Full text of "THE ROMMEL PAPERS"

TOBRUK

Rommel s plan for tfie
attack onTobruk which
was to take place

November 1941

Reproduction of a sketch map
drawn by Rommel

In this left hand corner of the original map Rommel
wrote the time schedule for the attack. It reads:

1 Start line X-Day 03.30

2 Attack onfortifications X-Day 04.00 after artillery
preparation (02.00-04.00)

3 Advance on both sides of Via Balbia up to junction
of three roads 06.30-10.00

4 Penetration to coastline 10.00-15.00

5 Attack on harbour and town ofTobruk 15 .&lt;A&gt;-
and Auda waterworks

6 Railing up of the coastal strip as fa, as
Sahal

00* }

X ** **

adi

MAI MAY 21 19

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HAY 16

7 Rommel s sketch on which he plotted the British
attack of November 20th aimed at the relief of
Tobruk, which forestalled and thwarted his plan,
"""""- with the movements of his own forces in
response to it.

940.933 R76p

Rcraiel

The Rcranel papers.

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INTERLIBRAW
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OCT 8 173 &lt;

JUL 15

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LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOG CARD NO. 53-5656
PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

CONTENTS ix

XV. ALAMEIN IN RETROSPECT page 327

XVI. THE GREAT RETREAT 337

The Evacuation of Cyrenaica 348

XVII. CONSULTATION IN EUROPE 359

XVIII. BACK TO TUNISIA 370

Through the Sirte 273

Buerat Respite 381

The End in Tripolitania 385

From Alamein to Mareth Retrospect 394

XIX. BETWEEN Two FIRES 397

Army Group " Afrika " 408

The End in Africa 416

PART FOUR

ITALY

XX. ITALY, 1 943, by Manfred Rommel 425

PART FIVE

INVASION

XXI. INVASION 1944, by General Fritz Bayerlein 4,51
RommeVs Letters from the West, December 1943 Jwne

1944 460

High Command Preparations for the Invasion 4.65

Invasion Day 471

XXII. THE LAST DAYS, by Manfred Rvmmel 495

XXIII. THE SKY HAS GROWN DARK 507

Modern Military Leadership 516

Africa in Retrospect

Appendix 525

Index 526

LIST OF MAPS
Drawn by J. F. Trotter

1. The advance from the Rhine to Cherbourg page 5

2. The break-through on the Meuse 8

3. Rommel s map of his advance, iSth-iyth May, 1940 23

4. Battles round Arras and Lille 31

5. Crossing the Somme 45

6. The Somme-Seine break-through 51

7. The drive into Cherbourg 71

8. The thrust into Cyrenaica, April 1941 108

9. The British Offensive, June 1941 Battleaxe 143

10. The British Offensive, November 1941 Crusader (ist phase) 157

1 1 . Crusader (and phase) 1 65

12. Rommel s attack at Gazala, May 1942 (ist phase) 205

13. Gazala (2nd phase) 215

14. Rommel s eastward thrust after Bir Hacheim 219

15. The Battle of Alamein, July 1942 247

16. The Battle of Alam Haifa, September 1942 278

17. The Battle of Alamein, October November 1942 301

1 8. The Battle of Kasserine ggg

19. The Battle of Medenine 4x3

20. The lay-out of German defences on D-Day 472

21. Battles round Caen 475

22. Battles in the Cherbourg Peninsula 488

FOLD OUT MAPS

The coast of North Africa from Alexandria to Tunis facing page 418

Northern France

LIST OF PLATES

Field Marshal Rommel frontispiece

Crossing the Somme facing page 42

Enemy artillery on the Somme 43

" We had reached the coast of France " 43

British and French prisoners at St. Valdry 58

The surrender at St. Val&y 58

Rammers letter to his wife, June 2ist, 1940 59

Rommel with General Gambier-Parry 98

The Fieseler Storch used by Rommel 98

Tracks south of Tobruk, Summer 1941 99

Another type of desert terrain 99

Rommel on the Via Balbia, April 1941 130

Rommel s main headquarters on the Via Balbia 130

Rommel s advanced headquarters near Tobruk 131

Rommel outside his tent 131

The Mammoth 2226

Digging a way through the sand hills 226

Rommel working in his caravan 227
Field Marshal Kesselring, General Froehlich, General Cause,

Field Marshal Rommel, General Cruewell 227

Plans for the attack on Cairo 258

Obstacles on the shores of France, Spring 1944 259

Rommel with Field Marshal Rundstedt 498

Rommel with General Speidel 498

RommeFs coffin being borne from his home 499

Hitler s wreath 499

INTRODUCTION

THE IMPACT that Rommel made on the world with the sword will be
deepened by his power with the pen. No commander in history has
written an account of his campaigns to match the vividness and value
of Rommel s which, for the most part, has now been retrieved from its
various hiding places and put together in this volume.

No other commander has provided such a graphic picture of his
operations and method of command. No one else has so strikingly
conveyed in writing the dynamism of Blitzkrieg and the pace of panzer
forces. The sense of fast movement and quick decision is electrifyingly
communicated in many of the passages Rommel carries the reader
along with him in his command vehicle.

Great commanders have mostly been dull writers. Besides lacking
literary skill in describing their actions, they have tended to be cloudy
about the way their minds worked. In relating what they did, they have
told posterity little about how and why. Napoleon was an exception,
but the value of his account is impaired by a more than usual un-
scrupulousness in treating facts, and by his intentness to falsify the
balance-sheet. Like Caesar s, his writing was not merely coloured but
dominated by a propaganda purpose.

Rommel s narrative is remarkably objective, as well as graphic.
In drafting it he certainly had, like most men who have made history,
a concern for his place in history. But while he shows a natural desire
for justification in his explanation of events, it is subordinate to his
burning interest in the military lessons of the campaigns. His evidence
stands up uncommonly well to critical examination, and checking by
other sources, A number of errors of fact can be found in it, but fewer
than in many of the official and personal narratives compiled with the
advantage of post-war knowledge. There are some disputable interpreta
tions, but not the purposeful distortions, for national or personal credit,
which are all too often found in such accounts.

The clarity and high degree of accuracy which distinguish Rommel s
picture of the operations are the more notable because of the confused
impressions that are apt to be produced by fast-moving tank battles,
especially in the desert. The clearness of Rommel s picture owes much
to his way of command his habit of getting right forward and seeking

Xlll

INTRODUCTION

to be near the crucial spot at the crucial time. It also owes much to his
prolonged self-training in observation, highly developed eye for spotting
what was significant in a scene, and knack of registering it. His passion
for taking photographs at every step of advance was a symptom of this
characteristic as it was with Lawrence, in the Arabian theatre of
World War L

There were marked resemblances between these two masters of desert
warfare, whatever their differences in temperament, range of interest
and philosophy. They were strikingly akin in their sense of time and
space, instinct for surprise, eye for ground and opportunity, combination
of flexibility with vision, and ideas of direct personal leadership. Another
military link was in the application of mechanised mobility to desert
warfare. Lawrence, who is popularly associated with camel-rides, was
among the first to see how the new means of mobility could transform
desert warfare, and had demonstrated this embryonically and in miniature,
with a few armoured cars and aircraft. RommeFs exploitation of these
potentialities on the grand scale would have delighted the Lawrence who
was a connoisseur of military art and had a revolutionary bent.

Rommel, also, had an urge to express himself on paper as well as in
action. That became evident long before he became famous as a
commander from his extraordinarily vivid treatise on infantry tactics,
inspired by his experiences as a young officer in World War I and by
his reflections upon them. Most text-books on tactics are deadly dull,
but he brought life into the subject. The more mobile operations of the
next war, and his own greater role, gave him bigger scope of which he
took full advantage. He was a born writer as well as a born fighter.
The same expressive gift and urge can be seen in the way he sketched on
paper, with pencil or coloured chalks, the operations he planned or even
imagined.

Throughout his activities in World War II he kept constantly in
mind the project of a book to match the performance, and continually
made notes for the purpose notes that he developed into a narrative
whenever he had a breathing space.

Death, under Hitler s decree, prevented him from completing the
project, but what he had already drafted makes a book that has no peer
among narratives of its kind. It may lack polish, but its literary power
is very striking. Along with descriptive clarity it has dramatic intensity,
while its value is much increased by the comments that accompany and
illuminate its story. His section on " The Rules of Desert Warfare " is a
masterly piece of military thinking, while the whole narrative is sprinkled
with sage reflections, often with a fresh turn about concentration in
time rather than in space; about the effect of speed in outweighing
numbers; about flexibility as a means to surprise; about the security
provided by audacity; about the stultifying conventions of the " quarter
master " mind; about creating new standards and not submitting to

INTRODUCTION XV

norms; about the value of indirect rather than direct reply to the enemy s
moves; about the way that air inferiority requires a radical revision of
the rules of ground operations; about the unwisdom of indiscriminate
reprisals and the folly of brutality; about the basic inexpediency of
. unprincipled expediency.

Until I delved into Rommel s own papers I regarded him as a brilliant
tactician and great fighting leader, but did not realise how deep a sense
of strategy he had or, at any rate, developed in reflection. It was a
surprise to find that such, a thruster had been so thoughtful, and that
his audacity was so shrewdly calculated. In certain cases, his moves may
still be criticised as too hazardous, but not as the reckless strokes of a
blind and hot-headed gambler. In analysis of the operations it can be
seen that some of the strokes which miscarried, with grave results for him,
came close to proving graver for his opponents. Moreover, even in
failure his strokes made such an impression on them as to assure his
army a chance of escape.

One of the clearer ways in which commanders can be measured is
by the extent to which they impress the opposing side. By that measure
Rommel s stature is very high. In centuries of warfare only Napoleon
has made a comparable impression on the British, and that was not
achieved purely in the military field, as it was in Rommel s case.

Moreover, Rommel became much more than a bogey to the British.
Awe for his dynamic generalship developed into an almost affectionate
admiration for him as a man. This was inspired primarily by the speed
and surprise of his operations, but it was fostered by the way that he
maintained in African warfare the decencies of the soldierly code, and
by his own chivalrous behaviour towards the many prisoners of war
whom he met in person. He became the hero of the Eighth Army troops
who were fighting against him to such an extent that it became their
habit, when wanting to say that someone had done a good job of any
kind on their own side, to describe it as " doing a Rommel ",

Such intense admiration for the enemy commander carried an under
lying danger to the soldiers morale. Thus the British commanders and
headquarter staffs were compelled to make strenuous efforts to dispel
" the Rommel legend ". It is a tribute to their sense of decency and his
personal conduct that such counter-propaganda was not directed towards
blackening his character but towards diminishing his military scale. In
that respect, his ultimate defeats provided a lever and it was hardly
to be expected that his opponents would emphasise his crippling dis
advantages in strength and supplies, or the significance of what he
managed to achieve under such handicaps. Juster comparison and truer
reckoning are left for history, which has a habit of correcting the
superficial judgments that temporarily keep company with victory.
Hannibal, Napoleon and Lee went down in defeat, yet rose above their
conquerors in the scales of history.

XVI INTRODUCTION

In true judgment of performance, due account must be taken of the
conditions and relative resources, together with the other factors that lie
outside a commander s control. Only then can we properly estimate
the quality of his performance. The outstanding feature of Rommel s
numerous successes is that they were achieved with inferiority of resources
and without any command of the air. No other generals on either side
in World War II won battles under these handicaps, except for the early
British leaders under Wavell and they were fighting Italians.

Rommel s performance was not flawless, and he suffered several
possibly avoidable reverses but when fighting superior forces any slip
may result in defeat, whereas numerous mistakes can be effectively
covered up by the commander who possesses a big margin of superiority
in strength. For all his audacity and rapidity of movement and decision,
Rommel comes out well, on balance, from the test embodied in Napoleon s
saying that " the greatest general is the one who makes the fewest
mistake*?."

That criticism, however, has too passive a note to fit the nature of
war, and is apt to foster a dangerous caution. It would be more pro
foundly true to say: "the greatest general is the one who leads his
opponent to make the most mistakes. 5 By that test, Rommel shines even
more brightly.

The best line of comparison between famous commanders of different
eras lies through their art, which can be distinguished from changing
technique. It is possible to make a comparative study of the use they made
of the means at their disposal to achieve their effects particularly their
use of mobility, flexibility, and surprise to upset their opponents* mental
and physical balance. It is even possible, with such as have disclosed their
conceptions, to gauge how far their effects were a matter of calculation.

Here, above all, lies the instructive value of Rommel s papers and
the more so because his narrative was not revised in the light of post
war knowledge, while his letters frequently provide pre-event evidence
of the way in wliich he approached his problems. It is in the approach,
more than in the act, that a man reveals the bent of his thought, and the
compass of his mind.

The Rommel Papers should go far to dispel the dust of controversy
that has been stirred up, from various motives. Rommel s narratives
were written long before he could have any idea of the controversy that
would arise outside Germany, and could frame them to meet it; his
letters to his wife have still more immediacy. It is remarkable how frank
they are in comment in view of the fact that they were liable to be opened.
From these conjoint sources the reader can get a clear view into Rommel s
mind and the mainsprings of his action. The picture may naturally
differ according to the individual reader s predisposition, but there is
little obscurity about the personality itself, and its various facets.

Rommel was very human apart from his extraordinary energy and

INTRODUCTION

his military genius. The "warts" are plainly self-revealed in his
narratives and letters. Like most of the leaders of mankind he was in a
state of immaturity. During his spell of greatest success his attitude had
the boyishness that is captivating but dangerously unphilosophical, and
his outlook had the limitations that make for success in leadership. In
the earlier part of the war, his letters suggest that he tended to regard
war as a great game the game for which, in his country s service, he
had trained himself with single-minded devotion. For maximum driving
power, a commander must feel like that about war and the most
thrustful of them always have. Rommel had an unusual capacity for
reflection, but his did not go beyond the military field until the last
months of his life.

Like most forceful soldiers, too, he did not find it easy to be tolerant*
about contrary views, especially among those who were fighting on the
same side. That is manifest in his biting comments on Haider and
Kesselring in particular, which were certainly unjust on several counts.
It should also be remembered that he was a sick man during the later
stages of the African campaign, a condition which naturally tended to
increase his aggravation and warp his view. But there was little malice
in him his explosiveness was an outlet and he was unusually ready to
repair an injustice when his anger passed. That can be seen, for instance,
in the high tribute he pays to Kesselring in his final reflections. Moreover,
his comments on the enemy French, British and American show a re
markable freedom from hatred and readiness to recognise their qualities.

Rommel s attitude to " the Fuehrer " and his long-continued loyalty
are a puzzle only to those who do not understand the habit of mind
produced by a professional soldier s early training, particularly in
Germany, and are unable to imagine how things look from such a point
of view. But the Papers make clearer two factors that for a time buttressed
his soldierly loyalty. It is easy to perceive how Rommel s dynamism made
him responsive to Hitler s and how the obstruction he suffered from the
intermediate " top-hamper " with which he was in close contact made
him feel more sympathetic to the distant Fuehrer. That continued while
Rommel s reflectiveness was simply military. But the wide measure of
independent authority he had in Africa, the larger problems with which
he had to deal, and the deep impression made on him by the material
superiority of the Allies, gradually widened the scope of his reflection
and thus paved the way for the momentous change of altitude that
developed when he came back to Europe and into closer contact with
Hitler. It would have been madness for him to have recorded on paper
this process of change indeed, some of his later letters show an obvious
effort to disguise it but there are a number of clues scattered through
the pages. His son and closest associates have supplemented these with
their evidence of how he was brought to the break-away, and the resolve
to overthrow Hitler, which cost him his life.

INTRODUCTION

The main importance of the papers lies, however, in the abundant
light they shed on Rommel s military leadership. Their evidence confirms
the judgment of the British soldiers who actually fought against him, and
shows that their estimate was closer to the mark than the counter-
propaganda designed to depreciate his formidable reputation. The
" Rommel legend " clearly had a much better foundation than most.
Save for his many narrow escapes from death or capture in battle, he
owed less to luck than most commanders who have attained fame. Now
that his actual conceptions and the workings of his mind are laid open
for examination it becomes evident that his successes were earned, not
accidental. They bear the hall-mark of military genius.

This is not the place for a biographical survey of Rommel s career-
which has been ably and vividly presented in Desmond Young s book, 1
a valuable complement to this. But it may be worthwhile to epitomise
the principal features of Rommel s generalship, and briefly discuss them
in relation to the general experience of warfare.

In most fields, genius is associated with originality. Yet it has been
rare among those who are usually acclaimed as the great masters of war.
Most of them have gained their successes by using conventional instru
ments superlatively well, and only a few have sought new means and
methods* That is strange, since history shows that the fate of nations
has been repeatedly decided, and the most epoch-making changes in
history determined, by change in weapons and tactics especially the
latter,

But such developments have usually been produced by some student
of war with a fresh turn of mind, and by his, influence upon the pro
gressively inclined soldiers of his time, rather than by the action of any
top-level commander. In the history of war great ideas have been less
numerous than great generals, but have had a more far-reaching effect.
The distinction between the two is a reminder that there are two forms
of military genius the conceptive and the executive.

In Rommel s case they were combined. While the theory of Blitzkrieg
the new super-mobile style of warfare with armoured and motorised
forces had been conceived in England, long before he came on the
stage, the quickness with which he grasped it and the way he developed
it showed his fresh-mindedness and innate conceptive power. He
became, next to Guderian, the leading exponent of the new idea. That
was the more remarkable because he had had no experience of tanks
until given command of the 7th Panzer Division in February, 1940, and
then had less than three months to study the theory and master the
problem of handling such forces before he was launched into action. His
brilliant share in the panzer drives that produced the collapse of France
led to his being given the opportunity of applying the new conception

1 Rommel (Harpers, 1951).

INTRODUCTION XIX

in Africa and with the advantage of independent command which
Guderian was never allowed in Europe, fortunately for Germany s
surviving opponents. Moreover, in Africa, Romniel demonstrated a
subtler application of the theory, blending the defensive with the offensive
and drawing the opposing tanks into baited traps, preparatory to his
own lightning thrusts. In other respects, too, he made signal contributions
to the new technique.

It is significant that Rommel was one of the few eminent commanders
who have gained distinction as military thinkers and writers. More
remarkable still is the fact that his chance to prove his powers as a
commander came through the effect of his writings. For it was his book
Infanterie grdft an that first attracted Hitler s attention to him, and by the
impression it made paved the way for his phenomenal rise.

Rommel was able to make the most of his chance because he also
possessed executive genius. The extent to which he had it may best be
realised by taking note of the qualities that the great commanders of
history have shown although the degree of each quality has varied in
each case.

In earlier times, when armies were small and fought with short-range
weapons, and when the battlefield rather than the theatre of war was
the general s arena, the quality most prized in a commander was coup
fftil an expressive term for the combination of acute observation with
swift-sure intuition. All the Great Captains possessed in high degree this
faculty of grasping instantly the picture of the ground and the situation;
of relating one to the other, and the part to the whole. Rommel most
clearly had this faculty. It had a renewed importance in Africa owing
to the nature of fast-moving armoured warfare and the moderate scale
of the forces in that theatre.

In recent times, as the range of weapons lengthened and armies
became more extended as well as larger in scale, so the need increased
for a faculty wider and deeper than coup d vil for insight. The power
of penetrating, as Wellington aptly expressed it, into what was going on
" at the other side of the hill " behind the enemy s lines, and in the
enemy s mind. In the present even more than in the past, a leader must
have a deep understanding of psychology in general, and of the opposing
commander s psychology in particular. The extent to which Rommel
possessed this kind of insight, or psychological sense, can be seen in his
Papers as well as in his operations.

Such a psychological sense is in turn the foundation of another
essential, and more positive, element of military genius the power of
creating surprise, of producing the unexpected move that upsets the
opponent s balance. For full effect, as history shows, it must be reinforced
by an acute time-sense, and by the capacity to develop the highest
possible degree of mobility. Speed and surprise are twin qualities. They
are predominantly the " hitting," or offensive, qualities of true general-

XX INTRODUCTION

ship. And their development, like that of the informative senses, depends
on a faculty which may be best, and briefly, defined as creative im
agination.

In power of producing the unexpected move, acuteness of time-sense,
and capacity to develop a pitch of mobility that can paralyse opposition,
it is hard to find a modern parallel to Rommel, except Guderian, the
prime minister of Blitzkrieg. Later in the war, Patton and ManteufTel
displayed similar qualities, but comparative assessment is difficult
because of their more Limited scope. So it is, also, when we go back into
the past, where instruments were so different although we know that
Seydlitz, Napoleon, and Bedford Forrest were outstandingly gifted in
achieving surprise through speed, and although a similar dynamism can
be discerned in the great Mongol leaders such as Genghiz Khan and
Sabutai. The secret of this combination has never been so clearly
communicated as in Rommel s Papers.

In seeking to upset the enemy s balance, a commander must not lose
his own balance. He needs to have the quality which Voltaire described
as the keystone of Marlborough s success " that calm courage in the
midst of tumult, that serenity of soul in danger, which the English call
a cool head." But to it he must add the quality for which the French
have found the most aptly descriptive phrase " le sens du praticable"
The sense of what is possible, and what is not possible tactically and
administratively. The combination of both these two " guarding "
qualities might be epitomised as the power of cool calculation. The
sands of history are littered with the wrecks of finely conceived plans that
capsized for want of this ballast.

On this count, there is more question about RommePs qualifications.
Along with tremendous courage he had what is called the artistic tempera
ment, and was apt to swing from exaltation to depression as his letters
show. Moreover, he was often criticised in German staff circles, including
his own, for not taking sufficient account of supply difficulties, and
attempting strategically more than was practicable administratively. In
a number of cases the course of the operations tends to bear out such
criticism. On the other hand, the Papers show that in the risks he took
there was a deeper calculation than appeared on the surface. He
demanded more than was possible by " Quartermasters " standards as
the most probable way of gaining great results under the new conditions
of strategy. Although that strategic policy miscarried at times, it is
remarkable how often he managed more than was possible administra
tively by any normal calculation and in consequence achieved results
that would not have been possible in any other way.

Finally, and beyond all the other qualities that mark a great com
mander, comes actual power of leadership. That is the dynamo of the
battle-car and no skill in driving will avail if it is defective. It is through
the current of great leadership that troops are inspired to do more

INTRODUCTION

than seems possible, and thus upset an opponent s " normal "
calculations.

There is no doubt on this score of Rommel s qualification as a
* Great .Captain. ". Exasperating to staff officers, he was worshipped by
the fighting troops, and what he got out of them in performance was far
beyond any rational calculation.

B. H. LIDDELL HART

THE STORY OF THE ROMMEL PAPERS

By Manfred Rommel

WHEN MY father died, he left a considerable number of documents which
had accumulated during his campaigns. There were army orders,
situation reports, daily reports to the High Command; besides these
official documents he left a number of volumes comprising his personal
diary, and comprehensive notes on the French campaign of 1940 and on
the war in the desert.

After the First World War my father published a book on infantry
tactics, based largely on his own experiences. When he was writing that
book he found he had preserved few of the essential documents, while
his diary was hardly more helpful; there were great gaps during the
most important periods, when he had been too occupied with fighting
to have time for his diary.

My father undoubtedly intended to publish another book on the
military lessons to be derived from his experiences in World War II,
and this time he was determined not to be at the same disadvantage in
the matter of contemporary records.

From the moment he crossed the frontier on 10 May 1940 he began
to keep a personal account of his operations, which he generally dictated
daily to one of his aides. Whenever a lull allowed, he prepared a more
considered appreciation of what had taken place.

He preserved all his official orders, reports and documents. In
addition there were hundreds of maps and sketches of his operations
which he or his staff had drawn in coloured chalks, some being carefully
and exactly finished off in drawing ink; there were also drafts for maps
intended to illustrate his subsequent writings.

As events took a less favourable turn, my father became all the more
anxious that an objective account of his actions should survive his
possible death so that his intentions could not be misinterpreted. On his
return from Africa he worked on his papers in great secrecy, dictating,
or giving drafts for typing, only to my mother or to one of his A.D,Cs,
On his return from France in August, 1944, he began to write an account
of the Invasion, but he destroyed this when it became clear that he was

xxiii

THE STORY OF THE ROMMEL PAPERS

suspected of complicity in the July 20 plot. On the other hand, some
papers have survived which he would undoubtedly have burned had he
had the time.

My father was an enthusiastic photographer. Here, again for the
purposes of his book, he had gone back to Italy after the first World War
to get photographs, which he needed for making tactical sketches, of the
places where he had fought in 1917; but that had not been easy, for the
Italians did not welcome German officers with cameras to their frontier
territory. My father travelled as an " engineer " with my mother on a
motor-cycle. For the book he planned to write on the Second World
War he intended to be well provided with photographs and he took
literally thousands, both in Europe and in Africa, including a large
number in colour. He took photographs only when advancing, he once
told me; " I don t photograph my own retreat."

Furthermore, he wrote to my mother almost daily and she had
preserved about a thousand of his letters.

Only a proportion of all this material survived the various vicissitudes
which it underwent.

During the months immediately preceding the outbreak of war, my
father commanded the War Academy at Wiener Neustadt, about thirty
miles south of Vienna. The academy was housed in an enormous old
castle. When in 1943 British and American bomber squadrons started
to raid the town and our home was in danger of being destroyed, we
deposited some of my father s papers in the deep cellars of the castle;
others we sent to a farm in south-west Germany. The rest we took with
us when in the autumn of 1943 we moved from Wiener Neustadt to
Herrlingen, five miles from Ulm in Wuerttemberg.

My father s death made my mother all the more anxious to save his
papers, not only for personal reasons but so that, when history came to
be written, the truth might be told. Already at the time of the funeral,
an S.S. officer had tried to find out, in the course of conversation, what
had become of my father s papers. We did not take the bait. Nonetheless,
it appeared highly probable that an attempt would be made to take
them from us.

My mother, therefore, immediately began to assemble all the papers
in the house. I went to Wiener Neustadt to retrieve the documents which
we had left in the castle cellars. One did not need to be very far-sighted
at that time to realise that Soviet troops would, in due course, reach
Vienna; and, as it turned out, six months later they stormed the castle
after it had been reduced to a heap of rubble following stout resistance
on the part of the German officer cadets in training there. Everything
that was not nailed to the ground, was plundered.

With the help of my father s sister and of Captain Aldinger, his

THE STORY OF THE ROMMEL PAPERS XXV

A.D.C., my mother began to pack up all the papers ready for evacuation
should the need arise. She intended to rely on dispersal, for while it was
probable that one hiding place would be discovered, it was improbable
that all would be.

In the middle of November, 1944, Captain Aldinger, who had stayed
with my mother to help her clear up my father s affairs, was suddenly
ordered by the town major of Ulm to present himself at the main railway
station of that city. It was said that an officer on General Maisel s staff
would be there and that he had certain matters to discuss with Captain
Aldinger. It was General Maisel who had fetched my father away a
month earlier. It was further intimated to Captain Aldinger that this
officer had orders to proceed to Herrlingen afterwards.

The purpose of this visit was obscure to my mother and Captain
Aldinger. Was an arrest planned? Or did they intend to carry out a
house search for my father s notes? No one could tell.

The work of hiding the remaining papers was speeded up as much
as possible. By the evening of the i4th November, with the exception
of drafts and jottings for his personal notes, all that remained in the house
were official war documents, marked " Secret ", which would, in any
event, have to be given up.

On the morning of the isth November, Aldinger left Herrlingen to
go to Ulm. " I shall leave the car here," he said to my mother; " God
knows whether I shall ever come back. Perhaps I shall be arrested right
away. If not, I shall come back to Herrlingen at once."

My mother waited. When the afternoon came, she became seriously
concerned about Aldinger s arrest. There was all the more danger that
this might happen because, with the exception of my mother and myself,
he was the only witness who knew the real cause of my father s death.
Towards three o clock the gate of our garden opened. Aldinger came in.
He was alone and was carrying rather a bulky parcel under his arm which
was wrapped in white paper. Mercifully my mother s fears had not
materialised. The officer on MaisePs staff had handed over the baton
and service cap which the two generals had taken from my father on
the i4th October, after he died. They had taken these " trophies " to
the Fuehrer s Headquarters and, as we found out afterwards, they were
kept for a time in the desk of Schaub, Hitler s A.D.C. Immediately after
my father s death, Captain Aldinger had repeatedly and vigorously
protested, in the name of my mother, at this unheard-of behaviour and
had now* against all expectations, been successful.

The majority of the documents had by this time been dispersed. 1 hey
were hidden on two different farms in south-west Germany, in one case
walled up in a cellar, in the other behind a heap of empty boxes ma
cellar. A small box which contained some of my father s notes on the
battle of Normandy was buried by a friend of ours between the walls of
a bombed Stuttgart ruin in a part of the town which had been so pounded

XXVi THE STORY OF THE ROMMEL PAPERS

by numerous air attacks that it was no longer likely to be considered a
worthwhile target. My father s diaries for 1943-44 were deposited in a
hospital, while other material was sent to my aunt in Stuttgart. My
mother retained in the house at Herrlingen the drafts of my father s notes
which had formed the original manuscript on Africa, films taken by my
father in the French campaign of 1940 and his personal letters.

Strangely enough, my mother was so preoccupied with the fear that
the Nazi authorities might get hold of the papers that she never thought
of the possibility that the Allies, who were now approaching, might show
an equal interest.

During the second half of April 1945, t ie bombing became continuous.
Hour by hour the American H.E. bombs crashed down on Ulm, which
was burning night and day in many places. From the west and from
the north the sound of artillery fire could be heard and day by day it
became more menacing. The remnants of the German Army were
streaming back weaponless through the valley in which Herrlingen lay,
some on farm-carts, some on foot, all in perpetual fear of attack by U.S.
fighter-bombers. The local Volksturm, comprising youngsters of fourteen
and old men of sixty-five, was mobilised. Placards had been put up
everywhere which read " Anyone who fails to defend Ulm against the
enemy is a swine."

One day, it must have been the aoth April, my mother, looking out
of her window, saw the American tanks approaching Ulm. Only when,
on the following day, Allied soldiers set fire to parts of the neighbouring
village on the false assumption that it was occupied by German partisans,
and Jong columns of refugees from that village came streaming through
Herrlingen, only then did my mother become anxious about the docu
ments that were still in the house. She got the letters, notes and films
ready so that she could take them with her at a moment s notice. Part
of these she threw in an old trunk which, with the help of neighbours, she
buried in the garden.

The American troops now occupied Herrlingen. Sentries were posted
everywhere. It was impossible to bury any further material. Among
the first Americans who came to see my mother was a Captain Marshall
of the Seventh Army. He asked -whether there were any documents
in the house. In the confident belief that private letters would not
be confiscated, my mother answered: "I have only the personal letters
of my husband written to me." " Where are these letters ? ** asked
Marshall,

He went with my mother down to the cellar. When he saw the
folders containing the letters lying in a box, he said: " I will have to
take them away. We shall want to have a look at them. I will bring them
back in a few days."

Next my mother was told that the return of these letters would be
delayed for a bit. A fortnight later Captain Marshall s interpreter came

THE STORY OF THE ROMMEL PAPERS XXVU

to my mother, and said: " The Captain is terribly sorry that we can t
keep our promise but the Army has decided that these documents will
have to be sent to Washington. *

One day, in the middle of May, at eight o clock in the morning, my
mother was ordered to leave her house by nine. An American unit was
to be billeted in our home. While my mother was still packing, American
soldiers started to open the drawers and cupboards and to search.
Numerous documents of my father s (drafts for notes on Africa and hand
written maps) which at the time were on the library shelves, in the desk
and in the cellar have not been seen since. All my mother managed to
do was to bring away on a small hand-cart a trunk containing my father s
films, the manuscript of the African campaign, and the official history
of the yth Panzer Division s operations in France in 1940, of which only
three copies had ever been made.

The papers which were evacuated to other places met with varied
fates.

On the one farm in south-west Germany, some Americans appeared,
announced that they belonged to the Counter Intelligence Corps and
demanded to see the trunks which Field Marshal Rommel had had
placed there. Unfortunately, some of these trunks and boxes had already
been brought up from the cellar in which they had been walled up
into the house itself. The Americans commandeered a chest and a trunk.
The chest contained my father s documents, notes and sketches from the
First World War the material he had used in his book, The Infantry in
Attack. The trunk contained my father s complete Leica equipment (a
camera and twelve different accessories), personal effects and about 3,000
snapshots which my father had himself taken. He was particularly proud
of his colour photographs, some of which had been taken with a certain
amount of danger to himself. One, I remember, which was most im
pressive, showed Australian infantry attacking with bayonets. There
were several thousand other photographs which he had collected from
war reporters and soldiers between 1940 and 1944; some he had already
captioned.

The Americans gave a receipt for the chest and the trunk. But
American officers who subsequently came and tried to be helpful about
the recovery of the trunks, and to whom we showed this " receipt,"
were doubtful whether these people had really been acting under official
orders. There remained on this farm another box containing the personal
diary of my father from 1940 to 1943 as well as notes on the French
campaign of 1940; there were two further boxes with maps. The owner
of the farm, a friend of my father, had denied, despite threats from the
two CJ.C. people, that he had any further material. Subsequently, he
did his best to see that at least these boxes remained in our possession.
Even then, the box with my father s diaries and notes on France in 1940
was, in an unguarded moment, stolen from the loft by an unknown

XXVlii THE STORY OF THE ROMMEL PAPERS

person. Whether he was pleased with what he found when he opened the
box, is doubtful.

On the other farm, meanwhile, a Moroccan force had taken over.
Cattle and poultry were slaughtered and open fires were burning in the
farmyard. The whole place was thoroughly searched several times by
Moroccans. Fortunately, none of them ever suspected that a further
cellar existed behind a whole heap of empty boxes. It was in this way
that the documents here w r ere saved.

The papers which my aunt had kept for us and those that had been
buried in the Stuttgart ruins also survived the German collapse.

When my mother had to leave her home, she found emergency
accommodation in a small room in the neighbourhood. It was here that
she made an inventory of the material that remained to her. The box
which had been buried in the garden at Herrlingen was once again
unearthed and removed to another place. The boxes on the farm, which
had in the meantime been evacuated by its Moroccan occupiers, were
fetched. Thus, when my mother eventually found new shelter in the
Herrlingen school, she took all the material along with her.

When my mother learned that posthumous denazification proceedings
were going to be taken against my father with the object of confiscating
what effects he had left, she once again loaded up the small hand-cart
and hid the documents away from where she was living. Fortunately,
these new threats never materialised, though we heard of a case in which
similar documents belonging to another officer were confiscated.

Encouraged by Brigadier Young, and by Captain Liddell Hart s
undertaking to edit my father s papers, I eventually started to reassemble
the documents from their various hiding places. In fact, it was possible
. to translate hurriedly a few passages and incorporate them as an Appendix
to the biography of my father which Brigadier Young had written and
which was by then already at press.

General Speidel, my father s former Chief of Staff, made repeated
efforts to have my father s letters restored to my mother. Brigadier
Young asked General Eisenhower to intercede with Washington for their
recovery. Finally, through the efforts of Captain Liddell Hart, and after
much protracted search, the letters were handed over to General Speidel
by Colonel Nawrocky on behalf of the American Historical Division. It
transpired that in Washington they had been filed, not under " ROMMEL ",
but under " ERWIN ", my father s Christian name and the signature on
the letters. Some are still missing, notably those written at the time of
the Invasion. However, some other documents dealing with Normandy
were subsequently returned to my mother.

With the return of the letters we felt we had recovered as many of
my father s papers as had survived the destruction of war, in part
carried out by my father for his own personal safety, and the looting
which inevitably follows in the wake of war.

EDITORIAL NOTE

THE MAIN part of Rommel s papers deal with the North African campaign.
The whole of his narrative is printed in this volume. The only part of
the story he did not cover, as he would have done if he had lived, is the
winter campaign of 1941-42. So a chapter on this has been provided by
General Bayerlein then Chief of Staff of the Afrika Korps with the
aid of Rommers notes and letters as well as his own knowledge, from very
close contact, of Rommers views. Bayerlein s own exceptional experience
and ability as a " Panzer leader " make this addition all the more
interesting.

Rommel s story of the 1940 campaign is on the whole intensely
exciting, but in some places it turns aside to deal with minor details of
unit movement, while occasionally there is nothing of particular interest
in the day s events. Such passages have been cut, as indicated in the text.

During the months he was in Italy, during 1943, Rommel did not
conduct any active operations, but his diary contains a number of
illuminating entries about the Italian coup d etat and the efforts to prevent
Italy changing side. Manfred Rommel has woven these diary passages,
and Rommel s letters at the time, into a short chapter.

Rommel did not live to write his story of the Normandy campaign,
but he left a lot of notes and a number of other records, especially about
his pre-invasion ideas and plans. General Bayerlein has pieced these
together, and also incorporated in this chapter Rommel s letters of the

period.

In a final chapter, Manfred Rommel relates the story of his father s
death, and of the tense weeks that preceded the arrival of the executioners
who came to carry out Hitler s decree.

The interest and value of these chapters and of Rommel s own
narrative is much enhanced by his letters. For they convey the colour
of his thought at the actual moment in the operations, and thus, besides
their vividness, often provide an historical check on the recollected story
in his subsequent narrative.

He wrote his wife almost every day, however hard pressed, although
his letters were always rather short. They were usually written in the
early hours of the morning, and sometimes when he was on the move

XXIX

XXX EDITORIAL NOTE

in his armoured car or in a tank. The handwriting of the letters often
has a shakiness caused by the movement of the vehicle or the chill of
the hours before sunrise.

While he had to be discreet in referring to operations in progress, it
is remarkable how frank he often was in his comments, in view of the
risk that his letters might be opened either by the ordinary or the
secret censorship.

Naturally, many of his letters were simply affectionate notes to his
wife, but any that contained significant comments are incorporated in
this volume.

Acknowledgments

IN THE first place, tribute is due to the excellent work of Manfred Rommel
and General Bayerlein in the initial assembly and classification of the
material. I was greatly impressed by their diligence and conscientiousness
during all the months we worked jointly on the Papers. The first section
recovered was Rommel s draft narrative of the African campaign, and
this was published in Germany under the title of Krieg Ohne Hass ( War
Without Hate) with a number of footnotes by Manfred Rommel and by
General Bayerlein. These footnotes have been kept in the present
volume where the full material is being published for the first time
while I have added numerous editoria^ notes to clarify points in the
narrative and to provide an historical background, relating Rommel s
actions and observations to those on the Allied side.

For the recovery of the letters and their restoration to Frau Rommel,
grateful thanks are due to Major-General Orlando Ward, Chief of
Military History, U.S.A., and to the initiative taken by Brigadier General
S. L. A. Marshall, the eminent military analyst and historian, whose
help I sought in the matter.

In the editing of The Rommel Papers, I would like to express my
appreciation ot the manifold help given by Mark Bonham Carter, Paul
Findlay (the translator but far more than that), and Ronald Politzer,
as welj as of Manfred Rommel and General Bayerlein. It was most
refreshing and stimulating to have such discerning and able associates
in the editorial task.

B. H. LIDDELL HART
WoLverton Park,
Buckinghamshire, August, 1952

Part One
FRANCE 1940

CHAPTER I

THE BREAK-THROUGH ON THE MEUSE

ON THE I oth May, 1940, Hitler launched his long-expected invasion
of the West. 1 It achieved a lightning victory that changed the course
of history 3 with far-reaching effects on the future of all peoples.

The decisive act in this world-shaking drama began on the i3th
when the Meuse was crossed by Guderian s panzer corps near Sedan and
by Rommel s panzer division near Dinant. The narrow breaches were
soon expanded into a vast gap. The German tanks, pouring through it,
reached the Channel coast within a week } thus cutting off the Allied
armies in Belgium. That disaster led on to the fall of France and the
isolation of Britain. Although Britain managed to hold out behind her
sea-ditch, rescue came only after a prolonged war had become a world
wide war. The price of that mid-May breakdown in 1940 has been
tremendous, and remains immeasurable.

After the catastrophe, the breakdown was commonly viewed as
inevitable, and Hitler s attack as irresistible. But appearances were very
different from reality as has become clear from post-war revelations.

Instead of having an overwhelming superiority in numbers, as was
imagined, the German armies were not able to muster as many as their
opponents did. The offensive was launched with 136 divisions, and was
faced by the equivalent of 156 French, British, Belgian and Dutch.
It was only in aircraft that the Germans had a big superiority, in numbers
and quality. Their tanks were fewer than those on the other side-
barely 2,800 against more than 4,000. They were also, on the average,
inferior in armour and armament, although slightly superior in speed.
The Germans main advantage, besides that in airpower, lay in the
speed with which their tanks were handled and the superior technique
they had developed. Their panzer leaders had adopted, and put into
practice with decisive effect, the new theories that had been conceived
in Britain but not comprehended by the heads of the British and French
armies.

introductory note is supplied by the Editor, Captain B. H. Liddell Hart.
Elsewhere all his editorial comments apart from footnotes are set in italics.

4 FRANCE, I94O

Of the 136 German divisions, only 10 were armoured but that small
fraction, used as spearheads, virtually decided the issue of the campaign
before the mass of the German Army came into action.

The brilliant result of these panzer thrusts obscured their small scale,
and also the narrowness of the margin by which they succeeded* That
success could easily have been prevented but for the paralysis, and all
too frequent moral collapse, of the opposing commanders and troops in
face of a tempo and technique of attack for which their training had not
prepared them. Even as it was, the success of the invasion turned on a
series of long-odds chances and on the readiness of dynamic leaders like
Guderian and Rommel to make the most of such chances.

The original plan for the offensive in the West had been on the lines
of the pre-1914 Schlieffen plan, with the main weight on the right wing,
where Bock s Army Group " B " was to advance through the plain of
Belgium. But early in 1 940 the plan was changed following the proposal
of Manstein for a more daring, and thus more unexpected, thrust through
the hilly and wooded Ardennes country of Belgian Luxembourg. The
centre of gravity was now shifted to Rundstedt s Army Group " A,"
which faced that sector. It was given seven of the ten German panzer
divisions and the largest part of the infantry divisions.

The main drive for the Meuse was led by Kleist s Panzer Group,
which was in the van of List s I2th Army. It had two spearheads, the
stronger one being formed by Guderian s corps (of three panzer divisions),
which made the decisive thrust near Sedan, while Reinhardt s corps (of
two panzer divisions) on its right aimed for the crossing at Monthermh ,
Farther to the right, operating under Kluge s Fourth Army, Hot ss.
panzer corps drove through the northern Ardennes as cover for Kleiste
flank and with the aim of getting across the Meuse between Givet and
Namur. This secondary thrust had two spearheads of smaller scale,
formed respectively by the 5th and 7th Panzer Divisions.

The yth was commanded by Rommel. This was one of the four
" light " divisions that had been converted into panzer divisions during
the winter. It had only one tank regiment instead of the normal two,
although this regiment was given three battalions instead , of two
making a total of 218 tanks. More than half of these were Czech-built. 2
r rhe 7th Panzer Division comprised:
Armour

25th Panzer Regiment (of 3 tank battalions)
37th Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion
Motorised Infantry
6th Rifle Regiment
7th Rifle Regiment
7th Motor-cycle Battalion
Engineers

58th Pioneer Battalion
Artillery

78th Field Artillery Regiment (of 3 battalions, each of 3 four-gun batteries)
42nd Anti-Tank Artillery Battalion f

6 FRANCE, 1940

The conversion had been made in the light of the lessons of the
Polish campaign. There Rommel, himself an ardent infantryman, had
come to recognise the potentialities of the tank arm. It was only on the
1 5th February that he had taken over command of the 7th at Godesberg,
on the Rhine, but he learned the new technique, and adapted himself
to it, with extraordinary quickness. He had always been a thruster in
the infantry field, handling infantry as if they were mobile troops, and he
revelled in the much greater scope for mobility offered by his new
command,

On the opening day of the offensive, little resistance was met. The
mass of the Belgian Army was concentrated to defend the plain of
Belgium, where the chief cities lie, and the defence of the hilly and
wooded region of Belgian Luxembourg, beyond the Meuse, was left to
the special Chasseurs Ardennais, whose role was simply to impose as much
delay as possible until the French came up to cover this wide flank approach
to their own frontier. Such was the calculation on which the Belgian
plan was based.

The French plan, however, was based on a more offensive concept.
The First and Seventh Annies, which comprised the bulk of the French
mechanised divisions, drove far forward into the plain of Belgium,
together with the British Expeditionary Force. Meanwhile, the Ninth
Army, forming the hinge of this manoeuvre, made a shorter wheeling
advance over the Belgian frontier to align itself along the Meuse from
Mezi6res to Namur. It consisted of seven infantry divisions (only one
of which was motorised) and two cavalry divisions these last being
horse-mounted troops with mechanised elements. The cavalry were sent
forward across the Meuse on the night of the loth May, and next day
pushed deep into the Ardennes, where they met the rapidly advancing
panzer divisions, which had already overcome most of the Belgian
defences there.

On the eve of the attack, during the last tense hours of preparation,
Rommel wrote this brief letter to his wife, and then takes up the narrative:

g May 1940
DEAREST Lu,

We re packing up at last. Let s hope not in vain. You ll get all
the news for the next few days from the papers. Don t worry yourself.
Everything will go all right.

In the sector assigned to my division the enemy had been preparing
obstructions of every kind for months past. All roads and forest tracks
had been permanently barricaded and deep craters blown in the main
roads. But most of the road blocks were undefended by the Belgians, and
it was thus in only a few places that my division was held up for any
length of time. Many of the blocks could be by-passed by moving across

THE BREAK-THROUGH ON THE MEUSE 7

country or over side roads. Elsewhere, all troops quickly set to work to
deal with the obstructions and soon had the road clear.

At our first clash with French mechanised forces, prompt opening
fire on our part led to a hasty French retreat. I have found again and
again that in encounter actions, the day goes to the side that is the first
to plaster its opponent with fire. The man who lies low and awaits
developments usually comes off second best. Motor-cyclists at the head
of the column must keep their machine-guns at the ready and open fire
the instant an enemy shot is heard. This applies even when the exact
position of the enemy is unknown, in which case the fire must simply be
sprayed over enemy-held territory. Observation of this rule, in my
experience, substantially reduces one s own casualties. It is funda
mentally wrong simply to halt and look for cover without opening fire,
or to wait for more forces to come up and take part in the action.

Experience in this early fighting showed that in tank attacks especially,
the action of opening fire immediately into the area which the enemy is
believed to be holding, instead of waiting until several of one s own
tanks have been hit, usually decides the issue. Even indiscriminate
machine-gun fire and 20 mm. anti-tank fire into a wood in which enemy
anti-tank guns have installed themselves is so effective that in most cases
the enemy is completely unable to get into action or else gives up his
position. In engagements against enemy tanks also which more often
than not have been more heavily armoured than ours opening fire early
has proved to be the right action and very effective.

ii May 1940

DEAREST Lu,

I ve come up for breath for the first time to-day and have a

moment to write. Everything wonderful so far. Am way ahead of

my neighbours. I m completely hoarse from orders and shouting.

Had a bare three hours sleep and an occasional meal. Otherwise

I m absolutely fine. Make do with this, please, I m too tired for

more,

Following up the retreat of the French ist and 4th Cavalry Divisions, Rommel s
advanced troops reached the Meuse in the afternoon of the i2th May. It was his
aim to rush a crossing if possible on the heels of the French, and gain a bridgehead
on the west bank. But the bridges at Dinant and Houx were blown up by the
French just as the leading tanks began to cross and Rommel was thus compelled
to mount a river-crossing assault with troops ferried over in rubber boats. This
assault was launched early next morning, and suffered heavy casualties before ii
succeeded. Rommel writes:

On the 1 3th May, I drove off to Dinant at about 04.00 houjrs with
Captain Schraepler. The whole of the divisional artillery was already
in position as ordered, with its forward observers stationed at the crossing

8 - FRANCE, 1940

points. In Dinant I found only a few men of the yth Rifle Regiment.
Shells were dropping in the town from French artillery west of the
Meuse, and there were a number of knocked-out tanks in the streets
leading down to the river. The noise of battle could be heard from the
Meuse valley.

There was no hope of getting my command and signals vehicle down
the steep slope to the Meuse unobserved, so Schraepler and I clambered
down on foot through the wood to the valley bottom. The 6th Rifle
Regiment was about to cross to the other bank in rubber boats, but was
being badly held up by heavy artillery fire and by the extremely trouble
some small arms fire of French troops installed among the rocks on the
west bank.

2. THE BREAK-THROUGH ON THE MEUSE

The situation when I arrived was none too pleasant. Our boats were
being destroyed one after the other by the French flanking fire, and the
crossing eventually came to a standstill. The enemy infantry were so
well concealed that they were impossible to locate even after a long
search through glasses. Again and again they directed their fire into
the area in which I and my companions the commanders of the Rifle
Brigade and the Engineer Battalion were lying. A smoke screen in
the Meuse valley would have prevented these infantry doing much
harm. But we had no smoke unit. So I now gave orders for a number of
houses in the valley to be set alight in order to supply the smoke we
lacked.

Minute by minute the enemy fire grew more unpleasant. From up
river a damaged rubber boat came drifting down to us with a badly

THE BREAK-THROUGH ON THE MEUSE 9

wounded man clinging to it, shouting and screaming for help the poor
fellow was near to drowning. But there was no help for him here, the
enemy fire was too heavy.

Meanwhile the village of Grange [i J miles west ofHoux (and the Meuse),
and 3 miles north-west of Dinant] on the west bank had been taken by the
yth Motor-cycle Battalion, but they had not cleaned up the river bank
as thoroughly as they should have done. I therefore gave orders for the
rocks on the west bank to be cleared of the enemy.

With Captain Schraepler, I now drove south down the Meuse valley
road in a Panzer IV to see how things were going with the yth Rifle
Regiment. On the way we came under fire several times from the
western bank and Schraepler was wounded in the arm from a number
of shell splinters. Single French infantrymen surrendered as we
approached.

By the time we arrived the yth Rifle Regiment had already succeeded
in getting a company across to the west bank, but the enemy fire had
then become so heavy that their crossing equipment had been shot to
pieces and the crossing had had to be halted. Large numbers of wounded
were receiving treatment in a house close beside the demolished bridge.
As at the northern crossing point, there was nothing to be seen of the
enemy who were preventing the crossing. As there was clearly no hope
of getting any more men across at this point without powerful artillery
and tank support to deal with the enemy nests, I drove back to Division
Headquarters, where I met the Army commander, Colonel-General von
Kluge and the Corps commander, General Hoth.

After talking over the situation with Major Heidkaemper and making
the necessary arrangements, I drove back along the Meuse to Leffe [a
village on the outskirts of Dinant] to get the crossing moving there. I had
already given orders for several Panzer Ills and IVs and a troop of
artillery to be at my disposal at the crossing point. We left the signals
vehicle for the time being at a point some 500 yards east of the river
and went forward on foot through deserted farms towards the Meuse.
In Leffe we found a number of rubber boats, all more or less badly
damaged by enemy fire, lying in the street where our men had left them.
Eventually, after being bombed on the way by our own aircraft, we
arrived at the river.

At Leffe weir we took a quick look at the footbridge, which had been
barred by the enemy with a spiked steel plate. The firing in the Meuse
valley had ceased for the moment and we moved off to the right through
some houses to the crossing point proper. . The crossing had now come
to a complete standstill, with the officers badly shaken by the casualties
which their men had suffered. On the opposite bank we could see several
men of the company which was already across, among them many
wounded. Numerous damaged boats and rubber dinghies lay on the
opposite bank. The officers reported that nobody dared show himself

IO FRANCE, 1940

outside cover, as the enemy opened fire immediately on anyone they
spotted.

Several of our tanks and heavy weapons were in position on the
embankment east of the houses, but had seemingly already fired off
almost all their ammunition. However, the tanks I had ordered to the
crossing point soon arrived, to be followed shortly afterwards by two field
howitzers from the Battalion Grasemann. 1

All points on the western bank likely to hold enemy riflemen were
now brought under fire, and soon the aimed fire of all weapons was
pouring into rocks and buildings. Lieutenant Hanke 2 knocked out a
pill-box on the bridge ramp with several rounds. The tanks, with turrets
traversed left, drove slowly north at 50 yards spacing along the Meuse
valley, closely watching the opposite slopes.

