Full text of "THE ROMMEL PAPERS"

TOBRUK

Rommel s plan for tfie
attack onTobruk which
was to take place

November 1941

Reproduction of a sketch map
drawn by Rommel

In this left hand corner of the original map Rommel
wrote the time schedule for the attack. It reads:

1 Start line X-Day 03.30

2 Attack onfortifications X-Day 04.00 after artillery
preparation (02.00-04.00)

3 Advance on both sides of Via Balbia up to junction
of three roads 06.30-10.00

4 Penetration to coastline 10.00-15.00

5 Attack on harbour and town ofTobruk 15 .&lt;A&gt;-
and Auda waterworks

6 Railing up of the coastal strip as fa, as
Sahal

00* }

X ** **

adi

MAI MAY 21 19

"u JUN o r

HAY 16

7 Rommel s sketch on which he plotted the British
attack of November 20th aimed at the relief of
Tobruk, which forestalled and thwarted his plan,
"""""- with the movements of his own forces in
response to it.

940.933 R76p

Rcraiel

The Rcranel papers.

DUE

INTERLIBRAW
KC..MJ.PU

U&4.

OCT 8 173 &lt;

JUL 15

s 1

M2U

HAY 28

L-16

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOG CARD NO. 53-5656
PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

CONTENTS ix

XV. ALAMEIN IN RETROSPECT page 327

XVI. THE GREAT RETREAT 337

The Evacuation of Cyrenaica 348

XVII. CONSULTATION IN EUROPE 359

XVIII. BACK TO TUNISIA 370

Through the Sirte 273

Buerat Respite 381

The End in Tripolitania 385

From Alamein to Mareth Retrospect 394

XIX. BETWEEN Two FIRES 397

Army Group " Afrika " 408

The End in Africa 416

PART FOUR

ITALY

XX. ITALY, 1 943, by Manfred Rommel 425

PART FIVE

INVASION

XXI. INVASION 1944, by General Fritz Bayerlein 4,51
RommeVs Letters from the West, December 1943 Jwne

1944 460

High Command Preparations for the Invasion 4.65

Invasion Day 471

XXII. THE LAST DAYS, by Manfred Rvmmel 495

XXIII. THE SKY HAS GROWN DARK 507

Modern Military Leadership 516

Africa in Retrospect

Appendix 525

Index 526

LIST OF MAPS
Drawn by J. F. Trotter

1. The advance from the Rhine to Cherbourg page 5

2. The break-through on the Meuse 8

3. Rommel s map of his advance, iSth-iyth May, 1940 23

4. Battles round Arras and Lille 31

5. Crossing the Somme 45

6. The Somme-Seine break-through 51

7. The drive into Cherbourg 71

8. The thrust into Cyrenaica, April 1941 108

9. The British Offensive, June 1941 Battleaxe 143

10. The British Offensive, November 1941 Crusader (ist phase) 157

1 1 . Crusader (and phase) 1 65

12. Rommel s attack at Gazala, May 1942 (ist phase) 205

13. Gazala (2nd phase) 215

14. Rommel s eastward thrust after Bir Hacheim 219

15. The Battle of Alamein, July 1942 247

16. The Battle of Alam Haifa, September 1942 278

17. The Battle of Alamein, October November 1942 301

1 8. The Battle of Kasserine ggg

19. The Battle of Medenine 4x3

20. The lay-out of German defences on D-Day 472

21. Battles round Caen 475

22. Battles in the Cherbourg Peninsula 488

FOLD OUT MAPS

The coast of North Africa from Alexandria to Tunis facing page 418

Northern France

LIST OF PLATES

Field Marshal Rommel frontispiece

Crossing the Somme facing page 42

Enemy artillery on the Somme 43

" We had reached the coast of France " 43

British and French prisoners at St. Valdry 58

The surrender at St. Val&y 58

Rammers letter to his wife, June 2ist, 1940 59

Rommel with General Gambier-Parry 98

The Fieseler Storch used by Rommel 98

Tracks south of Tobruk, Summer 1941 99

Another type of desert terrain 99

Rommel on the Via Balbia, April 1941 130

Rommel s main headquarters on the Via Balbia 130

Rommel s advanced headquarters near Tobruk 131

Rommel outside his tent 131

The Mammoth 2226

Digging a way through the sand hills 226

Rommel working in his caravan 227
Field Marshal Kesselring, General Froehlich, General Cause,

Field Marshal Rommel, General Cruewell 227

Plans for the attack on Cairo 258

Obstacles on the shores of France, Spring 1944 259

Rommel with Field Marshal Rundstedt 498

Rommel with General Speidel 498

RommeFs coffin being borne from his home 499

Hitler s wreath 499

INTRODUCTION

THE IMPACT that Rommel made on the world with the sword will be
deepened by his power with the pen. No commander in history has
written an account of his campaigns to match the vividness and value
of Rommel s which, for the most part, has now been retrieved from its
various hiding places and put together in this volume.

No other commander has provided such a graphic picture of his
operations and method of command. No one else has so strikingly
conveyed in writing the dynamism of Blitzkrieg and the pace of panzer
forces. The sense of fast movement and quick decision is electrifyingly
communicated in many of the passages Rommel carries the reader
along with him in his command vehicle.

Great commanders have mostly been dull writers. Besides lacking
literary skill in describing their actions, they have tended to be cloudy
about the way their minds worked. In relating what they did, they have
told posterity little about how and why. Napoleon was an exception,
but the value of his account is impaired by a more than usual un-
scrupulousness in treating facts, and by his intentness to falsify the
balance-sheet. Like Caesar s, his writing was not merely coloured but
dominated by a propaganda purpose.

Rommel s narrative is remarkably objective, as well as graphic.
In drafting it he certainly had, like most men who have made history,
a concern for his place in history. But while he shows a natural desire
for justification in his explanation of events, it is subordinate to his
burning interest in the military lessons of the campaigns. His evidence
stands up uncommonly well to critical examination, and checking by
other sources, A number of errors of fact can be found in it, but fewer
than in many of the official and personal narratives compiled with the
advantage of post-war knowledge. There are some disputable interpreta
tions, but not the purposeful distortions, for national or personal credit,
which are all too often found in such accounts.

The clarity and high degree of accuracy which distinguish Rommel s
picture of the operations are the more notable because of the confused
impressions that are apt to be produced by fast-moving tank battles,
especially in the desert. The clearness of Rommel s picture owes much
to his way of command his habit of getting right forward and seeking

Xlll

INTRODUCTION

to be near the crucial spot at the crucial time. It also owes much to his
prolonged self-training in observation, highly developed eye for spotting
what was significant in a scene, and knack of registering it. His passion
for taking photographs at every step of advance was a symptom of this
characteristic as it was with Lawrence, in the Arabian theatre of
World War L

There were marked resemblances between these two masters of desert
warfare, whatever their differences in temperament, range of interest
and philosophy. They were strikingly akin in their sense of time and
space, instinct for surprise, eye for ground and opportunity, combination
of flexibility with vision, and ideas of direct personal leadership. Another
military link was in the application of mechanised mobility to desert
warfare. Lawrence, who is popularly associated with camel-rides, was
among the first to see how the new means of mobility could transform
desert warfare, and had demonstrated this embryonically and in miniature,
with a few armoured cars and aircraft. RommeFs exploitation of these
potentialities on the grand scale would have delighted the Lawrence who
was a connoisseur of military art and had a revolutionary bent.

Rommel, also, had an urge to express himself on paper as well as in
action. That became evident long before he became famous as a
commander from his extraordinarily vivid treatise on infantry tactics,
inspired by his experiences as a young officer in World War I and by
his reflections upon them. Most text-books on tactics are deadly dull,
but he brought life into the subject. The more mobile operations of the
next war, and his own greater role, gave him bigger scope of which he
took full advantage. He was a born writer as well as a born fighter.
The same expressive gift and urge can be seen in the way he sketched on
paper, with pencil or coloured chalks, the operations he planned or even
imagined.

Throughout his activities in World War II he kept constantly in
mind the project of a book to match the performance, and continually
made notes for the purpose notes that he developed into a narrative
whenever he had a breathing space.

Death, under Hitler s decree, prevented him from completing the
project, but what he had already drafted makes a book that has no peer
among narratives of its kind. It may lack polish, but its literary power
is very striking. Along with descriptive clarity it has dramatic intensity,
while its value is much increased by the comments that accompany and
illuminate its story. His section on " The Rules of Desert Warfare " is a
masterly piece of military thinking, while the whole narrative is sprinkled
with sage reflections, often with a fresh turn about concentration in
time rather than in space; about the effect of speed in outweighing
numbers; about flexibility as a means to surprise; about the security
provided by audacity; about the stultifying conventions of the " quarter
master " mind; about creating new standards and not submitting to

INTRODUCTION XV

norms; about the value of indirect rather than direct reply to the enemy s
moves; about the way that air inferiority requires a radical revision of
the rules of ground operations; about the unwisdom of indiscriminate
reprisals and the folly of brutality; about the basic inexpediency of
. unprincipled expediency.

Until I delved into Rommel s own papers I regarded him as a brilliant
tactician and great fighting leader, but did not realise how deep a sense
of strategy he had or, at any rate, developed in reflection. It was a
surprise to find that such, a thruster had been so thoughtful, and that
his audacity was so shrewdly calculated. In certain cases, his moves may
still be criticised as too hazardous, but not as the reckless strokes of a
blind and hot-headed gambler. In analysis of the operations it can be
seen that some of the strokes which miscarried, with grave results for him,
came close to proving graver for his opponents. Moreover, even in
failure his strokes made such an impression on them as to assure his
army a chance of escape.

One of the clearer ways in which commanders can be measured is
by the extent to which they impress the opposing side. By that measure
Rommel s stature is very high. In centuries of warfare only Napoleon
has made a comparable impression on the British, and that was not
achieved purely in the military field, as it was in Rommel s case.

Moreover, Rommel became much more than a bogey to the British.
Awe for his dynamic generalship developed into an almost affectionate
admiration for him as a man. This was inspired primarily by the speed
and surprise of his operations, but it was fostered by the way that he
maintained in African warfare the decencies of the soldierly code, and
by his own chivalrous behaviour towards the many prisoners of war
whom he met in person. He became the hero of the Eighth Army troops
who were fighting against him to such an extent that it became their
habit, when wanting to say that someone had done a good job of any
kind on their own side, to describe it as " doing a Rommel ",

Such intense admiration for the enemy commander carried an under
lying danger to the soldiers morale. Thus the British commanders and
headquarter staffs were compelled to make strenuous efforts to dispel
" the Rommel legend ". It is a tribute to their sense of decency and his
personal conduct that such counter-propaganda was not directed towards
blackening his character but towards diminishing his military scale. In
that respect, his ultimate defeats provided a lever and it was hardly
to be expected that his opponents would emphasise his crippling dis
advantages in strength and supplies, or the significance of what he
managed to achieve under such handicaps. Juster comparison and truer
reckoning are left for history, which has a habit of correcting the
superficial judgments that temporarily keep company with victory.
Hannibal, Napoleon and Lee went down in defeat, yet rose above their
conquerors in the scales of history.

XVI INTRODUCTION

In true judgment of performance, due account must be taken of the
conditions and relative resources, together with the other factors that lie
outside a commander s control. Only then can we properly estimate
the quality of his performance. The outstanding feature of Rommel s
numerous successes is that they were achieved with inferiority of resources
and without any command of the air. No other generals on either side
in World War II won battles under these handicaps, except for the early
British leaders under Wavell and they were fighting Italians.

Rommel s performance was not flawless, and he suffered several
possibly avoidable reverses but when fighting superior forces any slip
may result in defeat, whereas numerous mistakes can be effectively
covered up by the commander who possesses a big margin of superiority
in strength. For all his audacity and rapidity of movement and decision,
Rommel comes out well, on balance, from the test embodied in Napoleon s
saying that " the greatest general is the one who makes the fewest
mistake*?."

That criticism, however, has too passive a note to fit the nature of
war, and is apt to foster a dangerous caution. It would be more pro
foundly true to say: "the greatest general is the one who leads his
opponent to make the most mistakes. 5 By that test, Rommel shines even
more brightly.

The best line of comparison between famous commanders of different
eras lies through their art, which can be distinguished from changing
technique. It is possible to make a comparative study of the use they made
of the means at their disposal to achieve their effects particularly their
use of mobility, flexibility, and surprise to upset their opponents* mental
and physical balance. It is even possible, with such as have disclosed their
conceptions, to gauge how far their effects were a matter of calculation.

Here, above all, lies the instructive value of Rommel s papers and
the more so because his narrative was not revised in the light of post
war knowledge, while his letters frequently provide pre-event evidence
of the way in wliich he approached his problems. It is in the approach,
more than in the act, that a man reveals the bent of his thought, and the
compass of his mind.

The Rommel Papers should go far to dispel the dust of controversy
that has been stirred up, from various motives. Rommel s narratives
were written long before he could have any idea of the controversy that
would arise outside Germany, and could frame them to meet it; his
letters to his wife have still more immediacy. It is remarkable how frank
they are in comment in view of the fact that they were liable to be opened.
From these conjoint sources the reader can get a clear view into Rommel s
mind and the mainsprings of his action. The picture may naturally
differ according to the individual reader s predisposition, but there is
little obscurity about the personality itself, and its various facets.

Rommel was very human apart from his extraordinary energy and

INTRODUCTION

his military genius. The "warts" are plainly self-revealed in his
narratives and letters. Like most of the leaders of mankind he was in a
state of immaturity. During his spell of greatest success his attitude had
the boyishness that is captivating but dangerously unphilosophical, and
his outlook had the limitations that make for success in leadership. In
the earlier part of the war, his letters suggest that he tended to regard
war as a great game the game for which, in his country s service, he
had trained himself with single-minded devotion. For maximum driving
power, a commander must feel like that about war and the most
thrustful of them always have. Rommel had an unusual capacity for
reflection, but his did not go beyond the military field until the last
months of his life.

Like most forceful soldiers, too, he did not find it easy to be tolerant*
about contrary views, especially among those who were fighting on the
same side. That is manifest in his biting comments on Haider and
Kesselring in particular, which were certainly unjust on several counts.
It should also be remembered that he was a sick man during the later
stages of the African campaign, a condition which naturally tended to
increase his aggravation and warp his view. But there was little malice
in him his explosiveness was an outlet and he was unusually ready to
repair an injustice when his anger passed. That can be seen, for instance,
in the high tribute he pays to Kesselring in his final reflections. Moreover,
his comments on the enemy French, British and American show a re
markable freedom from hatred and readiness to recognise their qualities.

Rommel s attitude to " the Fuehrer " and his long-continued loyalty
are a puzzle only to those who do not understand the habit of mind
produced by a professional soldier s early training, particularly in
Germany, and are unable to imagine how things look from such a point
of view. But the Papers make clearer two factors that for a time buttressed
his soldierly loyalty. It is easy to perceive how Rommel s dynamism made
him responsive to Hitler s and how the obstruction he suffered from the
intermediate " top-hamper " with which he was in close contact made
him feel more sympathetic to the distant Fuehrer. That continued while
Rommel s reflectiveness was simply military. But the wide measure of
independent authority he had in Africa, the larger problems with which
he had to deal, and the deep impression made on him by the material
superiority of the Allies, gradually widened the scope of his reflection
and thus paved the way for the momentous change of altitude that
developed when he came back to Europe and into closer contact with
Hitler. It would have been madness for him to have recorded on paper
this process of change indeed, some of his later letters show an obvious
effort to disguise it but there are a number of clues scattered through
the pages. His son and closest associates have supplemented these with
their evidence of how he was brought to the break-away, and the resolve
to overthrow Hitler, which cost him his life.

INTRODUCTION

The main importance of the papers lies, however, in the abundant
light they shed on Rommel s military leadership. Their evidence confirms
the judgment of the British soldiers who actually fought against him, and
shows that their estimate was closer to the mark than the counter-
propaganda designed to depreciate his formidable reputation. The
" Rommel legend " clearly had a much better foundation than most.
Save for his many narrow escapes from death or capture in battle, he
owed less to luck than most commanders who have attained fame. Now
that his actual conceptions and the workings of his mind are laid open
for examination it becomes evident that his successes were earned, not
accidental. They bear the hall-mark of military genius.

This is not the place for a biographical survey of Rommel s career-
which has been ably and vividly presented in Desmond Young s book, 1
a valuable complement to this. But it may be worthwhile to epitomise
the principal features of Rommel s generalship, and briefly discuss them
in relation to the general experience of warfare.

In most fields, genius is associated with originality. Yet it has been
rare among those who are usually acclaimed as the great masters of war.
Most of them have gained their successes by using conventional instru
ments superlatively well, and only a few have sought new means and
methods* That is strange, since history shows that the fate of nations
has been repeatedly decided, and the most epoch-making changes in
history determined, by change in weapons and tactics especially the
latter,

But such developments have usually been produced by some student
of war with a fresh turn of mind, and by his, influence upon the pro
gressively inclined soldiers of his time, rather than by the action of any
top-level commander. In the history of war great ideas have been less
numerous than great generals, but have had a more far-reaching effect.
The distinction between the two is a reminder that there are two forms
of military genius the conceptive and the executive.

In Rommel s case they were combined. While the theory of Blitzkrieg
the new super-mobile style of warfare with armoured and motorised
forces had been conceived in England, long before he came on the
stage, the quickness with which he grasped it and the way he developed
it showed his fresh-mindedness and innate conceptive power. He
became, next to Guderian, the leading exponent of the new idea. That
was the more remarkable because he had had no experience of tanks
until given command of the 7th Panzer Division in February, 1940, and
then had less than three months to study the theory and master the
problem of handling such forces before he was launched into action. His
brilliant share in the panzer drives that produced the collapse of France
led to his being given the opportunity of applying the new conception

1 Rommel (Harpers, 1951).

INTRODUCTION XIX

in Africa and with the advantage of independent command which
Guderian was never allowed in Europe, fortunately for Germany s
surviving opponents. Moreover, in Africa, Romniel demonstrated a
subtler application of the theory, blending the defensive with the offensive
and drawing the opposing tanks into baited traps, preparatory to his
own lightning thrusts. In other respects, too, he made signal contributions
to the new technique.

It is significant that Rommel was one of the few eminent commanders
who have gained distinction as military thinkers and writers. More
remarkable still is the fact that his chance to prove his powers as a
commander came through the effect of his writings. For it was his book
Infanterie grdft an that first attracted Hitler s attention to him, and by the
impression it made paved the way for his phenomenal rise.

Rommel was able to make the most of his chance because he also
possessed executive genius. The extent to which he had it may best be
realised by taking note of the qualities that the great commanders of
history have shown although the degree of each quality has varied in
each case.

In earlier times, when armies were small and fought with short-range
weapons, and when the battlefield rather than the theatre of war was
the general s arena, the quality most prized in a commander was coup
fftil an expressive term for the combination of acute observation with
swift-sure intuition. All the Great Captains possessed in high degree this
faculty of grasping instantly the picture of the ground and the situation;
of relating one to the other, and the part to the whole. Rommel most
clearly had this faculty. It had a renewed importance in Africa owing
to the nature of fast-moving armoured warfare and the moderate scale
of the forces in that theatre.

In recent times, as the range of weapons lengthened and armies
became more extended as well as larger in scale, so the need increased
for a faculty wider and deeper than coup d vil for insight. The power
of penetrating, as Wellington aptly expressed it, into what was going on
" at the other side of the hill " behind the enemy s lines, and in the
enemy s mind. In the present even more than in the past, a leader must
have a deep understanding of psychology in general, and of the opposing
commander s psychology in particular. The extent to which Rommel
possessed this kind of insight, or psychological sense, can be seen in his
Papers as well as in his operations.

Such a psychological sense is in turn the foundation of another
essential, and more positive, element of military genius the power of
creating surprise, of producing the unexpected move that upsets the
opponent s balance. For full effect, as history shows, it must be reinforced
by an acute time-sense, and by the capacity to develop the highest
possible degree of mobility. Speed and surprise are twin qualities. They
are predominantly the " hitting," or offensive, qualities of true general-

XX INTRODUCTION

ship. And their development, like that of the informative senses, depends
on a faculty which may be best, and briefly, defined as creative im
agination.

In power of producing the unexpected move, acuteness of time-sense,
and capacity to develop a pitch of mobility that can paralyse opposition,
it is hard to find a modern parallel to Rommel, except Guderian, the
prime minister of Blitzkrieg. Later in the war, Patton and ManteufTel
displayed similar qualities, but comparative assessment is difficult
because of their more Limited scope. So it is, also, when we go back into
the past, where instruments were so different although we know that
Seydlitz, Napoleon, and Bedford Forrest were outstandingly gifted in
achieving surprise through speed, and although a similar dynamism can
be discerned in the great Mongol leaders such as Genghiz Khan and
Sabutai. The secret of this combination has never been so clearly
communicated as in Rommel s Papers.

In seeking to upset the enemy s balance, a commander must not lose
his own balance. He needs to have the quality which Voltaire described
as the keystone of Marlborough s success " that calm courage in the
midst of tumult, that serenity of soul in danger, which the English call
a cool head." But to it he must add the quality for which the French
have found the most aptly descriptive phrase " le sens du praticable"
The sense of what is possible, and what is not possible tactically and
administratively. The combination of both these two " guarding "
qualities might be epitomised as the power of cool calculation. The
sands of history are littered with the wrecks of finely conceived plans that
capsized for want of this ballast.

On this count, there is more question about RommePs qualifications.
Along with tremendous courage he had what is called the artistic tempera
ment, and was apt to swing from exaltation to depression as his letters
show. Moreover, he was often criticised in German staff circles, including
his own, for not taking sufficient account of supply difficulties, and
attempting strategically more than was practicable administratively. In
a number of cases the course of the operations tends to bear out such
criticism. On the other hand, the Papers show that in the risks he took
there was a deeper calculation than appeared on the surface. He
demanded more than was possible by " Quartermasters " standards as
the most probable way of gaining great results under the new conditions
of strategy. Although that strategic policy miscarried at times, it is
remarkable how often he managed more than was possible administra
tively by any normal calculation and in consequence achieved results
that would not have been possible in any other way.

Finally, and beyond all the other qualities that mark a great com
mander, comes actual power of leadership. That is the dynamo of the
battle-car and no skill in driving will avail if it is defective. It is through
the current of great leadership that troops are inspired to do more

INTRODUCTION

than seems possible, and thus upset an opponent s " normal "
calculations.

There is no doubt on this score of Rommel s qualification as a
* Great .Captain. ". Exasperating to staff officers, he was worshipped by
the fighting troops, and what he got out of them in performance was far
beyond any rational calculation.

B. H. LIDDELL HART

THE STORY OF THE ROMMEL PAPERS

By Manfred Rommel

WHEN MY father died, he left a considerable number of documents which
had accumulated during his campaigns. There were army orders,
situation reports, daily reports to the High Command; besides these
official documents he left a number of volumes comprising his personal
diary, and comprehensive notes on the French campaign of 1940 and on
the war in the desert.

After the First World War my father published a book on infantry
tactics, based largely on his own experiences. When he was writing that
book he found he had preserved few of the essential documents, while
his diary was hardly more helpful; there were great gaps during the
most important periods, when he had been too occupied with fighting
to have time for his diary.

My father undoubtedly intended to publish another book on the
military lessons to be derived from his experiences in World War II,
and this time he was determined not to be at the same disadvantage in
the matter of contemporary records.

From the moment he crossed the frontier on 10 May 1940 he began
to keep a personal account of his operations, which he generally dictated
daily to one of his aides. Whenever a lull allowed, he prepared a more
considered appreciation of what had taken place.

He preserved all his official orders, reports and documents. In
addition there were hundreds of maps and sketches of his operations
which he or his staff had drawn in coloured chalks, some being carefully
and exactly finished off in drawing ink; there were also drafts for maps
intended to illustrate his subsequent writings.

As events took a less favourable turn, my father became all the more
anxious that an objective account of his actions should survive his
possible death so that his intentions could not be misinterpreted. On his
return from Africa he worked on his papers in great secrecy, dictating,
or giving drafts for typing, only to my mother or to one of his A.D,Cs,
On his return from France in August, 1944, he began to write an account
of the Invasion, but he destroyed this when it became clear that he was

xxiii

THE STORY OF THE ROMMEL PAPERS

suspected of complicity in the July 20 plot. On the other hand, some
papers have survived which he would undoubtedly have burned had he
had the time.

My father was an enthusiastic photographer. Here, again for the
purposes of his book, he had gone back to Italy after the first World War
to get photographs, which he needed for making tactical sketches, of the
places where he had fought in 1917; but that had not been easy, for the
Italians did not welcome German officers with cameras to their frontier
territory. My father travelled as an " engineer " with my mother on a
motor-cycle. For the book he planned to write on the Second World
War he intended to be well provided with photographs and he took
literally thousands, both in Europe and in Africa, including a large
number in colour. He took photographs only when advancing, he once
told me; " I don t photograph my own retreat."

Furthermore, he wrote to my mother almost daily and she had
preserved about a thousand of his letters.

Only a proportion of all this material survived the various vicissitudes
which it underwent.

During the months immediately preceding the outbreak of war, my
father commanded the War Academy at Wiener Neustadt, about thirty
miles south of Vienna. The academy was housed in an enormous old
castle. When in 1943 British and American bomber squadrons started
to raid the town and our home was in danger of being destroyed, we
deposited some of my father s papers in the deep cellars of the castle;
others we sent to a farm in south-west Germany. The rest we took with
us when in the autumn of 1943 we moved from Wiener Neustadt to
Herrlingen, five miles from Ulm in Wuerttemberg.

My father s death made my mother all the more anxious to save his
papers, not only for personal reasons but so that, when history came to
be written, the truth might be told. Already at the time of the funeral,
an S.S. officer had tried to find out, in the course of conversation, what
had become of my father s papers. We did not take the bait. Nonetheless,
it appeared highly probable that an attempt would be made to take
them from us.

My mother, therefore, immediately began to assemble all the papers
in the house. I went to Wiener Neustadt to retrieve the documents which
we had left in the castle cellars. One did not need to be very far-sighted
at that time to realise that Soviet troops would, in due course, reach
Vienna; and, as it turned out, six months later they stormed the castle
after it had been reduced to a heap of rubble following stout resistance
on the part of the German officer cadets in training there. Everything
that was not nailed to the ground, was plundered.

With the help of my father s sister and of Captain Aldinger, his

THE STORY OF THE ROMMEL PAPERS XXV

A.D.C., my mother began to pack up all the papers ready for evacuation
should the need arise. She intended to rely on dispersal, for while it was
probable that one hiding place would be discovered, it was improbable
that all would be.

In the middle of November, 1944, Captain Aldinger, who had stayed
with my mother to help her clear up my father s affairs, was suddenly
ordered by the town major of Ulm to present himself at the main railway
station of that city. It was said that an officer on General Maisel s staff
would be there and that he had certain matters to discuss with Captain
Aldinger. It was General Maisel who had fetched my father away a
month earlier. It was further intimated to Captain Aldinger that this
officer had orders to proceed to Herrlingen afterwards.

The purpose of this visit was obscure to my mother and Captain
Aldinger. Was an arrest planned? Or did they intend to carry out a
house search for my father s notes? No one could tell.

The work of hiding the remaining papers was speeded up as much
as possible. By the evening of the i4th November, with the exception
of drafts and jottings for his personal notes, all that remained in the house
were official war documents, marked " Secret ", which would, in any
event, have to be given up.

On the morning of the isth November, Aldinger left Herrlingen to
go to Ulm. " I shall leave the car here," he said to my mother; " God
knows whether I shall ever come back. Perhaps I shall be arrested right
away. If not, I shall come back to Herrlingen at once."

My mother waited. When the afternoon came, she became seriously
concerned about Aldinger s arrest. There was all the more danger that
this might happen because, with the exception of my mother and myself,
he was the only witness who knew the real cause of my father s death.
Towards three o clock the gate of our garden opened. Aldinger came in.
He was alone and was carrying rather a bulky parcel under his arm which
was wrapped in white paper. Mercifully my mother s fears had not
materialised. The officer on MaisePs staff had handed over the baton
and service cap which the two generals had taken from my father on
the i4th October, after he died. They had taken these " trophies " to
the Fuehrer s Headquarters and, as we found out afterwards, they were
kept for a time in the desk of Schaub, Hitler s A.D.C. Immediately after
my father s death, Captain Aldinger had repeatedly and vigorously
protested, in the name of my mother, at this unheard-of behaviour and
had now* against all expectations, been successful.

The majority of the documents had by this time been dispersed. 1 hey
were hidden on two different farms in south-west Germany, in one case
walled up in a cellar, in the other behind a heap of empty boxes ma
cellar. A small box which contained some of my father s notes on the
battle of Normandy was buried by a friend of ours between the walls of
a bombed Stuttgart ruin in a part of the town which had been so pounded

XXVi THE STORY OF THE ROMMEL PAPERS

by numerous air attacks that it was no longer likely to be considered a
worthwhile target. My father s diaries for 1943-44 were deposited in a
hospital, while other material was sent to my aunt in Stuttgart. My
mother retained in the house at Herrlingen the drafts of my father s notes
which had formed the original manuscript on Africa, films taken by my
father in the French campaign of 1940 and his personal letters.

Strangely enough, my mother was so preoccupied with the fear that
the Nazi authorities might get hold of the papers that she never thought
of the possibility that the Allies, who were now approaching, might show
an equal interest.

During the second half of April 1945, t ie bombing became continuous.
Hour by hour the American H.E. bombs crashed down on Ulm, which
was burning night and day in many places. From the west and from
the north the sound of artillery fire could be heard and day by day it
became more menacing. The remnants of the German Army were
streaming back weaponless through the valley in which Herrlingen lay,
some on farm-carts, some on foot, all in perpetual fear of attack by U.S.
fighter-bombers. The local Volksturm, comprising youngsters of fourteen
and old men of sixty-five, was mobilised. Placards had been put up
everywhere which read " Anyone who fails to defend Ulm against the
enemy is a swine."

One day, it must have been the aoth April, my mother, looking out
of her window, saw the American tanks approaching Ulm. Only when,
on the following day, Allied soldiers set fire to parts of the neighbouring
village on the false assumption that it was occupied by German partisans,
and Jong columns of refugees from that village came streaming through
Herrlingen, only then did my mother become anxious about the docu
ments that were still in the house. She got the letters, notes and films
ready so that she could take them with her at a moment s notice. Part
of these she threw in an old trunk which, with the help of neighbours, she
buried in the garden.

The American troops now occupied Herrlingen. Sentries were posted
everywhere. It was impossible to bury any further material. Among
the first Americans who came to see my mother was a Captain Marshall
of the Seventh Army. He asked -whether there were any documents
in the house. In the confident belief that private letters would not
be confiscated, my mother answered: "I have only the personal letters
of my husband written to me." " Where are these letters ? ** asked
Marshall,

He went with my mother down to the cellar. When he saw the
folders containing the letters lying in a box, he said: " I will have to
take them away. We shall want to have a look at them. I will bring them
back in a few days."

Next my mother was told that the return of these letters would be
delayed for a bit. A fortnight later Captain Marshall s interpreter came

THE STORY OF THE ROMMEL PAPERS XXVU

to my mother, and said: " The Captain is terribly sorry that we can t
keep our promise but the Army has decided that these documents will
have to be sent to Washington. *

One day, in the middle of May, at eight o clock in the morning, my
mother was ordered to leave her house by nine. An American unit was
to be billeted in our home. While my mother was still packing, American
soldiers started to open the drawers and cupboards and to search.
Numerous documents of my father s (drafts for notes on Africa and hand
written maps) which at the time were on the library shelves, in the desk
and in the cellar have not been seen since. All my mother managed to
do was to bring away on a small hand-cart a trunk containing my father s
films, the manuscript of the African campaign, and the official history
of the yth Panzer Division s operations in France in 1940, of which only
three copies had ever been made.

The papers which were evacuated to other places met with varied
fates.

On the one farm in south-west Germany, some Americans appeared,
announced that they belonged to the Counter Intelligence Corps and
demanded to see the trunks which Field Marshal Rommel had had
placed there. Unfortunately, some of these trunks and boxes had already
been brought up from the cellar in which they had been walled up
into the house itself. The Americans commandeered a chest and a trunk.
The chest contained my father s documents, notes and sketches from the
First World War the material he had used in his book, The Infantry in
Attack. The trunk contained my father s complete Leica equipment (a
camera and twelve different accessories), personal effects and about 3,000
snapshots which my father had himself taken. He was particularly proud
of his colour photographs, some of which had been taken with a certain
amount of danger to himself. One, I remember, which was most im
pressive, showed Australian infantry attacking with bayonets. There
were several thousand other photographs which he had collected from
war reporters and soldiers between 1940 and 1944; some he had already
captioned.

The Americans gave a receipt for the chest and the trunk. But
American officers who subsequently came and tried to be helpful about
the recovery of the trunks, and to whom we showed this " receipt,"
were doubtful whether these people had really been acting under official
orders. There remained on this farm another box containing the personal
diary of my father from 1940 to 1943 as well as notes on the French
campaign of 1940; there were two further boxes with maps. The owner
of the farm, a friend of my father, had denied, despite threats from the
two CJ.C. people, that he had any further material. Subsequently, he
did his best to see that at least these boxes remained in our possession.
Even then, the box with my father s diaries and notes on France in 1940
was, in an unguarded moment, stolen from the loft by an unknown

XXVlii THE STORY OF THE ROMMEL PAPERS

person. Whether he was pleased with what he found when he opened the
box, is doubtful.

On the other farm, meanwhile, a Moroccan force had taken over.
Cattle and poultry were slaughtered and open fires were burning in the
farmyard. The whole place was thoroughly searched several times by
Moroccans. Fortunately, none of them ever suspected that a further
cellar existed behind a whole heap of empty boxes. It was in this way
that the documents here w r ere saved.

The papers which my aunt had kept for us and those that had been
buried in the Stuttgart ruins also survived the German collapse.

When my mother had to leave her home, she found emergency
accommodation in a small room in the neighbourhood. It was here that
she made an inventory of the material that remained to her. The box
which had been buried in the garden at Herrlingen was once again
unearthed and removed to another place. The boxes on the farm, which
had in the meantime been evacuated by its Moroccan occupiers, were
fetched. Thus, when my mother eventually found new shelter in the
Herrlingen school, she took all the material along with her.

When my mother learned that posthumous denazification proceedings
were going to be taken against my father with the object of confiscating
what effects he had left, she once again loaded up the small hand-cart
and hid the documents away from where she was living. Fortunately,
these new threats never materialised, though we heard of a case in which
similar documents belonging to another officer were confiscated.

Encouraged by Brigadier Young, and by Captain Liddell Hart s
undertaking to edit my father s papers, I eventually started to reassemble
the documents from their various hiding places. In fact, it was possible
. to translate hurriedly a few passages and incorporate them as an Appendix
to the biography of my father which Brigadier Young had written and
which was by then already at press.

General Speidel, my father s former Chief of Staff, made repeated
efforts to have my father s letters restored to my mother. Brigadier
Young asked General Eisenhower to intercede with Washington for their
recovery. Finally, through the efforts of Captain Liddell Hart, and after
much protracted search, the letters were handed over to General Speidel
by Colonel Nawrocky on behalf of the American Historical Division. It
transpired that in Washington they had been filed, not under " ROMMEL ",
but under " ERWIN ", my father s Christian name and the signature on
the letters. Some are still missing, notably those written at the time of
the Invasion. However, some other documents dealing with Normandy
were subsequently returned to my mother.

With the return of the letters we felt we had recovered as many of
my father s papers as had survived the destruction of war, in part
carried out by my father for his own personal safety, and the looting
which inevitably follows in the wake of war.

EDITORIAL NOTE

THE MAIN part of Rommel s papers deal with the North African campaign.
The whole of his narrative is printed in this volume. The only part of
the story he did not cover, as he would have done if he had lived, is the
winter campaign of 1941-42. So a chapter on this has been provided by
General Bayerlein then Chief of Staff of the Afrika Korps with the
aid of Rommers notes and letters as well as his own knowledge, from very
close contact, of Rommers views. Bayerlein s own exceptional experience
and ability as a " Panzer leader " make this addition all the more
interesting.

Rommel s story of the 1940 campaign is on the whole intensely
exciting, but in some places it turns aside to deal with minor details of
unit movement, while occasionally there is nothing of particular interest
in the day s events. Such passages have been cut, as indicated in the text.

During the months he was in Italy, during 1943, Rommel did not
conduct any active operations, but his diary contains a number of
illuminating entries about the Italian coup d etat and the efforts to prevent
Italy changing side. Manfred Rommel has woven these diary passages,
and Rommel s letters at the time, into a short chapter.

Rommel did not live to write his story of the Normandy campaign,
but he left a lot of notes and a number of other records, especially about
his pre-invasion ideas and plans. General Bayerlein has pieced these
together, and also incorporated in this chapter Rommel s letters of the

period.

In a final chapter, Manfred Rommel relates the story of his father s
death, and of the tense weeks that preceded the arrival of the executioners
who came to carry out Hitler s decree.

The interest and value of these chapters and of Rommel s own
narrative is much enhanced by his letters. For they convey the colour
of his thought at the actual moment in the operations, and thus, besides
their vividness, often provide an historical check on the recollected story
in his subsequent narrative.

He wrote his wife almost every day, however hard pressed, although
his letters were always rather short. They were usually written in the
early hours of the morning, and sometimes when he was on the move

XXIX

XXX EDITORIAL NOTE

in his armoured car or in a tank. The handwriting of the letters often
has a shakiness caused by the movement of the vehicle or the chill of
the hours before sunrise.

While he had to be discreet in referring to operations in progress, it
is remarkable how frank he often was in his comments, in view of the
risk that his letters might be opened either by the ordinary or the
secret censorship.

Naturally, many of his letters were simply affectionate notes to his
wife, but any that contained significant comments are incorporated in
this volume.

Acknowledgments

IN THE first place, tribute is due to the excellent work of Manfred Rommel
and General Bayerlein in the initial assembly and classification of the
material. I was greatly impressed by their diligence and conscientiousness
during all the months we worked jointly on the Papers. The first section
recovered was Rommel s draft narrative of the African campaign, and
this was published in Germany under the title of Krieg Ohne Hass ( War
Without Hate) with a number of footnotes by Manfred Rommel and by
General Bayerlein. These footnotes have been kept in the present
volume where the full material is being published for the first time
while I have added numerous editoria^ notes to clarify points in the
narrative and to provide an historical background, relating Rommel s
actions and observations to those on the Allied side.

For the recovery of the letters and their restoration to Frau Rommel,
grateful thanks are due to Major-General Orlando Ward, Chief of
Military History, U.S.A., and to the initiative taken by Brigadier General
S. L. A. Marshall, the eminent military analyst and historian, whose
help I sought in the matter.

In the editing of The Rommel Papers, I would like to express my
appreciation ot the manifold help given by Mark Bonham Carter, Paul
Findlay (the translator but far more than that), and Ronald Politzer,
as welj as of Manfred Rommel and General Bayerlein. It was most
refreshing and stimulating to have such discerning and able associates
in the editorial task.

B. H. LIDDELL HART
WoLverton Park,
Buckinghamshire, August, 1952

Part One
FRANCE 1940

CHAPTER I

THE BREAK-THROUGH ON THE MEUSE

ON THE I oth May, 1940, Hitler launched his long-expected invasion
of the West. 1 It achieved a lightning victory that changed the course
of history 3 with far-reaching effects on the future of all peoples.

The decisive act in this world-shaking drama began on the i3th
when the Meuse was crossed by Guderian s panzer corps near Sedan and
by Rommel s panzer division near Dinant. The narrow breaches were
soon expanded into a vast gap. The German tanks, pouring through it,
reached the Channel coast within a week } thus cutting off the Allied
armies in Belgium. That disaster led on to the fall of France and the
isolation of Britain. Although Britain managed to hold out behind her
sea-ditch, rescue came only after a prolonged war had become a world
wide war. The price of that mid-May breakdown in 1940 has been
tremendous, and remains immeasurable.

After the catastrophe, the breakdown was commonly viewed as
inevitable, and Hitler s attack as irresistible. But appearances were very
different from reality as has become clear from post-war revelations.

Instead of having an overwhelming superiority in numbers, as was
imagined, the German armies were not able to muster as many as their
opponents did. The offensive was launched with 136 divisions, and was
faced by the equivalent of 156 French, British, Belgian and Dutch.
It was only in aircraft that the Germans had a big superiority, in numbers
and quality. Their tanks were fewer than those on the other side-
barely 2,800 against more than 4,000. They were also, on the average,
inferior in armour and armament, although slightly superior in speed.
The Germans main advantage, besides that in airpower, lay in the
speed with which their tanks were handled and the superior technique
they had developed. Their panzer leaders had adopted, and put into
practice with decisive effect, the new theories that had been conceived
in Britain but not comprehended by the heads of the British and French
armies.

introductory note is supplied by the Editor, Captain B. H. Liddell Hart.
Elsewhere all his editorial comments apart from footnotes are set in italics.

4 FRANCE, I94O

Of the 136 German divisions, only 10 were armoured but that small
fraction, used as spearheads, virtually decided the issue of the campaign
before the mass of the German Army came into action.

The brilliant result of these panzer thrusts obscured their small scale,
and also the narrowness of the margin by which they succeeded* That
success could easily have been prevented but for the paralysis, and all
too frequent moral collapse, of the opposing commanders and troops in
face of a tempo and technique of attack for which their training had not
prepared them. Even as it was, the success of the invasion turned on a
series of long-odds chances and on the readiness of dynamic leaders like
Guderian and Rommel to make the most of such chances.

The original plan for the offensive in the West had been on the lines
of the pre-1914 Schlieffen plan, with the main weight on the right wing,
where Bock s Army Group " B " was to advance through the plain of
Belgium. But early in 1 940 the plan was changed following the proposal
of Manstein for a more daring, and thus more unexpected, thrust through
the hilly and wooded Ardennes country of Belgian Luxembourg. The
centre of gravity was now shifted to Rundstedt s Army Group " A,"
which faced that sector. It was given seven of the ten German panzer
divisions and the largest part of the infantry divisions.

The main drive for the Meuse was led by Kleist s Panzer Group,
which was in the van of List s I2th Army. It had two spearheads, the
stronger one being formed by Guderian s corps (of three panzer divisions),
which made the decisive thrust near Sedan, while Reinhardt s corps (of
two panzer divisions) on its right aimed for the crossing at Monthermh ,
Farther to the right, operating under Kluge s Fourth Army, Hot ss.
panzer corps drove through the northern Ardennes as cover for Kleiste
flank and with the aim of getting across the Meuse between Givet and
Namur. This secondary thrust had two spearheads of smaller scale,
formed respectively by the 5th and 7th Panzer Divisions.

The yth was commanded by Rommel. This was one of the four
" light " divisions that had been converted into panzer divisions during
the winter. It had only one tank regiment instead of the normal two,
although this regiment was given three battalions instead , of two
making a total of 218 tanks. More than half of these were Czech-built. 2
r rhe 7th Panzer Division comprised:
Armour

25th Panzer Regiment (of 3 tank battalions)
37th Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion
Motorised Infantry
6th Rifle Regiment
7th Rifle Regiment
7th Motor-cycle Battalion
Engineers

58th Pioneer Battalion
Artillery

78th Field Artillery Regiment (of 3 battalions, each of 3 four-gun batteries)
42nd Anti-Tank Artillery Battalion f

6 FRANCE, 1940

The conversion had been made in the light of the lessons of the
Polish campaign. There Rommel, himself an ardent infantryman, had
come to recognise the potentialities of the tank arm. It was only on the
1 5th February that he had taken over command of the 7th at Godesberg,
on the Rhine, but he learned the new technique, and adapted himself
to it, with extraordinary quickness. He had always been a thruster in
the infantry field, handling infantry as if they were mobile troops, and he
revelled in the much greater scope for mobility offered by his new
command,

On the opening day of the offensive, little resistance was met. The
mass of the Belgian Army was concentrated to defend the plain of
Belgium, where the chief cities lie, and the defence of the hilly and
wooded region of Belgian Luxembourg, beyond the Meuse, was left to
the special Chasseurs Ardennais, whose role was simply to impose as much
delay as possible until the French came up to cover this wide flank approach
to their own frontier. Such was the calculation on which the Belgian
plan was based.

The French plan, however, was based on a more offensive concept.
The First and Seventh Annies, which comprised the bulk of the French
mechanised divisions, drove far forward into the plain of Belgium,
together with the British Expeditionary Force. Meanwhile, the Ninth
Army, forming the hinge of this manoeuvre, made a shorter wheeling
advance over the Belgian frontier to align itself along the Meuse from
Mezi6res to Namur. It consisted of seven infantry divisions (only one
of which was motorised) and two cavalry divisions these last being
horse-mounted troops with mechanised elements. The cavalry were sent
forward across the Meuse on the night of the loth May, and next day
pushed deep into the Ardennes, where they met the rapidly advancing
panzer divisions, which had already overcome most of the Belgian
defences there.

On the eve of the attack, during the last tense hours of preparation,
Rommel wrote this brief letter to his wife, and then takes up the narrative:

g May 1940
DEAREST Lu,

We re packing up at last. Let s hope not in vain. You ll get all
the news for the next few days from the papers. Don t worry yourself.
Everything will go all right.

In the sector assigned to my division the enemy had been preparing
obstructions of every kind for months past. All roads and forest tracks
had been permanently barricaded and deep craters blown in the main
roads. But most of the road blocks were undefended by the Belgians, and
it was thus in only a few places that my division was held up for any
length of time. Many of the blocks could be by-passed by moving across

THE BREAK-THROUGH ON THE MEUSE 7

country or over side roads. Elsewhere, all troops quickly set to work to
deal with the obstructions and soon had the road clear.

At our first clash with French mechanised forces, prompt opening
fire on our part led to a hasty French retreat. I have found again and
again that in encounter actions, the day goes to the side that is the first
to plaster its opponent with fire. The man who lies low and awaits
developments usually comes off second best. Motor-cyclists at the head
of the column must keep their machine-guns at the ready and open fire
the instant an enemy shot is heard. This applies even when the exact
position of the enemy is unknown, in which case the fire must simply be
sprayed over enemy-held territory. Observation of this rule, in my
experience, substantially reduces one s own casualties. It is funda
mentally wrong simply to halt and look for cover without opening fire,
or to wait for more forces to come up and take part in the action.

Experience in this early fighting showed that in tank attacks especially,
the action of opening fire immediately into the area which the enemy is
believed to be holding, instead of waiting until several of one s own
tanks have been hit, usually decides the issue. Even indiscriminate
machine-gun fire and 20 mm. anti-tank fire into a wood in which enemy
anti-tank guns have installed themselves is so effective that in most cases
the enemy is completely unable to get into action or else gives up his
position. In engagements against enemy tanks also which more often
than not have been more heavily armoured than ours opening fire early
has proved to be the right action and very effective.

ii May 1940

DEAREST Lu,

I ve come up for breath for the first time to-day and have a

moment to write. Everything wonderful so far. Am way ahead of

my neighbours. I m completely hoarse from orders and shouting.

Had a bare three hours sleep and an occasional meal. Otherwise

I m absolutely fine. Make do with this, please, I m too tired for

more,

Following up the retreat of the French ist and 4th Cavalry Divisions, Rommel s
advanced troops reached the Meuse in the afternoon of the i2th May. It was his
aim to rush a crossing if possible on the heels of the French, and gain a bridgehead
on the west bank. But the bridges at Dinant and Houx were blown up by the
French just as the leading tanks began to cross and Rommel was thus compelled
to mount a river-crossing assault with troops ferried over in rubber boats. This
assault was launched early next morning, and suffered heavy casualties before ii
succeeded. Rommel writes:

On the 1 3th May, I drove off to Dinant at about 04.00 houjrs with
Captain Schraepler. The whole of the divisional artillery was already
in position as ordered, with its forward observers stationed at the crossing

8 - FRANCE, 1940

points. In Dinant I found only a few men of the yth Rifle Regiment.
Shells were dropping in the town from French artillery west of the
Meuse, and there were a number of knocked-out tanks in the streets
leading down to the river. The noise of battle could be heard from the
Meuse valley.

There was no hope of getting my command and signals vehicle down
the steep slope to the Meuse unobserved, so Schraepler and I clambered
down on foot through the wood to the valley bottom. The 6th Rifle
Regiment was about to cross to the other bank in rubber boats, but was
being badly held up by heavy artillery fire and by the extremely trouble
some small arms fire of French troops installed among the rocks on the
west bank.

2. THE BREAK-THROUGH ON THE MEUSE

The situation when I arrived was none too pleasant. Our boats were
being destroyed one after the other by the French flanking fire, and the
crossing eventually came to a standstill. The enemy infantry were so
well concealed that they were impossible to locate even after a long
search through glasses. Again and again they directed their fire into
the area in which I and my companions the commanders of the Rifle
Brigade and the Engineer Battalion were lying. A smoke screen in
the Meuse valley would have prevented these infantry doing much
harm. But we had no smoke unit. So I now gave orders for a number of
houses in the valley to be set alight in order to supply the smoke we
lacked.

Minute by minute the enemy fire grew more unpleasant. From up
river a damaged rubber boat came drifting down to us with a badly

THE BREAK-THROUGH ON THE MEUSE 9

wounded man clinging to it, shouting and screaming for help the poor
fellow was near to drowning. But there was no help for him here, the
enemy fire was too heavy.

Meanwhile the village of Grange [i J miles west ofHoux (and the Meuse),
and 3 miles north-west of Dinant] on the west bank had been taken by the
yth Motor-cycle Battalion, but they had not cleaned up the river bank
as thoroughly as they should have done. I therefore gave orders for the
rocks on the west bank to be cleared of the enemy.

With Captain Schraepler, I now drove south down the Meuse valley
road in a Panzer IV to see how things were going with the yth Rifle
Regiment. On the way we came under fire several times from the
western bank and Schraepler was wounded in the arm from a number
of shell splinters. Single French infantrymen surrendered as we
approached.

By the time we arrived the yth Rifle Regiment had already succeeded
in getting a company across to the west bank, but the enemy fire had
then become so heavy that their crossing equipment had been shot to
pieces and the crossing had had to be halted. Large numbers of wounded
were receiving treatment in a house close beside the demolished bridge.
As at the northern crossing point, there was nothing to be seen of the
enemy who were preventing the crossing. As there was clearly no hope
of getting any more men across at this point without powerful artillery
and tank support to deal with the enemy nests, I drove back to Division
Headquarters, where I met the Army commander, Colonel-General von
Kluge and the Corps commander, General Hoth.

After talking over the situation with Major Heidkaemper and making
the necessary arrangements, I drove back along the Meuse to Leffe [a
village on the outskirts of Dinant] to get the crossing moving there. I had
already given orders for several Panzer Ills and IVs and a troop of
artillery to be at my disposal at the crossing point. We left the signals
vehicle for the time being at a point some 500 yards east of the river
and went forward on foot through deserted farms towards the Meuse.
In Leffe we found a number of rubber boats, all more or less badly
damaged by enemy fire, lying in the street where our men had left them.
Eventually, after being bombed on the way by our own aircraft, we
arrived at the river.

At Leffe weir we took a quick look at the footbridge, which had been
barred by the enemy with a spiked steel plate. The firing in the Meuse
valley had ceased for the moment and we moved off to the right through
some houses to the crossing point proper. . The crossing had now come
to a complete standstill, with the officers badly shaken by the casualties
which their men had suffered. On the opposite bank we could see several
men of the company which was already across, among them many
wounded. Numerous damaged boats and rubber dinghies lay on the
opposite bank. The officers reported that nobody dared show himself

IO FRANCE, 1940

outside cover, as the enemy opened fire immediately on anyone they
spotted.

Several of our tanks and heavy weapons were in position on the
embankment east of the houses, but had seemingly already fired off
almost all their ammunition. However, the tanks I had ordered to the
crossing point soon arrived, to be followed shortly afterwards by two field
howitzers from the Battalion Grasemann. 1

All points on the western bank likely to hold enemy riflemen were
now brought under fire, and soon the aimed fire of all weapons was
pouring into rocks and buildings. Lieutenant Hanke 2 knocked out a
pill-box on the bridge ramp with several rounds. The tanks, with turrets
traversed left, drove slowly north at 50 yards spacing along the Meuse
valley, closely watching the opposite slopes.

Under cover of this fire the crossing slowly got going again, and a
cable ferry using several large pontoons was started. Rubber boats
paddled backwards and forwards and brought back the wounded from
the west bank. One man who fell out of his boat on the way grabbed
hold of the ferry rope and was dragged underwater through the Meuse.
He was rescued by Private Heidenreich, who dived in and brought him
to the bank.

I now took over personal command of the 2nd Battalion of 7th Rifle
Regiment and for some time directed operations myself.

With Lieutenant Most I crossed the Meuse in one of the first boats
and at once joined the company which had been across since early
morning. From the company command post we could see Companies
Enkefort and Lichter were making rapid progress.

I then moved up north along a deep gully to the Company Enkefort.
As we arrived an alarm came in : " Enemy tanks in front." The company
had no anti-tank weapons, and I therefore gave orders for small arms fire
to be opened on the tanks as quickly as possible, whereupon we saw them
pull back into a hollow about a thousand yards north-west of Leffe.
Large numbers of French stragglers came through the bushes and slowly
laid down their arms.

x ln the Germany Army, units and formations were often called by the name of
their commanders.

2 JVbfe by Manfred Rommel Hanke was a prominent member of the Nazi Party and
an official of Goebbels s Propaganda Ministry. He appears to have been very unpopular
with the other officers on account of his high-handed behaviour, and Rommel finally
removed him from the Staff after an incident in the Mess when he suggested that he
had the power to have Rommel himself removed from his command. Rommel made
a long report later to -Hitler s Adjutant.

Later in the war, Hanke became Gauleiter of Silesia and achieved notoriety for his
defence of Breslau to the last stick and stone However, when the devastated city finally
capitulated, Hanke did not stay to meet the invading Red Army, but escaped in an
aeroplane, leaving the population to the tender mercies of the Russian troops. He has
never been heard of since.

THE BREAK-THROUGH ON THE MEUSE II

Other accounts show that RommeVs intervention was even more crucial, and
decisive, than he conveys. The German troops were badly shaken by the intensity
of the defenders fire when he arrived on the scene and organised the fresh effort, in
which he himself took the lead. Fortunately for his chances, the French i8th Infantry
Division, which was charged with the defence of the Dinant sector, was only in
process of taking over the position after a lengthy march on foot, and was short of
anti-tank guns, while the ist Cavalry Division had not recovered from the tank-
mauling it had received in tfie Ardennes. Thus the boldly led attackers were able
to prise open the defence once they had gained sufficient space on the west bank to
develop a manoeuvring leverage.

I now went down with Most to the Meuse again and had myself
taken back to the other bank, where I drove north with a tank and a
signals vehicle to the 6th Rifle Regiment s crossing point. Here the
crossing had meanwhile been resumed in rubber boats and was in full
swing. I was told by Colonel Mickl, the commander of the anti-tank
battalion, that he already had twenty anti-tank guns on the western bank.
A company of the engineer battalion was busily engaged in building
8-ton pontoons, but I stopped them and told them to build the 1 6-ton
type. I aimed to get part of the Panzer Regiment across as quickly as
possible. As soon as the first pontoon was ready I took my 8-wheeled
signals vehicle across. Meanwhile, the enemy had launched a heavy
attack, and the fire of their tanks could be heard approaching the ridge
of the Meuse bank. Heavy enemy shells were dropping all round the
crossing point.

On arrival at Brigade Headquarters on the west bank I found the
situation looking decidedly unhealthy. The commander of the 7th
Motor-cycle Battalion had been wounded, his adjutant killed, and a
powerful French counter-attack had severely mauled our men in Grange.
There was a danger that enemy tanks might penetrate into the Meuse
valley itself.

Leaving my signals lorry on the west bank, I crossed the river again
and gave orders for first the Panzer Company, and then the Panzer
Regiment to be ferried across during the night. However, ferrying tanks
across the i so-yards-wide river by night was a slow job, and by morning
there were still only 15 tanks on the west bank, an alarmingly small
number.

At daybreak [i4th May] we heard that Colonel von Bismarck had
pressed through his attack to close on Onhaye [3 miles west of Dinant],
where he was now engaged with a powerful enemy. Shortly afterwards a
wireless message came in saying that his regiment was encircled, and I
therefore decided to go to his assistance immediately with every available
tank.

At about 09.60 hours the 25th Panzer Regiment, under the command
of Colonel Rothenburg, moved off along the Meuse valley with the 30
tanks which had so far arrived on the west bank, and penetrated as far

12 FRANCE, 1940

as a hollow 500 yards north-east of Onhaye without meeting any
resistance. It transpired that von Bismarck had actually radioed "arrived"
instead of " encircled 51 and that he was now on the point of sending an
assault company round the northern side of Onhaye to secure its western
exit. This move, as had been shown by an exercise we had carried out.
earlier in Godesberg, was of the greatest importance for the next stages
of the operation. Accordingly, five tanks were placed under von Bismarck s
command for this purpose not to make a tank attack in the usual sense,
but to provide mobile covering fire for the infantry attack on the defile
west of Onhaye. It was my intention to place the Panzer Regiment itself
in a wood 1,000 yards north of Onhaye and then to bring all other units
up to that point, from where they could be employed to the north, north
west or west, according to how the situation developed.

I gave orders to Rothenburg to move round both sides of the wood
into this assembly area, and placed myself in a Panzer III which was
to follow close behind him.

Rothenburg now drove off through a hollow to the left with the five
tanks which were to accompany the infantry, thus giving these tanks a
lead of 100 to 150 yards. There was no sound of enemy fire. Some 20
to 30 tanks followed up behind. When the commander of the five tanks
reached the rifle company on the southern edge of Onhaye wood, Colonel
Rothenburg moved off with his leading tanks along the edge of the wood
going west. We had just reached the south-west corner of the wood and
were about to cross a low plantation, from which we could see the five
tanks escorting the infantry below us to our left front, when suddenly
we came under heavy artillery and anti-tank gunfire from the west.
Shells landed all round us and my tank received two hits one after the
other, the first on the upper edge of the turret and the second in the peri
scope.

The driver promptly opened the throttle wide and drove straight
into the nearest bushes. He had only gone a few yards, however, when
the tank slid down a steep slope on the western edge of the wood and
finally stopped, canted over on its side, in such a position that the enemy,
whose guns were in position about 500 yards away on the edge of the
next wood, could not fail to see it. I had been wounded in the right
cheek by a small splinter from the shell which had landed in the periscope.
It was not serious though it bled a great deal.

I tried to swing the turret round so as to bring our 37 mm. gun to
bear on the enemy in the opposite wood, but with the heavy slant of
the tank it was immovable.

The French battery now opened rapid fire on our wood and at any

moment we could expect their fire to be aimed at our tank, which was

in full view. I therefore decided to abandon it as fast as I could, taking

the crew with me. At that moment the subaltern in command of the

1 Translalor s note: eingetrqffen instead of eingtschlossen.

THE BREAK-THROUGH ON THE MEUSE 13

tanks escorting the infantry reported himself seriously wounded, with
the words : " Herr General, my left arm has been shot off." We clambered
up through the sandy pit, shells crashing and splintering "all round.
Close in front of us trundled Rothenburg s tank with flames pouring out
of the rear. The adjutant of the Panzer Regiment had also left his tank.
I thought at first that the command tank had been set alight by a hit
in the petrol tank and was extremely worried for Colonel Rothenburg s
safety. However, it turned out to be only the smoke candles that had
caught light, the smoke from which now served us very well. In the
meantime Lieutenant Most had driven my armoured signals vehicle
into the wood, where it had been hit in the engine and now stood im
mobilised. The crew was unhurt.

I now gave orders for the tanks to drive through the wood in a
general easterly direction, a move which the armoured cars, which stood
at my disposal, were of course unable to follow. Slowly Rothenburg s
command tank forced its way through the trees, many of them tall and
well grown. It was only the involuntary smoke-screen laid by this tank
that prevented the enemy from shooting up any more of our vehicles.
If only the tanks had sprayed the wood which the enemy was believed
to be holding, with machine-gun and 37 mm. gunfire during their
advance, the French would probably have immediately abandoned their
guns, which were standing in exposed positions at the edge of the wood,
and our losses would almost certainly have been smaller. An attack
launched in the evening by the 25th Panzer Regiment was successful,
and we were able to occupy our assembly area.

A tight combat control west of the Meuse, and flexibility to meet the
changing situation, were only made possible by the fact that the divisional
commander with his signals troop kept on the move and was able to
give his orders direct to the regiment commanders in the forward line.
Wireless alone due to the necessity for encoding would have taken
far too long, first to get the situation reports back to Division and then
for Division to issue its orders. Continuous wireless contact was maintained
with the division s operations staff, which remained in the rear, and a
detailed exchange of views took place early each morning and each
afternoon between the divisional commander and his la. 1 This method
of command proved extremely effective.

By his advance that day Rommel had created a breach which had momentous
consequences, particularly by its effect on the mind of General Corap, the commander
of the French Ninth Army.

Three crossings of the Meuse had been achieved on the i^th, Rommel 9 s being
the fast. In the afternoon, the leading troops of Reinhardfs panzer corps had got
across at Montherme, and Guderiarfs at Sedan. But Reinhardfs gained only a
narrow foothold, and had a desperate fight to maintain it. Not until early on the
i$th were they able to build a bridge over which his tanks could cross, and the exit

1U la " is the operations side of the staff, and is also used for the officer in charge of it.

14 FRANCE, 1940

from Monthermi ran through a precipitous defile that was easy to block. Gudenarfs
troops were more successful, but only one of his three divisions gained an adequate
foothold, and at daybreak on the i^th only one bridge had been completed. The
bridge wfis lucky to escape destruction, as it was repeatedly attacked by the Allied
air forces. Guderian 9 s troops had little support from the Luftwaffe on this second
crucial day, but his anti-aircraft gunners put up such a deadly canopy ofjire that
they brought down an estimated 150 French and British aircraft, and effectively
upset the bomb-aiming. By the afternoon, all three of Guderiaris panzer divisions
were over the river. Holding off heavy counter-attacks from the south he wheeled
west towards the joint between the French Second and Ninth Armies, which began
to give way under his fierce and skilfully manoeuvred pressure.

That night the commander of the French Ninth Army made a fatal decision,
under the double impact of Guderiatfs expanding threat to his right flank and
Rommers penetration in the centre of his front wild reports conveyed that thousands
of tanks were pouring through the breach there. Orders were issued for the abandon
ment of the Meuse, and a general withdrawal of the Ninth Army to a more westerly
line.

On Rommel* s front this intended stop-line ran along the railway east oj
Philippeville, and 75 miles behind the Meuse. It was penetrated by Rommel next
morning, the i$th, before it could be occupied, and under his deep-thrusting threat
the confusion of the withdrawal quickly developed into a spreading collapse. His
renewed thrust also forestalled an intended counter-attack towards Dinant by the
French ist Armoured Division and 4th North African Division, which were just
arriving on the scene. TJie former appeared on Rommel s right flank but ran out oj
fuel at this crucial moment, and only a small fraction of its tanks went into action.
RommeUs advance swept past its front while it was at a standstill, and many oj
its tanks were subsequently captured before they could get away. Meantime, the
North African Division was bowled over by the onrush of the panzers and the
stream of fugitives.

Worse still, Corap s general withdrawal order had uncorked the bottleneck at
Montherme, where the right wing of the Ninth Army had hitherto blocked Reinhardf s
panzer corps. Once a withdrawal began here, it quickly became a hopelessly
confused retreat, and Reinhardf s leading troops were able to slip round the right
flank of the Ninth Army behind the back of the forces opposing Guderian and
then drove on westward many miles along an open path. By that evening, also,
Guderian had overcome the last line of resistance that faced him, and broke through
into open country. The breach in the French front was now 60 miles wide.

The significance of Rommel s story of the i$th May becomes all the clearer
when set agaimt the wider background of that decisive day.

M.J intention for the isth May was to thrust straight through in one
stride to our objective, with the 25th Panzer Regiment in the lead and
with artillery and, if possible, dive-bomber support. The infantry was to
follow up the tank attack, partly on foot and partly lorry-borne. The
essential tiling, to my mind, was that the artillery should curtain off
both flanks of the attack, as our neighbouring divisions were still some

THE BREAK-THROUGH ON THE MEUSE 15

way behind us. The 25th Panzer Regiment s route, which was marked
out on the map, led round the outskirts of Philippeville [18 miles west of
Dinant], avoiding all villages, and on to our objective, the district round
Cerfontaine \8 miles west of Philippeville]. It was my Intention to ride with
25* Panzer Regiment so that I could direct the attack from up forward
and bring in the artillery and dive-bombers at the decisive moment. To
simplify wireless traffic over which highly important messages often
arrived late, due to the necessity for encoding I agreed a " line of thrust "
with the la and artillery commander. Starting point for this line was
taken as Rosee church and finishing point Froidchapelle church. All
officers marked the line on their maps. If I now wanted artillery fire on,
for instance, Philippeville, I simply radioed: " Heavy artillery fire
immediate round eleven." The artillery commander was delighted with
the new system.

At about 09.00 hours I met a Luftwaffe major who informed me that
dive-bombers could be made available for my division that day. As the
tanks were already starting to move I called for them immediately, to
go into action in front of the attack. I then moved over to Rothenburg s
tank and instructed my Gefechtsstqffel 1 to follow up the tank attack from
cover to cover with their armoured car and signals vehicle. -

After a brief engagement with enemy tanks near Flavion, the Panzer
Regiment advanced in column through the woods to Philippeville,
passing on the way numerous guns and vehicles belonging to a French
unit, whose men had tumbled headlong into the woods at the approach
of our tanks, having probably already suffered heavily under our dive-
bombers. Enormous craters compelled us to make several detours
through the wood- About 3 miles north-west of Philippeville there was
a brief exchange of fire with French troops occupying the hills and
woods south of Philippeville. Our tanks fought the action on the move,
with turrets traversed left, and the enemy was soon silenced. From time
to time enemy anti-tank guns, tanks and armoured cars were shot up.
Fire was also scattered into the woods on our flanks as we drove past.
Staff and artillery was kept closely informed of the progress of the attack
by brief radio messages sent in clear, with the result that the artillery
curtain functioned perfectly. The day s objective was soon reached.

With one of Rothenburg s panzer companies placed under my com
mand, I then drove back over the tracks of the advance to establish
contact with the infantry in the rear. On the high ground 1,000 yards
west of Philippeville we found two of our tanks which had fallen out with
mechanical trouble. Their crews were in process of collecting prisoners,
and a few who had already come in were standing around. Now hundreds
of French motor-cyclists came out of the bushes and, together with their

lf The Gefechtsstqffel, to which Rommel refers throughout his campaigns, was a small
headquarters group consisting of signals troops and a small combat team, together with
the appropriate vehicles (including a wireless lorry), which always accompanied him
in action.

l6 FRANCE, 1940

officers, slowly laid down their arms. Others tried to make a quick
getaway down the road to the south.

I now occupied myself for a short time with the prisoners. Among
them were several officers, from whom I received a number of requests,
including, among other things, permission to keep their batmen and to
have their kit picked up from Philippeville, where it had been left. It
was greatly to my interest that the Philippeville garrison should surrender
quickly and without fighting, so I granted the requests.

My escorting panzer company now drove for Neuville [2 miles south
of Philippeville], with the object of cutting off the French retreat from
Philippeville to the south. On arriving at the company with Most, I
found it involved in fighting near Neuville, with the action moving south
and threatening to turn into a pursuit. I had no intention of pushing
any farther south, and so gave orders for the battle to be broken off and
for the company to continue eastward from Neuville. About 500 yards
south of Vocedee we ran into part of Panzer Company Huttemann,
which joined up with us. On the southern edge of Vocedee we had a
brief engagement with a considerable force of French tanks, which was
soon decided in our favour. The French ceased fire and were fetched
out of their tanks one by one by our men. Some fifteen French tanks
fell into our hands, some of them damaged, others completely intact. It
being impossible to leave a guard, we took the undamaged tanks along
with us in our column, still with their French drivers. About a quarter
of an hour later we reached the main Dinant-Philippeville road, where
I met the leading troops of the Rifle Brigade, with 8th M.G. Battalion
under command, who were following up the tank attack. . I took several
officers into my armoured car and with the whole column behind me,
drove at high speed along the dusty road through the northern outskirts
of Philippeville. [Rommel had turned about, and was heading westward again.]

En route I described the situation to the commanding officers and
instructed them in their new tasks. At the rate we were driving (average
about 40 m.p.h.) the dust-cloud behind us was enormous. Near Senzeille
[4 miles west of Philippeville], we met a body of fully armed French motor
cyclists coming in the opposite direction, and picked them up as they
passed. Most of them were so shaken at suddenly finding themselves in
a German column that they drove their machines into the ditch and were
in no position to put up a fight. Without delaying, we drove on at high
speed to the hills west of Cerfontaine, where Rothenburg was standing
with the leading units of the Panzer Regiment. On its arrival, the
column was deployed as quickly as possible and without halting into the
surrounding district. Looking back east from the summit of the hill, as
night fell, endless pillars of dust could be seen rising as far as the eye
could reach comforting signs that the 7th Panzer Division s move into
the conquered territory had begun.

The fact that the enemy had been able to infiltrate between the

THE BREAK-THROUGH ON THE MEUSE 17

Panzer Regiment and the Rifle Brigade during the afternoon had been
solely due to the latter s delay in getting moving. The officers of a
panzer division must learn to think and act independently within the
framework of the general plan and not wait until they receive orders.
All units had known the start lime of the attack, and they should have
formed up at that time.

Next day, the i6th May 1940, I received orders from Corps to stay
at Divisional H.Q. The reason was unknown to me. It was about 09.30
hours before I at last received Corps permission to move forward to the
new H.Q. Shortly after my arrival the division received orders to thrust
via Sivry through the Maginot Line and on that night to the hills around
Avesnes. ,

This was not the Maginot Line proper, which ended near Longuyon, but its
later westward extension where the type of fortification was much less strong.
But German accounts often draw no distinction between the original line and its
extension.

Guderian s and Reinhardt s corps had encountered, and broken through, the
Maginot Line extension shortly after crossing the Meuse, and were now racing
westward behind it. But HotKs corps, having crossed the Meuse farther north,
in Belgian territory, had still to penetrate it in their south-westerly drive. Sivry
is 12 miles west of Cerfontaine y and Avesnes 12 miles west of Sivry.

I had just discussed the plan for our attack on the Maginot Line with
my la, when the Army Commander, Colonel-General von Kluge, walked
in. He was surprised that the division had not already moved off. I
described to him our plan. The intention was first to gain the frontier
near Sivry, while, at the same time the Reconnaissance Battalion recon
noitred the Maginot Line over a wide front and the mass of the artillery
moved into position round Sivry. Then the Panzer Regiment, under
powerful artillery cover, was to move in extended order up to the French
line of fortifications. Finally, the Rifle Brigade, covered by the tanks,
was to take the French fortifications and remove barricades. Not until
all this was accomplished was the break-through to Avesnes to be made,
with the armour in the lead and the mass of the division following closely
behind. General von Kluge gave complete approval to our plan.

Soon the leading battalion was moving rapidly forward towards
Sivry, which was reached without fighting. Artillery and anti-aircraft
went into position and received instructions to open fire immediately into
certain areas on the other side of the frontier to see whether the enemy
would reply. Meanwhile, the 25th Panzer Regiment arrived at Sivry
and received orders to cross the frontier and take Clairfayts [3 miles beyond].
No enemy battery had replied to our artillery fire on their fortified zone.

I rode, as on the previous day, in the regimental commander s
command tank. Soon we were across the French frontier and then the
tanks rolled slowly on in column towards Clairfayts, which was now only
a mile or so away. When a report came in from a reconnaissance troop

l8 FRANCE, I94O

that the road through Clairfayts had been mined, we bore off to the
south and moved in open order across fields and hedges in a semi-circle
round the village. There was not a sound from the enemy, although
our artillery was dropping shells at intervals deep into their territory.
Soon we found ourselves among orchards and tall hedges, which slowed
up the advance. Rothenbiirg s tank was among the leading vehicles,
with Hanke, my aide-de-camp, following behind in a Panzer IV. His
orders were to open fire quickly on a sign from me and thus act as a
lead-gun for the rest. It had been very evident in the previous days
fighting that frequently far too much time elapsed before the tank crews
opened fire on fleeting targets.

Suddenly we saw the angular outlines of a French fortification about
100 yards ahead. Close beside it were a number of fully-armed French
troops, who, at the first sight of the tanks, at once made as if to surrender.
We were just beginning to think we would be able to take it without
fighting, when one of our tanks opened fire on the enemy elsewhere, with
the result that the enemy garrison promptly vanished into their concrete
pill-box. In a few moments the leading tanks came under heavy anti
tank gunfire from the left and French machine-gun fire opened over the
whole area. We had some casualties and two of our tanks were knocked
out. When the enemy fire had quietened down again, reconnaissance
established the existence of a very deep anti-tank ditch close beside the
enemy fortification, which had not so far opened fire. There were more
defence works in the enemy rear and the road from Clairfayts towards
Avesnes was blocked by high steel hedgehogs (anti-tank obstacles).

Meanwhile, elements of 25th Panzer Regiment had joined battle
with the enemy west and 2,000 yards south of Clairfayts; the artillery
had also opened a heavy fire at my orders and was laying smoke over
various sections of the Maginot Line. French artillery now began to
bombard Clairfayts and Sivry. Soon the motor-cyclists arrived with the
engineer platoon of the 37th Armoured Reconnaissance Battalion. Under
covering fire from tanks and artillery, infantry and engineers pushed
forward into the fortified zone. The engineer platoon began to prepare
the demolition of the steel hedgehog blocking the road to our advance.

Meanwhile, an assault troop of the Panzer Engineer Company over
came the concrete pill-box. The men crawled up to the embrasure and
threw a 6-pound demolition charge in through the firing slit. When,
after repeated summonses to surrender, the strong enemy garrison still did
not emerge, a further charge was thrown in. One officer and 35 men
were then taken prisoner, although they shortly afterwards overcame the
weak assault troop and escaped, after French machine-guns had opened
fire from another pill-box.

Slowly the sky darkened and it became night. Farms were burning
at several points in Clairfayts and farther west. I now gave orders for
an immediate penetration into the fortified zone, and a thrust as far as

THE BREAK-THROUGH ON THE MEUSE ig

possible towards Avesnes. Staff and artillery were quickly informed by
wireless, and then it was time for us to climb into the command tank
and get under way. Taking our place immediately behind the leading
panzer company, we were soon rolling across the demolished road-block
towards the enemy.

During the time that the sappers of the 37th Reconnaissance Battalion
had been demolishing the steel hedgehogs, more violent fighting had
broken out against anti-tank guns and a few field-guns located near a
cluster of houses 1,000 yards west of Clairfayts. Round after round had
been fired over open sights at our tanks and infantry standing near
Clairfayts. Finally, the enemy guns had been silenced by a few rounds
from a Panzer IV.

The way to the west was now open. The moon was up and for the
time being we could expect no real darkness. I had already given orders,
in the plan for the break-through, for the leading tanks to scatter the
road and verges with machine and anti-tank gunfire at intervals during
the drive to Avesnes, which I hoped would prevent the enemy from laying
mines. The rest of the Panzer Regiment was to follow close behind the
leading tanks and be ready at any time to fire salvoes to either flank.
The mass of the division had instructions to follow up the Panzer Regiment
lorry-borne.

The tanks now rolled in a long column through the line of fortifica
tions and on towards the first houses, which had been set alight by our
fire. In the moonlight we could see the men of 7th Motor-cycle Battalion
moving forward on foot beside us. Occasionally an enemy machine-gun
or anti-tank gun fired, but none of their shots came anywhere near us.
Our artillery was dropping heavy harassing fire on villages and the road
far ahead of the regiment. Gradually the speed increased. Before long
we were 500 1,000 2,000 3,000 yards into the fortified zone. Engines
roared, tank tracks clanked and clattered. Whether or not the enemy
was firing was impossible to tell in the ear-splitting noise. We crossed
the railway line a mile or so south-west of Solre le Chateau, and then
swung north to the main road which was soon reached. Then off along
the road and past the first houses.

The people in the houses were rudely awoken by the din of our tanks,
the clatter and roar of tracks and engines. Troops lay bivouacked beside
the road, military vehicles stood parked in farmyards and in some
places on the road itself. Civilians and French troops, their faces distorted
with terror, lay huddled in the ditches, alongside hedges and in every
hollow beside the road. We passed refugee columns, the carts abandoned
by their owners, who had fled in panic into the fields. On we went,
at a steady speed, towards our objective. Every so often a quick glance
at the map by a shaded light and a short wireless message to Divisional
H.Q. to report the position and thus the success of 25th Panzer Regiment.
Every so often a look out of the hatch to assure myself that there was

20 FRANCE, 1940

still no resistance and that contact was being maintained to the rear.
The flat countryside lay spread out around us under the cold light of the
moon. We were through the Maginot Line! It was hardly conceivable.
Twenty-two years before we had stood for four and a half long years
before this self-same enemy and had won victory after victor) 11 and yet
finally lost the war. And now we had broken through the renowned
Maginot Line and were driving deep into enemy territory. It was not
just a beautiful dream. It was reality.

Suddenly there was a flash from a mound about 300 yards away to
the right of the road. There could be no doubt what it was, an enemy
gun well concealed in a concrete pill-box, firing on 25th Panzer Regiment
from the flank. More flashes came from other points. Shell bursts
could not be seen. Quickly informing Rothenburg of the danger he
was standing close beside me I gave orders through him for the regi
ment to increase speed and burst through this second fortified line with
broadsides to right and left.

Fire was opened quickly, the tank crews having been instructed in
the method of fire before the attack. Much of our ammunition was tracer
and the regiment drove on through the new defence line spraying an
immense rain of fire far into the country on either side. Soon we were
through the danger area, without serious casualties. But it was not now
easy to get the fire stopped and we drove through the villages of Sars
Poteries and Beugnies with guns blazing. Enemy confusion was complete.
Military vehicles, tanks, artillery and refugee carts packed high with
belongings blocked part of the road and had to be pushed unceremoniously
to the side. All around were French troops lying flat on the ground,
and farms everywhere were jammed tight with guns, tanks and other
military vehicles. Progress towards Avesnes now became slow. At last
we succeeded in getting the firing stopped. We drove through Semousies.
Always the same picture, troops and civilians in wild flight down both
sides of the road. Soon the road forked, one going right to Maubeuge,
which was now only about 10 miles away, and the other left down into
the valley towards Avesnes. The road was now thick with carts and
people, who moved off to the side of the tanks or had to be directed into
the side by us. The nearer we came to Avesnes the greater was the crush
of vehicles through which we had to fight our way. In Avesnes itself,
which had been shelled by our artillery shortly before, the whole popula
tion was on the move, jammed between vehicles and guns on both sides
of the road in front of our moving tank column. It was obvious that there
were strong French forces in the town.

I did not have the column halted, but drove on with the leading
battalion of tanks to the high ground west of Avesnes, where I intended
to stop and collect up prisoners and captured equipment. On the way
a scouting party of two tanks was detached in the southern outskirts of
Avesnes and dispatched down the main road to the south. Some 500

THE BREAK-THROUGH ON THE MEUSE 21

yards outside the town on the road to Landrecies, we made a halt,
marshalled our units and rounded up the French troops in the immediate
neighbourhood. Here, too, farmyards and orchards beside the road were
jammed full of troops and refugee carts. All traffic down the road from
the west was halted and picked up. Soon a prisoner-of-war cage had to
be constructed in the field.

Meanwhile, firing had started behind us in Avesnes tank guns by
the sound of it and soon we saw flames rising, probably from burning
tanks or lorries. We had lost contact with the tank battalion behind us
and with the 7th Motor-cycle Battalion.

This did not yet cause me any concern, as, in the confusion of owner
less refugee carts, it was only too easy for a traffic jam to pile up. We had
reached our objective and that was the main thing. However, the enemy
in Avesnes there must have been at least a battalion of tanks made
good use of the gap in the Panzer Regiment, and French heavy tanks
soon closed the road through the town. The 2nd Battalion of the 25th
Panzer Regiment at once tried to overcome the enemy blocking the
road, but their attempt failed with the loss of several tanks. The fighting
in Avesnes grew steadily heavier. Intermittent wireless contact was
established between the 2nd Battalion and ourselves. The battle in
Avesnes lasted until about 04.00 hours \ijth May]. Finally, Hanke,
who, on my orders, advanced from the west against the powerful enemy
tanks with a Panzer IV, succeeded in disposing of the French tanks.
Dawn was slowly breaking when the battle ended and contact was re
established with the 2nd Battalion.

Meanwhile, I had sent repeated signals to Corps through the divisional
staff asking whether, in view of the success of our break-through of the
Maginot Line, we should not now continue our advance over the Sambre.
Receiving no reply wireless contact had not been established I decided
to continue the attack at dawn with the object of seizing the Sambre
crossing at Landrecies and holding it open. I issued orders by wireless to
all other units to follow up the Panzer Regiment s advance to Landrecies
[// miles west of Avesnes].

At about 04.00 hours I moved off towards Landrecies with the
leading battalion of Rothenburg s Panzer Regiment. The 7th Motor
cycle Battalion, which had now closed up, followed behind, and I was
firmly convinced that behind them again the remaining units of the
division would take part in the attack. The failure of the wireless had
left me in ignorance of the exact position of the regiments and we had
simply transmitted all orders into the blue.

As no supplies had come up during the night, we now had to^be
sparing with ammunition and drove westwards through the brightening
day with guns silent. Soon we began to meet refugee columns and
detachments of French troops preparing for the march. A chaos of guns,
tanks and military vehicles of all kinds, inextricably entangled with horse-

22 FRANCE, I 940

drawn refugee carts, covered the road and verges. By keeping our guns
silent and occasionally driving our cross-country vehicles alongside the
road, we managed to get past the column without great difficulty. The
French troops were completely overcome by surprise at our sudden
appearance, laid down their arms and marched off to the east beside
our column. Nowhere was any resistance attempted. Any enemy
tanks we met on the road were put out of action as we drove past. The
advance went on without a halt to the west. Hundreds upon hundreds of
French troops, with their officers, surrendered at our arrival. At some
points they had to be fetched out of vehicles driving along beside us.

Particularly irate over this sudden disturbance was a French lieutenant-
colonel whom we overtook with his car jammed in the press of vehicles.
I asked him for his rank and appointment. His eyes glowed hate and
impotent fury and he gave the impression of being a thoroughly fanatical
type. There being every likelihood, with so much traffic on the road,
that our column would get split up from time to time, I decided on second
thoughts to take him along with us. He was already fifty yards away to
the east when he was fetched back to Colonel Rothenburg, who signed
to him to get in his tank. But he curtly refused to come with us, so, after
summoning him three times to get in, there was nothing for it but to
shoot him.

We drove through Maroilles \8\ miles west of Avesnes], where the
street was so crowded that it was not easy for the people to obey our
shouts of " A droit! " On we went, with the sun on our backs through
the thin morning mist to the west. The road was now just as full of
troops and refugees outside the villages. Our shouts of " A droit! " had
little effect and progress became very slow, with the tanks driving through
the fields alongside the road. At length we arrived at Landrecies, the
town on the Sambre, where there was again a vast crush of vehicles and
French troops in every lane and alley, but no resistance. We rolled across
the Sambre bridge, on the other side of which we found a French barracks
full of troops. As the tank column clattered past, Hanke drove into the
courtyard and instructed the French officers to have their troops paraded
and marched off to the east.

Still in the belief that the whole division was rapidly approaching
Landrecies behind us, I continued the attack towards Le Gateau [8 miles
west of^ Landrecies]. We drove through a long wood, which the enemy
was using as an ammunition dump. Against the rising sun, the sentries
were unable to identify us until we were on top of them. Then they
surrendered. In Pommereuille, too, the French troops stationed in the
village laid down their arms. I kept the advance going until the hill
just east of Le Gateau, where we finally halted. It was 6.15 a.m. My
first task was to assure myself that contact with the rear still existed, after
which I intended to make another attempt to get in touch with Division
Headquarters.

THE BREAK-THROUGH ON THE MEUSE 223

Rommel s division had advanced nearly 50 miles since the previous morning.
The way he had driven on with his tanks during the night was a daring act. Then,
and later, most commanders considered that, even in exploiting a victory, the
continuation of a tank advance in the dark was too great a hazard.

On Rommel s left, the leading troops of Reinhardfs and Guderiarfs Panzer
Corps were racing level with him. Early that day Guderiarfs left wing division
reached the Oise at Ribemont, 20 miles south of Le Cdteau. That was the breadth

3. ROMMEL S ADVANCE, 16x11- xyra MAY

Map drawn by Rommel showing his advance in the 24 hours to
7.50 a.m. ijth May in relation to those of the neighbouring divisions
and of von Kleist s Panzer Group. This map brings out the extra
ordinary depth, narrowness and audacity of his thrust from
Cerfontame to Le Cdteau.

24 FRANCE, I94O

of the swathe that had been cut by the tank torrents that were sweeping west towards
the sea, across the rear of the Allied armies in Belgium. All attempts to block
them proved too late, for each time that the French Command chose a new stop-line
it was overrun by the German tanks before the slower-moving French reserves
arrived, or before they settled into position. ,

It was now high time that the country we had overrun was secured
by the division, and the enormous number of prisoners approximately
two mechanised divisions was collected. I had kept the division staff
constantly informed of our progress, but all messages had been transmitted
blind from the Panzer Regiment s command tank and there was no way
of telling whether they had been received. Even so, I was not very
pleased when I heard shortly afterwards that only a small part of the
Panzer Regiment and part of the Motor-cycle Battalion had come through
as far as the hill east of Le Gateau. An officer was sent off to the rear
immediately. Then I tried myself to drive back to establish contact, but
soon came under anti-tank gun fire from Le Gateau and had to return.
Meanwhile, Rothenburg with part of Panzer Battalion Sickenius had
been in action with French tanks and anti-tank guns on the hill east of
Le Gateau, but had soon disposed of them. I returned to the Panzer
Battalion, which had meanwhile formed a hedgehog, and waited there
until the arrival of part of the Motor-cycle Battalion under Captain von
Hagen. I now felt the situation in front of Le Gateau to be secure, and,
still in the belief that the rest of the division had almost closed up, ordered
Rothenburg to hold his position with the aid of the Motor-cycle Battalion
which was placed under his command. I then started back in my signals
vehicle, with a Panzer III as escort, to bring up and deploy the rest of
the division. On the way we came across several stranded vehicles
belonging to the Motor-cycle Battalion and Panzer Regiment, whose
crews told us that it was wise to go carefully in Landrecies as a number of
our vehicles had been fired on there, by enemy tanks. I then drove on
[eastwards] at high speed to Landrecies, where the Panzer III, which
was in the lead, lost its way in the town. When at last we reached the
road to Avesnes, we saw a German vehicle standing in the road a hundred
yards ahead, where it had been shot up by enemy guns. There must
have been a French tank or anti-tank gun somewhere around, but we
had no time for a long palaver and so through! As we drove past,
wounded motor-cyclists shouted frantically to us to take them along.
I could not help them, unfortunately there was too much at stake. Both
vehicles crossed the danger zone at top speed and won through to the
Maroilles road. Then the escorting Panzer III dropped out with
mechanical trouble.

Vehicles now stood everywhere, all over and across the road. Along
side the road there were French officers and men bivouacked close beside
their weapons. But they had apparently not yet recovered from the
fright which the German tanks had spread and so we put them on the

THE BREAK-THROUGH ON THE MEUSE 25

march so far as we could by shouts and signs from the moving vehicle.
There were no German troops to be seen. On we went, at top speed,
through Maroilles. East of the village we suddenly discovered a Panzer
IV, which had been stranded by mechanical trouble and had its 75 mm.
gun in working order. We sighed with relief. A Panzer IV was a strong
protection at such a moment.

There were now French troops everywhere, on both sides of the road,
most of them bivouacked beside their vehicles. There was no chance,
unfortunately, of getting them on the march as prisoners as we had no
men to form an escort. Where we did manage to get them moving, they
marched only so long as our armoured car was with them, and then
vanished into the bushes the moment we drove on ahead.

I gave the Panzer IV orders to hold the hill east of Maroilles and to
send any prisoners who came from the west on to the east. Then we
drove on, but had only gone a few hundred yards when the driver
reported that he had to stop for petrol. Fortunately, he still had several
full cans aboard. Meanwhile, I was informed by Hanke that he had
heard from the crew of the Panzer IV that the village beyond had been
reoccupied by the enemy. There could be no question of tackling French
tanks and anti-tank guns with my lightly armoured vehicle, so I drove
back to the Panzer IV with the idea of making wireless contact from there
with all parts of the division and organising a quick move into the
territory we had overrun. Fortunately, there was no sound of fighting
anywhere in the vicinity.

I had barely arrived back at the Panzer IV when a motor rifle company
appeared on the horizon, travelling fast down the road from Marbaix
[5 miles west of Landrecies]. There now being a hope that further detach
ments would be following in the wake of this company, I drove off again
in the direction of Avesnes, but found nothing.

A short distance east of Marbaix a French car came out of a side-
turning from the left and crossed the road close in front of my armoured
car. At our shouts it halted and a French officer got out and surrendered.
Behind the car there was a whole convoy of lorries approaching in a great
cloud of dust. Acting quickly, I had the convoy turned off towards
Avesnes. Hanke swung himself up on the first lorry while I stayed on the
cross-road for a while, shouting and signalling to the French troops that
they should lay down their arms the war was over for them. Several
of the lorries had machine-guns mounted and manned against air attack.
It was impossible to see through the dust how long the convoy was, and
so after 10 or 15 vehicles had passed, I put myself at the head of the
column and drove on to Avesnes. Shortly before the town we had to
make a detour across country where the road was closed by burning
vehicles.

At length we arrived at the south-west entrance to Avesnes, where
we found part of the Battalion Paris [the commander s name] installed near

2 6 FRANCE, 1940

the cemetery. Without halting, Hanke led the lorry convoy on to a
parking place and there disarmed the enemy troops. We now found
that we had had no less than 40 lorries, many of them carrying troops,

C StaffH.O. of the division arrived in Avesnes at about 16.00 hours,
and now unit after unit began to move into the territory we had overrun
during the night and early morning. In the course of this move
the aid Battalion of the Artillery Regiment successfully prevented I 48
French tanks from going into action just north of Avesnes. The tanks
stood formed up alongside the road, some of them ^ with engines
running. Several drivers were taken prisoner still in their tanks. This
action saved the 2 5 th Panzer Regiment an attack in their rear by these

The 7th Panzer Division s losses during the break-through of the Maginot
Line extension (on the i6th\^th May) are given in the division s official history as 35
killed and 59 wounded. In the division s sector the prisoners taken were approximately
10,000 men, together with 100 tanks, 30 armoured cars and 27 guns.

The account concludes, " The division had no time to collect large numbers of
prisoners and equipment"

After settling the layout of the division between Le Gateau and the
French frontier west of Sivry, I took an hour and a half s rest. Shortly
after midnight orders came in for the attack to be continued next day,
the i8th May, towards Cambrai. At about 07.00 hours next morning
the adjutant of the 25th Panzer Regiment arrived at headquarters and
reported that a powerful enemy force had established itself in Pommereuille
Wood {midway between Landrecies and Le Gateau]. He had managed to break
through from west to east in an armoured car under cover of night. The
25th Panzer Regiment, which was still holding its position east of Le
Cateau, urgently needed petrol and ammunition and the commander
had instructed him to get them brought up as quickly as possible.

At about 08.00 hours I put the remaining panzer battalion on the
march for Landrecies and Le Cateau with orders to push through to the
regiment and get the ammunition and petrol up to it. The 37* Armoured
Reconnaissance Battalion was to follow up behind. With Most and
Hanke, I later caught up with the Panzer Battalion in the wood half a
mile east of Pommereuille, and found them in action against French tanks
which were barring the road. Violent fighting developed on the road
and there was no chance of outflanking the enemy position on either side.
Our guns seemed to be completely ineffective against the heavy armour
of the French tanks.

Tlie French tanks had from 40 mm. to 60 mm. of armour whereas even the
German medium tanks had only 30 mm., and the light tanks had even less protection.

We stood for some time watching the battle from close range, until I
finally decided to take the battalion south through the wood via Ors [4
miles south-west of Landrecies]. We again came up against the French in

THE BREAK-THROUGH ON THE MEUSE 27

the northern outskirts of Ors and progress became slow while we fought
our way ^ forward. For some unknown reason the Panzer Regiment s
ammunition and petrol column did not follow up behind the battalion.
It was midday before we finally reached Rothenburg s position. He
reported that his force had held the position against heavy enemy tank
attacks, but that he was now incapable of further movement and in
urgent need of petrol and ammunition. Unfortunately, I was not at that
moment in a position to help him.

The necessary forces were now dispatched to Pommereuille to open
the shortest road to Landrecies. Meanwhile, French heavy artillery had
begun to lay down a heavy barrage on our hedgehog position. Their fire
was accurate and part of the position had to be vacated. Confident that
the fighting at Pommereuille would soon be decided in our favour, I now
gave orders for the Panzer Regiment to form up for their attack on
Cambrai. By 15.00 hours the situation had cleared up sufficiently for
the attack to open.

The passages that follow in Rommel s narrative have more detail than
significance, and may therefore be summarised. The ammunition and petrol column
which had been left south-east of Pommereuille Wood did not reach 25th Panzer
Regiment s two battalions located near Le Cdteau until some hours later. By the
time these tanks had filled up with ammunition and petrol, the one Panzer Battalion
which Rommel had brought up was already far ahead on the road to Cambrai.

I now gave orders to the reinforced Battalion Paris to secure the
roads leading from Cambrai to the north-east and north as quickly as
possible. Led by its few tanks and two troops of self-propelled A. A. guns,
the battalion advanced over a broad front and in great depth straight
across the fields to the north-west, throwing up a great cloud of dust as
they went. Tanks and A.A. guns scattered fire at intervals into the
northern outskirts of Cambrai. The enemy in Cambrai, unable in the-
dust to see that most of our vehicles were soft-skinned, apparently thought
that a large-scale tank attack was approaching the north of the town and
offered no resistance.

Nothing could have been more futile than the way that the French Command
used its armoured forces. It had 53 tank battalions compared with the Germans 36.
But all the German battalions were formed into divisions (of which they had ten)
while nearly half the French were infantry-support units. Moreover, even their
seven divisions of armoured type were used piecemeal.

Before the war the only French armoured formations had been the so-called
" light mechanised division " (200 tanks), of converted cavalry. The French had
three of these, which were employed for the advance into Belgium. There were also
four " armoured" divisions (of 150 tanks only) which had been formed during the
winter. These four were thrown separately and successively against the seven German
armoured divisions (averaging 260 tanks apiece) that drove across the Meuse like a
vast phalanx. The ist French Armoured Division was directed towards Dinant,
but ran out of fuel and was overrun as already related. The $rd was directed

28 FRANCE, 1940

against Sedan^ but distributed to support the infantry there; the fragments were
swamped by Guderiarfs three divisions. The 4th (under de Gaulle] , recently formed
and still incomplete, went into action against Guderiarfs flank as he swept on towards
tlie Oise&gt; but was brushed aside. The 2nd was spread along a 25-mile stretch of the
Oise, and Guderian s two leading divisions quickly burst through this thin string of
static packets.

The three French mechanised divisions from Belgium were assembling just north
ofCambrai) and although two of them had been mauled in their fight with Hoeppner s
Panzer Corps in the Belgian plain they were still a powerful force. They were
ordered to strike south towards Cambrai and St. Quentin on the igth, but the order
was not executed as a considerable proportion of the tanks had been detached to
aid the infantry at various places.

As for the British^ they had only ten tank units in France, and these were all
split up among the infantry divisions* The fast armoured division was not embarked
for France until after the German offensive had started.

CHAPTER II

CLOSING THE TRAP

The fast going of the break-through drive ended, for Rommel, with the capture
ofCambrai. For on the i6th May the imperilled Allied armies in Belgium had at
last started to withdraw from their far advanced line in Belgium) and on the i8th
the right wing of the German Panzer forces had been engaged with forces that the
French First Army had sent back to cover its rear. The terrific momentum of the
Panzer drive had brushed aside these intervening forces in the last lap, from Le
Gateau to Cambrai, but the increasing opposition and flank threat caused concern
in the higher commands on the German side. So, while Guderian s and Reinhardt s
corps pursued the westward drive, HotKs corps (including Rommel s division) on the
right wing was held back until infantry reinforcements began to arrive on the scene
and take over the protection of the northern flank.

Rommel s account of the next two days can be briefly summarised. After
covering the stretch between Le Gateau and Cambrai, he paused to reorganise and
get up supplies, as well as to give his troops a chance to sleep and recover their
energy. He planned to continue the advance on the evening of the igth, with the
aim of reaching the high ground south-east of Arras.

In the late afternoon he was discussing the plan with his staff at Divisional H.Q.
when the Corps Commander, General Hoth, suddenly appeared and ordered a post
ponement, on the ground th$ the troops were too exhausted by their efforts of the past
days. Rommel did not share HotKs opinion. " The troops have been twenty
hours in the same place" he said, " and a night attack during moonlight will result
in fewer losses" So Hoth let him have his way.

The attack towards Arras began at 01.40 hours (on the soth], and Rommel
accompanied the tank spearhead, which at 06.00 hours reached Beaurains (z\ miles
south of Anas}. But the motorised rifle regiments had not followed the tank spear
head closely as intended, so Rommel drove back in an armoured car to hurry them
forward only to find that the French had meanwhile infiltrated into his line of
communication. For the next few hours he was in an extremely tight corner, until
the situation was restored by the arrival of an infantry 9 regiment with artillery.
Tliese troops were then put on the defensive south of Arras, news having come
through that a number of French and British divisions had assembled around that
city.

On the 2ist the Jth Panzer Division was to advance round the flank of Arras

3&lt;3 FRANCE, I94O

towards the north-west ; with the S.S. Division Totenkopf on its left flank, while
the $th Panzer Division advanced east of Arras. While again screening his exposed
flank with artillery, Rommel this time put his Armoured Reconnaissance Battalion
in between the Panzer Regiment, forming the spearhead, and the Rifle Regiments
behind in order to maintain communications and hold the road open. These
precautions were well justified, as his account shows.

At about 15.00 hours I gave the Panzer Regiment orders to attack.
Although the armour had by this tune been seriously reduced in numbers-,
due to breakdowns- and casualties, this was a model of what an attack
should be. When I saw the weight of it I was convinced that the 7th
Panzer Division s new thrust into enemy territory would be as successful
as all the other actions of the preceding days. I had actually intended to
accompany the tanks again myself, together with Lieutenant Most, my
dispatch riders, armoured car and signals vehicle, and to conduct
operations from there by wireless, but the infantry regiments were so
slow in backing up that I drove straight off back to chase up the yth Rifle
Regiment and get it to hurry. It was nowhere to be found. A mile or
so north of Ficheux we eventually came across part of the 6th Rifle
Regiment, and driving alongside their column, turned off with them
towards Wailly. Half a mile east of the village we came under fire from
the north. One of our howitzer batteries was already in position at the
northern exit from the village, firing rapid on enemy tanks attacking
southward from Arras.

This attack had been hurriedly organised by the Allied commanders in an
attempt to break the net that was swiftly closing round their armies in Belgium..
For the purpose, the British $th and $oth Divisions were rushed south to Arras,
together with the ist Army Tank Brigade (infantry tanks), while the French
planned to co-operate with two mechanised divisions and two infantry divisions.
The attack took longer to mount than had been reckoned, and was launched before
its mounting could be completed. For on the soth Guderiaris Corps raced into Amiens
in the morning and reache^the sea near Abbeville that night, thus cutting the Allied
armies* supply lines a deadly stroke.

Under pressure of the emergency, the British commander decided to start his
attack without waiting any longer for the French. But, as delivered, the British
attack boiled down to a matter of two tank battalions (the 4th andjth R.T.R., with
74 tanks in all) supported by two infantry battalions. Part of the French 3rd Light
Mechanised Division (70 tanks) co-operated on its right flank.

As we were now coming under machine-gun fire and the infantry
had already taken cover to the right, Most and I ran on in front of the
armoured cars towards the battery position. It did not look as though
the battery would have much difficulty in dealing with the enemy tanks,
for the gunners were calmly hurling round after round into them in
complete disregard of the return fire. Running along behind the battery
lines, we arrived at Wailly and then called up the vehicles. The enemy

4. BATTLES ROUND ARRAS AND LILLE

32 FRANCE, I94O

tank fire had created chaos and confusion among our troops in the village
and they were jamming up the roads and yards with their vehicles,
instead of going into action with every available weapon to fight off the
oncoming enemy. We tried to create order. After notifying the divisional
staff of the critical situation in and around Wailly we drove off to a hill
1,000 yards west of the village, where we found a light A. A. troop and
several anti-tank guns located in hollows and a small wood, most of
them totally under cover. About 1,200 yards west of our position, the
leading enemy tanks, among them one heavy, had already crossed the
Arras-Beaumetz railway and shot up one of our Panzer Ills. At the
same time several enemy tanks were advancing down the road from
Bac du Nord and across the railway line towards Wailly. It was an
extremely tight spot, for there were also several enemy tanks very close
to Wailly on its northern side. The crew of a howitzer battery, some
distance away, now left their guns, swept along by the retreating infantry.
With Most s help, I brought every available gun into action at top speed
against the tanks. Every gun, both anti-tank and anti-aircraft, was
ordered to open rapid fire immediately and I personally gave each gun
its target. With the enemy tanks so perilously close, only rapid fire
from every gun could save the situation. We ran from gun to gun. The
objections of gun commanders that the range was still too great to
engage the tanks effectively, were overruled. All I cared about was to
halt the enemy tanks by heavy gunfire. Soon we succeeded in putting
the leading enemy tanks out of action. About 150 yards west of our small
wood a British captain climbed out of a heavy tank and walked unsteadily
towards us with his hands up. We had killed his driver. Over by the
howitzer battery also despite a range of 1,200 to 1,500 yards the rapid
fire of our anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns succeeded in bringing the
enemy to a halt and forcing some of them to turn away.

We now directed our fire against the other group of tanks attacking
from the direction of Bac du Nord, and succeeded in keeping the tanks
off, setting fire to some, halting others and forcing the rest to retreat.
Although we were under very heavy fire from the tanks during this action,
the gun crews worked magnificently. The worst seemed to be over and
the attack beaten off, when suddenly Most sank to the ground behind a
20 mm. anti-aircraft gun close beside me. He was mortally wounded
and blood gushed from his mouth. I had had no idea that there was any
firing in our vicinity at that moment, apart from that of the 20 mm. gun.
Now, however, the enemy suddenly started dropping heavy gunfire into
our position in the wood. Poor Most was beyond help and died before
he could be carried into cover beside the gun position. The death of
this brave man, a magnificent soldier, touched me deeply.

