Full text of "Roumania's cause & ideals"

See other formats

HISTORY i

Univ. of California
Withdrawn

ROUMANIA'S CAUSE AND IDEALS

BY THE SAME AUTHOR

CONCISE GRAMMAR OF THE RUSSIAN LANGUAGE.
Second Edition.

LONDON : JOHN MURRAY

TALE OF THE ARMAMENT OF IGOR (A.D. 1185).
Edited and Translated.

FOLK-TALES OF RUSSIA. Translated.
PROS AND CONS IN THE GREAT WAR.

LONDON : KEGAN PAUL, TRENCH, TRUBNER & Co., LTD.

LEONARD A. MAGNUS, LL.B.

LONDON :

KEGAN PAUL, TRENCH, TRUBNER & Co. LTD.

NEW YORK : E. P. BUTTON & Co.

1917

HiSTORr i

•
. -

CONTENTS

CHAP. PAGE

MAP OF ROUMANIA AND TRANSYLVANIA Frontispiece

INTRODUCTION - vii

TABLE OF SOUNDS AND SPELLINGS - xiii

I A SHORT HISTORY OF ROUMANIA - - I

II A SHORT HISTORY OF TRANSYLVANIA - 15

III THE GRIEVANCES OF TRANSYLVANIA - - 27

IV A SHORT ACCOUNT OF BESSARABIA - - 51

V THE LEADING UP TO THE DECLARATION
OF WAR IN AUGUST, IQl6 — PRELIMINARY
OBSERVATIONS 59

VI THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN AUSTRIA

AXD ROUMANIA PRECEDING THE WAR - 74

1. ROUMANIA PERSISTS IN REMAINING NEUTRAL 74

2. THE FIRST POSSIBILITY OF WAR AFTER

TURKEY JOINED IN - yg

3. ROUMANIA REMAINS NEUTRAL. DEATH OF

KING CAROL - - - 8l

4. ROUMANIA WILL NOT LEt MUNITIONS PASS

THROUGH TO TURKEY. THE EXAMPLE OF

ITALY - 85

5. ROUMANIA NEUTRAL AFTER THE INTER-

VENTION OF ITALY, AND PREVENTED
FROM INTERVENING WHEN BULGARIA
TAKES UP ARMS gj

2227038

CONTENTS VI

PAGE

6. THE BULGARIAN DEMAND - Q2

7. BULGARIA ENTERS THE FIELD - - 1 06

8. THE PERIOD BEFORE THE FINAL ACT - I IQ

9. FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS - - ng

10. THE DECLARATION OF WAR - 126

11. WHAT FORCED ROUMANIA INTO WAR ON

THE 27TH AUGUST? - - - 141

12. SUMMARY - - - 147

APPENDIX, DECLARATIONS OF WAR

AFFECTING ROUMANIA IN THIS WAR - 151

A LIST OF USEFUL DATES - - - 153

LIST OF BOOKS CONSULTED - - - 159

INDEX - - - ... . 161

INTRODUCTION

THERE is so little known in this country of
Roumania, or, generally, of the East of Europe,
that a short account of the real factors that have
brought Roumania into the war is justified at the
present time, even though the inevitable lack of
authentic and irrefragable historical evidence
renders any such preliminary essay nothing more
than a provisional attempt at truth. In any case,
the lapse of time before authoritative history is
issued has always been very long.

The first broad principle is that the Western
nations have been screened by the Eastern-
Russia, Poland, Austria, and the Balkans — from
experiencing the devastating brunt of the Asiatic
invasions of the Middle Ages. The fury of these
assaults ravaged those countries and set the clock
of early civilization back for many centuries. The
West, sheltered behind this advance guard, pros-
pered in comparative security.

The Early Middle Ages were indeed the critical
period of European national development. It was

Vlll INTRODUCTION

the time when the consciousness of nationhood was
springing into active and fruitful life. In the West
the process was but slightly retarded — or perhaps
merely complicated — by the overweening claims
of that pale and persistent ghost of universal
dominion, the Holy Roman Empire. The East of
Europe had to endure the gruesome fight against
the Mongol and the Turk ; and, as it adhered to
the "heretical" Orthodox Church, was under the
further disadvantage of being cut off from the
cultural influence of the West.

In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, both
the Empire and the Turk, as deterrents, had been
more or less relegated to the muniment-room
in the castle of European thought : but, to the
prejudice of Balkan peoples, their spirit survived
in another form. The Balkan nations were destined
either to be forgotten and relinquished to the Turk ;
or, in the slow course of the dissolution of that
Empire, to wait until they duly fell into the power
of one or other of the claimants to the old Imperial
prestige of Rome ; either to serve as extensions
towards the sea of the landlocked domains of the
Caesarean Habsburgs of Vienna, or to furnish an
avenue to the open waters for the Byzantine
Romanovs, who also pretended to the heritage and
the tradition of the Second Rome at Constantinople.

Of all these colossal struggles, England, insular

INTRODUCTION IX

and protected, as by a bodyguard, by all the other
nations of the West, knew little and cared little.

When Bismarck in 1877, in cynical callousness,
pronounced that the Eastern question was not worth
the bones of a Pomeranian grenadier, as a
Prussian, as the Chancellor of a Continental
European Empire, he was, at any rate, not speaking
in ignorance of it. Such indifference, on the part
of Germany, was a disputable matter of expediency :
William II differed in his estimate, and in 1892
launched out upon a policy of Oriental aggrandise-
ment : to us who are living in this period, it is
too early to adjudicate on the wisdom of the new
departure.

But English indifference to th'e problems of
the Balkans had become a tradition, almost an
idee fixe. The precedent of disinterestedness of

1877 was almost exactly followed in 1912 and even
1914. In 1856 (after the Crimean War), and in

1878 (at the Congress of Berlin), we conservatively
leaned our strength to the moribund and corrupt
cause of the Turkish Empire.

We thereby directly contributed to the possibility
of the volcanic eruption of 1912 and 1914; regardless
of the fact, that, as of old, the Sultan was the ally
of the would-be despot of Europe, as he had been
of Louis XIV and Napoleon. Even the Tsardom
of Russia in 1878 gauged the true democratic

X INTRODUCTION

and national solidarity of Europe better than we
did.

The convulsion of this terrific world-war has at
last demonstrated to us what is the true unity of
Europe ; that a blow struck at international comity
in the Balkans will reverberate in the fjords of
Norway and Iceland, and shake the foundations of
national polity all the world over. The lesson to
be derived from the war is how to convert to
purposes, pacific and constructive, this essential
community of the free nations of Europe ; how, in
a measure, to re-inaugurate the ideals of the Holy
Alliance of 1815, without having recourse to the
brutal and obsolete caesarism of the Dynasts who
overwhelmed Napoleon.

In this vast scheme of things, Roumania, too,
has her place. In the dawn of European history,
she acted as a buffer against the Asiatic hordes,
and paid the price. As an independent kingdom,
very late in the day, she had to elect to which
group of powers she would adhere ; and she chose
the Triple Alliance. The stringencies that dictated
this selection are now very pertinent study for the
British public.

Those bonds might have been firm : they were
based upon contiguity and common commercial
interests. They were progressively slackened and
snapped, because the despots who controlled the

INTRODUCTION XI

High Contracting Parties never acted honestly,
unselfishly or democratkally.

Roumania at the last broke away from this
partnership, under the greatest provocation : and
the object of this book is to show how profoundly
she was justified, and what a sacrifice she has laicl
on the blood-stained altar of liberty.

In reading the foreign names in this book this table of values
may prove useful.

K'S

2 c

•

V3H 1

English church

c before e

tsch

and i

English Tsar

c or

Ts soft

—

dy in " dldyer I "

—

gy or

dzi

—

[=dy]

E as in French

as in English

e or ie

—

yet

G in English

g before

£ot get

a o u & h

& consonants

/ in English ;'et

g before e i

dsch

K in feill talfe

c before a o

u h and all

consonants

L hard in pull

—

L soft in Zily

S in sash

SH in sash

sch

V in valve

ER in anger

& e i 6 A

—

Z in zone

S in leisure

i rz

—

All other consonants have approximately the same value as in
English. All vowels, a e i o u, are to be sounded, as in German
or Italian : a 6 ii, as in German. In Magyar a 6 u represent the
long values, e.g., French peu seul ; pu fdte ; German Holle, Hohle ;
Miillor, Mwftle. In Magyar the acute accent represents a long
vowel.

ROUMANIA

CHAPTER I

The position of Roumania in Europe explains
something of the special nature of her history, and
of her participation in the Great European War.

The Roumanian people occupy the Carpathian
Alps and the mouths of the Danube and the right
bank of the Dnestr. They command direct access
to the Greek countries. They bar the road to the
East, and block the avenue to an invader from the
East.

The race that holds this critical position will be
subject to the most varied influences: to pressure
from the Slav, the Greek and the Oriental. When,
in addition to all of these potentialities, this race is
alien to all its strange neighbours, something of
a very special history may be expected.

The Roumanians boast they are descendants of
the Dacian colonists of Rome. Dacia was con-
quered in 106 A.D., and the Roman colony spread
over and beyond the Carpathians to the borders
of the Theiss : and to this day Transylvania is
Roumanian.

The Roumanians present the strange spectacle
of a Latin island in Slav territory. Their speech

is grammatically most akin to the Italian; but the
vocalization is Slav, and the civilizing influence
has been that of Constantinople, the Greek tongue
and the Greek Church. In the sense in which
English is a Teutonic language saturated with
Romance elements, until it is unintelligible save
to those who know Romance languages, and might
properly be termed a Romance language, Rou-
manian, though to a much slighter extent, re-
sembles a Slav speech built into and upon a basis
of Latin. Roumania is the bridge between the
Eastern and the Western civilizations of Europe;
and striking as is the medley of her speech and
history, she has, through all the ages of her
existence, borne a vigorous and unquenchable in-
dividuality, never submerged.

The dominating factor in her risorgimento is her
consciousness that she is of the Latin stock.

When the Romans abandoned Dacia in 271
A.D., the colonists are said to have retired into
the Carpathians.

The Bolgars, a Turanian race which overran
the Balkans in 679 A.D., were converted to Chris-
tianity in 864 A.D., and the Roumanian peoples
were subject to the Bulgarian Empire, and the
Bulgarian Church, the language of which was Old
Slav, and was used in the ritual. This finally
separated the Daco-Roumanians from the Latin
world.1

1 The first Bulgarian Empire was crushed by Constantine
BcuXvaccv.TCVOC in 1014 A.D.

ROUMANIA 3

About the end of the ninth century the
Hungarians (Magyars) made an irruption, over-
whelmed the Bulgarian Empire, and subdued the
Vlakhs (Wallachs) or Roumanians. The Magyars
seem to have derived their first civilization from
the Roumanians : they adopted Latin as their
official language; but they were converted to the
Roman Church by the Bohemian Bishop Adalbert
in the reign of Stephen the Saint (1000-1038).

In the thirteenth century the Roumanian nation2
beyond the Carpathians was organized into the
two principalities of Wallachia (or Muntenia, the
highlands) and Moldavia : these remained separate
and independent until the union into the Rou-
manian State. The position bounded by the
Carpathians and the river Alt was also called Little
Wallachia or Oltenia. Moldavia dates from
after the retreat of the Tatars, who had occupied
the country for a century (1241-1345), and were
driven out by an expedition under Hungarian
leadership with the aid of Roumanians from the
province of Maramure§ [Mdramarossziget].3

But the repulse of the Tatars was only the fore-
runner of a greater affliction; the Turks had in-
vaded Europe, and incidentally crushed the Mon-
gol Empire, just as in previous centuries the
Tatars had subdued the P61ovtsy, the Pecenegs,
and so forth, and at the battle of Kosovo (1389)

2 The Balkans, p. 255. I have drawn on this book for a large
part of my matter at this stage.

3 The Balkans.

4 ROUMANIA

the Balkan nations were finally crushed; and,
amongst them, Roumania became a vassal state
of the Turkish Empire, but never a mere province,
like Serbia, Bulgaria or Greece, and later,
Hungary (from the Battle of Mohacs, 1526, to the
Peace of Karlowitz, 1679). The four tributary
countries of the Turkish Empire were Moldavia,
Wallachia, Transylvania and Ragusa.4

The Roumanian provinces fought hard against
Turkish dominion : Stephen the Great of Moldavia
resisting for forty-seven years (1457-1504); and,
at Racova in 1475, he "annihilated an Ottoman
army in a victory considered the greatest ever
secured by the Cross against Islam." He was
betrayed by the Christian powers of Hungary and
Poland, and his son Bogdan made a voluntary
submission.3

" Michael the Brave, Prince of Wallachia (1593-
1601), was the last to stand up against Turkish
aggression." He defeated the Turks, and, for a
moment, re-united the three provinces of Walla-
chia, Moldavia and Transylvania, but not the
Banat of Temesvar. He too was betrayed by the
Christian powers who neighboured on him.

" After the murder of Michael (1601) the rulers
of the two Roumanian States were still mostly of
Roumanian stock, but bought their appointments

at Constantinople In 1619 the Sultan

sent an Italian to govern Moldavia. Nevertheless,

4 Historians' History.

5 The Balkans.

ROUMAXIA 5

the national independence was not completely lost.
In the early part of the seventeenth century there
was a period of comparative order and pros-
perity .... under Bessaraba in Wallachia, and
Basil the Wolf in Moldavia (1633-1654 and 1634-
1653). They introduced codes of written law,
purified the Church, encouraged the foundation
of schools and monastic colleges, and promoted
literature and the arts. The country received its
first printing press at this time; the first Rou-
manian book printed on Roumanian territory ap-
peared in 1640."°

About this time the first move to salvation from
without w,as made. In 1674 both tne principalities
petitioned the Emperor Alexis of Russia for his
protection, and in 1711 Peter the Great entered
into an alliance.

The immediate result was that the native rulers
ceased, and that the Porte appointed the Phanariote
Greeks (so named after a quarter of Constanti-
nople), whose administration was, in general,
little else than organized brigandage.7

Tocilescu says of them :

" At Constantinople there is a Greek suburb
called Phanar. In the second half of the seven-
teenth century some families, settled in this dis-
trict, became notable for their administrative ability
and astuteness. In 1666 Paniotachos Nikussis was
appointed interpreter to the Divan. From that

6 Historians' History.
~ The Balkans.

6 ROUMANIA

time to the Greek revolution in 1821 the office of
Interpreter to the Divan was held by the Greeks
as a family privilege. Their influence gained
them at last the lordship of the Roumanian prin-
cipalities: and in 1709 Nicholas Mavrocordato was
made Lord of Moldavia. These two principalities
were separately administered by Phanariot Greeks
up to 1821.

" The whole system of government by the
Phanariotes was one of pillage."

By the peace of Kutchuk — Kainarji, 1774,
Russia acquired a protectorate over the two prin-
cipalities: by a convention of 1775, Austria, which
in 1772 had partitioned Poland, annexed the Buco-
vina,8 which had always been an essential part of
Moldavia; and by the Treaty of Bucarest, 1812,
Russia annexed Bessarabia (i.e., the part of
Moldavia between the Dnestr and the Pruth).

In 1821, when the Greeks rebelled, the Phan-
ariotes were at last overthrown; but the two
provinces were now Russian protectorates, gov-
erned by gospodars elected by the provinces; and
by the Treaty of Adrianople, 1829, the Porte at
length was only permitted to exact tribute, and
might not in any way intervene in the administra-
tion or occupy any fortified port : all Mussulman
estates were expropriated.

In 1848, Wallachia, Moldavia, the Bucovina and

8 In the Bucovina there were in 1869 over 220,000 Roumanians
(SlavicI, p. 202), and at the present time, 273,254, or 34.8 per cent.
(Mavrodin).

ROUMANIA 7

Transylvania all rose in insurrection against their
respective masters, with the object of attaining
national autonomy. The Turks invaded Wallachia,
and the Russians Moldavia, and by the Treaty of
Balta Limani, 1849, the Sultan was to appoint the
two gospodars : the tenure of office should be seven
years; the candidates must be agreeable to both
Russia and Turkey, who should both maintain
troops in the country to preserve order.

In 1853 ^e Roumanians again rebelled against
this new domination, and the country was
occupied by Russian troops.

The Treaty of Paris, 1856 (ensuing on the
Crimean War), at last released the principalities
from the overbearing pressure of Russian friend-
ship, and put them under a collective European
guarantee; it also restored Southern Bessarabia
(including Akkerman, Kilia, Ismail, Reni, and
the left bank of the Pruth up to a point on a line
with HusI) to Roumania, including the delta of
the Danube1, which up to then had been Turkish.
Turkey still held a nominal suzerainty.

In the same year the seven years' term of the
gospodars expired, and the question of the union
of the provinces was again raised. Would the
Great Powers still thwart the national ambition ?
There was now no claim actively made on the
remainder of Bessarabia, or on Transylvania, or
the Bucovina.

The Roumanians solved the difficulty by elect-
ing Alexander loan Cuza as Prince of both pro-

8 ROUMANIA

vinces. He was deposed in 1866, and in the same
year Karl Ludwig zu Hohernzollern-Sigmaringen,
a cousin of King William of Prussia, but of a
branch, non-reigning and Catholic, was elected
Prince of the State of Roumania, which was still
under Turkish suzerainty.

In 1877 this suzerainty was thrown off, and in
1881 Roumania became an independent kingdom.
The price was a secret alliance with Russia; and
it was the Roumanian valour at Plevna that
secured victory to Russia in the Russo-Turkish
War of 1877-8.

By the Treaty of San Stefano, however, Bul-
garia was aggrandised, and Russia obtained the
Dobrudja and the Delta of the Danube, " reserv-
ing for herself the right to exchange these terri-
tories against the southern districts of Bessarabia,
restored to Roumania by the Treaty of Paris,
1856. "9

Berlin, which was interested in whittling away
the acquisitions of Russia and Bulgaria at the
Conference of Berlin, 1878, saw no pressing reason
not to leave rancours behind that might disincline
Roumania from Russia; and Great Britain, as in
IQI4,10 was only academically concerned with the
Balkan problems. Roumania thus received the

» The Balkans.

10 British Blue Book, No. 59, " His Majesty's Government can-
not declare themselves ' solidaires ' with Russia on a question
between Austria and Serbia, which in its present condition is not
one affecting England."

ROUMANIA 9

Dobrudja, and lost her remnant of Bessarabia, the
irredenta beyond the Pruth.

In 1883 Roumania became the ally of Austria,
and by implication joined the Triple Alliance : the
conditions were apparently those stated in Dr. E.
J. Dillon's article, p. 77.

Take lonescu in 1891 recalls an interesting in-
cident; that when the Bulgarians expelled the
Prince of Battenberg in 1887, and their throne was
vacant, it was offered to King Carol of Rou-
mania. The opportunity was missed : " we refused
it and committed the most unpardonable offence
any nation can, preferring a present tranquility
to the possibility of anticipating history."

Take lonescu argues in 1891 that Roumania
cannot rely on either Russia or Austria, but
must form a federation of the Balkan States,
" which can only live, if they reconstruct former
history, and only admit of one political body be-
tween the Mediterranean and the Carpathians."

Possibly it was this consideration that deterred
Roumania from joining in the Balkan League of
1913. It was previously directed against Austria
— so it is said — and Roumania had nothing to
redeem from Turkey.11

When the Second Balkan War broke out and
Bulgaria, on Austrian instigation, attacked her
allies and broke up the League, Roumania took
no part until the last, when she intervened and
put an end to the' fighting.

