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Vastness ! and Age ! and Memories of Eld ! 
Silence ! and Desolation ! and dim Night ! 
I feel ye now — I feel ye in your strength — 
Ο spells more sure than e'er Judaean King 
Taught in the gardens of Gethsemane ! 
Ο charms more potent than the rapt Chaldee 
Ever drew down from out the quiet stars. 



My reasons for translating the works of Appian are that 
they constitute an indispensable part of Roman history, that 
they are not accessible in English, and that none of the 
persons more competent to perform the task have seen 
fit to undertake it. The last English translation, made in 
1679, ^s not now obtainable, and would not be readable if 

All that we know about Appian as an individual is gleaned 
from his own writings and from the letters of Fronto, the 
tutor of Marcus Aurelius. It is supposed that he was born 
about A.D. 90, and that he died about a.d. ι 6o. He left an 
autobiography, as he tells us at the conclusion of his Preface, 
but it was lost early. It was not known to Photius in the 
ninth century, although Appian's historical works were all ex- 
tant at that time. He tells us in his Preface also that he was 
a native of Alexandria,^ in Egypt, and that he came to Rome 
where he practised the profession of an advocate in the 
courts of the emperors until they appointed him procurator. 
As he says in the same paragraph that he had reached the 
highest place in his own country, it is inferred that he was 
procurator of Egypt. A fragment of his works, brought to 

1 A papyrus recently unearthed and published by the Kffyjit Kxplora- 
tion Fund {Oxyrhynchus Papyri^ Part I. p. 62, London, 1898) contains 
the record of the arraignment of a certain Appianus of Alexandria at 
Rome before the Emperor (probably Marcus Aurelius) for participa- 
tion in a rebellion. The accused describes himself as " a nobleman 
and a gymnasiarch." Our Appian might possibly have been alive then, 
but he could not have been the person on trial, since the latter was ad- 
dressed by one of his friends present as a young man. 





light in recent years/ speaks of a war against the Jews in 
Egypt in which he had an adventure. This was probably the 
war waged by the Emperor Trajan to suppress the Jewish 
insurrection in that country a.d. 117, the year of Trajan's 
death. It is inferred, therefore, that Appian did not come 
to Rome till the reign of Hadrian, and that he lived there 
until the reign of Antoninus Pius, and that he was appointed 
procurator by the latter. Among the letters of Fronto, dis- 
covered by Cardinal Mai,^ is one addressed to Antoninus Pius 
asking the appointment of his friend Appian as procurator 
as a mark of distinction in his old age, not that he (Appian) 
desires it to gratify his ambition, or for the sake of the pay. 
Age and bereavement are mentioned among the reasons why 
this distinction should be conferred, and Fronto vouches for 
his friend's honor and integrity. A letter from Appian to 
Fronto, in a fragmentary state, and Fronto's reply, both 
written in Greek, are among the finds of Cardinal Mai, but 
they are of slight importance. Appian had sought to give 
two slaves to Fronto as a present, and Fronto, from motives 
of delicacy, had declined to accept them. So Appian writes 
to Fronto and asks why it should be considered improper 
for friends to accept presents from friends, when it is not 
considered improper for cities to accept gifts from their own 
citizens, or even from strangers. 

This is all that we know of Appian as a person. He says 
in his Preface (Sec. 9) that Rome had then existed 900 
years, which would imply that his book was published, in 
whole or in part, about a.d. 150; /.<?., during the reign of 
Antoninus Pius. The Testimonia Veterum, which Schweig- 
hauser places at the beginning of his third volume, tells us 
that Stephanus of Byzantium (sixth century), in his geo- 
graphical dictionary, referred to Appian in three places, and 

1 Concerniffg the Divination of the Arabs, vol. 11. p. 489. 

2 Frontonis Reliquice, Berlin, 181 6, p. 27. 


that Evagrius (a.d. 531-593) mentioned the names of five 
Greek writers of Roman history, of whom Appian was one. 
The earUest detailed account of Appian*s works that has 
reached us is that of Photius, Patriarch of Constantinople, 
who died a.d. 891. Photius wrote an encyclopedia of litera- 
ture called the MyHobiblon, containing notices of 280 authors 
whose works were then extant, together with extracts from 
some of them. Of Appian he said (Cod. 57) : — 

" We read the Roman history of Appian in three volumes, 
embracing twenty-four books. The first book contains the 
exploits and doings of the seven kings. It is entitled Rome 
under the Kings, The second embraces all of Italy except 
the part along the Adriatic gulf, and is entitled Italian 
Roman history. The next includes the war of the Romans 
against the Samnites, a great nation and one hard to con- 
quer. The Romans waged war with them eighty years, and 
with difficulty subjugated them and the nations allied with 
them. This is called the Samnite Roman history. The 
fourth, as it contains the wars of the Romans against the 
Gauls, is called the Gallic Roman history. The remaining 
books are styled in like manner: the fifth, Sicily and the 
Islands, since it relates to the Sicihans and the islanders ; 
the sixth, Spanish; the seventh, Hannibalic, embracing the 
war of the Romans against Hannibal the Carthaginian ; the 
eighth, Africany Carthaginian, and Numidian; the ninth, 
Macedonian; the tenth, Grecian and Ionian; the eleventh, 
Syrian and Parthian; the twelfth, Mithridatic, 

"Thus far are exhibited the transactions of the Romans 
with foreign nations and their wars with them. The next 
books treat of the internal dissensions of the Romans and 
their wars with each other, and are entitled the Civil Wars, 
first, second, and so on to the ninth, which is the twenty-first 
of the whole history. The twenty-second book is called 
The Hundred Years, the next after that the Dacian, and 
the twenty-fourth, the Arabian, These are the divisions of 
the whole history. 

"The first book of the Civil Wars contains those which 
Marius and Sulla waged against each other. The next treats 


of the contest between Pompey and Julius Caesar, and of the 
great battles they fought, showing how fortune turned the 
scale in favor of Caesar, and how he put Pompey to flight. Next 
come the wars of Antony and Octavius Caesar (Augustus) 
against the murderers of the first Caesar, at which time also 
many illustrious Romans were put to death without any kind of 
trial, and, finally, how they fell out (I mean Antony and Augus- 
tus) and warred against each other with powerful armies and 
great slaughter, showing how victory finally declared itself 
in favor of Augustus, and how Antony, bereft of allies, was 
pursued as a fugitive to Egypt where he took his own life. 
In the same book, which is the last one of the Civil Wars, 
Egypt was brought under Roman sway, and the Roman gov- 
ernment fell under the monarchy of Augustus. His history 
begins [here follows the first of the Excerpta]. . . . 

" His history begins, as I have said, with ^neas, and goes 
on to the boys Romulus and Remus. Then from Romulus, 
the founder, it gives a detailed account of events to the time 
of Augustus, and thence disconnectedly to that of Trajan. 

" This Appian was an Alexandrian by birth. At first he 
pleaded causes at Rome, and afterwards was deemed worthy 
to be appointed procurator of the emperors. His style is 
simple and unaffected, and his history adheres strictly to the 
truth, and he, if anybody, is careful in his account of military 
operations. Whether to arouse by speech the spirits of the 
dejected soldier, or to calm the fiery one, or to portray emo- 
tion, or to express anything else by words, he stands in the 
first rank. He flourished in the times of Trajan and of 

The lexicon of Suidas (about a.d. 970) contains a brief 
account of the works of Appian, but it is extremely con- 
fused. He takes the title of the first book for the title of 
the whole work. He mentions three books relating to the 
affairs of Italy, one relating to the Gallic wars in Italy, and 
one relating to the Punic wars in Italy. Next, he says that 
the civil wars of the Romans are treated separately. Then 
he speaks of the Gallic wars on the river Rhine and those 
waged by Julius Caesar. Finally, he says that Appian wrote 


nine books of Roman history. He concludes by saying that 
some persons spell the name of Appian with one p. 

An anonymous writer of the Middle Ages inscribed upon 
a manuscript copy of Appian a list of his works differing 
somewhat from that of Photius, and especially in making the 
whole number of books twenty-two instead of twenty-four, 
and the whole number of books of the Civil Wars five in- 
stead of nine. This list was copied again and again, so that 
at the time of the revival of learning in Europe it was found 
in several codices. This list differed from that of Photius 
also, in assigning to the Parthian book a place separate from 
the Syrian. 

We may as well dispose of this Parthian book now. It 
was a forgery. It consists of extracts fi*om Plutarch's biog- 
raphies of Crassus and of Antony, copied verbatim and foisted 
upon Appian's works by somebody who lived earlier than 
Photius. Appian has nowhere said that he had written a Par- 
thian history, but only that he intended to write one. The 
probability is that he did not carry that intention into effect, 
but that some early book maker observing the expressed in- 
tention of the author, pieced together these extracts from 
Plutarch and patched them upon the genuine books in order 
to add to the market value of his product. So the Parthian 
book passed into the works of Appian and was regularly 
reproduced, printed, and translated, until 1557 when William 
Xylander accidentally discovered that it was copied word for 
word from Plutarch. He concluded from internal evidence 
that it had been foisted upon Appian*s history by some 
enterprising book maker. There was a gap in the history 
from the death of Crassus to the expedition sent by An- 
tony against the Parthians, under the command of Ventidius. 
If Appian had stolen a Parthian history from Plutarch he 
would not have overlooked that gap of seventeen years. 
He would have put something into it. 


No sooner was Xylander's discovery made than the learned 
world divided into two opposing parties, one of which, led by 
Henry Stephen and Joseph Scaliger, held that Appian had 
committed a fraud, while the other adhered to the opinion of 
Xylander that he had been the victim of one. The contro- 
versy continued for two centuries, and we find participat- 
ing in it Voss, Fabricius, Freinshem, Reimar, Baudoin and 
others, and finally Schweighauser. At first the preponder- 
ance of authority was against Appian, but there was a grad- 
ual change culminating in the masterly array of evidence 
and argument advanced by Schweighauser in defence of the 
integrity of the author whose text he had done so much to 
restore and purify.^ At present nobody sustains the charge 
advanced by Henry Stephen, that Appian had stolen a book 
from Plutarch. On the other hand Stephen has lost reputa- 
tion as a critic by reason of his making the charge. 

A discrepancy exists between Photius and the anonymous 
writer respecting the books of the Civil Wars, the former 
making them nine in number, the latter only five. Schweig- 
hauser explained this discrepancy by showing that Photius 
included in the Civi/ Wars four books that Appian himself 
designated as Egyptian history, and that these four books 
had been lost between the time of Photius and that of the 
anonymous writer.^ That there were four books of Egyptian 
history is proved by citations from them in fragments of 
Appian preserved in a MS. known as the Saint Germain 
Grammar and published in Bekker*s Anecdota Grceca. This 
explains the reason why the Civil Wars terminate so abruptly 
with the death of young Pompeius instead of going on to the 
battle of Actium, as Appian himself proposed. In Book I., 
Sec. 6, of the Civil Wars the author gives us his plan as 
follows : — 

1 Schweighauser's Appian, Leipzig, 1785, vol. iii. p. 905 seq, 

2 Jbid.j p. 892 seq. 


" On account of its magnitude I have divided the work, 
first taking up the events that occurred from the time of 
Sempronius Gracchus to that of Cornelius Sulla ; next, those 
that followed to the death of Caesar. The remaining books 
of the Civil Wars treat of those waged by the triumvirs 
against each other and the Roman people, until the end of 
these conflicts, and the greatest achievement, the battle of 
Actium, fought by Octavius Caesar against Antony and Cleo- 
patra together, which will be the beginning of the Egyptian 

Under this plan the book containing the battle of Actium 
and the death of Antony and Cleopatra might have been 
designated either as the last book of the Civil Wars or as 
the first book of the Egyptian history. Evidently it was 
classed with the latter and perished with the remainder of 
that history, to our infinite regret.^ The book makers of the 
Middle Ages were concerned to keep alive the history of the 
civil wars of Rome. There was a sufficient demand for that 
part of Appian to keep copyists at work on it. There was 
not a sufficient demand for the Egyptian history. If the 
book makers and their public at that time were as undis- 
criminating as we have seen that Suidas was, we can easily 
understand how they allowed that important book to perish, 
simply because it was under a wrong title. 

How the MSS. of Appian have fared from the earliest 
periods to which we can trace them, and what is their 
present condition, is told by the late Professor Mendelssohn, 
of the University of Dorpat, Russia, in the preface to his 
(Teubner) edition of this author. I had thought at first 
to prepare a summary from this, and from Schweighauser*s 

1 Photius, it is true, says that the last book of the Civil Wars contains 
the defeat and death of Antony, and this would mean, in his enumera- 
tion, the ninth, i.e.^ the last Egyptian book; but, as Schweighauser 
observes, it is evident from his wrong cataloguing that Photius himself 
had not read these Egyptian books. 


preface, which would serve both for the student and the or- 
dinary reader, but on reflection I concluded that the former 
would like to see the whole scope of Mendelssohn's work, 
which, while built upon that of Schweighauser, is even more 
thorough. I have accordingly translated Mendelssohn's 
Latin preface, and added it to my own as a separate essay, 
so that students can see all of it, and the ordinary reader 
can omit all of it if he chooses. 

The praise which Mendelssohn bestows upon the great 
scholar who preceded him makes it unnecessary for me 
to recount the labors of Schweighauser on the text of 
Appian. Every one who speaks or thinks of that text thinks 
of Schweighauser. Everything dates before or after him. 
A few facts not mentioned by Mendelssohn may be here 
recapitulated. Schweighauser was professor of Greek in the 
University of Strassburg in the latter part of the eighteenth 
century. He was prompted to undertake the emendation 
of Appian by the English scholar, Samuel Musgrave, about 
the year 1780. He began to accumulate materials at first 
for the use of Musgrave, but the latter fell sick and was 
unable to use them. He urged Schweighauser to continue 
and complete the work and promised to contribute the notes 
he had made on the printed text of the author. Musgrave 
died soon afterward, but by some mistake his notes did not 
reach Schweighauser till two years later. Some additional 
notes of the German scholar Reiske came into his hands 
subsequently. The successive steps which he took to purify 
the text by the examination of the MSS., within his reach, 
and by the assistance of friends upon those not within his 
reach, are related by him in detail in his preface. Five years 
of incessant and well-directed labor were bestowed upon this 
revision, which was pubhshed in 1 785 in three volumes con- 
taining 2851 octavo pages. No greater service was ever 
rendered by one man of letters to another. 


Together with the Greek text Schweighauser printed the 
Latin version of Appian made by Sigismund Geslen and 
published at Basle in 1554, with such corrections as his own 
emendation had made necessary or his own scholarship sug- 
gested. This Latin translation of Geslen was a truly remark- 
able production considering the state of the text and of Greek 
learning at that time. " He was a man," says Schweighauser, 
"thoroughly versed in both Greek and Latin, and no less 
skilled in criticism than profound in his knowledge of Roman 
history. It was not the task of a mere interpreter that he 
performed, but, applying a healing hand to the corrupted 
text, he frequently and dexterously, but .for the most part 
cautiously, restored in the happiest manner a countless num- 
ber of passages which had been miserably deformed in his 
Greek copy, and in many places where the previous trans- 
lator (Candidus) had gone widely astray, he expressed the 
true meaning of the author in language clear and terse." 
The translation of Geslen did not embrace the Spanish or 
the lUyrian history. The translation of the former which is 
found in Geslen's book was made by Caelius Secundus Curio 
and that of the latter by Candidus. I was so fortunate as to 
procure a reprint of this book at an auction sale in this 
city two years ago. Geslen's Latin version as amended by 
Schweighauser, and still further by Dubner, is published in 
the Didot edition of Appian in parallel columns with the 
Greek text. 

The table of contents of the present volumes shows what 
works of Appian have come down to us. The Excerpta are 
passages extracted from the lost books, and preserved in 
compilations made by others. They are of four or five 
different kinds, but are principally embraced in two com- 
pilations made by order of the Emperor Constantine Por- 
phyrogenitus, about 950 a.d., one entitled "Concerning 
the Embassies " and the other " Concerning Virtues and 


Vices.*' Each of these books contains extracts from Appian 
and other ancient historians on the subjects named. Those 
of Appian from the former of the two compilations were first 
collected in a slovenly manner by Fulvio Orsini in Rome and 
published at Antwerp in 1580. Those from the latter were 
reproduced with great fidelity by Henry de Valois at Paris 
in 1634, from a MS. belonging to his friend Peiresc. Other 
excerpta have been preserved for us by Suidas. These, 
although numerous, are short and unimportant. A few have 
been collected by Cardinal Mai among his gleanings in the 
Vatican, but their authenticity is not established in all 

Appian has been accused of unduly favoring the Romans 
in his treatment of their wars and diplomacy with other 
nations. The accusation is not warranted. Impartiality and 
the judicial temper are his striking characteristics. These 
are especially shown in his treatment of the Numantine war, 
the third Punic war and the Mithridatic wars, in all of which 
the blame of their inception is put upon the Romans. 

Appian was, however, a narrator of events, not a philo- 
sophic historian. His style is as destitute of ornament as a 
lawyer's brief, and in the narrative parts almost as arid. In 
the rhetorical passages, however, which are numerous, it is 
animated, forcible and at times eloquent. It has been the 
translator's aim to put the whole into smooth, idiomatic Eng- 
lish, even at the risk of offending the taste which requires a 
translation to reproduce the author's style as well as his 
meaning. Occasionally Appian rises to the dignity of the 
best writers of the classical period. The introduction to the 
history of the civil wars is an example of this kind. Here 
the events leading up to the tragedy of Tiberius Gracchus 
move forward with a dignified and measured tread, which 
has been followed and imitated by many later historians of 
that period, but has been surpassed by none. Occasionally 


he gives us with startling clearness a glimpse of social and 
political conditions, but these are only incidental.^ His aim 
is to narrate events, not to pass judgment on them. And 
so, although he has given us a thousand pages filled with 
matter of absorbing interest, and has preserved for us facts 
and documents of the greatest value which, but for him, 
would have been wholly lost, he does not reach the first rank 
of historical writers. 

Appian has been severely censured for want of accuracy in 
details. According to modern canons of criticism, accuracy 
is the first and indispensable requisite of the historian ; but 
it was not so in the ancient world. General conformity to 
facts was of course necessary, but in most cases the aim of the 
ancient writer was to make an interesting book or to furnish 
a setting for the political ideas or the moral principles which 
he entertained. Appian was neither better nor worse in this 
respect than the average historian of the ancient world. He 
stands on the same plane with Plutarch, Dio Cassius, Sue- 
tonius, Florus, Velleius Paterculus, Diodorus Siculus, and 
Valerius Maximus, all of whom overlapped him here and 
there. Between himself and Plutarch there is a striking 
parallelism covering the whole period of the civil wars. In 
some places they use the same Greek phraseology, and this 
has led one modern commentator^ to the opinion that their 
common source here was a Greek, not a Latin, writer, since 
it would have been very remarkable if, in translating inde- 
pendently from the Latin, they had often used the same Greek 
words. After examining the passages cited by Dr. Vollgraff, 
and some that he has not cited, I concur in his opinion. 

How far Appian is contradicted in matters of fact by 

1 Civil Warsy ii. 19 and 120. 

2 Greek Writers of Roman History: Some Reflections upon the 
Authorities Used by Plutarch and Appianus^ by J. C. Vollgraff, Leyden, 
1880, pp. 113. 


better authorities than himself I have sought to show by foot- 
notes accompanying the text, although I do not assume that 
I have made a complete census of such passages. The 
better authorities are : 

I. The works of Cicero, especially the Letters, a histori- 
cal mine without a parallel in the ancient world and still 

II. Polybius, whose extant works, however, overlap those 
of Appian only in small part. Although Polybius was an eye- 
witness of the third Punic war, and of the destruction of 
Carthage, his history of those events and every other account 
except Appian*s, has perished. That Appian drew from 
Polybius in part is proved by his citation in the Punic wars. 
Sec. 132. 

III. Caesar's Commentaries, including in this term the 
writings of Hirtius and of the unknown author or authors of 
the wars in Africa and Spain. 

IV. The works of Sallust. These touch only a small part 
of Appian's history. 

V. The works of Livy perhaps. It is open to dispute 
whether Livy is more to be depended upon than Appian in 
dealing with facts, but as Livy's works later than the conquest 
of Macedonia, B.C. 168, have perished, we have little oppor- 
tunity for comparison, except with the Epitome, or table of 
contents, of his lost books. 

It was the habit of ancient historians to put speeches into 
the mouths of their leading actors in order to present the 
ideas that moved peoples, or parties, or factions, and some- 
times to deliver the author's moral lectures to mankind. 
This practice was introduced by Thucydides. It was, says 
Mr. Gilbert Murray,^ " a fatal legacy to two thousand years 
of history- writing after him." Appian followed the fashion. 
The speeches which he delivered in this way are the best 

"^Ancient Greek Liter ature^ London, 1897, P• ^86. 


part of his work in point of style. We feel that here we are 
listening to the practised debater, the trained pleader of 
causes in the imperial courts. If we could imagine these 
speeches to have been made by the men from whose mouths 
they proceed, we should wonder at the high range of dialec- 
tical skill and eloquence that prevailed in those times. We 
should wonder also that two speakers should show equal 
cleverness in maintaining opposite opinions so that we can 
scarcely decide, after reading their arguments, which of them 
ought to prevail. An excellent example is the conversation 
between Octavius and Antony.^ The whole debate that fol- 
lowed the assassination of Caesar is forceful and lifelike, but 
the best speech in the course of the civil wars is the one 
ascribed to Cassius shortly before the battle of Philippi.^ It 
pleads in the strongest possible terms the expiring cause of 
the Roman republic, and makes us forget for the moment 
the detestable crime that Cassius had committed and was 
about to expiate with his own blood. 

From what sources Appian drew the materials of his his- 
tory is a perplexing question. He makes mention of Polyb- 
ius,^ Hieronymus,* Caesar,^ Augustus,^ and Asinius Pollio,^ as 
authors, in such a way as to imply that he is quoting from 
them. He mentions the names of Varro,^ Fabius Pictor,® 
Cassius Hemina,^^ and Rutilius Rufus," as authors, but not in 
terms which imply any use of their works. He refers to two 
other authors about whom nothing is known ; viz. Paulus 
Claudius ^^ and Libo.^^ In the absence of any additional 
clues from the author himself respecting his authorities, 
resort must be had to the writings of those who preceded 

1 C W. iii. 15-20. 8 C. W. ii. 9; iv. 47. 

2 C W, iv. 90-icx). 9 Han. 27. 
8 Pun. 132. 10 Gall. vi. 
* Mithr. 8. 11 Sp. 88. 

δ Gall, xviii.; C. W. ii. 76, 99. 12 Gall. i. 3. 

6 Illyr. 14; C W, iv. 1 10, v. 45. i» C. W, iii. 77. 

7 C W, ii. 82. 


him. Two monographs on this subject, of comparatively 
recent date, in addition to that of Vollgraif, will be briefly 

Dr. Wynne considers only the five books of the Civil 
Wars, " Not only," he says, ** does Appian almost every- 
where abstain from indicating his authorities, but a careful 
comparison of his books on the civil wars with other writers 
treating the same convinces me that most of the writings 
that served him as sources have perished, and that any one 
sedulously comparing Appian*s histories with the extant writ- 
ings of others treating the same events will be almost cer- 
tainly persuaded that most of them he was either ignorant 
of, or neglected." He gives us a list of the works which 
Appian might have consulted for the first book of the Civil 
Wars, and thinks that he made use of those of Rutilius Rufus 
and of Posidonius (both in Greek and both lost), and also 
those of Livy, judging from Appian*s general agreement with 
the Epitome of the latter. He does not believe that Appian 
drew anything from Cicero or Velleius Paterculus ; or from 
Diodorus Siculus, or Valerius Maximus, for this book. 

In the second book of the Civil Wars reference is made 
by Appian to Varro, to Pompey's and Caesar's letters to the 
Senate, to Asinius Pollio, to Caesar's Ann-Cato and to his 
" memoranda of the government," υπομνημΛτα της αρχής. 
The references to Varro, and to the two last-mentioned 
works of Caesar, are only incidental. They do not imply 
that anything was drawn from them. Asinius Pollio is men- 
tioned as an authority, as also are the letters of Caesar and 
Pompey to the Senate. The oration of Brutus justifying the 
murder of Caesar and the funeral oration of Antony are in the 

^ De Fide et Auctoritaie Appiani, in Bellis Romanorum Civilibus 
Enarrandis, exploratis fontibus quibus usus esse videtur, Scripsit Dr. 
I. A. Wynne, Groningen, 1855, p. 129. 

Appianus und seine Quellen, by Dr. Emanuel Hannak, Vienna, 
1869, p. 184. 


second book. Both of these may have been genuine reports 
of the spoken words. The speech made by Brutus existed 
in manuscript at one time \ for Cicero says that it was sent 
to him for revision.^ Dr. Wynne thinks that Appian may 
have drawn from the works of Tanusius Geminus, which are 
not now extant. He infers this because Appian makes allu- 
sion to a fact which Plutarch also records and for which the 
latter gives Tanusius as authority. He thinks also that the 
Memoirs of Augustus may have contributed something to the 
concluding chapters of this book, since we know that Appian 
used the Memoirs in other places, and we know from Dio 
Cassius that they contained the details of Caesar's last will 
and testament.* A large number of passages showing simi- 
larity between Appian and the Epitome of Livy are cited by 
Dr. Wynne together with a few discrepancies ; and also some 
passages in Florus and Orosius drawn from the lost books of 
Livy which have their parallel in Appian*s history, and which 
lead him to say that after carefully weighing all these passages 
he concludes that Appian is much indebted to Livy in this 
book and that he has resorted to him here oftener than in 
the former one. He thinks that Appian made considerable 
use of Caesar's orations and of his Commentaries on the Civil 
War, but that he used other authorities also, the discrepancies 
between himself and Caesar being thus accounted for. He 
thinks that Appian was not acquainted with the writings of 
Lucan, or of Suetonius, or of Plutarch. 

Among the authorities for the third, fourth, and fifth books 
of the Civil Wars, in Dr. Wynne's opinion, were the history 
of Asinius PoUio, the Memoirs of Augustus, and very proba- 
bly the writings of Messala Corvinus, and possibly those 
of P. Volumnius (the companion of Brutus at Philippi), 
from whom Plutarch makes citations which are found also in 
Appian. The edict of proscription signed by the triumvirs, 

^AdAU.xvA. 2 Dio, xliv. 35. 


Antony, Octavius, and Lepidus, is an important addition to 
the fourth book of the Civil Wars, Dr. Wynne thinks that 
in this book also Appian drew much from Livy, but he cites 
also several contradictions which exist between the two. He 
acknowledges that his conclusions are uncertain and unsatis- 
factory wherever he goes beyond the very few writers whom 
Appian himself cites. 

I cannot agree with Dr. Wynne's conclusions respecting 
either Caesar or Livy. I had compared all of the Commen- 
taries on the Civil Wars with the corresponding parts of 
Appian before Dr. Wynne's treatise fell into my hands, and 
had formed the opinion that Appian had not used Caesar as 
an authority, except perhaps at second hand. I had reached 
the same conclusion as regards Livy also. Of all the com- 
ipentators upon Appian's authorities with whom I am famil- 
iar, Vollgraff is the most satisfactory. He seeks to show 
that the sources of both Plutarch and Appian for the civil 
wars were mainly the writings of Greek, not Latin, authors, 
whose works have since perished. The illustrations with 
which he sustains this thesis, all being in the nature of 
internal evidence, are, to my mind, convincing. 

Dr. Wynne concludes his essay by inquiring how much 
confidence should be reposed in Appian as a historian, and 
whether the orations and conversations with which his works 
abound can be considered genuine. His opinion, sustained 
by a large number of citations, is that Appian was a candid 
author, and that he aimed to give a true account of the 
events which he described, but that his work contains many 
faults which are to be attributed for the most part to the times 
in which he lived. Also that with a few exceptions, which 
are named, the speeches are either wholly composed by the 
author or are partly genuine and partly manufactured, the 
proportions of the one and the other being indeterminable. 
Among those that must be considered genuine is the con- 


versation between Octavius and Lucius Antonius, preceding 
the surrender of Perusia,^ as the author expressly says that 
he has translated it from the Memoirs of the former. 

Dr. Hannak deals only with the Excerpta. He takes them 
up seriatim and points out their sources, or what might have 
been their sources, in earlier writings now extant. For the 
first and second books he finds Dionysius of Halicarnassus 
the principal authority, a few passages being found in the 
pages of Diodorus Siculus. For the third (Samnite) book 
a few resemblances are found in Dionysius, but the greater 
number in Livy. In the fourth (Celtic) book Diodorus 
seems to be the principal authority, with one or two refer- 
ences to Caesar. The Sicilian excerpta seem to have been 
mainly derived from Polybius, one being referable to the 
Epitome of Livy. The few Numidian fragments find strik- 
ing resemblances in Sallust*sy//^r/'/«>/^ War, Dr. Hannak 
thinks that King Juba*s history may have furnished Appian 
with some of his material here. The Macedonian fragments 
are referable to Polybius and Livy. It is, of course, an open 
question whether Appian drew his materials from the sources 
where these resemblances are found, or from books now lost 
which were the common sources of Dionysius, Diodorus, and 
Livy, and of himself. I have compared all of Dr. Hannak's 
citations without being able to form any decided opinion on 
this question, except as to Polybius, and here my opinion is 
based on the fact already mentioned that Polybius is once 
quoted by Appian as an authority. In the fragmenta of 
Diodorus are several paragraphs which have a striking re- 
semblance to passages in Appian's Spanish and Hannibalic 

There have been two English translations of Appian, more 
or less complete, before this one, the first by W. B., in 1578, 
the second by J. D., in 1679. The former is in old English 

* Civil Warsy v. 45, 46. 


black-letter, and is not easy to read. It contains the five 
books of the Civil IVars, followed by a continuation written 
by the translator himself, bringing the history down to the 
death of Antony. A second part contains the Preface, the 
Mithridatic, Spanish, Punic, Syrian, Parthian, and Illyrian 
wars entire, and the Celtic epitome, and in that order. It 
does not contain the Hannibalic war. The matter is the 
same as that contained in the Latin version of Geslen, but 
not in the same order. As the Illyrian wars had not yet 
been published in Greek, it follows that W. B. must have 
translated this book from the Latin version of Candidus. 
Inspection shows this to be the fact, but it does not show 
that the remainder was translated from Geslen. I do not 
know who W. B. was.^ 

The translation of 1679 was made by a certain John 
Davies. It was published in folio, and a second edition was 
issued in 1690, but this seems to have been the unsold por- 
tion of the first, as it is identical with it in every particular 
except the title page. A third edition was published in 1 703, 
but I have never seen a copy of it. It contains the Punic, 
Syrian, Parthian, Mithridatic, Illyrian, Spanish, and Hanni- 
balic wars and the five books of the Civil Wars, Whatever 
may be said of Mr. Davies's knowledge of Greek, his use of 
English was very bad. M. Combes-Dounous, the French 
translator of the Civil Wars (1808), alludes to the transla- 
tion of Davies in his preface thus : " While I was engaged 
in translating this historian, I had occasion to speak of him 
in the presence of an English lady quite well versed in an- 
cient literature. This lady assured me that there was an 
English translation of Appian in existence. I begged her 
to try to procure a copy of it for me on her return to 

1 A copy of this extremely rare book is owned by Mr. Wilberforce 
Eames, Librarian of the Lenox Library, to whose kindness I am indebted 
for the privilege of examining it. 


London. In fact she took the trouble of searching for it 
in the great bookstore of Lackington, who declared that he 
knew of this translation, and added that it had been pub- 
lished under the name of the celebrated Dryden, who had 
had no share in it, but had allowed the obscure author of it 
to use his name to give his work some reputation and lustre. 
Lackington had promised to procure a copy of this transla- 
tion, but the war which has broken out has prevented my 
gathering the fruit of this promise. Besides, this work must 
surely be quite rare even in England, since neither Fabricius 
nor Harles knew anything about it." 

The first translation of Appian into a modern language 
was made by Alexander Braccio into Italian. It was pub- 
lished in two parts, the first at Rome in 1502, and the second 
at Florence in 1519. This was merely a translation of the 
Latin version of Candidus, but like its original it was im- 
mensely popular and ran through many editions in the course 
of the two following centuries. Two other Italian transla- 
tions of parts of Appian were published in the sixteenth 
century — that of Dolce in 1559, and that of Ruscelli in 

The first French translation was made by Claude de Seys- 

sel, Bishop of Marseilles. This also was made from the 
Latin version of Candidus. Its subsequent amendment, and 
its publication in 1544, after the death of Seyssel, are men- 
tioned in Professor Mendelssohn's essay which follows this 
preface. A second edition was published in 1552, and a 
third in 1569. The latter contained a translation of the 
Spanish and Hannibalic books made by Philippe des Aven- 
nelles. A new French translation was made by Odet 
Philippe Desmares and published in 1659. I have never 
seen this work. J. J. Combes-Dounous, the third French 
translator, says that Desmares only revamped the French 
version of Seyssel with the help of the Latin version of 


Geslen. Combes-Dounous translated the Civil Wars only, 
in 1808. This is a scholarly work, abounding in valuable 
notes. Its only defect consists in using rather more words 
than are needed to convey the author's meaning. Combes- 
Dounous divided the books of the Civil Wars into chapters 
to avoid the appearance of heaviness, and put chapter- 
headings over each. Schweighauser had previously divided 
the whole of Appian into short sections. I have followed 
the example of Combes-Dounous as to all the books. 

Other translations of Appian in modem tongues are men- 
tioned in the Bibliography. 

I have been engaged upon this translation for five years, 
in the intervals of more pressing occupations, and it has been 
at all times a pleasure and a recreation. If the work has 
been fairly well done, I shall consider it worth while to have 
drawn attention again to an author who has fallen into un- 
deserved neglect. I think that all the precious memorials 
of antiquity ought to be accessible in English. The fact that 
any literary work propagated itself for more than a thousand 
years through the Dark Ages by the toilsome process of 
copying by hand is pretty good evidence that it is worth 
reading in a modern tongue. Appian deals with the most 
momentous events of the ancient world, and his work can 
never be lost sight of while men continue to take an interest 
in Roman history. 

I have adhered to the old fashion of using the names 
Pompey and Antony, instead of Pompeius and Antonius, in 
order to avoid confusion with the names of Sextus Pompeius 
and Lucius Antonius, which are of frequent occurrence. For 
the same reason I have used the name Octavius for the 
adopted son and heir of Julius Csesar, although Appian 
generally gives him the name of Csesar after the death of the 
latter. In using the names of the gods in the old mythol- 
ogies I have employed the Greek ones where they are 


applicable in Greek countries, and the Latin ones else- 

I have used the text of Mendelssohn (Teubner edition) 
generally, but with constant reference to that of the Didot 
edition, and to that of Schweighauser. 

I owe hearty thanks to my friend Theodore Lyman Wright, 
Professor of Greek Literature and Art in Beloit College, for 
revising my work and correcting inaccuracies inevitable in 
the work of an amateur, and for numerous suggestions for 
bettering the phraseology. I desired to make a more ample 
recognition of Professor Wright's service than these lines 
convey, but he declined it 

My thanks are due to Father Ehrle, the Librarian of the 
Vatican, for permission extended to me, during a recent visit 
at Rome, to take photographs of specimen pages of the two 
oldest MSS. of Appian, for reproduction in this work. The 
one facing the Author's Preface bears the stamp of the 
Biblioiheque Nationale of Paris, which shows that it was a 
part of the plunder carried away by the first Napoleon and 
restored after the Congress of Vienna. 

The portraits used as illustrations were in part selected by 
myself at Rome and in part contributed from Duruy's His- 
tory by the generosity of the American publishers of that 
work, Messrs. Dana Estes & Co., Boston. The maps, with 
one exception, are from Shuckburgh's History of Rome, by 
permission of the publishers, who are also the publishers of 
this work. I am indebted to the kindness of Mr. Strachan- 
Davidson and the Oxford University Press, the publisher of 
his Selections from Polybius, for permission to use his plan 
of the battle of Cannae ; also to Messrs Longmans, Green & 
Co. for permission to use the diagram of the harbor of Car- 
thage contained in Mr. Bosworth Smith's Carthage and the 


H. W. 

New York, August, 1899. 


By professor L. MENDELSSOHN * 

It is now well established that the Roman History of 
Appian was originally embraced in twenty-four books which 
he divided in the following order :^ — 


I The Kings IV Gallic 

II Italic V Sicily and the Islands 

III Samnite VI Spanish 

1 Preface to vol. i., Teubner edition, Leipzig, 1879. 

2 The first nine books, as far as the Macedonian, and then (the inter- 
vening ones being omitted) five books of the Civil Wars, are enumer- 
ated separately by the author himself in his Preface, Sec. 14. But the 
Preface itself seems to have been written before the whole history was 
finished, and thence it comes about that the last seven books, beginning 
with the eighteenth, are not even mentioned here, and that the only one 
promised after the Civil Wars, the one on the civil budget of the Romans, 
never was written, unless, possibly, the material of it passed into The 
Hundred Years, Therefore, Photius remains the only sure witness con- 
cerning the series of distinct books after the ninth, although his copy 
had already suffered some slight changes, as will be shown at the 
respective passages. But we must entirely disregard at once the order, 
obviously transposed, given by the anonymous writer published by 
Schweighauser (vol. iii. p. 12), and by myself in the Rheinisches Museum 
(vol. xxxi. p. 210), and also the sequence shown by the codices them- 
selves, whether good or bad, and the numbers they give to the books, 
which are inconsistent with that order; as I now believe them to be of 
no value, although I had once thought them to contribute something to 
an understanding of the merits at least of the several classes. If the 
arrangement I have given above differs in places from that of Schweig- 
hauser (vol. iii. p. 887 seq,, or in his opusc. acad. vol. ii. p. 15 seq,), or 
from Westermann (as cited by Pauly, vol. i. p. 13405^^.), and finally 
from Hannak {Appian and his Sources, Vienna, 1869, p. 2 seq.), I dif- 
fer from them knowingly. 



VII Hannibalic XV Civil Wars, 3 

VIII African (Carthaginian XVI " " 4 

andNumidian)» XVII " " 5 

IX Macedonian and II- XVIII Egyptian, i* 

lyrian^ XIX « 2 

X Grecian and Ionian' XX " 3 

XI Syrian* XXI " 4 

XII Mithridatic XXII The Hundred Years* 

XIII Civil Wars, I XXIII Dacian» 

XIV " " 2 XXIV Arabian^ 

This so voluminous work early met a fate corresponding 
to its bulk. Undoubtedly the Byzantine age, impatient of 

^ Appian himself in his Preface, Sec. 14, calls this merely "Cartha- 
ginian." Photius calls it " African, Carthaginian and Numidian," and 
finally in the Vatican MS., 141, it is inscribed "The Libyca of Appian, 
or Carthaginian Affairs." Indeed, I think that " Libyca " was inscribed 
on this little book as a general title, of which Carthaginian and Nu- 
midian were divisions. Yet the Numidian fragments have hitherto 
been wrongly published separate from the Punic book. 

2 The Illyrian book, which was reluctantly placed by Schweighauser 
after the Mithridatic (see his vol. iii. p. 897), I have restored to its 
original position (see Civil Warsy v. 145), and subjoined to the Mace- 
donian history. 

8 See Schweighauser, vol. iii. p. 889 seq. [In the place referred to 
S. gives reasons, drawn from other parts of Appian's works, why the 
Grecian and Ionian should be considered as forming one book (Book 
X) instead of two (Books X and XI), as the anonymous writer desig- 
nated them.] 

* Inasmuch as Photius found a Parthian history appended to the 
Syrian, the fraud pointed out by Xylander and Perizon (^An, Hist., 
p. 390), and demolished at great length by Schweighauser (vol. iii. 
p. 905), must have been perpetrated very early. From the Civil 
IVarSf ii. 18 and v. 65, it fully appears that Appian intended io write a 
Parthian book, not that he had written one. Finally, the fragment in 
Bekker*s Anecdota Grceca (p. 156, 29), or the sixth in Bekker's Appian 
(vol. ii. p. 915), also belongs to that spurious history. 

^ Photius relates that there were nine books of the civil wars. In 
these he included, or ought to have included, the four books of the 
Egyptian history repeatedly promised by Appian. See Mithr. 114; 
Civil iVarSf i. 6; ii. 90; also Bekker's Anecdota Graca, p. 179, 21 ; 

p• 139» 31; p• 174. 14. 

* See Schweighauser, vol. iii. p. 895 seq. 

' That this was in reality the twenty-fourth book is now fully shown 
by the first line of the fragment of Miller. [See vol. ii. p. 489 of this 


reading and transcribing books in general, and especially of 
an author not very remarkable for art or genius, and who 
had severed the connection of the events themselves by a 
bad plan, preferred an immediate enjoyment of selections 
to the trouble of continuous reading. Their rules of dis- 
membering an author were two, by one of which they ex- 
tracted certain special passages from the whole work and 
brought them together according to their resemblance of 
subject; by the other they selected those entire books 
which seemed to them more important than the rest, and 
these alone were circulated by copying. To this rule, often 
salutary and oftener pernicious, are due whatever of the 
fragments of Appian were collected in the Constantinian 
extracts, and it is truly astonishing that the compilers of 
these extracts were acquainted with, or gave attention to, 
only one volume of his works, the one containing the first 
nine books. On the other hand, it seems to have been in 
consequence of the importance of the subjects and of the 
multitude of readers thence arising that, besides the Preface 
and the Celtic epitome, the Spanish, Hannibalic, Punic, 
Illyrian, Syrian, and Mithridatic histories, and the five books 
of the Civil IVars, escaped entire the slothfulness of those 

The remains of the whole work, which in one way and 
another were preserved, became known late, and little by 

1 An account of their method of making extracts (not referring, 
however, to the books now extant) follows the Preface in the Vatican 
MS., 141, whence it passed into the inferior MSB. of class i., as follows : 
" I have placed the Preface only of the Italian history of Appian in the 
present volume, since, for the details of Italian affairs, the Roman An- 
tiquities of Dionysius of Halicarnassus are the most noteworthy of all 
the histories. . . . Many others have written of Roman affairs, and 
among them Dio Cassius. ... It is fitting therefore to take the early 
Roman history from Dionysius, if you seek not merely the knowledge 
of events, but improvement in speech from the reading of them; and 
what took place after the time of the kings from Dio. The histories 
of the several races you will learn from this Appian. From his Civi/ 
IVars, I have chosen those of Augustus and Antony and those which 
follow next, namely, of the Romans against the Egyptians to the death 
of Cleopatra; then the Jewish, Pontic, and Dacian wars, in which 
Trajan distinguished himself; then the Spanish, Hannibalic, Punic, 
and Sicilian, and in addition to these the Macedonian and Grecian. 
Although there are many others, I thought these enough, and have 
embraced them in two volumes." 


little, to learned men, and still later began to receive at- 
tention from them. The beginnings and gradual progress 
of Appianic criticism have already been described in great 
part by Schweighauser in his edition of Appian (vol. i. 
p. iii seqJ) and in his opusc, acad, (vol. ii. p. 97), but it will 
be pertinent to give a new sketch of it, which, while more 
brief, will in several particulars be more correct ; especially 
since it will naturally introduce us to the contributions which 
are peculiar to the present edition. 

In the early times of the revival of learning it was not 
seldom the fortune of Greek writers that before they were 
presented in their own tongue, or could be, they were 
brought out clad in Latin, or something like Latin, garb. 
This fate overtook Appian also. He found a translator in 
Peter Candidus December,^ master of correspondence to 
Pope Nicholas V., not a new hand at the translation of Greek 
books, but always a rude one. About the middle of the 
fifteenth century he made a translation of those works which 
were then ascribed to Appian, which translation, both in 
manuscript (of which a number of copies still remain) and 
in print, was usually embraced in two parts, thus : — 


Appian's Preface Civil Wars, 5 books 

Punic The Illyrica entire 

Syrian The Celtic Epitome 


1 The life of Candidus has been written by many, including Tira- 
boschi (^Italian Literary History ^ vol. vi. 2, Venice, 1795, p. 669 seq.^^ 
Zeno {dissert. Foss., vol. i., Venice, 1752, p. 202 seq.) and others, and 
many writings of Candidus are extant in the Ambrosian library. Never- 
theless, the time when he made the translation of Appian is difficult to 
determine unless one should be willing to read the whole history of those 
times on purpose. As I am neither able nor willing to do so, I will say 
that one fact derived from a letter of Candidus written to L. Petronius, 
a knight of Siena, and published by Muccioli {catal. bibl. Cesenat.^ vol. 
ii., ed. Cesenae, 1782, p. loi), convinces me that the whole translation 
was finished and delivered to Pope Nicholas in the year 1452. This 
view coincides with facts mentioned by Dominicus Georgius in his 
Life of Nicholas V. (Rome, 1792), p. 190 seq.^ respecting these matters, 
although it still remains obscure how Candidus, after the death of 


That this translation of Candidus was not only uncouth, 
but in many places utterly misleading, is the unanimous voice 
of scholars. It has, nevertheless, been universally esteemed 
till now, and reckoned among the sources for the emenda- 
tion of Appian, because it was believed to have been based 
upon a good copy that was afterwards lost. Although this 
general view is correct, it will be possible to define it with 
more precision than has yet been given to it, and for this 
reason I shall return to it later. 

Although this work of Candidus, such as it was, was fre- 
quently reprinted from the year 1472 onward, the Greek 
text remained unpublished until Charles Stephen, the uncle 
of Henry Stephen, published the Preface, the Celtic epitome, 
the Punic wars, the Illyrian fragment, the Syrian [Parthian] 
and Mithridatic wars, and the five books of the Civil Wars, 
arranged in that order, at Paris, in the year 1551. The 
sources and critical method of this edition were first made 
plain by Schweighauser in his preface (p. vi. seq.^, showing 
that it had proceeded from the two Paris MSS., 1681 and 
1682 (designated by Schweighauser as Reg. A. and B., and 
by myself as a. and b.),and still remaining in Paris; but 
that it did not follow the text of these MSS. closely, and did 
not observe the same order of arrangement of the books. 
For the order of arrangement in these " Royal " MSS., as 
Schweighauser styled them, was the following : — 

Preface Illyrian fragment 

Celtic Epitome [Parthian] 

Syrian Mithridatic 

Punic Civil Wars, V. 

And finally he showed that their goodness, or rather their 
badness, was about equal, and that their age and origin were 
about the same, i.e. the beginning of the sixteenth or end of 
the fifteenth century. That all this was true I perceived as 
soon as I had these Paris MSS. in my own hands, and also 
that that distinguished man had left nothing undone to add 
to the accuracy of his collation.^ 

Nicholas, i.e,^ after the year 1455, could dedicate anew the second part 
of his translation to Alfonso, King of the Sicilies. 

1 Concerning the former codex, the following words of Seyssel, the 
French translator of Appian, to Louis XII., who reigned between the 


This editio princeps^ was followed by a separate edition of 
the Spanish and Hannibalic books which Henry Stephen 
obtained on the occasion of his journey to Italy, from Arnold 
Arlen, and which he published, together with some fragments 
of Ctesias, Agatharcides, and Memnon, at Geneva in 1557. 
That the copy of these books of Appian was very faulty 
Henry Stephen himself lamented, and his. edition testifies.^ 

Although the Stephens had limited their labors to the 
books of Appian which had been preserved entire, a little ' 
later the fragments which had been taken from the first nine 
books and thrown together in the store of the Constant! nian 
collections began to find editors. Of these, F. Orsini pub- 
lished at Antwerp, in 1582, the one entitled De Legationibus, 

years 1498 and 15 15 (preface new Paris edition, 1580), are worthy of 
note : " Having some time since acquired again by your help the 
eleven books of this history which are found in the Greek language, 
which the Seigniory of Florence has sent to you, I have gone through 
it anew, and corrected what I had previously done, throughout, with 
the assistance of John Lascarys, who is very well versed in both lan- 
guages." This Florentine codex, sent to Louis XII. about the year 1500, 
could have been no other than Reg. Α., for Reg. B. seems to have been 
brought from Venice to Paris not earlier than about 1530 (see Schweig- 
hauser's preface, vol. i. p. vii. note), and Bishop Claude de Seyssel, who 
died in 1520, using this very book, and with the help of John Lascaris, 
revised his own translation, which had been made from that of Can- 
didus, and this alone was printed, first at Paris [Combes-Dounous says 
at Lyons. — Tr.'\ in 1544, the former one having been suppressed. 
Nor does the age of that codex militate against this reasoning. 

1 This was admirably translated into Latin by Sigismund Geslen and 
published at Basle in 1554, after his death, by Caelius Secundus Curio, 
who added his own translation of the Spanish history. How extremely 
aggravating it is that we are utterly ignorant from what Greek codex 
Curio translated, for there are places where his work is useful in 
addition to the Vatican 141, although oftener it is either pedantic, or 
inaccurate and useless. 

2 Yet Charles Sigoni, in a note to Livy xxiii. 11 — that is, before the 
edition of Stephen — tells us that he had often read the Hannibalic 
history of Appian in manuscript (doubtless Greek) at the house of 
Louis Beccatelli; and Paul Manutius likewise brought out at Venice in 
1545 the Spanish book translated from Greek into Italian (see Hoff- 
man's lex, bibl. I.*^ p. 218), which translation I regret that I have never 
seen. Finally, concerning Curio's Latin translation of the Spanish his- 
tory made from some Greek codex — it may have been the same as 
that of Manutius — see the preceding note. All which seems to teach 
us that copies of the Spanish and Hannibalic books were not extremely 


he relying upon the Vatican Greek MS. No. 141 8, and the 
Neapolitan III. B. 15, but reproducing the text with too little 

Following this came a second edition of Henry Stephen, 
published at Geneva in 1592, to which he added the Spanish 
and HannibaUc books recently issued by himself, but to this 
edition he applied no other aids than a talent often happy 
but often wide of the mark. So it came about that in this 


edition also he was able to give of the Illyrica (which 
Candidus had entire in his Greek copy) only the fragment 
preserved in the Royal MSS. Seven years later David 
HoescheHus found in a MS. of Appian then at Augsburg 
(mentioned on page 67 of Reiser's "catalogue of the x\ugs- 
burg library," published at that place in 1675), but now of 
the Munich hbrary, Gr. 374, the Greek text of the Illyrica 
entire, and gave it to the light at Augsburg in a separate 
book. After this Henry de Valois, a man of rare learning 
and industry, merited well of Appian by bringing out, in 
1634, a considerable number of extracts from Appian pre- 
served under the Constantinian title De Virtiitibus ei Vitiis 
from a codex belonging to Peiresc. For these reasons 
Uttle praise is due to Alex. Tollius, who superintended a 
republication at Amsterdam, in 1670, of the relics of Ap- 
pian's work ; for besides being scarcely acquainted with 
Greek he had no knowledge of his predecessors who were 
his own superiors, and so it came about that the passages 
published by Orsini and Hoeschelius are not contained in 
that edition. 

Such were the labors of the men, learned and unlearned, 
who contributed to the study of Appian before Schweighauser. 
He alone was of more service than all the rest. Certainly 
when he found that, for revising those books of Appian 
which remained entire — for it was plain that the condition 
of the excerpta was deplorable and almost beyond hope of 
amendment — it was impossible to rest satisfied with those 
Royal MSS. of Charles Stephen or the Italian one of Henry 
Stephen, he resolved first to strengthen the very basis of his 
emendations. Nor was this a vain attempt, for in addition to 
some other small helps, he obtained this threefold apparatus 
for emendation : 



Vatican Gr. X4x. 

Laurendaa LXX, «6, 
X5th Century. 

Augsburg class' (O), 
15th Century. 

Sttirepitome "Λ Century 
Spanish \ 

Hannibalic > nth Century 
Punic ) 







Civil Wars, V. 

lUyrica entire 

These MSS., to which were added the Royal MSS. (class i) 
newly collated by himself, and the translation of Candid us, 
he so used that he brought in requisition for the Preface the 
Vatican MS. 141, and those of classes Ο and i ; for the 
Celtic epitome, Vat. 141 and i ; for the Spanish and Hanni- 
balic books, Vat. 141 and the Laurentian edition of H. 
Stephen ; for the Punic wars, Vat. 141, Ο and i ; for the U- 
lyrica, O, the fragment in the Royal MSS., the Leyden codex, 
and the translation of Gradius,^ and finally for the Mithri- 
datic and the remaining books, Ο and i ; but in such a way 
as to give a preference over the Royal MSS. whenever pos- 
sible, to class O, which he saw was much superior. Finally 
he made constant use of Candidus, who, in common with O, 
had the Illyrica entire, but regarding him as a source of 
much less authority than O. 

When Schweighauser^s materials had been augmented by 
the welcome addition of the notes of Musgrave and Reiske, 
in whatever way one man could earn distinction by the 
restoration of a text deformed by extraordinary corruption 
— either by the choice of MSS. or by long-continued study 
of the writer, or finally by a genius for emendation — he dis- 
tinguished himself abundantly, and relieved his successors 
of the greater part of their labor. Yet even then it was im- 
possible but that some faults should be left which it were desir- 
able to remove ; for besides the fact that not all the codices 

^That is, the Augsburg MS. of Hoeschelius itself, the Marcian 387, 
and the Mithridatica of the Vatican 134, of which books I shall speak 
separately below. 

2 Of these two I will speak later. 



that have some weight were within his reach, and that the 
friends to whom he had entrusted the task of making colla- 
tions did not, in all cases, perform that task with scrupulous 
fidelity, what was of more consequence, he did not himself 
arrive at a true estimate of the codices. Although this re- 
nowned work is lame in these particulars, no one after 
Schweighauser has concerned himself with the emendation 
of the very words of Appian on a settled plan and guided by 
new lights. For the editors who have succeeded him — 
they are, beside Teucher, who did not distinguish himself, 
the Didot editor, Dubner, and Bekker — have satisfied them- 
selves with inserting in their editions a few small fragments 
of Appian embraced in the Constantinian title De Sententiis^ 
and almost limited the remainder of their work to a repeti- 
tion of Schweighauser's text, although Bekker must not be 
deprived of the praise due him for some notable emenda- 
tions and for an improved punctuation of the whole. 

We may now pass to our opinion of the relations of the 
codices and inquire whether perchance any connection or 
kinship exists between the five classes, or whether each one 
must be considered, as Schweighauser thought, to have its 
own authority and origin, distinct from the others. These 
classes, we repeat, were the following : — 






Vat. 141 

Laur. LXX 26 


Cand. (C) 
15th Cen- 

Reg. class (i) 

and H. Steph. 

class (O) 

i5tli and i6th 

book 15th 

15th Cen- 



Preface ( 12th 



Celt. epit. ) Century 










Celt. epit. 











C. W. b. V 

Illyr. fragm. 

C. W. b. V 

Illyr. entire 


lUyr. entire 

Celt. epit. 

C. W. b. V 


As it was not credible that this large number of codices, 
for the most part carelessly examined, should not show dis- 
tinct and decided marks of relationship of the MSS., it was 
the twofold duty of a new editor that, in selecting the codi- 
ces, a sound rule should be observed, and that the account 
of those selected should be as exact as possible, especially 
of those that Schweighauser had not himself handled. 
Whence sprang the necessity of narrowing, as well as of 
enlarging, our critical apparatus. The necessity of narrow- 
ing it I could not but perceive clearly as soon as I touched 
the oldest one of all, the Vat. 141.^ This codex, however, 
is not of a uniform type. Without doubt the first eight 
leaves, containing the nreface and the Celtic epitome, did 
not originally belong to this codex. They were written in 
the twelfth century, the others in the eleventh, and, what is 
of more importance, the quaternions are reckoned from the 
ninth folio on ; and it is evident that the plan of these two 
small parts is not the same as of the others, />. of the Spanish, 
Hannibalic, and Punic books. For those books, therefore, 
I have set these codices in the lowest place of authority, 
although they are all derived from that very Vatican 141. It 
is perfectly evident from differences in the text that neither 
Candidus's Preface nor that of the Augsburg MS. go back 
to V, although i has come from that source. Therefore, in 
the study of these few pages, V and Ο C had to be compared. 
On the other hand, in the Celtic epitome, which is omitted 
in O, there was no doubt that C, no less than i, was of no 
authority as compared with V, and although it is doubtful 
from what source Candidus drew his knowledge of the 
epitome, I am inclined to believe that it was from i. 

By this means a more certain judgment can be formed 
of the other three books which V contains. That the Lau- 
rentian codex Ixx. 26, and that of H. Stephen of the Spanish 
and Hannibalic histories in their farthest origin^ go back 

^ It is a parchment of 166 large folios. Many hands of the fourteenth 
and fifteenth centuries have corrected it, especially the Punic wars, at- 
tending mostly to orthography. Iota subscript generally omitted in 
the codex, rare use also of the adscript, and the greatest negligence and 
license in respect of accents and breathings. 

2 This Laurentian seems to have been transcribed from the Vatican 
itself, and very carefully too, for in hardly any place does it differ from 


to that same V, or to some twin copy, my own collation of 
the Vatican proves, since the work of Spalletti, which 
Schweighauser was obliged to use, had been very negli- 
gently performed. Therefore, while both manuscripts had 
to be rejected, yet sometimes, as it happens, some reading 
from Stephen's text not attested by evidence, but conjec- 
tured with felicity, had to be adopted, although too often 
it was far from clear what the book had contained and what 
the editor had inserted by way of conjecture.^ 

While it is quite plain, therefore, that the Spanish and 
the Hannibalic books should be edited from Vat. 141 alone, 
the same ease and clearness of proof exist also respect- 
ing the Punic book. For example, in this Vatican book 
chapters 56-59 of the Punic wars have disappeared in a vast 
lacuna, and the same lacuna exists in all the other codices 
(i and Ο and C), and could not be filled except by inserting 
that scrap embraced in the Constantinian excerpta of the 
Embassies of the Nations to the Romans. But this lacuna 
in V. 141, much the oldest of all the MSS., as I have said, 
is not as Schweighauser thought (iii.' 426), primitive. It 
did not proceed from its original, but was due to accident 
and chance, for while the fifteenth quaternion ought to have 
four pairs of leaves in the following order : 

1284 5678 

the middle one (4 and 5) has fallen out by accident, as 
will immediately appear to any one examining it with his 
own eyes, as Schweighauser did not. Since, then, it is quite 
certain that this lacuna had its origin in V. itself and not 

it. On the other hand, that most shocking book of H. Stephen, in- 
fected with every kind of blemish, ascends eventually to the Vatican 
by the third or fourth step. Although Schweighauser himself knew 
that the Ottoboni MS. 45 (Vat. B) was of no value, — no doubt this 
also was drawn from Vat. 141, as were other Roman codices contain- 
ing the Spanish and Hannibalic wars, like the Palatine 51 and 61, — 
yet he wrongly and repeatedly appealed to it as a witness of real 

1 I have already remarked on the value which Curio's translation of 
the Spanish book sometimes has. 


in its original, the Punic b€K>ks of all the remaining codices 
which have this lacuna must have been transcribed from this 
very same Vatican^ or, to speak more accurately, from copies 
derived in the course of lime from it. O, C, and i there- 
fore cannot have any superiority in the Punic wars over V. 
itself. What they have peculiar to themselves and differing 
from V. are blemishes, or interpolations, or corrections of 
errors, usually slight ones; for he would greatly err who 
should attribute the not very easy amendment of certain pas- 
sages to some original copy, rather than to the happy genius 
of certain learned copyists of whom there was no lack. By 
virtue of these emendations, therefore, and not of the codi- 
ces themselves, it has come to pass that in some places 
mention of copies of the Punic wars has been found set- 
ting them almost above V. in point of honor. 

Although in the Spanish, Hannibalic, and Punic histories 
there is no manuscript authority before Vat. 141, another 
help exists in the compilations of Constantine and the themes 
drawn from them by Suidas — an assistance in some degree 
for the Spanish and Punic entire books, and the sole help 
(except the fragments preserved in Bekker's Anecdotal for 
the other first six books, />. the Kings, Italic, Samnite, Cel- 
tic, Sicilian, and Macedonian. I have deemed it not the 
least part of my duty to give an account of these compila- 
tions somewhat more copious and certain in this edition 
than has been done before. To touch each one briefly — 
there are two parts of the title treating of the Embassies, 
one written "concerning ambassadors (not embassies) of 
the Romans to the nations " ; the other " concerning am- 
bassadors of the nations to the Romans." After Orsini had 
published that part from the Vatican Gr. codex 141 8 and 
the Neapolitan III. Β 15 with such carelessness as I have 
described above, Schweighauser acquired the Munich codex 
1 85 — which he calls Bav., and I call Μ — containing the 
Embassies of the nations to the Romans, and from it he 
extracted quite accurately not only the fragments of the first 
six books, but he added also, most advantageously, scattered 
scraps from the Spanish and Punic histories evidently neg- 
lected by Orsini. That the account of this part, by far the 
most important of all, might be established with certainty, 
I myself collated afresh this Μ 185, and I obtained by the 


courtesy of Alfred Eberhard, a new collation of the Neapoli- 
tan MS., from which the carelessness and almost fraudulent 
license of Orsini fully appeared ; and finally I examined the 
third, the one considered the best of all, the Ambrosian, 
Ν 135 ^^P^ 

Of the second and much shorter part of this title, which 
contains the Embassies of the Romans to the nations, I have 
myself afresh gone over the codex Vat. 1418, and also the 
Munich codex 267,^ and I have added what few fragments 
exist in either, extracted from the Spanish and Punic histories. 

Since all the careful study that rests on manuscripts has 
been already applied to the fragments of Appian in the com- 
pilation entitled De Legationibus — and it is hardly possible 
for farther help to be found — it has been possible to accom- 
plish scarcely anything in respect of the other compilations 
which have to do with this writer. For in the book of Peiresc 
containing the copies of " Virtues and Vices," although H. 
de Valois bestowed admirable and most scrupulous work 
upon it, nevertheless he also, as it were, knowingly and de- 
signedly passed by everything that he found that had been 
previously published. That these passages were not few I in- 
ferred fi*om the preface of M. Gros's edition of Dio Cassius, 
vol. i. p. Ivii, and so I appHed by letter to Julius WoUen- 
berg, by whom I knew that this whole codex had been 
freshly examined ; but in vain, for that distinguished man 
had died a little before. So I was obliged reluctantly to 
rest satisfied with the very few excerpta that de Valois him- 
self had extracted from it at the end of his book, p. 125. 

Nor did my efforts succeed better in the extracts De 
SententiiSy although there were so few from Appian among 

^ With truth Nissen, in the Rheinisches Museum (vol. xxii. p. 627), 
filling out Ernst Schulz's defective reasoning on this subject (Z><? exc. 
Const, quaest. Crit. Bonn, 1866), asserts that the Ambrosian MS. was 
derived from the same Spanish copy with others. And yet since Dar- 
marius has employed extraordinary care in transcribing it, its value is 
distinguished above that of the Neapolitan and the Bavarian. Besides, 
these copies are all on paper and are of the sixteenth century. 

2 Concerning that other Munich codex 267 which, after the time of 
M. Gros's preface to Dio Cassius (vol. i. p. xlvi seq.)^ was described 
by Nissen {Quaest. Liv., p. 314 seq.), and employed in the first Dindorf 
edition of Polybius, Schulz likewise argued well (l.s. p. 29 seq.)y but he 
selected the fragments of Appian with too little care. 


them that the damage is rather slight. The things found 
by A. Mai in cod. Vat. Gr. 73 and inserted in his new collec- 
tion of ancient writers, v. ii. p. 367, are so affected by Mai*s 
doctoring that I have scarcely been able to gather anything, 
or to trust Mai for anything except the trifles which Her- 
werden has ingeniously extracted from him. 

Such, then, is the critical apparatus of both Schweighauser 
and myself for reviewing the remains of the first nine books. 
For the remaining whole books, the lUyrica, — which seems 
to have been rather early torn fi-om the Macedonian and 
should accordingly be connected with the latter part of that 
book, — the Syriaca, the Mithridatica, and the five books of 
the Civil Wars, there were, as I have said above, three kinds 
of codices employed by Schweighauser ; namely, the Augs- 
burg, class O, the translation of Candidus (C), and the 
Royal i. He gave the foremost place to O, constantly refer- 
ring to C and i, but not following them except in case of 
necessity. The painstaking man was quite correct in this 
preference, for there is scarcely a chapter in which the supreme 
merit of Ο does not outshine the rags and tatters of C and i. 
Yet it will not be amiss to define a httle more precisely than 
he has done the distinctions of value between the three 
classes, especially as it is not possible to dispense entirely 
with C or with i. 

Ο and C betray in two ways a certain primitive relation- 
ship, by having in common the Illyrica entire and by the 
order of arrangement of the books. (I will speak of the 
Celtic epitome later.) While Ο and C eventually go back to 
the same fountain, yet they deviated early, as is shown by 
certain lacunae which each of them supplies for the other and 
by the general differences of the text. This difference, even 
if it must be attributed to the inexperience of the translator 
himself, nevertheless remains always very great, and its nature 
is such that one ought for the most part to follow Ο and 
reject C. What almost every page of Schweighauser and 
of this edition teaches, it seems unnecessary to confirm by 

The general merit of Ο being sufficiently accepted, the 
relations of the several codices belonging to that class must 
be explained. Three sound ones belong there, namely : — 

I. A. Munich Gr. 374, formerly Augsburg, on cotton 


paper, 382 small leaves, fifteenth century, written by many 
hands nicely indeed, but mingled with very many errors of 
orthography. Many correcting hands appear. 

2. B. Venice, St. Mark's library, 387, paper, 390 square 
pages written in the year 1441 by a certain Gedeo. De- 
scribed in the catalogues of Zanetti and Morelli. Cited by 
Schweighauser as Ven. 

3. V. Vatican Gr. 134, cotton paper, square form, 318 
pages written by many hands in the fourteenth and fifteenth 
centuries, for the most part carefully. The Appiana are writ- 
ten on pages 125-318 ; the previous ones are occupied by the 
Roman Antiquities of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Books VI.- 
X., after which, on page 1 24, come some iambic verses of J. 
Eugenicus to the emperor John Paleologus. The Appiana 
are corrected only by the first hand. This is cited by 
Schweighauser in the Mithridatica as Vat, 

Additional to these, containing the Civil Wars, ii. 149-154 
and iv. 1-5 2 : — 

4. F. Paris, Reg. 1672, parchment, largest size, 944 
pages. Compilations of Appian begin on page 937', written 
at the beginning of the fourteenth century. The first part, 
embracing Plutarchea, I had attributed to the thirteenth 
century, but more correctly now M. Treu attributes this also 
to the fourteenth. I have myself collated it. 

5. E. Paris, Reg. 1642, paper, of various sizes, fifteenth 
century. The Appiana are transcribed from a copy very 
similar to the preceding and by a poor use of the codex. 
Schweighauser collated it with sufficient care. It is Reg. C. 
in his list. I afterwards reread it myself. Each of these 
two codices was at Constantinople until the year 1687. See 
Bernhardy's History of Greek Literature, I*, p. 744. 

Now, to drop further discussion of E, F, Schweighauser 
saw that A, B, V, were transcripts of the same original, but he 
thought that the greatest confidence in the matter of copy- 
ing should be placed in A. The conscientious man exam- 
ined this whole MS. himself. Of the Venetian one he had 
only the collation of Blessing, and finally it must be that he 
had nothing of Vat. 134 except the Mithridatica carelessly 
treated by Spalletti. On the other hand, what is not difficult 
to understand at present is that this very Vatican MS. has 
been most carefully, and the Aug. and Venet. have been 


rather less carefully, written. So I have collated the whole 
of it and have also reexamined the Aug. collation of Schweig- 
hauser ; and finally, for the Venetian, which for lack of time 
I have not been able to examine, I have contented myself 
with drawing from Schweighauser's^ materials. 

So much for the first group of codices. Proceeding to the 
remainder — that there can be no doubt that the merit of 
Candidus is much inferior to Ο we have already signified. 
Nevertheless it will be worth while to explore a little more 
carefully the sources and as it were the incunabula of the 
translation made by him. From what has been said above 
it is clear that he used some Greek copy which belonged by 
contents and order of books to class O. As he worked at 
Rome and from Roman copies, one of which (Vat. 134) be- 
longs to class O, I had for some time (while I was first col- 
lating that book) the same belief as Schweighauser, that 
I had discovered the copy used by Candidus. But that 
was an error. Besides other things less important, not only 
did numerous readings at variance with the Vat. oppose 
this conclusion, but certain lacunae in the Vat. were filled by 
Candidus. On the other hand, the copy of Candidus could 
not have been of the class Reg., for, to say nothing of all 
other matters, the very order of the books agreeing with Ο 
excludes the Reg. unless perchance the Celtic epitome was 
drawn from it by him (see below). So, as far as I can see, 
only two assumptions are possible. Either Candidus had that 
Vat. 134, and besides it other books belonging to class Reg. 
and free from those lacunae, or he used a book similar to 
Vat. 134, but not that book itself. And for some time I was 
induced to adopt the former assumption by an unpublished 

^ At this place we may conveniently advert to the extracts of 
Gemistus Pletho from the Syrian history embracing sections 52-66 and 
1-28. Concerning this work of Pletho it is not easy to form a judg- 
ment. No doubt he used some codex approximating class Ο in point 
of goodness, but, for the sake of improving the reading perhaps, he 
made so many rash changes that you often remain in doubt whether 
you have a figment of Pletho or a text of approved fidelity. There are 
places, however, where he is authority for sure emendations — for 
instance, one in his codex at the beginning of sec. 2, Syr. — and for this 
reason I have carefully examined those excerpta in the Marcian codex 
406 (P) in comparison with which MS., in the handwriting of Pletho 
himself, the copies that Schweighauser made use of are valueless. 


memorandum in the Medicean collection concerning the 
translation itself, which was kindly communicated to me by 
-^neas, Count de Piccolomini, professor at Pisa, and which I 
afterwards examined in person.^ It is as follows : — 

" per procuratione Nicholas V. 

" Dear son. Health and apostolic benediction. We learn 
that in the Florentine Hbrary of St. Mark, which by your 
diligence you have made illustrious with Latin and Greek 
books, two volumes are to be found written in Greek by 
Appian of Alexandria, on one of which is the inscription : 
* Third book of Appian concerning Roman affairs,* and on 
the other 'Appian concerning Italian history.' Since we 
have received from elsewhere books in Greek of this same 
Appian and we greatly desire to see in Latin what that man 
considered worthy of the memory of posterity, we have 
ordered that they be translated. But since a truer under- 
standing and a more faithful interpretation can be obtained 
from the reading of several volumes than from the inspection 
of one (since what is wanting in one the other may supply), 
we have thought to beseech your nobility to send us those 
books as quickly as possible. Immediately after using them 
we will return them to you to be put back in their own place. 
Since you have always been most compliant to our wishes, we 
are sure from your kindness that you will gratify us in this 
matter also. 

" Given at St. Peter's in Rome under the seal of the fisher- 
man, the 7th day of December, 1450, and the fourth year of 
our pontificate. P. Candidus. 

" To our dear son Cosmo de* Medici, citizen of Florence.** 

Since, then, this letter written by Candidus with his own 
hand was certainly very important, I began at once to 
inquire what these two Appian codices could be which 
Nicholas desired to be suppHed to himself by Cosmo. And 
now, since there are three altogether in the Laurentian 
library, it was manifest that MS. Ixx. 26, containing the 
Spanish and Hannibalic histories could not be taken into 
the reckoning, since Candidus did not have those books. 

1 It is at Florence in the Central Royal Archives among the Medi- 
cean ecclesiastical parchments, No. 36. 


Therefore it was easier to find the " third book of Appitin 
concerning Roman affairs"; for, in fact, codex Ixx. j;j, 
belonging to the family Reg. and containing the three 
last books of the Civii Wars has, in an ancient hand, 
this writing on the blank leaf before the first page : " ΊΊιΙπΙ 
Book of Appian concerning Roman aiTairs." licsidrs thJN, 
Nicholas asked for another volume inscribed *' Appian ( on- 
ceming Italian history." This one may have been the \a\\\- 
rentian codex Ixx. 5, this also belonging to the family Keg. 
and containing all that they contain, to whi('h, in fact, the 
title " Appian's Italian history " was prefixed.* WhencT it 
might seem quite certain that besides the Roman bookn. 
others also and those belonging to class Reg. were employed 
by Candidus in his translation. Without doubt they were 
sent to Rome. But that the good man did not everywhere 
compare them with his own copy, but thought it Hutfirient 
to trust to one codex, the tenor and form of his whole trans- 
lation convince me." To embrace the matter in one word, 

1 Perhaps Francesco Filelfo employed ihiii f»nine book Iwriily yrnrii 
later in his translation of Appian. For Binrc he i-ouhl not rn<lurr the 
crudeness of the work of Candidus he applied hiniMclf to a nrw Ιγαπη- 
lation, and for the purpose of obtaining; some (ireek codex, liml bo- 
sought Pope Paul II. As the latter boj^f^led and kept nmkin|{ drlayii, 
he applied to Lorenzo de* Medici, by whom a certain Morcnlinc codex 
was transmitted to him at Milan in the year 1470 (nee FilclH)'» I etten 
to his Friends^ 1., xxxvii. published at Venice in 1 502, fol. 2I(/). Hut the 
facts remaining about this translation are no obscure that it is not cer- 
tain that it was ever completed and published. That the story which 
his biographer Angelo Venusino tells about his excellent Latin trnnM- 
lation of Appian is nothing but conjecture drawn from his letters, the 
facts which Rosminius, in his life of Filelfo (vol. i., Milan, 1S08, p. 
viii seq.)^ relates concerning this Angelo clearly prove. And rightly too, 
Zeno (* dissert. Voss.,' vol. i. p. 294 seq^ and Rosminius himself (vol. ii. 
p. 205) seem to affirm that that work was never finished. In the bill 
of sale of books sold by John Lascaris to Lorenzo de' Medici in Candia 
in the year 1492 there is mentioned in the fifth place *5 Apiattus p,* 
(see Piccolomini in the Kivista di Filologia, vol. ii. p. 413). 'Inis 
codex either perished, or was fraudulently abstracted, with not a few 
others, from the Marcian convent. 

2 It is true that Candidus, when he translated the words In Sec. 6 of 
the lUyrica, κα\ vtpl Κρ'ίιτης Κ^Ύων, " when we come to write of the (!elts," 
made a note on the margin, " in another book it says ' of the Cretans.' '* 
From this, however, no conclusi(m should be drawn except that itt the 
Illyrica alone he examined from time to time more than one codex. 
Of course there may have been in the Vatican in the time of Candidus 


not only are there in the readings given by Candidus very 
many which differ equally from Reg. and Vat. 134, but also 
he has peculiar lacunae of his own which do not exist in 
either of them, of which a most remarkable example is Civil 
Wars, iii. 22, which he has omitted entirely.^ 

But if Candidus cannot be supposed to have made his 
translation from Vat. 134 alone, nor from that amended by 
other books joined to it, it follows that he used one codex 
and that one of a lineage of books approaching O. But the 
Celtic epitome, the translation of which I have already said 
differs in no respect from Vat. 141, nor from the i class 
which were transcribed from it — you will probably judge 
was known to Candidus from another copy of the i kind. 
For its very position seems to prevent us from believing that 
it could have been in the copy from which he drew the 

In using his work, I have followed in the main the example 
of Schweighauser ; that is, in no place have I failed to in- 
spect Candidus, and I have not put confidence in him ex- 
cept where Ο failed me. Wherever mention is made of 
him it refers to my copy published at Venice in 1477, 
except that in the Mithridatic wars, 11-121, it was better 
to rely upon that published by Michael Vascosan, Paris, 
1538. The utility of the more recent editions is almost 
the same as of the most ancient, since they differ in no 
respect except in some trifles of orthography. 

The argument concerning the codices has now resolved 

single copies of that entire book, since Stephen Gradius, in 1668, trans- 
lated the Illyrica into Latin from some Vatican codex which differed 
here and there both from Vat. 134, and from the codex of Candidus. 
Of this kind is the separate copy of the Illyrica at Leyden (L), which 
was transcribed by Wyttenbach for the use of Schweighauser, itself also 
belonging to class Ο ; also the Vat. Pal. codex 390, of the sixteenth cen- 
tury, useless, nevertheless. Finally, the words which the copyist places 
under the fifth book of the Ctvi/ IVars, viz. " the fifth and last book of 
Appian's Civil Wars ends this codex," proclaim clearly that the next 
book, i.i. the Illyrica, was added by him from some other codex. 

^ To show more clearly the peculiarity of the codex of Candidus, I 
adduce the following passages omitted in one or the other class : Mithr. 
21, καί €ίτφ — ^v omitted by C, contained in Ο and i; Civil Wars, i. 5, 
ai 5i arafffis — μάλιστα omitted by i, contained in Ο and C; i6ii/. ii. 46, 
Άσίνΐ05 — ανα\αβ(Ίν omitted by O, contained in C and i ; ioid. iv. 78, 
κάνταυθα — Kparovvrts contained in O, omitted by C and i. 


itself into this, that whereas before Schweighiiuscr the i class 
held the sole place, it was by him justly consigned to the 
lowest place. Wherefore, not unwilling to spare my eyes 
and my strength in a paltry matter, I have acijuicsced in the 
labors of my predecessor. Yet when by way of experiment 1 
had examined one, the I^urentian, Ixx. 33 (f), parchment, 
fifteenth century, iii octavo pages, containing Civil Wars^ 
iii.-v., I gained scarcely anything new that was not in Keg., 
and the same happened to Schweighauser in the case of a 
certain Breslau codex, which seems to be the first part of this 
Laurentian, since it does not contain those last three books 
of the Civil Wars.^ That both of these are somewhat more 
carefully written than the Reg. is of no moment, since the 
same badness is common to all of them. So, as I did not 
care to accumulate rubbish, whatever other books of that 
class* I knew of, I rejected, and I have been satisfied with 
the Parisian a and b of which I have spoken above, and 
Schweighauser*s report upon the Breslau MS., and my own 
test of the Laurentian. Let no one think, however, that this 
whole class should be despised, since some blemislies which 
have crept into Ο and C are not in it and some lacunae have 
been filled. 

These materials which I have just enumerated have been 
employed in this new revision in such a way that, except 
manifest errors of book makers and orthographic minutiae, all 
the apparatus has been referred to in proportion to the au- 
thority of the several classes of MSS. Upon the emendation, 
for which there was great room even after the collation of the 
best books, not only did I myself labor according to my 
powers, but August Nauck did splendid work. For while he, 
by a rare example of friendship, voluntarily shared with me the 
task of correcting the proofs, he wrote down a great many 
emendations such as might naturally come from a man of so 

^ In the preface to his second volume, Professor Mendelssohn says 
that he finds by a personal inspection of the Breslau MS. that his conjec- 
ture that it was the first part of the Laurentian Ixx. 33 was erroneous. 
It contains the same matter as the others of class i, except the last 
three books of the Civil Wars. It has a subscription in an antique 
hand: "finished at Rome, Sep. 25, 1453." — Tr. 

2 For example, the Vatican 142, the Vat. Urbino 103, the Laurentian 
Ixx. 5, the London British Museum Addit. MSS. 5422, all of which 
when inspected must be at once cast aside. 


great genius and learning. If I affirm that I am under the 
greatest obligations to the kindness of this illustrious scholar, 
I shall say too little. In respect of using the things found by 
him Nauck lays down the rule that whatever I adopt I shall 
adopt at my own peril, because they occurred to him while 
he was reading, since it has not been his fortune to have 
been deeply acquainted with the editor's author. So if from 
Nauck I have either accepted or adduced anything at vari- 
ance with Appian's peculiarity of diction, the blame of the 
error must fall upon me. I have applied or sought to apply 
the same caution also to my own conjectures, for this writer 
employs so unusual and perverse a style of discourse that 
often you do not venture to decide for certain what is in 
accordance with his style and what is not. 

It only remains that I testify, in this place also, my sense 
of obligation to Charles Halm, by whose kindness the Munich 
codices were sent to me at Leipzig, and to Alfred Eberhard, 
to whom I have said I am indebted for the collation of the 
Neapolitan MS. ; and finally to Rudolph Scholl, who kindly 
imparted to me some emendations of Nipperdey. 

DORPAT, January i, 1879. 



Vatican, Or. 141. Preface, Celtic, Spanish, Hannibalic, Punic 
Munich, Gr. 374 

Preface, Illyrian, Syrian, Mithridatic, 
Civil Wars, 

St. Mark's at 

Venice, 387 

Vatican, Gr. 134 ^ 

Paris, 1642 

Paris, 1672 

Leyden, Illyrian 

Paris, 1 68 1 

Paris, 1682 


Laurentian, Ixx. 33, Florence ^ 

j Civil IVarSf ii. 149-154, iv. 1-52 

Qass O. 

Qass L 


Ambrosian, N. 135 sup., Milan 
Munich, Gr. 185 
Neapolitan, III. B. 15 
Munich, 267 
Vatican, Gr. 1 41 8 

Concerning ambassadors of the na- 
tions to the Romans. 

Concerning ambassadors of the Ro^ 
mans to the nations. 

Editio PRINCEPS. 'Amriavov *Α\€ξαν^ρ^ω5 Ρωμαϊκών, KeKruc^, Αιβυκ^ 
^ Καρχηδονικ^ι, *1Κ\νρικ^, SuptaK^, Παρθικά), ΜιθριΒάτ€ΐ05, ^Εμψυ- 
λΐων e'. Appiani Alexandrini Romanarum Historiarum, Celtica, 
Libyca vel Carthaginiensis, Illyrica, Syriaca, Parthica, Mithridatica, 
Civilis, quinque libris distincta. Ex Bibliotheca Regis. Βασι\4ϊ 
τ* ά'γαθφ κρατ€ρφ τ* αίχμητρ, Lutetioe, Typis Regiis, Cura ac 
diligentia Caroli Stephani, MDLI. Cum privilegio Regis, folio. 

Έ« τών Κτησίου, *ΑγαθαρχΙΒου, Μ4μνονο5 Ιστορικών iK\oyaL Άττιανοΰ 
*1βηρίκ^} καϊ * ΚννιβαΧκ-ί]. Εχ Ctesia, Agatharchide, Memnone ex- 
cerpta historiae. Appiani Iberica. Item de gestis Annibalis. 
Gr. Omnia nunc primum edita. Cum H. Stephani castigationibus. 
Gr, and Lat. Geneva, 1557. 8vo. 



Amraavov *Αλ€|ανδ/>^ω5 Ρω/^αΓκά. Appiani Alexandrini Rom. Historia- 
rum Punica sive Carthaginensis, Syriaca, Parthica, Mithridatica, 
Iberica, Annibalica, Celticae & Illyricae fragmenta, item de Bellis 
Civilibus libri V. Henr. Stephani Annotationes in quasdam 
Appiani Historias in condones per totum opus sparsas. Excude- 
bat Henricus Stephanus, Geneva Anno, MDXCII. Gr. and Lat, 

Appiani Alexandrini Illyrica, quorum hactenus non nisi fragmentum 
extabat, e codd. MSS. reipub. Augustanae a D. Hoeschelio. Grsece 
nunc primum edita. Augsburg, 1599. 4to. 

'Ainriavou * k.\i^a.v^pi(os Ρωμαϊκά, Appiani Alexandrini Romanarum 
Historiarum, Pars prior, continens earum Punicam, Parthicam, 
Ibericam, Syriacam, Mithridaticam, Annibalicam. Pars altera, 
continens Bellorum Civilium libros V, Historise Celticae ac Illyricse 
fragmenta et Excerpta qusedam De Legationibus. Alexander Tol- 
lius Utrumque textum multis in locis emendavit, conrexit & Henrici 
Stephani ac Doctorum quorundam Virorum Selectas Annotationes 
adjecit. Amsterdam, Ex Officina Waesberge & Someren Anno 
MDCLXX. Gr. and Ζλ/. 2 vols. 8vo. 
ΑτΊΓίανον *Α\€ξανδρ€ω5 Ρωμαϊκών Ίστομικών τά ^ωζόμ€να. Appiani 
Alexandrini Romanarum Historiarum quae Supersunt novo Studio 
conquisivit digessit ad Fidem Codicum MSStorum recensuit supple- 
vit emaculavit Varietatem Lectionum adjecit Latinam Versionem 
emendavit Adnotationibus variorum suisque illustravit commodis 
Indicibus instruxit Johannes Schweighauser, Argentoratensis, 
Graece. et Orient. Liter, in Univers. Argentor. Prof Gr. and ΖλΛ 
Leipzig, 1785. 3 vols. Svo. 

Edition of Teucher, Gr., 2 vols, in 3 parts, Svo, " containing select 
notes from various preceding editors and many by the editor him- 
self." Lemgo, 1796-7, Dibdin. 

Edition of Schafer, Gr., 4 vols. i8mo, Leipzig, 1819, Moss. 

Appiani Alexandrini Romanarum Historiarum, quae supersunt. 
Editio stereotypa, Gr., 4 vols. 8vo, Tauchnitz, Leipzig, 1829. 

Appiani Romanarum Historiarum quae supersunt. Edited by J. F. 
DUbner. Gr. and Lat., 8vo, Paris, 1840. 

Appiani Alexandrini Historia Romana, ab I. Bekkero recognita, 
Gr,, 2 vols. Teubner, Leipzig, 1852. 

*AinrtaiOu ΑΚ^ξανδρίωε Ρωμαϊκών Ιστορικών τά Ίίωζόμίνα, Appiani Alex- 
andrini Romanarum Historiarum quae Supersunt Graece et Latine 
cum Indicibus, 4to, Didot, Paris, 1877. 

Appiani Historia Romana, edidit Ludovicus Mendelssohn, Gr., 2 
vols. Svo, Teubner, Leipzig, 187S-S1. 



Regii, fol. 1468. " A rare edition unknown to all those hihlio^raphert 
whose writings I have consulted. A copy was purchased l>y Mr. 
Heber, at Mr. Heath's sale in 1810 for £2 95." Moss^ Manual of 
Classical Bibliography, Bohn, London, 1837, v^^• ^ P• 72. This 
book was not known to Schweighauser or to McniiclsHohn. If 
there was such an edition, it must have been the first j)art of the 
translation of Candidus, — the part dedicated to Pope Nicholas V., 
who died in 1455. Schweighauser thought that the second part 
(dedicated to Alfonso, King of Aragon and the Two Sicilies) was 
printed first, and was unable to account for this irregularity. 

Venice, folio, 1472. No title page. Second part of the translation 
of Candidus, containing the five books of the Civil IVars, the 
lUyrica and the Celtic Epitome. Dedication : " Ad gloriosissimum 
et invictissimum Principem Alfonsum Aragonum et utriusijue 
Siciliae Regem in libros civilium bellorum S. P. Q. R. P. Candidi 
prologue," etc. Beautifully printed by Vindelinus de Spira. A copy 
of this rare book is in the Lenox library, New York. 

Venice, 1477, 2 vols., folio. First vol. begins: P. Candidi in lil)ro8 
Appiani sophistae Alexandrini ad Nicolaum quintum summum 
pontificem prefatio incipit felicissime. £nd : Appiani Alexan- 
drini sophistae Romanorum libri finit qui Mithridaticus inscribitur. 
Traductio P. Candidi. Second vol., begins : Ad divum Alfonsum 
Aragonum ... in libros civilium bellorum ex A. in Latinum tra- 
ductos prefatio incipit felicissime. £nd: Appiani Alexandrini 
sophistae Romanorum liber finit qui Celticus inscribitur. Traductio 
P. Candidi. " This is a most beautiful book, the paper is remark- 
ably white, and the margin ample. The capital letters are engraved 
and, as it appears, on metal. The whole exhibits an exquisite 
specimen of early typography." Beloe^s Anecdotes, vol. iv. p. 99. 

Regii, folio, 1494. Appiani Alexandrini de bellis civilibus. End : 
Appiani Alexandrini sophistae Romanorum liber finit qui Celticus 
inscribitur. Traductio P. Candidi. Per Franciscum de Mazali- 

Epistola p. Candidi in libros Appiani ... ad Nicolaum quintum 
summum pontificem praefatio incipit foelicissime. Liber Libycus, 
Syrius, Parthicus, Mithridaticus. Peregrini Pasquali opera. Sca- 
diani, 1495, ^^^• 

**The last two works separately printed in 1494 and 1495 ^o'™ together 
another edition of the copy of 1477; the order of the volumes, 
however, being reversed." British Museum catalogue^ 


Appianus Alexandrinus de bellis civilibus (Liber lUyricus, Celticus, 
Libicus, Syrius, Parthicus, Mithridaticus) . [Translated by P. Can- 
didas.] Per Christoferum de Pensis ; Venice, 1500, fol. 

Appianus Alexandrinus de bellis civilibus Romanorum. Cum libro . . . 
qui Illyrius et altero qui Celticus inscribitur. Translated by P. 
Candidus and edited by L. P. Rosellus, Venice, 1526, 8vo. 

Appianus Alexandrinus de civilibus Romanarum bellis historiarum libri 
quinque . . . Eiusdem . . . liber Illyricus et Celticus, Parthicus et 
Mithridaticus (P. Candido interprete) In ^dibus Joannis Schoeffer, 
Mayence, 1529. 

Appiani de civilibus Romanarum bellis historiarum libri quinque Eius- 
dem libri sex Illyricus, Parthicus, Mithridaticus et Romanae historiae 
prooemium. [Translated by P. Candidus.] Ex officina Michaelis 
Vascosani, Paris, 1538, fol. 

Appiani Alexandrini de civilibus Romanarum bellis historiarum libri 
quinque Ejusdem libri sex. Illyricus, Celticus, Libycus, Syrius, 
Parthicus et Mithridaticus. [Translated by P. Candidus.] Ley- 
den, 1560, i6mo. 

Appiani Alexandrini Romanarum historiarum de bellis Punicis liber 
. . . Omnia per S. Gelenium Latine reddita. De bellis His- 
panicis liber C. S. Curione Iranslatore. De bellis Illyricis liber, 
P. Candido interprete, H. Froben, Basle, 1554, fol. 

Appiani Alexandrini Romanarum historiarum lib. XII. Ex collatione 
Graecorum exemplarium restituti et emendati. [By Sigismund 
Geslen, Caelius Secundus Curio, & P. Candidus], Leyden, 1588, 

Appiani Alexandrini Hispanica et Annibalica. Latine nunc primum 
edita ex F. Beraldi interpretatione. H. Stephen, Paris, 1560, 8vo. 


An Auncient I Historic and exquisite Chronicle | of the Romanes warres, 
both I Civile and Foren. | Written in Greeke by the noble 
Orator and Histo|riogra|pher, Appian of Alexandria, one of the 
learned | Counsell to the most mighty Emperoures | Traiane and 
Adriane. | Translated out of divers languages and now set forth 
in Englishe, according to the Greeke text taken out of a Royal 
Librarie : by W. B. | . . . Βασιλάδι κράτισττ}, ^€σΊτότώι τ* 4iri(iK(- 
στατχι \ Imprinted at London | by Raulfe Newberrie and | Henry 
Bynnimam | Anno 1578. Black-letter. 2 parts in one vol. 4to. 

The I History \ of Appian \ of\ Alexandria \ in | two parts. | The | 
first consisting of the | Punick, Syrian, Parthian, Mithridatick, j 
lUyrian, Spanish, & Hannibalick Wars. | The | second contain- 
ing the five books ( of the | civil wars | of | Rome. | Made 

BiBLiOGRApny liii 

English by J. D. | London, | printed for John Amcry at tlio iVu- 
cock against S. Dunstan's | Church in I'lcct Street. 1679. Folio. 

A second edition in 1690. 

A third edition in 1703. 


Appien Alexandrien des guerres des RommainM, Livrci XI. Plu» le 

sixiesme des dictes guerres civiles extraict dc Plutar(|uc. \a*. tout 

traduit en Fran9oys par C. de Seyssel, Arccve»(|uc dc Turin. 

Lyons, 1544. Folio. 
Another edition, Paris, 1552. 8vo. 
Another edition containing the Spanish and Ilannibalic warn traiutlutcd 

by Philippe des Avennelles. Paris, 1569. Folio. 
Appien Alexandrin. . . . Des guerres civiles des Kommeins. 4 livrcs. 

Lyons, 1557. i6mo. British Museum. 
Appien Alexandrien des guerres des Komains. Traduit du (ircc. 

Par Odet Philippe, sieur des Mares. Paris, 1660. Folio. 
Histoire des guerres civiles de la republi(]ue Komaine. Traduitc du 

Grec par J. J. Combes-Dounous. 3 vols. Paris, 1808. 8vo. 


Rome. Folio. 1502. Hoc in volumine contincntur bcllum (.!arthagi- 
nense, Syrum, Particum et Mithridaticum in vulgari Sernione 
[Translated by A. Braccio, from the Latin of Candidu8.J Fu 
Stampato, in Roma, in campo di Fiore, per Kuchario Silbcr alias 

Florence, 8vo, 15 19. Appiano Alexandrino delle guerre civili de 
Romani. Tradotto da Alexandro Braccese. 

Another edition in 1526. 

Venice, 8vo, 1524. Delle Guerre Civili ed esterne. Ε revisto, e cor- 
retto per Marco Guazzo. 

Another edition in 1528. 

Another edition in 1538. 

Another edition in 3 vols, containing the civil and foreign wars and 
the wars in Spain, published by the sons of Aldus, 1545. A beau- 
tiful edition, supposed to have been revised by Paul Manutius. 

Another edition by the sons of Aldus, revised and much improved, 
3 vols., 8vo, Venice, 1551. 

Another edition in 3 vols, with the Illyrian, Spanish, and Hannibalic 
wars translated into Italian by Lodovico Dolce, published by 
Gabriel Giolito, Venice, 1554. 

Another edition revised and corrected by Lodovico Dolce, Venice, 



Other editions with the lUyrian and Hannibalic wars translated by 
Girolamo Ruscelli, Venice, 1563, 1567, 1575, and 1584. 

Another edition, Verona, 1730. 

Le Storie Romane de Appiano Alessandrino volgarizzate dall* Ab. 
Marco Mastrofini. Milano, coi tipi di Paolo Andrea Molina, 
1830, 3 vols. 


Frankfort-on-the-Main, 1 793-1 800 (Und mit erklarenden, berichti- 
genden und vergleichenden Anmerkungen versehen, von F. W. 
J. Dillenius), 3 vols. 8vo. Moss, 

A reprint, 2 vols., Stuttgart, 1829-32. 

Appianus, Romische Geschichte, ubersetzt von G. Hammerdorfer, 
Prentzlau, Prussia, 1829-31. 


Los Triumphos de Apiano. End : A loor de la sanctissima trinidad 
. . . se acabo la parte primara d'Appiano Alexandrino Sophista, 
etc. [Containing the books on the Libyan, Syrian, Parthian, and 
Mithridatic wars translated into Spanish by J. de Molina], Valen- 
cia, 1522. British Museum, 



Author's Preface i 

Concerning the Kings 9 

Concerning Italy 14 

The Samnite History 19 

The Gallic History 33 

Of Sicily and the Other Islands 43 



Chapter I 

Boundaries of Spain — King Arganthonius — Early Carthaginian 

Occupation — Hamilcar Barca — His Death ... 48 



Chapter II 


Hasdrubal succeeds Hamilcar — Rise of Hannibal — He attacks 

Saguntum — The Saguntines appeal to Rome . . • 51 

Chapter III 
War declared — The Two Scipios — Their Defeat and Death . 55 

Chapter IV 

Cornelius Scipio — Arrives in Spain — Attacks New Carthage — 

Captures the City and Vast Booty 57 

Chapter V 
Scipio marches against the Two Hasdrubals — Battle of Carmone 61 

Chaffer VI 

Scipio visits Africa — Other Operations in Spain — Destruction 

ofllurgia — The Fate of Astapa 64 

Chapter VII 

Mutiny in Scipio's Army — The Mutiny suppressed — Masinissa 

makes an Alliance with Scipio 67 

Chapter VIII 

Cato the Censor — His Victory in Spain — Revolt of the Lusones 

— The Elder Gracchus in Spain 70 

Chapter IX 

The Belli and the Titthi — Beginning of the Numantine War — 
Gaudius Marcellus in Spain — Makes an Armistice — Li- 
cinius LucuUus succeeds him — His Infamous Conduct — 
Scipio Africanus the Younger — Retreat of the Romans . 73 


Chapter X 


The Lusitanian War — The Doings of Mummius — Servius Galba 

— His Infamous Conduct 79 

Chapter XI 

The Rise of Viriathus — He defeats Vetilius — Defeats Plautius 

in Two Battles — Is defeated by Maximus yEmilianus . . 82 

Chapter XII 

War with Viriathus continued — A Treaty with Viriathus — The 
Treaty is broken by the Romans — I). Junius Brutus — 
Guerilla Bands cooperate with Viriathus — Viriathus assassi- 
nated — Character of Viriathus 86 

Chaiter XIII 

The Numantine War — Pompeius Aulus lays Siege to Numantia 

— Makes a Treaty with the Numantines — The Senate repu- 
diates it — Mancinus makes a Fresh Treaty — ^milius Lepi- 
dus makes War contrary to Orders of the Senate — The 
Senate repudiates the Treaty of Mancinus . . , .91 

Chapter XIV 

Scipio Africanus the Younger sent against the Numantines — He 
restores Discipline in the Army — Scipio's Maxims of War 

— Skirmishes with the Numantines 96 

Chapter XV 

Builds a Wall around the City — Stops Communication by the 
River — Numantia closely invested — The Exploit of Rhe- 
togenes — Negotiations with Scipio — Numantia surrenders 

— Heroism of the Numantines — Scipio razes Numantia to 

the Ground 100 

Chaiter XVI 

Later History — Infamous Behavior of Didius — Sertorius in 

Spain 105 



Chapter I 


Hamilcar Barca — Hannibal in Spain — Hannibal marches over 

the Alps io8 

Chapter Π 

Battle of Ticinus — Battle of Trebia — Battle of Lake Thrasi- 
menus — Hannibal destroys the Detachment of Centenius — 
Fabius Maximus chosen Dictator no 

Chapter HI 

The Policy of Fabius Maximus — Rashness of Minucius Rufus — 
Hannibal caught in a Trap — His Escape from Fabius — 
Carthage refuses to send Reenforcements to Hannibal — The 
New Consuls — Their Disagreement 114 

Chapter IV 

Preparations for Battle — Battle of Cannae — Total Defeat of the 

Romans — Roman Losses — Hannibal's Strategy . . .119 

Chapter V 

Consternation in Rome — Senate refuses to ransom the Prisoners 

— Siege and Capture of Petilia — Dasius of Arpi . . . 1 23 

Chapter VI 

The Capture of Tarentum — The Citadel holds out — Hannibal 
captures Thurii — Also Metapontum and Heraclea — The 
Romans besiege Capua — Hannibal marches to Rome — 
Consternation in the City — Flaccus follows Hannibal . .126 

Chapter VII 

Hannibal breaks into the Camp of Fulvius, but is driven out — 
Capua surrenders to the Romans — A Town of Bruttium lost 
and regained — The Story of Dasius and Blatius . . .131 


Chapter VIII 


Defeat and Death of the Consul Fulvius — The Romans recover 
Tarentum — Death of Marcellus — Hannibal foiled at Salapia 
— Battle of the Metaurus — Hannibal retires to Bruttium . 136 

Chapter IX 

Scipio sails to Sicily — A Sacred Image brought to Rome — Han- 
nibal's Troubles in Bruttium — Hannibal recalled by C'ar- 
thage — Tries to take his Italian Soldiers thither — Embarks 
for Africa — Punishment of the Bruttians . . . • 139 

Appendix 143 



Chapter I 

First Phoenician Settlement — First Punic War — Regulus de- 
feated by Xanthippus — Fate of Regulus — The Mercenary 
War 146 

Chapter II 

Hannibal's Invasion of Italy — Scipio's Invasion of Africa — 
Consternation at Carthage — Syphax and Masinissa — War 
between Masinissa and Carthage 149 

Chapter III 

Scipio arrives in Africa — First Skirmishes — Capture of Locha 

— Siege of Utica — Negotiations of Syphax . , . .152 

Chapter IV 

Scipio's Night Attack on Hasdrubal — Speech to his Officers 
before the Attack — Complete Victory of Scipio — Retreat 
of Syphax — Scipio advances against Carthage — Indecisive 
Naval Engagement 156 


Chapter V 


Masinissa defeats and captures Syphax — Syphaxand Sophonisba 

— Death of Sophonisba — Plot to burn Scipio's Camp — 
Siege of Utica raised 159 

Chapter VI 

Hannibal recalled — Negotiations for Peace — Hannibal lands at 
Hadrumetum — The Armistice violated — Hannibal sent for 

— He proposes a Renewal of the Armistice . . . .162 

Chapter VII 

Riots in Carthage — Second Armistice broken — Preparations for 
Battle — Speeches of Hannibal and Scipio — Battle of Zama 
— Personal Encounter of Hannibal and Scipio — Hannibal's 
Defeat and Flight 166 

Chapter VIII 

Spoils of the Victory — An Embassy to Scipio — Speech of Has- 
drubal Eriphus — Scipio's Reply — Scipio's Conditions of 

Chapter IX 


Hannibal advises their Acceptance — Another Embassy to Rome 
— Debate in the Senate — Views of Scipio's Friends — The 
Counsels of Clemency and of Prudence — Views of Scipio's 
Rivals — The Crimes of Carthage — Call for Vengeance — 
The Senate ratifies Scipio's Treaty — Scipio's Return — Form 
of a Roman Triumph 1 76 

Chapter X 

Masinissa's Depredations — Factions in Carthage — The Visit of 
Cato — War with Masinissa — A Battle with Masinissa — 
Carthaginian Army surrounded and captured . . .185 


Chapter XI 

Third Punic War — No Excuse for it — Utica joins the Romans 
— Hostages demanded of Carthage — Pitiful Scenes when 
the Hostages were sent — Roman Army lands at Utica — 
Embassy from Carthage 1 89 

Chapter XII 

Reply of Censorinus — " Perfidia plusquam Punica " — Terrible 
Plight of Carthage — Pathetic Speech of Hanno — Reply of 
Censorinus I94 

Chapter XIII 

Return of the Ambassadors — Terrible Scenes in the City — 

Carthage resolves to fight — Slow Movements of the C^onsuls 201 

Chapter XIV 

Topography of Carthage — The Two Harbors — The Romans 
repulsed — Roman Rams destroyed — Scipio the Younger — 
ileet burned — Exploits of Phameas 205 

Chapter XV 

A Sally from the City — Manilius marches against Hasdrubal 

and is repulsed — Flight of Manilius — A Detachment rescued 209 

Chapter XVI 

Rising Fame of Scipio — Death of Masinissa — A Talk with 
Phameas — Treason of Phameas — Arrival of the New Con- 
sul Piso — Piso repulsed — The Carthaginians in High Spirits 212 

Chapter XVII 

Scipio elected Consul — Saves Mancinus from Destruction — 

Demoralization of the Army — Scipio's Speech to the Soldiers 21 7 


Chafter XVIII 


Restores Discipline and captures Megara — Cruelties of Hasdru- 
bal — Scipio's Intrenched Camp — Cuts off the Supplies of 
Carthage — Attempts to close the Harbor but fails — Inde- 
cisive Naval Engagement — Desperate Fight for Possession 
of a Quay — Scipio captures Nepheris 221 

Chapter XIX 

Scipio takes the Inner Harbor — Fighting in the Streets — Scenes 
of Horror — Fighting in Byrsa — Hasdrubal and his Wife — 
Destruction of Carthage — Scipio sheds Tears . . . 228 

Chapter XX 

Rejoicings in Rome — Scipio's Triumph — Carthage rebuilt by 

Augustus 232 

Appendix A 235 

Appendix B 237 

NuMiDiAN Affairs 241 

Macedonian Affairs 243 



Chapter I 

Origin of the Illyrians — The Vengeance of Apollo — First Con- 
tact with the Romans 258 

Chapter II 

First Illyrian War — Second Illyrian War — War with Genthius 

— War with the Dalmatians 261 


Chapter III 


Julius Caesar and the lUyrians — The Pannonians on the Danube 265 

Chapter IV 

Augustus invades lUyria — Subjugation of the Salassi and of the 
lapydes — Hard Fighting at Metulus — Destruction of the 
City — War against the Segestani — Their City captured . 267 

Chapter V 

Second War against the Dalmatians — The City of Promona 

taken — Sunodium burned — The Dalmatians subdued . 272 



Chapter I 

Ambition of Antiochus the Great — His First Disagreement with 
Rome — A Conference at Lysimacheia — Hannibal at Ephe- 
sus — Antiochus forms Alliances 276 

Chapter II 

Sends an Embassy to Rome — HannibaPs Advice to Antiochus — 
Hannibal sends a Messenger to Carthage — Roman Ambas- 
sadors meet Hannibal at Ephesus — Colloquy between Han- 
nibal and Scipio Africanus — The Place of Hannibal's Death 279 

Chapter III 

Antiochus invades Greece — Amynander, King of the Athamanes, 
joins him — Hannibal repeats his Advice — The Romans 
prepare for War — Philip joins the Romans .... 283 

Chapter IV 

The Romans cross the Adriatic — Antiochus occupies Thermopylae 
— Battle at Thermopylae — Antiochus defeated — Plees to 
Asia — The Two Scipios sent against him .... 287 


Chapter V 


The Romans win a Naval Victory — The Scipios march to the 
Hellespont — A Roman Fleet captured by Stratagem — 
Fighting at Pergamus — The Naval Battle of Myonessus . 290 

Chapter VI 

Consternation of Antiochus — Antiochus sends Proposals to the 
Scipios — Both Armies prepare for Battle — The Roman 
Formation — Antiochus draws up his Forces — The Battle 
of Magnesia — The Macedonian Phalanx broken — Total 
Defeat of Antiochus 295 

Chapter VII 

Antiochus sues for Peace — Scipio's Reply — Treaty ratified — 
Accusations against Scipio — A Similar Accusation against 
Epaminondas — Manlius succeeds Scipio — A Disaster in 
Thrace — Rewards to Eumenes 302 

Chapter VIII 

The Successors of Antiochus the Great — Antiochus Epiphanes 
— Antiochus Eupator — Demetrius Soter — Tigranes, King 
of Armenia, conquers Syria — Pompey seizes it for the 
Romans — Also Phoenicia and Palestine — Later History of 
Syria 308 

Chapter IX 

Syria at the Death of Alexander the Great — Seleucus Nicator — 
The Extent of the Empire — Oracles and Prodigies concern- 
ing Seleucus — Cities founded by him — Seleucia-on-the- 
Tigris 312 

Chapter X 

Seleucus, Antiochus, and Stratonice — Seleucus divides his King- 
dom — Death of Seleucus — Death of Lysimachus . • 317 


Chapter XI 


The Successors of Seleucus — Demetrius Soter — Palace Q)n- 

spiracies — End of the Seleucidae 322 



Chapter I 

Prusias, King of Bithynia — His Attack upon Attalus — His Son 

Nicomedes — Conspiracy against Prusias — Death of Prusias 325 

Chapter II 

Cappadocia in Ancient Times — The First Mithridates — Mithri- 
dates Eupator — His First Difficulty with the Romans — 
Sends an Ambassador to them — His Dispute with Nicomedes 
— Duplicity of the Roman Legates 329 

Chapter III 

Mithridates seizes Cappadocia — Sends Another Embassy — First 
Mithridatic War — The Romans badly defeated — Retreat 
of the Roman Forces — The Roman Generals captured . 334 

Chapter IV 

Mithridates orders a Massacre of Romans in Asia — Frightful 
Scenes in Ephesus and Other Cities — Mithridates attacks 
Rhodes — Is defeated on the Sea — Makes an Assault by 
Land — Is beaten off 339 

Chapter V 

Athens sides with Mithridates — Other Greek States follow her 
Example — Cornelius Sulla marches against Mithridates — 
Besieges the Piraeus — Archelaus makes a Sally — Sulla sends 
LucuUus to procure Ships — Hard Fighting on the Walls — 
Famine in Athens — Battles Underground — Sulla repulsed 
from Piraeus . , 343 


Chapter VI 


Athens taken — Slaughter of the Inhabitants — Sulla returns to 
the Piraeus — Drives Archelaus out — Burns the Piraeus — 
Follows Archelaus — Battle of Choeronea — Archelaus routed 

— Great Slaughter of the Barbarians 349 

Chapter VII 

Fury and Cruelty of Mithridates — The Dismal Fate of Chios — 
Terror of the Greek Cities in Asia — Conspiracy against 
Mithridates — Battle of Orchomenus — Archelaus again de- 
feated by Sulla 354 

Chapter VIII 

Sulla declared a Public Enemy — Flaccus and Fimbria — Fim- 
bria destroys Ilium — Mithridates sues for Peace — Sulla's 
Answer — Terms of the Treaty offered by Sulla — Mithridates 
delays and Sulla marches to Asia — A Personal Conference 

— What Sulla said to Mithridates — Mithridates accepts the 
Terms 358 

Chapter IX 

Sulla demands the Surrender of Fimbria — Suicide of Fimbria — 
Sulla settles the Affairs of Asia — His Speech to the People 

— Imposes Five Years' Taxes and the Cost of the War — 
Piracy in the Mediterranean — Second Mithridatic War — 
The Aggressions of Murena — Mithridates appeals to Rome 

— Attacks and defeats Murena — Sulla puts a Stop to the 
War 365 

Chapter X 

New Troubles brewing — Mithridates forms an Alliance with 
Sertorius and prepares for War — Makes a Speech to his 
Trojps — Invades Bithynia 37 X 


Chapter XI 


Lucullus takes the Command against him and cuts off his Sup- 
plies at Cyzicus — Mithridates besieges Cyzicus — Valiant 
Defence of the City — Famine in the Besieging Army — 
Flight of Mithridates — Lucullus pursues — Mithridates suf- 
fers Shipwreck . , . . . , . , .374 

Chapter XII 

Second Campaign of Lucullus against Mithridates — Crosses a 
Mountain Range — A Panic in the Camp of Mithridates — 
Mithridates takes Refuge with Tigranes — Lucullus regulates 
the Pontic Cities — Demands the Surrender of Mithridates 
from Tigranes — Marches against Tigranes — Besieges Ti- 
granocerta — Battle of Tigranocerta — Total Defeat of 
Tigranes — Capture of Tigranocerta 380 

Chapter XIII 

Tigranes collects a New Army — Indecisive Movements — Mithri- 
dates defeats the Romans under Fabius and overwhelms 
Triarius — Intrigue against Lucullus at Rome . . . 386 

Chapter XIV 

Pompey invested with the Command — The Pirates in the Medi- 
terranean — Distress and Anxiety at Rome — Pompey as- 
signed to Command against the Pirates — His Arrangements 
for attacking them — Proceeds to Cilicia — Captures and 
destroys their Strongholds 389 

Chapter XV 

Extraordinary Powers given to Pompey — He marches against 
Mithridates — The King retreats by Night — Pompey over- 
takes and defeats him — Mithridates again flees to Armenia, 
and thence to the Scythians — Pompey advances to Colchis 
— Fights a Battle with the Barbarians — Marches against 
Tigranes — Tigranes comes to him as a Suppliant — Pompey 
pardons him, and settles the Affairs of Armenia . . . 393 


Chapter XVI 


Other Wars of Pompey — Brings Syria under Roman Rule — 
Mithridates in the Crimea — Prepares for Another War — 
Revolt against Mithridates — He plans an Invasion of Italy 
— His Son Pharnaces forms a Plot against him — Mutiny in 
the Army — Mithridates takes Poison, but without Effect — 
Is killed at his Own Request — Character and Career of 
Mithridates — He is buried at Sinope 400 

Chapter XVII 

Pompey's Exploits in the East — Cities founded by him — Pom- 
pey*s Triumph — Captives led in his Procession — Inscription 
on his Tablet — New Countries added to the Roman Sway 

— The Armaments of Mithridates — The Career of Pharnaces 

— Later History of Pontus 407 




Vatican MS. Gr. 141, reduced facsimile . . Frontispiece 

Vatican MS. Gr. 141, reduced facsimile . . To face page 1 

Vatican MS. Gr. 134, reduced facsimile 146 

Scipio Africanus 184 

The Harbors of Carthage 206 

L. Cornelius Sulla 344 

L. Licinius Lucullus 378 

Mithridates Eupator . • 413 


The Roman Empire under Hadrian 2 

Spain 48 

Gallia Cisalpina no 

Hannibal's March down Italy 114 

Plan of the Battle of Cannae 119 

Carthaginian Possessions 147 

Carthage 205 

Asia Minor 276 

Sulla's Campaign in Boeotia 351 



Intending to write the history of the Romans I have 
deemed it best to begin with the boundaries of the nations 
under their sway. They are as follows : In the ocean, the 
major part of those who inhabit the British Isles. Then 
entering the Mediterranean by the Pillars of Hercules and 
circumnavigating the same we find under their rule all the 
islands and the mainlands washed by that sea. The first 
of these on the right hand are the Mauritanians of the coast 
and various other African nations as far as Carthage. Far- 
ther inland are the nomad tribes whom the Romans call 
Numidians and their country Numidia ; then other Africans 
who dwell around the Syrtes as far as Cyrene, and Cyrene 
itself; also the Marmaridae, the Ammonii, and those who 
dwell by the lake Mareotis ; then the great city founded by 
Alexander on the border of Egypt, and Egypt itself, as one 
sails up the Nile, as far as eastern Ethiopia ; and as far as 
Pelusium by sea. 