Meanwhile, violent and costly fighting had been going on in the
region of Tilloy-Beaurains-Agny. Very powerful armoured forces had
thrust out of Arras and attacked the advancing ist Battalion of the 6th

CLOSING THE TRAP 33

Rifle Regiment, inflicting heavy losses in men and material. The anti
tank guns which we quickly deployed showed themselves to be far too
light to be effective against the heavily armoured British tanks, and the
majority of them were put out of action by gunfire, together with their
crews, and then overrun by the enemy tanks. Many of our vehicles were
burnt out. S.S. units close by also had to fall back to the south before
the weight of the tank attack. Finally, the divisional artillery and 88 mm.
anti-aircraft batteries succeeded in bringing the enemy armour to a halt
south of the line Beaurains-Agny. Twenty-eight enemy tanks were de
stroyed by the artillery alone, while the anti-aircraft guns accounted for
one heavy and seven light.

While this heavy fighting had been going on round the 6th and yth
Rifle Regiments, Rothenburg s 25th Panzer Regiment had reached its
objective -in a dashing advance, and then waited in vain for the arrival
of the Reconnaissance Battalion and the Rifle Regiments. At about
19.00 hours I gave orders for the Panzer Regiment to thrust south-
eastwards in order to take the enemy armour advancing south from
Arras in the flank and rear. During this operation, the Panzer Regiment
clashed with a superior force of heavy and light enemy tanks and many
guns south of Agnez. Fierce fighting flared up, tank against tank, an
extremely heavy engagement in which the Panzer Regiment destroyed
seven heavy tanks and six anti-tank guns and broke through the enemy
position, though at the cost of three Panzer IVs, six Panzer Ills and a
number of light tanks. 1

This action brought the enemy armour into such confusion that, in
spite of their superior numbers, they fell back into Arras. Fighting ceased
at nightfall. Meanwhile, the situation north-west of Wailly had been
fully restored.

This attack was the one serious counter-stroke made by the entrapped armies
before the end came. Small as was its scale, it gave the Germans a shock.

That was due to the tough skins of the tanks rather than to any deep penetration
by the attack. The British here employed slow but heavily armoured infantry tanks
" Matildas" They had in all 58 of the small Mark Is, armed only with machine-
guns, and 16 of the later and larger Mark Us with a 2-pounder gun. Even the
Mark JZr maximum speed was only 75 m.p.h., but they had 75 mm. (3 inches) oj
armour, and proved impervious to the ordinary $j mm. German anti-tank guns,
while even artillery shells often bounced off them. The French cavalry tanks,
Somuas, were faster and more thinly armoured although not so thinly as the German.

The British tank advance which was not in superior numbers had been
handicapped by having little infantry support, less artillery support, and no air
support. It was largely these deficiencies which had brought it to a halt, after a
very promising start, and then caused its withdrawal.

a The official history of the 7th Panzer Division states that the Division s losses on this
day were 89 killed, 1 16 wounded and 1 73 missing. That was four times the loss suffered
during the break-through into France.

34 FRANCE, 1940

But its mental and moral effect on the German higher command was very
marked and out of all proportion to material results. Discussing the 1940
campaign after the war, Field-Marshal von Rundstedt said: " A critical moment
in the drive came just as my forces had reached the ChanneL It was caused by a
British counter-stroke southward from Anas on May 21. For a short time it was
feared that our armoured divisions would be cut off before tfte infantry divisions
could come up to support them. None of the French counter-attacks carried any
serious threat as this one did." Kluge and Kleist were particularly affected. Kluge
was inclined to stop any further advance westward from Arras until the situation
there had been cleared up. Kleist^ too, became nervously cautious. Thus when
Guderian turned north from Abbeville on the 22nd driving towards Boulogne,
Calais and Dunkirk his advance was slowed down by Kleisfs restrictive orders.

Then, on the 24th, Guderian *s and Reinhardt 9 s corps were halted by Hitler s
order when they were barely 10 miles from Dunkirk the only remaining port
through which the British Army could escape from the trap. But that fateful
order was only issued after Hitler had visited Rundstedt, who was naturally
influenced by the cautious views of Kluge and Kleist. When the halt order was
lifted two days later, on the 26lh, the chance of preventing the British Army s escape
had faded as it had been allowed time to establish a shield round the port.

23 May
DEAREST Lu,

With a few hours sleep behind me, it s time for a line to you.
I m fine in every way. My division has had a blazing success. Dinant,
Philippeville, break-through the Maginot Line and advance in one
night 40 miles through France to Le Gateau, then Cambrai, Arras,
always far in front of everybody else. Now the hunt is up against
60 encircled British, French and Belgian divisions. Don t worry
about me. As I see it the war in France may be over in a fortnight.

24 May 1940
Close in front of Bethune. I m in splendid form. On the go all

day of course. But by my estimate the war will be won in a fortnight.
Lovely weather if anything too much sun.

26 May 1940

A day or two without action has done a lot of good. The division
has lost up to date 27 officers killed and 33 wounded, and 1,500 men
dead and wounded. That s about 12 per cent casualties. Very little
compared with what s been achieved. The worst is now well over.
There s little likelihood of any more hard fighting, for we ve given
the enemy a proper towsing. Food, drink and sleep are all back to
routine. Schraepler is back already. His successor was killed a yard
away from me.

CLOSING THE TRAP 35

On the 22nd and 2yd May Rommel pushed forward round the western outskirts
of Arras, and under pressure of this outflanking threat the British forces there were
withdrawn on the night of the 2$rd to the canal line (18 miles to the north) that
ran through La Bassee andBethune to the sea at Gravelines, south-west of Dunkirk.
On the 24th came Hitler s order that the panzer forces were to halt on this canal
line. Rommel spent the next two days in reorganising his division, parts of which
had been badly mauled by the British tank attack on the 2isL

Hitler s cancellation of the halt order on the s6th coincided with the British
decision to withdraw to the sea at Dunkirk. The larger part of the forces holding
the canal line were already being drawn away northward to reinforce the line in
Belgium, where Bock s Army Group was developing an ever-increasing pressure
under which the Belgian Army collapsed, and capitulated, on the following day.

As soon as the halt order was lifted, Rommel was quick to renew his northward
thrust, which was directed on Lille with the aim of cutting off the Allied forces
that were still covering the city and lying east of it.

During this phase of the campaign the Allied commanders, having had their
lines of communication severed, naturally tended to be over-conscious of the difficulties
of their situation. But from " the other side of the hill " things looked different,
as Rommel s account serves to make clear. The difficulty he met in forcing the
passage of the La Bassee canal is the more notable, particularly in comparison with
the crossing of the Meuse, because of the very thin defence. Only one British
battalion was holding tlie sector he attacked.

According to air reports which came in to my headquarters on the
afternoon of the 2 6th May, the enemy had been observed north of the
canal withdrawing towards the north-west. I immediately requested
permission from Corps to drive a bridgehead over the canal that evening.
It was soon granted.

I remained with the troops on the canal all the evening. The 37th
Reconnaissance Battalion, although suffering severely from the activities
of snipers, succeeded, with artillery help, in pushing armoured patrols
through as far as the canal, but strong enemy resistance prevented the
creation of a bridge-head. The 7th Rifle Regiment, however, achieved
a notable success that evening by getting elements of both its battalions
across the La Bass6e canal, which was blocked by immense numbers of
sunken barges. After eliminating a number of enemy machine-gun nests,
both battalions established themselves on the northern bank. Apart from
a few casualties at the crossing point caused by flanking fire from British
machine-gun posts to the west, the creation of the bridge-head at this
point seemed to have caused no great difficulty and there was now good
reason to expect that the battalions would establish a strong position on
the northern bank during the night.

Early next morning, die 27th May, I drove to the crossing point at
Cuinchy to see for myself how things were going. Snipers were still very
active, mainly from the left, and a number of men had been hit, including
Lieutenant von Enkefort, though his was no more than a graze. The

36 FRANCE, I 940

Engineer Battalion had constructed a number of pontoons in a small
harbour just off the canal, sufficient to build a bridge. However, they
had built the 8-ton type instead of the long i6-tonners, as the latter
.would have been too difficult to manoeuvre through the litter of submerged
or semi-submerged barges which was blocking the canal. The sappers
had already tried to blast a way through with explosives, but with little
success, due to the unwieldiness of the sunken barges.

Prospects did not look too good for the attack across the canal
Elements of the and Battalion, yth Rifle Regiment, had crossed in
rubber boats and were now located on the opposite bank in bushes close
to the canal. The battalion had not, however, as I had wished, extended
its hold deeper on the north bank and dug itself in, nor had it taken the
village of Givenchy. It had also omitted to clean up the enemy for a
few hundred yards along the north bank to the west, and to get anti
tank guns and heavy weapons across and dig them in. The fire protection
of the heavy company on the soutl\ bank was also inadequate. Things
were probably much the same with "the ist Battalion [which had gained a
bridge-head a little to the east}.

I now ordered 635th Engineer Battalion, which had newly been
placed under command, to construct a 1 6-ton bridge in the sector held
by Battalion Cramer near the demolished bridge at Cuinchy.

Then, under my personal direction, 2O-mm. A.A. guns and later a
Panzer IV were turned on the enemy snipers, who were maintaining a
most unpleasant fire from the left and picking off our men one by one.
I had every house from 300 to 600 yards west of 2nd Battalion s bridging
point demolished and the bushes swept with fire after which we had
some peace. I was able to see for myself how effective our fire had been
when we moved back again across the canal two days later. The British
had installed themselves in a lock-house from which, judging by the
number of empty cartridges I found there, they had maintained a steady
fire in the flank of my troops. A few of our shdls had wiped out the
occupants of the building. Numerous blood-covered bandages and the
body of a British soldier lay in the cellar.

While these nests were being engaged, and the sappers were con
structing a ramp on the northern bank and with great effort manoeuvring
across the first pontoons, a report came in that a strong force of enemy
tanks from La Bass6e had attacked the yth Rifle Regiment s eastern
bridge-head and thrown Battalion Cramer back across the canal The
enemy tanks, which included several British heavies, 1 were now standing
on the northern bank and spraying the southern bank with machine-gun
and shell fire. We could hear the enemy fire a few hundred yards away

*By " British heavies " Rommel evidently means the Matilda, Infantry Tank Mark
II, which weighed 26 tons and was also " heavy * in the sense of being slow compared
with the German medium tanks Panzer III (20 tons and 22 m.p.h.) and Panzer IV
(22 tons and 20 m.p.h.). But the British tank brigade was now reduced to one composite
company of sixteen tanks, which included only a single Mark II.

CLOSING THE TRAP 37

to our right and there was a grave danger that the enemy tanks would
push on to the west along the canal bank and attack the Battalion
Bachmann, which still had no anti-tank weapons, apart from anti-tank
rifles, on the northern bank, and also had no depth. If the enemy
exploited his chance, he could be at the western crossing point in a few
minutes.

The situation was extremely critical. I drove the sappers on to their
utmost speed and had the pontoons lashed roughly together, in order
to get at least a few guns and tanks across. With so many sunken barges
and other obstacles jammed in the canal, it was impossible for the bridge
to take a straight course, and its structure consequently had little strength.
As the first Panzer III lumbered across, several pontoons gave noticeably,
and it was touch and go whether or not the tank would slither bodily
into the canal. While it was crossing, I sent off a Panzer IV 50 yards
to the east along the high bank on our side of the canal, with orders to
open fire immediately On the enemy tanks attacking from La Basse.
The fire of this Panzer IV brought the leading enemy tank to a halt.
Shortly afterwards the Panzer III on the northern bank jofeed in, and a
few minutes later a howitzer which had been manhandled across. This
soon brought the enemy tank attack to a standstill.

Work was now started on strengthening the 1 6-ton bridge and before
long a steady flow of vehicles began to move one by one across it. First
to cross were field guns, anti-tank and 20 mm. anti-aircraft guns, then
elements of the 25th Panzer Regiment interspersed with an 88 mm. anti
aircraft battery. All this time, the 2nd Battalion of 7th Rifle Regiment
was extending its bridgehead north of the canal. Finally, with artillery
support, it took the commanding village of Givenchy. Battalion Cramer
was brought up in its wake to the western crossing point, where later the
whole Rifle Regiment crossed on foot to attack the enemy near Ganteleux.
This action resulted, towards midday, in a widening of the bridgehead
to the line Canteleux-Givenchy, and the capture, after a fierce resistance,
of a large number of British prisoners. The newly-won territory on the
north bank now steadily filled up with artillery and anti-aircraft guns.
At about noon Heidkaemper wirelessed that my presence was urgently
required at Divisional H.Q. as, by a Corps order, the 5th Panzer Brigade
(General Harde) had been placed under my command for the attack
on Lille. Soon after I arrived, General Harde came in with his regiment
commanders and reported the location, etc., of his brigade.

These were the tanks of the $th Panzer Division which, being one of the pre
war formations , had a Panzer brigade of two regiments, each of two tank battalions,
whereas Rommel s division had only one Panzer regiment of three battalions.
At the start of the campaign it had 324 tanks compared with Rommel* s 218.

I now drove off with General Harde to the bridge near Cuinchy,
which was finished by the time we arrived. Traffic across it was already
in full swing, although the steepness of the ramps at either end prevented

38 FRANCE, 1940

the flow from being very rapid. The rifle brigade was already across
on the north bank, but without its vehicles. The 25th Panzer Regiment
was standing ready to attack in the neighbourhood of Givenchy and a
large force of artillery and light and heavy A.A. was in position on the
northern bank. Several enemy batteries were maintaining an un
pleasantly heavy fire on our bridgehead position. The area held by our
forces on the northern bank was now far too constricted and I gave the
25th Panzer Regiment orders to widen the bridgehead by an attack on
Lorgies [2 miles north on the canal]. At about 15.00 hours, the 5th Panzer
Brigade began to move across the Cuinchy bridge. The steep angle of
the approaches prevented the crossing from proceeding as quickly as we
should have liked. Several of the heavy vehicles stuck on the ramps and
had to be towed off. I could not agree to General Harde s proposal that
in these circumstances the attack should be postponed, and gave orders
for the brigade to move off punctually at 18.00 hours with such of its
tanks as had then arrived on the northern bank.

The 25th Panzer Regiment had meanwhile made a long lunge
forward and reached the neighbourhood of Lorgies. During this advance,
the regiment had become involved in heavy and costly fighting against a
powerful defensive front, which they had finally succeeded in penetrating.
The enemy batteries, which had hitherto been dropping shells into our
bridgehead, now withdrew at top speed before the advancing German
tanks. The panzer regiment s attack moved on, and by its fire smashed
a visible breach in the enemy front, through which the division, reinforced
by Panzer Brigade Harde, then moved. With the tanks fighting their
way across country, progress was sufficiently slow for the infantry to
follow in extended order over a wide front. Soon Panzer Regiment
Werner on the right came up level and other units of 5th Panzer Brigade
followed them up. I was extremely impressed by the large numbers of
spick-and-span tanks which the 5th Panzer Brigade possessed, far larger
than the tank strength of my division.

Dusk was already far advanced when I reached a barn half a mile
east of Fournes and caught up with Rothenburg s command vehicle on
the road to Lille. Fighting in Fournes itself [10 miles south-west of Lille]
seemed to be already over. About half a mile away to the east, the
leading units of 5th Panzer Brigade could be seen in process of regrouping.
Despite the onset of night I now gave the 25th Panzer Regiment orders
to continue their attack and to close the western exit from Lille and the
road to Armentires. The regiment was to form a hedgehog in the
neighbourhood of Lomme [on tfie western edge of Lille] and await the arrival
of reinforcements which I would send them.

Rothenburg asked whether I would not like to accompany the attack
myself, but in view of the difficulty of handling the division in the situation
at that time I was forced to decline. Wireless was practically unusable
again and it seemed to me more important that I should detail the rest

CLOSING THE TRAP 39

of my force, personally if possible, to its positions round our final objective
at Lomme and see to it that they did in fact get there. I had also to
ensure that substantial reinforcements for the 25th Panzer Regiment
arrived by daybreak, and to organise their supply of ammunition and
petrol not an easy task. I wanted at all costs to avoid the Panzer
Regiment being placed a second time in the difficult situation in which
it had been outside Le Gateau.

\Vireless contact with General Harde proving impossible, I tried to
get orders to him via the divisional staff, to make an immediate advance
to Englos in the wake of the 25th Panzer Regiment. However, I was
unable to get the main body of the brigade on the move and the attack
on Englos had to proceed, first with only a company and later with a
battalion. It was unfortunately impossible for me to drive straight across
country in the darkness and deliver the orders myself, as my Gefechtsstqffel
was not fully equipped with cross-country vehicles. In any case, it would
have exposed us to the danger of being taken for a British scouting party
and fired on by one of the 5th Panzer Brigade s detachments of tanks
which were scattered about the country.

27 May 1940
DEAREST Lu,

I m very well. We re busy encircling the British and French in
Lille at the moment. I m taking part from the south-west. I m all
right for washing, etc. Guenther [Rommel 9 s batman} takes good care of
that. I ve taken a lot of photographs.

jth Panzer Division. 27-5-40

Adjutant.

MY DEAR FRAU ROMMEL,

May I be permitted to inform you that the Fuehrer has instructed
Lieut. Hanke to decorate your husband on his behalf with the
Knight s Cross. 1

Every man of the division myself particularly, who has the
privilege of accompanying the General knows that nobody has
deserved it more than your husband. He has led the division to
successes which must, I imagine, be unique.

*Note by Manfred Rommel. In the Second World War the following decorations for
gallantry were awarded :

(a) Iron Cross First and Second Class. (The First Class was mostly conferred on
officers.)

(b) German Cross in Gold. (Intermediate grade between the Iron Cross First
Class and the Knight s Cross; approx. 3,000 awarded.)

c) Knight s Cross to the Iron Cross. (1,500 to 3,000 awarded.)

d) Oakleaves to the Knight s Cross. (250 to 300 awarded.)

e) Oakleaves with Swords. (80 to 100 awarded.)

(i) Oakleaves with Swords and Diamonds. (Approx. 30 awarded.)
Later in the war these decorations were also awarded for command achievements.

4O FRANCE, 1940

The General is now up with the tanks again. If he knew that I
were writing you, gnddigste Frau, he would immediately instruct me
to send you his most heartfelt greetings and the news that he is
well.

I beg you to accept my apologies that I wiite impersonally on a
typewriter, but my arm is not yet well enough after my wound for
me to write legibly.

May I close with the kindest regards from all members of the
staff, and remain, meine gnddigste Fran,

Your obedient servant,

SCHRAEPLER

Meanwhile, Rothenburg had advanced through the night far to the
north. His path was marked by the glare of burning vehicles shot up
by his force. I now gave orders for the reinforced 6th and 7th Rifle
Regiments to be deployed in depth for defence of the newly- won territory.
37th Reconnaissance Battalion was to come forward to Fournes and
remain at my disposal. When the orders were out I went off to Fournes
to supervise their execution. Massive stone barricades and deep trenches
rendered movement through Fournes extremely difficult. Several convoys
had driven up abreast of each other, and it was some time before the
tangle could be straightened out. I had most of the convoys moved off
the road into the fields alongside, where they were to wait until an orderly
flow of traffic had been established. Amongst it all I found part of the
25th Panzer Regiment s petrol and ammunition column, to which I
gave instructions to move off to the side of the road and await my orders.
It was my intention to take these vehicles forward to 25th Panzer
Regiment in the latter part of the night, covered by 37th Reconnaissance
Battalion.

At about midnight I met the commander of the Reconnaissance
Battalion, Major Erdman, on the western outskirts of Fournes and told
him to expect an early alert and start next morning, the s8th May. I
then quartered myself with my immediate staff in a house on the western
outskirts of Fournes. At 01.40 hours \%8th May] a wireless signal came
in from Rothenburg to the effect that he had reached his objective near
Lomme. With this, Lille was sealed off to the west, and I immediately
had the Reconnaissance Battalion alerted and the Panzer Regiment s
petrol and ammunition column brought up to the north-west boundary
of Fournes, with the intention of pressing on to Lomme before morning
if possible. The whole convoy Reconnaissance Battalion and supply
column moved off at about 03.00 hours. After a detour to the west
to avoid Fort Englos, I decided to take the road through Enneti&res. In
the darkness we drove past large numbers of enemy lorries, armoured
vehicles and guns, mostly in the ditch, where they had apparently been
abandoned by their crews in panic. When, as dawn was breaking, we
found ourselves approaching the Lille-Armentiferes road with still no

CLOSING THE TRAP 41

sign of Rothenburg s tanks, we began to feel thoroughly uncomfortable,
for daylight was almost on us and any moment might find us under shell
fire. At last we found the first of our tanks. Rothenburg was delighted
at the increase in his strength in front of Lille, and even more over the
arrival of the ammunition and petrol. He reported briefly on the night s
fighting. The attack had first driven straight up the Fournes-Lille road.
Then, after crossing the railway, the regiment had swung north, shortly
afterwards coming up against enemy tanks and a strong motorised force.
The enemy tanks and lorries had been wiped out in a short but sharp
engagement, many of their crews seeking salvation in flight. The Panzer
Regiment had then pushed on to Lomme and occupied the western exits
from Lille.

I now regrouped the troops round Lomme into a planned defence.
Shortly afterwards fierce fighting developed at the western outlet from
Lille, with enemy units trying to break out to the west with tank and
artillery support.

Part of the Reconnaissance Battalion and a heavy company were now
placed on the defensive on either side of the Lille-Armenti&res road.
During the early hours of the morning, it seemed to us that the enemy
forces facing us west of Lille were growing steadily stronger and so I
sent out an urgent call for heavy artillery fire.

I now decided to pull 6th and yth Rifle Regiments out of their previous
positions south of Englos and Fournes and to incorporate them in the
general defence line north and south of Lomme.

Orders to this effect had just been issued, when a hail of shells
suddenly began to fall round the Panzer Regiment s command post,
which was also serving as Divisional H.Q. Even as they began we had
the feeling that they were our own shells, and immediately sent up green
flares. I tried to get to the radio to order the cease fire, but the fire was
so thick that it was not easy to reach the signals lorry, which was standing
behind the hoiise. There was no doubt that they were our own shells,
probably 150 mm., with whose effect we were only too familiar. I was
just making a dash for the signals vehicle, with Major Erdman running
a few yards in front, when a heavy shell landed close by the house door
near which the vehicle was standing. When the smoke cleared, Major
Erdman, commander of 37th Reconnaissance Battalion, lay face to the
ground, dead, with his back shattered. He was bleeding from the head
and from an enormous wound in his back. His left hand was still grasping
his leather gloves. I had escaped unscathed, though the same shell had
wounded several other officers and men. We continued to send up flares
and try by radio to get the fire stopped but it was a long time before
the last shell came down. We later discovered that the mistake had
been caused by inaccurate transmission of fire orders by an intermediate
signals point. The fire had come from the heavy battery of a neighbouring
division.

42 FRANCE, 1940

In blocking the roads running west from Lille, Rommel had helped to _ trap
nearly half the French First Army. After failing to break out, the trapped divisions
were driven to surrender on the 31*$.

Meanwhile, the bulk of the British, with what remained oj the French First
and Seventh Armies, had managed to reach Dunkirk-where a defensive bridgehead
had now been formed, and covered by a belt of inundations in the low ground. That
water-barrier proved a good protection except against the very harassing air attacks.
The defence held out long enough to enable 338,000 troops, including 120000
French, to be evacuated by sea to England between the 2 6thMayand the 4 th June
Only a few thousand were captured-belonging to the French rearguard which
valiantly covered the last stage of the embarkation. But during the three weeks
whirlwind campaign the Germans had taken over a million prisoners altogether, at
a cost to themselves of only 60,000 casualties. ^

The Belgian and Dutch Armies had been wiped off the slate. The French had
lost no divtions nearly one-third of their total strength, and including the most
mobile part of it. They had also lost the help of 12 British divisions, for although
tie personnel had escaped across the Channel, most of their equipment had been left
behind, and months would pass before they could be rearmed. Only 2 British
divisions remained in France, although 2 more that were not fully trained were now

Sent Itwas a grim situation that faced General Weygand, who had replaced Gamelin
as Allied Commander^Chief on the 20th May. He was left with 66 divisions,
mostly depleted, to hold a front that was longer than the original. The new front
ran from the sea, near Abbeville, along the Somme and the Aisne to link up with
the still untouched Maginot Line. Not much could be done to fortify this Weygand
Line " as it was called, in the very short time before the Germans struck afresh-
after bringing up the mass of their marching divisions, which had taken little
fiehting part in the first offensive. .

Rommefs division was given a few days 9 rest after its coup at Lille in cutting
off the French retreat to the sea. Then it moved south for the final stage of the
campaign.

29 May 1940

DEAREST Lu, . .

Now that the Lille fighting is over (we were again the first in front
of the western gates) we ve come out to rest behind the front.

On the 26th May, Lieutenant Hanke, acting for the Fuehrer,
ceremonially decorated me with the Knight s Cross and gave me the
Fuehrer s best regards. 3 \ hours later my division, with three Panzer
regiments under command, thrust against western Lille, which they
reached by midnight. An hour and a halPs sleep and I then took
fresh troops, with ammunition and petrol for the tanks, up to the front
line. Unfortunately one of my battalion commanders was killed by
our own fire.

Now we ll probably get a few days rest. Perhaps France will give

CLOSING THE TRAP 43

up her now hopeless struggle. If she doesn t we ll smash her to the last
corner. I m fine in every way. My very best wishes to you for your
birthday. There s a frightful lot to do. My Thuringians {the home
station of Rommel s division was in Thuringia] have lost a lot of equipment
on the road and in enemy tank attacks and this must be put right
as soon as possible. Meanwhile, we are making do with French guns.

2 June 1940
Ordered to the Fuehrer to-day. We re all in splendid form.

More to-morrow.

3 June 1940
The Fuehrer s visit was wonderful. He greeted me with the

words : " Rommel, we were very worried about you during the
attack." His whole face was radiant and I had to accompany him
afterwards. I was the only division commander who did.

4 June 1940
We re off again to-day. The six days rest has done a lot of

good and helped us to get our equipment more or less back into
shape.

The new move won t be so very difficult. The sooner it comes
the better for us. The country here is practically untouched by war.
It all went too fast. Would you cut out all the newspaper articles
about me, please. I ve no time to read at the moment, but it will
be fun to look at them later.

CHAPTER III

THE BREAK-THROUGH ON THE SOMME

5 June 1940 3.30 a.m.
DEAREST Lu,

To-day the second phase of the offensive begins. In an hour we
shall be crossing the canal [the Somme is canalised on this part]. We ve
had plenty of time and so everything, so far as can be foreseen, is well
prepared. I shall IDC observing the attack from well back in the rear.
A fortnight, I hope, will see the war over on the mainland. Masses
of post coming in every day. The whole world sending its con
gratulations. I ve opened nowhere near all the letters yet. There
hasn t been time.

The offensive was opened by Boctfs Army Group on the right wing, along the
Somme. Rundstedfs Army Group, facing the Aisne, did not join in until four days
later. Bock was given three of the five panzer corps; two of them, forming Kkisfs
group, were used for a pincer stroke on the Amiens-Pe ronne sector, while HotKs
corps stnick on the extreme right between Amiens and Abbeville. The two other
panzer corps were grouped under Guderian promoted after his decisive drive to
the Channel and were moved back eastward to the sector of the Aisne near Rethel,
south-west of Sedan. Each panzer corps consisted of two panzer divisions and one
motorised infantry division.

The extreme right wing thrust reached the Seine south of Rouen (70 miles
distant] during the night of the i8th June thanks largely to a swift cut-through
by RommeVs division after two days 9 tough fighting and got across the Seine on
the heels of the retreating troops. But the main right wing stroke, by Kleisfs
Panzer group, made slower progress and met increasingly stiff resistance as it
pushed in the direction of Paris. By contrast, Guderian s group made a rapid advance
after the Aisne had been crossed in the attack launched there on the gth June. So
Kleisfs group was switched eastward to back up the break-through on the Aisne,
which became the decisive stroke. For Guderian s group, turning south-east, raced
on to the Swiss frontier, thus cutting off the retreat of the French right wing in the
Maginot Line. By this time resistance was collapsing everywhere, and the French
had been driven to appeal for an armistice on the night of the i6th June,

5. CROSSING THE SOMME

Fig. i shows the position of the tank blocking the railway bridge.

Fig. 2 shows the junction of the Somme Canal and the River Somme.

Fig. 3 shows the shell burst. See photographs facing page 42.

46 FRANCE, 1940

While Guderiaris exploitation of the break-through on the Aisne had been
decisive, Rommel s thrust on the other flank had started the collapse. That fact adds
all the more significance to his account of the opening and development of the attack
across the Somme. His division operated as a spearhead in the crossing itself \ as
well as in the exploitation.

RoinmeVs stroke was launched on the sector between Longpre and Hangest.
Here there was a fiat and marshy " no-man s land" of nearly a mile between the
German position on the north bank of the Somme and the French position on the
slopes south of the river. Across the stretch ran two railway tracks, carried on
separate bridges over the river, then along embankments through the riverside
meadows, and over the Hangest-Longpre road by two more bridges.

The French had blown up the bridges which carried roads across the Somme
at Hangest and near Longpre, but not the two railway river-bridges nor even the
two railway r odd-bridges &gt; which lay so close to their own front. They paid heavily
for these omissions due originally to their own plans for taking the offensive. As
a deterrent to any belated attempt to demolish these bridges, Rommel kept them
under artillery and machine-gunfire by day and night prior to launching his attack
on the $th June, and succeeded in capturing all four intact early that morning.
Once the rails had been taken up, his tanks and other vehicles were able to pass
over the river and marshy belt with far less delay than if bridges and causeways
had had to be built.

To overcome such a multiple obstacle in this way was an extraordinary feat.
If the French had destroyed even the final pair of bridges, over the road, the capture
of the bridges over the river would have been of little avail. In a theoretical staff
exercise, what Rommel here achieved would hardly have been credited as a practical
possibility.

At about 04.15 hours I drove with Lieut. Luft and my signals staff
to the artillery command post, where we watched the opening of the all-
important attack across the Somme. The preparatory barrage, which
started punctual to the minute, made an extraordinarily impressive sight
from our excellent vantage point. The flash of our shell-bursts seemed
to be everywhere and there was little to be heard of enemy counter-fire.

This being so, we drove to 2nd Battalion 6th Rifle Regiment s bridging
point, where news reached us at about 05.00 hours that the railway and
road bridges had fallen intact into our hands. Part of the Engineer
Battalion was already hard at work on the railway bridge, unbolting
rails and clearing away sleepers, in order to prepare the way for the
division to cross with its vehicles. On the other side of the river, the
Rifle Regiment, under Colonel von linger, was moving smoothly forward.
We heard occasional short bursts of machine-gun fire. I now left my
signals vehicle on the north bank, giving the crew instructions to be the
first vehicle to cross, and walked over the Somme bridges with Lieutenant
Luft. The signals vehicle crossed at 06.00 hours, followed shortly
afterwards by artillery and anti-aircraft units and the 25th Panzer

THE BREAK-THROUGH ON THE SOMME 47

Regiment. The crossing went somewhat slowly, as there was still a
considerable number of rails and sleepers to be cleared away.

Meanwhile, I drove forward with my signal troop towards the
fighting. We had some difficulty in getting the vehicles up the steep
slopes, which were devoid of any kind of road or track. I walked a few
steps into the cornfield with Lieutenant Luft and L.-Cpl. Heidenreich
in order to observe the two battalions of 6th Rifle Regiment through the
glasses. We were a few hundred yards from our vehicle, when a French
soldier s head suddenly appeared out of the cornfield in front of us and
disappeared again as quickly.

Heidenreich walked across and found a wounded Frenchman, still
with a machine-gun beside him. Close by we found more French troops,
some dead, others wounded. Our barrage had apparently dealt heavily
with the enemy positions.

Meanwhile, the leading vehicles of the Panzer Regiment and the
artillery and anti-aircraft units were arriving on the steep slopes south
west of the Somme. Colonel Rothenburg, who had crossed with his
adjutant in advance of his regiment, received orders to follow up 6th
Rifle Regiment along a wide valley to a point behind Hill 116 where
they were to take up position for an attack on Le Quesnoy [5 miles beyond
the Somme}. French machine-gun fire several times forced us to take
cover during the briefing.

Traffic across the bridge had now ceased again. A Panzer IV had
shed its right track and was blocking the entire passage and preventing
any other tanks or vehicles from passing. Attempts were being made to
drag the tank bodily forwards, with little success as the sleepers were
jamming in the rubber rollers and pushing the ballast along in front of
them. A good half-hour was lost while the Panzer IV was pulled and
pushed across the bridge, by other tanks. Then the crossing gradually
began to move again.

By nine o clock the attack to the south-west had made good progress.
To eliminate the enemy force in Hangest, which had long been preventing
us from bridge-building there, a whole panzer battalion was launched
against the western outskirts of the village. Their orders were merely to
shoot up the enemy in the western outskirts, without becoming involved
in a fight for the village itself, which was to be cleaned up later by an
armoured engineer company which was being sent up for that purpose.
We watched the battalion approach closer and closer to the village and
very soon heard their fire. Then the tanks turned off up the hill to the
west, but only a few surmounted the topmost ridge. Most of them stuck
on the hill. This route up the steep side of the hill was not very well
chosen. The crews, who dismounted from their tanks, were suddenly
fired on by enemy machine-guns and suffered casualties in the coverless
terrain. Meanwhile, a detachment of self-propelled guns under Captain
von Fischer came up and bombarded the western outskirts of Hangest,

48 FRANCE, I94O

All other troops were directed into the bridgehead position with orders
to take up position in preparation for the forthcoming attack.

The cleaning up of Hangest was still giving a lot of trouble and I
finally put in the Motor-cycle Battalion under Captain von Hagen.
The battalion formed up in extended order for an attack on foot, and
was on the point of moving off when I drove back to them again to give
a further quick order to Captain von Hagen. Before I could do so, my
armoured command vehicle was fired on by machine-guns from Hangest.
The bullets clanged against its armoured walls but fortunately did not
penetrate, though direct hits were scored on the aerial and machine-gun
mounting. An N.C.O. in the 8-wheeIed armoured signals lorry behind
us was too slow getting his head down and was seriously wounded. The
enemy in Hangest continued to cover the road with fire for some time,
but finally the Motor-cycle Battalion attacked and reached its objective.

From 12 o clock onwards, heavy enemy artillery began to bombard
the area of our Somme crossing and shells fell thick and fast on both
sides of the road over which the division was slowly but steadily moving
forward. The hills west of the Somme and the hollows in which we were
forming up for the attack were also the target of intermittent heavy
shelling. Though casualties were light, the effect on morale of the heavy
gunfire was not inconsiderable. The bridgeheads west of the Somme
continued to fill with units of all arms and soon became overcrowded.

At midday, I was informed by Heidkaemper that the 5th Panzer
Division s attack would not be starting until 16.00 hours and that the
and Motorised Division had so far only gained 2,000 yards of ground.
In these circumstances I also ordered the attack to be resumed at 16.00
hours.

Orders were for the 25th Panzer Regiment to attack through the
6th Rifle Regiment to Le Quesnoy. The 37th Armoured Reconnaissance
Battalion, following behind the Panzer Regiment, was to protect the
rear of both its flanks, and to open fire in passing on all likely looking
woods on either side of the route. The yth Rifle Regiment was to follow
up in its carriers. The orders for the artillery and A.A. were first to
cover the division as it debouched from the assembly area and then to
leap-frog forward behind the moving attack. After the attack, the
territory which had been overrun was to be occupied by the infantry
and was to have artillery, anti-tank and anti-aircraft units positioned
in it in depth in such a manner that the maximum artillery support
could be provided against any attack, whether from the west, south or
east,

I was able to give these orders verbally, undisturbed by the enemy
artillery fire, which was still dropping intermittently into our territory.
At 1 6.00 hours sharp, the tanks moved to the attack. The various arms
worked in such perfect co-ordination that it might have been a peacetime
exercise. The French colonial troops opposing us, who were dug in in

THE BREAK-THROUGH ON THE SOMME 49

the small woods on the southern slopes of hills 116 and 104 with large
numbers of field and anti-tank guns, defended themselves desperately.
However, the tanks and Reconnaissance Battalion poured such a hail of
fire into the woods as they passed that the enemy fire was at first not too
heavy. I rode in my command vehicle with Luft near the rear of the
tank column and had good radio contact throughout with Heidkaemper
and the regiments. From time to time enemy fire clanged against the
vehicle s armoured sides and force4 us to get our heads down. In the
northern outskirts of Le Quesnoy a fierce battle developed. The Panzer
Regiment mopped up the enemy in its usual style, in spite of the fact
that they had installed themselves very skilfully round the outskirts of
the village.

This was particularly true of the wall round Chateau le Quesnoy,
which was held by a battalion of coloured troops. Stones had been
wrenched out all along the wall to make loopholes from which large
numbers of machine and anti-tank guns poured their fire into the
oncoming tanks. But even here they had no success, for the rapid fire of
our tanks, particularly the shells of the Panzer IVs, soon smashed the
enemy forces. While one battalion of tanks moved round Le Quesnoy
to the west, Rothenburg took the main body forward close alongside the
wall. The armoured cars, following up behind, then held the enemy in
check long enough to allow the leading infantry units to come up.

Firing and fighting without a break, the tanks rolled round both
sides of Le Quesnoy and came out on the wide and coverless plain to
its south. On they went through fields of high-grown corn. Any enemy
troops who were sighted were either wiped out or forced to withdraw.
Large numbers of prisoners were brought in, many of them hopelessly
drunk. Most of the prisoners were coloured troops. Our objective for
the day, as set by Corps, being the country east of Hornoy, I decided to
continue the attack at 19.25 hours through Montagne-le-Fayel and Gamps
Amienois. Orders were quickly issued. A large concentration of enemy
troops in the Bois de Riencourt was destroyed by the fire of the Panzer
Regiment s tanks as they drove past. Over to our left, a giant pillar of
smoke, belched up from a burning enemy petrol tanker and numerous
saddled horses stampeded riderless across the plain. Then heavy enemy
artillery fire from the south-west crashed into the division, but was unable
to halt its attack. Over a broad front and in great depth, tanks, anti
aircraft guns, field guns, all with infantry mounted on them, raced across
country east of the road. Vast clouds of dust rose high into the evening
sky over the flat plain.

A Corps order arrived refusing authority for the advance through
Montagne-le-Fayel [8 miles beyond the Somme~\ because of the danger the
division would run of attack by our own dive-bombers. I therefore gave
orders, verbally and by radio, for the advance to be halted and all units
to dig in in the area they had reached. This involved us in heavy fighting

5O FRANCE, 1940

against strong enemy forces, principally on our right flank. Enemy tanks
also put in an appearance, but they were soon disposed of either by the
88 mm. A.A. guns, the anti-tank guns, or the tanks. Enemy-held territory,
south and east, and also west of our position, was heavily shelled for some
time by every gun we could bring to bear, which took away their taste
for attack. At 2 1. 10 hours I passed back a message through the divisional
staff: " All quiet forward, enemy in shreds." Then I drove back to
headquarters.

I left headquarters very early next morning, the 6th June, with
Hanke as escort, to drive up to the commander of the 25th Panzer
Regiment, Heavy fighting had developed at several points late the
previous evening and during the night, against enemy tanks and coloured
troops. One A.A. battery had lost several 88 mm. guns in action against
enemy artillery. It was 09.00 hours before I could get the regiment and
battalion commanders together to brief them for the day s operations.

The attack began at 10.00 hours. We followed close behind the
Panzer Regiment. The division, in extended order, over a 2,ooo-yard
front and a depth of 12 miles, moved as if on an exercise. In this formation
we advanced up hill and down dale, over highways and byways straight
across country. The vehicles stood up to it well, even those which were
not meant for cross-country work. With the tanks clashing every so often
with enemy forces, the attack moved forward slowly enough for the
infantry to follow up and maintain close contact.

Hermilly was captured by men of yth Rifle Regiment after a fierce
fight. The Panzer Regiment moved on south over a broad front and
crossed the Caulieres-Eplessier road [20 miles beyond the Somme ] without
fighting. Several unsuspecting civilians driving down the road were
halted. Immense dust-clouds could be seen approaching in the rear, a
sign that 6th Rifle Regiment s troop carriers were coming up in area
formation.

On the ^th June Rommel swept forward more than 30 miles, a thrust which
split the French Tenth Army that was defending the sector from Amiens to the sea.
Two British divisions, the jzrf (Highland] and the xst Armoured, were in this
army the $ist being on the coastal flank.

At about nine o clock I left Divisional H.Q, at Camps with Schraepler
to drive via Poix to Eplessier. On the main road to Poix we met numerous
horse-drawn columns and guns of the 6th Division. Poix itself had
suffered considerably from bombardment, and sandbag barricades had
been constructed by the French on all the roads. However, there did
not seem to have been any serious fighting. The place was still burning
at many points.

In Eplessier I had a brief meeting with the Corps Commander. After
a few words of thanks and praise for the 7th Panzer Division s deeds
south of the Somme, and a brief explanation of future plans, General
Hoth gave his agreement to the attack which had been ordered for the

52 FRANCE, 1940

7th June. He even thought that it might be possible, with the existing
enemy situation, to thrust forward that day as far as Rouen.

We then drove on to Hill 184 south of Thieulloy la Ville, from which
point the left-hand column had been ordered to launch its attack at 10.00
hours. On the way we overtook the 6th Rifle Regiment and the 37th
Reconnaissance Battalion. At Point 184 I had another brief discussion
with Rothenburg and stressed the main points to be observed during the
day s advance; avoidance of villages most of which were barricaded
and all major roads; movement straight across country, thereby ensuring
a surprise appearance in the flank and rear of the enemy.

Such a general cross-country advance was rarely attempted by the Allied
armoured forces in 1944-45. Many of the delays they suffered might have been
avoided by fuller use of this method of movement.
The tanks moved off.

After some early delays, caused by mistakes in the route and too slow
correction from the map, the Panzer Regiment s attack flowed smoothly
forward.

The advance went straight across country, over roadless and trackless
fields, uphill, downhill, through hedges, fences and high cornfields. The
route taken by the tanks was so chosen that the less cross-country-worthy
vehicles of the 37th Reconnaissance Battalion and the 6th Rifle Regiment
could follow in their track-prints.

We met^no enemy troops, apart from a few stragglers, but plenty of
indications in the shape of military vehicles and horses standing in open
country that they had left shortly before our arrival. Four French soldiers
were picked up near Feuquieres. One of them, in spite of being severely
wounded, maintained his fire on our tanks right up to close quarters.
Fleeing civilians, and also troops, were on all the roads. Sometimes we
even surprised refugee lorries in open country, their occupants, men,
women and children, underneath the vehicles, where they had crawled
in mortal fear. We shouted to them, as we passed, to go back home.

East of Villers two enemy infantry guns and a light tank opened fire
on our tanks. They were quickly disposed of. Their crews, or those of
them who were still alive, fled into the wood.

From Bazancourt onwards our way led first along field paths and then
straight across country to the hills of Menerval, which we reached at
17.30 hours without any further fighting. In farms which we passed, the
people were hastily packing up, throwing bedding out of upper storey
windows into the yard, and would soon have been on the road if we had
not arrived.

In other farms carts stood packed high and ready harnessed; in others
again^ women and children took to their heels on sighting us and all our
shouting could not persuade them to return home. The only exception
was on Menerval Hill, where we found a farmer who had formerly been
a prisoner-of-war in Germany. He came up to us at once with his entire

THE BREAK-THROUGH ON THE SOMME 53

family, shook hands and went off to the cellar to fetch cider for the thirsty
German troops. He had, he said, got to know the Germans, and had no
fear of them.

While the 25th Panzer Regiment now took possession of the hills
round Menerval [45 miles beyond the Somme], the 37th Reconnaissance
Battalion was ordered to reconnoitre west and south-west as far as the
River Andelle [7 miles beyond Menerval], on either side of Sigy, and to get
its main force up to Mesangueville, as its next objective.

After satisfying myself that the Panzer Regiment had occupied the
important hills round Menerval, I drove to Captain Schultz s panzer
company, which had been ordered to thrust forward into the wooded
country west of Saumont as far as the main track intersection. The
appearance of German troops on the main road from Paris to Dieppe
near Saumont [near Forges-les-Eaux] had already sealed the fate of many
French vehicles. By the time I arrived well over 40 vehicles had been
picked up and traffic was still arriving from both directions. Panzer
Company Schultz had also had great success in the woods east of Saumont,
where a large ammunition depot had been captured. After fierce fighting
at some points, they had taken 300 prisoners in quick time, including
the supply staff of a French Army Corps, and captured 10 fighting vehicles
and 100 lorries. As we drove back along the main Dieppe- Paris road
we passed a German tankman bringing in a French tractor with a tank
trailing behind it. The young soldier s face was radiant, full of joy at
his success. We drove back to the new Division Headquarters, which had
been erected by the staff in Marcoquet. It was, as usual, difficult to
make our way back over the narrow, dusty roads, past the long approach
ing columns, and it was dark before we reached headquarters. When we
arrived we found the Intelligence Officer, Major Ziegler, interrogating
a number of French and British officers in the courtyard. Prisoners and
booty for that day were tremendous and mounting hourly. Our losses
were insignificant.

7 June
DEAREST Lu,

Your birthday was a thoroughly successful day. -We laid about
us properly. More and more signs of disintegration on the other side.
We re all very, very well. Slept like a top.

The Andelle was now held, thinly, by British troops. To meet the emergency
caused by the German break-through, an improvised force of nine infantry battalions
(made up from lines-of-communication troops] had been hastily stretched along a
6o-mile line from Dieppe to the Seine, to cover Rouen. It had no artillery and few
anti-tank guns but the ist Armoured Division, then refitting in rear, scraped up a
brigade with 90 tanks to support the centre of the line. Rommel pierced the Andelle
line next day at a point between the two main fractions of this armoured brigade

54 FRANCE, 1940

which then withdrew southward and succeeded in slipping across the Seine at Gaillon
before it was trapped.

On the 8th June, I called up the la at Corps shortly after 06.00 hours,
informed him of the position and made a proposal for the attack which
was planned on Rouen. I suggested that the yth Panzer Division should
push forward to a point some 4 miles east of Rouen and feign a direct
assault on the city by artillery fire, after which the mass of the division
would switch to the south-west with the object of seizing the Seine bridges
at Elbeuf [15 miles south-west of Rouen} by a coup de main and cutting off
the Seine bend.

After receiving the la s agreement, I drove quickly off with my escort
officers to Menerval church, where I instructed the commanders to meet
me at 08.30 hours for verbal briefing. To enable me to force the pace I
took the leading battalion under my personal command. We moved off
at 10.30 hours. Low-flying enemy air attacks on the battalion had little
success to show for their efforts : the defence was too strong. We drove
through the southern outskirts of Argeuil, finding no sign of enemy troops
in the town. Now the main body of the division received orders to move
off, and things went on fast as far as Sigy, where the Panzer Company,
which had meanwhile taken the lead, was met with enemy fire, to which
it gave an immediate and powerful reply.

During this brief engagement, the enemy blew the bridge over the
river Andelle. We had observed the whole action from a point a few
hundred yards away. The howitzer battery, which was close behind us,
was now quickly pulled up forward and brought into action in the open.
A motor-cycle company came up and anti-aircraft guns went into
position. . The roads were cleared and vehicles went into cover near a
railway embankment. Meanwhile, I reconnoitred the chances of getting
tanks across the river, and found a point 400 yards south of Sigy where
it could probably be forded. Part of the Panzer Company was im
mediately brought up and sent across the river in support of the infantry
who had already crossed to the other side.

Although there was over three feet of water near the eastern bank,
the first tanks crossed without any trouble and soon overtook the infantry.
However, when the first Panzer II attempted it, its engine cut out in
midstream, leaving the crossing barred to all other vehicles. Meanwhile,
several British soldiers had waded across to us with their hands up, and, with
their help, our motor-cyclists started in to improve the crossing. Great
pieces of the demolished railway bridge near by were thrown into the
deepest part of the ford. Willows alongside the river were sawn down
and similarly used to improve the passage across the ford. One of the
Panzer Ills which had already crossed was brought back to tow out the
Panzer II.

At that moment I received a wireless signal saying that Lieut. Sauvant s
reconnaissance troop had succeeded in preventing enemy preparations

THE BREAK-THROUGH ON THE SOMME 55

to blow the road and railway bridges in Normanville. Sauvant had both
bridges ^ firmly in his hands and was creating a bridgehead across the
river with his reconnaissance troop.

At this good news, I at once broke off the action at Sigy and switched
all forces south at top speed to cross the Andelle at Normanville. The
division s assault group crossed the bridge and continued the advance to
the west. ^ Sigy was taken from the west at 14.00 hours with the capture
of 100 British prisoners.

The route we now took by-passed, as far as possible, aU villages.
Good results had been achieved in the past few days by attacking away
from the roads. The 25th Panzer Regiment s attack started punctually.
At first we found no enemy troops in the small villages through which we
passed. After some time we discovered that enemy dispatch riders and
cars were suddenly travelling in our tank column. Here and there we
heard isolated shots.

Towards 20.00 hours, one company of the Panzer Regiment was
dispatched down the Rouen road to take the crossroad 5 miles east of
the city and provide protection for the artillery and anti-aircraft units
which were being sent there. My intention was to cause alarm among the
enemy forces round Rouen by firing a long-range barrage, and thereby
deceive them as to my true plans, which were to seize the Seine bridges
at Elbeuf later that evening. The Panzer Company arrived at the cross
road by 20.00 hours, but the left-hand column did not come as well
forward as I would have liked the tail of the column had apparently
become involved in fighting around Martainville and we were con
sequently unable to get a quick deployment of the heavy artillery and
anti-aircraft guns round the crossroad.

This seems to have been a brush with the tail of the British scratch force,
which was retreating southward across Rommel s line of advance. The way he
had repeatedly encountered British forces during this fast short campaign, and the
way their tracks crossed his, was a foreshadowing of future years.

With the day slowly fading, I waited in vain for the column to come
up, until eventually part of the yth Rifle Regiment came through.
Apparently the right-hand column had also become involved in fighting
and sometimes the noise of battle came so dangerously close that we
were forced to leave the road and take to the bushes. Then prisoners
began to be brought in from all sides and occasional enemy vehicles
were discovered in concealed parking places. At long last, just before
total darkness, a message came in that the right-hand column had arrived
at the cross road 5 miles east of Rouen and established contact with the
left-hand column. We now drove off quickly to the 25th Panzer Regiment
to give orders for the thrust to the Seine bridges. About 15 minutes later,
the left-hand column, consisting of the 25th Panzer Regiment and the
yth Motor-cycle Battalion, moved off as vanguard on the march to the
Seine. We rode with the signals troop close behind the Panzer Regiment.

56 FRANCE, I94O

Soon it was conipletely dark. We passed a stranded enemy tank, which
appeared to have4ost a track and been abandoned by its crew.

While crossing the main road from Rouen to Pont St. Pierre in the
eastern outskirts of Boos, the tail of the 25th Panzer Regiment s column
was fired on at a range of about 100 yards, by an enemy tank or anti
tank gun. Probably the tank crews were unable to hear the gunfire and
bursting shells above the noise of their engines, for at the end of a minute
not one of our tanks had replied and the whole column was still proceeding
steadily on its way to the south-west. The enemy gun was thus able to
loose off some ten or fifteen rounds at us without being fired on in reply.
It was extraordinary that none of our tanks was hit. To make the tank
crews aware of this threat to their right flank, I sent orders to the com
mander of the nearest armoured car to open fire on the enemy with
tracer. This soon brought the tanks into action and silenced the enemy
gun. Then we went on our way through the night.

We had great difficulty in the darkness and with our inadequate maps
in following the route. The noise of our passage as we drove through
villages wakened people from their sleep, and brought them rushing out
into the street to welcome us as British. We drove past an enemy anti
aircraft battery. There was still light in the guardroom and the sentries
paid us honours as we passed. It was not until next morning that we
discovered that several anti-aircraft guns had stood ready for action a
few yards away. We turned south at Les Authieux and reached the
village of Sotteville at midnight the first German troops to reach the
Seiner

Tank brakes ground and screeched on the winding road. An occasional
light flared up on the other side of the river. Lights were also burning at
several points along the railway line running through the Seine valley.
There were no enemy troops to be seen and everything looked set for
the success of our dash for the Seine bridges. They were only nine
miles away.

Radio communication had failed the usual business at night time
and we had long been out of touch with the divisional staff and our other
columns. The tank column, rolled closer and closer to Elbeuf down the
Seine valley. As we drove under a railway bridge a woman rushed out
of a house on the right of the road, ran over to my staff car, and catching
me by the arm, asked anxiously if we were British. She was sadly dis
appointed at the reply. I now had the Panzer Regiment halted and
the Motor-cycle Battalion, reinforced by five Panzer Ills, brought up
into the lead past it. The motor-cyclists were to go on ahead and send
out storming parties, each supported by several tanks, to seize the two
bridges across the Seine at Elbeuf. They were then to keep a firm grasp
of the bridges and hold them open. It took some time to filter the
battalion forward past the Panzer Regiment and form it up with its
tanks. We were still out of touch with the rest of the division.

THE BREAK-THROUGH ON THE SOMME 57

The clock now crept on to 01.30 hours as we waite&lt;4 tensely for news
of the storming parties. They must have long ago Cached the Elbeuf
bridges. Shortly after two I started for Elbeuf at the head of the 25th
Panzer Regiment to see for myself how the enterprise had gone. I knew
that dawn would be on us in ij-s hours and that it might then be
inadvisable to be caught standing in column on the Seine valley road,
for the enemy probably had artillery in position on the south bank of
the Seine. I therefore wanted to get the main body of my troops at all
costs on to the hills on one side or the other of the Seine by dawn.

In Elbeuf, we found a wild confusion of our vehicles in the narrow
streets north of the Seine and I was forced to go forward on foot to get
to the head of yth Motor-cycle Battalion. There I found that the storming
parties had still not yet made their attempt on the bridges, although the
battalion had already been in Elbeuf well over an hour. I was informed
that when the battalion had entered Elbeuf, they had found the bridges
carrying a lively traffic of civil and military vehicles. An officer also told
me that there had already been shooting near the bridges.

The situation was confused and prospects of success were pretty slim
now that the battalion had stood in the town for a whole hour only a
few hundred yards away from the bridges. But there might still be a
chance, I thought, and I gave the battalion commander orders to launch
his assault on the two bridges immediately. Under cover of the darkness
I took myself up closer to the bridge. Civilians stood around in the streets
and there were sandbag barricades at the crossroads, on one of which lay
a dead French soldier. More valuable minutes slipped by while the
storming parties were "forming up. At last the first party moved off; it
was shortly before 03.00 \$th June]. But they never reached the bridge,
for the enemy blew it before they had gone a hundred yards. The same
happened a few minutes later with the second storming party. Further
heavy detonations followed from west and east, from close at hand and
farther distant. The French had blown all the Seine bridges.

I was extremely angry over the failure of our enterprise. I had no
idea where the main body of the division was. We had behind us the
many enemy-held villages we had driven through during the night, and
as dawn broke saw two captive observation- balloons in the sky near
Rouen. It was beginning to look as though we were in for a fight. I
therefore decided to pull back out of the elongated peninsula into which
we had advanced. The troops moved off quickly. Fortunately, the
Seine basin lay shrouded in mist and we had no need to fear enemy
fire from the opposite bank.

9 June 1940

DEAREST Lu,

Two glorious days in pursuit, first south, then south-west. A
roaring success. 45 miles yesterday.

58 FRANCE, I94O

10 June 1940 5 a.m.

We ll soon be at the sea between the Somme and the Seine. I m
in fine form although I m on the go the whole time. Our successes
are tremendous and it looks to me inevitable that the other side
will soon collapse.

We never imagined war in the west would be like this. There s
been no post from you for several days.

The division now began to clean up the territory we had overrun.
Rouen had meanwhile fallen to the 5th Panzer Division. Late that
afternoon my division was instructed to prepare for a thrust to Le Havre,
and the confirming Corps order arrived in the evening. The plan was
for us to make a quick thrust through to the coast in order to cut off
the escape of two or three British and French infantry divisions and one
or two tank battalions through the port of Le Havre. The 25th Panzer
Regiment now received orders to move first into the district south-west
of Pissy. The Armoured Reconnaissance Battalion was to occupy the
eastern outskirts of Yvetot [22 miles north-west of Rouen] as soon as possible
and then probe towards the sea. I intended to follow up the Recon
naissance Battalion with the mass of the division as quickly as possible
and then thrust on to the sea.

This meant that, after reaching the Seine, Rommel had to make a right-angled
turn to the north-west, after his south-westerly drive from the, Somme to the Seine.
At 07.30 hours [loth June] I drove round the north of Rouen to
Barentin, giving orders by radio on the way for the division to join up
with me. Road demolitions were reported by the Reconnaissance
Battalion east of Yvetot. They were also repeatedly reporting the
capture of British prisoners both with and without vehicles. A civilian,
who maintained that he had left Le Havre at five o clock that morning,
was brought to me for interrogation. To my questions, which were
interpreted to him by a French-speaking officer, he replied that on the
previous day he had seen only a few British soldiers sitting about in
cafes, and no formations or units. The roads had been prepared for
demolition at various points a week before, but they were not mined,
and it was possible to zig-zag past the obstructions. The man, who said
he wanted to get through to Paris, gave the impression of being reliable.
So it seemed that there was no need for the moment to worry about
an enemy threat from Le Havre. I had the man s statement passed back
by wireless. After filling up with petrol, the Panzer Regiment moved
off to Yvetot at 09.20 hours; at the same time I gave the Reconnaissance
Battalion orders to reconnoitre immediately up towards Veulettes [on
the coast, 20 miles north of Tvetof],

These orders had just been issued, when a radio signal came in from
Major Heidkaemper informing us that a powerful enemy motorised
column had been reported moving west out of the forest north of St.

British and French prisoners at St. Valery. June nth, 1940. [Rommel* sown photograph]

The surrender at St. Valery. Extreme right, General Fortune, commander of the $ist
Highland Division. The bareheaded figure is the liberated Luftwaffe pilot referred to in
the text. [Photograph taken with RommeUs camera"}

.IT",

Rammers letter to his wife, June sist, 1940
[See page 85]

THE BREAK-THROUGH ON THE SOMME 59

Saens, and that, by all calculations, this force must be just about arriving
at Yvetot. The Reconnaissance Battalion was accordingly given orders
to close the main St. Saens- Yvetot road immediately and to open fire as
early as possible on the enemy force moving down it. I also had one
heavy and one light A.A. battery brought up past the Panzer Regiment,
and drove off with them at high speed towards Yvetot. I arrived at the
road fork east of the town shortly before 10.00 hours and the A. A. batteries
came in one after the other a few minutes later. They went straight into
position at top speed and received orders to lay down a heavy fire on the
road, on which a large number of enemy vehicles could already be seen.

When the Panzer Regiment appeared in sight of Yvetot at about
10.30 hours, I had the Reconnaissance Battalion launched against the
crossroad two miles east of Ourville, closely followed over the same road
by the Panzer Regiment. I positioned my signals troop immediately
behind the first tanks. All other units of the division received orders by
radio to make a further quick move forward. There were now two
columns driving up the road, sometimes side by side, the tanks on the
left and the Reconnaissance Battalion on the right. Wherever the ground
was in any way suitable, the tanks took a track alongside the road. The
division now went all out for the sea at an average speed of 25-40 m.p.h.
I had already issued orders through H.Q. for all units to increase their
speed to the maximum. No enemy force worthy of our notice had so
far been sighted.

As we approached the main Cany-Fecamp road a dispatch rider from
the Reconnaissance Battalion reported that Captain von Luck had found
enemy lorry columns on the main road and was rounding them up. We
at once drove up to the road to find that while single enemy vehicles
had already got away to the west, there were others halted on the road
to the east. It had every appearance of being a considerable formation.
I at once gave orders to the leading tanks, which were just then arriving,
and the armoured cars and light A.A. guns to open fire immediately on
the enemy standing on the road. After a short time large numbers of
British and French troops came running along the road to us. A quick
interrogation revealed that it was the beginning of 3ist French Division,
which was to have embarked at Fecamp that afternoon. There were also
some scattered British troops among them. The enemy column was
quickly broken up and, while armoured cars and A.A. guns took the
road beyond them under fire, the van of the division moved on again
at high speed to the sea. With my signals section I drove on in advance
of the regiment through Les Petites Dalles and down to the water [10
miles east of Fecamp, and 6 miles west of Veulettes].

The sight of the sea with the cliffs on either side thrilled and stirred
every man of us; also the thought that we had reached the coast of
France. We climbed out of our vehicles and walked down the shingle
beach to the water s edge until the water lapped over our boots. Several

6o FRANCE, 1940

dispatch riders in long waterproof coats walked straight out until the
water was over their knees, and I had to call them back. Close behind
us Rothenburg came up in his command tank, crashed through the
beach wall, and drove down to the water. Our task was over and the
enemy s road to Le Havre and Fecamp was closed.

Shortly afterwards the Brigade Commander, Colonel Fuerst, arrived
with the commander of a French artillery regiment and several French
officers. The French colonel was extremely impressed by the speed of
our advance, but beyond that there was nothing to be had out of him.

A report now came in from the Reconnaissance Battalion to the
effect that they were under heavy enemy pressure on the hill east of
Fecamp. After briefly discussing the essentials of the situation with
Heidkaemper, I drove off to Fecamp, to find that the Reconnaissance
Battalion had meanwhile succeeded in getting the situation under control.
A storming party under the command of Lieut. Sauvant had captured
a coast defence battery which had been heavily shelling the battalion.
We drove on towards the captured battery, but left our vehicles and
walked the last 200 yards, as enemy guns were still firing from the
western side of the town and the hills to its south. From the captured
gun position we had an excellent view over the town and harbour, which
apparently still contained strong enemy forces.

With the arrival of the two panzer companies and the Motor-cycle
Battalion which had been sent to the aid of the Reconnaissance Battalion,
I decided to push forward through the eastern outskirts of Fecamp to
the hills south of the town, I wanted to prevent the enemy units still
in the town from escaping to the south, and to get possession of the port
at the earliest possible moment. This move led to a number of clashes
with the enemy and we were more than once forced to change our plan.
Finally, we bore off through Tourville with the intention of making a
quick run up the main road from the south to St. Leonard. We had no
time to lose, for it was already 22.00 hours. During the descent to Tour
ville, we received a tremendous welcome from the people of a workers
settlement, who apparently took us for British. Just south of Tourville,
we drove through a road-block at the same moment as some British
motor-cyclists rode up to it from the direction of t camp. The British
stared a moment, then swung round and made off back as fast as they
could go. The crew of my command car wanted to open fire, but I
stopped them, because we were, for one thing, very short of time and,
even more important, it would have given away our detour to the
enemy around us and raised the alarm. A civilian whom we met on the
road pointed north and said there were still plenty of British troops to
be found up there. Shortly afterwards the leading tank fired a few
rounds from its gun. I had no idea of the cause and, hearing no enemy
fire, walked up forward, to find that the fire had been aimed at an enemy
road-block. With less than an hour to darkness, and a pitch-black night

THE BREAK-THROUGH ON THE SOMME 6l

ahead I could no longer enter into a slow probe forward but was com
pelled to demand that the tanks plunge forward at their top speed to St.
Leonard, either on the road or alongside it. I led them myself for some
way along the darkening village street. Not a shot was fired. Out in the
open country again, we saw that the British had driven their vehicles off
the road and concealed themselves behind bushes and hedges. A few
of them were winkled out and taken along by the infantry and tanks
following up behind. We had no time to halt, however, but pushed
quickly on to St. Leonard. The motor-cyclists behind us had a short
but successful clash with the British.

Captain von Hagen now received orders to occupy both roads from
Fecamp leading south through St. Leonard with six tanks, bar them to
traffic and establish an all-round defence. This was achieved without
fighting. A bad traffic jam occurred on the road, however, when the
motor-cyclists started to filter past both panzer companies just as the
latter were turning for the trip back. I had given the panzer companies
orders to return to their regiment that night once the Motor-cycle
Battalion had reached St. Leonard. Knowing that it might be extremely
important for me to be at Division H.Q. early next morning, I decided to
drive back with the tanks.

We began the return journey at 23.00 hours. With the road still
solidly blocked by the Motor-cycle Battalion, only one panzer company
could leave with us. We drove behind the third tank. On the way we
passed a number of enemy vehicles, which had apparently driven into
the Motor-cycle Battalion s convoy in the darkness; their crews had been
taken prisoner. Some of them looked as though they had put up a fight
for it first. Suddenly anti-tank gunfire opened from a village just ahead,
and the leading tank was hit in a track. The enemy gun then began to
fire rapid along the road close over our heads. Without replying to the
fire, the tanks in front of us drove straight up on the embankment on
both sides of the road. The leading tank remained where it had been hit.
My vehicle was now left standing only 150 yards away from the enemy
gun, with round after round whistling a hairsbreadth overhead not a
comfortable situation. When, after two or three minutes of this our tanks
had still not opened fire, I jumped down from my vehicle and ran to the
Panzer II standing on the embankment left of the road, where I also
found the commander of the leading tank. I told him what I thought
of him for not having opened fire immediately and for having left his
tank. Then I ordered the Panzer II to open fire at once, with both tank-
gun and machine-gun, on the enemy anti-tank position, in order to
give the whole column a chance of getting away to the left out of the
cutting through which the road ran at this point.

When fire was at last opened, the Panzer IPs 20 mm. shells and
tracer ammunition caused such a firework display that the enemy ceased
fire, as I had expected. We now managed to get my command truck up

62 FRANCE, 1940

the embankment, but it was too steep for the staff car and the armoured
cars and dispatch riders, and so I sent them back to spend the night with
the Motor-cycle Battalion.

Then we drove off with the Panzer Company. It was no easy task
in the pitch black night to find our way across country, in which we
might at any moment run into another enemy force, and required the
utmost vigilance,

jj June igqp
DEAREST Lu,

Over 60 miles in the pursuit yesterday, reached the sea west of
Dieppe and cut off several divisions (French and British). Took two
ports, overcame batteries, bombarded warships some severely
damaged. I didn t get back this morning until 3 a.m. To-day we re
bathing and sleeping.

Next day \iith June] the division moved ouLof Veulettes at about
noon, with the Panzer Regiment and part of 6th Rifle Regiment, to
advance along the coast to St. Valeiy. [This is St. Valery~en-Caux&gt; 6 miles
east of Veulettes and 20 miles west of Dieppe.] I took my Gefechtsstqffel and
drove with the Panzer Regiment. On the hills a mile east of Veulettes
the enemy met us with heavy artillery and anti-tank gunfire, and we
bore off to the south-east. But the enemy fire grew in violence and
heavy batteries joined in, so that all movement was frequently pinned
down. Every lull in the fire was used to drive closer to the enemy. The
rifle company, which was equipped with armoured troop-carriers, did
not, however, follow up the attack, which the 25th Panzer Regiment,
despite the enemy fire, carried closer and closer to the enemy. Near Le
Tot the British had built a fortified line and resistance was heavy. So
tenacious was the enemy defence that hand-to-hand combat developed
at many points. Meanwhile, the 25th Panzer Regiment had thrust
forward to the high ground immediately north-west of St. Valery and was
using every gun to prevent the embarkation of enemy troops. We drove
up as far as the Panzer Regiment with the Gefechtsstaffel and then walked
some distance farther on to get a look at the situation round St. Val&y.
British troops could be seen moving about among the port installations
and there were more troops with guns and vehicles in the northern part
of the town.

Elements of the Panzer Regiment and dispatch riders of my staff
did their best to summon the enemy, who were now only a few hundred
yards away, to give themselves up. In the course of the next few hours
we did, in fact, succeed in persuading about a thousand men to surrender*
in the northern part of St. Val&y, including many officers. Most of them
were French and there were comparatively few British. Among the
latter there was one naval officer who had spent a long time haranguing

THE BREAK-THROUGH ON THE SOMME 63

his men on the mole and apparently succeeded in dissuading them from
surrendering. Finally, we opened up on this officer with machine-guns
from the cliff about 200 yards away, without, as we found later, hitting
him. For half an hour he lay as if dead behind a heap of stones, but
then decided it was better to surrender. He spoke fluent German and,
when accused by Major Schraepler of being to blame for so many of
his men being wounded, replied: " Would you have acted differently
in my situation? 5J1

That evening I sent a large number of German-speaking prisoners
into St. Valery itself, which was still full of enemy troops, to call on them
to surrender by 21.00 hours and march under cover of white flags to the
hills west of St. Valery. It was mainly the British, though there were
some French officers also, who turned down all idea of capitulation and
sent our negotiators back empty handed. They kept their men hard at
it building barricades and getting large numbers of guns and machine-
guns into position all round St. Valery and especially in the port area.
Probably the British were hoping to resume their embarkation during
the night.

In these circumstances, therefore, the concentrated fire of the division,
including the Panzer Regiment and the Reconnaissance Battalion, which
had been brought up in the meantime, was unleashed at 21.00 hours.
A Panzer IV smashed the strong barricade on the mole, in which numerous
guns had been positioned, and left it in flames. Fires were soon blazing
everywhere. After a quarter of an hour, I had the whole division s fire
directed on to the northern part of the town, where, as we saw next day,
the effect was particularly devastating. The tenacious British, however,
still did not yield.

Pespite the violence of the fighting that afternoon, the division s
casualties had been small. One very sad loss was Major Kentel, one of
the 25th Panzer Regiment s battalion commanders, who had been
mortally wounded by a shell splinter. Meanwhile, the infantry had
arrived on the hills west of St. Valery and at nightfall the tanks were
withdrawn from the forward line, and light and heavy A.A. guns went
into position. The infantry were ordered to maintain a harassing fire all
night to prevent the enemy embarking his troops.

After returning to my H.Q., I discussed the situation with Heid-
kaemper. There was good reason to expect that the enemy would attempt
a break out in strength during the night, either to the west or south-west.
Heidkaemper had prudently^ taken all necessary counter measures to
meet this, but it was doubtful whether they could be effective in time.
To satisfy myself that a break-out attempt could be held, I drove off at
lf rhis officer has been identified by the Admiralty as Commander (now Rear-Admiral)
R. F. Elkins, C.V.O., O.B.E., at that time Naval Liaison Officer with 5ist (Highland)
Division. He figures on the extreme left of the top photograph taken by Rommel page
58. He did not long remain a prisoner, however, but escaped four days later and was
back in England by the end of June, 1940.

64 FRANCE, 1940

06.30 hours next morning, the 1 2th June, to the threatened sectors of the
front. Driving across country, I saw troops everywhere entrenched in
depth. Anti-tank and anti-aircraft units were also in position. To enable
me to deal with any break-out attempt quickly and effectively, I gave
orders at 07.00 hours for the main body of the Panzer Regiment to move
off immediately and remain at my disposal.

After visiting the Rifle Regiments, I was informed by radio that the
enemy were attempting to make their way out in small boats under
cover of warships to a number of transports which were lying one to
two thousand yards offshore east of St. Valery.

At about 10.00 hours the Panzer Regiment reached its old position
of the previous day, where a violent duel had meanwhile taken place
between an 88 mm. A. A. battery and an enemy warship, in which two
of our guns had been lost by direct hits. About 1,000 yards north-east
of St. Valery an enemy transport was just steaming out to sea. Our A. A.
battery had ceased fire. I at once had fire reopened on the enemy
transport from an 88 mm. gun close by, although the mounting of this
gun had been hit and it no longer stood firmly on all four feet. The crew
worked splendidly and shells were soon falling hard by the ship. However,
the damage to the mounting made it impossible to apply the necessary
corrections. Meanwhile, the gun had come under fire from a British
auxiliary cruiser lying 1,000 yards off shore. A smoke screen which I
had laid to cover the gun from the warship s fire, proved very effective.
Our gun crew, however, had no success with the enemy transport. Dive-
bombers had already been called up by radio. Shortly afterwards I met
a forward observer from a 100 mm. battery and instructed him to take
the enemy auxiliary cruiser under fire immediately. At 10.40 hours the
ship was set alight by several hits, and beached by her crew.

Meanwhile, I had brought up my Gefechtsstaffel past the wood north
west of St. Valery as far as the first houses of the town. Rothenburg had
orders to take the Panzer Regiment down the roads leading into the
valley, steadily closer to the town, which was still burning at many
points. The tanks, concealed by the undergrowth, rolled slowly down
the narrow winding roads, nearer and nearer to the first houses, until
finally they entered the western quarter of the town. I went on foot
beside the tanks with Colonel Rothenburg and Lieut. Luft and we
reached the western mole of the inner harbour without fighting. Fifty
to a hundred yards away from us on the opposite side stood a number
of British and French soldiers, irresolute, with their rifles grounded. Close
beside them were numerous guns, which appeared to have been damaged
by our bombardment. Fires were blazing all over the farther side of the
town and there was war material lying about everywhere, including large
numbers of vehicles. The Panzer Regiment s tanks rolled on steadily
yard by yard to the south, with their guns traversed east, past rows of
captured vehicles parked on the western side of the harbour. Meanwhile,

THE BREAK-THROUGH ON THE SOMME 65

we tried to persuade the enemy troops facing us to lay down their arms
and walk across a narrow wooden bridge towards us. It was some minutes
before the British could bring themselves to it. At first they came across
singly, with long intervals between each man, then gradually the file
began to thicken. Our infantry now went across to the other side to
receive British and French prisoners on the spot.

While the tanks were moving round the southern side of the harbour
towards the eastern quarter of the town, I followed the infantry across
the narrow bridge to the market square. The town hall and many
buildings round it were either already burnt out or still burning.
Barricades, which the enemy had constructed out of vehicles and
numerous guns, had also felt the effect of our fire. French and British
troops were now streaming in from all sides to the market square,
where they were formed up into columns and marched off to the west.
The infantry were cleaning up the town house by house and street by
street.

Shortly afterwards an N.C.O. reported to me that a high ranking
French general had been taken prisoner on the eastern side of the town
and was asking to see me. A few minutes later the French General Ihler
came up to me wearing an ordinary plain military overcoat. His escort
officer fell to the rear as he approached. When I asked the General
what division he commanded, he replied in broken German: "No
division. I command IX Corps.*

The General declared himself ready to accept my demand for the
immediate capitulation of his force. He added, however, that he would
not have been standing there surrendering if his force had had any
ammunition left.

The General s aide-de-camp, who spoke German, told us that the
number of divisions involved was five, including at least one British.
I now required the Corps Commander to return to his headquarters and
issue orders, through his own command channels, for his troops to
surrender and march off immediately with prominent white flags in the
direction of St. Valery. I wanted to ensure that our troops were able to
see from a distance that the enemy had laid down their arms.

I then requested the General to present himself with his staff in the
market square of St. Valery and agreed to his request that he should be
allowed his own vehicle and kit. Orders were issued to the artillery to
cease all fire on St. Valery and district and to fire only on shipping. The
5th Panzer Division, which had been reported in action at 11.40 hours
against enemy tanks in the neighbourhood of Manneville [2 miles south
east of St. Valery], was notified of the enemy surrender at St. Valery,
During the next few hours no less than twelve Generals were brought
in as prisoners, among them four dhisional commanders. A particular
joy for us was the inclusion among them of General Fortune, commander
of the 5 ist British Division, and his staff. I now agreed divisional

boundaries with my neighbour, General Cruewell, commander of the
2nd Motorised Division. Meanwhile, the captured Generals and staff
officers had been assembled in a house south of the market place. A
German Luftwaffe lieutenant, who had just been liberated from captivity,
was made responsible for the guard. He was visibly delighted by the
change of role.

Particularly surprising to us was the sangfroid with which the British
officers accepted their fate. The General, and even more, his staff
officers, stalked round laughing in the street in front of the house. The
only thing that seemed to disturb them was the frequent photographing
and filming they had to endure by our Propaganda Company and some
other photographers.

The captured generals were now invited to an open air lunch at a
German field kitchen, but they refused with thanks, saying that they still
had supplies of their own. So we ate alone. There were still arrangements
to be made for transporting away the prisoners, especially the numerous
officers, for salvaging the equipment, securing the coast and evacuating
St. Val&y. At about 20.00 hours we returned to Divisional H.Q. at
Chateau Auberville.

It was impossible at that stage to estimate the total of prisoners
and booty. 12,000 men, of whom 8,000 were British, were transported
off by the 7th Panzer Division s vehicles alone. The total number of
prisoners captured at St. Valery is said to have numbered 46,000 men.

12 June 1940
DEAREST Lu,

The battle is over here. To-day one corps commander and four
division commanders presented themselves before me in the market
square of St. Valery, having been forced by my division to surrender.
Wonderful moments ! "

14 June 194.0

On to Le Havre and inspected the town. It all went without
bloodshed. We re now engaging targets out to sea with long-range
artillery. Already set one transport alight to-day.

You can imagine my feelings when is Generals of the British
and French Armies reported to me and received my orders in the
market place of St. Val&y. The British General and his division
were a particular source of joy. The whole thing was filmed and will
no doubt be in the news reels.

Now we re getting a few days rest. I can t think that there ll be
any more serious fighting in France. We ve even had flowers along
the road in some places. The people are glad that the war is over
for them.

THE BREAK-THROUGH ON THE SOMME 67

16 June 134.0

Before setting off south this morning (05.30 hours) I received your
dear letter of the roth, for which my heartfelt thanks. To-day we re
crossing the Seine in the second line and will, I hope, get a good step
forward on the southern bank. With the fall of Paris and Verdun,
and a wide break-through of the Maginot Line near Saarbruecken,
the war seems to be gradually becoming a more or less peaceful
occupation of all France. The population is peacefully disposed, and
in some places very friendly.

CHAPTER IV

PURSUIT TO CHERBOURG

After a brief pause lo rest and reorganise, Rommel s division was switched
back to the Seine south of Rouen. Crossings had been made there on the gth June,
on the heels of the French Tenth Army, which was so badly shaken that the Germans
were able to get across this wide water-line with little fighting. The Tenth Army
then fell back westwards to the line of the Risle, whereas its neighbour retreated
southward. To exploit the fresh split in the French front, the leading German
infantry corps pressed their advance southwards towards the Loire, while Rommel s
division was brought down behind them on the i6th June and then launched westward
next day on a drive for Cherbourg.

On the night of the i6th the French Tenth Army had begun afresh step back,
and the remaining British troops serving with it were ordered to withdraw to
Cherbourg for re-embarkation to England as resistance was already collapsing.
That order was given in the nick of time for them, as the sector they had been
holding lay south of th& route of Rommel s drive next morning, and they only just
succeeded in reaching Cherbourg before they were cut off.

On the i yth June 1940, the division resumed its advance south of the
Seine, in the first place into the Laigle district. The yth Panzer Division
had instructions to push through as far as the Nonant-Sees road. After
arriving at this road, the division was to be reinforced by the Brigade
Senger and was then to strike on and capture the French naval port of
Cherbourg. Air reconnaissance had reported the presence in Cherbourg
of either warships or transports and it was therefore highly probable
that embarkation was in progress there.

The advance was made in two columns, neither of which at this stage
met any serious resistance, A few road-blocks were eliminated, a number
of prisoners made and several tanks captured. As soon as I heard that
the head of both columns had reached the Nonant-S6es road, I gave
orders for the attack to be continued round the flank of S6es. Routes
were as follows:

For the right-hand column, via Maroques, round the south of Ecouche,
then along the main road to Briouze and from there past the south side
of Flers to Landissacq.

For the left-hand column, via Mac6, Meh&ran, St. Brice, Le Menil
to La Chapelle.

PURSUIT TO CHERBOURG 69

I drove with my Gefechtsstqffel in the left-hand column. Things went
fairly fast as far as Montmerrei, where 20 French soldiers were taken
prisoner at about 13.00 hours. The column then pushed on towards
Bouce. In Francheville I received a report that enemy tanks were
holding the entry into Bouce and closing the road, although our recon
naissance troops had not so far been fired on." Since our column contained
nothing more than armoured cars, I ordered an immediate diversion
to the north. We now came across small groups of French troops all
along the route, whom we had no difficulty in making our prisoners.
Among them were several carloads of French officers, one of whom
spoke German and was accordingly now used as an interpreter. Dense
clouds of dust were stirred up by our passage over the side roads. Soon
the head of the column clashed with enemy motor-cyclists, whom they
quickly eliminated by their fire. Close behind the motor-cyclists, however,
we met a French column on the march. They were taken completely
by surprise at our appearance and did not seem very anxious to fight.
Negotiations opened between Captain von Luck [commander of yjth
Armoured Reconnaissance Battalion] and the French captain. I soon went
forward myself to find out what had caused the halt.

The French captain declared that Marshal Petain had made an
armistice proposal to Germany and had instructed the French troops
to lay down their arms. I had the French captain informed, through
our interpreter, that we had heard nothing of this armistice and that I
had orders to march on. I added that we would not open fire on any
French troops who surrendered and laid down their arms. I then
requested the French captain to free the road for our advance and have
his column moved off to the fields alongside it and ordered to lay down
their arms and fall out. The French captain still seemed to hesitate as
to whether or not he should do this. Anyway, it took too long to get
the French troops into their parking place and so I gave my column
orders to move on. We now drove on past the French column, which
stood on the road with its guns and anti-tank guns still limbered up.
The French captain looked a trifle disconcerted as we passed, but his
men seemed to be quite satisfied with this solution. We met more French
troops behind this column and beckoned to them with white handker
chiefs, calling out that the war was over for them. The advance went
on at a speed of 25 to 30 m.p.h. The next villages we came to were full
of French coloured troops, with their guns and vehicles parked in
orchards and farmyards. We drove past at top speed, waving, but not
otherwise bothering about them. In this way we got through without
fighting. After overtaking more convoys of brand-new American-built
vehicles, we reached the neighbourhood of Montreuil [40 miles west of
Laigle, and 12 miles W.S.W. of Argentan] at about 17.30 hours, where I
ordered an hour s rest for a meal, and, above all, to refill our tanks.

Since there seemed to be little further need to worry about serious

70 FRANCE, 1940

resistance, I decided to continue the advance at 18.40 hours, with
Cherbourg, which was still 140 miles 1 away, as the objective. Our right-
hand column, consisting of the 7th Motor-cycle Battalion^and part of
the 25th Panzer Regiment, had met with enemy resistance in the neigh
bourhood of Ecouchd between 16.00 and 17.00 hours, but this action
now seemed to be over. I also decided to make the rest of the journey
over main roads via Flers, Coutances and Barneville to Cherbourg, and
to take the whole division forward in one column.

This was an indirect approach, as Coutances lies close to the west coast of the
Cotentin Peninsula. Not until reaching this point did Rommel turn north up the
west coast route to Cherbourg. t

Details of the new objective and route were transmitted by radio to
the different parts of the division, although the messages did not get
through to one or two units.

At 18.40 hours the 37th Armoured Reconnaissance Battalion began
the advance to Cherbourg. They had orders to keep up the pace. We
reached the main road in a few minutes, where we found Panzer Company
Hanke, which I ordered to join up with us. The right-hand column
now received orders by radio to follow the left via Flers to Cherbourg.

We now raced on at top speed towards Flers. There were French
troops encamped on both sides of the road, and we waved to them as
we drove by. They stared in wonderment when they saw a German
column racing past. Nowhere was there any shooting. ^For^ the next
few hours we went steadily on at about 30 m.p.h. motoring in perfect
formation through one village after the other. A short halt was
made in Flers, due to difficulty in finding the right road. Crowds of
people in the streets, both troops and civilians, looked on curiously and
without taking up any kind of hostile attitude, at our hurried progress
through the town.

In the western outskirts of Flers we passed a large square crowded,
as usual, with French soldiers and civilians. Suddenly a civilian a few
yards from the column ran towards my car with drawn revolver, intending
to shoot, but French troops pulled him up short and prevented him carry
ing out his purpose. We drove on. I now had the whole division behind
me and was anxious to get to Cherbourg as quickly as possible. I was
very conscious of the fact that the territory we were crossing was full of
French troops, though their fighting value was probably low. It looked
indeed as though Petain s request for an armistice was already common
knowledge here. I was also under no illusions that the mass of the
division would be able to keep up our speed, but reckoned that any
units that fell behind would be able to catch up in a few hours. The
Reconnaissance Battalion raced steadily on, with never a stop. We had
already been driving for more than twelve hours. One French town
after another was left behind us without a shot being fired. Night fell,
x lt was actually about 130 miles by the route which Rommel took.

5 io 20 Kilometres

C.delaUaaue

7. THE DRIVE INTO CHERBOURG

72 FRANCE, 1940

revealing enormous fires burning to our right front, probably coming
from petrol and oil stores set alight by the enemy on the Lessay airfield
[30 miles north of Coutances, and 34 miles south of Cherbourg]. As usual after
nightfall, radio contact now failed. I knew that Senger s brigade, which
was on our right, had not yet come up and supposed it to be in the
neighbourhood of Falaise [i.e. 130 miles behind]. This did not alter my
decision, however, for I thought I would be able to cope with Cherbourg
alone.

After it had grown quite dark two officers reported to me, having
overtaken the column in a car. In the darkness I failed at first to recognise
their dust-covered faces, but they turned out to be Captain Kolbeck and
Lieut. Hausberg from the Fuehrer s H.Q,. Hausberg informed me that
he had been posted to my division and I immediately installed him as
aide-de-camp. Kolbeck had not been posted to me, but had merely
taken this opportunity of getting a trip to the front. I now sent Captain
Stollbrueck, my escort officer, back over our road on a motor-cycle to
ensure that everybody was following and to hand each regiment its orders
for the attack on Cherbourg. We would be there, barring obstacles, in
three hours.

On we raced without a stop into the dark night. It was about mid
night when the Reconnaissance Battalion drove across the market square
of La-Haye-du-Puits [5 miles north of Lessay]. There was a surprising
number of men in working clothes standing in the square and behind
them a number of lorries laden with material. They were mainly civilian
workmen, there were few troops, although several French officers
c#uld be seen hurrying busily around. One of them ran through the
column directly in front of my car and vanished into a doorway.
We drove on. As we passed the church I noticed a heavy French
lorry carrying a gun of 88 to 100 mm. calibre standing beside it. Still
without halting, the leading vehicles of the Reconnaissance Battalion,
under Lieut. Isermayer, bore off as ordered on the secondary road
to Bolleville and then drove at a smart pace onwards. I was just
turning over in my mind the detailed deployment of the division in front
of Cherbourg, when the head of die column suddenly ran up against
a defended roadblock and came under very heavy artillery and
machine-gun fire. The leading vehicles were hit and three went up in
flames. Lieut. Isermayer, who had been riding in the first vehicle, was
seriously wounded in the head and lay unconscious beside his burning
vehicle.

By all appearances, the road-block was held by a considerable enemy
force. The moon was now up but I still did not like the idea of attacking
immediately with tired troops and without artillery and tanks. I therefore
gave the Reconnaissance Battalion orders to break off the action and not
to move against the enemy position until daybreak.

Rommel s division had covered more than 150 miles since morning, and more

PURSUIT TO CHERBOURG 73

than TOO miles since its early evening halt to refuel. This far exceeded any day s
advance which had ever been made in warfare,

Then I drove back with my signals troop to La Haye-du-Puits. We
still had no contact with the infantry regiment behind us. On arrival
at La Haye-du-Puits, I took my stand by the church with Kolbeck,
Hausberg, a few dispatch riders, an armoured car and a signal lorry.
The heavy lorry we had seen on our way through, with the gun aboard,
was no longer in its old place. The labour column had also disappeared
from the market square.

A car coming up the main road from Cherbourg was halted. Its
occupant, a French naval officer, told us that he was an engineer officer
and that he had instructions to supervise a labour column building
barricades at this point against the German advance. I told him to
return to Cherbourg and report that he had come too late.

A few minutes later a number of British officers returning in a car
from sea bathing in the south were halted and taken prisoner. Then
Colonel von Unger arrived with the 6th Rifle Regiment. I now issued
orders for the next morning s attack on the enemy road-block. I was
satisfied that we would be able to break through the enemy positions
three miles north-west of La Haye-du-Puits and resume our dash for
Cherbourg during the morning.

At daybreak [on the iSth June] I drove forward to the 6th Rifle Regiment
with Hausberg. I had already given orders during the night for French
officers to be sent across to the enemy at dawn, with a demand for an
immediate surrender. When we arrived von Unger was already in
negotiation with the enemy. The French officers had gone into the
enemy positions, which were in an extremely commanding situation, and
we could see some of the garrison standing beside their strong-points with
rifles grounded. Through the glass we could also see guns and machine-
guns off to the right beside St. Sauveur church. [This was St. Sauveur-de-
Pierre Pont, not the larger village of St. Sauveur-le-Vicomte, which lies 4 miles
north-east, on the main road.] The road leading to the enemy position was
blocked at the bridge by a barricade of tree trunks.

The forward troops of the 6th Rifle Regiment were standing on either
side of the road, also with their rifles grounded, but with the difference
that, whereas the French had fixed positions close beside them, our
men stood in the open country or on the road entirely without cover.
If shooting had started suddenly, our troops would inevitably have
suffered heavy casualties. I was very angry at this lack of forethought
and ordered the officers concerned to reorganise their units immediately.

Shortly afterwards von Unger returned with the French officers and
reported that the troops opposite had no knowledge of Petain s armistice
proposal and did not believe it. They were not prepared to lay down
their arms and allow us to move on. These negotiations had cost us
valuable time and I therefore sent across a French officer once again to

74 FRANCE, 1940

deliver a summons to the enemy to lay down their arms by 08.00 hours,

failing which I would attack.

Preparations for the attack were now pushed ahead as quickly as
possible. Meanwhile, Heidkaemper had arrived and reported on the
division s night march to La Haye-du-Puits, which, it seemed, had by
no means gone smoothly. Due to incorrect marking of roads in Vire
with the " DG 7 * n sign, part of the division had gone off in error to
St. Lo [77 miles east of Coutances~\. No serious fighting had so far occurred
in the rear, but part of the column, including the divisional staff, had
been attacked by enemy tanks from out of a cornfield. Casualties had
been suffered, both dead and wounded, and several of our vehicles had
been set alight. In addition, one of the aides-de-camp, Lieut. Luft, had
narrowly escaped being taken prisoner during the night by either British
or French troops.

Since there had been no fighting of any note in the territory through
which we had come, it was fair to expect that the rest of the division
would close up with us during the morning, or at any rate, during the
day. It was therefore now possible to proceed with my plan for an
immediate attack on Cherbourg. At 08.00 hours, we found that the
enemy at St. Sauveur had suddenly disappeared. When we broke into
the enemy positions they were deserted, except for a few wounded and
one dead. An artillery and machine-gun barrage was now laid down
on the enemy s rear areas, while the leading battalion of the 6th Rifle
Regiment completed the occupation of the enemy positions, which were
tremendously strong. At the same time work went actively forward in
removing the obstructions across the stream and across a deep cutting
farther to the north. Baulks of timber had to be dragged out of the
railings on either side of the bridge, where they had been anchored with
heavy chains. We also had to get through a loo-yard long barricade
formed by numerous poplar trees, three feet or so in diameter, laid across
the road. The engineers did some good work here with motor-driven
saws.

At about 09.00 hours the leading company of the 6th Rifle Regiment,
which was equipped with armoured troop-carriers, moved off as vanguard
on the road to Cherbourg. About a mile and a quarter north-east of St.
L6 d Ourville, the leading platoon, with which I and my signals troop
were travelling, suddenly came under heavy flanking fire from a hill to
the right. Shortly afterwards an enemy battery joined in from the
neighbourhood of St. L6 [fOurvilU], but by that time our men had
jumped from their vehicles and taken coven A wounded man lay a few
yards in front of us behind the parapet of a bridge. The enemy fire was
now lively both from our right and from the front. Our own fire, on

1 Rommel had the roads over which his division advanced marked with the sign
" DG 7 " (Durchgangstrasse 7). This was contrary to normal German practice and he
was taken to task for it later. See page 85.

PURSUIT TO CHERBOURG 75

the other hand, was very slow in answering and, in order to get it moving,
I ordered the machine-gun crew of my armoured car to open fire im
mediately into the bushes on the right of the road. At the same time
the commander of an anti-tank gun was given orders from me to open
fire as quickly as possible on the nearest houses and bushes to our right.
Lieut. Hausberg took charge of all the machine-gunners and riflemen
near by and got them into position.

While this fire was pouring into the unseen enemy, the first field
howitzer came into action, firing over open sights 150 yards behind us.
The weight of our fire soon silenced the enemy on the hill, whereupon
the 2nd Battalion of the 6th Rifle Regiment attacked the hill and took it

After this short but violent action, the division resumed its march to
Cherbourg in the same order as before. Our speed through Barneville
to Les Pieux at times only 6 to 10 m.p.h. was too slow for me and I
several times had to make my presence felt to get it increased, for the
longer we took getting to Cherbourg, the more chance the enemy in the
intervening territory or in the port itself had to prepare for our arrival.
The telephone system was still everywhere intact and there was little
doubt that the Cherbourg garrison would be well informed about our
movements.

As we dropped down into the valley at Barneville, we could see the
sea on our left and some large buildings on the hills south of Barneville
which looked to us like barracks. There was, however, no sign anywhere
of enemy troops. Instead, we found a number of civilians at the entrance
to Barneville engaged in clearing away some partially constructed road
blocks. We saw more of this on our way to Les Pieux [12 miles south
west of Cherbourg], which we reached at 12.15 hours. Nowhere did we
have to go into action. Where we did come across enemy troops we
found them quite ready to lay down their arms.

The column bore off at Les Pieux without halting and drove at a
smart pace steadily closer to Cherbourg. Several captive balloons were
hanging in the sky over the port and it was not long before one of the
forts began to drop shells on the rear of our column. Now we were going
to see fighting. The leading unit halted a few minutes later, although
there was no firing yet up in front. I accordingly drove forward along
the column with my Gefechtsstaffel, to find out why we had stopped, and
found the rifle company s armoured vehicles halted 100 yards short of a
strong road-block, where negotiations were in progress with the enemy
garrison, who gave every sign of being ready to surrender. Von Unger
came across to me and reported. French troops were already on their
way across to us with white flags when suddenly a 75 mm. shell landed
among us, closely followed by a second. Hostilities had opened.

Everyone at first dived for cover, although one or two courageous
drivers did try to get their vehicles into shelter successfully in many
cases, as, for instance, with the drivers of my Gefechtsstaffel, who, despite

76 FRANCE, 1940

the fire, drove off up a side road until they were concealed from the
enemy. The leading vehicles of the 6th Rifle Regiment were already in
flames from the enemy shell-fire. My troops had unfortunately again
made the bad mistake of diving straight for cover instead of immediately
replying to the enemy fire with their machine-guns.

In order to get fire to bear as quickly as possible, I ordered the
machine-gunner of my armoured car to open fire at once in the general
direction of the enemy, and had orders given to the nearest platoon
commander to lead his platoon to an immediate attack on the road
block. But with enemy shells falling all round and a hail of splinters
whistling about our ears, it was not easy to get the infantry to leave
cover once they had found it and advance against the enemy. L.-Cpl.
Heidenreich and my driver L.-Cpl. Koenig particularly distinguished
themselves by their cool courage in this situation. They swept the
infantry forward, although it was still a long time before the machine-
gunners opened fire due apparently to the fact that they had not seen
the enemy and had probably not been trained to open fire immediately
at the spot where the enemy was thought to be.

In the meantime von Unger had been given orders from me to push
forward with his leading battalion round the right flank to Cherbourg.
Captain Kolbeck had already received instructions from me to hurry back
to the rear and bring a troop of artillery into action as quickly as possible.
As there was no more for my small staff to do up in the forward line,
and my most important job was to get the rest of the division into action
as quickly as possible, I took myself off to the rear with Lieut. Hausberg
and L.-Cpl. Heidenreich. The driver and operator of my signals lorry
had to remain with their vehicle. Enemy shell-fire was now incessant on
and along the road, forcing us to make several wide detours, during
which we had to be constantly on the alert for a clash with enemy
infantry.

When, about half an hour or so later, we at last got back to the road
over which we had advanced, several motor-cyclists came riding up and
prepared themselves to move on to the front. We now continued our
journey by motor-cycle. A few hundred yards farther on we met Lt.-Col.
Kessler, commander of the ist Battalion, y8th Artillery Regiment. I
ordered him to deploy his batteries on both sides of the road and to lay
down the heaviest barrage he could on the heights round Cherbourg and
above all, on the port installations. We then went on at top speed
farther to the rear. The ist Battalion of the 6th Rifle Regiment received
orders from me to launch an attack on the hill 1,000 yards west of the
Port Militaire. Shortly afterwards I met the commander of a 37 mm.
anti-aircraft battery and took him forward myself with his battery to
the point where Kessler s battalion was already in position. His orders
were to open rapid fire immediately on the heights round Cherbourg
and the docks.

PURSUIT TO CHERBOURG 77

Kessler s battalion had already opened fire. A few minutes later the
rapid fire of the 37 mm. guns was also tearing into Cherbourg and the
enemy hastily hauled down his balloons. The situation seemed to be
developing in our favour.

From my command post, which I had installed in a farmhouse on the
main road, all sound of infantry fire from the north had ceased. L.-CpL
Heidenreich managed to get my transport section out of the front line
and back to me unharmed. They had been in action against 40 British
soldiers, who had come on them suddenly from the rear and opened
fire. However, the signals corporal finally succeeded in disposing of
the enemy with his machine-gun and forcing them to surrender.

Radio contact had now been established with Major Heidkaemper.
The situation, which had appeared to be going so well, took a sudden
turn against us shortly before 16.00 hours, when within a few minutes
of each other, many of Cherbourg s forts opened a tremendous barrage
with guns of all sizes, including super-heavies, into the area which we
were holding and through which we had made our advance. British
warships also joined in with heavy naval guns. I was extremely glad
that the 6th Rifle Regiment had left its vehicles and deployed. The
positions occupied by the artillery battalion and A.A. battery came in
for particularly heavy attention and casualties soon began to mount.
My command post, too, was so seriously threatened that we found it
advisable to shift out into the open country along a hedge 500 yards
to the west, where, although overlooked by the enemy, we were far
better off than in the buildings with heavy shells falling all round.

One thing to be thankful for was that the radio was working. The
rapid fire of the forts lasted about an hour. I realised that things could
be very difficult for us if the enemy were to mount a strong infantry
attack from Cherbourg, and therefore devoted all my efforts to bringing
up reinforcements above all, the 7th Rifle Regiment and the 25th
Panzer Regiment.

On hearing that the divisional staff had arrived in Sotteville [9 miles
south-west of Cherbourg], I decided to conduct further operations from there.
We drove off soon after, keeping 300 yards spacing between vehicles
because of the enemy shell-fire.

Driving at top speed, we succeeded in getting our few vehicles back
along the road to Divisional H.Q. at Chateau Sotteville without loss.
The yth Rifle and the 25th Panzer Regiments arrived soon afterwards,
also the whole of the Division s light artillery and A. A. units. There was,
however, no hope of the heavy artillery getting into action before the late
evening. They had been unable to maintain the speed of the pursuit
over the 2io-mile stretch to Cherbourg,

It was now decided to adhere to our original plan of attack, which
was to launch the 7th Rifle Regiment, reinforced by tanks, through
Hainneville to Querqueville [on the north coast, 3 miles west of Cherbourg].

78 FRANCE, 1940

With the hills south of Querqueville in our hands it would be easy to
command the port and town of Cherbourg with artillery fire. Then the
eastern front of the Cherbourg defences could be cut off later by the
Brigade Senger. There was now no hope of this brigade arriving before
the following day.

Not having had any sleep since the previous morning, I took an
hour s rest at about 17.00 hours. During that time the commanders of
the 7th Rifle and the 25th Panzer Regiments came in, and after being
quickly briefed on the situation, received their orders for the attack.
Rothenburg drew attention to the fact that the terrain, criss-crossed as
it was with hedges and sunken roads, was extremely unfavourable for
tanks. Despite his objections I gave orders for a reinforced company of
the 25th Panzer Regiment to be attached to the battalions of the 7th
Rifle Regiment for the attack on Querqueville. The approach route
was to be through Tonneville.

Shortly after the commanders had gone, a number of highly important
maps were brought in, to which I gave immediate and careful study.
It seemed that the chateau in which we had taken up our quarters
belonged to the Commandant of Cherbourg, and a whole collection of
maps of the Cherbourg fortifications had been found in his secret drawers.
They included maps of the defended zone south of Cherbourg and, above
all, one map showing the zones of fire of all the light and heavy batteries
in and around the fortress. I studied this map very carefully and came
to the conclusion that it would be unwise to proceed with the attack
through Tonneville, for which orders had just been issued, as the enemy
would be able to cover it with the combined fire of several forts. Mean
while, a welcome signal had come in from Paris s Battalion to the effect
that it had achieved its task of capturing Hill 79, just west of the Rddoute
du Tot. I therefore decided to send the Rifle Regiment round the
western side of Hill 79 for its attack on Querqueville and amended my
orders accordingly. I intended to accompany the regiment forward on
its approach march myself that evening, in order to satisfy myself of its
deployment on the ground.

With my Gefechtsstqffel, I overtook the regiment at 21.00 hours and
then moved forward behind the tanks which formed its spearhead.
Every village we passed was crowded with French sailors and refugees
from Cherbourg, but we met no resistance. It was already growing dark.
Just south of Hainneville we passed a large concrete structure fenced in
with wire and a high wall, apparently a defence installation. A little
farther north I ran my Gefecktsstaffel under some trees, from which point
I was able to watch the deployment of the 7th Rifle Regiment, which
proceeded smoothly. The concrete structure turned out to be part of
an underground tank system.

Meanwhile, my dispatch rider had taken a look round the neighbour
hood and discovered a point from which a view of the naval dockyard

PURSUIT TO CHERBOURG 79

could be obtained from about 2,000 yards away. In the last gleam of
daylight we saw the defence works on the outer and inner moles, and the
naval harbour, which contained only small ships. The rest of the harbour
was empty, the British having apparently already gone. [The last troopship
had left at 16.00 hours.] While we were looking out over Cherbourg, the
long column of the yth Rifle Regiment moved up behind us through
Hainneville and occupied the positions assigned to them on the hills
south of Querqueville and round Hainneville. Light and heavy A.A.
batteries followed up the Rifle Regiment and took up position a t a point
where they could prevent the escape of ships from the harbour. The
enemy forts around us were silent and it was soon completely dark.
Our position was now so strong that we were certain of being able to
force the enemy to capitulate next day.

It was midnight by the time I arrived back at Divisional H.Q. During
the night, Lt.-Col. Froehlich disposed the whole of the divisional artillery,
plus a heavy battalion from the Brigade Senger, in front of Cherbourg
in such a manner that, when dawn broke, they would be able to launch
a concentrated fire of both heavy and light artillery on the various
defensive nests and forts,

Next morning, the igth of June, I drove up forward shortly before
06.00 hours, with Captain Schraepler and Lieut. Hausberg, Numerous
prisoners were being sent into Cherbourg from various points of the
front, with leaflets printed in French calling for an unconditional sur
render. In the area just south of the Redoute du Tot I met part of
the 6th Rifle Regiment under Lt.-Col. Jungk. I left my Gefechtsstaffel
at the edge of the wood as I felt that it would be dangerous, with the
enemy so close, to take the vehicles out of cover.

We now walked forward in a north-easterly direction beside some low
bushes. A dispatch rider followed on foot behind my two escort officers
and myself. As we made our way forward, we suddenly found the men
of a machine-gun platoon lying beneath the bushes. I asked the platoon
commander why his men were not in position and received the reply
that he had not so far been able to find a suitable field of fire. I ordered
him to get his platoon into position immediately in the front line. I was
just about to look for the battalion command post, which we were told
was farther forward, when shells suddenly started to fall behind us,
apparently from our own artillery. We dived straight for cover in a
trench to our right, but not before a shell had killed the dispatch rider,
Ehrmann, and wounded the signals officer, an N.C.O. and a second
dispatch rider. I was positive that the shells had come from our own
artillery and gave orders for no gun to fire without my express authority.
The order was transmitted by radio. It turned out later that the fire
had not come from the divisional artillery, but from an 88 mm. A.A.
battery.

