriminating
characterization of the “Supreme, Perpetual Dictator of the
Republic of Paraguay.” But the eccentric dictator was much
provoked by this account of his rule. Francia published a
reply to Rengger’s book : he described it as an “Essay of Lies” ;
he denounced its author as an “assassin,” a “barbarous atheist,”
and an “infamous impostor and deceiver.” This biting criti-
cism may help to reveal the character of El Supremo, who
dominated the destinies of Paraguay, the hermit state, for
almost a quarter of a century.

This chapter shows that some revolutionists in the vice-
royalty of la Plata were inclined to adopt radical measures.
Strange though it may seem to some Anglo-Saxons, certain
revolutionary leaders of South America did not wish to found
true republican governments upon the ruins of Spain’s colonial
system. Under the guise of a republic, Francia founded an
autocratic state in Paraguay. In contrast with the Paraguayan
dictator, Mariano Moreno stands forth like a tribune. He
was the democrat, who dreading anarchy, and fearing that
the people of la Plata provinces were not ready for a federal
government, wished to found a republic at Buenos Aires.
His ideas on government, however, were too democratic for
his associates. Moreno was not only a publicist, he was also
a scholar; the national library of the Argentine republic is
“the best monument to the memory of its founder.”

CHAPTER VI

JOSE DE SAN MARtIn

The gap between Mariano Moreno and Jose de San Martin
may be partly filled by the picturesque figure of Jose Artigas,
who is the hero of the struggle for independence in la Banda
Oriental, — the territory later known as Uruguay. His father
was a member of a well-known family of Montevideo who
owned a hacienda where Jose spent some years of his boyhood.
The youth early became inured to the hardships of frontier
life. On the wide pampas he acquired a love for personal
liberty. With regard to his career before the English attack
upon Buenos Aires, it is particularly difficult to distingfuish
between Artigas in legend and in history. There is a tradi-
tion that Jose Artigas became the chieftain of a roving band
which stole herds of cattle and shared the illicit gains of
smugglers. Whether or not he was for a time "the Robin
Hood of South America,” it is clear that being eventually in-
duced to enter the employment of the Spanish governor at
Montevideo, Artigas then upheld the rule of law and order in
la Banda Oriental. In i8io he was an officer in a corps of
lancers in the Spanish service.

Early in i8ii Artigas openly forsook his post. He became
the leader of a nondescript band which acknowledged the gov-
ernmental authority of the junta of Buenos Aires. On April
II, i8ii, Artigas issued a proclamation to his fellow-country-
men: he invited them to join him in defense of “a just cause,”
declaring that they ought “to die with honor rather than to
live ignominiously in frightful captivity.” On May i8, i8ii,
at the head of some insurgents who, according to his own
report, were mostly armed ‘with poles to which knives had

175

176 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

been fastened/ Artigas defeated at Las Piedras a detachment
of royalist soldiers which had been sent from Montevideo by
Francisco Xavier Elio, who was the successor of Cisneros
as the viceroy of la Plata. Artigas then became the leader
of the insurrectionary movement in his native province.

On April 13, 1813, in his camp before Montevideo, Artigas
signed the instructions to five delegates from la Banda Ori-
ental to a constituent assembly which had been convoked in
the city of Buenos Aires. His delegates to the assembly were
directed to urge that it should adopt a declaration of absolute
independence from Spain. Their instructions proposed that
a compact between the provinces of the Platean basin should
establish a confederation which would ensure complete civil
and religious liberty. Each province, as la Banda Oriental,
should be allowed to organize its own government. The
central government should direct only the general business of
the state, while other matters should be managed by the prov-
inces. The suggestion was made that, for the time being,
the provinces of la Plata should form a firm league of friend-
ship for their common defense, liberty, and mutual happi-
ness. Article eleven of the instructions provided that la
Banda Oriental retained “its sovereignty, liberty, and inde-
pendence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right” which
was not expressly delegated by the confederation to the con-
gress of “the United Provinces.” Article fourteen provided
that “no tax or duty should be imposed upon articles exported
from one province to another; nor should any preference be
given by any regulation of commerce or revenue to the ports
of one province over those of another; nor should vessels
sailing from this province to another province be obliged to
enter, anchor, or pay duties in another.” The instructions
contained a provision that each province should have the right
to raise and to organize its own militia ; this was accompanied
by a statement that military despotism should be completely
prevented by constitutional checks. It was affirmed as neces-
sary and indispensable that the capital should be located at

Francia an’d Artigas

(From Portraits by Bonpland in Demersay’s Atlas, "Histoire du Paraguay'

177

JOSE DE SAN MARTIN

some other place than the city of Buenos Aires. With regard
to the type of government, there was a provision that the prov-
inces should form their own constitutions. Each province
should also have the right to sanction the constitution for the
United Provinces which should be framed by the assembly.
That constitution was to guarantee to the provinces a republi-
can form of government which would save them from do-
mestic violence, as well as from any usurpation of their
rights or sovereignty. The “instructions of the year thirteen,”
as they are known in Platean history, were obviously based
in part upon North-American example. Whether or not Ar-
tigas was the sole author of these instructions, they embodied
his federalist ideals.

But the assembly at Buenos Aires declined to admit the
federalist delegates, alleging that their credentials were not
acceptable. Still the battle of Las Piedras was one of the
victories mentioned in a patriotic hymn which, in May, 1813,
was declared by the assembly to be the song of the Platean
provinces. A literal translation of the first stanza of the
song will suggest the sentiments of some Platean leaders at
this time.

Hear, Oh Mortals ! the sacred shouts.

Of liberty, liberty, liberty.

Hear the sound of broken chains.

Behold equality enthroned;

Behold in the face of day arising,

A new and glorious nation.

Her brows are crown’d with laurel,

A vanquished lion at her feet.

It was probably a dislike for the government at Buenos
Aires which impelled Artigas in January, 1814, to leave the
Platean soldiers who, under General Jose Rondeau, were be-
sieging Montevideo. Consequently, on February ii, 1814,
Gervasio Antonio Posadas, who had just become the supreme
director of the provinces of la Plata, declared the federalist
leader to be a traitor, and set a price upon his head. Despite

178 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

the attempts which were subsequently made to reconcile the
proscribed leader with Buenos Aires, the breach could not be
healed. Thus Artigas, the advocate of independence and
federation, became the champion of those inhabitants of la
Banda Oriental who struggled fiercely against the domination
of the government at Buenos Aires, the emperor of Brazil, and
the king of Spain. His spirit is preserved in the response
which he made to an agent of Spain who tried to induce him
to join the cause of the royalists: T cannot be purchased;
I wish no other reward for my hardihood than to see my nation
free from Spanish rule; and, if the noise of cannon cease
during my lifetime, my hands will drop the sword which they
have seized to defend my native land.’ In 1815 this revolution-
ary chieftain had reached the climax of his power ; for the city
of Montevideo, and several provinces of the viceroyalty of
Buenos Aires, as well as the region of the Guarani missions,
had recognized his ascendancy. His seat of power was at el
Hervidero upon the banks of the Uruguay River; his preten-
tious title was “the Protector of Free Peoples.” A Scotchman
who sailed up the Uruguay River to the headquarters of the
“protector” thus described him:

And there (I pray you do not turn skeptic on my hands),
what do you think I saw? Why, the most excellent Pro-
tector of half of the New World, seated on a bullock’s skull,
at a fire kindled on the mud floor of his hut, eating beef off
a spit, and drinking gin out of a cow-horn! He was sur-
rounded by a dozen officers in weather-beaten attire, in simi-
lar positions, and similarly occupied with their chief. All
were smoking, all gabbling. The Protector was dictating to
two secretaries, who occupied, at one deal table, the only
two dilapidated rush-bottom chairs in the hovel. ... To
complete the singular incongruity of the scene, the floor of
the one apartment of the mud hut ... in which the general,
his staff, and secretaries were assembled, was strewn with
pompous envelopes from all the provinces (some of them
distant 1,500 miles from that centre of operations), addressed
to “His Excellency the Protector.” At the door stood the
reeking horses of couriers arriving every half-hour, and the

JOS^ DE SAN MARTIN 179

fresh ones of those departing as often. Soldiers, aides-de-
camp, scouts, came galloping in from all quarters.

The prestige of this caudillo, rude, wild, and strong — who
cherished some extravagant ideas concerning liberty — declined
from 1817 to 1820. In 1817 Portuguese soldiers under Gen-
eral Lecor took possession of Montevideo. Early in 1820
one of his own lieutenants, Francisco Ramirez, raised his
hand against the “protector.” In September, 1820, the de-
jected leader of Gauchos withdrew to Paraguay, where he
was given an asylum by Dictator Francia. While the enigmat-
ical Artigas was living near Asuncion, he was quoted as having
described his career in the following words:

I did no more than to respond to the dark measures of the
directory of Buenos Aires and to the war which it made upon
me because it considered that I was an enemy of centraliza-
tion. . . . Taking the United States as a model, I desired the
autonomy of the Platean provinces, granting to each state its
own government, its constitution and its flag, with the right to
elect its representatives, its judges, and its governors from its
own natural-born citizens. This is what I attempted to do for
my province and for those other provinces which proclaimed
me their Protector. . . . But the Pueyrredons and their assist-
ants wished to make of Buenos Aires a new imperial Rome
which could send its proconsuls to govern the provinces in a
military fashion and deprive them of all political representa-
tion, just as it rejected the deputies whom the people of la
Banda Oriental selected for the constituent assembly, and as it
set a price upon my head.

Thus did Artigas apparently interpret his role in Platean
history.

In 1825 a compatriot of Artigas, Juan Antonio Lavalleja,
with an immortal band of about thirty-three followers, ini-
tiated another struggle for the liberation of la Banda Oriental,
with the aid of Buenos Aires. Lavalleja was soon joined by
Fructuoso Rivera and other patriots. On August 25 of that
year, in the town of Florida, an assembly of delegates from

i8o RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

various sections of the province framed a declaration of inde-
pendence. That declaration announced that all measures of
incorporation or oaths of allegiance which had been forcibly
imposed upon the people of the province by the intrusive agents
of Portugal and Brazil were null and void. “In consequence
of the foregoing declaration, la Banda Oriental — reassuming
those rights, liberties, and prerogatives inherent to the peoples
of the earth — declares itself by fact and right, free and inde-
pendent of the king of Portugal, of the emperor of Brazil, and
of any power of the universe, with ample power to assume in
the exercise of its sovereignty whatsoever form it may con-
sider convenient.” On the same day this assembly decreed
that the “Oriental Province” should be united to the other
provinces of the Rio de la Plata : — thus did it secure the coop-
eration of the United Provinces against its colossal neighbor,
the empire of Brazil. In reality, the struggle for the inde-
pendence of la Banda Oriental was not crowned with success
until August 27, 1828, when the United Provinces of the Rio
de la Plata and Brazil by a solemn treaty mutually recognized
its independence. In the following year a constitution was
formed for “the Oriental Republic of Uruguay”; and in 1830,
under the presidency of General Rivera, that republic was
launched upon an independent career.

While Artigas was struggling to found a vast federation
in the Platean basin, or, at least, to establish a new nation
in one province of the ancient viceroyalty of la Plata, Jose
de San Martin was winning the independence of South Amer-
ica from Spain. Jose Francisco de San Martin was born on
February 25, 1778, in the village of Yapeyu, which was located
on the right bank of the Uruguay River. Yapeyu was a mis-
sion which had been planted by Jesuit padres among the
Guarani Indians. In 1778 Juan de San Martin, the father of
Jose, was the administrator of that mission. Juan de San
Martin was a native of Cervatos de la Cueza in the province
of Leon, Spain, who had served as lieutenant, adjutant, and

JOSE DE SAN MARTIN

i8i

captain of a battalion of Spanish militia in the city of Buenos
Aires. Gregorio Matorras cle San Martin, the mother of
Jose, was the daughter of Domingo Matorras, who had under-
taken to conquer the Indians of Chaco. On the paternal side,
she traced her descent from Spaniards who had emigrated
from the province of Asturias; and, on the maternal side,
from natives of Old Castile.

The earliest years of Jose de San Martin were spent in
the Indian village of Yapeyu. When his father was again
stationed in the city of Buenos Aires, Jose was taken from the
frontier village to the metropolis of the viceroyalty. By an
order of Charles III., dated May 21, 1785, Captain San Martin
was transferred from his post at Buenos Aires to Malaga.
His fourth son, Jose, profited by the change, for he was soon
sent to a school in Madrid, where, at least, he acquired some
knowledge of mathematics. The example of his father, and
of his three older brothers, who had also become soldiers of
Spain, obviously influenced Jose, for, on July i, 1789, he asked
the Spanish government to be allowed to join the infantry
company of Murcia, in order, as he expressed it, that he
might “follow the disting^uished profession of arms.”

This boy volunteer fought for the first time under Spain’s
banner of blood and gold against the Moors in North Africa.
In 1793 he served in the campaign of the Spaniards against
the French in Roussillon. In 1797 and 1798 he served on the
frigate Dorotea in the Mediterranean Sea. With the regiment
of Murcia, San Martin then saw service in Spain’s campaign
of 1801 against Portugal. In 1804, as captain of the infantry
company of V oluntarios de Campo Mayor, to which he had
been transferred, San Martin served in the garrison at Cadiz,
where he read books of history, geography, and military sci-
ence. Later, as a reward for bravery in the g^aerrilla warfare
against the soldiers of Napoleon, the junta of Seville made San
Martin a captain in the cavalry regiment of Bourbon. For
his services in the engagements which preceded the surrender
of the French army under General Dupont at Bailen in July,

i82 rise of spanish-american republics

1808, San Martin was granted a medal and appointed lieuten-
ant colonel of cavalry. About a year later, he was made aide-
de-camp of the Marquis de Coupigny in the army of Cata-
lonia. According to his own statement, in July, 1811, San
Martin was appointed commander of the regiment of dragoons
of Saguntum.

From 1789 to 1811 Jose de San Martin had faithfully
served his king. He had passed through many varied experi-
ences as a Spanish officer. His valiant services had frequently
been recognized by the government of Spain. Such a distin-
guished and honorable reputation in the military service of
a European power had not been earned by any other Spanish-
American of the revolutionary epoch, — not even by Francisco
de Miranda. Possibly the creole colonel, San Martin, felt that
his services had not been sufficiently appreciated. Many years
afterwards he explained his departure from Spain in these
words: “In 1811, I was serving in the Spanish army. Twenty
years of honorable service had gained for me some considera-
tion in spite of the fact that I was an American; I heard of
the revolution in South America; and — forsaking my for-
tunes and my hopes — I desired only to sacrifice everything
to promote the liberty of my native land. I arrived at Buenos
Aires in the beginning of 1812 : — thenceforward I consecrated
myself to the cause of Spanish America.”

On March 9, 1812, Colonel San Martin disembarked at the
city of Buenos Aires, having proceeded from the Iberian pen-
insula to South America by way of England. A short time
after arriving in Buenos Aires, he married Maria de los Reme-
dios Escalada, the daughter of a well-known inhabitant of that
city. The Argentine biographer of San Martin, General Mitre,
has asserted that his hero transplanted to South America a
secret society, sometimes called the Lautaro lodge, which sol-
emnly pledged its members to consecrate themselves to the task
of liberating America from the odious rule of Spain. It is
possible that San Martin did establish at Buenos Aires a so-
ciety, which, in some respects, resembled a masonic lodge.

Jose de San Martin
(Medallion by Simon)

183

JOSE DE SAN MARTIN

But the writer has not found evidence to prove that such a
society was a potent force at Buenos Aires in 1812. At a later
stage in the South-American revolution evidence can be found
of the activity of a secret association to which certain leaders
belonged. For example, San Martin’s correspondence con-
tains occult allusions to “0-0”, and to “los Amigos” — allu-
sions which evidently veiled a mysterious fraternity that in-
fluenced the actions of prominent revolutionary leaders.

At once San Martin felt that the South American soldiers
were deficient in discipline and ignorant of the military art,
while the government of Buenos Aires realized that Colonel
San Martin might render valuable services to the revolutionary
cause. Accordingly, on March 16, 1812, the junta of Buenos
Aires appointed San M, '•tin lieutenant colonel of cavalry and
commander of a projected squadron of mounted grenadiers.
On April 3 his name was puomhed in the Gaceta de Buenos
Aires in recognition of his offer of one-third of his salary and
a monthly contribution of fifty pesos for the support of the
provisional government. San Martin soon took steps to im-
prove the soldiers of Buenos Aires : he established a military
training school, and provided for the supervision of the con-
duct of the soldiers through a monthly assembly of grenadiers.
That gathering, which, in some respects, resembled a secret
lodge, may have been the hazy nucleus of the Lautaro society.
In any case the esprit de corps of the citizen soldiery was
stimulated, if not indeed created. A token of what a trained
soldiery might accomplish under a brave and experienced com-
mander was soon given. On February 3, 1813, Colonel San
Martin’s grenadiers attacked a small detachment of royalist
soldiers at San Lorenzo on the right bank of the Parana River.
The Spanish soldiers were routed and forced to retreat to
Montevideo. A Scotchman who witnessed this conflict likened
San Martin’s grenadiers, who had screened themselves from
the royalists in the cloisters of the monastery of San Lorenzo,
to the Grecian warriors who were introduced into the city of
Troy in a wooden horse.

i84 rise of spanish-american republics

While San Martin was training his grenadiers, the sol-
diers of Buenos Aires under General Belgrano had defeated
the royalists in an engagement at Tucuman on September 24,
1812, and in an engagement at Salta on February 20, 1813.
But in October and in November, 1813, the royalists defeated
Belgrano. Hence in the following month, San Martin was
given command of an expedition which was sent to reenforce
Belgrano’s dispirited soldiers near the city of Tucuman. On
January 18, 1814, San Martin was made “general in chief’’ of
the army of Buenos Aires near Tucuman. That was indeed
a “heavy cross’’ ; for the army was poorly disciplined ; some
of the officers were incompetent ; and San Martin was ignorant
of the nature of the country. Upon reaching the defeated
army San Martin began to reform it : he established an en-
trenched camp at Tucuman; he gathered recruits, reorganized
the soldiers, and provided for instruction in mathematics and
engineering. So successful was San Martin in directing a
guerrilla warfare that the victorious royalists were checked.

In April, 1814, San Martin relinquished his position as com-
mander of the army which the government at Buenos Aires
had designed for use against the royalists in Upper Peru : on
August 10, 1814, the supreme director of la Plata appointed
him governor-intendant of the province of Cuyo, which was
south of Tucuman. With regard to the cause for this sig-
nificant transfer, it is evident that San Martin had asked to
be relieved of his position at Tucuman and to be given instead
a position at Cuyo because of poor health. But that plea prob-
ably masked his main motive. For it is certain that coupled
with the desire to improve his health in the delicious climate
of Mendoza, the capital of the province of Cuyo, was the ambi-
tion to become more serviceable in the struggle against the
royalists. As early as April, 1814, San Martin had written
to Nicolas Rodriguez Pena and declared that in Upper Peru
he could only wage a defensive war. In confidence he also
imparted to Pena his “secret.” This was the project which he
had conceived for the prosecution of the war against Spain,

JOSE DE SAN MARTIN

185

as contrasted with the plan of the provisional government of
Buenos Aires to attack the Spanish stronghold in Peru
through Upper Peru : ‘A small well-disciplined army in Men-
doza to cross the Andes in order to exterminate the royalists
in Chile and to aid a government of trusty friends to put an
end to the anarchy which reigns there. Then, allying our
forces, we shall go by sea to capture Lima. This is the road
and not the other: you may be sure that the war will not be
finished until we capture Lima.'

From 1814 to 1821 San Martin’s energies were devoted to
the execution of this strategic plan. Before considering the
measures which he to'k at Mendoza to carry out his project,
brief mention should be 1. ade of the rise and fall of the patriot
party in Chile.

The captaincy general of Chl’e included a narrow fringe of
territory between the cordillera and the ocean, extending from
the Straits of Magellan to the desert of Atacama. In 1808
Garcia Carrasco became its captain general: he was also
the chief intendant and the president of the royal audiencia.
Although reports of the deposition of Ferdinand VII. finally
reached the city of Santiago, yet the news did not produce
such a ferment there as in Buenos Aires. Many Chileans
wished to conserve the rights of the idolized Ferdinand ; some
were apprehensive of the supposed designs of Carlota Joaquina,
while others saw visions of independence from Spain.

In the city of Santiago on September 18, 1810, in the pres-
ence of a cahildo abierto. Captain General Garcia Carrasco
quietly laid down the baton of command. He was replaced
by a provisional junta that made loud professions of loyalty to
Ferdinand VIL Three months later, at the instance of the
cabildo of Santiago, the junta issued a summons for the elec-
tion of delegates to a congress which should form a new gov-
ernment for Chile. In the meantime, Camilo Henriquez, a
learned monk who was steeped in the philosophy of Rousseau,
published a pseudonymous pamphlet which advocated the es-
tablishment of an independent republic. The Chilean congress

l86 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

met at Santiago on July 4, 1811. Its members took an oath of
fidelity to Ferdinand VII. ; and they swore to support the con-
stitution and the laws which congress might establish. Jose
Miguel Carrera, an ambitious military officer who had served
under the Spanish standard, soon became the leader of a fac-
tion which favored the independence of Chile from Spain.
Soon after September 4, 1811, when, aided by his brothers
Luis and Juan Jose, that leader overthrew the provisional gov-
ernment, the movement against Spanish rule in Chile became,
in part, a struggle between the adherents of Jose Miguel Car-
rera and the followers of Bernardo O’Higgins. Ultimately
the contending factions were compelled to bury their jealousies
and to join hands against the common enemy. For, in 1813
and 1814, Jose de Abascal, viceroy of Peru, sent expeditions
to re-conquer Chile. After several encounters between the
royalist soldiers and the Chilean patriots, in October, 1814,
the patriots led by Bernardo O’Higgins and the Carrera broth-
ers were shamefully defeated at Rancagua by the royalists
under General Mariano Osorio.

Bernardo O’Higgins, a protege of Miranda, is the Chilean
hero of the revolutionary epoch. The natural son of an ad-
venturous Irishman who closed a career in the Spanish colonial
service as viceroy of Peru, Bernardo was educated in South
America and Europe. After the deposition of Carrasco, he
organized a band of soldiers and offered his services to the new
government. O’Higgins soon won a reputation for wisdom
in council and impetuous bravery upon the field of battle.
When, after the defeat at Rancagua many Chilean patriots
were forced to seek a refuge beyond the frozen peaks of the
Andes, O’Higgins led a group of Chilean emigres to Mendoza,
where they were cordially received by Jose de San Martin.

At that time the most important political problems con-
fronting the inhabitants of la Plata provinces resembled those
which had confronted Moreno in 1810. What should be their
attitude toward the Spanish monarch? What form of gov-
ernment should they adopt? An interesting sidelight is cast

JOSE DE SAN MARTIN

187

upon the plans of Platean leaders by the fact that in 1814 Di-
rector Posadas commissioned Manuel Belgrano and Bernar-
dino Rivadavia to negotiate with England, or with Spain, for
the establishment of a constitutional monarchy in southern
South America which might be ruled by a prince of Spain, of
England, or of some other strong nation. It appears that
when San Martin arrived in South America, he entertained
the hope that he would find his compatriots disposed to es-
tablish a democratic form of government, — that is to say, a
republic. An examination of his correspondence with Tomas
Godoy Cruz, an intimate friend, furnishes some interesting
suggestions in regard to the political organization which San
Martin thought was most suitaL’e for the Platean provinces.
In February, 1816, he wrote to Cru • :

I feel as though I might die every time that I hear people
speak of a federation. Would it not be more convenient to
transfer the capital from Buenos Aires to some other place
and thus to silence the just complaints of the provinces? A
federation! How could this be established? If a country
like the United States with an :stablished government, well
populated, artistic, agricultural, and commercial had so many
difficulties under a federal system of government during the
last war with England, what would happen if the provinces
of la Plata became jealous of each other? If you consider
also the rivalries and the clashing interests of various regions,
you will agree that the United Provinces would become a den
of beasts of which the royalists would be the masters.

Neither did San Martin believe in professions of loyalty to
Ferdinand VII. On April 12, 1816, he wrote to Cruz, who
then represented the province of Cuyo in a congress at Tucu-
man, “Does it not indeed appear ridiculous to coin money, to
have a flag and a national cockade, and, lastly, to make war
on the sovereign on whom it is believed that we are in a state
of dependence?” In another letter dated May 24, 1816, San
Martin said: “The inhabitants of the United Provinces have
had no other object in their revolution than to emancipate
themselves from Spanish rule and to establish a nation. Are

i88 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

we able to establish a republic without provoking the opposi-
tion of Brazil? A republic without arts, sciences, agriculture,
inhabitants, and with a large extent of territory which may
properly be called a desert, is not a good neighbor for a mon-
archy.” Thus as early as i8i6, San Martin — the republican
at heart — had become convinced that the people of la Plata
provinces were not ready for a republic. In other letters to
Cruz he urged that the congress at Tucuman should make a
public declaration of independence from Spain.

The delegates who assembled at Tucuman on March 24,
1816, were selected in accordance with a statute which had
been issued by a junta at Buenos Aires. The congress was at-
tended by delegates from various provinces of the former vice-
royalty of la Plata ; but Paraguay and la Banda Oriental were
not represented, while only a few delegates of Upper Peru
were present. In a short time the congress dispatched agents
to Artigas and Francia to invite “the free peoples” and the
Paraguayans to send delegates to the assembly. Vain was
the invitation. This congress took other measures which in-
dicated the assumption of governmental authority: it made
provisions for the collection of forced loans; and, on May 3,
it appointed Juan Martin de Pueyrredon, a delegate from San
Luis, “the supreme director of the state.” There appeared
at Tucuman while congress was in session, Manuel Belgrano,
who evidently reenforced the arguments of those delegates
who favored a declaration of independence. The official act
of that congress of July 9, 1816, declared that :

The ordinary session of the congress of the United Pro-
vinces having ended, it continued its former discussions con-
cerning the grand object of the independence of the peoples
represented therein. Although the opinion of the entire region
in favor of emancipation from the despotic rule of the kings of
Spain was general, constant, and decisive, yet the delegates
devoted to this crucial question the profundity of their talents,
and the rectitude of their intentions, which demanded a de-
cision regarding their own fate, the fate of the peoples repre-
sented. and of posterity. Finally, they w'ere asked: if they

JOSE DE SAN MARTIN

i8g

wished that the provinces of the Union should form a nation
free and independent of the kings of Spain and of her me-
tropolis. At once, animated by a holy love of justice, each
and every delegate successively announced his spontaneous
decision in favor of the independence of the country, signing
in consequence the following declaration. We, the representa-
tives of the United Provinces in South America, assembled in
a general congress, invoking the God who presides over the
universe, in the name and by the authority of the people whom
we represent, and proclaiming to ^'eaven and to all nations and
peoples of the earth the justice o2 ''ur intentions, declare
solemnly to the world that the unanim^ *s wish of these
provinces is to sever the oppressive bonds which connect them
with the kings of Spain, to recover the rights of which they
were deprived, and to assume the exalted position of a nation
free and independent of Ferdinand VII., of his successors,
and of the metropolis of Spain.

Thus certain provinces of la Plata adopted a declaration of
independence. This declaration was the logical culmination
of the action taken on May 25, 1810, in the city of Buenos
Aires. Mariano Moreno’s dream of independence from Spain
was thus partly fulfilled. The title of the new state, the United
Provinces of South America, resembled the title proposed by
Artigas in 1813. In practice, however, the name applied to
that state was ordinarily the United Provinces of the Rio de
la Plata. In 1816 the prospect of independence from Spain was
becoming brighter in the Platean provinces; but it had been
darkened by royalist successes in many parts of South Amer-
ica. The royalist commander Morillo dominated New Gran-
ada and Venezuela. Captain General Marco del Pont was the
master of Chile. Yet down in the province of Cuyo the valiant
Jose de San Martin was quietly recruiting the brave army of
the Andes, — an army which was destined to eclipse in the New
World the achievements of Hannibal. On hearing of the dec-
laration of July 9, 1816, San Martin declared that this was
"a masterly stroke.” On August 8 he and his chief officers
took a solemn oath to promote and defend the liberty and in-
dependence of the United Provinces of South America.

190 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

The congress of Tucuman also considered what type of
government should be established in the United Provinces. At
a secret session of congress on July 6, i8i6, Belgrano urged
that the most suitable form of government was a monarchy
with a member of the Inca dynasty upon the throne. This pro-
ject— which resembled Miranda’s plan — apparently gained the
approval of San Martin; for, on August 12, he wrote to Cruz
declaring that ‘all judicious persons would be pleased with the
plan concerning the dynasty of the Incas.’ In September, 1816,
some members of the Platean congress were considering the
establishment at Buenos Aires of a constitutional monarchy
under a foreign prince. Two months later, Director Pueyrre-
don proposed to congress a scheme for the coronation of a
prince of the house of Braganza as king of the United Prov-
inces under a constitution. Early in the following year, the
protean project was broached again. In a letter to San Martin
on March 3, 1817, Pueyrredon declared: “I desire a monarch
for our state; but I desire one worthy of the honor which he
would receive in commanding us ; that is to say, I wish a
greater man than Prince John of Portugal; and I wish a mon-
arch who would rule us only.”

While Platean publicists deliberated in regard to the frame
of government for the United Provinces, San Martin was ex-
ecuting his military plans. His base of operations was at Men-
doza. That city was located in an oasis that marked the line
where the foothills of the lofty Cordillera sank into the broad
pampas. On the west was “the snow-capped Andean range
trending away towards distant Patagonia” till the farthest
peaks sank below the horizon. With all possible secrecy San
Martin prepared to attack the Spaniards in Chile. He formed
from Chilean emigres the nucleus of a regiment. He recruited
soldiers and raised war revenues. He sent out spies to collect
information concerning the Chilean royalists. San Martin
solicited the impecunious government at Buenos Aires to aid
him ; he sent pleas to that city for muskets, sheepskins, moun-
tain artillery, munitions, mules, horseshoes, anchors, clarinets.

JOSE DE SAN MARTIN

191

and money. Aware that the royalists would entertain appre-
hensions concerning his designs, he tried to lull their sus-
picions and to deceive them by various subterfuges. For ex-
ample, messages bearing the similitude of truth were allowed
to fall into the hands of Chilean royalists, — messages which
contained false statements concerning San Martin’s designs.
San Martin sent letter after letter to the Platean government
urging that his plan of campaign was the wisest which could
be adopted for the liberation of South America. On April
25, 1816, he declared: “Chile is the citadel of this part of

America; her conquest will establish the basis of our political
being. Peru will yield to her influence ; and the continent will
be free!’’

In a letter to the supreme director on June 15, 1816, San
Martin sketched his plan of operations. He maintained that
the soldiers who were destined to invade Chile should cross the
Andean range only by certain passes. The most fertile and
populous provinces of Chile should be occupied at once. The
great aim of the army should be utterly to overwhelm the
royalists in the first action. Then Santiago should be cap-
tured. He declared that ‘upon the outcome of this expedition
depended the liberty of South America.’ The difficulties
which had to be surmounted in the projected march may be
suggested by the statement that the Uspallata pass, the high-
est of the passes over the Andes from Mendoza, is about twelve
thousand five hundred feet above sea level, — over four thou-
sand feet higher than the pass of St. Bernard by which Na-
poleon crossed the Alps. San Martin did not underestimate
the obstacles which confronted the expedition; for on June 14,
1816, he wrote to Tomas Guido, “It is not the opposition which
the royalists can offer to my soldiers that disturbs my sleep
but the passage of these immense mountains.”

In the latter part of 1816 Director Pueyrredon took the
final steps for the execution of San Martin’s cherished design.
On August I, 1816, Pueyrredon appointed San Martin com-
mander-in-chief of the army of the Andes; and on October 17,

192 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

he made San Martin captain general of that army. On De-
cember 21 Pueyrredon signed the instructions for the expedi-
tion against Chile. These instructions declared that one pur-
pose of the expedition was to acquire glory for the United
Provinces, — which may have been merely a rhetorical flourish.
The primary object of the campaign was to liberate Chile and
thus to promote the independence of South America from the
Spanish monarchy. San Martin was carefully instructed to
remain at the head of the army ; he was to engage in a pitched
battle only when conditions favored a victory. In case the
royalists were defeated, San Martin was cautioned never to
agree that they should be allowed to retire to Lima, which was
apparently regarded as his final objective point. Pueyrredon
explicitly declared that the soldiers of the army of the Andes
were neither to plunder nor to oppress the people of Chile. A
design to acquire control of the liberated territory was ex-
pressly disclaimed. San Martin was authorized to make ar-
rangements for a provisional government at Santiago. The
hope was expressed that a government might be established in
independent Chile which would resemble the government of
the United Provinces. It was suggested that these two coun-
tries might even enter into “a constitutional alliance.” San
Martin was to try to persuade the Chileans to send delegates
to a congress at Buenos Aires ; in order that ultimately Spanish
South America might constitute one nation.

To deceive the Chilean royalists San Martin sent small de-
tachments of soldiers against the enemy to the north and south
of the passes through which he planned to send the main divi-
sions of his army. By January, 1817, the army of the Andes
was ready to march. That army was divided into three divi-
sions, which were commanded by Colonel Gregorio de las
Heras, General Miguel Soler, and General O’Higgins. General
Soler commanded the vanguard of the army which was to
proceed by the longer and more difficult route by Los Patos
pass that wound around the northern side of Mount Acon-
cagua, General O’Higgins was to follow Soler with the re-

JOSE DE SAN MARTIN

193

serve division, while Las Heras with a small body of infantry
and the artillery was to lead his soldiers along the Uspallata
road which traversed the mountains south of Mount Acon-
cagua. Each of these commanders received from San Martin
an itinerary of the projected marches with topographical data
and detailed instructions. The army of the Andes was com-
posed of about two thousand six hundred infantry, seven hun-
dred cavalry, and two hundred and fifty artillerymen. The
procession started on January 18, when the soldiers of Las
Heras left the camp near Mendoza and began to march up the
trail leading toward the two passes. This division was sup-
plied with carts and anchors and cables to aid in the trans-
portation of the cannon over the crags and across the precipices
of the Andes. About a week later San Martin left Mendoza
to overtake his soldiers who were approaching the gloomy de-
files of the cordillera. Twenty-one days after the expedition
started, the soldiers of Soler, O’Higgins, and Las Heras had
passed the snowy summits of the Andes and were far down
the valleys that converged toward the Chilean plains. On
February 8, 1817, San Martin wrote to Pueyrredon from the
valley of Aconcagua:

The passage of the Andes has been a triumph in itself.
The soldiers of the army with supplies for almost a month,
with armament, munitions of war, and baggage have marched
a hundred leagues along a road which crossed craggy peaks,
defiles, folds, and deep, narrow chasms, — a road intersected
by four mountain ridges, where the cragginess of the soil
competes with the asperity of the atmosphere. If to over-
come these obstacles has been to gain a victory, it is no less
a victory because it has frightened the enemy.

Physical geography made possible this marvelous march.
In the execution of his daring design San Martin was favored
by circumstances ; the loyal support of Pueyrredon, the sacri-
ficing spirit of the inhabitants of Cuyo, and the devotion of his
soldiers. Nevertheless, he might have been foiled by Marco
del Pont, the captain general of Chile; but that commander,

194 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

deceived by the false moves of San Martin, had guarded the
Los Patos and Uspallata passes lightly. San Martin was a
military genius. The student of history will search long in
military annals to find a campaign more carefully matured,
more systematically prepared for, and more successfully ex-
ecuted than his march over the Andean range. Although San
Martin’s army was much smaller than Napoleon’s army which
surmounted the Alps in 1800, yet it is hardly too much to say
that the passage of the Andes had a more abiding influence
upon history. The march of San Martin prepared the way
for the establishment of the independence of Chile and Peru.
This heroic march was San Martin’s greatest achievement.

But when San Martin had reached the valley of Aconcagua,
he had not yet set foot upon the plains of Chile. Royalist
soldiers fled from the passes, while Spanish troops marched
from Santiago toward the mountains. When San Martin
heard of the movements of the royalists he decided to attack
them at once, before they had an opportunity to concentrate
their forces at the outlet of the passes. He divided his army
into two parts : the right division was led by General Soler, and
the left by General O’Higgins. Preparations were made for
a night march in order to surprise the enemy. Early on the
morning of February 12, San Martin’s soldiers deployed from
mountain paths and attacked the royalists, who were com-
manded by Colonel Rafael Maroto, in front and on the left
flank. After a stubborn resistance, Maroto’s soldiers were
dislodged from their position near the village of Chacabuco
and thrown into disorder. The decisive victory of Chacabuco
opened the road to Santiago. Marco del Pont fled precipi-
tately from the capital ; and two days later San Martin entered
it in triumph. As the reports of this victory spread through-
out Chile, the spirit of discontent with Spanish rule was stimu-
lated, and the prestige of the Spanish arms was lowered. On
February 28, 1817, Jose de San Martin wrote jubilantly to
Pueyrredon saying that ‘in twenty- four days his soldiers had
completed the campaign, defeated the tyrants, and given lib-

Bernardo O’Higgins

(From a Portrait in the Collection of Sr. Carlos I. Salas, Buenos

Aires)

JOSE DE SAN MARTIN

195

erty to Chile.’ When the news of this victory was received in
Buenos Aires great rejoicings took place: salvos were fired
from the fortresses and from the ships in the river. The gov-
ernment of the United Provinces appointed the victorious
commander brigadier general ; it provided that he was to be
presented with a pair of pistols and a sword. The cabildo of
Buenos Aires provided that a gold medal should be struck off
and a sword be forged for presentation to the victorious com-
mander. The cabildo of Tucuman made him perpetual regi-
dor. A cabildo abierto of Santiago unanimously selected the
victor of Chacabuco to be the governor of Chile.

With characteristic devotion to his grand design, San Mar-
tin declined the appointment as brigadier general of the United
Provinces; he also declined to accept the position of governor
of Chile, for he considered it his duty to remain at the head
of the army and to carry the war into Peru. Accordingly
some prominent citizens of Santiago elected General O’Hig-
gins Supreme Director of Chile : this act virtually made O’Hig-
gins dictator of the liberated territory. O’Higgins soon se-
lected a few secretaries to aid him in the government of Chile ;
he appointed Miguel Zanartu secretary of state, and Jose
Ignacio Zenteno secretary of war. A little later Hipolito Vil-
legas was placed in charge of Chile’s treasury. Meanwhile
Director O’Higgins issued decrees providing that the Chileans
should take an oath of fidelity to the new government, that
the property of the royalists should be confiscated, and that a
Chilean army should be organized.

O’Higgins and San Martin soon discussed the plans for an
attack upon the royalists in Peru. Both leaders felt that to
secure control of the Pacific Ocean a navy was necessary.
To secure aid in this enterprise San Martin soon re-crossed
the Andes, accompanied only by two companions, and pro-
ceeded to Buenos Aires. In the end of March he quietly en-
tered that city, where he soon held conferences with Pueyrre-
don. In accordance with a resolution of the congress of
Tucuman, Manuel de Aguirre, a merchant of Buenos Aires,

196 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

was appointed by Pueyrredon agent from the United Prov-
inces to the United States of North America. By an agree-
ment between Pueyrredon and San Martin, who had been
given the requisite authority by O’Higgins, Aguirre was also
commissioned to act for Chile. That agent was instructed to
enter into whatever negotiations might be necessary in the
United States for the purchase of war vessels. He carried
with him two hundred thousand pesos, and was authorized to
borrow funds in the United States. Aguirre took with him a
letter addressed by San Martin to the president of the United
States which declared that the great object of the mission was
to secure in that country a squadron of vessels to promote
the liberation of Peru. Aguirre arrived in Washington in
July, 1817; he soon attempted to execute his commission. He
informed President Monroe of the declaration of independence
of the United Provinces. In vain he pleaded with the secre-
tary of state, John Quincy Adams, for the recognition of the
United Provinces as a sovereign power and for the negotia-
tion of a treaty of amity and commerce between that nation
and the United States. At the same time Aguirre was bar-
gaining with merchants and ship-owners for vessels and muni-
tions for his struggling compatriots. As the United States
government was pursuing a neutral policy in the struggle be-
tween Spain and her revolted colonies, after securing two
vessels of war, Aguirre was arrested for violating the neutral-
ity law. Finally he despatched two vessels, the Curiaco and
the Horiaco, to Buenos Aires. In 1818 the Curiaco, re-
christened the Independencia, joined Chile’s squadron in the
Pacific Ocean.

In the meantime the Chilean patriots were making progress.
On June 9, 1817, shortly after the return of San Martin from
Buenos Aires, Hilario de Quintana, who was acting as the
director during the absence of O’Higgins from the capital,
issued a decree providing for the coinage of money bearing
the inscription “Liberty, Union, and Strength, — Independent
Chile.” The official declaration of Chilean independence pur-

JOSE DE SAN MARTIN

197

ported to be signed at Concepcion on January i, 1818, by
Director O’Higgins and his three ministers. The declaration
asserted that the rule of Spain in America was based upon
force, that the revolution of September 18, 1810, was the
first step which Chile had taken to fulfill her high destiny, and
that the ensuing war with Spain had inspired the inhabitants
of Chile with the determination to separate from the mother-
land. It also declared that the citizens of Chile had decided in
favor of an immediate declaration of independence from Spain.
Hence the announcement was made that “the continental
territory of Chile and the adjacent islands” formed “in fact
and by right, a free, independent, and sovereign state, which
will remain forever separated from the Spanish monarchy with
full power to adopt a suitable system of government.”

In his monumental history of Chile, Diego Barros Arana
states that this declaration was drafted by Miguel Zanartu
and revised by Bernardo O’Higgins. Barros Arana also de-
clares that O’Higgpns added to the clause declaring that Chile
was to be forever independent of Spain, the words “and of
any other state” — a phrase which was not inserted in the of-
ficial declaration as printed. The Chilean historian also affirms
that the document was subsequently antedated, for Bernardo
O’Higgins actually signed the declaration of independence at
Talca on January 2, 1818.

On February 7, 1818, a proclamation was issued by the
government of Chile declaring that February 12 had been se-
lected as the day when the independence of Chile from Spain
was to be formally announced. The proclamation contained
provisions concerning the arrangements for the ceremony.
Accordingly on the forenoon of February 12 — the first anni-
versary of the battle of Chacabuco — the tribunals and the cor-
porations of Santiago, with the leading officials, including Jose
de San Martin and Tomas Guido, the envoy of the govern-
ment of the United Provinces, proceeded from the palace of
government to a stage which had been erected in the great
square. On that stage in the presence of an enthusiastic crowd

200 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

influence of an agent in London, Jose Antonio Alvarez Con-
darco, Chile secured a most valuable recruit; for Lord Coch-
rane, an able and resourceful naval officer who had fallen
into disgrace in England, was induced to enlist in the cause
of South-American independence. Soon after the arrival of
Lord Cochrane at Valparaiso in November, i8i8, he was made
the commander of the Chilean navy. Shortly afterwards
Admiral Cochrane engaged in some daring exploits. He at-
tacked the fortified port of Callao, but without success; and,
in February, 1820, he captured the port of Valdivia. The
spectacular deeds of Lord Cochrane under the Chilean flag
soon frightened the Spaniards, who nicknamed him El Diablo
There were some Platean leaders who still dreamed of
founding a monarchy at Buenos Aires. When he heard ru-
mors of those designs, the ambassador of France in England,
the Marquis of Osmond, sent Colonel le Moyne to that city
on a secret mission. After arriving there, this agent held
several conferences with Director Pueyrredon. On Septem-
ber 2, 1818, Le Moyne reported that Pueyrredon secretly fa-
vored the establishment of a monarchy in the United Provinces
under French influence, while Belgrano and San Martin fa-
vored the establishment of a monarchy there under English
influence. It is significant that in October, 1818, the govern-
ment of the United Provinces sent Jose V. Gomez, an ec-
clesiastic, on a mission to Europe with instructions which
directed him to enter into negotiations with the government
of France. In May, 1819, Gomez had conferences with Mar-
quis Dessolle, the French minister of foreign affairs, concern-
ing the creation of an independent kingdom in the United
Provinces with a European prince as its sovereig^n. Baron
Dessolle evidently thought that the separation of the United
Provinces from Spain was almost inevitable. The role which
he wished to play was that of mediator between those provinces
and Spain : he proposed a scheme for the coronation of Prince
Charles Louis, Duke of Lucca, as king of the United
Provinces. Gomez, however, did not favor the project because

JOSE DE SAN MARTIN

201

that duke was a prince of Spain. In the same month when
these negotiations were pending, the congress of the United
Provinces adopted a constitution which vested the supreme
power of the state in a director, a native-born citizen who
should swear to preserve the integrity and independence of
the national territory. The legislative authority was vested in
a senate and a house of representatives. In June, 1819, Pueyr-
redon renounced the position of supreme director: he was
succeeded by General Rondeau. When Director Rondeau
heard of the negotiations of Gomez, he sent a message to con-
gress regarding the candidacy of the Duke of Lucca for the
throne of the United Provinces. The aspirations of some
Platean leaders are suggested by the surprising fact that the
members of congress decided to accept that duke as their
monarch upon certain conditions. But in the same month,
the new French minister of foreign affairs, Baron Pasquier,
informed Gomez that his government had withdrawn com-
pletely from the project of making a Spanish prince the king
of the United Provinces. Thus the negotiations of 1819 for
the establishment of a European dynasty in South America
ended fruitlessly.

The discord and anarchy in the United Provinces, which
made some leaders favor the establishment of a monarchy
there, hindered the preparations for San Martin’s expedition
against Peru. The government at Buenos Aires even ordered
San Martin to lead his soldiers back across the Andes. But
instead of obeying that command, and thus, for the time being
at least, relinquishing his long-cherished project, San Martin
resigned his office as general of the army of the Andes, de-
claring that the director who had appointed him to the com-
mand was no longer in power. At the instance of San Martin,
however, this resignation was referred to his army for con-
sideration. At the town of Rancagua on April 2, 1820, a
junta of his officers declared that San Martin was still the
commander of the army of the Andes. The Platean soldiers
of San Martin thus acted in defiance of their own government.

202 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

while San Martin sanctioned their action by retaining the
command of the army. In truth the so-called act of Rancagua
was a revolutionary measure : — San Martin and his soldiers
virtually renounced the governmental authority of the United
Provinces.

About one month after the act of Rancagua, the Chilean
government appointed San Martin commander-in-chief of the
army of liberation. On July 22, 1820, General San Mar-
tin issued a proclamation from Valparaiso addressed to the
people of the United Provinces of la Plata. In his farewell
proclamation San Martin attributed the anarchy prevailing
in those provinces to the attempt “to establish a federal gov-
ernment in a thinly-settled country where there were many
jealousies and local antipathies, where the citizens were poorly
acquainted with political affairs, and where revenues to pay the
expenses of the national government were lacking.” To justify
his action in declining to return to Buenos Aires, he asserted
that, if he had taken part in the dissensions of the United
Provinces, he would have been forced to relinquish his project
for the liberation of Peru. “Provinces of the Rio de la Plata,”
said General San Martin, “this proclamation will be my last
response to my calumniators: I can do no more than to risk
my life and my honor for the sake of my native land. What-
ever may be my lot in the campaign against Peru, I shall
demonstrate that ever since I returned to my native land,
her independence has been my constant thought, and that I
never entertained any other ambition than to merit the hatred
of the ungrateful and the esteem of the virtuous.”