2. Here turning our course we take in Palestine-Syria, 
and beyond it a part of Arabia. The Phoenicians hold the 
country next to Palestine on the sea, and beyond the Phoe- 
nician territory are Coele-Syria, and the parts stretching 
from the sea as far inland as the river Euphrates, namely 
Palmyra and the sandy country round about, extending 
even to the Euphrates itself. The Cilicians come next to 
the Syrians, and their neighbors are the Cappadocians, and 
that part of the Armenian country called Lesser Armenia. 
Along the Euxine are other nations called by the com- 
mon name Pontic, subject to the Roman rule. The Syrians 
and Cilicians border on the Mediterranean, the Armenians 
and Cappadocians extend to the Pontic nations and to 
the interior as far as Greater Armenia, which is not sub- 
ject to the Romans in the way of tribute, but its people 

VOL. I — Β I 



appoint their own kings. Descending from Cilicia and 
Cappadocia to Ionia we find the great peninsula bounded 
on the right by the Euxine, the Propontis, the Hellespont, 
and the ^gean, and on the left by the Pamphylian or 
Egyptian sea, for it is called by both names. Some of the 
countries embraced in it look toward the Egyptian sea, 
namely : Pamphylia and Lycia and after them Caria extend- 
ing to Ionia. Others look toward the Euxine, the Propon- 
tis, and the Hellespont, namely ; the Galatians, Bithynians, 
Mysians, and Phrygians. In. the interior are the Pisidians 
and Lydians. So many nations inhabit this peninsula and 
all are under Roman rule. 

3. Crossing from these coasts they rule other nations 
around the Euxine, the Mysians of Europe and the Thra- 
cians who border that sea. Beyond Ionia are the ^gean 
sea, the Adriatic, the straits of Sicily, and the Tyrrhenian 
sea stretching to the Pillars of Hercules. This is the dis- 
tance from Ionia to the ocean. Following the coast line 
we find the following countries subject to the Romans : all 
of Greece, Thessaly, and Macedonia, also the adjoining 
Thracians, the Illyrians, and Pannonians, and Italy itselζ 
the longest of all, extending from the Adriatic and border- 
ing the greater part of the Tyrrhenian sea as far as the 
country of the Celts (whom the Romans call Gauls), some 
of whom border the Mediterranean, others the Northern 
ocean, and still others dwell along the river Rhine ; also 
all of Spain and Celtiberia on the Northern and Western 
oceans as far as the Pillars of Hercules. Of these I shall 
speak more particularly when I come to deal with each 
nation. But for the present let this suffice for the principal 
boundaries which define their empire along the sea. 

4. On the landward side the boundaries are a part of 
Mauritania lying against western Ethiopia and the remainder 
of Africa (having a very warm climate, or much infested 
with wild beasts) extending to eastern Ethiopia. These 
are the Roman boundaries in Africa. Those of Asia are 
the river Euphrates, Mount Caucasus, the kingdom of 
Greater Armenia, the Colchians who dwell along the Euxine • 
sea, and the remainder of that coast. In Europe the two 
rivers, Rhine and Danube, for the most part bound the 
Roman empire. Of these the Rhine empties into the 


Northern ocean and the Danube into the Euxine. On 
the other side of these rivers, however, some of the Celts 
beyond the Rhine are under Roman sway, and beyond the 
Danube some of the Getae, who are called Dacians. These, 
with the nearest approach to accuracy, are the boundaries 
on the mainland. 

5. All the islands of the sea also, the Cyclades, Sporades, 
Ionian isles, Echinades, the Tuscan isles, the Balearic isles, 
and all the rest in Libyan, Ionian, Egyptian, Myrtoan, Sicil- 
ian, and Mediterranean waters, by whatever names called ; 
also those which the Greeks by way of distinction call the 
great islands, Cyprus, Crete, Rhodes, Lesbos, Euboea, Sicily, 
Sardinia, and Corsica, and whatever other isle there may be, 
large or small — all are under Roman rule. Crossing the 
Northern ocean to Britain, a continent in itself, they took 
possession of the better and larger part, not caring for the 
remainder. Indeed, the part they do hold is not of much 
use to them. 

6. Although holding the empire of so many and so great 
nations the Romans labored ^\^ hundred years with toil and 
difficulty to establish their power firmly in Italy itself. Half 
of this time they were under kings, but having expelled 
them and sworn to have kingly rule no longer, they adopted 
aristocracy, and chose their rulers yearly. In the two hun- 
dred years next succeeding the five hundred their dominion 
increased greatly, they acquired unexampled foreign power, 
and brought the greater part of the nations under their 
sway. Gaius [Julius] Caesar having got the upper hand of 
his rivals possessed himself of the sovereignty, holding it in 
a firm grasp, and preserved the form and name of the 
republic but made himself the absolute ruler of all. In this 
way the government, from that time to this, has been a 
monarchy; but they do not call their rulers kings, out of 
respect, as I think, for the ancient oath. They call them 
imperators [emperors], that being the title also of those 
who formerly held the chief command of the armies for the 
time being. Yet they are very kings in fact. 

7. From the advent of the emperors to the present time 
is nearly two hundred years more, in the course of which 
the city has been greatly embellished, its revenue much in- / 
creased, and in the long reign of peace and security every- 


thing has moved toward a lasting prosperity. Some nations 
have been added to the empire by these emperors, and the 
revolts of others have been suppressed. Possessing the best 
part of the earth and sea they have, on the whole, aimed to 
preserve their empire by the exercise of prudence, rather 
than to extend their sway indefinitely over poverty-stricken 
and profitless tribes of barbarians, some of whom I have seen 
at Rome offering themselves, by their ambassadors, as its 
subjects, but the chief of the state would not accept them 
because they would be of no use to it. They give kings to a 
great many other nations whom they do not wish to have un- 
der their own government. On some of these subject nations 
they spend more than they receive from them, deeming it 
dishonorable to give them up even though they are costly. 
They surround the empire with great armies and they gar- 
rison the whole stretch of land and sea like a single strong- 

8. No government down to the present time ever attained 
to such size and duration. That of the Greeks, even if we 
count the mastery of Athens, Sparta, and Thebes successively 
from the invasion of Darius, which was the beginning of their 
glory, to the hegemony of Greece held by Philip the son of 
Amyntas, lasted comparatively but few years. Their wars 
were not for conquest abroad but rather for preeminence 
among themselves, and they were most distinguished for the 
defence of their freedom against foreign invaders. Those of 
them who invaded Sicily with the hope of extending their 
dominion made a failure, and whenever they marched into 
Asia they accomplished small results and speedily returned. 
In short the Greek power, although ardent in fighting for 
the Grecian hegemony, never advanced steadfastly beyond 
the boundaries of Greece, but took pride in holding itself 
unenslaved and seldom conquered, and from the time of 
Philip the son of Amyntas, and of Alexander the son of 
Philip, they seem to me to have done very badly and to 
have been unworthy of themselves. 

9. The mastery of Asia is not to be compared, as to labor 
and bravery, with that of the smallest of the countries of 
Europe, on account of the effeminacy and cowardice of the 
Asiatic peoples, as will be shown in the progress of this his- 
tory. Such of the Asiatic nations as the Romans hold, they 


subdued in a few battles, though even the Macedonians 
joined in the defence, while the conquest of Africa and of 
Europe was in many cases very exhausting. Again, the dura- 
tion of the Assyrians, Medes, and Persians taken together 
(the three greatest empires before Alexander), does not 
amount to nine hundred years, which that of Rome has 
already reached, and the size of their empire I think was 
not half that of the Romans, whose boundaries extend from 
the setting of the sun and the Western ocean to Mount Cau- 
casus and the river Euphrates, and through Egypt to Ethio- 
pia and through Arabia as far as the Eastern ocean, so that 
their boundary is the ocean both where the sun-god rises 
and where he sinks, while they control the entire Mediter- 
ranean, and all its islands as well as Britain in the ocean. 
The greatest sea-power of the Medes and Persians included 
either the gulf of Pamphylia and the single island of Cyprus 
or perhaps some other small islets belonging to Ionia in the 
Mediterranean. They controlled the Persian gulf also, but 
how much of a sea is that?^ 

10. The history of Macedonia before Philip, the son of 
Amyntas, was of very small account ; there was a time, in- 
deed, when the Macedonians were a subject race. The 
reign of Philip himself was full of toil and struggles which 
were not contemptible, yet even his deeds concerned only 
Greece and the neighboring country. The empire of Alex- 
ander was splendid in its magnitude, in its armies, in the 
success and rapidity of his conquests, and it wanted little of 
being boundless and unexampled, yet in its shortness of 
duration it was like a brilliant flash of lightning. Although 
broken into several satrapies even the parts were splendid. 
The kings of my own country [Egypt] alone had an army 
consisting of 200,000 foot, 40,000 horse, 300 war elephants, 
and 2,000 armed chariots, and arms in reserve for 300,000 
soldiers more. This was their force for land service. For 
naval service they had 2,000 barges propelled by poles, and 
other smaller craft, 1,500 galleys with from one and a half 
to five benches of oars each, and galley furniture for twice 
as many ships, 800 vessels provided with cabins, gilded on 
stem and stern for the pomp of war, with which the kings 

^ This is a conjectural rendering; the text is corrupt. 


themselves were wont to go to naval combats ; and money 
in their treasuries to the amount of 740,000 Egyptian talents. 
Such was the state of preparedness for war shown by the 
royal accounts as recorded and left by the king of Egypt 
second in succession after Alexander, who was the most 
formidable of these rulers in his preparations, the most 
lavish in expenditure, and the most magnificent in projects. 
It appears that many of the other satrapies were not much 
inferior in these respects. Yet all these resources were 
wasted under their successors by warring with each other. 
By means of such civil dissensions alone are great states 

11. Through prudence and good fortune has the empire 
of the Romans attained to greatness and duration ;^ in gaining 
which they have excelled all others in bravery, patience, 
and hard labor. They were never elated by success until 
they had firmly secured their power, nor were they ever cast 
down by misfortune, although they sometimes lost 20,000 
men in a single day, at another time 40,000, and once 50,000, 
and although the city itself was often in danger. Neither 
famine, nor frequently recurring plague, nor sedition, nor all 
these falling upon them at once could abate their ardor; 
until, through the doubtful struggles and dangers of seven 
hundred years, they achieved their present greatness, having 
enjoyed the favors of fortune through wisdom. 

12. These things have been described by many writers, 
both Greek and Roman, and the history is even more copi- 
ous than that of the Macedonian empire, which was the 
longest history of earlier times. Being interested in it, and 
desiring to compare the Roman prowess carefully with that 
of every other nation, my history has often led me from 
Carthage to Spain, from Spain to Sicily or to Macedonia, or 
to join some embassy to foreign countries, or some alliance 
formed with them ; thence back to Carthage or Sicily, like 
a wanderer, and again elsewhere, while the work was still 
unfinished. At last I have brought the parts together, show- 

^ Literally : " The Roman power has excelled in greatness and good 
fortune by reason of prudence and long duration." This, as Schweig- 
hauser points out, is an awkward expression and inharmonious with the 
author's argument, in which prudence and good fortune are grouped 
together as causes, and greatness and duration as consequences. 


ing how often the Romans sent armies or embassies into 
Sicily and what they did there until they brought it into its 
present condition \ also how often they made war and peace 
with the Carthaginians, or sent embassies to them or re- 
ceived the same from them, and what damage they inflicted 
upon or suffered from them until they demolished Carthage 
and made Africa a Roman province, and how they rebuilt 
Carthage and brought Africa into its present condition. I 
have made this research also in respect to each of the other 
provinces, desiring to learn the Romans' relations to each, 
in order to understand the weakness of these nations or their 
power of endurance, as well as the bravery or good fortune 
of their conquerors or any other circumstance contributing 
to the result. 

13. Thinking that the public would like to learn the his- 
tory of the Romans in this way, I am going to write the part 
relating to each nation separately, omitting what happened 
to the others in the meantime, and taking it up in its proper 
place. It seems superfluous to put down the dates of every- 
thing, but I shall mention those of the most important 
events now and then. The Roman citizens, like other 
people, formerly had only one name each ; afterwards they 
took a second, and not much later, for easier recognition, 
there was given to some of them a third derived from some 
personal incident or as a distinction for bravery. In like 
manner surnames have been added to the names of certain 
Greeks. For purposes of distinction I shall sometimes men- 
tion all the names, especially of illustrious men, but for the 
most part I shall call these and others by the names that are 
deemed most characteristic. 

14. As there are three books which treat of the numerous 
exploits of the Romans in Italy, these three must together 
be considered the Italian Roman history; but on account of 
the great number of events in them the division has been 
made. The first of these will show the events that took 
place in successive reigns while they had kings, of whom 
there were seven, and this I shall call the history of Rome 
under the kings. Next in order will be the history of the 
rest of Italy except the part along the Adriatic. This, by 
way of distinction from the former, will be called the second 
Italian book of Roman history. With the last nation, the 


SamniteSy who dwelt on the Adriatic, the Romans struggled 
eighty years under the greatest difficulties, but finally they 
subjugated them and the neighbors who were allied with 
them, and also the Greeks who had settled in Italy. This, 
by way of distinction from the former, will be called the 
Samnite Roman history. The rest will be named according 
to its subject, the Celtic, Sicilian, Spanish, Hannibalic, Car- 
thaginian, Macedonian, and so on. The order of these his- 
tories with respect to each other is according to the time 
when the Romans began to be embroiled in war with each 
nation, even though many other things intervened before 
that nation came to its end. The internal seditions and 
civil wars of the Romans — to them the most calamitous of 
all — will be designated under the names of their chief 
actors, as the wars of Marius and Sulla, those of Pompey and 
Caesar, those of Antony and the second Caesar, surnamed 
Augustus, against the murderers of the first Caesar, and those 
of Antony and Augustus against each other. At the end 
of this last of the civil wars Egypt passed under the 
Roman sway, and the Roman government itself became a 

15. Thus, the foreign wars will be divided into books 
according to the nations, and the civil wars according to the 
chief commanders. The last book will show the present mili- 
tary force of the Romans, the revenues they collect from each 
province, what they spend for the naval service, and other 
things of that kind. It is proper to begin with the origin 
of the people of whose prowess I am about to write. Who 
I am, who have written these things, many indeed know, 
and I have already indicated.^ To speak more plainly I am 
Appian of Alexandria, having reached the highest place in 
my native country, and having been, in Rome, a pleader of 
causes before the emperors, until they deemed me worthy 
of being made their procurator. And if any one has a great 
desire to learn more [about my affairs] there is a special 
treatise of mine on that subject. 

^ Schweighauser considers this an allusion to the title page (now 
lost) which probably contained the name and nationality of the author. 


I. From Photius^ 

1. iENEAS, the son of Anchises, the son of Capys, flour- 
ished in the Trojan war. After the capture of Troy he fled, 
and after long wandering arrived at that part of the Italian 
coast called Laurentum, where his camping- place is shown 
to this day, and that shore is called, after him, the Trojan 
beach. The Aborigines of this part of Italy were then ruled 
by Faunus, the son of Mars, who gave to ^Eneas his daugh- 
ter Lavinia in marriage, and also a tract of land four hun- 
dred stades^ in circuit. Here JEnesiS built a town, which he 
named after his wife, Lavinium. Three years later, at the 
death of Faunus, ^Eneas succeeded to the kingdom by virtue 
of his marriage relationship, and he called the Aborigines 
Latins, from his father-in-law, Latinus Faunus. Three years 
later still, ^neas was killed by the Rutuli, a Tuscan tribe, in 
a war begun on account of his wife Lavinia, who had been 
previously betrothed to their king. He was succeeded in 
the government by Euryleon, otherwise called Ascanius, the 
son of JEneas and Creusa, a daughter of Priam, to whom he 
had been married in Troy. But some say that the Ascanius 
who succeeded to the government was the son of -^neas 
and Lavinia. 

2. Ascanius died four years after the founding of Alba 
(for he also built a city and gave it the name of Alba, and 
settled it with a colony from Lavinium), and Silvius suc- 
ceeded to the throne. They say that this Silvius had a son 

1 The extract from Photius reads: "Appian begins his history with 
iEneas . . ., who flourished," etc. 

2 The stade = 582 English feet. 



named ^neas Silvius, and he a son named Latinus Silvius, 
and he a son named Capys, and he a son named Capetus, 
and he a son named Tiberinus, and he a son named Agrippa, 
who was the father of the Romulus who was struck by light- 
ning, and who left a son Aventinus, who was the father of 
Procas. All of these bore the surname of Silvius. Procas 
had two sons, the elder named Numitor, and the younger 
Amulius. When the elder succeeded to the throne on the 
death of the father, the younger took it away from him by 
force and violence. He also killed Egestus, his brother's 
son, and he made Rhea Silvia, his brother's daughter, a 
vestal, so that she might remain childless. Notwithstanding 
a conspiracy against his life, Numitor himself was saved 
because of the gentleness and clemency of his manners. 
Silvia having become pregnant contrary to law, Amulius cast 
her into prison by way of punishment, and when she had 
given birth to two sons he gave them to some shepherds 
with orders to throw the babes into the neighboring stream 
called the river Tiber. These boys were Romulus and 
Remus. Being of the lineage of -^neas, on their mother's 
side, for their father's lineage was unknown, they always 
boasted their descent from the former. 

II. From the Same 

My first book contains the deeds of Rome's seven kings, 
viz. : Romulus, Numa Pompilius, Tullus Hostilius,^ Ancus 
Marcius (a descendant of Numa), Tarquinius, Servius Tul- 
lius, and Lucius Tarquinius, a son of the other Tarquinius. 
The first of these was the founder and builder of Rome, 
and although he governed it rather as a father than as an 
absolute monarch, he was nevertheless slain, or, as some 
think, translated. The second, not less kingly, but even 
more so than the first, died at the age of . . . The third 
was struck by lightning. The fourth died of a disease. The 
fifth was murdered by some shepherds. The sixth lost his 
life in a similar manner. The seventh was expelled from 
the city and kingdom for violating the laws. From that 

1 The text says, "Ancus Hostilius," an obvious error. 


time kingly rule came to an end, and the administration of 
government was transferred to consuls. 

III. From Suidas 

Having kept careful watch against her father's return, she 
(Tarpeia) promises Tatius to betray the garrison. 

IV. From the Same 

At the command of Tatius they threw pieces of gold at 
the girl until she succumbed to her wounds and was buried 
under the heap. 

V. From "The Embassies" 

When Tatius waged war against Romulus, the wives of 
the Romans, who were daughters of the Sabines, made 
peace between them. Advancing to the camp of the par- 
ents they held out their hands to them and showed the 
infant children already born to them and their husbands, 
and testified that their husbands had done them no wrong. 
They prayed that the Sabines would take pity on themselves, 
their sons-in-law, their grandchildren, and their daughters, 
and either put an end to this wretched war between rela- 
tives, or first kill them in whose behalf it was begun. The 
parents, moved partly by their own difficulties and partly by 
pity for the women, and perceiving that what the Romans 
had done was not from lust but necessity, entered into 
negotiations with them. For this purpose Romulus and 
Tatius met in the street which was named from this event 
Via Sacra and agreed upon these conditions : that both 
Romulus and Tatius should be kings, and that the Sabines 
who were then serving in the army under Tatius, and any 
others who might choose to come, should be allowed to 
settle in Rome on the same terms and under the same laws 
as the Romans themselves. 

VI. From Suidas 

The general, learning this fact from one of his personal 
friends, communicated it to Hostilius. 


VII. From the Same 

Some blamed him [Tullus Hostilius] because he wrongly 
staked everything on the prowess of three men (the Horatii) . 

VIII. From the Same 

[The Romans thought] that peace might be made [by 
Tarquinius] on the terms that the Gabini considered just. 

IX. From the Anonymous Grammarian 

[Tarquinius] bought three books [from the Sibyl] at the 
price [previously asked] for the nine. 

X. From SuroAS 

Horatius [Codes] was a cripple. He failed of reaching 
the consulship, either in war or in peace, on account of his 

XI. From the Same 

The Consuls tendered the oaths [by which they bound 
themselves], and said that they would yield everything 
rather than take back Tarquinius. 

^«;» XII. From Peiresc 


as© Tarquinius incited the Sabines against the Roman people. 504 
Claudius, an influential Sabine of the town of Regillus, op- 
posed any violation of the treaty, and being condemned for 
this action, he took refuge in Rome with his relatives, friends, 
and slaves, to the number of hwQ thousand. To all these 
the Romans gave a place of habitation, and land to culti- 
vate, and the right of citizenship. Claudius, on account of 
his brilliant exploits against the Sabines, was chosen a mem- 
ber of the Senate, and the Claudian gens received its name 
from him. 


XIII. From Suidas 

Y.R. Β C 

256 The Latins, although allied to the Romans by treaty, 498 
nevertheless made war against them. They accused the 
Romans of despising them, although they were allied to 
them, and of the same blood. 

[Here follow, in the Teubner edition, four detached 
sentences, or parts of sentences, which, without their con- 
text, convey no meaning.] 


I. From SuroAS 

V.R. . B.C. 

256 The Volsci, in nowise terrified by the misfortunes of their 498 
neighbors, made war against the Romans and laid siege to 
their colonies. 

II. From the Same 

«63 The people refused to elect Marcius (Coriolanus) when 491 
he sought the consulship, not because they considered him 
unfit, but because they feared his domineering spirit. 

III. From the Same 

26s Marcius being inflamed against the Romans when they g 
banished him went over to the Volsci, meditating no small 

IV. From the Same 

266 When he arrived there, having renounced his own coun- ^gg 
try and kin, he did not meditate anything in particular, but 
intended to side with the Volsci against his country.^ 

V. From "The Embassies" 

I. When Marcius had been banished, and had taken 
refuge with the Volsci, and made war against the Romans, 
and was encamped at a distance of only four hundred stades 
from the city, the people threatened to betray the walls to 

^ Mendelssohn considers this whole fragment corrupt. 



a66 the enemy unless the Senate would send an embassy to 488 
him to treat for peace. The Senate reluctantly sent 
plenipotentiaries for this purpose. When they arrived at 
the camp of the Volsci and were brought into his presence 
and that of the Volscian chiefs, they offered oblivion and 
permission to return to the city if he would discontinue the 
war, and they reminded him that the Senate had never done 
him any wrong. He, while accusing the people of the many 
wrongs they had done to him and to the Volsci, promised 
nevertheless that the latter would come to terms with them 
if they would surrender the land and towns they had taken 
from the Volsci and admit them to citizenship on the same 
terms as the Latins. But if the vanquished were to keep 
what belonged to the victors, he did not see how peace 
could be made. Having named these conditions, he dis- 
missed the ambassadors and gave them thirty days to con- 
sider. Then he turned against the remaining Latin towns, 
and having captured seven of them in the thirty days, he 
came back to receive the answer of the Romans. 

2. They replied that if he would withdraw his army from 
the Roman territory they would send an embassy to him to 
conclude peace on fair terms. When he refused this, they 
sent ten others to beg him that nothing should be done 
unworthy of his native country, and to allow a treaty to be 
made, not by his command, but of their own free will, for he 
should regard the honor of his country and the principles 
of his ancestors, who had never done him any wrong. He 
replied merely that he would give them three days more in 
order that they might think better of it. Then the Romans 
sent their priests to him wearing their sacred vestments to 
add their entreaties. To these he said that either they must 
obey his commands or they need not come to him again. 
Then the Romans prepared for a siege and brought stones 
and missiles upon the walls to fight off Marcius from above. 

3. Now Valeria, the daughter of Publicola, brought a 
company of women to Veturia, the mother of Marcius, and 
to Volumnia his wife. All these, clad in mourning garments 
and bringing their children to join in the supplication, 
implored that they would go out with them to meet 
Marcius, and beseech him to spare them and their country. 
The Senate allowed these women to go alone to the camp of 


Y.R. B.C. 

266 the enemy. Marcius admiring the high courage of the city, 488 
where even the women were inspired by it, advanced to 
meet them, sending away the rods and axes of the lictors, 
out of respect for his mother. He ran forward and embraced 
her, brought her into the council of the Volsci, and told her 
to tell what she wanted. 

4. She said that, being his mother, she was as much 
wronged as he in his banishment from the city; that she 
saw that the Romans had already suffered grievously at his 
hands, and had paid a sufficient penalty, so much of their 
territory had been laid waste and so many of their towns de- 
molished, and themselves reduced to the extremity of sending 
their consuls and priests, and finally his own mother and 
wife, as ambassadors to him, and offering to rescind the de- 
cree and to grant him forgetfulness of the past and a safe 
return to his home. " Do not,'* she said, "cure an evil by 
an incurable evil. Do not be the cause of calamities that 
will smite yourself as well as those you injure. Whither do 
you carry the torch ? From the fields to the city ? From 
the city to your own hearthstone ? From your own hearth- 
stone to the temples of the gods ? Have mercy, my son, on 
me and on your country as we plead.^' After she had thus 
spoken Marcius replied that the country which had cast him 
out was not his, but rather the land which had given him 
shelter. Nothing was dear to him that was unjust, nor was 
anybody his enemy who treated him well. He told her to 
cast her eyes upon the men here present with whom he had 
exchanged the pledge of mutual fidelity, who had granted 
him citizenship, had chosen him their general, and had in- 
trusted to him their private interests. He mentioned the 
honors bestowed upon him and the oath he had sworn, and he 
urged his mother to consider his friends and enemies hers also. 

5. While he was still speaking, she, in a burst of anger, 
and holding her hands up to heaven, invoked their household 
gods. " Two processions of women," said she, " have set 
forth from Rome in the deepest affliction, one in the time of 
King Tatius, the other in that of Gaius Marcius. Of these 
two Tatius, a stranger and downright enemy, had respect for 
the women and yielded to them. Marcius scorns a like 
delegation of women, including his wife, and his mother 
besides. May no mother, unblessed in her son, ever again 


Y.R. B.C. 

266 be reduced to the necessity of throwing herself at his feet. 488 
This I must submit to. I must prostrate myself before yours." 
So speaking she flung herself on the ground. He burst into 
tears, sprang forward and lifted her up, exclaiming with the 
deepest emotion : " Mother, you have gained the victory, but 
it is a victory by which you have lost your son." So saying 
he led back the army, in order to give his reasons to the 
Volsci and to make peace between the two nations. There 
was some hope that he might be able to persuade the Volsci, 
but on account of the jealousy of their leader Attius he was 
put to death.^ 

v.* From Suidas 

Marcius did not think proper to gainsay either of these 

VI. From the Same 

975 (The Fabii) were as much to be pitied for their misfortunes 479 
as they were worthy of praise for their bravery. For it was a 
great misfortune to the Romans, on account of their number, 
the dignity of a noble house, and its total destruction. The 
day on which it happened was ever after considered unlucky.* 

VII. From the Same 

a83 The army was incensed against the general (Appius Clau- 471 
dius) from remembrance of old wrongs, and refused to obey 
him. They fought badly on purpose, and took to flight, 
putting bandages on their bodies as though they were 
wounded. They broke up camp and tried to retreat, put- 
ting the blame on the unskilfulness of their commander. 

VIII. From Peiresc 

359 I. Bad omens from Jupiter were observed after the capture 395 
of Veii. The soothsayers said that some religious duty had 

^ The tale of Coriolatius is found in Livy, ii. 35-41, and at greater 
length in Dionysius of Halicarnassus, book viii. ; also in Plutarch, Life 
of Coriolaniis. 

2 The tale of the Fabian family and their voluntary assumption of 
the war against the Veientians, and their total destruction in an ambus- 
cade is related in Livy, ii. 48-50. 

VOL. I — c 


V R. B.C. 

359 been neglected, and Camillus remembered that it had been 395 
forgotten to appropriate a tenth of the plunder to the god 
that had given the oracle concerning the lake. Accordingly 
the Senate decreed that those who had taken anything from 
Veii should make an estimate, each one for himself, and 
bring in a tenth of it under oath. Their religious feeling 
was such that they did not hesitate to add to the votive 
offering a tenth of the produce of the land that had already 
been sold, as well as of the spoils. With the money thus 
obtained they sent to the temple of Delphi a golden cup 
which stood on a pedestal of brass in the treasury of Rome 
and Massilia^ until Onomarchus melted the cup during the 
Phocaean war. The pedestal is still standing. 

363 2. Camillus was afterwards accused before the people of 39X 
being himself the author of those bad omens and portents. 
The people, who had been for some time set against him, 
fined him heavily, having no pity for him although he had 
recently lost a son. His friends contributed the money in 
order that the person of Camillus might not be disgraced. 
In deep grief he went into exile in the city of Ardea, pray- 
ing the prayer of Achilles that the time might come when 
the Romans would long for Camillus. And in fact this came 

36s to pass very soon, for when the Gauls captured the city, the 389 
people fled for succor to Camillus and again chose him 
Dictator, as has been told in my Gallic history.^ 

IX. From the Same 

When Marcus Manlius, the patrician, saved the city of 
Rome from a Gallic invasion, he received the highest honors. 
370 At a later period when he saw an old man, who had often 384 
fought for his country, reduced to servitude by a money 
lender, he paid the debt for him. Being highly commended 
for this act, he released all his own debtors from their obli- 
gations. His glory being much increased thereby, he paid 
the debts of many others. Being much elated by his popu- 
larity, he even proposed that all debts should be cancelled, 
or that the people should sell the lands that had not yet 
been distributed and apply the proceeds for the relief of 

^ Marseilles. ^ Livy, v. 32 seq, Plutarch, Life of Camillus, 


I. From Peiresc 

Y.R. B.C 

411 I. When the Roman generals Cornelius and Corvinus, and 343 
the plebian Decius, had overcome the Samnites they left a 
military guard in Campania to ward off the Samnite incursions. 
These guards, partaking of the luxury and profuseness of the 
Campanians, were corrupted in their habits and began to 
envy the riches of these people, being themselves very poor 
and owing alarming debts in Rome. Finally they took coun- 
sel among themselves to kill their entertainers, seize their 
property, and marry their wives. This infamy would perhaps 
have been carried out at once, had not the new general 
Mamercus, who was marching against the Samnites, learned 
the design of the Roman guard. Concealing his intentions, 
he disarmed some of them and dismissed them, as soldiers 
entitled to discharge for long service. The more villanous 
ones he ordered to Rome on the pretence of important busi- 
ness, and he sent with them a military tribune with orders to 
keep a secret watch over them. Both parties of soldiers 
suspected that their design had leaked out, and they broke 
away from the tribune near the town of Terracina. They 
set free all those who were working under sentence in the 
fields, armed them as well as they could, and marched to 
Rome to the number of about 20,000. 

*" 2. About one day's march from the city they were met 34a 
by Corvinus who went into camp near them on the Alban 
mount. He remained quietly in his camp while investigating 
what the matter was, and did not consider it wise to attack 
these desperadoes. The men mingled with each other 
privately, the guards acknowledging with groans and tears, 
as among relatives and friends, that they were to blame, but 



V.R. B.C. 

4" declaring that the cause of it all was the debts they owed at 342 
Rome. When Corvinus understood this he shrank from the 
responsibility of so much civil bloodshed and advised the 
Senate to release these men from debt. He exaggerated 
the difficulty of the war if it should be necessary to put down 
such a large body of men, who would fight with the energy 
of despair. He had strong suspicions also of the result of 
the meetings and conferences, lest his own army, who were 
relatives of these men and not less oppressed with debt, 
should be to some extent lacking in fidelity. If he should 
be defeated he said that the dangers would be greatly in- 
creased; if victorious, the victory itself would be most 
lamentable to the commonwealth, being gained over so many 
of their own relatives. The Senate was moved by his argu- 
ments and decreed a cancellation of debts to all Romans, and 
immunity also to these revolters. The latter laid down their 
arms and returned to the city. 

II. From the Same 

4x4 Such was the bravery of the consul Manlius Torquatus. 340 
He had a penurious father who did not care for him, but 
kept him at work with slaves in the fields and left him to 
partake of their fare. When the tribune Pomponius prose- 
cuted him for numerous misdeeds and thought to mention 
among others his bad treatment of his son, young Manlius, 
concealing a dagger under his clothes, went to the house of 
the tribune and asked to see him privately as though he had 
something of importance to say about the trial. Being ad- 
mitted, and just as he was beginning to speak, he fastened 
the door and threatened the tribune with instant death if he 
did not take an oath that he would withdraw the accusation 
against his father. The latter took the oath, dismissed the 
accusation, and explained the reason to the people. Man- 
lius acquired great distinction from this affair, and was praised 
for being such a son to such a father. 

III. From Suidas 

414 With jeers he challenged him to single combat. The 340 
other [Manlius, the consul's son] restrained himself for a 


T.R. »,C 

414 while; but when he could no longer endure the pro\*oca»34o 
tion, he dashed on his horse against him. 

IV. From "The Emrassiks" 

43» I. While the Samnites were raiding and plundering the tor- .»•• 
ritor)• of Fregellae, the Romans captureil eighty-ono villages 
belonging to the Samnites and the Oaunii, slew 21,000 of 
their men, and drove them out of the Fregellian count ry. 
Again the Samnites sent ambassadors to Rome bringing the 
dead bodies of the men whom they had executed as guilty 
of causing the war, and also gold taken from their store. 
Wherefore the Senate, thinking that they had been utterly 
crushed, expected that a people who had been so sorely 
afflicted would concede the supremacy of Italy. 'I'he Sam- 
nites accepted the other conditions, or if they disputed any, 
they either entreated and begged for better terms, or re- 
ferred the matter to their cities. But as to the supremacy, 
they could not bear even to hear anything on that subject, 
because, they said, they had not come to surrender their 
towns, but to cultivate friendship. Accordingly they used 
their gold in redeeming prisoners, and went away angry 
and resolved to make trial for the su])remacy hereafter. 
Thereupon the Romans voted to receive no more embassies 
from the Samnites, but to wage irreconcilable, implacable 
war against them until they were subjugated by force. 

433 2. A god humbled this haughty spirit, for soon afterwards 3»» 
the Romans were defeated by the Samnites and compelled 
to pass under the yoke. The Samnites, under their general 
Pontius, having shut the Romans uj) in a defile where they 
were oppressed by hunger, the consuls sent messengers to him 
and begged that he should win the gratitude of the Romans, 
such as not many opportunities offer. Fie rejilied that they 
need not send any more messengers to him unless they were 
prepared to surrender their arms and their persons. There- 
upon a lamentation was raised as though a city had been 
captured, and the consuls delayed several days longer, hesi- 
tating to do an act unworthy of Rome. But when no means 
of rescue appeared and famine became severe, there being 
50,000 young men in the defile whom they could not bear 
to see perish, they surrendered to Pontius and begged him 


Y.R. B.C. 

433 either to kill them, or to sell them into slavery, or to keep 3»» 
them for ransom, but not to put any stigma of shame upon 
the persons of the unfortunate. 

3. Pontius took counsel with his father, sending to Cau- 
dium to fetch him in a carriage on account of his age. The 
old man said to him : " My son, for a great enmity there is 
but one cure, — either extreme generosity or extreme se- 
verity. Severity terrifies, generosity conciliates. Regard 
this first and greatest victory as a treasure-house of good 
fortune. Release them all without punishment, without 
shame, without loss of any kind, so that the greatness of the 
benefit may inure to your advantage. I hear that they are 
very sensitive on the subject of their honor. Vanquished 
by benefits only, they will strive to surpass you in deeds of 
kindness. It is in your power to attain this state of kindly 
action as a security for everlasting peace. If this does not 
suit you, then kill them to the last man, not sparing one' to 
carry the news. I advise as my choice the former, other- 
wise the latter is a necessity. The Romans will avenge 
themselves inevitably for any shame you put upon them. 
In that case you should strike the first blow and you will 
never deal them a heavier one than the slaughter of 50,000 
of their youi\g men at one time." 

4. When he had thus spoken his son answered : " I do 
not wonder, father, that you have suggested two plans abso- 
lutely opposed to each other, for you said in the beginning 
that you should propose extreme measures of one kind or 
the other. But I cannot put such a large number of men 
to death. I should fear the vengeance of a god and the 
opprobrium of mankind. Nor can I take away from the 
two nations all hope of mutual accommodation by doing an 
irreparable wrong. As to releasing them I myself do not 
approve of that. After the Romans have inflicted so many 
evils upon us and while they hold so many of our fields and 
towns in their possession to this day, it is impossible to let 
these captives go scot free. I shall not do that. Such un- 
reasonable leniency is insanity. Now look at this matter, 
leaving me out of the account. The Samnites, whose sons, 
fathers, and brothers have been slain by the Romans, and 
who have lost their goods and money, want satisfaction. A 
victor is naturally a haughty creature and our men are greedy 


Y.R. B'C. 

433 of gain. Who then will endure that I should neither kill, 3«« 
nor sell, nor even fine these prisoners, but dismiss them un- 
harmed like meritorious persons? Therefore let us discard 
the two extremes — the one because it is not in my power, 
the other because I cannot be guilty of such inhumanity. 
Yet, in order to humble the pride of the Romans to some 
extent, and to avoid the censure of others, I will take away 
the arms they have always used against us, and also their 
money (for even their money they get from us) . Then I 
will make them pass safe and sound under the yoke, this 
being the mark of shame they are accustomed to put upon 
others. Then I will establish peace between the two nations 
and select the most illustrious of their knights as hostages 
for its observance until the entire people ratify it. In this 
way I think I shall have accomplished what belongs to a 
victor and to a humane man. I think also that the Romans 
themselves will be content with these terms, which they, 
who lay claim to such excellence of character, have often 
imposed upon others.*' 

5. While Pontius was speaking the old man burst into 
tears, then seated himself in his carriage and went back to 
Caudium. Pontius then summoned the Roman envoys and 
asked them if they had any fetiaF priest with them. There 
was none present because the army had marched to under- 
take an irreconcilable, implacable war. Accordingly he 
commanded the envoys to make this announcement to the 
consuls and other officers of the army and to the whole 
multitude : " We had concluded perpetual friendship with 
the Romans, which you yourselves violated by giving aid to 
the Sidicini, our enemies. When peace was concluded 
again, you made war upon the NeapoHtans, our neighbors. 
Nor did it escape us that these things were part of a plan of 
yours to seize the dominion of all Italy. In the first battles, 
where you gained the advantage on account of the unskil- 
fulness of our generals, you showed us no moderation. Not 
content with devastating our country and occupying towns 
and villages not your own, you planted colonies in them. 

^The fetiales were a Roman college of priests who sanctioned 
treaties when concluded, and who demanded satisfaction of an enemy 
before a declaration of war. 


Y.R. B.C. 

433 Moreover, when we twice sent embassies to you and made 3»χ 
many concessions, you treated us disdainfully, and demanded 
that we should yield you the supremacy and obey you, as 
though we were not a nation to make terms with but a con- 
quered race. Thereupon you decreed this irreconcilable, 
implacable war against your former friends, descendants of 
the Sabines whom you made your fellow-citizens. On ac- 
count of your insatiable cupidity we ought not to make a 
treaty with you. But I, having regard for the divine wrath 
(which you despised), and mindful of our former relation- 
ship and friendship, will permit each one of you to pass 
under the yoke safe and sound with the clothes you stand 
in, if you swear to give up all of our lands and strongholds 
and withdraw your colonies from the same, and never wage 
war against the Samnites again." 

6. When these terms were communicated to the camp 
there was w^ailing and lamentation, long and loud, for they 
considered the disgrace of passing under the yoke worse than 
death. Afterwards, when they heard about the knights who 
were to be held as hostages, there was another long lament. 
Yet they were compelled by want to accept the conditions. 
Accordingly they took the oaths, Pontius on the one side, 
and the two consuls, Postumius and Veturius, on the other, 
together with two quaestors, four division commanders, and 
twelve tribunes, — all the surviving officers. When the 
oaths had been taken, Pontius opened a passage from the 
defile, and having fixed two spears in the ground and laid 
another across the top, caused the Romans to go under it as 
they passed out, one by one. He also gave them some 
animals to carry their sick, and provisions sufficient to bring 
them to Rome. This method of dismissing prisoners, which 
they call sending under the yoke, seems to me to serve only 
to insult the vanquished. 

7. When the news of this calamity reached the city there 
was wailing and lamentation like a public mourning. The 
women mourned for those who had been saved in this 
ignominous way as for the dead. The senators discarded 
their purple-striped tunics. Feasts, marriages, and every- 
thing of that kind were prohibited for a whole year, until the 
calamity was retrieved. Some of the returning soldiers took 
refuge in the fields for shame, others stole into the city by 



Y.R. B.C. 

433 night. The consuls entered by day according to law, and 3»» 
they wore their usual insignia, but they exercised no further 

V. From Suidas 

464 On account of admiration for his bravery a multitude of «90 
chosen youths numbering eight hundred were in the habit 
of following Dentatus, ready for anything. This was an 
embarrassment to the Senate at their meetings. 

VI. From "The Embassies" 

47r I. Once a great number of the Senones, a Celtic tribe, aided 983 
the Etruscans in war against the Romans, The latter sent 
ambassadors to the towns of the Senones and complained 
that, while they were under treaty stipulations, they were fur- 
nishing mercenaries to fight against the Romans; Although 
they bore the caduceus, and wore the garments of their office, 
Britomaris cut them in pieces and flung the parts away, 
alleging that his own father had been slain by the Romans 
while he was waging war in Etruria. The consul Cornelius, 
learning of this abominable deed while he was on the march, 
abandoned his campaign against the Etruscans, dashed with 
great rapidity by way of the Sabine country and Picenum 
against the towns of the Senones, and devastated them with 
fire and sword. He carried their women and children into 
slavery, and killed all the adult youth except a son of Brito- 
• maris, whom he reserved for awful torture, and led in his 

2. When the Senones who were in Etruria heard of this 
calamity, they joined with the Etruscans and marched against 
Rome.^ After various mishaps these Senones, having no 
homes to return to, and being in a state of frenzy over their 
misfortunes, fell upon Domitius [the other consul], by whom 
most of them were destroyed. The rest slew themselves in 
despair. Such was the punishment meted out to the Senones 
for their crime against the ambassadors. 

^ Livy, ix. i se^. 

^ The text at this place is corrupt. The translation is in part con- 


VII. From the Same 

Y.R. B.C. 

47a I. Cornelius went sight-seeing along the coast of Magna 282 
Graecia with ten ships with decks. At Tarentum there was 
a demagogue named Philocharis, a man of obscene life, who 
was for that reason nicknamed Thais. He reminded the 
Tarentines of an old treaty by which the Romans had bound 
themselves not to sail beyond the promontory of Lacinium. 
By his passion he persuaded them to excitement against 
Cornelius, and they sunk four of his ships and seized one 
of them with all on board. They accused the Thurini of 
preferring the Romans to the Tarentines although they were 
Greeks, and held them chiefly to blame for the Romans 
overpassing the limits. Then they expelled the noblest citi- 
zens of Thurii, sacked the city, and dismissed the Roman 
garrison that was stationed there under a treaty. 

2. When the Romans learned of these events, they sent 
an embassy to Tarentum to demand that the prisoners who 
had been taken, not in war, but as mere sight-seers, should 
be surrendered ; that the citizens of Thurii who had been 
expelled should be brought back to their homes ; that the 
property that had been plundered, or the value of what had 
been lost, should be restored ; and finally, that they should 
surrender the authors of these crimes,, if they wished to con- 
tinue on good terms with the Romans. The Tarentines 
made difficulties about admitting the embassy to their coun- 
cil at all, and when they had received them jeered at them 
because they did not speak Greek perfectly, and made fun 
of their togas and of the purple stripe on them. [The text 
here describes an indignity put upon Postumius, the chief 
of the embassy, by one Philonidas, which will not bear 
translation.] This spectacle was received with laughter by 
the bystanders. Postumius, holding out his soiled garment, 
said : " You will wash out this defilement with plenty of 
blood — you who take pleasure in this kind of jokes." As 
the Tarentines made no sort of answer the embassy departed. 
Postumius carried the soiled garment just as it was, and 
showed it to the Romans. 

473 3. The people, deeply incensed, sent orders to ^milius, 281 
who was waging war against the Samnites, to suspend opera- 
tions for the present and invade the territory of the Taren- 


Y.R. B.C 

473 tines, and offer them the same terms that the late embassy aSi 
had proposed, and if they did not agree, to wage war against 
them with all his might. He made them the offer accord- 
ingly. This time they did not laugh for they saw the army. 
They were about equally divided in opinion until one of their 
number said to them as they doubted and disputed : " To 
surrender citizens is the act of a people already enslaved, 
yet to fight without allies is hazardous. If we wish to defend 
our liberty stoutly and to fight on equal terms, let us call 
on Pyrrhus, king of Epirus, and designate him the leader 
of this war.'* This was done. 

VIII. From Peiresc 

474 After a shipwreck, Pyrrhus, king of Epirus, arrived at the 280 
harbor of Tarentum. The Tarentines were very much put 
out with the king's officers, who quartered themselves upon 
the citizens by force, and openly abused their wives and 
children. Afterwards Pyrrhus put an end to their revels 
and other social gatherings and amusements as incompatible 
with a state of war, and ordered the citizens to severe miH- 
tary exercise, under penalty of death if they disobeyed. 
Then the Tarentines, tired out by these most unusual exer- 
cises and orders, fled the city as though it were a foreign 
government and took refuge in the fields. Then the king 
closed the gates and placed guards over them. In this way 
the Tarentines gained a clear perception of their own folly. 

IX. From the Same 

I. Some Roman soldiers were stationed in Rhegium for 
the safety and protection of the city against enemies. They, 
and their leader Decius, envying the good fortune of the 
inhabitants and seizing an opportunity when they were 
observing a public festival, slew them and violated their 
wives. They offered an excuse for this crime, that the citi- 
zens of Rhegium were about to betray the garrison to Pyrrhus. 
So Decius became supreme ruler instead of a prefect of the 
guard, and he contracted an alliance with the Mamertines, 
who dwelt on the other side of the strait of Sicily, and who 


V R. B.C. 

474 had perpetrated the same kind of an outrage on their hosts 280 
not long before. 

2. Suffering from an affection of the eyes and distrusting 
the physicians of Rhegium, Decius sent for a medical man 
who had migrated from Rhegium to Messana so long before 
that it was forgotten that he was a Rhegian. The latter per- 
suaded him that, if he wished speedy relief, he should use 
certain hot drugs. ' Having applied a burning and corrosive 
ointment to his eyes, he told him to bear the pain till he 
should come again. Then he secretly returned to Messana. 
Decius, after enduring the pain a long time, washed off the 
ointment and found that he had lost his eyesight. 

3. Fabricius was sent by the Romans to restore the city 
to those Rhegians who still remained. He sent the guards 
who had been guilty of this revolt back to Rome. They 
were beaten with rods in the forum, then beheaded, and 
their bodies cast away unburied. Decius, being placed un- 
der strict guard, in the discouragement of a blind man, 
committed suicide. 

X. From "The Embassies" 

1 . Pyrrhus, king of Epirus, having gained a victory over 
the Romans and desiring to recuperate his forces after 
the severe engagement, and expecting that the Romans 
would be particularly desirous of coming to terms, sent to 
the city Cineas, a Thessalian, who was so renowned for 
eloquence that he had been compared with Demosthenes. 
When he was admitted to the senate-chamber, he extolled 
the king for a variety of reasons, and among others for his 
moderation after the victory, in that he had neither marched 
directly against the city nor attacked the camp of the van- 
quished. He offered them peace, friendship, and an al- 
liance with Pyrrhus, provided the Tarentines should be 
included in the same treaty, and provided the other Greeks 
dwelling in Italy should remain free under their own laws, 
and provided the Romans would restore to the Lucanians, 
Samnites, Daunii, and Bruttians whatever they had taken 
from them in war. If they would do this, he said that 
Pyrrhus would restore all his prisoners without ransom. 

2. The Romans hesitated a long time, being much in- 


Y.R. ^ ^ B.C 

474timidated by the prestige of Pyrrhus and by the calamity 280 
that had befallen them. Finally Appius Claudius, sumamed 
the Blind (because he had lost his eyesight from old age), 
commanded his sons to lead him into the senate- chamber, 
where he said : " I was grieved at the loss of my sight ; now 
I regret that I did not lose my hearing also, for never did 
I expect to see or hear deliberations of this kind from you. 
Have you become so forgetful of yourselves all of a sudden, 
by reason of one misfortune, as to take the man who brought 
it upon you, and those who called him hither, for friends 
instead of enemies, and to give back to the Lucanians and 
Bruttians the property that your ancestors took from them ? 
What is this but making the Romans servants of the Mace- 
donians ? And some of you dare to call this peace instead 
of servitude ! " Many other things in the like sense did 
Appius urge to arouse their spirit. If Pyrrhus wanted peace 
and the friendship of the Romans, let him withdraw from 
Italy and then send his embassy. As long as he remained 
let him be considered neither friend nor ally, neither judge 
nor arbitrator in Roman affairs. 

3. The Senate made answer to Cineas as Appius advised. 
They decreed the levying of two new legions for Laevinus, 
and made proclamation that whoever would volunteer in 
place of those who had been lost should put their names 
on the army roll. Cineas, who was still present and saw 
the multitude hastening to be enrolled, is reported to have 
said to Pyrrhus on his return : " We are waging war against 
a hydra." Others say that not Cineas, but even Pyrrhus 
himself said this when he saw the new Roman army larger 
than the former one; for the other consul, Coruncanius, 
came from Etruria and joined his forces with those of 
Laevinus. It is said also that when Pyrrhus made some 
further inquiries about Rome, Cineas replied that it was 
a city of generals; and when Pyrrhus wondered at this, 
he corrected himself, and said that it seemed more like 
a city of kings. When Pyrrhus saw that there was no ex- 
pectation of peace from the Senate, he marched toward 
Rome, laying everything waste on his way. When he had 
come as far as the town of Anagnia, finding his army en- 
cumbered with booty and a host of prisoners, he decided 
to postpone the battle. Accordingly he turned back to 


474 Campania, sending his elephants in advance, and distrib-280 
uted his army in winter quarters among the towns. 

4. Hither came Roman ambassadors proposing either to 
ransom the prisoners or to exchange them for Tarentines 
and his other alUes whom they held. He replied that if 
they were ready for peace on the terms proposed by Cineas, 
he would release the prisoners gratuitously, but if the war 
was to continue, he would not give up such a large number 
of vaHant men to fight against him. Otherwise he treated 
them in a kingly way. Perceiving that Fabricius, the chief 
of the embassy, had great influence in the city, and also 
that he was a very poor man, he approached him and 
said that if he would bring atiout a treaty of peace, he 
(Pyrrhus) would take him to Epirus, and make him his 
chief officer and the sharer of all his possessions ; and 
he asked him to accept a present of money then and 
there, on the pretext that he was to give it to those who 
perfected the treaty. Fabricius burst out laughing. He 
made no answer as to public matters, but said : " Nei- 
ther you nor your friends, Ο King, can take away my in- 
dependence. I consider my poverty more blessed than all 
the riches of kings if conjoined with fear." Others report 
the conversation differently, saying that Fabricius replied : 
** Beware lest the Epirotes share my nature and prefer me 
to you." 

5. Whichever answer he made, Pyrrhus admired his high 
spirit. He then tried another plan for procuring peace. He 
allowed the prisoners to go home without guards to attend 
the festival of Saturn, on the condition that if the city ac- 
cepted the terms offered by him they should be free, but if 
not that they should return to him at the end of the festival. 
Although the prisoners earnestly besought and urged the 
Senate to accept the terms, the latter ordered them, at the 
conclusion of the festival, to deliver themselves up to Pyrrhus 
on a day specified, and decreed the death penalty to those 
who should linger beyond that time. This order was observed 
by all. In this way Pyrrhus learned again that everything 
depended on the arbitrament of arms. 


XI. From the Same 

γ R. ft>C> 

476 I- λΜιϋε Pyrrhus was perplexed by the Roman complica- «78 
tion he was disturbed by an uprising of the Molossians. At 
this time also Agathocles, the king of Sicily, had just died. 
As P)iThus had married his daughter Laneia, he began to 
look upon Sicily as more of his concern than Italy. Still he 
was loath to abandon those who had summoned him to their 
aid, without some kind of arrangement for peace. Seizmg 
eagerly the occasion of the sending back of a traitor who 
had deserted from him, he testified his gratitude to the con- 
suls for this act and sent Cineas again to Rome to repeat 
his thanks for the man's safe-keeping, and to surrender the 
prisoners by way of recompense, — instructing him to procure 
peace in whatever way he could. Cineas brought a large 
number of presents both for men and women, knowing that 
the people were fond of money and gifts, and that the 
women had had large influence among the Romans from 
the earliest times. 

2. But they warned each other against the gifts, and re- 
plied that no man or woman would accept anything. They 
gave Cineas the same answer as before. If Pyrrhus would 
withdraw from Italy and send an embassy to them without 
gifts, they would agree to fair terms in all respects. They 
treated the embassy, however, in a sumptuous manner and 
sent back to Pyrrhus in exchange all the Tarentines and 
others of his allies whom they held as prisoners. There- 
upon Pyrrhus sailed for Sicily with his elephants and 8000 
horse, promising his allies that he would return to Italy. 
Three years later he returned, for the Carthaginians had 
driven him out of Sicily. 

XII. From Peiresc 

478 I. After the battle and the armistice with the Romans, 376 
Pyrrhus sailed for Sicily promising he would return to Italy. 
Three years later he returned, having been driven out of 
Sicily by the Carthaginians, and having been a grievous 
burden to the Sicilians themselves by reason of the lodging 
and supplying of his troops, the garrisons and the tribute he 
had imposed on them. Enriched by these exactions he set 


Y.R. B.C. 

478 sail for Rhegium with no decked ships, besides a much 276 
larger number of merchant vessels and ships of burthen. 
But the Carthaginians made a naval attack upon him, sunk 
seventy of his ships, and disabled all the rest except twelve. 
Fleeing with these he took vengeance on the Italian Locrians 
who had put to death his garrison and their commanding 
officer, because of outrages commited upon the inhabitants. 
Such savage vengeance did he take on them in the way of 
killing and plundering that he did not spare even the temple 
gifts of Proserpina, saying by way of joke that unseasonable 
piety was no better than superstition, and that it was good 
policy to obtain wealth without labor. 

2. Loaded down with spoils, a tempest overtook him, sunk 
some of his ships with the men in them, and cast the others 
ashore. The waves cast all the sacred things safe upon the 
Locrian beach. Wherefore Pyrrhus, perceiving too late the 
consequences of his impiety, restored them to the temple of 
Proserpina and sought to propitiate the goddess with numer- 

• ous sacrifices. As the victims were unpropitious he became 
stHl more furious, and he put to death all those who had 
advised the temple-robbing, or had assented to it, or had 
taken part in it. Thus had Pyrrhus come to grief. 


L An Epitome of Appian's Book " De Rebus Galuck " 

Y.R. B.C. 

365 I. At an early penod the Gauls waged war against the 389 
Romans, took Rome itself, except the Capitol, and burned 
it. Camillus, however, overcame and expelled them. At a 
later period, when they had made a second invasion, he 
overcame them again and enjoyed a triumph in conse- 
quence, being then in his eightieth year. A third army of 
Gauls which invaded Italy was destroyed by the Romans 
under Titus Quintius. Afterwards the Boii, the most savage 
of the Gallic tribes, attacked the Romans. Gains Sulpicius, 
the dictator, marched against them, and is said to have 
used the following stratagem. He commanded those who 
were in the front line to discharge their javelins, and imme- 
diately crouch low ; then the second, third, and fourth lines 
to discharge theirs, each crouching in turn so that they 
should not be struck by the spears thrown from the rear ; 
then when the last line had hurled their javelins, all were to 
rush forward suddenly with a shout and join battle at close 
quarters. The hurling of so many missiles, followed by an 
immediate charge, would throw the enemy into confusion. 
The spears of the Gauls were not like javeHns, but what the 
Romans called pila, four-sided, part wood and part iron, 
and not hard except at the pointed end. In this way the 
army of the Boii was completely destroyed by the Romans. 

404 2. Another Gallic force was defeated by Popillius, and 350 
after this Camillus, son of the former Camillus, defeated the 
same tribe. Afterwards ^milius Pappus won some trophies 

649 from the Gauls. Shortly before the consulships of Marius ^05 
a most numerous and warlike horde of Celtic tribes, most 
formidable in bodily strength, made incursions into both 
VOL. I— D 33 


Y.R. B.C. 

649 Italy and Gaul, and defeated some of the Roman consuls, 105 
and cut their armies in pieces. Marius was sent against 
them and he destroyed them all. The latest and greatest 
war of the Romans against the Gauls was that waged under 
the command of Caesar, for, in the ten years that he held 
command there, he fought with more than 4,000,000 bar- 
barians, taken all together. Of these 1,000,000 were capt- 
ured and as many more slain in battle. He reduced to 
subjection 400 tribes and more than 800 towns, which had 
either revolted from their allegiance or were conquered for 
the first time. Even before Marius, Fabius Maximus ^Emili- 
anus with a very small army killed 120,000 of them in one 
battle, losing only fifteen of his own men ; and he did this 
although suffering from a recent wound, urging and encourag- 
ing his troops and showing them how to fight barbarians, 
now borne on a litter and now hobbling on foot leaning on 
the arms of others. 

3. Caesar began his war against them by gaining a victory 
over some 200,000 of the Helvetii and Tigurini. The latter 
at an earlier period had captured a Roman army commanded 
by Piso and Cassius and sent them under the yoke, as is 
related in the writings of Paulus Claudius. The Tigurini 

696 were now overcome by Labienus, Caesar's lieutenant, and 58 
the others by Caesar himself, together with the Tricorii, who 
were aiding them. He also overcame the Germans under 
Ariovistus, a people who excelled all others, even the latgest 
men, in size ; savage, the bravest of the brave, despising 
death because they believe they shall live hereafter, bearing 
heat and cold with equal patience, living on herbs in time 
of scarcity, and their horses browsing on trees. It seems 
that they were without patient endurance in their battles, 
and did not fight in a scientific way or in any regular order, 
but with a sort of high spirit simply made an onset like wild 
beasts, for which reason they were overcome by Roman sci- 
ence and endurance. For, although the Germans made 

a tremendous rush and pushed the legions back a short 
distance, the Romans kept their ranks unbroken, and out- 
manoeuvred them, and eventually slew 80,000 of them. 

697 4. Afterwards Caesar fell upon the so-called Belgae as 57 
they were crossing a river, and killed so many of them that 
he crossed the stream on a bridge of their bodies. The 


V.R. B.C. 

697 Nervii defeated him by falling suddenly upon his array as it 57 
was getting itself into camp after a march. They made a 
very great slaughter, killing all of his tribunes and centu- 
rions. Caesar himself took refuge on a hill with his body- 
guard, and there he was surrounded by the enemy. The 
latter being assailed in the rear by the tenth legion were 
destroyed, although they were 60,000 in number. The 
Nervii were the descendants of the Cimbri and Teutones. 

699 Caesar conquered the Allobroges also. He slaughtered 55 
400,000 of the Usipetes and Tenchteri, armed and un- 
armed together. The Sicambri with 500 horse put to flight 
5000 of Caesar's horse, falling upon them unexpectedly. 
They subsequently paid the penalty for this in a defeat. 

5. Caesar was also the first of the Romans to cross the 
Rhine. He also passed over to Britain, an island larger 
than a very large continent, and still unknown to the men 
of Rome. He crossed by taking advantage of the move- 
ment of the tide. As it rose the fleet was impelled by the 
waves, slowly at first, then more rapidly, until finally Caesar 
was carried with great swiftness to Britain. 

II. From "The Embassies" 

364 In the 97th Olympiad, according to the Greek calendar, 390 
a considerable part of the Gauls who dwelt along the Rhine 
moved off" in search of new land, that which they occupied 
being insufficient for their numbers. Having scaled the 
Alps they fell upon the territory of Clusium, a fertile part 
of Etruria. The Clusians had made a league with the 
Romans not long before, and now applied to them for 
aid. So the three Fabii were sent with the Clusians as 
ambassadors to the Gauls to order them to vacate the coun- 
try that was in alliance with Rome, and to threaten them if 
they did not obey. The Gauls replied that they feared no 
mortal man in threat or war, that they were in need of land, 
and that they had not yet meddled with the affairs of the 
Romans. The Fabii urged the Clusians to make an attack 
upon the Gauls while they were heedlessly plundering the 
country. They took part in the expedition themselves and 
slew an immense number of the Gauls whom they caught 
foraging. Quintus Fabius, one of the Roman embassy, 


364 himself killed the chief of that band, stripped his body, and 390 
carried his arms back to Clusium. 

III. From the Same 

After the Fabii had slain this large number of Gauls, 
Brennus, their king, though he had refused to recognize the 
Roman embassy, for the purpose of intimidating the Ro- 
mans selected as ambassadors to them certain Gauls who 
exceeded all the others in bodily size as much as the Gauls 
exceeded other peoples, and sent them to Rome to com- 
plain that the Fabii, while serving as ambassadors, had 
joined in war against him, contrary to the law of nations. 
He demanded that they should be given up to him for pun- 
ishment unless the Romans wished to make the crime their 
own. The Romans acknowledged that the Fabii had done 
wrong, but having great respect for that distinguished family, 
they urged the Gauls to accept a pecuniary compensation 
from them. As the latter refused, they elected the Fabii 
military tribunes for that year, and then said to the Gallic 
ambassadors that they could not do anything to the Fabii 
now because they were now holding office, but told them to 
come again next year if they were still in a bad humor. 
Brennus and the Gauls under him considered this an insult 
and took it hard. Accordingly they sent around to the 
other Gauls asking them to make common cause of war 
with them. When a large number had collected in obedi- 
ence to this summons they broke camp and marched 
against Rome.^ 

IV. From Suidas 

365 He (Caedicius) promised to carry letters through the 389 
enemy's ranks to the Capitol. 

V, From Peiresc 

When Caedicius bore the decree of the Senate to Camillus, 
by which he was made consul, he exhorted him not to lay 
up against his country the injury it had done him. The 

* Livy, V. 36 seq• 


Y.R. BaC* 

365 latter, interrupting him, said : " I could not have prayed to 389 
the gods that the Romans might some time long for me if 
I had cherished any such feeling as that towards them. 
Now I pray the nobler prayer that I may render my country 
a service equal to the calamity that has befallen her." 

VI. From the Same 

AVhen the Gauls could find no means for scaling the 
Capitol they remained quietly in camp in order to reduce 
the defenders by famine. A certain priest named Dorso 
went down from the Capitol to make a certain yearly sacri- 
fice in the temple of Vesta, and passed safely, with the 
sacred utensils, through the ranks of the enemy, who were 
either awed by his courage or had respect for his piety and 
his venerable appearance. Thus he who had incurred dan- 
ger for the sake of his holy office was saved by it. That 
this event occurred, as related, the Roman writer Cassius 
tells us.^ 

VII. From SuroAS and Peiresc 

The Gauls filled themselves to repletion with wine and 
other luxuries, being intemperate by nature, and inhabiting 
a country which yielded only cereals, and was unfruitful and 
destitute of other productions. Thus their large bodies 
became delicate, distended with fatness, and heavy by rea- 
son of excessive eating and drinking, and quite incapable 
of running or hardship; and when any exertion was re- 
quired of them they speedily became exhausted by perspi- 
ration and shortness of breath. 

VIII. From SuroAS 

He (Camillus) showed them naked to the Romans and 
said : " These are the creatures who assail you with such 

^ This writer was L. Cassius Hemina, who lived about the beginning 
of the second century B.C. Schweighauser refers to two passages in 
Pliny's Natural History (xiii. 37, and xxix. i), where he is mentioned 
as one of the earliest Roman annalists; also to a passage in Aulus 
Gellius (xvii. 21), where his name appears. All the writings of Cassius 
Hemina have been lost except a few fragments preserved in the works 
of other authors. 


Y.R. B.C 

365 terrible shouts in battle, and clash their arms and shake 389 
their long swords and toss their hair. Behold their weak- 
ness of soul, their slothfulness and flabbiness of body, and 
gird yourselves to your work." 

IX. From the Same 

394 The people beheld the battle from the walls, and constantly 360 
sent fresh troops to take the place of the tired ones. But 
the tired Gauls having to engage with fresh opponents took 
to disorderly flight. 

X. From the Same 

40s The Gaul, furious and exhausted with loss of blood, 349 
pursued Valerius, hastening in order to grapple with him. As 
Valerius was all the time dodging just in front of him, the 
Gaul fell headlong. The Romans felicitated themselves on 
this second single combat with the Gauls. 

XI. From "The Embassies" 

47X The Senones, although they had a treaty with the Romans, 283 
nevertheless furnished mercenaries against them, wherefore 
the Senate sent an embassy to them to remonstrate against 
this infraction of the treaty. Britomaris, the Gaul, being 
incensed against them on account of his father, who had 
been killed by the Romans while fighting on the side of the 
Etruscans in this very war, slew the ambassadors while they 
held the caduceus in their hands, and wore the garments of 
their office. He then cut their bodies in small pieces and 
scattered them in the fields. The consul Cornelius, learning 
of this abominable deed while he was on the march, moved 
with great speed against the towns of the Senones by way of 
the Sabine country and Picenum, and ravaged them all with 
fire and sword. He reduced the women and children to 
slavery, killed all the adult males without exception, devas- 
tated the country in every possible way, and made it unin- 
habitable for anybody else. He carried off" Britomaris alone 
as a prisoner for torture. A little later the Senones (who were 
serving as mercenaries), having no longer any homes to re- 


Y.R. Β C 

471 turn to, fell boldly upon the consul Domitius, and being 383 
defeated by him killed themselves in despair. Such punish- 
ment was meted out to the Senones for their crime against 
the ambassadors.^ 

XII. From the Same 

633 The chiefs of the Salyi, a nation vanquished by the Romans, lax 
took refuge with the AUobroges. When the Romans asked 
for their surrender and it was refused, they made war on the 
AUobroges, under the leadership of Cnseus Domitius. When 
he was passing through the territory of the Salyi, an ambas- 
sador of Bituitus, king of the AUobroges, met him, arrayed 
magnificently and followed by attendants likewise arrayed, 
and also by dogs : for the barbarians of this region use dogs 
also as body-guards. A musician was in the train who sang 
in barbarous fashion the praises of King Bituitus, and then 
of the AUobroges, and then of the ambassador himself, cele- 
brating his birth, his bravery, and his wealth ; for which rea- 
son chiefly their illustrious ambassadors usually take such 
persons along with them. But this one, although he begged 
pardon for the chiefs of the Salyi, accomplished nothing. 

XIII. From the Same 

641 A numerous band of the Teutones bent on plunder in- 1x3 
vaded the territory of Noricum. The Roman consul, Papir- 
ius Carbo, fearing lest they should make an incursion into 
Italy, occupied the Alps at a place where the pass is narrow- 
est. As they made no attempt in this direction he attacked 
them, complaining that they had invaded the people of Nori- 
cum, who were foreign friends of the Romans. It was the 
practice of the Romans to make foreign friends of any people 
for whom they wanted to intervene on the score of friendship, 
without being obUged to defend them as aUies. As Carbo 
was approaching, the Teutones sent word to him that they 
had not known anything about this relationship between Rome 
and Noricum, and that for the future they would keep hands 
off. He praised the ambassadors, and gave them guides for 
their homeward journey, but privately charged the guides to 

^ Cf. Excerpt VI., Samnite History, supra. 


V.R. B.C. 

641 take them by a longer route. He himself then marched by 113 
a shorter one and fell unexpectedly upon the Teu tones, 
though they were still desisting from hostilities, but he suf- 
fered severely for his perfidy, and lost a large part of his 
army. He would probably have perished with his whole 
force had not darkness and a tremendous thunder-storm 
fallen upon them while the fight was in progress, separating 
the combatants and putting an end to the battle by sheer 
terror from heaven. Even as it was, the Romans fled in 
small bands through the woods and came together with dif- 
ficulty three days later. The Teutones passed into Gaul.^ 

XIV. From Suidas 

He ordered them to leave the bodies of the Cimbri in- 
tact till daylight because he believed they were adorned with 

XV. From "The Embassies" 

696 Two nations, the Tigurini and the Helvetii, made an in- 58 
cursion into the Roman province of Gaul. When Caesar 
heard of this movement he built a wall along the river Rhone 
about a hundred and fifty stades in length to intercept them. 
When they sent ambassadors to him to endeavor to make a 
treaty, he ordered them to give him hostages and money. 
They rephed that they were accustomed to receive these 
things, not to give them. As he wished to prevent them 
from forming a junction he sent Labienus against the Tigu- 
rini, who were the weaker, while he marched against the 
Helvetii, taking with him about 20,000 Gallic mountaineers. 
The work was easy to Labienus, who fell upon the Tigurini 
unawares on the river bank, defeated them, and scattered the 
greater part of them in disorderly flight.^ 

^ The Epitome of Livy (Ixiii.) assigns this victory to the Cimbri. 

2 Plutarch (^Life of Casar^ 18) agrees with Appian that the vic- 
tory over the Tigurini was won by Labienus. Caesar himself does not 
mention Labienus. He says that he himself marched about the third 
watch (midnight) and came upon the Tigurini on the bank of the 
river Arar, etc. (^Gallic War^ i. 12.) 


XVI. From the Same 

γ R Β C• 

69s Ariovistus, the king of the Germans beyond the Rhine, 59 
crossed to this side before Caesar's arrival and made war 
against the ^dui, who were friends of the Romans. But 
when the Romans commanded him to desist, he obeyed and 
moved away from ^dui and desired to be accounted a 
friend of the Roman people also, and this was granted, 
Caesar being consul and voting for it. 

XVII. From the Same 

Ariovistus, the king of the Germans, who had been voted 
a friend of the Roman people, came to Csesar to have a 
colloquy. After they had separated he wished to have an- 
other. Caesar refused it, but sent some of the leading men 
of the Gauls to meet him. Ariovistus cast them in chains, 
wherefore Caesar threatened him and made war on him, but 
fear fell upon the army on account of the military reputation 
of the Germans.^ 

XVIII. From the Same 

699 It is believed that the Usipetes and the Tenchteri, Ger- 55 
man tribes, with 800 of their own horse, put to flight about 
5000 of Caesar's horse. When they sent ambassadors to 
Caesar he held them as prisoners and made an attack on 
them, and took them so completely by surprise that 400,000 
of them were cut to pieces. One writer says that Cato in 
the Roman Senate proposed that Caesar should be surren- 
dered to the barbarians for this deed of blood perpetrated 
while negotiations were pending. But Caesar in his own diary 
says that when the Usipetes and Tenchteri were ordered 
to go back forthwith to their former homes, they replied 
that they had sent ambassadors to the Suevi, who had driven 
them away, and that they were waiting for their answer ; 
that while these negotiations were pending, they set upon 
his men with 800 of their horse, and by the suddenness 
of the attack put to flight his 5000 ; and that when they 
sent another embassy to explain this violation of good faith 

^ Cf. Caesar's Gallic War^ i. 42 seq. 


Υ•Κ• B«C• 

699 he suspected a similar deception, and made his attack before 55 
giving his answer.^ 

XIX. From Suidas 

Straightway they stirred up the Britons to violate the oath, 
complaining that while a treaty with them was in force the 
camp was still among them. 

XX. From the Same 

700 Caesar apprehending an attack on [Quintus] Cicero turned 54 

XXI. From the Vatican MSB. of Cardinal Mai 

Britores seduced the ^dui from their Roman allegiance. 
When Caesar reproached them for this, they said that an 
ancient alliance had the precedence. 

[Here follow two fragments of only three words each.] 

1 Caesar's Gallic War, iv. 1-5 ; Plutarch, Life ofCasar^ 22. The latter 
repeats Cato's proposal that Caesar should be surrendered to the barba- 
rians for his breach of faith. 

2 Caesar's Gallic fVar, v. 38 seg. 


I. From "The Embassies" 

Y.R. B.C 

502 Both Romans and Carthaginians were destitute of money ; 252 
and the Romans could no longer build ships, being exhausted 
by taxes, yet they levied foot soldiers and sent them to 
Africa and Sicily from year to year, while the Carthaginians 
sent an embassy to Ptolemy, the son of Ptolemy the son of 
Lagus, king of Egypt, seeking to borrow 2000 talents. He 
was on terms of friendship with both Romans and Cartha- 
ginians, and he sought to bring about peace between them. 
As he was not able to accomplish this, he said : " It be- 
hooves one to assist friends against enemies, but not against 
friends." ^ 

11. From the Same 

5xa I. When the Carthaginians had met with two disasters οηβ4« 
land at the same time, and two at sea where they had con- 
sidered themselves much the superior, and were already 
short of money, ships, and men, they sought an armistice 
from Lutatius and having obtained it sent an embassy to 
Rome to negotiate a treaty on certain limited conditions. 
With their own embassy they sent Atilius Regulus, the con- 
sul, who was their prisoner, to urge his countrymen to agree 
to the terms. When he came into the senate -chamber, clad 
as a prisoner in Punic garments, and the Carthaginian am- 
bassadors had retired, he exposed to the Senate the desper- 
ate state of Carthaginian affairs, and advised that either the 
war should be prosecuted vigorously, or that more satisfactory 

^ No other mention of this embassy, says Schweighauser, is found 
in any ancient writings that have come down to us. 



V.R. B.C. 

51a conditions of peace should be insisted on. For this reason, 242 
after he had returned voluntarily to Carthage, the Cartha- 
ginians put him to death by enclosing him in a standing 
posture in a box the planks of which were stuck full of iron 
spikes so that he could not possibly lie down. Nevertheless 
peace was made on conditions more satisfactory to the 

2. The conditions were these : All Roman prisoners and 
deserters held by the Carthaginians were to be delivered up ; 
Sicily and the small neighboring islands to be surrendered 
to the Romans; the Carthaginians not to initiate any war 
against Syracuse or its ruler, Hiero, nor to recruit merce- 
naries in any part of Italy; the Carthaginians to pay the 
Romans a war indemnity of 2000 Euboic talents in twenty 
years, in yearly instalments payable at Rome. The Euboic 
talent is equal to 7000 Alexandrine drachmas. So ended 
the first war between the Romans and the Carthaginians for 
the possession of Sicily, having lasted twenty- four years, in 
which the Romans lost 700 ships and the Carthaginians 500. 
In this way the chief part of Sicily (all of it that had been 
held by the Carthaginians) passed into the possession of the 
Romans. The latter levied tribute on the Sicilians, and 
apportioned certain naval charges among their towns, and 
sent a praetor each year to govern them. On the other hand 
Hiero, the ruler of Syracuse, who had cooperated with them 
in this war, was declared to be their friend and ally. 

3. When this war was ended the Gallic mercenaries de- 
manded of the Carthaginians the pay still due to them for 
their service in Sicily, together with the presents that Hamil- 
car had promised to give them. The African soldiers, al- 
though they were Carthaginian subjects, demanded the same 
things, on account of their service in Sicily, and this they 
did the more arrogantly as they saw that the Carthaginians 
were weakened and humbled ; they were angry also on 
account of the killing of 3000 of their own number whom 
the Carthaginians had crucified for deserting to the Romans. 
When the Carthaginians refused the demands of both Gauls 
and Africans, they joined together and seized the city of 
Tunis, and also Utica, the largest city in Africa after Car- 
thage. Starting thence they detached the rest of Africa, 
and brought over to their side some Numidians, and re- 



V.R. B.C. 

siaceived into their ranks a vast number of fugitive slaves, 242 
and pillaged the Carthaginian possessions in every direc- 
tion. Being pressed by enemies on all sides the Cartha- 
ginians appealed to the Romans for aid against the Africans. 
The Romans did not send them a military force, but allowed 
them to draw supplies from Italy and Sicily, and to recruit 
mercenaries in Italy for this war only. They also sent depu- 
ties to Africa to arrange peace if they could, but they re- 
turned without accomplishing anything. The Carthaginians 
prosecuted the war vigorously. 

III. From Peiresc 

540 Hippocrates and Epicydes, two brothers, were generals 2x4 
of the Syracusans. They had been for a long time incensed 
against the Romans, and when they could not stir up their 
fellow-countrymen to war, they went over to the Leontines, 
who had some differences with the Syracusans. They 
accused their own countrymen of renewing a separate 
league with the Romans, although Hiero had made one to 
include the whole of Sicily. The Leontines were much 
stirred up by this. The Syracusans made proclamation that 
if anybody would bring them the head of Hippocrates or of 
Epicydes, they would give him its weight in gold. But the 
Leontines chose Hippocrates as their general. ^ 

IV. From the Same 

542 The Sicilians, who had been for a long time embittered 212 
against the Roman general Marcellus, on account of his 
severity, were still more excited against him because he had 
gained entrance to Syracuse by treachery. For this reason 
they joined themselves to Hippocrates, and took an oath 
together that none of them would make peace without the 
others, and sent him supplies and an army of 20,000 foot 
and 5000 horse. ^ 

V. From the Same 

Marcellus was in such bad odor that nobody would trust 
him except under oath, for which reason, when the Tauro- 

1 Cf. Livy, xxiv. 29. 2 cf^ Livy, xxvi. 30. 


Υ•Κ• B.C. 

542 menians gave themselves up to him, he made an agreement 212 
and confirmed it with an oath, that he would not station any 
guard in their city nor require the inhabitants to serve as 

VI. From "The Embassies" 

680 I. The island of Crete seemed to be favorably disposed 74 
towards Mithridates, king of Pontus, from the beginning, 
and it was said that they furnished him mercenaries when he 
was at war with the Romans. It is believed also that they 
recommended to the favor of Mithridates the pirates who 
then infested the sea, and openly assisted them when they 
were pursued by Marcus Antonius. When Antonius sent 
legates to them on this subject, they made light of the 
matter and gave him a disdainful answer. Antonius forth- 
with made war against them, and although he did not 
accomplish much, he gained the title of Creticus for his 
work. He was the father of the Mark Antony who, at a later 
period, fought against Octavius Csesar at Actium. When the 
Romans declared war against the Cretans, on account of these 
things, the latter sent an embassy to Rome to treat for peace. 
The Romans ordered them to surrender Lasthenes, the author 
of the war against Antonius, and to deliver up all their pirate 
ships and all the Roman prisoners in their hands, together 
with 300 hostages, and to pay 4000 talents of silver. 

68s 2. As the Cretans would not accept these conditions, 69 
Metellus was chosen as the general against them. He 
gained a victory over Lasthenes at Cydonia. The latter fled 
to Gnossus, and Panares delivered over Cydonia to Metellus 
on condition of his own safety. While Metellus was besieg- 
ing Gnossus, Lasthenes set fire to his own house there, 
which was full of money, and fled from the place. Then 
the Cretans sent word to Pompey the Great, who was con- 
ducting the war against the pirates, and against Mithridates, 
that if he would come they would surrender themselves to 
him. As he was then busy with other things, he commanded 
Metellus to withdraw from the island, as it was not seemly to 
continue a war against those who offered to give themselves 
up, and he said that he would come to receive the surrender 
of the island later. Metellus paid no attention to this order, 
but pushed on the war until the island was subdued^ making 


Y.R. B.C 

685 the same terms with Lasthenes as he had made with Panares. 69 
Metellus was awarded a triumph and the title of Creticus 
with more justice than Antonius, for he actually subjugated 
the island.* 

VII. From Peiresc 

692 The patrician Clodius, surnamed Pulcher, which means 63 
handsome, was in love with Caesar's wife. He arrayed 
himself in woman's clothes from head to foot, being still 
without a beard, and gained admission to Caesar's house as a 
woman in the night, at a time when the mysteries [of the 
Bona Dea] were celebrated, to which only women were 
admitted. Having lost his guide, and being detected by 
others by the sound of his voice, he was hustled out.^ 

1 Cf. Floras, iii. 7. 

2 This was one of the important events in Roman history, both 
in its consequences and as showing the rottenness of society at the 
time. The presence of Clodius at the festival of the Bona Dea (the 
Good Goddess) was sacrilege of the deepest dye, and as religion was 
the foundation of Roman law and life, the culprit must needs be 
punished. Both Cicero and Hortensius took part in the prosecution. 
A bill for his trial was brought before the Senate. It provided that the 
jury of fifty-six persons should be appointed by the praetor. The tribune 
Fufius proposed that they should be chosen by lot. As there was no 
room for dispute about the facts, the only question being whether 
Clodius was there or not, Hortensius accepted the amendment of 
Fufius, being constrained to do so by the fact that Fufius had the power 
to veto the bill and stop the proceedings altogether. Hortensius, in 
his confidence, said that he could cut the throat of Clodius with a leaden 
sword. The jurors were selected by lot. They were bribed with 
money advanced by Crassus. Thirty-one voted for acquittal and 
twenty-five for conviction. The whole affair is described in two of 
Cicero's letters to Atticus (i. 14, 16). "You ask," he says, "what is 
the state of public affairs and of my own. That constitution of the 
republic which you thought had been confirmed by my counsels [by 
the overthrow of Catiline's conspiracy], and which I thought had been 
confirmed by Divine Providence, — which seemed to be fixed and 
founded on the union of all good men and the authority of my consul- 
ship, — has, you may be sure, unless some god takes pity on us, slipped 
from our hands by this single verdict ; if it can be called a verdict that 
thirty men, the basest and most worthless of the Roman people, bought 
with money, should subvert all law and justice, and that Talna and 
Plautus and Spongia and other riff-raff of that sort should decide that a 
thing was not done, which not only all men but even cattle know was 
done." The only person who really suffered in consequence of the trial 
of Clodius was Cicero himself. See Civil fVars, ii. 14, 15, infra. 


Chapter I 

Boundaries of Spain — King Arganthonius — Early Carthaginian 
Occupation — Hamilcar Barca — His Death 

1. The Pyrenees mountains extend from the Tyrrhenian 
sea to the Northern ocean. The eastern part is inhabited 
by Celts, otherwise called Galatians, and more lately Gauls. 
From this part westward, beginning at the Tyrrhenian sea 
and making a circuit by way of the Pillars of Hercules to 
the Northern ocean, the Iberians and Celtiberians dwell. 
Thus the whole of Iberia is sea-girt, except the part em- 
braced by the Pyrenees, the largest and perhaps the most 
precipitous mountains in Europe. In coasting they follow 
the Tyrrhenian sea as far as the Pillars of Hercules. They 
do not traverse the Western and Northern ocean, except 

, in crossing over to Britain, and this they accomplish by 
J availing themselves of the tide, as it is only half a day's 
journey.^ For the rest, neither the Romans nor any of the 
subject peoples navigate that ocean. The size of Iberia 
(now called Hispania by some) is almost incredible for a 
single country. Its breadth is reckoned at ten thousand 
stades, and its length is equal to its breadth. Many nations 
of various names inhabit it, and many navigable rivers flow 
through it. 

2. What nations occupied it first, and who came after 
them, it is not very important for me to inquire, in writing 

^ This is a bad blunder in geography, but no worse than that of 
Caesar, who places Spain to the west of Britain (^Gallic War, v. 13). 
Tacitus repeats this error (^AgricoUtf 10). 


§ 1-3] THE WARS IN SPAIN 49 

merely Roman history. However, I think that the Celts, 
passing over the Pyrenees at some former time, mingled 
with the natives, and that the name Celtiberia originated in 
that way. I think also that from an early time the Phoe- 
nicians frequented Spain for purposes of trade, and occu- 
pied certain places there. In like manner the Greeks 
visited Tartessus and its king Arganthonius,^ and some of 
them settled in Spain ; for the kingdom of Arganthonius was 
in Spain. It is my opinion that Tartessus was then the 
city on the seashore which is now called Carpessus. I 
think also that the Phoenicians built the temple of Hercules 
which stands at the straits. The religious rites performed 
there are still of Phoenician type, and the god is considered 
by the worshippers the Tyrian, not the Theban, Hercules. 
But I will leave these matters to the antiquaries. 

3. This fruitful land, abounding in all good things, the 
Carthaginians began to exploit before the Romans. A part 
of it they occupied and another part they plundered, until 
the Romans expelled them from the part they held, and 
immediately occupied it themselves. The remainder the 
Romans acquired with much toil, extending over a long 
period of time, and in spite of frequent revolts they eventu- 
ally subdued it and divided it into three parts and appointed 
a prsetor over each. How they subdued each one, and how 
they contended with the Carthaginians for the possession of 
them, and afterwards with the Iberians and Celtiberians, 
this book will show, the first part containing matters relating 
to the Carthaginians, since it was necessary for me to intro- 
duce their relations with Spain in my Spanish history. For 
the same reason the doings of the Romans and Carthagin- 
ians in respect to Sicily from the beginning of the Roman 
invasion and rule of that island are embraced in the Sicil- 
ian history. 

1 Herodotus (i. 163) mentions the visit of the Phocaeans (who 
were driven from their own country by Harpagus, the Persian general) 
to Tartessus and its king Arganthonius. Strabo (iii. 2, 1 1-14) men- 
tions both, and quotes from Anacreon concerning the king, who is 
said to have "reigned over Tartessus 150 years." Herodotus says 
that he reigned 80 years and lived to be 120. Several other ancient 
authors mention Arganthonius, but all seem to rely upon Herodotus 
and Anacreon. 

VOL. I — Ε 


Y.R. B.C 

4. The first external wax waged by the Romans against 
the Carthaginians in reference to Sicily was waged in Sicily 
itself. In like manner the first one conceniing Spain was 
waged in Spain, although in the course of it the combatants 
sent large forces into, and devastated, both Italy and Africa. 

536 This war began about the 140th Olympiad by the infraction ai8 
of a treaty which had been made at the end of the Sicilian 
war. The infraction came about in this way. Hamilcar, 
sumamed Barca, while commanding the Carthaginian forces 
in Sicily, had promised large rewards to his Celtic merce- 
naries and African allies, which they demanded after he 
returned to Africa; and thereupon the African war was 
kindled. In this war the Carthaginians suffered severely at 
the hands of the Africans, and they ceded Sardinia to the 
Romans as compensation for injuries they had inflicted upon 
Roman merchants during this war. When Hamilcar was 
brought to trial for these things by his enemies, who held 
him to blame for such serious calamities to the country, he 
secured the favor of the chief men in the state (of whom 
the most popular was Hasdrubal, who had married Barca*s 
daughter), by which means he escaped punishment; and as 
a disturbance with the Numidians broke out about this time, 
he secured the command of the Carthaginian forces in con- 
junction with Hanno the Great, although he had not yet 
rendered an account of his former generalship. 

516 5. At the end of this war, Hanno was recalled to answer 238 
certain charges against him in Carthage, and Hamilcar was 
left in sole command of the army. He associated his son- 
in-law Hasdrubal with him, crossed the straits to Gades and 
began to plunder the territory of the Spaniards, although 
they had done him no wrong. Thus he made for himself an 
occasion for being away fi*om home, and also for performing 
exploits and acquiring popularity. For whatever property 
he took he divided, giving one part to the soldiers, to stim- 
ulate their zeal for future plundering with him. Another 
part he sent to the treasury of Carthage, and a third he 
distributed to the chiefs of his own faction there. This 

525 continued until certain Spanish kings and other chieftains 229 
gradually united and put him to death in the following 
manner. They loaded a lot of wagons with wood and 
drove them in advance with oxen, they following behind 

§ 4-7] Ί'ΗΕ WARS IN SPAIN 5 1 

Y.R. Β C 

525 prepared for battle. When the Africans saw this they fell 229 
to laughing, not perceiving the stratagem. When they 
came to close quarters the Spaniards set fire to the wagons 
and drove the oxen against the enemy. The fire, being 
carried in every direction by the fleeing oxen, threw the 
Africans into confusion. Their ranks being thus broken 
the Spaniards dashed among them and killed Hamilcar 
himself and a great many others who came to his aid. 

Chapter II 

Hasdrubal succeeds Hamilcar — Rise of Hannibal — He attacks 
Saguntum — The Saguntines appeal to Rome 

6. The Carthaginians, enjoying the gains they had re- 
ceived from Spain, sent another army thither and appointed 
Hasdrubal, the son-in-law of Hamilcar, who was still in 
Spain, commander of all their forces there. He had with 
him in Spain Hannibal, the son of Hamilcar and brother of 
his own wife, a young man zealous in war, beloved by the 
army, and who soon after became famous for his military 
exploits. Him he appointed lieutenant-general. Hasdrubal 
brought many Spanish tribes to his support by persuasion, 
for he was attractive in personal intercourse, and where force 
was needed he made use of the young man. In this way 
he pushed forward from the Western ocean to the interior 
as far as the river Iberus (Ebro), which divides Spain about 
in the centre, and at a distance of about five days' journey 
from the Pyrenees flows down to the Northern ocean.^ 

7. The Saguntines, a colony of the island of Zacynthus, 
who lived about midway between the Pyrenees and the 
river Iberus,^ and other Greeks who dwelt in the neighbor- 
hood of Emporia and other Spanish towns, having appre- 
hensions for their safety, sent ambassadors to Rome. The 
Senate, who were unwilling to see the Carthaginian power 
augmented, sent an embassy to Carthage. It was agreed 

^ Another blunder in geography. The Ebro empties into the Medi- 

2 Another mistake. Saguntum was situated a long distance south- 
west of the Ebro. 


Υ•Κ. B.C. 

525 between them that the limit of the Carthaginian power in 229 
Spain should be the river Iberus; that beyond that river 
the Romans should not carry war against the subjects of 
Carthage, nor should the Carthaginians cross it for a similar 
purpose ; and that the Saguntines and the other Greeks in 
Spain should remain free and autonomous. So these agree- 
ments were added to the treaties between Rome and Car- 

534 8. Some time later, while Hasdrubal was governing that 230 
part of Spain belonging to Carthage, a slave whose master 
he had cruelly put to death killed him secretly in a hunting 
expedition. Hannibal convicted him of this crime and put 
him to death with dreadful tortures. Now the army pro- 
claimed Hannibal, although still very young, yet greatly 
beloved by the soldiers, their general, and the Carthaginian 
Senate confirmed the appointment. Those of the opposite 
faction, who had feared the power of Hamilcar and Hasdru- 
bal, when they learned of their death, despised Hannibal on 
account of his youth and prosecuted their friends and parti- 
sans with the old charges. The people took sides with the 
accusers, bearing a grudge against those now prosecuted, 
because they remembered the old severities of the times of 
Hamilcar and Hasdrubal, and ordered them to turn into the 
public treasury the large gifts that Hamilcar and Hasdrubal 
had bestowed upon them, as being enemy's spoils. The 
prosecuted parties sent messengers to Hannibal asking him 
to assist them, and admonished him that, if he should neglect 
those who were able to assist him at home, he would be 
thoroughly despised by his father's enemies. 

9. He had foreseen all this and he knew that the perse- 
cution of his friends was the beginning of a plot against 
himself. He determined that he would not endure this en- 
mity as a perpetual menace, as his father and brother-in-law 
had done, nor put up forever with the fickleness of the Car- 
thaginians, who usually repaid benefits with ingratitude. It 
was said also that when he was a boy he had taken an oath 
upon the altar, at his father's instance, that when he should 
arrive at man's estate he would be the implacable enemy of 
Rome. For these reasons he thought that, if he could in- 
volve his country in arduous and protracted undertakings 
and plunge it into doubts and fears, he would place his own 

§8-11] THE WARS IN SPAIN 53 

Y.R. B.C 

534 affairs and those of his friends in a secure position. Heaao 
beheld Africa, however, and the subject parts of Spain in 
peace. But if he could stir up a war with Rome, which he 
strongly desired, he thought that the Carthaginians would 
have enough to think about and to be afraid of, and that if 
he should be successful, he would reap immortal glory by 
gaining for his country the government of the habitable 
world (for when the Romans were conquered there would 
be no other rivals), and if he should fail, the attempt itself 
would bring him great renown. 

10. Conceiving that if he should cross the Iberus that 
would constitute a brilliant beginning, he suborned the Tur- 
buletes, neighbors of the Saguntines, that they should com- 
plain to him that the latter were overrunning their country 
and doing them many other wrongs. They made this com- 
plaint. Then Hannibal sent their ambassadors to Carthage, 
and wrote private letters saying that the Romans were incit- 
ing Carthaginian Spain to revolt, and that the Saguntines 
were cooperating with the Romans for this purpose. Nor 
did he desist from this deception, but kept sending messages 
of this kind until the Carthaginian Senate authorized him 
to deal with the Saguntines as he saw fit. Since he had a 
pretext, he arranged that the Turbuletes should come again 
to make complaints against the Saguntines, and that the 
latter should send legates also. When Hannibal commanded 
them to explain their differences to him, they replied that 
they should refer the matter to Rome. Hannibal thereupon 

535 ordered them out of his camp, and the next night crossed 3x9 
the Iberus with his whole army, laid waste the Saguntine 
territory, and planted engines against their city. Not being 
able to take it, he surrounded it with a wall and ditch, 
stationed plenty of guards, and pushed the siege at intervals. 

11. The Saguntines, oppressed by this sudden and un- 
heralded attack, sent an embassy to Rome. The Senate 
commissioned its own ambassadors to go with them. They 
were instructed first to remind Hannibal of the agreement, 
and if he should not obey to proceed to Carthage and com- 
plain against him. When they arrived in Spain and were 
approaching his camp from the sea, Hannibal forbade their 
coming. Accordingly they sailed for Carthage with the 
Saguntine ambassadors, and reminded the Carthaginians of 



535 the agreement. The latter accused the Saguntines of com- 219 
mitting many wrongs on their subjects. When the Sagun- 
tines offered to submit the whole question to the Romans as 
arbitrators, the Carthaginians replied that there was no use 
of an arbitration because they were able to avenge them- 
selves. When this reply was brought to Rome some advised 
sending aid to the Saguntines. Others favored delay, saying 
that the Saguntines were not inscribed as allies in the agree- 
ment with them, but merely as free and autonomous, and 
that they were still free although besieged. The latter opin- 
ion prevailed. 

12. The Saguntines, when they despaired of help from 
Rome, and when famine weighed heavily upon them, and 
Hannibal kept up the siege without intermission (for he 
had heard that the city was very prosperous and wealthy, 
and for this reason relaxed not the siege), issued an edict 
to bring all the silver and gold, public and private, to the 
forum, where they melted it with lead and brass, so that it 
should be useless to Hannibal. Then, thinking that it was 
better to die fighting than starve to death, they made a sally 
by night upon the besiegers while they were asleep and not 
expecting an attack, and killed some as they were getting 
out of bed, others as they were clumsily arming themselves, 
and still others who were actually fighting. The battle con- 
tinued until many of the Africans and all the Saguntines 
were slain. When the women witnessed the slaughter of 
their husbands from the walls, some of them threw them- 
selves from the housetops, others hanged themselves, and 
others slew their children and then themselves. Such was 
the end of Saguntum, once a great and powerful city. When 
Hannibal learned what had been done with the gold he was 
angry, and put all the surviving adults to death with torture. 
Observing that the city was not far from Carthage and with 
good land about it situated on the sea, he rebuilt it and 
made it a Carthaginian colony, and I think it is now called 
Spartarian Carthage.^ 

^ ην νυν όϊμαι Καρχηδόνα κα\€Ϊσθαι τ^ν 'Zirapraycv'/iv. This sentence 
has given rise to many conjectures as to the significance of the word 
" Spartagena." Sch weigh auser, relying on a passage in Strabo (iii. 
iv. 10), which speaks of " the Spartarian plain " near New Carthage (the 
present Carthagena) concludes that the word ILvaprayevfiv is another 

$ 12-14] THE WARS IN SPAIN 55 

Chapter III 

War declared — The Two Scipios — Their Defeat and Death 

V.R. B.C 

536 13. The Romans now sent ambassadors to Carthage to 218 
demand that Hannibal should be delivered up to them as 
a violator of the treaty unless they wished to assume the 
responsibility. If they would not give him up, war was to 
be declared forthwith. The ambassadors obeyed their in- 
structions, and when the Carthaginians refused to give up 
Hannibal they declared war. It is said that it was done in 
the following manner. The chief of the embassy, pointing 
to the fold of his toga and smiling, said : " Here, Cartha- 
ginians, I bring you peace or war, you may take whichever 
you choose." The latter replied : "You may give us which- 
ever you like." When the Romans offered war they all 
cried out : " We accept it." Then they wrote at once to 
Hannibal that he was free to overrun all Spain, as the treaty 
was at an end. Accordingly he marched against all the 
neighboring tribes and brought them under subjection, per- 
suading some, terrifying others, and subduing the rest. Then 
he collected a large army, telling nobody what it was for, 
but intending to hurl it against Italy. He also sent out 
ambassadors among the Gauls, and caused an examination 
to be made of the passes of the Alps, which he traversed 
later, leaving his brother Hasdmbal in command in Spain. 

14. When the Romans saw that war must be waged 
against the Carthaginians in Spain and Africa (for they never 
dreamed of an incursion of Africans into Italy), they sent 
Tiberius Sempronius Longus with 160 ships and two legions 
into Africa. What Longus and the other Roman generals 
did in Africa has been related in my Punic history.^ They 
also ordered Publius Cornelius Scipio to Spain with sixty 

Greek form of the word used by Strabo. A Spartarian plain means a 
plain covered with the fibrous plant spartutn — the Esparto grass of 
modern commerce. 

1 No doings of Sempronius Longus in Africa are related in Appian's 
Punic history as it has reached us, or in any other history, so far as my 
knowledge extends. The consul Sempronius was carrying on war 
against the Carthaginians in Sicily at the time here mentioned. See 
Livy, xxii. 49 seq. 


Y.R. B.C. 

536 ships, 10,000 foot, and 700 horse, and sent his brother 218 
Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio with him as a legate. The former 
(Publius), learning from Massilian merchants that Hannibal 
had crossed the Alps and entered Italy, and fearing lest he 
should fall upon the Italians unawares, turned over to his 
brother the command in Spain and sailed with his quin- 
queremes to Etruria. What he and the other Roman gen- 
erals after him did in Italy, until, at the end of sixteen years 
and with exceeding difficulty, they drove Hannibal out of 
the country, will be shown in the following book, which will 
contain all the exploits of Hannibal in Italy, and is called 
the HannibaUc book of Roman history. 

15. Gnaeus did nothing in Spain worthy of mention be- 
fore his brother Pubhus returned thither. When the latter's 
term of office expired, the Romans, having despatched the 
new consuls against Hannibal in Italy, appointed him pro- 
consul, and sent him again into Spain. From this time the 
two Scipios managed the war in Spain, Hasdrubal being the 
general opposed to them until the Carthaginians recalled 
him and a part of his army to ward off an attack of Syphax, 
the ruler of the Numidians. The Scipios easily overcame 
the remainder. Many towns also came over to them volun- 
tarily, for they were as persuasive in inducing subjects as in 
leading armies. 

16. The Carthaginians, having made peace with Syphax, 
again sent Hasdrubal into Spain with a larger army than 
before, and with thirty elephants. With him came also two 
other generals, Mago and another Hasdrubal, the son of 
Gisco. After this the war became more serious to the 
Scipios. They were successful, nevertheless, and many Afri- 
cans and elephants were destroyed by them. Finally, winter 
coming on, the Africans went into winter quarters at Turdi- 
tania, Gnaeus Scipio at Orso, and Publius at Castolo. When 
news was brought to the latter that Hasdrubal was approach- 
ing, he saUied out from the city with a small force to re- 
connoitre the enemy's camp and came upon Hasdrubal 
unexpectedly. He and his whole force were surrounded by 

548 the enemy's horse and killed. Gnaeus, who knew nothing «" 
of this, sent some soldiers to his brother to procure corn, 
who fell in with another African force and became engaged 
with them. When Gnaeus learned this he started out, with 


V.K. B,C. 

542 such troops as he had under arms, to assist them. The aw 
Carthaginians who had cut off the former party made a 
charge on Gnaeus, and compelled him to take refuge in a 
certain tower, which they set on fire, and burned him and 
his comrades to death. 

17. In this way the two Scipios perished, excellent men 
in every respect, and greatly regretted by those Spaniards 
who, by their labors, had been brought over to the Roman 
side. When the news reached Rome the people were greatly 
troubled. They sent Marcellus, who had lately come from 
Sicily, and with him Claudius [Nero], to Spain, with a fleet and 
1000 horse, 10,000 foot, and sufficient means. As nothing 
of importance was accomplished by them, the Carthaginian 
power increased until it embraced almost the whole of 
Spain, and the Romans were restricted to a small space in 
the Pyrenees mountains. When this was learned in Rome 
the people were greatly discouraged, and apprehensive lest 
these same Africans should make an incursion into northern 
Italy while Hannibal was ravaging the other extremity. 
Although they desired to abandon the Spanish war it was 
not possible, because of the fear that that war would be 
transferred to Italy. 

Chapter IV 

Cornelius Scipio — Arrives in Spain — Attacks New Carthage — 
Captures the City and Vast Booty 

543 18. Accordingly a day was fixed for choosing a general 
for Spain. When nobody offered himself the alarm was 
greatly augmented, and a gloomy silence took possession 
of the assembly. Finally Cornelius Scipio, son of that Pub- 
lius Cornelius who had lost his life in Spain, still a very 
young man (for he was only twenty-four years of age), but 
reputed to be discreet and high-minded, advanced and made 
an impressive discourse concerning his father and his uncle, 
and after lamenting their fate said that he was the only 
member of the family left to be the avenger of them and of 
his country. He spoke copiously and vehemently, like one 
possessed, promising to subdue not only Spain, but Africa 
and Carthage in addition. To many this seemed like you th- 



543 ful boasting, but he revived the spirits of the people (for an 
those who are cast down are cheered by promises), and was 
chosen general for Spain in the expectation that he would 
do something worthy of his high spirit. The older ones 
said that this was not high spirit, but foolhardiness. When 
Scipio heard of this he called the assembly together again, 
and repeated what he had said before, declaring that his 
youth would be no impediment, but he added that if any of 
his elders wished to assume the task he would willingly yield 

it to them. When nobody offered to take it, he was praised 
and admired still more, and he set forth with 10,000 foot 
and 500 horse. He was not allowed to take a larger force 
while Hannibal was ravaging Italy. He received money and 
apparatus of various kinds and twenty-eight war-ships with 
which he proceeded to Spain. 