Jungk now received orders to work his way forward with the leading

8O FRANCE, 1940

troops of the battalion alongside the bushes up to the outskirts of Cher
bourg. The enemy seemed to be offering no further resistance. As on
the previous evening, there were sailors everywhere, and hordes of
civilians streamed down every road out of Cherbourg and even across
country in order to escape the approaching battle. I issued orders by
radio for the exodus to be halted and the civilians sent back into Cher
bourg, for we had no intention of bombarding the town, but only the
military targets, such as the forts and the fortified naval dockyard,
around it.

We then drove over to the yth Rifle Regiment s command post in
Hainneville, but found that Col. von Bismarck was not there. On the
way we came across a heavy A.A. battery which had been completely
blocking the road with its guns and vehicles for hours past and was still
not in position. I said a few straight words to the numerous officers who
were with the battery and ordered them to take up position alongside
the road immediately and get all their vehicles away off the road.

At the northern edge of Hainneville I received a message that Lieut.
Durke had just been killed by artillery fire from Fort Central and
accordingly issued orders by radio for concentrated fire to be opened on
the fort. Fire was opened within a few minutes. We had excellent
observation from the 7th Rifle Regiment s command post, and were able
to send back a few small corrections which soon directed the fire into the
centre of the fort. Finally, it became so accurate that three out of four
shells were direct hits, and the fort ceased fire. In order to put its open
gun positions out of action, I had a heavy A. A. battery brought up with
orders to take a hand in the heavy artillery s next shoot on Fort Central
which was timed for i i.oo hours and to destroy its superstructure by
direct fire.

Shortly afterwards Major von Paris informed me that the garrison
of the R^doute des Couplets, 10 officers and 150 men, had just surrendered.
We could see the prisoners standing under guard over to our right. I
immediately went over to the Redoute, where I expected to get an
excellent view across the Cherbourg defences. We drove the first part of
the way in our combat vehicles, and then went on foot up the last 500
yards to the fort standing on its commanding height. We penetrated
through the forward trenches into the inner part of the fort, where we
found part of the 6th Rifle Regiment and the forward artillery observers.
The observation posts, which were intact and equipped with excellent
glasses, gave a view over the whole of the port and town.

I had just sent a radio message to Major Heidkaemper informing him
of the progress of the attack, when Col. Fuerst arrived from the eastern
side of Querqueville with the news that Col. von Bismarck was in negotia
tion there with a deputation from the town. This was probably a direct
result of the division s leaflets calling on the garrison to surrender,

So it seemed that negotiations were starting. I took myself off at

PURSUIT TO CHERBOURG 8l

once to a point half a mile north of the Redoute des Couplets. The naval
dockyard was still held by enemy forces, who were apparently not yet
inclined to surrender, so fire was opened on anything moving in the area.
By this time all fire had ceased from the forts out to sea. Fort Querquevilel
had refused to surrender, but the Commandant had informed us that
the fort would not open fire unless we did. He would only surrender,
however, on orders. Fort Central was silent.

At 12.15 * wo civilian cars drove out of the town. Their occupants,
a Deputy of the Chamber in Paris and the Cherbourg Prefect of Police,
were unfortunately not in a position to announce the surrender of the
fortress, but declared themselves ready to make urgent representations to
that end to the Commandant, who, they said, was in the naval dockyard.
They wished at all costs to avoid the bombardment and hence the
destruction of their town. I told them to drive back into the town and
effect an immediate surrender through the agency of the Chief of Staff.
I gave them until 13.15 hours. They hoped to be back by then to bring
me the answer personally.

During their journey back, the two cars were fired on from the naval
dockyard and their occupants had to alight and crawl for some distance
along the ditch running alongside the road. I did not hear of this, of
course, until later. At 13.15 hours the answer still had not arrived, and
so dive-bombers, punctual to the minute, swooped down and released
their bombs on the sea forts, scoring a direct hit on Fort Central. The
artillery also opened fire. I went back as quickly as possible to the
Redoute des Couplets to watch the effect of our fire from that excellent
observation point.

A storm of shells now descended on the naval dockyard, and flames
were soon shooting up from its extensive arsenals and sheds. Tremendous
clouds of smoke showed the existence of major conflagrations. Meanwhile,
the Rifle Regiments had been given orders to occupy the town during
this bombardment. When the whole naval dockyard was concealed under
a pall of flame and smoke, I had the fire switched to Fort Querqueville
in order to bring the garrison there to an early surrender.

During this bombardment, of which I had an excellent view from my
command post, a number of French naval officers appeared in the Redoute
des Couplets to negotiate the surrender of the fortress. I had the officers
brought up to my observation tower, mainly in order to let them see the
tremendous effect of our artillery fire. Among them was the Commandant
of Fort Querqueville, a naval officer with a long black beard. He was
horrified when he saw his fort shrouded with smoke, and asked me why
we were bombarding it it had already ceased fire. " That may be,"
I replied. " But it has not surrendered."

The negotiations for the surrender went ahead fairly quickly. The
French spokesman a captain who was apparently invested with some

82 FRANCE, 1940

powers, asked for our terms in writing. I accordingly dictated the
following:

" I have taken cognisance of the fact that the fortress of Cherbourg
is prepared to surrender, and have given orders for an immediate cease
fire. I require the garrison of each fort to hoist a white flag as a sign of
surrender and then to march off along the road from Cherbourg to Les
Pieux. Personal kit may be carried, including essential rations. I require
that N.C.O.s shall be instructed to take charge of the men. Officers will
assemble in the Prefecture Maritime. They will be permitted their
batmen. All weapons will be unloaded and stacked in an orderly manner
in the forts."

The formal surrender was fixed to take place at 17.00 hours in the
Prefecture Maritime. After the French delegates had declared their
agreement with the conditions, and given their assurance that they would
be carried out, I gave orders for the cease-fire and then drove off with
my Gefechtsstaffel to Cherbourg.

In the Prefecture Maritime, the staff of the fortress had already
transmitted the surrender conditions to all establishments. As there was
over an hour to wait until the official ceremony, I drove through Cher
bourg with Heidkaemper to inspect the town and port. We visited first
the British port area and the harbour railway station. In their haste to
get their ships away, the British had left all their vehicles standing in the
extensive harbour area and hundreds of lorries were parked there and in
the adjacent quarter of the town. The material was practically new and
most of the lorries intact.

We now found our way to the seaplane base, which had not been
touched by the bombardment, and then returned to the Prefecture, where
we found the commanding officers of 7th Panzer Division assembled on
one side of the courtyard and the officers of the Cherbourg garrison,
including the commandants of the various forts, on the other. After a
quick exchange of salutes with my officers, I addressed the senior French
officer, through the interpreter, in roughly the following terms:

" As Commander of the German troops at Cherbourg, I take note
of the fact that the fortress has surrendered and wish to express my
pleasure that the surrender has taken place without bloodshed among
the civilian population."

The French Chief of Staff then had me informed, on behalf of the
officers, that the fortress would not have surrendered if sufficient am
munition had been available.

Meanwhile, we discovered that the commandant of Cherbourg was
not there, nor, what was worse, the senior officer of the station the
admiral commanding the French Channel Fleet. Accordingly, the
division s liaison officer, Captain von Platen, was sent off to fetch the
gentlemen from their headquarters, which was housed in a chateau
heavily protected by anti-tank guns and barricades. When they arrived

PURSUIT TO CHERBOURG 83

I had the interpreter repeat to them the words I had already addressed
to the French Chief of Staff. Admiral Abrial said that the surrender of
the fortress had taken place without his agreement, to which I replied
that I took note of his statement. This concluded the capitulation of
Cherbourg.

Meanwhile, all forts which could be reached from the land had been
occupied by our troops and cleaning up began in the town and forts.
With Heidkaemper I visited Fort de Roule, which stood on a hill com
manding the town and harbour. A road-block, which we met on the
way, was quickly disposed of by the 8-wheeled armoured signals lorry.
It pushed an enormous half-burnt-out lorry in front of it like a football
and so cleared the road.

The Commandant of the fort and his deputy had been killed the day
before by a German shell, while standing on the walls of the fort. I went
into the casemates, which still contained their garrisons. The French
troops saluted mutely.

I then went on to Fort Querqueville, where I found the aerodrome
untouched, although the fourteen aircraft standing in its spacious hangars
were all more or less damaged. I was surprised to see how little damage
our shell-fire had caused in the fort. In the Commandant s house, which
stood in the middle of the open square, not even the window panes were
broken. The shell pits in the masonry of the fort were some 12-16 inches
deep and the garrison had apparently come to no serious harm.

The British forces with the French Tenth Army had escaped by the narrowest
margin. It had been an even closer shave for them than for the main B.E.F. at
Dunkirk three weeks before.

Lieut.-General Sir Alan Brooke, who had landed at CJierbourg on the i$th to
take overall command, came to the conclusion next day that the French position was
hopeless, and, after securing the British Government s agreement, made arrangements
to evacuate all the British troops still left in France, including the two fresh
divisions that had just been landed. But the withdrawal of" Norman Force," the
troops already operating with the French Tenth Army, was deferred. The main
elements of this were now the lyjth Infantry Brigade (of the 52nd Lowland
Division), which was then in the front line south of Laigle, and tJie 3rd Armoured
Brigade (of the ist Armoured Division], which was in reserve. Lieut.-General
J. H. Marshall-Cornwall, who took command of " Norman Force " on the i^th,
issued orders for its immediate withdrawal to Cherbourg when he learned on the
following night that the Tenth Army was starting a general retirement towards
Brittany.

The British troops set off at midnight and reached Cherbourg within 24 hours,
after having " moved 200 miles by roads encumbered by columns of troops and
refugees" That fact was remarkable proof of the value of motorised mobility for
escape purposes. It was found that the direct road to Cherbourg through Carentan
was already mined, so the British tank column was diverted to the west-coast route

84 FRANCE, 1940

throueh Learn. Then at La Haye-du-Puits a further westward diversion was made
via Barneville and Les Puils, as the main road was already mined and blocked.
In taking the same roundabout approach a few hours later, Rommel chose the route
that save him a clear passage, without any diversion. That calculation of the
advantages of the indirect approach, as the line of least expectation, showed his

enars-o report of the last phase ended: " In order to

protect tiie embarkation at Cherbourg, Iliad asked for afresh battalion of the 52nd
Division to be left to occupy a covering position some so miles to the south. Mis,
combined with the 5 French battalions of the Cherbourg garrison, ought to have
provided ample security, and I had hoped to continue the embarkation until the sist
in order to remote all the stores and mechanised vehicles. The enemy, however
again ufiset our calculations by the speed with which he followed up our rapid
withdrawal. At p a.m. on the i8th, a column of 60 lorries, carrying motonsed
German infantry, reached the covering position near St. Sauveur. Finding resistance
there they turned west to the sector held by French troops, and succeeded in penetrating
the position by the coast road. The French made little attempt to resist and I had
to make the decision at 11.30 to complete the evacuation by 3 p.m. The covering
battalion (jth Bn. K.O.S.B.) was withdrawn between 12 noon and 3 p.m. and
the last boat left at 4 p.m. All weapons were removed, except one 3.7 inch A.A.
tun which broke down and was rendered unserviceable, and one static Bofors gun
which could not be removed in the time. Two anti-tank guns also had to be
abandoned during the withdrawal. When the last troopship left, the Germans had
penetrated to within 3 miles of the harbour."

The casualties of Rommel s ?th Panzer Division during the six weeks campaign
were 682 killed, 1,646 wounded, and 296 missing, while its loss in tanks was only
42 totally destroyed. Its captures amounted to 97,648 prisoners, together with 277
field guns, 64 anti-tank guns, 458 tanks and armoured cars, over 4,000 lorries, over
i, goo cars, and over 1,300 horse-drawn vehicles.

On the soth, immediately after the capture of Cherbourg, Rommel wrote to his
wife:

I don t know whether the date s right, I ve rather lost count of
time after the last few days.

The division made the assault on Cherbourg in one stride over a
distance of 220 to 230 miles and took the powerful fortress despite a
strong defence. There were some bad moments for us, and the enemy
was at first between 20 and 40 times our superior in numbers. On
top of that they had 20 to 35 forts ready for action and many
single batteries. However, by buckling to quickly we succeeded
in carrying out the Fuehrer s special order to take Cherbourg as fast
as possible. . . .

With the capture of Cherbourg, the war in the West was over for 7th Panzer
Division and the division was now ordered south. Rommel wrote from Rennes:

PURSUIT TO CHERBOURG 85

Rennes 21 June 1940
DEAREST Lu,

Arrived here safely. The war has now gradually turned into a
lightning tour of France. In a few days it will be over for good.
The people here are relieved that it s all passing off so quietly.

25 June 1940

At last the armistice is in force. We re now less than 5200 miles
from the Spanish frontier and hope to go straight on there so as to
get the whole Atlantic coast in our hands. How wonderful it s all
been. Something I ate yesterday upset me but I m better again
already. Billets middling.

8 July 1940

France s war with the British Fleet is something quite unique.
It s good for France to be working in with the victors. The peace
terms will be so much the more lenient for her.

Anxiety about Russian expansion comes out clearly in Rommefs letter of
une 1940:

Russia s demands on Rumania are pretty stiff. I doubt whether
this suits us very well. They re taking all they can get. But they
won t always find it so easy to hold on to their spoils. . . .

Note by MANFRED ROMMEL: During the advance of the jih Panzer Division,
my father had introduced several new techniques on his own account, with, as will
be remembered, considerable success. Firstly, his method of command had been
something other than orthodox, secondly he had introduced his " line of thrust, " and
finally he had, against all instructions, sign-posted all his communication roads
with the sign " DG 7," to enable units following behind to close up quickly and to
facilitate supply traffic.

There was, of course, trouble from his superiors and criticism from others
concerning these independent experiments. He defended himself fiercely and
with success. Even Major Heidkaemper, his la, took the side of the critics in some
questions, a fact which made him particularly angry. On the i$th June
Heidkaemper submitted a memorandum to my father in which he complained that
contact had been broken between the staff and the divisional commander, and that
the practical conclusion to be drawn from this fact was that the commander should
stay farther to the rear. In fact, the principal cause of the crisis which had
arisen was that the unit commanders had not been sufficiently familiar with myfattisr s
technique of command. He had had far too little opportunity of exercising his
division as a formation and with its full complement of weapons. The result,
especially at the beginning of the campaign, was a need for repeated makeshift
measures, until finally, towards the end, operations went more or less smoothly.

86 FRANCE, I94O

After receiving Heidkaempefs memorandum, my father wrote the following
letter to my mother;

I m having a lot of trouble with my la just at the moment. He s
sent me a long screed about his activities on the i8th May. I shall
have to have him posted away as soon as I can. This young General
Staff Major, scared that something might happen to him and the
Staff, stayed some 20 miles behind the front and, of course, lost contact
with the fighting troops which I was commanding up near Cambrai.
Instead of rushing everything up forward, he went to Corps H.Q.,
upset the people there and behaved as if the command of the division
were no longer secure. And he still believes to this day that he
performed a heroic deed. I ll have to make a thorough study of the
documents so as to put the boy in his place.

Heidkaemper was actually on quite good Terms with Rommel, who wrote,
only a few days later, after his first wave of indignation had subsided:

The Heidkaemper affair was cleared up yesterday and has now
been finally shelved. I have the feeling that it s all going to be all
right now. I went and saw Hoth and we had a long talk about the
whole thing. I m glad there s peace in the camp again. However,
it was necessary to assert my authority.

During the next few months life for Rommel was much the same as for most
other German officers who were taking part in the occupation of France at that
time. A few extracts from letters which he wrote at the beginning of 1941 give
some idea of the life he was leading and what was in his mind. With so much
material available, it is only possible to include a selection of letters from this
period.

6 Jan. 1941

I received a whole pile of post yesterday, including your letters
of the 2ist and 23rd December, It looks as though the mails are
gradually getting right again. This afternoon we saw the film The
Queen s Heart (Mary Stuart), which I thoroughly enjoyed. We re
expecting distinguished visitors to-morrow to inspect our quarters.
We re not exactly comfortable. The wine growers round here probably
spent their lives in the same miserable hovels a thousand years ago
as they do to-day primitive sandstone block buildings with flat roofs
and sharply-curved tiles, just like those the Romans used. A lot of
the villages haven t even got piped water and are still using wells.
None of the houses are built for the cold. The windows don t shut
and the draught whistles straight through them. However, I suppose
things will soon be better. . .

PURSUIT TO CHERBOURG 87

8 Jan. 1941

The visit passed off very well yesterday. It was intensely interesting
to me to see what primitive lives the people round here are still
leading and how poverty-striken some of the billets are. The troops
made a very good impression everywhere. I m intending to take my
leave at the beginning of February. A lot of things will probably
have been cleared up by then. I m not surprised that our Allies
aren t having things all their own way in North Africa, They probably
thought that war was easy and now they ve got to show what they
can do. They began just the same in Spain, but fought very well
later on. . . .

17 J. 1941
Nothing new here. I spend most evenings with my officers talking

over the May 1940 war diary, which seems to impress them all.
The British Mediterranean Fleet has had to take some hard

knocks. Let s hope we see more of this sort of thing.

Part Two

THE WAR IN AFRICA
FIRST YEAR

CHAPTER V

GRAZIANPS DEFEAT-CAUSE AND EFFECT

IN A speech made by the Duce in February 1941, he said that between
1936 and 1940, Italy had sent to Libya an army of 14,000 officers and
327,000 men, and supplied it with great stores of material His words
sounded very grand and impressive, but the harsh truth was that this
army fell a long way short of the standard required by modern warfare.
It was designed for a colonial war against insurgent tribesmen, such as
Graziani had had to wage against the Senussi and the Negus. Its tanks
and armoured vehicles were too light and their engines under-powered.
Their radius of action was short. Most of the guns with which the artillery
units were equipped dated from the 1914-18 war and had a short range*
The army had too few anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns and even its rifles
and machine-guns were of obsolete pattern or otherwise unsuitable for
modern warfare.

But its worst feature was the fact that a great part of the Italian Army
consisted of non-motorised infantry. In the North African desert, non-
motorised troops are of practically no value against a motorised enemy,
since the enemy has the chance in almost every position, of making the
action fluid by a turning movement round the south. Non-motorised
formations, which can only be used against a modern army defensively
and in prepared positions, will disturb him very little in such an operation.
In mobile warfare, the advantage lies as a rule with the side which is
subject to the least tactical restraint on account of its non-motorised troops.
It follows then that the decisive disadvantage of the Italian Army vis-b-vis
the British was that the greater part of it was non-motorised.

Graziani s Army was set in motion in September 1940, at a time
when the British had nothing in Egypt capable of halting the Italians
before Alexandria. Starting from the Bardia area, the Italian divisions
moved across the Egyptian frontier at Sollum and then along the coast
to Sidi Barrani. The weak British holding forces did not stand to fight
a decisive action, but skilfully fell back to the east before the advancing
Italians. After reaching Sidi Barrani, Graziani did not continue his
advance, but chose instead to fortify the territory he had gained and lay

02 THE WAR IN AFRICA FIRST YEAR

a communication road along the coast; then he went on to assemble
stores and reinforcements and to organise water supplies. From this new
base he intended to continue the offensive towards the east.

If quartermasters and civilian officials are left to take their own time
over the organisation of supplies, everything is bound to be very slow.
Quartermasters often tend to work by theory and base all their calcula
tions on precedent, being satisfied if their performance comes up to the
standard which this sets. This can lead to frightful disasters when there
is a man on the other side who carries out his plans with greater drive
and thus greater speed. In this situation the commander must be ruthless
in his demands for an all-out effort. If there is anyone in a key position
who appears to be expending less than the energy that could properly
be demanded of him, or who has no natural sense for practical problems
of organisation, then that man must be ruthlessly removed. A commander
must accustom his staff to a high tempo from the outset and continually
keep them up to it. If he once allows himself to be satisfied with norms,
or anything less than an all-out effort, he gives up the race from the
starting-post and will sooner or later be taught a bitter lesson by his
faster-moving enemy and be forced to jettison all his fixed ideas.

Weeks and months passed, but Graziani still stood fast at Sidi Barrani.
The British, who commonly possess a good combination of brains and
initiative, were given time to prepare themselves to meet a further Italian
advance and to organise the defence of Egypt. Forces were assembled
all over the British Empire and, above all, modern, mechanised troops
with numerous tanks were brought into Egypt. The British tanks were
far superior in quality to the Italian.

Although the British Army was far smaller in numbers than the
Italian it was better equipped, had a better and more modern air force,
faster and more up-to-date tanks, longer-range artillery, and, what was
most important, its striking columns were fully motorised. The British
Fleet dominated the western Mediterranean, and the Italian Battle
Squadron and Cruiser Groups did not put to sea to sweep away the
numerically inferior British ships. Finally and this was of immense
importance throughout the African campaign the British possessed a
railway along the coast as far as Mersa Matruh, with connections through
to the Egyptian railway system, over which material could be brought to
the front. Egypt could be looked upon as an arsenal for war material of
all kinds.

At the end of November, General Waveli suddenly launched a surprise
attack. [It was actually launched on gth December.] His air force struck first.
Every British aircraft that could take the air, from the oldest to the
newest, dropped its bomb load on the Italian positions at Sidi Barrani
and the forward airfields. Simultaneously, the guns of British warships
thundered from the sea and covered Sidi Barrani and the coast road
with their heaviest shells.

GRAZIANfS DEFEAT CAUSE AND EFFECT 93

In the light of a full moon, an outflanking attack was then launched
against the Italian positions at Sidi Barrani by a striking force made up
of British, Australians, French, Poles and Indians, all units fully motorised.
After a short fight, strong Italian positions 15 miles south of Sidi Barrani
were overrun and 2,000 Italians found their way into British prison
camps.

The larger part of the striking force was British, and the bulk of the remainder
was Indian. The ground troops comprised the jth Armoured Division, the 4th Indian
Division (partly British] , and two British infantry brigades a total of 31,000
men. The Italian force in the forward zone was about 80,000 but had only 120
tanks compared with 275 British of which 35 were the heavily-armoured Matildas
of the jth Battalion^ Royal Tank Regiment.

The initial attack was against the Nibeiwa camp, and here 4,000 prisoners
were taken not 2,000 as Rommel says. The 4th Indian Division, spearheaded by
the Jth R. T.R., then continued its attack northward against the Italian positions
in the Sidi Barrani area.

The British motorised column now divided, one part continuing the
attack to the north against the Sidi Barrani area, while the other moved
off west far into the rear of the Italians.

This second part was the jth Armoured Division, which in fact moved
independently from the start.

At the same time waves of British infantry accompanied by infantry
tanks advanced from the east against the Italian positions at Sidi Barrani
in co-ordination with the outflanking columns attacking from the rear.
Again the thunder of British naval guns mingled with the fury of the
battle. It all swept over the Italians like a storm, and at the end of a
brief action, the three Italian infantry divisions at Sidi Barrani had been
wiped out.

Wavell continued his offensive. Soon he carne up with a Black Shirt
Division, which laid down its arms after a short battle in which the
Italians had fought with great courage. On the i6th December, Wavell
reached the Libyan frontier and defeated Graziani s troops at Capuzzo.
The light Italian tanks simply split apart in the British fire. Maletti, the
gallant commander of the Italian Armoured Corps in Africa, was lulled
in action and 30,000 Italians were taken prisoner. The Tenth Italian
Army had virtually ceased to exist.

The total bag in this battle was over 38,000 prisoners, 400 guns and 50 tanks
at a cost of barely 500 British casualties.

The British successes were obviously having an almost paralysing
effect on the Italians. They withdrew to their strongholds at Bardia and
Tobruk and waited to see what the enemy would do next.

On the i gth of December, Wavell s forces appeared in front of Bardia
and began to lay siege to the fortress. Under cover of R.A.F. bombs
and the shells of the Royal Navy, the superb Australian infantry stormed

94 THE WAR IN AFRICA FIRST YEAR

the fortress and forced 20,000 Italians to surrender. The Italian Com
mandant successfully escaped to Tobruk.

Only the jth Armoured Division followed up the Italian rout, and " appeared
in front of Bardia," as the 4th Indian Division had been dispatched to the Sudan
at the end of the Sidi Barrani battle. Tlie siege-assault on Bardia was thus delayed
until the arrival of a fresh infantry division, the 6th Australian. The assault was
at last launched on January 3rd, again spearheaded by the Matilda tanks of the
jth Battalion R. T.R. By the third day the fortress was completely captured
45,000 prisoners and 462 guns being taken.

The British Army continued its advance to the west and on the 8th
January 1941 enveloped Tobruk. Despite its tremendously strong defences,
its garrison of 525,000 men and powerful artillery formations with their
plentiful supply of stores, this first-class stronghold only managed to hold
out for a fortnight, after which the defence collapsed in an attack mainly
conducted by infantry tanks. The Italian troops had no real means of
defence against the heavily-armoured British vehicles.

Tobruk was actually enveloped on the 6th January by the Jth Armoured
Division, but the 6th Australian Division was not completely assembled and ready
to deliver the assault until a fortnight later. The attack opened on the 2ist, and
by early next morning all resistance had been overcome. Nearly 30,000 prisoners
were taken, with 236 guns.

After the fall of Tobruk, the British moved farther into Cyrenaica,
fighting short actions at Derna and Mechili. In spite of the difficult
terrain in Cyrenaica, which offered excellent opportunities for defence,
the British northern column, with Australians in the lead, made rapid
progress. Benghazi was in British hands as early as the 7th February.
Meanwhile, a powerful British armoured column had pushed forward
through Msus, apparently unnoticed by the Italians. The column struck
the coast road 30 miles south-west of Benghazi and brought to battle the
remainder of Graziani s army, which was retreating down the road.
The action, which was fought on either side of the Via Balbia, ended
v/ith the destruction of over 100 Italian fighting vehicles; 10,000 Italian
troops marched into British prison camps.

In this battle, near Beda Fomm; the total captures were 20,000 men, 216
guns and 120 tanks, mainly of the new (Italian) cruiser type. The British force
consisted of part of the jth Armoured Division, and amounted to only 3,000 men,
while it had no more than 32 cruiser tanks available. But the Italian tanks were
retreating along the road in small packets, and these were broken up in turn by the
British tanks, which skilfully manosuvred to gain flanking fire-positions. The
Italian infantry and other troops offered little resistance when their protecting tanks
were destroyed.

On the 8th February, leading units of the British Army occupied El
Agheila and thus stood on the frontier between Cyrenaica and Tripoli-
tania. Graziani s army had virtually ceased to exist. All that remained
of it was a few lorry columns and hordes of unarmed soldiers in full

GRAZIAOT S ^DEFEAT CAUSE AND EFFECT 95

flight to the west. The realisation that their arms were of no avail against
the British had cast fear and trepidation into the Italian Army. They had
lost 120,000 men in prisoners alone not counting their dead and wounded
also 600 armoured vehicles and almost the whole of their artillery,
vehicles and stores. The Italian Air Force in Africa had suffered an
annihilating defeat at the hands of the R.A.F., and lost most of its
aircraft and ground organisation.

The aggregate figures that Rommel gives for the British captures are closer to
ttie mark than those he gives for the various battles. The total during the campaign
was just over 130,000 prisoners, 1,300 guns, and 400 tanks (excluding armoured
cars and machine-gun carriers.}

If Wavell had now continued his advance into Tripolitania, no
resistance worthy of the name could have been mounted against him so
well had his superbly planned offensive succeeded.

To delay WavelPs advance, the Italians mined the road between
El Agheila, Arco dei Fileni, and Sirte and destroyed several bridges
across the wadis. These demolitions offered little obstruction to the
enemy as they could easily be by-passed. A weak Italian rearguard force,
consisting of one reinforced artillery regiment, stood at Sirte. Thousands
of stragglers collected at Horns and the remainder of the Italian forces
in Tripolitania moved into the outer environs of Tripoli and into the
Tripoli defence line itself a semi-circle 12 miles out of the city centre
for defence of the port. This defence line, which was constructed in sandy
soil, consisted of a wide and deep anti-tank ditch with walls partially
reinforced because of the loose sand, field positions protected by wire
entanglements, and occasional observation towers of light concrete con
struction, which could be seen for miles. In comparison with Tobruk
and Bardia, the defence works round Tripoli were totally inadequate.
They could possibly have been defended with some hope of success against
insurgent Senussi or Arab tribesmen, but never against the British.

However, the enemy stopped his advance, probably thinking that
Tripoli would sooner or later fall into his hands like a ripe plum. No
doubt he wanted time to assemble stores and organise supplies before
going on. But in doing so, he gave the Axis powers the chance to prepare
for a resumption of the struggle.

The advance was stopped by the British Government in order to dispatch an
expeditionary force to Greece., under the belief that a powerful flank threat to Germany
could be created in the Balkans. Early in January Mr. Churchill had pressed the
Greeks, who were already at war with Italy, to accept the aid of a British con
tingent. But General Metaxas, who was then head of the Greek Government, had
declined the proposal on the ground that it, was likely to provoke a German invasion
without providing a strong enough force to check such an invasion.

This polite rebuff coincided with the capture of Tobruk, so the British Govern
ment decided to allow Wavell to continue his advance in North Africa and capture
the port of Benghazi. That fresh step forward was duly achieved, and the remains

g6 THE WAR IN AFRICA FIRST YEAR

of the Italian Army in Cyrenaica were wiped out. But in the meantime General
Metaxas had died, on the i 9 th January, and Mr. Churchill then renewed his offer
to the Greek Government which, this time, was persuaded to accept it. Hence the
British Government ordered Wavell to halt the advance in Africa leave only a
minimum force to hold conquered Cyrenaica, and prepare to send the largest possible

TJie Balkan venture was short lived. The British force began to land in Greece
on the ?th March, the Germans invaded Greece on the 6th April, and the British
were driven to re-embark before the end of the month. That costly disaster was
followed in May by an even quicker expulsion from Crete, at the hands of a German

airborne force. . , Ar ,

General O Connor, the executive commander of the victorious advance in JVortti
Africa, had been eager to push on from Benghazi to Tripoli, and was convinced
that he could have carried out this fresh bound with little delay for replenishment of
supplies. Many other officers who were concerned in the planning shared his view.
Rommel confirms it. .

When a commander has won a decisive victory and WavelU victory
over the Italians was devastating it is generally wrong for him to be
satisfied with too narrow a strategic aim. For that is the time to exploit
success. It is during the pursuit, when the beaten enemy is still dispirited
and disorganised, that most prisoners are made and most booty captured.
Troops who on one day are flying in a wild panic to the rear, may, unless
they are continually harried by the pursuer, very soon stand in battle
again, freshly organised as fully effective fighting men.

The reason for giving up the pursuit is almost always the quarter
master s growing difficulty in spanning the lengthened supply routes
with his available transport. As the commander usually pays great
attention to his quartermaster and allows the latter s estimate of the
supply possibilities to determine his strategic plan, it has become the
habit for quartermaster staffs to complain at every difficulty, instead
of getting on with the job and using their powers of improvisation, which
indeed are frequently nil. But generally the commander meekly accepts
the situation and shapes his actions accordingly.

When, after a great victory which has brought the destruction of the
enemy, the pursuit is abandoned on the quartermaster s advice, history
almost invariably finds the decision to be wrong and points to the
tremendous chances which have been missed. In face of such a judgment
there are, of course, always academic soldiers quick to produce statistics
and precedents by people of little importance to prove it wrong. But
events judge otherwise, for it has frequently happened in the past that a
general of high intellectual powers has been defeated by a less intelligent
but stronger willed adversary.

The best thing is for the commander himself to have a clear picture
of the real potentialities of his supply organisation and to base all his
demands on his own estimate. This will force the supply staffs to develop

GRAZIANl s DEFEAT CAUSE AND EFFECT QJ

their initiative, and though they may grumble, they will as a result
produce many times what they would have done left to themselves.

The gravest results of the Italian defeat were to their morale. The
Italian troops had, with good reason, lost all confidence in their arms
and acquired a very serious inferiority complex, which was to remain
with them throughout the whole of the war, for the Fascist state was
never able to equip its men in North Africa properly. Psychologically,
it is particularly unfortunate when the very first battle of a war ends
with such a disastrous defeat, especially when it has been preceded by
such grandiose predictions. It makes it very difficult ever again to
restore the men s confidence.

CHAPTER VI

THE FIRST ROUND

AFRICAN MISSION

As A result of the strained situation in France at the end of I940, 1 1 had
to break off my Christmas leave before it was up and drive quickly back
over the snow-covered and icy roads to Bordeaux, where my division
was then stationed. Nothing, however, came of the scare and we did
not go into action.

Weeks of intensive training followed. I intended to make up for my
spoiled Christmas by taking some leave at the beginning of February,
but it was again abortive, for on my second evening at home I was
informed by an adjutant from the Fuehrer s H.Q. that I was to cut short
my leave and report to Field Marshal von Brauchitsch and the Fuehrer
immediately.

On the 6th February Field Marshal von Brauchitsch inducted me
into my new task.

In view of the highly critical situation with our Italian allies, two
German divisions one light and one panzer were to be sent to Libya
to their help. I was to take command of this German Afrika Korps and
was to move off as soon as possible to Libya to reconnoitre the ground.

The middle of February would see the arrival of the first German
troops in Africa; the movement of the 5th Light Division would be
complete by mid-April and of the i5th Panzer Division at the end of
May.

The basic condition for providing this help was that the Italian
Government should agree to undertake the defence of Tripolitania in
the Gulf of Sirte area, on a line running south from about Buerat, in
order to secure the necessary space for the employment of the German
Luftwaffe in Africa. This represented a departure from the previous
Italian plan, which had been limited to holding the Tripoli defence line,

lf rhe German Command had reports of a possible revolt in the unoccupied zone of
France. It was planned in that case to enter and occupy the whole South of France
the moment any such rising occurred.

Rommel talking with Major-General Gambler-Parry, commander of the
British 2nd Armoured Division, who was captured with his headquarters at
MechilL The bare-headed officer with dark glasses is Colonel Tounghusband,
his G.S.O.r. [Photograph taken with Rommel s camera]

The Fieseler Storch used by Rommel [RommeVs own photograph]

&gt;-;"f (/ l7 ", -ni i-y;; , , . ,," ,^ , ^^ 8 f{T f^&lt;,4 , ij ^ i

Tracks south of Tobruk,
Summer

Another type of desert
terrain photographed by
Rommel during a
reconnaissance

&lt;ik %
, jfe/^ ;l ^ ; ;;

^ a

THE FIRST ROUND 99

The Italian motorised forces in North Africa were to be placed under
y command, while I myself was to be subordinate to Marshal Gra^anu
In the afternoon I reported to the Fuehrer, who gave me a detailed
account of the situation in Africa and informed me that I had been
recommended to him as the man who would most quickly adapt hunsdf
to Stogether different conditions of the African theatre. The Fuehrers
chief adjutant, Colonel Schmundt, was to accompany me for the
first stare of my tour of reconnaissance. I was advised to start by
SenSS the German troops in the area round Tripoli so that they
3 go into action as one body. In the evening the Fuehrer showed
me a number of British and American illustrated papers describing
General WaveU s advance through Cyrenaica Of particular mterest
wa? the masterly co-ordination these showed between armoured land
forces, air force and navy.

6 Feb. 1941

D TSed 1 a tStaaken I2 .45. First to ObxLH.
who appointed me to my new job, and then to F. \Fuehrer\ Things
are moving fast. My kit is coming on here. I can only take barest
neceSwith me/Perhaps I ll be able to get the rest out soon.
rneed not^ell you how my head is swimming wiji all the many
thfngs Sere are to be done. It ll be months before anything

^So ^our leave was cut short again. Don t be sad, it had to be.
The new job is very big and important. . . .

7 Feb. 1941

Slept on my new job last night. Q**f** ff f w
rheumatism treatment.)^ I ve got a terrible lot to do, in the few
hours that remain, getting together all I need.
On the morning of the nth February I reported to General Guzzoni^
Chief ofStafF of the Commando Supremo [ Jfciw], where Ae plan to
She dSfnce of Tripolitania into the Gulf of Sirte ^ --kte

s?^& wh - -- -^- ^-

Africa.

IOO THE WAR IN AFRICA FIRST YEAR

British troops in the outer environs of Tripoli. As the first German
division would not be complete in Africa until the middle of April, its
help would come too late if the enemy continued his offensive. Something
had to be done at once to bring the British offensive to a halt.

I therefore asked General Geissler to attack the port of Benghazi
that night and to send bombers next morning to attack the British
columns south-west of the town. General Geissler would not at first hear
of it apparently the Italians had asked him not to bomb Benghazi, as
many Italian officers and civil officials owned houses there. I had no
patience with this, and so Colonel Schmundt communicated with the
Fuehrer s H.Q. that night and received authority to go ahead. A few
hours later the first German bombers took off on their mission to cripple
the British supply traffic to Benghazi.

At about 10 o clock next morning [isth February], our reconnaissance
party took off from Catania, heading for Tripoli. Flying low across the
water, we met numerous flights of German Junkers on the way back
from Tripoli, probably engaged on supply duties for the German Air
Force already in Africa. We landed at about midday at Castel Benito,
south of Tripoli. Lieut. Heggenreiner, Liaison Officer of the German
General in Rome 1 to the Italian High Command in North Africa,
received us with the news that Marshal Graziani had given up the High
Command and handed over to his Chief of Staff, General Gariboldi.
Heggenreiner briefly put me in the picture concerning the set-up of the
Italian forces in Africa and described some very unpleasant incidents
which had occurred during the retreat, or rather the rout which it had
become. Italian troops had thrown away their weapons and ammunition
and clambered on to overloaded vehicles in a wild attempt to get away
to the west. This had led to some ugly scenes, and even to shooting.
Morale was as low as it could be in all military circles in Tripoli. Most
of the Italian officers had already packed their bags and were hoping
for a quick return trip to Italy.

At about 13.00 hours I reported to General Gariboldi and put him
in the picture concerning my mission. He showed little enthusiasm for
the plan to establish a defence in the Sirte. With the help of a map I
explained to him the outline of my scheme for defending Tripolitania.
Its main features were not a step farther back, powerful Luftwaffe
support and every available man to be thrown in for the defence of the
Sirte sector, including the first German contingents as soon as they
landed. It was my belief that if the British could detect no opposition
they would probably continue their advance, but that if they saw that
they were going to have to fight another battle they would not simply
attack which would have been their proper course but would first
wait to build up supplies. With the time thus gained I hoped to build

General von Rintelen, German Military Attach^ in Rome and the representative
of the German Supreme Command with the Italian Supreme Command.

THE FIRST ROUND IOI

up our own strength until we were eventually strong enough to withstand
the enemy attack.

Gariboldi looked very dubious about it all. He was extremely
discouraged by the defeat and advised me to have a look at the Sirte
country first, because, having only just arrived, I could hardly be
expected to have any idea of the difficulties of this theatre, I impressed
on him as strongly as I could that we could only come to their help if
they really made up their minds to hold the Sirte. " It won t take me
long to get to know the country/ I added. " I ll have a look at it from
the air this afternoon and report back to the High Command this
evening."

I had already decided, in view of the tenseness of the situation and
the sluggishness of the Italian command, to depart from my instructions
to confine myself to a reconnaissance and to take the command at the
front into my own hands as soon as possible, at the latest after the arrival
of the first German troops. General von Rintelen, to whom I had given
a hint of my intention in Rome, had advised me against it, for, as he
put it, that was the way to lose both honour and reputation.

That afternoon, our H.E. in carried Colonel Schmundt and myself
over the soil of Africa. After seeing the field fortifications and the deep
anti-tank ditches east of Tripoli, we flew across a belt of sand which had
the appearance of , being difficult country for either wheeled or tracked
vehicles and of thus forming a good natural obstacle in front of Tripoli.
The flight continued over the hilly country between Tarhuna and Horns
not, as far as we could see, particularly suitable territory for motorised
forces. The level plain between Horns and Misurata, on die other hand,
looked ideal for that purpose. The Via Balbia stretched away like a black
thread through the desolate landscape, in which neither tree nor bush
could be seen as far as the eye could reach. We passed Buerat, a small
desert fort with a few huts and a landing stage. Finally, we circled over
the white houses of Sirte and saw Italian troops in position east and south
east of the village.

Apart from the salt marshes between Sirte and Buerat, which only
extended a few miles to the south, there was not a single break, such as
a ravine or deep valley, anywhere in the landscape. The flight confirmed
me in my plan to fortify Sirte and the country on either side of the coast
road and to reserve the motorised forces for the mobile defence.

When we met General Gariboldi that evening to report on the results
of our reconnaissance, General Roatta had already arrived and brought
the Duce s new directive. Nothing more was now put in the way of my
plan.

Next day, the X Italian Corps, consisting of the Brescia and Pavia
Divisions, was to move forward to the Sirte-Buerat area and establish a
defence. In its wake, the Ariete, which at that time possessed only 60
tanks of completely obsolete design (they were far too light and had

IO2 THE WAR IN AFRICA FIRST YEAR

once been used to chase the natives round Abyssinia), was to take
up position west of Buerat. For the time being these were all the
forces we could muster. The movement of even these formations was a
headache for the Italian High Command, for they did not have enough
transport for the lift and the road from Tripoli to Buerat was 250 miles
long.

We could not therefore expect these Italian formations to arrive at
the front very quickly, which meant that the only force we had im
mediately available with which to hold up the enemy apart from the
weak Italian garrison at Sirte was the German Luftwaffe. The Luft-
-waffe Commander Afrika General Froehlich was accordingly asked
to undertake this task, after it had been impressed on him how vitally
important it was for the future of the African theatre. The commander
of X Luftwaffe Korps was asked to provide support. With the limited
forces available to them they did all they could, day and night, to help
us out of our predicament, and not without success, for General WavelPs
army remained at El Agheila.

A few days later I flew to Sirte to inspect the Italians holding the
line there. They amounted to perhaps one regiment of troops and were
well led by Major Santa Maria and Colonel Grati. This unit was the
only force we had immediately available to oppose the British and our
anxiety about the situation will be easily understood. The rest of our
troops were standing nearly 200 miles away to the west.

At my insistence, the first Italian division was put on the march for
Sirte on die I4th of February. On the same day the first German units
3rd Reconnaissance Battalion and an anti-tank battalion arrived in
Tripoli harbour. With the situation so dangerous, I pressed for their
rapid disembarkation, and asked that it should be continued throughout
the night, by lamplight. The danger of enemy air attack simply had to
be accepted.

The all-night unloading of this 6,ooo~ton transport was a record for
the port of Tripoli. The men received their tropical kit early next
morning, and by eleven o clock were fallen in on the square in front of
Government House. They radiated complete assurance of victory, and
the change of atmosphere did not pass unnoticed in Tripoli. After a short
march past, Baron von Wechmar [commanding the 3rd Reconnaissance
Battalion] moved off with his men to Sirte and arrived at the front 26
hours later. On the i6th, German reconnaissance troops, working with
Santa Maria s column, made their first move against the enemy. I now
took over command at the front. Colonel Schmundt had returned to the
Fuehrer s H.Q. several days before.

14 Feb. 1941
DEAREST Lu,

All going as well as I could wish. I hope to be able to pull it off.

THE FIRST ROUND 103

I m very well. There s nothing whatever for you to worry about.
A lot to do. I ve already had a thorough look round.

17 Feb. 1941
Everything s splendid with me and mine in this glorious sunshine^

I m getting on very, very well with the Italian Command and

couldn t wish for better co-operation.

My lads are already at the front, which has been moved about

350 miles to the east. As far as I am concerned they can come now.

Through my daily flights between Tripoli and the front, I came to
know Tripolitania very well from the air and formed a great admiration
for the colonising achievement of the Italians. They had left their mark
all over the country, particularly round Tripoli, Tarhuna and Horns.

Day by day now, more columns of Italian and German troops moved
up to the front. Despite Italian advice to the contrary, the Afrika Korps*
Quartermaster (Major Otto), a first-class man, organised supplies along
the coast by small ships, thus considerably easing the pressure on our
lorry columns. The Italians had unfortunately never built a railway
along the coast. It would now have been of immense value.

To enable us to appear as strong as possible and to induce the
maximum caution in the British, I had the workshops three miles south of
Tripoli produce large numbers of dummy tanks, which were mounted
on Volkswagen {the German People s Car] and were deceptively like the
original. On the i7th February the enemy was very active and I feared
that he would continue his offensive towards Tripoli. This impression
was strengthened on the i8th, when we established the presence of further
British units between El Agheila and Agedabia. To give them in turn
an impression of activity on our part, I decided to push forward 3rd
Reconnaissance Battalion, reinforced by the Battalion Santa Maria and
with 39th Anti-tank Battalion under command, as far as the Nofilia
area, with instructions to make contact with the enemy.

On the 24th February, the first clash occurred between British and
German troops in Africa. Two enemy scout cars, a lorry and a car were
destroyed, and three British soldiers, including an officer, taken prisoner,
with no casualties on our side. Meanwhile, the movement of further
units of the 5th Light Division to the front proceeded as planned.

We were still rather suspicious about the British moves and to clarify
the situation, General Streich, commander of the 5th Light Division who
had taken over command at the front advanced up to the defile of
Mugtaa on the 4th March and closed it with mines. He saw nothing of
the enemy.

This move gained us a sector of some importance and materially
strengthened our position. The salt marsh known as Sebcha el Chebira
extends here 20 miles south of the Via Balbia and is impassable to

IO4 THE WAR IN AFRICA FIRST YEAR

vehicles except at a few points, which we very soon mined. An enemy
frontal attack against the narrows would have been comparatively easy
to beat off, and an outflanking movement, which would have involved
him in a long march oyer sandy and difficult country, was not very likely.
At Mugtaa we were already some 500 miles east of Tripoli. For our
coastal supply traffic we had gained the small port of Ras el Ali like
all those places with high-sounding names, this was in reality a desolate
and miserable hole to which the quartermasters very soon began sending
stores.

5 March 1941
DEAREST Lu,

Just back from a two-day journey or rather flight to the front,
which is now 450 miles away to the east. Everything going fine.

A lot to do. Can t leave here for the moment as I couldn t^ be
answerable for my absence. Too much depends on my own person
and my driving power. I hope you ve had some post from me.

My troops are on their way. Speed is the one thing that matters
here. The climate suits me down to the ground. I even " overslept "
this morning till after 6. ...

... A gala performance of " Victory in the West * u was given
here to-day. In welcoming the guests there were a lot, some with
ladies I said I hoped the day would come when we d be showing
" Victory in Africa." . . .

Our operations against Mugtaa resulted in a British withdrawal
eastward and we now supposed their main body to be lying round
Agedabia and along the coast to Derna.

The British forces had been reduced in number, and quality, to a greater
extent than Rommel realised. At the end of February the illustrious jth Armoured
Division had been sent back to Egypt to rest and refit. Its place had been taken by
half of the 2nd Armoured Division, raw from home the other half having been
sent to Greece. The 6th Australian Division had also been replaced by the gth
Australian Division, but part of this was kept back at Tobruk because of maintenance
difficulties farther forward. Besides lacking experience, the new formations had
also been stripped of much equipment and transport for the benefit of the expedition
to Greece. Moreover, O Connor had gone back to Egypt and been relieved by a
commander, General Neame, who was without experience of mechanised desert
warfare.

In taking such risks for the sake of giving " maximum support " to the Greek
venture, Wavell based himself on the belief that the " Italians in Tripolitania
could be disregarded and that the Germans were unlikely to accept the risk of sending
large bodies of armoured troops to Africa in view of the inefficiency of the Italian

." He was correct in his general estimate of the attitude of the German High

1 Film of the 1940 French campaign, made by German propaganda companies.

THE FIRST ROUND 105

Command, and also in his detailed estimate that only the equivalent of " one armoured
brigade " (.. the $th Panzer Regiment) had been landed. On normal reasoning
Wavell was justified in his conclusion of the 2nd March: " / do not think that with
this force he (the enemy) will attempt to recover Benghazi" But such reckoning
did not allow for a Rommel.

Enemy attempts to strangle our supplies by naval action in the
Mediterranean and air attack against Tripoli achieved no great success
at this stage. On the nth March, the 5th Panzer Regiment completed
its disembarkation in Tripoli; this force with its for those days up-to-
date equipment made a tremendous impression on the Italians. 1

On the 1 3th March, I moved my H.Q. up to Sirte in order to be
closer to the front. My original intention was to fly to Sirte in a Ghibli 2
aircraft with my Chief of Staff. After taking off, however, we ran into
sandstorms near Tauorga, whereat the pilot, ignoring my abuse and
attempts to get him to fly on, turned back, compelling me to continue
the journey by car from the airfield at Misurata. Now we realised what
little idea we had had of the tremendous force of such a storm. Immense
clouds of reddish dust obscured all visibility and forced the car s speed
down to a crawl. Often the wind was so strong that it was impossible
to drive along the Via Balbia. Sand streamed down the windscreen like
water. We gasped in breath painfully through handkerchiefs held over
our faces and sweat poured off our bodies in the unbearable heat. So
this was the Ghibli. Silently I breathed my apologies to the pilot. A
Luftwaffe officer crashed in a sandstorm that day.

On the 1 5th of March, a mixed German and Italian force, under the
command of Count Schwerin, moved out from Sirte towards Murzuch
[about 450 miles to the south]. The Italian High Command had asked us
to undertake this operation because General de Gaulle s troops in
southern Libya were beginning to become a nuisance. As far as we were
concerned, however, the main purpose of the move was to gain experience
of long marches and in particular to test the suitability of our equipment
for African conditions. Shortly afterwards the whole of the Brescia
Division arrived in the line at Mugtaa and the 5th Light Division was
freed for mobile employment.

On the igth March I flew to the Fuehrer s H.Q. to report and obtain
fresh instructions. The Fuehrer made me a retrospective award of the
Oakleaves 3 for the 7th Panzer Division s actions in France. The C.-in-C.
of the Army [von Brauchitsch] informed me that there was no intention of
striking a decisive blow in Africa in the near future, and that for the

ir The 5th Panzer Regiment was equipped with 120 tanks, but of these only 60 were
medium tanks (Panzer III and IV). In addition, the Italian Ariete Division advanced
with 80 tanks all that were serviceable at the time.

2 The name of an Italian aircraft. Ghibli is also the Arabic word for sandstorm, in
which sense it is used later in this passage.

8 See footnote on page 39.

106 THE WAR IN AFRICA FIRST YEAR

present I could expect no reinforcements. After the arrival of the 15th
Panzer Division at the end of May, I was to attack and destroy the
enemy round Agedabia. Benghazi might perhaps be taken. I pointed
out that we could not just take Benghazi, but would have to occupy the
whole of Cyrenaica, as the Benghazi area could not be held by itself.
I was not very happy at the efforts of Field Marshal von Brauchitsch
and Colonel-General Haider to keep down the numbers of troops sent
to Africa and leave the future of this theatre of war to chance. The
momentary British weakness in North Africa should have been exploited
with the utmost energy, in order to gain the initiative once and for all for
ourselves.

In my opinion it was also wrong not to risk a landing in England
in 1940-41. If ever there was a chance for this operation to succeed it
was in the period after the British Expeditionary Force had lost its equip
ment. From then on the operation became steadily more difficult to
undertake, and undertaken it eventually had to be, if the war against
Britain was to be won.

Before my departure, I had instructed the 5th Light Division to
prepare an attack on El Agheila for the 24th March, with the object of
taking the airfield and small fort, and driving out the present garrison.
A short time before, the Marada Oasis, some distance to the south, had
been occupied by a mixed Italian and German force. This force now
had to be maintained and our supply columns were being constantly
molested by the British from El Agheila.

Accordingly, after my return to Africa, 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion
took the fort, water points and airfield at El Agheila in the early hours
of the 24th March. The garrison, which consisted of only a weak force,
had strongly mined the whole place and withdrew skilfully in face of our
attack.

After our capture of El Agheila, the British outposts as we learnt
from the Luftwaffe appeared to fall back to the defile at Mersa el Brega.

26 March 1941
DEAREST Lu,

Spent our first day by the sea. It s a very lovely place and it s
as good as being in a hotel in my comfortable caravan. Bathe in
the sea in the mornings, it s already beautifully warm. Aldinger
and Guenther [RommePs A.D.C. and batman respectively] living in
a tent close by. We make coffee in the mornings in our own
kitchen. Yesterday an Italian General, Calvi de Bergolo, made
me a present of a bournous. It s a magnificent thing blue-black
with red silk and embroidery. It would do well for you as a theatre
cloak. . . .

Little fresh from the front. I have to hold the troops back to
prevent them bolting forward, They ve taken another new position,

THE FIRST ROUND IOJ

20 miles farther east. There ll be some worried faces among our
Italian friends.

THE RAID THROUGH CYRENAIGA

The defile at Mersa el Brega was the first objective for the attack which
we were due to launch in May on the enemy forces round Agedabia.
After the British had been driven out of El Agheila, they established
themselves on the commanding heights at Mersa el Brega and south of
the salt marsh at Bir es Suera, and began to build up their position.
It was with some misgivings that we watched their activities, because if
they had once been allowed time to build up, wire and mine these
naturally strong positions, they would then have possessed the counter
part of our position at Mugtaa, which was difficult either to assault or to
outflank round the south. The country south of the Wadi Faregh, some
20 or 30 miles south of Mersa el Brega, was extremely sandy and almost
impassable for vehicles. I was therefore faced with the choice of either
waiting for the rest of my troops to arrive at the end of May which
would have given the British time to construct such strong defences
that it would have been very difficult for our attack to achieve the
desired result or of going ahead with our existing small forces to attack
and take the Mersa el Brega position in its present undeveloped state. I
decided for the latter. It was, in fact, fair to expect that an attack by
even our relatively weak forces would give us the defile. The Mersa el
Brega position was just as well suited for our purpose as that at Mugtaa
and would at the same time provide us with a suitable assembly and
forming-up area for the May attack. A further argument in favour of
an immediate move was that our water supply had recently been so bad
that it was essential to open up new wells. An operation against Mersa
el Brega would give us access to plentiful water-bearing land.

On the 3ist March our attack moved forward against the British
positions at Mersa el Brega, and a fierce engagement took place in the
early hours of the morning with British reconnaissance troops at Maaten
Bescer. In the afternoon, troops of the 5th Light Division attacked the
Mersa el Brega position proper, which was stubbornly defended by the
British. Our attack came to a halt.

I spent the whole day on the battlefield with Aldinger and my Chief
of Staff, Lieut.-Col. von dem Borne, and in the afternoon reconnoitred
the possibility of attacking north of the coast road. The 8th M.G.
Battalion was put in at this point late in the evening and in a dashing
attack through rolling sandhills, succeeded in throwing the enemy back
to the east and taking possession of the Mersa el Brega defile.

The 5th Light Division s success was not reported to Corps until the
morBing. The British had apparently beaten a somewhat precipitate

THE FIRST ROUND IOQ

retreat, and 50 Bren-carriers and about 30 lorries had faEen into our
hands. For the ist April, I ordered our forces to close up in the area
Mersa el Brega and Maaten Giofer.

Luftwaffe reports clearly showed that the enemy was tending to
draw back and this was confirmed by reconnaissance patrols which
General Streich had sent out. It was a chance I could not resist and I
gave orders for Agedabia to be attacked and taken, in spite of the fact
that our instructions were not to undertake any such operation before
the end of May. Accordingly, on the 2nd of April, the 5th Light Division
moved forward on either side of the Via Balbia to Agedabia. The enemy
minefields gave us little trouble. The Italians followed along the coast
road. Agedabia was taken in the afternoon after a short action and our
forward units then pushed on rapidly to the Zuetina area. Meanwhile,
5th Panzer Regiment, which formed the main weight of our attack south
of the Via Balbia, ran up against British tanks and a skirmish developed.
Soon seven enemy tanks were burning on the battlefield. We lost only
three. In this action the enemy used a very effective camouflage in the
form of Arab tents, which enabled them to come into action unexpectedly.

By the time evening came we had occupied the country round
Agedabia up to a point 1 2 miles to the east. The Italians closed up again.
On the 3rd April I shifted my forward H.Q. to Agedabia and watched
the enemy s movements. He was now withdrawing generally and seemed
to be evacuating Cyrenaica. Apparently he was under the impression
that we were extremely strong, an impression in which our dummy tanks
had probably played a big part.

Wavell became anxious about the risks he had taken from the moment Rommel s
advanced force retook El Agheila. Neame was instructed to fall back on a position
near Benghazi if he was pressed, and given permission to evacuate the port if
necessary. Immediately after the capture of Agedabia on the 2nd April, hurried
orders were given for the abandonment of Benghazi, and a retreat eastward, with
the idea of keeping the forces intact. But in the confusion of the retreat they soon
disintegrated.

During the morning, a report came in that a force of 20 enemy tanks
was located some 20 miles north of Agedabia and I instructed Lieut. Berndt 1
to check its accuracy. He drove up the Benghazi road as far as Magrun,
identified them as abandoned Italian tanks and came back.

By -this time we had taken 800 British prisoners. The British apparently
intended to avoid, in any circumstances, fighting a decisive action; so,
that afternoon, I decided to stay on the heels of the retreating enemy
and make a bid to seize the whole of Cyrenaica at one stroke. With this
intention, I immediately put an advance party of the Ariete, under the
command of Colonel Fabris, on the march for Ben Gania and gave orders
to the 5th Light Division to push 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion forward

1 Alfred Ingemar Berndt, an official of the Propaganda Ministry attached to Rommel s
force.

110 THE WAR IN AFRICA FIRST YEAR

along the Via Balbia towards Benghazi, General Streich had some
misgivings on account of the state of his vehicles, but I could not allow
this to affect the issue. One cannot permit unique opportunities to slip
by for the sake of trifles.

I had been told by the Italian General, Zamboni, that the track from
Agedabia to Giof el Matar was an absolute death- trap, and he had done
his best to dissuade me from sending troops through Cyrenaica over that
route. However, I placed more faith in my own observation and set off
with my A.D.C., Lieut. Aldinger, in the direction of Giof el Matar.
After 12 miles we reached the head of the Italian Reconnaissance
Battalion Santa Maria, which was attached to Fabris s force. The
battalion was advancing, extremely well deployed in area formation.
The ground was quite good for driving and caused us no particular
difficulty.

On returning to my H.Q,. at about 16.00 hours, I learnt that the
5th Light Division were saying they needed four days to replenish their
petrol. This seemed to me to be utterly excessive and I immediately
gave orders for the division to unload all its vehicles and send them off at
once to the divisional dump at Arco dei Fileni, whence they were to
bring up sufficient petrol, rations and ammunition for the advance
through Cyrenaica inside 24 hours. It meant the division being im
mobilised for 24 hours but with the enemy withdrawing, this was a risk
we could afford to take.

Meanwhile, it was becoming increasingly clear that the enemy
believed us to be far stronger than we actually were a belief that it was
essential to maintain, by keeping up the appearance of a large-scale
offensive. Of course I was not at that moment in any position to press
hard after the enemy with my main force, but it looked as though we
should be able to maintain enough pressure with our advance troops
to keep him on the run. In 24 hours time I hoped to be able to move
up stronger forces, which I intended to concentrate on the southern
flank, with the object of pushing through Ben Gania to Tmimi,
thereby cutting off and putting out of action as many British troops as
possible.

That evening I drove north to see how things were going with 3rd
Reconnaissance Battalion, which had been sent off in the direction of
Benghazi. On coming up with them in the region of Magrun I was
informed by von Wechmar that he had not so far made any contact with
British troops. He had been informed by an Italian priest, who had come
out from Benghazi to meet them, that the enemy had already left the
town. At von Wechmar s request I immediately sent the battalion
forward to Benghazi.

On our way back to Agedabia we came across a German vehicle
which was apparently manned by British officers. We did not bother to
stop, assuming that they would be picked up by 3rd Reconnaissance

THE FIRST ROUND III

Battalion, which is what in fact did happen. We heard later that the
Tommies had ambushed a German driver north-west of Agedabia and
taken his vehicle in the hope of making their way through to their own
troops in Cyrenaica. After their gallant attempt one could almost have
wished them success. However, they were unlucky.

On my return to H.Q. I met the Italian Commander-in-Chief,
General Gariboldi, who was by no means pleased about the course of
the action to date, and berated me violently, principally because our
operations were in direct contradiction to orders from Rome. He added
that the supply situation was far too insecure to enable anyone to take
responsibility for such an operation, or for its consequences. He wanted
me to discontinue all action and undertake no further moves without
his express authority.

I had made up my mind to stand out from the start for the greatest
possible measure of operational and tactical freedom and, what is more,
had no intention of allowing good opportunities to slip by unused. As a
result the conversation became somewhat heated. I stated my views
plainly and without equivocation. General Gariboldi wanted to get
authority from Rome first. But that way days could go by unused; I
was not going to stand for it, and said that I intended to go on doing what
I felt I had to in whatever situation might arise. This brought the
argument to a climax. At that very moment, a signal arrived deus ex
machina from the German High Command, giving me complete freedom
of action, and settling the argument exactly as I wanted it*

Von Wechmar s battalion moved into Benghazi during the night of
the 3rd April, amid great jubilation from the civil population. The
British had set fire to all their stores.

3 April 1941
DEAREST Lu,

We ve been attacking since the 3ist with dazzling success. There ll
be consternation amongst our masters in Tripoli and Rome, perhaps
in Berlin too. I took the risk against all orders and instructions
because the opportunity seemed favourable. No doubt it will all be
pronounced good later and they ll all say they d have done exactly
the same in my place. We ve already reached our first objective,
which we weren t supposed t6 get to until the end of May. The
British are falling over each other to get away. Our casualties small.
Booty can t yet be estimated. You will understand that I can t sleep
for happiness.

Early next morning, a detachment of the Brescia to the strength of
one reinforced regiment set out for Benghazi in order to free 3rd Recon
naissance Battalion for further operations. The main body of the 5th
Light Division was to move forward through Ben Gania, and its leading

112 THE WAR IN AFRICA - FIRST YEAR

battalion, under Count Schwerin s command, was strengthened. The
Ariete was detailed to push forward over the same route as far as Bir
Tengeder and then to turn off north to take El Mechili. Speed was now
everything. We wanted at all costs to bring some part of the British force
to battle before they had all managed Jto withdraw from Gyrenaica and
thus escape the danger threatening them.

On the 4th April, I visited Benghazi with the Chief of Staff and
Aldinger and sent off the Reconnaissance Battalion, strengthened by a
Panzer company, through Regima and Charruba to Mechili. In the
afternoon I flew in a Junkers there being no Storch serviceable over
Ben Gania and towards Tengeder. Columns were rolling eastwards along
the track raising great pillars of dust. I thought I could identify our
leading units 1 2 miles east of Gania.

That evening, the enemy s dispositions appeared to be roughly as
follows :

Small bodies of their troops were located east of Ben Gania, while
other British forces continued to hold Msus. During the evening 3rd
Reconnaissance Battalion had made contact with a weak enemy force
at Regima and thrown it back. The British main body was in full
retreat and was evacuating Cyrenaica.

4 April 1941
DEAREST Lu,

Congratulations have come from the Fuehrer for the unexpected
success, plus a directive for further operations which is in full accord
with my own ideas. Our territory is expanding and now we can
manoeuvre.

Next morning [j*A Afirif] I alerted the KampfstaffeP- of the Afrika
Korps at 04.00 hours and put it on the march for Ben Gania. I intended,
as soon as the situation permitted, to go up to the forward units myself,
take over command and personally lead the advance on Tmimi or
Mechili.

I now took a look from my Storch at the progress of the advance to
Ben Gania and, after my return, talked over with Major Schleusener
how best to get up the heavy supply columns. We had some doubts
about using the rather difficult road through Ben Gania and decided
that we might get supplies up through Solluch to Mechili.

The Luftwaffe reported that the British retreat was continuing. At
about midday I ordered Colonel Olbrich to move forward immediately
with a strong force of armour, consisting of 5th Panzer Regiment and 40

1 The Kampfsteffel, not to be confused with the Gefechkstqffd (see note on page 15)
was a unit formed for the protection of the Corps or Army headquarters. It was normally
of company strength at Corps level and battalion strength at Army. During the course
of the African campaign the Kampfstaffel came to be used more and more as a combat
group for special tasks.

THE FIRST ROUND

Italian tanks, through Magrun and Solluch to Msus, destroy the enemy
there and go on to Mechili.

5 April
DEAREST Lu,

Off at 4 this morning. Things are happening in Africa. Let s
hope the great stroke we ve now launched is successful. Pm keeping
very fit. The simple life here suits me better than the fleshpots of
France. How are things with you both? . . .

At about 14.00 hours that afternoon I took off in a Junkers and flew
to Ben Gania. After landing, I heard from the Luftwaffe that there were
no longer any British to be seen in the area of Mechili and to its south.
Schwerin s column thereupon received the order: " Mechili clear of
enemy. Make for it. Drive fast. Rommel." The remainder of our
forward troops were also switched to Mechili. I myself flew off with
Aldinger in the afternoon to take over personal command of the leading
units. Towards evening we flew back to look for the th Light Division s
columns, which we discovered making good speed to the north-east.
Shortly afterwards we also found my Generalsstajjel* I now sent the
Storch back and drove up the track in my " Mammoth " 2 to Ben Gania
in order to get my own idea of the difficulty of the march. Two and a
half hours later, completely covered in dust, we reached the airfield
where I was informed that the 5th Light Division had been switched to
Mechili. Shortly afterwards, Lieut. Schulz arrived back from a recon
naissance flight and reported that Mechili and its surroundings were
now held by strong British forces. Earlier in the day Major Heymer had
been sent on a mission with two aircraft to mine the tracks east of Mechili.
He had not yet returned. My Ic, 8 Captain Baudissin, had been shot
down in a H.E. Ill and taken prisoner by the enemy.

It was now night and too late to fly back to Agedabia. In view of
the new and rather less favourable situation, I decided to drive up to the
5th Light Division and take over command of the operation myself.

We drove at first with headlights. Every now and again we had to
pick our way past minefields, which we located by the burning vehicles
standing at their edges. At about midnight, our long and brilliantly
lit column, winding its way through the desert, was suddenly attacked
by British aircraft. No damage was suffered, however, and we went on
our way, this time without lights. At about three in the morning we

1 Another term for the GefechtsstaffeL

2 Rommers armoured command vehicle which had been captured from the British
near Agheila.

*In the German Army, " Ic " is the Intelligence branch of the General Staff. The
term is also used, as here, to denote the chief representative of that branch on the staff
of any formation, high or low.

THE WAR IN AFRICA FIRST YEAR

reached the head of the 5th Light Division s column, where we found
the commander. The column halted and we discovered that we had
missed our route. According to the speedometer reading we should
have been in Bir Tengeder long before. There was nothing in sight.

Shortly afterwards two German aircraft flew over from the north, a
Henschel and a Storch. They recognised us and landed in spite of the
rough and stony ground. It was Major Heymer and his men their task
accomplished. After landing on the airfield at Mechili just before night
fall and mining the tracks leading to the east, they had lain all night a
few yards away from their aircraft, keeping watch on the British traffic.
When morning dawned, they had discovered that British troops had
taken up position close beside them, but had managed to reach their
aircraft in a sharp sprint and take off unmolested. For the rest, they
reported that Mechili was strongly held, with heavy vehicle traffic to the
east. There was now no time to lose, otherwise the bird would be flown.
As we were still about 12 miles from Mechili I instructed Lieut. Behrend
to push forward at top speed with his small combat team to the Mechili-
Derna track and close it at a suitable point. Lieut. -Col. Ponath, of whose
force there were unfortunately only 15 vehicles with us, was dispatched
to Derna, where he was to close the Via Balbia to both directions. Soon
Count Schwerin arrived with part of his force and he too received orders
to block the tracks leading out of Mechili to the east.

At about 07.30 hours, Lieut. Schulz landed at Corps H.Q,. and
reported the presence of 300 British vehicles at Mechili. General Streich
also arrived shortly afterwards and I informed him of my intentions.
Then I drove off with my staff to Count Schwerin s command post. On
the way we saw numerous British tank tracks in the sand, all going east.

Unfortunately, we were unable to launch the attack we had planned
on Mechili on the 6th April with Fabris s force attacking from the east
and Schwerin s from the south and south-east as Fabris did not arrive
in the hills east of Mechili until the evening. I had no reports at all that
evening from a large part of the Corps, distances having become too
great for wireless communication.

Colonel Olbrich s column reported to my la [operations chieQ who was
still in Agedabia, that sandstorms and shortage of petrol had badly held
up their progress through Msus. In spite of these delays they succeeded
in taking Msus in the late evening, and continued their march on towards
Mechili. At about 02.00 hours on the 7th April, Fabris s column reported
that they were completely out of petrol and were unable to get their
artillery into position. All petrol reserves held by Divisional H.Q. were
immediately collected together 35 cans in all and at 03.00 hours, I
set off with my Gefechtsstafd to get the artillery into position before
daybreak. In the pitch darkness, however there were not even any
stars we completely failed to find the column. Even when we repeated
our attempt next morning, we still had a great deal of trouble before we

THE FIRST ROUND 115

eventually found it. Among other vicissitudes, we ran into the rear of a
British outpost of several Bren-carriers. Although we had only three
vehicles, and only one of those was armed with a machine-gun, we drove
at top speed towards the enemy, raising a great cloud of dust which
prevented them seeing how many vehicles we had behind us. This
obviously rattled the enemy troops who hurriedly abandoned their
position.

After we had supplied the Italian vehicles with petrol, the fdrce
moved forward in area formation towards Mechili. Soon we came in
sight of Fort Mechili. Large numbers of enemy vehicles were parked
there and through glasses we were easily able to pick out the men standing
about in groups. I led Fabris s column to a point two miles north-east
of Mechili, where we halted and took up position. At first, the enemy
showed no sign of putting up a defence, and I sent Lieut. Grohne across
under a flag of truce with a summons to the British commander to
surrender. Of course he refused.

Unfortunately, we had seen no sign yet of Olbrich s force. He should
have arrived at Mechili long ago, and I took off in my Storch later that
morning to look for him. We flew at 2,000 feet across the sandy plain
and soon approached the hills near Mecliili. West of the fort I suddenly
saw long black columns of vehicles, which I took for Olbrich s. Several
men laid out a landing cross between the vehicles. At the last moment
I suddenly spotted the flat helmets of British troops. We immediately
banked and made off, followed by machine-gun fire from the British
troops. We were lucky to get away practically unscathed, with only one
hit in the tail. After that episode, we flew on west at a great height. Some
15 to 20 miles south-west of Mechili, we saw a number of small vehicles
travelling east. Their German markings could be clearly identified. I
landed and found part of 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion, which I im
mediately put on the right road. After taking off again I discovered
several columns of German and Italian tanks 15 to 20 miles farther south.
I landed and pitched into them for being so slow. Apparently the leading
vehicles, while crossing a dried-out salt marsh, had seen what appeared
to be a wide stretch of water away to the east and turned back. It was,
of course, only a mirage a common enough occurrence in that district.
I now ordered them to press on forward as fast as they could.

After returning to H.Q. I waited in vain for the arrival of Olbrich s
force. Finally, in the afternoon I took off in my Storch to look for them
again. Black smoke was rising from the hill at Mechili probably a
British vehicle on fire. At one point we crossed a new track on which
British vehicles were streaming off to the south-east. The Tommies took
cover when they saw the Storch, but did not open fire. There was
nothing to be seen anywhere and it was obvious that Olbrich s force had
once again lost its way. But where? There were tracks in the salt marsh,
but these soon vanished in the stony country. I was extremely angry and

Il6 THE WAR IN AFRICA FIRST YEAR

decidedly worried, because the decision in eastern Cyrenaica depended
entirely on the early arrival of this force. The sun had already gone down
and we knew that it would be dark in an hour and a half. We now flew
north. At last I saw plumes of dust on the horizon. Grown wary after
the incident with the British landing cross, we flew cautiously up to the
column. German vehicles they were, however, and we landed near
Colonel Olbrich s staff. I was extremely angry about the unnecessary
detour they had made due, it is true, to their ignorance of the road
and ordered them to get on as f^st as they could. Flying by watch and
compass, we eventually found my H.Q. again and landed successfully in
spite of the darkness. During my absence British low-flying aircraft had
shot up an airstrip and set fire to several Junkers.

8 April 7941
DEAREST Lu,

I ve no idea whether the date is right. We ve been attacking for
days now in the endless desert and have lost all idea of space or time.
As you ll have seen from the communiques, things are going very well.

To-day will be another decisive day. Our main force is on its
way up after a sso-mile march over the sand and rock of the desert.
I flew back from the front yesterday to look for them and found
them in the desert. You can hardly imagine how pleased I was. It s
going to be a " Cannae ", modern style.

I m very well. You need never worry.

Our attack was now due to be launched on the following morning.
At about 06.00 hours on the 8th April, I flew off in my Storch to the
front east of Mechili in order to follow the course of action. Flying at
about 150 feet, we approached a Bersaglieri battalion which had been
brought up by Colonel Fabris the previous day. The Italians had
apparently never seen a Storch before and were so completely bewildered
by our sudden appearance over their heads that they fired on us from all
directions. At the range of 50 to 100 yards, it was a miracle that we were
not shot down, and it did not speak well for Italian marksmanship. We
swung round immediately and soon put a fold in the ground between
our allies and ourselves. Having no wish to be shot down by my own
Italians I had the aircraft climb to 3,000 feet, from where we observed
the situation in safety. The attack on Mechili was obviously making
progress. A large column of enemy vehicles was on the move from
Mechili to the west and we flew on in the hope of finding Olbrich s force,
which must at last be coming up. But there was still no sign of them.
We did sight an 88-mm. gun with its crew a mile or two west of the
British. Thinking we would find more of our troops there, we came in
to land and taxied in to a sandhill, where the Storch piled up. The gun
commander reported that his gun had been attacked and shot up by

THE FIRST ROUND 117

tanks the previous day. There were none of our troops about in the
neighbourhood and he had sent a man off in a truck to make contact
with our own forces. I asked him whether he could at least fire on the
approaching dust cloud, which was being raised by British vehicles. At
first he said he could, but then he discovered that the man who had
gone off in the truck had taken the firing-pin. The British vehicles,
driving in area formation, were getting steadily closer and it was obviously
high time for us to be off if we were not to find our way to Canada!
Luckily, the gun crew still had another Jorry left and we drove off in it
to the south-east, where we shortly found a salt marsh which I recognised
from my flights of the previous day. From there, we eventually found
our way back to Corps H.Q.

Immediately on my return I sent Major Heymer off with a Henschel
to look for Olbrich and his men, and bring them in at long last to Mechili.
Meanwhile, more and more of the Ariete were arriving and were im
mediately put on the march to Mechili. As nothing was yet known about
the progress of the attack, which had been going on since morning, I set
off for Mechili with a small staff, to see for myself. It is impossible to take
the correct decisions without accurate knowledge of the situation. We
had not gone far before we found ourselves in a violent sandstorm and were
forced to stop for a while on the next hill. Driving on compass bearing
through the raging sand, we at length succeeded in finding our way to
Mechili airfield. From there we groped our way along the telegraph wire
steadily closer to Mechili, which had meanwhile been taken by our troops.
As we heard later from General Streich, all British attempts to break out
to the east they had made several during the morning had collapsed
in the fire of the German and Italian artillery. The attack which our
infantry had launched with the few German tanks and A.A. guns, had
been successful. Meanwhile, Olbrich and his force had arrived.

At about 12.00 hours, I received a report from Lieut.-Col. Ponath,
who was barring the Via Balbia at Derna, that prisoners and booty were
mounting hourly, but that his fighting strength was now greatly weakened
and he urgently required reinforcements. I immediately sent off
Schwerin s and Olbrich s forces to Derna. The remainder of the 5th
Light Division was to hold the captured territory at Mechili. The Ariete
was also to assemble there for the present.

Schwerin s force moved off to Derna at about midday and I followed
shortly afterwards with my Fuehrungsstqffel 1 and the anti-aircraft platoon.
Just beyond the fort we ran into a sandstorm, which scattered the column
so badly that it was some time before it could be marshalled again.
Despite this delay, we managed, by fast driving, to reach Derna by 18.00
hours, where Ponath reported the capture of 800 prisoners, including to

iThe Fuehrungsstqffel consisted of the staff branches " la " (operations) and " Ic "
(intelligence). It was normally sited statically in the forward operations area while
Rommel himself exercised command on the move with his Gefechtsstajfel (see note,
page 15).

Il8 THE WAR IN AFRICA FIRST YEAR

my great joy, almost the whole of the British staff. Among them were
General P. Neame, C.-in-C. British Troops in Egypt and Transjordan,
and General O Connor, the man who had so roughly handled the Italian
Army. They had been rounded up and taken prisoner by motor-cycle
troops. 1 The Brescia had already arrived in Derna from Benghazi,
largely thanks to the energetic intervention of General Kirchheim, who
had accompanied their advance.

General von Prittwitz, commander of the 15th Panzer Division, part
of which had just arrived in Africa, was now instructed to take command
of the pursuit force and follow up the British to Tobruk. The 3rd
Reconnaissance Battalion, 8th M.G. Battalion arid 6o5th Anti-Tank
Battalion were put under his command. Not all this force had anived
yet, of course, but the machine-gun battalion had already refuelled and
was ready to continue the pursuit.

The re-conquest of Cyrenaica was now complete. 2 However, it still
seemed to me very important to remain on the enemy s heels, and, by
keeping the pressure up, persuade him to continue his retreat. Even
though judging by experience to date we could not expect to split off
and destroy any major part of the enemy army, we would have an
excellent spring-board in the Marmarica for a possible summer offensive
against Alexandria, quite apart of course from the high propaganda and
psychological value that the reconquest of the Italian colony would have,
especially among the Italians. There was now a good hope that normal
supply traffic would soon be established along the coast road.

Several of our units had unfortunately gone astray during the raid
through the desert. We organised search parties to find and bring in all
stragglers and had the desert combed by aircraft. A large fire, giving
out dense clouds of smoke, was kept going in Mechili.

10 April 1341
DEAREST Lu,

After a long desert march I reached the sea the evening before
last. It s wonderftd to have pulled this off against the British. I m
well. My caravan arrived at last early this morning and I m hoping
to sleep in it again.

^O Connor had been sent up to take over command from Ncame, but with charac
teristic consideration had preferred to act as adviser until the battle was over. The car
in which the two were travelling ran into a German patrol, when unescorted, and both
were captured.

2 In speaking of Cyrenaica, Germans and Italians apply that term to the western
part of the country, and describe the area east of Gazala as the Marmarica.

THE FIRST ROUND -

FIRST LESSONS

Probably never before in modern warfare had such a completely
unprepared offensive as this raid through Cyrenaica been attempted.
It had made tremendous demands on the powers of improvisation of both
command and troops, and in some cases commanders had been unable
to reach their objectives. One thing particularly evident had been the
tendency of certain commanders to permit themselves unnecessary delays
for refuelling and restocking with ammunition, or for a leisurely overhaul
of their vehicles, even when an immediate attack offered prospects of
success. The sole criterion for a commander in carrying out a given
operation must be the time he is allowed for it, and he must use all his
powers of execution to fulfil the task within that time. I had not demanded
too much on the march to Mechili; this was shown by the fact that
commanders who had used their initiative had achieved what I asked.
A commander s drive and energy often count for more than his in
tellectual powers a fact that is not generally understood by academic
soldiers, although for the practical man it is self-evident. Later in the
campaign, when I had had a chance to establish closer relations with the
troops, they were capable at all times of achieving what I demanded
of them.

Later on our advance came in for some criticism on grounds of
higher strategy. When General Paulus came to Africa he said that our
rapid and unplanned advance through Cyrenaica had caused the British
to withdraw their troops from Greece, a move which had been entirely
contrary to the intentions of the High Command. 1

To this I would point out: first, I knew nothing of the High Com
mand s plan for Greece, and, in any case, doubt very much whether we
could have trapped the British in Greece, assuming that they were in
the south-west at the time of the German attack. They were, as a rule,
always able to get their troops away by sea very quickly when it came
to the point. I need only quote Dunkirk, Andalsnes and, not least,
Greece itself, where the Royal Navy managed to get away to North
Africa or Crete by far the majority of the Empire troops known to have
been there at the time the German offensive opened.

1 General Paulus was then Oberquartierrneister /at O.K.H. a post best defined as Deputy
Chief of the General Staff. He was mistaken in his view that Rommel s rapid advance
in Cyrenaica led to the withdrawal of the British force from Greece. That was due to
the effect of Yugo-Slavia s rapid collapse under Blitzkrieg attack and the threat to the
British force s exposed western flank in Greece. As- soon as this happened, the Greek
authorities suggested that the force should be evacuated in order to spare Greece from
devastation. The British Commander and the Government promptly concurred. General
Wilson hurriedly retreated southward to the Peloponnese peninsula, resisting the tempta
tion to make a heroic stand at Thermopylae, while the Navy hastened to the rescue.
Three-quarters of the force were safely brought away, although nearly 12,000 were
left behind along with most of the equipment.

120 THE WAR IN AFRICA FIRST YEAR

Secondly, it is my view that it would have been better if we had
kept our hands off Greece altogether, and rather created a concentration
of strength in North Africa to drive the British right out of the Mediter
ranean area. The air forces we employed in Greece should have been
used for the protection of convoys to Africa, and every possibility of
gaining shipping space in the Mediterranean should have been exploited
to the full. Malta should have been taken instead of Crete. Powerful
German motorised forces in North Africa could then have taken the
whole of the British-occupied Mediterranean coastline, which would have
isolated south-eastern Europe. Greece, Yugoslavia and Crete would have
had no choice but to submit, for supplies and support from the British
Empire" would have been impossible. The price in casualties of this
scheme which would not only have achieved our aims in south-east
Europe, but would also have secured the Mediterranean area and the
Near East as sources of oil and bases for attack on Russia would not
have been much greater than the price we did in fact have to pay in Greece,
Yugoslavia, Crete and North Africa in the summer of 1941. But our
superiors had inhibitions about undertaking any major operation in a
theatre of war where supplies had to be brought up by sea, and the
circles where obsolete and outdated ideas were held in reverence fought
tooth and nail, both then and later, against any such operation.

The experience which I had gained during this advance through
Cyrenaica formed the main foundation for my later operations. I had
made heavy demands throughout the action, far more than precedent
permitted, and had thus created my own standards. One is forced again
and again to re-learn the fact that standards set by precedent are based
on something less than average performance, and, for that reason, one
should not submit to them.

The British had been completely deceived as to our real strength.
Their moves would have been very astute, if they had in fact really been
attacked by a force as strong as they had supposed. They had not
accepted a decisive battle with their weak forces at Agedabia but had
pulled back in order to concentrate their strength. The capture of
Mechili was a coup; the enemy had probably not reckoned on our using
the route through Ben Gania or on our appearing as early as we did in
front of Mechili. Thus their troops were taken completely by surprise
and were probably again deceived as to our true strength by the dust-
clouds which were deliberately stirred up by our troops. Similarly, the
enemy forces still in Cyrenaica had probably not reckoned on our making
such a rapid advance to Derna. Hence it was principally our speed that
we had to thank for this victory. Incidentally, it is of interest to note
here that about twelve months later the British did make the mistake of
accepting battle at Agedabia with partial forces.

Wavell was obviously intending to maintain his hold on Tobruk and
to supply it by sea, assuming, that is, that our first attacks on the fortress

THE FIRST ROUND 121

did not succeed. I knew that we should then find ourselves In an extremely
unpleasant situation, both tactically and strategically, which would
. become particularly difficult if the British launched an attack on the
Sollum front. Either so the British commander s thinking probably ran
we would pull back to the level of Tobruk, in which case he would
always have this powerful fortress as a support for his defence, or we
would continue to hold the Sollum front, in which event we would be
exposed to a threat from all sides and thus be diverted from further
operations on Tobruk.

The following account shows what heavy restraints this situation did
in the event impose on our conduct of operations.

ASSAULT ON TOBRUK

On the gth April we had a great deal to do to complete the admini
strative arrangements for our supplies and for bringing up more troops.
A report came in that the enemy had concentrated strong contingents
of troops round Tobruk and was loading material into ten transports in
the harbour. Unfortunately, the Luftwaffe was fully occupied in bringing
up its aircraft and could only put a very few machines in the air. When
the commander of the Brescia arrived at about midday I informed him of
my intentions, which were for the Brescia and, later, the Trento to attack
Tobruk from the west, raising a great cloud of dust in the process ana
tying down the enemy strength, while at the same time the 5th Light
Division made a sweep through the desert round the south of Tobruk
in order to attack it from the south-east.

Early in the afternoon, Aldinger and I arrived in Tmimi, where our
advance troops were located, and I informed General von Prittwitz
of the plan for Tobruk.

Meanwhile, I imagined that the 5th Light Division was on the march
for Tmimi. It was now of the utmost importance to appear in strength
before Tobruk and get our attack started as early as possible, for we
wanted our blow to fall before the enemy had recovered his morale
after our advance through Cyrenaica, and had been able to organise
his defence of Tobruk. I therefore flew off in the direction of Mechili to
meet the 5th Light Division, but after 30 miles was forced by^a rising
Ghibli to break off the flight and return to Derna. After waiting for
the sandstorm to abate a little I took off again and arrived in Mechili
at 16.30 hours, and found the whole of the 5th Light Division still there.
They had imagined they could allow themselves a couple of days for
maintenance work on their vehicles. This was far from being my idea
and I ordered the division to move on through Tmimi that night and to
be in the Gazala area, which was to be their starting point for the attack
on Tobruk, by daybreak.

THE WAR IN AFRICA FIRST YEAR

In the early hours of the loth April, I drove off in die direction of
Tobruk and found 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion 30 miles west of the
fortress. Unfortunately, they had not yet started their switch to^the right
for their outflanking attack. I now ordered General von Prittwitz to
launch his attack immediately astride the road to Tobruk and 3rd
Reconnaissance Battalion to move up through Acroma to El Adem. I
then drove off towards Tobruk again and found the leading troops of the
machine-gun battalion in attack ten miles from Tobruk. Heavy British
artillery fire from Tobruk soon brought their attack to a halt. We had
at that time no real idea of the nature or position of the Tobruk defences.
The air shimmered and a sandstorm began to blow up; soon the
visibility, which had so far been good, closed right down and I drove
back. At about midday, Count Schwerin reported to me at a point
some 25 miles west of Tobruk that General von Prittwitz had been killed
a few hours earlier by a direct hit from an anti-tank gun.

To the 5th Light Division I gave orders, after they were relieved by
the Brescia, to thrust forward to the Via Balbia east of Tobruk and close
the fortress in. Meanwhile, the Ariete had been located at Bir Tengeder
and ordered forward to El Adem.

As the situation was rather confused I spent next day at the front
again. It is of the utmost importance to the commander to have a good
knowledge of the battlefield and of his own and his enemy s positions
on the ground. It is often not a question of which of the opposing
commanders is the higher qualified mentally, or which has the greater
experience, but which of them has the better grasp of the battlefield.
This is particularly the case when a situation develops, the outcome of
which cannot be estimated. Then the commander must go up to see for
himself; reports received second-hand rarely give the information he
needs for his decisions.

We first jolted in our Mammoth down a freshly made track running
south from Acroma, and then turned east to approach the Tobruk-El
Adem road about 2^ miles north of El Adem. British tanks and armoured
cars were moving about on a ridge in front of us apparently El Adem
had not yet been taken by 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion. On the high
ground north-east of El Adem, we discovered a tented camp, which the
enemy had already abandoned. British artillery was heavily shelling
elements of the 5th Light Division standing on the road, and soon their
shells began to fall near us. I met Lieut.-Col. Count Schwerin on the
Tobruk-El Adem road and instructed him to close on Tobruk from the
east and prevent any attempts at a break-out. Then I drove back to
Acroma to bring up more forces. There was now nothing to be seen of
German troops anywhere on the south-west front of Tobruk. The roof
of the Mammoth made an excellent observation tower and gave us a
wide view over the whole country necessary in that dangerous corner
where it would have been only too easy for a British scouting party to

THE FIRST ROUND 123

have picked us up. At last I found the staff of the 5th Light Division.
Soon afterwards 5th Panzer Regiment came up with 20 tanks and the
machine-gun battalion; they were immediately sent in to attack Tobruk
from the south-east. I now went forward again into the assembly area*
Scattered British artillery fire was falling at a few points* The attack
seemed to be meeting more difficulties in the open desert than I had
anticipated.

During the afternoon 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion reported the
capture of El Adem and I instructed them to continue the pursuit to
Bardia. Other forces were now coming in steadily.

On the nth April, the envelopment of Tobruk was complete and the
first attack began. Stukas attacked the defence works, the layout of
which was still completely unknown to us. More troops arrived on the
1 2th April and it was decided to open the first major attack on the
stronghold that afternoon. Bardia was taken that day by 3rd Recon
naissance Battalion.

The Brescia Division, which had meanwhile taken over the western
front of Tobruk, opened the attack in the afternoon. The 5th Light
Division was not too happy about its orders for the attack and raised a
number of objections which I had to brush aside. It was a day of driving
sand and there was no need to concern ourselves about aimed British
artillery fire. The 5th Light Division s attack finally got under way at
about 16.30 hours, I drove north in my Mammoth behind the tanks.
Enemy artillery scattered shells over the area as the tanks approached,
but caused few casualties. The 5th Panzer, Regiment halted when they
arrived at the break-in point and, of course, came under heavy artillery
fire. Finally, the tanks were brought to a standstill in front of an anti-tank
ditch, which we were not then in a position to blow in. Tobruk s defences
stretched much farther in all directions, west, east and south, than we
had imagined. We had still not been able to get hold of any of the plans
of the defences, which were held by the Italians.

After the failure of this attack, I decided to renew the attempt a few
days later when more artillery and the Ariete had arrived. In no circum
stances was the enemy to be allowed time to complete the organisation of
his defence.

For the isth I ordered a reconnaissance raid by the 5th Light Division
in which the reconnaissance groups were, if possible, to penetrate to the
crossroad inside the Tobruk defences and blow in the anti-tank ditch.
To divert the attention of the enemy command, the Brescia Division
was to pin down the enemy west of the fortress by fire, and, by raising
as much dust as possible, to simulate the existence of large-scale assembly

areas.

After the failure of the previous raid on Tobruk, the 5th ^ Light
Division had lost confidence in itself and was unwarrantedly pessimistic
about my plan to open our main attack on the I4th. The division s

124 THE WAR IN AFRICA FIRST YEAR

command had not mastered the art of concentrating its strength at one
point, forcing a break-through, rolling up and securing the flanks on either
side, and then penetrating like lightning, before the enemy has had time
to react, deep into his rear. 1 My estimate of the enemy at that time was
that we had a good chance of executing such an operation with the
forces we had. All it wanted was a little initiative and some realistic
thinking to find a way. Unfortunately, I had not had the opportunity
of training my formations personally before the raid through Cyrenaica,
otherwise we would have measured up much better to the tasks which
faced us at Tobruk.

There being still no sign of the Ariete, which was to back up the 5th
Light Division s attack, I set off myself to bring it up. I met the head
of the [Ariete] division 22 miles west of El Adem and ordered its com
mander, General Baldassare, to take his force into the area north of
El Adem.

At about 18.00 hours, 8th Machine-Gun Battalion began its raid
under the excellent leadership of Lieut-Col. Ponath. Its objective, as
already said, was to demolish the anti-tank ditch and create a bridge
head in the British defence zone. The supporting fire of the German and
Italian artillery concentrations was well placed. The i8th A. A. Battalion s
batteries, under the personal command of Major Hecht, brought the
enemy strong points under direct fire, obviously with considerable success.
The progress of our tanks and anti-tank troops seemed to me somewhat
on the slow side. The British were scattering the country here and there
with artillery fire, but we were suffering no great losses. Evening came
and we had still received no definite reports as to whether the demolition
of the anti-tank trench had been successful. It was, however, clear that
Ponath had broken into the British positions, formed a bridgehead and
thus created the conditions for the next day s attack.

Meanwhile, the position on the Sollum front had become more or
less stabilised. Sollum and Capuzzo had been taken and the British
were keeping fairly quiet,

14 April 1941 03.00
DEAREST Lu,

To-day may well see the end of the Battle of Tobruk. The British

were very stubborn and had a great deal of artillery. -However, we ll

bring it off. The bulk of my force is now out of the desert after a

fortnight of it. The lads stuck it magnificently and came through the

Pommel here succinctly describes the combined features of the " Blitzkrieg " method

that was executed with such decisive effect by the German armoured forces in the

opening campaigns of the war. It could not be better epitomised in a sentence. To find

an expressive name for it is more difficult Blitzkrieg (lightning war) is too vague.

When setting forth the compound idea in 1920 I christened it the " expanding torrent,"

which perhaps comes nearer to conveying the combination of concentration initial

penetration lateral expansion exploitation by deep penetration.

THE FIRST ROUND 125

battle, both with the enemy and nature, very well. We ve even got
water again.

Start time for the 5th Light Division s attack was now fixed for 00*30
ours on the i4th. Artillery Regiment Grati and i8th A.A. Battalion
rere instructed to work in closest co-operation with the 5th Light
)ivision. I advised the division to be sure to secure the flanks of its
enetration and to bring the artillery up quickly.

The attack opened punctually to time, with heavy artillery support,
onath soon reported that he was making good progress. At daybreak
drove up to a point about 100 yards south of the wire to see for myself
.ow the operation was developing. The attack seemed to be well under
ray and light signals were rising in the north* Suddenly British shells
icgan to fall in our neighbourhood and we were forced to withdraw after
he aerial of our signals vehicle had been cut through by a splinter.
Jnfortunately, there was nothing to be seen of the force which should
tave been covering the flanks, although a penetration had obviously
&gt;een made through the enemy positions west of the road. I therefore
Irove straight off to the Ariete and ordered them to follow up.

On returning to Corps H.Q. at about 09.00 hours, I. found a report
rom the 5th Light Division saying that their attack had come to a stand-
till, caused by the fact that their penetration of the enemy line had
&gt;een too narrow. Shortly afterwards General Streich and Colonel
Dlbrich arrived at my H.Q. Olbrich reported that he had already had
lis tanks at a point two and a half miles south of the town, but they had
hen come under a murderous British fire and had withdrawn to the level
&gt;f Corps H.Q. He added that a large part of the infantry had probably
)een lost. I was furious, particularly at the way that the tanks had left
he infantry in the lurch, and ordered them forward again immediately
;o open up the breach in the enemy line and get the infantry out. I
loped to get the attack moving again after the arrival of the Ariete, and
mmediately drove back to them to see that they were carrying out my
&gt;rders. Unfortunately, nothing had yet been done. I spurred the division
:m to the utmost speed.

When I returned to the 5th Light Division at about midday, I found
iiat practically nothing had been done because of the heavy enemy fire,
[n these circumstances I had no choice but to abandon the attack on
Tobruk for the moment, and to try to establish contact with Ponath s
battalion and fight a way out for them.

I then drove off to the Ariete for the third time and informed them
Df my decision. I ordered them to take over the sector south of Ras el
Madauer, adjoining the 5th Light Division, and accompanied them
forward myself at about 17.00 hours. South-east of Gasr el Glecha they
received a few rounds of artillery fire from Tobruk. The confusion was
indescribable. The division broke up in complete disorder, turned tail

126 THE WAR IN AFRICA FIRST YEAR

and streamed back in several directions to the south and south-west.
Their commander, General Baldassare, was away with me at the time
reconnoitring the ground north of Gasr el Glecha; with night coming
on, he had the greatest difficulty in getting his division under control
again and moving it forward into its allotted position.

We were unable to establish contact with Ponath s battalion on the
night 14-15 April. A large part of the battalion had been wiped out.
Lieut. -Col. Ponath himself, who had received the Knight s Cross for his
exploits during the advance through Cyrenaica, had been killed.

When the Panzer Army Afrika eventually broke into Tobruk, on the
2Oth June of the following year, and took possession of the British positions
south of the road fork 3 miles south of the town, I found there the remains
of several German tanks which had been put out of action by British
artillery and anti-tank guns on the I4th April 1941. They had reached
the hill and thus gained the most important point of the Tobruk defences. 1
Had the 5th Light Division been in a position to secure its two flanks
and thus allow the artillery and the Ariete to follow through the breach,
Tobruk would probably have fallen on the I4th or 15th April 1941.

16 April 1941
DEAREST Lu,

The battle for Tobruk has quietened down a bit. The enemy is
embarking, so we can expect the fortress to be ours very shortly.
Then we ll probably come to a stop. Nevertheless, our small force
has achieved a tremendous amount, which has put a different picture
on the whole campaign in the south.

On the move a lot and very busy.

My plan now was to take the hill, Ras el Madauer, using elements of
the Ariete and Trento and several German companies attacking under
strong artillery support.

At 17.00 hours on the i6th April, I launched the armoured battalion
of the Ariete (6 medium and 12 light tanks) against hill 187. We accom
panied the attack on its left flank. Instead of halting south of the hill and
then dismounting and observing the country through glasses, the Italians
drove to the highest point of hill 187 and then proceeded to halt. It was
not many minutes of course before British artillery opened fire on the hill,
whereupon the Italians promptly retired at top speed and halted, confused
and undecided, in a wadi. I tried to get the Italian tank commander
to advance in open order on Ras el Madauer, but without success.

All this while Lieut. Berndt was observing the advance of the Italian

1 Rommel was mistaken here. Olbrich s tanks never, in fact, reached this point.
Chester Wilmot who was the Australian Broadcasting Gommision s war correspondent,
and in Tobruk during the siege has told me that the wrecked German tanks which
Rommel saw had been towed there by the British for use as targets in anti-tank gun
practice shoots.

THE FIRST ROUND

infantry. Progress at first was in perfect order, but suddenly the Italians
turned and fled in a wild rout to the west. I instructed Berndt to take
an armoured car and drive to the Italians as fast as he could to find out
what was wrong. All sound of battle had ceased. Half an hour later
Berndt reappeared and reported that he had been told by an Italian
infantryman that the enemy was attacking with tanks. After moving
on a few hundred yards to the east, he had seen a British scout car
herding away a company of Italians with their hands up and had at
once opened fire on the scout car in order to give the Italians a chance
to run. They had run towards the British lines. Finally, a British
armoured vehicle had taken them over.

I now drove off with three anti-tank guns in order to save what was
left. I was unable to persuade the Italian tank crews to come with us.
Under Berndt s command, the anti-tank gunners succeeded in shooting
up several British Bren-carriers. However, the Italian battalion, which
had had no effective anti-tank weapons, had meanwhile been rounded
up and carried off by the enemy. My Adjutant, Major Schraepler, who
had accompanied the first wave of the Italians, had managed to escape
capture. He said that the Italians had advanced in too dense a mass.
He was now holding the heights round Acroma with what was left of the
Italians, and I sent him two more rifle companies to make up his strength.

The reason for attacking the Ras el Madauer was because the British
were in a position there to threaten our supply route through Acroma.
So a further attempt was to be made on the i yth. The Ariete, although
they had not yet seen any action, now had only 10 tanks left out of the
100 odd with which they had started the offensive. The remainder had
fallen out, due to engine failure or some other mechanical trouble. It
made one s hair stand on end to see the sort of equipment with which
the Duce had sent his troops into battle.

But again nothing went right in our next attack. The attacking force
had instructions to advance from one dip in the ground to the next,
waiting each time until supporting fire had first been secured. But the
company commanders ignored their instructions and made a blind dash
straight for the enemy. The Ariete s armour was led by Lieut. Wahl, an
interpreter on the 5th Light Division s staff. Contrary to their orders to
remain behind the infantry, they pushed on far ahead and soon vanished
out of sight. There was no means of communicating with them and their
location was unknown. Meanwhile, the leading infantry reached the
wire in front of Ras el Madauer without meeting any opposition of
consequence.

Suddenly at about 13.00 hours, a single tank appeared north of the
summit of Ras el Madauer, moving towards our line with its gun trained
on us. In the dust it was impossible to see if there were any more following
it. Fearing that the enemy was again using tanks in an attempt to
destroy my infantry, who were defenceless against armour, I quickly

128 THE WAR IN AFRICA FIRST YEAR

brought up my three anti-tank guns. More tanks had meanwhile been
sighted. An exchange of fire developed and two tanks were hit, which,
to our great consternation, turned out shortly afterwards to be Italians.
Lieut. Wahl did not return; he had obviously pushed his tank right
forward into the enemy positions and been shot up. The infantry attack
had also come to a standstill in the enemy wire. All further attempts to
penetrate into the British positions failed. It was now finally clear that
there was no hope of doing anything against the enemy defences with the
forces we had, largely because of the poor state of training and useless
equipment of the Italian troops. I decided to break off the attack until
the arrival of more troops.

On the i gth April, I drove to Bardia, where I found that the fortress
had not been occupied by my troops. Vast quantities of Italian war
material mainly vehicles and hundreds of guns which had been left
behind by Marshal Graziani s army lay on either side of the road. I
decorated Lieut.-Col. von Wechmar with the Knight s Cross. I also
gave orders for Bardia to be occupied immediately by a German company.
As it happened, the British sent a sizeable sabotage group into the
fortress that night, all 56 of whom, including a regular major, were taken
prisoner.

On the way back, we were twice attacked by British ground-strafing
aircraft about 10 miles west of Bardia. Corporal Eggert, the driver of
my cross-country vehicle, was killed; the vehicle received 25 hits. My
dispatch rider, Private Kanthak, was also killed. The driver of the
Mammoth was wounded by a bullet which came through the visor.
Leaving Berndt with the damaged vehicles, I climbed into the driving
seat of my Mammoth and drove myself. The road was in a frightful state.
I wanted to get back to H.Q. that night and turned off south before
Tobruk with the object of by-passing it through the desert. It was a
pitch-black night and we tried to navigate by the stars, but the sky
eventually clouded over so that I was forced to give up the attempt and
wait till morning.

The plans of the Tobruk defences had now at last arrived from the
Italian High Command. They included detailed maps of the layout of
the fortifications and plans showing the construction of individual defence
works. From these plans it appeared that the defences consisted of two
lines of strong-points, not in the usual form of concrete pill-boxes with
loop-holes, but completely sunk into the ground. The outer belt was
surrounded by an anti-tank ditch, covered with thin boarding disguised
by a layer of sand and stones on top, so that it could not be detected even
at the shortest distance. Each defence work had a diameter of about 90
yards and consisted of several heavily concreted dugouts, each holding
30 to 40 men. The individual dugouts were inter-connected by a com
munications trench, which had emplacements for machine-guns, anti
tank guns and mortars at each angle. As with the anti-tank ditch, the

THE FIRST ROUND

communications trench, which was 8 feet deep, was covered with boards
topped lightly with earth and could therefore easily be opened up at any
point. Each work was surrounded by strong wire entanglements and all
were inter-connected by barbed wire. The second defence line, which
lay two to three thousand yards behind the first, was of similar design,
but without the anti-tank ditch.

It was now my endeavour to pull the motorised troops out of the
investing front round Tobruk in order to make them available for mobile
use. I accordingly asked the Commando Supremo to send me two further
static divisions.