In August, 1820, the expedition for the liberation of Peru
gathered at Valparaiso. The fleet consisted of eight war ves-
sels and sixteen transports which carried supplies for six
months. The soldiers on board those vessels numbered over
four thousand ; more than one-half of them belonged ostensibly
to the army of the Andes, while the remainder were mainly
Chileans. There were about three hundred officers, most of
whom were from the Plateau provinces, or from Europe. A

203

JOSE DE SAN MARTIN

large number of the European military officers were from
England. The seamen and marines in the expedition num-
bered about sixteen hundred : among the naval officers there
were also a number of men of European birth. The flag
of independent Giile flew from the masthead of the frigate
O’Higgitus, commanded by Lord Cochrane, which led the small
squadron out of the harbor of Valparaiso on August 20, 1820.
When Cochrane opened his sealed instructions, signed by
O’Higgins and Zenteno, he read these words : “The object
of the expedition is to free Peru from Spanish domination,
to raise her to the rank of a free and sovereign power, and
thus to complete the sublime task of establishing the inde-
pendence of South America. Captain General Jose de San
Martin is the chief to whom the government of the republic
has given the entire charge of this great enterprise.”

In secret instructions San Martin was informed that, if
Admiral Cochrane disobeyed his commands, he was author-
ized to remove that admiral and to replace him by an officer
who merited his entire confidence. In conferring these ex-
tensive powers upon San Martin, O’Higgins declared that the
expedition was to liberate the Peruvian people, who should
be organized in the political form which was best adapted to
the circumstances of Peru and of South America. Director
O’Higgins, to whose exertions the equipment of the expedi-
tion was largely due, had written a proclamation for distribu-
tion among the Peruvians in which he declared: ‘You shall
be free and independent ; you shall form your government and
your laws according to the spontaneous wish of your own
representatives. The soldiers of the army of liberation, your
brothers, will exert no influence, military or civil, direct or
indirect, in your social system. Whenever it suits you, dismiss
the army which marches to protect you. A military force
should never occupy the territory of a free people unless in-
vited by its legitimate magistrates.’

The viceroyalty of Peru — the last important stronghold of
Spanish power on the American continent — stretched north-

204 rise of spanish-american republics

ward along the Pacific coast from the desert of Atacama to
the presidency of Quito. On the east it was bounded by
Brazil and the presidency of Charcas. Its chief port was the
fortified city of Callao. A short distance east of Callao was
the capital city of Lima, which Peruvians often designated as
the city of the kings. After i8io there had been uprisings
against Spanish rule in Peru — notably the revolt of Pumacahua
at Cuzco in 1814 — but no sustained movement such as we
have noticed in the basin of la Plata. A number of intellectual
leaders had attempted to arouse the Peruvian people against
the motherland. Of these leaders we may only notice Hipolito
Unanue of the University of San Marcos, and Jose de la Riva
Aguero, a young lawyer who was the most able and in-
fluential member of the revolutionary coteries. While the
army of the Andes was still at Mendoza, General Joaquin de
Pezuela, who had commanded the royalist army in Upper
Peru, was appointed viceroy of Peru. When Pezuela learned
that San Martin was preparing an expedition against his vice-
royalty, he earnestly hoped that the Spanish government would
send him reenforcements, but his hopes were disappointed.

On September 8, 1820, the first division of the army of
liberation landed near Pisco, south of Callao. On that day
General San Martin issued an address to his soldiers declar-
ing “that their main duty was to console South America, and
that they were not to make conquests but to free peoples.”
He asked them “to respect the rights of their Peruvian broth-
ers, as they had respected the rights of the Chileans after the
battle of Chacabuco.” In an address to the people of Peru
he spoke of the triumph of the constitutionalists in the Spanish
peninsula as follows : “The revolution in Spain is of the same
nature as our own revolution ; both of these revolutions were
caused by oppression : the object of both revolutions is to
ensure liberty to the people. But Spanish America can view
the liberal constitution of Spain only as a fraudulent attempt to
conserve a colonial system which can no longer be maintained
by force.”

JOSE DE SAN MARTIN 205

In accordance with instructions from the constitutional
government of Spain, Viceroy Pezuela selected two commis-
sioners, Count Villar de Fuente and Lieutenant Dionisio
Capuz, to treat with San Martin regarding peace. San Martin
sent as commissioners Colonel Tomas Guido, his aide-de-
camp, and Juan Garcia del Rio, a cultured creole of New
Granada who was acting as his secretary. On September 26
both parties agreed to observe an armistice during the nego-
tiations. The commissioners held some conferences at Mira-
flores, near Lima. The agents of Pezuela asked that the con-
stitution of 1812 should be accepted by the Chileans and by
the army of San Martin, while the agents of San Martin
asked that the independence of Peru should be recognized by
Spain. In the course of the negotiations San Martin’s agents
evidently intimated that they might agree to a compromise
which would provide for the coronation in South America of
a European prince. According to the viceroy those agents
even suggested that the prince might be selected from the
ruling dynasty of Spain. However, the commissioners could
not reach an agreement, evidently because Pezuela thought
that to negotiate for the establishment of a European prince
in South America was to exceed his authority. Pezuela also
questioned the authority of San Martin to engage in such ne-
gotiations. In announcing to the people of Peru the outcome
of the negotiations at Miraflores, San Martin declared that
his functions as general of the army of liberation would cease
upon the day when the Peruvians manifested their wishes con-
cerning their governmental institutions.

When he decided to break off negotiations with Pezuela,
San Martin sent a part of his army under General Arenales
toward the Andean range, and meanwhile he feigned an at-
tack upon Lima. Arenales made a venturesome march north-
ward; and on December 6, he defeated the royalists at Pasco,
a short distance northwest of Lima. In the end of October,
San Martin reembarked his army and sailed along the coast

2o6 rise of spanish-american republics

to Huaura, a point about seventy miles north of Lima, where,
on January 8, 1821, he was joined by Arenales.

In the same month the vacillating viceroy, who was in
camp near Lima, was deposed by a junta of his officers led by
Generals Canterac and Valdez and replaced by General Jose de
la Serna, who had succeeded him as commander of the army
in Upper Peru. Soon afterwards La Serna, who thus vir-
tually became viceroy of Peru, invited San Martin to enter
into negotiations for reconciliation with Spain. Commissioners
were again selected by the contending parties : again no agree-
ment was reached. The attempt was revived in the following
March, when Manuel Abreu, who had been commissioned by
the Spanish government to negotiate with the Chilean in-
surgents, arrived at Huaura. After Abreu and San Martin met.
La Serna appointed new commissioners to negotiate with San
Martin for peace. The upshot of the negotiations was that
an armistice was arranged at Punchauca on May 23, 1821,
which provided for an interview between La Serna and San
Martin. On June 2 this interview took place at Punchauca
in the presence of the peace commissioners and the generals of
both armies. As a preliminary to any negotiations, San Martin
demanded the recognition of Peruvian independence. Should
this be granted, he proposed that a governmental junta be
established in Peru. To San Martin the occasion seemed op-
portune for the presentation of his favorite political project.
Again he proposed the establishment of a constitutional mon-
archy in South America, suggesting that the king, or emperor,
might be a prince of the Spanish royal house. He even pro-
posed to send envoys to Spain to urge his project upon the
government. After conferring with the officers of his army.
La Serna declined to agree to these proposals. It is note-
worthy that this project bore some resemblance to the Plan
of Iguala, which unknown to San Martin, had been proclaimed
in Mexico three months before the armistice of Punchauca.
When San Martin heard of the progress of the Iturbidista
movement in Mexico, he broached his favorite design to

207

JOSE DE SAN MARTIN

General Canterac, but that officer firmly replied that events in
New Spain would in no wise influence him to adopt a meas-
ure which was not in harmony with the views of the Spanish
nation. The interpretation which San Martin later gave to
the negotiations with the Spaniards should be noticed : namely,
that his object was to compromise the Spanish commanders
by inducing them virtually to recognize the independence of
Spanish America.

A short time after the failure of the negotiations between
V'iceroy La Serna and General San Martin for the pacification
of Peru, Captain Basil Hall, an English traveler, had an in-
terview with the revolutionary leader on board a schooner
which was anchored in the harbor of Callao. In his journal
Captain Hall recorded his impressions of San Martin in these
words :

There was little, at first sight, in his appearance to engage
the attention ; but when he rose up and began to speak, his
great superiority over every other person I had seen in South
America was sufficiently apparent. He received us in very
homely style, on the deck of his vessel, dressed in a surtout
coat, and a large fur cap, seated at a table made of a few
loose planks laid along the top of two empty casks.

General San Martin is a tall, erect, well-proportioned,
handsome man, with a large aquiline nose, thick black hair,
and immense bushy whiskers extending from ear to ear under
the chin : his complexion is deep olive, and his eye, which is
large, prominent, and piercing, jet black; his whole appear-
ance being highly military. He is thoroughly well-bred, and
unaffectedly simple in his manners; exceedingly cordial and
engaging, and possessed evidently of great kindliness of dis-
position: in short, I have never seen any person, the enchant-
ment of whose address was more irresistible. In conversa-
tion he goes at once to the strong points of the topic, dis-
daining, as it were, to trifle with its minor parts: he listens
earnestly, and replies with distinctness and fairness, showing
wonderful resources in argument, and a most happy fertility
of illustration; the effect of which is to make his audience
feel they are understood in the sense they wish. Yet there
is nothing showy or ingenious in his discourse; and he cer-

2o8 rise of spanish-american republics

tainly seems at all times perfectly in earnest, and deeply pos-
sessed with his subject. Several times during this interview
his animation rose to a high pitch, and then the flash of his
eye, and the whole turn of his expression, became so ex-
ceedingly energetic as to rivet the attention of his audience
beyond the possibility of evading his arguments. This was
most remarkably the case when the topic was politics. . . .

The contest in Peru, he said, was not of an ordinary de-
scription— not a war of conquest and glory, but entirely of
opinion; it was a war of new and liberal principles against
prejudice, bigotry, and tyranny. “People ask,” said San
Martin, “why I don’t march to Lima at once; so I might,
and instantly would, were it suitable to my views — which it
is not. I do not want military renown — I have no ambition
to be the conqueror of Peru — I want solely to liberate the
country from oppression. Of what use would Lima be to
me, if the inhabitants were hostile in public sentiment? How
could the cause of Independence be advanced by my holding
Lima, or even the whole country, in military possession?
Far different are my views. I wish to have all men thinking
with me, and do not choose to advance a step beyond the
gradual march of public opinion. The capital is now ripe for
declaring its sentiments, and I shall give them the opportunity
of doing so in safety. It was in sure expectation of this mo-
ment that I have hitherto deferred advancing; and to those
who know the full extent of the means which have been put
in action, a sufficient explanation is afforded of all the delays
that have taken place. I have been gaining, indeed, day by
day, fresh allies in the hearts of the people, the only certain
allies in such a war. In the secondary point of military
strength, I have been, from the same causes, equally success-
ful in augmenting and improving the liberating army; while
that of the Spaniards has been wasted by want and desertion.
The country has now become sensible of its true interests, and
it is right the inhabitants should have the means of expressing
what they think. Public opinion is an engine newly intro-
duced into this country ; the Spaniards, who are utterly in-
capable of directing it, have prohibited its use; but they shall
now experience its strength and importance.”

Possibly it was partly because of the increasing sentiment
in favor of independence in northern Peru that, early in July,

209

JOSE DE SAN MARTIN

the viceroy decided to evacuate the Peruvian coast. On July
6 the soldiers of La Serna marched out of the capital city
toward the Andes, leaving a garrison in Callao. A deputa-
tion from the cabildo of Lima at once invited San Martin to
enter the city. True to the policy which he had announced,
San Martin declared that, if the citizens of Lima wished to
declare themselves independent of Spain, he* was ready to
enter that capital. Captain Hall quoted him as saying: “All
that I wish is, that this country should be managed by itself,
and by itself alone. As to the manner in which it is to be
governed, that belongs not at all to me. I propose simply
to give the people the means of declaring themselves in-
dependent, and of establishing a suitable form of government;
after which I shall consider that I have done enough, and leave
them.” Soon after the departure of the royalists, San Mar-
tin’s soldiers occupied Lima. On July 12, Captain General
San Martin quietly entered that city. Captain Hall has left
an interesting description of the reception of San Martin
by the people.

A fine-looking woman offered him her sons for the Peruvian
service. Five ladies wished to clasp his knees at once. A “tall
raw-boned, pale-faced friar” praised the manner in which he
had entered Lima. A “beautiful young woman . . . threw
herself into the General’s arms and lay there full half a minute
without being able to utter more than, ‘Oh mi General! mi
General !’ She then tried to disengage herself, but San Martin,
who had been struck with her enthusiasm and beauty, drew her
gently and respectfully back, and holding his head a little on
one side, said with a smile, that he must be permitted to show
his grateful sense of such good-will, by one affectionate salute.”

By his addresses, proclamations, and letters San Martin
had instilled the idea of independence from Spain into the
minds of some Peruvians and stimulated it in the minds of
others. In accordance with his suggestion, the cabildo of
Lima now invited some prominent citizens to assemble in order
to consider in an open council the question of Peruvian in-

210 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

dependence. On July 15 this cabildo abierto informed San
Martin that the personages who attended the meeting had
agreed that ‘the general wish was in favor of the independence
of Peru from Spain, and from all other nations, and that
measures should be taken to sanction the popular will by the
proper oath.’ In a short time arrangements were made to
declare Peru independent. On July 28, 1821, General San
Martin, the chief officers of his army, representatives of the
University of San Marcos, some prominent ecclesiastics, many
nobles, the members of the andiencia, and the cabildo, accom-
panied by a military escort, proceeded from the former palace
of the viceroy to the great square of Lima. There, on a
spacious stage, General San Martin unfurled for the first
time the flag of independent Peru. “ ‘From this moment,’ ”
he is reported to have said in the proclamation announcing
the event, “ ‘Peru is free and independent, by the general wish
of the people, and by the justice vf her cause, which may God
defend.’ Then, waving the flag, he exclaimed several times
in a tone thrilling with the pure and celestial pleasure which
only a beneficent personage could feel: ‘Viva la patria! Viva
la liber tad! Viva la independencia!’ — expressions which, like
a festive echo, resounded throughout the plaza, amid the noise
of cannon, the ringing of all the bells of the city, and the
exclamations of universal joy.”

Thus the independence of Peru from Spain was pro-
claimed. Silver medals were scattered in the square. They
bore upon one side the inscription, ‘‘Lima being liberated,
avowed its independence on July 28, 1821”; and upon the
other side, ‘‘Under the protection of the liberating army of
Peru, commanded by San Martin.” On the following day
Te Deum was chanted and high mass performed in the cathe-
dral of Lima. Then the leading inhabitants of the capital
swore ‘‘to maintain and to defend with their opinions, persons,
and properties the independence of Peru from the government
of Spain and from any other foreign domination.” In the
evening a ball was given at the governmental palace, while

JOSE DE SAN MARTIN 211

the houses were decorated and illuminated. The consulate of
Lima erected a triumphal arch which bore an equestrian statue
of the liberator with saber in hand. The news of the cere-
monies which marked the proclamation of Peruvian inde-
pendence was published in Peru by the Gaceta del Gobierno
de Lima Independiente. Meanwhile, San Martin had taken
steps to make the people conform to the system of independence
and to “the new institutions of Peru,” or to leave Peruvian
soil.

Then San Martin had to decide upon a system of govern-
ment for the new state. This was a difficult task, for Peru
was in a peculiar position. A large portion of her territory
was still dominated by the royalists. There was no govern-
mental nucleus around which a national organization might be
formed. Instructions for the army of liberation which were
framed by the Chilean senate had provided that, after the
capture of Lima, a director, or a supreme junta, was to be
elected there, with full power to govern Peru ; but evidently
these instructions were withheld from San Martin by O’Hig-
gins. San Martin’s administrative policy was embodied in a
proclamation dated August 3, 1821. He announced that the su-
preme military and civil authority of the former viceroyalty of
Peru was vested in himself with the title of protector. He de-
clared that his object in taking this action was “to advance the
sacred cause of America and to promote the happiness of the
Peruvian people.” He said that there still were enemies to com-
bat in Peru ; hence it was imperative that he should continue to
exercise the civil and military authority. San Martin dis-
claimed any ambitious motives. The experience gained during
ten years of revolution in South America, he said, had taught
him the lesson that to convoke a congress while there still were
royalists in a country was to produce serious evils. He argued
that independence should first be secured and then liberty
might be established firmly. Again he declared that, at the
moment when he saw Peru free, he would relinquish his
office to make way for the government which the Peruvians

212 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

might wish to establish. “When I have the satisfaction of
resigning the command and giving an account of my actions
to the representatives of the people,” said San Martin, “I
am certain that they will not discover during the period of my
administration those traces of venality, despotism, and cor-
ruption which have marked the administration of the Spanish
government in America. To administer exact justice to all,
to reward virtue and patriotism, and to punish vice and sedi-
tion wherever they may be found, — this is the ideal which
will regulate my actions, while I am at the head of this
nation.”

The protector of Peru selected three secretaries to assist
him in the administration of the government. Juan Garcia
del Rio was made secretary of state and foreign relations;
Bernardo Monteagudo was made secretary of war and the
navy; and Hipolito Unanue was made secretary of the treas-
ury. Wide differences of opinion have been expressed by
various writers in regard to the wisdom of San Martin’s
proclamation declaring himself the protector of Peru. Perhaps
the judgment of Captain Hall is the fairest : “It was more
creditable to assume the full authority in a manly and open
manner, than to mock the people with the semblance of a
republic, and, at the same time, to visit them with the reality
of a despotism.” Unfortunately, however, the establishment
of a protectorate, or rather a dictatorship, did not harmonize
with the assurances which had been gpven to the Peruvians
concerning a free and independent government. At a later
time Lord Cochrane indignantly declared that San Martin had
tried to induce him to accept the title of “First Admiral of
Peru,” that is, had virtually asked him to turn over Chile’s
squadron to the Peruvian government.

On October 8, 1821, the protector of Peru issued a pro-
visional decree which was to be observed until a permanent
constitution was promulgated. The decree provided that the
laws of Spain which harmonized with it and with the declara-
tion of independence were to remain in force. It vaguely

213

JOSE DE SAN MARTIN

defined the powers of the protector and provided a council
of state to advise him in governmental affairs. It declared
that the judicial department of government should be kept
separate from the executive department. The precise form of
government which was to be established in Peru, however,
was tacitly left to the future. A short time after issuing this
provisional decree San Martin founded a military fraternity,
the Order of the Sun. His object was evidently to reward
the warriors who had fought to establish Peruvian inde-
pendence. The chief officers of his army were made members
of the order; certain funds were assigned for its maintenance;
and an academy was established for the education of the sons
of its members. While the establishment of that order pro-
vided a reward for soldiers of merit, yet, as it also furnished
a natural basis for a military aristocracy, it promoted jealousy
among the Peruvians. In this particular the protectorate of
San Martin resembled the rule of Emperor Agpistin I. of
Mexico. There is some significance in the fact that at a
meeting of the patriotic society of Lima, which was founded
under the auspices of San Martin, a member argued that
Peru was not ready for a democratic government, and that a
kingdom should be established there.

Several other decrees of San Martin the protector deserve
attention. On August 4 he issued a decree warning the Span-
iards who were secretly intrig^uing against the government
that they would be made to feel all the rigors of the law and
would be deprived of their properties. He declared that he
was aware of what happened “in the most secluded comer”
of their houses. On August 12 he issued another decree de-
claring that the children of slaves born in Peru after the
proclamation of Peruvian independence should be free. Three
days later the protector issued a decree which declared that
every person who had left Valparaiso with his expedition
should be considered as belonging to the Peruvian service
and entitled to a pension. On August 27 the tribute which
the Spaniards had levied upon the Indians was abolished.

214 rise of spanish-american republics

One of the most important decrees was that providing for the
establishment of a national library at Lima.

But San Martin had passed the zenith of his power. The
refusal to fight Canterac, who provokingly marched before the
gates of Lima, although justified in September, 1821, by the
surrender of Callao, nevertheless injured San Martin’s mili-
tary prestige. A bitter quarrel with the belligerent Lord
Cochrane respecting the payment of the officers and seamen
of the Chilean squadron undermined the protector’s authority,
and resulted in the withdrawal from Peru of the squadron
which had made her independence possible. In November,
1821, San Martin was attacked by a mysterious malady which
confined him to his bed, convinced him of the precarious con-
dition of his health, and made him desire private life. The
wings of the “new Icarus,’’ as Cochrane styled San Martin,
would not support his lofty flight. Many of the revolutionary
soldiers had become dissatisfied with the Fabian policy which
their general had adopted. Grave dissensions appeared in the
army of liberation. A jealous dislike of their austere chieftain
spread among the military officers. A conspiracy against the
authority, and perhaps even against the life, of San Martin
was discovered. Furthermore, in 1822, the defeat of the sol-
diers whom he had sent south to the Ica Valley in charge of
two Peruvians, Domingo Tristan and Colonel Gamarra, im-
periled the cause of independence and damaged his military
reputation. Lastly, suspicions were rife about the designs
of San Martin regarding the government of independent Peru.
Perhaps it was not simply by way of a jest that some of his
military associates spoke of him as “King Jose.’’

The suspicions of San Martin’s monarchical projects were
strengthened by rumors in regard to agents who were sent
abroad at the instance of the protector. In December, 1821,
with the advice of his council of state, San Martin had chosen
Juan Garcia del Rio and Diego Paroissien to proceed to the Old
World on a secret mission. The ostensible objects of this
mission were to solicit the recognition of the independence of

215

JOSE DE SAN MARTIN

Peru by European nations and to negotiate a loan of six
million pesos. Garcia del Rio and Paroissien were instructed
to negotiate a treaty of alliance with the government of Eng-
land. In secret instructions the agents were directed to ask
that a prince of the house of Brunswick should become the
emperor of Peru under a constitution framed by representa-
tives of the Peruvians. If the approaches of those emissaries
to the court of London were unsuccessful, they were em-
powered to make similar proposals to Russia, Austria, France,
and Portugal. They might even solicit the Duke of Lucca
to occupy the throne of the Incas. San Martin attempted
to secure the cooperation of Chile in his schemes; for he wrote
to O’Higgins: “I am persuaded that my views will meet with
your approval, for I believe that you will be convinced of
the impossibility of erecting republics in these countries. In
brief, I desire only the establishment of that form of govern-
ment which is adapted to the existing circumstances, thus
avoiding the horrors of anarchy.” At that juncture, however,
O’Higgins did not favor the establishment of a monarchy in
Chile. In a memorandum which San Martin’s agents wrote
concerning their interview with Director O’Higgins, they re-
corded him as expressing the view that the monarchical plan
was doubtless suitable for Peru, but that in Chile, where there
was no definite opinion concerning the system of government,
the best policy was to leave the government as it was. Ap-
parently San Martin’s emissaries never fully disclosed the
monarchical project to a single chancellery of Europe. For
after the middle of 1822, when, as will be shown in the fol-
lowing chapter, San Martin withdrew from the position of
protector of Peru, his emissaries no longer felt authorized
to negotiate with European nations for the creation of a
monarchy in America.

The dramatic manner in which San Martin retired from
public life, and the influence of that step upon the fortunes of
the revolution against Spanish rule in Peru, can rightly be un-
derstood only after considering the career and the aspirations

2i6 rise of spanish-american republics

of his Colombian rival. For, although under the inspiration
of San Martin’s leadership, Chile had been re-conquered from
the royalists and the city of the kings had been captured, yet
the struggle for the establishment of South-American in-
dependence was not yet crowned with success. The narrative
of that struggle is a serial story, which will be continued in
the chapter devoted to Simon de Bolivar, who, after ten years
of warfare, established the independence of northern South
America.

CHAPTER VII

sim6n de boiJvar

The BoHbar family, to name it with the mediaeval spelling,
was Spanish, and its ancestral home was at Marquina, a town
in Vizcaya near Bilbao. Simon de Bolivar, the founder of the
Bolivar family in northern South America, emigrated from
Vizcaya to Santo Domingo in the middle of the sixteenth cen-
tury. About 1588 he moved from Santo Domingo to South
America, where his descendants figured prominently in the
annals of Venezuela. They married into various noble fami-
lies: de Rojas, de Rebolleda, de Villegas, de Ponte, de Nar-
vaez; and they served as judges, alcaldes, corregidores, and
captains. In the eighteenth century, the Bolivars accordingly
held an enviable place in Venezuelan society. Nevertheless, it
is suspected that in the veins of that aristocratic family there
ran some Indian blood.

In 1772 Juan Vicente de Bolivar, the fifth lineal descend-
ant of Simon, married Maria de la Concepcion Palacios y
Blanco, who, like himself, had been bom in the city of Caracas.
The ancestry of Maria Palacios y Blanco has been traced back
to Juan de Palacios, who, in the seventeenth century, lived
in the Spanish province of Burgos. Two daughters, Maria
Antonia and Juana, and two sons sprang from this marriage.
The elder son, Juan Vicente, figures dimly in the early revolu-
tion ; for he was sent to the United States in 1810 as an envoy
of the provisional junta of Venezuela, and apparently perished
in a shipwreck on the homeward voyage. The second son,
Simon de Bolivar, was born in the city of Caracas on July 24,
1783. His father was a wealthy and influential citizen of Ca-
racas: he was a regidor of that city and a colonel of militia

217

2i8 rise of spanish-american republics

of the valleys of Aragua ; he owned rich copper mines in the
sierra de Aroa and various haciendas in the valleys of Vene-
zuela.

On July 30, 1783, the second son of Juan de Bolivar was
baptized Simon, Jose, Antonio, de la Santisima Trinidad. The
child probably received the baptismal name “de la Santisima
Trinidad” because his parents were accustomed to worship in
a chapel of Caracas which a member of the Bolivar family
had dedicated to the worship of the Holy Trinity, — a cult which
Simon supported throughout his life. Only a few years of
Simon’s boyhood were spent in his father’s house near the
Plaza de San Jacinto; for he was left an orphan at an early
age: his father died in 1786, and his mother died in 1792.
Soon after the death of his father, the child was placed in
charge of Miguel J. Saenz, a jurisconsult of Caracas, with
whom he lived for about two years. After the death of his
mother, the orphan was for a time under the guardianship
of Esteban Palacios, his maternal uncle. According to tradi-
tions preserved in the Saenz family, the little boy was diso-
bedient, talkative, and provocative, but mentally and physically
alert.

For about eight years Bolivar was under the tutorship of
Simon Rodriguez, an eccentric philosopher, who taught him
the rudiments of Spanish grammar, Latin, arithmetic, and his-
tory. A younger tutor, Andres Bello — who later became a
famous Chilean scholar — strove to teach the youth geography
and cosmography. Of his preceptors Bolivar liked Rodriguez
the best; years afterwards he described that philosophic tutor
as the wisest, most virtuous, and most extraordinary man : “he
was the companion of my childhood, the confidant of all my
joys and sorrows, the mentor whose advice and encouragement
have influenced me greatly.” In view of this intimate rela-
tionship it appears significant that in 1797 the favorite tutor
of Bolivar was arrested for complicity in a revolutionary con-
spiracy. When he was relea.sed from prison the philosopher
left South America. It is clear that Simon de Bolivar did

'V\.

Simon de Bolivar
(Medallion by David d’Angers)

SIMON DE BOLIVAR

219

not profit greatly by the admonitions of his tutors. In a bio-
graphical note one of his uncles declared that the boy read a
little and wrote badly. In truth, a letter written when Simon
was almost sixteen years of age shows that, in spite of his
exceptional educational advantages, he did not spell some
common Spanish words correctly.

At that time the youth displayed a passionate fondness for
athletic exercise and outdoor life. It is likely that Simon spent
many happy days on the haciendas which belonged to his fam-
ily. At an early age he followed in his father’s footsteps;
for on January 14, 1797, he entered the Spanish military
service as a volunteer in the battalion of white militia of the
valleys of Aragua. The son of the deceased colonel of that
battalion was soon promoted: on July 4, 1798, a royal order
was issued which made him ensign of the sixth company of the
Aragua militia. In the official reports of this company which
have been printed, the officers of his battalion spoke hopefully
in regard to Simon’s ability and declared that his conduct was
good. The youth evidently enjoyed militia service, but, as the
occasion was lacking, he did not participate in any campaign.

According to a custom which prevailed among some aris-
tocratic families of South America, Simon de Bolivar was sent
abroad to complete his education. At the instance of his
guardian, early in 1799 he sailed from La Guaira for Europe
in the ship San Illdefonso. As the voyage was made by way
of Vera Cruz, in March, 1799, Bolivar visited Mexico City.
From Vera Cruz the San Illdefonso proceeded to the Iberian
peninsula. For some time after arriving in Madrid, Simon
de Bolivar lived again with Esteban Palacios, who was in favor
at the Spanish court because he was an intimate friend of
Manuel Mallo, a favorite of Queen Maria Luisa. Apparently
the young South American also became one of Mallo’s confi-
dants. Years afterwards Bolivar declared that after winning
a game of tennis from the Prince of Asturias, he audaciously
declared that he would later deprive Ferdinand of the most
Drecious jewel in his crown. It is possible that this story was

220 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

an afterthought on Bolivar’s part, for in later years his early
life became enveloped in a romantic glamor.

While in Spain Bolivar met a relative of the Marquis of
Toro named Bernardo Rodriguez del Toro. The young man
soon became enamored of Toro’s daughter, Maria Teresa.
The youth of the lovers, however, made Maria’s father wish
that their marriage might be delayed. In September, 1800,
Bolivar wrote to his g^Jardian, Pedro Palacios, avowing a de-
sire to marry Maria Teresa and asking his consent to the
marriage. Meanwhile, for some reason or other, Bolivar in-
curred the displeasure of the Spanish government; in 1801 he
left the peninsula in disgust. On that trip he made a visit to
Paris, where he was much impressed with the achievements of
the First Consul, Bonaparte, “the hero of the republic.” His
love affair soon drew him back to Spain, where on May 15,
1802, Charles IV. granted him a permit to marry Maria Teresa,
a permit indispensable to officers of Bolivar’s rank. A short
time afterwards the marriage of Simon de Bolivar and Maria
Rodriguez del Toro was solemnized at Madrid.

Soon after the nuptials were celebrated Bolivar and his
girl-bride sailed from Spain for South America. The bride-
groom returned to his native land partly because of financial
reasons. Before Simon was two years of age a relative named
Juan Felix Jerez y Aristeguieta had conveyed to him an estate,
which, at a conservative estimate, yielded an annual income of
two thousand pesos. The fruits of that estate Bolivar could
enjoy only by residing in Venezuela. Furthermore, he was in-
terested in other properties, for he had been bequeathed a por-
tion of the estate of Feliciano Palacios y So jo, his maternal
grandfather. Although kept in ignorance of the total amount
of his fortune, yet Bolivar must have been aware that he was
one of the wealthiest young aristocrats of Caracas.

If Simon de Bolivar had hoped to live quietly on a family
hacienda at San Mateo in the beautiful valleys of Aragua — far
from worldly strife — his idyllic dreams were rudely shattered.
Soon after arriving in Venezuela, his young wife was stricket

SIMON DE BOLIVAR

221

ill. On January 22, 1803, she died. Many years afterwards,
when time had not effaced the impression made by his wife’s
death, Bolivar was quoted as saying that this bereavement
greatly changed the current of his life:

I loved my wife much, and, at her death, I took an oath
nevermore to marry. ... If my wife had not died, I would
not have made my second trip to Europe. It is probable
that there would not have been born either at Caracas or at
San Mateo the ideas which I acquired in my travels: in
America I should not have gained the experience nor should
I have made that study of the world, of men, and of affairs
which has served me so well during the entire course of my
political career. The death of my wife placed me at an early
age in the road of politics : it caused me to follow the chariot
of Mars instead of the plow of Ceres.

Soon after his wife’s death, Bolivar made another trip to
Europe. His second tour abroad lasted from 1804 to 1807.
The young widower visited Spain, France, Austria, Italy, and
England. On the voyage to Spain he spent some time reading
Montesquieu, Voltaire, and Rousseau. Some of Bolivar’s bi-
ographers declare — without presenting evidence to support the
assertion — that, soon after disembarking at Cadiz, the South
American was admitted into a secret society, which aimed to
establish the independence of the Spanish colonies. From
Cadiz Bolivar proceeded to Madrid, where he mourned the
death of Maria Teresa with her father. Thence he went to
Paris, where he apparently regretted the transformation of the
first consul into the Emperor Napoleon. At Vienna he found
his beloved preceptor Rodriguez engrossed in the study of sci-
ence. Rodriguez seems to have feared that the melancholy
young widower was falling into consumption. He told Bolivar
that the total amount of the fortune which he had inherited
was four million pesos. In a letter which he wrote in 1804
Bolivar extravagantly declared that, when the immense size of
his fortune was thus revealed to him, the Spanish language
could not express his emotion:

222 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

I went to London, where I spent one hundred and fifty
thousand francs in three months. Then I went to Madrid,
where I maintained the train of a prince. I did the same in
Lisbon. In brief, I everywhere displayed the greatest luxury,
and squandered wealth for the semblance of pleasure.

During this visit to the Old World, Bolivar indulged in
speculations regarding the destiny of his native land. At Paris
he discussed with Alexander von Humboldt the future of Span-
ish America. In the company of Rodriguez, who tried to
arouse the ambition of his pupil and to interest him in the
cause of science or of liberty, Bolivar visited many historic
spots in Italy. According to the recollections of both master
and pupil, in 1805 Bolivar took a solemn oath upon the Aven-
tine Mount to dedicate himself to the task of liberating America
from the yoke of Spain. Many years afterwards in a letter to
Rodriguez, Bolivar mentioned the circumstance in these words,
“You remember when we went to Monte Sacro at Rome to
vow upon that holy spot the liberty of our fatherland.” This
romantic trip through Europe obviously had a great influence
upon Bolivar. He strove to forget his bereavement in dissi-
pation; he fell under the spell of Jean Jacques Rousseau; and
his soul burned because of the enslavement of his native land.
The role of the great Napoleon appears to have made a vivid
impression upon him. Jose Gil Fortoul, the noted scholar and
publicist of Venezuela, has appropriately said that Bolivar’s
second trip to Europe was in the nature of a parenthesis be-
tween two great passions.

After making a brief visit to the United States, Bolivar
returned to South America in 1807. It seems likely that he
sympathized with those fellow-countrymen who were secretly
plotting to subvert Spanish rule in Venezuela. There is a tra-
dition that, in 1809, he was compromised by participation in a
conspiracy. Unmistakable evidence of Bolivar’s revolutionary
spirit was furnished after the creation of a provisional junta
in April, 1810, for — as mentioned in the chapter concerning
Miranda — that junta sent him on a mission to London. After

SIMON DE BOLIVAR

223

returning to his native land Bolivar became a leader ot the
Venezuelan revolution. He made a stirring speech in favor
of independence before the patriotic society, and served with
distinction under Miranda in the campaign against the roy-
alists of Valencia. In the second chapter Bolivar’s part in the
downfall of Miranda was discussed. After Miranda’s be-
trayal General Monteverde allowed Bolivar to sail for Curasao.
If, after the capitulation of San Mateo, Colonel Bolivar had
actually harbored wild thoughts of enlisting under Sir Arthur
Wellesley in the Spanish peninsula, those thoughts were dis-
missed when he became aware not only that the gold and silver
which he had sent to Curasao had been sequestrated, but that
Monteverde had confiscated his estates. Henceforth Simon
de Bolivar was dedicated to the task of liberating his native
land from Spanish domination. From the West Indies he soon
proceeded to the city of Carthagena where some revolutionists
were entrenched.

At this point we must glance at the revolutionary move-
ment in the viceroyalty of New Granada, which was, at times,
the theater of Bolivar’s activity. That viceroyalty extended
from Venezuela to Peru. Its mountainous character made it
well adapted to guerrilla warfare. Its capital, Bogota, was
styled by Humboldt “the Athens of South America.” In 1810
reports of the governmental conditions in Spain made certain
inhabitants of that capital, notably Camilo Torres, dream of a
new regime which would ensure to the inhabitants of the vice-
royalty the same rights as peninsular Spaniards.

Not until after the uprising of April, 1810, at Caracas, how-
ever, did a secessionist movement take place at Bogota. At
that capital, on July 20, 1810, an extraordinary cabildo, which
avowed allegiance to the Spanish regency, deposed Viceroy
Antonio Amar and vested the government in a provisional
junta. Shortly afterwards the deposed viceroy was deported
to Europe. On November 27, 1811, delegates from several
provinces who gathered at Bogota adopted a confederate con-
stitution for the “United Provinces of New Granada,” — a con-

224 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

stitution which met with some opposition from a faction led
by Antonio Narino. On July i6, 1813, a congress of dele-
gates from Cundinamarca — the central province of New Gra-
nada— which had assembled at Bogota, adopted a declaration
of independence from Spain. However, that declaration
framed at the ancient capital of the viceroyalty was not the
first which was made by the provinces of New Granada. On
November ii, 1811, the members of a junta in the city of
Carthagena — influenced by popular sentiment — framed a dec-
laration of independence which contained an explanation of
the motives that impelled them to decide upon a separation
from the Spanish monarchy. The principal motives adduced
were; the cession of the crown of Spain to Napoleon which
had severed the bonds between the Spanish monarch and his
people; the imprudent and provocative measures which the
patriot government of Spain had taken in regard to the vice-
royalty of New Granada; the inequality of representation
which the American colonies had been granted in the Spanish
cortes; and the lack of good government for the Spanish-
Americans. The members of the junta declared that they
were accordingly obliged to use those imprescriptible rights
which they had acquired because of Napoleon’s usurpations:

We, the representatives of the good people of the province
of Carthagena de Indias, with their express and public con-
sent, invoking the Supreme Being to witness the rectitude of
our proceedings, and asking the impartial world to judge of
the justice of our cause, declare solemnly in the face of the
entire world, that the province of Carthagena de Indias is
henceforth by fact and right a free, sovereign, and inde-
pendent state; that it is absolved from the submission, vassal-
age, obedience, and relationship which previously bound it to
the crown and government of Spain; and that as a free and
absolutely independent state, it can do everything which
free and independent nations can do. And, for the greater
firmness and validity of this declaration, we solemnly pledge
our lives and properties, vowing that we shall shed the last
drop of our blood rather than fail to fulfil) this sacred pact.

SIMON DE BOLIVAR

22$

“I am, Granadians, a son of unhappy Caracas who, escap-
ing miraculously from the midst of her physical and political
ruins, is still faithful to the just and liberal system which my
country proclaimed, and who comes here to follow the banners
of independence which wave so gloriously in these states.” Thus
spoke Simon de Bolivar in a manifesto which he addressed at
Carthagena to the inhabitants of New Granada on December
15, 1812. That manifesto contained a criticism of the policy
which had been pursued by the revolutionary government of
Venezuela and also a program of action for the revolutionists.
In the first place Bolivar criticized the Venezuelans because of
their humane treatment of the royalists : “The codes consulted
by our magistrates were not those in which they might learn the
practical science of government ; but those which have been in-
vented by certain benevolent visionaries, who, imagining chi-
merical republics, have thought it possible to attain political
perfection, assuming the perfectibility of the human race. Thus
it is that we have had philosophers in place of chiefs, philan-
thropy in place of legislation, dialectics in place of tactics, and
sophists in place of soldiers.” Bolivar denounced the spirit of
faction as well as the opposition to the maintenance of a regu-
lar military force. He declared that a federal government was
not adapted to the conditions existing in Venezuela. “Although
the federal system of government is the most perfect system
and the most apt to promote the happiness of man in society,
yet that system is the most antagonistic to the interests of our
infant states. Generally speaking, not all of our citizens are in
a position to exercise their political rights in the fullest meas-
ure, for they lack the political virtues which mark the true re-
publican,— virtues which are not acquired under absolute gov-
ernments that do not recognize the rights and duties of the
citizen.”

In the second place, Bolivar proposed, “as an indispensable
measure for the security of New Granada, the re-conquest of
Caracas.” He said that a defensive war would be disastrous
to the patriot cause ; for Spain could use Venezuela as a base

226 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

of operations against the entire continent of South America.
He maintained that the people of New Granada should wage
an offensive war against the royalists in western Venezuela ; he
exhorted them “to march swiftly to revenge the dead, to give
life to the dying, to free the oppressed, and to give liberty to
all.” He declared that a government should adapt itself to
circumstances, arguing that, in a turbulent age, the government
should show itself terrible ; that, without regard to constitutions
or laws, it should arm itself with a firmness equal to the threat-
ening perils. The glowing words of this manifesto were read
with interest by patriotic leaders of New Granada.

A junta at Carthagena accepted the proffer of Bolivar’s
services, and directed him to serve under Colonel Labatut
against the Spaniards. Early in 1813 by a daring campaign
in which he disregarded the wishes of Labatut, Colonel Boli-
var drove the royalists from the lower Magdalena and sub-
sequently from the valleys of Cucuta. Soon afterwards the
congress of New Granada commissioned General Bolivar to
attack the Venezuelan royalists. On March i, 1813, he issued
a proclamation to his soldiers which fervently expressed his
faith in their ability to expel the Spaniards, “From you, in-
trepid soldiers of Carthagena and the Union, the whole of
America expects her liberty and salvation.” In Bolivar’s fer-
tile mind the design to free Venezuela was apparently devel-
oping into a plan to liberate all of Spanish South America.

At Trujillo in the Venezuelan mountains, on June 15, 1813,
Simon de Bolivar issued a proclamation of war to the death
against the Spaniards, — a proclamation which he did not re-
scind until the middle of 1816. In that manifesto he de-
nounced the Spaniards for the violation of the treaty of San
Mateo and declared that their victims would be avenged. He
invited the royalists to join the patriot cause, warning them
that every Spaniard who did not support the patriots would be
considered a traitor and put to death. “Spaniards and Canari-
ans, count on death, even though you are neutral, if you do not
work actively for the liberty of V’enezuela ! Americans, count

SIMON DE BOLIVAR

227

on life, even though you are culpable!” Bolivar’s bloody de-
cree announcing a war of retaliation upon the Spaniards has
been much discussed by students of the revolt against Spanish
rule: — it divided the Venezuelans into two great camps, roy-
alists and patriots, and presaged one of the darkest chapters
of South-American history.

Early in August, 1813, after liberating several provinces
of Venezuela, the implacable leader triumphantly entered the
city of Caracas. Soon afterwards Monteverde sought refuge
in La Guaira. The political ideas which Bolivar entertained
at this time were suggested by a proclamation in which he de-
clared that the liberating army intended not only to avenge
the outraged dignity of the Americans but also to reestablish
“republican institutions.” He suggested that “an assembly of
wise and virtuous men” be convoked to decide upon the form
of government which should be established. He disclaimed
any desire for authority beyond that which was necessary to
safeguard the country’s welfare. On October 14, 1813, an ex-
traordinary cabildo of the city of Caracas proclaimed that
Bolivar was the captain general of the patriot soldiers : it
gratefully bestowed upon him the title of “Liberator of Vene-
zuela.” At once the liberator acted as Venezuela’s chief execu-
tive. He issued a decree declaring that natives of Venezuela
and foreigners were to enjoy the same civil rights. On Oc-
tober 22, 1813, he issued another decree which created the
order of Liberators of Venezuela. The professed object of
that decree was to make known to the Venezuelans the valiant
officers who had liberated them from Spanish domination.
The badge of this military order was a star with seven radii —
symbolizing the seven provinces of Venezuela — which was to
bear on one side the name of the person who had been granted
the honor, and on the other side the inscription “Liberator
of Venezuela.”

At that time Bolivar was virtually a dictator. Soon after
driving the Spaniards from his native city, Bolivar chose three
secretaries to aid him in the government ; a secretary of state.

228 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

a secretary of justice, and a secretary of war and the navy.
He said that a congress should be assembled for the purpose
of establishing a suitable government, but declared that the
war which was being waged in Venezuela made the convoca-
tion of such a congress impracticable. On January 2, 1814,
however, a cabildo abierto of the city of Caracas met to con-
sider Bolivar’s acts. The liberator informed this assembly
that he had not bestowed freedom upon Venezuela: “You

owe it to my fellow-soldiers. ... I am not the sovereign.
Your representatives should form your laws.’’ After paying
a compliment to Bolivar, Cristobal de Mendoza suggested that
the liberator should be entrusted with the task of joining New
Granada and Venezuela in an indissoluble union. In a diplo-
matic reply Bolivar praised his brave lieutenants; he declared
that a military despotism would not ensure the happiness of a
people, and that a victorious soldier did not acquire the right
to govern his own country. He told the assembly to select
magistrates and to establish a just government; he said that the
arms which had saved the republic would ever protect the lib-
erty and glory of Venezuela. Juan Dominguez then spoke
of the need of a dictatorship. Domingo Alzuru proposed that
Bolivar should be acclaimed supreme magistrate of the re-
public and thus relieved of his dependent position as delegate
of the congress of New Granada. Thereupon Bolivar spoke
again. He suggested that, after the war for independence had
terminated. General Marino, the liberator of eastern Vene-
zuela, ought to become the chief executive, and declared that
he would merely accept the position of supreme magistrate of
Venezuela until elections might be held. In this manner Boli-
var bound Marino to the revolutionary cause, strengthened his
own prestige, and secured recognition as the supreme magis-
trate. The apparent reluctance of Bolivar to accept the su-
preme command was characteristic. It was displayed in a
similar fashion on many subsequent occasions.

In 1813 a ferocious Spaniard, Jose Tomas Boves, at the
head of reactionary royalists, committed many acts of cruelty

SIMON DE BOLIVAR

229

against Venezuelans. The savage in Bolivar was aroused.
On February 8, 1814, he ordered the patriot commanders at
La Guaira and Caracas to shoot all the Spanish prisoners in
their dungeons and hospitals. Accordingly over eight hundred
royalists were killed in cold blood. The contagion of murder
spread. Patriots and royalists vied with each other in san-
guinary acts of vengeance. This is the period of Venezuelan
history which most closely resembles the lurid age in Mexican
history that was initiated by the revolt of Miguel Hidalgo.

On June 15, 1814, the fierce charges of Boves’ cavalry
routed the patriot soldiers at la Puerta. Bolivar and Marino
fled to Caracas, while Boves devastated the valleys of Arag^a,
captured Valencia and massacred its inhabitants in cold blood,
despite his promises that their lives should be spared. Of the
acts of Boves a royalist contemporary, Jose F. Hereida, said,
“It seems impossible that these acts should have been com-
mitted by civilized and Christian people under the banners of
Spain.” On July 6 Bolivar evacuated the city of Caracas and
marched toward Barcelona, while men, women, and children
fled precipitately from Caracas to escape the wrath of Boves.
In September Bolivar turned up in Tunja and made a report
to the independent government of New Granada concerning
the vicissitudes of his Venezuelan campaign. That government
soon empowered him to lead a military expedition against Cun-
dinamarca, which was maintaining a distinct government that
did not act in harmony with other provinces in the confedera-
tion. After a brief and brilliant campaign, Bolivar forced the
dictator of Bogota to capitulate on December 12, 1814. Early
in the following year the patriot government of New Gra-
nada was installed at Bogota. In May, 1815, when he heard
reports of the arrival of a strong royalist army in Venezuela,
the liberator embarked at Carthagena for the English West
Indies.