544 19. Taking the forces already there, and joining them in 210 
one body with those he brought, he performed a lustration, 
and made the same kind of grandiloquent speech to them 
that he had made at Rome. The report spread immediately 
through all Spain, wearied of the Carthaginian rule and long- 
ing for the virtue of the Scipios, that Scipio the son of Scipio 
had been sent to them as a general, by divine providence. 
When he heard of this report he took care to give out that 
everything he did was by inspiration from heaven. He 
learned that the enemy were quartered in four camps at con- 
siderable distances from each other, containing altogether 
25,000 foot and above 2500 horse, and that they kept their 
supplies of money, food, arms, missiles, and ships, besides 
prisoners and hostages from all Spain, at the city formerly 
called Saguntum (but then called Carthage),^ and that it was 

in charge of Mago with 10,000 Carthaginian soldiers. He 
decided to attack these first, on account of the smallness of 
the force and the great quantity of stores, and because he 
believed that this city, with its silver-mines and its rich and 
prosperous territory abounding in everything, and its very 
short passage to Africa, would constitute a secure base of 
operations by land and sea against the whole of Spain. 
20. Excited with these thoughts and communicating his 

* Another error in Appian's geography. Saguntum was not the site 
of New Carthage. 

§ 19-21] THE WARS IN SPAIN 59 

y.R. B.C 

544 intentions to no one, he led his army out at sunset and azo 
marched the whole night toward New Carthage. Arriving 
there the next morning he took the enemy by surprise and 
began to enclose the town with trenches and planned to open 
the siege the following day, placing ladders and engines 
everywhere except at one place where the wall was lowest 
and where, as it was encompassed by a lagoon and the sea, 
the guards were careless. Having charged the machines with 
stones and darts in the night, and stationed his fleet in the 
harbor so that the enemy's ships might not escape (for he 
had high hopes of capturing everything the city contained), 
at daylight he manned the engines, ordering some of his 
troops to assail the enemy above, while others propelled the 
engines against the walls below. Mago stationed his 10,000 
men at the gates, some to sally out at a favorable opportunity 
with swords alone (since spears would be of no use in such 
a narrow space), and others to man the parapets. He made 
good use of his machines, stones, darts, and catapults, and 
did effective work. There was shouting and cheering on 
both sides, and neither was wanting in dash and courage. 
Stones, darts, and javelins filled the air, some thrown by hand, 
some by machines, and some by slings ; and whatever other 
apparatus or force was available was made use of to the ut- 

21. Scipio suffered severely. The 10,000 Carthaginians 
who were at the gates made sallies with drawn swords and 
fell upon those who were working the engines. Although 
they fought bravely, they suffered in their turn no less, until 
finally the perseverance and endurance of the Romans be- 
gan to prevail. With the change of fortune, those who were 
on the walls began to be distressed. When the ladders were 
put in place, the Carthaginian swordsmen, who had sallied out, 
ran back through the gates, closed them, and mounted the 
walls. This gave new and severe labor to the Romans. 
Scipio, who, as commanding general, was everywhere, giving 
orders and cheering on his men, had noticed that, at the 
place where the wall was low and washed by the lagoon, the 
sea retired about midday. That was the daily ebb tide, for 
at one time of day the waves were up to one's breast ; at 
another they were not knee high. When Scipio observed 
this, after ascertaining the nature of the tidal movement and 


Υ•Κ* B>C• 

544 that it would be low water for the rest of the day, he darted 210 
hither and thither, exclaiming : " Now, soldiers, now is our 
chance. Now the deity comes to my aid. Attack that part 
of the wall where the sea has made way for us. Bring the 
ladders. I will lead you." 

22. He was the first to seize a ladder and carry it into the 
lagoon, and he began to mount where nobody else had yet 
attempted to do so. But his armor-bearers and other sol- 
diers surrounded him and held him back, while they brought 
a great number of ladders together, planted them against the 
wall, and began to mount. Amid shouts and clamor on all 
sides, giving and receiving blows, the Romans finally pre- 
vailed and succeeded in occupying some of the towers, 
where Scipio placed trumpeters and ordered them to sound 
a blast as though the city were already taken. This brought 
others to their assistance and created consternation among 
the enemy. Some of the Romans jumped down and opened 
the gates to Scipio, who rushed in with his army. Some 
of the inhabitants took refuge in their houses, but Mago drew 
up his 10,000 in the market-place. After most of these were 
cut down he fled with the remainder to the citadel, which 
Scipio immediately invested. When Mago saw that he could 
do nothing with his beaten and cowering force, he sur- 

23. Having taken this rich and powerful city by audacity 
and good fortune in one day (the fourth after his arrival), 
he was greatly elated and it seemed more than ever that he 
was divinely inspired. He began to think so himself and 
to give it out to others, not only then, but all the rest of 
his life. At all events, he frequently went into the Capitol 
alone and closed the doors as though he were receiving 
counsel from the god. Even now in public processions they 
bring the image of Scipio alone out of the Capitol, all the 
others being taken from the Forum. In the captured city 
he obtained great stores of goods, useful in peace and war, 
many arms, darts, engines, dockyards containing thirty- 
three war-ships, corn, and provisions of various kinds, ivory, 
gold, and silver, some in the form of plate, some coined and 
some uncoined, also Spanish hostages and prisoners, and 
everything that had previously been captured from the 
Romans themselves. On the following day he sacrificed to 

§ 22-24] THE WARS IN SPAIN 6 1 

Y.R. B.C. 

544 the gods, celebrated the victory, praised the soldiers for their 210 
bravery, and after his words to his army made a speech to 
the townspeople in which he admonished them not to forget 
the name of the Scipios. He dismissed all the Spanish 
prisoners to their homes in order to conciliate the towns. 
He gave rewards to his soldiers for bravery, the largest to 
the one who first scaled the wall, half as much to the next, 
one-third as much to the next, and to the others according 
to their merit. The rest of the gold, silver, and ivory he 
sent to Rome in the captured ships. The city held a three 
days' thanksgiving, because after so many trials their an- 
cestral good fortune had shown itself once more. All Spain, 
and the Carthaginians who were there, were astounded at 
the magnitude and suddenness of this exploit. 

Chapter V 

Scipio marches against the Two Hasdrubals — Battle of Carmone 

24. Scipio placed a garrison in New Carthage and orr 
dered that the wall which was washed by the tide should be 
raised to the proper height. He then moved against the 
rest of Spain, sending friends to conciliate where he could, 
and subduing the others. There were two Carthaginian 
generals still remaining, both named Hasdrubal. One of 
these, the son of Hamilcar, was recruiting an army of mer- 
cenaries far away among the Celtiberians. The other, the 
son of Cisco, sent messengers to the towns that were still 
faithful, urging them to maintain their Carthaginian alle- 
giance, because an army of countless numbers would soon 
come to their assistance. He sent another Mago ^ into the 
neighboring country to recruit mercenaries wherever he 
could, while he made an incursion into the territory of Lersa 
which had revolted, intending to lay siege to some town 
there. On the approach of Scipio he retreated to Baetica 
and encamped before that city.^ On the following day he 

1 Μάγωι^α δ* ^repov. " Another Mago," i.e., not the one who was 
captured by Scipio in New Carthage, but the one mentioned in sec. 16, 

2 There was a province, but no city of the name of Baetica in Spain. 
Schweighauser has a very long note on this passage, which need not 
be recapitulated, since it leaves us as much in the dark as before. 


Y.R. B.C. 

544 was defeated by Scipio, who captured his camp and Bsetica 210 

547 25. Now this Hasdrubal ordered all the remaining Car- 207 
thaginian forces in Spain to be collected at the city of 
Carmone to fight Scipio with their united strength. Hither 
came a great number of Spaniards under the lead of Mago, 
and of Numidians under Masinissa. Hasdrubal had the 
infantry in a fortified camp, Masinissa and Mago, who com- 
manded the cavalry, bivouacking in front of it. Scipio 
divided his own horse so that Laelius should attack Mago 
while he himself should be opposed to Masinissa. This 
fight was for some time doubtful and severe to Scipio, since 
the Numidians discharged their darts at his men, then sud- 
denly retreated, and then wheeled and returned to the 
charge. But when Scipio ordered his men to hurl their 
javelins and then pursue without intermission, the Numidi- 
ans, having no chance to turn around, retreated to their 
camp. Here Scipio desisted from the pursuit and en- 
camped in a strong position, which he had chosen, about 
ten stades from the enemy. The total strength of the 
enemy was 70,000 foot, 5000 horse, and thirty-six elephants. 
That of Scipio was not one-third of the number. For some 
time, therefore, he hesitated and did not venture a fight, 
except some light skirmishes. 

26. When his supplies began to fail and hunger attacked 
his army, Scipio considered that it would be base to retreat. 
Accordingly he sacrificed, and bringing the soldiers to an 
audience immediately after the sacrifice, and putting on 
again the look and aspect of one inspired, he said that the 
deity had appeared to him in the customary way and told 
him to attack the enemy, and had assured him that it was 
better to trust in heaven than in the size of his army because 
his former victories were gained by divine favor rather than 
by numerical strength. In order to inspire confidence in 
his words he commanded the priests to bring the entrails 
into the assembly. While he was speaking he saw some 
birds flying overhead with great swiftness and clamor. 
Looking up he pointed them out and exclaimed this was a 
sign of victory which the gods had sent him. He followed 
their movement, gazing at them and crying out like one pos- 
sessed. The whole army, as it saw him turning hither and 

§ 25-27] THE WARS IN SPAIN 63 

V.R. B.C. 

547 thither, imitated his actions, and all were fired with the idea 207 
of certain victory. When he had everything as he wished 
he did not hesitate, nor permit their ardor to cool, but still 
as one inspired exclaimed : " These signs tell us that we 
must fight at once." When they had taken their food he 
ordered them to arm themselves, and led them against the 
enemy, who were not expecting them, giving the command of 
the horse to Silanus and of the foot to Laelius and Marcius. 
27. Hasdrubal, Mago, and Masinissa, when Scipio was 
coming upon them unawares, being only ten stades distant, 
and their soldiers not having taken their food, drew up their 
forces in haste, amid confusion and tumult. Battle being 
joined with both cavalry and infantry, the Roman horse pre- 
vailed over the enemy by the same tactics as before, by 
giving no respite to the Numidians (who were accustomed 
to retreat and advance by turns), thus making their darts of 
no effect by reason of their nearness. The infantry were 
severely pressed by the great numbers of the Africans and 
were worsted by them all day long, nor could Scipio stem 
the tide of battle, although he was everywhere cheering them 
on. Finally, giving his horse in charge of a boy, and snatch- 
ing a shield from a soldier, he dashed alone into the space 
between the two armies, shouting : " Romans, rescue your 
Scipio in his peril." ^ Then those who were near seeing, 
and those who were distant hearing, what danger he was 
in, and all being in like manner moved by a sense of 
shame and fear for their general's safety, charged furiously 
upon the enemy, uttering loud cries. The Africans were 
unable to resist this charge. They gave way, as their 
strength was failing for lack of food, of which they had 
had none all day. Then, for a short space of time, there 
was a terrific slaughter. Such was the result to Scipio of 
the battle of Carmone, although it had been for a long time 
doubtfiil. The Roman loss was 800 ; that of the enemy 

^ ^x(irovp€tT«, 2 P»/iato(, KivBvveooyri ύμων τφ ^κιτίωνι* The Latin 
version of Gkuus Secundus Curio renders the last three words " your 
Scipio," and Schweighauser concurs, but the latter prints a note by 
Henry Stephen who affirms that that is not a good Greek locution, and 
that the rendering should be, " rescue Scipio who incurs danger in your 
behalf," a criticism which can hardly be sustained. 


Y.R. B.C, 

547 28. After this engagement the enemy retreated with all 207 
speed, and Scipio followed dealing blows and doing damage 
whenever he could overtake them. After they had occu- 
pied a stronghold, where there was plenty of food and 
water, and where nothing could be done but lay siege to 
them, Scipio was called away on other business. He left 
Silanus to carry on the siege while he went into other parts 
of Spain and subdued them. The Africans who were be- 
sieged by Silanus deserted their position and retreated again 
until they came to the straits and passed on to Gades. Sila- 
nus, having done them all the harm he could, rejoined Scipio 

at New Carthage. In the meantime Hasdrubal, the son of 
Hamilcar, who was still collecting troops along the Northern 
ocean, was called by his brother Hannibal to march in all 
haste to Italy. In order to deceive Scipio he moved along 
the northern coast, and passed over the Pyrenees into Gaul 
with the Celtiberian mercenaries whom he had enlisted. In 
this way he was hastening into Italy without the knowledge 
of the Italians. 

Chapter VI 

Scipio visits Africa — Other operations in Spain — Destruction of 

Ilurgia — The Fate of Astapa 

548 29. Now Lucius [his brother], having returned from 206 
Rome, told Scipio that the Romans were thinking of send- 
ing the latter as general to Africa. Scipio had strongly de- 
sired this for some time and hoped that events might take 
this turn. Accordingly he sent Laelius with five ships to 
Africa on a mission to King Syphax, to make presents to 
him and remind him of the friendship of the Scipios, and 
ask him to join the Romans if they should make an expedi- 
tion to Africa. He promised to do so, accepted the pres- 
ents, and sent others in return. When the Carthaginians 
discovered this they also sent envoys to Syphax to seek his 
alliance. When Scipio heard of this, judging that it was a 
matter of importance to win and confirm the alliance of 
Syphax against the Carthaginians, he took Laelius and went 
over to Africa with two ships, to see Syphax in person. 

30. When he was approaching the shore the Carthaginian 
envoys who were still with Syphax sailed out against him 

§ 28-32] THE WARS IN SPAIN 6$ 

▼ R Β C• 

548 with their war-ships, without Syphax's knowledge. But he 206 
spread his sails, outran them completely, and reached the 
harbor. Syphax entertained both parties, but he made an 
aUiance with Scipio privately, and having exchanged pledges 
sent him away. He also detained the Carthaginians, who 
were again lying in wait for Scipio, until he was a good dis- 
tance out to sea. So much danger did Scipio incur both 
going and returning. It is reported that at a banquet given 
by Syphax, Scipio recHned on the same couch with Hasdru- 
bal and that the latter questioned him about many things, 
and was greatly impressed with his gravity, and afterwards 
said to his friends that Scipio was formidable not only in 
war but also at a feast. 

31. At this time certain of the Celtiberians and Spaniards 
were still serving under Mago as mercenaries, although their 
towns had gone over to the Romans. Marcius set upon them, 
slew 1500, and scattered the rest of them among their towns. 
He corralled 700 horse and 6000 foot of the same force, of 
whom Hanno was in command, on a hill. When they were 
reduced to extremities by hunger they sent messengers to 
Marcius to obtain terms. He told them first to surrender 
Hanno and the deserters, and then he would treat. Accord- 
ingly they seized Hanno, although he was their general and 
was Ustening to the conversation, and they delivered up the de- 
serters. Then Marcius demanded the prisoners also. When 
he had received these he ordered them to bring a specified 
sum of money down to a certain point in the plain, because 
the high ground was not a suitable place for suppliants. 
When they had come down to the plain he said : " You 
deserve to be put to death for adhering to the enemy and 
waging war against us after your country has espoused our 
side. Nevertheless, if you will lay down your arms, I will 
allow you to go unpunished." At this they were very angry 
and exclaimed with one voice that they would not lay down 
their arms. A severe engagement ensued in which about 
half of the Celtiberians fell, not unavenged, the other half 
escaping to Mago, who had arrived a little before at the 
camp of Hanno with sixty war-ships. When he learned of 
Hanno's disaster he sailed to Gades and awaited the turn 
of events, meanwhile suffering from want of provisions. 

32, While Mago lay here inert, Silanus was sent by Scipio 

VOL. I — F 


V.R. B.C. 

548 to receive the submission of the city of Castax. When the 206 
inhabitants received him in a hostile manner, he encamped 
before it, and communicated the fact to Scipio. The latter 
sent him some siege engines and prepared to follow, but 
turned aside to attack the town of Ilurgia. This place had 
been an ally of the Romans in the time of the elder Scipio, 
but at his death changed sides secretly, and having given 
shelter to the Roman soldiers who had fled thither suppos- 
ing it to be friendly, had delivered them up to the Cartha- 
ginians. To avenge this crime Scipio in his indignation 
took the place in four hours, and, although wounded in 
the neck, did not desist from the fight until he had con- 
quered. The soldiers, for his sake, in their fury even forgot 
to plunder the town, but slew the whole population, includ- 
ing women and children, although nobody gave them any 
orders to do so, and did not desist until the whole place 
was razed to the ground. When he arrived at Castax, 
Scipio divided his army into three parts and invested the 
city. He did not press the siege, however, but gave the 
inhabitants time to repent, having heard that they were so 
disposed. The latter, having slain those of the garrison 
who objected and put down all opposition, surrendered 
the place to Scipio, who stationed a new garrison there 
and placed the town under the government of one of its 
own citizens, a man of high reputation. He then returned 
to New Carthage, and sent Silanus and Marcius to the 
straits to devastate the country as much as they could. 

2^2^, There was a town named Astapa which had been 
always and wholly of the Carthaginian party. Marcius laid 
siege to it, and the inhabitants foresaw that, if they were 
captured by the Romans, they would be reduced to slavery. 
Accordingly they brought all their valuables into the mar- 
ket-place, piled wood around them, and put their wives 
and children on the heap. They made fifty of their prin- 
cipal men take an oath that whenever they should see that 
the city must fall, they would kill the women and children, 
set fire to the pile, and slay themselves thereon. Then 
calling the gods to witness what they had done, they sallied 
out against Marcius, who did not anticipate anything of the 
kind. For this reason they easily repulsed the light-armed 
troops and cavalry whom they met. When they became 

S 33-35] Ί'ίί^ WARS IN SPAIN 67 

y.R. B.C. 

548 engaged with the legionaries, they still had the best of it, 206 
because they fought with desperation. Finally the Romans 
overpowered them by sheer numbers, for the Astapians cer- 
tainly were not inferior to them in bravery. When they had 
all fallen, the fifty who remained behind slew the women 
and children, kindled the fire, and flung themselves on it, 
thus leaving the enemy a barren victory. Marcius, in ad- 
miration of the bravery of the Astapians, spared the houses. 

Chapter VII 

Mutiny in Scipio's Army — The Mutiny suppressed — Masinissa makes 

an Alliance with Scipio 

34. After this Scipio fell sick, and the command of the 
army devolved on Marcius. Some of the soldiers, who had 
squandered their means in riotous living, and who thought 
that because they had nothing they had found no fit com- 
pensation for their toils, but that Scipio was appropriating 
all the glory of their deeds, seceded from Marcius and 
went off and encamped by themselves. Many from the 
garrisons joined them. Messengers came to them from 
Mago, bringing money and inviting them to revolt to him. 
They took the money, chose generals and centurions from 
their own number, made other arrangements to their liking, 
put themselves under military discipline, and exchanged 
oaths with each other. When Scipio learned this, he sent 
word to the seceders separately that on account of his sick- 
ness he had not yet been able to remunerate them for their 
services. He urged others to try and win back their erring 
comrades. He also sent a letter to all the soldiers in com- 
mon, as though they had already been reconciled, saying 
that he was about ready to discharge his debt to them, 
and telling them to come to New Carthage and get their 

35. Upon reading these letters, some thought that they 
were not to be trusted. Others put faith in them. Finally 
they came to an agreement that all should go to New Car- 
thage together. When they were coming, Scipio enjoined 
upon those senators who were with him that each one 


Y.R. B.C. 

548 should attach himself to some one of the leaders of the 206 
sedition as they came in, as if to admonish him in a friendly 
way, should then make him his guest, and quietly secure 
him. He also ordered the military tribunes that each 
should have his most faithful soldiers in readiness at day- 
light unobserved, with their swords, and station them at 
intervals in convenient places about the assembly, and if 
any tumult should arise, to draw their weapons and kill 
at once, without waiting for orders. Shortly after daybreak, 
Scipio was conveyed to the tribunal, and he sent the heralds 
around to summon the soldiers to the place of meeting. 
The call was unexpected to them and they were ashamed 
to keep their sick general waiting. They thought also that 
they were only called to get their rewards. So they came 
running together from all sides, some without their swords, 
others dressed only in their tunics, not having had time to 
put on all their clothing, by reason of their haste. 

36. Scipio, having a guard around himself that was not 
observed, first accused them of their misdeeds. " Never- 
theless,** he said, " the blame belongs only to the authors of 
the conspiracy, whom I will punish with your help." He 
had scarcely said this when he ordered the lictors to divide 
the crowd in two parts, and when they had done so the 
senators dragged the guilty leaders into the middle of the 
assembly. When they cried out and called their comrades 
to their aid, every one who uttered a word was killed by the 
tribunes. The rest of the crowd, seeing that the assembly 
was surrounded by armed men, remained in sullen silence. 
Then Scipio caused the wretches who had been dragged to 
the middle space to be beaten with rods, those who had 
cried for help being beaten hardest, after which he ordered 
that their necks should be fastened to stakes driven in the 
ground and their heads cut off. The heralds proclaimed 
pardon to the rest. In this way was the mutiny in Scipio's 
camp put down.^ 

37. While the mutiny was going on in the Roman army, 
a certain Indibilis, one of the chiefs who had come to an 
understanding with Scipio, made an incursion into the terri- 
tory of Scipio's allies. When Scipio marched against him 

^This mutiny is described at great length by Livy (xxviii. 24). 

§ 36-38] THE WARS IN SPAIN 69 

γ R• B.C. 

548 he made a very stiff fight, and killed some 1200 of theao6 
Romans, but having lost 20,000 of his own men he sued for 
peace. Scipio made him pay a fine, and then came to an 
agreement with him. At this time also Masinissa crossed 
the straits, without the knowledge of Hasdrubal, and estab- 
lished friendly relations with Scipio, and swore to join him 

if the war should be carried into Africa. This man re- 
mained faithful under all circumstances and for the fol- 
lowing reason. The daughter of Hasdrubal had been 
betrothed to him while he was fighting under the latter's 
command. But King Syphax was desperately in love with 
the same girl, and the Carthaginians, considering it a matter 
of great moment to secure Syphax against the Romans, gave 
her to him without consulting Hasdrubal. The latter, when 
he heard of it, concealed it from Masinissa out of regard 
for him. When Masinissa learned the facts he made an 
alliance with Scipio. Mago, the admiral, despairing of 
Carthaginian success in Spain, sailed to the country of the 
Ligurians and the Gauls to recruit mercenaries. While he 
was absent on this business the Romans took possession of 
Gades, which he had abandoned. 

549 38. From this time, which was a little before the 144th 205 
Olympiad, the Romans began to send praetors to Spain 
yearly to the conquered nations as governors or superin- j 
tendents to keep the peace. Scipio left them a small force 
suitable for a peace establishment, and settled his sick and 
wounded soldiers in a town which he named Italica after 
Italy, and this was the native place of Trajan and Hadrian, 
who afterwards became emperors of Rome. Scipio himself 
sailed for Rome with a large fleet magnificently arrayed, 
and loaded down with captives, money, arms, and all kinds 

of booty. The city gave him a glorious reception, bestowing 
noble and unprecedented honors upon him on account of 
his youth and the rapidity and greatness of his exploits. 
Even those who envied him acknowledged that his boastful 
jjromises of long ago were realized in facts. And so, ad- 
mired by all, he was awarded the honor of a triumph. As 
soon as Scipio departed from Spain, Indibilis rebelled again. 
The generals in Spain, collecting together an army from the 
garrisons and such forces as they could obtain from the 
subject tribes, defeated and slew him. Those who were 


Y.R. B.C. 

549 guilty of inciting the revolt were brought to trial, and pun- 205 
ished with loss of goods and death. The tribes that took 
sides with Indibilis were fined, deprived of their arms, re- 
quired to give hostages, and placed under stronger garrisons. 
These things happened just after Scipio's departure. And 
so the first war undertaken by the Romans in Spain came to 
an end. 

Chapter VIII 

Cato the Censor — His Victory in Spain — Revolt of the Lusones — 

The Elder Gracchus in Spain 

39. Subsequently, when the Romans were at war with the 
Gauls on the Po, and with Philip of Macedon, the Spaniards 

557 attempted another revolution, thinking the Romans now too 197 
distracted to heed them. Sempronius Tuditanus and Marcus 
Helvius were sent from Rome as generals against them, and 
after them Minucius. As the disturbance became greater, 

559 Cato was sent in addition, with larger forces. He was still 195 
a very young man, austere, laborious, and of such solid 
understanding and superb eloquence that the Romans called 
him Demosthenes for his speeches, for they learned that 
Demosthenes had been the greatest orator of Greece. 

40. When Cato arrived in Spain at the place called 
Emporia, the enemy from all quarters assembled against him 
to the number of 40,000. He took a short time to disci- 
phne his forces. When he was about to fight he sent away 
the ships which he had brought, to Massilia. Then he told 
his soldiers that they had not so much to fear from the 
superior numbers of the enemy (for courage could always 
overcome numbers), as from their own want of ships, so 
that there was no safety for them unless they beat the 
enemy. With these words he had not inspired his army, as 
would other generals, with hope — but with fear ; then he 
ordered an engagement. But when battle was joined he 
flew hither and thither exhorting and cheering his troops. 
When the conflict had continued doubtful till evening and 
many had fallen on both sides, he ascended a high hill with 
three cohorts of the reserve, where he could overlook the 
whole field. When he saw the centre of his own line sorely 

§ 39-42] THE WARS IN SPAIN 71 

559 pressed he sprang to their relief, exposing himself to danger, 195 
and broke the ranks of the enemy with a charge and a shout, 
and here his victory began. He pursued them the whole 
night, captured their camp, and slew a vast number. Upon 
his return the soldiers congratulated and embraced him as 
the author of the victory. After this he gave the army a 
rest and sold the plunder. 

41. Now envoys came to him from all sides, from whom 
he required hostages. To each of their towns he sent sealed 
letters, and he charged the bearers that they should all 
deliver the letters on one and the same day, for he had fixed 
the day by calculating how long it would take to reach the 
farthest town. The letters commanded the magistrates of 
all the towns to demolish their walls on the very day 
they received the order. If there was a day's delay he 
threatened to sell them into slavery. They, having been 
lately vanquished in a great battle, and not knowing whether 
these orders had been sent to them alone or to all, were 
much perplexed, for if it were to them alone they felt that 
they were but weak objects of scorn, but if it were to the 
others also, they feared to be the only ones to delay. 
Wherefore, as they had no time to send to each other, and 
the officers who brought the letters urged them to obey, 
they decided to do so, each town consulting its own safety. 
And so they threw down their walls with all speed, for when 
they had once decided to obey they thought that those who 
did the work most expeditiously would receive most favor. 
Thus the towns along the river Iberus in one day, and by 
one act of generalship, levelled their own walls. Being less 
able to resist the Romans thereafter, they remained longer 
at peace. 

573 42. Four Olympiads later, — that is, about the 150th iSx 
• Olympiad, — many Spanish tribes, having insufficient land, 
including the Lusones and others who dwelt along the river 
Iberus, revolted from the Roman rule. These being over- 
come in battle by the consul Fulvius Flaccus, the greater 
part of them scattered among their towns. The rest, being 
destitute of land and living a vagabond life, collected at 
Complega, a city newly built and fortified, and which had 
grown rapidly. Sallying out from this place they demanded 
that Flaccus should deliver to each of them a cloak, a horse. 


573 and a sword as recompense for their dead in the late war, i8i 
and take himself out of Spain or suffer the consequences. 
Flaccus replied that he would bring them plenty of cloaks, 
and following closely after their messengers, he encamped 
before the city. Far from making good their threats, they 
took to their heels, plundering the neighboring barbarians 
on the road. These people wore a thick outer garment 
with a double fold which they fastened with a clasp after the 
manner of the military cloak, and they called it the sagum. 

575 43. Flaccus was succeeded in the command by Tiberius 179 
Sempronius Gracchus, at which time the city of Caravis, 
which was in alliance with Rome, was besieged by 20,000 
Celtiberians. As it was reported that the place was about 
to be taken Gracchus hastened all the more to relieve it. 
He could but circle about the besiegers, and had no means 
of communicating to the town his own nearness. Comin- 
ius, a prefect of horse, having considered the matter care- 
fully, and communicated his plan to Gracchus, donned a 
Spanish sagum and secretly mingled with the enemy's fora- 
gers. In this way he gained entrance to their camp as a 
Spaniard, and passed through it into Caravis and told the 
people that Gracchus was approaching. Wherefore they 
endured the siege patiently and were saved, for Gracchus 
arrived three days later, and the besiegers fled. About the 
same time the inhabitants of Complega, to the number of 
20,000, came to Gracchus* camp in the guise of petitioners 
bearing olive-branches, and when they arrived they attacked 
him unexpectedly, and threw everything into confusion. 
Gracchus adroitly abandoned his camp to them and simu- 
lated flight ; then suddenly turning he fell upon them while 
they were plundering, killed most of them, and captured 
Complega and the surrounding country. Then he divided 
the land among the poor and settled them on it, and made 
carefully defined treaties with all the tribes, binding them 
to be the friends of Rome, and giving and receiving oaths 
to that effect. These treaties were often longed for in the 
subsequent wars. In this way Gracchus became celebrated 
both in Spain and in Rome, and was awarded a splendid 

§ 43-45] THE WARS IN SPAIN 73 

Chapter IX 

The Belli and the Titthi — Beginning of the Numantine War — 
Claudius Marcellus in Spain — Makes an Armistice — Licinius Lu- 
cullus succeeds Him — His Infamous Conduct -^ Scipio Africanus 
the Younger — Retreat of the Romans 

γ R Β C 

600 44. Some years later another serious war broke out in 154* 
Spain for the following reason : Segeda, a large and power- 
ful city of a Celtiberian tribe called the Belli, was included 

in the treaties made by Gracchus. It persuaded some of 
the smaller towns to settle in its own borders, and then 
surrounded itself with a wall forty stades in circumference. 
It also forced the Titthi, a neighboring tribe, to join in the 
undertaking. When the Senate learned this it forbade the 
building of the wall, demanded the tribute imposed by 
Gracchus, and ordered the inhabitants to furnish a contin- 
gent for the Roman army, for this was one of the stipula- 
tions of the treaty made with Gracchus. As to the wall 
they replied that the Celtiberians were forbidden by 
Gracchus to build new cities, but not forbidden to fortify 
existing ones. As to the tribute and the military contin- 
gent they said that they had been released from these 
requirements by the Romans themselves subsequently. This 
was true, but the Senate, when granting these exemptions, 
always added that they should continue only during the 
pleasure of the Roman people. 

601 45, Accordingly the praetor Nobilior was sent against χ53 
them with an army of nearly 30,000 men. When the Sege- 
dians learned of his coming, their wall not being yet finished, 
they fled with their wives and children to the Arevaci and 
begged that the latter would receive them. The Arevaci 
did so, and also chose a Segedian named Cams, whom they 
considered skilful in war, as their general. On the third 
day after his election he placed 20,000 foot and 500 horse 

in ambush in a dense forest and fell upon the Romans as 
they were passing through. The battle was for a long time 
doubtful, but in the end he gained a splendid victory, 
6000 Roman citizens being slain. So great a disaster 
befell the city on that day. But while he was engaged in 
a disorderly pursuit after the victory, the Roman horse, 


V.R. B. C 

6ox who were guarding the baggage, fell upon him and killed 153 
Cams himself, who was performing prodigies of valor, and 
not less than 6000 others with him. Finally night put an 
end to the conflict. This disaster happened on the day 
on which the Romans are accustomed to celebrate the 
festival of Vulcan. For which reason, from that time on, 
no general will begin a battle on that day unless compelled 
to do so. 

46. The Arevaci convened immediately, even in the 
night, at Numantia, which was a very strong city, and chose 
Ambo and Leuco as their generals. Three days later 
Nobilior advanced and pitched his camp twenty-four stades 
from the place. Here he was joined by 300 horse and 
ten elephants sent to him by Masinissa. When he moved 
against the enemy he placed these animals in the rear 
where they could not be seen. Then when battle was 
joined the army divided and brought the elephants into 
view. The Celtiberians and their horses, who had never 
seen elephants before, were thunderstruck and fled to the 
city. Nobilior advanced at once against the city walls, 
where the battle raged fiercely, until one of the elephants 
was struck on the head with a large falling stone, when he 
became savage, uttered a loud cry, turned upon his friends, 
and began to destroy everything that came in his way, 
making no distinction between friend and foe. The other 
elephants, excited by his cries, all began to do the same, 
trampling the Romans under foot, scattering and hurling 
them this way and that. This is always the way with ele- 
phants when they are enraged. Then they take everybody 
for foes ; wherefore some people call them the common 
enemy, on account of their fickleness. The Romans took 
to disorderly flight. When the Numantines perceived this 
they sallied out and pursued them, killing about 4000 men 
and three elephants. They also captured many arms and 
standards. The loss of the Celtiberians was about 2000. 

47. Nobilior, recovering a little from this disaster, made 
an attack upon the stores which the enemy had collected at 
the town of Axinium, but he accomplished nothing, and hav- 
ing lost many of his men there, he returned by night to his 
camp. Thence he sent Biesius, his master of horse, to se- 
cure the alliance of a neighboring tribe and to ask for assist- 

§ 46-48] THE WARS IN SPAIN 75 

Y.R. e.C 

601 ance in the way of cavalry. They gave him some, and as 153 
he was returning with them the Celtiberians laid an ambush 
for him. The ambush was discovered and the allies escaped, 
but Biesius, who engaged the enemy, was killed and many 
of his soldiers with him. Under the influence of such a 
succession of disasters to the Romans, the town of Ocilis, 
where their provisions and money were stored, revolted to 
the Celtiberians. Then Nobilior in despair went into winter 
quarters in his camp, sheltering himself as well as he could. 
He suffered much from scantiness of supplies, having only 
what was inside the camp, and from hea\y snowstorms and 
severe frost, so that many of his men perished while outside 
gathering wood, and others inside fell victims to confine- 
ment and cold. 

60a 48. The following year Claudius Marcellus succeeded «s» 
Nobilior in the command, bringing with him 8000 foot and 
500 horse. The enemy laid an ambush for him also, but he 
moved with circumspection and pitched his camp before 
Ocilis with his whole army. As he was renowned for good 
fortune in war, he brought the place to terms at once and 
granted it pardon, taking hostages and imposing a fine of 
thirty talents of silver. The Nergobriges, hearing of his 
moderation, sent and asked what they could do to obtain 
peace. In reply he ordered them to furnish him 100 horse- 
men as auxiliaries, and they promised to do so, but in the 
meantime they were attacking the rear guard of the Romans 
and carried off a lot of baggage. When the leaders of the 
hundred horse arrived according to agreement, and were 
interrogated about the attack on the rear guard, they re- 
plied that this had been done by some of their people who 
did not know of the agreement. Marcellus then put the 
hundred horsemen in chains, sold their horses, devastated 
their country, distributed the plunder to his soldiers, and 
besieged the city. When the Nergobriges saw the engines 
advanced and the mounds thrown up against their walls they 
sent a herald, who wore a wolfs skin instead of bearing a 
caduceus, and begged forgiveness. Marcellus replied that 
he would not grant it unless all the Arevaci, the Belli, and 
the Titthi would ask it together. When these tribes heard 
of this, they sent ambassadors eagerly, and begged that 
Marcellus would let them off with a light punishment and 


6o3 renew the terms of the agreement made with Gracchus, xsa 
This petition was opposed by some of the country people 
who had been incited to war by them. 

49. Marcellus sent ambassadors from each party to Rome 
to carry on their dispute there. At the same time he sent 
private letters to the Senate urging peace. He desired that 
the war should be brought to an end by himself, thinking 
that he should gain glory thereby. Some of the ambas- 
sadors from the friendly faction on coming to the city were 
treated as guests, but, as was customary, those from the 
hostile faction lodged outside the walls. The Senate re- 
jected the proposal of peace and took it ill that these peo- 
ple had refused terms to the Romans when they were asked 
by Nobilior, the predecessor of Marcellus. So they replied 
that Marcellus would announce the Senate's decision to 
them. And now for the first time they chose an army for 
Spain by lot, instead of the customary levy, for since many 
had complained that they had been treated unjustly by the 
consuls in the enrolment, while others had been chosen for 
easy service, it was decided now to choose by lot. The 
consul Licinius LucuUus was appointed to the command, 
and he had for his lieutenant Cornelius Scipio who was not 
long afterwards distinguished as the conqueror of Carthage 
and of Numantia. 

50. While LucuUus was on the march Marcellus notified 
the Celtiberians of the coming war, and gave back the host- 
ages in response to their request. Then he sent for the 
chief of the Celtiberian embassy in Rome and conferred 
with him privately a long time. From this circumstance it 
was then suspected, and was strongly confirmed by later 
events, that he sought to persuade them to put their affairs 
in his hands, because he tried in every way to bring the war 
to an end before the arrival of LucuUus. Directly after this 
conference 5000 of the Arevaci took possession of the city 
of Nergobriga. Marcellus marched against Numantia, en- 
camped at a distance of five stades from it, and was driving 
the Numantines inside the walls when their leader Litenno 
halted and called out that he would like to have a confer- 
ence with Marcellus. This being granted he said that the 
Belli, Titthi, and Arevaci would put themselves entirely in 
his hands. He was delighted to hear this and having de- 

§ 49-52] THE WARS IN SPAIN γγ 

Y.R. * B.C 

603 manded and received hostages and money, he let them go 151 
free. Thus the war with the BelH, the Titthi, and the Are- 
vaci was brought to an end before Lucullus arrived. 

51. Lucullus being greedy of fame and needing money, 
because he was in straitened circumstances, invaded the 
territory of the Vaccaei, another Celtiberian tribe, neighbors 
of the Arevaci, against whom war had not been declared 
by the Senate, nor had they ever attacked the Romans, or 
offended Lucullus himself. Crossing the river Tagus he 
came to the city of Cauca, and pitched his camp near it. 
The citizens asked him what he had come for and what 
occasion there was for war, and when he replied that he 
had come to aid the Carpetani whom the Vaccaei had mal- 
treated they retired inside their walls, from which they sallied 
out and fell upon his wood-cutters and foragers, killing many 
and pursuing the remainder to the camp. When battle was 
joined the Caucaei, who resembled light-armed troops, had 
the advantage at first, but when they had expended all their 
darts they were obliged to fly, not being accustomed to a 
standing fight, and while forcing their way through the gates 
about 3000 of them were slain. 

52. The next day the elders of the city came out wearing 
crowns on their heads and bearing olive-branches, and asked 
Lucullus what they should do to establish friendly relations. 
He replied that they must give hostages and 100 talents 
of silver^ and furnish a contingent of horse to the Roman 
army. When all these demands had been complied with 
he asked that a Roman garrison should be admitted to the 
city. When the Caucaei assented to this he brought in 
2000 soldiers carefully chosen, to whom he gave orders that 
when they were admitted they should occupy the walls. 
When this was done Lucullus introduced the rest of his army 
and ordered them at the sound of the trumpet to kill all the 
adult males of the Caucaei. The latter, invoking the gods 
who preside over promises and oaths, and upbraiding the 
perfidy of the Romans, were cruelly slain, only a few out 
of 20,000 escaping by leaping down the sheer walls at the 
gates. Lucullus sacked the city and brought infamy upon 
the Roman name. The rest of the barbarians collecting 
together from the fields took refuge among inaccessible rocks 
or in the most strongly fortified towns, carrying away what 


Y.R. • B. C. 

603 they could, and burning what they were obliged to leave, 151 
so that LucuUus should not find any plunder. 
. 53. The latter, having traversed a long stretch of deserted 
country, came to the city of Intercatia where more than 
20,000 foot and 2000 horse had taken refuge together. 
LucuUus very foolishly invited them to enter into a treaty. 
They reproached him with the slaughter of the Caucsei, and 
asked him whether he invited them to the same kind of a 
pledge that he had given to that people. He, like all guilty 
souls, being angry with his accusers instead of reproaching 
himself, laid waste their fields. Then he drew a line of siege 
around the city, threw up several mounds, and repeatedly 
set his forces in order of battle to provoke a fight. The 
enemy did not respond but fought with projectiles only. 
There was a certain barbarian distinguished by his splendid 
armor, who frequently rode into the space between the 
armies and challenged the Romans to single combat, and 
when nobody accepted the challenge he jeered at them, made 
insulting gestures, and went back. After he had done this 
several times, Scipio, who was still a youth, felt very much 
aggrieved, and springing forward accepted the challenge. 
Fortunately he won the victory over this giant although he 
was himself a man of small size. 

54. This victory raised the spirits of the Romans, but 
the next night they were seized with panic. A body of the 
enemy's horse who had gone out foraging before LucuUus 
arrived, returned and not finding any entrance to the city 
because it was surrounded by the besiegers, ran about shout- 
ing and creating disturbance whUe those inside the walls 
shouted back. These noises caused strange terror in the 
Roman camp. Their soldiers were sick from want of sleep, 
and because of the unaccustomed food which the country 
afforded. They had no wine, no salt, no vinegar, no oil, 
but lived on wheat and barley, and the flesh of deer and 
rabbits boiled without salt, which caused dysentery, from 
which many died. Finally when a mound was completed 
so that they could batter the enemy's walls, they knocked 
down a section and rushed into the city, but they were 
speedily overpowered. Being compeUed to retreat and being 
unacquainted with the ground, they feU into a reservoir where 
many perished. The foUowing night the barbarians repaired 

§ 53-56] THE WARS IN SPAIN 79 

Y.R. B.C 

603 their broken wall. As both sides were now suffering severely χΐχ 
(for famine had fastened upon both), Scipio promised the ■ 
barbarians that if they would make a treaty it should not be 
violated. They had so much confidence in his word that 
the war was brought to an end on these conditions : The 
Intercatii to give to LucuUus 10,000 cloaks, a certain num- 
ber of cattle, and fifty hostages. As for the gold and silver 
that LucuUus was after (and for the sake of which he had 
waged this war, thinking that all Spain abounded with gold 
and silver), he got nothing. Not only did they have none, 
but these particular Celtiberians did not set any value on 
those metals. 

55. He went next to Pallantia, a city more renowned for 
bravery, where many refugees had congregated, for which 
reason he was advised by some to pass by without making 
an attempt upon it. But, having heard that it was a rich 
place, he would not go away until the Pallantian horse, by 
incessantly harassing his foragers, prevented him from getting 
supplies. When his food was exhausted LucuUus withdrew 
his army, marching in the form of a square, and pursued by 
the Pallantians as far as the river Durius. From that place 
the Pallantians returned by night to their own country. 
LucuUus passed into the territory of the Turditani, and went 
into winter quarters. This was the end of the war with the 
Vaccaei, which was waged by LucuUus without the authority | 
of the Roman people, but he was never caUed to account 
for it. 

Chapter X 

The Lusitanian War — The Doings of Mummius — Servius Galba — 

His Infamous Conduct 

599 56. At this time another part of autonomous Spain 155 
called Lusitania, under Punicus as leader, was ravaging the 
fields of the Roman subjects and having put to flight their 
praetors (first Mamlius and then Calpurnius Piso), killed 
6000 Romans and among them Terentius Varro, the quaestor. 
Elated by this success Punicus swept the country as far as 
the ocean, and joining the Vettones to his army he laid siege 
to the Blastophoenicae, who were Roman subjects. It is said 


Y.R. B.C. 

599 that Hannibal, the Carthaginian, brought among these people ^^s 
settlers from Africa, from whence they derived their name. 
Here Punicus was struck on the head with a stone and killed. 
He was succeeded by a man named Caesarus. The latter 
joined battle with Mummius, who came from Rome with 
another army, was defeated and put to flight, but as Mummius 
was pursuing him in a disorderly way, he rallied and slew 
about 9000 Romans, recaptured the plunder they had taken 
from him as well as his own camp, and took that of the 
Romans also, together with many arms and standards which 
the barbarians in derision carried throughout all Celtiberia. 

601 57. Mummius took his 5000 remaining soldiers and drilled 153 
them in camp, not daring to go out into the plain until they 
should have recovered their courage. While he was watch- 
ing his opportunity the barbarians passed by, carrying a part 
of the booty they had captured. He fell upon them sud- 
denly, slew a large number, and recaptured the plunder and 
the standards. Some of the Lusitanians on the other side 
of the Tagus, under the leadership of Caucenus, being in- 
censed against the Romans, invaded the Cunei, who were 
Roman subjects, and captured their large city, Conistorgis, 
and near the Pillars of Hercules they crossed over the straits, 
and some of them overran part of Africa, while others laid 
siege to the city of Ocile. Mummius followed them with 
9000 foot and 500 horse, and slew about 15,000 of them 
who were engaged in plundering, and a few of the others, and 
raised the siege of Ocile. Falling in with a party who were 
carrying off booty he slew all of them, so that not one was 
left to bear the tidings of the disaster. All the booty that it 
was possible to carry he divided among the soldiers. The 
rest he devoted to the gods of war and burned. Having 
accomplished these results, Mummius returned to Rome 
and was awarded a triumph. 

602 58. He was succeeded in the command by Marcus 152 
Atilius, who made an incursion among the Lusitanians and 
killed about 700 of them and took their largest city, called 
Oxthracae. This so terrified the neighboring tribes that they 
all made terms of surrender. Among these were some of 
the Vettones, a nation adjoining the Lusitanians. But when 
he went away into winter quarters they all forthwith revolted 
and besieged some of the Roman subjects. Servius Galba, • 

§57-6o] THE WARS IN SPAIN 8 1 

V.R. ^ ^ B.C 

603 the successor of Atilius, hastened to relieve them. Having is» 
marched 500 stades in one day and night, he came in sight 
of the Lusitanians and sent his tired army into battle in- 
stantly. Fortunately he broke the enemy's ranks, but he 
imprudently followed the fugitives, the pursuit being feeble 
and disorderly on account of the fatigue of his men. When 
the barbarians saw them scattered, and by turns stopping to 
rest, they rallied and fell upon them and killed about 7000. 
Galba, with the cavalry he had about him, fled to the city 
of Carmone. There he received the fugitives, and having 
collected alHes to the number of 20,000 he moved to the 
territory of the Cunei, and wintered at Conistorgis. 

59. LucuUus, who had made war on the Vaccaei without 
authority, was wintering in Turditania. When he discov- 
ered that the Lusitanians were making incursions in his 
neighborhood he sent out some of his best lieutenants and 
slew about 4000 of them. He killed 1500 others while they 
were crossing the straits near Gades. The remainder took 
refuge on a hill and he drew a line of circumvallation around 
it and captured an immense number of them. Then he in- 

6o4vaded Lusitania and gradually depopulated it. Galba did «so 
the same on the other side. When some of their ambassa- 
dors came to him desiring to renew the treaty made with 
Atilius, his predecessor in the command, though they had 
transgressed this treaty, he received them favorably, and 
made a truce and pretended to sympathize with them be- 
cause they had been compelled by poverty to rob, make 
war, and break their engagements. " For, of course," said 
he, " poorness of soil and penury forced you to do these 
things. If you wish to be friendly, I will give you good land 
for your poor people and settle them in three divisions, in a 
fertile country." 

60. Beguiled by these promises they left their own habita- 
tions and came together at the place where Galba directed. 
He divided them into three parts, and showing to each 
division a certain plain, he commanded them to remain in 
this open country until he should assign them their places. 
Then he came to the first division and told them as friends 
to lay down their arms. When they had done so he sur- 
rounded them with a ditch and sent in soldiers with swords 
who slew them all, they, meanwhile, crying aloud and invok- 

VOL. I — G 


Y.R. B.C 

604 ing the names and faith of the gods. In like manner he 150 
hastened to the second and third divisions and destroyed 
them while they were still ignorant of the fate of the first. 
Thus he avenged treachery with treachery in a manner 
unworthy of a Roman, but imitating barbarians. A few 
escaped, among them Viriathus, who not long afterward 
became the leader of the Lusitanians and killed many 
Romans and performed the greatest exploits, which I shall 
relate hereafter. Galba, being even more greedy than 
Lucullus, distributed a little of the plunder to the army and 
a little to his friends and kept the rest himself, although he 
was already one of the richest of the Romans. Not even in 
time of peace, they say, did he abstain from lying and per- 
jury in order to get gain. Although generally hated, and 
called to account for his rascalities, he escaped punishment 
by means of his wealth. 

Chapter XI 

The rise of Viriathus — He defeats Vetilius — Defeats Plautius in Two 
Battles — Is defeated by Maximus iCmilianus 

606 61. Not long afterward those who had escaped the vil- 148 
lany of Lucullus and Galba, having collected together to 
the number of 10,000, overran Turditania. Gaius Vetilius 
marched against them, bringing a new army from Rome and 
taking also the soldiers already in Spain, so that he had 
about 10,000 men. He fell upon their foragers, killed 
many of them, and forced the rest into a place where, if 
they stayed, they were in danger of famine, and if they came 
out would fall into the hands of the Romans. Being in 
these straits they sent messengers to Vetilius with olive- 
branches asking land for a dwelUng-place, and agreeing from 
that time on to obey the Romans in all things. He promised 
to give them the land, and an agreement was nearly made 
to that effect when Viriathus, who had escaped the perfidy 
of Galba and was then among them, reminded them of the 
bad faith of the Romans, told them how the latter had often 
set upon them in violation of oaths, and how this whole 
army was composed of men who had escaped from the 

§ 61-63] THE WARS IN SPAIN 83 

Y.R. B.C. 

606 ρεηυπβΒ of Galba and LucuUus. If they would obey him, u» 
he said, he would show them a safe retreat from this place. 

62. Excited by the new hopes with which he inspired 
them, they chose him as their leader. He drew them up in 
line of battle as though he intended to fight, but gave them 
orders that when he should mount his horse they should 
scatter in every direction and make their way by different 
routes to the city of Tribola and there wait for him. He 
chose 1000 only whom he commanded to stay with him. 
These arrangements having been made, they all fled as soon 
as Viriathus mounted his horse, Vetilius was afraid to pur- 
sue those who had scattered in so many different ways, but 
turning towards Viriathus who was standing there and ap- 
parently waiting a chance to attack, joined battle with him. 
The latter, having very swift horses, harassed the Romans by 
attacking, then retreating, again standing still and again 
attacking, and thus consumed the whole of that day and the 
next dashing around on the same field. As soon as he con- 
jectured that the others had made good their escape, he 
hastened away in the night by devious paths and arrived at 
Tribola with his nimble steeds, the Romans not being able 
to follow him at an equal pace by reason of the weight of 
their armor, their ignorance of the roads, and the inferiority 
of their horses. Thus did Viriathus, in an unexpected way, 
rescue his army from a desperate situation. This feat, 
coming to the knowledge of the various tribes of that 
vicinity, brought him fame and many reenforcements from 
different quarters, and enabled him to wage war against the 
Romans for eight years. 

607 63. It is my intention here to relate this war with 147 
Viriathus, so very harassing to the Romans and so badly 
managed by them, and to take up hereafter the other events 
that happened in Spain at the same time. Vetilius pursued 
him till he came to Tribola. Viriathus, having first laid an 
ambush in a dense thicket, retreated until Vetilius was pass- 
ing through the place, when he turned, and those who were 

in ambush sprang up. On all sides they began killing the 
Romans, driving them over the cliffs and taking prisoners. 
Vetilius himself was taken prisoner ; and the man who capt- 
ured him, not knowing who he was, but seeing that he was 
old and fat, and considering him worthless, killed him. Of 


V.R. B.C. 

607 the 10,000 Romans, 6000 with difficulty made their way to 147 
the city of Carpessus on the seashore, which I think was 
formerly called by the Greeks Tartessus, and was ruled by 
King Arganthonius, who is said to have lived one hundred 
and fifty years. The soldiers, who made their escape to 
Carpessus, were stationed on the walls of the town by the 
quaestor who accompanied Vetilius, badly demoralized. 
Having asked and obtained 5000 allies from the Belli and 
Titthi, he sent them against Viriathus who slew them all, so 
that there was not one left to tell the tale. After that the 
quaestor remained quietly in the town waiting for help from 

608 64. Viriathus overran the fruitful country of Carpetania 146 
without hinderance, and ravaged it until Caius Plautius came 
from Rome bringing 10,000 foot and 1300 horse. Then 
Viriathus again feigned flight and Plautius sent 4000 men to 
pursue him but he turned upon them and killed all except a 
few. Then he crossed the river Tagus and encamped on a 
mountain covered with olive-trees, called Venus* mountain. 
There Plautius overtook him, and eager to retrieve his mis- 
fortune, joined battle with him, but was defeated with great 
slaughter, and fled in disorder to the towns, and went into 
winter quarters in midsummer not daring to show himself 
anywhere. Accordingly, Viriathus overran the whole coun- 
try without check and required the owners of the growing 
crops to pay him the value thereof, or if they would not, he 
destroyed them. 

609 65. When these facts became known at Rome, they sent 145 
Fabius Maximus ^milianus, the son of ^milius Paulus 
(who had conquered Perseus, the king of Macedonia), to 
Spain, having given him power to levy an army. As Car- 
thage and Greece had been but recently conquered, and the 
third Macedonian war brought to a successful end, in order 
that he might spare the soldiers who had just returned from 
those places, he chose young men who had never been 
engaged in war before, to the number of two legions. He 
obtained additional forces from the allies and arrived at 
Orso, a city of Spain, having altogether 15,000 foot and about 
2000 horse. As he did not wish to engage the enemy until 
his forces were well disciplined, he made a voyage through 
the straits to Gades in order to sacrifice to Hercules. In 

§ 64-66] THE WARS IN SPAIN 85 

Υ•Κ• B.C• 

609 the meantime Viriathus fell upon his wood-cutters, killed us 
many, and struck terror into the rest. His lieutenant com- 
ing out to fight, Viriathus defeated him also and captured a 
great booty. When Maximus returned, Viriathus drew out 
his forces repeatedly and offered battle. But Maximus de- 
cUned an engagement with the whole army and continued 

to exercise his men, frequently sending out skirmishing 
parties, making trial of the enemy's strength, and inspiring 
his own men with courage. When he sent out foragers he 
always placed a cordon of legionaries around the unarmed 
men and himself rode about the region with his cavalry. 
He had seen his father Paulus do this in the Macedonian 
war. Winter being ended, and his army well disciplined, he 

610 attacked Viriathus and was the second Roman general 10x44 
put him to flight (although he fought valiantly), capturing 
two of his cities, one of which he plundered and the other 
burned. He pursued Viriathus to a place called Baecor, and 
killed many of his men, after which he wintered at Corduba.^ 

6x1 66. Now Viriathus, being not so confident as before, de- 143 
tached the Arevaci, Titthi, and Belli, very warlike peoples, 
from their allegiance to the Romans, and these began to 
wage another war on their own account which was long and 
tedious to the Romans, and which was called the Numan- 
tine war from one of their cities. I shall give an account of 
this after finishing the war with Viriathus. The latter coming 
to an engagement in another part of Spain with Quintus, 
another Roman general, and being worsted, returned to the 
Venus mountain. From this he sallied and slew 1000 of 
Quintus* men and captured some standards from them and 
drove the rest into their camp. He also drove out the gar- 
rison of Itucca and ravaged the country of the Bastitani. 
Quintus was unable to render them aid by reason of his 
timidity and inexperience, but went into winter quarters at 
Corduba in the middle of autumn, and frequently sent Caius 
Marcius, a Spaniard from the city of Italica, against him. 

^ The text of sec. 65 concludes with words which are repeated near 
the end of sec. 68, viz. : *' having already been two years in the command. 
Having performed these labors, vEmilianus returned to Rome and was 
succeeded in the command by Quintus Pompeius Aulus." Schweighau- 
ser considered the text corrupt in both places and cast it out altogether 
from sec. 65. 


Chapter XII 

War with Viriathus continued — A Treaty with Viriathus — The 
Treaty is broken by the Romans — D. Junius Brutus — Guerilla 
Bands cooperate with Viriathus — Viriathus assassinated — Character 
of Viriathus 

Y.R. B.C. 

6ia 67. At the end of the year, Fabius Maximus Servilianus, 142 
the brother of ^milianus, came to succeed Quintus in the 
command, bringing two new legions Tfrom Rome and some 
alUes, so that his forces altogether amounted to about 18,000 
foot and 1600 horse. He wrote to Micipsa, king of the 
Numidians, to send him some elephants as speedily as possi- 
ble. As he was hastening to Itucca with his army in divisions, 
Viriathus attacked him with 6000 troops with great noise 
and barbaric clamor, and wearing the long hair which in 
battles they are accustomed to shake in order to terrify their 
enemies, but he was not dismayed. He stood his ground 
bravely, and the enemy was driven off without accomplishing 
anything. When the rest of his army arrived, together with 
ten elephants and 300 horse from Africa, he established a 
large camp, advanced against Viriathus, defeated and pur- 
sued him. The pursuit became disorderly, and when Viria- 
thus observed this as he fled he rallied, slew about 3000 of 
the Romans, and drove the rest to their camp. He attacked 
the camp also where only a few made a stand about the 
gates, the greater part hiding under their tents from fear, and 
being with difficulty brought back to their duty by the gen- 
eral and the tribunes. Here Fannius, the brother-in-law of 
Laelius, showed splendid bravery. The Romans were saved 
by the approach of darkness. But Viriathus continued to 
make incursions by night or in the heat of the day, appear- 
ing at every unexpected time with his light-armed troops and 
his swift horses to annoy the enemy, until he forced Servih- 
anus back to Itucca. 

68. Then at length Viriathus, being in want of provisions, 
and his army much reduced, burnt his camp in the night 
and returned to Lusitania. Servilianus did not overtake 
him, but fell upon the country of Bseturia and plundered 
five towns that had sided with Viriathus. After this he 
marched against the Cunaei, and thence to Lusitania once 

§ 67-70] THE WARS IN SPAIN 87 

6ia more, against Viriathus. While he was on the march two 14a 
captains of robbers, Curius and Apuleius, with 10,000 men 
attacked the Romans, threw them into confusion, and capt- 
ured some booty. Curius was killed in the fight, and Servil- 
ianus not long afterward recovered the booty and took the 
towns of Escadia, Gemella, and Obolcola, which had been 
garrisoned by Viriathus. Others he plundered and still 
others he spared. Having captured about 10,000 prisoners, 
he beheaded 500 of them and sold the rest as slaves. Then 
he went into winter quarters, having already been two years 
in the command. Having performed these labors, Servil- 
ianus returned to Rome and was succeeded in the com- 
mand by Quintus Pompeius Aulus. The brother of the 
former, Maximus ^milianus, having received the surrender 
of a captain of robbers, named Connoba, released him but 
cut off the hands of all of his men. 

69. While following Viriathus, Servilianus laid siege to 
Erisana, one of his towns. Viriathus entered the town by 
night, and at daybreak fell upon those who were working in 
the trenches, compelling them to throw away their spades 
and run. In like manner he defeated the rest of the army, 
which was drawn up in order of battle by Servilianus, pur- 
sued it, and drove the Romans among some cliffs from 
\Hiich there was no chance of escape. Viriathus was not 
arrogant in the hour of victory, but considering this a favor- 
able opportunity to bring the war to an end and win the 
great gratitude of the Romans, he made an agreement with 
them, and this agreement was ratified at Rome. Viriathus 
was declared to be a friend of the Roman people, and it 
was decreed that all of his followers should have the land 
which they then occupied. Thus the Viriathic war, which 
had been so extremely tedious to the Romans, seemed to 
have been settled satisfactorily and brought to an end. 

614 70. The peace was not of long duration, for Csepio, 140 
brother of the Servilianus who had concluded it, and his 
successor in the command, complained of the treaty, and 
wrote home that it was most unworthy of the dignity of 
the Roman people. The Senate at first authorized him to 
annoy Viriathus according to his own discretion, provided 
it were done secretly. By persisting and continually send- 
ing letters he procured the breaking of the treaty and a 


V.R. B.C. 

614 renewal of open hostilities against Viriathus. When war 140 
was publicly declared Caepio took the town of Arsa, which 
Viriathus abandoned, and followed Viriathus himself (who 
fled and destroyed everything in his path) as far as Car- 
petania, the Roman forces being much stronger than his. 
Viriathus deeming it unwise to engage in battle, on account 
of the smallness of his army, ordered the greater part of 
it to retreat through a hidden defile, while he drew up the 
remainder on a hill as though he intended to fight. When 
he judged that those who had been sent before had reached 
a place of safety, he darted after them with such disregard 
of the enemy and such swiftness that his pursuers did not 
know whither he had gone. Caepio turned against the 
Vettones and the Callaici and wasted their fields. 

616 71. Emulating the example of Viriathus many other gue- 138 
rilla bands made incursions into Lusitania and ravaged it. 
Sextus Junius Brutus, who was sent against them, despaired 
of following them through the extensive country bounded 
by the navigable rivers Tagus, Lethe, Durius, and Baetis, 
because he considered it extremely difficult to overtake 
them while flying from place to place after the manner of 
robbers, and yet disgraceful not to do so, and a task not 
very glorious even if he should conquer them. He there- 
fore turned against their towns, thinking that thus he should 
take vengeance on them, and at the same time secure a 
quantity of plunder for his army, and that the robbers would 
scatter, each to his own place, when their homes were 
threatened. With this design he began destroying every- 
thing that came in his way. Here he found the women 
fighting and perishing in company with the men with such 
bravery that they uttered no cry even in the midst of 
slaughter. Some of the inhabitants fled to the mountains 
with what they could carry, and to these, when they asked 
pardon, Brutus granted it, taking their goods as a fine. 

617 72. He then crossed the river Durius, carrying war far 137 
and wide and taking hostages from those who surrendered, 
until he came to the river Lethe, being the first of the 
Romans to think of crossing that stream. Passing over this 
he advanced to another river called the Nimis, where he 
attacked the Bracari because they had plundered his pro- 
vision train. They were a very warlike people, the women 

§ 71-74] THE WARS IN SPAIN 89 

617 bearing arms with the men, who fought never turning, never 137 
showing their backs, or uttering a cry. Of the women who 
were captured some killed themselves, others slew their 
children with their own hands, considering death preferable 
to captivity. There were some towns that surrendered to 
Brutus and soon afterwards revolted. These he reduced to 
subjection again. 

73. One of the towns that often submitted and as often 
rebelled was Talabriga. When Brutus moved against it the 
inhabitants begged pardon and offered to surrender at dis- 
cretion. He first demanded of them all the deserters, the 
prisoners, and the arms they had, and hostages in addition, 
and then he ordered them to vacate the town with their 
wives and children. When they had obeyed these orders, 
he surrounded them with his army and made a speech to 
them, telling them how often they had revolted and renewed 
the war against him. Having inspired them with fear and 
with the belief that he was about to inflict some terrible 
punishment on them, he ceased his reproaches. Having 
deprived them of their horses, provisions, public money, 
and other general resources, he gave them back their town 
to dwell in, contrary to their expectation. Having accom- 
plished these results, Brutus returned to Rome. I have 
united these events with the history of Viriathus, because 
they were undertaken by other guerilla bands at the same 
time, and in emulation of him. 

614 74. Viriathus sent his most trusted friends Audax, Ditalco, ,40 
and Minurus to Caepio to negotiate terms of peace. The 
latter bribed them by large gifts and promises to assassinate 
Viriathus, which they did in this way. Viriathus, on account 
of his excessive cares and labors, slept but little, and for the 
most part took rest in his armor so that when aroused he 
should be prepared for every emergency. For this reason 
it was permitted to his friends to visit him by night. Tak- 
ing advantage of this custom, those who were associated with 
Audax in guarding him entered his tent as if on pressing 
business, just as he had fallen asleep, and killed him by 
stabbing him in the throat, which was the only part of his 
body not protected by armor. The nature of the wound 
was such that nobody suspected what had been done. The 
murderers fled to Caepio and asked for the rest of their pay. 


614 For the present he gave them permission to enjoy safely 140 
what they had already received ; as for the rest of their 
demands he referred them to Rome. When dayhght came 
the attendants of Viriathus and the remainder of the army 
thought he was still resting and wondered at his unusually 
long repose, until some of them discovered that he was lying 
dead in his armor. Straightway there was grief and lam- 
entation throughout the camp, all of them mourning for 
him, fearing for their own safety, thinking what dangers they 
were in, and of what a general they had been bereft. Most 
of all were they grieved that they could not find the perpe- 
trators of the crime. 

75. They arrayed the body of Viriathus in splendid gar- 
ments and burned it on a lofty funeral pile. Many sacri- 
fices were offered for him. Troops of horse and foot in 
armor marched around him singing his praises in barbarian 
fashion. Nor did they depart from the funeral pile until 
the fire had gone out. When the obsequies were ended, 
they had gladiatorial contests at his tomb. So great was 
the longing for Viriathus after his death — a man who had 
the highest qualities of a commander as reckoned among 
barbarians, always foremost in facing danger and most exact 
in dividing the spoils. He never consented to take the lion's 
share, even when friends begged him to, but whatever he 
got he divided among the bravest. Thus it came about (a 
most difficult task and one never before achieved by any 
other commander so easily) that in the eight years of this 
war, in an army composed of various tribes, there never was 
any sedition, the soldiers were always obedient and fearless 
in the presence of danger. After his death they chose a 
general named Tantalus and made an expedition against 
Saguntum, the city which Hannibal had overthrown and re- 
established and named New Carthage, after his own country. 
When they had been repulsed from that place and were 
crossing the river Baetis, Csepio pressed them so hard that 
Tantalus became exhausted and surrendered his army to 
Caepio on condition that they should be treated as subjects. 
The latter took from them all their arms and gave them suf- 
ficient land, so that they should not be driven to robbery 
by want. In this way the Viriathic war came to an end. 

§ 75-77] "^^^ WARS IN SPAIN 9 1 

Chapter XIII 

The Numantine War — Pompeius Aulus lays Siege to Numantia — 
Makes a Treaty with the Numan tines — The Senate repudiates it — 
Mancinus makes a Fresh Treaty — ^milius Lepidus makes War 
Contrary to Orders of the Senate — The Senate repudiates the Treaty 
of Mancinus 

γ R BaC* 

6« 76. Our history returns to the war against the Arevacii43 
and the Numantines, whom Viriathus stirred up to revolt. 
Caecilius Metellus was sent against them from Rome with a 
larger army and he subdued the Arevaci, falling upon them 
suddenly while they were gathering their crops. There 
still remained the two towns of Termantia and Numantia to 
engage his attention. Numantia was difficult of access by 
reason of two rivers and the ravines and dense woods that 
surrounded it. There was only one road to the open coun- 
try and that had been blocked by ditches and palisades. 
The Numantines were first-rate soldiers, both horse and 
foot, there being about 8000 altogether. Although small in 
numbers, yet they gave the Romans great trouble by their 
bravery. At the end of winter Metellus surrendered to his 
successor, Quintus Pompeius Aulus, the command of the 
army, consisting of 30,000 foot and 2000 horse, admirably 
trained. While encamped against Numantia, Pompeius had 
occasion to go away somewhere. The Numantines made 
a sally against a body of his horse that was ranging after 
him and destroyed them. When he returned he drew up 
his army in the plain. The Numantines came down to 
meet him, but retired slowly as though intending flight, until 
they had drawn Pompeius to the ditches and palisades.^ 

613 77. When he saw his forces wasted day by day in skir- 141 
mishes with an enemy much inferior in numbers, he moved 
against Termantia as being an easier task. Here he engaged 
the enemy and lost 700 men ; and one of his tribunes, who 
was bringing provisions to his army, was put to flight by the 
Termantines. In a third engagement the same day they 
drove the Romans into a rocky place where many of their 
infantry and cavalry with their horses were forced down a 

^ At this point there is a lacuna in the text. 


613 precipice. The remainder, panic-stricken, passed the night 141 
under arms. At daybreak the enemy came out and a regu- 
lar battle was fought which lasted all day with equal fort- 
une. Night put an end to the conflict. Thence Pompeius 
marched against a small town named Malia, which was gar- 
risoned by Numantines. The inhabitants slew the garrison 
by treachery and delivered the town to Pompeius. He 
required them to surrender their arms and give hostages, 
after which he moved to Sedatania, which a robber chief 
named Tanginus was plundering. Pompeius overcame him 
and took many of his men prisoners. So high-spirited were 
these robbers that none of the captives would endure servi- 
tude. Some killed themselves, others killed those who had 
bought them, and others scuttled the ships that carried 
them away. 

614 78. Pompeius, coming back to the siege of Numantia, 140 
endeavored to turn the course of a certain river in order to 
reduce the city by famine. The inhabitants harassed him 
while he was doing this work. They rushed out in crowds 
without giving any signal, and assaulted those who were 
working on the river, and hurled darts at those who came to 
their assistance from the camp, and finally shut the Romans 
up in their own fortification. They also attacked the fora- 
gers and killed many, and among them Oppius, a military 
tribune. They made an assault in another quarter on a 
party of Romans who were digging a ditch, and killed about 
400 of them including their leader. About this time certain 
counsellors came to Pompeius from Rome, together with an 
army of new recruits, still raw and undisciplined, to take the 
places of the soldiers who had served their six years. Pom- 
peius, being put to shame by so many disasters, and desiring 

to wipe out the disgrace, remained in camp in the winter 
time with these raw recruits. The soldiers, being exposed 
to severe cold without shelter, and unaccustomed to the 
water and climate of the country, fell sick with dysen- 
tery and many died. A detachment having gone out 
for forage, the Numantines laid an ambuscade near the 
Roman camp and provoked them to a skirmish. The 
latter, not enduring the affront, sallied out against them. 
Then those who were in ambush sprang up, and many of 
the common soldiers and many of the nobility lost their 

§ 78-80] THE WARS IN SPAIN 93 

Y.R. B.C 

614 lives. Finally the Numantines encountered the foraging 140 
party on its return and killed many of those also. 

79. Pompeius, being cast down by so many misfortunes, 
marched away with his senatorial council to the towns to 
spend the rest of the winter, expecting a successor to come 
early in the spring. Fearing lest he should be called to ac- 
count, he made overtures to the Numantines secretly for the 
purpose of bringing the war to an end. The Numantines them- 
selves, being exhausted by the slaughter of so many of their 
bravest men, by the loss of their crops, by want of food, and 
by the length of the war, which had been protracted beyond 
expectation, sent legates to Pompeius. He publicly advised 
them to surrender at discretion, because no other kind of 
treaty seemed worthy of the dignity of the Roman people, but 
privately he told them what terms he should impose. When 
they had come to an agreement and the Numantines had 
given themselves up, he demanded and received from them 
hostages, together with the prisoners and deserters. He also 
demanded thirty talents of silver, a part of which they paid 
down and the rest he agreed to wait for. His successor, 

615 Marcus Popillius Laena, had arrived when they brought the «39 
last instalment. Pompeius being no longer under any 
apprehension concerning the war, since his successor was 
present, and knowing that he had made a disgraceful peace 
and without authority from Rome, began to deny that he 
had come to any understanding with the Numantines. The 
latter proved the contrary by witnesses who had taken part 

in the transaction, senators, and his own prefects of horse 
and military tribunes. Popillius sent them to Rome to carry 
on the controversy with Pompeius there. The case was 
brought before the Senate, and the Numantines and Pompeius 
debated it there. The Senate decided to continue the war. 
Thereupon Popillius attacked the Lusones who were neigh- 
bors of the Numantines, but he accomplished nothing, and 
on the arrival of his successor in office, Hostilius Mancinus, 
he returned to Rome. 
617 80. Mancinus had frequent encounters with the Numan- 137 
tines in which he was worsted, and finally, after great loss, 
took refuge in his camp. On a false rumor that the Cantabri 
and Vaccaei were coming to the aid of the Numantines, he 
became alarmed, extinguished his fires, and fled in the dark- 



617 ness of night to a desert place where Nobilior once had a 137 
camp. Being shut up in this place at daybreak without 
preparation or fortification and surrounded by Numantines, 
who threatened all with death unless he made peace, he 
agreed to terms like those previously made between the 
Romans and Numantines. To this agreement he bound 
himself by an oath. When these things were known at Rome 
there was great indignation at this most ignominious treaty, 
and the other consul, ^Emilius Lepidus, was sent to Spain, 
Mancinus being called home to stand trial. The Numan- 
tine ambassadors followed him thither, ^milius becoming 
tired of idleness while awaiting the decision from Rome 
(for some men sought the command, not for the advantage 
of the city, but for glory, or gain, or the honor of a triumph), 
falsely accused the Vaccaei of supplying the Numantines 
with provisions during the war. Accordingly he ravaged 
their country and laid siege to their principal city, Pallantia, 
which had in no way violated the treaty, and he persuaded 
Brutus, his brother-in-law, who had been sent to Farther 
Spain (as I have before related), to join him in this under- 

618 81. Here they were overtaken by Cinna and Caecilius, X36 
messengers from Rome, who said that the Senate was at a 
loss to know why, after so many disasters had befallen them 
in Spain, -^milius should be seeking a new war, and they 
placed in his hands a decree warning him not to attack the 
Vaccaei. But he, having actually begun the war, considered 
that the Senate was ignorant of that, and of the fact that Brutus 
was cooperating with him, and that the Vaccaei had aided the 
Numantines with provisions, money, and men. Accordingly 
he made answer that it would be dangerous to abandon the 
war, since nearly all Spain would rebel if they should imagine 
that the Romans were afraid. He sent Cinna*s party home 
without having accomplished their errand, and he wrote in 
this sense to the Senate. After this he began, in a fortified 
place, to construct engines and collect provisions. While he 
was thus engaged, Flaccus, who had been sent out on a for- 
aging expedition, found himself in an ambuscade but he 
saved himself by a trick. He cunningly spread a rumor 
among his men that ^milius had captured Pallantia. The 
soldiers raised a shout of victory. The barbarians, hearing it 

§ 81-83] THE WARS IN SPAIN 95 

Y.R. , B.C. 

618 and thinking that the report was true, withdrew. In this 136 
way Flaccus rescued his convoy from danger. 

82. The siege of Pallantia was long protracted, the food 
supply of the Romans failed, and they began to suffer from 
hunger. All their animals perished and many of the men 
died of want. The generals, ^miUus and Brutus, kept heart 

• . for a long time. Being compelled to yield at last, they gave 
an order suddenly one night, about the last watch, to retreat. 
The tribunes and centurions ran hither and thither to hasten 
the movement, so as to get them all away before daylight 
Such was the confusion that they left behind everything, and 
even the sick and wounded, who clung to them and besought 
them not to abandon them. Their retreat was disorderly 
and confused and much hke a flight, the Pallantines hanging 
on their flanks and rear and doing great damage from early 
dawn till evening. When night came the Romans, worn with 
toil and hunger, threw themselves on the ground by com- 
panies just as it happened, and the Pallantines, moved by 
some divine interposition, went back to their own country. 
And this was what happened to ^milius. 

83. Wheti these things were known at Rome, ^milius 
was deprived of his command and consulship, and when he 
returned to Rome as a private citizen he was fined besides. 
The dispute before the Senate between Mancinus and the 
Numantine ambassadors was still going on. The latter 
exhibited the treaty they had made with Mancinus ; he, on 
the other hand, put the blame on Pompeius, his predeces- 
sor in the command, who had turned over to him a worth- 
less and ill-provided army, with which Pompeius himself 
had often been beaten, and so had made a similar treaty 
with the Numantines. He added that the war had been 
under bad omens, for it had been decreed by the Romans 
in violation of these agreements. The senators were 
equally incensed against both, but Pompeius escaped be- 
cause he had been tried for this offence long before. They 
decided to deliver Mancinus to the Numantines for making 
a disgraceful treaty without their authorization. In this 
they followed the example of the fathers, who once delivered 
to the Samnites twenty generals who had made similar trea- 
ties without authority. Mancinus was taken to Spain by 
Furius, and delivered naked to the Numantines, but they 


619 refused to receive him. Calpurnius Piso was chosen gen- 135 
eral against them, but he did not march against Numantia. 
He made an incursion into the territory of Pallantia, and 
having collected a small amount of plunder, spent the rest 
of his term of office in winter quarters in Carpetania. 

Chapter XIV 


Scipio Africanus the Younger sent against the Numantines — He re- 
stores Discipline in the Army — Scipio's Maxims of War — Skir- 
mishes with the Numantines 

6ao 84. The Roman people being tired of this Numantinex34 
war, which was protracted and severe beyond expectation, 
elected Cornelius Scipio, the conqueror of Carthage, consul 
again, believing that he was the only man who could subdue 
the Numantines. As he was still under the consular age 
the Senate voted, as was done when Scipio was appointed 
general against the Carthaginians, that the tribunes of the 
people should repeal the law respecting the age limit, and 
reenact it for the following year.^ Thus Scipio was made 
consul a second time and hastened to Numantia. He did 
not take any army by levy because the city was exhausted 
by so many wars, and because there were plenty of soldiers 
in Spain. With the Senate *s consent he took a certain 
number of volunteers sent to him by cities and kings on 
the score of private friendship. To these were added 500 
of his clients and friends whom he joined in one body and 
called it the troop of friends. All these, about 4000 in 
number, he put under marching orders in charge of Buteo, 
his nephew, while he went in advance with a small escort 
to the army in Spain, having heard that it was full of idle- 
ness, discord, and luxury, and well knowing that he could 
never overcome the enemy unless he should first bring his 
own men under strict discipline. 

85. When he arrived he expelled all traders and harlots ; 

1 Scipio was not under the consular age at this time. He was born 
in the year of Rome 569 and was now fifty-one years old. The con- 
sular age was forty-three. Livy, xliv. 44; Velleius, ii. 4; Cicero, De 
Amicitiai 3. 

§ 84-86] THE WARS ΪΝ SPAIN 9^ 

V.R. B.C. 

620 also the soothsayers and diviners, whom the soldiers were 134 
continually consulting because they were demoralized by 
defeat. For the future he forbade the bringing in of any- 
thing not necessary, or any victims for purposes of divina- 
tion. He ordered all wagons and their superfluous contents 
to be sold, and all pack animals, except such as he desig- 
nated, to remain. For cooking utensils it was permitted to 
have only a spit, a brass kettle, and one cup. Their food 
was limited to plain boiled and roasted meats. They were 
forbidden to have beds, and Scipio was the first one to 
sleep on straw. He forbade them to ride on mules when 
on the march ; " for what can you expect in a war," said 
he, " from a man who is not able to walk ? " Those who 
had servants to bathe and anoint them were ridiculed by 
Scipio, who said that only mules, having no hands, needed 
others to rub them. Thus in a short time he brought them 
back to good order. He accustomed them also to respect 
and fear himself by being difficult of access and sparing of 
favors, especially favors contrary to regulations. He often 
said that those generals who were severe and strict in the 
observance of law were serviceable to their own men, while 
those who were easy-going and bountiful were useful only 
to the enemy. The soldiers of the latter, he said, might be 
joyous but insubordinate, while the others, although down- 
cast, would be obedient and ready for all emergencies. 

2^6, He did not venture to engage the enemy until he 
had trained his men by many laborious exercises. He trav- 
ersed all the neighboring plains, and daily fortified new 
camps one after another, and then demolished them, dug 
deep trenches and filled them up again, constructed high 
walls and overthrew them, personally overlooking the work 
fi*om morning till night. In order to prevent the men from 
straggling while on the march, as heretofore, he always 
moved in the form of squares, and no one was allowed to 
change the place assigned to him. Moving around the hne 
of march he often visited the rear and caused horsemen to 
dismount and give their places to the sick, and when the 
mules were overburdened he made the foot soldiers carry a 
part of the load. When he had come to the end of the 
day's march he required those who had formed the van- 
guard during the day to deploy around the camping-place, 

VOL. I— Η 

98 APPIAN 'S HlSTOk V [Bk. VI, Ch. XIV 

Y.R. B<C• 

620 and a body of horse to scour the country, while the rest 134 
performed their Plotted tasks, some digging the trench, 
others building the rampart, and others pitching the tents. 
He also fixed the time within which these tasks must be 
finished, and kept an accurate account thereof. 

87. When he judged that the army was alert, obedient to 
himself, and patient in labor, he moved his camp near to 
Numantia. He did not place advance guards in fortified 
stations, as some do, because he did not wish to divide his 
army as yet, lest he should meet some disaster at the outset 
and gain the contempt of the enemy, who had so long de- 
spised the Romans. Nor did he proceed at once to attack 
the enemy because he was still studying the nature of this 
war, watching his opportunity, and trying to discover the 
plans of the Numantines. In the meantime he foraged 
through all the fields behind his camp and cut down the un- 
ripe grain. When those fields had been harvested and it was 
necessary to move forward, and a short road to Numantia 
was found across the country which many advised him to 
take, he said : " What I am afraid of is the coming back. 
Our enemies are very nimble. They can dart out of the• city 
and dart back again, while our men, like soldiers who return 
from foraging, will be tired out with the booty, the wagons, 
and the burdens they bring. For this reason the fighting 
will be severe and unequal. If we are beaten the danger 
will be serious, and if victorious, neither the glory nor the 
gain will be great. It is foolish to incur danger for small re- 
sults. He must be considered a reckless general who would 
fight before there is any need, while a good one takes risks 
only in cases of necessity." He added by way of simile 
that physicians do not cut and burn their patients till they 
have first tried drugs. Having spoken thus, he ordered his 
officers to take the longer road. Then he made some ex- 
cursions beyond the camp and later advanced into the terri- 
tory of the Vaccaei, from whom the Numantines bought their 
food supplies, cutting down everything, taking for himself 
what was useful as food, and piling the rest in heaps and 
burning it. 

SS. In a part of Pallantia called Complanio the Pal- 
lantians had concealed a large force just below the brow 
of a hill while others openly annoyed the Roman foragers. 

§ 87-89] THE WARS IN SPAIN 99 

Y.R. B.C. 

6sro Scipio ordered Rutilius Rufus, a military tribune (who af- 134 
terwards wrote a history of these transactions), to take four 
troops of horse and drive back the assailants. Rufus followed 
them too sharply when they retreated, and darted up the 
hill with the fugitives. When he discovered the ambush he 
ordered his troops not to pursue or attack the enemy further, 
but to stand on the defensive with their spears presented to 
the enemy and merely ward off their attack. Straightway 
Scipio, seeing that Rufus had exceeded his orders, and fear- 
ing for his safety, followed with all haste. When he dis- 
covered the ambush he divided his horse into two bodies 
and ordered them to charge the enemy on either side alter- 
nately, hurling their javelins all together and then retiring, 
not to the same spot from which they had advanced, but a 
little further back each time. In this way the horsemen 
were brought in safety to the plain. As he was shifting 
quarters and retiring again, he had to cross a river which was 
difficult to ford by reason of its muddy banks, and here the 
enemy had laid an ambush for him. Having learned this 
fact, he turned aside and took a route that was longer, and 
where there was no water supply. Here he marched by 
night on account of the heat and thirst, and dug wells which 
yielded for the most part only bitter water. He saved his 
men with extreme difficulty, but some of his horses and pack 
animals perished of thirst. 

• 89. VVhile passing through the territory of the Caucsei, 
whose treaty with the Romans Lucullus had violated, he 
made proclamation that they might return in safety to their 
own homes. Thence he came again to the Numantine ter- 
ritory and went into winter quarters. Here Jugurtha, the 
grandson of Masinissa, joined him with twelve elephants and 
the body of archers and slingers who usually accompanied 
them in war. While' Scipio was constantly ravaging and 
plundering the neighboring country, the enemy laid an am- 
bush for him at a certain village which was surrounded on 
nearly all sides by a marshy pool. On the remaining side 
was a ravine in which the ambuscading party was hidden. 
Scipio*s soldiers were divided so that one part entered the 
village to plunder it, leaving the standards outside, while 
another, but not large party, was coursing around it on horse- 
back. The men in ambush fell upon the latter, who began a 


Y.R. Β.ς 

620 desperate fight. Scipio, who happened to be standing in 134 
front of the village near the standards, recalled by trumpet 
those who had gone inside, and before he had collected a 
thousand men went to the aid of the horsemen who were in 
difficulties. The greater part of those who were in the vil- 
lage rushed out and put the enemy to flight. He did not 
pursue the fugitives, however, but returned to the camp, a 
few having fallen on each side. 

Chapter XV 

Builds a Wall around the City — Stops Communication by the River — 
Numantia Closely Invested — The Exploit of Rhetogenes — Nego- 
tiations with Scipio — Numantia surrenders — Heroism of the Nu- 
mantines — Scipio razes Numantia to the Ground 

621 90. Not long afterwards he established two camps very 133 
near to Numantia and placed his brother Maximus in charge 
of one while he commanded the other. The Numantines 
came out in large numbers and offered battle, but he dis- 
regarded their challenge, not thinking it wise to engage in 
battle with men who were fighting in sheer desperation, but 
rather to sl\ut them up and reduce them by famine. Plac- 
ing seven towers around the city, he began the siege and 
wrote letters to each of the allied tribes, telling them what 
forces he desired them to send. When they came he 
divided them into several parts and afterwards subdivided 
his own army. Then he appointed a commander for each 
division and ordered them to surround the city with a ditch 
and palisade. The circumference of Numantia itself was 
twenty-four stades, that of the enclosing works more than 
twice as great. All of this space was carefully allotted to 
the several divisions, and he had given orders that if the 
enemy should make a sally anywhere they should signal to 
him by raising a red flag on a tall spear in the daytime or 
by a fire at night, so that he or Maximus might hasten to 
the aid of those who needed it. When this work was com- 
pleted and he could effectually repel any assaults, he dug 
another ditch not far behind this one and fortified it with 
paHsades and built a wall eight feet wide and ten feet high, 
exclusive of the parapets. He built towers along the whole 


Y.R. , ^ B.C. 

621 of this wall at intervals of 100 feet. As it was not possible 133 
to carry the wall around the adjoining marsh he threw an 
embankment around it of the same height and thickness as 
the wall, to serve in place of it. 

91. Thus Scipio was the first general, as I think, to throw 
a wall around a city which did not shun a battle in the open 
field. However, the river Durius, which took its course 
through the fortifications, was very useful to the Numantines 
for bringing provisions and sending men back and forth, 
some diving and others concealing themselves in small 
boats, some making their way with sail-boats when a strong 
wind was blowing, or with oars aided by the current. As he 
was not able to span it on account of its breadth and swift- 
ness, Scipio built two towers in place of a bridge. To each 
of these towers he moored large timbers with ropes and set 
them floating across the river. The timbers were stuck full 
of knives and spear-heads, which were kept constantly in 
motion by the force of the stream dashing against them, so 
that the enemy were prevented from passing covertly, either 
by swimming, or diving, or sailing in boats. Thus was ac- 
complished what Scipio especially desired, namely, that 
nobody could have any dealings with them, nobody could 
come in, and they could have no knowledge of what was 
going on outside. Thus they would be in want of provi- 
sions and apparatus of every kind. 

92. When everything was ready and the catapults, ballis- 
tge, and other engines were placed on the towers, the stones, 
darts, and javelins collected on the parapets, and the 
archers and slingers in their places, he stationed messengers 
at frequent intervals along the entire wall to pass the word 
from one to another by day or night to let him know what 
was taking place. He gave orders to each tower that in 
any emergency the one that was first attacked should hoist 
a signal and that the others when they saw it should do 
the same, in order that he might be advised of the commo- 
tion quickly by signal, and learn the particulars afterward 
by messengers. The army, together with the native forces, 
now numbering some 60,000 men, he arranged so that one- 
half should guard the wall and in case of necessity go to 
any place where they should be wanted, 20,000 were to 
fight from the top of the wall when necessary, and the re- 


Υ•Κ• BaC• 

631 maining 10,000 were kept in reserve. Each division had 133 
its place assigned, and it was not permitted to any to change 
without orders. Each man was to spring to the place as- 
signed to him when any signal of an attack was given. So 
carefully was everything arranged by Scipio. 

93. The Numantines made several attacks here and there 
upon those guarding the walls. Swift and terrible was the 
appearance of the defenders, the signals being everywhere 
hoisted, the messengers running, the defenders of the walls 
springing to their places in crowds, and the trumpets sound- 
ing on every tower, so that the whole circuit of fifty stades 
presented to all beholders a most formidable aspect. This 
circuit Scipio traversed each day and night for the purpose 
of inspection. He was convinced that the enemy thus 
enclosed, and unable to obtain food, arms, or succor from 
without, could not hold out very long. 

94. In the meantime Rhetogenes, a Numantine, sur- 
named Caraunius, a man of the greatest valor, induced five 
of his friends to take an equal number of servants and 
horses, and cross the space between the two armies secretly, 
on a cloudy night, carrying a bridge made in sections. 
Arriving at the wall he and his friends sprang upon it, slew 
the guards on either side, sent back the servants, drew the 
horses up the bridge, and rode off to the towns of the 
Arevaci, bearing olive-branches and entreating them, as 
blood relations, to help the Numantines. The chiefs of 
the Arevaci, fearing the Romans, would not even listen to 
them, but sent them away immediately. There was a rich 
town named Lutia, distant 300 stades from Nuraantia, 
whose young men sympathized with the Numantines and 
urged their city to send them aid. The older citizens 
secretly communicated this fact to Scipio. Receiving this 
intelligence about the eighth hour, he marched thither at 
once with a numerous and well-equipped force. Surround- 
ing the place about daylight, he demanded that the leaders 
of the young men should be delivered up to him. When 
the citizens replied that they had fled from the place, he 
sent a herald to tell them that if these men were not 
surrendered to him he would sack the city. Being terri- 
fied by this threat, they delivered them up, to the number 
of about 400. Scipio cut off their hands, withdrew his 

§ 93-96] THE WARS IN SPAIN 103 

631 force, rode away, and was back in his own camp the next 133 

95. The Numantines, being oppressed by hunger, sent 
five men to Scipio to ask whether he would treat them 
with moderation if they would surrender. Their leader, 
Avarus, discoursed much about the prestige and bravery of 
the Numantines, and said that even now they had done no 
wrong, but had fallen into their present misery for the sake 
of their wives and children, and for the freedom of their 
country. "Wherefore, Ο Scipio," he said, "it is worthy 
of you, as a man renowned for virtue, to spare a brave and 
honorable race and to extend to us terms dictated by hu- 
manity, which we shall be able to bear, now that we have 
at last experienced a change of fortune. It rests not with 
us but with you whether you receive the surrender of our 
city on fair terms, or allow it to perish in a last struggle." 
When Avarus had thus spoken, Scipio (who knew from 
prisoners the state of affairs inside) said merely that they 
must surrender their arms and place themselves and their 
city in his hands. When this answer was made known, the 
Numantines, who were previously savage in temper because 
of their absolute freedom and quite unaccustomed to obey 
the orders of others, and were now wilder than ever and 
beside themselves by reason of their hardships, slew Avarus 
and the five ambassadors who had accompanied him, as 
bearers of evil tidings, and perhaps thinking that they had 
made private terms for themselves with Scipio. 

96. Soon after this, all their eatables being consumed, 
having neither grain, nor flocks, nor grass, they began, as is 
frequently necessary in wars, to lick boiled hides. When 
these also failed, they boiled and ate the bodies of human 
beings, first of those who had died a natural death, chop- 
ping them in small bits for cooking. Afterwards being 
nauseated by the flesh of the sick, the stronger laid violent 
hands upon the weaker. No form of misery was absent. 
They were rendered savage in mind by their food, and their 
bodies were reduced to the semblance of wild beasts by 
famine, plague, long hair, and neglect. In this condition 
they surrendered themselves to Scipio. He commanded 
them the same day to bring their arms to a place desig- 
nated by him, and on the following day to assemble at 


V.R. B.C 

631 another place. But they put off the day, declaring that 133 
many of them still clung to liberty and desired to take their 
own lives. Wherefore they asked for a day to arrange for 

97. Such was the love of liberty and of valor which ex- 
isted in this small barbarian town. With only 8000 fight- 
ing men before the war began, how many and what terrible 
reverses did they bring upon the Romans ! How many trea- 
ties did they make on equal terms with the Romans, which 

- the latter would not consent to make with any other people ! 
How often did they challenge to open battle the last gen- 
eral sent against them, who had an army of 60,000 men! 
But he showed himself more experienced in war than them- 
selves, by refusing to join battle with wild beasts when he 
could reduce them by that invincible enemy, hunger. In 
this way alone was it possible to capture the Numantines, 
and in this way alone were they captured. Reflecting upon 
their small numbers and great* sufferings, their valiant deeds 
and long endurance, it has occurred to me to narrate these 
particulars of the Numantine history. Many, directly after 
the surrendeF, killed themselves in whatever way they chose, 
some in one way and some in another. The remainder 
congregated on the third day at the appointed place, a 
strange and shocking spectacle. Their bodies were foul, 
their hair and nails long, and they were smeared with dirt. 
They smelt most horribly, and the clothes they wore were 
likewise squalid and emitted an equally foul odor. For 
these reasons they appeared pitiable even to their enemies. 
At the same time there was something fearful to the be- 
holders in the expression of their eyes — an expression of 
anger, grief, toil, and the consciousness of having eaten 
human flesh. 

98. Having reserved fifty of them for his triumph, Scipio 
sold the rest and razed the city to the ground. So this 
Roman general overthrew two most powerful cities, — Car- 
thage, by decree of the Senate, on account of its greatness, 
its power, and its advantages by land and sea; Numantia, 
small and with a sparse population, the Romans knowing 
nothing about the transaction as yet. He destroyed the 
latter either because he thought that it would be for the 
advantage of the Romans, or because he was in a violent 




6n rage agunsl the captrres. or, as soedc tiiiDk. in cvder to 133 
acquire the gkHT ot tvo samaTnrs from two greit cibLmi- 
ties. At any rate, uic Romans id tins day call ηΐζΏ Africa* 
nns and Numantiims irom ύχ rsin be bioTigh: upon those 
two places. Having divided tiie teiritoiy oi the Nnman- 
tines amos^ their near neighbors and transacted certain 
business in the other cities, threatening or nning any whom 
he suspected, be saikd for home. 

Chapter XVI 

Later Histofr — Iii£udois Bdsarior c^ Didios — Sextonus in Spun 

99. The Romans, according to their custom, sent ten 
senators to the newly acquired provinces of Spain, which 
Scipio, or Brutus before him, had received in surrender, or 
had taken by force, to settle their affairs on a peace basis. 

643 At a later time, other revolts having taken place in Si>ain, na 
Calpumius Piso was chosen as commander. He was suc- 
ceeded by Servius Galba. \Mien the Cimbri invaded Italy, 
and Sicilv was torn bv the second ser\'ile war, the Romans 
were too much preoccupied to send soldiers to Spain, but 
sent legates who endeavored to settle affairs without war as 
far as diey could. \Mien the Cimbri were driven out Titus 
Didius was sent to Spain, and he slew about 20,000 of the 
Arevaci. He also removed Termesum, a large cit}' alwa}'s 
insubordinate to the Romans, from a place of security into 
the plain, and ordered the inhabitants to live without walls. 

656 He also besieged the city of Colenda and captured it nine 98 
months after he had invested it, and sold the inhabitants 
with their wives and children. 

100. There was another city near Colenda inhabited by 
mixed tribes of Celtiberians w^ho had been the allies of 
Marcus Marius in a war against the Lusitanians, and whom 
he had settled there five years before with the approval of 
the Senate. They were living by robbery on account of 
their poverty. Didius, with the concurrence of the ten 
legates who were still present, resolved to destroy them. 
Accordingly, he told their principal men that he would 
allot the land of Colenda to them because they were poor. 


Y.R. B.C. 

656 Finding them very much pleased with this offer, he told 98 
them to communicate it to their people, and to come with 
their wives and children to the parcelling out of the land. 
When they had done so he ordered his soldiers to vacate 
their camp, and these people, whom he wanted to ensnare, 
to go inside, so that he might make a list of their names, 
the men on one register and the women and children on 
another, in order to know how much land should be set 
apart for them. When they had gone inside the ditch and 
palisade, Didius surrounded them with his army and killed 
them all, and for this he was honored with a triumph. At 
a later period, the Celtiberians having revolted again, 
Flaccus was sent against them and slew 20,000. The 
people of the town of Belgida were eager for revolt, and 
when their senate hesitated they set fire to the senate-house 
and burned the senators. When Flaccus arrived there he 
put the authors of this crime to death. 

loi. These are the events which I have found most 
worthy of mention in the relations of the Romans with the 

673 Spaniards until that time. At a later period, when the 82 
dissensions of Sulla and Cinna arose in Rome, and the coun- 
try was torn with civil wars and hostile camps, Quintus 
Sertorius, one of Cinna' s party, who had been chosen to 
the command in Spain, stirred up that country against the 
Romans. He raised a large army, created a senate of his 
own friends after the manner of the Roman Senate, and 
marched towards Rome full of confidence and high courage, 
for he had been renowned for valor elsewhere. The Sen- 
ate in great alarm sent against him their most famous gen- 
erals, first Caecilius Metellus with a large army, and then 
Pompey with another army, in order to repel if possi- 
ble this war from Italy, which was terribly distracted with 

683 civil strife. But Sertorius was murdered by Perpenna, one 72 
of his own partisans, who proclaimed himself general of 
the faction in place of Sertorius. Pompey slew Perpenna 
in battle, and so this war, which had greatly alarmed the 
Romans, came to an end; but I shall speak of this more 
particularly in my account of the civil wars of Sulla. 

693 102. After the death of Sulla, Gaius Caesar was sent as 6x 
praetor into Spain with power to make war wherever it was 
needful. All of those Spaniards who were doubtful in their 


693 allegiance, or had not yet submitted to the Romans, he 61 
brought under subjection by force and arms. Some, who 
afterwards rebelled, were subdued by his adopted son Octa- 

729 vius, surnamed Augustus. From that time it appears that 25 
the Romans have divided Iberia (which they now call His- 
pania) into three parts and sent a praetor to govern each, 
two being chosen annually by the Senate, and the third ap- 
pointed by the emperor to hold office during his pleasure. 


Chapter I 

Hamilcar Barca — Hannibal in Spain — Hannibal marches over the 


1. What Hannibal the Carthaginian did to, and suffered 
from, the Romans during the sixteen years that he persisted 
in war against them, from his first march from Spain to 
Italy until he was recalled by the Carthaginians (their own 
city being in danger), and was then driven out by the 
Romans, this book will show. What Hannibal's real reasons 
for that invasion were, as well as his public pretext, have 
been very clearly set forth in my Spanish history, yet I 
shall mention them here by way of reminder. 

2. Hamilcar, surnamed Barca, the father of this Hanni- 
bal, was the commander of the Carthaginian forces in Sicily 
when they contended with the Romans for possession of 
that island. Being prosecuted by his enemies on a charge 
of maladministration, and fearing a conviction, he man- 
aged to get himself chosen general against the Numidians 
before he had settled his accounts. Having proved useful 
in this war and having secured the favor of the army by 
plunder and largesses, he passed over the straits into Spain 
and made an expedition against Gades without the authority 
of Carthage. From thence he sent much booty to Carthage 
in order to win the favor of the multitude so that if possi- 
ble he might ward off censure on account of his command 
in Sicily. Having gained much territory and great glory 
he inspired the Carthaginians with a desire to possess the 
whole of Spain, and persuaded them that it would be an 
easy task. Thereupon the Saguntines and other Greeks who 
were settled in Spain had recourse to the Romans, and a 



Y.R. B.C 

boundary was fixed to the Carthaginian possessions in that 
country, namely, that they should not cross the river Iberus 
(Ebro), and a treaty to Uiis effect was made between the 
Romans and the Carthaginians. After this, Hamilcar, 
while settling the affairs of Carthaginian Spain, was killed 
in battle, and Hasdrubal, his son-in-law, succeeded him as 
general. The latter while hunting was killed by a slave 
whose master he had put to death. 
534 3. After them this Hannibal was chosen by the army as a» 
the third commander in Spain because he seemed to have 
great aptitude and fondness for war. He was the son of 
Hamilcar and the brother of Hasdrubars wife, a very young 
man whose early years had been passed in the company of 
his father and his brother-in-law. The people of Carthage 
confirmed his election as general. In this way Hannibal, 
whose history I am about to write, became the commander 
of the Carthaginians against the Spaniards. The enemies 
of Hamilcar and Hasdrubal in Carthage continued to per- 
secute the friends of those men, despising Hannibal on 
account of his youth. The latter, believing that this per- 
secution was originally directed against himself and that 
he might secure his own safety by means of his country's 
fears, began to think about involving it in a great war. 
Believing, as was the fact, that a war between the Romans 
and Carthaginians once begun would last a long time, and 
that the undertaking would bring great glory to himself, 
even if he should fail (it was said, also, that he had been 
sworn on the altar by his father, while yet a boy, that he 
would be an eternal enemy of Rome), he resolved to cross 

535 the Iberus in defiance of the treaty. For a pretext he pro- 2x9 
cured certain persons to make accusations against the Sa- 
guntines. By continually forwarding these accusations to 
Carthage, and by accusing the Romans of secretly inciting 
the Spaniards to revolt, he obtained permission from Car- 
thage to take such steps as he should think fit. Thereupon 
he crossed the Iberus and destroyed the city of Saguntum 
with its inhabitants. Thus the treaty, made between the 
Romans and the Carthaginians after the war in Sicily, was 

536 4. What Hannibal himself and what the other Cartha- ax8 
ginian and Roman generals after him did in Spain, I have 


536 related in the Spanish history. Having collected a large 218 
army of Celtiberians, Africans, and other nationalities, and 
put the command of Spain in the hands of his brother Has- 
drubal, he crossed over the Pyrenees mountains into the 
country of the Celts, which is now called Gaul, with 90,000 
foot, 12,000 horse, and 37 elephants. He passed through 
the country of the Gauls, conciliating some with money and 
some by persuasion, and overcoming others by force. When 
he came to the Alps and found no road through or over 
them (for they were exceedingly precipitous), he never- 
theless marched boldly forward, but suffered great losses. 
The snow and ice being heaped high in front, he cut down 
and burned wood, quenched the ashes with water and vine- 
gar, and thus rendering the rocks brittle he shattered them 
with iron hammers and opened a passage which is still in 
use over the mountains and is called Hannibal's pass. As 
his supplies began to fail he pressed forward, the Romans 
remaining in ignorance until he was actually in Italy. 
Scarcely six months after leaving Spain, and after suffering 
heavy losses of men, he descended from the mountains to 
the plain. 

Chapter II 

Battle of Ticinus — Battle of Trebia — Battle of Lake Thrasimenus — 
Hannibal destroys the Detachment of Centenius — Fabius Maximus 
chosen Dictator 

5. After a brief pause he attacked Taurasia, a Gallic 
town, took it by storm, and put the prisoners to death, in 
order to strike terror into the rest of the Gauls. Then he 
advanced to the river Eridanus, now called the Padus [Po], 
where the Romans were at war with the Gallic tribe called 
the Boii, and pitched his camp. The Roman consul, Pub- 
lius Cornelius Scipio, was at that time contending with the 
Carthaginians in Spain. When he learned of Hannibal's 
incursion into Italy, he left his brother, Gnaeus Cornelius 
Scipio, in charge of affairs in Spain and sailed for Etruria. 
Marching thence with such allies as he could collect, he 
came before Hamiibal to the Po. He sent Manlius and 
Atilius, who were conducting the war against the Boii, back 
to Rome, as they had no right to command when a consul 

§ 5-7] ^^^ haMnibalic war 1 1 1 

Y.R. B'C. 

536 was on the ground, and taking their forces drew them up 218 
for battle with Hannibal. After a skirmish and a cavalry 
engagement, the Romans were surrounded by the Africans 
and fled to their camp. The next night they took refuge 
in Placentia, a place strongly fortified, crossing the Po and 
then breaking down the bridge. Nevertheless Hannibal 
made a new bridge and crossed the river. 

6. These exploits, one after another, following his pas- 
sage of the Alps, exalted Hannibal's fame among the Cis- 
alpine Gauls as an invincible commander and one most 
highly favored by fortune. In order to increase the ad- 
miration of those barbarians, who were easily deceived, he 
frequently changed his clothes and his hair, using carefully 
prepared devices each time. When the Gauls saw him 
moving among their people now an old man, then a young 
man, and again a middle-aged man, and continually chang- 
ing from one to the other, they were astonished and thought 
that he partook of the divine nature. Sempronius, the 
other consul, being then in Sicily and learning what had 
happened, embarked his forces, came to Scipio*s aid, and 
encamped at a distance of forty stades from him. The fol- 
lowing day they all made ready for battle. The river Tre- 
bia separated the hostile armies, which the Romans crossed 
before daylight on a raw, sleety morning of the spring 
equinox, wading in the water up to their breasts. Hanni- 
bal allowed his army to rest till the second hour and then 
marched out. 

7. The order of battle on each side was as follows. The 
Roman cavalry were posted on the wings in order to pro- 
tect the infantry.^ Hannibal ranged his elephants opposite 
the Roman horse and his foot-soldiers against the legions, 
and he ordered his own cavalry to remain quiet behind the 
elephants until he should give the signal. When battle was 
joined the horses of the Romans, terrified by the sight and 
smell of the elephants, broke and fled. The foot-soldiers, 
although suffering much and weakened by cold, wet clothes, 
and want of sleep, nevertheless boldly attacked these beasts, 
wounded them, and cut the hamstrings of some, and were 
already pushing back the enemy's infantry. Hannibal, ob- 

^ At this point there is a lacuna in the text. 


Υ•Κ• B>C• 

536 serving this, gave the signal to his horse to attack theais 
Roman flank. The Roman horse having been just dis- 
persed by fear of the elephants, the foot-soldiers were left 
without protection, and were now in difficulties. Fearing 
lest they should be surrounded, they everywhere broke in 
flight to their own camp. Many foot-soldiers were cut 
off by the enemy's horse and many perished in the swift 
stream, for the river was now swollen with melting snow so 
that they could not wade, on account of its depth, nor 
could they swim, on account of the weight of their armor. 
Scipio, who followed trying to rally them, was wounded 
and almost killed, and was with difficulty rescued and 
carried to Cremona. There was a small arsenal near Pla- 
centia which Hannibal laid siege to, where he lost 400 men 
and was himself wounded. And now they all went into 
winter quarters, Scipio in Cremona and Placentia, and Han- 
nibal on the Po. 

8. When the Romans in the city learned of this third 
defeat on the Po (for they had in fact been beaten by the 
Boii before Hannibal arrived), they levied a new army of 
their own citizens which, with those already on the Po, 
amounted to thirteen legions, and they called for double 
that number from the allies. At this time the legion con- 
sisted of 5000 foot and 300 horse. Some of these they 
sent to Spain, some to Sardinia (for they were at war there 

537 also), and some to Sicily. The greater part were de-217 
spatched against Hannibal under Cn. Servilius and Gaius 
Flaminius, who had succeeded Scipio and Sempronius as 
consuls. Servilius hastened to the Po where he received 
the command from Scipio. The latter, having been chosen 
proconsul, sailed for Spain. Flaminius, with 30,000 foot 
and 3000 horse, guarded Italy within the Apennines, which 
alone can be properly called Italy. The Apennines extend 
from the centre of the Alpine range to the sea. The coun- 
try on the right-hand side of the Apennines is Italy proper. 
The other side, extending to the Adriatic, is now called 
Italy also, just as Etruria is now called Italy, but is inhab- 
ited by people of Greek descent, along the Adriatic shore, 
the remainder being occupied by Gauls, the same people 
who at an early period attacked and burned Rome. When 
Camillus drove them out and pursued them to the Apen- 


Y.R. B.C. 

537 nines, it is my opinion that they crossed over these moun- «17 
tains and made a settlement near the Adriatic instead of 
their former abode. Hence this part of the country is still 
called Gallic Italy. 