I continued, in the days ahead, to work on a plan for attacking
Tobruk, especially as we now had some idea of the form and layout of
its defences. -I intended to instal the main body of the Brescia Division
in fixed positions on Tobruk s eastern front, thus freeing 2nd M.G.
Battalion, and to use part of the Trento Division to occupy Bardia and,
if possible, Sollum, in order to release the Battalion Knabe. The main
attack was to be made by the I5th Panzer Division as much of it as
had arrived in Africa reinforced by units of the Ariete; the line of the
attack was to be through Ras el Madauer into the rear of the fixed
defences. Simultaneous with the main attack, the 5th Light Division
was to mount a secondary attack on the south-east front. I had hopes
of launching the attack at tlie end of April or the beginning of May.

21 April 194.1
DEAREST Lu,

Things are slowly quietening down and Pm at last able to collect
my thoughts after three weeks of offensive. It s been very hectic for
the last few weeks. We re hoping to pull off the attack on Tobruk
very soon now.

We re lying at the moment in a rocky hollow, widely dispersed
on account of the very active British aircraft. Froehlich is doing some
tidying up over on the other side. But the strengths are fairly equal
and there s some doubt as to whether the British are not bringing
in new forces every day.

But before many days had passed we suffered a new reverse. On
the morning of the 22nd the enemy overran Battalion Fabris on Hill 201
and then moved on towards Acroma. I immediately alerted the i5th
Panzer Division, part of which had now arrived, and ordered it to occupy
the Via Balbia east of Cantoniera 31 [road maintenance depot, 31 km.
from Tobruk], Soon machine-gun fire was reported from in front of
Acroma. At this news I drove across there as fast as I could go. We
overtook Gosth Anti-tank Battalion on the way and took them along
with us. On arrival, we heard that the enemy had actually taken prisoner
the greater part of Fabris s staff, after which the six British tanks which

130 THE WAR IN AFRICA FIRST YEAR

had made the attack had moved on into the Italian gun positions,
destroyed the guns and captured the crews. The six Italian tanks which
had been put there to protect the position, and which should have been
perfectly capable of engaging and driving off the enemy tanks, had been
sent back by Colonel Fabris. I immediately took a combat group to the
Fabris Battalion s positions, where we found vehicles and motor-cycles
still burning; the guns of two batteries seemed to be still quite serviceable.
Needless to say, I was not very pleased at this curious behaviour in face
of the enemy.

Meanwhile, feverish training was going on among the forces detailed
for the attack, as it has become only too evident that the training of our
infantry in position warfare was nowhere near up to the standard of the
British and Australians. This we now intended to correct. On my in
spections, both German and Italian troops made a very good impression.
I soon gave up my plan for the 5th Light Division to attack on the south
east side of Tobruk, as the division had little taste for the project, because
of the open terrain and lack of cover.

Major Schraepler, Rommefs Adjutant, to Frau Rommel:

22 April
MY DEAR FRAU ROMMEL,

I realise that there is a possibility that it may cause you a shock
to receive a letter bearing my name as sender; nevertheless, I am
taking this risk in order to give you the assurance that all is .well with
your esteemed husband.

He will have had little time for writing during the past few days,
as they have been very full for him, and very worrying too. His
endeavour and the desire of every one of us to be not only in, but
far beyond Tobruk, is at the moment impossible to realise. We have
too few German forces and can do nothing with the Italians. They
either do not come forward at all, or if they do, run at the first shot.
If an Englishman so much as comes in sight, their hands go up. You
will understand, Madam, how difficult this makes the command for
your husband. I am certain, however, that by the time this letter
arrives you will not have much longer to wait for the special com-
muniqud announcing the capture of Tobruk, and then things will
begin to move again.

We are now located in a rocky ravine, where enemy aircraft will
find it difficult to spot us. We also have some German fighters here
now, which keep the British bombers and low fliers away. Field
Marshal Milch has promised your husband still further support.

Though we do not live as well as we did in France, we are still
not doing badly. Captured British stores provide an improvement
to the army rations. You may rest assured, Madam, that Guenther

Rommel on the Via Balbia, April 1941, in the Mammoth, a British armoured
command vehicle captured during Rommel s first advance through Cjrenaica. Left,
Lt.-Col. von dem Borne, his Chief of Staff at the time

Rommel s Main Headquarters on the Via Balbia, photographed from his Storch

&lt;t f * * i , t

Rommel s Advanced Headquarters near Tobruk photographed from his Storch

Rommel outside his caravan

THE FIRST ROUND

looks after your husband very well within the limits of what can be
done, I am very glad that your husband has an Italian caravan,
which at least offers him some comfort and quiet, and protection
against the cold nights. The Italians are past masters at such
amenities; others we will provide for ourselves in Cairo.

The latest issue of Das Reich to arrive contained an article on your
husband, which you will no doubt have already read. Your husband
was very angry about it and wrote the word " Nonsense " in the
margin. I have discussed it with Berndt, the Deputy Reichspressechef
who is serving here on Corps staff. All Germany knows of the
tremendous achievements of your husband, and there is no need for
a paid hack to write untrue statements about them.

(Signed : Schraepler.)

23 April TQ4i
DEAREST Lu,

Heavy fighting yesterday in front of Tobruk. The situation was
highly critical, but we managed to restore it. There s little reliance
to be placed on the Italian troops. They re extremely sensitive to
enemy tanks and as in 1917 quick to throw up the sponge. Newly
arrived German units have now made the situation rather more secure.

I had a meeting with Gariboldi and Roatta yesterday. Minister
Terruzzi was also present. I was ceremonially awarded the Italian
" Medal for Bravery." I am also supposed to be getting the Italian
" Pour le M6rite." What a trivial business it all is at a time like this.
I ve been able to have my sleep out during the last few days, so now
I m ready for anything again. Once Tobruk has fallen, which I hope
will be in ten days or a fortnight, the situation here will be secure.
Then there ll have to be a few weeks pause before we take on anything
new.

How are things with you both? There must be a whole lot of post
lying at the bottom of the Mediterranean.

P.S. Easter has slipped by unnoticed.

25 April 1941

Things are very warm in front of Tobruk. I shan t be sorry to
see more troops arrive, for we re still very thin on the long fortress
front. I ve seldom had such worries militarily speaking as in the
last few days. However, things will probably look different soon.

. . . Greece will probably soon be disposed of and then it will be
possible to give us more help. Paulus is due to arrive in a few days.
The battle for Egypt and the Canal is now on in earnest and our
tough opponent is fighting back with all he s got.

The attack on Ras el Madauer was opened at about 18.30 hours on

132 THE WAR IN AFRICA FIRST YEAR

the 30th April by our Stukas. Sirens screaming, they swooped down on
the enemy positions and the hill was soon hidden by a thick pall of smoke
and dust. Our artillery opened fire on the break-in points with good
effect, as far as we could see. The attack on the outer defence line was
completely successful, the enemy line being penetrated to a depth of
up to two miles immediately north and south of the Ras el Madauer.
The enemy fought with remarkable tenacity. Even their wounded went
on defending themselves with small arms fire and stayed in the fight to
their last breath. At about 21.00 hours the commanding hill of Ras el
Madauer was attacked in the rear and taken by Battalion Voigtsbcrger.
The enemy put up a heavy defensive barrage, but it was directed mainly
at the point of our feint attacks on the roads leading from Derna and El
Adem towards Tobruk. Unfortunately, a few forts and strong points
continued to hold out all night, and our attacking force foolishly allowed
itself to be drawn into a fight for these points before pushing on with its
main attack. This should really have been a job for a few storming
parties. It is a great mistake to allow oneself to be diverted from the
main line of one s plan by relative trivialities.

The Ariete was now put on the march with orders to close up on the
Kirchheim Group during the night. Driving east to Kirchheim s H.Q.
next morning [ist May], I met part of the Ariete, which should have
moved into the captured positions long before. As I stopped at Kirch
heim s H.Q., the Italian force was just halting, unloading its weapons
and ammunition and going into position.

I was extremely annoyed and charged Major Appel with the task of
getting the Italians forward. He made a great effort, but did not achieve
much. With British artillery fire sweeping the whole area, the Italians
crept under their vehicles and resisted all their officers attempts to get
them out again.

Shortly afterwards a batch of some fifty or sixty Australian prisoners
was marched off close beside us immensely big and powerful men, who
without question represented an elite formation of the British Empire, a
fact that was also evident in battle. Enemy resistance was as stubborn
as ever and violent actions were being fought at many points. All the
same, I continued for some time to think that we would be able to
maintain our attack and take Tobruk. The only question was whether
we had enough troops to go on feeding the attack long enough. After a
while I went off to the attacking front, riding part of the way and walking
the rest, in order to get a picture of the situation for myself. On arrival
I gave orders for the captured positions to be occupied immediately, in
order to guard against unpleasant surprises.

But next day [2nd May] it became obvious that we were not strong
enough to mount the large-scale attack necessary to take the fortress,
and I had no choice but to content myself with what we had achieved,
namely, the elimination of the threat to our supply route from enemy

THE FIRST ROUND 133

positions on the Ras el Madauer. It was now impossible to contemplate
anything more for the present than isolated operations against individual
strong points,

The next few days brought several British counter-attacks against the
captured sector, which were beaten off with little result. Many of the
British troops engaged in these attacks were depressed and in poor spirits
because of water shortage, their ration being under a pint a day.

6 May 1941
DEAREST Lu,

There was too much doing yesterday for me to write. We ve had
several days of Ghibli, which has left us all quite limp. It seems to
be gradually getting better now.

Paulus has now gone, although Froehlich has just phoned to say
that he couldn t fly because of the Ghibli. Water is very short in
Tobruk, the British troops are getting only half a litre [just under a
pint]. With our dive-bombers I m hoping to cut their ration still
further.

The heat is getting worse every day and it s a relief when night
comes. One s thirst becomes almost unquenchable.

In this assault we lost more than 1,200 men killed, wounded and
missing. This shows how sharply the curve of casualties rises when one
reverts from mobile to position warfare. In a mobile action, what counts
is material, as the essential complement to the soldier. The finest fighting
man has no value in mobile warfare without tanks, guns and vehicles.
Thus a mobile force can be rendered unfit for action by the destruction
of its tanks, without having suffered any serious casualties in man-power.
This is not the case with position warfare, where the infantryman with
rifle and hand grenade has lost little of his value, provided, of course, he
is protected by anti-tank guns or obstacles against the enemy s armour.
For him enemy number one is the attacking infantryman. Hence position
warfare is always a struggle for the destruction of men in contrast to
mobile warfare, where everything turns on the destruction of enemy
material.

The high casualties suffered by my assault forces were- primarily
caused by their lack of training. Even in the smallest action, there are
always tactical tricks which can be used to save casualties, and these must
be made known to the men. It frequently happened that dash was used
where caution was really needed, with, of course, casualties as the result.
On the next occasion, when boldness really was required, the men would
be over-cautious. In these small-scale infantry tactics in particular, what
is wanted is a maximum of caution, combined with supreme dash at the
right moment.

The captured Ras el Madauer positions lay under continuous British

134 THE WAR IN AFRICA FIRST YEAR

artillery fire. Our defence works were shallow the ground was too
rocky to dig in far with the result that the troops were forced to remain
motionless all day, exposed defenceless to thousands of flies. Many men
had dysentery and the conditions were frightful. To disperse the enemy
artillery fire, we installed dummy tanks mainly in the sector held by
the Brescia and these did in fact soon draw heavy fire from the British
artillery. Unfortunately, the troops had no idea of how to use such
devices, which must be kept continually moving and not be left standing
for a fortnight on the same spot. I made repeated visits to the front to
try to inculcate in the troops some up-to-date ideas in position warfare
appropriate to the conditions they were facing.

The Italians had acquired a very considerable inferiority complex,
as was not surprising in the circumstances. Their infantry were practically
without anti-tank weapons and their artillery completely obsolete. Their
training was also a long way short of modern standards, so that we were
continually being faced by serious breakdowns. Many Italian officers
had thought of war as little more than a pleasant adventure and were,
perforce, having to suffer a bitter disillusionment.

One thing that worked very seriously against us was the fact that the
Luftwaffe in Africa was not subordinate to the Afrika Korps. As a result,
fighter and ground-strafing groups were used more in a strategic role
than tactically in support of the ground forces. It would have been far
better for the cause as a whole if the Luftwaffe Commander Afrika had
been responsible for the tactical requirements of the Afrika Korps while
X Luftwaffe Corps took care of the strategic tasks.

The supply situation was none too good, due to the fact that the
Italian transport fleets were still arriving at Tripoli and making too little
use of Benghazi. This meant a tremendous strain on our road transport.
The German quartermasters had, it is true, wasted no time in organising
coastal shipping, but here again, far more could have been done with a
little more activity on the part of the Italians.

Little came of the operations planned against individual British
strong-points, as the Axis forces, despite all their training, were still not
up to these difficult tasks.

BATTLE ON THE FRONTIER

The siege of Tobruk stood or fell by the maintenance of our Sollum
positions. It was therefore necessary to apportion out the tasks of the
German-Italian forces in North Africa, as follows:

One force to keep Tobruk securely closed in and hold the line
against any break-out attempt by the enemy garrison.

A second force to hold the line at Sollum and at the same time

THE FIRST ROUND 135

provide a mobile defence against any enemy turning movement in
the area bounded by Bir Hacheim, Ga2ala, Sollum and Sidi Omar,
in order to prevent the enemy operating against the rear of our forces
round Tobruk.

Non-motorised troops, of which unlike the British we had a great
number, could only be employed with any prospect of success in* the
following ways :

In the investing front round Tobruk.

In holding the static Sollum-Sidi Omar line.

In holding Bardia.

This ineant that the main weight of the fighting in any British attack
from the east had to be carried by our motorised forces. The purpose of
occupying a number of fixed positions was merely to deny certain opera
tions to the enemy. The motorised forces could not be given any second
task, and consequently could not at one and the same time be earmarked
for the mobile defence and be committed in the siege of Tobruk.

Accordingly it was our aim, firstly to hold the fixed positions detailed
above with adequate non-motorised forces, and secondly to hold ready a
motorised force strong enough to provide adequate opposition to any
enemy offensive concentration against our Tobruk front, and at the same
time to beat off an attack by the British motorised forces located east of
Sollum. To this end the motorised forces in the static lines were to be
relieved by non-motorised troops.

Our dispositions at the middle of May were far from fulfilling these
requirements. The Sollum front was not yet fully manned by infantry;
in fact, all it consisted of was a few light combat groups holding something
in the nature of an outpost line. A surprise attack by the Herff force had
brought us the Halfaya Pass, but fortification of this or of the Sollum Pass
had hardly begun.

In these circumstances, we looked forward with no little anxiety to
the attack which we were shortly expecting the British to launch on
Sollum.

To prepare for the worst I had already given instructions for a line
to be constructed at Gazala. The defences were to be laid out in a similar
manner to those at Tobruk, which had shown themselves so admirably
suited to meet modern methods of attack. But how to withdraw the non-
motorised German and Italian forces to that line remained, of course,
a problem.

In the early hours of the i5th May, the British launched an attack
on our forces near Sollum. While our strong points on the Halfaya Pass
and along the frontier were attacked frontally, British armour moved
forward from the Habata area along the escarpment, first to the north-

136 THE WAR IN AFRICA FIRST YEAR

west and then to the north, towards Capuzzo. The troops holding the
strong points and the mobile units of HerfFs force both suffered con
siderable losses and our forces were pressed steadily back to the north.
This attack was launched by Wavell with the idea of catching Rommel
unawares before the expected arrival of the i$th Panzer Division, and in the hope
of driving him back west of TobruL The attack was carried out by General Gott
with the 7th Armoured Brigade (comprising some 55 tanks] and the 22nd Guards
Brigade.

I accordingly sent a Panzer battalion reinforced by A.A. guns, under
the command of Lieut.-Col. Kramer, to HerfPs assistance. The two
forces, Herff s and Kramer s, were to join up during the night 15-16 May
west of Sidi Azeiz. Our air reconnaissance and the units holding the
Sollum-Bardia line had formed the impression that the British intended
to concentrate their troops south of Sidi Azeiz, in order to sweep aside
Herff s force on the morning of the i6th and then completely unhinge
our Sollum-Bardia front by a further thrust to the north. My intention,
therefore, in uniting Herff s and Kramer s forces, was to prevent this
British move being driven home.

Herff s force drove towards Kramer s during the night in order to
ensure that the enemy had no opportunity of tackling the two forces
separately in the morning. But the two formations missed each other
and, on the morning of the i6th, Kramer arrived in the Sidi Azeiz area
alone. Contrary to expectations, however, the enemy had meanwhile
withdrawn to the south and obviously broken off his attack.

This is an example of how different things look when viewed from &lt;c the other
side of the hill." The British Jth Armoured Brigade had pushed on to Sidi A^ei^
but was pulled back when news came that Capuzzo, which lay on its rear flank,
had been recaptured by a German counter-attack which Rommel does not mention.
Disconcerted by the fact that the Germans had shown greater strength than had been
expected, the British Command decided to withdraw the whole force, leaving a
garrison at the Halfaya Pass. For it was deemed best to await a special convoy
that, on Churchill s bold initiative, was being rushed out by tlie short but hazardous
Mediterranean route, carrying 180 Matilda and 100 cruiser tanks. By the time this
big reinforcement had arrived, the i$th Panzer Division had also arrived on the
other side so that the prospective advantage disappeared.

During the next few days, the British moved back to their starting line
and the situation once again stabilised. Our garrison at Halfaya had
been overpowered and the British were now holding the pass. Hence on
the 1 8th May we were, with that exception, virtually back where we
had started.

The Halfaya and Sollum Passes were points of great strategic im
portance, for they were the only two places between the coast and Habata
where it was possible to cross the escarpment of anything up to 600 feet
in height which stretched away from Sollum in a south-easterly direction
towards Egypt. The Halfaya positions gave an equal command over

THE FIRST ROUND 137

both possible roads. In any offensive from Egypt, therefore, possession
of these passes was bound to be of the utmost value to the enemy, as they
offered him a comparatively safe route for his supplies. If, on the
other hand, he were to attempt to attack Bardia without holding them,
he would be thrown back on a supply route through Habata which would
be vulnerable to attack and harassing action by us.

The British began to fortify the captured positions at Halfaya after
the 1 7th May and deployed strong combat groups made up of tanks,
artillery and anti-tank guns in the territory they had captured. But we
were by no means prepared to leave the British in possession of the
Halfaya Pass and I soon instructed the Herff force to organise a move
to recapture it.

23 May 1941
DEAREST Lu,

I haven t had a chance to write until this afternoon, after getting
back from Sollum and Bardia.

We left at 5 a.m. yesterday and have been riding in the Mammoth
through the endless landscape ever since, part of the time over desert
tracks (sand roads worn out with driving terribly hard on the
vehicles) and part on the Via Balbia. I ve come back from my trip
to the front very impressed. Cpmmand is good up there and we have
fresh forces standing by in case we re not left in peace. Overnight we
formed a laager (five vehicles) in the desert. Even my A.D.C.s did
watch, without my knowing it. You see how well I m guarded.

Three assault groups moved into position in front of the [Halfaya] Pass
on the evening of the 26th May, and our attack opened on the morning
of the 27th. The British were soon driven out and fled in panic to the east,
leaving considerable booty and material of all kinds in our hands. Our
losses were comparatively insignificant.

The German recapture of the Halfaya Pass seriously hampered the British
offensive when it was launched in mid- June.

In the period following these actions we made strenuous efforts to
strengthen our Sollum-Halfaya-Bardia front. The construction of the
Halfaya Pass positions was pushed ahead with the utmost vigour and
several strong points were built along the Egyptian frontier. During an
inspection of the Bardia defence area I found vast quantities of material
lying in the defences where it had been left by Graziani s army. This
material was just waiting to be used, and I therefore gave immediate
instructions for all unclaimed Italian guns to be collected up and used
to strengthen the SollunvHalfaya-Sidi Omar front. A substantial number
of these guns was put in order by one or two of our German workshops
and then installed in the strong points. But the Italian High Command
did not agree at all, and General Gariboldi had me informed, through

138 THE WAR IN AFRICA FIRST YEAR

Heggenreiner, that the guns were Italian property and were only to be
used by Italians. They had been perfectly content up till then to stand
by and watch this material go to wrack and ruin, but the moment the first
guns had been made serviceable on our initiative, they began to take
notice. However, I was not to be put off.

In constructing our positions at Halfaya and on Hill 208 great skill
was shown in building in batteries of 88 mm. guns for anti-tank work, so
that with the barrels horizontal there was practically nothing to be seen
above ground. I had great hopes of the effectiveness of this arrangement.
This significantly showed that the Germans not only knew how to exploit the
offensive potentialities of the long-disputed theory of armoured warfare but had also
grasped the idea of the defensive counter to it. Rommel was the first Panzer leader
to demonstrate the modern version of the " sword and shield " combination, and
prove the value of the " defensive-offensive " method in mobile mechanised warfare.
The effectiveness of his offensive strokes was greatly aided by the skilful way he
laid defensive traps for his opponents 9 attacks blunting the edge of their " sword s *
on his " shield."

One very great problem was the maintenance of our troops at Sollum-
Halfaya-Bardia. With the Via Balbia barred by the British at Tobruk,
all supplies for the troops east of Gambut had to be carried through the
open desert round the south of the fortress. The lorry routes which the
troops had marked out had become so badly worn and widened at each
side that driving was almost impossible. Light vehicles had become
embedded in the dust at many points, and even lorries had the utmost
difficulty in grinding their way through. It was a good effort for a
column to get round Tobruk in a day. I repeatedly pressed the Italian
higher authorities to have a by-pass road built, but for the moment, with
little success. They quite saw the necessity for the road but it occurred
to nobody to make a real assault on the job.

A further trial for us was that the Italians were still carrying the bulk
of our supplies to Tripoli and making very little use of Benghazi. Tripoli
was over 1,000 miles from the front. Bearing in mind that 1,500 tons of
supplies, including water and rations, had to be carried up to the front
every day, even for normal activity, it is easy to understand that our
transport could not cope indefinitely with a route of that length. With
no authority over the people responsible for shipping in the Mediterranean,
however, it was very difficult for us to do anything about it.

As a result of Italian loss of prestige after Graziani s defeat, a number
of Arab tribes had begun to get restive. This was not helped by the fact
that Italian troops occasionally took liberties with the Arab women, a
thing which Arabs particularly resent. I was forced to send an urgent
request to the Italian High Command, asking them to see to it that the
Arabs were treated with sufficient respect to avoid an armed uprising close
behind our front.

At about this time officers and men of the Trento Division were

THE FIRST ROUND 139

responsible for several excesses against the Arab population, with the
result that the Arabs killed a number of Italian soldiers and kept the
Italians away from their villages by armed force. There are always
people who will invariably demand reprisals in this sort of situation
for reasons, apart from anything else, of expediency. Such action is never
expedient. The right thing to do is to ignore the incidents, unless the real
culprits can be traced.

Our greatest worry was still the difficult strategic situation caused by
our dual task of having to maintain the siege of Tobruk and at the same
time be ready for major British attacks from Egypt. We would thus
.have given a lot to have driven the British out of Tobruk. We had hoped
that when Crete fell the Luftwaffe would be able to get such a strangle
hold on British sea traffic to Tobruk that the enemy would find it im
possible to maintain the fortress. But the Luftwaffe formations that were
released from service in Greece and Crete were not sent to North Africa.

I also asked for German submarines and motor torpedo boats to be
sent into the Mediterranean to provide an alternative weapon against
British seaborne traffic to Tobruk. The Italian Navy was quite incapable
of coping with the task. Their submarines of which they had the
largest fleet in the world before the war were so full of technical defects,
that they were almost completely unusable for war in the Mediterranean.
Their motor torpedo boats, which would have had a very good base at
Bardia as Balbo had constructed it, were not seaworthy enough for the
job.

One day, General Cause of the OKW 1 arrived with a large staff to recon
noitre the possibilities of employing bigger forces in Africa for an offensive
against Egypt, and to prepare the ground for them. General Gause had
received explicit instructions not to place himself under my command,
but did in fact do so after I had told him categorically that the command
of all troops in Africa was vested in me alone.

As a result of his discussions with the Italian authorities, Gause had
gained the impression that it would be difficult to persuade them to
agree to further German forces being shipped to North Africa, for they
feared that the German element would then gain a preponderance in
the theatre and be in a position of advantage ws-b-vis their own.

26 May 1941
DEAREST Lu,

Yesterday evening I received a considerable rocket from
Brauchitsch, the reason for which completely passes my compre
hension. Apparently the reports I send back, stating the conditions
as they exist, don t suit their book. The result will be that we ll
keep our mouths shut and only report in the briefest form. However,
we had f litre of Bavarian beer last night to console us. -

iQKW (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht) Supreme Command of the Armed
Forces.

140 THE WAR IN AFRICA FIRST YEAR

Otherwise things have grown quiet, both here and on the front
near Sollum. Though of course one can never know whether it isn t
the calm before some new attack,

29 May 1941

Von dem Borne [then Rommel s Chief of Staff] is to take this letter
with him to-morrow and I hope it will reach you earlier than usual
I ve had a major rocket from the OKH 1 to my mind unjustified
in gratitude for our previous achievements. But as with the " Line
of Thrust " in 1940,2 I m not going to take it lying down, and a
letter is already on its way to v. B. [von Brauchitsch].

For your peace of mind, I ve kept very well so far and the situation
has also shown a noticeable change for the better. The heat, it s true,
is almost unbearable and it s a good thing to stay indoors during the
hottest part of the day.

2 June

It was 107 here yesterday, and that s quite some heat. Tanks
standing in the sun go up to as much as 160, which is too hot to
touch.

My affair with the OKH is under way. Either they ve got con
fidence in me or they haven t. If not, then I m asking them to draw
their own conclusions. I m very intrigued to know what jvill come
of it. It s easy enough to bellyache when you aren t sweating it out
here.

// June

Borne is back, with partially satisfactory results. They were mad
at me in the OKH because my reports had gone to the OKW as
well. But that was Rintelen s fault who was acting in accordance
with his duty. I ve had no reply to my letter to B.

^.K.H. (Oberkommando dcs Heeres) Army High Command, subordinate to the
OKW,

s Sec pages 15 and 85.

CHAPTER VII

THE BRITISH SUMMER OFFENSIVE, 1941

After its failure, this offensive was described as merely a reconnaissance in
force, and the British public wer$ kept in the dark about its originally ambitious
aims to " destroy " Rommel s forces and gain a " decisive victory " in North
Africa. Its code-name " Battleaxe " epitomised the conception. Wavell began to
have doubts as the time approached, not only because of the arrival of the i$th Panzer
Division but also on technical grounds. In a report on the s8th May he said:
" Our infantry tanks are really too slow for a battle in the desert, and have been
suffering considerable casualties from thejire of the powerful enemy anti-tank guns.
Our cruisers have little advantage in power or speed over German medium tanks."
But he still hoped to " succeed in driving the enemy west of Tobruk"

The offensive was directed by General Beresford-Peirse, and carried out by a
force comprising the jth Armoured Division, 4th Indian Division, and 22nd Guards
Brigade. There is a wide variation in the figures given in different British reports
as to the number of tanks used they range from ijo to 250. Rommel, it will be seen,
says that the i$th Panzer Division had 80 tanks available to meet the British attack,
but shows that they were reinforced by the tanks of the 5th Light Division. In other
German records the total is given as 750, of which only 55 were Panzers III or IV.
No Italian tanks were in action,

At the beginning of June there were many signs that a major British
attack on our Tobruk 1 front was to be expected at about the middle of
the month. Two British divisions had concentrated opposite the I5th
Panzer Division s positions, (isth Panzer Division had meanwhile been
transferred to the Sollum-Bardia-Halfaya sector, although its Rifle Brigade
was still holding the line on the Ras el Madauer.) The bulk of the 5th
Light Division was already in reserve south of Tobruk.

Unfortunately, our petrol stocks were badly depleted, and it was with
some anxiety that we contemplated the coming British attack, for we
knew that our moves would be decided more by the petrol gauge than
by tactical requirements.

*It would seem likely, by the context, that Rommel made a slip here and intended
to write the Sollum front. This front, which covered the forces investing Tobruk, was
70 miles to the east.

141

THE WAR IN AFRICA FIRST YEAR

At about 21.00 hours on the 1 4th June, I alerted the Sollum front.
Several of the 5th Light Division s units and some Italian were put on
the march for new positions, with instructions to hold themselves in
readiness to intervene on the Sollum front.

The expected enemy attack came at 04.00 hours on the isth. They
advanced over a wide front, both in the coastal plain and on the plateau,
and forced back our outposts south-east and south of Sollum. The first
reports we received from Sollum were fairly optimistic. But the enemy
rapidly gained ground and from 09.00 hours onwards a tank attack was
already in progress on Capuzzo. The 15th Panzer Division had orders
not to launch its counter-attack until the situation had clarified.

Meanwhile, the 5th Light Division s combat group had been alerted
and its advance troops had already arrived south of Gambut. At 11.00
hours all other available units of the 5th Light Division were alerted and
put on the march towards Sollum.

The enemy was meanwhile concentrating very powerful forces
between Sidi Omar and Capuzzo, obviously with the intention of
destroying the i5th Panzer Division by a concentric attack to the north.
To be ready for any eventuality, I ordered the garrison of Bardia to man
the eastern and western exits from the fortress. Unfortunately, there were
not enough troops available to man the whole of Bardia s defences.

Meanwhile, the British were making repeated attacks on the Halfaya
Pass from both sides in an attempt to open the road. But Major Bach
and his men fought magnificently. The British force engaged in this
attack was soon describing its position as serious and complaining of
heavy casualties.

In the afternoon and evening of this first day of battle, the British
enveloped Capuzzo and began to mount attacks against the southern
front of Bardia. 1 Late in the evening Capuzzo was stormed by British
troops. A violent tank battle developed between 80 tanks of 8th Panzer
Regiment (isth Panzer Division) and jome 300 British tanks which
pressed stubbornly northwards.

Rommel overestimates the British tank strength in the same way that the
British overestimated his.

The 1 5th Panzer Division, together with a panzer battalion of the
5th Light Division, which had meanwhile come up in support, had orders
to take up positions south of Bardia during the night for a renewed
counter-attack to the south. In view of the tremendous strength of the
British, there was of course no certainty that this attack would achieve
any decisive success.

The main force of 5th Light Division had orders to launch an attack
on the morning of the i6th from a point west of Sidi Azeiz towards
Sidi Suleiman, with the object of getting through to the Halfaya Pass,

Actually the bulk of the British armour penetrated only a few miles north of the
line Gapuzzo-Musaid during this battle.

144 THE WAR IN AFRICA - FIRST YEAR

cutting the British off from their supply bases and thus forcing them to
retreat. The I5th Panzer Division was to move south at first light on
either side of Capuzzo in order to pin down the British main force, I
planned to concentrate both armoured divisions suddenly into one focus
and thus deal the enemy an unexpected blow in his most sensitive spot.

16 June 1941
DEAREST Lu,

There was heavy fighting in our eastern sector all day yesterday,
as you will have seen long ago from Wehrmacht communiques. To-day
it s 2.30 a.m. will see the decision. It s going to be a hard fight,
so you ll understand that I can t sleep. These lines in haste will
show you that I m thinking of you both. More soon when it s all
over.

At 05.00 hours on the i6th, the second day of the battle, the
Panzer Division launched its attack on Capuzzo, and a violent and heavy
tank battle soon developed. For all its efforts, however, the division was
unable to gain any telling success. Soon Musaid also fell into British
hands. At about 10.30 hours the Panzer Division reported that it had
been forced to break off its attack on Capuzzo. The enemy remained
unshaken. Of the 80 tanks which I5th Panzer Division had taken into
battle, only 30 remained; the remainder were either burnt out on the
battlefield or awaiting recovery and repair.

The British force at Capuzzo was the 22nd Guards Brigade and the jth
Armoured Brigade which here consisted of the 4th and jth R. T.R* They were
equipped with Matilda tanks, of which they had go. Rommel had met these two
tank battalions in his first encounter with the British at Anas in May 1940.

The 5th Light Division, which was attacking toward Sidi Suleiman
from the area west of Sidi Azeiz, was also soon heavily engaged with
7th British Armoured Brigade [equipped with Cruiser tanks] 6 miles west of
Sidi Omar. The violent tank battle which ensued was soon decided in
our favour and the division succeeded in fighting its way through to the
area north-east of Sidi Omar and continuing its advance on Sidi Suleiman.
This was the turning point of the battle. I immediately ordered the isth
Panzer Division to disengage all its mobile forces as quickly as possible
and, leaving only the essential minimum to hold the position north of
Capuzzo, to go forward on the northern flank of the victorious 5th Light
Division towards Sidi Suleiman. The decisive moment had come. It is
often possible to decide the issue of a battle merely by making an
unexpected shift of one s main weight.

The enemy seemed unwilling to relinquish the initiative so easily,
and concentrated the bulk of his armour north of Capuzzo in order to
launch a heavy attack early next .morning against the element of I5th
Panzer Division still left in the north, with the object of forcing a break-

THE BRITISH SUMMER OFFENSIVE, 1 94 1 145

through. To impose my plans on the enemy from the outset, I ordered
the 5th Light and I5th Panzer Divisions to get their attack on Sidi
Suleiman moving at 4.30 a.m., i.e. before the probable start time of the
enemy attack.

Next morning, the I7th June, the 5th Light Division set off at the
appointed time and after a headlong advance reached the neighbourhood
of Sidi Suleiman at 06.00 hours. The i5th Panzer Division had become
involved in heavy fighting against an armoured force which the British
had sent to parry the danger menacing their army. But it soon reached
its objective. Great numbers of destroyed British tanks littered the
country through which the two divisions had passed.

This operation had obviously taken the British completely by surprise.
In wireless messages which we intercepted they described their position
as very serious. The commander of jth Armoured Division sent a
request to the Commander-in-Chief of the desert force to come to his
headquarters. It sounded suspiciously as though the British commander
no longer felt himself capable of handling the situation. It being now
obvious that in their present bewildered state the British would not start
anything for the time being, I decided to pull the net tight by going on
to Halfaya. Accordingly, at about 09.00 hours, orders were issued for
the 5th Light and isth Panzer Division to push on to Halfaya and
prevent any break-through of British armour from the north. The
British were seriously in trouble over petrol and ammunition and I
hoped to be able to force them into a stand-up fight and destroy their
whole force.

The enemy wireless was repeatedly reporting lack of ammunition.
Soon they set fire to their stores at Gapuzzo and withdrew, leaving the
desert littered with vehicles abandoned for lack of petrol. They com
plained bitterly of their high tank casualties.

The 5th Light and ^th Panzer Divisions reached the Halfaya Pass
shortly after 16.00 hours. There they turned and advanced side by side
to the north. This was a very unfortunate move, as its result was to
squeeze out the pocket instead of closing it and preventing the enemy s
escape. Thus the enemy was able to pour back east unmolested through
the vast gap between Sidi Omar .and Halfaya. I was furious at this
missed opportunity. The two divisions should have deployed in front
of the enemy as soon as they reached Halfaya, thus bringing him to
battle and preventing his escape. In that way we might have raked in
a large portion of his offensive power.

Rommel is mistaken. The main body of the British striking force had already
withdrawn to the south between the Halfaya Pass and the head of the Afrika
Korps column.

Thus the three-day battle of Sollum was over. It had finished with
a complete victory for the defence, although we might have dealt the
enemy far greater damage than we actually had done. The British had

146 THE WAR IN AFRICA FIRST YEAR

lost, in all, over 220 tanks and their casualties in men had been tremendous.
We, on the other hand, had lost only about 25 tanks totally destroyed.
Although two-thirds of the British tanks were out of action by the end of the
battle, the number destroyed or captured was 87 (58 " / " tanks and 29 cruisers),
besides 500 men killed or captured. They took 570 prisoners, and claimed to have
knocked out nearly 100 enemy tanks. Here, again, it can be seen how each side
is apt to overestimate the other s loss, particularly in a fast-moving battle.

18 June 1941
DEAREST Lu,

The three-day battle has ended in complete victory. I m going
to go round the troops to-day to thank them and issue orders. I m
leaving at six, so please be content with this brief note for the moment.

23 June 1941

Fve been three days on the road going round the battlefield.
The joy of the " Afrika " troops over this latest victory is tremendous.
The British thought they could overwhelm us with their 400 tanks.
We couldn t put that amount of armour against them. But our
grouping and the stubborn resistance of German and Italian troops
who were surrounded for days together, enabled us to make the
decisive operation with all the forces we still had mobile. Now the
enemy can come, he ll get an even bigger beating.

THE BATTLE OF SOLLUM A REVIEW

Wavell s strategic planning of this offensive had been excellent.
What distinguished him from other British army commanders was his
great and well-balanced strategic courage, which permitted him to con
centrate his forces regardless of his opponent s possible moves. He knew
very well the necessity of avoiding any operation which would enable
his opponent to fight on interior lines and destroy his formations one by
one with locally superior concentrations. But he was put at a great
disadvantage by the slow speed of his heavy infantry tanks, which
prevented him from reacting quickly enough to the moves of our faster
vehicles. Hence the slow speed of the bulk of his armour was his soft
spot, which we could seek to exploit tactically.

Rommers high tribute to Wavell is significant. For immediately after this
battle, Churchill, who was deeply disappointed with the outcome, decided to replace
Wavell by Auchinleck as Commander-in-Chief. It will be seen that Rommel s
diagnosis of the main factor in the British failure corresponds with forebodings
that Wavell had expressed on the 28th May when cautioning the authorities at
home against counting too much on a decisive success.

THE BRITISH SUMMER OFFENSIVE, 194! 147

The enemy s plan had been extremely simple, but simple plans are
in most cases more menacing than complex ones. With the German and
Italian holding forces in the Sollum-Halfaya sector tied down frontally,
the British had planned to move their assault brigades round the escarp
ment and then to the north. The Halfaya Pass was to be taken by an
attack from both sides, the success of which must have seemed certain
to the British after their experience in May. Once the road through the
passes was opened, the British had intended to concentrate their forces
and move on to the north, thus unhinging our whole Sollum-Halfaya
position. Most probably they would then have gone all out for Tobruk
and tried to raise the siege.

In this battle, the British used large numbers of their Mark II [Matilda]
tanks, which were too heavily armoured to be penetrated by most of our
anti-tank weapons. However, the gun which they carried was far too
small and its range too short. They were also only supplied with solid,
armour-piercing shell. It would be interesting to know why the Mark II
was called an infantry tank, when it had no H.E. ammunition with which
to engage the opposing infantry. It was also, as I have already said, far
too slow. In fact, its only real use was in a straight punch to smash a
hole in a concentration of material.

In the winter battles 1941-42, the enemy Mark VI Cruiser tank
made its first appearance. With its tremendous speed more than 40
m.p.h. this was an extremely useful tank. But its gun was again too
small, and it could not make up for its lack of calibre and thus of range
by the heavy armour it carried. Had this tank been equipped with a
heavier gun, it could have made things extremely unpleasant for us.

The British Mark VI cruiser was the type better known by its name, the
" Crusader." Rommel s high opinion of it, apart from its 2-pounder gun, is worthy
of note since disappointment with its inadequate gun-power led to sweeping criticism
of it on the British side, and to its good qualities being under-valued. Rommel
is mistaken in saying that it fast appeared in the winter 50 wen used in " Battleaxe "
in June.

Its 2-pounder gan had a penetration of 44 mm. at 1000 yards., which was
slightly better than tither the 50 mm. Kwk. gun in the Panzer in or the short 75
mm. in the Panzer IV. It had 49 mm. of armour on the turret front, compared
with 35 mm. on the Panzer III and IV, though thinner elsewhere. But the
frequency of mechanical trouble when %t fast appealed tended to aggravate dis
satisfaction with it on other scores.

The crucial position in this battle was the Halfaya Pass, which Captain
Bach and his men held through the heaviest fighting. Major Pardi s
artillery battalion also rendered distinguished service in this action, thus
showing that Italian troops could give a good account of themselves when
they were well officered. Had the British been able to take the Halfaya
Pass as they had planned, the situation would have been very different.

1^8 THE WAR IN AFRICA - FIRST YEAR

They would have been able to thrust both to the front and the rear along
the coast, and would have been In a position to make better tactical use
of their armour in all circumstances. The armoured units which they
threw against our striking force in the area north of Sidi Omar failed
to prevent the advance of the 5th Light Division and I5th Panzer Division,
and thanks to the excellent co-ordination between our anti-tank, armoured
and A.A. forces, were themselves destroyed. We could have annihilated
the greater part of the British force north of Sidi Suleiman if our com
manders had been alive to their opportunity and had acted on their
own initiative.

When the German attack was launched from north of Sidi Omar,
Wavell was prevented by the slowness of his infantry tanks from shifting
his main weight at that moment from Capuzzo to the point of the Axis
attack. There was nothing for him but a quick retreat, which he executed
with the minimum of casualties to the British forces.

The garrisons holding the strong points on our Sollum front also had
a great share in the Axis victory. Some of them succeeded in beating
off every enemy attack, while others fought on to the last breath.

This battle made a great impression on our superior commands.
General Roatta, who arrived in Africa some time later, informed me that
the Italian High Command realised the necessity of considerably reinforc
ing the Axis forces in North Africa. The German element was to be
brought up to four mechanised divisions and the Italian to an armoured
corps of three divisions, with a further two to three motorised divisions.
Their zeal unfortunately did not last long.

If these reinforcements had in fact come to Africa in the autumn of
1941, with their supplies guaranteed, we could have beaten off the
British winter offensive in the Marmarica assuming that is, that
Auchinleck would have begun it at all in those circumstances. We
would have been strong enough to destroy the British in Egypt in the
spring of 1942, and could have advanced into Irak and cut off the
Russians from Basra. This would have been a very heavy blow strategic
ally both for Britain and Russia.

28 June 1941

DEAREST Lu,

You need not worry yourself any more about my health. I m
doing fine. Our place is much healthier, lying 600 feet above sea
level. Besides, Pve got the advantage of my four walls. Aldinger
was sick for a few days, but he s now getting better. There s a lot
of work.

3
A quite atrocious heat, even during the night. One lies in bed,

THE BRITISH SUMMER OFFENSIVE, 194! 149

tossing and turning and dripping with sweat. The news of the
victories in Russia is very good to hear. It s all quiet here so far.
But I m not being taken in. Our stubborn friends on the other side
will be back sooner or later. The first congratulations on my pro
motion to Panzer General are coming in. Of course I ve heard
nothing official yet, but I understand it s been announced on the
radio.

I usually spend a lot of time travelling; yesterday I was away
eight hours. You can hardly imagine what a thirst one gets up after
such a journey. Fm hoping that my flight (to the Fuehrer s H.Q.)
will come off in about a fortnight. It s no good going until the
Russian affair is more or less over, otherwise there ll be scant regard
for my interests.

I was glad to hear that Manfred is now getting on in mathematics.
It s all a matter of the method of teaching. I m also very pleased
about his other successes in school.

I m managing, by dint of keeping the place dark and " shooting
a lot of them down," to keep my office fairly clear of mosquitoes.
I m even having an occasional bang while writing.

21 Aug. 1941

Nothing to report of importance. Had another visit from the
Italian C.-in-G. yesterday; purely " comradely ", however. On the
official level I ve been disagreeing with a number of things which
have been done and have said so through Galvi, so this visit was
probably a goodwill gesture. I ve got a number of visitors to-day.
We re having chicken and I m not going to miss it in spite of my
diet. This perpetual mush loses its fascination after a time. I m very
pleased about my new appointment. [Rommel had just been appointed
Commander of the Panzer Group Afrika.] Everybody else in that position
is a Colonel-General. If things here go as I should like them, I,
too, will probably get that rank after the war s over.

26 Aug. 1941

I was unable to write yesterday on the road all day. I returned
to my new H.Q,. in the evening and moved into my two rooms.
Bagged two more bugs, alas, this morning although they were out
side the net. There are endless swarms of flies and my flycatcher is
going to come in very useful.

27 Aug.

Nothing new. The heat s frightful, night time as well as day time.
Liquidated four bugs. My bed is now standing in tins filled with

150 THE WAR IN AFRICA FIRST YEAR

water and I hope the nights will be a little more restful from now on.
Some of the others are having a bad time with fleas. They ve left
me alone so far.

s8 Aug. 1941

... As to my health, I m feeling absolutely right. Everything s
working again. I m getting on famously with my new Chief of Staff
[Cause] which is of tremendous importance to me. Unfortunately
the bugs are still about four in the last twenty-four hours. But I
hope to win this campaign also.

29 Aug. 1941
A ferocious heat! We re going off some time to bathe. Otherwise

nothing new. There s a lot of blather about an imminent attack by
the British, but it s probably pure gossip. They re scraping together
troops for Iran. Their communications with Russia through Siberia
are very shaky, because of Japan s attitude, so there only remains
the route across the Persian Gulf. This also looks a very doubtful
proposition. Probably they ll come too late.

A night without bugs! Maybe I have killed the last of the
Mohicans. I ve even mastered the flies in my rooms.

30 Aug. 1941
We ve settled in very well in our new place. Fve been free of

the bugs ever since I had petrol poured over my iron bedstead, and
set light to. They must have been in the framework. We had a
quick bathe yesterday, but the sea water is too warm to refresh.

A caravan is supposed to be on the way for me, but it seems to
have sunk. A pity, but it can t be helped.

31 Aug. 1941
It s damned hot again, so hot that one steams even in the early

morning. Otherwise there s nothing doing, except that the Italian
High Command is dissatisfied at having so little say in things here.
They mess us about over all manner of petty details, but we don t
take any of it lying down. Maybe they re working for a real bust-up,
in order to get me, or perhaps the whole German force, out of the
way. I for one wouldn t be sorry to have a change of theatre.

jo Sept. 1941

I went out shooting last evening with Major von Mellenthin and

Lieutenant Schmidt. It was most exciting. Finally, I got a running

gazelle from the car. We had the liver for dinner and it was delicious.

Wfe have a distinguished visitor coming to-day Major Melchiori,

a close confidant of the Duce. I m hoping for a lot from this visit,

THE BRITISH SUMMER OFFENSIVE, 194!

as the feeling towards us is not particularly friendly at the moment.
Things have changed ! However, we take good care of ourselves and
don t always mince our words. All for now, our visitor s arriving.

29 Sept. 1941

The last few days have been exciting. A large shipment arrived
for us at Benghazi. It took 50 hours to unload. All went well. You
can imagine how pleased I was. With things as they are in the
Mediterranean it s not easy to get anything across. For the moment
we re only stepchildren and must make the best of it. Anyway, they re
making good progress in Russia and our time will come again.

The wind s howling outside, although there is no Ghibli.
Guenther s doing fried potatoes this evening and I m looking forward
to it after being off my food for a few days.

6 Oct. 1941
Unable to write yesterday, my stomach struck work again, We

had a fowl the evening before last which must have come from
Rameses II s chicken run. For all the six hours cooking it had
it was like leather, and my stomach just couldn t take it.

7 Oct. 1941
My stomach is completely back in order and I m rushing around

in fine fettle. What do you think of ray leave plans? I should be
able to get away to Rome for a week at the beginning of November.
I ve got a lot of business to clear up there. I ll have to come back for
the battle, of course, and we must hope that supplies work all right,
so that we can really get down to it. Then I ll be able to take my
leave at the end of November. I know it s not a very good time for
leave and it won t be easy for me to get used to the cold. However,
it s the best time for things here. Of course supplies might upset
everything and cause a long postponement.

9 Oct. 1941

I received some nice news from Voggenreiter 1 yesterday. He says
that royalties for the large edition (50,000) will not be less than
25,000 marks. At the same time Mittler und Sohn notified me of a
credit of 1021.5 marks! 2 That really is something to be going on
with. f

And now there are all these special communiques from the East.
I wonder if Britain won t soon begin to get cold feet. A lot of work

1 Rommers publisher.

2 Rommel refers here to his book Infanterie greift an which sold 400,000 copies in
Germany before and during the war.

152 THE WAR IN AFRICA FIRST YEAR

here. Gambarra s 1 coming to-day, but it s doubtful whether his news
will be very pleasant.

10 Oct. 194.1

A fairly stormy meeting yesterday, to be continued to-day. Not
much to show for it. The things one has to put up with ! I m keeping
very fit touch wood lively from morning to night.

12 Oct. 1941
Wonderful news from Russia ! After the conclusion of the great

battles, we can expect the advance east to go fast and thus remove
all possibility of the enemy creating any significant new forces. The
British workers seem to be getting thoroughly rebellious. . . .

Britain would be only too pleased to attack, but she has neither
the troops nor the equipment to make a major landing in Europe.
They ll be too late for Russia if they choose the only road left open
to them, through India, and an attack in Libya would be a risky
business and would not have any direct effect on things in Russia.
Once we ve taken T, [Toimi], there ll be precious little hope for
them here.

13 Oct. 1941
I hope we meet all right on the ist November. Inquire about

the trains please and let me know exactly when you ll be getting to
Rome. Then I ll arrange things so that I can be there on time.
I m hoping the situation will permit me to stay until the i5th. But
you must bring along a civilian outfit for me ( brown suit).

24 Oct. 1941
DEAR MANFRED,

You ll be getting more letters from me now that you re alone in
the house.

Everything is going as planned here. I visit the troops every day,
most of them are by the sea. Occasionally we bathe. The water is
still very warm, and the heat pretty bad during the day, but it s so
cool at night now, that I need two blankets. My new home is nicely
furnished. The wall is covered with all different maps, especially
of Russia, on which every advance we make is immediately marked
in.

28 Oct.
DEAR MANFRED,

We had the Ghibli again yesterday. Sometimes the dust-clouds
were so thick you could only see two to three yards. It seems to be
better to-day.

1 Italian Corps Commander,

THE BRITISH SUMMER OFFENSIVE, 1941 153

It s only a few days now before I take off to fly across the water.
Fm very pleased to be seeing Mummy again in Rome and am only
sorry that you, young man, can t be with us. But it couldn t be
helped. I am certain to get some leave this winter and then we ll
have a good prowl round together. There s not much hunting here
where I am now. Some of the officers have shot cheetahs, which
have their homes in the stony wadis. Occasionally one comes across
a bustard, a fox, a jackal or even a gazelle. The camel thorn bushes
are now growing faintly green and have got tiny flowers. Last night
the British bombarded jus from the sea. Dive-bombers and torpedo-
bombers sank one or two of their cruisers and we ve had peace since.
All for to-day.

No further German divisions beyond the original two were sent from Europe
in 1941 (nor during the first half of 1942}^ but one extra division was formed
in Africa from a number of independent units there* This division, which was
called the goth Light, had no tanks and comprised only four infantry battalions, but
was relatively strong in fire-power, having three field artillery battalions, an anti
tank battalion, and a battalion of 88 mm. dual-purpose (A. A. and A.Tk.) guns.
The 5th Light Division was renamed the 2ist Panzer Division, but without
any change in organisation and equipment. Both this and the i^th Panzer Division
had only two tank battalions and three infantry battalions.

After Rommel s command was raised to the status of a Panzer Group in August,
Lieut.-General Cruewell was appointed commander of the Afrika Korps (with
Colonel Bayerlein as Chief of Staff). Only the two Panzer divisions were included
in the Afrika Korps. 1 Besides the Africa Korps and the goth Light Division,
Rommel also had under him six Italian divisions the Ariete and Trieste
(forming the XX Motorised Corps}; the Pavia, Bologna and Brescia (form
ing the XXI Infantry Corps] which were investing Tobruk; and the Savona,
which was garrisoning Bardia.

x Each of the two panzer divisions comprised:

A panzer regiment of 2 battalions (each of 4 companies).

Companies had an establishment of 21 tanks apiece the total of the regiment,
including command and signal tanks, being 194.

One company of each battalion, however, was still in Germany when the
British autumn offensive, " Operation Crusader," was launched in November,

1941. By the spring of 1942 the 4th company of each battalion had been sent
to Africa, and the proportion of medium tanks was increased. In August,

1942, the (nominal) establishment of a regiment was reduced to 180 tanks.
A Motorised Infantry Regiment of 3 battalions (each of 4 companies).

An Artillery Regiment of 3 battalions (each of 3 batteries^ and each battery ot
4 guns). One battalion was heavy with 150 mm. howitzers.

An Anti-Tank Battalion (of 3 companies, each with 12 anti-tank guns).

An Armoured Reconnaissance Battalion (with 30 armoured cars).

Engineers and other troops. .

The establishment (planned strength^ of the panzer division in personnel was
approximately 12,500 and in anti-tank guns, 120.

CHAPTER VIII

THE WINTER CAMPAIGN, 1941-2
By Lieut.-General Fritz Bqyerlein

UNFORTUNATELY THERE is no connected account written by Rommel
for the next period of the war in Africa the winter of 1941-42. As a
proper appreciation of the tactical and strategical problems in Africa,
and of Rommel s generalship, is impossible without this part of the
story, it has been thought necessary for a summary of operations during
this period to be compiled from the available documents. I have been
all the more ready to undertake this task as I was myself in the centre
of events, having arrived in the desert from the mud of the early Russian
winter shortly before the beginning -of the British autumn offensive, with
a thorough practical schooling in mobile warfare behind me, which I
had acquired in the European theatre under that master of the art,
General Guderian. The account which follows has, therefore, been
compiled partly from my own experience during the Libyan campaign
and partly from the documents available to me.

The German-Italian operations in the spring of 1941 and the rapid
conquest of Cyrenaica which had resulted had left the whole world
gasping. The reconquered Italian territory had been held against heavy
British counter-attacks and its defence strengthened by the construction
of the Sollum-Bardia line. On the other side of the picture, we had
failed, despite all efforts, to take Tobruk and thus acquire a supply port
close to the front for Benghazi was about 300 miles away and Tripoli
about 1,000. The British had been quick to appreciate the decisive
importance of Tobruk and were defending it with the utmost tenacity.
Important German and Italian forces were now tied up in the siege.
But far worse was the fact that all future operations were bound to be
determined by the situation at Tobruk. Were the enemy to launch
simultaneous attacks from Egypt and Tobruk, Rommel s position could
not fail to become extremely critical. The weak Axis forces had in-

154

THE WINTER CAMPAIGN, 1941-2 155

sufficient depth to allow them to operate freely; their supply lines \vere
continually threatened, and a serious danger existed of their fighting
units being squeezed into the confined space between the sea, the
Sollum and the Tobruk fronts, and there surrounded and destroyed by
a superior and skilfully led enemy.

Rommel was in no doubt that die British would exploit this oppor
tunity towards the end of the year and that it was essential to forestall
them by taking Tobruk before they had the chance. In any attack on
Tobruk, however, he had to reckon with the possibility of a British
relieving attack in the rear of his assault force; to meet it he would be
forced to deploy the mass of his mobile forces between Capuzzo and Bir
el Gobi. Rommel did not expect the British to launch a major attack
until they thought the Middle East free of the danger of a German
offensive through the Caucasus, when they would be able to draw off
major forces for employment on the Egyptian front sufficient to ensure
the success of their plan. With the adverse turn which our operations
in Russia had taken, this situation could be expected to arise by about
November.

During September the siege front round Tobruk was strengthened
and suitable jump-off points for the attack were taken. The trans
portation across the Mediterranean of the necessary reinforcements,
arms and supplies for the attack required a substantial increase in the
level of Italian shipments to Africa. But these remained, as usual, far
below the promises given us by the High Command, which had them
selves been regarded as an absolute minimum. The result was that by the
end of September only a third of the troops and a seventh of the supplies
which we needed had arrived. This was a terrible handicap in our race
for time with the British, and forced us to postpone our attack until
November; even then we had to be content with inadequate forces and
material.

As time was pressing, Rommel reported to the High Command at
the beginning of November that he had enough troops in position to
open the offensive and that he thought it essential, even if the necessary
supplies had not all arrived, to mount the attack in the second half of
November, by which time all other preparations would be ready. But
the High Command failed to appreciate the situation and were appre
hensive. In their reply they drew attention to the British superiority in
the air and proposed that the attack should be put off until the following
year. Rommel could not let it go at that and replied the same day that
with the present state of shipping in the Mediterranean, he feared
that any lengthy postponement would only result in the balance of
strength swinging even further against us. He therefore regarded it as
vital to strike at the earliest possible moment. The High Command

THE WAR IN AFRICA FIRST YEAR

thereupon gave approval for the operation to be undertaken at the time

proposed. i_ T -L TN- -

The assault proper was to be made by the goth Light Division,
1 5th Panzer Division and two Italian infantry divisions. As a covering
force Rommel moved the Italian Motorised Corps Gambarra (the Ariete
Armoured Division and Trieste Motorised Division) and the sist Panzer
Division into the area south and south-east of Tobruk between Bir
Hacheim, Gasr el Arid and Got el Hariga, where they were to form a
mobile defence against any relieving attacks which the enemy might mount
either on the rear of the Tobruk assault force or on the Sollum front.
This move was complete by the i6th November. The siege of Tobruk
was maintained by the Italian Brescia and Trento Divisions.

Rommel s tank strength at that time comprised 260 German and
154 Italian tanks. Of the German tanks, 15 were Panzer I, 40 were
Panzer II, 150 were Panzer III (50 per cent of which were still equipped
with the 37-mm. gun), and 55 were Panzer IV.

During the night 17-18 November, British Commandos, in a raid of
great audacity, tried to wipe out what they supposed to be Army Head
quarters in Beda Littoria 200 miles behind our front as a prelude to
their offensive. The place they attacked was actually occupied at the
time by the Quartermaster staff, who lost two officers and two other ranks.

It is interesting to note that Rommel had in fact formerly had his
H.Q. in this house. He himself had had the first floor and his A.D.C.s
the ground floor. The British must have received knowledge of this
through their Intelligence Service.

The British Commandos answered the sentry in German. Although
they did not know the password, the sentry did not fire, thinking they
: were Germans who had lost their way. The British were wearing no
insignia which might have identified them as enemy. Suddenly one of
them drew his pistol and shot the sentry. They pressed quickly into the
house, fired a volley into the room on the left of the entrance door,
killing two Germans, and tried to get up to the first floor. Here, however,
they were met by German bullets. One British officer was killed and a
German fatally wounded. The remainder of the British Commandos
withdrew.

THE BRITISH ATTACK

In the middle of October, our Army intelligence circular notified all
formations that with large quantities of enemy war material and strong
contingents of troops steadily pouring into Egypt, there was a grave
danger that the British would soon launch a major offensive. Even
before this, in September, a move by the South African and New Zealand
Divisions from the Nile Delta to Mersa Matruh had been detected by

158 THE WAR IN AFRICA FIRST YEAR

our interception service and afterwards confirmed by prisoner interroga
tion. However, the armed reconnaissance which sist Panzer Division
made in the middle of September into the area south of Sidi Barrani
brought back no evidence of an impending attack. No supply dumps
capable of supporting a major offensive were seen in the Egyptian frontier
area. The enemy s approach march and deployment passed unnoticed
by our reconnaissance. His concealment of his preparations was excellent.
The wireless silence which he imposed prevented our interception service
detecting his approach march into the assembly areas. Our air recon
naissance operating, it is true, with far too few aircraft failed to spot
his troop movements, probably because he only moved by night and
laid up during the day under the protection of excellent camouflage.
Moreover, as luck would have it, torrential rain put all our airfields out
of commission on the i8th November and no air reconnaissance was
flown that day. But air reconnaissance failed just as badly on the southern
flank, where the British had established large supply dumps. Ground
reconnaissance was equally ineffective. As a result the attack achieved
complete tactical surprise.

From captured papers we later learned the dispositions of the British
Eighth Army for their attack. Its aim was to destroy the German-Italian
forces, relieve Tobruk and then exploit victory by an advance to occupy
Tripolitania. XXX Corps, on the desert flank, -was to advance on
Tobruk from the frontier with the bulk of the British armour. The task
of XIII Corps, on the coast, was first to pin down the garrisons of the
Sollum front while the armoured manoeuvre was in progress, then to
advance northward to cut off these garrisons and then to move west to
support XXX Corps.

This offensive, called " Crusader" began on the i8th November with a long
approach march, by the main force, that passed wide round the flank of the German-
Italian fortified position near Sollum, on the coast route. The attacking force
comprised the equivalent of seven divisions, including the Tobruk garrison, and was
opposed by three German and seven Italian. But such figures give a false impression,
and all the more so because the issue mainly turned on armour and air-power. The
British had five brigades of armour, while Rommel had the equivalent of two
German and one Italian. In number of tanks the British total was 724, with some
200 in reserve (which were sent up at the rate of about forty a day). Rommel s
strength at the start was 414 (including 154 Italian}. He had some fifty under repair
but had no reserve of new tanks. In the air the British predominance was much
greater, as in aircraft fit for action they had close on 1,100 against 120 German
and about 200 Italian. The initial advantage was multiplied by surprise.

Rommel himself was in Rome during the first part of November. He had gone
there to win sanction for his plan of an early attack on Tobruk, and stayed on to
spend his birthday, the /j/A, with his wifefiying back to Africa just before the
British advance began.

It was not until the afternoon of the i8th November, when operations

THE WINTER CAMPAIGN, IQ4I-2 159

were already under way, that the Panzer Group realised that the enemy
had launched an offensive. Our outposts were forced back from the
Bir el Gobi Sidi Omar line by superior enemy forces. A statement
given by a British soldier captured at Sidi Suleiman on the 1 7th November,
provided us with a detailed account of the enemy s forces and plans, so
detailed in fact that we at first doubted its veracity. Subsequent develop
ments confirmed it in every detail.

In the circumstances, Rommel decided not to go ahead with the
attack on Tobruk. The enemy had beaten him to it. He immediately
ordered the Afrika Korps to launch an attack against the British masses
moving north through Gabr Saleh.

Considerable controversy has occurred since as to whether Rommel
was right in calling off the attack on Tobruk in order to deal with the
enemy offensive first. Our covering force might indeed have sufficed to
hold off the enemy attack until after Tobruk had fallen and this would
have been of the greatest advantage for us, for we could then have operated
in the Marmarica with far greater ease and freedom than we were, in
the event, able to do with the strong Tobruk garrison in our backs. But
would the British have allowed us time to capture Tobruk undisturbed?
This was not just a matter of audacity and daring; it was a gamble,
which General Rommel refused to undertake.

The British armour advanced towards the Tobruk area in three
columns, and struck our covering screen on the igth November. The
left column reached Bir el Gobi, forcing back the Ariete Division after
a hot fight. The right column was checked by part of the 2ist
Panzer Division, and then driven back on Gabr Saleh. Meanwhile, the
centre column had penetrated to the airfield at Sidi Rezegh, and
established itself on the escarpment, barely 10 miles from the Tobruk
perimeter.

On the soth the Afrika Korps continued and developed its pressure
on the enemy s right flank, and destroyed many tanks in the day s
fighting. Both our divisions won through to the area Gabr Saleh-Sidi
Omar, a good base for an attack on the rear of the enemy s centre column.
Rommel s plan, taking into account our inferior strength and the limited
usefulness of the Italians, was to concentrate his mobile formations into
one compact force, and defeat the enemy formations one after the other,
until finally the entire British striking force had been destroyed. ^

The British obliged by throwing their armoured brigades into the
battle in separate units. This enabled us to gain a series of partial
successes, and eventually led to victory in one of the greatest armoured
battles of the campaign, in which the bulk of the enemy s armour was
destroyed. In these actions, which are among the most interesting of the
African war, the tactics were developed which were to bring such success
later. They provide an illuminating picture of Rommel s generalship and
that of his subordinate commanders.

l6o THE WAR IN AFRICA FIRST YEAR

Rommel returned to Africa on i8th November. Two days later he wrote to
his wife:

20 Nov. 1941

DEAREST Lu,

The enemy offensive began immediately after my arrival. The
battle has now reached its crisis. I hope we get through it in good
order. It will probably all be decided by the time this letter arrives.
Our position is certainly not easy.

Fm as well as can be expected.

On the morning of the 2ist November, the Afrika Korps moved to
the attack against the rear of the British armour. By evening, after heavy
fighting, it gained the escarpment near Bir Sciaf-Sciuf south of the Trigh
Capuzzo, where it took up position for a mobile defence to meet the
enemy s renewed attack.

On the previous night., a minor sortie of the Tobruk garrison from
the south-east sector was followed by a heavy attack supported by 50
infantry tanks. The enemy broke through the investing front, and over
ran the artillery positions of the Bologna Division. Although the position
was restored this sector of tte front remained a continual source of
anxiety for us.

For the 22nd November Rommel ordered " mobile operations "
south of the Trigh Capuzzo. On the previous night General Cruewell
had led the isth Panzer Division out to the east, completely unobserved
by the enemy, and regrouped them in depth up against the enemy s long
flank. While the 2ist Panzer Division attacked the Sidi Rezegh airfield
and threw the enemy back to the south, the I5th Panzer Division drove
into the flank and rear of the enemy force attacking Bir Sciaf-Sciuf.
Pushing on during the night, they overran the headquarters of the
British 4th Armoured Brigade, captured the commander and disrupted
the brigade.

That day no attacks were made from Tobruk. Farther east the enemy
launched an outflanking movement aimed at the rear of the Sollum
front. Our strong points held, but Fort Capuzzo was taken by the
New Zealanders.

THE TANK BATTLE OF TO TENSO NNTA G l

Orders for the 23rd November were the destruction of the enemy s
main striking force by a concentric attack of all German-Italian mobile
forces.

That day Rommel was unable for the first time to issue his orders

1 Memorial Sunday. The German day of remembrance for those who died in the
First World War.

THE WINTER CAMPAIGN, IQ4I-2 l6l

verbally and so the Afrika Korps received a lengthy wireless signal which
would have taken far too long to transcribe and decode. General Gruewell
could not wait and, knowing RommePs general plan, felt compelled to
act on his own initiative. Accordingly, he left his H.Q,. at Gasr el Arid
at about 05.30 hours to lead his troops personally in the forthcoming
decisive battle. Half an hour later, his whole headquarters staff together
with almost the entire paraphernalia of command was surprised by the
New Zealanders, who had come up from Sidi Azeiz unobserved, and
taken prisoner after a heroic defence. General Cruewell and I escaped
this fate by a hairsbreadth.

On the morning of the 23rd, German-Italian dispositions were as
follows :

The 1 5th Panzer Division was reorganising after its success near Bir
Sciaf-Sciuf. The 2ist Panzer Division was deployed for defence in the
Sidi Rezegh area. The Italian Ariete and Trieste Divisions were assembled
round Bir el Gobi.

The enemy armour was thought to be lying on the extensive desert
plateau of Sidi Muftah and Bir el Haiad, divided up into several combat
groups.

General CruewelPs plan was to attack the enemy in the rear, but he
first intended to join up with the Ariete, who were moving up from Bir
el Gobi, in order to bring all the available armour to bear in one united
effort. At about 07.30 hours, the 15th Panzer Division moved to the
south-west where they discovered and immediately attacked a strong
force of enemy armour round Sidi Muftah. Violent tank fighting
developed. More enemy groups with vast vehicle parks, numerous tanks
and guns were discovered north of Hagfed el Haiad and General Gruewell
accordingly embarked on an even wider outflanking movement. By the
early afternoon, after continuous fighting, he reached a point south-east
of Hagfed el Haiad, deep in the enemy s rear.

The Ariete s assault spearheads had meanwhile arrived with 120
tanks and General Cruewell now launched the combined German and
Italian armoured forces northwards into the enemy s rear, with the
object of bottling him up completely and forcing him back against the
2ist Panzer Division s front at Sidi Rezegh.

The attack started well, but soon came up against a wide artillery
and anti-tank gun screen, which the South Africans had formed at a
surprising speed between Haiad and Muftah. Guns of all kinds and
sizes laid a curtain of fire in front of the attacking tanks and there seemed
almost no hope of making any progress in the face of this fire-spewing
barrier. Tank after tank split open in the hail of shells. Our entire
artillery had to be thrown in to silence the enemy guns one by one.
However, by the late afternoon we had managed to punch a few holes
in the front. The tank attack moved forward again and tank duels of
tremendous intensity developed deep in the battlefield. In fluctuating

l62 THE WAR IN AFRICA FIRST YEAR

fighting, tank against tank, tank against gun or anti-tank nest, sometimes
in frontal, sometimes in flanking assault, using every trick of mobile
warfare and tank tactics, the enemy was finally forced back into a confined
area. With no relief forthcoming from a Tobruk sortie, he now saw his
only escape from complete destruction in a break-out from the ring
surrounding him.

At one moment during this confused battle, the Afrika Korps*
Mammoth, containing General Cruewell and his staff, was suddenly
ringed round by British tanks. The German crosses on the sides of the
vehicle, which had been originally captured from the British, were not
easy to identify. The hatches were shut. The British tankmen, who had
fortunately fired off all their ammunition, had no idea whom they had
met. A number of them left their Mark VI, walked across to the
Mammoth and knocked on the armour plate, whereupon General
Cruewell opened the hatch and found himself looking into the face of
a British soldier, to the great astonishment of both. At that moment
gunfire started to spray into the neighbourhood. The occupants of the
Mammoth threw themselves flat 6n the thin wooden flooring, but the
vehicle escaped undamaged. A German so-mm. anti-aircraft gun had
opened fire on the dismounted British tank crews, who promptly jumped
back into their tanks and disappeared as fast as they could to the south,
thus releasing the staff of the Afrika Korps from a highly precarious
situation.

The wide plain south of Sidi Rezegh was now a sea of dust, haze
and smoke. Visibility was poor and many British tanks and guns were
able to break away to the south and east without being caught. But a
great part of the enemy force still remained inside. Twilight came, but
the battle was still not over. Hundreds of burning vehicles, tanks and
guns lit up the field of that Totensonntag. It was long after midnight before
we could get any sort of picture of the day s events, organise our force,
count our Idsses and gains and form an appreciation of the general
situation upon which the next day s operations would depend. The most
important results of this battle were the elimination of the direct threat
to the Tobruk front, the destruction of a large part of the enemy armour
and the damage to enemy morale caused by the complete ruin of his
plans.

After these reverses, the commander of XXX Corps, General Norrie, decided
to withdraw what remained of his forces southward to the Gabr Saleh area. Two-
thirds of his tanks had been lost, and the remaining 150 were badly dispersed.

23 Nov. 1941
DEAREST Lu,

The battle seems to have passed its crisis. I m very well, in good
humour and full of confidence. Two hundred enemy tanks shot up
so far. Our fronts have held.

THE WINTER CAMPAIGN, 1941-2 163

THE RAID INTO EGYPT

General Cruewell s conduct of the battle had been masterly; on the
morning of the 24th November he reported to Rommel on the ring road
Rommel did not yet know the full details of the action south of Tobruk
that the enemy had been smashed at Sidi Rezegh, and that only a part
of his force had escaped destruction. This fact strengthened Rommel in
the decision he had already taken to strike to the south-east deep into
the enemy s rear. Rommel explained his plan in the following words:
" The greater part of the force aimed at Tobruk has been destroyed;
now we will turn east and go for the New Zealanders and Indians before
they have been able to join up with the remains of their main force for
a combined attack on Tobruk. At the same time we will take Habata
and Maddalena and cut off their supplies. Speed is vital; we must
make the most of the shock effect of the enemy s defeat and push forward
immediately and as fast as we can with our entire force to Sidi Omar."

Rommel s intention was to exploit the disorganisation and confusion
which he knew must exist in the enemy s camp, by making an unexpected
and audacious raid into the area south of the Sollum front. He hoped to
complete the enemy s confusion and perhaps even induce him to pull
back into Egypt again. Our entire mobile force was to- take part in the
operation.

A weak holding force, scraped together from different formations
and put under the command of the artillery commander, General
Boettcher, was placed south of Tobruk to deal with any further enemy
attempts to raise the siege. Italian infantry remained at Bir el Gobi and
the siege of Tobruk was maintained by the same forces as hitherto. This
decision of Rommel s probably the boldest he ever made has been
severely criticised by certain German authorities, who were for ever
incapable of understanding the African theatre, but has been praised
and admired by the enemy.

It would, of course, have been possible for him to have first disposed
finally of the enemy remnants who had been fortunate enough to escape
destruction south of Tobruk; but this would have taken a great deal of
valuable time. He therefore judged it better to take the enemy unawares
by going for his Sollum front and at the same time striking a blow at his
most sensitive spothis life-line of supply. Accordingly, at midday on
the 24th November, the Afrika Korps and the Ariete Division started
on their long desert trek towards Sidi Omar, which they reached in the
evening after a wild drive in complete disregard of the British threat to
their flanks. Rommel, who was at the head of the column, led the 2ist
Panzer Division straight through the 4th Indian Division into the Sidi
Suleiman district in order to seal off the Halfaya front to the east. The
1 5th Panzer Division was ordered to attack Sidi Omar. One mixed

164 THE WAR IN AFRICA FIRST YEAR

combat group was assembled to take the supply centre at Maddalena,
while another was to destroy the camps round Habata, the terminus of
the desert railway. There is no doubt that these moves would have
seriously upset the enemy s supply, but they could never have caused it
to collapse altogether, and the story put about by a number of writers
that " the whole fate of the Eighth Army hung by a single thread, which
Rommel was unable to cut " is entirely without foundation.

On the 24th November, the issue of orders took place late in the
afternoon near Bir Sheferzen, east of Graziani s wire fence. Rommel
then drove off to 2ist Panzer Division and personally put them at the
Halfeya Pass. On the way back to Sidi Omar his one and only vehicle
broke down with engine trouble. It was pure luck that as dusk was
falling, the Afrika Korps Mammoth, containing General Cruewell and
his battle staff, came by. " Give us a lift," said Rommel, who, with
Cause, was shivering with cold. The Mammoth, now carrying all the
most senior officers of the Panzer Group, drove on to the wire fence.
Unfortunately, no way through it could be found, and it was impossible
to make one. Finally, Rommel grew impatient. " 1*11 take over myself,"
he said, and dismissed the A.D.C., who had been directing the vehicle
up till then, But this time even Rommel s legendary sense of direction
did not help. To make matters worse they were in an area completely
dominated by the enemy, Indian dispatch riders buzzed to and fro past
the Mammoth, British tanks moved up forward and American-built
lorries ground their way through the desert. None of them had any
suspicion that the highest officers of the German-Italian Panzer Group
were sitting in a captured command vehicle, often only two or three yards
away. The ten officers and five men spent a restless night.

During the days that followed, Rommel continued to drive from one
unit to another, usually through the British lines, in order to deal with
the continually recurring crises. On one occasion he went into a New
Zealand hospital, which was still occupied by the enemy. By this time
no one really knew who was captor and who captive except Rommel,
who was in no doubt. He inquired if anything was needed, promised the
British medical supplies and drove on unhindered. He also crossed an
air strip occupied by the British, and was several times chased by British
vehicles, but always escaped.

Meanwhile, the sist Panzer Division, contrary to its original instruc
tions, but following an order wrongly transmitted to it by the Army s
rear operations staff, had moved through the Halfaya position on to
Capuzzo and become involved in dangerous and costly fighting with the
New Zealanders. The attack made by units of the Afrika Korps on Sidi
Omar miscarried, and it soon became apparent that the enemy was
everywhere still far stronger than might have been expected after our
victories. He had recovered from the shock very quickly and the situation
had been saved as we discovered later by the personal intervention

l66 THE WAR IN AFRICA FIRST YEAR

of General Auchinleck, G.-in-C. Middle East Army Group, who had
rushed up from Cairo and at the last moment reversed General Cunning
ham s decision to evacuate the Marmarica and withdraw to Egypt.

Rommel s daring stroke came very close to proving decisive by its effect on the
mind of the commander of the opposing army. The shattering defeat of his armour
in the battle around Sidi Re&gh led Cunningham on the syrd to contemplate
abandoning the offensive and withdrawing over the frontier to reorganise his forces
out of Rommel 9 s reach. By such a timely withdrawal he could reckon on keeping
his army in being, whereas by continuing the offensive in tlie existing conditions he
ran the risk of having it completely destroyed. But his inclination to retreat was
overruled by Auchinleck, who arrived at this crucial moment by air from Cairo.

The next day, Rommel launched the Afrika Korps on its strategic raid. As it
burst through into the, British rear area it spread confusion and panic. This
alarming news naturally increased Cunningham 9 s anxiety. If the decision to persist
or retreat had rested with him, RommeFs deep advance might have settled the issue.
But on the 26th Auchinleck, after returning to Cairo, came to the conclusion that he
must reinforce his order to continue the offensive by giving the Eighth Army a
different commander, and replaced Cunningham by Ritchie the Deputy Chief of
the General Staff at his own headquarters.

AuchinlecKs intervention and resolution brought victory out of defeat. Tet his
decision was basically more of a gamble than Rommel* s raid, because it staked
the survival of the Eighth Army on a continuance of the British offensive. The
misdirection of the 21 st Panzer Division, as well as the firm resistance of the New
Zealand and 4th Indian Divisions, was an important factor in the issue.

As things turned out, Rommel 9 s raid resulted in more forfeit than gain. When
the raid started, he had almost won the battle. When the raid ended, the scales had
tilted against him. But the margin was very narrow, not only psychologically but
physically. For in his south-easterly drive to the frontier aimed at the British
supply sources behind it lie actually passed the two field supply depots on which
the whole British advance depended. These two huge dumps, each some six miles
square, lay 75 miles south-east and south-west respectively of Gabr Saleh, and only
the 22nd Guards Brigade was available to defend them. The Afrika Korps actually
passed through the water point on the northern edge of the more easterly dump.
But the existence of these two vital supply sources was not discovered thanks to
good concealment, and control ofttie air on tlie British side.

If Rommel, after his success at Sidi Rezegh, had pushed south to mop up the
remains of XXX Corps, he would have found the dumps and probably sealed his
victory. It was ironical that in pursuing the bigger aim he missed the bigger target.
The course he actually took might be condemned by cautiously conventional doctrine,
but it was in accord with the classic ideas of generalship as applied by the " Great
Captains " of history. When a similar course was followed by the Panzer forces
the year before against the Allied armies in Western Europe, under more precarious
circumstances, it had produced the greatest victory of modern times. Its miscarriage,
this time in Africa, was due partly to the human factors already mentioned

THE WINTER CAMPAIGN, 1941-2 167

Auchinleck above all but it was also a demonstration of the big part that chance
plays in the issues of war.

BACK TO TOBRUK

Rommel had notified his la, Lieut.-CoI. Westphal, of his decision to
strike for Sidi Omar in the early morning of the 24th November. Westphal
wanted to raise objections, and in particular to draw attention to the fact
that the British were reassembling their troops south of Bir el Gobi.
But Rommel permitted no discussion, pulled General Gause, his Chief
of Staff, into the car and drove off to Sidi Oman

Before they had gone far the accompanying wireless vehicle stuck
fast in the desert. Rommel drove on without it and the operations staff
at headquarters could no longer reach him by wireless. So when the
British, freshly organised after Auchinleck s assumption of command,
advanced on the now practically denuded area of Sidi Rezegh, Westphal
tried desperately to make contact with Rommel. Several aircraft were
sent out to look for him, but they did not return. The situation south of
Tobruk grew steadily more tense, and finally Westphal decided to take
matters into his own hands and recall the 2ist Panzer Division to Sidi
Rezegh.

When Rommel heard of this order he regarded it at first as an enemy
trick, but soon found out that it was genuine. An A.D.C. of Rommel s,
Lieut. Voss, gives the following account of his return to H.Q. :

" Rommel was at first furious at Lieut.-Col. Westphal s independent
action in recalling 2ist Panzer Division to El Adem. On returning to
headquarters he greeted nobody but stalked silently into the command
vehicle and looked at the situation maps. Behind him stood Cause.
We tried to signal to Cause that he should talk to Rommel and explain
Westphal s decision. But it was not necessary, for Rommel suddenly
left the vehicle saying that he was going to lie down. Nobody dared go
to the vehicle where Rommel was sleeping, to report on the situation.
Next morning, however, to everybody s relief, the General made no
further mention of the incident. He was as friendly as ever and work
at headquarters continued smoothly."

Although the British 7th Armoured Division and the South Africans
had undoubtedly been very badly mauled, the New Zealanders, the
Indians, the Guards Brigade and the Tobruk garrison were all fully
intact and active. In these circumstances, Rommel was compelled to
give up . the operations against the supply centres at Maddalena and
Habata [in the desert, 25 miles south ofBuqbuq], as these long-range and time-
consuming raids could no longer take the enemy by surprise and would
have meant a wanton dispersal of our strength. He now concentrated
all his mobile forces against the New Zealanders. On the 25th November

l68 THE WAR IN AFRICA FIRST YEAR

heavy fighting flared up again at Tobruk, where our holding force was
caught between pincers, one coming from the south-east and the other
from the fortress itself. By mustering all their strength, the Boettcher
Group succeeded in beating off most of these attacks, and the only
enemy penetration was brought to a standstill by an Italian counter
attack.

In view of this critical situation, Rommel immediately broke off
operations on the Sollum front and brought all his formations back as
quickly as possible to the main centre of the battle at Tobruk*

27 Nov. 1341
DEAREST Lu,

The battle has now been raging in the desert round Tobruk and
in front of Sollum since the igth. You will have heard from the
communiques more or less how it has gone. I think we re through
the worst and that the battle will be of decisive importance to the
whole war situation.

I m very well. I ve just spent four days in a desert counter-attack
with nothing to wash with. We had a splendid success.

It s our 25th wedding anniversary to-day. Perhaps it ll run to a
special communiqu^. I need not tell you how well we get on together.
I want to thank you for all the love and kindness through the years
which have passed so quickly. I think, with gratitude to you, of our
son, who is a source of great pride to me. With his splendid gifts he
should go far.

All for now. Our next move is already beginning.

On the 28th November, while the 2ist Panzer Division raced along
on either side of the coast road to Gambut and gained the country south
of Zafraan, I5th Panzer Division drove down the Trigh Capuzzo
with its flank constantly threatened by mobile forces. After fighting its
way up the escarpment and for the Jebel, the division found itself in the
evening once again on the old battleground at Sidi Rezegh.

A wireless signal from Rommel summoned the commander of the
Afrika Korps to the Panzer Group s forward H.Q,., which was said to be
located near Gambut. After searching for a long time in the darkness
they finally discovered a British lorry, which General Cruewell s command
car approached with great caution. Inside it, to his good fortune, were
no British troops, but Rommel and his Chief of Staff, both of them
unshaven, worn with lack of sleep and caked with dust. In the lorry
was a heap of straw as a bed, a can of stale water to drink and a few tins
of food. Close by were two wireless trucks and a few dispatch riders.
Rommel now gave his instructions for next day s operations.

His plan was to surround the New Zealand division, which had
meanwhile joined hands with the Tobruk garrison, and thus close the

THE WINTER CAMPAIGN, 1941-2 l6g

ring round Tobruk again. For this operation he gathered together
eveiy available formation and put the main weight of his attack on the
western flank in order to prevent the New Zealanders withdrawing into
Tobruk.

29 Nov. 1941
DEAREST Lu,

The battle seems to be developing well. The decision will probably
come to-day. I m full of confidence.

In haste.

The 2 ist Panzer Division whose commander, General von Raven-
stein, had been taken prisoner by the New Zealanders closed the ring
from the east and at the same time defended itself against heavy relieving
attacks from the south. In the evening the I5th Panzer Division, moving
north, took the important ridge of El Duda, but it was lost again during
the night.

50 Nov. 1941
DEAREST Lu,

The battle is still going on and will need all our efforts if we are
to win it. Prospects are good, but the troops are dead tired after
twelve days of it. Fm in good form, very lively and ready for anything.
The British have captured von Ravenstein. All for to-day.

On the morning of the 3Oth November, powerful enemy armour and
massed infantry advanced against our southern screen, but their attacks
were unco-ordinated and we were able to repulse them all along the line.
The 1 5th Panzer Division, on the other hand, in spite of many attempts,
failed to take Belhammed or make contact with the goth Light Division,
which would have cut the pocket off from Tobruk.

It was not finally sealed off until the following day, when, after all
attempts at relief from the south and east had been beaten off, a con
centric attack was launched which resulted in the destruction of the
greater part of the New Zealand Division.

Thus the British garrison was once again locked up in Tobruk. The
enemy, moreover as we learnt from an intercepted wireless message
had suffered such heavy losses that he now intended temporarily to break
off the battle.

But Rommel could not allow his troops the rest they so badly needed.
The Sollum front was having to fight hard to defend itself against the
Indians, the supply line was being continually molested and Bardia was
seriously threatened. He therefore dispatched two mixed combat groups
of the Afrika Korps along the Trigh Capuzzo and the coast road,
respectively, to open our lines of communication. He placed the bulk
of the German and Italian mobile forces south-east of Tobruk where,

I7O THE WAR IN AFRICA FIRST YEAR

while being supplied and refitted, they could be sent quickly either to
the Sollum front or to the south against the British main force.

The enemy formations carried out their reorganisation and re
grouping on either side of the Trigh el Abd, covered by a deep screen
of armoured cars along the line Sidi Muftah Capuzzo.

With the enemy so much better off for supplies than we were, we
could expect him soon to be ready to resume his offensive. However, the
battle had reached a temporary conclusion and the army reported to the
High Command on its victories :

" In the continuous heavy fighting between the i8th November and
the ist December, 814 enemy armoured fighting vehicles and armoured
cars have been destroyed, and 127 aircraft shot down. No estimate can
yet be given of the booty in arms, ammunition and vehicles. Prisoners
exceed 9,000, including three generals."

Not until later did we learn that the enemy had meanwhile made a
change in the command of the Eighth Army. General Ritchie had
replaced General Cunningham.

2 Dec.

DEAREST Lu,

Yesterday we succeeded in destroying the remains of one, or
perhaps two, British divisions in front of Tobruk, which has made the
situation a little easier. But the British won t give up, if I know them.
However, we are now fighting under better conditions than before
and will pull it off for certain.

The attack of our two mixed combat groups on Bardia-Sollum mis
carried. On the 4th December, the army gained a clear picture of the
enemy s dispositions. A new force was being formed round Bir el Gobi,
obviously with the intention of thrusting round our flank deep into our
rear and unhinging the siege front round Tobruk. Rommel decided to
attack this force immediately and with all his mobile formations, before
it had had time to complete its preparations.

Our forces had now become too weak to maintain the ring round
Tobruk, and Rommel had preparations made to give up the eastern
part of the siege front. During the night 4-5 December the Afrika Korps
moved westwards through the corridor between El Duda and Sidi
Rezegh now only two miles wide to its assembly area at El Adem.
The attack on Gobi was due to be made in conjunction with the Italian
Motorised Corps coming up from the north-east, but with the Italians
neither assembled nor in a fit state to attack, the Afrika Korps had to
strike the blow alone, which they did at midday on the 5th December.
The Korps first came up against the British Guards Brigade newly
arrived in the battle and then the refitted brigades of 7th Armoured
Division. In spite of this they advanced by evening to a point 10 miles

THE WINTER CAMPAIGN, 1941-2

north-west of Gobi. Meanwhile, the British had launched an attack
from Tobruk, and taken the hill line Duda-Belhammed* This finally
forced us to give up the eastern part of the Tobruk front.

At midday on the 5th December, a Commando Supremo Staff
officer, sent by the Duce, arrived at Army H.Q. and informed us that no
reinforcements for the Panzer Group could be expected to arrive before
the beginning of January* Nothing could be done until that date except
to cover the barest essentials of rations and ammunition* This information
did not make us any more cheerfuL

Auchinleck managed to send up two more infantry brigades, and two armoured
car regiments. Moreover, the ist Armoured Division had just arrived from England
and was moved up close to the frontier for intense desert training; it would thus
provide additional insurance against any further panzer raid.

On the evening of the 5th December, Rommel had the following
appreciation to consider: " The Afrika Korps attack has inflicted no
decisive damage on the enemy at Gobi, largely because of the absence
of the Italian Motorised Corps. It is to be expected that the enemy
force in the Gobi area will be further reinforced by fresh formations and
will soon go over to the attack itself in superior strength. Events at Tobruk
have shown that there, too, the enemy still disposes of battle-worthy
formations. Nevertheless, there still appears to be a chance of gaining a
decision, by launching all the remaining German and Italian panzer
and motorised divisions in a concerted attack against the British at Gobi.
If this fails to destroy a substantial part of the enemy s force, then, in view
of our own heavy losses in men and material, we shall have to consider
breaking off the battle and withdrawing to the Gazala position, and later
evacuating Cyrenaica altogether."

The Afrika Korps launched their attack on the 6th December, once
again alone. The Italians reported that their troops were exhausted and
no longer fit for action. The enemy fell slowly back on Bir el Gobi, but
it was no longer possible to destroy, or even outflank and envelop any
material part of their force. There was in fact a serious danger of our
own force being outflanked round both sides by the superior enemy. 1
In spite of this, the attack was resumed on the 7th December, again
without success. Our casualties were heavy.

In view of the great numerical superiority of the enemy and the
condition of our own troops, Rommel now decided to give up Tobruk
completely and beat a fighting retreat to the Gazala position. It was a
painful decision to have to take, for the German troops had fought
successfully and inflicted very heavy losses on the enemy. But to have
stayed any longer at Tobruk would merely have led to the steady

1 Cruewell, who realised that the destruction of the enemy could only be achieved
\vith the co-operation of the Italians, repeatedly wirelessed: " Where is Gambarra? "
But Gambarra did not appear on the battlefield. Cruewell s signal later became a stock
witticism with the troops in Africa.

172 THE WAR IN AFRICA FIRST YEAR

attrition of our already weakened forces, and thus ultimately to the loss
of Libya.

Letter written by L-Cpl. Guenther, Rommel s batman

6 Dec. 1941
DEAR FRAU ROMMEL,

The General went off to his command post very early again this
morning. I am to send you his warmest greetings and to inform
you that the General is still in good health and that all is well with
him.

The new fighting is making very heavy demands on the General;
he has no time to spare.

We left our house a fortnight ago and have moved several times
since then. Now to-day we have landed up once again in a small
wadi, where aircraft will not find us very easily. Our vehicles are
well camouflaged and now have quite a look of the desert about
them. We have still got the two chickens, the General has no doubt
told you about them. They are even managing to find something
green here. [Rommel had been presented with a number of chickens,
which at Guenther s special request had not been killed, but were being taken
along as mascots.]

It is very quiet to-day compared with the past weeks. We are
no longer in range of the enemy artillery, which used to fire very
frequently all round and behind us. So it is very pleasant again not
to have the shells whizzing all round. Now I will close. I wish you
the very best and send the warmest greetings on behalf of the General
to you and your son.

HERBERT GUENTHER
L-Cpl.

9 Dec. 1941
DEAREST Lu,

You will no doubt have seen how we re doing from the Wehrmacht
commUniques. I ve had to break off the action outside Tobruk on
account of the Italian formations and also the badly exhausted
German troops. I m hoping we ll succeed in escaping enemy encircle
ment and holding on to Cyrenaica. I m keeping well. You can
imagine what I m going through and what anxieties I have. It
doesn t look as though we ll get any Christmas this year. It s only a
fortnight away.

THE WINTER CAMPAIGN, 1941-2 173

RETREAT FROM GYRENAIGA

During the night 7-8 December, with the defence of Tobruk s western
front maintained, the Afrika Korps and the Italian Motorised Corps
disengaged from the enemy. Elements of the non-motorised Italian
XXI Corps and goth Light Division were already arriving in the Gazala
position. Our main danger during the withdrawal was to the southern
flank, where the enemy could outflank us without difficulty, and the
Afrika Korps was accordingly detailed to cover the flank of the whole
force. However, the enemy attempted nothing so ambitious, but limited
himself to thrusts against our front, all of which were beaten off. The
Sollum front now 120 miles from the main force was still holding out,
in spite of the fact that there was now no land route through to them for
supplies.

A substantial force was now put in to protect the weakest and most
dangerous point on the German-Italian side, the bottleneck at Agedabia,
where it would have been a simple matter for the enemy to cut the life
line of the whole Axis Army.

Withdrawing a step at a time, fighting isolated and sometimes very
troublesome actions as they went, all troops reached the Gazala Line
by the isth December, without the enemy having succeeded, during the
withdrawal, in cutting off any sizeable detachments of troops or inflicting
any serious casualties,

RommePs decision found no agreement with his Italian superiors,
and an interesting sidelight on this situation is given in the following
entry in his diary:

" I also received a visit from Excellency Bastico in a ravine south-east
of Ain el Gazala bay, where we established our H.Q. on the I2th
December. He is very upset about the way the battle is going and is
particularly worried about the Agedabia area, to which he wants to move
an Italian division as quickly as possible. It worked up to a very stormy
argument, during which I told him, among other things, that I was not
going to stand for any of my Italian divisions being taken from me and
redisposed by him. I would have no option but to make the retreat
through Cyrenaica with the German forces alone, leaving the Italians
to their fate. I added that I was quite certain that we for our part would
be able to fight our way through, but that the Italians would not manage
it without our help. In short, I did not intend to have a single Italian
soldier removed from my command. Excellency Bastico thereupon
became more amenable."

is Dec. 1941
DEAREST Lu,

Don t worry about me. It will all come out all right. We re still

174 THE WAR IN AFRICA FIRST YEAR

not through the crisis. It ll probably go on for another couple of
weeks yet. But I still have hopes of holding on here. I m now living
in a proper house complete with " hero s cellar " [a dugout or shelter].
I spend the days with the troops.

Happy Christmas to you and Manfred. I hope to be with you
shortly afterwards.

On the 1 3th December, a strong enemy infantry attack broke through
XX Italian Motorised Corps s line and enemy reconnaissance forces
reached Bir Temrad, 12 miles behind our front.

13 Dec. 1941
DEAREST Lu,

The situation has been made extremely critical by the failure of a
major Italian formation. However, I hope to be able to hold on.
Otherwise, I m very well, in fixed quarters.

Simultaneously enemy armour \^th Armoured Brigade] was enveloping
the Afrika Korps positions on the desert flank. The enemy s frontal
break-through was temporarily checked by a successful counter-attack,
but he was strong enough to renew it. Beyond that, there was obviously
a danger that the enemy armour might push through to the desert cross
roads at Mechili, stop our supplies and cut off our retreat through
Cyrenaica. It was no use concealing the fact that the strength of the
Axis forces was at an end and Rommel reported to the High Command:
" After 4 weeks of uninterrupted and costly fighting, the fighting power
of the troops despite superb individual achievements is showing signs
of flagging, all the more so as the supply of arms and ammunition has
completely dried up. While the Army intends to maintain its hold on
the Gazala area during the i6th December, retreat through Mechili-
Derna will be unavoidable, at the latest during the night of the i6tb,
if it is to escape being outflanked and destroyed by a superior enemy."

The Italian High Command was horrified over this plan. On the
1 6th December General Cavallero appeared at Army H.Q, and had
several conferences with Rommel. The diary entry reads as follows:

" At my meeting at 15.15 hours with General Cavallero, I stated that
as things had developed, there was only one possibility open to me,
namely, to break off the action south of the Ain el Gazala bay and near
Tmimi during the night and withdraw our troops to Mechili and Tmimi
respectively. The enemy had enveloped the whole of this front and the
only escape route left to us was a narrow strip through Tmimi. The
Italian troops now had little fight left in them. Cavallero raised no
objections at the time.

" However, at 23.00 hours he appeared at my H.Q. again, this time
accompanied by Field-Marshal Kesselring, Excellency Bastico and

THE WINTER CAMPAIGN, 1941-2 175

General Gambarra. In a voice charged with emotion, he demanded that
the order for the retreat should be withdrawn. He did not see the
necessity for it, and in any case feared political difficulties for the Duce if
Gyrenaica were lost. Kesselring backed him up strongly and said that it
was completely out of the question for him to give up the airfield at
Derna. I stood my ground and said that it was too late to alter my
decision. The orders had been issued and were in some cases already
being executed. Unless the Panzer Group wanted to face complete
destruction, it had no choice but to fight its way back through the enemy
during the night. I fully realised that this would mean the eventual loss
of Cyrenaica and that political difficulties might result. But the choice
I was faced with was either to stay where I was and thus sacrifice the
Panzer Group to destruction thereby losing both Cyrenaica and
Tripolitania or to begin the retreat that night, fight my wa^/back
through Cyrenaica to the Agedabia area and at least defend Tripolitania.
I could only choose the latter. Excellency Bastico and Gambarra
behaved so violently in my room that evening, that I was finally obliged
to ask Bastico how he, as Commander-in-Chief of the North African
forces, proposed to handle the situation. Bastico evaded the question,
and said that as Commander-in-Chief it was not his business; heqouh}
only say that we ought to keep our forces together. Finally, the delegation
left my H.Q. having accomplished nothing."

On the evening of the i6th December the Afrika Korps and the
Italian Motorised Corps, all under the command of General Cruewell,
began their withdrawal across the southern edge of the Cyrenaican
mountains to El Abiar, while the Italian non-motorised infantry forma
tions marched back through Cyrenaica [.*. the coastal strip].

20 Dec. 1941
DEAREST Lu,

We re pulling out. There was simply nothing else for it. I hope
we manage to get back to the line we ve chosen. Christmas is going
to be completely messed up.

I m very well. I ve now managed to get a bath and a change,
having slept in my coat most of the time for the last few weeks. Some
supplies have arrived die first since October. My commanding
officers are ill all those who aren t dead or wounded.

22 Dec. 1941

Retreat to A 1 1 You can t imagine what it s like. Hoping

to get the bulk of my force through and make a stand somewhere.
Little ammunition and petrol, no air support. Quite the reverse
with the enemy. But enough of that. . . .

^Agedabia.

176 THE WAR IN AFRICA FIRST YEAR

23 Dec. 1941

Operations going satisfactorily to-day, so far as it s possible to tell
in the morning. It looks as though we ll succeed in extricating our
selves from the envelopment and getting the main body back. It ll
be a great Christmas treat for me if it does come off. How modest
one becomes! It s no good turning to the Italian High Command
of course. They would have been roped in long ago with all their
force.

25 Dec. 1941

I opened my Christmas parcel in my caravan yesterday evening
and was very pleased with the letters from you and Manfred and the
presents. Some of it, like the bottle of champagne, I took straight
across to the Intelligence truck where I sat over it with the Chief, the
la and Ic. The night passed quietly. But the Italian divisions give us
a lot of worry. There are shocking signs of disintegration and German
troops are being forced to the rescue everywhere. The British were
badly disappointed at Benghazi in neither cutting us off, nor finding
petrol and rations. Cruewell has been made a full Panzer General.
He really deserves it. Pm up at the front every day, regrouping and
organising our forces. I hope we now succeed in making a stand.

P.S. I don t think I ve told you yet that Schraepler met with a
fatal accident (run over by the Mammoth).

By the 25th December, the retreat to Agedabia was complete, without
the enemy having exploited a single one of the many chances which he
had had for outflanking the German forces. The non-motorised German-
Italian troops moved into improvised defence lines on either side of the
town, while the Afrika Korps and the Italian Motorised Corps took up
positions round Agedabia for a mobile defence.

There was one more major " victory " to record before the retreat
was over on the igth December a convoy from Italy arrived in Benghazi
carrying two German panzer companies, artillery batteries and supplies.
These were the first ships carrying arms which had arrived since the
beginning of the British offensive in mid-November. Part of the convoy
had been sunk during the crossing and two panzer companies and one
battery lost.

It remains a mystery why the British did not outmarch us through
the excellent driving country of the desert and finally cut off our retreat
at the critical point, i.e. Agedabia. Fortunately for us, this danger, of
which Rommel was all the time afraid, did not materialise. 1

ir The British follow-up was greatly handicapped by the difficulties of maintaining
supplies as the line of supply became increasingly stretched. In consequence, the follow-
up forces not only had to be reduced, but dwindled as the advance continued. The re-
equipped 22nd Armoured Brigade formed the main armoured element, but was twice

THE WINTER CAMPAIGN, 1941-2 177

Even so, the threat of our flank being turned by a wide hook through
the desert was still with us at Agedabia, which was operationally a weak*
position. In view of the condition of our troops particularly the Italians
and the deficiencies in our supply it did not seem very advisable to
make a long stay at Agedabia, but rather to limit ourselves to fighting
a delaying action there, and then, when the moment seemed right, to
pull back the bulk of our force to Mersa el Brega. Rommel reported in
these terms to the Commando Supremo and they, after long deliberation,
were eventually forced to agree that whereas we might lose everything
if we stayed at Agedabia, Tripolitania at least could be successfully
defended if we pulled back to Mersa el Brega. However, the time for
this retreat had not yet come.

Our defence at Agedabia was centred on the Afrika Korps. As the
position itself was incapable of withstanding a major attack, the only
way to defend it was by movement and counter-attack. Meanwhile, the
enemy had already pushed forward very close to our front, so that we
could expect both a frontal assault on our line and a hook round our
desert flank. On the 2 7th December, the 22nd British Armoured Brigade,
recently refitted and again up to full fighting strength, 1 moved forward
through El Haseiat, while other troops launched a frontal attack at
Agedabia. In three days of tank fighting, the enemy was outflanked,
forced to fight on a reversed front, and finally surrounded. Some thirty
of his tanks succeeded in escaping east, as petrol shortage checked the
completion of our success. Under the impress of this defeat the elements
of the Support Group and Guards Brigade which had mounted the
frontal attack, also withdrew to the north-east. Thus the immediate
danger to the Agedabia position was over. Rommel immediately made
use of this breathing space to evacuate the position and retire by stages
without enemy pressure into the Mersa el Brega line. The withdrawal
began on the 2nd January with the departure of the Italian infantry.
The mobile formations moved last and all troops were ready for action
in the Brega line by the 1 2th January.

While these successful actions were being fought, the situation on the
Halfaya-Bardia front, where the garrisons now 450 miles away from
the main body were still maintaining a heroic resistance, had visibly
deteriorated. On the 3Oth December, the enemy launched a decisive
attack on Bardia with powerful artillery, air and naval support and gained
a deep penetration over a wide front in our defences. The last of our
ration and ammunition dumps fell into enemy hands, and the Corn-
held up for lack of petrol. It is clear that Rommel s supply system was far better adapted
to rapid and long-range movement than the British. Auchinleck himself emphasises that
Rommel was " greatly helped by the remarkable elasticity of his supply organisation.*

ir That is not correct. It had been made up to a strength of 130 tanks, but of these
many had broken down in the long desert march from Gazala. In the battle that
followed 65 were destroyed.

178 THE WAR IN AFRICA FIRST YEAR

mandant, with Army s approval, asked for terms. The fortress was
finally handed over on the 2nd January.

In the Halfaya sector the starving garrison held out until the ryth
January, when, having exhausted its stores and being cut off from its
last water supply, it was forced to surrender. Superb leadership was
shown by the Italian General de Georgis, who commanded this German-
Italian force in its two months struggle.

As a result of the fall of these frontier garrisons, Rommel s loss, which had
been about the same as the British (18,000), during the battle, became much larger
in the end. Some 4,000 Germans and 10,000 Italians were captured at Bardia,
Sollum and Halfaya.

Tfie British had suffered a much heavier loss of tanks in the battle, but through
RommeVs retreat they were able to recover and repair a large proportion so that their
permanent loss was only 278, while Rommel s was about 300 (including the Italian
tanks).

30 Dec. 7947
DEAREST Lu,

Heavy fighting yesterday, which went well for us. Their new
attempt to encircle us and force us back against the sea has failed.

I m back in Army H.Q. again. Kesselring and Gambarra are
coming to-day. Gause will be flying off afterwards to Rome. They ve
got absolutely no idea there of the difficulties here in Africa and are
all going about their normal daily round of business or pleasure.

