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THE RIVER COLUMN
THE RIVER COLUMN
A NARRATIVE OF THE ADVANCE OF THE RIVER
COLUMN OF THE NILE EXPEDITIONARY
FORCE, AND ITS RETURN DOWN
THE RAPIDS
BY
Major-general
HENRY BRACKENBURY, C.B.
LATE COMMANDING THE RIVER COLUMN ;
FORMERLY PROFESSOR OF MILITARY HISTORY AT THE ROYAL
MILITARY ACADEMY, WOOLWICH ; AUTHOR OF ' A
NARRATIVE OF THE ASHANTI WAR '
WITH MAPS
BY
Major the Hon. F. L. L. COLBORNE
ROYAL IRISH RIFLES ; LATE OF THE SURVEY
DEPARTMENT OF THE COLUMN
''jE^v-^*^
WILLIAM BLACKV^OOD AND SONS
EDINBURGH AND LONDON
MDCCCLXXXV
S 1 iOS. >>
235081
\
.^^1
^
PREFACE,
I HAVE written this simple narrative in the
belief that the advance and return of four
regiments of infantry through a hundred
miles of cataracts and rapids in an enemy's
country deserve, as a military operation,
some permanent record, and because death
has removed the only other officers pos-
sessing sufficient knowledge of all details
to write that record with accuracy.
It would have been a pleasure to me to
take this opportunity of praising those in-
dividuals to whom, in my opinion, such suc-
cess as the Column attained is chiefly due ;
J\^
VI PREFACE.
but my position demands so strict a neu-
trality that I have thought it right to avoid
all words of praise, lest in any case their
accidental omission might appear to impute
the semblance of blame.
HENRY BRACKENBURY.
London, September 1885.
CONTENTS.
CHAP. PAGE
I. KORTI TO MERAWI— ADVANCED GUARD, . I
II. MERAWI TO HAMDAB — ADVANCED POST, 21
III. HAMDAB — ORGANISATION, . . -39
IV. HAMDAB — CONCENTRATION, . . -54
V. HAMDAB TO KAB EL ABD — TOUCH OF THE ENEMY, 73
VI. KAB EL ABD TO GAMRA — RETREAT OF THE
ENEMY, . . . . . .88
VII. BIRti — HALT, AND ADVANCE OF THE ENEMY, . I07
VIII. KIRBEKAN — RECONNAISSANCE AND PREPARATION, 1 36
IX. KIRBEKAN — THE FIGHT, . . . . I52
X. THE SHUKOOK PASS, . . . . I72
XI. SALAMAT — DESTRUCTION OF SULEIMAN WAD
GAMR'S PROPERTY, . . -197
XII. HEBBEH — THE PASSAGE OF THE NILE, . .211
XIII. HEBBEH — THE SCENE OF COLONEL STEWART'S
MURDER, ..... 224
XIV. HUELLA — THE END OF THE MONASSIR COUNTRY, 234
XV. RECALL — BACK TO SALAMAT, . . . 246
XVI. RUNNING THE RAPIDS — BACK TO HAMDAB, . 265
XVII. THE BREAK-UP OF THE COLUMN — BACK TO KORTI, 285
LIST OF MAPS.
PAGE
SKETCH OF GROUND AT KIRBEKAN, . . . 170
SKETCH OF RIVER NILE AT HEBBEH, . . 232
SKETCH OF RIVER NILE, FROM MERAWI TO
HUELLA, . . . . . .At end
THE RIVER COLUMN.
CHAPTER I.
KORTI TO MERAWI ADVANCED GUARD.
On the morninef of the 24th December 24tb Dec.
^ ^ ^ 1884.
1884, I arrived at Korti, Lord Wolseley's
headquarters — having up to that time been
engaged as Deputy Adjutant and Quarter-
master General under General Sir Red vers
Buller, the chief of the staff, in the organ-
isation of the Nile Expedition. The exact
nature of Lord Wolseley s plans was not
at that time known to me ; but I knew that
his original idea of moving the whole force
by river to Berber and thence to Khartoum
A
2 KORTI TO MERAWI.
had necessarily to be abandoned, and that,
if Gordon were to be rescued within the
period we had reason to hope he could
hold out for, troops must be sent across
the desert. That this was a more or less
desperate venture, none of us could for
a moment doubt; but it had to be made,
if Gordon were to be saved ; and in
the four camel regiments, camel battery,
camel - bearer company, camel field - hos-
pital, and camel transport - companies, a
force had been specially organised for this
effort. It was not, however, till after
General BuUer's arrival at Korti, that the
exact nature of Lord Wolseley s plan was
made known to me, and the details of the
scheme had then to be worked out.
The plan, in its bare outline, was as
follows : The greater portion of the mount-
ed troops, under Sir Herbert Stewart, was
to advance across the desert from Korti to
Metemmeh, establishing fortified posts at the
wells along the route. Sir Charles Wilson
was then, with a small escort of infantry, to
ADVANCED GUARD. 3
proceed in Gordon's steamers to Khartoum,
and, having communicated with Gordon, to
return to Metemmeh. Upon his report
the future conduct of the desert column
would be framed. I do not know what
instructions Sir Herbert Stewart may have
received; but I do know that if Stewart
had not been killed, and if Wilson had
brought back word that Gordon was hold-
ing out, but in sore need, Stewart and the
troops under him were capable of forcing
their way to Gordon's assistance through
any number of the enemy. And I know
that if Wilson's report as to Gordon's
power of holding out had been favourable,
Lord Wolseley himself had intended to
join Stewart, taking with him the re-
mainder of the mounted troops and a
force of infantry.
Simultaneously with the advance of the
desert column under Stewart, a force
was to be sent by river under command
of General Earle to punish the murderers
of Colonel Stewart and of the Consuls, and
(
4 KORTI TO MERAWI.
to advance by Berber to co-operate with
Stewart's force in an attack on the Mahdi
before Khartoum, under Lord Wolseley's
personal command.
I was informed that Lord Wolseley had
selected me to be second in command of
this column and chief staff-officer to Major-
QsthDec. General Earle ; and on Christmas Day
General Duller set me free from my work
in his office — bringing in Colonel Wolse-
ley, A.A.G., to replace me — and told me
to devote my whole time to organising
General Earle's column, as Lord Wolseley
wanted me to proceed at the earliest pos-
sible date with a battalion of infantry and
a few cavalry to establish an advanced
post at Hamdab, above the portion of
river marked in the map as the Geren-
did cataract, and near the point (Dugiyet)
where the desert road from Berber strikes
the river. General Earle was at this time
at Dongola.
I had some few details to discuss with
Herbert Stewart. The cavalry of the ex-
ADVANCED GUARD. 5
peditiori — five troops — was to be evenly
divided between us ; and the Royal Engin-
eers, who had reached Korti in boats, were,
with their equipment, to be divided into two
portions — one to accompany the desert and
one the river column. We had no difficulty
in settling matters amicably.
The first battalion of the South Stafford-
shire Regiment — the battalion which had first
ascended the river in whalers — was to lead
the advance up the river. I had accom-
panied them on their start from Gemai
dockyard, above the second cataract, to
Sarras ; and had congratulated Colonel Eyre
upon the strange chance which had given
him, as the boat at the head of his column,
that bearing the number 38, the old number
of his regiment ; and knowing what a keen
soldier he was, I was glad to have him with
me now.^
In making the preparations for a start, it
^ Another curious coincidence was the fact that the first boat
taken up through the great gate of the second cataract, under
the superintendence of Colonel Butler, bore the number 69 — the
number of his old regiment, of whose "Records" he is the historian.
6 KORTI TO MERAWI.
was found that the original liberal allowance
of boat-gear with which the troops had start-
ed had been sadly reduced by the journey up
the river, and that we could not count upon
more than eight oars and two poles per
boat. And as the supplies of food brought
up by the Staffords were being taken in great
quantities for the desert column, we had
to content ourselves with thirty days* boat
rations for the present. In a memo, written
to Colonel Eyre on the 26th, authorising
an issue of soap, I said : -* In this and every
similar issue, you must impress upon your
men the necessity of economy. They have
many weeks, probably some months, of work
yet before them, and all supplies are limited
in quantity."
At this time Colonel Colvile was at Mer-
awi, or rather at Abu Dom, which is to
Merawi what Southwark is to London.
With him was the Vakeel of the Mudirieh
of Dongola, Gaudet Bey, with some 400 of
the Mudir's troops. The Mudir was sup-
posed to be collecting supplies for us ; and
ADVANCED GUARD. 7
I entered into telegraphic correspondence
with Colonel Colvile, telling him the quan-
tities of barley, dourra, dourra - stalk, and
firewood we required to be ready for us
on our arrival.
On Sunday, the 28th December, at 2 p.m., 28th Dec.
the Staffords, 545 of all ranks, entered their
fifty boats. I had issued orders previously
to the following effect : ** From the time
of leaving Korti, the company will be the
unit by which boats will work. The utmost
efforts must be made to keep companies
together. In every case an officer will be
with the last boat of the company, and it
will be his duty to urge on, and assist
where necessary, any boats of his company
which may be falling behind." Working
on this principle, the Staffords started, and
in thirty-one minutes their last boat was
under way. It was the first time that a
whole battalion had moved together, and as
it was the first forward movement beyond
Korti, it was full of interest. Two boats,
containing a detachment, 26th Company,
8 KORTI TO MERAWI.
R.E., under Captain Blackburn, left at the
same time.
29th Dec. Early on the 29th half a troop of 19th
Hussars, under Captain Aylmer, twenty-six
of all ranks, and thirty horses, marched to
overtake the Stafifords, taking with them the
horses and camels of my own party ; and
in the afternoon I started in the Monarch
steam-launch with Major Slade, D.A.A.G.,
Intelligence Department; Captain Beau-
mont, K.R.R., officer for signalling; and
D.A.C.G. Boyd, of the Commissariat.
Before starting I said good-bye to two
old friends whom I was never destined to
see again, Herbert Stewart and St Leger
Herbert. We had all served together in
South Africa, and at the storming of Seku-
kuni's fighting koppie. We had lived
together and travelled together for many a
weary league. Stewart had succeeded me
as military secretary to Lord Wolseley when
I went to join the Viceroy's staff in India.
St Leger Herbert had been my companion
on the staff in Cyprus as well. I do not
ADVANCED GUARD. 9
know which was the keener soldier of the
two. If ever a man loved fighting, it was
St Leger Herbert; and Stewart's and my
last words together were the mutually ex-
pressed hope that each of us would meet
the enemy in force, and make an end of it
in one good fight.
At 5 P.M. we overtook the Staffords and
Hussars about twenty miles from Korti, and
bivouacked for the night on the left bank
at the village of Kureir, opposite Hanneck.
The following morning, 30th, we advanced 30th Dec.
to Abu Dom. Having selected a site for our
bivouac, about half a mile above a strong
fort that had been built by native labourers
on the designs of the Vakeel, and below
which the native troops were hutted, I vis-
ited Colonel Colvile, who was living in a
grass hut on the river-bank close to the
landing-place, surrounded by groaning camels
and by natives anxious to bargain, or clam-
ouring for payment for supplies or camels
purchased for the desert column.
I now held an interview in Colonel Col-
lO KORTI TO MERAWI.
vile's hut with the Vakeel, who was living
on board a dahabeeyah close by, at which in-
terview the Turkish major commanding the
troops assisted. I told them our wants in
the matter of supplies. Many difficulties
were made, but ultimately all we wanted
was promised, both in cattle, dourra, dourra-
stalk, wood, and wheat, The exceptions
were barley and flour — the Vakeel assur-
ing me that the first was not in existence,
and the latter not to be obtained in any
large quantities, owing to the scarcity of
grindstones. This we found to be true :
there were only two large grindstones, of
the kind which are turned one upon the
other, in all the district ; the flour for the
use of each family being made by the
women of the family, by pounding or rub-
bing with a stone a small handful at a time
of wheat or dourra placed in a hollowed-
out stone. The result of the interview, in
spite of all promises, left on my mind the
conviction that Gaudet Bey and the Major
meant to be obstructive, and had no inten-
ADVANCED GUARD. II
tion of doing for us any more than they
could help ; and I gave the Vakeel to under-
stand that we must have what we wanted,
and that the military commander must now
reign supreme.
Colvile, Slade, and I then proceeded up
the river in the picket-boat, with a view to
selecting a camping-ground at Belal ; but,
finding we should not have time to get so
far, we returned to Abu Dom. Immediately
on our return we were informed that a mes-
senger from Gordon had arrived, and that
the Vakeel had telegraphed the fact to the
Mudir. As this was in direct opposition
to the instructions given by me in the morn-
ing, that no telegrams were to be sent un-
less first submitted to Colonel Colvile, I
sent for the Vakeel ; and on my saying I
must report him to Lord Wolseley, he re-
plied that he did not care — he was not Lord
Wolseley s Vakeel. As I found that he
had not collected the supplies which he had
promised to collect on the opposite bank
for our troops, and had replied, when asked
12 KORTI TO MERAWI.
about it, that he had not time to discuss the
matter, I telegraphed to General Duller that
I thought we should do better to send the
Vakeel away, and appoint the Kasheef of
Belal, Mohammed Effendi Wad Kenaish, to
act in his place. The same night I received
a telegram from General Duller saying that
a very civil message had been sent to the
Vakeel requesting him to come to Korti,
and one from Sir C. Wilson, asking me to
tell the Vakeel that Lord Wolseley wished
to consult him on matters of importance,
and begged he would go there by the
picket-boat next day.
I then saw the messenger from Gordon.
He was a man who had been sent by
Colvile with a letter from Lord Wolseley;
and he brought back that now historical
letter of three words, " Khartoum all right,
14th December, C. G. Gordon.'* He told
me that when he left K hartoum all was well
there, and that provisions were sufficient,
though not plentiful. On his way back he
had remained six days in the Mahdi's camp.
ADVANCED GUARD. 13
Sickness was prevalent among the enemy,
but there was no lack of food. He told me
that Hashm el Moos was at Wady Bishara
on the 2 1 St December with three steamers,
having loaded two steamers with provisions
and sent them to Khartoum. He then added
in great secrecy that Gordon had confided
to him a message that we were to come
quickly, — not to divide our force or leave
Berber behind, but to take Berber and come
by the right bank.
That night of bivouac was rendered
hideous by the Mudir's troops. They had
a semicircle of sentries from the fort to
the river enclosing their huts and Colvile s
camels ; and they shouted the equivalent of
" alFs well " without cessation. Each sentry
had a number, and as soon as No. i had
called out "No. i, all's well," No. 2
shouted " No. 2, all's well," and so on till
the last number was reached, when No. i
began again. This continued through the
whole night. Colvile was used to it, and
did not mind.
14 KORTI TO MERAWI.
31st Dec. On the morning of the 31st the Vakeel
and Gordon's messenger went ofif together
to Korti in the Monarch picket -boat,
Lieutenant Tyler, R.N., who was in charge,
having great difficulty in carrying out his
orders to keep them apart. I informed
General Duller that I had appointed
Mohammed Wad Kenaish to act in the
Vakeel's place, instead of the major whom
the Vakeel had named ; and was instructed
in reply that I should have accepted the
deputy appointed by the Vakeel, and that
my action amounted to taking the govern-
ment of the country into our hands, which
was not desirable. It was proposed to
admonish the Vakeel seriously, and send
him back. I urged by telegraph his not
being sent back ; but was informed that it
would not do to start in one portion of the
Mudirieh a policy different from that prevail-
ing elsewhere. I vainly represented that
part of this portion of the Mudirieh was in
rebellion, and taxes could not be collected ;
that the Vakeel confessed himself unable to
ADVANCED GUARD. 1 5
punish the persons who cut the telegraph;
that, according to the Vakeel, El Zain, with
some of the Mahdi's dervishes, was at
Hamdab, and that these were reasons why
the military authority should be paramount
here. I only found that I was uselessly
kicking against the pricks. Lord Wolseley
did not consider any of my reasons sufficient,
and I was told the Vakeel would be sent
back with General Earle.^
Meanwhile, throughout the day the Staf-
fords with their boats had been employed
in bringing over to the left bank the sup-
plies collected in the Shoona or Gov-
ernment store on the right bank. Had
. I passed on, leaving the supplies in the
Shoona, the bringing them over to the left
bank might have been indefinitely post-
poned ; and in the present temper of the
Mudir's authorities, I did not feel sure
the supplies would ever reach us. I con-
sidered it important to show that we meant
^ The Vakeel afterwards told Colonel Colvile and myself that
he was at this time acting under orders from the Mudir of
Dongola to give us as little help as possible.
i
l6 KORTI TO MERAWI.
to have what we wanted, and were cap-
able of helping ourselves, if need be;
and this action had an undoubtedly good
effect.
In the course of the day I presented Said
Hassan, the Sheikh of Amri Island and
King of Zowarah, with a robe of honour in
Lord Wolseley s name. This monarch had
joined the Shagiyeh in rebellion against the
Egyptians in the previous summer, and had
been badly wounded in the arm when fight-
ing against the Mudir s troops at Korti.
He had since thought better of it; and
when, shortly before, Suleiman Wad Gamr
had sent to his island to bring him to Birti,
he had, according to his own story, escaped
and fled to us. This noble conduct I had
been instructed to reward in what was
certainly a conspicuous manner; for when
the old gentleman was clothed in a scarlet
cloth robe, a crimson fez, a sword very much
gilt with sundry gorgeous tassels, and a pair
of red slippers, he was as like a monkey on
a barrel-organ as anything I ever saw. But
ADVANCED GUARD. 17
he was a king, and the act I had been per-
forming was one with which every reader of
the Scriptures is familiar. King Said's first
act was to beg for money for himself and his
ragged retinue, and to try to drive as hard
a bargain with me as he could. I promised
him finally a pound a-day for himself and
his followers, provided he would help us
with labour and supplies when we reached
his country — payment to be contingent on
results. He never was of the slightest use
to us; and as, when we returned to Abu
Dom, he did not hesitate to return among
the rebels, I have little doubt that he had
only followed the traditionary policy of the
Soudanese sheikhs, to have some of a fam-
ily on each side in a war, so that, which-
ever side wins, there may be some in power
to intercede for those on the beaten side.
In fact, so well is this policy recognised
among them, that the members of the
family who have been on the wrong side
are thought none the worse of for their
apparent treason.
B
1 8 KORTI TO MERAWI.
About seven o'clock in the evening, tele-
graphic communication with Korti was in-
terrupted. I did not learn this till nearly
nine, and then at once sent out an officer
of Engineers with a few Hussars and a
native linesman to repair the line. They re-
turned about 2.30 A.M., having found it cut
about eight miles from our camp, and traces
of camels leading into the desert. They
had repaired the line,
istjan. On New Year's Day the Staffords con-
tinued and completed the work of bringing
over the supplies from the Shoona ; and I
rode with Major Slade and Captain Beau-
mont about eight miles, to Belal, at the foot
of the Gerendid cataract, and selected a
bivouac. On the way we passed close to
a remarkable cluster of pyramids, many
of which have crumbled away into gravel
mounds, a few retaining their pyramidal
form. Their bases are buried, but not
deep, in the sand, and the highest stands
about sixty feet above the present level.
They stand in irregular rows. They are
1885.
ADVANCED GUARD, 19
made of blocks of pudding-stone, of which
there is a laige quantity in the neighbour-
hood, faced with one layer of blocks of
sandstone. No native has the vaguest idea
of their age. They are undoubtedly tombs ;
their neighbourhood has been used as a
graveyard from time inmiemorial, and is
so now. I inquired at Belal if any curios-
ities, scaraba&i, clay figures, or antiquities of
any sort were ever found there, offering to
purchase them at a good price; but was
assured nothing had ever been found. On
the opposite bank of the river, about equally
distant from its present bed, stands another
cluster of similar pyramids near the hill
known as Jebel Barkal, in which a temple
is hewn.
On New Year's night we dined outside
Colonel Colvile's hut In addition to the
menu furnished by our rations, we had eggs
and chickens, pumpkin, and a plum-pudding,
a most delicious melon, a bottle of cham-
pagne, and a tot of whisky. The English
mail arrived bringing us letters and Christ-
I
20 KORTI TO MERAWI.
mas cards, and we sat up till late, speculat-
ing on what the year would bring forth.
Then saying good-bye to Colvile, we of the
river column sought our beds on the soft,
clean, yellow sand by the side of the sleep-
ing troops.
21
CHAPTER II.
MERAWI TO HAMDAB — ADVANCED POST.
On the morning of the 2d, at six o'clock, 2djan.
the Staffords moved off in their boats, the
Hussars covering the advance along the
bank. They arrived at Belal in the after-
noon. Slade, with an escort, rode over to
Hamdab to select a camping-ground for our
concentration; the rest of our party re-
mained at Belal. The Kasheef, Mohammed
Wad Kenaish, brought us excellent wheaten
cakes, honey, and melons, with milk both
sweet and sour, in which latter condition
only the natives seem to drink it. The
people brought dates and milk and bread
for sale to the troops.
Slade received information that there
22 MERAWI TO HAMDAB.
were about 600 rebels at Birti, under
Moussa, the son of Abu Hegel, sheikh of
the Robatab tribe. Moussa, it was reported,
had been made an Emir by the Mahdi, and
was anxious to advance towards Hamdab.
Suleiman Wad Gamr, sheikh of the Mon-
assir tribe, was said to have objected to this
advance, and to have left Birti on the 29th
December with the intention of proceeding to
Berber, and reporting the matter to Moham-
med el Kheir, the Mahdi's Emir of Berber.
We also learnt the particulars of a raid
which had been made much nearer to us on
the last day of the year, and of which we
had received information at Abu Dom. El
Zain, a well known robber chief, with forty
followers, had raided from the wells of El
Koua, thirty miles out on the road from
Dugiyet to Berber, and had captured nearly
200 camels which were grazing in the desert
about two hours* march from the river. A
large number of these camels belonged to
the Kasheef of Belal.
We were now, it appeared, really begin-
ADVANCED POST. 23
ning to approach a hostile country. Thirty
miles in front of us was a force of Mon-
assir and Robatab ready to fight, under a
commander who wanted to lead them on ;
and thirty miles on our right flank was a
famous raider with a number of followers
more bold than numerous. We had been
so long sitting still without a prospect of a
fight, that we had begun almost to disbelieve
in the possibility of one ; but our prospects
were apparently brightening.
We had a pleasant enough spot for our
bivouac, with good anchorage, and a grove
of palm-trees close by. But we noticed
that the desert had now become rocky, and
the rocks came close down to the river.
The fine open sandy plain, so favourable
for the development of modern infantry
fire, so fatal to the Arab rush, had disap-
peared. We had entered into the region of
rocks and cataracts, that we were to carry
with us almost to the furthest limits of
«
the country of the Monassir.
On the 3d we again advanced, our lead- adjan.
24 MERAWI TO HAMDAB,
ing boats reaching their camping-ground at
Hamdab at one o'clock, and the last boat
closing up to them by two ; and this in spite
of Omar, the sheikh of Duaim, whom we had
chartered as a pilot, running Colonel Eyre's
boat on a rock. We found no cataract,
only a very rapid stream between rocks,
against which the men were able to row.
And so the Gerendid cataract,^ of which we
had a picture in the Intelligence Depart-
ment publications, did not exist ; and we
began to congratulate ourselves on the
prospect of an easy ascent to Berber.
News reached us that a party of fifty
dervishes (the generic name for the Mahdi's
followers, dressed in his patchwork uniform)
was on the right bank opposite Ooli Is-
land ; and that El Zain at El Koua had been
reinforced by forty men from Berber. We
were now beyond Dugiyet, and the point,
marked by a solitary dom-palm, where the
chief desert -track from Berber strikes the
^ No native of the district had ever heard this name. The
local name is the rapids of Hajar Oolad Gurbar.
ADVANCED POST. 25
Nile. Under these circumstances the wells
of El Koua and Bir Sani became an im-
portant point for our consideration, as the
raid made towards the river might at any
time be repeated, and our convoys from
Abu Dom, of which the first arrived to-day,
might be molested. But my handful of
cavalry was too small to attempt any coun-
terstroke in that direction, and I tele-
graphed to Korti asking for more cavalry,
and expressing the desire that the Mudir's
troops, whom I had been directed not to
move, should cross the river, and encamp
on the opposite bank to us, so as to prevent
small parties of dervishes, such as we were
informed were near Ooli Island, firing
across the river into our camp at night.
Not liking the camp selected by Slade, 4th Jan.
I rode out on the morning of the 4th and
chose another site about a mile farther
up stream, with good anchorage, and an
excellent position for a small defensive
work, on the site of an old mud fort placed
on a rocky spur jutting out into the Nile,
26 MERAWI TO HAMDAB.
and commanding the river and the camp.
We then rode on to Jebel Kulgeili, about
five miles to the front, and ascended the
mountain. From it we could see for many
miles in every direction; but only about
three miles of actual river were visible
beyond the mountain, as the islands over-
lap and close the view near Ooli Island.
We could see enough, however, to assure
us that there was nothing to stop the boats*
progress from Hamdab to Ooli.
As far as Belal we had been travelling
through a rich country with much cultiva-
tion ; at Belal, as already stated, the rocks
came down to near the river, and from
Belal to Hamdab but little cultivation ex-
isted. Beyond Hamdab the amount of
cultivation still further diminished, and the
people, who up to Hamdab had been friend-
ly, became more shy, several houses being
deserted. But from Kulgeili to Ooli
there was not a sign of life. One or two
strips of neglected cultivation existed, but
every hovel was deserted. Hamdab marked
ADVANCED POST. 27
the limits of territory within which the
Mudir had collected taxes since the re-
bellion began ; and those beyond that limit,
not having paid taxes, had doubtless guilty
consciences, and the fear bred thereof. We
read, however, to those of them whom we
could assemble between Belal and Kulgeili,
Lord Wolseley's proclamation of friendli-
ness to the Shagiyeh, and left copies of it
with them.
In the afternoon General Earle arrived
with his aide-de-camp, Lieut. St Aubyn, and
Brigade-Major, Major Boyle, and assumed
command. He brought with him Lord Wol-
seley's instructions, which had been shown
to me before leaving Korti. In them he was
informed that his force was to consist of —
One squadron 19th Hussars;
The Staffordshire Regiment ;
The Royal Highlanders ;
The Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry;
The Gordon Highlanders ;
A battery of Egyptian Artillery ;
The Egyptian Camel Corps ;
28 MERAWI TO HAMDAB.
Headquarters and 300 camels of the
nth Transport Company ;
and that in addition another regiment would
be placed at his disposal to form posts between
Merawi and Abu Hamed. He was to con-
centrate at Abu Hamed, and advance thence
as soon as he had collected a hundred days*
supplies per man. Major Rundle, who had
a large quantity of rations at Korosko, had
undertaken to have a convoy of supplies at
Abu Hamed four days after General Earle's
arrival there. After filling up with supplies
at Abu Hamed, General Earle was to ad-
vance upon Berber; and having secured
that place, to endeavour to forward as
many supplies as possible to the force
which would have proceeded by land to
Khartoum. A portion of the Mudir*s
troops was told off to accompany General
Earle's force. He might use them as he
thought fit, but it was suggested he should
employ them to collect supplies in the
Monassir country. He was to treat all
tribes as friends (except the Monassir) if
ADVANCED POST. 29
they would meet his advances; if not, he
was to enforce his demands. The Mon-
assir were only to be treated as friends if
they would give up the murderers of Colo-
nel Stewart and his party. He was to
occupy Abu Hamed and Berber, and such
other places as might be necessary for the
safety of his line ; and to consider it of
first importance to place 75,000 rations at
Shendy at the disposal of the force operat-
ing by the desert as quickly as possible.
To the above military instructions some
political instructions were added for Gene-
ral Earle in his dealings with the various
tribes. The sheikhs, he was told, might be
informed that the English policy was, in the
first place, to restore peace and tranquillity
to the country, and then to establish some
form of native government which would be
acceptable to the people. The English
Government did not intend to interfere
with the property or just rights of any one.
All persons wishing to submit, with the
exception of the murderers of Colonel
4
30 MERAWI TO HAM DAB.
Stewart and his party, and their accom-
plices, would be well received and pardoned
if they gave in their submission at once;
but those persisting in rebellion would re-
ceive the punishment they deserved.
For the better carrying out of these in-
structions, letters in Arabic, addressed to
the sheikhs of the various tribes, had been
prepared ; and General Earle was in-
structed, before entering each district, to
send one of these letters to the sheikh or
tribe to whom it was addressed. A special
proclamation, offering a reward for the ap-
prehension of Suleiman Wad Gamr and
Fakri Wad Etman, the instigator and per-
petrator of Stewart*s murder, was to be
circulated only when it should be known
that Suleiman Wad Gamr had fled.
In the course of the afternoon a telegram
arrived, instructing the General that he was
not to advance beyond Hamdab until he
could do so with his whole force. Lord
Wolseley also wished him to avoid recon-
naissances as much as possible, — deprecat-
ADVANCED POST. 31
ing reconnaissances from a stationary force,
as the reconnoitrers must in the end re-
tire to their force, and such a retirement is
often magnified by natives into a defeat;
and as it was of importance to prevent any
opening being given for such a rumour.
On the 5th January Major Flood marched sth Jan.
into camp with a troop and a half of Hussars,
completing the squadron to 9 1 sabres ; and
the troops were employed preparing the
newly selected camp. We were now nine-
teen miles from the telegraph station at
Abu Dom ; but there was lying along the
ground between us, and in the river at
Merawi, much wire belonging to the old
Berber line, which had crossed the desert
from Dugiyet, and Lieutenant Stuart, R.E.,
was already at work getting poles cut and
erected by native labour. Meanwhile we
had established a daily camel -post with
Abu Dom; and to-day we received by it
the welcome news from General BuUer
that Herbert Stewart had successfully estab-
lished posts at Gakdul and Howeiyet, had
32 MERAWI TO HAMDAB.
found plenty of water, grass, and firewood,
and would return with the convoy to-day.
His expedition to Gakdul, we were told,
had been a complete surprise. No oppo-
sition had been offered, and he had cap-
tured several prisoners.
6th Jan. On the 6th, in a most unpleasant dust-
storm, the troops moved into their new
camp. A market was at once established ;
and the natives brought in a fair supply
of milk, dates, dourra-bread, and other pro-
ducts of the country. So well satisfied
with our treatment of them were the na-
tives, that several of them afterwards fol-
lowed us up the country, bringing dates to
sell. Three of these met with their death
at the hands of some Monassir, near Kir-
bekan, a few days after the action there.
The daily record from this date to the
23d January would have but little general
interest. The troops for the column con-
tinued to arrive at Abu Dom and Ham-
dab; and we were busily occupied in per-
fecting our arrangements for the advance.
ADVANCED POST. 33
The organisation of our force necessitated
my making one trip to Korti, and several
to Abu Dom ; and General Earle had to
go once to Abu Dom to bring the Vakeel
to book. Of that organisation I propose
to speak in the next chapter.