9. Thus had the Romans divided their large armies at 
this juncture for many campaigns. Hannibal, learning 
this fact, moved secretly in the early spring, devastated 
Etruria, and advanced toward Rome. The citizens became 
greatly alarmed as he drew near, for they had no force at 
hand fit for battle. Nevertheless, 8000 of those who re- 
mained were brought together, over whom Centenius, one 
of the patricians, although a private citizen, was appointed 
commander, there being no regular officer present, and 
sent into Umbria to the Plestine marshes to occupy the 
narrow passages which offered the shortest way to Rome. 
In the meantime Flaminius, who guarded the interior of 
Italy with 30,000 men, learning of the rapidity of Hanni- 
bal's movement, changed his position hastily, giving his 
army no chance to rest. Fearing for the safety of the city 
and being inexperienced in war (for he had been wafted 
into power on a popular breeze), he hastened to engage with 

10. The latter, well aware of his rashness and inexperi- 
ence, moved forward and took a position with a mountain 
and a lake [Thrasimenus] before him, concealing his light- 
armed troops and his cavalry in a ravine. Flaminius, see- 
ing the enemy's camp in the early morning, delayed a little 
to let his men rest from their toilsome march and to fortify 
his camp, after which he led them straightway to battle, 
although they were still weary with night-watches and hard 
labor. Caught between the mountain and the lake and the 
enemy (for the ambush suddenly appeared everywhere), he 
lost his own life, and 20,000 men were slain with him. 
The remaining 10,000 escaped to a village strongly fortified 
by nature. Maharbal, Hannibal's lieutenant, who had 
himself acquired very great renown in war, not being able 
to take them easily and thinking it unwise to fight with 
desperate men, persuaded them to lay down their arms, 
agreeing that they should go free wherever they pleased. 
When they had complied with this agreement he brought 
them disarmed to Hannibal. The latter, denying that 

VOL. I — I 

1 14 APPIAN'S HISTORY [Βκ. VII, Ch. Ill 

Y.R. B.C 

«37 Maharbal had authority to make such an agreement without 217 
: his consent, nevertheless treated the Roman allies with kind- 
ness and sent them home without ransom, in order to con- 
ciliate their towns. He kept all the Romans as prisoners. 
He gave the booty to the Gauls who were serving with him, 
in order to attach them to him by the hope of gain, and 
then marched forward. When this news reached the con- 
sul Servilius on the Po, he marched to Etruria with 40,000 
men. Centenius, with his 8000, had already occupied the 
narrow passage previously mentioned. 

11. When Hannibal saw the Plestine marsh and the 
mountain overhanging it, and Centenius between them 
guarding the passage, he inquired of the guides whether 
there was any way around. When they said there was no 
path but that the whole region was rugged and precipitous, 
he, nevertheless, sent a body of light-armed troops, under 
the command of Maharbal, to explore the district and pass 
around the mountain by night. When he judged that they 
had reached their destination he attacked Centenius in 
front. While the engagement was in progress, Maharbal 
was seen pushing forward strenuously on the summit above, 
where he raised a shout. The Romans thus surrounded 
took to flight, and there was a great slaughter among them, 
3000 being killed and 800 taken prisoners. The remainder 
escaped with difficulty. When this news reached the city 
they feared lest Hannibal should march against them at 
once. They collected stones upon the walls, and the old 
men armed themselves. Being in want of arms they took 
down from the temples those that had been hung there as 
trophies of former wars, and, as was customary in times of 
great danger, they chose a dictator, Fabius Maximus being 

Chapter ΙΠ 

The Policy of Fabius Maximus — Rashness of Minucius Rufus — Han- 
nibal caught in a Trap — His Escape from Fabius — Carthage refuses 
to send Reenforcements to Hannibal — The New Consuls — Their 

12. But divine Providence turned Hannibal away toward 
the Adriatic, where he ravaged the sea-coast and gathered 


V.R. B.C 

537 vast plunder. The consul Servilius, marching parallel with 217 
him, came to Ariminum, being distant from Hannibal by 
one day's march. He retained his army there in order to 
hearten those Gauls who were still friendly to Rome. When 
Fabius Maximus, the dictator, arrived, he sent to Rome Ser- 
vilius, who could be no longer either consul or general after 
a dictator had been chosen. Fabius followed Hannibal 
closely, but did not come to an engagement with him, 
although often challenged. He kept careful watch on his 
enemy's movements, and lay near him and prevented him 
from besieging any town. After the country was exhausted 
Hannibal began to be short of provisions. So he traversed 
it again, drawing his army up each day and offering battle. 
Fabius would not come to an engagement, although his 
master of horse, Minucius Rufus, disapproved of his policy, 
and wrote to his friends in Rome that Fabius held back on 
account of cowardice. As Fabius had occasion to go to 
Rome to perform certain sacrifices, the command of the 
army fell to Minucius, and he had a sort of a fight with 
Hannibal, and as he thought he had the best of it he grew 
bolder and wrote to the Senate accusing Fabius of not want- 
ing to win a victory; and the Senate, when Fabius had re- 
turned to the camp, voted that his master of horse should 
share the command equally with him. 

13. They accordingly divided the army and encamped 
near each other; and each held to his own opinion, Fabius 
seeking to exhaust Hannibal by the lapse of time and mean- 
while to receive no damage from him, while Minucius was 
eager for a decisive fight. Shortly afterward Minucius 
joined battle, and Fabius looked on to see what would 
happen, holding his own forces well in hand. In this way 
he was enabled to receive Minucius when he was beaten, 
and to drive Hannibal's men back from the pursuit. Thus 
did Fabius save Minucius from a great disaster, bearing 
him no malice for his slander. Then Minucius, recogniz- 
ing his own want of experience, laid down his command 
and delivered his part of the army to Fabius, who held to 
the belief that the only time for a skilful captain to fight 
is when it is necessary. This maxim, at a later time, was 
often brought to mind by Augustus, who was slow to fight 
and preferred to win by art rather than by valor. Fabius 

1 1 6 APPIAN^S HISTOR Υ [Βκ. Vll, Ch. Ill 

Y.R. B.C. 

537 continued to watch Hannibal as before and prevented him 217 
from ravaging the country, not coming to an engagement 
with his whole army but merely cutting off stragglers, well 
knowing that Hannibal would soon be short of supplies. 

14. They were now approaching a narrow pass of which 
Hannibal was ignorant. Fabius sent forward 4000 men to 
occupy it, keeping the remainder of his force at the other 
extremity where he encamped on a strong hill. When 
Hannibal discovered that he had been caught between 
Fabius and the defended pass he was more alarmed than he 
had ever been before, for there was no way of escape, but 
all the country round about was rugged and precipitous. 
He could not hope to overcome Fabius or those defending 
the pass, on account of the difficulties of the ground. In 
this desperate situation he put to death his 5000 prisoners 
lest they should add a new tumult to the danger. Then he 
tied torches to the horns of all the cattle he had in the 
camp (and there were many), and when night came he 
lighted the torches, extinguished all the camp fires, and 
commanded the strictest silence. Then he ordered the 
most courageous of his young men to drive the cattle up the 
rocky places between Fabius and the pass. These, urged 
on by their drivers and burned by the torches, ran furiously 
up the mountain side, and if any of them fell down they 
would get up and run on again. 

15. The Romans on either side when they observed the 
silence and darkness in Hannibal's camp and the many and 
various lights on the mountain side, could not exactly make 
out what was taking place, because it was night. Fabius, 
indeed, suspected that it was some stratagem of Hannibal's, 
but not being sure he kept his army in its position on 
account of the darkness. But those who held the pass 
imagined, just as Hannibal wished, that in his extremity 
he was trying to escape by scaling the cliffs above. So they 
hastened away to the place where they saw the lights, in 
order to catch Hannibal there in difficulties. The latter, 
when he discovered that the pass was deserted, advanced 
with a flying detachment, in dead silence and without light, 
in order to conceal the movement. Having seized the pass 
and strengthened his position he made a signal by trumpet, 
and the army in camp answered him with a shout and im- 


Y.R. Β C. 

537 mediately relighted the fires. Then the Romans saw that 217 
they had been deceived. The remainder of Hannibal* s 
army and those who drove the cattle now advanced to the 
pass without fear, and when he had brought them all to- 
gether he moved forward. Thus did Hannibal succeed 
beyond expectation and rescue his army from danger. 
Thence he advanced to Geronia, a city of Apulia, which 
was well stored with provisions. This town he captured, 
and here went into winter quarters in the midst of 

16. Fabius, pursuing the same policy as before, followed 
and encamped at a distance of ten stades from Geronia, 
with the river Aufidus flowing between them. The six 
months which limited the terms of dictators among the 
Romans now expired, and the consuls Servilius and Atilius 
resumed their offices and came to the camp, and Fabius 
returned to Rome. During the winter frequent skirmishes 
took place between Hannibal and the Romans in which the 
latter were generally successful, and showed to the better 
advantage. Hannibal was all the time writing exultingly 
to the Carthaginians about the events of the war, but now, 
having lost many men and being in want of assistance, he 
asked them to send him soldiers and money. But his ene- 
mies, who had jeered at all of his doings, replied that 
they could not understand how Hannibal should be asking 
for help when he said he was winning victories, since vic- 
torious generals did not ask for money but sent it home to 
their own people. The Carthaginians followed their sug- 
gestion and sent neither soldiers nor money. Hannibal, 
lamenting this short-sighted policy, wrote to his brother 
Hasdrubal in Spain, telling him to make an incursion into 
Italy at the beginning of summer with what men and money 
he could raise, and ravage the other extremity so that the 
whole country might be wasted at once and the Romans 
exhausted by the double encounter. Such was the situation 
of Hannibal's affairs. 

17. The Romans, distressed by the magnitude of the dis- 
asters to Flaminius and Centenius, and considering such a 
succession of surprising defeats unworthy of their dignity, 
and that a war within their own territory was not to be tol- 
erated, and furious against Hannibal, levied four new 

1 1 8 APPIAN 'S HISTOR Υ [Βκ. VII, Ch. Ill 

r.R. B.C. 

538 legions in the city to serve against him, and hurried the 216 
allied forces from all quarters to Apulia. As consuls they 
chose Lucius -^milius, who had acquired military fame in 
the war against the Illyrians, and Terentius Varro, a dema- 
gogue who had won popular favor by the usual high-sound- 
ing promises. When they sent the consuls forward they 
begged them as they were leaving the city to end the war 
by battle, and not to exhaust the city by delay, by conscrip- 
tions, by taxes, and . by hunger and idleness due to the 
devastation of the fields. The consuls on taking command 
of the army in Apulia had altogether 70,000 foot and 6000 
horse, and they encamped near a village called Cannae. 
Hannibal's camp was near by. Hannibal, who was always 
ready to fight and impatient of idleness, was especially so 
now because he was troubled lest his supplies should fail, 
for which reason he continually offered battle. He feared 
also lest his mercenaries should desert him, as they had not 
received their pay, or disperse through the country in search 
of food. For this reason he challenged the enemy daily. 
18. The opinions of the consuls were diverse, ilimilius 
thought that it was best to exhaust Hannibal by delay, as 
he could not hold out long for want of provisions, rather 
than come to an engagement with a general so skilled in 
war and an army so accustomed to victory. But Varro, 
like the demagogue he was, reminded his colleague of the 
charge which the people had laid upon them at their de- 
parture, that they should bring matters to a speedy decision 
by battle. Servilius, the consul of the previous year, who 
was still present, alone sustained the opinion of -^milius. 
All the senators and the so-called knights who held offices 
in the army agreed with Varro. While they were still dis- 
puting, Hannibal set upon some detachments of theirs that 
were collecting wood and forage, and he pretended to be 
defeated, and about the last watch put the bulk of his army in 
motion as if in retreat. Varro, seeing this, led out the army 
with the thought of pursuing Hannibal in his flight, ^^milius 
even then forbade the movement, and as Varro did not obey 
he consulted the omens alone, according to the Roman cus- 
tom, and sent word to Varro, just as he was starting, that 
the day was unpropitious. The latter thereupon came 
back, not venturing to disregard the omen, but he tore his 


Y.R. B.C. 

538 hair in the sight of the whole army, and cried out that vie- 2x6 
tory had been snatched from him by the envy of his col- 
league; and the whole crowd shared his anger. 

Chapter IV 

Preparations for Battle — Battle of Cannae — Total Defeat of the 
Romans — Roman Losses — Hannibal's Strategy 

19. Hannibal, when his scheme failed, returned forth- 
with to his camp, thus showing that his retreat was feigned, 
but this did not teach Varro to suspect every movement 

of Hannibal. Hurrying armed as he was to the praeto- / 
rium, he complained in the presence of senators, centuri- 
ons, and tribunes that iEmilius had made a pretence about 
the omen in order to snatch a sure victory from the city, 
either hesitating from cowardice or moved by jealousy 
toward himself. While he was thus venting his wrath the 
soldiers standing around the tent listened to him and joined 
in the censure of ^milius. The latter nevertheless con- 
tinued to give good advice to those within, but in vain. 
When all the others, Servilius alone excepted, sided wijh 
Varro, he yielded, and on the following day he himself 
drew up the army in order of battle as commander, for 
Varro yielded to him that title. Hannibal perceived the 
movement but he did not come out of his camp because he 
was not quite ready for battle. On the next day both 
armies came down to the open field. The Romans were 
drawn up in three lines with a small interval between them, 
each part having infantry in the centre, with light-armed 
troops and cavalry on the wings. ^Emilius commanded the 
centre, Servilius the left wing, and Varro the right. Each 
had a thousand picked horse at hand to carry aid wherever 
it should be needed. Such was the Roman formation. 

20. Hannibal had previously observed that a stormy east 
wind began to blow in that region regularly about noon. 
So he chose the ground where he should have the wind at 
his back. Then on a wooded hill cut by ravines he placed 
some cavalry and light-armed troops in ambush, to whom 
he gave orders that when the battle was joined and the 
wind had risen, they should fall upon the enemy's rear. 


v.». ' B.C. 

538 With them were placed 500 Celtiberians who had, in addi- 216 
tion to the long swords at their belts, short daggers under 
their garments. These they were not to use till he himself 
gave the signal. He divided his whole army into three 
lines of battle and extended his horse at long distances on 
the wings in order to outflank the enemy if possible. He 
gave the command of the right wing to his brother Mago, 
and of the left to his nephew Hanno, retaining the centre 
for himself on account of ^Emilius* reputation as an ex- 
perienced commander. He had 2000 picked horse and 
Maharbal had 1000, who were ordered to move about and 
give assistance wherever they saw any part of the army in 
difficulties. In making these arrangements he protracted 
the time till about the second hour so that the wind might 
come to his aid the sooner. 

21. When all was in readiness on either side the com- 
manders rode up and down the ranks encouraging their 
soldiers. The Romans were exhorted to remember their 
parents, wives, and children, and to wipe out the disgrace 
of former defeats. They were admonished that this battle 
was the last hope of safety. Hannibal reminded his men 
of their former exploits and their victories over these same 
enemies, and said that it would be shameful to be van- 
quished now by the vanquished. When the trumpets 
sounded the foot-soldiers raised a shout and the archers, 
slingers, and light-armed troops advanced and began the 
battle. After them the legions took up the work. Now 
began a great slaughter and a great struggle, each side con- 
tending valiantly. Presently Hannibal gave the signal to 
his horse to surround the enemy* s wings. The Roman 
horse, although inferior in number, advanced against them, 
and extending their line of battle to a dangerous thinness, 
nevertheless fought valiantly, especially those on the left 
toward the sea. Hannibal and Maharbal together now led 
against them the cavalry they had kept around their own 
persons, with loud barbarian shouts, thinking to terrify 
their enemies. Yet the Romans received the shock without 
flinching and without fear. 

22. When Hannibal saw that his manoeuvre had failed, 
he gave the signal to his 500 Celtiberians. These passing 
out of their own line of battle went over to the Romans, 


V.R. ' B.C. 

538 holding out their shields, spears, and swords in the manner axo 
of deserters. Servilius commended them and at once took 
possession of their arms and stationed them in the rear, in 
their tunics alone as he supposed, for he did not think it 
best to put deserters in chains in the sight of the enemy, nor 
did he have any suspicion of men whom he saw with noth- 
ing but their tunics, nor was there time to take counsel in 
the thick of the fray. Now some of the African cohorts 
made a pretence of flight toward the mountains, uttering 
loud cries. This was the signal to those concealed in the 
ravines to fall upon the pursuers. Straightway the light- 
armed troops and cavalry that had been placed in ambush 
showed themselves, and simultaneously a strong and blind- J 
ing wind rose carrying dust into the eyes of the Romans, / 
which prevented them from seeing their enemies. The 
impetus of the Roman missiles was lessened by the oppos- 
ing wind, while that of the enemy* s was increased and their 
aim made surer. The Romans, not being able to see and 
avoid the enemy's weapons nor to take good aim with their 
own, stumbled against each other and soon fell into dis- 
order of various kinds. 

23. At this juncture the 500 Celtiberians, seeing that 
the expected opportunity had come, drew their daggers from 
their bosoms and first slew those who were just in front of 
them, then, seizing the swords, shields, and spears of the 
dead, made a greater onslaught against the whole line, dart- 
ing from one to another indiscriminately, and they accom- 
plished all the greater slaughter inasmuch as they were in 
the rear of all. Now were the Romans in great and various 
trouble, assailed by the enemy in front, by ambuscades in 
flank, and butchered by foes amid their own ranks. They 
could not turn upon the latter on account of the pressure 
of the enemy in front and because it was not easy to dis- 
tinguish these assailants, for they had possessed themselves 
of Roman shields. Most of all were they harassed rby the 
dust, which prevented them from even guessing what was 
taking place. But (as usually happens in cases of disorder 
and panic) they considered their condition worse than it 
was, the ambuscades more dreadful, and the 500 more 
numerous than 500. In short, they imagined that their 
whole army was surrounded by hostile cavalry and deserters. 


y.R. Β c 

538 So they turned and broke into headlong flight, first those on 216 
the right wing where Varro himself led the retreat, and 
after them the left wing, whose commander, Servilius, how- 
ever, went to the assistance of -^milius. Around these the 
bravest of the horse and foot rallied, to the number of 
about 10,000. 

24. The generals and all the others who had horses, 
although surrounded by Hannibal's cavalry, dismounted aUd 
fought on foot. They charged the enemy with fury and 
performed many brilliant exploits, the fruit of military ex- 
perience, being nerved by the energy of despair. But 
they fell on all sides, and Hannibal, darting hither and 
thither, encouraged his soldiers, now exhorting them to 
make their victory complete, now rebuking and reproaching 
them because, after they had scattered the main body of 
the enemy, they could not overcome the small remainder. 
As long as .^milius and Servilius survived the Romans 
stood firm, although giving and receiving many wounds, 
but when their generals fell they forced their way through 
the midst of their enemies most bravely, and escaped in 
various directions. Some took refuge in the two camps 
where others had preceded them in flight. These were 
altogether about 15,000, whom Hannibal straightway be- 
sieged. Others, to the number of about 2000, took refuge 
in Cannae, and these surrendered to Hannibal. A few es- 
caped to Canusium. The remainder were dispersed in 
groups through the woods. 

25. Such was the result of the battle between Hannibal 
^ and the Romans at Cannae, which was begun after the sec^ 

ond hour of the day and ended within two hours of night- 
fall, and which is still famous among the Romans as a 
disaster, for in these few hours 50,000 of their soldiers 
were slain and a great many taken prisoners. Many sen- 
ators who were present lost their lives and with them all 
the military tribunes and centurions, and their two best 
generals. The most worthless one, who was the cause of 
the calamity, had made good his escape at the beginning 
of the rout. The Romans, in their two years* war with 
Hannibal in Italy, had now lost, of their own and their 
allied forces, about 100,000 men. 

26. Hannibal gained this rare and splendid victory by 

§ 24-27] THE HANNIBALIC WAR 1 23 

Y.R. B.C 

538 employing four stratagems in one day : by the force of the 216 
wind, by the feigned desertion of the Celtiberians, by the 
pretended flight, and by the ambuscades in the ravines. 
Immediately after the battle he went to view the dead. 
When he saw the bravest of his friends lying among the 
slain he lifted up his voice and wept, saying that he did not 
want another such victory. It is said that Pyrrhus, king 
of Epirus, made the same exclamation aforetime, when he 
too gained a victory over the Romans in Italy, with like 
loss to himself. Some of those who escaped from the battle 
and who had taken refuge in the larger camp and in the 
evening had chosen Publius Sempronius as their general, 
forced a passage through Hannibal's guards, who were ex- 
hausted by weariness and want of sleep. These men, to 
the number of about 10,000, made their way to Canusium 
about midnight. But the 5000 in the smaller camp were 
captured by Hannibal the following day. Varro, having 
collected the remains of the army and sought to revive their 
fainting spirits, put them under the command of Scipio, 
one of the military tribunes, and himself hastened to Rome. 

Chapter V 

Consternation in Rome — Senate refuses to ransom the Prisoners — 
Siege and Capture of Petilia — Dasius of Arpi 

27. When the disaster was announced in the city^ mul- 
titudes thronged the streets uttering lamentations for their 
relatives, calling on them by name, and bewailing their 
own fate as soon to fall into the enemy's hands. Women 
went to the temples with their children and prayed that 
there might sometime be an end to the calamities to the 
city. The magistrates besought the gods by sacrifices and 
prayers that if they had any cause of anger they would be 
satisfied with the punishment already visited. The Senate 
sent Quintus Fabius (the same who wrote a history of these 
events) to the temple of Delphi to seek an oracle concern- 
ing the present posture of affairs. They freed 8000 slaves 
with their masters' consent, and ordered everybody in the 
city to go to work making arms and projectiles. They also 


Y.R. ^ Β C. 

538 made a conscription, as was allowed, even among certain of 216 
the allies. They also changed the destination of Claudius 
Marcellus, who was about to sail to Sicily, and sent him to 
fight against Hannibal. Marcellus divided the fleet with 
his colleague Furius and sent a part of it to Sicily, while 
he himself took the manumitted slaves and as many others 
as he could collect of citizens and allies, amounting alto- 
gether to 10,000 foot and 2000 horse, and marched to 
Teanum in order to see what Hannibal would do next. 

28. Hannibal allowed his captives to send messengers 
to Rome in their own behalf, to see if the citizens would 
ransom them with money. Three were chosen by them, 
of whom Gn. Sempronius was the leader, from whom Han- 
nibal exacted an oath that they would return to him. The 
relatives of the prisoners, collecting around the senate- 
house, declared their readiness to redeem their friends 
severally with their own money and begged the Senate to 
allow them to do so, and the people joined them with their 
own prayers and tears. Some of the senators thought it was 
not wise, after such great calamities, to expose the city to 
the loss of so many more men, or to disdain free men while 
giving liberty to slaves. Others thought that it was not fit- 
ting to accustom men to flight by compassion, but rather to 
teach them to conquer or die, as would be the case if not 
even his relative should pity the runaway. Many prece- 
dents having been adduced on either side, the Senate finally 
decided that the prisoners should not be ransomed by their 
relatives, being of opinion that while so many dangers were 
still impending present clemency would tend to future 
harm, while severity, although painful, would be for the 
public advantage hereafter, and indeed at this very time 
would startle Hannibal by the very boldness of their action. 
Accordingly Sempronius and the two prisoners who accom- 
panied him returned to Hannibal. The latter in his anger 
sold some of his prisoners, put others to death, and made a 
bridge of their bodies with which he passed over a stream. 
The senators and other distinguished prisoners in his hands 
he compelled to fight with each other, as a spectacle for 
the Africans, fathers against sons, and brothers against 
brothers. He omitted no act of disdainful cruelty. 

29. Hannibal next turned his arms against the territory 

§ 28-31] THE HANNIBALIC WAR 12$ 

Y.R. B.C. 

538 of the Roman allies and, having devastated it, laid siege 216 
to Petilia. The inhabitants, although few in number, made 
courageous sallies against him (their women joining in the 
fight) and performing many noble deeds of daring. They 
burned his siege engines unceasingly, and in these enter- 
prises the women were in no wise inferior to the men. 
But their numbers were reduced by each assault, and they 
began to suffer the pangs of hunger. When Hannibal per- 
ceived this he drew a line of circumvallation around them 
and left Hanno to finish the siege. As their sufferings in- 
creased they first thrust outside the walls all those who were 
incapable of fighting and looked on without grieving while 
Hanno slew them, considering the dead better off than the 
living, for which reason the remainder, when reduced to 
the last extremity, made a sally against the enemy, and 
after performing many splendid acts of bravery, being 
nearly starved and completely exhausted, they were unable 
to return and were all slain by the Africans. Thus Hanno 
possessed himself of the town. But yet a few escaped, who 
had sufficient strength to run. These wanderers the Romans 
carefully collected, to the number of about 800, and re- 
placed them in their own country after the war, being 
moved by kind feeling toward them and admiration for 
their exceptional fidelity. 

539 30. As the Celtiberian horse, who were serving with «15 
Hannibal as mercenaries, were seen to be splendid fighters, 
the Roman generals in Spain obtained an equal number 
from the towns under their charge and sent them to Italy 
to contend against the others. These when encamped near 
Hannibal mingled with their fellow-countrymen and won 
them over. Thus it came about that many of them went 
over to the Romans and others deserted or ran away, while 
the remainder were no longer trusted by Hannibal, as they 
were under suspicion by him and he by them. Hannibal's 
affairs began to decline from this circumstance. 

541 31. There is a city called Arpi in Daunia which is said 213 
to have been founded by Diomedes, the Argive. Here a 
certain Dasius, said to have been a descendant of Dio- 
medes, a very fickle-minded person, quite unworthy of such 
descent, after the terrible defeat of the Romans at Cannae 
drew his people over to the Carthaginian side. But now 


Y.R. Β C. 

541 when Hannibal's power began to wane he rode secretly to 213 
Rome, and being introduced to the Senate, said that he 
could bring the city back to the Roman allegiance and thus 
atone for his error. The Romans very nearly killed him 
and drove him from the city forthwith. Then, being in 
equal fear of them and of Hannibal, he became a wanderer 
through the country. Hannibal burned his wife and chil- 
dren alive. Arpi was betrayed by a portion of the inhabi- 
tants to Fabius Maximus, who captured it by night, and 
having put to death all the Carthaginians he found there, 
he established a Roman garrison in the city. 

Chapter VI 

The Capture of Tarentum — The Citadel holds out — Hannibal captures 
Thurii — Also Metapontum and Heraclea — The Romans besiege 
Capua — Hannibal marches to Rome — Consternation in the City — 
Flaccus follows Hannibal 

54» 32. Tarentum, which was held by a Roman garrison, 212 
was betrayed by Cononeus in the following manner. Being 
in the habit of hunting and always bringing a present of 
game to Livius, the prefect of the guard, he became very 
familiar with him. As war was raging in the country he 
said that it was necessary to hunt and bring back his game 
by night. For this reason the gates were opened to him 
by night. He made an arrangement with Hannibal in pur- 
su mce of which he took a body of soldiers, some of whom 
he concealed in a thicket near the town; others he ordered 
to follow himself at no great distance, and still others to go 
with him, clad outwardly in hunting garments but girded 
with breastplates and swords underneath. He came by 
night, a wild boar being carried in front of them on poles. 
When the guards had opened the gates as usual, those who 
came with him slew the gate-men immediately. Those fol- 
lowing behind made a sudden dash upon the other guards, 
those from the thicket were admitted, and the gates were 
opened to Hannibal. When the latter was once inside he 
speedily possessed himself of the remainder of the town, 
and having conciliated the Tarentines he laid siege to the 
citadel, which was held by a Roman garrison. In this way 
was Tarentum betrayed by Cononeus. 

§ 32-34] THE HANNIBALIC WAR 12/ 

Y.R. B.C. 

542 33. The Romans who held the citadel were about 5000 212 
in number, and some of the Tarentines came to their aid. 
The prefect of the guard at Metapontum joined them with 
half of his force, bringing an abundance of missiles and 
engines with which they expected to drive Hannibal easily 
back from the walls. But Hannibal had a plentiful supply 
of these things also. Accordingly he brought up towers, 
catapults, and tortoises with which he shook some of the 
walls, pulled off the parapets with hooks attached to ropes, 
and laid bare the defences. The garrison hurled stones 
down upon the engines and broke many of them, turned 
aside the hooks with slip-knots, and making frequent and 
sudden sallies always threw the besiegers into confusion 
and returned after killing many. One day when they 
noticed that the wind was violent some of the Romans 
threw down firebrands, flax, and pitch upon the engines, 
while others darted out and put fire under them. Hanni- 
bal, despairing of his attempt, threw a wall around the city 
except on the sea side, where it was not possible to do so. 
Then turning the siege over to Hanno he advanced into 

34. The port of Tarentum looked toward the north and 
gave entrance through a narrow passage to those sailing 
in from the sea. The passage was now closed by bridges 
which were under the control of the Roman garrison, by 
which means they obtained provisions by sea and prevented 
the Tarentines from supplying themselves. For this reasof 
the latter began to suffer from want, until Hannibal came 
back and suggested the making of another passage by ex- 
cavating the public highway, which ran through the midst 
of the city from the harbor to the sea on the south. When 
this was done they had provisions in plenty, and with their 
triremes they worried the Roman garrison who had no ships, 
even coming close to the walls, especially in calm weather, 
and intercepting the supply ships coming to them. The 
Romans in turn began to suffer from want. When the 
people of Thurii sent them some ships laden with corn by 
night, under a convoy of triremes, the Tarentines and the 
Carthaginians in league with them, getting wind of the 
affair, laid a trap for them and captured them all, including 
the com and the men that brought it. The Thurians sent 


Y.R. B.C. 

542 numerous messengers to negotiate for the release of the 213 
captives, and the Tarentines won the negotiators over to 
Hannibal, who thereupon released all the Thurian prisoners 
he held. These, when they came home, forced their rela- 
tives to open the gates to Hanno. Thus the Thurians, 
while endeavoring to help the Romans in Tarentum, unex- 
pectedly fell into the power of the Carthaginians. The 
Roman garrison in Thurii escaped secretly by sea to 

543 35. The Metapontines, whose prefect had taken half of an 
his force to Tarentum, slew the remainder, who were few 
in number, and delivered themselves up to Hannibal. 
Heraclea, which lay midway between Metapontum and 
Tarentum, followed their example, being moved by fear 
rather than inclination. Thus Hannibal's affairs again 
began to wear a flourishing aspect. In the following year 
some of the Lucanians revolted from Rome, and Sempro- 
nius Gracchus, the proconsul, marched against them. A 
certain Lucanian named Flavius, of the party that had re- 
mained faithful to the Romans, who had been also a friend 
and guest of Gracchus but was now his betrayer, persuaded 
him to come to a certain place to have a conference with 
the Lucanian generals, saying that they had repented and 
wished to return to the Roman allegiance. Suspecting 
nothing, he went to the place with thirty horsemen, where 
he found himself surrounded by a large force of Numidians 
in ambush, with whom Flavius then joined himself. When 
Gracchus discovered the treachery he leaped from his horse 
with his companions, and after performing many noble 
deeds of valor was slain with all the others, except three. 
These were the only ones captured by Hannibal, who had 
exerted himself to the utmost to take the Roman proconsul 
alive. Although he had basely entrapped him, nevertheless 
in admiration of his bravery in the final struggle he gave 
him a funeral and sent his bones to Rome. After this he 
passed the summer in Apulia and collected large supplies 
of corn. 

36. The Romans decided to attack the Capuans, and 
Hannibal sent Hanno with 1000 foot and as many horse to 
enter Capua by night. This he did without the knowledge 
of the Romans. At daylight the Romans discovered what 

§ 35-37] ^^^ HANNIBALIC WAR 1 29 

Y.R. ^ B.C. 

543 had taken place by observing greater numbers of men on 211 
the walls. So they turned back from the city forthwith and 
began hurriedly to reap the harvest of the Capuans and the 
other inhabitants of Campania. When the Campanians 
bewailed their losses Hannibal said to them that he had 
plenty of corn in Apulia, and he gave an order that they 
should send and get it as often as they wished. Accord- 
ingly they sent not only their pack animals and men, but 
also their women and children, to bring loads of corn. 
They had no fear of danger on the way because Hannibal 
had transferred his headquarters from Apulia to Campania 
and was encamped on the river Calor near the country of 
the Beneventines, whom alone they feared as the latter were 
still in alliance with Rome. While Hannibal was there 
they despised all their enemies. 

549 37. It happened, however, that Hannibal was called by 219 
Hanno into Lucania, leaving the greater part of his baggage 
under a small guard in the camp near Beneventum. One 
of the two Roman consuls who were in command there 
(Fulvius Flaccus and Appius Claudius), learning of this, 
fell upon the Campanians who were bringing corn and slew 
many who were unprepared for an attack, and gave the corn 
to the Beneventines. He also took Hannibal's camp and 
plundered his baggage, and, as Hannibal was still in Lu- 
cania, drew a line of circumvallation around Capua. Then 
the two consuls built another wall outside of this and estab- 
lished their camp between the two. They erected battle- 
ments also, some toward the besieged Capuans and others 
toward the enemy outside. There was the appearance of 
a great city enclosing a smaller one. The space between 
the enclosing wall and Capua was about two stades, in 
which many enterprises and encounters took place each 
day and many single combats, as in a theatre surrounded 
by walls, for the bravest were continually challenging each 
other. A certain Capuan named Taureus having had a single 
combat with the Roman Claudius Asellus, and seeking to 
escape, retreated, Asellus pursuing till he came to the walls 
of Capua. The latter not being able to check his horse 
dashed at full speed through the gate into Capua, and gal- 
loping through the whole city, ran out at the opposite gate 
and rejoined the Romans, and was thus marvellously saved. 
VOL. I — κ 


543 3^• Hannibal, having failed in the task that called him to an 
Lucania, turned back to Capua, considering it very impor- 
tant to defend a city so large, and which had been a city 
of importance under Roman sway. He accordingly at- 
tacked their enclosing wall, but as he accomplished nothing 
and could devise no way to introduce either provisions or 
soldiers into the city, and as none of them could commu- 
nicate with him on account of the closeness of the siege, 
he marched to Rome with his whole army, having learned 
that the Romans also were hard pressed by famine and hop- 
ing to draw the Roman generals away from Capua, or to 
accomplish something more important than its relief. 
Moving with the greatest celerity through the country in- 
habited by many hostile peoples, some of whom were not 
able to hinder him while others would not incur the risk 
of battle, he encamped at the river Anio, two and thirty 
stades from Rome. 

39. The city was thrown into consternation as never 
before. They were without any suitable force (what they 
had being in Campania), and now this strong, hostile army 
came suddenly against them under a general of invincible 
bravery and good fortune. Nevertheless, for the present 
emergency those who were able to bear arms manned the 
gates, the old men mounted the walls, and the women and 
children brought stones and missiles, while those who were 
in the fields flocked in all haste to the city. Confused cries, 
lamentations, prayers, and mutual exhortations on every 
side filled the air. Some went out and cut down the bridge 
over the river Anio. The Romans had at one time fortified 
a small town among the ^qui, which they called Alba after 
the name of their mother city. Its inhabitants with the 
lapse of time, either because of carelessness of pronuncia- 
tion or corruption of language, or to distinguish them 
from the Albanians, were called Albenses. Two thousand 
of these Albenses hastened to Rome to share the danger. 
As soon as they arrived they armed themselves and mounted 
guard at the gates. Such zeal did this one small town, out 
of many colonies, exhibit, just as the little city of Plataea 
came to the aid of the Athenians at Marathon and shared 
their danger. 

40. Appius, one of the Roman generals, remained at 


Y.R. ^ ^ B.C. 

543 Capua, believing that he could capture the place by him- an 
self. Fulvius Flaccus, the other one, marched with untir- 
ing haste by other roads and encamped opposite Hannibal, 
with the river Anio flowing between them. When Hanni- 
bal found that the bridge had been destroyed and that Ful- 
vius was occupying the opposite bank, he decided to go 
around by the sources of the stream. Fulvius moved paral- 
lel with him on the other side. Here, again, as was his 
custom, Hannibal devised a stratagem. He left some 
Numidian horse behind, who, as soon as the armies had 
moved off, crossed the Anio and ravaged the Roman terri- 
tory until they had come very near to the city itself, and 
had carried consternation into it, when they rejoined Han- 
nibal according to their orders. The latter, when he had 
passed around the sources of the stream, whence the road 
to Rome was not long, is said to have reconnoitred the 
city with three body-guards secretly by night, and to have 
observed the lack of force and the confusion prevailing. 
Nevertheless he went back to Capua, either because divine 
Providence turned him aside this time as in other instances, 
or because he was intimidated by the valor and fortune of 
the city, or because, as he said to those who urged him to 
attack it, he did not wish to bring the war to an end lest 
the Carthaginians should deprive him of his command. 
At any rate, the army under Fulvius was by no means a 
match for him. Fulvius followed him as he retreated, 
merely preventing him from foraging and taking care not 
to fall into any traps. 

Chapter VH 

Hannibal breaks into the Camp of Fulvius, but is driven out — Capua 
surrenders to the Romans — A Town of Bruttium lost and regained 
— The Story of Dasius and Blatius 

41. Hannibal, on a certain moonless night, having ob- 
served that Fulvius, at the close of the day, had neglected 
to throw up a wall in front of his camp (but had merely 
dug a ditch with certain spaces in lieu of gates, and the 
earth thrown outward instead of a wall), quietly sent a body 
of cavalry to a fortified hill overlooking Fulvius' camp, 


543 and ordered them to keep silence until the Romans should an 
believe the hill unoccupied. Then he ordered his Indians 
to mount their elephants and break into the camp of Ful- 
vius through the open spaces, and over the piles of earth, 
in any way they could. He also directed a number of 
trumpeters and horn-blowers to follow at a short distance. 
When they should be inside the entrenchments some of 
them were ordered to run around and raise a great tumult 
so that they might seem to be very numerous, while others, 
speaking Latin, should call out that Fulvius, the Roman 
general, ordered the evacuation of the camp and the seizure 
of the neighboring hill. Such was Hannibars stratagem, 
and at first all went according to his intention. The ele- 
phants broke into the camp, trampling down the guards, 
and the trumpeters did as they were ordered. The unex- 
pected clamor striking the ears of the Romans as they 
started out of bed in the darkness of the night was some- 
thing fearful. Hearing orders given in Latin directing 
them to take refuge on the hill, they hurried in that 

42. Fulvius, who was always looking out for some strata- 
gem and suspecting one in everything that Hannibal did, 
being guided either by his own intelligence or by divine 
inspiration, or having learned the facts from some prisoner, 
quickly stationed his military tribunes in the roads leading 
to the hill to stop those who were rushing that way, and to 
tell them that it was not the Roman general but Hannibal 
who had given the command in order to lead them into an 
ambush. Then he stationed strong guards at the ramparts 
to repel any new attack from without, and with others 
passed rapidly through the camp exclaiming that there was 
no danger and that those who had broken in with the ele- 
phants were but few. Torches were lighted and fires kin- 
dled on all sides. Then the smallness of the attacking force 
was so manifest that the Romans utterly despised them, 
and, turning from fear to wrath, slew them the more easily 
since they were, few in number and light-armed. The ele- 
phants not having room to turn around, and being entangled 
among the tents and huts, furnished an excellent mark for 
darts by reason of the narrowness of the place and the size 
of their bodies. Enraged with pain and unable to reach 

§42-44] THE HANNIBAUC WAR 1 33 

Y.R. B.C 

543 their enemies, they shook off their riders and trampled them a« 
under foot with fury and savage outcries, and broke out of 
the camp. Thus did Fulvius Flaccus by his constancy and 
skill bring to naught this unexpected ambush, frustrate Han- 
nibal, and save his army, which had always been in terror 
of Hannibal's stratagems. 

43. When his scheme had failed, Hannibal moved his 
army to Lucania and went into winter quarters, and here 
this fierce warrior gave himself up to unaccustomed luxury 
and the delights of love. From this time, little by little, 
his fortune changed. Fulvius returned to his colleague at 
Capua and both of them pressed the siege vigorously, 
hastening to take the city during the winter while Hanni- 
bal remained quiet. The Capuans, their supplies being 
exhausted and no more being obtainable from any quarter, 
surrendered themselves to the Roman generals, together 
with the Carthaginian garrison and their two commanders, 
another Hanno and Bostar. The Romans stationed a gar- 
rison in the city and cut off the hands of all the deserters 
they found there. They sent the Carthaginian nobles to 
Rome and the rest they sold as slaves. Of the Capuans 
themselves they put to death those who had been chiefly re- 
sponsible for the defection of the city. From the others 
they only took away their land. All the country round 
about Capua is very fertile, being a plain. When Capua 
was once more restored to the Romans the principal advan- 
tage possessed by the Carthaginians in Italy was taken from 

544 44. In Bruttium, which is a part of Italy, there was a axo 
man of the town of Tisia (which was garrisoned by the 
Carthaginians) who was in the habit of plundering and 
sharing his booty with the commander of the garrison, and 
who had by this means so ingratiated himself with the latter 
that he almost shared the command with him. This man 
was incensed at the arrogant behavior of the garrison toward 
his country. Accordingly, by an arrangement with the 
Roman general, with whom he exchanged pledges, he 
brought in a few soldiers each day as prisoners and lodged 
them in the citadel, to which place he took their arms also 

as spoils. When he had introduced a sufficient number he 
released and armed them, and overpowered the Carthaginian 


γ R. B.C. 

544 garrison, after which he brought in another garrison from aio 
the Roman forces. But as Hannibal passed that way not 
long afterwards, the guards fled in terror to Rhegium, and 
the inhabitants of Tisia delivered themselves up to Hanni- 
bal, who burned those who had been guilty of the defection 
and placed another garrison in the town. 

45 . In Salapia, subject to Carthage in Apulia, were two men 
preeminent by birth, wealth, and power, but for a long time 
enemies to each other. One of these, named Dasius, 
sided with the Carthaginians, the other, Blatius, with the 
Romans. While Hannibal's affairs were flourishing Blatius 
remained quiet, but when the Romans began to recover 
their former supremacy he endeavored to come to an un- 
derstanding with his enemy, simply for the sake of their 
country, lest, if the Romans should take it by force, some 
irreparable harm should befall it. Dasius, pretending to 
agree with him, communicated the matter to Hannibal. 
Hannibal took the part of a judge between them, Dasius 
accusing and Blatius defending himself, and saying that he 
was slandered by reason of his accuser's personal enmity. 
He was emboldened to use such language in the presence 
of his enemy, because he foresaw that such a foe would be 
likely to be distrusted on account of his private grudge. 
Hannibal thought that it was not wise to reject the accusa- 
tion altogether, or to put too much faith in an accuser who 
was a personal enemy ; so he dismissed them as though he 
would consider of the matter by himself. As they were 
going out by a very narrow passage Blatius said to Dasius 
in a low tone, " Are you not willing to save your country, 
good sir?" The latter immediately repeated the words in 
a loud voice, thus letting Hannibal know. 

46. Then in a piteous tone Blatius cried out with much 
appearance of credibility, that his cunning enemy had made 
a plot against him. "This present scheme," he said, "will 
relieve me from all suspicion, if there was any, as to the 
former one. For who would have made a confidant of an 
enemy in such matters in the first place, or, if he had been 
so thoughtless before, would now, while still in danger and 
under trial and denying the charge against him, dare to 
say the same things a second time to one who had been his 
false accuser concerning these very matters, and especially 

§45-47] THE HANNIBALIC WAR 1 35 

V.R. . . Β C. 

544 in the judgment hall where many can hear his words and 210 
where his accuser stands ready to renew the charge against 
him. Even supposing the accuser had suddenly become 
friendly and well disposed, how would he be able to coop- 
erate with me in saving the country after what has hap- 
pened? Why should I ask the aid of one who is not able 
to give any? " I think that Blatius again designedly whis- 
pered those things to Dasius because he foresaw the event, 
in order to discredit him still more, and thus induce Han- 
nibal to disbelieve his former accusations. Nor did Blatius, 
after he had been acquitted, desist from persuading his 
enemy to change sides, for he despised him now as a person 
utterly discredited. So Dasius again pretended to agree 
with him and sought to learn the plan of the revolt. Bla- 
tius replied without hesitation : " I will ride to one of the 
Roman camps (indicating one that was very far distant) 
the commander of which is my particular friend, and obtain 
a force which I will bring hither. You will remain here 
and keep watch upon affairs in the city." 

47. Having spoken thus he immediately rode away, 
without the knowledge of Dasius, not to the camp he had 
named but to Rome by a shorter journey, and having given 
his son as a hostage to the Senate, he asked for a thousand 
horse, with which he hastened back with all speed, antici- 
pating what would be the result. Dasius not seeing hi» 
enemy during the next few days thought that he had Uiken 
in hand the business they had agreed upon, as now having 
confidence in him. Supposing that Blatius had in fact 
gone to the more distant camp he rode to Hannibal, not 
doubting that he should get back before Blatius. "And 
now," said he to Hannibal, "I will deliver Blatius to you 
in the very act of bringing a hostile force into the city." 
Having exposed the affair and having rcceiveil a military 
force, he hastened back to the town, not imagining th;it 
Blatius was yet anywhere near. But the latter was alntady 
inside, having slain the Carthaginian garrison, which wan 
small, and taken care to prevent anybody from going out. 
He had also closed all the gates except that by whir h D;i!viui< 
was expected to return. On that side he n;inov<:d fh*! 
guards from the wall to avoid suspicion, but the grouiid 
inside was intersected by ditches so that an attack iiig iof< c 


Y.R. B.C. 

544 should not be able to make its way through the whole town, aw 
Dasius was delighted when he saw the gates open, thinking 
that he had anticipated his enemy, and he entered the town 
rejoicing. Then Blatius shut the gate and slew him and 
his companions, who were squeezed together in a narrow 
place and had no way of passage through the ditches. A 
few of them escaped by leaping from the walls. Thus did 
Blatius overcome Dasius at the third encounter of their 

Chaffer VIII 

Defeat and Death of the Consul Fulvius — The Romans recover Taren- 
tum — Death of Marcellus — Hannibal foiled at Salapia — Battle of 
the Metaurus — Hannibal retires to Bruttium 

48. While Fulvius, the Roman consul, was besieging 
Herdonia, Hannibal approached him quietly one evening, 
having given orders that no fires should be lighted and that 
strict silence should be observed. Early in the morning, 
which happened to be foggy, he sent a body of horse to 
attack the Roman camp. The latter repelled them with 
some confusion as they hurried from their beds, but with 
boldness, for they believed their foe to be some few men 
from somewhere or other. As Hannibal was passing around 
to the other side of the town with a body of infantry in 
order to reconnoitre, and at the same time to encourage the 
people inside, he fell in with the Romans in the course of 
his circuit, either by chance or by design, and surrounded 
them. Being attacked on both sides they fell confusedly 
and in heaps. About 8000 of them were killed, including 
the consul Fulvius himself. The remainder took refuge 
inside a fortification in front of their camp, and by fighting 
bravely preserved it and prevented Hannibal from taking 
the camp. 

49. After this, the Romans ravaged the country of the 
revolted Apulians, and Hannibal that of the Campanians, 
all of whom had returned to the Roman allegiance except 
the Atellaei. The latter he settled in Thurii in order that 
they might not suffer by the war that was raging in Bruttium, 
Lucania, and Apulia. The Romans settled the exiles of 
Nuceria in Atella and then, continuing their attacks on 


Y.R. B.C 

545 Hannibars allies, they took Aulonia and overran the terri- 209 
tory of the Bruttians. They also laid siege by land and sea 
to Tarentum, which was under the command of Carthalo. 
The latter, as he had few Carthaginian soldiers present, 
had taken Bruttians into his service. The captain of these 
Bruttians was in love with a woman whose brother was 
serving with the Romans, and the latter managed, by means 
of his sister, that this captain should surrender that part of 
the wall which he commanded to the Romans, who were 
directing their engines against it. In this way the Romans 
again got possession of Tarentum, a place admirably situ- 
ated for the purposes of war both by land and by sea. 

50. Hannibal was hastening to its relief when he learned 
of its capture. He turned aside to Thurii greatly disap- 
pointed, and proceeded thence to Venusia. There Clau- 
dius Marcel lus, who had conquered Sicily and was now 
consul for the fifth time, and Titus Crispinus took the field 208 
against him, not venturing, however, to fight a pitched 
battle. But Marcellus happening to see a party of Numidi- 
ans carrying off plunder, and thinking that they were only 

a few, attacked them confidently with three hundred horse. 
He led the attack in person, being a man of daring courage 
in battle and ever despising danger. Suddenly, a large 
body of Africans started up and attacked him on all sides. 
Those Romans who were in the rear early took to flight, 
but Marcellus, who thought that they were following him, 
fought valiantly until he was thrust through with a dart and 
killed. When Hannibal stood over his body and saw the 
wounds all on his breast, he praised him as a soldier but 
criticised him as a general. He took off his ring, burned 
his body with distinguished honors, and sent his bones to 
his son in the Roman camp. 

51. Being angry with the Salapians, Hannibal sent a 
Roman deserter to them with a letter stamped with the 
signet ring of Marcellus, before the latter' s death had 
become generally known, saying that the army of Marcellus 
was on the way thither and that Marcellus gave orders that 
the gates should be opened to receive them. But the citi- 
zens had received letters a little before from Crispinus, 
who had sent word to all the surrounding towns that Han- 
nibal had got possession of Marcellus' ring. So they sent 


V.R. B.C. 

546 Hannibars messenger back in order that he might not know aos 
by remaining there what was going on, and they promised 

to do as they had been ordered. Then they armed them- 
selves and having taken their station on the walls awaited 
the result of the stratagem. When Hannibal came with 
his Numidians, whom he had armed with Roman weapons, 
they drew up the portcullis as though they were gladly wel- 
coming Marcellus. When they had admitted as many as 
they thought they could easily master, they dropped the 
portcullis and slew all those who had gained entrance. 
Upon those who were still standing around outside the 
walls they hurled missiles from above and covered them 
with wounds. Hannibal, having failed in his second 
attempt against the city, now withdrew. 

547 52. In the meantime his brother Hasdrubal, with the 207 
army he had enlisted in Celtiberia, marched to Italy. 
Being received in a friendly way by the Gauls he had passed 
over the Alps by the road that Hannibal had opened, ac- 
complishing in two months the journey which had previ- 
ously taken Hannibal six. He debouched in Etruria with 
48,000 foot, 8000 horse, and fifteen elephants. He sent 
letters to his brother announcing his arrival. These letters 
were intercepted by the Romans so that the consuls, Salina- 
tor and Nero, learned the number of his forces. They 
combined their own forces in one body, moved against 
him, and encamped opposite him near the town of Sena. 
He did not intend to fight yet, but hastening to join his 
brother, moved off, marching by night among swamps and 
pools and along an unfordable river, where he lost his way. 
At daybreak the Romans came up with them, while they 
were scattered about and wearied with toil and want of 
sleep, and slew most of them with their officers, while they 
were still assembling and getting themselves in order of 
battle. Hasdrubal himself was slain with them. Many of 
them were taken prisoners. Thus was Italy delivered from 

a great fear, since Hannibal could never have been con- 
quered if he had received this addition to his forces. 

53. It seems to me that a god gave this victory to the 
Romans as a compensation for the disaster of Cannae, as it 
came not long afterward and was about equal to it in other 
respects. In both cases the commanding generals lost their 

§52-55] THE HANNIBALIC WAR 1 39 

547 lives, and the number of soldiers killed and the number 207 
of prisoners taken were very nearly the same in each case. 
Each side also captured the other's camp and a vast quan- 
tity of baggage. Thus did Rome taste good and bad fort- 
une alternately. Of the Celtiberians who escaped the 
slaughter, some made their way to their own country and 
some to Hannibal. 

54. Hannibal was greatly depressed by the loss of his 
brother and of so great an army, destroyed suddenly 
through ignorance of the roads. Deprived of all that he 
had gained by the untiring labors of fourteen years, during 
which he had fought with the Romans in Italy, he with- 
drew to Bruttium, whose people were the only ones that 
remained in alliance with him. Here he remained quiet, 
awaiting new forces from Carthage. They sent him 100 
merchant ships laden with supplies, soldiers, and money, 
but as they had not a sufficient force of rowers they were 
driven by the wind to Sardinia. The praetor of Sardinia 
attacked them with his war-ships, sunk twenty and captured 
sixty of them. The remainder escaped to Carthage. Thus 
was Hannibal still further straitened and he despaired of 
assistance from the Carthaginians. Nor did Mago, who 
was collecting mercenaries in Gaul and Liguria, send him 
any aid, but waited to see what turn affairs would take. 
Perceiving that he could not stay there long, Hannibal 
now began to despise the Bruttians themselves as men who 
would soon be strangers to him, and he loaded them with 
taxes. He transferred the strongholds of their towns to the 
plains as though they were planning a revolt. He despoiled 
many of their men, bringing accusations against them in 
order that he might confiscate their property. Such was 
his situation. 

Chapter IX 

Scipio sails to Sicily — A Sacred Image brought to Rome — Hannibal's 
Troubles in Bruttium — Hannibal recalled by Carthage — Tries to 
take his Italian Soldiers thither — Embarks for Africa — Punishment 
of the Bruttians 

549 55. In Rome the consuls at this time were Licinius2o5 
Crassus and Publius Scipio, the conqueror of Spain. 


549 Crassus conducted the war against Hannibal in Apulia, but 205 
Scipio advised the people that they would never drive Han- 
nibal and the Carthaginians out of Italy except by sending 

a Roman army into Africa and so bringing danger to their 
own doors. By persisting strenuously and persuading those 
who hesitated he was himself chosen general for Africa and 
sailed forthwith to Sicily. Having collected and drilled 
an army there he sailed suddenly to Locri in Italy which 
was garrisoned by Hannibal. Having slain the garrison 
and put the town under the command of Pleminius he em- 
barked for Africa. Pleminius visited upon the Locrians 
every kind of outrage, licentiousness, and cruelty, and 
ended by robbing the temple of Proserpina. For this the 
Romans put him and his companions in wrong-doing to 
death in prison, and gave the property they left to the 
Locrians to be deposited in the treasury of the goddess. All 
the rest of the plunder that they could find they restored 
to the goddess, and what they could not find they made 
good out of their own public treasury. 

550 56. During the same time Crassus detached Consentia, 204 
a large town of Bruttium, and six others, from Hannibal. 
As certain direful prodigies sent by Jupiter had appeared 

in Rome, the decemviri, having consulted the Sibylline 
books, said that something would soon fall from heaven at 
Pessinus in Phrygia (where the mother of the gods is 
worshipped by the Phrygians), which ought to be brought 
to Rome. Not long after, the news came that it had fallen 
and the image of the goddess was brought to Rome, and 
still to this day they keep holy to the mother of the gods 
the day that it arrived. It is said that the ship which bore 
it stuck in the mud of the river Tiber, and could by no 
means be moved until the soothsayers proclaimed that it 
would follow only when drawn by a woman who had never 
committed adultery. Claudia Quintia, who was under ac- 
cusation of that crime but not yet tried (being suspected of 
it on account of fast living), vehemently called the gods to 
witness her innocence, and fastened her girdle to the ship, 
whereupon the goddess followed. Thus Claudia acquired 
the greatest fame in place of her previous bad reputation. 
But before this affair of Claudia the Romans had been ad- 
monished by the Sibylline books to send their best man to 

§ 5^5^] Ί^ΗΕ HANNIBALIC WAR 14 1 

γ R. . B.C. 

550 bring the image from Phrygia. Scipio Nasica, son of Gn. 204 
Scipio, who had been general in Spain and had lost his life 
there, and cousin of Scipio Africanus the elder, was judged 
to be their best man. In this way was the goddess brought 
to Rome by the best of their men and women. 

57. When the Carthaginians were continually beaten by 
Scipio in Africa those of the Bruttians who heard of it re- 
volted from Hannibal, some of them slaying their garrisons 
and others expelling them. Those who were not able to do 
either of these things sent messengers to Rome secretly to 
explain the necessity under which they had acted and to 
declare their good will. Hannibal came with his army 
to Petelia, which was not now occupied by the Petelians, 
as he had expelled them and given the town to the Bruttians. 
He accused the latter of sending an embassy to Rome. 
When they denied it he pretended to believe them, but in 
order, as he said, that there might be no ground for sus- 
picion, he delivered their principal citizens over to the 
Numidians, who were ordered to guard each one of them 
separately. He also disarmed the people, armed the slaves, 
and stationed them as guards over the city. He did the 
same to the other cities that he visited. He removed 3000 
citizens of Thurii, who were particularly friendly to the 
Carthaginians, and 500 others from the country, but gave 
the goods of the remainder as spoils to his soldiers. Leav- 
ing a strong garrison in the city he settled these 3500 
people at Croton, which he found to be well situated for 
his operations and where he established his magazines and 
his headquarters against the other towns. 

55X 58. When the Carthaginians summoned him to hasten 203 
to the aid of his own country, which was in danger from 
Scipio, and sent Hasdrubal, their admiral, to him that there 
might be no delay, he lamented the perfidious and ungrateful 
conduct of the Carthaginians toward their generals, of 
which he had had long experience. Moreover, he had ap- 
prehensions for himself touching the cause of this great 
war, which had been begun by himself in Spain. Never- 
theless, he recognized the necessity of obeying, and 
accordingly he built a fleet, for which Italy supplied 
abundant timber. Despising the cities still allied to him 
now as foreigners, he resolved to plunder them all, and 


Y.R. B.C. 

551 thus, by enriching his army, render himself secure against 203 
his calumniators in Carthage. But being ashamed of such 
a breach of faith, he sent Hasdrubal, the admiral, about, 
on pretence of inspecting the garrisons. The latter, as he 
entered each city, ordered the inhabitants to take what 
things they and their slaves could carry, and move away. 
Then he plundered the rest. Some of them, learning of 
these proceedings before Hasdrubal came, attacked the 
garrisons, overcoming them in some places and being over- 
come by them in others. Indiscriminate slaughter, ac- 
companied by the violation of wives and the abduction of 
virgins, and all the horrors that usually take place when 
cities are captured, ensued. 

59. Hannibal himself, knowing that the Italians in his 
army were extremely well-drilled soldiers, sought to per- 
suade them by lavish promises to accompany him to Africa. 
Those of them who had been guilty of crimes against their 
own countries willingly expatriated themselves and followed 
him. Those who had committed no such wrong hesitated. 
Collecting together those who had decided to remain, as 
though he wished to say something to them, or to reward 
them for their services, or to give them some command as 
to the future, he surrounded them with his army unex- 
pectedly, and directed his soldiers to choose from among 
them such as they would like to have for slaves. Some 
made their selections accordingly. Others were ashamed 
to reduce their comrades in so many engagements to servi- 
tude. All the rest Hannibal put to death with darts in 
order that the Romans might not avail themselves of such 
a splendid body of men.^ With them he slaughtered also 
about 4000 horses and a large number of pack animals, 
which he was not able to transport to Africa. 

60. Thereupon he embarked his army and waited for a 
wind, having left a few garrisons on the land. These the 
Petalini and other Italians set upon, slew some of them, and 
then ran away. Hannibal passed over to Africa, having 
devastated Italy for sixteen successive years, and inflicted 
countless evils upon the inhabitants, and reduced Rome 
several times to the last extremity, and treated his own sub- 

1 See Appendix to this Book« 


Υ•1ν• B«C• 

551 jects and allies with contumely as enemies. For, just as 303 
he had made use of them for a time, not from any good 
will but from necessity, so now that they could be of no 
further service to him he scorned them and considered 
them enemies. 

61. When Hannibal had departed from Italy the Senate 
pardoned all the Italian peoples who had sided with him, 
and voted a general amnesty except as to the Bruttians, 
who remained most zealous for him to the end. From 
these they took away a considerable part of their land, also 
their arms, if there were any that Hannibal had not taken. 
They were also forbidden to be enrolled in the military 
forces thereafter, as being no longer free persons, and they 
were required to attend as servants upon the consuls and 
praetors who went about inspecting the affairs of govern- 
ment and the public works of the provinces. Such was 
the end of Hannibal's invasion of Italy. 

By the Translator 

The accusation against Hannibal that he put to death 
those of his Italian soldiers who refused to follow him to 
Africa is referred to by Livy (xxx. 20) in these words: 
" Many of Italian birth who refused to follow him to Africa 
and withdrew to the shrine of Juno Lacinia, hitherto invio- 
late, were foully slain in the temple itself." The tale is 
generally discredited by modern historians as an impossible 
crime and as inconsistent with the relations that existed 
between Hannibal and his soldiers as related by Livy him- 
self (xxviii. 12), viz.: — 

"No battle was fought with Hannibal that year, for 
neither did he take the offensive after the recent public and 
private wound [at the Metaurus], nor did the Romans dis- 
turb his quiet, so great a power resided in him, although 
everything else around him was going to ruin. And I know 
not whether he was not more wonderful in adversity than 
in prosperity, because, although he waged war in a hostile 


country thirteen years, far from home, with varying fortune, 
not with an army composed of his own citizens but of the 
mingled riff-raff of all nations, who had no law, custom, or 
language in common, but were different in character, dress, 
arms, religious belief and ceremony, and I had almost said 
in their gods, he held them together by such a bond that 
no disturbance ever broke out, either among themselves or 
against their commander, although, in the territory of ene- 
mies, he was often in want of money to pay them and of 
supplies to feed them, the lack of which in the former 
Punic war had been the cause of many dreadful scenes 
between the commanders and the soldiers. After the army 
of Hasdrubal and its chief, in whom all hope of victory had 
been reposed, had perished, and he had yielded the rest of 
Italy by retiring to the corner of Bruttium, to whom does 
it not seem wonderful that no commotion took place in his 
camp? For, to other things, this also was added, that 
there was no hope of feeding his soldiers except from the 
Bruttian territory, which, even if it were all cultivated, 
would be very scant for supporting so great an army, 
whereas the war absorbed a large part of the young men, 
who were drawn away from the tillage of the fields, and a 
custom ingrafted on a depraved people prevailed of carry- 
ing on military operations by robbery. Nor was anything 
sent to him from home, where they were solicitous about 
retaining their hold on Spain, as though all their affairs 
were flourishing in Italy." 

The foregoing is in part copied from a passage in Poly- 
bius, viz. : " Who can fail to be struck with admiration for 
the generalship, the courage, the ability of this man in the 
field, when we think of the length of time the war lasted; 
when we look at it as a whole, and at the particular battles, 
sieges, and revolts of cities, and at the turns of fortune ; 
when we contemplate the totality of the design and execu- 
tion in the course of which Hannibal waged continuous war 
against the Romans in Italy for sixteen years and never 
once dismissed his forces from field service, but held them 
like a good pilot in subjection to himself, and restrained 
such a multitude from mutiny and from strife with each 
other, although the forces he made use of were not all of 
one nation or even of the same race ? They were composed 


of Africans, Spaniards, Ligurians, Gauls, Phoenicians, 
Italians, and Greeks, who had neither law, custom, speech, 
nor anything else naturally in common. Yet such was the 
skill of the general that, notwithstanding these great diver- 
sities, he made them all attentive to one command and obe- 
dient to one will, although circumstances were not always 
propitious but varied; although fortune did not always 
come in favoring but sometimes in adverse gales. In view 
of these facts one may well be astonished at his command- 
ing ability in military affairs, and may confidently affirm 
that if he had begun with other parts of the earth and had 
attacked the Romans last, he would not have failed of any 
part of his designs. But now, as he began with those who 
should have been the last, he made both the beginning and 
the end of his exploits among them." (Fragment xu 19.) 

VOL. I — L 


Chapter I 

First Phoenician Settlement — First Punic War — Regulus defeated by 
Xanthippus — Fate of Regulus — The Mercenary War 

1. The Phoenicians settled Carthage, in Africa, fifty years 
before the capture of Troy. Its founders were either Zorus 
and Carchedon, or, as the Romans and the Carthaginians 
themselves think. Dido, a Tyrian woman, whose husband 
had been slain clandestinely by Pygmalion, the ruler of 
Tyre. The murder being revealed to her in a dream, she 
embarked for Africa with her property and a number of 
men who desired to escape from the tyranny of Pygmalion, 
and arrived at that part of Africa where Carthage now 
stands. Being repelled by the inhabitants, they asked for 
as much land for a dwelling place as they could encompass 
with an ox-hide. The Africans laughed at this frivolity 
of the Phoenicians and were ashamed to deny so small a 
request. Besides, they could not imagine how a town 
could be built in so narrow a space, and wishing to unravel 
the mystery they agreed to give it, and confirmed the prom- 
ise by an oath. The Phoenicians, cutting the hide round 
and round in one very narrow strip, enclosed the place where 
the citadel of Carthage now stands, which from this affair 
was called Byrsa (a hide). 

2. Proceeding from this start and getting the upper hand 
of their neighbors, as they were more adroit, and engaging 
in traffic by sea, like the Phoenicians, they built a city 
around Byrsa. Gradually acquiring strength they mastered 
Africa and the greater part of the Mediterranean, carried 
war into Sicily and Sardinia and the other islands of that 



^αι TO" Α?,ί^ ■* ί ϊ>^ tf , ο, ^ ibV ιίιΐΓί u τ» '/■■sTe G φ a 1 ί»" {Μ" 
ijV lA*» ^, ■"■ΐΡ ι ί'*'^ Κιϊ* dr^ *ί "J" ί«ν a:'>Uli_titA ir iwr i^Kf / 

lU.Qt-rUtj-crii'oiuJiJ• i^TViui (ji'eit iSi)j7aii-S<triv ifle «i^ 

§ 1-3] THE PUNIC WARS 147 

Y.R. B.C. 

sea, and also into Spain. They sent out numerous colo- 
nies. They became a match for the Greeks in power, and 
next to the Persians in wealth. But about 700 years after 
the foundation of the city the Romans took Sicily and Sar- 
dinia away from them, and in a second war Spain also. 
Then, assailing each the other's territory with immense 
armies, the Carthaginians, under Hannibal, ravaged Italy 
for sixteen years in succession, but the Romans, under the 
leadership of Cornelius Scipio the elder, carried the war 
into Africa, crushed the Carthaginian power, took their 
ships and their elephants, and required them to pay tribute 
for a time. A second treaty was now made between the 
Romans and the Carthaginians which lasted fifty years, until, 
upon an infraction of it, the third and last war broke out 
between them, in which the Romans under Scipio the 
younger razed Carthage to the ground and forbade the re- 
building of it. But another city was built subsequently by 
their own people, very near the former one, for convenience 
in governing Africa. Of these matters the Sicilian part is 
shown in my Sicilian history, the Spanish in the Spanish 
history, and what Hannibal did in his Italian campaigns in 
the Hannibalic history. This book will deal with the op- 
erations in Africa from the earliest period. 

498 3. About the beginning of the Sicilian war the Romans 256 
sent 350 ships to Africa, captured a number of towns, and 
left in command of the army Atilius Regulus, who took some 
200 more towns, which gave themselves up to him on ac- 
count of their hatred of the Carthaginians; and continually 
advancing he ravaged the territory. Thereupon the Car- 
thaginians, considering that their misfortunes were due to 
bad generalship, asked the Lacedemonians to send them a 
commander. The Lacedemonians sent them Xanthippus. 

499 Regulus, being encamped in the hot season alongside a 255 
lake, marched around it to engage the enemy, his soldiers 
suffering greatly from the weight of their arms, from dust, 
thirst, and fatigue, and exposed to missiles from the neigh- 
boring heights. Toward evening he came to a river which 
separated the two armies. This he crossed at once, think- 
ing in this way to terrify Xanthippus, but the latter, antici- 
pating an easy victory over an enemy thus harassed and 
exhausted and having night in his favor, drew up his forces 


Y.K. B.C. 

499 and made a sudden sally from his camp. The expecta-ass 
tions of Xanthippus were not disappointed. Of the 30,000 
men led by Regulus, only a few escaped with difficulty to 
the city of Aspis. All the rest were either killed or taken 
prisoners, and among the latter was the consul Regulus 

504 4. Not long afterward the Carthaginians, weary of fight- 250 
ing, sent him, in company with their own ambassadors, to 
Rome to obtain peace or to return if it were not granted. 
Yet Regulus in private strongly urged the chief magistrates 
of Rome to continue the war, and then went back to cer- 
tain torture, for the Carthaginians shut him up in a cage 
stuck full of spikes and thus put him to death. This suc- 
cess was the beginning of sorrows to Xanthippus, for the 
Carthaginians, in order that the credit might not seem to 
be due to the Lacedemonians, pretended to honor him 
with splendid gifts, sent galleys to convey him back to 
Lacedemon, but enjoined upon the captains of the ships to 
throw him and his Lacedemonian comrades overboard.* 
In this way he paid the penalty for his successes. Such 

513 were the results, good and bad, of the first war of the 241 
Romans in Africa, until the Carthaginians surrendered 
Sicily to them. How this came about has been shown in 
my Sicilian history. 

5. After this there was peace between the Romans and 
the Carthaginians, but the Africans, who were subject to 
the latter and had served them as auxiliaries in the Sicilian 
war, and certain Celtic mercenaries who complained that 
their pay had been withheld and that the promises made to 

SM them had not been kept, made war against the Carthagin- 240 
ians in a very formidable manner. The latter appealed to 
the Romans* for aid on the score of friendship, and the 
Romans allowed them for this war only to hire mercenaries 
in Italy, for even that had been forbidden in the treaty. 
Nevertheless they sent men to act as mediators between 
them. The Africans refused the mediation, but offered to 
become subjects of the Romans if they would take them. 

1 See Appendix to this Book. 

2 Polybius (i. 36) says that Xanthippus returned home in safety. 
He seems to have been aware of the report of foul play against Xan- 
thippus, but discredited it. 

§ 4-7] ^^^ PUNIC WARS 1 49 

V.R. 1I,C. 

514 The latter would not accept them. Then the Carthagin- «40 
ians blockaded the towns with a great fleet, and cut off their 
supplies from the sea, and as the land was untilled in con- 
sequence of the war they overcame the Africans by the 
famine, but were driven to supply their own wants by 
piracy, even taking some Roman ships, killing the crews, 
and throwing them overboard to conceal the crime. This 

516 escaped notice for a long time. When the facts became 138 
known and the Carthaginians were called to account they 
put off the day of reckoning until the Romans voted to 
make war against them, when they surrendered Sardinia by 
way of compensation. And this clause was added to the 
former treaty of peace. 

Chapter II 

HannibaPs Invasion of Italy — Scipio's Invasion of Africa — Consterna- 
tion at Carthage — Syphax and Masinissa — War between Masinissa 
and Carthage 

525 6. Not long afterwards the Carthaginians invaded Spain 199 
and were gradually subduing it, when the Sagun tines ap- 
pealed to Rome and a boundary was fixed to the Cartha- 
ginian advance by agreement that they should not cross the 
river Ebro. The Carthaginians, under the lead of Hanni- 
bal, violated this treaty by crossing the stream, and having 
done so Hannibal marched against Italy, leaving the com- 
mand in Spain in the hands of others. The Roman gen- 
erals in Spain, Publius Cornelius Scipio and Gnseus 
Cornelius Scipio, two brothers, after having performed 
some brilliant exploits were both slain by the jcnemy. The 
generals who succeeded them fared badly until Scipio, the 
son of the Publius Scipio who was killed in Spain, set sail 

544 thither, and making all believe that he was come by aaio 
divine mission and had divine counsel in all things, pre- 
vailed brilliantly, and achieving great glory by this success, 
gave over his command to those sent to succeed him, re- 
turned to Rome, and asked to be sent with an army to 
Africa so as to draw Hannibal out of Italy and to bring 
retribution upon the Carthaginians in their own coimtry. 

549 7. Some of the leading men opposed this plan, saying 905 


Y.R. B.C. 

549 that it was not best to send an army into Africa while Italy 205 
was wasted by such long wars and was subject to the rav- 
ages of Hannibal, and while Mago was enlisting Ligurian 
and Celtic mercenaries for a flank attack upon her. They 
ought not to attack another land, they said, until they had 
delivered their own country from its present perils. Others 
thought that the Carthaginians were emboldened to attack 
Italy because they were not molested at home, and that if 
war were brought to their own doors they would recall Han- 
nibal. So it was decided to send Scipio into Africa, but 
they would not allow him to levy an army in Italy while 
Hannibal was ravaging it. If he could procure volunteers 
he might take them, and he might use the forces which 
were then in Sicily. They authorized him to fit out ten 
galleys and allowed him to take crews for them, and also 
to refit those in Sicily. They did not give him any money 
except what he could raise among his friends. So indiffer- 
ently at first did they undertake this war, which soon came 
to be the most great and glorious for them. 

8. Scipio, who seemed to be divinely inspired from long 
ago against Carthage, having collected scarcely 7000 
soldiers, cavalry and infantry, sailed for Sicily, taking as a 
body-guard 300 chosen youths whom he ordered to accom- 
pany him without arms. He then chose 300 wealthy 
Sicilians by conscription and ordered them to report on 
a certain day, provided with the best possible arms and 
horses. When they came he told them that they might 
furnish substitutes for the war if they preferred. As they 
all accepted this offer he brought forward his 300 unarmed 
youths and directed the others to supply them with arms 
and horses, and this they did willingly. So it came about 
that Scipio had in place of the Sicilians, 300 Italian youths 
admirably equipped at other people's expense, who at once 
thanked him for this favor and ever afterward rendered 
him excellent service. 

9. When the Carthaginians learned these things they 
sent Hasdrubal, the son of Cisco, to hunt elephants, and 
they despatched to Mago, who was enlisting Ligurian mer- 
cenaries, 6000 foot, 800 horse, and seven elephants, and' 
commanded him to attack Etruria with these and such other 
forces as he could collect, in order to draw Scipio from 

§8-n] THE PUNIC WARS 151 

Y.R. B.C. 

549 Africa. But Mago delayed because he could not join Han- 205 
nibal at such a distance and because he was always of a 
hesitating disposition. Hasdrubal, on his return from the 
elephant hunt, levied 6000 foot and 600 horse from both 
the Carthaginian and the African population, and bought 
5000 slaves as oarsmen for the ships. He also obtained 
2000 horse from the Numidians and hired mercenaries and 
exercised them all in camp at a distance of two hundred 
stades from Carthage. 

10. There were many chieftains in Numidia who had 
separate dominions. Syphax occupied the highest place 
among them and was held in greater honor than the others. 
There was also a certain Masinissa, son of the king of the 
Massylians, a powerful tribe. He had been brought up and 
educated at Carthage. He was a man of fine presence and 
good manners. Hasdrubal, the son of Gisco, who was 
second in rank to nobody in Carthage, betrothed his 
daughter to him although he was a Numidian, and after 
the betrothal took the young man with him to the war in 
Spain. Syphax, who was also in love with the girl, was 
indignant at this and began to pillage the Carthaginian 
territory, and he proposed to Scipio (who made a journey 
from Spain to meet him) that they should make a joint at- 
tack on Carthage. The Carthaginians, learning this and 
knowing how great service Syphax could render them in the 
war against the Romans, gave the girl to him without the 
knowledge of Hasdrubal or Masinissa, since they were in 
Spain. The latter, being greatly exasperated, made an 
alliance with Scipio in Spain, concealing it from Hasdru- 
bal, as he supposed. Hasdrubal, although he was grieved 
at the outrage put upon the young man and his daughter, 
nevertheless thought that it would be an advantage to the 
country to make away with Masinissa. So when the latter 
returned from Spain to Africa at the death of his father, he 
sent a cavalry escort with him and told them to put him to 
death secretly in whatever way they could. 

11. Masinissa, getting wind of this plot, managed to 
escape, and made his inherited power strong by collecting 
a body of cavalry who were trained to hurl the javelin ad- 
vancing and retreating and advancing again, either by day 
or by night; for their only method of fighting was flight 


Y.R. B.C. 

549 and pursuit. The Numidians also know how to endure 205 
hunger. They often subsist on herbs in place of bread, 
and they drink nothing but water. Their horses never even 
taste grain ; they feed on grass alone and drink but rarely. 
Masinissa collected about 20,000 such and led them in the 
chase and in pillaging expeditions against other tribes, 
thinking to keep them exercised in this way. The Car- 
thaginians and Syphax, thinking that these preparations of 
the young man were made against them (for they were con- 
scious of the affront they had put upon him), decided to 
make war on him first, and after crushing him to march 
against the Romans. 

12. Syphax and the Carthaginians were much the more 
numerous. They marched with wagons and a great load of 
luggage and luxuries. On the other hand, Masinissa was 
an example in all doing and enduring and had only cavalry, 
no pack animals and no provisions. Thus he was able the 
more easily to retreat, to attack, and to take refuge in 
strongholds. Often, when surrounded, he divided his 
forces so that they might scatter as best they could, con- 
cealing himself with a handful until they should all come 
together again, by day or by night, at an appointed rendez- 
vous. Once he was one of three who lay concealed in a 
cave around which his enemies were encamped. He never 
had any fixed camping-place. His generalship consisted 
especially in concealing his position. Thus his enemies 
never could make a regular assault upon him, but were 
always warding off his attacks. His provisions were ob- 
tained each day from whatever place he came upon toward 
evening, whether village or city. He seized and carried 
off everything and divided the plunder with his men, for 
which reason many Numidians flocked to him, although he 
did not give regular pay, for the sake of the booty, which 
was better. 

Chapter III 

Scipio arrives in Africa — First Skirmishes — Capture of Locha — 
Siege of Utica — Negotiations of Syphax 

550 13. In this way Masinissa made war on the Carthagini- 204 
ans. In the meantime Scipio, having completed his prep- 

§ 12-14] THE PUNIC WARS 1 53 

Y.R. B.C. 

550 arations in Sicily, and sacrificed to Jupiter and Neptune, 304 
set sail for Africa with fifty-two war-ships and 400 trans- 
ports, with a great number of smaller craft following behind. 
His army consisted of 16,000 foot and 1600 horse. He 
carried also projectiles, arms, and engines of various kinds, 
and a plentiful supply of provisions. And thus Scipio 
accomplished his voyage. When the Carthaginians and 
Syphax learned of this they decided to pretend to make 
terms with Masinissa for the present, until they should over- 
come Scipio. Masinissa was not deceived by this scheme. 
In order to deceive them in turn he marched to Hasdrubal 
with his cavalry as though he were reconciled to him, fully 
advising Scipio beforehand. Hasdrubal, Syphax, and 
Masinissa encamped not far froip each other near the city 
of Utica, to which Scipio had been driven by the winds, 
and he also was camped hard by. Not far from him was 
Hasdrubal with an army of 20,000 foot, 7000 horse, and 
140 elephants. 

14. Now Syphax, either being moved by fear, or being 
faithless to all parties in turn, pretended that his country 
was harassed by the neighboring barbarians, and set out for 
home. Scipio sent out some detachments to feel the enemy, 
and at the same time several towns surrendered themselves 
to him. Then Masinissa came to Scipio* s camp secretly 
by night, and, after mutual greeting, advised him to place 
not more than 5000 men in ambush on the following day, 
about thirty stades from Utica, near a tower built by 
Agathocles, the tyrant of Syracuse. At daybreak he per- 
suaded Hasdrubal to send Hanno, his master of horse, to 
reconnoitre the enemy and throw himself into Utica, lest 
the inhabitants, taking advantage of the proximity of the 
enemy, should start a revolution. He promised to follow 
if ordered to do so. Hanno set out accordingly with 1000 
picked Carthaginian horse and a lot of Africans. Masinissa 
followed with his Numidians. Thus they came to the tower 
and Hanno passed on with a small force to Utica. Here- 
upon a part of the men in ambush showed themselves, and 
Masinissa advised the officer who was left in command of 
the cavalry to attack them as being a small force. He fol- 
lowed at a short distance, as if to support the movement. 
Then the rest of the men in ambush showed themselves and 

1 54 APPIAN'S HISTOR Υ [Βκ. VIII, Ch. Ill 

550 surrounded the Africans ; and the Romans and Masinissa 204 
together assailed them on all sides and slew all except 400, 
who were taken prisoners. After he had accomplished this, 
Masinissa, as though a friend, hastened after Hanno, who 
was returning, seized him and carried him to Scipio^s camp, 
and exchanged him for his own mother, who was in Has- 
drubal's hands. 

15. Scipio and Masinissa ravaged the country and re- 
leased the Roman prisoners who were digging in the fields, 
who had been sent thither by Hannibal from Spain, from 
Sicily, and from Italy itself. They also besieged a large 
town called Locha, where they met great difficulties. As 
they were putting up the scaling ladders, the Lochaians 
asked a parley and offered to leave the city under a truce. 
Thereupon Scipio sounded a retreat; but the soldiers, angry 
at what they had suffered in the siege, refused to obey. 
They scaled the walls and slaughtered indiscriminately, not 
sparing women and children. Scipio dismissed the sur- 
vivors in safety; he then deprived the army of its booty 
and compelled the officers who had disobeyed orders to 
cast lots publicly, and punished three of them, upon whom 
the lot had fallen, with death. Having done these things 
he began ravaging the country again. Hasdrubal sought to 
draw him into ambush by sending Mago, his master of 
horse, to attack him in front, while he fell upon his rear. 
Scipio and Masinissa being surrounded in this way divided 
their forces into two parts, turning in opposite directions 
against the enemy, by which means they slew 5000 of the 
Africans, took 1800 prisoners, and drove the remainder 
over a precipice. 

16. Soon afterward Scipio besieged Utica by land and 
sea. He built a tower on two galleys joined together, from 
which he hurled missiles three cubits long, and also great 
stones, at the enemy. He inflicted much damage and also 
suffered much, and the ships were badly shattered. On 
the landward side he built great mounds, and battered the 
wall with rams, and tore off with hooks what hides and other 
coverings were on it. The enemy, on the other hand, un- 
dermined the mounds, turned the hooks aside with slip- 
knots, and deadened the force of the rams by interposing 
transverse wooden beams. They made sallies against the 

§ I5-I8] THE PUNIC WARS 1 55 

Y.R. B'C• 

550 machines with fire whenever the wind was blowing toward 204 
them. Whereupon Scipio, despairing of the capture of the 
city by this means, established a close siege around it. 

17. Syphax, when he learned how things were going, 
came back with his army and encamped not far from Has- 
drubal. Pretending still to be the friend of both parties, 
and thinking to protract the war until the new ships which 
were building for the Carthaginians were ready, and the 
Celtic and Ligurian mercenaries arrived, he proposed an 
arbitration. He thought that it would be fair for the 
Romans to discontinue the war in Africa and the Cartha- 
ginians in Italy, and that the Romans should retain Sicily, 
Sardinia, and whatever other islands they now held, and 
also Spain. He said that if either party should refuse these 
terms he would join forces with the other. While he was 
doing this he attempted to draw Masinissa to himself by 
promising to establish him firmly in the kingdom of the 
Massy Hans and to give him in marriage whichever of his 
three daughters he should choose. The person who deliv- 
ered this message brought gold also, in order that, if he 
could not persuade Masinissa, he might bribe one of his 
servants to kill him. As he did not succeed, he paid the 
money to one of them to murder him. The servant took 
the money to Masinissa and exposed the giver. 

551 18. Then Syphax, finding that he could not deceive any- 203 
body, joined the Carthaginians openly. He captured, by 
means of treachery, an inland town named Tholon, where 
the Romans had a large store of war materials and food, and 
slew all of the garrison who would not depart on parole. 
He also called up another large reenforcement of Numidi- 
ans. And now, as the mercenaries had arrived and the 
ships were in readiness, they decided to fight, Syphax 
attacking those besieging Utica, and Hasdrubal the camp 
of Scipio, while the ships should bear down upon the ships; 
all these things to be done the next day and at the same 
time in order to overwhelm the Romans with numbers. 


Chapter IV 

Scipio's Night Attack on Hasdrubal — Speech to his Officers before the 
Attack — Complete Victory of Scipio — Retreat of Syphax — Scipio 
advances against Carthage — Indecisive Naval Engagement 

55» 19. Masinissa learned of these plans at nightfall from 203 
certain Numidians, and communicated them to Scipio. 
The latter was perplexed, being apprehensive lest his army, 
divided into so many parts, should be too weak to sustain 
the whole strength of the enemy. He forthwith called his 
officers to a council at night. Finding that they were all at 
a loss what to do, and after meditating for a long time him- 
self, he said : " Courage and swiftness, friends, and desper- 
ate fighting are our only salvation. We must anticipate 
the enemy in making the attack. Just see what we shall 
gain by it. The unexpectedness of the attack and the very 
strangeness of the thing, — that those who are so few in num- 
ber should be the aggressors, — will terrify them. We shall 
employ our strength not divided into several detachments, 
but all together. We shall not be engaged with all of our 
enemies at once, but with those we choose to attack first, 
since their camps are separate from each other. We are 
their equals in strength when we take them separately, 
while in courage and good fortune we are their superiors. 
If heaven shall give us victory over the first, we may despise 
the others. Upon whom the assault shall be made first, 
and what shall be the time and manner of delivering it, if 
you please, I will now tell you." 

20. As they all agreed, he continued: "The time to 
strike is immediately after this meeting ends, while it is 
still night, since the blow will be the more terrifying and 
the enemy will be unprepared, and none will be able to give 
aid to their allies in the darkness. Thus we shall antici- 
pate their intention of attacking us to-morrow. They have 
three stations; that of the ships is at a distance, and it is 
not easy to attack ships by night. Hasdrubal and Syphax 
are not far from each other. Hasdrubal is the head of the 
hostile force. Syphax will not dare to do anything at 
night; he is a barbarian, effeminate and timid. Come 
now, let us attack Hasdrubal with all our force. We will 

§ 19-21 ] THE PUNIC WARS 1 57 

Y.R. B.C. 

551 place Masinissa in ambush for Syphax, if, contrary to ex- 203 
pectation, he should move out of his camp. Let us advance 
with our infantry against Hasdrubars defences, surround 
and storm them on every side, with high hope and resolute 
courage, for these are the things most needed now. As the 
cavalry are not of much use in a night attack, I will send 
them to surround the enemy* s camp a little farther off, so 
that if we are overpowered we may have friends to receive 
us and cover our retreat, and if we are victorious they may 
pursue the fugitives and destroy them." 

21. Having spoken thus he sent the officers to arm the 
troops, and he offered sacrifice to Courage and also to 
Fear ^ in order that no panic should overtake them in the 
night, but that the army should show itself absolutely in- 
trepid. At the third watch the trumpet sounded lightly 
and the army moved, observing the most profound silence 
until the cavalry had completely surrounded the enemy and 
the infantry had arrived at the trenches. Then, with shouts 
mingled with the discordant blast of trumpets and horns 
for the puφose of striking terror into the enemy, they swept 
the guards away from the outposts, filled up the ditch, and 
tore down the palisades. The boldest, pushing forward, 
set some of the huts on fire. The Africans, starting in 
consternation out of sleep, fumbled around for their arms 
and tried confusedly to get into order of battle, but on 
account of the noise could not hear the orders of their 
officers, nor did their general himself know exactly what 
was happening. The Romans caught them, as they were 
starting up and trying to arm themselves, with confusion 
on every hand. They fired more huts and slew those 
whom they met. The noise of the invaders, their appear- 
ance, and the fearful work they were doing in the midst of 
darkness and uncertainty made the catastrophe complete. 
Thinking that the camp had been taken, and being afraid 
of the fire of the burning huts, they were glad to get out of 
them; and they pushed on to the plain as a safer place. 
Thus they ran helter-skelter, just as it happened, and the 

^ The Roman mythology was very comprehensive. " There were 
gods," says Duruy, " for every act of a man's life from the cradle to the 


Y.R. B.C. 

551 Roman horse, who had completely surrounded them, fell 203 
upon them and slaughtered them. 

22. Syphax, hearing the noise and seeing the fire in the 
night, did not leave his quarters, but sent a detachment of 
horse to the assistance of Hasdrubal. Masinissa fell upon 
these unawares and made a great slaughter. At daybreak, 
learning that Hasdrubal had fled and that his forces were 
destroyed, or taken prisoners, or dispersed, and that his 
camp and war material had fallen into the hands of the 
Romans, he fled precipitately to the interior, leaving every- 
thing behind, fearing lest Scipio should return from the 
pursuit of the Carthaginians and fall upon him. Masinissa 
took possession of his camp and belongings. 

23. Thus by one act of daring and in a little part of a 
night, did the Romans demolish two camps and two armies 
much greater than their own. The Romans lost about 100 
men killed, the enemy a little less than 30,000, besides 
2400 prisoners. Moreover, 600 horse surrendered them- 
selves to Scipio on his return. Some of the elephants were 
killed and some wounded. Scipio, having gained a great 
store of arms, gold, silver, ivory, and horses, Numidian 
and other, and having prostrated the Carthaginians by one 
splendid victory, distributed prizes to the army and sent 
the richest of the spoils to Rome. Then he began drilling 
the army diligently, expecting the arrival of Hannibal 
forthwith from Italy, and of Mago from Liguria. 

24. While Scipio was thus engaged, Hasdrubal, the Car- 
thaginan general, who had been wounded in the night en- 
gagement, fled with 500 horse to the town of Anda, where 
he collected some mercenaries and Numidians who had 
escaped from the battle, and proclaimed freedom to all 
slaves who would enlist. Learning that the Carthaginians 
had decreed the penalty of death against him for his bad 
generalship, and had chosen Hanno, the son of Bomilcar, 
as commander, he made this an army of his own, recruited 
a lot of malefactors, robbed the country for provisions, and 
drilled his men to the number of 3000 horse and 8000 foot, 
resting his hopes solely on fighting. His doings were for 
a long time unknown to both the Romans and the Car- 
thaginians. And now Scipio, having his army in readiness, 
led it to Carthage itself and haughtily offered battle, but 

§ 22-26] THE PUNIC WARS 1 59 

Y.R. B.C. 

551 nobody responded. Meanwhile Hamilcar, the admiral, «03 
hastened with 100 ships to attack Scipio's naval station, 
hoping to outstrip him in reaching the place, and thinking 
that he could easily destroy the twenty Roman ships there 
with his hundred. 

25. Scipio, seeing him sail away, sent orders ahead to 
block up the entrance to the harbor with ships of burthen 
anchored at intervals so that the galleys could dart out, as 
through gates, when they should see an opportunity. These 
ships were bound together by their yard arms and fastened 
to each other so as to form a wall. This work done he en- 
tered into the action. When the Carthaginians made their 
attack their ships were battered by missiles from the Roman 
ships, from the shore, and from the walls, and they with- 
drew at evening discomfited. As they were retreating, the 
Romans pressed upon them, darting out through the open 
spaces, and when they were overpowered withdrawing again. 
They took ooe ship in tow without any men and brought 
it to Scipio. After this both combatants went into winter 
quarters. The Romans received plentiful supplies by sea, 
but the Uticans and Carthaginians, being pinched with 
hunger, robbed the merchant ships until new galleys, sent 
to Scipio from Rome, blockaded the enemy and put an end 
to their plundering, after which they were severely oppressed 
by hunger. 

Chapter V 

Masinissa defeats and captures Syphax — Syphax and Sophonisba — 
Death of Sophonisba — Plot to burn Scipio's Camp — Siege of 
Utica raised 

26. This same winter, Syphax being near them, Masinissa 
asked of Scipio a third part of the Roman army as a rein- 
forcement to his own, and with this force under the com- 
mand of Laelius, he set out in pursuit of him. Syphax 
retreated until he came to a certain river, where he gave 
battle. The Numidians on both sides, as is their custom, 
discharged volleys of missiles at each other while the 
Romans advanced, holding their shields in front of them. 
Syphax, seeing Masinissa, dashed upon him with rage. The 
latter encountered him eagerly. The battle between them 


Y.R. ^ B.C. 

551 continued until the forces of Syphax turned in flight and 203 
began to cross the river. Syphax* s horse received a wound 
and threw his rider. Masinissa ran up and caught him 
and also one of his sons, and sent them forthwith to Scipio. 
In this battle 10,000 of Syphax* s men were killed. The 
Roman loss was seventy-five and Masinissa* s 300. Four 
thousand of Syphax* s men also were taken prisoners, of 
whom 2500 were Massylians who had deserted from Masi- 
nissa to Syphax. These Masinissa asked Laelius to surren- 
der to him, and having received them he put them to the 

27. After this they entered the country of the Massylians 
and of Syphax, and settled them under the government of 
Masinissa, persuading some and coercing others. Ambas- 
sadors came to them from Cirta offering them the palace of 
Syphax, and others came specially to Masinissa from So- 
phonisba, the wife of Syphax, to make explanations about 
her forced marriage. Masinissa accepted her explanations 
gladly and married her; but when he returned to Scipio he 
left her at Cirta, foreseeing what would happen. Scipio 
asked Syphax : " What evil genius misled you, after invit- 
ing me as your friend to come to Africa, and caused you 
to forfeit your oath to the gods and your faith to the Roman 
people, and to join the Carthaginians in making war against 
us, when not long before we were helping you against 
the Carthaginians?" Syphax replied: "Sophonisba, the 
daughter of Hasdrubal, with whom I fell in love to my hurt, 
is passionately attached to her country and she is able to 
make everybody subservient to her wishes. She turned me 
away from your friendship to that of her own country, and 
plunged me from that state of good fortune into my pres- 
ent misery. I advise you (for, being now on your side and 
relieved of Sophonisba, I must be faithful to you) to beware 
lest she draw Masinissa over to her designs, for it is not to 
be expected that this woman will ever espouse the Roman 
side, so strongly is she attached to her own country." 

28. So he spake, but whether he was telling the truth or 
was moved by jealousy and a desire to hurt Masinissa as 
much as possible, is not known. But Scipio called Syphax 
to the council, as he had shown himself sagacious and was 
acquainted with the country, and advised with him as Cyrus 

§ 27-29] THE PUNIC WAR^ l6l 

551 did with Croesus, king of Lydia. Laelius having returned 303 
and told him the same things about Sophonisba that he had 
learned from many others, he commanded Masinissa to 
deliver up the wife of Syphax. When the latter tried to 
beg off and related the facts concerning her as above, 
Scipio ordered him more sharply not to possess himself by 
force of the Roman spoils of victory, but to ask for her 
after she was delivered up and obtain her if he could. Ac- 
cordingly Masinissa went with a Roman detachment to fetch 
Sophonisba, but he went ahead secretly and gave her a dose 
of poison, explaining the circumstances and telling her that 
she must either drink it or go into voluntary captivity to 
the Romans. Without another word he mounted his horse. 
She showed the cup to her nurse, told her not to weep for 
her since she died gloriously, and drank the poison. 
Masinissa showed her dead body to the Romans who had 
now come up, then gave her a royal funeral; after which he 
returned to Scipio. The latter praised him, and to console 
him for the loss of a worthless woman, crowned him for his 
successful attack upon Syphax and gave him many presents. 
When Syphax arrived in Rome, some of the authorities 
thought that he ought to be spared because he had been 
their friend and ally in Spain, others, that he ought to be 
punished for fighting against his friends. In the meantime 
he sickened of grief and died. 

29. When Hasdrubal had his forces well drilled he sent 
word to Hanno, the Carthaginian general, proposing to 
share the command with him, and intimating that there 
were many Spanish soldiers serving with Scipio under com- 
pulsion, who might be bribed with gold and promises to 
set fire to Scipio 's camp. He said that he would lend a 
hand if he were duly notified. Hanno, although he in- 
tended to cheat Hasdrubal, did not neglect the suggestion. 
He sent a trusty man, in the guise of a deserter, with gold 
to Scipio' s camp, who, winning the confidence of those he 
fell in with, corrupted many, and having fixed a day for the 
execution of the plot, disappeared. Hanno communicated 
the date to Hasdrubal. To Scipio, while sacrificing, the vie- 1 
tims revealed that there was danger from fire. Accordingly ! 
he sent orders all around the camp if any glowing fires ' 
were found to put them out. He continued sacrificing sev- 

VOL, I — Μ 


V.R. B.C. 

551 eral days, and as the victims still indicated danger from fire 203 
he became anxious and determined to shift his camp. 

30. At this juncture a Spanish servant of one of the 
Roman knights, suspecting something of the conspiracy, 
pretended to be one of the accomplices and in this way 
learned all about it, and told his master. The latter 
brought him to Scipio, and he convicted the whole crowd. 
Scipio put them all to death and cast their bodies out of 
the camp. Knowledge of this coming quickly to Hanno, 
who was not far off, he did not come to the rendezvous, 
but Hasdrubal, who remained in ignorance, did. When he 
saw the multitude of corpses he guessed what had happened 
and withdrew. But Hanno slandered him and told every- 
body that he had come to surrender himself to Scipio, but 
that the latter would not receive him. Thus Hasdrubal 
was made more hateful to the Carthaginians than ever. 
About this time Hamilcar made a sudden dash on the 
Roman fleet and took one galley and six ships of burthen, 
and Hanno made an attack upon those who were besieging 
Utica, but was beaten off. As the siege had lasted a long 
time without result, Scipio raised it and moved his engines 
against the town of Hippo. As he accomplished nothing 
there, he burned his engines as useless, and overran the 
country, making allies of some and pillaging others. 

Chapter VI 

Hannibal recalled — Negotiations for Peace — Hannibal lands at Had- 
rumetum — The Armistice violated — Hannibal sent for — He 
proposes a Renewal of the Armistice 

31. The Carthaginians, depressed by their ill success, 
chose Hannibal as their commanding general and sent an 
admiral with ships to hasten his coming. At the same 
time they sent ambassadors to Scipio to negotiate for peace, 
thinking to gain one of two things, either peace or a delay 
until Hannibal should arrive. Scipio consented to an ar- 
mistice, and having thus gained sufficient supplies for his 
army allowed them to send their ambassadors to Rome. 
They did so, but they were received there as enemies and 
required to lodge outside the walls. When the Senate gave 

§ 30-33] THE PUNIC WARS 1 63 

SSI them audience they asked pardon. Some of the senators 303 
adverted to the faithlessness of the Carthaginians, and told 
how often they had made treaties and broken them, and 
what injuries Hannibal had inflicted on the Romans and 
their allies in Spain and Italy. Others represented that 
the Carthaginians were not more in need of peace than 
themselves, Italy being exhausted by so many wars; and 
they showed how much danger was to be feared from the 
great armies moving together against Scipio, that of Han- 
nibal from Italy, that of Mago from Liguria, and that of 
Hanno at Carthage. 

32. The Senate was not able to agree, but sent counsel- 
lors to Scipio with whom he should advise, and then do 
whatever he should deem best. Scipio made peace with 
the Carthaginians on these terms : That Mago should de- 
part from Liguria forthwith, and that hereafter the Car- 
thaginians should hire no mercenaries; that they should 
not keep more than thirty long galleys; that they should 
restrict themselves to the territory within the so-called 
" Phoenician trenches ** ; that they should surrender to the 
Romans all captives and deserters, and that they should 
pay 1600 talents of silver within a certain time; also that 
Masinissa should have the kingdom of the Massylians and 
as much of the dominion of Syphax as he could take. 
Having made this agreement, ambassadors on both sides 
set sail, some to Rome to take the oaths of the consuls, and 
others from Rome to Carthage to receive those of the Car- 
thaginian magistrates. The Romans gave to Masinissa, as 
a reward for his alliance, a crown of gold, a signet ring of 
gold, a chair of ivory, a purple robe, a horse with gold 
trappings, and a suit of armor. 

33. In the meantime Hannibal set sail for Africa against 
his will, knowing the untrustworthy character of the people 
of Carthage, their bad faith toward their magistrates, and 
their general recklessness. He did not believe that a 
treaty would be made, and if made he well knew that it 
would not last long. He landed at the city of Hadrume- 
tum, in Africa, and began to collect corn and buy horses. 
He made an alliance with the chief of a Numidian tribe 
called the Areacidae. He slew with arrows 4000 horsemen 
who had come to him as deserters. These had formerly 


551 been Syphax's men and afterward Masinissa's, and he sus-203 
pected them. He gave their horses to his own army. Me- 
sotulus, another chieftain, came to him with 1000 horse; 
also Verminia, another son of Syphax, who ruled the greater 
part of his father* s dominions. He gained some of Masi- 
nissa's towns by surrender and some by force. He took 
the town of Narce by stratagem in this way. Dealing in 
their market he sent to them as to friends, and when he 
thought the time had come to spring the trap he sent in a 
large number of men carrying concealed daggers, and 
ordered them not to do any harm to the traders until the 
trumpet should sound, and then to set upon all they met, 
and hold the gates for him. In this way was Narce taken. 

34. The common people of Carthage, although the treaty 
had been so lately concluded, and Scipio was still there, 
and their own ambassadors had not yet returned from 
Rome, plundered some of Scipio' s stores that had been 
driven into the port of Carthage by a storm, and put the 
carriers in chains, in spite of the threats of their own 
council and of their admonitions not to violate the treaty 
so recently made. The people found fault with the treaty, 
and said that hunger was more dangerous to them than 
treaty-breaking. Scipio did not deem it best to renew the 
war after the treaty, but he demanded reparation as from 
friends who were in the wrong. The people attempted to 
seize his messengers, intending to hold them until their 
own ambassadors should return from Rome, but Hanno the 
Great and Hasdrubal Eriphus [the Kid] rescued them from 
the mob and sent them away in two galleys. Some others, 
however, sent word to Hasdrubal, the admiral, who was 
moored near the promontory of Apollo, that when the es- 
cort should leave them he should set upon Scipio' s galleys. 
This he did, and some of the messengers were killed with 
arrows. The others were wounded, and the rowers darted 
into the harbor of their own camp and sprang from the ship 
which was just being seized. So narrowly did they escape 
being taken prisoners. 

35. When the Romans at home learned these things they 
ordered the Carthaginian ambassadors, who were still there 
treating for peace, to depart immediately as enemies. 
They accordingly set sail, and were driven by a tempest to 

§ 34-37] THE PUNIC WARS 1 65 

Y.R. B.C 

551 Scipio's camp. To his admiral, who asked what he should 303 
do with them, Scipio said : " We shall not imitate Car- 
thaginian bad faith; send them away unharmed." When 
the Carthaginian Senate learned this they chided the people 
for the contrast between their behavior and Scipio* s, and 
advised them to beg Scipio to adhere to the agreement and 
to accept reparation for the Carthaginian wrong-doing. 
But the people had been finding fault with the Senate a 
long time for their ill success, because they had not suffi- 
ciently foreseen what was for their advantage, and being 
pushed on by demagogues and excited by vain hopes, they 
summoned Hannibal and his army. 

552 36. Hannibal, in view of the magnitude of the war, 209 
asked them to call in Hasdrubal and the force he had in 
hand. Hasdrubal was accordingly forgiven for his offence, 
and he delivered his army over to Hannibal. Yet he did 
not dare to show himself to the Carthaginians, but con- 
cealed himself in the city. Now Scipio blockaded Car- 
thage with his fleet and cut off their supplies by sea, while 
from the land they were poorly supplied by reason of the 
war. About this time there was a cavalry engagement 
between the forces of Hannibal and those of Scipio near 
Zama, in which the latter had the advantage. On the suc- 
ceeding days they had sundry skirmishes until Scipio, 
learning that Hannibal was very short of supplies and was 
expecting a convoy, sent the military tribune, Thermus, by 
night to attack the supply train. Thermus took a position 
on the crest of a hill at a narrow pass, where he killed 4000 
Africans, took as many more prisoners, and brought the 
supplies to Scipio. 

37. Hannibal, being reduced to extremity for want of 
provisions and considering how he might arrange for the 
present, sent messengers to Masinissa reminding him of 
his early life and education at Carthage, and asking that 
he would persuade Scipio to renew the treaty, saying that 
the former infractions of it were the work of the common 
people, and of fools who had stirred them up. Masinissa, 
who had in fact been brought up and educated at Carthage, 
and who had a high respect for the dignity of the city, and 
was the friend of many of the inhabitants, besought Scipio 
to comply, and brought them to an agreement on the fol- 


Y.R. B.C. 

55» lowing terms: That the Carthaginians should surrender 20a 
the men and ships bringing provisions to the Romans, 
which they had taken, also all plunder, or the value of it, 
which Scipio would estimate, and pay 1000 talents as a 
penalty for the wrong done. These things were agreed 
upon. An armistice was concluded until the Carthaginians 
should be made acquainted with the details; and thus Han- 
nibal was saved in an unexpected way. 

Chapter VII 

Riots in Carthage — Second Armistice broken — Preparations for 
Battle — Speeches of Hannibal and Scipio — Battle of Zama — 
Personal Encounter of Hannibal and Scipio — Hannibal's Defeat 
and Flight 

38. The Carthaginian council warmly welcomed the 
agreement and exhorted the people to adhere to its terms, 
explaining all their misfortunes and their immediate want 
of soldiers, money, and provisions. But the people, like 
a mere mob, behaved like fools. They thought that their 
generals had made this arrangement for their own private 
ends, so that, relying upon the Romans, they might hold 
the power in their own country. They said that Hannibal 
was doing now what had been done before by Hasdrubal, 
who had betrayed his camp to the enemy by night, and a 
little later wanted to surrender to Scipio, having approached 
him for that purpose, and was now concealed in the city. 
Thereupon there was a great clamor and tumult, and some 
of them left the assembly and went in search of Hasdrubal. 
He had anticipated them by taking refuge in his father^s 
tomb, where he destroyed himself with poison. But they 
pulled his corpse out, cut off his head, put it on a pike, and 
carried it about the city. Thus was Hasdrubal first ban- 
ished unjustly, next falsely slandered by Hanno, and then 
driven to his death by the Carthaginians, and loaded with 
indignities after his death. 

39. Then the Carthaginians ordered Hannibal to break 
the truce and begin war against Scipio, and to fight as soon 
as possible on account of the scarcity of provisions. Ac- 
cordingly he sent word that the truce was at an end. Scipio 

§ 38-40] THE PUNIC WARS 1 6/ 

V.R. B. C 

552 marched immediately, and took the great city of Partha2oa 
and encamped near Hannibal. The latter moved off, but 
he sent three spies into the Roman camp who were captured 
by Scipio. The latter did not put them to death, however, 
according to the custom of dealing with spies, but ordered 
that they should be taken around and shown the camp, the 
arsenals, the engines, and the army under review. He 
then set them free so that they might inform Hannibal 
concerning all these things. The latter deemed it advis- 
able to have a parley with Scipio, and when it was granted 
he said that the Carthaginians had rejected the former 
treaty on account of the money indemnity. If he would 
remit that, and if the Romans would content themselves 
with Sicily, Spain, and the islands they now held, the 
agreement would be lasting. "HannibaPs escape from 
Italy would be a great gain to him," said Scipio, "if he 
could obtain these terms in addition." He then forbade 
Hannibal to send any more messages to him. After in- 
dulging in some mutual threats they departed, each to his 
own camp. 

40. The town of Cilia was in the neighborhood and near 
it was a hill well adapted for a camp. Hannibal, perceiv- 
ing this, sent a detachment forward to seize it and lay out a 
camp. Then he started and moved forward as though he 
were already in possession of it. Scipio having anticipated 
him and seized it beforehand, Hannibal was cut off in the 
midst of a plain without water and was engaged all night 
digging wells. His army, by toiling in the sand, with great 
difficulty obtained a little muddy water to drink, and so 
they passed the night without food, without care for their 
bodies, and some of them without removing their arms. 
Scipio, mindful of these things, moved against them at day- 
light while they were exhausted with marching, with want 
of sleep, and want of water. Hannibal was troubled, since 
he did not wish to join battle in that plight. Yet he saw 
that if he should remain there his army would suffer severely 
from want of water, while if he should retreat the enemy 
would take fresh courage and fall upon his rear. For these 
reasons it was necessary for him to fight. He speedily put 
in battle array about 50,000 men and eighty elephants. He 
placed the elephants in the front line at intervals, in order 


Y.R. Β C. 

55» to strike terror into the enemy's ranks. Next to them he 202 
placed the third part of his army, composed of Celts and 
Ligurians, and mixed with them everywhere Moorish and 
Balearic archers and slingers. Behind these was his second 
line, composed of Carthaginians and Africans. The third 
line consisted of Italians who had followed him from their 
own country, in whom he placed the greatest confidence, 
since they had the most to apprehend from defeat. The 
cavalry were placed on the wings. In this way Hannibal 
arranged his forces. 