Under cover of this fire the crossing slowly got going again, and a
cable ferry using several large pontoons was started. Rubber boats
paddled backwards and forwards and brought back the wounded from
the west bank. One man who fell out of his boat on the way grabbed
hold of the ferry rope and was dragged underwater through the Meuse.
He was rescued by Private Heidenreich, who dived in and brought him
to the bank.

I now took over personal command of the 2nd Battalion of 7th Rifle
Regiment and for some time directed operations myself.

With Lieutenant Most I crossed the Meuse in one of the first boats
and at once joined the company which had been across since early
morning. From the company command post we could see Companies
Enkefort and Lichter were making rapid progress.

I then moved up north along a deep gully to the Company Enkefort.
As we arrived an alarm came in : " Enemy tanks in front." The company
had no anti-tank weapons, and I therefore gave orders for small arms fire
to be opened on the tanks as quickly as possible, whereupon we saw them
pull back into a hollow about a thousand yards north-west of Leffe.
Large numbers of French stragglers came through the bushes and slowly
laid down their arms.

x ln the Germany Army, units and formations were often called by the name of
their commanders.

2 JVbfe by Manfred Rommel Hanke was a prominent member of the Nazi Party and
an official of Goebbels s Propaganda Ministry. He appears to have been very unpopular
with the other officers on account of his high-handed behaviour, and Rommel finally
removed him from the Staff after an incident in the Mess when he suggested that he
had the power to have Rommel himself removed from his command. Rommel made
a long report later to -Hitler s Adjutant.

Later in the war, Hanke became Gauleiter of Silesia and achieved notoriety for his
defence of Breslau to the last stick and stone However, when the devastated city finally
capitulated, Hanke did not stay to meet the invading Red Army, but escaped in an
aeroplane, leaving the population to the tender mercies of the Russian troops. He has
never been heard of since.

THE BREAK-THROUGH ON THE MEUSE II

Other accounts show that RommeVs intervention was even more crucial, and
decisive, than he conveys. The German troops were badly shaken by the intensity
of the defenders fire when he arrived on the scene and organised the fresh effort, in
which he himself took the lead. Fortunately for his chances, the French i8th Infantry
Division, which was charged with the defence of the Dinant sector, was only in
process of taking over the position after a lengthy march on foot, and was short of
anti-tank guns, while the ist Cavalry Division had not recovered from the tank-
mauling it had received in tfie Ardennes. Thus the boldly led attackers were able
to prise open the defence once they had gained sufficient space on the west bank to
develop a manoeuvring leverage.

I now went down with Most to the Meuse again and had myself
taken back to the other bank, where I drove north with a tank and a
signals vehicle to the 6th Rifle Regiment s crossing point. Here the
crossing had meanwhile been resumed in rubber boats and was in full
swing. I was told by Colonel Mickl, the commander of the anti-tank
battalion, that he already had twenty anti-tank guns on the western bank.
A company of the engineer battalion was busily engaged in building
8-ton pontoons, but I stopped them and told them to build the 1 6-ton
type. I aimed to get part of the Panzer Regiment across as quickly as
possible. As soon as the first pontoon was ready I took my 8-wheeled
signals vehicle across. Meanwhile, the enemy had launched a heavy
attack, and the fire of their tanks could be heard approaching the ridge
of the Meuse bank. Heavy enemy shells were dropping all round the
crossing point.

On arrival at Brigade Headquarters on the west bank I found the
situation looking decidedly unhealthy. The commander of the 7th
Motor-cycle Battalion had been wounded, his adjutant killed, and a
powerful French counter-attack had severely mauled our men in Grange.
There was a danger that enemy tanks might penetrate into the Meuse
valley itself.

Leaving my signals lorry on the west bank, I crossed the river again
and gave orders for first the Panzer Company, and then the Panzer
Regiment to be ferried across during the night. However, ferrying tanks
across the i so-yards-wide river by night was a slow job, and by morning
there were still only 15 tanks on the west bank, an alarmingly small
number.

At daybreak [i4th May] we heard that Colonel von Bismarck had
pressed through his attack to close on Onhaye [3 miles west of Dinant],
where he was now engaged with a powerful enemy. Shortly afterwards a
wireless message came in saying that his regiment was encircled, and I
therefore decided to go to his assistance immediately with every available
tank.

At about 09.60 hours the 25th Panzer Regiment, under the command
of Colonel Rothenburg, moved off along the Meuse valley with the 30
tanks which had so far arrived on the west bank, and penetrated as far

12 FRANCE, 1940

as a hollow 500 yards north-east of Onhaye without meeting any
resistance. It transpired that von Bismarck had actually radioed "arrived"
instead of " encircled 51 and that he was now on the point of sending an
assault company round the northern side of Onhaye to secure its western
exit. This move, as had been shown by an exercise we had carried out.
earlier in Godesberg, was of the greatest importance for the next stages
of the operation. Accordingly, five tanks were placed under von Bismarck s
command for this purpose not to make a tank attack in the usual sense,
but to provide mobile covering fire for the infantry attack on the defile
west of Onhaye. It was my intention to place the Panzer Regiment itself
in a wood 1,000 yards north of Onhaye and then to bring all other units
up to that point, from where they could be employed to the north, north
west or west, according to how the situation developed.

I gave orders to Rothenburg to move round both sides of the wood
into this assembly area, and placed myself in a Panzer III which was
to follow close behind him.

Rothenburg now drove off through a hollow to the left with the five
tanks which were to accompany the infantry, thus giving these tanks a
lead of 100 to 150 yards. There was no sound of enemy fire. Some 20
to 30 tanks followed up behind. When the commander of the five tanks
reached the rifle company on the southern edge of Onhaye wood, Colonel
Rothenburg moved off with his leading tanks along the edge of the wood
going west. We had just reached the south-west corner of the wood and
were about to cross a low plantation, from which we could see the five
tanks escorting the infantry below us to our left front, when suddenly
we came under heavy artillery and anti-tank gunfire from the west.
Shells landed all round us and my tank received two hits one after the
other, the first on the upper edge of the turret and the second in the peri
scope.

The driver promptly opened the throttle wide and drove straight
into the nearest bushes. He had only gone a few yards, however, when
the tank slid down a steep slope on the western edge of the wood and
finally stopped, canted over on its side, in such a position that the enemy,
whose guns were in position about 500 yards away on the edge of the
next wood, could not fail to see it. I had been wounded in the right
cheek by a small splinter from the shell which had landed in the periscope.
It was not serious though it bled a great deal.

I tried to swing the turret round so as to bring our 37 mm. gun to
bear on the enemy in the opposite wood, but with the heavy slant of
the tank it was immovable.

The French battery now opened rapid fire on our wood and at any

moment we could expect their fire to be aimed at our tank, which was

in full view. I therefore decided to abandon it as fast as I could, taking

the crew with me. At that moment the subaltern in command of the

1 Translalor s note: eingetrqffen instead of eingtschlossen.

THE BREAK-THROUGH ON THE MEUSE 13

tanks escorting the infantry reported himself seriously wounded, with
the words : " Herr General, my left arm has been shot off." We clambered
up through the sandy pit, shells crashing and splintering "all round.
Close in front of us trundled Rothenburg s tank with flames pouring out
of the rear. The adjutant of the Panzer Regiment had also left his tank.
I thought at first that the command tank had been set alight by a hit
in the petrol tank and was extremely worried for Colonel Rothenburg s
safety. However, it turned out to be only the smoke candles that had
caught light, the smoke from which now served us very well. In the
meantime Lieutenant Most had driven my armoured signals vehicle
into the wood, where it had been hit in the engine and now stood im
mobilised. The crew was unhurt.

I now gave orders for the tanks to drive through the wood in a
general easterly direction, a move which the armoured cars, which stood
at my disposal, were of course unable to follow. Slowly Rothenburg s
command tank forced its way through the trees, many of them tall and
well grown. It was only the involuntary smoke-screen laid by this tank
that prevented the enemy from shooting up any more of our vehicles.
If only the tanks had sprayed the wood which the enemy was believed
to be holding, with machine-gun and 37 mm. gunfire during their
advance, the French would probably have immediately abandoned their
guns, which were standing in exposed positions at the edge of the wood,
and our losses would almost certainly have been smaller. An attack
launched in the evening by the 25th Panzer Regiment was successful,
and we were able to occupy our assembly area.

A tight combat control west of the Meuse, and flexibility to meet the
changing situation, were only made possible by the fact that the divisional
commander with his signals troop kept on the move and was able to
give his orders direct to the regiment commanders in the forward line.
Wireless alone due to the necessity for encoding would have taken
far too long, first to get the situation reports back to Division and then
for Division to issue its orders. Continuous wireless contact was maintained
with the division s operations staff, which remained in the rear, and a
detailed exchange of views took place early each morning and each
afternoon between the divisional commander and his la. 1 This method
of command proved extremely effective.

By his advance that day Rommel had created a breach which had momentous
consequences, particularly by its effect on the mind of General Corap, the commander
of the French Ninth Army.

Three crossings of the Meuse had been achieved on the i^th, Rommel 9 s being
the fast. In the afternoon, the leading troops of Reinhardfs panzer corps had got
across at Montherme, and Guderiarfs at Sedan. But Reinhardfs gained only a
narrow foothold, and had a desperate fight to maintain it. Not until early on the
i$th were they able to build a bridge over which his tanks could cross, and the exit

1U la " is the operations side of the staff, and is also used for the officer in charge of it.

14 FRANCE, 1940

from Monthermi ran through a precipitous defile that was easy to block. Gudenarfs
troops were more successful, but only one of his three divisions gained an adequate
foothold, and at daybreak on the i^th only one bridge had been completed. The
bridge wfis lucky to escape destruction, as it was repeatedly attacked by the Allied
air forces. Guderian 9 s troops had little support from the Luftwaffe on this second
crucial day, but his anti-aircraft gunners put up such a deadly canopy ofjire that
they brought down an estimated 150 French and British aircraft, and effectively
upset the bomb-aiming. By the afternoon, all three of Guderiaris panzer divisions
were over the river. Holding off heavy counter-attacks from the south he wheeled
west towards the joint between the French Second and Ninth Armies, which began
to give way under his fierce and skilfully manoeuvred pressure.

That night the commander of the French Ninth Army made a fatal decision,
under the double impact of Guderiatfs expanding threat to his right flank and
Rommers penetration in the centre of his front wild reports conveyed that thousands
of tanks were pouring through the breach there. Orders were issued for the abandon
ment of the Meuse, and a general withdrawal of the Ninth Army to a more westerly
line.

On Rommel* s front this intended stop-line ran along the railway east oj
Philippeville, and 75 miles behind the Meuse. It was penetrated by Rommel next
morning, the i$th, before it could be occupied, and under his deep-thrusting threat
the confusion of the withdrawal quickly developed into a spreading collapse. His
renewed thrust also forestalled an intended counter-attack towards Dinant by the
French ist Armoured Division and 4th North African Division, which were just
arriving on the scene. TJie former appeared on Rommel s right flank but ran out oj
fuel at this crucial moment, and only a small fraction of its tanks went into action.
RommeUs advance swept past its front while it was at a standstill, and many oj
its tanks were subsequently captured before they could get away. Meantime, the
North African Division was bowled over by the onrush of the panzers and the
stream of fugitives.

Worse still, Corap s general withdrawal order had uncorked the bottleneck at
Montherme, where the right wing of the Ninth Army had hitherto blocked Reinhardf s
panzer corps. Once a withdrawal began here, it quickly became a hopelessly
confused retreat, and Reinhardf s leading troops were able to slip round the right
flank of the Ninth Army behind the back of the forces opposing Guderian and
then drove on westward many miles along an open path. By that evening, also,
Guderian had overcome the last line of resistance that faced him, and broke through
into open country. The breach in the French front was now 60 miles wide.

The significance of Rommel s story of the i$th May becomes all the clearer
when set agaimt the wider background of that decisive day.

M.J intention for the isth May was to thrust straight through in one
stride to our objective, with the 25th Panzer Regiment in the lead and
with artillery and, if possible, dive-bomber support. The infantry was to
follow up the tank attack, partly on foot and partly lorry-borne. The
essential tiling, to my mind, was that the artillery should curtain off
both flanks of the attack, as our neighbouring divisions were still some

THE BREAK-THROUGH ON THE MEUSE 15

way behind us. The 25th Panzer Regiment s route, which was marked
out on the map, led round the outskirts of Philippeville [18 miles west of
Dinant], avoiding all villages, and on to our objective, the district round
Cerfontaine \8 miles west of Philippeville]. It was my Intention to ride with
25* Panzer Regiment so that I could direct the attack from up forward
and bring in the artillery and dive-bombers at the decisive moment. To
simplify wireless traffic over which highly important messages often
arrived late, due to the necessity for encoding I agreed a " line of thrust "
with the la and artillery commander. Starting point for this line was
taken as Rosee church and finishing point Froidchapelle church. All
officers marked the line on their maps. If I now wanted artillery fire on,
for instance, Philippeville, I simply radioed: " Heavy artillery fire
immediate round eleven." The artillery commander was delighted with
the new system.

At about 09.00 hours I met a Luftwaffe major who informed me that
dive-bombers could be made available for my division that day. As the
tanks were already starting to move I called for them immediately, to
go into action in front of the attack. I then moved over to Rothenburg s
tank and instructed my Gefechtsstqffel 1 to follow up the tank attack from
cover to cover with their armoured car and signals vehicle. -

After a brief engagement with enemy tanks near Flavion, the Panzer
Regiment advanced in column through the woods to Philippeville,
passing on the way numerous guns and vehicles belonging to a French
unit, whose men had tumbled headlong into the woods at the approach
of our tanks, having probably already suffered heavily under our dive-
bombers. Enormous craters compelled us to make several detours
through the wood- About 3 miles north-west of Philippeville there was
a brief exchange of fire with French troops occupying the hills and
woods south of Philippeville. Our tanks fought the action on the move,
with turrets traversed left, and the enemy was soon silenced. From time
to time enemy anti-tank guns, tanks and armoured cars were shot up.
Fire was also scattered into the woods on our flanks as we drove past.
Staff and artillery was kept closely informed of the progress of the attack
by brief radio messages sent in clear, with the result that the artillery
curtain functioned perfectly. The day s objective was soon reached.

With one of Rothenburg s panzer companies placed under my com
mand, I then drove back over the tracks of the advance to establish
contact with the infantry in the rear. On the high ground 1,000 yards
west of Philippeville we found two of our tanks which had fallen out with
mechanical trouble. Their crews were in process of collecting prisoners,
and a few who had already come in were standing around. Now hundreds
of French motor-cyclists came out of the bushes and, together with their

lf The Gefechtsstqffel, to which Rommel refers throughout his campaigns, was a small
headquarters group consisting of signals troops and a small combat team, together with
the appropriate vehicles (including a wireless lorry), which always accompanied him
in action.

l6 FRANCE, 1940

officers, slowly laid down their arms. Others tried to make a quick
getaway down the road to the south.

I now occupied myself for a short time with the prisoners. Among
them were several officers, from whom I received a number of requests,
including, among other things, permission to keep their batmen and to
have their kit picked up from Philippeville, where it had been left. It
was greatly to my interest that the Philippeville garrison should surrender
quickly and without fighting, so I granted the requests.

My escorting panzer company now drove for Neuville [2 miles south
of Philippeville], with the object of cutting off the French retreat from
Philippeville to the south. On arriving at the company with Most, I
found it involved in fighting near Neuville, with the action moving south
and threatening to turn into a pursuit. I had no intention of pushing
any farther south, and so gave orders for the battle to be broken off and
for the company to continue eastward from Neuville. About 500 yards
south of Vocedee we ran into part of Panzer Company Huttemann,
which joined up with us. On the southern edge of Vocedee we had a
brief engagement with a considerable force of French tanks, which was
soon decided in our favour. The French ceased fire and were fetched
out of their tanks one by one by our men. Some fifteen French tanks
fell into our hands, some of them damaged, others completely intact. It
being impossible to leave a guard, we took the undamaged tanks along
with us in our column, still with their French drivers. About a quarter
of an hour later we reached the main Dinant-Philippeville road, where
I met the leading troops of the Rifle Brigade, with 8th M.G. Battalion
under command, who were following up the tank attack. . I took several
officers into my armoured car and with the whole column behind me,
drove at high speed along the dusty road through the northern outskirts
of Philippeville. [Rommel had turned about, and was heading westward again.]

En route I described the situation to the commanding officers and
instructed them in their new tasks. At the rate we were driving (average
about 40 m.p.h.) the dust-cloud behind us was enormous. Near Senzeille
[4 miles west of Philippeville], we met a body of fully armed French motor
cyclists coming in the opposite direction, and picked them up as they
passed. Most of them were so shaken at suddenly finding themselves in
a German column that they drove their machines into the ditch and were
in no position to put up a fight. Without delaying, we drove on at high
speed to the hills west of Cerfontaine, where Rothenburg was standing
with the leading units of the Panzer Regiment. On its arrival, the
column was deployed as quickly as possible and without halting into the
surrounding district. Looking back east from the summit of the hill, as
night fell, endless pillars of dust could be seen rising as far as the eye
could reach comforting signs that the 7th Panzer Division s move into
the conquered territory had begun.

The fact that the enemy had been able to infiltrate between the

THE BREAK-THROUGH ON THE MEUSE 17

Panzer Regiment and the Rifle Brigade during the afternoon had been
solely due to the latter s delay in getting moving. The officers of a
panzer division must learn to think and act independently within the
framework of the general plan and not wait until they receive orders.
All units had known the start lime of the attack, and they should have
formed up at that time.

Next day, the i6th May 1940, I received orders from Corps to stay
at Divisional H.Q. The reason was unknown to me. It was about 09.30
hours before I at last received Corps permission to move forward to the
new H.Q. Shortly after my arrival the division received orders to thrust
via Sivry through the Maginot Line and on that night to the hills around
Avesnes. ,

This was not the Maginot Line proper, which ended near Longuyon, but its
later westward extension where the type of fortification was much less strong.
But German accounts often draw no distinction between the original line and its
extension.

Guderian s and Reinhardt s corps had encountered, and broken through, the
Maginot Line extension shortly after crossing the Meuse, and were now racing
westward behind it. But HotKs corps, having crossed the Meuse farther north,
in Belgian territory, had still to penetrate it in their south-westerly drive. Sivry
is 12 miles west of Cerfontaine y and Avesnes 12 miles west of Sivry.

I had just discussed the plan for our attack on the Maginot Line with
my la, when the Army Commander, Colonel-General von Kluge, walked
in. He was surprised that the division had not already moved off. I
described to him our plan. The intention was first to gain the frontier
near Sivry, while, at the same time the Reconnaissance Battalion recon
noitred the Maginot Line over a wide front and the mass of the artillery
moved into position round Sivry. Then the Panzer Regiment, under
powerful artillery cover, was to move in extended order up to the French
line of fortifications. Finally, the Rifle Brigade, covered by the tanks,
was to take the French fortifications and remove barricades. Not until
all this was accomplished was the break-through to Avesnes to be made,
with the armour in the lead and the mass of the division following closely
behind. General von Kluge gave complete approval to our plan.

Soon the leading battalion was moving rapidly forward towards
Sivry, which was reached without fighting. Artillery and anti-aircraft
went into position and received instructions to open fire immediately into
certain areas on the other side of the frontier to see whether the enemy
would reply. Meanwhile, the 25th Panzer Regiment arrived at Sivry
and received orders to cross the frontier and take Clairfayts [3 miles beyond].
No enemy battery had replied to our artillery fire on their fortified zone.

I rode, as on the previous day, in the regimental commander s
command tank. Soon we were across the French frontier and then the
tanks rolled slowly on in column towards Clairfayts, which was now only
a mile or so away. When a report came in from a reconnaissance troop

l8 FRANCE, I94O

that the road through Clairfayts had been mined, we bore off to the
south and moved in open order across fields and hedges in a semi-circle
round the village. There was not a sound from the enemy, although
our artillery was dropping shells at intervals deep into their territory.
Soon we found ourselves among orchards and tall hedges, which slowed
up the advance. Rothenbiirg s tank was among the leading vehicles,
with Hanke, my aide-de-camp, following behind in a Panzer IV. His
orders were to open fire quickly on a sign from me and thus act as a
lead-gun for the rest. It had been very evident in the previous days
fighting that frequently far too much time elapsed before the tank crews
opened fire on fleeting targets.

Suddenly we saw the angular outlines of a French fortification about
100 yards ahead. Close beside it were a number of fully-armed French
troops, who, at the first sight of the tanks, at once made as if to surrender.
We were just beginning to think we would be able to take it without
fighting, when one of our tanks opened fire on the enemy elsewhere, with
the result that the enemy garrison promptly vanished into their concrete
pill-box. In a few moments the leading tanks came under heavy anti
tank gunfire from the left and French machine-gun fire opened over the
whole area. We had some casualties and two of our tanks were knocked
out. When the enemy fire had quietened down again, reconnaissance
established the existence of a very deep anti-tank ditch close beside the
enemy fortification, which had not so far opened fire. There were more
defence works in the enemy rear and the road from Clairfayts towards
Avesnes was blocked by high steel hedgehogs (anti-tank obstacles).

Meanwhile, elements of 25th Panzer Regiment had joined battle
with the enemy west and 2,000 yards south of Clairfayts; the artillery
had also opened a heavy fire at my orders and was laying smoke over
various sections of the Maginot Line. French artillery now began to
bombard Clairfayts and Sivry. Soon the motor-cyclists arrived with the
engineer platoon of the 37th Armoured Reconnaissance Battalion. Under
covering fire from tanks and artillery, infantry and engineers pushed
forward into the fortified zone. The engineer platoon began to prepare
the demolition of the steel hedgehog blocking the road to our advance.

Meanwhile, an assault troop of the Panzer Engineer Company over
came the concrete pill-box. The men crawled up to the embrasure and
threw a 6-pound demolition charge in through the firing slit. When,
after repeated summonses to surrender, the strong enemy garrison still did
not emerge, a further charge was thrown in. One officer and 35 men
were then taken prisoner, although they shortly afterwards overcame the
weak assault troop and escaped, after French machine-guns had opened
fire from another pill-box.

Slowly the sky darkened and it became night. Farms were burning
at several points in Clairfayts and farther west. I now gave orders for
an immediate penetration into the fortified zone, and a thrust as far as

THE BREAK-THROUGH ON THE MEUSE ig

possible towards Avesnes. Staff and artillery were quickly informed by
wireless, and then it was time for us to climb into the command tank
and get under way. Taking our place immediately behind the leading
panzer company, we were soon rolling across the demolished road-block
towards the enemy.

During the time that the sappers of the 37th Reconnaissance Battalion
had been demolishing the steel hedgehogs, more violent fighting had
broken out against anti-tank guns and a few field-guns located near a
cluster of houses 1,000 yards west of Clairfayts. Round after round had
been fired over open sights at our tanks and infantry standing near
Clairfayts. Finally, the enemy guns had been silenced by a few rounds
from a Panzer IV.

The way to the west was now open. The moon was up and for the
time being we could expect no real darkness. I had already given orders,
in the plan for the break-through, for the leading tanks to scatter the
road and verges with machine and anti-tank gunfire at intervals during
the drive to Avesnes, which I hoped would prevent the enemy from laying
mines. The rest of the Panzer Regiment was to follow close behind the
leading tanks and be ready at any time to fire salvoes to either flank.
The mass of the division had instructions to follow up the Panzer Regiment
lorry-borne.

The tanks now rolled in a long column through the line of fortifica
tions and on towards the first houses, which had been set alight by our
fire. In the moonlight we could see the men of 7th Motor-cycle Battalion
moving forward on foot beside us. Occasionally an enemy machine-gun
or anti-tank gun fired, but none of their shots came anywhere near us.
Our artillery was dropping heavy harassing fire on villages and the road
far ahead of the regiment. Gradually the speed increased. Before long
we were 500 1,000 2,000 3,000 yards into the fortified zone. Engines
roared, tank tracks clanked and clattered. Whether or not the enemy
was firing was impossible to tell in the ear-splitting noise. We crossed
the railway line a mile or so south-west of Solre le Chateau, and then
swung north to the main road which was soon reached. Then off along
the road and past the first houses.

The people in the houses were rudely awoken by the din of our tanks,
the clatter and roar of tracks and engines. Troops lay bivouacked beside
the road, military vehicles stood parked in farmyards and in some
places on the road itself. Civilians and French troops, their faces distorted
with terror, lay huddled in the ditches, alongside hedges and in every
hollow beside the road. We passed refugee columns, the carts abandoned
by their owners, who had fled in panic into the fields. On we went,
at a steady speed, towards our objective. Every so often a quick glance
at the map by a shaded light and a short wireless message to Divisional
H.Q. to report the position and thus the success of 25th Panzer Regiment.
Every so often a look out of the hatch to assure myself that there was

20 FRANCE, 1940

still no resistance and that contact was being maintained to the rear.
The flat countryside lay spread out around us under the cold light of the
moon. We were through the Maginot Line! It was hardly conceivable.
Twenty-two years before we had stood for four and a half long years
before this self-same enemy and had won victory after victor) 11 and yet
finally lost the war. And now we had broken through the renowned
Maginot Line and were driving deep into enemy territory. It was not
just a beautiful dream. It was reality.

Suddenly there was a flash from a mound about 300 yards away to
the right of the road. There could be no doubt what it was, an enemy
gun well concealed in a concrete pill-box, firing on 25th Panzer Regiment
from the flank. More flashes came from other points. Shell bursts
could not be seen. Quickly informing Rothenburg of the danger he
was standing close beside me I gave orders through him for the regi
ment to increase speed and burst through this second fortified line with
broadsides to right and left.

Fire was opened quickly, the tank crews having been instructed in
the method of fire before the attack. Much of our ammunition was tracer
and the regiment drove on through the new defence line spraying an
immense rain of fire far into the country on either side. Soon we were
through the danger area, without serious casualties. But it was not now
easy to get the fire stopped and we drove through the villages of Sars
Poteries and Beugnies with guns blazing. Enemy confusion was complete.
Military vehicles, tanks, artillery and refugee carts packed high with
belongings blocked part of the road and had to be pushed unceremoniously
to the side. All around were French troops lying flat on the ground,
and farms everywhere were jammed tight with guns, tanks and other
military vehicles. Progress towards Avesnes now became slow. At last
we succeeded in getting the firing stopped. We drove through Semousies.
Always the same picture, troops and civilians in wild flight down both
sides of the road. Soon the road forked, one going right to Maubeuge,
which was now only about 10 miles away, and the other left down into
the valley towards Avesnes. The road was now thick with carts and
people, who moved off to the side of the tanks or had to be directed into
the side by us. The nearer we came to Avesnes the greater was the crush
of vehicles through which we had to fight our way. In Avesnes itself,
which had been shelled by our artillery shortly before, the whole popula
tion was on the move, jammed between vehicles and guns on both sides
of the road in front of our moving tank column. It was obvious that there
were strong French forces in the town.

I did not have the column halted, but drove on with the leading
battalion of tanks to the high ground west of Avesnes, where I intended
to stop and collect up prisoners and captured equipment. On the way
a scouting party of two tanks was detached in the southern outskirts of
Avesnes and dispatched down the main road to the south. Some 500

THE BREAK-THROUGH ON THE MEUSE 21

yards outside the town on the road to Landrecies, we made a halt,
marshalled our units and rounded up the French troops in the immediate
neighbourhood. Here, too, farmyards and orchards beside the road were
jammed full of troops and refugee carts. All traffic down the road from
the west was halted and picked up. Soon a prisoner-of-war cage had to
be constructed in the field.

Meanwhile, firing had started behind us in Avesnes tank guns by
the sound of it and soon we saw flames rising, probably from burning
tanks or lorries. We had lost contact with the tank battalion behind us
and with the 7th Motor-cycle Battalion.

This did not yet cause me any concern, as, in the confusion of owner
less refugee carts, it was only too easy for a traffic jam to pile up. We had
reached our objective and that was the main thing. However, the enemy
in Avesnes there must have been at least a battalion of tanks made
good use of the gap in the Panzer Regiment, and French heavy tanks
soon closed the road through the town. The 2nd Battalion of the 25th
Panzer Regiment at once tried to overcome the enemy blocking the
road, but their attempt failed with the loss of several tanks. The fighting
in Avesnes grew steadily heavier. Intermittent wireless contact was
established between the 2nd Battalion and ourselves. The battle in
Avesnes lasted until about 04.00 hours \ijth May]. Finally, Hanke,
who, on my orders, advanced from the west against the powerful enemy
tanks with a Panzer IV, succeeded in disposing of the French tanks.
Dawn was slowly breaking when the battle ended and contact was re
established with the 2nd Battalion.

Meanwhile, I had sent repeated signals to Corps through the divisional
staff asking whether, in view of the success of our break-through of the
Maginot Line, we should not now continue our advance over the Sambre.
Receiving no reply wireless contact had not been established I decided
to continue the attack at dawn with the object of seizing the Sambre
crossing at Landrecies and holding it open. I issued orders by wireless to
all other units to follow up the Panzer Regiment s advance to Landrecies
[// miles west of Avesnes].

At about 04.00 hours I moved off towards Landrecies with the
leading battalion of Rothenburg s Panzer Regiment. The 7th Motor
cycle Battalion, which had now closed up, followed behind, and I was
firmly convinced that behind them again the remaining units of the
division would take part in the attack. The failure of the wireless had
left me in ignorance of the exact position of the regiments and we had
simply transmitted all orders into the blue.

As no supplies had come up during the night, we now had to^be
sparing with ammunition and drove westwards through the brightening
day with guns silent. Soon we began to meet refugee columns and
detachments of French troops preparing for the march. A chaos of guns,
tanks and military vehicles of all kinds, inextricably entangled with horse-

22 FRANCE, I 940

drawn refugee carts, covered the road and verges. By keeping our guns
silent and occasionally driving our cross-country vehicles alongside the
road, we managed to get past the column without great difficulty. The
French troops were completely overcome by surprise at our sudden
appearance, laid down their arms and marched off to the east beside
our column. Nowhere was any resistance attempted. Any enemy
tanks we met on the road were put out of action as we drove past. The
advance went on without a halt to the west. Hundreds upon hundreds of
French troops, with their officers, surrendered at our arrival. At some
points they had to be fetched out of vehicles driving along beside us.

Particularly irate over this sudden disturbance was a French lieutenant-
colonel whom we overtook with his car jammed in the press of vehicles.
I asked him for his rank and appointment. His eyes glowed hate and
impotent fury and he gave the impression of being a thoroughly fanatical
type. There being every likelihood, with so much traffic on the road,
that our column would get split up from time to time, I decided on second
thoughts to take him along with us. He was already fifty yards away to
the east when he was fetched back to Colonel Rothenburg, who signed
to him to get in his tank. But he curtly refused to come with us, so, after
summoning him three times to get in, there was nothing for it but to
shoot him.

We drove through Maroilles \8\ miles west of Avesnes], where the
street was so crowded that it was not easy for the people to obey our
shouts of " A droit! " On we went, with the sun on our backs through
the thin morning mist to the west. The road was now just as full of
troops and refugees outside the villages. Our shouts of " A droit! " had
little effect and progress became very slow, with the tanks driving through
the fields alongside the road. At length we arrived at Landrecies, the
town on the Sambre, where there was again a vast crush of vehicles and
French troops in every lane and alley, but no resistance. We rolled across
the Sambre bridge, on the other side of which we found a French barracks
full of troops. As the tank column clattered past, Hanke drove into the
courtyard and instructed the French officers to have their troops paraded
and marched off to the east.

Still in the belief that the whole division was rapidly approaching
Landrecies behind us, I continued the attack towards Le Gateau [8 miles
west of^ Landrecies]. We drove through a long wood, which the enemy
was using as an ammunition dump. Against the rising sun, the sentries
were unable to identify us until we were on top of them. Then they
surrendered. In Pommereuille, too, the French troops stationed in the
village laid down their arms. I kept the advance going until the hill
just east of Le Gateau, where we finally halted. It was 6.15 a.m. My
first task was to assure myself that contact with the rear still existed, after
which I intended to make another attempt to get in touch with Division
Headquarters.

THE BREAK-THROUGH ON THE MEUSE 223

Rommel s division had advanced nearly 50 miles since the previous morning.
The way he had driven on with his tanks during the night was a daring act. Then,
and later, most commanders considered that, even in exploiting a victory, the
continuation of a tank advance in the dark was too great a hazard.

On Rommel s left, the leading troops of Reinhardfs and Guderiarfs Panzer
Corps were racing level with him. Early that day Guderiarfs left wing division
reached the Oise at Ribemont, 20 miles south of Le Cdteau. That was the breadth

3. ROMMEL S ADVANCE, 16x11- xyra MAY

Map drawn by Rommel showing his advance in the 24 hours to
7.50 a.m. ijth May in relation to those of the neighbouring divisions
and of von Kleist s Panzer Group. This map brings out the extra
ordinary depth, narrowness and audacity of his thrust from
Cerfontame to Le Cdteau.

24 FRANCE, I94O

of the swathe that had been cut by the tank torrents that were sweeping west towards
the sea, across the rear of the Allied armies in Belgium. All attempts to block
them proved too late, for each time that the French Command chose a new stop-line
it was overrun by the German tanks before the slower-moving French reserves
arrived, or before they settled into position. ,

It was now high time that the country we had overrun was secured
by the division, and the enormous number of prisoners approximately
two mechanised divisions was collected. I had kept the division staff
constantly informed of our progress, but all messages had been transmitted
blind from the Panzer Regiment s command tank and there was no way
of telling whether they had been received. Even so, I was not very
pleased when I heard shortly afterwards that only a small part of the
Panzer Regiment and part of the Motor-cycle Battalion had come through
as far as the hill east of Le Gateau. An officer was sent off to the rear
immediately. Then I tried myself to drive back to establish contact, but
soon came under anti-tank gun fire from Le Gateau and had to return.
Meanwhile, Rothenburg with part of Panzer Battalion Sickenius had
been in action with French tanks and anti-tank guns on the hill east of
Le Gateau, but had soon disposed of them. I returned to the Panzer
Battalion, which had meanwhile formed a hedgehog, and waited there
until the arrival of part of the Motor-cycle Battalion under Captain von
Hagen. I now felt the situation in front of Le Gateau to be secure, and,
still in the belief that the rest of the division had almost closed up, ordered
Rothenburg to hold his position with the aid of the Motor-cycle Battalion
which was placed under his command. I then started back in my signals
vehicle, with a Panzer III as escort, to bring up and deploy the rest of
the division. On the way we came across several stranded vehicles
belonging to the Motor-cycle Battalion and Panzer Regiment, whose
crews told us that it was wise to go carefully in Landrecies as a number of
our vehicles had been fired on there, by enemy tanks. I then drove on
[eastwards] at high speed to Landrecies, where the Panzer III, which
was in the lead, lost its way in the town. When at last we reached the
road to Avesnes, we saw a German vehicle standing in the road a hundred
yards ahead, where it had been shot up by enemy guns. There must
have been a French tank or anti-tank gun somewhere around, but we
had no time for a long palaver and so through! As we drove past,
wounded motor-cyclists shouted frantically to us to take them along.
I could not help them, unfortunately there was too much at stake. Both
vehicles crossed the danger zone at top speed and won through to the
Maroilles road. Then the escorting Panzer III dropped out with
mechanical trouble.

Vehicles now stood everywhere, all over and across the road. Along
side the road there were French officers and men bivouacked close beside
their weapons. But they had apparently not yet recovered from the
fright which the German tanks had spread and so we put them on the

THE BREAK-THROUGH ON THE MEUSE 25

march so far as we could by shouts and signs from the moving vehicle.
There were no German troops to be seen. On we went, at top speed,
through Maroilles. East of the village we suddenly discovered a Panzer
IV, which had been stranded by mechanical trouble and had its 75 mm.
gun in working order. We sighed with relief. A Panzer IV was a strong
protection at such a moment.

There were now French troops everywhere, on both sides of the road,
most of them bivouacked beside their vehicles. There was no chance,
unfortunately, of getting them on the march as prisoners as we had no
men to form an escort. Where we did manage to get them moving, they
marched only so long as our armoured car was with them, and then
vanished into the bushes the moment we drove on ahead.

I gave the Panzer IV orders to hold the hill east of Maroilles and to
send any prisoners who came from the west on to the east. Then we
drove on, but had only gone a few hundred yards when the driver
reported that he had to stop for petrol. Fortunately, he still had several
full cans aboard. Meanwhile, I was informed by Hanke that he had
heard from the crew of the Panzer IV that the village beyond had been
reoccupied by the enemy. There could be no question of tackling French
tanks and anti-tank guns with my lightly armoured vehicle, so I drove
back to the Panzer IV with the idea of making wireless contact from there
with all parts of the division and organising a quick move into the
territory we had overrun. Fortunately, there was no sound of fighting
anywhere in the vicinity.

I had barely arrived back at the Panzer IV when a motor rifle company
appeared on the horizon, travelling fast down the road from Marbaix
[5 miles west of Landrecies]. There now being a hope that further detach
ments would be following in the wake of this company, I drove off again
in the direction of Avesnes, but found nothing.

A short distance east of Marbaix a French car came out of a side-
turning from the left and crossed the road close in front of my armoured
car. At our shouts it halted and a French officer got out and surrendered.
Behind the car there was a whole convoy of lorries approaching in a great
cloud of dust. Acting quickly, I had the convoy turned off towards
Avesnes. Hanke swung himself up on the first lorry while I stayed on the
cross-road for a while, shouting and signalling to the French troops that
they should lay down their arms the war was over for them. Several
of the lorries had machine-guns mounted and manned against air attack.
It was impossible to see through the dust how long the convoy was, and
so after 10 or 15 vehicles had passed, I put myself at the head of the
column and drove on to Avesnes. Shortly before the town we had to
make a detour across country where the road was closed by burning
vehicles.

At length we arrived at the south-west entrance to Avesnes, where
we found part of the Battalion Paris [the commander s name] installed near

2 6 FRANCE, 1940

the cemetery. Without halting, Hanke led the lorry convoy on to a
parking place and there disarmed the enemy troops. We now found
that we had had no less than 40 lorries, many of them carrying troops,

C StaffH.O. of the division arrived in Avesnes at about 16.00 hours,
and now unit after unit began to move into the territory we had overrun
during the night and early morning. In the course of this move
the aid Battalion of the Artillery Regiment successfully prevented I 48
French tanks from going into action just north of Avesnes. The tanks
stood formed up alongside the road, some of them ^ with engines
running. Several drivers were taken prisoner still in their tanks. This
action saved the 2 5 th Panzer Regiment an attack in their rear by these

The 7th Panzer Division s losses during the break-through of the Maginot
Line extension (on the i6th\^th May) are given in the division s official history as 35
killed and 59 wounded. In the division s sector the prisoners taken were approximately
10,000 men, together with 100 tanks, 30 armoured cars and 27 guns.

The account concludes, " The division had no time to collect large numbers of
prisoners and equipment"

After settling the layout of the division between Le Gateau and the
French frontier west of Sivry, I took an hour and a half s rest. Shortly
after midnight orders came in for the attack to be continued next day,
the i8th May, towards Cambrai. At about 07.00 hours next morning
the adjutant of the 25th Panzer Regiment arrived at headquarters and
reported that a powerful enemy force had established itself in Pommereuille
Wood {midway between Landrecies and Le Gateau]. He had managed to break
through from west to east in an armoured car under cover of night. The
25th Panzer Regiment, which was still holding its position east of Le
Cateau, urgently needed petrol and ammunition and the commander
had instructed him to get them brought up as quickly as possible.

At about 08.00 hours I put the remaining panzer battalion on the
march for Landrecies and Le Cateau with orders to push through to the
regiment and get the ammunition and petrol up to it. The 37* Armoured
Reconnaissance Battalion was to follow up behind. With Most and
Hanke, I later caught up with the Panzer Battalion in the wood half a
mile east of Pommereuille, and found them in action against French tanks
which were barring the road. Violent fighting developed on the road
and there was no chance of outflanking the enemy position on either side.
Our guns seemed to be completely ineffective against the heavy armour
of the French tanks.

Tlie French tanks had from 40 mm. to 60 mm. of armour whereas even the
German medium tanks had only 30 mm., and the light tanks had even less protection.

We stood for some time watching the battle from close range, until I
finally decided to take the battalion south through the wood via Ors [4
miles south-west of Landrecies]. We again came up against the French in

THE BREAK-THROUGH ON THE MEUSE 27

the northern outskirts of Ors and progress became slow while we fought
our way ^ forward. For some unknown reason the Panzer Regiment s
ammunition and petrol column did not follow up behind the battalion.
It was midday before we finally reached Rothenburg s position. He
reported that his force had held the position against heavy enemy tank
attacks, but that he was now incapable of further movement and in
urgent need of petrol and ammunition. Unfortunately, I was not at that
moment in a position to help him.

The necessary forces were now dispatched to Pommereuille to open
the shortest road to Landrecies. Meanwhile, French heavy artillery had
begun to lay down a heavy barrage on our hedgehog position. Their fire
was accurate and part of the position had to be vacated. Confident that
the fighting at Pommereuille would soon be decided in our favour, I now
gave orders for the Panzer Regiment to form up for their attack on
Cambrai. By 15.00 hours the situation had cleared up sufficiently for
the attack to open.

The passages that follow in Rommel s narrative have more detail than
significance, and may therefore be summarised. The ammunition and petrol column
which had been left south-east of Pommereuille Wood did not reach 25th Panzer
Regiment s two battalions located near Le Cdteau until some hours later. By the
time these tanks had filled up with ammunition and petrol, the one Panzer Battalion
which Rommel had brought up was already far ahead on the road to Cambrai.

I now gave orders to the reinforced Battalion Paris to secure the
roads leading from Cambrai to the north-east and north as quickly as
possible. Led by its few tanks and two troops of self-propelled A. A. guns,
the battalion advanced over a broad front and in great depth straight
across the fields to the north-west, throwing up a great cloud of dust as
they went. Tanks and A.A. guns scattered fire at intervals into the
northern outskirts of Cambrai. The enemy in Cambrai, unable in the-
dust to see that most of our vehicles were soft-skinned, apparently thought
that a large-scale tank attack was approaching the north of the town and
offered no resistance.

Nothing could have been more futile than the way that the French Command
used its armoured forces. It had 53 tank battalions compared with the Germans 36.
But all the German battalions were formed into divisions (of which they had ten)
while nearly half the French were infantry-support units. Moreover, even their
seven divisions of armoured type were used piecemeal.

Before the war the only French armoured formations had been the so-called
" light mechanised division " (200 tanks), of converted cavalry. The French had
three of these, which were employed for the advance into Belgium. There were also
four " armoured" divisions (of 150 tanks only) which had been formed during the
winter. These four were thrown separately and successively against the seven German
armoured divisions (averaging 260 tanks apiece) that drove across the Meuse like a
vast phalanx. The ist French Armoured Division was directed towards Dinant,
but ran out of fuel and was overrun as already related. The $rd was directed

28 FRANCE, 1940

against Sedan^ but distributed to support the infantry there; the fragments were
swamped by Guderiarfs three divisions. The 4th (under de Gaulle] , recently formed
and still incomplete, went into action against Guderiarfs flank as he swept on towards
tlie Oise&gt; but was brushed aside. The 2nd was spread along a 25-mile stretch of the
Oise, and Guderian s two leading divisions quickly burst through this thin string of
static packets.

The three French mechanised divisions from Belgium were assembling just north
ofCambrai) and although two of them had been mauled in their fight with Hoeppner s
Panzer Corps in the Belgian plain they were still a powerful force. They were
ordered to strike south towards Cambrai and St. Quentin on the igth, but the order
was not executed as a considerable proportion of the tanks had been detached to
aid the infantry at various places.

As for the British^ they had only ten tank units in France, and these were all
split up among the infantry divisions* The fast armoured division was not embarked
for France until after the German offensive had started.

CHAPTER II

CLOSING THE TRAP

The fast going of the break-through drive ended, for Rommel, with the capture
ofCambrai. For on the i6th May the imperilled Allied armies in Belgium had at
last started to withdraw from their far advanced line in Belgium) and on the i8th
the right wing of the German Panzer forces had been engaged with forces that the
French First Army had sent back to cover its rear. The terrific momentum of the
Panzer drive had brushed aside these intervening forces in the last lap, from Le
Gateau to Cambrai, but the increasing opposition and flank threat caused concern
in the higher commands on the German side. So, while Guderian s and Reinhardt s
corps pursued the westward drive, HotKs corps (including Rommel s division) on the
right wing was held back until infantry reinforcements began to arrive on the scene
and take over the protection of the northern flank.

Rommel s account of the next two days can be briefly summarised. After
covering the stretch between Le Gateau and Cambrai, he paused to reorganise and
get up supplies, as well as to give his troops a chance to sleep and recover their
energy. He planned to continue the advance on the evening of the igth, with the
aim of reaching the high ground south-east of Arras.

In the late afternoon he was discussing the plan with his staff at Divisional H.Q.
when the Corps Commander, General Hoth, suddenly appeared and ordered a post
ponement, on the ground th$ the troops were too exhausted by their efforts of the past
days. Rommel did not share HotKs opinion. " The troops have been twenty
hours in the same place" he said, " and a night attack during moonlight will result
in fewer losses" So Hoth let him have his way.

The attack towards Arras began at 01.40 hours (on the soth], and Rommel
accompanied the tank spearhead, which at 06.00 hours reached Beaurains (z\ miles
south of Anas}. But the motorised rifle regiments had not followed the tank spear
head closely as intended, so Rommel drove back in an armoured car to hurry them
forward only to find that the French had meanwhile infiltrated into his line of
communication. For the next few hours he was in an extremely tight corner, until
the situation was restored by the arrival of an infantry 9 regiment with artillery.
Tliese troops were then put on the defensive south of Arras, news having come
through that a number of French and British divisions had assembled around that
city.

On the 2ist the Jth Panzer Division was to advance round the flank of Arras

3&lt;3 FRANCE, I94O

towards the north-west ; with the S.S. Division Totenkopf on its left flank, while
the $th Panzer Division advanced east of Arras. While again screening his exposed
flank with artillery, Rommel this time put his Armoured Reconnaissance Battalion
in between the Panzer Regiment, forming the spearhead, and the Rifle Regiments
behind in order to maintain communications and hold the road open. These
precautions were well justified, as his account shows.

At about 15.00 hours I gave the Panzer Regiment orders to attack.
Although the armour had by this tune been seriously reduced in numbers-,
due to breakdowns- and casualties, this was a model of what an attack
should be. When I saw the weight of it I was convinced that the 7th
Panzer Division s new thrust into enemy territory would be as successful
as all the other actions of the preceding days. I had actually intended to
accompany the tanks again myself, together with Lieutenant Most, my
dispatch riders, armoured car and signals vehicle, and to conduct
operations from there by wireless, but the infantry regiments were so
slow in backing up that I drove straight off back to chase up the yth Rifle
Regiment and get it to hurry. It was nowhere to be found. A mile or
so north of Ficheux we eventually came across part of the 6th Rifle
Regiment, and driving alongside their column, turned off with them
towards Wailly. Half a mile east of the village we came under fire from
the north. One of our howitzer batteries was already in position at the
northern exit from the village, firing rapid on enemy tanks attacking
southward from Arras.

This attack had been hurriedly organised by the Allied commanders in an
attempt to break the net that was swiftly closing round their armies in Belgium..
For the purpose, the British $th and $oth Divisions were rushed south to Arras,
together with the ist Army Tank Brigade (infantry tanks), while the French
planned to co-operate with two mechanised divisions and two infantry divisions.
The attack took longer to mount than had been reckoned, and was launched before
its mounting could be completed. For on the soth Guderiaris Corps raced into Amiens
in the morning and reache^the sea near Abbeville that night, thus cutting the Allied
armies* supply lines a deadly stroke.

Under pressure of the emergency, the British commander decided to start his
attack without waiting any longer for the French. But, as delivered, the British
attack boiled down to a matter of two tank battalions (the 4th andjth R.T.R., with
74 tanks in all) supported by two infantry battalions. Part of the French 3rd Light
Mechanised Division (70 tanks) co-operated on its right flank.

As we were now coming under machine-gun fire and the infantry
had already taken cover to the right, Most and I ran on in front of the
armoured cars towards the battery position. It did not look as though
the battery would have much difficulty in dealing with the enemy tanks,
for the gunners were calmly hurling round after round into them in
complete disregard of the return fire. Running along behind the battery
lines, we arrived at Wailly and then called up the vehicles. The enemy

4. BATTLES ROUND ARRAS AND LILLE

32 FRANCE, I94O

tank fire had created chaos and confusion among our troops in the village
and they were jamming up the roads and yards with their vehicles,
instead of going into action with every available weapon to fight off the
oncoming enemy. We tried to create order. After notifying the divisional
staff of the critical situation in and around Wailly we drove off to a hill
1,000 yards west of the village, where we found a light A. A. troop and
several anti-tank guns located in hollows and a small wood, most of
them totally under cover. About 1,200 yards west of our position, the
leading enemy tanks, among them one heavy, had already crossed the
Arras-Beaumetz railway and shot up one of our Panzer Ills. At the
same time several enemy tanks were advancing down the road from
Bac du Nord and across the railway line towards Wailly. It was an
extremely tight spot, for there were also several enemy tanks very close
to Wailly on its northern side. The crew of a howitzer battery, some
distance away, now left their guns, swept along by the retreating infantry.
With Most s help, I brought every available gun into action at top speed
against the tanks. Every gun, both anti-tank and anti-aircraft, was
ordered to open rapid fire immediately and I personally gave each gun
its target. With the enemy tanks so perilously close, only rapid fire
from every gun could save the situation. We ran from gun to gun. The
objections of gun commanders that the range was still too great to
engage the tanks effectively, were overruled. All I cared about was to
halt the enemy tanks by heavy gunfire. Soon we succeeded in putting
the leading enemy tanks out of action. About 150 yards west of our small
wood a British captain climbed out of a heavy tank and walked unsteadily
towards us with his hands up. We had killed his driver. Over by the
howitzer battery also despite a range of 1,200 to 1,500 yards the rapid
fire of our anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns succeeded in bringing the
enemy to a halt and forcing some of them to turn away.

We now directed our fire against the other group of tanks attacking
from the direction of Bac du Nord, and succeeded in keeping the tanks
off, setting fire to some, halting others and forcing the rest to retreat.
Although we were under very heavy fire from the tanks during this action,
the gun crews worked magnificently. The worst seemed to be over and
the attack beaten off, when suddenly Most sank to the ground behind a
20 mm. anti-aircraft gun close beside me. He was mortally wounded
and blood gushed from his mouth. I had had no idea that there was any
firing in our vicinity at that moment, apart from that of the 20 mm. gun.
Now, however, the enemy suddenly started dropping heavy gunfire into
our position in the wood. Poor Most was beyond help and died before
he could be carried into cover beside the gun position. The death of
this brave man, a magnificent soldier, touched me deeply.

Meanwhile, violent and costly fighting had been going on in the
region of Tilloy-Beaurains-Agny. Very powerful armoured forces had
thrust out of Arras and attacked the advancing ist Battalion of the 6th

CLOSING THE TRAP 33

Rifle Regiment, inflicting heavy losses in men and material. The anti
tank guns which we quickly deployed showed themselves to be far too
light to be effective against the heavily armoured British tanks, and the
majority of them were put out of action by gunfire, together with their
crews, and then overrun by the enemy tanks. Many of our vehicles were
burnt out. S.S. units close by also had to fall back to the south before
the weight of the tank attack. Finally, the divisional artillery and 88 mm.
anti-aircraft batteries succeeded in bringing the enemy armour to a halt
south of the line Beaurains-Agny. Twenty-eight enemy tanks were de
stroyed by the artillery alone, while the anti-aircraft guns accounted for
one heavy and seven light.