While sojourning in Jamaica, Bolivar addressed, on Sep-
tember 6, 1815, a remarkable letter to a gentleman who had
displayed great interest in the independence of South America.

230 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

In that letter, after surveying the Spanish conquest of Amer-
ica and the revolt against Spain, Bolivar expressed his thoughts
respecting the Spanish-American peoples. He compared the
empire of Spain in America with the Roman empire, which
crumbled into states that formed governments suitable to their
respective positions. He thought that the people of Spanish
America needed the fostering care of paternal governments,
which would heal “the sores and wounds of despotism and of
war.” Still, he declared that the project to establish one grand
monarchical government in Spanish America was a dream, for
a single monarchy would be “a clumsy colossus which would
fall by its own weight at the least convulsion.” He also
expressed an opinion adverse to the establishment of a number
of monarchical states, declaring that he did “not believe in
monarchies in America.” His prophecy was that Spanish
America would ultimately split into fifteen or seventeen inde-
' pendent states. With regard to the governments to be adopted
by those states, Bolivar declared in favor of republics. He
expressed the reasons why he preferred republics above mon-
archies as follows :

The well-understood interest of a republic is concerned
with its preservation, prosperity, and glory. . . . There is no
stimulus which excites republicans to extend the boundaries
of their territory to their own detriment in order that their
neighbors may enjoy a liberal constitution. They obtain no
right, they derive no advantage by conquering the neighbor-
ing states unless they make them colonies, conquests, or al-
lies after the example of Rome. But such examples are in
direct opposition to the just principles of republican systems;
and, I may say further, in manifest opposition to the interests
of their citizens. A state too extensive in itself, or by virtue
of its dependencies, ultimately falls into decay; its free gov-
ernment is transformed into a tyranny; it disregards the
principles which it should preserve, and finally degenerates
into despotism. Tlie distinguishing characteristic of small
republics is stability: the characteristic of large republics is
mutability. Such republics always drift toward empire. Al-
most all of the small republics have lived long. Among the

SIMON DE BOLIVAR

231

large republics only Rome sustained herself for several cen-
turies. This happened because the capital city was a republic,
while the rest of Rome’s dominions were governed by differ-
ent laws and institutions. ... I think that the Spanish-Ameri-
cans who are anxious for peace, arts, sciences, commerce,
and agriculture would prefer republics to kingdoms. . . .
Among the popular and representative systems of government
I do not approve of the federal system: it is too perfect; and
it requires virtues and political talents much superior to our
own. For a similar reason I dislike the mixed monarchy
formed of aristocracy and democracy, which has procured so
much fortune and splendor to England. As it is not possible
for us to select from republics and monarchies the most per-
fect form, let us not become demagogical anarchies or mono-
cratic tyrannies. These opposite extremes would carry us to
the same reefs, — unhappiness and dishonor; let us seek a
mean between them !

Bolivar then made some remarkable predictions concern-
ing the political destinies of the different sections of Spanish
America. Mexico, he averred, would first establish a repre-
sentative republic in which the chief executive would exercise
great authority and perhaps hold office for life. He predicted
that, if the dominant party in Mexico should be aristocratic or
military, a constitutional monarchy would probably be estab-
lished which would inevitably become absolute. He prophe-
sied that the provinces of Central America would form a con-
federation. “Its canals will shorten the distances of the world ;
they will draw closer the commercial relations of Europe,
America, and Asia, and will bring to that happy region the
tribute of the four quarters of the globe. Some day the capital
of the world may perhaps be located there — a capital which
may occupy the place that Constantine wished to give Byzan-
tium as the capital of the ancient hemisphere. At Buenos Aires
there will appear a centralized government where the military
class will predominate, as a result of internal divisions and ex-
ternal w'ars.” He predicted that the government at Buenos
Aires would necessarily “degenerate into an oligarchy or a
monocracy.” He declared that Chile was destined to be a re-

232 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

public, for her position, the customs of her inhabitants, and the
example of the Araucanian Indians alike encouraged the for-
mation of a democratic government.

I am inclined to believe that, if aay republic endures long
in America, it will be the Chilean. . . . On the contrary, Peru
contains two elements which are inimical to any just and
liberal rule: gold and slaves; gold corrupts everything; slaves
are themselves corrupt. The soul of a slave rarely appreciates
true liberty. A slave rushes furiously into tumult, or lives
humiliated in chains. I suppose that in Lima the rich people
will not tolerate the democracy, while the slaves and the free
negroes will not tolerate the aristocracy. . . . Peru will ac-
complish a great deal, if she secures her liberty. . . . New
Granada will unite with Venezuela, if they agree to form a
central republic, whose capital will be Maracaibo, or a new
city, which, under the name of Las Casas — in honor of that
hero of philanthropy — will be founded on the borders of the
two countries in the magnificent harbor of Bahia Honda. . . .
That nation should be called Colombia, as a sign of gratitude
to the discoverer of the New World. Its government may
imitate the English government, with the difference that, in
place of a king, there will be an elective executive who should
hold office at most for life, and should never be hereditary, if
a republic is desired There will be an upper house of the
legislature composed of members elected under no other re-
strictions than those existing in regard to the lower house in
England. I desire that this constitution should partake of the
characteristics of all forms of government, but should not
partake of all their vices. Colombia being my country, I have
an incontestable right to wish for her that form of govern-
ment which, in my opinion, is best.

Near the end of his prophetic letter, Bolivar mentioned
the project to establish a confederate government in Spanish
America. But he declared that differences of climate, geog-
raphy, and interests would make it impossible to form there
one great republic embracing all the revolted provinces. He
suggested, however, tliat a Spanish-American congress should
be assembled:

SIMON DE BOLIVAR

233

How grand it would be if the Isthmus of Panama should
be to us what the Isthmus of Corinth was to the Greeks !
God grant that some day we may have the fortune to install
there an august congress of representatives of republics, king-
doms, and empires to treat and discuss important subjects of
peace and war with the nations of the other three-quarters
of the world.

This letter suggests the liberator’s design to assemble on the
Isthmus of Panama an international American congress.
Therein are expressed the views which he entertained in 1815
concerning the best type of government for the states which
were destined to appear in Spanish America. His thoughts in
regard to the political fortunes of those states — considered
in the light of their subsequent history — give him a high place
among political prophets.

While the exiled liberator was dreaming of an American
state system, Spain’s soldiers under the command of General
Pablo Morillo, were completing the subjugation of northern
South America. Morillo had fought bravely against the
French invaders of Spain during the peninsular war. After
the restoration of Ferdinand VII., he was made captain gen-
eral of Venezuela, and was given charge of an expedition des-
tined for South America. In elastic terms Morillo was in-
structed to pacify the captaincy general of Venezuela, to oc-
cupy the city of Carthagena, and to aid the royalists in New
Granada. The soldiers in Morillo’s expedition numbered about
ten thousand: they were mostly infantry, who were veterans
of the peninsular war. This was the most formidable expe-
dition which Spain ever sent to subjugate her revolted colonists
in America.

After gaining possession of the island of Margarita, Mo-
rillo disembarked on the mainland, and, on May ii, 1815, he
entered the city of Caracas. There he issued a proclamation
summoning the inhabitants to join his victorious banner and
thus to ensure peace to their native land. He exacted a forced
loan from the citizens of Caracas, replaced the audiencia of

234 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

that city by other courts, and created a special junta to se-
questrate the property of his enemies. In June, 1815, Morillo
left Salvador de Moxo temporarily in charge of the captaincy
general of Venezuela, and proceeded with the royalist army
to the seacoast. On December 6, after a siege of three months,
Morillo entered the desolate city of Carthagena. Early in
1816, he marched into the interior of New Granada: in the
end of May, he quietly entered Bogota. Parties of royalist
soldiers sent from that city soon subjugated the outlying prov-
inces. Thus, in the course of 1816, the authority of Ferdi-
nand VII. was reestablished throughout Venezuela and New
Granada. At first, the god of war was no more favorable to
Bolivar than he had been to Miranda.

Bolivar’s career from 1815 to 1818 was extremely adven-
turous. From Jamaica he proceeded to Haiti, whence, in
March, 1816, he led a small expedition to Margarita. There
he issued a proclamation announcing that a new congress
would be convoked for Venezuela. His expedition was futile,
and he again took refuge in the West Indies. In December,
1816, he led an expedition to the continent of South America.
There he again announced his intention to convoke a congress.
He struggled against the sectional, or anarchical, designs of
Manuel Piar, who was eventually condemned by a military
court to be shot for insubordination and desertion. Bolivar
led his soldiers with varying success against the royalists.
In the words of the Spanish commander, Venezuela was “a
vast field of battle.” Ultimately Bolivar secured control of a
region in the Orinoco Valley : there, at Angostura, the pro-
visional capital of Venezuela was established. Early in Octo-
ber, 1818, Bolivar decided that a congress of delegates should
be assembled to make laws for Venezuela. A revolutionary
council of state which he had established accordingly made
rules for the election of delegates to a congress that was to
assemble at Angostura. As only a small section of northern
South America was free from Spanish rule, the delegates were
chosen in an irregular fashion. In certain towns thev were

SIMON DE BOLIVAR 235

chosen by the inhabitants ; in some other places they were
apparently selected by the revolutionary soldiers.

In an interesting passage of his memoirs, Daniel F.
O’Leary, who joined Bolivar’s followers as a private in a band
of hussars which was organized in England, described how
Bolivar was employed in the art of composition on a journey
to Angostura. O’Leary said that while ‘reclining in a canoe
on the bosom of the Orinoco River, or lolling in a hammock
under the shade of the gigantic trees that fringed its banks, in
the heat of the day, or in the cool hours of the night, as the
mood seized him, with one hand on the lapel of his coat and
a forefinger upon his upper lip, Bolivar dictated the constitu-
tion which he was preparing for Venezuela and the famous
address which has justly deserved the admiration of orators
and statesmen.’ On February 15, 1819, Bolivar delivered an
address to the congress of Angostura in which he again de-
clared that he resigned the supreme command. With regard
to one-man power in a republic, he made this interesting ex-
pression of sentiment :

The exercise of power by the same individual has often
been the end of democratic government. Frequent elections
are essential in popular governments ; for nothing is more
perilous than to allow power to remain in the hands of the
same man. The people become accustomed to obey him, and
he becomes accustomed to command them : from this originate
usurpation and tyranny. A just jealousy is the guarantee of
republican liberty. Our citizens ought rightly to fear that
the magistrate who has governed them for a long time may
govern them perpetually.

Bolivar again criticized the federal system of government :

As much as I admire the excellence of the federal Consti-
tution of the United States, so much am I convinced that it
is impossible to adopt that constitution in our state. To me
it is a marvel that the Constitution of the United States has
operated so successfully and has not been overthrown when
the first embarrassments or oerils appeared. But the United

236 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

States is a singular example of political virtue and moral
rectitude. That nation has been cradled in liberty, has been
nurtured in liberty, and has been maintained by pure liberty.
I will add that the people of the United States are unique in
the history of the human race. And I repeat: it is a marvel
that a government so weak and complicated as the federal
system should have endured under such difficult and delicate
circumstances as those which have existed in the United
States. But whatever may be true in regard to the govern-
ment, I must say with regard to the American people, that
the idea never entered my head to consider as identical the
characteristics of two peoples so different as the Anglo-Ameri-
can and the Spanish-American. Would it not be very difficult
to apply to Spain the English system of political, civil, and
religious liberty? It is even more difficult to adopt the laws of
the United States in Venezuela. Does not I’Esprit des lois
say that the laws should suit the people who make them?
That it is a mere chance if the laws of one nation suit an-
other nation? That laws should be adapted to the physiogra-
phy of the country, to the climate, to the soil, to the situation
of the country, to its extent, and to the manner of life of the
inhabitants? That laws should be adapted to the degree of
liberty which the constitution can sanction, to the religion of
the inhabitants, to their inclinations, riches, numbers, com-
merce, and manners? This is the code which we ought to
consult and not the code of Washington.

Bolivar maintained that the Venezuelans who framed the
federal constitution of i8ii had failed to incorporate in their
fundamental law that provision in the constitution of the
United States which was most worthy of imitation, namely, a
single executive. Instead they had adopted a plural executive,
which necessarily lacked continuity and responsibility. He
affirmed that, when Venezuela declared her independence, she
was not ready for a federal republic : the operation of a demo-
cratic government could be “sublime only when adopted by a
republic of saints.” He pointed out that the Venezuelans
were neither Europeans nor Indians : white, black, and Indian
blood mingled in their veins. Among the prominent leaders
of the revolutionary era, Bolivar realized most acutely that

SIMON DE BOLIVAR 237

the Spanish-American peoples had not only battles to fight and
constitutions to form, but sociological problems to solve.

Despite the mixed character of the Venezuelan people, Boli-
var thought that a republic would best suit them. “The gov-
ernment of Venezuela has been, is, and should be republican.
The bases of the Venezuelan government should be the sov-
ereignty of the people, the division of powers, civil liberty, the
prohibition of slavery, the abolition of monarchy and of privi-
leges.” He advocated, however, a political system modeled
rather upon the government of England than upon the gov-
ernment of the United States. He proposed that the legisla-
ture of Venezuela should be composed of a house of repre-
sentatives, the members of which were to be chosen by popular
election, and of a senate, the members of which were at first to
be chosen by congress from among the liberators. After the
first election, however, the senators were to hold their positions
by hereditary right: thus the race of liberators — “virtuous,
prudent, and valiant men” — might be preserved to the republic :

It has been justly remarked that the house of lords is
invaluable to the British nation because it forms a bulwark
of liberty; and I dare to add that the senate of Venezuela
will not only form a bulwark of liberty, but will be a means
of rendering the republic perpetual. . . . The more thorough-
ly you examine the nature of the executive power in England,
the more firmly will you be inclined to consider it as the most
perfect model for a monarchy, an aristocracy, or a democ-
racy. Let such an executive power be established in Vene-
zuela in the person of a president chosen either by the people
or by their representatives, and we shall then have taken a
long step towards national felicity !

He urged that the powers of this executive should be analo-
gous to the powers of the king of England :

Nothing is so perilous to a people as a weak executive;
and, if it has been deemed necessary to endow the executive
with so many powers in a monarchy, how infinitely more in-
dispensable is a strong executive in a republic ! . . . The chief

238 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

executive of a republic is an individual isolated in the midst
of society, charged at the same time to repress the tendency
of the people toward license and the inclination of judges and
administrators to abuse the laws. He is subject to the lower
house of the legislature, to the senate, and to the people; he
is a single individual resisting the combined attack of the
opinions, interests, and passions which agitate society. As
Carnot has said, he is a man who struggles unceasingly be-
tween the desire to dominate, and the desire to elude domina-
tion : in fine, he is an athlete struggling with a crowd. To cor-
rect this weakness the executive must be endowed with great
energy, — energy corresponding to the resistance which he will
encounter in the legislative and judicial departments as well
as in the people. If the proper authority is not placed at his
disposal, the executive department will inevitably become use-
less or be abused, which will be the death of government. It
will have as heirs, anarchy, usurpation, and tyranny.

Bolivar suggested that the judicial department of govern-
ment should be reformed by providing for the independence
of the judges, by establishing the jury system, and by for-
mulating wise civil and criminal codes. He also made some
suggestive remarks about a government of laws :

Venezuelans love their country but they do not love its
laws, because these laws are bad and the source of evil. . . .
If a sacred respect does not exist for the country, for the laws,
and for the constituted authorities, society is in a state of
confusion; there is a singular conflict of man against man,
hand-to-hand. . . . Our laws are the melancholy relics of
ancient and modern despotisms. • . . Let us dictate a code of
Venezuelan laws.

In the liberator’s governmental scheme the judiciary was to be
reenforced by a fourth department, or power, of government :

Let us give to our republic a fourth power with authority
over the youth, the hearts of men, public spirit, habits, and
republican morality. Let us establish this areopagus to watch
over the education of the children, to supervise national edu-
cation, to purify whatever may be corrupt in the republic, to
denounce ingratitude, coldness in the country’s service, ego-

SIMON DE BOLIVAR 239

tlsm, sloth, idleness, and to pass judgment upon the first signs
of corruption and pernicious example.

This moral power seems to be an elaboration of the pro-
vision for censors which was contained in the constitutional
projects of Francisco de Miranda. The upshot of Bolivar’s
address to the congress of Angostura was the proposal that
the Venezuelans should establish a centralized republic.

The liberator concluded his speech with an extravagant
burst of oratory in which he pictured the future of the state
which he thought should include New Granada as well as
Venezuela :

When I contemplate this immense reunited country, my
soul mounts to that height demanded by the colossal perspec-
tive of a picture so wonderful. My imagination takes flight
toward future ages and admiringly observes from them the
prosperity, the splendor, and the life which will exist within
this vast territory. I am carried away; and I seem to behold
it in the heart of the universe, stretching along its extensive
coasts between two oceans which nature has separated; but
which our fatherland has united by long and wide canals.
I see it serve as the bond, as the center, as the emporium of
the human race. I see it sending to the ends of the earth the
treasures of gold and silver which its mountains contain. I
see it, through the healing virtue of its plants, dispensing
health and life to afflicted men of the Old World. I see it
disclosing its precious secrets to the sages who know that
the store of knowledge is more valuable than the store of
riches which nature has so prodigally bestowed upon us. I
see it seated upon the throne of liberty, the scepter of justice
in its hand, crowned by glory, showing to the Old World the
majesty of the New World.

When asked by Bolivar to revise this discourse, the Vene-
zuelan scholar, Manuel Palacio Fajardo, spoke of Bolivar’s
style in these words : “The discourse much resembles the gar-
dens of painters where they love to place the pinks, the roses,
the lilies, the hyacinths, and other beautiful flowers by the side
of the borage and the scabious, that are also beautiful, but

240 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

which are not worthy companions of the rose and the lily. . . .
Your Spanish is not always pure ; but it is always select, rhyth-
mical, and elegant. There are audacious thoughts in your
discourse ; but their value depends upon the originality with
which you judge of our political situation.” The speech to
the congress of Angostura contains the fullest statement of the
political beliefs which Bolivar entertained early in 1819. As
an exposition of his political gospel, this speech occupies an
intermediate place between the prophetic letter which he wrote
while sojourning in Jamaica and the constitution which, in
1826, he framed for the republic of Bolivia.

To the congress of Angostura Bolivar submitted an elab-
orate scheme for the fourth power, — the moral power. He
proposed that the moral power should be vested in an areop-
agus composed of a president and forty members, who were
to exercise a full and independent authority over the manners
and the education of the Venezuelans. The jurisdiction of the
areopagus was to extend to individuals, families, departments,
provinces, tribunals, and even to the national government it-
self. Bolivar’s proposal for the establishment of a moral
power was viewed with interest by the congress of Angostura.
That body finally decided not to adopt the proposal, but to
publish it as an appendix to the constitution, in order that the
wise men of all nations might pass judgment upon it. Event-
ually the liberator was induced to accept the presidency, while
Francisco Antonio Zea, a citizen of New Granada, was made
vice president. Bolivar selected three ministers to aid him
in managing the government. The legislators of Angostura
cast aside the federal constitution which had been adopted
at Caracas, and, after several months of debate, they signed
on August 15, 1819, a provisional constitution which embodied
Bolivar’s governmental scheme with some modifications. By
that constitution the executive power was vested in a presi-
dent who was to hold office for four years, while legislative
authority was entrusted to a congress composed of a senate

SIMON DE BOLIVAR

241

and a house of representatives. The constitution declared that
the republic of Venezuela was “one and indivisible.”

While the congress of Angostura was framing a constitu-
tion for a centralized republic, Bolivar was conceiving a plan
for a campaign against the royalists in the central provinces
of New Granada. In his memoirs General O’Leary declared
that at a council of war held on May 23, 1819, during which
Bolivar, and his chief lieutenants — Soublette, Anzoategui,
Briceno, Mendez, Carillo, Ibarren, Rangel, Rook, Plaza, and
Manrique — sat on the bleached skulls of the cattle that had
been slaughtered to supply their soldiers with meat, the mo-
mentous decision was reached to carry out the hazardous plan
of a march against Bogota. Early in June, 1819, Bolivar had
decided to leave the patriot cavalry in the llanos of Venezuela
to check Morillo’s soldiers while he led the infantry to Casa-
nare, where he would join the patriot soldiers of New Granada
under their resolute general, Francisco de Paula Santander,
who for some time had been cooperating with the Venezuelans.
Thence by a daring march he planned suddenly to carry the
war into the heart of New Granada by an unexpected route.
He carried out this campaign by an achievement in mountain
warfare which deserves to be chronicled with San Martin’s
heroic march across the Andean range. At the head of an
army of about two thousand men, including those Englishmen
who constituted the British legion, the liberator scaled the
Granadian Andes and marched across the desolate plateau
of Pisba, which is about thirteen thousand feet above the level
of the sea. After terrible sufferings, on July 6, the weary
soldiers of Bolivar reached Socha. To the royalists the sudden
advent of Bolivar seemed like a terrible apparition. Inspirit-
ing his soldiers, gathering supplies, and enrolling recruits,
Bolivar prepared for a battle with the Spanish forces under
General Barreiro. It seems ultimately to have been Bar-
reiro’s intention to effect a junction with the veteran soldiers
under Samano, the viceroy of New Granada, at Bogota, before
meeting Bolivar in a decisive conflict. But, on August 7, the

242 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

patriot soldiers intercepted Barreiro’s march toward the capi-
tal at a bridge across the River Boyaca. There the royalists
were defeated. Sixteen hundred soldiers were captured, with
Barreiro and most of his officers, as well as a quantity of mili-
tary supplies. Two days later the discomfited viceroy fled
from Bogota precipitately. In dispatches to the Spanish gov-
ernment General Morillo lamented the battle ; in October,
1820, he confessed his inability to restore the king’s authority
in northern South America.

In the history of Colombia the battle of Boyaca was per-
haps more important than the battle of Chacabuco in Chilean
history. Boyaca freed the viceroyalty of New Granada from
Spanish rule, with the exception of the presidency of Quito.
This battle cleared the way for the conclusive combat in
Venezuela. Further, the victory of Boyaca was of consti-
tutional significance; for at the instance of Bolivar, on De-
cember 17, 1819, the congress of Angostura — which now in-
cluded delegates from several provinces of New Granada —
passed “a fundamental law” that proclaimed the union of the
former viceroyalty of New Granada and the captaincy general
of Venezuela into one state, the Republic of Colombia. The
executive authority was to be entrusted to a president and
a vice president elected by congress. The provisional capital of
the extensive republic was located at Cucuta. The republic
was divided into three departments which were designated as
Venezuela, Cundinamarca, and Quito. Each department was
to have a vice president who should also be chosen by congress.
Santander was made vice president of Cundinamarca; J. G.
Roscio was made vice president of Venezuela; while Zea was
made vice president and Bolivar the president of Colombia.
In this manner there was faintly traced upon the map of
northern South America the outlines of a new state that was
destined to be known as Great Colombia.

Just as the revolution of 1820 in Spain affected her policy
toward San Martin, so did it affect her policy toward Bolivar.
Like the viceroy of Peru, Morillo was instructed to negotiate

SIMON DE BOLIVAR

243

with the insurgents for peace on the condition that the con-
stitution of 1812 should be accepted. Hence, in June, 1820,
Morillo appointed commissioners, who, on November 25, signed
at Trujillo with Bolivar’s commissioners — one of whom was
Antonio Jose de Sucre — a treaty providing for an armistice
that was to last six months. That treaty delimited the zones
which should be occupied by the opposing armies during the
truce. It provided that the envoys whom Colombia might se-
lect to negotiate peace with Spain should be allowed freely
to sail from South America. Bolivar and Morillo agreed to
adopt a convention to regulate the war according to the law
of nations. On November 26 the commissioners signed an-
other treaty, which was apparently designed to check the
horrible barbarities of war, — a treaty which Bolivar described
as being “worthy of the soul of General Sucre.’’ On Novem-
ber 26 and 27, Morillo approved the treaty for the regulariza-
tion of the war and the treaty of armistice. By the treaty
providing for an armistice the revolutionists clearly gained an
advantage; because they were given time to prepare for the
final struggle with the royalists, — a struggle, which, as Spain
refused to recognize their independence, was inevitable. Years
later Bolivar was reported to have said that he negotiated the
armistice wdth Morillo merely in order that the world might
see Spain negotiating with Colombia as with an independent
nation. When speaking of an amicable meeting which he and
Morillo held at Santa Ana on November 27, the liberator
characterized that interview as “a diplomatic comedy.’’ When
Morillo informed his government of the treaty of Trujillo, he
advised it either to send reenforcements to the royalists or to
listen to the proposals of the revolutionists.

In accordance with the terms of the truce of Trujillo, in
January, 1821, Bolivar appointed Jose R. Revenga and Jose
Echeverria envoys to Madrid. The envoys were instructed to
negotiate a treaty of peace with Spain acknowledging the in-
dependence of Colombia. Within that republic Venezuela,
New Granada, and Quito should be included; but the envoys

244 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

were authorized to arrange a treaty which might exclude from
Colombia the Isthmus of Panama, or Quito, or both of those
regions. Further, the envoys were authorized to offer Spain
reciprocal commercial advantages. But they were to oppose
any proposal for a confederation including Spain and America.
At most, they might agree to a purely defensive alliance be-
tween Spain and Colombia. As it had at times “entered into
the views of Spain to propose a prince of the house of Bour-
bon for king of Colombia” — so ran the instructions — the en-
voys were instructed to object to such a proposition. This pro-
test was to be applied “not only to the Bourbons, but to every
reigning house of Europe, — either princes, or sovereigns, or
potentates. . . . Colombia will be independent, sovereign, and
free from all foreign domination, or will cease to exist.” After
the envoys had departed Bolivar was haunted by the fear that
false rumors of reverses suffered by Colombian soldiers might
induce them to arrange a compromise with Spain : he said that
Colombia and not Spain “should dictate the terms of peace
and reconciliation.” Nothing came of the negotiations of
Revenga and Echeverria, however; for, in August, 1821, the
government of Spain, alleging that Bolivar had broken the
armistice of Trujillo, ordered these emissaries to leave the
Spanish court.

Before this armistice had expired, with the aid of money,
supplies, and soldiers that were furnished by the former vice-
royalty of New Granada, Bolivar prepared for a fresh at-
tack upon the royalists in Venezuela. In April, 1821, the revo-
lutionary soldiers in northern South America were widely
scattered. General Urdaneta with several thousand men was
encamped at San Cristobal in New Granada. General Paez
Vvith the soldiers of the llanos was near the Apure River.
General Bermudez was at Barcelona, while Bolivar’s head-
quarters were at Barinas. The royalists, commanded by Gen-
eral La Torre — Morillo having sailed for Spain — were sta-
tioned at Barlovento, San Carlos, Calabozo, Caracas, Guanare,
and Coro. La Torre’s total available fighting force was about

SIMON DE BOLIVAR

245

seven thousand five hundred men. In March and April, 1821,
Bolivar decided to bring the scattered divisions of the patriot
forces together at a central point, and there, with an equal, or
a superior force, to give battle to the enemy. Accordingly
General Bermudez was ordered to attack the city of Caracas
as soon as the armistice of Trujillo had expired. The object of
that movement was to divert the enemy and thus to safeguard
the march of the other divisions of the patriot army, which
were to move towards the point of concentration. Colonel
Carillo was sent with a column of soldiers to attack the royal-
ists at Valencia and San Felipe. While the royalists were
being thus misled, beginning on April 28, the soldiers of Paez,
Urdaneta, and Bolivar made slow marches toward the ren-
dezvous. At Tinaquillo, on June 23, the liberator reviewed
the united army of Colombia, which was about six thousand
five hundred strong. On the morning of June 24 Bolivar led
his army toward the royalist forces under La Torre. On
reaching the heights of Buena Vista he could detect with a
field glass the royalist soldiers drawn up in battle array upon
the fields of Carabobo. According to his estimate — probably
rather high — there were about six thousand soldiers in La
Torre’s army. It was while surveying the situation, said one
of Bolivar’s aides, that the liberator was told of a devious
path leading to the rear of the enemy’s right flank. He de-
cided to send General Paez with a part of the army, including
the British soldiers, along that path to attack the enemy. Those
forces attacked the Spaniards in the rear, and the rest of
Bolivar’s army soon attacked the enemy in front. After a
short but fierce conflict, in which the steadfastness of the
British legion appears to have played no small part, the sol-
diers of La Torre fled from the field of battle pursued by the
exultant soldiers of the revolution. La Torre took refuge in
Puerto Cabello.

The battle of Carabobo was important, for it ensured the
independence of the northern part of South America from
Spain. This victory was more significant to New Granada

246 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

and Venezuela than the battle of Maipu to Chile and the
United Provinces. On June 25 Bolivar wrote to Santander:
“Yesterday a splendid victory signalized the political birth of
the republic of Colombia.” The first congress of Colombia,
which in accordance with the action of the congress at An-
gostura had assembled at Cucuta, soon took measures to per-
fect the union between New Granada and Venezuela. On
July 12 that congress passed a “fundamental law of union,”
which announced that the peoples of Venezuela and New
Granada were united in the republic of Colombia with the
understanding that its government should be democratic and
representative. The Colombian nation should be free and in-
dependent of the Spanish monarchy and of any other foreign
power; it should never become the patrimony of any family or
of any person. This law declared that the supreme national
authority should always be exercised through three distinct
departments, executive, legislative, and judicial. The terri-
tory of the republic of Colombia was to comprise the regions
included within the limits of the captaincy general of Vene-
zuela and the viceroyalty of New Granada, reserving for a
more convenient occasion an exact delimitation of its boundar-
ies. The republic was to be divided into six or more de-
partments. The law declared that this congress would act
as a constituent assembly for the republic, a state which
would assume all the debts that the two nations had con-
tracted separately. Until the constituent congress should se-
lect the flag and the coat of arms for the new republic, it
should continue to use the arms of New Granada and the
standard of Venezuela.

A committee soon presented to congress a project of a
constitution, which was adopted on August 30, 1821. This
constitution vested the legislative authority in a senate and a
house of representatives. It vested the chief executive au-
thority in a president, who, in a critical period, was to have
absolute power. The president was to hold his office for four
years ; he might be reelected only once, without an intermis-

SIMON DE BOLIVAR

247

sion. In case of the death or disability of the president, or
when he was commanding the army of the republic in person,
his civil functions were to be exercised by the vice president.
Provision was also made for five secretaries of state: foreign
affairs, interior, treasury, war, and the navy. The supreme
judicial power was vested in a high court of justice. Pro-
vision was made for an advisory council to the president
which should be composed of the vice president, the secretaries
of state, and a member of the supreme court. On September 7
the constituent congress selected the liberator as president.
After a show of reluctance, Bolivar accepted the presidency
on the express condition that he should be allowed to remain
at the head of the army, while the chief civil authority should
be exercised by Vice President Santander.

The congress of Cucuta passed many decrees and laws of
importance. Among these was a law providing that the city
of Bogota — “located in the heart of the republic, neaf rivers
that afforded prompt communication with its coasts and with
the departments of Venezuela” — should be the provisional
capital. A decree was sanctioned which authorized the execu-
tive to negotiate a loan of three million pesos. On July 21
a law was enacted which prohibited the slave trade and which
provided that the children of slaves born after the publication
of that law should be free. Another law was enacted which
provided that property belonging to the Spanish government
in the provinces conquered by Colombian arms should be
confiscated. The tribute which had been levied upon the
aborigines was abolished — and it was declared that these peo-
ple had the same status as other citizens of the republic. Stip-
ulations were made concerning the process by which foreign-
ers might become naturalized citizens of Colombia. In Oc-
tober a law was passed which divided the republic into de-
partments, provinces, and cantons that should be governed by
an administrative hierarchy composed mainly of intendants,
governors, and “political judges.” The former state of Vene-
zuela was divided into three departments; New Granada was

248 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

divided into four departments. These departments were sub-
divided into provinces. On October 4 congress enacted a law
which provided that the arms of the Colombian republic should
thenceforth be two cornucopias filled with flowers of the cold,
temperate, and torrid regions — the symbol of abundance —
and a sheaf of lances with a battle-axe and a bow and arrows
— the symbol of force and union. The national standard was
the tricolor first used by Miranda in 1806.

The constitution and the legislative enactments of the con-
gress of Cucuta are the most notable political achievements of
the South-American republics in the first quarter of the nine-
teenth century. They embody the ideals cherished by many
of Colombia’s leaders during her age of gold. On October
14 the president of the first constituent congress of Colombia,
Jose Ignacio Marquez, addressed to his countrymen an expo-
sition describing the labors of that congress and conveying
some wholesome advice : “Live in intimate and fraternal

union, with reciprocal tolerance, and permit neither jealousies
nor rivalries to enter your hearts. These are the arms which
your enemies have always used to sow discord. Union will
make you strong and will put an end to the revolutionary war.
Dissension will deprive you of repose and of the true bless-
ings of society. United, you are invincible : disunion is the
only enemy which you should fear. Obey the laws which are
your work; for they have been adopted by your representa-
tives, and respect the magistrates elected by your votes. Think
only of Colombia!’’ The student of South-American history
cannot but pause to conjecture what might have been the des-
tiny of Great Colombia if her people had followed this sage
advice !

The complete expulsion of the Spanish soldiers from the
former viceroyalty of New Granada took place shortly after
the adoption of the constitution of Cucuta. In November,
1823, Puerto Cabello, the last stronghold of the Span-
iards in northern South America, fell into the hands
of the Colombians. As early as November 28, 1821, a

SIMON DE BOLIVAR

249

junta on the Isthmus of Panama had declared that the
isthmus belonged to Colombia. Accordingly, early in the foL
lowing year, Vice President Santander issued a decree pro-
viding for the administration of the isthmus as a department
of the Colombian state. In the meantime, Colombians were
subverting the rule of Spain in the presidency of Quito. For
although Quito was not specifically mentioned in the consti-
tution of Cucuta as belonging to the republic of Colombia, yet
some Colombians considered it as an integral part of that
republic as provided by the fundamental law of 1819.

In the presidency of Quito the revolutionary cause had
suffered many vicissitudes of fortune. As early as August 10,
1809, the people of the city of Quito had established a junta to
govern on behalf of Ferdinand VII. But soldiers of the vice-
roy of New Granada soon overthrew that provisional gov-
ernment. In September, 1810, another junta was established
at Quito, which was swept away by Toribio Montes, who
had been made president of Quito by the Spanish regency.
In October, 1820, the inhabitants of Guayaquil revolted against
the Spanish government, and established a governmental junta
composed of three persons of whom a poet, Jose de Olmedo,
was the chief.

When, shortly afterwards, Bolivar felt that it was inexpe-
dient for him to lead his soldiers into the presidency of Quito
at once, he decided to send General Sucre as his substitute. In
January, 1821, the liberator ordered General Sucre to take
command of an expedition of one thousand soldiers which
was to proceed to Guayaquil. Antonio Sucre was thus made
the lieutenant of the liberator in the execution of his long-
meditated and ambitious plan to extend the revolution down
the Pacific shores. On April 4, 1821, the Colombian expedi-
tion destined for the presidency of Quito left Buenaventura in
the corvette Alejandro, two brigantines, and several transports.
According to statements made by General Sucre, he did not
have one thousand soldiers on board those vessels. After a
voyage of twenty-eight days the vessels reached Point St.

fSO RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

Helena, which was about thirty-five leagues from Guayaquil;
at that point Sucre’s soldiers disembarked, while the Ale-
jandro proceeded to Guayaquil with the munitions. Sucre
reached that port with his forces on May 6. As his soldiers
were in poor condition, he wisely decided to postpone a cam-
paign against the royalists : instead he sent a request to Bogota
for reenforcements. In the meanwhile he was not idle; for on
May 25, 1821, he signed a convention with the revolutionary
junta of Guayaquil. According to this convention, the prov-
ince of Guayaquil placed itself under the protection of Colom-
bia; that province conferred upon Bolivar the powers which
were necessary for the preservation of its independence; it
promised to cooperate in Colombia’s plans ; and it conferred
upon Sucre the power to negotiate with the Spanish officials
in the city of Quito. The agreement between General Sucre
and the provisional junta of Guayaquil helped to thwart the
designs of Jose de San Martin.

In August and September, 1821, Sucre had engagements
with the royalists. The most important of those conflicts took
place in the valley of Ambato where the royalists disputed
the march of Sucre’s soldiers toward the city of Quito. Al-
though Sucre did not feel ready to fight the enemy, he yielded
to the importunities of his companions and suffered a bloody
repulse. In a letter to Bolivar on September 18, 1821, Sucre
lamented his defeat as an “imprudent act,’’ which had mis-
used “the best opportunity to liberate Quito,’’ and had de-
stroyed a division of his army. As the news of that defeat
reached Bolivar soon after the victory at Carabobo, it probably
made him hasten his preparations to march to Quito. On
October 9, 1821, President Bolivar left Cucuta to carry the
conquering banner of Colombia southward. Vice President
Santander, who possessed much ability as a civil executive, was
entrusted with the political functions of the president. Be-
fore the liberator departed, the Colombian congress passed a
law authorizing him to organize as he deemed best the prov-
inces which he liberated from Spanish rule. On December

SIMON DE BOLIVAR

251

15 Bolivar left Bogota on the long march overland to Quito.
He led his soldiers up the beautiful Cauca valley, and tried
in vain to avoid marching through the province of Pasto,
which was controlled by devoted royalists. On April 7, 1822,
his march was disputed by two thousand soldiers, who, under
Colonel Garcia, occupied a strong position near the plateau of
Bombona. After a desperate conflict the royalists retired.
But the battle of Bombona was “a costly and barren victory” :
Bolivar was compelled to send to Bogota for reenforcements.
It was while the liberator was still maneuvering against Garcia
that he received reports of a battle which Sucre had won in
the presidency of Quito.

While the liberator was making the hazardous march south
from Bogota, Sucre, who had received reenforcements from
San Martin which were commanded by a Peruvian, Colonel
Andres Santa Cruz, led his soldiers across the Andes to
Cuenca. He evaded the royalists by a flank march, and on
May 17, 1822, he reached the valley of Chillo, a few leagues
south of Quito. Meanwhile the royalist army under General
Aymerich, who was now acting as the Spanish commander in
the ancient viceroyalty of New Granada, took possession of the
capital city. After some maneuvering, Sucre marched by a
difficult route to the volcano of Pichincha, west of that city.
Early on the morning of May 24, the soldiers of Sucre gazed
down upon the capital of the presidency.

General Aymerich soon accepted the challenge. On May
24 a battle, lasting about three hours, in which, said O’Leary,
Colombian dragoons and Platean grenadiers vied with each
other in bravery, was fought between Aymerich and Sucre on
the slopes of Mount Pichincha. The royalists were decisively
defeated. As a result of this battle, eleven hundred soldiers,
one hundred and sixty officers, fourteen pieces of artillery, and
seventeen hundred muskets, besides standards and munitions
of war, were surrendered to General Sucre. The capitulation
which followed the battle of Pichincha provided that the city
of Quito and also the territory under Spanish domination north

252 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

and south of that city were to be given up by the royalists;
the soldiers of Spain were to march out of the capital with the
honors of war; they were to be allowed freely to leave the
country ; and the officers were generally to be allowed to keep
their arms and their horses. When, on the afternoon of May
25, Sucre entered the capital city at the head of his victorious
columns, he was given a cordial reception by the Quitenos.
The news of the victory of Pichincha caused Bolivar to re-
joice ; on June 8, he issued the following proclamation to his
soldiers :

Colombians ! All your beauteous fatherland is now free.
The victories of Bombona and Pichincha have completed
the work of your heroism. From the banks of the Orinoco
River to the Peruvian Andes the army of liberation, marching
triumphantly, has covered all the territory of Colombia with
its protecting arms. . . . Colombians of the South ! The blood
of your brothers has redeemed you from the horrors of war.
. . . The constitution of Colombia is the model of a repre-
sentative, republican, and strong government. You need not
expect to find a better government among the political in-
stitutions of the earth, unless it should be this constitution
made more perfect. . . . Colombians ! share with me the ocean
of joy which floods my heart; and in your own hearts erect
altars to the liberating army which has given you glory,
peace, and liberty !

On May 29, the cabildo of Quito proclaimed that the prov-
inces of the presidency were incorporated into Colombia. It
provided that a medal celebrating the victory of Pichincha
should be presented to the soldiers of the liberating army, and
that a pyramid should be built upon the field of battle bearing
an inscription to the effect that it was erected “by the sons
of the equator to Simon Bolivar, the angel of peace and Co-
lombian liberty.” On this monument there was also to be
inscribed the name of Sucre with these words : “Quito free
on May 24, 1822.” The busts of Bolivar and Sucre were to
be placed in the hall of the cabildo as well as in the palace of
government. The victory of Pichincha was indeed a milestone

SIMON DE BOLIVAR

253

on the road to South-American independence. It had a bene-
ficial influence upon Bolivar’s fortunes, for the royalists of
Pasto soon capitulated: on June 16 Bolivar entered the city
of Quito amid the plaudits of the inhabitants. He soon pro-
claimed that the liberated territory was incorporated with
Colombia.

Even before the battle of Pichincha took place, Bolivar
had kept a watchful eye upon the protector of Peru. A
friend of the liberator in San Martin’s camp had kept him in-
formed of the jealousy which the protector’s officers enter-
tained of their leader and of their dislike for his monarchical
schemes. After he received reports of the negotiations of
Punchauca, Bolivar directed his secretary. Colonel O’Leary, to
instruct Colonel Ibarra, a Colombian in San Martin’s army,
to induce that leader to desist from his project of establishing
a throne in Peru. Bolivar argued that such a scandalous proj-
ect would produce new dissensions among the patriots and
would stimulate the Spaniards to continue the war. He de-
clared that Colombia would not agree to such a scheme, for
it harmonized neither with her institutions nor with her de-
sires for liberty. The liberator’s apprehensions regarding San
Martin’s plan for the establishment of a European prince in
South America became more acute when he heard of the
progress of the Mexican revolution under Agustin de Iturbide.
On November 15, 1821, after he heard of the treaty of Cor-
doba, Bolivar wrote to San Martin announcing that he would
soon march to complete the liberation of southern Colombia.

At present the liberty of the southern provinces of Co-
lombia and the complete expulsion of the enemies who re-
main in South America is of increasing importance, because
events in Mexico will give a new aspect to the American
revolution. This new order of things gives me reason to be-
lieve that, if the Spanish cabinet accepts the treaty which
Generals Iturbide and O’Donoju have agreed to in Mexico,
and, if Ferdinand VII., or some other European prince goes
to that country, Spain will entertain similar designs in re-
gard to all the other independent governments of Spanish

254 rise of SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

America : she will desire to terminate her differences with
them upon the same principles accepted in regard to Mexico.
The transfer of European princes to the New World and their
support by the monarchs of the Old World may produce im-
portant alterations in the policy adopted by the government
of America. Accordingly I am more than ever of opinion
that it is indispensable to complete the expulsion of the
Spaniards from the entire continent. We should draw closer
together and agree to engage with the new enemies and with
the new means which they can employ.

Evidently San Martin was also of opinion that Peru and
Colombia should cooperate in the war for independence. In
January, 1822, he made public in Lima his intention of meeting
the liberator of Colombia at Guayaquil. The protector of
Peru declared that an interview with Bolivar was necessary in
order to promote the interests of both Peru and Colombia, to
prosecute the war with energy, and to ensure a stable destiny
for Spanish America. “The course of events,” said he, had
made them “in a high degree responsible for the outcome” of
their “sublime enterprise.” On June 17, 1822, Bolivar wrote a
letter to San Martin from Quito expressing a desire to furnish
effectual aid to Peru in the campaign against the royalists. On
July 13, 1822, the protector replied :

Peru is the only field of battle which remains in America:
there those men should unite who wish to share the honor
of the last triumph over the forces which have been van-
quished in the rest of the continent. To promote the success
of this campaign and to leave nothing to the fluctuations of
fortune, I accept the generous offer which you made to me in
your letter of June 17. Peru will receive with enthusiasm
and gratitude all the troops that your Excellency can spare.

Temporarily delegating his power to the Marquis of Torre
Tagle, San Martin embarked on board the Macedonia, and
sailed towards the former presidency of Quito. When the
protector of Peru reached Guayaquil, be found that the lib-
erator of Colombia bad already taken possession of that port.

SIMON DE BOLIVAR 255

Bolivar feigned surprise at the arrival of San Martin, but
effusively welcomed him to “Colombian soil.”

San Martin spent July 26 and 27 at Guayaquil. The meet-
ing of San Martin and Bolivar at that port was enveloped in
a cloud of mystery, which has not been completely lifted. For
no unprejudiced third party witnessed their conferences: — the
only descriptions of their conversations are those which ema-
nated directly or indirectly from Bolivar or San Martin.
Shortly after the mysterious interview, both participants ad-
mitted that they had there discussed the fortunes of Spanish
America; and each leader left on record his impressions of his
great antagonist. Among the correspondence of Bolivar there
are found some brief characterizations of his rival. On Sep-
tember 26, 1822, he wrote to Fernando Pehalver, “General
San Martin came to see me at Guayaquil : he appeared to me
the same that he seemed to those persons who have judged
him in the most favorable manner.” On July 29, he wrote to
Santander concerning San Martin : “His character appeared
to me to be decidedly military ; he appeared to be active,
prompt, and not obtuse.” A little later Bolivar wrote to Sucre :

General San Martin had the respect of the army which
was accustomed to obey him, while the people of Peru con-
sidered him as their liberator. Besides, he had been for-
tunate, and you know that illusions lent by fortune are at
times worth more than merit. In fine, my friend, Peru has
lost a good captain and a benefactor.

From expressions which escaped from San Martin upon
various occasions, it is clear that he was disappointed with the
personality and the designs of his Colombian antagonist.
Many years later, the French traveler, La Fond, recorded San
Martin’s opinion of General Bolivar in these words :

He appeared to possess much pride, which hardly har-
monized with his habit of never looking into the face of the
person whom he addressed, — at least unless that person was
greatly his inferior. I was able to convince myself of his lack

256 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

of frankness in the conferences which I had with him at
Guayaquil, for he never responded in a positive manner to
my propositions but always in evasive terms. I perceived —
and Bolivar himself told me — that those officers in whom he
had most confidence were the Englishmen who served in his
army. To touch upon another trait, his manners were dis-
tingue and showed the good education which he had received.
His language was at times somewhat trivial, but it seemed
to me that this was not a natural defect, and that he only
sought in this manner to assume a most martial air. Public
opinion accused him of excessive ambition and an ardent
thirst for command — a reproach which he himself has com-
pletely justified. People credited him with great disinterest-
edness, and that justly, for he died in poverty. Bolivar was
very popular with his soldiers, for he permitted them a li-
cense which military laws did not authorize; but he was much
less popular with his officers, whom he often treated in a fash-
ion that was most humiliating.

Not until after the death of Bolivar, however, did San
Martin give to the world a letter which he had written to that
commander from Lima one month after the conferences at
Guayaquil. This letter is worth quoting at length.