41. Scipio had about 23,000 foot and 1500 Italian and 
Roman horse. He had as allies Masinissa with a large 
number of Numidian horse, and another prince, named 
Dacamas, with 1600 horse. He drew up his infantry, like 
those of Hannibal, in three lines. He placed all his co- 
horts in straight lines with open spaces so that the cavalry 
might readily pass between them. In front of each cohort 
he stationed men armed with heavy stakes two cubits long, 
mostly shod with iron, for the purpose of assailing the on- 
coming elephants by hand, as with catapult bolts. He 
ordered these and the other foot-soldiers to avoid the im- 
petus of these beasts by turning aside and continually 
hurling javelins at them, and by darting around them to 
hamstring them whenever they could. In this way Scipio 
disposed his infantry. He stationed his Numidian horse 
on his wings because they were accustomed to the sight and 
smell of elephants. As the Italian horse were not so, he 
placed them all in the rear, ready to charge through the 
intervals of the foot-soldiers when the latter should have 
checked the first onset of the elephants. To each horse- 
man was assigned an attendant armed with plenty of darts 
with which to ward off the attack of these beasts. In this 
way was his cavalry disposed. Laelius commanded the 
right wing and Octavius the left. In the middle both 
Hannibal and himself took their stations, out of respect for 
each other, each having a body of horse in order to send 
reenforcements wherever they might be needed. Of these 
Hannibal had 4000 and Scipio 2000, besides the 300 
Italians whom he had armed in Sicily. 

42. When everything was ready each one rode up and 
down encouraging his soldiers. Scipio, in the presence of 

§ 41-43] THE PUNIC WARS 1 69 

Y.R. B.C. 

552 his army, invoked the gods, whom the Carthaginians had «02 
offended by their frequent violation of treaties. He told 
the soldiers not to think of the numbers of the enemy but 
of their own valor, by which aforetime these same enemies, 
in even greater numbers, had been overcome in this same 
country. If fear, anxiety, and doubt oppress those who 
have hitherto been victorious, how much more, he said, 
must these feelings weigh upon the vanquished. Thus did 
Scipio encourage his forces and console them for their in- 
feriority in numbers. Hannibal reminded his men of what 
they had done in Italy, their great and brilliant victories 
won, not over Numidians, but over those who were all 
Italians, and throughout Italy. He pointed out, in plain 
sight, the smallness of the enemy's force, and exhorted 
them not to show themselves inferior to a less numerous 
body in their own country. Each general magnified to his 
own men the consequences of the coming engagement. 
Hannibal said that the battle would decide the fate of 
Carthage and all Africa; if vanquished, they would be en- 
slaved forthwith, if victorious, they would have universal 
supremacy hereafter. Scipio said that there was no safe 
refuge for his men if they were vanquished, but if victori- 
ous there would be a great increase of the Roman power, 
a rest from their present labors, a speedy return home, and 
glory forever after. 

43. Having thus exhorted their men they joined battle. 
Hannibal ordered the trumpet to sound, and Scipio re- 
sponded in like manner. The elephants began the fight 
decked out in fearful panoply and urged on with goads by 
their riders. The Numidian horse flying around them in- 
cessantly thrust darts into them. Being wounded and put 
to flight and having become unmanageable, their drivers 
took them out of the combat. This is what happened to 
the elephants on both wings. Those in the centre trampled 
down the Roman infantry, who were not accustomed to 
that kind of fighting and were not able to avoid or to pur- 
sue them easily on account of their heavy armor, until 
Scipio brought up the Italian cavalry, who were in the rear 
and more lightly armed, and ordered them to dismount 
from their frightened horses, and run around and stab the 
elephants. He was himself the first to dismount and 


V.R. B.C. 

552 wound the front- tramping elephant. The others were en- 202 
couraged by his example, and they inflicted so many wounds 
upon the elephants that these also withdrew. 

44. The field being cleared of these beasts the battle 
was now waged by men and horses only. The Roman 
right wing, where Laelius commanded, put the opposing Nu- 
midians to flight, and Masinissa struck down their prince, 
Massathes, with a dart, but Hannibal quickly came to their 
rescue and restored the line of battle. On the left wing, 
where Octavius commanded and where the hostile Celts 
and Ligurians were stationed, a doubtful battle was going 
on. Scipio sent the tribune Thermus thither with a reen- 
forcement of picked men, but Hannibal, after rallying his 
left wing, flew to the assistance of the Ligurians and Celts, 
bringing up at the same time his second line of Cartha- 
ginians and Africans. Scipio, perceiving this, brought his 
second line in opposition. When the two greatest generals 
of the world thus met, in hand to hand fight, there was, 
on the part of the soldiers of each, a brilliant emulation 
and reverence for their commanders, and no lack of zeal on 
either side in the way of sharp and vehement fighting and 

45. As the battle was long and undecided, the two gen- 
erals had compassion on their tired soldiers, and rushed 
upon each other in order to bring it to a more speedy 
decision. They threw their javelins at the same time. 
Scipio pierced Hannibal's shield. Hannibal hit Scipio's 
horse. The horse, smarting from the wound, threw Scipio 
over backwards. He quickly mounted another and again 
hurled a dart at Hannibal, but missed him and struck another 
horseman near him. At this juncture, Masinissa, hearing of 
the crisis, came up, and the Romans seeing their general 
not only serving as a commander but fighting also as a com- 
mon soldier, fell upon the enemy more vehemently than 
before, routed them, and pursued them in flight. Nor could 
Hannibal, who rode by the side of his men and besought 
them to make a stand and renew the battle, prevail upon 
them to do so. Therefore, despairing of these, he turned 
to the Italians who had come with him, and who were still 
in reserve and not demoralized. These he led into the 
fight, hoping to fall upon the Romans in disorderly pursuit. 

§44-47] THE PUNIC WARS 171 

Y.R. B.C. 

552 But they perceived his intention, and speedily called one ««» 
another back from the pursuit and restored the line of 
battle. As their horse were no longer with them and they 
were destitute of missiles, they now fought sword in hand 
in close combat. Great slaughter ensued and innumerable 
wounds, mingled with the shouts of the combatants and the 
groans of the dying, until, finally, the Romans routed these 
also and put them to flight. Such was the brilliant issue of 
this engagement. 

46. Hannibal in his flight seeing a mass of Numidian 
horse collected together, ran up and besought them not to 
desert him. Having secured their promise, he led them 
against the pursuers, hoping still to turn the tide of battle. 
The first whom he encountered were the Massylians, and 
now a single combat between Masinissa and Hannibal took 
place. Rushing fiercely upon each other, Masinissa drove 
his spear into Hannibal's shield, and Hannibal wounded 
his antagonist's horse. Masinissa, being thrown, sprang 
towards Hannibal on foot, and struck and killed a horseman 
who was advancing towards him in front of the others. At 
the same time he received in his shield — made of elephant's 
hide — several darts, one of which he pulled out and hurled 
at Hannibal; but, as it happened, it struck another horse- 
man who was near and killed him. While he was pulling 
out another, he was wounded in the arm, and withdrew from 
the fight for a brief space. When Scipio learned this, he 
feared for Masinissa and hastened to his relief, but he found 
that the latter had bound up his wound and returned to the 
fight on a fresh horse. Thus the battle continued doubtful 
and very severe, the soldiers on either side having the ut- 
most reverence for their commanders, until Hannibal, dis- 
covering a body of Spanish and Celtic troops on a hill near 
by, dashed over to them to bring them into the fight. 
Those who were still engaged, not knowing the cause of his 
going, thought that he had fled. Accordingly, they aban- 
doned the fight of their own accord and broke into dis- 
orderly rout, not following after Hannibal, but helter skelter. 
This band having been dispersed, the Romans thought that 
the fight was over and pursued them in a disorderly way, 
not perceiving Hannibal's purpose. 

47. Presently Hannibal returned accompanied by the 


Y.R. B.C. 

553 Spanish and Celtic troops from the hill. Scipio hastened 203 
to recall the Romans from the pursuit, and formed a new 
line of battle much stronger than those who were coming 
against him, by which means he overcame them without 
difficulty. When this last effort had failed, Hannibal de- 
spaired utterly, and fled in plain sight. Many horsemen 
pursued him, and among others Masinissa, although suffer- 
ing from his wound, pressed him hard, striving eagerly to 
take him prisoner and deliver him to Scipio. But night 
came to his rescue and under cover of darkness, with twenty 
horsemen who had alone been able to keep pace with him, 
he took refuge in a town named Thon. Here he found 
many Bruttian and Spanish horsemen who had fled after 
the defeat. Fearing the Spaniards because they were fickle 
barbarians, and apprehending that the Bruttians, as they 
were Scipio* s countrymen, might deliver him up in order 
to secure pardon for their transgression against Italy, he 
fled secretly with one horseman in whom he had full confi- 
dence. Having accomplished about 3000 stades^ in two 
nights and days, he arrived at the seaport of Hadrumetum, 
where a part of his army had been left to guard his supplies. 
Here he began to collect forces from the adjacent country 
and from those who had escaped from the recent engage- 
ment, and to prepare arms and engines of war. 

Chapter VIII 

Spoils of the Victory — An Embassy to Scipio — Speech of Hasdrubal 
Eriphus — Scipio's Reply — Scipio's Conditions of Peace 

48. Now Scipio, having gained this splendid victory, 
girded himself as for a sacrifice and burned the less valu- 
able spoils of the enemy, as is the custom of the Roman 
generals. He sent to Rome ten talents of gold, 2500 talents 
of silver, a quantity of carved ivory, and many distinguished 
captives in ships, and Lselius to carry news of the victory. 
The remainder of the spoils he sold, and divided the pro- 
ceeds among the troops. He also made presents for dis- 
tinguished valor, and crowned Masinissa again. He also 

^ About 330 miles. 

§ 48-50] THE PUNIC WARS 1 73 

Y.R. B.C. 

553 sent out expeditions and gathered in more cities. Such 202 
was the result of the engagement between Hannibal and 
Scipio, who here met in combat for the first time. The 
Roman loss was 2500 men, that of Masinissa rather more. 
That of the enemy was 25,000 killed, and 8500 taken pris- 
oners. Three hundred Spaniards deserted to Scipio, and 
800 Numidians to Masinissa. 

49. Before the news reached either Carthage or Rome, 
the former sent word to Mago, who was collecting Gallic 
mercenaries, to invade Italy if possible, and if not, to set 
sail with his forces for Africa. These letters being inter- 
cepted and brought to Rome, another army, together with 
horses, ships, and money, was despatched to Scipio. The 
latter had already sent Octavius by the land route to Car- 
thage, and was going thither himself with his fleet. When 
the Carthaginians learned of Hannibal's defeat they sent 
ambassadors to Scipio on a small fast-sailing ship, of whom 
the principal ones were Hanno the Great and Hasdrubal 
Eriphus, who bore a herald's staff aloft on the prow and 
stretched out their hands toward Scipio in the manner of 
suppliants. He directed them to come to the camp, and 
when they had arrived he attended to their business in high 
state. They threw themselves on the ground weeping, and 
when the attendants had lifted them up and bade them say 
what they wished, Hasdrubal Eriphus spoke as follows : 

50. "For myself, Romans, and for Hanno here, and 
for all sensible Carthaginians, let me say that we are guilt- 
less of the wrongs which you lay at our door. For when 
the same men, driven by hunger, did violence to your 
legates, we rescued them and sent them back to you. You 
ought not to condemn all the people of Carthage who so 
recently sought peace, and when it was granted eagerly took 
the oath to support it. But cities are easily swayed to their 
hurt, because the masses are always controlled by what is 
pleasing to their ears. We have had experience of these 
things, having been unable either to persuade or to restrain 
the multitude by reason of those who slandered us at home 
and who have prevented us from making ourselves under- 
stood by you. Romans, do not judge us by the standard 
of your own discipline and good counsel. If any one 
esteems it a crime to have yielded to the persuasions of 


Y.R. B.C. 

553 these rabble-rousers, consider the hunger and the necessity 20a 
that was upon us by reason of suffering. For it could not 
have been a deliberate intention on the part of our people, 
first to ask for peace, and give such a large sum of money 
to obtain it, and deliver up all their galleys except a few, 
and surrender the bulk of their territory, swear to these 
things, and send an embassy to Rome with the ratifications, 
and then wantonly to violate the agreement before our em- 
bassy had returned. Surely some god misled them and the 
tempest that drove your supplies into Carthage; and be- 
sides the tempest, hunger carried us away, for people who 
are in want of everything do not form the best judgments 
respecting other people's property. It would not be rea- 
sonable to punish with severity a multitude of men so dis- 
organized and unfortunate. 

51. " But if you consider us more guilty than unfortunate, 
we confess our fault and ask pardon for it. Justification 
belongs to the innocent, entreaty to those who have of- 
fended. And much more readily will the fortunate extend 
pity to others, when they observe the mutability of human 
affairs, and see people craving mercy to-day who yesterday 
were carrying things with a high hand. Such is the con- 
dition of Carthage, the greatest and most powerful city of 
Africa, in ships and money, in elephants, in infantry and 
cavalry, and in subject peoples, which has flourished 700 
years and held sway over all Africa and so many other 
nations, islands, and seas, standing for the greater part of 
this time on an equality with yourselves, but which now 
places her hope of safety not in her dominion of the sea, 
her ships, her horses, her subjects (all of which have passed 
over to you), but in you, whom we have heretofore shame- 
fully treated. Contemplating these facts, Romans, it is fit 
that you should beware of the Nemesis which has come 
upon them and should use your good fortune mercifully, 
to do deeds worthy of your own magnanimity and of the 
former fortunes of Carthage, and to deal with the changes 
which Providence has ordered in our affairs without re- 
proach, so that your conduct may be blameless before the 
gods and win the praises of all mankind. 

52. "There need be no fear that the Carthaginians will 
change their minds again, after being subjected to such re- 

§51-54] THE PUNIC WARS 1 75 

Y.R. . B.C. 

553 pentance and punishment for their past folly. Wise men 202 
are prevented from wrong-doing by their wisdom, the 
wicked by their suffering and repentance. It is reasonable 
to suppose that those who have been chastised will be more 
trusty than those who have not had such experience. Be 
careful that you do not imitate the cruelty and the sinful- 
ness that you lay at the door of the Carthaginians. The 
misfortunes of the miserable are the source of fresh trans- 
gressions arising from poverty. To the fortunate the oppor- 
tunity for clemency exists in the abundance of their means. 
It will be neither to the glory nor to the advantage of your 
government to destroy so great a city as ours, instead of 
preserving it. Still, you are the better judges of your own 
interests. For our safety we rely on these two things: 
the ancient dignity of the city of Carthage and your well- 
known moderation, which, together with your arms, has 
raised you to so great dominion and power. We must ac- 
cept peace on whatever terms you grant. It is needless to 
say that we place everything in your hands." 

53. At the conclusion of his speech Eriphus burst into 
tears. Then Scipio dismissed them and consulted with his 
officers a long time. After he had come to a decision, he 
called the Carthaginian envoys back and addressed them 
thus : " You do not deserve pardon, you who have so often 
violated your treaties with us, and only lately abused our 
envoys in such a public and heaven-defying manner that 
you can neither excuse yourselves nor deny that you are 
worthy of the severest punishment. But what is the use of 
accusing those who confess? And now you take refuge in 
prayers, you who would have wiped out the very name of 
Rome if you had conquered. We did not imitate your bad 
example. When your ambassadors were at Rome, although 
you had violated the agreement and maltreated our envoys, 
the city allowed them to go free, and when they were driven 
into my camp, although the war had been recommenced, I 
sent them back to you unharmed. Now that you have con- 
demned yourselves, you may consider whatever terms are 
granted to you in the light of a gain. I will tell you what 
my views are, and our Senate will vote upon them as it shall 
think best. 

54. "We will yet grant you peace, Carthaginians, on 


552 condition that you surrender to the Romans all your war- 202 
ships except ten, all your elephants, the plunder you have 
lately taken from us, or the value of what has been lost, 
of which I shall be the judge, all prisoners and deserters 
and those whom Hannibal led from Italy. These con- 
ditions to be fulfilled within thirty days after peace is de- 
clared. Mago to depart from Liguria within sixty days, 
and your garrisons to be withdrawn from all cities beyond 
the Phoenician trenches and their hostages to be surren- 
dered. You to pay to Rome the sum of 250 Euboic talents 
per annum for fifty years. You shall not recruit merce- 
naries from the Celts or the Ligurians, nor wage war against 
Masinissa or any other friend of Rome, nor permit any 
Carthaginians to serve against them with consent of your 
people. You to retain your city and as much territory 
inside the Phoenician trenches as you had when I sailed for 
Africa. You to remain friends of Rome and be her allies 
on land and sea; all this, if the Senate please, in which 
case the Romans will evacuate Africa within 150 days. If 
you desire an armistice until you can send ambassadors to 
Rome, you shall forthwith give us 150 of your children as 
hostages whom I shall choose. You shall also give 1000 
talents in addition for the pay of my army, and provisions 
likewise. When the treaty is ratified we will release your 


Hannibal advises their Acceptance — Another Embassy to Rome — 
Debate in the Senate — Views of Scipio's Friends — The Counsels 
of Clemency and of Prudence — Views of Scipio's Rivals — The 
Crimes of Carthage — Call for Vengeance — The Senate ratifies 
Scipio's Treaty — Scipio's Return — Form of a Roman Triumph 

55. When Scipio had finished speaking the envoys bore 
his conditions to Carthage, where the people debated them 
in the Assembly for several days. The chief men thought 
that it was best to accept the offer and not, by refusing a 
part, to run the risk of losing all; but the vulgar crowd, 
not considering the instant peril rather than the draft, great 
as it was, upon their resources, and being the majority, re- 
fused compliance. They were angry that their rulers, in 

§55-57] THE PUNIC WARS 1 77 

Y.R. . ^ B.C. 

552 time of famine, should send provisions away to the Romans aoa 
instead of supplying their own citizens during the armis- 
tice, and they banded together, threatening to plunder and 
burn the houses of every one of them. Finally, they de- 
cided to take counsel with Hannibal, who now had 6000 
infantry and 500 cavalry stationed at the town of Mar- 
thama. He came and, although moderate citizens feared 
lest a man so fond of war should excite the people to re- 
newed exertions, he very gravely advised them to accept 
peace. But the people, mad with rage, reviled him also, 
and threatened everybody, until some of the notables, de- 
spairing of the city, took refuge with Masinissa, and others 
with the Romans themselves. 

56. The remaining Carthaginians, hearing that a large 
quantity of provisions had been stored by Hannibal at a 
certain place, sent a number of transports and war-ships 
thither, being resolved, if they could obtain food, to con- 
tinue the war and to endure everything rather than accept 

553 servitude to the Romans. But after a storm had shattered aox 
their ships, despairing of everything, they accused the 
gods of conspiring against them, assented to the agreement 
with Scipio, and sent an embassy to Rome. Scipio also 
sent counsellors to confirm the agreement. It was said that 
Scipio was moved by two considerations. He thought that 
peace would be for the advantage of the city. He knew 
also that the consul, C. Cornelius Lentulus, would grasp at 
his command, and he was not willing that another should 
reap the glory of bringing the war to an end. At all events 
he enjoined upon his messengers to say that if there should 
be delay at Rome he would conclude peace himself. 

57. There was great rejoicing at Rome that this mighty 
city, which had brought so many calamities upon them and 
had been the second or third in the leadership of the world, 
had been completely vanquished. But there were differ- 
ences of opinion as to what should be done. Some were 
exceedingly bitter toward the Carthaginians. Others had 
pity on them, thinking that this was a more becoming atti- 
tude to take respecting other people's misfortunes. One 
of Scipio* s friends rose and said: "Gentlemen, this is not 
so much a question of saving Carthage as it is of preserving 
our faith with the gods and our reputation among men — 

VOL. I — Ν 


V.R. B.C. 

553 lest it be said that we, who have so often charged the Car- 201 
thaginians with cruelty, behave with greater cruelty than 
they, and that we, who always exercise moderation in small 
matters, neglect it wholly in large ones, which, on account 
of their very magnitude, cannot escape notice. The deed 
will be sounded through all the earth, now and hereafter, 
if we destroy this famous city, former mistress of the seas, 
ruler of so many islands, and of the whole expanse of water, 
and more than half of Africa, and which in contests with 
ourselves has exhibited such wonderful success and power. 
While they were in arms it was necessary to fight them; 
now that they have fallen they should be spared, just as 
athletes refrain from striking a fallen antagonist, and as 
many wild beasts spare the enemies they have thrown 
down. It is fitting, in the hour of success, to beware of the 
indignation of the gods and of the envy of mankind. If 
we consider closely what they have done to us, that is itself 
a most fearful example of the fickleness of fortune, that they 
are now asking us simply to save them from destruction, 
they who have been able to inflict so many and so great 
evils upon us, and not long ago were contending on even 
terms with us for the possession of Sicily and Spain. But, 
for these things they have already been punished. For 
their later transgressions blame the pangs of hunger, the 
most painful suffering that can afflict mankind, a torture 
that may easily dethrone the reasoning powers of men. 

58. "I do not speak for the Carthaginians; that would 
not be fitting. Nor do I forget that they violated other 
treaties before those which are now under review. What 
our fathers did in like circumstances (and by which means 
they arrived at the summit of fortune) I will recall to your 
minds for you know them already. Although the neigh- 
boring peoples round about us often revolted and were con- 
tinually breaking treaties, our ancestors did not disdain 
them — the Latins, the Etruscans, the Sabines, for example. 
Afterward, the ^qui, the Volsci, the Campanians, also our 
neighbors, and various other peoples of Italy, committed a 
breach of their treaties, and our fathers met it magnani- 
mously. Moreover, the Samnite race, after betraying 
friendship and agreements three times and waging the most 
desperate \var against us for eighty years, were not de- 

§ 58-60] THE PUNIC WARS 1 79 

Y.R. B.C 

553 stroyed, nor were those others who called Pyrrhus into 201 
Italy. Nor did we destroy those Italians who lately joined 
forces with Hannibal^ not even the Bruttians, who remained 
with him to the last. We took from them a part of their 
lands and allowed them to keep the remainder. Thus it 
was esteemed both generous to them and useful to us not 
to exterminate a whole race, but to bring them into a better 
state of mind. 

59. "Why, in dealing with the Carthaginians, should we 
change our nature, in the exercise of which we have until 
now so greatly prospered? Is it because their city is large? 
That is the very reason why it ought to be spared. Is it 
because they have often violated their treaties with us? 
So have other nations, almost all of them. Is it because 
they are now to be subjected to a light punishment? They 
are to lose all their ships but ten. They are to give up 
their elephants, which constitute so large a part of their 
strength. They are to pay 10,000 Euboic talents. They 
are to yield all the cities and territories outside of the 
Phoenician trenches, and they are forbidden to enlist sol- 
diers. What they took from us when pressed by hunger 
they are to restore, although they are still hungry. As to 
all doubtful matters, Scipio, the man who fought against 
them, is the judge. I praise Scipio the rather for the 
magnitude and multitude of these things. I think you 
ought to spare them considering the invidiousness and the 
mutability of human affairs. They still have (until the 
treaty is ratified) an abundance of ships and elephants, and 
Hannibal, that most skilful captain, who still has an army; 
also Mago, who is leading another considerable force of 
Celts and Ligurians; also Vermina, the son of Syphax, is 
allied with them, and other Numidian tribes. They have 
also a great many slaves. If they despair of pardon from 
you they will use all these things with a lavish hand. 
Nothing is more dangerous than desperation in battles, in 
which also the divine will is both uncertain and vengeful. 

60. " It seems that Scipio was apprehensive of these 
things when he communicated his own opinion to us, saying 
that if we delayed he would conclude peace himself. It 
is reasonable to suppose, too, that he can form a better 
judgment than ourselves, since the one who presides over 

1 80 APPIAN'S mSTOR Υ [Βκ. VIII, Ch. IX 

Y.R. B.C. 

553 the whole business can have the best view of it. If we 201 
reject his advice we shall give pain to that ardent patriot, 
that renowned general, who urged us to carry the war into 
Africa when we were not in favor of it; and when he could 
not obtain an army from us, raised it himself, and there 
achieved for us a success far beyond our expectations. It 
is astonishing that you who entered upon this war so slug- 
gishly in the beginning, should now prosecute it so fiercely 
and to such extremity. If any one agrees to this, but fears 
lest the Carthaginians should break faith again, I answer 
that it is more likely that they now perceive the necessity 
of keeping their agreements because they have suffered so 
much from former violations of them, and that they will 
observe the claims of religion all the more since their im- 
piety has led only to their ruin. It is not consistent to 
despise the Carthaginians as being powerless, and in the 
same breath to fear lest they should have power to rebel. 
It will be easier for us to keep watch over them, that they 
do not become too great hereafter, than to destroy them 
now. They will fight with desperation now, but hereafter 
they will always be held in check by their fears. Besides, 
they will have plenty of troubles without us, for all their 
neighbors, angered by their former tyranny, will press 
upon them•, and Masinissa, our most faithful ally, will 
always be there lying in wait for them. 

61. "If any one is disposed to treat all these considera- 
tions lightly, and is only thinking how he may succeed to 
Scipio's command and turn it to his own advantage, trust- 
ing that the favors of fortune will attend him to the end, 
what are we going to do with the city after we have taken 
it — supposing we do take it? Shall we destroy it utterly 
because they seized some of our corn and ships, which they 
are ready to give back, together with many other things? 
If we do not do this (having regard to the indignation of 
the gods and the censures of men) shall we give it to Masi- 
nissa? Although he is our friend, it is best not to make 
him too strong. It should rather be considered a public 
advantage to the Romans that the two should be at strife 
with each other. Is it said that we might collect rent from 
their land? The expense of military protection would eat 
up the rent, for we should need a strong force to ward off 

§ 61-63] THE PUNIC WARS 181 

Y.R. B.C. 

553 so many surrounding tribes, all of them uncivilized. Can aox 
we plant colonies in the midst of such a host of Numidians? 
They would always be exposed to the depredations of these 
powerful barbarians, and if they should conquer them they 
might hereafter become objects of fear and jealousy to us, 
possessing a country so much more fruitful than ours. All 
of which things, it seems to me, Scipio clearly discerned 
when he advised us to yield to the prayers of the Cartha- 
ginians. Let us then grant their request and that of our 

62. When he had thus spoken, Publius Cornelius, a 
relative of Cornelius Lentulus, who was then consul and 
who expected to be Scipio* s successor, replied thus: "In 
war, gentlemen, the only thing to be considered is, what is 
advantageous. We are told that this city is still powerful. 
So much the more ought we to be on our guard against 
treachery joined to power, and to crush the power since 
we cannot extinguish the treachery. No time can be better 
chosen to free ourselves from all fear of the Carthaginians 
than the present, when they are weak and stripped of every- 
thing, and before they grow again to their former propor- 
tions. Not that I would deny the claims of justice, but I 
do not think that we can be accused of want of moderation 
toward the Carthaginians, who in their days of prosperity 
were unjust and insolent to everybody, but have become 
suppliants in adversity, and will immediately break away 
from the new treaty if they have a chance. They have 
neither respect for treaties nor regard for their oaths — 
these people whom the gentleman thinks we ought to spare, 
in order that we may avoid the indignation of the gods and 
the censures of men. I think that the gods themselves have 
brought Carthage into this plight in order to punish for 
their former impiety those who in Sicily, in Spain, in Italy, 
and in Africa itself, with us and with all others, were always 
making covenants and breaking their oaths, and committing 
outrage and savagery. Of these things I will give you some 
foreign examples before I speak of those that concern our- 
selves, in order that you may know that all men will rejoice 
over the Carthaginians if they are brought to condign 

63. "The people of Saguntum, a noble city of Spain, in 


Υ•Κ. B.C. 

553 league with themselves and friendly to us, they slaughtered 201 
to the last man, although they had given no offence. Those 
of Nuceria, a town subject to us, surrendered to them under 
a sworn agreement that they might depart with two garments 
each. They shut the senators of Nuceria up in a bath-room 
and suffocated them with heat. Then they shot the com- 
mon people with arrows as they were going away. After 
entering into a treaty with the Senate of Acerra they threw 
them into wells and buried them alive. Our consul, Mar- 
cus Cornelius, they lured by false oaths to an interview with 
their general, who pretended to be sick. They seized him 
and carried him prisoner from Sicily into Africa with 
twenty-two of our ships. They put our other general, 
Regulus, to death with torture after he had gone back to 
them in accordance with his oath. The acts perpetrated 
by Hannibal himself in war, stratagem and perjury, against 
our cities and armies, and at last against his own allies, 
destroying their cities and slaughtering their soldiers serv- 
ing with him, it would take too long to enumerate. In a 
word, 400 of our towns were depopulated by him. He cast 
our men, whom he had taken prisoners, into ditches and 
rivers, making bridges of their bodies to pass over. He 
had them trodden under foot by elephants. He made them 
fight with each other, brothers against brothers and fathers 
against sons. And just now, while they were here treating 
for peace, and calling the gods to witness, and taking oaths, 
and while their ambassadors were still among us, they seized 
our ships in Africa and put our men in chains. To such a 
pitch of madness have they been brought by the practice of 

64. "What pity, therefore, or what moderation is due 
from others to these Carthaginians, who have never exer- 
cised moderation or clemency in anything, and who, as 
Scipio says, would have expunged the very name of Rome 
if they had vanquished us? But good faith, you say, and 
the right hand are reliable. How so? What treaty, what 
oath, have they not trampled under foot? We should not 
imitate them, the gentleman says. What treaty can we 
violate when we have not yet made any? But we should 
not imitate their cruelty, he says. Ought we to make the 
most cruel people in the world our friends and allies? 

§ 64-66] THE PUNIC WARS 1 83 

Y.R. B.C 

553 Neither of these things is desirable. Let them surrender 201 
at discretion, as is the custom of the vanquished, as many 
others have surrendered to us. Then we shall see what we 
will do, and whatever we accord to them they shall take in 
the light of a favor and not of a bargain. There is this 
difference between the two plans. As long as we treat with 
them they will violate the treaties as they have heretofore, 
always making some excuse that they were overreached. 
They will always find plausible grounds for dispute. But 
when they surrender at discretion, and we take away their 
arms, and when their persons are in our possession and they 
see that there is nothing they can call their own, their 
spirits will be tamed and they will welcome whatever we 
allow them to have, as a gratuity bestowed by others. If 
Scipio thinks differently you have the two opinions to choose 
from. If he is going to make peace with the Carthaginians 
without you, what is the need of his sending any word to 
you ? For my part, I have given you the opinion which I 
hold to be for the advantage of the city, as to judges who 
are really going to exercise a judgment on the matter in 

65. After Publius had spoken, the Senate took a vote on 
the question, and the majority agreed with Scipio. Thus 
a third treaty was made between the Romans and the Car- 
thaginians. Scipio deemed it best to urge this policy upon 
the Romans, either for the reasons mentioned above, or 
because he considered it a sufficient success for Rome to 
have taken the supremacy away from Carthage. There are 
some who think that in order to preserve the Roman disci- 
pline he wished to keep a neighbor and rival as a perpetual . 
menace, so that they might never become intoxicated with 
success and careless by reason of the greatness of their 
prosperity. That Scipio had this feeling, Cato, not long 
after, publicly declared to the Romans when he reproached 
them for undue severity toward the Rhodians. When 
Scipio had concluded the treaty, he sailed from Africa to 
Italy with his whole army, and made a triumphal entry into 
Rome more glorious than that of any of his predecessors. 

66. The form of the triumph (which the Romans con- 
tinue to employ) was as follows: All who were in the 
procession wore crowns. Trumpeters led the advance and 


SS3 wagons laden with spoils. Towers were borne along rep- 201 
resenting the captured cities, and pictures showing the ex- 
ploits of the war; then gold and silver coin and bullion, 
and whatever else they had captured of that kind; then 
came the crowns that had been given to the general as a 
reward for his bravery by cities, by allies, or by the army 
itself. White oxen came next, and after them elephants 
and the captive Carthaginian and Numidian chiefs. Lie- 
tors clad in purple tunics preceded the general; also a 
chorus of musicians and pipers, in imitation of an Etruscan 
procession, wearing belts and golden crowns, and they 
march evenly with song and dance. They call themselves 
Lydi because, as I think, the Etruscans were a Lydian 
colony. One of these, in the middle of the procession, 
wearing a purple cloak and golden bracelets and necklace, 
caused laughter by making various gesticulations, as though 
he were insulting the enemy. Next came a lot of incense 
bearers, and after them the general himself on a chariot 
embellished with various designs, wearing a crown of gold 
and precious stones, and dressed, according to the fashion 
of the country, in a purple toga embroidered with golden 
stars. He bore a sceptre of ivory, and a laurel branch, 
which is always the Roman symbol of victory. Riding in 
the same chariot with him were boys and girls, and on 
horses on either side of him young men, his own relatives. 
Then followed those who had served him in the war as 
secretaries, aids, and armor-bearers. After these came the 
army arranged in companies and cohorts, all of them 
crowned and carrying laurel branches, the bravest of them 
bearing their military prizes. They praised some of their 
captains, derided others, and reproached others; for in a 
triumph everybody is free, and is allowed to say what he 
pleases. When Scipio arrived at the Capitol the procession 
came to an end, and he entertained his friends at a ban- 
quet in the temple. 

§67-68] THE PUNIC WARS 185 

Chapter X 

Masinissa's Depredations — Factions in Carthage — The Visit of Cato 
— War with Masinissa — A Battle with Masinissa — Carthaginian 
Army surrounded and captured 

Y.R. B.C 

559 67. Thus the second war between the Romans and the 19s 
Carthaginians, which began in Spain and terminated in 
Africa with the aforesaid treaty, came to an end. This 
was about the 144th Olympiad according to the Greek reck- 
oning. Presently Masinissa, being incensed against the 
Carthaginians and relying on the friendship of the Romans, 
seized a considerable part of the territory belonging to the 
former on the ground that it had once belonged to himself. 
The Carthaginians appealed to the Romans to bring Masi- 
nissa to terms. The Romans accordingly sent arbitrators, 
but told them to favor Masinissa as much as they could. 
Thus Masinissa appropriated a part of the Carthaginian 
territory and made a treaty with them which lasted about 
fifty years, during which Carthage, blessed with peace, 
advanced greatly in population and wealth by reason of the 
fertility of her soil and the profits of her commerce. 

561 d^. By and by (as frequently happens in periods of pros- 193 
perity) factions arose. There was a Roman party, a demo- 
cratic party, and a party which favored Masinissa as king. 
Each had leaders of eminence in position and in bravery. 
Hanno the Great was the leader of the Romanizing fac- 
tion; Hannibal, surnamed the Starling, was the chief of 
those who favored Masinissa; and Hamilcar, surnamed the 
Samnite, and Carthalo, of the democrats. The latter party, 
watching their opportunity while the Romans were at war 
with the Celtiberians, and Masinissa was marching to the 
aid of his son, who was surrounded by other Spanish forces, 
persuaded Carthalo (the commander of auxiliaries and in 
discharge of that office going about the country) to attack 
the subjects of Masinissa, whose tents were on disputed 
territory. Accordingly he slew some of them, carried off 
booty, and incited the rural Africans against the Numidi- 

57» ans. Many other hostile acts took place on both sides, xSa 
until the Romans again sent envoys to restore peace, telling 
them as before to help Masinissa secretly. They artfully 


Y.R. B.C. 

57a confirmed Masinissa in the possession of what he had taken 182 
before, in this way. They would neither say anything nor 
listen to anything, so that Masinissa might not be worsted 
in the controversy, but they passed between the two liti- 
gants with outstretched . hands, and this was their way of 

580 commanding both to keep the peace. Not long afterward 174 
Masinissa raised a dispute about the land known as the 
" big fields " and the country belonging to fifty towns, which 
is called Tysca. Again the Carthaginians had recourse to 
the Romans. Again the latter promised to send envoys to 
arbitrate the matter, but they delayed until it seemed prob- 
able that the Carthaginian interests would be utterly ruined. 

597 69. At length they sent the envoys, and among others 157 
Cato. These went to the disputed territory and they asked 
that both parties should submit all their differences to them. 
Masinissa, who was grabbing more than his share and who 
had confidence in the Romans, consented. The Cartha- 
ginians hesitated, because their former experience had led 
them to fear that they should not receive justice. They 
said therefore that it was of no use to have a new dispute 
and a correction of the treaty made with Scipio, they only 
complained about transgressions of the treaty. As the 
envoys would not consent to arbitrate on the controversy 
in parts, they returned home. But they carefully observed 
the country; they saw how diligently it was cultivated, and 
what great estates it possessed. They entered the city and 
saw how greatly it had increased in wealth and population 
since its overthrow by Scipio not long before. When they 
returned to Rome they declared that Carthage was to them 
an object of apprehension rather than of jealousy, the city 
being so ill affected, so near them, and growing so rapidly. 
Cato especially said that even the liberty of Rome would 
never be secure until Carthage was destroyed. When the 
Senate learned these things it resolved upon war but waited 
for a pretext, and meanwhile concealed the intention. It 
is said that Cato, from that time, continually expressed the 
opinion in the Senate that Carthage must be destroyed. 
Scipio Nasica held the contrary opinion that Carthage ought 
to be spared so that the Roman discipline, which was 
already relaxing, might be preserved through fear of her. 

60a 70. The democratic faction in Carthage sent the leaders 15, 

§69-71] THE PUNIC WARS 187 

y.R. B.C. 

602 of the party favoring Masinissa into banishment, to the is» 
number of about forty, and confirmed it by a vote and an 
oath that they should never be taken back, and that the 
question of taking them back should never be discussed. 
The banished took refuge with Masinissa and urged him to 
declare war. He, nothing loath, sent his two sons, Gulussa 
and Micipsa, to Carthage to demand that those who had 
been expelled on his account should be taken back. When 
they came to the city gates the boetharch warned them off, 
fearing lest the relatives of the exiles should prevail with 
the multitude by their tears. When Gulussa was returning 
Hamilcar the Samnite set upon him, killed some of his 
attendants, and thoroughly frightened him. Thereupon 
Masinissa, making this an excuse, laid siege to the town of 
Oroscopa, which he desired to possess contrary to the 
treaty. The Carthaginians with 25,000 foot and 400 city 

604 horse under Hasdrubal, their boetharch, marched against 150 
Masinissa. At their approach, Asasis and Suba, Masinissa' s 
lieutenants, on account of some difference with his sons, 
deserted with 6000 horse. Encouraged by this accession, 
Hasdrubal moved his forces nearer to the king and in some 
skirmishes gained the advantage. But Masinissa by strata- 
gem retired little by little as if in flight, until he had drawn 
him into a great desert surrounded by hills and crags, and 
destitute of provisions. Then turning about he pitched 
his camp in the open plain. Hasdrubal drew up among 
the hills as being a stronger position. 

71. They were to fight the following day. Scipio the 
younger, who afterwards captured Carthage, and who was 
then serving Lucullus in the war against the Celtiberians, 
was on his way to Masinissa* s camp, having been sent 
thither to procure elephants. Masinissa, as he was pre- 
paring his own person for battle, sent a body of horse to 
meet him, and charged some of his sons to receive him 
when he should arrive. At daylight he put his army in 
. order of battle in person, for although he was eighty-eight 
years old he was still a vigorous horseman and rode bare- 
back, as is the Numidian custom, both when fighting and 
when performing the duties of a general. Indeed, the 
Numidians are the most robust of all the African peoples 
and of the long-lived they live the longest. The reason 


Y.R. B.C 

604 probably is that their winter is not cold enough to do them 150 
much harm and their summer not so extremely hot as that 
of Ethiopia and of India ; for which reason also this coun- 
try produces the most powerful wild beasts, and the men 
are always performing labor in the open air. They use 
very little wine and their food is simple and frugal. When 
Masinissa, upon his charger, drew up his army Hasdrubal 
drew up his in opposition. It was very large, since many 
recruits had flocked in from the country. Scipio witnessed 
this battle from a height, as one views a spectacle in a 
theatre. He often said afterwards that he had witnessed 
various contests, but never enjoyed any other so much, for 
here only had he seen at his ease 110,000 join battle. He 
added with an air of solemnity that only two had had such 
a spectacle before him: Jupiter from Mount Ida, and Nep- 
tune from Samothrace, in the Trojan war. 

72. The battle continued from morning till night, many 
falling on both sides, and it seemed that Masinissa had the 
advantage. As he was returning from the field Scipio pre- 
sented himself, and Masinissa greeted him with the greatest 
attention, having been a friend of his grandfather. When 
the Carthaginians learned of Scipio* s arrival they besought 
him to make terms for them with Masinissa. He brought 
them to a conference, and the Carthaginians made pro- 
posals that they would surrender to Masinissa the territory 
belonging to the town of Emporium and give him 200 
talents of silver now and 800 talents later. When he asked 
for the deserters they would not give them up. So they 
separated without coming to an agreement. Then Scipio 
returned to Spain with his elephants. Masinissa drew a 
line of circumvallation around the hill where the enemy 
were encamped and prevented them from bringing in any 
food. Nor could any be found in the neighborhood, for 
it was with the greatest difficulty that he could procure a 
scant supply for himself from a long distance. Now Has- 
drubal thought that he should be able to break through the 
enemy's line with his army, which was still strong and un- 
harmed. Having more supplies than Masinissa, he thought 
it would be a good plan to provoke him to battle and he 
delayed because he had just learned that envoys were on 
their way from Rome to settle the difficulty. By and by 

§ 72-74] THE PUNIC WARS 189 

Y.R. B.C. 

604 they came. They had been instructed if Masinissa were 150 
beaten lib put an end to the strife, but if he were successful, 

to spur him on. And they carried out their orders. 

73. In the meantime hunger wasted Hasdrubal and the 
Carthaginians and, being much debilitated, they were no 
longer able to assault the enemy. First they ate their pack 
animals, and after them their horses, and they boiled their 
leather straps for food. They also fell sick of various 
diseases due to lack of food, want of exercise, and the 
season, for they were enclosed in one place and in a con- 
tracted camp — a great multitude of men exposed to the 
heat of an African summer. When the supply of wood for 
cooking failed they burned their shields. They could not 
carry out the bodies of the dead because Masinissa kept 
strict guard; nor could they burn them for want of fuel. 
So there was a terrible pestilence among them in conse- 
quence of living in the stench of putrefying corpses. The 
greater part of the army was already wasted away. The 
rest, seeing no hope of escape, agreed to give up the de- 
serters to Masinissa and to pay him 5000 talents of silver 
in fifty years, and to take back those who had been ban- 
ished, although this was contrary to their oath. They were 
to pass out through their enemies, one by one, through a 
single gate, and with nothing but a short tunic for each. 
Gulussa, full of wrath at the assault made upon him not 
long before, either with the connivance of his father or 
upon his own motion, made a charge upon them with a 
body of Numidian cavalry as they were going out. As they 
had neither arms to resist nor strength to fly, many were 
slain. So, out of 58,000 men composing the army only a 
few returned safe to Carthage, among them Hasdrubal, the 
general, and others of the nobility. 

Chapter XI 

Third Punic War — No Excuse for It — Utica joins the Romans — 
Hostages demanded of Carthage — Pitiful Scenes when the Hostages 
were sent — Roman Army lands at Utica — Embassy from Girthage 

605 74. Such was the war between Masinissa and the Car- ,49 
thaginians. The third and last Punic war of the Romans 


605 in Africa followed it. The Carthaginians having suffered 149 
this calamity at the hands of Masinissa, and the city being 
much weakened by it, they began to be apprehensive of the 
king himself, who was still near them with a large army, 
and also of the Romans, who were always harboring ill-will 
toward fliem and would make the affairs of Masinissa an 
excuse for it. They were not wrong in either particular. 
The Romans, when they learned the foregoing facts, 
straightway began to collect an army throughout all Italy, 
not telling what it was intended for, but in order, they said, 
to have it ready for emergencies. The Carthaginians, 
thinking to put an end to the excuse, condemned Hasdru- 
bal, who had conducted the campaign against Masinissa, 
and Carthalo, the boetharch, and any others who were con- 
cerned in the matter, to death, putting the whole blame of 
the war upon them. They sent ambassadors to Rome to 
complain of Masinissa, and at the same time to accuse their 
own citizens of taking up arms against him too hastily and 
rashly, and of furnishing an occasion for an imputation of 
hostility on the part of their city. When one of the senators 
asked the ambassadors why they did not condemn their 
officers at the beginning of the war instead of waiting till 
they were beaten, and why they did not send their embassy 
before, instead of postponing it till now, they could not 
give any answer. The Senate, which had previously re- 
solved upon war and was only seeking some petty excuse, 
answered that the defence offered by the Carthaginians was 
not satisfactory. The latter, much disturbed, asked again, 
if they had done wrong, how they could atone for it. The 
answer was given in a word : "You must make it right with 
the Roman people.*' When they inquired among them- 
selves what would make it right, some thought that the 
Romans would like to have something added to the pecu- 
niary fine imposed by Scipio; others, that the disputed ter- 
ritory should be given up to Masinissa. Being at a loss 
what to do they sent another embassy to Rome, and asked 
to know exactly what they should do to make it right. 
The Romans replied that the Carthaginians knew per- 
fectly well what was necessary, and having given this 
answer dismissed them. 

75. While they were stricken with fear and perplexity 

§ 75-76] THE PUNIC WARS 191 

V Β BaC• 

fo5 on this account, the city of Utica (the largest in Africa after 149 
Carthage itself, having a harbor with good anchorage and 
well adapted for landing an army, at a distance of sixty 
stades from Carthage and well situated as a base of opera- 
tions against it), observing the plight the Carthaginians 
were in, and recalling their ancient animosity toward them, 
sent an embassy to Rome at this critical moment offering 
to give themselves up to the Romans. The Senate, which 
had been previously eager and prepared for war, having 
gained the accession of a city so strong and so conveniently 
placed, now disclosed its purpose. Assembling in the 
Capitol (where they were accustomed ,to deliberate on the 
subject of war), the senators voted to declare war against 
Carthage. They immediately despatched the consuls in 
command of the forces, M. Manlius having charge of the 
foot soldiers and L. Marcius Censorinus of the fleet, and 
they gave them secret orders not to desist from the war 
until Carthage was razed to the ground. After offering 
sacrifice they sailed for Sicily, intending to cross over 
thence to Utica. They were conveyed in 50 quinque- 
remes and 100 hemiolii,^ besides many open boats and 
transports. The army consisted of 80,000 infantry and 
about 4000 cavalry, all the very best. There was a general 
rush of citizens and allies to join this splendid expedi- 
tion, and absolute confidence in the result, and many 
were eager to have their names on the enrolment. 

76. The declaration of war and the war itself reached 
the Carthaginians by the same messenger. He brought the 
vote of the Senate, and told them that the fleet had already 
sailed. They were astounded, and in despair for want of 
ships and by the recent loss of so many young men. They 
had neither allies, nor mercenaries, nor supplies for endur- 
ing a siege, nor anything else in readiness for this sudden 
and unheralded war. They knew that they could not pre- 
vail against the Romans and Masinissa combined. They 
sent another embassy to Rome with full powers to settle the 
difficulty on any terms they could. The Senate was con- 
vened and it told them that if, within thirty days, the Car- 
thaginians would give to the consuls, who were still in 

^ The quinquereme was a ship with five banks of oars, the hemiolius 
with one-and-a-half. 


Y.R. B.C. 

605 Sicily, three hundred children of their noblest families as 149 
hostages, and would obey their orders in other respects, 
the freedom and autonomy of Carthage should be preserved 
and that they should retain their lands in Africa. This 
was voted in public, and they gave the resolution to the 
ambassadors to carry to Carthage; but they sent word 
privately to the consuls that they should carry out their 
secret instructions. 

77. The Carthaginians had some suspicion of this Senate 
resolution, since there was no security given for the return 
of the hostages. Nevertheless, the danger was so great that 
they could omit nothing in which hope could be placed. 
So, anticipating the appointed time, they sent their chil- 
dren into Sicily, amid the tears of the parents, the kindred, 
and especially the mothers, who clung to their little ones 
with frantic cries and seized hold of the ships and of the 
officers who were taking them away, even holding the 
anchors and tearing the ropes, and throwing their arms 
around the sailors in order to prevent the ships from mov- 
ing; some of them even swam out far into the sea beside 
the ships, shedding tears and gazing at their children. 
Some of them tore out their hair on the shore and smote 
their breasts in the extremity of their grief. It seemed to 
them that they were giving hostages only nominally, but 
were really giving up the city, when they surrendered their 
children without any fixed conditions. Many of them pre- 
dicted, with lamentations, that it would profit the city noth- 
ing to have delivered up their children. Such were the 
scenes that took place in Carthage when the hostages were 
sent away. When the consuls received them in Sicily they 
sent them to Rome, and said to the Carthaginians that they 
would give them further information at Utica in reference 
to the ending of the war. 

78. Crossing to the latter place they pitched the camp 
for their infantry at the same place where that of Scipio 
had formerly been. The fleet remained in the harbor of 
Utica. When the ambassadors came there from Carthage 
the consuls placed themselves on a high seat, with the chief 
officers and military tribunes standing near, and the whole 
army drawn up on either side with arms glistening and 
standards erect, in order that the ambassadors might be 

§ 77-79] THE PUNIC WARS 193 

Y.R. B.C. 

605 impressed in this way with the strength of the expedition. 149 
When the consuls had proclaimed silence by the trumpet, 
a herald told the Carthaginian envoys to come forward, and 
they advanced through the long camp, but did not draw 
near to the place where the consuls sat, because they were 
fenced off by a rope. The consuls then ordered them to 
tell what they wanted. The envoys then told a various and 
pitiful tale about the former agreements between the Ro- 
mans and themselves, about the antiquity of Carthage, its 
size and power, and its wide dominion on land and sea. 
They said that they did not mention these things in a 
boasting way, this was no fit occasion for boasting, " but 
that you, Romans (they said), may be moved to moderation 
and clemency by the example of our sudden change of for- 
tune. The bravest are those who pity the fallen, and they 
may cherish confidence in their own continued prosperity 
in proportion as they do nothing to the injury of others. 
Such a course will be worthy of you, Romans, and of that 
reverent spirit which you, of all men, most profess. 

79. " But even if we had met ruthless enemies we have 
suffered enough. Our leadership on land and sea has been 
taken from us; we delivered our ships to you, and we have 
not built others; we have abstained from the hunting and 
possession of elephants. We have given you, both before 
and now, our noblest hostages, and we have paid tribute to 
you regularly, we who had always been accustomed to re- 
ceive it from others. These things were satisfactory to 
your fathers, with whom we had been at war. They entered 
into an agreement with us that we should be friends and 
allies, and we took the same oath together to observe the 
agreement. And they, with whom we had been at war, 
observed the agreement faithfully afterward. But you, 
with whom we have never come to blows, what part of the 
treaty do you accuse us of violating, that you vote for war 
so suddenly, and march against us without even declaring 
it? Have we not paid the tribute? Have we any ships, or 
any hateful elephants? Have we not been faithful to you 
from that time to this? Are we not to be pitied for the 
recent loss of 50,000 men by hunger? But we have fought 
against Masinissa, you say. He was always grabbing our 
property, and we endured all things on your account. 

VOL. I — ο 


60s While holding, all the time and contrary to right, the very 149 
ground on which he was nurtured and educated, he seized 
other lands of ours around Emporium, and after taking that 
he invaded still others, until the peace which we made with 
you was broken. If this is an excuse for the war, we con- 
demned those who resisted him, and we sent our ambassadors 
to you to make the necessary explanations, and afterwards 
others empowered to make a settlement on any terms you 
pleased. What need is there of a fleet, an expedition, an 
army against men who do not acknowledge that they have 
done wrong, but who, nevertheless, put themselves entirely 
in your hands ? That we are not deceiving you, and that 
we will submit ungrudgingly to whatever penalty you im- 
pose, we demonstrated plainly when we sent, as hostages, 
the children of our noblest families, demanded by you, as 
soon as the decree of your Senate ordered us to do so, not 
even waiting the expiration of the thirty days. It was a 
part of this decree that if we would deliver the hostages 
Carthage should remain free under her own laws and in the 
enjoyment of her possessions." 

Chapter XII 

Reply of Censorinus — "Perfidia plusquam Punica" — Terrible Plight 
of Carthage — Pathetic Speech of Banno — Reply of Censorinus 

80. So spake the ambassadors. Then Censorinus rose 
and replied as follows: "Why is it necessary that I should 
tell you the causes of the war, Carthaginians, when your 
ambassadors have been at Rome and have learned them 
from the Senate? What you have stated falsely, that I will 
refute. The decree itself declared, and we gave you notice 
in Sicily when we received the hostages, that the rest of the 
conditions would be made known to you at Utica. For 
your promptness in sending the hostages and your care in 
selecting them, you are entitled to praise. If you are sin- 
cerely desirous of peace why do you need any arms? Bring 
all your weapons and engines of war, both public and pri- 
vate, and deliver them to us." When he had thus spoken 
the ambassadors said that they would comply with this order 

§ 8o-8i] THE PUNIC WARS I95 

Y.R. B.C. 

605 also, but that they did not know how they could defend 149 
themselves against Hasdrubal, whom they had condemned 
to death, and who was now leading 20,000 men against 
them, and was already encamped near Carthage. When 
the consul said that he would take care of Hasdrubal they 
promised to deliver up their arms. Thereupon Cornelius 
Scipio Nasica and Cnseus Cornelius Hispanus were sent 
with the ambassadors, and they received complete armor 
for 200,000 men, besides innumerable javelins and darts, 
and 2000 catapults for throwing pointed missiles and stones. 
When they came back it was a remarkable and unparalleled 
spectacle to behold the vast number of loaded wagons which 
the enemy themselves brought in. The ambassadors ac- 
companied them, together with numerous senators and 
other leading men of the city, priests and distinguished 
persons, who hoped to inspire the consuls with respect or 
pity for them. They were brought in and stood in their 
robes before the consuls. Again Censorinus (who was a 
better speaker than his colleague) rose, and with a stern 
countenance spoke as follows : — 

81. "Your ready obedience up to this point, Cartha- 
ginians, in the matter of the hostageis and the arms, is 
worthy of all praise. In cases of necessity we must not 
multiply words. Bear bravely the remaining commands of 
the Senate. Yield Carthage to us, and betake yourselves 
where you like within your own territory at a distance of 
at least ten miles from the sea, for we are resolved to raze 
your city to the ground." While he was yet speaking, the 
Carthaginians lifted their hands toward heaven with loud 
cries, and called on the gods as avengers of violated faith. 
They heaped reproaches on the Romans, as if willing to 
die, or insane, or determined to provoke the Romans to 
sacrilegious violence to ambassadors. They flung them- 
selves on the ground and beat it with their hands and heads. 
Some of them even tore their clothes and lacerated their 
flesh as though they were absolutely bereft of their senses. 
After the first frenzy was past there was great silence and 
prostration as of men lying dead. The Romans were struck 
with amazement, and the consuls thought it best to bear 
with men who were overwhelmed at an appalling command 
until their indignation should subside, for they well knew 


Y.R. B.C 

605 that great dangers often bring desperate courage on the in- 149 
stant, which time and necessity gradually subdue. This 
was the case with the Carthaginians, for when the sense 
of their calamity came over them, during the interval of 
silence, they ceased their reproaches and began to bewail, 
with fresh lamentations, their own fate and that of their 
wives and children, calling them by name, and also their 
country, as though she could hear their cries like a human 
being. The priests invoked their temples, and the gods 
within them, as though they were present, accusing them 
of being the cause of their destruction. So pitiable was 
this mingling together of public and private grief that it 
drew tears from the Romans themselves. 

82. The consuls, although moved to pity by this exhibi- 
tion of the mutability of human affairs, awaited with stern 
countenances the end of their lamentations. When their 
outcries ceased there was another interval of silence, in 
which they reflected that their city was without arms, that 
it was empty of defenders, that it had not a ship, not a 
catapult, not a javelin, not a sword, nor a sufficient num- 
ber of fighting men, having lost 50,000 a short time ago. 
They had neither mercenaries, nor friends, nor allies, nor 
time to procure any. Their enemies were in possession of 
their children, their arms, and their territory. Their city 
was besieged by foes provided with ships, infantry, cavalry, 
and engines, while Masinissa, their other enemy, was on 
their flank. Seeing the uselessness of lamentation and re- 
proaches they desisted from them, and again began to talk. 
Banno, surnamed Tigillas, the most distinguished man 
among them, having obtained permission to speak, said : — 

?i%, " If it is permitted to repeat what we have already 
said to you, Romans, we would speak once more, not as 
though we were contending for rights (since disputation is 
never timely for the unfortunate), but that you may per- 
ceive that pity on your part toward us is not without excuse 
and not without reason. We were once the rulers of Africa 
and of the greater part of the sea, and we contended with 
yourselves for empire. We desisted from this in the time 
of Scipio, when we gave up to you all the ships and ele- 
phants we had. We agreed to pay you tribute and we pay 
it at the appointed time. Now, in the name of the gods 

§ 82-84] THE PUNIC WARS 1 97 

Y.R. B.C. 

605 who witnessed the oaths, spare us, respect the oath sworn 149 
by Scipio that the Romans and Carthaginians should be 
allies and friends. We have not violated the treaty. We 
have no ships, no elephants. The tribute is not in default. 
On the contrary, we have fought on your side against three 
kings. You must not take offence at this recital, although 
we mentioned it before when you demanded our arms. 
Our calamities make us verbose, and nothing gives more 
force to an appeal than the terms of a treaty. Nor can we 
take refuge in anything else than words, since we have 
given all other power over to you. Such, Romans, were 
the former conditions, for which Scipio was our surety. 
Of the present ones you, consuls, are yourselves the doers 
and the witnesses. You asked hostages, and we gave you 
our best. You asked for our arms, and you have received 
them all, which even captured cities do not willingly give 
up. We had confidence in your habits and your character. 
Your Senate sent us word, and you confirmed it, when the 
hostages were demanded, that if they were delivered, Car- 
thage should be left free and autonomous. If it was added 
that we should endure your further commands it was not to 
be expected that in the matter of the hostages you would, in 
your distinct demand, promise that the city should be in- 
dependent, and then besides the hostages would make a 
further demand that Carthage itself be destroyed. If it is 
right for you to destroy it, how can you leave it free and 
autonomous as you said you would? 

84. "This is what we have to say concerning the former 
treaties and those made with yourselves. If you do not 
care to hear it we will omit it altogether and have recourse 
to prayers and tears, the one refuge of the unfortunate, for 
which there is ample occasion in the greatness of our 
calamity. We beseech you, in behalf of an ancient city 
founded by command of the gods, in behalf of a glory that 
has become great and a name pervading the whole world, 
of the many temples it contains and of its gods who have 
done you no wrong. Do not deprive them of their festi- 
vals, solemnities, and sacrifices. Deprive not the dead, 
who have never harmed you, of the offerings which their 
children bring to their tombs. If you have pity for us (as 
you say that out of pity you yield us another dwelling-place), 


Y.R. ^ B.C 

605 spare our shrines, spare our forum, respect the deity who 149 
presides over our council, and all else that is dear and 
precious to the living. What fear can you have of Car- 
thage when you are in possession of our ships and our arms 
and our hateful elephants? As to a change of dwelling- 
place (if that is considered in the light of a consolation), 
it is impracticable for our people, a countless number of 
whom get their living by the sea, to move into the country.^ 
We propose an alternative more desirable for us and more 
glorious for you. Spare the city which has done you no 
harm, but if you please, kill us, whom you have ordered to 
move away. In this way you will seem to vent your wrath 
upon men, not upon temples, gods, tombs, and an innocent 

85. "Romans, you desire a good name and reputation 
for piety in all that you do, and you announce and claim 
moderation in all your successes and acquisitions. Do not, 
I implore you in the name of Jove and of your other gods, 
as well as of those who still preside over Carthage (and may 
they never remember ill against you or your children), do 
not tarnish your good name for the first time in your deal- 
ings with us. Do not defile your reputation by an act so 
horrible to do and to hear, and which you will be the first 
in all history to perform. Greeks and barbarians have 
waged many wars, and you, Romans, have waged many 
against other nations, but no one has ever destroyed a city 
whose people had surrendered before the fight, and deliv- 
ered up their arms and children, and submitted to every 
other penalty that could be imposed upon men. Remind- 
ing you of the oaths sworn before the gods, of the muta- 
bility of the human lot, and the avenging Nemesis that ever 
lies in wait for the fortunate, we beseech you not to do 
violence to your own fair record, and not to push our 
calamities to the last extremity. Or, if you cannot spare 
our city, grant us time to send another embassy to your 
Senate to present our petition. Although the intervening 
time is short, it will bring long agony to us through the 

1 Literally : " It is impracticable for a seafaring people, a countless 
number of whom get their living by the sea," etc. Tautology, which 
weakens the force of an expression in English, gave it additional 
strength in Greek. 

§ 85-87] THE PUNIC WARS 1 99 

Y,R. B.C. 

605 uncertainty of the event. It will be all the same to you 149 
whether you execute your purposes now or a little later, 
and in the meantime you will have performed a pious and 
humane act." 

86. So spake Banno, but the consuls showed by their 
stern looks that they would yield nothing. When he had 
ceased, Censorinus replied: "What is the use of repeating 
what the Senate has ordered? It has issued its decrees and 
they must be carried out. We have no power to alter the 
commands already laid upon us. If we were addressing 
you as enemies, Carthaginians, it would be necessary only 
to speak and then to use force, but since this is a matter of 
the common good (somewhat of our own and still more of 
yours), I have no objection to giving you the reasons, if 
you may be thus persuaded instead of being coerced. The 
sea reminds you of the dominion and power you once ac- 
quired by means of it. It prompts you to wrong-doing and 
brings you to grief. By this means you invaded Sicily and 
lost it again. Then you invaded Spain and were driven out 
of it. While a treaty was in force you plundered merchants 
on the sea, and ours especially, and in order to conceal the 
crime you threw them overboard, until finally you were 
caught at it, and then you gave us Sardinia by way of pen- 
alty. Thus you lost Sardinia also by means of this sea, 
which always begets a grasping disposition by the very 
facilities which it offers for gain.^ 

87. "In like manner the Athenians, when they became 
a maritime people, grew mightily, but they fell as suddenly. 
Naval prowess is like merchants' gains — a good profit 
to-day and a total loss to-morrow. You know that those 
very people whom I have mentioned, when they had ex- 
tended their sway over the Ionian Sea to Sicily could not 
restrain their greed until they had lost everything, and were 
compelled to surrender their harbor and their ships to their 
enemies, to receive a garrison in their city, to demolish 
their own long walls, and to become almost exclusively an 

^ Here Censorinus touches the real cause of the expedition. "It 
was, of course, the commercial monopolists," says Professor Mahaffy, 
" and not old Cato and his figs, who destroyed Carthage. These horse- 
leeches of the world could not bear the modest rivalry of either Corinth 
or Carthage." 


60s inland people. And this very thing kept them going a 149 
long time. Believe me, Carthaginians, country life, with 
the joys of agriculture and freedom from danger, is much 
more wholesome. Although the gains of agriculture are 
smaller than those of mercantile life, they are surer and a 
great deal safer. In fact, a maritime city seems to me to 
be more like a ship than like solid ground, being so tossed 
about on the waves of trouble and so much exposed to the 
vicissitudes of life, whereas an inland city enjoys all the 
security of terra firma. For this reason the ancient seats 
of empire were generally inland, and in this way those of 
the Medes, the Assyrians, the Persians, and others became 
very powerful. 

ZZ. " But I will omit kingly examples, which no longer 
concern you. Look over your African possessions, where 
there are numerous inland cities out of the reach of danger, 
from which you can choose one that you would like to have 
for neighbors, so that you may no longer be in the presence 
of the thing that excites you, so that you may lose the 
memory of the ills that now vex you whenever you cast your 
eyes upon the sea empty of ships, and call to mind the 
great fleets you once possessed and the spoils you capt- 
ured and proudly brought into your harbor, and gorged 
your dockyards and arsenals. When you behold the bar- 
racks of your soldiers, the stables of your horses and ele- 
phants, and the storehouses alongside them, all empty, 
what do these things put into your minds? What else but 
grief and an intense longing to get them back again if you 
can? When we recall our departed fortune it is human 
nature to hope that we may recover it. The healing drug 
for all evils is oblivion, and this is not possible to you 
unless you put away the sight. The plainest proof of this 
is that as often as you obtained forgiveness and peace from 
us you violated the agreement. If you still yearn for do- 
minion, and bear ill-will toward us who took it away from 
you, and if you are waiting your opportunity, then of course 
you have need of this city, this great harbor and its dock- 
yards, and these walls built for the shelter of an army. 
Why should we spare our captured enemies? If you have 
abdicated dominion sincerely, not in words only but in 
fact, and are content with what you possess in Africa, and 

§ 88-90] THE PUNIC WARS 20I 

Y.R. Β C 

60s if you honestly desire peace with us, come now, prove it 149 
by your acts. Move into the interior of Africa, which 
belongs to you, and leave the sea, the dominion of which 
you have yielded to us. 

89. "Do not pretend that you are grieved for your 
temples, your shrines, your forum, your tombs. We shall 
not harm your tombs. You may come and make offerings 
there, and sacrifice in your temples, as often as you like. 
The rest, however, we shall destroy. You do not sacrifice 
to your shipyards nor do you make offerings to your walls. 
You can provide yourselves with other shrines and temples 
and a forum in the place you move to, and presently this 
will be your country; just as you left your old ones in Tyre 
when you migrated to Africa, and now consider the newly 
acquired land your country. Understand then, in brief, 
that we do not make this decision from any ill-will toward 
you, but in the interest of a lasting peace and of the com- 
mon security. If you will remember, we caused Alba, not 
an enemy, but our mother city, to change her abode to 
Rome for the common good, acting not in a hostile spirit, 
but receiving them as settlers with due honor, and this 
proved to be for the advantage of both. But you say you 
have many work-people who gain their living by the sea. 
We have thought of this. In order that you might easily 
have traffic by sea and a convenient importation and expor- 
tation of commodities, we have not ordered you to go more 
than ten miles from the shore, while we, who give the order, 
are twelve miles from it ourselves. We offer you whatever 
place you choose to take, and when you have taken it you 
shall live under your own laws. This is what we told you 
beforehand, that Carthage should have her own laws if 
you would obey our commands. We consider you to be 
Carthage, not the ground and buildings where you live." 

Chapter XIII 

Return of the Ambassadors — Terrible Scenes in the City — Carthage 
resolves to fight — Slow Movements of the Consuls 

90. Having spoken thus, Censorinus paused. When the 
Carthaginians, thunderstruck, answered not a word, he 


Y.R. B.C. 

60s added, "All that can be said in the way of persuasion and 149 
consolation has been said. The order of the Senate must 
be carried out, and quickly too. Therefore take your de- 
parture, for you are still ambassadors." When he had thus 
spoken they were thrust out by the lictors, but as they fore- 
saw what was likely to be done by the people of Carthage, 
they asked permission to speak again. Being readmitted 
they said, " We see that your orders are inexorable since 
you will not even allow us to send an embassy to Rome. 
Nor can we hope to return to you again, since we shall be 
slain by the people of Carthage before we have finished 
speaking to them. We pray you, therefore, not on our 
account (for we are ready to suffer everything), but on 
account of Carthage itself, that you will, if possible, strike 
terror into them so that they may be able to endure this 
calamity. Advance your fleet to the city while we are re- 
turning by the road, so that, seeing and hearing what you 
have ordered, they may learn to bear it if they can. To 
this state has dire necessity brought us that we ask you to 
hasten your ships against our fatherland." Having spoken 
thus, they departed, and Censorinus set sail with twenty 
quinqueremes and cast anchor alongside the city. Some 
of the ambassadors wandered away from the road, but the 
greater part moved on in silence. 

91. Meanwhile some of the Carthaginians were watching 
from the walls the return of the ambassadors, and tore their 
hair with impatience at their delay. Others, not waiting, 
ran to meet them in order to learn the news; and when they 
saw them coming with downcast eyes they smote their own 
foreheads and questioned them, now all together, now one 
by one, as each chanced to meet a friend or acquaintance, 
seizing hold of them and asking questions. When no one 
answered they wept aloud as though certain destruction 
awaited them. When those on the walls heard them they 
joined in the lamentations, not knowing why, but as though 
some great evil were impending. At the gates the crowd 
almost crushed the envoys, rushing upon them in such 
number. They would have been torn in pieces had they 
not said that they must make their first communication to 
the senate. Then some of the crowd turned aside, and 
others opened a path for them, in order to learn the news 

§ 91-92] THE PUNIC WARS ' 203 

Y.R. B.C. 

60s sooner. When they were come into the senate-chamber 149 
the senators turned the others out and sat down alone by 
themselves, and the crowd remained standing outside. 
Then the envoys announced first of all the order of the 
consuls. Immediately there was a great outcry in the sen- 
ate which was echoed by the people outside. When the 
envoys went on to tell what arguments and prayers they had 
used to get permission to send an embassy to Rome, there 
was again profound silence among the senators, who listened 
to the end; and the people kept silence also. When they 
learned that they were not even allowed to send an em- 
bassy, they raised a loud and mournful outcry, and the 
people rushed in among them. 

92. Then followed a scene of indescribable fury and 
madness such as the Maenads are said to enact in the Bac- 
chic mysteries. Some fell upon those senators who had 
advised giving the hostages and tore them in pieces, con- 
sidering them the ones who had led them into the trap. 
Others treated in a similar way those who had favored 
giving up the arms. Some stoned the ambassadors for 
bringing the bad news and others dragged them through the 
city. Still others, meeting certain Italians, who were 
caught among them in this sudden and unexpected mis- 
chance, maltreated them in various ways, saying that they 
would make them suffer for the fraud practised upon them 
in the matter of the hostages and the arms. The city was 
full of wailing and wrath, of fear and threatenings. People 
roamed the streets invoking whatever was most dear to them 
and took refuge in the temples as in asylums. They up- 
braided their gods for not being able to defend themselves. 
Some went into the arsenals and wept when they found them 
empty. Others ran to the dockyards and bewailed the ships 
that had been surrendered to perfidious men. Some called 
their elephants by name, as though they had been present, 
and reviled their own ancestors and themselves for not per- 
ishing, sword in hand, with their country, instead of paying 
tribute and giving up their elephants, their ships, and their 
arms. Most of all was their anger kindled by the mothers 
of the hostages who, like Furies in a tragedy, accosted those 
whom they met with shrieks and accused them of giving 
away their children against their protest, or mocked at 


Y.R. ^ B.C. 

60s them, saying that the gods were now taking vengeance 149 
on them for the lost children. A few kept their wits about 
them, closed the gates, and brought stones upon the walls 
to be used in place of catapults. 

93. The same day the Carthaginian senate declared war 
and proclaimed freedom to the slaves. They also chose 
generals and selected Hasdrubal for the outside work, whom 
they had condemned to death, and who had already col- 
lected 30,000 men. They despatched a messenger to him 
begging that, in the extreme peril of his country, he would 
not remember, or lay up against them, the wrong they had 
done him under the pressure of necessity from fear of the 
Romans. Within the walls they chose for general another 
Hasdrubal, the son of a daughter of Masinissa. They also 
sent to the consuls asking a truce of thirty days in order 
to send an embassy to Rome. When this was refused a 
second time, a wonderful change and determination came 
over them, to endure everything rather than abandon their 
city. Quickly all minds were filled with courage from this 
transformation. All the sacred places, the temples, and 
every other unoccupied space, were turned into workshops, 
where men and women worked together day and night 
without pause, taking their food by turns on a fixed sched- 
ule. Each day they made 100 shields, 300 swords, 1000 
missiles for catapults, 500 darts and javelins, and as many 
catapults as they could. For strings to bend them the 
' women cut off their hair for want of other fibres. 

\ 94. While the Carthaginians were preparing for war with 

i such haste and zeal, the consuls, who perhaps hesitated 

about performing such an atrocious act on the instant, or 
because they thought that they could easily capture an un- 
; armed city whenever they liked, kept delaying. They 

I thought also that the Cartljaginians would give in for want 

I of means, as it usually happens that those who are in des- 

] perate straits are very eager to resist at first, but as time 

ι brings opportunity for reflection, fear of the consequences 

I of disobedience takes possession of them. Something of 

I this kind happened in Carthage, where a certain citizen, 

conjecturing that fear had already come upon them, walked 
into the assembly as if on other business and dared to say 
that among evils they ought to choose the least, since they 

§ 93-95] '^^^ PUNIC WARS 205 

Y«R• o*C• 

60s were unarmed, thus speaking his mind plainly. Masinissa 149 
was vexed with the Romans, and took it hard that when he 
had brought the Carthaginians to their knees others should 
carry off the glory, not even communicating with him 
beforehand as they had done in the former wars. Never- 
theless, when the consuls, by way of testing him, asked his 
assistance, he said that he would send it whenever he should 
see that they needed it. Not long after he sent to inquire 
if they wanted anything at present. They, not tolerating 
his haughtiness and already suspicious of him as a disaf- 
fected person, answered that they would send for him when- 
ever they needed him. Yet they were already in much 
trouble for supplies for the army, which they drew from 
Hadrumetum, Leptis, Saxo, Utica, and Acholla only, all 
the rest of Africa being in the power of Hasdrubal, from 
which he sent supplies to Carthage. Several days having 
been consumed in this way, the two consuls moved their 
forces against Carthage, prepared for battle, and laid siege 
to it. 

Chapter XIV 

Topography of Carthage — The Two Harbors — The Romans repulsed 
— Roman Rams destroyed — Scipio the Younger — Fleet burned — 
Exploits of Phameas 

95. The city lay in a recess of a great gulf and was in 
the form of a peninsula. It was separated from the main- 
land by an isthmus about three miles in width. From this 
isthmus a narrow and longish tongue of land, about 300 
feet wide, extended toward the west between a lake and 
the sea. On the sea side the city was protected by a single 
wall. Toward the south and the mainland, where the cita- 
del of Byrsa stood on the isthmus, there was a triple wall. 
The height of each wall was forty-five feet without counting 
parapets and towers, which were separated from each other 
by a space of 200 feet, and each was divided into four 
stories. The depth was thirty feet. Each wall was divided 
vertically by two vaults, one above the other. In the lower 
space there were stables for 300 elephants, and alongside 
were receptacles for their food. Above were stables for 
4000 horses and places for their fodder and grain. There 


Y.R. B.C 

60s were barracks also for soldiers, 20,000 foot and 4000 horse. 149 
Such preparation for war was arranged and provided for in 
their walls alone. The angle which ran around from this 
wall to the harbor alpng the tongue of land mentioned 
above was the only weak and low spot in the fortifications, 
having been neglected from the beginning. 

96. The harbors had communication with each other, 
and a common entrance from the sea seventy feet wide, 
which could be closed with iron chains. The first port was 
for merchant vessels, and here were collected all kinds of 
ships* tackle. Within the second port was an island which, 
together with the port itself, was enclosed by high embank- 
ments. These embankments were full of shipyards which 
had capacity for 220 vessels. Above them were magazines 
for their tackle and furniture. Two Ionic columns stood 
in front of each dock, giving the appearance of a continu- 
ous portico to both the harbor and the island. On the 
island was built the admiral's house, from which the trum- 
peter gave signals, the herald delivered orders, and the 
admiral himself overlooked everything. The island lay 
near the entrance to the harbor and rose to a considerable 
height, so that the admiral could observe what was going 
on at sea, while those who were approaching by water could 
not get any clear view of what took place within. Not 
even the incoming merchants could see the docks, for a 
double wall enclosed them, and there were gates by which 
merchant ships could pass from the first port to the city 
without traversing the dockyards. Such was the appear- 
ance of Carthage at that time. 

97. Now the consuls, having divided their work, moved 
against the enemy. Manilius advanced from the mainland 
by way of the isthmus, intending to fill up the ditch, sur- 
mount the low parapet overlooking it, and from that to 
scale the high wall. Censorinus raised ladders both from 
the ground and from the decks of ships against the neg- 
lected angle of the wall. Both of them despised the 
enemy, thinking that they were unarmed, but when they 
found that they were provided with new arms and were full 
of courage they were astounded and took to their heels. 
Thus they met a rebuff at the very beginning, in expecting 
to take the city without fighting. When they made a sec- 


Plan of Harbors at Carthage. 

From "Carthage and the Carthaginians," by R. Bosworth Smith, 
kind permission of Longmans, Green & Co. 


§ 96-98] THE PUNIC WARS 20/ 

Y.R. B.C. 

605 ond attempt and were again repulsed, the spirits of the 149 
Carthaginians were very much raised. The consuls, fear- 
ing Hasdrubal, who had pitched his camp behind them on 
the other side of the lake, not far distant, fortified two 
camps, Censorinus on the lake under the walls of the 
enemy, and Manilius on the isthmus leading to the main- 
land. When the camps were finished Censorinus crossed 
the lake to get timber for building engines and lost about 
500 men, who were cutting wood, and also many tools, the 
Carthaginian cavalry general, Himilco, surnamed Phameas, 
having suddenly fallen upon them. Nevertheless, he se- 
cured a certain amount of timber with which he made en- 
gines and ladders. Again they made an attempt upon the 
city in concert, and again they failed. Manilius, after 
some feeble efforts, having with difficulty beaten down a 
little of the outworks, gave up in despair of taking the city 
from that side. 

98. Censorinus, having filled up a portion of the lake 
along the tongue of land in order to have more room, 
brought up two enormous battering rams, one of which 
was driven by 6000 foot-soldiers under charge of the mili- 
tary tribunes, and the other by oarsmen of the ships under 
charge of their captains. Moved by a spirit of emulation 
among officers and men in the performance of their similar 
tasks, they beat down a part of the wall, so that they could 
look into the city. The Carthaginians, on the other hand, 
drove them back and strove to repair the breaches in the 
wall by night. As the night time was not sufficient for the 
work and they feared lest the Roman arms should readily 
destroy by daylight their moist and newly made wall, they 
made a sally, some with arms and others with torches, to 
set fire to the machines. They did not succeed in destroy- 
ing these entirely (the Romans rallying and not giving them 
sufficient time), but they rendered them quite useless and 
regained the city. When daylight returned the Romans 
conceived the purpose of rushing in through the opening 
where the Carthaginians had not finished their work and 
overpowering them. They saw inside an open space, well 
suited for fighting, where the Carthaginians had stationed 
armed men in front and others in the rear provided only 
with stones and clubs, and. many others on the roofs of the 


Y.R. B.C. 

60s neighboring houses, all in readiness to meet the invaders. 149 
The Romans, when they saw themselves scorned by an un- 
armed enemy, were still more exasperated, and dashed in 
fiercely. But Scipio, who a little later took Carthage and 
from that feat gained the surname Africanus, being then a 
military tribune, held back, divided his companies into 
several parts, and stationed them at intervals along the 
wall, not allowing them to go into the city. When those 
who entered were driven back by the Carthaginians, who 
fell upon them from all sides, he gave them succor and 
saved them from destruction. And this action first brought 
him renown, as he had shown himself wiser than the consul. 

99. Now the dog star began to rise and sickness broke 
out in the camp of Censorinus, who was conducting his 
operations on a lake of stagnant water with high walls shut- 
ting off the fresh air from the sea, for which reason he 
moved his station from the lake to the sea. The Cartha- 
ginians, observing that the wind blew toward the Romans, 
attached ropes to some small boats and hauled them behind 
the walls, so that they should not be observed by the enemy, 
and filled them with dry twigs and tow. Then they pushed 
them back, and as they turned the corner and came in sight 
of the enemy, they poured brimstone and pitch over the 
contents, spread the sails, and, as the wind filled them, set 
fire to the boats. These, driven by the wind and the fury 
of the flames against the Roman ships, set fire to them and 
came a little short of destroying the whole fleet. Shortly 
afterward Censorinus went to Rome to conduct the election. 
Then the Carthaginians began to press more boldly against 
Manilius. They made a sally by night, some with arms, 
others, unarmed, carrying planks with which to bridge the 
ditch of the Roman camp, and began to tear down the pali- 
sades. While all was in confusion in the camp, as is usual 
in nocturnal assaults, Scipio passed out with his horse by 
the rear gates where there was no fighting, moved around 
to the front, and so frightened the Carthaginians that they 
betook themselves to the city. Thus a second time Scipio 
appeared to have been the salvation of the Romans by his 
conduct in this nocturnal meloe. 

100. Manilius thereupon fortified his camp more care- 
fully. He threw around it a wall in place of the palisade 


60s and built a fort on the sea-shore at the place where his 149 
supply-ships came in. Then, turning to the mainland, he 
ravaged the country with 10,000 foot and 4000 horse, col- 
lecting wood and forage and provisions. These foraging 
parties were in charge of the military tribunes by turns. 
Now Phameas, the chief of the African horse, — a young 
man eager for fighting, having small but swift horses that 
lived on grass when they could find nothing else, and could 
bear both hunger and thirst when necessary, — hiding in 
thickets and ravines, when he saw that the enemy were not 
on their guard swooped down upon them from his hiding- 
place like an eagle, inflicted as much damage on them as he 
could, and took refuge in flight. But when Scipio's turn 
came he never made his appearance, because Scipio always 
kept his foot-soldiers in line and his horsemen on horse- 
back, and in foraging he never broke ranks until he had 
encircled the field where his harvesters were to work, with 
cavalry and infantry. Moreover, he was always reconnoi- 
tring with other troops of horse around the circle, and if any 
of the harvesters straggled away or passed outside of the 
circle he punished them severely. For this reason he was 
the only one that Phameas did not attack. 

Chapter XV 

A Sally from the City — Manilius marches against Hasdrubal and is 
repulsed — Flight of Manilius — A Detachment rescued 

loi. As these things were happening all the time, the 
fame of Scipio was on the increase, so that the other trib- 
unes, out of envy, spread a report that there was an under- 
standing between Phameas and Scipio, arising from the 
former friendship between the ancestors of Phameas and 
Scipio 's grandfather Scipio. Certain Africans had taken 
refuge in towers and castles, with which the country 
abounded, in pursuance of agreements made with the other 
tribunes, and the latter, after giving them this permission, 
had set upon them when they were going out; but Scipio 
always conducted them safely home. For this reason none 
of them would make any agreement unless Scipio were pres- 
ent. In this way his reputation for courage and good faith 

VOL. I — ρ 


V.R. B.( 

605 spread gradually among both friends and enemies. After i4< 
the Romans had returned from their foraging the Cartha- 
ginians made a night attack on their fort by the sea, causing 
tremendous confusion, in which the citizens joined by 
making noises to add to the alarm. While Manilius kept 
his forces inside, not knowing where the danger lay, Scipio, 
taking ten troops of horse, led them out with lighted torches, 
ordering them, as it was night, not to attack the enemy, 
but to course around them with the firebrands and make a 
show of numbers and to frighten them by making a feint of 
attacking here and there. This was done until the Cartha- 
ginians, thrown into confusion on all sides, became panic- 
stricken and took refuge in the city. This also was added 
to the famous exploits of Scipio. Thus in the mouths 
of all he was proclaimed as the only worthy successor of 
his father, Paulus, the conqueror of Macedonia, and of the 
Scipios into whose family he had been received by adoption. 
102. Manilius undertook an expedition to Nepheris 
against Hasdrubal, which Scipio disapproved of, because 
the road was flanked by mountain crags, gorges, and thick- 
ets, and the heights were occupied by the enemy. When 
they had come within a third of a mile of Hasdrubal, and 
to the bed of a river where it was necessary to go down 
and up again, in order to reach the enemy, Scipio urged 
him to turn back, saying that another time and other means 
would be more propitious for attacking Hasdrubal. The 
other tribunes, moved by jealousy, took the opposite view 
and held that it savored of cowardice, rather than of pru- 
dence, to turn back after coming in sight of the enemy, and 
that it would embolden him to attack them in the rear. 
Then Scipio gave another piece of advice, that they ought 
to fortify a camp on the hither side of the stream, to which 
they could retreat if they were overpowered, there being 
now no place where they could take refuge. The others 
laughed at this, and one of them threatened to throw away 
his sword if Scipio, instead of Manilius, were to command 
the expedition. Thereupon Manilius, who had not had 
much experience in war, crossed the river and on the other 
side encountered Hasdrubal. There was great slaughter on 
both sides. Finally Hasdrubal took refuge in his strong- 
hold, where he was safe and from which he could watch his 

§ I02-I03] THE PUNIC WARS 211 

V.R. ^ B.C. 

605 chance of attacking the Romans as they moved off. The 149 
latter, who already repented of their undertaking, retired 
in good order till they came to the river. As the crossing ' 
was difficult on account of the fewness and narrowness of 
the fords, it was necessary for them to break ranks. When 
Hasdrubal saw this he made a most brilliant attack, and 
slew a vast number of them who were more intent upon 
flight than upon defending themselves. Among the killed 
were three of the tribunes who had been chiefly instru- 
mental in urging the consul to risk the engagement. 

103. Scipio, taking 300 horsemen that he had with him 
and as many more as he could hastily collect, divided them 
into two bodies and led them, with many charges, against 
the enemy, discharging darts at them and retreating by 
turns, then straightway coming back at them and again re- 
treating, for he had given orders that one-half of them 
should advance by turns continually, discharge their jave- 
lins, and retire, as though they were attacking on all sides. 
This movement being constantly repeated without any in- 
termission, the Africans, thus assailed, turned against Scipio 
and pressed less heavily on those who were crossing. The 
latter hurried across the stream and after them came Scipio 
with his men under a shower of darts and with great diffi- 
culty. At the beginning of this fight four Roman cohorts 
were cut ofl from the stream by the enemy and took refuge 
on a hill. These Hasdrubal surrounded, and the Romans 
did not miss them until they came to a halt. When they 
learned the facts they were in a quandary. Some thought 
they ought to continue their retreat and not to endanger the 
whole army for the sake of a few, but Scipio maintained 
that while deliberation was proper when you were laying 
out your plans, yet in an emergency, when so many men and 
their standards were in danger, nothing but reckless daring 
was of any use. Then, selecting some companies of horse, 
he said that he would either rescue them or willingly perish 
with them. Taking two days' rations, he set out at once, 
the army being in great fear lest he should never return. 
When he came to the hill where the men were besieged he 
took possession of another eminence hard by and separated 
from the former by a narrow ravine. The Africans pressed 
the siege vigorously, making signals to each other and think- 



Y.K. B. 

605 ing that Scipio would not be able to relieve his friends on 14 
account of the excessive fatigue of his march. But Scipio, 
seeing that the bases of the two hills curved around the 
j ravine, lost no time but dashed around them and secured a 

] position above the enemy. They, finding themselves sur- 

! rounded, fled in disorder. Scipio did not pursue them, as 

! they were much superior in numbers. 

104. Thus Scipio saved these men also, who had been 
. given up for lost. When the army at a distance saw him 

returning safe, and that he had saved the others contrary to 
expectation, they shouted for joy and conceived the idea 
that he was aided by the same deity that was supposed to 
have enabled his grandfather Scipio to foresee the future. 
Manilius then returned to his camp in front of the city, 
having suffered severely from not following the advice of 
Scipio, who had tried to dissuade him from the expedition. 
When all were grieved that those who had fallen in battle, 
and especially the tribunes, remained unburied, Scipio re- 
leased one of the captives and sent him to Hasdrubal, ask- 
ing that he would give burial to the tribunes. The latter 
searched among the corpses, and, recognizing them by their 
signet rings (for the military tribunes wore gold rings while 
common soldiers had only iron ones), he buried them, thus 
thinking to do an act of humanity not uncommon in war, 
or perhaps because he was in awe of the reputation of 
Scipio and thought to do him a service. As the Romans 
were returning from the expedition against Hasdrubal, 
Phameas made an attack upon them while demoralized by 
that disaster, and as they came into camp the Carthaginians 
made a sally from the city and killed some of the camp 

Chapter XVI 

Rising Fame of Scipio — Death of Masinissa — A Talk with Phameas 
— Treason of Phameas — Arrival of the New Consul Piso — Piso 
repulsed — The Carthaginians in High Spirits 

606 105. Now the Senate sent commissioners to the army to ih 
get particulars, before whom Manilius and the council and 
the remaining tribunes bore testimony in favor of Scipio; 

§ I04-I06] THE PUNIC WARS 2 1 3 

V.R. B. C. 

606 for all jealousy had been stifled by his glorious actions. 148 
The whole army did the same, and his deeds spoke for 
themselves, so that the messengers, on their return, reported 
to everybody the military skill and success of Scipio and 
the attachment of the soldiers to him. These things greatly 
pleased the Senate. On account of the many mishaps that 
had taken place they sent to Masinissa to secure his utmost 
aid against Carthage. The envoys found that he was no 
longer living, having succumbed to old age and disease. 
Having several illegitimate sons, to whom he had made 
large gifts, and three legitimate ones, who differed from 
each other in their qualities, he had asked Scipio, on the 
ground of his (Masinissa* s) friendship with him and with 
his grandfather, to come and consult with him concerning 
his children and the government. Scipio went immedi- 
ately, but shortly before he arrived Masinissa breathed his 
last, having charged his sons to obey Scipio in the matter 
of the division of the estate. 

106. Having uttered these words he died. He had been 
a fortunate man in all respects. By divine favor he re- 
gained his ancestral kingdom, that had been snatched from 
him by Syphax and the Carthaginians, and extended it from 
Mauritania on the ocean through the continent as far as the 
government of Cyrene. He brought a good deal of land 
under cultivation where Numidian tribes had lived on 
herbs for want of agricultural knowledge. He left a large 
sum of money in his treasury and a well-disciplined army. 
Of his enemies he took Syphax prisoner with his own hand, 
and he was a cause of the destruction of Carthage, having 
left it a prey to the Romans, completely deprived of 
strength. He was by nature tall, and very strong to extreme 
old age, and he participated in battles and could mount a 
horse without assistance to the day of his death. The 
strongest testimony to his robust health was, that while 
many children were born to him and died before him, he 
never had less than ten living at one time, and when he 
died, at the age of ninety, he left one only four years old. 
Such a lifetime and such strength of body had Masinissa, 
but he died at last. Scipio made gifts to the sons of his 
concubines in addition to those they had already received. 
To each of the legitimate sons he gave treasures and reve- 


606 nues and the title of king. The other things he divided 148 
as he judged fitting, according to the dispositions of each. 
To Micipsa, the oldest, a lover of peace, he assigned the 
city of Cirta and the royal palace there. Gulussa, a man 
of warlike parts and the next in age, he made the director 
of matters relating to peace and war. Mastanabal, the 
youngest, who was learned in the law, was appointed judge 
to decide causes between their subjects. 

107. In this way Scipio divided the government and 
estate of Masinissa among his children, and he brought 
Gulussa straightway to the aid of the Romans. The latter 
searched out the hiding-places from which Phameas had 
inflicted such distress upon the Romans, and speedily put 
an end to his raids. One wintry day Scipio and Phameas 
found themselves on the opposite sides of an impassable 
stream, where neither could do any harm to the other. 
Scipio, fearing lest there might be an ambuscade farther 
on, advanced with three companies to reconnoitre. Pha- 
meas, observing this movement, advanced with only one 
companion. Scipio, anticipating that Phameas wanted to 
say something to him, advanced further with only one. 
When they had come near enough to hear each other and 
were at a sufficient distance from the Carthaginians, Scipio 
said, " Why do you not look out for your own safety since 
you cannot do anything for your country?" The other 
replied, "What chance is there for my safety when the 
affairs of Carthage are in such straits and the Romans have 
suffered so much at my hands?" "If you have any confi- 
dence in my word and influence," said Scipio, "I will 
promise you safety and pardon from the Romans and their 
favor besides." Phameas praised Scipio as the most trust- 
worthy of men, and replied, "I will think of it, and if I 
find that it can be done I will let you know." Then they 

108. Manilius, being ashamed of the miscarriage of his 
attack upon Hasdrubal, again advanced to Nepheris, taking 
rations for fifteen days. When he neared the place he for- 
tified a camp with palisade and ditch as Scipio had advised 
on the former occasion. But he accomplished nothing and 
was more ashamed than before, and was again in fear of 
being attacked by Hasdrubal on his retreat. While he was 

§ I07-I09] THE PUNIC WARS 2 1 5 

Y.R. B.C. 

606 in this helpless state a messenger brought a letter from 148 
Gulussa's army to Scipio, which he showed to the consul 
under seal. Breaking the seal, they read as follows : " On 
such a day I will occupy such a place. Come there with as 
many men as you please and tell your outposts to receive 
one who is coming by night." Such was the content of 
the letter, which was without signature, but Scipio knew 
that it was from Phameas. Manilius feared lest Scipio 
might be drawn into an ambuscade by this very versatile 
man; nevertheless, when he saw how confident he was, he 
allowed him to go and authorized him to give Phameas tlie 
strongest assurances of safety, but not to make any definite 
promise of reward, but to tell him that the Romans would 
do what was fitting. There was no need of promises, for 
Phameas, when he came to the rendezvous, said that he 
trusted in the good faith of Scipio for his safety, and as for 
favors he would leave all that to the Romans. Having said 
this he drew up his forces on the following day in battle 
order, and going forward in conference with his officers as 
though about some other matters, he said, " If there is any 
chance of rendering service to our country I am ready to 
stand by you for that purpose, but in the state of things 
that exists, I am going to look out for my own safety. I 
have made terms for myself and for as many of you as I 
can persuade to join me. You have now the opportunity 
to consider what is for your advantage." When he had said 
this, some of the officers went over to the enemy with their 
forces to the number of about 2200 horse. The remainder 
were held together by Hanno, surnamed the White. 

109. When Scipio was returning with Phameas the army 
went out to meet him and welcomed him as in a triumph. 
Manilius was overjoyed, and as he after this no longer con- 
sidered his return disgraceful or thought that Hasdrubal 
would pursue him after such a stroke, he moved away for 
want of provisions on the seventeenth instead of the fif- 
teenth day of the expedition. They must have three days 
more of suffering in their return; therefore Scipio, taking 
Phameas and Gulussa and their horse, together with some 
of the Italian cavalry, hastened to the plain called Great 
Barathrum and returned to the army by night laden with a 
great quantity of spoils and provisions. Manilius, learning 

2 1 6 APPIAN'S mS TOR γ [Bk. VIII, Ch. XVI 

Y.K. Β c. 

606 that his successor, Calpurnius Piso, was coming, sent Scipio 148 
to Rome with Phameas. The army conducted Scipio to 
the ship with acclamations and prayed that he might return 
to Africa as consul, because they thought that he alone 
could take Carthage, for the opinion had sprung up among 
them, as by divine inspiration, that only Scipio would take 
Carthage. Many of them wrote to this effect to their rela- 
tives in Rome. The Senate lauded Scipio and bestowed 
on Phameas a purple robe with gold clasps, a horse with 
gold trappings, a complete suit of armor, and 10,000 
drachmas of silver money. They also gave him 100 minas 
of silver plate and a tent completely furnished, and told 
him that he might expect more if he would cooperate with 
them to the end of the war. He promised to do so and set 
sail for the Roman camp in Africa. 

no. In the early spring Calpurnius Piso, the new con- 
sul, arrived, and with him Lucius Mancinus as admiral of 
the fleet, but they did not attack either the Carthaginians 
or Hasdrubal. Marching against the neighboring towns 
they made an attempt on Aspis by land and sea, and were 
repulsed. Piso took another town near by and destroyed 
it, the inhabitants accusing him of attacking them in viola- 
tion of a treaty. He then moved against Hippagreta, a 
large city, with walls, citadel, harbor, and dockyards hand- 
somely built by Agathocles, the tyrant of Sicily. Being 
situated between Carthage and Utica it intercepted the 
Roman supply-ships and was growing rich thereby. Cal- 
purnius thought to punish them and deprive them of their 
gains at the same time, but he besieged them the whole 
summer and accomplished nothing. Twice the inhabitants 
made sallies, with the aid of the Carthaginians, and burned 
the Roman engines. The consul, being foiled, returned 
to Utica and went into winter quarters. 

III. The Carthaginians, finding themselves and the army 
of Hasdrubal unharmed, and that they had worsted Piso in 
the fighting around Hippagreta, and their forces being 
augmented by 800 horse, who had deserted from Gulussa, 
under Bithya, a Numidian chief; seeing also that Micipsa 
and Mastanabal, the sons of Masinissa, were always prom- 
ising arms and money to the Romans, but always delaying 
and waiting to see what would happen, plucked up their 

§ I lo-i 1 2] THE PUNIC WARS 2 1 7 

Y.R. B.C. 

6o6 spirits and roamed through Africa without fear, fortifying 148 
the country, and making abusive speeches in the town as- 
semblies against the Romans. In proof of their cowardice 
they pointed to the two victories at Nepheris and the 
more recent one at Hippagreta, and to Carthage itself, 
which the enemy had not been able to take although it was 
unarmed and poorly defended. They sent to Micipsa and 
Mastanabal and to the free Moors asking their aid, and 
showing them that they, as well as Carthage, were in danger 
of subjection to the Romans. They sent messengers to 
Macedonia to the supposed son of Perseus, who was at war 
with the Romans, exhorting him to carry on the war with 
vigor and promising that Carthage would furnish him money 
and ships. Being now armed they considered nothing too 
small to be worth attention, and they gained in confidence, 
courage, and preparation from day to day. Hasdrubal, who 
commanded in the country and who had twice got the better 
of Manilius, was in high spirits also. Aspiring to the com- 
mand in the city, which was held by another Hasdrubal, a 
nephew of Gulussa, he accused the latter of an intention to 
betray Carthage to Gulussa. This accusation being brought 
forward in the assembly, and the accused being at a loss to 
answer the unexpected charge, they fell upon him and beat 
him to death with the benches. 

Chapter XVII 

Scipio elected Consul — Saves Mancinus from Destruction — Demorali- 
zation of the Army — Scipio*s Speech to the Soldiers 

112. When the ill success of Piso and the preparation 
of the Carthaginians were reported at Rome, the people 
were chagrined and anxious, as the war was growing larger 
and more irreconcilable, and coming nearer every day. 
There could be no expectation of peace since they had been 
the first to break faith. Remembering the exploits of 
Scipio while he was a military tribune not long before, and 
comparing them with the present blunders and recalling 
the letters written to them by friends and relatives from 
the army on that subject, there was presently an intense 


V.R. B.C. 

606 desire that he should be sent to Carthage as consul. The 148 
election was drawing near and Scipio was a candidate for 
the sedileship, for the laws did not permit him to hold the 
consulship as yet, on account of his youth; yet the people 
elected him consul. This was illegal, and when the con- 
suls showed them the law they became importunate and 
urged all the more, exclaiming that by the laws handed 
down from Tullius and Romulus the people were the judges 
of the elections, and that, of the laws pertaining thereto, 
they could set aside or confirm whichever they pleased. 
Finally one of the tribunes of the people declared that he 
would take from the consuls the power of holding an elec- 
tion unless they yielded to the people in this matter. Then 
the Senate allowed the tribunes to repeal this law, and after 
one year they reenacted it. In like manner the Lacede- 
monians, when they were obliged to relieve from disgrace 
those who had surrendered at Pylus,^ said, "Let the laws 
sleep to-day." Thus Scipio, while seeking the sedileship, 
was chosen consul. When his colleague, Drusus, proposed 

to him to cast lots to see which should have Africa as his 
province, one of the tribunes put the question of the com- 
mand of that army to the people, and they chose Scipio. 
They also allowed him to take as many soldiers by con- 
scription as had been lost in the war, and as many volun- 
teers as he could enlist among the allies, and for this purpose 
to send to the allied kings and states letters written in the 
name of the Roman people, according to his own discretion. 
In this way he obtained assistance from them. 

607 113• Having made these arrangements, Scipio sailed first 147 
to Sicily and thence to Utica. Piso, in the meantime, had 
laid siege to a town in the interior. Mancinus, observing 

a neglected part of the wall of Carthage, which was protected 
by continuous and almost impassable cliffs and had been 
neglected for that reason, made an attack there, thinking 
to scale the wall secretly by means of ladders. These being 
fixed, certain soldiers mounted boldly. The Carthaginians, 
despising their small numbers, opened a gate adjacent to 
these rocks and made a sally against the enemy. The 

^ This refers to the capture of 292 Spartan hoplites on the island of 
Sphacteria by the Athenians in the seventh year of the Peloponnesian 
war, B.C. 425. 


Y.R. B-C. 

607 Romans repulsed and pursued them, and rushed into the 147 
city through the open gate. They raised a shout of victory, 
and Mancinus, transported with joy (for he was giddy and 
rash by nature), and the whole crowd with him, rushed 
from the ships, unarmed or half -armed, to aid their com- 
panions. As it was now about sunset they occupied a 
strong position adjacent to the wall and spent the night 
there. Being without food, Mancinus called upon Piso and 
the magistrates of Utica to assist him in his perilous posi- 
tion and to send him provisions in all haste, for he was in 
danger of being thrust out by the Carthaginians at daylight 
and dashed to pieces on the rocks. 

114. Scipio arrived at Utica that same evening, and 
happening, about midnight, to meet those to whom Man- 
cinus had written, he ordered the trumpet to sound for 
fighting immediately, and the heralds to call to the sea-shore 
those who had come with him from Italy, and also the 
young men of Utica, and he directed the older ones to 
bring provisions to the galleys. At the same time, he re- 
leased some Carthaginian captives so that they might go 
and tell their friends that Scipio was coming upon them 
with his fleet. To Piso he sent horseman after horseman, 
urging him to move with all speed. About the last watch 
he put to sea, giving orders to the soldiers that when they 
approached the city they should stand up on the decks in 
order to give an appearance of vast numbers to the enemy. 
At early dawn the Carthaginians attacked Mancinus from 
all sides and he formed a circle with his 500 armed men, 
within which he placed the unarmed ones, 3000 in num- 
ber. Suffering from wounds and being forced back to the 
wall, he was on the point of being pushed over the preci- 
pice when Scipio's fleet came in sight, driven at a tre- 
mendous rate of speed, with soldiers crowding the decks 
everywhere. This was not a surprise to the Carthaginians, 
who had been advised of it by the returned prisoners, but 
to the Romans, who were ignorant of what had happened, 
Scipio brought unexpected relief. Gradually the Cartha- 
ginians drew back and Scipio received those who had been 
in peril into his ships. Straightway he sent Mancinus to 
Rome (for his successor, Serranus, had come with Scipio 
to take command of the fleet), and he pitched his camp 


607 not far from Carthage. The Carthaginians advanced five 147 
stades from the walls and fortified a camp opposite him. 
Here they were joined by Hasdrubal, the commander of 
the forces in the country, and Bithya, the cavalry general, 
who had 6000 foot-soldiers and 1000 horse well trained and 

115. Scipio, finding the discipline of the army relaxed 
and the soldiers under Piso given up to idleness, avarice, 
and rapine, and a multitude of hucksters mingled with them, 
who followed the camp for the sake of booty, and accom- 
panied the bolder ones when they made expeditions for 
plunder without permission (although in contemplation of 
law everybody was a deserter who went beyond the sound of 
the trumpet in time of war); seeing also that the com- 
mander was held to blame for all their failures and that the 
plunder they took was the cause of fresh quarrels and de- 
moralization among them, for many of them fell out with 
their comrades on account of it and proceeded to blows, 
wounds, and even manslaughter — in view of all these things 
and believing that he should never master the enemy unless 
he first mastered his own men, he called them together 
and, mounting a high platform, he lashed them with these 
words : — 

116. "Soldiers, when I served with you under the com- 
mand of Manilius, I gave you an example of obedience, as 
you can testify. I ask the same from you, now that I am 
in command; for while I have ample powers to punish the 
disobedient, I think it best to give you warning beforehand. 
You know what you have been doing. Therefore why 
should I tell you what I am ashamed to speak of? You 
are more like robbers than soldiers. You are runaways 
instead of guardians of the camp. You are more like huck- 
sters than conquerors. You are in quest of luxuries in the 
midst of war and before the victory is won. For this 
reason the enemy, from the hopeless weakness in which I 
left him, has risen to such strength, and your labor has been 
made harder by your laziness. If I considered you to blame 
for this I should punish you now, but since I ascribe it to 
another, I shall overlook the past. I have come here not 
to rob, but to conquer, not to exact money before victory, 
but to overcome the enemy first. Now, all of you who are 

§ 115-117] I'HE PUNIC WARS 221 

Y.R. B.C. 

607 not soldiers must leave the camp to-day, except those who 147 
have my permission to remain, and of those who go, I shall 
allow none to come back except such as bring food, and 
this must be for the army, and plain food at that. A defi- 
nite time will be given to them to dispose of their goods, 
and I and my quaestor will superintend the sale. So much 
for the camp followers. For you, soldiers, I have one 
order adapted to all occasions, and that is, that you follow 
the example of my habits and my industry. If you observe 
this rule you will not be wanting in your duty and you will 
not fail of your reward. We must toil while the danger 
lasts; spoils and luxury must be postponed to their proper 
time. This I command and this the law commands. 
Those who obey shall reap large rewards; those who do not 
will repent it." 

Chapter XVIII 

Restores Discipline and captures Megara — Cruelties of Hasdrubal — 
Scipio's Intrenched Camp — Cuts off the Supplies of Carthage — 
Attempts to close the Harbor but fails — Indecisive Naval Engage- 
ment — Desperate Fight for Possession of a Quay — Scipio captures 

117. Having spoken thus, Scipio forthwith expelled the 
crowd of useless persons and with them whatever was super- 
fluous, idle, or luxurious. The army being thus purged, 
and full of awe for him, and keenly intent for his com- 
mands, he made an attempt one night, in two different 
places, to surprise that part of Carthage called Megara. 
This was a very large suburb adjacent to the city wall. He 
sent a force round against the opposite side, while he ad- 
vanced directly against it a distance of twenty stades with 
axes, ladders, and crowbars, without noise and in the 
deepest silence. When their approach was perceived and 
a shout was raised from the walls, they shouted back — first 
Scipio and his force, then those who had gone around to 
the other side — as loudly as possible. The Carthaginians 
were at first struck with terror at finding such a large force 
of the enemy attacking them on both sides in the night- 
time, but Scipio with his utmost efforts was not able to 
scale the walls. There was a deserted tower outside the 


Y.R. ^ B.C. 

607 walls, belonging to a private citizen, of the same height as 147 
the walls themselves. He sent some of his bravest young 
men to the top of this tower, who with their javelins fought 
back the guards on the wall, threw planks across, and made 
a bridge by which they reached the walls, descended into 
the town, broke open a gate, and admitted Scipio. He 
entered with 4000 men, and the Carthaginians made a hasty 
flight to Byrsa, as though the remainder of the city had 
already been taken. All kinds of noises were raised and 
there was great tumult. Many fell into the hands of the 
enemy, and the alarm was such that those encamped outside 
left their fortification and rushed to Byrsa with the others. 
As Megara was planted with gardens and was full of fruit- 
bearing trees divided off by low walls, hedges, and bram- 
bles, besides deep ditches full of water running in every 
direction, Scipio was fearful lest it should be impracticable 
and dangerous for the army to pursue the enemy through 
roads that they were unacquainted with, and lest they might 
fall into an ambush in the night. Accordingly he withdrew. 
118. When daylight came Hasdrubal, enraged at the 
attack upon Megara, took the Roman prisoners whom he 
held, brought them upon the walls, in full sight of their 
comrades, and tore out their eyes, tongues, and tendons 
with iron hooks ; of some he lacerated the soles of the feet, 
he cut off the fingers of others, and some he flayed alive. 
All who survived these tortures he hurled from the top of 
the walls. He thus gave the Carthaginians to understand 
that there was no possibility of peace with the Romans, and 
sought to fire them with the conviction that their only safety 
was in fighting. But the result was contrary to his inten- 
tion, for the Carthaginians, conscience-stricken by these 
nefarious deeds, became timid instead of courageous, and 
hated Hasdrubal for depriving them of all hope of pardon. 
Their senate especially denounced him for committing 
these savage and unusual cruelties in the midst of so great 
domestic calamities. So he arrested some of the complain- 
ing senators and put them to death. Making himself feared 
in every way he came to be more like a tyrant than a gen- 
eral, for he considered himself secure only if he were an 
object of terror to them, and he trusted that he should be 
protected from danger in this way. 