11 Take lonescu, La politique dtrangtre de la Roumanie, p. 34.

10 ROUMANIA

The Treaty of Bucarest of 1913 was never fa-
voured by Austria, who had miscalculated on the
double chance that both Turkey and Bulgaria
would have the upper hand. Roumania took a
portion of the Dobrudja, and this unjust extension
of her frontier estranged Bulgaria; and Austria in
1913 intended revising the Treaty of Bucarest by
force of arms : the war contemplated against Serbia
was frustrated by Italy and Roumania refusing to
join, and Germany not being ready for a European
war.12 Austria in 1913 succeeded only in expelling
the Montenegrins from Skutari, and establishing
a principality of Albania.

At the sitting, August 8, 1913, of the Bucarest
Peace Conference, T. MaTorescu announced that
the Austro-Hungarian Government had notified
its intention to submit the question of Kavala to-
gether with other questions to a revision " what-
ever the result of the Conference on this point may
be."13

" The natural counter effect of that action was
the detachment of Roumania from the Central

Powers This breaking away from the

' traditional policy ' of adjutancy-in-waiting to the
Central Powers was indicated by the visit of Prince
Ferdinand to Petrograd, and the even more sig-
nificant visit which Tsar Nicholas afterwards paid
to the late King Carol of Roumania, at Con-
stanza."14

12 Serbian Blue Book, Appendix No. 2.

IS Le trait^ de paix de Bucarest, 1913, p. 48

1* The Balkans, p. 304.

ROUMANIA

In 1913 (v. p. 75) Gzernin was appointed to
succeed Prince Fiirstenberg to "patch up Austro-
Roumanian relations."

The rest is the history of yesterday. The nego-
tiations that compelled Roumania to renounce the
unnatural alliance with Austria are analysed in
full in chapter VI.

Modern Roumania has made enormous pro-
gress : — *

POPULATION ... In 1866:

Two ruined

AGRICULTURE

PETROL

RAILWAYS

INDUSTRIES

PEOPLE'S BANKS

Turkish provinces

In 1866:

457,608 tons

In 1866:
5,915 tons

In 1866:
None

In 1914 :
A united King-

In 1902 :
700. Capital
4,250,600 francs

PEASANT CO-OPERATIVE
SOCIETIES ... In 1903 :
8

dom of almost
8,000,000

In 1913 :

3,230,235 tons
& large exports

In 1912 :

2,000,000 tons

In 1912 :
3,690 kilometres

In 1912 :

Annual produc-
tion 400 million
francs

In 1910 :

2,656. Capital
100,000,000 francs

FINANCE

In 1911 :

378
In 1867 : Budget of In 1912 & 1913 :

56,000,000 francs

BULGARIA, MONTENEGRO, SERBIA
and GREECE.

BUDGET RECEIPTS, 1911, 450 million.
FOREIGN TRADE, ,, 852 ,,

Budget of
500,000,000 francs.

ROUMANIA.

583 million.

1026 million.

* Mavrodin, La Roumanie contemporaine.

12 ROUMANIA

For the future one question remains. Assuming
that in the eighteenth century there were only
dynasties bargaining with no sense of democracy,
with no knowledge or appreciation of racial as-
pirations; granted that in the fifties and sixties of
last century Russia was despotic, Napoleon III,
vain and ambitious, whilst Prussia was grasping
and unscrupulous, as ever, but had a genius to
guide her whose dissimulation was deeper than the
frank cynicism of Napoleon III; will not the spirit
of the modern democracy of Russia and the Re-
public of France have penetrated into the high
court of diplomacy ? When the time comes, after
victory, to dictate the terms of peace, will the
plenipotentiaries exert their power to obtain a dur-
able peace ?

The conditions of a lasting peace in Europe,
and ultimately of a federation, are1 nationalism and
democracy. Most of the wars of Europe since the
fall of Napoleon have been caused by the terri-
torial aspirations of the German despots at Berlin
and Vienna, overriding national claims and pre-
cedents, and careless of the soreness of an irre-
deemable homeland. If we are waging war for
Belgium and Serbia, for Transylvania and Poland
and the Trentino against German and Austrian
tyranny, it will be well if Russia, now released
from the bondage of Potsdam, be generous to
Roumania. Surrounded by a chain of complete
and satisfied nations, she would have nothing to
fear from her neighbours and friends.

ROUMANIA 13

Score out from the map of Europe such terri-
tories as Alsace-Lorraine, Sleswig-Holstein, Bos-
nia, Poland, Transylvania, the Trentino, and the
result will be the effacement of all the points of
conflict, of all specific grievances, and incidentally
of all the aggressions of the Central German
Powers.

The situation of countries like Roumania, Italy
and Serbia is almost unimaginable to an English-
man. When Mary happily lost Calais, England
became self-contained : her expansion has been
co-extensive with her nationality. But Italy, Rou-
mania and Serbia have doggedly persisted in the
face of odds throughout all the centuries : every
gain achieved, every advance made, has been
thwarted and begrudged by those central powers
who had a vested interest in their alien territories.

From their point of view, these pretensions to
hold other peoples in subjection were not quite un-
warranted, for the Germans of the two Empires
are landlocked, as also are the Russians, and every
great nation must have an adequate sea-board.
But is there no means of reconciling their objects ?
The Germans boast that Rotterdam and Antwerp
were German ports. Since the war, Antwerp, as
a port, leads nowhere.

It is, when these oppressed nations shall have
been completed, that the trade of the landlocked
German and Russian nations will flow most
easily and readily, for the mutual benefit of all :
it will be carried on by willing hands.

14 ROUMANIA

Russia, when the victory comes, will receive a
sufficient reward in other directions, and access to
the sea. If on her fringe there should lie a united
Roumania, including the Bucovina, Bessarabia,
Transylvania, as well as Wallachia and Moldavia,
a united Poland, a united Serbia and other States
which should be liberated from Austria, she
will be all the stronger : and Prussia may then
intrigue as she will; there will be no discontent
on which she can batten. Her one and principal
success in this war was when she gained over
Bulgaria. Bulgaria had a grievance, the unjust
seizure of Silistria and Balcik by Roumania.

On the foundation of national States a European
federation may arise.

CHAPTER II

TRANSYLVANIA

The great province of Roman Dacia, which had
been so thoroughly assimilated into the Roman
Empire, broke up, as has been said, into the three
separate principalities of Moldavia, Wallachia and
Transylvania. The last named is called Erde*ly
by the Magyars (possibly from Erdo, a forest),
and in Roumanian Ardeal (or Arde*!). The Ger-
man name, Siebenbiirgen (which in literal trans-
lation is used in Polish, Cech, Swedish, Dutch,
etc., Sedmiogr6d, Semigrad, Zevenbergen, etc.) is
really derived from Zibinburg, i.e., the town on
the Zibin or Zeben, Magyar Sze"ben, now called
Hermannstadt, but in Magyar, Nagy-Sze*ben, and
in Roumanian Sibiu (Latin, Cibianum).

Transylvania, being beyond the mountains,
suffered least from the barbarian migrations. The
plains were overrun in succession by the Goths,
the Gepidae, the Ugry, the Pecenegs, the P61ovtsy
or Cumanians, and the Mongols, as well as by
the Magyars in the course of their invasion; i.e.,
it was steadily devastated, century after century,
from the ninth to the thirteenth by each wave of
Asiatic savagery.

1 6 ROUMANIA

Stephen I, King of Hungary (1000-1038),
undertook the defence of Transylvania, and settled
colonies of Magyars in it, called the settlers, the
Sze"kelyek (or the Szeklers, from Ssek, settlement).
In 1103 a Magyar bishopric was established. In
1141, Ge*za II, King of Hungary, populated the
ravaged southern portions of Transylvania with
Saxons. These districts were autonomous, and
retained German law and language : the towns of
Medias, Miihlenbach (Balta Moarei), Hermann-
stadt (Nagy-Szeben), Schaszburg (Segesvar),
Klausenburg (Kolozsvar, Cluj), Kronstadt
(Brasso, Brasov), Bistri^a (Besztercze), amongst
others, were founded or developed by these
colonists.

In 12 1 1 Andrew II gave part of the territory
to the Order of Teutonic Knights to settle and
colonize.

In 1240 the Mongols invaded Poland and the
West, after subduing the Russian State at the
Battle of the Kalka, 1223; but were defeated in
1241 by the united powers of the Magyars and
Roumanians of all three provinces.

In 1291 on one occasion the Roumanians were
summoned to the Diet as a Fourth nation.

The Turks crushed the Mongol power and in-
herited it; and after subduing the Southern Slavs
at the Battle of Kosovo, 1389, invaded the Rou-
manian provinces, in 1411 and 1423.

For the whole of this period Transylvania was
an independent principality, governed by its own

TRANSYLVANIA 17

Duke (Voivod), though generally in subjection to
Hungary.

From 1411 to 1877 Moldavia and Wallachia were
tributary to Turkey ; but they were never mere
provinces of the Turkish Empire, as Hungary
itself became from 1526 to 1690.

The Reformation spread widely over Transyl-
vania; and when in 1526 the Hungarian crown de-
volved on the German Emperor, Ferdinand I,
John Zapolya, Voivod of Transylvania, invoked
the aid of Sultan Suleiman and subjugated a great
part of Hungary.

After the Battle of Mohacs, 1526, the Turks
conquered the whole of Hungary, and retained it
up to the year 1690, excepting a strip extending
from the junction of the Mur and the Drave to
the East of Varasdin, following a line thence to
Nagy-Kanizsa and Gyor (Raab), thence by a line
following Ersekujvar (Neuhausel), and the natural
boundaries of the rivers Ipoly and Saj6 to Kassa
(Kaschau), whence it proceeded to the Carpathians
by the River Ondava. All the remainder of Hun-
gary was a Turkish province, the kingdom of
Slavonia (bounded by the Drave and the Danube
as far as Peter wardein); and the Banat of Temes-
var (the quadrilateral formed by the Theiss), the
Danube down to Ormenyes, and on the north the
river Maros.

The principality of Transylvania was independ-
ent, subject to Turkish suzerainty. This princi-
pality was bounded towards the Banat of Temesvar

1 8 ROUMANIA

by a line from Or§ova to Ormenyes, and a point
just over the Vulcan Pass on the Western side;
and thence in a more or less straight line north
to a point twenty-four miles west of Deva and
fifty miles east of Arad, i.e., somewhere near Zam,
on the river Maros. From this point the political
frontiers of Transylvania were practically identical
with those of the present Counties of Hunyad
(Hunedoara), Als6-Feher (Aba de jos, Unter-
weissenburg), Torda-Aranyos (Turda Aries),
Kis-kiikiillo (Cojocna, Klein-Kokelburg), Szol-
nok-Doboka and Besztercze-Naszod (Bistri^a-
Nasaud), and bounded on the other side by the
international frontier of Roumania in the Car-
pathians.

The ethnological boundaries of the Roumanians
are more extensive, and the compilers of the Ox-
ford Historical Atlas of Modern Europe, Con-
stantin D. Mavrodin,1 and the writers of the
lugo-Slav pamphlets are all in substantial agree-
ment, as well as the authorities in the great
Russian and German encyclopaedias. It seems to
be established that the territory of the Roumanian
population begins at Moldova Nova on the left
bank of the Danube in the Banat of Temesvar,
mounts up to Fehertemplon [Biserica Alba, Weiss-
kirchen] and thence to Versecz, Temesvar
[Timi§oara], Nagy-Szalonta [Salonta-Mare], Nagy-
Varad [Oradea-Mare, Grosswardein], and thence

l La Roumanie contemporaine Paris, 1915.

TRANSYLVANIA 19

through Borza (near Kolozsvar) to the Roumanian
frontier.

The writer in Meyer and Andre'evski's encyclo-
paedia further states that the line of division be-
tween the Magyars and Roumanians starts at the
frontier of Moldavia between the mouths of the
Olt (Alt, Aluta) and Bistri^a, crosses the river
Maros, and extends as far north as Saint Marton,
near Munkacs. The great complication is, that in
the heart of the Daco-Roumanian territories on
either side of the political frontier, there exist solid
blocks of Magyars (i.e., Magyar immigrants or
settlers), of the Szekelyek (the families originally
settled in the twelfth century), and Germans. The
Magyars are to be found mainly in the Counties
of Kolozsvar, Szolnok-doboka, Hunyad, Maros-
Torda, Kiikiillo, Brasso, in parts of Fogaras, the
Szekelyek in Udvarhely, Csik, Torda-Maros, and
Torda-Aranyo; whilst the Germans still retain the
old Konigsbodcn at Hermannstadt, Kronstadt
(Brasso, Brasov), and the ancient colonies. The
few settlements of Bulgarians are less incompatible,
as they are rapidly absorbed both by the Magyars
and the Roumanians.

Transylvania within these boundaries was an
independent principality subject to Turkish su-
zerainty. In 1540, John Sigismund, the son of
John Zapolya, withdrew from the extended fron-
tiers, and Transylvania was once again within its
lational boundaries of the river Theiss.

For one hundred and fifty years (to 1690),

2O ROUMANIA

Transylvania was thus separated from Hungary
in every political sense.

In 1571, Stephen Bathori was on the throne of
Transylvania, and in 1576 was elected King of
Poland: and in 1599 Andrew Bathori was defeated
in a war with Wallachia by Michael the Brave,
who succeeded in reuniting all three provinces for
seven years under one sovereign (until 1606).

Michael, however, had to encounter the allied
forces of the Sultan and the Emperor, and was
overthrown; and Transylvania was overrun by the
Imperial forces, and was administered by them
with the result that Stephen Bocskay revolted
and was recognised by the Sultan as Voivod of
Transylvania.

This fact is noticeable : Christian populations
have often preferred Turkish suzerainty to Aus-
trian rule. In 1822 Milos, the Liberator of Serbia,
said: " If you sum everything up, you will agree
with me that it would be better for the Serbians
to endure the tyranny of the Turks than to lie down
under the yoke Austria is making ready for

them If-the Austrian Government, under

any pretext whatsoever, marches its army into our
territory, we shall join hands with the Turks."

In 1606, by the Peace of Vienna, liberty of
conscience was guaranteed to the Hungarian Pro-
testants, and Stephen Bocskay was formally ac-
knowledged as Prince of Transylvania.

In 1608 Sigismund Rak6czy was elected to the
throne, and in 1631 George Rakoczy I, who in

TRANSYLVANIA 21

1644 joined the alliance of France and Sweden
against the Empire, and extended the frontiers of
Transylvania.

However, this dynasty became unpopular, and
in 1660 there was civil war ; as the outcome of
which in 1688 Apafi, the Turcophil candidate to
the throne, was compelled to acknowledge an Aus-
trian suzerainty over Transylvania — this was only
possible after Jan Sobieski had delivered Vienna
from the Turks in 1683.

Apafi died in 1690, and his son, Apafi II, re-
nounced his principality in favour of Austria; but
obtained a charter (ratified solemnly in 1697)
guaranteeing the absolute independence of Tran-
sylvania in all matters confessional and adminis-
trative. This ancient charter, which conferred
rights only on the nations of the Sze"kelyek, the
Magyars and the Germans, nevertheless held good
until 1848; and the modernization of it need not
have involved the destruction of the national in-
dependence built upon it.

Thus Transylvania became re-attached to the
Habsburg dynasty : possibly, had she had a non-
elective throne, and a determinate line of princes,
she might have remained independent.

By the Treaty of Karlowitz, 1699, the Porte for-
mally abdicated all suzerainty or sovereignty over
Transylvania.

The Transylvanians were not so easily satisfied.
In 1703 Francis Rak6czy rebelled, and received the
support of the Sz^klers and Magyars : but he was

22 ROUMANIA

defeated by the Imperial troops, and the Treaty
of Szathmar, 1711, definitely incorporated Tran-
sylvania in the Hapsburg dominions.

About this time many Bulgarians settled at
Alvincz, DeVa, Hermannstadt, and elsewhere.

The Turks stirred up war once again; but their
pretensions were finally sealed by the Treaty of
Pozarevats (or Passarowitz) in 1718.

The Banat of Temesvar was recovered from the
Turks in 1718, and Belgrade, Shabats, part of
Serbia, Little Wallachia and Or§ova ceded to
Austria: all of these were lost in 1739 (Treaty of
Belgrade), except the Banat.

From this point onwards Transylvania has no
independent history. In 1765 Maria Theresa
created Transylvania a Grand Duchy; and under
Joseph II a. great national insurrection of the
Roumanians broke out in 1784 under the leader-
ship of Horia and Clo§ca. The Austrian Government
at this time was acting tyrannically; but the con-
stitutional rights of 1690 were re-affirmed, and
re-asserted and maintained at every diet; those of
1825, February, 1835, 1841, and 1846 stand out
conspicuous.

Towards the end of the eighteenth and begin-
ning of the nineteenth centuries, a new German
element was introduced into Transylvania, the
Landler settlers from Baden, the Breisgau, Suabia,
Salzburg, Styria and Carinthia.

Whether under pressure of German-Austrian
rule or not, the Szekler and Magyar classes in

TRANSYLVANIA 23

Transylvania (who had many electoral privileges)
began agitating early in the nineteenth century
for a union with Hungary. The Roumanian
population protested, and the Wallachs desired to
be acknowledged as the fourth nation (with the
Germans, Szeklers, and Magyars) in Transyl-
vania.

In 1848 there was a monster meeting of the
Wallachs at Balasfalva [Blasendorf, Blaj], and a
petition for recognition was sent to the Emperor,
with a deputation. Massacres, rebellion, riots
ensued, and civil war : the Magyars did everything
to crush the Roumanian aspirations.

Still Transylvania remained an autonomous
principality until 1867.

A great opportunity was lost by the Central
Powers in 1849, when the Roumanians addressed
a petition to the Emperor of Austria, requesting
that all the Roumanians of Transylvania and the
two principalities (of Wallachia and Moldavia,
which were not yet united) might be gathered into
an autonomous nation with political and religious
independence, governed by the Emperor of Austria
as Grand Duke of Roumania. This new State was
to use Roumanian as the official language, was
to have a representative at the Austrian Court (as
Transylvania had from 1690 to 1848), and was to
include Bucovina and as much of Bessarabia as
was then in the principality of Moldavia.

The Austrians did not consent. It is a satire
on the present war that the Central Powers were

24 ROUMANIA

in 1848 offered their present scheme of a Central
Europe on a fair and Liberal basis and declined.

In 1860 a new charter was granted confirming
and ratifying the old constitution, and the Tran-
sylvanian Chancery at Vienna was re-established.

In 1863 a diet at Hermannstadt reaffirmed the
constitution of 1835, and proposed to send deputies
to the Austrian Reichsrath. But the old franchises
were restored; and in 1865 an artificial Magyar
majority3 voted union with Hungary, which Aus-
tria, weakened after Sadowa (1866), had to satisfy.

This was the first beginning of a Hungarian
Transylvania.

Now Transylvania merely consists of Hungarian
counties, which send 75 members to the Hungarian
Chamber : every one of the liberties and national
rights enjoyed under Turkish and even Austrian
rule have vanished, not only for the Roumanians,
but for the Saxon Konigsboden as well. In 1868
the High Court at Kolozsvar (Klausenburg) was
abolished.

The whole problem of Transylvania, or the
Roumanian irredenta, dates back to 1867, and is
the creation of the new autocratic Germany, as
well as of the frantic efforts of the Magyar minority
to retain the present domains of the Crown of St.
Stephen.

The Roumanians of Transylvania have always
been loyal to the Habsburg dynasty : but their al-

2 The Diet was packed : there were 89 Magyar representatives,
31 Saxon and 13 Roumanian. [Roumanian Reply].

TRANSYLVANIA 25

legiance to the Empire at Vienna may have been
shaken when they were transferred arbitrarily to
the Kingdom of Hungary.

Transylvanian history thus falls into five
principal epochs.

1000-1526. Independent Principality attached to
the Hungarian Crown.

1526-1690. Independent.

1690-1848. Under the Austrian Crown, but inde- ,
pendent.

1848-1867. Under the autocratic government of
Austria.