The results of our interview have not been those which,
as I promised myself, would promote the speedy termination
of the war. Unfortunately, I am fully convinced either that
you did not believe that the offer which I made to serve under
your orders was sincere, or that else you felt that my pres-
ence in your army would be an impediment to your success.
Permit me to say that the two reasons which you expressed
to me : first, that your delicacy would not permit you to com-
mand me; and, second, that even if this difficulty were
overcome, you were certain that the congress of Colombia
would not consent to your departure from that republic, do
not appear plausible to me. The first reason refutes itself.
In respect to the second reason, I am strongly of the opinion
that the slightest suggestion from you to the congress of
Colombia would be received with unanimous approval, pro-
vided that it was concerned with the cooperation of yourself
and your army in the struggle in which we are engaged. The
high honor of terminating the struggle for independence

SIMON DE BOLIVAR 257

would re6**ct as much credit upon you as upon the republic
over which you preside.

General, do not delude yourself. The reports which you
have received of the royalist forces are misleading: in Upper
and Lower Peru they amount to over nineteen thousand vet-
eran soldiers who can be united within two months. The pa-
triot army is decimated by sickness: there cannot be placed
in battle array more than eight thousand five hundred men of
whom the greater number are recruits. . . . The division of
fourteen hundred Colombian soldiers that you might send
would be necessary to maintain the garrison of Callao and
to preserve order in Lima. . . . Thus the struggle will be
prolonged for an indefinite period. I say an indefinite period;
for I am profoundly convinced that, whatever the vicissitudes
of the present war, the independence of America is inevitable.
I am convinced, however, that the prolongation of the war
will cause the ruin of her people ; hence it is a sacred duty of
those men to whom America’s destinies are confided to pre-
vent the continuation of great evils.

Lastly, general, my decision has been irrevocably made.
I have convened the first congress of Peru for the twentieth
of next month : on the day following that on which congress
convenes, I shall embark for Chile, for I am convinced that
my presence is the only obstacle which prevents you from
marching to Peru with your army. It would have been the
acme of happiness for me to have terminated the war of
independence under the orders of a general to whom America
owes her liberty. Fate decreed otherwise. . . .

I will say nothing to you regarding the reunion of Guaya-
quil to the republic of Colombia. Permit me, however, to
suggest that, in my opinion, we were not called upon to decide
that important affair. After the war had terminated, the
respective governments could have adjusted this question
without causing results which may now prejudice the inter-
ests of the new South-American states.

I have spoken to you, general, with frankness, but the
sentiments which this letter contains will remain buried in the
most profound silence: if they were to become public, our
enemies might profit by them and injure the cause of liberty,
while ambitious and intriguing persons might use them to
foment discord.

With Commander Delgado, the bearer of this letter, I send

258 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

to you a gun and a pair of pistols, as well as a pacer which I

offered to you in Guayaquil. Accept this remembrance from

the first of your admirers.

In conclusion San Martin expressed the wish that the glory
of terminating the South-American war for independence
might belong to Bolivar alone. Inferences drawn from this
important document — which does not appear to have been
found among Bolivar’s papers — indicates what took place at
secret conferences between Bolivar and San Martin. The de-
cision was evidently reached that Guayaquil, the key to the
former presidency of Quito, should remain in Bolivar’s pos-
session. San Martin deemed that the liberator did not offer
to furnish a sufficient number of Colombian soldiers to co-
operate in the war for Peruvian independence, because the
projected campaign again.st the royalists was confronted with
immense difficulties; while Bolivar diplomatically but firmly
declined to accept the generous offer of San Martin to serve
under him against the Spaniards. As a consequence, the pro-
tector of Peru decided to withdraw from public life. Obvi-
ously, he hoped that the ambitious liberator of Colombia
would then bring his army to Peru and lead in person the last
struggle against Spain. While the writer admires the spirit
of self-abnegation that animated San Martin, he must com-
mend the decision which entrusted the struggle in the debatable
land to his resourceful rival. For his veteran soldiers, his
able lieutenants, and his genuine powers of leadership, seemed
to make Bolivar the man of destiny, who, if unhampered by
rivalries and jealousies, might bring the war for independence
to a successful termination.

It should be noticed, however, that, according to sources
emanating from Bolivar, there was another side to the famous
interview. In Bolivar’s letter to Santander of July 29, 1822,
the liberator stated that San Martin had declared that he
neither desired to become king of Peru nor did he desire a
democracy there, for he wished that a prince should come
from Europe to rule that state. In this letter Bolivar men-

SIMON DE BOLIVAR

259

tioned a memorandum of his conversations with San Martin
which he was transmitting to Bogota. That memorandum
was evidently a letter written to the secretary of state of Co-
lombia from Guayaquil on July 29, 1822, by J. G. Perez,
Bolivar’s general secretary, — a letter the original of which the
writer has seen in the Colombian archives with his own eyes.
Perez reported San Martin as saying that before he retired
from public life, he wished to see the foundations of govern-
ment well established: ‘that the government should not be
democratic in Peru, for such a system did not suit that coun-
try; and that there should come from Europe a prince who
would take complete charge of the state. His excellency,
Bolivar, replied that the introduction of European princes
would not suit America or Colombia, for they were so differ-
ent from our peoples: that, for his part, he would oppose
this, so far as he was able; but that he would not object to
the particular form of government which each state wished to
adopt for itself. On this point, Bolivar added his thoughts
in regard to the character of governments, making a refer-
ence to his discourse to the congress of Angostura. The pro-
tector of Peru replied that the European prince would arrive
later. Whereupon, Bolivar responded that he would never
agree to allow such princes to be enthroned in America; that
he would prefer to invite General Iturbide to accept the
throne; in order that no Bourbons, or Austrians, or other
European dynasty should come to America.’

If we accept this version of the interview as supplementary
to the account of San Martin, it is clear that at Guayaquil his
design to enthrone European princes in South America was
buried beyond resurrection. It is certain that the triumph
of Bolivar over his rival in the mysterious conferences near
the equator made him the dominant personality of the South-
American revolution. An anecdote has come down to us that,
at a banquet which followed the last conference, Bolivar gave
a toast. “To the two greatest men of South America; Gen-
eral San Martin and myself,’’ and that San Martin made the

26o rise of spanish-american republics

response, “For the speedy termination of the war, the organi-
zation of the different republics of the continent, and the
health of the liberator of Colombia.” In the record of this
incident, which may be partly apocryphal, we may read the
judgment which posterity has passed upon the character and
the aspirations of these two men. That story rightly sug-
gests how they drew a veil over their negotiations and tacitly
presented to the world an appearance of harmony and friend-
ship.

The mood of the protector of Peru at this juncture is re-
vealed in a letter which he wrote to O’Higgins on August 25,
1822.

Believe me, my friend, I am tired of being called tyrant,
and of having it said in all quarters that I wish to become a
king, an emperor, or even the devil. Further, my health has
become much poorer: the climate of this country is bringing
me to my grave. Lastly, as my youth was sacrificed in the
service of Spain and my middle age in the service of my
native land, I believe that I have the right to dispose of my
old age.

Step by step San Martin retired from the scene. From
Guayaquil he returned to Lima. There the delegates who had
been chosen to the first Peruvian congress met on September
29, 1822. San Martin at once resigned his position as pro-
tector of Peru. The constituent congress thanked “the first
soldier of liberty” for his services ; it appointed him generalis-
Bimo of the army and navy, and granted him a pension of
twelve thousand pesos per annum during his lifetime. San
Martin firmly declined to exercise the functions of commander-
in-chief, declaring that his presence in Peru would be incon-
sistent with the continued existence of congress. He declared
that, if the liberty of Peru were ever attacked, he would
spring to her defense. On September 20, 1822, he issued a
farewell address to the Peruvians which breathes his admirable
spirit and furnishes his answer to the charge that he desired
to become king of Peru.

SIMON DE BOLIVAR

261

I have witnessed the declarations of the independence of
the states of Chile and Peru; I hold in my hand the standard
which Pizarro brought to enslave the empire of the Incas;
and I have ceased to be a public man. Thus am I recom-
pensed with usury for ten years employed in revolution and
in war. My promises to the countries for which I have fought
are fulfilled: to secure their independence, and to leave them
to select their own governments. The presence of a fortunate
soldier, however disinterested he may be, is dangerous to
newly-established states. Then, too, I am weary of hearing
people say that I wish to make myself a monarch. Neverthe-
less, I shall always be ready to make the last sacrifice for the
liberty of this country, but only in the capacity of a private
citizen. With regard to my public conduct, my compatriots,
as in most affairs, will be divided in opinion : — their children
will give a just verdict.

The remaining years of San Martin’s life were spent as an
exile from Peru. From Lima he proceeded to Santiago.
Thence he soon departed to seek repose on an estate near his
ever-beloved Mendoza. Here he received the mournful news
of the death of his wife in the city of Buenos Aires. In 1824
he departed from that city for Europe, with his little daugh-
ter Maria Mercedes. After paying a brief visit to England,
which he reached at the same time as Agustin de Iturbide,
San Martin took up his residence in Brussels, where he su-
pervised his daughter’s education. Although the hero of San
Lorenzo had been treated with indifference and neglect on
his return to Buenos Aires, yet he displayed a lively interest
in South-American affairs, corresponding with Guido, O’Hig-
gins, and General Miller — an Englishman who had served
in the wars for independence. When, in April, 1826, General
Miller wrote to San Martin and intimated that Bolivar had
declared that the mysterious interview at Guayaquil was chiefly
concerned with San Martin’s design to crown himself emperor
of Peru, San Martin replied that, if he had entertained such a
design, he would have merited the appellation of impostor.
T can assure you that, if this had been my design, Bolivar

262 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

could not have made me change my plan.’ In 1829 San Martin
sailed from Europe for South America : his intention was to
live a secluded life at Mendoza. Before disembarking at
Buenos Aires, however, he became convinced that political
conditions were so unsettled that he could not live in his native
land without becoming involved in factional strife. In con-
sequence he sadly returned to Europe. Sometimes the volun-
tary exile was ill; and he was often in financial straits: these
circumstances at times made him speak with bitterness of the
ingratitude of the republics of South America toward himself.
Ultimately, however, through the generosity of a former com-
rade-in-arms in Spain, the financial condition of San Martin
was improved. After living for a short time in Paris, he se-
cured a comfortable home near that capital. In 1848 the
precarious state of his health caused him to transfer his resi-
dence to Boulogne, where he died on August 17, 1850. Three
days later he was buried in the cathedral of that city. In
1880, in accordance with his last wishes, the remains of San
Martin were disinterred, and transported to Argentina. There,
on May 29, they were reinterred with much ceremony in the
cathedral of Buenos Aires. The sword which General San
Martin had carried in the revolutionary wars, he bequeathed to
General Rosas of the Argentine republic, because the latter
had upheld the honor of that state against the pretensions of
foreign powers.

While the personality of San Martin ordinarily made a
favorable impression upon foreigners who met him, yet it
appears that his associates sometimes saw only the less agree-
able traits of his disposition. For the most part, San Martin
disdained to leave behind him documents which might explain
or interpret his changing moods. We may safely judge that
certain idiosyncrasies were probably due to constitutional in-
firmities. Intimations may indeed be found in his private pa-
pers, as well as among the dispatches from English naval
officers on the Pacific coast to their government, that San
Martin occasionally resorted to the use of morphine to alle-

SIMON DE BOLIVAR

263

viate his sufferings. At rare moments, San Martin’s pen re-
vealed his attitude toward contemporaries ; witness the inscrip-
tion, which, at his direction, was carved on his wife’s mauso-
leum in the city of Buenos Aires, “Here lies Remedios Esca-
lada, the wife and friend of General San Martin.’’ His con-
ception of a woman’s role in the world is suggested in the
statement which he made concerning the object of his daugh-
ter’s education : namely, that it was not to fashion her into a
dame after the grand mode, but “to make her a tender mother
and a good spouse.’’ The conduct of San Martin, who re-
mained an exile from his native land in order that he might
not encourage a factional spirit there, furnishes a contrast
with Iturbide’s conduct. Among the remarks made by San
Martin while living in exile, one, in particular, deserves to be
mentioned : he sagely said that, in regard to contemporary
affairs, men were accustomed to judge according to their
prejudices, but that history would record the truth.

San Martin was not endowed in a high degree with the art
of a politician, the finesse of a diplomat, or the administrative
ability of a statesman. Never did he take the people, seldom
did he take his associates, completely into his confidence. Nor
did he make a consistent and well-sustained effort to appear to
do so. But San Martin had an organizing brain; he had a
prophetic vision, for he saw in the liberation of Oiile and Peru
the best guarantee of South-American independence ; and he
possessed an indomitable will that triumphed over great and
numberless obstacles. So little confidence did he entertain in
the capacity of South America for self-government, that he
preferred a monarchical form of government to a democracy.
Conscious that a strong spirit of sectionalism existed in some
provinces of the former viceroyalty of la Plata, he decried
proposals for the establishment of a federal republic at Buenos
Aires. After reaching Peru, this high-minded patriot unfor-
tunately lost the confidence of his jealous comrades. What
was said of Miranda may almost be said of San Martin:
namely, that the separation of South America from Spain

264 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

eventually became the ruling purpose of his life. But San
Martin would deliberately have made the Spanish-American
states appanages of Europe.

Fame has been gracious to San Martin. The name of
Simon de Bolivar is not more deeply graven upon the hearts
of his fellow-countrymen than the name of San Martin upon
the hearts of the citizens of southern South America. Mis-
judged by his associates, with no true apologist among his con-
temporaries, Jose de San Martin, silent and reserved, is re-
vealed in history as one of the founders of Argentina, a liber-
ator of Chile and Peru, — the warrior whose valiant leadership
helped to ensure the ultimate triumph of Bolivar. The writer
indeed hardly knows which to admire the more, the heroic
march of San Martin across the Andes, or the remarkable
spirit of self-abnegation with which he relinquished the posi-
tion of protector of Peru, in order to promote the liberty and
welfare of South America.

Upon Jose de San Martin widely different judgments have
been passed, depending upon the prejudice or the viewpoint of
the writer. Here only a few estimates of South-American
writers may be noticed. The Venezuelan, C. A. Villanueva,
grudgingly declared that, although San Martin was a great
general, yet he lacked the qualities of a great leader. The
Argentine writer, Manuel F. Montilla, extravagantly eulogized
San Martin as a master of the art of war, a pure liberator, a
most magnanimous and noble statesman, a humble and disin-
terested patriot, — the greatest man whom the New World has
produced. Many and diverse are the parallels which have
been made between San Martin and Bolivar. A unique com-
parison was made by the Chilean publicist, Domingo Santa
Maria, who declared that San Martin was a fox, while Bolivar
was an eagle.

Let us turn again to Sim6n de Bolivar, — the greatest per-
sonality of the heroic age of South America. Simon de
Bolivar was about five feet six inches in height, lean of limb
and body. His cheek bones stood out prominently in an oval-

265

SIMON DE BOLIVAR

shaped face, which tapered sharply towards the chin. His
countenance was vivacious; but his skin was furrowed with
wrinkles, and tanned by exposure to a tropical sun. The
curly black hair that once covered Bolivar’s head in luxuriant
profusion, began to turn white about 1821 ; thenceforth, he
was accustomed to wear his hair short. His nose was long
and aquiline. Flexible, sensual lips were often shaded by a
thick mustache, while whiskers covered a part of his face. In
1822 Bolivar’s large, black, penetrating eyes, “with the glance
of an eagle,’’ were losing their remarkable brilliancy. At that
time Bolivar had also lost some of the animation, energy,
and extraordinary agility which had distinguished him in youth
and early manhood : even the casual observer judged him to
be many years older than he really was, so sick and weary did
he appear. Ordinarily, Bolivar’s address was pleasant and
his manners were graceful. Gifted with conversational ability
of no mean order, at leisure moments he was accustomed to tell
anecdotes concerning his romantic career. He could harangue
his soldiers or address a congress in eloquent words. When
in good humor, his manner was pleasing and attractive ; but
when impatient, irritated, or contradicted, unless he was anx-
ious to appear otherwise, he became disagreeable, and at times
appeared to act like a madman. A man of many moods, jovial,
talkative, taciturn, gloomy, he changed swiftly from sunshine
to storm. When in a meditative mood, the liberator sometimes
assumed a pose that was statuesque.

The personality of the liberator was indeed so complex
that it is not easily described. Prodigal in his youth, when he
became dictator of Colombia he scattered his own silver with
open hand. He was extremely sensitive to criticism, particu-
larly did he detest the criticism of the press. So nervous was
his disposition, that, even when resting from the strife of bat-
tle, or the labors of the cabinet, he was seldom in complete re-
pose. His slumbers were short and light: — a habit to which,
on at least one occasion, he owed his life. He was very fond
of physical exercise, especially did he like horseback riding and

266 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

dancing. Bolivar was passionately fond of the female sex.
Certain South-American historical writers speak of his differ-
ent mistresses and of his many amorous escapades with a
frankness that is amazing — at least to an Anglo-Saxon. At
the table the liberator’s habits varied according to circum-
stances ; when necessary, he lived upon a soldier’s scanty fare ;
at other time, he had upon his table rich viands and spark-
ling wines. Bolivar was a skillful horseman. There is a
tradition that, in the use of the sword, he was ambidextrous.
Speaking of Bolivar as a warrior, Paez said : “In the camp
Bolivar showed his good humor by jests and jokes; but when
on the march, he always became somewhat fidgety and to
relieve his impatience he hummed a patriotic song. A lover
of combat — perchance he was too fond of it — while a battle
was being fought, he showed the utmost serenity. To rally
soldiers who had been routed, he did not spare example, voice,
or sword.” Defeat left Bolivar undismayed. Said O’Leary,
who served for a time as an aide-de-camp of the liberator:
“Always great, he was greatest in adversity. His enemies had
a saying that ‘when vanquished Bolivar is more terrible than
when he conquers.’ ”

CHAPTER VIII

ANTONIO JOSE DE SUCRE

“Ip God should g^ve to men the right to select the members
of their own family, I should select . . . for a son General
Sucre.” Thus, according to his secretary, spoke Simon de
Bolivar of that comrade whose career was closely interwoven
with his own. Although not so well known as the house of
Bolivar, yet the members of Sucre’s family had gained distinc-
tion in the Spanish service in the Indies, where they had lived
for several generations. The founder of the Sucre family in
northern South America was Carlos de Sucre, apparently a
native of Flanders, who faithfully served the Spanish king in
important offices at Carthagena and Havana. On December
22, 1729, Carlos de Sucre was made governor of the province
of New Andalusia in eastern Venezuela. For many years
after leaving Cuba, Governor Sucre made his home at Cumana,
the capital of New Andalusia. His children intermarried with
prominent families of Venezuela : his son Antonio, who seems
to have been born in Cuba, married Josefa Margarita de
Urbaneja, whose ancestors apparently fought under the con-
quistadores. In 1792 by a royal decree Antonio de Sucre was
appointed colonel of infantry. One of Antonio’s sons was
Vicente Sucre, who married twice. The first wife of Vicente
Sucre was Maria Manuela de Alcala, who bore him a numerous
progeny. On February 20, 1795, in a church at Cumana, the
seventh son of this marriage was baptized Antonio Jose Fran-
cisco: the brief entry in the register of the church indicates
that the child was born at Cumana on February 3, 1795.

There are very few contemporary documents available
which throw light upon the early career of Antonio Jose de

267

268 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

Sucre. However, it is clear that he did not enjoy such edu-
cational advantages as Simon de Bolivar. A part of Sucre’s
education was evidently obtained in Caracas. In later life
Sucre often expressed regret that he had not received the
proper training for a political career. “It is no disgrace to
confess,” said he, “that I grew up in the midst of revolution
and of war; that my education was in the school of the sol-
dier; and that I know little concerning political affairs.”
Moreover, Sucre’s family encouraged his predilection for the
military profession. According to a statement of Sucre, a
paternal uncle encouraged him to take up arms for the pro-
visional junta of Caracas. An official list of the engineers
employed by that junta bearing date of April, i8ii, contains
the following item, “In Margarita, Lieutenant Don Antonio
Sucre Alcala, comjnandant of his department in that island.”
Evidently Antonio, who was only sixteen years of age, had
been placed in charge of the engineers in Margarita. Another
fragment of evidence shows that in July, 1812, this lad was
acting as lieutenant of the engineers and artillerymen of the
revolutionary soldiers who were stationed at Barcelona. After
General Miranda capitulated at San Mateo, Lieutenant Sucre
sought an asylum in the West Indies. From 1813 to 1817 he
bravely participated in campaigns which were waged against
the royalists in northern South America. O’Leary declares
that in 1819 Francisco A. Zea, Vice President of Venezuela,
appointed Colonel Sucre general. Sucre had accordingly risen
to the rank of revolutionary general at the early age of twenty-
three.

Fragments of evidence which convey suggestions of Sucre’s
personality indicate that in stature he was somewhat below
the medium height. Sucre was an alert and vigorous man with
a vivacious countenance and pleasing manners. Friend and
foe alike testify to his gentlemanly demeanor. The best por-
trait of General Sucre is probably that painted by the Vene-
zuelan artist Tovar, which depicts this general as a man of
dig^iified mien with a thoughtful aspect. In his memoirs

Antonio Jose de Sucre

(From a Portrait by Tovar in the Federal Palace, Caracas)

ANTONIO JOSE DE SUCRE

269

O’Leary describes the first meeting of General Sucre and Gen-
eral Bolivar in an entertaining fashion. He declares that,
while proceeding down the Orinoco River after the battle of
Boyaca, the liberator’s boat met a canoe going up the river.
In a peremptory manner, Bolivar hailed the boat and asked,
“Who goes in this canoe?’’ The reply was “General Sucre.’’
With anger, Bolivar exclaimed, “There is no such general’’ ;
and he thereupon commanded that both crafts should make
for the river bank. Then the youthful Sucre explained that
although he had been named general because his military serv-
ices merited such promotion, yet he had not thought of ac-
cepting the title without the acquiescence of the liberator.
Even though this explanation conveyed a rebuke, the liberator
deigned to accept it. Thenceforth Bolivar and Sucre were
loyal friends, who with some truth have been characterized
as the Achilles and Patroclus of the American Iliad.

O’Leary declared that upon a certain occasion, when Boli-
var made his entrance into Cucuta, General Sucre rode out to
meet him. “When I beheld Sucre,’’ said O’Leary, “I asked
the liberator who was the horseman who approached us.
‘That,’ he responded, ‘is one of the best officials of the army ;
he combines the professional knowledge of Soublette, the
generous character of Briceno, the talent of Santander, and
the activity of Salom. ... I am resolved to bring him into
the foreground, for I am convinced that some day he will
rival me.’ ’’ As was shown in the last chapter, early in 1821,
the liberator sent General Sucre as his substitute into the
presidency of Quito, — a mission that was justified by the vic-
tory at Pichincha, an operation which evoked words of praise
from Jose de San Martin. After the fateful interview of
Bolivar and San Martin at Guayaquil, which determined that
the equatorial coast of South America should be under the
suzerainty of Colombia, a subject of much anxiety to Bolivar
and Sucre was the condition of Peru.

In September, 1822, the constituent congress of Peru, which
San Martin had mistakenly convoked, placed the executive

270 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

power of the state in the hands of a governmental junta, a
triumvirate composed of its own members. On December 6,

1822, that congress promulgated a provisional constitution.
In Utopian terms the constitution declared that all the prov-
inces of Peru united into one organization composed the Peru-
vian nation; that sovereignty resided in the nation which was
independent of all foreign powers, — a nation which could not
become the patrimony of any person or family. This new
nation was designated the Republica Peruana; its government
should be democratic and representative ; and its religion
should be exclusively Roman Catholicism. The separation of
the executive, the legislative, and the judicial departments was
declared to be a fundamental principle of government. There
was a stipulation that the executive power should never be
held for life. Besides a congress of one house, provision was
made for a senate which should watch over the execution of
the laws as well as the conduct of the republic’s magistrates
and citizens. Judges were to hold office for life. It was pro-
vided that the future constitution of the Peruvian republic
should acknowledge Peru’s debts, should provide for public
education, and should contain some guarantees of individual
rights.

In February, 1823, the Peruvian congress abolished the
inefficient governmental junta and entrusted the executive au-
thority to Colonel Jose de la Riva Agiiero with the title of
president. The first president of the republic of Peru was
granted by congress the rank of grand marshal. In March,

1823, President Riva Agiiero instructed General Mariano Por-
tocarrero to proceed as an envoy to Bolivar in order to solicit
four thousand soldiers, money, and munitions. Bolivar
promptly decided to send three thousand Colombian soldiers
to Peru. On March 18, 1823, representatives of Colombia and
Peru signed at Guayaquil a convention by which Bolivar agreed
to aid the Peruvian patriots with six thousand soldiers, and
Peru agreed to pay the cost of transporting and maintaining
those troops. About a month later General Sucre was sent to

ANTONIO JOSE DE SUCRE

271

Lima as Colombia’s commissioner. On May 22, 1823, Sucre
informed the Peruvian congress at Lima that the auxiliary
Colombian division under his command oflfered its services
to Peru for the preservation of her liberty. Bolivar’s instruc-
tions directed Sucre to take such steps as were necessary to
promote the independence of Peru and the safety of his sol-
diers. He was urged to beware of a pitched battle with the
royalists, for anything was better than the loss of a battle.
The army of liberation was not to risk a conflict with the
royalists unless the chances of victory were in its favor. In
supplementary instructions which Bolivar sent to Sucre on
May 25, 1823, the latter was directed not to engage in any
military operations without carefully studying the plan of
campaign. In elastic clauses General Sucre was authorized to
take whatever steps might seem necessary or prudent for the
liberation of Peru and the preservation of Colombia’s army.
In reality the mission of Sucre to Lima was a reconnaissance.
Shortly after his arrival in the Peruvian capital, Sucre wrote
to the secretary of Bolivar to inform the latter of the plots
against Riva Agiiero, and declared, “According to my instruc-
tions, and guided by the dictates of prudence, I am observing
and shall continue to observe a perfect neutrality so long as no
attempt is made to disturb the public order and so long as
the government is not attacked by factions.’’

Sucre’s arrival in the city of the kings was followed by a
steady decline in the power and prestige of President Riva
Agiiero. Certain historical writers have attributed that decline
to the intrigues of Sucre who was secretly preparing the way
for his master. It should be borne in mind, however, that,
after San Martin vanished from the scene, the advent of Boli-
var was almost inevitable ; indeed a Peruvian faction soon
advocated that the liberator should be brought to Lima. On
June 20, 1823, the Peruvian congress sent two emissaries to
Guayaquil to invite Bolivar to Peru. When the royalist army
threatened the Peruvian capital, congress transferred its meet-
ings to Callao, where, on June 23, 1823, it decreed that Riva

272 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

Agiiero was no longer to exercise his functions within the
theater of hostilities, while on the contrary, it informed Sucre
that the fate of Peru was in his hands. This step was taken
in the presence of the enemy, for when General Canterac
marched upon Lima with an army of about seven thousand
men, Sucre had reluctantly evacuated the capital and occu-
pied Callao. Thus, for the time being, he lost Lima, but saved
the army. In July Riva Agiiero, who did not renounce his
post in spite of the growing opposition in congress, arbitrarily
dissolved that assembly, which had transferred its residence
to Trujillo; but a number of its members reassembled at Lima
— again evacuated by the Spaniards — where in August they
declared Riva Agiiero to be a traitor, and appointed the Mar-
quis of Torre Tagle president of Peru. The writer has not
found evidence to substantiate the view that these grave
civil dissensions in the Peruvian republic were due mainly
to Sucre’s influence. In truth, it was in accordance with a
secret agreement between Riva Agiiero and Sucre dated June
22, 1823, that the latter prepared for an expedition against the
royalists in southern Peru. There Sucre found it impossible
to cooperate with General Andres Santa Cruz, who was sub-
sequently defeated by the Spaniards. Enough has been said
of the tumultuous events in Peru to indicate that the talented,
unfortunate, and misunderstood Riva Agiiero, — who is viewed
by his great-grandson as the champion of Peruvian nationality
against the imperialistic hero of Colombia — was impotent to
control the situation. Conditions were indeed ripe for the ad-
vent of Bolivar.

In response to the liberator’s request, early in June, 1823,
the congress of Colombia granted Bolivar permission to leave
Colombian soil, in order that he might personally direct the
war for Peruvian independence. On September i Bolivar
landed at Callao; he proceeded immediately to Lima, where
he was given a flattering reception. Amid the acclamations of
the populace he was escorted to the mansion designated for
his residence. The Gaceta de Lima compared the liberator

273

ANTONIO JOS^ DE SUCRE

with General Washington; it characterized him as “the first
soldier of America.” At a banquet which was given in Boli-
var’s honor in the former viceregal palace certain Peruvian
leaders toasted the Colombian hero. In response Bolivar ex-
pressed the hope that the Spanish-Americans might never con-
sent ‘to the erection of a throne in their territory, that just as
Napoleon was swallowed up in the ocean, and as the new
Emperor, Iturbide, was driven from the throne of Mexico,
thus might the usurpers of the rights of the American people
be humbled until not one remained triumphant in the New
World.’ The Peruvian congress received the liberator of
Colombia with enthusiasm, while he apparently promised to
liberate Peru, or to die in the attempt. On September lo,
1823, congress decreed that there should be deposited in the
hands of Simon de Bolivar, who was given the title of liberator,
the supreme military authority of Peru and the political au-
thority, so far as was necessary for the prosecution of the
war. The news of Bolivar’s arrival on Peruvian soil made
Sucre rejoice. At Arequipa, on October 7, he issued a procla-
mation to his soldiers announcing that he transferred the
command of the united army to Bolivar, “the son of liberty.”
Soon after Bolivar was declared liberator of Peru, he at-
tempted to initiate negotiations to terminate the dissen-
sions between congress and Riva Aguero, but in vain : a short
time afterwards that leader was exiled from his native land,
nursing in his heart a bitter hatred of the Colombian com-
manders.

Months before he reached Lima, Bolivar had sketched
plans for a campaign against General Canterac. In a plan
which he presented to General Sucre in May, 1823, the lib-
erator argued that the Colombian soldiers should keep pos-
session of Peru, but that they should rather remain inactive
than be defeated by the royalists. Bolivar took the view that
the patriot forces were not ready to take the offensive against
the disciplined and experienced soldiers of Spain. “Canterac
and Valdez are not terrible ; still their resources, their posi-

274 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

tions, and their victories give them a decided superiority which
cannot be overcome suddenly but only slowly and progres-
sively.” To this view Bolivar wisely adhered despite the pug-
nacious advice of Sucre, who wished to take the offensive at
once. Near the end of 1823 Sucre took charge of the Colom-
bian soldiers who were stationed north of Lima; in Decem-
ber of that year Bolivar advised Sucre to take preparatory
steps for a campaign against the royalists. The impetuous
liberator of Colombia had become the cautious dictator of
Peru.

Early in 1824, even Bolivar saw clearly that his extraordi-
nary activity had sapped his constitution. He felt deeply hurt
at the intrigues which were being carried on against him in
Colombia. A letter which he wrote to Sucre on January 16,
1824, will suggest the despondent mood into which the libera-
tor sometimes fell when contemplating the affairs of South
America.

I have asked for my dismissal by the Colombian congress
and have displayed much disgust at the ingratitude of the
people. This action will certainly produce a favorable result
at Bogota, as well as at Lima. If it does not, I shall take the
occasion to leave public life completely; for I am resolved
that Colombia shall not be lost in my hands. Neither will I
liberate her a second time. Such a task should not be per-
formed twice. I felt ready to give battle to the Spaniards, in
order to terminate the war in America; but I feel ready no
longer. I feel tired; I am old; and I have nothing more to
expect from fortune. On the contrary, I feel like an avari-
cious rich man who is always afraid that someone will steal
his money. Everything causes me fear and alarm. It appears
to me that, from moment to moment, I am losing my reputa-
tion, which is the reward and the fortune that I have obtained
for my immense sacrifices. A similar fate will befall you.
Nevertheless, I ought to say that you are still very young,
and that a brilliant prospect is before you. Would that I
might be in your position; so that I need not tremble for my
own fortune: at least I would have desires; I would have
hopes to caress me !

ANTONIO JOSE DE SUCRE

275

Thus wrote Bolivar the liberator, — who was old at forty
years — partly because of excesses that this history had rather
not name. Fortunate was it for the cause of South-Ameri-
can independence that, in the hour of need, his comrade Sucre
could grasp the baton of command.

On January 26, 1824, Bolivar wrote to Sucre recommend-
ing that cattle should be gathered for the use of the army,
that arrangements be made to store provisions for the pro-
jected campaign, and that the soldiers be compelled to march
regularly in the mountains, in order that they might become
hardened and accustomed to the altitude. On February 4
Bolivar again wrote to Sucre ; he again declared that the secret
of their success in the war lay in the preservation of the Co-
lombian army:

This army is the safeguard of Peru, the vangfuard of
Colombia, and the military agent of South America. If we
expose it to defeat without having previously arranged for
new forces and new reserves, we shall be inconsiderate and
imprudent. Time will procure for us new truces and new
political successes. . . . Your spirit is fertile in cooperative
expedients; there is no limit to your efficiency, zeal, and activ-
ity. I expect much of time.

The cause of Peruvian independence was seriously injured,
when, early in February, 1824, the garrison of Callao, which
was composed partly of soldiers from the Platean provinces,
mutinied and gave up that stronghold to the royalists. The
loss of that port was followed by the re-occupation of Lima
by royalist soldiers. Thus the Spaniards held the center and
the south of Peru, as well as the highlands. General Canterac
being encamped at Jauja on the elevated Andean plateau.
On February 10, 1824, the Peruvian congress conferred upon
Bolivar the supreme political power of the state. A few days
later the dictator of Peru — who was still the titular president
of Colombia — informed General Sucre that the latter was to
act as the commander-in-chief of the united army of liberation.
Bolivar and Sucre spent months quietly preparing for the

276 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

arduous campaign against General Canterac. For a time the
center of Bolivar’s activity was the town of Trujillo, while
Sucre was located at Huaraz, and General Jose de La Mar, a
native of Cuenca, was in charge of the Peruvian soldiers at
Cajamarca. At that juncture Bolivar demonstrated that his
residence in Peru had not destroyed his talent for organiza-
tion. He tried to secure thousands of additional soldiers from
Colombia ; he sent instructions and queries to Sucre in re-
gard to roads, horses, and cattle. For example, he advised
Sucre that the soldiers’ horses were to be shod only with shoes
of Vizcayan iron. To paraphrase O’Leary, Trujillo was ‘an
immense arsenal, where no one was idle.’ General Sucre was
‘the right arm of the liberator’ : he studied the topography of
the Andean range; tirelessly did he explore the mountains,
surveying the roads, spying upon the royalists, and secreting
barley and wood in the caverns. Thousands of ounces of silver
were collected from the churches of Peru for the support of
the expedition. Forced contributions were levied upon the
inhabitants, and many Peruvians were induced to enlist in the
army of liberation. After describing the liberator’s prepara-
tions for this campaign, O’Leary said that it would seem “as
though from the head of a new Jupiter there had sprung not
a new Pallas armed from head to foot, but eight thousand
soldiers equipped for battle.’’

About the middle of June the divisions of the army broke
camp, and detachments of soldiers proceeded towards the ap-
pointed rendezvous by different routes along dangerous An-
dean paths. After marching about two hundred leagues, in
the end of July, soldiers from Colombia, la Plata, and Peru
bivouacked at the rendezvous on the plateau north of Lake
Reyes, twelve thousand feet above the level of the sea. There
Bolivar assembled his united army, which numbered about
nine thousand men. To the soldiers of his army the titular
president of Colombia and dictator of Peru addressed an
inspiring proclamation. “You are about to complete the
greatest task which Heaven has entrusted to men, — the eman-

ANTONIO JOSE DE SUCRE

277

dpation of an entire world from slavery. . . . Peru and
America expect from you peace, — the daughter of victory.
Even liberal Europe contemplates you in enchantment ; for
the liberty of the New World is the hope of the universe.”

In command of this army, under Bolivar, was placed Gen-
eral Sucre. General Jose Maria Cordoba, a Colombian, was
placed in charge of the vanguard ; the division of the center
was commanded by General La Mar; and the rearguard was
commanded by General Jacinto Lara. General Nechochea was
made commander of the cavalry ; Colonel Carvajal was placed
in immediate charge of the Colombian cavalry; and General
Miller was given charge of the Peruvian cavalry. Among the
cavalry, as well as the infantry, there were some soldiers who
had followed Jose de San Martin from Chile and even from
the United Provinces. The picturesque scene which took place
upon the Andean plateau is thus described in the memoirs of
General Miller:

Nothing could exceed the excitement felt upon that occa'
sion. Every circumstance tended to impart a most romantic
interest to the scene. Near the same spot, four years before,
the royalists had been defeated by General Arenales. The
view from the table land, upon which the troops were re-
viewed, and which is at an elevation of more than twelve
thousand feet above the level of the sea, is perhaps the most
magnificent in the world. On the west arose the Andes, which
had just been surmounted with so much toil. On the east
were enormous ramifications of the Cordillera stretching
towards the Brazils. North and south, the view was bounded
by mountains whose tops w'ere hidden in the clouds. On that
plain, surrounded by such sublime scenery, and on the margin
of the magnificent lake of Reyes, the principal source of the
Amazon, the mightiest of rivers, were now assembled men
from Caracas, Panama, Quito, Lima, and Buenos Aires; men
who had fought at Maypo in Chile ; at San Lorenzo, on the
banks of the Parana; at Carabobo in Venezuela; and at
Pichincha at the foot of the Chimborazo. Amidst these de-
voted Americans were a few foreigners, still firm and faithful
to the cause, in support of which so many of their country-
men had fallen. Amongst those few survivors were men

278 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

who had fought on the banks of the Guadiana and of the
Rhine; who had witnessed the conflagration of Moscow, and
the capitulation of Paris. . . . American or European, they
were all animated by one sole spirit, that of assuring the
political existence of a vast continent.

In the end of July reports of the unexpected march of
Bolivar’s soldiers rudely awoke Canterac from his fancied se-
curity. At the head of an army of about eight thousand men,
he marched north from Jauja, and proceeded along the eastern
shores of Lake Reyes. But meanwhile the soldiers of Bolivar
were marching south along the western shores of that lake.
When the royalist commander learned where Bolivar’s army
was, he suddenly faced his army about, and marched back to-
ward his encampment. In the afternoon of August 6, on the
plains of Junin, a part of the eager patriot cavalry under Gen-
eral Nechochea encountered the royalist forces. At once Gen-
eral Canterac led his cavalry in a spirited charge against Ne-
chochea’s troops, which, being attacked at a disadvantage, were
thrown into disorder. But a squadron of Peruvian huzzars
under the brave Colonel Suarez led a counter-attack. “The
terrible silence was interrupted only by the strident voice of
the clarinets, the clash of sabers and lances, the galloping
and stamping of horses, the maledictions of the vanquished,
and the lamentations of the wounded.” After a fierce hand-to-
hand conflict which lasted scarcely an hour, the Spanish cavalry
fled hastily from the plains of Junin. In a dejected mood Gen-
eral Canterac led his soldiers toward Cuzco.

In a poem composed in honor of the victory of Junin,
Olmedo compared Bolivar’s sword to the sun which obscured
the stars. But it does not appear that Bolivar took part in the
cavalry engagement at Junin except to direct the patriots in
the opening struggle. Yet he undoubtedly deserved a large
share of the credit for the management of the campaign which
culminated in a victory that lowered the prestige of the sol-
diers of Spain and gave the patriots possession of several
provinces in the Peruvian highlands. Sucre’s was the honor

ANTONIO JOSE DE SUCRE

279

of acting as Bolivar’s chief commander. When the royalists
at Lima heard of the battle of Junin, they evacuated that city
for the last time.

After the victory at Junin, Bolivar slowly led his soldiers
southward across the elevated plateau of the Andes toward
Huamanga. General Sucre was placed in command of the
rearguard, — a position which much disgusted him. On August
28, 1824, he wrote to Bolivar in these words:

I have been deprived of the command of the army to exe-
cute a commission which would ordinarily be entrusted to an
officer of no higher rank than an aide-de-camp, and have been
sent to the rearguard when the army is advancing upon the
enemy. Thus the impression has been publicly given that I
am considered incapable of active operations: my companions
in arms have been given reason to consider me as either a
useless person or a fool.

On September 4 Bolivar made a reply to his sensitive friend.

I respond to the letter which Escalona brought me with
an expression that Rousseau used when the lover of Julia
complained of the offense which she had committed by send-
ing him money: “This is the only tactless action which you
have performed in the course of your life.’’ I believe that
you committed an error of judgment when you thought that
I wished to offend you. I am full of regret, because of your
sorrow; but I do not feel in the least guilty of an intentional
offense. I gave you a commission which I did not wish to
undertake myself; for I believed that you were better able to
perform it because of your extraordinary agility. I gave you
that commission rather as an indication of my favor than as
a proof of humiliation.

Near the end of August the soldiers of Bolivar encamped
at the Indian hamlet of Huamanga, which was west of the
Apurimac River on the road leading from Cuzco to Lima.
About a month later Bolivar decided to leave the army and to
proceed to the coast, evidently intending to await there the
arrival of the reenforcements which he expected from Colom-

28o rise of spanish-american republics

bia. Apparently his plan was to join Sucre with those re-
enforcements, and then to engage the royalists in the last
great battle, which would decide the fate of South America.
When the liberator journeyed to the Peruvian coast. General
Sucre remained in charge of the soldiers who had been vic-
torious on the plains of Junin. Before he departed Bolivar
carefully instructed Sucre to encamp with the army for a
month ; in order that the men and horses might get a much-
needed rest. After he thus became the commander of the
patriot army, Sucre stationed his- soldiers at points which ex-
tended over leagues of territory, — the center of his line was
at Lambrana. On hearing of this disposal of the troops Boli-
var instructed Sucre that he was not to divide the army, and
that he was to preserve it at any cost ; for to weaken the army
was to risk the loss of a battle and to jeopardize the interests
of Spanish America. “The liberty of Peru will not be achieved
by the occupation of territory unless that territory is the very
region where we gain a victory over the enemy.”

In October, General Valdez, who had been pacifying Upper
Peru, joined forces with General Canterac at Cuzco. Viceroy
La Serna, the former antagonist of San Martin, took command
of the united royalist army which numbered about ten thou-
sand men. La Serna soon led the royalist soldiers through
deep valleys and across rugged mountains in search of the
patriots, who were near the capital of the ancient empire of the
Incas. Early in November General Sucre was suddenly
warned that the combined royalist forces were advancing
against him, — news which he declared gave him mingled feel-
ings of surprise, disgust, and pleasure. He consequently pre-
pared to concentrate his soldiers ; in order that, as a military
disciple of Bolivar, he might meet the enemy under the most
favorable conditions possible. A very remarkable series of
maneuvers then took place : at time the hostile armies moved
on parallel lines, separated only by a precipitous ravine or a
mountain torrent ; they marched and counter-marched : La
Serna frequently attempted to take his opponent at a disad-

ANTONIO JOSE DE SUCRE

281

vantage, while Sucre, in accordance with Bolivar’s advice, acted
ordinarily on the defensive. On November 16 the royalist
soldiers occupied Huamanga ; thus Sucre was cut off from his
base of supplies on the Pacific coast. By December 1 he was
tired of a retreat from the enemy with soldiers who were
sighing for a battle : he declared that, under no circumstances,
would he retire beyond Huamanga. On December 3, while
Sucre’s soldiers were on the march, they were attacked by
the royalists and suffered a loss of men, munitions, and artil-
lery. Incited by the royalists, the neighboring Indians rose
against the patriots. At this critical juncture the patriot com-
mander received a letter from Bolivar which authorized him
to offer battle to the royalists in the Peruvian highlands, while
the liberator sustained the cause of independence upon the sea-
coast.

At last, Sucre was in supreme command of the patriot
army. Convinced that he should not act upon the defensive,
he decided to offer battle to the enemy at the first favorable
opportunity, even though his forces were numerically inferior.
Sucre’s army numbered about six thousand men ; whereas the
viceroy had over nine thousand men. While the soldiers of
Spain were led by generals who did not always act in har-
mony, the revolutionary soldiers were commanded by an able
and inspiring general who appeared confident of victory. It
seems that to offset the numerical superiority of the enemy,
Sucre sought an arena for the conflict which might afford him
a strategic advantage.

Sucre’s aide-de-camp. Colonel Lopez, asserted that Gener-
als Sucre and La Mar deliberately selected for the field of
battle the small secluded plain of Ayacucho, “the corner of
death,” which, according to tradition, was an ancient Inca
battle-field. On December 6 the army of Sucre paused near
the Indian village of Quinua, which was located on the west-
ern side of Ayacucho. When arrayed on this plain, the flanks
of Sucre’s army were protected by ravines, while the rear was
guarded by a valley. To the east, the field of battle was bor-

282 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

dered by the craggy, wooded heights of Condorkanki. On
the afternoon of December 8 the soldiers of La Serna climbed
the heights of Condorkanki, which seemed to dominate the
plain of Ayacucho : — at last, the patriot soldiers appeared to
be at bay. As his chief of staff Sucre had chosen General
Agustin Gamarra, a native of Cuzco. The patriot army was
arranged in three main divisions under experienced leaders.
The left was composed largely of Peruvian soldiers under
General La Mar; the right was made up mainly of Colom-
bians under General Cordova ; the center was composed of
cavalry under General Miller ; while the reserve was in charge
of General Lara. At a critical moment during the forenoon
of December 9, when the royalist files were slowly descend-
ing the heights and forming into columns upon the plain of
Ayacucho, General Sucre rode along his battle-line and inspir-
ited his followers. According to his aide, he exclaimed, “Upon
the efforts of today the destiny of South America depends,”
and, pointing towards the royalist columns, he assured his sol-
diers that their admirable constancy would soon be rewarded
by another day of glory.

When only a part of the royalist army had formed in battle
array, Sucre ordered the gallant Cordova to begin the attack.
While the Spanish soldiers were engaged in a desperate hand-
to-hand struggle with the Colombian soldiers upon the plain,
Sucre sent a detachment of cavalry to charge the royalists who
were descending from the heights. The Spanish soldiers were
soon routed, and, in part, driven to the heights of Condor-
kanki. A brilliant charge by the patriot cavalry upon a di-
vision of the royalist army under General Valdez which at-
tacked Sucre’s left wing, drove it into flight. After a struggle
which lasted only about an hour, the royalists were driven
from the plain of Ayacucho. The Spanish soldiers who sought
a refuge upon the heights were fiercely pursued ; and there the
wounded viceroy was captured. To quote again from the me-
moirs of General Miller: “The battle of Ayacucho was the
most brilliant ever fought in South America. ... It was not

ANTONIO JOSE DE SUCRE

283

a victory of mere chance, but the result of the most determined
bravery and an irresistible onset conceived and executed at the
proper moment.” In one of those rare moments when General
Sucre mentioned his own military achievements, he wrote to
a friend concerning the battle upon the plain of Ayacucho, “A
proud Spanish army was there put to rout ; but this was done
so skillfully that the battle can scarcely be described.”