Only one or two matters of external in-
terest occurred during this period. The
sheikh of Ooli, or rather a younger brother
of the sheikh, stating that the sheikh was
lame and unable to walk, came into our
camp and asked for the protection promised
under Lord Wolseley's proclamation to the
Shagiyeh. This he was promised on con-
dition that he helped us to obtain supplies.
At 1.45 A.M. on the 13th, a report arrived 13th jan,
from Col vile, saying that Omar, the sheikh
of Duaim, whom we had employed as a
pilot for a short time, but subsequently dis-
missed as incompetent, had met two men
at Belal, who stated that they had accom-
panied a force of 1000 men from Berber to
the wells of Bak, half-way between Bir Sani
and El Koua ; that the force was armed with
34 MERAWI TO HAMDAB.
rifles, and had a great quantity of ammu-
nition, and that it was intended to attack
our camp in the early morning. Cavalry
patrols were at once sent out in the direc-
tion of the Berber road, and other military
precautions taken. Nothing came of it;
and when traced to its source, the rumour
appeared to be a concoction of Omar's own,
based upon the fact that two men had
arrived at Belal from Bir Sani, bringing the
news of a reinforcement of 50 men to El
Zain, and a report of a force of 1000 men
having marched from Berber, under Abdul
Majid Wad el Lekalik, to reinforce the
enemy at Birti.
It was, however, evident that unless
something were done to stop El Zain,
rumours of this sort would occur from time
to time ; and General Earle decided to ask
Lord Wolseley*s permission to make a raid
upon this cluster of w^lls. The permis-
sion being accorded, it was decided to make
the raid shortly before our advance up the
river, allowing only sufficient time for the
ADVANCED POST. 35
horses to have a couple of days* rest after-
wards. Accordingly, on the 17th January 17th jan.
the Egyptian Camel Regiment, with twenty
camels of the Egyptian battery, carrying
all the available camel water-tins, were
brought from Abu Dom to Hamdab, it
being given out that the water-tanks were
being brought up to be overhauled by the
Engineers ; and orders were issued that on
Sunday the i8th the General would inspect
the Engineers, the Hussars, and the Camel
Corps in fighting order, with two days*
rations, water, &c., as if ready to march
into action. Major Flood, 19th Hussars,
who was to command the party, and Major
Slade, of the Intelligence Department, were
taken into the secret. No one else but
General Earle and myself had an inkling
of what was intended.
Our information was to the effect that
the wells of El Koua, where great numbers
of cattle and camels of the Monassir were
said to be, were seven hours distant (this
time would not represent more than twenty-
36 MERAWI TO HAMDAB.
eight miles) ; that the wells of Bir Sani
were some two hours farther on, with the
wells of Bak intervening ; and that El Zain,
with a party of dervishes, variously esti-
mated at from lOO to 150, lived, with their
flocks and herds, and the camels they had
captured, on a hill called Jebel Katete,
about two miles from Bir Sani, coming down
to the wells for water.
Major Flood's instructions were to pro-
ceed with the Hussars (about 60 sabres)
and Camel Corps (about 90 rifles) to the
wells of El Koua, and, if possible, to Bak
and Bir Sani, to surprise the Arabs, take
them prisoners, burn their dwellings, and
capture their camels and cattle. He was
instructed to strike a blow at El Zain if
possible, but not to be drawn into a serious
engagement ; and it was left to his judgment
whether he would proceed beyond El Koua.
Major Slade procured a guide, and was
placed at Major Flood's disposal.
i8th Jan. The parade was held on Sunday at i p.m.
The Engineers, having been inspected, were
ADVANCED POST. 37
dismissed. The mounted troops were told
the General would inspect them after a
short march ; and they moved off into the
desert, striking into a khor which led them
by a short cut into the Berber- Dugiyet
road, some five miles from Dugiyet The
secret had been well kept in camp. But it
must have got out — probably through the
guide, who has since joined the Mahdi — for
there on the road were the unmistakable
traces of the recent passage of a camel
from Dugiyet in the direction of the wells.
Flood marched till near midnight, and then
halted about eight miles short of El Koua.
He started again at 4 a.m., and reached a 19th Jan.
cultivated khor (El Koua), where he found
traces of hasty flight, but no cattle or
camels. The wells gave barely sufficient
water for thirty horses; the water he had
with him was little more than enough for
the men. The distance he had already
travelled he estimated at thirty-five miles.
He pushed on three miles to the end of
the cultivated khor^ where the rocks closed
38 MERAWI TO HAMDAB.
in and the ground became bad for cavalry ;
and then, considering the distance and the
scarcity of water, he considered it advisable
not to go farther; burned some of the
Monassir huts, carried off some grain, and
returned the same night to Hamdab.
The raid had not had the result hoped
for; but it was sufficient to keep El Zain
quiet as long as we were anywhere within
striking distance of El Koua.
39
CHAPTER III.
HAMDAB — ORGANISATION.
The chief care of a General in the organ- sth to 23d
isation of a force for active service is to ^'
ensure to his troops a sufficient supply
of food and ammunition. This requires
a sufficiency of transport, which again re-
quires food for the transport animals. It
may be assumed, as a general rule, that
troops start properly clothed and armed, so
that a supply of clothing and arms is only
required when an expedition is likely to be
prolonged.
When a General has secured for his troops
the reasonable certainty of the necessary food
and ammunition, he is at liberty to turn his
mind to other questions of organisation, fore-
40 HAM DAB.
most in importance among which is the care
of his sick and wounded, and, in all ordinary
expeditions, the evacuation of the sick and
wounded from his field-hospitals to hospitals
upon the line of communication. It may
safely be said that these questions require
far more time and elaboration of detail than
the strategical and tactical questions ; and
the system now prevailing in all European
armies is to give to a General in command
of an expedition a Chief of the Staff, who re-
lieves him of this detail, and of all the minor
details of camp routine, leaving the General
in command free to weigh the value of the
reports made by his intelligence department,
and to decide by what means, strategical
and tactical, he can obtain the greatest ad-
vantage over his enemy. This system
ensures to the General in command time for
thought, relief from small worrying cares,
and leisure to mature his plans of campaign
and of battle.
In the present case, the river column
had some peculiar advantages in its favour,
ORGANISATION. 41
and some peculiar disadvantages to contend
with. In the first and great matter of food
for the troops, we were certain of its not
failing for nearly three months. All our
infantry leaving Korti brought one hundred
days* food per man in their boats, — food,
supposed to be of the best quality, specially
prepared and packed in England. All
other troops coming up in boats brought
as many days* supply as they could carry,
in addition to loads of material for their
special services. Every effort was made
to economise these supplies by obtaining
cattle and native flour. Troops leaving
Korti brought with them **way rations"
sufficient to last to Abu Dom. There
native bakers supplied them with bread
baked from native flour, and fresh meat
was killed for them. On arrival at Ham-
dab, they found a commissariat bakery,
which we established immediately on ar-
rival, by building four ovens in the river
bank, each able to turn out nearly six hun-
dred loaves a-day ; and a cattle depot, which
42 HAM DAB.
was kept supplied by local purchase. We
were thus enabled to start from Hamdab
with our supplies of biscuit and preserved
meat almost untouched.
As originally intended in the orders given
to General Earle, when he left Korti at the
beginning of the year, we were to have a
battalion of infantry for the special purpose
of forming posts between Abu Dom and
Abu Hamed, which would have greatly
facilitated the forwarding of convoys of
cattle after the column from Abu Dom ;
15th jto. but on the 15th, fresh orders were received
to the effect that it would not be possible to
give to General Earle a fifth battalion to
occupy posts, that the General of communi-
cation would not establish any line of com-
munication beyond Abu Dom, and that the
river force was to be a flying column. We
should therefore have to depend for food
upon the supplies we could take with us
from Abu Dom, upon whatever we could
buy or capture in the country we were about
to enter, and upon the promised convoy
ORGANISATION. 43
from Korosko, which was to meet us at
Abu Hamed.
But we had not only to consider how to
supply the European troops with food. We
had to supply some 200 Egyptian troops,
and 1 50 natives, mostly Aden camel-drivers,
and to feed about 150 horses and 530 camels.
The Egyptian soldiers. Camel Corps, and
Artillery, agreed without a murmur to their
ration being confined to i lb. meat and i lb.
flour, if they were allowed a small sum, which
was settled at half a piastre (about ijE^^d.)
daily, to supplement their ration by the pur-
chase of vegetables or any native delicacy.
The Aden camel-drivers also consented to
forego their authorised ration of sugar, salt,
and tea or coffee ; so that we were enabled
to reserve all our groceries for the Euro-
pean troops and Egyptian officers.
The horses — Egyptian cavalry horses —
which had been handed over to the 19th
Hussars atWady Haifa, and the ponies of the
staff and regimental officers, were in hard
serviceable condition ; but to keep them in
I
44 HAMDAB.
condition, they must not be reduced below
their ration of lo lb. of grain daily, to be
supplemented by such green forage as could
be procured. And this meant 1500 lb. of
grain daily, or five camel -loads ; for we
found that 300 lb. is as heavy a load as
camels in good condition will, on the aver-
age, carry for several days in succession.
The Camel Corps and the Artillery had
sufficient regimental transport to carry six
days* rations for themselves, and six days*
forage, at a daily ration of 8 lb. of grain for
each camel ; but all the grain for horses, all
further reserve of grain for the Egyptian
camels, and all the grain for the Eleventh
Transport Company, had to be carried by the
350 camels of that company, which had also
to carry their own European staff, with their
kits, the kits of the Aden drivers, the equip-
ment of the Hussars, certain headquarter
baggage and office material, a large number
of iron water-tanks — brought up in case we
should be compelled to make a flanking
movement to turn a position by the desert,
— and all the flour for the native troops. We
ORGANISATION. 45
were fairly well off for transport; but we
were going into an enemy*s country, where
no supplies were likely to be forthcoming
by purchase. It was said to be a very
barren country also, and we must anticipate
that the small store of grain kept by the
natives would be either carried off or con-
cealed, so that it was a matter of vital im-
portance to take the utmost possible quan-
tity of flour and grain with us.
As it was, we were enabled to start from
Hamdab, taking 24th February as the day
from which the start was made, with the
following supplies : about eighty-five days'
boat rations for the whole European force,
with the exception of sugar and salt, of
which we were on very short rations
throughout. The ration of sugar was re-
duced even before we left Hamdab from
two and a half to one and a half ounces ;
and the ration of salt was reduced to a
quarter of an ounce, and only issued on
days when fresh meat was served out.
This quantity of eighty-five days' supply
was what was represented by the number of
46 HAM DAB.
cases of the various kinds of food ; but, be-
fore leaving Hamdab, we had become aware
that in certain items, especially biscuit, pre-
served vegetables, rice, oatmeal, and to-
bacco, considerable deductions must be
made for goods damaged by water, owing
to defective packing, or rather defective
closing of the tin cases, and to the exposure
to wet to which large quantities of cases had
been subject in leaky or damaged boats on
the way from Sarras to Korti. We estimated
the probable loss in biscuit alone at thirty
per cent, almost all the " cabin biscuit "
being bad ; and accordingly we arranged
that the convoy from Korosko was to bring
to Abu Hamed supplies in the following
proportions : meat, tea, lime-juice, pepper,
one ration each ; preserved vegetables, one
and a half; biscuit, sugar, and salt, two
rations each. The great loss in sugar and
salt was due chiefly to their having been
packed in bags, not waterproof, which had
become wet; and partly, especially in sugar,
to thefts by natives at the various portages
ORGANISATION. 47
along our long line of communication from
Alexandria to Korti.
For the natives we started with sixty
days' supply of flour, and forty days' supply
of unground wheat, which could either be
converted into flour, or be used for the
horses, if the supply of grain should fail.
We hoped to collect cattle and sheep, or to
get these sent up after us, in sufficient num-
bers to supply the natives daily with fresh
meat ; and as a matter of fact, that supply
did not fail us till we had reached Hebbeh, a
month after our start : up to that date we
were successful in supplying all the troops
with fresh meat, and our preserved meat
was almost untouched.
For the horses we started with nearly
forty days* grain. More could not be car-
ried for want of transport The camels,
it was evident from the first, must go short
of grain, and subsist on the growing for-
age, unless we could obtain grain in large
quantities from the country we were about
to enter.
48 HAM DAB.
For firewood we must trust to the local
supply for the day's wants : our transport
would not admit of our carrying on from
each bivouac more than sufficient for the
following day's needs, both boats and camels
being loaded up with full loads.
Such was our provision for the feeding of
the troops and animals. As regards am-
munition, each gun had a hundred rounds,
and about 280 rounds for every rifle was
carried in the boats.
Our transport was in good condition.
The boats, in spite of their rough work on
the way up, were serviceable. They had
mostly been overhauled at Korti. Many of
them bore honourable scars in the shape
of tin patches, and there was rather a lack
of paint, but they were fit for work. Our
camels were in sound, serviceable order,
and their saddles were in good condition.
The next work which demanded atten-
tion was the organisation for the care of the
sick and wounded. The material for a field-
hospital of 200 beds had already been for-
ORGANISATION. 49
warded to Abu Dom ; but it was manifest
to me, upon a cursory inspection, that it
was upon a scale unsuited for our river ex-
pedition. Twenty hospital marquees were
luxuries that we could not afford to carry ;
meat -covers and meat - skewers, however
valuable elsewhere, were out of place here ;
large pewter measures and beer-taps still
more so, in a land where no beer is. Pairs
of bellows might possibly be useful, though
it was doubtful ; but coffee-mills could not
help us, where there was no coffee. Sheets
and pillows might be of great comfort, but
they could only be taken in such small
quantities as to be available for the worst
cases; and so on through a long list, includ-
ing blue waistcoats and trousers. In fact,
all superfluous gear, to use the sailors* fa-
vourite word, must be abandoned — sacrificed
to the stern necessity of utilising every par-
ticle of available transport for the carriage
of food and ammunition.
Accordingly, I visited Korti, and there
saw Surgeon-General 0*Nial, the principal
D
so HAMDAB.
medical ofificer of the expedition, and Sur-
geon-Major Harvey, who was selected as
senior medical officer of the river column.
They met me in the fairest way. I agreed,
on General Earle's part, to give them one
boat for each of the eight sections of the
field - hospital, and a ninth boat for the
senior medical officer, in which he could
take extra comforts for the sick, and to
furnish a sufficient number of men to make
up, with the men of the Medical Staff
Corps, crews for the boats. I undertook
that, if tentage was necessary, it should be
provided from the tents carried by the
troops in their boats. They agreed to
reduce the equipment, so that each section
for twenty-five patients should be carried
in one boat — a few luxuries such as con-
densed milk, champagne, lime-juice, &c.,
being carried by the senior medical officer.
Surgeon-Major Harvey proceeded to Abu
Dom, and superintended the revision of the
equipment, and its stowage in the whalers ;
the crews for the whalers were sent down
ORGANISATION. $1
from Hamdab. And throughout the cam-
paign, two sections of this field-hospital
accompanied each infantry battalion.
The resources of the field-hospital were
made available to the utmost by the aban-
donment of all rules of red tape. Medical
officers of corps were granted the power of
admission to and discharge from the hos-
pital, and were authorised to draw from the
field - hospital at all times whatever was
wanted to keep their regimental medical
equipment complete.
We had no means, nor was there time at
our disposal, for forming a bearer company
to carry wounded out of action ; but it was
arranged that the eight stretchers of each
battalion should accompany the battalion
into action, carried by the bandsmen of the
battalion. Each corps was to carry its own
sick in its own boats, and the sick of
mounted corps were to be carried in the
boats of the battalion to which they were
attached for rations. For it is one of the
penalties of a flying column that it must
4
£2 HAMDAB.
carry forward with it, and cannot leave be-
hind or send back, its sick and wounded.
A paymaster was sent to us with about
;^ 1 0,000 in money. We spent about
;^I500 in buying supplies, in native labour,
&c., before leaving Hamdab ; but from that
time forward Major Mackie, our paymaster,
had an easy time, for money was useless
in an arid desert where there were no
sellers and nothing to buy.
A veterinary surgeon accompanied the
transport.
Only a few days before we left Hamdab,
the telegraph was extended to an office in
our fort there. This was a great boon, as
it saved much time and labour hitherto
expended in sending our messages to and
receiving them from Abu Dom, nineteen
miles away. The country was quite im-
practicable for heliographic signalling, ow-
ing to the absence of marked high hills,
and the presence of a succession of low
ridges.
Before the 24th of January a number of
ORGANISATION. 53
Canadian voyageurs joined the column, and
were distributed among the battalions and
corps in boats ; and a boat-repairing party,
under Lieutenant Kenney, R.E., arrived
with repairing material. Its two boats'
crews were from that moment almost in-
cessantly at work.
While the work of organisation was
going on. General Earle, with his own
hand, drew up a series of rules for the
movement of the troops in boats, for em-
barkations and disembarkations, for the
bivouac, and for precautions on the march.
He also designed special tactical formations
for the march, with a view to rapidly pass-
ing from column into square, and square
into column. These memoranda, together
with others drawn up on the system of
supply during the advance, and the medical
arrangements for the troops, were circu-
lated ; and during our stay at Hamdab, the
troops were frequently practised by General
Earle, in the tactical formations he had
devised, over the very roughest ground.
54
CHAPTER IV.
HAMDAB CONCENTRATION.
sthto23d It seemed at one time, during the earlier
portion of our period of concentration at
Hamdab, that the necessities of the desert
column, on which so much depended,
would seriously cripple us of the river
route. Colonel Burnaby had been pro-
mised to us ; and General Earle had hoped
to have him for the command of the
6th Jan. mounted troops; but on the 6th January
General BuUer telegraphed, " I must steal
Burnaby. I do not know who else is to
8th Jan. command Metemmeh." On the 8th General
BuUer still counted on sending^ us the West
Kent Regiment, to take up posts on our
9th Jan. line of communications ; but on the 9th the
CONCENTRATION. 55
first note of alarm to us was sounded.
" Every endeavour/' General Duller wrote,
" will be made to complete the infantry of
your force up to lOO days' rations per man
before they start; but it is possible the
difficulties of transport may make it almost
impossible to do this within a reasonable
time. It is desirable, therefore, for you to
consider whether it may not be possible
for you to advance, say two battalions of
infantry and a portion of your artillery
and mounted men, through the Monassir
country to Abu Hamed, and so open the
line of supply from Korosko." In this
case, General Earle was to keep touch
of his rear battalions ; the Mudir's troops
assisting him to do this by occupying the
Monassir country; and he was reminded
that for the present his main objective was
the capture of Berber, and that for this
purpose he must concentrate his force.
To this minute General Earle replied loth Jan.
that he should be prepared to advance with
two battalions and the mounted troops as
#
S6 HAM DAB.
soon as he had two battalions of infantry
complete with lOO days* supply, together
with the portion of the transport company
allotted to his column, by which time he
hoped to have collected forage for the
animals and food for the Egyptian troops.
He considered all his small force of
mounted troops should accompany his ad-
vanced brigade, and he did not propose to
divide them, as opposition was to be ex-
pected to that brigade in the Monassir
country. He wished the Mudir's troops to
march parallel to us upon the right bank,
and to be ready to occupy the Monassir
country as soon as he had defeated the
Monassir tribe. He asked for two com-
panies of a regiment from the line of com-
munications to occupy Hamdab and a post
in the Monassir country; and in that case
anticipated no military difificulty for the
troops following the leading brigade, mov-
ing in half - battalions. General Earle
trusted that before he moved, his naval
boat, with a Gardner gun, his boat officers
COXCENTRATIOX. 57
and vo)-ageurs, and boat - repairing party
might have reached his camp. He urged,
also, that his commissariat staff should be
prompdy and considerably increased.
In reply General Earle was informed, on 15* j
the 1 5th, that most of his requests were in
course of fulfilment ; but that Lord Wolseley
did not approve his proposal to take with
him two companies of a line of communi-
cation r^ment for the purpose of forming
posts on his line. He was instructed that
his force was to be a fl}nng column; that
the General of communications would not
occupy the line behind us ; and further, that
it was improbable the West Kent Regiment
could be rationed sufficiently in advance to
enable it to follow us up the river. Our,
at that time, very insufficient commissariat
staff could not yet be increased, because
there was no one at Korti to send to us.
Our land transport was on the 14th only
leaving Dongola; but Lord Wolseley was
anxious that our leading battalions should
advance at the very earliest moment to
S8 HAMDAB.
occupy the Monassir country, and con-
sidered it not necessary that we should
wait for our transport company, desiring
General Earle to advance into the Monassir
country, and there await the arrival of the
transport.
At this time we had not a single baggage-
camel, except the few belonging to the
Egyptian Camel Corps and Artillery. To
attempt an advance in boats into an ene-
my's country by an unknown river, without
cavalry to scout on the banks, would
have been an act of folly; and cavalry
could not move without some transport.
It is true that I had moved half a troop
from Korti to Hamdab without any trans-
port animals, by carrying their forage and
equipment in the boats of the Staffords,
and making the horses and the boats
rendezvous together at night ; but that was
not a manoeuvre to be attempted outside a
peaceful country. Indeed it is well we did
not attempt it, for after the first day's
advance the boats had to take a channel
CONCENTRATION. 59
which effectually separated them from all
touch of the horses for two days.
There was another strong reason against
our immediate advance. Our leading
battalion, the Staffords, had been sent up
with only thirty days* supplies, of which
nearly twenty were already consumed. It
had to fill up from the supplies of the Duke
of Cornwall's Light Infantry, which we had
halted at Abu Dom, and which, in its turn,
had to fill up from the West Kent. This
operation could not be completed till the
2 2d; and if we advanced without our full
quantity of supplies, we should never be
able to bring them up, as our completing
our required amount depended absolutely
on every infantry boat taking up its full
100 days per man in the boat. How
important it seemed that we should not
start without our full quantity can be
judged from the fact that the same post
which brought the above-named instruc-
tions to General Earle, also brought him
instructions that, subject to the military I
4
6o HAMDAB.
necessities of the situation, he was to leave
at Abu Hamed a garrison of 300 men, with
sixty days* supply; and at Berber a garrison
of 700 men with sixty days* supply, and
also 40,000 complete rations; which, with
800 ardebs of dourra that we were to
purchase at Berber, would be required for
the use of a force to be sent from Berber
to Suakim.
17th Jan. General Earle, therefore, replied by tele-
graph to the Chief of the Staff on the 1 7th,
that if the latter would send him forty
baggage -camels, with saddles and drivers
complete, at once, he could advance on
the 23d, but not before, as the Staffords'
supplies would not be complete sooner.
He also wrote at length, explaining the
situation. He said in his memorandum :
"As I am aware that there is a consider-
able force before us at Birti, as a prolonged
halt in its immediate presence would be
disadvantageous, and as I cannot inflict a
severe defeat upon it without my small
force of cavalry, I do not consider it ad-
CONCENTRATION. 6l
visable to advance from this camp until I
can move with two battalions of infantry,
the Hussars and other mounted troops, to
the direct attack of the enemy's position/*
He repeated the arguments stated above,
and his offer to advance on 23d if forty
camels were sent to him, and added : ** I
must, however, point out, that by thus ad-
vancing without other land transport, I shall
be deprived of the means of making any
turning movement in the desert, which would
require a day's absence of the infantry from
their boats ; and should difficult rapids
render portaging necessary, I shall be
without the means of carrying loads which
the transport allotted to me was specially
intended to provide."
On the 1 7th General Duller replied, " I
have not a camel or driver to send. They
are in the desert."
As regarded our power to carry out the
instructions for leaving supplies at Abu
Hamed and Berber, I went very carefully
into calculations ; and the Chief of the Staff
62 HAMDAB.
was informed that, in the event of our
starting, filled up with all the rations we
could take, and receiving 50,000 rations at
Korosko, we should, supposing us to be
ready to leave Berber on 3d March, have
at that date only twenty-eight days' sup-
plies for the balance of our force (1800
men), after leaving the garrisons and sup-
plies ordered at Abu Hamed and Berber.
These calculations were accepted by the
Chief of the Staff.
19th Jan. On the 19th, the good news reached us
that our transport under Captain Lea had
reached Korti, would be completed to 350
serviceable camels, and would start on the
20th Jan. 20th; and on the 20th we were told that
supplies to complete all our demands would
leave at once in the steamer N ass if el
Kheir, with the exception of certain quan-
tities of biscuit, sugar, cocoa and milk for
hospitals, salt, soap, and tobacco. General
Buller s telegram ended : ** The consign-
ment by Nassif Kheir and Lea will com-
plete all I can send you. You must be
CONCENTRATION. 63
thankful for small mercies, and go as quickly
as you can."
Colonel Butler arrived at Hamdab on
the 20th, and General Earle decided to
charge him with' the duty of reconnoitring
for the advance of the force. He was to
move with the cavalry and camel corps
along the bank, cover the advance of and
select camping-grounds for the troops in
the boats; and he was to command the
advanced post whenever headquarters were
not present there.^
Lieutenant-Colonel Alleyne with a party 21st jan.
of voyageurs arrived on the 21st. He was
charged with the direction of the advance
by river, and had as his assistants Captain
Orde, Rifle Brigade, Captain Lord Avon-
more, Hampshire Regiment, and Lieuten-
ant Peel, 2d Life Guards, all by this time
thoroughly experienced in boat-work on
the Nile.
^ At Colonel Butler's request, Major Martin, R.A., and
Lieutenant Pirie, 2d Life Guards, were attached to him as
staff officers.
I
Jan.
64 HAMDAB.
Captain Courtney, R.E., and Captain
Hon. F. Colborne, Royal Irish Rifles, ar-
rived for the purpose of surveying the river
as we advanced.
The headquarters of the ist battalion
Royal Highlanders (Black Watch) arrived
in our camp on the 13th, and the battalion
was completed in the course of the next
few days.
2istto23d The headquarters of the ist battalion
Gordon Highlanders arrived on the 21st,
but the battalion was still incomplete on
the 24th. One company had been left to
garrison Haifa ; and one company, with the
Lieutenant- Colonel second in command, was
still far behind.
The 2d battalion Duke of Cornwall's
Light Infantry, after handing over its sup-
plies to the Staffords at Abu Dom, waited
there to complete its own supplies from
convoys sent up from Korti. Its first half-
battalion reached Hamdab on the 23d; its
headquarters and remaining half on the
24th.
CONCENTRATION. 6$
The camel battery marched from Abu
Dom to Hamdab on the 2 2d, joining the
camel corps there.
After placing great difficulties in the
way, the Mudir of Dongola had consented
to his troops advancing into the Monassir
country by the right bank. I do not pro-
pose to enter into any detail of their com-
position, or into the story of their march.
It is sufficient here to state that, after
having succeeded in taking over the Va-
keel's fort at Abu Dom for the use of
the two companies of the Essex Regiment,
which arrived there as garrison on the 23d,
Col vile succeeded in getting the Mudir's
troops crossed over to the right bank
at Merawi on the 21st and 2 2d. On the
23d, to the number of 310, they made a
short march out from Merawi, complete,
Colvile informed us, with transport (camels
and donkeys) and ammunition (120 rounds
per man), but without riding-camels for
scouting. They had also a brass gun,
which they used to fire off at night. The
E
66 HAMDAB.
Vakeel accompanied them, saying it was
necessary he should do so, to prevent ill-
treatment of friendly natives. Before start-
ing, he telegraphed to the Mudir to say
that, ** with God's help, he hoped to collect
some taxes."
The situation in the Soudan, as known
to us at this time, was as follows. Herbert
Stewart, having established a post at Gak-
dul, had returned to Korti, had again ad-
vanced to and beyond Gakdul, and had
fought the action of Abu Klea. Our
knowledge of the details of that fight was
very limited ; but we could read between
the lines of the telegrams, and could tell
that Stewart had met with a very deter-
mined resistance, and that somehow the
enemy had got inside the square. We
were told that Stewart was continuing his
advance on Metemmeh.
A messenger from Gordon, who had left
for Khartoum on i8th December, had re-
turned to Korti on nth January; but un-
fortunately, on his way back his letters had
CONCENTRATION. 6/
been taken from him, and he had been so
severely beaten he could recollect nothing.
Thus our latest news from Khartoum was
still the few words — " All well, 14th Decem-
ber," and the verbal message mentioned in
the first chapter.
From Berber we had news as late as the
23d December. All was then quiet there.
There were very few soldiers in the town ;
they were spread about in the surrounding
villages — the Egyptian soldiers working as
slaves at the sakyehs. The town was said
to be surrounded by an intrenchment ; and
there were some guns, varying in the state-
ments from three to six in number, on the
left bank of the river at Robush or Mas-
seed, the village opposite Berber. Moham-
med el Kheir, the Mahdi's Emir of Berber,
had applied to the Mahdi for reinforcements
and guns, but had met with a refusal to send
them.
From Abu Hamed we had news as late
as the 3d January. The sakyehs between
Berber and Abu Hamed were then at work.
68 HAMDAB.
Abu Hegel, chief of the Robatab, was at
his own village. Sheikhs Hassan Wad Hag
Said and AH Basha were at Abu Hamed —
having replaced two sheikhs who had been
recalled, because they had not reported a
reconnaissance to near Abu Hamed made
by Major Rundle and Sheikh Saleh Bey in
November.
Our latest news from Birti was of the
1 8th January; but we had spies there who
were to inform us of any serious change in
the situation. Suleiman Wad Gamr had
returned from Berber, but had gone to Sal-
amat to meet Abdul Majid Wad Abu Lek-
alik, who had arrived from Berber with
reinforcements at least a thousand strong,
and he was remaining at Salamat to bring
up more reinforcements. Lekalik, as we
shall hereafter call him, was on the i8th
at Birti with 1 500 dervishes and the Mon-
assir and Robatab, and had been placed by
the Emir of Berber in command of all the
troops there. He was said to have been
anxious to advance to fight us, but Sulei-
CONCENTRATION. 69
man had urged remaining at Birti ; and
now that Lekalik had agreed to remaining
at Birti, Suleiman wanted to retire to the
Shukook Pass. Moussa Wad Abu Hegel
was still at Birti, and said to be full of fight.
To sum up the state of the information
obtained through our intelligence depart-
ment up to 23d January : All was well at
Khartoum on 14th December; Stewart had
had a hard fight, and was advancing on
Metemmeh on i8th January; Berber was
quiet, and not strongly defended, on 23d
December ; Abu Hamed had a small garri-
son and no defences on 3d January ; a force
about 3000 strong was in front of us at
Birti — consisting of Berberines, Monassir,
and Robatab, about 500 of them having
rifles — and its commander meant fighting.
BuUer had told us that, from various ac-
counts of Stewart's fight, he found that
"these Arabs do charge home, and very
quickly," and had advised us "not to let
them get a run at us unless we were in
square.'*
70 HAMDAB.
Our orders were to advance through the
Monassir country, take and garrison Abu
Hamed, receive a convoy from Korosko,
and advance on Berber. When near Ber-
ber — within twenty miles — we were to fire
a gun and two rockets every night at twelve.