1867. Amalgamated with Hungary.

The Roumanians, it is true, never had any
rights under the old medieval charter of independ-
ence (save that in 1291 Andrew II, of Hungary,
admitted them as a fourth nation to the Transyl-
vanian Diet).

The land was Roumanian : the Magyars in the
twelfth century dwelt in tents; but when the Ger-
man Empire consolidated, and put an end to
external forays, they too settled into towns, and
colonized the strategical districts of Transylvania.8
The voluminous endeavour to prove themselves
indigenous, and the Roumanians settlers, has not
succeeded.

3 Jung, p. 216.

26 ROUMANIA

But this medieval constitution does not justify
the Magyars of the present day in treating them
as an " inferior race,"4 a " tolerated race,"5 and
subordinating the language and needs of the
majority to the tyranny of the Magyar aristocracy.

4 Roumanian Declaration of War.

5 Magyar Reply.

CHAPTER III
THE GRIEVANCES OF TRANSYLVANIA

The brief history of Transylvania has already
outlined what is the substance of the cause that
has at last provoked Roumania to arms. But
some account still seems necessary of the official
and systematic misrule in Transylvania. For this
purpose we shall rely, as far as may be, on foreign
and hostile evidence, so as to avoid any impugn-
ment of interested witnesses. Friedrich Naumann
himself admits (p. 91) that the Hungarian system
of Government ruthlessly and permanently ex-
cludes the little peoples from any share in the
administration, and leaves them with a very com-
prehensible feeling of rancour: and (p. 81) that
it was with the rise of the Hungarians that the
question of the Nationalities for the first time be-
came really serious.

Naumann is writing in 1915: it may be helpful
to trace expressions of opinion back a little farther.

In 1860 an anonymous pamphlet, " Die Sprachen
und Nationalitatsfragen in Oesterreich, von
einem Romanen," was published at Vienna. At
this time Hungary and Transylvania were both
being more or less impartially oppressed from

28 ROUMANIA

Vienna. This writer states: "Hungary is com-
parable with Switzerland, as long as it enjoys a
similar system of home rule. The various peoples
should have the right to appeal to the Monarch

in their own tongue In any case, a

sovereignty in Hungary, a sort of State of Hun-
gary within the State of Austria, seems to us to-
day something as preposterous as the belief in a
dualism in the Universe. A semi-sovereignty,
both logically and practically, is only an expecta-
tion for the reversion of the whole estate. A house
divided against itself cannot stand Prac-
tically a Hungarian, or rather a Magyar, autonomy
would now — after the theoretic acknowledgement
of the equal rights of all the nationalities — be
one of the most disastrous anomalies imag-
inable; the immediate result would be, either the
rescission of national equality in Austria or the
legitimate struggle of all the races and districts
for equal independence. The former would have
a precedent on a larger scale in the miserable
conditions of Turkey : the latter would be in itself
a logical result, but would lead inevitably to

anarchy A historic claim is put up by

renascent Magyarism in a manner unjustified and
out of date : first of all, because the historic pre-
tensions of Hungary are being resuscitated against
those of Austria, which in this respect exist de
facto and de iure are equally valid; secondly,
because the true and substantive historical right
that unites the Hungarian peoples, comprehends

THE GRIEVANCES OF TRANSYLVANIA 2Q

more than the Magyar race by itself What

reliance can these peoples place in Magyarism, in
the Magyar State or oligarchy after their bitter
experiences up to the year 1849? [when the Russo-
Austrian armies suppressed the revolt of the
Magyars with the partial aid of Transylvania]. The
Magyars in the eighteenth century kept on peti-
tioning the Austrian government for fifty years to
cede to them the Banat (which Austrian arms had
liberated from Turkish rule), in order to introduce
Magyar administration, and thus to enslave the
Roumanians of that province who had not been
altogether bereft of their rights even under the
Turkish yoke."

The writer also points out that, as long as the
independence of Transylvania had been respected,
Magyars and Roumanians had been on friendly
terms from the tenth century onwards, until in the
Diets of 1832, 1836, 1844, 1847 and 1848, Latin
was replaced by Magyar as the official language;
and other proselytizing followed apace.

In 1877 Constantin Frantz [Deutsche Antwort
auf die orientalische Frage, 1877] remarks : " The
Roumanians seem as though they had been
snowed into the mass of the peoples surrounding
them without a natural resting-place: and their
nationality is in the gravest peril from the Mag-
yars. If the Magyars conjure up to themselves
the vision of a Magyar world, a Roumanian world
would be just as imaginable."

Julius Jung [Romer und Romanen, 1877,

30 ROUMANIA

bruck] remarks: " Hungarian history is the story
of the relations of the Magyar nobility, the en-
serfed Roumanian peasantry and the German
colonists, and of the relations to each of them of
the Kingdom of Hungary The Magyar-
German colonists wedged themselves into the
Wallach territory. Each of the colonies, the
Saxon settlers, the Szekelyek, and the Magyar
nobles took exclusive possession of the dominion
of the country, as the sole ' nations ' entitled there-
to in right of conquest : while the Wallachs were
nothing more than the servant, unprivileged mass.1
It was a different situation from any other in the
colonizations of the Germans, or of any people,
whether in ancient or modern history."

In this connection from a different point of view
— not less grasping — the remark of the Russian
diplomat, F. N. Fonton, in 1812, might be quoted,
at the time of the first annexation of Bessarabia
[Kasso, p. 229] : " This people, the Roumanians,
have a strongly national character : and I cannot
disguise the fact, that, when I glance at the map,
I feel utterly vexed that these eight millions of
a people foreign to the Slavs are settled here on
the delightful slopes of the Carpathian Alps,
wedged in, as it were, between Slav races, and
forming an obstacle to their reunion."

An impartial onlooker might consider that this

1 " According to our ancient laws the Roumanian people as an
immigrant population [sic] was nothing but a tolerated people in
Transylvania." [Magyar Reply, 1891].

THE GRIEVANCES OF TRANSYLVANIA 31

compact national mass had as much right to their
ancient boundaries as the Slavs, or the Germans,
or the Maygars, all of whom are of later date.

loan Slavic! in 1880, a Roumanian, published
his great history [Die Rumanen in Ungarn,
Siebenbiirgen and der Bukowina] in German.
His judgment on the conditions of his time is
worth some brief extracts.

" If ever a people has worked its way up from
misery and degradation, it is the Roumanians,"
(citing G. von Rath [Siebenbiirgen, Reise-
beobachtungen, 1879]); and Slavic! adds: "The
Roumanians have endured and still endure much,
without letting it interrupt their development,
without losing patience : for they feel that the

future belongs to them For centuries the

Magyars have been the ruling race on the lower
Danube, the principal Christian people in the
East, the intermediaries between East and West :
during the whole of this long period they have
never succeeded in becoming the social cement of
their subject races. Politically, they have constituted
a capable stock, but not a civilizing element. ....
When the civilizing element at length made its
appearance in the East with the Habsburgs, a
regulated civilizing effort could begin. The at-
tempt of the German element to solve the task for
which the Magyars had proved their incapacity,
has itself only partially succeeded. The peoples
of the Monarchy found in the Monarchy a sure
mainstay, and loyalty to the common dynasty has

32 ROUMANIA

held them long together; but the German people
is too remote, and the German Kultur has been
too much adulterated with other peoples, such as
the Magyars and the Jews, as transmitted to the
other nations."

Hence, vSaguna, the Roumanian leader in the
'sixties, aimed at the self-education of the Rou-
manians in alliance with the German element, and
in subjection only to the common sovereign. It
was he who extorted from the Magyars the Law
of the Nationalities [for which see p. 45]. "So
ran the law. But the legislators, even when voting

never intended respecting it No one can

be surprised at the trouble the Magyars put them-
selves to, to force their language down others'
throats : none would ever learn it save under com-
pulsion."

In the section dealing with the grievances in
some detail, the learned and calm judgment of
Slavici will be quoted afresh.

To carry the story forward of the general con-
siderations, to show how it is the elevation of one
race — the Magyars — to an unjustified supremacy
that has been the root of the Roumanian problem,
and ultimately, the cause of any disaffection to
the Austrian dynasty, a pamphlet by Take lonescu
[La Politiqtie Etrangere de la Roumanie, 1891,
Bucarest] provides further confirmation. In this
publication Take lonescu insists that the only
possible policy for Roumania is a foreign one,
and can scarcely be one of alliance with either of

THE GRIEVANCES OF TRANSYLVANIA 33

the Great Powers, Russia or Austria, both of whom
have despoiled essential parts of the national do-
main. " Neutrality for the Roumanian State is

neither desirable nor possible Belgium

is only neutral, in as far as it is believed that Eng-
land will not allow anyone to seize it

But how could we who hold the keys of Southern
Europe, commanding the avenue of the Russians
to the Southern Slavs and the high road to the

Dardanelles, remain neutral ? " He

thus characterizes Magyar policy. " The Mag-
yars, foreign in speech and origin to all the
European nations, alien by religion to all the
Eastern peoples; strange by its social organiza-
tion to all the Eastern peoples, which are essential-
ly democratic; odious to all the nationalities by
their mad and violent policy of Magyarization — in
itself a suicidal policy — the Magyars, despite their
great and incontestable qualities, have none of
the indispensable attributes of an apostle. They
can only guard Europe against Pan-Russism, if
in agreement with us, as they formerly could
against the Turk, with us as advanced guard. They
cannot play the part of propagator of Western

civilization in the South-East of Europe

Hungary must become a federative State or be
effaced." The solution proffered by Take lonescu
in 1891 is a Balkan federation, which might work
in harmony with a federalized Austria-Hungary.
In all these declarations there is never any hostility

ROUMANIA

to Germany : the Magyar incubus is the great
hindrance.

The population of Transylvania and its racial
proportions are a matter of great consequence.

On Magyar statistics, according to the reply of
the Magyar students of Kolozsvar in 1891, the
census of 1880 revealed a total population for the
whole of Hungary of 13,728,622; of whom

46.65 were Magyar.

13.62

I3-S2

I7-50

2-57

4.60

i-54

German.

Slovak.

Roumanian.

Ruthenian.

Serb.

unclassified.

For the census of 1890 the following figures and
facts are drawn from German-Austrian sources;
the classification being on the ordinary language
used, not according to origin. These figures are
so far inaccurate, as there exist 80,000 gypsies,
15,000 Jews, 9,000 Turks and Bulgarians: some of
whom have been distributed under other heads.

TRANSYLVANIA

POPULATION

RELIGIONS

Per cent.

Roumanians...

1,276,890

Orthodox .. 694,890

30.87

Magyars

697,945

Greek Cath. ..

633,570

28.14

Germans

217,670

9.67

Lutheran

328,034

14-57

Others

58,7"

2-33

Rom. Cath. ..

284,800

9.27

Evangelical

208,758

9.27

Unitarian

59,287

2.64

Others 54,°37

5-24

2,251,216 100.00

2,251,216 loo.oo

THE GRIEVANCES OF TRANSYLVANIA

From the Roumanian side we read that in the
whole of the Monarchy there were at the same
census of 1880 [Reply of the Roumanian Students
of Bucarest, 1891] : —

10,170,000
6,542,000
2,623,000

755.°°°
7,140,000
3,255,000
2,918,000
3,158,000
1,128,000

Germans

Magyars
Roumanians

Italians

Cechs

Poles

Serbs

Ruthenes

Slovenes

38,489,000

The proportion of the Roumanians in the whole
of the Monarchy, on the authority of A magyar
Romanak es a magyar nemzet, thus constitutes
2623/38489 or about 6.834 Per cent. This points
to a diminution from the figures for the entire
monarchy, as compared with the census of 1869
[Slavic!, p. 195], when there were 2,900,000 — or
according to the statistics compiled by Keleti
Karoly, on behalf of the Magyars, 2,321,000
Roumanians in all parts of the Empire, a correct
estimate probably being about 2,700,000.

The census of 1890 (Roumanian reply) showed
for the whole of Hungary a proportion of 54.22 per
cent. Magyars and 15.9 Roumanians, with 12.22
Germans. The variations in these figures can be
accounted for in many ways : partly by the
emigration of Transylvanian Roumanians into
Roumania ; but much more by the zeal of the

30 ROUMANIA

Magyar government to demonstrate the Magyar
character of their State. Personal and local names
are Magyarized : anyone who can speak or write
Magyar is set down as belonging to that nation-
ality.

The statistics for 1910 can be found in Nau-
mann's Mitteleuropa for Hungary : —

Magyars

10,050,000

. 48-2%

Roumanians

2,950,000

• 14-1%

Germans

2,030,000

9-8%

Slovaks

2,030,000

9-4%

Croats

1,830,000

8.8%

Serbs

1,110,000

5-3%

Ruthenes

470,000

2.3%

Unclassified

460,000

2.1%

whilst for the whole Empire, including Bosnia-
Hercegovina, the proportion of the two ruling
races of the Germans and Magyars, is only 12 and
10.1 millions respectively out of 51.4 millions, i.e.,
23.341 per cent, and 19.45 Per cent.

These figures despite fluctuations, arbitrary or
natural, show the permanence of a large and com-
pact Roumanian population, a very considerable
minority in the Empire and in the Kingdom of
Hungary, as well as a clear majority in Transyl-
vania.

There are no absolutely reliable statistics; and
those of Keleti are suspected and impugned by
nearly every authority, as vitiated by pro-Magyar
policy.

THE GRIEVANCES OF TRANSYLVANIA 37

In a previous chapter the political and ethno-
logical boundaries of Transylvania have been
shortly sketched. It remains to consider how
far the great majority, the Roumanians, receive
justice, since they have been swept into a complete
political amalgamation with the Kingdom of
Hungary.

In 1868, when the dualistic regime was formally
sanctioned between Austria and Hungary, a series
of fundamental laws was passed, conferring
equality of rights of the Nationalities of Hungary
and Transylvania; enacting that the trials should
be held in the regional language, where one fifth
of the local Council so desired ; that religious com-
munities should be free and the schools belonging
to them ; that the medium of instruction should be
the native tongue ; that municipal Councils should
be free and in the choice of their official language ;
that all the laws should be published in the region-
al languages ; that all public officials must be cog-
nisant with the local language and so forth.

All of these provisions seem to be an elementary
safeguard, where a centralized alien government
takes over the administration of compact masses
of strange populations.

In the history of England there have been many
oppressive and persecuting kings : very often
religious and personal convictions have been pro-
scribed, so as to conform to some ecclesiastical
tyranny or fanatical devotion to serve the inclin-
ations of the monarch and ruling aristocracy. But

38 • ROUMANIA

all such notions are things of long ago ; and, even
thus, Charles I never oppressed the Welsh for
speaking Welsh : nor did Cromwell inhibit the
use of Irish. Possibly a long-oppressed nation-
ality acquires a morbid self-consciousness, which
makes it distrust everything it cannot remodel in
its own shape within its own boundaries. The
bond of unity with the Magyars may be, as with
the Prussians, the hatred and fear of other races.

"Hungary will become Magyar, or else she will
not exist," said Kossuth in 1848. The whole
evidence to be derived from the writers of the 'six-
ties corroborates this statement, but from the other
side of the quesion : if Hungary could not exist
without claiming and denationalizing non-Magyar
territories, they preferred as the lesser evil a uni-
form Austrian administration. This fact the
Magyar apologists pervert. "The Roumanian
Nationalists are the docile instruments of German-
ism : the restoration of constitutional government
[sic] leaves them cold and passive."2

However, says Slavici in 1881 : " §aguna had
expressed three wishes in the name of the Rou-
manian people, touching the Church, the School
and the Language. His wishes were granted :
the Roumanian Church was legally declared auto-
cephalous : the Roumanians were assured of the
right to institute their own schools, to maintain
them, and to administer them : and the so-called

2 Magyar Reply, p. 54.

THE GRIEVANCES OF TRANSYLVANIA 39

Law for the Nationalities in certain circumstances
and in certain districts permitted the official use
of the Roumanian language. So much for the
law. But the legislators never contemplated re-
specting the law, even when they were voting
for it."

(I.) ELECTORAL DISABILITIES.

The suffrage in Hungary is on a basis of prop-
erty franchise of 72-80 florins a year.9 Voting is
open, not by ballot : and the towns at which vot-
ing takes place are scattered. There is urgent
need for a redistribution of seats : some small
Magyar towns have two deputies for 300 voters;
some Roumanian towns with 5,000 voters are un-
represented. Of the 74 deputies, 35 are sent by
four Magyar counties and 35 urban communes.
There remain over 33 counties in which the excess
of Roumanians over Magyars is as 18 to 7.

In practice, only electors who can speak Magyar
are allowed to vote ; and the military are employed
to bar access to undesired voters; and every de-
vice is employed, such as arbitrary imprisonment,
falsification of the counting, to secure the election
of the Magyar candidate. The result is that of
the 417 deputies only one is a Roumanian, whereas
the proportion, on a basis of population, should
be 75.

All non-Magyar populations are equally affected.

» Ibid, p. 58.

4<D ROUMANIA

In 1884 the Slovaks decided to abstain from the
elections altogether ; and their suit was followed
by the Serbs and Roumanians in 1892. On the
other hand, there are seven Saxons who adhere to
the Magyar Liberal party.

It was in 1891, when the protest of the Rou-
manian students of Bucarest appeared and was
officially answered by the Magyar students of
Kolozsvar. In that year A -magyar dllam (the
Magyar State) (22 vij, 1891) wrote : —

"And moreover it is a fact that in the districts
inhabited by the nationalities we find a body of
officials, who in the name of the Hungarian State
administer and render justice in a manner worthy
only of the Turkish Pashas. We might enumer-
ate hundreds of similar cases which all prove that
the Governors themselves do not respect the Law
of the Nationalities, so that even after the appear-
ance of the Reply of the Magyars one sad truth
remains incontestable, that in reality the Nation-
alities are oppressed." [Reply of ihe Roumanian
students^ .

In the elections of 1896 this public voting took
place only in the large towns, thus excluding the
Roumanian peasantry, who were further incapaci-
tated by a severe examination as to their kno\v-
ledge of Magyar, and by the electoral census
being raised in Roumanian towns to a sum
three or four times as high as in Magyar towns.
In 1896 two army corps were mobilized in Hungary
to preside over the elections. The result was

THE GRIEVANCES OF TRANSYLVANIA 41

that instead of 80 members, the Roumanians were
represented by three in the Chamber [Mavrodin,
p. 7]. " The exercise of the franchise by the non-
Magyars is prevented or restricted by every imag-
inable device or chicanery, and there is an
elaborate governmental system of terrorism or re-
pression. The whole machinery of the State is
thrown into the scale against the non-Magyar
voter, and his chances are rendered well-nigh hope-
less by wholesale employment of troops and armed
gendarmes to preserve order."

At the present time the Magyar Lower Cham-
ber consists of 413 deputies (excluding 40 sent to
it from Croatia-Slavonia), and of these only 8,
instead of 198 on a basis of population, are non-
Magyars : i.e., 1.79 per cent, instead of 47.9.

In the Austrian House even, which is grossly
packed, the non-Germans outnumber the Germans
by 26 (233 Germans, 283 non-Germans), and the
elections are not supervised by the military [New
Europe, No. n].

(II.) EDUCATION.

The matter of education is one of the sorest for
a subject nationality. How are the young to have
adequate knowledge of their own language and
institutions ? What would have been the outcry
in South Africa and Canada, if Dutch and French
had been proscribed, and the use of the two lan-
guages not been legal and obligatory for all pur-
poses? Even as things are, there are complaints,

42 ROUMANIA

if by accident one or two officials are not competent
linguists. The Magyars have been faithful pupils
of the Prussians in Poland and Sleswig ; they
have bettered the example of their benefactors,
through whose victory they obtained equality in
the Dual Monarchy.

Education and Church polity are inextricably
connected, for it is the Churches that founded and
maintained the first schools.