Rain is falling and the nights are bitterly cold and windy. I m
keeping fit sleeping all I can. You will no doubt understand that
there s no chance whatever of my leaving here at the moment.

All for now, must go to the Chief [Chief of Staff].

31 Dec. 1941
My thoughts to-day, the last day of the year, are more than ever

with you two, who mean the happiness of this earth to me.

Almost superhuman exertions lie behind my gallant troops. The
past three days fighting, in which we have been on the attack, has
cost the enemy in tanks and 23 armoured cars. The difficulties
under which this success has been scored beggar description. Anyway,
it was a good finish for 1941 and gives hope for 1942.

I m well. One cockerel and one hen have accustomed themselves
to this gipsy existence and run loose round the truck. They belong
half to Gause.

All the best to you both for 1942.

5 Jan. 1942

Everything going as planned so far. Maybe better times are
coining, in spite of everything. Gause was with the Fuehrer yesterday.

THE WINTER CAMPAIGN, I 941 -2 179

I would have liked him to have spent a fortnight in Rome with his
wife. He was very exhausted after all he has had to go through at
my side. Our la (Lieut.-Col. Westphal) is bearing up, although he
had to go and get jaundice in the middle of it all. Kcsselring was here
yesterday. We re gradually getting more stuff across. He s doing
very good work over Malta.

jo Jan. 1942

Yesterday s letter was also dated the roth. One has no feeling
for time here.

Operations going as planned so far. Our mines and Luftwaffe
are making things difficult for the enemy pursuit. To think that
we ve got our force back 300 miles to a good line, without suffering
serious harm, and in spite of the fact that the bulk of it is non-
motorised! That our " unemployed " generals are grousing all the
time doesn t surprise me. Criticism doesn t cost much.

The Afrika Korps goes into the second line to-day, for the first
time since the i8th November. Cruewell s got a very bad dose of
jaundice and it s doubtful if he ll stick it out. I ll soon be the only
one of the German officers who s seen the whole thing through from
start to finish. The nights are bitterly cold and damp. I wrap myself
up in woollens as much as I can. My stomach s all right. Guenther
sees to it that I eat well. I m on the move from morning to night
seeing that everything is going properly with the troops. It s very
necessary. Best wishes to you and our son.

14 Jan. 1942

All going as planned here. The clash must come very soon now,
but I have the greatest confidence that we ll survive it. Kesselring is
coining to-day, so I won t be able to go to the front until 9.30. The
Japanese victories are quite tremendous. The British will be out of
eastern Asia in a few weeks. They ll look all the more for victories in
North Africa, but they re going to be very disappointed. My troops
are back in good fettle again.

17 Jan. 1942

The situation is developing to our advantage and I m full of plans
that I daren t say anything about round here. They d think me
crazy. But I m not; I simply see a bit farther than they do. But
you know me. I work out my plans early each morning, and how
often, during the past year and in France, have they been put into
effect within a matter of hours? That s how it should be and is going
to be, in future.

l8o THE WAR IN AFRICA FIRST YEAR

/9 Jan.

The sun s quite warm here now at midday, just like on a fine
spring day at home. The troops are already sunbathing. A few quiet
days have done a lot of good. Cause has written from Rome. The
Fuehrer apparently approved of all Fd done and was full of praise
and admiration. Supplies have now improved, so you ll understand
the Wehrmacht communiques for the next few days. Pm so pleased
at this new turn I can hardly sleep at night. But as you know that s
always been the same when I ve been particularly looking forward
to something.

Much to do and discuss.

20 Jan. 1942
6.30 hours. As usual, a few lines to you. I wish you were in as good

spirits as I am. The British may attack to-day, but I m ready for
them. So you ll understand why I m cheerful. Weeks of frightful
hardship and anxiety lie behind us and are forgotten by the troops
also.

By the time this letter arrives you will long ago have heard how
the battle s gone from the Wehrmacht communiques. The prepara
tions are taking me all my time. Cruewell is not quite back on form
yet and I m doubtful whether he ll be able to keep going with us for
long, I should be very sorry if there had to be a change. I myself
am very well.

21 Jan. 1942
The Army launches its counter-attack in two hours time. After

carefully weighing the pros and cons, I ve decided to take the risk.
I have complete faith that God is keeping a protective hand over us
and that He will grant us victory.

THE COUNTER-STROKE

On 5th January, a convoy of ships carrying 55 tanks and 20 armoured
cars, as well as anti-tank guns and supplies of all kinds arrived safely in
Tripoli. This was as good as a victory in battle, and Rommel immediately
began to think of taking the offensive again. His plans for the reconquest
of Cyrenaica were already prepared.

On the soth January by which time the Afrika Korps had in
serviceable tanks at the front and 28 in the rear, while the Italian
Motorised Corps disposed of 89 Rommel launched his counter-stroke.
The plan was for the Afrika Korps to make an outflanking drive along
the Wadi el Faregh, starting from the southern sector of the front, while
the Italians, together with a German combat group, attacked frontally.

THE WINTER CAMPAIGN, 1941-2 l8l

Bad going delayed the Afrika Korps s move round the flank, with the
result that the enemy managed to escape encirclement.
Rommel s diary for the 2 ist January, 1942, remarks:
" I had maintained secrecy over the Panzer Group s forthcoming
attack eastwards from Mersa el Brega and informed neither the Italian
nor the German High Command. We knew from experience that Italian
Headquarters cannot keep things to themselves and that everything they
wireless to Rome gets round to British ears. However&gt; I had arranged
with the Quartermaster for the Panzer Group s order to be posted up in
every Cantoniera [Road Maintenance Depot] in Tripolitania on the 2 ist
January the day the attack was due to take place. Excellency Bastico
in Horns learnt of our intentions through this, of course, and was furious
that he had not been told before. He reported to this effect to Rome,
and so I was not surprised when Cavallero turned up in person at Mersa
el Brega a few days later. *

On the 22nd of January, Agedabia was taken and the enemy retired
in disorder. The Afrika Korps then pushed forward to the line Antelat-
Saunnu and enveloped a combat group of the British ist Armoured
Division, which lost 117 tanks and armoured cars, 33 guns, numerous
vehicles and thousands of prisoners. But the pocket was not completely
closed and a large part of the enemy force managed to get away to the
north. During the pursuit to Msus, another 98 armoured fighting
vehicles and 38 guns were destroyed in a concentric attack. 1 The supply
centre of Saunnu, with large stores of war material, fell to the Afrika
Korps.

22 Jan. 1942
DEAREST Lu,

I wonder what you have to say about the counter-attack we
started at 08.30 yesterday? Our opponents are getting out as though
they d been stung. Prospects are good for the next few days. You
can guess how we ll react. I m very well, except that I could bear to
sleep a little better. Though the sleepless early morning hours are
very productive for me at the moment.

On the 23rd January, General Cavallero appeared at Army H.Q,.
to remonstrate with Rommel about the independent action of the
Panzer Army 2 . Rommel s diary entry says of this meeting:

" General Cavallero brought directives from the Duce for future

x ln tanks, the ist Armoured Division lost 70 out of its initial strength of 150 in the
first fight, and more than half the remainder on the way to Msus. It also lost during the
retreat 30 field guns, 30 anti-tank guns, and 25 light anti-aircraft guns.

*The " Panzergruppe Afrika " was made the " Panzerarmee Afrika " on the 22nd
January 1942. It included all the Italian troops at the front, which then consisted of:

XX Corps (Ariete Armoured Division and Trieste Mptorised Division),

XXI Corps (Pavia, Trento, and Sahratha Infantry Divisions),
X Corps (Bologna and Brescia Infantry Divisions).

182 THE WAR IN AFRICA FIRST YEAR

operations. Everything indicates that Rome is anything but pleased
with the Panzer Army s counter-attack, and would like to put a stop
to it as soon as possible by issuing orders. During the discussion Cavallero
said: Make it no more than a sortie and then come straight back.
I was not standing for this and told him that I had made up my mind
to keep at the enemy just as long as my troops and supplies would allow;
the Panzer Army was at last getting under way again and its first blows
had struck home. We were first going to drive south and destroy the
enemy south of Agedabia; then we would move east and later north-east.
I could always fall back to the Mersa el Brega line if things went wrong,
but that was not what I was after; my aims were set much higher.
Cavallero implored me not to go on with it, I told him that nobody
but the Fuehrer could change my decision, as it would be mainly German
troops who would be engaged. Finally, after Kesselring had made some
attempt to back him up, he went off growling. I kept General von
Rintelen behind so as to give him at least a glimpse of the battlefield
next day. He had spent practically all his time sitting in Rome and I
wanted to instil in him some understanding of the needs of this theatre.
" Cavallero took his revenge by holding back part of the Italian Corps
in the Mersa el Brega area and part in Agedabia, so that it was more or
less removed from my command. In spite of this, the German troops
retook Cyrenaica."

25 Jan. 1942
DEAREST Lu,

Four days of complete success lie behind us. Our blows struck
home. And there s still one to come. Then we ll go all modest again
and lie in wait for a bit. The foreign press opinion about me is
improving again. Cavallero arrived and wanted to whistle me
straight back on orders from the Duce. But the Duce s directive,
which was given to me in writing, reads differently and, at least, left
me greater freedom.

27 Jan. 1942

Everything O.K. here. We re clearing up the battlefield, collecting
up guns, armoured cars, tanks, rations and ammunition for our own
needs. It will take some time. It s chilly again and rainy, though
the rain has its advantages, as it prevents the British getting their
planes off the ground from their airfields in Cyrenaica,

Gause will be back on ist February. But he ll never be quite
the same. It was all rather much at once. I m more used to such
things.

We re getting on fine with the Italian Corps now. They re very
sick that they couldn t come along with us. But that s their own fault.

THE WINTER CAMPAIGN, 1941-2 183

Rommel could not risk continuing the pursuit to Mechili as the
threat to his rearward communications from the Benghazi area was too
great. So, on the s8th January, he launched a surprise attack on
Benghazi itself. The fortress was first sealed off to the north and then
to the south, and by the agth was in our hands. The vast quantities of
vehicles, arms and material which fell into our hands served to equip
and motorise many of our own units.

After this victory, Rommel decided to embark on a long-range thrust
to the east.

Two mixed combat groups, neither very strong, attacked frontally
through Cyrenaica and retook this great territory by the 6th February
[i.e. exclusive of the Marmarica district in the east]. During this time the
Afrika Korps and the Italian Motorised Corps were lying idle round
Msus and Agedabia. If only we could have thrown these two formations
forward at the same time through Tengeder and Mechili, we could
probably have overrun and destroyed a great part of the enemy s force.

Thus the enemy was able to get the bulk of his forces back safely to
the Gazala - Bir Hacheim - Tobruk area, where they began with the con
struction of large-scale defence works. The Axis Army similarly went
over to defence, holding the eastern edge of Cyrenaica between Mechili
and Temrad. The German-Italian motorised formations were deployed
behind the front for use in a mobile role.

This concluded the winter fighting. Both sides now prepared for the
approaching decisive battle of the summer.

4 Feb. 1942
DEAREST Lu,

On the move since the 2nd. But we have got Cyrenaica back.
It went like greased lightning. I hope to be home in 10 days and to
get quite a bit of leave. But there s still a lot to do until then.

7 Feb. 1943

It s quiet again on our front, which now extends for 300 miles
(from the left to the right wing). It s particularly pleasing to have got
Cyrenaica back again. I m hoping the situation will stabilise
sufficiently in the next week for me to get away for a while. I ve been
given a new order, by the way (a star on the chest to match the one
I ve already got round my neck).

10 Feb. 1942

. . . Trouble with Rome, who don t agree with the way I m running
things and would be best pleased to see us get out of Cyrenaica again.

23 Feb. 1942

. . . The Italians have taken an Army Corps off me because I m not
sitting as far back as they would like me to. They ll be sorry for it.

THE WAR IN AFRICA FIRST YEAR

THE WINTER FIGHTING IN REVIEW

The British autumn offensive had as its aims the destruction of the
German-Italian forces in the Marmarica, the conquest of Libya, and the
occupation, in conjunction with the Free French, of the North African
coast as the base for an attack on southern Europe. Its military objectives
were therefore set high.

The assembly of the offensive force took place under the cover of
very clever camouflage, and was greatly favoured by the weather. It
achieved, in consequence, complete surprise. But, however skilful and
ingenious the enemy s preparations for the offensive, their execution of
it was not so effective. Even at the outset the dispositions of the enemy
formations were designed to set them on divergent courses. They should
have been first concentrated on Sidi Rezegh and then thrust forward in
echelon formation. Better still would have been a thrust at Acroma in
order simultaneously to cut off our supplies.

The Sollum front, on the other hand, only needed watching and there
was no need to use two divisions to attack it. The 4th Indian Division
was tied up there for fully two months. In effect the main offensive force
consisted of only one division containing the bulk of the armour, with a
second division as cover for the flank, and the decisive blow was thus
struck by only a fraction of the total force engaged in the offensive.
Contrary to the principle that one can never be strong enough at the
centre of gravity and must concentrate everything at that point, every
attack was made by part only of the Eighth Army, and even the main
offensive force, already too weak for its purpose, was thrown into battle
dispersed.

The result of these tactics of dispersal was that the British formations
were either badly battered or destroyed one after the other and dis
appeared from the theatre while the battle was still in progress. The
British Command did not once, during the whole of this battle, succeed
in conducting operations with a concentration of its forces at the decisive
point. This fundamental mistake was one of the reasons why victory
escaped them. Their unwieldy and rigidly methodical technique of
command, their over-systematic issuing of orders down to the last detail,
leaving little latitude to the junior commander, and their poor adapt
ability to the changing course of the battle were also much to blame
for the British failures.

Immobility and a rigid adherence to pattern are bad enough in
European warfare; in the desert they are disastrous. Here everything
is in flux; there are no obstructions, no lines, water or woods for cover;
everything is open and incalculable; the commander must adapt and
reorientate himself daily, even hourly, and retain his freedom of action.
Everything is in motjton; he must be constantly on the alert, all the

THE WINTER CAMPAIGN, 1941-2 185

time on the edge of capture or destruction by a more cunning, wide
awake or versatile enemy. There can be no conservatism in thought or
action, no relying on tradition or resting on the laurels of previous
victory. Speed of judgment, and action to create changing situations
and surprises for the enemy faster than he can react, never making
dispositions in advance, these are the fundamentals of desert tactics.

The merit and value of the desert soldier can be measured by his
physical capacity, intelligence, mobility, nerve, pugnacity, daring and
stoicism. A commander of men requires these same qualities in even
greater measure and in addition must be outstanding in his toughness,
devotion to his men, instinctive judgment of terrain and enemy, speed of
reaction and spirit. In General Rommel these qualities were embodied
in rare degree, and I have known no other officer in whom they were
so combined.

The British soldier fought very well in the desert, even though he
may not have attained the elan of the German attack. Their officers
fought with tremendous courage and self-sacrifice. Rommel himself often
expressed his high admiration for his adversary and once said, on seeing
a number of them as prisoners, that he would be happy to lead such men
into battle.

The actions in North Africa during the winter of 1941-42 left no doubt
that the decisive part in desert warfare is played by the tank, principally
because the desert contains no obstacles for it and no limitations on its

use.

Hence the extent of either a victory or a defeat can be measured by
the number of tanks destroyed. But it is not only the quantity of tanks
which matters, even more important is their technical performance,
manoeuvrability and the range and calibre of the tank guns. For the
main thing in the open desert is to bring the enemy under effective fire
and start hitting him before he is in a position to hit back. What matters
is to be " farther away from the enemy than he is from you." For a
long time the British Matilda tank was feared because its heavy armour
made it difficult to kill. But it was slow and had a short, small-calibre
gun. At the end of 1941 the German Panzer III and Panzer IV were
still superior to enemy types in range and calibre of guns and, in some
measure, manoeuvrability. This advantage was held until May 1942,
when our opponents found an answer with the Grants and Lees, and later
the Shermans. Much of the German success in the winter battles must
be put down to the superiority of their tanks.

The principles that apply for the tank gun apply equally to the
artillery. A long arm is decisive and here the British had the best of it.
It was not pleasant to be exposed to the fire of their 25-pounder guns at
extreme range and to be unable to make an effective reply. But the
Germans had one weapon the 88-mm. dual-purpose (anti-tank and
anti-aircraft) gun which was always envied for its versatility; and

l86 THE WAR IN AFRICA FIRST YEAR

remained unequalled in this respect. This gun regarde d by the British,
so prisoners told me, as an unfair weapon against tanks contributed
in no small measure to the German successes. The infantry on either
side played a comparatively unimportant part in the mobile fighting, and
it was only in the position warfare on the Sollum front, that they had any
significant share.

Given equal leadership, equal training, equal supply conditions and
air force, the primary decisive factors in desert warfare are the number
and manoeuvrability of the tanks and the range of their guns; after that
comes the number of field-guns and their range; and then, finally, the
number of anti-tank guns, their range and calibre.

If either side is inferior in these arms, the quality of their troops and
command must make up for the disadvantage. But there is no com
pensating for the lack of an air force or for shortage of supplies.

si March 1942
DEAREST Lu,

I went to CruewelPs birthday party yesterday. Everything went
very nicely. He s going on leave in a few days and will probably
have a course of treatment. I hope he comes back, it wouldn t be so
easy to replace him here. His deputy is a real cold fish. Everything
is green in Cyrenaica now; even places which are usually desert are
covered with a green carpet. It s pleasantly warm at sea level, but
there s a lot of wind and it s downright cold up here where we are,
2,500 feet up. There s a great deal to do, although our position seems
to be fairly well secured.

26 March 1942

Nothing to report. Supply difficulties, particularly getting the
stuff up overland, are still a great headache. The new Army Chief
of Staff came to see us yesterday. Gambarra has been given a com
mand back in Italy in other words he s in disgrace. The new man
makes a good impression.

29 March 1942

It should be Sunday to-day. It s 10 days since I flew back from
home. I m getting about a lot and putting on the pressure everywhere
to get the most urgent jobs done. I got thoroughly sunburnt yesterday,
but we have the right ointment.

31 March 1942

I couldn t write yesterday, we were " moving." We re glad to
be in a new place and I m pleased to be nearer the front and not
to have to spend so much time travelling. It s also very lovely up

THE WINTER CAMPAIGN, 1941-2 187

here, as the flowers are still all in. full bloozn. I ve made a colour
film and will send it home shortly.

I suppose it will soon all be green at home. Before they left my
new " house 9 the British wrote on the door: "Keep clean, we ll
be back soon! " We ll see about that.

9 April 1942

Kesselring came yesterday. His news so far as it concerns our
allies wasn t very cheerful. They re just riddled with bureaucracy
in anything and everything, and on top of that there s a complete
lack of understanding of the demands of modern warfare. The whole
tempo of the supply organisation is completely inadequate. And
that with Malta neutralised as never before.

With us everything s O.K. apart from some minor mishaps
with an Italian formation. The next three weeks are going to be
very busy.

10 April 1942

I m getting another visitor from the Reich on Sunday an
Admiral from the O.K.W. It would be a good thing if a few more of
the gentlemen from home came to see us. A lot of Easter parcels
have arrived. Amorous letters piling up from all manner of females.
A shell splinter came through the window recently and landed in my
stomach after going through my overcoat and jacket. All it left was
a multi-coloured bruise the size of a plate. It was finally stopped by
my trousers. The luck of the devil !

j?j April 1942

Just another line before we move off to the south through a real
moon landscape. Dawn has a fantastic beauty in this country of flat-
topped mountains. Temperature is around zero. - But it will soon
warm up.

I had a couple of lively meetings yesterday, with Weichhold and
General Barbassetti Gambarra s successor. I m told that Gambarra
went because he declared in the presence of some officers that all he
wanted was to live till the day when it would be granted him to lead
an Italian army against us Germans. What a fool !
All for to-day.

27 April 1942

Kesselring will be here this afternoon. I m very anxious to hear
his news. To-morrow Bastico is coming to present me with another
Italian decoration. I can t say I m terribly thrilled about it. More
troops would suit me better.

l88 THE WAR IN AFRICA FIRST YEAR

28 April

Unable to write to-day until the evening. Kesselring was here
this morning. Nothing much new to report. Plenty of plans are
being made in Rome, but whether they ll come to anything I very
much doubt. I ve already spoken plainly on this point at the Fuehrer s
H.Q. It all went off amicably with Bastico. He presented me, in the
name of the King, with the new Colonial Order. A large silver star,
even bigger than the previous one, plus a red sash with small order.
This really is enough.

12 May 1942

Nothing much to report. Heat and lots of dust. The main road
is a sea of pot-holes with the amount of traffic on it.

There s a certain nervousness on our front. The British are
expecting us and we them. One day the two forces will measure their
strength. You ll hear about it soon enough from the papers. We re
all hoping that we ll be able to bring the war to an end this year.
It will soon have lasted three full years.

Part Three

THE WAR IN AFRICA
SECOND YEAR

CHAPTER IX

GAZALA AND TOBRUK

THE BUILD UP

AFTER 1 THE conclusion of our counter-offensive, which had led at the
beginning of 1942, to the reconquest of Cyrenaica, serious difficulties
arose over supplies.

The blame for this apart from the scant attention given to the
African theatre of war by the German High Command, who failed to
recognise its immense importance lay with the half-hearted conduct of
the war at sea by the Italians. The British Navy, in contrast, was very
active in the early part of 1942, and the R.A.F. was also extremely
-troublesome.

The German High Command, to which I was subordinate, still failed
to see the importance of the African theatre. They did not realise that
with relatively small means, we could have won victories in the Near
East which, in their strategic and economic value, would have far
surpassed the conquest of the Don Bend [in Southern Russia]. Ahead of us
lay territories containing an enormous wealth of raw materials; Africa,
for example, and the Middle East which could have freed us from all
our anxieties about oil A few more divisions for my Army, with supplies
for them guaranteed, would have sufficed to bring about the complete
defeat of the entire British forces in tfte Near East.

But it was not to be. Our demands for additional formations were
refused on the grounds that with the huge demand for transport which
the eastern front was making on Germany s limited productive capacity,
the creation of further motorised units for Africa was out of the question.

It was obvious that the High Command s opinion had not changed
from that which they had expressed in 1941, namely, that Africa was a
" lost cause " and that any large-scale investment of material and troops
in that theatre would pay no dividends. A sadly short-sighted and
misguided view! For, in fact, the supply difficulties which they were so
anxious to describe as " insuperable " were far from being so. Ail that

^ommePs own narrative starts again here.
191

ig2 THE WAR IN AFRICA SECOND YEAR

was wanted was a real personality in Rome, someone with the authority
and drive to tackle and clear away the problems involved. No doubt
it would have led to friction in certain Italian circles, but this could have
been overcome by an authority unencumbered with other political
functions. Our Government s weak policy towards Italy seriously
prejudiced the German-Italian cause in North Africa.

The heavy burden which the eastern front was placing upon German
material resources was certainly not to be underestimated, particularly
after our Eastern Army had lost the great part of its equipment in the
winter of 1941-42. Nevertheless, I am firmly convinced that, bearing in
mind the tremendous possibilities offered by the North African theatre,
some less important sectors could have been found which could have
spared us a few mechanised divisions.

Basically, however, there was no understanding of the situation, and
thus no will to do anything.

The consequences were very serious. With only three German
divisions, whose fighting strength was often ludicrously small, we kept
the British Army busy in Africa for eighteen long months and gave them
many a trouncing, until our strength finally ran out at Alamein. After
the loss of Africa an increasing number of German divisions had to be
employed against the British and Americans, until finally some 70
divisions were thrown into the fighting in Italy and France whereas in
the summer of 1942, given six German mechanised divisions, we could
have smashed the British so thoroughly that the threat from the south
would have been eliminated for a long time to come. There is no doubt
that adequate supplies for these formations could have been organised
if the will had been there. Afterwards, in Tunisia when, of course, it was
too late it became perfectly possible to double our supplies; but by
that time the fact that we were up to our necks in trouble had penetrated
even to the mainland.

After March 1942, during which month only 18,000 tons reached the
Panzer Army in Africa out of a total supply requirement of 60,000 tons,
the situation changed thanks to the initiative of Field-Marshal Kessel-
. ring, whose air force succeeded in attaining air superiority over the
Mediterranean during the spring of that year. The heavy Axis air raids
against Malta, in particular, were instrumental in practically neutralising
for a time the threat to our sea routes. It was this fact which made
possible an increased flow of material to Tripoli, Benghazi and Derna
the reinforcement and refitting of the German-Italian forces thereupon
proceeded with all speed.

Nevertheless, it was obvious that the British Eighth Army could still
be reinforced more rapidly than our own. The British Government was
making tremendous efforts to provide them with all the material they
could lay their hands on. Large convoys were arriving one after the other
in the Egyptian ports, bringing war material from Britain or America

GAZALA AND TOBRUK

round the Cape. Naturally, this i2,ooo-mile voyage, which the British
transports could make at the most only once or twice a year, must have
made very heavy demands on the enemy staffs, who were having to cope
with the immense difficulties caused by our U-boat warfare. In spite of
this, the British Navy and Mercantile Marine were able to maintain
supplies to the British forces in the Near East on a scale far superior
to our own, even over this huge distance. Moreover, the British could
get all the petrol they wanted, and more, from the refineries in the Near
East.

It was rarely that the British supply ports received the serious attention
of German bombers. From these ports the enemy could feed supplies to
the front over three different routes :

1. By a well-laid railway line running from the Suez area to the
outer perimeter of Tobruk.

2. By sea. The British Navy had created an admirable coastal
shipping organisation and had the use of Tobruk, one of the best
ports in North Africa.

3. By road. They had the coast-road and abundant transport at
their disposal.

Even more important, however, was the fact that on the British side
there were men with great influence and considerable foresight, who
were doing all they could to organise the supply service in the most
efficient manner possible. In this respect, our adversary benefited from a
number of factors :

1. North Africa was the principal theatre of war for the British
Empire.

2. The British Government regarded the fighting in Libya as of
decisive influence in the war.

3. The British had in the Mediterranean a powerful and first-class
Navy and Air Force of their own, while we had to deal with the
unreliable Italian naval staff.

4. The entire British Eighth Army, down to the last unit, was fully
motorised.

The ordinary British infantry formations were not "fully " motorised in the
true sense of the term of being always mounted in their own vehicles. The bulk
of the personnel were merely " lifted" from place to place as and when troop*
carrying transport could be provided from the pool. Such formations were not
tactically mobile, and the fact of having to be carried in relays, instead of simul
taneously, was a limitation on their strategic mobility.

It was clear to us that the British would try to destroy our army
with all the means at their disposal as soon as they felt themselves strong
enough to do so. Our southern flank lay wide open and they had a large

194 THE WAR IN AFRICA SECOND YEAR

choice of possible operations to choose from. 1 A constant threat would
hang over our supply lines. Retreat, if we were forced into it by the
danger of being outflanked, would be fraught with tremendous difficulties,
due to the fact that most of my Italian divisions were non-motorised.
But the British were not to have the chance of exploiting their
opportunities, for I had decided to strike first.

The basic British plan for the defence of the Marmarica was shaped
by a desire to impose on the attacker a form of warfare more to the liking
of their own command than manoeuvring in the open desert. The
technical execution of the plan was first rate.

But the premises from which they approached the problem were
false. In any North African desert position with an open southern flank,
a rigid system of defence is bound to lead to disaster. The defence must
be conducted offensively for it to be successful. Naturally, fortified lines
can be of very great value in preventing the enemy from undertaking
particular operational moves. But the manning of such lines must not,
under any circumstances, be at the expense of the forces required for the
mobile defence.

The British dispositions in the Marmarica were as follows :

A heavily mined defence line stretching away to the south from the
coast near Gazala was held by 5Oth British and ist South African
Divisions. From the southern end of this line a deep belt of mines extended
down as far as Bir Hacheim. This place, which represented the southern
bastion of the British Gazala front, was built up as a fortress, with its
defence positions embedded in extensive minefields. It was garrisoned
by the ist Free French Brigade.

The whole line had been planned with great skill. It was the first
time that an attempt had been made to build a line of this kind so far
into the desert. Some 500,000 mines lay in the area of these defences alone.

On a track intersection some miles east of the centre of the Gazala
line lay the strong-point " Knightsbridge", 2 held by the British 20 ist
Guards Brigade,

The area round El Hatian and Batruna was strongly fortified to
cover the southern approaches of Tobruk. The El Adem " box", as this
was called, was held by units of 5th Indian Division. Tobruk itself acted
as a supply base and as a fixed support for the whole Gazala line. Since
1941 the British had been pushing ahead with improvements in the
Tobruk defences 3 , mainly in the form of extensive minefields throughout

J The outflanking potentialities were handicapped, however, not only by the superior
gun-power of the^ German tanks but also by the superior leadership and training of their
armoured formations as Auchinleck frankly pointed out in his note of 2 ist March, 1942.

2 Rommel, it will be noted, adopts the name that the British gave to this pivotal
point of their defence.

s This is not quite correct. Since the relief of Tobruk in December, 1941, the develop
ment of it as a fortress had slipped into the background, and most of the earlier work
went out of order before Midsummer, 1942.

GAZALA AND TOBRUK 195

the defended area. These defences were garrisoned by the reinforced
2nd South African Division.

All fortified points were provided with powerful artillery, infantry
and armoured car units, and abundant supplies. The entire line was
remarkable for the extraordinary degree of technical skill which had gone
into its construction. All defence positions and strong-points conformed
to the most modern requirements of warfare. Countless numbers of mines
had been laid over a million in the Marmarica positions. And judging
by the 150,000 or so which were later picked up by my men in the British
rear areas, even more mining had been planned.

Besides the fully motorised forces I have mentioned, the British had
a mobile reserve in position behind the main defence works, consisting
of powerful armoured and mechanised formations (ist and 7th Armoured
Divisions and several independent armoured brigades and battalions).

Although the basic British defence plan was essentially a " second-
best solution", particularly in view of the complete motorisation of their
forces, the skilful construction of their defence works made their line a
very tough nut for us to crack.

The basic defect in the British dispositions was that they had been planned
primarily with a view to an offensive under pressure from the War Cabinet at
home. They were better suited to provide a pivot for an attack westwards^ than
to meet an attack by Rommel. Moreover, the vast accumulation of supplies in the
forward base at Belhammed (just north of Sidi Rezegfi) weighed on the minds of the
British commanders^ making them hesitate to manoeuvre their armour in any way
that might uncover their base.

THE BALANCE OF FORCES

At the beginning of the battle, the German-Italian Panzer Army con
sisted of two German and one Italian armoured divisions, together with
one German and one Italian motorised division. In additions, four non-
mo torised Italian infantry divisions and one non-mo torised German rifle
brigade were held under the command of the German-Italian Army High
Command. During the battle, a further Italian armoured division the
Littorio was sent to us by the Commando Supremo. Thus we had in all,
three German divisions, one German brigade and seven Italian divisions,
although only three of the Italian divisions were motorised and hence
of use in mobile warfare. Many German and all Italian units were well
below strength; the goth Light Division, for instance, went into battle
with a company strength of only fifty men. This low man-power was
particularly serious with the Italians so much so, in fact, that an ^Italian
motorised division rated rather as a brigade and an infantry division as
a regiment.

At the beginning of the battle the British had under command four

196 THE WAR IN AFRICA SECOND YEAR

motorised infantry divisions, two armoured divisions and four independent
mechanised brigades. In addition, by the middle of July they received a
further four divisions and a number of independent armoured units. All
these forces were motorised and up to full establishment. Since the British
armoured divisions, unlike our own, were undiluted that is to say, they
consisted exclusively of armoured 1 units the relative strengths at the
beginning of the battle showed a 6 to 9 ratio to our disadvantage. We
went into battle with 320 German and 240 Italian tanks. The British
brought against us, in all, approximately 900. Tank reinforcements
received by the enemy during the battle were out of all proportion to ours. 2
Up to May of 1942 our tanks had in general been superior in quality
to the corresponding British types. This was now no longer true, at least
not to the same extent. The American-built Grant tank, which appeared
for the first time in the summer battles, undoubtedly had a match in our
long-barrelled Panzer IV, but only four of these latter were on African
soil during our offensive. There was, in any case, no ammunition
available for them, so that they were in fact unable to take any part.
Our short-barrelled Panzer IV was also clearly superior to the Grant in
speed and manoeuvrability. Nevertheless, the Grant had the advantage,
as it could shoot up the short-barrelled Panzer IV at a range where the
latter s shell was unable to penetrate the heavy armour of the American

1 This is not correct. The pattern of the British armoured division had recently been
changed, and now comprised one armoured brigade (of 3 tank units and i motor
infantry unit) and one lorried infantry brigade (of three battalions) although an
additional armoured brigade was sometimes attached.

*On the British side, the forces which took part in the original battle were:

INFANTRY DIVISIONS soth, ist and and South African, 5th Indian.

BRIGADE GROUPS 3rd Indian Motor, ist Free French.

ARMOURED DIVISIONS f ist (with and and 22nd Armoured Brigades, and 20 ist

&lt; Guards Motor Brigade);

v 7th (with 4th Armoured Brigade, and 7th Motor Brigade).

ARMY TANK BRIGADES ist and $2nd (infantry tanks).

In addition the recently re-equipped ist Armoured Brigade had just arrived, and
was to have been given to the 7th Armoured Division so that each division might
have two armoured brigades. That promised a big advantage as the German panzer
divisions had only one apiece. But the ist Armoured Brigade was not quite ready
for action when the battle opened, and was used instead to replace casualties in the
other three armoured brigades.

It can thus be seen that Rommel understates the number of armoured formations
lhat opposed him, while his broad use of the term " motorised " confuses the distinc
tion between the different types of formation. His figure of 900 tanks on the British
side is roughly correct, counting the Replacements that came into action during the
battle. In the initial stage the British superiority in number of tanks was not very
large. But the Grant type, of which about 200 were available, had a stronger punch
than any of Rommel s, while all his 240 Italian tanks and his 50 Panzer Us counted
for little in a tank v. tank battle.

Rommers chief asset in meeting such adverse tank odds Jky in his 88-mm. guns,
but he had only 48 of these. Even at Alamein ia October the total was only 70.

GAZALA AND TOBRUK 197

tank. We had forty short-barrelled Panzer IVs as against 160 British
Grants.

The main armament of our panzer formations was the Panzer III,
which, with its 5O-mm. gun of which by far the majority were short-
barrelledwas even less of a match for the Grant. Those British tanks
which were still armed with a 4o-mm. gun a large proportion of the
older British types had meanwhile been supplied with a 75-mm. 1 were
inferior to the Panzer III. The 240 Italian tanks were no sort of match
for the British and the troops had long talked of them as " self-
propelled coffins".

It was the same with the artillery, in which the British had a
superiority of 8 to 5.

As far as the air is concerned, it would probably be safe to say that
apart from a few fluctuations to either side, the German-Italian Air
Force held the balance with the R.A.F., at any rate at the beginning of
the battle. Things were very different later. 2

So it will be seen that taken as a whole the Panzer Army was faced
by British forces of considerably greater strength. Compared with what
was to come during the British winter offensive 1942-43, of course, the
balance of power was quite tolerable even though only three German
and three Italian divisions were fit to be used in the offensive, while the
remainder, due to their lack of mobility, had to remain almost entirely
in the background. A further factor was that the two weak Italian
motorised divisions, due to their poor armament, could only be used under
German protection.

RULES OF DESERT WARFARE

Of all theatres of operations, it was probably in North Africa that
the war took on its most advanced form. The protagonists on both sides
were fully motorised formations, for whose employment the flat and
obstruction-free desert offered hitherto undreamed-of possibilities. It
was the only theatre where the principles of motorised and tank warfare,
as they had been taught theoretically before the war, could be applied
to the full and further developed. It was the only theatre where the
pure tank battle between major formations was fought. Even though the
struggle may have occasionally hardened into static warfare, it remained
at any rate, in its most important stages (i.e. in 1941-42 during the
Cunningham-Ritchie offensive, and in the summer of 1942 Marmarica

1 This is not correct Rommel must have been misinformed.

2 The British first line strength was actually 604, while the German-Italian was only
542. But 120 of the 35 1 Axis fighters were of the Messerschmitt 109 class, which was
superior to the Hurricanes and Kittyhawks on the British side.

ig8 THE WAR IN AFRICA SECOND YEAR

battles, capture of Tobruk) based on the principle of complete
mobility.

In military practice, this was entirely new, for our offensives in Poland
and the West had been against opponents who, in all their operations,
had still had to take account of their non-motorised infantry divisions
and had thus had to suffer the disastrous limitation in their freedom of
tactical decision which this imposes, especially in retreat. Often they
had been forced into actions quite unsuited to the object of holding up
our advance. After our break-through in France, the enemy infantry
divisions had simply been overrun and outflanked by our motorised forces.
Once this had happened they had had no choice but to allow their
operational reserves to be worn away by our assault groups, often in
tactically unfavourable positions, in an endeavour to gain time for the
retreat of their infantry.

Non-motorised infantry divisions are only of value against a motorised
and armoured enemy when occupying prepared positions. If these
positions are pierced or outflanked, a withdrawal will leave them helpless
victims of the motorised enemy, with nothing else to do but hold on in
their positions to the last round. They cause terrible difficulties in a
general retreat for, as I have indicated, one has to commit one s
motorised formations merely to gain time for them. I was forced to go
through this myself during the Axis retreat from Cyrenaica in the winter
of 1941-42, when the whole of the Italian infantry and a considerable
part of the German, including the majority of what was to become goth
Light Division, were without vehicles and had either to be carried by a
shuttle service of lorries, or to march. It was only the gallantry of my
armour that enabled the retreat of the Italo-German infantry to be
covered, for our fully motorised enemy was in hot pursuit. Similarly,
Graziani s failure can be attributed mainly to the fact that the greater
part of the Italian Army was delivered up helpless and non-motorised in
the open desert to the weaker but fully motorised British formations,
while the Italian motorised forces, although too weak to oppose the
British successfully, were nevertheless compelled to accept battle and
allow themselves to be destroyed in defence of the infantry.

The British forces in contrast to ours were all fully mobile, and
the war in Africa was, in fact, waged almost exclusively by mobile forces.
Out of this pure motorised warfare, certain principles were established,
principles fundamentally different from those applying in other theatres.
These principles will become the standard for the future, in which the
fully-motorised formation will be dominant.

The envelopment of a fully-motorised enemy in the flat and good-
driving terrain of the desert has the following results :

(a) For a fully-motorised formation, encirclement is the worst tactical
situation imaginable, since hostile fire can be brought to bear on

GAZALA AND TOBRUK 199

it from all sides; even envelopment on only three sides is a
tactically untenable situation.

(b) The enemy becomes forced, because of the bad tactical situation
in which the encirclement has placed him, to evacuate the area
he is holding.

The encirclement of the enemy and his subsequent destruction in the
pocket can seldom be the direct aim of an operation; more often it is
only indirect, for any fully-motorised force whose organisational structure
remains intact will normally and in suitable country be able to break
out at will through an improvised defensive ring. Thanks to his motorisa-
tion, the commander of the encircled force is in a position to concentrate
his weight unexpectedly against any likely point in the ring and burst
through it. 1 This fact was repeatedly demonstrated in the desert.

It follows therefore that an encircled enemy force can only be
destroyed

(a) when it is non-motorised or has been rendered immobile by lack
of petrol, or when it includes non-mobile elements which have to
be considered;

(b) when it is badly led or its command has decided to sacrifice one
formation in order to save another;

Except for cases (a) and (b), which occurred very frequently in other
theatres of war, encirclement of the enemy and his subsequent destruction
in the pocket can only be attempted if he has first been so heavily battered
in open battle that the organic cohesion of his force has been destroyed.
I shall term all actions which have as their aim the wearing down of the
enemy s power of resistance " battles of attrition." In motorised warfare,
material attrition and the destruction of the organic cohesion of the
opposing army must be the immediate aim of all planning.

Tactically, the battle of attrition is fought with the highest possible
degree of mobility. The following points require particular attention:

(a) The main endeavour should be to concentrate one s own forces
in space and time, while at the same time seeking to split the
enemy forces spatially and destroy them at different times.

(4) Supply lines are particularly sensitive, since all petrol and
ammunition, indispensable requirements for the battle, must pass
along them. Hence, everything possible must be done to protect

HThe first part of this comment is well founded, but the conclusion goes too far. A
break-out can be made very difficult if the commanders in the encircling force really
understand the defensive side of modern mobile warfare.

2OO THE WAR IN AFRICA SECOND YEAR

one s own supply lines and to upset, or better still, cut the enemy s.
Operations in the enemy s supply area will lead immediately to
his breaking off the battle elsewhere, since, as I have indicated,
supplies are the fundamental premise of the battle and must be
given priority of protection.

(tf) The armour is the core of the motorised army. Everything turns
on it, and other formations are mere auxiliaries. The war of
attrition against the enemy armour must therefore be waged as
far as possible by the tank destruction units. One s own armour
should only be used to deal the final blow.

(d) Reconnaissance reports must reach the commander in the shortest
possible time; he must take his decisions immediately and put
them into effect as fast as he can. Speed of reaction decides the
battle. Commanders of motorised forces must therefore operate
as near as possible to their troops, and must have the closest
possible signal communication with them.

(e) Speed of movement and the organisational cohesion of one s own
forces are decisive factors and require particular attention. Any
sign of dislocation must be dealt with as quickly as possible by
reorganisation.

(/) Concealment of intentions is of the utmost importance in order
to provide surprise for one s own operations and thus make it
possible to exploit the time taken by the enemy command to
react. Deception measures of all kinds should be encouraged, if
only to make the enemy commander uncertain and cause him to
hesitate and hold back.

(g) Once the enemy has been thoroughly beaten up, success can be
exploited by attempting*to overrun and destroy major parts of
his disorganised formations. Here again, speed is everything. The
enemy must never be allowed time to reorganise. Lightning
regrouping for the pursuit and reorganisation of supplies for the
pursuing forces are essential.

Concerning the technical and organisational aspect of desert warfare,
particular regard must be paid to the following points:

(a) The prime requirements in the tank are manoeuvrability, speed
and a long-range gun for the side with the bigger gun has the
longer arm and can be the first to engage the enemy. Weight of
armour cannot make up for lack of gun-power, as it can only be
provided at the expense of manoeuvrability and speed, both of
which are indispensable tactical requirements.

(b) The artillery must have great range and must, above all, be
capable of great mobility and of carrying with it ammunition in
large quantities.

GAZALA AND TOBRUK 2OI

(c) The infantry serves only to occupy and hold positions designed
either to prevent the enemy from particular operations, or to
force him into other ones. Once this object has been achieved, the
infantry must be able to get away quickly for employment else
where. It must therefore be mobile and be equipped to enable
it rapidly to take up defence positions in the open at tactically
important points on the battlefield.

It is my experience that bold decisions give the best promise of success.
But one must differentiate between strategical or tactical boldness and a
military gamble. A bold operation is one in which success is not a
certainty but which in case of failure leaves one with sufficient forces
in hand to cope with whatever situation may arise. A gamble, on the
other hand, is an operation which can lead either to victory or to the
complete destruction of one s force. Situations can arise where eve,n a
gamble may be justified as, for instance, when in the normal course of
events defeat is merely a* matter of time, when the gaining of time is
therefore pointless and the only chance lies in an operation of great risk.

The only occasion when a commander can calculate the course of
a battle in advance is when his forces are so superior that victory is a
foregone conclusion; then the problem is no longer one of" the means "
but only of " the method". But even in this situation, I still think it is
better to operate on the grand scale rather than to creep about the
battlefield anxiously taking all possible security measures against every
conceivable enemy move.

Normally, there is no ideal solution to military problems; every
course has its advantages and disadvantages. One must select that which
seems best from the most varied aspects and then pursue it resolutely
and accept the consequences. Any compromise is bad.

It is in the light of all these considerations that the plan which I and
my staff had worked out should be read. It should be regarded as the
best possible solution under the most favourable circumstances. The fate
of my army was in no way tied up with the success of this particular plan
for, following my usual principles, I reckoned throughout with the
possibility that things might not all go as we wanted them. But even in
that event, the situation at the start of the battle would be as far as
could be foreseen by no means unfavourable. We looked forward to the
battle full of optimism, trusting in our troops, with their superb tactical
training and their experience in improvisation.

The opening move of the offensive was to be a frontal attack by the
Italian infantry divisions in the Gazala line against the soth British
Division and the South Africans. A powerful force of artillery was detailed
to support the attack. Tanks and lorries were to be driven in circles day

2O2 THE WAR IN AFRICA SECOND YEAR

and night behind the front, to simulate the existence of tank assembly
areas.

The British command was to be made to expect our main attack in
the north and centre of the Gazala line. We hoped to persuade them to
deploy their armour behind the infantry positions in this sector. The
idea of a German frontal attack against the Gazala position could not
appear so very far fetched to the British command, as it was quite within
the bounds of possibility that we would prefer it to the risky right hook
round Bir Hacheim. If we failed to mislead the British into concentrating
the whole of their armour in this sector, then we hoped that they would
send at least part of it up there and thus split their striking power. 1

During daylight all movement of my motorised forces was to be
directed towards the point of the Italian infantry s attack. They would
then move into their assembly area after nightfall. The striking force was
to consist of the Africa Korps (i5th and 2 ist Panzer Divisions), XX
Italian Motorised Corps (Trieste and Ariete Divisions) and the goth
Light Division reinforced by three reconnaissance regiments. The
beginning of the advance, which was to be an outflanking movement
round Bir Hacheim, was fixed for 22.00 hours. From Bir Hacheim the
Afrika Korps and XX Italian Motorised Corps were to push on through
Acroma to the coast, with the object of cutting off and destroying the
British divisions in the Gazala line and the armoured units behind it.

The task of the goth Light Division, with the three reconnaissance
battalions, was to push into the El Adem Belhammed area in order to
prevent the withdrawal of the Tobruk garrison and the movement of
reinforcements into the Acroma area, and in addition to cut the British
off from the extensive supply dumps they had established in the area east
of Tobruk. To enable the goth Light Division to feign the presence of
massed armour in the area, they were to be provided with several dust-
raisers (lorries carrying aero engines and propellers, which by stirring up
great clouds of dust were intended to suggest the approach of powerful
armoured forces). We hoped to keep the British forces in that area from
intervening in the Acroma battle so long as our armoured formations were
trying to force a decision.

Following on the destruction of the British forces in the Marmarica,
*A long advisory letter that Auchinleck wrote to Ritchie on the 2oth May, nearly a
week before the battJe opened, shows that Auchinleck thought it more likely that Rommel
would attempt a break-through in the centre, but reckoned with either alternative.
Moreover, the letter urged Ritchie to keep both armoured divisions together and com
plete, placing them astride the Trigh Capuzzo ready for a concentrated flank counter-
stroke against Rommel s armour when this was clearly committed in one direction or
the other. But Ritchie, while positioning the ist Armoured Division just south of the
Trigh Capuzzo, put the 7th Armoured Division (the weaker of the two) ten miles farther
southon the exposed desert flank round which Rommel delivered his right hook. This
disposition, and separation, turned out badly. On the first morning (the 27th May)
the 7th Armoured Division was overrun and broken up while isolated. One of the
two armoured brigades of the ist Armoured Division was belatedly sent to reinforce
the 7tl\, but itself became engaged in a l lone fight, and suffered heavily.

GAZALA AND TOBRUK 2OJ

it was our intention to make a quick conquest of Tobmk. My freedom
of operation was limited by the Duce to the area up to the Egyptian
frontier.

It had actually been intended that Malta should be taken by Italo-
German parachute and airborne forces before the offensive started, but
for some unaccountable reason our High Command abandoned this
scheme. 1 My request to have this pleasant task entrusted to my own
army had unfortunately been refused in the previous spring.

And so, in view of the steady increase of British strength, we fixed
the date of the attack for the sGth May, 1942.

STRUGGLE FOR THE INITIATIVE

26th May to i^th June,

During these first three weeks the battle of attrition was waged in
the Western Desert in its most violent form. It began very badly for us,
but in the fluctuating fighting which followed we succeeded partly by
attacks with limited objectives, partly in defence in smashing the
British formations one by one, despite the courage with which they
fought*

In view of the superior strength of the British force this victory of
my German-Italian troops came as a complete surprise to world opinion,
and the measures taken by my adversary, Lieut.-General Ritchie, became
the subject of severe criticism. But was it in fact true that the British
defeat was the result of their commander s mistakes?

After the battle I came upon an article by the British military critic,
Liddell Hart, which ascribed the shortcomings of the British command
during the African campaign to the British generals* close associations
with infantry warfare. I had the same impression. The British command
had not drawn the correct conclusions from their defeat of 1941-42.

Prejudice against innovation is a typical characteristic of an Officer

1 After the plan had been worked put for this tfc Operation Hercules", Mussolini went
to Berchtesgaden for a conference with Hitler at the end of April. Here it was agreed
that the attack on Malta should be launched early in July, after Rommel s offensive in
Africa which was to be halted, so that the weight of the Luftwaffe could be switched
against Malta. But soon after this agreement Hitler showed renewed doubts, and in
discussion with his staff brought up a series of arguments against the operationthat
the Italians could not keep anything secret; that they had not got the fighting spirit for
such a difficult venture; that they would not be punctual in arriving to support the
German parachute troops; that their Navy would not face die British, and were thus
likely to leave the German troops stranded without supplies.

So, on the aist May, he decided that the preparations were only to be continued on
paper, and that the operation was in any case to be dropped if Rommel succeeded in
taking Tobruk. For he argued that supply ships could then be sent to Tobruk via Crete,
by-passing Malta. While that argument proved fallacious, his doubts of the Italian
Navy were borne out by the extreme caution it showed in the montlis that followed.

2O4 THE WAR IN AFRICA SECOND YEAR

Corps which has grown up in a well-tried and proven system. Thus it
was that the Prussian Army was defeated by Napoleon. This attitude
was also evident during this war, in German as well as British officer
circles, where, with their minds fixed on complicated theories, people lost
the ability to come to terms with reality. A military doctrine had been
worked out to the last detail and it was now regarded as the summit of all
military wisdom. The only military thinking which was acceptable was
that which followed their standardised rules. Everything outside the
rules was regarded as a gamble; if it succeeded then it was the result of
luck and accident. This attitude of mind creates fixed preconceived ideas,
the consequences of which are incalculable.

For even military rules are subject to technical progress. What was
good for 1914 is only good to-day where the majority of the formations
engaged on both sides, or at least on the side which is attacked, are made
up of non-motorised infantry units. Where this is the case the armour
still acts as the cavalry, with the task of outrunning and cutting off the
infantry. But in a battle fought between two fully-motorised adversaries,
quite different rules apply. I have dealt with this already.

However praiseworthy it may be to uphold tradition in the field of
soldierly ethics, it is to be resisted in the field of military command. For
to-day it is not only the business of commanders to think up new techniques
which will destroy the value of the old : the potentialities of warfare are
themselves being continually changed by technical advance. Thus the
modern army commander must free himself from routine methods and
show a comprehensive grasp of technical matters, for he must be in a
position continually to adapt his ideas of warfare to the facts and possi
bilities of the moment. If circumstances require it, he must be able to
turn the whole structure of his thinking inside out.

I think that my adversary, General Ritchie, like so many generals
of the old school, had not entirely grasped the consequences which
followed from the fully motorised conduct of operations and the open
nature of the desert battlefield. In spite of the good detailed preparation
of his plans, they were bound to go wrong, for they were, in essence, a
compromise.

26 May 1942
DEAREST Lu,

By the time you get this letter you will have long ago heard from
the Wehrmacht communiques about events here. We re launching a
decisive attack to-day. It will be hard, but I have full confidence
that my army will win it. After all, they all know what battle means.
There is no need to tell you how I will go into it. I intend to demand
of myself the same as I expect from each of my officers and men. My
thoughts, especially in these hours of decision, are often with you.

206 THE WAR IN AFRICA SECOND YEAR

At 14.00 hours on the s6th May, after heavy artillery preparation,
the Italian infantry under the command of General Cruewell launched
a frontal attack against the Gazala line. To deceive the British who, as
I have said, were to be led to expect the main Axis thrust at this point
and on this assumption to bring up their armour one panzer regiment
of the Afrika Korps and one of Italian XX Corps was attached to each
of the assault formations. These regiments were to return to their parent
formations in the evening. The British outposts in front of the Gazala
line offered little resistance and withdrew to their main defences.

Meanwhile, the striking group, consisting of the Afrika Korps, goth
Light Division and XX Italian Corps, was gathering in its appointed
assembly area. During the evening, part of this force moved off towards
the point of the Italian attack and, after being observed as intended, by
the British evening air reconnaissance, they turned and raced back at
top speed to the assembly area.

At 20.30 hours I ordered "Operation Venezia ", and the 10,000
vehicles of the striking force began to move. My staff and I, in our place
in the Afrika Korps s column, drove through the moonlit night towards
the great armoured battle. Occasional flares lit up the sky far in the
distance probably the Luftwaffe trying to locate Bir Hacheim. I was
tense and keyed-up, impatiently awaiting the coming day. What would
the enemy do? What had he already done? These questions pounded
my brain, and only morning would bring the answers. Our formations
rolled forward without a halt. The drivers often had difficulty in main
taining contact with the vehicle ahead.

Shortly before daybreak we took an hour s rest some 10 or 12 miles
south-east of Bir Hacheim; then the great force started to move again
and, in a swirling cloud of dust and sand, thrust into the British rear.
Enemy minefields and decoys gave some trouble, but an hour or two
after daybreak all formations of the Panzer Army were in full cry for their
objectives, goth Light Division reported their arrival at El Adem as
early as 10.00 a.m. Many of the supply dumps of British XXX Corps,
for whom this area had acted as supply base, had fallen into their hands.
At about midday the British command reacted and a furious battle
developed.

Meanwhile, panzer units of the Afrika Korps collided with the 4th
British Armoured and 3rd Indian Motor Brigades some six miles south
east of Bir el Harmat, and an armoured battle flared up. Unfortunately
our panzer units attacked without artillery support, although I had
constantly been at pains to impress on them not to do so until our artillery
had opened fire. There was also a British surprise awaiting us here, one
which was not to our advantage the new Grant tank, which was used
in this battle for the first time on African soil. Tank after tank, German
and British, was shattered in the fire of the tank-guns. Finally, we
succeeded in throwing the British back to the Trigh el Abd, although at

GAZALA AND TOBRUK 2C&gt;7

the cost of heavy casualties. The British, however, soon came back to
the attack.

When at around midday I and my staff attempted to get through to
the goth Light Division at El Adem, our column was attacked by British
tanks and we were forced to turn back. Contact between the goth Light
Division and the Afrika Korps was broken. Trying to fight our way back
to the Afrika Korps, we suddenly found ourselves confronted by a British
battery, probably en route from the Bir Hacheiin area to Tobruk.
Although the staff did not represent much in the way of fighting power,
we attacked the British on the move and rounded them up. They
seemed to have been taken completely by surprise.

In the afternoon, heavy tank fighting flared up some five miles north
east of Bir el Harmat, south of the Trigh Capuzzo. ist British Armoured
Division joined in the battle, its powerful armoured units attacking mainly
from the north-east. The British armour, under heavy artillery cover,
poured their fire into the columns and panzer units of the Afrika Korps&gt;
which were visible for miles. Fire and black smoke welled up from
lorries and tanks, and our attack came to a standstill. Again my divisions
suffered extremely serious tank losses. Many of our columns broke into
confusion and fled away to the south-west, out of the British artillery
fire. The Afrika Korps, while maintaining its defence to the east, fought
its way step by step to the north. The battle raged on in the camel-
thorn-studded plain until nightfall, by which time the mass of the Afrika
Korps had thrust through to a point some eight miles south and south
west of Acroma. Unfortunately, most of the lorry columns had been
parted from the panzer divisions and part of the infantry had also been
unable to follow. Contact had been broken within my staff. Lieut.-CoL
Westphal, my la, had pushed on with a number of signals lorries to the
Afrika Korps, whereas I myself, with the rest of the army staff, was
located at nightfall about twp miles north-east of Bir el Harmat.

Looking back on the first day s fighting, it was clear that our plan
to overrun the British forces behind the Gazala line had not succeeded.
The advance to the coast had also failed and we had thus been unable
to cut off the soth British and ist South African Divisions from the rest
of the Eighth Army. The principal cause was our underestimate of the
strength of the British armoured divisions. The advent of the new
American tank had torn great holes in our ranks. Our entire force now
stood in heavy and destructive combat with a superior enemy. 1

lr This is a sidelight on how differently a situation is apt to look when viewed from
" the other side of the hill." Under the shock of the losses suffered in encountering the
new Grant tanks, the Germans did not fully appreciate the extent of the opening
advantage they had gained in disrupting a large proportion of the British armoured
force. The effect on the British side was seen in the lack of any really strong and well-
directed effort to exploit the weakness and precariousness of the attacker s situation. Thus
Rommel had a respite to reorganise, and was then enabled to profit by the tactical
advantages of the defensive when ably conducted towards wearing down the British

2O8 THE WAR IN AFRICA SECOND YEAR

Certainly we had seriously mauled the brigades which the British
had thrown against us south-east of Bir el Harmat. The 3rd Indian
Motor Brigade had suffered such heavy losses that it was unable to make
any further appearance during the whole of the battle. It was also to
be a long time before the yth Armoured Division recovered from the
x blows it had been dealt that day.

But I will not deny that I was seriously worried that evening. Our
heavy tank losses were no good beginning to the battle (far more than a
third of the German tanks had been lost in this one day). The goth
Light Division under General Kleeman had become separated from the
Afrika Korps and was now in a very dangerous position. British motorised
groups were streaming through the open gap and hunting down the
transport columns which had lost touch with the main body. And on
these columns the life of my army depended.

However, in spite of the precarious situation and the difficult problems
with which it faced us, I looked forward that evening full of hope to what
the battle might bring. For Ritchie had thrown his armour into the
battle piecemeal and had thus given us the chance of engaging them on
each separate occasion with just about enough of our own tanks. This
dispersal of the British armoured brigades was incomprehensible.
In my view the sacrifice of the 7th Armoured Division south of Bir el
Harmat served no strategical or tactical purpose whatsoever, for it
was all the same to the British whether my armour was engaged
there or on the Trigh Capuzzo, where the rest of the British
armour later entered the battle. The principal aim of the British
should have been to have brought all the armour they had into action
at one and the same time. They should never have allowed themselves
to be duped into dividing their forces before the battle or during our
feint attack against the Gazala line. The full motorisation of their units
would have enabled them to cross the battlefield at great speed to
wherever danger threatened. Mobile warfare in the desert has often
and rightly been compared with a battle at sea where it is equally
wrong to attack piecemeal and leave half the fleet in port during the
battle.

The plan for next day was to concentrate forces for an attack to the
north. I intended to disengage the goth Light Division, which was under
heavy enemy pressure in the El Adem area, and join it up with the
Afrika Korps in the west in order to increase our striking power,
superiority of numbers. It was by his skilful " trapping " defence in the following days
that he paved the way for another, and more decisive, offensive stroke. Like most
dynamic soldiers, he was inclined to despise defence, but when circumstances compelled
him to adopt it he showed an instinctive grasp of its subtle technique, and in that lay
the foundation of his victories.

His practice aptly fulfilled the maxim of the famous pugilist, Jem Mace: "Let em
come to ye, they ll beat theirselves " a maxim thai was more explicitly defined by another
great boxer in a later generation, Kid McCoy: " Draw your man into attack and get
him so that he has both hands out of business and you have one hand free."

GAZALA AND TOBRUK 2&lt;X)

At dawn on the 28th May, I took a look round the horizon through
glasses to see what was going on in the neighbourhood* North-east of
us, there were British forces moving in a north-westerly direction* We
still had no contact with the various separate parts of the Panzer Army.
Shortly after dawn, British tanks opened fire on my command post,
which was located close beside the Kampfstaffel and our vehicles. Shells
fell all round us and the windscreen of our command omnibus flew into
fragments. Fortunately, we were able to get away in our vehicles out of
range of the British fire. During the morning I drove to XX Italian
Motorised Corps and ordered them to push northwards in the wake of
the Afrika Korps.

The goth Light Division was unable to carry out its orders to join up
on the east of the Afrika Korps and reinforce its striking power, as it was
being repeatedly attacked by powerful British forces. About 100 British
tanks were engaged in the fighting. Large numbers of R.A.F. aircraft
showered bombs on the division, and several of its units soon became
split away. To enable it to meet further enemy attacks, the division was
forced to form a hedgehog some six miles east of Bir el Harmat.

Fortunately, we at least managed to form a defensive front during
the morning, for the protection of our columns. The front was composed
of elements of the Afrika Korps and was located north-east of Bir el
Harmat.

Things were also very serious with the Afrika Korps. The enemy
had now concentrated practically the whole of his available armour
north of the Trigh Capuzzo and was launching attack after attack on
the Afrika Korps. News had come in from Westphal during the morning.
He had had to order the Italians to attack the Gazala line in order to
prevent the British and South Africans located there from joining in the
battle. The attack, which went in about midday, made good progress
near Eluet el Tamar against the resistance of weak British forces.

I was now becoming uneasy and, wishing to make contact with the
two panzer divisions, set out in the afternoon with my Chief of Staff,
General Cause, to try to find a negotiable route to the Afrika Korps;
a signal had meanwhile come in from it with the alarming news that part
of the 1 5th Panzer Division was out of action for lack of ammunition. It
was therefore vitally important to get up its supply columns. By late
afternoon we managed to push forward with several vehicles and anti
tank guns to a hill about ten miles north of Bir el Harmat, from where
we could see the Afrika Korps. It was a typical picture of a desert battle.
Black smoke clouds rolled up to the sky, giving the landscape a curious
sinister beauty. I decided to use this route to take the supply columns up
to the Afrika Korps early next morning.

On our way back to Battle H.Q. we had a brush with one British
and one Italian column! The latter also took us for hostile and opened
a wild fire, which we escaped by a quick withdrawal. After dark we

2IO THE WAR IN AFRICA SECOND YEAR

made our way through a lane which the Italians had cleared through the
minefields, as far as the area south-west of Bir el Harmat, where we met
our own troops and heard that the British had overrun my staff during
our absence. Several British tanks had been shot up by Kampfstqffel
Kiehl, but other British columns had penetrated right through to the
Afrika Korps supply units, causing great confusion and destroying a
number of petrol and ammunition lorries* Order was restored and we
succeeded in re-occupying our old positions during the night,

Late that evening, I formed up the supply columns ready to take
them up myself to the Afrika Korps next morning. In view of the small
amount of cover we could expect to find, this journey through a district
dominated by enemy formations promised to be a decidedly risky affair.

Fortunately, however, the goth Light Division was able to disengage
from the British during the night and take up a position near Bir el
Harmat. In addition, the Ariete was put in to stop the gap between
the goth Light and the Afrika Korps. These new dispositions made the
supply columns 5 route far safer. We set off for the Afrika Korps at
daybreak \2$th May] and all went smoothly.

On arrival on the battlefield, we found that the Afrika Korps had just
been attacked from the north and east by British armour. Shortage of
petrol and ammunition had been severely limiting their freedom of
action, but now this situation could at last be eased. I set up my command
post in the area during the afternoon.

Now that contact had been fully restored between all parts of the
Army, I was at last able to obtain a comprehensive picture of the situation.

We had now succeeded in concentrating our forces on both sides of
the Trigh el Abd and had established a firm defence line. But the
German-Italian units had suffered heavily. Our supply route had been
virtually cut through by British motorised units south of Bir Hacheim.
The Italian infantry assault on the Gazala line had penetrated as far as
the main British positions and then come to a standstill in front of well-
constructed defence works. Their commander, General Cruewell, had
been shot down in his Storch and was missing. Later I heard that he had
been taken prisoner by the British. Nor was he the only one of our
generals to be put out of the fight that day, for General von Vaerst,
commander of the I5th Panzer Division, had been wounded and forced
to leave the battlefield. The British had now assembled their 2nd, 4th
and 22nd Armoured Brigades and, with 201 st Guards Brigade, were
throwing them in concentric counter-attacks against our front.

In this situation it was far too hazardous to continue our attack to
the north, as we had originally planned. I drew my conclusions accord
ingly. The main thing now was to open up a secure supply route for our
striking force, and I therefore decided to move units of goth Light
Division and an element of the Afrika Korps against the minefields from

GA2ALA AND TOBRUK 211

to the defensive on a shortened front. As soon as the penetration of the
Gazala defences had been made I intended to pinch out Bir Hacheim,
the southern bastion of the British line.

I made this plan on the certain assumption that, with strong German
motorised forces standing south of the coast road, the British would not
dare to use any major part of their armoured formations to attack the
Italians in the Gazala line, for a counter-attack by my panzer divisions
would have put them between two fires. On the other hand, I hoped that
the presence of the Italian infantry in front of the ist South African and
5Oth British Divisions would continue to persuade the overcautious
British command to leave those formations complete in the Gazala line.
It seemed highly improbable to me that Ritchie would order these two
infantry divisions to attack the Italian infantry corps without support
from other formations, for such an operation would not have fulfilled
the normal British demand for what they supposed to be 100 per cent
certainty. Thus I foresaw that the British mechanised brigades would
continue to run their heads against our well-organised defensive front and
use up their strength in the process. The defence was to be conducted
with the maximum of elasticity and mobility.

Orders for these operations went out on the evening of the 2gth of
May.

At first light on May soth the respective divisions moved into their
appointed positions and put themselves on the defensive. During these
moves, we established the presence of strong British forces, including
armour, in the Ualeb area. It was the reinforced isoth Brigade of soth
British Division. [The ist Army Tank Brigade had been sent to support it
and in the outcome shared its fate.] Meanwhile, elements of X Italian Corps
had succeeded in crossing the British minefield and establishing a bridge
head east of it, although the lanes through the British mines lay under
heavy British artillery fire, which had an extremely upsetting effect on
our columns. Nevertheless, contact was established at noon between
the striking force and X Italian Corps, and a direct supply route was
opened to the west. During the day the British brigade in Got el Ualcb
was surrounded. .

In the afternoon, I drove through the minefield to X Italian Corps
H.Q,. for a meeting with Field Marshal Kesselring, the commander
of X Italian Corps, and Major von Below (Adjutant to the Fuehrer),
during which I informed them of my further plans. With the Afrika
Korps screening the British minefield against all attacks from the north
east, we were first going to clean up the whole of the southern part of
the Gazala line and then to resume the offensive. In the course of this
operation, we intended to destroy the 150* British Brigade in Ualeb
and then the ist Free French Brigade in Bir Hacheim.

The enemy was very hesitant in following up our movements. The
withdrawal of the German-Italian formations had evidently come as a

THE WAR IN AFRICA SECOND YEAR

complete surprise to him, and, in any case, the British command never
reacted very quickly. During the morning we established the presence
of British assembly areas east and north of our front, with 280 tanks in
the former and 150 in the latter, and we expected the British to launch
their major blow at any moment. Nothing happened during the morning,
however, except a few attacks on the Ariete, which the Italians beat off,
and a number of even weaker thrusts on the rest of the front. Fifty-seven
British tanks were shot up that day.

In the afternoon I personally reconnoitred the possibilities for an
attack on Got el Ualeb, and detailed units of the Afrika Korps, goth
Light Division and the Italian Trieste Division for an assault on the
British positions next morning.

The attack was launched on the morning of the 3ist May. German-
Italian units fought their way forward yard by yard against the toughest
British resistance imaginable. The defence was conducted with con
siderable skill and, as usual, the British fought to the last round. They
also brought a new 57-mm. anti-tank gun [the 6-pounder] into use in this
action. Nevertheless, by the time evening came we had penetrated a
substantial distance into the British positions.

31 May 1942
DEAREST Lu,

Fm well. The great crisis of the battle is over and so far we ve
done well. But the next few days are still going to be hard. Cruewell
has, unfortunately, fallen into British hands, complete with Storch,
but I m still hoping to hack a way out for him.

On the following day the defenders were to receive their quietus.
After heavy Stuka attacks, the infantry again surged forward against the
British field positions. I went forward with them, accompanied by Colonel
Westphal, who was unfortunately seriously wounded in a surprise British
mortar attack and had to be taken back to Europe, so that I had to do
without him in the days ahead. This was a grave loss to the Panzer
Army, for whom he had always been an outstandingly important man,
because of his great knowledge, experience and ready decision. However,
the attack went on. Piece by piece the elaborate British defences were
won until by early afternoon the whole position was ours. The last
British resistance was quenched. We took in all 3,000 prisoners and
destroyed or captured 101 tanks and armoured cars, as well as 124 guns
of all kinds.

At about this time there fell into our hands an order issued by the

British Armoured Brigade to the effect that German and Italian
prisoners were to be given nothing to eat or drink until they had been
interrogated. We found this very disturbing, for measures of this kind
could only result in the war between the British and Germans, already

GAZALA AND TOBRUK

tragic enough, being intensified to a deplorable bitterness. Evidently the
British command were of the same opinion, for they withdrew the order
at our intervention.

In the late afternoon of June ist, after the fall of Got el Ualeb,
British reconnaissance units attacked the front which was screening our
position to the east and south-east. A violent artillery barrage followed &gt;
mainly on my command post, and my Chief of Staff, General Gause &gt;
was wounded by a small splinter. Thus two of my most important
assistants had been put out of the fight on the same day. I decided to
appoint the Chief of Staff of the Afrika Korps, Colonel Bayerlein, as
Chief of the Army Staff

DEAREST Lu,

The battle is going favourably for us; about 400 tanks have been
shot up. Our losses are bearable.

Got el Ualeb having fallen, it was now the turn of Bir Hacheim, which
was to be surrounded and stormed next day. British and French raiding
parties from the fortress were constantly attacking our line of com
munications and this had to be stopped.

VICTORY IN THE DESERT

On the night 1-2 June, the goth Light Division and the Trieste moved
against Bir Hacheim. They crossed the minefields without heavy casualties.,
thus shutting off the fortress from the east.

After our summons to surrender had been rejected, the attack opened
at about midday. The Trieste from the north-east and the 9Oth Light
from the south-east advanced against the fortifications, field positions
and minefields of the French defenders. With our preliminary barrage
there began a battle of extraordinary severity, which was to last for ten
whole days. I frequently took over command of the assault forces myself
and seldom in Africa was I given such a hard-fought struggle. The
French fought in a skilfully planned system of field positions and small
defence works slit trenches, small pill-boxes, machine-gun and anti
tank gun nests all surrounded by dense minefields. This form of defence
system is extraordinarily impervious to artillery fire or air attack, since a
direct hit can destroy at the most one slit trench at a time. An immense
expenditure of ammunition is necessary to do any real damage to an
enemy holding a position of this kind.

It was a particularly difficult task to clear lanes through the minefields
in face of the French fire. Superhuman feats were performed by the
sappers, who suffered heavy casualties. Working under the cover of

214 THE WAR IN AFRICA SECOND YEAR

smoke-screens and artillery fire, they were frequently forced to sap their
\vay direct through to the mines. Our victory was in a great measure
due to their efforts.

Under non-stop attacks by our Luftwaffe (from the 2nd June up to
the capture of the last French positions on the 1 1 th, the Luftwaffe flew
1,300 sorties against Bir Hacheim) the French positions were attacked in
the north by mixed assault groups drawn from various formations and in
the south by the goth Light Division. Attack after attack came to a
halt in the excellent British defence system.

During the first few days of our attack on Bir Hacheim the mass of
the British iorces kept astonishingly quiet. Their only move was on the
2nd June against the Ariete, who resisted stubbornly. After a counter
attack by the 2ist Panzer Division, the situation quietened down again.
British raiding parties from the area south of Bir Hacheim were con
tinually harrying our supply traffic, to our great discomfort. Mines were
laid on the desert tracks and attacks made against our supply columns.
The British Motorised Group " August " particularly distinguished
itself in this work. We were forced to use armoured cars and self-propelled
guns for convoy protection.

The Afrika Korps took advantage of the lull to make good some of
its heavy material losses by repairs. On June 2nd they had only 130
serviceable tanks left, as against 320 at the beginning of the battle. Now
the number slowly began to rise again.

3 June 1942
DEAREST Lu,

The battle continues, though we re in such a favourable position
that I ve got no more serious worries. I think we ll pull it off all right
and reach our objectives.

.We could feel that there was something brewing. It was obvious that
the British would soon launch an attack, either against the line held by
our armour in the north or against our force investing Bir Hacheim in
the south. 1 During the night 4-5 June we moved the i5th Panzer Division
into position south of Bir el Harmat, where it would be able to strike

1 Auchinleck had expressed anxiety about the way that Rommel was being allowed
time to consolidate the wedge in the British position. He had also been urging the early
delivery of an indirect counterstroke, aimed at the enemy s supply route. But Ritchie
considered this too hazardous. He felt that he must keep enough armour near Acroma
to protect his own rear, and that his total did not suffice to provide for a stroke at the
enemy s reafc at the same time. (He had some 400 tanks still available, whereas Rommel
had only 130 German tanks, and about too of the relatively ineffective Italian M.I3S.)

Ritchie, therefore, preferred to mount a direct assault on the enemy salient. This
proved very costly, and turned out disastrously. The British superiority in tank strength
withered in the repeated attempts to overcome the enemy by direct assault. By the 6th
June it had fallen to 1 70. Thus the way was smoothed for a decisive thrust by RommeFs
armour \\hich had suffered very little in the meantime.

2l6 THE WAR IN AFRICA SECOND YEAR

either north-east or south-east according to the location of the British
attack. Just how important this move was to be was shown on the
morning of the 5th June.

Shortly before 06.00 hours, after an hour s heavy artillery preparation,
the British 2nd and 22nd Armoured Brigades, together with the loth
Indian and 2oist Guards Brigade, advanced to the attack against the
Ariete. As a feint, they put down smoke and fired a heavy barrage in
the 2 ist Panzer Division s sector, which adjoined the Ariete to the north.
Shortly afterwards an attack was also launched at that point by the
4th Armoured Brigade and 42nd Royal Tank Regiment with the object
of dividing our forces.

Rommel was mistaken about several points here. The initial attack from the
east was delivered by the loth Indian Infantry Brigade. After it had captured Aslagh
Ridge, the ssnd Armoured Brigade passed through to continue the attack, and was
followed by the gth Infantry Brigade. They soon ran into trouble. The converging
attack from the north was delivered by the %s&gt;nd Army Tank Brigade employing
two units, the jth and 4Snd R. T.R. and part of the 6gth Infantry Brigade. This
attack miscarried. It was not until a later stage that the 2nd and $h Armoured
Brigades were used to retrieve the situation. Tfieir attack became disjointed, and
failed to save the wth Indian Infantry Brigade, with four supporting regiments of
artillery, from being overwhelmed while isolated.

Thus the British attack was even more of a piecemeal affair than Rommel
imagined. As for its consequences, AuchinlecKs dispatch expressed the judgment:
" This unsuccessful counter-stroke was probably the turning point of the whole
battle."

In face of the heavy British pressure their forces in this sector were
several times stronger than ours the Ariete fell right back to the Army
artillery lines, where the British attack came to a halt under concentrated
artillery fire. Meanwhile, to relieve the pressure on the Italians, 8th
Panzer Regiment of I5th Panzer Division had thrust through to Bir et
Tamar.

From these positions, the Panzer Army, with its northern flank
secured, moved to the counter attack. Combat Group Wolz, which had
been deployed as Army reserve six miles north-east of Bir Hacheim,
thrust forward under my command into the rear of the British at Knights-
bridge. The 1 5th Panzer Division drove into battle on our left. Its task
was to close the British in from the south. Soon the guns of our tanks
were firing from three sides into the British, who fought back in their
usual way with extreme stubbornness but far too little mobility. By the
evening, more than fifty British tanks lay shot up on the battlefield.

At about six o clock next morning the mass of 2ist Panzer Division,
which had hitherto been firmly held down by British attacks, was also
able to move and launched an attack to the east. And now at last the
British slowly began to give ground in the fierce tank fighting. Combat
Group Wolz closed the Trigh Enver Bei to the west and thus forced the

GAZALA AND TOBRUK

British units into the fire of the attacking Axis forces. Soon the Wolz
Group came under heavy attack from the east and, after being out
flanked by the enemy in the south, had to withdraw during the night
to Bir el Harmat,

Once again, the Axis troops had fought superbly. The British, under
pressure from three sides, had suffered very heavy losses. Some 4,000
British troops, mainly from soist Guards and loth Indian Brigades,
marched into our prisoner-of-war camps on the 5th and 6th of June.
The newly arrived loth Indian Brigade had been wiped out.

This defeat had done considerable damage to the enemy s offensive
power. As I had foreseen, the British command had decided against
committing any major force from the two divisions in the Gazala line to
form a second point of pressure on the 2ist Panzer Division. Nor had any
units of the 2nd South African Division been committed. In a moment
so decisive they should have thrown in all the strength they could muster.
What is the use of having overall superiority if one allows one s formations
to be smashed piece by piece by an enemy who, in each separate action,
is able to concentrate superior strength at the decisive point?

After this British defeat we no longer expected any major relieving
attack on our forces round Bir Hacheim, and hoped to get on with our
assault undisturbed.

Meanwhile, there had been a pause in the fighting in front of the
French positions. Now, at 11.00 hours on the 6th June, the goth Light
Division resumed its attack against General Koenig s troops. The assault
spearheads succeeded in approaching to within half a mile of the Ridotta 1
Bir Hacheim, but there the attack came to a halt again. A hail of fire
tore across the rocky and covefless ground into the ranks of our attacking
troops and the attack had to be called off in the evening. The noose
round Bir Hacheim was drawn still tighter. Weak relieving attacks made
on the goth Light Division by the 7th British Motor Brigade were beaten
off.

That night, the 6-7 June, the goth Light Division cleared several lanes
through the mines in their sector and assault groups approached under
cover of darkness to within storming distance. Combat Group Wolz
was detailed to support the attack. On the morning of the 7th June,
after an artillery and air bombardment, the infantry stormed straight
for the French positions. Yet for all their dash, this attack too, was
broken up by the fire of all arms. Only in the north were a few penetra
tions made. This was a remarkable achievement on the part of the
French defenders, who were now completely cut off from the outside
world. To tire them out, flares were fired and the defences covered with
machine-gun fire throughout the following night. Yet, when my storming
parties went in next morning, the French opened fire again with un-

a Ridotta a small desert fort.

2l8 THE WAR IN AFRICA SECOND YEAR

diminished violence. The enemy troops hung on grimly in their trenches
and remained completely invisible.

8 June 1942
DEAREST Lu,

The past two days have been particularly lively, but also successful.
You will already have seen from the Wehrmacht communiques how
things are going. The fighting will last another fortnight, but I hope
to be through the worst of it by then.

I thought of you in the heat of the tank battle on the 6th June
[Frau Rommel s birthday] and hoped that my greeting from Africa
arrived punctually on the day.

On the gth June I drew a further combat group from the Afrika
Korps to support the attack on Bir Hacheim. From early morning
onwards, waves of our infantry surged once more against the enemy
defences. At about midday the goth Light Division, which had hitherto
only been giving support by their heavy weapons to the combat group
attacking in the north, joined in the assault from their positions in the
south. Continuously exposed to the fire of the French, who fought grimly
to the end, our storming parties suffered grievous casualties. However,
by eight o clock that night they worked their way forward to within
about 220 yards of the Ridotta Bir Hacheim. During the day, Ritchie
made a weak diversionary attack against the goth Light Division s
covering units south of Bir Hacheim, using motor battalions and an
armoured regiment of the 4th Armoured Brigade. We had no difficulty
in beating it off.

Meanwhile, we had several times had trouble with Kesselring. He
was being severely critical of the slow progress of our attack on the
French. What mainly upset him was the fact that he had had to keep
Luftwaffe formations continuously employed over Bir Hacheim, where
they had suffered severe losses. [On one day alone, the R.A.F. shot down
very nearly 40 dive-bombers.] He insisted that an immediate attack should
be launched on the French by all our armoured formations. This was
completely out of the question, for tanks cannot be sent into minefields
which are protected against clearance by strong-points. Moreover,
Ritchie would not have remained inactive on the other fronts while this
was going on. Such a move would have led to disaster. We did our best
to pacify Kesselring, who probably had little idea of the difficulties we
were up against.

Next day, the xoth June, the Afrika Korps* combat group, under
the command of Colonel Baade, succeeded at long last in breaking into
the main enemy position north of Bir Hacheim. The attack took place
under very heavy artillery fire and air attack, with the French desperately
defending every single nest of resistance and suffering terrible casualties

22O THE WAR IN AFRICA SECOND YEAR

as a result. After this penetration, Bir Hacheim could no longer be held.

We now thought it likely that the enemy would bring up a relieving
force to enable the French garrison to stage a break-out. Part of 7th
British Motor Brigade which had hitherto been engaged in harassing
our supply routes, had already been sighted by our reconnaissance on the
march towards Bir Hacheim. To arm myself against any situation I
ordered the isth Panzer Division to move to Bir Hacheim. The French
garrison was to be given its quietus next day.

But the French did not oblige, for in spite of all our security measures,
the greater part of the garrison broke out during the night under the
leadership of their commander, General Koenig, and disappeared in the
darkness away to the west, where they joined up with the yth British
Motor Brigade. Later we discovered that the instructions for sealing
the ring round the fortress had not been properly carried out at the
point where the break-out had been made. Once again it had been
shown that, however desperate the situation, there is always something
that can be done by a resolute commander who is not just prepared
to throw in his hand.

The goth Light Division was thus able to occupy Bir Hacheim in the
early morning of the nth June. Some 500 French soldiers fell into our
hands, the majority of them wounded. Later in the morning I inspected
the fortress for which such a bitter struggle had been waged and the
fall of which we had awaited with such impatience. 1

Now our forces were free. Despite all the courage which the British
in the Ualeb position and the French in Bir Hacheim had displayed,
Ritchie had been badly mistaken if he had thought to wear down my
forces by these pitched battles. Certainly we had suffered heavy casualties,
but they were in no way comparable with those of the British, for in the
strong-points which we had surrounded thousands of British troops had
been compelled to surrender through lack of water and ammunition.
For psychological reasons alone, the sacrifice of whole formations to the
enemy is generally a mistake. 2 Even though considerable advantage
may sometimes be gained for other formations by ordering troops to
resist to the end, one should still think twice before taking such a decision,
for the confidence of the ordinary soldier so vitally important to the
Army Commander is liable to become undermined. The men will no
longer obey the command s orders with the necessai y care-free equanimity,
because they will fear that if a crisis arises they may be left in the lurch.

On the afternoon of the nth June, I put the Bir Hacheim force on
the move to the north in order to seek a final decision without further
delay.

W0fe by Central Bayerlein. The defence works round Bir Hacheim included, among
other things, some 1,200 nests, combat positions, etc,, for infantry and heavy weapons.

2 RommePs line of thought here may have been accentuated by his reflections on
what happened in the previous winter when he fell back westwards, leaving large garrison*
in the frontier position to be cut off and captured.

GAZAtA AND TOBRUK 221

In the evening, the 15* Panzer and goth Light Divisions with 3rd
and 33rd Reconnaissance Battalions, all under my command, reached
an area six to ten miles south and south-west of El Adem. To parry this
danger, Ritchie moved the 2nd British Armoured Brigade from a point
south of Acroma into the neighbourhood of Bir Lefa* After a violent
battle with the concentrated British armour, which fought under strong
artillery support, we succeeded in taking the area round El Adem and
south of the Trigh Capuzzo before noon on the I2th of June. El Adem
itself was occupied by the goth Light Division. The British suffered
considerable tank losses and left 400 prisoners in our hands. The 2gth
Indian Brigade defended itself stubbornly in the El Adem box.

On the same morning [isth] a combat group of the 2ist Panzer
Division also drove east, thus steadily pressing together the British
armour, which, squeezed between the two German panzer divisions, no
longer possessed full freedom of movement. Into this area, which was
already extremely confined, Ritchie now brought up the 32nd Army
Tank Brigade from out of the Gazala line. A continuation of the I5th
Panzer Division s attack north-westwards now held out promise of great
success. The initiative was ours.

In the morning I set off with my Kampfstaffel to a ridge south-east of
El Adem, where I observed the course of the battle between the goth
Light Division and the Indians. Incessant British bomber attacks were
giving the goth Light Division a bad time. Later I tried to get through
to the 1 5th Panzer Division, but our vehicles were heavily fired on from
the north and south and pinned down in the open for several hours. It
was afternoon before I reached the I5th, whom I then accompanied in
their attack to the west. During the evening we were bombed by some
of our own Stukas. They were being chased by British fighters and, lame
ducks that they were, were forced to drop their bombs on their own
troops for the sake of some extra speed. However, the three of us
Bayerlein, the driver and I escaped once again without a scratch.

I spent the next day {131)1 June} with the Afrika Korps whose 15th
Panzer Division was cleaning up the escarpment to the west, while the
Italian Trieste and Ariete Divisions were pressing the British into the
area north of the Trigh Capuzzo. The 2ist Panzer Division, too, began
to move during the evening and thrust east in a raging sandstorm, which
at times brought visibility to zero. The slaughter of British tanks went on.
One after the other of the 120 or so which they probably now had left
remained lying on the battlefield. A murderous fire struck from several
sides into the tightly packed British formations, whose strength gradually
diminished. Their counter-attacks decreased steadily in momentum.

Unfortunately, the goth Light Division was \unable for several hours
to carry out its orders to join up on the east of tfie I5th Panzer Division,
as the British were attacking on all sides and forcing the division to fight

2Q2 THE WAR IN AFRICA SECOND YEAR

for its life. It was afternoon before it was able to disengage and, evading
a strong British column, move into its new position.

The Guards Brigade evacuated Knightsbridge that day, after it had
been subjected all the morning to the combined fire of every gun we
could bring to bear. This brigade was almost a living embodiment of the
virtues and faults of the British soldier tremendous courage and tenacity
combined with a rigid lack of mobility. The greater part of the armoured
force attached to the Guards Brigade was destroyed, either during that
day or on their retreat in the following night.

My intention now was to bring the whole of my motorised force, both
German and Italian, into action during the next day or two, in a bid
to break through to the sea. The British divisions from the Gazala line,
which were already beginning to move east along the coast road, were
to be flung back to the west and destroyed. Kesselring s aircraft were
already over their columns and the Via Balbia stood in flames.

It was clear that there was going to be very heavy fighting during
the next day or so as the British seemed to be determined to hold on to
the Acroma position in order to keep a retreat road open for the troops
in the Gazala line. It looked as though Ritchie would sacrifice his last
tank to that end.

By the evening of the i^th the British strength in this decisive area was
reduced to about 70 tanks. Although Rommel had also lost heavily, he had now a
superiority of more than two to one in tanks Jit for action and being in possession
of the battlefield he was able to recover and repair many of his damaged tanks,
while Ritchie could not.

The battle, which had begun so badly for us, was now taking an
increasingly favourable turn. All this we owed to the courage of the
German and Italian soldiers.

During the night of the I3th both divisions of the Afrika Korps were
deployed west of the Trigh Bir Hacheim ready for an attack to the north.
The Italian Ariete and Trieste Divisions were to act as a screen for their
eastern flank. The goth Light Division moved off to the east to put
itself in a position for a quick grab at the Tobruk approaches.

Next morning [j^th] the German panzer divisions moved off and
rolled northwards. Full speed was ordered, as British vehicles were now
streaming east in their thousands. I rode with the tanks and constantly
urged their commanders to keep the speed up. Suddenly we ran into a
wide belt of mines. Ritchie had attempted to form a new defence front
and had put in every tank he had. The advance halted and our vehicles
were showered with British armour-piercing shells.

I at once ordered the reconnaissance regiments to clear lanes through
the minefields, a task which was made easier by the violent sandstorm
which blew up towards midday. Meanwhile, I ordered our lyo-mm. guns
to open fire on the Via Balbia. The thunder of our guns mingled with the

GAZALA AND TOBRUK

shock of demolitions. The British and South Africans were blowing up
their ammunition dumps in the Gazala line.

Late in the afternoon, the iisth Rifle Regiment moved to the attack
against Hill 187. In spite of violent counter-fire from British tanks,
artillery and anti-tank guns the attack steadily gained ground. Towards
five o clock the British fire, to which my own vehicle had also for some
hours been exposed, slowly began to slacken. Enemy resistance crumbled
and more and more British troops gave themselves up. Black dejection
showed on their faces.

By evening the British barrier was pierced. After violent and successful
fighting its success could be measured in the hulks of 45 British tanks
lying on the battlefield the German panzer divisions gained the area
west of Acroma. The way to the Via Balbia was now virtually open.

The ist British Armoured Division was no longer in a fit state for
action and left the battlefield during the night.

Its remaining tanks were transferred to the 4th Armoured Brigade (of Jth
Armoured Division). This armoured brigade the only one left was thereby
made up to a strength of about 60 tanks.

That same night, units of the soth British Division succeeded in
breaking through the Italians of X Corps and escaping to the south.
Although we shot up 400 vehicles and took several hundred prisoners, yet
British troops to the strength of about a brigade managed to get away.
After the break-through, the British commander took his troops in small
columns through our supply zone, where they were able to do considerable
damage on the way. It would have been right, in fact, for both British
divisions to have broken through at this point. At least it would have
enabled them to get away in a better condition than was possible along
the Via Balbia. But an even more important reason was the fact that the
British armoured brigades would not have had to let themselves be
pulverised in the tactically hopeless position at Acroma, but would have
remained in the fight. As it was, the destruction of the British armour
its remnants were now streaming back into Egypt cost Ritchie his last
chance of taking any further effective part in events in the Marmarica.

After the fall of Got el Ualeb and Bir Hacheim, the British command
ought to have realised that there was nothing more to be gained by
holding on to the northern part of the Gazala line. There had been no
point in sacrificing the ist French Brigade unless the time thus gained
had been used to move the two British divisions in the Gazala line into
the Acroma-Gazala area for mobile defence against the expected advance
of my motorised forces. With their 300 guns and 200 to 300 light armoured
vehicles and Bren-carriers they would have tilted the scales heavily in
the British favour. My Italian divisions, with their antediluvian weapons
and worse still, without vehicles, could never have been sent forward into
the open desert, unless with considerable German motorised support.
There would have been no danger from that side.

224 THE WAR IN AFRICA SECOND YEAR

In the early hours of the 15th of June, units of the I5th Panzer
Division thrust across the Via Balbia to the sea. Contrary to my express
instructions, however, the detachment they left to bar the Via Balbia
was only seven tanks strong. The British and South Africans of course
had no difficulty in shooting up these few vehicles and breaking through
the barrier; thus several more units escaped to the east, most of them
in wild flight. Shortly afterwards the breach was finally closed. Mean
while, the pursuit had been joined by the Italian divisions and the
German brigade from the Gazala line.

75 June 1942
DEAREST Lu,

The battle has been won and the enemy is breaking up. We re
now mopping up encircled remnants of their army. I needn t tell
you how delighted I am. We ve made a pretty clean sweep this time.
Of course it s cost us some sad losses here and there. Cause and
Westphal have been wounded. Cause will be back in three to four
weeks, Westphal in a month or two. My health has stuck it all right.
I ve been living in my car for days and have had no time to leave
the battlefield in the evenings. Perhaps we will now see each other
in July after all,

I had already withdrawn the 2ist Panzer Division from the Acroma
district during the morning, and dispatched it eastwards through El
Adem with the goth Light Division and a reconnaissance group. The
attack on the El Adem box, with its strong points Batruna and El Hatian,
rolled past me in area formation, and a violent exchange of fire soon blazed
up between our tanks and the Indians defending the box. That evening
Batruna was stormed with the capture of 800 prisoners and numerous
guns and other war material. Despite heavy British bomber attacks the
division reached Sidi Rezegh before night, where their advance came to
a temporary standstill under heavy British counter-fire. The goth Light
Division, in spite of many attempts, did not succeed that day in taking
El Hatian, the main position in the El Adem box.

Meanwhile, the remnants of the British Eighth Army had retired
to the Egyptian frontier area. Tobruk and El Hatian obviously had
the task of tying down our forces long enough to enable a defence
line to be constructed on the Egyptian frontier.

I was convinced that major organisational weaknesses must still exist
in the Tobruk defences, because part of the 2nd South African Division
had made a stand at Acroma. So the main thing now was to attack and
take Tobruk while confusion and depression were still rife among the
garrison and while our victory in the desert was still having its effect on
the British soldier s morale. Once again speed was vital.

GAZALA AND TOBRUK 225

THE SECOND BATTLE FOR TOBRUK

Tobruk was one of the strongest fortresses in North Africa. In 1941,
with magnificent troops in its garrison, it had presented us with immense
difficulties. Many attacks had collapsed in its defences and much of its
outer perimeter had literally been soaked in blood. Often the battle
had raged round a square yard at a time. We were no strangers to
Tobruk.

We intended this time to attack and storm the fortress according to
the plan which we had finally evolved in 1941 but which had been
forestalled by Cunningham s offensive. Under this plan a feint attack
was first to be launched in the south-west to conceal our true design and
pin down the garrison at that point. The formations assigned to make
the main assault were to arrive on the scene unexpectedly. To this end
they were to move on eastwards past Tobruk in order to give the im
pression that we intended to lay siege to the fortress as in 1941. Then
they were to switch back suddenly to the south-eastern front of the
fortress, deploy for the assault during the night and, after* a heavy dive-
bomber and artillery bombardment, launch their assault at dawn and
overrun the surprised enemy.

To every man of us, Tobruk was a symbol of British resistance and
we were now going to finish with it for good.

On the morning of the i6th June, I drove up to the Via Balbia and
then along it to. the west. Fighting at Gazala had finally ceased and
another six thousand British troops had found their way into our prison
camps. Evidence of the British defeat could be seen all along the road
and verges. Vast quantities of material lay on all sides, burnt-out vehicles
stood black and empty in the sand. Whole convoys of undamaged British
lorries had fallen into our hands, some of which had been pressed into
service immediately by the fighting troops, while others were now awaiting
collection by the salvage squads. Apparently the British had taken off
some of their units by sea. Soon we met our troops advancing eastwards
from the Gazala line. They received orders to push on as fast as they
could up to the western edge of Tobruk and were provided with lorry
columns to carry their men up to the front by shuttle service. Quick re
grouping for the investment of Tobruk was now the most urgent necessity.

One of the first lessons I had drawn from my experience of motorised
warfare was that speed of manoeuvre in operations and quick reaction
in command are decisive. Troops must be able to carry out operations
at top speed and in complete co-ordination. To be satisfied with norms
is fatal. One must constantly demand and strive for maximum per
formance, for the side which makes the greater effort is the faster and
the faster wins the battle. Officers and N.C.O.s must continually train
their troops along these lines.

226 THE WAR IN AFRICA SECOND YEAR

In my view the duties of a commander are not limited to his work
with his staff. He must also concern himself with details of command
and should pay frequent visits to the fighting line, for the following
reasons:

(a) Accurate execution of the plans of the commander and his staff
is of the highest importance. It is a mistake to assume that every
unit officer will make all that there is to be made out of his
situation; most of them soon succumb to a certain inert ja. Then
it is simply reported that for some reason or another this or that
cannot be done reasons are always easy enough to think up.
People of this kind must be made to feel the authority of the
commander and be shaken out of their apathy. The commander
must be the prime mover of the battle and the troops must always
have to reckon with his appearance in personal control.

(b) The commander must be at constant pains to keep his troops
abreast of all the latest tactical experience and developments,
and must insist on their practical application. He must see to it
that his subordinates are trained in accordance with the latest
requirements. The best form of " welfare " for the troops is first-
class training, for this saves unnecessary casualties.

(c) It is also greatly in the commander s own interest to have a personal
picture of the front and a clear idea of the problems his sub
ordinates are having to face. It is the only way in which he can
keep his ideas permanently up to date and adapted to changing
conditions. If he fights his battles as a game of chess, he will
become rigidly fixed in academic theory and admiration of his
own ideas. Success comes most readily to the commander whose
ideas have not been canalised into any one fixed channel, but
can develop freely from the conditions around him.

(d) The commander must have contact with his men. He must be
capable of feeling and thinking with them. The soldier must
have confidence in him. There is one cardinal principle which
must always be remembered: one must never make a show of
false emotions to one s men. The ordinary soldier has a sur
prisingly good nose for what is true and what false.

The Indians were still holding on in El Hatian. On the i6th June,
the goth Light Division, despite all the courage they displayed, were
again unable to extend the wedges in the defence system which assault
teams had made the evening before. As with all other British defence
systems in the Marmarica, this position had been constructed with great
technical skill and according to the most up-to-date ideas. Following
the example of Bir Hacheim, a part of the garrison (consisting of 291*1
Indian Brigade) broke out during the night and withdrew to the south.

The Mammoth is used to haul a captured British gun
Digging a way through the sand hills for Rammers caravan

I * " ^

Rommel working in his caravan

Left to right: Field Marshal Kesselring, General Froehlich, General
Cause, Field Marshal Rommel, General Cruewell

GAZALA AND TOBRUK 227

The Indians simply concentrated their weight on one sector, opened fire
with every weapon and then broke out, thus showing once again the
difficulty of effectively enveloping a fully-motorised enemy whose
structure of command has remained intact.

The remainder of the Indians in El Hatian surrendered on the evening
of 1 7th July. Some 500 prisoners and considerable quantities of war
material fell into our hands.

The powerful forts of El Duda and Belhammed had already been
captured the day previously by the Afrika Korps. The moment that El
Hatian fell I sent the goth Light Division against several other British
strong points which were still holding out in that area. They were sur
rounded and stormed.

The whole of the Afrika Korps with the Ariete were now put on the
march to Gambut and the area to its south. We wanted, as I have
already said, to divert British attention from Tobruk and at the same
time gain the necessary freedom of movement in our rear for the Tobruk
attack. Primarily, however, this advance was directed against the R.A.F.
who, with their short time of flighjt from neighbouring bases, were being
unpleasantly attentive. We intended to clear them off their airfield near
Gambut and keep them out of the way during our assault on Tobruk*

So now my army was moving east again. The Ariete, who had
instructions to maintain touch with the Afrika Korps, fell behind from
the start and lost contact. I went off to look for them but very soon ran
into a tank battle. Shells whistled backwards and forwards and we were
not sorry to escape from that unfriendly neighbourhood. Soon afterwards
we succeeded in making contact with the Ariete by radio and moved
them up to the main body.

At about 19.30 hours that evening [the ijth\ I switched the sist
Panzer Division to the north and rode with my Kampfstaffel about two
miles in front of the van of the division. A slight fracas blew up south of
Gambut and a few Foreign Legionaries were taken prisoner. Finally,
after some trouble with extensive British minefields, we arrived at
Gambut with the leading troops at around 22.00 hours. The main body
remained lying before the minefields all night.

At dawn on the i8th June, British aircraft again appeared over the
2 ist Panzer Division, which was moving on northwards. The road and
railway were reached shortly before 04.30. This railway, which the British
had built during the past few months, ran from Mersa Matruh to the
outer perimeter of Tobruk. We crossed it, demolishing some of the
track on the way. The 4th Rifle Regiment had already taken 500
prisoners on the road during the night and this figure was now steadily
increasing. On the airfields, which the British had not evacuated until
the last moment, we captured 15 serviceable aircraft and considerable
quantities of oil and petrol, which we found very useful.

On arriving back that night at Army H.Q., we found life being made

228 THE WAR IN AFRICA SECOND YEAR

unpleasantly hazardous by the activities of a British 25-pounder battery,
which began to shell our position. I sent Captain Kiehl with the
Kampfstafel to drive it off, which he did, but the British promptly selected
another site and began to honour us with their attentions again. I soon
became bored with this and shifted my H.Q. back to El Hatian, where
the staff of British XXX Corps had formerly been housed.

Mopping up of the area between Tobruk and Gambut was completed
on 1 8th June and the necessary moves carried out to close in Tobruk.
An excellent piece of organisational work was now done in building up
supplies for the assault. During our advance we had found some of the
artillery depots and ammunition dumps, which we had been forced to
abandon during the Cunningham offensive in 1941. They were still
where we had left them, and were now put to good use.

The Afrika Korps moved into its new position on the afternoon of
igth June, while the goth Light Division thrust east to take possession
of British supply dumps between Bardia and Tobruk. The movement of
this division was particularly important to increase still further British
uncertainty about our true intentions. In addition the Pavia Division and
Littorio Armoured Division, units of which were just arriving, were to
screen the attack on Tobruk to the west and south.

We had the impression that evening that our movements had only
been partially and inaccurately observed by the enemy, and there was
therefore every chance that our attack would achieve complete surprise.
Outside the fortress of Tobruk, there was no British armour of any con
sequence left in the Western Desert and we could therefore look forward
with great hopes to the forthcoming enterprise.

In spite of the hard time we had been through, the army was on its
toes and confident of victory. On the eve of the battle every man was
keyed up and tense for attack.

THE CONQUEST OF TOBRUK

The Tobruk garrison was of approximately the same strength as it
had been in 1941, and consisted of the following troops of the British
Empire:

2nd South African Infantry Division, reinforced.

nth Indian Brigade.

2nd Battalion, Guards Brigade.

Several infantry tank regiments, under command 32nd Army Tank

Brigade.
Artillery strengthening to the extent of several artillery regiments.

This is not quite correct. The 2nd South African Division had only two

GAZALA AND TOBRUK

infantry brigades instead of three. On the other hand, the soist Guards Brigade
had two battalions and part of a third under its command. The ytnd Anny Tank
Brigade had two battalions of infantry tanks. There was no additional artillerjp
apart from the 4th Anti-Aircraft Brigade.

Although this force corresponded in numbers to the 1941 garrison,
it could not be expected to put up such a stubborn and well-organised
resistance, for the bulk of the troops had already given us battle and were
tired and dispirited. The British command, moreover, which never was
very quick at reorganising, had been given no time to build up its
defensive machine.

Besides this force in Tobruk, Ritchie still had available five infantry
divisions of which three had been very badly mauled; the other two
had been freshly brought up. His two armoured divisions had been
virtually wiped out in the recent fighting, but were now receiving
reinforcements and replacements from the Nile Delta.

One more word about the Tobruk defences.

Tobruk, hemmed in on its eastern and western sides by rocky and
trackless country, extends out to the south into a flat and sandy plain.
It had been extremely well fortified by the Italians under Balbo, and full
account had been taken of the most modern weapons for the reduction
of fortifications. The numerous defence positions running in a belt round
the fortress were sunk in the ground in such a manner that they could
only be located from the air. Each defence position consisted of an under
ground tunnel system leading into machine and anti-tank gun nests.
These nests, of which most of the defence positions had a considerable
number, waited until the moment of greatest danger before throwing off
their camouflage and pouring a murderous fire into the attacking troops.
Artillery could not take them under direct fire because of the lack of
apertures on which to take aim. Each separate position was surrounded
by an anti-tank ditch and deep wire entanglements. In addition the
whole fortified zone was surrounded at all points passable to tanks by
a deep anti-tank ditch.

Behind the outer belt of fortifications, most of which was several
lines in depth, were powerful artillery concentrations, field positions
and several forts. The majority of the defence works were protected by
deep minefields.

The feint attack in the south-west was to be executed by XXI Italian
Corps, who were provided with several tanks in support. The group
making the main attack consisted of the Afrika Korps and XX Italian
Corps. Before the attack was opened the main attack sector, south-east
of the fortress, was to be bombed by the entire German-Italian Air Force
in Africa. Once the infantry had succeeded in reducing the fortified
lines, the Afrika Korps was to press on over the crossroads to the harbour
and open up the Via Balbia to the west. Following up the Afrika Korps,

23O THE WAR IN AFRICA SECOND YEAR

XX Italian Corps was to capture the British defence works and thrust
through to the Ras el Madauer in the rear of the South Africans.