The desert column was to have steamers
and men six or eight miles above Berber,
and would answer our signal, and the steam-
ers would then reconnoitre and assist our
attack. We knew that Rundle had 700
camels ready to march from Korosko, and
we had arranged signals to let him know
of our proximity to Abu Hamed ; and we
telegraphed to Cairo asking that our letters
and papers by the mail leaving Cairo 2 2d
should be sent to Korosko to await the
departure of this convoy. We also ar-
ranged for supplies of such vitally neces-
sary material as paint for the boats and
shoes for the horses being sent by the same
route,
aadjan. Qn the 2 2d Colonel Butler reconnoitred
to Ooli island, and selected a site for a
CONCENTRATION. /I
camp. He reported the river free from
obstacles to that point. The natives had
fled between Kulgeili and OoH, but at the
latter place some were remaining.
On the 23d our transport, about 330 23d jan.
camels, under Captain Lea, arrived at
Hamdab. Arrangements were at once
made for handing over regimental trans-
port to the Hussars, the necessary trans-
port to headquarters, and for mounting
staff officers, who had been sent up to the
column without any sort of mount; and
then orders for the advance on the follow-
ing day were issued.
Colonel Hammill, of the Gordon High-
landers, was left in command at Hamdab,
with orders to send on the Cornwalls by
half-battalions on 25th and 26th, with two
sections of the field-hospital. On the 26th
he was to send on the Egyptian battery
and the transport company under escort of
a portion of the camel corps, left behind
for this purpose, the whole under command
of Major Wodehouse, R.A. He was him-
^2 HAM DAB.
«
self to follow with his own battalion and
two sections of field - hospital, as soon as
his battalion was concentrated, having
previously sent down to Abu Dom any
superfluous stores remaining at Hamdab,
and disestablished the telegraph.
General Duller, in asking me to send him
a state of our force before actually starting,
had said to me : " I know you have been
handicapped ; but now the force is com-
pleted, I mention that I know Lord Wolse-
ley attaches great importance to your mak-
ing as rapid an advance as possible ; '' and
had asked me for the probable date of
our arrival at Abu Hamed. I replied :
** We start to-morrow. It is impossible to
predict the date of reaching Abu Hamed.
It must depend on nature of river and
opposition of enemy, both unknown quan-
tities.*'
73
CHAPTER V.
HAMDAB TO KAB EL ABD TOUCH OF
THE ENEMY.
Before General Earle left Korti, Lord
Wolseley gave him some dates of probable
moves, which he entered in his pocket-
book. The first of these was, " Leave
Hamdab, 24th January." We were punc-
tual to our time. On the morning of the 24th Jan.
24th the advance commenced at 7 a.m.
The Hussars and half the camel corps
marched at seven, their baggage and head-
quarter baggage following at to o'clock
under an escort of mounted troops. Two
companies of the Staffordshire, with Lieut-
Colonel AUeyne and the other boat officers,
moved off by river at seven, followed by
74 HAMDAB TO KAB EL ABD.
the boats of the Royal Engineers, and then
the remainder of the battalion. The Black
Watch followed at eight; the boat-repair-
ing party, the senior medical officer, half the
field- hospital, two headquarter boats, and
three guard boats manned by Gordon
Highlanders, moving between the half-
battalions of the Black Watch. The masts
of all whalers were lowered before starting,
as we were about to commence a long jour-
ney against the prevailing north wind.
Headquarters marched about 1 1 a.m.
Before starting we telegraphed to Korti :
"Just off; all going as well as possible;
troops in high spirits, longing for a fight ;
no sick." As we rode along the bank we
saw many boats in difficulties. The chan-
nel was full of sunken rocks ; and nine boats
had to be unloaded, hauled up, and repaired
either by their own crews or the boat-
repairing party. The last boats did not
arrive opposite Ooli island, about eight
miles from Hamdab, till 7 p.m.; but by half-
past 7 we were all in bivouac. The
TOUCH OF THE ENEMY. 75
anchorage on the left bank being scanty, the
Black Watch bivouacked on the right bank
opposite. The position for the bivouac of
the Staffords and mounted troops was on
a high Nile island — that is to say, on land
which, though now connected with the main-
land, would at high Nile be entirely separated
from it by a wide deep channel, now only
partially full and crossed by a causeway.
On the arrival of the leading boats, the
mounted troops reconnoitred along the left
bank, a short distance beyond Kabour, and
found the country deserted. Two of the
boat officers reconnoitred by river. The
result of the combined reports, and of na-
tive information, was that the channel along
the left bank was impracticable for boats ;
and it was decided that the channel on the
right bank, on the far side of Great Ooli
island, must be used. It was found that
it could be reached from the left bank
channel by a narrow dyke between Great
Ooli island and another small island just
opposite the camp of the Staffords.
^6 HAMDAB TO KAB EL ABD.
And now commenced our first military
difficulty, necessitating the first of those
moves in the game of chess which we sub-
sequently had to play. The infantry was
about to be effectually separated from the
mounted troops. Any boats sent into the
rapids in the right-bank channel would be
as completely separated from us for the
time being as if they were a hundred miles
away. A force of 3000 of the enemy was
known to be within eighteen miles of us ;
and in the rocky and difficult country into
which we had now entered, every move
must be made with caution. If there was
one thing more important than another, it
was that we should avoid the smallest
chance of being surprised. It would not
do to send a small force of 60 Hussars and
40 Egyptian Camel Corps to bivouac by
themselves in advance on the left bank.
Yet the head of the rapid through which
the troops were about to pass must be held,
and cavalry must scout well to its front.
It was therefore decided to march half a
TOUCH OF THE ENEMY. ^^
battalion of the Black Watch to the neigh-
bourhood of Kabour to form a post there,
with the cavalry and camel corps at a
point where the Staffords, who were to be
sent into the right -bank channel, would
again emerge into the main stream at the
head of Suffi island.
About 7 P.M. we got into heliographic
communication with Colvile, who had, with
the Mudir's troops, reached Ummerikh, on
the right bank opposite our bivouac. We
sent over a signaller to relieve one of his
who had been touched by the sun, and at the
same time ordered him to advance the fol-
lowing day on the right bank to the head of
the rapid (known as Edermih cataract) into
which we were about to launch the Staffords.
Information as to the channel between
Hamdab and our present bivouac was sent
back to Hamdab, for the use of the troops
who were to follow, and the messenger took
back our report of progress for the Chief of
the Staff.
On the morning of the 25th, Colonel
78 HAMDAB TO KAB EL ABD.
asthjan. Butler moved off with the mounted troops,
and selected a strong position for the ad-
vanced post on a small rocky high Nile island,
just above the head of Suffi island ; and
the half-battalion Black Watch arrived there
at lo o'clock. The Staffords had moved
into the dike leading to the right-bank chan-
nel at 6.45 A.M., and soon after 8 o'clock
their last boat was lost to view. Half the
battalion Black Watch remained at Ooli
bivouac, where, in the course of the day, they
were joined by the leading half-battalion of
the Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry.
General Earle with his staff rode to the
advanced post, arriving there about 1 1 am.
Communication by heliograph was at once
established with the Ooli bivouac, and about
the same time the Mudir's troops arrived at
Mushra el Abiad on the opposite bank, and
Colvile established his heliograph there.
We then rode up the river as far as Ka-
benat, about three miles beyond Kabour.
Here we found a strong fort, with walls
eight to twelve feet thick built of loose
TOUCH OF THE ENEMY. 79
Stones, and capable of holding a garrison
of 500 men, on the top of a high detached
hill, completely commanding the river and
bank; and a similar fort opposite on the
right bank, with swift and difficult water
flowing between. Who built these forts ?
From what period do they date ? There is
a vague tradition among the Soudanese that
they were built by some Christian power
some centuries ago, and I am satisfied these
forts are of comparatively modern date.
Ascending to the fort, we obtained an ex-
tended view, and were shortly joined by
Colonel Butler, who told us he had recon-
noitred to the cataract of Kab el Abd, five
miles further on. He reported the country
clear and fairly open, and the water fairly
clear up to Kab el Abd, the cataract there
being like the big gate of Semneh. All the
country beyond Ooli camp was deserted.
We returned to Kabour post, and about
4 P.M. got into communication by heliograph
with Colonel Alleyne on Suffi island.
He told us three complete companies were
{
8o HAM DAB TO KAB EL ABD.
through the cataract ; so he was ordered to
send on two companies to relieve the half-
battahon Black Watch, which Colonel But-
ler was ordered to send back to Ooli as
soon as relieved. Colvile was directed to
keep the Mudir*s troops halted till further
orders. Instructions were sent back to
Hamdab to detain the artillery and trans-
port there till further orders, and to send
two officers of the Gordon Highlanders to
view the river as far as Kabenat, in order
to expedite the advance of the battalion
later on. General Earle and staff then re-
turned to the Ooli bivouac.
Two companies of the Staffords reached
the Kabour advanced post shortly after
dark ; but as the pickets of the Black Watch
were posted. Colonel Butler did not relieve
them, and the half-battalion did not return
to Ooli till the following morning.
26th Jan. At the usual hour on the 26th (6.45 a.m.),
the half-battalion Black Watch at Ooli, with
one boat of repairing party, and field-hos-
pital, moved off into the Edermih cataract.
TOUCH OF THE ENEMY. 8l
piloted by a boat officer sent back for the
purpose, and followed by the second half-
battalion, as soon as it arrived from Kabour.
The second half-battalion of the Cornwalls
arrived at Ooli.
General Earle and his staff again rode to
Kabour. The Staffords completed the pas-
sage of the cataract, and concentrated at
the advanced post. In the afternoon we
embarked in a whaler and crossed to the
Mudir's camp, where General Earle in-
spected the Mudir s troops under Achmet
Effendi. The Vakeel was living in a tent,
with carpets and cushions — a great contrast
to our primitive open-air bivouac. Coffee
was served, the situation was discussed,
and we then dropped down in our boat to
the head of Suffi island, where we met
Colonel AUeyne, and walked with him to
the cataract. The leading wing of the
Black Watch was passing through, and the
rear wing was closing up at the foot of the
rapid. The cataract (Edermih) was a very
troublesome one. In the first place, two
F
i
82 HAMDAB TO KAB EL ABD.
small shoots of rapids had to be tracked up ;
then came three-quarters of a mile of swift
broken rapids, with four shoots or rushes of
water, the last of which was like the great
gate of Semneh. Arms, ammunition, and
accoutrements had to be portaged for three-
quarters of a mile, and the crews of three
boats had to be employed to haul one boat
through. Alleyne thought it was as bad
water as any on the river.
We returned to Kabour, and thence to
Ooli, leaving orders with Colonel Butler to
advance with the Staffords and as many
of the Black Watch as possible to Kab el
Abd next day. Only two companies of the
Black Watch reached Kabour that night.
Orders were sent to Colonel Hammill at
Hamdab for the artillery and transport to
march with their escort on the 28th. Col-
vile was instructed to move in the morning
with the Mudir^s troops, and take up a posi-
tion opposite Kab el Abd. Meanwhile
he was to urge the Vakeel to keep his
troops in hand, as they had been setting fire
TOUCH OF THE ENEMY. 83
to huts, and we were in a thieoretically
friendly country. The Cornwalls were
ordered to advance into the Edermih cata-
ract in the morning.
In the night one of our spies returned
from Birti. He brought word that on
Saturday the 24th there were at Birti some
2500 men, under five chiefs, of whom the
most prominent were Lekalik, Suleiman
Wad Gamr, and Moussa Wad Abu Hegel.
He told us it was their intention to attack
us when our boats were separated in the
cataract of Kab el Abd, or beyond it, and
that they meant to attack in the early morn-
ing, when it was cold.
Colonel Butler was then further instructed
to push on to the foot of Kab el Abd, and
concentrate the two leading battalions there.
He was to reconnoitre with the mounted
troops till he should get touch of the enemy,
endeavouring to ascertain his strength and
position, and falling back upon the infantry ;
and Colvile was directed to advance his
troops only as far as Shebabit, and to push
84 HAMDAB TO KAB EL ABD.
a reconnaissance on the right bank as near-
ly opposite to Birti as he could reach, en-
deavouring to ascertain the enemy s strength
and position there.
27th Jan. On the 27th the Cornwalls advanced into
the Edermih cataract, and the StafFords and
Black Watch concentrated about a mile
short of Kab el Abd cataract, where head-
quarters joined them. A strong position
was taken up here, and a zareeba made.
It was ascertained that the great gate of
the cataract could be avoided by tracking
up the opposite bank.
Meanwhile the mounted troops advanced,
and some two and a half miles beyond the
cataract sighted about 1 20 of the enemy on
foot, with seven or eight horsemen, near the
tomb of a sheikh at Warag. Shots were
exchanged at about a thousand yards, and
the enemy retiring, a further advance was
made. Colonel Butler reported on return
to camp that about two miles above the
great gate of Kab el Abd there commenced
two miles of bad rapid water.
TOUCH OF THE ENEMY. 85
The news of the river was bad. We
seemed to have entered upon a succession
of troublesome rapids. The land, too, was
as bad as it could well be — nothing but
black rocks and sand everywhere ; scarcely
a scrap of cultivation visible. But the
news that the cavalry had really exchanged
shots with the enemy cheered us, and there
were tangible results in the shape of four
camels, six oxen, and sixty sheep, captured
by Marriott's camel corps. General Earle,
telegraphing that night, reported, " Troops
in excellent spirits, and only seven slight
cases of sickness in whole force."
Meanwhile Col vile had not let the grass
grow under his feet. No sooner had he
reached Shebabit than, mounting ten of the
Mudir's men on ten of his best baggage-
camels, he pushed on with them fourteen
miles to Hush el Jeruf, the village right
opposite Birti, whence he obtained a good
view of the enemy's camp. He described
it to us as situated on a gentle slope, run-
ning down from a low range of hills to the
86 HAMDAB TO KAB EL ABD.
river, the ground being broken and rocky,
and the camp commanded on all sides.
Owing to the nature of the ground it was
difficult to see distinctly, but his impression
was that there were not more than looo
of the enemy. Three tents were visible.
About 300 of the enemy had collected on
a rise in the ground, and watched his party.
On his return over a succession of what
at high Nile would be islands, but which
had now a dry channel between them and
the mainland, he met with no opposition,
but was followed by a small body of horse
and foot. He learned that several deser-
tions had taken place from among the
enemy.
He described the population on the right
bank as remaining at work on its sakyehs,
and presenting, therefore, a very different
appearance to that of the barren deserted
waste through which we were passing on
the left bank.
That evening we received through Korti
a long telegram from Colonel Rundle at
TOUCH OF THE ENEMY. 87
Korosko, giving details of the tribes who,
according to the report of his sheikhs, were
gathered to oppose us at Birti. It wound
up thus : " I can get none of the sheikhs
to go below 10,000 as the force in front, of
General Earle. They have no doubt now
of their intention to fight.'*
Orders were issued for the advance to
commence at the usual hour in the morn-
ing ; and Colvile was directed to cover the
advance of the boats on the right bank, and
endeavour to communicate with our sig-
nallers on Mishami ridge.
88
CHAPTER VI.
KAB EL ABD TO GAMRA RETREAT OF THE
ENEMY.
28th Jan. Early on the 28th the infantry advanced
in their boats. The StafFords and Black
Watch passed through the Kab el Abd
cataract, with damage to two boats of the
Black Watch, and reached a point in the
rapids about two miles distant from their
camp of the previous night, immediately
opposite the foot of Kandi island. The
anchorage on the left bank was apparently
insufficient for two battalions, and the Black
Watch bivouacked on Kandi island — the
Staffords occupying a semicircular position,
which was covered by a zareeba, with out-
posts and sentries placed on a bastion-like
hill in front of the camp. It was a most
RETREAT OF THE ENEMY. 89
unsatisfactory military position ; but we
were on this occasion, as on others, com-
pelled to bivouac on sites badly suited for
defence, as we were restricted in the choice
of sites by the limit of distance the boats
could travel, and the necessity for bivouack-
ing where there was anchorage. This was
a wind-swept, sun-baked, dusty spot, with-
out shade by day or shelter by night, at the
extremity of a ridge of forbidding black
rocks known as Mishami ridge.
Meanwhile the Corn walls completed the
passage of the Edermih cataract, begun on
the previous day, and reached the foot
of Kab el Abd, where we had bivouacked
the previous night.
Our mounted troops reconnoitred as far
as Rahami cataract, seven or eight miles to
the front ; and Colonel Butler reported no
signs of the enemy. It would, he con-
sidered, be possible to push a battalion
through the rapids immediately in front of
us by nightfall on the 29th, but it would be
necessary to portage arms and ammunition.
90 KAB EL ABD TO GAMRA.
Colvile had vainly tried to find a position
on the right bank opposite us ; but the
rocky nature of the ground, and the numer-
ous islands intervening between the right
and left bank, made it impossible. He,
however, found a safe camping-ground on
Umkumtata island nearly opposite Gamra,
about three miles above our camp at Mish-
ami ridge, all the channels between tHe
islands themselves, and between the islands
and the right bank, being sufficiently dry
to admit of their being crossed by the
Mudirs troops.
Our artillery and transport, with an
escort of half Major Marriott's Egyptian
Camel Corps, marched from Hamdab, and
took up a position, surrounded by a zareeba,
on some open ground about a mile in our
rear, where there was a certain amount of
forage and a good watering-place for the
camels.
29th Jan. At 6.45 on the 29th, six companies of the
Black Watch marched to Warag, and took
up a position on fairly open ground at the
RETREAT OF THE ENEMY. 9 1
head of the rapid ; while the mounted troops
pushed on, with orders from General Earle
that they were to push home to Birti and
bring back information as to the enemy's
strength. The Cornwalls passed through
the Kab el Abd cataract, and arrived at
Mishami ridge, when we at once proceeded
to form a zareeba on a horse-shoe-topped
hill, which we held at night with the Corn-
walls and half the Black Watch.
The Staffords entered the Umhaboah
rapid at the same early hour. It proved to
be the worst piece of water yet encountered,
and it was with great difficulty and labour
that four companies succeeded in working
their way to Warag by sunset. Meanwhile
the Black Watch had been forming a zareeba;
and as soon as the half- battalion of the
Staffords reached it, two companies of the
Black Watch marched back to Mishami
ridge, leaving half a battalion at Warag
with the Staffords. The other wing of the
Staffords bivouacked together in a zareeba
about half-way through the rapid.
92 KAB EL ABD TO GAMRA.
In the course of the morning a report
was received from Colonel Colvile that a
spy had returned from Birti with news that
reinforcements from Berber, which would
bring the Birti force up to 5000 men, had
left Salamat on the 27th, and were to
reach Birti on the 29th. Part of this force
was said to be advancing on the right bank;
and as General Earle did not wish Colonel
Colvile and the Mudir's troops to run any
risk of being attacked by superior force in
an isolated position, he directed Colvile
to fall back to the end of Kandi island,
opposite Mishami ridge. Colvile came
himself with a few men, and was brought
over to our camp in a boat ; but the Vakeel
protested against falling back, as it would
tire his men, and he could not find anywhere
on the islands so good and open a position
as the one he was in. As the Mudir's troops
seemed to be free from anxiety as to their
position. General Earle did not press his
order for their return.
Orders were sent back to Hamdab di-
RETREAT OF THE ENEMY. 93
recting the Gordon Highlanders to move
without fail on the 30th ; and a boat officer
who had been twice through Edermih
cataract and once through Kab el Abd,
was sent to pilot them from Ooli.
On Colonel Butler's return at night, we
learnt the result of his reconnaissance. He
had pushed to within a mile of Birti, and
had found the hills approaching close to the
river, leaving only a narrow space for the
road, which was rough, stony, and broken.
He had come in sight of a body of the
enemy about 700 to 800 yards distant, ap-
parently advancing, and had retired from
the broken ground, and taken up a po-
sition. Slade had ascended a hill from
which he had looked down on the enemy s
camp, and had seen a body of them, whose
number he estimated at 2000, parading with
the apparent object of advancing. Marriott
on the right had fallen in with a scouting-
party of the enemy, and had exchanged
shots, having one camel killed. He had
worked down a wady to the right, from
94 KAB EL ABD TO GAMRA.
which he had seen three camps of the
enemy.
News reached us to-day that Herbert
Stewart had advanced on the i8th, and had
had a second fight on the 19th. We were
told that the enemy did not charge home so
well as on the 17th, and that our men's
steady volleys had been too much for them ;
but that they shot well with their Reming-
tons. Our troops, we learnt, were strongly
intrenched at Goubat, two miles south of
Metemmeh, which was still held by the
enemy. Four of Gordon's steamers were
co-operating with us, of which two had
started on the 24th for Khartoum with
Sir C. Wilson and a small detachment of
the Sussex Regiment. Herbert Stewart,
we were told, was severely wounded, but
was progressing satisfactorily, and great
hopes were entertained of his recovery.
Talbot with a large convoy had reached
Gakdul from Goubat. Half the Royal Irish
had left Korti on the 28th ; the remainder
and West Kent were to follow. Wilson
RETREAT OF THE ENEMY. 95
reported large reinforcements marching from
Berber to Metemmeh. General Duller was
going to take command, and told us that
** if Khartoum is sufficiently provisioned,
we don't mean to do anything until you
join us."
Our situation was aggravating. The
desert column already on the Nile above
Metemmeh, and proposing to wait there till
we could join them ; the enemy in force in
our front ten miles away ; and our troops
scattered along these terrible rapids, which
seemed to grow more and more difficult
with each mile of our advance. There was
nothing for it but to push on, and concen-
trate a sufficient force within striking dis-
tance of the enemy, who was apparently
resolved to hold his ground at Birti.
I for one slept lightly that night. It was
bitterly cold, and there was no escaping the
wind. A full moon, which we hoped was
to light us to victory at Birti, was shining.
More than once I walked round the zareeba,
where our sentries were standing motion-
(
96 KAB EL ABD TO GAMRA.
less, looking out over the rocks and ravines
around. At last I was sleeping soundly,
when I was awakened by the field-officer of
the Black Watch on duty, who told me that
a native dressed in white had crept up,
leading a horse, to within a few yards of
the zareeba, had looked down upon our
cavalry below, and had then made off again.
Did it portend an early attack ? If so, we
were ready at any moment. The first note
of alarm by one of our sentries would have
brought all our men, armed and accoutred,
to their feet, and have lined the zareeba
with a circle of bayonets, and of rifles ready
to sweep the surrounding space with their
fire. Should we hear firing from either of
our smaller advanced posts, and have to
march to their assistance ; or was it only
a bold spy, come to learn our strength and
dispositions for defence ?
Nothing came to disturb us further.
30th Jan. RdveilU sounded at five ; and the troops
stood to their arms as usual. Our cavalry
patrols went out, and to them at once
RETREAT OF THE ENEMY. 97
surrendered himself the gentleman who had
visited us the night before. His story was
as follows : He had been an Egyptian
soldier, one of the garrison of Berber, when
that place was taken by the Mahdi ; he had
been made to join the Mahdi's troops ; he
had been one of the force which marched
from Berber to Birti under Lekalik, and
had been made to take command of a body
of riflemen there, commanding outposts at
night, and visiting the troops by day. He
said that on the previous night he had
deserted, bringing with him a horse, the
property of Moussa Wad Abu Hegel, and
his rifle and ammunition. He told us
that the force at Birti consisted of 5000
Monassir, 4000 Robatab, and 6000 Bisharin
and Berberines; but that there were only
300 rifles, and thirty rounds of ammuni-
tion per rifle. He said that the gun from
Stewart's steamer was there, but spiked
and without ammunition. * Lekalik had first
seen our scouts on the 25th; he had then
intended occupying Mishami ridge, but
G
98 KAB EL ABD TO GAMRA.
found it held by us on the 28th. The
enemy had made a stone parapet, facing
the road and river at Birti, but no other
defences ; and they intended standing
there, though the Robatab were deserting.
Lekalik and Moussa had followed our
retiring scouts yesterday on horseback ; and
drums were beating all evening. Our
friend told us that Lekalik had received a
letter from Berber telling him there had
been a great fight at Metemmeh.
There was nothing in this information to
alter the dispositions made for the day.
Half a battalion of the Corn walls marched
to Warag, and relieved the wing of the
Black Watch there. The Staffords con-
tinued their advance through the cataract,
and concentrated at Warag, where also half
a battalion of the Black Watch arrived in
its boats. The other wing of the Black
Watch, after its return to Mi^hami, entered
the Umhaboah cataract, but did not get
through, bivouacking where half the Staf-
fords had bivouacked on the previous
RETREAT OF THE ENEMY. 99
night The Corn walls remained at Mish-
ami ridge. Headquarters and the mounted
troops moved to Warag. Cavalry had a
quiet day, vedettes out, and nothing of
importance occurred.
Above Warag there still lay two miles of
bad rapid water to Gamra, where there was
excellent anchorage and camping-ground.
Gamra was about seven miles from Birti,
and General Earle decided to concentrate
three battalions, the mounted troops, and
artillery there; and to make it the point
from which he would march to attack the
enemy, leaving his boats and transport
covered by a strong detachment in a good
zareeba, with clear field of fire. Accordingly
on the 31st he marched the Staffords by 31st Jan.
land to Gamra, covered by the mounted
troops. On arrival they prepared the
ground, and made a zareeba for the Black
Watch, who advanced in boats, being so
much retarded by the difficult water that
they did not succeed in concentrating at
Gamra till 7 p.m., when the Staffords
lOO KAB EL ABD TO GAMRA.
marched back to Warag. The Cornwalls,
in the meantime, entered the Umhaboah
cataract ; six companies reached Warag, and
two bivouacked in rear. Their reserve am-
munition was carried on camels to Gamra.
Colonel Butler's report of the direct road
along the river to the enemy s camp did
not seem to favour a direct attack. We
should apparently have to force our way
through a gorge between rocks and river,
commanded by hills on our right ; and
should, on emerging," find ourselves faced by
the enemy's stone parapet, of which the
deserter had told us. It was therefore very
desirable, from tactical as well as strategical
reasons, to find a way by which we could
outflank the position ; and I was sent by
General Earle to ascertain if such a way
was to be found. Accompanied by Colonel
Butler, Colonel Colvile, Major Slade, and
the deserter from Birti, I reconnoitred with
the mounted troops to the south-east into
the desert; and ascending a high detached
hill about six miles from our camp, and
RETREAT OF THE ENEMY. lOI
four and a half miles from Birti, discov-
ered that the low hills which enclosed the
position of Birti formed a semicircle, with
its flanks on the river; that immediately
behind the hills there ran, straight from
the hill on which we were, a broad khor
or wady, — a dry sandy watercourse, which
struck the river beyond the enemy's camp,
and at the end of which we could see the
palm-trees on the river-bank that marked
— so our deserter said — the site of Suleiman
Wad Gamr's abode. It was evident that
from this wady there were branches leading
straight into the enemy's camp, and the
deserter assured us it was so. Here then
was our line of attack clearly marked out,
and the more satisfactorily that the khor
could be reached from the camp at Gamra
without passing over more than about two
miles of broken ground.
It struck us at the time as singular that
we saw no signs of the enemy's presence,
— not a man on the look-out, not a beast
grazing on the shrubs and coarse grass of
I02 KAB EL ABD TO GAMRA.
the wady; and I should have pushed our
reconnaissance along the wady, were it not
that, feeling sure General Earle would
adopt this line of attack, I did not like to
show our hand. Up to this time the enemy
evidently considered us only capable of
moving along the river-bank, and it would be
dangerous to disabuse their minds too soon.
On our return to camp in the evening,
Slade proceeded to examine at length a
deserter who had come into our camp in
the morning, but whom he had only cur-
sorily questioned before our start to recon-
noitre. From this man he learnt that on
the previous day — sl report having been
received at Birti that the English would
attack from the desert side, and that the
Turks (Mudir's troops) would advance on
the right bank — a council of war had been
held, at which it was decided to retire.
The troops had broken up at sunset, and
marched (about 1500 in number) towards
Salamat, with the intention, this deserter
said, of going to the Shukook pass. So, if
RETREAT OF THE ENEMY. 103
this were true, Birti was empty at the very
time we were reconnoitring for the best way
to attack it.
Before starting with me in the morning,
Colvile had received a letter from the
Vakeel. I must preface what is coming by
saying that the Vakeel, when at Korti at
New Year, had been promised a very hand-
some reward if he were instrumental in
catching Suleiman Wad Gamr and the
blind man, and was very eager to earn it.
His letter now was to the effect that last
night (30th), Omar, Suleiman's uncle, had
come in, and asked the Vakeel to promise
him for the remainder of his tribe and
Suleiman, that nobody would hurt them.
The Vakeel had promised that no harm
should happen to them or to Suleiman,
whereupon Omar had gone back to bring
them. ''We shall get them by these
means," said the Vakeel, "and then we
can do what we like." The Vakeel was
in high spirits over this joyful news, which
must have been rather damped by Colonel
I04 KAB EL ABD TO GAMRA.
Colvile's reply : " We will treat Omar and
his brothers well if they come in ; but the
only promise we can make to Suleiman
Wad Gamr and Colonel Stewart's mur-
derers is, that we will hang them if we
catch them/*
Colvile, as soon as he returned to our
camp, crossed over and saw the Vakeel,
reminded him of his repeated instructions
to make no terms with Suleiman Wad
Gamr, and said his proposal could not
be for a moment entertained. To this he
replied that the only way we could get
through our difficulties was by leading
Suleiman to believe we were his friends,
and killing him afterwards. On Colvile
refusing to listen to such a proposal, the
Vakeel handed him a letter of remon-
strance, saying that if we could bring in
Suleiman, the tribes before us would be
scattered; if not, we should have great
trouble. Colvile then returned to our
camp, and in the course of the evening
received another letter from the Vakeel,
RETREAT OF THE ENEMY. 105
saying that Omar and Abu Bekr, Suleiman's
uncles, had come into his camp as friends,
asserting that they had sent Lekalik and
Moussa, with their people, away out of their
country, and that they held their own people
to be with the Government. This was
rather amusing, considering that neither
Omar nor Abu Bekr had any authority
over the Monassir, and that Lekalik and
Moussa had only retired the night before
to seek a better position in the Shukook
pass.
Colvile was directed to inform the Va-
keel immediately that General Earle dis-
tinctly refused to acknowledge, and repu-
diated, any promises made to Suleiman
Wad Gamr; and that General Earle had
been sent here to punish Suleiman and the
other murderers of Colonel Stewart and the
English and French Consuls, and to punish
those who had made themselves accom-
plices in the murder by not bringing in
Suleiman as a prisoner. Colvile was fur-
ther instructed to proceed at an early hour
I
Io6 KAB EL ABD TO GAMRA.
on the 1st to the Vakeel's camp, and bring
him over to see General Earle, bringing over
at the same time Omar and Abu Bekr.