Under the laws of 1868 all religious communi-
ties were free together with their schools, in which
the native language was to be the medium of in-
struction, and the Magyar Reply of 1891 affirms
that Roumanian is still so employed. The facts
mentioned in the Roumanian Reply do not bear
this contention out. Slavic! says : "Although the
Roumanians [who support their own voluntary
schools] like other citizens pay their taxes, the
Hungarian State contributes nothing to the
improvement of Roumanian education. In 1848
the Roumanians had a superior gymnasium, an
ecclesiastical seminar and a Teachers' College at
Blaj [Blasendorf], another superior gymnasium at
Belenyes, and few hundreds of poor elementary
schools. In 1879 they had four upper gymnasia
at Blaj, Belenyes, Nasaud and Brasov and
Szamos-Cjvdr, etc., and 2,932 elementary schools.
But the provision for their education is inferior to
that of the Germans, the Slovaks, or the Magyars.

Slavic! published his book in 1880. In 1879
Magyar was made a compulsory subject in all

THE GRIEVANCES OF TRANSYLVANIA 43

schools, and the secondary schools were almost
entirely magyarized.

There are insufficient schools for the Roumani-
ans, e.g., at Arad, where the Roumanian and
Magyar populations are as 63 to 23 ; the pupils at
the schools are as 45 to 405. So too at Caran§ebe§.
Further, no private schools may be opened at all ;
and Roumanian endowed establishments are
arbitrarily closed and converted to Magyar uses,
e.g., at Belenyes [BejusJ.

There are no Roumanian universities ; the
Austrian government under Count L6nyay refused
permission, even during the relatively happier
period of absolutism from 1849 to 1867. But at
the Magyar universities at Pest and Kolozsvar the
Roumanian students are only 5 per cent, and n.6
per cent, respectively.

In all the schools the names of the entrants have
to be magyarized in spelling. [Roumanian Reply,
PP. 58 . . .]

In addition to this systematic persecution and
repression, by Law XV. of 1891 any parents who
are considered incompetent to look after their own
children must send them in infancy to Infant
Asylums, where they are handed over to Magyar
foster-parents and denationalized. This practice
has some curious Turanian parallels : the Turks
used to recruit the Janissaries by a devchurme or
children's poll-tax.4 Latterly, during last year's

4 The same principle is now in full operation in occupied Serbia
(BirSevyya, V&d., n i. 17).

ROUMANIA

Armenian atrocities, "the converts to Islam were
offered the following terms : they must hand over
all children under twelve years of age to the gov-
ernment, which would undertake to place them in
orphanages." So, too, the Tatars, when they
ruled over medieval Russia, took a toll of young
children, as a part of the scheme of taxation.

In 1874, 1888, and 1889, a number of Slovak
children were officially declared orphans and trans-
ported to the Hungarian plain or puszta.

These facts are mainly drawn from Roumanian
sources; but the allegations are not contradicted
in the official Magyar Reply; the Russian Ency-
clopaedia (which derives much of its information,
both in matter and form, from German authorities)
also states that — "The teaching in the Hungarian
schools must be in the native language of the
pupils. In the year 1891-92 there were 28 schools
in which the teaching was conducted in three
languages. In 1891 a scheme of national infant
education was introduced in Hungary, in spite
of the opposition of the non-Magyar nations, and
\vas intended as a step in the direction of crush-
ing these nationalities."

Not that the grievances are only Roumanian :
they, as merely the largest subject people, are the
most affected. Xaumann says of the Germans in
Transylvania: "Where the Germans in Austria
or Hungary live dispersed and affronted, they are
sure of our sympathy and protection; but they
should also, as far as possible, take into consider-

THE GRIEVANCES OF TRANSYLVANIA 45

ation that reciprocal justice raises the standard of
a nation, and that there are other nations as well
who want to live beside us."

In the Austrian Bucovina, by common consent
conditions are much more equable.

There are two Roumanian Churches : one
Orthodox Greek, and the other Greek Uniate, ow-
ing allegiance to the Pope but using the Orthodox
Ritual. The Greek Church is one in doctrine,
but national in organization, unlike the Roman.

(III.) THE CHURCH.

The Roumanian Church in Transylvania was
made autocephalous in 1868. Yet a Magyar Arch-
bishop was immediately appointed, and a Magyar
ministry was given control of the Church estates.
In August, 1916, the appointment of Bishop
Mangra raised a great outcry on account of his
alleged Magyar proclivities. The ecclesiastical
schools in Temesvar were taken over by the
Magyars, and whilst 300,000 florins were allotted
to the Magyar theatres, the amount assigned to
the Roumanian Church was limited to 50,000.

(IV.) LOCAL GOVERNMENT.

The municipal government is engineered so as
to return only Magyars to power. In 1889 Baron
Banffy held an inquisition into all the townships
and expelled or fined all office-holders who could
not speak the Magyar language. By decrees of
1873 and 1874 it was laid down that all municipal

46 ROUMANIA

and local proceedings must be drawn up in
Magyar; and all judicial procedure must also be
in that language.

Yet the Law XLIX. of 1868, S. 7 provided that
every inhabitant of a county in the country may
use the national language of the commune at the
tribunals of his district. The judge is to sum up,
interrogate, etc., in the same language ; and the
proces-verbal also to be in the language assented
to by the parties.

All public or municipal officials are compelled
to magyarize their names, and in the 21 counties
of Transylvania out of 6,588 officials 405 are Rou-
manian, instead of 3,310. [Roumanian Reply,
1891].

The percentage of the population in some of the
principal counties was as follows : —

Magyar
29.62

56. 5
10.82
86.72
86.92
2.18

In Transylvania in 1891 amongst the officials
in the ministries (where there should be 320
Roumanians out of the 1,726), there were only 18;
and in the High Court of Justice out of 428, 10
Roumanians instead of 73.

The provisions of Law XLIX. of 1868 that the
authorities in the Transylvanian and other coun-
ties should be selected from amongst men

Roumanian

Brass6

36.18

Maros-Torda

35-04

Maramaros

2S-91

Haromsz6k

12.78

Csik (Ciuc)

1 2. 02

Nagy-Sz^ben

66.27

THE GRIEVANCES OF TRANSYLVANIA 47

acquainted with the local language has been utterly
disregarded ; and there is not one Roumanian
Viscount (Lord-Lieutenant of a county) nor one
Roumanian in the Supreme Court.

The administration of justice has been entirely
magyarized. Contrary to the fundamental laws
of 1868, decrees were promulgated continuously
from 1872 to 1888 that all the proceedings must be
in Magyar, all the Counsels' speeches, all official
correspondence, all registrations of land (with the
incidental result that land-tenure has to depend on
the good will or honesty of the official translator).

The situation is not in the least comparable with
anything Englishmen can imagine. Welsh is
practically the only really live non-English
language in England ; and Engish is not a small
local tongue of a minority. The parallel would
be, if the Welsh persecuted the use of English
outside Wales, and made it the only official and
governmental means of intercourse and business
and education.

V. GENERALLY.

The remaining forms of persecution of the Rou-
manians are rather more non-descript. There is
no right of association for any purpose, whether
agricultural, literary, academic, commercial, trade
unions, etc., etc. ; even Austrian and Prussian
administration is less tyrannous; Roumanian
societies exist at Vienna.

Except for the Magyar and German press, there

48 ROUMANIA

is no liberty, and libel actions are taken on any
pretext against publishers. Up to 1885 such ac-
tions were brought up before the Assize Court at
Hermannstadt [Nagy-Szeben, Sibiu], where the
juries and judges were German, so that the
charges failed before a non-national, but not hos-
tile tribunal. In that year the Court was trans-
ferred to Kolozsvar [Klausenburg, Cluj], where
the whole apparatus iudicandi was securely
Magyar, and no such miscarriages of Magyar
justice have since failed of effect. There is still
no Roumanian daily newspaper.

The petty persecutions for dancing the national
dances, wearing the national colours, reading the
books published in the free kingdom of Roumania,
singing Roumanian songs, and so forth, are too
numerous to mention. Full evidence will be found
in the books mentioned in the bibliography.

In 1892 the Roumanians petitioned the Emper-
or, but the Hungarian authorities frustrated the
move. In 1894 there was a monster trial for trea-
son at Kolozsvar (like the Agram trial of 1908);
the Hungarian counsel admitted at the end to the
defendants : "You are the condemned, but we are
the vanquished."

The administration of the law at the hands of
the Magyar police is correspondingly and system-
atically brutal and inhuman to a unimaginable
degree. There is nothing but a reign of sheer
force.

The entire policy is dictated by one motive, the

THE GRIEVANCES OF TRANSYLVANIA 49

persuasion contained in Kossuth's phrase that
Hungary must be Magyar or perish. There is no
notion of federalism or conciliation. Thus in
1885 a charge of 17% on the direct taxes was im-
posed to pay for the expenses of magyarization in
the County of Szathmar. The process involves,
inter alia, the penalizing with fines or imprison-
ment of those who will not transform their names ;
all placenames are translated or altered beyond
recognition or understanding by the local
residents, and the expenses are put down to the
recalcitrant victims. This picture might seem
overdrawn ; but the Magyar apologists do not dis-
pute, but rather corroborate and excuse these pro-
ceedings ; and allegations in the pro-Roumanian
writings are supported by the German and
Austrian authorities. The root of the evil is the
dualism of 1867 which raised one of the races of
Austria to a co-partnership in the profits of repres-
sion. German as a lingua franca in the Austrian
medley would not have been unacceptable. The
arrogance of the Magyars was intolerable. Now,
as the price of renewing the Ausgleich (which ex-
pires on the 3ist December, 1917, and had to be
confirmed by the 3ist December, 1916), the
Magyars are demanding Bosnia-Hercegovina and
part of Serbia as their patrimony.

The relations of the two partners in the dual
monarchy have only been cordial, when they agree
as to the proper treatment of other nations equally
numerous and less favoured by fortune. Towards

5O ROUMANIA

the Austrians, the Magyars have always shown
themselves grasping and grudging. For the good
of the world, such relations do not augur any per-
manent friendship.

NOTE. — This book is only concerned with the Roumanians ; but
it is pertinent to state that in Hungary (outside Transylvania) the
following Counties are almost entirely Slovak, viz., Arva, Liptau,
Trentschin, Turec, Zips, Saros, Zolyom, Nyitra, whilst Pozsony,
Bars, Hont, N6grad, Gomor, Abanj-Torna, Zemplin and Ung are
Slovak to nearly 50 per cent. 5

3 New Europe, No. 15.

CHAPTER IV

BESSARABIA

The district now known as Bessarabia originally
formed part of Roman Dacia, and in European
times has always been part of Moldavia. In the
Middle Ages it was ravaged by all the hordes
that poured from Central Asia and the Steppes,
and it provided few means of natural defence.

When after 1711 (i.e., after the treaties of Karlo-
witz and Pozarevac, when Turkey had to recede to
her boundaries up to 1856, beyond the Danube)
Russia began to surge forward to redeem the
Balkans and reach Constantinople, between 1711
and 1812, Bessarabia changed hands five times;
it was the Russian land-road to her objective. The
population is partly Roumanian, partly Little-
Russian.

In 1812, by the Treaty of Bucarest, all of the
Bessarabia1 was ceded to Russia.

In 1829 (by the Treaty of Adrianople) Turkey
had to cede the estuary of the Danube as well (i.e.,
the Northern Dobrudja) ; but by the Treaty of
Paris, 1856, this was restored to Moldavia under
Turkish suzerainty, and included in that single

l The derivation is uncertain, Hasdeu derives it from a rank
Ban Sorab (in Dacian Sarabes head) ; Roum. Basarab.

e2 ROUMANIA

principality. The boundary was the river
Yapluk.

In 1878, by the Treaty of Berlin, Bessarabia
was restored to Russia, but the Dobrudja and the
Delta of the Danube, a Turkish and non-Roumanian
country, ceded to the new State of Roumania.

The racial frontier of Roumania is said to be
the Dnestr ; and until Bessarabia was redeemed
by Russia, it never had any special name, being
an integral part of Moldavia.

The population according to Russian authorities
is accounted for as follows : —

RACES. RELIGIONS.

Percent. Orthodox 1,368,668

Moldavians^ 47.9 Rom. Cath 9,307

Russians 27.8 Armenian Gregorian 3,849

Jews ii. 8 Protestant 44,2I4

Bulgars 5.3 Dissidents from the

Greeks i Orthodox Church 21,900

Turks and Tatars ... 2.9 Mahomedans 930

Germans 3.1 Jews 180,918

Misc. 17

Between 48% and 70% are Moldavians, or
Roumanians; the remainder are Ruthenes or
Little-Russians and Great-Russians. The Little-
Russians are, in the main, to be found in the
districts of Akkerman, Izmail, Bender (BeH^epLi)
and Orgeyev, and also in the north-west corner,
the uezd of Khotin.

- But according to Mavrodin, 63 per cent. ; and, 48 per cent.
officially, but in fact 70 per cent., according to LaSkov, Beccapa6iH,
KB CTOjrfeTiio npHCoe^HHeaiH KT> Poccin Bessarabia. (The centenary
of its union with Russia) Kiiinev, 1912.

BESSARABIA 53

The Great-Russians in Bessarabia are immigrants
and principally represent the official classes.

There are also some Bulgarians near Komrat
and Bolgrad, and 400 families of Armenians.
Gypsies also exist in Bessarabia ; they made their
first appearance in 1417 and were enslaved between
1504 and 1509.

A few Germans live at Akkerman, and Jews are
also scattered over Bessarabia.

The Moldavians principally inherit the uezd of
Kisinev (Chi§ineu) and the banks of the Pruth.

The Russian administration of Bessarabia has
always left much to be desired. According to
Kasso [A. A. Kasso: " Poccin na J^yna-fe, H
o6pa30Bame 6eccapa6cKoii o6jiacTH," Moscow,
1913], Harting, the Governor of Bessarabia, in
1813, intended standardizing Bessarabia with the
other provinces of the Empire ; and the Moldavians
tried to remonstrate with the Tsar ; and in the
years 1825-1828 Bessarabia was assimilated to the
other Russian province. Russian was made the
only official language ; and the use of Moldavian
(i.e., Roumanian) forbidden in official procedure.
Kasso admits that the early administration was
very defective ; but, at any rate, it was of a piece
with the general government of the country.
There was no differentiation against the Rou-
manian population, no attempt to russify them
compulsorily.

At the present time, Mavrodin says, the two
millions of Roumanians in Bessarabia can neither

ROUMANIA

pray, nor be taught, or read in their own language,
nor receive any publications from free Roumania.
"Ending this system would not only bring good
fortune to the Moldavians of Bessarabia, but
would also mitigate the rancour of the crime com-
mitted in 1878 against our kingdom : and Russia
would completely recover the sympathy of the
Roumanian nation to which she is allied by bonds
of religious and common memories in the past."

It is in very different terms that Mavrodin
inveighs against the Magyars.

THE EDUCATION AND LANGUAGE QUESTION IN
BESSARABIA.

Mavrodin's remarks as to the present situation
have already been quoted, and a high standard is
hardly to be expected. There is no Roumanian
university — but Bessarabia suffers no less and no
more than other subject peoples of Russia from
the disabilities and intolerance practiced up to re-
cent times, and has no specific grievance of
special \zcd oppression.

At all events, the Russian law on education is
more generous than the Magyar, though the
execution is lax.

According to Laskov, at the time of the annexa-
tion in 1812, no schools existed: the Phanariote
gospodars of Moldavia occasionally opened Greek
schools.

In 1813 an ecclesiastical seminar was instituted,
in 1816 a secondary school, and in 1828 schools

BESSARABIA 55

in the principal towns, such as Kisinev, Beltsy,
Khotin, Akkerman, Bender, Izmail, Reni, and
Kilia; and in 1829 Jewish schools at Kisinev. In
1909 there were altogether 109,000 pupils. There
is no indication in Laskov that the instruction was
not in the native language and by the medium of
the native language : for the five years' curri-
culum at the school established in 1816 comprised
compulsory French, Russian, and Moldavian.

Further, the general regulations for subjects in
Russian schools insist on religion, Russian and
ordinary or special subjects : such as German and
the local language (e.g., Esthonian or Courland-
ish, the Caucasian languages). The medium of
instruction is always the native language. In
the provinces of Kiev and the south the religious
supervision of non-orthodox schools is left to the
proper religious authorities ; it is only in Poland
(Vilna, Volhynia, Kovno, Grodno and Minsk,
Mohilevsk and Vitebsk) that the local language
(Polish) is used as the medium of instruction only
during the first two years of elementary education.
[Andreevski, Encyclopaedia].

This aim at liberality is a contrast to Prussian
methods, e.g., in Sleswig, where children have to
be taught in deaf-and-dumb show, because Danish
is prohibited. [Le Slesvig du Nord, Copenhagen].

Tocilescu [Manual de Istoria Romdnilor, Buca-
rest, 1900] thus describes the manner in which
Russia acquired Bessarabia : —

" By the Treaty of Ia§i, 1791, Russia advanced

56 ROUMANIA

her western frontier to the Dnestr; by that of 1812
she brought it up to the Pruth, soon afterwards
taking the mouths of the Danube. In fact, Russia
being threatened by Napoleon with war, could
no longer maintain an army on the Danube, and,
consequently, would have been very glad to con-
clude a peace with Turkey on any conditions.
Napoleon even warned the Sultan not to accept the
peace which the Russians wanted, much less to
approve their claims, because he had declared war
on Russia. Unfortunately, the Forte's foreign
affairs were then in the hands of the brothers
Moruzi, who, like all the Phanariote Greeks, were
sold to Russia. The Dragoman Dimitri Moruzi was
commissioned to conclude peace at Bucarest and
let his brother Panaiot take his place. When he
received Napoleon's message, instead of translating
it and giving it to the Sultan, he sent it on to
Dimitri, who handed it to the Russian ambassadors
in place of giving it to the Turkish minister,
Galip Effendi. Galip Effendi, being ignorant of
the circumstances, seeing that the Russian
ambassadors no longer claimed both principalities,
but would be content with Bessarabia, signed
the peace (i2th May, 1812). Shortly after this
treachery of Moruzi was discovered, and
though rather late, he received his due reward :
Dimitri was beheaded on the 8th November, and
his brother Panaiot also."

Take lonescu in 1891 says of Bessarabia: "It
was the first to be snatched from South-Eastern

BESSARABIA 57

Europe, on the pretext of rescue from Turkish
tyranny. An excellent opportunity was presented
to the Russian government of proving to the
Eastern Christians that a Russian supremacy is
not incompatible with a national and proper life
amongst her subjects or confederates. But what
has Russia done in Bessarabia ? She has spared
no device to denationalize it with unheard-of speed.
The religion being the same, it became a tool for
Russification. The lack of a Roumanian middle
class made it possible to widen the gap between
the peasantry and the governing classes. Russia,
who in Poland championed the peasants against
the nobles, has, in Bessarabia, propitiated the
boyar class by systematic bribery, so as to leave
the peasantry without natural leaders. She has
forbidden, uniting violence with Machiavellianism,
in this Roumanian country, the reading of any
Roumanian book or paper."

Whether the extraordinary advance of democ-
racy in Russia, the rise of a Duma powerful
enough against Court influence to cast out two
ministries during this war, has altered matters for
the better, we do not know.8

Possibly the war has made Russia gentler. At
any rate the welcome given to the Russians in this
war is symptomatic : whereas the Hungarian Parlia-
ment has sat continuously during the war and has
not temporized with the Roumanians. On the

3 This was written before the Russian Revolution.

58 ROUMANIA

contrary, as soon as Roumania declared war, the
Magyar Government confiscated all the funds of
the Roumanian municipalities in Transylvania
[Independance roumaine, loth Oct., 1916].