The victory of Ayacucho gave the coup de grace to the
royalist army in Lower Peru. Late in the afternoon of De-
cember 9, General Canterac appeared before Sucre’s tent to
propose a capitulation. Of that proposal the magnanimous
victor said, “Although the condition of the enemy made possi-
ble a surrender at our discretion, I believed it worthy of
American generosity to concede some honors to the van-
quished soldiers, who had been victorious in Peru for four-
teen years The capitulation was arranged upon the field
of battle.” The treaty which was signed by Sucre and Can-
terac shortly afterwards provided that Lower Peru should
be relinquished to the victors. The vanquished soldiers were
to be allowed freely to proceed to Spain, on the condition that
they were not to return to the New World to take up arms
against the Spanish-American states. It was provided that
they might be admitted into the army of Peru. No person
should be disturbed because of his political opinions or be-
cause he had served under the Spanish banner, provided that
he observed the laws. Any persons might emigrate from Peru
with their families and properties within one year; those per-
sons who chose to remain in the country should be considered
as Peruvians. The property held in Peru by non-resident
Spaniards was to be respected, provided that those Spaniards
did not oppose the independence of that state. Subject to the
approval of congress, Peru was to assume the responsibility
for the debts which Spain had incurred in the liberated terri-
tory. If Peru approved, viceregal officers might even retain
their positions. Obviously both Sucre and Canterac felt that
this capitulation determined the destinies of other states than

284 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

Peru ; for a clause in the treaty provided that certain patriot
and royalist commanders should be sent to the Platean prov-
inces in order that the archives, munitions, and garrisons might
be promptly transferred to the independent government. Span-
ish merchant vessels and war ships were to be allowed to se-
cure provisions in Peruvian ports for six months after the
publication of the treaty; but such war vessels were to leave
the Pacific Ocean promptly ; and they were not to touch at any
port which was still held by the Spaniards. The Spanish offi-
cers who had been captured at Ayacucho, including fourteen
generals, were to be set at liberty. The prisoners who had
been captured in other engagements between the patriots and
the royalists were also to be released. The generals and other
officers of Spain were to be allowed to keep their swords and
uniforms. The defeated soldiers might move about freely in
order to arrange their affairs without being embarrassed by the
actions of any independent state. The last article of the
capitulations provided that “any question which might arise
in regard to any article of this treaty” should be interpreted
“in favor of the soldiers of the Spanish army.” Such gener-
ous treatment of a vanquished enemy by the victor should
have influenced the government of Spain to ratify the treaty
which was signed upon the plain of Ayacucho.

In Miller’s memoirs a pathetic picture is drawn of La
Serna, the captive viceroy of Peru, leaning against the mud
wall of an Indian hut near Ayacucho, his white hair clotted
with blood from a wound received in the battle. That picture
symbolizes the end of the Spanish empire in continental Amer-
ica. In the former capital of the Peruvian viceroys the battle
of Ayacucho was rightly believed to signalize the destruction
of Spanish rule in Peru. This victory was indeed significant
not only to Peru but also to other states of South America :
on one side, it completed the achievements of Jose de San
Martin; on the other side, it almost concluded the labors of
Simon de Bolivar. The glowing tribute of the liberator to the
hero of Ayacucho will furnish his estimate of the significance

Pl.AN OF THF. RaTTI.E OF AyACUCIIO
(From tlie “Memoirs of General Miller”

ANTONIO JOSE DE SUCRE 285

of the battle: it will furnish another illustration of the occa-
sional exuberance of Bolivar’s style.

The battle of Ayacucho is the climax of American glory,
and the work of General Sucre. The arrangement for this
battle was perfect, and the execution divine. In one hour
rapid and masterly maneuvers routed the victors of fourteen
years, — an army perfectly constituted and ably led. . . . Just
as the battle of Waterloo decided the destinies of European
nations, so did the battle of Ayacucho decide the fate of the
nations of Spanish America. . . . General Sucre is the father
of Ayacucho: he is the redeemer of the sons of the sun; he
has broken the chains with which Pizarro bound the empire
of the Incas. Posterity will represent Sucre with one foot at
Pichincha and the other foot at Potosi, holding in his hands
the cradle of Manco Capac, and contemplating the chains of
Peru broken by his sword.

In truth, Sucre’s victory exercised a decisive influence upon
the fortunes of the dissident provinces of Spain in America
from the Rio de la Plata to the Rio Grande. Nevertheless, the
court of Madrid did not sanction the treaty of Ayacucho.
Ferdinand VII. — unfettered by a constitution — would not rec-
ognize the independence of the rising states of Spanish Amer-
ica. The achievements of Bolivar and Sucre, however, were
appreciated in South America. On February 12, 1825, the
Peruvian congress decreed that a medal should be struck off
in honor of the liberator, Simon de Bolivar, and that hence-
forth General Sucre should be dignified with the title of Grand
Marshal of Ayacucho. It also provided that an equestrian
statue of Bolivar should be erected at Lima. About the same
time the Colombian congress passed a law providing that a
medal of platinum should be presented to Bolivar, the liberator
of Colombia and Peru, and that a sword of gold should be
presented to Sucre, the victor of Ayacucho. From the ancient
capital of the Inca empire, Sucre wrote to Bolivar, “I shall
forward to you the banner which Pizarro carried to Cuzco
three hundred years ago.”

General Sucre soon led the army of liberation into the

286 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

presidency of Charcas — Upper Peru — that extensive region
which, during the last years of Spanish rule, was under the
jurisdiction of the audiencia of Chuquisaca and also of the
viceroy of Buenos Aires. Early in 1825 Sucre terminated suc-
cessfully the war for the liberation of that region. The po-
litical status of Upper Peru presented a thorny problem to
Marshal Sucre. In certain particulars he occupied a position
similar to that which San Martin had held in 1821 with regard
to Lower Peru. In other particulars his position was dif-
ferent. Upper Peru had been liberated by soldiers from Co-
lombia, la Plata, and Lower Peru ; the republic of Peru wished
to establish jurisdiction over Upper Peru; it was far from the
former seat of government at Buenos Aires; and some of its
people wished to found an independent state. Further, Sucre
was acting under Bolivar’s aegis. Marshal Sucre soon decided
that it would be wise to avoid a military dictatorship and also
to abstain from any interference in the domestic affairs of this
section. As early as February 9, 1825, he issued a significant
proclamation. Declaring that the former viceroyalty of Buenos
Aires lacked a central government, he announced that Upper
Peru would remain under the control of the liberating army
until delegates of the provinces should assemble. He proposed
that the delegates should meet in April, 1825, to deliberate
freely in regard to a provisional government and to consider
the political destinies of Upper Peru. Sucre also suggested
that the decision reached by this assembly should be sanctioned
by the governments at Buenos Aires and Lima. When Bolivar
heard of the proclamation, he sent a letter to Marshal Sucre
which was couched in these words :

Neither you, nor I, nor the congress of Peru, nor of
Colombia, can break and violate the basis of public law which
we have recognized in Spanish America. This basis is: that
republican governments are being founded within the limits
of the former viceroyalties, captaincy generals, or presiden-
cies, for example, Chile. Upper Peru is a dependency of the
viceroyalty of Buenos Aires, just as Quito is a contiguous
dependency of Bogota. Although Chile was a dependency of

ANTONIO JOSE DE SUCRE

287

Peru, yet it was in reality separated from Peru some time
before the revolution began, just as Guatemala was separated
from New Spain. Thus both of these presidencies might
rightly become independent of their ancient viceroyalties; but
neither Quito nor Charcas can rightly become independent
except by an agreement embodied in a treaty resulting from a
war between the parties, or resulting from the deliberations
of a congress.

This protest embodied the idea which, consciously or un-
consciously, influenced some leaders of the revolutionary epoch
in South America : namely, that the boundaries of the inde-
pendent states should coincide with the boundaries of those
colonial divisions which had been under the control of a vice-
roy, a captain general, or a president. In other words, this
was Bolivar’s statement of a doctrine which is commonly
known in the international law of Spanish America as the uti
possidetis of 1810.

In the case of Upper Peru, however, the scruples of Bolivar
were outweighed by Sucre’s arguments and actions. On May
16, after the meeting of the delegates summoned by Sucre
had been postponed, Bolivar the dictator of Peru, reluctantly
sanctioned the assembly and decreed that, in the meantime,
Upper Peru should be subject to Sucre’s authority. During
the interregnum Marshal Sucre busied himself with reforms
concerning justice and finance. Soon after the delegates of
Upper Peru assembled at Chuquisaca, on July 19, 1825, they
wrote to Bolivar declaring that they placed themselves under
his protection ; the liberator responded that he felt honored by
this announcement made at a time when those delegates were
entering upon their new career. After considerable debate, on
August 6, the anniversary of the battle of Junin, delegates
from the provinces of Charcas, La Paz, Cochabamba, Potosi,
and Santa Cruz proclaimed the independence of Upper Peru
from Spain. The justification which they presented for this
act was the misgovemment and oppression of the motherland.
They declared that both Peru and the United Provinces had

288 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

expressed their intentions to allow Upper Peru to determine
her own political destiny. They proclaimed that the rule of
Ferdinand VII. had ceased and expressed their desire to es-
tablish a sovereign state which would be independent alike of
the nations of the Old World and the New, — a state that should
be governed by a constitution and laws formed by its own
citizens.

On August II, 1825, the assembly of Upper Peru decreed
that the new state should be designated the Republica Bolivar.
It provided that Bolivar was the father and protector of this
state, as well as the first president. It also decreed that the
future capital of the republic should be named Sucre. A few
days later it adopted a national flag, as well as a coat of arms,
and made provision for a national coinage. On August 31 it
declared that the new nation was to have “a representative
republican” government. Apparently the Bolivians did not
feel able to maintain their independence without foreign aid,
for, on October 4, the assembly expressed a desire that two
thousand Colombian soldiers should be allowed to remain
in the republic so long as its legislators might deem necessary.
In regard to the provisional government of the new republic,
on October 3, 1825, the assembly passed a decree providing
that Marshal Sucre should be the supreme ruler of the state
when Bolivar was not upon Bolivian soil.

While Bolivian legislators were thus laying the founda-
tions of a new state, Bolivar — who had delegated his power
as dictator of Peru to a council — was making a triumphal tour
through the liberated provinces of Lower and Upper Peru.
On August 18 he reached La Paz, where he met a delegation
from the Bolivian assembly that asked him to promote the in-
dependence of their state, whereupon Bolivar apparently gave
it assurances that he would use his influence with the Peruvian
congress to secure such recognition. On November i Bolivar
reached Chuquisaca, where he acted as the chief executive
of the state. During the few months when Bolivar was ac-
tually the dictator-president of Bolivia he inaugurated some

ANTONIO JOSE DE SUCRE

289

political and administrative reforms: by various decrees he
insisted upon economy in the administration of the govern-
ment ; he provided that the tribute which had been levied upon
the Indians should be replaced by a head-tax; he took vari-
ous measures to promote education, making his old tutor, Rod-
riguez, director of public instruction ; he provided for the es-
tablishment of new judicial tribunals; and he ordered that
wagon-roads should be constructed between the different sec-
tions of the republic. On December 29 Bolivar issued a de-
cree announcing that the constituent congress of Bolivia would
assemble on May 25, 1826. On the same day he transferred
his executive authority to Sucre.

Early in 1826 — while again acting as the chief executive of
the nascent state — Sucre took measures to carry out several
orders or decrees of the liberator. In addition, he initiated
some administrative reforms. He soon entrusted the man-
agement of such matters as internal affairs, war, and the
finances to distinct ministries. On January 23, 1826, he issued
an important decree which laid the basis of Bolivia’s adminis-
trative system. That decree provided that her territory should
be divided into five departments ; these departments were to
be subdivided into provinces, and the provinces were to be
divided into cantons. As the chief executive of Bolivia, Sucre
ardently desired to secure control of the district of Tarija, but
that district became a bone of contention between Bolivia and
the United Provinces. In vain did Sucre hope to secure from
Peru a strip of territory upon the Pacific Ocean which would
include the port of Arica and thus furnish Bolivia a good
outlet to the sea. Still, he made certain of an outlet further
south; for, as early as March, 1826, he exercised jurisdiction
over the district of Atacama, which later became the debatable
land between Bolivia and Chile. The territory of the new state
which was thus being hewn out of the side of the United Prov-
inces included, roughly speaking, the region which had been
subject to the audiencia of Chuquisaca. On May 25 Sucre
resigned his extraordinary authority to the constituent con-

290 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

gress which had gathered at Chuquisaca; but that congress at
once elected him provisional president of the republic, a posi-
tion which he finally accepted with much reluctance.

What of the first constitution of the republic of Bolivia? It
was while residing in Chuquisaca that Bolivar fulfilled the
request of Bolivia’s first assembly to frame a constitution for
the new state. Accordingly, when he was not enjoying the
felicitations of the inhabitants, or receiving the commissioners
who had been sent from the Platean provinces to congratulate
him, or issuing reformatory decrees, Bolivar was framing a
constitution for the republic which bore his name. When he
discussed the motives which impelled Bolivar again to essay
the role of maker of constitutions, O’Leary said :

I do not consider myself competent to pass upon the merits
or the defects of this constitution; but it is my duty — a duty
imposed alike by honor and justice — to give testimony to the
purity of the motives which animated its illustrious author to
propose changes in the political system which was so popular
in America. Profoundly versed in the history of the human
race and well instructed in theories of political science, he was
not ignorant of the institutions which, in ancient and modern
times, had raised nations to prosperity and glory, or had pro-
moted their decadence and ruin. Bolivar possessed another
qualification even more essential. He had a perfect knowledge
of the world, and, interested as he was in the study of the
human heart, few individuals possessed a keener intuition, or
a more delicate tact. The peculiar circumstances of his ad-
venturous life and the extraordinary events of his public
career, had brought him into contact with all classes of society
and enabled him to observe men in all phases and conditions.
More then any other person did he understand his fellow-
patriots of South America. . . . The political condition of
Spanish America did not gratify the observant and penetrating
eyes of Bolivar, who had played the principal role in the revo-
lutionary drama, and who was aware of America’s most hidden
secrets. . . . Full of fear, he contemplated the terrible picture,
and proposed to derive wise lessons from the spectacle. Al-
though he knew that the easiest method to preserve his ascend-
ancy was to cajole popular prepossessions, yet he had too much

ANTONIO JOSE DE SUCRE

291

patriotism to traffic with the fortunes of his country for per-
sonal advantage. So great was his soul that he would not sac-
rifice his convictions, which were sustained by reason and ex-
perience, upon the altar of popularity. Thus he reached his
decision without any vacillation. He sought a system which
would be strong enough to curb revolutions and not theories
which would foment them.

By the end of February, 1826, Bolivar had completed his
task. When he saw that political conditions in Lima would not
permit him to be present at the opening of the Bolivian con-
stituent congress, the liberator composed a discourse to explain
the constitution which he had framed for the “Republic of
Bolivia.” In June, 1826, Sucre presented the project to the
constituent congress and read to it Bolivar’s discourse.

In this constitution the executive power was vested in a
president chosen by congress, who was to serve for life. If
the president died, or was disabled, he was to be succeeded
by the vice president, who ordinarily presided over the meet-
ings of the cabinet. That body was to be composed of three
secretaries : a secretary of the interior and foreign relations, a
secretary of finance, and a secretary of war and the navy. The
president was vested with powers which were analogous to
the powers of the President of the United States. In his dis-
course Bolivar compared the position of the president in his
plan to the position of the sun in the solar system. “This
supreme authority should be perpetual ; for governments with-
out hierarchies, in particular, need a fixed point around which
magistrates and citizens, men and things, may revolve: ‘Give
me a fixed point,’ said an ancient sage, ‘and I will move the
world.’ To Bolivia a president holding office for life will
be such a point. Though not endowed with action, he will
support the entire system. His head has been removed, in
order that no person may fear his intentions ; and his hands
have been tied that he may injure no one.” Bolivar argued
that as America was largely unsettled, it would be difficult
to establish a monarchy there. “Deserts are favorable to in-

292 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

dependence. In America we have no grandees, either civil
or ecclesiastical. . . . There is no power more difficult to
maintain than that of a new prince. Bonaparte, who van-
quished so many armies, could not overcome this rule, which
is stronger than empires.” Thus, apparently, did Bolivar
conceive the role of president under his constitution. Never-
theless, it appears that a president for life, as proposed by
him, would have meant in practice a constitutional monarch.

The legislative authority of Bolivia was to be vested in
three houses : the house of tribunes, the house of senators, and
the house of censors. Each house was to be composed of
thirty members. The tribunes, whose special powers were
largely concerned with financial affairs, the army, the navy,
and foreign affairs, were to hold office for four years. The
senators, whose special powers were concerned chiefly with
judicial, ecclesiastical, and constitutional matters, were to hold
office for eight years. The censors were to hold office for
life : they should watch that the constitution, laws, and treaties
of Bolivia were faithfully observed. The censors were also
given the exclusive right to propose all laws concerning edu-
cation and the press. They were to protect the liberty of the
press, to encourage arts and sciences, to distribute honors
and rewards, and to condemn to “eternal opprobium the usurp-
ers of public authority, notorious traitors, and atrocious crim-
inals.” In his discourse Bolivar compared “the political and
moral power” of the censors to the power exercised by “the
areopagus of Athens and the censors of Rome.” The censors
of the Bolivian constitution — “the high priests of the laws”
— illustrate the idea of a moral power, which Bolivar pro-
posed to the congress of Angostura.

The judicial power was to be vested in a supreme court
and certain inferior courts. The supreme court should be
composed of a president and six other judges. Only some
of the cases in which that court had jurisdiction may here
be named : it was to take cognizance of cases relating to am-
bassadors, other diplomatic agents, and consuls, of criminal

293

ANTONIO JOSE DE SUCRE

cases involving certain important officers of the republic, and
of matters relating to the patronage. It was to examine papal
bulls, briefs, and rescripts relating to civil affairs. Provisions
were also made for inferior courts in judicial districts which
were to be carved out of the provinces. In every town of one
hundred inhabitants there were to be judges, or justices, who
were to promote the reconciliation of contending parties. The
use of torture or the extortion of confessions was prohibited.
In his discourse Bolivar praised the judicial system because
of its “absolute independence. The people present the candi-
dates, while the legislature selects the individuals who are to
be the members of the courts.”

The selective process which Bolivar thus suggested was
provided by what he styled “the electoral power.” In reality
that so-called power was an arrangement for the choice of
certain officers by means of electoral colleges in the provinces.
The citizens who had the right to vote should choose electors
that were to hold their offices for four years. The electors
were to meet annually in the capitals of their respective prov-
inces to receive the reports of elections, to petition the legis-
lature for reforms, to elect members of the legislature and
certain other officers, and to nominate candidates for such
offices as prefects, alcaldes, and curates. The suggestions for
a so-called electoral power were probably adapted from the
Constitution of the United States. In Bolivar’s discourse he
praised this power which constituted a new weight cast into
the balance against the authority of the executive. To para-
phrase the words which the author used in a circular extolling
his constitution : it entrusted the exercise of important acts of
sovereignty to electoral bodies. This elaborate electoral power
was probably the liberator’s most distinctive contribution to
political science.

Bolivar stipulated that the republic was to be composed
of departments which were to be divided into provinces. Those
provinces were to be subdivided into cantons. The head of
each department was to be a prefect. In each province a

294 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

governor was to be the chief authority. The political affairs of
each canton were to be managed by a corregidor. Provision
was made for a navy as well as an army. In his discourse
Bolivar maintained that the constitution should contain no
prescription in regard to religious faith; but the constituent
congress of Bolivia did not accept this view.

The monarchical constitution framed for the republic
of Bolivia embodied the ideas of the “liberator of Colombia,
Peru, and Bolivia” in regard to the type of government which
was most suitable for an independent state in the existing
condition of Spanish America. In an address which he later
made in Peru, Bolivar is reported to have said in regard
to the framing of the constitution : “This constitution is the
work of ages. To form it I have consulted every ancient
and modern authority. It combines the lessons of experience
with the counsels and opinions of the wise.” In all likeli-
hood in framing his constitution, Bolivar tried to imitate in
some respects the government of France under General Bona-
parte, the First Consul. An agent of France in South America
quoted Bolivar as having said that by this constitution he
established a mixed government which utilized the best princi-
ples of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy. According to
an inedited note of Tomas de Heres found in the archives of
the liberator at Caracas, the wise men whom Bolivar con-
sulted were certain of his associates — as Tomas de Heres —
who were asked to furnish him in writing with their reflections
upon his draft of the constitution. It would appear that
Bolivar’s main intention was to ingraft a monarchical custom
into the republican system. Unwittingly, perhaps, Bolivar
made the executive authority in the Bolivian system some-
what weaker than in the constitution which he presented in
1819 to the congress of Angostura. When he sent copies
of his constitution and discourse to General Paez, the liberator
declared that it was not possible for him to present any other
plan of government to a state which was named after himself.
In letters to prominent Colombians he expressed the hope

ANTONIO JOSE DE SUCRE

295

that conditions in Colombia might alter so as to make possible
the adoption there of the Bolivian constitution. To synchron-
ize our story, it should be noticed that at the very time when
the Bolivians were considering the liberator’s constitution, a
constituent assembly at the former capital of the viceroyalty
of la Plata was adopting a centralistic constitution for the
Argentine republic.

Bolivar’s constitution was referred to a committee of the
congress of Bolivia which suggested some changes. After
several months of debate, with some modifications — the most
important being that article which provided that Roman
Catholicism should be the state religion — congress adopted
this constitution. In October, 1826, General Sucre was elected
the president of Bolivia. This office he was reluctant to ac-
cept ; because he had an inherent dislike for the position of
civil magistrate which he felt unfitted to fill, and he appre-
hended that it might be difficult to preserve Bolivia as a buffer
state between Peru and the Argentine republic. Nevertheless
he waived his personal desires in order that the rule of law
might be established in Bolivia. On December 9, 1826, he
took a solemn oath to observe the Bolivian constitution. He
made a short address to congress announcing his fixed deter-
mination to retire from the presidency on August 2, 1828,
the day set for the convocation of the first congress of Bolivia
under the constitution. Bolivar did not share his friend’s
opinion with regard to the presidency of Bolivia ; for he urged
Sucre to accept that token of the republic’s gratitude to its
founder. About the time of Sucre’s inauguration, the Peru-
vians adopted the Bolivian constitution, slightly modified, as
the constitution for their state upon the condition that Bolivar
should be their president. But in September, 1826, Bolivar
had relinquished the supreme authority in Peru and had started
on the long journey for Bogota. In the following year his
beloved constitution was discarded by the Peruvians and they
promulgated — with some modifications — a constitution for the
republic of Peru which had been adopted in 1823, but which

296 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

had been practically suspended during Bolivar’s dictatorship.

The Marshal of Ayacucho often regretted that he had be-
come the president of Bolivia. In spite of Bolivar’s advice
and despite the constitutional provision for a life president,
Sucre steadfastly adhered to his resolution to relinquish the
presidency. To judge by letters which he wrote in 1827, Sucre
believed that the people of Bolivia were tranquil under his
rule. But he felt that the Peruvians viewed Bolivia as “a bat-
tery of the liberator” which might some day destroy their
freedom and independence. Aware that there was some dis-
satisfaction with his administration, he felt that the Bolivians
were ungrateful to him. On June 4, 1827, he wrote to Bolivar
declaring that the anarchy, the confusion, and the ingratitude
which prevailed among the Spanish-Americans had convinced
him that, if the leaders who had figured prominently in the
wars for independence did not relinquish their positions, they
would soon lose their heads, — a remarkable prophecy which
almost came true in his own case. For, on April 18, 1828, at
Chuquisaca, or Sucre, the discontented soldiers in the garrison
tumultuously rebelled. While quelling the insurrection Presi-
dent Sucre was badly wounded in the arm; in a letter to
Bolivar about a week later he exclaimed : ‘T, who came through
the wars of independence without a wound, carry a mark of
the ingratitude of men in a shattered arm!” The mutiny at
the capital was followed by a Peruvian invasion, which was
finally repelled by President Sucre. In his last message to con-
gress on August 2, 1828, he denounced the dangerous policy
of intervention which Peru had thus adopted. A few ex-
tracts from this message of Sucre to the Bolivians will serve
to depict the man : —

I shall not conclude my message without asking of the
nation’s representatives a reward for my services, which —
great or small — have given existence to Bolivia, — services
which consequently deserve some requital. The constitution
makes me inviolable : I cannot be held responsible for the acts
of my government. I ask, then, that I should be deprived of

ANTONIO JOSE DE SUCRE 297

this prerogative, and that all my conduct should be examined
minutely. If, by April 18, it is shown that I have violated a
single law; if the constitutional chambers judge that there is
occasion for the presentation of a case to the ministry, I shall
return from Colombia and submit to the judgment of the law.
I ask this reward with so much more reason, for I solemnly
declare that, during my administration, I have governed; the
good or the evil which has been done, I have done. ... I
ask another reward from the people of Bolivia and their
administrators: that they should not destroy the work of my
creation; that they preserve amid every peril the independence
of Bolivia. . . .

For the rest, gentlemen, it is sufficient remuneration for
my services to return to my native land after six years of
absence, having gloriously served the friends of Colombia.
Although as a result of foreign intrigues, I bear this arm
withered — the arm which at Ayacucho terminated the war for
American independence, destroyed the chains of Peru, and
brought Bolivia into existence — yet I am content. In the
midst of trying circumstances, I have kept my conscience free
from all crime. When I crossed the Desaguadero River, I
beheld a group of men: assassins and victims, slaves and
tyrants, devoured by rancor and thirsting for vengeance. I
have pacified men’s minds; I have formed a nation that has
its own laws; that is transforming its education and its colo-
nial habits; that is recognized by its neighbors; that is free
from foreign indebtedness; that has only a small and advam
tageous domestic debt; and, that, if directed by a prudent
government, will be happy. When the general assembly in-
vited me to take charge of Bolivia, I declared that the inde-
pendence and the organization of the state would rest upon
my labors. Although I have lived in the midst of parties
which have been active for fifteen years, and in a desolated
country, yet to secure these benefits I have not made a single
Bolivian grieve: I have made no widow or orphan mourn; I
have pardoned some of the wretches who were condemned
by law. My government has been distinguished by clemency,
tolerance, and kindness. Perhaps it will be alleged that this
clemency was the cause of my own wounds. But I shall not
regret them, if my successors with equal lenity shall accustom
the Bolivian people to be guided by the laws, without the
need of noisy bayonets perennially threatening men’s lives and

298 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

endangering liberty. In my retirement I shall see my scars;
but I shall never regret that I carry them, when I recollect
that to found Bolivia, I chose to rule by the empire of law
rather tb^ by the actions of a tyrant or an executioner, who
constantly holds a sword suspended over the heads of the
citizens.

In Sucre’s farewell address to the Bolivians, he expressed
his opinion that the constitution which had been framed by
Bolivar should be amended. He said that he was “not a par-
tisan of the Bolivian constitution’’; for although it appeared
to give “stability to the government,’’ in fact it deprived the
government “of the means to make itself respected.’’ He de-
clared that under this constitution the president had “neither
the vigor nor the force necessary to support himself’’ ; hence
his rights amounted to nothing. Under such conditions he
said that upheavals were bound to occur frequently. In par-
ticular was President Sucre dissatisfied with the constitutional
provisions concerning the presidency. “I am persuaded,’’ he
said, “that one feature of this constitution, a weak executive,
will encourage disturbances, for an executive who is so weakly
supported cannot act as a curb.” Thus, according to the
judgment of Bolivar’s dearest friend, this cherished consti-
tution was defective.

In Sucre’s letters to Bolivar he at times suggested that the
liberator’s political designs were over-ambitious. As early
as 1823 Sucre had written to Bolivar arguing that they ought
to confine themselves to a Colombian policy, and that they
should not adopt a policy which would view all the Spanish-
Americans as brothers, for they were not such. At a later
period with regard to Bolivar’s design for a federation of Co-
lombia, Peru, and Bolivia, Sucre expressed the opinion that a
federal system might remedy some of the existing evils, but
that such a system would unite those states too closely. Above
all, Sucre was anxious that Bolivar should preserve for himself
the title of liberator, for he considered that title unique. In
1826 when General Paez proposed that Bolivar should be

ANTONIO JOSE DE SUCRE

299

crowned king of Colombia, Sucre advised the liberator against
the project, urging in particular that as Bolivar had no sons
this Napoleonic project would ultimately involve the father-
land in destruction. He frankly stated his views to Bolivar
in these words :

For, after your death, each advocate of the project would
think that he had a right to the succession : each would seize
a piece of territory, in order that he might rule over it des-
potically. I agree with your sister that either you ought to be
the liberator, or you ought to be dead — as liberator you will
live with glory during the coming centuries. . . . The con-
centration of the powers of government and the maintenance
of the liberty and independence of the nation should be the
object of every Colombian who labors for the welfare of his
country. I think that if you constantly retain the support of
popular ideas, you will retain your ascendancy; so that under
all circumstances you ought to be the ark of the covenant of
the Colombian people and of the people of America, — the life-
boat that rescues them from shipwreck during political tem-
pests.

When Sucre relinquished the presidency of Bolivia, a ro-
mantic motive which had impelled him to withdraw from pub-
lic life became apparent. Soon after the battle of Pichincha he
had become enamored of Mariana Carcelen y Larrea, Mar-
chioness of Solanda, an heiress of Quito. Frequent meetings
were followed by mutual pledges. Forced to leave the city of
Quito in order to fight for independence, induced to remain
away from that city by exacting official duties, it was not
strange that Sucre frequently lamented his inability to retire
to private life. While president of Bolivia, he arranged to be
married by proxy to the marchioness : that ceremony took
place at Quito just a few days after Sucre had been wounded
at Chuquisaca. Some time after relinquishing the presidency
of Bolivia, Sucre appeared in the city of Quito. There for
a short period he lived the quiet life of a private citizen. He
superintended his wife’s estates, directed the cultivation of the
fields, and lamented the decadence of Colombia. At times

300 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

Marshal Sucre was ill, and depressed in spirit. On October
9, 1829, he wrote to Bolivar from Quito: “I am not ashamed
to say that there are days when I do not have a single real; but
nevertheless I live by the mercy of God, and sometimes by the
mercy of my wife. Such is this unhappy world.”

The plan of this book precludes an attempt to describe in
detail the public career of Bolivar from 1825 to 1829. Here
only such events will be considered as are intimately concerned
with Spanish- American independence. From this viewpoint
the most significant problem which confronted Bolivar during
those troublous years was the identical problem which had
perplexed San Martin, namely, the establishment of mon-
archies in Spanish America. The available evidence upon that
subject, emanating directly or indirectly from Bolivar, is con-
flicting and difficult to evaluate. In part it consists of reports
sent to England by her agents in South America. From these
only one pertinent example will be taken. Three months after
the victory of Ayacucho, Bolivar had a conference at Lima
with Captain Mailing of the English frigate Cambridge. Ac-
cording to that captain’s report to his government, Bolivar ex-
pressed the idea that if the English cabinet ever proposed
to promote the establishment of a monarchy in Spanish Amer-
ica, such a proposal would meet with his approval, for he
would steadily support the prince whom England might wish
to place upon the South-American throne. Further, Bolivar
seems to have suggested that instead of the name king the
name Inca should be used, — a title for which the Indians
had a predilection. “If we are to have a new Gov-
ernment,” Bolivar is also reported to have said, “let it be
modeled on yours, and I am ready to give my support to any
sovereign England may give us.” Similar reports respecting
Bolivar’s designs were made at a later date by other English
agents. Possibly the dispatch of Captain Mailing did not
rightly represent the views of the liberator. Even if the re-
ports of English agents correctly described the conversation

301

ANTONIO JOSE DE SUCRE

of the volatile Colombian, it seems likely that Bolivar, the
diplomat, was merely toying with them.

For when General Paez proposed to Bolivar, who was act-
ing as dictator of Peru, that he should return to Colombia to
assume the role which Napoleon had played in France after
his Egyptian campaign, the liberator replied in March, 1826,
that Colombia was not France, nor was he Napoleon; and that
he did not desire to imitate such unworthy personages as
Caesar or Iturbide. But the idea of a vast monarchy in north-
ern South America seemed destined to bloom perennially. For,
when Vice President Santander responded to Bolivar’s letters
regarding the adoption of the Bolivian constitution in Colom-
bia, on July 6, 1826, he expressed the belief that “an empire
stretching from Potosi to the Orinoco River would be very
strong and influential,’’ but that it would be “a perpetual cause
of war between monarchists and democrats.’’ Santander also
declared that, after having striven for sixteen years for “the
establishment of a legal regime under republican forms,” he
could not betray his principles and accept a foreign prince.
He asserted that he would gladly obey Bolivar as emperor;
but he raised an insuperable obstacle to this project when he
stated that after the death of Bolivar, he would never accept
Paez, or any other Colombian leader, as “supreme and crowned
chief for life.” These excerpts will suggest how persistent
was the idea that an unmasked monarchy might be established
in northern South America.

The views of Bolivar — the president of Colombia — were
again suggested when, in 1828, a periodical of Cuenca proposed
that a monarchy should be founded in northern South Amer-
ica with its capital at Lima. At that time Bolivar openly dis-
claimed any connection with the scheme. A little later Presi-
dent Bolivar argued strongly against such a project upon an
occasion when his secretaries favored the establishment of a
monarchy in Colombia under a European prince in order to
provide a successor to his power. A luminous statement of

302 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

Bolivar’s views was made on July 14, 1829, in a letter to
Estanislao Vergara, the Colombian secretary of foreign affairs.

Although the project to invite a foreign prince to succeed
me in the command might produce some good results, yet I
see a thousand obstacles which it would encounter. No for-
eign prince would accept as his patrimony an anarchical prin-
cipality without any guarantees. Colombia’s debts and the
poverty of the people do not ensure the revenues which are
necessary for the support of a prince and a court, — even in a
miserable fashion. The lower classes would become alarmed,
fearing the effects of aristocracy and inequality. The gen-
erals of the revolution and ambitious personages of every
stamp could never tolerate a government which would deprive
them of the supreme power. I have not spoken of the obsta-
cles in Europe : to suppose that there were none would be to
imagine a rare combination of favoring circumstances.

As Bolivar grew older he seems to have become more and
more pessimistic regarding democratic government in Spanish
America. Obviously, he expressed different views at different
times concerning the establishment of a monarchy, or of mon-
archies, in South America. It is hardly too much to suggest
that he was all things to all men. The puzzling question as to
what Bolivar actually believed regarding governmental systems
during his last years is essentially psychological. Who can
say with certainty what political ideals were cherished in the
recesses of the liberator-president’s mind? Still, it is an in-
disputable fact, that the fullest, the most mature, and the most
authentic expression of Bolivar’s political creed, remains the
constitution which he framed for the republic of Bolivia, —
a constitution which apparently made provision for a masked
constitutional monarchy.

From 1826 to 1830 Great Colombia was disturbed by fac-
tions whose quarrels presaged the disruption of the state.
Generals La Mar and Cordova led unsuccessful revolts against
Bolivar’s domination. General Paez became the leader of a
faction which favored the secession of Venezuela. In Bogota
Vice President Santander, “the champion of the constitution,”

ANTONIO JOSE DE SUCRE

303

directed a party which pposed the dictatorial policy of Boli-
var. In an attempt to allay that partisan strife the Colombian
congress summoned delegates to meet at Ocana early in 1828
to reform the constitution of 1821. At the convention of
Ocana Bolivar’s supporters could make no compromise with
the followers of Santander; some delegates even walked out
of the convention, which soon dissolved. Subsequently, certain
Colombian leaders at Bogota proclaimed that Bolivar was dic-
tator. Whereupon daring conspirators planned to enter the
palace of the dictator, who now styled himself liberator-presi-
dent, in order to secure his person, living or dead. An at-
tempt to seize him which was made on the night of September
25, 1828, was unsuccessful ; for, while his favorite mistress,
Mrs. Thorne, or, as she is commonly known, Manuela Saenz,
parleyed with the conspirators, the hero of many battles
jumped out of a window, and thus escaped the assassin’s dag-
ger. Bolivar was now thoroughly disgusted with his compa-
triots; in a letter to Sucre on October 28, 1828, he said : “You
are the only man of integrity in this heroic and unfortunate
country.’’ And in a rare pamphlet attributed to Bolivar, which
was published in the city of Quito in 1829, this statement
was made: “There is no faith in America; neither among

men, nor among nations : their treaties are paper ; their con-
stitutions are books, their elections are combats : liberty is an-
archy; and life is a torment.”

Thus, in the sere and yellow leaf, Bolivar bewailed the
anarchy of “Great Colombia.” In the south, the Peruvians
under Riva Agiiero invaded Colombian territory. They were
only repelled after Marshal Sucre was placed at the head of
an army, which in February, 1829, defeated them at the battle
of Tarqui. The secession movement in Venezuela finally be-
came so strong that on November 26, 1829, an assembly of
prominent citizens in Caracas decided upon the separation of
Venezuela from Colombia. General Paez was naturally se-
lected as the Venezuelan executive. In January, 1830, the
constituent congress of Colombia, which Bolivar had con--

304 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

yoked, made a last effort to save the republic from dissolution,
it appointed a commission to treat for peace and union with
the secessionists of Venezuela. General Sucre, who had been
serving as the president of this congress, was selected as one
of the commissioners. But even Sucre’s efforts at reconcilia-
tion were futile. Thereupon Bolivar renounced, for the last
time, the office of chief magistrate. In his last message to the
Colombian congress, he declared despairingly, “Independence
is the only blessing which we have acquired at the expense
of everything else.” The renunciation of his power by the lib-
erator-president sealed the doom of Great Colombia. In
an inedited letter of Sucre to Colonel Andrade, May lo, 1830,
the former declared that Bolivar had said that Colombia was
about to be dissevered ; that in whatever section he might live,
the inhabitants would ask him to become their caudillo; and
that neither his position nor his dignity would permit him to
become the chief of a faction.

After the conferences with the Venezuelan commissioners
had failed, Sucre wrote a farewell letter to Bolivar, and then
started on the long and tiresome trip overland to Quito. This
was the last journey of the Marshal of Ayacucho. On June 4,
1830, while riding through the lonely forest of Berruecos, not
far from the town of Pasto, he was shot in a cowardly manner
by hired assassins. The odium for Sucre’s mysterious assassi-
nation fell largely upon General Ovando, the military com-
mander in the department of Cauca, who may have instigated
the murder. The melancholy news of the untimely death of
Sucre shocked his friends. When his widow wrote to Bolivar,
informing him that the sword presented to Sucre by the Co-
lombian congress to celebrate the battle of Ayacucho had been
bequeathed to the liberator, she said : “You lost a loyal friend
who knew your merits. I lost a companion. The sad memo-
ries of this event will embitter the remaining days of my life.”
The news of the assassination must have confirmed Bolivar’s
belief that ‘those who had served the cause of the revolution
had plowed the sea.’ On July i he wrote to his compatriot,

305

ANTONIO JOSE DE SUCRE

General Juan Flores : “This news has produced so deep an im-
pression upon me that I judge it impossible to live in a country
where they cruelly and barbarously assassinate the most illus-
trious generals whose labors have ensured the liberty of Amer-
ica. . . . The immaculate Sucre has not been able to escape
the ambuscades of these monsters. ... I believe that the
object of this crime was to deprive the country of a successor
to me.”

The ingratitude of Colombia seemed to Bolivar sharper
than a serpent’s tooth. His plan to sail from South America
to Europe was frustrated, for he could not sell the mines
of Aroa because of the litigious opposition of his political ene-
mies in Venezuela. In his extremity he again thought of an
asylum in the West Indies. On May ii in a letter to an inti-
mate friend Bolivar expressed his intention to leave Colombia
in any event : “I have decided nevermore to return to Co-

lombia,— nevermore to serve my ungrateful compatriots.” The
former dictator resisted the supplications of friends who
wished him to assume the supreme power again. He avowed
that he had never looked with favor upon insurrections, de-
claring that he now regretted the revolutions which he had led
against Spanish rule. Sick and steadily declining in health,
he said that rather than take medicine, he preferred to die.
Early in December, accompanied by a few of his military
comrades, “the liberator of Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia,” was
carried on a litter into the town of Santa Marta. On Decem-
ber 17, 1830, he died near that place of pulmonary tuberculo-
sis. A proclamation which he had signed on December 10 was
his political testament; —

Colombians ! You have witnessed my attempts to establish
liberty where tyranny had reigned. I have labored disinter-
estedly, relinquishing my fortune, and even my peace of mind.
I gave up the supreme command when I became convinced
that you doubted my disinterestedness. My enemies abused
your credulity and trampled upon my most sacred posses-
sion,— my reputation and my love for liberty. Although I am
the victim of my persecutors, who have driven me to the gates

3o6 rise of SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

of the tomb, yet I forgive them. About to leave this world,
my affection tells me that I ought to make known to you my
last wishes: I do not aspire to any other glory than to con-
solidate Colombia. All of you should labor for the inestimable
boon of union. The people should obey the existing govern-
ment in order to free themselves from anarchy. The priests
of the Church should direct the progress of the people toward
heaven. And the soldiers should employ their swords to
defend the social guarantees. Colombians ! My last wishes
are for the happiness of my native land. If my death helps
to check the growth of factions and to consolidate the union,
I shall rest tranquilly in the sepulcher !

On January 12, 1830, the dying man had signed his last
will. Bolivar provided that the medal which had been granted
to him by the Bolivian congress should be returned to that
body as a testimonial of the sincere affection which he enter-
tained for Bolivia. To the University of Caracas he be-
queathed two books which had belonged to Napoleon: Rous-
seau’s “Social Contract,” and Montecuccoli’s “Art of War.”
The sword which Sucre had bequeathed to Bolivar was to be
returned to the marshal’s widow ; in order that she might pre-
serve it as a token of the love which the liberator had cherished
for the hero of Ayacucho. Bolivar expressed a wish that
his remains should be buried in his native city. He provided
that, after the payment of a legacy to a faithful servant, the
remnant of his wealth, his debts, and his rights were to be
the heritage of his two sisters and of the children of his de-
ceased brother. Bolivar ordered that his voluminous papers,
which were stored in ten boxes, should be burned. Fortu-
nately for the student of the South-American wars for inde-
pendence, this order was not observed. These documents,
which were later placed at the disposal of Bolivar’s former
secretary, form a large part of the collection known as the
Memorias del general O’Leary that constitutes a valuable rec-
ord of the career of the liberator-president, who exercised so
profound an influence upon the fortunes of northern South
America during the heroic age.

307

ANTONIO JOSE DE SUCRE

Bolivar’s hopes regarding the political existence of the
state which had been created by his genius were vain. Even
before the hero of Colombia expired at Santa Marta, Great
Colombia had split into three parts. In September, 1830, a
convention of delegates from the former captaincy general of
Venezuela which had assembled at Valencia adopted a consti-
tution for the republic of Venezuela. In the same month a
constitutional convention composed of delegates from the prov-
inces of the former presidency of Quito which had assembled
at Riobamba adopted a republican constitution for the state
of Ecuador. In November, 1831, a convention which had
assembled at Bogota, announced that the provinces which had
composed the central part of Colombia formed the state of
New Granada — at a later time again designated as Colombia —
and a short time afterwards a republican constitution was
adopted which had been framed by the constituent congress in
May, 1830.

The sanity of Bolivar’s judgment was well illustrated by the
selection of Antonio Jose de Sucre to be the commander of the
army of liberation upon the Pacific coast. Many of the letters
which passed between Bolivar and Sucre contained evidence of
their mutual affection. Sucre frequently gave expression to
the tender love and genuine admiration which he cherished for
the liberator. “If I could be sure of your friendship,’’ wrote
Sucre to Bolivar in 1825, “I would be satisfied in a corner of
Quito.” In truth, it would be difficult to find in the chronicles
of history two other leaders who, in an atmosphere of jeal-
ousy .and suspicion, preserved their friendship more hallowed,
or maintained their loyalty to a common cause more unsullied,
than these two Venezuelans.

Antonio Jose de Sucre was not without faults. His great-
est fault was perhaps his pride and sensitiveness which occa-
sionally made him interpret actions as slights to himself. By
a somewhat unusual combination of qualities, Sucre was not
only proud, but also modest. At times he ascribed all the
credit for his military successes to his master. It would in-

3o8 rise of SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

deed seem that Sucre possessed the spirit of self-abnegation to
almost as great a degree as San Martin. Marshal Sucre was
an honest man ; for although he served South America for
many years in a public capacity, and doubtless had opportuni-
ties to line his own purse, yet at his death he owned very little
property. He even declined to accept the monies which were
granted him by Peru and Bolivia as a reward for his services
as liberator, while his salary as a soldier of Colombia was
partly used to relieve the needs of his relatives at Cumana.
Other incidents in Sucre’s career demonstrate his deep attach-
ment for the numerous family of his father. Nor did the
valiant general forget his birth-place: after the battle of Pi-
chincha, Sucre sent to the city of Cumana a wreath of gold
which had been presented to him by the city of Cochabamba.
Obscured for a time by the over-shadowing figure of the lib-
erator-president, with every passing year the hero of Ayacucho
rises higher in the esteem of Venezuelans who now reverence
him as one of their revolutionary trinity, — Miranda, Bolivar,
and Sucre. And, in the vast mediterranean state of South
America, the memory of Sucre is revered as that of the true
founder of Bolivia.

A remarkable diary which was apparently written in 1828
by Peru de la Croix, a companion in arms of Bolivar, pre-
serves some illuminating remarks made by the liberator while
sojourning at Bucaramanga. If the words which La Croix
attributed to Bolivar concerning the Bayard of South America
do not preserve the liberator’s precise sentiments, at least they
contain a suggestive contemporary opinion of Bolivar’s favor-
ite general : —

Sucre is always a gentleman; he has the best intellect in
Colombia; he is methodical; he is capable of the most lofty
conceptions; he is the best general of the republic, and her
first statesman. His ideas are excellent and definite; his
morality is exemplary; his soul is grand and strong. He
knows how to persuade and how to lead men. He knows also
how to judge them: and, if in political affairs, it is not a

309

ANTONIO JOSE DE SUCRE

defect to consider men as worse than they really are, General
Sucre is able to demonstrate in an extreme fashion the un-
favorable judgments which he has formed of them. Anothci
defect of General Sucre is that he wishes to make it appear
that he is extremely ingenuous and popular, while he is not
able to conceal that in reality he is not so. But these are only
slight defects, which are found among so many merits and
virtues that a very observant eye is needed to detect them.
To all this it may be added that the Grand Marshal of Aya-
cucho is brave among the brave, loyal among the loyal, a lover
of laws and not of despotism, a partisan of order, an enemy
of anarchy, and finally, a true liberal.

Of particular interest are the statements which La Croix
attributes to Bolivar in regard to politics and revolution. The
diary of Bucaramanga records the words of the liberator to
the effect that only a despot could rightly govern Colombia.
With respect to himself, Bolivar affirmed that he had not acted
as a despot, for the Colombian people had chosen him to serve
as their dictator. He even appears to have ironically asserted
that a theocratic form of government would be best adapted
to the people of Spanish America. In 1828, Bolivar evidently
felt that there were some defects in the constitution which he
had framed for Bolivia. The honied words of praise which
fell from the liberator’s lips at Bucaramanga indicate that in
his heart of hearts Bolivar admired and emulated the great
Frenchman as administrator, statesman, and soldier. The
truth of the matter seems to be that Napoleon was Bolivar’s
inimitable model.