Colonel Butler was directed to recon-
noitre to Birti with the mounted troops as
early as possible in the morning of the ist;
half a battalion of the Black Watch was
directed to march towards Birti in support
of his reconnaissance ; and all troops in rear
of Gamra were ordered to advance by
boat.
I07
CHAPTER VII.
BIRTI — HALT, AND ADVANCE OF THE ENEMY.
At the usual early hour on the ist February, ist Feb.
the troops moved as ordered. Colonel
Butler entered Birti, and found it deserted ;
his scouts, pushing three miles farther, found
traces of the enemy's retreat. As soon as
his report arrived, the wing of the Black
Watch, which had been pushed on in sup-
port, was ordered back ; and as the leading
Staffords arrived at Gamra, the other wing
of the Black Watch was pushed on into the
Rahami cataract, and a wing of the Corn-
walls was ordered on into the rapids to
follow the Staffords. The artillery and
convoy were ordered up from their position
in rear of Mishami to Gamra.
I08 BIRTI.
Colonel Colvile brought over the Vakeel
into our camp. Gaudet seemed incapable
of believing we were so stupid as to be in
earnest in refusing to capture Suleiman by
promises of safety, with a view to putting
him to death subsequently ; but at last our
dull obstinacy overcame him, and he be-
lieved. He still, however, had some hopes
of catching Suleiman through the agency
of Omar and Abu Bekr, and accordingly
they were allowed to return to his camp,
where Colvile also returned. Later in the
day, however, he learned that Suleiman had
fled beyond recall. He then threw up his
hand in disgust, and withdrew his opposi-
tion to our issuing the proclamation offering
rewards for the apprehension of Suleiman
and the blind man, which he had hitherto
declared would remove the last hope of
capturing either of them.
His interview with the Vakeel ended.
General Earle rode on to the advanced
post of the Black Watch, and as soon as
he received Colonel Butler's report that
HALT, AND ADVANCE OF THE ENEMY. IO9
Birti was deserted, he rode on there. He
discovered the boat of Colonel Stewart's
steamer on the shore, and there came run-
ning to him a man who announced himself
to be Hassain, the stoker of the ill-fated
steamer. Hassain gave the story of the
wreck and the murder in detail. It differed
little from the accounts so well known, and
so often published ; but it fixed the date of
the murder as Thursday, i8th September,
and it more directly connected Suleiman
with the murder than any account we had
yet heard. He had made his way down
the river after the murder, had been taken
prisoner, and kept safe by Omar, Sulei-
man's uncle, who had used him as a slave.
We were anxious to keep him with us, that
he might identify the site of the murder
on our reaching Hebbeh ; but he was eager
to return to his home in Upper Egypt, and
soon made his escape.
Our mounted troops fell back to Gam-
ra, and that night we bivouacked as
under : —
I lO BIRTI.
Half the Black Watch in advance of
Gamra in the Rahami cataract.
Headquarters, mounted troops, Staffords,
half the Black Watch, artillery, and convoy
at Gamra.
Half the Cornwalls at Warag, and half
in the Umhaboah cataract between Warag
and Mishami.
The Gordons were through the Edermih
cataract ; and Captain Orde, the boat officer
sent to pilot them, reported that cataract
far worse than when he had passed it
before, owing to the considerable fall of
the river.
In reading through the rough diary of
our daily proceedings, I am struck by the
frequency of the expression applied to the
rapids: '*The worst yet encountered," or
**the most difficult yet met with." The
fact is, that from Ooli to Birti the river was
but a succession of rapids as bad as it was
possible for the boats to pass. If there
was one part worse than another, it was
the series of rapids along the left bank
HALT, AND ADVANCE OF THE ENEMY. Ill
between Gamra and Birti, known as the
Rahami cataract. Into this half the Black
Watch had already penetrated; and the
remaining wing was sent forward early on ad Feb.
the 2d February.
All our boat officers were suffering in
health from constant exposure to the sun,
severe physical fatigue, and the incessant
strain upon their energies. There was
danger of their breaking down ; and ac-
cordingly, two additional officers were se-
lected and appointed to act as boat officers
— Lieutenant Morris, D.C.L.I., and Lieu-
tenant Livingstone of the Black Watch.
The rapids immediately before us proved
fully sufficient to tax their powers to the
utmost.
General Earle considered it important to
occupy Birti at once; and as the news of
the enemy's movements justified him in
pushing forward the mounted troops alone.
Colonel Butler was sent on with the Hus-
sars and camel corps to form a zareeba
and hold it. Having formed a zareeba.
112 BIRTI.
he reconnoitred five miles in advance, and
came upon some baggage and provisions
abandoned by the enemy. He saw no in-
habitants. The river was smooth, resem-
bling a Scotch loch ; the country along the
shore exceedingly rough, with rocks coming
down to near the river.
A refugee from the rebel camp reported
that the rebels had halted a day at the
entrance to the Shukook pass, but when
they heard that the English were in Birti
they had retired farther. He had heard
that Lekalik and Suleiman were going to
Berber, and Moussa to the Robatab country.
There had been many desertions since Birti
was abandoned, and Suleiman, who had
seen the proclamation offering a reward for
his capture, was reported to be in great
alarm. A report from Colonel Colvile,
however, said that the information brought
to the Vakeel was to the effect that the
rebels were halted, and were holding the
Shukook pass.
The leading wing of the Black Watch
HALT, AND ADVANCE OF THE ENEMY. II3
was, early in the day, engaged in over-
coming a most serious succession of bad
rushes of water ; and its progress was very
slow. Alleyne resolved to try, if pos-
sible, to find another passage, and sent
Colonel Denison, with his crew of voya-
geurs, to examine another channel on the
north of the great island opposite us. I
rode on to Birti, and there found Colonel
Denison, who had succeeded in passing
through this northern channel, and reported
it, though difficult, by no means so bad as
the southern channel. Accordingly, on my
return, all troops not already committed to
the left bank were diverted into this chan-
nel ; but seven companies of the Black
Watch had advanced too far to return with
safety. The troops worked till dusk, and
then bivouacked by half-battalions on the
high bank above their boats in the Rahami
cataract. The Cornwalls, with headquarters,
artillery, and convoy, bivouacked at Gamra.
On the following day (3d) the Cornwalls 3d Feb.
, entered the cataract ; and headquarters,
H
114 BIRTI.
with the artillery and convoy, marched to
Birti, where, late in the evening, five com-
panies of the Staffords arrived by the
northern passage after twelve hours* unre-
mitting toil. The whole of the remainder
of the infantry was still struggling through
the cataract ; but the General had not hesi-
tated to push forward the convoy, there being
no fear of attack, and the ground at Birti
offering an admirable site for an encamp-
ment, and ample supplies of growing forage.
The Mudir s troops occupied the village
of Hush el Jeruf on the right bank oppo-
site our camp, and Colvile reported that his
information was that the rebels had retired
beyond the Shukook pass, that no resist-
ance was to be expected there, that Sulei-
man's movements were uncertain, and that
it was doubtful whether he had or had not
fled to Berber. One of our own spies,
however, brought us in apparently more
definite information. He said that Lekalik
and Moussa were encamped at the far end
of the Shukook pass ; that they had given
HALT, AND ADVANCE OF THE ENEMY. II5
Suleiman six days to collect his cattle and
family at Salamat, promising to hold the
pass for that time, but no longer ; and that
then Suleiman was to go with Lekalik
across the desert to Abu Egli, Moussa
returning to his own country.
The mounted troops patrolled some six
miles to the front ; and Colonel Butler re-
ported that he had found a site for a camp
about this distance forward, which was
equally suitable for one battalion or for
two, with forage and good ground for
mounted troops, and that there was nothing
but clear water between it and Birti. The
General therefore decided to push forward
the mounted troops and the Staffords on
the following day.
Meanwhile the houses in Birti had been
carefully searched by our intelligence offi-
cers, and large quantities of papers found
were examined. Some few relics of Stew-
arts party were discovered, fragments of
French and English books, a portion of an
English ** field boot," the broken face and
Il6 BIRTI.
case of an aneroid barometer, which I have
since ascertained was sold to Stewart an
hour or two before his departure from Char-
ing Cross with General Gordon. These
were all found in Suleiman Wad Gamr's
house. Every effort was made to ascertain
correctly which houses, trees, and sakyehs
were the property of Suleiman Wad Gamr,
and of any prominent rebels ; and a list of
them was prepared.
For the first time since leaving Belal we
found ourselves in a well-cultivated country.
Birti was an oasis in the wilderness of
hideous rocks, through which for ten days
we had been wending our weary way.
Both on the mainland and on the high hill
island opposite there were many sakyehs^
and plentiful green crops. Our commis-
sariat officers, with the camels of the trans-
port company, were engaged in searching
for grain. Some was found in the houses,
and much more buried in pits on the
island.
The enemy's camp had been situated
HALT, AND ADVANCE OF THE ENEMY. I17
on uncultivated ground, some distance be-
low (down-stream of) the village of Birti
itself. A semicircle of low rocky hills sur-
rounded it, the ends of the semicircle rest-
ing on the river. In the midst of it there
was a low rocky eminence; and on this,
on the slopes of the hills, and on the flat
ground below, the dervishes had constructed
their shelters of boughs of trees and straw
mats. One of the most curious features
of the camp was the number of places of
prayer of large size, prepared on spaces of
flat ground by clearing away all stones,
carefully marked out by lines of stones,
with the same point towards the east, with
which we are all familiar on oriental
prayer-carpets. Judging by my experience
of native camps built in a similar way in
Ashanti, I should say there had been from
1500 to 2000 men encamped here. We
could see where the tents of the three
chiefs had been, and the. stables of their
horses. Nothing of any value was found
in the camp : a few cooking-pots, walking-
Il8 BIRTI.
Sticks, one or two pieces of wood with
verses from the Koran written on them,
some inferior straw mats, were all that we
could find. No arms of any kind were
discovered ; but a thousand rounds of Rem-
ington ammunition were found in one of the
houses. The broad wady by which we had
purposed to march to the attack led directly
round the back of the camp to the culti-
vated ground behind, and had wide easy
passages leading right into the heart of the
camp. It was a matter of sore regret to
us not to have found the enemy here ; and
it became evident to us that unless they
deliberately stayed to meet us, we never
could hope to overtake them. Already the
head of the Black Watch had been three
days in the Rahami cataract, and not a boat
had reached Birti.
4th Feb. On the morning of the 4th, the Staffords
closed up at Birti, and six companies were
sent on by river, their advance covered by
the mounted troops. The leading com-
panies arrived at the site selected by
HALT, AND ADVANCE OF THE ENEMY. II9
Colonel Butler, and by him christened
Castle Camp, at noon. Butler recon-
noitred along the bank for between three
and four miles farther over exceedingly
broken ground, where horses had frequently
to be led in single file. A mile and a half
above Castle Camp the rapids began again ;
but Alleyne, who reconnoitred in his boat
to their foot, and examined them, pro-
nounced that they could be passed. A
mile above Castle Camp, a large island
(Dulka) began, and extended from three
to four miles. On the opposite side of the
island there appeared to be a stretch of
clear water ; but Alleyne, who examined it,
discovered much broken water and many
islands beyond.
During the day the Black Watch con-
centrated at Birti. They had been four
days in the cataract, seven miles in length,
working from dawn to dusk. They had
lost one man drowned, and two boats.
The last two companies of the Staffords
were also kept at Birti, five of their boats
120 BIRTI.
being in need of repair. They were all
ordered to advance to Castle Camp on the
5th ; but no orders were issued for any ad-
vance beyond that place, pending Colonel
Butler's reconnaissance report, which did
not arrive till the following day.
A party of Royal Engineers and two com-
panies of the Black Watch, under instruc-
tions of the intelligence officers, were em-
ployed in destroying Suleiman Wad Gamr's
houses, date-palms, and sakyehs.
The Cornwalls were still in Rahami cat-
aract, and news arrived that the Gordons
had passed through Kab el Abd cataract.
A boat officer was sent back from Birti to
pilot them on, and to relieve the one who
had brought them through Edermih and
Kab el Abd.
General Earle hoped now to be able to
move the Cornwalls forward from Birti on
the 6th ; and he therefore gave orders to
Colonel Colvile to instruct the Vakeel to
cross the Mudir's troops over on the 6th
to the left bank, with a view to their re-
k
HALT, AND ADVANCE OF THE ENEMY. 121
maining in occupation of the Monassir
country during our advance to Berber.
The General also, thinking that the
Vakeel could be of great use to him in his
advance as far as Salamat by collecting
information, directed Colvile to request
him to cross over with an escort on the
5th, in readiness to advance with our head-
quarters on the 6th. Colvile was himself
to come over, and to bring with him
Suleiman's uncles and some other sheikhs
who had surrendered to the Vakeel. This
was in compliance with Lord Wolseley's
orders that we were to take on to Berber
all sheikhs who might come into our camp,
as hostages for the good behaviour of their
people in our rear.
Colvile heliographed back that the Va-
keel did not wish to go any farther, say-
ing his doing so would be contrary to
the Mudir's orders, and that he was tired.
He wished, however, to speak to General
Earle, and would come across next day,
bringing Abu Bekr and Wad el Turki.
122 BIRTI.
He could not bring Omar, as he had run
away,
sth Feb. On the morning of the 5th General Earle
sent over to say, through Colvile, that he
was sorry the Vakeel found it inconvenient,
but must insist on his coming over and
accompanying the General to Salamat. In
reply, the Vakeel wrote a letter saying his
advancing to Salamat would be useless, as
he did not know the country ; that he had
orders from the Mudir to collect taxes at
Hamdab and in the cataracts by the help
of the Mudir's troops ; that if he advanced
to Salamat, their collection would be de-
layed. He could not disobey the Mudir's
orders ; and he thought his remaining where
he was with the troops would have a good
effect, preventing the Monassir from re-
turning.
General Earle still insisting upon his
point, the Vakeel at last gave way, con-
senting to bring his troops over, and to
accompany the General, but asserting it
would be impossible for him to start until
HALT, AND ADVANCE OF THE ENEMY. 123
the 8th. General Earle then consented to
give him an interview, and he came over
to our camp. He protested with such
apparent show of reason the utter useless-
ness of his going to Salamat, that General
Earle consented to allow him to remain at
Birti with the Mudir s troops, on condition
that they crossed over on the morrow.
To this the Vakeel consented promptly ;
and General Earle telegraphed to Lord
Wolseley, asking him to urge the Mudir
to insist on their remaining at Birti, at least
till we should reach Abu Hamed.
With him the Vakeel had brought Abu
Bekr, Suleiman Wad Gamr's uncle, and
Wad el Turki ; and they now remained in
our camp. It was known that neither Abu
Bekr nor Omar had been on friendly terms
with Naaman, Suleiman's father, and they
were not supposed to be on friendly terms
with Suleiman himself; but a very com-
promising letter was found on Abu Bekr's
person, written shortly after the murder by
Suleiman, bidding Abu Bekr come to the
124 BIRTI.
council to be held, and speaking of having
been occupied with the disposal of the
prisoners from the steamer. However,
Abu Bekr had come in under a promise of
safety ; and as he was not actively a partic-
ipator in the murder, we were able to treat
him kindly, and use him as a guide.
Abd el Rahman Wad el Turki was a
sheikh of the Shagiyeh tribe. He had
fought against the Mudir's troops at Deb-
beh and at Korti, having raised a small
force. After the defeat at Korti, he had
retired to the rocks above Edermih cata-
ract, and had collected another force there.
He had remained there till our advance,
when he retired to Birti, and joined the
Robatab under Moussa, bringing with him
a contingent of about lOO men. He was a
great partisan of the Mahdi.
Colonel Butler's reconnaissance reports
having arrived during the night of the 4th.
General Earle informed him, on the morn-
ing of the 5th, that he did not wish any
advance in boats beyond Castle Camp
HALT, AND ADVANCE OF THE ENEMY. 1 25
until the two channels in front had been
more thoroughly examined. '' Lieut. -Colonel
AUeyne/* the instructions run, ** should push
boat-reconnaissance up both channels until
he has discovered which is the best, and
should examine the ground with a view to
sites for camping, while you are making an
extended reconnaissance towards the front."
The Black Watch and remainder of the
Staffords were sent on to Castle Camp, and
Colonel Butler was told to order the ad-
vance of the Staffords on the following day
to such point as he might consider best
after reconnaissance and consultation with
AUeyne. Butler was requested to make
his reconnaissance early, so that his report
might arrive before sundown, as no further
orders would be issued till it arrived. With
General Earle's memorandum, a boy, who
had been captured in the Mahdi's uniform,
and who said that he had deserted from
the rebel camp at Shukook, was sent to act
as a guide.
While the Staffords and Black Watch
126 BIRTI.
were advancing to Castle Camp, the Corn-
walls were arriving at Birti ; and as they
arrived, they were employed completing the
destruction of the houses, palm-trees, and
sakyehs of Suleiman Wad Gamr, his uncle
Omar, and other prominent rebels. Noth-
ing is easier than to destroy a sakyeh, its
timber and rope burning freely. We
found that by an occasional charge of gun-
cotton, and by the free use of pickaxes, we
could rapidly level the largest mud -built
house to the ground. But the destruction
of palm-trees is a difficult matter. The
tough fibrous bark blunts the axes, and the
tree will not burn freely ; nevertheless some
280 date-palms were cut down or utterly
destroyed by fire.
The Commissariat continued their search
for grain ; and it was reported to me that
our horses were now rationed with grain
up to the 6th March, and our natives with
flour to 23d March, without counting six tons
of unground wheat to be used for either
natives or horses as most required. From
HALT, AND ADVANCE OF THE ENEMY. 127
Hamdab to Birti no supplies of any kind,
except growing forage, had been obtain-
able either by capture or purchase. The
country had been a desolate waste; the
people had buried their grain in the desert,
and driven off their cattle. By no offers
could they be induced to bring even milk
for sale, and by no promise of wage could
they be tempted to engage in our service
as labourers.
That afternoon, about four o'clock, a ci-
pher-telegram arrived from General Wood,
who, we thus learned, was acting as Chief
of the Staff in place of Sir R. Duller.
General Earle and I deciphered it to-
gether. It ran thus : ''4th Feb., 8.50 p.m. —
I am ordered by Lord Wolseley to inform
you that, to his deep regret, Khartoum was
found by Wilson to be in possession of
enemy. Wilson in returning was wrecked,
but steamer has gone for him, and there is
no apparent danger for him. You are to
halt where you are until further orders/'
It is needless to say what we felt. Any
128 BIRTI.
thought for ourselves was swallowed up in
grief for what we could only interpret to
mean Gordon s certain death. Both of us
felt, too, how great the shock would be to
Lord Wolseley ; and to me there was a
peculiar sting in the fact of this blow com-
ing upon the anniversary of the capture of
Coomassie. But action had to be at once
taken, and immediate orders were sent to
Colonel Butler that none of his troops were
to move without further orders, — that he
was to patrol with small bodies of cavalry
only, and hold all his troops ready to move
at short notice. Colvile was instructed that
the Mudir s troops were not to cross on the
morrow; and, convinced in his own mind,
as I was in mine, that we should be at once
recalled. General Earle would not bring the
Gordon Highlanders to Birti, but sent back
his aide-de-camp with orders to them to close
up at Gamra, construct a zareeba, and halt
there till further orders. The officer sent
with the order failed to find them, as they
had not reached Gamra, where he fully ex-
HALT, AND ADVANCE OF THE ENEMY. 1 29
pected they would be ; and darkness came
on before he could go farther. The order,
however, reached them on the following
morning early. The contents of the tele-
gram were kept strictly secret, no one but
General Earle and myself knowing the
cause of the orders to halt.
The evening brought us the report of
Colonel Butler's reconnaissance. It has a
singular interest by the light of subsequent
events. He had proceeded in the direction
of the Shukook pass, getting out to the river
whenever practicable. He had ascended a
high range of hills near the upper end of the
large island (Dulka) about six to seven miles
distant from his camp — a range which he
described as continued across the several
branches of the river, its highest point being
attained in a large dome-shaped hill on the
island of Boni, which overlaps Dulka. For
more than an hour previously, the native boy
we had sent him had constantly been inform-
ing him that Shukook was only a very short
distance ahead — on several occasions point-
I
I30 BIRTI.
ing out what he called the entrance to the
pass, amid the rugged surrounding rocks.
Now, however, from the top of the hill he
pointed out a place two miles distant as the
real Shukook, and asserted that a lower
range lying between him and it was im-
mediately over the enemy's camp. Colonel
Butler had found one or two sites which
would do for a camp. The ridge which he
had ascended was that on which, five days
later, we fought the action of Kirbekan.
Alleyne had proceeded up the southern
channel to the foot of the rapids, and then
walked on the shore of the island nearly
two miles farther. He pronounced the
channel practicable. The northern channel
was a maze of islands, rocks, and rapid
water.
In acknowledging his instructions not to
move till further orders, Butler reported
later that his camel-corps patrol had fallen
in with the enemy, exchanged shots, brought
in a prisoner, and captured some camels,
goats, and cattle. We afterwards found
HALT, AND ADVANCE OF THE ENEMY. 131
they had come across a party of armed vil-
lagers tending their flocks in a desert wady.
Before the arrival of the telegram telling
us of the fall of Khartoum, a long telegram
had been sent to Lord Wolseley detailing
the position of the troops and the latest
news of the enemy. General Earle said
in this that he did not anticipate resistance
this side of Abu Hamed, and would push
on as rapidly as possible, consistently with
the necessary precautions. " The road be-
yond this,*' he said, " is as bad as the river
— a tangled mass of rocks, quite unsuited
for mounted troops, and affording neither
good anchorage nor good ground for bivou-
acs.'* We had informed Colonel Rundle at
Korosko of our advance beyond Birti hav-
ing commenced ; and in addition to our
previous urgent demands for boat-repairing
materials and paint, horse-shoes and nails,
to be sent to meet us at Abu Hamed, we
now added a moving appeal for trousers,
telegraphing : ** Men's and many officers'
trousers in rags ; not sufficient for decency."
132 BIRTI.
Lord Wolseley was now informed that his
telegram had been received, and that his in-
structions were being carried out ; and Rundle
was advised that the probable date of our
arrival at Salamat, which we had given as
the loth February, must now be postponed.
6th Feb. Early on the 6th I rode over to Colonel
Butler's camp, and, by General Earless per-
mission, told him, under the seal of secrecy,
the contents of yesterday's telegram. General
Earle rode back to Gamra and visited the
Gordon Highlanders.
All the troops had a day of thorough rest,
much needed after the unending labours of
the past fortnight. It gave them the oppor-
tunity of washing their clothes and trying to
patch the particoloured rags they were wear-
ing as trousers. General Earle talked over
with me the arrangements to be made for
the return to Korti, which we confidently
expected would be ordered ; and we sent a
party of the Egyptian camel corps back to
Abu Dom to act as carriers of messages,
requesting the commandants there to send
HALT, AND ADVANCE OF THE ENEMY. 133
US all messages from Lord Wolseley in
duplicate — one copy by two of our own
camel-men, one copy by a native messenger.
And as our stay at Birti might possibly
be prolonged, we made sanitary arrange-
ments for supply of water, &c., as for a
standing camp.
In the evening Colvile reported that a
man had just come in with the news that the
enemy, who were in Shukook, had advanced
to Kirbekan ; that they were not a thousand
strong, and had about 1 50 rifles. They had
no outposts at night, but sent out a patrol
before daylight. He said they had chosen
their present camp as being easier to escape
from than Shukook in case of defeat. This
information was at once sent to Colonel
Butler.
On the 7th the troops were employed in im- 7th Feb.
proving the sanitary condition and watering
arrangements of the camps. A quantity of
grain was discovered by our foraging-parties
on Ishishi island, and was brought over to
our camp. We had now not only full loads
134 BIRTI.
of grain for all our camels, but were able
out of the surplus to issue a small grain-
ration to the camels which had hitherto
been subsisting on growing crops only.
Our camels were in fair condition, but from
want of sufficient work were becoming soft,
and the saddle-galls from which these un-
fortunate animals seem seldom or never
free were in consequence not so healthy.
We found it necessary to exercise the camels
regularly, which had a better effect on their
health than even the issue of grain. Butler
sent out patrols to the scene of the camel
corps skirmish of the 5th, without finding
any trace of the enemy.
8th Feb. On the morning of the 8th we sent to the
Chief of the Staff a telegram stating the
exact state of our supplies, based upon re-
turns obtained during the halt. We told
him that the total strength drawing rations
last night was 2966 officers and men, and
fixed the exact number of days* supply of
each article remaining for that number ; and
we requested him so to arrange that the
HALT, AND ADVANCE OF THE ENEMY. 1 35
supplies sent by Rundle to Korosko should
equalise the various articles of food. We
added that we had thirty days' grain for
our 140 horses, but none for our 580
camels; that the latter had hitherto done
well on the green forage of the country,
but that a prolonged halt would make it
very difficult to feed them. Soap we espe-
cially asked for to be sent up by first con-
voy. We had only thirty days' supply
remaining; and many of the boats were
full of lice, which were infesting the clothes
of the men, and in some cases of the
officers.
136
CHAPTER VIII.
KIRBEKAN — RECONNAISSANCE AND
PREPARATION.
8th Feb. At 8 A.M. Oil Sunday the 8th, General
Earle received a message from General
Wood, dated i A.M., 7th: " Lord Wolseley,'*
it said, *' is communicating with Government
as to future operations, but he wishes you to
push on to Abu Hamed, and await further
orders there."
Orders were at once issued and despatched
for the Gordons to advance immediately by
the northern channel to Birti, and for the
Staffords, covered by the mounted troops,
to advance from Castle Camp to a point to
be selected by Colonel Butler. General
Earle did not wish to commit more than
RECONNAISSANCE AND PREPARATION. 137
one battalion to the rapids, until their nature
was more thoroughly known, and therefore
he left the Black Watch at Castle Camp.
Wishing to close up the Gordons nearer to
the Corn walls, he left the latter also for the
day at Birti. The Black Watch and a wing
of the Cornwalls were ordered to advance
on the 9th, and the Mudir's troops to cross
over to the left bank.
I rode over with the orders to Castle
Camp, and found the men in their red coats,
after church parade. Within half an hour
Alley ne and the first boats were off, and
the cavalry scouts were advancing along
the bank.
Butler, taking command of the whole ad-
vanced guard, left the Staffords at the head
of the first rapid, and directed Colonel Eyre
to make his camp on Dulka island. He
then advanced with Major Flood and twenty
Hussars along the left bank. At 2.30 p.m.
his scouts fell in with the enemy, posted on
some rocky ground, all of which had been
patrolled by our mounted troops on the 5th.
138 KIRBEKAN.
Their right rested on the river, and they
were dotted about clumps of rock com-
manding the track by which the cavalry
were advancing. Our men took up a posi-
tion opposite them and fired a few volleys,
which made them leave the front faces of
the rocky knolls, but they still held their
sides and summits. About 4 p.m. four ex-
ploring boats arrived by river just below the
cavalry, and Butler landed two boats' crews
and fired some volleys. Colonel Butler esti-
mated those who had shown themselves as
about 200 in number. Only about ten rifles
had opened fire, but he had seen many
spear-heads. At the approach of sunset
Butler retired to Castle Camp, the enemy
following him as far as the most advanced
position which he had held. The boats fell
back to Colonel Eyres camp on Dulka
island.
Colonel Butler reported the position occu-
pied by the enemy as being about two miles
from Colonel Eyre's camp on Dulka island,
with the river between ; and he considered
RECONNAISSANCE AND PREPARATION. 139
that the Staffords could .be moved to the
spot where he engaged the enemy in less
than two hours, and the Black Watch from
Castle Camp in six hours. Colonel Butler
said that he would cover the ground for the
Staffords landing next day with his mounted
troops, and then move the battalion to the
left bank, bringing the Black Watch also to
the same place, unless otherwise ordered.
He asked for two guns to be sent early
next day to Castle Camp ; and in his report
stated that the enemy's right and rear was
within easy range of Dulka island, so that
guns taken across the river by boat, and
carried about two miles along the island,
could take the position in reverse. He sent
his staff ofificer, Lieutenant Pirie, with the
report.
On receipt of this report at 10 p.m., and
after questioning Lieutenant Pirie, General
Earle decided that he would himself recon-
noitre the position on the following day.
He ordered the two guns asked for to Castle
Camp, but did not wish them sent over to
I40 KIRBEKAN.
Dulka island. He told Colonel Butler that
he would leave Birti at 6.30 a.m. for Castle
Camp, and directed that an officer should
be left there to guide him to the position
where he would find Colonel Butler. He
approved of the proposal to move the Staf-
fords and Black Watch to the open ground
in rear of the position opposite the enemy
occupied by the cavalry ; and impressed the
importance of great care in effecting the
crossing of the Staffbrds, so that it should
be impossible for them to be attacked while
landing, in case the enemy should advance
and compel our cavalry to retire,
9th Feb. On the morning of the 9th, the following
instructions were sent to Colonel Colvile :
the Mudir's troops, after crossing the river,
were to take up a position out of rifle-range
of our Birti camp. Headquarters were about
to advance, but half a battalion of the Corn-
walls would remain at Birti, where the Gor-
dons were expected to arrive that day.
Should they do so, all our troops would
clear out of Birti on the morning of the
RECONNAISSANCE AND PREPARATION. 141
loth, and Colonel Colvile should himself
then join General Earle's headquarters.
Before leaving, Colvile was to inform the
Vakeel that he and the Mudir's troops were
to remain in occupation of the Monassir
country till further orders, — General Earle
relying upon the Vakeel to obtain and for-
ward to us supplies of cattle and grain, to
send us information of the movements and
intentions of the enemy, and to forward our
messages to and from Abu Dom.
By 1 1 A.M. the Mudir's troops had crossed
and bivouacked opposite their former camp.
Shortly after landing, they found the moun-
tain-gun from Colonel Stewards steamer.
It was spiked, and the sight, spokes of one
wheel, and cap-squares were missing.
General Earle's start from Birti was
somewhat delayed ; and when we moved on
from Castle Camp, the officer sent to guide
us unfortunately could not find the way, and
lost himself amongst the rocks, so that we
did not reach the ground where the Staffords
were to encamp until nearly mid-day.
142 KIRBEKAN.
Meanwhile the mounted troops had
pushed forward, and had occupied with
their advanced posts the rocky hillocks, or
koppies, as they are called in South Africa,
which they had occupied yesterday, and
found the enemy still in the same position
as before. Colonel Butler then sent for the
Staffords.
General Earle, accompanied by his staff,
then personally examined the enemy s posi-
tion from the rocks upon which our cavalry
vedettes were posted, about 800 yards
distant. Immediately in front of us the
enemy held some rocky koppies about 50
to 80 feet in height, their right being di-
rectly over the river. Between two of these
koppies ran the road from Birti to Salamat.