While this heavy fighting had been going on round the 6th and yth
Rifle Regiments, Rothenburg s 25th Panzer Regiment had reached its
objective -in a dashing advance, and then waited in vain for the arrival
of the Reconnaissance Battalion and the Rifle Regiments. At about
19.00 hours I gave orders for the Panzer Regiment to thrust south-
eastwards in order to take the enemy armour advancing south from
Arras in the flank and rear. During this operation, the Panzer Regiment
clashed with a superior force of heavy and light enemy tanks and many
guns south of Agnez. Fierce fighting flared up, tank against tank, an
extremely heavy engagement in which the Panzer Regiment destroyed
seven heavy tanks and six anti-tank guns and broke through the enemy
position, though at the cost of three Panzer IVs, six Panzer Ills and a
number of light tanks. 1

This action brought the enemy armour into such confusion that, in
spite of their superior numbers, they fell back into Arras. Fighting ceased
at nightfall. Meanwhile, the situation north-west of Wailly had been
fully restored.

This attack was the one serious counter-stroke made by the entrapped armies
before the end came. Small as was its scale, it gave the Germans a shock.

That was due to the tough skins of the tanks rather than to any deep penetration
by the attack. The British here employed slow but heavily armoured infantry tanks
" Matildas" They had in all 58 of the small Mark Is, armed only with machine-
guns, and 16 of the later and larger Mark Us with a 2-pounder gun. Even the
Mark JZr maximum speed was only 75 m.p.h., but they had 75 mm. (3 inches) oj
armour, and proved impervious to the ordinary $j mm. German anti-tank guns,
while even artillery shells often bounced off them. The French cavalry tanks,
Somuas, were faster and more thinly armoured although not so thinly as the German.

The British tank advance which was not in superior numbers had been
handicapped by having little infantry support, less artillery support, and no air
support. It was largely these deficiencies which had brought it to a halt, after a
very promising start, and then caused its withdrawal.

a The official history of the 7th Panzer Division states that the Division s losses on this
day were 89 killed, 1 16 wounded and 1 73 missing. That was four times the loss suffered
during the break-through into France.

34 FRANCE, 1940

But its mental and moral effect on the German higher command was very
marked and out of all proportion to material results. Discussing the 1940
campaign after the war, Field-Marshal von Rundstedt said: " A critical moment
in the drive came just as my forces had reached the ChanneL It was caused by a
British counter-stroke southward from Anas on May 21. For a short time it was
feared that our armoured divisions would be cut off before tfte infantry divisions
could come up to support them. None of the French counter-attacks carried any
serious threat as this one did." Kluge and Kleist were particularly affected. Kluge
was inclined to stop any further advance westward from Arras until the situation
there had been cleared up. Kleist^ too, became nervously cautious. Thus when
Guderian turned north from Abbeville on the 22nd driving towards Boulogne,
Calais and Dunkirk his advance was slowed down by Kleisfs restrictive orders.

Then, on the 24th, Guderian *s and Reinhardt 9 s corps were halted by Hitler s
order when they were barely 10 miles from Dunkirk the only remaining port
through which the British Army could escape from the trap. But that fateful
order was only issued after Hitler had visited Rundstedt, who was naturally
influenced by the cautious views of Kluge and Kleist. When the halt order was
lifted two days later, on the 26lh, the chance of preventing the British Army s escape
had faded as it had been allowed time to establish a shield round the port.

23 May
DEAREST Lu,

With a few hours sleep behind me, it s time for a line to you.
I m fine in every way. My division has had a blazing success. Dinant,
Philippeville, break-through the Maginot Line and advance in one
night 40 miles through France to Le Gateau, then Cambrai, Arras,
always far in front of everybody else. Now the hunt is up against
60 encircled British, French and Belgian divisions. Don t worry
about me. As I see it the war in France may be over in a fortnight.

24 May 1940
Close in front of Bethune. I m in splendid form. On the go all

day of course. But by my estimate the war will be won in a fortnight.
Lovely weather if anything too much sun.

26 May 1940

A day or two without action has done a lot of good. The division
has lost up to date 27 officers killed and 33 wounded, and 1,500 men
dead and wounded. That s about 12 per cent casualties. Very little
compared with what s been achieved. The worst is now well over.
There s little likelihood of any more hard fighting, for we ve given
the enemy a proper towsing. Food, drink and sleep are all back to
routine. Schraepler is back already. His successor was killed a yard
away from me.

CLOSING THE TRAP 35

On the 22nd and 2yd May Rommel pushed forward round the western outskirts
of Arras, and under pressure of this outflanking threat the British forces there were
withdrawn on the night of the 2$rd to the canal line (18 miles to the north) that
ran through La Bassee andBethune to the sea at Gravelines, south-west of Dunkirk.
On the 24th came Hitler s order that the panzer forces were to halt on this canal
line. Rommel spent the next two days in reorganising his division, parts of which
had been badly mauled by the British tank attack on the 2isL

Hitler s cancellation of the halt order on the s6th coincided with the British
decision to withdraw to the sea at Dunkirk. The larger part of the forces holding
the canal line were already being drawn away northward to reinforce the line in
Belgium, where Bock s Army Group was developing an ever-increasing pressure
under which the Belgian Army collapsed, and capitulated, on the following day.

As soon as the halt order was lifted, Rommel was quick to renew his northward
thrust, which was directed on Lille with the aim of cutting off the Allied forces
that were still covering the city and lying east of it.

During this phase of the campaign the Allied commanders, having had their
lines of communication severed, naturally tended to be over-conscious of the difficulties
of their situation. But from " the other side of the hill " things looked different,
as Rommel s account serves to make clear. The difficulty he met in forcing the
passage of the La Bassee canal is the more notable, particularly in comparison with
the crossing of the Meuse, because of the very thin defence. Only one British
battalion was holding tlie sector he attacked.

According to air reports which came in to my headquarters on the
afternoon of the 2 6th May, the enemy had been observed north of the
canal withdrawing towards the north-west. I immediately requested
permission from Corps to drive a bridgehead over the canal that evening.
It was soon granted.

I remained with the troops on the canal all the evening. The 37th
Reconnaissance Battalion, although suffering severely from the activities
of snipers, succeeded, with artillery help, in pushing armoured patrols
through as far as the canal, but strong enemy resistance prevented the
creation of a bridge-head. The 7th Rifle Regiment, however, achieved
a notable success that evening by getting elements of both its battalions
across the La Bass6e canal, which was blocked by immense numbers of
sunken barges. After eliminating a number of enemy machine-gun nests,
both battalions established themselves on the northern bank. Apart from
a few casualties at the crossing point caused by flanking fire from British
machine-gun posts to the west, the creation of the bridge-head at this
point seemed to have caused no great difficulty and there was now good
reason to expect that the battalions would establish a strong position on
the northern bank during the night.

Early next morning, die 27th May, I drove to the crossing point at
Cuinchy to see for myself how things were going. Snipers were still very
active, mainly from the left, and a number of men had been hit, including
Lieutenant von Enkefort, though his was no more than a graze. The

36 FRANCE, I 940

Engineer Battalion had constructed a number of pontoons in a small
harbour just off the canal, sufficient to build a bridge. However, they
had built the 8-ton type instead of the long i6-tonners, as the latter
.would have been too difficult to manoeuvre through the litter of submerged
or semi-submerged barges which was blocking the canal. The sappers
had already tried to blast a way through with explosives, but with little
success, due to the unwieldiness of the sunken barges.

Prospects did not look too good for the attack across the canal
Elements of the and Battalion, yth Rifle Regiment, had crossed in
rubber boats and were now located on the opposite bank in bushes close
to the canal. The battalion had not, however, as I had wished, extended
its hold deeper on the north bank and dug itself in, nor had it taken the
village of Givenchy. It had also omitted to clean up the enemy for a
few hundred yards along the north bank to the west, and to get anti
tank guns and heavy weapons across and dig them in. The fire protection
of the heavy company on the soutl\ bank was also inadequate. Things
were probably much the same with "the ist Battalion [which had gained a
bridge-head a little to the east}.

I now ordered 635th Engineer Battalion, which had newly been
placed under command, to construct a 1 6-ton bridge in the sector held
by Battalion Cramer near the demolished bridge at Cuinchy.

Then, under my personal direction, 2O-mm. A.A. guns and later a
Panzer IV were turned on the enemy snipers, who were maintaining a
most unpleasant fire from the left and picking off our men one by one.
I had every house from 300 to 600 yards west of 2nd Battalion s bridging
point demolished and the bushes swept with fire after which we had
some peace. I was able to see for myself how effective our fire had been
when we moved back again across the canal two days later. The British
had installed themselves in a lock-house from which, judging by the
number of empty cartridges I found there, they had maintained a steady
fire in the flank of my troops. A few of our shdls had wiped out the
occupants of the building. Numerous blood-covered bandages and the
body of a British soldier lay in the cellar.

While these nests were being engaged, and the sappers were con
structing a ramp on the northern bank and with great effort manoeuvring
across the first pontoons, a report came in that a strong force of enemy
tanks from La Bass6e had attacked the yth Rifle Regiment s eastern
bridge-head and thrown Battalion Cramer back across the canal The
enemy tanks, which included several British heavies, 1 were now standing
on the northern bank and spraying the southern bank with machine-gun
and shell fire. We could hear the enemy fire a few hundred yards away

*By " British heavies " Rommel evidently means the Matilda, Infantry Tank Mark
II, which weighed 26 tons and was also " heavy * in the sense of being slow compared
with the German medium tanks Panzer III (20 tons and 22 m.p.h.) and Panzer IV
(22 tons and 20 m.p.h.). But the British tank brigade was now reduced to one composite
company of sixteen tanks, which included only a single Mark II.

CLOSING THE TRAP 37

to our right and there was a grave danger that the enemy tanks would
push on to the west along the canal bank and attack the Battalion
Bachmann, which still had no anti-tank weapons, apart from anti-tank
rifles, on the northern bank, and also had no depth. If the enemy
exploited his chance, he could be at the western crossing point in a few
minutes.

The situation was extremely critical. I drove the sappers on to their
utmost speed and had the pontoons lashed roughly together, in order
to get at least a few guns and tanks across. With so many sunken barges
and other obstacles jammed in the canal, it was impossible for the bridge
to take a straight course, and its structure consequently had little strength.
As the first Panzer III lumbered across, several pontoons gave noticeably,
and it was touch and go whether or not the tank would slither bodily
into the canal. While it was crossing, I sent off a Panzer IV 50 yards
to the east along the high bank on our side of the canal, with orders to
open fire immediately On the enemy tanks attacking from La Basse.
The fire of this Panzer IV brought the leading enemy tank to a halt.
Shortly afterwards the Panzer III on the northern bank jofeed in, and a
few minutes later a howitzer which had been manhandled across. This
soon brought the enemy tank attack to a standstill.

Work was now started on strengthening the 1 6-ton bridge and before
long a steady flow of vehicles began to move one by one across it. First
to cross were field guns, anti-tank and 20 mm. anti-aircraft guns, then
elements of the 25th Panzer Regiment interspersed with an 88 mm. anti
aircraft battery. All this time, the 2nd Battalion of 7th Rifle Regiment
was extending its bridgehead north of the canal. Finally, with artillery
support, it took the commanding village of Givenchy. Battalion Cramer
was brought up in its wake to the western crossing point, where later the
whole Rifle Regiment crossed on foot to attack the enemy near Ganteleux.
This action resulted, towards midday, in a widening of the bridgehead
to the line Canteleux-Givenchy, and the capture, after a fierce resistance,
of a large number of British prisoners. The newly-won territory on the
north bank now steadily filled up with artillery and anti-aircraft guns.
At about noon Heidkaemper wirelessed that my presence was urgently
required at Divisional H.Q. as, by a Corps order, the 5th Panzer Brigade
(General Harde) had been placed under my command for the attack
on Lille. Soon after I arrived, General Harde came in with his regiment
commanders and reported the location, etc., of his brigade.

These were the tanks of the $th Panzer Division which, being one of the pre
war formations , had a Panzer brigade of two regiments, each of two tank battalions,
whereas Rommel s division had only one Panzer regiment of three battalions.
At the start of the campaign it had 324 tanks compared with Rommel* s 218.

I now drove off with General Harde to the bridge near Cuinchy,
which was finished by the time we arrived. Traffic across it was already
in full swing, although the steepness of the ramps at either end prevented

38 FRANCE, 1940

the flow from being very rapid. The rifle brigade was already across
on the north bank, but without its vehicles. The 25th Panzer Regiment
was standing ready to attack in the neighbourhood of Givenchy and a
large force of artillery and light and heavy A.A. was in position on the
northern bank. Several enemy batteries were maintaining an un
pleasantly heavy fire on our bridgehead position. The area held by our
forces on the northern bank was now far too constricted and I gave the
25th Panzer Regiment orders to widen the bridgehead by an attack on
Lorgies [2 miles north on the canal]. At about 15.00 hours, the 5th Panzer
Brigade began to move across the Cuinchy bridge. The steep angle of
the approaches prevented the crossing from proceeding as quickly as we
should have liked. Several of the heavy vehicles stuck on the ramps and
had to be towed off. I could not agree to General Harde s proposal that
in these circumstances the attack should be postponed, and gave orders
for the brigade to move off punctually at 18.00 hours with such of its
tanks as had then arrived on the northern bank.

The 25th Panzer Regiment had meanwhile made a long lunge
forward and reached the neighbourhood of Lorgies. During this advance,
the regiment had become involved in heavy and costly fighting against a
powerful defensive front, which they had finally succeeded in penetrating.
The enemy batteries, which had hitherto been dropping shells into our
bridgehead, now withdrew at top speed before the advancing German
tanks. The panzer regiment s attack moved on, and by its fire smashed
a visible breach in the enemy front, through which the division, reinforced
by Panzer Brigade Harde, then moved. With the tanks fighting their
way across country, progress was sufficiently slow for the infantry to
follow in extended order over a wide front. Soon Panzer Regiment
Werner on the right came up level and other units of 5th Panzer Brigade
followed them up. I was extremely impressed by the large numbers of
spick-and-span tanks which the 5th Panzer Brigade possessed, far larger
than the tank strength of my division.

Dusk was already far advanced when I reached a barn half a mile
east of Fournes and caught up with Rothenburg s command vehicle on
the road to Lille. Fighting in Fournes itself [10 miles south-west of Lille]
seemed to be already over. About half a mile away to the east, the
leading units of 5th Panzer Brigade could be seen in process of regrouping.
Despite the onset of night I now gave the 25th Panzer Regiment orders
to continue their attack and to close the western exit from Lille and the
road to Armentires. The regiment was to form a hedgehog in the
neighbourhood of Lomme [on tfie western edge of Lille] and await the arrival
of reinforcements which I would send them.

Rothenburg asked whether I would not like to accompany the attack
myself, but in view of the difficulty of handling the division in the situation
at that time I was forced to decline. Wireless was practically unusable
again and it seemed to me more important that I should detail the rest

CLOSING THE TRAP 39

of my force, personally if possible, to its positions round our final objective
at Lomme and see to it that they did in fact get there. I had also to
ensure that substantial reinforcements for the 25th Panzer Regiment
arrived by daybreak, and to organise their supply of ammunition and
petrol not an easy task. I wanted at all costs to avoid the Panzer
Regiment being placed a second time in the difficult situation in which
it had been outside Le Gateau.

\Vireless contact with General Harde proving impossible, I tried to
get orders to him via the divisional staff, to make an immediate advance
to Englos in the wake of the 25th Panzer Regiment. However, I was
unable to get the main body of the brigade on the move and the attack
on Englos had to proceed, first with only a company and later with a
battalion. It was unfortunately impossible for me to drive straight across
country in the darkness and deliver the orders myself, as my Gefechtsstqffel
was not fully equipped with cross-country vehicles. In any case, it would
have exposed us to the danger of being taken for a British scouting party
and fired on by one of the 5th Panzer Brigade s detachments of tanks
which were scattered about the country.

27 May 1940
DEAREST Lu,

I m very well. We re busy encircling the British and French in
Lille at the moment. I m taking part from the south-west. I m all
right for washing, etc. Guenther [Rommel 9 s batman} takes good care of
that. I ve taken a lot of photographs.

jth Panzer Division. 27-5-40

Adjutant.

MY DEAR FRAU ROMMEL,

May I be permitted to inform you that the Fuehrer has instructed
Lieut. Hanke to decorate your husband on his behalf with the
Knight s Cross. 1

Every man of the division myself particularly, who has the
privilege of accompanying the General knows that nobody has
deserved it more than your husband. He has led the division to
successes which must, I imagine, be unique.

*Note by Manfred Rommel. In the Second World War the following decorations for
gallantry were awarded :

(a) Iron Cross First and Second Class. (The First Class was mostly conferred on
officers.)

(b) German Cross in Gold. (Intermediate grade between the Iron Cross First
Class and the Knight s Cross; approx. 3,000 awarded.)

c) Knight s Cross to the Iron Cross. (1,500 to 3,000 awarded.)

d) Oakleaves to the Knight s Cross. (250 to 300 awarded.)

e) Oakleaves with Swords. (80 to 100 awarded.)

(i) Oakleaves with Swords and Diamonds. (Approx. 30 awarded.)
Later in the war these decorations were also awarded for command achievements.

4O FRANCE, 1940

The General is now up with the tanks again. If he knew that I
were writing you, gnddigste Frau, he would immediately instruct me
to send you his most heartfelt greetings and the news that he is
well.

I beg you to accept my apologies that I wiite impersonally on a
typewriter, but my arm is not yet well enough after my wound for
me to write legibly.

May I close with the kindest regards from all members of the
staff, and remain, meine gnddigste Fran,

Your obedient servant,

SCHRAEPLER

Meanwhile, Rothenburg had advanced through the night far to the
north. His path was marked by the glare of burning vehicles shot up
by his force. I now gave orders for the reinforced 6th and 7th Rifle
Regiments to be deployed in depth for defence of the newly- won territory.
37th Reconnaissance Battalion was to come forward to Fournes and
remain at my disposal. When the orders were out I went off to Fournes
to supervise their execution. Massive stone barricades and deep trenches
rendered movement through Fournes extremely difficult. Several convoys
had driven up abreast of each other, and it was some time before the
tangle could be straightened out. I had most of the convoys moved off
the road into the fields alongside, where they were to wait until an orderly
flow of traffic had been established. Amongst it all I found part of the
25th Panzer Regiment s petrol and ammunition column, to which I
gave instructions to move off to the side of the road and await my orders.
It was my intention to take these vehicles forward to 25th Panzer
Regiment in the latter part of the night, covered by 37th Reconnaissance
Battalion.

At about midnight I met the commander of the Reconnaissance
Battalion, Major Erdman, on the western outskirts of Fournes and told
him to expect an early alert and start next morning, the s8th May. I
then quartered myself with my immediate staff in a house on the western
outskirts of Fournes. At 01.40 hours \%8th May] a wireless signal came
in from Rothenburg to the effect that he had reached his objective near
Lomme. With this, Lille was sealed off to the west, and I immediately
had the Reconnaissance Battalion alerted and the Panzer Regiment s
petrol and ammunition column brought up to the north-west boundary
of Fournes, with the intention of pressing on to Lomme before morning
if possible. The whole convoy Reconnaissance Battalion and supply
column moved off at about 03.00 hours. After a detour to the west
to avoid Fort Englos, I decided to take the road through Enneti&res. In
the darkness we drove past large numbers of enemy lorries, armoured
vehicles and guns, mostly in the ditch, where they had apparently been
abandoned by their crews in panic. When, as dawn was breaking, we
found ourselves approaching the Lille-Armentiferes road with still no

CLOSING THE TRAP 41

sign of Rothenburg s tanks, we began to feel thoroughly uncomfortable,
for daylight was almost on us and any moment might find us under shell
fire. At last we found the first of our tanks. Rothenburg was delighted
at the increase in his strength in front of Lille, and even more over the
arrival of the ammunition and petrol. He reported briefly on the night s
fighting. The attack had first driven straight up the Fournes-Lille road.
Then, after crossing the railway, the regiment had swung north, shortly
afterwards coming up against enemy tanks and a strong motorised force.
The enemy tanks and lorries had been wiped out in a short but sharp
engagement, many of their crews seeking salvation in flight. The Panzer
Regiment had then pushed on to Lomme and occupied the western exits
from Lille.

I now regrouped the troops round Lomme into a planned defence.
Shortly afterwards fierce fighting developed at the western outlet from
Lille, with enemy units trying to break out to the west with tank and
artillery support.

Part of the Reconnaissance Battalion and a heavy company were now
placed on the defensive on either side of the Lille-Armenti&res road.
During the early hours of the morning, it seemed to us that the enemy
forces facing us west of Lille were growing steadily stronger and so I
sent out an urgent call for heavy artillery fire.

I now decided to pull 6th and yth Rifle Regiments out of their previous
positions south of Englos and Fournes and to incorporate them in the
general defence line north and south of Lomme.

Orders to this effect had just been issued, when a hail of shells
suddenly began to fall round the Panzer Regiment s command post,
which was also serving as Divisional H.Q. Even as they began we had
the feeling that they were our own shells, and immediately sent up green
flares. I tried to get to the radio to order the cease fire, but the fire was
so thick that it was not easy to reach the signals lorry, which was standing
behind the hoiise. There was no doubt that they were our own shells,
probably 150 mm., with whose effect we were only too familiar. I was
just making a dash for the signals vehicle, with Major Erdman running
a few yards in front, when a heavy shell landed close by the house door
near which the vehicle was standing. When the smoke cleared, Major
Erdman, commander of 37th Reconnaissance Battalion, lay face to the
ground, dead, with his back shattered. He was bleeding from the head
and from an enormous wound in his back. His left hand was still grasping
his leather gloves. I had escaped unscathed, though the same shell had
wounded several other officers and men. We continued to send up flares
and try by radio to get the fire stopped but it was a long time before
the last shell came down. We later discovered that the mistake had
been caused by inaccurate transmission of fire orders by an intermediate
signals point. The fire had come from the heavy battery of a neighbouring
division.

42 FRANCE, 1940

In blocking the roads running west from Lille, Rommel had helped to _ trap
nearly half the French First Army. After failing to break out, the trapped divisions
were driven to surrender on the 31*$.

Meanwhile, the bulk of the British, with what remained oj the French First
and Seventh Armies, had managed to reach Dunkirk-where a defensive bridgehead
had now been formed, and covered by a belt of inundations in the low ground. That
water-barrier proved a good protection except against the very harassing air attacks.
The defence held out long enough to enable 338,000 troops, including 120000
French, to be evacuated by sea to England between the 2 6thMayand the 4 th June
Only a few thousand were captured-belonging to the French rearguard which
valiantly covered the last stage of the embarkation. But during the three weeks
whirlwind campaign the Germans had taken over a million prisoners altogether, at
a cost to themselves of only 60,000 casualties. ^

The Belgian and Dutch Armies had been wiped off the slate. The French had
lost no divtions nearly one-third of their total strength, and including the most
mobile part of it. They had also lost the help of 12 British divisions, for although
tie personnel had escaped across the Channel, most of their equipment had been left
behind, and months would pass before they could be rearmed. Only 2 British
divisions remained in France, although 2 more that were not fully trained were now

Sent Itwas a grim situation that faced General Weygand, who had replaced Gamelin
as Allied Commander^Chief on the 20th May. He was left with 66 divisions,
mostly depleted, to hold a front that was longer than the original. The new front
ran from the sea, near Abbeville, along the Somme and the Aisne to link up with
the still untouched Maginot Line. Not much could be done to fortify this Weygand
Line " as it was called, in the very short time before the Germans struck afresh-
after bringing up the mass of their marching divisions, which had taken little
fiehting part in the first offensive. .

Rommefs division was given a few days 9 rest after its coup at Lille in cutting
off the French retreat to the sea. Then it moved south for the final stage of the
campaign.

29 May 1940

DEAREST Lu, . .

Now that the Lille fighting is over (we were again the first in front
of the western gates) we ve come out to rest behind the front.

On the 26th May, Lieutenant Hanke, acting for the Fuehrer,
ceremonially decorated me with the Knight s Cross and gave me the
Fuehrer s best regards. 3 \ hours later my division, with three Panzer
regiments under command, thrust against western Lille, which they
reached by midnight. An hour and a halPs sleep and I then took
fresh troops, with ammunition and petrol for the tanks, up to the front
line. Unfortunately one of my battalion commanders was killed by
our own fire.

Now we ll probably get a few days rest. Perhaps France will give

CLOSING THE TRAP 43

up her now hopeless struggle. If she doesn t we ll smash her to the last
corner. I m fine in every way. My very best wishes to you for your
birthday. There s a frightful lot to do. My Thuringians {the home
station of Rommel s division was in Thuringia] have lost a lot of equipment
on the road and in enemy tank attacks and this must be put right
as soon as possible. Meanwhile, we are making do with French guns.

2 June 1940
Ordered to the Fuehrer to-day. We re all in splendid form.

More to-morrow.

3 June 1940
The Fuehrer s visit was wonderful. He greeted me with the

words : " Rommel, we were very worried about you during the
attack." His whole face was radiant and I had to accompany him
afterwards. I was the only division commander who did.

4 June 1940
We re off again to-day. The six days rest has done a lot of

good and helped us to get our equipment more or less back into
shape.

The new move won t be so very difficult. The sooner it comes
the better for us. The country here is practically untouched by war.
It all went too fast. Would you cut out all the newspaper articles
about me, please. I ve no time to read at the moment, but it will
be fun to look at them later.

CHAPTER III

THE BREAK-THROUGH ON THE SOMME

5 June 1940 3.30 a.m.
DEAREST Lu,

To-day the second phase of the offensive begins. In an hour we
shall be crossing the canal [the Somme is canalised on this part]. We ve
had plenty of time and so everything, so far as can be foreseen, is well
prepared. I shall IDC observing the attack from well back in the rear.
A fortnight, I hope, will see the war over on the mainland. Masses
of post coming in every day. The whole world sending its con
gratulations. I ve opened nowhere near all the letters yet. There
hasn t been time.

The offensive was opened by Boctfs Army Group on the right wing, along the
Somme. Rundstedfs Army Group, facing the Aisne, did not join in until four days
later. Bock was given three of the five panzer corps; two of them, forming Kkisfs
group, were used for a pincer stroke on the Amiens-Pe ronne sector, while HotKs
corps stnick on the extreme right between Amiens and Abbeville. The two other
panzer corps were grouped under Guderian promoted after his decisive drive to
the Channel and were moved back eastward to the sector of the Aisne near Rethel,
south-west of Sedan. Each panzer corps consisted of two panzer divisions and one
motorised infantry division.

The extreme right wing thrust reached the Seine south of Rouen (70 miles
distant] during the night of the i8th June thanks largely to a swift cut-through
by RommeVs division after two days 9 tough fighting and got across the Seine on
the heels of the retreating troops. But the main right wing stroke, by Kleisfs
Panzer group, made slower progress and met increasingly stiff resistance as it
pushed in the direction of Paris. By contrast, Guderian s group made a rapid advance
after the Aisne had been crossed in the attack launched there on the gth June. So
Kleisfs group was switched eastward to back up the break-through on the Aisne,
which became the decisive stroke. For Guderian s group, turning south-east, raced
on to the Swiss frontier, thus cutting off the retreat of the French right wing in the
Maginot Line. By this time resistance was collapsing everywhere, and the French
had been driven to appeal for an armistice on the night of the i6th June,

5. CROSSING THE SOMME

Fig. i shows the position of the tank blocking the railway bridge.

Fig. 2 shows the junction of the Somme Canal and the River Somme.

Fig. 3 shows the shell burst. See photographs facing page 42.

46 FRANCE, 1940

While Guderiaris exploitation of the break-through on the Aisne had been
decisive, Rommel s thrust on the other flank had started the collapse. That fact adds
all the more significance to his account of the opening and development of the attack
across the Somme. His division operated as a spearhead in the crossing itself \ as
well as in the exploitation.

RoinmeVs stroke was launched on the sector between Longpre and Hangest.
Here there was a fiat and marshy " no-man s land" of nearly a mile between the
German position on the north bank of the Somme and the French position on the
slopes south of the river. Across the stretch ran two railway tracks, carried on
separate bridges over the river, then along embankments through the riverside
meadows, and over the Hangest-Longpre road by two more bridges.

The French had blown up the bridges which carried roads across the Somme
at Hangest and near Longpre, but not the two railway river-bridges nor even the
two railway r odd-bridges &gt; which lay so close to their own front. They paid heavily
for these omissions due originally to their own plans for taking the offensive. As
a deterrent to any belated attempt to demolish these bridges, Rommel kept them
under artillery and machine-gunfire by day and night prior to launching his attack
on the $th June, and succeeded in capturing all four intact early that morning.
Once the rails had been taken up, his tanks and other vehicles were able to pass
over the river and marshy belt with far less delay than if bridges and causeways
had had to be built.

To overcome such a multiple obstacle in this way was an extraordinary feat.
If the French had destroyed even the final pair of bridges, over the road, the capture
of the bridges over the river would have been of little avail. In a theoretical staff
exercise, what Rommel here achieved would hardly have been credited as a practical
possibility.

At about 04.15 hours I drove with Lieut. Luft and my signals staff
to the artillery command post, where we watched the opening of the all-
important attack across the Somme. The preparatory barrage, which
started punctual to the minute, made an extraordinarily impressive sight
from our excellent vantage point. The flash of our shell-bursts seemed
to be everywhere and there was little to be heard of enemy counter-fire.

This being so, we drove to 2nd Battalion 6th Rifle Regiment s bridging
point, where news reached us at about 05.00 hours that the railway and
road bridges had fallen intact into our hands. Part of the Engineer
Battalion was already hard at work on the railway bridge, unbolting
rails and clearing away sleepers, in order to prepare the way for the
division to cross with its vehicles. On the other side of the river, the
Rifle Regiment, under Colonel von linger, was moving smoothly forward.
We heard occasional short bursts of machine-gun fire. I now left my
signals vehicle on the north bank, giving the crew instructions to be the
first vehicle to cross, and walked over the Somme bridges with Lieutenant
Luft. The signals vehicle crossed at 06.00 hours, followed shortly
afterwards by artillery and anti-aircraft units and the 25th Panzer

THE BREAK-THROUGH ON THE SOMME 47

Regiment. The crossing went somewhat slowly, as there was still a
considerable number of rails and sleepers to be cleared away.

Meanwhile, I drove forward with my signal troop towards the
fighting. We had some difficulty in getting the vehicles up the steep
slopes, which were devoid of any kind of road or track. I walked a few
steps into the cornfield with Lieutenant Luft and L.-Cpl. Heidenreich
in order to observe the two battalions of 6th Rifle Regiment through the
glasses. We were a few hundred yards from our vehicle, when a French
soldier s head suddenly appeared out of the cornfield in front of us and
disappeared again as quickly.

Heidenreich walked across and found a wounded Frenchman, still
with a machine-gun beside him. Close by we found more French troops,
some dead, others wounded. Our barrage had apparently dealt heavily
with the enemy positions.

Meanwhile, the leading vehicles of the Panzer Regiment and the
artillery and anti-aircraft units were arriving on the steep slopes south
west of the Somme. Colonel Rothenburg, who had crossed with his
adjutant in advance of his regiment, received orders to follow up 6th
Rifle Regiment along a wide valley to a point behind Hill 116 where
they were to take up position for an attack on Le Quesnoy [5 miles beyond
the Somme}. French machine-gun fire several times forced us to take
cover during the briefing.

Traffic across the bridge had now ceased again. A Panzer IV had
shed its right track and was blocking the entire passage and preventing
any other tanks or vehicles from passing. Attempts were being made to
drag the tank bodily forwards, with little success as the sleepers were
jamming in the rubber rollers and pushing the ballast along in front of
them. A good half-hour was lost while the Panzer IV was pulled and
pushed across the bridge, by other tanks. Then the crossing gradually
began to move again.

By nine o clock the attack to the south-west had made good progress.
To eliminate the enemy force in Hangest, which had long been preventing
us from bridge-building there, a whole panzer battalion was launched
against the western outskirts of the village. Their orders were merely to
shoot up the enemy in the western outskirts, without becoming involved
in a fight for the village itself, which was to be cleaned up later by an
armoured engineer company which was being sent up for that purpose.
We watched the battalion approach closer and closer to the village and
very soon heard their fire. Then the tanks turned off up the hill to the
west, but only a few surmounted the topmost ridge. Most of them stuck
on the hill. This route up the steep side of the hill was not very well
chosen. The crews, who dismounted from their tanks, were suddenly
fired on by enemy machine-guns and suffered casualties in the coverless
terrain. Meanwhile, a detachment of self-propelled guns under Captain
von Fischer came up and bombarded the western outskirts of Hangest,

48 FRANCE, I94O

All other troops were directed into the bridgehead position with orders
to take up position in preparation for the forthcoming attack.

The cleaning up of Hangest was still giving a lot of trouble and I
finally put in the Motor-cycle Battalion under Captain von Hagen.
The battalion formed up in extended order for an attack on foot, and
was on the point of moving off when I drove back to them again to give
a further quick order to Captain von Hagen. Before I could do so, my
armoured command vehicle was fired on by machine-guns from Hangest.
The bullets clanged against its armoured walls but fortunately did not
penetrate, though direct hits were scored on the aerial and machine-gun
mounting. An N.C.O. in the 8-wheeIed armoured signals lorry behind
us was too slow getting his head down and was seriously wounded. The
enemy in Hangest continued to cover the road with fire for some time,
but finally the Motor-cycle Battalion attacked and reached its objective.

From 12 o clock onwards, heavy enemy artillery began to bombard
the area of our Somme crossing and shells fell thick and fast on both
sides of the road over which the division was slowly but steadily moving
forward. The hills west of the Somme and the hollows in which we were
forming up for the attack were also the target of intermittent heavy
shelling. Though casualties were light, the effect on morale of the heavy
gunfire was not inconsiderable. The bridgeheads west of the Somme
continued to fill with units of all arms and soon became overcrowded.

At midday, I was informed by Heidkaemper that the 5th Panzer
Division s attack would not be starting until 16.00 hours and that the
and Motorised Division had so far only gained 2,000 yards of ground.
In these circumstances I also ordered the attack to be resumed at 16.00
hours.

Orders were for the 25th Panzer Regiment to attack through the
6th Rifle Regiment to Le Quesnoy. The 37th Armoured Reconnaissance
Battalion, following behind the Panzer Regiment, was to protect the
rear of both its flanks, and to open fire in passing on all likely looking
woods on either side of the route. The yth Rifle Regiment was to follow
up in its carriers. The orders for the artillery and A.A. were first to
cover the division as it debouched from the assembly area and then to
leap-frog forward behind the moving attack. After the attack, the
territory which had been overrun was to be occupied by the infantry
and was to have artillery, anti-tank and anti-aircraft units positioned
in it in depth in such a manner that the maximum artillery support
could be provided against any attack, whether from the west, south or
east,

I was able to give these orders verbally, undisturbed by the enemy
artillery fire, which was still dropping intermittently into our territory.
At 1 6.00 hours sharp, the tanks moved to the attack. The various arms
worked in such perfect co-ordination that it might have been a peacetime
exercise. The French colonial troops opposing us, who were dug in in

THE BREAK-THROUGH ON THE SOMME 49

the small woods on the southern slopes of hills 116 and 104 with large
numbers of field and anti-tank guns, defended themselves desperately.
However, the tanks and Reconnaissance Battalion poured such a hail of
fire into the woods as they passed that the enemy fire was at first not too
heavy. I rode in my command vehicle with Luft near the rear of the
tank column and had good radio contact throughout with Heidkaemper
and the regiments. From time to time enemy fire clanged against the
vehicle s armoured sides and force4 us to get our heads down. In the
northern outskirts of Le Quesnoy a fierce battle developed. The Panzer
Regiment mopped up the enemy in its usual style, in spite of the fact
that they had installed themselves very skilfully round the outskirts of
the village.

This was particularly true of the wall round Chateau le Quesnoy,
which was held by a battalion of coloured troops. Stones had been
wrenched out all along the wall to make loopholes from which large
numbers of machine and anti-tank guns poured their fire into the
oncoming tanks. But even here they had no success, for the rapid fire of
our tanks, particularly the shells of the Panzer IVs, soon smashed the
enemy forces. While one battalion of tanks moved round Le Quesnoy
to the west, Rothenburg took the main body forward close alongside the
wall. The armoured cars, following up behind, then held the enemy in
check long enough to allow the leading infantry units to come up.

Firing and fighting without a break, the tanks rolled round both
sides of Le Quesnoy and came out on the wide and coverless plain to
its south. On they went through fields of high-grown corn. Any enemy
troops who were sighted were either wiped out or forced to withdraw.
Large numbers of prisoners were brought in, many of them hopelessly
drunk. Most of the prisoners were coloured troops. Our objective for
the day, as set by Corps, being the country east of Hornoy, I decided to
continue the attack at 19.25 hours through Montagne-le-Fayel and Gamps
Amienois. Orders were quickly issued. A large concentration of enemy
troops in the Bois de Riencourt was destroyed by the fire of the Panzer
Regiment s tanks as they drove past. Over to our left, a giant pillar of
smoke, belched up from a burning enemy petrol tanker and numerous
saddled horses stampeded riderless across the plain. Then heavy enemy
artillery fire from the south-west crashed into the division, but was unable
to halt its attack. Over a broad front and in great depth, tanks, anti
aircraft guns, field guns, all with infantry mounted on them, raced across
country east of the road. Vast clouds of dust rose high into the evening
sky over the flat plain.

A Corps order arrived refusing authority for the advance through
Montagne-le-Fayel [8 miles beyond the Somme~\ because of the danger the
division would run of attack by our own dive-bombers. I therefore gave
orders, verbally and by radio, for the advance to be halted and all units
to dig in in the area they had reached. This involved us in heavy fighting

5O FRANCE, 1940

against strong enemy forces, principally on our right flank. Enemy tanks
also put in an appearance, but they were soon disposed of either by the
88 mm. A.A. guns, the anti-tank guns, or the tanks. Enemy-held territory,
south and east, and also west of our position, was heavily shelled for some
time by every gun we could bring to bear, which took away their taste
for attack. At 2 1. 10 hours I passed back a message through the divisional
staff: " All quiet forward, enemy in shreds." Then I drove back to
headquarters.

I left headquarters very early next morning, the 6th June, with
Hanke as escort, to drive up to the commander of the 25th Panzer
Regiment, Heavy fighting had developed at several points late the
previous evening and during the night, against enemy tanks and coloured
troops. One A.A. battery had lost several 88 mm. guns in action against
enemy artillery. It was 09.00 hours before I could get the regiment and
battalion commanders together to brief them for the day s operations.

The attack began at 10.00 hours. We followed close behind the
Panzer Regiment. The division, in extended order, over a 2,ooo-yard
front and a depth of 12 miles, moved as if on an exercise. In this formation
we advanced up hill and down dale, over highways and byways straight
across country. The vehicles stood up to it well, even those which were
not meant for cross-country work. With the tanks clashing every so often
with enemy forces, the attack moved forward slowly enough for the
infantry to follow up and maintain close contact.

Hermilly was captured by men of yth Rifle Regiment after a fierce
fight. The Panzer Regiment moved on south over a broad front and
crossed the Caulieres-Eplessier road [20 miles beyond the Somme ] without
fighting. Several unsuspecting civilians driving down the road were
halted. Immense dust-clouds could be seen approaching in the rear, a
sign that 6th Rifle Regiment s troop carriers were coming up in area
formation.

On the ^th June Rommel swept forward more than 30 miles, a thrust which
split the French Tenth Army that was defending the sector from Amiens to the sea.
Two British divisions, the jzrf (Highland] and the xst Armoured, were in this
army the $ist being on the coastal flank.

At about nine o clock I left Divisional H.Q, at Camps with Schraepler
to drive via Poix to Eplessier. On the main road to Poix we met numerous
horse-drawn columns and guns of the 6th Division. Poix itself had
suffered considerably from bombardment, and sandbag barricades had
been constructed by the French on all the roads. However, there did
not seem to have been any serious fighting. The place was still burning
at many points.

In Eplessier I had a brief meeting with the Corps Commander. After
a few words of thanks and praise for the 7th Panzer Division s deeds
south of the Somme, and a brief explanation of future plans, General
Hoth gave his agreement to the attack which had been ordered for the

52 FRANCE, 1940

7th June. He even thought that it might be possible, with the existing
enemy situation, to thrust forward that day as far as Rouen.

We then drove on to Hill 184 south of Thieulloy la Ville, from which
point the left-hand column had been ordered to launch its attack at 10.00
hours. On the way we overtook the 6th Rifle Regiment and the 37th
Reconnaissance Battalion. At Point 184 I had another brief discussion
with Rothenburg and stressed the main points to be observed during the
day s advance; avoidance of villages most of which were barricaded
and all major roads; movement straight across country, thereby ensuring
a surprise appearance in the flank and rear of the enemy.

Such a general cross-country advance was rarely attempted by the Allied
armoured forces in 1944-45. Many of the delays they suffered might have been
avoided by fuller use of this method of movement.
The tanks moved off.

After some early delays, caused by mistakes in the route and too slow
correction from the map, the Panzer Regiment s attack flowed smoothly
forward.

The advance went straight across country, over roadless and trackless
fields, uphill, downhill, through hedges, fences and high cornfields. The
route taken by the tanks was so chosen that the less cross-country-worthy
vehicles of the 37th Reconnaissance Battalion and the 6th Rifle Regiment
could follow in their track-prints.

We met^no enemy troops, apart from a few stragglers, but plenty of
indications in the shape of military vehicles and horses standing in open
country that they had left shortly before our arrival. Four French soldiers
were picked up near Feuquieres. One of them, in spite of being severely
wounded, maintained his fire on our tanks right up to close quarters.
Fleeing civilians, and also troops, were on all the roads. Sometimes we
even surprised refugee lorries in open country, their occupants, men,
women and children, underneath the vehicles, where they had crawled
in mortal fear. We shouted to them, as we passed, to go back home.

East of Villers two enemy infantry guns and a light tank opened fire
on our tanks. They were quickly disposed of. Their crews, or those of
them who were still alive, fled into the wood.

From Bazancourt onwards our way led first along field paths and then
straight across country to the hills of Menerval, which we reached at
17.30 hours without any further fighting. In farms which we passed, the
people were hastily packing up, throwing bedding out of upper storey
windows into the yard, and would soon have been on the road if we had
not arrived.

In other farms carts stood packed high and ready harnessed; in others
again^ women and children took to their heels on sighting us and all our
shouting could not persuade them to return home. The only exception
was on Menerval Hill, where we found a farmer who had formerly been
a prisoner-of-war in Germany. He came up to us at once with his entire

THE BREAK-THROUGH ON THE SOMME 53

family, shook hands and went off to the cellar to fetch cider for the thirsty
German troops. He had, he said, got to know the Germans, and had no
fear of them.

While the 25th Panzer Regiment now took possession of the hills
round Menerval [45 miles beyond the Somme], the 37th Reconnaissance
Battalion was ordered to reconnoitre west and south-west as far as the
River Andelle [7 miles beyond Menerval], on either side of Sigy, and to get
its main force up to Mesangueville, as its next objective.

After satisfying myself that the Panzer Regiment had occupied the
important hills round Menerval, I drove to Captain Schultz s panzer
company, which had been ordered to thrust forward into the wooded
country west of Saumont as far as the main track intersection. The
appearance of German troops on the main road from Paris to Dieppe
near Saumont [near Forges-les-Eaux] had already sealed the fate of many
French vehicles. By the time I arrived well over 40 vehicles had been
picked up and traffic was still arriving from both directions. Panzer
Company Schultz had also had great success in the woods east of Saumont,
where a large ammunition depot had been captured. After fierce fighting
at some points, they had taken 300 prisoners in quick time, including
the supply staff of a French Army Corps, and captured 10 fighting vehicles
and 100 lorries. As we drove back along the main Dieppe- Paris road
we passed a German tankman bringing in a French tractor with a tank
trailing behind it. The young soldier s face was radiant, full of joy at
his success. We drove back to the new Division Headquarters, which had
been erected by the staff in Marcoquet. It was, as usual, difficult to
make our way back over the narrow, dusty roads, past the long approach
ing columns, and it was dark before we reached headquarters. When we
arrived we found the Intelligence Officer, Major Ziegler, interrogating
a number of French and British officers in the courtyard. Prisoners and
booty for that day were tremendous and mounting hourly. Our losses
were insignificant.

7 June
DEAREST Lu,

Your birthday was a thoroughly successful day. -We laid about
us properly. More and more signs of disintegration on the other side.
We re all very, very well. Slept like a top.

The Andelle was now held, thinly, by British troops. To meet the emergency
caused by the German break-through, an improvised force of nine infantry battalions
(made up from lines-of-communication troops] had been hastily stretched along a
6o-mile line from Dieppe to the Seine, to cover Rouen. It had no artillery and few
anti-tank guns but the ist Armoured Division, then refitting in rear, scraped up a
brigade with 90 tanks to support the centre of the line. Rommel pierced the Andelle
line next day at a point between the two main fractions of this armoured brigade

54 FRANCE, 1940

which then withdrew southward and succeeded in slipping across the Seine at Gaillon
before it was trapped.

On the 8th June, I called up the la at Corps shortly after 06.00 hours,
informed him of the position and made a proposal for the attack which
was planned on Rouen. I suggested that the yth Panzer Division should
push forward to a point some 4 miles east of Rouen and feign a direct
assault on the city by artillery fire, after which the mass of the division
would switch to the south-west with the object of seizing the Seine bridges
at Elbeuf [15 miles south-west of Rouen} by a coup de main and cutting off
the Seine bend.

After receiving the la s agreement, I drove quickly off with my escort
officers to Menerval church, where I instructed the commanders to meet
me at 08.30 hours for verbal briefing. To enable me to force the pace I
took the leading battalion under my personal command. We moved off
at 10.30 hours. Low-flying enemy air attacks on the battalion had little
success to show for their efforts : the defence was too strong. We drove
through the southern outskirts of Argeuil, finding no sign of enemy troops
in the town. Now the main body of the division received orders to move
off, and things went on fast as far as Sigy, where the Panzer Company,
which had meanwhile taken the lead, was met with enemy fire, to which
it gave an immediate and powerful reply.

During this brief engagement, the enemy blew the bridge over the
river Andelle. We had observed the whole action from a point a few
hundred yards away. The howitzer battery, which was close behind us,
was now quickly pulled up forward and brought into action in the open.
A motor-cycle company came up and anti-aircraft guns went into
position. . The roads were cleared and vehicles went into cover near a
railway embankment. Meanwhile, I reconnoitred the chances of getting
tanks across the river, and found a point 400 yards south of Sigy where
it could probably be forded. Part of the Panzer Company was im
mediately brought up and sent across the river in support of the infantry
who had already crossed to the other side.

Although there was over three feet of water near the eastern bank,
the first tanks crossed without any trouble and soon overtook the infantry.
However, when the first Panzer II attempted it, its engine cut out in
midstream, leaving the crossing barred to all other vehicles. Meanwhile,
several British soldiers had waded across to us with their hands up, and, with
their help, our motor-cyclists started in to improve the crossing. Great
pieces of the demolished railway bridge near by were thrown into the
deepest part of the ford. Willows alongside the river were sawn down
and similarly used to improve the passage across the ford. One of the
Panzer Ills which had already crossed was brought back to tow out the
Panzer II.

At that moment I received a wireless signal saying that Lieut. Sauvant s
reconnaissance troop had succeeded in preventing enemy preparations

THE BREAK-THROUGH ON THE SOMME 55

to blow the road and railway bridges in Normanville. Sauvant had both
bridges ^ firmly in his hands and was creating a bridgehead across the
river with his reconnaissance troop.

At this good news, I at once broke off the action at Sigy and switched
all forces south at top speed to cross the Andelle at Normanville. The
division s assault group crossed the bridge and continued the advance to
the west. ^ Sigy was taken from the west at 14.00 hours with the capture
of 100 British prisoners.

The route we now took by-passed, as far as possible, aU villages.
Good results had been achieved in the past few days by attacking away
from the roads. The 25th Panzer Regiment s attack started punctually.
At first we found no enemy troops in the small villages through which we
passed. After some time we discovered that enemy dispatch riders and
cars were suddenly travelling in our tank column. Here and there we
heard isolated shots.

Towards 20.00 hours, one company of the Panzer Regiment was
dispatched down the Rouen road to take the crossroad 5 miles east of
the city and provide protection for the artillery and anti-aircraft units
which were being sent there. My intention was to cause alarm among the
enemy forces round Rouen by firing a long-range barrage, and thereby
deceive them as to my true plans, which were to seize the Seine bridges
at Elbeuf later that evening. The Panzer Company arrived at the cross
road by 20.00 hours, but the left-hand column did not come as well
forward as I would have liked the tail of the column had apparently
become involved in fighting around Martainville and we were con
sequently unable to get a quick deployment of the heavy artillery and
anti-aircraft guns round the crossroad.

This seems to have been a brush with the tail of the British scratch force,
which was retreating southward across Rommel s line of advance. The way he
had repeatedly encountered British forces during this fast short campaign, and the
way their tracks crossed his, was a foreshadowing of future years.

With the day slowly fading, I waited in vain for the column to come
up, until eventually part of the yth Rifle Regiment came through.
Apparently the right-hand column had also become involved in fighting
and sometimes the noise of battle came so dangerously close that we
were forced to leave the road and take to the bushes. Then prisoners
began to be brought in from all sides and occasional enemy vehicles
were discovered in concealed parking places. At long last, just before
total darkness, a message came in that the right-hand column had arrived
at the cross road 5 miles east of Rouen and established contact with the
left-hand column. We now drove off quickly to the 25th Panzer Regiment
to give orders for the thrust to the Seine bridges. About 15 minutes later,
the left-hand column, consisting of the 25th Panzer Regiment and the
yth Motor-cycle Battalion, moved off as vanguard on the march to the
Seine. We rode with the signals troop close behind the Panzer Regiment.

56 FRANCE, I94O

Soon it was conipletely dark. We passed a stranded enemy tank, which
appeared to have4ost a track and been abandoned by its crew.

While crossing the main road from Rouen to Pont St. Pierre in the
eastern outskirts of Boos, the tail of the 25th Panzer Regiment s column
was fired on at a range of about 100 yards, by an enemy tank or anti
tank gun. Probably the tank crews were unable to hear the gunfire and
bursting shells above the noise of their engines, for at the end of a minute
not one of our tanks had replied and the whole column was still proceeding
steadily on its way to the south-west. The enemy gun was thus able to
loose off some ten or fifteen rounds at us without being fired on in reply.
It was extraordinary that none of our tanks was hit. To make the tank
crews aware of this threat to their right flank, I sent orders to the com
mander of the nearest armoured car to open fire on the enemy with
tracer. This soon brought the tanks into action and silenced the enemy
gun. Then we went on our way through the night.

We had great difficulty in the darkness and with our inadequate maps
in following the route. The noise of our passage as we drove through
villages wakened people from their sleep, and brought them rushing out
into the street to welcome us as British. We drove past an enemy anti
aircraft battery. There was still light in the guardroom and the sentries
paid us honours as we passed. It was not until next morning that we
discovered that several anti-aircraft guns had stood ready for action a
few yards away. We turned south at Les Authieux and reached the
village of Sotteville at midnight the first German troops to reach the
Seiner

Tank brakes ground and screeched on the winding road. An occasional
light flared up on the other side of the river. Lights were also burning at
several points along the railway line running through the Seine valley.
There were no enemy troops to be seen and everything looked set for
the success of our dash for the Seine bridges. They were only nine
miles away.

Radio communication had failed the usual business at night time
and we had long been out of touch with the divisional staff and our other
columns. The tank column, rolled closer and closer to Elbeuf down the
Seine valley. As we drove under a railway bridge a woman rushed out
of a house on the right of the road, ran over to my staff car, and catching
me by the arm, asked anxiously if we were British. She was sadly dis
appointed at the reply. I now had the Panzer Regiment halted and
the Motor-cycle Battalion, reinforced by five Panzer Ills, brought up
into the lead past it. The motor-cyclists were to go on ahead and send
out storming parties, each supported by several tanks, to seize the two
bridges across the Seine at Elbeuf. They were then to keep a firm grasp
of the bridges and hold them open. It took some time to filter the
battalion forward past the Panzer Regiment and form it up with its
tanks. We were still out of touch with the rest of the division.