§ II8-I20] THE PUNIC WARS 223 

607 119. Now Scipio set fire to the camp of the enemy, 147 
which they had abandoned the day before, when they took 
refuge in the city. Being in possession of the whole isth- 
mus he began a trench across it from sea to sea not more 
than a stone's throw from the enemy. The latter were not 
idle. Along the whole distance of five and twenty stades 
he had to work and fight at the same time. When he had 
finished this one he dug another of the same length, at no 
great distance from the first, looking towards the mainland. 
He then made two others running transversely, giving the 
interior space the form of a quadrangle, and threw around 
the whole a palisade of chevaux-de-frise. In addition to 
the palisade he fortified the ditches also, and along the 
one looking toward Carthage he built a wall twenty-five 
stades in length and twelve feet high, without counting the 
parapets and towers which surmounted the wall at inter- 
vals. The width of the wall was about one-half of its 
height. The highest tower was at the middle, and upon 
this another of wood, four stories high, was built, from 
which to observe what was going on in the city. Having 
completed this work in twenty days and nights, the whole 
army working and fighting and taking food and sleep by 
turns, he brought them all within the fortification. 

120. This was at the same time a camp for himself and 
a rather long fort commanding the enemy's country. From 
this base he could intercept all the supplies sent to the Car- 
thaginians from the interior, since Carthage was every- 
where washed by the sea except on this neck. Hence this 
fort was the first and principal cause of famine and other 
troubles to them, for, while the great multitude betook 
themselves from the fields to the city, and none could go 
out on account of the siege, foreign merchants ceased to 
frequent the place on account of the war. Thus they had 
to rely on food brought from Africa alone, little coming in 
by sea and only when the weather was favorable, much the 
greater part being forwarded by the land route. Deprived 
of this, they began to suffer severely from hunger. Bithya, 
their cavalry general, who had been sent out some time 
before to procure food, did not venture to make the at- 
tempt by attacking and breaking through Scipio' s fortifica- 
tion, but he sent supplies a long way around by water, 


607 although Scipio's ships were blockading Carthage. The 147 
latter did not keep their place all the time, nor did they 
stand thickly together, as they had no shelter and the sea 
was full of reefs. Nor could they anchor near the city 
itself, with the Carthaginians standing on the walls and the 
sea pounding on the rocks there worst of all. Thus the 
ships of Bithya and an occasional merchant, whom the love 
of gain made reckless of danger, watching for a strong and 
favorable wind, spread their sails and ran the blockade, the 
Roman galleys not being able to pursue merchant ships 
sailing before the wind. But these chances were rare and 
only when a strong wind was blowing from the sea. These 
supplies Hasdrubal distributed to his 30,000 soldiers exclu- 
sively, for he despised the multitude; for which reason 
they suffered greatly from hunger. 

121. When Scipio perceived this he planned to close 
the entrance to the harbor on the west side, not very far from 
the shore. For this purpose he carried a strong embank- 
ment into the sea, beginning on the tongue of land which 
lay between the lake and sea, advancing straight toward the 
harbor's mouth. He filled it with heavy stones so that it 
might not be washed away by the waves. The embankment 
was twenty-four feet wide on the top and four times as 
much on the bottom. The Carthaginians at first despised 
this work as likely to take a long time, and perhaps impos- 
sible of execution altogether. But when they saw the whole 
army proceeding eagerly, and not intermitting the work by 
day or by night, they became alarmed, and began to exca- 
vate another entrance at another part of the harbor in mid- 
sea, where it was impossible to carry an embankment on 
account of the depth of the water and the fury of the wind. 
Even the women and children helped to dig. They began 
the work inside, and carefully concealed what they were 
doing. At the same time they built triremes and quin- 
queremes from old material, and they left nothing to be 
desired in the way of courage and high spirit. Moreover, 
they concealed everything so perfectly that not even the 
prisoners could tell Scipio with certainty what was going 
on, but merely that there was a great racket in the harbor 
day and night; what it was about they did not know. 
Finally, everything being finished, the Carthaginians 

§ I2I-I23] THE PUNIC WARS 22$ 

607 opened the new entrance about the dawn of day and passed 147 
out with fifty triremes, besides pinnaces, brigantines, and 
other small craft decked out in a way to cause terror. 

122. The Romans were so astounded by the sudden ap- 
pearance of this new entrance, and of the fleet issuing from 
it, that if the Carthaginians had at once fallen upon their 
ships, which were in disorder by reason of beleaguerment 
of the walls, neither sailors nor rowers being present, they 
might have possessed themselves of the whole fleet. But 
now (since it was fated that Carthage should perish) they 
only sailed out to make a show, and, having flouted the 
enemy in a pompous way, they returned inside the harbor. 
Three days later they set out for a naval engagement, and 
the Romans advanced to meet them with their ships and 
other apparatus in good order. They came together with 
loud shouts on both sides and cheers from the rowers, steers- 
men, and marines, the Carthaginians resting their last hope 
of safety on this engagement and the Romans hoping to 
make it their final victory. The fight raged till midday. 
During the battle the Carthaginian small boats, running 
under the sides of the Roman ships, which were taller, stove 
holes in their sterns and broke off their oars and rudders, 
and damaged them in various other ways, advancing and 
retreating nimbly. As the day verged toward evening the 
battle was still undecided, and the Carthaginians thought 
best to withdraw, not that they were beaten, but to renew 
the engagement the next day. 

123. Their small boats retired first, and arriving at the 
entrance, and becoming entangled on account of their 
number, they blocked up the mouth so that when the larger 
ones arrived they were prevented from entering. They 
took refuge at a wide quay, which had been built against the 
city wall for unloading merchant ships some time before, 
and on which a small parapet had been erected during this 
war lest the space might sometime be occupied by the 
enemy. When the Carthaginian ships took refuge here for 
want of a harbor, they ranged themselves with their bows 
outward and received the attack of the enemy, some of 
them standing on the ships, some on the quay, and still 
others on the parapet. To the Romans the onset was easy, 
for it is not hard to attack ships that are standing still, but 

VOL. I — Q 


V.«. B.C. 

607 when they attempted to turn around, in order to retire, the 147 
movement was slow and difficult on account of the length 
of the ships, for which reason they received as much dam- 
age as they had given; for while they were executing the 
movement they were exposed to the onset of the Cartha- 
ginians. Finally five ships of the city of the Sidetse, which 
were in alliance with Scipio, dropped their anchors in the 
sea at some distance, attaching long ropes to them, by 
which means they were enabled to dash against the Cartha- 
ginian ships by rowing, and having delivered their blow warp 
themselves back by the ropes stern foremost. Then the 
whole fleet, catching the idea from the Sidetse, followed 
their example and inflicted great damage upon the enemy. 
Night put an end to the battle, after which the Carthaginians 
withdrew to the city — as many of them as survived the en- 

124. At daylight Scipio attacked this quay because it 
was well situated to command the harbor. Assailing the 
parapet with rams and other engines he beat down a part of 
it. The Carthaginians, although oppressed by hunger and 
distress of various kinds, made a sally by night against the 
Roman engines, not by land, for there was no passage-way, 
nor by ships, for the water was too shallow, but naked and 
bearing torches not lighted, so that they might not be seen 
at a distance. Thus, in a way that nobody would have ex- 
pected, they plunged into the sea and crossed over, some of 
them wading in water up to their breasts, others swimming. 
When they reached the engines they lighted their torches, 
and becoming visible and being naked they suffered greatly 
from wounds, which they courageously returned. Although 
the barbed arrows and spear-points rained on their breasts 
and faces, they did not relax their efforts, but rushed for- 
ward like wild beasts against the blows until they had set 
the engines on fire and put the Romans to disorderly flight. 
Panic and confusion spread through the whole camp and 
such fear as was never before known, caused by the frenzy 
of these naked enemies. Scipio, fearing the consequences, 
ran out with a squadron of horse and commanded his at- 
tendants to kill those who would not desist from flight. 
He killed some of them himself. The rest were brought 
by force into the camp, where they passed the night under 

§ 124-126] THE PUNIC WARS 22/ 

Y.R. B.C. 

607 arms, fearing some desperate deed of the enemy. The 147 
latter, having burned the engines, swam back home. 

125. When daylight returned the Carthaginians, no 
longer molested by the engines, rebuilt that part of the 
outwork which had been battered down and added to it a 
number of towers at intervals. The Romans constructed 
new engines and built mounds in front of these towers, 
from which they threw upon them lighted torches and ves- 
sels filled with burning brimstone and pitch, and burned some 
of them, and drove away the Carthaginians. The footway 
was so slippery with coagulated blood, lately shed in great 
quantity, that the Romans were compelled, unwillingly, to 
abandon the pursuit. Scipio, having possessed himself of 
the entire quay, fortified it and built a brick wall of the 
same height as that of Carthage, and at no great distance 
from it. When it was finished, he put 4000 men on it to 
discharge darts and javelins at the enemy, which they could 
do with comparative safety. As the walls were of equal 
height the darts were thrown with great effect. And now 
the summer came to an end. 

126. At the beginning of winter, Scipio resolved to sweep 
away the Carthaginian power in the country, and the allies 
from whom supplies were sent to them. Sending his cap- 
tains this way and that he moved in person to Nepheris 
against Diogenes, who held that town as HasdrubaPs suc- 
cessor, going by the lake while sending Gaius Laelius by 
land. When he arrived he encamped at a distance of two 
stades from Diogenes. Leaving Gulussa to keep Diogenes 
unceasingly employed, he hastened back to Carthage, after 
which he kept passing to and fro between the two places 
overseeing all that was done. When two of the spaces 
between Diogenes' towers were demolished Scipio came 
and stationed 1000 picked soldiers in ambush in the enemy's 
rear, and 3000 more, also carefully selected for bravery, in 
his front, to attack the demolished rampart. They did 
not make the attack en masse^ but by divisions in close 
order, following each other, so that if those in front were 
repulsed they could not retreat on account of the weight of 
those coming behind. The attack was made with loud 
shouts, and the Africans were drawn thither. The 1000 
in ambush, unperceived and unsuspected, fell boldly upon 


607 the rear of the camp, as they had been ordered, and tore 
down and scaled the palisade. When the first ones entered 
the Africans were panic-stricken and fled, thinking that 
the numbers of the new assailants were much greater than 
they were. Gulussa pursued them with his Numidian cav- 
alry and elephants and made a great slaughter, some 70,000, 
including non-combatants, being killed. Ten thousand 
were captured and about 4000 escaped. In addition to the 
camp the city of Nepheris was taken also, after a siege of 
twenty-two days, prosecuted by Scipio with great labor and 
suffering on account of the severity of the weather. This 
success contributed much to the taking of Carthage, for 
provisions were conveyed to it by this army, and the people 
of Africa were in good courage as long as they saw this force 
in the field. As soon as it was captured the remainder of 
Africa surrendered to Scipio's lieutenants or was taken with- 
out much difficulty. The supplies of Carthage now fell 
short, since none came from Africa or from foreign parts, 
navigation being cut off in every direction by the war and 
the storms of winter. 

Chafteb XIX 

Scipio takes (he Inner Harbor — Fighting in the Streets — Scenes of 
Horror — ^Killing in Hyrsa — HasdruLal and his Wife — Ucslruc- 
tion t>f Carthaye — Scipio sheds Tears 

oS 127- When spring returned, Scipio laid siege to liyrsa 
and to the harbor of Cothon. Hasdrubal one night set fire 
to that part of Cothon which is in the form of a quadrangle. 
But Lielius, still expecting Scipio to make the attack, and 
while the Carthaginians were turned to that quarter, with- 
out being observed, mounted the other part of Cothon, 
which was in the form of a circle. A shout went up as 
though a victory had been gained, the Carthaginians became 
alarmed, while the Romans mounted on all sides, despising 
the danger, and filled up the vacant spaces with limbers, 
engines, and scaffolding, the guards making only a feeble 
resistance because they were weak from hunger and down- 
cast in spirit. The wall around Cothon being taken, Scipio 
seized the neighboring forum. Being unable to do more. 

§ 127-129] THE PUNIC WARS 229 

Y>R• B.C. 

608 as it was now nightfall, he and his whole force passed the 146 
night there under arms. At daylight he brought in 4000 
fresh troops. They entered the temple of Apollo, whose 
statue was there, covered with gold, in a shrine of beaten 
gold, weighing 1000 talents, which they plundered, chop- 
ping it with their swords, disregarding the commands of 
their officers until they had divided it among themselves, 
after which they returned to their duty. 

128. Now Scipio hastened to the attack of Byrsa, the 
strongest part of the city, where the greater part of the in- 
habitants had taken refuge. There were three streets 
ascending from the forum to this fortress, along which, on 
either side, were houses built closely together and six stories 
high, from which the Romans were assailed with missiles. 
They were compelled, therefore, to possess themselves of 
the first ones and use those as a means of expelling the oc- 
cupants of the next. When they had mastered the first, they 
threw timbers from one to another over the narrow passage- 
ways, and crossed as on bridges. While war was raging in 
this way on the roofs, another fight was going on among 
those who met each other in the streets below. All places 
were filled with groans, shrieks, shouts, and every kind of 
agony. Some were stabbed, others were hurled alive from 
the roofs to the pavement, some of them alighting on the 
heads of spears or other pointed weapons, or swords. No 
one dared to set fire to the houses on account of those who 
were still on the roofs, until Scipio reached Byrsa. Then 
he set fire to the three streets all together, and gave orders 
to keep the passageways clear of burning material so that 
the army might move back and forth freely. 

129. Then came new scenes of horror. As the fire 
spread and carried everything down, the soldiers did not 
wait to destroy the buildings little by little, but all in a 
heap. So the crashing grew louder, and many corpses fell 
with the stones into the midst. Others were seen still 
living, especially old men, women, and young children who 
had hidden in the inmost nooks of the houses, some of 
them wounded, some more or less burned, and uttering 
piteous cries. Still others, thrust out and falling from such 
a height with the stones, timbers, and fire, were torn 
asunder in all shapes of horror, crushed and mangled. Nor 


6οβ was this the end of their miseries, for the street cleaners, i 
who were removing the rubbish with axes, mattocks, and 
forks, and making the roads passable, tossed with these in- 
straments the dead and the living together into holes in the 
ground, dragging them along like sticks and stones and 
turning them over with their iron tools. Trenches were 
filled with men. Some who were thrown in head foremost, 
with their legs sticking out of the ground, writhed a long 
time. Others fell with their feet downward and their heads 
above ground. Horses ran over them, crushing their faces 
and skulls, not purposely on the part of the riders, but in 
their headlong haste. Nor did the street cleaners do these 
things on purpose; but the tug of war, the glory of ap- 
proaching victory, the rush of the soldiery, the orders of the 
officers, the blast of the trumpets, tribunes and centurions 
marching their cohorts hither and thither — all together 
made everybody frantic and heedless of the spectacles under 
their eyes. 

130. Six days and nights were consumed in this kind of 
fighting, the soldiers being changed so that they might not 
be worn out with toil, slaughter, want of sleep, and these 
horrid sights, Scipio alone toiled without rest, hurrying 
here and there, without sleep, taking food while he was at 
work, until, utterly fatigued and relaxed, he sat down on a 
high place where he could overlook the work. Much re- 
mained to be ravaged, and it seemed likely that the carnage 
would be of longer duration, but on the seventh day some 
suppliants presented themselves to Scipio bearing the sacred 
garlands of ^sculapius, whose temple was much the richest 
and most renowned of all in the citadel. These, taking 
olive branches from the temple, besought Scipio that he 
would spare the lives of all who might wish to depart from 
Byrsa, This he granted to all except the deserters. Forth- 
with there came out 50,000 men and women together, a 
narrow gate in the wall being opened, andaguard furnished 
for them. The Roman deserters, about 900 in number, 
despairing of their lives, betook themselves to the temple 
of ^^sculapius with Hasdrubal and his wife and their two 
boys. Here they might have defended themselves a long 
time although they were tew in number, on account of the 
height and rocky nature of the place, which in time of 

§ 130-132] THE PUmC WARS 23 1 

Y.R. B.C. 

608 peace was reached by an ascent of sixty steps. But, finally, 146 
overcome by hunger, want of sleep, fear, toil, and approach- 
ing dissolution, they abandoned the enclosures of the 
temple and fled to the shrine and roof. 

131. Thereupon Hasdrubal secretly presented himself to 
Scipio, bearing an olive branch. Scipio commanded him 
to sit at his feet and there showed him to the deserters. 
When they saw him, they asked silence, and when it was 
granted, they heaped all manner of reproaches upon Has- 
drubal, then set fire to the temple and were consumed in it. 
It is said that as the fire was lighted the wife of Hasdrubal, 
in full view of Scipio, arrayed in the best attire possible 
under such circumstances, and with her children by her 
side, said in Scipio's hearing, "For you, Roman, the gods 
have no cause of indignation, since you exercise the right 
of war. Upon this Hasdrubal, betrayer of his country and 
her temples, of me and his children, may the gods of Car- 
thage take vengeance, and you be their instrument." Then 
turning to Hasdrubal, "Wretch," she exclaimed, "traitor, 
most effeminate of men, this fire will entomb me and my 
children. Will you, the leader of great Carthage, decorate 
a Roman triumph? Ah, what punishment will you not 
receive from him at whose feet you are now sitting." 
Having reproached him thus, she slew her children, flung 
them into the fire, and plunged in after them. Such, they 
say, was the death of the wife of Hasdrubal, which would 
have been more becoming to himself. 

132. Scipio, beholding this city, which had flourished 
700 years from its foundation and had ruled over so many 
lands, islands, and seas, rich with arms and fleets, elephants 
and money, equal to the mightiest monarchies but far sur- 
passing them in bravery and high spirit (since without 
ships or arms, and in the face of famine, it had sustained 
continuous war for three years), now come to its end in total 
destruction — Scipio, beholding this spectacle, is said to 
have shed tears and publicly lamented the fortune of the 
enemy. After meditating by himself a long time and re- 
flecting on the rise and fall of cities, nations, and empires, 
as well as of individuals, upon the fate of Troy, that once 
proud city, upon that of the Assyrians, the Medes, and the 
Persians, greatest of all, and later the splendid Macedonian 


608 empire, either voluntarily or otherwise the words of the 146 
poet escaped his lips : — 

" The day shall come in which our sacred Troy 
And Priam, and the people over whom 
Spear-bearing Priam rules, shall perish all." ^ 

(Jliad^ vi, 448, 449 ; Bryant's translation.) 

Being asked by Polybius in familiar conversation (for Po- 
lybius had been his tutor) what he meant by using these 
words, he said that he did not hesitate frankly to name his 
own country, for whose fate he feared when he considered 
the mutability of human affairs. And Polybius wrote this 
down just as he heard it. 

Chapter XX 

Rejoicings in Rome — Scipio*s Triumph — Carthage rebuilt by Augustus 

133• Carthage being destroyed, Scipio gave the soldiers 
a certain number of days for plunder, reserving the gold, 
silver, and temple gifts. He also gave prizes to all who 
had distinguished themselves for bravery, except those who 
had violated the shrine of Apollo. He sent a swift ship, 
embellished with spoils, to Rome to announce the victory. 
He also sent word to Sicily that whatever temple gifts they 
could identify as taken from them by the Carthaginians in 
former wars they might come and take away. Thus he en- 
deared himself to the people as one who united clemency 
with power. He sold the rest of the spoils, and, in sacri- 
ficial cincture, burned the arms, engines, and useless ships 
as an offering to Mars and Minerva, according to the 
Roman custom. 

134. When the people of Rome saw the ship and heard 
of the victory early in the evening, they poured into the 
streets and spent the whole night congratulating and em- 
bracing each other like people just now delivered from 
some great fear, just now confirmed in their world-wide 
supremacy, just now assured of the permanence of their 

^ *Έσσ€ται i5/uop, ^rav •κοτ ολώλ»; "lAtos <p^, 
KfjX ΠplaμoSf καΐ \ahs 4ΰμμ€\1ω Πριάμοιο. 

§ 133-135] ^^^ PUNIC WARS 233 

Y.R. B.C 

608 own city, and winners of such a victory as never before. 146 
Many brilliant deeds of their own, many more of their 
ancestors, in Macedonia and Spain and lately against Antio- 
chus the Great, and in Italy itself, had they celebrated; but 
no other war had so terrified them at their own gates as the 
Punic wars, which ever brought peril to them by reason of 
the perseverance, skill, and courage, as well as the bad faith, 
of those enemies. They recalled what they had suffered 
from the Carthaginians in Sicily and Spain, and in Italy 
itself for sixteen years, during which Hannibal destroyed 
400 towns and killed 300,000 of their men in battles alone, 
more than once marching up to the city and putting it in 
extreme peril. Pondering on these things, they were so ex- 
cited over this victory that they could hardly believe it, and 
they asked each other over and over again whether it was 
really true that Carthage was destroyed. And so they 
gabbled the whole night, telling how the arms of the Car- 
thaginians were got away from them and how, contrary to 
expectation, they supplied themselves with others; how 
they lost their ships and built a great fleet out of old mate- 
rial; how the mouth of their harbor was closed, yet they 
managed to open another in a few days. They talked about 
the height of the walls, and the size of the stones, and the 
fires that so often destroyed the engines. They pictured 
to each other the whole war, as though it were just taking 
place under their own eyes, suiting the action to the word; 
and they seemed to see Scipio on the ladders, on shipboard, 
at the gates, in the battles, and darting hither and thither. 
In this way the people of Rome passed the night. 

135. The next day there were sacrifices and solemn pro- 
cessions to the gods by tribes, also games and spectacles 
of various kinds. The Senate sent ten of the noblest of 
their own number as deputies to arrange the affairs of Africa 
in conjunction with Scipio, to the advantage of Rome. 
They decreed that if anything was still left of Carthage, 
Scipio should obliterate it and that nobody should be al- 
lowed to live there. Direful threats were levelled against 
any who should disobey and chiefly against the rebuilding 
of Byrsa or Megara, but it was not forbidden to go upon 
the ground. The towns that had allied themselves with the 
enemy it was decided to destroy, to the last one. To those 


Υ• Κ• B.C• 

608 who had aided the Romans there was an allotment of lands 146 
won by the sword, and first of all to the Uticans was given 
the territory of Carthage itself, extending as far as Hippo. 
Upon all the rest a tribute was imposed, both a land tax 
and a personal tax, upon men and women alike. It was 
decreed that a praetor should be sent from Rome yearly to 
govern the country. After these arrangements had been 
carried out by the deputies, they returned to Rome. Scipio 
did all that they directed, and he instituted sacrifices and 
games to the gods for the victory. When all was finished, 
he sailed for home and was awarded the most glorious tri- 
umph that had ever been known, splendid with gold and 
gorged with statues and votive offerings that the Cartha- 
ginians had gathered from all parts of the world through all 
time, the fruit of their countless victories. It was at this 
time also that the third Macedonian triumph occurred for 
the capture of Andriscus, surnamed Pseudophilippus, and 
the first Grecian one, for Mummius. This was about the 
1 60th Olympiad. 

631 136. Some time later, in the tribunate of Gains Gracchus, 123 
uprisings occurred in Rome on account of scarcity, and it 
was decided to send 6000 colonists into Africa. When 
they were laying out the land for this purpose in the vi- 
cinity of Carthage, all the boundary lines were torn down 
and obliterated by wolves. Then the Senate put a stop to 

708 the settlement. At a still later time it is said that Caesar, 46 
who afterwards became dictator for life, when he had pur- 
sued Pompey to Egypt, and Pompey's friends from thence 
into Africa, and was encamped near the site of Carthage, 
was troubled by a dream in which he saw a whole army 
weeping, and that he immediately made a memorandum in 
writing that Carthage should be colonized. Returning to 
Rome not long after, and while making a distribution of 
lands to the poor, he arranged to send some of them to 
Carthage and some to Corinth. But he was assassinated 
shortly afterward by his enemies in the Roman Senate, 
and his son Augustus, finding this memorandum, built the 
present Carthage, not on the site of the old one, but very 
near it, in order to avoid the ancient curse. I have ascer- 
tained that he sent some 3000 colonists from Rome and 
that the rest came from the neighboring country. And 

Appendix A] THE PUNIC WARS 235 

Y.R. B.C. 

708 thus the Romans took Africa away from the Carthaginians, Φ 
destroyed Carthage, and repeopled it again 102 years after 
its destruction. 

Appendix A 
By the Translator 

Appian*s account of the defeat of Regulus by Xanthippus 
is altogether different from that given by Polybius. I sub- 
join a translation of the latter : — 

" About this time a certain recruiting officer returned to 
Carthage who had been sent to Greece some time before, 
bringing a large number of soldiers, and among them a cer- 
tain Xanthippus, a Lacedemonian, versed in the Spartan 
discipline and having corresponding experience in matters 
of war. When he had acquainted himself with the circum- 
stances of the late defeat and had observed what still re- 
mained of the Carthaginian forces, and particularly their 
great strength in cavalry and elephants, he began to put this 
and that together, and showed his friends how it happened 
that the Carthaginians had been beaten, not by the Romans, 
but by the unskilfulness of their own generals. The words 
of Xanthippus, being rumored around among the multitude 
and the generals, finally reached the ears of the magistrates, 
who sent for him in order to get better information. When 
he came he explained the causes of their recent failure, and 
showed that if they would follow his advice and choose the 
level ground for their marches, camps, and battles, they 
might easily repair their losses and overcome the enemy. 
The generals accepted this advice and immediately put 
their forces under his training. When the advice of Xan- 
thippus was spread through the city hopeful talk and rumors 
became common among the people. When he brought the 
forces in front of the city, and marshalled them in good 
order, and began to drill them by divisions, and to give the 
word of command according to rule, he presented such a 
contrast to the want of discipline of the former command- 
ers that the rank and file applauded and demanded to be 
led against the enemy as soon as possible, feeling assured 
that no misfortune could befall them under the lead of Xan- 
thippus. The generals, seeing the spirits of the soldiers so 


wonderfully raised, addressed them in a manner befitting the 
occasion, and a few days later put their forces on the march. 
They had 12,000 foot, 4000 horse, and about 100 elephants. 
"The Romans, seeing the Carthaginians marching 
through the open country and camping on level ground, 
were surprised at this unexpected movement and hastened 
to meet them. At the end of the first day's march they 
encamped at a distance of only ten stades from the enemy. 
The next day the Carthaginian generals held a council of 
war to determine what should be done. But the soldiers, 
despising the danger, ran together in crowds and, shouting 
the name of Xanthippus, demanded to be led immediately 
against the enemy. The generals, observing the eagerness 
and confidence of their men and being urged by Xanthippus 
not to lose this opportunity, gave orders to the army to 
prepare for battle and put everything in the hands of Xan- 
thippus to do as he liked. He took command, ranged the 
elephants in a single line in front of the whole army, and 
stationed the Carthaginian phalanx a short distance behind 
them. He placed the bulk of the mercenaries on the right 
wing, but the light-armed ones were stationed at the front 
of each wing, together with the horse. The Romans, ob- 
serving the enemy's movements, drew up their forces with 
equal readiness. In order to protect themselves against 
the onset of the elephants, which they dreaded, they threw 
forward a large number of skirmishers armed with javelins. 
Behind these were ranged the legions, and the horse were 
divided between the two wings. Their line of battle was 
somewhat shorter than usual, but deeper, being well calcu- 
lated to receive the attack of the elephants, but not to with- 
stand that of the enemy's horse, which far outnumbered 
their own. When both armies had been put in battle array, 
according to their respective plans and divisions, they stood 
still for a while, each one eagerly expecting the moment of 

" At the same time that Xanthippus gave the order for 
the elephants to advance and break the ranks of the enemy, 
and for the horse to surround and attack their wings, the 
Roman soldiers, clashing their arms, according to their 
custom, and raising a shout, rushed against their adversaries. 
The Roman horse were speedily put to flight on both 

Appendix Β] THE PUNIC WARS 237 

wings, being so much inferior in number to the Cartha- 
ginians. Their foot soldiers, stationed on the left wing in 
order to avoid the onset of the elephants and because they 
despised the enemy's mercenaries, dashed furiously against 
the Carthaginian right wing, broke it, and pursued them as 
far as their camp. The first who encountered the elephants 
were thrust aside by their momentum, or trampled down in 
heaps, and utterly destroyed, but the column, as a whole, 
remained unbroken for a considerable time by reason of the 
depth of the files. When those bringing up the rear were 
surrounded on all sides by the Carthaginian horse and com- 
pelled to turn and ward off this danger, and when those 
who had struggled through the line of elephants to the front 
encountered, in the rear of the beasts, the solid Cartha- 
ginian phalanx still in perfect order, and were slaughtered 
by them, the Romans were ever)rwhere in difficulties. The 
greater part were trampled down by the enormous weight 
of the elephants and the rest fell in their very ranks under 
the javelins of the Carthaginian horse. Finally, a few 
took refuge in flight. As their line of retreat lay through 
an open country, most of these were destroyed by the ene- 
my's cavalry and elephants. About 500, who had escaped 
with their general, Marcus, were, after a little, overtaken 
and made prisoners. About 800 of the Carthaginian mer- 
cenaries, who were opposed to the Roman left wing, were 
killed, and the 2000 Romans who pursued them, being thus 
carried out of danger, were saved. All the rest were slain 
except Marcus and those who were retreating with him. 
Those who escaped found refuge unexpectedly in the city 
of Aspis. The Carthaginians, having stripped the dead, 
returned to the city rejoicing over their victory and bring- 
ing the Roman general and the prisoners captured with 
him." (Polybius I., 32-34.) 

Appendix B 

The Topography of Carthage 

The following sketch of the present appearance of the 
site of ancient Carthage is from the pen of the Rt. Hon. 
James Bryce, M.P. : — 


" At the extremity of a peninsula stretching eight or ten 
miles into the Mediterranean, and connected with the 
mainland by a flat isthmus, across which the sea must once 
have flowed, there is a ridge of hills, forming a sort of 
semicircle some four miles long, with its convex turned 
toward the sea, and rising at its highest point to about 
400 feet. The sea under the hills is deep and sheltered 
from the northwest, the quarter whence most high winds 
come, while toward the land the neck of the peninsula, 
even now only some three miles wide, and 2500 years ago 
probably much narrower, makes the defence of a settle- 
ment upon the hills comparatively easy. It was at the 
southern extremity of this line of hills that the Tyrian 
founders of Carthage planted their settlement, and the last 
eminence or hummock toward the south became their cita- 
del or Bozrah (for *Bozrah * seems to be the true Phoenician 
form of the word which the Greek and Roman authors have 
written Byrsa). This hummock rises about 200 feet above 
the sea, from which its base is a quarter of a mile distant. 
It is steep towards the sea on the east and the south, while 
sloping more gently towards the west. On it and around 
its base the city arose. The ports were excavated beneath 
it to the southeast, and were easily made large enough (the 
ground being partly alluvial and the rock soft) to contain 
a large fleet and many merchant vessels. Thus the position 
was both convenient and strong. The citadel defended the 
ports, and while the citadel was surrounded by a wall of its 
own, the city, stretching along the line of eminences to the 
north, had also an enclosing wall of its own, and thus gave 
a double protection to the citadel on the sides (north and 
west) where the acclivities were gentle. 

" So much is clear. The so-called ports which are now 
visible have been dug out afresh recently, on what is be- 
lieved to be the site, or part of the site, of the ancient ports. 
The space they occupy is so decidedly smaller than the 
descriptions of ancient writers imply that some antiquaries 
suppose there existed another port, enclosed by moles pro- 
jecting into the sea, which has since vanished. The remains 
of the amphitheatre have been unearthed in the lower 
ground at the western base of the hill. And as to the 
Bozrah itself, on whose summit stood in Punic times the 

Appendix Β] THE PUNIC WARS 239 

temple of the great god Eshmun, and where probably stood 
afterwards the residence of the Roman proconsul, and still 
later the palace of the Vandal kings, there is no question. 
But almost everything else is uncertain. Various spots have 
been suggested as the sites of the temples and churches and 
other public edifices mentioned by the ancient writers, but 
no data have yet been discovered sufficient to fix them. 
Even the direction of the walls and the extent of ground 
covered by the city are matters of controversy, so far as 
the evidence of the diggings goes. The ground area in- 
cluded in the compass of the city proper would appear to 
have been small (hardly more than a square mile) compared 
with its population, which is said to have at one time reached 
700,000 or even 1,000,000. But probably there were large 
suburbs; and as the bulk of the population consisted of 
slaves, many might well be crowded into a small space. 

"As the position is strong for defence, with the sea en- 
vironing it, as it is admirable for maritime empire, lying in 
the middle of the Mediterranean, with Sicily and Sardinia 
close at hand, half-way from the mother-land of Tyre to the 
outermost Phoenician settlements on the edge of the ocean, 
so it rivals in the nobility of its landscape Constantinople 
or Corinth or Gibraltar. The hill of Bozrah is not lofty, 
but it rises so steeply from the sea, and commands so un- 
broken a prospect in every direction, except northeast 
(where it is overtopped by Sidi Bou Said, another eminence 
of the same chain of hills two miles away), that the view 
seems boundless over both land and sea. To the east there 
is the vast expanse of the Mediterranean, broken twenty- 
five miles off by the rocky isle of Zembra. To the southeast 
a long Hne of hills rises over the ample bosom of the Gulf 
of Tunis, running far out to the Fair Promontory, as the 
ancients called it, now Cape Bon. To the northwest, be- 
yond the flat lands which the sea once covered, rise the 
gentler ridges where stand the lonely ruins of Utica, the elder 
sister of Carthage, the spot where Cato*s death left Julius 
Caesar master of all the Roman world except Spain. To 
the south and southwest three magnificent mountain groups 
successively arrest the eye and carry it far into the interior 


of Africa. Nearest, with its foot washed by the sea, is the 
double-peaked summit of Bou Kornein, the mountain of 
the two-horned Baal (Saturnus Baalcaranensis, as the Ro- 
mans called him), where the ruins of his temple have been 
recently discovered. Further to the south is Jebel Resas, 
the Lead Mountain, among whose gorges the mercenary 
troops that revolted from Carthage, and brought her almost 
to destruction after the First Punic war, were hemmed in 
and destroyed by famine and the sword. Furthest of all, 
and highest, is the magnificent pinnacle of Zaghwan, * Mons 
Zeugitanus,* whence the Zeugitanian province took its 
name. In this peak rise the copious springs which, led by 
an aqueduct more than eighty miles in length, suppHed 
Carthage with the purest water, and from its craggy top the 
view extends far away to the south over plains once rich, 
but now mostly waste and desolate, almost to the verge of 
the Sahara. Immediately beneath the hill of Carthage is 
the narrow strip of land that divides the lagoon of Tunis 
from the sea, with Goletta, long a stronghold of the Moor- 
ish pirates, stormed by the Emperor Charles V., and again 
(after his troops had been withdrawn) the arsenal and for- 
tress of the Beys, rising upon it at the point where a narrow 
channel gives access from the sea to the lagoon. And at 
the head of the lagoon, its smooth surface ruffled only by 
the flocks of flamingoes that disport themselves in the 
sunshine, rise the minarets and cupolas of Tunis, glittering 
white across the blue waters, with line after line of hill seen 
behind it, growing dimmer and more delicate in their soft 
blue-gray tints till they sink beneath the western horizon on 
the borders of Numidia. As there are few more exquisite 
views in the world, so there are few which embrace a region 
more full of stirring and terrible events. For 1600 years, 
down to the destruction of Carthage by the Arabs in a.d. 697 
a fierce and strenuous Ufe ebbed and flowed incessantly 
round this hill and on the plain that lies between it and 
Tunis. For 1200 years the hill has stood silent and melan- 
choly as it stands now, and, in the words of Tasso, 

" * Low lies proud Carthage ; and the silent shore 
Keeps of her lordly ruins scarce a trace.' " 


I. From the Vatican MSS. of Cardinal Mai 

Y.R. B.C. 

644 BoMiLCAR being under accusation fled before his trial, "o 
and with him Jugurtha, who uttered that famous saying 
about bribetakers, that " the whole city of Rome could be 
bought if a purchaser could be found for it." 

II. From Peiresc 

645 Metellus went back to the African province, where he «>9 
was accused by the soldiers of slothfulness toward the 
enemy and of cruelty toward his own men, because he 
punished offenders severely. 

III. From the Same 

646 Metellus put the whole senate of Vacca to death because "^ 
they had betrayed the Roman garrison to Jugurtha, and 
with them, also, Turpilius, the prefect of the guard, a Ro- 
man citizen, who was under suspicion of being in league 
with the enemy. After Jugurtha had delivered up to Metel- 
lus certain Thracian and Ligurian deserters, the latter cut 
off the hands of some, and others he buried in the earth up 

to their stomachs, and after transfixing them with arrows 
and darts set fire to them while they were still alive. 

IV. From "The Embassies" 

647 When Marius arrived at Cirta messengers came to him X07 
from Bocchus asking that he would send somebody to hold 

VOL. I — R 241 


Y.R. ^ B.C. 

647 a conference with him. He accordingly sent Aulus Man- 107 
lius, his lieutenant, and Cornelius Sulla, his quaestor. To 
them Bocchus said that he fought against the Romans on 
account of the acts of Marius, who had taken from him the 
territory which he himself had taken from Jugurtha. To 
this complaint of Bocchus, Manlius replied that the Ro- 
mans had taken this territory from Syphax by the law of 
war, and had made a present of it to Masinissa, and that 
such gifts were made by the Romans to be kept by those 
who received them during the pleasure of the Senate and 
people of Rome. Nor did the Romans take back their 
gifts without reason. Masinissa was dead, and Jugurtha, 
who had murdered his grandchildren, was at war with the 
Romans. "It is not right," he said, "that an enemy 
should keep the gift that we made to a friend, nor should 
you think that you can take from Jugurtha property that 
belongs to the Romans." These were the words of Manlius 
concerning the territory in question. 

V. From the Same 

Bocchus sent another embassy who were to solicit peace 
from Marius and urge Sulla to assist them in the negotia- 
tion. These ambassadors were despoiled by robbers on 
the road, but Sulla received them kindly and entertained 
them until Marius returned from Gaetulia. Marius advised 
them to urge Bocchus to consult with Sulla as to all his 
affairs. Accordingly, when Bocchus was inclined to betray 
Jugurtha he sent messengers around to the neighboring 
Ethiopians (who extend from eastern Ethiopia westward 
to the Mauritanian Mount Atlas) under pretence of raising 
a new army, and then asked Marius to send Sulla to him 
for a conference, and Marius did so. In this way Bocchus 
himself, and his friend Magdalses, and a certain freedman 
of Carthage, named Cornelius, deceived Apsar, the friend 
of Jugurtha, who had been left in Bocchus* camp to keep 
watch on his doings. 


I. From "The Embassies" 

γ R Β C 

The Romans paid no attention to Philip, the Mace- 
donian, when he began war against them. They were so 
busy about other things that they did not even think of him, 
for Italy was still scourged by Hannibal, the Carthaginian 
general, and they were at war in Africa, Carthage, and 
539 Spain, and were restoring order in Sicily. Philip himself, 2x5 
moved by a desire of enlarging his dominions, although he 
had suffered nothing whatever at the hands of the Romans, 
sent an embassy, the chief of which was Xenophanes, to 
Hannibal in Italy, proposing to aid him in Italy if he 
would promise to assist him in the subjugation of Greece. 
Hannibal agreed to this arrangement and took an oath to 
support it, and sent an embassy in return to receive the 
oath of Philip. A Roman trireme intercepted the ambas- 
sadors of both on their return and carried them to Rome. 
Thereupon Philip in his anger attacked Corcyra, which was 
in alliance with Rome. 

II. From the Vatican MSS. of Cardinal Mai 

The Sibylline books induced the Romans to make war 
against Philip by these lines: "The Macedonians boast 
their descent from Argive kings. Philip will be the arbiter 
of weal or woe to you. The elder of that name shall give / 
rulers to cities and peoples, but the younger shall lose every 
honor, and shall die the subject of a western race." ^ 

^ Αύχοΰντ€5 βουσιΧ€υσι Μακηδόν€5 ^ApyeaB^ffiv, 
ύμΊν Koipav€uv ayadhv κάϊ νήμα ΦίΚΐ7Γ'Κ05, 
"ϋτοί δ μ\ν trparepos ιτόΚ^σιν Καοισί τ' 6.vaKras 
θήσ€ΐ, 6 δ* ό•π\6τ€ρο$ ημ^ν άιτλ "κασαν 6\^σσ€ΐ, 
Βμηθ€\$ δ* ianreploiaiv νπ' άν^ράσιν ίνθάν όλβιται. 




III. From "The Embassies" 

6 I. Ambassadors from Ptolemy, king of Egypt, and with 
them others from Chios and Mitylene, and from Amynander, 
king of the Athamanes, assembled at two different times al 
the place where the ^itolians were accustomed to call theii 
cities together for consultation, to compose the differences 
between the Romans, the ^tolians, and Philip. But as 
Sulpicius said that it was not in his power to conclude 
peace, and wrote privately to the Senate that it was for the 
advantage of the Romans that the jiitolians should continue 
the war against Philip, the Senate forbade the treaty and 
sent 10,000 foot and 1000 horse to assist the ^tolians. 
With their help the /Etotians took Ambracia, which Philif 
recovered, not long afterward, on their departure. Again 
the ambassadors assembled and said that it was very evidenl 
that Philip and the yEtolians, by their differences, wert 
subjecting the Greeks to servitude to the Romans, because 
they were accustoming the latter to make frequent attempts 
upon Greece. When Sulpicius rose to reply to them the 
crowd would not hear him, but shouted that the ambassa• 
dors had told the truth. 

9 t. Finally the ^tolians took the initiative and madt 
peace with Philip by themselves without the Romans, anc 
messengers were sent to Rome by Philip himself and by the 
commander of the Roman forces in order to come to ar 
agreement. Peace was made between them on the con- 
dition that neither party should do any injury to the friend: 
of the other. This was the result of the first trial 01 
strength between them, and neither of them believed thai 
the treaty would be lasting, since it was not based on good- 

IV. From the Same 

t Not long afterward Philip, having ordered a fleet to bt 
prepared by his maritime subjects, took Samos and Chioi 
and devasted a part of the territory of King Attalus. Hi 
even attempted Pergamus itself, not sparing tcmjiles 01 
sepulchres. He also ravaged I'eraea, which belonged to th( 
Rhodians, who had been promoters of the treaty of peace. 


Y.R. ^ B.C. 

554 With another part of his army he ravaged Attica and laid 200 
siege to Athens, as though none of these countries concerned 
the Romans. It was reported also that a league had been 
made between Philip and Antiochus, king of Syria, to the 
effect that Philip should help Antiochus to conquer Egypt 
and Cyprus, of which Ptolemy IV., surnamed Philopator,^ 
who was still a boy, was the ruler; and that Antiochus 
should help Philip to gain Cyrene, the Cyclades islands, 
and Ionia. This rumor, so disquieting to all, the Rhodi- 
ans communicated to Rome. After the Rhodians, ambas- 
sadors of Athens came complaining of the siege instituted 
by Philip. The ^tolians also had repented of their treaty, 
and they complained of Philip's bad faith toward them and 
asked to be inscribed again as allies. The Romans re- 
proached the ^tolians for their recent defection, but they 
sent ambassadors to the kings ordering Antiochus not to in- 
vade Egypt, and Philip not to molest the Rhodians, or the 
Athenians, or Attains, or any other ally of theirs. To 
them Philip made answer that it would be well if the Romans 
would abide by the treaty of peace they had entered into 
with him. Thus was the treaty dissolved and a Roman 
army hastened to Greece, Publius commanding the land 
forces and Lucius the fleet. 

V. From the Vatican MSS. of Cardinal Mai 

556 Philip, king of Macedon, had a conference with Flami- xgs 
ninus, which had been brought about by the ambassadors 
of the Epirots. When Flamininus ordered Philip to retire 
to Greece, not on account of the Romans, but of the Greek 
cities themselves and to make good the damage he had 
done to the aforesaid cities. . . . 

VI. From Suidas 

A shepherd promised to guide an army well equipped for 
the climb by a mountain path in three days' time. 

1 This should be Ptolemy V., surnamed Epiphanes, the son of Ptolemy 
Philopator. The latter died in the year 551 (B.C. 203). The error is 
repeated in Syr. i, 2, and 4 (Schweighauser, vol. iii. pp. 507 and 529). 


VII. From "The Embassies" 

^•R• B.C. 

556 Lucius Quintius [Flamininus] ^ sent envoys to the Achaean 198 
League to persuade them, together with the Athenians and 
Rhodians, to abandon Philip and join the Romans, and to 
ask them to furnish aid as allies. But they, being troubled 
by a civil war and also by one with Nabis, the neighboring 
tyrant of Lacedaemon, were divided in mind and hesitated. 
The greater part of them preferred the alliance of Philip 
and sided against the Romans on account of certain out- 
rages against Greece committed by Sulpicius, the former 
commander. When the Roman faction urged their views 
with vehemence, most of their opponents left the assembly 

in disgust, and the remainder, being forced to yield by the 
smallness of their number, entered into an alliance with 
Lucius and followed him at once to the siege of Corinth, 
bringing their engines with them. 

VIII. From the Same 

557 Flamininus came into conference with Philip a second 197 
time at the Malian gulf. When the Rhodians, the ^toli- 
ans, and Amynander, king of the Athamanes, made their 
complaints against Philip, Flamininus ordered him to re- 
move his garrison from Phocis, and required both parties 

to send ambassadors to Rome. When this was done the 
Greeks asked the Roman Senate to require Philip to remove 
from their country the three garrisons which he called the 
fetters of Greece : the one at Chalcis, which threatened the 
Boeotians, the Euboeans, and the Locrians; the one at Cor- 
inth, which closed the door of the Peloponnesus; and the 
third at Demetrias, which lay, as it were, in ambush for 
the ^-Etolians and the Magnesians. The Senate asked 
Philip's ambassadors what the king's views were respecting 
the garrisons. When they answered that they did not know, 
the Senate said that Flamininus should decide the question 
and do what he considered just. So the ambassadors took 

1 L. Quintius Flamininus was a brother of the consul Titus Quintius 
Flamininus, who conducted the war against Philip and defeated him 
lat Cynocephalse in the year 557 (b.c. 197). 


Y.IL B.C. 

557 their departure from Rome. Flamininus and Philip, being 197 
unable to come to any agreement, resumed hostilities. 

IX. From the Same 

1. Philip, being defeated again, sentaherald to Flamininus 
to sue for peace, and again Flamininus granted him a con- 
ference, whereat the ^tolians were greatly displeased and 
accused him of being bribed by the king, and complained 
of his sudden change of mind as to all these matters. But 
he thought that it would not be to the advantage of the 
Romans, or of the Greeks, that Philip should be deposed 
and the ^tolian power made supreme. Perhaps, also, the 
unexpected greatness of the victory made him satisfied. 
Having agreed upon a place where Philip should come, he 
directed the allies by cities to deliver their opinions. 
Some of them were disposed to be moderate, viewing sus- 
piciously the mysteries of fortune as evinced in the calam- 
ities of Philip, and considering this disaster that had 
befallen him due not so much to weakness as to bad luck. 
But Alexander, the presiding officer of the ^tolians, said, 
"Flamininus cannot be ignorant that this victory will be 
of no advantage to the Romans or the Greeks unless the 
kingdom of Philip is overthrown." 

2. Flamininus replied, "Alexander cannot be ignorant 
of the custom of the Romans, who never destroy an enemy 
at once, but have spared many offenders, as recently the 
Carthaginians, restoring their property to them and making 
allies of those who had done them wrong. You forget also 
that there are many barbarous tribes on the border of Mace- 
donia, who would make easy incursions into Greece if the 
Macedonian kings were taken away. Wherefore, I think 
that the Macedonian government should be left to protect 
you against the barbarians, but Philip must retire from 
those Greek places that he has hitherto refused to give up, and 
must pay the Romans 200 talents for the expenses of the 
war, and give hostages of the most noble families, includ- 
ing his own son, Demetrius. Until the Senate ratifies these 
conditions there shall be an armistice of four months." 

558 3. Philip accepted all these conditions, and the Senate, 196 


Υ• R• Β• C• 

558 when it learned the facts, ratified the peace, but considered 196 
the terms granted by Flamininus too lenient, and, accord- 
ingly, decreed that all the Greek cities that had been under 
Philip's rule should be free, and that he should withdraw 
his garrisons from them before the next celebration of the 
Isthmian games; that he should deliver to Flamininus all 
his ships, except one with six benches of oars and five small 
ones with decks; that he should pay the Romans 500 talents 
pf silver down, and remit to Rome 500 more in ten years, 
in annual instalments; and that he should surrender all 
prisoners and deserters in his hands. These conditions 
were added by the Senate and Philip accepted them all, by 
which it was made plain that those named by Flamininus 
were much too lenient. They sent to him as counsellors 
ten men (as was customary at the end of a war), with whose 
aid he should regulate the new acquisitions. 

4. When he had arranged these things with them he went 
to the Isthmian games, and, the stadium being full of 
people, he commanded silence by trumpet and directed the 
herald to make this proclamation, " The Roman people and 
Senate, and Flamininus, their general, having vanquished 
the Macedonians and Philip, their king, order that Greece 
shall be free from foreign garrisons, not subject to tribute, 
and shall live under her own customs and laws." There- 
upon there was great shouting and rejoicing and a scene of 
rapturous tumult; and groups here and there called the 
herald back in order that he might repeat his words for 
them. They threw crowns and fillets upon the general and 
voted statues for him in their cities. They sent ambassadors 
with golden crowns to the Capitol at Rome to express their 
gratitude, and inscribed themselves as allies of the Roman 
people. Such was the end of the second war between the 
Romans and Philip. 

564 5. Not long afterward Philip lent aid in Greece to the 190 
Romans in their war against King Antiochus. As they 
were moving against Antiochus in Asia, passing through 
Thrace and Macedonia by a difficult road, he escorted them 
with his own troops, supplied them with food and money, 
repaired the roads, bridged the unfordable streams, and 
dispersed the hostile Thracians, until he had conducted 
them to the Hellespont. In return for these favors the 


T.K. ρ c. 

564 Senate released his son Demetrius, who had been held loo 
by them as a hostage, and remitted the payments of money 
still due from him. But these Thracians fell upon tlie 
Romans when they were returning from their victory over 
Antiochus, when Philip was no longer with them, carried 
off boot}' and killed many — by which it was plainly shown 
how great a ser\'ice Philip had rendered them when they 
were going. 

571 6. That war being ended, many of the (ireeks charged 1B3 
Philip with doing or omitting various things, in disregard 
of the orders given by Flamininus when he settled the 
affairs of Greece. To answer these charges Demetrius went 
as an envoy to Rome in his father's behalf, the Romans 
being well pleased with him aforetime, when he had been 
a hostage, and Flamininus strongly recommending him to 
the Senate. As he was a very young man and somewhat 
flustered, they directed him to read his father's memoran- 
dum in which were written down, one by one, the things 
already done and those yet to be done, although decided 
upon contrary to justice; for, indeed, his unjust acts were 
prominent in the thought of many. Nevertheless, the Sen- 
ate, having regard to his late zeal in the matter of Antio- 
chus, said that it would pardon him, but added that it did 
so on account of Demetrius. Philip, having been confess- 
edly most useful to them in the war with Antiochus, when 
he might have done them the greatest damage if he had co- 
operated with Antiochus, as the latter asked him to, expect- 
ing much on this account and now seeing himself discredited 
and accused, and considered worthy of pardon rather than 
of gratitude, and even this merely on account of Demetrius, 
was indignant and angry, but concealed his feelings for a 
time. Afterwards, in a certain arbitration before the Ro- 
mans, they transferred much of his territory to Eumencs, 
seeking all the time to weaken him. Then, at once, he 
began secretly preparing for war. 

X. From Suidas 

Philip utterly destroyed all forces that sailed against 
him, lest the Romans should say that the Macedonian power 
was weakening. 


XI. From "The Embassies" 

Y.R. B.C 

583 I. The Romans were suspicious of Perseus (the son of »7« 
Philip) on account of his rapidly growing power, and they 
were especially disturbed by his nearness to the Greeks and 
their friendship for him, due to hatred of the Romans, 
which the Roman generals had caused. Afterward the am- 
bassadors, who were sent to the Bastarnae, reported that 
they had observed that Macedonia was strongly fortified and 
had abundant war material, and that its young men were 
well drilled; and these things also disturbed the Romans. 
When Perseus perceived this he sent other ambassadors to 
allay the suspicion. At this time also Eumenes, king of 
that part of Asia lying about Pergamus, fearing Perseus on 
account of his own former enmity to Philip, came to Rome 
and accused him publicly before the Senate, saying that he 
had always been hostile to the Romans; that he had killed 
his brother for being friendly to them ; that he had aided 
Philip in collecting material for war against them, which 
material, when he became king, he did not desist from col- 
lecting, but added much more to it; that he was conciliating 
the Greeks in every possible way and furnishing military aid 
to the Byzantines, the i^tolians, and the Boeotians; that he 
had possessed himself of the great stronghold of Thrace and 
had stirred up dissensions among the Thessalians and the 
Perrhaebi when they wanted to send an embassy to Rome. 

2. "And of your two friends and allies," he said, "he 
drove Abrupolis out of his kingdom and conspired to kill 
Arthetaurus, the Illyrian chief, and gave shelter to his mur- 
derers." Eumenes also slandered him on account of his 
marriages, both of which were with royal families, and for 
his bridal processions escorted by the whole fleet of Rhodes. 
He even made his industry a crime and his sobriety of life 
(being so young), and his being beloved and praised by so 
many in so short a time. Of the things that could excite 
their jealousy, envy, and fear even more strongly than direct 
accusations, Eumenes omitted nothing, and he urged the 
Senate to beware of a youthful enemy so highly esteemed 
and so near to them. 

3. The Senate, in fact, did not like to have on their 


V.R. B.C. 

582 flank a sober-minded, laborious, and popular king, an 173 
hereditary enemy to themselves, attaining eminence so sud- 
denly. So, making a pretended accusation of the things 
alleged by Eumenes, they decided to make war against Per- 
seus, but kept the matter a secret among themselves. When 
Harpalus, who had been sent by Perseus to answer the 
charge of Eumenes, and a certain ambassador of the Rhodi- 
ans, desired to discuss the matter in the presence of Eu- 
menes, who was still there, they were not admitted; but 
after his departure they were received. These, being angry 

at such treatment, and using too much freedom of speech, 
exasperated still more the Romans, who were already medi- 
tating war against Perseus and the Rhodians. Many sena- 
tors, however, blamed Eumenes for causing so great a war 
on account of his own private grudges and fears, and the 
Rhodians refused to receive only his among all the repre- 
sentatives of the kings sent to their festival of the sun. 

4. When Eumenes was returning to Asia he went up from 
Cirrha to Delphi to sacrifice, and there four men, hiding 
behind a wall, made an attempt upon his life. Other causes 
besides this were advanced by the Romans for a war against 
Perseus, although it had not yet been decreed, and ambas- 
sadors were sent to the allied kings, Eumenes, Antiochus, 
Ariarathes, Masinissa, and Ptolemy of Egypt, also to Greece, 
Thessaly, Epirus, Acarnania, and to such oif the islands as 
they could perhaps draw to their side. This specially 
troubled the Greeks, some because fond of Perseus as a 
Philhellene, and some because compelled to enter into 
agreement with the Romans. 

583 5. When Perseus learned these facts he sent other am- 171 
bassadors to Rome, who said that the king was surprised 
and wished to know for what reason they had abandoned 
the agreement and sent around legates against himself, their 
ally. If they were offended at anything, they ought to dis- 
cuss the matter first. The Senate then accused him of the 
things that Eumenes had told them, and also of what Eu- 
menes had suffered, and especially that Perseus had taken 
possession of Thrace and had collected an army and war 
material, which were not the doings of one desiring peace. 
Again he sent ambassadors who, deeply grieved, spoke as 
follows in the senate-chamber : " To those who are seeking 


Y.R. B.C. 

583 an excuse for war, Ο Romans, anything will serve for a pre- χ?» 
text, but if you have respect for treaties, — you who profess 
so much regard for them, — what have you suffered at the 
hands of Perseus that you should bring war against him ? 
It cannot be because he has an army and war material. He 
does not hold them against you, nor do you prohibit other 
kings from having them, nor is it wrong that he should take 
precautions against those under his rule, and against his 
neighbors, and foreigners who might have designs against 
him. But to you, Romans, he sent ambassadors to confirm 
the peace and only recently renewed the treaty. 

6. " But, you say, he drove Abrupolis out of his king- 
dom. Yes, in self-defence, for he had invaded our terri- 
tory. This fact Perseus himself explained to you, and 
afterward you renewed the treaty with him, as Eumenes 
had not yet slandered him. The affair of Abrupolis ante- 
dates the treaty and seemed to you just, when you ratified 
it. You say that he made war on the Dolopians, but they 
were his own subjects. It is hard if he is to be obliged to 
give an account to you of what he does with his own. He 
gives it nevertheless, being moved by his high regard for 
you and for his own reputation. The Dolopians put their 
governor to death with torture, and Perseus asks what you 
would have done to any of your subjects who had been 
guilty of such a crime. But the slayers of Arthetaurus lived 
on in Macedonia ! Yes, by the common law of mankind, 
the same under which you give asylum to fugitives from 
other countries. But when Perseus learned that you consid- 
ered this a crime he forbade them his kingdom entirely. 

7. "He gave aid to the Byzantines, the ^tolians, and 
the Boeotians, not against you, but against others. Of these 
things our ambassadors advised you beforehand, and you 
did not object until Eumenes uttered his slander against us, 
which you did not allow our ambassadors to answer in his 
presence. But you accuse Perseus of the plot against him 
at Delphi. How many Greeks, how many barbarians, have 
sent ambassadors to you to complain against Eumenes, to 
all of whom he is an enemy because so base a man ! As 
for Erennius of Brundusium, who would believe that Perseus 
would choose a Roman citizen, your friend and patron, to 
administer poison to the Senate, as though he could destroy 


Y.R. B.C. 

583 the Senate by means of him, or by destroying some of them 171 
render the others more favorable to himself? Erennius has 
lied to those who are inciting you to war, furnishing them 
a plausible pretext. Eumenes, moved by hatred, envy, and 
fear, does not scruple to make it a crime on the part of Per- 
seus that he is liked by so many people, that he is a Philhel- 
lene, and that he leads the life of a temperate ruler, free 
from drunkenness and luxury. And you endure to listen to 
such stuff from this accuser ! 

8. " Beware lest his slanders multiply against yourselves, 
if you cannot endure temperate, honest, and industrious 
neighbors. Perseus challenges Erennius and Eumenes and 
anybody else to scrutiny and trial before you. He reminds 
you of his father's zeal and assistance to you against Antio- 
chus the Great. You realized it very well at the time ; it 
would be base to forget it now. He invokes the treaties 
that you made with his father and with himself, and he 
does not hesitate to exhort you to fear the gods by whom 
you swore, and not to bring an unjust war against your 
allies and not to make nearness, sobriety, and preparation 
causes of complaint. It is not worthy of you to be stirred 
by envy and fear like Eumenes. On the contrary, it will 
be the part of wisdom for you to spare neighbors who are 
diligent and, as Eumenes says, are well prepared ! " 

9. When the ambassadors had thus spoken the Senate 
gave them no answer, but made a public declaration of war, 
and the consul ordered the ambassadors to depart from 
Rome the same day and from Italy within thirty days. The 
same orders were proclaimed to all Macedonian residents. 
Consternation mingled with anger followed this action of 
the Senate, that, on a few hours' notice, so many people 
were compelled to depart together, who were not able to 
find animals in so short a time, or to carry all their goods 
themselves. Some, in their confusion, could not reach a 
lodging-place, but passed the night in the middle of the 
roads. Others threw themselves on the ground at the city 
gates with their wives and children. Everything happened 
that was likely to follow such an unexpected decree, for it 
was unexpected to them on account of the pending 


XI Ι. From the Same 

V.R. B.C. 

583 After his victory Perseus, either to make sport of Cras- χ?» 
sus, and by way of joke, or to test his present state of mind, 
or fearing the power and resources of the Romans, or for 
some other reason, sent messengers to him to treat for peace, 
and promised to make many concessions which his father, 
Philip, had refused. In this promise he seemed to be rather 
joking with him and testing him. But Crassus replied that 
it would not be worthy of the dignity of the Roman people 
to come to terms with him unless he should surrender Mace- 
donia and himself to them. Being ashamed that the Romans 
were the first to retreat, Crassus called an assembly, in 
which he praised the Thessalians for their brave conduct in 
the catastrophe, and falsely accused the -^tolians and the 
other Greeks of being the first to fly; and these men he sent 
to Rome. 

XIII. From Suidas 

Both armies employed the rest of the summer in collect- 
ing corn, Perseus threshing in the fields and the Romans 
in their camp. 

XIV. From the Same 

He (Q. Marcius) was foremost in labor, although sixty 
years of age and very corpulent. 

XV. From the Same 

Then somebody ran to Perseus, while he was refreshing 
himself with a bath, and told him [that the enemy was ap- 
proaching]. He sprang out of the water, exclaiming that 
he had been captured before the battle. 

XVI. From Peiresc 

585 Perseus, having already gradually plucked up courage 169 
after his flight, wickedly put to death Nicias and Androni- 


γ R. ^ B.C. 

585 cus, whom he had sent with orders to throw his money into 169 
the sea and to burn his ships; because after the ships and 
money had been saved he knew that they were witnesses of 
his disgraceful panic and might tell others of it. And from 
that time, by a sudden change, he became cruel and reck- 
less toward everybody. Nor did he show any soundness or 
wisdom of judgment thereafter, but he, who had before 
been most persuasive in council and shrewd in calculation 
and courageous in battle, barring his inexperience, when 
fortune began to change became suddenly and unaccount- 
ably timid and imprudent, as well as changeable and mal- 
adroit in all things. Thus we see many who lose their usual 
discretion when reverses come. 

XVII. From "The Embassies" 

The Rhodians sent ambassadors to Marcius to congratu- 
late him on the state of affairs in his war with Perseus. 
Marcius advised the ambassadors to persuade the Rhodians 
to send legates to Rome to bring about peace between the 
Romans and Perseus. When the Rhodians heard these 
things they changed their minds, thinking that the affairs 
of Perseus were not in such bad shape, for they could not 
imagine that Marcius would have given this advice with- 
out the concurrence of the Romans. But he did this and 
many other things on his own motion, by reason of coward- 
ice. The Rhodians nevertheless sent ambassadors to Rome 
and others to Marcius. 

XVIII. From Peiresc 

586 I. Genthius, king of a tribe of Illyrians bordering onx68 
Macedonia, having formed an alliance with Perseus in con- 
sideration of 300 talents, of which he had received a part 
down, made an attack upon Roman Illyria, and when the 
Romans sent Perpenna and Petilius as ambassadors to inquire 
about it, he put them in chains. When Perseus learned this 
he decided not to pay the rest of the money, thinking that 
now the Romans would make war on him for this outrage. 
He also sent legates to the Getae on the other side of the 


V.R. B.C. 

586 Danube, and he offered money to Eumenes if he would come χ68 
over to his side, or negotiate for him a peace with Rome, 
or help neither party in the contest. He hoped either that 
Eumenes would do some one of these things, which could 
not be kept secret from the Romans, or that he should cause 
Eumenes to be suspected by the very attempt. Eumenes 
refused to come over to his side, and he demanded 1500 
talents for negotiating a peace, or 1000 for remaining neu- 
tral. But now Perseus, learning that 10,000 foot and as 
many horse were coming to him as mercenaries from the 
Getae, began forthwith to despise Eumenes, and said that 
he would pay nothing for his neutrality, for that would be a 
disgrace to both of them, but for negotiating a peace he 
would not fail to pay, and would deposit the money in 
Samothrace until the treaty was concluded, so fickle and 
penurious in all matters had he become in his infatuation. 
Nevertheless, one of the things that he hoped for took 
place : Eumenes fell under suspicion at Rome. 

2. When the Getae had crossed the Danube, it was 
claimed that there was due to Clcelius, their leader, 1000 
gold staters and, also, ten to each horseman and five to each 
foot-soldier, the whole amounting to a little over 150,000 
pieces of gold. Perseus sent messengers to them bearing 
military cloaks, gold necklaces, and horses for the officers, 
and 10,000 staters. When he was not far from their camp 
he sent for Cloelius. The latter asked the messengers 
whether they had brought the gold, and when he learned 
that they had not, he ordered them to go back to Perseus. 
When Perseus learned this, he was again misled by his evil 
genius, and complained among his friends of the fickleness 
and bad faith of the Getse, and pretended to be afraid to 
receive 20,000 of them in his camp. He said that he could 
hardly subdue 10,000 of them if they should rebel. 

3. While saying these things to his friends, he offered 
other fictions to the Getse and asked for half of their force, 
promising to give them the gold that he had on hand — so 
inconsistent was he, and so anxious about the money that 
he had ordered to be thrown into the sea a little while 
before. Cloelius, seeing the messengers returning, asked in 
a loud voice whether they had brought the gold, and when 
they wanted to talk about something else he ordered them 


Y.R. B.C. 

586 to Speak of the gold first. When he learned that they did 168 
not have it, he led his army home without waiting to hear 
another word from them. Thus Perseus deprived himself 
of this powerful force of auxiliaries, which had opportunely 
arrived. He was so foolish, also, that while wintering 
with a large army at Phila he made no incursion into Thes- 
saly, which furnished supplies to the Romans, but sent a 
force to Ionia to prevent the bringing of supplies to them 
from that quarter. 

XIX. From the Same 

Some divinity was jealous of the prosperity of Paulus 
when he had reached such a pinnacle of fortune. Of his 
four sons he gave the two elder, Maximus and Scipio, for 
adoption into other families. The two younger ones died, 
one of them three days before his triumph and the other 
five days after it. Paulus alluded to this among other things 
in his address to the people. When he came to the forum 
to give an account of his doings, according to the custom 
of generals, he said, " I sailed from Brundusium to Corcyra 
in one day. Five days I was on the road from Corcyra to 
Delphi, where I sacrificed to the god. In five days more 
I arrived in Thessaly and took command of the army. Fif- 
teen days later I overthrew Perseus and conquered Mace- 
donia. All these strokes of good fortune coming so rapidly 
led me to fear the approach of some calamity to the army 
or to you. When the army was made safe, I feared for you 
on account of the invidiousness of fate. Now that the ca- 
lamity falls upon me, in the sudden loss of my two sons, I 
am the most unfortunate of men for myself, but free from 
anxiety as to you." Having spoken thus, Paulus became 
the object of universal admiration, and commiseration on 
account of his children; and he died not long after. 

VOL. I — s 


Chapter I 

Origin of the lUyrians — The Vengeance of Apollo — First Contact 

with the Romans 

1. The Greeks call those people Illyrians who occupy the 
region beyond Macedonia and Thrace from Chaonia and 
Thesprotia to the river Ister (Danube). This is the length 
of the country. Its breadth is from Macedonia and the 
mountains of Thrace to Pannonia and the Adriatic and 
the foot hills of the Alps. Its breadth is five days' journey 
and its length thirty — so the Greek writers say. The 
Romans measured the country and found its length to be 
upward of 6000 stades and its width about 1200. 

2. They say that the country received its name from 
Illyrius, the son of Polyphemus; for the Cyclops Polyphe- 
mus and his wife, Galatea, had three sons, Celtus, Illyrius, 
and Galas, all of whom migrated from Sicily; and the 
nations called Celts, Illyrians, and Galatians took their 
origin from them. Among the many myths prevailing 
among many peoples this seems to me the most plausible. 
Illyrius had six sons, Encheleus, Autarieus, Dardanus, 
Maedus, Taulas, and Perrhaebus, also daughters, Partho, 
Daortho, Dassaro, and others, from whom sprang the Tau- 
lantii, the Perrhsebi, the Enchelees, the Autarienses, the 
Dardani, the Partheni, the Dassaretii, and the Darsii. 
Autarieus had a son Pannonius, or Paeon, and the latter had 
sons, Scordiscus and Triballus, from whom nations bearing 
similar names were derived. But I will leave these matters 
to the archaeologists. 

3. The Illyrian tribes are many, as is natural in so ex- 



tensive a country; and celebrated even now are the names 
of the Scordisci and the Triballi, who inhabited a wide re- 
gion and destroyed each other by wars to such a degree 
that the remnant of the Triballi took refuge with the Getae 
on the other side of the Danube, and, though flourishing 
until the time of Philip and Alexander, is now extinct and 
its name scarcely known in the regions once inhabited by 
it. The Scordisci, having been reduced to extreme weak- 
ness in the same way, and having suffered much at a later 
period in war with the Romans, took refuge in the islands 
of the same river. In the course of time some of them re- 
turned and settled on the confines of Pannonia, and thus it 
happens that a tribe of the Scordisci still remains in Pan- 
nonia. In like manner the Ardiaei, who were distinguished 
for their maritime power, were finally destroyed by the 
Autarienses, whose land forces were stronger, but whom 
they had often defeated. The Liburni, another lllyrian 
tribe, were next to the Ardisei as a nautical people. These 
committed piracy in the Adriatic Sea and islands with their 
light, fast-sailing pinnaces, from which circumstance the 
Romans to this day call their own light, swift biremes 

4. The Autarienses were overtaken with destruction by the 
vengeance of Apollo. Having joined Molostimus and 
the Celtic people called Cimbri in an expedition against 
the temple of Delphi, the greater part of them were de- 
stroyed by storm, hurricane, and lightning just before the 
sacrilege was committed. Upon those who returned home 
there came a countless number of frogs, which filled the 
streams and polluted the water. The noxious vapors rising 
from the ground caused a plague among the lllyrians which 
was especially fatal to the Autarienses. At last they fled 
from their homes, and as the plague still clung to them 
(and for fear of it nobody would receive them), they came, 
after a journey of twenty- three days, to a marshy and unin- 
habited district of the Getae, where they settled near the 
Bastarnae. The god visited the Celts with an earthquake 
and overthrew their cities, and did not abate the calamity 
until these also fled from their abodes and made an incur- 
sion into Illyria among their fellow-culprits, who had been 
weakened by the plague. While robbing the lllyrians they 

26ο ΑΡΡΙΑΝ 'S HISTOR Υ [Βκ. Χ, Ch. Ι 

caught the plague and again took to flight and plundered 
their way to the Pyrenees. When they were returning to 
the east the Romans, mindful of their former encounters 
with the Celts, and fearful lest they should cross the Alps 
and invade Italy, sent against them both consuls, who were 
annihilated with the whole army. This calamity to the 
Romans brought great dread of the Celts upon all Italy 
until Gaius Marius, who had lately triumphed over the 
Numidians and Mauritanians, was chosen commander and 
defeated the Cimbri repeatedly with great slaughter, as I 
have related in my Celtic history. Being reduced to ex- 
treme weakness, and for that reason excluded from every 
land, they returned home, inflicting and suffering many 
injuries on the way. 

5. Such was the punishment which the god visited upon 
the Illyrians and the Celts for their impiety. But they did 
not desist from temple- robbing, for again, in conjunction 
with the Celts, certain Illyrian tribes, especially the Scor- 
disci, the Maedi, and the Dardani again invaded Mace- 
donia and Greece together, and plundered many temples, 
including that of Dephi, but losing many men this time 
also. The Romails, thirty-two years after their first en- 
counter with the Celts, having fought with them at intervals 
since that time, now, under the leadership of Lucius Scipio, 
made war against the Illyrians, on account of this temple- 
robbery, as they [the Romans] now held sway over the 
Greeks and the Macedonians. It is said that the neighbor- 
ing tribes, remembering the calamity that befell all the 
Illyrians on account of the crime of the Autarienses, would 
not give aid to the temple- robbers, but abandoned them to 
Scipio, who destroyed the greater part of the Scordisci, the 
remainder fleeing to the Danube and settling in the islands 
of that river. He made peace with the Maedi and Dar- 
dani, accepting from them part of the gold belonging to 
the temple. One of the Roman writers says that this was 
the chief cause of the numerous civil wars of the Romans 
after Lucius Scipio's time till the establishment of the 
empire. So much by way of preface concerning the peoples 
whom the Greeks called Illyrians. 

6. These peoples, and also the Pannonians, the Rhser- 
tians, the Noricans, the Mysians of Europe, and the other 


V.R. B.C. 

neighboring tribes who inhabited the right bank of the 
Danube, the Romans distinguished from one another just 
as the various Greek peoples are distinguished from each 
other, and they call each by its own name, but they con- 
sider the whole of Illyria as embraced under a common 
designation. Whence this idea took its start I have not 
been able to find out, but it continues to this day, for they 
farm the tax of all the nations from the source of the Dan- 
ube to the Euxine Sea under one head, and call it the Illyr- 
ian tax. Why the Romans subjugated them, and what 
were the real causes or pretexts of the wars, I acknow- 
ledged, when writing of Crete, that I had not discovered, 
and I exhorted those who were able to tell more, to do so. 
I shall write down only what I know. 

Chapter II 

First Illyrian War — Second lUyrian War — War with Genthius — War 

with the Dalmatians 

524 7. Agron was king of that part of Illyria which borders «30 
the Adriatic Sea, over which sea Pyrrhus, king of Epirus, 
and his successors held sway. Agron captured a part of 
Epirus and also Corcyra, Epidamnus, and Pharus in succes- 
sion, where he established garrisons. When he threatened 
the rest of the Adriatic with his fleet, the isle of Issa im- 
plored the aid of the Romans. The latter sent ambassadors 

to accompany the Issii and to ascertain what offences Agron 
imputed to them. The Illyrian vessels attacked the am- 
bassadors on their voyage and slew Cleemporus, the envoy of 
Issa, and the Roman Coruncanius; the remainder escaped 

525 by flight. Thereupon the Romans invaded Illyria by land 239 
and sea. Agron, in the meantime, had died, leaving an in- 
fant son named Pinnes, having given the guardianship and 
regency to his wife, although she was not the child's mother. 
Demetrius, who was Agron 's governor of Pharus and who 
held Corcyra also, surrendered both places to the invading 
Romans by treachery. The latter then entered into an alli- 
ance with Epidamnus and went to the assistance of the Issii 
and of the Epidamnians, who were besieged by the Illyrians. 


y.R. B.C. 

525 The latter raised the siege and fled, and one of their tribes, 229 
called the Atintani, went over to the Romans. After these 

526 events the widow of Agron sent ambassadors to Rome to 228 
surrender the prisoners and deserters into their hands. She 
begged pardon also for what had been done, not by herself, 
but by Agron. They received for answer that Corcyra, 
Pharus, Issa, Epidamnus, and the Illyrian Atintani were 
already Roman subjects, that Pinnes might have the re- 
mainder of Agron* s kingdom and be a friend of the Roman 
people if he would keep hands off the aforesaid territory, 
and agree not to sail beyond Lissus nor to keep more than 
two Illyrian pinnaces, both to be unarmed. The woman 
accepted all jthese conditions. 

8. This was the first conflict and treaty between the 
Romans and the Illyrians. Thereupon the Romans made 
Corcyra and Apollonia free. To Demetrius they gave cer- 
tain castles as a reward for his treason to his own people, 
adding the express condition that they gave them only con- 
ditionally, for they suspected the man's bad faith; and 

532 before long he began to show it. While the Romans were 232 
engaged in a three years' war with the Gauls on the river 
Po, Demetrius, thinking that they had their hands full, set 
forth on a piratical expedition, brought the Istrians, another 
Illyrian tribe, into the enterprise, and detached the Atintani 
from Rome. The Romans, when they had settled their 
business with the Gauls, immediately sent a naval force and 
overpowered the pirates. The following year they marched 
against Demetrius and his Illyrian fellow-culprits. De- 
metrius fled to Philip, king of Macedon, but when he re- 
turned and resumed his piratical career in the Adriatic they 
slew him and utterly demolished his native town of Pharus, 

534 which was associated with him in crime. They spared the 220 
Illyrians on account of Pinnes, who again besought them 
to do so. And such was the second conflict and treaty 
between them and the Illyrians. 

9. The following events I have written as I have found 
them, not in due order according to their times of occur- 
rence, but rather taking each Illyrian nation separately. 

586 When the Romans were at war with the Macedonians during 168 
the reign of Perseus, the successor of Philip, Genthius, an 
Illyrian chief, made an alliance with Perseus for money and 


586 attacked Roman Illyria. When the Romans sent ambas- 168 
sadors to him on this subject he put them in chains, charg- 
ing that they had not come as ambassadors, but as spies. 
The Roman general, Anicius, in a naval expedition, cap- 
tured some of Genthius' pinnaces and then engaged him 
in battle on land, defeated him, and shut him up in a castle. 
When he begged a parley Anicius ordered him to surrender 
himself to the Romans. He asked and obtained three days 
for consideration, at the end of which time, his subjects 
having meanwhile gone over to Anicius, he asked for an 
interview with the latter, and, falling on his knees, begged 
pardon in the most abject manner. Anicius encouraged 
the trembling wretch, lifted him up, and invited him to 
supper, but as he was going away from the feast he ordered 
the lictors to cast him into prison. Anicius afterward led 
both him and his sons in triumph at Rome. The whole 
war with Genthius was finished within twenty days. When 
iEmilius Paulus, the conqueror of Perseus, returned to 
Rome, he received secret orders from the Senate to go back 
on particular business relating to the seventy towns that 

587 had belonged to Genthius. They were much alarmed, but 167 
he promised to pardon them for what they had done if they 
would deliver to him all the gold and silver they had. 
When they agreed to do so he sent a detachment of his 
army into each town appointing the same day for all the 
commanding officers to act, and ordering them to make 
proclamation at daybreak in each that the inhabitants 
should bring their money into the market-place within three 
hours, and when they had done so to plunder what remained. 
Thus Paulus despoiled seventy towns in one hour. 

10. The Ardei and the Palarii, two other Illyrian tribes, 
made a raid on Roman Illyria, and the Romans, being 
otherwise occupied, sent ambassadors to scare them. When 
they refused to be obedient, the Romans collected an army 
of 10,000 foot and 600 horse to be despatched against them. 
619 When the Illyrians learned this, as they were not yet pre- 13s 
pared for fighting, they sent ambassadors to crave pardon. 
The Senate ordered them to make reparation to those whom 
they had wronged. As they were slow in obeying, Fulvius 
Flaccus marched against them. This war resulted in an 
excursion only, for I cannot find any definite end to it. 


Y.R. ^ B.C. 

635 Sempronius Tuditanus and Tiberius Pandusa waged war 129 
with the lapydes, who live among the Alps, and seem to 

63s have subjugated them, as Lucius Cotta and Metellus seem 119 
to have subjugated the Segestani; but both tribes revolted 
not long afterward. 

598 II. The Dalmatians, another Illyrian tribe, made anise 
attack on the Illyrian subjects of Rome, and when ambas- 
sadors were sent to them to remonstrate they were not re- 
ceived. The Romans accordingly sent an army against 
them, with Marcius Figulus as consul and commander. 
While Figulus was laying out his camp the Dalmatians over- 
powered the guard, defeated him, and drove him out of the 
camp in headlong flight to the plain as far as the river 
Naro. As the Dalmatians were returning home (for winter 
was now approaching), Figulus hoped to fall upon them 
unawares, but he found them reassembled from their towns 
at the news of his approach. Nevertheless, he drove them 
into the city of Delminium, from which place they first got 
the name of Delmatenses, which was afterward changed to 
Dalmatians. As he was not able to attack this strongly de- 
fended town from the road, nor to use the engines that he 
had, on account of the height of the place, he attacked and 
captured some other towns that were partially deserted on 
account of the concentration of forces at Delminium. 
Then, returning to Delminium, he hurled sticks of wood, 
two cubits long, covered with flax and smeared with pitch 
and sulphur, from catapults into the town. These caught 
fire from friction and, flying in the air like torches, wherever 
they fell caused a conflagration, so that the greater part of 
the town was burned. This was the end of the war waged 
by Figulus against the Dalmatians. At a later period, in 

635 the consulship of Caecilius Metellus, war was declared 119 
against the Dalmatians, although they had been guilty of 
no offence, because he desired a triumph. They received 
him as a friend and he wintered among them at the town 
of Salona, after which he returned to Rome and was awarded 
a triumph. 


Chapter III 

Julius Caesar and the lUyrians — The Pannonians on the Danube 

γ R Β C 

12. At the time when Caesar held the command in Gaul 
these same Dalmatians and other Illyrians, who were then 
in a very prosperous condition, took the city of Promona 

704 from the Liburni, another lUyrian tribe. The latter put 50 
themselves in the hands of the Romans and appealed to 
Caesar, who was near by. Caesar sent word to those who 
were holding Promona that they should give it up to the 
Liburni, and when they refused, he sent against them a 
strong detachment of his army who were totally destroyed 
by the Illyrians. Nor did Caesar renew the attempt, for he 
had no leisure then, on account of the civil strife with 
Tompey. When the civil strife burst forth in war Caesar 
crossed the Adriatic from Brundusium in the winter, with 
what forces he had, and opened his campaign against Pom- 
pey in Macedonia. Antony brought another army to Cae- 1 
sar*s aid in Macedonia, he also crossing the Adriatic in | 
mid-winter. Gabinius led fifteen cohorts of foot and 3000 
horse for him by way of Illyria, passing around the Adriatic. 

706 The Illyrians, fearing punishment for what they had done 48 
to Caesar not long before, and thinking that his victory 
would be their destruction, attacked and slew the whole 
army under Gabinius, except Gabinius himself and a few 
who escaped. Among the spoils captured was a large 
amount of money and war material. 

13. Caesar was preoccupied by the necessity of coming 
to a conclusion with Pompey, and, after Pompey's death, 
with the numerous parts of his faction still remaining. 
When he had settled everything he returned to Rome and 
made preparations for war with the Getae and the Parthians. 
The Illyrians began to fear lest he should attack them, as 
they were on his intended line of march. So they sent am- 
bassadors to Rome to crave pardon for what they had done 
apd to offer their friendship and alliance, vaunting them- 

709 selves as a very brave race. Caesar was hastening his prep- 45 
arations against the Parthians; nevertheless, he gave them 
the dignified answer that he could not make friends of those 

266 APPIAN 'S HISTOR Υ [Βκ. Χ, Ch. Ill 

Y.R. B.C 

709 who had done what they had, but that he would grant them 45 
pardon if they would subject themselves to tribute and give 
him hostages. They promised to do both, and accordingly 
he sent Vatinius thither with three legions and a large cav- 
alry force to impose a light tribute on them and receive the 

710 hostages. When Caesar was slain the Dalmatians, thinking 44 
that the Roman power resided in him and had perished with 
him, would not listen to Vatinius on the subject of the trib- 
ute or anything else. When he attempted to use force they 
attacked and destroyed five of his cohorts, including their 
commanding officer, Bsebius, a man of senatorial rank. 
Vatinius took refuge with the remainder of his force in 
Epidamnus. The Roman Senate transferred this army, 
together with the province of Macedonia and Roman Illyria, 

to Brutus Csepio, one of Caesar's murderers, and at the same 
time assigned Syria to Cassius, another of the assassins. 
But they also, being involved in war with Antony and the 
second Caesar, surnamed Augustus, had no time to attend 
to the Illyrians. 

14. The Pseones are a great nation on the Danube, extend- 
ing from the lapydes to the Dardani. They are called 
Pseones by the Greeks, but Pannonians by the Romans. 
They are counted by the Romans as a part of Illyria, as I 
have previously said, for which reason it seems proper that 
I should include them in my lUyrian history. They have 
been renowned from the Macedonian period through the 
Agrianes, who rendered very important aid to Philip and 
Alexander and are Pseones of Lower Pannonia bordering on 
Illyria. When the expedition of Cornelius against the 
Pannonians resulted disastrously, so great a fear of those 
people came over all the Italians that for a long time after- 
wards none of the consuls ventured to march against them. 
Concerning the early history of the Illyrians and Panno- 
nians, I have not been able to discover anything further, 
nor have I found in the commentaries of Augustus anything 
earlier in the chapters treating of the Pannonians. 

15. I think that other Illyrian tribes besides those men- 
tioned had previously come under Roman rule, but how, I 
do not know. Augustus did not describe the transactions 
of others so much as his own, telling how he brought back 
those who had revolted and compelled them again to pay 


Y.R. B.C 

710 tribute, how he subjugated others that had been indepen- 44 
dent from the beginning, and how he mastered all the tribes 
that inhabit the summits of the Alps, barbarous and warlike 
peoples, who often plundered the neighboring parts of 
Italy. It is a wonder to me that so many great Roman 
armies traversing the Alps to conquer the Gauls and Span- 
iards, should have overlooked these tribes, and that even 
Gains Caesar, that most successful man of war, did not de- 
spatch them during the ten years that he was fighting the 
Gauls and wintering in that very country. But the Romans 
seem to have been intent only upon getting through the 
Alpine region on the business they were bestirring them- 
selves about, and Caesar seems to have delayed putting an 
end to the Illyrian troubles on account of the Gallic war 
and the strife with Pompey, which closely followed it. It 
appears that he was chosen commander of Illyria as Avell 
as of Gaul — not the whole of it, but as much as was then 
under Roman rule. 

Chapter IV 

Augustus invades Illyria — Subjugation of the Salassi and of the lapydes 
— Hard Fighting at Metulus — Destruction of the City — War 
against the Segestani — Their City Captured 

16. When Augustus had made himself master of every- 
thing, he informed the Senate, by way of contrast with 
Antony's slothfulness, that he had freed Italy from the sav- 
719 age tribes that had so often raided it. He overcame the 35 
Oxyaei, the Perthoneatae, the Bathiatae, the Taulantii, the 
Cambaei, the Cinambri, the Meromenni, and the Pyrissaei 
in one campaign. By more prolonged effort he also over- 
came the Docleatae, the Carui, the Interphrurini, the 
Naresii, the Glintidiones, and the Taurisci. From these 
tribes he exacted the tributes they had been failing to pay. 
When these were conquered, the Hippasini and the Bessi, 
neighboring tribes, were overcome by fear and surrendered 
themselves to him. Others which had revolted, the Meli- 
teni and the Corey reans, who inhabited islands and prac- 
tised piracy, he destroyed utterly, putting the young men 
to death and selling the rest as slaves. He deprived the 
Liburnians of their ships because they also practised piracy. 


Y.R. B.C 

719 The Moentini and the Avendeat3e,two tribes of the lapydes, 35 
dwelling within the Alps, surrendered themselves to him at 
his approach. The Arrepini, who are the most numerous 
and warlike of the lapydes, betook themselves from their 
villages to their city, but when he arrived there they fled 

to the woods. Augustus took the city, but did not burn it, 
hoping that they would deliver themselves up, and when 
they did so he allowed them to occupy it. 

17. Those who gave him the most trouble were the Sa- 
lassi, the transalpine lapydes, the Segestani, the Dalma- 
tians, the Daesitiatse, and the Pannonians, far distant from 
the Salassi, who occupy the higher Alpine mountains, diffi- 
cult of access, the paths being narrow and hard to climb. 
For this reason they had not only preserved their indepen- 
dence, but had levied tolls on those who passed through 
their country. Vetus assaulted them unexpectedly, seized 
the passes by stratagem, and besieged them for two years. 
They were driven to surrender for want of salt, which they 
use largely, and they received a Roman garrison; but when 
Vetus went away they expelled the garrison forthwith, and, 
possessing themselves of the mountain passes, they mocked 
at the forces that Augustus sent against them, as unable to 
accomplish anything of importance. Thereupon Augustus, 
anticipating a war with Antony, acknowledged their inde- 
pendence and allowed them to go unpunished for their 
offences against Vetus. But as they were suspicious of what 
might happen, they laid in large supplies of salt and made 

720 incursions into the Roman territory until Messala Corvinus 34 
was sent against them and reduced them by hunger. In 
this way were the Salassi subjugated. 

719 18. The transalpine lapydes, a strong and savage tribe, 35 
drove back the Romans twice within the space of about 
twenty years, overran Aquileia, and plundered the Roman 
colony of Tergestus. When Augustus advanced against 
them by a steep and rugged road, they made it still harder 
for him by felling trees. As he advanced farther they took 
refuge in another forest, where they lay in ambush for the 
approaching foe. Augustus, who was always suspecting 
something of this kind, sent forces to occupy certain ridges 
which flanked both sides of his advance through the flat 
country and the fallen timber. The lapydes darted out 

§ I7-20] THE ILLY RI AN WARS 269 

V.R. B.C. 

719 from their ambush and wounded many of the soldiers, but 35 
the greater part of their own forces were killed by the 
Romans who fell upon them from the heights above. The 
remainder again took refuge in the thickets, abandoning 
their town, the name of which was Terponus. Augustus 
took this town, but did not burn it, hoping that they also 
would give themselves up, and they did so. 

19. Thence he advanced to another place called Metulus, 
which is the chief town of the lapydes. It is situated on 
a heavily timbered mountain, on two ridges with a narrow 
valley between them. Here were about 3000 warlike and 
well-armed youth, Avho easily beat off the Romans who sur- 
rounded their walls. The latter raised a mound. The 
Metulians interrupted the work by assaults by day and 
by night, and harassed the soldiers from the walls with 
engines which they had obtained from the war which Deci- 
mus Brutus^ had waged there with Antony and Augustus. 
When their wall began to crumble they built another inside, 
abandoned the ruined one, and took shelter behind the 
other. The Romans captured the abandoned one and 
burned it. Against the new fortification they raised two 
mounds and from these threw four bridges to the top of the 
wall. Then, in order to distract their attention, Augustus 
sent a part of his force around to the rear of the town and 
ordered the others to dash across the bridges to the walls. 
He ascended to the top of a high tower to see the result. 

20. Some of the barbarians ran from the parapet to meet 
the Romans who were crossing, while others, unseen, sought 
to undermine the bridges with their long spears. They 
were much encouraged at seeing one bridge fall and a 
second one follow on top of it. When a third one went 
down a regular panic overtook the Romans, so that no one 
ventured on the fourth bridge until Augustus leaped down 
from the tower and reproached them. As they were not 
roused to their duty by his words, he seized a shield and 

^ All the codices say, ** Decimus Brutus." The Latin version of Can- 
didus omits " Decimus." Decimus Brutus did not wage war against 
Antony and Octavius in Illyria. He fought against Antony in Cis- 
alpine Gaul and was killed there, while trying to escape to Illyria, as 
we learn from our author (Civil Wars, iii, 98) and numerous other au- 


Y.R. B.C. 

719 sprang upon the bridge himself. Agrippa and Hiero, two 35 
of the generals, and one of his body-guard, Lucius, and 
Volas ran with him, only these four with a few armor- bearers. 
He had almost crossed the bridge when the soldiers, over- 
come by shame, rushed after him in crowds. Then this 
bridge, being overweighted, fell also, and the men on it 
went down in a heap. Some were killed and others were 
carried away with broken bones. Augustus was injured in 
the right leg and in both arms. Nevertheless, he ascended 
the tower with his signals forthwith and showed himself safe 
and sound, lest dismay should arise from a report of his 
death. In order that the enemy might not fancy that he 
was going to give in and retire he began to construct new 
bridges; by which means he struck terror into the Metu- 
lians, who thought that they were contending against an 
unconquerable will. 

2 1 . The next day they sent messengers to Augustus offer- 
ing to give fifty hostages whom he might select, and promis- 
ing to receive a garrison and to assign to them the highest 
hill while they themselves would occupy the other. When 
the garrison entered and he ordered them to lay down their 
arms they were very angry. They shut their wives and chil- 
dren up in their council-chamber and stationed guards there 
with orders to set fire to the building in case things went 
wrong with them, and then they attacked the Romans with 
desperation. Since, however, they made the attack from a 
lower position upon those occupying higher ground, they 
were completely overpowered. Then the guards set fire to 
the council-chamber and many of the women killed their 
children and themselves. Others, holding in their arms 
their children still alive, leaped into the flames. Thus all 
the Metulian youth perished in battle and the greater part 
of the non-combatants by fire. Their city was entirely con- 
sumed, and, large as it was, not a trace of it now remains. 
After the destruction of Metulustheremainderof the lapydes, 
being terror-stricken, surrendered to Augustus. The trans- 
alpine lapydes were then for the first time brought in subjec- 
tion to the Romans. After Augustus departed the Poseni 

720 rebelled and Marcus Helvius was sent against them. He 34 
conquered them and after punishing the leaders of the revolt 
with death sold the rest as slaves. 

§21-23] THE ILLYRIAN WARS 2/1 

Y.R. B.C. 

719 22. At an earlier time the Romans ti^-ice attacked the 35 
country of the Segestani, but obtained no hostages nor any- . 
thing else, for which reason the Segestani became very 
arrogant. Augustus advanced against them through the 
Pannonian territory, which was not yet under subjection 
to the Romans. Pannonia is a wooded country extending 
from the lapydes to the Dardani. The inhabitants do not 
live in cities, but scattered through the country or in vil- 
lages according to relationship. They have no common 
council and no rulers over the whole nation. They number 
100,000 fighting men, but they do not assemble in one body, 
because they have no common government. When Augus- 
tus advanced against them they took to the woods, from 
which they darted out and slew the stragglers of the army. 
As long as Augustus hoped that they would surrender volun- 
tarily he spared their fields and villages. As none of them 
came in he devastated the country with fire and sword for 
eight days, until he came to the Segestani. Theirs is also 
Pannonian territory, on the river Save, on which is situated 
a city strongly fortified by the river and by a very large 
ditch encircling it. For this reason Augustus greatly desired 
to possess it as a magazine convenient for a war against the 
Dacians and the Bastarnae on the other side of the Ister, 
which is there called the Danube, but a little lower down is 
called the Ister. The Save flows into it, and Augustus 
caused ships to be built in the latter stream to bring pro- 
visions to the Danube for him. 

23. For these reasons he desired to obtain possession of 
Segesta. As he was approaching, the Segestani sent to in- 
quire what he wanted. He replied that he desired to sta- 
tion a garrison there and to have them give him 100 hostages 
in order that he might use the town safely as a base of opera- 
tions in his war against the Dacians. He also asked for as 
much food as they were able to supply. The chief men of 
the town acquiesced, but the common people were furious, 
yet consented to the giving of the hostages, perhaps because 
they were not their children, but those of the notables. 
When the garrison came up, however, they could not bear 
the sight of them, but shut the gates in a mad fury and sta- 
tioned themselves on the walls. Thereupon Augustus 
bridged the river and surrounded the place with ditch and 


Y.R. B.C. 

719 palisade, and, having blockaded them, raised two mounds. 35 
. Upon these the Segestani made frequent assaults and, being 
unable to capture them, endeavored to destroy them with 
torches and fire thrown from above. When aid was sent to 
them by the other Pannonians Augustus met and ambuscaded 
this reenforcement, destroyed a part of their force, and 
put the rest to flight. After this they got no more help from 
the Pannonians. 

24. Thus the Segestani, after enduring all the evils of a 
siege, were taken by force on the thirtieth day, and then 
for the first time they began to beg. Augustus, admiring 
them for their bravery and yielding to their prayers, neither 
killed nor banished them, but contented himself with a fine. 
He caused a part of the city to be separated from the rest 
by a wall, and in this he placed a garrison of twenty-five 
cohorts. Having accomplished this he went back to Rome, 
intending to return to Illyria in the spring. But a rumor 
becoming current that the Segestani had massacred the gar- 
rison, he set forth hastily in the winter. However, he found 
that the rumor was false, yet not without cause. They had 
been in danger from a sudden uprising of the Segestani and 
had lost many men by reason of its unexpectedness, but on 
the next day they rallied and put down the insurgents. 
Augustus turned his forces to Dalmatia, another Illyrian 
country bordering on Taulantia. 

Chapter V 

Second War against the Dalmatians — The City of Promona taken — 
Sunodium burned — The Dalmatians subdued 

720 25. The Dalmatians, after the slaughter of the five cohorts 34 
under Gabinius and the taking of their standards, elated by 
their success, had not laid down their arms for ten years. 
When Augustus advanced against them they made an alli- 
ance with each other for mutual aid in war. They had 
upwards of 12,000 fighting men under a general named 
Versus. He occupied Promona, the city of the Liburni, 
and fortified it, although it was very strong by nature. It 
is a mountain stronghold surrounded on all sides by sharp- 
pointed hills like saw-teeth. The greater part of his forces 

§24-27] THE ILLY RI AN WARS 273 

Y.R. B.C. 

720 were stationed in the town, but he placed guards on the 34 
hills and all of them looked down upon the Romans from 
elevated positions. Augustus in plain sight began to draw 
a wall around the whole, but secretly he sent his bravest 
men to seek a path to the highest of the hills. These, con- 
cealing themselves in the woods, fell upon the guards by 
night while they were asleep, slew them, and signalled to 
Augustus in the twilight. He led the bulk of the army to 
make an attempt upon the city, and sent another force 
to hold the height that had been taken, while the captors 
of it should get possession of the lower hills. Terror and 
confusion fell upon the barbarians everywhere, for they 
believed themselves to be attacked on all sides. Especially 
were those on the hills alarmed lest they should be cut off 
from their supply of water, for which reason they all fled 
to Promona. 

26. Augustus surrounded the town, and two hills which 
were still held by the enemy, with a wall forty stades in 
length. When Testimus, another Dalmatian general, 
brought an army to the relief of the place Augustus met 
him and drove him back to the mountains, and while Testi- 
mus was still looking on he took Promona before the line of 
circumvallation was finished. For when the citizens made 
a sally and were sharply repulsed, the Romans pursued them 
and entered the town with them, where they killed a third 
part of them. The remainder took refuge in the citadel, 
at the gates of which a Roman cohort was placed to keep 
watch. On the fourth night the barbarians asaulted them, 
and they fled terror-stricken from the gates. Augustus re- 
pulsed the enemy's assault, and the following day received 
their surrender. The cohort that had abandoned its posi- 
tion was obliged to cast lots, and every tenth man suffered 
death. The lot fell upon two centurions among others. It 
was ordered, as a further punishment, that the surviving 
members of the cohort should subsist on barley instead of 
wheat for that summer. 

27. Promona being thus taken, Testimus, who was still 
looking on, disbanded his army, telling them to scatter in 
all directions. For this reason the Romans were not able 
to pursue them long, as they feared to divide themselves 
into small bands, being ignorant of the roads, and the foot- 

voL. 1 — τ 


V.R• B>C• 

720 prints of the fugitives being much confused. They took 34 
the town of Sunodium at the edge of the forest in which 
the army of Gabinius had been entrapped by the Dalmatians 
in a long and deep gorge between two mountains. There 
also they laid an ambuscade for Augustus, but after he had 
burned Sunodium he sent soldiers around by the summits 
of the mountains to keep even pace with him on either side 
while he passed through the gorge. He cut down trees and 
captured and burned all the towns he found on his way. 
While he was besieging the city of Setovia a force of bar- 
barians came to its assistance, which he met and prevented 
from entering the place. In this conflict he was struck by 
a stone on the knee and was confined for several days. 
When he recovered he returned to Rome to perform the 
duties of the consulship with Volcatius Tullus, his colleague, 
leaving Statilius Taurus to finish the war. 

7" 28. Entering upon his new consulship on the Calends 33 
of January, and delivering the government to Autronius 
Psetus the same day, he started back to Dalmatia at once, 
the triumvirate still existing; for two years remained of the 
second five-year period which the triumvirs themselves had 
ordained and the people confirmed. And now the Dalma- 
tians, oppressed by hunger and cut off from foreign sup- 
plies, met him on the road and delivered themselves up 
with supplications, giving 700 of their children as hostages, 
as Augustus demanded, and also the Roman standards 
taken from Gabinius. They also promised to pay the trib- 
ute that had been in arrears since the time of Gaius Caesar 
and to be obedient henceforth. Augustus deposited the 
standards in the portico called the Octavia. After the Dal- 
matians were prostrated Augustus advanced against the 
Derbani, who likewise begged pardon with supplications, 
gave hostages, and promised to pay the past-due tribute.^ 
In like manner other tribes at his approach gave hostages 
for observing the treaties that he made with them. Some, 
however, he was prevented by sickness from reaching. 
These gave no hostages and made no treaties. It appears, 
however, that they were subjugated later. Thus Augustus 
subdued the whole Illyrian country, not only the parts that 

^ At this point there is a lacuna in the text. 

§28-3o] THE ILLYRIAN WARS 275 

Y.R. B.C. 

had revolted from the Romans, but those that had never 
725 before been under their rule. Wherefore the Senate «9 
awarded him an Illyrian triumph, which he enjoyed later, 
together with one for his victory over Antony. 

29. The remaining peoples, who are considered by the 
Romans to be parts of Illyria, are the Rhsetians and the 
Noricans, on this side of Pannonia, and the Mysians on 
the other side as far as the Euxine Sea. I think that the 
Rhaetians and Noricans were subdued by Gaius Caesar during 
the Gallic war or by Augustus during the Pannonian war, 
as they lie between the two. I have found no mention of 
any war against them separately, whence I infer that they 
were conquered along with other neighboring tribes. 

30. Marcus Lucullus, brother of that Licinius Lucullus 
who conducted the war against Mithridates, advanced 
against the Mysians and arrived at the river where six Gre- 
cian cities lie adjacent to the Mysian territory, namely, 
Istrus, Dionysopolis, Odessus, Mesembria, Catalis, and 
ApoUonia; * from which he brought to Rome the great statue 
of Apollo which was afterward set up on the Palatine Hill. 
I have found nothing further done by the Roman republic 
as to the Mysians. They were not subjected to tribute by 
Augustus, but by Tiberius, who succeeded him as Roman 
emperor. All the things done by command of the people 
before the taking of Egypt have been written by me for 
each country separately. Those countries that the emper- 
ors themselves pacified after Egypt was taken, or annexed 
as their own work, will be mentioned after the affairs of the 
commonwealth. There I shall tell more about the Mysians. 
For the present, since the Romans consider the Mysians a 
part of Illyria and this is my Illyrian history, in order that 
it may be complete it seems proper to premise that Lucul- 
lus invaded Mysia as a general of the republic and that 
Tiberius took it in the time of the empire. 

1 The text here is imperfect. 


Chapter I 

Ambition of Antiochus the Great — His First Disagreement with Rome 
— A Conference at Lysimacheia — Hannibal at £phesiis — Antiochus 
forms Alliances 

Y.R. B.C 

53© I. Antiochus (the son of Seleucus and grandson of Antic- 224 
chus), king of the Syrians, the Babylonians, and other 
nations, was the sixth in succession from that Seleucus who 
succeeded Alexander in the government of the Asiatic coun- 
tries around the Euphrates. He invaded Media and Parthia, 
and other countries that had revolted from his ancestors, 
and performed many exploits, from which he was named 
Antiochus the Great. Elated by his successes, and by the 

556 title which he had derived from them, he invaded Ccele- 198 
Syria and a portion of Cilicia and took them away from 
Ptolemy Philopator [Epiphanes],^ king of Egypt, who was 
still a boy. As there was nothing small in his views he 
marched among the Hellespontines, the ^olians, and the 
lonians as though they belonged to him as the ruler of Asia; 
and, indeed, they had been formerly subjects of the Asiatic 

558 kings. Then he crossed over to Europe, brought Thrace 196 
under his sway, and reduced by force those who would not 
obey him. He fortified Chersonesus and rebuilt Lysim- 
acheia, which Lysimachus, who ruled Thrace in the time 
of Alexander, built as a stronghold against the Thracians 
themselves, but which they destroyed after his death. An- 
tiochus repeopled it, calling back the citizens who had fled, 
redeeming those who had been sold as slaves, bringing in 
others, supplying them with cattle, sheep, and agricultural 

1 See note to p. 245. 


§ 1-3] THE SYRIAN WARS 277 

Y.R. B.C. 

558 implements, and omitting nothing that might contribute to 196 
its speedy completion as a stronghold; for the place seemed 
to him to be admirably situated to hold all of Thrace in 
subjection, and a convenient base of supplies for other 
operations that he contemplated. 

2. Here the open disagreements between him and the 
Romans began, for as he passed among the Greek cities 
thereabout most of them joined him and received his gar- 
risons, because they feared capture by him. But the in- 
habitants of Smyrna and Lampsacus, and some others who 
still resisted, sent ambassadors to Flamininus, the Roman 
general, who had lately overthrown Philip the Macedonian 
in a great battle in Thessaly; for the affairs of the Mace- 
donians and of the Greeks were closely linked together at 
certain times and places, as I have shown in my Grecian 
history. Accordingly, certain embassies passed between 
Antiochus and Flamininus and tested each other to no pur- 
pose. The Romans and Antiochus had been suspicious of 
each other for a long time, the former surmising that he 
would not keep quiet because he was so much puffed up by 
the extent of his dominions and the acme of fortune that 
he had reached. Antiochus, on the other hand, believed 
that the Romans were the only people who could put a stop 
to his increase of power and prevent him from passing over 
to Europe. Still, there was no outward cause of enmity 
between them until ambassadors came to Rome from 
Ptolemy Philopator complaining that Antiochus had taken 
Syria and Cilicia away from him. The Romans gladly 
seized this occasion as one well suited to their purposes, 
and sent to Antiochus ostensibly to bring about a recon- 
ciliation between him and Ptolemy, but really to find out 
his designs and to check him as much as they could. 

3. Gngeus,^ the chief of the embassy, demanded that 
Antiochus should allow Ptolemy, who was a friend of the 
Roman people, to rule over all the countries that his father 
had left to him, and that the cities of Asia that had been 
part of the dominions of Philip should be independent, for 

^ The name of this ambassador, according to Polybius (xvii. 31), was 
Lucius Cornelius. Γη other respects the account of the conference by 
Polybius agrees with that of our author. The conference took place at 


γ R. B.C. 

558 it was not right that Antiochus should usurp powers of 196 
which the Romans had deprived Philip. " We are wholly 

at a loss to know," he said, "why Antiochus should come 
from Media bringing such a fleet and such an army from 
the upper country to the Asiatic coast, make an incursion 
into Europe, build cities there, and subdue Thrace, unless 
these are the preparations for another war." Antiochus 
replied that Thrace had belonged to his ancestors, that it 
had fallen away from them when they were occupied else- 
where, and that he had resumed possession because he had 
leisure to do so. He had built Lysimacheia as the future 
seat of government of his son Seleucus. He would leave 
the Greek cities of Asia independent if they would acknow- 
ledge the gratitude therefor as due to himself and not to the 
Romans. "I am a relative of Ptolemy," he said, "and I 
shall be his father-in-law, although I am not so now, and 
I will see to it that he renders gratitude to you. I am at a 
loss to know by what right you meddle with the affairs of 
Asia when I never interfere with those of Italy." And so 
they separated without coming to any understanding, and 
both sides broke into more open threats. 

559 4. A rumor having spread abroad that Ptolemy Philopator 195 
was dead, Antiochus hastened to Egypt in order to seize 
the country while bereft of a ruler. While on this journey 
Hannibal the Carthaginian met him at Ephesus. He was 
now a fugitive from his own country on account of the ac- 
cusations of his enemies, who reported to the Romans that 
he was hostile to them, that he wanted to bring on a war, 
and that he could never enjoy peace. This was a time 
when the Carthaginians were leagued with the Romans by 
treaty. Antiochus received Hannibal in a magnificent 
manner on account of his great military reputation, and 
kept him near himself. At Lycia he learned that Ptolemy 
was alive. So he gave up the idea of seizing Egypt and 
turned his attention to Cyprus, hoping to take it instead of 
Egypt, and sailed thither with all speed. Encountering a 
storm at the mouth of the river Sarus and losing many of his 
ships, some of them with his soldiers and friends, he sailed 
back to Seleucia in Syria to repair his damaged fleet. There 
he celebrated the nuptials of his children, Antiochus and 
Laodice, whom he had joined together in marriage. 

§ 4-6] THE SYRIAN WARS 279 

Y.R. B.C 

56X 5. Now, determining no longer to conceal his intended 193 
war with the Romans, he formed alliances by marriage with 
the neighboring kings. To Ptolemy in Egypt he sent his 
daughter Cleopatra, surnamed Syra, giving with her Coele- 
Syria as a dowry, which he had taken away from Ptolemy 
himself, thus flattering the young king in order to keep 
him quiet during the war with the Romans. To Ariarathes, 
king of Cappadocia, he sent his daughter Antiochis, and 
the remaining one to Eumenes, king of Pergamus. But 
the latter, seeing that Antiochus was about to engage in war 
with the Romans and that he wanted to form a marriage 
connection with him on this account, refused her. To his 
brothers, Attalus and Philetserus, who were surprised that he 
should decline marriage relationship with so great a king, 
who was also his neighbor and who made the first overtures, 
he showed that the coming war would be of doubtful issue 
at first, but that the Romans would prevail in the end by 
their courage and perseverance. " If the Romans conquer, " 
said he, "I shall be firmly seated in my kingdom. If An- 
tiochus is the victor, I may expect to be stripped of all my 
possessions by my powerful neighbor, or, if I am allowed 
to reign, to be ruled over by him." For these reasons he 
rejected the proffered marriage. 