We could see that they had built stone
sconces, or breastworks, among the rocks,
and completely commanded with their rifles
both road and river. They must clearly be
turned out of that before we could advance
to Abu Hamed.
Running parallel to the low rocky koppies
RECONNAISSANCE AND PREPARATION. 143
above-named, but to the enemy*s left rear,
and some 600 yards behind the koppies, and
ending abruptly 600 yards from the river,
was a very remarkable ridge about 300 feet
high, presenting on the side next to us a
steep slope like the moraine of a glacier,
out of which at the summit projected a
ridge of white marble rocks, as the teeth
project from the jawbone of a skeleton.
This was the ridge ascended by Colonel
Butler on the 5th. All along its summit we
could see men with flags and spear-heads
moving about among the rocks. Still it
was evident that these two positions were
not capable of holding a large body of
men ; and we were disposed to believe them
held by an outpost some 300 to 400 strong,
and that we should find the enemy emerge
in force from behind the hills on our ad-
vancing to attack them.
There were four ways of attacking the
position. First, the direct attack upon the
koppies, aided perhaps by flanking fire
from Dulka island. This would involve
144 KIRBEKAN.
heavy loss, and would be the least effectual,
as the enemy, when beaten, would retreat
directly along the river, through the broken
ground, to the Shukook pass. Secondly,
an advance through the valley, between the
range of koppies and the marble-topped
high ridge. This would turn the koppies ;
and General Earle inclined to the belief, in
which I shared, that if once the enemy in
the koppies found themselves outflanked,
and liable to have their retreat cut off, they
would retreat. Thirdly, to advance upon
the marble-topped ridge, and storm it,
bringing fire from it to bear afterwards
upon the koppies below, while we sent a
force to attack them. Fourthly, provided
the country would lend itself to the idea,
to move to our right under cover of the
broken ground, and march completely round
the marble-topped ridge, which was only
about a mile long, and move round its rear
to the attack both of it and of the koppies.
Colonel Butler was sent at 4 p.m. to make
a wide detour round the ridge, and see if
RECONNAISSANCE AND PREPARATION. 14S
there was a fair road for infantry and camels
by which we could thus turn the position.
On his return he reported that we could
turn the position by an easy march through
a wide sandy wady, and that he had noted
a road by which we could approach the
wady from our camp without exposing our-
selves to any great extent. This latter
plan of advance was therefore decided up-
on by the General ; and as the enemy did
not appear to be in great force, it was re-
solved to attack him the following morning,
with such troops as we had ready to our
hand.
Sending over to Castle Camp for the two
guns to come on, and also for the senior
medical officer, with such assistance as he
might require, and having informed him of
what was in contemplation, we then pro-
ceeded to organise the details for the mor-
row's fight.
By sunset the whole of the Staffords, with
two sections of the field -hospital, and the
headquarters and seven companies of the
K
i
146 KIRBEKAN.
Black Watch, had reached their bivouac, a
short mile from the enemy's position. One
company of the Black Watch was absent.
Having taken the wrong channel, and been
fired upon from the right bank, it had re-
turned to Castle Camp, and bivouacked
there with the wing of the Cornwalls, who
arrived there from Birti. The two guns
arrived, and the senior medical officer, with
his staff and certain necessary appliances ;
and the following dispositions for the attack
were made.
One company of the Black Watch, under
Lieut-Colonel Eden, with Major Sandwith
as his staff officer, was to remain in the
zareeba, to guard the boats and baggage.
All infantry baggage to be packed in the
boats by 6.30 a.m. ; all other baggage and
baggage-animals to be parked on the low
shore, in front of the boats. All headquarter
servants, departmental and unarmed men, to
remain with the baggage. The boat of the
Royal Navy, with its Catling gun so dis-
posed as to sweep the shore and river up-
RECONNAISSANCE AND PREPARATION. 147
Stream, to be under Lieut-Colonel Eden's
command.
The Staffords and six companies Black
Watch, with the two guns, to parade in suf-
ficient time to march off the ground at
seven o'clock. Troops in red, Highlanders
in kilts. The men to breakfast before par-
ade, and carry one day's rations of meat and
biscuit. All water-bottles to be full on
marching off. Each man to carry sixty
rounds of ammunition, and each battalion
to have two camels, each carrying four
boxes of reserve ammunition, making 4800
rounds of reserve ammunition for each bat-
talion. The guns to have two ammunition-
camels for each gun. Commanding officers,
two wing field-officers, and the adjutant of
each battalion, to be mounted.
Each battalion to have eight stretchers
carried by sixteen of its unarmed men, with
four men in reserve as bearers. A detach-
ment of the field - hospital, with three
camels carrying surgical and hospital equip-
ment, to parade with the infantry ; also two
148 KIRBEKAN.
camels to carry water for the field -hos-
pital.
The Hussars and camel corps to parade
separately under Colonel Butler.
General Brackenbury, Major Boyle, Major
Slade, Captain Beaumont, and Lieutenant St
Aubyn to accompany General Earle. All
other staff officers to remain with the bag-
gage, except Lieut. -Colonel Alley ne, who
was instructed to take command of two com-
panies of the Staffords and the two guns,
and to occupy with them the rocky position
held yesterday by our cavalry outposts, and
to hold the enemy in check in front, attract-
ing their attention in that direction while
our flank movement was in progress.
During the afternoon the enemy opened
fire from a small island above Dulka island,
and one of their shots having struck one of
our vedettes, a company of the Staffords
was sent across in boats to occupy the
island and bivouack there. To reach the
island, the boats had to ascend a nasty
RECONNAISSANCE AND PREPARATION. 149
rapid just opposite our bivouac. All fires
were put out at "lights out," and it was
ordered that none should be lit before rd-
veilU on the following day.
About 3 P.M. a telegram arrived from
Lord Wolseley to the following effect —
dated 9 a.m., 8th : The Government have
decided that the Mahdi's power at Khar-
toum must be overthrown. This most
probably means a campaign here next cold
weather, and certainly the retention in the
Soudan of all troops now here. A strong
force of all arms goes as soon as possible to
Suakim to crush Osman Digma. We must
now take Berber. BuUer will now take
Metemmeh. Let me know early the date
you calculate upon reaching Berber, so that
BuUer's force may co-operate with you.
At 5.45 P.M. a long letter arrived from
Lord Wolseley to General Earle, dated 2
P.M., 7th. It was almost entirely in cipher,
and I sat up till late in the night decipher-
ing its contents. In it Lord Wolseley in-
I
ISO KIRBEKAN.
formed General Earle of the questions he
had addressed to the Cabinet, the replies
he had received, and his further queries.
It amplified the contents of his telegram
received that afternoon. It told us that he
had not yet heard of Wilson's safety ; and
in it there was this sentence : " I congratu-
late you upon the progress you have made,
although I am naturally very sorry the
enemy have not tested the temper of your
steel. However, let us hope their courage
may be stiffened by the fall of Khartoum,
and that you may strike them hard yet
before you reach Berber." Hope soon to
be realised !
General Earle talked this letter over with
me until a very late hour, and decided not
to reply to it till after the action of the
morrow. Two of our spies came in, and
professed to have been unable to see any
trace of the enemy in the position they had
held during the day ; and we retired to rest,
half fearing they might again give us the
RECONNAISSANCE AND PREPARATION. 151
slip, as they had done ten days before at
Birti. But we were needlessly anxious.
We did not then know that their courage
had been stiffened — that they had heard
of the fall of Khartoum.
i
152
CHAPTER IX.
KIRBEKAN THE FIGHT.
The night passed without incident. At
loth Feb. the earliest dawn our cavalry vedettes were
again in their position of yesterday, and as
soon as the growing daylight enabled them
to see clearly, they reported the enemy still
in position — good news which soon spread
through the camp. The men were tired of
the delays caused by the precautions neces-
sary in the presence of an enemy who
escaped just as we were within striking
distance ; and those holding responsible
positions in the force felt it to be of the
utmost importance to meet the enemy soon,
and get the chance of teaching them a
lesson which would prevent their meeting
THE FIGHT. 1 53
US again for some time, thus clearing the
way for our advance to the main objective
of our column — Berber.
The company on outpost-duty at Dulka
island was recalled, baggage was parked
according to orders, the naval boat was
placed in position, the camels were loaded
to accompany the column. The men
breakfasted and fell in on parade, looking
smart and thoroughly workmanlike. After
inspection, Lieut. -Colonel Eden's company
of the Black Watch was set to work form-
ing a small zareeba ; two companies of the
Staffordshire Regiment were told off to
escort the two guns under Lieut-Colonel
Alleyne; and as soon as we saw the dis-
positions for defence of the zareeba fairly
complete, and Alleyne's two companies and
guns marched off to occupy the ground held
by our cavalry outposts, with orders not to
open fire till we had reached the outer
flank of the great ridge round which we
were to move, the column marched off. It
was then about a quarter past seven. Just
154 KIRBEKAN.
before we left the zareeba, General Earle
directed me to send back to inform the
English correspondent of a foreign news-
paper, who had made his way up with the
Gordon Highlanders, that, owing to the
necessity for economising all food for man
and beast, and in view of all spare whaler
accommodation being required for transport
of sick, he could not allow any civilian
correspondents to accompany the column.
We marched in line of half-battalion
columns, at an interval of two companies,
the Staffords (six companies) leading, the
Black Watch (six companies) following.
Company stretcher-bearers followed their
own companies. The field-hospital camels
and reserve small-arm ammunition camels
(nine and one spare), were massed between
the Staffords and Black Watch, and moved
with the left column. The General's object
in this formation was to enable each column
to take advantage of practicable ground for
marching as long as we were moving over
the rocks, but at the same time to be able,
THE FIGHT. IS5
by closing the columns together, to get
rapidly into formation ready to form square,
or rather oblong, with the stretcher-bearers
and camels inside.
Colonel Butler led the column. The
first mile of our road lay in a north-easterly
direction over broken but hard ground ;
then we reached a wide wady of loose
deep sand, in which progress was slow
and fatiguing, and followed it till we
reached the farthest end of the marble-
topped ridge. We then, at about half-past
eight, halted for a few minutes, allowing a
few men to fall out. Not a shot had been
fired at us as yet, though our column must
have been visible from the ridge at more
than one point in its march. While here
we heard Alleyne's guns open fire.
Our front as we marched had been
covered by the cavalry ; our left flank by
the Egyptian camel corps, who lined the
edge of the broken ground opposite to the
high ridge. Colonel Butler now went on
with the cavalry scouts, and just as we were
156 KIRBEKAN.
about to continue our march, sent back to
say that the enemy were in sight on some
low rocky hills, to the number of two or
three hundred, and immediately afterwards
a second message to say the enemy were
retiring. We now marched round the
eastern end of the ridge, and turning sharp
to the left, marched through a rocky valley
in the direction of the river, with the high
ridge on our left. In front of us was a low
rocky range running at right angles to the
high ridge on which Colonel Butler had
seen the enemy. The enemy now opened
fire on us from the high ridge at about
9. 1 5 A.M., and we had two or three men hit.
General Earle, after a short farther advance,
halted the column under cover, and sent
forward one company of the Staffords to
the low range in front, and another com-
pany (C) to line the rocks on our left, and
keep down the fire from the high ridge.
The enemy not appearing immediately in
front, the column advanced about 300
yards into a valley with rocky ridges on
THE FIGHT. 1 57
every side, leaving C Company of the
Staffords engaged with the enemy on the
high ridge. The fire from this ridge now
becoming hotter, General Earle directed
Colonel Eyre to take two companies of his
regiment and endeavour to take the ridge
by its western shoulder. They advanced
under a heavy fire, and climbed about one
third of the way up the shoulder, till they
reached a cluster of rocks under which they
obtained partial shelter.
At the same time two companies of the
Black Watch descended the rocky ridge to
our right front, from whence the river was
visible about six hundred yards away; and
we could see parties of the enemy making
their way to it, and swimming over to the
opposite bank. It being then evident that
the only serious opposition we had to expect
was from the enemy remaining on the high
marble-topped ridge, and on the koppies,
whence fire was now opened on us. General
Earle ordered two companies of the Black
Watch to move to their right front towards
i
IS8 KIRBEKAN.
the river- bank, and establish themselves
there, so as to prevent all retreat in this
direction ; and the three remaining com-
panies of the Staffords and the four re-
maining companies of the Black Watch to
advance and swing round to the left, so as
to face the koppies.
It now became evident, from the fire
which was directed upon us from the
koppies, that the enemy had a considerable
body of riflemen in position there, and the
two companies of the Black Watch which
had been sent down to the river were
ordered to advance in line along the river-
bank towards the koppies, clearing it of the
enemy.
The remainder of the Black Watch and
Staffords took up a position on the rocks, at
about 800 yards, and brought a heavy fire
to bear upon the koppies. Little by little
they advanced from one vantage-point to
another, till they attained a position on the
nearest rocks to the koppies, about 400
yards distant. Between them and the
THE FIGHT. 159
koppies there was now only open ground,
swept by the enemy's fire.
General Earle now ordered the two
companies of the Black Watch nearest the
river, who had by this time come up abreast
of our main position, to advance along the
shore of the low Nile, under cover of the
high bank, and take the koppie nearest the
river from its river flank. A company
of the Staffords accompanied them, and
advancing rapidly under cover of the river-
bank, they seized the lowest rocks and then
the summit of this koppie, driving out or
killing the rebels who were there. Some
of these attempted flight by the river in the
direction of Colonel Alleyne s men and our
zareeba ; a few escaped by swimming, but
many were shot down by our men. From
the summit of this koppie now in our hands,
a flanking fire was brought to bear upon the
two main central koppies.
It was now evident that nothing more
was to be done but to assault the position,
and the order was about to be given when
(
l6o KIRBEKAN.
a body of the enemy, one of whom carried
a flag, the rest being armed with spears,
descended boldly from the heights in front,
and charged towards the nearest companies
of the Black Watch, which were somewhat
advanced towards our left front, under
Colonel Green. The troops never moved,
but the gallant Arabs were received with
so withering a fire from all sides that those
who were not killed turned and fled towards
the river. A few gained it. Our men, far
from fearing the rush, stood up to meet it,
in some cases even advanced; and they
could with difficulty be restrained from
leaving the ranks to follow the fugitives
along the river.
This episode over, the order for the
assault was given, and well responded to.
I had myself previously carried the orders
to the troops on the koppie by the river
to advance simultaneously with the front
assault, and had returned to General Earle
to the front of the position previous to the
enemy's charge. General Earle ordered
THE FIGHT. l6l
the assault to be made; and then, with pipes
playing, the Black Watch charged over the
open ground and stormed the koppies, not
stopping till they had crowned the highest
rocks. The troops on the river-side koppie
also well carried out their orders, advanc-
ing from the flank and seizing the koppie
nearest to them. Such of the enemy as
still remained fought to the last, and were
killed to a man.
The assault was over, and the two main
koppies were in our hands ; the troops were
searching the sconces and holes among the
rocks ; and there was, as there must always
be after such an effort, some need to collect
them and form them up for fresh work.
Between the crests of the two main koppies
there was a depression forming a small flat
plateau, on which was built a stone hut
some ten feet square, with a thatched roof.
General Earle was engaged in forming up
the men in the ranks on this plateau, not
more than ten yards from the hut, when a
sergeant of the Black Watch said, ** There
L
\
l62 KIRBEKAN.
are a lot of men in that hut, and they have
just shot one of our men." General Earle
ordered the roof to be set on fire ; but on
its being said that there was a quantity
of ammunition in the hut, he ordered the
roof to be pulled down, and himself ap-
proached the hut. I was close to him, and
said, " Take care, sir ; the hut is full of
men." Our men had set the roof on fire,
and my attention was attracted for a mo-
ment by seeing a native who rushed out from
the side door of the hut bayoneted by one
of our men. As I turned my head back
towards the General, I saw him fall, shot
through the head from a small square win-
dow in the hut, close to which he had ap-
proached. He lived only a few minutes,
tended to the last by his aide-de-camp
Lieutenant St .Aubyn, and by the senior
medical officer, Surgeon-Major Harvey.
The command having now devolved
upon me, I directed two companies of the
Black Watch to remain as a picket on the
koppies; and I had sent to the Staffords
THE FIGHT. 163
with a view to assembling them, when it
was brought to my knowledge that the two
companies of the Staffords sent to take the
high ridge had failed as yet to reach higher
than the cluster of rocks about one-third of
the way up ; that Colonel Eyre had been
killed, shot through the heart ; that Captain
Horsburgh and Lieutenant Colborne had
been severely wounded ; that their loss in
men had been considerable ; that their am-
munition was exhausted, except four rounds
per man, which they had reserved ; and that
the enemy was still holding the ridge. As-
sembling, therefore, four companies of the
Black Watch as a reserve at the foot of the
koppies, I sent for Lieutenant-Colonel Beale,
upon whom the command of the Staffords
had devolved, and instructed him to take
the remainder of his regiment, reinforce the
two companies on the hill with troops and
ammunition, and with the aid of the com-
pany left to watch the hill early in the day,
assault and take the position. The order
was most admirably carried out. Ascend-
l64 KIRBEKAN.
ing the steep moraine-like hill by alternate
rushes, the Staffords reached the rocky
summit, and bayoneted the enemy, who
remained there fighting to the very end.
It was now about one o'clock, and the
enemy were driven from their last position.
Meanwhile, early in the day, Colonel But-
ler, with the few Hussars at his disposal, had
struck the river above the point where we
first gained it, and had pursued scattered
groups of Arabs who were retreating along
the main river track. Half an hour later
he gained the entrance to the Shukook
pass, and in the centre of the rocky gorge
there came upon the enemy's deserted
camp, where he captured a number of
standards, and some camels and donkeys.
While there the enemy opened fire upon
the Hussars from the surrounding hills, but
without causing any casualties among our
men. Colonel Butler sent back for camel-
men to drive in the animals captured : the
message did not reach me till after the
fight, and the camel corps having then been
THE FIGHT. 165
fighting for the whole morning, I instructed
Colonel Butler to return with the cavalry
to camp. He had already anticipated this
order, driving back some of the animals
with the Hussars.
The Egyptian camel corps under Major
Marriott had done excellent service. They
had at the commencement of the day taken
up a position in front of the high ridge, and
protected the flank of the infantry in its
advance. In that position they remained
throughout the day, assisting by their fire
to keep down the fire from the heights, and
shooting, or in some instances pursuing and
capturing, the rebels who attempted to
escape towards the east, along the southern
slope of the hill. Their conduct was wit-
nessed by the Staffords, who remained so
long upon the shoulder of the hill, and was
the theme of much praise. When the Staf-
fords stormed the hill one Egyptian soldier
charged up the hill, all alone, on their ex-
treme right — a most gallant feat. They
had two men killed and one wounded.
i
l66 KIRBEKAN.
Leaving, as already said, two companies
of the Black Watch on the summit of the
koppies, and sending two companies to
bivouac on a high Nile island at the head
of the rapid, about a mile and a half up the
river, I ordered the remainder of the troops
back to camp.
During the action the wounded had been
collected, as far as possible, by the stretcher-
bearers into groups under shelter from fire ;
dressing-stations had been established at
successive points as we moved on ; and
restoratives, such as beef-tea prepared on
the field, champagne, and brandy, were ad-
ministered to the wounded during and after
the action. Owing to the nature of the
ground, both medical officers and wounded
had been frequently exposed to considerable
cross-fire. The medical officers of corps
had accompanied their men into action, and
the medical officers of the dressing-station
gave their services freely wherever most
required. As soon as the action was over,
additional men were told off as stretcher-
THE FIGHT. 167
bearers, and the wounded were brought
into our camp. The bodies of General
Earle, Colonel Eyre, and Colonel Coveney,
were conveyed back to our camp ; the other
brave dead were buried together by the
river-bank, near the field where they had
fallen.
At sunset the bodies of General Earle,
Colonel Eyre, and Colonel Coveney were
' buried side by side in deep graves near the
foot of a solitary palm-tree ; and the hill of
Kirbekan echoed back the boom of the
minute-guns paying their solemn tribute to
the memory of three soldiers, each a type
of what the English officer should be.
Orders were then issued for the half-
battalion of the Cornwalls, which had ar-
rived in camp during the day, together with
the two companies of the Staffords and the
. two companies of the Black Watch which
had not been engaged in the flank march,
to advance by river in the morning, and
occupy the position at the head of the
rapid, relieving the two companies of the
l68 KIRBEKAN.
Black Watch there, and for the remainder
of the Cornwalls who had reached Castle
Camp to come on to our camp. I wished
now to put the Cornwalls and Gordons in
front ; but the latter, to my disappointment,
had not got farther than Birti, their progress
through the northern channel of the Ra-
hami cataract having been, owing to the
falling Nile, slower than that of the other
troops who had traversed the same passage.
They were ordered to come on as soon as
possible.
It was a busy night. There was much to
be thought of and arranged. I sent off a
telegraphic summary and a written despatch,
and a letter to Lord Wolseley, in which I
said, *' Our troops having turned them out
of these positions, must have a great effect
upon the spirit of the enemy. I sincerely
trust it may prevent our having to fight
our way to Abu Hamed, as if we have
many such fights as to-day, we shall be
seriously embarrassed how to carry on our
THE FIGHT. 169
wounded. If it enables us to pass the
Shukook pass, which is still before us, and
to get through the rapids ahead without
more fighting, it will indeed be a valuable
day for us."
We had not purchased our victory cheaply.
General Earle, Colonel Eyre, Colonel Cove-
ney, and nine men killed ; four officers and
forty-four men wounded, made a total of
sixty, — ^a serious loss in our little force of
twelve hundred. It had been most difficult
to estimate either the enemy s strength or
his loss with accuracy. I do not believe that
when we marched to attack the position there
were more than about eight hundred men
holding it. Half of these made their escape
before we attacked ; a few more during the
fight. The remainder were simply desperate
men, resolved to fight to the last, and to
sell their lives dearly. They were in what
might fairly have been called an impregnable
position, and they were thoroughly well
armed, — a position out of which they could
I/O KIRBEKAN.
not have been dislodged by any but first-
rate troops. We have all heard of ** a posi-
tion which ten men could hold against a
thousand." I honestly confess that the
expression conveys exactly what was in my
mind when first I saw the hills we had to
attack.
In my despatch written that night, I gave
the probable loss of the enemy as not less
than a hundred and fifty. This I altered
to two hundred after going over the ground
next day with Colonel Butler. We counted
sixty dead bodies on the main koppies,
sixty-five on the razor-backed ridge ; others
were lying below ; there were many whom
we could not have seen ; many had been
shot crossing the river : and I am satisfied
now that the larger figure does not over-
state the enemy's loss.
Not less valuable than the effect of this
action upon the enemy's morale was its
effect upon the spirits of our own men. It
inspired them with great confidence. The
1
THE FIGHT. 171
idea that unless in square formation they
could not stand against Arabs had been to
a certain extent prevalent : to-day the troops
had learnt that they could beat their enemy
in hand-to-hand combats in the rocks, fight-
ing in loose order.
172
CHAPTER X.
THE SHUKOOK PASS.
nth Feb. On the morning of the nth, the troops
began to pass through the troublesome
rapid commencing opposite our camp, and
a wing of the Corn walls, two companies
of the Black Watch, and two of the Staf-
fords — all troops which had not been en-
gaged on the previous day — reached the
high Nile island at Kirbekan, and camped
there, relieving the companies of the Black
Watch who had bivouacked there the pre-
ceding night. The mounted troops covered
the advance, and Butler reconnoitred to
the entrance of, and some distance into, the
Shukook pass, seeing no sign of any enemy.
The other wing of the Cornwalls, the artil-
THE SHUKOOK PASS. 173
lery and convoy, arrived in our camp oppo-
site Dulka island, and the Gordons reached
Castle Camp.
Now was the time when a strong force of
cavalry would have been invaluable. To
push on after the enemy with cavalry, and
at once seize and hold the upper end of the
Shukook pass, before he could rally from
his defeat, was the proper course to pursue.
It could not be done with infantry, for
the infantry were tied to their boats, and
every man who marched a yard beyond his
boat, had to be marched back again to it
sooner or later. As for mounted troops,
all that could be spared, after leaving the
strictly necessary guards with the main
camp, the artillery and convoy, were about
sixty Hussars, and forty to fifty of the Egyp-
tian camel corps ; and to push on so small
a force to encamp at the far side of this
long and difficult pass without any infantry
support, would have been to court disaster.
The mounted troops, therefore, fell back to
the bivouac at Kirbekan.
174 THE SHUKOOK PASS.
Slade examined nine prisoners whom we
had taken in the action of yesterday, and
reported that, from their statements, the
enemy who had held the position consisted
of 400 men of the Robatab tribe, under
Sheikh Moussa Wad Abu Hegel ; 200 men
from Berber, under Sheikh Ali Wad Hus-
sein and Hamid Lekalik, cousin and brother
respectively of Abdul Majid Wad el Leka-
lik; 300 of the Monassir tribe, under Sheikh
el Hagid ; and several slaves and villagers
from their lands, — making a total of about
1500 to 2000 men, of whom the Robatab
and Berber men alone had held the position
so stoutly defended. All the sheikhs above-
named, with the exception of El Hagid,
were killed during the action, Moussa's
body having been identified by one of the
prisoners. The main camp of the enemy
was at the upper end of the Shukook pass,
the camp taken by our mounted troops at
the lower end of the pass being only an
advanced post. The prisoners stated that
neither Suleiman Wad Gamr nor Abdul
THE SHUKOOK PASS. 175
Majid Wad el Lekalik had been present at
the action, the former being at Salamat, the
latter at the main camp. They said that
their losses had been very heavy, only
those who escaped by swimming the river
having been saved. They all agreed in
stating that after the enemy left Birti, they
had retired to the spot where the main
camp now was, at the upper end of the
Shukook pass, and that they had returned
and occupied the position at Kirbekan on
the 6th, strengthening the position by rein-
forcements from the main camp on the even-
ing of the 9th.
At the Vakeel's request we sent two of
our prisoners to be examined by him at
Birti, he thinking that he would get more
information out of them than we could.
His report practically confirmed Slade*s :
he estimated the numbers present at 2O30,
and the killed at 700. He expressed his
opinion that we should meet with no more
opposition till we reached Berber.
The prisoners also said that they had
176 THE SHUKOOK PASS.
heard there were 2000 men under Hassan
Wad Mahommed at Abu Hamed, consisting
of Ababdeh and Robatab men, and men
from Berber. They had converted the Gov-
ernment shoona (grain-store) into a barrack :
it is in the middle of the town, five hundred
yards from the river, and has a mud wall
ten to twelve feet high, and two feet thick.
They had constructed no other defences.
A spy who had been sent from Korti to
Berber arrived in our camp, according to
his orders, on his way back to Korti. He
had left Berber about a week before. This
was his account of the state of affairs there.
The guns which had been on the left bank
at Robush had been removed — one to Me-
temmeh, and one to the right bank at Ber-
ber. Mohammed el Kheir had moved his
own property across the river to the right
bank. Many Berber men had been killed
in the fight at Abu Klea, and the news of
that fight had spread terror through the
town. Most of the men now at Berber
were Magrafaab Jaalins. The Hadendowas
THE SHUKOOK PASS. l^^
and the Bisharin Arabs from the Atbara
had been asked to come and fight the Eng-
lish, but had refused. Nour Anga, the
governor of Metemmeh, had sent to the
Mahdi for ammunition, but it had been
refused to him. The gun at Berber was
out of order. Food was scarce in Berber,
and the spy professed himself convinced
that, when the English approached, the
Jaalins between Berber and Metemmeh
would surrender.
By this time I had learnt by experience
that native reports might generally be
classed under two heads : those of spies,
who said what they thought we should
like to hear ; and those of professed desert-
ers, which were intended to frighten us.
We had constantly heard from our spies
that the tribes were frightened ; that the
Mahdi's troops were deserting him ; that
this tribe and that had refused to join him ;
that the enemy would not fight, but join us
when we advanced. Of these this spy's
account was a specimen. We as constantly
M
178 THE SHUKOOK PASS.
heard from men who came to us, profess-
ing to be deserters, greatly exaggerated
accounts of the enemy's numbers and deter-
mination to fight. Of these, the deserter
who had come in to our camp at Mishami
was a specimen. In fact, the only infor-
mation of value was what our own recon-
naissance told us, and what was supplied
to us through Colvile by the Vakeel.
That evening Colonel Butler rode back
to my camp, bringing with him an Arabic
document. It had been found, he told
me, by a private of the Cornwalls in the
saddle-bag of a donkey, which was found
grazing on the bank near the Kirbekan
camp. There being a very strict column-
order that all papers of every description
found anywhere were to be preserved and
sent to the intelligence officer, this paper
had been kept for that purpose. But in
the meantime it had been shown to the
interpreter of the battalion, and rumour
had spread through the camp that Khar-
toum had been taken and Gordon killed.
THE SHUKOOK PASS. 179
I sent for my interpreter and translator,
who spoke and wrote French but not
English. On my showing him the paper,
and asking him what it contained, he an-
swered : " Tres mauvaises nouvelles ; il dit
que le Mahdi a pris Khartoum, et que
Gordon a 6t6 tu6/' I made him translate
it, and from his translation I again made
the following version, which I at once sent
to Abu Dom to be telegraphed to Lord
Wolseley : —
Copy of a letter received from the Governor-General
of Berber to the Goverfior of the Sectiofi.
" In the name of God, &c., from Mohammed el
Kheir, Abdullah Khogeali, Emir-General of Ber-
ber, to his friend, Abdul Majid Wad el Lekalik,
and all his men. — I inform you that to-day after
the mid-day prayer we received a letter from the
faithful Khalife Abdullah Eben Mohammed, in
which he tells us that Khartoum was taken on
Monday the ninth Rabi 1 302, on the side of El
Hauoi, in the following manner. The Mahdi
(pray upon {priez sur) him, his dervishes, and his
troops) advanced against the fortifications, and
entered Khartoum in a quarter of an hour. They
killed the traitor (le perfide^ Gordon, and cap-
l8o THE SHUKOOK PASS.
tured the steamers and boats. God has made
him glorious ; be grateful, and thank and praise
God for His unspeakable mercy. I announce it
to you. Tell your troops."
The document was dated the thirteenth
Rabi, and on it was written, '* Received,
Friday the twentieth Rabi."