20 June 1942
DEAREST Lu,

Only two hours sleep last night. This is the really decisive day.
Hope my luck holds. Pm very tired, though quite well otherwise.

My assault force moved into its assembly areas on the night of the
igth June. At 05.20 hours several hundred aircraft hammered their
bombs on die break-in point south-east of the fortress. I watched the
effect of this attack. Great fountains of dust plumed up out of die Indian
positions, whirling entanglements and weapons high into the air. Bomb
after bomb tore through the enemy wire.

As soon as the aircraft had finished, the infantry of the Afrika Koips
(i5th Rifle Brigade) and XX Italian Corps moved forward to the assault.
Lanes had been cleared through the mines the night before. Two hours
later the German storming parties had succeeded in driving a wedge
into the British defences. One position after another was attacked by my
" Africans " and captured in fiercest hand-to-hand combat.

The engineers had the anti-tank ditch bridged by 08.00 hours. The
exploits of the engineers that day merited particular praise. It is difficult
to conceive what it meant to do work of this kind under heavy British
fire. Now the way was open and we unleashed the armour.

At about 08.00, I drove with my Gefechtsstqffel through the Ariete s
sector and into the 15th Panzer Division s. Riding in an armoured troop-
carrier, I went through as far as the lanes through the minefields, which
lay under heavy British artillery fire. Considerable traffic jams were
piling up as a result of this fire and I sent Lieut. Berndt up immediately
to organise a smooth flow of traffic. Half an hour later, I crossed the
anti-tank ditch with Bayerlein and examined two of the captured positions.
Meanwhile, the Afrika Korps was becoming the target of British tank
attacks from outside the fortress and a violent tank battle flared up, in
which the artillery on both sides joined. Towards n.oo hours, I
ordered the Ariete and Trieste, who, after overcoming the anti-tank
ditch, had come to a halt in the British defended zone, to follow up
through the Afrika Korps s penetration. The German attack moved
steadily on and the Afrika Korps, after a brief action in which 50 British
tanks were shot up, reached the crossroad Sidi Mahmud at about midday.
We held the key to Tobruk.

I now accompanied the Afrika Korps s advance onward from the
crossroad. A furious fire beat into the attacking troops from the Fort
Pilastrino area and several nests on the Jebel descent. Several British
ships weighed anchor and made as if to leave harbour, apparently
attempting to get their men away by sea. I at once directed the A.A.

GAZALA AND TOBRUK

and artillery on to this target and six ships were sunk. Most of the men
aboard them were picked up.

The advance continued and we soon reached the descent into the
town, where we came up against a British strong-point which fought back
with extraordinary stubbornness. I sent Lieut, von Schlippenbach with
a summons to the garrison of 50 men to surrender. Their only answer
was a withering fire on our vehicles. Eventually, our outrider, Corporal
Huber, covered by six anti-aircraft men, succeeded in approaching the
strong-point and putting die garrison out of action with hand grenades.

Pilastrino offered to capitulate in the evening and a Stuka attack on
the fort was called off. Fort Solaro was stormed by my men and another
gunboat sunk in the harbour. By nightfall two-thirds of the fortress was
in our hands; the town and harbour had already been captured by the
Afrika Korps in the afternoon.

At 05.00 hours on the sist of June, I drove into the town of Tobruk.
Practically every building of the dismal place was either flat or little
more than a heap of rubble, mostly the result of our siege in 1941. Next
I drove off along the Via Baibia to the west. The staff of the 32nd British
Army Tank Brigade offered to surrender, which brought us 30 serviceable
British tanks. 1 Vehicles stood in flames on either side of the Via Baibia.
Wherever one looked there was chaos and destruction.

At about 09.40 hours, on the Via Baibia about four miles west of the
town, I met General Klopper, G.O.C. 2nd South African Infantry Division
and Garrison Commandant of Tobruk. He announced the capitulation
of the fortress of Tobruk. He had been unable to stave off the defeat any
longer, although he had done all he could to maintain control over his
troops.

I told the General, who was accompanied by his Chief of Staff, to
follow me in his car along the Via Baibia to Tobruk. The road was lined
with about ten thousand prisoners of war.

On arrival at the Hotel Tobruk, I talked for a while with General
Klopper. It seemed that he had no longer been in possession of the
necessary communications to organise a break-out. It had all gone too
quickly. I instructed the South African general to make himself and his
officers responsible for order among the prisoners, and to organise their
maintenance from the captured stores.

21 June 1942
DEAREST Lu,

Tobruk! It was a wonderful battle. There s a lot going on in
the fortress area. I must get a few hours sleep now after all that s
happened. How much I think of you.

lf These must have been tanks under repair in the workshops, and were not surrendered
by the brigade staff proper. Only a few tanks remained in action with the brigade after
its desperate fight the previous day, and the brigade commander ordered these to be
destroyed that night prioi; to an attempt to escape on foot in small parties.

232 THE WAR IN AFRICA SECOND YEAR

The capture of Tobruk, which had taken place without interference
from outside, marked the conclusion of the fighting in the Marmarica.
For every one of my " Africans", that sist of June 3 was the high point
of the African war. I had the following Order of the Day issued by the
Panzer Army:

"Soldiers!

The great battle in the Marmarica has been crowned by your
quick conquest of Tobruk. We have taken in all over 45,000 prisoners
and destroyed or captured more than 1,000 armoured fighting
vehicles and nearly 400 guns. During the long hard struggle of the
last four weeks, you have, through your incomparable courage and
tenacity, dealt the enemy blow upon blow. Your spirit of attack has
cost him the core of his field army, which was standing poised for an
offensive. Above all, he has lost his powerful armour. My special
congratulations to officers and men for this superb achievement.

Soldiers of the Panzer Army Afrika!

Now for the complete destruction of the enemy. We will not
rest until we have shattered the last remnants of the British Eighth
Army. During the days to come, I shall call on you for one more
great effort to bring us to this final goal.

ROMMEL."

Next day Rommel heard by wireless from Hitler s headquarters that in reward
for his victory he had been made a Field- Marshal. He was forty-nine. He was
so busy in the days that followed that he quite forgot to change his shoulder badges
to those of his new rank two crossed batons. It was only after he had reached El
Alamein that he was reminded of this by Field-Marshal Kesselring, who gave
Rommel a pair of his own badges. Rommel received his actual baton when he saw
Hitler in Berlin in September. He remarked to his wife at the time: " / would
rather he had given me one. more division"

CHAPTER X

PURSUIT INTO EGYPT

IN WINNING our victory at Tobruk we, too, had expended the last of
our strength, for the weeks of very heavy fighting against an enemy
superior in both men and material had left their mark on my forces.
Now, however, with the vast booty that had fallen to us, including
ammunition, petrol, food, and war material of all kinds, a build-up for
a further offensive was possible.

Rome had assured me several times that supplies to Africa could
only be guaranteed in adequate quantities if the ports of Tobruk and
Mersa Matruh were in our hands. This strengthened my resolve to
exploit the weakness of the British after the battle of Tobruk by thrusting
forward as far as I could into Egypt.

But that was not the main reason for my decision. I was determined
at all costs to avoid giving the British any opportunity of creating another
new front and occupying it with fresh formations from the Near East.
The Eighth Army was now extremely weak, with a core of only two fresh
infantry divisions; its armoured formations, which had been rushed up
in great haste from the Egyptian hinterland, could not possibly have any
striking power worth mentioning. All in all, the proportion of our
strength to the British, in comparison with what it had been, was highly
encouraging. Our intention was to overtake the Eighth Army s formations
by a lightning thrust forward and bring them to battle before they had
been able to join up with other formations from the Middle East. If we
could once succeed in destroying the tattered remnants of the Eighth
Army which had escaped from the Marmarica battles, plus its two fresh
divisions and this was by no means impossible then the British would
have nothing left in Egypt capable of opposing our advance to Alexandria
and the Suez Canal.

It was a plan with a chance of success a try on. The existence of
my army would in no way be jeopardised, for, with things as they were,
we would be quite capable of looking after ourselves whatever the
outcome. 1

1 It is interesting to observe that Rommel repeatedly defends himself against the
criticism that he made a practice of gambling. He was evidently sensitive to that
criticism. In general, his journal provides much evidence that his plans were carefully
thought out, and that their boldness was based on deep calculation.

233

034 THE WAR IN AFRICA SECOND YEAR

This move into Egypt has since been the subject of criticism in some
quarters. It has been said that the supply line from Benghazi to El
Alamein was too long for the supply columns to maintain for any length
of time, and that the British derived great advantage from their short
supply route from Port Said to the front.

Against this, there is the following to be said :

(a) British superiority would have had an even greater effect at
Sollum than at El Alamein. For at Sollum they would have
been able to outflank our line by wide sweeps into the desert and,
with their armoured brigades which, by the time of the Alamein
battle were superior to ours not only in numbers, which they
had been before, but above all in quality to smash our motorised
divisions. Moreover, the chances of withdrawing our non-mo torised
infantry from Sollum would have been even worse than from El
Alamein. These non-motorised formations, which made up the
bulk of my army at El Alamein, would have been completely
ineffective at Sollum, where the enemy would not have had to
break through their line, but could quite simply and without
effort, have gone round it. They would then have become either
easy prey for the British or mere ballast during the retreat.

(b] Nor would there have been any worthwhile improvement in our
supply position at Sollum, for with our front so far west, instead
of the ports of Tobruk and Mersa Matruh being within range of
the British bombers it would have been Tobruk and Benghazi.
Thus Benghazi would, for all practicable purposes, have been
closed to the larger ships, which would have meant a lengthening
of the overland supply line to Tripoli, a distance which our
available transport was completely inadequate to cover. The
British supply position, on the other hand, would have hardly
been affected, for they had the railway, ample vehicle space for
road transport, and well-organised coastal shipping all at their
disposal. 1

Wbfe by General Bqyerletn. Rommel s argument was on the whole correct. One must
add, however, that a build-up would have taken Montgomery far longer at Sollum
than at El Alamein. There is no doubt that this would have meant a postponement, not
only of the Eighth Army s offensive, but also of Anglo-American operations in North-west
Africa, for it can hardly be supposed that the Allies would have landed in North-west Africa
before Montgomery had first tied down Rommel s army by his attack. It is nevertheless
extremely doubtful whether, with supply conditions as bad as they were, the time gained
would have given the Panzer Army an advantage which would have made up for the
disadvantages (as described by Rommel) of the Sollum position compared with that
at El Alamein.

General Westphal, in his book The German Army in the West (Cassell), expresses the view
that it would have been better to call off the offensive at Sollum and move the German-
Italian air force engaged in Africa, to Catania for use in the capture of Malta. This can
hardly be upheld. Quite apart from the fact that Malta would probably even then not
have been attacked the OKW and the Commando Supremo had already had eighteen

PURSUIT INTO EGYPT 235

It is, of course, true that our supply columns were faced with serious
difficulties as a result of our advance into Egypt. But the same effort
should have been demanded from the supply staffs in Rome as from
every tankman or infantryman, tired out as they were with weeks of fighting.
Thus, supply by sea should have been improvised immediately to ports
in the forward zone on the scale which had always been promised for
this occasion. The top Italian authorities could have done this at any
time. When I gave orders for the advance into Egypt, I was assuming
that the fact of final victory in Egypt being now within reach would spur
even the Italian Commando Supremo into some sort of effort.

On the strength of all these and other similar arguments, I requested
the Duce, immediately after the capture of Tobruk, to lift the restrictions
on the Panzer Army s freedom of operation and allow us to advance into
Egypt* Permission was granted, whereupon orders went out immediately
to all formations concerned to prepare for the march.

Our approach march for the thrust across the Egyptian frontier went
without a hitch. In spite of the strain of the previous weeks, the troops
were in high spirits and the superb morale of the Panzer Army was once
again evident. My forces began to move east on the ssnd June* I myself
crossed the frontier on the 23rd, well behind the goth Light Division,
which had thrust a long way ahead. Heavy smoke clouds were rising far
over to the east; the British had evacuated the frontier area. The mass
of the Eighth Army, as we learnt from captured documents, had been
ordered to take up positions at Mej-sa Matruh. The supreme requirement
now, and for several days, was speed.

23 June
DEAREST Lu,

We re on the move and hope to land the next big punch very
soon. Speed is the main thing now. The events of the past weeks
lie behind me like a dream. Cause is back again. He still looks
thoroughly exhausted, but he just couldn t stick it any longer back
at the rear. I m very well, sleeping like a log.

On the 24th June I rode with the goth Light Division s column and
hour after hour urged them on to ever greater speed. Unfortunately, the
Afrika Korps ran badly short of petrol that day and was immobilised for
several hours. Luckily, we found a considerable quantity of British petrol

months in which to do it (see also footnote onpage 203 L.H.) the withdrawal of the German-
Italian air force, which had suffered heavy losses in the Marmarica battle, was impossible
unless one was prepared to vouchsafe the British complete command of the air im
mediately after the fall of Tobruk. Rommel has actually given dear enough reasons
for his plan in his account. There is, however, one further point which should perhaps be
mentioned, namely, that in the summer of 1942. the OKW supplied the 7th and loth
German Panzer Divisions with tropical equipment and prepared them for Africa. This
must have led Rommel to believe that he could count on his German armoured force
being doubled. The two divisions were later sent to Russia.

236 THE WAR IN AFRICA SECOND YEAR

at Habata railway station where we were able to salvage a large part of
the store, even though it was already burning. In spite of the difficulties,
our advance continued to make good progress and by next day we had
already reached a point 30 miles west of Mersa Matruh.

My formations were being repeatedly assailed by heavy R.A.F.
bomber attacks. Our own Luftwaffe was re-grouping at the time and
could not put up any fighters. The Afrika Korps, with its 50 remaining
tanks, was the most frequent target of the R.A.F. s attacks. An astonish
ingly high proportion of our transport now consisted of captured British
vehicles and it was, in fact, no longer possible at any distance to dis
tinguish us from the British. Thus, Kampfstqffel Kiehl, with its " British
Look ", managed to coax up numerous British stragglers and put them
in the bag to their intense disgust when they found out their mistake.

The Italians were also having their difficulties. On the 25th June
the Ariete and Trieste had a grand total of 14 tanks, 30 guns and 2,000
infantry between them! The Littorio was immobilised for hours on end
by lack of petrol and simply could not keep up. Heavy demands were
made on the supply services powers of improvisation. British air attacks
on our eastward-moving columns continued right into the night. Sortie
after sortie was flown by the 200 multi-engined and 360 single-engined
aircraft which Ritchie still had available in western Egypt.

On the morning of the 26th June, swarms of British aircraft continued
the attack and succeeded in destroying a supply column, which caused
the Afrika Korps a -serious petrol shortage for a time. In spite of these
difficulties, we managed that day to reach a point some 10 miles south
west of Mersa Matruh. The remnants of the British ist and yth Armoured
Divisions fell back from this area, leaving only reconnaissance units
behind. We did not expect any great British resistance here, but thought
they would merely try to delay us long enough to enable them to get
away the equipment of their numerous airfields and supply installations
in the area round Mersa Matruh and El Daba.

Our intention was to bring the British to battle at this point and
attempt to destroy a major part of their infantry. To this end we planned
to envelop the fortress of Mersa Matruh with its powerful garrison inside
and then take it by storm. To provide the necessary elbow room for this
attack the British armour was to be driven back by a quick thrust to the
east and thus prevented from taking any hand in operations round the
fortress.

26 June 1942
DEAREST Lu,

We ve made a good move forward in the last few days and are
hoping to launch our attack on the enemy remnants to-day. For
days now I ve been camping out in the car with Gause. Food has
been good all the time but washing has suffered. I ve had my head-

PURSUIT INTO EGYPT 237

quarters by the sea for the past twenty hours and bathed yesterday
and to-day. But the water doesn t refresh, it s much too hot. A lot
to do. Gavallero and Rintelen are coming to-day, probably to put
the brakes on, so far as they can. These beggars don t change!

On the same day, the 26th June, it became clear that Ritchie intended
to make a preliminary stand on the line Mersa Matruh Bir Khalda. 1
However, after the Afrika Korps had thrown the British reconnaissance
units back into their line, goth Light Division moved up, broke through
the northern part of the line and in a quick dash reached the coast road
in the evening and closed it to both directions.

Mersa Matruh was now successfully enclosed. This fortress was
fortified in similiar strength to that of Tobruk, but its defences had not

been constructed with anything like the same skill. Many mines

probably about 200,000 had been laid in its outer environs. Inside the
fortress lay the mass of the New Zeaknd and loth Indian Divisions,
together with units of the soth British and 5th Indian Divisions. Thus
the greater pan of the British infantry was locked up in this place.*

Meanwhile the Afrika Korps under General Nehring, and XX
Italian Corps, whose brave and efficient commander, General Baldassare,
had fallen to British fire the day before, collided with a concentration of
British armour in the area north of Khalda. American medium tanks,
most of them freshly brought up from Egypt, launched attack after attack
against our formations. The battle lasted until late evening, by which
time 1 8 American tanks lay shot up on the field. Lack of petrol and
ammunition unfortunately prevented us from exploiting this success.

27 June 1942
DEAREST Lu,

We re still on the move and hope to keep it up until the final
goal. It takes a lot out of one, of course, but it s the chance of a life
time. The enemy is fighting back desperately with his air force.

P.S. Italy in July might still be possible. Get passports!

Thus the British motorised forces had again been heavily defeated

a lt had been the intention, as Rommel deduced, to defend Mersa Matruh. Indeed, it
was planned as the final stand. But on the evening of the 2501 Auchinleck took over
direct control of the Eighth Army from Ritchie. He brought with him Major-General
E. E. Dorman-Smith, his Deputy Chief of the General Staff, to act as his principal staff
officer in the measures he now took to deal with the crisis. The first decision was that
the plan of standing at Mersa Matruh should be discarded and that the Eighth Army
should be kept mobile. This reversal of the previous decision was fortunate, as can be
seen from Rommel s account of his plans to cut off and wipe out the remains of the
Eighth Army.

2 This is not correct. The garrison had been thinned out, and the New Zealand
Division was posted so miles south of Mersa Matruh.

238 THE WAR IN AFRICA SECOND YEAR

and there was now no chance of their giving any appreciable assistance
to the troops locked up in Mersa Matruh. In these circumstances it
seemed very unlikely that the British command, after their experience in
Tobruk, would give us the opportunity of destroying what was left of
iheir infantry in western Egypt, for this would have finally opened our
road to Alexandria. So we had to expect that the fully motorised British
infantry would try to break out through the ring round Mersa Matruh,
which on the a 7th June was by no means firmly closed, in order to gain
the open desert and make off for the east. Many of their vehicles did
actually try to get away through the open southern sector soon after the
fortress was shut in.

To hamper the break-out of further enemy forces, I ordered units of
the Brescia and Pavia, which had meanwhile been brought up in supply
lorries, to move as fast as they could round to the south of Mersa Matruh.
However, with their poor equipment and transport, this move went
terribly slowly. Other Italian formations had already occupied the area
round the west and south-west of the fortress. All units holding the line
were ordered to maintain the utmost vigilance during the night.

The New Zealand Division under General Freyberg, an old acquaint
ance of mine from previous campaigns, did in fact concentrate in the
night and break out in the south. A wild mlee ensued, in which my
own headquarters, which lay south of the fortress, became involved.
Kampfstoffel Kiehl and units of the Littorio joined in the fighting. The
firing between my forces and the New Zealanders grew to an extra
ordinary pitch of violence and my headquarters was soon ringed by
burning vehicles, making it the target for continuous enemy fire. I soon
had enough of this and ordered the headquarters and the staff to withdraw
to the south-east. One can scarcely conceive the confusion which reigned
that night. It was pitch-dark and impossible to see one s hand before
one s eyes. The R.A.F. bombed their own troops, and, with tracer flying
in all directions, German units fired on each other.

In the early hours of the morning, several hundred more New Zealand
vehicles broke out through great gaps on the south-east side of our front.
It is in fact extremely difficult in desert warfare to improvise a long front
capable of withstanding the attack of a force which has retained its
cohesion and is able, thanks to motorisation, to focus its strength suddenly. 1

At 05.00 hours next morning, the s8th June, I drove up to the break
out area where we had spent such a disturbed night. There we found

Pommel has not got the picture clear probably owing to the confusion he describes,
His troops had driven through between the main position at Matruh and the outlying
position of the New Zealanders at Minqa Quaim, and portions of them had then enveloped
the New Zealanders* area on the ayth. But that night the 4th New Zealand Brigade,
deployed for assault with bayonets fixed, broke through on foot by moonlight. The
remainder of the division, loaded on transport, followed them through the gap or slipped
out by a southerly circuit. Freyberg himself had been severely wounded during the day
and the break-out was directed by Brigadier Inglis.

PURSUIT INTO EGYPT 239

a number of lorries full of the mangled corpses of New Zealanders who
had been killed by British bombs* Although the main body of the British
had now moved off towards Fuka, Mersa Matruh was still being defended
by units of the loth Indian, New Zealand and soth British Divisions.
reinforced with additional artillery and a newly arrived regiment of
4th British Armoured Brigade. British units now dispersed and less
well organised were still making constant attempts to slip out of the
ring.

The troops at Matruh might have got away before the road was bamd, but
part of their troop-carrying transport had been taken away in order to make the
New Zealand Division fully mobile for its flank-covering role. Nevertheless, most
of them managed to break out or slip out the following night, though they had to
abandon much of their ammunition and equipment. The fact that part of them were
unable to get away underlines RommeFs point about the value of completely motorised
formations, although he is mistaken in describing the British as such.

At about 17.00 hours, the goth Light Division, sSoth Reconnaissance
Regiment, Kampfstaffel Kiehl and those units of XX and XXI Italian
Corps that had arrived moved to the assault. In spite of stubborn
British resistance the goth Light Division s attack went forward welL
The bitter struggle lasted all night, with groups of British vehicles, large
and small, trying the whole time to break away. Most of them were shot
up. In some places the British set fire to their vehicles with the bodies of
their comrades inside and tried to get away on foot. We had little
difficulty in the moonlit night in rounding most of them up. Enormous
fires raged in the fortress zone of Mersa Matruh,

*9 June
DEAREST Lu,

Now the battle of Mersa Matruh has also been won and our leading
units are only 125 miles from Alexandria, There ll be a few more
battles to fight before we reach our goal, but I think the worst is well
behind us. I m fine.

Some actions make demands on one s strength to the point of
bodily exhaustion, but there are quieter periods when one gets a
chance to recover. We re already 300 miles east of Tobruk. British
rail and road system in first-class order!

At last, early next morning, the agth June, the goth Light Division
from the east, and Kampfstaffel Kiehl and sSoth Reconnaissance Regiment
from the south forced their way into the fortress. Firing gradually died
away and finally ceased. The booty was enormous. Besides the large
supply dumps, war material of all kinds, approximating in all to the
equipment of a whole division, fell into our hands. Forty enemy tanks
were destroyed And 6,000 British troops marched into our prison camps.

24O THE WAR IN AFRICA SECOND YEAR

Our men had once again fought with extraordinary courage. Un
fortunately, the New Zealanders under Freyberg had escaped. This
division, with which we had already become acquainted back in 1941-42,
was among the &ite of the British Army, and I should have been very
much happier if it had been safely tucked away in our prison camps
instead of still facing us.

The last fortress port in the Western Egyptian desert was now ours,
and the British had once again suffered heavy losses. Nevertheless, they
had been able to get the great bulk of their infantry back to the El
Alamein position, where work on the development of the defences had
been going ahead at top speed for some time past. The position was
already occupied by a number of fresh units. Immediately after the fall
of Mersa Matruh, therefore, I set my troops on the march again. We
planned to get through to the Alamein line and overrun it while it was
still incomplete and before the retreating remnants of the Eighth Army
had had time to organise its defence. This line was the last bastion on
which the British could oppose our advance. Once through it, our road
was clear.

So the forces at Mersa Matruh moved off east again as soon as the
fortress had fallen. The Italian infantry was also put on the march
with its leading elements directed on Fuka. Then our vehicles, too,
resumed their eastward drive. As we were passing the airfield Bir Teifel
Fukasch, machine-gun bullets suddenly spurted into the dust around us.
I immediately drove to Colonel Marcks, the fine commander of the
goth Light Division, and instructed him to take a column round in an
arc to the south. However, it soon transpired that it was the Littorio who
had fired on us, thinking that we were British troops on the run. Friend
and foe were no longer distinguishable, for both sides were using mainly
British vehicles.

Towards midday we learned from radio interception that the British
were leaving Haneish. I immediately gave orders for the retreating
Tommies to be picked up, and a considerable number of prisoners was
brought in as a result. Several miles south-east of Fuka the goth Light
Division suddenly came under British artillery fire from the south-east,
which was apparently being directed by scout cars. The vehicles were
driven off by a few guns which we quickly brought into position, after
which the artillery fire slowly died away. The march went on. A few
miles farther on we stumbled across several belts of mines which had
been laid between minefields on either side of the road. The crash of
bursting mines came from beneath the wheels of our leading vehicles.
After I and a few others had cleared away the mines the column moved
off again. At nightfall we halted about six miles west of El Daba. Gigantic
explosions could be heard from the east an unwelcome sound, for it
meant that the British were blowing up their dumps, which we could
have put to good use.

PURSUIT INTO EGYPT 24!

There are always moments when the commander s place is not back
with his staff but up with the troops. It is sheer nonsense to say that
maintenance of the men s morale is the job of the battalion commander
alone. The higher the rank, the greater the effect of the example. The
men tend to feel no kind of contact with a commander who, they know,
is sitting somewhere in headquarters. What they want is what might be
termed a physical contact with him. In moments of panic, fatigue or
disorganisation, or when something out of the ordinary has to be demanded
from them, the persona! example of the commander works wonders,
especially if he has had the wit to create some sort of legend round
himself.

The physical demands on the troops during this period approached
the limits of endurance. This placed a particular duty on the officers to
provide a continual example and model for their men. 1

30 June
DEAREST Lu,

Mersa Matruh fell yesterday, after which the Army moved on
until late in the night. We re already 60 miles to the east. Less than
100 miles to Alexandria!

On the morning of the 3Oth June I found that advance elements of
the 1 5th Panzer Division had already reached a point far beyond El
Daba. Great booty had fallen to the Afrika Korps, including a British
i5O-mm, battery, which they had immediately put back into action again.
Unfortunately, the Italians were in trouble again, and it was almost
midnight before they arrived in the area west of El Alamein.

While on a tour of reconnaissance, I came across a couple of lorries
and a Russian gun 2 at the southern end of Telegraph Track; 3 one of
the lorries was still fully loaded and there were loaded tommy-guns and
rifles lying close by. It seemed that the British had surprised the gun
team in their sleep and taken them prisoner. In El Daba, we found a
large ration store by the roadside and set up headquarters in one of its
huts. Fighter-bomber attacks, however, soon decided me to move farther
east. But there again we soon heard the guns of British low-flyers, which

by General Bayerltm. The value that Rommel placed on the personal example
of ine officer is shown by an address which he gave as Director of the Military School
in Wiener Neustadt at the passing out parade of a 1938 class of cadets:

** Be an example to your men, both in your duty and in private life. Never spare
yourself, and let the troops see that you don t, in your endurance of fatigue and
privation. Always be tactful and well mannered and teach your subordinates to
be the same. Avoid excessive sharpness or harshness of voice, which usually indicates
the man who has shortcomings of his own to hide."

*A large number of Russian 76 mm, guns, captured on the Eastern Front, had been
sent to Africa and were used by Rommel both as field guns and as anti-tank guns.

8 A desert track, lined by telegraph wires and poles, which ran south behind the
front from Sidi Abd el Rahman to the Qattara Depression.

242 THE WAR IN AFRICA SECOND YEAR

had apparently already settled in on their new airfields. So we moved
on a second time. Unfortunately, several of our vehicles had been burnt
out.

During the afternoon I talked over the forthcoming attack on the
El Alamein line with several of my generals and chiefs-of-staff. We
decided that the attack should go in at 03.00 hours next morning. Mean
while my " Africans " were moving into their assembly areas. On the
same afternoon I drove on to the east through a violent sandstorm and
met Colonel Bayerlein, who, on his way to the Army H.Q., had driven
right through the columns of the British yth Armoured Division, which
we had broken through.

I again discussed the next day s attack. In the evening it became
clear that we would not be able to keep to the time-table we had planned,
as the formations taking part in the attack had been badly held up, partly
by the retreating British and partly by the unforeseen difficulty of the
country.

CHAPTER XI

THE INITIATIVE PASSES

CHECK AT ALAMEIN

MY PANZER ARMY had now been five weeks in battle against superior
British forces. For four of those weeks the fighting had raged backwards
and forwards in the foreground of Tobruk* We had succeeded, partly
by attacks with limited objectives, partly in defence, in wearing down
the British forces. After the fall of Knightsbridge and Gazala we had
stormed Tobruk. The British had retired first to Mersa Matruh and then
to El Alamein.

This series of engagements had brought the strength of my Army to
the point of exhaustion. With our reserves of material including the
immediately usable booty beginning to run out, it was only the men s
amazing spirit and will to victory that kept them going at all. Not only
had no replacement material arrived, but, with an almost unbelievable
lack of appreciation of the situation, the supply authorities had actually
sent only three thousand tons to Africa during June, as compared with
our real requirement of sixty thousand tons, a figure which was never
in fact attained. Captured stores had certainly helped to tide us over the
expected crisis in our supply situation after the fall of Tobruk, but it was
urgently necessary that this should have been followed up by adequate
supplies from our own sources.

. In Rome one excuse after the other was found for the failure of the
supply organisation which was supposed to maintain my army. It was
easy enough back there to say: " It can t be done ", for life and death
did not depend on finding a solution. If everybody had pulled together
in a resolute search for ways and means, and the staff work had been
done in the same spirit, the technical difficulties could without any
doubt have been overcome.

The following are the detailed reasons why our supply failed:

(a) Many of the authorities responsible for supply did not put their
best effort into it, simply because they themselves were not

243

244 THE WAR IN AFRICA SECOND YEAR

directly threatened by the urgency of the situation. Peace rdgned
in Rome and there was no immediate danger of disaster there,
even if the problems were not solved. There were many, too,
who did not realise that the African war was approaching its
climax. Some did realise it, but for some inexplicable reason did
not intensify their efforts. I knew the type well. Whenever
difficulties arose they declared that our maintenance was a com
pletely insoluble problem and proved it with rows of statistics.
These people lacked any kind of practical ingenuity and initiative.
They should have been packed off home before it was too late,
and replaced by others who could do it.

(b) The protection of our convoys at sea was the responsibility of the
Italian Navy. A great part of its officers, like many other Italians,
were not supporters of Mussolini and would rather have seen our
defeat than our victory. Hence they sabotaged wherever they
could. The correct political conclusions, however, were not drawn
from this.

(c) Most of the higher Fascist authorities were too corrupt or too
pompous to do any good. Frequently, too, they wanted as little
as possible to do with the whole African war.

(d) Those who did give of their best to get supplies to us were unable
to make any headway in the maze of over-organisation which
existed in Rome.

When it is remembered that in modern warfare supplies decide
the battle, it is easy to see how the clouds of disaster were gathering
for my army.

The British, on the other hand, were sparing no effort to master
the situation. They organised the move of fresh troops into the
Alamein line with admirable speed. Their leading men had clearly
realised that the next battle in Africa would determine the situation
for a long time to come, and were looking at things very cool-headedly.
The peril of the hour moved the British to tremendous exertions, just
as always in a moment of extreme danger things can be done which
had previously been thought impossible. Mortal danger is an effective
antidote for fixed ideas.

Later on even our supply authorities in Rome suddenly found it
possible to ship supplies across to Tunis in quantities which we had
never before seen in Africa, and that at a time when the greater part
of the shipping which we had had in the summer of 1942 had been
sunk, and when the British had a very different grip on the Mediter
ranean from that which they had wielded during our advance to El
Alamein. But it was then too late, tor the enemy s shipments of
supplies, always far higher than ours, had meanwhile been multiplied
several times over.

THE INITIATIVE PASSES 245

Up to this time my staff and I had been just about able to manage,
largely by drawing on the abundance of material we had captured.
Up to 85 per cent of our transport still consisted of captured enemy
vehicles, and continued to do so, even after this time* My troops
had at all times given of their best. But it had repeatedly been the
superiority of certain German weapons over the British equivalents
that had been our salvation. Now there were already signs, in the
new British tanks and anti-tank guns, of a coming qualitative
superiority of British material. If this were achieved, it would clearly
mean the end for us.

For that reason alone, therefore, it was essential to do everything
possible to bring about a British collapse in the Near East before any
considerable shipments of arms could arrive from Britain or the
United States. And so there followed during July a series of violent
and bloody battles in front of El Alamein, the main feature of which
was continuous round-the-clock bombing by the R.A.F. We succeeded
in taking several fortified works of the Alamein line and advancing a
few miles beyond them to the east. But there our attack came to a
halt and our strength failed. We were met by greatly superior British
armoured formations thrusting against our front. Our chance of over
running the remainder of the Eighth Army and occupying Eastern
Egypt at one stroke was irretrievably gone.

On the ist July, as we had foreseen the previous evening, the Afrika
Korps was late in mounting its attack on the Alamein line. The attack
at first made good progress.

At 02.30 hours I drove to the front from my command post south
of El Daba to observe the course of operations. The coast road lay under
heavy shell-fire from British artillery. During the morning two British
bomber formations unloaded their gifts alongside the Gefechtsstaffel and
our vehicles. I first went to the Afrika Korps command post and brought
the army artillery into action against the British guns. I had already, at
one o clock that morning, asked the Luftwaffe to put everything it had
into the battle that day. Now the British artillery fire slowly died away.
Under relay bomber and low-flyer attack, we set up our command post
at Hill 31 on the " Alarm " track. [.4 desert track running close behind the
front length of the front and giving rapid access to all troops in the main fighting
zone. ] Batteries close by were receiving particular attention from the
British aircraft. At about 09.00 hours the 2ist Panzer Division ran up
against the strong-point Deir el Shein, which was stubbornly defended
by the 8th Indian Division, fresh from Iraq.

This was the i8th Indian Infantry Brigade Group not the complete division.

Once again extensive enemy minefields caused great difficulty. The
division s advance came to a halt and violent fighting flared up.

At about midday we observed the development of the battle to our

246 THE WAR IN AFRICA SECOND

south between the 2ist Panzer Division and the Indians, British artillery
fire fell round my Gefechtsstaffel. The Kampfstqffel, which was in position
north-west of us, was heavily shelled and several vehicles were burnt out.

The goth Light Division also reported that their attack had gone in
at 03.20 hours* It had made smooth progress at first but had then come
to a halt at about 07.30 hours before the fortress front of Alamein which
was very strongly built up,

Not until the division moved farther south did its attack begin to
flow forward again, at about midday. Slowly the division forced its way
into the area south-east of El Alamein. [There is very soft sand in this area.]
Here it formed a defensive front to the north and south and, at about
1 6.00 hours, renewed the attack with the object of breaking through to
the coast road and thus closing in the Alamein fortress and either
destroying its garrison or forcing it to break out. This was a deadly
threat for the British and they threw in every gun they could muster,
showering our attacking front with a hail of shells. Gradually the tempo
of the attack slowed until finally our troops were pinned down in terrific
British artillery fire. An S O S came in from the goth Light Division
calling for artillery, as the divisional artillery was no longer battleworthy.
I at once sent in Kampfstqffel Kiehl south of the division and drove up myself
in an armoured car to get a view of the situation and make my decisions.
However, heavy British artillery fire soon forced us to turn back.

At 16.00 hours a report came in from Nehring [Commander of the
Afrika Korps} saying that the Afrika Korps had stormed the greater part
of the Indian strong-point Deir el Shein. In the evening the battle at this
point was over. Two thousand Indians had been taken prisoner and
30 British guns destroyed or captured.

Late in the afternoon I decided to put everything I could into
supporting the southern flank of the goth Light Division s break-through
attempt. Accompanied by my Gefechtsstaffel, I joined up with Kampfstqffel
Kiehl. Furious artillery fire again struck into our ranks. British shells
came screaming in from three directions, north, east and south; anti
aircraft tracer streaked through our force. Under this tremendous weight
of fire, our attack came to a standstill. Hastily we scattered our vehicles
and took cover, as shell after shell crashed into the area we were holding.
For two hours Bayerlein and I had to lie out in the open. Suddenly,
to add to our troubles, a powerful British bomber force came flying up
towards us. Fortunately, it was turned back before it reached us by some
German fighters who had been escorting a dive-bomber raid. Despite
the heavy British anti-aircraft fire our dive-bombers returned to the
attack again and again and fires were soon blazing in the attack area.
When, towards evening, the British fire at last began to slacken, I ordered
my Gefechtsstaffel to get out as fast as they could and return to our old
headquarters. The Kampfstqffel was to maintain its hold on the area
we had reached.

248 THE WAR IN AFRICA SECOND YEAR

At 21.30 hours that evening, I ordered the goth Light Division to
continue its attack through to the coast road by moonlight. I wanted
to open the road to Alexandria at this point as quickly as possible. The
British defence in the threatened sector was strengthening hour by hour.
During the night the Luftwaffe commander reported to me that the
British Fleet had left Alexandria. This determined me to go all out for
a decision in the next few days. The British no longer seemed to trust
their luck and were preparing for a retreat. I was convinced that a break
through over a wide front by my forces would result in complete
panic.

However, the goth Light Division s night attack was also forced to a
halt t with heavy artillery and machine-gun fire raking the 1,300 men
which were still left to it. To its north the division faced well-built
concrete fortifications and to its east a strong system of British field
defences. It proved completely impossible to make more than a slight
advance against these defences, even though the attack was resumed
next day.

The field defences south of the Alamein fortress were far from strong at this
time, while disconnected and lacking in depth. Rommel? s disappointment at being
checked doubtless accounts for his impression of them.

Meanwhile, the Afrika Korps continued its attack on the 2nd July
with a thrust to the north-east. Their object was to break through to
the coast some eight miles east of El Alamein and then take the fortress
by storm. The British at first fell back to the south but shortly afterwards
launched a heavy attack on our open southern flank. The I5th Panzer
Division was pulled out to parry this attack and its armour was soon
involved in violent fighting with the British. The 2ist Panzer Division s
units were also forced increasingly on to the defensive in the sandy,
scrubby country, until by evening the whole of the Afrika Korps was
locked in violent defensive fighting against a hundred British tanks and
about ten batteries.

This, too, is an exaggerated impression -probably increased because two
squadrons of Grants were thrown in here. The German attack was not pushed hard,
and prisoners taken during these critical days were obviously very tired men.

More and more British tanks and guns were arriving at the front.
General Auchinleck, who had meanwhile taken over command himself
at El Alamein, was handling his forces with very considerable skill and
tactically better than Ritchie had done. He seemed to view the situation
with decided coolness, for he was not allowing himself to be rushed into
accepting a " second best " solution by any moves we made. This was
to be particularly evident in what followed.

After three days vainly assaulting the Alamein line, I decided that I
would call the offensive off for the moment after the next day s attack.
Reasons for my decision were the steadily mounting strength of the enemy,
the low fighting strength of my own divisions, which amounted by that

THE INITIATIVE PASSES 249

time to no more than 1,200 to 1,500 men, and above all the terribly
strained supply situation.

3 Jdj *94*
DEAREST Lu,

One loses all idea of time here. The struggle for the last position
before Alexandria is hard. I ve been up in the front area for a few
days, living in the car or a hole in the ground. The enemy air force
gave us a bad time. However, I hope to manage it. Heartfelt thanks
for your many dear letters.

A mountain of post is arriving. And Boettcher [RommePs $ecretcay\
is not here yet. He s probably with the caravan 450 miles away to
the west.

At about midday on the 3rd July, after hours of British artillery
bombardment round my H.Q., which was located close by the attack
spearhead, I sent the Afrika Korps forward once more against the British
line. After an initial success, the attack finally became pinned down in
concentric defensive fire. On the same day, signs of disintegration began
to show amongst the Italians. An attack by the New Zealanders against
the Ariete, which had been detailed to protect the Panzer Army s southern
flank, met with complete success. Twenty-eight out of thirty guns were
lost to the enemy; 400 men were taken prisoner and the remainder took
to their heels in panic.

This reverse took us completely by surprise, for in the weeks of
fighting round Knightsbridge, the Ariete covered, it is true, by German
guns and tanks had fought well against every onslaught of the British,
although their casualties had not been light. But now the Italians were
no longer equal to the very great demands being made of them.

The resulting threat to our southern flank meant that the Afrika
Korps intended knock-out attack now had to be carried on by the
2ist Panzer Division alone, and the weight of the attack was consequently
too small. The goth Light Division joined up with them later, but was
equally unable to force a decision. The attack came to a standstill.

In these circumstances a continuation of the attack next day would
have resulted in nothing more than a useless attrition of our strength.
However valuable a breathing space might be to the British command,
we had to give the troops a few days rest and try to carry out an extensive
refit. We intended to return to the attack as soon as possible.

As it was highly probable that the next few days would bring British
counter-attacks, the Panzer Army s formations were regrouped for
defence along the line we had reached.

4 J ul y *94*

DEAREST Lu,

Unfortunately, things are not going as I should like them.

Resistance is too great and our strength exhausted. However, I still

250 THE WAR IN AFRICA SECOND YEAR

hope to find a way to achieve our goal. Fm rather tired and fagged
out,

5 Juty ^942

We re going through some extremely critical days. But I m hoping
to see them through. Cause is in trouble again with concussion
(shell burst) and Bayerlein will probably have to replace him for a
while. Our build-up of strength is very slow. It s not easy to have
to hold on like this, only 60 miles from Alexandria. But it, too, will
pass.

It was now our intention to withdraw the motorised and armoured
units from the front one by one for reorganisation and refit, and to
replace them by the Italian infantry divisions, most of which unfortunately
were still in the rear areas. The 2ist Panzer Division was taken out of the
line on the 4th of July. The British, thinking apparently that this was the
start of a withdrawal, followed up and broke through our line over a
width of four thousand yards; 40 British tanks then thrust on to the west. 1
The situation was highly unpleasant for there was neither anti-tank nor
artillery ammunition available for the defence. Artillery Command
reported that all batteries had exhausted their ammunition. Luckily, one
effective battery was found with the Zech Group, and this succeeded in
bringing the British advance to a halt with its last few rounds. I im
mediately gave orders for the extensive use of decoys, including dummy
tanks and 88-mm. A.A. guns, to take away the British taste for further
attacks. Then we set about stocking up a few batteries with ammunition.
Fortunately, we found 1,500 rounds of artillery ammunition in the
captured British strong-point Deir el Shein, which at least enabled us
to keep a few batteries of 25-pounders (captured British guns) in action.
The Italians still had stocks, and so we were able to regard the crisis as
over for the moment.

Unfortunately, the refit of our formations made very slow progress,
due to the fact that for some unaccountable reason the few ships engaged
on the Africa run were still not arriving at Tobruk or Mersa Matruh but
at Benghazi or Tripoli, This meant that all supplies had to be carried
by transport columns or our few coastal vessels over a distance of either
750 or 1,400 miles. This, of course, was more than we could manage.

British activity during this period was confined to small-scale sector
attacks, which were all effectively beaten off. Gradually, the Italian
infantry arrived in the line and took over from our motorised forces. One
striking feature of this period was the astonishing amount of ammunition
which the British expended in their preliminary barrages. Thus, during
the night y-Sth July, British guns fired ten thousand rounds into a three-

1 Most of these " 40 tanks " were, in fact, armoured cars. Auchinleck s three armoured
car regiments had been grouped under the command of and Armoured Brigade, which
\vas rechristened a " light armoured brigade." The part that broke through penetrated
almost to Daba.

THE INITIATIVE PASSES 25!

mile sector of the i th Panzer Division. Then, in the pitch-dark night,
British infantry worked their way forward as far as our outpost line and
suddenly flung explosive charges into the defence posts. This attack had
been preceded by all-day tank thrusts against my exhausted troops, who
had lain all the time in their trenches and foxholes exposed to the full
blaze of the sun. By these tactics the British did actually succeed in taking
part of our line in this sector. When they tried to move on, however,
they were thrown back by a spirited counter-attack of the sector reserve.
On the 8th July we drew up the following statement of the total
strength of the Panzer Army:

GERMAN TROOPS: The Afrika Korps, with isth and 2ist Panzer
Divisions, having a total of 50 tanks. Each division included a
rifle regiment (strength about 300 men and 10 anti-tank guns)
and an artillery regiment of seven batteries.

goth Light Division, consisting of four infantry regiments, with
an overall strength of 1,500 men; also 30 anti-tank guns and two
batteries.

Three reconnaissance battalions with, in all, 15 armoured cars,
20 armoured troop-carriers and three captured batteries.

The Army artillery, consisting of eleven heavy and four light
batteries, and the Army A.A. Artillery with 26 88-mm. and 25 20-
mm. guns.

ITALIAN TROOPS: XX Motorised Corps, containing two armoured
and one motorised divisions, with a total of 54 tanks and eight
motor battalions (overall strength of the motor battalions 1,600
men). Also 40 anti-tank guns and six light batteries.

Elements of X and XXI Italian Corps consisting in all of eleven
infantry battalions each of about 200 men and thirty light and
eleven heavy batteries. Four more heavy batteries were held by
the Italian Army Artillery. 1

Thus it will be seen that my formations no longer merited the title
of divisions. On the Italian side, this low fighting strength was by no
means the result of battle; it had been more or less the same throughout
the campaign. Only in the motorised and armoured divisions had any
major losses been incurred.

Meanwhile, I had gained a detailed knowledge of the strength of the
Alamein line and discovered its weakest sector, where we intended to

Wofc by General Bayerlein. At full establishment the tank and anti-tank gun strength
of these formations would have been: Afrika Korps (i 5 th and sist Panzer Divisions) :
071 tanks, 1246 anti-tank guns, goth Light Division, 220 anti-tank guns. XX Italian
Motorised Corps (Ariete, Littorio and Trieste Divisions), 430 tanks &gt; J - anti-tank

guns.

252 THE WAR IN AFRICA SECOND YEAR

launch a heavy blow on the New Zealanders on the gth July, capture
their position and use it as a base for a break-through.

During the night of the 8th a fighting reconnaissance group of the
2 ist Panzer Division penetrated into Qaret el Abd, which was held
by the New Zealanders. Next morning the Panzer Army, with the
2 ist Panzer Division, Littorio Armoured Division and goth Light Division,
advanced against the southern sector of the British front, broke through
it and thrust onward up to the level of the previous point of penetration
in the centre of the front. The New Zealanders withdrew, their move
ment covered by units of the 5th Indian Division and elements of the
7th Armoured Division. 1 Meanwhile, the 2 ist Panzer Division had been
able to occupy the whole of Qaret el Abd after its evacuation by the New
Zealanders. Early in the afternoon, I met General von Bismarck, com
mander of the 2 ist Panzer Division, in Qaret el Abd and discussed our
further plans. It was our intention to strike on from this point far to the
east and thus bring about the fall of the Alamein line.

Qaret el Abd itself lay in extremely favourable terrain and was
fortified with well-built concrete strong-points, gun emplacements and
extensive ^minefields. The New Zealanders had left behind quantities of
ammunition and equipment, and we were at a loss to understand why
they had given the position up. I decided to bring my headquarters
forward during the night and set it up in Qaret el Abd, where I intended
to spend the night in one of the concrete fortifications. It was a quiet
night. Seeing that the 5th Indian and yth Armoured Divisions had been
thrown back by our striking force during the day, we planned to thrust
on next day with all our strength.

Next morning, the loth July, we were awakened at about 05.00 hours
by the dull thunder of artillery fire from the north. I at once had an
inkling that it boded no good. Presently came the alarming news that
the enemy had attacked from the Alamein position and overrun
the Sabratha Division, which had been holding a line on either side of
the coast road. The enemy was now in hot pursuit westwards after the
fleeing Italians and there was a serious danger that they would break
through and destroy our supplies. I at once drove north with the Kampf-
stqffel and a combat group of the isth Panzer Division and directed them
on to the battlefield. The attack from Qaret el Abd had to be cancelled,
since the portion of our original striking force now left in the south was
too weak to execute the thrust to the east.

Meanwhile, the battle on the coast had soon run its course. The
Sabratha Division had been nearly annihilated and many of the batteries
which had been alloted to it had been lost. It seemed that certain of the

1 Thc withdrawal was ordered to avoid the risks of holding on to an isolated position
There was no real penetration of the " Alamein line "-nor, in fact, any " line " in
die normal military sense of the term. It was also hoped that the withdrawal might
disconcert Rommel and put him off his stride.

THE INITIATIVE PASSES 253

battery commanders had not fired on the approaching enemy because
they had had no orders. The Italians had left their line, many of them in
panic, and, with no attempt at defending themselves, sought the open
desert, throwing away arms and ammunition as they ran. It was primarily
the Panzer Army s staff, led at the time by Lieut-Col, von Mellenthin,
whom we had to thank for bringing the British attack to a halt. Machine
and anti-aircraft guns had been hurriedly collected together and with
the help of part of the 328th Infantry Regiment of i64th Light Division,
which was just on its way up to the front, an improvised defence line had
been formed about three thousand yards south-west of Army H.Q.

At about midday the forces which had been drawn off from the
southern front moved forward against the flank of the British salient, but
their attack came to a standstill in terrific British artillery fire from El
Alamein. Next day, the nth July, the British continued their attack
south of the coast road, using powerful artillery and air support, and
several more Italian units, this time of the Trieste, were overpowered and
taken prisoner. Increasing numbers of troops had to be drawn off from
the southern front and thrown into the fighting south of the coast road.
Soon the whole of the Army artillery was brought into action, after
which the British attack slowly petered out.

This British drive along the coast had brought about the destruction
of the bulk of the Sabratha and a large part of the Trieste, and important
sectors of country had fallen into enemy hands. We were forced to the
conclusion that the Italians were no longer capable of holding their line.
Far too much had already been demanded of them by Italian standards
and now the strain had become too great. 1

There were splendid Italian officers who made tremendous efforts
to sustain their men s morale. Navarrini (XXI Italian Army Corps)
for example, for whom I had the highest regard, did everything he could.
I shall return to this question of the Italian forces in a later chapter.

There could be no question of launching any large-scale attack in the
immediate future. I was compelled to order every last German soldier
out of his tent or rest camp up to the front, for, in face of the virtual
default of a large proportion of our Italian fighting power, the situation
was beginning to take on crisis proportions.

THE FRONT BECOMES STATIC

Day by day now, reinforcements and fresh formations were flowing
to the Eighth Army, and the British troops were once again firmly

1 Auchinleck was aiming to produce a crack by striking at Rommel s soft spot his
Italian troops and their morale. Dorman-Smith, Auchinleck s chief assistant in this
crucial phase, was an ardent advocate of the indirect approach. Two years earlier he
had helped to devise the plan through which Graziani s army was taken in rear and
overthrown at Sidi Barrani.

254 THE WAR IN AFRICA SECOND YEAR

in the hands of their commander. With the abandonment of our
offensive plans which the conditions had forced on us, we finally had to
give up all idea of fighting it out with the British in the Alamein line
while their formations were all still suffering under the impact of the
Eighth Army s great losses during the summer battle. For the British
commander was now in a position to press on at full speed with the
replenishment and refitting of his beaten army. It had proved
impossible to follow up our success in the Marmarica to final victory.

The front had now grown static and the British Command was in
its element, for the modern form of infantry battle and static warfare was
its strongest point. Local attacks carried forward under the protection
of infantry tanks and artillery were the British speciality. The Alamein
line abutted on the sea in the north and in the south opened out into the
Qattara depression a flat plain of loose sand studded with numerous
salt marshes and hence completely impassable for motor vehicles. The
line could not be turned, and as a result the war took on a form
of which both sides possessed great experience and theoretical knowledge
and in which neither could produce any revolutionary technique which
would come as an innovation to the other. In static warfare, victory goes
to the side which can fire the more ammunition.

My endeavour at El Alamein had been to escape from this rigid,
static warfare in which the British were masters and for which their
infantry and tank crews had been trained and to gain the open desert
in front of Alexandria, where I could have exploited our definite tactical
superiority in open desert warfare; but I had not succeeded. The British
had brought my formations to a halt.

During the past few days the British Command had been showing
considerable enterprise and audacity. They had learnt that Italians
who were suffering from the apathy of sheer exhaustion were easy meat.
It was therefore probable that they would continue their attacks.

To repair the unpleasant situation which had resulted from the rout
of the Sabratha, and to eliminate the threat to our southern front caused
by the British positions west of El Alamein, I decided to launch the
sist Panzer Division against the El Alamein fortress. The attack (on
the 1 3th July) was to be supported by every gun and every aeroplane
we could muster. The division was first to cut the fortress area off from
the east in a lightning advance, and then to break into it.

12 July 1942
DEAREST Lu,

The very serious situation of the past few days is slowly being
overcome. But the air is still electric with crisis. I hope to make
another step forward to-morrow.

THE INITIATIVE PASSES 255

*3 Jdjr 1942

To-day is to be another decisive day in this hard struggle. Things
are already on the move all over the desert. This short but heartfelt
greeting to you and Manfred,

But the attack miscarried, not even reaching the line of the gth
Australian Division, which had taken over the fortress area from the
ist South African several days before. The reason for this failure apart
from the heavy enemy artillery fire and their extremely well-constructed
line, which included many dug-in tanks was probably that the 2ist
Panzer Division s infantry had not assembled for the attack in the Italian
line but in an area two or three thousand yards behind it. As a result
the British gunners had been able to lay their guns on the attacking
troops early in the operation and bring them to a halt by concentrated
fire before they had passed our own lines.

In the evening I decided to break off the action. I was in an extremely
bad humour, for a heavy sandstorm had been blowing all day, which
had robbed the British of all visibility. How well this could have served
us ! We had indeed missed a unique opportunity.

This remark is hard to understand, and would seem to spring from emotion
rather than reason* Failure was almost inevitable in view of the way the general
situation had changed to RommeFs disadvantage.

14 July 1942
DEAREST Lu,

My expectations for yesterday s attack were bitterly disappointed.
It achieved no success whatever. However, the blow must be borne
and we re going fonvard with fresh courage to new operations.
Physically I m very well. I m wearing shorts for the first time to-day
it s pretty hot. The battle in the East 1 is going splendidly, which
gives us courage to hang on here.

I again ordered the 2ist Panzer Division forward on the following
day, the i4th July. The objective this time was the position which the
Sabratha had given up west of El Alamein, which was now being strongly
fortified by the Australians. The attack went in after heavy air bombard
ment. But the infantry was too late again and failed to take full advantage
of the effects of the preliminary bombing. Heavy British air attacks
pounded our vehicle formations and the British artillery again came into
action with every gun. With the sun at their backs, our units fought their
way forward from south to north as far as the area between the road and
railway, where the attack came to a halt. Fierce fighting followed with
the Australians, whom we knew only too well from the time of the

iThc German offensive, launched at the end of June, with the aim of capturing
Stalingrad and the Caucasus oilfields.

256 THE WAR IN AFRICA SECOND YEAR

Tobruk siege, and lasted well into the night. We had originally intended
to continue this attack next day, but now a new and more serious set
back forced us to a different course.

That night, the 14-15111 July, the British mainly the ist Armoured
Division attacked on the Ruweisat Ridge, and gained a penetration
into the X Italian Corps s positions. Soon afterwards they succeeded in
breaking through the Brescia Division and penetrating as far as the
German tank and gun positions, where their leading troops were halted
in severe hand-to-hand fighting. Early next morning, they continued
their attack and succeeded in taking Ruweisat Ridge, from which point
their main force struck off in a westerly direction. Part of this force
turned east again into the rear of the Brescia and Pavia, with the result
that the bulk df these two formations fell prisoner that morning to the
British.

Nor was this all, for our own line south-east of Deir el Shein collapsed;
our anti-aircraft detachments were soon overrun, because of their
reluctance to fire into the swarms of Italians who had already been taken
prisoner. Still in the early morning the British broke into Deir el Shein
itself, and it was only with the utmost difficulty that the worst calamity
the loss of this strong-point could be prevented by the reconnaissance
regiments and a combat group of the Afrika Korps.

I immediately broke off 2ist Panzer Division s attack in the north and
brought them into the Afrika Korps s assembly area south-west of Deir
el Shein.

The Panzer Corps s counter-attack was launched in the afternoon
and gained ground slowly against a stubbornly resisting adversary. By
evening the penetration had been sealed off. 1,200 British prisoners were
taken in that day s fighting.

Next day, the 1 6th July, the British attacked again, but this time only
locally. After intensive artillery preparation, the Australians attacked
in the early hours of the morning with tank support and took several
strong-points held by the Sabratha [i.e. what remained of if]. Many of the
prisoners which they took in this action were sent back to our own lines.
The rest they carried off to the rear. Under the concentric fire of the
German-Italian artillery and the terrific effect of our mobile A.A., the
enemy soon relinquished the territory he had gained, leaving behind a
considerable number of dead and wounded.

After touring the front at 05.00 hours and becoming involved in a
violent British artillery barrage and an R.A.F. bombing attack, I con
ferred with the Corps Commanders at the Afrika Korps H.Q. that
morning on how to maintain command of the difficult situation. Our
deliberations were badly interrupted, for no less than nine bombing
raids took place between six in the morning and three in the afternoon in
the immediate vicinity of the conference.

The night of the i6th was quiet; yet when I arrived at the operations

THE INITIATIVE PASSES 257

vehicle at about six next morning, wireless messages were corning in one
after the other. The Australians had attacked from El Alamein again,
this time towards the south-west. They had soon penetrated our line in
the Trento s and Trieste s sectors and had taken a large number of Italians
prisoner. Now they were trying to roll up our front to the south.

DEAREST Lu,

Things are going downright badly for me at the moment, at any
rate, in the military sense. The enemy is using his superiority,
especially in infantry, to destroy the Italian formations one by one,
and the German formations are much too weak to stand alone. It s
enough to make one weep.

We had been planning an attack in the central sector to retake the
territory which had been lost during the British assault on the Italian Corps,
but this, of course, now had to be abandoned, for the German troops
we had assembled for it had to move north at top speed to seal off this
new penetration. Soon the Australian attack began to lose way in front
of a line quickly improvised by German units. My " Africans " counter
attacked in the afternoon and re-occupied our old position in the evening.
The enemy made similar attacks on the Trento elsewhere but suffered a
sharp rebuff under the fire of Italian artillery and heavy air attacks.

On that day every last German reserve had to be thrown in to beat
off the British attacks. Our forces were now so small in comparison with
the steadily growing strength of the British that we were going to have to
count ourselves lucky if we managed to go on holding our line at all.
Field-Marshal Kesselring and Count Cavallero arrived at my head
quarters at about 16.00 hours that afternoon. Cavallero, typically, set
about belittling our supply difficulties again, just as I had been stressing
how serious they were. A long wrangle followed, until Kesselring and I
finally asked for concrete decisions. This conversation made very clear
again just how near the bottom of the barrel we were, and how little we
could rely on the help of the Italian authorities. Cavallero promised that
barges would now be used to build up the army s supplies and that the
railway to the front would soon be put back into service. More Italian
formations were promised. After our experience in the past we were
sceptical rightly, as the future showed.

18 July 1942

DEAREST Lu,

Yesterday was a particularly hard and critical day. We pulled
through again. But it can t go on like it for long, otherwise the front
will crack. Militarily, this is the most difficult period I ve ever been
through. There s help in sight, of course, but whether we will live to
see it is a question. You know what an incurable optimist I am. But

258 THE WAR IN AFRICA SECOND YEAR

there are situations where everything is dark. However, this period
too, will pass.

During the next four days the front was more or less quiet, the British
undertaking no major attacks. It was the calm before the storm. On the
mth and soth July, we detected British assembly areas in the central
sector of the front, in which Auchinleck was concentrating masses of
tanks and artillery.

On the night of the 2ist the storm broke. Waves of British infantry
surged against the I5th Panzer Division s sector and broke into their line.
The penetration was sealed off, however, and 500 British were taken
prisoner. As a result of the immense casualties which the Italians had
recently suffered our line was now very thinly manned, even though we had
shortened it by withdrawing to a line on the level of the captured strong-
points, Deir el Shein and Qaret el Abd. We had virtually no reserves.

An attack had also been launched on the northern front by a strong
force of Australians supported by tanks. This attack gained ground yard
by yard towards the south-west against fierce resistance by the German-
Italian infantry.

Then, at about 08.00 hours \22nd], the main British attack was
launched in the central sector by a force comprised of the 2nd New
Zealand, 5th Indian and ist Armoured Divisions, together with 23rd
Army Tank Brigade, which had arrived from Britain only that month.
Supported by over a hundred tanks, the British troops surged against our
line at Deir el Shein and farther south. South of the strong-point they
overran our positions, after the German-Italian infantry holding them
had fought to the end, and by nine o clock were already dangerously far
behind our front. Finally, the tank spearhead came to a standstill on the
Steinpiste [Stony Track], where a sizeable number of British tanks was shot
up. Then the 2ist Panzer Division s armour rolled forward and threw
the British back. More and more British tanks were hit.

With the situation so critical in the central sector, an increasing number
of formations had to be drawn off from the southern end of the front.
The battle, which we fought with the maximum of mobility and which
demanded the use of our very last reserves, raged the whole of that day.
Gradually the force of the British attack was blunted. In the evening the
Australians attacked in the north again, but without any notable success.
Their advancing infantry were pinned to the ground by our defensive
fire and the tanks which broke through were soon destroyed by my
mobile formations.

When evening came, our defence had scored an undoubted success.
1,400 British prisoners had been taken anil 140 enemy tanks put out of
action. [The figure of tanks destroyed is approximately correct]. Most of the
damaged British tanks lay in territory which we controlled and thus
could not be salvaged by the enemy s recovery services.

Obstacles on the shores of France, Spring 1944

THE INITIATIVE PASSES 3*59

But our losses were also not negligible, especially in view of our low
man-power. Something more than three weak infantry battalions had
been lost and, although the armour had come through without any
serious casualties, we were still very worried and regarded the prospect
of further British attacks with considerable disquiet.

But the British apparently thought better of it and were probably
suffering equal exhaustion. Next day was quiet again, except in the air,
where our Luftwaffe attacked the enemy with everything it had. Before
the enemy s attack, the Panzer Army s sappers had been feverishly laying
minefield after minefield and this work was now resumed. Mines from all
sources, British, German and Italian, were dug into the sand and soon
several sectors were protected by minefields of considerable strength.

After the fighting of the 22nd July, I had the following signal trans
mitted to all troops: " I send all ranks my special appreciation of their
gallant action during our victorious defence of 22nd July. I am positive
that any further enemy attacks will meet with the same reception."

Meanwhile, replacement infantry units had been slowly trickling into
our lines for several weeks past and the very large gaps in the ranks of
our formations were being gradually filled not all, unfortunately, by
" fit for tropical service " troops. Elements of the 164* Infantry Division
had been flown across from Crete, but had brought neither heavy weapons
nor vehicles. Several units of an Italian parachute division excellent
troops by their appearance also arrived at the front. All this while the
army was working at feverish speed to strengthen its line. Yet, in spite
of all these improvements in the situation we could not regard the im
mediate danger as over until an adequate operational reserve had been
built up behind the front*

26 July 1942

DEAREST Lu,

A fairly quiet day yesterday. Went down to the great [Qattara]
Depression a fantastic sight. It lies far below sea level. Our territory
is slowly filling up again. The worst of our troubles are disappearing.

On the moonlit night of the 26th July, the Australians attacked again,
this time in brigade strength. Their objective was the German line west
of the Alamein-Abu Dweis track. The assembly had been made in all
secrecy, and the assault, which was preceded by a violent R.A.F. bombing
attack, consequently achieved a considerable measure of surprise.
Despite the curtain of fire which was at once put down by the German-
Italian artillery, the Australians succeeded in penetrating our front and
wiping out the greater part of one German battalion. However, a dashing
counter-attack by Combat Group Briehl, 3rd Reconnaissance Regiment
and Kampfstaffel Kiehl eventually smashed in the Australian wedge, and
threw the enemy back to his own line with heavy losses.

260 THE WAR IN AFRICA SECOND YEAR

The central sector of our line was also attacked by the newly re
plenished 5Oth British Division, and part of an Italian battalion was
overrun. A counter-attack by the aooth Infantry Regiment and a combat
group of the Afrika Korps succeeded here, too, in throwing the enemy
back to his own line.

The attack here was delivered by the 6Qth Infantry Brigade (ofthe$oth Division),
which was to have been followed up by the ist Armoured Division. But the com
mander was not satisfied that a sufficiently wide gap had been cleared in the minefield
by the South African engineers, and his delay in advancing spoilt the prospects of
the attack as a whole. The 6$th Infantry Brigade was temporarily cut off, and
suffered heavily before it was extricated.

The British had again suffered heavy casualties a thousand prisoners
and 32 tanks and their command now lost all taste for further attacks.
The German-Italian front had shown itself to be no longer penetrable by
forces of the size they were committing. It was now certain that we could
continue to hold our front, and that, after the crises we had been through,
was at least something. Although the British losses in this Alamein
fighting had been higher than ours, yet the price to Auchinleck had not
been excessive, for the one thing that had mattered to him was to halt
our advance, and that, unfortunately, he had done.

Rommel s final sentence is the final verdict on Auchinleck s achievement in these
crucial weeks. The opening sentence, however, is not so correct. Auchinleck had not
" lost all taste for further attacks," although some of his subordinates had. Reviewing
the results he " most reluctantly concluded " that the Eighth Army was not capable
of pursuing the offensive successfully without fresh reserves and fuller training.
It had suffered over 13,000 casualties during the July struggle at Alamein, but had
taken over 7,000 prisoners (including more than a thousand Germans). The price
would have been lower, and the gains greater, if the execution of the plans had been
more skilled. Even as it was, the difference in the total loss on either side was not
large and Rommel was less able to afford the loss. His account makes it clear
how perilously close he was to defeat in July. Moreover, his frustration in itself
was fatal.

RETROSPECT

So ended the great campaign of the summer. It had begun with a
fantastic victory. But, after the capture of Tobruk, the immense strength
of the British Empire had begun to tell again. There had only been a
few days during which we could have hoped to conquer Alamein and take
the Suez Canal area. While we, on our side, had had to fight every new
action with the same formations, the British had been able to take their
battered divisions out of the line for refitting, and to throw in fresh

THE INITIATIVE PASSES

formations fully equipped and up to full battle strength. My troops had
remained in the fight. Their numbers had grown continually smaller,
while- losses from dead, wounded and sick had steadily increased. Again
and again, it had been the same battalions, carried for the most part in
captured vehicles, who had driven up to the British line, leapt from their
lorries and stormed through the sand up to the enemy. Again and again,
it had been the same tank crews who had ridden their tanks into battle
and the same gunners who had pushed their guns into position. The
deeds performed in these weeks by both officers and men had reached the
limit of human endurance.

I had made tremendous demands on my forces, and spared neither
the men, the officers nor myself. I knew that the fall of Tobruk and the
collapse of the Eighth Army was the one moment in the African war
when the road to Alexandria lay open and virtually undefended, and my
staff and I would have been fools not to have gone all out to seize this
unique opportunity. If success had depended, as in times gone by, on the
strength of will of my men and their officers, then we would have overrun
Alamein. But our sources of supply had dried up thanks to the idleness
and muddle of the supply authorities on the mainland.

And then the power of resistance of many of the Italian formations
had collapsed. The duties of comradeship, for me particularly as their
Commander-in-Chief, compel me to state unequivocally that the defeats
which the Italian formations suffered at El Alamein in early July were
not the fault of the Italian soldier. The Italian was willing, unselfish and
a good comrade, and, considering the conditions under which he served,
had always given far better than the average. There is no doubt that the
achievement of every Italian unit, especially of the motorised forces, far
surpassed anything that the Italian Army had done for a hundred years.
Many Italian generals and officers won our admiration both as men
and soldiers.

The cause of the Italian defeat had its roots in the whole Italian
military and state system, in their poor armament and in the general
lack of interest in the war shown by many of the leading Italians, both
officers and statesmen. This Italian failure frequently prevented the
realisation of my plans.

In general terms, the defects which existed in the Italian armed
forces arose from the following causes:

The Italian command was, for the most part, not equal to the task
of carrying on war in the desert, where the requirement was lightning
decision followed by immediate action. The training of the Italian
infantryman fell far short of the standard required by modern warfare.
His equipment was so utterly bad, that for that reason alone, he was
unable to stand his ground without German help. Perhaps the best
example of the inferior quality of the Italian armament apart from the
grave technical defects of their tanks, with their short-range guns and

262 THE WAR IN AFRICA SECOND YEAR

under-powered engines was to be found in the artillery, with its low
mobility and short range. Their supply of anti-tank weapons was totally
inadequate. Rations were so bad that the Italian soldier frequently had
to ask his German comrade for food. Particularly harmful was the all-
pervading differentiation between officer and man. While the men had
to make shift without field-kitchens, the officers, or many of them, refused
adamantly to forgo their several course meals. Many officers, again,
considered it unnecessary to put in an appearance during battle and thus
set the men an example. All in all, therefore, it was small wonder that
the Italian soldier, who incidentally was extraordinarily modest in his
needs, developed a feeling of inferiority which accounted for his occasional
failure in moments of crisis. There was no foreseeable hope of a change
for the better in any of these matters, although many of the bigger
men among the Italian officers were making sincere efforts in that
direction.

During the march to El Alamein, I had wanted above all else to
avoid another mutual build-up of material taking place on any line west
of Alexandria. I had not wanted the British to have another chance of
re-equipping, for I knew very well that we would then have an enemy
to tackle whose material superiority would be even greater than it had
been in the Marmarica, and who would also have learnt from his defeats
during the summer. But the main thing I had wanted to avoid was the
war settling down at El Alamein into mechanised static warfare with a
stabilised front, because this was just what the British officers and men
had been trained for. The good points of the British soldier, his tenacity,
for instance, would have the maximum effect and the bad points, such as
his immobility and rigidity, none at all.

But we had failed in these intentions and the future did not look
very bright.

We had, of course, dealt the British severe losses. Between the 26th
of May and the soth of July, 60,000 British, South Africans, Indians,
New Zealanders, French and Australians had found their way into our
prisoner-of-war camps. My men had destroyed well over 2,000 British
tanks and armoured vehicles. The equipment of an entire British
offensive army lay destroyed in the desert and thousands upon thousands
of their vehicles were now being used by my troops.

But our losses had also been heavy. On the German side alone,
2,300 officers and men had been killed, 7,500 wounded and 2,700 taken
prisoner. Of the Italian forces, over 1,000 officers and men had been
killed, more than 10,000 wounded and some 5,000 taken prisoner.
Needless to say, the losses of material had also been very considerable.

Thus after immense victories, the great summer campaign had ended
in a dangerous lull.

THE INITIATIVE PASSES 263

2 Aug. 1942
DEAREST Lu,

All quiet, except for intense air activity against my supply lines.
I m thankful for every day s respite we get. A lot of sickness. Un
fortunately many of the older officers are going down now. Even I am
feeling very tired and limp, though I have got a chance to look after
myself a bit just at the moment.

Unfortunately, the British railway from Tobruk to the front is not
yet in operation. We re waiting for locomotives.

Holding on to our Alamein position has given us the severest
fighting we ve yet seen in Africa. We ve all got heat diarrhoea now, but
it s bearable. A year ago I had jaundice and that was much worse.

5 Aug. 1942

Trouble with supplies. Rintelen does little in Rome and constantly
lets himself be done in the eye, for the Italian supplies are working
excellently.

10 Aug.

Kesselring was here yesterday. We reached agreement over what
is to happen. Now it s a question of making full use of the few weeks
to get ready. The situation is changing daily to my advantage.

The (nominal) establishment of the German forces at the end of August, 1942 was:
AFRIKA KORPS: 25,000 men;

371 tanks;
246 anti-tank guns;
72 artillery pieces;

5,600 other vehicles (including 600 tracked).
90TH LIGHT DIVISION: 12,500 men;

220 anti-tank guns;
24 artillery pieces (the balance was not sent to

Africa).

2,400 vehicles (including 250 tracked).
ARMY ARTILLERY: 3,300 men;

56 artillery pieces;

1,000 vehicles (of which 100 were tracked).
164111 INFANTRY Dry.: 11,500 men;

45 anti-tank guns;
36 artillery pieces.

(It was intended to convert this into a " light " division,
but the required increase of anti-tank guns and motor
transport was not provided; the actual vehicle-strength
was only about 300, including captured British vehicles.)

CHAPTER XII

RACE AGAINST TIME

AFTER THE temporary cessation of our attack on the Alamein line and
the successful repulse of the enemy s counter-attack, a calm set in over
the front. Both sides sought to use the breathing space to refit their
forces and bring up fresh troops. Once again we were in a race to
reorganise.

All efforts of the Panzer Army were directed towards an early re
sumption of the offensive, for its success during the summer had, as
expected, struck fear and dismay into the Allied camps in New York
and London. It was therefore obvious that the Anglo-Americans would
spare no effort to prevent a further advance by the Panzer Army to
Alexandria. But their shipping from Britain or America required two
to three months for the journey round the Cape to North Africa and we
therefore had a few weeks grace before the immense reinforcements which
they had no doubt planned for the Eighth Army after the fall of Tobruk,
could reach African soil. We reckoned on mid-September as the arrival
date of the Eighth Army s reinforcements (other than normal routine
replacements) from Britain and America. The balance of strength would
then go so heavily against us that our chances of mounting an offensive
would be gone for good. So we intended to strike first.

There were other reasons why we had to get our attack launched as
quickly as possible. Every day that went by the British laid more and
more mines on their front. An outflanking move round the mayi Alamein
position, which was what we were planning, first required a break
through in the southern part of the British front, and the difficulties facing
such a project were growing steadily greater. The decisive element in
our plan was speed and surprise we had to make our thrust through the
British line and win through to the open country beyond as quickly as
possible in order to present the unsuspecting enemy with what amounted
to an accomplished fact. If we were first to have to spend a long time
overcoming strong British defences this element of surprise would be gone.

Moreover, with the Near East and India close at hand, the British
would soon be in a position to face us at El Alamein with forces of very
considerable strength. Fresh troops would be brought up to the enemy

264

RAGE AGAINST TIME 265

front from India, Syria and Iraq. Equipment could be found for them
by combing out every available supply dump and using the regular
shipments as they arrived in Egypt, We estimated that by the aoth of
August, counting both the new and the reorganised units, the British
would have 70 infantry battalions, 900 tanks and armoured vehicles,
550 light and heavy guns and 850 anti-tank guns available for action. 1

Already, at the end of July-beginning of August, the soth British and
ist South African Divisions were back at the front, almost entirely
replenished. Soon afterwards the loth Indian Division was also battle-
worthy again, after reorganisation with units from other formations*
Several large convoys had arrived in Suez during July and air recon
naissance had reported the arrival of several hundred thousand tons of
shipping.

Thus a strenuous effort was going to be necessary in the field of supply
if we were to keep pace with the steadily growing strength of the Eighth
Army. But it was in this very question of supply that a serious crisis was
upon us. The causes of this crisis and its effects were as follows:

Since the end of July, the R.A.F. had shifted the main weight of
its activity to our lines of communication between the African ports and
the front, where they were shooting up our transport columns and sinking
one barge and coastal vessel after the other. No ship lying in the Harbours
at Bardia and Mersa Matruh, and frequently even at Tobruk, was safe
from the attentions of the British bombers. Our Luftwaffe had its hands
full at the front, where British air-power was also steadily increasing, and
could only supply very meagre forces for the protection of the coast road
and coastal waters. Thus, at the beginning of August, the R.A.F. sank
three coastal vessels in Bardia harbour on one day alone. The coastal
waters were also being harassed by British naval forces.

In the absence of Italian escort destroyers, the bulk of our supply
ships were having to run into Benghazi or Tobruk, a fact which made
very heavy demands on our road transport. To make matters worse,
Tobruk was heavily attacked by British bombers on the 8th of August,

lf This estimate was approximately correct counting the forces refitting behind the
front and those disposed for the defence of the Nile Delta. The front was held by 5
divisions (including i armoured), but in the rear there were 6 more divisions (including
3 armoured) as well as several independent brigades. Two of these divisions were
brought up to the front before the end of August.

By that time the British had on the Alamein front about 480 tanks, 230 armoured
cars, 300 medium and field guns, 400 anti-tank guns. (Rommel s tank strength had
been built up by then to a total of 229 German tanks, and 281 Italian.)

Meanwhile the War Cabinet had appointed General Alexander to replace Auchinlcck
as Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, and General Montgomery had taken over
command of the Eighth Army. .

Rommel had 4 German and 8 Italian divisions (a of each being armoured). A com
parative reckoning of the two sides in number of divisions is, of course, no true comparison.
RommePs were being made up to strength much more slowly than the British, and his
Italian divisions were too poorly equipped to be reckoned on the same terms as the
British or German apart from the question of fighting spirit.

266 THE WAR IN AFRICA SECOND YEAR

and its capacity reduced by 20 per cent through the destruction of its
principal wharf. This hit us very hard.

During the early part of August the supplies we received barely
covered our daily requirements. Replenishment was hardly to be thought
of and a build-up out of the question. The vehicle situation was parti
cularly worrying; the bad state of the roads and the continual heavy
demands we were having to make on our transport were resulting in a
steady 35 per cent of our vehicle strength being in for repair. As some
85 per cent or so of our transport still consisted of vehicles of British or
American manufacture, for which we had no great stocks of spares, it is
easy to imagine the difficulties our repair shops were having to contend
with.

The units of the i64th Division and Italian Folgore Parachute Division
which were just then arriving, possessed no vehicles of their own and
were thus becoming a load on the transport columns of other formations.

Our endeavour now was to have all captured vehicles gradually
withdrawn from the transport units and replaced by new or repaired
vehicles of our own manufacture. Standing ready in Italy, some of them
for a year past, were upwards of 2,000 lorries and nearly 100 guns of all
kinds awaiting transport across to the German forces. Owing to various
troubles with our heavy shipping at that time, the transport of this
material to Africa was proceeding desperately slowly. A further 1,000
vehicles and 120 tanks were held on call for us in Germany.

Of the German element of the Panzer Army, 1 7,000 men had been
in action in Africa ever since the beginning of the campaign, and all of
them had suffered more or less severely from the effects of the African
climate. It was in most cases, only their enthusiasm and remarkable
esprit de corps which had kept them with the Panzer Army. But now it
was time for the majority of them, if they were to avoid serious damage
to their health, to leave Africa and return to Europe. Much as I regretted
losing these battle-tried veterans, I was forced to ask for their relief, since
by far the majority of them were, with the best of intentions, no longer
usable in a crisis. The German divisions (now numbering four) were
short of a further 1 7,000 men, caused by death, sickness, wounds and,
above all, the very low unit strength with which they had started.
Hence, our problems were also very serious in the field of personnel. [General
Bayerlein estimates the German fighting strength at this time at 34,000 men.}

Nevertheless, the worst difficulties were with bulk supply. Here there
existed serious weaknesses of organisation which worked heavily against
us. Control of shipping across the Mediterranean lay in the hands of the
Commando Supremo. The only German office which could exercise an
influence on supply matters was under the charge of General von Rintelen,
who had been German Military Attache in Rome for years. Field
Marshal Kesselring and Admiral Weichhold were only called in on
questions concerned with the air and sea protection of convoys and ports.

RAGE AGAINST TIME 367

The only influence which the Panzer Army Command could exercise
on the supply question was the production of a " priority list," that is to
say a list showing the order in which the material stored in Italy should
be brought to Africa if at all.

We had no influence whatever over the shipping lists, the ports of
arrival or most important the proportion of German to Italian cargoes.
In theory this was supposed to be a ratio of i : i ; in fact, it moved steadily
to the German disadvantage. A good example was the case of the
Pistoia Division. This division, which was scheduled to arrive in mid-
September and was intended for use in Libya instead of at the front, was
shipped across with two-thirds of its men and between three and four
hundred of its vehicles at the beginning of August, although only 60
vehicles had then arrived for 1641*1 Division, which already had units in
the line. Then again, while many of the Italian units in the Alamcin line
were being refitted at an astonishing speed and were exchanging their
vehicles one after the other for new ones from Italy, not one German
replacement vehicle left Italy for the Panzer Army up to the beginning of
August.

It is always a bad thing when political matters are allowed to affect
supply or the planning of operations. Where these two questions are
concerned, any ill-feelings deriving from other fields must be swept
ruthlessly aside and all efforts must be concentrated, regardless of all
other considerations, to the one purpose of military victory.

The Panzer Army contained approximately two Germans for every
one Italian (82,000 to 42,000). The following shows what proportion of
supplies for the two forces were shipped across the Mediterranean by the
Commando Supremo during the month of August:

For the German element of the Panzer Army: 8,200 tons (32 per

cent of requirements) ;
For the Italian element of the Panzer Army, the Italian troops in

Libya and the civilian population: 25,700 tons (800 tons of which

were for civilian needs).
For the German Luftwaffe: 8,500 tons.

These figures speak for themselves.

The Panzer Army fought for its interests by every means open to it,
without, however, achieving any improvement. It invariably finished
in a battle of words. When, for instance, we protested against the dispatch
of the Pistoia to Africa, the Italians produced the story that it had been
done with shipping newly brought up from the ^Egean. In the circum
stances at that time, one might have thought that they would have put
every ship they could lay their hands on at the service of the Panzer
Army, to enable it to continue its fight against the British.

Cavallero, who from time to time visited the front, often promised

268 THE WAR IN AFRICA SECOND YEAR

to have all manner of things put right. But it just as frequently happened
that on his next visit he would say with a laugh that he had made many
a promise in his time and not all of them could be kept.

The unloading of shipping in Africa was also a terribly leisurely affair.
It was only too often a triumph of antiquated ideas, lack of initiative and
a total absence of any sort of technical ingenuity. Thus we found it com
pletely impossible to get the port capacity of Tobruk increased 600 tons
a day was all it could handle, with the result that ships were kept far
too long in the harbour exposed to the danger of destruction by British
bombers. We made repeated demands for increased port construction,
the building of unloading facilities in neighbouring inlets by Italian labour,
the provision of larger quantities of Italian dock equipment and stronger
air defences for Tobruk all, of course, with little success.

We Had built tremendous hopes round the captured British military
railway from Tobruk to El Daba, and had supposed that large-scale
railway traffic would soon be organised to the front, thus greatly relieving
the pressure on our road transport. But here, too, nothing immediate
was done.

The cause of the trouble as I have already said lay in the over-
organisation and muddle which characterised the Italian supply staffs.

Probably General von Rintelen had too many diplomatic ties rising
out of his duties as Attache to be able to apply himself really effectively
to the service of our cause. He was also considerably inferior in rank and
authority to the Italians with whom he had to deal. Another factor
responsible for a great deal of our difficulty was the political relationship
between Germany and Italy, which prevented us drawing the Italian
command s attention, frankly and openly, to their weaknesses and
demanding that they be put right. Instead of bringing matters to open
discussion, a course which would have been far more in keeping with a
true alliance than this continued insincerity, it was thought better to
keep up outward pretences by declaring all the time that everything was
in order meanwhile, losing battles. This attitude of the German
Government limited Herr von Rintelen s scope, and his military rank
was not high enough to allow him to protest on matters of such high
policy.

It follows then that what was needed was a single authority to control
the organisation and protection of all sea traffic in Mediterranean and
North African waters, with full powers of command over all Axis land,
sea and air forces concerned in the operation and with the particular
function of giving support to our demands. I therefore proposed to the
High Command that the control of Mediterranean shipping should be
vested in Field Marshal Kesselring, with special powers. In making this
suggestion, I had the following considerations in mind:

Field Marshal Kesselring had a personal interest in helping us at
Alamein; he had considerable strength of will, a first-class talent for

RACE AGAINST TIME 269

diplomacy and organisation, and a considerable knowledge of technical
matters.

Kesselring had the Luftwaffe and Goering behind him and could
thus command sufficient support at the highest level to enable him to
tackle questions of high policy in relation to Italy.

This suggestion, unfortunately, was not acted upon either early
enough or in the form in which I wanted it.

The consequences of all these weaknesses were very serious. The
fact that the German formations of the Panzer Army consumed, between
the ist and aoth August, almost double the supplies that were brought
across the Mediterranean in the same period, tells its own story. The
result was an even further diminution of our already meagre stocks. At
the end of this period the German forces were below strength to the extent
of 16,000 men, 210 tanks, 175 troop-carriers and armoured cars, and
at a low estimate 1,500 other vehicles. 1 If we had not had the big
British dumps in the Marmarica and Western Egypt to fall back on we
should never have been able to exist at all. Rations were miserable and
so monotonous that we were sick of the sight of them. The petrol and
ammunition situation was as serious as ever, and we were having to
exercise the strictest economy. We were frequently compelled to put a
complete ban on all forms of harassing fire merely in order to save
ammunition. The British, on the other hand, were able to exercise the
full weight of their material superiority and hammered away with their
artillery for hours on end at our troops, who were forced to endure fright
ful hardships in the heat and desolation of their positions.

During the month of August, no effort should have been spared to
provide an adequate build-up of petrol and ammunition on African soil.
That this was not done I have already made clear. The refitting of our
German formations also left much to be desired. Despite the high Italian
supply quotas, even the infantry units of XX Italian Motorised Corps,
which were to be a very important factor in the offensive which the Duce
was always demanding from us, were short of half their vehicles; thus
only four of their ten motor battalions were mobile, the rest being
completely valueless in the open desert. Of the 220 tanks which this
corps now possessed, at least half of them threatened to break down after
the shortest run, due to their worn-out engines and inexperienced
drivers.

On the British side, we had to expect that a large convoy of well
over 100,000 tons, laden with a cargo of the very latest weapons and war
material for the Eighth Army, would arrive in Suez at the beginning of
September. The Panzer Army was therefore insistent on launching its
offensive before that date. Because of the general shortage of supplies,
planning had to be limited to striking a blow at the Eighth Army in the

1 In enumerating these deficiencies, Rommel counted in his actual strength the captured
British vehicles that he was using.

27O THE WAR IN AFRICA SECOND YEAR

Alamein line and taking possession of the territory around Alexandria
and Cairo. But the date of the attack had to be postponed again and
again, for it depended on the arrival of large quantities of petrol and
ammunition, without which an offensive was impossible.

The Panzer Army put every form of pressure it could on the supply
authorities to provide it with the necessary build-up in time. But not
the least thing was done, although it was never at any time impossible.
Probably it was thought in Rome that victory in Africa was already in
the bag. However, at the end of August, Cavallero informed me that
tankers had been dispatched to get to us in time for the offensive. If
these were sunk, other ships, which were already assembled, would sail
at once under appropriate escort. Kesselring promised the Panzer Army
that in an emergency his transport squadrons would fly across 500 tons
of petrol a day. Cavallero said he would use submarines and warships
for the carriage of the most urgent material.

24 Aug. 1942
DEAREST Lu,

I was unable to write again yesterday. I m now well enough to
get up occasionally. But 1*11 still have to go through with the six
weeks treatment in Germany. My blood pressure must be got properly
right again some time or other. One of the Fuehrer s doctors is
supposed to be on his way. I m certainly not going to leave my post
here until I can hand over to my deputy without worrying. It s not
yet known who is coming. I m having another examination to-day.
It s some comfort to know that the damage can probably all be
cleared up. At the rate we ve been using up generals in Africa
five per division in eighteen months it s no wonder that I also need
an overhaul some time or other.

Lieutenant Alfred Ingemar Berndt to Frau Rommel

Egypt 26 Aug. 1942
DEAR FRAU ROMMEL,

You ll no doubt be surprised at hearing from me from Africa. . . .
The reason for my letter is to inform you about the state of the
Marshal s health. Your husband has now been 19 months in Africa,
which is longer than any other officer over 40 has stood it so far, and,
according to the doctors, an astonishing physical feat. After the
rigours of the advance, he has had to carry the immense responsibility
of the Alamein front, anxiety for which has for many nights allowed
him no rest. Moreover, the bad season has come again.

All this has, in the nature of things, not failed to leave its mark,
and thus, in addition to all the symptoms of a heavy cold and the
digestive disturbances typical of Africa, he has recently shown signs

RACE AGAINST TIME 2JI

of exhaustion which have caused great anxiety to all of us who were
aware of it. True, there is no immediate danger, but unless he can
get a thorough rest some time, he might easily suffer an overstrain
which could leave organic damage in its train.

The doctor who is treating him, Professor Dr. Horster of Wurzburg
University one of the best-known stomach specialists in Germany
is constantly available to him for medical advice and to watch over
his health. The Fuehrer has been informed, and it has been agreed
that he will receive a long period of sick leave in Europe once the
future of this theatre has been decided. Until that time, we will do
everything we can to make his life easier and to persuade him to look
after himself. We prepare and keep handy everything he needs for
his health. I have installed a small kitchen and obtained a good cook.
Fresh fruit and vegetables arrive by air daily. We fish, shoot pigeons,
obtain chickens and eggs, etc., in order to keep his strength up. 1

This sort of " mothering " is not of course particularly easy with
the Marshal and he has to know as little about it as possible. Being
the man he is, he would deny himself any extra rations.

I must ask you, Madam, not to misunderstand this letter. But a
long medical report has gone to the O.K.W., and I know from
experience that this will open the door for all soils of rumours about
the Marshal s health, as things of this kind get round very quickly.
I wanted, therefore there being nobody else to do it to let you
have a clear picture of the situation before you are caused anxiety
by uninformed rumours of this kind. There is no cause for worry.
All he needs is a lengthy rest in Europe at some time in the fairly
near future, and that is already arranged. He must sleep peacefully
again, have less worries and relax physically and mentally, although
that will no doubt not be easy with such a restlessly active spirit.

It is certain that the Fuehrer will have need of our Marshal for
other tasks, equally important and great, and for that the Marshal
must be kept in health* Purely as a precaution, therefore, we attach

by General Bqycrlein. Professor Horster, who was RommePs medical adviser in
North Africa, and was on very close terms with him, was one day called by Cause to
carry out an examination of the Field Marshal. Rommel was having frequent attacks
of faintness at the time, but was trying with all his strength to remain on his feet. After
the examination, Professor Horster and General Cause jointly sent off a signal in approxi
mately the following words :

" Field Marshal Rommel suffering from chronic stomach and intestinal catarrh,
nasal diphtheria and considerable circulation trouble. He is not in a fit condition
to command the forthcoming offensive."

Rommel considered that the only man who could take his place was General Guderian
and asked the OKW to appoint Guderian commander of the Panzer Army on an acting
basis. Back came the reply the same evening: " Guderian unacceptable." Rommel
thereupon decided to command the battle himself and Horster sent a further telegram
to the OKW shortly before the offensive was due to open:

" G-in-C s condition so far improved that he can command the battle under constant
medical attentions Nevertheless, essential to have a replacement on the spot."

272 THE WAR IN AFRICA SECOND YEAR

greater importance to anything concerning his health than one would
normally do.

I ask you, Madam, not to worry. As for his personal safety, I
shall, in the event of further operations, once again *do everything
possible to safeguard it, for every one of us, officers and men, would
be ready to die for the Marshal. . . *

27 Aug. 1942
DEAREST Lu,

Kesselring is coming to-day for a long talk over the most acute
of our problems. He, too, often has a tough job in Rome* He gets
plenty of promises, but few are kept. His over-optimism concerning
these blighters has brought him bitter disappointments.

All quiet here so far. The British artillery sometimes do some
excited shooting and send a few thousand rounds over into our
territory. But we ve " thinned out " and so their effect is minimised.

29 Aug. 1942

Tension is growing here. Conferred yesterday with the Command
ing Generals. General Vaerst is back and has taken over his division
again. He commanded particularly well and with great dash back
in the January fighting. He was, of course, wounded very early in
the great May battle. My health is now very good again and I hope
to stand up well to the lively days ahead. Cause will be staying at
H.Q. this time and Westphal will come with me. I can t see Gause
keeping it up much longer. He s been having constant headaches
ever since that day at tjie beginning of June when the British gave
us such a terrible pounding with their bombs and artillery. I hope it
will be better for him in Europe.

THE NEW BREAK-THROUGH PLAN

At the end of August, 1942, the British dispositions in the Alamein
line were roughly as follows:

The northern sector was held by the 5th Indian, 5Oth British and
gth Australian Divisions, with the ist South African Division behind
them on the coast, all under command of XXX Corps.

In the southern sector, under the command of XIII Corps, the
7th Armoured Division was in the line with the reconnaissance units.
Holding the line to the north of the 7th Armoured Division was the
2nd New Zealand Division. Behind the centre and southern parts of the
front were the ist Armoured and, as we later discovered, the loth
.Armoured Division. 1

J Rommel is here mistaken on several points, and apparently unaware of others:
i. The 5Oth Division was not in the line. One of its brigades was brought up
on the third day of the battle (and September).

RAGE AGAINST TIME 2/3

The Panzer Army s plan was as follows:

The motorised group of the Panzer Army, consisting of the Afrika
Korps, XX Italian Motorised Corps and goth Light Division, was to
move into its assembly areas in the southern part of the front, taking all
possible precautions against observation. The armour was to move to
its new positions a quarter at a time and there deploy under camouflage,
the movement extending over a period of several days. With the armour
in position, the wheeled vehicles were to be shifted to the assembly area
in one bound, being replaced in their old positions by supply vehicles,
No effort was to be spared to keep our intentions concealed.

As is shown by the enemy dispositions given above, only small
British forces lay in the southern part of the front. Our reconnaissance
had consistently reported that only weakly mined defences existed in the
south, which would be comparatively easy to penetrate. These positions
were to be taken in a night attack by the German and Italian infantry,
and the enemy thrown back by armoured formations following im
mediately behind. Then, in a headlong thrust to the east, the Afrika
Korps and part of the Motorised Corps were to win through before
morning as far as the area south-west of El Hammam, 25 to 30 miles
from their starting point.

While X Italian Corps, which was holding the southern part of our
front, stood on the defensive, partly in its present and partly in the
newly captured positions, the goth Light Division with part of XX
Italian Corps was to cover our flank at the level of the British El Alamein
line and east of it, and ward off all British attacks, which we anticipated

ii. The ist South African Division was in the centre of the XXX Corps sector

which stretched from the sea to the Ruweisat ridge,
iii. The ist Armoured Division was not in this battle,
iv. The roth Armoured Division (in XIII Corps) had two armoured brigades under

its command, while the yth was left with only a light armoured brigade,
v. There was also an independent armoured brigade, the 23rd, so placed that it

could support either of the two corps,
vi. The XIII Corps also included the 44th Division, which was posted on the Alam

Haifa ridge,
vii. There was nothing directly behind the 7th Armoured Division on the southern

part of the front. The loth Armoured and 44th Division were posted behind

the and New Zealand Division i.e. behind the northern part of the XIII

Corps sector.

As Alexander clearly puts it in his dispatch: " The plan was to hold as strongly as
possible the area between the sea and Ruweisat ridge, and to threaten from the flank
any enemy advance south of the ridge from a strongly defended prepared position on the
A|am el Haifa ridge." It was a plan of indirect counter to Rommel s characteristic out
flanking move. It had been devised by Dorman-Smith and adopted by Auchinleck.
On taking over the Eighth Army Montgomery had " accepted this plan in principle**,
with Alexander s approval, while seeking to strengthen the rear flank position at Alam
Haifa as additional infantry became available. In the event this proved superfluous,
and die 44th Division was not engaged. The flank menace from the concentrated mass
of British armour caused Rommel to turn north to tackle it, abandoning his intended
wider move. His assault on the well-sited position of the British armour was a failure.

274 THE WAR IN AFRICA SECOND YEAR

would probably be fairly heavy in this area in the early stages of the

operation.

At dawn, the rnotorised group [primarily the Afrika Korps] was to
thrust north up as far as the coast, and then east through the British
supply area where a decision was to be sought in open battle. The
appearance of our motorised group in the British supply area would
probably draw off their motorised forces, and leave them with insufficient
to overcome the defence of the goth Light Division and thus cut off the
motorised group before the latter had had time to react effectively to
such a move. We placed particular reliance in this plan on the slow
reaction of the British command and troops, for experience had shown
us that it always took them some time to reach decisions and put them
into effect. We hoped, therefore, to be in a position to present the
operation to the British as an accomplished fact.

Things were then to move fast. The decisive battle was on no account
to become static. With large British forces pinned down by repeated
minor attacks by the German-Italian infantry left in the Alamein line,
the decisive battle was to be fought out behind the British front in a form
in which the greater aptitude of our troops for mobile warfare and the
high tactical skill of our commanders could compensate for our lack
of material strength. Separated from their supply depots, the British
would be left with the option of either fighting it out to the end in their
line or breaking out and falling back to the west, thus relinquishing their
hold on Egypt.

Summing up, the success of the operation depended the supply
question apart on the following factors:

(a) The effectiveness with which our move into the assembly areas
was concealed.

(b) The speed with which the break-through of the British line and
the thrust into their rear could be achieved in other words, on
the accuracy of our reconnaissance.

At the end of August, the ammunition and petrol which had been
promised us by the Commando Supremo had still not arrived. The full
moon, indispensable to our operation, was already on the wane. Any
further delay would have meant giving up all idea of ever again resuming
the offensive.

However, Marshal Cavallero informed me that the tankers would
arrive under heavy escort in a matter of hours, or at the latest next
day.

In the hope that this promise would be fulfilled and trusting to
Field Marshal Kesselring s assurance that he would fly across up to 500
tons of petrol a day in an emergency but above all, in the certainty
that if we did not act during this full moon our last chance of an offensive

RACE AGAINST TIME 275

would be gone for ever, I gave the order for the attack to open on the

night 30-31 August.

30 Aug. 1942
DEAREST Lu,

To-day has dawned at last. It s been such a long wait worrying
all the time whether I should get everything I needed together to
enable me to take the brakes off again. Many of my worries have
been by no means satisfactorily settled and we have some very grave
shortages. But I ve taken the risk, for it will be a long time before
we get such favourable conditions of moonlight, relative strengths,
etc., again. I, for my part, will do my utmost to contribute to success.
As for my health, I m feeling quite on top of my form. There are
such big things at stake. If our blow succeeds, it might go some way
towards deciding the whole course of the war. If it fails, at least I
hope to give the enemy a pretty thorough beating. Neurath has seen
the Fuehrer, who sent me his best wishes. He is fully aware of my
anxieties. 1

*Note by General Bayerlein. . , . Professor Horster states that Rommel left his sleeping
truck on the morning of the attack with a very troubled face. " Professor", he said,
" the decision to attack to-day is the hardest I have ever taken. Either the army in
Russia succeeds in getting through to Grozny and we in Africa manage to reach the Suez
Canal, or. . . ." He made a gesture of defeat.

CHAPTER XIII

NOW OR NEVER-ALAM HALFA

DURING THE night 30-31 August 3 the infantry with the motorised group
of the Panzer Army moved to the attack against the southern bastions
of the British El Alamein front.

Shortly after passing the eastern boundary of our own minefields, our
troops came up against an extremely strong and hitherto unsuspected
British mine belt, which was stubbornly defended. Under intensely
heavy artillery fire, the sappers and infantry eventually succeeded in
clearing lanes through the British barrier, although at the cost of very
heavy casualties and a great deal of time in many cases it needed three
attempts. The minefields, which contained an extraordinary number of
mines (according to our estimate there were 150,000 in the sector where
we attacked), were of great depth and protected by numerous booby-traps.

Before long, relay bombing attacks by the R.A.F. began on the area
occupied by our attacking force. With parachute flares turning night
into day, large formations of aircraft unloosed sticks of H.E. bombs
among my troops.

The Army staff spent most of the night on the telephone, with reports
pouring in in a continual stream. Even so there remained considerable
uncertainty about the situation, although it gradually became clear that
things could not have gone altogether as planned. The first report from
the Afrika Korps reached me at about 08.00 hours in the neighbourhood
of Jebel Kalakh, Owing to the great strength of the enemy minefields,
the Corps had been unable to reach its appointed objectives. By dawn,
its leading units, with the reconnaissance group, had reached a point
some eight to ten miles east of our minefields. The British had defended
their strong positions with extraordinary stubbornness and had thereby
delayed our advance. This had given the enemy units in the threatened
sectors time to send alarm messages and situation reports back to British
Headquarters, and had enabled the British commander to take the
necessary counter-measures. Such a respite was of immense value to the
enemy, for he only needed to hold his line long enough to allow his
mobile forces to take up a position from which immediate counter-action

276

NOW OR NEVER ALAM HALFA 277

could be taken against any German-Italian forces which broie through*

News arrived a few minutes later that General von Bismarck, com
mander of the 21 st Panzer Division, had been killed by a mine and that
General Nehring, commander of the Afrika Korps, had been wounded
in an air attack.

My plan for the motorised forces to advance 30 miles east by moon
light and then strike north at dawn had not worked. The assault force
had been held up far too long by the strong and hitherto unsuspected
mine barriers, and the element of surprise, which had formed the basis
of the whole plan, had been lost. In these circumstances, we were now in
two minds whether or not to break off the action. We no longer had the
advantage of the time which the British would have needed, in the event
of a quick break-through in the south, to reconnoitre the situation, make
their decisions and put them into effect a period during which there
would have been no need to expect serious counter measures to our moves.
The enemy now knew where we were. I decided to make the decision
dependent on how, things stood with the Afrika Korps.

Soon afterwards I heard that the Afrika Korps, under the fine leader
ship of its Chief of Staff, Colonel Bayerlein, had overcome the British
mine belt and was about to move on to the east. I discussed the situation
with Bayerlein and we decided that the attack should go on.

General Bqyerlein had taken over acting command of the AJrika Korps after
General Nehring had been wounded.

With the British armour now assembled for immediate action, it was
impossible for us to continue with our wide sweep to the east, as our
flanks would have been under a constant threat from the yth Armoured
Division in the south and the ist and loth Armoured Divisions in the
north. This compelled us to decide on an earlier turn to the north than
we had intended.

The objectives of the attack were now set as Hill 1312 for the Afrika
Korps and Alam Bueit-Alam Haifa for XX Italian Corps. According
to our air reconnaissance, this ridge was now heavily fortified; it was
also, as we later discovered, held by 44th British Infantry Division, newly
arrived from Great Britain. From our experience in similar situations
we knew that the battle for the [Alam Haifa] ridge, which was the key
to the whole El Alamein position, would be very severe. Field Marshal
Kesselring was accordingly asked to attack it heavily from the air during
the next few days.

After the Afrika Korps had refuelled and taken on ammunition,
which consumed a great deal of time, the advance was resumed at about
13.00 hours. The attack, which was made in a heavy sandstorm, went
well forward at first, and carried the Italian Littorio Armoured Division
along with it. Unfortunately, the Ariete and Trieste were still delayed
in clearing lanes through the minefields and threading their units through
the British defence system. The XX Motorised Corps, as a result, was

278

THE WAR IN AFRICA SECOND YEAR

unable to begin its advance until 15.00 hours, and from the outset hung
somewhat behind on the left of the Afrika Korps.

From Afrika Korps H.Q,., where I had again been discussing the
situation and our plans with Bayerlein, I drove to the Italian divisions
and urged them to hurry.