THE BREAK-THROUGH ON THE SOMME 57

The clock now crept on to 01.30 hours as we waite&lt;4 tensely for news
of the storming parties. They must have long ago Cached the Elbeuf
bridges. Shortly after two I started for Elbeuf at the head of the 25th
Panzer Regiment to see for myself how the enterprise had gone. I knew
that dawn would be on us in ij-s hours and that it might then be
inadvisable to be caught standing in column on the Seine valley road,
for the enemy probably had artillery in position on the south bank of
the Seine. I therefore wanted to get the main body of my troops at all
costs on to the hills on one side or the other of the Seine by dawn.

In Elbeuf, we found a wild confusion of our vehicles in the narrow
streets north of the Seine and I was forced to go forward on foot to get
to the head of yth Motor-cycle Battalion. There I found that the storming
parties had still not yet made their attempt on the bridges, although the
battalion had already been in Elbeuf well over an hour. I was informed
that when the battalion had entered Elbeuf, they had found the bridges
carrying a lively traffic of civil and military vehicles. An officer also told
me that there had already been shooting near the bridges.

The situation was confused and prospects of success were pretty slim
now that the battalion had stood in the town for a whole hour only a
few hundred yards away from the bridges. But there might still be a
chance, I thought, and I gave the battalion commander orders to launch
his assault on the two bridges immediately. Under cover of the darkness
I took myself up closer to the bridge. Civilians stood around in the streets
and there were sandbag barricades at the crossroads, on one of which lay
a dead French soldier. More valuable minutes slipped by while the
storming parties were "forming up. At last the first party moved off; it
was shortly before 03.00 \$th June]. But they never reached the bridge,
for the enemy blew it before they had gone a hundred yards. The same
happened a few minutes later with the second storming party. Further
heavy detonations followed from west and east, from close at hand and
farther distant. The French had blown all the Seine bridges.

I was extremely angry over the failure of our enterprise. I had no
idea where the main body of the division was. We had behind us the
many enemy-held villages we had driven through during the night, and
as dawn broke saw two captive observation- balloons in the sky near
Rouen. It was beginning to look as though we were in for a fight. I
therefore decided to pull back out of the elongated peninsula into which
we had advanced. The troops moved off quickly. Fortunately, the
Seine basin lay shrouded in mist and we had no need to fear enemy
fire from the opposite bank.

9 June 1940

DEAREST Lu,

Two glorious days in pursuit, first south, then south-west. A
roaring success. 45 miles yesterday.

58 FRANCE, I94O

10 June 1940 5 a.m.

We ll soon be at the sea between the Somme and the Seine. I m
in fine form although I m on the go the whole time. Our successes
are tremendous and it looks to me inevitable that the other side
will soon collapse.

We never imagined war in the west would be like this. There s
been no post from you for several days.

The division now began to clean up the territory we had overrun.
Rouen had meanwhile fallen to the 5th Panzer Division. Late that
afternoon my division was instructed to prepare for a thrust to Le Havre,
and the confirming Corps order arrived in the evening. The plan was
for us to make a quick thrust through to the coast in order to cut off
the escape of two or three British and French infantry divisions and one
or two tank battalions through the port of Le Havre. The 25th Panzer
Regiment now received orders to move first into the district south-west
of Pissy. The Armoured Reconnaissance Battalion was to occupy the
eastern outskirts of Yvetot [22 miles north-west of Rouen] as soon as possible
and then probe towards the sea. I intended to follow up the Recon
naissance Battalion with the mass of the division as quickly as possible
and then thrust on to the sea.

This meant that, after reaching the Seine, Rommel had to make a right-angled
turn to the north-west, after his south-westerly drive from the, Somme to the Seine.
At 07.30 hours [loth June] I drove round the north of Rouen to
Barentin, giving orders by radio on the way for the division to join up
with me. Road demolitions were reported by the Reconnaissance
Battalion east of Yvetot. They were also repeatedly reporting the
capture of British prisoners both with and without vehicles. A civilian,
who maintained that he had left Le Havre at five o clock that morning,
was brought to me for interrogation. To my questions, which were
interpreted to him by a French-speaking officer, he replied that on the
previous day he had seen only a few British soldiers sitting about in
cafes, and no formations or units. The roads had been prepared for
demolition at various points a week before, but they were not mined,
and it was possible to zig-zag past the obstructions. The man, who said
he wanted to get through to Paris, gave the impression of being reliable.
So it seemed that there was no need for the moment to worry about
an enemy threat from Le Havre. I had the man s statement passed back
by wireless. After filling up with petrol, the Panzer Regiment moved
off to Yvetot at 09.20 hours; at the same time I gave the Reconnaissance
Battalion orders to reconnoitre immediately up towards Veulettes [on
the coast, 20 miles north of Tvetof],

These orders had just been issued, when a radio signal came in from
Major Heidkaemper informing us that a powerful enemy motorised
column had been reported moving west out of the forest north of St.

British and French prisoners at St. Valery. June nth, 1940. [Rommel* sown photograph]

The surrender at St. Valery. Extreme right, General Fortune, commander of the $ist
Highland Division. The bareheaded figure is the liberated Luftwaffe pilot referred to in
the text. [Photograph taken with RommeUs camera"}

.IT",

Rammers letter to his wife, June sist, 1940
[See page 85]

THE BREAK-THROUGH ON THE SOMME 59

Saens, and that, by all calculations, this force must be just about arriving
at Yvetot. The Reconnaissance Battalion was accordingly given orders
to close the main St. Saens- Yvetot road immediately and to open fire as
early as possible on the enemy force moving down it. I also had one
heavy and one light A.A. battery brought up past the Panzer Regiment,
and drove off with them at high speed towards Yvetot. I arrived at the
road fork east of the town shortly before 10.00 hours and the A. A. batteries
came in one after the other a few minutes later. They went straight into
position at top speed and received orders to lay down a heavy fire on the
road, on which a large number of enemy vehicles could already be seen.

When the Panzer Regiment appeared in sight of Yvetot at about
10.30 hours, I had the Reconnaissance Battalion launched against the
crossroad two miles east of Ourville, closely followed over the same road
by the Panzer Regiment. I positioned my signals troop immediately
behind the first tanks. All other units of the division received orders by
radio to make a further quick move forward. There were now two
columns driving up the road, sometimes side by side, the tanks on the
left and the Reconnaissance Battalion on the right. Wherever the ground
was in any way suitable, the tanks took a track alongside the road. The
division now went all out for the sea at an average speed of 25-40 m.p.h.
I had already issued orders through H.Q. for all units to increase their
speed to the maximum. No enemy force worthy of our notice had so
far been sighted.

As we approached the main Cany-Fecamp road a dispatch rider from
the Reconnaissance Battalion reported that Captain von Luck had found
enemy lorry columns on the main road and was rounding them up. We
at once drove up to the road to find that while single enemy vehicles
had already got away to the west, there were others halted on the road
to the east. It had every appearance of being a considerable formation.
I at once gave orders to the leading tanks, which were just then arriving,
and the armoured cars and light A.A. guns to open fire immediately on
the enemy standing on the road. After a short time large numbers of
British and French troops came running along the road to us. A quick
interrogation revealed that it was the beginning of 3ist French Division,
which was to have embarked at Fecamp that afternoon. There were also
some scattered British troops among them. The enemy column was
quickly broken up and, while armoured cars and A.A. guns took the
road beyond them under fire, the van of the division moved on again
at high speed to the sea. With my signals section I drove on in advance
of the regiment through Les Petites Dalles and down to the water [10
miles east of Fecamp, and 6 miles west of Veulettes].

The sight of the sea with the cliffs on either side thrilled and stirred
every man of us; also the thought that we had reached the coast of
France. We climbed out of our vehicles and walked down the shingle
beach to the water s edge until the water lapped over our boots. Several

6o FRANCE, 1940

dispatch riders in long waterproof coats walked straight out until the
water was over their knees, and I had to call them back. Close behind
us Rothenburg came up in his command tank, crashed through the
beach wall, and drove down to the water. Our task was over and the
enemy s road to Le Havre and Fecamp was closed.

Shortly afterwards the Brigade Commander, Colonel Fuerst, arrived
with the commander of a French artillery regiment and several French
officers. The French colonel was extremely impressed by the speed of
our advance, but beyond that there was nothing to be had out of him.

A report now came in from the Reconnaissance Battalion to the
effect that they were under heavy enemy pressure on the hill east of
Fecamp. After briefly discussing the essentials of the situation with
Heidkaemper, I drove off to Fecamp, to find that the Reconnaissance
Battalion had meanwhile succeeded in getting the situation under control.
A storming party under the command of Lieut. Sauvant had captured
a coast defence battery which had been heavily shelling the battalion.
We drove on towards the captured battery, but left our vehicles and
walked the last 200 yards, as enemy guns were still firing from the
western side of the town and the hills to its south. From the captured
gun position we had an excellent view over the town and harbour, which
apparently still contained strong enemy forces.

With the arrival of the two panzer companies and the Motor-cycle
Battalion which had been sent to the aid of the Reconnaissance Battalion,
I decided to push forward through the eastern outskirts of Fecamp to
the hills south of the town, I wanted to prevent the enemy units still
in the town from escaping to the south, and to get possession of the port
at the earliest possible moment. This move led to a number of clashes
with the enemy and we were more than once forced to change our plan.
Finally, we bore off through Tourville with the intention of making a
quick run up the main road from the south to St. Leonard. We had no
time to lose, for it was already 22.00 hours. During the descent to Tour
ville, we received a tremendous welcome from the people of a workers
settlement, who apparently took us for British. Just south of Tourville,
we drove through a road-block at the same moment as some British
motor-cyclists rode up to it from the direction of t camp. The British
stared a moment, then swung round and made off back as fast as they
could go. The crew of my command car wanted to open fire, but I
stopped them, because we were, for one thing, very short of time and,
even more important, it would have given away our detour to the
enemy around us and raised the alarm. A civilian whom we met on the
road pointed north and said there were still plenty of British troops to
be found up there. Shortly afterwards the leading tank fired a few
rounds from its gun. I had no idea of the cause and, hearing no enemy
fire, walked up forward, to find that the fire had been aimed at an enemy
road-block. With less than an hour to darkness, and a pitch-black night

THE BREAK-THROUGH ON THE SOMME 6l

ahead I could no longer enter into a slow probe forward but was com
pelled to demand that the tanks plunge forward at their top speed to St.
Leonard, either on the road or alongside it. I led them myself for some
way along the darkening village street. Not a shot was fired. Out in the
open country again, we saw that the British had driven their vehicles off
the road and concealed themselves behind bushes and hedges. A few
of them were winkled out and taken along by the infantry and tanks
following up behind. We had no time to halt, however, but pushed
quickly on to St. Leonard. The motor-cyclists behind us had a short
but successful clash with the British.

Captain von Hagen now received orders to occupy both roads from
Fecamp leading south through St. Leonard with six tanks, bar them to
traffic and establish an all-round defence. This was achieved without
fighting. A bad traffic jam occurred on the road, however, when the
motor-cyclists started to filter past both panzer companies just as the
latter were turning for the trip back. I had given the panzer companies
orders to return to their regiment that night once the Motor-cycle
Battalion had reached St. Leonard. Knowing that it might be extremely
important for me to be at Division H.Q. early next morning, I decided to
drive back with the tanks.

We began the return journey at 23.00 hours. With the road still
solidly blocked by the Motor-cycle Battalion, only one panzer company
could leave with us. We drove behind the third tank. On the way we
passed a number of enemy vehicles, which had apparently driven into
the Motor-cycle Battalion s convoy in the darkness; their crews had been
taken prisoner. Some of them looked as though they had put up a fight
for it first. Suddenly anti-tank gunfire opened from a village just ahead,
and the leading tank was hit in a track. The enemy gun then began to
fire rapid along the road close over our heads. Without replying to the
fire, the tanks in front of us drove straight up on the embankment on
both sides of the road. The leading tank remained where it had been hit.
My vehicle was now left standing only 150 yards away from the enemy
gun, with round after round whistling a hairsbreadth overhead not a
comfortable situation. When, after two or three minutes of this our tanks
had still not opened fire, I jumped down from my vehicle and ran to the
Panzer II standing on the embankment left of the road, where I also
found the commander of the leading tank. I told him what I thought
of him for not having opened fire immediately and for having left his
tank. Then I ordered the Panzer II to open fire at once, with both tank-
gun and machine-gun, on the enemy anti-tank position, in order to
give the whole column a chance of getting away to the left out of the
cutting through which the road ran at this point.

When fire was at last opened, the Panzer IPs 20 mm. shells and
tracer ammunition caused such a firework display that the enemy ceased
fire, as I had expected. We now managed to get my command truck up

62 FRANCE, 1940

the embankment, but it was too steep for the staff car and the armoured
cars and dispatch riders, and so I sent them back to spend the night with
the Motor-cycle Battalion.

Then we drove off with the Panzer Company. It was no easy task
in the pitch black night to find our way across country, in which we
might at any moment run into another enemy force, and required the
utmost vigilance,

jj June igqp
DEAREST Lu,

Over 60 miles in the pursuit yesterday, reached the sea west of
Dieppe and cut off several divisions (French and British). Took two
ports, overcame batteries, bombarded warships some severely
damaged. I didn t get back this morning until 3 a.m. To-day we re
bathing and sleeping.

Next day \iith June] the division moved ouLof Veulettes at about
noon, with the Panzer Regiment and part of 6th Rifle Regiment, to
advance along the coast to St. Valeiy. [This is St. Valery~en-Caux&gt; 6 miles
east of Veulettes and 20 miles west of Dieppe.] I took my Gefechtsstqffel and
drove with the Panzer Regiment. On the hills a mile east of Veulettes
the enemy met us with heavy artillery and anti-tank gunfire, and we
bore off to the south-east. But the enemy fire grew in violence and
heavy batteries joined in, so that all movement was frequently pinned
down. Every lull in the fire was used to drive closer to the enemy. The
rifle company, which was equipped with armoured troop-carriers, did
not, however, follow up the attack, which the 25th Panzer Regiment,
despite the enemy fire, carried closer and closer to the enemy. Near Le
Tot the British had built a fortified line and resistance was heavy. So
tenacious was the enemy defence that hand-to-hand combat developed
at many points. Meanwhile, the 25th Panzer Regiment had thrust
forward to the high ground immediately north-west of St. Valery and was
using every gun to prevent the embarkation of enemy troops. We drove
up as far as the Panzer Regiment with the Gefechtsstaffel and then walked
some distance farther on to get a look at the situation round St. Val&y.
British troops could be seen moving about among the port installations
and there were more troops with guns and vehicles in the northern part
of the town.

Elements of the Panzer Regiment and dispatch riders of my staff
did their best to summon the enemy, who were now only a few hundred
yards away, to give themselves up. In the course of the next few hours
we did, in fact, succeed in persuading about a thousand men to surrender*
in the northern part of St. Val&y, including many officers. Most of them
were French and there were comparatively few British. Among the
latter there was one naval officer who had spent a long time haranguing

THE BREAK-THROUGH ON THE SOMME 63

his men on the mole and apparently succeeded in dissuading them from
surrendering. Finally, we opened up on this officer with machine-guns
from the cliff about 200 yards away, without, as we found later, hitting
him. For half an hour he lay as if dead behind a heap of stones, but
then decided it was better to surrender. He spoke fluent German and,
when accused by Major Schraepler of being to blame for so many of
his men being wounded, replied: " Would you have acted differently
in my situation? 5J1

That evening I sent a large number of German-speaking prisoners
into St. Valery itself, which was still full of enemy troops, to call on them
to surrender by 21.00 hours and march under cover of white flags to the
hills west of St. Valery. It was mainly the British, though there were
some French officers also, who turned down all idea of capitulation and
sent our negotiators back empty handed. They kept their men hard at
it building barricades and getting large numbers of guns and machine-
guns into position all round St. Valery and especially in the port area.
Probably the British were hoping to resume their embarkation during
the night.

In these circumstances, therefore, the concentrated fire of the division,
including the Panzer Regiment and the Reconnaissance Battalion, which
had been brought up in the meantime, was unleashed at 21.00 hours.
A Panzer IV smashed the strong barricade on the mole, in which numerous
guns had been positioned, and left it in flames. Fires were soon blazing
everywhere. After a quarter of an hour, I had the whole division s fire
directed on to the northern part of the town, where, as we saw next day,
the effect was particularly devastating. The tenacious British, however,
still did not yield.

Pespite the violence of the fighting that afternoon, the division s
casualties had been small. One very sad loss was Major Kentel, one of
the 25th Panzer Regiment s battalion commanders, who had been
mortally wounded by a shell splinter. Meanwhile, the infantry had
arrived on the hills west of St. Valery and at nightfall the tanks were
withdrawn from the forward line, and light and heavy A.A. guns went
into position. The infantry were ordered to maintain a harassing fire all
night to prevent the enemy embarking his troops.

After returning to my H.Q., I discussed the situation with Heid-
kaemper. There was good reason to expect that the enemy would attempt
a break out in strength during the night, either to the west or south-west.
Heidkaemper had prudently^ taken all necessary counter measures to
meet this, but it was doubtful whether they could be effective in time.
To satisfy myself that a break-out attempt could be held, I drove off at
lf rhis officer has been identified by the Admiralty as Commander (now Rear-Admiral)
R. F. Elkins, C.V.O., O.B.E., at that time Naval Liaison Officer with 5ist (Highland)
Division. He figures on the extreme left of the top photograph taken by Rommel page
58. He did not long remain a prisoner, however, but escaped four days later and was
back in England by the end of June, 1940.

64 FRANCE, 1940

06.30 hours next morning, the 1 2th June, to the threatened sectors of the
front. Driving across country, I saw troops everywhere entrenched in
depth. Anti-tank and anti-aircraft units were also in position. To enable
me to deal with any break-out attempt quickly and effectively, I gave
orders at 07.00 hours for the main body of the Panzer Regiment to move
off immediately and remain at my disposal.

After visiting the Rifle Regiments, I was informed by radio that the
enemy were attempting to make their way out in small boats under
cover of warships to a number of transports which were lying one to
two thousand yards offshore east of St. Valery.

At about 10.00 hours the Panzer Regiment reached its old position
of the previous day, where a violent duel had meanwhile taken place
between an 88 mm. A. A. battery and an enemy warship, in which two
of our guns had been lost by direct hits. About 1,000 yards north-east
of St. Valery an enemy transport was just steaming out to sea. Our A. A.
battery had ceased fire. I at once had fire reopened on the enemy
transport from an 88 mm. gun close by, although the mounting of this
gun had been hit and it no longer stood firmly on all four feet. The crew
worked splendidly and shells were soon falling hard by the ship. However,
the damage to the mounting made it impossible to apply the necessary
corrections. Meanwhile, the gun had come under fire from a British
auxiliary cruiser lying 1,000 yards off shore. A smoke screen which I
had laid to cover the gun from the warship s fire, proved very effective.
Our gun crew, however, had no success with the enemy transport. Dive-
bombers had already been called up by radio. Shortly afterwards I met
a forward observer from a 100 mm. battery and instructed him to take
the enemy auxiliary cruiser under fire immediately. At 10.40 hours the
ship was set alight by several hits, and beached by her crew.

Meanwhile, I had brought up my Gefechtsstaffel past the wood north
west of St. Valery as far as the first houses of the town. Rothenburg had
orders to take the Panzer Regiment down the roads leading into the
valley, steadily closer to the town, which was still burning at many
points. The tanks, concealed by the undergrowth, rolled slowly down
the narrow winding roads, nearer and nearer to the first houses, until
finally they entered the western quarter of the town. I went on foot
beside the tanks with Colonel Rothenburg and Lieut. Luft and we
reached the western mole of the inner harbour without fighting. Fifty
to a hundred yards away from us on the opposite side stood a number
of British and French soldiers, irresolute, with their rifles grounded. Close
beside them were numerous guns, which appeared to have been damaged
by our bombardment. Fires were blazing all over the farther side of the
town and there was war material lying about everywhere, including large
numbers of vehicles. The Panzer Regiment s tanks rolled on steadily
yard by yard to the south, with their guns traversed east, past rows of
captured vehicles parked on the western side of the harbour. Meanwhile,

THE BREAK-THROUGH ON THE SOMME 65

we tried to persuade the enemy troops facing us to lay down their arms
and walk across a narrow wooden bridge towards us. It was some minutes
before the British could bring themselves to it. At first they came across
singly, with long intervals between each man, then gradually the file
began to thicken. Our infantry now went across to the other side to
receive British and French prisoners on the spot.

While the tanks were moving round the southern side of the harbour
towards the eastern quarter of the town, I followed the infantry across
the narrow bridge to the market square. The town hall and many
buildings round it were either already burnt out or still burning.
Barricades, which the enemy had constructed out of vehicles and
numerous guns, had also felt the effect of our fire. French and British
troops were now streaming in from all sides to the market square,
where they were formed up into columns and marched off to the west.
The infantry were cleaning up the town house by house and street by
street.

Shortly afterwards an N.C.O. reported to me that a high ranking
French general had been taken prisoner on the eastern side of the town
and was asking to see me. A few minutes later the French General Ihler
came up to me wearing an ordinary plain military overcoat. His escort
officer fell to the rear as he approached. When I asked the General
what division he commanded, he replied in broken German: "No
division. I command IX Corps.*

The General declared himself ready to accept my demand for the
immediate capitulation of his force. He added, however, that he would
not have been standing there surrendering if his force had had any
ammunition left.

The General s aide-de-camp, who spoke German, told us that the
number of divisions involved was five, including at least one British.
I now required the Corps Commander to return to his headquarters and
issue orders, through his own command channels, for his troops to
surrender and march off immediately with prominent white flags in the
direction of St. Valery. I wanted to ensure that our troops were able to
see from a distance that the enemy had laid down their arms.

I then requested the General to present himself with his staff in the
market square of St. Valery and agreed to his request that he should be
allowed his own vehicle and kit. Orders were issued to the artillery to
cease all fire on St. Valery and district and to fire only on shipping. The
5th Panzer Division, which had been reported in action at 11.40 hours
against enemy tanks in the neighbourhood of Manneville [2 miles south
east of St. Valery], was notified of the enemy surrender at St. Valery,
During the next few hours no less than twelve Generals were brought
in as prisoners, among them four dhisional commanders. A particular
joy for us was the inclusion among them of General Fortune, commander
of the 5 ist British Division, and his staff. I now agreed divisional

boundaries with my neighbour, General Cruewell, commander of the
2nd Motorised Division. Meanwhile, the captured Generals and staff
officers had been assembled in a house south of the market place. A
German Luftwaffe lieutenant, who had just been liberated from captivity,
was made responsible for the guard. He was visibly delighted by the
change of role.

Particularly surprising to us was the sangfroid with which the British
officers accepted their fate. The General, and even more, his staff
officers, stalked round laughing in the street in front of the house. The
only thing that seemed to disturb them was the frequent photographing
and filming they had to endure by our Propaganda Company and some
other photographers.

The captured generals were now invited to an open air lunch at a
German field kitchen, but they refused with thanks, saying that they still
had supplies of their own. So we ate alone. There were still arrangements
to be made for transporting away the prisoners, especially the numerous
officers, for salvaging the equipment, securing the coast and evacuating
St. Val&y. At about 20.00 hours we returned to Divisional H.Q. at
Chateau Auberville.

It was impossible at that stage to estimate the total of prisoners
and booty. 12,000 men, of whom 8,000 were British, were transported
off by the 7th Panzer Division s vehicles alone. The total number of
prisoners captured at St. Valery is said to have numbered 46,000 men.

12 June 1940
DEAREST Lu,

The battle is over here. To-day one corps commander and four
division commanders presented themselves before me in the market
square of St. Valery, having been forced by my division to surrender.
Wonderful moments ! "

14 June 194.0

On to Le Havre and inspected the town. It all went without
bloodshed. We re now engaging targets out to sea with long-range
artillery. Already set one transport alight to-day.

You can imagine my feelings when is Generals of the British
and French Armies reported to me and received my orders in the
market place of St. Val&y. The British General and his division
were a particular source of joy. The whole thing was filmed and will
no doubt be in the news reels.

Now we re getting a few days rest. I can t think that there ll be
any more serious fighting in France. We ve even had flowers along
the road in some places. The people are glad that the war is over
for them.

THE BREAK-THROUGH ON THE SOMME 67

16 June 134.0

Before setting off south this morning (05.30 hours) I received your
dear letter of the roth, for which my heartfelt thanks. To-day we re
crossing the Seine in the second line and will, I hope, get a good step
forward on the southern bank. With the fall of Paris and Verdun,
and a wide break-through of the Maginot Line near Saarbruecken,
the war seems to be gradually becoming a more or less peaceful
occupation of all France. The population is peacefully disposed, and
in some places very friendly.

CHAPTER IV

PURSUIT TO CHERBOURG

After a brief pause lo rest and reorganise, Rommel s division was switched
back to the Seine south of Rouen. Crossings had been made there on the gth June,
on the heels of the French Tenth Army, which was so badly shaken that the Germans
were able to get across this wide water-line with little fighting. The Tenth Army
then fell back westwards to the line of the Risle, whereas its neighbour retreated
southward. To exploit the fresh split in the French front, the leading German
infantry corps pressed their advance southwards towards the Loire, while Rommel s
division was brought down behind them on the i6th June and then launched westward
next day on a drive for Cherbourg.

On the night of the i6th the French Tenth Army had begun afresh step back,
and the remaining British troops serving with it were ordered to withdraw to
Cherbourg for re-embarkation to England as resistance was already collapsing.
That order was given in the nick of time for them, as the sector they had been
holding lay south of th& route of Rommel s drive next morning, and they only just
succeeded in reaching Cherbourg before they were cut off.

On the i yth June 1940, the division resumed its advance south of the
Seine, in the first place into the Laigle district. The yth Panzer Division
had instructions to push through as far as the Nonant-Sees road. After
arriving at this road, the division was to be reinforced by the Brigade
Senger and was then to strike on and capture the French naval port of
Cherbourg. Air reconnaissance had reported the presence in Cherbourg
of either warships or transports and it was therefore highly probable
that embarkation was in progress there.

The advance was made in two columns, neither of which at this stage
met any serious resistance, A few road-blocks were eliminated, a number
of prisoners made and several tanks captured. As soon as I heard that
the head of both columns had reached the Nonant-S6es road, I gave
orders for the attack to be continued round the flank of S6es. Routes
were as follows:

For the right-hand column, via Maroques, round the south of Ecouche,
then along the main road to Briouze and from there past the south side
of Flers to Landissacq.

For the left-hand column, via Mac6, Meh&ran, St. Brice, Le Menil
to La Chapelle.

PURSUIT TO CHERBOURG 69

I drove with my Gefechtsstqffel in the left-hand column. Things went
fairly fast as far as Montmerrei, where 20 French soldiers were taken
prisoner at about 13.00 hours. The column then pushed on towards
Bouce. In Francheville I received a report that enemy tanks were
holding the entry into Bouce and closing the road, although our recon
naissance troops had not so far been fired on." Since our column contained
nothing more than armoured cars, I ordered an immediate diversion
to the north. We now came across small groups of French troops all
along the route, whom we had no difficulty in making our prisoners.
Among them were several carloads of French officers, one of whom
spoke German and was accordingly now used as an interpreter. Dense
clouds of dust were stirred up by our passage over the side roads. Soon
the head of the column clashed with enemy motor-cyclists, whom they
quickly eliminated by their fire. Close behind the motor-cyclists, however,
we met a French column on the march. They were taken completely
by surprise at our appearance and did not seem very anxious to fight.
Negotiations opened between Captain von Luck [commander of yjth
Armoured Reconnaissance Battalion] and the French captain. I soon went
forward myself to find out what had caused the halt.

The French captain declared that Marshal Petain had made an
armistice proposal to Germany and had instructed the French troops
to lay down their arms. I had the French captain informed, through
our interpreter, that we had heard nothing of this armistice and that I
had orders to march on. I added that we would not open fire on any
French troops who surrendered and laid down their arms. I then
requested the French captain to free the road for our advance and have
his column moved off to the fields alongside it and ordered to lay down
their arms and fall out. The French captain still seemed to hesitate as
to whether or not he should do this. Anyway, it took too long to get
the French troops into their parking place and so I gave my column
orders to move on. We now drove on past the French column, which
stood on the road with its guns and anti-tank guns still limbered up.
The French captain looked a trifle disconcerted as we passed, but his
men seemed to be quite satisfied with this solution. We met more French
troops behind this column and beckoned to them with white handker
chiefs, calling out that the war was over for them. The advance went
on at a speed of 25 to 30 m.p.h. The next villages we came to were full
of French coloured troops, with their guns and vehicles parked in
orchards and farmyards. We drove past at top speed, waving, but not
otherwise bothering about them. In this way we got through without
fighting. After overtaking more convoys of brand-new American-built
vehicles, we reached the neighbourhood of Montreuil [40 miles west of
Laigle, and 12 miles W.S.W. of Argentan] at about 17.30 hours, where I
ordered an hour s rest for a meal, and, above all, to refill our tanks.

Since there seemed to be little further need to worry about serious

70 FRANCE, 1940

resistance, I decided to continue the advance at 18.40 hours, with
Cherbourg, which was still 140 miles 1 away, as the objective. Our right-
hand column, consisting of the 7th Motor-cycle Battalion^and part of
the 25th Panzer Regiment, had met with enemy resistance in the neigh
bourhood of Ecouchd between 16.00 and 17.00 hours, but this action
now seemed to be over. I also decided to make the rest of the journey
over main roads via Flers, Coutances and Barneville to Cherbourg, and
to take the whole division forward in one column.

This was an indirect approach, as Coutances lies close to the west coast of the
Cotentin Peninsula. Not until reaching this point did Rommel turn north up the
west coast route to Cherbourg. t

Details of the new objective and route were transmitted by radio to
the different parts of the division, although the messages did not get
through to one or two units.

At 18.40 hours the 37th Armoured Reconnaissance Battalion began
the advance to Cherbourg. They had orders to keep up the pace. We
reached the main road in a few minutes, where we found Panzer Company
Hanke, which I ordered to join up with us. The right-hand column
now received orders by radio to follow the left via Flers to Cherbourg.

We now raced on at top speed towards Flers. There were French
troops encamped on both sides of the road, and we waved to them as
we drove by. They stared in wonderment when they saw a German
column racing past. Nowhere was there any shooting. ^For^ the next
few hours we went steadily on at about 30 m.p.h. motoring in perfect
formation through one village after the other. A short halt was
made in Flers, due to difficulty in finding the right road. Crowds of
people in the streets, both troops and civilians, looked on curiously and
without taking up any kind of hostile attitude, at our hurried progress
through the town.

In the western outskirts of Flers we passed a large square crowded,
as usual, with French soldiers and civilians. Suddenly a civilian a few
yards from the column ran towards my car with drawn revolver, intending
to shoot, but French troops pulled him up short and prevented him carry
ing out his purpose. We drove on. I now had the whole division behind
me and was anxious to get to Cherbourg as quickly as possible. I was
very conscious of the fact that the territory we were crossing was full of
French troops, though their fighting value was probably low. It looked
indeed as though Petain s request for an armistice was already common
knowledge here. I was also under no illusions that the mass of the
division would be able to keep up our speed, but reckoned that any
units that fell behind would be able to catch up in a few hours. The
Reconnaissance Battalion raced steadily on, with never a stop. We had
already been driving for more than twelve hours. One French town
after another was left behind us without a shot being fired. Night fell,
x lt was actually about 130 miles by the route which Rommel took.

5 io 20 Kilometres

C.delaUaaue

7. THE DRIVE INTO CHERBOURG

72 FRANCE, 1940

revealing enormous fires burning to our right front, probably coming
from petrol and oil stores set alight by the enemy on the Lessay airfield
[30 miles north of Coutances, and 34 miles south of Cherbourg]. As usual after
nightfall, radio contact now failed. I knew that Senger s brigade, which
was on our right, had not yet come up and supposed it to be in the
neighbourhood of Falaise [i.e. 130 miles behind]. This did not alter my
decision, however, for I thought I would be able to cope with Cherbourg
alone.

After it had grown quite dark two officers reported to me, having
overtaken the column in a car. In the darkness I failed at first to recognise
their dust-covered faces, but they turned out to be Captain Kolbeck and
Lieut. Hausberg from the Fuehrer s H.Q,. Hausberg informed me that
he had been posted to my division and I immediately installed him as
aide-de-camp. Kolbeck had not been posted to me, but had merely
taken this opportunity of getting a trip to the front. I now sent Captain
Stollbrueck, my escort officer, back over our road on a motor-cycle to
ensure that everybody was following and to hand each regiment its orders
for the attack on Cherbourg. We would be there, barring obstacles, in
three hours.

On we raced without a stop into the dark night. It was about mid
night when the Reconnaissance Battalion drove across the market square
of La-Haye-du-Puits [5 miles north of Lessay]. There was a surprising
number of men in working clothes standing in the square and behind
them a number of lorries laden with material. They were mainly civilian
workmen, there were few troops, although several French officers
c#uld be seen hurrying busily around. One of them ran through the
column directly in front of my car and vanished into a doorway.
We drove on. As we passed the church I noticed a heavy French
lorry carrying a gun of 88 to 100 mm. calibre standing beside it. Still
without halting, the leading vehicles of the Reconnaissance Battalion,
under Lieut. Isermayer, bore off as ordered on the secondary road
to Bolleville and then drove at a smart pace onwards. I was just
turning over in my mind the detailed deployment of the division in front
of Cherbourg, when the head of die column suddenly ran up against
a defended roadblock and came under very heavy artillery and
machine-gun fire. The leading vehicles were hit and three went up in
flames. Lieut. Isermayer, who had been riding in the first vehicle, was
seriously wounded in the head and lay unconscious beside his burning
vehicle.

By all appearances, the road-block was held by a considerable enemy
force. The moon was now up but I still did not like the idea of attacking
immediately with tired troops and without artillery and tanks. I therefore
gave the Reconnaissance Battalion orders to break off the action and not
to move against the enemy position until daybreak.

Rommel s division had covered more than 150 miles since morning, and more

PURSUIT TO CHERBOURG 73

than TOO miles since its early evening halt to refuel. This far exceeded any day s
advance which had ever been made in warfare,

Then I drove back with my signals troop to La Haye-du-Puits. We
still had no contact with the infantry regiment behind us. On arrival
at La Haye-du-Puits, I took my stand by the church with Kolbeck,
Hausberg, a few dispatch riders, an armoured car and a signal lorry.
The heavy lorry we had seen on our way through, with the gun aboard,
was no longer in its old place. The labour column had also disappeared
from the market square.

A car coming up the main road from Cherbourg was halted. Its
occupant, a French naval officer, told us that he was an engineer officer
and that he had instructions to supervise a labour column building
barricades at this point against the German advance. I told him to
return to Cherbourg and report that he had come too late.

A few minutes later a number of British officers returning in a car
from sea bathing in the south were halted and taken prisoner. Then
Colonel von Unger arrived with the 6th Rifle Regiment. I now issued
orders for the next morning s attack on the enemy road-block. I was
satisfied that we would be able to break through the enemy positions
three miles north-west of La Haye-du-Puits and resume our dash for
Cherbourg during the morning.

At daybreak [on the iSth June] I drove forward to the 6th Rifle Regiment
with Hausberg. I had already given orders during the night for French
officers to be sent across to the enemy at dawn, with a demand for an
immediate surrender. When we arrived von Unger was already in
negotiation with the enemy. The French officers had gone into the
enemy positions, which were in an extremely commanding situation, and
we could see some of the garrison standing beside their strong-points with
rifles grounded. Through the glass we could also see guns and machine-
guns off to the right beside St. Sauveur church. [This was St. Sauveur-de-
Pierre Pont, not the larger village of St. Sauveur-le-Vicomte, which lies 4 miles
north-east, on the main road.] The road leading to the enemy position was
blocked at the bridge by a barricade of tree trunks.

The forward troops of the 6th Rifle Regiment were standing on either
side of the road, also with their rifles grounded, but with the difference
that, whereas the French had fixed positions close beside them, our
men stood in the open country or on the road entirely without cover.
If shooting had started suddenly, our troops would inevitably have
suffered heavy casualties. I was very angry at this lack of forethought
and ordered the officers concerned to reorganise their units immediately.

Shortly afterwards von Unger returned with the French officers and
reported that the troops opposite had no knowledge of Petain s armistice
proposal and did not believe it. They were not prepared to lay down
their arms and allow us to move on. These negotiations had cost us
valuable time and I therefore sent across a French officer once again to

74 FRANCE, 1940

deliver a summons to the enemy to lay down their arms by 08.00 hours,

failing which I would attack.

Preparations for the attack were now pushed ahead as quickly as
possible. Meanwhile, Heidkaemper had arrived and reported on the
division s night march to La Haye-du-Puits, which, it seemed, had by
no means gone smoothly. Due to incorrect marking of roads in Vire
with the " DG 7 * n sign, part of the division had gone off in error to
St. Lo [77 miles east of Coutances~\. No serious fighting had so far occurred
in the rear, but part of the column, including the divisional staff, had
been attacked by enemy tanks from out of a cornfield. Casualties had
been suffered, both dead and wounded, and several of our vehicles had
been set alight. In addition, one of the aides-de-camp, Lieut. Luft, had
narrowly escaped being taken prisoner during the night by either British
or French troops.

Since there had been no fighting of any note in the territory through
which we had come, it was fair to expect that the rest of the division
would close up with us during the morning, or at any rate, during the
day. It was therefore now possible to proceed with my plan for an
immediate attack on Cherbourg. At 08.00 hours, we found that the
enemy at St. Sauveur had suddenly disappeared. When we broke into
the enemy positions they were deserted, except for a few wounded and
one dead. An artillery and machine-gun barrage was now laid down
on the enemy s rear areas, while the leading battalion of the 6th Rifle
Regiment completed the occupation of the enemy positions, which were
tremendously strong. At the same time work went actively forward in
removing the obstructions across the stream and across a deep cutting
farther to the north. Baulks of timber had to be dragged out of the
railings on either side of the bridge, where they had been anchored with
heavy chains. We also had to get through a loo-yard long barricade
formed by numerous poplar trees, three feet or so in diameter, laid across
the road. The engineers did some good work here with motor-driven
saws.

At about 09.00 hours the leading company of the 6th Rifle Regiment,
which was equipped with armoured troop-carriers, moved off as vanguard
on the road to Cherbourg. About a mile and a quarter north-east of St.
L6 d Ourville, the leading platoon, with which I and my signals troop
were travelling, suddenly came under heavy flanking fire from a hill to
the right. Shortly afterwards an enemy battery joined in from the
neighbourhood of St. L6 [fOurvilU], but by that time our men had
jumped from their vehicles and taken coven A wounded man lay a few
yards in front of us behind the parapet of a bridge. The enemy fire was
now lively both from our right and from the front. Our own fire, on

1 Rommel had the roads over which his division advanced marked with the sign
" DG 7 " (Durchgangstrasse 7). This was contrary to normal German practice and he
was taken to task for it later. See page 85.

PURSUIT TO CHERBOURG 75

the other hand, was very slow in answering and, in order to get it moving,
I ordered the machine-gun crew of my armoured car to open fire im
mediately into the bushes on the right of the road. At the same time
the commander of an anti-tank gun was given orders from me to open
fire as quickly as possible on the nearest houses and bushes to our right.
Lieut. Hausberg took charge of all the machine-gunners and riflemen
near by and got them into position.

While this fire was pouring into the unseen enemy, the first field
howitzer came into action, firing over open sights 150 yards behind us.
The weight of our fire soon silenced the enemy on the hill, whereupon
the 2nd Battalion of the 6th Rifle Regiment attacked the hill and took it

After this short but violent action, the division resumed its march to
Cherbourg in the same order as before. Our speed through Barneville
to Les Pieux at times only 6 to 10 m.p.h. was too slow for me and I
several times had to make my presence felt to get it increased, for the
longer we took getting to Cherbourg, the more chance the enemy in the
intervening territory or in the port itself had to prepare for our arrival.
The telephone system was still everywhere intact and there was little
doubt that the Cherbourg garrison would be well informed about our
movements.

As we dropped down into the valley at Barneville, we could see the
sea on our left and some large buildings on the hills south of Barneville
which looked to us like barracks. There was, however, no sign anywhere
of enemy troops. Instead, we found a number of civilians at the entrance
to Barneville engaged in clearing away some partially constructed road
blocks. We saw more of this on our way to Les Pieux [12 miles south
west of Cherbourg], which we reached at 12.15 hours. Nowhere did we
have to go into action. Where we did come across enemy troops we
found them quite ready to lay down their arms.

The column bore off at Les Pieux without halting and drove at a
smart pace steadily closer to Cherbourg. Several captive balloons were
hanging in the sky over the port and it was not long before one of the
forts began to drop shells on the rear of our column. Now we were going
to see fighting. The leading unit halted a few minutes later, although
there was no firing yet up in front. I accordingly drove forward along
the column with my Gefechtsstaffel, to find out why we had stopped, and
found the rifle company s armoured vehicles halted 100 yards short of a
strong road-block, where negotiations were in progress with the enemy
garrison, who gave every sign of being ready to surrender. Von Unger
came across to me and reported. French troops were already on their
way across to us with white flags when suddenly a 75 mm. shell landed
among us, closely followed by a second. Hostilities had opened.

Everyone at first dived for cover, although one or two courageous
drivers did try to get their vehicles into shelter successfully in many
cases, as, for instance, with the drivers of my Gefechtsstaffel, who, despite

76 FRANCE, 1940

the fire, drove off up a side road until they were concealed from the
enemy. The leading vehicles of the 6th Rifle Regiment were already in
flames from the enemy shell-fire. My troops had unfortunately again
made the bad mistake of diving straight for cover instead of immediately
replying to the enemy fire with their machine-guns.

In order to get fire to bear as quickly as possible, I ordered the
machine-gunner of my armoured car to open fire at once in the general
direction of the enemy, and had orders given to the nearest platoon
commander to lead his platoon to an immediate attack on the road
block. But with enemy shells falling all round and a hail of splinters
whistling about our ears, it was not easy to get the infantry to leave
cover once they had found it and advance against the enemy. L.-Cpl.
Heidenreich and my driver L.-Cpl. Koenig particularly distinguished
themselves by their cool courage in this situation. They swept the
infantry forward, although it was still a long time before the machine-
gunners opened fire due apparently to the fact that they had not seen
the enemy and had probably not been trained to open fire immediately
at the spot where the enemy was thought to be.

In the meantime von Unger had been given orders from me to push
forward with his leading battalion round the right flank to Cherbourg.
Captain Kolbeck had already received instructions from me to hurry back
to the rear and bring a troop of artillery into action as quickly as possible.
As there was no more for my small staff to do up in the forward line,
and my most important job was to get the rest of the division into action
as quickly as possible, I took myself off to the rear with Lieut. Hausberg
and L.-Cpl. Heidenreich. The driver and operator of my signals lorry
had to remain with their vehicle. Enemy shell-fire was now incessant on
and along the road, forcing us to make several wide detours, during
which we had to be constantly on the alert for a clash with enemy
infantry.

When, about half an hour or so later, we at last got back to the road
over which we had advanced, several motor-cyclists came riding up and
prepared themselves to move on to the front. We now continued our
journey by motor-cycle. A few hundred yards farther on we met Lt.-Col.
Kessler, commander of the ist Battalion, y8th Artillery Regiment. I
ordered him to deploy his batteries on both sides of the road and to lay
down the heaviest barrage he could on the heights round Cherbourg and
above all, on the port installations. We then went on at top speed
farther to the rear. The ist Battalion of the 6th Rifle Regiment received
orders from me to launch an attack on the hill 1,000 yards west of the
Port Militaire. Shortly afterwards I met the commander of a 37 mm.
anti-aircraft battery and took him forward myself with his battery to
the point where Kessler s battalion was already in position. His orders
were to open rapid fire immediately on the heights round Cherbourg
and the docks.

PURSUIT TO CHERBOURG 77

Kessler s battalion had already opened fire. A few minutes later the
rapid fire of the 37 mm. guns was also tearing into Cherbourg and the
enemy hastily hauled down his balloons. The situation seemed to be
developing in our favour.

From my command post, which I had installed in a farmhouse on the
main road, all sound of infantry fire from the north had ceased. L.-CpL
Heidenreich managed to get my transport section out of the front line
and back to me unharmed. They had been in action against 40 British
soldiers, who had come on them suddenly from the rear and opened
fire. However, the signals corporal finally succeeded in disposing of
the enemy with his machine-gun and forcing them to surrender.

Radio contact had now been established with Major Heidkaemper.
The situation, which had appeared to be going so well, took a sudden
turn against us shortly before 16.00 hours, when within a few minutes
of each other, many of Cherbourg s forts opened a tremendous barrage
with guns of all sizes, including super-heavies, into the area which we
were holding and through which we had made our advance. British
warships also joined in with heavy naval guns. I was extremely glad
that the 6th Rifle Regiment had left its vehicles and deployed. The
positions occupied by the artillery battalion and A.A. battery came in
for particularly heavy attention and casualties soon began to mount.
My command post, too, was so seriously threatened that we found it
advisable to shift out into the open country along a hedge 500 yards
to the west, where, although overlooked by the enemy, we were far
better off than in the buildings with heavy shells falling all round.

One thing to be thankful for was that the radio was working. The
rapid fire of the forts lasted about an hour. I realised that things could
be very difficult for us if the enemy were to mount a strong infantry
attack from Cherbourg, and therefore devoted all my efforts to bringing
up reinforcements above all, the 7th Rifle Regiment and the 25th
Panzer Regiment.

On hearing that the divisional staff had arrived in Sotteville [9 miles
south-west of Cherbourg], I decided to conduct further operations from there.
We drove off soon after, keeping 300 yards spacing between vehicles
because of the enemy shell-fire.

Driving at top speed, we succeeded in getting our few vehicles back
along the road to Divisional H.Q. at Chateau Sotteville without loss.
The yth Rifle and the 25th Panzer Regiments arrived soon afterwards,
also the whole of the Division s light artillery and A. A. units. There was,
however, no hope of the heavy artillery getting into action before the late
evening. They had been unable to maintain the speed of the pursuit
over the 2io-mile stretch to Cherbourg,

It was now decided to adhere to our original plan of attack, which
was to launch the 7th Rifle Regiment, reinforced by tanks, through
Hainneville to Querqueville [on the north coast, 3 miles west of Cherbourg].

78 FRANCE, 1940

With the hills south of Querqueville in our hands it would be easy to
command the port and town of Cherbourg with artillery fire. Then the
eastern front of the Cherbourg defences could be cut off later by the
Brigade Senger. There was now no hope of this brigade arriving before
the following day.

Not having had any sleep since the previous morning, I took an
hour s rest at about 17.00 hours. During that time the commanders of
the 7th Rifle and the 25th Panzer Regiments came in, and after being
quickly briefed on the situation, received their orders for the attack.
Rothenburg drew attention to the fact that the terrain, criss-crossed as
it was with hedges and sunken roads, was extremely unfavourable for
tanks. Despite his objections I gave orders for a reinforced company of
the 25th Panzer Regiment to be attached to the battalions of the 7th
Rifle Regiment for the attack on Querqueville. The approach route
was to be through Tonneville.

Shortly after the commanders had gone, a number of highly important
maps were brought in, to which I gave immediate and careful study.
It seemed that the chateau in which we had taken up our quarters
belonged to the Commandant of Cherbourg, and a whole collection of
maps of the Cherbourg fortifications had been found in his secret drawers.
They included maps of the defended zone south of Cherbourg and, above
all, one map showing the zones of fire of all the light and heavy batteries
in and around the fortress. I studied this map very carefully and came
to the conclusion that it would be unwise to proceed with the attack
through Tonneville, for which orders had just been issued, as the enemy
would be able to cover it with the combined fire of several forts. Mean
while, a welcome signal had come in from Paris s Battalion to the effect
that it had achieved its task of capturing Hill 79, just west of the Rddoute
du Tot. I therefore decided to send the Rifle Regiment round the
western side of Hill 79 for its attack on Querqueville and amended my
orders accordingly. I intended to accompany the regiment forward on
its approach march myself that evening, in order to satisfy myself of its
deployment on the ground.

With my Gefechtsstqffel, I overtook the regiment at 21.00 hours and
then moved forward behind the tanks which formed its spearhead.
Every village we passed was crowded with French sailors and refugees
from Cherbourg, but we met no resistance. It was already growing dark.
Just south of Hainneville we passed a large concrete structure fenced in
with wire and a high wall, apparently a defence installation. A little
farther north I ran my Gefecktsstaffel under some trees, from which point
I was able to watch the deployment of the 7th Rifle Regiment, which
proceeded smoothly. The concrete structure turned out to be part of
an underground tank system.

Meanwhile, my dispatch rider had taken a look round the neighbour
hood and discovered a point from which a view of the naval dockyard

PURSUIT TO CHERBOURG 79

could be obtained from about 2,000 yards away. In the last gleam of
daylight we saw the defence works on the outer and inner moles, and the
naval harbour, which contained only small ships. The rest of the harbour
was empty, the British having apparently already gone. [The last troopship
had left at 16.00 hours.] While we were looking out over Cherbourg, the
long column of the yth Rifle Regiment moved up behind us through
Hainneville and occupied the positions assigned to them on the hills
south of Querqueville and round Hainneville. Light and heavy A.A.
batteries followed up the Rifle Regiment and took up position a t a point
where they could prevent the escape of ships from the harbour. The
enemy forts around us were silent and it was soon completely dark.
Our position was now so strong that we were certain of being able to
force the enemy to capitulate next day.

It was midnight by the time I arrived back at Divisional H.Q. During
the night, Lt.-Col. Froehlich disposed the whole of the divisional artillery,
plus a heavy battalion from the Brigade Senger, in front of Cherbourg
in such a manner that, when dawn broke, they would be able to launch
a concentrated fire of both heavy and light artillery on the various
defensive nests and forts,

Next morning, the igth of June, I drove up forward shortly before
06.00 hours, with Captain Schraepler and Lieut. Hausberg, Numerous
prisoners were being sent into Cherbourg from various points of the
front, with leaflets printed in French calling for an unconditional sur
render. In the area just south of the Redoute du Tot I met part of
the 6th Rifle Regiment under Lt.-Col. Jungk. I left my Gefechtsstaffel
at the edge of the wood as I felt that it would be dangerous, with the
enemy so close, to take the vehicles out of cover.

We now walked forward in a north-easterly direction beside some low
bushes. A dispatch rider followed on foot behind my two escort officers
and myself. As we made our way forward, we suddenly found the men
of a machine-gun platoon lying beneath the bushes. I asked the platoon
commander why his men were not in position and received the reply
that he had not so far been able to find a suitable field of fire. I ordered
him to get his platoon into position immediately in the front line. I was
just about to look for the battalion command post, which we were told
was farther forward, when shells suddenly started to fall behind us,
apparently from our own artillery. We dived straight for cover in a
trench to our right, but not before a shell had killed the dispatch rider,
Ehrmann, and wounded the signals officer, an N.C.O. and a second
dispatch rider. I was positive that the shells had come from our own
artillery and gave orders for no gun to fire without my express authority.
The order was transmitted by radio. It turned out later that the fire
had not come from the divisional artillery, but from an 88 mm. A.A.
battery.

Jungk now received orders to work his way forward with the leading

8O FRANCE, 1940

troops of the battalion alongside the bushes up to the outskirts of Cher
bourg. The enemy seemed to be offering no further resistance. As on
the previous evening, there were sailors everywhere, and hordes of
civilians streamed down every road out of Cherbourg and even across
country in order to escape the approaching battle. I issued orders by
radio for the exodus to be halted and the civilians sent back into Cher
bourg, for we had no intention of bombarding the town, but only the
military targets, such as the forts and the fortified naval dockyard,
around it.

We then drove over to the yth Rifle Regiment s command post in
Hainneville, but found that Col. von Bismarck was not there. On the
way we came across a heavy A.A. battery which had been completely
blocking the road with its guns and vehicles for hours past and was still
not in position. I said a few straight words to the numerous officers who
were with the battery and ordered them to take up position alongside
the road immediately and get all their vehicles away off the road.