According to Peru de la Croix, the liberator sententiously
said that the art of politics was rightly to judge men and af-
fairs. If indeed Bolivar made that remark, he certainly prac-
ticed what he preached. Almost unerring in his judgment of
men, he intuitively recognized the strength as well as the weak-
ness of his political and military associates. Perhaps as a
necessary consequence, Bolivar was able to secure good service
from the available men. This service he secured partly be-
cause he carefully selected the man best fitted for the particu-

310 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

lar position, partly because he wisely instructed his agents,
and partly because he made each agent feel the cardinal im-
portance of his assigned task. Then, too, until near the end
of his remarkable career Bolivar had a sublime faith in his
mission as liberator — a faith that could move mountains. Still,
he did not over-estimate his own achievements ; nor did he, like
some great men, consider himself as being charged with a di-
vine mission, which no one else could have performed. It is
indeed not given to all statesmen or warriors to judge of the
part which they have played in history so justly as Bolivar,
the warrior-statesman, seems to have judged of his role. La
Croix records a remarkable conversation between Bolivar and
himself in which the liberator stated his views concerning the
role which he had played in the struggle for the independence
of the Spanish-American republics. “ T have not been the sole
author of the revolution,’” said Bolivar. “Tf I had not been
present during the crisis of the revolution and during the pro-
tracted struggle between the Spanish troops and the patriots,
some other champion of independence would have appeared :
the penumbra of my fortune would not have overshadowed
other patriots, who have been kept in an orbit inferior to my
own. Superstitious people may believe, if they wish, that a
kind Providence destined me for the redemption of Colombia :
— the truth is that circumstances, my genius, my character,
and my passions, placed me on the road which led to inde-
pendence ; my ambition, my constancy, and my lively imagina-
tion caused me to follow that road. . . ”

Thus did Bolivar answer the question of the Sphinx which
guards the highway of history as to the influence of a master-
ful personality upon the movements of his age. As extracts
from his letters and speeches have indicated, Bolivar has some
claim to consideration as a literary man. The large collection
of letters which he left behind attests his far-reaching inter-
ests, as well as his unresting energy, when in his prime. With
his own hand Bolivar wrote letters only to relatives or intimate
friends. To the letters which were ordinarily taken from

ANTONIO JOSE DE SUCRE 311

dictation by his secretary, he occasionally added a few words
of greeting in his own handwriting. Official letters and me-
morials were read to the liberator by his secretary or by a
clerk. The replies were often dictated while Bolivar was
swinging in a hammock or pacing a room with a book in his
hand. In a passage of his invaluable memoirs, O’Leary thui
describes the mode in which the liberator conducted his cor
respondence :

He dictated the official dispatches and letters to as many
as three amanuenses at once. No matter how humble the
station of the writer, never did he lay aside a letter without
making a reply. Although he was sometimes interrupted
while engaged in dictation, never did I hear him make a mis-
take, never did I see him at a loss to pick up the phrase.
When he was not acquainted with the correspondent or the
petitioner, he would ask one or two questions. This occurred
very rarely, however, for, as Bolivar was endowed with a
marvelous memory, he remembered not only all the officers
of the army but also all the officials of the government and
the notable personages of the country.

The picturesque and imaginative style of Bolivar, ordi-
narily limpid and lucid, but at times obscure, has led Gil For-
toul to say that the liberator thought in French and expressed
himself in Spanish.

Simon de Bolivar has been characterized as the Napoleon
0^ the South- American revolution. Endowed with unusual
power to discipline, to organize, and to inspirit his compa-
triots, he led his devoted soldiers from Caracas to Lima, — sol-
diers whose valor and constancy were largely responsible for
the victories of Junin and Ayacucho. Bolivar’s mission was
to free from the heavy yoke of Spain the inhabitants of two
viceroyalties and to lay the foundations of several independ-
ent states. His biographer, De Schryver, has said that ‘besides
establishing the independence of five nations, the achievement
of Bolivar consisted in the fact that he thrust half a million
of slaves into struggles for republican government and de-

312 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

mocracy.’ Bolivar’s chief defects as a publicist may be thus
briefly enumerated: a fondness for personal and autocratic
rule; a pretorian spirit; and a tendency toward imperialism.
These were the defects of his good qualities. From the mili-
tary as well as the political point of view, Bolivar tow-
ered above most of his contemporaries in South America; for
with the exception of San Martin, their gaze seldom left their
own native provinces, while Bolivar’s comprehensive vision
embraced all the rising Spanish-American republics. This dis-
tinguished son of Caracas looked beyond the boundaries of
Venezuela and beheld a liberated and a confederated Spanish
America. After the lapse of many generations in which Boli-
var’s alluring dream of a confederation of the Spanish-Ameri-
can states has remained unfulfilled, it is easy to say that his
ideal of a confederated state in northern South America was
impracticable. For his ideal ignored these facts : that even the
peoples of New Granada, Quito, and Venezuela were sep-
arated by vast wildernesses and lofty mountain ranges; that
they did not possess a real national spirit ; and that, on the con-
trary, they were obsessed with a fierce spirit of particular-
ism. Nevertheless, it was this idealism which swept Bolivar
beyond the ken of his contemporaries, that helped to make him
— in words attributed to San Martin while in exile — “the most
extraordinary personage that South America has produced.”
What wonder that his personality has been obscured by leg-
ends, while his fame has been sung by poets, and his figure
depicted by painters and sculptors! A few stanzas from a
poem inscribed to “the father of Colombia and liberator of
Peru” by a Colombian contemporary, Jose Fernandez Madrid,
as done into English by A. C. Luthman, will furnish the reader
with a noteworthy appreciation of Bolivar by a citizen of
northern South America.

Once lit the fire of patriot feeling ran

From heart to heart, and brighter, stronger grew;

Each doff’d the slave — proclaim’d himself a man —

And to the camp of brave Bolivar flew.

ANTONIO JOSE DE SUCRE

Full well they knew their long and dark career
Through fields of blood, and fire, and peril lay.

They heeded not — the voice was in their ear.

That promised deathless palms and victory !

* :«c « * * *

Thy high heroic deeds shall bear thy name,
Renown’d Bolivar through the shades of time;

And men who live for virtue, freedom, fame,
Must copy thee — no model more sublime.

Ye mighty rivers that through ocean flow,

To distant lands his patriot story bear;

Ye Andes glittering in eternal snow.

Show ye the footprints of his glory here !

The unfading laurel for his brow prepare

Who push’d the bark of freedom from the shore,

And steered her through the ocean of despair,
Nor left the helm until the storm was o’er.

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSION

There is no doubt that the leaders whose revolutionary
careers have been sketched were exceptional men. By ances-
try, by training, and by ability they were much superior to the
average creole. By the same tokens they were immeasurably
superior to the members of the lower classes in Spanish Amer-
ica. Possibly it is significant that the ancestry of several of
the leaders can be traced to natives of northern Spain. It is
noteworthy that all of those leaders came from the middle or
upper strata of society in their respective colonies : they were
often members of an intellectual or property-holding aris-
tocracy. Several of the ‘liberators’ had enjoyed the advan-
tages of study and travel in Europe. From Miranda to Sucre,
with the possible exception of Iturbide, they had been better
educated than the ordinary creole of their generation. A
strange fate decreed that several of these men should meet
a tragic death. Miranda expired in a lonely dungeon near
Cadiz; Hidalgo was shot as a traitor by the Spaniards; Itur-
bide was shot as an outlaw by the Mexicans whom he had
liberated ; Moreno perished while crossing the Atlantic ;
San Martin died a voluntary exile in France; Sucre was
treacherously assassinated ; and Bolivar lived long enough
to regret his achievements as founder of Colombia, Peru, and
Bolivia. The seven narratives have shown that the ultimate
success of the revolution against Spanish rule in America was
in large measure due to the example, the achievements, and
the influence of the liberators and their companions. In the
South-American wars for independence, Venezuelan warriors
played the most notable part: besides liberating their own

314

Francisco de Paula Santander
(Medallion by David d’Angers)

CONCLUSION

315

state, they aided effectively to liberate the territories within
the present republics of Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia.
Although when measured by the great wars of Europe, the
military achievements of the liberators shrink in magnitude,
yet their long-sustained struggle moulded the history of rising
states.

This is a convenient point at which to summarize the causes
for the revolt against Spanish domination in America. Careful
students of the history of Spanish America are not able to ex-
plain that movement, as chemists explain a reaction, by a for-
mula. At present little more can be done than to mention
some of the obvious causes of the revolution. It is clear that
among the conditions which made the revolution in Spanish
America possible was a conviction entertained by some colon-
ists that the burdens of the colonial regime were unendura-
ble:— the oppressive fiscal system of Spain was particularly
detested. Then, too, the Spanish officials often displayed a
shocking disregard for the humane provisions of the anti-
quated laws of the Indies, — a behavior on the part of colonial
officials which encouraged among the people a spirit of con-
tempt for the motherland’s authority. In certain sections of
the Indies the belief that the Spanish laws lacked sanction was
promoted by Spain’s belated attempts to reform her colonial
administration. As in the case of the English colonies in
North America, the revolution in Spanish America was partly
due to the lack of a well-managed colonial system. The secret
spread of philosophic, revolutionary doctrines emanating from
France constituted an intellectual cause of the Spanish-Ameri-
can revolution, as did also a desire among certain leaders to
emulate the revolutionists who separated the English colonies
in North America from the motherland. As a moral cause
of the revolution may be characterized the fact that, because
of his traditions, training, and environment, the creole of Span-
ish America was a different type of man than the Spaniard
overseas. The historian of the future may indeed seek a par-
tial explanation of this uprising in the psychology of a “race.”

3i6 rise of SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

But, although because of certain economic, religious, and po-
litical conditions a spirit of discontent was present in various
sections of Spanish America, yet this was not enough to pro-
voke a general rebellion. It was the usurpation of Napoleon
in the Iberian peninsula that precipitated the movements which
developed into the protracted revolution. The inflammable
tinder that lay scattered throughout the vast dominions of
Spain in America was lighted by Napoleon’s hand.

Let us contrast the revolution which culminated in the sep-
aration from Spain of her continental American colonies with
ihe revolution that separated the English colonies in North
America from their motherland. The Spanish-American revo-
lution affected a more extensive territory than the revolution
in the thirteen colonies. The territory which became free as
a result of the wars between Spain and her colonies was about
seven times as large as the territory conceded to the United
States by the treaty of 1783. From this it is obvious that in
the struggle with her revolted colonists Spain had, in some re-
spects, a more difflcult task than England. Spain’s far-flung
battle line extended from the Sabine River to the Rio de la
Plata : in more accurate terms, Spain had in America a number
of detached battle lines which fronted the alert enemy. Again,
because of the nature and extent of the arena of combat, the
Spanish-Americans could not cooperate as did the North
Americans. Between Mexico and South America, to take an
extreme illustration, there was absolutely no cooperation and
scarcely any sympathy. Although revolts broke out contem-
poraneously in several sections of South America, yet these
uprisings were sometimes sporadic or local. It seems like
a truism to say that no military commander in South America
ever held a position like that conferred by the continental con-
gress upon George Washington. In truth the strongest links
between the widely-separated sections of South America were
the activities of the revolutionary soldiers led by the liberators
San Martin, Bolivar, and Sucre. Unlike the North-American
revolutionists, the South Americans received no aid, material

CONCLUSION

3i>

or moral, through an alliance with a foreign state. For them
there was no such agreement as the treaty with France of Feb-
ruary, 1778, which, like a sunburst after a troubled dawn,
gladdened the hearts of Washington’s followers. The South
Americans had no wise old Franklin, no Beaumarchais! They
received little encouragement from foreign lands beyond sur-
reptitious loans of money from sympathizers in England and
the aid of filibusters from England and the United States.

The South-American revolution differed from the North-
American in another particular : namely, it was neither accom-
panied nor followed by the establishment of a general govern-
ment. During the early revolution the local juntas indeed
played a part comparable with the role of committees of cor-
respondence in the English colonies; but no union of the
revolutionary colonies in Spanish America was formed. Cer-
tain leaders at Buenos Aires, Caracas, and Santiago de Chile
indeed suggested that the people in Spanish South America
should join hands against the peninsular Spaniards. But, with
the exception of the congress of Panama, no assemblage of
representatives of different regions was held. The reasons for
the failure of the Spanish-American revolutionists to form a
union are not far to seek : they are found partly in the sparsity
of the population, and partly in the absence of preexisting
institutions of self-government. It was largely because the
colonists lived in isolated groups that, in the sections which
later became independent nations, they successively framed
separate and distinct declarations of independence.

There were indeed some features in which the Spanish-
American revolution was analogous to the Anglo-American
revolution. Perhaps the most striking analogy was the fact
that a considerable number of the Spanish colonists — the
Tories of the Indies — opposed the revolution. It must never
be forgotten that there were many devoted loyalists who fol-
lowed the Spanish standard on many widely-separated battle-
fields. In certain sections of the Indies the revolution which
separated those regions from the motherland was, in some

3i8 rise of SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

stages at least, the work of a capable, vigorous, and determined
minority. Probably it is not an exaggeration to say that the
spirit of loyalty to the motherland was stronger and more
enduring in the Spanish colonies in America than in the
thirteen English colonies in North America. Spain’s banner
of blood and gold waved so long in South America largely
because so many colonists were at heart loyal to Ferdinand
VII. and to their motherland. The extreme statement has
recently been hazarded by a Colombian writer that, if La
Serna had triumphed upon the plain of Ayacucho, the abso-
lute king would have reestablished his authority throughout
Spanish America. As in the case of the revolt against George
III., there was some sympathy for the revolutionary colonists
in the mother country. This sentiment was particularly signifi-
cant during the years from 1820 to 1823 when Spain was a
constitutional monarchy. The liberal government actually
commissioned envoys who were instructed to negotiate with
the insurgent provinces from Mexico to Patagonia with a view
to the pacification of America. But, after Ferdinand VII. was
restored to absolute power, the proceedings of those envoys
were formally repudiated. That monarch announced that a
preliminary convention of peace which the commissioners of
the constitutional government had signed on July 4, 1823, with
the revolutionary government at Buenos Aires, was void.

No treaty of peace recognizing the triumph of the revo-
lutionists— like the treaty of 1783 between England and the
United States — terminated the Spanish-American wars for in-
dependence. Neither were they terminated by contempora-
neous conventions which acknowledged the independence of
all the Spanish-American nations. The government of Spain
disavowed the treaty of Cordoba and ignored the treaty of
Ayacucho; — the pride of the Spaniard dreaded the independ-
ence of the alienated colonists. Long after the Spanish-
American republics had indisputably established their inde-
pendence, the Spaniards tenaciously cherished their dream of
a colonial empire.

CONCLUSION

319

This leads to another suggestion concerning the circum-
stances which affected the outcome of the revolution : namely,
that to some extent the achievements of the partisans of in-
dependence in America were made possible by the govern-
mental fluctuations in Spain, — fluctuations which rendered a
firm and consistent policy toward the revolutionists well-nigh
impossible. At war with Napoleon, successively governed by
a junta, by the regency and a cortes, by an absolute king, by a
constitutional ministry and a cortes, and again by her misguid-
ed and illiberal monarch, Spain was heavily handicapped in
her long struggle to win back the disaffected colonists to their
allegiance. Those fluctuations coupled with the fact that the
Holy Alliance cautiously refrained from any attempt to restore
Spain’s authority over her revolted colonies, help to explain
why the Spanish navy played such an unimportant part in the
revolution. In truth, at the battle of Trafalgar Spain’s naval
power had been shattered, and it seems likely that after 1823
any attempt by the Holy Alliance to furnish soldiers for the
subjugation of the American revolutionists would have pro-
voked the intervention of the English navy. The only occa-
sions when a fleet played a very important role were in trans-
porting Morillo’s expedition to Venezuela, and in conveying
San Martin’s soldiers to Peru. In the main, the struggle was
fought upon the land.

But the great revolution, or, as some Spanish-American
writers prefer to designate it, the movement for emancipation,
which disrupted the largest colonial empire that the world
had ever known and reconstructed the map of the Three Amer-
icas, was not followed by the establishment of stable govern-
ments. Under the influence of lofty and mistaken ideals, the
Spanish-Americans adopted democratic forms of government
which were unsuited to their training and temperament. These
ideals were at times mirrored in the governmental projects of
the liberators. Moreno, the republican, wished to establish
democracies in South America. San Martin discarded the
thought of establishing republics upon that continent and

320 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

dreamed of founding monarchies there. The liberator Itur-
bide audaciously crowned himself emperor of Mexico only to
be overthrown largely because of republican intrigues. And
Bolivar, under the forms of a republic, moved toward a thinly-
veiled monarchy upon the Napoleonic model. It was only
natural that statesmen who had been nurtured under a pa-
ternalistic monarchy and who keenly felt that their compa-
triots were not fitted for republican government, should have
imagined that the establishment of a monarchical regime would
solve some political problems. To North- American readers,
who are acquainted with the proposals of Colonel Nicola to
crown General Washington king, the projects of Bolivar and
his contemporaries will not seem altogether fanciful. Ani-
mated by a somewhat different spirit than that of George
Washington, Simon de Bolivar coquetted with the monarchists
but refrained from placing the tiara upon his own head.

The protracted struggle for the emancipation of Spanish
America furnished a stern school for her citizens. Many
Spanish-American publicists of the national era received their
preliminary training in those wars which resulted in the politi-
cal, as well as the military, triumph of the creole aristocracy.
After the downfall of Iturbide, Guadeloupe Victoria, Vicente
Guerrero, and Antonio Santa Anna successively became presi-
dents of Mexico. Early in 1823, when O’Higgins abdicated
his office as dictator of Chile, he was succeeded by General
Ramon Freire, another soldier of the revolution, who, became
the supreme director of that state. In 1826 Bernardino
Rivadavia became the first president of the Argentine republic.
Shortly after Bolivar’s death General Santander became the
political chieftain, as well as the president, of the republic of
New Granada. So great an influence did General Paez exert in
Venezuelan politics that the period from 1831 to 1863 has been
designated as the age of Paez. In Ecuador General Flores
vainly strove to keep the reins of government from Vicente
Rocafuerte, who had played an obscure role in the Mexican
revolution. General La Mar became the president of Peru it?

CONCLUSION

321

1827. A few years after Bolivar’s death, as chief executive of
Bolivia, General Santa Cruz tried to unite Peru and Bolivia
into a confederation. In 1831 Francia, the mysterious dictator,
still dominated the destinies of Paraguay,

The secession of the American colonies from Spain entailed
much economic and social re-adjustment. That movement was
often accompanied by a guerrilla warfare. Sometimes the war
was a fratricidal contest. Occasionally it resembled a strug-
gle between bands of banditti. This struggle devastated vast
areas, incited factions, and encouraged the formation of revo-
lutionary habits. During the wars for independence thousands
of lives were sacrificed ; wherever the revolutionists were vic-
torious, some of the loyalists emigrated to other countries.
Thus in one way or another the sparse population of Spanish
America was considerably reduced. In many sections of the
Indies agriculture and cattle-raising were interrupted, com-
merce was destroyed, and public administration was more or
less demoralized. The Spanish mercantile system was steadily
undermined, for much colonial commerce fell into the eager
hands of foreign merchants. In general, wherever an inde-
pendent state was founded, its ports were opened to the com-
merce of the world, commercial relations with neutral states
were formed, and coastwise trade with other revolted colo-
nies was allowed. With the progress of the revolution, the
ancient bars to emigration were taken down ; foreigners — who
had hitherto been excluded — soon formed another class in the
population of Spanish America and furnished another element
for that vast melting-pot of peoples. A new phase in the in-
dustrial development of Spanish America is suggested by the
fact that, from 1811 to 1830, consuls of the United States were
sent to towns and cities in Mexico, Central America, Great
Colombia, Peru, Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina.

After the disruption of Great Colombia in 1831, there ex-
isted in Spanish America eleven independent states. On the
north of these new nations, the boundary line between Mexico
and the United States was the line which had been drawn by

322 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

the treaty of 1819 between the United States and Spain, — a
line that had not been surveyed, and which was unsatisfac-
tory to some citizens of the United States. The subsequent
history of the Spanish- American states demonstrated that their
boundaries in 1831 were more or less uncertain, largely be-
cause the uti posseditis of 1810 upon which by tacit consent
those boundaries depended, was based upon Spanish laws and
orders which, dealing as they sometimes did with extensive
areas that were unexplored, were often vague or conflicting
in regard to the metes and bounds of the colonial divisions.
The heirs of presidencies, as Bolivia and Ecuador, were most
unfortunate : here an illustration will be taken from Ecuado-
rian history; in 1802 a royal decree had been issued command-
ing that an extensive region in the interior of the presidency
of Quito should be transferred to the jurisdiction of Peru-
vian authorities : — after the dissolution of Great Colombia
that decree furnished the basis for a controversy between
Ecuador and Peru which remains unsettled to the present
day.

Although some colonial evils, as negro slavery, had been
swept away by revolutionary reformers, yet many Spanish
manners and customs prevailed, especially in the towns and
cities. The mode of procedure which was followed in the ad-
ministration of justice was essentially Spanish. The transac-
tions of merchants were often regulated by the ordinances of
Bilbao. The legal codes of Spain still remained influential, for
the new states sometimes enacted statutes providing that the
Spanish laws which harmonized with their laws were still to
be considered in force. Throughout the Spanish-American
republics the capital cities — in whose streets and plazas many
stirring scenes had been enacted during the revolution — con-
tinued to play a most important role in politics. In some capi-
tals the governmental offices were located in the “palace of
government” which had sheltered the colonial officials during
the old regime. That r%ime left its impress upon the govern-
mental systems of the new nations, which sometimes borrowed

CONCLUSION

323

Spanish names and functionaries. The early Spanish-Ameri-
can constitutions often presented a curious mingling of ancient
ideals, colonial customs, and French revolutionary philosophy.
In form they were ordinarily republican, more or less in imi-
tation of the Constitution of the United States. According to
these constitutions, the provinces which had existed in colonial
days were sometimes dignified with the names or invested
with the attributes of states. Thus artificially created, the
states did not function as organic parts of the systems to which
they belonged. In truth, many conditions still favored the
establishment of strongly centralized governments, — govern-
ments where the chief executive bearing the name of president
had some monarchical attributes. Accordingly political par-
ties were sometimes composed of persons who were in favor
of quasi-monarchical, or centralized, governments ; on the
other hand, there were parties composed of such persons as
wished to entrust a large share of governmental power to the
officials of important administrative subdivisions. Sometimes
a political party was composed mainly of the adherents of a
prominent political leader. Some publicists of the South-
American republics harbored fears of monarchical aggressions,
for along the borders of their states stretched the colossal em-
pire of Brazil, which seemed to menace their political ideals
as well as their territorial integrity.

The founding of republics in Spanish America necessarily
involved the formation of new international relations. From
the very beginning of the secessionist movement some insurrec-
tionary provinces in South America attempted to enter into
closer relations with neighboring provinces. In the course
of time, if not at once, certain nascent states adopted the policy
of treating their neighbors as political entities which were
vested with sovereign rights. Some Spanish-American states
which had declared their independence of Spain, sent diplo-
matic missions to the capitals of other states, while several of
the rising states recognized the independence of their neigh-
bors. For example, in August, 1823, the United Provinces of

324 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

Central America appointed a diplomatic agent to Mexico,
while in the same month the Mexican congress recognized the
independence of Central America. The most notable event in
the relations of the Hispanic-American states during the third
decade of the nineteenth century was the attempt of Simon de
Bolivar to realize his dream of a congress composed of repre-
sentatives of these states.

On December 7, 1824, Bolivar issued from Lima an invi-
tation to the governments of la Plata, Brazil, Chile, Guate-
mala, Colombia, and Mexico, to send delegates to a congress
on the Isthmus of Panama. He proposed that the congress
should serve those nations as a council in great danger, as
a faithful interpreter of treaties, and as an umpire and concili-
ator when disputes arose. Appealing to the spirit of the Span-
ish-American peoples, Bolivar declared that a common basis
should be found for the protection of their independent gov-
ernments. Anxious to find a point d’appui for common ac-
tion against Spain, he declared that the congress should estab-
lish a supreme authority to direct the policies of the Spanish-
American states. The replies to Bolivar’s invitation differed.
La Plata disliked the plan, while Chile, Colombia, and Mexico
praised the proposal for a league directed against their com-
mon enemy, Spain, or against European intervention in Amer-
ica. The instructions of Bolivar to the Peruvian envoys to this
congress dated May 15, 1825, suggested that the Spanish-
American states should make a concerted attack upon the
coasts of Spain. He urged that these states should solemnly
agree not to cease the war until Spain should formally recog-
nize their independence. He proposed that certain principles
of American international law should be formulated, and that
a declaration against European intervention in America should
be promulgated similar to the anouncement contained in Presi-
dent Monroe’s message to congress of December 2, 1823. In
connection with his project for an international congress,
Bolivar even dreamed of a league of American nations which
should be sanctioned by Great Britain.

CONCLUSION

325

In the end of 1825 and early in 1826, the delegates from
Colombia and Peru held some preliminary conferences on the
Isthmus of Panama. The delegates of Central America ar-
rived on the isthmus in March, 1826, and the Mexican dele-
gates arrived in June. The formal meetings of the Panama
congress, which was composed of eight delegates, were held in
June and July, 1826. The concrete results of the congress
were a treaty of perpetual union, league, and confederation,
and two other treaties, which dealt with the contingents of
ships, soldiers, and monies that the states concerned were to
furnish to the projected confederation. Although these trea-
ties were ratified only by the government of Colombia, yet
the amphictyonic council was not without significance. It sym-
bolized a unity of spirit among the Spanish-Americans. It
evoked expressions of opinion from prominent states of Span-
ish America upon matters of common interest. It was the
first of a series of international congresses which served to
crystallize the ideas of American publicists concerning the rela-
tions of independent states. Negatively, the congress of Pan-
ama indicated that Bolivar’s dream of a league composed of the
nations of Spanish America was Utopian.

About the time when the Panama congress was being con-
voked, the United States and the leading nations of Spanish
America were interchanging diplomatic missions. As indi-
cated in the preceding chapters, at various stages in the re-
volt against Spain the Spanish-Americans sent emissaries to
the United States to plead for aid and for the recognition of
their independence. At first the government of the United
States did not receive those envoys officially : it strove to re-
main neutral in the protracted struggle between Spain and her
colonies. Not until 1822 — the year when Iturbide was
crowned emperor of Mexico — did the United States decide to
recognize the independence of the de facto states. On March
8, 1822, President Monroe sent to congress a special message
recommending that five Spanish-American states, Colombia,
Chile, Peru, la Plata, and Mexico, should be recognized as in-

326 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

dependent nations. On May 4 of the same year, the president
signed a law which made an appropriation for diplomatic mis-
sions to “the independent nations of the American continent.”
By this act the United States announced her intention to ac-
knowledge the independence of the revolted colonies of Spain
in America which stretched from the parallel of forty-two de-
grees, north latitude, to Cape Horn. With the exception of
the Portuguese monarchy seated at Rio de Janeiro, the North-
American Republic was the first member of the society of na-
tions to extend the hand of fellowship to the new family of
states. The announcement of the United States concerning
her foreign policy caused great dissatisfaction to the Spanish
ministry, which sent to the leading nations of Europe a mani-
festo protesting against the acknowledgment of Spanish-
American independence. Ignorant of the excitement which
the policy of recognition by the United States provoked in
the chancelleries of continental Europe, the significance of that
policy was not sufficiently appreciated by statesmen through-
out the Spanish-American republics.

The act of May 4, 1822, was not completely carried out for
several years. The first Spanish-American nation formally
recognized by the United States was Colombia. On June 19,
1822, Secretary Adams presented Manuel Torres, as charge
d’affaires from Colombia, to President Monroe. On December
12 following, Jose Manuel Zozaya, envoy extraordinary and
minister plenipotentiary from Mexico, was officially presented
by Adams to Monroe: that ceremony constituted the recogni-
tion of the independence of the Mexican empire by the United
States. The recognition of the independence of other Span-
ish-American nations by the United States during the revolu-
tionary epoch of their history was consummated by the ap-
pointment of diplomatic agents to these countries. On Janu-
ary 27, 1823, the senate of the United States confirmed the
appointment of ministers to Colombia, la Plata, and Chile.
Richard C. Anderson, the first minister of the United States
to serve in a Spanish-American state, was formally received in

CONCLUSION

327

the capital of Colombia on December 16, 1823. Later in the
same month Minister Rodney was received by the govern-
ment of la Plata. In April, 1824, Heman Allen was formally
received at Santiago de Chile as minister of the United States.
In May, 1826, James Cooley was received as charge d’affaires
of the United States at Lima. Thus did diplomatic action
by the Great Republic of the North crown the victories which
had been won by the swords of Bolivar and Sucre. In Decem-
ber, 1825, John Williams was received as charge d’affaires of
the United States by the government of Central America.
Joel R. Poinsett, the first envoy extraordinary and minister
plenipotentiary of the United States to serve in Mexico, was
formally received in the Mexican capital on June i, 1825.
During a critical period in Hispanic history, the United States
accordingly established legations in six capitals of Spanish
America. From 1822 to 1830, four Spanish-American states,
Mexico, Central America, Colombia, and Argentina accredited
envoys to Washington. In this reciprocal fashion the govern-
ments of the Three Americas laid the foundations for Pan-
Americanism.

Whatever influence the decision by the United States to
acknowledge the independence of the Spanish-American na-
tions may have exerted upon the fortunes of those nations
was reenforced by the President’s message to congress of De-
cember 2, 1823, announcing the Monroe Doctrine. The origi-
nal Monroe Doctrine was given a cordial reception by journal-
ists and publicists in Bogota and Buenos Aires. In the United
Provinces of la Plata it was mentioned with approval in cer-
tain state papers of 1824 by Bernardino Rivadavia and Gen-
eral las Heras. In a message to the congress of la Plata on
December 16, 1824, Las Heras said that the United States had
assumed that the Plateau provinces could struggle single-
handed against Spain, but had “constituted herself the guard-
ian of the field of battle in order that no foreign power”
might interfere. In a message to the Colombian congress on
April 6, 1824, Vice President Santander declared that the an-

328 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

nouncement of President Monroe was “an act eminently just, —
an act worthy of the classic land of American liberty.” Shortly
before the battle of Junln, Bolivar read about Monroe’s mes-
sage in the columns of a Jamaica gazette which reprinted the
news from the London Courier. On April 28, 1824, he made
the following comment upon the news: “The United States

of North America have solemnly declared that they will view
as an act of hostility toward themselves whatever measures
the powers of the European continent may take against Span-
ish America and in favor of Spain.” Bolivar associated this
declaration of policy by the United States with the policy
of opposition to European intervention in Spanish America
which England had avowed ; and hence he believed that those
nations would protect the Spanish-Americans against an at-
tack by the Holy Alliance. During the third decade of the
nineteenth century, Colombia and la Plata actually invited the
United States to guard their respective national interests
against foreign aggression by enforcing the Doctrine of Mon-
roe. Upon these proposals the United States did not consider
it necessary to take action. As was suggested by Bolivar’s
comment upon Monroe’s message, the influence which the
United States exercised by its foreign policy upon the for-
tunes of the Spanish-American states was sometimes inex-
tricably associated with the influence of England, which sprang
from “the dear-bought glories of Trafalgar’s day.”

During the revolutionary epoch the foundations were also
laid of diplomatic and commercial relations between the Span-
ish-American states and European nations. Here only Spain
and England may be noticed. In June, 1822, Lord Castlereagh,
the English secretary for foreign affairs, intimated to Spain
that his government was contemplating the recognition of the
Spanish-American states. From time to time divers English
merchants petitioned their government to take such a step.
In October, 1823, George Canning, who had succeeded Cas-
tlereagh as foreign secretary, wrote instructions for agents
to Mexico City, Bogota, and Buenos Aires, who were to make

The Hispanic-American States in 1831

CONCLUSION

329

reports concerning the conditions in Spanish America. In
January, 1825, the English government formally notified the
diplomatic corps in London of its intention to recognize the in-
dependence of certain Spanish-American states. That an-
nouncement evoked a protest from Spain, Austria, Prussia, and
Russia. Still, early in 1825, England negotiated treaties with
la Plata and Colombia ; late in the following year, she nego-
tiated a treaty with Mexico. In thus acknowledging the inde-
pendence of those states. Canning was animated by the notion
that this policy would aid England to counterbalance the grow-
ing influence of the United States in the New World. It was
during this epoch that several Spanish-American states bor-
rowed money from English financiers in order to promote the
revolution. The basis was thus gradually laid for the finan-
cial dependence of those states upon England. According to
an estimate which was published in the Times, Central Amer-
ica, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru had incurred in Eng-
land, as the price of liberty, a bonded indebtedness which in
1833 with the arrears of interest, exceeded twenty-two million
pounds.

Not until long after the revolutionary period, par excel-
lence, had terminated, did the Spanish government deign to
recognize her former colonies as sovereign nations. For Fer-
dinand VII. persistently strove to prevent or to retard such
action by other nations. From time to time the ambassadors
of Spain at various European courts were instructed formally
to protest against the acknowledgment of the independence of
her revolted colonies either by the reception of diplomatic
agents or by other acts. The Spanish-American republics —
whose independence was acknowledged by important nations in
America and Europe — accordingly occupied an anomalous posi-
tion for many, many years. Although they had established
their independence de facto, their motherland had not rec-
ognized them as independent de jure. It was not until after
Isabella II. became queen of Spain, on December 4, 1836, that
the Cortes reluctantly passed a decree which authorized the gov-

330 RISE OF SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

eminent to negotiate treaties with the Spanish-American states
acknowledging their independence. In accordance with that
decree, Jose M. Calatrava, Spain’s secretary of state, and
Miguel Santa Maria, envoy extraordinary from Mexico, signed
a treaty at Madrid on December 28, 1836, which recognized
Mexico as “a free, sovereign, and independent nation.” By
that treaty Isabella II. renounced all pretensions to the govern-
ment, property, and territory of Mexico. Article five declared
that an immediate result of the treaty of peace would be to
open commercial relations between the contracting parties
upon the reciprocal basis of the treatment accorded to the
most favored nation. The treaty with Mexico was the first
treaty which Spain ratified with a state that had been carved
out of her former American dominions. In the same manner,
during the period from 1836 to 1895, by conventions of rec-
ognition, peace, and amity — which were sometimes preceded
by the establishment of commercial relations between the con-
tracting parties — the court of Spain tardily recognized the
independence of Ecuador, Chile, Venezuela, Bolivia, Argen-
tina, Peru, Colombia, Paraguay, Uruguay, and also of five
other states that had formerly been members of the Central-
American Federation.

During the period from 1808 to 1831, Cuba, Porto Rico,
and the Philippine Islands remained subject to Spain, while
upon the American continent, viceroyalties, captaincies gen-
eral, and presidencies had been transformed into independent
republics. But although a new family of states had appeared
upon the map of America, yet the tumult and the shouting
did not die away. Some abuses had indeed disappeared in
the maelstrom of revolution, but there were still many reforms
to be accomplished. Against the motherland some Spanish-
Americans had a grievance because she was loath to recognize
their independence — a grievance that might encourage or pro-
voke war. The citizens of the new republics had not only
to heal the grievous wounds of war, but they had also to ad-
just their economic and social life to altered conditions. The

CONCLUSION

331

publicists of the Spanish-American states had to handle the
delicate problems arising out of unsettled boundaries between
neighboring states, they had to solve the difficult problems of
fiscal readjustment, and they had to grapple again and again
with the problem of their political organization. For the new-
born statesmen had still to climb the long and painful road of
governmental inexperience in search of political wisdom.

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. Bibliographical Aids

Bancroft, H. H., The Works of Hubert Howe Bancroft: volume
eight, The History of Central America, 1801-1887; volumes
twelve and thirteen. The History of Mexico, 1803-1861, San
Francisco, 1885-1887.

These volumes contain useful bibliographical notes on
Spanish North America.

Medina, J. T, Biblioteca Hispano-Americana (1493-1810), espe-
cially volume seven, Santiago de Chile, 1907.

Only the last volume of this great work touches the Span-
ish-American revolution directly.

“Museo Mitre”: Catalogo de la Biblioteca, Buenos Aires,

1907.

This catalogue contains a list of the books collected by the
Argentine historian and publicist. General Bartolome Mitre,
when preparing to write his volumes on Manuel Belgrano
and Jose de San Martin.

Paz Soldan, M. T., Historia del Peru Independiente, primer
periodo, 1819-1822; segundo periodo, 1822-1827, three vol-
umes, Lima, 1868-1874.

Valuable bibliographies of the revolution in Peru are
found in these volumes.

Robertson, W. S., Francisco de Miranda and the Revolutionizing
of Spanish America, in the Annual Report of the American
Historical Association, 1907, volume one, Washington, 1909.

In this work, pages 491-509, there is a select, annotated
bibliography of the early revolution, with special reference to
Venezuela.

Salas, C. J., Bibliografia del general don Jose de San Martin y
de la Emancipaci6n Sudamericana, 1778-1910, five volumes,
Buenos Aires, 1910.

A very useful bibliography of the movement for the eman-
cipation of southern and western South America, which con-
tains extensive annotations, some documents, and fine illus-
trations.

333

334 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Sanchez, M. S., Bibliografia Venezolanista, contribucion al cono-
cimiento de los libros extranjeros relatives a Venezuela y sus
grandes hombres, publicados 6 reimpresos desde el siglo XIX,
Caracas, 1914.

This scholarly bibliography is devoted mainly to books and
studies concerning Miranda, Bolivar and Sucre.

B. Atlases

Biedma, J. and Beyer, C., Atlas Historico de la Republica Ar-
gentina, Buenos Aires, 1909.

CoDAZzi, A., Atlas Fisico y Politico de la Republica de Venezuela,
Caracas, 1840.

Atlas Geografico e Historico de la Republica de Colombia

(antigua Nueva Granada) el cual comprende las Republicas
de Venezuela y Ecuador, Paris, 1889.

Based as they are upon personal study and investigation,
the atlases of Codazzi are very useful for the student of the
history and geography of northern South America Several
maps show the routes of the revolutionary armies.

Demersay, L. a., Histoire physique, economique du Paraguay et
des etablissements des Jesuites. Atlas, Paris, i860.

Paz Soldan, M. F., Atlas Geografico del Peru, Paris, 1865.

Restrepo, J. M., Historia de la Revolucidn de la Republica de
Colombia. Atlas, Paris, 1827.

This atlas contains detailed maps of Great Colombia and
its departments about 1827.

Shepherd, W. R., Historical Atlas, New York, 1911.

Among the maps in this atlas are a few that are useful on
Spanish America.

C. Secondary Accounts
I. Books and Pamphlets

Acevedo, L., Jose Artigas, Jefe de los Orientales y Protector de
los Pueblos Fibres, three volumes, Montevideo, 1909, 1910.

The author quotes in his commentary the most important
sources which have been published in regard to the career of
the enigmatical Artigas.

Altamira y Crevea, R., Historia de Espaiia y de la Civilizacion
Espanola, volumes three and four, Barcelona, 1906, 1911.

The fourth volume of this scholarly work contains a select
bibliography of Spanish history.

BIBLIOGRAPHY 335

Altamira y Crevea, R., Resumen Historico de la Independencia
de la America Espanola, Buenos Aires, 1910.

Alvarez, A., Rasgos generales de la Historia diplomatica de Chile
(1810-1910), primera epoca, la Emancipacion, Santiago de
Chile, 1911.

A very suggestive volume by an eminent Chilean scholar.

Amunategu,!, M. L., Camilo Henriquez, two volumes, Santiago
de Chile, 1889.

La dictadura de O’Higgins, Santiago de Chile, 1882.

Los Precursores de la Independencia de Chile, three vol-
umes, Santiago de Chile, 1870.

Vida de Don Andres Bello, Santiago de Chile, 1882.

Antequera, J. M., Historia de la Legislacion Espanola, desde los
tiempos mas remotas hasta nuestros dias, Madrid, 1895.

AzpurOa, R., Biografias de Hombres Notables de Hispano-Amcr-
ica, four volumes, Caracas, 1877.

These volumes contain useful, although not always ac-
curate, accounts of many Spanish-Americans.

Baez, C., Ensayo sobre el Doctor Francia y la Dictadura en Sud-
America, Asuncion, 1910.

The best biography of Francia.

Bancroft, H. H., The Works of Hubert Howe Bancroft: volume
eight. The History of Central America, 1801-1887; volumes
twelve and thirteen. The History of Mexico, 1803-1861, San
Francisco, 1885-1887.

Bancroft’s volumes are still very useful.

Baralt, R. M., and Diaz, R., Resumen de la Historia de Vene-
zuela desde el ano 1797 hasta el de 1830, two volumes, Paris,
1841.

Barbagelata, H. D., Artigas y la Revolucion Americana, Paris,
1914.

Barros Arana, D., Historia Jeneral de Chile, volumes eight to
fourteen, Santiago de Chile, 1854.

This standard history of Chile ranks among the finest his-
torical products of Spanish Americans.

• Historia General de la Independencia de Chile, four vol-

umes, Santiago de Chile, 1854.

Bauza, F., Historia de la Dominacion Espanola en el Uruguay,
volume three, Montevideo, 1897.

Useful on the closing years of the Spanish regime in la
Plata.

336 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Becerra, R., Ensayo Historico Documentado de la Vida de Don
Francisco de Miranda, two volumes, Caracas, 1896.

The best appreciation of Miranda which has been written
by a South American.

Bertling, H., Estudio sobre el Paso de la Cordillera de los Andes
efectuado por el general San Martin en los meses de enero i
febrero de 1817 (campana de Chacabuco), Santiago de Chile,
1917.

Bingham, H., The Journal of an Expedition across Venezuela and
Colombia, 1906-1907, New York, 1909.

Bulnes, G., Historia de la Expedici6n Libertadora del Peru (1817-
1822), two volumes, Santiago de Chile, 1887-1888.

tJltimas Campanas de la Independencia del Peru (1822-

1826), Santiago de Chile, 1897.

Carranza, A. P., La Junta Gubernativa de 1810, Buenos Aires,
1910.

Cevallos, P. F., Resumen de la Historia del Ecuador desde su
origen hasta 1845, volumes three, four, and five, Lima, 1870.

Chisholm, A. S. M., The Independence of Chile, Boston, 1911.

Espejo, G., El Paso de los Andes, cronica historica de las opera-
ci6nes del ejercito de los Andes para la restauracion de Chile
en 1817, Buenos Aires, 1882.

Flairoto, M. T., Mariano Moreno: estudio de su personalidad, y
de su obra, Buenos Aires, 1916.

A biography of Moreno which hardly does justice to the
subject.

Fuente, J. M. de la, Hidalgo Intimo, apuntes y documentos para
una biografia del benemerito cura de Dolores, d. Miguel
Hidalgo y Costilla, Mexico, 1910.

A useful biography of Hidalgo which contains some
sources.

Garay, B., La Revolucion de la Independencia del Paraguay,
Madrid, 1897.

The most scientific account of the early revolutionary
movement in Paraguay.

Garcia Calder6n, F., Les democraties latines de I’Amerique,
Paris, 1912.

A sparkling and suggestive volume by a Peruvian scholar.

Gervinius, G. G., Geschichte des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts seit
den Wiener Vertragen, volumes three and four, Leipsic, 1858,

BIBLIOGRAPHY 337

Gil Fortoul, J., Historia Constitucional de Venezuela, volumes
one and two, Berlin, 1907, 1909.

Within its limits, the most useful history of Venezuela.

Goenaga, J. M., La Entrevista de Guayaquil (Bolivar y San Mar-
tin), Rome, 1915.

This pamphlet is the most important contribution to the
literature concerning the famous interview.

Groussac, P., Santiago de Liniers, Conde de Buenos Aires, 1753-
1810, Buenos Aires, 1907.

Guinan, F. G., Historia Contemporanea de Venezuela, volume
one, Caracas, 1909.

Gutierrez, J. R., Revolucion del 16 de Julio de 1809 y Biografia
de don Pedro Domingo Murillo, La Paz, 1878.

Hispano, C. (pseudonym of Lopez, L), Colombia en la Guerra de
Independencia. La Cuestion Venezolana, Bogota, 1914.

Emphasis is here laid upon Colombia’s sacrifices in the
revolution and some inediled documents are printed.

Historia de la Vida y Reinado de Fernando VII de Espana, con
documentos justificativos, ordenes reservados y numerosas
cartas del mismo monarca, three volumes, Madrid, 1842.

A manuscript note by Pascual de Guayangos in the first
volume of this useful work which is in the National Library
at Madrid, states that its author was Costa Bayo, who lived
in Valencia.

Hubbard [N.] G., Histoire contemporaine de I’Espagne, volumes
one, two, and three, Paris, 1868-1878.

Humbert, J., Les origines Venezueliennes, essai sur la coloniza-
tion Espagnol au Venezuela, Paris, 1905.

Irisarri, a. j., Historia Critica del Asesinato cometido en la
Persona del gran mariscal de Ayacucho, Caracas, 1846.

One of the most important productions in the long con-
troversy concerning the murder of Sucre.

IzcuE, J. A., de, Los Peruanos y su Independencia, Lima, 1906.

Lafuente, M., y Valera, J., Historia General de Espana, desde
los tiempos primitivos hasta la muerte de Fernando VII, con-
tinuada desde dicha epoca hasta nuestros dias, volumes six-
teen to twenty-two, Barcelona, 1889, 1890.

In these volumes the revolt in the colonies is discussed
from a Spanish viewpoint and some inedited documents are
printed.

Larrazabal, F., Vida y Correspondencia General del Libertador
Simon Bolivar, enriquecida con la inserci6n de los manifestos.

338

BIBLIOGRAPHY

mensages, exposiciones, proclamas, etc., two volumes, New
York, 1901.

Although eulogistic in tone, this is a useful biography
based, in part, upon documents which were subsequently lost.

Larrazabal, F., The Life of Simon Bolivar, Liberator of Colom-
bia and Peru, Father and Founder of Bolivia, volume one.
New York, 1866.

Lea, H. C., The Inquisition in the Spanish Dependencies: Sicily,
Naples, Sardinia, Milan, The Canaries, Mexico, Peru, New
Granada, — New York, 1908.

Liceaga, J. M., Adiciones y Rectificaciones a la Historia de Mex-
ico que escribio D. Lucas Alaman, Guanajuato, 1868.

Llanos, J., El Dr. Francia, Buenos Aires, 1907.

Lopez, V. F., Historia de la Republica Argentina, su origen, su
revolucion, y su desarrolle politico hasta 1852, ten volumes,
Buenos Aires, 1911.

A detailed history of Argentina which furnishes much
material upon the revolution.

Lozano y Lozano, F., El Maestro del Libertador, Paris (1914).

Maeso, j., Artigas y su fipoca. Apuntes documentados para la
historia oriental, two volumes, Montevideo, 1885.

Los Primeros Patriotas Orientales de 1811, Montevideo,

1888.

Mancini, j., Bolivar et I'emancipation des colonies espagnoles des
origines a 1815, Paris, 1912.

The most careful and sympathetic biography of Bolivar.
Unfortunately the author died before completing the work.

Mantilla, V. F., San Martin, Buenos Aires, 1913.

Markham, C. R., A History of Peru, Chicago, 1892.

Marure, a., Bosquejo Historico de las Revoluciones de Centro-
America, desde 1811 hasta 1834, volume one, Guatemala, 1877.

Medina, J. T., Historia del Tribunal del Santo Oficio de la In
quisicion en Mexico, Santiago de Chile, 1908.