Meanwhile, the vehicles and tanks of the Afrika Korps were painfully
grinding their way through the soft sand covering their line^ of march.
Driving sandstorms blew on and off all day, making the lives of my
men a misery although they did, at the same time, prevent the British

LEGEND

Cerman Attacks. 31? Aug.
British Positions ..

16. THE BATTLE OF ALAM HALF A, SEPTEMBER 1942

air forces making any heavy attacks on my units. Due to the heavy
going, the Afrika Korps 5 petrol stocks were soon badly depleted and at
1 6.00 hours we called off the attack on Hill 132. The XX Italian Corps
was still a considerable way behind, but the goth Light Division had
reached its assigned position. Protection to the east and south-east was
provided by the reconnaissance battalions.

After nightfall our forces became the target for heavy R.A.F. attacks,
mainly on the reconnaissance group, but also though less severe on
other units. With one aircraft flying circles and dropping a continuous

NOW OR NEVER AtAM HALFA $79

succession of flares, bombs from the other machines, some of which dived
low for the attack, crashed down among the flare-lit vehicles of the
reconnaissance units. All movement was instantly pinned down by low-
flying attacks. Soon many of our vehicles were alight and burning
furiously. The reconnaissance group suffered heavy casualties.

Meanwhile, the promised petrol had still not arrived in Africa, added
to which our supply traffic through the lanes in the enemy minefields was
being seriously disturbed by the British armour south of our salient
(yth Armoured Division). Consequently, on the morning of the ist
September, I found myself compelled to give up any attempt at major
action for the moment; all large-scale movement of the motorised forces
had to be avoided, and the most we could permit ourselves was a few
local, limited objective attacks.

Acting on this decision, the Afrika Korps attacked on the morning
of the ist September with the I5th Panzer Division only; after shooting
up a number of British heavy tanks, the division s main force managed
to reach the area just south of Hill 132, where, with their petrol almost
exhausted, they were forced to call off even this local advance.

The Afrika Korps continued to be assailed throughout the day by
heavy R.A.F. bomber attacks. In the bare and coverless country, with
the bomb-bursts frequently intensified by rock splinters, we suffered severe
casualties. Seven officers were killed from the Afrika Korps staff alone.
Next morning, after disposing of a few command matters, I drove
through the area occupied by the Afrika Korps. Between ten and twelve
o clock we were bombed no less than six times by British aircraft. On
one occasion I only just had time to throw myself into a slit trench before
the bombs fell. A spade lying on the soil beside the trench was pierced
clean through by an 8-inch splinter and the red-hot metal fragment
fell beside me in the trench. Swarms of low-flying fighter-bombers were
coming back to the attack again and again and my troops suffered
tremendous casualties. Vast numbers of vehicles stood burning in the
desert. , .

In the afternoon, I shifted my command post, and, in view of the bad
supply situation, again considered whether to break off the battle.

The non-stop attacks of the British bomber formations continued the
whole day through. The British artillery was also very active and fired
vast quantities of ammunition about ten shells were answering every
one of ours. The movement of major formations and the establishment
of timed march schedules now seemed to be ruled out. Our badly out
numbered fighters hurled themselves again and again towards the British
bomber squadrons, but rarely succeeded in penetrating to their targets,
for they were intercepted every time and engaged in combat by the
tremendously strong fighter escorts of the " Party Rally " bomber
squadrons. . . .

Rommel is here referring to the perfect formation-flying of the Bntish bomber

28O THE WAR IN AFRICA SECOND YEAR

squadrons, comparing them with formations performing a fly-past at the Nuremberg
Party Rally celebrations,

Thus these bomber formations, flying almost undisturbed, were able
to area-bomb our ranks with immense salvoes of bombs no less than
twelve times on that one day alone.

Still no drop of the promised petrol had arrived in Africa. That
evening, the Panzer Army had only one petrol issue left, and one issue,
even with the greatest economy, could only suffice to keep our supply
traffic going for a very short time.

An issue of petrol was equivalent to the quantity required by the units to travel
zoo kilometres (62\ miles) over normally good going i.e. terrain that was not
particularly difficult.

By the 2nd September, out of the 5,000 tons of petrol which had been due to
arrive by the yd, 2,600 tons had already been sunk and 1,500 tons were still in Italy.

From 23.00 hours onwards, right into the morning of the 2nd Sep
tember, we were again attacked by relays of aircraft dropping bombs
of all sizes. Once again they carne crashing round my command post.
A vehicle was set alight not ten yards from my slit trench.

After that night, I decided to call off the attack and retire by stages
to the line El Taque-Bab el Qattara. My reasons were the serious air
situation and the disastrous state of our supplies. Our offensive no longer
had any hope of success, partly because we had no petrol and insufficient
fighter cover and partly because the battle had now reached a stage
where material strength alone would decide the issue. Had the attack
on the plateau round Hill 132 been continued, it could only have developed
into a battle of material attrition.

Meanwhile the British had assembled powerful armoured forces
between Alam Haifa and Bab el Qattara and had then remained
stationary in their assembly areas. Repeated local attacks followed, but
these were easily beaten off. The impression we gained of the new
British commander, General Montgomery, was that of a very cautious
man, who was not prepared to take any sort of risk.

Montgomery had taken steps to prepare a strong counter-stroke, and even to
organise a pursuit force. But in the end he decided to be content with restoring the
line and " to proceed methodically with my own preparations for a big offensive
later on" Accordingly^ he refrained from, and restrained, efforts to cut off Rommel s
retreat.

In the evening I conferred with Field Marshal Kesselring and gave
him a detailed account of the effect of the British air attacks, in particular
of their " bomb-carpets " in an area covered with tanks, guns and
vehicles. He promised to do all he could to help us.

But that night again (2-3 September), the Afrika Korps, part of the
Italian armoured divisions and the goth Light Division were once more
subjected to non-stop pounding by powerful British bomber formations.
A steady succession of parachute flares kept the whole of the desert bathed

NOW OR NEVER ALAM HALFA

in a brilliant light. Magnesium incendiaries, impossible to extinguish,
lay flaring on the ground, lighting up the whole neighbourhood. Mean
while, vast quantities of H.E. and fragmentation bombs, even some
land-mines, dropped into the territory occupied by my troops. Many
of the 88-mm. A.A. guns, which had previously scored an occasional hit,
were now picked out by the British, attacked from a great height and
destroyed. Hundreds of our vehicles were destroyed or damaged,

Next day, the withdrawal proceeded as planned. The British made
only isolated attacks and, apart from these, let the air force and artillery
take their toll. Kesselring informed us that he would send every aircraft
he could raise to attack the British forces north of our break-through,
where they were apparently entertaining ideas about launching an attack
in our flank.

That night, while the R.A.F. made only small-scale sorties over our
front, the attack of our air force on the loth Indian Division, which
was preparing for a thrust against the Brescia Division and the Ramcke
Brigade, appeared to bring about the dispersal of the enemy approach
march. All attacks against our flank made by other formations, especially
the New Zealanders, were too weak to make any penetration and were
easily beaten off.

A night attack on the X Italian Corps cost the British particularly
heavy losses, including many dead. We took 200 prisoners, among them
Brigadier Clifton, commander of 6th New Zealand Brigade.

Next morning I had a talk with Brigadier Clifton. He said that he was
ashamed to have to admit to having been taken prisoner by the Italians. He
had been in the act of persuading them to surrender by telling them of
the strong British armour assembled in front of their position, and they
had, in fact, already started taking the bolts out of their rifles, when to
his disgust a German officer had come along and ruined the whole affair.
He seemed very disgusted about it all. I tackled him about various acts
contrary to international law for which the New Zealanders had been
responsible. Repeated cases had occurred of prisoners and wounded
being massacred by this particular division. He said it was probably due
to the large number of Maoris which the division contained. For the rest,
he expressed an absolute certainty of victory, understandable now that
our attack had been repulsed. One of the veteran " Africans " of the
other side, he had commanded troops against us ever since 1940, and had
taken part in the fighting in Greece and the winter campaign in 1941-42.

He gave the impression of being a courageous and likeable man. He
asked particularly that he should become a prisoner of the Germans
and not be sent to Italy. I tried to grant his wish and, contrary to
standing instructions, sent him back to a German depot in Mersa Matruh.
However, the O.K.W. later gave orders for him to be handed over to
the Italians.

The evening before he was due to be handed over, Clifton asked to

282 THE WAR IN AFRICA SECOND YEAR

be taken to the lavatory, where he climbed out of the window and
vanished without trace. All troops were immediately warned by radio.
A few days later several of my staff officers were out hunting gazelles
when they suddenly spotted a weary figure plodding across the desert
carrying what looked lie a jerry-can of water. Closer inspection revealed
him as the much sought-after Clifton, whereupon they straightway picked
him up and brought him in again. I had a talk with him shortly after
wards and expressed my appreciation of his exploit. Such a trek through
the desert is not everybody s meat and, not surprisingly, he looked
completely exhausted. To put a stop to any further nonsense of the kind
I had him sent straight across to Italy. 1 Later I heard that he had escaped
from an Italian prisoner-of-war camp disguised as a Hitler Youth leader,
complete with shorts and insignia, and in this garb had crossed the
frontier into Switzerland. 2

4 Sept. 1942
DEAREST Lu,

Some very hard days lie behind me. We had to break off the
offensive for supply reasons and because of the superiority of
the enemy air force although victory was otherwise ours. Well, it
can t be helped. Made a quick call at H.Q,. for the first time to-day,
even had my boots off and washed my feet. I m still hoping that the
situation can be straightened out. All my wishes to you and Manfred.

P.S. Bismarck killed. Nehring wounded.

The British showed little desire to make a real fight of it; there was
indeed no need for them to do so, since time as far as material was
concerned was working in their favour.

A number of statements made by British officers and men who were
captured during this battle agreed in saying that the British command
had been aware of our intention to attack on or about the 25th August.
Several prisoners even went so far as to say that the British H.Q. had
been informed by a senior Italian officer of our plan to attack on the
southern part of the front. 8

l Note by General Bqyerlein. Professor Horster, who was present at all conversations
between Rommel and Brigadier Clifton, draws attention to an interesting point.

During his conversation with Clifton, Rommel had suggested that Britain had
overlooked the fact that the real danger to Europe lay in Asia.

When Clifton escaped from Mersa Matruh, Rommel was very alarmed that his
statement about Asia (i.e. including also the Japanese) might have unfortunate political
results. Consequently every possible measure was taken to ensure Clifton s recapture.

2 Rommers information was inaccurate. Clifton did in fact escape in Italy at his fifth
attempt, but was caught near Como just before reaching the Swiss frontier. He was
dressed externally as a merchant sailor, not as a Hitler Youth leader. He finally got
away at his ninth attempt, from Germany despite having been badly wounded in his
eighth attempt.

8 JVbte by General Bqyerlein. This statement has so far received no confirmation from
either side.

NOW OR NEVER ALAM HALFA 283

On the morning of the 6th September we completed our withdrawal
and my troops went over to the defensive, utilising the strong British
positions we had captured* With the failure of this offensive our last
chance of gaining the Suez Canal had gone. We could now expect that
the full production of British industry and, more important, the enormous
industrial potential of America, which, consequent on our declaration
of war, was now fully harnessed to the enemy cause, would finally turn
the tide against us.

THE THIRD DIMENSION
Our offensive had failed because:

(a] contrary to our reconnaissance reports, the British positions in
the south had been constructed in great strength.

(4) non-stop and very heavy air attacks by the R.A.F., whose com
mand of the air had been virtually complete, had pinned my army
to the ground and rendered any smooth deployment or any
advance by time-schedule completely impossible.

(c) the petrol, which was an essential condition for the fulfilment of
our plan, had not arrived, Some of the ships which Gavallero had
promised had been sunk, some delayed and others not even
dispatched. In addition, Kesselring had unfortunately been unable
to keep his promise to fly over 500 tons a day to the front in an
emergency.

General Westphal, in his book, says that Kesselring did actually send these 500
tons of petrol, but that it " consumed itself 39 on the way up to the front.

Our casualties had been very severe, caused mainly by the bombing
and low-flying attacks of the R.A.F. They totalled, German and Italian
together, 570 dead, 1,800 wounded and 570 prisoners in all, nearly
3,000 men. On the material side, the main feature was our vehicle losses,
which totalled 50 tanks, 15 field guns and 35 anti-tank guns, and 400
lorries.

According to formation reports we had taken 350 prisoners and
knocked out or captured 150 British tanks and armoured cars. We had
also destroyed 10 field guns and 20 heavy anti-tank guns.

The British losses, as given in Alexander s dispatch, were 1,640 men killed,
wounded and missing; 68 tanks, 18 anti-tank guns, but no field guns.

The British " estimated " the enemy s loss in killed and wounded as 4,500
nearly double the figures that Rommel gives but took prisoner only 300. Tliey
collected from the battlefield 51 tanks (of which 42 were German}, 30 field guns
and 40 anti-tank guns.

We had learnt one important lesson during this operation, a lesson

284 THE WAR IN AFRICA SECOND YEAR

which was to affect all subsequent planning and, in fact, our entire future
conduct of the war. This was that the possibilities, of ground action,
operational and tactical, become very limited if one s adversary com
mands the air with a powerful air force and can fly mass raids by heavy
bomber formations unconcerned for their own safety.

This battle was known to the troops for ever after as the " Six-day
Race "* from the fact that it had lasted six days from the opening of
the offensive until our retreat into our new positions.

British ground forces, as has been shown, had hardly put in an
appearance during the offensive. Montgomery had attempted no large-
scale attack to retake the southern part of his line; and would probably
have failed if he had. He had relied instead on the effect of his enormously
powerful artillery and air force. Added to this, our lines of communica
tion had been subjected to continual harassing attacks by the jth
Armoured Division. There is no doubt that the British commander s
handling of this action had been absolutely right and well suited to the
occasion, for it had enabled him to inflict very heavy damage on us in
relation to his own losses, and to retain the striking power of his own force.

According to our estimate, some 1,300 tons of bombs had been
dropped on the area occupied by my army s assault force during the six
days of the battle. Although this was not very great compared with the
quantity that was to be showered on us during the Alarnein battle, it
was far greater than anything that had so far been known during the
African campaign.

In any case, two points were already clear:

(a) the paralysing effect which air activity on such a scale had on
motorised forces; above all, the serious damage which had been
caused to our units by area bombing.

(b) The British bid to secure complete command of the air and to
exercise it to the full.

We were in no doubt that the forthcoming increase in British strength
the 100,000-ton convoy expected for the beginning of September had
already arrived in Suez would apply equally to their air force. From
this we concluded that the R.A.F, would employ many times more aircraft
against us in the coming battle than in the one just fought. This being
so, we had to expect the following results :

The enemy would fight the battle of attrition from the air. His bombs
would be particularly effective against motorised forces standing without
cover in the open desert; their vehicles, tanks and guns whether on the
march, in assembly areas, or in the attack itself would offer a wonderful
target for bombers and low-flying aircraft. The enemy would be in a

^Translator s note. After a famous German cycle race the Sechstagcrewun.

NOW OR NEVER ALAM HALFA 285

position to batter our forces so severely as to render them in time virtually
unfit for action, and this without any appreciable expenditure of his own
strength.

From the command point of view he would gain the following
advantages:

(a) Through his total command of the air, he alone would have
access to complete and unbroken reconnaissance reports.

(b) He would be able to operate more freely and boldly, since, if an
emergency arose, he would be able, by use of his air-power, to
break up the approach march and assembly and indeed every
operation of his opponent, or alternatively delay them until he
himself had had time to take effective counter measures.

(c) As a general rule, any slowing down of one s own operations tends
to increase the speed of the enemy s. Since speed is one of the
most important factors in motorised warfare, it is easy to see what
effect this would have.

Moreover, whoever enjoys command of the air is in a position to
inflict such heavy damage on the opponent s supply columns that serious
shortages must soon make themselves felt. By maintaining a constant
watch on the roads leading to the front he can put a complete stop to day
light supply traffic and force his enemy to drive only by night, thus
causing him to lose irreplaceable time. But an assured flow of supplies is
essential; without it the army becomes immobilised and incapable of
action. 1

All this provided us with inescapable conclusions. What we really
needed was parity, or at least something approaching parity, in the air.
This would have required a vast reinforcement of Kesselring s air force,
especially in pursuit and fighter planes, but above all, would have needed
the addition of a number of heavy bomber squadrons.

A balance of power in the air would have made the old rules of
warfare valid again, although, of course, with certain tactical restrictions
imposed by the intense aerial activity on both Sides.

Anyone who has to fight, even with the most modern weapons, against
an enemy in complete command of the air, fights like a savage against
modern European troops, under the same handicaps and with the same
chances of success. And since there was no foreseeable hope, with the
German Luftwaffe so severely stretched in other theatres, of Kesselring
receiving aircraft reinforcements in any way comparable with those

*Note by General Bayerlein. This argument is of great importance, Rommel founded
many of his later decisions on his experience in this and the subsequent Alamein ^battle,
above all, his decision in 1944 to oppose the expected Allied invasion on the coast instead
of risking an approach march from the French hinterland, which would have been
operationally correct in normal conditions.

286 THE WAR IN AFRICA SECOND YEAR

flowing to the British, we had to face the likelihood of the R. A.F. shortly
gaining absolute air supremacy,

We therefore had to try to put our defence against the forthcoming
British attack into such a form that British air superiority would have
the least effect. For the first and most serious danger which now
threatened us was from the air. This being so, we could no longer rest
our defence on the motorised forces used in a mobile role, since these
forces were too vulnerable to air attack. We had instead to try to
resist the enemy in field positions which had to be construtced for
defence against the most modern weapons of war.

We had to accept the fact that, by using his air-power, the enemy
would be able to delay our operations at will, both in the daytime and
using parachute flares at night. For no man can be expected to stay
in his vehicle and drive on under enemy air attack. Our experience in
the " Six-day Race " had shown us that any sort of time-schedule was
now so much waste paper. This meant that our positions had henceforth
to be constructed strongly enough to enable them to be held by their
local garrisons independently and over a long period, without even the
support of operational reserves, until reinforcements however much
delayed by the R.A.F. could arrive.

The fact of British air superiority threw to the winds all the tactical
rules which we had hitherto applied with such success. There was no
real answer to the enemy s air superiority, except a powerful air force of
our own. In every battle to come the strength of the Anglo-American
air force was to be the deciding factor.

CHAPTER XIV

BATTLE WITHOUT HOPE-ALAMEIN

WITH THE failure of our offensive against the British Alamein line, a new
phase opened which was eventually to lead to the final collapse of our
North African front In the period from the 6th September to the 23rd
October the battle of supplies was waged with new violence. At the end
of the period it had been finally lost by us and won by the British by a
wide margin.

Our feelings at the failure of our offensive can be imagined. The
supply ships which Cavallero had promised would reach us in time for
our offensive at the end of August or the beginning of September, in
fact arrived in North Africa on the 8th September, Meanwhile, the
supply situation had attained crisis proportions, largely because the
quantities sent to us had never once come up to the agreed target;
during the first eight months of 1942 we had received approximately
120,000 tons only 40 per cent of our absolute minimum needs.

It was, of course, true that with the intense activity of the British strategic
air force and Royal Navy in the Mediterranean, the difficulties had now
considerably increased. Enemy aircraft were making attack after attack
on our ports and destroying one supply installation after the other. More
and more tonnage was being lost and less and less ships were being
provided by the Italians for the Africa run. New construction of shipping
compared with the 1,300,000 tons or so which Italy had lost up to the
beginning of October 1942 was pitifully small. Sinkings were going up
steadily. Ten ships had been sunk by enemy action on the Africa rim
in the period from February until the end of July; between the end of
July and the middle of October it was twenty. In fact, the question now
was whether the supply problem could be solved at all even with the
utmost efforts. The errors and omissions of the past had brought our
supply organisation to such a pass that we had now very little hope of
ever attaining tolerable supply conditions again.

Eighteen months before, senior officers of the German General Staff
had declared that maintenance of the African theatre was an insoluble
problem. The fact that this opinion was shared in the highest circles of

287

288 THE WAR IN AFRICA SECOND YEAR

Wehrmacht command made it possible for the people in Italy and
Europe who were lying down on the job to continue in their posts, because
at the top level their arguments always fell on receptive ears and were
accepted. Their estimate of the transport situation was at any rate, up
to the late summer of 1942 completely without foundation; it was the
product of obsolete opinions and betrayed the tendency of the academic
mind to evade all difficulties and prove them insurmountable. We
should have swept away all old prejudices and preconceived ideas from
the start.

There often occurred to me the difference between the Professor of
Economics and the business man, as judged by their financial success.
The business man may not perhaps be on the same intellectual plane as
the professor, but he bases his ideas on real facts and puts the whole
power of his will behind their realisation. The professor, on the other
hand, often has a false conception of reality and although perhaps having
more ideas, is neither able nor anxious to carry them out; the fact that
he has them is satisfaction enough. And so the business man has the
greater financial success.

The same difference can often be found between the academic and
fighting soldier* One of the most important factors not only in military
matters, but in life as a whole is the power of execution, the ability to
direct one s whole energies towards the fulfilment of a particular task.
The officer of purely intellectual attainments is usually only fitted for
work as an assistant on the staff; he can criticise and provide the material
for discussion. But a conclusion intellectually arrived at needs the
executive power of the commander to follow it up and force it to
realisation.

These remarks can be equally applied to the supply question. The
malady from which we were suffering had its cause apart from the
weaknesses I have already described in the lack of a sense of reality
and an absence of all initiative and drive. In illustration of this I should
perhaps indicate some of the things which might have been done:

(a) It never proved possible to get major Italian naval units used
for the protection of convoys or the transport of urgent supplies.
Of course, the fuel could not then have been used for the Rome
taxis.

(b) It never proved possible to get an attack organised and mounted
on Malta. I had offered to carry out this enterprise myself and
am convinced that, given the number of troops for which I asked
and proper support from the sea and air, I would have succeeded
in taking the island fortress. With Malta in our hands, the
British would have had little chance of exercising any further
control over convoy traffic in the Central Mediterranean, Malta

BATTLE WITHOUT HOPE ALAMEIN 289

has the lives of many thousands of German and Italian soldiers
on its conscience.

(c) It never proved possible to get quantity production of lighters and
coastal vessels started in Italy or to organise a satisfactory service
of coastal shipping under appropriate naval protection.

(d) It never proved possible to get new landing places with dock
installations constructed along the coast, or to have the unloading
capacity of the existing ports increased quickly enough.

I in no way underestimated the difficulties of organising our supply
as was always maintained by certain people in the Fuehrer s H.Q,.
I simply saw them in their true perspective. At the end of 1942, after the
battle of El Alamein, maintenance of the African theatre of war quite
clearly became an impossibility. But there is no doubt that secure convoy
traffic could have been established in the spring and summer of that year.
This would have enabled us to conquer the whole of the Mediterranean
coast-line, and after that traffic across the Mediterranean would have
presented no problem. But there was no understanding in the Fuehrer s
H.Q,. of the art of creating strategic centres of gravity at the decisive point.

Immediately after our abortive offensive, I reported to the Fuehrer s
H.Q. and Commando Supremo in the following words:

" The German troops of the Panzer Army Africa, who are bearing the
brunt of the war in Africa against the finest troops of the British Empire,
must be provided with an uninterrupted flow of the supplies essential
for life and battle, and every available ship and transport aircraft should
be employed for that purpose. Failing this, the continued successful
maintenance of the African theatre of war will be impossible and the
army will sooner or later run the danger, when the British launch a major
offensive, of suffering the same fate as befell the Halfaya garrison."

Meanwhile, the British were growing steadily stronger. By about the
nth September, they had five infantry divisions and one armoured
division in the front, two infantry and two armoured divisions behind the
front as army reserve, and a further two infantry divisions in the Nile
Delta. Our anxiety was therefore continually increasing. We demanded
substantial reinforcements of heavy anti-tank guns, to compensate at
least in some measure for the tremendous British superiority in armour.
We also asked for early reinforcement by another division.

Rations, too, were beginning to be a problem, now that we were
coming to the end of the stocks we had captured in the Marmarica. On
my visits to the front I was continually hearing of growing sick parades
caused by the bad rations. Casualties from this cause were particularly
heavy in divisions which contained troops who had been too long in
Africa, or who had not been tested for fitness for tropical service.

I again pointed out the seriousness of the situation to the Fuehrer s
H.Q,. and stated that our supply problem must be solved at all costs

THE WAR IN AFRICA - SECOND YEAR

by the use of every available scrap of shipping space; either that, or
the German-Italian Panzer Army would in no circumstances be able to
hold out for long in North Africa.

I demanded as a minimum the shipment of 30,000 tons during
September and 35,000 tons during October, after the arrival of the 22nd
Air Landing Division. 1 I also demanded the shipment across of every
vehicle which was being held in Germany and Italy for the Panzer
Army. We sent back accurate and detailed reports of the effect of British
attacks on our troops and demanded a considerable reinforcement of our
air force, particularly in fighter strength. But it soon became obvious
that we need entertain little hope that our demands would be met.

I regarded the following stocks as indispensable requirements for a
defence against the forthcoming British attack:

AMMUNITION: eight daily issues.
PETROL: 2,000 miles per vehicle.

RATIONS: 30 days stock.

I stated categorically that it would only be possible to guarantee a
successful defence if these requirements were met.

9 Sept. 1942
DEAREST Lu,

My health is now fairly well restored and I hardly think anybody
would notice anything. However, the doctor is pressing me hard to
have a break in Germany and doesn t want me to postpone it any
longer. But Stumme must first arrive and be installed in his job.

On the one hand, I m overjoyed at the prospect of getting away
for a while and seeing you, but on the other I fear I shall never be
free of anxiety about this place, even though I won t be able to get
to the front myself. I know Churchill is supposed to have said that
he will only be able to hold Egypt a few months longer, but I m more
inclined to think that he s considering launching a new offensive with
superior forces in four to six weeks time. A victory for us in the
Caucasus is the only thing that would stop him.

Now Cause is unfit for tropical service and has to go away for
six months. Things are also not looking too good with Westphal, he s
got liver trouble [jaundice]. Lieut.-CoL von Mellenthin [Ic.] is
leaving to-day with amoebic dysentery. One of the divisional com
manders was wounded yesterday, so that every divisional commander
and the Corps Commander have been changed inside ten days.

by General Bayerlein. The 22nd Air Landing Division, which -was a motoriscd
infantry division, had been withdrawn from Russia after a long period in action on that
front. Its movement to North Africa was planned but never carried out.

BATTLE WITHOUT HOPE ALAMEIN

// StpL

Fm quite well so far. It goes up and down. It s high time I got
out for a few weeks. The British seem to be having great anxieties
in India and to be very worried about the Caucasus front. I hope
to be the one to benefit. It was blowing sand again yesterday, but
didn t get up to a real storm. IVe received Manfred s letter of the
3 1 st. I was very pleased with it.

It s quite likely that my letters will now arrive after I do. However,
1*11 go on writing; one never knows.

How are things looking in Wiener Neustadt? I m very excited to
see how I ll find everything. Manfred must have grown a tremendous
lot in seven months and have practically caught me up.

In the early hours of the I4th September, after relay bombing attacks
by 1 80 aircraft on the port and surroundings of Tobruk, the British
attempted to land strong forces in the fortress area. According to
documents which fell into our hands, their mission was to destroy the
dock installations and sink the ships in the harbour.

The A.A. batteries on the peninsula immediately opened a furious
fire on the British. German and Italian assault groups, which were
quickly formed up, succeeded in enveloping the landed enemy troops.
Fearing that the British were planning to capture Tobruk, we im
mediately set a number of motorised units in march for the fortress. But
the local forces soon succeeded in restoring the situation. The British
suffered considerable losses in killed and prisoners and according to
reports from the A.A. batteries three destroyers and three landing or
escort vessels were sunk. Next day our air force caught the British again
and reported the sinking of one cruiser, one more destroyer and several
escort vessels. A number of British ships were damaged by bombs.

On the 1 5th September I flew over to Tobruk myself and expressed
my appreciation to the troops of the well-conducted defensive action they
had fought. The report of the British attack had actually caused us no
little alarm, for Tobruk was one of our most vulnerable points. I was
afraid that the enemy might attempt another such operation at the start
of his offensive, and instructed Vice-Admiral Lombardi and General
Deindl to do everything they could to make the defence of the fortress
secure.

16 Sept.

DEAREST Lu,

Arrived back last night from Tobruk. You ll no doubt have been
pleased to hear the special communiqu6 about the abortive landing.
Everything seems to be under control again now. Stumme is arriving
in Rome to-day. I hope to start in a week s time.

Kesselring came this morning, after I d seen and talked to him

292 THE WAR IN AFRICA SECOND YEAR

yesterday in Tobruk. He d come from the Fuehrer s H.Q. The battle
for Stalingrad seems to be very hard and is tying up a lot of forces
which we could make better use of in the south.

I hear that Field Marshal List is retiring. I thought particularly
highly of him, as you know.

This was the heaviest attack which the British made on our rear areas.
Generally, minor operations of this kind were undertaken by the Com
mandos under the command of Colonel Stirling. 1 These Commandos,
working from Kufra 2 and the Qattara depression, sometimes operated
right up into Cyrenaica, where they caused considerable havoc and
seriously disquieted the Italians. They tried again and again to incite
the Arabs against us fortunately, with little success, for there is nothing
so unpleasant as partisan warfare. It is perhaps very important not to
make reprisals on hostages at the first outbreak of partisan warfare, for
these only create feelings of revenge and serve to strengthen the francs-
tireurs* It is better to allow an incident to go unavenged than to hit back
at the innocent. It only agitates the whole neighbourhood, and hostages
easily become martyrs. The Italian commander shared my view, and so
the occasional Arab raid was usually overlooked.

Meanwhile, in spite of the excellent care of the good Professor Horster,
my health had grown so bad after an uninterrupted eighteen months in
Africa, that it had become essential for me to embark on a long course of
treatment in Europe without further delay. General Stumme was to
deputise for me as Army Commander during my absence. He arrived
at my headquarters on the igth September. Later the same day a
conference took place between Marshal Cavallero, Lieut.-Col. Otto (my
Quartermaster) and myself. Otto and I complained of the frightful state
of our supplies and especially about the Italian action in shipping across
more formations destined for Tripolitania. These formations were of no
earthly use at the front but merely required the use of shipping space
which was already in great enough demand for the fighting troops. The
Duce had actually given orders for two further divisions, additional to
the Pistoia, to be brought to Tripolitania. At the same time, men of the
Panzer Army s Italian formations who had been more than two years in
Africa were being withdrawn, without any replacements forthcoming.
As usual Cavallero promised to look after our interests.

On the 2 ist September, I flew with Gause and Baycrlein to inspect
the German-Italian garrison at the Siwa oasis, where we were given an
enthusiastic welcome by the Arab population. We presented gifts to the

a lt is interesting to see that Rommel was unaware that a variety of special raiding
forces were employed in these operations. Thus he used the term " Commandos " to
embrace the S.A.S. (Special Air Service Regiment), the L.R.D.G. (Long Range Desert
Group), and other guerrilla-type forces.

2 The Kufra Oasis is some 500 miles south of Tobruk, deep in the Sahara Desert.

BATTLE WITHOUT HOPE ALAMEIN 293

local chiefs and photographed the tribesmen in their magnificent coloured
robes. I was presented with an envelope on which was stuck every
postage stamp issued in the oasis, stamped with that day s postmark.

N ext day I handed over command of the Panzer Army to General
Stumme. He was rather put out when he heard that I proposed to cut
short my cure and return to North Africa if the British opened a major
offensive. He supposed that I had no confidence in him. But that was
by no means the case; it was merely that I was convinced that even the
most skilful Panzer General would be unable to take the right decisions
in an emergency on the Alamein front unless he were familiar with the
British. Words alone cannot impart one s experience to a deputy. On
the Alamein front, there was a very great difference between quiet and
critical days.

It was with a heavy heart that I set off for Derna next day (23rd)
to fly to Italy. I intended to bring it home once more to the Italians that
if we were to hold out in Egypt for any length of time, a quite extra
ordinary effort would have to be made in the field of supply. *-

On the 23rd September I reached the following agreements with
the Italians : The Italians in Libya were to provide 3,000 men immediately
to build a road behind the front. Continued driving over unmetalled
tracks, mostly covered with deep sand and pitted with holes up to eighteen
inches deep, was ruining our vehicles, especially as our drivers usually
drove like the devil and without any regard for their vehicles. The spare
part situation was so bad that we could no longer afford this wastage.

The Italians agreed to ship 7,000 tons of rails and sleepers to Africa
for the construction of railway communications.

The Italians further undertook to attack and capture Kufra in order
to put a stop to the sabotage raids for which it was forming a base.

It is interesting to compare Cavallero s promises with what was
actually done by about the middle of October.

When General Barbassetti received the demand for 3,000 men* he
declared that he was not in a position to provide that number and that
the most he could spare was 400. Of these 400 only a little over 100
actually arrived and so the road could never be built.

Similarly, there arrived neither rails nor sleepers. The only work that
was done on the railway was by men of the goth Light Division.

When it came to the point, neither Barbassetti nor Gavallero was
willing to attack, or in fact did attack, the Kufra oasis. Everything stayed
as it was, and the threat of the British Commandos remained.

It is probable that Marshal Cavallero merely wanted to keep me
quiet, and thought that it would be bound to be some time before I
could be effective in Africa again.

On the 24th September I discussed the situation with the Duce. I
left him in no doubt that unless supplies were sent to us at least on the
scale I had demanded we should have to get out of North Africa. I think

1294 THE WAR IN AFRICA SECOND YEAR

that, for all I said, he still did not realise the full gravity of the situation.
All through the past two years I had myself informed him again and
again of our supply difficulties, without any noticeable improvement
resulting except during the spring of 1942. Yet, in spite of this lack of
response, things had never actually gone wrong. Of course people had
no idea in Europe what difficult decisions had often faced us out there.
We were always told: "You ll pull it off all right" but unless the
material conditions had first been created I could not pull off anything.
The confidence everybody had in us was certainly very gratifying, but
we in Africa quite frankly placed a great deal more value on an adequate
supply. We in no way overestimated ourselves, but knew that any success
we scored was due to natural causes. 1

At any rate, I was pleased to hear that the German and Italian
supply authorities were proposing to put a considerable quantity of
French shipping into service in the near future. In addition the very
efficient Gauleiter Kaufmann, an extremely talented man in organisation
and technical matters, was to take our maintenance in hand. So in spite
of everything there was at least a glimmer of light.

Several days later I reported to the Fuehrer. His headquarters had
obviously been very impressed by the Panzer Army s successes and now
wanted to force a decision in the Mediterranean area.

I outlined to the Fuehrer the course of our attack on the Alamein Line
and the cause of its failure. I laid particular stress on the tremendous
superiority of the British in the air, and described the effect of the new
R.A.F. bombing tactics, above all, the limitations which they brought
on the employment of motorised forces, caused by the extreme vulner
ability of these forces to air attack. I also said that the only way to
overcome the enemy air superiority was by the immediate dispatch to
Africa of strong air forces of our own.

I dealt very thoroughly with the bad supply situation and, as with
the Duce, made no secret of the fact that we would be unable to keep
going unless a radical improvement was made. I described in detail the
possibilities that existed for improving our supply. I also demanded that
the ratio of the German supply quota to the Italian should be raised,
pointing out that the strength of the German fighting formations far
exceeded that of the Italian. I stated once more that the transport across
the Mediterranean of 30,000 tons in September and 35,000 tons in October
was an indispensable condition for a successful defence against the forth*
coming British attack.

I concluded my report with the following words:

" I quite realise that, with the present strategic sea and air situation
in the Mediterranean, a very great effort will be required to ensure a safe

Wot* by General Bqyerlein By "natural causes *, Rommel apparently meant the
absolute minimum of petrol, ammunition and material necessary for making war in the
desert.

BATTLE WITHOUT HOPE ALAMEIN 295

and uninterrupted German supply to Africa. It will make the utmost
demands of all German and Italian transport services and will require
the reinforcement of the transport fleet. But it is only by the fulfilment of
the conditions I have stated that the German troops, who are bearing
the main brunt of the fighting in Africa, will be able to maintain their
hold on tfiis theatre against the finest troops of the British Empire.**

During the conference I realised that the atmosphere in the Fuehrer s
H.Q. was extremely optimistic. Goering in particular was inclined to
minimise our difficulties. When I said that British fighter-bombers had
shot up my tanks with 4O-mm. shells, the Reichsmarschall, who felt
himself touched by this, said: "That s completely impossible. The
Americans only know how to make razor blades." I replied: "We
could do with some of those razor blades, Herr Reichsmarschall."

Fortunately, we had brought with us a solid armour-piercing shell
which had been fired at one of our tanks by a low-flying British aircraft.
It had killed almost the entire tank crew.

The Fuehrer promised that our supplies would be considerably
increased during the next few weeks by the use of large numbers of
Siebelfaehren. [Flat ferries designed by a German engineer named Siebel,] These
were vessels of such shallow draught that torpedoes passed underneath
them. They also carried several A.A. guns and were thus relatively
invulnerable to air attack. One disadvantage of them was that they could
not be used in a heavy sea, but heavy seas are not very frequent in the
Mediterranean. I was shown production figures which held out a hope
that much of our supply difficulty could be overcome in the near future
provided, of course, that it was not then too late.

While at the Fuehrer s H.Q. I was assured that a Nebelwerfer
{multiple rocket-projector] Brigade of 500 rocket tubes was shortly to be sent
to Africa. Forty Tiger tanks and self-propelled guns were also to be
sent over as early as possible in Siebelfaehren and Italian transports.

Later it transpired that many of these promises had been given in a
moment of over-optimism and on the basis of incorrect production figures,
for it was neither possible to realise the building programme for Siebel
faehren on the scale provided for, nor to send the stated number of Nebel
werfer or of Tiger tanks to the African theatre.

During these days I found myself reluctantly compelled to face
representatives of the Press in order to dispel a number of rumours which
were in circulation about myself. With things as they were I could not,
of course, give a true picture of the situation. In any case, by giving an
optimistic account I hoped to bring about some postponement of the
British offensive.

After this I went off to the Semmering 1 to clear up my liver and blood-
pressure trouble. Before my departure from Africa, Professor Horster
had insisted on my making an extended stay in Europe. He had already
X A mountain resort near Vienna.

296 THE WAR IN AFRICA SECOND YEAR

kept me under continual observation during the ** Six-day Race." Up
on the Semmering I was completely cut off from the outside world, except
for the radio, newspapers and occasional letters from General Stumme
and Colonel Westphal. But with my army in such a plight I was of
course incapable of attaining real peace of mind. I followed the operations
of our submarines in the Atlantic with particular anxiety.

By declaring war on America, we had brought the entire American
industrial potential into the service of the Allied war production. We
in Africa knew all about the quality of its achievements. Now, during
my stay in Europe, I obtained for myself some figures on American
productive capacity. It was many times greater than ours. The battle
which was being fought in the Atlantic was deciding whether the
Americans would be able to go on carrying their material to Europe,
Russia and Africa. I realised that there would be little hope left for us
if the Americans and British succeeded in eliminating, or reducing to
tolerable proportions, the U-boat threat to their convoys. But if we could
strangle their sea routes, then the entire industrial capacity of America
would avail the Allies little. As things turned out, of course, the Americans
succeeded, several months later, in sinking so many of our submarines
by the use of location devices and helicopters, as to render the further
use of this weapon virtually impossible. 1

The news I received from Africa was not very cheering. The British
air force was becoming increasingly active and the Eighth Army was
growing steadily stronger. The Panzer Army lived in constant expecta
tion of a major British attack. They thought that the attack would be
launched at several points simultaneously, and that the British would
subsequently throw in their whole strength at the point where a break
through seemed most likely to succeed.

According to our estimates, the British had a two to one superiority
in tanks. This figure included on our side the 300 Italian tanks, the
fighting value of which was very small. We still had only very few tanks
armed with a 75-mm. gun, whereas the British had many hundreds
equipped with heavy guns. 2 Of our 210 German tanks only 30 or so

1 Rommel was so profoundly impressed by the tremendous war-potential of the
U.S.A. which, he felt, had fatally turned the scales against Germany that he was
apt to ascribe any powerful new development to the Americans without discrimination.
That tendency was increased, naturally, by the way that the balance of qualitative
superiority in tanks turned against him with the advent of the Grants and Shermans.
But, in fact, the principal location device the radar instrument known as HiS that
eventually changed the course of the submarine war, as well as the war in the air, was
a British invention.

2 Rommel here understates rather than overstates the relative situation. The British
superiority in tank numbers was nearly 2 J to i over the combined German and Italian
tanks, and about 5$ to i over the German tanks.

A still more preponderant factor was that the British numbers included more than
500 tanks armed with a 75-mm. gun some 400 of which were Shermans, and the
remainder Grants and Lees. Rommel had only 38 tanks armed with a 75-mm. gun.

BATTLE WITHOUT HOPE ALAMEIN 297

were Panzer IVs; the majority were Panzer Ills, half of which were of
the short-barrel type and hence very out of date. 1 As for the 300 Italian
tanks apart from their technical deficiencies which I have mentioned
several times already most of them were decrepit, and barely fit for
action. Supplies were not being maintained at anything like the required
level, so immense shortages existed in almost every field.

At this time, only four fast motor-ships, aggregating 19,000 tons, and
seven large but slow transports of together 40,000 tons, were in use for
the Panzer Army. Eight ships, totalling 40,000 tons, were in dock under
going repairs.

My deputy, General Stumme, was on the move continually, both fay
car and aircraft, trying to bring our defence preparations up to the
standard I required. He, too, had now come to realise the full extent
of the supply deficiencies, on which the whole Africa problem turned.
The longer things went on, the more obvious it became that, despite all
the efforts of the army, the supply situation could no longer be improved.
It was now too late.

THE DEFENCE PLAN

The Alamein line lay between the sea and the Qattara depression,
which our reconnaissance had finally established as being impassable for
major vehicle columns. Thus it was the only front in North Africa,
apart from the Akarit position, which could not be turned at its southern
end. All other positions could be collapsed by tying them down frontally
and outflanking them to the south. Everywhere else it was possible
to make a surprise sweep with motorised forces round the southern end
of the line in order to seek a decision in mobile warfare in the enemy s
rear. This fact of the open flank had led repeatedly to completely novel
situations.

But at Alamein it was different. This line, if solidly held by infantry
throughout its length, completely ruled out any chance of a surprise
enemy appearance in one s rear. The enemy had first to force a break
through, which meant that the defence had a chance of holding its line
long enough to enable the mobile reserve to come up and join the battle.

At El Alamein, therefore, we were presented with yet another set of
tactical conditions. The defence was here at a certain advantage because
it could dig in and protect itself with mines, while the enemy had to
make his attack exposed to the fire of the dug-in defence. And the
attacker had no choice but to assault and overcome the defender s line.
Elsewhere at Sollum, for instance, in 1941-42, and at Gazala in the

lf The Panzer IV was armed with a 75-mm. gun and the Panzer III with a 50 mm.
In both types there was an older short-barrelled model and a later one with a long
barrel. The greater length of barrel gave a considerable increase in the range and
penetration of the gun.

298 THE WAR IN AFRICA SECOND YEAR

summer of 1942 the battle had been conducted in a wholly mobile form,
with neither side deriving any initial advantage from its position, since
the tanks and vehicles of both combatants stood equally unprotected
in the desert. There had perhaps been a slight disadvantage for the
attack, in that the defence had in both cases held a line extending to the
south. For us at Sollum this was right, for the units employed in
the Sollum-Halfaya line were non-motorised and thus only suitable
for use in fixed and fortified positions. But it was not right for the
British at Gazala, since all the British divisions in the Gazala line were
fully motorised, and the small supply difficulties they were able to
create for us did not make up for their absence from the battlefield of
Knightsbridge-Acroma. As I have already explained, it is the extent to
which one can concentrate one s forces, both in space and time, that
counts in motorised warfare,

In the open desert, we were as all previous actions had shown
considerably superior in training and command to the British. Although
we could expect that the British had learnt many tactical lessons from the
large number of battles and skirmishes we had given them, they could
not have removed all their shortcomings, since these had then* cause less
in their command, than in the ultra-conservative structure of their army,
which although excellently suited for fighting on fixed fronts, was far
from suitable for war in the open desert.

Nevertheless, we still could not take the risk of putting the main
weight of our defence on to operations in the open desert, for the following
reasons:

(a) The relative strengths in motorised divisions had become too
unequal; while our opponents were receiving a steady flow of
motorised reinforcements, we received only non-motorised, which
were as good as useless in the open desert. Consequently, we were
forced to choose a form of warfare in which they, too, could play
their part

(b) The British air superiority, together with the new air tactics of
the R.A.F., created severe limitations on the tactical use of
motorised forces, of which a detailed explanation has already been
given.

(c) We were permanently short of petrol. I did not want to get myself
again into the awkward situation of having to break off a battle
because we were out of petrol. In a mobile defensive action,
shortage of petrol spells disaster.

For all these reasons, we now had to try to base our defence on a
fortified and infantry-held line.

This meant that the British would first have to try for a break-through.
We had no doubts about the suitability of the British Army for such a
task, for its entire training had been based on the lessons learnt in the

BATTLE WITHOUT HOPE ALAMEIN

battles of material of the First World War. And, although technical
developments had left their mark on this form of warfare, they had
brought about no revolution. Although the tactical consequences of
motorisation and armour had been pre-eminently demonstrated by
British military critics, 1 the responsible British leaders had not taken the
risk either of using this hitherto untried system as a foundation for peace
time training, or of applying it in war. But this failure, which had told
so heavily against the British in the past, would not affect the issue of the
approaching battle of position and break-through, because the extensive
minefields would rob the armour of its freedom of movement and
operation, and would force it into the role of the infantry tank. In
this form of action the full value of the excellent Australian and New
Zealand infantry would be realised and the British artillery would have
its effect.

We, for our part, had to prevent the British from breaking through
our line at all costs, since, for the reasons already given, we could not
face having to fight a mobile defensive battle. Our motorised formations
would hardly suffice to cover a withdrawal of the infantry from a front
some 40 miles long and, in any case, the infantry themselves might by
that time have become so involved in the action that disengagement would
be unthinkable.

This brought us to two inescapable conclusions:

(a) Our position had to be held at all costs.

(b) Any penetration would have to be cleaned up by immediate
counter-attack to prevent it being extended into a break-through,
for it was my opinion that if a break-through occurred, the British
would throw their whole striking power into the breach.

We constructed our defence system to meet these requirements. We
saw to it that the troops were given such firm positions, and that the front
was held in such density that a threatened sector could hold out against
even the heaviest British attack long enough to enable the mobile reserve
to come up, however long it was delayed by the R.A.F.

Coming down to more detail, the defences were so laid out that the
minefields adjoining no-man s land were held by light outposts only,

^-Publisher** Note. The following footnote was written by General Bayerlcin for the
German edition Krieg ohne Hass and indicates why the Rommel family were particularly
anxious that Captain Liddell Hart should write an Introduction to, and edit, the
English edition :

Note by General Bqyerlein* Rommel was here referring to Captain Liddell Hart and
General Fuller. In his opinion the British could have avoided most of their defeats if
only they had paid more heed to the modern theories expounded by those two writers
beifore the war. During the war, in many conferences and personal talks with Field-Marshal
Rommel, we discussed Liddell Hart s military works, which won our admiration. Of
all military writers, it was Liddell Hart who made the deepest impression on the Field-
Marshal and greatly influenced his tactical and strategical thinking. He, like
Guderian, could in many respects be termed Liddell Harf s * pupil."

3OO THE WAR IN AFRICA SECOND YEAR

\vlth the main defence line, which was two to three thousand yards in
depth, located one to two thousand yards west of the first mine-belt.
The panzer divisions were positioned behind the main defence line so
that their guns could fire into the area in front of the line and increase
the defensive fire-power of their sector. In the event of the attack
developing a centre of gravity at any point, the panzer and motorised
divisions situated to the north and south were to close up on the threatened
sector.

A very large number of mines was used in the construction of our line,
something of the order of 500,000, counting in the captured British mine
fields. In placing the minefields, particular care was taken to ensure that
the static formations could defend themselves to the side and rear as well
as to the front. Vast numbers of captured British bombs and shells were
built into the defence, arranged in some cases for electrical detonation.
Italian troops were interspersed with their German comrades so that an
Italian battalion always had a German as its neighbour. The Italian
armament was unfortunately so inefficient that it had to be distributed
evenly over the whole front, thus ensuring that German arms were also
available in every sector.

Our outposts were provided with dogs to give warning of any British
approach to the minefields. We wanted to ensure that the work of
clearing the minefields proceeded at the slowest possible speed and not
until after our outposts had been eliminated. Most of the mines available
in Africa were unfortunately of the anti-tank type, which infantry could
walk over without danger. They were, therefore, comparatively easy to
clear.

Thus the army was put on the defensive along these lines during my
absence. But all our efforts were to prove unavailing against the im
mensely superior British forces not because of mistakes we had made,
but because victory was simply impossible under the terms on which we
entered the battle. 1

THE STORM BREAKS

An outline of the British plan is required as a preliminary to RommeVs account
of the battle, for its fuller understanding. Attacking on a front where the scope for
manoeuvre was restricted, Montgomery used his infantry to open the way for his
armour. He also chose to concentrate the weight of his attack in the northern sector.
The main attack here was delivered by Leese s XXX Corps with four infantry
divisions from right to left, the gth Australian, $ist Highland, 2nd New

by Generd Bayerlein. It has been repeatedly stated by different writers that
General Stumme did not plan the defences at El Alamein in the way that Rommel would
have done. To this is must be clearly stated that Rommel issued orders for the con
struction of the defences before his departure from Africa, and that Stumme merely
executed them.

MEDITERRANEAN

LEGEND
German defensive area.

and minefields
German Divisions
Italian &gt;,
British Front, 23 r &lt;* Oct

Bridgehead, 2". d Nov. = = =

17. THE BATTLE OF ALAMEIN, OCTOBER NOVEMBER 1942

302 THE WAR IN AFRICA SECOND YEAR

Zealand, and ist South African. The 4th Indian Division was to create a local
diversion. After two corridors had been driven through the enemy minefields, the
ist and loth Armoured Divisions ofLumsden s X Corps were to pass through, take
up a position at the far end, and repulse the anticipated counter-attack of the enemy s
armour before trying to drive on.

In the south, Horrocks 9 XIII Corps 44th and $oth (Infantry) Divisions and
7th Armoured Division attempted a diversionary attack to distract the enemy s
attention and pin down his reserves -particularly the 2 ist Panzer Division.

Although the Eighth Army comprised only three armoured divisions, it had three
additional armoured brigades, making six in all, as well as a light armoured
brigade against two German, and two Italian.

The battle which began at El Alamein on the 23rd October 1942
turned the tide of war in Africa against us and, in fact, probably repre
sented the turning point of the whole vast struggle. The conditions under
which my gallant troops entered the battle were so disheartening that
there was practically no hope of our coming out of it victorious.

Something over 200 German and about 300 Italian tanks faced
qualitatively superior British armour to the strength of over 1,000 tanks.
True, we had a fair number of guns, but many of these were obsolete
Italian types, many of them captured guns and all of them terribly short
of ammunition. In addition, the British had now gained complete air
supremacy over the Mediterranean and, by bombing our ports and
maintaining close air observation over our sea routes, supplemented by
intense naval activity, were in a position virtually to paralyse our sea
traffic. As a result, our stocks of supplies were so low that shortages of
every kind were evident even at the beginning of the battle, with effects
which will be clearly seen in the following account.

The 23rd October passed just like any other day on the Alamein
front until the evening, when, at 21.40 hours, a barrage of immense
weight opened over the whole line, eventually concentrating on the
northern sector. Such drum-fire had never before been seen on the
African front, and it was to continue throughout the whole of the Alamein
battle. Apart from the divisional artillery of the attacking and holding
divisions, Montgomery had concentrated 15 heavy artillery regiments 1
representing a total 0^540 guns of a calibre greater than 105 mm. in
the northern sector between Hill 35 and Deir el Shein. The British
bombarded our known positions with extraordinary accuracy, and
enormous casualties resulted. R.A.F. bombers also took part in the
preparatory barrage.

Our communication network was soon smashed by this drum-fire,
and reports from the front virtually ceased. Our outposts fought to the
last round and then either surrendered or died.

*By " heavy artillery " Rommel here means what, in the British Army, is classified
as " medium artillery," In all some 1,200 guns were used in the opening bombardment.

BATTLE WITHOUT HOPE ALAMEIN 303

Under the impact of the terrible British artillery fire, which grew
to World War I proportions, part of the Italian 6snd Infantry Regiment
left their line and streamed back to the rear. Exposed to this tornado
of fire in their partially completed defence positions, their nerve had
failed. By 01 .00 hours the British had overrun our outposts and penetrated
to our main defence line over a width of six miles. Our infantry resisted
bitterly, although most of their heavy weapons had been smashed by
the enemy artillery fire. Again and again the British brought up tanks.
Soon they overran the remains of the 6snd Italian Infantry Regiment
and broke into our line, where they were finally stopped by concentrated
artillery fire. Two battalions of die i64th Infantry Division were also
wiped out during the early hours of the morning by the concentric fire
of the British guns.

The offensive as a whole made less progress, and went slower, than the British
Command hoped. That was largely due to the density of the minefields. Dawn
came before even one of the corridors was cleared sufficiently for the armour to pass
through, and when it tried to push on beyond in daylight it was soon held up. In
the other corridor the armour was still hung up in the minefield. It was not until
the following morning, after fresh night attacks by the infantry, that the deployment
was completed. The four armoured brigades of the X Corps, with their 700 tanks
and strong artillery, then took up a position covering the mouth of the six-mile breach,
ready to deal with the German armoured counter-attack which Montgomery hoped
to provoke.

Back in H.Q,. which was sited on the coast only a few miles behind
the front General Stumme heard this tornado of fire, but because of
the meagre stocks of ammunition in Africa, did not authorise the artillery
to open fire on the British assembly positions. This was a mistake, in my
view, for it would have at least reduced the weight of the British attack.
When the artillery did finally open fire it was unable to have anything
like the effect it might have had earlier, for the British had by that time
been able to install themselves in the defence posts they had captured
during the night. When dawn broke on the 24th of October, headquarters
had still only received a few reports, and there was considerable obscurity
about the situation. Accordingly General Stumme decided to drive up
to the front himself.

The acting Army Chief of Staff, Colonel Westphal, pressed him to
take an escort vehicle and signals truck as I had always done. But he
refused to take any escort apart from Colonel Buechting; he intended to
go no farther than the headquarters of the goth Light Division and
considered it unnecessary to take any other vehicles.

Concentric artillery fire began again in the early hours of the 24th,
this time on the southern sector, where the British soon attacked with
infantry and about 160 tanks. After overrunning our outposts they were
brought to a halt in front of the main defence line.

Here, in the XIII Corps sector, the ?th Armoured Division got through the

304 THE WAR IN AFRICA SECOND YEAR

first minefield on the opening night, but was stopped in front of the second by heavy
defensive fire. A narrow penetration was made on the next night, but when the
armour tried to go through it was again blocked by fire. As losses were rising,
Montgomery discontinued the attack in the south, for he wanted to preserve the
jth Armoured Division for further action elsewhere.

On the afternoon of the 24-th, I was rung up on the Semmering by
Field Marshal Keitel, who told me that the British had been attacking
at Alamein with powerful artillery and bomber support since the previous
evening. General Stumme was missing. He asked whether I would be
well enough to return to Africa and take over command again. I said
I would. Keitel then said that he would keep me informed of develop
ments, and would let me know in due course whether I was to return to
my command. I spent the next few hours in a state of acute anxiety,
until the evening, when I received a telephone call from Hitler himself.
He said that Stumme was still missing either captured or killed and
asked whether I could start for Africa immediately. I was to telephone
him again before I actually took off, because he did not want me to
interrupt my treatment unless the British attack assumed dangerous
proportions. I ordered my aircraft for seven o clock next morning and
drove immediately to Wiener Neustadt. Finally, shortly after midnight,
a call came through from the Fuehrer. In view of developments at
Alamein he found himself obliged to ask me to fly back to Africa and
resume my command. I took off next morning. I knew there were no
more laurels to be earned in Africa, for I had been told in the reports I
had received from my officers that supplies had fallen far short of my
minimum demands. But just how bad the supply situation really was
I had yet to learn.

On arriving at Rome at about 1 1 .00 hours (25th October) I was met
at the airport by General von Rintelen, Military Attache and German
General attached to the Italian forces. He informed me of the latest
events in the African theatre. After heavy artillery preparation, the
enemy had taken part of our line south of Hill 3 1 ; several battalions of
1 64th Division and of Italians had been completely wiped out. The
British attack was still in progress and General Stumme still missing.
General von Rintelen alst&gt; informed me that only three issues of petrol
remained in the African theatre; it had been impossible to send any more
across in the last weeks, partly because the Italian Navy had not provided
the shipping and partly because of the British sinkings. This was sheer
disaster, for with only 300 kilometres worth of petrol per vehicle between
Tripoli and the front, and that calculated over good driving country, a
prolonged resistance could not be expected; we would be completely
prevented from taking the correct tactical decisions and would thus suffer
a tremendous limitation in our freedom of action. I was bitterly angry,
because when I left there had been at least eight issues for the Army in
Egypt and Libya, and even this had been absurdly little in comparison

BATTLE WITHOUT HOPE ALAMEIN 305

with the minimum essential of thirty issues. Experience had shown that
one issue of petrol was required for each day of battle; without it, the
army was crippled and could not react to the enemy s moves. General
von Rintelen regretted the situation, but said that he had unfortunately
been on leave and had consequently been unable to give sufficient
attention to the supply question.

Rommel was justifiably incensed at the fact that virtually nothing had been
done by the German authorities in Rome towards supplying the Panzer Army for
the forthcoming battle. Rommefs reproach, however, should have been aimed at
General von Rintelen 1 s deputy rather than Rintelen himself % who had been absent on
sick leave.

Feeling that we would fight this battle with but small hope of success,
I crossed the Mediterranean in my Storch and reached headquarters at
dusk (25th October). Meanwhile, General Stumme s body had been
found at midday and taken to Derna. He had apparently been driving
to the battlefield along the Alarm track when he had suddenly been fired
on in the region of Hill 2 1 by British infantry using anti-tank and machine-
guns. Colonel Buechting had received a mortal wound in the head. The
driver, Corporal Wolf, had immediately swung the car round, and
General Stumme had leapt out and hung on to the outside of it, while
the driver drove at top speed out of the enemy fire. General Stumme
must have suddenly had a heart attack and fallen off the car. The driver
had noticed nothing. On Sunday morning the General had been found
dead beside the Alarm track. General Stumme had been known to
suffer from high blood-pressure and had not really been fit for tropical
service.

We all deeply regretted the sudden death of Stumme. He had spared
no pains to command the army well and had been day and night at the
front. Just before setting off on his last journey on the 24th of October,
he had told the acting Chief of Staff that he thought it would be wise to
ask for my return, since with his short experience of the African theatre,
and in view of the enormous British strength and the disastrous supply
situation, he felt far from certain that he would be able to fight the battle
to a successful conclusion. I, for my part, did not feel any more optimistic.

General von Thoma and Colonel Westphal reported to me that
evening on the course of the battle to date, mentioning particularly that
General Stumme had forbidden the bombardment of the enemy assembly
positions on the first night of the attack, on account of the ammunition
shortage. As a result the enemy had been able to take possession of part
of our minefield and to overcome the occupying troops with comparatively
small losses to himself. The petrol situation made any major movement
impossible and permitted only local counter-attacks by the armour
deployed behind the particular sector which was in danger. Units of the
1 5th Panzer Division had counter-attacked several times on the 24th and
25th October, but had suffered frightful losses in the terrible British

306 THE WAR IN AFRICA SECOND YEAR

artillery fire and non-stop R.A.F. bombing attacks. By the evening of the
25th, only 31 of their 119 tanks remained serviceable.

There were now only very small stocks of petrol left in North Africa
and a crisis was threatening. I had already on my way through Rome
demanded the immediate employment of all available Italian sub
marines and warships for the transport of petrol and ammunition. Our
own air force was still unable to prevent the British bombing attacks, or
to shoot down any major number of British aircraft. The R.A.F. s new
fighter-bombers were particularly in evidence, as is shown by the fact
that every one of the captured tanks belonging to the Kampfstqffd had
been shot up by this new type of aircraft.

Our aim for the next few days was to throw the enemy out of our
main defence line at all costs and to reoccupy our old positions, in order
to avoid having a westward bulge in our front.

That night our line again came under a heavy artillery barrage,
which soon developed into one long roll of fire. I slept only a few hours
and was back in my command vehicle again at 05.00 hours [26th October],
where I learnt that the British had spent the whole night assaulting our
front under cover of their artillery, which in some places had fired as
many as five hundred rounds for every one of ours. Strong forces of the
panzer divisions were already committed in the front line. British night-
bombers had been over our units continuously. Shortly before midnight
the enemy had succeeded in taking Hill 28, an important position in the
northern sector. 1 He had .then brought up reinforcements to this point
ready to continue the attack in the morning with the object of extending
his bridge-head west of the minefields.

Attacks were now launched on Hill 28 by elements of the 15th Panzer
Division, the Littorio and a Bersaglieri Battalion, supported by the
concentrated fire of all the local artillery and A.A. Unfortunately, the
attack gained ground very slowly. The British resisted desperately.
Rivers of blood were poured out over miserable strips of land which, in
normal times, not even the poorest Arab would have bothered his head
about. Tremendous British artillery fire pounded the area of the attack.
In the evening part of the Bersaglieri Battalion succeeded in occupying
the eastern and western edges of the hill. The hill itself remained in
British hands and later became the base for many enemy operations.

I myself observed the attack that day from the north. Load after load
of bombs cascaded down among my troops. British strength round Hill
28 was increasing steadily. I gave orders to the artillery to break up the
British movement north-east of Hill 28 by concentrated fire, but we had
too little ammunition to do it successfully. During the day I brought
up the goth Light Division and the Kampfstqffel, in order to press home the
attack on Hill 28. The British were continually feeding fresh forces into

Called by the British " Kidney Ridge " from the shape of the ring contour on the
map.

BATTLE WITHOUT HOPE ALAMEIN 307

their attack from Hill 28 and it was clear that they wanted to win through
to the area between El Daba and Sidi Abd el Rahman. I therefore moved
the Trieste into the area east of El Daba. Late in the afternoon German
and Italian dive-bomber formations made a self-immolating attempt to
break up the British lorry columns moving towards the north-west.
Some 60 British fighters pounced on these slow machines and forced the
Italians to jettison their bombs over their own lines, while the German
pilots pressed home their attack with very heavy losses. Never before
in Africa had we seen such a density of anti-aircraft fire. Hundreds of
British tracer shells criss-crossed the sky and the air became an absolute
inferno of fire.

British attacks supported by tanks tried again and again to break out
to the west through our line south of Hill 28. Finally, in the afternoon,
a thrust by 160 tanks succeeded in wiping out an already severely mauled
battalion of the i64th Infantry Division and penetrated into our line
towards the south-west. Violent fighting followed in which the remaining
German and Italian tanks managed to force the enemy back. Tank
casualties so far, counting in that day s, were 61 in the I5th Panzer
Division and 56 in the Littorio, all totally destroyed.

Following on their non-stop night attacks, the R.A.F. sent over
formations of 18 to 20 bombers at hourly intervals throughout the day,
which not only caused considerable casualties, but also began to produce
serious signs of fatigue and a sense of inferiority among our troops.

Fatigue and depression were also evident on the British side &gt; and there was a
widespread feeling that the offensive might have to be broken off. While the German
and Italian armour had suffered heavy losses in their attacks on the 2$th and zSth,
the British armour also lost heavily when they in turn tried to attack on tJie 26th.
Both sides, indeed, successively provided an object lesson in the cost and futility of
the " direct approach " the offensive spirit unguided by subtlety of mind. On the
British side, the commanders of the armour felt increasing doubts about the way
it was being used to batter a way through. The infantry too, were also very tired,
and depressed by their losses.

Montgomery decided that it would be wise to pause and change tfieplan, giving
the bulk of his troops a rest while he was regrouping and bringing up the jth
Armoured Division from the south. Frontal pressure was kept up meantime by
minor attacks, on the 2?th and 28th, and even in these one almost complete armoured
brigade was used up.

The supply situation was now approaching disaster. ^ The tanker
Proserpina, which we had hoped would bring some relief in the petrol
situation, had been bombed and sunk outside Tobruk. There was only
enough petrol left to keep supply traffic going between Tripoli and the
front for another two or three days, and that without counting the needs
of the motorised forces, which had to be met out of the same stocks.
What we should really have done now was to assemble all our motorised
units in the north in order to fling the British back to the main defence line

308 THE WAR IN AFRICA SECOND YEAR

in a concentrated and planned counter-attack. But we had not the petrol
to do it. So we were compelled to allow the armoured formations in the
northern part of our line to assault the British salient piecemeal.

Since the enemy was operating with astonishing hesitancy and
caution, a concentrated attack by the whole of our armour could have
been successful, although such an assembly of armour would of course
have been met by the heaviest possible British artillery fire and air
bombardment. However, we could have made the action more fluid
by withdrawing a few miles to the west and could then have attacked
the British in an all-out charge and defeated them in open country. The
British artillery and air force could not easily have intervened with their
usual weight in a tank battle of this kind, for their own forces would
have been endangered.

But a decision to take forces from the southern front was unthinkable
with the petrol situation so bad. Not only could we not have kept a
mobile battle going for more than a day or two, but our armour could
never have returned to the south if the British had attacked there. I did,
however, decide to bring the whole of the 2ist Panzer Division up north,
although I fully realised that the petrol shortage would not allow it to
return. In addition, since it was now obvious that the enemy would
make his main effort in the north during the next few days and~try~for
a decision there, half the Army artillery was drawn off from the southern
front. At the same time I reported to the Fuehrer s H.Q. that we would
lose the battle unless there was an immediate improvement in the supply
situation. Judging by previous experience, there was very little hope of
this happening.

26 Oct. 1942
DEAREST Lu,

Arrived 18.30 yesterday. Situation critical. A lot of work! After
my wonderful weeks at home it s not easy to acclimatise myself to the
new surroundings and the job in hand. There s too big a difference.

Relays of British bombers continued their attack throughout the
night of the 26th. At about 02.00 hours a furious British barrage by guns
of every calibre suddenly began in the northern sector. Soon it was
impossible to distinguish between gun-fire and exploding shells and the
sky grew bright with the glare of muzzle-flashes and shell-bursts. Con
tinuous bombing attacks seriously delayed .the approach march of the
2 ist Panzer Division and a third of the Ariete. By dawn the goth Light
Division and the Trieste had taken up position round the southern side
of Sidi Abd el Rahman.

That morning \2jth October] I gave orders to all formations to pin
down the British assault forces during their approach by all-out fire
from every gun they could bring to bear.

BATTLE WITHOUT HOPE ALAMEIN 309

The tactics which the British were using followed from their apparently
inexhaustible stocks of ammunition. Their new tank, the General
Sherman, which came into action for the first time during this
battle, showed itself to be far superior to any of ours.

Attacks against our line were preceded by extremely heavy artillery
barrages lasting for several hours. The attacking infantry then pushed
forward behind a curtain of fire and artificial fog, clearing mines and
removing obstacles. Where a difficult patch was struck they frequently
switched the direction of their attack under cover of smoke. Once the
infantry had cleared lanes in the minefields, heavy tanks moved forward,
closely followed by infantry. Particular skill was shown in carrying out
this manoeuvre at night and a great deal of hard training must have
been done before the offensive.

In contact engagements the heavily gunned British tanks approached
to a range of between 2,000 and 2,700 yards and then opened con
centrated fire on our anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns and tanks, which
were unable to penetrate the British armour at that range. The
enormous quantities of ammunition which the enemy tanks used
sometimes they fired over 30 rounds at one target were constantly
replenished by armoured ammunition carriers. The British artillery fire
was directed by observers who accompanied the attack in tanks.

27 Oct. 1942
DEAREST Lu,

A very hard struggle. No one can conceive the burden that lies
on me. Everything is at stake again and we re fighting under the
greatest possible handicaps. However, I hope we ll pull through.
You know I ll put all I ve got into it.

YARD BY YARD

In the early hours of the 2?th of October, the British attacked again
towards the south-west at their old break-in point south of Hill 28. At
about 10 a.m. I went off to Telegraph Track. Two enemy bomber
formations, each of 18 aircraft, dropped their bombs inside ten minutes
into our defence positions. The whole front continued to lie under a
devastating British barrage.

Local counter-attacks were due to be launched that afternoon by the
qoth Light Division on Hill 28 and by the 15* and 2ist Panzer Divisions,
the Littorio and a part of the Ariete, against the British positions between
minefields L and I.

At 14.30 hours I drove to Telegraph Track again, accompanied by
Major Ziegler. Three times within a quarter of an hour units of the
goth Light Division, which had deployed and were standing in the open

3IO THE WAR IN AFRICA SECOND YEAR

in preparation for the attack, were bombed by formations of eighteen
aircraft. At 15.00 hours our dive-bombers swooped down on the British
lines. Every artillery and anti-aircraft gun which we had in the northern
sector concentrated a violent fire on the point of the intended attack.
Then the armour moved forward. A murderous British fire struck into
our ranks and our attack was soon brought to a halt by an immensely
powerful anti-tank defence, mainly from dug-in anti-tank guns and a
large number of tanks. We suffered considerable losses and were obliged
to withdraw. There is, in general, little chance of success in a tank attack
over country where the enemy has been able to take up defensive
positions; but there was nothing else we could do. The goth Light
Division s attack was also broken up by heavy British artillery fire and a
hail of bombs from British aircraft. A report from the division that they
had taken Hill 28 unfortunately turned out to be untrue.

That evening further strong detachments of the panzer divisions had
to be committed in the front to close the gaps. Several of the goth Light
Division s units also went into the line. Only 70 tons of petrol had been
flown across by the Luftwaffe that day, with the result that the army
could only refuel for a short distance, for there was no knowing
when petrol would arrive in any quantity and how long the divisions
would have to get along with the few tons we could issue to them.
The watchword " as little movement as possible " applied more than ever.

In the evening we again sent S O S s to Rome and the Fuehrer s H.Q.
But there was now no longer any hope of an improvement in the situation.
It was obvious that from now on the British would destroy us bit by bit,
since we were virtually unable to move on the battlefield. As yet,
Montgomery had only thrown half his striking force into the battle.

28 Oct. 1942
DEAREST Lu,

Who knows whether I ll have a chance to sit down and write in
peace in the next few days or ever again. To-day there s still a chance.

The battle is raging. Perhaps we will still manage to be able to
stick it out, in spite of all that s against us but it may go wrong, and
that would have very grave consequences for the whole course of the
war. For North Africa would then fall to the British in a few days,
almost without a fight. We will do all we can to pull it off. But the
enemy s superiority is terrific and our resources very small.

Whether I would survive a defeat lies in God s hands. The lot
of the vanquished is heavy. I m happy in my own conscience that
I ve done all I can for victory and have not spared myself.

I realised so well in the few short weeks I was at home what you
two mean to me. My last thought is of you.

Next day [s8tK\ I was forced to decide on bringing further units

BATTLE WITHOUT HOPE ALAMEIN

north, at the cost of almost completely denuding the southern front of
heavy weapons and German units. They were replaced by the third part
of the Ariete which had previously been engaged on the northern front.
During the morning the British made three attacks against our northern
front, but were thrown back to their starting point each time by our panzer
units. Unfortunately, we again lost heavily in tanks.

As on the previous days, ceaseless bombing attacks hammered down
on the German-Italian forces. The Luftwaffe tried all it could to help
us, but could achieve little or nothing against the tremendous numerical
superiority of the enemy.

The supply situation remained disastrous. In Italy, auxiliary cruisers
and destroyers were being mobilised in order to satisfy our urgent needs
for ammunition and petrol. Unfortunately only a few of the ships we
had been promised were coming to Tobruk; most were bound for
Benghazi. We knew from experience that transport from these ports to
the front took several days, and there was, therefore, little hope of these
supplies reaching us before it was too late*

Since midday on the 28th the existence of strong concentrations of
British armour had become apparent in minefield I. We assumed that
the British were about to launch what they intended to be their decisive
break-through and accordingly prepared ourselves, so far as our
diminished strength allowed, to meet the attack. Because of the heavy
casualties which had been suffered by the German-Italian infantry
divisions, the whole of the Afrika Korps had to be put into the line.

I again informed all commanders that this was a battle for life or
death and that every officer and man had to give of his best.

At about 21.00 hours a tremendous British drum-fire started to pound
the area west of Hill 28. Soon hundreds of British guns concentrated
their fire into the sector of the 2nd Battalion, I25th Regiment, north of
Hill 28.

This was the opening of the new British offensive. It took the form of a right-
angled thrust northward to the coast, delivered from the broad wedge that had been
driven into Rommefs front. The aim was to pinch off the now projecting northern
/lank of his position, and create an opening for a follow-up drive along the coast road,
towards Daba and Fuka.

The initial northward thrust was delivered by the $th Australian Division with
part of the 23rd Armoured Brigade. It was only a partial success and the tanks
suffered very heavily.

The British launched their assault at about 22,00 hours. The weight
of this attack was something quite exceptional. However, by concentrating
every gun in the area, we managed to break up the British attacks, which
were mainly made from Minefield I. Farther to the north, in the gap
between Minefields I and H, British tanks and infantry succeeded in
making a penetration. The battle raged at this point with tremendous
fury for six hours, until finally II/i25th Regiment and XI Bersaglieri

312 THE WAR IN AFRICA - SECOND YEAR

Battalion were overrun by the enemy. Their troops, surrounded and
exposed to enemy fire from all sides, fought on desperately.

Army H.Q. had meanwhile been moved farther to the west. I spent
the whole of that night with a number of my officers and men on the
coast road roughly in line with the old H.Q. site, from where we could
see the flash of bursting shells in the darkness and hear the rolling thunder
of the battle. Again and again British bomber formations flew up and
tipped their death-dealing loads on my troops, or bathed the country in
the brilliant light of parachute flares.

No one can conceive the extent of our anxiety during this period.
That night I hardly slept and by 03.00 hours \2Qth October] was pacing
up and down turning over in my mind the likely course of the battle, and
the decisions I might have to take. It seemed doubtful whether we
would be able to stand up much longer to attacks of the weight which the
British were now making, and which they were in any case still able to
increase. It was obvious to me that I dared not await the decisive break
through but would have to pull out to the west before it came. Such a
decision, however, could not fail to lead to the loss of a large proportion
of my non-motorised infantry, partly because of the low-fighting power
of my motorised formations and partly because the infantry units them
selves were too closely involved in the fighting. We were, therefore, going
to make one more attempt, by the tenacity and stubbornness of our
defence, to persuade the enemy to call off his attack. It was a slirn hope,
but the petrol situation alone made a retreat which would inevitably
lead to mobile warfare, out of the question.

If retreat were nevertheless forced upon us, the principal aim of the
Army would have to be to get as many tanks and weapons away to the
west as it could. On no account could they be allowed to await their
complete destruction in the Alamein line. So I decided that morning
that if British pressure became too strong I would withdraw to the Fuka
position before the battle had reached its climax,

This rearward line ran south from Fuka on the coast and terminated^ like the
Alamein line, in the Qattara depression.

29 Oct.
DEAREST Lu,

The situation continues very grave. By the time this letter arrives,
it will no doubt have been decided whether we can hold on or not.
I haven t much hope left.

At night I lie with my eyes wide open, unable to sleep, for the
load that is on my shoulders. In the day I m dead tired.

What will happen if things go wrong here? That is the thought
that torments me day and night. I can see no way out if that happens.

On the morning of the 2gth the British continued their attack against

BATTLE WITHOUT HOPE ALAMEIN 313

II/i25th Regiment under cover of heavy artillery fire. An attack by the
goth Light Division, aimed at relieving the battalion or, at any rate,
reducing the pressure on it, was met by devastating British drum-fire.
However, the remnants of II/i25th Regiment were able to disengage
under cover of this attack and fight their way back to the neighbouring
units. The rest of them had either been killed or wounded and taken
prisoner.

But the expected major attack did not come that day. It was the calm
before the storm. At 07.00 hours Colonel Bayerlein returned from
Europe and, after a short conference, set off for the Afrika Korps, where
his presence was urgently required*

When it was found that Rommel had shifted the goth Light Division to the
coastal sector, thus blocking the prospects of a rapid break-through there&gt; Alexander
and Montgomery thought that the best course was to revert to the original axis, now
that the opposition there had been thinned. The reorientation involved fresh re-
grouping, so that the new attack^ Operation Supercharge, was not ready for delivery
until the night of the ist November.

At about half-past eleven I received the shattering news that the
tanker Louisiana^ which had been sent as a replacement for the Proserpina^
had been sunk by an aerial torpedo. Now we really were up against it.
The ill-humour in which this news left me vented itself on the head of
General Barbassetti, who arrived at my H.Q. shortly afterwards to
represent Marshal Gavallero, who was detained in Rome. What riled
me most was that heavily armed Italian auxiliary cruisers and other
vessels, carrying cargoes intended for the front, were still being sent to
Benghazi in order to keep them out of range of the torpedo-carrying
British aircraft.

It was clear that it had now dawned on them even in Rome that the
Army was facing annihilation unless its mobile formations could im
mediately be supplied with sufficient petrol. All at once it was decided
to press submarines, warships, civilian aircraft and additional shipping
space into service. If only this had been done after the fall of Tobruk,
we would not have been sitting in front of El Alamein at die end of
October. But now it was becoming steadily clearer that it was too late.

The 2gth of October came and went and still the British had not
launched their big attack. They were obviously regrouping. I was in
course of discussing the details of the Fuka plan with Colonel Westphal,
when suddenly the alarming news broke upon us that two British divisions
had advanced through the Qattara depression and reached a point
60 miles south of Mersa Matruh. We were aghast, because we had
virtually no defence against such a move. Several units stationed in the
rear were immediately set in march for the threatened area. Next
morning, however, we discovered that the whole story, which had come
to us from the Commando Supremo, was a pure invention.

314 THE WAR IN AFRICA SECOND YEAR

30 Oct.

DEAREST Lu,

Situation a little quieter. I ve had some sleep, am in good spirits
and hope to pull it ofT even yet.

The front continued comparatively quiet except for heavy artillery
fire and air attacks hammering at our northern sector. That day the
R.A.F. concentrated their attack on the coast road, where many of our
vehicles were shot up by low-flying aircraft. Much to our relief, the
petrol situation was slightly improved by the arrival of an Italian ship
carrying 600 tons.

That day we had the Fuka position reconnoitred. The army had
been so badly battered by the British air force and artillery that we could
not now hope to stand up for long to the British break-through attempt,
which was daily or even hourly expected. In the open desert, the Italian
infantry formations would be so much dead weight, for they had practi
cally no transport. At the time of our retreat from Cyrenaica in 1941-42,
the Italians besieging Tobruk had been far enough west of the battlefield
for them to be easily moved out behind a screen of motorised and
armoured forces. Here, however, any withdrawal of the infantry would
open up the centre and southern sectors of the front to the powerful
British motorised forces standing ready there. The only thing for us was
to try to whip out the infantry unexpectedly under cover of darkness, load
all the units we could on to transport columns and then, after forming
a wide front with the motorised forces, beat a fighting retreat to the west.
But first we had to wait for the British to move, to ensure that they would
be engaged in battle and could not suddenly throw their strength into a
gap in our front and thus force a break-through.

Orders were given for the sist Panzer Division to be withdrawn from
the front line west of Minefields K and L during the night of the 3oth
and become mobile; it was to be replaced by the Trieste Division.
These moves were proceeding in the darkness when suddenly a violent
British barrage dropped on the sector held by the I25th Infantry Regiment
in the north. Our army and A.A. artillery immediately engaged the
British assembly areas south of Minefield H, but were unable to break
up the dense concentration of British infantry and armoured formations
in this sector. After an hour s barrage, the Australians opened their
attack by pinning down the I25th Regiment at the front and assaulting
its flank from the south. At the same time a strong force of British
armour rolled north from the area north of Hill 28, and overran a light
artillery battalion of the XXI Italian Corps, whose men, after a gallant
resistance, either died or fought their way through to the neighbouring
sector.

By next morning, the 3ist October, a force of 30 heavy British tanks
had reached the coast road and attacked part of the 36ist Grenadier

BATTLE WITHOUT HOPE ALAMEIN 315

Regiment, which was holding the second line. With the aist Panzer
Division still in process of handing over to the Trieste, the only unit
immediately available for the counter-attack was the 5&&amp;gt;th Recon
naissance Battalion. I immediately drove up to Sidi Abd el Rahman and
set up my command post east of the mosque. Meanwhile, the enemy had
forced their way through to the coast and cut off the 125th Infentry
Regiment. General von Thoma, who appeared at my command post
with Bayerlein about 10.00 hours, was given command of our counter
attack, which was to be undertaken by troops of the 2ist Panzer and
goth Light Divisions. It was to be preceded by heavy dive-bomber attacks
and a barrage from all the artillery in that sector.

r&gt; T 3^ OcL 1942

DEAREST Lu,

Position very grave again, otherwise all well with me personally.
I ve got accustomed to the difficult situation. A week ago I was still
with you, all unsuspecting.

Our attack went in at about 12.00 hours but failed to penetrate, as
the enemy broke up and scattered our tanks and infantry with con
centrated artillery fire and air attacks. However, contact was restored
with 1 25th Regiment. Later we were able to relieve both battalions
when a renewed attempt by the striking group under General von Thoma
succeeded next day in throwing the enemy back across the railway line
to die south.

Early in the afternoon of the ist November, I went to Hill 16 with
General von Thoma, General Sponeck and Colonel Bayerlein to inspect
the country over which this action had been fought. Visibility was
excellent. A Red Cross flag was flying from the railway station " The
Hut " [close to Tell el Eisa md to what the British called Thompson s Post].
Seven wrecked tanks lay around " The Hut " alone, and farther on we
could see another 30 or 40 destroyed British armoured vehicles. The
British were obviously getting their wounded out, and our artillery had
accordingly ceased fire.

That day waves of British aircraft, each of 1 8 to 20 bombers, attacked
our front north of Hill 28 no less than 34 times. The air was filled with
hundreds of British fighters, and large numbers of R.A.F. fighter-bombers
spent the day shooting-up our supply vehicles on the coast road.

The supply situation remained as wretched as ever, although petrol
showed a slight improvement as a result of increased supplies brought
across by air to Tobruk. The ammunition situation was as bad as it
could be. Only 40 tons had reached the African coast since the beginning
of the British offensive and we were being forced to the strictest economy.
We were compelled to issue orders that British assembly areas were to
be engaged by harassing fire only and not by concentrated fire.

3*6 THE WAR IN AFRICA SECOND YEAR

The British had so far used only a few divisions in their front line and
still disposed of some 800 tanks, which were now assembled before our
line in the northern sector for a decisive attack. We, on our side, had only
90 German and 140 Italian tanks to put in the battle. But how the
situation appeared in Rome is best shown by a signal from Cavallero
which reached us on the evening of the ist November.

For FIELD MARSHAL ROMMEL

The Duce authorises me to convey to you his deep appreciation
of the successful counter-attack led personally by you. The Duce
also conveys to you his complete confidence that the battle now in
progress will be brought to a successful conclusion under your
command.

UGO CAVALLERO

It was soon to be shown that the Fuehrer s H.Q,. was no better
informed over the situation in Africa. It is sometimes a misfortune to
enjoy a certain military reputation. One knows one s own limits, but
other people expect miracles and set down a defeat to deliberate
cussedness.

Meanwhile, the reconnaissance reports had come in on the Fuka
position. Steep declivities rendered its southern end proof against tanks,
so that we could always hope to hold on there in an emergency until the
British brought their artillery up, which might give time for reinforce
ments of some kind to be sent across.

Probably a hint of what we were doing percolated through some
channel to the Fuehrer s H.Q,. Anyway, it was already known there
as I was to learn later that we had worked out a time-table for this
operation.

Sunday, i Nov. 1042
DEAREST Lu,

It s a week since I left home. A week of very, very hard fighting.
It was often doubtful whether we d be able to hold out. Yet we did
manage it each time, although with sad losses. I m on the move a
lot in order to step in wherever we re in trouble. Things were very
bad in the north yesterday morning, although it was all more or less
cleaned up by evening. The struggle makes very heavy demands on
one s nervous energy, though physically I m quite well. Some
supplies are supposed to be on their way. But it s a tragedy that this
sort of support only arrives when things are almost hopeless.

BATTLE WITHOUT HOPE ALAMEIN 317

U TO VICTORY OR DEATH"

The expected British major attack came on the night of the ist
November. For three hours, shells from hundreds of British guns burst
in our main defence line, while relays of night bombers attacked the
German-Italian troops. Then massed British infantry and tanks advanced
westward to the assault behind a moving curtain of fire. First came a
heavy thrust against the sooth Infantry Regiment on either side of Hill
28. The British soon made a penetration and moved on with tanks and
armoured cars to the west. After some heavy fighting we succeeded in
halting this advance by throwing in the goth Light Division s reserves.
The enemy steadily strengthened his forces in the wedge he had driven
into our line.

The British XXX Corps 9 attack was on a narrow front (4^000 yards) , but
made in great depth&gt; by relays, to give it impetus. Two infantry brigades supported
by the syrd Armoured Brigade drove a lane 4,000 yards long through the enemy s
new position, clearing the minefields as they advanced. Then the gth Armoured
Brigade passed through with the aim of advancing 2^000 yards farther and penetrat
ing RommeFs gun-screen before daylight. It was followed up by the ist 9 yth and
loth Armoured Divisions. Alexander s dispatch says: " General Montgomery
issued firm instructions that should XXX Corps not reach its objectives, the armoured
divisions of X Corps were to fight their way through" But those instructions
proved unavailing in their immediate application,

Soon afterwards, massed British formations broke through the I5th
Panzer Division s front south-west of Hill 28. New Zealand infantry and
powerful British armoured units according to captured documents,
there were between 400 and 500 tanks advanced to the west, overran
a regiment of the Trieste and a German Grenadier Battalion, in spite of
a gallant resistance, and by dawn reached a point west of Telegraph
Track.

According to reports from my artillery observers, there were another
400 British tanks standing east of the minefields. Isolated groups of
British tanks and armoured cars succeeded in breaking out to the west
and started hunting down our supply units.

^ Nov. 1942
DEAREST Lu,

Very heavy fighting again, not going well for us. The enemy,
with his superior strength, is slowly levering us out of our position.
That will mean the end. You can imagine how I feeL Air raid after
air raid after air raid!

In the early hours of the morning [2nd November] the Afrika Korps
counter-attacked and achieved some success, although at the cost of

318 THE WAR IN AFRICA SECOND YEAR

severe losses in armour, as our tanks were simply no match for the heavy
British vehicles* The 4,000 yard British penetration in which the enemy
command had placed, besides the tanks already mentioned, fifteen
artillery regiments with inexhaustible ammunition was sealed off. It
was only by the desperate fire of all available artiflery and anti-aircraft
guns, regardless of the ammunition shortage, that a further British
penetration was prevented.

It was now extremely difficult to obtain any clear picture of the
situation, as all our communication lines had been shot to pieces and most
of our wireless channels were being jammed by the enemy. Complete
chaos existed at many points on the front.

The 2ist and I5th Panzer Divisions those parts of them that were
not already committed in the front were now put in from the north and
south respectively to pinch out the enemy wedge. Violent tank fighting
followed. The British air force and artillery hammered away at our
troops without let-up. Inside an hour at about midday seven formations,
each of 18 bombers, unloaded their bombs on my troops. More and
more of our 88-mnia guns, which were our only really effective weapons
against the heavy British tanks, were going out of action. Although every
air protection A.A. gun within reach had been brought up to the front
we still had only 24 of these guns available for use that day. Soon, almost
all our mobile forces were committed in the front. We had already
squeezed every possible reinforcement out of the administrative units, yet
our fighting strength was now only a third of what it had been at the start
of the battle. I drove repeatedly to the front and watched the course of
the battle from a hill.

The British were shooting up one after the other of the Littorio s
and Trieste s tanks. The Italian 47-1x101. anti-tank gun was no more
effective against the British tanks than our own 5O-mm., and signs of
disintegration were beginning to show among the Italian troops. Units
of the Littorio and the Trieste were on the run to the west and were no
longer in the hands of their officers.

In the early afternoon the gravity of the situation in the north forced
us to the decision to bring the Ariete up to the north along Telegraph
Track and thus denude the southern front completely. After some delay
I succeeded in making contact with Colonel Bayerlein, via the Chief of
Staff, and notified him of this decision. The Ariete set off for the north
later that afternoon, bringing with it a large part of the artillery from the
southern front. I also decided that the time had come to shorten the
front by pulling the 125* Regiment out of its positions and re-deploying
it with its front to the east, in line with Telegraph Track.

In the evening I received reports on die Panzer s Army s supply
situation. It was absolutely desperate. That day we had fired off 450
tons of ammunition; only 190 tons had arrived, brought by three
destroyers to Tobrtik.

BATTLE WITHOUT HOPE ALAMEIN $19

The British now had what amounted to complete command of the
air and sea up to a point beyond Tobruk, and were repeatedly attacking
the town and harbour from the air. Several ships had been sunk in the
harbour in the past few day s. Due to our increased movement, the petrol
situation was also becoming critical again. And we still had the heaviest
fighting in front of us.

That evening it became clear that the British were concentrating their
second-line armour at their point of penetration. So our final destruction
was upon us. The Afrika Korps had only 35 serviceable tanks left.

Things looked different on " the other side of the Aitf." The $th Armoured
Brigade lost 75 per cent of its strength^ having 87 tanks destroyed* and although the
2nd and 8th Armoured Brigades came up through the lane to reinforce it the attack
was brought to a standstill by the combination of anti-tank guns ahead and tank
threats on both flanks. The advance was still hung up throughout the next day,
the yd November thus providing Rommel with a good chance to slip a&aj.

This then, was the moment to get back to the Fuka line. Some of our
rear installations had already been carried off to the west. During the
night the southern front was pulled back to the positions we had occupied
before our offensive at the end of August. The I25th Regiment was moved
into the area south of Sidi Abd el Rahman. Tlie goth Light Division,
the Afrika Korps and XX Italian Corps were now to withdraw slowly
enough to enable the foot divisions to march or be transported away.
Seeing that the British had so far been following up hesitantly and that
their operations had always been marked by an extreme, often incom
prehensible, caution, I hoped to be able to salvage at least part of the
infantry.

The army s strength was so exhausted after its ten days of battle that
it was not now capable of offering any effective opposition to the enemy s
next break-through attempt, which we expected to come next day. With
our great shortage of vehicles an orderly withdrawal of the non-motorised
forces appeared impossible. Added to that, the mobile forces were so
firmly locked in battle that we could not expect to be able to disengage
all of them. In these circumstances we had to reckon, at the least, with
the gradual destruction of the army. I reported in these terms to the
Fuehrer s H.Q,.

Our intention for the 3rd of November was to withdraw before the
British pressure to an area running south from a point some 10 miles
east of El Daba. Our disengagement in the central and southern sectors
passed unnoticed, although with no vehicles available and most of the
heavy weapons having to be manhandled, the move went very slowly.
However, in spite of all difficulties, the southern divisions were in their
new positions by morning.

32O THE WAR IN AFRICA SECOND YEAR

DEAREST Lu,

army. I wonder if it will succeed. At night I lie open-eyed,
racking my brains for a way out of this plight for my poor troops.

We are facing very difficult days, perhaps the most difficult that
a man can undergo. The dead are lucky, it s all over for them. I
think of you constantly with heartfelt love and gratitude. Perhaps all
will yet be well and we shall see each other again.

The 3rd November will remain a memorable day in history. For
not only did it become finally clear on that day that the fortunes of war
had deserted us, but from that day on the Panzer Army s freedom of
decision was continually curtailed by the interference of higher authority
in its conduct of operations.

Already in the morning I had an uncomfortable feeling that in spite
of our unequivocal situation reports, our higher command had not drawn
the proper conclusions from the conditions we were facing, and I therefore
decided to send my A.D.C., Lieutenant Berndt, to report direct to the
Fuehrer. Berndt was to leave the Fuehrer s H.Q. in no doubt about our
situation and was to indicate that the African theatre of war was probably
already lost. He was to demand the fullest freedom of action for the
Panzer Army. I wanted at all costs to avoid playing into the hands of
the British in their efforts to surround and destroy us. I intended to fight
delaying actions in as many intermediate positions as possible, forcing
the enemy to bring up his artillery each time, and to avoid any decisive
battle until either we had grown strong enough for it or the bulk of the
African Army had been carried across to Europe, with only a small part
left in Africa to cover the retreat.

At nine in the morning I drove east along the coast road as far as
Forward H.Q,. Large numbers of vehicles, mainly Italian, were jammed
up on the road, but surprisingly there were no British fighter-bombers
about. At about 10.00 hours General von Thoma and Colonel Bayerlein
reported that the British were lying in a semicircle in front of the Afrika
Korps, which still possessed 30 serviceable tanks. The British were
making only probing and local attacks and appeared to be reorganising
and supplying their formations. The moment seemed propitious, and
I gave orders for part of the Italian formations to inarch off. Despite
our frequent reminders, the vehicles promised by Barbassetti had still
not arrived, and so the Italians had to march. Dense columns of vehicles
were already streaming westwards. The Italian infantry marched off
and soon the road was full of trafEc. But the British soon spotted our
move and attacked the coast road with about 200 fighter-bombers. Their
bomber squadrons were, also extremely active that day. The Afrika

BATTLE WITHOUT HOPE ALAMEIN 321

Korps alone was attacked no less than eleven times during the morning
by strong formations of bombers.

At about midday I returned to my command post, only just escaping,
by some frantic driving, a carpet of bombs laid by 18 British aircraft.
At 13.30 hours an order arrived from the Fuehrer. It read in roughly
the following words: 1

To FIELD MARSHAL ROMMEL

In the situation in which you find yourself there can be no other
thought but to stand fast and throw every gun and every man into
the battle. The utmost efforts are being made to help you* Your
enemy, despite his superiority, must also be at the end of his strength.
It would not be the first time in history that a strong will has triumphed
over the bigger battalions. As to your troops, you can show them
no other road than that to victory or death.

ADOLF HITLER

This order demanded the impossible. Even the most devoted soldier
can be killed by a bomb. In spite of our unvarnished situation reports,
it was apparently still not realised at the Fuehrer s H.Q,. how matters
really stood in Africa. Arms, petrol and aircraft could have helped us,
but not orders. We were completely stunned, and for the first time
during the African campaign I did not know what to do. A kind of
apathy took hold of us as we issued orders for all existing positions to be
held on instructions from the highest authority. I forced myself to this
action, as I had always demanded unconditional obedience from others
and, consequently, wished to apply the same principle to myself. Had
I known what was to come I should have acted differently, because from
that time on, we had continually to circumvent orders from the Fuehrer
or Duce in order to save the army from destruction. But this first instance

1 Rommel gives a shortened version of the order. The full version reads as follows :
To FIELD MARSHAL ROMMEL

It is with trusting confidence in your leadership and the courage of the German-
Italian troops under your command that the German people and I are following the
heroic struggle in Egypt. In the situation in which you find yourself there can be no
other thought but to stand fast, yield not a yard of ground and throw every gun and
every man into the battle. Considerable air force reinforcements are being sent to C.-
in-C. South. The Duce and the Commando Supremo are also making the utmost
efforts to send you the means to continue the fight. Your enemy, despite his superiority,
must also be at the end of his strength. It would not be the first time in history
that a strong will has triumphed over the bigger battalions. As to your troops, you can
show them no other road than that to victory or death.

ADOLF HITLER

322 THE WAR IN AFRICA SECOND YEAR

of interference by higher authority in the tactical conduct of the African
%var came as a considerable shock. 1

Movements in progress to the west were stopped and everything
possible was done to strengthen our fighting power. To the Fuehrer we
reported that any further stand in the positions which the Panzer Army
was then holding would mean the inevitable loss of the army, and thus
of the whole of North Africa.

The order had a powerful effect on the troops. At the Fuehrer s
command they were ready to sacrifice themselves to the last man. An
overwhelming bitterness welled up in us when we saw the superlative spirit
of the army, in which every man, from the highest to the lowest, knew
that even the greatest effort could no longer change the course of the
battle.

Not until the afternoon did the British follow up the X Italian Corps*
withdrawal in the southern sector, having spent the morning pouring
artillery fire into the abandoned positions. Attacks on the corps northern
flank were beaten off. This corps suffered particularly badly from the
activities of enemy armoured cars behind our front. 2 A considerable
number of these vehicles had broken through our line and were harassing
our supply traffic, rendering the supply of X Corps* troops, even with
the barest minimum of water and rations, almost an impossibility.
Finally, we had to use Italian armoured cars to protect our supply
convoys.

The Bologna Division was already on the march to the west and
Italian staff officers had great trouble in getting it back to the front, for
its march columns were almost impossible to locate.

3 NOD. 1942
DEAREST Lu,

The battle still rages with unspent fury. I can no longer, or
scarcely any longer, believe in its successful outcome. Berndt flies to
the Fuehrer to-day to report.

Enclosed 25,000 lire that I ve saved.

What will become of us is in God s hands. . .
P.S. Have Appel exchange the lire. Currency regulations!

In the evening I sent Lieutenant Berndt off to the Fuehrer s H.Q.
He was^ to report that if the Fuehrer s order were upheld, the final
destruction of the German-Italian Army would be a matter of days only,

l NoU by Manfred Rommel. The existence of such passages as this caused my father to
decide, in 1944, to burn that part of the manuscript dealing with El Alamein. His death
on 1 4th October of that year prevented him carrying out his design.

*The Royal Dragoons armoured cars had slipped through the German anti-tank
screen in the dawn mist on the and, and were followed later by the 4th South African
Armoured Car Regiment.

BATTLE WITHOUT HOPE ALAMEIN 323

and was to add that we had already suffered immense harm because of it.
Later that night Berndt informed me from M ersa M atrah that hundreds
of low-flying aircraft had attacked the densely crowded road, packed
with two lines of traffic, continuously from nightfall at about 17.00 hours
until his arrival in Mersa Matruh at 21.00 hours. The road was blocked
at many points by burning vehicles and vast traffic jams had developed.
In many cases drivers and men had abandoned their vehicles and fled
westwards on foot. Abandoned tanks and vehicles stood at many points
on the road.

The night of the 3rd November also passed without any particular
move from the British. This was all so much lost time for us, for we could
meanwhile have got the whole of our force back to Fuka in all pro
bability with only small casualties. I had not dared hope that the
British commander would give us such a chance. And now it was passing
unused.

On the morning of the 4th November, the Afrika Korps under
General von Thoma, adjoining the goth Light Division under General
von Sponeck, held a thin semicircular line on either side of Tell el
Mampsra, extending to a point some 10 miles south of the railway line,
where it linked up with the Italian Armoured Corps, consisting of the
Ariete and the remnants of the Littorio and Trieste. The south was held
by the Italian Trento Division, Parachute Brigade Ramcke, and X
Italian Corps.

After about an hour s artillery preparation, the British opened their
attack at about 8 a.m. By throwing in all their strength, the Afrika
Korps which General von Thoma commanded in the front line and
the goth Light Division succeeded in beating off enemy attacks supported
by about 200 tanks, which went on till midday. The German Panzer
Corps had only 20 serviceable tanks left.

Alexander s dispatch states: " Our casualties were a negligible factor as far
as the pursuit was concerned; on 4th November the Eighth Army could put in the
field very nearly six hundred tanks against eighty German"

The number of German tanks left Jit for action was fewer even than was
supposed. More than 500 British tanks had been disabled in the struggle, nearly
three times as many as the Germans had lost, but the British could afford it, and
the adverse rate of attrition had been highly profitable on balance. It ensured
ultimate victory provided that the commanders 9 resolution and their troops* endurance
did not fail. That was the crux of the issue.

Field Marshal Kesselring arrived at my H.Q,. during the morning.
As I imagined that the Fuehrer had based his decision on optimistic
situation reports sent back by the Luftwaffe, some angry words passed
between us. Kesselring thought that the Fuehrer had learnt from his
experience in the East that, in circumstances like these, the front must
be held at all costs. I said to him very clearly: " So far I ve always taken
it for granted that the Fuehrer left the command of the army to me.

324 THE WAR IN AFRICA SECOND YEAR

This crazy order has come like a bombshell. He can t just blindly apply
experience he s gained in Russia to the war in Africa. He really should
have left the decision here to me/ 1

In actual fact, the Fuehrer s order had been based on other, quite
different grounds as was to become increasingly clear as time went on.
Paradoxical though it may sound, it was the custom at the Fuehrer s H.Q,.
to subordinate military interests to those of propaganda. They were
simply unable to bring themselves to say to the German people and the
world at large that Alamein had been lost, and believed they could avert
its fate by a " Victory or Death " order. Until this moment we in
Africa had always had complete freedom of action. Now that was over.

After the conference with Kesselring, I drove to Afrika Korps H.Q.
which was housed in a dugout a few miles west of the front. Before
leaving I had telephoned Bayerlein to tell him that the goth Light
Division was now bulging badly to the east and that the Afrika Korps
should only withdraw slowly if British pressure became too strong. On
my arrival at Corps H.Q. their la reported that the British had not yet
brought artillery up to the Afrika Korps* front, and that all their attacks
so far appeared to have been halted.

I now heard by telephone from my Chief of Staff, Westphal, that
the British had broken through the XXI Corps* front south of XX Corps,
and that units of the XXI Corps were retreating westwards. The Italian
anti-tank guns were simply useless against the heavy British tanks. At
about 10.00 hours a powerful force of British armour had appeared in
front of the XX Corps and shortly afterwards the Italian divisions, their
artillery in particular, had come under intensely heavy artillery fire and
continuous R.A.F. bombing attacks. Westphal added that the situation
was very serious and that a violent armoured battle was now in progress.

At about 13.00 hours, Bayerlein arrived back at Afrika Korps H.Q,.
from the front, and reported on the Korps situation. The Korps
Kampfstaffel* had been holding the centre of the line at Tell el Mampsra,
with 2 ist Panzer Division to its north and I5th to its south. The two
divisions had managed to dig in reasonably well. But Bayerlein went
on to say that the Kanipfstqffel had been wiped out and that it had been
impossible to persuade General von Thoma to leave the front line, where
he had probably sought his death. Bayerlein had escaped on foot at the
last moment just as the British tanks were preparing to overrun the hill
Tell el Mampsra where the vehicles and equipment of the shattered
Kampfstaffel were burning and break through to the west.

Enormous dust-clouds could be seen south and south-east of head-

Wote by Manfred Rommel Kesselring did, in fact, discuss with my father the possibility
of circumventing Hitler s order. Kesselring gave it as his view that Rommel, as the
man on the spot, should do what he thought was right.

*As earlier mentioned this was a combat unit of about company strength, which had
originally been formed to protect Corps H.Q.,, but was always employed on special
combat tasks.