Comparing these dates with the ' Soudan
Almanac' prepared in the Intelligence
Department in London, we found that the
letter announced the fall of Khartoum to
have taken place on Monday the 26th Jan-
uary ; it had been written at Berber on the
30th January, and received at the Shukook
pass on Friday the 6th February. Now
we understood why the enemy had returned
on that day to Kirbekan, and what had
stiffened their courage.
i2thFeb. On the 1 2th the wing of the Cornwalls
at Kirbekan camp advanced about a mile
through the rapids to the mouth of a broad
wady — probably one of the many branches
of the Wady el Argu, which runs across
the desert from Kirbekan to Abu Egli, on
THE SHUKOOK PASS. l8l
the Nile above Berber; and the wing at
Dulka camp closed up upon them, the last
boat arriving at 4 p.m. It would have been
impossible to advance a whole battalion
farther, and it was not desirable to move
a small force in boats into the rocky
reaches of the Shukook until those reaches
were examined, and the pass itself recon-
noitred to its farthest end, so that we might
ascertain what lay behind, and whether the
pass itself was clear. We were evidently
now about to become entangled in a long
rocky pass both by road and river.
The Engineers and royal naval boat,
with two sections of field-hospital, accom-
panied the Cornwalls. The Staffords closed
up at Kirbekan ; and three companies suc-
ceeded in reaching Wady el Argu camp,
but not till very late. Five companies,
with two companies Black Watch, remained
at Kirbekan, and the Gordons closed up to
our camp opposite Dulka island. Owing
to the shallowness of the water, and their
boats being very heavily laden, they had
1 82 THE SHUKOOK PASS.
been obliged to abandon three boats on
their way up from Hamdab.
Alleyne reconnoitred a mile and a half
up stream, from Wady el Argu to the foot
of a very swift rapid, which he reported
must be tracked up; and Butler reconnoi-
tred with the mounted troops, making a
wide cast out into the desert, and returning
through the Shukook pass, without finding
any signs of the enemy. He found a site
for a camp at the mouth of a wady in the
Shukook pass, not far from* Jebel Shu-
kook, the mountain which is the one con-
spicuous feature in the mass of rugged
rocks here piled together, and returned to
the bivouac at Wady el Argu. Orders were
therefore issued for an advance to the Shu-
kook camp on the following day.
In the morning I had received a tele-
gram, addressed to General Earle by the
Chief of the Staff, dated the 9th. It in-
formed me that the Government had de-
cided that we were to stay in the Soudan
till the Mahdi's power at Khartoum was
THE SHUKOOK PASS. 183
destroyed. If we could not do this before
the hot weather, we must wait until autumn.
Duller had left Gakdul on the 8th for
Gubat, and would take Metemmeh as soon
as the Royal Irish reached Gubat. It was
assumed that I could reach Berber on the
28th February, or have reported my prox-
imity to it. Buller would be in the neigh-
bourhood, with four or six guns and about
1500 men, on the left bank. If I did not
think I could reach Berber by that date,
I was to name a date, in order that Buller
might meet me and co-operate in the attack
on Berber. The desert road to Gubat
would be held, and a garrison left there,
with a view to subsequent operations of the
united columns against Khartoum, if, as all
native report declared to be the case, Gor-
don was still holding out. I was therefore
to push forward with all possible speed com-
patible with safety. I was to leave a garri-
son of 200 men at Abu Hamed, instead of
300 as previously ordered, with 250 rounds
of ammunition per man, and sixty days'
l84 THE SHUKOOK PASS.
provisions. The telegram further contained
orders as to the precautions to be taken by
the commandant of the garrison, and other
matters not necessary to detail.
To this telegram I replied that I did not
think it possible to reach Berber by the
28th February, and that any date given
must be pure conjecture, the time being
dependent upon condition of unknown
rapids and unknown movements of the
enemy. I said it was impossible to pass
more than one battalion a-day through the
rapids here ; and if the enemy were holding
the Shukook, I must again concentrate the
whole or part of my force. When we
reached Salamat, I should be able to give
an approximate date for reaching Abu Ha-
med, and at that place an approximate date
for reaching Berber. Now I could only
say I did not think we could reach the
latter place under one month from this
date (i2th February). I intended to cross
over my mounted troops and transport be-
fore reaching Abu Hamed.
THE SHUKOOK PASS. 185
Fresh supplies of boat-repairing material
arrived during the day, sent by camel from
Korti ; they were very urgently needed.
Our boats were suffering severely from the
shallow and rocky rapids up which they
had to be forced. Planks, pitch, paint, and
copper nails were conspicuous by their ab-
sence ; and where a plank was stove in, it
had to be repaired by a patch of tin from
a biscuit-box, nailed over the leak with iron
nails taken from the boxes which contained
our food.
Three men of the Staffords died to-day
of their wounds. The other wounded of
the Staffords had been carried on in their
boats, arrangements having been made for
their transport, and for the transport of the
wounded of the Black Watch by their own
regiments. Each wounded man had his
boat's number attached to his stretcher, and
a medical officer superintended his being
placed in the boat. They were to sleep in
the boats or in tents pitched on shore, as
the surgeon might think best in each case.
1 86 THE SHUKOOK PASS.
In the first instance, the stretchers were
placed athwart-ships near the stern, in front
of the coxswain ; but it was found that the
ends of the stretchers were liable to be
knocked against in hauling the boats up
rapids, or coming in to shore in swift water ;
and as this annoyed men made nervous
by pain and weakness, arrangements were
afterwards made for laying the stretchers
along fore and aft, on the thwarts, between
the rowers. Awnings were spread for
wounded men, but were not allowed in any
other boats.
We had captured about 140 rifles on the
scene of the action, of which the majority
had been . broken at the time. These
broken ones we threw into the middle of
the river; but about 40 Remingtons we
retained, with the intention of arming our
unarmed men with them in case of need ;
and at our request the Vakeel returned to
us 1000 rounds of Remington ammunition,
which we had captured at Birti, and handed
over to him.
THE SHUKOOK PASS. 187
On the 1 3th the Cornwalls and four com- 13th Feb.
panics of the Staffords advanced about five
miles, partly through rapids, to the Shu-
kook camp. The rest of the Staffords, the
Gordons, and two companies Black Watch,
closed up at Wady el Argu, to which I ad-
vanced my headquarters.
AUeyne reconnoitred four miles of clear
and not very swift water beyond. Through
overhanging rocky cliffs, Butler, with the
mounted troops, reconnoitred to the upper
end of the Shukook pass opposite Uss
island. Here there was another rapid, but
not so formidable as some we had passed.
He reported the country opening out, but
no traces of cultivation; and considered
that the Cornwalls and the wing of the
Staffords from Shukook could reach the
foot of the rapid next day, and possibly
commence its passage.
The early morning saw the death of
Captain Lord Avonmore from enteric fever.
He, no less than those who fell at Kirbekan,
was killed in action. He had overtaxed his
l88 THE SHUKOOK PASS.
apparently boundless energy; and the ex-
haustion produced by incessant exposure to
the sun, and great physical fatigue, left him
too weak to repel the insidious attack of
the disease. We laid him by the side of
the officers whom we had buried on the
loth ; and as we turned away for the last
time from those nameless graves, many a
strong man*s eyes were moist, and many
a lip quivered from heartfelt emotion.
To-day the news reached us by telegram
from Korti that Sir Charles Wilson and
Lieutenant Stuart Wortley had reached
Korti on the 9th, with a short account of
Lord Charles Beresford's brilliant affair with
the enemy. We learnt that half the West
Kent Regiment was to leave for Gakdul
on the loth, and that Lord Wolseley would
possibly leave for the same place on the
15th.
No information had yet been given to
the troops as to the fall of Khartoum ; but
as the Reuter's telegram which arrived
simultaneously with this news alluded to it
THE SHUKOOK PASS. 189
as a fact established, I thought it desirable,
to prevent wild rumours, to circulate the
following memorandum throughout the
force : —
" From information received from Lord Wolse-
ley, there is reason to fear that the original object
of this expedition — namely, the relief of General
Gordon — cannot be carried out.
"When Sir Charles Wilson arrived before
Khartum, he found it in the hands of the enemy ;
and from information derived from a letter cap-
tured after the action of Kirbekan, it is believed
that Khartum was taken by the Mahdi on the
26th of January, and that General Gordon was
killed.
"Sir Charles Wilson in returning from Khar-
tum was wrecked. He and his party appear to
have taken refuge on an island, whence, accord-
ing to information received from the Chief of the
Staff, they were brought off by a steamer under
the command of Captain Lord Charles Beresford,
R.N.
"Lord Charles Beresford had a brilliant little
engagement with the enemy, who were in posi-
tion on the bank with four guns. One shot hit
the boiler, disabling the steamer till the boiler
was repaired, which was done under fire, taking
190 THE SHUKOOK PASS.
the greater part of the day. One sailor was
killed, and Lieutenant Van Koughnet, R.N.,
wounded, but not dangerously.
"Sir Charles Wilson and Lieutenant Stuart
Wortley arrived at Korti on the night of the lOth
instant.
"It is understood to be the present intention
of her Majesty's Government to break up the
Mahdi's power in the Soudan, and a strong force
of all arms is proceeding to Souakim to crush
Osman Digna.
"Headquarters and three companies of the West
Kent Regiment left Korti on the loth instant for
Gakdul.
"Lord Wolseley will probably leave later to
join General BuUer's force, and co-operate with
this column in the capture of Berber."
14th Feb. On the 14th the Corn walls advanced to
and reached the foot of Uss rapid, opposite
Little Uss island, entered the rapid, and
made some progress through it. Here was
the true upper entrance to the Shukook
pass, which had evidently been the site
of a camp of the enemy. I halted the lead-
ing wing of the Staffords at the foot of the
rapid, and the Gordons and other wing of
THE SHUKOOK PASS. 191
the Stafifords closed up upon them before
nightfall. The Black Watch reached Wady
el Argu, as did the artillery and convoy.
I moved my headquarters to the foot of
Uss rapid. The troopers sent back as guides
by Colonel Butler to lead me from our Wady
el Argu camp through the Shukook, instead
of turning to the right, as they should have
done, at the entrance to the pass, took a
turn to the left, and involved me and the
baggage-convoy in a labyrinth of the wildest
description.
The path by which they brought us was
utterly unfitted for a track for loaded camels,
though practicable enough for horses. We
marched for six miles through as bad ground
as it was possible to traverse, wedged in
between rocks ; and it was evidently im-
possible that this could be what was after
all a well-known and much-travelled pass.
Inquiries from Abu Bekr, who was in rear
with the baggage, satisfied me that there
was another road far better, and little, if at
all, longer ; and I sent back Colonel Colvile
192 THE SHUKOOK PASS.
with Abu Bekr to Wady el Argu, to lead
the convoy by the better route the next day.
Colonel Butler reconnoitred three or four
miles beyond the head of Uss rapid, and
found swift water but no bad rapid. Culti-
vation commenced ahead ; and there were
many mimosa-trees, the ground becoming
more open. No signs of any enemy, and
all inhabitants fled.
A spy returned from Salamat, which was
now only ten miles from our advanced camp,
reported that the people had fled on the 1 2th,
carrying all their possessions with them, in
the direction of the Robatab country or into
the desert. Colonel Butler was therefore in-
structed to push his mounted troops home
into Salamat the following day, and ascer-
tain whether it was still held by the enemy
or not.
I was now in a position to place the
Gordon Highlanders ahead of the Stafford-
shire Regiment in the order of march, and
accordingly the following orders were issued
for the next day's advance : —
THE SHUKOOK PASS. 1 93
" The Cornwalls to continue their advance
through Uss rapid, covered by the advance
of the mounted troops ; the Gordons to enter
the Uss rapid, moving in two columns — one
by each bank ; the Staffords to be in readi-
ness to follow the Gordons ; the Black Watch
to advance from Wady el Argu to the foot
of Uss rapid."
This rapid opposite Uss island, though
not marked in any map or mentioned in
any account of the river, proved one of the
most troublesoijie obstacles we had yet en-
countered. Boats had to track singly by
the island bank up the last rush of water.
The Gordons had passed through the lower isth Feb.
portion of the rapid, and closed up on the
rear of the Cornwalls, long before these
were all through the upper rush of water.
In fact, by 2 p.m. only the Cornwalls and
two companies of the Gordons were through
the rapid.
Meanwhile Butler reconnoitred with the
mounted troops, and at 1.30 p.m. entered
the beginning of the long village of Sala-
N
194 THE SHUKOOK PASS.
mat, which extends for some two and a half
miles along the left bank opposite the island
of Sherri. He found the whole village de-
serted. He reported that there was another
bad rapid opposite Sherari island — but
above that, clear water apparently for some
miles ; and that opposite the upper end of
the village of Salamat, the yellow sand of
the true right bank of the Nile was again
visible.
Alleyne, with the leading boats, reached
a small village opposite the island of Shoar,
about four miles above the Uss rapid, in
four hours from leaving the head of the
rapid, and halted there. All boats which
had passed through the Uss rapid by 2 p.m.,
and which could therefore reach the Shoar
bivouac before dark, were sent on there.
The remainder of the Gordons were
passed through Uss rapid, and encamped on
the left bank at its head. The Staffords
concentrated on a small sand island at the
foot of the bad part of the rapid, ready to
commence passing through it at daylight;
THE SHUKOOK PASS. 19S
and the Black Watch bivouacked in the
camp at the foot, occupied by the Staffords
and Gordons the preceding night.
Early in the day I had moved my head-
quarters to the old dervish's camp opposite
to the rapid and to the entrance of the
Shukook pass, and about noon had the
pleasure of seeing the head of the convoy
and the battery emerge from the pass. That
pass had long been a subject of anxiety to
us, and rightly so. In the course of the
day I rode back some two or three miles
through it, and an uglier place it was dif-
ficult to conceive. In some places there
was barely room for a loaded camel to
pass between the perpendicular rocks ; in
others, where the path was wider, the rocks
had been prepared for defence by loopholed
stone sconces, in the same way as the kop-
pies and ridge at Kirbekan. There was
no order or regularity in the plan of the
rocks. They seemed to have been up-
heaved as a mass in some great volcanic
convulsion, and to have fallen one upon
196 THE SHUKOOK PASS.
another in every direction, covering a space
some six miles long by three or four broad.
With our infantry tied to the boats, as it
was, and with so small a force of mounted
troops, it would have been a most difficult
task to dislodge an active and determined
enemy from such a position, of which he
knew every outlet, and of which we knew
nothing. It was an oppressive place to
remain in. It had not even the redeeming
element of grandeur, such as great massive
features give to the most rugged mountain-
range. It represented low, sullen savagery.
It was typical of the tribe to whom it
belonged.
Orders were issued for a general advance
of all the boats from their respective posi-
tions in the morning; and I was enabled,
with a light heart, to report to Lord Wolse-
ley that our cavalry had entered Salamat,
and that the convoy was through the Shu-
kook pass.
197
CHAPTER XL
salamat — destruction of suleiman wad
game's property.
My report to Lord Wolseley on the 15th was isthFeb.
to the following effect : ** Cavalry entered
Salamat to-day, and found it deserted.
Leading infantry are within five miles of
Salamat ; but a bad rapid intervenes oppo-
site Sherari island, which will probably
require 500 yards* portage. The rapid
opposite Uss island is not marked in any
map, nor had we any information of its
existence ; but it takes three days to get
the troops through it. Under conditions
of exceptionally low Nile and unexpected
rapids, any estimate of time must be mere
guess - work. I hope I may reach Abu
igS SALAMAT.
Hamed in ten days, but do not think I
can concentrate there in less than four-
teen, as I have all'my camels and horses
to cross over."
Colonel Butler, in his reconnaissance of
the 15th, had reported Sherri island as
being richly cultivated, with many houses.
Some of the inhabitants had hailed his
party across the river, and asked for
** grace," exactly in the same way as the
inhabitants of Hebbeh had asked for
"grace" from Colonel Stewart when his
steamer was wrecked there. Butler had
replied that grace would be given to all
except the murderers of Stewart and his
companions ; and the islanders replied that
they had to consult the rest of their people,
and would reply when all our soldiers had
arrived at Salamat.
i6thFeb. On the 1 6th the mounted troops ad-
vanced and covered the head of Sherari
rapid, while the Cornwalls advanced to it
and succeeded in passing six companies
through, which bivouacked above the rapid.
SULEIMAN*S PROPERTY DESTROYED. I99
The lower half of this rapid was not difficult
when once the channel was known ; but there
was only one narrow and difficult passage
through the upper half. In one place there
was only just sufficient water through sunken
rocks for a hundred yards. The boats were
all taken through by a party of voyageurs.
A company of the Gordons, with Captain
Peel, was sent to try another channel round
Sherari island ; but they returned, having
lost one boat swamped. The remainder of
the Comwalls and the Gordons bivouacked
below the upper portion of the rapid — the
Staffords at Shoar, and the Black Watch
still at Uss — the river above being too
much blocked with boats for them to
move during the day. The mounted
troops joined the Corn walls at the head of
the rapid. Headquarters bivouacked with
the Gordons ; and the convoy was brought
on to the same place, as it afforded good
camping-ground and forage.
In consequence of the attitude of the in-
habitants of Sherri island, I sent to them
200 SALAMAT.
a letter in Arabic, promising that if they
would lay down their arms and assist us
with supplies, no one should be harmed
except the murderers of Colonel Stewart,
and that their houses and sakyehs should be
spared. The letter was delivered on the
island.
Orders were issutd for all troops to ad-
vance on the following day — the cavalry to
cover the advance of the Cornwalls ; the
camel corps to remain in bivouac, and
cover the convoy, artillery, and troops in
the Sherari cataract.
17th Feb. On the 17th, Colonel Butler, with the
cavalry, occupied Salamat by 9 a.m., and at
the same hour two companies of the Corn-
walls landed on Sherri island. They found
it deserted, and commenced to search for
supplies. No cattle were found, but a con-
siderable quantity of grain and dates, which,
together with a supply of grain found on
Uss island, completed the loads of our
camel transport to its full carrying power.
The Sherari cataract caused great delay
SULEIMAN S PROPERTY DESTROYED. 20I
and considerable damage to boats. The
Staffords and the Gordons each lost one
boat, damaged beyond repair ; but no lives
were lost. By sunset the Cornwalls and
three companies of the Gordons were in
bivouac at Salamat, with the naval boat,
Engineers, part of the field-hospital, and
the cavalry. Headquarters also moved to
Salamat, and occupied a house in a walled
garden near the river -bank, belonging to
a sister of Abu Bekr — an aunt, therefore,
of Suleiman Wad Gamr. All the camel
troops and convoy advanced to a good
camping-ground, with ample forage, at the
head of Sherari. Colonel Butler recon-
noitred as far as Jebel Asma, and ascended
the mountain. He reported clear water
for nine miles from Salamat, no trace of
enemy, and signs of cultivation along the
river-bank beyond Jebel Asma.
The infantry continued their slow pro-
gress through the rapids. The remainder
of the Gordons and the Staffords bivouacked
at Sherari, and the Black Watch at Shoar.
202 SALA>L\T.
On the pre\nous evening a tel^ram from
the acting Chief of the Staff had arrived,
dated 13th, giving projects for sending us
up supplies by hired camels, and stating
what supplies we might possibly find at
Abu Hamed. It informed me that a con-
voy was to start from Korosko on the 15 th,
which should reach Abu Hamed by the
20th or 2ist; that Lord Wolseley antici-
pated that I could be ready to leave Abu
Hamed on the 22d or 23d ; but as he could
not let me leave it until he should hear
from General Duller, I was to await orders
there, and he scarcely hoped I should reach
Berber until the 13th or 14th March.
The telegram informed me of Lord Wol-
seley's proposals for the disposition of the
troops after the projected capture of Ber-
ber, and of my own share, and that of my
column, in these arrangements ; but as sub-
sequent events made these proposals void,
it is not necessary to reproduce them here.
Captain K eke wich, D.A.A.G., also arrived
with despatches, having left Korti on the
SULEIMAN S PROPERTY DESTROYED. 203
13th, and travelled through by camel in
three days from Abu Dom. He brought
me a letter from Lord Wolseley, and a
copy of the instructions to General Duller,
dated 12th February. With him returned
from Abu Dom all the camel-corps men
hitherto employed in carrying messages to
and from that place, — arrangements having
now been made with the commandant at
Abu Dom, and the Vakeel at Birti, to sup-
ply messengers between these places, and
with the latter to supply messengers from
Birti to our camp. From Captain Keke-
wich we learned something of the situation
on the desert side, so far as it was known
at Korti up to the date of his leaving.
I replied to-day to the Chief of the Staffs
telegram. I said frankly that I had no
faith in the promises of any sheikhs that
they would forward supplies to our camp,
and that the convoy I was to receive at
Abu Hamed from Korosko would enable
my force to live till the 23d April, and no
longer. I entered into questions of supply
204 SALAMAT.
as affecting Lord Wolseley's proposed plan
of operations, expressed my fears as to too
sanguine an estimate having been formed
both as to time and supplies, and again
repeated that I could fix no dates, rate of
progress being dependent on unknown con-
ditions. I informed him that my rear bat-
talion could only reach Salamat on the 19th.
Immediately on arrival at Salamat, Sulei-
man Wad Gamr*s house had been taken
possession of and searched. Many relics of
the murder were found there, including one
of poor Stewart's visiting-cards stained with
blood, extracts from M. Herbin's papers,
and photographs of M. Herbin and of the
Austrian consul, presented by them to Mr
Power. Chests of papers were found here,
and great numbers of papers, with some few
relics of the murder, on Sherri island. All
these were secured and carefully examined
by the interpreters ; and orders were issued
for all the troops at Salamat, except the
pickets and a search-party ordered to
Sherri island, to parade under the intelli-
Suleiman's property destroyed. 205
gence officers with axes, picks, and shovels,
for the destruction of property. The other
troops were ordered to close up to Salamat.
On the 1 8th the Gordons and Staffords isthFeb.
closed up on the Cornwalls at Salamat.
The damaged boats of the Cornwalls and
Gordons were repaired, the repairing party
working till late. The Black Watch entered,
and a portion passed through, the Sherari
cataract.
The foraging party on Sherri island was
successful, and brought over some forty
camel-loads of grain in their boats. The
troops were, I fear, much disappointed at not
obtaining permission to destroy the houses
and sakyehs on the island; but knowing
that sooner or later we should have to
return down the river, I forbade all destruc-
tion which, without any marked object to be
gained, would interfere with the sources of
supply on our return. The discipline of the
troops was admirable. At one time some
unauthorised burning of huts had taken
place — not, I believe, by enlisted soldiers.
206 SALAMAT.
I had therefore published an order abso-
lutely forbidding such irregularities, directing
that any soldier, voyageur, or interpreter,
plundering or setting fire to any house,
sakyehy or trees, without authority, was to
be tried by summary court-martial, and
pointing out that the offence was punishable
with death. From that date the offence
entirely ceased.
The troops had set to with a will to
destroy Suleiman Wad Gamr's property.
His house was a large one, standing on an
eminence, with a colonnade supported by
pillars, and several courtyards, each with
several rooms. Roofs were pulled down,
all wood available for firewood carried off,
the walls shaken by charges of gun-cotton,
and then utterly destroyed by the pick and
the shovel. Beams and solid wooden doors,
rare articles in this country, were destroyed
by fire, and the house was razed to the
ground. All his sakyeks were burnt, and
his palm-trees were cut down and destroyed
with fire.
Suleiman's property destroyed. 207
By way of instruction, I ordered a wing
of the Staffords to occupy Sheikh Omar s
house as their bivouac this evening, and to
place it in a defensible state, with orders to
destroy it and the rest of Omar's property
in the morning — Omar having escaped from
the Vakeel, and rejoined Suleiman. Abu
Bekr's property and that of his sister were
spared.
These houses were of a higher class than
any we had met with in the Shagiyeh or
Monassir country. They had some attempt
at ornament, and stood in gardens. In
Abu Bekr s garden there was an orange-
tree full of blossom, the only one we had
seen since leaving Dongola.
Colvile's soldier-servant came into camp
to-day, having had a curious adventure.
He and a native servant of Colvile's, a
Dongolese or Shagiyeh — I forget which —
having left the bivouac of the previous
day on camels with Colvile's baggage for
Salamat, had taken a wrong turn in a wady,
and had strayed into the desert, where they
208 SALAMAT.
lost themselves and wandered about till
nightfall, without water, and with little food.
In the early morning they started to try
and find the camp, and came upon a party
of natives — doubtless nomad Monassir —
tending cattle in a wady, with their women
and children. The native servant asserted
that they invited him to join them in killing
the white man, but he told them there were
50,000 English at Salamat, who had come
here on purpose to avenge another English-
man's death, and they would certainly all be
killed if they hurt this one. At all events
the two servants were shown their way to
Salamat, and allowed to proceed unharmed,
— another tolerably convincing proof of the
moral effect of the fight at Kirbekan.
Butler reconnoitred four or five miles
beyond Jebel Asma, reported the river
clear, the country fairly open, and ample
cultivation for foraging herds of animals.
Orders were therefore issued for the advance
to recommence in the morning, the Corn-
walls leading, followed by the Gordons ; the
SULEIMAN S PROPERTY DESTROYED. 209
Staffords to halt at Salamat, repair their
boats, and demolish Sheikh Omars pro-
perty. The Black Watch, battery, and
convoy, to close up to Salamat. The
cavalry to cover the advance with half the
camel corps and two guns.
Reporting the intended advance to the
Chief of the Staff to-day, I said: ** I am un-
willing to send back soldiers with messages,
and native runners are limited in number.
I shall therefore not attempt to communi-
cate with you again after this, unless some-
thing special occurs, until I reach Abu
Hamed, which I hope to do about 26th
instant."
A native taken prisoner by our scouts
stated he had left Abu Hamed four days
ago, and had met crowds of men, women,
and children, with cattle and camels, making
their way up the river on both banks. He
said they had few rifles, but many spears ;
and he had heard that Suleiman Wad
Gamr was retiring on Berber, by order of
Mohammed el Kheir. All the Monassir
O
2 1 S ALAM AT.
villages were deserted, but the Robatab
villages were still inhabited.
19th Feb. On the 19th the advance from Salamat
commenced. Omar's house was razed to
the ground, and his sakyehs and palm-trees
destroyed. A quantity of grain was col-
lected. The cavalry and camel troops
started with grain for six days ; every
transport camel was fully loaded up, and
the camels had a good feed. The last of
the troops and the convoy closed -up at
Salamat, and were ordered to advance on
the following day.
211
CHAPTER XII.
HEBBEH — THE PASSAGE OF THE NILE.
On the 19th, Colonel Butler on the bank, 19th Feb.
and Colonel AUeyne in his boat, recon-
noitred for a distance of between eleven
and twelve miles from Salamat, and Butler
selected a site for a bivouac at Sulimanyeh,
about nine miles above Salamat, and about
two and a half miles below the wreck of
Stewart's steamer ; and the Corn walls, Gor-
dons, and details concentrated there by five
o'clock. Butler reported that when he ar-
rived opposite the wreck, two Arab scouts on
camels began to shout from the right bank,
and then rode off to the north. We had
seen the enemy's scouts in the same way on
our arrival at Salamat. A prisoner taken
t
212 HEBBEH.
beyond the site of the wreck asserted that
Suleiman Wad Gamr had arrived at Suliman-
yeh on the i6th, and had gone northwards
on the 17th, taking with him Fakri Wad
Etman ; he was said to be accompanied
by about 400 men and a number of women
and children, with many cattle, camels, don-
keys, and much baggage. Lekalik, with
the force which had retreated from the
Shukook pass, was said to have preceded
Suleiman Wad Gamr, two of the sheikhs
that had been with him at the Shukook
having been sent direct to Berber.
Another prisoner informed us that he
had left the neighbourhood of Abu Hamed
on the 14th. He heard that many men
from Berber had arrived there, and that
there were 2000 Ababdehs, 1000 Bisharin,
and some Robatab assembled there to
defend Abu Hamed.
Although the accounts of prisoners were
by no means to be trusted, there was a
persistency in the accounts of the flights
along the left bank which, coupled with the
THE PASSAGE OF THE NILE. 213
hasty and complete abandonment of the
Shukook pass, led me to believe that the
enemy in front of us was in a state of
demoralisation, and unlikely to make any
stand. On the other hand, the presence of
the enemy^s mounted scouts on the right
bank — their defiant attitude as they retired,
menacing us by voice and gesture, as the
enemy's outposts on the left bank had men-
aced us before Kirbekan, but at no other
time — led me to believe the consistent re-
ports that on the right bank at, or possibly
before reaching, Abu Hamed, we should
meet with a more determined opposition, in
which it was probable the news of the fall
of Khartoum might induce both Ababdeh
and Bisharin Arabs to join.
I was therefore anxious to cross my
mounted troops and transport animals over
to the right bank as soon as practicable, and
resolved to do this at the first convenient
locality. Little was to be gained by ad-
vancing farther on the left bank ; for though
there was perhaps more cultivation on it
214 HEBBEH.
than on the right bank, both were barren
sandy wastes, with only occasional patches
of growing crops ; and as at Sulimanyeh we
were within little more than forty miles of
Abu Hamed, and all accounts united in
agreeing that there was but one more rapid
of any importance — that close to Mograt
island — the time before reaching Abu
Hamed should now be so brief, that a little
better grazing for the camels did not weigh
against the importance of effecting the
crossing without opposition.
I had attached Colonel Colvile to the
advanced guard under Butler since his
arrival in camp after guiding the convoy
through the Shukook, with instructions to
send in a sketch daily to accompany Colonel
Butler's report. Judging from his sketch
received this evening at Salamat that a
favourable crossing - place would be found
near Sulimanyeh, I wrote to Colonel Butler
saying that the whole of the troops at Sala-
mat would move to Sulimanyeh on the 20th,
that I should myself start at 7 and be in
THE PASSAGE OF THE NILE. 21$
his camp at 8.30, and that I begged him to
wait for me there. He was to send oh the
Cornwalls and Gordons in the morning by
river, but not the guns or any baggage or
baggage-animals till after my arrival ; and
two companies of each of the leading bat-
talions were to halt on the left bank op-
posite to Hebbeh, with all the axes, picks,
and shovels the battalions could furnish.
No troops were to be allowed to land on
the right bank. My intention was, if
there was a favourable crossing - place at
Sulimanyeh, to cross all the animals and
guns over there with the boats of the two
rear battalions, to visit and examine the
site of Stewart's murder, and then destroy
the house and surrounding property of
Fakri Wad Etman. If there should not be
a favourable crossing-place, the dispositions
were such that no delay whatever would be
caused.
On the morning of the 20th I reached 20th Feb.
Sulimanyeh at the hour named, and told
Colonel Butler my views. He said that
2l6 HEBBEH.
Hebbeh itself afforded so favourable a site for
the crossing, that he had directed AUeyne
to halt all the boats there, pending my de-
cision. On arrival opposite Hebbeh, directly
opposite the wrecked steamer, I found all
the conditions for a favourable crossing
fulfilled. On this side a high commanding
bank, with clear view over the neighbouring
country, affording an excellent position for
infantry and guns both to sweep the oppo-
site bank and hold their own against any
attack from this side. Below the high bank,
but easily approached by a natural ramp, a
long sandbank sloping gradually into the
water. On the opposite side, but a quarter
of a mile below, a high Nile island, forming
a strong position for infantry, and with a
similar sandbank — the breadth from the left
bank to the high Nile island being about
300 yards. The high Nile island itself was
separated' from the right bank only by a
narrow channel, over which at one place
there was a dry crossing.