At the northern edge of Hainneville I received a message that Lieut.
Durke had just been killed by artillery fire from Fort Central and
accordingly issued orders by radio for concentrated fire to be opened on
the fort. Fire was opened within a few minutes. We had excellent
observation from the 7th Rifle Regiment s command post, and were able
to send back a few small corrections which soon directed the fire into the
centre of the fort. Finally, it became so accurate that three out of four
shells were direct hits, and the fort ceased fire. In order to put its open
gun positions out of action, I had a heavy A. A. battery brought up with
orders to take a hand in the heavy artillery s next shoot on Fort Central
which was timed for i i.oo hours and to destroy its superstructure by
direct fire.

Shortly afterwards Major von Paris informed me that the garrison
of the R^doute des Couplets, 10 officers and 150 men, had just surrendered.
We could see the prisoners standing under guard over to our right. I
immediately went over to the Redoute, where I expected to get an
excellent view across the Cherbourg defences. We drove the first part of
the way in our combat vehicles, and then went on foot up the last 500
yards to the fort standing on its commanding height. We penetrated
through the forward trenches into the inner part of the fort, where we
found part of the 6th Rifle Regiment and the forward artillery observers.
The observation posts, which were intact and equipped with excellent
glasses, gave a view over the whole of the port and town.

I had just sent a radio message to Major Heidkaemper informing him
of the progress of the attack, when Col. Fuerst arrived from the eastern
side of Querqueville with the news that Col. von Bismarck was in negotia
tion there with a deputation from the town. This was probably a direct
result of the division s leaflets calling on the garrison to surrender,

So it seemed that negotiations were starting. I took myself off at

PURSUIT TO CHERBOURG 8l

once to a point half a mile north of the Redoute des Couplets. The naval
dockyard was still held by enemy forces, who were apparently not yet
inclined to surrender, so fire was opened on anything moving in the area.
By this time all fire had ceased from the forts out to sea. Fort Querquevilel
had refused to surrender, but the Commandant had informed us that
the fort would not open fire unless we did. He would only surrender,
however, on orders. Fort Central was silent.

At 12.15 * wo civilian cars drove out of the town. Their occupants,
a Deputy of the Chamber in Paris and the Cherbourg Prefect of Police,
were unfortunately not in a position to announce the surrender of the
fortress, but declared themselves ready to make urgent representations to
that end to the Commandant, who, they said, was in the naval dockyard.
They wished at all costs to avoid the bombardment and hence the
destruction of their town. I told them to drive back into the town and
effect an immediate surrender through the agency of the Chief of Staff.
I gave them until 13.15 hours. They hoped to be back by then to bring
me the answer personally.

During their journey back, the two cars were fired on from the naval
dockyard and their occupants had to alight and crawl for some distance
along the ditch running alongside the road. I did not hear of this, of
course, until later. At 13.15 hours the answer still had not arrived, and
so dive-bombers, punctual to the minute, swooped down and released
their bombs on the sea forts, scoring a direct hit on Fort Central. The
artillery also opened fire. I went back as quickly as possible to the
Redoute des Couplets to watch the effect of our fire from that excellent
observation point.

A storm of shells now descended on the naval dockyard, and flames
were soon shooting up from its extensive arsenals and sheds. Tremendous
clouds of smoke showed the existence of major conflagrations. Meanwhile,
the Rifle Regiments had been given orders to occupy the town during
this bombardment. When the whole naval dockyard was concealed under
a pall of flame and smoke, I had the fire switched to Fort Querqueville
in order to bring the garrison there to an early surrender.

During this bombardment, of which I had an excellent view from my
command post, a number of French naval officers appeared in the Redoute
des Couplets to negotiate the surrender of the fortress. I had the officers
brought up to my observation tower, mainly in order to let them see the
tremendous effect of our artillery fire. Among them was the Commandant
of Fort Querqueville, a naval officer with a long black beard. He was
horrified when he saw his fort shrouded with smoke, and asked me why
we were bombarding it it had already ceased fire. " That may be,"
I replied. " But it has not surrendered."

The negotiations for the surrender went ahead fairly quickly. The
French spokesman a captain who was apparently invested with some

82 FRANCE, 1940

powers, asked for our terms in writing. I accordingly dictated the
following:

" I have taken cognisance of the fact that the fortress of Cherbourg
is prepared to surrender, and have given orders for an immediate cease
fire. I require the garrison of each fort to hoist a white flag as a sign of
surrender and then to march off along the road from Cherbourg to Les
Pieux. Personal kit may be carried, including essential rations. I require
that N.C.O.s shall be instructed to take charge of the men. Officers will
assemble in the Prefecture Maritime. They will be permitted their
batmen. All weapons will be unloaded and stacked in an orderly manner
in the forts."

The formal surrender was fixed to take place at 17.00 hours in the
Prefecture Maritime. After the French delegates had declared their
agreement with the conditions, and given their assurance that they would
be carried out, I gave orders for the cease-fire and then drove off with
my Gefechtsstaffel to Cherbourg.

In the Prefecture Maritime, the staff of the fortress had already
transmitted the surrender conditions to all establishments. As there was
over an hour to wait until the official ceremony, I drove through Cher
bourg with Heidkaemper to inspect the town and port. We visited first
the British port area and the harbour railway station. In their haste to
get their ships away, the British had left all their vehicles standing in the
extensive harbour area and hundreds of lorries were parked there and in
the adjacent quarter of the town. The material was practically new and
most of the lorries intact.

We now found our way to the seaplane base, which had not been
touched by the bombardment, and then returned to the Prefecture, where
we found the commanding officers of 7th Panzer Division assembled on
one side of the courtyard and the officers of the Cherbourg garrison,
including the commandants of the various forts, on the other. After a
quick exchange of salutes with my officers, I addressed the senior French
officer, through the interpreter, in roughly the following terms:

" As Commander of the German troops at Cherbourg, I take note
of the fact that the fortress has surrendered and wish to express my
pleasure that the surrender has taken place without bloodshed among
the civilian population."

The French Chief of Staff then had me informed, on behalf of the
officers, that the fortress would not have surrendered if sufficient am
munition had been available.

Meanwhile, we discovered that the commandant of Cherbourg was
not there, nor, what was worse, the senior officer of the station the
admiral commanding the French Channel Fleet. Accordingly, the
division s liaison officer, Captain von Platen, was sent off to fetch the
gentlemen from their headquarters, which was housed in a chateau
heavily protected by anti-tank guns and barricades. When they arrived

PURSUIT TO CHERBOURG 83

I had the interpreter repeat to them the words I had already addressed
to the French Chief of Staff. Admiral Abrial said that the surrender of
the fortress had taken place without his agreement, to which I replied
that I took note of his statement. This concluded the capitulation of
Cherbourg.

Meanwhile, all forts which could be reached from the land had been
occupied by our troops and cleaning up began in the town and forts.
With Heidkaemper I visited Fort de Roule, which stood on a hill com
manding the town and harbour. A road-block, which we met on the
way, was quickly disposed of by the 8-wheeled armoured signals lorry.
It pushed an enormous half-burnt-out lorry in front of it like a football
and so cleared the road.

The Commandant of the fort and his deputy had been killed the day
before by a German shell, while standing on the walls of the fort. I went
into the casemates, which still contained their garrisons. The French
troops saluted mutely.

I then went on to Fort Querqueville, where I found the aerodrome
untouched, although the fourteen aircraft standing in its spacious hangars
were all more or less damaged. I was surprised to see how little damage
our shell-fire had caused in the fort. In the Commandant s house, which
stood in the middle of the open square, not even the window panes were
broken. The shell pits in the masonry of the fort were some 12-16 inches
deep and the garrison had apparently come to no serious harm.

The British forces with the French Tenth Army had escaped by the narrowest
margin. It had been an even closer shave for them than for the main B.E.F. at
Dunkirk three weeks before.

Lieut.-General Sir Alan Brooke, who had landed at CJierbourg on the i$th to
take overall command, came to the conclusion next day that the French position was
hopeless, and, after securing the British Government s agreement, made arrangements
to evacuate all the British troops still left in France, including the two fresh
divisions that had just been landed. But the withdrawal of" Norman Force," the
troops already operating with the French Tenth Army, was deferred. The main
elements of this were now the lyjth Infantry Brigade (of the 52nd Lowland
Division), which was then in the front line south of Laigle, and tJie 3rd Armoured
Brigade (of the ist Armoured Division], which was in reserve. Lieut.-General
J. H. Marshall-Cornwall, who took command of " Norman Force " on the i^th,
issued orders for its immediate withdrawal to Cherbourg when he learned on the
following night that the Tenth Army was starting a general retirement towards
Brittany.

The British troops set off at midnight and reached Cherbourg within 24 hours,
after having " moved 200 miles by roads encumbered by columns of troops and
refugees" That fact was remarkable proof of the value of motorised mobility for
escape purposes. It was found that the direct road to Cherbourg through Carentan
was already mined, so the British tank column was diverted to the west-coast route

84 FRANCE, 1940

throueh Learn. Then at La Haye-du-Puits a further westward diversion was made
via Barneville and Les Puils, as the main road was already mined and blocked.
In taking the same roundabout approach a few hours later, Rommel chose the route
that save him a clear passage, without any diversion. That calculation of the
advantages of the indirect approach, as the line of least expectation, showed his

enars-o report of the last phase ended: " In order to

protect tiie embarkation at Cherbourg, Iliad asked for afresh battalion of the 52nd
Division to be left to occupy a covering position some so miles to the south. Mis,
combined with the 5 French battalions of the Cherbourg garrison, ought to have
provided ample security, and I had hoped to continue the embarkation until the sist
in order to remote all the stores and mechanised vehicles. The enemy, however
again ufiset our calculations by the speed with which he followed up our rapid
withdrawal. At p a.m. on the i8th, a column of 60 lorries, carrying motonsed
German infantry, reached the covering position near St. Sauveur. Finding resistance
there they turned west to the sector held by French troops, and succeeded in penetrating
the position by the coast road. The French made little attempt to resist and I had
to make the decision at 11.30 to complete the evacuation by 3 p.m. The covering
battalion (jth Bn. K.O.S.B.) was withdrawn between 12 noon and 3 p.m. and
the last boat left at 4 p.m. All weapons were removed, except one 3.7 inch A.A.
tun which broke down and was rendered unserviceable, and one static Bofors gun
which could not be removed in the time. Two anti-tank guns also had to be
abandoned during the withdrawal. When the last troopship left, the Germans had
penetrated to within 3 miles of the harbour."

The casualties of Rommel s ?th Panzer Division during the six weeks campaign
were 682 killed, 1,646 wounded, and 296 missing, while its loss in tanks was only
42 totally destroyed. Its captures amounted to 97,648 prisoners, together with 277
field guns, 64 anti-tank guns, 458 tanks and armoured cars, over 4,000 lorries, over
i, goo cars, and over 1,300 horse-drawn vehicles.

On the soth, immediately after the capture of Cherbourg, Rommel wrote to his
wife:

I don t know whether the date s right, I ve rather lost count of
time after the last few days.

The division made the assault on Cherbourg in one stride over a
distance of 220 to 230 miles and took the powerful fortress despite a
strong defence. There were some bad moments for us, and the enemy
was at first between 20 and 40 times our superior in numbers. On
top of that they had 20 to 35 forts ready for action and many
single batteries. However, by buckling to quickly we succeeded
in carrying out the Fuehrer s special order to take Cherbourg as fast
as possible. . . .

With the capture of Cherbourg, the war in the West was over for 7th Panzer
Division and the division was now ordered south. Rommel wrote from Rennes:

PURSUIT TO CHERBOURG 85

Rennes 21 June 1940
DEAREST Lu,

Arrived here safely. The war has now gradually turned into a
lightning tour of France. In a few days it will be over for good.
The people here are relieved that it s all passing off so quietly.

25 June 1940

At last the armistice is in force. We re now less than 5200 miles
from the Spanish frontier and hope to go straight on there so as to
get the whole Atlantic coast in our hands. How wonderful it s all
been. Something I ate yesterday upset me but I m better again
already. Billets middling.

8 July 1940

France s war with the British Fleet is something quite unique.
It s good for France to be working in with the victors. The peace
terms will be so much the more lenient for her.

Anxiety about Russian expansion comes out clearly in Rommefs letter of
une 1940:

Russia s demands on Rumania are pretty stiff. I doubt whether
this suits us very well. They re taking all they can get. But they
won t always find it so easy to hold on to their spoils. . . .

Note by MANFRED ROMMEL: During the advance of the jih Panzer Division,
my father had introduced several new techniques on his own account, with, as will
be remembered, considerable success. Firstly, his method of command had been
something other than orthodox, secondly he had introduced his " line of thrust, " and
finally he had, against all instructions, sign-posted all his communication roads
with the sign " DG 7," to enable units following behind to close up quickly and to
facilitate supply traffic.

There was, of course, trouble from his superiors and criticism from others
concerning these independent experiments. He defended himself fiercely and
with success. Even Major Heidkaemper, his la, took the side of the critics in some
questions, a fact which made him particularly angry. On the i$th June
Heidkaemper submitted a memorandum to my father in which he complained that
contact had been broken between the staff and the divisional commander, and that
the practical conclusion to be drawn from this fact was that the commander should
stay farther to the rear. In fact, the principal cause of the crisis which had
arisen was that the unit commanders had not been sufficiently familiar with myfattisr s
technique of command. He had had far too little opportunity of exercising his
division as a formation and with its full complement of weapons. The result,
especially at the beginning of the campaign, was a need for repeated makeshift
measures, until finally, towards the end, operations went more or less smoothly.

86 FRANCE, I94O

After receiving Heidkaempefs memorandum, my father wrote the following
letter to my mother;

I m having a lot of trouble with my la just at the moment. He s
sent me a long screed about his activities on the i8th May. I shall
have to have him posted away as soon as I can. This young General
Staff Major, scared that something might happen to him and the
Staff, stayed some 20 miles behind the front and, of course, lost contact
with the fighting troops which I was commanding up near Cambrai.
Instead of rushing everything up forward, he went to Corps H.Q.,
upset the people there and behaved as if the command of the division
were no longer secure. And he still believes to this day that he
performed a heroic deed. I ll have to make a thorough study of the
documents so as to put the boy in his place.

Heidkaemper was actually on quite good Terms with Rommel, who wrote,
only a few days later, after his first wave of indignation had subsided:

The Heidkaemper affair was cleared up yesterday and has now
been finally shelved. I have the feeling that it s all going to be all
right now. I went and saw Hoth and we had a long talk about the
whole thing. I m glad there s peace in the camp again. However,
it was necessary to assert my authority.

During the next few months life for Rommel was much the same as for most
other German officers who were taking part in the occupation of France at that
time. A few extracts from letters which he wrote at the beginning of 1941 give
some idea of the life he was leading and what was in his mind. With so much
material available, it is only possible to include a selection of letters from this
period.

6 Jan. 1941

I received a whole pile of post yesterday, including your letters
of the 2ist and 23rd December, It looks as though the mails are
gradually getting right again. This afternoon we saw the film The
Queen s Heart (Mary Stuart), which I thoroughly enjoyed. We re
expecting distinguished visitors to-morrow to inspect our quarters.
We re not exactly comfortable. The wine growers round here probably
spent their lives in the same miserable hovels a thousand years ago
as they do to-day primitive sandstone block buildings with flat roofs
and sharply-curved tiles, just like those the Romans used. A lot of
the villages haven t even got piped water and are still using wells.
None of the houses are built for the cold. The windows don t shut
and the draught whistles straight through them. However, I suppose
things will soon be better. . .

PURSUIT TO CHERBOURG 87

8 Jan. 1941

The visit passed off very well yesterday. It was intensely interesting
to me to see what primitive lives the people round here are still
leading and how poverty-striken some of the billets are. The troops
made a very good impression everywhere. I m intending to take my
leave at the beginning of February. A lot of things will probably
have been cleared up by then. I m not surprised that our Allies
aren t having things all their own way in North Africa, They probably
thought that war was easy and now they ve got to show what they
can do. They began just the same in Spain, but fought very well
later on. . . .

17 J. 1941
Nothing new here. I spend most evenings with my officers talking

over the May 1940 war diary, which seems to impress them all.
The British Mediterranean Fleet has had to take some hard

knocks. Let s hope we see more of this sort of thing.

Part Two

THE WAR IN AFRICA
FIRST YEAR

CHAPTER V

GRAZIANPS DEFEAT-CAUSE AND EFFECT

IN A speech made by the Duce in February 1941, he said that between
1936 and 1940, Italy had sent to Libya an army of 14,000 officers and
327,000 men, and supplied it with great stores of material His words
sounded very grand and impressive, but the harsh truth was that this
army fell a long way short of the standard required by modern warfare.
It was designed for a colonial war against insurgent tribesmen, such as
Graziani had had to wage against the Senussi and the Negus. Its tanks
and armoured vehicles were too light and their engines under-powered.
Their radius of action was short. Most of the guns with which the artillery
units were equipped dated from the 1914-18 war and had a short range*
The army had too few anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns and even its rifles
and machine-guns were of obsolete pattern or otherwise unsuitable for
modern warfare.

But its worst feature was the fact that a great part of the Italian Army
consisted of non-motorised infantry. In the North African desert, non-
motorised troops are of practically no value against a motorised enemy,
since the enemy has the chance in almost every position, of making the
action fluid by a turning movement round the south. Non-motorised
formations, which can only be used against a modern army defensively
and in prepared positions, will disturb him very little in such an operation.
In mobile warfare, the advantage lies as a rule with the side which is
subject to the least tactical restraint on account of its non-motorised troops.
It follows then that the decisive disadvantage of the Italian Army vis-b-vis
the British was that the greater part of it was non-motorised.

Graziani s Army was set in motion in September 1940, at a time
when the British had nothing in Egypt capable of halting the Italians
before Alexandria. Starting from the Bardia area, the Italian divisions
moved across the Egyptian frontier at Sollum and then along the coast
to Sidi Barrani. The weak British holding forces did not stand to fight
a decisive action, but skilfully fell back to the east before the advancing
Italians. After reaching Sidi Barrani, Graziani did not continue his
advance, but chose instead to fortify the territory he had gained and lay

02 THE WAR IN AFRICA FIRST YEAR

a communication road along the coast; then he went on to assemble
stores and reinforcements and to organise water supplies. From this new
base he intended to continue the offensive towards the east.

If quartermasters and civilian officials are left to take their own time
over the organisation of supplies, everything is bound to be very slow.
Quartermasters often tend to work by theory and base all their calcula
tions on precedent, being satisfied if their performance comes up to the
standard which this sets. This can lead to frightful disasters when there
is a man on the other side who carries out his plans with greater drive
and thus greater speed. In this situation the commander must be ruthless
in his demands for an all-out effort. If there is anyone in a key position
who appears to be expending less than the energy that could properly
be demanded of him, or who has no natural sense for practical problems
of organisation, then that man must be ruthlessly removed. A commander
must accustom his staff to a high tempo from the outset and continually
keep them up to it. If he once allows himself to be satisfied with norms,
or anything less than an all-out effort, he gives up the race from the
starting-post and will sooner or later be taught a bitter lesson by his
faster-moving enemy and be forced to jettison all his fixed ideas.

Weeks and months passed, but Graziani still stood fast at Sidi Barrani.
The British, who commonly possess a good combination of brains and
initiative, were given time to prepare themselves to meet a further Italian
advance and to organise the defence of Egypt. Forces were assembled
all over the British Empire and, above all, modern, mechanised troops
with numerous tanks were brought into Egypt. The British tanks were
far superior in quality to the Italian.

Although the British Army was far smaller in numbers than the
Italian it was better equipped, had a better and more modern air force,
faster and more up-to-date tanks, longer-range artillery, and, what was
most important, its striking columns were fully motorised. The British
Fleet dominated the western Mediterranean, and the Italian Battle
Squadron and Cruiser Groups did not put to sea to sweep away the
numerically inferior British ships. Finally and this was of immense
importance throughout the African campaign the British possessed a
railway along the coast as far as Mersa Matruh, with connections through
to the Egyptian railway system, over which material could be brought to
the front. Egypt could be looked upon as an arsenal for war material of
all kinds.

At the end of November, General Waveli suddenly launched a surprise
attack. [It was actually launched on gth December.] His air force struck first.
Every British aircraft that could take the air, from the oldest to the
newest, dropped its bomb load on the Italian positions at Sidi Barrani
and the forward airfields. Simultaneously, the guns of British warships
thundered from the sea and covered Sidi Barrani and the coast road
with their heaviest shells.

GRAZIANfS DEFEAT CAUSE AND EFFECT 93

In the light of a full moon, an outflanking attack was then launched
against the Italian positions at Sidi Barrani by a striking force made up
of British, Australians, French, Poles and Indians, all units fully motorised.
After a short fight, strong Italian positions 15 miles south of Sidi Barrani
were overrun and 2,000 Italians found their way into British prison
camps.

The larger part of the striking force was British, and the bulk of the remainder
was Indian. The ground troops comprised the jth Armoured Division, the 4th Indian
Division (partly British] , and two British infantry brigades a total of 31,000
men. The Italian force in the forward zone was about 80,000 but had only 120
tanks compared with 275 British of which 35 were the heavily-armoured Matildas
of the jth Battalion^ Royal Tank Regiment.

The initial attack was against the Nibeiwa camp, and here 4,000 prisoners
were taken not 2,000 as Rommel says. The 4th Indian Division, spearheaded by
the Jth R. T.R., then continued its attack northward against the Italian positions
in the Sidi Barrani area.

The British motorised column now divided, one part continuing the
attack to the north against the Sidi Barrani area, while the other moved
off west far into the rear of the Italians.

This second part was the jth Armoured Division, which in fact moved
independently from the start.

At the same time waves of British infantry accompanied by infantry
tanks advanced from the east against the Italian positions at Sidi Barrani
in co-ordination with the outflanking columns attacking from the rear.
Again the thunder of British naval guns mingled with the fury of the
battle. It all swept over the Italians like a storm, and at the end of a
brief action, the three Italian infantry divisions at Sidi Barrani had been
wiped out.

Wavell continued his offensive. Soon he carne up with a Black Shirt
Division, which laid down its arms after a short battle in which the
Italians had fought with great courage. On the i6th December, Wavell
reached the Libyan frontier and defeated Graziani s troops at Capuzzo.
The light Italian tanks simply split apart in the British fire. Maletti, the
gallant commander of the Italian Armoured Corps in Africa, was lulled
in action and 30,000 Italians were taken prisoner. The Tenth Italian
Army had virtually ceased to exist.

The total bag in this battle was over 38,000 prisoners, 400 guns and 50 tanks
at a cost of barely 500 British casualties.

The British successes were obviously having an almost paralysing
effect on the Italians. They withdrew to their strongholds at Bardia and
Tobruk and waited to see what the enemy would do next.

On the i gth of December, Wavell s forces appeared in front of Bardia
and began to lay siege to the fortress. Under cover of R.A.F. bombs
and the shells of the Royal Navy, the superb Australian infantry stormed

94 THE WAR IN AFRICA FIRST YEAR

the fortress and forced 20,000 Italians to surrender. The Italian Com
mandant successfully escaped to Tobruk.

Only the jth Armoured Division followed up the Italian rout, and " appeared
in front of Bardia," as the 4th Indian Division had been dispatched to the Sudan
at the end of the Sidi Barrani battle. Tlie siege-assault on Bardia was thus delayed
until the arrival of a fresh infantry division, the 6th Australian. The assault was
at last launched on January 3rd, again spearheaded by the Matilda tanks of the
jth Battalion R. T.R. By the third day the fortress was completely captured
45,000 prisoners and 462 guns being taken.

The British Army continued its advance to the west and on the 8th
January 1941 enveloped Tobruk. Despite its tremendously strong defences,
its garrison of 525,000 men and powerful artillery formations with their
plentiful supply of stores, this first-class stronghold only managed to hold
out for a fortnight, after which the defence collapsed in an attack mainly
conducted by infantry tanks. The Italian troops had no real means of
defence against the heavily-armoured British vehicles.

Tobruk was actually enveloped on the 6th January by the Jth Armoured
Division, but the 6th Australian Division was not completely assembled and ready
to deliver the assault until a fortnight later. The attack opened on the 2ist, and
by early next morning all resistance had been overcome. Nearly 30,000 prisoners
were taken, with 236 guns.

After the fall of Tobruk, the British moved farther into Cyrenaica,
fighting short actions at Derna and Mechili. In spite of the difficult
terrain in Cyrenaica, which offered excellent opportunities for defence,
the British northern column, with Australians in the lead, made rapid
progress. Benghazi was in British hands as early as the 7th February.
Meanwhile, a powerful British armoured column had pushed forward
through Msus, apparently unnoticed by the Italians. The column struck
the coast road 30 miles south-west of Benghazi and brought to battle the
remainder of Graziani s army, which was retreating down the road.
The action, which was fought on either side of the Via Balbia, ended
v/ith the destruction of over 100 Italian fighting vehicles; 10,000 Italian
troops marched into British prison camps.

In this battle, near Beda Fomm; the total captures were 20,000 men, 216
guns and 120 tanks, mainly of the new (Italian) cruiser type. The British force
consisted of part of the jth Armoured Division, and amounted to only 3,000 men,
while it had no more than 32 cruiser tanks available. But the Italian tanks were
retreating along the road in small packets, and these were broken up in turn by the
British tanks, which skilfully manosuvred to gain flanking fire-positions. The
Italian infantry and other troops offered little resistance when their protecting tanks
were destroyed.

On the 8th February, leading units of the British Army occupied El
Agheila and thus stood on the frontier between Cyrenaica and Tripoli-
tania. Graziani s army had virtually ceased to exist. All that remained
of it was a few lorry columns and hordes of unarmed soldiers in full

GRAZIAOT S ^DEFEAT CAUSE AND EFFECT 95

flight to the west. The realisation that their arms were of no avail against
the British had cast fear and trepidation into the Italian Army. They had
lost 120,000 men in prisoners alone not counting their dead and wounded
also 600 armoured vehicles and almost the whole of their artillery,
vehicles and stores. The Italian Air Force in Africa had suffered an
annihilating defeat at the hands of the R.A.F., and lost most of its
aircraft and ground organisation.

The aggregate figures that Rommel gives for the British captures are closer to
ttie mark than those he gives for the various battles. The total during the campaign
was just over 130,000 prisoners, 1,300 guns, and 400 tanks (excluding armoured
cars and machine-gun carriers.}

If Wavell had now continued his advance into Tripolitania, no
resistance worthy of the name could have been mounted against him so
well had his superbly planned offensive succeeded.

To delay WavelPs advance, the Italians mined the road between
El Agheila, Arco dei Fileni, and Sirte and destroyed several bridges
across the wadis. These demolitions offered little obstruction to the
enemy as they could easily be by-passed. A weak Italian rearguard force,
consisting of one reinforced artillery regiment, stood at Sirte. Thousands
of stragglers collected at Horns and the remainder of the Italian forces
in Tripolitania moved into the outer environs of Tripoli and into the
Tripoli defence line itself a semi-circle 12 miles out of the city centre
for defence of the port. This defence line, which was constructed in sandy
soil, consisted of a wide and deep anti-tank ditch with walls partially
reinforced because of the loose sand, field positions protected by wire
entanglements, and occasional observation towers of light concrete con
struction, which could be seen for miles. In comparison with Tobruk
and Bardia, the defence works round Tripoli were totally inadequate.
They could possibly have been defended with some hope of success against
insurgent Senussi or Arab tribesmen, but never against the British.

However, the enemy stopped his advance, probably thinking that
Tripoli would sooner or later fall into his hands like a ripe plum. No
doubt he wanted time to assemble stores and organise supplies before
going on. But in doing so, he gave the Axis powers the chance to prepare
for a resumption of the struggle.

The advance was stopped by the British Government in order to dispatch an
expeditionary force to Greece., under the belief that a powerful flank threat to Germany
could be created in the Balkans. Early in January Mr. Churchill had pressed the
Greeks, who were already at war with Italy, to accept the aid of a British con
tingent. But General Metaxas, who was then head of the Greek Government, had
declined the proposal on the ground that it, was likely to provoke a German invasion
without providing a strong enough force to check such an invasion.

This polite rebuff coincided with the capture of Tobruk, so the British Govern
ment decided to allow Wavell to continue his advance in North Africa and capture
the port of Benghazi. That fresh step forward was duly achieved, and the remains

g6 THE WAR IN AFRICA FIRST YEAR

of the Italian Army in Cyrenaica were wiped out. But in the meantime General
Metaxas had died, on the i 9 th January, and Mr. Churchill then renewed his offer
to the Greek Government which, this time, was persuaded to accept it. Hence the
British Government ordered Wavell to halt the advance in Africa leave only a
minimum force to hold conquered Cyrenaica, and prepare to send the largest possible

TJie Balkan venture was short lived. The British force began to land in Greece
on the ?th March, the Germans invaded Greece on the 6th April, and the British
were driven to re-embark before the end of the month. That costly disaster was
followed in May by an even quicker expulsion from Crete, at the hands of a German

airborne force. . , Ar ,

General O Connor, the executive commander of the victorious advance in JVortti
Africa, had been eager to push on from Benghazi to Tripoli, and was convinced
that he could have carried out this fresh bound with little delay for replenishment of
supplies. Many other officers who were concerned in the planning shared his view.
Rommel confirms it. .

When a commander has won a decisive victory and WavelU victory
over the Italians was devastating it is generally wrong for him to be
satisfied with too narrow a strategic aim. For that is the time to exploit
success. It is during the pursuit, when the beaten enemy is still dispirited
and disorganised, that most prisoners are made and most booty captured.
Troops who on one day are flying in a wild panic to the rear, may, unless
they are continually harried by the pursuer, very soon stand in battle
again, freshly organised as fully effective fighting men.

The reason for giving up the pursuit is almost always the quarter
master s growing difficulty in spanning the lengthened supply routes
with his available transport. As the commander usually pays great
attention to his quartermaster and allows the latter s estimate of the
supply possibilities to determine his strategic plan, it has become the
habit for quartermaster staffs to complain at every difficulty, instead
of getting on with the job and using their powers of improvisation, which
indeed are frequently nil. But generally the commander meekly accepts
the situation and shapes his actions accordingly.

When, after a great victory which has brought the destruction of the
enemy, the pursuit is abandoned on the quartermaster s advice, history
almost invariably finds the decision to be wrong and points to the
tremendous chances which have been missed. In face of such a judgment
there are, of course, always academic soldiers quick to produce statistics
and precedents by people of little importance to prove it wrong. But
events judge otherwise, for it has frequently happened in the past that a
general of high intellectual powers has been defeated by a less intelligent
but stronger willed adversary.

The best thing is for the commander himself to have a clear picture
of the real potentialities of his supply organisation and to base all his
demands on his own estimate. This will force the supply staffs to develop

GRAZIANl s DEFEAT CAUSE AND EFFECT QJ

their initiative, and though they may grumble, they will as a result
produce many times what they would have done left to themselves.

The gravest results of the Italian defeat were to their morale. The
Italian troops had, with good reason, lost all confidence in their arms
and acquired a very serious inferiority complex, which was to remain
with them throughout the whole of the war, for the Fascist state was
never able to equip its men in North Africa properly. Psychologically,
it is particularly unfortunate when the very first battle of a war ends
with such a disastrous defeat, especially when it has been preceded by
such grandiose predictions. It makes it very difficult ever again to
restore the men s confidence.

CHAPTER VI

THE FIRST ROUND

AFRICAN MISSION

As A result of the strained situation in France at the end of I940, 1 1 had
to break off my Christmas leave before it was up and drive quickly back
over the snow-covered and icy roads to Bordeaux, where my division
was then stationed. Nothing, however, came of the scare and we did
not go into action.

Weeks of intensive training followed. I intended to make up for my
spoiled Christmas by taking some leave at the beginning of February,
but it was again abortive, for on my second evening at home I was
informed by an adjutant from the Fuehrer s H.Q. that I was to cut short
my leave and report to Field Marshal von Brauchitsch and the Fuehrer
immediately.

On the 6th February Field Marshal von Brauchitsch inducted me
into my new task.

In view of the highly critical situation with our Italian allies, two
German divisions one light and one panzer were to be sent to Libya
to their help. I was to take command of this German Afrika Korps and
was to move off as soon as possible to Libya to reconnoitre the ground.

The middle of February would see the arrival of the first German
troops in Africa; the movement of the 5th Light Division would be
complete by mid-April and of the i5th Panzer Division at the end of
May.

The basic condition for providing this help was that the Italian
Government should agree to undertake the defence of Tripolitania in
the Gulf of Sirte area, on a line running south from about Buerat, in
order to secure the necessary space for the employment of the German
Luftwaffe in Africa. This represented a departure from the previous
Italian plan, which had been limited to holding the Tripoli defence line,

lf rhe German Command had reports of a possible revolt in the unoccupied zone of
France. It was planned in that case to enter and occupy the whole South of France
the moment any such rising occurred.

Rommel talking with Major-General Gambler-Parry, commander of the
British 2nd Armoured Division, who was captured with his headquarters at
MechilL The bare-headed officer with dark glasses is Colonel Tounghusband,
his G.S.O.r. [Photograph taken with Rommel s camera]

The Fieseler Storch used by Rommel [RommeVs own photograph]

&gt;-;"f (/ l7 ", -ni i-y;; , , . ,," ,^ , ^^ 8 f{T f^&lt;,4 , ij ^ i

Tracks south of Tobruk,
Summer

Another type of desert
terrain photographed by
Rommel during a
reconnaissance

&lt;ik %
, jfe/^ ;l ^ ; ;;

^ a

THE FIRST ROUND 99

The Italian motorised forces in North Africa were to be placed under
y command, while I myself was to be subordinate to Marshal Gra^anu
In the afternoon I reported to the Fuehrer, who gave me a detailed
account of the situation in Africa and informed me that I had been
recommended to him as the man who would most quickly adapt hunsdf
to Stogether different conditions of the African theatre. The Fuehrers
chief adjutant, Colonel Schmundt, was to accompany me for the
first stare of my tour of reconnaissance. I was advised to start by
SenSS the German troops in the area round Tripoli so that they
3 go into action as one body. In the evening the Fuehrer showed
me a number of British and American illustrated papers describing
General WaveU s advance through Cyrenaica Of particular mterest
wa? the masterly co-ordination these showed between armoured land
forces, air force and navy.

6 Feb. 1941

D TSed 1 a tStaaken I2 .45. First to ObxLH.
who appointed me to my new job, and then to F. \Fuehrer\ Things
are moving fast. My kit is coming on here. I can only take barest
neceSwith me/Perhaps I ll be able to get the rest out soon.
rneed not^ell you how my head is swimming wiji all the many
thfngs Sere are to be done. It ll be months before anything

^So ^our leave was cut short again. Don t be sad, it had to be.
The new job is very big and important. . . .

7 Feb. 1941

Slept on my new job last night. Q**f** ff f w
rheumatism treatment.)^ I ve got a terrible lot to do, in the few
hours that remain, getting together all I need.
On the morning of the nth February I reported to General Guzzoni^
Chief ofStafF of the Commando Supremo [ Jfciw], where Ae plan to
She dSfnce of Tripolitania into the Gulf of Sirte ^ --kte

s?^& wh - -- -^- ^-

Africa.

IOO THE WAR IN AFRICA FIRST YEAR

British troops in the outer environs of Tripoli. As the first German
division would not be complete in Africa until the middle of April, its
help would come too late if the enemy continued his offensive. Something
had to be done at once to bring the British offensive to a halt.

I therefore asked General Geissler to attack the port of Benghazi
that night and to send bombers next morning to attack the British
columns south-west of the town. General Geissler would not at first hear
of it apparently the Italians had asked him not to bomb Benghazi, as
many Italian officers and civil officials owned houses there. I had no
patience with this, and so Colonel Schmundt communicated with the
Fuehrer s H.Q. that night and received authority to go ahead. A few
hours later the first German bombers took off on their mission to cripple
the British supply traffic to Benghazi.

At about 10 o clock next morning [isth February], our reconnaissance
party took off from Catania, heading for Tripoli. Flying low across the
water, we met numerous flights of German Junkers on the way back
from Tripoli, probably engaged on supply duties for the German Air
Force already in Africa. We landed at about midday at Castel Benito,
south of Tripoli. Lieut. Heggenreiner, Liaison Officer of the German
General in Rome 1 to the Italian High Command in North Africa,
received us with the news that Marshal Graziani had given up the High
Command and handed over to his Chief of Staff, General Gariboldi.
Heggenreiner briefly put me in the picture concerning the set-up of the
Italian forces in Africa and described some very unpleasant incidents
which had occurred during the retreat, or rather the rout which it had
become. Italian troops had thrown away their weapons and ammunition
and clambered on to overloaded vehicles in a wild attempt to get away
to the west. This had led to some ugly scenes, and even to shooting.
Morale was as low as it could be in all military circles in Tripoli. Most
of the Italian officers had already packed their bags and were hoping
for a quick return trip to Italy.

At about 13.00 hours I reported to General Gariboldi and put him
in the picture concerning my mission. He showed little enthusiasm for
the plan to establish a defence in the Sirte. With the help of a map I
explained to him the outline of my scheme for defending Tripolitania.
Its main features were not a step farther back, powerful Luftwaffe
support and every available man to be thrown in for the defence of the
Sirte sector, including the first German contingents as soon as they
landed. It was my belief that if the British could detect no opposition
they would probably continue their advance, but that if they saw that
they were going to have to fight another battle they would not simply
attack which would have been their proper course but would first
wait to build up supplies. With the time thus gained I hoped to build

General von Rintelen, German Military Attach^ in Rome and the representative
of the German Supreme Command with the Italian Supreme Command.

THE FIRST ROUND IOI

up our own strength until we were eventually strong enough to withstand
the enemy attack.

Gariboldi looked very dubious about it all. He was extremely
discouraged by the defeat and advised me to have a look at the Sirte
country first, because, having only just arrived, I could hardly be
expected to have any idea of the difficulties of this theatre, I impressed
on him as strongly as I could that we could only come to their help if
they really made up their minds to hold the Sirte. " It won t take me
long to get to know the country/ I added. " I ll have a look at it from
the air this afternoon and report back to the High Command this
evening."

I had already decided, in view of the tenseness of the situation and
the sluggishness of the Italian command, to depart from my instructions
to confine myself to a reconnaissance and to take the command at the
front into my own hands as soon as possible, at the latest after the arrival
of the first German troops. General von Rintelen, to whom I had given
a hint of my intention in Rome, had advised me against it, for, as he
put it, that was the way to lose both honour and reputation.

That afternoon, our H.E. in carried Colonel Schmundt and myself
over the soil of Africa. After seeing the field fortifications and the deep
anti-tank ditches east of Tripoli, we flew across a belt of sand which had
the appearance of , being difficult country for either wheeled or tracked
vehicles and of thus forming a good natural obstacle in front of Tripoli.
The flight continued over the hilly country between Tarhuna and Horns
not, as far as we could see, particularly suitable territory for motorised
forces. The level plain between Horns and Misurata, on die other hand,
looked ideal for that purpose. The Via Balbia stretched away like a black
thread through the desolate landscape, in which neither tree nor bush
could be seen as far as the eye could reach. We passed Buerat, a small
desert fort with a few huts and a landing stage. Finally, we circled over
the white houses of Sirte and saw Italian troops in position east and south
east of the village.

Apart from the salt marshes between Sirte and Buerat, which only
extended a few miles to the south, there was not a single break, such as
a ravine or deep valley, anywhere in the landscape. The flight confirmed
me in my plan to fortify Sirte and the country on either side of the coast
road and to reserve the motorised forces for the mobile defence.

When we met General Gariboldi that evening to report on the results
of our reconnaissance, General Roatta had already arrived and brought
the Duce s new directive. Nothing more was now put in the way of my
plan.

Next day, the X Italian Corps, consisting of the Brescia and Pavia
Divisions, was to move forward to the Sirte-Buerat area and establish a
defence. In its wake, the Ariete, which at that time possessed only 60
tanks of completely obsolete design (they were far too light and had

IO2 THE WAR IN AFRICA FIRST YEAR

once been used to chase the natives round Abyssinia), was to take
up position west of Buerat. For the time being these were all the
forces we could muster. The movement of even these formations was a
headache for the Italian High Command, for they did not have enough
transport for the lift and the road from Tripoli to Buerat was 250 miles
long.

We could not therefore expect these Italian formations to arrive at
the front very quickly, which meant that the only force we had im
mediately available with which to hold up the enemy apart from the
weak Italian garrison at Sirte was the German Luftwaffe. The Luft-
-waffe Commander Afrika General Froehlich was accordingly asked
to undertake this task, after it had been impressed on him how vitally
important it was for the future of the African theatre. The commander
of X Luftwaffe Korps was asked to provide support. With the limited
forces available to them they did all they could, day and night, to help
us out of our predicament, and not without success, for General WavelPs
army remained at El Agheila.

A few days later I flew to Sirte to inspect the Italians holding the
line there. They amounted to perhaps one regiment of troops and were
well led by Major Santa Maria and Colonel Grati. This unit was the
only force we had immediately available to oppose the British and our
anxiety about the situation will be easily understood. The rest of our
troops were standing nearly 200 miles away to the west.

At my insistence, the first Italian division was put on the march for
Sirte on die I4th of February. On the same day the first German units
3rd Reconnaissance Battalion and an anti-tank battalion arrived in
Tripoli harbour. With the situation so dangerous, I pressed for their
rapid disembarkation, and asked that it should be continued throughout
the night, by lamplight. The danger of enemy air attack simply had to
be accepted.

The all-night unloading of this 6,ooo~ton transport was a record for
the port of Tripoli. The men received their tropical kit early next
morning, and by eleven o clock were fallen in on the square in front of
Government House. They radiated complete assurance of victory, and
the change of atmosphere did not pass unnoticed in Tripoli. After a short
march past, Baron von Wechmar [commanding the 3rd Reconnaissance
Battalion] moved off with his men to Sirte and arrived at the front 26
hours later. On the i6th, German reconnaissance troops, working with
Santa Maria s column, made their first move against the enemy. I now
took over command at the front. Colonel Schmundt had returned to the
Fuehrer s H.Q. several days before.

14 Feb. 1941
DEAREST Lu,

All going as well as I could wish. I hope to be able to pull it off.

THE FIRST ROUND 103

I m very well. There s nothing whatever for you to worry about.
A lot to do. I ve already had a thorough look round.

17 Feb. 1941
Everything s splendid with me and mine in this glorious sunshine^

I m getting on very, very well with the Italian Command and

couldn t wish for better co-operation.

My lads are already at the front, which has been moved about

350 miles to the east. As far as I am concerned they can come now.

Through my daily flights between Tripoli and the front, I came to
know Tripolitania very well from the air and formed a great admiration
for the colonising achievement of the Italians. They had left their mark
all over the country, particularly round Tripoli, Tarhuna and Horns.

Day by day now, more columns of Italian and German troops moved
up to the front. Despite Italian advice to the contrary, the Afrika Korps*
Quartermaster (Major Otto), a first-class man, organised supplies along
the coast by small ships, thus considerably easing the pressure on our
lorry columns. The Italians had unfortunately never built a railway
along the coast. It would now have been of immense value.

To enable us to appear as strong as possible and to induce the
maximum caution in the British, I had the workshops three miles south of
Tripoli produce large numbers of dummy tanks, which were mounted
on Volkswagen {the German People s Car] and were deceptively like the
original. On the i7th February the enemy was very active and I feared
that he would continue his offensive towards Tripoli. This impression
was strengthened on the i8th, when we established the presence of further
British units between El Agheila and Agedabia. To give them in turn
an impression of activity on our part, I decided to push forward 3rd
Reconnaissance Battalion, reinforced by the Battalion Santa Maria and
with 39th Anti-tank Battalion under command, as far as the Nofilia
area, with instructions to make contact with the enemy.

On the 24th February, the first clash occurred between British and
German troops in Africa. Two enemy scout cars, a lorry and a car were
destroyed, and three British soldiers, including an officer, taken prisoner,
with no casualties on our side. Meanwhile, the movement of further
units of the 5th Light Division to the front proceeded as planned.

We were still rather suspicious about the British moves and to clarify
the situation, General Streich, commander of the 5th Light Division who
had taken over command at the front advanced up to the defile of
Mugtaa on the 4th March and closed it with mines. He saw nothing of
the enemy.

This move gained us a sector of some importance and materially
strengthened our position. The salt marsh known as Sebcha el Chebira
extends here 20 miles south of the Via Balbia and is impassable to

IO4 THE WAR IN AFRICA FIRST YEAR

vehicles except at a few points, which we very soon mined. An enemy
frontal attack against the narrows would have been comparatively easy
to beat off, and an outflanking movement, which would have involved
him in a long march oyer sandy and difficult country, was not very likely.
At Mugtaa we were already some 500 miles east of Tripoli. For our
coastal supply traffic we had gained the small port of Ras el Ali like
all those places with high-sounding names, this was in reality a desolate
and miserable hole to which the quartermasters very soon began sending
stores.

5 March 1941
DEAREST Lu,

Just back from a two-day journey or rather flight to the front,
which is now 450 miles away to the east. Everything going fine.

A lot to do. Can t leave here for the moment as I couldn t^ be
answerable for my absence. Too much depends on my own person
and my driving power. I hope you ve had some post from me.

My troops are on their way. Speed is the one thing that matters
here. The climate suits me down to the ground. I even " overslept "
this morning till after 6. ...

... A gala performance of " Victory in the West * u was given
here to-day. In welcoming the guests there were a lot, some with
ladies I said I hoped the day would come when we d be showing
" Victory in Africa." . . .

Our operations against Mugtaa resulted in a British withdrawal
eastward and we now supposed their main body to be lying round
Agedabia and along the coast to Derna.

The British forces had been reduced in number, and quality, to a greater
extent than Rommel realised. At the end of February the illustrious jth Armoured
Division had been sent back to Egypt to rest and refit. Its place had been taken by
half of the 2nd Armoured Division, raw from home the other half having been
sent to Greece. The 6th Australian Division had also been replaced by the gth
Australian Division, but part of this was kept back at Tobruk because of maintenance
difficulties farther forward. Besides lacking experience, the new formations had
also been stripped of much equipment and transport for the benefit of the expedition
to Greece. Moreover, O Connor had gone back to Egypt and been relieved by a
commander, General Neame, who was without experience of mechanised desert
warfare.

In taking such risks for the sake of giving " maximum support " to the Greek
venture, Wavell based himself on the belief that the " Italians in Tripolitania
could be disregarded and that the Germans were unlikely to accept the risk of sending
large bodies of armoured troops to Africa in view of the inefficiency of the Italian

." He was correct in his general estimate of the attitude of the German High

1 Film of the 1940 French campaign, made by German propaganda companies.

THE FIRST ROUND 105

Command, and also in his detailed estimate that only the equivalent of " one armoured
brigade " (.. the $th Panzer Regiment) had been landed. On normal reasoning
Wavell was justified in his conclusion of the 2nd March: " / do not think that with
this force he (the enemy) will attempt to recover Benghazi" But such reckoning
did not allow for a Rommel.

Enemy attempts to strangle our supplies by naval action in the
Mediterranean and air attack against Tripoli achieved no great success
at this stage. On the nth March, the 5th Panzer Regiment completed
its disembarkation in Tripoli; this force with its for those days up-to-
date equipment made a tremendous impression on the Italians. 1

On the 1 3th March, I moved my H.Q. up to Sirte in order to be
closer to the front. My original intention was to fly to Sirte in a Ghibli 2
aircraft with my Chief of Staff. After taking off, however, we ran into
sandstorms near Tauorga, whereat the pilot, ignoring my abuse and
attempts to get him to fly on, turned back, compelling me to continue
the journey by car from the airfield at Misurata. Now we realised what
little idea we had had of the tremendous force of such a storm. Immense
clouds of reddish dust obscured all visibility and forced the car s speed
down to a crawl. Often the wind was so strong that it was impossible
to drive along the Via Balbia. Sand streamed down the windscreen like
water. We gasped in breath painfully through handkerchiefs held over
our faces and sweat poured off our bodies in the unbearable heat. So
this was the Ghibli. Silently I breathed my apologies to the pilot. A
Luftwaffe officer crashed in a sandstorm that day.

On the 1 5th of March, a mixed German and Italian force, under the
command of Count Schwerin, moved out from Sirte towards Murzuch
[about 450 miles to the south]. The Italian High Command had asked us
to undertake this operation because General de Gaulle s troops in
southern Libya were beginning to become a nuisance. As far as we were
concerned, however, the main purpose of the move was to gain experience
of long marches and in particular to test the suitability of our equipment
for African conditions. Shortly afterwards the whole of the Brescia
Division arrived in the line at Mugtaa and the 5th Light Division was
freed for mobile employment.

On the igth March I flew to the Fuehrer s H.Q. to report and obtain
fresh instructions. The Fuehrer made me a retrospective award of the
Oakleaves 3 for the 7th Panzer Division s actions in France. The C.-in-C.
of the Army [von Brauchitsch] informed me that there was no intention of
striking a decisive blow in Africa in the near future, and that for the

ir The 5th Panzer Regiment was equipped with 120 tanks, but of these only 60 were
medium tanks (Panzer III and IV). In addition, the Italian Ariete Division advanced
with 80 tanks all that were serviceable at the time.

2 The name of an Italian aircraft. Ghibli is also the Arabic word for sandstorm, in
which sense it is used later in this passage.

8 See footnote on page 39.

106 THE WAR IN AFRICA FIRST YEAR

present I could expect no reinforcements. After the arrival of the 15th
Panzer Division at the end of May, I was to attack and destroy the
enemy round Agedabia. Benghazi might perhaps be taken. I pointed
out that we could not just take Benghazi, but would have to occupy the
whole of Cyrenaica, as the Benghazi area could not be held by itself.
I was not very happy at the efforts of Field Marshal von Brauchitsch
and Colonel-General Haider to keep down the numbers of troops sent
to Africa and leave the future of this theatre of war to chance. The
momentary British weakness in North Africa should have been exploited
with the utmost energy, in order to gain the initiative once and for all for
ourselves.

In my opinion it was also wrong not to risk a landing in England
in 1940-41. If ever there was a chance for this operation to succeed it
was in the period after the British Expeditionary Force had lost its equip
ment. From then on the operation became steadily more difficult to
undertake, and undertaken it eventually had to be, if the war against
Britain was to be won.

Before my departure, I had instructed the 5th Light Division to
prepare an attack on El Agheila for the 24th March, with the object of
taking the airfield and small fort, and driving out the present garrison.
A short time before, the Marada Oasis, some distance to the south, had
been occupied by a mixed Italian and German force. This force now
had to be maintained and our supply columns were being constantly
molested by the British from El Agheila.

Accordingly, after my return to Africa, 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion
took the fort, water points and airfield at El Agheila in the early hours
of the 24th March. The garrison, which consisted of only a weak force,
had strongly mined the whole place and withdrew skilfully in face of our
attack.

After our capture of El Agheila, the British outposts as we learnt
from the Luftwaffe appeared to fall back to the defile at Mersa el Brega.

26 March 1941
DEAREST Lu,

Spent our first day by the sea. It s a very lovely place and it s
as good as being in a hotel in my comfortable caravan. Bathe in
the sea in the mornings, it s already beautifully warm. Aldinger
and Guenther [RommePs A.D.C. and batman respectively] living in
a tent close by. We make coffee in the mornings in our own
kitchen. Yesterday an Italian General, Calvi de Bergolo, made
me a present of a bournous. It s a magnificent thing blue-black
with red silk and embroidery. It would do well for you as a theatre
cloak. . . .

Little fresh from the front. I have to hold the troops back to
prevent them bolting forward, They ve taken another new position,

THE FIRST ROUND IOJ

20 miles farther east. There ll be some worried faces among our
Italian friends.