BATTLE WITHOUT HOPE ALAMEIN

quarters, where the desperate struggle of the small and inefficient Italian
tanks of XX Corps was being played out against the hundred of so
British heavy tanks which had come round their open right flank, I was
later told by Major von Luck, whose battalion I had sent to close the gap
between the Italians and the Afrika Korps, that the Italians, who at that
time represented our strongest motorised force, fought with exemplary
courage. Von Luck gave what assistance he could with his guns, but was
unable to avert the fate of the Italian Armoured Corps. Tank after tank
split asunder or burned out, while all the time a tremendous British barrage
lay over the Italian infantry and artillery positions. The last signal came
from the Ariete at about 15.30 hours:

" Enemy tanks penetrated south of Ariete, Ariete now encircled.
Location 5 km. north-west Sir el Abd. Ariete s tanks in action."

By evening the XX Italian Corps had been completely destroyed
after a very gallant action. In the Ariete we lost our oldest Italian
comrades, from whom we had probably always demanded more than
they, with their poor armament, had been capable of performing.

A view over the battlefield from Corps H.Q, showed that strong
British tank formations had also broken through the Afrika Korps and
were pressing on to the west.

Thus the picture in the early afternoon was as follows: on the right
of the Afrika Korps, powerful enemy armoured forces had destroyed
the XX Italian Motorised Corps, and thus burst a 1 2-mile hole in our
front, through which strong bodies of tanks were moving to the west.
As a result of this, our forces in the north were threatened with encircle
ment by enemy formations twenty times their superior in tanks. The goth
Light Division had defended their line magnificently against all British
attacks, but the Afrika Korps line had been penetrated after a very
gallant resistance by their troops. There were no reserves, as every
available man and gun had had to be put into the line.

So now it had come, the thing we had done everything in our power
to avoid our front broken and the fully motorised enemy streaming
into our rear. Superior orders could no longer count. We had to save
what there was to be saved. After a preliminary talk with Colonel
Bayerlein, who had now assumed command of the Afrika Korps again, I
issued orders for the retreat to be started immediately. General von
Thoma had tried to prevent the British break-through with his KampJ-
staffel and, as we heard later over the British news service, had been
taken prisoner after the destruction of his force.

This decision could at least be the means of saving the motorised
part of the Panzer Army from destruction, although the army had already
lost so much as a result of the 24-hour postponement of its retreat
including practically the whole of its infantry and large numbers of tanks,
vehicles and guns that it was no longer in a position to offer effective

3*6 THE WAR IN AFRICA SECOND YEAR

opposition to the British advance at any point. Orders for the retreat
went out at 15.30 hours, and the movement began immediately.

There was now no chance of getting order into our columns, for
nothing short of a quick retreat could save us from the British air attacks,
which reached a climax that day. Anything that did not immediately
reach the road and race off westwards was lost, for the enemy followed
us up over a wide front and overran everything that came in his path.

Next morning far too late signals arrived from the Fuehrer and
the Commando Supremo authorising the withdrawal of the army to
the Fuka position.

CHAPTER XV

ALAMEIN IN RETROSPECT

WE HAD lost the decisive battle of the African campaign. It was decisive
because our defeat had resulted in the loss of a laige part of our infantry
and motorised forces. The astonishing thing was that the authorities,
both ^Gcrman and Italian, looked for the fault not in the failure of
supplies, not in our air inferiority, not in the order to conquer or die at
Alamein, but in the command and troops. The military career of most of
the people who aimed these accusations at us was notable for a consistent
absence from the front, on the principle of " umt vom Sckuss gibt all*
Kricgtr " " far from the battle makes old soldiers/

It was even said that we had thrown away our weapons, that I was
a defeatist, a pessimist in adversity and therefore largely responsible.
My refusal to sit down under this constant calumny aimed at my valiant
troops was to involve me later in many violent arguments and rows*
Our old ill-wishers particularly men who had always resented our success
drew from our defeat the courage to vilify us, where previously they
had had to keep silent The victim of it all was my army, which, after
my departure from Tunis, fell to a man into British hands, while highly
qualified armchair strategists were still entertaining ideas about operations
against Casablanca.

The fact is that there were men in high places who, though not without
the capacity to grasp the facts of the situation, simply did not have the
courage to look them in the face and draw the proper conclusions. They
preferred to put their heads in the sand, live in a sort of military pipe-
dream and look for scapegoats whom they usually found in the troops
or field commanders*

Looking back, I am conscious of only one mistake that I did not
circumvent the " Victory or Death " order twenty-four hours earlier.
Then the army would in all probability have been saved, with all its
infantry, in at least a semi-battleworthy condition.

To leave future historians in no doubt as to the conditions and
circumstances under which both troops and command had to labour at
El Alamein, I give the following summary:

3*7

328 THE WAR IN AFRICA SECOND YEAR

The first essential condition for an army to be able to stand the strain
of battle is an adequate stock of weapons, petrol and ammunition. In
fact, the battle is fought and decided by the Quartermasters before the
shooting begins. The bravest men can do nothing without guns, the guns
nothing without plenty of ammunition, and neither guns nor am
munition are of much use in mobile warfare unless there are vehicles
with sufficient petrol to haul them around. Maintenance must also
approximate, both in quantity and quality, to that available to the
enemy.

A second essential condition for an army to be able to stand in battle
is parity or at least something approaching parity in the air. 1 If the
enemy has air supremacy and makes full use of it, then one s own com
mand is forced to suffer the following limitations and disadvantages :

By using his strategic air force, the enemy can strangle one s
supplies, especially if they have to be carried across the sea.

The enemy can wage the battle of attrition from the air.

Intensive exploitation by the enemy of his air superiority gives
rise to far-reaching tactical limitations (already described) for one s
own command.

In future the battle on the ground will be preceded by the battle in
the air. This will determine which of the contestants has to suffer the
operational and tactical disadvantages detailed above, and thus be forced,
throughout the battle, into adopting compromise solutions.

In our case, neither of the conditions I have described were in the
slightest degree fulfilled and we had to suffer the consequences.

As a result of British command of the air in the Central Mediterranean,
and of other reasons I have already given, the army s supplies were barely
sufficient to keep life going, even on quiet days. A build-up for a defensive
battle was out of the question. The quantity of material available to the
British, on the other hand, far exceeded our worst fears. Never before
in any theatre of war had such a vast quantity of heavy tanks, bombers
and artillery, with inexhaustible supplies of ammunition, been engaged
on so short a front as at El Alamein.

British command of the air was complete. On some days they flew
800 bomber sorties and 2,500 sorties of fighters, fighter-bombers and
low-flying aircraft. We, on the other hand, could fly at the most 60
dive-bomber and 100 fighter sorties. 2 And this number continually
decreased.

Pommel s conclusion here would seem to be brought in question by the successes
he achieved under conditions of air inferiority. At the same time the effect of the handicap
becomes very clear in studying his account the much increased demands on tactical
skill and also the much-increased risks.

*This figure refers to the German air force only. The Italians also flew about 100
sorties. See page 335 for German figures.

ALAMEIN IN RETROSPECT

The principles of British command had on the whole not altered ;
method and rigid adherence to system were still the main feature of their
tactics. But on this occasion the British principles actually helped the
Eighth Army to victory, for the following reasons:

(a) There was no open desert fighting, as our motorised forces were
drawn to the front to support the frontally engaged infantry
divisions.

(b) The British had such superiority in weapons, both in quality and
quantity, that they were able to force through any and every
operation.

The methods which the British employed for the destruction of my
force were conditioned by their overwhelming material superiority.
They were based on:

Extreme concentrations of artillery fire.

Continuous air attacks by powerful waves of bombers.

Locally limited attacks, executed with lavish use of material and
manifesting an extremely high state of training, fully in line with
previous experience and the conditions under which the battle was
fought.

For the rest, the British based their planning on the principle of exact
calculation, a principle which can only be followed where there is
complete material superiority. They actually undertook no operations 1
but relied simply and solely on the effect of their artillery and
air force. Their command was as slow as ever in reacting. When we
embarked on our retreat on the night of the 2nd November, a long time
elapsed before the British forces started their pursuit and, but for the
intervention of that unfortunate order, we would probably have been
able to escape to Fuka with the bulk of our infantry. Their command
continued to show its customary caution and lack of resolute decision.
Thus they repeatedly allowed their armoured formations to attack
separately, instead of throwing in the 900 or so tanks, which they could
safely have committed on the northern front, in order to gain a quick
decision with the minimum of effort and casualties. In fact, only half that
number of tanks, acting under cover of their artillery and air force, would

J The term " operations " has a more specific meaning in German military language
than in English covering the intermediate sphere between strategy and tactics, and
being applied to generalship in the handling of forces in the field. The German sense is
best expressed in the now little-used term " grand tactics." In the German Army^ the
distinctive sense given to " operations " and k operational " helped to develop the idea
of manoeuvre in contrast to battering-ram tactics to sheer massing of superior weight
in men and weapons. But it tended to overshadow the importance of strategy, and the
extent to which action in the field is subject to factors of a wider kind.

330 THE WAR IN AFRICA SECOND YEAR

have sufficed to destroy my forces, which frequently stood immobile on
the battlefield. These piecemeal tactics also caused the British themselves
very high casualties* In all probability their command wanted to hold
back its armour for the pursuit, as their assault formations could not
apparently be regrouped quickly enough to follow up. 1

In the training of their armoured and infantry formations the British
command had made excellent use of the experience they had gained in
previous actions with the Axis forces although, of course, the new
methods they used were only made possible by their vast stocks of am
munition, material and new equipment. These methods are described
in detail in the following:

Tank Tactics

Here the new British methods were made possible by the use of new
tanks, more heavily gunned and armoured than ours (including the Grant,
Lee and Sherman; the heavy Churchill is ako said to have put in an
appearance 2 ), and their inexhaustible supplies of ammunition.

With the light tanks sent out in advance, the heavier, gun-carrying
tanks remained more and more in the rear. The task of the light tanks
was to draw the fire of our anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns and armour.
As soon as our guns and t^nks had given away their positions, the heavier
British tanks opened a destructive fire on all die targets they had located,
from a range of up to 2,700 yards and, if possible, from the rear slope of
a hill. Their fire seemed always to be directed by the commander of the
squadron. The vast quantities of ammunition which this system needed
were continually fed forward in armoured machine-gun carriers. By this
means the British shot up our tanks, machine-gun nests and anti-aircraft
and anti-tank gun positions at a range at which our own guns were
completely incapable of penetrating their heavier tanks and could not,
in any case, have afforded the ammunition they would have needed to
shoot themselves in.

Artillery Tactics

The British artillery once again demonstrated its ^ well-known
excellence. A particular feature was its great mobility and tremendous
speed of reaction to the needs of the assault troops. The British armoured
units obviously carried artillery observers to transmit the needs of the
front back to the artillery in the shortest possible time. In addition to
the advantage given by their abundant supplies of ammunition, the
British benefited greatly from the long range of their guns, which enabled
them to take the Italian artillery positions under fire at a range at which
the Italian guns, most of which were limited to 6,000 yards, were com-

^ommel s impression was mistaken. See note on page 342.

8 Four of the Churchill tanks were present in this battle.

ALAMEIN IN RETROSPECT 331

plctely unable to hit back. As by far the greater part of our artillery
was made up of these obsolete Italian guns, this was a particularly
distressing circumstance for us*

Infantry Tactics

When our defence had been shattered by artillery, tanks and air
force, the British infantry attacked.

With our outposts pinned down by British artillery fire their positions
had been located long before by air reconnaissance highly-trained
British sappers, working under cover of smoke, cleared mines and cut
broad lanes through our minefields. Then the tanks attacked, followed
closely by infantry. With the tanks acting as artillery, British storming
parties worked their way up to our defence posts, suddenly to force their
way into our trenches and positions at the point of the bayonet. Every
thing went methodically and according to a drill. Each separate action
was executed with a concentration of superior strength. The artillery
followed up dose behiftd the infantry in order to crush any last flickers
of resistance. Success was not usually exploited in any depth but was
confined to occupation of the conquered positions, into which reinforce
ments and artillery were then brought up and disposed for defence.
Night attacks continued to be a particular speciality of the British. 1

Was there an Alternative?

As I have already explained at length, our own dispositions at the
outset of the battle were guided by the experience we had gained in
previous actions. Having once installed our infantry in the Alamein line,
we were bound to accept battle there in spite of the enemy s immense
superiority in artillery and ammunition. Had we withdrawn immediately,
we would have had to abandon all the ammunition we had piled up at
Alamein having no transport to move it back without having any
worthwhile supplies in the rear to replace it* Quite apart from the heavy
losses which the non-motorised infantry would probably have suffered
during the retreat, we would also have lost the advantage of prepared

l This development had an interesting background. The value of attacking under
cover of darkness was urged by one or two military thinkers after World War I, but
disputed by most soldiers on the score that the risks of confusion were too great. Eventually
the argument for night attack convinced a War Office Committee appointed in 1932,
but the recommendations of this coaaomittee were still resisted or neglected by the majority
of commanders. One of the few exceptions was Sir Frederick Pile, a dynamic tank leader
who was then commanding an infantry brigade in Egypt. He took up the theory
enthusiastically and developed an intensive system of night attack training in the desert.
At that time Montgomery was one of his battalion commanders, and, although at first
sceptical, was converted by experience of these trials. When Montgomery returned to
"** Tpt in 1942 to take over command of the Eighth Army, he made the fullest use of

fit attacks in all his offensives as his key method of breaking into the enemy front.

332 THE WAR IN AFRICA SECOND YEAR

positions, for no defences had yet been constructed at Fuka. As it was,
the British suffered considerable losses in our minefields and we managed
to shoot off at them almost all the ammunition we had stored in the
Alamein line,

Our tactical reactions during the battle were guided by the needs of
the situation and the extent of our material resources, which were small
enough.

After the battle, with all the experience it had brought us, I had an
idea for a plan which might have enabled us to put up a more successful
defence of Western Egypt against an enemy with the material strength
of Montgomery s army, attacking from Alexandria. Not that we, of
course, could ever have put the plan into effect; our petrol shortage
would have seen to that. Moreover, we had tied up too much of our
material- material which was now irreplaceable in the construction of
the Alamein line. However, I mention the plan here because it contains
one or two points of substance.

It would first have been necessary to establish the non-motorised
infantry in the Fuka line, using the maximum possible number of mines
and with positions constructed similarly to those at El Alamein. The
line at Fuka, like that at El Alamein, rested in the south on the Qattara
depression and thus could not be turned. It had the additional advantage
that steep declivities rendered some twelve miles of it in the south
impassable to tanks and vehicles.

The El Alamein line would have been held by motorised formations
and reconnaissance units, while the motorised forces located between
Alamein and Fuka would have been grouped for a mobile defence.

On the British launching their attack, the action would probably
have developed on something like the following lines: The British
motorised forces would have thrust forward into open country, following
up our reconnaissance and motorised forces, which would have withdrawn
from the Alamein line. Then, in a position favourable to ourselves, battle
would have been joined between our mobile forces and the British, who
would now have been without the protection of their artillery regiments.
In this battle, which would have been fought in front of the Fuka line,
our armour would not, of course, have been capable of standing up to
the powerful British striking groups for long. However, experience
indicated that we would probably have been able to force the over
cautious British into more than one difficult tactical situation and to
inflict considerable losses on their striking forces. When the moment
came, as it was bound to come, that the British had concentrated their
forces on the battlefield and were threatening to get the upper hand
in other words, when there was a danger that a continuation of the
mobile battle would work more to their advantage than to ours we
would have had to extricate our motorised forces from the battle and
bring them back behind the German-Italian line before their losses had

ALAMEIN IN RETROSPECT 333

become too great. The sole purpose of this mobile fighting in front of
the Fuka line would have been to soak up some of the British striking
power.

In the absence of their massive artillery support, a British attack at
Fuka against a line similarly constructed to that at E! Alamein, would
have met with a bloody rebuff. They would have been forced to bring
up their artillery, and this would have meant moving all their installations
forward. Thus we would have been given a reprieve during which many
things could have happened. The Nebclwerfer regiment might have
come across, we might indeed have actually received our " Tigers "
at the very least, somebody might have done something to improve the
supply situation. Even so, it is still very doubtful whether we could have
held out in the African theatre any longer than we actually did. I only
include these notes because several of my later plans and actions in
Tripolitania and Tunisia were based on principles which had been
formed out of our experience at El Alamein.

I have said that our defence plan was a compromise. There was no
real redress either for our inferiority in the air or for the supply situation;
nor was it possible to motorise the infantry. It was left to the command
in Africa to cope with these problems as best it could.

Such a compromise can be no ideal solution. We simply did what we
could, with our very meagre resources, to come to terms with the
unalterable disadvantages under which we suffered. It was a matter of
getting the best out of a hopeless situation. Armed with a pitch-fork, the
finest fighting man can do little against an opponent with a tommy-gun
in his hands.

No one can say that we had not given warning, months before the
British offensive, that the army would be unable to fight a successful
defence, unless a minimum specific build-up was created in Africa and
unless certain specific quantities of reinforcements and replacement
material reached African soil. That this was not done, was very well known
to the people who later flung the most mud. To quote only one example
instead of the thirty issues of petrol I had demanded, we had had three.
The figure I had given for our material requirements had been based on
the anticipated increase In British strength. I could not of course have
foreseen just how great the strength of the British was actually to be.

In these circumstances, there was never any chance of the army
achieving success at El Alamein. Our sole advantage, compared with
the many afforded to the enemy, was the possession of prepared positions;
but these were soon stormed, after a terrible artillery and air bombard
ment, by British infantry, who gnawed their way yard by yard into our
defence system. One sector after another of the northern front fell into
British hands, until finally the Axis troops lost the whole of the northern
part of their line, A further stand at El Alamein was then senseless, for
not only were the defending forces exposed to the full weight of the

334 THE WAR IN AFRICA SECOND YEAR

enemy s non-stop air attacks in roughly improvised positions, but also
the vehicle assemblies were being obliterated by the torrential British
artillery fire. That way lay destruction*

Our counter-attacks early in the battle could not be made with a
concentration of strength, as British assembly areas in the southern sector
gave us good cause to fear that if we drew off all the motorised forces
they would attack there as well. And the shortage of petrol would never
have allowed us to move the Ariete and 2ist Panzer Division back there
again. At that stage of the battle, therefore, it was too great a risk to
draw off all our motorised forces from the southern front to the north.

There is another very important point to be taken into account. Any
formation we employed on the northern front was ground away by the
British bombing and drum-fire far more quickly than were the attacking
British by our defensive fire. The units which remained in their start
ing positions mostly had their vehicles dug in and were comparatively
seldom attacked. But the northern sector was like a mill. Everything
that went into it, regardless of quantity, was ground down to dust.

The bravery of the German and of many of the Italian troops in this
battle, even in the hour of disaster, was admirable. The army had behind
it a record of eighteen magnificent months, such as has seldom been
equalled, and every one of my soldiers who fought at Alamein was
defending not only his homeland, but also the tradition of the Panzer
Army " Afrika". The struggle of my army, despite its defeat, will be a
glorious page in the annals of the German and Italian peoples.

ALAMEIN IN RETROSPECT

3S5

SORTIES BY THE GERMAN LUFTWAFFE DURING THE
BATTLE OF EL ALAMEIN 1

Date

Told Sorties

Fighter Sorties

Tons of Bombs
Dropped

24/10/42

107

5.0

25/10/42

140

22.0

26/10/42

28.1

27/10/42

29.1

28/10/42

163

1 06

20.2

29/10/42

196

129

29.1

30/10/42

200*

125*

30-5 1

31/10/42

242

128

43-3

1/11/42

141

12.8

2/11/42

175

20.7

figures were given to Rommel by General Setdemann, Commander
Luftwaffe in Africa.

figures for 30/10/4? are estimate* only.

336

THE WAR IN AFRICA SECOND YEAR

BATTLE STRENGTH, ACCORDING TO RETURNS, OF

GERMAN-ITALIAN ARMOURED FORMATIONS DURING

THE BATTLE OF EL ALAMEIN

Nature of Action

Date

No. of Tanks held by German and
Italian Formations

Defence and counter
attacks with limited
objective

Decisive break
through

24/10/42

PANZER II, III, IV

M-TANK

L-TANK

219

3 l8

25/10/42

154

270

26/10/42

162

221

27/10/42

137

210

28/10/42

197

29/10/42

109

190

30/10/42

116

201

31/10/42

106

198

1/11/42

109

l8 9

2/11/42

I40 1

I5 1

3/11/42

I20 1

o 1

4/11/42

JEstimates only.

CHAPTER XVI

THE GREAT RETREAT

ON THE night of the 4th November, the army retreated to Fuka, The
movement was made over a broad front, mainly through the open desert,
as the coast road was continuously bathed in the brilliant light of British
flares and under non-stop RAF. attack. It was a race between the
British armour and ourselves, both striving for the same goal

The ist and roth Armoured Divisions, after breaking out, wm told to drive
north-westwards and get astride the coast road at Doha and Galal, west of Daba.
The yth Armoured Division and the Mew Zealand Division, with armoured troops
attached^ were sent on a wider circuit through the desert, and directed on Fuka.

On the evening of the $h November these pursuit forces were well in rear of
Rommel s battered army, whose retreat had been delayed by Hitlers intervention.
Yet by the following afternoon the bulk of the remaining German troops, who were
motorised, had managed to slip through the series of" trap doors" and had regained
a good chance of escaping. It is not easy to see how they succeeded especially in
mew of the disorder and congestion on the coast road in running the gauntlet
of air and ground attack.

After the event, the failure to block their escape was ascribed to the intervention
of sudden rain Montgomery said, in his account, " only the rain on 6th and jth
November saved them from complete annihilation" The downpour that began on
the evening of the 6th helped the later stages of formers " get-away" but by
then its prospects were already becoming better. The most crucial stage of the
pursuit was during the day and night of the 4th, During that period, escape looked
hardly possible. But while Rommel s troops were spurred on by desperation, Mont
gomery s were slowed down by the natural reaction that followed their hard and
prolonged efforts in the battle. The magic of RommeFs reputation, particularly
for table-turning ripostes, also induced caution. Moreover, the most promising of
the initial cut-off strokes were retarded by halting for the night, for fear of confusion
in the dark, instead of driving on to block the coast road.

In the next stage, the pursuit suffered not only from the impeding mud but from
lack of sufficient petrol to maintain the momentum.

Many of my units were so short of vehicles that they had to be made
dependent on the transport of the armoured formations. Even so, they
were frequently hard put to it to save their men, as the distance to Fuka

337

338 THE WAR IN AFRICA SECOND YEAR

was 60 miles. The paratroopers and Italians in the south had to march.
It had, as I have already said, been impossible to provide proper main
tenance for the troops in the south for some days, due to the activities
of British armoured cars which had penetrated our line and disturbed
our supply traffic. As a result these formations suffered severely from
petrol and water shortage.

When all the necessary orders had been issued, my headquarters also
moved off shortly after nightfall from the area south-west of El Daba
and drove back to Fuka along the southern side of the railway. It was a
pitch-dark night and the vehicles often drove off the track and up to
their axles into sand-drifts, from which they had to be hauled out each
time and man-handled by all hands back to the track. It brought to my
mind the desperate attempt we had made to get to Alexandria after our
victory at Tobruk, Then my troops, exhausted after their long battle
but nevertheless afire with enthusiasm, had crossed this self-same stretch
of country to grasp at our one and only chance of finally seizing the
initiative in Africa. But our supplies had let us down and now we were
reaping the consequences. Thoughts were bitter on that night of defeat.

Towards morning [j/A November] we reached the wire round the
Fuka airfield where we had to halt. The coast road to our right was still
brilliant with the light of flares and British bombs were still falling among
our lorry columns. After stopping for several hours on the airfield we
drove on again at dawn to a hill two miles to the south-west, where we
set up the Panzer Army s H.Q,.

The authorisation for the retreat, which had now arrived far too
late from the Fuehrer and Duce, charged us with the duty of extricating
all German and Italian troops, especially the non-motorised units. We
could do nothing but shrug our shoulders, for extricating the infantry
was precisely what the original order had prevented us from doing.
Moreover, had we waited for the authorisation we would have lost not
only the infantry but also the armoured and motorised divisions. Now
only Fate could show whether the British would permit us to stay at
Fuka long enough for the Italian and German infantry to catch up.

It was my intention to hold on there with the motorised forces until
either the infantry withdrawal was complete, or until the British, who at
that time had complete command of the situation and could dictate the
speed of our retreat, were poising themselves to strike the final blow at
our motorised forces. If it came to the latter, I would have to try to save
all there was to be saved and would no longer be in a position to worry
about the infantry; otherwise, the entire army would be destroyed and
not a man of it would cross the frontier at Sollum. The reason why I
have dwelt on this point is that we were afterwards accused by stupid
people, who knew nothing of conditions in Africa, of having left the
Italian infantry in the lurch at El Alamein.

During the sth November, a large part of the Afrika Korps, the goth

THE CHEAT RETREAT 339

Light Division, and dements of the Italian motorised forces reached the
area round Fuka. Fresh British forces from their second line, consisting
of approximately 200 tanks and 200 armoured troop-carriers, were pressing
hard on the heels of the Afrika Korps rearguard. The X Italian Corps
and ist Parachute Brigade succeeded in reaching the area south-west
of El Daba during the night* The long march on foot, in conditions of
acute water shortage, was severely taxing the strength of these formations.

As early as midday, violent fighting began at Fuka between our
motorised forces and greatly superior British armour. Sandstorms
frequently reduced visibility to zero. Soon a powerful British outflanking
column advanced against our open southern flank and it became obvious
that we would have to sound the retreat before everything was lost.

There was wild confusion on the coast road between Fuka and Mcrsa
Matruh. Vehicle columns, their lorries full of stragglers, jammed up and
choked the whole road, while overhead the R.A.F. reigned supreme,
flying one attack after the other against every worthwhile target. I first
visited the front on the coast road and then drove south to the Afrika
Korps, which at that time it was still morning was already engaged in
heavy fighting. By the time I returned to my staff the British outflanking
column had already been reported.

Shortly afterwards two bombing attacks were made on the Panzer
Army s H.Q., which the British had apparently located through its
wireless traffic. Westphal .and I lay in a slit-trench and let the carpet of
bombs pass over. There was little damage. Shortly afterwards several
Sherman tanks came in sight and opened fire on everything they
could see. We apparently no longer had any troops between us and the
British.

With the Afrika Korps broken through between the isth and mst
Panzer Divisions and no more reserves left, I gave orders with a heavy
heart, because of the German and Italian formations still on the march
for the withdrawal to Mersa Matruh,

When the orders were out, we too, moved off. It was a wild helter-
skelter drive through another pitch-black night. Occasional Arab villages
loomed up and dropped behind us in the darkness, and several vehicles
lost contact with the head of the column. Finally, we halted in a small
valley to wait for daylight. At that time it was still a matter of doubt
as to whether we would be able to get even the remnants of the army
away to the west. Our fighting power was very low. The bulk of the
Italian infantry had been lost. Of the XXI Corps, part had been destroyed
after a stiff resistance against the overwhelmingly superior British, and
part had been overtaken in its retreat and taken prisoner; the vehicles
which we had repeatedly demanded for them from the Italian Supply
H.Q,. had not arrived. The X Italian Corps was on the march south-east
of Fuka, short of water and ammunition, and, to be quite frank, with no
hope of escaping to the west. Of these formations only the transport

34-O THE WAR IN AFRICA SECOND YEAR

echelons were on the coast road, choking it with their traffic as they
dowly trickled west. There was little we could do to get order into the
columns; it would have taken time and all we had to do was to get the
move over as quickly as possible*

As for the XX Italian Motorised Corps, it had been practically wiped
out on the 4th November no more than a few companies and detach
ments remained in the hands of the Corps* staff. Tanks and vehicles had
been dispersed and scattered and could not be brought into action.

The only forces which retained any fighting strength were the
remnants of the goth Light Division, the Afrika Korps 9 two divisions
now reduced to the strength of small combat groups, the Panzer Grenadier
Regiment Africa and a few quickly scratched together German units, the
remains of the i&4th Light Division. Tanks, heavy A. A. guns, heavy and
light artillery, all had sustained such frightful losses at El Alarnein that
there was nothing but a few remnants left. 1

At dawn on the 6th November, we tried to reassemble and get some
order into the Panzer Army s staff a far from easy task, as our vehicles
were scattered all round the country. Our first find, when we attempted
to gather our little force together, was a coloured British soldier who
had crept into hiding near my vehicle. Shortly afterwards several lorries
north of us went up in flames. After some difficulty we eventually
succeeded in rounding up our vehicles and during the morning filtered
them through the mined area south of Mersa Matruh as far as a point
1,000 yards to the east, where we set up Army Headquarters.

Conditions on the road were indescribable. Columns in complete
disorder partly of German, partly of Italian vehicles choked the road
between the minefields. Rarely was there any movement forward and
then everything soon jammed up again. Many vehicles were on tow and
there was an acute shortage of petrol, for the retreat had considerably
increased consumption.

While the 15th Panzer and goth Light Divisions succeeded in reaching
their allotted stations south-west of Mersa Matruh, the 2ist Panzer
Division was forced to form a hedgehog with the Army s last tanks south
west of Quasaba; the petrol which had coine up was only sufficient for
one of the Afrika Korps* divisions. The VQSS Group, 2 which had remained
behind as a decoy in the Fuka position, had apparently been outflanked
during the night by a strong force of British armour. At about 10.00 hours
on the 6th November, this force launched an attack with 60 tanks against
the almost completely immobilised sist Panzer Division. The division
defended itself desperately and, by gathering together all its strength,
succeeded in beating off the attack. The Voss Group, on its way back

1 See appendix preceding chapter for battle strength of German aad Italian armoured
formations during El Alamein.

Captain Voss, Commander of sSoth Reconnaissance Battalion, formerly AJ3.C. to
Rommel.

THE GREAT RETREAT

from Fuka, took the British force in the rear and indicted considerable
casualties on them. Then it took up position south-west of aist Panzer
Division with the object of preventing any British attempt to encircle
the division, whose tanks were by that time completely immobilised.
The petrol columns which were dispatched did not get through. The
enemy launched attack after attack against the aist Panzer Division, until
finally, in the afternoon, the division destroyed all immobilised tanks
where they stood and fought its way westwards with the wheeled transport.
But after a few miles it was again forced to form a hedgehog. Finally, we
managed to get a little petrol up to this remnant of the division during
the night, thus enabling it to move off westwards at last into its allotted
position.

Meanwhile, our columns were steadily streaming westwards and
were now approaching Sollum. In the afternoon the Italian General
Gandin appeared on behalf of Marshal Cavallero to inquire about
our situation and plans. This suited me very well. I gave him a detailed
account of the battle, laying particular stress on the effects of the supply
crisis and the Fuehrer s and Duce s order, I told him point-blank that
with the present balance of forces there was not a chance of our making
a stand anywhere, and that the British could keep on going right through
to Tripolitania, if they chose to. We could never accept battle, but would
have to confine ourselves to trying to delay the British long enough to
allow our columns, in which the utmost confusion reigned, to get across
the Libyan frontier. There could be no attempt to restore any semblance
of order until they arrived in Libya, because so long as they were this
side of the frontier they were in constant danger of being cut off. Speed,
therefore, was the one thing that mattered. We could attempt no
operation with our remaining armour and motorised forces because of
the petrol shortage; every drop that reached us had to be used for getting
our troops out. Gandin left my H.Q. visibly shaken. It was clear that
to the Commando Supremo war was simple. When, for instance, during
the July crisis at Alamein, I had told Marshal Cavallero that in the event
of a British break-through threatening, only two possibilities would exist
either to stay in our line and be forced to surrender in two or three
days by lack of water, or to beat a fighting retreat to the west Cavallero
had said he could give no guidance for such an event; one simply should
not contemplate it. That was no doubt an easy way out.

During that day, we succeeded in forming a fairly firm front and
beat off all enemy attacks. Although the enemy must have been aware
of our weakness, he still continued to operate with great caution. All
German troops everywhere, and some of the Italian units, made a very
disciplined and good impression and appeared to be firmly in the hands
of their officers. It was a personal blow to every man to have to give up
all this territory we had conquered with such high hopes during the
summer.

343 THE WAR IN AFRICA SECOND YEAR

The petrol situation was disastrous, in spite of the fact that ships
had reached Benghazi on the 4th November with 5,000 tons an unpre
cedented quantity* The news of our collapse had apparently even
galvanised Rome into action. But what was the good of petrol in
Benghazi? We needed it at the front, where our columns were waiting.
Incidentally, 2,000 of the 5,000 tons had already been destroyed during
British air raids on Benghazi. We tried our hardest to persuade the
Italians and Kesselring to bring the petrol straight to the front.

Torrential rain fell during this period, making many tracks im
passable and forcing us to rely almost solely on the coast road, which
became hopelessly jammed up with traffic at many points. But the
British, also, had their difficulties and were unable to send their columns
through the desert fast enough to outflank us. The result was a con
siderable slowing up of speed on both sides.

The effect on the British outflanking mows through the desert was worse than
Rammd realised. The heavy downpour on the night of the 6th November turned
their de&rt rmUs into a morass. The lorry-borne New Zealand Division, the
lorritd infantry brigades of the armoured divisions, and their supply echelons become
&*&. The tanks themselves were slowed down, but hampered evm more by the
w&? their supporting trwps and supplies were held up.

The earliest exponents of armoured uoarfare in the 1920$ had urged that the
new-model forces should be completely on a tracked vehicle basis, while emphasising
the drawbacks of incorporating^ and making them dependent upon, wheeled vehicles.
In the autumn of 1941, the German Army had forfeited its chance of decisive
victory in Russia because the wheeled portion of their Panzer divisions became
bogged. Now the British Army, in turn, provided another object lesson.

That, however, was not the only cause of failure in the pursuit. The xst
Armoured Division, after itsjirst turn-in, at Daba, had swung out again to block
Rommel s line of escape west of Mersa Matruh. It moved fast outstripping
Rammers retreat along the congested coast road. But on the 6th, before the rain
became serious, its armoured brigade was twice brought to a halt by lack of petrol
the second time when within close reach of Rommel s escape road. That was the
more galling because the divisional commander, General Briggs, had urged before
the break-out that one armoured division at least should be loaded up with sufficient
petrol for a prolonged pursuit. $ut caution had prevailed, and ammunition for the
battle had been treated as the prime requirement.

The outcome of the hold-up was that on the following day the outflanking
pursuit was only carried on by an armoured-car regiment and some elements of the
4th Light Armoured Brigade which proved too weak to cut off or pin down the
retreating forces. The xoth Armoured Division* which had been halted at Fuka,
was then ordered to push on to Matruh along the coast road. But that direct pursuit
only served to push Rommefs rearguards back, along the road they were taking,
and gave them the best chance of keeping the pursuers in check.

With this general reduction of tempo I hoped to have a chance of
getting at least a little order into the motorised forces, to enable them to

THE GREAT RETREAT 343

hold on to Mersa Matruh for a few TDOTC days and thus gain time lor some
defences to be constructed at Sollum. In die morning [jlh November],, I
conferred with Stcfanis, commander of the XX Italian Motorised Corps,
and his Chief of Staff, Rugged, There was now little hope left of any
farther major bodies of their troops getting away. Many stragglers were
still being collected up and, of the whole Corps, there now remained a
little over a battalion and about ten tanks. The reserve tanks which
had been held for the Corps in Mersa Matruh were already worn out
from long desert driving. Some we had to destroy, others were carried
back to the rear on transporters* I ordered the Italians to move on to
Buq Buq and Capuzzo, where they were to collect up their stragglers
and form them into units.

We discovered during the morning that British movements WOTC not
being as badly hampered by the going as we had at first expected, and
it was possible that the enemy would reach our line that day. I therefore
conferred with Bayerlein at Afrika Korps H.Q. as to our next move*
We decided under no circumstances to accept battle, as that must
inevitably result in the destruction of the remainder of our motorised
units. After yesterday s bad affair with the sist Panzer Division, Bayerlein
was trying desperately to get his petrol up. The 2ist Panzer Division had
unfortunately been very badly knocked about. Of the 30 tanks it had
salvaged from El Alamein, only four now remained intact. And that
was not all, for during yesterday s incident, when the division had been
attacked by the British in an almost completely immobilised state, it had
lost almost all its guns.

After this conference I issued orders for the army to hold its line as
long as possible and to lay down a concentrated fire on all enemy attack
preparations. It was on no account to allow itself to be drawn into a
battle from which it could not easily disengage, but, if pressure became
serious, was to fall back slowly to a rearward position.

At about 10.00 hours, General Ramcke reported in with some 600
men of his brigade. Having heard that the British had caught up with
the retreating Italian X Corps at about the level of Fuka and, after a
brief action, taken them all prisoner, we had given up hope of ever seeing
Ramcke and his men appear out of the desert again. The march of these
paratroopers was a very fine achievement. They had been equipped
with very few vehicles, but had ambushed some British lorries and made
themselves mobile. Ramcke must have led them extremely well. The
brigade had never been very popular with us, because, following the
normal Luftwaffe practice, they had always been demanding special
treatment. They had wanted, for instance, units taken out of line in
order to husband their special troops. Now they were angry again
because we had not provided them with vehicles for the retreat. But it
had been impossible for one thing, because we had had no vehicles,
and secondly, because we could not have carried off all the German

344 THE WAR IN AFRICA SECOND YEAR

troops and left the Italians completely in the lurch. However, we now
had them picked up by passing vehicles and taken back to the rear for
rest and recovery.

All that day, powerful formations of British bombers and close-
support aircraft attacked the coast road and inflicted serious casualties
on our columns. The British launched attack after attack against our
rearguard formed by the goth Light Division but came off worst.
Three outflanking attacks, each by infantry with tank support, were
beaten off. In the afternoon, a strong British force moved west over
hard and stony ground, where they were able to make rapid progress
relatively unhampered by the rain.

It is not clear what force Rommel means, unless it be part of the 4th Light
Armottred Brigade which was not a " strong force." The main force was
reorganised after the hold-up on the yth, when it became evident that Rommel was
slipping out of reach, and that the follow-up would be a long race, not a short one.
To diminish the supply problem it was obviously necessary to reduce the scale of
the pursuit force, and this was now constituted only of the jth Armoured Division
and the New Zealand Division (with attached armour). This force, under the
command of X Corps, moved off afresh on the 8th November with the frontier as
its first objective, and Tobruk as the next. The New Zealand Division followed
the coast road, while the jth Armoured Division took the inland route on top of
the escarpment. The task of striking at Rommel s rearguards was entrusted
primarily to the air force, which operated from forward landing grounds that were
often ahead of the main ground advance.

After the frontier positions had been gained the New Zealand Division stopped
there to reorganise, while the ist Armoured Division went forward to replace it
in the advance.

It was now decided to move Army H.Q. back to the Sidi Barrani
district. We first tried to get through south of the coast road, but found
that the rain had covered the tracks with deep mud. Several vehicles
stuck fast and had to be dragged out at the cost of much toil and sweat.
After that we decided to continue the journey along the coast road and a
few hours later the new H.Q. was set up near the Sidi Barrani airfield.
Shortly afterwards the Quartermaster brought us a report from the frontier.
Apparently a vast column of vehicles, thirty to forty miles long, was
jammed up this side of the Halfaya and Sollum passes, and the retreat
over the hills, which lay under continual R.A.F. low-flying and bomber
attacks, was probably going to take a week. It was very unlikely that the
enemy would grant us all that grace, so I gave orders for movement
through the passes to be speeded up by co-opting large numbers of
officers for traffic control duties. Driving was to continue day and night,
regardless of bombing and low-flying aircraft. A.A. barrages over the
area had already been ordered. The Luftwaffe commander had mean
while informed me that German fighters were up over the threatened
area. We hoped to hold the Sollum-Halfaya front against the British

THE GREAT RETREAT 345

spearheads long enough to enable us at least to reorganise our column*
behind it and form up new fighting units*

With the shipping situation so difficult, we could expect no replace
ments to speak of from Europe in the near future. Hence, if the British
continued the pursuit, the evacuation of Cyrenaica would become
inevitable and we would be unable to think of making another stand
before Mersa el Brega, I hoped that by the time we arrived there, more
material would have been shipped out to Tripolitania, so that we would
face the British striking columns better armed and be able to take any
opportunities that offered of beating up partial enemy forces.

As the British now appeared to be bringing an armoured division
round the south of Mersa Matruh, I gave orders for all forces to evacuate
the area during the night and retire to Sidi Barrani with goth Light
Division as rearguard. During the night of the yth the British, correctly,
turned north in an attempt to cut off our retreat. But the trap was
empty; all they netted was a small number of burnt-out vehicles, which
we had had to destroy because of petrol shortage. There is never any
point in attempting an outflanking movement round an enemy force
unless it has first been tied down fron tally, because the defending force
can always use its motorised forces assuming it has petrol and vehicles
to hold up the outflanking columns while it slips out of the trap.

That night, enemy bombers flew non-stop attacks against the Sollum-
Halfaya position. At that time the two burning problems of our retreat
were, firstly, whether we should be able to get our columns through the
passes soon enough, and secondly, our petrol supply. So long as these
enormous columns were still jammed up on this side of the passes, the
motorised combat groups would have to go on trying, by every means
open to them, to delay the enemy. Next morning there was still a 25-mile
queue of vehicles waiting to get through the passes. Traffic had moved
very slowly during the night, as a result of the incessant attacks of the
R.A.F.

At about 08.00 hours [8th November] I met Bayerlein and informed
him that a convoy of about 104 ships was approaching Africa, and it
was possible that the British and Americans were about to strike at us
from the west. At about 11.00 hours this was confirmed* The Anglo-
Americans had, in fact, landed in North- West Africa during the night
as I heard shortly afterwards from Westphal. This spelt the end of the
army in Africa.

At about midday, I drove to the west and met the Quartermaster,
who brought with him the new Engineer Commander, General Buelowius,
and Lieutenant Berndt. Major Otto reported that the movement of our
vehicles would take another two days, and that traffic blocks on the
road were making it extremely difficult to bring supplies up to the
fighting troops as the railway could only cope with a few tons a day.
I therefore decided to send back the XX Italian Corps, 3rd Reconnais-

346 THE WAR IN AFRICA SECOND YEAR

sance Battalion and later the Afrika Korps via Habata, in order to relieve
the pressure on the road and leave the passes free for the goth Light
Division as rearguard. Without delaying I turned round and drove
back to inform the various formations of this decision. At Buq Buq I
met General Stefanis and Major von Luck and put them in the picture.
Shortly after 14.00 hours I met Colonel Bayerlein and discussed the
consequences for us of the British and American landing in the west.
On the subject of my order to use the Jebel ascent north of Habata for
the retreat of the Afrika Korps, Bayerlein demurred for, as he said,
the Afrika Korps* vehicles were not up to such a cross-country journey.
I told him that I was well aware of this difficulty, but that as things
stood we had no choice. However, I decided to leave the final decision
untij the gth November.

Meanwhile numerous British vehicles and scout-cars were being
sighted on our southern flank, where we were keeping a very close watch.
Accordingly, the Voss Group and 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion put out
a number of reconnaissance detachments south of the railway line, in
order to give warning of a British thrust in good time for the necessary
counter-measures to be taken. In the coastal sector the enemy made no
attempt to press us hard with major forces that day, but merely maintained
contact with armoured cars.

Our columns were now flowing comparatively smoothly over the
passes as I saw for myself that evening. Traffic was being controlled
by numerous officer-manned traffic posts and control teams. There was
now a hope that all the lorry columns would be across by midday on
gth November, which would enable the Afrika Korps to use the road.
With petrol so short and many vehicles on tow, this would mean a great
easing of the situation. It is a great mistake in circumstances like these
to attempt to get order into supply troops which have panicked and lost
their organisational structure, until it can be done in peace and quiet.
One should simply allow them to run and try to channel their flight
gradually into ordered routes. After a few days of this, the troops* self-
confidence and urge to discipline will begin to assert themselves again
and reorganisation can then be undertaken without difficulty.

Orders had come from the Duce for the Sollum line to be held.
That it was impossible to do this for long is evident from the fact that
we now had no battle-worthy armoured or anti-tank units large enough
to contain a powerful armoured thrust through the open desert south of
Sidi Omar. Thus it could on no account be considered. Casualties in the
German motorised forces had certainly been heavy in killed and wounded,
but had not been too serious in terms of total man-power, not at any rate,
in comparison with the number of men which the fully motorised Eighth
Army had lost during the summer. The vital thing now was to get every
German and Italian soldier and as much material as possible away to
the west to enable us either to make a stand somewhere farther back,

THE GREAT RETREAT 347

or to ship them back to Europe. Meanwhile, the Italians had moved
elements of the Pistoia Division and some other battalions up to the
Libya-Egypt frontier, and were wanting to place them under my com
mand. I was forced to decline, however, as I no longer had the necessary
equipment for either their communications, their transport or their supply.

On the morning of the gth November there were about a thousand
of our vehicles left on the coastal plain east of the pass. The move
through the passes had gone off more quickly than we had expected.
Several low-flying attacks were made on our columns again during the
morning and iny escort vehicles did not escape unscathed, although the
damage was not serious. I notified Bayerlein that the Afrika Korps
would, after all, be able to use the coast road over the passes. In view
of the improved situation on the Sollum Pass, I also gave orders for the
area west of Sidi Barrani to be evacuated*

The Army s total strength at this time was roughly as follows:

For manning the Sollum front we had 2,000 Italian and 2,000
German fighting troops with 15 German anti-tank and 40 German
field guns, and a few Italian anti-tank guns and several Italian
field guns.

For the mobile reserve we had 3,000 German and 500 Italian
fighting troops with n German and 10 Italian tanks, 20 German
anti-tank guns, 24 anti-aircraft guns and 25 field guns.

It was obvious that with these forces we could not afford to await
an attack by hundreds of British tanks and several motorised infantry
divisions.

The " Young Fascist " Division, which should really have been brought
up from the Siwa Oasis to Sollum, could never have arrived there in time
and was accordingly diverted to Mersa el Brega. To accept a British
attack in the Marmarica was unthinkable, painful though it was to us
all to have to give up territory so hardly won. But courage which goes
against military expediency is stupidity, or, if it is insisted upon by a
commander, irresponsibility.

S Nov. 1942
DEAREST Lu,

I m well. Thanks for letter. Heartfelt greetings.

10 Nov. 1942

I ve had no chance to write since the enemy break-through at
Alamein, but you re to have a few lines to-day. Things go badly
with an army which has been broken through. It has to fight its way
out and lose what s left of its fighting power in the process. We can t
go on like that for long, for we have a superior enemy after us.

THE WAR IN AFRICA SECOND YEAR

Physically Pm all right* For the rest I must do my best to keep
going to the end. Seiderer has arrived, also Buelowius. They are both
pretty shattered by the conditions here.

THE EVACUATION OF CYRENAICA

Meanwhile, we had heard that the Axis powers had landed troops
in Tunisia and were trying to meet the threat from the west. Nevertheless,
there was still a possibility that the British and Americans would be able
to mount an operation against the Panzer Army from that quarter. In
that event, I felt that our best action would be for the Panzer Army to
hold the hill country on either side of Cirene and get its men away to
Europe from that area by means of aircraft, submarines and small ships,
ultimately evacuating North Africa altogether.

During the night of the loth November, hundreds of British fighter-
bombers ranged the area round Capuzzo by the light of flares, causing
a considerable amount of damage.

Late the following morning, the British launched an energetic attack
along the coast; we also detected armoured car concentrations in the
south. Accordingly the goth Light Division received orders to withdraw
at around midday along the road through SoIIum. The move went
according to plan and was completed by the afternoon, after the road
through the passes had been blown up behind the rear vehicles.

The administrative echelons, with scattered men and detached units,
were now all pouring back into Cyrenaica. Formations which still
retained any fighting strength disposed themselves for a delaying defence.
We could not even make a stand in the Gazala line, because that, too,
would have needed mobile support which we had not the forces to provide
as the figures already given will show. We did not yet know how many
troops there were with the administrative echelon in the rear.

In view of the situation in Tunisia, I asked Marshal Cavallero and
Field Marshal Kesselring to come to North Africa. I wanted to get
from them a precise statement on the prospects of Tunisia being held,
and, in spite of the demands of the Tunisian front, to obtain at least some
reinforcements for my army in the Mersa el Brega line. The situation
demanded a strategic decision and, while tactical decisions tend to
require a certain boldness, a strategic decision such as this should only
be taken after meticulous examination of all possible consequences, and
should, as a matter of principle, satisfy the need for 100 per cent security.
Yet neither Cavallero nor Kesselring considered it necessary to come
to Africa. I therefore decided to send Lieutenant Berndt to the Fuehrer s
H.Q,. next day to report the position. When he returned several days
later, Berndt reported that he had met with little understanding. The
Fuehrer had instructed him to inform me that I should leave Tunis out

THE GREAT RETREAT 349

of my calculations and simply act on the assumption that the bridgehead
would be held. This was typical of the attitude of our highest command.
It was to be characteristic of, and at the same time to determine, the
coming series of reverses. Excellent as our tactical achievements were
in all theatres of war, they lacked the solid strategic foundation which
would have directed our tactical skill into the right channels. In other
respects too, Berndt reported, " the master " had been far from amiable*
Although he had sent me an assurance of " his very special confidence",
he had apparently been noticeably out of temper. He had promised
active support in the matter of supplies, and had said that we should
notify our requirements in all fields as quickly as possible nothing
would be denied us. The Mersa el Brega position was to be held at all
costs, for it was to be the spring-board for a new offensive.

Meanwhile, the retreat through Cyrenaica continued. We had been
able to refuel for another 60 or 100 miles just before Sollum, but that
was the last petrol there was in Cyrenaica. It was virtually impossible
to bring up the petrol stored in Benghazi because of the heavy burden
which the non-motorised troops, the sick and the wounded were placing
on our lorry columns. Also many of our columns were still in a bad state
of disorganisation. We were thus faced with very serious problems, when,
on the loth November, we had to prepare the evacuation of the Mar-
marica. I informed higher authority in no uncertain terms that major
loads of war material for the Panzer Army should be shipped across to
Tripoli now, while it was still possible, for in a very few weeks British
aircraft would be able to take off for Tripoli from the Sirte coast

It was proving particularly difficult to filter our troops through the
narrow lanes in the Tobruk and Gazala minefields, as these were menaced
both by fighter and bomber aircraft and by enemy armoured car
units.

The British had now launched an armoured division \the ?tK\ round
the south of Sidi Omar in an attempt to overtake us and we accordingly
pulled back to the level of Tobruk. During his follow-up on the nth
November the enemy unfortunately succeeded in overpowering a
battalion of the Pistoia and three batteries of the German Army Artillery
in the Halfaya position. 1 Our columns were still on the road from Bardia
to Tobruk, with the rearguard located between Sollum and Bardia,
when British forces were suddenly reported south of the Gambut airfield.
I was very worried lest they should move north and cut off the road
to the west. Fortunately, they kept south and the withdrawal was able

Wofe b? General Baycrltin.- The British took the Halfaya Pass during the ni|ht,_after
the surrender of the Italian battalion holding it, and then passed an armoured brigade
through to the plateau behind it by dawn. This brigade then pushed on west at first
light. Lying in rest positions in the country behind the passes was goth Light Division.
During the morning General von Sponcck happened to be driving east where he suddenly
saw the dust cloud stirred up by the approaching British armoured brigade. There was
only just time to alert his division and get it out of the British reach at the last moment.

350 THE WAR IN AFRICA SECOND YEAR

to proceed more or less smoothly. British air activity was also less
intensive than on the previous day. By using our last petrol reserves from
airfields and stores we succeeded in reaching the El Adem-Tobruk line
at about midday. Not until then did the British push through to the road,
by which time there was nothing left of our forces east of their road
block.

We intended to stand as long as possible at Tobruk, in order to get
away at least part of the 10,000 tons of material which were still lying
there. By the nth November, despite our requests that nothing but
petrol should be flown across, our transport squadrons had brought
across 1,100 men. These troops had not the slightest value in action, for
they had not been properly fitted out for battle. Neither had they any
vehicles of their own, which meant that they were nothing more than an
encumbrance on our transport.

We received one wireless message after the other calling on us to
gain as much time in our retreat as possible. But the speed of the retreat
was now dictated solely by the enemy and our petrol situation.

There was again a large vehicle jam in the Gazala bottle-neck on the
1 2th which made it essential for us to go on holding the Tobruk front until
evening. Hundreds of vehicles were on tow, some with engine trouble,
others out of petrol. Discipline everywhere was now good. The panic
which had reigned in the German-Italian columns was now over, and
they were all convinced that they would be able to get away. The
petrol situation was as gloomy as ever, as the Luftwaffe, with many of its
transport groups tied up in Tunisia, could no longer fly across more than
200 tons a day.

There now being signs that the British intended to launch an out
flanking drive round through Acroma to approach Tobruk from the
west, we were forced to the decision to evacuate the fortress. Tobruk
now possessed only symbolic value. Militarily it could not be held in the
situation at that time, without delivering up a large part of the Army
to certain sacrifice. We did not intend to repeat the mistake which the
British had made in 1942. Thus the enemy was able to occupy it, virtually
without fighting, on the night of the I2th, after its evacuation by the
goth Light Division,

Throughout our retreat we called on all our resources of imagination
to provide the enemy with ever more novel booby traps and thus to induce
the maximum possible caution in his advance guard. Our Engineer
Commander, General Buelowius, one of the best engineers in the German
Army, did a splendid job.

On the following evening it became evident that the British were
making another attempt to outflank us by a thrust in considerable
strength on Segnalu Air reconnaissance reported over 1,000 vehicles
moving west.

THE GREAT RETREAT 351

DEAREST Lu,

The battle in [French] North Africa 1 is nearing its end* This
will put the odds even further against us. Here, too, the end wiH not
be long for we re being simply crushed by the enemy superiority,
The army is in no way to blame. It has fought magnificently.

At about midday on the i3th November, the first contingent of the
Panzer Army reached the Mersa el Brega line. In spite of considerable
traffic jams in the defiles, the movement of our columns went more or
less according to plan.

Unfortunately, it again proved impossible to bring petrol east over
the choked roads from Benghazi or to bring it up by rail to Barce,
since the Italians had already blown the track. We vrere, therefore,
compelled to ask the Luftwaffe to come to our assistance with transport
aircraft.

After the British had overcome the Gazala line, our position became
particularly difficult, as they now had numerous possibilities for out
flanking movements aimed at enveloping the whole of Cyrenaica. The
closest watch was necessary over the tracks round Mechili to ensure that
our motorised forces could be dispatched early enough to intercept the
British assault columns. The evacuation of Cyrenaica also had to go
ahead now at full speed. It had repeatedly been shown in the various
African battles that the Gazala line was the critical point in any retreat
to the west. Although we had been able, by skilful manoeuvring, to get
away in 1941-42 without serious losses, Beigonzoli s troops, hampered by
their non-motorised infantry, had been trapped there.

Rommel is here referring to the Italian retreat through Cyrenaica in the winter
of 19404!) after their shattering defeat at Sidi Barrani.

14 Nov. 1942
DEAREST Lu,

Heading west again. I m well in myself, but you won t need to
be told what s going on in my mind. We have to be grateful for
every day that the enemy does not close in on us. How far we shall
get I cannot say. It all depends on the petrol, which has yet to be
flown across to us.

How are you both? My thoughts even with so much on my
mind are often with you. What will become of the war if we lose
North Africa? How will it finish? I wish I could get free of these
terrible thoughts.

Next day, we were faced with a grave petrol crisis, when the Luftwaffe
flew across only 60 tons instead of our full day s demand of 250, which

1 The Allied forces which had landed in Algeria were pushing eastward, and on the
1 2th the port of Bone, 50 miles from the Tunisian border, was seized by British parachute
troops and Commandos. The general advance, however, was slow.

35 2 THE WAR IN AFRICA SECOND YEAR

Kcsseiring had promised. As a result of this crisis and the fact that heavy
rain had softened the tracks we had been intending to use to ease the
load on the road, we were unable that day to reach our objectives. It
was, of course, extremely exasperating to have such a hold-up in the
difficult situation I have described, in which speed was everything.
Fortunately, the enemy was also prevented from using the cross-desert
tracks and his movement was equally delayed.

Marshal Cavallero had been in Libya since the i2th November, but
had not, of course, thought it necessary to come and confer with me,
although I had several times asked him to. He sent me instead, via
Ritter von Pohl (German Air Attach^), an order on behalf of the Duce
to stand fast in Cyrenaica for at least another week. The same order also
required us to hold on to the Mersa el Brega position at all costs, as the
fate of the Axis forces in Africa depended on it It would have been very
much better if Marshal Cavallero had applied this zeal he was now
asking from us to the task of supplying the Panzer Army before Alamein,
or, indeed, if he had now begun to do so. We had always done our share,
and the courage of my troops had overcome difficulties fer worse than
anything the supply staffs had had to meet. It was time that our higher
authorities demanded the same expenditure of energy from themselves as
we had made our norm. Marshal Cavallero belonged to the type of the
intellectually fairly well-qualified, but weak-willed office-chair soldier.
The organisation of supplies, the command of men, anything in any way
constructive requires more than intellect; it requires energy and drive
and an unrelenting will to serve the cause, regardless of one s personal
interests. Academic soldiers mostly look on war as a pure intellectual
problem and demand energy and drive only from those whom they some
what contemptuously refer to as " Troupier ", 1 but from themselves,
never. They rest content with their professional qualifications, which are
attested for them by others of the same ilk, and regard themselves as the
source of all good and the " Troupier " as the source of all evil It is time
that a clean sweep was made of this mentality, both in Germany and
Italy.

On the 1 5th November the petrol crisis took an even more acute turn
when several petrol ships on the way to Benghazi were turned back, and
a tanker left Benghazi with 100 tons of petrol still on board. Added to
this, the Luftwaffe was still flying only very small quantities across. Lack
of petrol prevented the Afrika Korps from getting under way until
midday and by evening it was halted again without a drop in its tanks.
The goth Light Division still had a small supply. On the morning of the
1 5th I informed Ritter von Pohl, in no uncertain terms, that in future I
wanted to receive the proper amount and not to be promised 250 tons
and receive 60. The road was still hopelessly blocked with traffic and

*A term, usually of scorn, used to denote the field commander with few or no staff
or academic qualifications.

THE GREAT RETREAT 353

very little ammunition could be brought up to the Afrifca Korps. On top
of all else, some over-zealous people had blown up the ammunition dump
at Barce along with the ammunition we were most short of* The British
were again very active in the air that day, shooting up large number* of
our vehicles in the bottlenecks. Otherwise, they appeared to be organising
their supplies before resuming the pursuit. The premature departure of
the Italian ships from Benghazi prevented us from getting out as much of
our stores as we might otherwise have done. Every possible expedient
should have been used to get at least the ammunition away before the
port was given up.

Rain continued to fall during the night of the 15th. The British
were slow in following up our movements and our sappers found the time
and leisure to prepare all kinds of neat little surprises for them. Once
again the war was moving across the beautiful country of Cyrenaica, in
whose gigantic rubble heaps the splendour of the former corn-growing
colony could still be detected. In Cyrenaica, as in Tripolitania, the
Italians had performed great feats of colonisation. Its former occupants,
the Arabs, had let the land go to rack and ruin, lacking the means, both
financial and technical, to cultivate it. Many new settlements had been
created, particularly in the Barce district and the surroundings of Beda
Littoria the area which was now serving the goth Light Division as a
rearguard line by the hard and unremitting toil of the Italian farmers,
who had wrested the land yard by yard from the desert.

I had the layout of these settlements explained to me in detail. The
country had formerly been desert grassland nourishing only a few Arab
sheep and cattle, with a few patches here and there planted with barley.
The irrigation systems, which in many places still existed from Roman
times, had sanded up and gone to ruin. The cultivation of wheat in the
clayey Cyrenaican soil had been an unknown craft to the Arabs. The
first Italian settlers who had attempted to carve a new life out of Africa
had been pressed very hard by the rebellious Senussi until 1929, and it
was not until after the Italian Government had proceeded against the
hostile Arabs that Italian settlers had begun to flow to Cyrenaica in any
quantity. There is no doubt that Mussolini deserves the greatest possible
credit for what was done in Libya. He created generous financial credits
and had settlements constructed with community wells and irrigation
systems. Thousands of houses were built in Cyrenaica and Tripolitania,
and a considerable return of wheat had already been achieved, when the
war came and destroyed the work of years. During our retreat the settlers
suffered severely at the hands of the Arabs. Their fields were devastated
and their houses plundered. The rebirth of Cyrenaica as the " granary
of Rome ** now seemed very far off.

354 THE WAR IN AFRICA SECOND YEAR

1 6 Nov.
DEAREST Lu,

Another good step back. To cap it all It s now raining, which
makes it all the more difficult to move. Shortage of petrol! It s
enough to make one weep. Let s hope the British are having equally
bad weather.

The Afrika Korps was still immobilised. The Italian Supply H.Q.
had been overcome by a perfect frenzy of destruction. Ammunition
dumps were blown up and water-points destroyed, all of which were
urgently needed for the maintenance of the fighting troops. It was only
at the last moment that we managed to stop them demolishing the water
and electricity works in Benghazi.

Next morning, although the going was still bad, the British followed
up with strong forces hard on the heels of the goth Light Division and
also appeared in considerable strength on our flank near Msus. This
meant that we now had to get out of Cyrenaica as fast as we could if
the Army was not to be cut off and destroyed in the area round Benghazi,
As usual, of course, we were up against it for petrol. Italian warships,
which we had been promised several days before would bring it across
to us, simply did not arrive.

To our good fortune, the Luftwaffe soon reported that the British
outflanking column at Msus was being badly held up by floods caused
by the torrential rain. Petrol was now so short that we would have been
unable to meet a British thrust at that point with our motorised forces.

This flank move was carried out, however, by merely a couple of armoured
car regiments with some supporting arms. Alexander s dispatch says:

"The enemy was withdrawing through the Gebel and it was a great temptation
to imitate our previous strategy by pushing a force across the desert to cut him off
at or near Agtdabia. General Montgomery was determined, however, not to take
any chances, especially in view of the difficulties of the maintenance situation, and
X Corps was instructed to dispatch only armoured cars by this route. Later,
however, when it appeared that the enemy s retreat had actually been brought to a
temporary standstill by lack of fuel, X Corps was ordered to strengthen, if possible,
the outflanking force; this proved impracticable in the then existing circumstances"

At dawn on the i8th November, British armoured cars and tanks
probed forward from Msus against our covering force but were beaten
back. The morning brought us the news that the destroyers bringing
petrol to us were being turned back. Shortly afterwards a British convoy
of 15 transport vessels with an equal number of escort craft, was reported
north-east of Derna en route for the west. We assumed that this meant
a British landing in Benghazi, and, in spite of heavy seas, ordered all
barges laden with tanks and material to put out to sea. All other war
material left in Benghazi was destroyed. Most of the barges sank
during the next few hours and we were thus unable to salvage more

THE GREAT RETREAT 355

than a very small part of our stores from the Cyrenaican port. Harbour
and dock installations were demolished and the utmost confusion reigned
among Benghazi s civil population. This sorely-tried town was changing
hands for the fifth time in the war.

The advanced guard of the Afrika Korps now withdrew with great
difficulty as far as the district round Zuetina, where it was regrouped for
defence to the east. Hundreds of vehicles were on tow. In spite of the
acute danger from the enemy and the terrible shortage of material,
exemplary order was maintained and everything went more or less
according to plan. Again and again the British outflanking column west
of Msus was thrown back by the 33rd Reconnaissance Battalion. Early
in the morning of the igth November the goth Light Division evacuated
Benghazi. During the day the whole of the Afrika Korps arrived in its
new position, and the goth Light Division established itself in Agedabia.
The evacuation of Cyrenaica was complete.

The retreat from Gazala to Agedabia had been fraught with particular
danger, because the British had all the time had the possibility of cutting
us off by a thrust through Mechili. Sections of my force had stood choking
the roads without petrol for days on end, and the British air force had
flown attack after attack against the Go-mile column, with considerable
success. The quantity of petrol we had received, while very considerable
from the Luftwaffe point of view it had been carried almost exclusively
in transport aircraft had not sufficed to fill the needs of the Army.
Nevertheless, we had succeeded in making a planned withdrawal. From
Tobruk to Mersa el Brega we had lost scarcely a man.

When we arrived in Agedabia, we had virtually no petrol left. There
were 500 tons lying in Tripoli and another 10 tons in Buerat, but even
the latter was still 250 miles away. The principal cause of this crisis
was the fact that the front was now out of reach of transport aircraft from
Italy. That day an Italian tanker carrying 4,000 tons of petrol was sunk
off Misurata, although a smaller tanker with 1,200 tons aboard succeeded
in reaching Tripoli. Every supply lorry that would run was immediately
sent off to Tripoli to bring it up. It was an ugly situation to have to stand
immobilised for any length of time in the desert. Marshal Bastico said he
would do all he could to help us and would bring the 500 tons which
had already been unloaded in Tripoli up to Agheila as quickly as
possible.

Meanwhile, work had been going forward at full pressure so far
as our limited resources permitted on the Mersa el Brega line. The line
as such was very well situated. A few miles south of the coast it abutted
on a salt marsh approximately 10 miles across, beyond which there was a
long stretch of very heavy going for vehicles. Thus any enemy attacking
from the east and wishing to outflank the position and take the defence
in the rear was bound to haul off a long way to the south. And the
farther one has to pull out to the south in North Africa, the riskier the

356 THE WAR IN AFRICA SECOND YEAR

operation is. Nevertheless, defence of even the Mersa el Brega line needed
the use of motoiised forces at least strong enough to take on the enemy s
outflanking column. In any action at this point between two forces of
more or less equal strength, the attacking force could not fail to find
itself in a difficult tactical position throughout the battle, for its supply
route, reaching well down to the south 3 would inevitably be very vulnerable
to interference by the motorised defence. The main points for the defence
plan in this circumstance would be to bar the defile at Mersa el Brega,
secure the Sebcha [salt marsh] crossing and hold a mobile force provided
with sufficient petrol and ammunition ready behind the front. Without
this force, or without the petrol, the Mersa el Brega position could never
be held.

It soon became clear that we were in for another mutual build-up of
strength at the Mersa el Brega position. The British needed to organise
their supplies. The outcome of the battle would depend on whether or
not we were able to obtain some sort of reinforcement by motorised forces
and secure a supply of ammunition and petrol for them before the enemy
was ready to attack.

Meanwhile, the Italian Divisions " Young Fascist," Pistoia and Spezia
(only part of the last two had been brought across to Africa) had been
installed in the Mersa el Brega line and had started with its construction
under the direction of Marshal Bastico. Units of the newly-arrived
Centauro Armoured Division had been deployed behind the line. The
paratroopers, the i64th Light Division and the remnants of the XXI
Italian Corps had also been assembled and were being formed up near
Mersa el Brega. As soon as I arrived in the area I pointed out that
fortifications, however strong, could not help us, as the enemy could
outflank the whole line even though with some difficulty. And then,
I said, the non-motorised Italian formations, like their comrades at
Alamein, would become easy prey for the British armoured and motorised
brigades, to whom they would be able to offer no serious resistance in
the open desert.

To rouse some understanding of the tactics of this situation in our
higher command I sent General de Stefanis (as Marshal Cavallero would
not come to see me) to report to the Duce and Marshal Cavallero in
Rome. De Stefanis, who was an intelligent officer, well informed in
matters of tactics, was fully aware of the shortcomings of the Italian Army.
He was to lay particular stress on the serious limitations which a com
mander has to suffer in his freedom of decision, when, having no stocks
of supplies to draw on, he is forced to live from hand to mouth and can
never be certain what the next day will bring. It was now too late to alter
the course of events which had been started at El Alamein. The only
thing to do was to look facts in the face and try to get the best out of the
situation in the greater long-term interest. This being so, there could be
no question of accepting battle at Mersa el Brega.

THE GREAT RETREAT 357

Perhaps an hour after I had instructed General de Stefanis on his
mission and he had left for Rome, I drove off to see General Navarrini,
who was now commanding the XXI Italian Corps, comprising the
Pistoia, Spczu and Young Fascist Divisions, He, too, fully realised
that to accept battle with the existing balance of strength would mean
the destruction of his force, and I promised him that I would see to it
that we did not lose the Italian infantry a second time.

Looking back over the events at the beginning of 1942, we discussed
the possibility of repeating our surprise attack on the British in front of
Agedabia and destroying the partial forces which they had there. In
reality there was, of course, never a hope of our putting this purely
academic discussion into effect, as we had neither the petrol nor sufficient
tank destruction units for such a scheme. The flow of supplies could not

now be concentrated at Tripoli as it had been at the end of 1941 but

had to be directed to Tunisia, thus making it impossible for us to assemble
the necessary stores and replacement equipment for such an under
taking.

This apart, the situation was very similar to the one we had faced
in the winter of 1941-42. The British had again followed up with partial
forces, leaving their main body in the rear. Even with the excellent
British supply organisation, their whole force could not yet be maintained
at Agedabia. In fact, provided the Cyrenaican ports have been effectively
destroyed, the area round Agedabia must always be a critical point for a
force attacking from the east, for the maintenance of an army over such
distances cannot be improvised immediately by road alone. Con
sequently, a large part of it has to remain behind in the Marmarica.
The defence, with an adequate supply base behind it in the west, can fall
on and destroy the enemy s vanguard before other formations can arrive.
Even if reinforcements are drawn from Cyrenaica, it is quite likely that
they will arrive too late and find the battle already decided. Then they,
tooj will be open to attack and destruction by a superior enemy.

If I were advancing from the east, I would never accept a counter
attack at Agedabia, but would pull back and not join battle until I had
linked up with other formations, as Wavell had done in 1941.

In January 1942, we had succeeded for the reasons I have described
in falling upon and smashing the British vanguard with locally superior
forces before effective help could reach them. This had brought about
the final collapse of Ritchie s offensive. This time, however, any such
scheme had to remain theoretical. It could never be realised, because
contrary to 1941-42 the necessary conditions were not fulfilled. What
made this so galling was that the British dispositions were excellently
suited for such an operation.

The great retreat had been the result of our defeat at El Alamein.
Once we had got over the first disorganisation, the behaviour of the troops,
both German and Italian, had been exemplary. Our losses, apart from

358 THE WAR IN AFRICA - SECOND YEAR

those suffered at El Alamein itself, had not been great. 1 Of the 90,000
or so German troops (including Luftwaffe and Navy), which we must
have had before Alamein, 70,000 had been saved, not including the
thousands of sick and wounded who had been flown to Europe.

We had still received no strategic decision from the supreme German
and Italian authorities on the future of the African theatre of war. They
did not look at things realistically indeed, they refused to do so. What
we found really astonishing was to see the amount of material that they
were suddenly able to ship to Tunisia, quantities out of all proportion
to anything we had received in the past. The urgency of the danger had
at last percolated through to Rome. But the British and Americans had
meanwhile multiplied their supply shipments many times over and were
steadily increasing their strategic command over sea and air. One Axis
ship after the other was going down beneath the waters of the Mediter
ranean, and it was becoming obvious that even the greatest effort could
no longer hope to effect any decisive improvement in the supply situation;
we were up to our necks in the mud and no longer had the strength to
pull ourselves out.

The mismanagement, the operational blunders, the prejudices, the
everlasting search for scapegoats, these were now to reach the acute stage.
And the man -who paid the price was the ordinary German and Italian
soldier.

by General Bayerlein* The casualties of the Panzer Army from the beginning
of the battle of Ei Alamein up to its arrival at the Mersa el Brega line amounted to:
German troops, 1,100 killed, 3,900 wounded and 7,900 prisoners; Italian troops (approxi
mations only, figures cannot be guaranteed), 1,200 killed, 1,600 wounded, and 20,000
prisoners. (Figures obtained from Offizieller Bericht des Oberkommandos Afrika.)

CHAPTER XVII

CONSULTATION IN EUROPE

IN THE weeks ahead, far greater difficulties were caused us by the lack
of understanding of our higher authorities than by any activities of the
British. There was, as I have already shown, only one course open to us
never to accept battle. A successful defence against a British outflanking
drive however ardently our masters may have desired it was beyond
all hope.

We now had left only a third of the fighting power that we had had
before Alamein. We had neither supply dumps nor stocks, and lived,
in the truest sense of the word, from hand to mouth. Very little was
arriving in Tripoli. Tankers in particular were falling victim one after
the other to British torpedo-carrying aircraft and submarines. My
suggestion that they should be disguised as merchant ships was not acted
on by the relevant authorities. In attacking our petrol transport, the
British were able to hit us in a part of our machine on whose proper
functioning the whole of the rest depended.

At that time I fondly believed that the attitude adopted by higher
authority towards the Army arose out of a mistaken appreciation of our
situation and prospects, probably caused by somewhat peculiar reporting
on the part of the Italians and the Luftwaffe. I hoped to be able to arouse
in them in course of time a realisation of the true facts of the situation.
But I was to learn that people in our higher commands were sometimes
not prepared to accept unpalatable truths; they put their heads in the
sand and only gave in before the force of events.

While General de Stefanis was away in Italy, a signal arrived from the
Fuehrer confirming the Duce s order that the Mersa el Brega line was to
be held at all costs. Large reinforcements of tanks and guns, both anti
tank and anti-aircraft, were promised, but we knew from long experience
what these promises meant We were also made subordinate to Marshal
Bastico again, " to satisfy purely formal considerations."

Rommel had already been subordinate to Bastico before the Panzer Army s
advance into Egypt. During the El Alamein fighting, however, he had been
responsible direct to the Commando Supremo and the Fuehrer s H.Q.

359

360 THE WAR IN AFRICA SECOND YEAR

I had already decided to use the breathing space which we expected
during the British build-up to drive the facts of the situation home to
the Commando Supremo and the Fuehrer s H.Q,. and to insist on the
proper conclusions being drawn.

I have already indicated some part of my plan? but will give it in
connected form for greater clarity.

(a) In the existing conditions of supply, which permitted us neither
the months* overdue replacements of tanks, vehicles and v/eapons,
nor the build-up necessary to sustain a mobile battle, we could
not hope to make a stand against a heavy British attack anywhere
in Tripolitania. The reason was that every possible position could
be outflanked in the south and would thus require the main burden
of the defence to be put on the motorised forces.

It was therefore necessary to think from the outset in terms of
evacuating Tripolitania completely in order to make a last with
drawal to Gabes where a line could be held bounded on the
south-west by the Shott el Jerid and there finally make our
stand.

This line is 120 miles west of the Tunisian frontier, and midway
between Tripoli and Tunis. It covers the narrow 1 2-mile stretch between
the sea and the chain of lakes and marshes known as the Shott el Jerid
(orFejaj}.

Two things would matter in carrying out this withdrawal
from Mersa el Brega to Tunisia, firstly, to gain the maximum
possible time, and secondly, to execute the operation with the
minimum losses of men and material.

Our great problem was the non-motorised Italians. The
slowest formation, assuming that one is not prepared to abandon
it, always determines the speed of retreat of die whole army. This
is a disastrous disadvantage in the face of a fully-motorised and
superior enemy. It was therefore going to be absolutely essential
for us to move the Italian divisions into new positions farther
west before the British attack opened, leaving the motorised forces
at Mersa el Brega to tie down the British, mine the roads and
use every opportunity that offered to inflict damage on the enemy
vanguard. The British commander had shown himself to be
overcautious. He risked nothing in any way doubtful and bold
solutions were completely foreign to him. So our motorised forces
would have to keep up an appearance of constant activity, in order
to induce ever greater caution in the British and make them even
slower. I was quite satisfied that Montgomery would never take
the risk of following up boldly and overrunning us, as he could
have done without any danger to himself. Indeed, such a course
would have cost him far fewer losses in the long run than his

CONSULTATION IN EUROPE 361

methodical insistence on overwhelming superiority in each tactical
action, which he could only obtain at the cost of his speed.

The retreat to Tunisia would need to be made in a number of
stages, in order to force the British into as many approach marches
as possible. This was another gamble on the caution of the British
commander, which later turned out to be well justified. The first
stop was to be made at Buerat and the second at Tarhuna-Homs.
We had no intention of accepting battle even at these points, but
planned to get the infantry away before we were attacked, while
the mechanised formations lightly engaged the British and delayed
their advance. Finally, in the Gabes position which, like that
at El Alamein, could not be outflanked to the south we would
make our stand.

(b) At Gabes, we would be able to put the main weight of the battle
on the non-motorised infantry. The position did not lend itself
to attack by motorised forces, and could only be broken by a
tremendous concentration of material. Montgomery would there
fore need several months to transport sufficient material up through
the whole of Libya to enable him to attack the Wadi Akarit [this
obstacle spans the Gabes defile] with an assured prospect of success. 1
And during these months, our motorised forces would be refitted
with material brought into Tunis while the retreat was going on.
Together with the Fifth Panzer Army, which had meanwhile
landed in Tunis, we would then have the chance of creating a
real punch.

The great danger for us was the wide-open western front in
Tunisia, which offered the British and Americans excellent
possibilities for an offensive. It was therefore essential for us to
strike first and launch a surprise attack with the whole of our
motorised forces, destroying part of the Anglo-American forma
tions and driving the rest back into Algeria. Meanwhile, Mont
gomery would be unable to do anything against the Gabes line
without large-scale stocks of artillery ammunition.

When the Anglo-American forces in western Tunisia had been
defeated and deprived of their striking power, the quickest
possible reorganisation would be necessary to enable us to attack
Montgomery, throw him back to the east and delay his deploy
ment. This operation would, of course, be fraught with con
siderable difficulty, due to the unfavourable nature of the terrain.

(c) In the long run neither Libya nor Tunisia could be held, for, as
I have already said, the African war was being decided by the battle

General Bayerlein. Rommel has not expressed himself very clearly here. He
obviously meant that it would take several months to organise the supply of an army
over a distance as far as from Port Said to Mareth. He did not mean that Montgomery
would need several months for his build-up after he arrived at Mareth.

362 THE WAR IN AFRICA SECOND YEAR

of the Atlantic. From the moment that the overwhelming
industrial capacity of the United States could make itself felt in
any theatre of war, there was no longer any chance of ultimate
victory in that theatre. Even if we had overrun the whole of the
African continent, with the exception of a small strip of territory
providing the enemy with good operational possibilities and
permitting the Americans to bring in their material, we were
bound to lose it in the end. Tactical skill could only postpone
the collapse, it could not avert the ultimate fate of this theatre.
Hence our object in Tunisia would again have to be to gain
as much time as possible and get out as many as we could of our
battle-tried veterans for use in Europe. We knew by experience
that there would be no hope of supplying and equipping an Army
Group in Tunisia, which meant that we would have to try to
reduce the fighting troops there to fewer but well-equipped forma
tions. If a major, decision-seeking offensive were launched by
the Allies, we would have to shorten the front step by step and
evacuate increasing numbers of troops by transport aircraft,
barges and warships. The first stand would be in the hill country
extending from Enfidaville round Tunis, the second in the Cap
Bon peninsula. When the Anglo-American forces finally completed
their conquest of Tunisia, they were to find nothing, or at the most
only a few prisoners, and thus be robbed of the fruits of their
victory, just as we had been at Dunkirk.

(d) From the troops evacuated to Italy, a striking force would be
formed. These troops, in both training and battle experience,
were the best we had to oppose the British and Americans. My
relations with them were such that on that score alone they were
worth far more under my command than their actual numbers
represented.

During the coming weeks I discussed my ideas with all our superior
commands and hoped vainly, as it turned out to get them ultimately
adopted. On the 22nd November, I had a meeting with Marshal
Bastico. I developed the arguments given above and emphasised that
the moment had now come when we had to give effect to the order to
** resist to the end in Mersa el Brega," which meant the certain destruction
of the army unless the order were revoked in time.

" We either lose the position four days earlier and save the army,
or lose both position and army four days later." With this and similar
arguments I tried to drive the facts of the situation home. Navarrini
also did all he could to convince Marshal Bastico who, though probably
himself aware that the course we proposed was the only possible one,
outwardly still held out against it. But there was not much he could say,
because we too had no illusions about the great disadvantages which

CONSULTATION IN EUROPE 363

would accrue from the evacuation of Tripolitania; however, there was
simply nothing else for it. Finally, he promised to represent our view
as objectively as he could to higher authority.

sx Nov. 1342
DEAREST Lu,

The last few days have been quiet as far as actual fighting is
concerned. It s been pouring with rain on and off, which hasn t
made life particularly comfortable, especially as I ve been camping
out in my car.

To-day I ve a roof over my head again, and a table. That is
great luxury. I ve written you some thoroughly miserable letters,
which I m now sorry for. Although a favourable turn in the situation
is almost more than I dare hope for now, nevertheless miracles do
sometimes happen.

On the 24th November, Field Marshal Kesselring and Marshal
Cavallero at last came to Africa for the meeting which I had so long
been seeking. It took place at Arco dei Fileni, 1 on the frontier between
Cyrenaica and Tripolitania; Kesselring, Cavallero, Bastico and I were
present.

To put something of a damper on the over-optimistic mood in which
Cavallero and Kesselring both appeared, I opened the meeting by
describing the course of the fighting since Alamein, stressing the fact that
the appalling supply conditions before the battle had been the cause
of the whole sorry story. The troops had fought magnificently. We had
lost practically all our heavy equipment, partly in the Alamein line and
partly during the retreat, although every vehicle had had another in tow
in order to get back as much material as possible. The remains of the
army represented in fighting strength approximately one weak division.
I added that the armament of the three Italian infantry divisions was
practically unusable and that they could on no account be allowed to
cross swords with the British. It was therefore completely impossible to
hold the Mersa el Brega line. I again put forward my ideas on the subject
of evacuating Tripolitania. Here, however, I came up against the solid
opposition of Kesselring and Cavallero. The former looked at everything
from the standpoint of the Luftwaffe, and thought principally of the
consequences which the move would have on the strategic air situation
in Tunisia. As for the latter, he lived in a world of make-believe.

I told them both that it would be too late to think of a retreat in

two or three weeks time when the British moved against our line with

800 armoured vehicles, 400 guns and 550 anti-tank guns. We had to

make up our minds now. If they really wanted to hold the Mersa d

J Known to the Eighth Army as " Marble Arch."

364 THE WAR IN AFRICA SECOND YEAR

Brega, line, then the following equipment with crews would have to be sent
to the front within a week:

75-mm. anti-tank guns 50

Long-barrelled Panzer IVs 50

Field guns of 100-150 mm. calibre 78

Transporters and ample ammunition for the above

At least 4,000 tons of petrol and 4,000 tons of ammunition

We would also need a considerable reinforcement of the air force.

Judging by experience, there was not a chance of these demands
being satisfied, so that there was only one solution back to the west.
Ultimately, neither of them could advance any logical argument against
this reasoning. When I asked their views on the tactical action to be
taken in the event of a British outflanking thrust, neither said a word.
They had not come with any intention of learning from events and thus
forming a rational judgment; they believed the fault lay with us and
thought they could improve our fighting spirit with bombastic and
magniloquent phrases. Me, they regarded as a pessimist of the first
order, and they were probably the source of the legend which later went
the rounds back in the rear and was swallowed whole by certain office-
chair soldiers only loo anxious to delude themselves that I was " cock-a-
hoop in victory, but a prey to despair in defeat/ 5 In any case, it was
quite obvious that neither of the Marshals would ever support my case.
The reader should bear in mind that Rommel s account was written shortly
after the bitter end of the African campaign^ and that he had no opportunity to
revise it. His harsh comments on Kesselring^ in particular, should not be taken
as a considered opinion. There is a significant difference in the view he took later ;
as expressed in the final chapter written in 1944^ shortly before he died, when he
saw the African events in better perspective. They show afar higher appreciation
of Kesselring^ qualities.

The supply situation was still very serious. Instead of the 400 tons
a day we needed, 50 tons was all we could bring overland up to the
front, due partly to our shortage of vehicle space and partly to the great
distance of Tripoli from the front. The result was to be seen in deficiencies
of every possible kind.

On the 26th November we received the reaction to the meeting with
Kesselring and Cavallero. While Kesselring required us to detach troops
to protect the town of Tripoli, the Duce maintained his demand for the
Mersa el Brega line to be held, On top of that Mussolini wanted us to
launch an attack on the British as soon as possible, in which we would
receive the support of a strongly reinforced Luftwaffe. What that support
would amount to we knew only too well from our experience. In the
event of a British attack, Marshal Bastico was to decide whether or not
a retreat was necessary. Moreover, the Commando Supremo had im-

CONSULTATION IN EUROPE 365

pressed on the Marshal that in order to stiffen my back he was to give
no such order except in the direst emergency. Rather decently, Bastico
immediately got in touch with me to enable some preliminary arrange
ments to be made.

I was extremely indignant at these orders. Hitherto it had always
been the Panzer Army s command which had again and again managed
to pull our fortunes out of the morass into which they would inevitably
have sunk if things had been left to the Commando Supremo. Now
that the impossibility of getting any sense into Rome had again been
demonstrated, I decided to fly to the Fuehrer. I wanted to ask him
personally for a strategic decision and to request, as a long-term policy,
the evacuation of North Africa. I intended to lay before him the opera
tional and tactical views of the Panzer Army, as I have already described
them, and get them accepted.

We took off on the morning of the s8th November and reached
Rastenburg in the afternoon. The first talks opened at about 16.00
hours between Keitel, Jodl, Schmundt and myself. The two former were
extremely wary and reserved.

At about 17.00 hours I was ordered to the Fuehrer. There was a
noticeable chill in the atmosphere from the outset. I described all the
difficulties which the army had had to face during both the battle and
the retreat. It was all noted and the execution of the operation was
described as faultless and unique.

Unfortunately, I then came too abruptly to the point and said that,
since experience indicated that no improvement in the shipping situation
could now be expected, the abandonment of the African theatre of
war should be accepted as a long-term policy. There should be no
illusions about the situation and all planning should be directed towards
what was attainable. If the army remained in North Africa, it would be
destroyed.

I had expected a rational discussion of my arguments and intended
to develop them in a great deal more detail. But I did not get as far,
for the mere mention of the strategic question worked like a spark in a
powder barrel. The Fuehrer flew into a fury and directed a stream of
completely unfounded attacks upon us. Most of the F.H.Q,. staff officers
present, the majority of whom had never heard a shot fired in anger,
appeared to agree with every word the Fuehrer said. In illustration of
our difficulties I mentioned the fact that only 5,000 of the 15,000 fighting
troops of the Afrika Korps and goth Light Division had weapons, the
remainder being completely unarmed. This provoked a violent outburst
in which we were accused, among other things, of having thrown our
arms away. I protested strongly against charges of this^kind, and said in
straight terms that it was impossible to judge the weight of the battle
from here in Europe. Our weapons had simply been battered to pieces
by the British bombers, tanks and artillery and it was nothing short of

366 THE WAR IN AFRICA SECOND YEAR

a miracle that we had been able to escape with all the German motorised
forces, especially in view of the desperate petrol shortage, which had
allowed us to retreat at a rate of only tens of kilometres a day. I stated
that all other armies would suffer the same fate if the Americans ever
succeeded in setting foot on the continent.

But there was no attempt at discussion. The Fuehrer said that his
decision to hold the eastern front in the winter of 1941-42 had saved
Russia and that there, too, he had upheld his orders ruthlessly. I began
to realise that Adolf Hitler simply did not want to see the situation as it
was, and that he reacted emotionally against what his intelligence must
have told him was right. He said that it was a political necessity to
continue to hold a major bridgehead in Africa and there would, therefore,
be no withdrawal from the Mersa el Brega line. He would do everything
possible to get supplies to me. The Reichsmarschall [Goering] was to
accompany me to Italy. He would be vested with extraordinary powers
and was to negotiate with the Italians and all responsible authorities.
We, however, had had experience enough of these ventures.

After leaving the Fuehrer s H.Q., Goering and I travelled in a rail-car
as far as Gumbinnen where we changed to Goering s special train for
the journey to Rome. I was angry and resentful at the lack of under
standing displayed by our highest command and their readiness to blame
the troops at the front for their own mistakes. My anger redoubled when
I was compelled to witness the antics of the Reichsmarschall in his special
train. The situation did not seem to trouble hhu in the slightest. He
plumed himself, beaming broadly at the primitive flattery heaped on him
by imbeciles from his own court, and talked of nothing but jewellery and
pictures. At other times his behaviour could perhaps be amusing now,
it was infuriating.

Goering also possessed inordinate ambition .and had no scruples about
the means he used to advance it. Thus he thought that there were easy
laurels to be earned on the African front and was angling to manoeuvre
the Luftwaffe into control of it. Units of his Praetorian Guard, the
Panzer Division " Hermann Goering," were already on their way to
Tunis. 1 His estimate of the possibilities offered by the African theatre
was to prove a disastrous fallacy. I do not think that there has been any
other front where we have been opposed by a command with such
excellent qualities and by such well-trained troops not to mention their
equipment and armament as the British and later the Americans in
North Africa. Our only advantage over them was our more modern
conception of war, and this was of no avail once the material conditions

*Note by General Bayerlein. This remark is interesting. Rommel was firmly convinced
that Goering was pursuing the intentions he describes and various signs, in fact, pointed
to it. Rommel, for his part, always bitterly opposed the raising of S.S. and Luftwaffe
Field Divisions. He several times suggested to Hitler in 1943 that a single unified army
should be formed again, without these " Praetorian Guards".

CONSULTATION IN EUROPE 367

for it no longer existed. It was consequently madness to underestimate
our Western enemies in the slightest degree.

During the whole of this period my bitterest enemy was Goering*
I think he wanted to get me sacked in order to realise his own plans in
North Africa. He dismissed every appreciation of the situation which I
sent to the Fuehrer s H.Q. as mere pessimism. He gave birth to the
absurd idea that I was governed by moods and could only command
when things went well; if they went badly I became depressed and
caught the " African sickness". From this it was argued that since, to
win battles, it needed a general who believed in victory and since I was
a sick man anyway, it was necessary to consider whether to relieve me
of my command. On the subject of the " moods", I should perhaps say
that we at the front were naturally not particularly pleased when the
situation approached disaster. The Reichsmarschall, on the other hand,
sat through it all in his saloon carriage. Thus the angle of approach was a
little different.

To avoid wasting the opportunity altogether, I instructed my A.D.G.,
Lieutenant Berndt, a man with a very persuasive tongue, to make the
Gabes plan \a retreat into Tunisia and defence of the Gabes line] palatable
for Goering. I myself found his opinions so infuriating that sooner or
later I would have been bound to speak out, which would have finished
any chances I might have had.

By displaying all its advantages in the most exaggerated form, Berndt
did, in fact, succeed in rousing Goering s enthusiasm for the plan. He
made a particular point of the propaganda effect which an offensive into
Algeria by the combined motorised forces of the two armies would have
on world opinion. Goering beamed his approval and decided to give
the idea his support.

But the success was short-lived, for when we arrived in Rome, Kessel-
ring came out against the plan because of the increased air threat it
would mean to Tunisia. I pointed out that we did not really have any
choice, for the retreat would sooner or later be forced on us. We should
exploit the advantage of the concentration of strength at a moment
particularly favourable for us. But the Reichsmarschall considered that
the disadvantage given by an air triangle Malta-Algiers-Tripoli out
weighed the advantages of the plan. So a retreat to Gabes was out of
the question, and no further thought should be given to it. I had on my
lips the argument that it was nonsense to be talking of an air triangle
when it was all the same to us in the end where the British aircraft which
bombed our ports came from; however, I realised the futility of the
whole discussion and kept quiet.

In the conference with the Duce, Goering declared that I had left
the Italians in the lurch at Alamein. Before I could make a worthy reply
to this monstrous statement, Mussolini said: "That s news to me;
your retreat *was a masterpiece, Marshal Rommel."

368 THE WAR IN AFRICA SECOND YEAR

On this occasion the Italians were far more reasonable than our own
higher command and began by supporting my recommendation to retire
to the Gabes position. However, no real agreement was reached. I had,
meanwhile, issued orders to my army that if the British attacked, the
Mersa el Brega line was to be held to the last man, and had referred to
the Fuehrer s order. The Italians saw quite clearly that this must lead
to the inevitable destruction of the army, and I did, therefore, manage to
get permission from the Duce to begin with the construction of the
Buerat line and to take steps to move the non-motorised Italian infantry
back there in good time. The motorised forces also received authority
to withdraw in the event of a British attack. That was at least something.

On the morning of the 2nd December, a conference took place in the
Commando Supremo on supply matters. I had already drawn attention
to the fact that practically the whole of our shipping space was being used
for the Fifth Panzer Army [in Tunisia] and that my army was not even
receiving the necessities of life, although it was carrying the main burden
of the fighting. The most likely reason for this was the interest that the
Luftwaffe and various other Rome authorities had in supplying the
Fifth Army for an offensive to die west.

At the outset of the conference, Goering stated that I must at all costs
hold on indefinitely at Buerat, but that if possible I should already begin
attacking the enemy from Mersa el Brega.

The discussion then turned to a number of technical points concerning
the method of carrying supplies to Tripoli. In particular, Goering sug
gested that we might lay a mine-barrier after the British example, which
would keep the seaways between Tunis and Italy safe from submarines
from both sides. Adequate quantities of sea-mines were available in
Germany. The Italian Navy, of course, opposed any such scheme and
put forward all manner of objections.

I found all this talk very embittering. If our highest authorities had
only occupied themselves with the subject a little earlier, and put these
ideas into practice months before, victory in Africa would have been
ours. Most people do not seem to exert themselves until the water is
lapping round their shins.

I was not best pleased when it came out that Kesselring had diverted
to Tunis a number of the latest type of 88-mm. guns, which the Fuehrer
had promised us and which we urgently required. It was unfortunate but
true that in matters of supply Kesselring behaved in a very uncomradely
spirit towards us and thought only of himself. Finally, Kesselring gave
orders for these ships to be diverted back to Tripoli.

Particularly interesting was Goering s political attitude towards the
Italians in relation to the difficult situation in Africa. Although we had
always been forbidden to say a word to the Italians about the short
comings of their Army and State, or to demand improvements, Goering
now began to talk to Cavallero about really fundamental questions, such

CONSULTATION IN EUROPE 369

as the poor Italian armament, their sea strategy and similar thorny
subjects. The only result, of course, was that he put their backs up without
having any hope of getting anything put right. I have already drawn
attention in an earlier chapter to the unsatisfactory political basis on
which the Italo-German alliance was founded. It was the source of most
of the trouble and faults which led to the loss of the African war. A war
of alliance always causes difficulty and friction between the allies, as
each country tries to work for its own ends rather than the other s. The
right thing in these circumstances is to air all differences openly and not to
cover them with a cloak of silence. Many Italians felt very deeply that
the Axis was a sham, and consequently believed that in final victory we
would have scant regard for their interests.

It was generally felt that if Tripolitania were lost, Mussolini would
be threatened by a political crisis in Italy. His position may well have
been still further weakened by Goering s sudden heavy-handed behaviour.
A great many Italians had had enough of the war and were considering
how best they could get out of it.

Flying back to Africa I realised that we were now completely thrown
back on our resources and that to keep the army from being destroyed
as the result of some crazv order or other would need all our skill.

CHAPTER XVIII

BACK TO TUNISIA

MY STAFF in Africa were profoundly shocked when they heard what little
appreciation our highest command had shown for our position.

Meanwhile, the British had not been idle. Artillery had been brought
into position and supply dumps established, and they were now very
active with reconnaissance. Now that we were out of range of air transport
from Sicily, our petrol situation had grown even worse. In fact, we were
to all intents and purposes completely immobilised. With petrol so short,
the Luftwaffe was having to confine itself to only the most essential of
sorties.

Although 5,000 tons of petrol had arrived in Africa for the Panzer
Army during November, no less than 8,100 tons had been sunk by the
British on the way. The scale of these sinkings and the quantity of petrol
lost by them is made even more clear when it is realised that the greater
part of the 5,000 tons which did arrive was flown over by the Luftwaffe.

In these circumstances it had now become a matter of doubt whether
we would ever be able to get our formations back as far as Buerat. The
major British attack was expected for mid-December and we had to be
out by then. When I talked over the situation with Marshal Bastico on
the 3rd December we decided to go on doing alLwe could to get the facts
across to our higher authorities. For the rest we were completely
dependent on the arrival of the promised petrol ships.

But the petrol situation did not improve during the next few days.
Our first idea had been not to attempt a withdrawal until enough petrol
was available to get the whole force back. But we soon had to give that up,
since on the 5th December it became increasingly evident that the
British attack would not be long delayed. So we began to shift the
Italians back on the night of the 6th. In spite of the need for secrecy
I was certain that if the British once got wind of our intentions they
would attack immediately the Italians made an atrocious din and some
of their vehicles even drove back through the moonlit night with blazing
headlights.

Thus the Italians were carried away night by night to the west*

370

BACK TO TUNISIA 371

Their move swallowed up practically all the meagre amount of petrol
we did receive, and transport of ammunition to the front virtually ceased.
The armoured and motorised forces were all but immobilised and could
never have reacted to British attacks. SOS after SOS was dispatched
to Europe. With the enemy concentrating his air reconnaissance also
part of his ground reconnaissance in the south, it was obvious that he
was preparing a wide hook through the desert to outflank our line. It
therefore became every day more urgent to get ourselves mobile again.

8 Dec*
MY DEAR MANFRED,

It s time that I sent you my congratulations on your I4th birthday.
My wishes must not arrive too late.

The war is very hard and it looks doubtful whether I shall be
permitted to return to you. You know what a difficult struggle we re
having with the British at present, how great their superiority is and
how small our supplies. If it goes on like this, we shall be crushed by
the enemy s immense superiority. It is a bitter fate for my soldiers
and me to have to go through this at the end of so heroic and
victorious a struggle. We will do our very utmost to avoid defeat*

Now, to you, Manfred, dear. . . . You re going to be 14, and
school will soon lie behind you. You must realise the seriousness of
the situation and learn as much as you can at school. You are
learning for yourself. It is not impossible that you might soon have
to stand on your own feet. The times could become very, very hard
for all of us. Be guided by your mother, who always has your best
interests at heart. I am not pleased that the Hitler Jugend makes
such heavy demands on your time and that school has to suffer as a
result. It s probably too much for you. . . .

ii Dec. 1942

DEAREST Lu,

Not much news. Things have livened up a little at the front.
Our supply troubles are as bad as ever and are causing me a lot of
headaches. I wonder if you could have an English-German dictionary
sent to me by courier post. It would come in very useful.

I m terribly looking forward to seeing your letters and especially
the first one. Nehring has been relieved of his command and a
Colonel-General has taken oven I wonder if he ll do any better? 1

Christmas will be here in a few days. I wish you both, from my
heart, a very happy Christmas.

On the night of the 1 1 th December, after laying down heavy artillery
fire on several of our strong points, the British opened an attack along

iNehring, the former commander of the Afrika Korps, had been sent to command
in Tunisia, but was there superseded by von Arnim.

372 THE WAR IN AFRICA SECOND YEAR

the coast road in the north. Shortly afterwards my troops succeeded in
engaging a British scouting party which had the task of reconnoitring road
conditions near Merduma. Thus Montgomery s intentions were finally
clear. The British made attack after attack against our strong-points in
the north and soon there was no more doubt the enemy offensive had
opened.

The withdrawal of the non-motorised German and Italian troops was
now complete. It being essential to avoid getting our forces too closely
engaged in battle in the Mersa el Brega line we sounded the retreat in
the evening and, from 7 o clock onwards, an unbroken stream of fighting
troops and transport moved off to the west. There was no hope of
opposing a British outflanking thrust with the motorised forces; we had
too little petroL It would therefore have been suicide to have remained
in the position any longer,

Montgomery had intended to launch his attack on the i6th December, but
hastened it when he saw signs, at the beginning of the month, that Rommel was
about to withdraw. His plan was to make a frontal attack with the j/ st Highland
Division, with the jth Armoured Division advancing on its left flank, while the 2nd
New Zealand Division carried out a much wider outflanking move with the aim of
getting astride Rommefs line of retreat at the Wadi Matratin, near Merduma,
sixty miles west of Agheila. The attack as a whole was conducted by XXX Corps
(Leese] which had taken over from X Corps.

The New Zealand Division was concentrated round El Haseiat by the Qth
December, and started its outflanking move from that rearward position on the isth.
Montgomery ordered that large-scale raids by the $ist Division should open on the
night of the nth, to occupy the enemy s attention, and that the frontal attack proper
should be launched on the i$th. But these preliminary raids were taken by Rommel
to be the start of the attack, and thus led him to hasten his intended withdrawal
an effect that spoilt Montgomery s plan.

Our petrol was only enough to carry the motorised group back to
the El Mugtaa district where, provided the British did not advance
round the flank into the Merduma area, we intended to make a pre
liminary halt and await the renewed attack.

The British commander s planning had contained one mistake.
Experience must have told him that there was a good chance that we
would not accept battle at Mersa el Brega. He should not, therefore,
have started bombarding our strong-points and attacking our line until
his outflanking force had completed its move and was in a position
to advance on the coast road in timed co-ordination with the frontal
attack.

Meanwhile, on the loth December, the Fifth Panzer Army Command
had been formed in Tunis under Colonel-General von Arnim. Un
fortunately, very little co-ordination existed between this new command
and ourselves. We badly felt the need during this period of a single
authority on African soil which could have welded together under a

BACK TO TUNISIA 373

common command the two armies whose fates were so closely dependent
on each other.

THROUGH THE SIRTE

Once again my troops were moving through the arid and monotonous
wastes of the Great Sirte, westwards and probably for the last time.
The retreat went as planned during the night, with the British obviously
noticing nothing, for next morning, the I3th, they put down a violent
barrage on our old positions. British fighter-bombers attacked the
bottleneck at El Mugtaa all that day.

Late in the morning, a superior enemy force launched an attack on
Combat Group Ariete, which was located south-west of El Agheila,
with its right flank resting on the Sebcha Chebira and its left linking up
with goth Light Division. Bitter fighting ensued against 80 British tanks
and lasted for nearly ten hours. The Italians put up a magnificent fight,
for which they deserved the utmost credit. Finally, in the evening, the
British were thrown back by a counter attack of the Centauro s armoured
regiment, leaving 22 tanks and 2 armoured cars burnt out or damaged
on the battlefield. The British intention of cutting off the goth Light
Division had been foiled.

Throughout that day I had reconnaissance forces out in the Merduma
area to prevent a surprise attack on the coast road by an enemy out
flanking column.

That day the British sank a tanker and two fast ships laden with a
total of 3,500 tons of petrol. This was a heavy blow for us, particularly
in view of the British threat from the south, which made a speed-up in
the operation essential.

Air reconnaissance, which had been specially ordered because of the
anxiety we felt for our flank, very soon reported the advance of powerful
British forces on Merduma. This meant that we now had to use our last
drop of petrol to get out of the sack. It was infuriating for me to have
to stand idly by and watch the wonderful opportunities which the enemy
offered us for effective counter-moves. For example, the British com
mander used a column of only about 2,000 vehicles for his southern hook,
and it would have been simple enough, if only we had had the petrol,
to have left a small force holding the Mugtaa defile while the bulk of
our motorised forces attacked and destroyed the enemy outflanking
column. As things were, however, the situation presented us with deadly

peril.

So that night the retreat was resumed. Next morning, the 2ist
Panzer Division held the Mugtaa defile as rearguard. At about 10.00
hours, I moved Army H.Q,. back to a point some 30 miles east of Nofilia,
where, during the afternoon, I received news from the Luftwaffe com
mander that the British had reached a point 20 miles south-east of

THE WAR IN AFRICA SECOND YEAR

Merduma. This was bad news indeed, because there was then very little
petrol left at the front and we had to get some up over the road. Mean
while the ^rd Reconnaissance Battalion, which was screening our
southern front, was being slowly forced back to Merduma by the greatly
superio