I at once ordered the crossing to be
THE PASSAGE OF THE NILE. 217
undertaken. Sending the Cornwalls over
in their boats to establish themselves on the
high Nile island, and to take up a position
to cover the crossing, and bringing half the
Gordons to the high ground on the left
bank, where I directed them to form a
zareeba, I sent back orders to Sulimanyeh
for the guns and baggage there to be
brought on by their escort, and for the
whole of the troops and convoy on their
arrival there, both by land and water, to be
pushed on to Hebbeh.
We could see with our glasses that we
were being watched from behind the sand-
hills less than a mile out in the desert on
the right bank, and Butler at once crossed
over with a scouting-party of Hussars, before
whom the enemy's scouts retired. About
II A.M. the baggage of the advanced guard
and two guns arrived from Sulimanyeh, and
the guns were at once placed in position.
Our Hussars formed a line of vedettes on a
radius of a mile and a half from the point
of crossing on the left bank, and those first
\
2l8 HEBBEH.
sent across placed vedettes in commanding
positions about a mile out on the right
bank. About the same hour, ii a.m., the
leading boats of the Black Watch and Staf-
fords arrived. They had advanced along
both banks from Salamat By one o'clock
the remainder of the battery and the con-
voy arrived, under escort of half the camel
corps.
The troops and baggage were crossed
over in the following order : —
Scouting-party 19th Hussars.
Support, consisting of half the camel
corps.
Two guns of the Egyptian battery, with
their camels — having been replaced in
their position on the left bank by the
four remaining guns on their arrival ;
they were placed in position on high
Nile island as soon as crossed over.
Cavalry baggage.
Camel corps baggage.
Remainder of the 19th Hussars — having
been relieved on vedette duty by the
THE PASSAGE OF THE NILE. 219
half of the camel corps which had
escorted the convoy.
Camels of the four guns on the left
bank.
Headquarter baggage and horses, and
infantry regimental horses.
The transport company, camels, and
loads.
The cattle and donkeys.
The four guns.
Remaining half of the camel corps.
Each animal was towed over by a boat,
— its saddle, load, and driver or rider being,
as a rule, ferried across in that boat. The
ferrying commenced at 1 1 a.m. and ended
for the day at 5.30 p.m., recommenced at 20th to 21s
Feb.
7 A.M. and finished at 2 p.m., having thus
occupied thirteen and a half hours of actual
work, during which time 780 animals, with
their equipment and loads, and their drivers
or riders, and six guns, had been taken
across.
The crossing was effected under the
superintendence of Colonel Alleyne, as-
220 HEBBEH.
sisted by all the staff officers available.
Two crossing-places were worked at the
same time ; and it was found that as many
as fifty boats could be simultaneously em-
ployed, but not more. The crossing was
made down-stream, the actual distance tra-
versed being about 400 yards.
The water being too shallow for the
boats to come quite up to the dry shore of
the sandbank, each animal, having had a
rope fastened securely round its head by
one of Lieutenant Bourke's blue-jackets, or
by one of the Egyptian camel- men, was
led into the water, and the loose end of
the rope was handed to a man in the stern.
The boat was then rowed off from shore,
and the animal followed till out of its
depth, when it commenced to swim, or, in
some cases of camels, lay on its side and
allowed itself to be towed across. The
horses swam freely; and it was found im-
portant to let them have ample length of
rope, with their heads freed from any
strain. With the camels, on the other
THE PASSAGE OF THE NILE. 221
hand, it was found necessary to have a
very short rope, and to hold the animaVs
head well above water, close up to the
boat. The camel is an indififerent swim-
mer. He can make his way down-stream
for a short time, but soon becomes ex-
hausted; and he cannot swim against a
strong stream. The tendency always is
for his head to go under, and his hind-
quarters to rise above the water; and the
Egyptian artillerymen counteracted this by
sitting astride on the rumps of their camels,
thus forcing the quarters down, when the
heads correspondingly rise. The camels
which were least exhausted were those that
lay on their sides, and, with their heads
held well up close to the hands of the man
in the stern, allowed themselves, thus sus-
pended, to be towed across without attempt-
ing to swim.
The veterinary surgeon with his assist-
ants was stationed on the right bank, and
administered restoratives to any animals
which appeared exhausted on arrival. I
§
222 HEBBEH.
have noticed, for future guidance, that the
points chiefly to be attended to, in addition
to the length of rope above-mentioned, are
the tying of the head-rope, great care being
necessary to prevent its slipping or getting
round the animars nostrils ; the hours of
crossing, which should not be very early
or very late, but when the sun is well up,
so that there is less risk of chill ; the
pace of the boats, which, in the case of
horses and camels, should be regulated by
their pace of swimming ; immediate admin-
istration of restoratives to exhausted ani-
mals ; and gentle exercise after crossing
for all.
We lost only three camels. One, the
rope having broken, floated down the rapid
water and was drowned. Two died from
suffocation, the rope having slipped and
closed their nostrils. Six others, nearly all
from among those which crossed over late
in the evening, suffered subsequently from
epileptic fits, similar to staggers in a horse
THE PASSAGE OF THE NILE. 223
Of these, three recovered, and the rest
died; though had they been able to rest
for a few days, they also would in all
probability have recovered. No casualty
occurred among the horses or cattle. One
donkey died of exhaustion.
224
CHAPTER XIII.
HEBBEH THE SCENE OF COLONEL STEWART's
MURDER.
aoth to 2ist While the crossing was in progress on the
Feb.
20th, I visited the wreck and the scene of
the murder, taking with me those of the
staff who could be spared, and the com-
manding officers of regiments. We found
the steamer impaled on a large rock, about
two hundred yards from the proper right
bank of the river. She was a much larger
vessel than we had supposed her to be.
She was seventy feet in length from stem
to stern, and twenty -two feet in breadth
over her paddles : the depth of her hold
was four feet six inches. Plates of iron a
quarter of an inch thick protected her sides,
SCENE OF COL. STEWART S MURDER. 225
pitted with bullet-marks, and torn through
in places by case-shot or splinters of shell.
She lay with her keel sixteen feet above
the present level of the water, in a channel
studded with rocks — an intricate narrow
labyrinth ; while on the left bank of the
river there was open clear water for nearly
three hundred yards in breadth, so that at
the time of the wreck there must have
been nearly four hundred yards of open
water on that bank. Yet her pilot had
steered her into this rocky maze, where,
even at high Nile, many of the rocks must
have shown above water. To us it seemed
incredible that the wreck was an accident,
for it was almost impossible to believe she
had not been purposely steered to her
destruction. And yet, who can say ? At
high Nile she would have come rushing
down the swift water above, and a very
small error in steering would have caused
her to be swept in here.
The natives had stripped her of every-
thing that could be of use, leaving her a
p
/
226 HEBBEH.
mere shell. All her wood-work had been
carried away, including the floats of her
paddles, and such iron as was sufficiently
portable. The after-part of her hold was
filled with sand, her bows were high out
of water. A few torn scraps of letters and
paper, of no particular interest, were lit-
tered about; but there was nothing what-
ever worth preserving as a relic.
From the steamer we walked by a dry
causeway to the mainland — right bank —
which we followed down-stream for about
four hundred yards, when we came to the
first group of houses of Hebbeh. We had
brought with us Abu Bekr, the uncle of
Suleiman Wad Gamr, and I have seldom
seen a man in a more wholesome state of
fear. He evidently thought that we had
brought him here to execute him on the
spot. But he mastered his terrors, and
pointed out to us the house of Fakri Wad
Etman. It was an ordinary native mud-
house, the external entrance being into a
small courtyard, on one side of which was
SCENE OF COL. STEWART S MURDER. 227
the house. But it was not here, Abu Bekr
told us, that the strangers would have been
received. In this house the women lived,
and no strangers would have been admitted
there. The murder must have taken place
in the salaamliky or guest-chamber — a de-
tached mud -hut of one room only, some
fifty yards from the dwelling-house. We
entered this small room, stooping to pass
under the low doorway with feelings of
awe. But there was nothing to remind us
of the terrible tragedy that had taken place
there six months before. There were no
signs of blood. The floor and all the
ground round the hut had been carefully
strewn with fine sand.
A hundred yards in front of the door, on
the river-bank, stood a group of palms, the
scene of another tragedy. But I will let
the story be told in the words of one who
was fortunate enough to escape from the
scene, as taken down from his own lips by
Major Slade, through the medium of an
interpreter, on the ist February.
228 HEBBEH.
STATEMENT OF HASSEIN ISMAIN.
"I am the stoker of the steamer Abbas,
which left Khartoum about six months ago, on
a Wednesday. Stewart Pasha, two European
consuls, twelve Greeks, five artillery soldiers, four
Arab women and four slave women, and seven
native crew, were on board. The captain of the
steamer was Mahomed Saf Eddin, and the reises
[pilots] Ali Bishteeli and Mohamed. Two other
steamers accompanied us to beyond Berber, and
four nuggers sailed with us, which were towed as
far as Berber by the two steamers. The steamers
shelled the forts at Berber, and when our steamer
was safely past, they left us, and we continued
our journey with the four nuggers. We left the
nuggers behind us, just before reaching Abu
Hamed, and steamed on.
" On a Thursday, three days before the end of
the month of Dhul-kadeh [i8th September], at
about nine in the morning, the steamer ran on
a rock about two feet below the surface in Wad
Gamr's country. Before we struck we had seen
several people running away into the hills on
both banks. When we struck, the small boat
was filled with our things, and everything was
landed on the small island. Four trips were
made between the steamer and the island, and
when everything of value had been landed,
SCENE OF COL. STEWART S MURDER. 229
Stewart Pasha returned to the steamer himself,
drove a nail into the vent of the gun, and filed
the projecting part off. The gun was bolted to
the deck of the ship, and the artillery soldiers set
it free, and threw it overboard. Two boxes of
gun-ammunition were also thrown overboard at
the same time.
" While this was going on, several people came
to the right bank and shouted out, * Give us peace
and grace.' Hassan Bey, belonging to the Tele-
graph Department, acted as interpreter to Stewart
Pasha, and told the natives that they would have
peace. Four or five natives swam over to the
island, and Hassan Bey returned with them in
the small boat to the right bank, and saw Sheikh
Suleiman Wad Gamr, who was in a house near
the bank. Hassan asked him for camels to take
the party to Merawi, and Suleiman ordered four
camels to be taken to the bank to be loaded with
the baggage, and Hassan returned. Suleiman
then sent two men to the island to invite Stewart
Pasha to land and come to the house. Every-
body then landed on the right bank, taking with
them all the baggage. Hassan Bey then went
to the house of a blind man named Etman Fakri,
with two men ; and he was told by Suleiman to
#
ask Stewart Pasha and the two consuls to come
in and drink coffee, and arrange about the price
to be paid for the camels. This was at about
230 HEBBEH.
4 P. M. The soldiers wanted to accompany
Stewart Pasha as a guard ; but Hassan Bey said
that it would frighten the people, and the camels
would not be given.
" Stewart Pasha, the two consuls, and Hassan
Bey then entered the house of Etman Fakri.
They were all unarmed except Stewart Pasha,
who had a small revolver on his belt After a
short time, I saw Suleiman come out of the house
with a copper water-pot in his hand. He made a
sign to the people who were standing about the
village armed with swords and spears ; and im-
mediately the people divided into two parties,
one going to the house of Etman Fakri, and the
other rushing to the place (by the palms) where
the rest of Stewart's party was assembled. I was
with this party, and when the natives charged
us, we threw ourselves into the river. The natives
fired at us and killed many ; others were drowned.
I swam to a small island, and remained there till
it was dark, when I swam to the left bank. I
remained there for some time, and then made my
way to Hamdab. There I was taken by a man
called Taha Wad Fadeil, made prisoner, and
taken to Sheikh Omar, uncle of Suleiman Wad
Gamr, at Birti. He told me to remain with him
and not escape, and he would treat me well. I have
been at Birti ever since, and remained there after
the dervishes ran away the day before yesterday.
SCENE OF COL. STEWARTS MURDER. 231
"I heard that when the natives entered the
house of Etman Fakri, they fell upon Stewart
Pasha and the consuls, and killed them all.
Hassan Bey escaped, wounded in the arm by a
knife, and went to Berber. When the natives
rushed into the hut, Hassan Bey held the blind
man in front of him, and thus was saved. The
captain was killed.
"Two of the artillery soldiers, the two reiseSy
and three of the native crew, are alive at Berber.
Four full-grown slaves, one woman slave, and two
young ones, are also alive, and were near Birti, in
the desert looking after cattle, a month ago. The
money found was divided amongst the natives
who fell upon the party. Everything else was
sent to Berber. Two bundles of spears, and two
suits of chain-armour, the property of one of the
consuls, were at Birti.
"All the bodies of those murdered were thrown
into the river."
We found but few traces of the murder :
some fragments of books, more of poor
Stewart's visiting-cards, a shirt-sleeve stain-
ed with blood, and a few papers, apparently
belonging to MM. Herbin and Power. At
Sherari island we had found five pages of
Stewart's diary, describing Gordon's entry
232 HEBBEH.
into Abu Hamed and Berber on the way
from Korosko to Khartoum.
We pressed Abu Bekr as to how Sulei-
man Wad Gamr came to be at the scene
of the wreck, and he told us that as soon
as the steamer went ashore, Fakri Wad
Etman had sent a message to Suleiman
Wad Gamr at Salamat; and that Sulei-
man had immediately ordered his camels,
and had hastened to Hebbeh. This was
quite consistent with the stoker's account of
the wreck having taken place at nine, and
Suleiman's first appearance on the scene
some time in the afternoon, when Hassan
Bey went to Fakri Wad Etman's house,
after all the baggage had been removed
from the steamer, the gun spiked, and the
ammunition destroyed.
Orders were issued for the destruction of
the property of Fakri Wad Etman and the
2istFeh village of Hebbeh on the 21st The work
was superintended by the officers of the
Intelligence Department, who searched
everywhere for papers or relics, boring and
»
«#
ff
SCENE OF COL. STEWART S MURDER. 233
digging wherever the ground seemed dis-
turbed. Some skeletons were found, but
they were bid, and of Africans. Little or
nothing of interest was discovered. There
was no trace of that journal of which Gordon
spoke in such high terms. Fakri Wad Et-
man's houses were destroyed, his sakyehs
burnt, and his palm-trees cut down and
set on fire : his salaamlik was razed to the
ground.
234
CHAPTER XIV.
HUELLA — THE END OF THE MONASSIR
COUNTRY.
2ist Feb. On the night of the 2 1 st, headquarters biv-
ouacked on the high Nile island with the
Cornwalls and Staffords, mounted troops,
and convoy. The Gordons and Black
Watch bivouacked on the left bank. Butler
reconnoitred a few miles to the front, and
reported the river very swift for about two
miles, and then again comparatively easy.
With the exception of an occasional small
village with cultivation, the open desert of
yellow sand reached to the water's edge.
We now were about to leave the region
of rocks, and to enter a country where there
was breathing-space. The character of the
opposition likely to be encountered was also
END OF THE MONASSIR COUNTRY. 235
changed. We had no longer to fear ambus-
cades in ravines, or to expect to find rocky
gorges held against us by ensconced rifle-
men. If the enemy on the right bank
meant battle before our reaching Abu
Hamed, he must fight us in comparatively
open ground, where the discipline of our
troops, and the superiority of our weapons,
must tell with deadly effect ; and, if report
was true, we might expect here to meet the
nomad Bisharin Arabs, whose tactics would
probably be like those of the Hadendowas
at Teb and Tamai, or the enemy encoun-
tered by Herbert Stewart. The change
was a great relief; but we had also to
consider that the enemy we should now
encounter would consist of fresh troops,
undaunted by previous defeat.
The following orders were therefore is-
sued : ** In the further advance of the
column by river, every effort must be made
to keep the boats well closed up, not by
constant delays on the part of the leading
boats to wait for the remainder, but by stren-
236 HUELLA.
UOU5 exertions on the part of the crews of
the boats in rear to keep up with those lead-
ing the advance. Commanding officers will
impress upon all non-commissioned officers
and men that the success of the expedition,
and its safety while moving by river, depend
mainly upon the amount of eneigy which
they put into their work.
** The advance will be covered on the
right bank by the mounted troops, who will
give warning to the leading boats of any
aggressive movement of the enemy. Should
the officers commanding the mounted troops
report the enemy advancing to attack, the
leading boats will fall back on the rear boats
of the leading half-battalion, and the rear
half-battalion will close up. As soon as the
leading half battalion is concentrated, the
troops will be landed and at once formed
up to meet the attack in the strongest avail-
able position. All following battalions, un-
less specially ordered to the contrary, will
close up on the leading battalion, land, and
await orders."
END OF THE MONASSIR COUNTRY. 237
The orders for an unexpected landing
issued by Major- General Earle on 19th
January were republished, and attention
called to their salient points. The various
departmental boats were assigned their
places in the column.
" The advance by land of the guns and
convoy, and their escort, must be guided by
circumstances," ran the order, "which may
change from day to day ; therefore no pre-
cise rules can be laid down, but all trans-
port must be kept well together, must move
on as wide a front as the nature of the
ground permits, and must invariably be pro-
tected by flankers, well thrown out into the
desert.''
On the morning of the 2 2d the column 22dFeb.
advanced, the Gordon Highlanders leading,
at 6.45 A.M. The river immediately above
our crossing-place was very swift and diffi-
cult, and it was late in the afternoon before
the last boat was through it. Two miles of
swift and rocky water followed. The two
leading battalions and mounted troops —
238 HUELLA,
under Colonel Butler — bivouacked at a
small village about six miles above Hebbeh,
and nearly opposite a remarkable rock of
white marble, standing alone in the river,
called Hajar el Baida, " the white rock."
The cavalry reconnoitred six miles to the
front, and saw no trace of the enemy.
The remainder of the column bivouacked
at El Kab, about a mile below Hajar el
Baida. Here there was a small village with
a fair quantity of growing crops. There
was also a large stone fort on a high rock
over the river, and another on the opposite
bank, of precisely the same nature as those
already spoken of at Kabenat, below Birti.
We took up a strong defensive position here,
with a company on outpost on a high de-
tached rock in front, only accessible by one
steep path. The country beyond was flat
desert, or undulating sand-dunes.
Before moving off from Hebbeh in the
morning, I had released a spy of El Zain.
This man had been brought in by our
scouts, and after telling many different
END OF THE MONASSIR COUNTRY. 239
Stories, had at last confessed to being a
spy of El Zain, sent by him to obtain in-
formation of our strength and movements.
I suppose he ought to have been hanged,
but I thought he would be more useful
alive ; and having extracted from him such
information as he would give as to El Zain*s
position and strength, I let him see the
whole force, and then sent him back to El
Zain, bidding him tell that robber-chief
what he had seen at Kirbekan and Hebbeh.
On the 23d the boats advanced simul- 23d Feb.
taneously from both camps, moving in
parallel columns by both banks. Much
swift water was encountered, but no rapid
necessitating tracking. By an early hour
in the afternoon the leading boats had
reached a cluster of grass huts at the head
of a swift rapid, said by Abu Bekr to be
named Huella, and to be the last habita-
tions in the Monassir country.
Before nightfall, by dint of great exertion,
the last boat of the column had closed up,
and our 215 boats lay moored side by side
240 HUELLA.
along the bank, having averaged lo^ miles
rowing against very swift water.
The mounted troops having reconnoitred
five miles to the front, reported good clear
water, and having seen no enemy, though
traces of their camel scouts, fell back to
Huella.
The convoy and artillery, marching on a
broad front over the undulating desert sand,
also closed up. On the way I had halted
them, and told Major Wodehouse, who
commanded the convoy throughout, to make
dispositions to resist an attack from the
left front. The camels were rapidly parked,
and a strong front of fire brought to bear ;
and I was satisfied that the convoy, which
was moving with wide -flanking scouts,
would run no risk of being taken at a dis-
advantage. The convoy then moved on
to Huella.
Village Huella was not, in any sense of
the term, and there was no cultivation.
It was apparently only the temporary
resting-place of nomad Arabs, who brought
END OF THE MONASSIR COUNTRY. 241
flocks and herds there to water and graze.
There was no forage for camels, but we
were assured that the following day's ad-
vance through easy water would bring us to
cultivation in the Robatab country. The
camels had brought loads of cut forage
with them from El Kab and Hajar el
Baida, and an issue of grain was sanc-
tioned.
Shortly after leaving El Kab, we had been
hailed by a camel-man on the left bank, and
having ferried him across, ascertained that
he was a spy sent from the Intelligence
Department at headquarters, who had been
sent to Berber with orders to report his
news to us on his way back. It differed in
little from what we previously knew. He
brought back with him a messenger whom
we had sent from Hebbeh on the 21st with
despatches. This messenger had been
seized by some dervishes in the Shukook
pass, his papers had been taken from him,
and he had been stripped. The dervishes
were proceeding to kill him, when the camel-
Q
242 HUELLA.
man from Berber appeared on the scene,
and they fled hastily.-
In the evening, a boy whom we had
sent with instructions to try and reach Abu
Hamed, and bring back news, returned,
saying that he had been stopped by a party
of dervishes on the right bank about ten
miles from our camp, and made prisoner,
but had escaped. He had gathered from
them that there were only a few of the
enemy between us and Abu Hamed on this
bank, but that the Monassir and Robatab,
and a force from Berber with Suleiman
Wad Gamr and other sheikhs, were hold-
ing a rocky position on the other bank, at a
place called Shamkiyeh, near Jebel Gergerib,
and intended to oppose our advance there.
They were not aware of our having crossed
all our mounted troops to the right bank.
We bivouacked in a strong semicircular
position on the yellow sand, covering our
boats and mounted troops on the sandbank
below. At nine o'clock, being now within
END OF THE MONASSIR COUNTRY. 243
the distance, we fired a rocket from the
nearest high hill, and another five minutes
later — a preconcerted signal to inform Run-
die's scouts, who should be on the watch,
that we were within thirty miles of Abu
Hamed. I walked round the position, and
saw that perfect order reigning which came
from the constant repetition and constant
supervision of the nightly bivouac in readi-
ness to meet instantaneous attack. Troops
peacefully sleeping, tired with the hard
day s work, beside their piled arms ; double
sentries alert and motionless, watching with
trained eyes every foot of the open space
before the bivouac ; officers on watch vig-
ilant ; perfect silence everywhere. Not once,
in any camp I had been in, had there ever
been a sign of a false alarm. This day's
work had been the best ever performed by
the troops. Two hundred and fifteen boats
had been rowed by their strong arms
through ten or eleven miles of the swift-
est water possible to contend with. Our
244 HUELLA.
wounded were all doing well. No death
had occurred among them since we left our
camp at Dulka. The physical condition of
the men was magnificent. We had com-
pleted a month out from Hamdab — a month
of almost unparalleled exertion, passed en-
tirely in the open air. We had not sent
back one sick man ; we had had but one
death from disease ; and the total sick-list of
the force was now only eighteen, a propor-
tion of 6.4 per 1000 — a condition of health
which I believe to be unprecedented among
any troops in any campaign. The men
were in high spirits; and there were two
battalions, neither of which had yet been in
action, longing for the chance of emulating
those who had fought so gallantly at Kir-
bekan. It was the first time I had seen
the whole force in one bivouac ; and I lay
down with a feeling of perfect confidence in
their power to conquer any host of Arabs
that the Mahdi could bring against them
from the farthest corners of the Soudan.
END OF THE MONASSIR COUNTRY. 245
In four days, I said to myself, we shall be
at Abu Hamed. We shall open up the
Korosko desert-route, and our doing so
will ring through the Soudan, and weak-
en the knees of the followers of Mahomet
Achmet.
i
246
CHAPTER XV.
RECALL — BACK TO SALAMAT.
24th Feb. I HAD issued ordcrs that to give the men
more rest after so good a day's work, rd-
veilld would not sound till half- past five ;
and it was seven o'clock on the morning of
the 24th before the first boat was in readi-
ness to move. Some letters and Reuter's
telegrams had arrived the night before by
camel-post ; and an opportunity thus occur-
ring of sending back to Korti, I reported in
the most cheerful terms to Lord Wolseley.
Seeking for something in my despatch-box, I
came across the following cutting which I had
taken at Haifa from the * Army and Navy
Gazette' of the 13th September 1884 : —
"The opinions which were expressed in this
BACK TO SALAMAT. 247
journal as soon as the orders were made known
for the construction of those ridiculous row-boats
for the expedition on the Nile have been cor-
roborated by the assent and concurrence of every
man who has any experience of the country and
the river. A more wicked waste of money was
never perpetrated, a more silly quackery was
never devised, by any public department than that
of which Lord Hartington and the Duke of Cam-
bridge, representing the War Office and the Horse
Guards, have really and truly been guilty in
ordering that monstrous armada of boats, that
unfloatable flotilla for the Nile ! Burn them for
firewood ! Send them to Jericho, to ply on the
Palestine canal of the future ! Make matches of
them — do anything with them ! Put men in
them, and try to send them up the Nile cataracts
— never, we beg of you ! "
Well, there they lay, 215 boats of the
unfloatable flotilla, floating above all the
worst cataracts of the Nile, within ten
miles of the last of that series of rapids of
which it was said in every map published
before the expedition started, " Between
Gerendid and Mograt cataracts (140 miles),
the river is unnagivable at low Nile." Said,
248 RECALL.
and truly said hitherto. It had been left
for British soldiers and British "ridiculous
row - boats " to navigate the unnavigable,
and to convey an army of 3000 men, with
their stores and munitions of war, to within
twenty-six miles of Abu Hamed.
Our cavalry scouts and patrols had long
been out. The leading boats of the Gor-
dons had just pushed off. The main body
of the cavalry had moved out of camp.
Colonel Butler was riding past my bivouac,
when a messenger arrived with a despatch
from Korti. I opened it. It was mostly in
cipher ; but some words in clear caught my
eye, sent a cold shiver through me, and
caused me at once to sound the halt
This is what the message said when it
had been deciphered : —
"Korti, 20/'A February,
"Buller evacuated Gubat. His main body
went to Gakdul with all sick and wounded.
He remains with about 1 500 men at Abu Klea
The enemy have now begun to fire into his camp
there, and have killed and wounded some of his
men. He awaits camels to fall back on Gakdul,
BACK TO SALAMAT. 249
which I hope he will begin to do to-morrow, the
2 1st instant; but owing to the weak state of his
camels, all his men must go on foot. I have
abandoned all hope of going to Berber before
the autumn campaign begins. You will there-
fore not go to Abu Hamed, but having burned
and destroyed everything in the neighbourhood
where Stewart was murdered, you will withdraw
all your force to Abu Dom, near Merawi, bring-
ing all the Mudir's troops with you.
" Please express to the troops Lord Wolseley's
high appreciation of their gallant conduct in
action, and of the military spirit they have dis-
played in overcoming the great difficulties pre-
sented by the river. Having punished the
Monassir people for Stewart's murder, it is not
intended to-undertake any further military opera-
tions until after the approaching hot season.
" Further orders will be sent to you upon your
reaching Abu Dom. Until you have occupied
the Shukook pass, and made sure of every one
through it, you had better keep this telegram
entirely to yourself and Butler. Of course, if you
are in the presence of the enemy when you
receive this, you must defeat him before turning
back. If you do not receive this before you
have reached Abu Hamed, or are so near to it
that It is merely a question of occupying it with-
out opposition, you must halt there, and send
250 RECALL.
back information at once to me, when I will start
the convoy from Korosko, which I do not other-
wise mean to despatch. Of course it is impossible
at this distance to give you positive orders, but
Lord Wolseley has every confidence in your
military discretion."
But little time was needed for decision.
The cup was snatched from our lips, but
we must bear the disappointment bravely.
The conditions in which I found myself
gave no reasonable excuse for pressing on.
And lightly as the message touched upon
General Buller*s difficulties, there was suf-
ficient in it to give cause for anxiety as to
the result of his retreat. That lie had not
retired one hour before it was necessary to
do so was a certainty. If his troops should
be surrounded by vast numbers of the late
besiegers of Khartoum, who had already
had three weeks within which to collect to
oppose him, his situation might be full of
peril. I knew Lord Wolseley could have
but a handful of men at Korti, and the
flower of his force was here in the River
BACK TO SALAMAT. 25 1
Column. I had but one course open to me
— to make my way to Abu Dom with all
possible speed. I showed the telegram to
Colonel Butler. He entirely agreed with
me, and I sent back the following reply : —
" I received your telegram this morning, just as
the troops were starting up river. I am, by the
map, about twenty-six miles from Abu Hamed.
I am not in the immediate presence of the enemy,
nor have the patrols, who have been six miles
beyond this, had any touch of the enemy. Nor
do I anticipate meeting the enemy to-day, should
I continue my advance. My latest information
is that the enemy intend to fight at Abu Hamed,
and I anticipate opposition if I advance upon it.
There is a cataract between me and Abu Hamed,
and if opposed, it might take some days before I
could occupy the place. I am confident I could
beat any force opposed to me, but I feel it my
duty, in view of the facts contained in the first
part of your telegram, to fall back immediately
to Abu Dom, and I shall fall back to Hebbeh
to-day. I shall return by the right bank."
By returning along the right bank to
Merawi, I should avoid all danger of op-
position to the convoy in the Shukook pass.
252 RECALL.
where a few men could cause serious delay.
It was evidently impossible for any serious
opposition to be organised at very short
notice on the right bank.
I then issued the following orders to the
troops : " The Brigadier-General announces
to the troops that since they entered the
boats this morning he has received a tele-
gram from Lord Wolseley, stating that,
after the Monassir tribe has been punished
for Colonel Stewart's murder, it is not in-
tended to undertake any further military
operations until after the approaching hot
season. The furthest limits of the Monassir
country having been reached, and the pun-
ishment for Colonel Stewart's murder hav-
ing been, so far as possible, inflicted, the
troops will now return through the Monassir
country to Birti. The column will there-
fore move upon Hebbeh to-day." Lord
Wolseley's expression of appreciation was
also published, and the following was add-
ed : " The Brigadier- General has to remind
the troops that the descent of this swift
BACK TO SALAMAT. 253
river will require even greater care than its
ascent. All will depend upon the vigilance
of the men in the bows, and the coolness
and resource of the men steering."
The following instructions for the in-
formation of officers in charge of boats
descending the Nile were drawn up by
Lieut.-Colonel AUeyne : —
" I. Owing to the swiftness of the stream, the
boats will move over it at a rapid rate, conse-
quently if a boat strikes a rock she will probably
receive a severe injury. Accidents of this nature
can be avoided, ^r^/, by the vigilance of the pole-
man, who should sound frequently ; secondly y by
not allowing boats to close up or crowd upon
each other when descending a rapid.