THE RAID THROUGH CYRENAIGA

The defile at Mersa el Brega was the first objective for the attack which
we were due to launch in May on the enemy forces round Agedabia.
After the British had been driven out of El Agheila, they established
themselves on the commanding heights at Mersa el Brega and south of
the salt marsh at Bir es Suera, and began to build up their position.
It was with some misgivings that we watched their activities, because if
they had once been allowed time to build up, wire and mine these
naturally strong positions, they would then have possessed the counter
part of our position at Mugtaa, which was difficult either to assault or to
outflank round the south. The country south of the Wadi Faregh, some
20 or 30 miles south of Mersa el Brega, was extremely sandy and almost
impassable for vehicles. I was therefore faced with the choice of either
waiting for the rest of my troops to arrive at the end of May which
would have given the British time to construct such strong defences
that it would have been very difficult for our attack to achieve the
desired result or of going ahead with our existing small forces to attack
and take the Mersa el Brega position in its present undeveloped state. I
decided for the latter. It was, in fact, fair to expect that an attack by
even our relatively weak forces would give us the defile. The Mersa el
Brega position was just as well suited for our purpose as that at Mugtaa
and would at the same time provide us with a suitable assembly and
forming-up area for the May attack. A further argument in favour of
an immediate move was that our water supply had recently been so bad
that it was essential to open up new wells. An operation against Mersa
el Brega would give us access to plentiful water-bearing land.

On the 3ist March our attack moved forward against the British
positions at Mersa el Brega, and a fierce engagement took place in the
early hours of the morning with British reconnaissance troops at Maaten
Bescer. In the afternoon, troops of the 5th Light Division attacked the
Mersa el Brega position proper, which was stubbornly defended by the
British. Our attack came to a halt.

I spent the whole day on the battlefield with Aldinger and my Chief
of Staff, Lieut.-Col. von dem Borne, and in the afternoon reconnoitred
the possibility of attacking north of the coast road. The 8th M.G.
Battalion was put in at this point late in the evening and in a dashing
attack through rolling sandhills, succeeded in throwing the enemy back
to the east and taking possession of the Mersa el Brega defile.

The 5th Light Division s success was not reported to Corps until the
morBing. The British had apparently beaten a somewhat precipitate

THE FIRST ROUND IOQ

retreat, and 50 Bren-carriers and about 30 lorries had faEen into our
hands. For the ist April, I ordered our forces to close up in the area
Mersa el Brega and Maaten Giofer.

Luftwaffe reports clearly showed that the enemy was tending to
draw back and this was confirmed by reconnaissance patrols which
General Streich had sent out. It was a chance I could not resist and I
gave orders for Agedabia to be attacked and taken, in spite of the fact
that our instructions were not to undertake any such operation before
the end of May. Accordingly, on the 2nd of April, the 5th Light Division
moved forward on either side of the Via Balbia to Agedabia. The enemy
minefields gave us little trouble. The Italians followed along the coast
road. Agedabia was taken in the afternoon after a short action and our
forward units then pushed on rapidly to the Zuetina area. Meanwhile,
5th Panzer Regiment, which formed the main weight of our attack south
of the Via Balbia, ran up against British tanks and a skirmish developed.
Soon seven enemy tanks were burning on the battlefield. We lost only
three. In this action the enemy used a very effective camouflage in the
form of Arab tents, which enabled them to come into action unexpectedly.

By the time evening came we had occupied the country round
Agedabia up to a point 1 2 miles to the east. The Italians closed up again.
On the 3rd April I shifted my forward H.Q. to Agedabia and watched
the enemy s movements. He was now withdrawing generally and seemed
to be evacuating Cyrenaica. Apparently he was under the impression
that we were extremely strong, an impression in which our dummy tanks
had probably played a big part.

Wavell became anxious about the risks he had taken from the moment Rommel s
advanced force retook El Agheila. Neame was instructed to fall back on a position
near Benghazi if he was pressed, and given permission to evacuate the port if
necessary. Immediately after the capture of Agedabia on the 2nd April, hurried
orders were given for the abandonment of Benghazi, and a retreat eastward, with
the idea of keeping the forces intact. But in the confusion of the retreat they soon
disintegrated.

During the morning, a report came in that a force of 20 enemy tanks
was located some 20 miles north of Agedabia and I instructed Lieut. Berndt 1
to check its accuracy. He drove up the Benghazi road as far as Magrun,
identified them as abandoned Italian tanks and came back.

By -this time we had taken 800 British prisoners. The British apparently
intended to avoid, in any circumstances, fighting a decisive action; so,
that afternoon, I decided to stay on the heels of the retreating enemy
and make a bid to seize the whole of Cyrenaica at one stroke. With this
intention, I immediately put an advance party of the Ariete, under the
command of Colonel Fabris, on the march for Ben Gania and gave orders
to the 5th Light Division to push 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion forward

1 Alfred Ingemar Berndt, an official of the Propaganda Ministry attached to Rommel s
force.

110 THE WAR IN AFRICA FIRST YEAR

along the Via Balbia towards Benghazi, General Streich had some
misgivings on account of the state of his vehicles, but I could not allow
this to affect the issue. One cannot permit unique opportunities to slip
by for the sake of trifles.

I had been told by the Italian General, Zamboni, that the track from
Agedabia to Giof el Matar was an absolute death- trap, and he had done
his best to dissuade me from sending troops through Cyrenaica over that
route. However, I placed more faith in my own observation and set off
with my A.D.C., Lieut. Aldinger, in the direction of Giof el Matar.
After 12 miles we reached the head of the Italian Reconnaissance
Battalion Santa Maria, which was attached to Fabris s force. The
battalion was advancing, extremely well deployed in area formation.
The ground was quite good for driving and caused us no particular
difficulty.

On returning to my H.Q,. at about 16.00 hours, I learnt that the
5th Light Division were saying they needed four days to replenish their
petrol. This seemed to me to be utterly excessive and I immediately
gave orders for the division to unload all its vehicles and send them off at
once to the divisional dump at Arco dei Fileni, whence they were to
bring up sufficient petrol, rations and ammunition for the advance
through Cyrenaica inside 24 hours. It meant the division being im
mobilised for 24 hours but with the enemy withdrawing, this was a risk
we could afford to take.

Meanwhile, it was becoming increasingly clear that the enemy
believed us to be far stronger than we actually were a belief that it was
essential to maintain, by keeping up the appearance of a large-scale
offensive. Of course I was not at that moment in any position to press
hard after the enemy with my main force, but it looked as though we
should be able to maintain enough pressure with our advance troops
to keep him on the run. In 24 hours time I hoped to be able to move
up stronger forces, which I intended to concentrate on the southern
flank, with the object of pushing through Ben Gania to Tmimi,
thereby cutting off and putting out of action as many British troops as
possible.

That evening I drove north to see how things were going with 3rd
Reconnaissance Battalion, which had been sent off in the direction of
Benghazi. On coming up with them in the region of Magrun I was
informed by von Wechmar that he had not so far made any contact with
British troops. He had been informed by an Italian priest, who had come
out from Benghazi to meet them, that the enemy had already left the
town. At von Wechmar s request I immediately sent the battalion
forward to Benghazi.

On our way back to Agedabia we came across a German vehicle
which was apparently manned by British officers. We did not bother to
stop, assuming that they would be picked up by 3rd Reconnaissance

THE FIRST ROUND III

Battalion, which is what in fact did happen. We heard later that the
Tommies had ambushed a German driver north-west of Agedabia and
taken his vehicle in the hope of making their way through to their own
troops in Cyrenaica. After their gallant attempt one could almost have
wished them success. However, they were unlucky.

On my return to H.Q. I met the Italian Commander-in-Chief,
General Gariboldi, who was by no means pleased about the course of
the action to date, and berated me violently, principally because our
operations were in direct contradiction to orders from Rome. He added
that the supply situation was far too insecure to enable anyone to take
responsibility for such an operation, or for its consequences. He wanted
me to discontinue all action and undertake no further moves without
his express authority.

I had made up my mind to stand out from the start for the greatest
possible measure of operational and tactical freedom and, what is more,
had no intention of allowing good opportunities to slip by unused. As a
result the conversation became somewhat heated. I stated my views
plainly and without equivocation. General Gariboldi wanted to get
authority from Rome first. But that way days could go by unused; I
was not going to stand for it, and said that I intended to go on doing what
I felt I had to in whatever situation might arise. This brought the
argument to a climax. At that very moment, a signal arrived deus ex
machina from the German High Command, giving me complete freedom
of action, and settling the argument exactly as I wanted it*

Von Wechmar s battalion moved into Benghazi during the night of
the 3rd April, amid great jubilation from the civil population. The
British had set fire to all their stores.

3 April 1941
DEAREST Lu,

We ve been attacking since the 3ist with dazzling success. There ll
be consternation amongst our masters in Tripoli and Rome, perhaps
in Berlin too. I took the risk against all orders and instructions
because the opportunity seemed favourable. No doubt it will all be
pronounced good later and they ll all say they d have done exactly
the same in my place. We ve already reached our first objective,
which we weren t supposed t6 get to until the end of May. The
British are falling over each other to get away. Our casualties small.
Booty can t yet be estimated. You will understand that I can t sleep
for happiness.

Early next morning, a detachment of the Brescia to the strength of
one reinforced regiment set out for Benghazi in order to free 3rd Recon
naissance Battalion for further operations. The main body of the 5th
Light Division was to move forward through Ben Gania, and its leading

112 THE WAR IN AFRICA - FIRST YEAR

battalion, under Count Schwerin s command, was strengthened. The
Ariete was detailed to push forward over the same route as far as Bir
Tengeder and then to turn off north to take El Mechili. Speed was now
everything. We wanted at all costs to bring some part of the British force
to battle before they had all managed Jto withdraw from Gyrenaica and
thus escape the danger threatening them.

On the 4th April, I visited Benghazi with the Chief of Staff and
Aldinger and sent off the Reconnaissance Battalion, strengthened by a
Panzer company, through Regima and Charruba to Mechili. In the
afternoon I flew in a Junkers there being no Storch serviceable over
Ben Gania and towards Tengeder. Columns were rolling eastwards along
the track raising great pillars of dust. I thought I could identify our
leading units 1 2 miles east of Gania.

That evening, the enemy s dispositions appeared to be roughly as
follows :

Small bodies of their troops were located east of Ben Gania, while
other British forces continued to hold Msus. During the evening 3rd
Reconnaissance Battalion had made contact with a weak enemy force
at Regima and thrown it back. The British main body was in full
retreat and was evacuating Cyrenaica.

4 April 1941
DEAREST Lu,

Congratulations have come from the Fuehrer for the unexpected
success, plus a directive for further operations which is in full accord
with my own ideas. Our territory is expanding and now we can
manoeuvre.

Next morning [j*A Afirif] I alerted the KampfstaffeP- of the Afrika
Korps at 04.00 hours and put it on the march for Ben Gania. I intended,
as soon as the situation permitted, to go up to the forward units myself,
take over command and personally lead the advance on Tmimi or
Mechili.

I now took a look from my Storch at the progress of the advance to
Ben Gania and, after my return, talked over with Major Schleusener
how best to get up the heavy supply columns. We had some doubts
about using the rather difficult road through Ben Gania and decided
that we might get supplies up through Solluch to Mechili.

The Luftwaffe reported that the British retreat was continuing. At
about midday I ordered Colonel Olbrich to move forward immediately
with a strong force of armour, consisting of 5th Panzer Regiment and 40

1 The Kampfsteffel, not to be confused with the Gefechkstqffd (see note on page 15)
was a unit formed for the protection of the Corps or Army headquarters. It was normally
of company strength at Corps level and battalion strength at Army. During the course
of the African campaign the Kampfstaffel came to be used more and more as a combat
group for special tasks.

THE FIRST ROUND

Italian tanks, through Magrun and Solluch to Msus, destroy the enemy
there and go on to Mechili.

5 April
DEAREST Lu,

Off at 4 this morning. Things are happening in Africa. Let s
hope the great stroke we ve now launched is successful. Pm keeping
very fit. The simple life here suits me better than the fleshpots of
France. How are things with you both? . . .

At about 14.00 hours that afternoon I took off in a Junkers and flew
to Ben Gania. After landing, I heard from the Luftwaffe that there were
no longer any British to be seen in the area of Mechili and to its south.
Schwerin s column thereupon received the order: " Mechili clear of
enemy. Make for it. Drive fast. Rommel." The remainder of our
forward troops were also switched to Mechili. I myself flew off with
Aldinger in the afternoon to take over personal command of the leading
units. Towards evening we flew back to look for the th Light Division s
columns, which we discovered making good speed to the north-east.
Shortly afterwards we also found my Generalsstajjel* I now sent the
Storch back and drove up the track in my " Mammoth " 2 to Ben Gania
in order to get my own idea of the difficulty of the march. Two and a
half hours later, completely covered in dust, we reached the airfield
where I was informed that the 5th Light Division had been switched to
Mechili. Shortly afterwards, Lieut. Schulz arrived back from a recon
naissance flight and reported that Mechili and its surroundings were
now held by strong British forces. Earlier in the day Major Heymer had
been sent on a mission with two aircraft to mine the tracks east of Mechili.
He had not yet returned. My Ic, 8 Captain Baudissin, had been shot
down in a H.E. Ill and taken prisoner by the enemy.

It was now night and too late to fly back to Agedabia. In view of
the new and rather less favourable situation, I decided to drive up to the
5th Light Division and take over command of the operation myself.

We drove at first with headlights. Every now and again we had to
pick our way past minefields, which we located by the burning vehicles
standing at their edges. At about midnight, our long and brilliantly
lit column, winding its way through the desert, was suddenly attacked
by British aircraft. No damage was suffered, however, and we went on
our way, this time without lights. At about three in the morning we

1 Another term for the GefechtsstaffeL

2 Rommers armoured command vehicle which had been captured from the British
near Agheila.

*In the German Army, " Ic " is the Intelligence branch of the General Staff. The
term is also used, as here, to denote the chief representative of that branch on the staff
of any formation, high or low.

THE WAR IN AFRICA FIRST YEAR

reached the head of the 5th Light Division s column, where we found
the commander. The column halted and we discovered that we had
missed our route. According to the speedometer reading we should
have been in Bir Tengeder long before. There was nothing in sight.

Shortly afterwards two German aircraft flew over from the north, a
Henschel and a Storch. They recognised us and landed in spite of the
rough and stony ground. It was Major Heymer and his men their task
accomplished. After landing on the airfield at Mechili just before night
fall and mining the tracks leading to the east, they had lain all night a
few yards away from their aircraft, keeping watch on the British traffic.
When morning dawned, they had discovered that British troops had
taken up position close beside them, but had managed to reach their
aircraft in a sharp sprint and take off unmolested. For the rest, they
reported that Mechili was strongly held, with heavy vehicle traffic to the
east. There was now no time to lose, otherwise the bird would be flown.
As we were still about 12 miles from Mechili I instructed Lieut. Behrend
to push forward at top speed with his small combat team to the Mechili-
Derna track and close it at a suitable point. Lieut. -Col. Ponath, of whose
force there were unfortunately only 15 vehicles with us, was dispatched
to Derna, where he was to close the Via Balbia to both directions. Soon
Count Schwerin arrived with part of his force and he too received orders
to block the tracks leading out of Mechili to the east.

At about 07.30 hours, Lieut. Schulz landed at Corps H.Q,. and
reported the presence of 300 British vehicles at Mechili. General Streich
also arrived shortly afterwards and I informed him of my intentions.
Then I drove off with my staff to Count Schwerin s command post. On
the way we saw numerous British tank tracks in the sand, all going east.

Unfortunately, we were unable to launch the attack we had planned
on Mechili on the 6th April with Fabris s force attacking from the east
and Schwerin s from the south and south-east as Fabris did not arrive
in the hills east of Mechili until the evening. I had no reports at all that
evening from a large part of the Corps, distances having become too
great for wireless communication.

Colonel Olbrich s column reported to my la [operations chieQ who was
still in Agedabia, that sandstorms and shortage of petrol had badly held
up their progress through Msus. In spite of these delays they succeeded
in taking Msus in the late evening, and continued their march on towards
Mechili. At about 02.00 hours on the 7th April, Fabris s column reported
that they were completely out of petrol and were unable to get their
artillery into position. All petrol reserves held by Divisional H.Q. were
immediately collected together 35 cans in all and at 03.00 hours, I
set off with my Gefechtsstafd to get the artillery into position before
daybreak. In the pitch darkness, however there were not even any
stars we completely failed to find the column. Even when we repeated
our attempt next morning, we still had a great deal of trouble before we

THE FIRST ROUND 115

eventually found it. Among other vicissitudes, we ran into the rear of a
British outpost of several Bren-carriers. Although we had only three
vehicles, and only one of those was armed with a machine-gun, we drove
at top speed towards the enemy, raising a great cloud of dust which
prevented them seeing how many vehicles we had behind us. This
obviously rattled the enemy troops who hurriedly abandoned their
position.

After we had supplied the Italian vehicles with petrol, the fdrce
moved forward in area formation towards Mechili. Soon we came in
sight of Fort Mechili. Large numbers of enemy vehicles were parked
there and through glasses we were easily able to pick out the men standing
about in groups. I led Fabris s column to a point two miles north-east
of Mechili, where we halted and took up position. At first, the enemy
showed no sign of putting up a defence, and I sent Lieut. Grohne across
under a flag of truce with a summons to the British commander to
surrender. Of course he refused.

Unfortunately, we had seen no sign yet of Olbrich s force. He should
have arrived at Mechili long ago, and I took off in my Storch later that
morning to look for him. We flew at 2,000 feet across the sandy plain
and soon approached the hills near Mecliili. West of the fort I suddenly
saw long black columns of vehicles, which I took for Olbrich s. Several
men laid out a landing cross between the vehicles. At the last moment
I suddenly spotted the flat helmets of British troops. We immediately
banked and made off, followed by machine-gun fire from the British
troops. We were lucky to get away practically unscathed, with only one
hit in the tail. After that episode, we flew on west at a great height. Some
15 to 20 miles south-west of Mechili, we saw a number of small vehicles
travelling east. Their German markings could be clearly identified. I
landed and found part of 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion, which I im
mediately put on the right road. After taking off again I discovered
several columns of German and Italian tanks 15 to 20 miles farther south.
I landed and pitched into them for being so slow. Apparently the leading
vehicles, while crossing a dried-out salt marsh, had seen what appeared
to be a wide stretch of water away to the east and turned back. It was,
of course, only a mirage a common enough occurrence in that district.
I now ordered them to press on forward as fast as they could.

After returning to H.Q. I waited in vain for the arrival of Olbrich s
force. Finally, in the afternoon I took off in my Storch to look for them
again. Black smoke was rising from the hill at Mechili probably a
British vehicle on fire. At one point we crossed a new track on which
British vehicles were streaming off to the south-east. The Tommies took
cover when they saw the Storch, but did not open fire. There was
nothing to be seen anywhere and it was obvious that Olbrich s force had
once again lost its way. But where? There were tracks in the salt marsh,
but these soon vanished in the stony country. I was extremely angry and

Il6 THE WAR IN AFRICA FIRST YEAR

decidedly worried, because the decision in eastern Cyrenaica depended
entirely on the early arrival of this force. The sun had already gone down
and we knew that it would be dark in an hour and a half. We now flew
north. At last I saw plumes of dust on the horizon. Grown wary after
the incident with the British landing cross, we flew cautiously up to the
column. German vehicles they were, however, and we landed near
Colonel Olbrich s staff. I was extremely angry about the unnecessary
detour they had made due, it is true, to their ignorance of the road
and ordered them to get on as f^st as they could. Flying by watch and
compass, we eventually found my H.Q. again and landed successfully in
spite of the darkness. During my absence British low-flying aircraft had
shot up an airstrip and set fire to several Junkers.

8 April 7941
DEAREST Lu,

I ve no idea whether the date is right. We ve been attacking for
days now in the endless desert and have lost all idea of space or time.
As you ll have seen from the communiques, things are going very well.

To-day will be another decisive day. Our main force is on its
way up after a sso-mile march over the sand and rock of the desert.
I flew back from the front yesterday to look for them and found
them in the desert. You can hardly imagine how pleased I was. It s
going to be a " Cannae ", modern style.

I m very well. You need never worry.

Our attack was now due to be launched on the following morning.
At about 06.00 hours on the 8th April, I flew off in my Storch to the
front east of Mechili in order to follow the course of action. Flying at
about 150 feet, we approached a Bersaglieri battalion which had been
brought up by Colonel Fabris the previous day. The Italians had
apparently never seen a Storch before and were so completely bewildered
by our sudden appearance over their heads that they fired on us from all
directions. At the range of 50 to 100 yards, it was a miracle that we were
not shot down, and it did not speak well for Italian marksmanship. We
swung round immediately and soon put a fold in the ground between
our allies and ourselves. Having no wish to be shot down by my own
Italians I had the aircraft climb to 3,000 feet, from where we observed
the situation in safety. The attack on Mechili was obviously making
progress. A large column of enemy vehicles was on the move from
Mechili to the west and we flew on in the hope of finding Olbrich s force,
which must at last be coming up. But there was still no sign of them.
We did sight an 88-mm. gun with its crew a mile or two west of the
British. Thinking we would find more of our troops there, we came in
to land and taxied in to a sandhill, where the Storch piled up. The gun
commander reported that his gun had been attacked and shot up by

THE FIRST ROUND 117

tanks the previous day. There were none of our troops about in the
neighbourhood and he had sent a man off in a truck to make contact
with our own forces. I asked him whether he could at least fire on the
approaching dust cloud, which was being raised by British vehicles. At
first he said he could, but then he discovered that the man who had
gone off in the truck had taken the firing-pin. The British vehicles,
driving in area formation, were getting steadily closer and it was obviously
high time for us to be off if we were not to find our way to Canada!
Luckily, the gun crew still had another Jorry left and we drove off in it
to the south-east, where we shortly found a salt marsh which I recognised
from my flights of the previous day. From there, we eventually found
our way back to Corps H.Q.

Immediately on my return I sent Major Heymer off with a Henschel
to look for Olbrich and his men, and bring them in at long last to Mechili.
Meanwhile, more and more of the Ariete were arriving and were im
mediately put on the march to Mechili. As nothing was yet known about
the progress of the attack, which had been going on since morning, I set
off for Mechili with a small staff, to see for myself. It is impossible to take
the correct decisions without accurate knowledge of the situation. We
had not gone far before we found ourselves in a violent sandstorm and were
forced to stop for a while on the next hill. Driving on compass bearing
through the raging sand, we at length succeeded in finding our way to
Mechili airfield. From there we groped our way along the telegraph wire
steadily closer to Mechili, which had meanwhile been taken by our troops.
As we heard later from General Streich, all British attempts to break out
to the east they had made several during the morning had collapsed
in the fire of the German and Italian artillery. The attack which our
infantry had launched with the few German tanks and A.A. guns, had
been successful. Meanwhile, Olbrich and his force had arrived.

At about 12.00 hours, I received a report from Lieut.-Col. Ponath,
who was barring the Via Balbia at Derna, that prisoners and booty were
mounting hourly, but that his fighting strength was now greatly weakened
and he urgently required reinforcements. I immediately sent off
Schwerin s and Olbrich s forces to Derna. The remainder of the 5th
Light Division was to hold the captured territory at Mechili. The Ariete
was also to assemble there for the present.

Schwerin s force moved off to Derna at about midday and I followed
shortly afterwards with my Fuehrungsstqffel 1 and the anti-aircraft platoon.
Just beyond the fort we ran into a sandstorm, which scattered the column
so badly that it was some time before it could be marshalled again.
Despite this delay, we managed, by fast driving, to reach Derna by 18.00
hours, where Ponath reported the capture of 800 prisoners, including to

iThe Fuehrungsstqffel consisted of the staff branches " la " (operations) and " Ic "
(intelligence). It was normally sited statically in the forward operations area while
Rommel himself exercised command on the move with his Gefechtsstajfel (see note,
page 15).

Il8 THE WAR IN AFRICA FIRST YEAR

my great joy, almost the whole of the British staff. Among them were
General P. Neame, C.-in-C. British Troops in Egypt and Transjordan,
and General O Connor, the man who had so roughly handled the Italian
Army. They had been rounded up and taken prisoner by motor-cycle
troops. 1 The Brescia had already arrived in Derna from Benghazi,
largely thanks to the energetic intervention of General Kirchheim, who
had accompanied their advance.

General von Prittwitz, commander of the 15th Panzer Division, part
of which had just arrived in Africa, was now instructed to take command
of the pursuit force and follow up the British to Tobruk. The 3rd
Reconnaissance Battalion, 8th M.G. Battalion arid 6o5th Anti-Tank
Battalion were put under his command. Not all this force had anived
yet, of course, but the machine-gun battalion had already refuelled and
was ready to continue the pursuit.

The re-conquest of Cyrenaica was now complete. 2 However, it still
seemed to me very important to remain on the enemy s heels, and, by
keeping the pressure up, persuade him to continue his retreat. Even
though judging by experience to date we could not expect to split off
and destroy any major part of the enemy army, we would have an
excellent spring-board in the Marmarica for a possible summer offensive
against Alexandria, quite apart of course from the high propaganda and
psychological value that the reconquest of the Italian colony would have,
especially among the Italians. There was now a good hope that normal
supply traffic would soon be established along the coast road.

Several of our units had unfortunately gone astray during the raid
through the desert. We organised search parties to find and bring in all
stragglers and had the desert combed by aircraft. A large fire, giving
out dense clouds of smoke, was kept going in Mechili.

10 April 1341
DEAREST Lu,

After a long desert march I reached the sea the evening before
last. It s wonderftd to have pulled this off against the British. I m
well. My caravan arrived at last early this morning and I m hoping
to sleep in it again.

^O Connor had been sent up to take over command from Ncame, but with charac
teristic consideration had preferred to act as adviser until the battle was over. The car
in which the two were travelling ran into a German patrol, when unescorted, and both
were captured.

2 In speaking of Cyrenaica, Germans and Italians apply that term to the western
part of the country, and describe the area east of Gazala as the Marmarica.

THE FIRST ROUND -

FIRST LESSONS

Probably never before in modern warfare had such a completely
unprepared offensive as this raid through Cyrenaica been attempted.
It had made tremendous demands on the powers of improvisation of both
command and troops, and in some cases commanders had been unable
to reach their objectives. One thing particularly evident had been the
tendency of certain commanders to permit themselves unnecessary delays
for refuelling and restocking with ammunition, or for a leisurely overhaul
of their vehicles, even when an immediate attack offered prospects of
success. The sole criterion for a commander in carrying out a given
operation must be the time he is allowed for it, and he must use all his
powers of execution to fulfil the task within that time. I had not demanded
too much on the march to Mechili; this was shown by the fact that
commanders who had used their initiative had achieved what I asked.
A commander s drive and energy often count for more than his in
tellectual powers a fact that is not generally understood by academic
soldiers, although for the practical man it is self-evident. Later in the
campaign, when I had had a chance to establish closer relations with the
troops, they were capable at all times of achieving what I demanded
of them.

Later on our advance came in for some criticism on grounds of
higher strategy. When General Paulus came to Africa he said that our
rapid and unplanned advance through Cyrenaica had caused the British
to withdraw their troops from Greece, a move which had been entirely
contrary to the intentions of the High Command. 1

To this I would point out: first, I knew nothing of the High Com
mand s plan for Greece, and, in any case, doubt very much whether we
could have trapped the British in Greece, assuming that they were in
the south-west at the time of the German attack. They were, as a rule,
always able to get their troops away by sea very quickly when it came
to the point. I need only quote Dunkirk, Andalsnes and, not least,
Greece itself, where the Royal Navy managed to get away to North
Africa or Crete by far the majority of the Empire troops known to have
been there at the time the German offensive opened.

1 General Paulus was then Oberquartierrneister /at O.K.H. a post best defined as Deputy
Chief of the General Staff. He was mistaken in his view that Rommel s rapid advance
in Cyrenaica led to the withdrawal of the British force from Greece. That was due to
the effect of Yugo-Slavia s rapid collapse under Blitzkrieg attack and the threat to the
British force s exposed western flank in Greece. As- soon as this happened, the Greek
authorities suggested that the force should be evacuated in order to spare Greece from
devastation. The British Commander and the Government promptly concurred. General
Wilson hurriedly retreated southward to the Peloponnese peninsula, resisting the tempta
tion to make a heroic stand at Thermopylae, while the Navy hastened to the rescue.
Three-quarters of the force were safely brought away, although nearly 12,000 were
left behind along with most of the equipment.

120 THE WAR IN AFRICA FIRST YEAR

Secondly, it is my view that it would have been better if we had
kept our hands off Greece altogether, and rather created a concentration
of strength in North Africa to drive the British right out of the Mediter
ranean area. The air forces we employed in Greece should have been
used for the protection of convoys to Africa, and every possibility of
gaining shipping space in the Mediterranean should have been exploited
to the full. Malta should have been taken instead of Crete. Powerful
German motorised forces in North Africa could then have taken the
whole of the British-occupied Mediterranean coastline, which would have
isolated south-eastern Europe. Greece, Yugoslavia and Crete would have
had no choice but to submit, for supplies and support from the British
Empire" would have been impossible. The price in casualties of this
scheme which would not only have achieved our aims in south-east
Europe, but would also have secured the Mediterranean area and the
Near East as sources of oil and bases for attack on Russia would not
have been much greater than the price we did in fact have to pay in Greece,
Yugoslavia, Crete and North Africa in the summer of 1941. But our
superiors had inhibitions about undertaking any major operation in a
theatre of war where supplies had to be brought up by sea, and the
circles where obsolete and outdated ideas were held in reverence fought
tooth and nail, both then and later, against any such operation.

The experience which I had gained during this advance through
Cyrenaica formed the main foundation for my later operations. I had
made heavy demands throughout the action, far more than precedent
permitted, and had thus created my own standards. One is forced again
and again to re-learn the fact that standards set by precedent are based
on something less than average performance, and, for that reason, one
should not submit to them.

The British had been completely deceived as to our real strength.
Their moves would have been very astute, if they had in fact really been
attacked by a force as strong as they had supposed. They had not
accepted a decisive battle with their weak forces at Agedabia but had
pulled back in order to concentrate their strength. The capture of
Mechili was a coup; the enemy had probably not reckoned on our using
the route through Ben Gania or on our appearing as early as we did in
front of Mechili. Thus their troops were taken completely by surprise
and were probably again deceived as to our true strength by the dust-
clouds which were deliberately stirred up by our troops. Similarly, the
enemy forces still in Cyrenaica had probably not reckoned on our making
such a rapid advance to Derna. Hence it was principally our speed that
we had to thank for this victory. Incidentally, it is of interest to note
here that about twelve months later the British did make the mistake of
accepting battle at Agedabia with partial forces.

Wavell was obviously intending to maintain his hold on Tobruk and
to supply it by sea, assuming, that is, that our first attacks on the fortress

THE FIRST ROUND 121

did not succeed. I knew that we should then find ourselves In an extremely
unpleasant situation, both tactically and strategically, which would
. become particularly difficult if the British launched an attack on the
Sollum front. Either so the British commander s thinking probably ran
we would pull back to the level of Tobruk, in which case he would
always have this powerful fortress as a support for his defence, or we
would continue to hold the Sollum front, in which event we would be
exposed to a threat from all sides and thus be diverted from further
operations on Tobruk.

The following account shows what heavy restraints this situation did
in the event impose on our conduct of operations.

ASSAULT ON TOBRUK

On the gth April we had a great deal to do to complete the admini
strative arrangements for our supplies and for bringing up more troops.
A report came in that the enemy had concentrated strong contingents
of troops round Tobruk and was loading material into ten transports in
the harbour. Unfortunately, the Luftwaffe was fully occupied in bringing
up its aircraft and could only put a very few machines in the air. When
the commander of the Brescia arrived at about midday I informed him of
my intentions, which were for the Brescia and, later, the Trento to attack
Tobruk from the west, raising a great cloud of dust in the process ana
tying down the enemy strength, while at the same time the 5th Light
Division made a sweep through the desert round the south of Tobruk
in order to attack it from the south-east.

Early in the afternoon, Aldinger and I arrived in Tmimi, where our
advance troops were located, and I informed General von Prittwitz
of the plan for Tobruk.

Meanwhile, I imagined that the 5th Light Division was on the march
for Tmimi. It was now of the utmost importance to appear in strength
before Tobruk and get our attack started as early as possible, for we
wanted our blow to fall before the enemy had recovered his morale
after our advance through Cyrenaica, and had been able to organise
his defence of Tobruk. I therefore flew off in the direction of Mechili to
meet the 5th Light Division, but after 30 miles was forced by^a rising
Ghibli to break off the flight and return to Derna. After waiting for
the sandstorm to abate a little I took off again and arrived in Mechili
at 16.30 hours, and found the whole of the 5th Light Division still there.
They had imagined they could allow themselves a couple of days for
maintenance work on their vehicles. This was far from being my idea
and I ordered the division to move on through Tmimi that night and to
be in the Gazala area, which was to be their starting point for the attack
on Tobruk, by daybreak.

THE WAR IN AFRICA FIRST YEAR

In the early hours of the loth April, I drove off in die direction of
Tobruk and found 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion 30 miles west of the
fortress. Unfortunately, they had not yet started their switch to^the right
for their outflanking attack. I now ordered General von Prittwitz to
launch his attack immediately astride the road to Tobruk and 3rd
Reconnaissance Battalion to move up through Acroma to El Adem. I
then drove off towards Tobruk again and found the leading troops of the
machine-gun battalion in attack ten miles from Tobruk. Heavy British
artillery fire from Tobruk soon brought their attack to a halt. We had
at that time no real idea of the nature or position of the Tobruk defences.
The air shimmered and a sandstorm began to blow up; soon the
visibility, which had so far been good, closed right down and I drove
back. At about midday, Count Schwerin reported to me at a point
some 25 miles west of Tobruk that General von Prittwitz had been killed
a few hours earlier by a direct hit from an anti-tank gun.

To the 5th Light Division I gave orders, after they were relieved by
the Brescia, to thrust forward to the Via Balbia east of Tobruk and close
the fortress in. Meanwhile, the Ariete had been located at Bir Tengeder
and ordered forward to El Adem.

As the situation was rather confused I spent next day at the front
again. It is of the utmost importance to the commander to have a good
knowledge of the battlefield and of his own and his enemy s positions
on the ground. It is often not a question of which of the opposing
commanders is the higher qualified mentally, or which has the greater
experience, but which of them has the better grasp of the battlefield.
This is particularly the case when a situation develops, the outcome of
which cannot be estimated. Then the commander must go up to see for
himself; reports received second-hand rarely give the information he
needs for his decisions.

We first jolted in our Mammoth down a freshly made track running
south from Acroma, and then turned east to approach the Tobruk-El
Adem road about 2^ miles north of El Adem. British tanks and armoured
cars were moving about on a ridge in front of us apparently El Adem
had not yet been taken by 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion. On the high
ground north-east of El Adem, we discovered a tented camp, which the
enemy had already abandoned. British artillery was heavily shelling
elements of the 5th Light Division standing on the road, and soon their
shells began to fall near us. I met Lieut.-Col. Count Schwerin on the
Tobruk-El Adem road and instructed him to close on Tobruk from the
east and prevent any attempts at a break-out. Then I drove back to
Acroma to bring up more forces. There was now nothing to be seen of
German troops anywhere on the south-west front of Tobruk. The roof
of the Mammoth made an excellent observation tower and gave us a
wide view over the whole country necessary in that dangerous corner
where it would have been only too easy for a British scouting party to

THE FIRST ROUND 123

have picked us up. At last I found the staff of the 5th Light Division.
Soon afterwards 5th Panzer Regiment came up with 20 tanks and the
machine-gun battalion; they were immediately sent in to attack Tobruk
from the south-east. I now went forward again into the assembly area*
Scattered British artillery fire was falling at a few points* The attack
seemed to be meeting more difficulties in the open desert than I had
anticipated.

During the afternoon 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion reported the
capture of El Adem and I instructed them to continue the pursuit to
Bardia. Other forces were now coming in steadily.

On the nth April, the envelopment of Tobruk was complete and the
first attack began. Stukas attacked the defence works, the layout of
which was still completely unknown to us. More troops arrived on the
1 2th April and it was decided to open the first major attack on the
stronghold that afternoon. Bardia was taken that day by 3rd Recon
naissance Battalion.

The Brescia Division, which had meanwhile taken over the western
front of Tobruk, opened the attack in the afternoon. The 5th Light
Division was not too happy about its orders for the attack and raised a
number of objections which I had to brush aside. It was a day of driving
sand and there was no need to concern ourselves about aimed British
artillery fire. The 5th Light Division s attack finally got under way at
about 16.30 hours, I drove north in my Mammoth behind the tanks.
Enemy artillery scattered shells over the area as the tanks approached,
but caused few casualties. The 5th Panzer, Regiment halted when they
arrived at the break-in point and, of course, came under heavy artillery
fire. Finally, the tanks were brought to a standstill in front of an anti-tank
ditch, which we were not then in a position to blow in. Tobruk s defences
stretched much farther in all directions, west, east and south, than we
had imagined. We had still not been able to get hold of any of the plans
of the defences, which were held by the Italians.

After the failure of this attack, I decided to renew the attempt a few
days later when more artillery and the Ariete had arrived. In no circum
stances was the enemy to be allowed time to complete the organisation of
his defence.

For the isth I ordered a reconnaissance raid by the 5th Light Division
in which the reconnaissance groups were, if possible, to penetrate to the
crossroad inside the Tobruk defences and blow in the anti-tank ditch.
To divert the attention of the enemy command, the Brescia Division
was to pin down the enemy west of the fortress by fire, and, by raising
as much dust as possible, to simulate the existence of large-scale assembly

areas.

After the failure of the previous raid on Tobruk, the 5th ^ Light
Division had lost confidence in itself and was unwarrantedly pessimistic
about my plan to open our main attack on the I4th. The division s

124 THE WAR IN AFRICA FIRST YEAR

command had not mastered the art of concentrating its strength at one
point, forcing a break-through, rolling up and securing the flanks on either
side, and then penetrating like lightning, before the enemy has had time
to react, deep into his rear. 1 My estimate of the enemy at that time was
that we had a good chance of executing such an operation with the
forces we had. All it wanted was a little initiative and some realistic
thinking to find a way. Unfortunately, I had not had the opportunity
of training my formations personally before the raid through Cyrenaica,
otherwise we would have measured up much better to the tasks which
faced us at Tobruk.

There being still no sign of the Ariete, which was to back up the 5th
Light Division s attack, I set off myself to bring it up. I met the head
of the [Ariete] division 22 miles west of El Adem and ordered its com
mander, General Baldassare, to take his force into the area north of
El Adem.

At about 18.00 hours, 8th Machine-Gun Battalion began its raid
under the excellent leadership of Lieut-Col. Ponath. Its objective, as
already said, was to demolish the anti-tank ditch and create a bridge
head in the British defence zone. The supporting fire of the German and
Italian artillery concentrations was well placed. The i8th A. A. Battalion s
batteries, under the personal command of Major Hecht, brought the
enemy strong points under direct fire, obviously with considerable success.
The progress of our tanks and anti-tank troops seemed to me somewhat
on the slow side. The British were scattering the country here and there
with artillery fire, but we were suffering no great losses. Evening came
and we had still received no definite reports as to whether the demolition
of the anti-tank trench had been successful. It was, however, clear that
Ponath had broken into the British positions, formed a bridgehead and
thus created the conditions for the next day s attack.

Meanwhile, the position on the Sollum front had become more or
less stabilised. Sollum and Capuzzo had been taken and the British
were keeping fairly quiet,

14 April 1941 03.00
DEAREST Lu,

To-day may well see the end of the Battle of Tobruk. The British

were very stubborn and had a great deal of artillery. -However, we ll

bring it off. The bulk of my force is now out of the desert after a

fortnight of it. The lads stuck it magnificently and came through the

Pommel here succinctly describes the combined features of the " Blitzkrieg " method

that was executed with such decisive effect by the German armoured forces in the

opening campaigns of the war. It could not be better epitomised in a sentence. To find

an expressive name for it is more difficult Blitzkrieg (lightning war) is too vague.

When setting forth the compound idea in 1920 I christened it the " expanding torrent,"

which perhaps comes nearer to conveying the combination of concentration initial

penetration lateral expansion exploitation by deep penetration.

THE FIRST ROUND 125

battle, both with the enemy and nature, very well. We ve even got
water again.

Start time for the 5th Light Division s attack was now fixed for 00*30
ours on the i4th. Artillery Regiment Grati and i8th A.A. Battalion
rere instructed to work in closest co-operation with the 5th Light
)ivision. I advised the division to be sure to secure the flanks of its
enetration and to bring the artillery up quickly.

The attack opened punctually to time, with heavy artillery support,
onath soon reported that he was making good progress. At daybreak
drove up to a point about 100 yards south of the wire to see for myself
.ow the operation was developing. The attack seemed to be well under
ray and light signals were rising in the north* Suddenly British shells
icgan to fall in our neighbourhood and we were forced to withdraw after
he aerial of our signals vehicle had been cut through by a splinter.
Jnfortunately, there was nothing to be seen of the force which should
tave been covering the flanks, although a penetration had obviously
&gt;een made through the enemy positions west of the road. I therefore
Irove straight off to the Ariete and ordered them to follow up.

On returning to Corps H.Q. at about 09.00 hours, I. found a report
rom the 5th Light Division saying that their attack had come to a stand-
till, caused by the fact that their penetration of the enemy line had
&gt;een too narrow. Shortly afterwards General Streich and Colonel
Dlbrich arrived at my H.Q. Olbrich reported that he had already had
lis tanks at a point two and a half miles south of the town, but they had
hen come under a murderous British fire and had withdrawn to the level
&gt;f Corps H.Q. He added that a large part of the infantry had probably
)een lost. I was furious, particularly at the way that the tanks had left
he infantry in the lurch, and ordered them forward again immediately
;o open up the breach in the enemy line and get the infantry out. I
loped to get the attack moving again after the arrival of the Ariete, and
mmediately drove back to them to see that they were carrying out my
&gt;rders. Unfortunately, nothing had yet been done. I spurred the division
:m to the utmost speed.

When I returned to the 5th Light Division at about midday, I found
iiat practically nothing had been done because of the heavy enemy fire,
[n these circumstances I had no choice but to abandon the attack on
Tobruk for the moment, and to try to establish contact with Ponath s
battalion and fight a way out for them.

I then drove off to the Ariete for the third time and informed them
Df my decision. I ordered them to take over the sector south of Ras el
Madauer, adjoining the 5th Light Division, and accompanied them
forward myself at about 17.00 hours. South-east of Gasr el Glecha they
received a few rounds of artillery fire from Tobruk. The confusion was
indescribable. The division broke up in complete disorder, turned tail

126 THE WAR IN AFRICA FIRST YEAR

and streamed back in several directions to the south and south-west.
Their commander, General Baldassare, was away with me at the time
reconnoitring the ground north of Gasr el Glecha; with night coming
on, he had the greatest difficulty in getting his division under control
again and moving it forward into its allotted position.

We were unable to establish contact with Ponath s battalion on the
night 14-15 April. A large part of the battalion had been wiped out.
Lieut. -Col. Ponath himself, who had received the Knight s Cross for his
exploits during the advance through Cyrenaica, had been killed.

When the Panzer Army Afrika eventually broke into Tobruk, on the
2Oth June of the following year, and took possession of the British positions
south of the road fork 3 miles south of the town, I found there the remains
of several German tanks which had been put out of action by British
artillery and anti-tank guns on the I4th April 1941. They had reached
the hill and thus gained the most important point of the Tobruk defences. 1
Had the 5th Light Division been in a position to secure its two flanks
and thus allow the artillery and the Ariete to follow through the breach,
Tobruk would probably have fallen on the I4th or 15th April 1941.

16 April 1941
DEAREST Lu,

The battle for Tobruk has quietened down a bit. The enemy is
embarking, so we can expect the fortress to be ours very shortly.
Then we ll probably come to a stop. Nevertheless, our small force
has achieved a tremendous amount, which has put a different picture
on the whole campaign in the south.

On the move a lot and very busy.

My plan now was to take the hill, Ras el Madauer, using elements of
the Ariete and Trento and several German companies attacking under
strong artillery support.

At 17.00 hours on the i6th April, I launched the armoured battalion
of the Ariete (6 medium and 12 light tanks) against hill 187. We accom
panied the attack on its left flank. Instead of halting south of the hill and
then dismounting and observing the country through glasses, the Italians
drove to the highest point of hill 187 and then proceeded to halt. It was
not many minutes of course before British artillery opened fire on the hill,
whereupon the Italians promptly retired at top speed and halted, confused
and undecided, in a wadi. I tried to get the Italian tank commander
to advance in open order on Ras el Madauer, but without success.

All this while Lieut. Berndt was observing the advance of the Italian

1 Rommel was mistaken here. Olbrich s tanks never, in fact, reached this point.
Chester Wilmot who was the Australian Broadcasting Gommision s war correspondent,
and in Tobruk during the siege has told me that the wrecked German tanks which
Rommel saw had been towed there by the British for use as targets in anti-tank gun
practice shoots.

THE FIRST ROUND

infantry. Progress at first was in perfect order, but suddenly the Italians
turned and fled in a wild rout to the west. I instructed Berndt to take
an armoured car and drive to the Italians as fast as he could to find out
what was wrong. All sound of battle had ceased. Half an hour later
Berndt reappeared and reported that he had been told by an Italian
infantryman that the enemy was attacking with tanks. After moving
on a few hundred yards to the east, he had seen a British scout car
herding away a company of Italians with their hands up and had at
once opened fire on the scout car in order to give the Italians a chance
to run. They had run towards the British lines. Finally, a British
armoured vehicle had taken them over.

I now drove off with three anti-tank guns in order to save what was
left. I was unable to persuade the Italian tank crews to come with us.
Under Berndt s command, the anti-tank gunners succeeded in shooting
up several British Bren-carriers. However, the Italian battalion, which
had had no effective anti-tank weapons, had meanwhile been rounded
up and carried off by the enemy. My Adjutant, Major Schraepler, who
had accompanied the first wave of the Italians, had managed to escape
capture. He said that the Italians had advanced in too dense a mass.
He was now holding the heights round Acroma with what was left of the
Italians, and I sent him two more rifle companies to make up his strength.

The reason for attacking the Ras el Madauer was because the British
were in a position there to threaten our supply route through Acroma.
So a further attempt was to be made on the i yth. The Ariete, although
they had not yet seen any action, now had only 10 tanks left out of the
100 odd with which they had started the offensive. The remainder had
fallen out, due to engine failure or some other mechanical trouble. It
made one s hair stand on end to see the sort of equipment with which
the Duce had sent his troops into battle.

But again nothing went right in our next attack. The attacking force
had instructions to advance from one dip in the ground to the next,
waiting each time until supporting fire had first been secured. But the
company commanders ignored their instructions and made a blind dash
straight for the enemy. The Ariete s armour was led by Lieut. Wahl, an
interpreter on the 5th Light Division s staff. Contrary to their orders to
remain behind the infantry, they pushed on far ahead and soon vanished
out of sight. There was no means of communicating with them and their
location was unknown. Meanwhile, the leading infantry reached the
wire in front of Ras el Madauer without meeting any opposition of
consequence.

Suddenly at about 13.00 hours, a single tank appeared north of the
summit of Ras el Madauer, moving towards our line with its gun trained
on us. In the dust it was impossible to see if there were any more following
it. Fearing that the enemy was again using tanks in an attempt to
destroy my infantry, who were defenceless against armour, I quickly

128 THE WAR IN AFRICA FIRST YEAR

brought up my three anti-tank guns. More tanks had meanwhile been
sighted. An exchange of fire developed and two tanks were hit, which,
to our great consternation, turned out shortly afterwards to be Italians.
Lieut. Wahl did not return; he had obviously pushed his tank right
forward into the enemy positions and been shot up. The infantry attack
had also come to a standstill in the enemy wire. All further attempts to
penetrate into the British positions failed. It was now finally clear that
there was no hope of doing anything against the enemy defences with the
forces we had, largely because of the poor state of training and useless
equipment of the Italian troops. I decided to break off the attack until
the arrival of more troops.

On the i gth April, I drove to Bardia, where I found that the fortress
had not been occupied by my troops. Vast quantities of Italian war
material mainly vehicles and hundreds of guns which had been left
behind by Marshal Graziani s army lay on either side of the road. I
decorated Lieut.-Col. von Wechmar with the Knight s Cross. I also
gave orders for Bardia to be occupied immediately by a German company.
As it happened, the British sent a sizeable sabotage group into the
fortress that night, all 56 of whom, including a regular major, were taken
prisoner.

On the way back, we were twice attacked by British ground-strafing
aircraft about 10 miles west of Bardia. Corporal Eggert, the driver of
my cross-country vehicle, was killed; the vehicle received 25 hits. My
dispatch rider, Private Kanthak, was also killed. The driver of the
Mammoth was wounded by a bullet which came through the visor.
Leaving Berndt with the damaged vehicles, I climbed into the driving
seat of my Mammoth and drove myself. The road was in a frightful state.
I wanted to get back to H.Q. that night and turned off south before
Tobruk with the object of by-passing it through the desert. It was a
pitch-black night and we tried to navigate by the stars, but the sky
eventually clouded over so that I was forced to give up the attempt and
wait till morning.

The plans of the Tobruk defences had now at last arrived from the
Italian High Command. They included detailed maps of the layout of
the fortifications and plans showing the construction of individual defence
works. From these plans it appeared that the defences consisted of two
lines of strong-points, not in the usual form of concrete pill-boxes with
loop-holes, but completely sunk into the ground. The outer belt was
surrounded by an anti-tank ditch, covered with thin boarding disguised
by a layer of sand and stones on top, so that it could not be detected even
at the shortest distance. Each defence work had a diameter of about 90
yards and consisted of several heavily concreted dugouts, each holding
30 to 40 men. The individual dugouts were inter-connected by a com
munications trench, which had emplacements for machine-guns, anti
tank guns and mortars at each angle. As with the anti-tank ditch, the

THE FIRST ROUND

communications trench, which was 8 feet deep, was covered with boards
topped lightly with earth and could therefore easily be opened up at any
point. Each work was surrounded by strong wire entanglements and all
were inter-connected by barbed wire. The second defence line, which
lay two to three thousand yards behind the first, was of similar design,
but without the anti-tank ditch.

It was now my endeavour to pull the motorised troops out of the
investing front round Tobruk in order to make them available for mobile
use. I accordingly asked the Commando Supremo to send me two further
static divisions.

I continued, in the days ahead, to work on a plan for attacking
Tobruk, especially as we now had some idea of the form and layout of
its defences. -I intended to instal the main body of the Brescia Division
in fixed positions on Tobruk s eastern front, thus freeing 2nd M.G.
Battalion, and to use part of the Trento Division to occupy Bardia and,
if possible, Sollum, in order to release the Battalion Knabe. The main
attack was to be made by the I5th Panzer Division as much of it as
had arrived in Africa reinforced by units of the Ariete; the line of the
attack was to be through Ras el Madauer into the rear of the fixed
defences. Simultaneous with the main attack, the 5th Light Division
was to mount a secondary attack on the south-east front. I had hopes
of launching the attack at tlie end of April or the beginning of May.

21 April 194.1
DEAREST Lu,

Things are slowly quietening down and Pm at last able to collect
my thoughts after three weeks of offensive. It s been very hectic for
the last few weeks. We re hoping to pull off the attack on Tobruk
very soon now.

We re lying at the moment in a rocky hollow, widely dispersed
on account of the very active British aircraft. Froehlich is doing some
tidying up over on the other side. But the strengths are fairly equal
and there s some doubt as to whether the British are not bringing
in new forces every day.

But before many days had passed we suffered a new reverse. On
the morning of the 22nd the enemy overran Battalion Fabris on Hill 201
and then moved on towards Acroma. I immediately alerted the i5th
Panzer Division, part of which had now arrived, and ordered it to occupy
the Via Balbia east of Cantoniera 31 [road maintenance depot, 31 km.
from Tobruk], Soon machine-gun fire was reported from in front of
Acroma. At this news I drove across there as fast as I could go. We
overtook Gosth Anti-tank Battalion on the way and took them along
with us. On arrival, we heard that the enemy had actually taken prisoner
the greater part of Fabris s staff, after which the six British tanks which

130 THE WAR IN AFRICA FIRST YEAR

had made the attack had moved on into the Italian gun positions,
destroyed the guns and captured the crews. The six Italian tanks which
had been put there to protect the position, and which should have been
perfectly capable of engaging and driving off the enemy tanks, had been
sent back by Colonel Fabris. I immediately took a combat group to the
Fabris Battalion s positions, where we found vehicles and motor-cycles
still burning; the guns of two batteries seemed to be still quite serviceable.
Needless to say, I was not very pleased at this curious behaviour in face
of the enemy.