The Roumanian people are evidently less af-
flicted in Bessarabia than in Transvlvania.

CHAPTER V

THE NEGOTIATIONS LEADING UP TO
THE WAR OF ROUMANIA AND AUSTRIA.

PRELIMINARY. — The principal authority is the
third Austro-Hungarian Red Book : and the
slender volume, officially issued, challenges com-
parison with the second, the one bearing on the
war with Italy.

The contrast is very pronounced. In the Italian
volume there are 205 diplomatic excerpts, no gaps
or discontinuity, and full reports not only of the
despatches of the Austrian Ambassador and the
Austrian Chancellor, but also of the interviews at
Vienna, at Berlin and elsewhere. The collection
is so full, and corresponds so well with the Italian
Green Book, that it is a reliable source of history.
The appendices contain extracts from the Triple
Alliance, and other pronouncements bearing on
the Treaty relations.

For the two years of negotiations with
Roumania we have only no documents : 25 for the
year 1914, 25 for the year 1915, and 60 for 1916;
and there are no documents quoted for any of the
winter months; no references to the obligations of
Austria under the Treaty of Triple Alliance or

60 ROUMANIA

otherwise, no references (save one, No. 90) to any
demand by Roumania for territorial compensa-
tions, whilst the lacunae in the correspondence are
most noticeable. Unlike the previous Red Book,
this official emanation must be ranked with the
German White Book and the first Austrian Red
Book, as a compilation availing itself of the official
devices of suppression, and, possibly, re-editing,
to obtain the desired effect, that of demonstrating
that Roumania for two years protested a specious
and unconvincing neutrality, and, with the most
bare-faced treachery, without even any skilled
sophistications, at the end of two years, sprang a
declaration of war on a long-suffering ally. The
most improbable feature of this official tale is either
the incredible fatuousness of a Roumanian govern'
ment that imagined it could be beguiling the
intended foe, or an Austria which would not have
acted much sooner in the face of such undisguised
villainy.

So much for the deficiencies of this official book
on internal evidence. It remains to supplement
it from other sources.

First, from Austrian official sources. The Austro-
Hungarian Red Book on Italy (henceforward re-
ferred to as A.H.II.) contains some of the clauses
of the Triple Alliance. Italy and Roumania both
entered the Triple Alliance in the year 1883, on the
same ground and with the same objects. They
were both of them fundamentally embroiled with
Austria, who retained lands belonging to their co-

THE NEGOTIATIONS OF ROUMANIA AND AUSTRIA 6 1

nationals, in the Trentino and Transylvania,
countries which were being systematically op-
pressed and denationalized. There could be no
relations between either and Austria, save war or a
very sharply defined alliance. Bismarck attained
the latter result at the Conference of Berlin, by
inducing France to occupy Tunis, and Russia
to re-assume the whole of Bessarabia : the two
states were too weak to stand in splendid isolation,
and had to gravitate towards one or other of the
great alliances.

But the terms were rigid. If Italy and Roumania
were to be debarred from their natural extension
into their native territories, it could only be on
a mutual ordinance of self-denial; any advance
by Austria-Hungary in the Balkans or the Mgean
was to be accompanied with compensatory
advances in territory to Roumania and Italy;
and no advance was to be made or contemplated
without an entire preliminary accord.

This arrangement, artificial in its essence,
bolstered up through all the lighter crises in the
Near East, was shattered by two great changes :
when Italy waged war with Turkey for Tripoli
(which was outside the bounds of Article VII.)
and thus compensated herself for her loss of Tunis;
and when Roumania, after the Balkan war, secured
some share in the redistributed territories. The
Austrian contention (in A.-H. II) that the
provisions of Article VII applied intact to the
Balkan territories, after Turkish sovereignty was

62 ROUMANIA

at an end, was refuted by Italy, and absurd in
itself.

The clauses published in A.H. II are cited
infra. The negotiations between Italy and Aus-
tria were based on Article VII; and Italy, backed
to a certain extent by Germany, extorted very large
promises of concessions in the Tyrol and Dalmatia,
the fulfilment of which was left uncertain.1 So,
too, the Rec of Petrograd states on the i5th
August, 1916 :2 "Last year's experience with Italy
proves which of the partners in the Austro-German
firm is held materially accountable for failure
in war. The liabilities are always payable in
Austrian coin. Last year, Germany wrung out of
Austria her assent to territorial compensations for
Italy. Unfortunately, in the case of Roumania,
Roumania is claiming territories belonging to the
dual monarchy, incorporated not with the wizened
frame of Austria, but with the vigorous energetic
body of Hungary."

The clauses mentioned are —

" ARTICLE I. — The Contracting Parties promise
each other mutually peace and friendship, and will
not enter into any alliance or treaty directed against
any one of these States.

'They engage to practise the habit of an
exchange of thought on political and economic
questions of a general nature, such as may arise,

1 vi., " Pros and Cons " in " The Great War."

2 Cf. The Times, 27th July, 1915.

THE NEGOTIATIONS OF ROUMANIA AND AUSTRIA 63

and, in addition, promise each other mutual support
in the realm of their own interests.

" ARTICLE III. — If one or two of the Contracting
Parties be attacked without a direct provocation
emanating from its own side, and should find
itself or themselves at war with two or more Great
PoAvers who are not parties to this Treaty, the
casus foederis shall simultaneously spring into
being for all the Contracting Parties.

"ARTICLE IV. — In the event of a Great Power,
which has not subscribed this present Treaty,
threatening the safety of the States of one of the
Contracting Parties, and the State thus menaced
considering itself obliged therefore to declare war
on such another Power, the two remaining allies
pledge themselves to observe a benevole'nt
neutrality towards their ally. Each of them
reserves to itself the right to take part in the war,
should it deem fit to make common cause with its
ally.

"ARTICLE VII. — With the intention of conserving,
as far as possible, the status quo in the East,
Austria-Hungary and Italy hereby engage to
utilize their influence with the object of preventing
any territorial alteration that might be prejudicial
to one or the other of the Powers signatories to
this present Treaty. For this purpose they will
communicate to each other all items of news that
might serve to enlighten each other mutually on
their own objectives, as well as on those of other
Powers. However, in the event of circumstances

64 ROUMANIA

rendering impossible the conservation of the status
quo in the Balkans, or in the region of the Turkish
coasts and islands in the Adriatic and JEgean
Seas ; and in the event, whether resultant from the
action of a third Power, or from any other cause, of
either Austria-Hungary or Italy seeing itself obliged
or forced to modify the status quo by an occupation
temporary or permanent, in all such events such
an occupation shall only take place after a
preliminary agreement between these two Powers;
and such agreement shall be based on the principle
of a mutual compensation for each and every
advantage, territorial or otherwise, which either of
these Powers might gain over and beyond the
present status quo; such previous agreement to
give satisfaction to the authenticated interests and
claims of both Parties."

Thus this first omission of these fundamental
clauses suggests the nature of some of the gaps
in this correspondence. These have, as far as
possible, been eked out from other sources. But
it follows that, as in No. 4, Roumania distinctly
intimated that no casus foederis arose under the
Treaty, the obligation to compensate was also
brought to life. The position of Roumania, as
of Italy, was that of a junior partner, aggrieved by
the forcible action of the principal partner, but
not in a position to vindicate his right immediately.
Such a victim would not be considered to be in the
wrong, if he lay low. bided his time, and selected
the moment opportune to himself, not to his

culprit partners, to seek redress. The complete
pretermission of any such negotiations is the second
great deficiency in this slim Red Book. It suggests
that there is much to conceal, and good politic
reasons for reticence.

Thirdly, one more general observation may be
made. These despatches are purely Austrian, and
their strict accuracy cannot be checked (as was the
case with A.H. II, which is very faithful, and
tallies with the Italian Green Book); and, on a
general comparison of the style, these despatches
do give countenance to a surmise that they have
been edited for the gallery. There are precedents,
at the Friedjung Trial, 1913, and elsewhere, of
official forgeries in Austria, and still more recently
at the trial of Kramar [New Europe, 4, i. 17], the
Cech leader, when a letter sent by Kramar to
Count Thun was proved to have been falsified for
the purposes of the Court-Martial; and the witness
to the forgery was Count Thun himself. Austria
had valid reason to suspect both the Italian and
the Roumanian premiers of a desire to reacquire
their terre irredente; but in the Roumanian
documents the dramatic insistence by Count
Czernin on the " betrayal, treachery, lies,"
of Bratianu is unconvincingly frequent and
indiscriminating. A diplomat would have used a
style less gross, less strident, and more trenchant,
especially such masters of refined and clear German
style, as the diplomatic agents of Austria appear
to be from their three official publications.

66 ROUMANIA

Lastly, before proceeding to the analysis of these
diplomatic papers, it should be observed that
Roumania, though it is a constitutional country,
accords the King a much greater independence
of his ministers, than Italy — or, of course, Great
Britain. The King can apparently receive foreign
Ambassadors apart from his ministers, and state
his own views, and, subject to their consent, make
agreements binding on his country. There was
evidently some divergence of view between both
King Charles and King Ferdinand with the
Cabinet.

Roumania is, as one of the most advanced of the
Balkan States, also one of the most constitutional,
and the King has no despotic powers : a psycho-
logical fact which the ambassadors of the two
Empires failed to recognise. Their experience in
Bulgaria and Greece, and their home traditions
may have misled them.

The dramatis personae in the prologue to the real
conflict now being enacted in Roumania are : —

ROUMANIA.

King Charles and King Ferdinand.
Ion C. Bratianu, Prime Minister.
Take lonescu, Conservative Democrat Party

leader.

Nicholas Filipescu f Conservative

Alexander Marghiloman i Democrats.
Porumbaru, Foreign Minister.
Costinescu, Financial Minister.

THE NEGOTIATIONS OF ROUMANIA AND AUSTRIA 67

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AND GERMANY.
Count Berchtold, succeeded by Baron Burian,

Austrian Chancellor.

Ottokar Count Czernin (also von Wodianer,
his deputy), Austro-Hungarian Minister
at Bucarest.
Gottfried Prince zu Hohenlohe; and Herr von

Jagow, at the Foreign Office at Berlin.
Consul-General von Felner, Austro Hungarian

Consul at Galaji.
Freiherr von Giskra, Austro-Hungarian

Minister at the Hague.
Count Hadik, Austro-Hungarian Minister at

Stockholm.

The following interesting study of Count
Czernin (Austria-Hungary's new Foreign Minister),
who, till last August was minister in Bucarest, is
from the pen of the distinguished Roumanian
statesman, Take lonescu, and appeared in his
newspaper, La Roumanie, a few days before the
evacuation of the capital.

Count Czernin was no longer in the service,
when in 1913 Vienna thought fit to replace Prince
Fiirstenberg, who had not been able to prevent
Roumania's entry into the war against Bulgaria,
and in consequence, the Peace of Bucarest.

It was the Archduke Ferdinand who chose
Czernin. He had long singled him out as his
future Minister of Foreign Affairs, and in the
meanwhile he sent him to Bucarest with the defi-

68 ROUMANIA

nite mission of patching up Austro-Roumanian
relations once more by means of serious con-
cessions, which the Magyars were to make to the
Roumanians of Transylvania.

Take lonescu says: —

"I met Count Czernin for the first time soon after
his arrival at the opening of the new Industrial
Museum. He took me into a corner, and despite
the crowd all around us, explained to me that he
had come to Bucarest with the sole object of con-
solidating our relations by the large concessions
which the Magyars were to make to the
Roumanians. He assured me that these concessions
would be made, whether the Magyars liked it or
no; but that it was certain that Budapest would
see reason in the end, since it was not merely a
matter of justice, but of sheer necessity. Without
these large concessions on the part of the Magyars,
the Austro-Roumanian alliance could no longer
continue.

' There was a measure of true courage in this
firm declaration. I had no doubt whatsoever that
Count Czernin was under an illusion as to the
possibility of serious concessions, but it was very
honourable on the part of an Austro-Hungarian
Minister to acknowledge that they were necessary.

" At the same time, it seemed very strange that
he should make such a definite declaration to me
at our first meeting, and in the midst of a crowd
that jostled us at every turn. It merely confirmed
my former opinion of Austrian diplomatists. In

THE NEGOTIATIONS OF ROUMANIA AND AUSTRIA 69

course of time, it became obvious even to Count
Czernin that the story of Magyar concessions to
the Roumanians of Hungary would remain a mere
Arabian night's entertainment, and he spoke of it
less and less whenever I met him

" Then when I answered that the issues of war
and peace did not rest with me, he declared : —

" ' You will go to war with us. That is an
understood thing. It is both your interest and
your duty. Why, if I were a Roumanian, I should
attack Austria; and I do not see why you should
not do what I would do in your place. It certainly
is not a noble action to turn against an ally; but
history is full of such villainies, that of Austria,
as well as of other states; and I do not see why
Roumania should be the only exception.' '

This article by Take lonescu can be confirmed
from other sources : Czernin informed a Hungarian
journalist on Jan. 2oth, 1914, that the Roumanians
in Hungary had no rights : and this state of things
was unjust.3

The following extract from Dr. E. J. Dillon's
article in The Fortnightly Review, October, 1916,
explains the treaty obligations of Roumania prior
to the War : —

(p. 536) "As soon as Germany had burned her
boats and appealed to the sword, the question

3 Debate, Hungarian Parliament, [agth Sept., 1916]. A Vildg,
17, recalling that Czernin 's appointment in 1913 raised stormy
protests : as it was considered he held opinions incompatible with
the Hungarian Constitution.

70 ROUMANIA

became urgent what course her Allies would strike
out. Besides Bulgaria, whose engagements were
unknown to the Entente Powers, there were Italy
and Roumania to consider. The latter country was
allied to the Central Empires by a Treaty concluded
in the year 1883, and renewed several times since
then, the last occasion being in the year 1912,
during the Balkan War. This compact, which was
extended to Italy in 1888, was not based on that of
the Triple Alliance, but on the earlier Austro-
Hungarian-German Alliance. By its terms, the
co-operation of the four countries in dealing with
the Near East was established, the defence of the
Hohenzollern dynasty in Roumania was promised
in case of need; Roumania bound herself to con-
struct fortifications against Russian aggression, not
to conclude any political or economic alliance with
any other State without the knowledge and assent
of her Allies, and not to encourage disaffection
among the Roumanians of Austria-Hungary.
Should opportunity serve, Roumania's efforts to
widen her frontiers at the expense of Russia,
Serbia, or in the Dobrudja would be backed by
her Allies, and in case Austria were attacked by
Russia, Turkey or Serbia, it would be Roumania's
duty to go to the assistance of the Habsburg
Monarchy and place all her forces and all her
strongholds at the disposition of her Ally. Lastly,
if, while the Treaty was in force, Austria-Hungary
should put the Balkan States under her, Roumania
would profit largely by Hungary's acquisitions.

THE NEGOTIATIONS OF ROUMANIA AND AUSTRIA 71

" Now this covenant, which afterwards compre-
hended Italy, had one flaw :4 concluded by King
Carol alone, it had never [p. 537] been submitted
either to the Parliament or to a Cabinet Council,
and was therefore null and void. Each Prime
Minister, after he had taken office, was cognisant
of the arrangement, but was bound to absolute
secrecy. Now the Monarch, although only a con-
stitutional ruler, enjoyed a degree of freedom of
initiative in matters of foreign policy which is
usually reserved to autocrats. This privilege, how-
ever, was based exclusively on the tacit consent
of all parties in the State, and no serious protest
was ever raised by any of them against his openly
avowed prepossession for the Central Empires in
general, or for Austria in particular. But this
concession neither implied nor involved a change
in the constitutional law of the realm which lays
it down that treaties with foreign countries, to be
binding, must have been ratified by the legislature.
The circumstances that this one was countersigned
by the Premier goes for nothing, because he has
no authority to discharge the functions of the
Parliament.

" On the outbreak of the war, Italy, who also
had a treaty with the Central Empires, was con-
sidering her position, when King Carol called a

4 Furthermore, in 1913, Bratianu warned both Berlin and Vienna
that the Treaty could not be fulfilled by anyone in Roumania, unless
full account were taken of Roumanian national interests, and war
on Serbia would mean a European war. (Speech at la-jT, Novoye
Vremya, 4. i. 17).

72 ROUMANIA

Crown Council at Bucarest for August the 3rd, to
discuss the situation and concert means of action.
He was a straight, honourable man, who held that,
having given his promise in 1883 to the Central
Empires, it was now his duty to redeem his word.
To the Ministers and ex-Ministers assembled in the
Council Hall, he revealed the existence of the
treaty, accentuated the benefits which it had con-
ferred on the people, and proposed to discharge
the duties of ally which he had taken over in the
name of the nation. But his words evoked no
responsive echo. A number of the members
repudiated an obligation taken over without their
authority, without their knowledge, without the
usual tests and the constitutional ratification.
Some, like Carp, fell in with the King's pro-
posal, but it was in danger of being rejected. Then
the Monarch appealed to their sense of honour,
and asked what figure Roumania would cut in
Europe, if she left friends of thirty year's standing
in the lurch, especially as Italy, who was in the
same boat as Roumania, was certain to keep her
promise and draw the sword with Germany and
Austria-Hungary.

'' His stirring words made a deep impression on
all the members of the Council, for they believed
that Italy would take the course traced by the
King. In fact, for the previous forty-eight hours,
Bratianu had been expecting a telegram from
Rome informing him of Italy's decision. It was
already three o'clock in the afternoon, and no

THE NEGOTIATIONS OF ROUMANIA AND AUSTRIA 73

dispatch had been delivered. The members of the
Council were growing nervous, for a decision had
to be come to in one sense or the other, the
Monarch having put the question. The King, in-
deed, had Italy's readiness to meet her obligations
as an argument. And it was undoubtedly a telling
consideration; but was it true? Just as one of the
scales was about to descend, and the Council, under
the impression of the King's address, and on the
assumption that Italy would declare war on France,
Russia, and Britain, was on the point of recording
its vote, a messenger entered and announced the
Italian Minister in Bucarest, Baron Fasciotti, who
requested to be received on a matter of great
urgency. Silence fell upon the assembly; and the
King, rising and requesting the members to await
his return, left the hall, and ordered the messenger
to usher in the diplomatist. A few minutes later,
the Monarch returned, and straightway informed
the members that Italy had decided upon neutrality.
Most of the statesmen present looked relieved, and
the King, addressing them, admitted frankly that it
was superfluous, in the circumstances, to continue
the discussion; for if Italy, whose engagements
with the Central Empires did not essentially differ
from those of Roumania, deemed it compatible
with her honour to remain neutral, there was no
pressing motive why Roumania should act differ-
ently."

CHAPTER VI

THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN

AUSTRIA AND ROUMANIA

PRECEDING THE WAR.

Roumania §i. — On the 22nd July, 1914, Count
remaining Berchtold at Vienna instructed Ottokar
neutral. Count Czernin, the Austro-Hungarian
Minister at Bucarest to inform the
Roumanian Government that Austria intended
handing in a 48 hours' ultimatum to Serbia [No.
i]. Whether or not an explanatory memorandum
is suppressed (such as appears in the Italian Red
Book No. 2 of the 2oth July), to the effect that
Clause VII. of the Triple Alliance does not apply
(in view of the inheritance of Turkey in the
Balkans having since 1883 fallen to the Balkan
States) is doubtful : but it is probable : for on the
26th Berchtold informed Czernin that Serbia had
refused the Austrian offer — in itself a gross mis-
statement. [No. 2]. In this despatch Berchtold
emphasizes that Austria does not intend any terri-
torial aggrandisement at Serbia's expense, and
hopes that the war will remain " localized." There
is implied in this note a belated admission that
Austria's act, without consultation, is contrary to

NEGOTIATIONS 75

the terms of the Alliance: for it adds " The loyalty
and wisdom of His Majesty (King Charles) led
us to expect a strict neutrality1 on the part of
Roumania. We, having regard to our alliance,
would not in further eventualities take any measure
that affects Roumanian interests, without sounding
our ally's wishes. If Russia were to take hostile
action against us, we should reckon on the loyal
co-operation of Roumania as our ally."