"2. As a rule, when descending a rapid the
crew must row, otherwise the boat will not steer.
"3. The last two (2) boats of each battalion
should be nearly empty, so that in the event of
a boat being severely injured in a rapid, they may
be able to take in her cargo or return to her
assistance. All other boats should have equal
draught of water.
"4. Coxwains must follow the lead given by
boats with pilots in them.
254 RECALL.
" 5. After descending a rapid, the leading boats
must halt until the rear boats join them.
"In difficult rapids special arrangements will
be made for taking each boat through with
Canadian pilots."
While halted, I was informed that a
number of men on camels had been seen
in the desert to the south-west Patrols
were sent out, but the camels turned out
to be only the product of a fevered ima-
gination. However, some delay had been
caused; and so the men were ordered to
dine early, and then move down -stream.
The mounted troops were ordered to patrol
up-stream and cover the retirement by a for-
ward reconnaissance, while the convoy with
an escort returned towards Hebbeh. At
noon the boats commenced to move down-
stream, led by Colonel Denison command-
ing the Canadian voyageurs. The column
moved in reversed order from its progress
up-sti'eam. The Staffords led, followed
successively by the Black Watch and Corn-
walls. The Gordons brought up the rear.
BACK TO SALAMAT. 255
The three leading battalions reached
Hebbeh, and bivouacked on the high Nile
island. The Gordons were halted with the
convoy, camel battery, and part of the
camel corps at Umsyal, a village three
miles above Hebbeh, where there was plen-
ty of good forage, with orders to destroy
houses and sakyehs before leaving. The
cavalry and the remainder of the camel
corps having patrolled to within sight of
the island of Mograt and seen no enemy,
halted at El Kab, under Colonel Butler.
The casualties amongst the boats were
three damaged and repaired, and one total
wreck. The horses and camels had suffered
heavily from the heat, and the heavy sand
fetlock-deep. Four camels and one horse
died of exhaustion. I therefore ordered a
halt for the next day, except that all the
troops and convoy were to close up to
Hebbeh.
The evening brought a messenger with
despatches, all of earlier date than that re-
ceived in the morning, and not containing
256 RECALL.
orders of recall; also messages from the
Commandant at Abu Dom and the Vakeel,
to say that neither for love nor money could
they get any more messengers to come to
us. It did not matter now ; we were going
to them. But I have often since thought,
that if that messenger had not been so
pressing who reached us with the order of
recall, we should have been in presence of
the enemy ; we should have had another
fight, and as we had twice as many troops
present as at Kirbekan, probably an even
more telling victory. I must then have
occupied Abu Hamed ; and the fact of our
doing so would, I believe, have materially
improved our position in the Soudan. But
fate willed it otherwise.
25th Feb. On the 25th the troops were employed
in completing the destruction of the houses
and sakyeks of the village of Hebbeh, and
on the island of El Kun, and the Gor-
dons and mounted troops closed up on
the column.
A detachment of Hussars and camel
BACK TO SALAMAT. 257
corps was sent to a village about three
miles down-stream, with orders to march
off at the same hour as the boats in the
morning. Supplies were equalised among
the regiments, in proportion to their number
of boats, and ordered to be so divided as to
bring all boats to as nearly as possible the
same draught of water.
Orders were issued to the following effect :
The Gordons were to move off at 7.45 a.m.,
followed at successive intervals of three-
quarters of an hour by the Staffords, Black
Watch, and Cornwalls — the last regiment
furnishing the rear-guard. In every bat-
talion except the rear battalion, the officer
second in command was to bring up the
rear of his battalioq, being held responsible
for bringing on all boats of his own bat-
talion, and all boats of details moving with
his battalion or between it and the preced-
ing battalion. He was not to move on
himself until every one of these boats that
could be brought on had preceded him.
Each battalion, as previously ordered, was
R
258 RECALL.
to have two empty boats moving in rear of
the others.
The officer commanding the rear bat-
talion was himself to bring up the rear of
the whole column. He was to tell off four
companies of his battalion as a rear-guard,
and to move with this rear-guard in rear
of all boats not abandoned, being held re-
sponsible that no boat of the column was left
behind unless necessarily abandoned, and
that all abandoned boats were destroyed.
On arrival in camp he was to report ver-
bally to headquarters that every boat had
arrived.
Major Flood, 12th Hussars, was to cover
the rear of the column with the mounted
troops ; and the command of the rear-guard
on shore and on the river was given to
Colonel Butler, to whom the officer com-
manding the rear battalion was to report,
should he be unable to reach headquarters
camp.
The number of repairing boats was in-
creased to four, — one to move in rear of
BACK TO SAL AM AT. 259
each battalion, and assist in repairing any
boats that might be damaged, and could
not be repaired regimentally.
In reporting to Lord Wolseley in the
evening, I said that, after consultation with
Butler and Alleyne, I was of opinion it
would take six or seven days to Birti, and
six or seven from that place to Merawi.
My place of crossing would depend on the
information I might receive at Birti.
On the morning of the 26th the troops 26th Feb.
moved as ordered. By noon the advanced
guard of mounted troops and the convoy,
with two battalions of infantry, were con-
centrated at Amarim, opposite Salamat, on
the right bank, near the head of Sherri
island. We on the bank rode along a flat
wady at some distance from the bank the
greater part of the way. On reaching
Amarim, I at once rode on with Alleyne
and Peel to inspect the channel between
the right bank and Sherri island. We found
it impracticable for boats from its shallow-
ness, and the distance of the right bank
26o RECALL.
from the left bank x)f the river increased
rapidly, it being evident that very large
islands lay between.
I was satisfied that it would be now
practically impossible to combine with ac-
curacy the movements of the mounted
troops and of the boats. We were now
about to commence the descent of the for-
midable series of cataracts between Salamat
and Ooli ; and I decided that my own
proper place was with the boats, and that
the command of the mounted troops and
convoy should be confided to Colonel But-
ler. Moving a cavalry advanced guard
about three miles down-stream, and leaving
the remainder at Amarim, where I halted
the Cornwalls on their arrival for the pur-
pose of completing the mounted troops up
to six days* rations from the boats, I in-
structed Colonel Butler to advance at 7 a.m.
on the 27th, sending the Cornwalls by river
at the same hour. He was to endeavour
to keep touch of the troops in boats, but
failing that, to make his way to Hush el
BACK TO ^ALAMAT. 26 1
Jeruf, opposite Birti, and await the boats
there. Each party was to fire a rocket at
8 P.M. each night to show the other its
position.
My brigade- major and aide-de-camp
were to accompany me in the boats; all
other staff officers, except the boat officers,
to accompany the party on shore. Colvile
was instructed, as soon as he thought it
safe, to join the Vakeel at Birti, inform him
I had received Lord Wolseley's orders to
move to Abu Dom and take his troops with
me, and request him to be ready to march
immediately on my arrival.
These orders- issued, I entered one of the
boats of the headquarter escort Gordon
Highlanders, and by sunset the three bat-
talions were in bivouac on Sherri island.
One boat of the Staffords struck a rock,
and had to be abandoned as a total wreck.
Arms, ammunition, and most of her stores
were saved ; no lives were lost.
A native who had -hailed us from the left
bank opposite Hebbeh in the morning, was
262 RECALL.
brought on in the boats, and on being ques-
tioned in the evening, told the following
story. He was one of the soldiers of the
Mudir, and had been taken prisoner at Am-
bukol by the Shagiyeh, and sold to Haddai in
the previous summer. When Haddai was
killed, he was taken to Mograt — not to the
island, but to the mainland on the left bank —
where he worked for a man named Moham-
med el Amin, a dervish. In the evening
of the 25th, hearing the English were near,
he escaped, and travelled by the left bank
till he got opposite our boats in the morn-
ing. He said that at Shamkiyeh there were
assembled Suleiman Wad Gamr with the
Monassir, and Wad Abu Hegel with the
Robatab, and many men from Berber under
Lekalik, all under the chief command of Abu
Hegel ; that at this place the river passes
through a narrow passage between rocks,
and there is an old fort on each bank ; that
they had fortified the rocks with stone-
work, and occupied these old forts, and
intended to dispute the advance of our
BACK TO SALAMAT. 263
boats. They had no artillery, and but few
rifles, but they were numerous, — far more
numerous than our force, — and had all
either swords or spears. They had heard
of Kirbekan, and knew that Moussa Wad
Abu Hegel and many dervishes had been
killed. They knew also that Khartoum
had fallen, and Gordon had been killed.
They told the people that Gordon was
killed because he refused to become a Mus-
sulman, and that the English, when they
saw so many dervishes, would all throw
their arms into the river from fear. They
had heard, he said, of our returning; and
when he left their camp the previous night,
they were loading up provisions on camels,
with the intention of following us.
On our way down, we saw signs of a
hasty retreat having been made from Sherri
island. There were a few native boats, all
of which we destroyed, as we had done all
we could find coming up the river; and
there were some rough rafts. The whaler
abandoned by Captain Peel on the i6th
264 RECALL.
was found hauled up, and the stores that
had been left with her were gone. Several
natives were seen watching us from behind
distant rocks, but we were in no way
molested.
26s
CHAPTER XVI.
RUNNING THE RAPIDS — BACK TO HAMDAB.
The boat officers had decided that it would 26th Feb.
be impossible to pass down the left-bank
channel by which we had ascended the
Sherari rapid; and accordingly we had
turned out of the left-bank channel, and our
bivouac on Sherri island was on a central
channel between Sherri and Sherari, at the
head of a rapid. In the descent of the
river a different nature of channel had to be
sought from that best suited for ascent. In
ascending, wherever the river became too
swift for rowing, passages had to be sought
through which the boats could be hauled or
tracked, and these necessarily were never
in mid-stream, but always close to the bank.
266 RUNNING THE RAPIDS.
either of the main shore or of an island. A
very great rush of water was to be avoided ;
and in consequence of these requirements,
the passage by which the boats ascended a
rapid was generally very shallow, and fre-
quently only a narrow channel among rocks.
To attempt to descend by such passages as
these would be to court certain destruction
for the boats ; and the main point was to
find sufficient depth of water, no matter how
swift or turbulent the stream. Consequently,
as a rule, the descent was in mid-stream of
that channel which, in their upward journey,
the boat officer had noted as most likely to
be full of water.
I had originally intended to make the
battalions in turn take the onerous duty of
furnishing the rear-guard; but on consid-
ering the question, I decided to make the
advanced guard and rear-guard permanent,
chiefly because any other arrangement in-
volving the transposition of battalions in
the order of the column might involve delay.
Having selected Colonel Hammill to com-
BACK TO HAMDAB. 267
marid the advanced guard of Gordon High-
landers and the naval boat, and Colonel
Green the rear - guard of Black Watch,
orders were issued for the descent of the
rapids in the following order — Gordons,
Cornwalls, Staffords, Black Watch, com-
mencing at 6.45 A.M.
Instructions were issued by Alley ne for
the passing of the Sherri island rapid to
the following effect : —
** The two boats of each battalion that are
first passed down the rapid will not put into
shore, but remain in the stream at the foot
of the rapid, one near each bank, ready to
pull to any boat that may require assist-
ance, — ^an officer and life-belts to be in each
boat. The two boats of the leading bat-
talion to be relieved by the two leading
boats of the following battalion, and so on.
** The first set of boats will be taken
through the rapid by Canadian voyageurs ;
and a company officer will descend in each
boat, who, on his return, should be able to
steer a boat of his company down the rapid.
268 RUNNING THE RAPIDS.
After the first set of boats have passed the
rapid, a Canadian will be placed in every
second, third, or fourth boat, as may be
found necessary. At the hour named to
start, adjutants of battalions will collect the
voyageurs of battalions, and hand them
over to Lieutenant-Colonel Denison.
" When the boats have passed the
rapid they will be anchored on the sand-
bank on the right bank till that anchorage
is full, when they will be anchored on the
sandbank on the left bank.
** The life-buoys in all boats to be always
so placed that they can be thrown without
delay to a man in the water."
27th Feb. The rapid was run by all the boats of
the column by 10.30 a.m., with the excep-
tion of the rear-guard and the rear boats
of' the Corn walls, who were delayed by a
boat of the Cornwalls which, in descending
from Amarim, was wrecked above our
Sherri island bivouac on a sunken rock.
Her crew, arms (except one rifle), ammu-
nition, and stores were saved. The boat
BACK TO HAM DAB. 269
was got to shore, but so badly damaged
that she had to be broken up and burnt;
and it was 1.30 p.m. before the whole of
the boats were through and concentrated
about a mile and a half above the bivouac
of Shoar on the upward journey. The
column then moved forward, well closed
up, to the head of Uss rapid. Here it
was decided not to attempt the left -bank
channel, but to pass round the western side
of Little Uss island. A sharp short rapid,
with a nasty curve, had to be run at the
turning from the left-bank channel, into the
passage between the two islands ; and the
naval boat, which was one of the first to
attempt the passage, struck heavily on a
rock in mid-stream, in the swiftest water,
and remained there. Other boats were
with difficulty taken to her assistance by
the voyageurs, her stores were unloaded,
and she was got off; but in getting her off,
a boat of the Gordon Highlanders got on
the rock, and in freeing her, another boat
of the Gordons was so damaged that she
2/0 RUNNING THE RAPIDS.
filled and sank. This accident to the naval
boat caused considerable delay, as, while
the other boats were engaged in rescuing
her, and the boats damaged in going to her
help, the passage of the rapid was blocked.
Thus by nightfall only 64 boats, Gordons
and part of Cornwalls, were through the
rapid; and the force bivouacked in two
camps above and below the rapid on Uss
island, about 1000 yards apart. A few
natives with spears were seen, but they all
kept out of our way. We fired our signal
rocket at 8 p.m., and were answered by
Colonel Butler from the mainland, about
two miles due west.
Our total wrecks this day were three, —
one of the Gordons and one of the Corn-
walls, already described, and another of the
Cornwalls, which struck on the rocks and
filled almost immediately after leaving the
Sherri island bivouac. The repairing parties
worked till late in the night, repairing other
boats more or less seriously damaged.
The following day would take us into
BACK TO HAMDAB. 27 1
the Shukook, where, if anywhere, the
enemy would attempt to interfere with our
passage. There were many places where
the river passed between rocky cliffs, from
which a few riflemen could do us serious
damage. I did not for a moment antici-
pate that any large force would be gathered
there; but I did think it highly probable
that the enemy would post a small body
of riflemen to oppose our passage, and that
we might have to land a force to turn them
out. Orders were therefore issued that two
men would be in the bows of each boat
with their rifles loaded and in their hands,
and with accoutrements and ammunition
ready. In the event of any shots being
fired at the boats, these men were at once
to return the fire. The column was not
to be halted for mere stray shots ; but
should any serious amount of firing take
place, the nearest boats were at once to
pull to shore and land their men, the
landing being covered by the armed bow-
men. Wooden plugs were made and issued
272 RUNNING THE RAPIDS.
out to each boat to stop bullet- holes if
required,
asth Feb. Previous to the advance on the morning
of 28th, I saw commanding officers, and
explained to them my wishes in case of our
being fired upon, and of a landing being
necessary. We then moved off, halting at
the foot of the Uss rapid till two battalions
and a half were concentrated there, and
then recommencing the advance. My en-
deavour was throughout this descent of the
river, as in the ascent, so to regulate the
movement as to obtain the greatest possi-
ble rapidity consistent with power of con-
centration to meet any sudden attack.
The advance through the Shukook was
unmolested. As my boat followed the last
company of the Gordons, I was in momen-
tary expectation of hearing the first shots
fired. It would have been so easy to
shoot some of our men in the boats from
the rocky cliffs, and to choose places for
the riflemen whence they could easily
escape before we could reach them with
BACK TO HAMDAB. 2/3
our infantry. But not a shot was fired,
and not a human being was seen; and it
was with no small satisfaction that we
emerged from the rocky defile, and, having
passed our old camp at Wady el Argu, ran
the very nasty rapid intervening between
it and the high Nile island camp at Kir-
bekan, which we reached at 11.30 a.m.
This rapid required that every boat should
be taken down by voyageurs, and occa-
sioned considerable delay. At night the
Gordon Highlanders and my headquar-
ters reached Dulka island, and bivouacked
there, immediately opposite the old camp
whence we had marched for our fight, and
the remaining troops bivouacked between
the old Kirbekan camp and Wady el Argu.
Our rocket was answered by Colonel Butler
about six miles W.N.W. He was encamped
on the north bank, opposite Birti island.
We had got through the day without the
loss of a boat.
While halted in the afternoon at the high
Nile island camp of Kirbekan, the Gordons
s
274 RUNNING THE RAPIDS.
had taken prisoner an old man, dressed in
the Mahdi^s patchwork uniform. He gave
no information, and next day I handed him
over to the Vakeel, who pronounced him
old and half-witted, and let him go. A
messenger from Birti brought me word that
the Vakeel had gone to El Koua with some
of the troops, but was expected back in the
morning. Achmet Effendi, the commander
of the troops, was deeply concerned at our
return, and begged me to let him know its
cause,
xst March. On the ist March, as soon as the troops
had closed up to Dulka island, we con-
tinued our advance. We successfully passed
the troublesome rapid above Castle Camp,
and the swift water above Birti. I took
Colonel Butler on board off Birti island,
and dropped down to his camp, where I
was joined by Colonel Colvile, who had
seen the Vakeel, and arranged for his start-
ing as soon as ordered to do so. The
boats of the column pressed on to their
rendezvous on the right bank, opposite the
BACK TO HAMDAB. 275
site of our old bivouac, where the Vakeel
was now in camp.
The Vakeel, accompanied by Achmet
Effendi, now crossed over to see me ; and
it was arranged with him that he should
start on the following morning. There was
a short desert -route from Birti to Jebel
Kulgeili, but he preferred marching near
the river, and keeping touch of our boats.
Colvile now again joined the Vakeels
camp, with instructions to await our arrival
at Hamdab. I sent off a messenger re-
porting arrival to Lord Wolseley.
Having rationed the mounted troops up
to six days, the boats again moved on, and
entered the Rahami cataract, where we
were again obliged to place a voyageur in
every boat. Each time that the nature of
the rapids required this caused delay — as
after taking a boat down, each voyageur
had to walk back to the head of the rapid
to bring down another boat. We had only
sixty-seven voyageurs, and more than two
hundred boats ; so when only one voyageur
276 RUNNING THE RAPIDS.
was required for a boat, each had to make
from three to four trips; when two were
required, each had to make seven trips.
Headquarters, Corn walls, and StafFords
bivouacked on the left bank, about the
middle of the cataract; the Gordons on
a sandy island opposite; and the Black
Watch, who had not yet entered the cata-
ract, about three-quarters of a mile above.
The men were now becoming as skilful
in the descent as they had become in the
ascent of the rapids. An excellent system
of leaving boats at important places to
point out the route to be taken had been
perfected by Colonel Alleyne. Boats
followed at regular intervals keeping to
the track of the pilot-boat, and the words
" slower " or " faster " were passed down
the line with rapidity. But we could not
avoid accidents : two boats of the Staffords
had to be abandoned to-day, and two were
badly damaged, but repaired. Still, we had
lost no lives, and but few stores.
2d March. On the 2d the advance was resumed.
BACK TO HAMDAB. 277
Rahami cataract was successfully negotiated ;
and we entered the swift water at the top
of Umhaboah cataract. Near our old camp
at Warag we were halted, while Colonels
Denison and Alleyne examined the river
in front, Alleyne returned presently and
told me there was a choice between two
passages. That to the right was straight,
but there was a clear fall of nearly three feet
at one place. That to the left had no
actual waterfall, but it was a rushing in-
clined plane, its worst feature being that
the channel was narrow, and turned at
right angles in the very worst part of the
shoot. They had elected for this latter
passage; but considered no one should
descend it except the necessary two voy-
ageurs (bowman and steerer), and the six
men required to row each boat. All others
were ordered to walk, and all arms were
portaged.
The voyageurs walked to see the shoot,
before attempting to pass it. They said it
was bad, but practicable. To me it seemed
278
RUNNING THE RAPIDS.
as bad as bad could be. The channel
to the left, and then sharply at right
to the right. Just at this turn, two
rocks stood out in mid -stream. 1
necessary to pass between them. Th
error in steering would be fatal. To
the turn too soon would bring the bi
to the right-hand rock ; to wait toi
would sweep her on to the left-hanc
Sitting under the shadow of a great i
watched this triumph of skill over a di;
that to any one unaccustomed to sucl
would have seemed insuperable. Boi
boat came down at lightning - spec
men giving way with might and n
give steering power ; the bowmen st
cool and collected watching the wati
only using the oar should the ste<
seem to need help ; the steersmen bi
round the boat with marvellous juc
at the right moment. Now and tl
error of half a second brought a boa
the edge of the left-hand rock, and si
and fell like a horse jumping a fence
1/ -V ,
BACK TO HAMDAB. 279
in the day*s work only one boat of the
Gordons and one of the Staffords were
wrecked. Half the force bivouacked below
this shoot at our old camp of Mishami
ridge ; half above it at Warag.
The Mudir s troops bivouacked at Kab
el Abd, and we established heliographic
communication with Colonel Butler at
Shebabit. We had entered again into the
land of the friendly Shagiyehs, and the first
sakyeh we had seen at work since leaving
Hamdab groaned out its creaking welcome
to us opposite Gamra.
The two rear battalions were ordered
to close up on the following morning, the
advance of the leading battalions to be
postponed till this was complete.
Early in the morning the passage of this 3d March,
rapid was continued. As one boat was
coming through, her rudder broke ; she
struck a rock, and the voyageur in the bow
was thrown by the shock into the water.
He, fortunately, clung to the rock, and got
upon it. A boat was lowered down to him
28o RUNNING THE RAPIDS.
by a rope from the shore by other voyageurs,
and he was brought safely to land. This,
and the length of time required for the
return-trips of the voyageurs, made it half-
past eleven before all boats were through,
and in readiness to advance.
Passing through Kab el Abd, we looked
in vain for the cataract that was ** like the
big gate of Semneh " as we went up. It had
entirely disappeared. This was only one of
the many striking changes in the nature and
appearance of the river between our ascent
and descent. The Nile evidently entirely
changes its character at each place with its
change of level, and no map of the river
drawn at any one season can be even
approximately correct for another season.
We made good progress to the head of the
fourth cataract. Here again it was decided
not to attempt the channel to the west of
Suffi island by which the boats had ascend-
ed, but to descend the main channel on
the left bank. It was a long straight run
of a mile and a half or more (distances
BACK TO HAM DAB. 28 1
are hard to measure when flying like an
express train) of water broken and rough,
studded with rocks both seen and unseen —
a dangerous rapid to the unskilled or care-
less, yet safe to the trained eye and skilled
hand.
As my boat shot down we passed the
adjutant of the Gordons, with his boat
stuck fast in the very centre of the boiling
rapid — a useful beacon to the following
boats. His was not the only boat that
struck. Four others of the same battalion
were on rocks. Three were repaired, but
two of the five sank and were abandoned.
The quartermaster was thrown into the
water, and lost all his kit. The adjutant
had a narrow escape for his life. Thrown
into the water, as his boat sank, his head
struck a sharp rock, and he was severely
cut. The arms, ammunition, and men's
bedding in his boat, and all lives, were
saved. The Black Watch, also, had to
abandon a boat that struck on a rock
near Kabour. But by sunset, thanks to
282 RUNNING THE RAPIDS.
the admirable exertions of the men, and
the skill of the voyageurs, all wrecked
crews were brought to shore. All the
Gordons and eleven boats of the Comwalls
bivouacked below the rapid, and the re-
mainder of the troops above.
The Mudir's troops encamped half a mile
north of us on the left bank ; Colonel But-
ler's party on the right bank, opposite the
end of Ooli island.
Orders were issued for the troops to close
up below the cataract before advancing in
the morning; and to Colonel Butler to march
to Abu Dom, select a place and make pre-
parations for his crosssing.
4th March. On the 4th the remaining boats passed
through the fourth cataract with a loss of
three boats wrecked, and, alas 1 with the
first fatal accident in all our downward jour-
ney. The course to be steered through
the cataract was a very tortuous one. The
boats had to go from mid-stream over close
to the right bank, and there pass between
BACK TO HAMDAB. 283
a rock and the shore, turning again to the
left into mid-stream. Officers and a voya-
geur were stationed with their boats on the
rocky islands to show the direction to be
taken, but unfortunately a boat stuck across
the stream, in the narrow channel near the
right bank, blocking it. Instead of the re-
maining boats being turned in to the bank
to wait till the channel was clear, they were
by some error directed off into mid-stream,
and the greater part of the boats of three
battalions shot over a fall of about three
feet, like a Thames weir in flood. That only
one accident occurred is marvellous. One
boat having safely shot the weir, through
some error in steering struck a rock vio-
lently, and upset. Unfortunately she had
in her two wounded men, both of whom,
with a sergeant, were drowned. One of the
wounded men, private Barber, had been spe-
cially distinguished by his gallant conduct at
Kirbekan. A wounded private of the Black
Watch also died on board his boat in pass-
284 RUNNING THE RAPIDS.
ing through the cataract. His leg had been
amputated above the knee, and it was an
almost hopeless case.
It was nearly noon before the running of
this rapid was complete, and we then moved
down the river. A halt was made at Jebel
Kulgeili, to concentrate two battalions, and
the advance was continued to Hamdab,
where three and a half battalions concen-
trated in bivouac. The rear-guard half-
battalion Black Watch, with two damaged
boats of the Staffords and six of the Corn-
walls, were still in rear.
The Mudir s troops bivouacked at Dugi-
yet ; the mounted troops at Kasingar, oppo-
site Belal.
We had descended in nine days what it
had taken us thirty-one days to ascend.
285
CHAPTER XVII.
THE BREAK-UP OF THE COLUMN BACK
TO KORTI.
At Hamdab I received a telegram from
Korti. General BuUer's name at the head
was sufficient to tell us the retreat had been
safely accomplished from Abu Klea. The
telegram directed me to leave Colonel But-
ler in command at Abu Dom with the Black
Watch, a troop of Hussars, the Egyptian
camel corps, two guns of the Egyptian
battery, a detachment of Engineers, and a
hundred transport camels, with all the ra-
tions I could spare, and to bring the rest
of the column to Korti.
On the morning of the 5th we moved sth March.
on to Abu Dom. The rapid water between
286 BREAK-UP OF THE COLUMN.
Hamdab and Belal offered no difficulty of
importance, and by 12.30 p.m. two battalions
had closed up, and the mounted troops had
reached the right bank at Merawi. At
1.40 P.M., after the men's dinners, the boats
of the Gordons and Staffbrds commenced
to take across the animals and their loads,
and by sunset the greater number of them
were across, and all the infantry in bivouac
together.
The Mudir's troops I had halted at
Duaim, three miles short of Abu Dom.
Orders arrived for them to be sent to hold
Hamdab, for which place, on my recom-
mendation, Dugiyet was afterwards substi-
tuted, as being nearer the supplies of Belal,
and at the entrance of the Berber road.
6th March. The early part of the 6th was occupied
in ferrying across the remainder of the ani-
mals, and in the transfer of supplies from
the regiments going to Korti to the com-
missariat officer detailed to remain at Abu
Dom. A committee consisting of Colonel
Butler, Colonel Alleyne, Lieutenant-Colonel
BACK TO KORTI. 287
Colvile, Major Slade, Captain Courtenay,
and Lieutenant Colborne, met and went
over the survey together, deciding upon the
names of the various cataracts, islands, vil-
lages, hills, and districts through which we
had passed. This was no easy task, as the
same places seem to be known by many dif-
ferent names ; and when the sound of a
name was agreed upon, it was no easy mat-
ter to spell the word. Major Colborne*s
map, attached to this volume, represents the
fruit of their joint revision.
A violent dust-storm blew throughout the
day, but dropped towards evening ; and at
five o'clock I held a review of the River
Column — the first and the last time it was
ever inspected on parade. The horses,
though their feet were tender from want of
shoes, did not show any other signs of un-
fitness. The camels of the camel corps
and battery seemed none the worse for
their crossing. Two thousand of the finest
fighting men that it ever was any man s lot
to command were inspected in line, marched
288 BREAK-UP OF THE COLUMN.
past, re-formed in line of quarter-columns,
and advanced in review order. Having
said a few farewell words to commanding
officers, I bade the column, as ** The River
Column," good-bye.
The voyageurs were drawn up at the
flag-staff under command of Lieutenant-
Colonel Denison. Out of the contingent
of 377 men that left Canada, ten had died,
six of whom had been drowned in the Nile.
Their six months' engagement expiring on
9th March, eighty-nine of them had re-
engaged, and sixty-seven of those had
ascended the Nile with the River Column.
Without them, the ascent of the river, if
not impossible, would have been far slower,
and attended with far greater loss of life.
Without them, the descent of the river
would have been impossible. Officers and
men, they had worked with unceasing energy
and a complete disregard of danger.
The Vakeel had been met at Duaim by
an order for him at once to hand over his
BACK TO KORTI. 289
duties to Izzedin Bey, and to consider him-
self dismissed. Another commander was
also being sent up to replace Achmet
Effendi. Both these acts appear to have
been the Mudir's own, without reference to
Lord Wolseley. The first, the dismissal of
the Vakeel, was beyond his powers ; and
the Vakeel was reinstated later, and sent
to replace the Mudir himself at Dongola.
As soon as he saw that the English were
really strong and in earnest, he had done
his best to help us. I had no fault to find
with him, or with Achmet Effendi, and I
publicly thanked them on the parade, at
which they both were present.
Achmet Effendi, however, expressed
strong objections to being sent to garrison
Dugiyet. The fact was, that information
had arrived that the enemy reoccupied
Birti the day after the Mudir s troops left
it. Rumour exaggerated their numbers ;
and a force of 6000 men was said to be
there under Lekalik, Suleiman Wad Gamr,
T
March.
290 BREAK-UP OF THE COLUMN.
and Abu Hegel, while an army under Mo-
hammed El Kheir was said to be ad-
vancing from Berber by the river to join
them.
7th to 8th On the morning of the 7th, having said
good-bye to Butler and his troops, I started
with the boats, and early on the 8th handed
over my command at Korti. The River
Column then ceased to exist.
In justice to those on whom the great
burden of the work fell, I will end this nar-
rative with the last paragraph of my final
report to Lord Wolseley : ** I cannot,*' I
said, "close this report without dwelling
upon the splendid behaviour of the regi-
mental officers, non-commissioned officers,
and men of this column. The life of the
men has been one of incessant toil from the
first to the last day of the expedition. In
ragged clothing, scarred and blistered by
the sun and rough work, they have worked
with constant cheerfulness and unceasing
BACK TO KORTI. 29 1
energy. Their discipline has been beyond
reproach ; and I do not hesitate to say that
no finer, more gallant, or more trustworthy
body of men ever served the Queen than
those I have had the honour to command
in the' River Column."
THE END.
PRINTBD BY WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS.
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