Meanwhile, feverish training was going on among the forces detailed
for the attack, as it has become only too evident that the training of our
infantry in position warfare was nowhere near up to the standard of the
British and Australians. This we now intended to correct. On my in
spections, both German and Italian troops made a very good impression.
I soon gave up my plan for the 5th Light Division to attack on the south
east side of Tobruk, as the division had little taste for the project, because
of the open terrain and lack of cover.

Major Schraepler, Rommefs Adjutant, to Frau Rommel:

22 April
MY DEAR FRAU ROMMEL,

I realise that there is a possibility that it may cause you a shock
to receive a letter bearing my name as sender; nevertheless, I am
taking this risk in order to give you the assurance that all is .well with
your esteemed husband.

He will have had little time for writing during the past few days,
as they have been very full for him, and very worrying too. His
endeavour and the desire of every one of us to be not only in, but
far beyond Tobruk, is at the moment impossible to realise. We have
too few German forces and can do nothing with the Italians. They
either do not come forward at all, or if they do, run at the first shot.
If an Englishman so much as comes in sight, their hands go up. You
will understand, Madam, how difficult this makes the command for
your husband. I am certain, however, that by the time this letter
arrives you will not have much longer to wait for the special com-
muniqud announcing the capture of Tobruk, and then things will
begin to move again.

We are now located in a rocky ravine, where enemy aircraft will
find it difficult to spot us. We also have some German fighters here
now, which keep the British bombers and low fliers away. Field
Marshal Milch has promised your husband still further support.

Though we do not live as well as we did in France, we are still
not doing badly. Captured British stores provide an improvement
to the army rations. You may rest assured, Madam, that Guenther

Rommel on the Via Balbia, April 1941, in the Mammoth, a British armoured
command vehicle captured during Rommel s first advance through Cjrenaica. Left,
Lt.-Col. von dem Borne, his Chief of Staff at the time

Rommel s Main Headquarters on the Via Balbia, photographed from his Storch

&lt;t f * * i , t

Rommel s Advanced Headquarters near Tobruk photographed from his Storch

Rommel outside his caravan

THE FIRST ROUND

looks after your husband very well within the limits of what can be
done, I am very glad that your husband has an Italian caravan,
which at least offers him some comfort and quiet, and protection
against the cold nights. The Italians are past masters at such
amenities; others we will provide for ourselves in Cairo.

The latest issue of Das Reich to arrive contained an article on your
husband, which you will no doubt have already read. Your husband
was very angry about it and wrote the word " Nonsense " in the
margin. I have discussed it with Berndt, the Deputy Reichspressechef
who is serving here on Corps staff. All Germany knows of the
tremendous achievements of your husband, and there is no need for
a paid hack to write untrue statements about them.

(Signed : Schraepler.)

23 April TQ4i
DEAREST Lu,

Heavy fighting yesterday in front of Tobruk. The situation was
highly critical, but we managed to restore it. There s little reliance
to be placed on the Italian troops. They re extremely sensitive to
enemy tanks and as in 1917 quick to throw up the sponge. Newly
arrived German units have now made the situation rather more secure.

I had a meeting with Gariboldi and Roatta yesterday. Minister
Terruzzi was also present. I was ceremonially awarded the Italian
" Medal for Bravery." I am also supposed to be getting the Italian
" Pour le M6rite." What a trivial business it all is at a time like this.
I ve been able to have my sleep out during the last few days, so now
I m ready for anything again. Once Tobruk has fallen, which I hope
will be in ten days or a fortnight, the situation here will be secure.
Then there ll have to be a few weeks pause before we take on anything
new.

How are things with you both? There must be a whole lot of post
lying at the bottom of the Mediterranean.

P.S. Easter has slipped by unnoticed.

25 April 1941

Things are very warm in front of Tobruk. I shan t be sorry to
see more troops arrive, for we re still very thin on the long fortress
front. I ve seldom had such worries militarily speaking as in the
last few days. However, things will probably look different soon.

. . . Greece will probably soon be disposed of and then it will be
possible to give us more help. Paulus is due to arrive in a few days.
The battle for Egypt and the Canal is now on in earnest and our
tough opponent is fighting back with all he s got.

The attack on Ras el Madauer was opened at about 18.30 hours on

132 THE WAR IN AFRICA FIRST YEAR

the 30th April by our Stukas. Sirens screaming, they swooped down on
the enemy positions and the hill was soon hidden by a thick pall of smoke
and dust. Our artillery opened fire on the break-in points with good
effect, as far as we could see. The attack on the outer defence line was
completely successful, the enemy line being penetrated to a depth of
up to two miles immediately north and south of the Ras el Madauer.
The enemy fought with remarkable tenacity. Even their wounded went
on defending themselves with small arms fire and stayed in the fight to
their last breath. At about 21.00 hours the commanding hill of Ras el
Madauer was attacked in the rear and taken by Battalion Voigtsbcrger.
The enemy put up a heavy defensive barrage, but it was directed mainly
at the point of our feint attacks on the roads leading from Derna and El
Adem towards Tobruk. Unfortunately, a few forts and strong points
continued to hold out all night, and our attacking force foolishly allowed
itself to be drawn into a fight for these points before pushing on with its
main attack. This should really have been a job for a few storming
parties. It is a great mistake to allow oneself to be diverted from the
main line of one s plan by relative trivialities.

The Ariete was now put on the march with orders to close up on the
Kirchheim Group during the night. Driving east to Kirchheim s H.Q.
next morning [ist May], I met part of the Ariete, which should have
moved into the captured positions long before. As I stopped at Kirch
heim s H.Q., the Italian force was just halting, unloading its weapons
and ammunition and going into position.

I was extremely annoyed and charged Major Appel with the task of
getting the Italians forward. He made a great effort, but did not achieve
much. With British artillery fire sweeping the whole area, the Italians
crept under their vehicles and resisted all their officers attempts to get
them out again.

Shortly afterwards a batch of some fifty or sixty Australian prisoners
was marched off close beside us immensely big and powerful men, who
without question represented an elite formation of the British Empire, a
fact that was also evident in battle. Enemy resistance was as stubborn
as ever and violent actions were being fought at many points. All the
same, I continued for some time to think that we would be able to
maintain our attack and take Tobruk. The only question was whether
we had enough troops to go on feeding the attack long enough. After a
while I went off to the attacking front, riding part of the way and walking
the rest, in order to get a picture of the situation for myself. On arrival
I gave orders for the captured positions to be occupied immediately, in
order to guard against unpleasant surprises.

But next day [2nd May] it became obvious that we were not strong
enough to mount the large-scale attack necessary to take the fortress,
and I had no choice but to content myself with what we had achieved,
namely, the elimination of the threat to our supply route from enemy

THE FIRST ROUND 133

positions on the Ras el Madauer. It was now impossible to contemplate
anything more for the present than isolated operations against individual
strong points,

The next few days brought several British counter-attacks against the
captured sector, which were beaten off with little result. Many of the
British troops engaged in these attacks were depressed and in poor spirits
because of water shortage, their ration being under a pint a day.

6 May 1941
DEAREST Lu,

There was too much doing yesterday for me to write. We ve had
several days of Ghibli, which has left us all quite limp. It seems to
be gradually getting better now.

Paulus has now gone, although Froehlich has just phoned to say
that he couldn t fly because of the Ghibli. Water is very short in
Tobruk, the British troops are getting only half a litre [just under a
pint]. With our dive-bombers I m hoping to cut their ration still
further.

The heat is getting worse every day and it s a relief when night
comes. One s thirst becomes almost unquenchable.

In this assault we lost more than 1,200 men killed, wounded and
missing. This shows how sharply the curve of casualties rises when one
reverts from mobile to position warfare. In a mobile action, what counts
is material, as the essential complement to the soldier. The finest fighting
man has no value in mobile warfare without tanks, guns and vehicles.
Thus a mobile force can be rendered unfit for action by the destruction
of its tanks, without having suffered any serious casualties in man-power.
This is not the case with position warfare, where the infantryman with
rifle and hand grenade has lost little of his value, provided, of course, he
is protected by anti-tank guns or obstacles against the enemy s armour.
For him enemy number one is the attacking infantryman. Hence position
warfare is always a struggle for the destruction of men in contrast to
mobile warfare, where everything turns on the destruction of enemy
material.

The high casualties suffered by my assault forces were- primarily
caused by their lack of training. Even in the smallest action, there are
always tactical tricks which can be used to save casualties, and these must
be made known to the men. It frequently happened that dash was used
where caution was really needed, with, of course, casualties as the result.
On the next occasion, when boldness really was required, the men would
be over-cautious. In these small-scale infantry tactics in particular, what
is wanted is a maximum of caution, combined with supreme dash at the
right moment.

The captured Ras el Madauer positions lay under continuous British

134 THE WAR IN AFRICA FIRST YEAR

artillery fire. Our defence works were shallow the ground was too
rocky to dig in far with the result that the troops were forced to remain
motionless all day, exposed defenceless to thousands of flies. Many men
had dysentery and the conditions were frightful. To disperse the enemy
artillery fire, we installed dummy tanks mainly in the sector held by
the Brescia and these did in fact soon draw heavy fire from the British
artillery. Unfortunately, the troops had no idea of how to use such
devices, which must be kept continually moving and not be left standing
for a fortnight on the same spot. I made repeated visits to the front to
try to inculcate in the troops some up-to-date ideas in position warfare
appropriate to the conditions they were facing.

The Italians had acquired a very considerable inferiority complex,
as was not surprising in the circumstances. Their infantry were practically
without anti-tank weapons and their artillery completely obsolete. Their
training was also a long way short of modern standards, so that we were
continually being faced by serious breakdowns. Many Italian officers
had thought of war as little more than a pleasant adventure and were,
perforce, having to suffer a bitter disillusionment.

One thing that worked very seriously against us was the fact that the
Luftwaffe in Africa was not subordinate to the Afrika Korps. As a result,
fighter and ground-strafing groups were used more in a strategic role
than tactically in support of the ground forces. It would have been far
better for the cause as a whole if the Luftwaffe Commander Afrika had
been responsible for the tactical requirements of the Afrika Korps while
X Luftwaffe Corps took care of the strategic tasks.

The supply situation was none too good, due to the fact that the
Italian transport fleets were still arriving at Tripoli and making too little
use of Benghazi. This meant a tremendous strain on our road transport.
The German quartermasters had, it is true, wasted no time in organising
coastal shipping, but here again, far more could have been done with a
little more activity on the part of the Italians.

Little came of the operations planned against individual British
strong-points, as the Axis forces, despite all their training, were still not
up to these difficult tasks.

BATTLE ON THE FRONTIER

The siege of Tobruk stood or fell by the maintenance of our Sollum
positions. It was therefore necessary to apportion out the tasks of the
German-Italian forces in North Africa, as follows:

One force to keep Tobruk securely closed in and hold the line
against any break-out attempt by the enemy garrison.

A second force to hold the line at Sollum and at the same time

THE FIRST ROUND 135

provide a mobile defence against any enemy turning movement in
the area bounded by Bir Hacheim, Ga2ala, Sollum and Sidi Omar,
in order to prevent the enemy operating against the rear of our forces
round Tobruk.

Non-motorised troops, of which unlike the British we had a great
number, could only be employed with any prospect of success in* the
following ways :

In the investing front round Tobruk.

In holding the static Sollum-Sidi Omar line.

In holding Bardia.

This ineant that the main weight of the fighting in any British attack
from the east had to be carried by our motorised forces. The purpose of
occupying a number of fixed positions was merely to deny certain opera
tions to the enemy. The motorised forces could not be given any second
task, and consequently could not at one and the same time be earmarked
for the mobile defence and be committed in the siege of Tobruk.

Accordingly it was our aim, firstly to hold the fixed positions detailed
above with adequate non-motorised forces, and secondly to hold ready a
motorised force strong enough to provide adequate opposition to any
enemy offensive concentration against our Tobruk front, and at the same
time to beat off an attack by the British motorised forces located east of
Sollum. To this end the motorised forces in the static lines were to be
relieved by non-motorised troops.

Our dispositions at the middle of May were far from fulfilling these
requirements. The Sollum front was not yet fully manned by infantry;
in fact, all it consisted of was a few light combat groups holding something
in the nature of an outpost line. A surprise attack by the Herff force had
brought us the Halfaya Pass, but fortification of this or of the Sollum Pass
had hardly begun.

In these circumstances, we looked forward with no little anxiety to
the attack which we were shortly expecting the British to launch on
Sollum.

To prepare for the worst I had already given instructions for a line
to be constructed at Gazala. The defences were to be laid out in a similar
manner to those at Tobruk, which had shown themselves so admirably
suited to meet modern methods of attack. But how to withdraw the non-
motorised German and Italian forces to that line remained, of course,
a problem.

In the early hours of the i5th May, the British launched an attack
on our forces near Sollum. While our strong points on the Halfaya Pass
and along the frontier were attacked frontally, British armour moved
forward from the Habata area along the escarpment, first to the north-

136 THE WAR IN AFRICA FIRST YEAR

west and then to the north, towards Capuzzo. The troops holding the
strong points and the mobile units of HerfFs force both suffered con
siderable losses and our forces were pressed steadily back to the north.
This attack was launched by Wavell with the idea of catching Rommel
unawares before the expected arrival of the i$th Panzer Division, and in the hope
of driving him back west of TobruL The attack was carried out by General Gott
with the 7th Armoured Brigade (comprising some 55 tanks] and the 22nd Guards
Brigade.

I accordingly sent a Panzer battalion reinforced by A.A. guns, under
the command of Lieut.-Col. Kramer, to HerfPs assistance. The two
forces, Herff s and Kramer s, were to join up during the night 15-16 May
west of Sidi Azeiz. Our air reconnaissance and the units holding the
Sollum-Bardia line had formed the impression that the British intended
to concentrate their troops south of Sidi Azeiz, in order to sweep aside
Herff s force on the morning of the i6th and then completely unhinge
our Sollum-Bardia front by a further thrust to the north. My intention,
therefore, in uniting Herff s and Kramer s forces, was to prevent this
British move being driven home.

Herff s force drove towards Kramer s during the night in order to
ensure that the enemy had no opportunity of tackling the two forces
separately in the morning. But the two formations missed each other
and, on the morning of the i6th, Kramer arrived in the Sidi Azeiz area
alone. Contrary to expectations, however, the enemy had meanwhile
withdrawn to the south and obviously broken off his attack.

This is an example of how different things look when viewed from &lt;c the other
side of the hill." The British Jth Armoured Brigade had pushed on to Sidi A^ei^
but was pulled back when news came that Capuzzo, which lay on its rear flank,
had been recaptured by a German counter-attack which Rommel does not mention.
Disconcerted by the fact that the Germans had shown greater strength than had been
expected, the British Command decided to withdraw the whole force, leaving a
garrison at the Halfaya Pass. For it was deemed best to await a special convoy
that, on Churchill s bold initiative, was being rushed out by tlie short but hazardous
Mediterranean route, carrying 180 Matilda and 100 cruiser tanks. By the time this
big reinforcement had arrived, the i$th Panzer Division had also arrived on the
other side so that the prospective advantage disappeared.

During the next few days, the British moved back to their starting line
and the situation once again stabilised. Our garrison at Halfaya had
been overpowered and the British were now holding the pass. Hence on
the 1 8th May we were, with that exception, virtually back where we
had started.

The Halfaya and Sollum Passes were points of great strategic im
portance, for they were the only two places between the coast and Habata
where it was possible to cross the escarpment of anything up to 600 feet
in height which stretched away from Sollum in a south-easterly direction
towards Egypt. The Halfaya positions gave an equal command over

THE FIRST ROUND 137

both possible roads. In any offensive from Egypt, therefore, possession
of these passes was bound to be of the utmost value to the enemy, as they
offered him a comparatively safe route for his supplies. If, on the
other hand, he were to attempt to attack Bardia without holding them,
he would be thrown back on a supply route through Habata which would
be vulnerable to attack and harassing action by us.

The British began to fortify the captured positions at Halfaya after
the 1 7th May and deployed strong combat groups made up of tanks,
artillery and anti-tank guns in the territory they had captured. But we
were by no means prepared to leave the British in possession of the
Halfaya Pass and I soon instructed the Herff force to organise a move
to recapture it.

23 May 1941
DEAREST Lu,

I haven t had a chance to write until this afternoon, after getting
back from Sollum and Bardia.

We left at 5 a.m. yesterday and have been riding in the Mammoth
through the endless landscape ever since, part of the time over desert
tracks (sand roads worn out with driving terribly hard on the
vehicles) and part on the Via Balbia. I ve come back from my trip
to the front very impressed. Cpmmand is good up there and we have
fresh forces standing by in case we re not left in peace. Overnight we
formed a laager (five vehicles) in the desert. Even my A.D.C.s did
watch, without my knowing it. You see how well I m guarded.

Three assault groups moved into position in front of the [Halfaya] Pass
on the evening of the 26th May, and our attack opened on the morning
of the 27th. The British were soon driven out and fled in panic to the east,
leaving considerable booty and material of all kinds in our hands. Our
losses were comparatively insignificant.

The German recapture of the Halfaya Pass seriously hampered the British
offensive when it was launched in mid- June.

In the period following these actions we made strenuous efforts to
strengthen our Sollum-Halfaya-Bardia front. The construction of the
Halfaya Pass positions was pushed ahead with the utmost vigour and
several strong points were built along the Egyptian frontier. During an
inspection of the Bardia defence area I found vast quantities of material
lying in the defences where it had been left by Graziani s army. This
material was just waiting to be used, and I therefore gave immediate
instructions for all unclaimed Italian guns to be collected up and used
to strengthen the SollunvHalfaya-Sidi Omar front. A substantial number
of these guns was put in order by one or two of our German workshops
and then installed in the strong points. But the Italian High Command
did not agree at all, and General Gariboldi had me informed, through

138 THE WAR IN AFRICA FIRST YEAR

Heggenreiner, that the guns were Italian property and were only to be
used by Italians. They had been perfectly content up till then to stand
by and watch this material go to wrack and ruin, but the moment the first
guns had been made serviceable on our initiative, they began to take
notice. However, I was not to be put off.

In constructing our positions at Halfaya and on Hill 208 great skill
was shown in building in batteries of 88 mm. guns for anti-tank work, so
that with the barrels horizontal there was practically nothing to be seen
above ground. I had great hopes of the effectiveness of this arrangement.
This significantly showed that the Germans not only knew how to exploit the
offensive potentialities of the long-disputed theory of armoured warfare but had also
grasped the idea of the defensive counter to it. Rommel was the first Panzer leader
to demonstrate the modern version of the " sword and shield " combination, and
prove the value of the " defensive-offensive " method in mobile mechanised warfare.
The effectiveness of his offensive strokes was greatly aided by the skilful way he
laid defensive traps for his opponents 9 attacks blunting the edge of their " sword s *
on his " shield."

One very great problem was the maintenance of our troops at Sollum-
Halfaya-Bardia. With the Via Balbia barred by the British at Tobruk,
all supplies for the troops east of Gambut had to be carried through the
open desert round the south of the fortress. The lorry routes which the
troops had marked out had become so badly worn and widened at each
side that driving was almost impossible. Light vehicles had become
embedded in the dust at many points, and even lorries had the utmost
difficulty in grinding their way through. It was a good effort for a
column to get round Tobruk in a day. I repeatedly pressed the Italian
higher authorities to have a by-pass road built, but for the moment, with
little success. They quite saw the necessity for the road but it occurred
to nobody to make a real assault on the job.

A further trial for us was that the Italians were still carrying the bulk
of our supplies to Tripoli and making very little use of Benghazi. Tripoli
was over 1,000 miles from the front. Bearing in mind that 1,500 tons of
supplies, including water and rations, had to be carried up to the front
every day, even for normal activity, it is easy to understand that our
transport could not cope indefinitely with a route of that length. With
no authority over the people responsible for shipping in the Mediterranean,
however, it was very difficult for us to do anything about it.

As a result of Italian loss of prestige after Graziani s defeat, a number
of Arab tribes had begun to get restive. This was not helped by the fact
that Italian troops occasionally took liberties with the Arab women, a
thing which Arabs particularly resent. I was forced to send an urgent
request to the Italian High Command, asking them to see to it that the
Arabs were treated with sufficient respect to avoid an armed uprising close
behind our front.

At about this time officers and men of the Trento Division were

THE FIRST ROUND 139

responsible for several excesses against the Arab population, with the
result that the Arabs killed a number of Italian soldiers and kept the
Italians away from their villages by armed force. There are always
people who will invariably demand reprisals in this sort of situation
for reasons, apart from anything else, of expediency. Such action is never
expedient. The right thing to do is to ignore the incidents, unless the real
culprits can be traced.

Our greatest worry was still the difficult strategic situation caused by
our dual task of having to maintain the siege of Tobruk and at the same
time be ready for major British attacks from Egypt. We would thus
.have given a lot to have driven the British out of Tobruk. We had hoped
that when Crete fell the Luftwaffe would be able to get such a strangle
hold on British sea traffic to Tobruk that the enemy would find it im
possible to maintain the fortress. But the Luftwaffe formations that were
released from service in Greece and Crete were not sent to North Africa.

I also asked for German submarines and motor torpedo boats to be
sent into the Mediterranean to provide an alternative weapon against
British seaborne traffic to Tobruk. The Italian Navy was quite incapable
of coping with the task. Their submarines of which they had the
largest fleet in the world before the war were so full of technical defects,
that they were almost completely unusable for war in the Mediterranean.
Their motor torpedo boats, which would have had a very good base at
Bardia as Balbo had constructed it, were not seaworthy enough for the
job.

One day, General Cause of the OKW 1 arrived with a large staff to recon
noitre the possibilities of employing bigger forces in Africa for an offensive
against Egypt, and to prepare the ground for them. General Gause had
received explicit instructions not to place himself under my command,
but did in fact do so after I had told him categorically that the command
of all troops in Africa was vested in me alone.

As a result of his discussions with the Italian authorities, Gause had
gained the impression that it would be difficult to persuade them to
agree to further German forces being shipped to North Africa, for they
feared that the German element would then gain a preponderance in
the theatre and be in a position of advantage ws-b-vis their own.

26 May 1941
DEAREST Lu,

Yesterday evening I received a considerable rocket from
Brauchitsch, the reason for which completely passes my compre
hension. Apparently the reports I send back, stating the conditions
as they exist, don t suit their book. The result will be that we ll
keep our mouths shut and only report in the briefest form. However,
we had f litre of Bavarian beer last night to console us. -

iQKW (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht) Supreme Command of the Armed
Forces.

140 THE WAR IN AFRICA FIRST YEAR

Otherwise things have grown quiet, both here and on the front
near Sollum. Though of course one can never know whether it isn t
the calm before some new attack,

29 May 1941

Von dem Borne [then Rommel s Chief of Staff] is to take this letter
with him to-morrow and I hope it will reach you earlier than usual
I ve had a major rocket from the OKH 1 to my mind unjustified
in gratitude for our previous achievements. But as with the " Line
of Thrust " in 1940,2 I m not going to take it lying down, and a
letter is already on its way to v. B. [von Brauchitsch].

For your peace of mind, I ve kept very well so far and the situation
has also shown a noticeable change for the better. The heat, it s true,
is almost unbearable and it s a good thing to stay indoors during the
hottest part of the day.

2 June

It was 107 here yesterday, and that s quite some heat. Tanks
standing in the sun go up to as much as 160, which is too hot to
touch.

My affair with the OKH is under way. Either they ve got con
fidence in me or they haven t. If not, then I m asking them to draw
their own conclusions. I m very intrigued to know what jvill come
of it. It s easy enough to bellyache when you aren t sweating it out
here.

// June

Borne is back, with partially satisfactory results. They were mad
at me in the OKH because my reports had gone to the OKW as
well. But that was Rintelen s fault who was acting in accordance
with his duty. I ve had no reply to my letter to B.

^.K.H. (Oberkommando dcs Heeres) Army High Command, subordinate to the
OKW,

s Sec pages 15 and 85.

CHAPTER VII

THE BRITISH SUMMER OFFENSIVE, 1941

After its failure, this offensive was described as merely a reconnaissance in
force, and the British public wer$ kept in the dark about its originally ambitious
aims to " destroy " Rommel s forces and gain a " decisive victory " in North
Africa. Its code-name " Battleaxe " epitomised the conception. Wavell began to
have doubts as the time approached, not only because of the arrival of the i$th Panzer
Division but also on technical grounds. In a report on the s8th May he said:
" Our infantry tanks are really too slow for a battle in the desert, and have been
suffering considerable casualties from thejire of the powerful enemy anti-tank guns.
Our cruisers have little advantage in power or speed over German medium tanks."
But he still hoped to " succeed in driving the enemy west of Tobruk"

The offensive was directed by General Beresford-Peirse, and carried out by a
force comprising the jth Armoured Division, 4th Indian Division, and 22nd Guards
Brigade. There is a wide variation in the figures given in different British reports
as to the number of tanks used they range from ijo to 250. Rommel, it will be seen,
says that the i$th Panzer Division had 80 tanks available to meet the British attack,
but shows that they were reinforced by the tanks of the 5th Light Division. In other
German records the total is given as 750, of which only 55 were Panzers III or IV.
No Italian tanks were in action,

At the beginning of June there were many signs that a major British
attack on our Tobruk 1 front was to be expected at about the middle of
the month. Two British divisions had concentrated opposite the I5th
Panzer Division s positions, (isth Panzer Division had meanwhile been
transferred to the Sollum-Bardia-Halfaya sector, although its Rifle Brigade
was still holding the line on the Ras el Madauer.) The bulk of the 5th
Light Division was already in reserve south of Tobruk.

Unfortunately, our petrol stocks were badly depleted, and it was with
some anxiety that we contemplated the coming British attack, for we
knew that our moves would be decided more by the petrol gauge than
by tactical requirements.

*It would seem likely, by the context, that Rommel made a slip here and intended
to write the Sollum front. This front, which covered the forces investing Tobruk, was
70 miles to the east.

141

THE WAR IN AFRICA FIRST YEAR

At about 21.00 hours on the 1 4th June, I alerted the Sollum front.
Several of the 5th Light Division s units and some Italian were put on
the march for new positions, with instructions to hold themselves in
readiness to intervene on the Sollum front.

The expected enemy attack came at 04.00 hours on the isth. They
advanced over a wide front, both in the coastal plain and on the plateau,
and forced back our outposts south-east and south of Sollum. The first
reports we received from Sollum were fairly optimistic. But the enemy
rapidly gained ground and from 09.00 hours onwards a tank attack was
already in progress on Capuzzo. The 15th Panzer Division had orders
not to launch its counter-attack until the situation had clarified.

Meanwhile, the 5th Light Division s combat group had been alerted
and its advance troops had already arrived south of Gambut. At 11.00
hours all other available units of the 5th Light Division were alerted and
put on the march towards Sollum.

The enemy was meanwhile concentrating very powerful forces
between Sidi Omar and Capuzzo, obviously with the intention of
destroying the i5th Panzer Division by a concentric attack to the north.
To be ready for any eventuality, I ordered the garrison of Bardia to man
the eastern and western exits from the fortress. Unfortunately, there were
not enough troops available to man the whole of Bardia s defences.

Meanwhile, the British were making repeated attacks on the Halfaya
Pass from both sides in an attempt to open the road. But Major Bach
and his men fought magnificently. The British force engaged in this
attack was soon describing its position as serious and complaining of
heavy casualties.

In the afternoon and evening of this first day of battle, the British
enveloped Capuzzo and began to mount attacks against the southern
front of Bardia. 1 Late in the evening Capuzzo was stormed by British
troops. A violent tank battle developed between 80 tanks of 8th Panzer
Regiment (isth Panzer Division) and jome 300 British tanks which
pressed stubbornly northwards.

Rommel overestimates the British tank strength in the same way that the
British overestimated his.

The 1 5th Panzer Division, together with a panzer battalion of the
5th Light Division, which had meanwhile come up in support, had orders
to take up positions south of Bardia during the night for a renewed
counter-attack to the south. In view of the tremendous strength of the
British, there was of course no certainty that this attack would achieve
any decisive success.

The main force of 5th Light Division had orders to launch an attack
on the morning of the i6th from a point west of Sidi Azeiz towards
Sidi Suleiman, with the object of getting through to the Halfaya Pass,

Actually the bulk of the British armour penetrated only a few miles north of the
line Gapuzzo-Musaid during this battle.

144 THE WAR IN AFRICA - FIRST YEAR

cutting the British off from their supply bases and thus forcing them to
retreat. The I5th Panzer Division was to move south at first light on
either side of Capuzzo in order to pin down the British main force, I
planned to concentrate both armoured divisions suddenly into one focus
and thus deal the enemy an unexpected blow in his most sensitive spot.

16 June 1941
DEAREST Lu,

There was heavy fighting in our eastern sector all day yesterday,
as you will have seen long ago from Wehrmacht communiques. To-day
it s 2.30 a.m. will see the decision. It s going to be a hard fight,
so you ll understand that I can t sleep. These lines in haste will
show you that I m thinking of you both. More soon when it s all
over.

At 05.00 hours on the i6th, the second day of the battle, the
Panzer Division launched its attack on Capuzzo, and a violent and heavy
tank battle soon developed. For all its efforts, however, the division was
unable to gain any telling success. Soon Musaid also fell into British
hands. At about 10.30 hours the Panzer Division reported that it had
been forced to break off its attack on Capuzzo. The enemy remained
unshaken. Of the 80 tanks which I5th Panzer Division had taken into
battle, only 30 remained; the remainder were either burnt out on the
battlefield or awaiting recovery and repair.

The British force at Capuzzo was the 22nd Guards Brigade and the jth
Armoured Brigade which here consisted of the 4th and jth R. T.R* They were
equipped with Matilda tanks, of which they had go. Rommel had met these two
tank battalions in his first encounter with the British at Anas in May 1940.

The 5th Light Division, which was attacking toward Sidi Suleiman
from the area west of Sidi Azeiz, was also soon heavily engaged with
7th British Armoured Brigade [equipped with Cruiser tanks] 6 miles west of
Sidi Omar. The violent tank battle which ensued was soon decided in
our favour and the division succeeded in fighting its way through to the
area north-east of Sidi Omar and continuing its advance on Sidi Suleiman.
This was the turning point of the battle. I immediately ordered the isth
Panzer Division to disengage all its mobile forces as quickly as possible
and, leaving only the essential minimum to hold the position north of
Capuzzo, to go forward on the northern flank of the victorious 5th Light
Division towards Sidi Suleiman. The decisive moment had come. It is
often possible to decide the issue of a battle merely by making an
unexpected shift of one s main weight.

The enemy seemed unwilling to relinquish the initiative so easily,
and concentrated the bulk of his armour north of Capuzzo in order to
launch a heavy attack early next .morning against the element of I5th
Panzer Division still left in the north, with the object of forcing a break-

THE BRITISH SUMMER OFFENSIVE, 1 94 1 145

through. To impose my plans on the enemy from the outset, I ordered
the 5th Light and I5th Panzer Divisions to get their attack on Sidi
Suleiman moving at 4.30 a.m., i.e. before the probable start time of the
enemy attack.

Next morning, the I7th June, the 5th Light Division set off at the
appointed time and after a headlong advance reached the neighbourhood
of Sidi Suleiman at 06.00 hours. The i5th Panzer Division had become
involved in heavy fighting against an armoured force which the British
had sent to parry the danger menacing their army. But it soon reached
its objective. Great numbers of destroyed British tanks littered the
country through which the two divisions had passed.

This operation had obviously taken the British completely by surprise.
In wireless messages which we intercepted they described their position
as very serious. The commander of jth Armoured Division sent a
request to the Commander-in-Chief of the desert force to come to his
headquarters. It sounded suspiciously as though the British commander
no longer felt himself capable of handling the situation. It being now
obvious that in their present bewildered state the British would not start
anything for the time being, I decided to pull the net tight by going on
to Halfaya. Accordingly, at about 09.00 hours, orders were issued for
the 5th Light and isth Panzer Division to push on to Halfaya and
prevent any break-through of British armour from the north. The
British were seriously in trouble over petrol and ammunition and I
hoped to be able to force them into a stand-up fight and destroy their
whole force.

The enemy wireless was repeatedly reporting lack of ammunition.
Soon they set fire to their stores at Gapuzzo and withdrew, leaving the
desert littered with vehicles abandoned for lack of petrol. They com
plained bitterly of their high tank casualties.

The 5th Light and ^th Panzer Divisions reached the Halfaya Pass
shortly after 16.00 hours. There they turned and advanced side by side
to the north. This was a very unfortunate move, as its result was to
squeeze out the pocket instead of closing it and preventing the enemy s
escape. Thus the enemy was able to pour back east unmolested through
the vast gap between Sidi Omar .and Halfaya. I was furious at this
missed opportunity. The two divisions should have deployed in front
of the enemy as soon as they reached Halfaya, thus bringing him to
battle and preventing his escape. In that way we might have raked in
a large portion of his offensive power.

Rommel is mistaken. The main body of the British striking force had already
withdrawn to the south between the Halfaya Pass and the head of the Afrika
Korps column.

Thus the three-day battle of Sollum was over. It had finished with
a complete victory for the defence, although we might have dealt the
enemy far greater damage than we actually had done. The British had

146 THE WAR IN AFRICA FIRST YEAR

lost, in all, over 220 tanks and their casualties in men had been tremendous.
We, on the other hand, had lost only about 25 tanks totally destroyed.
Although two-thirds of the British tanks were out of action by the end of the
battle, the number destroyed or captured was 87 (58 " / " tanks and 29 cruisers),
besides 500 men killed or captured. They took 570 prisoners, and claimed to have
knocked out nearly 100 enemy tanks. Here, again, it can be seen how each side
is apt to overestimate the other s loss, particularly in a fast-moving battle.

18 June 1941
DEAREST Lu,

The three-day battle has ended in complete victory. I m going
to go round the troops to-day to thank them and issue orders. I m
leaving at six, so please be content with this brief note for the moment.

23 June 1941

Fve been three days on the road going round the battlefield.
The joy of the " Afrika " troops over this latest victory is tremendous.
The British thought they could overwhelm us with their 400 tanks.
We couldn t put that amount of armour against them. But our
grouping and the stubborn resistance of German and Italian troops
who were surrounded for days together, enabled us to make the
decisive operation with all the forces we still had mobile. Now the
enemy can come, he ll get an even bigger beating.

THE BATTLE OF SOLLUM A REVIEW

Wavell s strategic planning of this offensive had been excellent.
What distinguished him from other British army commanders was his
great and well-balanced strategic courage, which permitted him to con
centrate his forces regardless of his opponent s possible moves. He knew
very well the necessity of avoiding any operation which would enable
his opponent to fight on interior lines and destroy his formations one by
one with locally superior concentrations. But he was put at a great
disadvantage by the slow speed of his heavy infantry tanks, which
prevented him from reacting quickly enough to the moves of our faster
vehicles. Hence the slow speed of the bulk of his armour was his soft
spot, which we could seek to exploit tactically.

Rommers high tribute to Wavell is significant. For immediately after this
battle, Churchill, who was deeply disappointed with the outcome, decided to replace
Wavell by Auchinleck as Commander-in-Chief. It will be seen that Rommel s
diagnosis of the main factor in the British failure corresponds with forebodings
that Wavell had expressed on the 28th May when cautioning the authorities at
home against counting too much on a decisive success.

THE BRITISH SUMMER OFFENSIVE, 194! 147

The enemy s plan had been extremely simple, but simple plans are
in most cases more menacing than complex ones. With the German and
Italian holding forces in the Sollum-Halfaya sector tied down frontally,
the British had planned to move their assault brigades round the escarp
ment and then to the north. The Halfaya Pass was to be taken by an
attack from both sides, the success of which must have seemed certain
to the British after their experience in May. Once the road through the
passes was opened, the British had intended to concentrate their forces
and move on to the north, thus unhinging our whole Sollum-Halfaya
position. Most probably they would then have gone all out for Tobruk
and tried to raise the siege.

In this battle, the British used large numbers of their Mark II [Matilda]
tanks, which were too heavily armoured to be penetrated by most of our
anti-tank weapons. However, the gun which they carried was far too
small and its range too short. They were also only supplied with solid,
armour-piercing shell. It would be interesting to know why the Mark II
was called an infantry tank, when it had no H.E. ammunition with which
to engage the opposing infantry. It was also, as I have already said, far
too slow. In fact, its only real use was in a straight punch to smash a
hole in a concentration of material.

In the winter battles 1941-42, the enemy Mark VI Cruiser tank
made its first appearance. With its tremendous speed more than 40
m.p.h. this was an extremely useful tank. But its gun was again too
small, and it could not make up for its lack of calibre and thus of range
by the heavy armour it carried. Had this tank been equipped with a
heavier gun, it could have made things extremely unpleasant for us.

The British Mark VI cruiser was the type better known by its name, the
" Crusader." Rommel s high opinion of it, apart from its 2-pounder gun, is worthy
of note since disappointment with its inadequate gun-power led to sweeping criticism
of it on the British side, and to its good qualities being under-valued. Rommel
is mistaken in saying that it fast appeared in the winter 50 wen used in " Battleaxe "
in June.

Its 2-pounder gan had a penetration of 44 mm. at 1000 yards., which was
slightly better than tither the 50 mm. Kwk. gun in the Panzer in or the short 75
mm. in the Panzer IV. It had 49 mm. of armour on the turret front, compared
with 35 mm. on the Panzer III and IV, though thinner elsewhere. But the
frequency of mechanical trouble when %t fast appealed tended to aggravate dis
satisfaction with it on other scores.

The crucial position in this battle was the Halfaya Pass, which Captain
Bach and his men held through the heaviest fighting. Major Pardi s
artillery battalion also rendered distinguished service in this action, thus
showing that Italian troops could give a good account of themselves when
they were well officered. Had the British been able to take the Halfaya
Pass as they had planned, the situation would have been very different.

1^8 THE WAR IN AFRICA - FIRST YEAR

They would have been able to thrust both to the front and the rear along
the coast, and would have been In a position to make better tactical use
of their armour in all circumstances. The armoured units which they
threw against our striking force in the area north of Sidi Omar failed
to prevent the advance of the 5th Light Division and I5th Panzer Division,
and thanks to the excellent co-ordination between our anti-tank, armoured
and A.A. forces, were themselves destroyed. We could have annihilated
the greater part of the British force north of Sidi Suleiman if our com
manders had been alive to their opportunity and had acted on their
own initiative.

When the German attack was launched from north of Sidi Omar,
Wavell was prevented by the slowness of his infantry tanks from shifting
his main weight at that moment from Capuzzo to the point of the Axis
attack. There was nothing for him but a quick retreat, which he executed
with the minimum of casualties to the British forces.

The garrisons holding the strong points on our Sollum front also had
a great share in the Axis victory. Some of them succeeded in beating
off every enemy attack, while others fought on to the last breath.

This battle made a great impression on our superior commands.
General Roatta, who arrived in Africa some time later, informed me that
the Italian High Command realised the necessity of considerably reinforc
ing the Axis forces in North Africa. The German element was to be
brought up to four mechanised divisions and the Italian to an armoured
corps of three divisions, with a further two to three motorised divisions.
Their zeal unfortunately did not last long.

If these reinforcements had in fact come to Africa in the autumn of
1941, with their supplies guaranteed, we could have beaten off the
British winter offensive in the Marmarica assuming that is, that
Auchinleck would have begun it at all in those circumstances. We
would have been strong enough to destroy the British in Egypt in the
spring of 1942, and could have advanced into Irak and cut off the
Russians from Basra. This would have been a very heavy blow strategic
ally both for Britain and Russia.

28 June 1941

DEAREST Lu,

You need not worry yourself any more about my health. I m
doing fine. Our place is much healthier, lying 600 feet above sea
level. Besides, Pve got the advantage of my four walls. Aldinger
was sick for a few days, but he s now getting better. There s a lot
of work.

3
A quite atrocious heat, even during the night. One lies in bed,

THE BRITISH SUMMER OFFENSIVE, 194! 149

tossing and turning and dripping with sweat. The news of the
victories in Russia is very good to hear. It s all quiet here so far.
But I m not being taken in. Our stubborn friends on the other side
will be back sooner or later. The first congratulations on my pro
motion to Panzer General are coming in. Of course I ve heard
nothing official yet, but I understand it s been announced on the
radio.

I usually spend a lot of time travelling; yesterday I was away
eight hours. You can hardly imagine what a thirst one gets up after
such a journey. Fm hoping that my flight (to the Fuehrer s H.Q.)
will come off in about a fortnight. It s no good going until the
Russian affair is more or less over, otherwise there ll be scant regard
for my interests.

I was glad to hear that Manfred is now getting on in mathematics.
It s all a matter of the method of teaching. I m also very pleased
about his other successes in school.

I m managing, by dint of keeping the place dark and " shooting
a lot of them down," to keep my office fairly clear of mosquitoes.
I m even having an occasional bang while writing.

21 Aug. 1941

Nothing to report of importance. Had another visit from the
Italian C.-in-G. yesterday; purely " comradely ", however. On the
official level I ve been disagreeing with a number of things which
have been done and have said so through Galvi, so this visit was
probably a goodwill gesture. I ve got a number of visitors to-day.
We re having chicken and I m not going to miss it in spite of my
diet. This perpetual mush loses its fascination after a time. I m very
pleased about my new appointment. [Rommel had just been appointed
Commander of the Panzer Group Afrika.] Everybody else in that position
is a Colonel-General. If things here go as I should like them, I,
too, will probably get that rank after the war s over.

26 Aug. 1941

I was unable to write yesterday on the road all day. I returned
to my new H.Q,. in the evening and moved into my two rooms.
Bagged two more bugs, alas, this morning although they were out
side the net. There are endless swarms of flies and my flycatcher is
going to come in very useful.

27 Aug.

Nothing new. The heat s frightful, night time as well as day time.
Liquidated four bugs. My bed is now standing in tins filled with

150 THE WAR IN AFRICA FIRST YEAR

water and I hope the nights will be a little more restful from now on.
Some of the others are having a bad time with fleas. They ve left
me alone so far.

s8 Aug. 1941

... As to my health, I m feeling absolutely right. Everything s
working again. I m getting on famously with my new Chief of Staff
[Cause] which is of tremendous importance to me. Unfortunately
the bugs are still about four in the last twenty-four hours. But I
hope to win this campaign also.

29 Aug. 1941
A ferocious heat! We re going off some time to bathe. Otherwise

nothing new. There s a lot of blather about an imminent attack by
the British, but it s probably pure gossip. They re scraping together
troops for Iran. Their communications with Russia through Siberia
are very shaky, because of Japan s attitude, so there only remains
the route across the Persian Gulf. This also looks a very doubtful
proposition. Probably they ll come too late.

A night without bugs! Maybe I have killed the last of the
Mohicans. I ve even mastered the flies in my rooms.

30 Aug. 1941
We ve settled in very well in our new place. Fve been free of

the bugs ever since I had petrol poured over my iron bedstead, and
set light to. They must have been in the framework. We had a
quick bathe yesterday, but the sea water is too warm to refresh.

A caravan is supposed to be on the way for me, but it seems to
have sunk. A pity, but it can t be helped.

31 Aug. 1941
It s damned hot again, so hot that one steams even in the early

morning. Otherwise there s nothing doing, except that the Italian
High Command is dissatisfied at having so little say in things here.
They mess us about over all manner of petty details, but we don t
take any of it lying down. Maybe they re working for a real bust-up,
in order to get me, or perhaps the whole German force, out of the
way. I for one wouldn t be sorry to have a change of theatre.

jo Sept. 1941

I went out shooting last evening with Major von Mellenthin and

Lieutenant Schmidt. It was most exciting. Finally, I got a running

gazelle from the car. We had the liver for dinner and it was delicious.

Wfe have a distinguished visitor coming to-day Major Melchiori,

a close confidant of the Duce. I m hoping for a lot from this visit,

THE BRITISH SUMMER OFFENSIVE, 194!

as the feeling towards us is not particularly friendly at the moment.
Things have changed ! However, we take good care of ourselves and
don t always mince our words. All for now, our visitor s arriving.

29 Sept. 1941

The last few days have been exciting. A large shipment arrived
for us at Benghazi. It took 50 hours to unload. All went well. You
can imagine how pleased I was. With things as they are in the
Mediterranean it s not easy to get anything across. For the moment
we re only stepchildren and must make the best of it. Anyway, they re
making good progress in Russia and our time will come again.

The wind s howling outside, although there is no Ghibli.
Guenther s doing fried potatoes this evening and I m looking forward
to it after being off my food for a few days.

6 Oct. 1941
Unable to write yesterday, my stomach struck work again, We

had a fowl the evening before last which must have come from
Rameses II s chicken run. For all the six hours cooking it had
it was like leather, and my stomach just couldn t take it.

7 Oct. 1941
My stomach is completely back in order and I m rushing around

in fine fettle. What do you think of ray leave plans? I should be
able to get away to Rome for a week at the beginning of November.
I ve got a lot of business to clear up there. I ll have to come back for
the battle, of course, and we must hope that supplies work all right,
so that we can really get down to it. Then I ll be able to take my
leave at the end of November. I know it s not a very good time for
leave and it won t be easy for me to get used to the cold. However,
it s the best time for things here. Of course supplies might upset
everything and cause a long postponement.

9 Oct. 1941

I received some nice news from Voggenreiter 1 yesterday. He says
that royalties for the large edition (50,000) will not be less than
25,000 marks. At the same time Mittler und Sohn notified me of a
credit of 1021.5 marks! 2 That really is something to be going on
with. f

And now there are all these special communiques from the East.
I wonder if Britain won t soon begin to get cold feet. A lot of work

1 Rommers publisher.

2 Rommel refers here to his book Infanterie greift an which sold 400,000 copies in
Germany before and during the war.

152 THE WAR IN AFRICA FIRST YEAR

here. Gambarra s 1 coming to-day, but it s doubtful whether his news
will be very pleasant.

10 Oct. 194.1

A fairly stormy meeting yesterday, to be continued to-day. Not
much to show for it. The things one has to put up with ! I m keeping
very fit touch wood lively from morning to night.

12 Oct. 1941
Wonderful news from Russia ! After the conclusion of the great

battles, we can expect the advance east to go fast and thus remove
all possibility of the enemy creating any significant new forces. The
British workers seem to be getting thoroughly rebellious. . . .

Britain would be only too pleased to attack, but she has neither
the troops nor the equipment to make a major landing in Europe.
They ll be too late for Russia if they choose the only road left open
to them, through India, and an attack in Libya would be a risky
business and would not have any direct effect on things in Russia.
Once we ve taken T, [Toimi], there ll be precious little hope for
them here.

13 Oct. 1941
I hope we meet all right on the ist November. Inquire about

the trains please and let me know exactly when you ll be getting to
Rome. Then I ll arrange things so that I can be there on time.
I m hoping the situation will permit me to stay until the i5th. But
you must bring along a civilian outfit for me ( brown suit).

24 Oct. 1941
DEAR MANFRED,

You ll be getting more letters from me now that you re alone in
the house.

Everything is going as planned here. I visit the troops every day,
most of them are by the sea. Occasionally we bathe. The water is
still very warm, and the heat pretty bad during the day, but it s so
cool at night now, that I need two blankets. My new home is nicely
furnished. The wall is covered with all different maps, especially
of Russia, on which every advance we make is immediately marked
in.

28 Oct.
DEAR MANFRED,

We had the Ghibli again yesterday. Sometimes the dust-clouds
were so thick you could only see two to three yards. It seems to be
better to-day.

1 Italian Corps Commander,

THE BRITISH SUMMER OFFENSIVE, 1941 153

It s only a few days now before I take off to fly across the water.
Fm very pleased to be seeing Mummy again in Rome and am only
sorry that you, young man, can t be with us. But it couldn t be
helped. I am certain to get some leave this winter and then we ll
have a good prowl round together. There s not much hunting here
where I am now. Some of the officers have shot cheetahs, which
have their homes in the stony wadis. Occasionally one comes across
a bustard, a fox, a jackal or even a gazelle. The camel thorn bushes
are now growing faintly green and have got tiny flowers. Last night
the British bombarded jus from the sea. Dive-bombers and torpedo-
bombers sank one or two of their cruisers and we ve had peace since.
All for to-day.

No further German divisions beyond the original two were sent from Europe
in 1941 (nor during the first half of 1942}^ but one extra division was formed
in Africa from a number of independent units there* This division, which was
called the goth Light, had no tanks and comprised only four infantry battalions, but
was relatively strong in fire-power, having three field artillery battalions, an anti
tank battalion, and a battalion of 88 mm. dual-purpose (A. A. and A.Tk.) guns.
The 5th Light Division was renamed the 2ist Panzer Division, but without
any change in organisation and equipment. Both this and the i^th Panzer Division
had only two tank battalions and three infantry battalions.

After Rommel s command was raised to the status of a Panzer Group in August,
Lieut.-General Cruewell was appointed commander of the Afrika Korps (with
Colonel Bayerlein as Chief of Staff). Only the two Panzer divisions were included
in the Afrika Korps. 1 Besides the Africa Korps and the goth Light Division,
Rommel also had under him six Italian divisions the Ariete and Trieste
(forming the XX Motorised Corps}; the Pavia, Bologna and Brescia (form
ing the XXI Infantry Corps] which were investing Tobruk; and the Savona,
which was garrisoning Bardia.

x Each of the two panzer divisions comprised:

A panzer regiment of 2 battalions (each of 4 companies).

Companies had an establishment of 21 tanks apiece the total of the regiment,
including command and signal tanks, being 194.

One company of each battalion, however, was still in Germany when the
British autumn offensive, " Operation Crusader," was launched in November,

1941. By the spring of 1942 the 4th company of each battalion had been sent
to Africa, and the proportion of medium tanks was increased. In August,

1942, the (nominal) establishment of a regiment was reduced to 180 tanks.
A Motorised Infantry Regiment of 3 battalions (each of 4 companies).

An Artillery Regiment of 3 battalions (each of 3 batteries^ and each battery ot
4 guns). One battalion was heavy with 150 mm. howitzers.

An Anti-Tank Battalion (of 3 companies, each with 12 anti-tank guns).

An Armoured Reconnaissance Battalion (with 30 armoured cars).

Engineers and other troops. .

The establishment (planned strength^ of the panzer division in personnel was
approximately 12,500 and in anti-tank guns, 120.

CHAPTER VIII

THE WINTER CAMPAIGN, 1941-2
By Lieut.-General Fritz Bqyerlein

UNFORTUNATELY THERE is no connected account written by Rommel
for the next period of the war in Africa the winter of 1941-42. As a
proper appreciation of the tactical and strategical problems in Africa,
and of Rommel s generalship, is impossible without this part of the
story, it has been thought necessary for a summary of operations during
this period to be compiled from the available documents. I have been
all the more ready to undertake this task as I was myself in the centre
of events, having arrived in the desert from the mud of the early Russian
winter shortly before the beginning -of the British autumn offensive, with
a thorough practical schooling in mobile warfare behind me, which I
had acquired in the European theatre under that master of the art,
General Guderian. The account which follows has, therefore, been
compiled partly from my own experience during the Libyan campaign
and partly from the documents available to me.