Mendiburu, M. de, Diccionario Historico-Biografico del Peru,
parte primera que corresponde a la epoca de la dominacion
espanola, eight volumes, Lima, 1874-1890.

A monumental and encyclopedic work, which, however,
needs revision.

Michelena, T., Resumen de la Vida Militar y Politica del Ciuda-
dano esclarecido general Jose Antonio Paez. Caracas, 1890.

Mitre, B., Las Cuentas del Gran Capitar (en el centenario de
San Martin), Buenos Aires, 1878.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

339

Mitre, B., The Emancipation of South America. Being a con-
densed translation by William Pilling of the history of San
Martin by General Don Bartolome Mitre, London, 1893.

A survey of the South-American revolution, with special
attention to the career of San Martin.

■ Historia de Belgrano, two volumes, Buenos Aires, 1859.

A detailed account of Belgrano’s role in the revolution,
with documents in the appendices.

Historia de San Martin y de la Emancipacion Sud-Amer-

icana, three volumes, Buenos Aires, 1887, 1888.

Written from the Argentine viewpoint, this is the classic
work on San Martin’s role in the revolution.

Molinari, D. L., La ‘Representacion de los Hacendados’ de Mari-
ano Moreno, su ninguna influencia en la vida economica del
pais y en los sucesos de mayo de 1810, Buenos Aires, 1914.

A critical study of the influence of Moreno’s famous me-
morial.

Moreno, F. R., Estudio sobre la Independencia del Paraguay, vol
ume one, Asuncion, 1911.

Moses, B., South America on the Eve of Emancipation, New York
and London, 1908.

Noll, A. H., and McMahon, A. P., The Life and Times of
Miguel Hidalgo y Costilla, Chicago, 1910.

0 Kelly de Galway, A. C., Francisco de Miranda. . . . Biog-
raphie et Iconographie, Paris, 1913.

A documented biographical sketch which is serviceable for
Miranda’s iconography.

Olavarria y Ferrari, E., Mexico Independiente, 1821-1855 (vol-
ume four in Mexico a traves de los siglos), Barcelona (c.
1880).

Oman, C., A History of the Peninsular war, volume one, Ox-
ford, 1902.

Paxson, F. L., The Independence of the South-American Repub-
lics, a study in recognition and foreign policy, Philadelphia,
1903.

Paz Soldan, M. F., Historia del Peru Independiente, primer
periodo, 1819-1822, segundo periodo, 1822-1827, three volumes,
Lima, 1868-1874.

This standard work contains some inedited documents.

Pereira da Silva, J. M., Historia da Fundaqao do Imperio Brazil-
eiro, three volumes, Rio de Janeiro, 1870, 1871.

Pesquera Valenilla, V., Rasgos Biograficos del general en jefe

340

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Antonio Jose de Sucre, gran mariscal de Ayacucho, Caracas,
1894.

Petre, F. L., Simon Bolivar, “El Libertador,” a life of the chief
leader in the revolt against Spain in Venezuela, New Granada,
and Peru, London and New York, 1909.

The most detailed biography of Bolivar in English: em-
phasis is laid upon military events.

Pi y Margall, F., and Pi y Arsuga, F., Historia de Espana en
el Siglo XIX, volumes one, two, three, Barcelona, 1902.

PiNiLLA, S., La Creadon de Bolivia (volume seventeen in Biblio-
teca Ayacucho, edited by R. Blanco-Fombona), Madrid

(1917)-

A helpful volume upon an obscure period.

Quesada, E., Las Reliquias de San Martin, Buenos Aires, 1900.

Quesada, V. G., Vireinato del Rio de la Plata, 1778-1810, apunta-
mientos criticos-historicos para servir en la cuestion de limites
entre la republica Argentina y Chile, Buenos Aires, 1881.

Important for the study of colonial boundaries in southern
South America.

Rene-Moreno, G., Bolivia y Peru. Notas Historicas y Bibliogra-
ficas, Santiago de Chile, 1905.

Bolivia y Peru. Mas Notas Historicas y Bibliograficas,

Santiago de Chile, 1905.

Nuevas Notas Historicas y Bibliograficas, Santiago de

Chile, 1907.

■ Dltimas Dias Coloniales en el Alto-Peni: narracion; doc-

umentos ineditos de 1808 y 1809, two volumes, Santiago de
Chile, 1896, 1901.

Robertson, W. S., Francisco de Miranda and the Revolutionizing
of Spanish America, in Annual Report of the American His-
torical Association, 1907, volume one, pages 189-540, Wash-
ington, 1909.

A scientific monograph which is based largely upon archi-
val investigations.

The Life of Miranda, two volumes, Chapel Hill, North

Carolina, 1929.

RodrIguez, G. F., Historia de Alvear con la Accion de Artigas en
el Periodo Evolutivo de la Revolucion Argentina de 1812 a
1816, volumes one and two, Buenos Aires, 1913.

El General Soler, contribucion historica, documentos in-
editos, 1783-1849, Buenos-Aires, 1909.

RodrIguez Villa, A., El teniente general don Pablo Morillo,

BIBLIOGRAPHY

341

Primer Conde de Cartagena, Marques de la Puerta (1778-
1837), estudio biografico documentado, four volumes, Madrid,
1908, 1910.

This set contains much material concerning the revolt in
northern South America.

Rojas, A., Los Hombres de la Revolucion, 1810-1826. El can6nigo
Jose Cortes Madariaga, El general Emparan, Caracas, 1878.

Historia Patria, estudios hist6ricos, origines Venezolanos,

volume one, Caracas, 1891.

Rojas, El Marques de, Sim6n Bolivar, Paris, 1883.

A documented study.

Tiempo Perdido, coleccion de escritos sobre literatura y

hacienda publica, Paris, 1905.

Rosseeuw St.-Hilaire [E. F. A.], Histoire d’Espagne depuis les
premiers temps historiques jusqu’a la mort de Ferdinand
VII, volumes thirteen and fourteen, Paris, 1878, 1879.

Saavedra, A. Z., Don Cornelio de Saavedra, presidente de la junta
de gobierno de 1810, Buenos Aires, 1909.

SaldIas, a.. La Evolucion Republicana durante la Revolucion
Argentina, Buenos Aires, 1896.

Sanchez, M. S., Apuntes para la Iconografia del Libertador,
Caracas, 1916.

An illustrated study of Bolivar as depicted by artists and
sculptors.

Sassenay, Le Marquis de, Napoleon ler. et la fondation de la
republique Argentine, Paris, 1892.

ScHRYVER, S. DE, Esquisse de la vie de Bolivar, Brussels, 1898.

Unsurpassed as a presentation of Bolivar’s career in one
volume.

Temperley, H. W. V., Life of Canning, London, 1905.

Useful for the study of English policy toward Spanish
America.

Urquinaona y Pardo, P., Resumen de las causas principales que
preparon y dieron impulse a la Emancipaci6n de la America
Espanola, Madrid, 1835.

Varela, L. V., Historia Constitucional de la Republica Argen-
tina, four volumes. La Plata, 1910.

(Vicuna Mackenna, B.), La Corona del Heroe, recopilacion de
dates i documentos para perpetuar la memoria del jeneral don
Bernardo O’Higgins, Santiago de Chile, 1872.

A biographical account of O’Higgins which is accompanied
by many important documents.

342 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Vicuna Mackenna, B., and others, Historia Jeneral de la Re-
publica de Chile desde su independencia hasta nuestros dias,
five volumes, Santiago de Chile, 1866-1882.

This cooperative history contains special studies of various
phases of the Chilean revolution.

Vicuna Mackenna, B., El jeneral d. Jose de San Martin, con-
siderado segiin documentos enteramente ineditos, Santiago de
Chile, 1863.

El Ostracismo del jeneral d. Bernardo O’Higgins, escrito

sobre documentos ineditos i noticias autenticas, Valparaiso,
i860.

La Revolucion de la Independencia del Peru desde 1809 a

1819, Lima, i860.

Vida del capitan jeneral de Chile, don Bernardo O’Hig-
gins, escrito sobre documentos ineditos i noticias autenticas,
Valparaiso, i860.

El Washington del Sur, cuadros de la vida militar del

jeneral Antonio Jose de Sucre, Santiago de Chile, 1893.

Villanueva, C. A., Historia y Diplomacia, Napoleon y la inde-
pendencia de America, Paris, 1911.

A study of Napoleon’s influence upon the Spanish-Amer-
ican revolt which supplements De Sassenay.

La Monarquia en America : Bolivar y el general San Mar-
tin; Fernando VII y los nuevos estados; La santa alianza;
El imperio de los Andes, four volumes, Paris (1911-1914).

These volumes print — in Spanish — many documents from
European archives concerning the Spanish-American revolu-
tion. The author’s thesis is that Bolivar was a monarchist.

Villanueva, L., Vida del gran mariscal de Ayacucho, Caracas,
1895.

The best life of Sucre.

Washburn, C. A., The History of Paraguay, with notes of per-
sonal observations and reminiscences of diplomacy under diffi-
culties, volume one, Boston, 1871.

This volume transmits some Paraguayan reminiscences
and traditions of Francia.

Zarate, J., La Guerra de Independencia (volume three in Mexico
a traves de los siglos), Barcelona (c. 1880).

A volume by a scholar of Mexico upon her struggle for
independence.

ZiNNY, A., Historia de los Gobernantes del Paraguay, 1535-1887,
Buenos Aires, 1887.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

343

2. Articles in Periodicals, etc.

AncIzar, M., “Antonio Jose de Sucre,” in the Boletin de la
Academia Nacional de la Historia, volume two, pages 52-80,
107-139, Caracas, 1913.

Baez, C., “Historia del Paraguay: las leyes de extrangeria,” in
the Revista del Institute Paraguayo, aho IX, pages 385-417,
Asuncion, 1908.

Desd^vises DU Dezert, G., “Vice-rois et capitaines generaux des
Indes espagnoles a la fin du XVIII® siecle,” in Revue His-
torique, volume one hundred and twenty-five, pages 225 ff.,
Paris, 1917.

Francia, F., “Genealogia de la Familia del Libertador Simon
Bolivar,” in the Gaceta de los Museos Nacionales, volume
one, pages 33 ff., Caracas, 1912.

Fuente, J. M. de la, “Apuntes y Documentos sobre las Familias
Hidalgo y Costilla, Gallega Mandarte y Villasenor,” in the
Anales del Museo Nacional de Arqueologia, Historia, y Et-
nologia, volume one, pages 531-552, Mexico, 1909.

“Arbol Genealogico del Benemerito Cura de Dolores, D.

Miguel Hidalgo y Costilla . . .” in the Anales del Museo Na-
cional de Arqueologia, Historia, y Etnologia, volume one, page
232, Mexico, 1909.

GarcIa, G., “Leona Vicario, heroina insurgente,” in the Anales
del Museo Nacional de Arqueologia, Historia, y Etnologia,
volume one, pages 255-457, Mexico, 1909.

Humbert, J., “Los Bolivar de Vizcaya, los antepasados del Liber-
tador de la America del Sur,” in the Anales de la Universidad
Central de Venezuela, volume eleven, pages 53-63, Caracas,
1910.

A valuable study of Bolivar’s ancestors in Spain.

Lea, H. C., “Hidalgo and Morelos,” in the American Historical
Review, volume four, pages 636-651, New York, 1899.

Lecuna, V., “La campana de Carabobo y la diversion de Bermu-
dez,” in El Cojo Ilustrado, December 15, 1912, pages 663-669,
Caracas, 1912.

A scientific study by a student of military history.

Mendoza, C. A., “Sucre,” in the Memorias de la Academia Na-
cional de la Historia, volume one, pages 16-40, Caracas, 1890.

Ponte, A. F., “Arbol genealogico del Libertador Sim6n Bolivar,”
in El Universal, July 5, 1911, Caracas, 1911.

A careful study of Bolivar’s ancestry.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

344

Ramos, J., “Origenes del Mariscal de Ayacucho,” in the Boletin
de la Academia Nacional de Historia, volume three, pages
125-144, Caracas, 1914.

A documented study of Sucre’s ancestry.

Robertson, W. S., “The Beginnings of Spanish-American Diplo-
macy,” in the Turner Essays in American History, pages 231-
267, New York, 1910.

“The First Legations of the United States in Latin Amer-
ica” in the Mississippi Valley Historical Review, volume two,
pages 183-212, Cedar Rapids, 1915.

“The Juntas of 1808 and the Spanish Colonies,” in the

English Historical Review, volume thirty-one, pages 573-585,
London, 1916.

“The Recognition of the Spanish Colonies by the Mother-
land,” in the Hispania American Historical Review, volume
one, pages 70-91, Baltimore, 1918.

“South America and the Monroe Doctrine, 1824-1828,”

in the Political Science Quarterly, volume thirty, pages 82-
105, New York, 1915.

“The United States and Spain in 1822,” in the American

Historical Review, volume twenty, pages 781-800, New York,

1915-

The six above-mentioned studies, by the author of the
present volume, are mainly concerned with the international
relations of the American states during the revolutionary
epoch. They utilize considerable archival material.

Samper, S. A. de, “Sucre,” in the Memorias de la Academia
Nacional de la Historia, volume one, pages 41-320, Caracas,
1890.

Webster, C. K., “Castlereagh and the Spanish Colonies,” in the
English Historical Review, volume twenty-seven, pages 78-85,
and volume thirty, pages 631-644, London, 1912, 1915.

This study utilizes archival material and supplements Tem-
perley’s volume.

WiTZKE, C. F., “Bosquejo de la Vida de Simon Bolivar desde su
Nacimiento hasta el Ano de 1810,” in the Gaceta de los Museos
Nacionales, volume one, pages 147 ff., Caracas, 1912. —

The most useful study of Bolivar’s early career.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

345

D. Sources
/. Books and Pamphlets

Adams, J. Q., Memoirs of John Quincy Adams, comprising por-
tions of his diary from 1797 to 1848. Edited by C. F. Adams,
volumes four to eight, Philadelphia, 1875, 1876.

The Writings of John Quincy Adams. Edited by W. C.

Ford, volumes five and following. New York, 1915. —

Alaman, L., Historia de Mexico, con una noticia preliminar del
sistema de gobierno que regia en 1808 y del estado en que se
hallaba el pais en el mismo ano, five volumes, Mexico, 1883-

1885.

These volumes contain a detailed history of the Mexican
revolution which is written from the royalist viewpoint.

American State Papers: Foreign Relations, volumes three to six,
Washington, 1832-1859.

Annals of the Congress of the United States, eleventh, twelfth,
thirteenth, fourteenth, fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth
Congresses, Washington, 1853-1856.

The Annual Register, or a view of the history, politics, and litera-
ture for the year 1808, for the year 1809, etc., London, 1820. —

Archive general de la Nacion : Partes oficiales y Documentos rel-
atives k la Guerra de la Independencia Argentina, four vol-
umes, Buenos Aires, 1900-1903.

An important collection of documents for the study of the
revolution in the Platean provinces, 1810-1828.

Artigas (J.), Artigas: Estudio historico, Documentos justifica-
tivos. Edited by C. L. Fregeiro, Montevideo, 1886.

A collection of documents dealing with conditions in the
Platean basin, 1803-1814, and especially with Artigas.

Austria, J. de, Bosquejo de la Historia Militar de Venezuela en
la guerra de su Independencia, volume one, Caracas, 1855.

Belgrano (M.), . . . Documentos del Archive de Belgrano, five
volumes, Buenos Aires, 1913. —

Important for the investigation of Belgrano’s career.

Beneski, C. de, a Narrative of the last moments of the Life of
Don Augustin de Iturbide, ex-emperor of Mexico, New York,
1825.

Bertling, H., Editor. Documentos histdricos referentes al Paso
de los Andes efectuado en 1817 por el general San Martin,
Concepcion, 1908.

346 BIBLIOGRAPHY

[Biggs, J.], The History of Don Francisco de Miranda’s attempt
to effect a Revolution in South America, in a series of letters
by a gentleman who was an officer under that general, to his
friend in the United States. To which are annexed sketches
of the life of Miranda and geographical notices of Caracas,
Boston, i8io.

The most useful published source on Miranda’s expedition
of 1806.

Blanco, J. F., and Azpurua, R., Editors. Documentos para la
Historia de la Vida publica del Libertador de Colombia, Peru,
y Bolivia, publicados por disposicion del general Guzman
Blanco, fourteen volumes, Caracas, 1875-1877.

This is probably the most useful collection of documents
concerning the revolution in Spanish America.

Bocanegra, j. M., Memorias para la Historia de Mexico Inde-
pendiente, 1822-1846, two volumes, Mexico, 1892.

Bolivar (S.), Papeles de Bolivar, publicados por Vicente Lecuna,
Caracas, 1917.

Carefully selected from inedited manuscripts in the
archives of the liberator at Caracas, this volume contains doc-
uments which supplement the O’Leary collection at many
points.

Brackenridge, H. M., Voyage to South America in the years 1817
and 1818, in the frigate Congress, two volumes, London, 1820.

British and Foreign State Papers, volumes one to twenty-five,
London, 1841-1853.

Scattered through this collection are many documents on
the Spanish-American revolution.

Bustamante, C. M. de, Campanas del general d. Felix Maria
Calleja, comandante en gefe del ejercito real de operaciones
llamado del centro, Mexico, 1828.

Continuacion del Cuadro Histdrico. Historia del Em-

perador d. Agustin de Iturbide hasta su muerte, y sus conse-
cuencias, y establecimiento de la repiiblica popular federal,
Mexico, 1846.

Important for the career of Iturbide as emperor.

Cuadro Historico de la Revolucion Mexicana, comenzada

en 15 de Septiembre de 1810 por el ciudadano Miguel Hidalgo
y Costilla, cura del pueblo de los Dolores, en el obispado de
Michoacan, five volumes, Mexico, 1843-1846.

One of the most important sources on the Mexican revo-
lution.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

347

[Bustamante, C. M. de], Historia militar del General Don Jose
Maria Morelos, sacado en lo conducente a ella de sus declara-
ciones recibidas de orden del virey de Mexico, cuando estuvo
arrestado en la ciudadela de esta capital, Mexico, 1825.

Calvo, C, Recueil historique complet des traites, conventions,
capitulations, armistices et autres actes diplomatiques de tous
les etats de I’Amerique Latine, ire. periode, 2de. periode, fif-
teen volumes, Paris, 1863-1867.

Scattered through these volumes are documents which con-
cern particularly the diplomatic history of the revolution.

Camba [A. G.], Memorias para la Historia de las Armas Es-
paiiolas en el Peru, two volumes, Buenos Aires, 1895-1899.

Carranza, A. P., Editor. Archivo general de la Republica Ar-
gentina, segunda serie, fourteen volumes, Buenos Aires, 1894-
1899.

Catastrophe de don Agustin de Yturbide, aclamado emperador de
Mejico, el 18 de Mayo del ano 1822, 6 relacion exacta de las
circunstancias que han acompanado el desembarco y la muerte
de este hombre celebre, Paris, 1825.

Causa criminal seguida contra el coronel graduado Apolinar Mo-
rillo, y demas autores y complices del asesinato perpetrado en
la persona del senor Jeneral Antonio Jose de Sucre, Bogota,
1843-

Original documents concerning the trial of those persons
accused of Sucre’s murder.

[Cavia, P. C.], El Protector nominal de los Pueblos libres, d. Jose
Artigas, clasificado por el amigo del orden, Buenos Aires,
1818.

This booklet contains some much-disputed statements con-
cerning the early career of Artigas.

Cochrane, C. S., Journal of a Residence and Travels in Colombia
during the years 1823 and 1824, two volumes, London, 1825.

Cochrane, T. B., and Bourne, R. F. H., The Life of Thomas,
Lord Cochrane, tenth Earl of Dundonald, G. C. B., two vol-
umes, London, 1869.

Coleccion de Historiadores i de Documentos relativos a la Inde-
pendencia de Chile, volumes one to twenty-two, Santiago de
Chile, 1900. —

A most important collection on the Chilean revolution.

Coleccion de leyes, decretos y ordenes publicados en el Peru desde
el ano de 1821 hasta 31 de diciembre de 1859, reimpresa por
orden de materias oor el dr. d. Juan Oviedo, abogado de los

348

BIBLIOGRAPHY

tribunales de la republica, especially volume one, Lima, i86i.

This volume contains the earliest constitutional statutes
of Peru.

Coleccion de ordenes y decretos de la soberano junta provisional
gubernativa, y soberanos congresos generales de la nacion
mexicana, four volumes, Mexico, 1829.

A collection of orders and decrees of the first empire of
Mexico and of the republic which followed.

Coleccion de los decretos y ordenes que han expedido las Cortes
generales y extraordinarias desde su instalacion . . . 1810, ten
volumes, Madrid, 1813-1823.

(Coleccion legislativa de Espana) :

Decretos del Rey Don Fernando VII, volumes one to
eighteen, Madrid, 1818-1834.

Decretos de la Reina nuestra senora dona Isabel II, dados
en su real nombre por su augusta madre la reina gobernadora
y reales ordenes, resoluciones y reglamentos generales expedi-
dos por las secretarias del despacho universal desde i® de en-
ero . . . de 1834, volumes nineteen to twenty-one, Madrid,

1835-1837- ^

Coleccion de las leyes, decretos, y declaraciones de las
Cortes, y de los reales decretos, ordenes, resoluciones, y reg-
lamentos generales expedidos por las secretarias del despacho
desde i® de enero . . . de 1837 . . . volumes twenty-two to
thirty-five, Madrid, 1837-1846.

Coleccion legislativa de Espana (continuacidn de la colec-
ci6n de decretos), volumes thirty-six to one hundred and
thirty, Madrid, 1848.

Among the above collections of laws and decrees are many
documents concerning Spain’s policy toward her colonies.

Coleccion oficial de leyes, decretos, ordenes y resoluciones vigentes
de la Republica Boliviana, volumes one to five, Sucre, 1846,
1847.

This collection contains many administrative and legisla-
tive provisions of Bolivia, 1825-1830.

Coleccidn legislativa de la Republica Oriental del Uruguay, vol-
ume one, Montevideo, 1900.

The first statutes of the Uruguayan republic.

Cuerpo de leyes de la Republica de Colombia, three volumes, Lon-
don, 1825.

These volumes contain important legislative material in
regard to the founding of Great Colombia.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

349

Depons, F., Voyage a la partie oriental de la Terra-ferme, dans
I’Amerique meridionale, fait pendant les annees i8oi, 1802,
1803, et 1804: contenant la description de la capitainerie gen-
erale de Caracas, . . . three volumes, Paris, 1806.

A valuable source concerning conditions in northern South
America on the eve of the revolution.

Diario de las actas y discusiones de las Cortes, legislatura de los
ahos de 1820 y 1821, twenty-three volumes, and three volumes
of appendices, Madrid, 1820-1821.

Diario de las actas y discusiones de las Cortes extraordinarias del
ano de 1821, six volumes, Madrid, 1821.

Diario de las sesiones de Cortes: legislatura extraordinaria (esta
legislatura dio principio el dia 22 de setiembre de 1821 y ter-
mino el 14 de febrero de 1822), three volumes, Madrid, 1871.

Diario de las actas y discusiones de las Cortes extraordinarias del
ano de 1822, six volumes, Madrid, 1822, 1823.

Diario de las sesiones de Cortes, estamento de ilustres proceres,
legislatura de 1835 a 1836, Madrid, 1869.

Diario de sesiones de las Cortes constituyentes, dieron principio
el 17 de octubre de 1836, terminaron el 4 de noviembre de
1837, volume one, Madrid, 1870.

In the above six collections of the debates in the cortes
may be found many documents respecting the policy of Spain’s
statesmen towards the American colonies.

Dias del Mayo: actas del cabildo de Buenos Aires, 1810, Buenos
Aires, 1910.

Documentos para los Anales de Venezuela desde el movimiento
separatista de la union Colombiana hasta nuestros dias, primer
periodo, seven volumes, Caracas, 1889-1891 ; segundo periodo,
volume four, Caracas, 1912.

Documentos relativos a los Antecedentes de la Independencia de la
Republica Argentina, Buenos Aires, 1912.

Documentos en honor del Gran Mariscal de Ayacucho coordinados
por la comision, que nombro de su seno la Academia Nacional
de la Historia, Caracas, 1890.

Documentos para la Historia de la Provincia de Cartagena de
Indias, hoy estado soberano de Bolivar en la union Colom-
biana, two volumes, Bogota, 1883.

Ducoudray Holstein, H. L. V., Memoirs of Simon Bolivar, Presi-
dent Liberator of the Republic of Colombia, and of his prin-
cipal generals, secret history of the revolution, and of the

350

BIBLIOGRAPHY

events which preceded it from 1807 to the present time, Bos*
ton, 1829.

Dundonald, Thomas, Earl of. Narrative of Services in the Lib-
eration of Chile, Peru, and Brazil, from Spanish and Portu-
guese domination, two volumes, London, 1859.

Filisola, V., La Cooperacion de Mexico en la Independencia de
Centro America (volumes thirty-five and thirty-six in Docu-
mentes ineditos 6 muy raros para la historia de Mexico, edited
by G. Garcia), Mexico, 1911.

Garcia, G., Editor. Documentos Historicos Mexicanos : obra con-
memorativa del primer centenario de la independencia de
Mexico, seven volumes, Mexico, 1910.

This important collection supplements Hernandez y
Davalos.

Hackett, J., Narrative of the Expedition which sailed from Eng-
land in 1817 to join the South American patriots, comprising
every particular connected with its formation, history, and
fate; with observations and authentic information elucidating
the real character of the contest, mode of warfare, state of
the armies, etc., London, 1818.

Hall, B., Extracts from a Journal written on the coasts of Chile,
Peru, and Mexico, in the years 1820, 1821, 1822, part I, part
II, London, 1840.

This contains interesting commentaries upon the revolu-
tionary movement.

Hamilton, J. P., Travels through the interior provinces of Colom-
bia, two volumes, London, 1827.

Hereida, j. F., Memorias sobre las Revoluciones de Venezuela,
Paris, 1895.

Hernandez y Davalos, J. E., Editor. Coleccion de Documentos
para la Historia de la guerra de Independencia de Mexico de
1808 a 1821, six volumes, Mexico, 1877-1882.

In general this is the most useful collection of documents
upon the revolution in Mexico.

Herrera, J. H., Editor. El Album de Ayacucho: coleccion de los
principals documentos de la guerra de la independencia del
Peru y de los cantos de victoria y poesias relativas a ella,
Lima, 1862.

Prose and poems concerning the revolution in Peru.

Hippisley, G., a Narrative of the Expedition to the Rivers Ori-
noco and Apure in South America, which sailed from England

BIBLIOGRAPHY 351

in November, 1817, and joined the patriotic forces in Vene-
zuela and Caracas, — London, 1819.

Humboldt, A. de, and Bonpland, A., Personal Narrative of trav-
els to the equinoctial regions of the new continent during the
years 1799-1804. Translated by H. M. Williams, six volumes,
London, 1818-1829.

Humboldt, A., Essai politique sur le royaume de la Nouvelle
Espagne, five volumes, Paris, 1811.

Humboldt’s writings contain much valuable material on
colonial conditions.

(Iturbide, a. de), a Statement of some of the Principal Events
in the Public Life of Augustin de Iturbide, written by him-
self, with a preface by the translator, and an appendix of
documents, London, 1824.

Iturbide’s memorias done into English by M. J. Quin.

Breve diseno critico de la emancipacion y libertad de la

nacion Mexicana, y de las causas que influyeron en sus mas
ruidosos sucesos, acaecidos desde el grito de Iguala hasta la
espantosa muerte del Libertador en la villa de Padilla, Mexico,
1827.

A Spanish translation of Iturbide’s above-mentioned
memoirs, accompanied by some other documents.

Labarrieta, A., Informe del Dr. Don Antonio Labarrieta, cura
de la ciudad de Guanajuato, sobre la conducta que observe
Iturbide siendo comandante general del Bajio, Mexico, 1821.

Lacroix, L., Peru de, Diario de Bucaramanga, 6 vida publica y
privada del Libertador Simon Bolivar, publicada por primera
vez con una introduccion y notas por Cornelio Hispano (pseu-
donym of I. Lopez), Paris (1912).

This much-discussed diary purports to contain Bolivar’s
confidential remarks in 1828 concerning his career and his
companions.

Lafond (de Lurcy), G., Voyages autour du Monde et naufrages
celebres, volumes one, two, and three, Paris, 1870.

Leyes promulgadas en Chile desde 1810 hasta el 1° de Junio de
1912. Edited by R. Anguita, volume one, Santiago de Chile,
1912.

This volume contains the earliest constitutional statutes
of Chile.

El Libro nacional de los Venezolanos, actas del congreso con-
stituyente de Venezuela en 1811, origenes de la reptiblica,
Caracas, 1911.

352 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Londonderry, R. S., Memoirs and Correspondence of Viscount
Castlereagh, second Marquess of Londonderry. Edited by
Charles Vane, Marquess of Londonderry, twelve volumes,
London, 1850-1853.

Lopez, M. A., Campana del Peru por el Ejercito Unido Libertador
de Colombia, Peru, B. Aires, y Chile, a las ordenes del im-
mortal Bolivar, en los ahos de 1823, 24 y 25 con mapas de los
Campos de batalla que dieron libertad a aquella repiiblica y
aseguraron la independencia del nuevo mundo, Caracas, 1843.

Malo, J. R., Apuntes historicos sobre el destierro, vuelta al terri-
torio Mexicana y muerte del Libertador d. Agustin de Itur-
bide, Mexico, 1869.

Medina, J. T., Biblioteca Hispano-Chilena (1523-1817), volume
three, Santiago de Chile, 1899.

Memorias de los Vireyes que han gobernado el Peru durante el
tiempo del coloniaje Espanol, six volumes, Lima, 1859.

Valuable upon the colonial regime in the Peruvian vice-
royalty.

Mendibil, P. de, Resumen historico de la Revolucion de los Esta-
dos Unidos Mejicanos, sacado del “Cuadro Historico,” que en
forma de cartas escribio el Lie. d. Carlos Maria Bustamante,
London, 1828.

Miller, J., Memoirs of General Miller in the service of the Re-
public of Peru, two volumes, London, 1828.

Based as these memoirs are upon the correspondence and
notes of General William Miller, a participant in the revolu-
tionary war, they constitute a valuable source on the South-
American revolt.

Miranda, F., Miranda dans la revolution Franqaise: recueil de
documents authentiques relative a I’histoire du General Fran-
cisco de Miranda pendant son sejour en France de 1792 a
1798. Edited by A. Rojas, Caracas, 1889.

Documents concerning Miranda’s career in the French
revolution.

Miranda (F.), El general Miranda. Edited by El Marques de
Rojas. Paris, 1884.

Documents concerning various phases of Miranda’s career.

South American Emancipation, documents historical and

explanatory, shewing the designs which have been in progress,
and the exertions made by General Miranda for the attain-
ment of that object during the last twenty-five years. Edited
by J M. Antepara. London. 1810.

BIBLIOGRAPHY 353

This contains documents which were edited under Miran-
da’s direction.

Molas, M. a., Descripcion historica de la antigua provincia del
Paraguay, correjida, aumentada y anotada por el Doctor
Angel Justiniano Carranza, Buenos Aires, 1868.

Monroe, J., The Writings of James Monroe, including a collec-
tion of his public and private papers and correspondence now
for the first time printed. Edited by S. M. Hamilton, volumes
five to seven. New York and London, 1901-1903.

Moore, J. B., Editor. A Digest of International Law as embodied
in diplomatic discussions, treaties, and other international
agreements . . ., especially volume one, Washington, 1906.

Moreno, Mariano, Coleccion de Arengas en el foro y Escritos del
doctor dn. Mariano Moreno, abogado de Buenos Aires, y sec-
retario del primer gobierno en la revolucion de aquel estado,
volume one, London, 1836.

The only volume published, which was presumably edited
by Manual Moreno.

Escritos de Mariano Moreno, con un prologo por Norberto

Pinero, Buenos Aires, 1896.

The most complete edition of Moreno’s writings: it in-
cludes the memorial of 1809.

Representacion que el apoderado de los hacendados de las

campanas del Rio de la Plata dirigio al excelentisimo senor
virey don Baltasar Hidalgo de Cisneros en el expediente
promovido sobre proporcionar ingresos al erario por medio
de un franco comercio con la nacion Inglesa. La escribio el
doctor don Mariano Moreno, Buenos Aires, 1810.

An edition of the famous memorial by which Mariano
Moreno acknowledged its authorship.

Moreno, Manuel, Vida y Memorias del dr. dn. Mariano Moreno,
secretario de la junta de Buenos Aires, capital de las pro-
vincias del Rio de la Plata, con una idea de su revolucion y
de la de Mexico, Caracas, — London, 1812.

A biography of Mariano Moreno by his brother.

Mosquera, T. C. de, Memorias sobre la Vida del Libertador Simon
Bolivar, New York, 1853.

Novisima recopilacion de las leyes de Espana, mandada formar
por el Senor Don Carlos IV, edicion publicada por don Vi-
cente Salva, five volumes, Paris, 1854.

O’Donoju, j., Modelo de virtud y filantropia, loor eterno al exmo.
senor capitan general don Juan O’Donoju, carta de remision

354

BIBLIOGRAPHY

al gobierno Espanol del tratado celebrado en la villa de Cor*
doba, por el exmo. senor don Juan O’Donoju, Mexico, 1822.

Q’Higgins, B., Epistolario de d. Bernardo O’Higgins, capitan gen-
eral y director supremo de Chile, gran mariscal del Peru y
brigadier de las Provincias Unidas del Rio de la Plata, ano-
tado por Ernesto de la Cruz, first volume, Santiago de Chile,
1916.

This volume of O’Higgins’ papers contains many inedited
documents.

O’Leary, D. F., Memorias del General O’Leary, publicados por
su hijo Simon B. O’Leary, thirty-two volumes, Caracas, 1879-
1888.

Under this misleading title, was published the most val-
uable collection of sources for the life of Bolivar: it also
contains a large amount of material concerning his comrades.

Olivart, Marques de, Coleccion de los tratados, convenios, y
documentos internacionales celebrados por nuestros gobiernos
con los estados extranjeros desde el reinado de dona Isabel
hasta nuestros dias, volumes one to eleven, Madrid, 1890-1902.

Indispensable upon the recognition of the Spanish colonies
by the motherland.

Paez, J. a., Autobiografia del general Jose Antonio Paez, two
volumes, Caracas, 1888.

[Palacio Fajardo, M.], Outline of the Revolution in Spanish
America, or an account of the origin, progrtss, and actual
state of the war carried on between Spain and . .panish Amer-
ica containing the principal facts which have marked the
struggle. By a South American, New York, 1817.

Parish, W., Buenos Aires and the Provinces of the Rio de la
Plata from their discovery and conquest by the Spaniards to
the establishment of their political independence, London,
1852.

Poinsett, J. R., Notes on Mexico, made in the autumn of 1822,
accompanied by an historical sketch of the revolution and
translations of official reports on the present state of that
country, London, 1825.

An interesting account of conditions in Mexico under Itur-
bide.

Posada, E., and Ibanez, P. M., Editors. Biblioteca de Historia
Nacional; especially volumes one, two, four, six, eight, and
thirteen, Bogota, 1902-1914.

A meritorious series — cooperative in type — published under

BIBLIOGRAPHY

355

the direction of the National Academy of History of Colom-
bia. Many of its volumes contain much source material con-
cerning conditions in northern South America during the
revolutionary era.

PouDENX, H., and Mayer, F., Memoire pour servir a I’histoire de
la revolution de la capitainerie generale de Caracas, depuis
I’abdication de Charles IV, jusqu’au mois d’aout 1814, Paris,
1815.

The proceedings of a general court martial held at Chelsea hos-
pital on Thursday, January 28, 1808, and continued by ad-
journment till Tuesday, March 15, for the trial of Lieut. Gen.
Whitelocke, two volumes, London, 1808.

Procter, R., Narrative of a journey across the cordillera of the
Andes and of a residence in Lima and other parts of Peru in
the years 1823 and 1824, London, 1825.

Publicaciones del archivo general de la nacion, Estados Unidos
Mexicanos, secretaria de relaciones exteriores, volumes three
and four, La Constitucion de 1812 en la Nueva Espana, Mex-
ico, 1912.

Pueyrred6n, J. M. de, . . . Documentos del Archivo de Pueyrre-
don, four volumes, Buenos Aires, 1912.

Important for the role of Pueyrredon in the revolution.

Recopilacion de leyes de los reinos de las Indias, mandada im-
primir y publicar por la magestad catolica del rey don Carlos
II nuestro sehor, two volumes, Madrid, 1841.

Registro oficial de la Repiiblica Argentina que comprende los doc-
umentos espedidos desde 1810 hasta 1873, volumes one, two,
three, Buenos Aires, 1879-1882.

An important collection for the history of Argentina.

Rengger [J. R.], and Longchamp [M.], Essai historique sur la
revolution du Paraguay, et le gouvernement dictatorial du doc-
teur Francia, Paris, 1827.

One of the most useful accounts of Francia’s rule by a
foreign visitor.

Ensayo historico sobre la Revolucion del Paraguay por

Rengger y Longchamp. Edicion especial precedida de la
biografia del Tirano Francia, y continuada con algunos doc-
umentos y observaciones historicas por M. A. Pelliza, Buenos
Aires, 1883.

Restrepo, j. M., Historia de la Revolucion de la Repiiblica de
Colombia en la America Meridional, five volumes, Besanqon,
1858.

356

BIBLIOGRAPHY

The best edition of the classic history of the Colombian
revolution, \vritten by a contemporary publicist.

Rey de Castro, J. M., Recuerdos del Tiempo Heroico, pajinas de
la vida militar i politica del gran mariscal de Ayacucho, —
Guayaquil, 1883.

La Revolucion de la Paz en 1809, documentos historicos, Buenos
Aires, 1897.

[Riva Aguero, J. de la], Memorias y documentos para la his-
toria de la independencia del Peru y causas del mal exito que
ha tenido esta. Obra postuma de P. Pruvoneva, two volumes,
Paris, 1858.

Riva Agiiero’s apology, edited with the aid of certain
priests.

Robertson, J. P., and Robertson, W. P., Letters on Paraguay:
comprising an account of four years’ residence in that repub-
lic under the government of the Dictator Francia, two vol-
umes, London, 1838.

Francia’s Reign of Terror, being the continuation of let-
ters on Paraguay, London, 1839.

Robinson, W. D., Memoirs of the Mexican Revolution, including
a narrative of the expedition of Gen ral Xavier Mina, . . .
Philadelphia, 1820.

[Rocafuerte, V.], Bosque jo ligerisimo de la Revolucion de Me-
gico, desde el grito de Iguala hasta la proclamacion imperial
de Iturbide. Por un verdadero Americano, Philadelphia, 1822.

An Ecuadorian’s views concerning Iturbide’s revolution,
with some illustrative documents.

Rodney (C. A.), and Graham (J.), The Reports on the Present
State of the United Provinces of South America, London,
1819.

San MartIn, J., . . . Documentos del Archivo de San Martin,
twelve volumes, Buenos Aires, 1910, 1911.

These useful documents were selected from the manu-
scripts collected by General Mitre for his life of San Martin, —
documents preserved in the Mitre Museum under whose aus-
pices these volumes and also those concerning Belgrano and
Pueyrredon were published.

. . . San Martin, su correspondencia, 1823-1850, Buenos

Aires, 1911.

Material on San Martin’s life during his retirement and
some after-thoughts concerning the revolution.

Santa Anna, A. L. de. Mi historia militar y politica, 1810-1874

BIBLIOGRAPHY

357

(volume two in Documentos ineditos 6 muy raros para la
historia de Mexico, edited by G. Garcia), Mexico, 1905.

Santander, F. de P., Archivo Santander. Publicacion hecha por
una comision de la academia de la historia, bajo la direccion
de don Ernesto Restrepo Tirado, volumes one to nine, Bogota

(1913-)-

Containing as it does numerous inedited documents con-
cerning Bolivar’s great rival, this work promises to be one of
the most important sources for the history of northern South
America.

Smith, M., History of the Adventures and Sufferings of Moses
Smith during five years of his life, from the beginning of
the year 1806, when he was betrayed into the Miranda expe-
dition until June, 1811, when he was non-suited in an action
at law which lasted three years and a half, to which is added
a biographical sketch of General Miranda, Brooklyn, 1812.

Stevenson, W. H., Historical and descriptive Narrative of twenty
years’ residence in South America, three volumes, London,
1829.

Torata, El Conde de. Editor. Documentos para la Historia de
la Guerra separatista del Peru, five volumes, Madrid, 1894-
1898.

These volumes contain material of value concerning the
last period of the Peruvian war for independence.

Toreno, El Conde de, Historia del levantamiento, guerra, y revo-
lucion de Espana, seven volumes, Madrid, 1848.

Torrente, M., Historia de la Revolucion Hispano-Americana,
three volumes, Madrid, 1829, 1830.

A royalist view of the Spanish-American revolution.

Torres Lanzas, P., Independencia de America, fuentes para su
estudio, catalogo de documentos conservados en el archivo
general de Indias de Sevilla, primera serie, six volumes, Ma-
drid, 1912.

A catalogue of inedited documents in the Spanish archives
which, at some points, is detailed enough so that it can be
used as a source.

Tratados celebrados en la villa de Cordoba el 24 del presente entre
los senores d. Juan O’Donojii, teniente general de los ejercitos
de Espana, y d. Augustin de Iturbide, primer gefe del ejercito
imperial Mejicano de las tres garantias, Cordoba, 24 de Agosto
de 1821, — Mexico, 1821.

Ultimos instantes de los primeros caudillos de la independencia.

358

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Narracion de un testigo ocular. Edited by L. G. Obregon,
Mexico, 1896.

[ViscARDO Y Guzman, P.], Lettre aux Espagnols-Americains.
Par un de leurs compatriots, Philadelphia, 1799.

A rare pamphlet which indicts Spanish rule in America.

Walton, W., Present State of the Spanish Colonies, including a
particular report of Hispaniola, London, 1810.

Ward, H. G., Mexico in 1827, London, 1828.

Wellington, A., Supplementary despatches, correspondence, and
memoranda of Field Marshal, Arthur, Duke of Wellington,
K.G., volumes six and twelve, London, 1860-1865.

Zercero, a., Memorias para la Historia de las Revolucidnes en
Mexico, volume one, Mexico, 1869.

2. Newspapers, etc.

Aurora de Chile, 1812-1813. Reimpresi6n paleografica a plana y
renglon con una introduccion por Julio Vicuna Cifuentes,
Santiago de Chile, 1903.

Gaceta de Buenos Aires (i8io-i8!i). Reimpresidn facsimilar,
dirigida por la junta de historia y numismatica Amer-
icana . . ., five volumes, Buenos Aires, 1910-1914.

Of great value upon the revolution in the viceroyalty of la
Plata.

Gaceta de Madrid, Madrid, 1821-1825.

Gaceta Imperial de Mexico, Mexico, 1821, 1822.

Invaluable upon the Iturbidista revolution.

The Courier, London, 1822-1824.

The Daily National Intelligencer, Washington, 1822, 1823.

The Political Herald and Review, or, a survey of domestic and
foreign politics . . ., London, 1785.

El Tiempo, Caracas, 1910.

The Times, London, 1822-1824.

El Universal, Caracas, 1915.

The Weekly Register, edited by H. Niles, volumes one to thirty-
seven, Baltimore, 1811-1830.

Some useful documents concerning Spanish America found
their way into this newspaper.

j. Periodicals, etc.

“Bolivar y Sucre, E. Martinez y T. Guido; Preciosas cartas para
servir a la historia de las campanas de la independencia de

BIBLIOGRAPHY 359

Peru,” in La Revista de Buenos Aires, volume eighteen, pages
3-16, Buenos Aires, 1869.

"Cartas del Libertador que no estan en las Memorias de O’Leary,”
in the Gaceta de los Museos Nacionales, volume one, pages 43
flf., Caracas, 1912-

“Centenario del Libertador,” in Anales de la Instruccion publica
en los Estados Unidos de Colombia, volume six, pages 3-64,
Bogota, 1883.

“La Diplomacia de la Revolucion: misiones de Mariano Moreno al
Brazil y a Inglaterra,” in La Revista de la Universidad de
Buenos Aires, volume fifteen, pages 502-514, Buenos Aires,
1911.

This contains some inedited documents on Moreno’s mis-
sion.

"Documents concerning the consular service of the United States
in Latin America, with introductory note, in the Mississippi
Valley Historical Review, volume two, pages 561-568, Cedar
Rapids, 1916.

“Documentos Ineditos,” in the Boletin de la Academia Nacional
de Historia, volume two, pages 139-175, Caracas, 1913.

Some inedited letters of Sucre, Santander, and others.

“English Policy toward America in 1790-1791,” in the American
Historical Review, volume seven, pages 706-735, New York,
1902.

“Entrevista en Guayaquil (1822) de los generales San Martin y
Bolivar,” in the Revista de Buenos Aires, volume fifteen,
pages 66-75, Buenos Aires, 1868.

GikARD, A., “Le General Jose de San Martin,” from L’Impartial
de Boulogne-sur-mer, Boulogne-sur-mer, 1850.

"Miranda and the British Admiralty,” in the American Historical
Review, volume six, pages 5015-530, New York, 1901.

"South American Emancipation,” in the Edinburgh Review, or
Critical Journal, volume thirteen, pages 277-312, Edinburgh,
1809.

This is a review of “Lettre aux Espagnols-Americains” ;
as Miranda evidently aided in preparing it, it partakes of the
character of autobiographical material concerning his career.

“Sucre Intimo,” in the Boletin de la Academia Nacional de la
Historia, volume three, pages 1-30, Caracas, 1914-

BIBLIOGRAPHY

360

4. Manuscript Collections

There is an enormous amount of manuscript material concern-
ing Spanish America during the revolutionary period preserved
in archival repositories. The writer utilized some of this material
while preparing his “Francisco de Miranda” : a complete list of
the archives then consulted will be found on pages 507-51 1 of that
work. Since that work was published, he has used other inedited
materials upon certain phases of the Spanish-American revolution.
There are collections of unexploited material in the archives of
England, France, and the United States; this material is fre-
quently most useful because it furnishes the impressions and the
viewpoints of foreign observers. Helpful suggestions concerning
the material in some of these archives relating to Spanish-Amer-
ican history may be found in the Carnegie Institution guides to
materials in foreign archives relating to the history of the United
States. As yet, the historical archives — public and private — of
South America, are virtually unknown in North America. Many
of those collections are in the possession of the respective govern-
ments; other collections are in the control of learned societies;
while some collections are, at least in part, in the hands of private
individuals. For the present purpose, the writer has confined his
statements concerning archival material to a bi'efly annotated list
of the main collections which he has actually found useful upon
one phase or another of the movement for the emancipation of
Spanish America.

Archivo Diplomatico y Consular de Colombia, Bogota.

Through the courtesy of Senor Antonio Gomez Restrepo
the writer was allowed to view in these archives the original
of the letter written by Bolivar’s general secretary concerning
the fateful interview between Bolivar and San Martin at
Guayaquil.

Archives of the English Government: Public Record Office, Lon-
don.

A vast amount of useful material concerning Spanish-
American affairs is found among the reports of English offi-
cials in America which are in the various groups of manu-
scripts found in this repository.