Chapter II 

Sends an Embassy to Rome — HannibaPs Advice to Antiochus — Han- 
nibal sends a Messenger to Carthage — Roman Ambassadors meet 
Hannibal at Ephesus — Colloquy between Hannibal and Scipio 
Africanus — The Place of Hannibal's Death 

6. Then Antiochus went down to the Hellespont and 
crossed over to Chersonesus and possessed himself of a large 
part of Thrace by conquest or surrender. He freed the 
Greeks who were under subjection to the Thracians, and 
conciliated the Byzantines in many ways, because their city 
was admirably situated at the outlet of the Euxine Sea. By 
gifts and by fear of his warlike preparations he brought the 
Galatians into his alliance, because he considered them 
formidable by reason of their bodily size. Then he went 
back to Ephesus and sent as ambassadors to Rome Lysias, 

t > 


Y.R. B.C. 

s6i Hegesianax, and Menippus. They were sent really to find 193 
out the intentions of the Senate, but for the sake of appear- 
ances Menippus said, "King Antiochus, while strongly 
desirous of the friendship of the Romans and willing to be 
their ally if they wish, is surprised that they urge him to 
give up the cities of Ionia and to remit tribute for certain 
states, and not to interfere with certain of the affairs of Asia 
and to leave Thrace alone, though it has always belonged 
to his ancestors. Yours are not the exhortations of friends, 
but resemble orders given by victors to the vanquished." 
The Senate, perceiving that the embassy had come to make 
a test of their disposition, replied curtly, "If Antiochus 
will leave the Greeks in Asia free and independent, and 
keep away from Europe, he can be the friend of the Roman 
people if he desires." Such was the answer of the Romans, 
and they gave no reason for their rejoinder. 

7. As Antiochus intended to invade Greece first and 
thence begin his war against the Romans, he communicated 
his design to Hannibal. The latter said that as Greece had 
been wasted for a long time, the task would be easy; but 
that wars which were waged at home were the hard ones to 
bear, by reason of the scarcity which they caused, and that 
those which took place in foreign territory were much easier 
to endure. Antiochus could never vanquish the Romans in 
Greece, where they would have plenty of home-grown corn 
and all needed material. Hannibal urged him to occupy 
some part of Italy and make his base of operations there, 
so that the Romans might be weakened both at home and 
abroad. "I have had experience of Italy," he said, "and 
with 10,000 men I can occupy some convenient place and 
write to my friends in Carthage to stir up the people to 
revolt. As they are already discontented with their con- 
dition, and harbor ill-will toward the Romans, they will be 
filled with courage and hope if they hear that I am ravaging 
Italy again." Antiochus listened eagerly to this advice, 
and as he considered a Carthaginian accession a great ad- 
vantage (as it would have been) for his war, directed him 
to write to his friends at once. 

8. Hannibal did not write the letters, since he did not 
consider it yet safe to do so, as the Romans were searching 
out everything and the war was not yet openly declared. 


Y.R. B.C 

561 and he had many opponents in Carthage, and the city had 193 
no fixed or sound policy, — the very lack of which caused 
its destruction, not long afterward. But he sent Aristo, a 
Tyrian merchant, to his friends, on the pretext of trading, 

to tell them that when he should invade Italy they should 
rouse Carthage to avenge her wrongs. Aristo did this, but 
when Hannibal's enemies learned that he was in the city 
they raised a tumult as though a revolution was impending, 
and searched everywhere to find him. In order that Han- 
nibal's friends might not be particularly accused, he posted 
letters in front of the senate-chamber secretly by night, 
saying that Hannibal exhorted the whole senate to rescue 
the country with the help of Antiochus. Having done this 
he sailed away. In the morning the friends of Hannibal 
were relieved of their fears by this afterthought of Aristo, 
which implied that he had been sent to the whole senate. 
The city was filled with all kinds of tumult, the people feel- 
ing bitterly toward the Romans, but despairing of accom- 
plishing anything indirectly. Such was the situation of 
affairs in Carthage. 

562 9. In the meantime Roman ambassadors, and among 199 
them Scipio, who had humbled the Carthaginian power, 
were sent, like those of Antiochus, to ascertain his designs 
and to form an estimate of his strength. Learning that the 
king had gone to Pisidia, they waited for him at Ephesus. 
There they entered into frequent conversations with Han- 
nibal, Carthage being then at peace with them and war with 
Antiochus not yet declared. They reproached Hannibal 
for flying his country when the Romans had nothing to 
complain against him, or against the other Carthaginians, 
under the terms of the last treaty. They did this in order 
to cast suspicion on Hannibal in the mind of the king by 
the protracted conversations and intercourse. Hannibal, 
although a most profound military genius, did not perceive 
their design, but the king, when he learned what had been 
going on, did suspect him, and was more reluctant to give 
him his confidence thereafter. . There was also some jeal- 
ousy and envy added, lest Hannibal should carry off the 
glory of the exploits. 

10. It is said that at one of their meetings in the gym- 
nasium Scipio and Hannibal had a conversation on the 


Y.R. B.C. 

562 subject of generalship, in the presence of a number of 192 
bystanders, and that Scipio asked Hannibal whom he con- 
sidered the greatest general, to which the latter replied, 
"Alexander of Macedon." To this Scipio assented since 
he also yielded the first place to Alexander. Then he asked 
Hannibal whom he placed next, and he replied, "Pyrrhus 
of Epirus," because he considered boldness the first quali- 
fication of a general; "for it would not be possible," he 
said, "to find two kings more enterprising than these." 
Scipio was rather nettled by this, but nevertheless he asked 
Hannibal to whom he would give the third place, expecting 
that at least the third would be assigned to him; but Han- 
nibal replied, "To myself; for when I was a young man I 
conquered Spain and crossed the Alps with an army, the first 
after Hercules. I invaded Italy and struck terror into all 
of you, laid waste 400 of your towns, and often put your 
city in extreme peril, all this time receiving neither money 
nor reenforcements from Carthage." As Scipio saw that he 
was likely to prolong his self-laudation he said, laughing, 
"Where would you place yourself, Hannibal, if you had 
not been defeated by me?" Hannibal, now perceiving 
his jealousy, replied, " In that case I should have put myself 
before Alexander." Thus Hannibal continued his self- 
laudation, but flattered Scipio in a delicate manner by sug- 
gesting that he had conquered one who was the superior of 

II. At the end of " this conversation Hannibal invited 
Scipio to be his guest, and Scipio replied that he would be 
so gladly if Hannibal were not living with Antiochus, who 
was held in suspicion by the Romans. Thus did they, in 
a manner worthy of great commanders, cast aside their 
enmity at the end of their wars. Not so Flamininus, for, 
at a later period when Hannibal had fled after the defeat of 
Antiochus and was wandering around Bithynia, Flamininus 
sent an embassy to King Prusias on other matters, and, 
although he had no grievance against Hannibal, and had no 

1 This tale is considered by most modern critics a fiction. It is, how- 
ever, found in Plutarch and Livy. The latter (xxxv. 14), gives the 
authority for it, viz: "Claudius, following the Greek history of Acilias, 
says that Africanus was in that embassy," etc. But in his own account 
of the embassy Livy does not include Africanus as a member of it. 


562 orders from the Senate, and Hannibal was no longer for- 192 
midable to them, Carthage having fallen, he caused Prusias 
to put him to death by poison. There was a story that an 
oracle had once said ; 

"Libyssan earth shall cover Hannibal's remains."^ 

So he believed that he should die in Libya. But there 
is a river Libyssus in Bithynia, and the adjoining country 
takes the name of Libyssa from the river. ^ These things I 
have placed side by side as memorials of the magnanimity 
of Hannibal and Scipio and of the smallness of Flamininus. 

Chapter HI 

Antiochus invades Greece — Amynander, King of the Athamanes, 
joins him — Hannibal repeats his Advice — The Romans prepare 
for War — Philip joins the Romans 

12. Antiochus, on his return from Pisidia to Ephesus, 
entered upon the business with the Roman ambassadors and 
promised to leave the Rhodians, the Byzantines, the Cyzi- 
caeans, and the other Greeks of Asia free and independent 
if the Romans would make a treaty with him, but he would 
not release the ^iltolians and the lonians, since they had 
long been accustomed to obey the barbarian kings of Asia. 
The Roman ambassadors came to no agreement with him — 
in fact, they had not come to make an agreement, but to 
find out his purposes. So they returned to Rome. There- 
upon an ^tolian embassy came to Antiochus, of which 
Thoas was the principal member, offering him the com- 
mand of the ^tolian forces and urging him to embark for 
Greece at once, as everything was in readiness there. They 
would not allow him to wait for the army that was coming 
from upper Asia, but by exaggerating the strength of the 
^toliansand promising the alliance of the Lacedaemonians 
and of Philip of Macedon in addition, who was angry with 
the Romans, they urged his crossing. He assembled his 
forces very hastily, nor did even the news of his son's death 
in Syria delay him at all. He sailed to Euboea with 10,000 

^ Αίβυσσα κρύ^€ΐ βώ\ο$ *ΑννΙβου ϋμας. 

^ Hannibal's burial-place at Libyssa was still visible in the time of 
Pliny, A.D. 23-79 {Natural History, v. 43). 

284 APPIAN'S HISTORY [Βκ. XI, Ch. Ill 

562 men, who were all that he had in hand at the time. He 192 
took possession of the whole island, which surrendered to 
him through fear. Michithio, one of his generals, fell upon 
the Romans at Delium (a place sacred to Apollo), killed 
some of them, and took the rest prisoners. 

13. Amynander, king of the Athamanes, leagued him- 
self with Antiochus for the following reason. A certain 
Macedonian, named Alexander, who had been educated at 
Megalopolis and admitted to citizenship there, pretended 
that he was a descendant of Alexander the Great, and to 
make people believe his fables he named his two sons 
Philip and Alexander and his daughter Apama. The latter 
he betrothed to Amynander. Her brother Philip con- 
ducted her to the nuptial ceremony, and when he saw that 
Amynander was weak and inexperienced he remained there 
and took charge of the government by virtue of this con- 
nection. By holding out to this Philip the hope that he 
would restore his ancestral kingdom of Macedonia to him, 
Antiochus secured the alliance of the Athamanes. He 
secured that of the Thebans also by going to Thebes and 
making a speech to the people. He was emboldened to 
enter upon this great war relying rqost rashly on the The- 
bans, Amynander, and the ^tolians, and he made a recon- 
noissance of Thessaly to determine whether he should invade 
it at once or after the winter had passed. As Hannibal ex- 
pressed no opinion on the subject, Antiochus, before coming 
to a decision, asked him his thought. 

14. Hannibal replied, "It is not difficult to reduce the 
Thessalians either now or at the end of winter, if you wish. 
Exhausted by much suffering they will change now to you, 
and again to the Romans, if any misfortune befalls you. 
We have come here without any army of our own, trusting 
to the ^tolians, who said that the Lacedaemonians and 
Philip would join us. Of these I hear that the Lacedae- 
monians are as hostile to us as the Achaeans are, and as for 
Philip I do not see him here helping you, although he can 
turn the scale of this war for whichever side he favors. I 
hold the same opinion as before, that you should call in an 
army from Asia as quickly as possible and not put any re- 
liance on Amynander or the /Etolians. When your army 
comes, carry the war into Italy so that they may be dis- 

§ 13-15] THE SYRIAN IVARS 285 

T.R. B.C 

soatracted by evils at home, and thus harm you as little as 19a 
possible, and make no advance movement for fear of what 
may befall themselves. The plan I spoke of before is no 
longer available, but you ought to employ half of your fleet 
in ravaging the shores of Italy and keep the other half lying 
in wait for opportunities, while you station yourself with 
all your land forces at some point in Greece near to Italy, 
making a feint of invasion and invading it at any time if 
you can. Try by every means to make an alliance with 
Philip, because he can be of the greatest service to which- 
ever side he espouses. If he will not consent, send your 
son Seleucus against him by way of Thrace so that Philip 
likewise may be distracted by troubles at home, and pre- 
vented from furnishing aid to the enemy." Such were the 
counsels of Hannibal, and they were the best of all that 
were offered; but, moved by jealousy of his reputation and 
judgment, the other counsellors, and the king himself no 
less, cast them all aside lest Hannibal should seem to excel 
them in generalship, and lest the glory of the exploits 
should be his — except that Polyxenidas was sent to Asia to 
bring an army. 

563 15. When the Romans heard of the irruption of Antio- jgx 
chus into Greece and the killing and capture of Romans 
at Delium, they declared war. In this way the war between 
them, which had been smouldering a long time, first actu- 
ally broke out. So great was the dominion of Antiochus, 
ruler of many powerful nations of upper Asia, and of all 
but a few on the sea-coast, who had now invaded Europe; 
so formidable was his reputation and so complete his prep- 
aration, so many and so famous had been his exploits 
against other peoples, from which he had earned the title 
of Great, that the Romans anticipated that this war would 
be long and severe for them. They had their suspicions 
also of Philip of Macedon, whom they had lately con- 
quered, and of the Carthaginians also, lest they should 
prove false to the treaty because Hannibal was cooperating 
with Antiochus. Other subject peoples were under suspi- 
cion lest revolution should break out among them in conse- 
quence of the fame of Antiochus. For these reasons they 
sent forces into all the provinces to watch them without 
provoking hostilities. With them were sent commanders 

286 APPIAN'S HISTOR Υ [Βκ. XI, Ch. Ill 

563 called six-axe men (praetors), so called because the consuls 191 
had twelve bundles of rods and axes (as the kings before 
them had), whereas the praetors had only half the dignity 
of the consuls and half the number of insignia of office. 
As in cases of great peril they showed their anxiety for Italy 
also, lest there should be some weakening or revolt against 
them there. They sent a large force of infantry to Taren- 
tum to guard against an attack in that quarter, and also a 
fleet to patrol the coast. So great was the alarm caused by 
Antiochus at first. When everything appertaining to the 
government at home was arranged, they raised an army to 
serve against Antiochus, 20,000 from the city and double 
that number from the allies, to cross the Adriatic in the 
early spring. Thus they employed the whole winter in 
making preparations for war. 

1 6. Antiochus marched against the Thessalians and came 
to Cynoscephalae, where the Macedonians had been defeated 
by the Romans, and finding the remains of the dead still 
unburied, gave them a magnificent funeral. Thus he curried 
favor with the Macedonians and accused Philip before 
them of leaving unburied those who had fallen in his ser- 
vice. Until now Philip had been wavering and in doubt 
which side he should espouse, but when he heard of this 
he joined the Romans at once. He invited Baebius, their 
nearest general, to a rendezvous and gave pledges anew of 
faithful alliance against Antiochus. Baebius praised him 
for this, and felt emboldened to send Appius Claudius 
straightway with 2000 foot through Macedonia into Thes- 
saly. When Appius arrived at Tempe and from that point 
saw Antiochus besieging Larissa, he kindled a large number 
of fires to conceal the smallness of his force. Antiochus 
thought that Baebius and Philip had arrived, and became 
panic-stricken, abandoned the siege on a pretext of bad 
weather, and retreated to Chalcis. There he fell in love 
with a pretty girl, and, although he was above fifty years of 
age and was supporting the burden of so great a war, he 
celebrated his nuptials with her, gave a public festival, and 
allowed his army to spend the whole winter in idleness and 
luxury. When spring came he made a descent upon Acar- 
nania, where he perceived that idleness had unfitted his 
army lor every kind of duty. Then he repented himself 

§ i6-i8] THE SYRIAN WARS 287 

Y.R. B.C. 

563 of his marriage and his public festival. Nevertheless he 19' 
reduced a part of Acarnania and was besieging the rest of 
its strongholds when he learned that the Romans were 
making a passage of the Adriatic. Then at once he returned 
to Chalcis. 

Chapter IV 

The Romans cross the Adriatic — Antiochus occupies Thermopylae — 
Battle at Thermopylae — Antiochus defeated — Flees to Asia — The 
two Scipios sent against him 

17. The Romans crossed hastily from Brundusium to 
Apollonia with the forces that were then ready, being 2000 
horse, 20,000 foot, and a few elephants, under the command 
of Acinius Manius Glabrio. They marched to Thessaly and 
relieved the besieged cities. They expelled the enemy's 
garrisons from the towns of the Athamanes and made a pris- 
oner of that Philip of Megalopolis who was still expecting 
the throne of Macedonia. They also captured about 3000 
of the soldiers of Antiochus. While Manius was doing 
these things, Philip made a descent upon Athamania and 
brought the whole of it under subjection. King Amynander 
fleeing to Ambracia. When Antiochus learned these facts, 
he was terrified by the rush of events and by the suddenness 
of the change of fortune, and he now perceived the wisdom 
of Hannibal's advice. He sent messenger after messenger 
to Asia to hasten the coming of Polyxenidas. Then from 
all sides he drew in what forces he had. These amounted 
to 10,000 foot and 500 horse of his own, besides some 
allies, with which he occupied Thermopylae in order to put 
this difficult pass between himself and the enemy while 
waiting for the arrival of his army from Asia. The passage 
at Thermopylae is long and narrow, flanked on the one side 
by a rough and inhospitable sea and on the other by a deep 
and impassable morass. It is overhung by two mountain 
peaks, one called Tichius and the other Callidromiis. The 
place also contains some hot springs, whence comes the 
name Thermopylae (the Hot Gates). 

18. There Antiochus built a double wall on which he 
placed engines. He sent -^tolian troops to occupy the 


Y.R. B.C. 

563 summits of the mountains to prevent anybody from coming 191 
around secretly by way of the hill called Atropos, as Xerxes 
had come upon the Spartans under Leonidas, the mountain 
paths at that time being unguarded. One thousand ^to- 
lians occupied each mountain. The remainder encamped 
by themselves near the city of Heraclea. When Manius 
saw the enemy's preparations he gave the signal for battle 
on the morrow and ordered two of his tribunes, Marcus 
Cato and Lucius Valerius, to select such forces as they 
pleased and to go around the mountains by night and drive 
the ^tolians from the heights as best they could. Lucius 
was repulsed from Mount Tichius by the -^tolians, who at 
that place fought well, but Cato, who moved against Mount 
Callidromus, fell upon the enemy while they were still 
asleep, about the last watch. Nevertheless there was a stiff 
fight here, as he was obliged to climb over high rocks and 
precipices in the face of an opposing enemy. Meantime 
Manius was leading his army against Antiochus' front in 
straight lines, as this was the only way possible in the 
narrow pass. The king placed his light-armed troops and 
peltasts in front of the phalanx, and drew up the phalanx 
itself in front of the camp, with the archers and slingers 
on the right hand next to the foot-hills, and the elephants, 
with the guard that always accompanied them, on aie left 
near the sea.^ 

19. Battle being joined, the light-armed troops assailed 
Manius first, rushing in from all sides. He received their 
onset bravely, first yielding and then advancing and driving 
them back. The phalanx opened and let the light-armed 
men pass through. It then closed and pushed forward, the 
long pikes set densely together in order of battle, with which 
the Macedonians from the time of Alexander and Philip 
have struck terror into enemies who have not dared to en- 
counter the thick array of long pikes presented to them. 
At this juncture the ^tolians were seen fleeing from Calli- 
dromus with loud cries, and leaping down into the camp 
of Antiochus. At first neither side knew what had hap- 
pened, and there was confusion among both in their uncer- 

1 The words right and left are transposed in the text. As Antiochus 
was looking toward Thessaly, his right hand was on the sea-shore and 
his left against the mountains. 


V.R. B.C. 

soatainty; but when Cato made his appearance pursuing the 191 
^tolians with shouts of victory and was already close above 
the camp of Antiochus, the king's forces, who had been 
hearing for some time back fearful accounts of the Roman 
style of fighting, and who knew that they themselves had 
been enervated by idleness and luxury all winter, took 
fright. Not knowing how large Cato's force was, it was 
magnified to their minds by terror. Fearing for the safety 
of their camp they fled to it in disorder, with the intention 
of defending it against the enemy. But the Romans were 
close at their heels and entered the camp with them. Then 
there was another flight of the Antiocheans as disorderly as 
the first. Manius pursued them as far as Scarphia, killing 
and taking prisoners. Returning thence he plundered the 
king's camp, and by merely showing himself drove out the 
-^tolians who had broken into the Roman camp during his 

20. The Romans lost about 200 in the battle and the 
pursuit; Antiochus about 10,000, including prisoners. The 
king himself, at the first sign of defeat, fled precipitately 
with 500 horse as far as Elateia, and from Elateia to Chal- 
cis, and thence to Ephesus with his bride Eubcea, as he called 
her, with his ships; but not all of them, for the Roman 
admiral made an attack upon some that were bringing sup- 
plies, and sunk them. When the people of Rome heard of 
this victory, so swiftly and easily gained, they offered sacri- 
fice, being satisfied with their first trial of the formidable 
reputation of Antiochus. To Philip, in return for his ser- 
vices as an ally, they sent his son Demetrius, who was still 
a hostage in their hands. 

21. While these things were going on in the city, Manius 
received the supplications of the Phoceans, the Chalcideans, 
and others who had cooperated with Antiochus, and he 
relieved their fears. He and Philip ravaged ^Etolia and 
reduced its cities. He captured, in hiding, Democritus, 
the general of the -^tolians, who had threatened Flamini- 
nus that he would pitch his camp on the banks of the Tiber. 
Manius, with an army laden with baggage and spoils, made 
his way to Callipolis over Mount Corax, the highest, 
rockiest, and most difficult in that region. Many soldiers, 
by reason of the badness of the road, fell over precipices 

VOL. I — υ 

290 APPIAN'S- HISTOR Υ [Βκ. XI, Ch. V 

V.R. B.C. 

563 and were dashed in pieces with their arms and accoutre- 191 
ments. Although the ^tolians might have punished them 
severely, they were nowhere to be seen, having sent an em- 
bassy to Rome to treat for peace. In the meantime Antio- 
chus ordered the satraps of upper Asia to send their army 
down to the coast in all haste, and he fitted out a fleet which 
he put under the command of Polyxenidas, an exile from 
Rhodes. He crossed over to Chersonesus and again forti- 
fied it. He also strengthened Sestos and Abydos, through 
which the Roman legions would be obliged to pass if they 
should invade Asia. He made Lysimacheia his principal 
magazine for the present war and accumulated large supplies 
of arms and provisions in it, believing that the Romans 
would presently attack him with large land and sea forces. 
The latter appointed Lucius Scipio as the successor of 
Manius in the command, as he was then consul, but as he 
was inexperienced in war they appointed as his lieutenant 
his brother, Publius Scipio, who had humbled the Cartha- 
ginian power and who first bore the title of Africanus. 

Chapter V 

The Romans win a Naval Victory — The Scipios march to the Helles- 
pont — A Roman Fleet captured by Stratagem — Fighting at Perga- 
mus — The Naval Battle of Myonessus 

2 2. While the Scipios were still making their prepara- 
tions, Livius, who had charge of the coast defence of Italy 
and who had been chosen the successor of Atilius, with his 
own coast-guard ships and some contributed by the Car- 
thaginians and other allies, sailed for the Piraeus. Receiv- 
ing there the fleet from Atilius he set sail with eighty-one 
decked ships, Eumenes following with fifty of his own, 
one-half of which had decks. They put in at Phocaea, a 
place belonging to Antiochus, but which received them 
from fear, and on the following day they sailed out for a 
naval engagement. Polyxenidas, commanding the fleet of 
Antiochus, met them with 200 ships much lighter than those 
opposed to him, which was a great advantage to him, since 
the Romans were not yet experienced in nautical affairs. 
Seeing two Carthaginian ships sailing in front, he sent three 

§ 22-23] THE SYRIAN WARS 29 1 

V.R. B.C. 

563 of his own against them and took them, but found them 191 
empty, the crews having leaped overboard. Livius dashed 
angrily at the three with his flag- ship, much in advance of 
the rest of the fleet. The enemy being three to one grappled 
him contemptuously with iron hooks, and when the ships 
were fastened together the battle was fought as though it 
were on land. The Romans, being much superior in valor, 
sprang upon the enemy's ships, overpowered them, and re- 
turned, bringing back two ships captured simultaneously by 
one. This was the prelude to the naval engagement. When 
the fleets came together the Romans had the best of it by 
reason of their bodily strength and bravery, but on account 
of the unwieldy size of their ships they could not capture 
the enemy, who got away with their nimble craft, and, by 
rapid flight, took refuge in Ephesus. The Romans repaired 
to Chios, where twenty-seven Rhodian ships joined them as 
allies. When Antiochus received the news of this naval 
fight, he sent Hannibal to Syria to fit out another fleet from 
Phoenicia and Cilicia. When he was returning with it the 
Rhodians drove him into Pamphylia, captured some of his 
ships, and blockaded the rest. 

564 23. In the meantime Publius Scipio arrived in -^tolia 190 
with the consul and received the command of the army 
from Manius. He scorned the siege of the ^tolian towns 
as small business, and allowed the imploring people to send 

a new embassy to Rome, while he hastened against Antio- 
chus before his brother's consulship should expire. He 
moved by way of Macedonia and Thrace to the Hellespont, 
and it would have been a very hard march for him had not 
Philip of Macedon repaired the roads, entertained him, es- 
corted him, bridged the streams some time before, and 
furnished him provisions. In return for this the Scipios 
immediately relieved him from the payment of the remain- 
ing money indemnity, having been authorized to do so by 
the Senate if they should find him zealous. They also wrote 
to Prusias, king of Bithynia, reminding him that the Ro- 
mans were in the habit of augmenting the possessions of 
the kings in alliance with them. They said that, although 
they had conquered Philip of Macedon, they had allowed 
him to retain his kingdom, had released his son whom they 
had held as a hostage, and had remitted the money pay- 

292 APPIAN 'S HIS TOR Υ [Βκ. XI, Ch. V 

V.R. B.& 

564 ment still due. Thereupon Prusias willingly entered into 190 
alliance with them against Antiochus. Livius, the com- 
mander of the fleet, when he learned that the Scipios were 
on the march, left Pausimachus, the Rhodian, with the 
Rhodian ships and a part of his own, in ^olis, and him- 
self sailed with the greater part to the Hellespont to assist 
the army. Sestos and Rhseteum, and the harbor of the 
Achseans,^ and several other places surrendered to him. 
Abydos refused and he laid siege to it. 

24. After the departure of Livius, Pausimachus trained 
his sailors by repeated exercises, and constructed machines 
of various kinds. He attached iron pans containing fire to 
long poles and suspended them over the sea, so as to clear 
his own ships and fall upon those of the enemy when they 
approached. While he was thus engaged Polyxenidas, the 
admiral of Antiochus, who was also a Rhodian, but had 
been banished for crime, laid a trap for him. He prom- 
ised to deliver the fleet of Antiochus to him if he would 
agree to help him in securing readmittance to his own 
country. Pausimachus suspected the wily rascal and took 
special pains to guard against him. But after Polyxenidas 
had written him an autograph letter on the subject of the 
betrayal and in accord therewith had sailed away from 
Ephesus on the pretence of procuring corn for the army, 
Pausimachus, observing the movement and thinking that 
no one would put his own signature to a letter proposing a 
betrayal unless he was speaking the truth, felt entire confi- 
dence, relaxed his vigilance, and sent his own fleet away to 
procure corn. Polyxenidas, seeing that his stratagem was 
successful, reassembled his ships, and sent the pirate Ni- 
cander to Samos with a few men to create confusion by 
getting in the rear of Pausimachus on the land, and him- 
self sailed at midnight, and about daybreak fell upon him 
while still asleep. Pausimachus, in this sudden and unex- 
pected catastrophe, ordered his men to abandon their ships 
and defend themselves on land. When Nicander attacked 
him in the rear he thought that the land had been taken 

1 b Αχαιών \ιμ^ν. This was the harbor at the mouth of the river 
Xanthus where the Greeks are supposed to have landed when they 
came to besiege Troy. It is mentioned by our author in Mithr. 77, and 
in the Civil Wars, v. 138. 

§ 24-26] THE SYRIAN WARS 293 

V.R. B.C. 

564 possession of by night not merely by those who were visi- 190 
ble, but by a much larger number. So he made another 
confused rush for his ships. He was foremost in the en- 
counter and the first to fall, fighting bravely. The rest 
were all captured or killed. Seven of the ships, which 
were provided with the fire-apparatus, escaped, as no one 
dared approach them for fear of conflagration. The re- 
maining twenty Polyxenidas towed to Ephesus. 

25. Upon the news of this victory Phocsea again changed 
sides to Antiochus, as did also Samos and Cuma. Livius, 
fearing for his own ships, which he had left in ^olis, re- 
turned to them in haste. Eumenes hastened to join him, 
and the Rhodians sent the Romans twenty new ships. In 
a short time they were all in good spirits and they sailed 
toward Ephesus prepared for another engagement. As no 
enemy appeared they divided their naval force into two 
parts, one half for a long time showing itself on the high 
sea, while the other landed on the enemy's coast and rav- 
aged it until Nicander attacked them from the interior, 
took away their plunder, and drove them back to their 
ships. Then they withdrew to Samos, and Livius' term 
of office as admiral expired. 

26. About this time Seleucus, the son of Antiochus, 
ravaged the territory of Eumenes and laid siege to Per- 
gamus, shutting up the soldiers in it. On account of this 
Eumenes sailed with haste to Elsea, the naval station of his 
kingdom, and with him L. ^milius Regillus, the successor 
of Livius as admiral. One thousand foot-soldiers and 100 
picked horse had been sent by the Achseans as allies to 
Eumenes. When their commander, Diophanes, from the 
wall saw the soldiers of Seleucus sporting and drinking in 
a contemptuous way, he urged the Pergameans to join him 
in a sally against the enemy. As they would not agree to 
this he armed his 1000 foot and his 100 horse, led them out 
of the city under the wall, and stood there quietly. The 
enemy derided him for a long time on account of the small- 
ness of his force and because he did not dare to fight, but 
he fell upon them while they were taking their dinner, 
threw them into confusion, and put their advance guard to 
flight. While some sprang for their arms, and others tried 
to bridle their horses or to catch those that ran away or to 


V.R. B.C 

564 mount those that would not stand, Diophanes won a most 190 
glorious victory, the Pergameans cheering vociferously from 
the walls, but even then not venturing out. Having killed 
as many as he could in a brief demonstration and taken a 
certain number of prisoners with their horses, he quickly 
returned. The following day he again stationed the Achae- 
ans under the wall, the Pergameans again not going out 
with him. Seleucus approached him with a large body of 
horse and challenged him to battle, but Diophanes did not 
accept the challenge. He kept his station close under the 
wall and watched his opportunity. Seleucus remained till 
midday, when he turned and led his tired horsemen back. 
Then Diophanes fell upon his rear and threw it into confu- 
sion, and after doing all the damage he could, returned 
forthwith to his place under the wall. By continually steal- 
ing upon the enemy in this way whenever they were collect- 
ing forage or wood, and inflicting losses upon them, he 
compelled Seleucus to move away from Pergamus, and 
finally drove him out of Eumenes' territory altogether. 

27. Not long afterward Polyxenidas and the Romans had 
a naval engagement near Myonnesus, in which the former 
had ninety decked ships, and Regillus, the Roman admiral, 
eighty- three, of which twenty-five were from Rhodes. The 
latter were ranged by their commander, Eudorus, on the 
left wing. Seeing Polyxenidas on the other wing extending 
his line much beyond that of the Romans, and fearing lest 
it should be surrounded, he sailed rapidly around there with 
his swift ships and experienced oarsmen, and brought his 
fire-ships against Polyxenidas first, scattering flames every- 
where. The ships of the latter did not dare to meet their 
assailants on account of the fire, but, sailing round and 
round, tried to keep out of the way, shipped much water, 
and were exposed to ramming behind the bows.^ Presently 
a Rhodian ship struck a Sidonian, and the blow being severe 
the anchor of the latter was dislodged and stuck in the 
former, fastening them together. The two ships being im- 
movable the contest between the crews became like a land 
fight. As many others hastened to the aid of each, the 

^ Ba\aaa7)s ^ττίμ^τΧαντο κα.\ h τας ^ττωτίδας ^τύτττοντο. Schweig- 
hauser thought that this sentence ought to be transposed, the shipping 
of water being the usual consequence of ramming. 

§ 27-28] THE SYRIAN WARS 295 

Y.R. B.C. 

564 competition on both sides became spirited, and the Roman 190 
ships broke through the Antiochean line of battle, which 
was exposed in this way, and surrounded the enemy before 
they knew it. When they discovered it there was a flight 
and a pursuit. Twenty-nine of the Antiochean ships were 
lost, thirteen of which were captured with their crews. The 
Romans lost only two vessels. Polyxenidas captured the 
Rhodian ship and brought it to Ephesus. 

Chapter VI 

Consternation of Antiochus — Antiochus sends Proposals to the Scipios 
— Both Armies prepare for Battle — The Roman Formation — Anti- 
ochus draws up his Forces — The Battle of Magnesia — The Mace- 
donian Phalanx broken — Total Defeat of Antiochus 

28. Such was the result of the naval engagement at Myon- 
nesus. Before Antiochus heard of it he was fortifying the 
Chersonesus and Lysimacheia with the greatest care, think- 
ing, as was the fact, that this was very important as a defence 
against the Romans, who would have found it very difficult 
to pass, or to get through the rest of Thrace, if Philip had 
not conducted them. But Antiochus, who was generally 
fickle and light-minded, when he heard of his defeat at 
Myonnesus was completely panic-stricken, and thought that 
his evil genius had conspired against him. Everything had 
turned out contrary to his expectations. The Romans had 
beaten him on the sea, where he thought he was much su- 
perior. The Rhodians had shut Hannibal up in Pamphylia. 
Philip was helping the Romans over the impassable roads, 
whereas Antiochus supposed that he would have a lively 
remembrance of what he had suffered from them. Every- 
thing unnerved him, and the deity took away his reasoning 
powers (as is usually the case when misfortunes multiply), 
so that he abandoned the Chersonesus without cause, even 
before the enemy came in sight, neither carrying away nor 
burning the great stores which he had collected there of 
grain, arms, money, and engines, but leaving all these 
sinews of war in good condition for the enemy. He paid 
no attention to the Lysimacheans who, as though after a 
siege, with lamentations accompanied him in his flight, 


V.R. B.C 

564 together with their wives and children. He was intent only 190 
upon preventing the enemy from crossing at Abydos, and 
rested his last hope of success wholly on that. Yet he was 
so beside himself that he did not even defend the crossing, 
but hastened to reach the interior in advance of the enemy, 
not even leaving a guard at the straits. 

29. When the Scipios learned of his flight they took 
Lysimacheia on their march, possessed themselves of the 
treasure and arms in the Chersonesus, crossed the un- 
guarded Hellespont in haste in order to arrive at Sardis 
before Antiochus, who did not yet know that they had 
crossed. The panic-stricken king, charging his own faults 
to the score of fortune, sent Heraclides the Byzantine to 
the Scipios to treat for peace. He offered to give them 
Smyrna, Alexandria on the Granicus, and Lampsacus, on 
account of which cities the war had been begun, and to pay 
them half the cost of the war. He was authorized if neces- 
sary to surrender the Ionian and ^olian cities which had 
sided with the Romans in the fight and whatever else the 
Scipios might ask. These things Heraclides was to propose 
publicly. He was authorized to promise Publius Scipio 
privately a large sum of money and the surrender of his son, 
whom the king had taken prisoner in Greece as he was sail- 
ing from Chalcis to Demetrias. This son was the Scipio 
who afterwards took and destroyed Carthage, and was the 
second to bear the name of Scipio Africanus.^ He was the 
son of Paulus, who conquered Perseus, king of Macedon, 
and of Scipio's daughter, and had been adopted by Scipio. 
The Scipios in council gave this answer to Heraclides, " If 
Antiochus wishes peace he must surrender not only the 
cities of Ionia and ^olia, but all of Asia this side of Mount 
Taurus, and pay the whole cost of the war incurred on his 
account." Privately Publius said to Heraclides, "If An- 
tiochus had offered these conditions while he still held the 
Chersonesus and Lysimacheia they would have been gladly 
accepted; perhaps so if he were only still guarding the 
passage of the Hellespont. But now that we have crossed 

1 This is an inexcusable blunder. Scipio Africanus the Younger was 
the son of yEmilius Paulus and the adopted son of the son of Scipio 
Africanus the Elder, and was not born till five years after the events 
here mentioned. 

§ 29-31] THE SYRIAN WARS 297 

Y.R. B.C 

564 in safety and have not merely bridled the horse (as the say- 190 
ing is), but mounted him, we cannot consent to such light 
conditions. I thank the king for his proposal and shall 
thank him still more after receiving my son. I will repay 
him now with good advice, that he accept the terms offered 
instead of waiting for severer ones." 

30. After this conference Publius was taken sick and 
withdrew to Elaea, leaving Gnaeus Domitius as his brother's 
counsellor. Antiochus thinking, as Philip of Macedon did, 
that nothing worse than these terms could befall him if he 
were vanquished in war, drew his forces together near the 
plain of Thyatira not far from the enemy, and sent Scipio's 
son to him at Elsea. Scipio advised those who brought his 
son that Antiochus should not fight until he himself should 
return to the army. Antiochus, acting on this advice, 
transferred his camp to Mount Sipylus and fortified it with 
a strong wall. He also interposed the river Phrygius 
between himself and the enemy, so that he should not be 
compelled to fight against his will. Domitius, however, 
in a spirit of ambition, wanted to decide the war himself. 
So he boldly crossed the river and established a camp at a 
distance of twenty stades from Antiochus. Four days in 
succession they both drew up their forces in front of their 
own fortifications, but neither of them began a battle. On 
the fifth day Domitius did the same again and haughtily 
advanced. As Antiochus did not meet him he moved his 
camp nearer. After an interval of one day he announced 
by herald in the hearing of the enemy that he would fight 
Antiochus on the following day whether he was willing or 
not. The latter was perplexed and again changed his mind. 
Although he would have ventured heretofore only to make 
a stand under the wall or to repel the enemy from the wall, 
till Scipio should regain his health, he now thought that 
with superior numbers it would be disgraceful to decline an 
engagement. So he prepared for battle. 

31. Both marched out about the last watch, just before 
daylight. The ordering of the troops on either side was 
as follows. The Roman legionaries, to the number of 
10,000, formed the left wing resting on the river. Behind 
these were 10,000 Italian allies, and both these divisions 
were in files in triple line of battle. Behind the Italians 


564 came the army of Eumenes and about 3000 Achaean pel- 190 
tasts. Thus stood the left, while on the right wing were 
the Roman and Italian cavalry and those of Eumenes, not 
more than 3000 in all. Mingled with all these were light- 
armed troops and bowmen, and around Domitius himself 
were four troops of horse. Altogether they were about 
30,000 strong. Domitius took his station on the right wing 
and placed the consul in the centre. He gave the command 
of the left wing to Eumenes. Considering his African ele- 
phants of no use, being few in number and of small size, 
as those of Africa usually are (and the small ones are afraid 
of the larger), he placed them in the rear of all. Such was 
the Roman line of battle. 

32. The total force of Antiochus was 70,000 and the 
strongest of these was the Macedonian phalanx of 16,000 
men, still arrayed after the fashion of Alexander and Philip. 
These were placed in the centre, divided into ten sections 
of 1600 men each, with fifty men in the front line of each 
section and thirty-two deep. On the flanks of each section 
were twenty- two elephants.^ The appearance of the phalanx 
was like that of a wall, of which the elephants were the 
towers. Such was the arrangement of the infantry of Antio- 
chus. His horse were stationed on either wing, consisting 
of the mail-clad Galatians and the Macedonian corps called 
the Agema, so named because they were picked horsemen. 
An equal number of these were stationed on either side of 
the phalanx. Besides these the right wing had certain 
light-armed troops, and other horsemen with silver shields, 
and 200 mounted archers. On the left were the Galatian 
bands of the Tectosagi, the Trocmi, the Tolistoboii, and 
certain Cappadocians furnished by King Ariarthes, and a 
mingling of other tribes. There was another body of horse, 
mail-clad but light-armed, called the Companion cavalry. 
In this way Antiochus drew up his forces. He seems to 
have placed most reliance on his cavalry, whom he stationed 
in large numbers on his front. The serried phalanx, in 
which he should have placed most confidence, on account 

^ ks δβ τά 9Γλ6ΐ;ρα 4κάστου μ4ρου$ 4\f<pavTes δύο καί Ηκοσιν. This ar- 
rangement requires 220 elephants, an incredible number, whereas Livy 
says that there were two for each of the ten divisions. Evidently the 
words kqX ϋκοσιν should be rejected. 

§32-33] THE SYRIAN WARS 299 

T.R. B.C. 

564 of its high state of discipline, was crowded together unskil- xgo 
fully in a narrow space. Besides the forces enumerated 
there was a great multitude of slingers, archers, javelin 
throwers, and peltasts from Phrygia, Lycia, Pamphylia, 
Pisidia, Crete, Tralles, and Cilicia, armed after the Cretan 
fashion. There were also other mounted archers from the 
Dahae, Mysia, Elymais, and Arabia, riding on swift camels, 
who shot arrows with dexterity from their high position, 
and used very long thin knives when they came to close 
combat. Antiochus also placed scythe-bearing chariots in 
the space between the armies to begin the battle, with 
orders to retire after the first onset. 

33. The appearance of his formation was like that of 
two armies, one to begin the fight, the other held in reserve. 
Each was arranged in a way to strike terror into the enemy 
both by numbers and equipment. Antiochus commanded 
the horse on the right wing in person; his son Seleucus 
commanded the left. Philip, the master of the elephants, 
commanded the phalanx, and Mendis and Zeuxis the skir- 
mishers. The day was dark and gloomy so that the sight 
of the display was obscured and the aim of the missiles of 
all kinds impaired by the misty and murky atmosphere. 
When Eumenes perceived this he disregarded the remainder 
of the enemy's force, and fearing only the onset of the 
scythe-bearing chariots, which were mostly ranged against 
him, he ordered the slingers, archers, and other light-armed 
under his command to circle around the chariots and aim 
at the horses, instead of the drivers, for when a horse 
becomes unmanageable in a chariot all the chariot becomes 
useless. He often breaks the ranks of his own friends, who 
are afraid of the scythes. So it turned out. The horses 
being wounded in great numbers charged with their chariots 
upon their own ranks. The camels were thrown into dis- 
order first, as they were next in line to the chariots, and 
after them the mail-clad horse who could not easily dodge 
the scythes on account of the weight of their armor. Great 
was the tumult and various the disorder started chiefly by 
these runaways and spreading along the whole front, the 
apprehension being even worse than the fact. For, as by 
reason of distance and multitude, discordant cries and 
manifold fears, the truth was not clearly grasped even by 


r.R. B.C. 

564 those near the danger, so these transmitted the alarm con- 190 
stantly magnified to those beyond. 

34. Eumenes, having succeeded admirably in his first 
attempt and cleared the ground held by the camels and 
chariots, led his own horse and those of the Romans and 
Italians in his division against the Galatians, the Cappa- 
docians, and the other collection of mercenaries opposed 
to him, cheering loudly and exhorting them to have no fear 
of these inexperienced men who had been deprived of their 
advance supports. They obeyed him and made so heavy a 
charge that they put to flight not only those, but the adjoin- 
ing squadrons and the mail-clad horse, who were already 
thrown into disorder by the chariots. The greater part of 
these, unable to turn and fly quickly, on account of the 
weight of their armor, were captured or killed. While this 
was the state of affairs on the left of the Macedonian pha- 
lanx, Antiochus, on the right, broke through the Roman 
line of battle, dismembered it, and pursued a long distance. 

35. The Macedonian phalanx, which had been stationed 
between the two bodies of horse in a narrow space in the 
form of a square, when denuded of cavalry on either side, 
had opened to receive the light-armed troops, who had been 
skirmishing in front, and closed again. Thus crowded 
together, Domitius easily enclosed them with his numerous 
light cavalry. Having no opportunity to charge or even 
to deploy their dense mass, they began to suffer severely; 
and they were indignant that military experience availed 
them nothing, exposed as they were on all sides to the 
weapons of the enemy. Nevertheless, they presented their 
thick-set pikes on all four sides. They challenged the 
Romans to close combat and preserved at all times the 
appearance of being about to charge. Yet they did not 
advance, because they were foot-soldiers and heavily armed, 
and saw that the enemy were mounted. Most of all they 
feared to relax their close formation lest they might not 
readily bring it together again. The Romans did not come 
to close quarters nor approach them because they feared 
the discipline, the solidity, and the desperation of this 
veteran corps ; but circled around them and assailed them 
with javelins and arrows, none of which missed their mark 
in the dense mass, who could neither turn the missiles aside 


F.R. B.C. 

564 nor dodge them. After suffering severely in this way they 190 
yielded to necessity and fell back step by step, but with a 
bold front, in perfect order and still formidable to the 
Romans. The latter kept their distance and continued to 
circle around and wound them, until the elephants inside 
the Macedonian phalanx became excited and unmanage- 
able. Then the phalanx broke into disorderly flight. 

36. After he had gained this success, Domitius hastened 
to the camp of Antiochus and overpowered the forces 
guarding it. In the meantime Antiochus, after pursuing 
for a long distance that part of the Roman legionaries op- 
posed to him, came to the Roman camp, where he found 
no guard, either of cavalry or light-armed troops (for Do- 
mitius, thinking that the river afforded sufficient protection, 
had not provided any). But a military tribune, the prefect 
of the camp, hastened to meet him with a body of fresh 
troops and checked his advance, and the fugitives took new 
courage from their comrades and rallied. The king re- 
turned haughty as one who had gained a victory, knowing 
nothing of what had taken place elsewhere. When Attains, 
the brother of Eumenes, with a large body of horse, threw 
himself in his way, Antiochus easily cut through them, but 
he disregarded the enemy, who took to flight before they 
had received much damage. When he discovered his de- 
feat and saw the field of battle strewn with the bodies of his 
own men, horses, and elephants, and his camp already capt- 
ured, he fled precipitately, arriving at Sardis about mid- 
night. From Sardis he went to the town Celsenae, which 
they call Apamea, whither he had been informed that his 
son had fled. On the following day he retreated to Syria, 
leaving officers in Celsense to collect the remains of his 
army. He also sent ambassadors to the consul to treat for 
peace. The latter was engaged in burying his own dead, 
stripping those of the enemy, and collecting prisoners. 
Of the Roman dead there were found twenty-four knights 
and 300 foot-soldiers from the city, being mostly those 
whom Antiochus had slain. Eumenes lost only fifteen of 
his horse. It is believed that the loss of Antiochus, includ- 
ing prisoners, was 50,000. It was not easy to number them 
on account of their multitude. Some of his elephants were 
killed and fifteen were captured. 


Y.R. B.C. 

564 Z90 

Chapter VII 

Antiochus sues for Peace — Scipio's Reply — Treaty ratified — Ac- 
cusations against Scipio — A Similar Accusation against Epami- 
nondas — Manlius succeeds Scipio — A Disaster in Thrace — Rewards 
to Eumenes 

37. After this brilliant victory, to many people quite un- 
expected (for it did not seem at all likely that the smaller 
force, fighting in a strange land, would overcome a much 
larger one so completely, and especially the Macedonian 
phalanx which was then in a high state of discipline and 
valor, and had the reputation of being formidable and in- 
vincible), the friends of Antiochus began to blame him for 
his rashness in quarrelling with the Romans and for his 
want of skill and his bad judgment from the beginning. 
They blamed him for giving up the Chersonesus and Lysim- 
acheia with their arms and apparatus without making any 
defence against the enemy, and for leaving the Hellespont 
unguarded, when even the Romans would not have expected 
to force a passage easily. They accused him of his latest 
blunder in rendering the strongest part of his army useless 
by its cramped position, and for putting his reliance on 
the promiscuous multitude of raw recruits rather than on 
men who had become skilled in military affairs by long 
training, and had been hardened by many wars to the high- 
est state of valor and endurance. While these discussions 
were going on among the friends of Antiochus, the Romans 
were in high spirits and considered no tasks too hard for 
them now, under favor of the gods and their own courage, 
for it brought them great confidence in their own good fort- 
une that such a small number, meeting the enemy on the 
march, in the first battle, in a foreign country, should have 
overcome a much greater number, composed of so many 
peoples, with all the royal preparations, including valiant 
mercenaries and the renowned Macedonian phalanx, and 
the king himself, ruler of this vast empire and surnamed 
the Great, — all in a single day. It became a common 
saying among them, "There ze/^j a king — Antiochus the 

38. While the Romans were thus congratulating them- 

§ 37-3^1 THE SYRIAN WARS 303 

y.R. B.C. 

564 selves the consul gave audience to the ambassadors of An- 190 
tiochus, his brother, Publius, having recovered his health 
and returned from Elsea. These wanted to know on what 
terms Antiochus could be a friend of the Roman people. 
To them Publius made the following reply : " The grasping 
nature of Antiochus has been the cause of his present and 
past misfortunes. While he was the possessor of a vast 
empire, which the Romans did not object to, he seized 
Coele-Syria, which belonged to Ptolemy, his own relative 
and our friend. Then he invaded Europe, \vhich did not 
concern him, subjugated Thrace, fortified the Cherso- 
nesus, and rebuilt Lysimacheia. He passed thence into 
Greece and took away the liberty of the people whom the 
Romans had lately freed, and kept on this course till he 
was defeated in battle at Thermopylae, and put to flight. 
Even then he did not forego his grabbing propensity, for, 
although frequently beaten at sea, he did not seek peace 
until we had crossed the Hellespont. Then he scornfully 
rejected the conditions offered to him, and, again collect- 
ing a vast army and uncounted supplies, he continued the 
war against us, determined to come to an engagement with 
his betters, until he plunged into this great calamity. We 
might properly impose a severer punishment on him for his 
obstinacy in fighting us so persistently, but we are not ac- 
customed to abuse our own prosperity or to aggravate the 
misfortunes of others. We will offer him the same condi- 
tions as before, adding a few which will be equally for our 
own and his future advantage. He must abandon Europe 
altogether and all of Asia this side of the Taurus, the 
boundaries to be fixed hereafter ; he shall surrender all the 
elephants he has, and such number of ships as we may pre- 
scribe, and for the future keep no elephants and only so 
many ships as we allow; must give twenty hostages, whom 
the consul will select, and pay for the cost of the present 
war, incurred on his account, 500 Euboic talents down and 
2500 more when the Senate ratifies the treaty; and 12,000 
more during twelve years, each yearly installment to be 
delivered in Rome. He shall also surrender to us all pris- 
oners and deserters, and to Eumenes whatever remains of 
the possessions he acquired by his agreement with Attains, 
the father of Eumenes. If Antiochus accepts these condi- 


Υ•Κ. B.C• 

564 tions without guile we will grant him peace and friendship 190 
subject to the Senate's ratification." 

39. All the terms offered by Scipio were accepted by the 
ambassadors. That part of the money which was to be 
paid down, and the twenty hostages, were furnished. 
Among the latter was Antiochus, the younger son of Antio- 
chus. The Scipios and Antiochus both sent messengers to 
Rome. The Senate ratified their acts, and a treaty was 
written carrying out Scipio' s views, a few things being 
added or made plain that had been left indefinite. The 
boundaries of the dominions of Antiochus were to be the 
two promontories of Calycadnus and Sarpedonium, beyond 
which he should not sail for purposes of war; He should 
have only twelve war-ships for the purpose of keeping his 
subjects under control, but he might have more if he were 
attacked. He should not recruit mercenaries from Roman 
territory nor entertain fugitives from the same, and the 
hostages should be changed every third year, except the son 

565 of Antiochus. This treaty was engraved on brazen tablets 189 
and deposited in the Capitol (where it was customary to 
deposit such treaties), and a copy of it was sent to Manlius 
Vulso, Scipio' s successor in the command. He adminis- 
tered the oath to the ambassadors of Antiochus at Apamea in 
Phrygia, and Antiochus did the same to the tribune, Ther- 
mus, who was sent for this purpose. This was the end of 
the war between Antiochus the Great and the Romans, and 
some thought that it was by reason of the favor extended 
by Antiochus to Scipio' s son that it went no farther. 

567 40. When Scipio returned, some persons accused him 187 
of this, and two tribunes of the people brought a charge of 
corruption and betrayal of the public interest against him. 
He made light of it and scorned the accusation, and as his 
trial was set for the day which happened to be the anniver- 
sary of his victory over Carthage, he sent victims for sacri- 
fice to the Capitol in advance of his coming, and then 
made his appearance in court clad in festive garments in- 
stead of the mournful and humble garb customary to those 
under accusation, whereby he made a profound impression 
on all and predisposed them favorably as to a high-minded 
citizen conscious of his own rectitude. When he began to 
speak he made no mention of the accusation against him, 

§ 39-41] THE SYRIAN WARS 305 

y.R. B.C. 

567 but detailed the events of his life, what he had done, the 187 
wars he had waged for his country, how he had carried on 
each, and how often he had been victorious. It delighted 
the listeners to hear this grand discourse. When he came 
to the overthrow of Carthage he was roused to the highest 
pitch of eloquence and filled the multitude, as well as him- 
self, with noble rage, saying, " On this very day, Ο citizens, 
I won the victory and laid at you feet Carthage, that had 
lately been such an object of terror to you. Now I am 
going up to the Capitol to offer the sacrifice appointed for 
the day. As many of you as love your country join me in 
the sacrifice, which is offered for your own good." Having 
finished his speech he went to the Capitol, having made no 
allusion to the charge against him. The crowd followed 
him, including most of the judges, with joyful acclama- 
tions, which were continued while he was performing the 
sacrifice. The accusers were nonplussed and did not dare 
to call him to trial again, as that was to no purpose, or to 
charge him with demagogism, because they knew that his 
whole life had been above the reach of suspicion or cal- 

41. In this way Scipio disdained to notice an accusation 
unworthy of his career, being wiser, as I think, than Aris- 
tides when charged with theft, or Socrates when accused as 
he was. Each of these under a like calumny made no 
reply, unless Socrates said what Plato makes him say. 

38s Scipio was more lofty-minded than Epaminondas, too, 369 
when he held the office of Boeotarch with Pelopidas and 
one other. The Thebans gave each of them an army and 
sent them to assist the Arcadians and Messenians, in war 
against the Lacedaemonians, but recalled them on account 
of certain calumnies, before they had accomplished what 
they intended to do. Yet they did not turn over the com- 
mand to their successors for six months, nor until they had 
driven out the Lacedaemonian garrisons and substituted 
Arcadians in their places. Epaminondas had compelled 
his colleagues to take this course and had undertaken that 
they should be held guiltless. When they returned home 
the prosecuting officers put them on trial for their lives, 
separately (for the law made it a capital offence to withhold 
by force a command which had been assigned to another), 

VOL. 1 — X 


Y.R. B.C. 

385 but the other two escaped punishment by exciting pity and 369 
by long speeches, putting the blame on Epaminondas, who 
had authorized them to say this and who so testified while 
they were speaking. He was tried last. "I acknowledge," 
he said, " that I retained the command beyond my time, 
contrary to law, and that I coerced those whom you have 
just acquitted. Nor do I deprecate the death penalty, 
since I have broken the law. I only, ask, for my past ser- 
vices, that you inscribe on my tomb, 'Here lies the victor 
of Leuctra. Although his country had not dared to face 
this enemy, or even a stranger that wore the Doric cap, he led 
his fellow-citizens to the very doors of Sparta. His country 
put him to death for violating the laws for her own good.' " 
After saying this he stepped down from the rostrum and 
offered to surrender his person to those who wished to diag 
him to punishment. The judges, moved to shame by the 
speech, and to admiration of the defence, and to reverence 
for the man who had spoken, did not wait to take the vote, 
but ran out of the court-room. The reader may compare 
these cases together as he likes. 

565 42. Manlius, who succeeded Scipio as consul, went to zSg 
the countries taken from Antiochus and regulated them. 
The Tolistoboii, one of the Galatian tribes in alliance with 
Antiochus, had taken refuge on Mount Olympus in Mysia. 
With great difficulty Manlius ascended the mountain and 
pursued them as they fled until he had killed and hurled 
over the rocks so large a number that it was impossible to 
count them. He took 40,000 of them prisoners and 
burned their arms, and as it was impossible to take about 
with him so many captives while the war was continuing, 
he gave them to the neighboring barbarians. Among the 
Tectosagi and the Trocmi he fell into danger by ambush 
and barely escaped. He came back against them, however, 
and found them packed together in a great crowd in camp. 
He enclosed them with his light-armed troops and rode 
around ordering his men to shoot them at a distance, but 
not to come in contact with them. The crowd was so dense 
that no dart missed its mark. He killed 8000 of them and 
pursued the remainder beyond the river Halys. Ariarthes, 
king of Cappadocia, who had sent military aid to Antio- 
chus, became alarmed and sent entreaties, and 200 talents 

§ 42-44] THE SYRIAN WARS 307 

Y.R. Β C. 

566 in money besides, by which means he kept Manlius out of 188 
his country. The latter returned to the Hellespont with 
vast treasures, uncounted money, and an army laden with 

43. Manlius had done well so far, but he managed very 
badly afterward. He scorned to go home by water in the 
summer time. He made no account of the burden he was 
carrying. He neglected to keep the army in good disci- 
pline while on the march, because it was not going to war, 
but returning home with its spoils. He marched by a long, 
narrow, and difficult road through Thrace in a stifling heat. 
Nor did he send word to Philip of Macedonia to meet and 
escort him. He did not divide his army into parts, so that 
it might move more lightly and have what was needed more 
handy. Nor did he keep his baggage in good order for 
easy defence. He led his army higgledy-piggledy, all 
strung out, with the baggage in the centre of the line, so 
that neither the vanguard nor the rear-guard could render 
assistance quickly by reason of the length and narrowness 
of the road. So, when the Thracians attacked him in flank 
from all directions, he lost a large part of the spoils, and of 
the public money, and of the army itself. He escaped into 
Macedonia with the remainder — by which means it became 
very plain how great a service Philip had rendered by es- 
corting the Scipios, and how Antiochus had blundered in 
abandoning the Chersonesus. Manlius passed from Mace- 
donia into Thessaly, and thence into Epirus, crossed to 
Brundusium, dismissed what was left of his army to their 
homes, and returned to Rome. 

44. The Rhodians and Eumenes, king of Pergamus, were 
very proud of their share in the alliance against Antiochus. 
Eumenes set out for Rome in person and the Rhodians sent 
envoys. The Senate gave to the Rhodians Lycia and Caria, 
which they took away from them soon afterward, because 
in the war with Perseus, king of Macedonia, they showed 
themselves rather favorable to him. They bestowed upon 
Eumenes all the rest of the territory taken from Antiochus, 
except the Greek cities in Asia. Of the latter, those that 
were formerly tributary to Attains, the father of Eumenes, 
were ordered to pay tribute to Eumenes, while those which 
formerly paid to Antiochus were released from tribute 


Y.R. B.C. 

566 altogether and made independent. In this way the Romans x88 
disposed of the lands they had gained in the war. 

Chapter VIII 

The Successors of Antiochus the Great — Antiochus Epiphanes — 
Antiochus Eupator — Demetrius Soter — Tigranes, King of Armenia, 
conquers Syria — Pompey seizes it for the Romans — Also Phoenicia 
and Palestine — Later History of Syria 

567 45. Afterward, on the death of Antiochus the Great, his 187 
son Seleucus succeeded him. He gave his son Demetrius 
as a hostage in place of his brother Antiochus. When the 
latter arrived at Athens on his way home, Seleucus was as- 
sassinated as the result of a conspiracy of a certain Helio- 
dorus, one of the court officers. When Heliodorus sought 
to possess himself of the government he was driven out by 
Eumenes and Attalus, who installed Antiochus therein in 
order to secure his good-will; for, by reason of certain 
bickerings, they had already grown suspicious of the Ro- 
mans. Thus Antiochus, the son of Antiochus the Great, 
ascended the throne of Syria. He was called Epiphanes 
(the Illustrious) by the Syrians, because when the govern- 

579 ment was seized by usurpers he showed himself to be their 175 
true sovereign. By cementing the friendship and alliance 
of Eumenes he governed Syria and the neighboring nations 
with a firm hand. He appointed Timarchus as satrap of 
Babylon and Heraclides as treasurer, two brothers, both of 
whom had been his favorites. He made an expedition 
against Artaxias, king of Armenia, and took him prisoner. 

590 46. Epiphanes died, leaving a son, Antiochus, nine years 164 
of age, to whom the Syrians gave the name of Eupator, in 
commemoration of his father's bravery. The boy was edu- 
cated by Lysias. The Senate was glad that this Antiochus, 
who had early shown himself high spirited, died young. 
When Demetrius, the son of Seleucus and nephew of Antio- 
chus Epiphanes (grandson of Antiochus the Great and first 
cousin of this boy), at this time a hostage at Rome, and 
twenty-three years old, asked that he should be installed in 
the kingdom as belonging to him rather than to the boy, 
the Senate would not allow it. They thought that it would 

§ 45-48] THE SYRIAN WARS 309 

y.R. B.C. 

590 be more for their advantage that Syria should be governed 164 
by an immature boy than by a full-grown man. Learning 
that there were many elephants in Syria and more ships 
than had been allowed to Antiochus in the treaty, they sent 
ambassadors thither, who killed the elephants and burned 
the ships. It was a pitiful sight, the killing of these rare 
and tame beasts and the burning of the ships. A certain 
Leptines of Laodicea was so exasperated by the sight that 
he stabbed Gnaeus Octavius, the chief of this embassy, while 
he was anointing himself in the gymnasium at that place, 
and Lysias buried him. 

47. Demetrius came before the Senate again and asked 
at all events to be released as a hostage, since he had been 
given as a substitute for Antiochus, who was now dead. 
When his request was not granted he escaped secretly by 

592 boat. As the Syrians received him gladly, he ascended the 163 
throne after having put Lysias to death and the boy with 
him. He removed Heraclides from office and killed Ti- 
marchus, who rebelled and who had administered the gov- 
ernment of Babylon badly in other respects. For this he 
received the surname of Soter (the Protector), which was 
first bestowed upon him by the Babylonians. When he 
was firmly established in the kingdom he sent a crown val- 
ued at 10,000 pieces of gold to the Romans as the gift of 
their former hostage, and also delivered up Leptines, the 
murderer of Octavius. They accepted the crown, but not 
Leptines, because they intended to hold the Syrians respon- 

595 sible for that crime. Demetrius took the government of 159 
Cappadocia away from Ariarthes and gave it to Olophemes, 
who was supposed to be the brother of Ariarthes, receiving 
1000 talents therefor. The Romans, however, decided that 
as brothers both Ariarthes and Olophernes should reign 

48. These princes were deprived of the kingdom — and 
their successor, Ariobarzanes, also, a little later — by Mith- 
ridates, king of Pontus. The Mithridatic war grew out of 
this event, among others, — a very great war, full of vicissi- 
tudes to many nations and lasting nearly forty years. 
During this time Syria had many kings, succeeding each 
other at brief intervals, but all of the royal lineage, and 
there were many changes and revolts from the dynasty. 


Y.R. B.4 

595 The Parthians, who had previously revolted from the rule x5< 
of the Seleucidae, seized Mesopotamia, which had been 
subject to that house. Tigranes, the son of Tigranes, king 
of Armenia, who had annexed many neighboring principali- 
ties, and from these exploits had acquired the title of King 
of Kings, attacked the Seleucidae because they would not 
acknowledge his supremacy. Antiochus Pius was not able 

671 to withstand him. Tigranes conquered all of the Syrian g; 
peoples this side of the Euphrates as far as Egypt. He 
took Cilicia at the same time (for this was also subject to 
the Seleucidae) and put his general, Magadates, in command 
of all these conquests for fourteen years. 

68s 49• When the Roman general, Lucullus, was pursuing 6 
Mithridates, who had taken refuge in the territory of Ti- 
granes, Magadates went with his army to Tigranes' assist- 
ance. Thereupon Antiochus, the son of Antiochus Pius, 
entered Syria clandestinely and assumed the government 
with the consent of the people. Nor did Lucullus, who 
first made war on Tigranes and wrested his newly acquired 
territory from him, object to Antiochus exercising his an- 

688 cestral authority. But Pompey, the successor of Lucullus, 6< 
when he had overthrown Mithridates, allowed Tigranes to 
reign in Armenia and expelled Antiochus from the govern- 
ment of Syria, although he had done the Romans no wrong. 
The real reason for this was that it was easy for Pompey, 
with an army under his command, to rob an unarmed king, 
but the pretence was that it was unseemly for the Seleucidae, 
whom Tigranes had dethroned, to govern Syria, rather than 
the Romans who had conquered Tigranes. 

50. In this way the Romans, without fighting, came into 
possession of Cilicia and both inland Syria and Coele-Syria, 
Phoenicia, Palestine, and all the other countries bearing the 
Syrian name from the Euphrates to Egypt and the sea. The 

691 Jewish nation still resisted, and Pompey conquered them, 6; 
sent their king, Aristobulus, to Rome, and destroyed their 
greatest, and to them holiest, city, Jerusalem, as Ptolemy, 
the first king of Egypt, had formerly done. It was after- 
ward rebuilt and Vespasian destroyed it again, and Hadrian 
did the same in our time. On account of these rebellions 
the tribute imposed upon all Jews is heavier per capita than 
upon the generality of taxpayers. The annual tax on the 

§49-50 'Γ^^ SYRIAN WARS 3II 

r.R. B.C. 

691 S5n:ians and Cilicians is one per cent, of the valuation of 03 
the property of each. Pompey put the various nations that 
had belonged to the Seleucidae under kings or chiefs of their 
own. In like manner he confirmed the four chiefs of the 
Galatians in Asia, who had cooperated with him in the 
Mithridatic war, in their tetrarchies. Not long afterward 
they all came gradually under the Roman rule, mostly in 
the time of Augustus. 

51. Pompey now put Scaurus, who had been his quaestor 
in the war, in charge of Syria, and the Senate afterward 
appointed Marcius Philippus as his successor and Lentulus 
Marcellinus as the successor of Philippus, both being of 
praetorian rank. Much of the biennial term of each was 
consumed in warding off the attacks of the neighboring 
Arabs. It was on account of these events in Syria that 
Rome began to appoint for Syria proconsuls, so-called, with 
power to levy troops and engage in war like consuls. The 
first of these sent out with an army was Gabinius. As he 

699 was in readiness to begin the war, Mithridates, king of the ss 
Parthians, who had been driven out of his kingdom by his 
brother, Orodes, persuaded Gabinius to turn his forces from 
the Arabs against the Parthians. At the same time Ptolemy 
XI., king of Egypt, who likewise had lost his throne, pre- 
vailed upon him by a large sum of money to turn his arms 
from the Parthians against Alexandria. Gabinius over- 

700 came the Alexandrians and restored Ptolemy to power, but 54 
was himself banished by the Senate for invading Egypt 
without their authority, and undertaking a war considered 
ill-omened by the Romans; for it was forbidden by the 
Sibylline books. I think that Crassus succeeded Gabinius 
in the government of Syria — the same who met with a great 
disaster when waging war against the Parthians. While 

703 Lucius Bibulus was in command of Syria after Crassus, the sx 
Parthians made an incursion into that country. While the 

714 government was in charge of Saxa, the successor of Bibulus, 40 
they overran the country as far as Ionia, the Romans being 
then occupied by the civil wars. I shall deal with these 
events more particularly in my Parthian history. 

3 1 2 APPIAN'S HISTOR Υ [Βκ. XI, Ch. IX 

Chapter IX 

Syria at the Death of Alexander the Great — Seleucus Nicator — The 
Extent of the Empire — Oracles and Prodigies concerning Seleucus 
— Cities founded by him — Seleucia-on-the-Tigris 

52. In this book of Syrian history I have told how the 
Romans came into possession of Syria, and how they brought 
it to its present condition. It will not be amiss to tell how 
the Macedonians, who ruled Syria before the Romans, ac- 
quired the same country. After the Persians, Alexander 
became the sovereign of Syria as well as of all other peoples 
whom he found. He died leaving one son very small and 

431 another yet unborn. The Macedonians, who were loyal to 333 
the race of Philip, chose Ardiaeus, the brother of Alexander, 
as king during the minority of Alexander's sons, although 
he was considered to be hardly of sound mind, and they 
changed his name from Ardiaeus to Philip. They also kept 
careful guard over the wife, who was enceinte. Meanwhile 
Alexander's friends continued in charge of the conquered 
nations, divided into satrapies, which Perdiccas parcelled 
among them by the authority of King Philip. Not long 
afterward, when the true kings died, these satraps became 
kings. The first satrap of Syria was Laomedon of Mitylene, 
who derived his authority from Perdiccas and from Anti- 
pater, who succeeded the latter as prime minister. To this 
Laomedon, Ptolemy, the satrap of Egypt, came with a fleet 
and offered him a large sum of money if he would hand 
over Syria to him, because it was well situated for defend- 
ing Egypt and for attacking Cyprus. When Laomedon re- 
fused Ptolemy seized him. Laomedon bribed his guards 
and escaped to Alcetas in Caria. Thus Ptolemy ruled 
Syria for a while, left a garrison there, and returned to 

433 53• Antigonus was satrap of Phrygia, Lycia, and Pam- 321 
phylia. Having been left as overseer of all Asia when 
Antipater went to Europe, he besieged Eumenes, the satrap 
of Cappadocia, who had been publicly declared an enemy 
of the Macedonians. The latter fled and brought Media 
under his power, but Antigonus afterward captured and 
killed him. When he returned he was received magnifi- 

§52-54] THE SYRIAN WARS 313 

Y.R. B.C 

438 cently by Seleucus, the satrap of Babylon. One day Seleu- 316 
cus punished one of the governors without consulting 
Antigonus, who was present, and the latter became angry 
and demanded an accounting of his money and possessions. 
As Seleucus was inferior to Antigonus in power he fled to 
Ptolemy in Egypt. Thereupon Antigonus removed Blitor, 
the governor of Mesopotamia, from office, because he 
allowed Seleucus to escape, and took upon himself the gov- 
ernment of Babylon, Mesopotamia, and all the countries 
from Media to the Hellespont, Antipater having died in 
the meantime. The other satraps at once became envious 
of his possession of so large a share of the territory; for 
which reason chiefly, and at the instance of Seleucus, 
Ptolemy, Lysimachus, the satrap of Thrace, and Cassander, 
the son of Antipater and leader of the Macedonians after 
his father's death, entered into a league with each other. 
They sent a joint embassy to Antigonus and demanded that 
he should share with them and with the other Macedonians 
who had lost their satrapies, his newly acquired lands and 
money. Antigonus treated their demand with scorn, and 
they jointly made war against him. Antigonus prepared to 
meet them. He drove out all of Ptolemy's garrisons in 
Syria and stripped him of all the possessions that he still 
retained in Phoenicia and Coele-Syria. 

54. Then he marched beyond the Cilician gates, leaving 
his son Demetrius, who was about twenty-two years of age, 
at Gaza with an army to meet Ptolemy, who was coming 
from Egypt, but the latter defeated the young man badly 
in a battle near Gaza and compelled him to fly to his father. 

442 Ptolemy immediately sent Seleucus to Babylon to resume 313 
the government and gave him 1000 foot-soldiers and 300 
horse for the purpose. With this small force Seleucus took 
Babylon, the inhabitants receiving him with enthusiasm, 
and within a short time he augmented his power greatly. 
Nevertheless Antigonus warded off the attack of Ptolemy 
and gained a splendid naval victory over him near Cyprus, 
in which his son Demetrius was the commander. On ac- 
count of this very notable exploit the army began to call 
both Antigonus and Demetrius kings, as their own kings 
(Ardiseus, the son of Philip and Olympias, and the two 
sons of Alexander) were now dead. Ptolemy's army also 


r.R. B.C. 

443 saluted him as king lest by inferiority of rank he should be 3" 
deemed less lofty than the victors in the late battle. Thus 
for these men similar consequences followed contrary 
events. All the others followed suit, and all the satraps 
became kings. 

55. In this way Seleucus became king of Babylonia. 
He also acquired the kingdom of Media, slaying with his 
own hand in battle Nicator whom Antigonus had left as 
satrap of that country. He afterward waged many wars 
with Macedonians and barbarians. The two principal 
ones were with Macedonians, the second with Lysimachus, 
king of Thrace, the first with Antigonus at Ipsus in Phrygia, 
where Antigonus commanded in person and fought in per- 
son although he was above eighty years of age. Antigonus 

453 was killed in battle, and then all the kings who had been 301 
in league with Seleucus against him divided his territory 
among themselves. At this division all Syria from the 
Euphrates to the sea, also inland Phrygia, fell to the lot of 
Seleucus. Always lying in wait for the neighboring nations, 
strong in arms and persuasive in council, he acquired 
Mesopotamia, Armenia, the so-called Seleucid Cappadocia, 
the Persians, Parthians, Bactrians, Arabs, Tapyri, Sogdiani, 
Arachotes, Hyrcanians, and other adjacent peoples that 
had been subdued by Alexander, as far as the river Indus, 
so that the boundaries of his empire were the most exten- 
sive in Asia after that of Alexander. The whole region 
from Phrygia to the Indus was subject to Seleucus. He 
crossed the Indus and waged war with Androcottus, king of 
the Indians, who dwelt on the banks of that stream, until 
they came to an understanding with each other and con- 
tracted a marriage relationship. Some of these exploits 
were performed before the death of Antigonus and some 

56. It is said that while he was still serving under Alex- 
ander and following him in the war against the Persians 
he consulted the Didymaean oracle to inquire about his 
return to Macedonia and that he received for answer : — 

" Do not hurry back to Europe; Asia will be much better 
for you." 

It was said also that in Macedonia a great fire burst forth 
on his ancestral hearth without anybody lighting it; also 

§55-57] THE SYRIAN WARS 315 

453 that his mother saw in a dream that whatever ring she found 301 
she should give him to carry, and that he should be king 
at the place where he should lose the ring. She did find 
an iron ring with an anchor engraved on it, and he lost it 
near the Euphrates. It is said that at a later period, when 
he was returning to recover Babylon, he stumbled against a 
stone and that when he caused this stone to be dug up an 
anchor was found under it. When the soothsayers were 
alarmed at this prodigy, thinking that it portended delay, 
Ptolemy, the son of Lagus, who accompanied the expedi- 
tion, said that an anchor was a sign of safety, not of delay. 
For this reason Seleucus, when he became king, used an 
engraved anchor for his signet-ring. Some say that while 
Alexander was still alive and looking on, another omen of 
the future power of Seleucus was made manifest in this wise. 
After Alexander had returned from India to Babylon and 
while he was sailing around the Babylonian lagoons with a 
view to the irrigation of the Assyrian fields from the Eu- 

431 phrates, a wind struck him and carried away his diadem 323 
and hung it on a bunch of reeds growing on the tomb of an 
ancient king. This of itself signified the early death of 
Alexander. They say that a sailor swam after it, put it on his 
own head, and, without wetting it, brought it to Alexander, 
who gave him at once a silver talent as a reward for his 
kind service. The soothsayers advised putting the man to 
death. Some say that Alexander followed their advice. 
Others say the contrary. Other narrators skip that part of 
the story and say that it was no sailor at all, but Seleucus 
who swam after the king's diadem, and that he put it on 
his own head to avoid wetting it. The signs turned out 
true as to both of them in the end, for Alexander de- 
parted from life in Babylon and Seleucus became the ruler 
of a larger part of his dominions than any other of Alex- 
ander's successors. 

57. Such are the prophecies I have heard of concerning 
Seleucus. Directly after the death of Alexander he became 
the leader of the Companion cavalry, which Hephsestion, 
and afterwards Perdiccas, commanded during the life of 
Alexander. After commanding the horse he became satrap 
of Babylon, and after satrap, king. As he was very suc- 
cessful in war he acquired the surname of Nicator. At 

3 1 6 APPIAN'S HISTOR Υ [Βκ. XI, Ch. IX 

442- least that seems more probable than that he received it 3x2- 
^7^ from the killing of Nicator. He was of such a large and'^ 
powerful frame that once when a wild bull was brought for 
sacrifice to Alexander and broke loose from his ropes, 
Seleucus held him alone, with nothing but his hands, for 
which reason his statues are ornamented with horns. He 
built cities throughout the entire length of his dominions 
and named sixteen of them Antioch after his father, five 
Laodicea after his mother, nine after himself, and four 
after his wives, that is, three Apamea and one Stratonicea. 
Of these the two most renowned at the present time are the 
two Seleucias, one on the sea and the other on the river 
Tigris, Laodicea in Phoenicia, Antioch under Mount Leba- 
non, and Apamea in Syria. To others he gave names 
from Greece or Macedonia, or from his own exploits, or in 
honor of Alexander; whence it comes to pass that in Syria 
and among the barbarous regions of upper Asia many of 
the towns bear Greek and Macedonian names, such as 
Berrhoea, Edessa, Perinthus, Maronea, Callipolis, Achaia, 
Pella, Orophus, Amphipolis, Arethusa, Astacus, Tegea, 
Chalcis, Larissa, Heraea, and Apollonia; in Parthia also 
Sotera, Calliope, Char is, Hecatompylos, Achaia; in India 
Alexandropolis; in Scythia Alexandreschata. From the 
victories of Seleucus come the names of Nicephorium in 
Mesopotamia and of Nicopolis in Armenia very near 

58. They say that when he was about to build the two 
Seleucias a portent of thunder preceded the foundation of 
the one by the sea, for which reason he consecrated thun- 
der as a divinity of the place. Accordingly the inhabi- 
tants worship thunder and sing its praises to this day. They 
say, also, that when the Magi were ordered to indicate the 
propitious day and hour for beginning the foundations of 
Seleucia-on-the-Tigris they falsified as to the hour because 
they did not want to have such a stronghold built against 
themselves. While the king was waiting in his tent for the 
appointed hour, and the army, in readiness to begin the 
work, stood quietly till Seleucus should give the signal, 
suddenly, at the true hour of destiny, they seemed to hear 
a voice ordering them on. So they sprang to their work 
with such alacrity that the heralds who tried to stop them 

§58-59] ' THE SYRIAr^ WARS 317 

Y.R. B.C. 

442- were not able to do so. When the work was brought to an 3"- 
*^^ end Seleucus, being troubled in his mind, again made in- *^ 
quiry of the Magi concerning his city, and they, having first 
secured a promise of impunity, replied, "That which is 
fated, Ο King, whether it be for better or worse, neither 
man nor city can change, for there is a fate for cities as well 
as for men. It pleases the gods that this city shall endure 
for ages, because it was begun on the hour on which it was 
begun. We feared lest it should be a stronghold against 
ourselves, and falsified the appointed time. Destiny is 
stronger than crafty Magi or an unsuspecting king. For 
that reason the deity announced the more propitious hour 
to the army. It is permitted you to know these things so 
surely that you need not suspect us of deception still, for 
you were presiding over the army yourself, as king, and you 
had yourself ordered them to wait; but the army, ever obe- 
dient to you in facing danger and toil, could not now be 
restrained, even when you gave them the order to stop, but 
sprang to their work, not a part of them merely, but all 
together, and their officers with them, thinking that the 
order had been given. In fact it had been given. That 
was the reason why not even you could hold them back. 
What can be stronger in human affairs than a king, unless 
it be a god, who overcame your intention and supplanted 
us in giving you directions about the city; for the god is 
in hostility to us and to all the people round about? What 
can our resources avail hereafter with a more powerful race 
settled along side of us? This city of yours has had a fort- 
unate beginning, it will be great and enduring. We beg 
that you will confirm your pardon of our fault which we 
committed from fear of the loss of our own prosperity." 
The king was pleased with what the Magi said and pardoned 
them. This is what I have heard about Seleucia. 

Chapter X 

Seleucus, Antiochus, and Stratonice — Seleucus divides his Kingdom — 
Death of Seleucus — Death of Lysimachus 

461 59. Seleucus, while still living, appointed his son. An- «93 
tiochus, king of upper Asia in place of himself. If this 

3 1 8 APPIAN'S HISTOR Υ [Βκ. XI, Ch. X 

Y.R. B.C. 

461 seems noble and kingly on his part, even nobler and wiser 293 
was his behavior in reference to his son's falling in love, 
and his self-restraint in suffering; for Antiochus was in 
love with Stratonice, the wife of Seleucus, his own step- 
mother, who had already borhe a child to Seleucus. Rec- 
ognizing the wickedness of this passion, Antiochus did 
nothing wrong, nor did he show his feelings, but he fell 
sick, took to his bed, and longed for death. Nor could 
the celebrated physician, Erasistratus, who was serving 
Seleucus at a very high salary, form any diagnosis of his 
malady. At length, observing that his body was free from 
all the symptoms of disease, he conjectured that this was 
some condition of the mind, through which the body is 
often strengthened or weakened by sympathy. Grief, 
anger, and other passions disclose themselves; love only 
is concealed by the modest. As Antiochus would confess 
nothing when the physician asked him in confidence, he 
took a seat by his side and watched the changes of his 
body to see how he was affected by each person who entered 
his room. He found that when others came the patient 
was all the time weakening and wasting away at a uniform 
pace, but when Stratonice came to visit him his mind was 
greatly agitated by the struggles of modesty and conscience, 
and he remained silent. But his body in spite of himself 
became more vigorous and lively, and when she went away 
he became weaker again. So the physician told Seleucus 
that his son had an incurable disease. The king was over- 
whelmed with grief and cried aloud. Then the physician 
added, "His disease is love, love for a woman, but a 
hopeless love." 

60. Seleucus was astonished that there could be any 
woman whom he, king of Asia, could not prevail upon to 
marry such a son as his, by entreaties, by gold, by gifts, by 
the whole of this great kingdom, the eventual inheritance 
of the sick prince, which the father would give to him even 
now, if he wished it, in order to save him. Desiring to 
learn only one thing more, he asked, " Who is this woman ? " 
Erasistratus replied, "He is in love with my wife." "Well 
then, my good fellow," rejoined Seleucus, "since you are 
so bound to us by friendship and favors, and are a model 
of goodness and wisdom in matters of small moment, will 

§6o-6i] THE SYRIAN WARS 3 19 

■ •R• BaC• 

461 you not save this princely young man for me, the son of 393 
your friend and king, unfortunate in love but virtuous, who 
has concealed his sinful passion and prefers to die rather 
than confess it? Do you so despise Antiochus? Do you 
despise his father also?" Then Erasistratus changed his 
tactics, and, as though he were giving him a knock-down 
argument, said, " You would not give Antiochus your wife 
if he were in love with her, although you are his father." 
Seleucus swore by all the gods of his royal house that he 
would willingly and cheerfully give her, and make himself 
an illustrious example of a kind and good father to a chaste 
son who controlled his passion and did not deserve such 
suffering. Much more he added of the same sort, and, 
finally, began to lament that he could not himself be the 
physician to his unhappy boy, but must needs depend on 
Erasistratus in this matter also. 

6 1 . When Erasistratus saw that the king was in earnest 
and not hypocritical, he told the whole truth. He related 
how he had discovered the nature of the malady, and how 
he had detected the secret passion. Seleucus was over- 
joyed, but it was a difficult matter to persuade his son and 
not less so to persuade his wife; but he succeeded finally. 
Then he assembled his army, which was perhaps expecting 
something of the kind, and told them of his exploits and 
of the extent of his empire, showing that it surpassed that 
of any of the other successors of Alexander, and saying that 
as he was now growing old it was hard for him to govern it 
on account of its size. "I wish," he said, "to divide it, 
and so at the same time to provide for your safety in the 
future and give a part of it now to those who are dearest to 
me. It is fitting that all of you, who had advanced to such 
greatness of dominion and power under me since the time 
of Alexander, should cooperate with me in everything. 
The dearest to me, and well worthy to reign, are my grown- 
up son and my wife. As they are young, I pray they may 
soon have children to be an ample guarantee to you of the 
permanency of the dynasty. I will join them in marriage 
in your presence and will send them to be sovereigns of the 
upper provinces now. And I charge you that none of the 
customs of the Persians and other nations is more worthy 
of observance than this one law, which is common to all 


Y.R• BaC• 

461 of thera, 'That what the king ordains is always right.' "293 
When he had thus spoken the army shouted that he was the 
greatest king of all the successors of Alexander and the 
best father. Seleucus laid the same injunctions on Stra- 
tonice and his son, then joined them in marriage, and sent 
them to their kingdom, showing himself even stronger in 
this famous act than in his deeds of arms. 

62. Seleucus had seventy-two satraps under him, so ex- 
tensive was the territory over which he ruled. The greater 
part he had transferred to his son, but he continued to reign 
over the country which lies between the Euphrates and the 
sea. The last war that he waged was with Lysimachus, for 
the possession of Phrygia on the Hellespont. Lysimachus 

473 was defeated and slain in battle. Then Seleucus crossed 381 
the Hellespont in order to possess himself of Lysimacheia, 
but he was killed by Ptolemy Ceraunus who accompanied 
him. This Ceraunus was the son of Ptolemy Soter and 
Euridice, the daughter of Antipater. He had left Egypt 
from fear, because his father had decided to leave the 
kingdom to his youngest son. Seleucus had received 
him as the unfortunate son of his friend, and thus he sup- 
ported, and took around with himself everywhere, his own 

474 63. Thus Seleucus died at the age of seventy- three, 380 
having reigned forty-two years. It seems to me that the 
oracle hit the mark in his case when it said to him, " Do 
not hurry back to Europe; Asia will be much better for 
you," for Lysimacheia is in Europe, and he then crossed 
over to Europe for the first time after leaving it with the 
army of Alexander. It is said also that once when he con- 
sulted an oracle in reference to his own death he received 
this answer: — 

" If you keep away from Argos you will reach your allotted 
year, but if you approach that place you will die before 
your time." 

There is an Argos in Peloponnesus, another in Amphi- 
lochia, another in Orestea (whence come the Macedonian 
Argeadae), and the one on the Ionian sea, said to have 
been built by Diomedes during his wanderings, — all these, 
and every place named Argos in every other country, Seleu- 
cus inquired about and avoided. While he was advancing 

§62-64] THE SYRIAN WARS 32 1 

Y.R. B.C. 

474 from the Hellespont to Lysimacheia a splendid great altar 280 
presented itself to his view, which he was told had been 
built either by the Argonauts on their way to Colchis, or by 
the Achseans who besieged Troy, for which reason the people 
in the neighborhood still called it Argos, either by a cor- 
ruption of the name of the ship Argo^ or from the native 
place of the sons of Atreus. While he was learning these 
things he was killed by Ptolemy, who stabbed him in the 
back. Philetaerus, the prince of Pergamus, bought the body 
of Seleucus from Ceraunus for a large sum of money, burned 
it, and sent the ashes to his son Antiochus. The latter 
deposited them at Seleucia-by-the-Sea, where he erected a 
temple to his father on consecrated ground, to which ground 
he gave the name of Nicatoreum. 

64. I have heard that Lysimachus, who was one of the 
armor-bearers of Alexander, was once running by his side 
for a long distance, and, being fatigued, took hold of the . 
tail of the king's horse and continued to run; that he was 
struck in the forehead by the point of the king's spear, 
which opened one of his veins from which the blood flowed 
profusely; that Alexander, for want of a bandage, bound up 
the wound with his own diadem which was thus saturated 
with blood; and that Aristandrus, Alexander's soothsayer, 
when he saw Lysimachus carried away wounded in this 
manner, said, "That man will be a king, but he will reign 
with toil and trouble." He reigned nearly forty years, 
counting those in which he was satrap, and he did reign 
with toil and trouble. He fell in battle, while still com- 
manding his army, at the age of seventy. Seleucus did 
not long survive him. Lysimachus* dog watched his body 
lying on the ground for a long time, and kept it unharmed 
by birds or beasts until Thorax of Pharsalia found and 
buried it. Some say that he was buried by his own son, 
Alexander, who fled to Seleucus from fear when Lysimachus 
put to death his other son, Agathocles; that he searched 
for the body a long time and found it at last by means of 
the dog, and that it was already partly decomposed. The 
Lysimacheians deposited the bones in their temple and 
named the temple itself the Lysimacheum. Thus did these 
two kings, the bravest and most renowned for bodily size, 
come to their end at nearly the same time, one of them at 

VOL. I — γ 


474 the age of seventy, the other three years older, and bothaSo 
fighting with their own hands until the day of their death. 

Chapter XI 

The Successors of Seleucus — Demetrius Soter — Palace Conspiracies 

— End of the Seleucidse 

65. After the death of Seleucus, the kingdom of Syria 
passed in regular succession from father to son as follows : 
the first was the same Antiochus who fell in love with his 
stepmother, to whom was given the surname of Soter (the 
Protector) for driving out the Gauls who had made an in- 
cursion into Asia from Europe. The second was another 
Antiochus, bom of this marriage, who received the surname 
of Theos(the Divine) from the Milesians in the first instance, 
because he slew their tyrant, Timarchus. This Theos was 
poisoned by his wife. He had two wives, Laodice and 
Berenice, the former a love-match, the latter a daughter 
pledged to him by Ptolemy Philadelphus. Laodice assas- 
sinated him and afterward Berenice and her child. Ptolemy, 
the son of Philadelphus, avenged these crimes by killing 
Laodice. He invaded Syria and advanced as far as Baby- 
lon. The Parthians now began their revolt, taking advan- 
tage of the confusion in the house of the Seleucidae. 

508 66. Seleucus, the son of Theos and Laodice, surnamed 246 
Callinicus (the Triumphant), succeeded Theos as king of 

528 Syria. After Seleucus his two sons, Seleucus and Antio- 226 
chus, succeeded in the order of their age. As Seleucus was 
sickly and poor and unable to command the obedience of 
the army, he was poisoned by a court conspiracy in the 

530 second year of his reign. His brother was Antiochus the 224 
Great, who went to war with the Romans, of whom I have 

567 written above. He reigned thirty-seven years. I have ,87 
already spoken of his two sons, Seleucus and Antiochus, 
both of whom ascended the throne. The former reigned 
twelve years, but feebly and without success by reason of 

579 his father's misfortune. Antiochus (Kpiphanes) reigned 175 
not quite twelve years, in the course of which he captured 
Artaxias the Armenian and made an expedition into Egypt 

§ 65-68] THE SYRIAN WARS 323 

579 against Ptolemy VI., who had been left an orphan with one 175 
brother. While he was encamped near Alexandria, Po- 
pilius came to him as Roman ambassador, bringing an 
order in writing that he should not attack the Ptolemies. 
When he had read it he replied that he would think about 
it. Popilius drew a circle around him with a stick and 

590 said, "Think about it here." He was terrified and with- 164 
drew from the country, and robbed the temple of Venus 
Elymais; then died of a wasting disease, leaving a son nine 
years of age, the Antiochus Eupator already mentioned. 

592 67.1 have also spoken of Demetrius, his successor, who 162 

"^' had been a hostage in Rome and who escaped and became ^'^• 
king. He was also called Soter by the Syrians, the next 
who bore that title after the son of Seleucus Nicator. 
Against him a certain Alexander took up arms, falsely pre- 
tending to be of the family of the Seleucidse, to whom 
Ptolemy, king of Egypt, gave aid because he hated Deme- 
trius. The latter was deprived of his kingdom by this means 
and died. His son, Demetrius, drove out Alexander. For 
his victory over this bastard of the family he was surnamed 
Nicator by the Syrians, the next who bore that title after 
Seleucus. Following the example of Seleucus he made an 
expedition against the Parthians. He was taken prisoner 
by them and lived in the palace of King Phraates, who 
gave him his sister, Rhodoguna, in marriage. 

68. While the country was without a government Dio- 
dotus, a slave of the royal house, placed on the throne a 
young boy named Alexander, a son of Alexander the Bastard 
and of Ptolemy's daughter. Afterward he put the boy to 
death and undertook the government himself and assumed 
the name of Trypho. But Antiochus, the brother of the 
captive Demetrius, learning in Rhodes of his captivity, 
came home and, with great difficulty, put Trypho to death. 
Then he marched with an army against Phraates and de- 
manded his brother. Phraates was afraid of him and sent 
Demetrius back. Antiochus nevertheless fought with the 
Parthians, was beaten, and committed suicide. When 
Demetrius returned to his kingdom he was killed by the 
craft of his wife, Cleopatra, who was jealous on account of 
his marriage with Rhodoguna, for which reason also she 
had previously married his brother Antiochus. She had 

324 APPIAN'S fflSTOR Υ [Βκ. XI, Ch. XI 

Y.R. B.C. 

592 borne two sons to Demetrius, named Seleucus and Antic- i6a 
'^^• chus Grypus (the Hook Nosed) ; and to Antiochus one son, *'^• 
named Antiochus Cyzicenus. She had sent Grypus to 
Athens and Cyzicenus to Cyzicus to be educated. 

69. As soon as Seleucus assumed the diadem after his 
brother's death his mother shot him dead with an arrow, 
either fearing lest he should avenge his father or moved by 
an insane hatred for everybody. After Seleucus, Grypus 
became king, and he compelled his mother to drink poison 
that she had mixed for himself. So justice overtook her at 
last. Grypus was worthy of such a mother. He laid a 
plot against Cyzicenus, his half-brother, but the latter found 
it out, made war on him, drove him out of the kingdom, 
and became king of Syria in his stead. Then Seleucus, the 
son of Grypus, made war on his uncle and took the govern- 
ment away from him. The new sovereign was violent and 
tyrannical and was burned to death in the gymnasium at 
the city of Mopsus in Cilicia. Antiochus, the son of Cyzi- 
cenus, succeeded him. The Syrians thought that he escaped 
a plot of his cousin Seleucus on account of his piety, for 
which reason they gave him the name of Antiochus Pius. 
He was really saved by a handsome prostitute with whom he 
was in love. I think that the Syrians must have given him 
this title by way of joke, for this Pius married Selene, who 
had been the wife of his father, Cyzicenus, and of his uncle, 
Grypus. For this reason the divine vengeance pursued him 
and he was expelled the kingdom by Tigranes. 

70. The son of Pius and Selene, who was brought up in 
Asia and was for that reason called Asiaticus, was deprived 
of the government of Syria by Pompey, as I have already 
mentioned. He was the seventeenth king of Syria, reckon- 
ing from Seleucus (for I leave out Alexander and his son as 
being illegitimate, and also their slave, Diodotus), and he 
reigned only one year, while Pompey was busy elsewhere. 
The dynasty of the Seleucidse lasted 230 years. To com- 
pute the time from Alexander the Great to the beginning 
of the Roman domination there must be added fourteen 
years of the rule of Tigranes. So much, in the way of 
foreign history, concerning the Macedonian kings of Syria. 


Chapter I 

Prusias, King of Bithynia — His Attack upon Attalus — His Son Nico- 
medes — Conspiracy against Prusias — Death of Prusias 

1 . The Greeks think that the Thracians who marched to 
the Trojan war with Rhesus, who was killed by Diomedes 
in the night-time in the manner described in Homer's 
poems, ^ fled to the outlet of the Euxine sea at the place 
where the crossing to Thrace is shortest. Some say that 
as they found no ships they remained there and possessed 
themselves of the country called Bebrycia. Others say 
that they crossed over to the country beyond Byzantium 
called Thracian Bithynia and settled along the river Bithya, 
but were forced by hunger to return to Bebrycia, to which 
they gave the name of Bithynia from the river where they 
had previously dwelt; or perhaps the name was changed by 
them insensibly with the lapse of time, as there is not much 
difference between Bithynia and Bebrycia. So some think. 
Others say that their first ruler was Bithys, the son of Zeus 
and Thrace, and that the two countries received their names 
from them. 

2. So much by way of preface concerning Bithynia. Of 
the forty-nine kings who successively ruled the country 
before the Romans, it does not concern me to make special 
mention in writing Roman history. Prusias, surnamed the 
Hunter, was the one to whom Perseus, king of Macedonia, 
gave his sister in marriage. When Perseus and the Ro- 
mans, not long afterward, went to war with each other, Pru- 
sias did not take sides with either of them. When Perseus 

1 Iliad, X. 482-497. 


YR• B.C 

was taken prisoner Prusias went to meet the Roman gen- 
erals, clad in a toga which they call the tebennus, shod in 
the Italian fashion, with his head shaved and wearing on it 
2ipi/leus^ in the manner of slaves who have been made free 
in their masters* wills, and making himself appear base 

, and insignificant in other ways. When he met them he said 
in the Latin tongue, " I am the f reedman of the Romans, 
which is to say * emancipated.' " They laughed at him and 
sent him to Rome. As he appeared equally ridiculous there 
he obtained pardon. 

600 3. Some time later, being incensed against Attains, king 154 
of the Asiatic country about Pergamus, Prusias ravaged his 
territory. When the Roman Senate learned of this they 
sent word to Prusias that he must not attack Attalus, who 
was their friend and ally. As he was slow in obeying, the 
ambassadors laid stern commands upon him to obey the 
orders of the Senate and to go with 1000 horse to the boun- 
dary line to negotiate a treaty with Attalus, who, they said, 
was awaiting him there with an equal number. Despising 
the handful of men with Attalus and hoping to ensnare 
him, Prusias sent the ambassadors in advance to say that 
he was following with 1000 men, but actually put his whole 
army in motion and advanced as if to battle. When 
Attalus and the ambassadors learned of this they took to 
promiscuous flight. Prusias seized the beasts of burden be- 
longing to the Romans that had been left behind, captured 
and destroyed the stronghold of Nicephorium, burned the 
temples in it, and besieged Attalus, who had fled to Per- 
gamus. When these things became known in Rome a fresh 
embassy was sent, ordering Prusias to make compensation 
to Attalus for the damage done to him. Then Prusias 
became alarmed, obeyed the order, and retired. The am- 
bassadors decided that as a penalty he must transfer to 
Attalus twenty decked ships at once, and pay him 500 tal- 
ents of silver within a certain time. Accordingly he gave 
up the ships and began to make the payments at the 
prescribed time. 

4. As Prusias was hated by his subjects on account of 
his extreme cruelty they became greatly attached to his son, 

^ The pilleus is known to the modern world as the " cap of liberty." 

§3-5] ^ ^^^^ MITHRIDATIC WARS 327 

Y.R. B.C 

6ooNicomedes. Thus the latter fell under the suspicion of 154 
Prusias, who sent him to live in Rome. Learning that he 

606 was much esteemed there also, Prusias directed him to 148 
petition the Senate to release him from the payment of the 
money still due to Attalus. He sent Menas as his fellow- 
ambassador, and told him if he should secure a remission ^ 
of the payments to spare Nicomedes, but if not, to kill him 
at Rome. For this purpose he sent a number of small 
boats with him and 2000 soldiers. As the fine imposed on 
Prusias was not remitted (for Andronicus, who had been 
sent by Attalus to argue on the other side, showed that it 
was less in amount than the plunder), Menas, seeing that 
Nicomedes was an estimable and attractive young man, was 
at a loss to know what to do. He did not dare to kill him, 
nor to go back himself to Bithynia. The young man noticed 
his delay and sought a conference with him, which was 
just what he wanted. They formed a plot against Prusias 
and secured the cooperation of Andronicus, the legate of 
Attalus, that he should persuade Attalus to take back Nico- 
medes to Bithynia. They met by agreement at Bernice, a 
small town in Epirus, where they entered into a ship by 
night to confer as to what should be done, and separated 
before daylight. 

5. In the morning Nicomedes came out of the ship clad 
in the royal purple and wearing a diadem on his head. 
Andronicus met him, saluted him as king, and formed an 
escort for him with 500 soldiers that he had with him. 
Menas, pretending that he had then for the first time learned 
that Nicomedes was present, rushed to his 2000 men and 
exclaimed with assumed trepidation, " Since we have two 
kings, one at home and the other going there, we must look 
out for our own interests, and form a careful judgment of 
the future, because our safety lies in foreseeing correctly 
which of them will be the stronger. One of them is an old 
man, the other is young. The Bithynians are averse to 
Prusias; they are attached to Nicomedes. The leading 
Romans are fond of the young man, and Andronicus has 
already furnished him a guard, showing that Nicomedes is 
in alliance with Attalus, who rules an extensive dominion 
alongside the Bithynians and is an old enemy of Prusias." 
In addition to this he expatiated on the cruelty of Prusias 


Y• R• B• C• 

606 and his outrageous conduct toward everybody, and the 148 
general hatred in which he was held by the Bithynians on 
this account. When he saw that the soldiers also abhorred 
the wickedness of Prusias he led them forthwith to Nico- 
medes and saluted him as king, just as Andronicus had 
done before, and formed a guard for him with his 2000 

6. Attains received the young man warmly and ordered 
Prusias to assign certain towns for his occupation, and 
territory to furnish him supplies. Prusias replied that he 
would presently give his son the whole kingdom of Attains, 
which he had intended for Nicomedes when he invaded 
Asia ^ before. After giving this answer he made a formal 
accusation at Rome against Nicomedes and Attains and 
cited them to trial. The forces of Attains at once made an 
incursion into Bithynia, the inhabitants of which gradually 
took sides with the invaders. Prusias, trusting nobody and 
hoping that the Romans would rescue him from the toils of 
the conspiracy, asked and obtained from his son-in-law, 
Diegylis, the Thracian, 500 men, and with these alone as a 
body-guard he took refuge in the citadel of Nicaea. The 
Roman praetor, in order to favor Attains, delayed intro- 
ducing the ambassadors of Prusias to the Senate at Rome. 
When he did introduce them, the Senate voted that the 
praetor himself should choose legates and send them to 
settle the difficulty. He selected three men, one of whom 
had once been struck on the head with a stone, from which 
he was badly scarred; another was a diseased cripple, and 
the third was considered almost a fool; wherefore Cato 
made the contemptuous remark concerning this embassy, 
that it had no understanding, no feet and no head. 

7. The legates proceeded to Bithynia and ordered that 
the war be discontinued. Nicomedes and Attains pretended 
to acquiesce. The Bithynians had been instructed to say 
that they could no longer endure the cruelty of Prusias, 
especially after they had openly complained against him. 
On the pretext that these complaints were not yet known at 
Rome the legates adjourned, leaving the business unfin- 
ished. When Prusias despaired of assistance from the 

1 In Roman nomenclature Asia meant the proconsular province com- 
posed of Mysia, Lydia, Caria, and Phrygia. 


Y.R. B.C. 

606 Romans (in reliance upon whom he had neglected to pro- 148 
vide means for his own defence) he retired to Nicomedia 
in order to possess himself of the city and resist the invad- 
ers. The inhabitants, however, betrayed him and opened 
the gates, and Nicomedes entered with his army. Prusias 
fled to the temple of Zeus, where he was stabbed by some 
of the emissaries of Nicomedes. In this way Nicomedes 
succeeded Prusias as king of the Bithynians. At his death 
his son, Nicomedes, surnamed Philopator, succeeded him, 
the Senate confirming his ancestral authority. So much 
for Bithynia. To anticipate the sequel,^ another Nico- 
medes, grandson of this one, left the kingdom to the 
Romans in his will. 

Chapter II 

Cappadocia in Ancient Times — The First Mithridates — Mithridates 
Eupator — His First Difficulty with the Romans — Sends an Am- 
bassador to Them — His Dispute with Nicomedes — Duplicity of the 
Roman Legates 

8. Who were the rulers of Cappadocia before the Mace- 
donians I am not able to say exactly — whether it had a 
government of its own or was subject to Darius. I judge 
that Alexander left behind him governors of the conquered 
nations to collect the tribute while he hastened after Darius. 
But it appears that he restored to Amisus, a city of Pontus, 
of Attic origin, its original democratic form of government. 
Yet Hieronymus ^ says that he did not touch those nations 
at all, but that he went after Darius by another road, along 
the sea-coast of Pamphylia and Cilicia. But Perdiccas, 
who ruled the Macedonians after Alexander, captured and 
hanged Ariarthes, the governor of Cappadocia, either 

^ Literally : " If anybody wishes to know it all beforehand." 
2 Hieronymus of Cardia accompanied Alexander in his campaign 
against Darius and wrote a history of it which has not come down to 
us. He is mentioned by Diodorus the Sicilian as a friend and fellow- 
citizen of Eumenes. After the death of Alexander he served under 
Eumenes and afterwards under Antigonus and the latter's son and 
grandson. His history embraced the successors of Alexander and was 
continued to the death of Pyrrhus. It is said that he lived to the age 
of 104. 


Y.R. B.C 

606 because he had revolted or in order to bring that country 148 
under Macedonian rule, and placed Eumenes of Cardia 
over these peoples. Eumenes was afterward adjudged an 
enemy of Macedonia and put to death, and Anti pater, who 
succeeded Perdiccas as overseer of the territory of Alex- 
ander, appointed Nicanor satrap of Cappadocia. 

9. Not long afterward dissensions broke out among the 
Macedonians. Antigonus expelled Laomedon from Syria 
and assumed the government himself. He had with him 
one Mithridates, a scion of the royal house of Persia. An- 
tigonus had a dream that he had sowed a field with gold, 
and that Mithridates reaped it and carried it off to Pontus. 
He accordingly arrested him, intending to put him to 
death, but Mithridates escaped with six horsemen, fortified 
himself in a stronghold of Cappadocia, where many joined 
him in consequence of the decay of the Macedonian power, 
and possessed himself of the whole of Cappadocia and of 
the neighboring countries along the Euxine. This great 
power, which he had built up, he left to his children. 
They reigned one after another until the sixth Mithridates 
in succession from the founder of the house, and he went 
to war with the Romans. Since there were kings of this 
house of both Cappadocia and Pontus, I judge that they 
divided the government, some ruling one country and some 
the other. 

10. At any rate a king of Pontus, the Mithridates sur- 
named Euergetes (the Benefactor), who was the first of them 
inscribed as a friend of the Roman people, and who even 
sent some ships and a small force of auxiliaries to aid them 
against the Carthaginians, invaded Cappadocia as though it 
were a foreign country. He was succeeded by his son, 
Mithridates, surnamed Dionysus, and also Eupator. The 

662 Romans ordered him to restore Cappadocia to Ariobarzanes, 92 
who had fled to them and who seemed to have a better title 
to the government of that country than Mithridates; or 
perhaps they distrusted the growing power of that great 
monarchy and thought it would be better to have it divided 

664 into several parts. Mithridates obeyed the order, but he 90 
put an army at the service of Socrates, surnamed Chrestus, 
the brother of Nicomedes, king of Bithynia, who overthrew 
the latter and usurped the government. This Nicomedes 

§9-12] THE MITHklDATIC WARS 33 1 

Y. R. B.C 

664 was the son of Nicomedes the son of Prusias, who had re- 90 
ceived the kingdom of Bithynia as his patrimony at the 
hands of the Romans. Simultaneously Mithraas and 
Bagoas drove out Ariobarzanes, whom the Romans had 
confirmed as king of Cappadocia, and installed Ariarthes 
in his place. 

11. The Romans decided to restore Nicomedes and 
Ariobarzanes at the same time, each to his own kingdom, 
and sent thither for this purpose an embassy, of which 
Manius Aquilius was the chief, and ordered Lucius Cassius, 
who was in charge of the Asiatic country around Pergamus 
and had a small army under his command, to cooperate in 
their mission. Similar orders were sent to Mithridates 
Eupator himself. But the latter, being angry with the 
Romans on account of their interference in Cappadocia, and 
having been recently despoiled of Phrygia by them (as 
narrated in my Hellenic history), did not cooperate. Never- 
theless Cassius and Manius, with the army of the former, 
and a large force collected from the Galatians and Phrygians, 
restored Nicomedes to Bithynia and Ariobarzanes to Cappa- 
docia. They urged them at the same time, as they were 
neighbors of Mithridates, to make incursions into his terri- 
tory and stir up a war, promising them the assistance of 
the Romans. Both of them hesitated to begin so important 
a war on their own border, because they feared the power of 
Mithridates. When the ambassadors insisted, Nicomedes, 
who had agreed to pay a large sum of money to the generals 
and ambassadors for restoring him to power, which he still 
owed, together with other large sums which he had borrowed 
on interest from the Romans in his country and for which 
they were dunning him, made an attack reluctantly on the 

666 territory of Mithridates and plundered it as far as the city 88 
of Amastris, meeting no resistance. Although Mithridates 
had his forces in readiness he retreated, because he wanted 
to have good and sufficient cause for war. 