On the 28th July, Czernin had an audience of
the King himself, and the upshot of the con-
versation was : —

1. In a war between the Monarchy and Serbia,
the King guaranteed Roumania's strict neutrality.

2. The King was satisfied with the declaration
that the interests of Roumania would be regarded
in any subsequent actions.

3. The King, despite his personal goodwill,
would not promise military aid against Russia :
but no power on earth would move him to mobilize
against the Monarchy. [No. 3; 28th July, 1914].

However, other national forces were at work. On
the 4th August, Bratianu, the Premier, informed
Czernin of the result of the Crown Council at
Sinaia. " After a fervid appeal by the King to
set the Treaty in motion, the Council decided with
one dissentient that no party dared take such a
responsibility. It has resolved that as Roumania
was neither consulted nor informed in advance of

1 Italics inserted by editor.

76 ROUMANIA

the Austro-Hungarian demarche at Belgrade, no
castis foederis had arisen. It also resolved that
military precautions should be taken to hold the
frontiers : and therein it was benefiting the
Monarchy, and covering some hundreds of miles."
[No. 4].

After this clear indication that Roumania was
not an autocracy, it might have been supposed that
Austria would deal with the constitutional situa-
tion, as such; but this, as will be seen, was too
great an effort of imagination.

Austria evidently remonstrated with Berlin (as
she did in the Austro-Italian negotiations), and
Berlin persuaded Austria to accept the decision and
" in future to respect Roumanian interests, but
with the certain expectation that Roumania would
hold her Moldavian frontiers, and guard against
a Russian irruption." [4th August, 1914; No. 5].

This joint declaration of the two Central Em-
pires had an "excellent effect," and "did more
to conciliate Roumania and those Empires than
anything in the history of the past forty years."

These were Bratianu's words [No. 6; 5th
August]. The key-note is "that Roumania's
interests would be respected by both Empires in
this difficult situation."

Czernin (like Macchio at Rome in the Italian
negotiations) was cynical on the situation. He
said that Italy's decision to remain neutral had
influenced the Crown Council at Sinaia : that King
Charles was, sincerely, pro-German; but that

NEGOTIATIONS 77

Roumania would join the victor, either in loyalty
to her allies, or to share in the distribution of the
Austrian Empire. But she would resist a Russian
invasion. [No. 7; 6th August].

Take lonescu affirmed that Roumania would be
neutral to the end of the war — in a pamphlet of
1 89 12 he argued it was inconceivable for Roumania
to assist either of the oppressors of the Roumanian
race, Hungary and Russia — Bratianu inclined to
think that Roumania might proceed against Russia.
[No. 8; 8th August].

Roumania The attitude of Roumania at the out-
and break of war in July, 1914, was largely

contingent on that of Greece. On July
25, 1914, Pasic, the Serbian Premier, asked for an
indication of the attitude of Greece in view of the
rupture between Austria and Serbia. Venizelos
replied that Greece would hold her forces in re-
serve to oppose Bulgaria if she eventually attacked
Serbia,8 so as to assure respect for the Treaty of
Bucarest. " Simultaneously with this, Venizelos
got into touch with the Cabinet of Bucarest, and
proceeded with them to a joint friendly demarche
to Bulgaria, in which it was made clear that
Roumania would insist upon the maintenance of
the Treaty of Bucarest (1913), as indeed they had
undertaken to do in a secret annexe to that docu-
ment."

However, " Germany was at this time already

8 La politique ilrangbre de la Roumanie, Bucarest, 1891.
3 Crawfurd Price, p. 47.

78 ROUMANIA

casting around for allies. She was reasonably sure
of Turkey, and Bulgaria (according to a declara-
tion made this summer [1916] by the President
of the Bulgarian Chamber to the Hungarian paper,
the Pester Lloyd) was already committed to her.
M. Venizelos' warning of July 25 effectually held
back Bulgaria, and a suggestion of a new Balkan
combination, as a result of which Turkey,
Bulgaria, Roumania and Greece were to re-model
the map of the Peninsula in their own favour at the
expense of Serbia, which was thrown out by Talaat
Bey at Bucarest, was also checkmated by the same
hand."4

Turkey proceeded to war two months after the
arrival of the Goeben and Breslau at Constanti-
nople; the reason of her delay was twofold, firstly,
unwillingness to act as the catspaw of Germany,
secondly, that the object of this "sale" was
ostensibly to enable Turkey to attack Greece and
reacquire the islands off the coast of Asia Minor.5
Grey declared that the Turkish Fleet should not
be allowed to sail outside the Dardanelles;6 and
thus this possible war was frustrated, and the
Turkish forces were directed against Russia,
literally by force majeure on the part of the
Central Powers.

When the Turkish fleet was led by German
commanders against Odessa, and Turkey was thus

* Crawfurd Price, p. 51.

3 Cf. Belgian Grey Book, IV., No. 53, quoted on p. 87.

6 Turkish White Paper, Nos. 55 and 56, 3rd Sept., 1914.

NEGOTIATIONS 79

jockeyed into the war,7 Greece was again anxious
to intervene : but made it conditional on obtaining
the support either of Bulgaria or Roumania.8
Roumania refused, because a victory of the
Central Powers, or the Entente, would both
probably result in an aggrandisement of Bulgaria,
as a reward either of intervention on the side of the
Central Powers, or as a sop from the Entente for
her neutrality.

These considerations to a certain extent supple-
ment the partial story in the Third Austro-
Hungarian Red Book, the hesitation of Roumania
and Greece were alike ascribable to the diplomatic
haze in which Bulgaria was skilfully concealing her
real intentions; while the Entente was suing for her
favour.

The first §2. — There is a gap in the Austrian

of'war'5 papers partly supplemented by the

when Turkey negotiations with Greece : and the
joined in. despatches attenuate from this point

onwards. The entry of Bulgaria
and Turkey was being mooted. No. 53 of the
Second Belgian Grey Book is very much to the
point. The Belgian Minister at Constantinople
reports to Davignon that Turkey is on the point
of entering the field. " The Ottoman army is
much too weak to create any effective diversion
against Russia. But Roumania seems to be on the

7 On the agth Oct., 1914 [R.O.B., Nos. 90 and 91].

8 Crawfurd Price, p. 55.

80 ROUMANIA

point of taking a hostile attitude towards Austria,
which she could not manage without making
sure of the benevolent neutrality of Bulgaria.
Possibly Berlin intends putting pressure on
Roumania and Bulgaria at the weak point in their
armour, viz., their Black Sea Coast, which they
could not defend against a bombardment by the
Turkish fleet. Yesterday and the day before the
Breslau and Goeben did firing practice in the Black
Sea."

It was generally expected that Turkey would
declare war on Greece to secure the islands on the
coast of Asia Minor. [Belgian Grey Book, No.
43; 7th September, 1914].

This despatch lends colour to the Austrian
surmise of the 23rd Aug., 1914, that Russia with
large promises and grave intimidation (grosster
Terrorismus) had been working on both Sofia and
Bucarest, and making the ministers personally
answerable for an anti-Russian policy. [No. 9].

On the i3th September, Czernin reported to
Berchtold that the Roumanians were deeply
impressed by Russia's advance in Galicia; that
Bratianu considered the Austrian position to be
critical; that agitation was rife for co-operation
with the Entente. [Nos. 10 and ii].9

' The cry, ' We want Transylvania,' is the order
of the day. Bratianu every day becomes more
ambiguous and anxious: the King is the only

» Cj. Times, 2oth Sept., 1914.

NEGOTIATIONS 8 1

brake acting on the downward road." [No. 12;
1 9th September, 1914].

Roumania §3- — Turkey was formally ushered

remains into the war by Germany on Nov. 5th,

Death 'of Z9T4 : Dut the preparations were going

King Charles, on all the time preceding, as is
evident from the British and Russian
despatches. Roumania, as the controller of the
only road to Turkey, was affected : Serbia being,
as yet, unconquered.

Bratianu refused leave for the transport of muni-
tions to Turkey : the Roumanians were eager for
war against the Monarchy, and any such per-
mission would cause a popular outbreak. Czernin
objected that such conduct could hardly be termed
"benevolent neutrality," and was scarcely com-
patible with treaty obligations. [No. 13; 22nd
September, 1914].

There is no mention in the preceding documents
that Roumania had ever promised a benevolent™
neutrality: merely "strict," "absolute." [v. No.
3 and No. 7]. It was Austria who declared she
would still regard Roumania as an ally : in
diplomatic language, this would be unilateral, not
synallagmatic.

King Charles was ailing, and the Crown Prince
accorded Czernin an audience on the 23rd Sep-
tember.

An unwonted personal touch comes into these

10 Editor's italics.

82 ROUMANIA

dry narratives. The Crown Prince is described
as irresolute, shifting his point of view, making
unreliable statements [No. 14], being evasive,
having little authority [No. 42], having little self-
confidence or energy [No. 73], as impulsive and
weak [No. 80], as using ambiguous language
[No. 1 08].

Evidently, he was not a man of the stern
resolution of his uncle, and held different opinions;
and this personal factor is of some considerable
weight in the subsequent history.

Baron Jehan de Witte has said that King Charles
was the first King of Roumania, but that King
Ferdinand will be the first King of the Rou-
manians.11

At the interview of the 23rd Sept., 1914, the
Crown Prince declared that "everyone wanted to
make war on Roumania," " he did not know what
the end would be : only one thing was out of the
question, war against Russia." But he considered
the popular demand for war against Austria as
suicidal : that Roumania would, if Russia won, be
Russia's vassal, or if Austria won, Austria's
victim. He is also alleged to have said that war
against Austria would be a breach of honour and
a felony. Czernin regarded the Crown Prince as
the passive instrument of his surroundings. [No.
14].

Rumour was busy: on the 28th Sept., 1914,

11 Toekomst, Dec. i6th, 1916.

NEGOTIATIONS 83

there was talk of another Crown Council and an
invasion of Transylvania. [No. 15].

The King was fast sickening. [No. 16 and 17].
He died on the loth October. [No. 21]. No
Crown Council was held, as the Conservative
Marghiloman and the progressive Take lonescu
agreed that " on mature consideration they would
support the policy of the Government, and there
was no reason for a change." [2nd October, 1914;
No. 1 8].

On the Qth October the crisis was over; and the
reservists were disbanded. Czernin suspected that
Bratianu was coquetting with the ministers of the
Entente but thought the hour was not ripe for
intervention.

Czernin thus judges King Charles : " The King,
ill and exhausted, had only one thought — rest and
an end of this nerve-shattering fight [against the
popular demand for intervention in Transylvania].
He would rather die than be guilty of a dastardly
act unparalleled in history. And he stood quite
alone."

Czernin says that on the 29th Sept., 1914, every
preparation had been made to attack Austria. The
Crown Council was to decide on an invasion of
Transylvania — "an idea, in support of which nearly
everybody of authority had been won over, if
for different motives." There was open talk of
the abdication of King Charles and the enthrone-
ment of the Crown Prince.

" Forty-eight hours later the Opposition and the

84 ROUMANIA

Government compromised on ' neutrality,' and the
disbandment of the reservists."

" The situation is, for the instant, saved."
Czernin continues: "We shall remain on top, if
our army fulfils our high expectations. But there
will be many anxious moments." [No. 20; gth
October, 1914].

What happened in those fateful forty-eight hours
is not revealed. Possibly Bulgaria was recalcitrant.
The crisis had arisen on the matter of the transit of
munitions to Turkey. In the course of it, the pro-
German King Charles died. But it may be
surmised from similar incidents disclosed in these
negotiations that an ultimatum was addressed to
Roumania, whose intervention would have been
very inopportune to the Central Powers; for it was
on the 29th September that the Turco-German fleet
started hostilities in the Black Sea by bombarding
Odessa.18

King Ferdinand on the advice of both
Marghiloman and Take lonescu continued the
policy of neutrality.

The attitude Meantime, in November, the
of Greece. Austrians invaded Serbia for the
second time; and the Serbian resistance
(as might have been expected) was much feebler.
Venizelos again offered to intervene, if Roumania
would do so simultaneously; if Bulgaria would
remain neutral, and if the Entente would give two

'2 R.O.B., Nos. 90 and 91 ; Turkish White Paper, No. 177.

NEGOTIATIONS 85

army corps as a security; the Serbian army being
too much reduced.

Roumania refused; "as early as September, 1914,
she had declared that she no longer considered the
Treaty of Bucarest as a necessary base for regu-
lating the status quo in the Balkans"; and she
apprehended, that if the Central Empires emerged
victorious, their triumph would result in the de-
struction of Serbia and the enhancement of Bul-
garia; but that the Entente would also incline to
strengthen Bulgaria, as a reward of intervention
on their side, or as a sop for her neutrality.13

On 6th March, 1915, King Constantine refused
to accept Venizelos' proposal to send Greek troops
to the Dardanelles, and Venizelos resigned. The
pro-German or neutralist ministries that succeeded
him would not in any case move against Austria
to succour Serbia. Roumanian intervention would
therefore have been a very forlorn hope in the
Balkans, unless the intervention of Italy should
restore the balance.

Roumania §4. — The accession of King Ferdi-

6 nand did not involve any change of

pass through policy. Roumania adhered to a rigid

to Turkey. neutrality: on the i7th Oct., 1914,

The example , .. ,

of Italy. absolutely declining to allow the trans-

port of horses or munitions to Turkey
[No. 23] and persisting in this determination.
[Nos. 24, 27, and 30; i.e., until May, 1915].

13 Crawfurd Price, pp. 55 and 56.

86 ROUMANIA

She was equally neutral against Germany : on
the i6th Nov., 1914, von Waldthausen, the
German Minister left Bucarest; the reason is not
stated [Times']. On or about the 22nd Nov.,
1914, a German commercial agency at Bucarest
was closed, as suspected of espionage. [Times,
22nd Nov., 1914].

The Austrian Red Book is most inconsequential
at this point. On the i4th Nov., 1914, Czernin
reports there are only two parties : those who do
and those who do not deem the time opportune to
strike at Austria. The refusal to supply Turkey with
arms was very serious; and the only hope lay in
military success against the Russians, who held
Lw6w (Lemberg), Przemysl, and were advancing
from the lines of the San and the Vistula. [No.
24].

Quite significantly, on the 2nd Dec., Czernin
anticipates that Roumania will strike in the spring,
with the consent of all parties, the Court, to " earn
the cheap laurels anew, which she plucked in the
last Balkan War." The sole deterrent would be
an Austrian success. The King was still
ambiguous in his language: but "all the sym-
pathies of Roumania were with France, and
passionate hatred against the Central Powers
poured forth in every word written or spoken."

At this point there is a gap of three months :
and at present one can only surmise what may
have been suppressed. Italy was successfully
cajoling and bullying Austria into territorial com-

NEGOTIATIONS 87

pensations; and it was generally supposed that she
and Roumania were acting in concert. Possibly,
Austria was also being induced to offer territorial
compensations for her breach of the Articles of the
Alliance.

Serbia was being spared further invasions, partly
through Italian intervention; as Italy had intimated
to Austria that a renewed attack without full pre-
liminary consent would be considered a breach of
Article VII. of the Triple Alliance; and that even
a temporary occupation would bring this Article
into force.14

On 23rd Jan., 1915, Sir Francis Elliot at Athens
once again approached Venizelos, offering conces-
sions in Asia Minor, if only Greece would range
herself by her exhausted ally, Serbia. The con-
dition again was the restitution by Greece of some
part of Macedonia to Bulgaria, and the interven-
tion of Bulgaria. But Bratianu would not
co-operate and King Constantine also would not
cede Kavala and Drama; so that the offer to Greece
was futile: whilst Roumania clearly distrusted
Bulgaria too much to offer her the old frontier
of 1913. 15

The subsequent efforts in April and May to
induce the Gounaris ministry to intervene for the
Entente were equally fruitless.10

The Entente cannot have been idle with respect

14 A.-H. II, No. 74, i2th Dec., 1014.

15 Crawfurd Price, p. 62.

16 Crawfurd Price, p. 91.

88 ROUMANIA

to Roumania at this period, for on or about
28th Jan., 1915, the British Government advanced
Roumania ^5,000,000 on account of exchange
difficulties with the countries able to supply war
materials, so as to put Roumania in a position to
face eventualities. [Times, 28th Jan., 19 r 5].

Germany was now relieving the pressure on
Austria by the attacks on Warsaw, the second of
which failed in January, 1915. The Russian
advance in the Carpathians had been definitely
stayed.

The intentions of Bulgaria were still doubtful,
for on the 22nd February, 1915, a Roumano-
Bulgarian transit agreement was signed. [Times'].
Roumania was evidently preparing, for on the 2nd
March, 1915, a bill was passed authorising the
declaration of a state of siege when ever the
Government thought it necessary. [Times'}.

At this point the Austrian despatches cease their
curious hibernation: for on the 4th March, 1915,
Czernin reports that the Italian Minister at
Bucarest is more insistent, and that the King told
a politician that " he would follow Italy as an ally,
in the event of Italy's attacking Austria." [No.
26].

Italy had just persuaded Berlin to bring Vienna
to heel, and make some genuine proposals. [A.-H.
II., 109 ....].

On the 1 8th March the King absolutely refused
to allow munitions of war to pass to Turkey, and
Czernin despaired of success. This despatch [No.

NEGOTIATIONS 89

27] leaves the reader in some doubt as to the
precise nature of "our wishes" that had been
frustrated.

On the 3oth March Roumania refused permis-
sion to German troops to pass through her terri-
tory. [Times, 3Oth March, 1915].

Lw6w and Przemys'l had now been taken by
the Germans.

There is a further gap in the correspondence.
Roumania still refused to pass munitions through
her territory, confiscated bags of munitions that
were consigned to the German and Austrian
legations at Bucarest. [Times, 2nd April, 1915].

The approaching break with Italy, and the
Austrian victories in Galicia were counterbalancing
factors : and both Bratianu and the King wanted
to maintain neutrality, but said that Italy's
determination made things very critical, and the
Opposition — now an interventionist party — might
carry the day. Italy might after all accept
Austria's offer : so said Czernin. This touch
seems to show that Roumania and Italy were
acting together. [24th April, and nth May, 1915;
Nos. 28 and 29].

On the point of Turkish munitions Bratianu
remained obdurate, [aist May, 1915; No. 30].

On the 23rd May, 1915, when Italy declared war
on Austria, Baron Burian (who had replaced
Berchtold) played a stronger hand.

He instructed Czernin as follows : —

90 ROUMANIA

" Hesitating to recognise her true interests, en-
ticed by the dazzling offers of the Entente, Rou-
mania has already come into close contact with our

enemies But for Roumania, the question

is not what she may get, but what she can keep.
Any gains at the cost of the Monarchy would be
precarious. Quite apart from subsequent re-
acquisition by the Monarchy, a victorous Russia
would not suffer a situation in which Roumania,
strong and firmly encamped, blocked the way to
the Straits, impaired Russian predominance in
Bulgaria, and held a decisive position of advantage
over the remaining Slav States.

" Roumania's permanence depends on the
defeat, not on the victory of Russia.

" We also, after Russia's crushing defeats,
should insist with more emphasis than ever on
Roumania's co-operation with us." [No. 31].

The King in reply assured Czernin he would
do all he could to remain neutral; but " princes
could not always do exactly as they liked." Take
lonescu and Filipescu argued that Berlin and
Vienna would never, as things stood, forgive
Roumania. Czernin rejoined that Roumania
could still win back the good graces of those
Courts. [26th May, 1915; No. 32].