Archivo del general Jose E. Andrade, Caracas.

By the courtesy of Senor V. Lecuna the writer secured
from this collection some inedited letters of Jose E. Andrade
concerning the period from 1826-1830.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

361

The Library of Congress: Division of Manuscripts.

“Yturbide Papers.”

This important collection is concerned rather with Itur-
bide’s career as a royalist commander and his role as em-
peror of Mexico than with his career as liberator.

Archives of the Mexican Government: Archivo General de la
Nacion, Mexico City.

The writer has used inedited papers in this archive which
concern Iturbide’s revolution.

Archivo del Libertador (Simon de Bolivar), Caracas.

By the courtesy and aid of Senor Lecuna, the writer
secured copies of certain inedited papers of Bolivar which still
remain in this archive.

Archives of the Spanish Government:

Archivo General de Simancas, Simancas.

From Simancas material was secured relating to the mili-
tary services of Iturbide, as well as to the early career of
Miranda.

Archivo General de Indias, Seville.

This is, of course, the great repository of material con-
cerning the Spanish Indies. Many papers found here are con-
cerned with the revolution ; they are especially useful on
diplomatic problems.

Archives of the United States Government, Washington, D. C.
Bureau of Indexes and Archives.

There is a large amount of unpublished material concern-
ing the Spanish-American revolution, 1810-1830, reposing in
this bureau of the American department of state.

INDEX

Abad y Quiepo, Manuel, 79, 87.

Abascal, Jose de, viceroy of
Peru, 186.

Abasolo, Mariano, 82, 99, 100.

Abella, Angel, 99, loi.

Aculco, battle of, 94.

Adams, John, and Miranda, 43,
44-

Adams, John Quincy, and
Aguirre, 196.

Aguirre, Manuel H. de, agent
from la Plata to United
States, 195, 196.

Alaman, Lucas, on Hidalgo and
revolt, 78, 79, 81, 85: quoted
on sack of Guanajuato, 89;
cited on Iturbide, 113.

Alcabala, 12, 16, 95.

Aldama, Ignacio, Mexican agent
to the United States, 98, 100.

Aldama, Juan, part in Hidal-
go’s revolution, 82, 83, 84 ;
capture and execution, 99,
100.

Allen, Heman, United States
minister to Chile, 327.

Allende, Ignacio, character and
role in Hidalgo’s revolution,
82, 84, 85, 94; deposes Hidal-
go, 97, 98; capture, 99; ex-
ecution, 100.

Amar, Antonio, viceroy of New
Granada, deposed, 223.

Anderson, Richard C., United
States minister to Colombia,
326, 327.

Antepara, J. M., edits South
American Emancipation, 59,
60.

Apodaca, Juan R. de, viceroy
of Mexico, 1 1 5, 1 17, 1 18; re-
jects Plan of Iguala, 122; de-
posed, 122, 123.

Argentina, see under Spanish-
American republics.

Armijo, Jose G. de, 83, 117.

Artigas, Jose G., early career,
175; leaves Spanish service,
175; instructions of 1813, 176,
177; retires to Paraguay, 179;
political ideas and role in
revolution in words ascribed
to him, 179; description of,
178, 179.

Audiencia, character, 6-8; at
Bogota, 6, 16; Buenos Aires,
6, 144, 152; Caracas, 6; Cuz-
co, 6; Charcas, 6, 7, 286, 289;
Santiago, 6; Guadalajara, 5,
6, 7; Guatemala, 6; Havana,
6; Lima, 6, 210; Mexico City,
5, 6, 73, 107; Quito, 6, 7.

Ayacucho, battle of, 282, 285;
Bolfvar on, 285; Sucre on,
283; Miller on, 282, 283;
treaty of, 283, 284, 318.

363

INDEX

364

Aymerich, General, surrenders
to Sucre, 251, 252.

La Banda Oriental, 155, 175-
180. See also Uruguay, Vice-
royalty of la Plata.

Barreiro, General, defeated at
Boyaca, 241, 242.

Barros Arana, Diego, “Historia
Jeneral de Chile,” referred
to, 197.

Becerra, Ricardo, biography of
Miranda referred to, 69, 70.

Belgrano, Manuel, member of
coterie at Buenos Aires, 145;
role in revolution of 1810, 150,
154, 155. 156; engagements
with royalist army, 184; emis-
sary to Europe, 187; at con-
gress of Tucuman, 188.

Bello, Andres, meets Miranda,
60; tutors Bolivar, 218.

Bermudez, General, 244, 245.

Biggs, James, description of
Miranda quoted, 54, 55.

Bolivar, Simon de, birth and
family, 217, 218, 306; early
career, 217-223; in Spanish
military service, 219; mar-
riage, 220; effects of wife’s
death, 221 ; early interest in
revolution, 222; meets Mi-
randa, 53, 60; shares in
Miranda’s betrayal, 67, 68;
escapes from Venezuela, 223;
manifesto to New Granada
quoted, 225-229; campaigns
in northern South America,
223-226, 241 ; his decree of
death, 226, 227; declared Lib-
erator of Venezuela, 227; in
West Indies, 223, 229, 233,

234; Andean march and bat-
tle of Boyaca, 241, 242; nego-
tiations with Morillo and with
Spain, 242-244; battle of
Carabobo, 244-246 ; Bolivar
to Santander on, 246; made
president of Colombia, 247;
marches to Quito, 250-253;
battle of Bombona, 251 ;
proclamation on battle of
Pichincha quoted, 252 ; quoted
on treaty of Cdrdoba, 253,
254; letter to San Martin
quoted, 254; interview with
San Martin at Guayaquil,
254-260 ; arrives in Lima, 272,
273; preparations for cam-
paign against Canterac, 273-
276; made dictator of Peru,
275 ; address to soldiers
quoted, 276, 277; at battle of
Junin, 278, 279; leaves united
army, 279, 280; on uti possi-
detis of 1810, quoted, 286,
287; dictator-president of Bo-
livia, 288, 289; frames con-
stitution for Bolivia, 290, 291,
294, 295 ; O’Leary on quoted,
290, 291 ; Bolivar’s discourse
on quoted, 291, 292, 293; re-
turns to Colombia, 295; pro-
claimed dictator of Colombia,
303 ; attempt to assassinate,
303; personality of, 264-266;
San Martin on quoted, 255,
256, 312; as a literary man,
310, 31 1 ; role in revolution,
308, 31 1, 312, 314; political
ideas in prophetic letter
quoted, 230-233; in address
to congress of Angostura
quoted, 235-241 ; in constitu-

INDEX

tion of Bolivia, 291-296; on
monarchies in Spanish Amer-
ica, 300-302; on American
constitutions quoted, 303; re-
nounces chief magistracy of
Colombia, 304 ; death, 305 ;
farewell proclamation, 305 ;
will, 306; papers, 306. See
also Congress of Panama,
Francisco de Miranda, Mon-
roe Doctrine, Jose de San
Martin, Antonio Jose de
Sucre.

Bolivia, see under Spanish-
American republics.

Bombona, battle of, 251.

Bonaparte, Joseph, proclaimed
king of Spain, 50.

Bonaparte, Napoleon, usurpa-
tions in Iberian peninsula, 49,
50; influence of, upon His-
panic America, 60, 61, 73, 84,
100, loi, 14s, 149, 185, 223,
249. 316; referred to, 45, 59,
173, 220 221, 294, 309, 31 1.
See also Spanish-American
juntas, Spanish-American rev-
olution.

Boves, Jose T., 228, 229.

Boyaca, battle of, 241, 242.

Bracho, Rafael, 100, 102.

Braganza, house of, flight to
Brazil, 49.

Bravo, Nicolas, companion of
Morelos, 108; supports Plan
of Iguala, 122; supports plan
of Casa Mata, 135; member
of executive power, 140.

Brazil, referred to, 4, 13, 155,
156, 159, 160, 164, 165, 180,
188, 323, 324.

Brissot de Warville, J. P., re-

365

lations with Miranda, 36, 37;
letter to Dumouriez quoted,
37-

Bustamante, Carlos M. de,
cited, 78, 84, 126.

Caballero, Pedro J., 169.

Cabildo (ayuntamiento), char-
acter of, 9, 10; referred to,
55, 61, 85, 86, no, 128, 130,
158, 185, 195, 209, 210, 223,
227, 252. See also Cabildo
abierto.

Cabildo abierto, character, 9:
role of, in Buenos Aires, 17,
150; Caracas, 61, 228; Lima,
209, 210; Santiago, 185, 195.

Cadena, Count of, 86, 90.

Calatrava, Jose M., negotiates
treaty with Mexico, 330.

Calderon, battle of, 97.

Calleja, Felix M., royalist com-
mander, 87, 88, 90, 94, 97; re-
ferred to on inscription at
Guanajuato, 104; viceroy of
Mexico, no.

Cancha Rayada, battle of, 198.

Canning, George, referred to,
50, 328, 329.

Canterac, Jose de, royalist com-
mander, occupies Lima, 272;
referred to, 273, 275; at bat-
tle of Junin, 278; joins Val-
dez at Cuzco, 280; at battle
of Ayacucho, 283.

Captain general, creation and
powers, 5; referred to, 6, 7;
of Guatemala, 5, 6, 131 ; Ven-
ezuela, 5, 6, 26, 61 ; Chile, 5,
6, 185, 189, 194; Cuba, 5. See
also Audiencia, Intendant,
Viceroy.

INDEX

366

Captaincies general, referred
to, 5, 8, 25, 26, 46, 47, 63, 131,
132, 185.

Carabobo, battle of, 244-246.

Carcelen y Larrea, Mariana,
fiancee and wife of Sucre,

299, 300. 304-

Carlota Joaquina, referred to,
49; intrigues in South Amer-
ica, 145.

Carrera, Jose M., 186.

Carrera, Juan J., 186.

Carrera, Luis, 186.

Castelli, Juan J., 145, 150.

Castlereagh, Lord, Miranda’s
letter to quoted, 47 48; cited,
48; referred to, 328.

Catherine IL, Miranda and, 32,
33. 70-

Central America, see under
Spanish-American republics.

Chacabuco, battle of, 194, 195.

Charles IV., extent of American
dominions, i, 2; administra-
tion, 2; title to Indies, 3; re-
nounces right to Spanish
crown, 50.

Charles Louis, Duke of Lucca,
referred to, 124, 200, 201,
215-

Chile, see under Spanish-Amer-
ican republics.

Church, 17, 18; measures of
Mexican Church against Hi-
dalgo, 87. See also Inquisi-
tion.

Cisneros, Baltasar Hidalgo de,
appointed viceroy of Buenos
Aires, arrives in South Amer-
ica, 146; Moreno’s Rcpresen-
tacion to, 146-149; decree on
neutral commerce mentioned.

149; proclamation, 149; de-
posed and deported, 150, 152.

Clay, Henry, quoted on resourc-
es of South America, i, 2.

Cochrane, Lord, enters Chilean
service, naval exploits, 200;
relations with San Martin,
203, 212, 214.

Colombia, see under Spanish-
American republics.

El Colombiano, founded by
Miranda, 58; quoted, 58, 59.

Congress: of Bolivia, 288, 289;
Colombia : Angostura, 234,

235; Cucuta, 246-248; Mexi-
co: Chilpancingo, 109-111,

empire, 127-131, 134-138, 140:
Paraguay, 169-171 ; Peru, 260,
269-271 ; United Provinces
of la Plata: Tucuman, 188-
190; of 1819, 201; of 1826,
295. See also Congress of
Panama.

Congress of Panama, suggested,
233 ; convoked by Bolivar,
324; results of, 325.

Constitution of Spain: of 1812,
described, 107; sworn to in
Mexico, 107; proclaimed by
Riego, 1 15; proclaimed in
Mexico, 1 15, 1 16.

Constitutions of Spanish-Amer-
ican republics : Argentina,

of 1826, 295. (See United
Provinces of la Plata below) ;
Bolivia, of 1826, 291-296, 309;
Central America, of 1824,
140; Chile, of 1818, 198, 199;
of 1828, 199; Colombia, fun-
damental law of 1819, 242;
Cucuta, 246, 247, 252. (See
also New Granada below) ;

INDEX

Ecuador, of 1830, 307; Mex-
ico, of 1814, no. III ; of 1824,
140. (See also Plan of Igu-
ala) ; New Granada, of 1811,
223; of 1831, 307; Paraguay,
of 1813, 169, 170; Peru, of
1822, 270, 295; of 1826, 295;
United Provinces of la Plata,
of 1819, 201 ; Uruguay, of
1830, 180; Venezuela, of

1811, 64, 65; of 1819, 240,
241 ; of 1830, 307.

Consulate, referred to, 14, 147,
211.

Cooley, James, charge d’affaires
of the United States to Peru,
327-

Cordoba, Jose M., patriot com-
mander of Colombia, 277; at
Ayacucho, 282; leads revolt,
302.

Cordoba, Treaty of, arranged,
124; provisions of, 124, 125;
compared with Plan of
Iguala, 125; Mexican con-
gress on in 1823, 136; Bolivar
on, 253, 254; Spain’s attitude
towards, 318.

Cortes, Mexican: mentioned in
Plan of Iguala, 119; in treaty
of Cordoba, 124, 125.

Cortes, Spanish: of 1810, de-
cree of amnesty referred to,
98; of 1812, promulgates con-
stitution, 107; of 1820, passes
decrees concerning Spanish-
America, 1 16; of 1821, re-
jects Plan of Iguala, 120; of
1822, declares against recog-
nition of Spanish-American
colonies, 128, 129; referred to,

319-

367

Council of the Indies, person-
nel, 2; powers, 3.

Cruz, Jose de la, royalist com-
mander, 97; offers pardon to
Hidalgo, 98.

Declaration of Independence of :
Argentina (see United Prov-
inces of la Plata below) ; Bo-
livia, 287, 288; Central-Amer-
ica, 140; Chile, 196-198; Mex-
ico, of 1813, 109; in Plan of
Iguala, 1 19; “act of independ-
ence’’ of 1821, 126, 127; New
Granada: at Cartagena, 224;
at Bogota, 224; Paraguay, al-
leged declaration referred to,
170; Peru, 209-211; United
Provinces of la Plata, 188,
189; Uruguay, 179, 180; Ven-
ezuela, 63, 64.

De Liniers, Santiago de, and
English invasion, 17; and Na-
poleon’s agent, 145 ; execution
of, 154.

Delpech, Louis, quoted on ca-
pitulation of San Mateo, 68.

Despertador Americano, 95.

El Diario erudito, economico y
comer cial de Lima, 20.

Dominguez, Josefa Ortiz de,
wife of Miguel Dominguez,
warns conspirators, 82, 83.

Dumouriez, General, relations
with Miranda, 37, 38.

Echeverria, Jose, Venezuelan
envoy to Spain, 243, 244.

Ecuador, see under Spanish-
American republics.

Edinburgh Review, referred to,

29, S8.

INDEX

368

Education ; elementary in Span-
ish America, 20; higher, 21;
universities and colleges in,
21, 22, 75.

Elio, Francisco X., viceroy of
la Plata, 176.

England, attempt to revolution-
ize Spanish America referred
to, 16; Jittack on la Plata, 16,
17; influence of, 17, 48-51;
treaty with central junta of
Spain, 51 ; commercial rela-
tions with Spanish America,
16, 17, 146-150; British le-
gion, 245 ; influence upon
Spanish-American independ-
ence, 328. See also Recog-
nition of Spanish-American
republics.

Ferdinand VII, youth, 2; be-
comes king of Spain, enforced
abdication, 50; influence of,
in Spain, 50; in Mexico, 73,
85; Venezuela, 60; la Plata,
145; Chile, 185; effects of
restoration of in America,
no; commission to Apodaca,
5; effects in America of his
acceptance of constitution
of 1812, 115-117, 242, 243;
referred to in Plan of Iguala,
1 19 ; in treaty of Cordoba, 124 ;
O’Donoju sends commission-
ers to, 128; policy toward
Spanish-American revolution,
1 1 5, 285, 328, 329. See also
Cortes, Juntas, Spain.

Fernandez Madrid, Jose, poem
on Bolivar quoted, 312, 313.

Filangieri, Gaetano, referred to,
148, 160; quoted, 148.

Filisola, Vicente, joins Itur-
bide’s following, 122; leads
expedition to Central Amer-
ica, 132; convokes a congress
there, 140.

Flores, General, referred to,

305. 320.

France, attitude toward Spanish-
American revolution, 65, 200,
201 ; project to revolution-
ize Spanish America in 1792,
36-38; influence upon revolu-
tion, 20, 62, 64, 65, 77, 80, 90,
143, 160, 294. See also Na-
poleon Bonaparte, Raynal,
Rousseau.

Francia, Jose G. R. de, early
career, 169; author of a con-
stitution of Parag^iay, 169;
consul of, 169, 170; dictator
of, 170-174; estimate of his
role, 171, 172, 174; political
ideas, 169, 173; gives asylum
to Artigas, 179; description
by Rengger, 172-174; his de-
nunciation of Rengger’s essay,
174; dictatorship referred to,
321.

Freire, Ram6n, referred to, 320.

Fuente, Jose de la, biographer
of Hidalgo cited, 79, 81.

Gaceta de Buenos Aires, found-
ed, 152, 153; quoted, 59, 161-
163.

Gaceta de Caracas, 20.

Gaceta del Gobierno de Lima
Indep'endiente, 21 1.

Gaceta de Lima, 272.

Gaceta de Madrid, 139.

Gaceta de Mexico, 20, 79, 86.

Gaceta de Santa Fe, 20.

INDEX

Gaceta Imperial de Mexico, 126.

Gachupines, ii, 82, 83.

Gallegos, Manuel, advice to Hi-
dalgo quoted, 90.

Gamarra, Agustin, 214, 282.

Garay, Bias, referred to, 170.

Garcia Carrasco, F., captain
general of Chile deposed, 185.

Garda del Rio, Juan, 205, 212,
214, 215.

Garibay, Pedro, viceroy of Mex-
ico, 73, 81.

Gil Fortoul, Jose, referred to,
222, 31 1.

George III., referred to, 50.

Godoy, Manuel de, referred to,
2, 50-

Godoy Cruz, Tomas, 187, 188.

Gomez, Jose V., Platean agent
to France, 200, 201.

Great Colombia, see Colombia.

Grenville, Lord, on Miranda’s
designs, 42, 43.

El Grito de Dolores, 83.

Guadeloupe, Virgin of, patron
saint of Mexican revolution,

85-

Gual, Manuel, 20, 53.

Guerrero, Vicente, early career,
role in revolution, 118; rela-
tions \vith Iturbide, 118; ac-
cepts Plan of Iguala, 121 ;
supports Santa Anna, 135;
Mexican president, 320.

Guido, Tomas, secretary of
Mariano Moreno, 167; quoted
on, 168; referred to, 191, 197,
261.

Hall, Basil, quoted on San Mar-
tin, 207, 208, 209, 212.

Hamilton, Alexander, relations

369

with Miranda, 30, 31 ; corre-
spondence with, 43.

Henriquez, Camilo, 185.

Hereida, Jose F., quoted on
Boves, 229.

Hidalgo y Costilla, Miguel,
birth and family of, 74, 79;
early career, 75, 76; teacher
at San Nicolas Obispo, 76;
curate at Colima, San Felipe,
Dolores, 77-84; denounced to
inquisition, 76-79; beginnings
of his revolutionary ideas, 81 ;
fellow-conspirators in 1810,
81, 82; starts Mexican revolu-
tion, 83; various motives for
attributed, 84; on objects of
revolt, 84, 87, 88; takes Cel-
aya, 85; commissions More-
los, 108; acclaimed captain
general, 85; opposition to his
revolt, 86 ; besieges Guana-
juato, 86, 87; capture and
sack of, 89; Alhondiga of, re-
ferred to, 87, 88, 89 ; captures
Valladolid, 90; inquisition is-
sues edict against, 91 ; his re-
ply to from Valladolid, 91, 92;
made generalissimo, 92, 93;
battle of Las Cruces, 93 ; bat-
tle of Aculco, 94 ; breach with
Allende, 94; enters Guadala-
jara, 94; reforms there, 94,
95 ; deposed by Allende, 97,
98; declines offer of pardon,
98; captured by Elizondo, 99;
imprisonment, trial, and
cross-examination, 99-102; his
manifesto to “All the World,”
loi, 102; sentence, 102, 103;
execution, 103, 314; inter-
ment, 104; personality as de-

370

INDEX

scribed by Alaman, 8o, 8i ;
political ideas, 77, 78, 90, 91 ;
role in Mexican revolution,
104-106. See also Inquisi-
tion.

Holy Alliance, referred to, 136,

137, 139, 319, 328.

Humboldt, Alexander von, re-
ferred to, 10, 222, 223.

Hymn of provinces of la Plata
quoted from, 177.

Inquisition : tribunals of, ac-
tivities, 18; Segur quoted on,
18, 19; censorship: prohibited
books, 18, 19; Miranda and,
27; Hidalgo and: as rector,
76; denounced to, 77; report
on, 90; edict against, 90, 91;
reply to, 91, 92; end of case,
104.

Instructions of 1813, 176, 177.
See also Artigas.

Intendant, character, 7, 8; re-
ferred to, 26, 73, 143. See
also Audicncia, Captain Gen-
eral, Viceroy.

Internal provinces of New
Spain, creation, division, 8, 9.

Interview at Guayaquil, 255-
260. See also Bolivar and
San Martin.

Isthmus of Panama, referred to,
4, 40, 42, 49, 233, 249, 324,

325-

iturbide, Agustin de, birth
and family of, 112; early ca-
reer, 1 12, 1 13; marriage, 113;
in Spanish military service,
113-118; quoted on Hidalgo’s
revolt, 1 14; recalled by Cal-
leja, 1 15; quoted on condi-

tions in 1820, 1 16, 1 17; ap-
pointed commander of royal-
ist army, 117; publishes Plan
of Iguala, 1 18; interview
with O’Donoju; arranges
treaty of C6rdoba, 124, 125;
entry into Mexico City, 126;
forms junta of government,
126; becomes president of re-
gency, 127; quoted on his ele-
vation to emperor, 129; coro-
nation as, 131 ; founds order
of Guadeloupe, 131 ; exten-
sion of sway over Central
America, 131, 132; extent of
dominions in 1822, 132; rela-
tions with congress, 127-134;
dissolves congress, 134;
quoted on his abdication, 135;
congress annuls his acts, 136;
in exile, 136; return to Mex-
ico, detention, and execution,
136-138, 314: memorial to
congress quoted, 138, 139;
political ideas, 114, 116, 117;
Bolivar on, 253, 254, 259, 273 ;
Poinsett quoted on personal-
ity, 132, 133; role in Mexican
history, 139, 140. See also
Plan of Iguala, Treaty of
Cordoba.

Iturrigaray, Jose de, viceroy of
Mexico, 73.

Jefferson, Thomas, and Miran-
da, 46; “Summary View” re-
ferred to, 24.

Jesuits, activities, 22; decree of
expulsion, 22; effects of, 23;
Miranda and, 32.

Jimenez, Mariano, 99, loo.

John, Prince of Portugal, flight

INDEX

to Brazil, 49 : referred to,
190.

Jiinin, battle of, 278, 279.

Juntas of Spain: in 1808, 50;
central junta, 51, 60.

Juntas of Spanish-America :
Argentina (see United Prov-
inces of la Plata below) ;
Central America, 131, 132;
Chile, 185; Ecuador, 249, 250;
Mexico, 73, 81, 108, 126, 134:
Paraguay, 169; Peru, 270;
United Provinces of la Plata,
150-160, 163-167, 169, 175,
183; Venezuela, 60, 61, 268.
(See also Joseph Bonaparte,
Napoleon Bonaparte.)

King, Rufus, meets Miranda,
30; in London, 41, 42.

Knox, Henry, relations with
Miranda referred to, 30, 31,
36, 37-

La Croix, Peru de. Diary
quoted, 221, 308, 309, 310.

La Fond, G., quoted on San
Martin’s opinion of Bolivar,
255. 256.

La Mar, Jose de, patriot com-
mander, 276, 277, 281, 282;
leads revolt, 302 ; president of
Peru, 320, 321.

Lara, Jacinto, 277, 282.

Las Cruces, battle of, 93; Itur-
bide at, 114.

Las Heras, Gregorio de, march
over Andes, 192, 193; quoted
on Monroe Doctrine, 327.

Las Piedras, battle of, 175, 176,
177-

La Torre, General, succeeds

371

Morillo, 244; defeated at
Carabobo, 245.

Lautaro Lodge, Miranda and
alleged lodge, 53 ; in South
American revolution, 182, 183.

Lavalleja, Juan Antonio, leader
of thirty-three, 179.

Laws of the Indies, Recopila-
cion de Leyes de los Reinos
de las Indias, 10.

Laws of Spain, Novisima Re-
copilacion de las Leyes de
Espaiia, 10.

Lea, Henry C., referred to, in.

Lebrun, Charles F., 36, 37.

Lecor, General, captures Mon-
tevideo, 179.

Le Moyne, Colonel, French
agent to la Plata, 200.

Liberators, estimate of their in-
fluence; general discussion of
their governmental projects,
319, 320. See also Francisco
de Miranda, etc.

Liberators of Venezuela, Order
of, established by Bolivar,
227.

Lizanza y Beaumont, Francisco
J. de, viceroy of Mexico, 81.

London Courier, referred to,
328.

Lopez, Charles A., referred to,
172.

Lopez, Francisco S., referred
to, 172.

Lopez, Vicente F., cited, 160.

Los Remedios, Virgin of, patron
saint of royalists, 93, 99.

Lower Peru, see Peru, undet
Spanish-American republics.

Loyalists, referred to, 65, 317,
318.

372

INDEX

Loyola, Ignatius, 22.

Luthman, A. C, translation of
Fernandez de Madrid, quoted,
312, 313.

Madison, James, relations with
Miranda referred to, 46.

Maipu, battle of, 198.

Marino, Santiago, 228, 229.

Maroto, Rafael, 194.

Marquez, Jose Ignacio, address
concerning congress of Cii-
cuta, quoted, 248.

Matamoras, Mariano, 108.

Mendoza, Antonio de, viceroy
of New Spain, 3.

Mer curio Peruano de historia,
literatura y noticias publicas,
20.

Mexico, see under Spanish-
American republics.

Miller, William, 261, 277;

memoirs quoted on Bolivar’s
army, 277, 278; on battle of
Ayacucho, 282, 283.

Mina, Francisco X., in Spain,
III; part in Mexican revolt,
III, 112; fate, 112.

Miranda, Francisco de, birth
and family of, 26, 70 ; early
career, 27-29 ; supposed origin
of revolutionary ideas, 29;
flight from West Indies and
trip through United States,
28-31 ; relations with Hamil-
ton, Knox, and Washington
discussed, 30, 31; petition to
Charles III., from London,
quoted, 31, 32; notice of, in
Political Herald and Review,
32 ; tour through Europe, 32,
33; relations with Pitt in

I790» 33-36, 70; government-
al plans in 1790, 33-35 ; career
in France, 1792-1798, 36-39;
his alleged instructions, 40,
41 ; renews relations with
Pitt, 39-45; with King, and
Hamilton, 41, 43, 44; attempts
to interest President Adams,
43; Addington, 45; relations
with Madison and Jefferson
in 1805, 46; leads filibuster-
ing expedition from United
States against Venezuela, 46;
pleas to Castlereagh, de-
scribed and quoted, 47-49;
revolutionary plans in 1807-
1808, 48, 49; his arguments
against Spanish rule, 51, 52;
objective points of his pro-
jected attacks, 52; influence
upon Spanish-American lead-
ers, 53; interest in learning,

53, 54; correspondence with
Spanish-Americans, 55 ; gov-
ernmental plans in 1808, 55-
58; views on dictator in
Spanish-America, quoted, 56,
57; relations with Antepara,
60; with Bolivar, 60, 62, 66-
68; returns to Venezuela, 61;
advocates a declaration of in-
dependence, 62, 63; views on
national flag and constitution,
64; dictator of Venezuela, 66,
67; betrayed to Spaniards, 67;
a prisoner of Spain, 67-69;
death, 69, 314; personality of,

54, 69, 70; character of, 70-
72; political ideas, 33-35, 55-
58; role in history, 71, 72.
See also Simon de Bolivar.

Monroe, James, referred to, 132,

INDEX

373

196. See also Monroe Doc-
trine, Recognition of Span-
ish-American Republics.

Monroe Doctrine, original, re-
ception in South America,
324, 327, 328.

Monteagudo, Bernardo, 212.

Monteverde, Domingo, 66, 67,
223, 227.

Morelos, Jose M., early career,
108; military services, 108,
109; made chief executive
of Mexico, 109; member of
executive power, iii; cap-
ture and execution, in; po-
litical ideas, 109, no.

Moreno, Manuel, referred to,
142, 143; quoted on Mariano
Moreno, 144, 151; secretary
of, 166, 167.

Moreno, Mariano, birth and
family of, 142 ; early career,
142-144; author of Represen-
tacion, 146; Representacion
described and quoted, 146-
150; in cabildo abierto, 150;
made secretary of junta,
150; his decree on founding
of Gaceta quoted, 152, 153;
quoted from on free speech,
I53> 154! founder of national
library at Buenos Aires, 154,
174; subscribes for expedition
to interior provinces, 155;
correspondence with Strang-
ford, 155, 156; Plan of Oper-
ations ascribed to him de-
scribed and quoted, 156-160;
influence of European writers
upon, 160; edits translation
of Rousseau’s “Social Con-
tract,” opinion on Rousseau,

quoted, 160, 161 ; opposes

Saavedra, 163, 164; resigns
secretaryship, 164; appointed
diplomatic agent to England,
164; character of that mis-
sion, 164-167; his secretaries,
166; death, 167, 314; private
life referred to, 144, 167, 168;
characterizations of, 166, 167,
168; quoted on political ideas,
161-163; role in revolution,
168, 174, 319.

Morillo, Pablo, role as royalist
commander, 233, 234, 242-244.

Moscoso, Juan, appointed cap-
tain general of New Spain,
128.

Narino, Antonio, 19, 41, 224.

Nechochea, General, 277, 278.

New Granada, see under Span-
ish-American republics.

New Spain, see Viceroyalty of
Mexico, Mexico (under Span-
ish-American republics).

Nootka Sound Controversy, 33-

36.

Novella, Francisco, 122, 125.

Ochoa, Juan, denounces Hidal-
go, 82, 83.

O’Donoju, Juan, appointed cap-
tain general of Mexico, 123;
arrives in Vera Cruz, 123;
address to Mexicans, de-
scribed, 123, 124; interview
with Iturbide, 124; in treaty
of C6rdoba, 124; relations
with Novella, 125 ; member of
Mexican regency, 127; sends
commissioners to Spain, 128.
See also Treaty of Cordoba.

374

INDEX

O’Higgins, Bernardo, meets Mi-
randa, 53; early career in
Chile, 186; at Mendoza, 186;
march over Andes, 192, 193;
at Chacabuco, 194; supreme
director of Chile, 195-199; in-
structions to Cochrane, 203;
proclamation to Peruvians
quoted, 203; on monarchy in
South America, 215; referred
to, 261, 320.

O’Leary, Daniel F., quoted on
Bolivar’s methods of compo-
sition, 235, 31 1 ; memoirs re-
ferred to, 241, 306; referred
to, 253, 268, 269; quoted on
Bolivar’s constitution for Bo-
livia, 290, 291.

Olmedo, Jose de, 249, 278.

Order of Guadeloupe, 131.

Order of Sun, 213.

Ordinances of Bilbao, 14, 322.

Orea, Telesforo de, Venezuelan
agent to United States, 65.

Ortiz de Letona, Pascasio, Mex-
ican agent to United States,
96, 100.

Osorio, Mariano, 186, 198.

Paez, Jose A., referred to, 244,
245, 294, 320; cited on mon-
archy in Colombia, 301 ;
quoted on Bolivar, 266; leads
faction in Venezuela, 302,

303-

Paine, Thomas, meets Miranda,
30; “Common Sense” re-
ferred to, 148.

Palacio Fajardo, Manuel,
quoted on Bolivar’s address
to congress of Angostura,
239, 240.

Panama, Isthmus of, see Isth-
mus of Panama.

Pan-Americanism, 327.

Paraguay, see under Spanish-
American republics.

Paroissien, Diego, Peruvian en-
voy to Europe, 214, 215.

Pasco, battle of, 205.

Pavia, Joseph, characterization
of Miranda quoted, 45, 53.

Pelegrin, Ramon, Spain’s colo-
nial secretary, circular of,
128.

Pena, Nicolas Rodriguez, re-
ferred to, 145; letter of San
Martin to on Andean march,
quoted, 184, 185.

Perez Calama, Jose, quoted on
Hidalgo, 76.

Perez, J. G., quoted on inter-
view at Guayaquil, 259.

Peru, see under Spanish-Amer-
ican republics.

Pezuela, Joaquin de, viceroy of
Peru, 204; negotiations with
San Martin, 205; deposition,
206.

Pichincha, battle of, 251-253;
Bolivar on quoted, 252.

Pitt, William, relations with
Miranda, 33-36, 57, 70; Mi-
randa’s letter to, of January
16, 1798, quoted, 39; of

March 19, 1799, quoted, 44-45.
See also Francisco de Mir-
anda.

Plan of Casa Mata, proclaimed,
supporters, 135; Agustin I.
on, quoted, 135.

Plan of Iguala, first publica-
tion, 118; provisions, 119,
120; three guarantees of, 120;

INDEX

Iturbide on quoted, 120, 121 ;
rejected by Spanish cartes,
129; relation to treaty of
Cordoba, 124; cited by Mex-
ican congress, 130; congress
on in 1823, 136; referred to,
139, 140, 253, 254. See also
Treaty of Cordoba.

Poinsett, Joel R., sent to Mex-
ico by President Monroe, 123;
description of Iturbide quoted,
132, 133; minister of United
States to Mexico, 327.

Pont, Marco del, captain gen-
eral of Chile, 189; flees from
Santiago, 194.

Popham, Home, 16, 45.

Population of Spanish America,
Humboldt on, 10; character
of, II ; creoles, ii; influence
of revolution upon, 321.

Portugal, referred to, 49, 179,
180, 326.

Posadas, Gervasio A., 177.

Presidencies: character, 7; pres-
idency of Charcas, composi-
tion, 7; referred to, 204,
285-287; presidency of Quito,
referred to, 7, 204, 249-253,
287.

Primo Verdad, Francisco,

73-

Pueyrredon, Juan Martin de,
and English invasion, 17; su-
preme director of la Plata,
188; instructions to San Mar-
tin described, 192; confers
with, 195; renounces director-
ship, 201.

Quintana, Hilario de, 196.

Quintana Roo, Andres, author

375

of manifesto, 109; accepts
pardon from king, 112.

Rancagua, battle of referred to,
186; act of described, 201,
202.

Raynal, Abbe, 19, 143.

Rayon, Ignacio, Hidalgo’s secre-
tary; president of Mexican
junta, 108.

Recognition of Spanish-Ameri-
can republics: by England,
328, 329; by Spain, early at-
titude towards, 128, 129, 134,
206, 207; consummated, 329,
330; by United States, 325-

327-

Regency: Mexican, 127, 128;

Spanish, 58, 60, 61.

Rengger, John, quoted on Fran-
cia, 172-174; Francia’s reply
to cited, 174.

Revenga, Jose R., Venezuela’s
agent to United States, 65 ; to
Spain, 243, 244.

Riano, Juan A., 79, 87, 88.
Riego, Rafael, 115.

Riva Agiiero, Jose de la, role
in Peruvian revolution, 204,
275; made president of Peru,
270; fall of, 271, 272, 273; in-
vades Colombia, 303.
Rivadavia, Bernardino, 150, 187,

327-

Rivera, Fructuoso, 179.
Rocafuerte, Vicente, 113, 320.
Rodney, Caesar A., minister of
United States to la Plata,

327-

Rodriguez, Simon, 218, 221, 222,
289.

Rondeau, Jose, 177, 201.

INDEX

376

Rousseau, Jean J., influence on
Mariano Moreno, 160, 161 ; on
Simon de Bolivar, 221, 306;
referred to, 18, 19, 173, 185.

Saavedra, Cornelio de, 17, 150,
163, 164; quoted on Mariano
Moreno’s death, 167.

Salta, battle of, 184.

San Lorenzo, battle of, 183.

San Martin, Jose Francisco de,
birth and family, 180, 181,
182, 261, 263; early career,
181, 182; quoted on depar-
ture from Spanish military
service, 182; appointed colo-
nel by junta of Buenos Aires,
183; defeats royalists at San
Lorenzo, 183; succeeds Bel-
grano, 184; made governor of
Cuyo, 184; supports declara-
tion of independence, 188,
189; march across the Andes
projected, 184, 185, 191 ; prep-
arations for, 190, 191 ; exe-
cuted, 192-194; letters to
Pueyrredon on quoted, 193,
194, 195; at battle of Chaca-
buco, 194; at Maipti, 198;
made Chilean general, 199;
expedition to Peru referred
to, 195, 196; preparations for,
198-202 ; farewell proclama-
tion to la Plata quoted, 202;
departure from Valparaiso,
202, 203 ; instructions referred
to, 203, 21 1 ; proclamations at
Pisco quoted, 204 ; negotia-
tions with Pezuela, 205 ; en-
ters Lima, 209 ; proclaims inde-
pendence of Peru, 210; pro-
claims himself protector, 21 1,

212; policy as, 212-216; inter-
view with Bolivar at Guya-
quil, 254-260; quoted on, 256-
258; farewell address to Pe-
ruvians quoted, 261 ; in exile,
261-262; illness, 214; death,
262, 314; description of by
Hall quoted, 207, 208; per-
sonality of, 262, 263 ; Bolivar
upon, 255; political ideas, 187,
188, 205, 206, 207, 208, 210,
214, 215, 259, 260, 263; role in
revolution, 263, 264. See also
Sim6n de Bolivar.

San Mateo, capitulation of, 66,
67.

Santa Anna, Antonio Lopez de,
supports Plan of Iguala, 121,
122, relations with O’Donoju
and Iturbide, 124; declares
against Agustin I., 134; advo-
cates plan of Casa Mata,
135; referred to as Mexican
president, 320.

Santa Maria, Miguel, Mexican
envoy to Spain, 330.

Santander, Francisco de Paula,
patriot commander of New
Granada, 241 ; made vice-presi-
dent of Colombia, 247; decree
on Isthmus of Panama re-
ferred to, 249; leader of party
against Bolivar, 302, 303; re-
ferred to as president of Co-
lombia, 320.

Sassenay, Marquis de, Napo-
leon’s agent to South Amer-
ica, 145.

Schryver, S. de, cited, 31 1, 312.

Segur, Count, quoted on inquisi-
tion, 18, 19.

Serna, Jose de la, viceroy of

INDEX

Peru, 206; takes charge of
army, 280 ; marches against
Sucre, 280; at Ayacucho, 282,
284.

Soler, Miguel, march across
Andes, 192, 193.

Spain, colonial empire under
Charles IV., i, 2; administra-
tion of, 2-10; fiscal policy, 12-
15: policy towards creoles, ii,
168; constitution of 1812, de-
scribed, promulgation in Mex-
ico, 107; proclaimed by Riego,
1 15; effects of, in America,
1 1 5-1 17, 242, 243; San Mar-
tin on, 204; conditions in, dur-
ing Spanish-American revolu-
tion, 319; attempts to negoti-
ate peace with American rev-
olutionists, 134, 205, 206, 207,
242, 243, 244, 318; persistence
of influence in Spanish Amer-
ica, 322. See also Audiencias,
Cabildos, Captain Generals,
England, Intendants, Juntas,
Joseph Bonaparte, Napoleon
Bonaparte, Recognition of
Spanish-American Republics,
Viceroys.

Spanish-American Republics :
Argentina, referred to, 295,
327, 330. See also United
Provinces of la Plata below.
Viceroyalty of la Plata.
Bolivia, declaration of inde-
pendence, 287, 288; early his-
tory, 286-289, 295-298. See
also Presidency of Charcas,
Upper Peru.

Central America, revolution-
ary movement in, 131, 132;
independence proclaimed, 140.

377

See also Captain General of
Guatemala.

Chile, revolts in, 185, 186, 191-
196; declaration of independ-
ence, 196-198; early history,
198-203. See also Captain
General of Chile.

Colombia, revolution in and
early history, 224-226, 229,
241-260, 301-307. See also
New Granada, Viceroy of
New Granada, Viceroyalty of
New Granada.

Ecuador, revolts in, 249-259.
See also Presidency of Quito,
Colombia.

Mexico, revolts in, 73, 74, 81^
100, 108-112, 116-129; decla-
ration of independence in
1813, 109; act of independ-
ence in 1821, 1 19, 126, 127;
empire, 130-136. See also
Viceroy of Mexico, Viceroy-
alty of Mexico.

New Granada, revolts in, 16;
declarations of independence,
224. See also Colombia.
Paraguay, revolutionary
movement in, 155, 168-170;
alleged declaration of inde-
pendence referred to, 170;
early history, 170-174.

Peru, revolts in, 15, 16, 204-
209; declaration of independ-
ence, 209, 210; protectorate,
212-215; early history, 209-
216, 269-286. See also Viceroy
of Peru, Viceroyalty of Peru.
United Provinces of la Plata,
revolution in, 149-167, 175-
177; declaration of independ-
ence, 188, 189. See also At-

INDEX

378

gentina, Viceroy of la Plata,
Viceroyalty of la Plata.
Uruguay, declaration of inde-
pendence quoted, 180. See
also la Banda Oriental, Vice-
royalty of la Plata, Viceroy
of la Plata.

Venezuela, revolts in, 60-63 ;
declaration of independence,
63; early history, 64-69, 223,
226-229, 233-241. See also
Captain General of Venezue-
la, Colombia, New Granada.
On the Spanish-American Re-
publics, see also Constitutions,
Juntas, Recognition of Span-
ish-American republics, Spain,
Spanish-American revolu-
tion.

Spanish-American revolution,
summary of causes, 315, 316;
compared with revolution of
English colonists in North
America, 316-318; military
and political influence of, 320-
322, 330; social and economic
results of, 321, 322, 330; in-
ternational results, 323, 324.
See also Cabildo abierto, Fer-
dinand VII., Joseph Napo-
leon, Napoleon Bonaparte,
Juntas, Spain, Spanish-Amer-
ican republics.

Star of the South, 17.

Strangford, Lord, correspond-
ence with junta of Buenos
Aires, 155, 156, 165; quot-
ed on Mariano Moreno,
168.

Sucre, Antonio Jose de, birth
and family, 267, 308; early
career, 267, 268; meets Boli-

var, 269; peace commissioner
to Morillo, 243 ; leads expedi-
tion to Quito, 249-250; battle
of Pichincha, 251-253; Boli-
var’s agent to Lima and re-
lations with Riva Agiiero,
270-272 ; preparations for
campaign against Canterac,
275, 276 ; campaign against
Canterac, 276-279 ; corre-
spondence with Bolivar con-
cerning rearguard quoted,
279; becomes commander of
united patriot army, 280;
maneuvers preceding battle of
Ayacucho, 280-282; battle of
Ayacucho, 282-285 ; quoted
on, 283 ; leads army into presi-
dency of Charcas, 286; issues
proclamation convoking as-
sembly, 286; chief executive
of Bolivia, 287-290; presents
Bolivar’s constitution to Bo-
livian congress, 291 ; becomes
first president of Bolivia, 295;
president of Bolivia, 296-299;
farewell message to Bolivians
quoted, 296-298; marriage,
299 ; private life, 299, 300 ; de-
feats Peruvians at Tarqui,
303 ; commissioner to negoti-
ate with Venezuelans, 304;
assassination, 304, 314; his
wife quoted on, 304; Bolivar
on quoted, 305 ; Bolivar
on Sucre quoted, 267, 269,
274, 275 ; views on Boli-
var’s constitution for Bo-
livia, 298, 299; personality,
307-309; Bolivar on quoted,
308, 309. See also Sim6n de
Bolivar.

INDEX

Talamantes, Melchor, 73, 74.

Tarqui, battle of, 303.

Teodoro de Croix, viceroy of
Peru, quoted on censorship,
19.

Torre Tagle, Marquis of, 254,
272.

Torres, Camilo, 223.

Torres, Manuel, charge d’af-
faires of Colombia to United
States, 326.

Trujillo, Torcuato, at Las
Cruces, 93, 114.

Tucuman, battle of, 184; con-
gress of, see under Congress.

Tupac Amaru, 15, 35.

Unanue, Hipolito, 204, 212.

United Provinces of la Plata,
see under Spanish-American
republics.

United States, filibusters re-
cruited in, 46, III ; attitude to-
ward early revolt, 44, 46, 65,
195, 196; agents from Spanish
America to, 96, 195, 196;
sends consuls and ministers
to Spanish-American repub-
lics, 321, 326, 327; influence of
upon Spanish-American revo-
lution suggested, 19, 24, 63,
64, 235, 237. See also Monroe
Doctrine, Recognition of
Spanish-American republics.

Upper Peru, 7, 286-289. See al-
so Bolivia, under Spanish-
American republics. Presiden-
cy of Charcas.

Uruguay, see under Spanish-
American republics.

Uti Possidetis of 1810, Bolivar
upon in 1825 quoted, 286, 287;

379

results of principle suggested,
322.

Valdez, General, 273, 280, 282.

Velasco, Bernardo de, governor
of Paraguay deposed, 169.

Venegas, Francisco J., viceroy
of Mexico, 81, 86, 87, 99,
107.

Venezuela, see under Spanish-
American republics.

Viceroy, character, 4, 5 ; viceroy :
in Mexico, 3, 5, 8, 9, ii, 73,
81, 93. 99, 107, 114, 115, 117,
1 18, 122, 123, 131; in New
Granada, 223, 241, 242; in la
Plata, 16, 17, 142, 146, 150,
152; in Peru, 3, 4, 186, 204,
205, 206, 207, 209, 280, 282,
284. See also Audiencia,
Captain General, Intendant,
Viceroyalty.

Viceroyalty of : Mexico, 3, 5, 8,
II, 73, 86, no, 131, 140; New
Granada, 4, 242; la Plata, 4,
142; Peru, 4, 203, 204.

Victoria, Guadeloupe (sobri-
quet), 108, 134, 13s, 140, 141,
320.

Villanueva, Carlos A., 70,

264.

Viscardo y Guzman, J. P., his
Lettre aux Espagnols-Ameri-
cains, quoted, 23, 24; origin
and publication of, 25; dis-
cussed in Edinburgh Review,

58.

Washington, George, 30, 95,
320.

Wellesley, Arthur, relations
with Miranda, 49-51, 57; sails

380

INDEX

for Iberian peninsula, 57. See
also Wellington, Duke of.

Wellesley, Marquis, relations
with Bolivar and Lopez Men-
dez, 61 ; letter of junta of
Buenos Aires to, quoted, 165-
166.

Wellington, Duke of, quoted on
Miranda, 50, 51.

Williams, John, charge d’af-

faires of United States to
Central America, 327.

Yegros, Fulgencio, 169.

Zarate, Julio, cited, 118.

Zea, Francisco A., 240, 242, 268.
Zenteno, Jose L, 195, 203.
Zozaya, Jose M., first minister
of Mexico to the United
States, 326.

(8)

Date Due

0 -b I '-

r