12. Nicomedes returned with large booty and Mithri- 
dates sent Pelopidas to the Roman generals and ambassa- 
dors. He was not ignorant that they wanted to bring on a 
war, and that they had incited this attack upon him, but 
he dissembled in order to procure more and clearer causes 
for the coming war, for which reason he reminded them of 


Y.R. B.C 

666 his own and his father's friendship and alliance, in return 88 
for which Pelopidas said that Phrygia and Cappadocia had 
been wrested from him, of which Cappadocia had always 
belonged to his ancestors and had been left to him by his 
own father. " Phrygia, " he continued, " was given to him 
by your own general as a reward for his victory over Aris- 
tonicus; nevertheless he paid a large sum of money to that 
same general for it. But now you allow Nicomedes even 
to close the mouth of the Euxine, and to overrun the coun- 
try as far as Amastris, and you see him carrying off vast 
plunder with impunity. My king was not weak, he was not 
unprepared to defend himself, but he waited in order that 
you might be eye-witnesses of these transactions. Since 
you have seen all this, Mithridates, who is your friend and 
ally, calls upon you as friends and allies (for so the treaty 
reads) to defend us against the wrong-doing of Nicomedes, 
or to restrain the wrong-doer." 

13. When Pelopidas had finished speaking the ambas- 
sadors of Nicomedes, who were there to answer him, said: 
"Mithridates plotted against Nicomedes long ago and put 
Socrates on the throne by force and arms, though Socrates 
was of a quiet disposition and thought it right that his elder 
brother should reign. This was the act of Mithridates to 
Nicomedes whom you, Romans, had established on the 
throne of Bithynia — a blow which was evidently aimed as 
much at you as at us. In like manner after you had com- 
manded the Asiatic kings not to molest Europe, he seized 
the greater part of Chersonesus. Let these acts stand as 
examples of his arrogance, his hostility, his disobedience 
towards yourselves. Look at his great preparations. He 
stands in complete readiness, as for a great and predeter- 
mined war, not merely with his own army, but with great 
force of allies, Thracians, Scythians, and many other 
neighboring peoples. He has formed a marriage alliance 
with Armenia, and has sent to Egypt and Syria to make 
friends with the kings of those countries. He has 300 
ships of war and is still adding to the number. He has 
sent to Phoenicia and Egypt for naval officers and steers- 
men. These things, that Mithridates is collecting in such 
vast quantities, are not designed for Nicomedes, nay, Ο 
Romans, but for you. He is angry with you because, when 


Y.R. B.C. 

666 he had bought Phrygia by a corrupt bargain from one of 88 
your generals, you ordered him to give up his ill-gotten 
gains. He is angry on account of Cappadocia, which was 
given by you to Ariobarzanes. He fears your increasing 
power. He is making preparations under pretence that 
they are intended for us, but he means to attack you if he 
can. It will be the part of wisdom not to wait till he de- 
clares war against you, but to look at his deeds rather than 
his words, and not give up true and tried friends for a 
hypocrite who offers you the fictitious name of friendship, 
nor allow your decision concerning our kingdom to be 
annulled by one who is equally the foe of both of us." 

14. After the ambassadors of Nicomedes had thus 
spoken Pelopidas again addressed the Roman assembly, 
saying that if Nicomedes was complaining of bygones, he 
accepted the decision of the Romans, but as to present 
matters which were transpiring under their eyes, the rav- 
aging of Mithridates' territory, the closing of the sea, and 
the carrying away of such vast plunder, there was no need 
of discussion or adjudication. "We call upon you, Ro- 
mans, again," he said, "either to prevent such outrages, or 
to assist Mithridates, who is their victim, or at all events 
to stand aside, allow him to defend himself, and not help 
either party." While Pelopidas was repeating his demand, 
though it had been determined by the Roman generals long 
before to help Nicomedes, they made a pretence of listen- 
ing to the argument on the other side. Yet the words of 
Pelopidas and the alliance of Mithridates, which was still 
in force, put them to shame, and they were at a loss for 
some time what answer to make. Finally, after long 
thought, they made this artful reply, " We would not wish 
that Mithridates suffer harm at the hands of Nicomedes, 
nor can we allow war to be made against Nicomedes, be- 
cause we do not think that it would be for the interest of 
Rome that he should be weakened." Having delivered 
this response they dismissed Pelopidas from the assembly, 
although he wanted to show the insufficiency of their 


Chapter III 

Mithridates seizes Cappadocia — Sends Another Embassy — First Mith- 
ridatic War — The Romans badly defeated — Retreat of the Roman 
Forces — The Roman Generals captured 

Y»R B«C• 

666 15. Mithridates, having been denied justice by the 88 
Romans in this public manner, sent his son Ariarthes 
with a large force to seize the kingdom of Cappadocia. 
Ariarthes speedily overpowered it and drove out Ariobar- 
zanes. Then Pelopidas returned to the Roman generals 
and said : " How patiently King Mithridates bore injury 
from you when he was deprived of Phrygia and Cappadocia 
not long ago you have been told already, Ο Romans. 
What injuries Nicomedes inflicted upon him you have seen 
— and have not heeded. And when we appealed to your 
friendship and alliance you answered as though we were 
not the accusers but the accused, saying that it would not 
be for your interest that harm should come to Nicomedes, 
as though he were the injured one. You therefore are ac- 
countable to the Roman republic for what has taken place 
in Cappadocia. Mithridates has done what he has done 
because you disdained us and mocked us in your answers. 
He intends to send an embassy to your Senate to complain 
against you. He summons you to defend yourselves there 
in person in order that ye may do nothing in haste, nor 
begin a war of such magnitude without the decree of Rome 
itself. You should bear in mind that Mithridates is ruling 
his ancestral domain, which is 2000 stades long, and that 
he has acquired many neighboring nations, the Colchians, 
a very warlike people, the (Greeks bordering on the Euxine, 
and the barbarian tribes beyond them. He has allies also 
ready to obey his every command, Scythians, Taurians, 
Bastarnoe, Thracians, Sarmatians, and all those who dwell 
in the region of the Don and Danube and the sea of Azof. 
Tigranes of Armenia is his son-in-law and Arsaces of 
Parthia his ally. He has a large number of ships, some in 
readiness and others building, and apparatus of all kinds 
in abundance. 

16. "The Bithynians were not wrong in what they told 
you lately about the kings of Egypt and Syria. Not only 


V.R. B.C 

666 are these likely to help us if war breaks out, but also your 88 
newly acquired province of Asia, and Greece, and Africa, 
and a considerable part of Italy itself, which even now 
wages implacable war against you because it cannot endure 
your greed. Before you are able to compose this strife 
you attack Mithridates and set Nicomedes and Ariobarzanes 
on him by turns, and you say, forsooth, that you are our 
friends and allies. You pretend to be so, and yet you act 
like enemies. Come now, if at last the consequences of 
your acts have put you in a better frame of mind, either 
restrain Nicomedes from injuring your friends and allies 
(in which case I promise that King Mithridates shall help 
you to put down the rebellion in Italy), or throw off the 
mask of friendship for us, or let us go to Rome and settle 
the dispute there." So spake Pelopidas. The Romans 
considered his speech insolent and ordered Mithridates to 
let Nicomedes and Cappadocia alone (for they had again 
restored Ariobarzanes to the latter). They also ordered 
Pelopidas to leave their camp immediately, and not to 
return unless the king obeyed their commands. Having 
given this answer they sent him away under guard lest he 
should inveigle some persons on the road. 

17. After they had finished speaking they did not wait 
to hear what the Senate and people of Rome would think 
about such a great war, but began to collect forces from 
Bithynia, Cappadocia, Paphlagonia, and the Galatians of 
Asia. As soon as Lucius Cassius, the governor of Asia, 
had his own army in readiness all the allied forces were as- 
sembled. Then they were put in separate divisions and 
sent into camp, Cassius on the boundary of Bithynia and 
Galatia, Manius on Mithridates* line of march to Bithynia, 
and Oppius, the third general, among the mountains of 
Cappadocia. Each of these had about 40,000 men, horse 
and foot together. They had also a fleet under command 
of Minucius Rufus and Gains Popillius at Byzantium, 
guarding the mouth of the Euxine. Nicomedes was pres- 
ent with 50,000 foot and 6000 horse under his command. 
Such was the total strength of the forces brought together. 
Mithridates had in his own army 250,000 foot and 40,000 
horse, 300 ships with decks, 100 with two banks of oars 
each, and other apparatus in proportion. He had for gen- 

336 APPIAN'S HISTOR Υ [Βκ. XII, Ch. Ill 

Y.R. B.C. 

666 erals Neoptolemus and Archelaus, two brothers. The king ss 
took charge of the greater number in person. Of the 
allied forces Arcathias, the son of Mithridates, led 10,000 
horse from Armenia Minor, and Doryalus commanded the 
phalanx. Craterus had charge of 130 war chariots. So 
great were the preparations on either side when the Romans 
and Mithridates first came in conflict with each other, 
about the 173d Olympiad. 

18. When Nicomedes and the generals of Mithridates 
came in sight of each other in a wide plain bordered by 
the river Amnias they drew up their forces for battle. 
Nicomedes had his entire iarmy in hand; Neoptolemus and 
Archelaus had only their light infantry and the cavalry of 
Arcathias and a few chariots; for the phalanx had not yet 
come up. They sent forward a small force to seize a 
rocky hill in the plain lest they should be surrounded by 
the Bithynians, who were much more numerous. When 
Neoptolemus saw his men driven from the hill he was still 
more in fear of being surrounded. He advanced with haste 
to their assistance, at the same time calling on Arcathias 
for help. When Nicomedes perceived the movement he 
sought to meet it by a similar one. Thereupon a severe 
and bloody struggle ensued. Nicomedes prevaihd and put 
the Mithridateans to flight until Archelaus, advancing from 
the right flank, fell upon the pursuers, who were compelled 
to turn their attention to him. He yielded little by little 
in order that the forces of Neoptolemus might have a chance 
to rally. When he judged that they had done so sufficiently 
he advanced again. At the same time the scythe-bearing 
chariots made a charge on the Bithynians, cutting some of 
them in two, and tearing others to pieces. The army of 
Nicomedes was terrified at seeing men cut in halves and 
still breathing, or mangled in fragments and their parts 
hanging on the scythes. Overcome rather by the hideous- 
ness of the spectacle than by loss of the fight, fear took 
possession of their ranks. While they were thus thrown 
into confusion Archelaus attacked them in front, and 
Neoptolemus and Arcathias, who had turned about, as- 
sailed them in the rear. They fought a long time facing 
both ways. After the greater part of his men had fallen, 
Nicomedes fled with the remainder into Paphlagonia, 


V.R. B.C. 

666 although the Mithridatean phalanx had not come into the 88 
engagement at all. His camp was captured, together with 
a large sum of money and many prisoners. All these 
Mithridates treated kindly and sent to their homes with 
supplies for the journey, thus gaining a reputation for 
clemency among his enemies. 

19. This first engagement of the Mithridatic war alarmed 
the Roman generals, because they had kindled so great a 
strife precipitately, without good judgment, and without 
any public decree. A small number of soldiers had over- 
come a much larger one, not by having a better position, 
or through any blunder of the enemy, but by the valor of 
the generals and the fighting quality of the army. Nico- 
medes now encamped alongside of Manius. Mithridates 
ascended Mount Scoroba, which lies on the boundary 
between Bithynia and Pontus. A hundred Sarmatian horse 
of his advance-guard came upon 800 of the Nicomedean 
cavalry and took some of them prisoners. Mithridates dis- 
missed these also to their homes and furnished them sup- 
plies. Neoptolemus, and Nemanes the Armenian, overtook 
Manius on his retreat at the castle of Protophachium about 
the seventh hour, while Nicomedes was moving away to 
join Cassius, and compelled him to fight. He had 4000 
horse and ten times that number of foot. They killed 
10,000 of his men and took 300 prisoners. When they 
were brought to Mithridates he released them in like 
manner, thus winning the good opinion of his enemies. 
The camp of Manius was also captured. He fled to the 
river Sangarius, crossed it by night, and escaped to Per- 
gamus. Cassius and Nicomedes and all the Roman ambas- 
sadors who were with the army decamped to a place called 
the Lion's Head, a very powerful stronghold in Phrygia, 
where they began to drill their newly collected mob of 
artisans, rustics, and other raw recruits, and made new 
levies among the Phrygians. Finding them worthless they 
abandoned the idea of fighting with such unwarlike men, 
dismissed them and retreated; Cassius with his own army 
to Apamea, Nicomedes to Pergamus, and Manius toward 
Rhodes. When those who were guarding the mouth of the 
Euxine learned these facts they scattered also and delivered 
the straits and all the ships they had to Mithridates. 

VOL. I — ζ 


Y.R. B.C. 

666 20. Having subverted the whole dominion of Nico- 88 
medes at one blow, Mithridates took possession of it and 
put the cities in order. Then he invaded Phrygia and 
lodged at an inn which had been occupied by Alexander 
the Great, thinking that it would bring him luck to halt 
where Alexander had once stopped. He overran the rest 
of Phrygia, together with Mysia and those parts of Asia 
which had been lately acquired by the Romans. Then he 
sent his officers to the adjoining provinces and subjugated 
Lycia, Pamphylia, and the rest as far as Ionia. To the 
Laodiceans on the river Lycus, who were still resisting (for 
the Roman general, Quintus Oppius, had arrived with his 
cavalry and certain mercenaries at their town and was de- 
fending it), he made this proclamation by herald before 
the walls, " King Mithridates promises that the Laodiceans 
shall suffer no injury if they will deliver Oppius to him." 
Upon this announcement they dismissed the mercenaries 
unharmed, but led Oppius himself to Mithridates with his 
lictors marching in front of him by way of ridicule. Mith- 
ridates did him no harm, but took him around with him 
unbound, exhibiting a Roman general as his prisoner. 

21. Not long afterward he captured Manius Aquilius, 
one of the ambassadors and the one who was most to blame 
for this war. Mithridates led him around, bound on an 
ass, and compelled him to introduce himself to the public 
as Manius. Finally, at Pergamus, Mithridates poured 
molten gold down his throat, thus rebuking the Romans for 
their bribe-taking. After appointing satraps over the vari- 
ous nations he proceeded to Magnesia, Ephesus, and Mity- 
lene, all of which received him gladly. The Ephesians 
overthrew the Roman statues which had been erected in 
their cities — for which they paid the penalty not long 
afterward. On his return from Ionia Mithridates took the 
city of Stratonicea, imposed a pecuniary fine on it, and 
placed a garrison in it. Seeing a handsome virgin there 
he added her to his list of wives. Her name, if anybody 
wishes to know it, was Monima, the daughter of Philopoe- 
men. Against those Magnesians, Paphlagonians, and 
Lycians who still opposed him he directed his generals to 
make war. 


§20-23] Τ/ί£ MITHRIDATJC WARS 339 

Chapter IV 

Mithridates orders a Massacre of Romans in Asia — Frightful Scenes 
in Ephesus and Other Cities — Mithridates attacks Rhodes — Is 
defeated on the Sea — Makes an Assault by Land — Is beaten off 

^•^• B.C. 

666 2 2. Such was the state of affairs with Mithridates. As 88 
soon as his outbreak and invasion of Asia were known at 
Rome they declared war against him, although they were 
occupied with grievous dissensions in the city and a for- 
midable Social war, almost all parts of Italy having revolted 
one after another. When the consuls cast lots, the govern- 
ment of Asia and the Mithridatic war fell to Cornelius 
Sulla. As they had no money to defray his expenses they 
voted to sell the treasures that King Numa Pompilius had 
set apart for sacrifices to the gods; so great was their want 
of means at that time and so great their ambition for the 
commonwealth. A part of these treasures, sold hastily, 
brought 9000 pounds* weight of gold and this was all they 
had to spend on so great a war. Moreover Sulla was de- 
tained a long time by the civil wars, as I have stated in my 
history of the same. In the meantime Mithridates built a 
large number of ships for an attack on Rhodes, and he 
wrote secretly to all his satraps and magistrates that on the 
thirtieth day thereafter they should set upon all Romans 
and Italians in their towns, and upon their wives and chil- 
dren and their domestics of Italian birth, kill them and 
throw their bodies out unburied, and share their goods with 
himself. He threatened to punish any who should bury 
the dead or conceal the living, and offered rewards to in- 
formers and to those who should kill persons in hiding, 
and freedom to slaves for betraying their masters. To 
debtors for killing money-lenders he offered release from 
one-half of their obligations. These secret orders Mith- 
ridates sent to all the cities at the same time. When the 
appointed day came calamities of various kinds befell the 
province of Asia, among which were the following : 

23. The Ephesians tore fugitives, who had taken refuge 
in the temple of Artemis, from the very images of the god- 
dess and slew them. The Pergameans shot with arrows 


y.R. B. 

666 those who had fled to the temple of ^Esculapius, while they 8 
were still clinging to his statues. The Adramytteans fol- 
lowed those who sought to escape by swimming, into the 
sea, and killed them and drowned their children. The 
Caunii, who had been made subject to Rhodes after the war 
against Antiochus and had been lately liberated by the 
Romans, pursued the Italians who had taken refuge about 
the Vesta statue of the senate-house, tore them from the 
shrine, killed children before their mothers' eyes, and then 
killed the mothers themselves and their husbands after them. 
The citizens of Tralles, in order to avoid the appearance of 
blood-guiltiness, hired a savage monster named Theophilus, 
of Paphlagonia, to do the work. He conducted the vic- 
tims to the temple of Concord, and there murdered them, 
chopping off the hands of some who were embracing the 
sacred images. Such was the awful fate that befell the 
Romans and Italians throughout the province of Asia, men, 
women, and children, their freedmen and slaves, all who 
were of Italian blood; by which it was made very plain that 
it was quite as much hatred of the Romans as fear of 
Mitiiridates that impelled the Asiatics to commit these 
atrocities. But they paid a double penalty for their crime 
— one at the hands of Mithridates himself, who ill-treated 
them perfidiously not long afterward, and the other at the 
hands of Cornelius Sulla. In the meantime Mithridates 
crossed over to the island of Cos, where he was welcomed 
by the inhabitants and where he received, and afterward 
brought up in a royal way, a son of Alexander, the reigning 
sovereign of Egypt, who had been left there by his grand- 
mother, Cleopatra, together with a large sum of money. 
From the treasures of Cleopatra he sent vast wealth, works 
of art, precious stones, women's ornaments, and a great 
deal of money to Pontus. 

24. While these things were going on the Rhodians 
strengthened their walls and their harbor and erected en- 
gines of war everywhere, receiving some assistance from 
Telmessus and Lycia. All the Italians who escaped from 
Asia collected at Rhodes, among them Lucius Cassius, the 
proconsul of the province. When Mithridates approached 
with his fleet, the inhabitants destroyed the suburbs in 
order that they might not be of service to the enemy. Then 


V.R. B.C. 

666 they put to sea for a naval engagement with some of their 88 
ships ranged for an attack in front and some on the flank. 
Mithri dates, who was sailing around in a quinquereme, 
ordered his ships to extend their wing out to sea and to 
quicken the rowing in order to surround the enemy, for they 
were fewer in number. The Rhodians were apprehensive 
of this manoeuvre and retired slowly. Finally they turned 
about and took refuge in the harbor, closed the gates, and 
fought Mithridates from the walls. He encamped near 
the city and continually tried to gain entrance to the har- 
bor, but failing to do so he waited for the arrival of his 
infantry from Asia. In the meantime there was continual 
skirmishing going on among the soldiers in ambush around 
the walls. As the Rhodians had the best of it in these 
affairs, th6y gradually plucked up courage and kept their 
ships well in hand in order to dart upon the enemy when- 
ever they should discover an opportunity. 

25. As one of the king*s merchantmen was moving near 
them under sail a Rhodian two-bank ship advanced against 
it. Many on both sides hastened to the rescue and a severe 
naval engagement took place. Mithridates outweighed his 
antagonists both in fury and in the multitude of his fleet, 
but the Rhodians circled around and rammed his ships 
with such skill that they took one of his triremes in tow 
with its crew and tackle and much spoil, and brought it 
into the harbor. Another time, when one of their quin- 
queremes had been taken by the enemy, the Rhodians, not 
knowing this fact, sent out six of their swiftest ships to 
look for it, under command of their admiral, Demagoras. 
Mithridates despatched twenty-five of his against them. 
Demagoras retired before them until sunset. When it 
began to grow dark and the king's ships turned around 
to sail back, Demagoras fell upon them, sunk two, drove 
two others into Lycia, and returned home on the open sea 
by night. This was the result of the naval engagement, as 
unexpected to the Rhodians on account of the smallness of 
their force as to Mithridates on account of the largeness 
of his. In this engagement while the king was sailing 
about in his ship and urging on his men, an allied ship 
from Chios ran against his in the confusion with a severe 
shock. The king pretended not to mind it at the time, 


Y.R. B.< 

666 but later he punished the pilot and the lookout man, and » 
conceived a hatred for all Chians. 

26. About the same time the land forces of Mithridates 
set sail in merchant vessels and triremes, and a storm, 
blowing from Caunus, drove them toward Rhodes. The 
Rhodians promptly sailed out to meet them, fell upon them 
while they were still scattered and suffering from the effects 
of the tempest, captured some, rammed others, and burned 
others, and took about 400 prisoners. Thereupon Mithri- 
dates prepared for another naval engagement and siege at 
the same time. He built a sambuca, an immense machine 
for scaling walls, and mounted it on two ships. Some 
deserters showed him a hill that was easy to climb, where 
the temple of Zeus Atabyrius was situated, surrounded by 
a low wall. He placed a part of his army in ships by night, 
distributed scaling ladders to others, and commanded both 
parties to move silently until they should see a fire signal 
given from Mount Atabyrius; and then to make the greatest 
possible uproar, and some to attack the harbor and others 
the wall. Accordingly they approached in profound silence. 
The Rhodian sentries knew what was going on and lighted 
a fire. The army of Mithridates, thinking that this was 
the fire signal from Atabyrius, broke the silence with a loud 
shout, the scaling party and the naval contingent shouting 
all together. The Rhodians, not at all dismayed, answered 
the shout and rushed to the walls in crowds. The king's 
forces accomplished nothing that night, and the next day 
they were beaten off. 

27. The Rhodians were most dismayed by the sambuca, 
which was moved against the wall where the temple of Isis 
stands. It was operating with weapons of various kinds, 
both rams and projectiles. Soldiers in numerous small 
boats circled around it with ladders, ready to mount the 
wall by means of it. Nevertheless the Rhodians awaited 
its attack with firmness. Finally the sambuca collapsed of 
its own weight, and an apparition of Isis was seen hurling 
a great mass of fire down upon it. Mithridates despaired 
of his undertaking and retired from Rhodes. He then laid 
siege to Patara and began to cut down a grove dedicated 
to Latona, to get material for his machines, until he was 
warned in a dream to spare the sacred trees. Leaving Pelop- 


Y.R. B.C. 

666idas to continue the war against the Lycians he sent 88 
Archelaus to Greece to gain allies by persuasion or force 
according as he could. After this Mithridates committed 
most of his tasks to his generals, and applied himself to 
raising troops, making arms, and enjoying himself with 
his Stratonicean wife. He also held court to try those who 
were accused of conspiring against him, or of inciting 
revolution, or of favoring the Romans in any way. 

Chapter V 

Athens sides with Mithridates — Other Greek States follow her Ex- 
ample — Cornelius Sulla marches against Mithridates — Besieges 
the Piraeus — Archelaus makes a Sally — Sulla sends LucuUus to 
procure Ships — Hard Fighting on the Walls — Famine in Athens 
— Battles Underground — Sulla repulsed from Piraeus 

667 28. While Mithridates was thus occupied the following 87 
events took place in Greece: Archelaus, sailing thither 
with abundant supplies and a large fleet, possessed himself 
by force and violence of Delos and other strongholds which 
had revolted from the Athenians. He slew 20,000 men 
in these places, most of whom were Italians, and turned 
the strongholds over to the Athenians. In this way, and 
by boasting about Mithridates and extravagantly praising 
him, he brought the Athenians into alliance with him. 
Archelaus sent them the sacred treasure of Delos by the 
hands of Aristion, an Athenian citizen, attended by 2000 
soldiers to guard the money. These soldiers Aristion made 
use of to make himself master of the country, putting to 
death immediately some of those who favored the Romans 
and sending others to Mithridates. And these things he 
did although he professed to be a philosopher of the school 
of Epicurus. Nor was it only in Athens that men played 
the part of tyrants as did he and before him Critias and his 
fellow-philosophers. But in Italy, too, some of the Pythag- 
oreans and those known as the Seven Wise Men in other 
parts of the Grecian world, who undertook to manage public 
affairs, governed more cruelly, and made themselves greater 
tyrants than ordinary despots; whence arose doubt and 
suspicion concerning other philosophers, whether their dis- 


ν.Κ. B.C 

667 courses about wisdom proceeded from a love of virtue or as 87 
a comfort in their poverty and idleness. We see many of 

I these now, obscure and poverty-stricken, wearing the garb 
) of philosophy as a matter of necessity, and railing bitterly 
; at the rich and powerful, not because they have any real 
contempt for riches and power, but from envy of the pos- 
sessors of the same. Those whom they speak ill of have 
much better reason for despising them. These things the 
reader should consider as spoken against the philosopher 
Aristion, who is the cause of this digression. 

29. Archelaus brought over to the side of Mithridates 
the Achseans, the Lacedaemonians, and all of Boeotia except 
Thespise, to which he laid close siege. At the same time 
Metrophanes, who had been sent by Mithridates with an- 
other army, ravaged Euboea and the territory of Demetrias 
and Magnesia, which states refused to espouse his cause. 
Bruttius advanced against him with a small force from 
Macedonia, had a naval fight with him, sunk one large ship 
and one hemiolia, and killed all who were in them while 
Metrophanes was looking on. The latter fled in terror 
and, as he had a favorable wind, Bruttius could not over- 
take him, but stormed Sciathos, which was a storehouse of 
plunder for barbarians, and crucified some of them who 
were slaves and cut off the hands of the freemen. Then 
he turned against Boeotia, having received reenforcements 
of 1000 horse and foot from Macedonia. Near Chseronea 
he was engaged in a fight of three days* duration with 
Archelaus and Aristion, which had an indecisive result. 
When the Lacedaemonians and Achaeans came to the aid of 
Archelaus and Aristion, Bruttius thought that he was not a 
match for all of them together and withdrew to the Piraeus 
until Archelaus came up with his fleet and seized that place 

30. Sulla, who had been appointed general of the Mith- 
ridatic war by the Romans, now for the first time passed 
over to Greece with five legions and a few cohorts and 
troops of horse and straightway called for money, reenforce- 
ments and provisions from ^^tolia and Thessaly. As soon 
as he considered himself strong enough he crossed over to 
Attica to attack Archelaus. As he was passing through the 
country all Boeotia joined him except a few, and among 

η ihiT Cliiaramorli Musmim, Rome. Considered hy li 

§ 29-30 ^^^^ MITHRIDATIC WARS 345 

Y.R. ^ ^ B.C. 

667 Others the great city of Thebes which had rather lightly 87 
taken sides with the Mithridateans against the Romans, but 
now even more nimbly changed from Archelaus to Sulla 
before coming to a trial of strength. When Sulla reached 
Attica he detached part of his army to lay siege to Aristion 
in Athens, and himself went down to attack the Piraeus, 
where Archelaus had taken shelter behind the wall with his 
forces. The height of the wall was about forty cubits and 
it was built of large square stones. It was the work of 
Pericles in the time of the Peloponnesian war, and as he 
rested his hope of victory on the Piraeus he made it as 
strong as possible. Notwithstanding the height of the 
walls Sulla planted his ladders against them at once. After 
inflicting and receiving much damage (for the Cappado- 
cians bravely repelled his attack), he retired exhausted to 
Eleusis and Megara, where he built engines for a new 
attack upon the Piraeus and formed a plan for besieging it 
with mounds. Artifices and apparatus of all kinds, iron, 
catapults, and everything of that sort were supplied by 
Thebes. Sulla chopped down the grove of the Academy 
and constructed his largest engines there. He demolished 
the Long Walls, and used the stones, timber, and earth for 
building mounds. 

3 1 . Two Athenian slaves in the Piraeus — either because 
they favored the Romans or were looking out for their own 
safety in an emergency — wrote down everything that took 
place there, enclosed their writing in leaden balls, and 
threw them over to the Romans with slings. As this was 
done continually it came to the knowledge of Sulla, who 
gave his attention to the missives and found one which 
said, ''To-morrow the infantry will make a sally in front 
upon your workers, and the cavalry will attack the Roman 
army on both flanks." Sulla placed an adequate force in 
ambush and when the enemy dashed out with the thought 
that their movement would completely surprise him he 
gave them a greater surprise with his concealed force, kill- 
ing many and driving the rest into the sea. This was the 
end of that enterprise. When the mounds began to rise 
Archelaus erected opposing towers and placed the greatest 
quantity of missiles on them. He sent for reenforcements 
from Chalcis and the other islands and armed his oarsmen, 


667 for he considered himself in extreme danger. As his army 87 
was superior in number to that of Sulla before, it now 
became much more so by these reenforcements. He then 
darted out in the middle of the night with torches and 
burned one of the tortoises and the machines alongside of 
it; but Sulla made new ones in ten days' time and put them 
in the places of the former ones. Against these Archelaus 
established a tower on that part of the wall. 

32. Having received from Mithridates by sea a new 
army under command of Dromichsetes, Archelaus led all 
his troops out to battle. He distributed archers and sling- 
ers among them and ranged them close under the walls so 
that the guards above could reach the enemy with their 
missiles. Others were stationed around the gates with 
torches to watch their opportunity to make a sally. The 
battle remained doubtful a long time; each side yielding 
by turns. First the barbarians gave way until Archelaus 
rallied them and led them back. The Romans were so 
dismayed by this that they were put to flight next, until 
Murena ran up and rallied them. Just then another legion, 
which had returned from gathering wood, together with 
some soldiers who had been disgraced, finding a hot fight 
in progress, made a powerful charge on the Mithridateans, 
killed about 2000 of them and drove the rest inside the 
walls. Archelaus tried to rally them again and stood his 
ground so long that he was shut out and had to be pulled 
up by ropes. In consideration of their splendid behavior 
Sulla removed the stigma from those who had been dis- 
graced and gave large rewards to the others. 

33. Now winter came on and Sulla established his camp 
at Eleusis and protected it by a deep ditch, extending from 
the high ground to the sea so that the enemy's horse could 
not readily reach him. While he was prosecuting this 
work fighting took place daily, now at the ditch, now at 
the walls of the enemy, who frequently came out and as- 
sailed the Romans with stones, javelins, and leaden balls. 
Sulla, being in need of ships, sent to Rhodes to obtain 
them, but the Rhodians were not able to send them because 
Mithridates controlled the sea. He then ordered Lucullus, 
a distinguished Roman who later succeeded Sulla as com- 
mander in this war, to proceed secretly to Alexandria and 

§ 32-35] ^^^ MITHRIDA TIC WARS 347 

067 Syria, and procure a fleet from those kings and cities that 87 
were skilled in nautical affairs, and to bring with it the 
Rhodian naval contingent also. Lucullus had no fear of 
the hostile fleet. He embarked in a fast sailing vessel and, 
by changing from one ship to another in order to conceal 
his movements, arrived at Alexandria. 

668 34. Meanwhile the traitors in the Piraeus threw another 86 
message over the walls, saying that Archelaus would on that 
very night send a convoy of soldiers with provisions to the 
city of Athens, which was suffering from hunger. Sulla 
laid a trap for them and captured both the provisions and 
the soldiers. On the same day, near Chalcis, Minutius 
wounded Neoptolemus, Mithridates* other general, killed 
1500 of his men, and took a still larger number prisoners. 
Not long after, by night, while the guards on the walls of 
the Piraeus were asleep, the Romans took some ladders from 
the engines near by, mounted the walls, and killed the 
guards at that place. Thereupon some of the barbarians 
abandoned their posts and fled to the harbor, thinking that 
all the walls had been captured. Others, recovering their 
courage, slew the leader of the assailing party and hurled 
the remainder over the wall. Still others darted out through 
the gates and almost burned one of the two Roman towers, 
and would have burned it had not Sulla ridden up from the 
camp and saved it by a hard fight lasting all that night and 
the next day. Then the barbarians retired. Archelaus 
planted another great tower on the wall opposite the Roman 
tower and these two assailed each other, discharging all 
kinds of missiles constantly until Sulla, by means of his 
catapults, each of which discharged twenty of the heaviest 
leaden balls at one volley, had killed a large number of the 
enemy, and had so shaken the tower of Archelaus that it 
was rendered untenable, and the latter was compelled, by 
fear of- its destruction, to draw it back with all speed. 

35. Meanwhile famine pressed more and more on the 
city of Athens, and the ball throwers in the Piraeus gave 
information that provisions would be sent thither by night. 
Archelaus suspected that some traitor was giving informa- 
tion to the enemy about his convoys. Accordingly, at the 
same time that he sent it, he stationed a force at the gates 
with torches to make an assault on the Roman works if 

348 APPIAN'S HISTORY [Βκ. Xll, Ch. V 

VR. B.C. 

668 Sulla should attack the provision train. So it turned out 86 
that Sulla captured the train and Archelaus burned some 
of the Roman works. At the same time Arcathias, the son 
of Mithridates, with another army invaded Macedonia and 
without difficulty overcame the small Roman force there, 
subjugated the whole country, appointed satraps to govern 
it, and advanced against Sulla, but was taken sick and died 
near Tisseus. In the meantime the famine in Athens 
became very severe. Sulla built stockades around it to 
prevent anybody from going out so that, by reason of their 
numbers, the hunger should be more severe upon those who 
were shut in. 

36. When Sulla had raised his mound to the proper 
height at the Piraeus he planted his engines on it. But 
Archelaus undermined the mound and carried away the 
earth, the Romans for a long time suspecting nothing. 
Suddenly the mound sank down. Quickly understanding 
the state of things, the Romans withdrew their engines and 
filled up the mound, and, following the enemy's example, 
began in like manner to undermine the walls. The diggers 
met each other underground, and fought there with swords 
and spears as well as they could in the darkness. While 
this was going on, Sulla pounded the wall with rams erected 
on the tops of mounds until part of it fell down. Then he 
hastened to burn the neighboring tower, and discharged a 
large number of fire-bearing missiles against it, and ordered 
his bravest soldiers to mount the ladders. Both sides 
fought bravely, but the tower was burned. Another small 
part of the wall was thrown down also, over against which 
Sulla at once stationed a guard. Having now undermined 
a section of the wall, so that it was only sustained by wooden 
beams, he placed a great quantity of sulphur, hemp, and 
pitch under it, and set fire to the whole at once. The walls 
fell — now here, now there — carrying the defenders down 
with them. This great and unexpected crash demoralized 
the forces guarding the walls everywhere, as each one ex- 
pected that the ground would sink under him next. Fear 
and loss of confidence kept them turning this way and that 
way, so that they offered only a feeble resistance to the 

37. Against the forces thus demoralized Sulla kept up 


Y.R. B.C 

663 an unceasing fight, continually changing the active part of 86 
his own army, bringing up fresh soldiers with ladders, one 
division after another, with shout and cheer, urging them 
forward with threats and encouragement at the same time, 
and telling them that victory would shortly be theirs. 
Archelaus, on the other hand, brought up new forces in 
place of his discouraged ones. He, too, changed their 
labor continually, cheering and urging them on, and tell- 
ing them that their salvation would soon be secured. A 
high degree of zeal and courage was excited in both armies 
again and the fight became very severe, the slaughter being 
substantially equal on both sides. Finally Sulla, being the 
attacking party and therefore soonest exhausted, sounded 
a retreat and led his forces back, praising many of his men 
for their bravery. Archelaus forthwith repaired the dam- 
age to his wall by night, protecting a large part of it with 
a lunette curving inward. Sulla attacked this newly built 
wall at once with his whole army, thinking that as it was 
still moist and weak he could easily demolish it, but as he 
had to work in a narrow space and was exposed to missiles 
from above, both in front and flank, as is usual with cres- 
cent-shaped fortifications, he was again worn out. Then 
he abandoned all idea of taking the Piraeus by assault and 
established a siege around it in order to reduce it by 

Chapter VI 

Athens taken — Slaughter of the Inhabitants — Sulla returns to the 
Piraeus — Drives Archelaus out — Burns the Pirseus — Follows Ar- 
chelaus — Battle of Chseronea — Archelaus routed — Great slaughter 
of the Barbarians 

38. Knowing that the defenders of Athens were severely 
pressed by hunger, that they had devoured all their cattle, 
boiled the hides and skins, and licked what they could get 
therefrom, and that some had even partaken of human 
flesh, Sulla directed his soldiers to encircle the city with a 
ditch so that the inhabitants might not escape secretly, 
even one by one. This done, he brought up his ladders 
and at the same time began to break through the wall. The 
feeble defenders were soon put to flight, and the Romans 


Y.R. B.C. 

668 rushed into the city. A great and pitiless slaughter ensued 86 
in Athens, the inhabitants, for want of nourishment, being 
too weak to fly. Sulla ordered an indiscriminate massacre, 
not sparing women or children. He was angry that they 
had so suddenly joined the barbarians without cause, and 
had displayed such violent animosity toward himself. 
Most of the Athenians when they heard the order given 
rushed upon the swords of the slayers voluntarily. A few 
had taken their feeble course to the Acropolis, among them 
Aristion, who had burned the Odeum, so that Sulla might 
not have the timber in it at hand for storming the Acropo- 
lis. Sulla forbade the burning of the city, but allowed the 
soldiers to plunder it. In many houses they found human 
flesh prepared for food. The next day Sulla sold the slaves 
at auction. To the freemen who had escaped the slaughter 
of the previous night, a very small number, he promised 
their liberty but took away their right as voters and electors 
because they had made war upon him. The same terms 
were extended to their offspring. 

39. In this way did Athens have her full of horrors. 
Sulla stationed a guard around the Acropolis, to whom 
Aristion and his company were soon compelled by hunger 
and thirst to surrender. Sulla inflicted the penalty of 
death on Aristion and his body-guard, and upon all who 
exercised any authority or who had done anything whatever 
contrary to the rules laid down for them after the first capt- 
ure of Greece by the Romans. Sulla pardoned the rest 
and gave to all of them substantially the same laws that had 
been previously established for them by the Romans. 
About forty pounds of gold and 600 pounds of silver was 
obtained from the Acropolis, — but these events at the 
Acropolis took place somewhat later. 

40. As soon as Athens was taken Sulla, impatient at the 
long siege of the Piraeus, brought up rams, and projectiles 
of all kinds, and a large force of men, who battered the 
walls under the shelter of tortoises, and numerous cohorts 
who hurled javelins and shot arrows in vast numbers at the 
defenders on the walls in order to drive them back. He 
knocked down a part of the newly built lunette, which was 
still moist and weak. Archelaus had anticipated this from 
the first and had built several others like it inside, so that 


§ 39-42] THE MITHRIDA TIC WARS 3 5 1 

'.R. B.C. 

.68 Sulla came upon one wall after another, and found his task 86 
endless. But he pushed on with tireless energy, he relieved 
his men often, he was ubiquitous among them, urging them 
on and showing them that their entire hope of reward for 
their labors depended on accomplishing this small re- 
mainder. The soldiers, too, believing that this would in 
fact be the end of their toils, and spurred to their work by 
the love of glory and the thought that it would be a splen- 
did achievement to conquer such walls as these, pressed 
forward vigorously. Finally, Archelaus was dumbfounded 
by their senseless and mad persistence, and abandoned the 
walls to them and betook himself to that part of the Piraeus 
which was most strongly fortified and enclosed on all sides 
by the sea. As Sulla had no ships he could not attack it. 

41. Thence Archelaus withdrew to Thessaly by way of 
Bceotia and drew what was left of his entire forces together 
at Thermopylae, both his own and those brought by Dromi- 
chaetes. He also united with his command the army that 
had invaded Macedonia under Arcathias, the son of King 
Mithridates, which was fresh and at nearly its full strength, 
and had lately received recruits from Mithridates; for he 
never ceased sending forward reinforcements. While 
Archelaus was hastily gathering these forces Sulla burned 
the Piraeus, which had given him more trouble than the 
city of Athens, not sparing the arsenal, or the navy yard, 
or any other of its famous belongings. Then he marched 
against Archelaus, proceeding also by way of Bceotia. As 
they neared each other the forces of Archelaus just from 
Thermopylae advanced into Phocis, consisting of Thracian, 
Pontic, Scythian, Cappadocian, Bithynian, Galatian, and 
Phrygian troops, and others from Mithridates' newly ac- 
quired territory, in all 120,000 men. Each nationality had 
its own general, but Archelaus had supreme command over 
all. Sulla's forces were Italians and some Greeks and 
Macedonians, who had lately deserted Archelaus and come 
over to him, and a few others from the surrounding coun- 
try, but they were not one-third the number of the enemy. 

42. When they had taken position opposite each other 
Archelaus repeatedly led out his forces and offered battle. 
Sulla hesitated on account of the nature of the ground and 
the numbers of the enemy. When Archelaus moved toward 



YR. B.( 

668 Chalcis Sulla followed him closely, watching for a favorable » 
time and place. When he saw the enemy encamped in a 
rocky region near Chaeronea, where there was no chance 
of escape for the vanquished, he took possession of a broad 
plain near by and drew up his forces in such a way that he 
could compel Archelaus to fight whether he wanted to or 
not, and where the slope of the plain favored the Romans 
either in advancing or retreating. Archelaus was hedged 
in by rocks which, in a battle, would not allow his whole 
army to act in concert, as he could not bring them together 
by reason of the unevenness of the ground; and if they 
were routed their flight would be impeded by the rocks. 
Relying for these reasons on his advantage of position Sulla 

• moved forward in such a way that the enemy's superiority 
of numbers should not be of any service to him. Archelaus 
did not dream of coming to an engagement at that time, 
for which reason he had been careless in choosing the place 
for his camp. Now that the Romans were advancing he 
perceived sorrowfully and too late the badness of his posi- 
tion, and he sent forward a detachment of horse to prevent 
the movement. The detachment was put to flight and 
shattered among the rocks. He next charged with sixty 
chariots, hoping to sever and break in pieces the formation 
of the legions by the shock. The Romans opened their 
ranks and the chariots were carried through by their own 
momentum to the rear, and before they could turn back they 
were surrounded and destroyed by the javelins of the rear 

43. Although Archelaus might have fought safely from 
his fortified camp, where the crags would perhaps have de- 
fended him, he hastily led out his vast multitude of men 
who had not expected to fight here, and drew them up, in a 
place that had proved much too narrow, because Sulla was 
already approaching. He first made a powerful charge 
with his horse, cut the Roman formation in two, and, by 
reason of the smallness of their numbers, completely sur- 
rounded both parts. The Romans turned their faces to 
the enemy on all sides and fought bravely. The divisions 
of Galba and Hortensius suffered most since Archelaus led 
the battle against them in person, and the barbarians fight- 
ing under the eye of the commander were spurred by emu- 

§43-44] ^'^^' MITHRIDATIC WARS 353 

Y.R. B.C. 

668 lation to the highest pitch of valor. But Sulla moved to 86 
their aid with a large body of horse and Archelaus, feeling 
sure that it was Sulla who was approaching, for he saw the 
standards of the commander-in-chief, and a greater cloud 
of dust arising, released his grasp and began to resume his 
first position. Sulla, leading the best part of his horse and 
picking up two new cohorts that had been placed in reserve, 
struck the enemy before they had executed their manoeuvre 
and formed a solid front. He threw them into confusion, 
put them to flight, and pursued them. While victory was 
dawning on that side, Murena, who commanded the left 
wing, was not idle. Chiding his soldiers for their remiss- 
ness he, too, dashed upon the enemy valiantly and put them 
to flight. 

44. When Archelaus* two wings gave way the centre no 
longer held its ground, but took to promiscuous flight. 
Then everything that Sulla had foreseen befell the enemy. 
Not having room to turn around, or an open country for 
flight, they were driven by their pursuers among the rocks. 
Some of them rushed into the hands of the Romans. Others 
with more wisdom fled toward their own camp. Archelaus 
placed himself in front of them and barred the entrance, 
and ordered them to turn and face the enemy, thus betray- 
ing the greatest inexperience of the exigencies of war. 
They obeyed him with alacrity, but as they no longer had 
either generals to lead, or officers to align them, or stand- 
ards to show where they belonged, but were scattered in 
disorderly rout, and had no room either to fly or to fight, 
the pursuit having brought them into their very narrowest 
place, they were killed without resistance, some by the 
enemy, upon whom they could not retaliate, and others by 
their own friends in the jam and confusion. Again they 
fled toward the gates of the camp, around which they 
became congested. They upbraided the gate-keepers. 
They appealed to them in the name of their country's gods 
and their common relationship, and reproached them that 
they were slaughtered not so much by the swords of the 
enemy as by the indifference of their friends. Finally 
Archelaus, after more delay than was necessary, opened the 
gates and received the disorganized runaways. When the 
Romans observed this they gave a great cheer, burst into 

VOL, I — 2 A 


Y.R. B.C. 

668 the camp with the fugitives, and made their victory 86 

45 . Archelaus and the rest, who made their escape singly, 
came together at Chalcis. Not more than ιο,οοο of the 
120,000 remained. The Roman loss was only fifteen, and 
two of these turned up afterward. Such was the result of 
the battle of Chseronea between Sulla and Archelaus, the 
general of Mithridates, to which the sagacity of Sulla and 
the blundering of Archelaus contributed in equal measure. 
Sulla captured a large number of prisoners and a great quan- 
tity of arms and spoils, the useless part of which he put in 
a heap. Then he girded himself according to the Roman 
custom and burned it as a sacrifice to the gods of war. 
After giving his army a short rest he hastened with his best 
troops after Archelaus, but as the Romans had no ships the 
latter sailed securely among the islands and ravaged the 
coasts. He landed at Zacynthus and laid siege to it, but 
being attacked in the night by a party of Romans who were 
sojourning there he reembarked in a hurry and returned to 
Chalcis more like a robber than a warrior. 

Chapter VII 

Fury and Cruelty of Mithridates — The Dismal Fate of Chios — Terror 
of the Greek Cities in Asia — Conspiracy against Mithridates — Battle 
of Orchomenus — Archelaus again defeated by Sulla 

46. When Mithridates heard of this great disaster he 
was astonished and terror-stricken, as was natural. Never- 
theless, he proceeded with all haste to collect a new army 
from all his subject nations. Thinking that certain per- 
sons would be likely to turn against him on account of his 
defeat, either now or later, if they should find a good chance, 
he arrested all suspects before the war should become 
sharper. First, he put to death the tetrarchs of Galatia 
with their wives and children, not only those who were 
united with him as friends, but those who were not his sub- 
jects — all except three who escaped. Some of these he 
took by stratagem, the others he slew one night at a ban- 
quet. He believed that none of them would be faithful to 
him if Sulla should come near. He confiscated their prop- 


Y.R. B.C 

668 erty, established garrisons in their towns, and appointed 86 
Eumachus satrap of the nation. But the tetrarchs who had 
escaped raised an army from the country people forthwith, 
expelled him and his garrisons, and drove them out of 
Galatia, so that Mithridates had nothing left of that country 
except the money he had seized. Being angry with the 
inhabitants of Chios, one of whose vessels had accidentally 
run against the royal ship in the naval battle near Rhodes, 
he first confiscated the goods of all Chians who had fled to 
Sulla, and then sent persons to inquire what property in 
Chios belonged to Romans. For a third move, his gen- 
eral, Zenobius, who was conducting an army to Greece, 
seized the walls of Chios and all the fortified places by 
night, stationed guards at the gates, and made proclama- 
tion that all strangers should remain quiet, and that the 
Chians should repair to the assembly so that he might give 
them a message from the king. When they had come 
together he said that the king was suspicious of the city on 
account of the Roman faction in it, but that he would be 
satisfied if they would deliver up their arms and give the 
children of their principal families as hostages. Seeing 
that their city was already in his hands they gave both. 
Zenobius sent them to Erythrae and told the Chians that the 
king would write to them directly. 

47. A letter came from Mithridates of the following 
tenor: "You favor the Romans even now, and many of 
your citizens are still sojourning with them. You are reap- 
ing the fruits of Roman property of which you do not make 
returns to us. Your trireme ran against and shook my ship 
in the battle before Rhodes. I willingly imputed that fault 
to the pilots alone, hoping that you would observe the 
rules of safety and remain my submissive subjects. Now 
you have secretly sent your chief men to Sulla, and you have 
never proved or declared that this was done without public 
authority, as was the duty of those who were not cooperat- 
ing with them. Although my friends consider that those 
who conspire against my government, and who intend to 
conspire against my person, ought to suffer death, I will let 
you off with a fine of 2000 talents." Such was the purport 
of the letter. The Chians wanted to send legates to the 
king, but Zenobius would not allow it. As they were dis- 


668 armed and had given up the children of their principal 86 
families, and a large barbarian army was in possession of 
the city, they groaned aloud, but they collected the temple 
ornaments and the women's jewellery to the full amount of 
2000 talents. When this sum had been made up Zenobius 
accused them of giving him short weight and summoned 
them to the theatre. Then he stationed his army with 
drawn swords around the theatre itself and along the streets 
leading from it to the sea. Then he led the Chians one 
by one out of the theatre and put them in ships, the men 
separate from the women and children, and all treated with 
indignity by their barbarian captors. In this way they were 
dragged to Mithridates, who packed them off to Pontus on 
the Euxine. Such was the calamity that befell the citizens 
of Chios. 

48. When Zenobius approached Ephesus with his army, 
the citizens ordered him to leave his arms at the gates and 
come in with only a few attendants. He obeyed the order 
and made a visit to Philopoemen (the father of Monima, 
the favorite wife of Mithridates), whom the latter had ap- 
pointed overseer of Ephesus, and summoned the Ephesians 
to the assembly. They expected nothing good from him, 
and adjourned the meeting till the next day. During the 
night, however, they. met for mutual consultation and en- 
couragement, after which they cast Zenobius into prison 
and put him to death. They then manned the walls, put 
the citizens in training, brought in supplies from the coun- 
try, and put the city in a state of complete defence. When 
the people of Tralles, Hypaepa, Metropolis, and several 
other towns heard of this they feared lest they should meet 
the fate of Chios, and followed the example of Ephesus. 
Mithridates sent an army against the revolters and inflicted 
terrible punishments on those whom he captured, but as 
he feared other defections, he gave freedom to the Greek 
cities, proclaimed the cancelling of debts, gave the right of 
citizenship to all sojourners therein, and freed the slaves. 
He did this hoping (as indeed it turned out) that the debt- 
ors, sojourners, and slaves would consider their new privi- 
leges secure only under the rule of Mithridates, and would 
therefore be well disposed toward him. In the meantime 
Mynnio and Philotimus of Smyrna, Cleistheness and Ascle- 


Y.R. ' B.C. 

668 piodotus of Lesbos, all of them the king's intimates (As- «6 
clepiodotus had once entertained him as a guest) joined 
in a conspiracy against Mithridates. Of this conspiracy 
Asclepiodotus himself became the informer, and in order 
to confirm his story he arranged that the king should con- 
ceal himself under a couch and hear what Mynnio said. 
The plot being thus revealed the conspirators were put to 
death with torture, and many others suffered from suspicion 
of similar designs. Thus eighty citizens of Pergamus were 
caught taking counsel together to like purpose, and others 
in other cities. The king sent spies everywhere who de- 
nounced their own enemies, and in this way about 1500 
men lost their lives. Some of these accusers were captured 
by Sulla a little later and put to death, others committed 
suicide, and still others took refuge with Mithridates him- 
self in Pontus. 

49. While these events were taking place in Asia, Mith- 
ridates assembled an army of 80,000 men, which Dorylaus 
led to Archelaus in Greece, who still had 10,000 of his 
former force remaining. Sulla had taken a position against 
Archelaus near Orchomenus. When he saw the great 
number of the enemy's horse coming up, he dug a number 
of ditches through the plain ten feet wide, and drew up 
his army to meet Archelaus when the latter advanced. 
The Romans fought badly because they were in terror of 
the enemy's cavalry. Sulla rode hither and thither a long 
time, encouraging and threatening his men. Failing to 
bring them up to their duty in this way, he leaped from his 
horse, seized a standard, ran out between the two armies 
with his shield-bearers, exclaiming, "If you are ever asked, 
Romans, where you abandoned Sulla, your general, say that 
it was at the battle of Orchomenus." When the officers 
saw his peril they darted from their own ranks to his aid, 
and the troops, moved by the sense of shame, followed and 
drove the enemy back in their turn. This was the begin- 
ning of the victory. Sulla again leaped upon his horse and 
rode among his troops praising and encouraging them until 
the end of the battle. The enemy lost 15,000 men, about 
10,000 of whom were cavalry, and among them Diogenes, 
the son of Archelaus. The infantry fled to their camps. 

50. Sulla feared lest Archelaus should escape him again, 





Y. R. B. C 

668 because he had no ships, and take refuge in Chalcis as 68 
before. Accordingly he stationed night watchmen at inter- 
vals over the whole plain, and the next day he enclosed 
Archelaus with a ditch at a distance of less than 600 feet 
from his camp, to prevent his escape. Then he appealed 
to his army to finish the small remainder of the war, since 
the enemy were no longer even making show of resistance ; 
and so he led them against the camp of Archelaus. Like 
scenes transpired among the enemy, with a change of 
feeling necessarily, the officers hurrying hither and thither, 
representing the imminent danger, and upbraiding the 
men if they should not be able to defend the camp against 
assailants inferior in numbers. There was a rush and 
a shout on each side, followed by many valiant deeds 
on the part of both. The Romans, protected by their 
shields, were demolishing a certain angle of the camp when 
the barbarians leaped down from the parapet inside and 
took their stand around this corner with drawn swords to 
ward off the invaders. No one dared to enter until the 
military tribune, Basillus, first leaped over and killed the 
man in front of him. Then the whole army dashed after 
him. The flight and slaughter of the barbarians followed. 
Some were captured and others driven into the neighbor- 
ing lake, and, not knowing how to swim, perished while 
begging for mercy in barbarian speech, not understood by 
their slayers. Archelaus hid in a marsh, where he found 
a small boat by which he reached Chalcis. Whatever re- 
mained of the Mithridatean forces in separate detachments 
he summoned thither with all speed. 

Chapter VIII 

Sulla declared a Public Enemy — Flaccus and Fimbria — Fimbria 
destroys Ilium — Mithridates sues for Peace — Sulla's Answer — 
Terms of the Treaty offereil by vSulla — Mithridates delays and Sulla 
marches to Asia — A Personal Conference — What Sulla said to 
Mithridates — Mithridates accepts the Terms 

51. The next day Sulla decorated the tribune, Basillus, 
and gave rewards for valor to others. He ravaged Boeotia, 
which was continually changing from one side to the other, 


Y.R. B.C. 

668 and then moved to Thessaly and went into winter quarters, 86 
and waited for Lucullus and his fleet. As he had no tidings 
of Lucullus he began to build ships for himself. At this 
juncture Cornelius Cinna and Gaius Marius, his rivals at 
home, caused him to be declared an enemy of the Roman 
people, destroyed his houses in the city and the country, 
and murdered his friends. This, however, did not weaken 
him in the least, since he had a zealous and devoted army. 
Cinna sent Flaccus, whom he had caused to be chosen as 
his colleague in the consulship, to Asia with two legions to 
take charge of that province and of the Mithridatic war in 
place of Sulla, who was now declared a public enemy. As 
Flaccus was inexperienced in the art of war, a man of 
senatorial rank named Fimbria, who was skilled in military 
affairs, accompanied him as a volunteer. As they were 
sailing from Brundusium many of their ships were destroyed 
by a tempest, and some that had gone in advance were 
burned by a new army that had been sent forward by Mith- 
ridates. Moreover, Flaccus was a rascal, and, being severe 

in punishments and greedy of gain, was hated by the whole 
army. Accordingly, a part of them who had been sent 
ahead into Thessaly went over to Sulla, but Fimbria kept 
the rest of them from deserting, because they considered 
him more humane and a better general than Flaccus. 

669 52. Once while he was at an inn he had a dispute with 85 
the qusestor about their lodgings. Flaccus, who acted as 
arbiter between them, showed little consideration for Fim- 
bria, and the latter was vexed and threatened to go back to 
Rome. Accordingly Flaccus appointed a successor to per- 
form the duties which he then had charge of. Fimbria 
watched his opportunity, and when Flaccus had sailed for 
Chalcedon he first took the fasces away from Thermus, 
whom Flaccus had left as his praetor, as though the army 
had conferred the command upon himself, and when Flac- 
cus returned soon afterward and was angry with him. Fim- 
bria compelled him to fly. Flaccus took refuge in a certain 
house and in the night-time climbed over the wall and fled 
first to Chalcedon and afterward to Nicomedia, and closed 
the gates of the city. Fimbria overcame the place, found 
him concealed in a well, and killed him, although he was 

a Roman consul and the commanding officer of this war. 


V.R. B.C. 

669 and Fimbria himself was only a private citizen who had 8$ 
gone with him as an invited friend. Fimbria cut off his 
head and flung it into the sea, and left the remainder of 
his body unburied. Then he appointed himself com- 
mander of the army and fought several successful battles 
with the son of Mithridates. He drove the king himself 
into Pergamus. The latter escaped from Pergamus to 
Pitane. Fimbria followed him and began to enclose the 
place with a ditch. Then the king fled to Mitylene on a 

53. Fimbria traversed the province of Asia, punished 
the Cappadocian faction, and devasted the territory of the 
towns that did not open their gates to him. The inhab- 
itants of Ilium, who were besieged by Fimbria, appealed 
to Sulla for aid. The latter said that he would come, and 
told them to say to Fimbria meanwhile that they had in- 
trusted themselves to Sulla. Fimbria, when he heard this, 
congratulated them on being already friends of the Roman 
people, and ordered them to admit him within their walls 
because he also was a Roman. He spoke in an ironical 
way also of the relationship existing between Ilium and 
Rome. When he was admitted he made an indiscriminate 
slaughter and burned the whole town. Those who had 
been in communication with Sulla he tortured in various 
ways. He spared neither the sacred objects nor the per- 
sons who had fled to the temple of Athena, but burned them 
with the temple itself. He demolished the walls, and the 
next day made a search to see whether anything of the 
place was left standing. So much worse was the city now 
treated by one of its relations than it had been by Aga- 
memnon, that not a house, not a temple, not a statue was 
left. Some say that the image of Athena, called the Pal- 
ladium, which was supposed to have fallen from heaven, 
was then found unbroken, the falling walls having formed 
an arch over it; and this may be true unless Diomedes and 
Ulysses carried it away from Ilium during the Trojan war. 
Thus was Ilium destroyed by Fimbria at the close of the 
173d Olympiad. Some people think that 1050 years had 
intervened between this calamity and that which it suffered 
at the hands of Agamemnon. 

54. When Mithridates heard of his defeat at Orchome- 


Y.R. ^ B.C. 

669 nus, he reflected on the immense number of men he had 8s 
sent into Greece from the beginning, and the continual 
and swift disaster that had overtaken them. Accordingly, 
he sent word to Archelaus to make peace on the best terms 
possible. The latter had an interview with Sulla in which 
he said, "King Mithridates was your father's friend, Ο 
Sulla. He became involved in this war through the ra- 
pacity of other Roman generals. He will avail himself of 
your virtuous character to make peace, if you will grant 
him fair terms.'* As Sulla had no ships; as his enemies 
at Rome had sent him no money, nor anything else, but 
had declared him an outlaw; as he had already spent the 
money which he had taken from the Pythian, Olympian, 
and Epidauric temples, in return for which he had assigned 
to them half of the territory of Thebes on account of its 
frequent defections; and because he was in a hurry to lead 
his army fresh and unimpaired against the hostile faction 
at home, he assented to the proposal, and said, "If injustice 
was done to Mithridates, Ο Archelaus, he ought to have 
sent an embassy to show how he was wronged, instead of 
which he put himself in the wrong by overrunning such a 
vast territory belonging to others, killing such a vast num- 
ber of people, seizing the public and sacred funds of cities, 
and confiscating the private property of those whom he 
destroyed. He has been just as perfidious to his own friends 
as to us, many of whom he has put to death, including the 
tetrarchs whom he had brought together at a banquet, and 
their wives and children, although they had committed no 
hostile act. Toward us he was moved by an inborn enmity 
rather than by any necessity for war, visiting every possi- 
ble calamity upon the Italians throughout Asia, torturing 
and murdering all of our race, together with their wives, 
children, and servants. Such hatred did this man bear 
toward Italy, who now pretends friendship for my father ! 
— a friendship which ye did not call to mind until I had 
destroyed 160,000 of your troops. 

55. "Instead of treating for peace we ought to be abso- 
lutely implacable toward him, but for your sake I will un- 
dertake to obtain his pardon from Rome if he actually 
repents. But if he is playing the hypocrite again, I advise 
you, Archelaus, to look out for yourself. Consider how 


YR. B. 

669 matters stand at present between you and him. Bear in s 
mind how he has treated his other friends and how we 
treated Eumenes and Masinissa." While he was yet speak- 
ing, Archelaus rejected the offer with indignation, saying 
that he would never betray one who had put an army under 
his command. "I hope," he said, "to come to an agree- 
ment with you if you offer moderate terms." After a short 
interval Sulla said, " If Mithridates will deliver to us the 
entire fleet in your possession; if he will surrender our 
generals and ambassadors and all prisoners, deserters, and 
runaway slaves, and send back to their homes the people of 
Chios and all others whom he has dragged off to Pontus; 
if he will remove his garrison from all places except those 
that he held before the outbreak of hostilities; if he will 
pay the cost of the war incurred on his account, and remain 
content with his ancestral dominions, — I shall hope to per- 
suade the Romans not to remember the injuries he has 
done them." Such were the terms which he offered. 
Archelaus at once withdrew his garrison from all the places 
he held and referred the other conditions to the king. In 
order to make use of his leisure in the meantime, Sulla 
marched against the Eneti, the Dardani, and the Sinti, 
tribes on the border of Macedonia, who were continually 
invading that country, and devasted their territory. In 
this way he exercised his soldiers and enriched them at the 
same time. 

670 56. The ambassadors of Mithridates returned with rati- g 
fications of all the terms except those relating to Paphla- 
gonia, and they added that Mithridates could obtain better 
conditions, " if he should negotiate with your other general, 

f Fimbria." Sulla was indignant that he should be brought 

into such comparison and said that he would bring Fimbria 
to punishment, and would go himself to Asia and see 
whether Mithridates wanted peace or war. Having spoken 

( thus he marched through Thrace to Cypsella after having 

sent Lucullus forward to Abydus, for Lucullus had arrived 
at last, having run the risk of capture by pirates several 
times. He had collected a sort of a fleet composed of 
ships from Cyprus, Phoenicia, Rhodes, and Pamphylia, and 

Ij had ravaged much of the enemy's coast, and had skirmished 

' with the ships of Mithridates on the way. Then Sulla ad- 




670 vanced from Cypsella and Mithridates from Pergamus, and 84 
they met in a conference. Each went with a small force 
to a plain in sight of the two armies. Mithridates began 
by discoursing of his own and his father's friendship and 
alliance with the Romans. Then he accused the Roman 
ambassadors, committeemen, and generals of doing him 
injuries by putting Ariobarzanes on the throne of Cappa- 
docia, depriving him of Phrygia, and allowing Nicomedes 
to wrong him. "And all this," he said, "they did for 
money, taking it from me and from them by turns; for 
there is nothing of which most of you are so liable to accu- 
sation, Ο Romans, as the love of lucre. When war had 
broken out through the acts of your generals all that I did 
was in self-defence, and was the result of necessity rather 
than of intention." 

57. When Mithridates had ceased speaking Sulla re- 
plied: "Although you called us here," he said, "for a dif- 
ferent purpose, namely, to accept our terms of peace, I 
shall not refuse to speak briefly of those matters. I re- 
stored Ariobarzanes to the throne of Cappadocia by decree 
of the Senate when I was governor in Cilicia, and you 
obeyed the decree. You ought to have opposed it and 
given your reasons then, or forever after held your peace. 
Manius gave Phrygia to you for a bribe, which was a crime 
on the part of both of you. By the very fact of your getting 
it by bribery you confess that you had no right to it. 
Manius was tried at Rome for other acts that he had done 
for money and the Senate annulled them all. For this 
reason they decided, not that Phyrgia, which had been 
given to you wrongfully, should be made tributary to Rome, 
but should be free. If we who had taken it by war did not 
think best to govern it, by what right could you hold it? 
Nicomedes charges that you sent against him an assassin 
named Alexander, and then Socrates Chrestus, a rival 
claimant of the kingdom, and that it was to avenge these 
wrongs that he invaded your territory. However, if he 
wronged you, you ought to have sent an embassy to Rome 
and waited for an answer. But although you took swift 
vengeance on Nicomedes, why did you attack Ariobarzanes, 
who had not harmed you? When you drove him out of his 
kingdom you imposed upon the Romans, who were there, 


YR. B.C. 

670 the necessity of putting him back. By preventing them 84 
from doing so you brought on the war. You had meditated 
war a long time, because you hoped to rule the whole world 
if you could conquer the Romans, and the reasons you tell 
of were mere pretexts to cover your real intent. The proof 
of this is that you, although not yet at war with any nation, 
sought the alliance of the Thracians, Sarmatians, and Scy- 
thians, sought aid from the neighboring kings, built a navy, 
and enUsted pilots and helmsmen. 

58. "The time you chose convicts you of treachery most 
of all. When you heard that Italy had revolted from us 
you seized the occasion when we were occupied to fall upon 
Ariobarzanes, Nicomedes, Galatia, and Paphlagonia, and 
finally upon our Asiatic province. When you had taken 
them you committed all sorts of outrages on the cities, ap- 
pointing slaves and debtors to rule over some of them, and 
freeing slaves and cancelling debts in others. In the Greek 
cities you destroyed 1600 men on one false accusation. 
You brought the tetrarchs of Galatia together at a banquet 
and slew them. You butchered or drowned all residents 
of Italian blood in one day, including mothers and babes, 
not sparing even those who had fled to the temples. What 
cruelty, what impiety, what boundless hate did you exhibit 
toward us ! After you had confiscated the property of all 
your victims you crossed over to Europe with great armies, 
although we had forbidden the invasion of Europe to all 
the kings of Asia. You overran our province of Macedonia 
and deprived the Greeks of their freedom. Nor did you 
begin to repent and tell Archelaus to intercede for you, 
until I had recovered Macedonia and delivered Greece 
from your grasp, and destroyed 160,000 of your soldiers, 
and taken your camps with all their belongings. I am as- 
tonished that you should now seek to justify the acts for 
which you asked pardon through Archelaus. If you feared 
me at a distance, do you think that I have come into your 

i neighborhood to have a debate with you? The time for 

j! that passed by when you took up arms against us, and we 

vigorously repelled your assaults and repelled them to the 

>: end." While Sulla was still speaking with vehemence the 

king yielded to his fears and consented to the terms that 

t had been offered through Archelaus. He delivered up the 



Y.R. B.C. 

670 ships and everything else that had been required, and went 84 
back to his paternal kingdom of Pontus as his sole posses- 
sion. And thus the first war between Mithridates and the 
Romans came to an end. 

Chapter IX 

Sulla demands the Surrender of Fimbria — Suicide of Fimbria — Sulla 
settles the Affairs of Asia — His Speech to the People — Imposes 
Five Years' Taxes and the Cost of the War — Piracy in the Mediter- 
ranean — Second Mithridatic War — The Aggressions of Murena — 
Mithridates appeals to Rome — Attacks and defeats Murena — Sulla 
puts a Stop to the War 

59. Sulla now advanced within two stades of Fimbria 
and ordered him to deliver up his army since he held the 
command contrary to law. Fimbria replied jestingly that 
Sulla himself did not now hold a lawful command. Sulla 
drew a line of circumvallation around Fimbria, and many 
of the latter' s soldiers deserted openly. Fimbria called 
the rest of them together and urged them to stand by him. 
When they refused to fight against their fellow-citizens he 
rent his garments and besought them man by man. As 
they still turned away from him, and still more of them 
deserted, he went around among the tents of the tribunes, 
bought some of them with money, called these to the as- 
sembly again, and got them to swear that they would stand 
by him. Those who had been suborned exclaimed that all 
ought to be called up by name to take the oath. He sum- 
moned those who were under obligations to him for past 
favors. The first name called was that of Nonius, who had 
been his close companion. When even he refused to take 
the oath Fimbria drew his sword and threatened to kill him, 
and would have done so had he not been alarmed by the 
outcry of the others and compelled to desist. Then he 
hired a slave, with money and the promise of freedom, to 
go to Sulla as a pretended deserter and assassinate him. 
As the slave was nearing his task he became frightened, 
and thus fell under suspicion ; was arrested and confessed. 
Sulla's soldiers who were stationed around Fimbria's camp 
were filled with anger and contempt for him. They reviled 


Y.R. B.C. 

670 him and nicknamed him Athenio — a man who was once a 84 
king of fugitive slaves in Sicily for a few days. 

60. Thereupon Fimbria in despair went to the line of 
circumvallation and asked for a colloquy with Sulla. The 
latter sent Rutilius instead. Fimbria was disappointed at 
the outset that he was not deemed worthy of an interview, 
although it had been given to the enemy. When he begged 
pardon for an offence due to his youth, Rutilius promised 
that Sulla would allow him to go away in safety by sea if he 
would take ship from the province of Asia, of which Sulla 
was proconsul. Fimbria said that he had another and 
better route. He went to Pergamus, entered into the 
temple of ^sculapius, and stabbed himself with his sword. 
As the wound was not mortal he ordered a slave to drive 
the weapon in. The latter killed his master and then him- 
self. So perished Fimbria, who next to Mithridates had 
most sorely afflicted Asia. Sulla gave his body to his freed- 
men for burial, adding that he would not imitate Cinna and 
Marius, who had deprived many in Rome of their lives and 
of burial after death. The army of Fimbria came over to 
him, and he exchanged pledges with it and joined it with 
his own. Then he directed Curio to restore Nicomedes to 
Bithynia and Ariobarzanes to Cappadocia, and reported 
everything to the Senate, ignoring the fact that he had been 
voted an enemy. 

61. Having settled the affairs of Asia, Sulla bestowed 
freedom on the inhabitants of Ilium, Chios, Lycia, Rhodes, 
Magnesia, and some others, either as a reward for their 
cooperation, or a recompense for what they had bravely 
suffered on his account, and inscribed them as friends of 
the Roman people. Then he distributed his army among 
the remaining towns and issued a proclamation that the 
slaves who had been freed by Mithridates should at once 
return to their masters. As many disobeyed and some of 
the cities revolted, several massacres ensued, of both free 
men and slaves, on various pretexts. The walls of many 
towns were demolished. Many others were plundered and 
their inhabitants sold into slavery. The Cappadocian fac- 
tion, both men and cities, were severely punished, and 
especially the Ephesians, who, with servile adulation of the 
king, had treated the Roman offerings in their temples with 


Y.R. B.C. 

670 indignity. After this a proclamation was sent around com- 84 
manding the principal citizens to come to Ephesus on a 
certain day to meet Sulla. When they had assembled Sulla 
addressed them from the tribune as follows : — 

62. "We first came to Asia with an army when Antio- 
chus, king of Syria, was despoiling you. We drove him 
out and fixed the boundaries of his dominions beyond the 
river Halys and Mount Taurus. We did not retain posses- 
sion of you when we had delivered you from him, but set 
you free, except that we awarded a few places to Eumenes 
and the Rhodians, our allies in the war, not as tributaries, 
but as clients. The proof of this is that when the Lycians 
complained of the Rhodians we deprived them of their 
authority. Such was our conduct toward you. You, on 
the other hand, when Attalus Philometor had left his king- 
dom to us in his will, gave aid to Aristonicus against us 
for four years. When he was captured most of you, under 
the impulse of necessity and fear, returned to your duty. 
Notwithstanding all this, after a period of twenty-four years, 
during which you had attained to great prosperity and em- 
bellishment, public and private, you again became puffed 
up by ease and luxury and took the opportunity, while we 
were preoccupied in Italy, some of you to call in Mithri- 
dates and others to join him when he came. Most infa- 
mous of all, you obeyed the order he gave to kill all the 
Italians in your communities, including women and chil- 
dren, in one day. You did not even spare those who fled 
to the temples dedicated to your own gods. You have re- 
ceived some punishment for this crime from Mithridates 
himself, who broke faith with you and gave you your fill 
of rapine and slaughter, redistributed your lands, cancelled 
debts, freed your slaves, appointed tyrants over some of 
you, and committed robberies everywhere by land and sea; 
so that you learned immediately by experiment and com- 
parison what kind of defender you chose instead of your 
former ones. The instigators of these crimes paid some 
penalty to us also. It is necessary, too, that some penalty 
should be inflicted upon you in common, as you have been 
guilty in common, and something corresponding to your 
deserts. But may the Romans never even conceive of im- 
pious slaughter, indiscriminate confiscation, servile insur- 


V.R. B.C 

ojorections, or other acts of barbarism. I shall spare even 84 
now the Greek race and name so celebrated throughout 
Asia, and for the sake of that fair repute that is ever dear 
to the Romans I shall only impose upon you the taxes of 
five years, to be paid at once, together with the cost of the 
war expended by me, and whatever else may be spent in 
settling the affairs of the province. I will apportion these 
charges to each of you according to cities, and will fix the 
time of payment. Upon the disobedient I shall visit 
punishment as upon enemies." 

63. After he had thus spoken Sulla apportioned the fine 
to the delegates and sent men to collect the money. The 
cities, oppressed by poverty, borrowed it at high rates of 
interest and mortgaged their theatres, their gymnasiums, 
their walls, their harbors, and every other scrap of public 
property, being urged on by the soldiers with contumely. 
Thus was the money collected and brought to Sulla. The 
province of Asia had her fill of misery. She was assailed 
openly by a vast number of pirates, resembling regular fleets 
rather than robber bands. Mithridates had first fitted them 
out at the time when he was ravaging all the coasts, think- 
ing he could not long hold these regions. Their numbers 
had then greatly increased, and they did not confine them- 
selves to ships alone, but openly attacked harbors, castles, 
and cities. They captured lassus, Samos, and Clazomenae, 
also Samothrace, where Sulla was staying at the time, and 
it was said that they robbed the temple at that place of 
ornaments valued at 1000 talents. Sulla, willing perhaps 
that those who had offended him should be maltreated, or 
because he was in haste to put down the hostile faction in 
Rome, left them and sailed for Greece, and thence passed 
on to Italy with the greater part of his army. What he 
did there I have related in my history of the civil wars. 

671 64. The second Mithridatic war began in this way. 83 
Murena, who had been left by Sulla with Fimbria's two 
legions to settle affairs of the rest of Asia, sought trifling 
pretexts for war, being ambitious of a triumph. Mithri- 
dates, after his return to Pontus, went to war with the Col- 
chians and the tribes around the Cimmerian Bosporus who 
had revolted from him. The Colchians asked him to give 
them his son, Mithridates, as their ruler, and when he did 


Y.R. B.C. 

671 SO they at once returned to their allegiance. The king 83 
suspected that this was brought about by his son through 
his own ambition to be king. Accordingly he sent for him 
and first bound him with golden fetters, and soon afterward 
put him to death, although he had served him well in Asia 
in the battles with Fimbria. Against the tribes of the Bos- 
porus he built a fleet and fitted out a large army. The 
magnitude of his preparations gave rise to the belief that 
they were made not against those tribes, but against the 
Romans, for he had not yet restored the whole of Cappadocia 
to Ariobarzanes, but still retained a part of it. He also 
had suspicions of Archelaus. He thought that the latter 
had yielded more than was necessary to Sulla in his nego- 
tiations in Greece. When Archelaus heard of this he be- 
came alarmed and fled to Murena, and by working on him 
persuaded him to anticipate Mithridates in beginning hos- 
tilities. Murena marched suddenly through Cappadocia 
and attacked Comana, a very large country town belonging 
to Mithridates, with a rich and renowned temple, and 
killed some of the king's cavalry. When the king's am- 
bassadors appealed to the treaty he replied that he saw no 
treaty; for Sulla had not written it out, but had gone away 
after the terms had been fulfilled by acts. When Murena 
had delivered his answer he began robbing forthwith, not 
sparing the money of the temples, and he went into winter 
quarters in Cappadocia. 

672 65. Mithridates sent an embassy to the Senate and to 89 
Sulla to complain of the acts of Murena. The latter, mean- 
time, had passed over the river Halys, which was then swol- 
len by rains and very difiicult to cross. He captured 400 
villages belonging to Mithridates. The king offered no 
opposition, but waited for the return of his embassy. 
Murena returned to Phrygia and Galatia loaded down with 
plunder. There he met Calidius, who had been sent from 
Rome on account of the complaints of Mithridates. Ca- 
lidius did not bring a decree of the Senate, but he declared 
in the hearing of all that the Senate ordered him not to 
molest the king, as he had not broken the treaty. After 
he had thus spoken he was seen talking to Murena alone. 
Murena abated nothing of his violence, but again invaded 
the territory of Mithridates. The latter, thinking that 

VOL. I — 2 Β 


Y.R. Β C. 

672 open war had been ordered by the Romans, directed his 83 
general, Gordius, to retaliate on their villages. Gordius 
straightway seized and carried off a large number of ani- 
mals and other property and men, both private citizens and 
soldiers, and took position against Murena himself, with a 
river flowing between them. Neither of them began the 
fight until Mithridates came up with a larger army, when a 
severe engagement immediately took place on the banks of 
the river. Mithridates prevailed, crossed the river, and 
got the better of Murena decidedly. The latter retreated 
to a strong hill where the king attacked him. After losing 
many men Murena fled over the mountains to Phrygia by a 
pathless route, severely harassed by the missiles of the 

66. The news of this brilliant and decisive victory 
spread quickly and caused many to change sides to Mith- 
ridates. The latter drove all of Murena* s garrisons out of 
Cappadocia and offered sacrifice to Zeus Stratius on a lofty 
pile of wood on a high hill, according to the fashion of 
his country, which is as follows. First, the kings them- 
selves carry wood to the heap. Then they make a smaller 
pile encircling the other one, on which they pour milk, 
honey, wine, oil, and various kinds of incense. A banquet 
is spread on the ground for those present (as at the sacri- 
fices of the Persian kings at Pasargadae) and then they set 
fire to the wood. The height of the flame is such that it 
can be seen at a distance of 1000 stades from the sea, and 
they say that nobody can come near it for several days on 
account of the heat. Mithridates performed a sacrifice of 
this kind according to the custom of his country. Sulla 

673 thought that it was not right to make war against Mithri- 81 
dates when he had not violated the treaty. Accordingly, 
Aulus Gabinius was sent to tell Murena that the former 
order, that he should not fight Mithridates, was to be taken 
seriously, and to reconcile Mithridates and Ariobarzailes 
with each other. At a conference between them Mithri- 
dates betrothed his little daughter, four years old, to Ario- 
barzanes, and improved the occasion to stipulate that he 
should not only retain that part of Cappadocia which he 
then held, but have another part in addition. Then 
he gave a banquet to all, with prizes of gold for those who 


V.R. B.C. 

673 should excel in drinking, eating, jesting, singing, and so 81 
forth, as was customary, in which Gabinius was the only 
one who did not engage. Thus the second war between 
Mithridates and the Romans, lasting about three years, 
came to an end. 

Chapter X 

New Troubles brewing — Mithridates forms an Alliance with Sertorius 
and prepares for War — Makes a Speech to his Troops — Invades 

674 67. As Mithridates was now at leisure he subdued the 80 
tribes of the Bosporus and appointed Machares, one of his 
sons, king over them. Then he fell upon the Achseans 
beyond Colchis (who are supposed to be descended from 
those who lost their way when returning from the Trojan 
war), but lost two divisions of his army, partly by open war, 
partly by the severity of the climate, and partly by strata- 
gem. When he returned home he sent ambassadors to 
Rome to sign the agreements. At the same time Ariobar- 
zanes, either of his own notion or at the prompting of 
others, sent thither to complain that Cappadocia had not 
been delivered up to him, but that a greater part of it was 
yet retained by Mithridates. Sulla commanded Mithridates 
to give up Cappadocia. He did so, and then sent another 
embassy to sign the agreements. But now Sulla had just 

676 died, and as the Senate was otherwise occupied the praetors 78 
did not admit them. So Mithridates persuaded his son-in- 
law, Tigranes, to make an incursion into Cappadocia as 
though it were on his own account. This artifice did not 
deceive the Romans. The Armenian king threw, as it 
were, a drag net around Cappadocia and made a haul of 
about 300,000 people, whom he carried off to his own 
country and settled them, with others, in a certain place 
where he had first assumed the diadem of Armenia and 
which he had called after himself, Tigranocerta, or the city 
of Tigranes. 

68. While these things were taking place in Asia Serto- 
rius, the governor of Spain, incited that province and all 
the neighboring country to rebel against the Romans, and 


Y.R. B. 

679 selected from his associates a senate in imitation of that : 
of Rome. Two members of his faction, Lucius Magius 
and Lucius Fannius, proposed to Mithridates to ally him- 
self with Sertorius, holding out the hope that he would 
acquire a large part of the province of Asia and of the 
neighboring nations. Mithridates fell in with this sugges- 
tion and sent ambassadors to Sertorius. The latter intro- 
duced them to his senate and felicitated himself that his 
fame had extended to Pontus, and that he could now besiege 
the Roman power in both the Orient and the Occident. 
So he made a treaty with Mithridates to give him Asia, 
Bithynia, Paphlagonia, Cappadocia, and Galatia, and sent 
Marcus Varius to him as a general and the two Luciuses, 
Magius and Fannius, as counsellors. With their assistance 
Mithridates began his third and last war against the Ro- 
mans, in the course of which he lost his entire kingdom, 
and Sertorius lost his life in Spain. Two generals were 
sent against Mithridates from Rome; the first, Lucullus, 
the same who had served as prefect of the fleet under Sulla; 
11 the second, Pompey, by whom the whole of his dominions, 

and the adjoining territory as far as the river Euphrates, 
under the pretext and impetus of the Mithridatic war, were 
brought under Roman sway. 

69. Mithridates had been in collision with the Romans 
so often that he knew that this war, so inexcusably and 
hastily begun, would be an implacable one. He made 
every preparation with the thought that all was at stake. 
The remainder of the summer and the whole of the winter 
he spent in cutting timber, building ships, and making 
arms. He distributed 2,000,000 medimni ^ of corn along 
the coast. Besides his former forces he had for allies 
the Chalybes, Armenians, Scythians, Taurians, Achaeans, 
Heniochi, Leucosyrians, and those who occupy the terri- 
tory about the river Thermodon, called the country of the 
Amazons. These additions to his former strength were 
from Asia. From Europe he drew of the Sarmatian tribes, 
both the Basilidae and the Jazyges, the Coralli, and those 
Thracians who dwelt along the Danube and on the Rhodope 
and Haemus mountains, and besides these the Bastarnae, the 

1 The mecUmnus = i2 gallons. 


Y.K. B.C. 

679 bravest nation of all. Altogether Mithridates recruited a 75 
fighting force of about 140,000 foot and 16,000 horse. A 
great crowd of road-makers, baggage-carriers, and sutlers 

680 70. At the beginning of spring Mithridates made trial 74 
of his navy and sacrified to Zeus Stratius in the customary 
manner, and also to Poseidon by plunging a chariot with 
white horses into the sea. Then he hastened against Paph- 
lagonia with his two generals, Taxiles and Hermocrates, in 
command of his army. When he arrived there he made 

a speech to his soldiers, eulogistic of his ancestors and still 
more so of himself, showing how his kingdom had grown 
to greatness from small beginnings, and how his army had 
never been defeated by the Romans when he was present. 
He accused the Romans of avarice and lust of power " to 
such an extent,** he said, "that they had enslaved Italy and 
Rome itself." He accused them of bad faith respecting 
the last and still existing treaty, saying that they were not 
willing to sign it because they were watching for an oppor- 
tunity to violate it again. After thus setting forth the cause 
of the war he dwelt upon the composition of his army and 
his apparatus, upon the preoccupation of the Romans, who 
were waging a difficult war with Sertorius in Spain, and 
were torn with civil dissensions throughout Italy, "for 
which reason," he said, "they have allowed the sea to be 
overrun by pirates a long time, and have not a single ally, 
nor any subjects who still obey them willingly. Do you 
not see," he added, "some of their noblest citizens (point- 
ing to Varius and the two Luciuses) at war with their own 
country and allied with us? " 

71. When he had finished speaking and exciting his 
army, he invaded Bithynia. Nicomedes had lately died 
childless and bequeathed his kingdom to the Romans. 
Cotta, its governor, was a man altogether unwarlike. He 
fled to Chalcedon with what force he had. Thus Bithynia 
again passed under the rule of Mithridates. The Romans 
from all directions flocked to Cotta at Chalcedon. When 
Mithridates advanced to that place Cotta did not go out to 
meet him because he was inexperienced in military affairs, 
but his naval prefect, Nudus, with a part of the army occu- 
pied a very strong position on the plain. He was driven 


Y.R. Β 

68o out of it, however, and fled to the gates of Chalcedon over : 
many walls which greatly obstructed his movement. There 
was a struggle at the gates among those trying to gain en- 
trance simultaneously, for which reason no missile cast by 
the pursuers missed its mark. The guards at the gates, 
fearing for the city, let down the gate from the machine. 
Nudus and some of the other officers were drawn up by 
ropes. The remainder perished between their friends and 
their foes, holding out their hands in entreaty to each. 
Mithridates made good use of his success. He moved his 
ships up to the harbor the same day, broke the brazen chain 
that closed the entrance, burned four of the enemy's ships, 
and towed the remaining sixty away. Nudus offered no 
resistance, nor Cotta, for they remained shut up inside the 
walls. The Roman loss was about 3000, including Lucius 
Manlius, a man of senatorial rank. Mithridates lost 
twenty of his Bastarnse, who were the first to break into the 

Chapter XI 

Lucullus takes the Command against him and cuts off his Supplies 
at Cyzicus — Mithridates besieges Cyzicus — Valiant Defence of the 
City — Famine in the Besieging Army — Plight of Mithridates — 
Lucullus pursues — Mithridates suffers Shipwreck 

72. Lucius Lucullus, who had been chosen consul and 
general for this war, led one legion of soldiers from Rome, 
joined with it the two of Fimbria, and added two others, 
making in all 30,000 foot and 1600 horse, with which he 
pitched his camp near that of Mithridates at Cyzicus. 
When he learned from deserters that the king's army con- 
tained about 300,000 men and that all his supplies were 
furnished by foragers or came by sea, he said to those 
around him that he would presently reduce the enemy with- 
out fighting, and he told them to remember his promise. 
Seeing a mountain well suited for a camp, where he could 
readily obtain supplies, and could cut off those of the 
enemy, he moved forward to occupy it in order to gain a 
victory by that means without danger. There was only one 
narrow pass leading to it, and Mithridates held it by a 


Y.R. Β C• 

680 Strong guard. He had been advised to do so by Taxiles 74 
and his other officers. Lucius Magius, who had brought 
about the alliance between Sertorius and Mithridates, now 
that Sertorius was dead, opened secret communications 
with LucuUus, and having secured pledges from him per- 
suaded Mithridates to allow the Romans to pass through 
and encamp where they pleased. "The two legions of 
Fimbria," he said, "want to desert, and will come over to 
you directly. What is the use of a battle and bloodshed 
when you can conquer the enemy without fighting?" 
Mithridates assented to this advice heedlessly and without 
suspicion. He allowed the Romans to go through the pass 
unmolested and to fortify the great hill on his front. When 
they had possessed themselves of it they were able to draw 
supplies from their rear without difficulty. Mithridates, 
on the other hand, was cut off by a lake, by mountains, and 
by rivers, from all provisions on the landward side, except 
an occasional supply secured with difficulty; he had no 
easy way out and he could not overcome Lucullus on ac- 
count of the difficulty of the ground, which he had disre- 
garded when he himself had the advantage. Moreover, 
winter was now approaching and would soon interrupt his 
supplies by sea. As Lucullus looked over the situation he 
reminded his friends of his promise, and showed them that 
his prediction was practically accomplished. 

73. Although Mithridates might perhaps even now have 
been able to break through the enemy* s lines by force of 
numbers, he neglected to do so, but pressed the siege of 
Cyzicus with the apparatus he had prepared, thinking that 
he should find a remedy in this way both for the badness 
of his position and for his want of supplies. As he had 
plenty of soldiers he pushed the siege in every possible 
way. He blockaded the harbor with a double sea wall and 
drew a line of circumvallation around the rest of the city. 
He raised mounds, built machines, towers, and rams pro- 
tected by tortoises. He constructed a siege engine 100 
cubits high, from which rose another tower furnished with 
catapults discharging stones and various kinds of missiles. 
Two quinqueremes joined together carried another tower 
against the port, from which a bridge could be projected 
by a mechanical device when brought near the wall. When 


V.X. B.C. 

680 all was in readiness he first sent against the city on ships 74 
3000 inhabitants of Cyzicus whom he had taken prisoners. 
These raised their hands toward the wall in supplication 
and besought their fellow-citizens to spare them in their 
dangerous position, but Pisistratus, the Cyzicean general, 
proclaimed from the walls that as they were in the enemy's 
hands they must meet their fate bravely. 

74. When this attempt had failed Mithridates brought 
up the machine erected on the ships and suddenly projected 
the bridge upon the wall and four of his men ran across. 
The Cyziceans were at first dumbfounded by the novelty of 
the device and gave way somewhat, but as the rest of the 
enemy were slow in following, they plucked up courage 
and thrust the four over the wall. Then they poured burn- 
ing pitch on the ships and compelled them to back out 
stern foremost with the machine. In this way the Cyzi- 
ceans beat off the invaders by sea. Three times on the 
same day all the machines on the landward side were massed 
against the toiling citizens, who flew this way and that way 
to meet the constantly renewed assault. They broke the 
rams with stones, or turned them aside with nooses, or 
deadened their blows with baskets of wool. They extin- 
guished the enemy's fire-bearing missiles with water and 
vinegar, and broke the force of others by means of gar- 
ments suspended or linen cloth stretched before them. In 
short, they left nothing untried that was within the com- 
pass of human zeal. Although they toiled most persever- 
ingly, yet a portion of the wall, that had been weakened by 
fire, gave way toward evening; but on account of the heat 
nobody was in a hurry to dash in. The Cyziceans built 
another wall around it that night, and about this time a 
tremendous wind came and smashed the rest of the king's 

75. It is said that the city of Cyzicus was given by Zeus 
to Proserpina by way of dowry, and that of all the gods the 
inhabitants have most veneration for her. Her festival 
now came around, on which they are accustomed to sacri- 
fice a black heifer to her, and as they had none they made 
one of paste. Just then a black heifer swam to them from 
the sea, dived under the chain at the mouth of the harbor, 
walked into the city, found her own way to the temple, and 


Y• R• D• C• 

680 took her place by the altar. The Cyziceans sacrificed her 74 
with joyful hopes. Thereupon the friends of Mithridates 
advised him to sail away from the place since it was sacred, 
but he would not do so. He ascended Mount Dindymus, 
which overhung the city, and built a mound extending from 

it to the city walls, on which he constructed towers, and, 
at the same time, undermined the wall with tunnels. As 
his horses were not useful here, and were weak for want of 
food and had sore hoofs, he sent them by a roundabout 
way to Bithynia. Lucullus fell upon them as they were 
crossing the river Rhyndacus, killed a* large number, and 
captured 15,000 men, 6000 horses, and a large amount of 
baggage. While these things were transpiring at Cyzicus 
Eumachus, one of Mithridates' generals, overran Phrygia 
and killed a great many Romans, with their wives and chil- 
dren, subjugated the Pisidians and the Isaurians and also 
Cilicia. Finally Deiotarus, one of the tetrarchs of Galatia, 
drove the marauder away and slew many of his men. Such 
was the course of events in and around Phrygia. 

76. When winter came Mithridates was deprived of his 
supplies by sea, if he had any, so that his whole army suf- 
fered from hunger, and many of them died. There were 
some who ate the entrails ^ according to a barbarian custom. 
Others were made sick by subsisting on herbs. Moreover 
the corpses that were thrown out in the neighborhood un- 
buried brought on a plague in addition to that caused by 
famine. Nevertheless Mithridates continued his efforts, 
hoping still to capture Cyzicus by means of the mounds ex- 
tending from Mount Dindymus. But when the Cyziceans 
undermined them and burned the machines on them, and 
made frequent sallies upon his forces, knowing that they 
were weakened by want of food, Mithridates began to think 

681 of flight. He fled by night, going himself with his fleet 73 
to Parius, and his army by land to Lampsacus. Many lost 
their lives in crossing the river ^sepus, which was then 
greatly swollen, and where Lucullus attacked them. Thus 
the Cyziceans escaped the vast siege preparations of the 
king by means of their own bravery and of the famine that 
Lucullus brought upon the enemy. They instituted games 

1 The text here is defective. 


T.R. B.C. 

68x in his honor, which they celebrate to this day, called the 73 
Lucullean games, Mithridates sent ships for those who 
had taken refuge in Lampsacus, where they were besieged 
by Lucullus, and carried them away, together with the 
liampsaceans themselves. Leaving 10,000 picked men 
and fifty ships under Varius (the general sent to him by 
Sertorius), and Alexander the Paphlagonian, and Dionysius 
the eunuch, he sailed with the bulk of his force for Nico- 
media. A storm came up in which many of both divisions 

77. When Lucullus had accomplished this result on land 
by starving his enemies, he collected a fleet from the Asi- 
atic province and distributed it to the generals serving 
under him. Trirarius sailed to Apamea, captured it, and 
slew a gr^at many of the inhabitants who had taken refuge 
in the temples. Barba took Prusias, situated at the base 
of a mountain, and occupied Nicsea, which had been aban- 
doned by the Mithridatic garrison. At the harbor of the 
Achseans Lucullus captured thirteen of the enemy's ships. 
He overtook Varius and Alexander and Dionysius on a 
barren island near Lemnos (where the altar of Philoctetes 
is shown with the brazen serpent, the bows, and the breast- 
plate bound with fillets, to remind us of the sufferings of 
that hero), and dashed at them in a contemptuous manner. 
They stoutly held their ground. He checked his oarsmen 
and sent his ships toward them by twos in order to entice 
them out to sea. As they declined the challenge, but con- 
tinued to defend themselves on land, he sent a part of his 
fleet around to another side of the island, disembarked a 
force of infantry, and drove the enemy to their ships. Still 
they did not venture out to sea, but hugged the shore, 
because they were afraid of the army of Lucullus. Thus 
they were exposed to missiles on both sides, landward and 
seaward, and received a great many wounds, and after heavy 
slaughter took to flight. Varius, Alexander, and Dionysius 
the eunuch were captured in a cave where they had con- 
cealed themselves. Dionysius drank poison which he had 
with him and immediately expired. Lucullus gave orders 
that Varius be put to death, since he did not want to have 
his triumph graced by a Roman senator, but he kept Alex- 
ander for that purpose. Lucullus sent letters wreathed with 

L. LiciNius 

In the Museum of Che Hermilage (Duruy) 


V.R. Β C. 

681 laurel to Rome, as is the custom of victors, and then pressed 73 
forward to Bithynia. 

78. As Mithridates was sailing to Pontus a second tem- 
pest overtook him and he lost about 10,000 men and sixty 
ships, and the remainder were scattered wherever the wind 
blew them. His own ship sprang a leak and he went aboard 
a small piratical craft although his friends tried to dissuade 
him. The pirates landed him safely at Sinope. From that 
place he was towed to Amisus, whence he sent appeals to 
his son-in-law, Tigranes the Armenian, and his son, 
Machares, the ruler of the Cimmerian Bosporus, that they 
should hasten to his assistance. He ordered Diodes to 
take a large quantity of gold and other presents to the 
neighboring Scythians, but Diodes took the gold and the 

682 presents and deserted to LucuUus. Lucullus moved to 7» 
the front with the prestige of victory, subduing everything 
in his path and subsisting on the country. Presently he 
came to a rich district, exempt from the ravages of war, 
where a slave was sold for four drachmas,^ an ox for one, 
and goats, sheep, clothing, and other things in proportion. 
Lucullus laid siege to Amisus and also to Eupatoria, which 
Mithridates had built alongside of Amisus ^ and named after 
himself and where he had fixed the royal residence. With 
another army he besieged Themiscyra, which is named after 
one of the Amazons and is situated on the river Thermo- 
don. The besiegers of this place brought up towers, built 
mounds, and dug tunnels so large that great subterranean 
battles could be fought in them. The inhabitants cut open- 
ings into these tunnels from above and thrust bears and 
other wild animals and swarms of bees into them against 
the workers. Those who were besieging Amisus suffered in 
other ways. The inhabitants repelled them bravely, made 
frequent sallies, and often challenged them to single combat. 
Mithridates sent them plenty of supplies and arms and 
soldiers from Cabira, where he wintered and collected a 
new army. Here he brought together about 40,000 foot 
and 4000 horse. 

1 The metallic equivalent of the drachma was 9|</. English money. 

2 Another geographical error. Amisus was on the sea-coast and 
Eupatoria a considerable distance inland. 


Chapter XII 

Second Campaign of Luctdlus against Mithridates — Crosses a Mountain 
Range — A Panic in the Camp of Mithridates — Mithridates takeft 
Refuge with Tigranes — Lucullus regulates the Pontic Cities — De- 
mands the Surrender of Mithridates from Tigranes — Marches against 
Tigranes — Besieges Tigranocerta — Battle of Tigranocerta — Total 
Defeat of Tigranes — Capture of Tigranocerta 

Y.R. B.C 

683 79• When spring came Lucullus marched over the moun- 71 
tains against Mithridates, who had stationed advanced posts 
to hinder his approach, and to start signal fires whenever 
anything important should happen. He appointed a mem- 
ber of the royal family, named Phoenix, commander of this 
advance guard. When Lucullus drew near. Phoenix gave 
the fire-signal to Mithridates and then deserted to Lucullus 
with his forces. Lucullus now passed over the mountains 
without difficulty and came down to Cabira, but was beaten 
by Mithridates in a cavalry engagement and retreated again 
to the mountain. Pomponius, his master of horse, was 
wounded and taken prisoner and brought to the presence 
of Mithridates. The king asked him what favor he (Pom- 
ponius) could render him for sparing his life. Pomponius 
replied, "A great one if you make peace with Lucullus, 
but if you continue his enemy I will not even consider your 
question.'* The barbarians wanted to put him to death, 
but the king said that he would not do violence to bravery 
overtaken by misfortune. He drew out his forces for battle 
several days in succession, but Lucullus would not come 
down and fight; so he looked about for some way to come 
at him by ascending the mountain. At this juncture a Scyth- 
ian, named Olcaba, who had deserted to Lucullus some- 
time before and had saved the lives of many in the recent 
cavalry fight, and for that reason was deemed worthy to share 
Lucullus' table, his confidence, and his secrets, came to 
his tent while he was taking his noonday rest and tried to 
force his way in. He was wearing a short dagger in his 
belt as was his custom. When he was prevented from en- 
tering he became angry and said that there was a pressing 
necessity that the general should be aroused. The servants 
replied that there was nothing more useful to Lucullus than 

§ 79-8 1 ] THE MI ΤΗ RID A TIC WARS 3 8 1 

V.R. ^ ^ B.C. 

683 his safety. Thereupon the Scythian mounted his horse and 71 
went immediately to Mithridates, either because he had 
plotted against LucuUus and now thought that he was sus- 
pected, or because he considered himself insulted and was 
angry on that account. He exposed to Mithridates another 
Scythian, named Sobdacus, who was about to desert to 
Lucullus. Sobdacus was accordingly arrested. 

80. Lucullus hesitated about going down directly to the 
plain since the enemy was so much superior in horse, nor 
could he discover any way around, but he found a hunter 
in a cave who was familiar with the mountain paths. With 
him for a guide he made a circuitous descent by rugged 
paths over Mithridates* head. He avoided the plain on 
account of the cavalry, and came down and chose a place 
for his camp where he had a mountain stream on his front. 
As he was short of supplies he sent to Cappadocia for corn, 
and in the meantime had frequent skirmishes with the 
enemy. Once when the royal forces were put to flight 
Mithridates came running to them from his camp and, with 
reproachful words, rallied them to such good purpose that 
the Romans became terrified in turn and fled up the moun- 
tain side with such swiftness that they did not know for 
a long time that the hostile force had desisted from the 
pursuit, but each one thought that the fleeing comrade be- 
hind him was an enemy, so great was the panic that had 
overtaken them. Mithridates sent bulletins everywhere 
announcing this victory. He then sent a detachment 
composed of the bravest of his horse to intercept the 
convoy that was bringing supplies from Cappadocia to 
Lucullus, hoping to bring upon him the same scarcity of 
provisions from which he had himself suffered at Cyzicus. 

81. It was his great object to cut off Lucullus* supplies, 
which were drawn from Cappadocia alone, but when his 
cavalry came upon the advance guard of the convoy in a 
narrow defile, they did not wait till their enemies had 
reached the open country. Consequently their horses were 
useless in the narrow space, where the Romans hastily put 
themselves in line of battle across the road. Aided, as 
foot-soldiers would naturally be, by the difficulties of the 
ground, they killed some of the king's troops, drove others 
over precipices, and scattered the rest in flight. A few 


Y.R. B.C. 

683 of them arrived at their camp by night, and said that they 71 
were the only survivors, so that rumor magnified the ca- 
lamity which was indeed sufficiently great. Mithridates 
heard of this affair before LucuUus did, and he expected 
that LucuUus would take advantage of so great a slaughter 
of his horsemen to attack him forthwith. Accordingly he 
fell into a panic and contemplated flight, and at once com- 
municated his purpose to his friends in his tent. They 
did not wait for the signal to be given, but while it was 
still night each one sent his own baggage out of the camp, 
which made a great crush of pack animals around the gates. 
When the soldiers perceived the commotion, and saw what 
the baggage-carriers were doing, they imagined every sort 
of absurdity. Filled with terror, mingled with anger that 
the signal had not been given to them also, they demolished 
and ran over their own fortification and scattered in every 
direction over the plain, helter-skelter, without orders from 
the commanding general or any other officer. When Mith- 
ridates heard the disorderly rush he dashed out of his tent 
among them and attempted to say something, but nobody 
would listen to him. He was caught in the crowd and 
knocked from his horse, but remounted and was borne to 
the mountains with a few followers. 

82. When LucuUus heard of the success of his provision 
train and observed the enemy's flight, he sent out a large 
force of cavalry in pursuit of the fugitives. Those who 
were still collecting baggage in the camp he surrounded 
with his infantry, whom he ordered for the time to abstain 
from plunder, but to kill indiscriminately. But the sol- 
diers, seeing vessels of gold and of silver in abundance and 
much costly clothing, disregarded the order. Those who 
overtook Mithridates himself cut open the pack saddle of a 
mule that was loaded with gold, which fell out, and while 
they were busy with it they allowed him to escape to Co- 
mona. From thence he fled to Tigranes with 2000 horse- 
men. Tigranes did not admit him to his presence, but 
ordered that royal entertainment be provided for him on 
his estates. Mithridates, in utter despair of his kingdom, 
sent the eunuch Bacchus to his palace to put his sisters, 
wives, and concubines to death as he could. These, with 
wonderful devotion, destroyed themselves with daggers, 


V.R. ^ B.C. 

684 poison, and ropes. When the garrison commanders of 70 
Mithridates saw these things they went over to Lucullus in 
crowds, all but a few. Lucullus marched among the others 
and regulated them. He also sent his fleet among the cities 
on the Pontic coast and captured Amastris, Heraclea, and 
some others. 

83. Sinope continued to resist him vigorously, and the 
inhabitants fought him on the water not without success, 
but when they were besieged they burned their heavier 
ships, embarked on the lighter ones, and went away. Lu- 
cullus at once made it a free city, being moved thereto by 
the following dream. It is said that Autolycus, the com- 
panion of Hercules in his expedition against the Amazons, 
was driven by a tempest into Sinope and made himself 
master of the place, and that his consecrated statue gave 
oracles to the Sinopeans. As they were hastening their 
flight they could not embark it on shipboard, but wrapped 
it up with linen cloths and ropes. Nobody told Lucullus 
of this beforehand and he knew nothing about it, but he 
dreamed that he saw Autolycus calling him, and the follow- 
ing day, when some men passed him carrying the image 
wrapped up, he ordered them to take off the covering and 
then he saw what he thought he had seen in the night. 
This was the kind of dream he had. After Sinope Lucullus 
restored to their homes the citizens of Amisus, who had 
fled by sea in like manner, because he learned that they 
had been settled there by Athens when she held the empire 
of the sea ; that they had had a democratic form of govern- 
ment at first, and afterward had been subject for a long 
time to the kings of Persia; that their democracy had been 
restored to them by decree of Alexander; and that they had 
finally been compelled to serve the kings of Pontus. Lu- 
cullus sympathized with them, and in emulation of the favor 
shown to the Attic race by Alexander he gave the city its 
freedom and recalled the citizens with all haste. Thus did 
Lucullus desolate and repeople both Sinope and Amisus. 
He entered into friendly relations with Machares, the son 
of Mithridates and ruler of the Bosporus, who sent him a 
crown of gold. He demanded the surrender of Mithridates 
from Tigranes. Then he went back to the province of Asia. 
When the instalment of tribute imposed by Sulla became 


due he levied upon one-fourth of the harvest, and imposed 
a house-tax and a slave-tax. He offered a triumphal sacri- 
fice to the gods for the successful termination of the war. 
685 84. After the sacrifices had been performed he marched 69 
with two legions and 500 horse against Tigranes, who had 
refused to surrender Mithridates to him. He crossed the 
Euphrates, but he required the barbarians, through whose 
territory he passed, to furnish only necessary supplies since 
they did not want to fight, or to expose themselves to suffer- 
ing by taking sides in the quarrel between Lucullus and 
Tigranes. No one told Tigranes that Lucullus was advan- 
cing, for the first man who brought this news he hanged, 
considering him a disturber of the good order of the cities. 
When he learned that it was true, he sent Mithrobarzanes 
forward with 2000 horse to hinder Lucullus' march. He 
intrusted to Mancseus the defence of Tigranocerta, which 
city, as I have already said, the king had built in this region 
in honor of himself, and to which he had summoned the 
principal inhabitants of the country under penalty of con- 
fiscation of all of their goods that they did not transfer to 
it. He surrounded it with walls fifty cubits high and wide 
enough to contain stables for horses. In the suburbs he 
built a palace and laid out large parks, enclosures for wild 
animals, and fish-ponds. He also erected a strong tower 
near by. All these he put in charge of Mancaeus, and then 
he went through the country to collect an army. Lucullus, 
at his first encounter with Mithrobarzanes, defeated him 
and put him to flight. Sextilius shut up Mancaeus in Ti- 
granocerta, plundered the palace outside the walls, drew a 
ditch around the city and tower, moved machines against 
them, and undermined the wall. 

85. While Sextilius was doing this Tigranes brought 
together some 250,000 foot and 50,000 horse. He sent 
about 6000 of the latter to Tigranocerta, who broke through 
the Roman line to the tower, and seized and brought away 
the king's concubines. With the rest of his army Tigranes 
marched against Lucullus. Mithridates, who was now for 
the first time admitted to his presence, advised him not to 
come to close (quarters with