The ihreat had succeeded : the moment for in-
tervention was not propitious. Italy went to war
unseconded.

NEGOTIATIONS 91

Roumania §5- — Austria had prevailed on

neutral after Roumania to remain neutral, and

the intervention ... . . . . . , ,

of Italy, and stl^ vainly tried to induce her to

prevented from side Avith the Central Powers. [9th,

Bu?g±ntgoolhen I0th and 23rd June> '9'S; Nos. 33,
up arms. 34 and 35]. The Roumanian Army

was all but mobilized [Times, iyth
June, 1915]; the vital question to the Central
Powers was the road to Turkey : the road through
Serbia was still unassailable.

The parties in Roumania were now four in
number : the Liberals, the Conservatives following
Marghiloman, the section following Lehovary, and
those adhering to Take lonescu. The third and
fourth were both active pro-Entente; the Liberals
held their hand; the Conservatives were against
the war with Austria. [26th June, 1915; No. 36].

On the i3th July Czernin was still insistent on
the question of the Turkish munitions : Bratianu
held out no hopes. [No. 37 and 38] ,17

On the 28th August, the King and the Ministry
agreed not to put any obstacle in the way of an
offensive against Serbia; and so solved the question
of transport for Austria. [No. 39].

These very short and spasmodic telegrams throw
little light on the real inducements.

The Times of the I3th July, 1915, possibly
explains the situation, and indicates one whole
series of communiques that have been suppressed.

17 Cf. Times, i4th July and 4th Sept., when Roumania seizes and
confiscates munitions being clandestinely smuggled into Turkey.

ROUMANIA

The Central Powers are said to have offered
Roumania the Bucovina up to the river Seret, as
the northern boundary, so as to comprehend the
Roumanian inhabitants, in return for a friendly
neutrality.

But, as a reward for prompt military help,
Roumania should receive the Bucovina up to the
river Pruth, and an extension of territory to the
Iron Gates on the Danube, to include the town of
Mehadia; on the solemn guarantee of the German
Government.

This is probably accurate : it so exactly resembles
the offers to Italy; a German guarantee, execution
deferred : and no mention of Transylvania. The
most essential and vital claim was not Austria's
to offer; and Hungary was irreconcilable.

Russia, on the other hand,18 had promised
Bessarabia and Transylvania as an inducement.

However this may be, Austria had scored again :
Roumania would again be neutral with regard to
Serbia, and the provisionment of Turkey by that
route.

The Bulgarian §6. — The story of this period (§5)
demand. js a reflection of the negotiations

passing between all the Great Powers
and Bulgaria. The Austrian despatches can be
partly supplemented from semi-official statements
in the Press. Bulgaria was being munitioned,
even from Denmark,19 and was assiduously wooed

18 Times, i^th July, 1915.

19 Politiken, 2. vj. 15.

NEGOTIATIONS 93

by the Quadruple Entente. She was promised
Serbian Macedonia, Greek Macedonia (as far as
Kavala), and the Enos-Midia frontier as against
Turkey. She asked for more : and wanted to know
what compensation would be adjudged to Serbia
and Greece, and what she was to gain in the
Dobrudja.20 It was claimed at Sofia that Bulgaria
ought to be restored to the frontiers settled at the
Conference of London, 1913 : and on these
conditions she would oppose not Russia, but
Pan-Germanism .21

Such rectifications would have been hard enough
to enforce by the " Concert of the Powers " : it
was very much complicated by the fact of the
Great European War, and the influence on the
little Powers of the Balkans of the ebb and flow
of fortune in the field : for Russia was beginning
her great and disastrous retreat. There were
rumours that negotiations were proceeding for a
separate peace with Russia.22
The offers On the 3Oth June the Quadruple En-

oi the tente sent in its offer to Bulgaria:28 but

Entente. . ,' f

these were apparently unacceptable, for

Ghenadiev claimed the whole of the Dobrudja, as
well as Macedonia.24

20 Berliner Morgenpost, 22, vj. 15.

21 Echo de Bulgarie, 23. vj. 15; Mir, 23. vj. 15; cf. Berliner
Tageblatt, 2. vij. 15 ; Pesti Hirlap, 12. vij. 15.

22 La corrispondenza militar, 13. vij. 15.

23 Stampa. 30. vj. 15.

24 Pesti Hirlap, 12. vij. 15.

94 ROUMANIA

In the meantime the Quadruple Entente was
trying to make Roumania, Greece and Serbia con-
sent to these sacrifices : Roumania required the
Roumanian territories in the Banat of Temesvar,
Bucovina and Transylvania. Russia objected to
giving up Northern Bucovina, and the Western
Banat, as not being Roumania in population (not
to speak of cessions in Bessarabia, of which there
is no mention until late in 1916) ;25 Roumania
insisted on the possession of Czernowitz and the
boundary of the Pruth.26 The negotiations came
to a standstill.27 But, after the fall of Lemberg,
Russia was willing to concede Czernowitz and
the line of the Pruth;28 and promised that the
Dardanelles should be internationalized.29
oners of The Central Powers, too, up to

the Central thjs pOint had not been idle. They
Powers.

offered Roumania a rectification of the

Transylvania frontier and in Bucovina,
and a grant of autonomy to the remainder of
Transylvania.30 This much was offered in return
for neutrality : for active participation, Bessarabia,
Bucovina up to the Pruth, and extension up the
Danube to Mehadia.81 Evidently these overtures
did not succeed : for Roumania was pronounced to

25 Corners delle Sera, 10. vj. 15.

26 Novoye Vremya, 18. vj. 15.

27 Rec, 6. vij. 15 ; Corriere della Sera, 9. vij. 15.

28 Ziirichcr Post, 15. vij. 15.

29 Nicuwe Rott. Ct., 17. vij. 15.

so Tribuna, 27, vj. 15 (Report from Sofia).
31 Times, 13. vij. 15.

NEGOTIATIONS 95

be anti-neutral, in stopping munitions to Turkey ;SJ
the Central Powers would have to consider
whether their Treaty to Roumania bound them
any longer.53 They began terrorizing. " When-
ever the Germans have a victory over the enemy,
they at once begin to threaten us. We can imagine
what will happen if Germany is victorious."34
They exercised economic pressure on Roumania,
reducing her State revenue by 36,608,306 francs;55
they concentrated at least 160,000 troops on the
Hungarian frontier.56

As a result, Roumania had to relax her inhibi-
tion on the transit of war material and men to
Turkey;87 the interventionist party, Ac\iunea
Xafionald, was defeated;58 and these endearments
from the Central Powers induced renewed relations
with the Quadruple Alliance, under pressure of
the contingencies in Bulgaria and Greece.
The Central Radoslavov, the Bulgarian minister,

Powers and was sa^ to be pro-German;59 the

Bulgaria, up to ~

August, 1915. Roumano-Bulganan agreement as

to transit of goods was said to be
illusory.89 The Bulgarian attitude was undecided

32 Deutsche Tages Ztg, 12. vij. 15.

33 Frankfurter Ztg, 12. vij. 15.
94 Adeverul, 18. vij. 15.

35 Tagli.che Rundschau, 26. vij. 15 ; La Politique (Roum.), 25.
vij. 15.

96 Adeverul, 27. vij. 15.

37 Moskov. Ved., 22. vij., 15 ; AdevSrul, 13. viij. 15.

98 La Politique, 28. vij. 15.

39 Berliner Tageblatt, 2. vij. 15.

96 ROUMANIA

even at the end of July; they feared that the
arms of the Entente might solve the Turkish
question without calling in Bulgaria, and that
Germany could not advance a loan;40 but this
last doubt was dissipated, for Germany issued
Bulgarian Treasury Bills early in August to the
extent of 120 million francs at 7%.41 The offer of
the Entente was too shadowy ; neither Greece nor
Serbia evacuated their portions of Macedonia;42 and
Bulgaria pledged herself to a benevolent neutrality
towards Turkey.43

Hence Roumania was left as the one obstacle
in the munitionment of Turkey : and the Central
Powers had reconciled Turkey and Bulgaria.
The Central The Quadruple Entente was anxious
Powers and to propitiate Bulgaria, who held
Greece* and f^e keys of Constantinople; and to
Bulgaria effect this, had to induce Roumania,
Serbia and Greece to renounce their
gains in the Second Balkan War, 1913.

Greece was dubious as to her advantage in
joining the Allies: what would she benefit, if
Constantinople fell (the Dardanelles expedition
had not collapsed in July, 1915); what compensa-
tions would Bulgaria receive; what would happen
if Bulgaria were obdurate, or attacked Macedonia

40 Echo dc Bulgarie, 30. vij. 15.
« Koln. Ztg., 3. viij. 15.

42 Journal de Geneve, 2. viij., 15.

43 Le Temps, 2. viij., 15; Kreuzztg, 16. viij. 15.

NEGOTIATIONS 97

for herself ?44 This attitude evidently pleased the
Kaiser, for he telegraphed to Queen Sofia of
Greece: "Thanks to you and to Bulgaria and
Roumania, our triumph' is assured."45 Greece
would not consent to cede Kavala to Bulgaria,46
though Great Britain had offered Cyprus as a sop,
to induce Greece to keep her Treaty-bond.47

The Kaiser's language was not mere bombast.
For, on the zyth July, a treaty had been signed
between Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and
Bulgaria, under which Bulgaria was to receive the
whole of Albania, Greek and Serbian Macedonia
(thus including Salonica and Kavala). This was
only published on the nth October: and was
vouched for by the British Minister at Athens.48

The arrangement was consummated in October,
1915, when the Bulgarian railways were placed at
the disposal of Germany : Bulgaria promised to
attack Serbia : Germany was to invade Serbia from
the North with 300,000 men; and Bulgaria was to
receive Bulgarian and Serbian Macedonia, and
was free to settle accounts with Greece.49

The beginning of August seems to have found
Bulgaria definitely inclining towards Germany; but

44 Neue Freie Presse, 17. vij. 15.

45 Journal des Balkans, 18. vij. 15.

4rt NSvoye Vremya, 29. vij. 15 ; Messager d'Ath&nes, 10. viij. 15.

47 Cf. Times, 27. x. 15.

48 Times, 17. vii. 15; n. x. '15; 8. x. '15;
10. x. 15.

49 Echo de Paris, 7. x. 15, quoting Kambana.

gS ROUMANIA

the former still demanded Kavala and the hinter-
land.50

But Germany still had one task left over; the
reconciliation of Greece and Bulgaria was now
attempted by the Central Powers;51 and was con-
summated by a treaty in November, 1915.

The provisions are stated to have been : —

1. A benevolent neutrality from Greece to Bul-
garia.

2. The Bulgarian forces to be guarded by
Greece from any sudden attack.

3. The Expeditionary Force at Salonica to be
regarded as uninvited guests.

4. The Treaty of Alliance between Greece and
Serbia to be considered null and void. ,

5. Bulgaria renounced her pretensions to Greek
Macedonia, and would aid Greece to extend her
frontiers (i.e., against Italy) in Albania.

This treaty was signed by King Ferdinand of
Bulgaria, King Constantine of Greece, Radoslavov
for Bulgaria, and Zaimis on behalf of Greece.52

How this treaty could be reconciled with that
of the jyth July (first disclosed on the nth Oct.)
may be left to the ingenuity of the Germans who
promoted both.
The Quadruple The Quadruple Entente, if it was

Entente and to placate Bulgaria, also had to exact
Serbia. , 0 ,. &.

from Serbia, its own ally, a return

50 La Tribuna, 8. viij. 15.

31 Berliner Tageblatt, 25. viij. 15.

52 Adeverul, 19. xj. 15.

NEGOTIATIONS 99

to the conditions ail-but ratified at the Conference
of London, 1913.

Austria-Hungary in August, 1915, was very
much exhausted,53 and seems to have been anxious
to conclude a separate peace with Serbia. Serbia
had compromised with Italy on her claims to
Dalmatia and raised no objection to the Italians
having the coast-line.54

By the end of August, 1915, the Quadruple
Entente had induced Serbia to yield up her share
of Bulgarian Macedonia, and part of her claim to
the Banat of Temesvar; thus reconciling both
Bulgaria and Roumania.

Bulgaria demanded in addition as her price,
Rodosto (on the Sea of Marmora), Kavala, and
the Dobrudja.55 Bulgaria also required to know
what compensation Serbia was to receive.56

"It has taken a year for the Entente to decide
to give Bulgaria what she asked, and the latter
now waits to know Serbia's answer."57

Clearly the Entente were not able to give Bul-
garia her frontier as settled by the abortive Con-
ference of London : it might have been equally
clear that Bulgaria was playing for time into the
hands of Germany.

The Entente also vetoed any attack by Serbia

59 AdevSrul, 6. viij. 15.

54 Interview with PaSic ; Corriere della Sera, 23. viij. 15.

55 Le Matin, 29. viii. 15.

56 La Tribuna, 8. viii. 15.

67 Journal de Gentve, n ix. 15; Journal des Dtbats, 17. ix. 15

IOO ROUMANIA

on Bulgaria, in anticipation of Bulgaria's joining
the Central Empires;58 in which the latter had her
proper place, rather than in a Balkan League.58
Delcasse resigned his portfolio as Foreign Minister
of France, probably in disapproval of this decision.

Yet in the middle of September Bulgaria, who
was, like all the Balkan States, merely pursuing
her own interests, was sounded by the Entente
whether she would attack Turkey and accept the
Serbian concessions :59 this action was represented
by the Austrians as a cringing of the Entente and
the Tsar before Bulgaria.60

The Entente The attitude assumed by

and Roumania. Roumania during these negotia-
tions was necessarily very cautious.

By the 6th August, 1915, apparently matters
had been accommodated between the Entente and
Roumania, who would not join Germany under
any condition, and might join in a new Russian
offensive (which did not eventuate).61 This
rumour of a treaty between Roumania and the
Entente was also officially contradicted.62 But any
such intervention must be on the rising tide; they
could not aid the Russians in retreat: "It is in
the interest of the Allies that Roumania's inter-
as Koln. Ztg., 3. xj. 15.

50 Miinchener Neueste Nachrichten, 17. ix. 15.

W Neue Freie Presse, 26. ix. 15.

81 Adeverul, 6. viij. 15 ; Le Matin, 29. viij. 15.

«2 Berlingske Tidende, 6. viij. 15.

NEGOTIATIONS,

vention should be the coup de grace."63 " Her
army may cross the Carpathians [i.e., in the event
of participation] without anxiety : the Balkan
Alliance assures her safety on the Danube."64

Germany was dissatisfied with the continued
prohibition of the transit of munitions to Turkey,
though submarines in sections were allowed
through.05

But by the 23rd August some pressure must have
been put upon Roumania, who, it was said, would
be benevolently neutral, and would not attack
Bulgaria;66 and on the 3ist a declaration of war
on Roumania by the Central Powers was said to
be imminent;67 this rumour was, however, denied.68

If such a course had been threatened, it would
explain Roumania's passivity towards the pro-
jected invasion of Serbia. [A.-H., III.; 28th
August].

At all events, Russia's offers were insufficient.
She had secured the neutrality of Roumania,
nothing more. The crucial point was Bessarabia;
and Roumania put no trust in the Russian
promise;69 and had to recognise the claims of
Bulgaria, and do nothing to counter them.70

63 AdevSrul, 8. viij. 15.
<54 Adeverul. 15. viij. 15.

65 Frankfurterztg, 14. viij. 15; Aachener Allgemeine Ztg, 23.
viij. 15.

66 Aachener Allgemeine Ztg, 23. viij. 15.

67 Tribune de Geneve, 31. viij. 15.

68 Ncue Zurcher Ztg, i. ix. 15 (quoting Viitorul).

69 Miinch. Neueste Nach, 16. ix. 15.

70 Trierscheztg, 17. ix. 15.

1 02 ROUMANIA

On the 24th Sept., 1915, Czernin delivered a
virtual ultimatum. [A.-H., III., No. 46]. Feel-
ing may have been kindled in Roumania by the
arbitrary conduct and barbarity of the Austro-
Hungarian authorities in Transylvania.71

Moreover, the Germans were boycotting
Roumanian trade, and causing great loss.72

The Roumanian Press was being bribed and
corrupted by both Russia and Germany : the
latter founded a new League of the People [Liga
Populara] to forward their interests.73

It had often been rumoured that Roumania and
the Quadruple Entente had entered into a definite
compact. The text of the agreement was published
in Russia in October, 1915. The stipulations
were : —

The Quadruple Entente undertook to cede a
portion of Bucovina, of 14,000 square kilometres
[probably this was a fair division], and not to
conclude peace, until Roumania had been able to
annex Transylvania, Bucovina, and a part of the
Banat [thus giving effect to the compact with
Serbia].

Roumania was to put 500,000 men into the field,
and not to make a separate peace with Austria-
Hungary without the consent of the Entente.

Should Bulgaria join the Entente, Roumania
should return the strip of the Dobrudja annexed

71 Echo de Paris, 10. x. 15 ; Adeverul, 19. xj. 15.

72 Dcutscher Aussenhandel, 20. ix. 115.

73 La Roumanie, 24. ix. 15; Kreuzztg, n. xij. 15.

NEGOTIATIONS 1 03

at the conclusion of the Second Balkan War [i.e.,
the quadrilateral of Silistria — Tuturkai — Balcik —
Mangalia].

Roumania should observe a benevolent neutrality
until she intervenes.

Should Bulgaria join the Central Powers,
Roumania should send 250,000 troops to aid the
Serbs.-4

It will be observed that the attitude of Bulgaria,
and her engagements, were still unknown; that it
was assumed that Russia would guard the Danube
frontier, or else that Bulgaria would not declare war
against Roumania; and that the main effort of
Roumania was to be directed against Transylvania
— a very distant road to cutting the backbone of
Central Europe (viz., the Continental route to
Turkey, through Pest, Belgrade and Ni§); lastly,
there is still no mention of Bessarabia.

These preparations (in conjunction with the un-
readiness of the Allies at Salonica) furnish a
further reason and justification of the ultimatum
delivered by Austria on the 24th Sept. [A.H., 45];
as also of the fact that munitions were for a
time allowed to pass through to Turkey;75 and
smuggling of them was very common;78 also that
German agents were buying petrol at Gala^i in
very large quantities.77

74 Russkoye Sldz'o, 5. x. 15 ; Neue Freie Presse, 5. x. 15.

75 Echo de Paris quoting Dimineafa, 5. x. 15.

7« Journal des Debats, 7. x. 15 ; fifJ.7T()6<; 25. x. '15.
~~ .\devt? nil, 9. x. 15; La Politique, 25. ii. 16.

104 ROUMANIA

On this important matter of petrol some figures
may be useful.78

EXPORTS FROM ROUMANIA.™

1914. 1915.

To Germany 99^65 ... 154,688

,, Austria-Hungary 84,253 ... 225,699

„ Bulgaria 18,689 ... 33,568

,, France 50,028 ...

,, Great Britain ... 77,971 ...

,, Russia 7,oi6 ... 578

,, Turkey 3M63 ••• 8,191

,, other countries... 285,439 ... 6,363

Total 654,024 429,087

Or in percentages : —

1914. 1915.

To Germany and

Austria ... 28.04% ••• 88.64%
,, France and Gt.

Britain ... 19.57% •••

,, Russia 1.07% ... 0.13%

,, Bulgaria 2.86% ... 7.83%

,, Turkey 4.81% ... 1.92%

,, other countries 43.65% ... 1.48%

On the 8th and gth Oct., 1915, Bulgaria, before
going to war, published a long memorandum ex-
plaining her motives for adhesion to the Central
Powers.80

"8 Universul, 4. iv. 16.

70 For the figures as to grain, v. pp. in and 112.

*> Frankfurterztg. 8 and 9. x. 15.