The German-Italian operations in the spring of 1941 and the rapid
conquest of Cyrenaica which had resulted had left the whole world
gasping. The reconquered Italian territory had been held against heavy
British counter-attacks and its defence strengthened by the construction
of the Sollum-Bardia line. On the other side of the picture, we had
failed, despite all efforts, to take Tobruk and thus acquire a supply port
close to the front for Benghazi was about 300 miles away and Tripoli
about 1,000. The British had been quick to appreciate the decisive
importance of Tobruk and were defending it with the utmost tenacity.
Important German and Italian forces were now tied up in the siege.
But far worse was the fact that all future operations were bound to be
determined by the situation at Tobruk. Were the enemy to launch
simultaneous attacks from Egypt and Tobruk, Rommel s position could
not fail to become extremely critical. The weak Axis forces had in-

154

THE WINTER CAMPAIGN, 1941-2 155

sufficient depth to allow them to operate freely; their supply lines \vere
continually threatened, and a serious danger existed of their fighting
units being squeezed into the confined space between the sea, the
Sollum and the Tobruk fronts, and there surrounded and destroyed by
a superior and skilfully led enemy.

Rommel was in no doubt that die British would exploit this oppor
tunity towards the end of the year and that it was essential to forestall
them by taking Tobruk before they had the chance. In any attack on
Tobruk, however, he had to reckon with the possibility of a British
relieving attack in the rear of his assault force; to meet it he would be
forced to deploy the mass of his mobile forces between Capuzzo and Bir
el Gobi. Rommel did not expect the British to launch a major attack
until they thought the Middle East free of the danger of a German
offensive through the Caucasus, when they would be able to draw off
major forces for employment on the Egyptian front sufficient to ensure
the success of their plan. With the adverse turn which our operations
in Russia had taken, this situation could be expected to arise by about
November.

During September the siege front round Tobruk was strengthened
and suitable jump-off points for the attack were taken. The trans
portation across the Mediterranean of the necessary reinforcements,
arms and supplies for the attack required a substantial increase in the
level of Italian shipments to Africa. But these remained, as usual, far
below the promises given us by the High Command, which had them
selves been regarded as an absolute minimum. The result was that by the
end of September only a third of the troops and a seventh of the supplies
which we needed had arrived. This was a terrible handicap in our race
for time with the British, and forced us to postpone our attack until
November; even then we had to be content with inadequate forces and
material.

As time was pressing, Rommel reported to the High Command at
the beginning of November that he had enough troops in position to
open the offensive and that he thought it essential, even if the necessary
supplies had not all arrived, to mount the attack in the second half of
November, by which time all other preparations would be ready. But
the High Command failed to appreciate the situation and were appre
hensive. In their reply they drew attention to the British superiority in
the air and proposed that the attack should be put off until the following
year. Rommel could not let it go at that and replied the same day that
with the present state of shipping in the Mediterranean, he feared
that any lengthy postponement would only result in the balance of
strength swinging even further against us. He therefore regarded it as
vital to strike at the earliest possible moment. The High Command

THE WAR IN AFRICA FIRST YEAR

thereupon gave approval for the operation to be undertaken at the time

proposed. i_ T -L TN- -

The assault proper was to be made by the goth Light Division,
1 5th Panzer Division and two Italian infantry divisions. As a covering
force Rommel moved the Italian Motorised Corps Gambarra (the Ariete
Armoured Division and Trieste Motorised Division) and the sist Panzer
Division into the area south and south-east of Tobruk between Bir
Hacheim, Gasr el Arid and Got el Hariga, where they were to form a
mobile defence against any relieving attacks which the enemy might mount
either on the rear of the Tobruk assault force or on the Sollum front.
This move was complete by the i6th November. The siege of Tobruk
was maintained by the Italian Brescia and Trento Divisions.

Rommel s tank strength at that time comprised 260 German and
154 Italian tanks. Of the German tanks, 15 were Panzer I, 40 were
Panzer II, 150 were Panzer III (50 per cent of which were still equipped
with the 37-mm. gun), and 55 were Panzer IV.

During the night 17-18 November, British Commandos, in a raid of
great audacity, tried to wipe out what they supposed to be Army Head
quarters in Beda Littoria 200 miles behind our front as a prelude to
their offensive. The place they attacked was actually occupied at the
time by the Quartermaster staff, who lost two officers and two other ranks.

It is interesting to note that Rommel had in fact formerly had his
H.Q. in this house. He himself had had the first floor and his A.D.C.s
the ground floor. The British must have received knowledge of this
through their Intelligence Service.

The British Commandos answered the sentry in German. Although
they did not know the password, the sentry did not fire, thinking they
: were Germans who had lost their way. The British were wearing no
insignia which might have identified them as enemy. Suddenly one of
them drew his pistol and shot the sentry. They pressed quickly into the
house, fired a volley into the room on the left of the entrance door,
killing two Germans, and tried to get up to the first floor. Here, however,
they were met by German bullets. One British officer was killed and a
German fatally wounded. The remainder of the British Commandos
withdrew.

THE BRITISH ATTACK

In the middle of October, our Army intelligence circular notified all
formations that with large quantities of enemy war material and strong
contingents of troops steadily pouring into Egypt, there was a grave
danger that the British would soon launch a major offensive. Even
before this, in September, a move by the South African and New Zealand
Divisions from the Nile Delta to Mersa Matruh had been detected by

158 THE WAR IN AFRICA FIRST YEAR

our interception service and afterwards confirmed by prisoner interroga
tion. However, the armed reconnaissance which sist Panzer Division
made in the middle of September into the area south of Sidi Barrani
brought back no evidence of an impending attack. No supply dumps
capable of supporting a major offensive were seen in the Egyptian frontier
area. The enemy s approach march and deployment passed unnoticed
by our reconnaissance. His concealment of his preparations was excellent.
The wireless silence which he imposed prevented our interception service
detecting his approach march into the assembly areas. Our air recon
naissance operating, it is true, with far too few aircraft failed to spot
his troop movements, probably because he only moved by night and
laid up during the day under the protection of excellent camouflage.
Moreover, as luck would have it, torrential rain put all our airfields out
of commission on the i8th November and no air reconnaissance was
flown that day. But air reconnaissance failed just as badly on the southern
flank, where the British had established large supply dumps. Ground
reconnaissance was equally ineffective. As a result the attack achieved
complete tactical surprise.

From captured papers we later learned the dispositions of the British
Eighth Army for their attack. Its aim was to destroy the German-Italian
forces, relieve Tobruk and then exploit victory by an advance to occupy
Tripolitania. XXX Corps, on the desert flank, -was to advance on
Tobruk from the frontier with the bulk of the British armour. The task
of XIII Corps, on the coast, was first to pin down the garrisons of the
Sollum front while the armoured manoeuvre was in progress, then to
advance northward to cut off these garrisons and then to move west to
support XXX Corps.

This offensive, called " Crusader" began on the i8th November with a long
approach march, by the main force, that passed wide round the flank of the German-
Italian fortified position near Sollum, on the coast route. The attacking force
comprised the equivalent of seven divisions, including the Tobruk garrison, and was
opposed by three German and seven Italian. But such figures give a false impression,
and all the more so because the issue mainly turned on armour and air-power. The
British had five brigades of armour, while Rommel had the equivalent of two
German and one Italian. In number of tanks the British total was 724, with some
200 in reserve (which were sent up at the rate of about forty a day). Rommel s
strength at the start was 414 (including 154 Italian}. He had some fifty under repair
but had no reserve of new tanks. In the air the British predominance was much
greater, as in aircraft fit for action they had close on 1,100 against 120 German
and about 200 Italian. The initial advantage was multiplied by surprise.

Rommel himself was in Rome during the first part of November. He had gone
there to win sanction for his plan of an early attack on Tobruk, and stayed on to
spend his birthday, the /j/A, with his wifefiying back to Africa just before the
British advance began.

It was not until the afternoon of the i8th November, when operations

THE WINTER CAMPAIGN, IQ4I-2 159

were already under way, that the Panzer Group realised that the enemy
had launched an offensive. Our outposts were forced back from the
Bir el Gobi Sidi Omar line by superior enemy forces. A statement
given by a British soldier captured at Sidi Suleiman on the 1 7th November,
provided us with a detailed account of the enemy s forces and plans, so
detailed in fact that we at first doubted its veracity. Subsequent develop
ments confirmed it in every detail.

In the circumstances, Rommel decided not to go ahead with the
attack on Tobruk. The enemy had beaten him to it. He immediately
ordered the Afrika Korps to launch an attack against the British masses
moving north through Gabr Saleh.

Considerable controversy has occurred since as to whether Rommel
was right in calling off the attack on Tobruk in order to deal with the
enemy offensive first. Our covering force might indeed have sufficed to
hold off the enemy attack until after Tobruk had fallen and this would
have been of the greatest advantage for us, for we could then have operated
in the Marmarica with far greater ease and freedom than we were, in
the event, able to do with the strong Tobruk garrison in our backs. But
would the British have allowed us time to capture Tobruk undisturbed?
This was not just a matter of audacity and daring; it was a gamble,
which General Rommel refused to undertake.

The British armour advanced towards the Tobruk area in three
columns, and struck our covering screen on the igth November. The
left column reached Bir el Gobi, forcing back the Ariete Division after
a hot fight. The right column was checked by part of the 2ist
Panzer Division, and then driven back on Gabr Saleh. Meanwhile, the
centre column had penetrated to the airfield at Sidi Rezegh, and
established itself on the escarpment, barely 10 miles from the Tobruk
perimeter.

On the soth the Afrika Korps continued and developed its pressure
on the enemy s right flank, and destroyed many tanks in the day s
fighting. Both our divisions won through to the area Gabr Saleh-Sidi
Omar, a good base for an attack on the rear of the enemy s centre column.
Rommel s plan, taking into account our inferior strength and the limited
usefulness of the Italians, was to concentrate his mobile formations into
one compact force, and defeat the enemy formations one after the other,
until finally the entire British striking force had been destroyed. ^

The British obliged by throwing their armoured brigades into the
battle in separate units. This enabled us to gain a series of partial
successes, and eventually led to victory in one of the greatest armoured
battles of the campaign, in which the bulk of the enemy s armour was
destroyed. In these actions, which are among the most interesting of the
African war, the tactics were developed which were to bring such success
later. They provide an illuminating picture of Rommel s generalship and
that of his subordinate commanders.

l6o THE WAR IN AFRICA FIRST YEAR

Rommel returned to Africa on i8th November. Two days later he wrote to
his wife:

20 Nov. 1941

DEAREST Lu,

The enemy offensive began immediately after my arrival. The
battle has now reached its crisis. I hope we get through it in good
order. It will probably all be decided by the time this letter arrives.
Our position is certainly not easy.

Fm as well as can be expected.

On the morning of the 2ist November, the Afrika Korps moved to
the attack against the rear of the British armour. By evening, after heavy
fighting, it gained the escarpment near Bir Sciaf-Sciuf south of the Trigh
Capuzzo, where it took up position for a mobile defence to meet the
enemy s renewed attack.

On the previous night., a minor sortie of the Tobruk garrison from
the south-east sector was followed by a heavy attack supported by 50
infantry tanks. The enemy broke through the investing front, and over
ran the artillery positions of the Bologna Division. Although the position
was restored this sector of tte front remained a continual source of
anxiety for us.

For the 22nd November Rommel ordered " mobile operations "
south of the Trigh Capuzzo. On the previous night General Cruewell
had led the isth Panzer Division out to the east, completely unobserved
by the enemy, and regrouped them in depth up against the enemy s long
flank. While the 2ist Panzer Division attacked the Sidi Rezegh airfield
and threw the enemy back to the south, the I5th Panzer Division drove
into the flank and rear of the enemy force attacking Bir Sciaf-Sciuf.
Pushing on during the night, they overran the headquarters of the
British 4th Armoured Brigade, captured the commander and disrupted
the brigade.

That day no attacks were made from Tobruk. Farther east the enemy
launched an outflanking movement aimed at the rear of the Sollum
front. Our strong points held, but Fort Capuzzo was taken by the
New Zealanders.

THE TANK BATTLE OF TO TENSO NNTA G l

Orders for the 23rd November were the destruction of the enemy s
main striking force by a concentric attack of all German-Italian mobile
forces.

That day Rommel was unable for the first time to issue his orders

1 Memorial Sunday. The German day of remembrance for those who died in the
First World War.

THE WINTER CAMPAIGN, IQ4I-2 l6l

verbally and so the Afrika Korps received a lengthy wireless signal which
would have taken far too long to transcribe and decode. General Gruewell
could not wait and, knowing RommePs general plan, felt compelled to
act on his own initiative. Accordingly, he left his H.Q,. at Gasr el Arid
at about 05.30 hours to lead his troops personally in the forthcoming
decisive battle. Half an hour later, his whole headquarters staff together
with almost the entire paraphernalia of command was surprised by the
New Zealanders, who had come up from Sidi Azeiz unobserved, and
taken prisoner after a heroic defence. General Cruewell and I escaped
this fate by a hairsbreadth.

On the morning of the 23rd, German-Italian dispositions were as
follows :

The 1 5th Panzer Division was reorganising after its success near Bir
Sciaf-Sciuf. The 2ist Panzer Division was deployed for defence in the
Sidi Rezegh area. The Italian Ariete and Trieste Divisions were assembled
round Bir el Gobi.

The enemy armour was thought to be lying on the extensive desert
plateau of Sidi Muftah and Bir el Haiad, divided up into several combat
groups.

General CruewelPs plan was to attack the enemy in the rear, but he
first intended to join up with the Ariete, who were moving up from Bir
el Gobi, in order to bring all the available armour to bear in one united
effort. At about 07.30 hours, the 15th Panzer Division moved to the
south-west where they discovered and immediately attacked a strong
force of enemy armour round Sidi Muftah. Violent tank fighting
developed. More enemy groups with vast vehicle parks, numerous tanks
and guns were discovered north of Hagfed el Haiad and General Gruewell
accordingly embarked on an even wider outflanking movement. By the
early afternoon, after continuous fighting, he reached a point south-east
of Hagfed el Haiad, deep in the enemy s rear.

The Ariete s assault spearheads had meanwhile arrived with 120
tanks and General Cruewell now launched the combined German and
Italian armoured forces northwards into the enemy s rear, with the
object of bottling him up completely and forcing him back against the
2ist Panzer Division s front at Sidi Rezegh.

The attack started well, but soon came up against a wide artillery
and anti-tank gun screen, which the South Africans had formed at a
surprising speed between Haiad and Muftah. Guns of all kinds and
sizes laid a curtain of fire in front of the attacking tanks and there seemed
almost no hope of making any progress in the face of this fire-spewing
barrier. Tank after tank split open in the hail of shells. Our entire
artillery had to be thrown in to silence the enemy guns one by one.
However, by the late afternoon we had managed to punch a few holes
in the front. The tank attack moved forward again and tank duels of
tremendous intensity developed deep in the battlefield. In fluctuating

l62 THE WAR IN AFRICA FIRST YEAR

fighting, tank against tank, tank against gun or anti-tank nest, sometimes
in frontal, sometimes in flanking assault, using every trick of mobile
warfare and tank tactics, the enemy was finally forced back into a confined
area. With no relief forthcoming from a Tobruk sortie, he now saw his
only escape from complete destruction in a break-out from the ring
surrounding him.

At one moment during this confused battle, the Afrika Korps*
Mammoth, containing General Cruewell and his staff, was suddenly
ringed round by British tanks. The German crosses on the sides of the
vehicle, which had been originally captured from the British, were not
easy to identify. The hatches were shut. The British tankmen, who had
fortunately fired off all their ammunition, had no idea whom they had
met. A number of them left their Mark VI, walked across to the
Mammoth and knocked on the armour plate, whereupon General
Cruewell opened the hatch and found himself looking into the face of
a British soldier, to the great astonishment of both. At that moment
gunfire started to spray into the neighbourhood. The occupants of the
Mammoth threw themselves flat 6n the thin wooden flooring, but the
vehicle escaped undamaged. A German so-mm. anti-aircraft gun had
opened fire on the dismounted British tank crews, who promptly jumped
back into their tanks and disappeared as fast as they could to the south,
thus releasing the staff of the Afrika Korps from a highly precarious
situation.

The wide plain south of Sidi Rezegh was now a sea of dust, haze
and smoke. Visibility was poor and many British tanks and guns were
able to break away to the south and east without being caught. But a
great part of the enemy force still remained inside. Twilight came, but
the battle was still not over. Hundreds of burning vehicles, tanks and
guns lit up the field of that Totensonntag. It was long after midnight before
we could get any sort of picture of the day s events, organise our force,
count our Idsses and gains and form an appreciation of the general
situation upon which the next day s operations would depend. The most
important results of this battle were the elimination of the direct threat
to the Tobruk front, the destruction of a large part of the enemy armour
and the damage to enemy morale caused by the complete ruin of his
plans.

After these reverses, the commander of XXX Corps, General Norrie, decided
to withdraw what remained of his forces southward to the Gabr Saleh area. Two-
thirds of his tanks had been lost, and the remaining 150 were badly dispersed.

23 Nov. 1941
DEAREST Lu,

The battle seems to have passed its crisis. I m very well, in good
humour and full of confidence. Two hundred enemy tanks shot up
so far. Our fronts have held.

THE WINTER CAMPAIGN, 1941-2 163

THE RAID INTO EGYPT

General Cruewell s conduct of the battle had been masterly; on the
morning of the 24th November he reported to Rommel on the ring road
Rommel did not yet know the full details of the action south of Tobruk
that the enemy had been smashed at Sidi Rezegh, and that only a part
of his force had escaped destruction. This fact strengthened Rommel in
the decision he had already taken to strike to the south-east deep into
the enemy s rear. Rommel explained his plan in the following words:
" The greater part of the force aimed at Tobruk has been destroyed;
now we will turn east and go for the New Zealanders and Indians before
they have been able to join up with the remains of their main force for
a combined attack on Tobruk. At the same time we will take Habata
and Maddalena and cut off their supplies. Speed is vital; we must
make the most of the shock effect of the enemy s defeat and push forward
immediately and as fast as we can with our entire force to Sidi Omar."

Rommel s intention was to exploit the disorganisation and confusion
which he knew must exist in the enemy s camp, by making an unexpected
and audacious raid into the area south of the Sollum front. He hoped to
complete the enemy s confusion and perhaps even induce him to pull
back into Egypt again. Our entire mobile force was to- take part in the
operation.

A weak holding force, scraped together from different formations
and put under the command of the artillery commander, General
Boettcher, was placed south of Tobruk to deal with any further enemy
attempts to raise the siege. Italian infantry remained at Bir el Gobi and
the siege of Tobruk was maintained by the same forces as hitherto. This
decision of Rommel s probably the boldest he ever made has been
severely criticised by certain German authorities, who were for ever
incapable of understanding the African theatre, but has been praised
and admired by the enemy.

It would, of course, have been possible for him to have first disposed
finally of the enemy remnants who had been fortunate enough to escape
destruction south of Tobruk; but this would have taken a great deal of
valuable time. He therefore judged it better to take the enemy unawares
by going for his Sollum front and at the same time striking a blow at his
most sensitive spothis life-line of supply. Accordingly, at midday on
the 24th November, the Afrika Korps and the Ariete Division started
on their long desert trek towards Sidi Omar, which they reached in the
evening after a wild drive in complete disregard of the British threat to
their flanks. Rommel, who was at the head of the column, led the 2ist
Panzer Division straight through the 4th Indian Division into the Sidi
Suleiman district in order to seal off the Halfaya front to the east. The
1 5th Panzer Division was ordered to attack Sidi Omar. One mixed

164 THE WAR IN AFRICA FIRST YEAR

combat group was assembled to take the supply centre at Maddalena,
while another was to destroy the camps round Habata, the terminus of
the desert railway. There is no doubt that these moves would have
seriously upset the enemy s supply, but they could never have caused it
to collapse altogether, and the story put about by a number of writers
that " the whole fate of the Eighth Army hung by a single thread, which
Rommel was unable to cut " is entirely without foundation.

On the 24th November, the issue of orders took place late in the
afternoon near Bir Sheferzen, east of Graziani s wire fence. Rommel
then drove off to 2ist Panzer Division and personally put them at the
Halfeya Pass. On the way back to Sidi Omar his one and only vehicle
broke down with engine trouble. It was pure luck that as dusk was
falling, the Afrika Korps Mammoth, containing General Cruewell and
his battle staff, came by. " Give us a lift," said Rommel, who, with
Cause, was shivering with cold. The Mammoth, now carrying all the
most senior officers of the Panzer Group, drove on to the wire fence.
Unfortunately, no way through it could be found, and it was impossible
to make one. Finally, Rommel grew impatient. " 1*11 take over myself,"
he said, and dismissed the A.D.C., who had been directing the vehicle
up till then, But this time even Rommel s legendary sense of direction
did not help. To make matters worse they were in an area completely
dominated by the enemy, Indian dispatch riders buzzed to and fro past
the Mammoth, British tanks moved up forward and American-built
lorries ground their way through the desert. None of them had any
suspicion that the highest officers of the German-Italian Panzer Group
were sitting in a captured command vehicle, often only two or three yards
away. The ten officers and five men spent a restless night.

During the days that followed, Rommel continued to drive from one
unit to another, usually through the British lines, in order to deal with
the continually recurring crises. On one occasion he went into a New
Zealand hospital, which was still occupied by the enemy. By this time
no one really knew who was captor and who captive except Rommel,
who was in no doubt. He inquired if anything was needed, promised the
British medical supplies and drove on unhindered. He also crossed an
air strip occupied by the British, and was several times chased by British
vehicles, but always escaped.

Meanwhile, the sist Panzer Division, contrary to its original instruc
tions, but following an order wrongly transmitted to it by the Army s
rear operations staff, had moved through the Halfaya position on to
Capuzzo and become involved in dangerous and costly fighting with the
New Zealanders. The attack made by units of the Afrika Korps on Sidi
Omar miscarried, and it soon became apparent that the enemy was
everywhere still far stronger than might have been expected after our
victories. He had recovered from the shock very quickly and the situation
had been saved as we discovered later by the personal intervention

l66 THE WAR IN AFRICA FIRST YEAR

of General Auchinleck, G.-in-C. Middle East Army Group, who had
rushed up from Cairo and at the last moment reversed General Cunning
ham s decision to evacuate the Marmarica and withdraw to Egypt.

Rommel s daring stroke came very close to proving decisive by its effect on the
mind of the commander of the opposing army. The shattering defeat of his armour
in the battle around Sidi Re&gh led Cunningham on the syrd to contemplate
abandoning the offensive and withdrawing over the frontier to reorganise his forces
out of Rommel 9 s reach. By such a timely withdrawal he could reckon on keeping
his army in being, whereas by continuing the offensive in tlie existing conditions he
ran the risk of having it completely destroyed. But his inclination to retreat was
overruled by Auchinleck, who arrived at this crucial moment by air from Cairo.

The next day, Rommel launched the Afrika Korps on its strategic raid. As it
burst through into the, British rear area it spread confusion and panic. This
alarming news naturally increased Cunningham 9 s anxiety. If the decision to persist
or retreat had rested with him, RommeFs deep advance might have settled the issue.
But on the 26th Auchinleck, after returning to Cairo, came to the conclusion that he
must reinforce his order to continue the offensive by giving the Eighth Army a
different commander, and replaced Cunningham by Ritchie the Deputy Chief of
the General Staff at his own headquarters.

AuchinlecKs intervention and resolution brought victory out of defeat. Tet his
decision was basically more of a gamble than Rommel* s raid, because it staked
the survival of the Eighth Army on a continuance of the British offensive. The
misdirection of the 21 st Panzer Division, as well as the firm resistance of the New
Zealand and 4th Indian Divisions, was an important factor in the issue.

As things turned out, Rommel 9 s raid resulted in more forfeit than gain. When
the raid started, he had almost won the battle. When the raid ended, the scales had
tilted against him. But the margin was very narrow, not only psychologically but
physically. For in his south-easterly drive to the frontier aimed at the British
supply sources behind it lie actually passed the two field supply depots on which
the whole British advance depended. These two huge dumps, each some six miles
square, lay 75 miles south-east and south-west respectively of Gabr Saleh, and only
the 22nd Guards Brigade was available to defend them. The Afrika Korps actually
passed through the water point on the northern edge of the more easterly dump.
But the existence of these two vital supply sources was not discovered thanks to
good concealment, and control ofttie air on tlie British side.

If Rommel, after his success at Sidi Rezegh, had pushed south to mop up the
remains of XXX Corps, he would have found the dumps and probably sealed his
victory. It was ironical that in pursuing the bigger aim he missed the bigger target.
The course he actually took might be condemned by cautiously conventional doctrine,
but it was in accord with the classic ideas of generalship as applied by the " Great
Captains " of history. When a similar course was followed by the Panzer forces
the year before against the Allied armies in Western Europe, under more precarious
circumstances, it had produced the greatest victory of modern times. Its miscarriage,
this time in Africa, was due partly to the human factors already mentioned

THE WINTER CAMPAIGN, 1941-2 167

Auchinleck above all but it was also a demonstration of the big part that chance
plays in the issues of war.

BACK TO TOBRUK

Rommel had notified his la, Lieut.-CoI. Westphal, of his decision to
strike for Sidi Omar in the early morning of the 24th November. Westphal
wanted to raise objections, and in particular to draw attention to the fact
that the British were reassembling their troops south of Bir el Gobi.
But Rommel permitted no discussion, pulled General Gause, his Chief
of Staff, into the car and drove off to Sidi Oman

Before they had gone far the accompanying wireless vehicle stuck
fast in the desert. Rommel drove on without it and the operations staff
at headquarters could no longer reach him by wireless. So when the
British, freshly organised after Auchinleck s assumption of command,
advanced on the now practically denuded area of Sidi Rezegh, Westphal
tried desperately to make contact with Rommel. Several aircraft were
sent out to look for him, but they did not return. The situation south of
Tobruk grew steadily more tense, and finally Westphal decided to take
matters into his own hands and recall the 2ist Panzer Division to Sidi
Rezegh.

When Rommel heard of this order he regarded it at first as an enemy
trick, but soon found out that it was genuine. An A.D.C. of Rommel s,
Lieut. Voss, gives the following account of his return to H.Q. :

" Rommel was at first furious at Lieut.-Col. Westphal s independent
action in recalling 2ist Panzer Division to El Adem. On returning to
headquarters he greeted nobody but stalked silently into the command
vehicle and looked at the situation maps. Behind him stood Cause.
We tried to signal to Cause that he should talk to Rommel and explain
Westphal s decision. But it was not necessary, for Rommel suddenly
left the vehicle saying that he was going to lie down. Nobody dared go
to the vehicle where Rommel was sleeping, to report on the situation.
Next morning, however, to everybody s relief, the General made no
further mention of the incident. He was as friendly as ever and work
at headquarters continued smoothly."

Although the British 7th Armoured Division and the South Africans
had undoubtedly been very badly mauled, the New Zealanders, the
Indians, the Guards Brigade and the Tobruk garrison were all fully
intact and active. In these circumstances, Rommel was compelled to
give up . the operations against the supply centres at Maddalena and
Habata [in the desert, 25 miles south ofBuqbuq], as these long-range and time-
consuming raids could no longer take the enemy by surprise and would
have meant a wanton dispersal of our strength. He now concentrated
all his mobile forces against the New Zealanders. On the 25th November

l68 THE WAR IN AFRICA FIRST YEAR

heavy fighting flared up again at Tobruk, where our holding force was
caught between pincers, one coming from the south-east and the other
from the fortress itself. By mustering all their strength, the Boettcher
Group succeeded in beating off most of these attacks, and the only
enemy penetration was brought to a standstill by an Italian counter
attack.

In view of this critical situation, Rommel immediately broke off
operations on the Sollum front and brought all his formations back as
quickly as possible to the main centre of the battle at Tobruk*

27 Nov. 1341
DEAREST Lu,

The battle has now been raging in the desert round Tobruk and
in front of Sollum since the igth. You will have heard from the
communiques more or less how it has gone. I think we re through
the worst and that the battle will be of decisive importance to the
whole war situation.

I m very well. I ve just spent four days in a desert counter-attack
with nothing to wash with. We had a splendid success.

It s our 25th wedding anniversary to-day. Perhaps it ll run to a
special communiqu^. I need not tell you how well we get on together.
I want to thank you for all the love and kindness through the years
which have passed so quickly. I think, with gratitude to you, of our
son, who is a source of great pride to me. With his splendid gifts he
should go far.

All for now. Our next move is already beginning.

On the 28th November, while the 2ist Panzer Division raced along
on either side of the coast road to Gambut and gained the country south
of Zafraan, I5th Panzer Division drove down the Trigh Capuzzo
with its flank constantly threatened by mobile forces. After fighting its
way up the escarpment and for the Jebel, the division found itself in the
evening once again on the old battleground at Sidi Rezegh.

A wireless signal from Rommel summoned the commander of the
Afrika Korps to the Panzer Group s forward H.Q,., which was said to be
located near Gambut. After searching for a long time in the darkness
they finally discovered a British lorry, which General Cruewell s command
car approached with great caution. Inside it, to his good fortune, were
no British troops, but Rommel and his Chief of Staff, both of them
unshaven, worn with lack of sleep and caked with dust. In the lorry
was a heap of straw as a bed, a can of stale water to drink and a few tins
of food. Close by were two wireless trucks and a few dispatch riders.
Rommel now gave his instructions for next day s operations.

His plan was to surround the New Zealand division, which had
meanwhile joined hands with the Tobruk garrison, and thus close the

THE WINTER CAMPAIGN, 1941-2 l6g

ring round Tobruk again. For this operation he gathered together
eveiy available formation and put the main weight of his attack on the
western flank in order to prevent the New Zealanders withdrawing into
Tobruk.

29 Nov. 1941
DEAREST Lu,

The battle seems to be developing well. The decision will probably
come to-day. I m full of confidence.

In haste.

The 2 ist Panzer Division whose commander, General von Raven-
stein, had been taken prisoner by the New Zealanders closed the ring
from the east and at the same time defended itself against heavy relieving
attacks from the south. In the evening the I5th Panzer Division, moving
north, took the important ridge of El Duda, but it was lost again during
the night.

50 Nov. 1941
DEAREST Lu,

The battle is still going on and will need all our efforts if we are
to win it. Prospects are good, but the troops are dead tired after
twelve days of it. Fm in good form, very lively and ready for anything.
The British have captured von Ravenstein. All for to-day.

On the morning of the 3Oth November, powerful enemy armour and
massed infantry advanced against our southern screen, but their attacks
were unco-ordinated and we were able to repulse them all along the line.
The 1 5th Panzer Division, on the other hand, in spite of many attempts,
failed to take Belhammed or make contact with the goth Light Division,
which would have cut the pocket off from Tobruk.

It was not finally sealed off until the following day, when, after all
attempts at relief from the south and east had been beaten off, a con
centric attack was launched which resulted in the destruction of the
greater part of the New Zealand Division.

Thus the British garrison was once again locked up in Tobruk. The
enemy, moreover as we learnt from an intercepted wireless message
had suffered such heavy losses that he now intended temporarily to break
off the battle.

But Rommel could not allow his troops the rest they so badly needed.
The Sollum front was having to fight hard to defend itself against the
Indians, the supply line was being continually molested and Bardia was
seriously threatened. He therefore dispatched two mixed combat groups
of the Afrika Korps along the Trigh Capuzzo and the coast road,
respectively, to open our lines of communication. He placed the bulk
of the German and Italian mobile forces south-east of Tobruk where,

I7O THE WAR IN AFRICA FIRST YEAR

while being supplied and refitted, they could be sent quickly either to
the Sollum front or to the south against the British main force.

The enemy formations carried out their reorganisation and re
grouping on either side of the Trigh el Abd, covered by a deep screen
of armoured cars along the line Sidi Muftah Capuzzo.

With the enemy so much better off for supplies than we were, we
could expect him soon to be ready to resume his offensive. However, the
battle had reached a temporary conclusion and the army reported to the
High Command on its victories :

" In the continuous heavy fighting between the i8th November and
the ist December, 814 enemy armoured fighting vehicles and armoured
cars have been destroyed, and 127 aircraft shot down. No estimate can
yet be given of the booty in arms, ammunition and vehicles. Prisoners
exceed 9,000, including three generals."

Not until later did we learn that the enemy had meanwhile made a
change in the command of the Eighth Army. General Ritchie had
replaced General Cunningham.

2 Dec.

DEAREST Lu,

Yesterday we succeeded in destroying the remains of one, or
perhaps two, British divisions in front of Tobruk, which has made the
situation a little easier. But the British won t give up, if I know them.
However, we are now fighting under better conditions than before
and will pull it off for certain.

The attack of our two mixed combat groups on Bardia-Sollum mis
carried. On the 4th December, the army gained a clear picture of the
enemy s dispositions. A new force was being formed round Bir el Gobi,
obviously with the intention of thrusting round our flank deep into our
rear and unhinging the siege front round Tobruk. Rommel decided to
attack this force immediately and with all his mobile formations, before
it had had time to complete its preparations.

Our forces had now become too weak to maintain the ring round
Tobruk, and Rommel had preparations made to give up the eastern
part of the siege front. During the night 4-5 December the Afrika Korps
moved westwards through the corridor between El Duda and Sidi
Rezegh now only two miles wide to its assembly area at El Adem.
The attack on Gobi was due to be made in conjunction with the Italian
Motorised Corps coming up from the north-east, but with the Italians
neither assembled nor in a fit state to attack, the Afrika Korps had to
strike the blow alone, which they did at midday on the 5th December.
The Korps first came up against the British Guards Brigade newly
arrived in the battle and then the refitted brigades of 7th Armoured
Division. In spite of this they advanced by evening to a point 10 miles

THE WINTER CAMPAIGN, 1941-2

north-west of Gobi. Meanwhile, the British had launched an attack
from Tobruk, and taken the hill line Duda-Belhammed* This finally
forced us to give up the eastern part of the Tobruk front.

At midday on the 5th December, a Commando Supremo Staff
officer, sent by the Duce, arrived at Army H.Q. and informed us that no
reinforcements for the Panzer Group could be expected to arrive before
the beginning of January* Nothing could be done until that date except
to cover the barest essentials of rations and ammunition* This information
did not make us any more cheerfuL

Auchinleck managed to send up two more infantry brigades, and two armoured
car regiments. Moreover, the ist Armoured Division had just arrived from England
and was moved up close to the frontier for intense desert training; it would thus
provide additional insurance against any further panzer raid.

On the evening of the 5th December, Rommel had the following
appreciation to consider: " The Afrika Korps attack has inflicted no
decisive damage on the enemy at Gobi, largely because of the absence
of the Italian Motorised Corps. It is to be expected that the enemy
force in the Gobi area will be further reinforced by fresh formations and
will soon go over to the attack itself in superior strength. Events at Tobruk
have shown that there, too, the enemy still disposes of battle-worthy
formations. Nevertheless, there still appears to be a chance of gaining a
decision, by launching all the remaining German and Italian panzer
and motorised divisions in a concerted attack against the British at Gobi.
If this fails to destroy a substantial part of the enemy s force, then, in view
of our own heavy losses in men and material, we shall have to consider
breaking off the battle and withdrawing to the Gazala position, and later
evacuating Cyrenaica altogether."

The Afrika Korps launched their attack on the 6th December, once
again alone. The Italians reported that their troops were exhausted and
no longer fit for action. The enemy fell slowly back on Bir el Gobi, but
it was no longer possible to destroy, or even outflank and envelop any
material part of their force. There was in fact a serious danger of our
own force being outflanked round both sides by the superior enemy. 1
In spite of this, the attack was resumed on the 7th December, again
without success. Our casualties were heavy.

In view of the great numerical superiority of the enemy and the
condition of our own troops, Rommel now decided to give up Tobruk
completely and beat a fighting retreat to the Gazala position. It was a
painful decision to have to take, for the German troops had fought
successfully and inflicted very heavy losses on the enemy. But to have
stayed any longer at Tobruk would merely have led to the steady

1 Cruewell, who realised that the destruction of the enemy could only be achieved
\vith the co-operation of the Italians, repeatedly wirelessed: " Where is Gambarra? "
But Gambarra did not appear on the battlefield. Cruewell s signal later became a stock
witticism with the troops in Africa.

172 THE WAR IN AFRICA FIRST YEAR

attrition of our already weakened forces, and thus ultimately to the loss
of Libya.

Letter written by L-Cpl. Guenther, Rommel s batman

6 Dec. 1941
DEAR FRAU ROMMEL,

The General went off to his command post very early again this
morning. I am to send you his warmest greetings and to inform
you that the General is still in good health and that all is well with
him.

The new fighting is making very heavy demands on the General;
he has no time to spare.

We left our house a fortnight ago and have moved several times
since then. Now to-day we have landed up once again in a small
wadi, where aircraft will not find us very easily. Our vehicles are
well camouflaged and now have quite a look of the desert about
them. We have still got the two chickens, the General has no doubt
told you about them. They are even managing to find something
green here. [Rommel had been presented with a number of chickens,
which at Guenther s special request had not been killed, but were being taken
along as mascots.]

It is very quiet to-day compared with the past weeks. We are
no longer in range of the enemy artillery, which used to fire very
frequently all round and behind us. So it is very pleasant again not
to have the shells whizzing all round. Now I will close. I wish you
the very best and send the warmest greetings on behalf of the General
to you and your son.

HERBERT GUENTHER
L-Cpl.

9 Dec. 1941
DEAREST Lu,

You will no doubt have seen how we re doing from the Wehrmacht
commUniques. I ve had to break off the action outside Tobruk on
account of the Italian formations and also the badly exhausted
German troops. I m hoping we ll succeed in escaping enemy encircle
ment and holding on to Cyrenaica. I m keeping well. You can
imagine what I m going through and what anxieties I have. It
doesn t look as though we ll get any Christmas this year. It s only a
fortnight away.

THE WINTER CAMPAIGN, 1941-2 173

RETREAT FROM GYRENAIGA

During the night 7-8 December, with the defence of Tobruk s western
front maintained, the Afrika Korps and the Italian Motorised Corps
disengaged from the enemy. Elements of the non-motorised Italian
XXI Corps and goth Light Division were already arriving in the Gazala
position. Our main danger during the withdrawal was to the southern
flank, where the enemy could outflank us without difficulty, and the
Afrika Korps was accordingly detailed to cover the flank of the whole
force. However, the enemy attempted nothing so ambitious, but limited
himself to thrusts against our front, all of which were beaten off. The
Sollum front now 120 miles from the main force was still holding out,
in spite of the fact that there was now no land route through to them for
supplies.

A substantial force was now put in to protect the weakest and most
dangerous point on the German-Italian side, the bottleneck at Agedabia,
where it would have been a simple matter for the enemy to cut the life
line of the whole Axis Army.

Withdrawing a step at a time, fighting isolated and sometimes very
troublesome actions as they went, all troops reached the Gazala Line
by the isth December, without the enemy having succeeded, during the
withdrawal, in cutting off any sizeable detachments of troops or inflicting
any serious casualties,

RommePs decision found no agreement with his Italian superiors,
and an interesting sidelight on this situation is given in the following
entry in his diary:

" I also received a visit from Excellency Bastico in a ravine south-east
of Ain el Gazala bay, where we established our H.Q. on the I2th
December. He is very upset about the way the battle is going and is
particularly worried about the Agedabia area, to which he wants to move
an Italian division as quickly as possible. It worked up to a very stormy
argument, during which I told him, among other things, that I was not
going to stand for any of my Italian divisions being taken from me and
redisposed by him. I would have no option but to make the retreat
through Cyrenaica with the German forces alone, leaving the Italians
to their fate. I added that I was quite certain that we for our part would
be able to fight our way through, but that the Italians would not manage
it without our help. In short, I did not intend to have a single Italian
soldier removed from my command. Excellency Bastico thereupon
became more amenable."

is Dec. 1941
DEAREST Lu,

Don t worry about me. It will all come out all right. We re still

174 THE WAR IN AFRICA FIRST YEAR

not through the crisis. It ll probably go on for another couple of
weeks yet. But I still have hopes of holding on here. I m now living
in a proper house complete with " hero s cellar " [a dugout or shelter].
I spend the days with the troops.

Happy Christmas to you and Manfred. I hope to be with you
shortly afterwards.

On the 1 3th December, a strong enemy infantry attack broke through
XX Italian Motorised Corps s line and enemy reconnaissance forces
reached Bir Temrad, 12 miles behind our front.

13 Dec. 1941
DEAREST Lu,

The situation has been made extremely critical by the failure of a
major Italian formation. However, I hope to be able to hold on.
Otherwise, I m very well, in fixed quarters.

Simultaneously enemy armour \^th Armoured Brigade] was enveloping
the Afrika Korps positions on the desert flank. The enemy s frontal
break-through was temporarily checked by a successful counter-attack,
but he was strong enough to renew it. Beyond that, there was obviously
a danger that the enemy armour might push through to the desert cross
roads at Mechili, stop our supplies and cut off our retreat through
Cyrenaica. It was no use concealing the fact that the strength of the
Axis forces was at an end and Rommel reported to the High Command:
" After 4 weeks of uninterrupted and costly fighting, the fighting power
of the troops despite superb individual achievements is showing signs
of flagging, all the more so as the supply of arms and ammunition has
completely dried up. While the Army intends to maintain its hold on
the Gazala area during the i6th December, retreat through Mechili-
Derna will be unavoidable, at the latest during the night of the i6tb,
if it is to escape being outflanked and destroyed by a superior enemy."

The Italian High Command was horrified over this plan. On the
1 6th December General Cavallero appeared at Army H.Q, and had
several conferences with Rommel. The diary entry reads as follows:

" At my meeting at 15.15 hours with General Cavallero, I stated that
as things had developed, there was only one possibility open to me,
namely, to break off the action south of the Ain el Gazala bay and near
Tmimi during the night and withdraw our troops to Mechili and Tmimi
respectively. The enemy had enveloped the whole of this front and the
only escape route left to us was a narrow strip through Tmimi. The
Italian troops now had little fight left in them. Cavallero raised no
objections at the time.

" However, at 23.00 hours he appeared at my H.Q. again, this time
accompanied by Field-Marshal Kesselring, Excellency Bastico and

THE WINTER CAMPAIGN, 1941-2 175

General Gambarra. In a voice charged with emotion, he demanded that
the order for the retreat should be withdrawn. He did not see the
necessity for it, and in any case feared political difficulties for the Duce if
Gyrenaica were lost. Kesselring backed him up strongly and said that it
was completely out of the question for him to give up the airfield at
Derna. I stood my ground and said that it was too late to alter my
decision. The orders had been issued and were in some cases already
being executed. Unless the Panzer Group wanted to face complete
destruction, it had no choice but to fight its way back through the enemy
during the night. I fully realised that this would mean the eventual loss
of Cyrenaica and that political difficulties might result. But the choice
I was faced with was either to stay where I was and thus sacrifice the
Panzer Group to destruction thereby losing both Cyrenaica and
Tripolitania or to begin the retreat that night, fight my wa^/back
through Cyrenaica to the Agedabia area and at least defend Tripolitania.
I could only choose the latter. Excellency Bastico and Gambarra
behaved so violently in my room that evening, that I was finally obliged
to ask Bastico how he, as Commander-in-Chief of the North African
forces, proposed to handle the situation. Bastico evaded the question,
and said that as Commander-in-Chief it was not his business; heqouh}
only say that we ought to keep our forces together. Finally, the delegation
left my H.Q. having accomplished nothing."

On the evening of the i6th December the Afrika Korps and the
Italian Motorised Corps, all under the command of General Cruewell,
began their withdrawal across the southern edge of the Cyrenaican
mountains to El Abiar, while the Italian non-motorised infantry forma
tions marched back through Cyrenaica [.*. the coastal strip].

20 Dec. 1941
DEAREST Lu,

We re pulling out. There was simply nothing else for it. I hope
we manage to get back to the line we ve chosen. Christmas is going
to be completely messed up.

I m very well. I ve now managed to get a bath and a change,
having slept in my coat most of the time for the last few weeks. Some
supplies have arrived die first since October. My commanding
officers are ill all those who aren t dead or wounded.

22 Dec. 1941

Retreat to A 1 1 You can t imagine what it s like. Hoping

to get the bulk of my force through and make a stand somewhere.
Little ammunition and petrol, no air support. Quite the reverse
with the enemy. But enough of that. . . .

^Agedabia.

176 THE WAR IN AFRICA FIRST YEAR

23 Dec. 1941

Operations going satisfactorily to-day, so far as it s possible to tell
in the morning. It looks as though we ll succeed in extricating our
selves from the envelopment and getting the main body back. It ll
be a great Christmas treat for me if it does come off. How modest
one becomes! It s no good turning to the Italian High Command
of course. They would have been roped in long ago with all their
force.

25 Dec. 1941

I opened my Christmas parcel in my caravan yesterday evening
and was very pleased with the letters from you and Manfred and the
presents. Some of it, like the bottle of champagne, I took straight
across to the Intelligence truck where I sat over it with the Chief, the
la and Ic. The night passed quietly. But the Italian divisions give us
a lot of worry. There are shocking signs of disintegration and German
troops are being forced to the rescue everywhere. The British were
badly disappointed at Benghazi in neither cutting us off, nor finding
petrol and rations. Cruewell has been made a full Panzer General.
He really deserves it. Pm up at the front every day, regrouping and
organising our forces. I hope we now succeed in making a stand.

P.S. I don t think I ve told you yet that Schraepler met with a
fatal accident (run over by the Mammoth).

By the 25th December, the retreat to Agedabia was complete, without
the enemy having exploited a single one of the many chances which he
had had for outflanking the German forces. The non-motorised German-
Italian troops moved into improvised defence lines on either side of the
town, while the Afrika Korps and the Italian Motorised Corps took up
positions round Agedabia for a mobile defence.

There was one more major " victory " to record before the retreat
was over on the igth December a convoy from Italy arrived in Benghazi
carrying two German panzer companies, artillery batteries and supplies.
These were the first ships carrying arms which had arrived since the
beginning of the British offensive in mid-November. Part of the convoy
had been sunk during the crossing and two panzer companies and one
battery lost.

It remains a mystery why the British did not outmarch us through
the excellent driving country of the desert and finally cut off our retreat
at the critical point, i.e. Agedabia. Fortunately for us, this danger, of
which Rommel was all the time afraid, did not materialise. 1

ir The British follow-up was greatly handicapped by the difficulties of maintaining
supplies as the line of supply became increasingly stretched. In consequence, the follow-
up forces not only had to be reduced, but dwindled as the advance continued. The re-
equipped 22nd Armoured Brigade formed the main armoured element, but was twice

THE WINTER CAMPAIGN, 1941-2 177

Even so, the threat of our flank being turned by a wide hook through
the desert was still with us at Agedabia, which was operationally a weak*
position. In view of the condition of our troops particularly the Italians
and the deficiencies in our supply it did not seem very advisable to
make a long stay at Agedabia, but rather to limit ourselves to fighting
a delaying action there, and then, when the moment seemed right, to
pull back the bulk of our force to Mersa el Brega. Rommel reported in
these terms to the Commando Supremo and they, after long deliberation,
were eventually forced to agree that whereas we might lose everything
if we stayed at Agedabia, Tripolitania at least could be successfully
defended if we pulled back to Mersa el Brega. However, the time for
this retreat had not yet come.

Our defence at Agedabia was centred on the Afrika Korps. As the
position itself was incapable of withstanding a major attack, the only
way to defend it was by movement and counter-attack. Meanwhile, the
enemy had already pushed forward very close to our front, so that we
could expect both a frontal assault on our line and a hook round our
desert flank. On the 2 7th December, the 22nd British Armoured Brigade,
recently refitted and again up to full fighting strength, 1 moved forward
through El Haseiat, while other troops launched a frontal attack at
Agedabia. In three days of tank fighting, the enemy was outflanked,
forced to fight on a reversed front, and finally surrounded. Some thirty
of his tanks succeeded in escaping east, as petrol shortage checked the
completion of our success. Under the impress of this defeat the elements
of the Support Group and Guards Brigade which had mounted the
frontal attack, also withdrew to the north-east. Thus the immediate
danger to the Agedabia position was over. Rommel immediately made
use of this breathing space to evacuate the position and retire by stages
without enemy pressure into the Mersa el Brega line. The withdrawal
began on the 2nd January with the departure of the Italian infantry.
The mobile formations moved last and all troops were ready for action
in the Brega line by the 1 2th January.

While these successful actions were being fought, the situation on the
Halfaya-Bardia front, where the garrisons now 450 miles away from
the main body were still maintaining a heroic resistance, had visibly
deteriorated. On the 3Oth December, the enemy launched a decisive
attack on Bardia with powerful artillery, air and naval support and gained
a deep penetration over a wide front in our defences. The last of our
ration and ammunition dumps fell into enemy hands, and the Corn-
held up for lack of petrol. It is clear that Rommel s supply system was far better adapted
to rapid and long-range movement than the British. Auchinleck himself emphasises that
Rommel was " greatly helped by the remarkable elasticity of his supply organisation.*

ir That is not correct. It had been made up to a strength of 130 tanks, but of these
many had broken down in the long desert march from Gazala. In the battle that
followed 65 were destroyed.

178 THE WAR IN AFRICA FIRST YEAR

mandant, with Army s approval, asked for terms. The fortress was
finally handed over on the 2nd January.

In the Halfaya sector the starving garrison held out until the ryth
January, when, having exhausted its stores and being cut off from its
last water supply, it was forced to surrender. Superb leadership was
shown by the Italian General de Georgis, who commanded this German-
Italian force in its two months struggle.

As a result of the fall of these frontier garrisons, Rommel s loss, which had
been about the same as the British (18,000), during the battle, became much larger
in the end. Some 4,000 Germans and 10,000 Italians were captured at Bardia,
Sollum and Halfaya.

Tfie British had suffered a much heavier loss of tanks in the battle, but through
RommeVs retreat they were able to recover and repair a large proportion so that their
permanent loss was only 278, while Rommel s was about 300 (including the Italian
tanks).

30 Dec. 7947
DEAREST Lu,

Heavy fighting yesterday, which went well for us. Their new
attempt to encircle us and force us back against the sea has failed.

I m back in Army H.Q. again. Kesselring and Gambarra are
coming to-day. Gause will be flying off afterwards to Rome. They ve
got absolutely no idea there of the difficulties here in Africa and are
all going about their normal daily round of business or pleasure.

Rain is falling and the nights are bitterly cold and windy. I m
keeping fit sleeping all I can. You will no doubt understand that
there s no chance whatever of my leaving here at the moment.

All for now, must go to the Chief [Chief of Staff].

31 Dec. 1941
My thoughts to-day, the last day of the year, are more than ever

with you two, who mean the happiness of this earth to me.

Almost superhuman exertions lie behind my gallant troops. The
past three days fighting, in which we have been on the attack, has
cost the enemy in tanks and 23 armoured cars. The difficulties
under which this success has been scored beggar description. Anyway,
it was a good finish for 1941 and gives hope for 1942.

I m well. One cockerel and one hen have accustomed themselves
to this gipsy existence and run loose round the truck. They belong
half to Gause.

All the best to you both for 1942.

5 Jan. 1942

Everything going as planned so far. Maybe better times are
coining, in spite of everything. Gause was with the Fuehrer yesterday.

THE WINTER CAMPAIGN, I 941 -2 179

I would have liked him to have spent a fortnight in Rome with his
wife. He was very exhausted after all he has had to go through at
my side. Our la (Lieut.-Col. Westphal) is bearing up, although he
had to go and get jaundice in the middle of it all. Kcsselring was here
yesterday. We re gradually getting more stuff across. He s doing
very good work over Malta.

jo Jan. 1942

Yesterday s letter was also dated the roth. One has no feeling
for time here.

Operations going as planned so far. Our mines and Luftwaffe
are making things difficult for the enemy pursuit. To think that
we ve got our force back 300 miles to a good line, without suffering
serious harm, and in spite of the fact that the bulk of it is non-
motorised! That our " unemployed " generals are grousing all the
time doesn t surprise me. Criticism doesn t cost much.

The Afrika Korps goes into the second line to-day, for the first
time since the i8th November. Cruewell s got a very bad dose of
jaundice and it s doubtful if he ll stick it out. I ll soon be the only
one of the German officers who s seen the whole thing through from
start to finish. The nights are bitterly cold and damp. I wrap myself
up in woollens as much as I can. My stomach s all right. Guenther
sees to it that I eat well. I m on the move from morning to night
seeing that everything is going properly with the troops. It s very
necessary. Best wishes to you and our son.

14 Jan. 1942

All going as planned here. The clash must come very soon now,
but I have the greatest confidence that we ll