NEGOTIATIONS 105

A typical piece of German propaganda at this
time deserves mention : it was intended to arouse
distrust in Russia, and is absolutely unsubstan-
tiated, viz. : that Great Britain and Russia had made
a secret treaty against Roumania and Bulgaria,
by which Russia was to acquire Constanta,
Constantinople and Burgas.81 The truth at the
bottom of this may be that German agents tried
to detach Russia from the Entente with the bribe
of Constanta, just as in 1916 they were endea-
vouring to seduce Russia to a separate peace with
an offer of the whole of Moldavia.82

The anti-interventionists at Bucarest were
naturally encouraged by the course of events,
and a demonstration was made towards the end
of October, 1915, to overthrow the Bratianu
Cabinet i83 followed by a great anti-German
demonstration, at which Take lonescu and
Filipescu spoke.84

There were insistent rumours for some time
following these last events of a German incendiary

81 Koln. Volksztg, 24. x. 15.

82 Literary Digest, 9. vij. '16 ; Sunday Telegram, 17. vij. '16 ;
and cf. Le Genevois (quoted by the Gazzetta Ticinese, 17. iii. 17)
and Berner Tagwacht, 6. \. 16 : stating that Roumania was to be
offered by the Central Powers to Russia in part, together with
Armenia and parts of Galicia, in return for a separate peace and
a free hand elsewhere.

83 Journal de Geneve, 27. x. 15 (quoting Wiener Correspondenz).

84 Munch. Neueste Nachrichten, 28. x. 15.

106 ROUMANIA

plot against Filipescu, Take lonescu, Bratianu,
and Costinescu.85

This intermediate chapter will supply some of
the missing links in the official story as put
forward by the Austro-Hungarian Government.
Roumania §7- — But Serbia could not be

is quiescent crushed without the aid of Bulgaria.

eWnhte^hegaria Dr- Dillon> in Land and Water>

fleid. of Qth October, 1916, says of the

negotiations of the Allies: "Four
great powers entered into conversation with the
four or five Balkan States, so that nine foreign
secretaries and about sixty ministers pleni-
potentiary were thereupon engaged in interchang-
ing views Months passed in this elaborate

effort to get Bulgaria to outline her demands, and
to move Serbia to accord them. And all that
expenditure of time and labour was made in the
single-minded belief that Bulgaria's statement was
true, and that her freedom of choice (which it

presupposed) really existed Serbia, heroic

in her voluntary sacrifice, as in her terrible
martyrdom, accepted the situation and gave up
Macedonia. [Be it observed, Serbia alone of the
Balkan Kingdoms has a national dynasty, not a
German prince]. Bulgaria could no longer lurk
and weave unavowed plans in the safe retreat of

justifiable neutrality Mobilization was

resorted to, when the game of neutrality could be

85 Deutsche Tagesztg, 13. xij. 15; La Stampa (quoting Wiener
Aug. £tg.), 19. xij. 15.

NEGOTIATIONS 1 07

prolonged no further The first care of

Sofia and Berlin was to tranquillize Roumania and
Greece. The game was being played by two
partners. Germany had already spread far and
wide the terrifying tale that she was about to hack
her way through Serbia, and to pass thence through
Bulgaria into Turkey. The attitude of the brave
Bulgars would then be shaped by dire neces-
sity

" Four Bulgarian divisions were despatched to
keep watch and ward over Roumania

" As soon as 25,000 Bulgarian Comitadjis over-
ran Macedonia, Serbian troops would have to be
despatched from the North-Eastern front, leaving
Germany's road to Turkey inadequately de-
fended "

These preliminary quotations explain the
fragmentary despatches in this section : Roumania
was on her guard, too, against Austria, for there
were 200,000 German troops concentrated at Brasso
on the Roumanian frontier [Times, 3oth Aug.,
1915]. They could be moved either into Rou-
mania, or North-Eastern Serbia by Or§ova.

On the roth Sept., Bratianu and Czernin had
a " very earnest conversation." Austria had closed
the Hungaro-Roumanian frontier to all intercourse
and traffic whatsoever; Roumania had had to
protect herself. Bratianu asseverated once again he
had no treaty with the Entente; but Roumanians
were expecting an attack from Austria — a proba-
bility he himself discounted. Czernin adds in his

108 ROUMANIA

own despatch: " I repeat I am convinced that no
attack from Roumania need be anticipated in our
present military situation." [No. 40 and 41].

Not content with the answer given by Bratianu,
Czernin had an interview with the King on the
1 4th Sept. Czernin demanded the withdrawal of
the Roumanian troops (which were ail-but mobil-
ized, v. Times, yth, i5th and 2Qth Sept.); and,
apparently, there was some dispute between the
King and General Iliescu and Bratianu. The
King shilly-shallied — according to Czernin, who
insisted that the King as oberster Kriegsherr had
only to command. [The Austrians in all their
negotiations with Italy, Serbia, etc., never under-
stand a constitutional monarchy].

At last the King promised to withdraw his troops
at once if the Austrians opened the frontier and
withdrew theirs. The frontier was opened on the
same day. [No. 42].

Bratianu (whom Czernin interviewed next day)
consented to withdraw the troops in a fortnight,
after the defensive works had been constructed.
" He would be a lunatic to attack the Monarchy
now, when he refused, whilst the Russians were
beyond the Carpathians." [No. 43].

On the 22nd the troops were still on the frontier.
Czernin took it on himself to inform the King that
his orders were disobeyed. [No. 44].

On the 24th September Czernin acted summarily,
and told Bratianu " he had no orders, and was not
speaking officially. But, as a private individual

NEGOTIATIONS IOQ

acquainted with Berlin and Vienna, he must notify
him that Roumania was not in the position of
Greece [which was then governed by Venizelos
and bound by alliance to Serbia]; and a mobiliza-
tion would force the Monarchy to ask for explana-
tions. He had better weigh the consequences."

Bratianu bridled at the distinction made between
Roumania and all the other Balkan States that had
mobilized. Czernin pointed to the hostility of the
Roumanian press.

On that day, the 24th Sept., a Cabinet Council
was on the point of meeting [No. 45] : and was
satisfactorily intimidated. [No. 46].

Burian approved this brusque action [No. 47]
and Roumania was effectively deterred from any
further military measures. [No. 46; 24th Sept.].

Burian remarked [No. 47] : " To-day, when even
Bulgaria has shaken herself free of the terror of
the Moscovites, Roumania ought to be able to
pick up pluck enough to resume the road to which
history, the true interests of the country and pru-
dence all point."

Again Austria had scored. Bulgaria entered the
war, and Roumania was mute and neutral. The
time was not ripe for action : Bratianu could not
publish his reasons.86 Serbia was crushed and the
road to Constantinople clear.

As a mere incident one other fact might be men-
tioned at this stage.

8fi Le Temps, 2. x. 15 (in reply to a parliamentary delegation).

1 10 ROUMANIA

In the beginning of 1915, when the Bulgarians
had renounced the Balkan League, and found
harbour with the Central Powers,87 the official
pundits discovered a new racial affinity between
the Magyars, Bulgarians and Turks; and Pan-
Turanianism came into fashion, to the discarding
of Panslavism, which, anyhow, had incited Russia
to create Bulgaria in 1878 ex nihilo.
The period §8. — The Roumanian people were

before the none the less pro- Ally, because their
final act. ,.,, r , . ...

government was still forced to passivity.

On or about the 5th Oct., there was a popular
demand for full mobilization, and the Bulgarian
ports on the Danube were closed to Roumanian
traffic [Times, 5th Oct., 1915]; on the yth
troops were sent to the Bulgarian frontier and
Giurgievo v/as fortified. There must have been
danger of treachery and espionage, for officers of
Bulgarian origin were sent into the interior of the
country : and the army was kept on a strong war-
footing [ibid., yth Oct. and i8th Oct., 1915]. On
the 1 8th it was reported that the army of 600,000
could be increased to 1,100,000, but for lack of
munitions : 220,000 were concentrated in the
Carpathians [ibid., 22nd Oct., 1915].

On the 3rd Nov. Burian was apprehensive of a
Russian violation of Roumania, with her con-
nivance: both Czernin and Bratianu dissipated the
notion. [Nos. 48 and 49].

'7 Thus Radoslavov in Koln. Ztg., 3. xj. 15; lasul, 2. iij. 16 ;
Universal, 15. iij. 15.

NEGOTIATIONS 1 1 1

There is another prodigious gap in this series
of documents, over the winter. In the meantime
Serbia was overrun, Riga was attacked, and ail-
but abandoned, the Allied forces driven back to
their position before the offensive of 1915 which
culminated in the capture of Monastir; the
Dardanelles were evacuated; the British advance
on Kut proved disastrous; it was only the Russian
advance in Armenia, and the German defeat at
Verdun that redeemed the situation.

What negotiations were pending between Rou-
mania and the Great Powers can at present only
be guessed.
The sale of One other great issue for Rou-

Roumanian mania was the sale of her cereal

cereals during , . , . , , ,

the critical harvests : it furnished a large part

period ol 1915. of the national income, and all the
belligerents were in need of her
supplies, which were too large for home consump-
tion.

The economic progress made by Roumania has
been mentioned elsewhere (p. 19).

On English reports, it appears that on the 22nd
Jan., 1916, Great Britain purchased ^10,000,000
of Roumanian wheat [Times, 22nd and 3ist
Jan., and i6th Feb., 1916]. But, by way of com-
pensation, Roumania had to supply the Austro-
German Empires with 1,000,000 tons of maize,
150,000 tons of barley and 100,000 tons of oats
[Times, 4th Feb., 1916]. And on the i4th Feb-
ruary the Central Empires entered a protest against

1 1 2 ROUMANIA

the purchase by Great Britain, though Germany
had already bought 200,000 tons, but had not been
able to fetch it for lack of trucks [ibid., i4th Feb.,
1916].

In January, 1916, the export of grain was for-
bidden (which marks a change of policy from
November, 1915); and this caused Roumania
financial loss and deprivation in Germany.88

But in that same month 600,000 truck-loads were
ordered for Great Britain;89 and 80,000 waggons
of corn for Germany.90 One note must be made
regarding this last purchase (as it bears on military
possibilities); Roumania had not sufficient trucks
to convey this quantity.81

In exchange Germany would send anything, save
war materials though Roumania had passed
cotton through to Turkey.92

Yet the pro-German party represented that after
the contract with Great Britain, " the Government
had lost all right to pose as neutral."93

The matter was compromised and both sets of
belligerents were to get their deliveries on the ist
June.M

The Central Powers were evidently putting

88 Independence Roumaine, 13. xj. 15 ; Vorwdrts, 5. i. 16.

89 Koln. Ztg., 15. 5. 16.

90 La Politiqus, 22. i. 16.

91 La Politique, 2. ii. 16.

92 Universal, 14. ii. 16 ; 3. ii. 16.
99 Steagul, 14. ii. 16.

9* AdevSrul. 13. ii. 16 ; La Politique, 10. iii. 16 ; Adevtrul ii.
iii 16.

NEGOTIATIONS 113

economic pressure on to Roumania; thus they
granted leave for the import of Roumanian wine
in April, I9i6.95

In 1916 Roumania — having no other market —
had been compelled to sell to the Central Powers :
from Jan. ist — May I4th, 548,236,790 kilos of
cereals ;

April ist — May I4th, 230,926,879 kilos of
grain.96

These figures merely demonstrate what were the
disabilities of Roumania as a neutral. She had
no market, save the Powers hostile to her, and was
subject to constant economic pressure and military
demonstrations.

Also, in this unchronicled interval, the
Roumanians had not been neglecting military
precautions. They succeeded in leaving both sets
of belligerents in doubt as to their choice.87 By the
7th Feb., 1916, the special army credits amounted
to ^24,000,000, reservists abroad were summoned
home : the Roumanian Bank collected a large gold
reserve: the new '17 and '18 classes would bring
the effective strength of the army up to 1,000,000.
On the 1 5th Feb. the mobilization is stated to be
completed; the Carpathian passes and the banks
of the Danube in the new Dobrudja territory were
being fortified [Times, 7th, loth, I2th and I5th
Feb., 1916].

95 Pesti Hirlap, 28. iv. 16.

96 Universal, 7. vj. 16.

97 Berliner Tageblatt, 29. i. 16.

114 ROUMANIA

Roumania's Although the road to Constantinople

relations with was now open to the Central Powers,
*"* they still were trying to avail them-
selves of the Roumanian railways, and
shells for Turkey were despatched, to take only
one of many instances, concealed in large crates
of sugar.

Whether there were any hagglings proceeding
in the form of the offer of territories by way of
compensation or enticement from the belligerents,
there is no record to hand : but it is, at the least,
probable.

If only Russia would make concessions in Bes-
sarabia, late as the offer was, she might win Rou-
mania over.98 Filipescu in February apparently
went to Petrograd," and returned a month later,
with very little practical result.100 The negotiations
as to cessions in Bessarabia failed.101 It was
considered that Briand's visit to Rome fore-
shadowed renewed pressure on Roumania.102

Very probably a German ultimatum was launched
at Roumania, requiring her to demobilize. She
refused, because Bulgaria had been aggrandised,
and she hereby might enter into the war by the end
of March.103 Bratianu was pleged to the Entente;

98 Journal de Geneve, 2. ii. 16.

99 Vossische Ztg., 23. ii. 16.

100 Weserztg, 16. iii. 16.

101 Limburger Koerier quoting Minerva, 26. ii. 16.
109 Koln. Volksztg., 12. ii. 16.

los 'EdirtptvY] 25. ii. 16; Nea EXXa? 5. iii. 16.

NEGOTIATIONS 115

and the British Embassy at Petrograd was striving
to effect a Greco-Roumanian accord.104

At the same time Bratianu and Radoslavov had
been discussing economic arrangements.105

A grand move was expected from Russia over
the Bessarabian frontier;106 but Skoloudis (the
Greek Premier) declared for neutrality.107

Possibly the Dual Monarchy might make a bid
for Roumanian neutrality, as she did last year [v.
p. 97] : but the utmost concession Tisza would
offer in Transylvania was the teaching of
Roumanian by Magyars in the elementary
schools.108

Meantime, Germany had been trying to mobilize
even the "activists," or pro-Germans, of Sweden
to influence the government of Roumania.109

In March, 1916, the Red Book at last breaks
silence. On the yth March110 Burian requests the
same defensive neutrality on the Russian as on
the other frontiers. [No. 50]. Czernin had an
interview of the King (loth March), who con-
sidered that there was no danger of a Russian
invasion.

104 Steagul, Adevfrul, lasul, 2. iij. 16.

105 Berliner Tageblatt, 17. ii. 16 (quoting Ndvoye Vremyd).

106 Deutsche Tagesztg, 3. iii. 16.

i°7 Nsa 'EXXa?, 5. ii. 16.

108 Adev&rul, 7. iii. 16.

109 Deutsche Tagesztg, 13. xij. 15 ; Berliner Tageblatt, 15. iij. 16.
no The same point had been reaffirmed on the ist January, that

Roumania would not give passage to the Russians. [Deutsche
Tagesztg, i. i. 16].

Il6 ROUMANIA

As a fact troops were heavily concentrated on
the Austro-Hungarian frontier, which was closed;
and there was no Russian army on the Eastern
frontier.111

Czernin also interviewed Porumbaru, the Foreign
Minister by himself. Porumbaru objected that
Roumania could not be held responsible if the
Russian troops " made a surprise move, without
the assent of the Roumanian Government "; to
which Czernin rejoined that, after this third warn-
ing, Roumania would be held accountable for all
the consequences.

The danger, in Czernin 's opinion, lay in
Bratianu's apathy and bad will. [No. 51].

From all these signs, war with Austria was
anticipated at the end of March; what postponed
it is not clear. Probably Russia was too weak
and too grudging. The press was urging that
Roumania ought to strike on the Danube at the
Bulgars, before attempting an invasion of Tran-
sylvania (where confessedly the Russians had not
massed troops);112 when the moment was favour-
able. Marghiloman, the Conservative, was now in
agreement with Bratianu;11' and the anti-Russian
party is told that, if only Roumania were a nation
of 13 millions and had the Bucovina, Banat and
Transylvania and Bessarabia, she would be a
power to respect.114

HI Adevirul, 14. iij. 16 ; Independence Roumaine, 15. iij. 16.
t Adevernl, 23. iij. 16 ; Universul, 24. iij. 16.

113 Steagul, 13. iij. 16 ; Preborets (Bulgarian paper). 14. iv. 16.

114 Universul, 26 iv. 16.

NEGOTIATIONS 1 17

There was a certain amount of impatience, for,
on the 1 2th May, it is said that Roumania cannot
wait indefinitely on Russia, before she decides on
invading Transylvania; the prolongation of her
neutrality spells territorial loss.

The Allies at Salonica (where there were
400, ooo115 troops to match the 350,000 Bulgarians)
can keep the Bulgarians busy; Roumania need
only concern herself with the Carpathians :116 whilst
any agreement with the Central Powers is merely
commercial.117

About this time, too, Carp, Maiorescu, and other
pro-Germans proceeded to Austria; and Austria
solemnly deprived Take lonescu of the insignia of
the Iron Crown.118

These comments may explain why the Austrian
Red Book resumes its despatches : why on the
1 2th May Bratianu is said to have spontaneously
expressed the opinion that neither combatant had
won; that Roumania had better bide her time.
[Nos. 52 and 53].

Czernin gave Bratianu to understand that " a
draw was as impossible as a defeat of Austria, and
there would be no chance given to Roumania for
co-operation after an Austrian victory." [Nos. 52
and 53].

us Cf. Echo, 28. ix. 1 6, quoting interview with Radev in Voss.
Ztg.

116 Adev&rul, 12. v. 16.

117 BirZevyya Ved., 12. v. 16 ; La Rountanie, 14. v. 16.

118 La Roumanie and L'Indtpendance Roumaine, 23. v. 16.
lonescu thereupon returned the Insignia of the Red Eagle as well.

Il8 ROUMANIA

On the 26th May the King spoke in admiration
of the Austrian offensive in Italy, but said that
" at the time " co-operation with Austria was
impracticable. He expressed himself delighted at
the economic rapprochement with the Central
Powers. [No. 54].

Of the meaning of this last phrase there is no
hint given in the Red Book. From The Times
(ist, 2nd May, ist, gth June) it appears that
the contract to supply 500,000 tons of wheat to
Germany had been fulfilled: 1,000,000 tons of
cereals had been exported to Germany; whilst half
of the 800,000 tons promised to Great Britain had
been delivered. According to the Neue Freie
Presse of Vienna [Nov. 3Oth, 1916] between Dec.,
1915, and Aug., 1916, Roumania sold the Central
Pov/ers over 20 million centners of corn.

Roumania also engaged to supply Turkey with
petrol, benzol, and wheat in exchange for tobacco.

In June, 1916, Brusilov's great offensive was
producing a marked effect on Roumanian public
opinion [No. 55, loth June : cf. Times, 24th
June, 1916]. The Russians had advanced to
Buczasz and Stremenec on the Strypa, and by June
22nd had occupied Czernowitz and Luck, and were
thus on the Northern Roumanian frontier on the
river Pruth.

A Russian cavalry patrol crossed the Roumanian
frontier at Her^a (on the Pruth) and was disarmed
and interned. Another detachment crossed the
Pruth at Mamorni^a, and overwhelmed the

NEGOTIATIONS 119

frontier-guard. Prompt measures were taken to
prevent further infractions [Nos. 56, 57 and 58].
Another patrol by mistake penetrated as far inland
as Dorogoie [No. 59]. This news was by no
means unwelcome at Galati [i2th June; No. 59].

On the 1 7th June Czernin was fully satisfied at
the proper attitude observed by Roumania;
Bratianu inclined to think that these infractions
might have been ballons-d'essai to see how
Roumania would behave.

Take lonescu and Filipescu were urging instant
action by Roumania : but the King was adverse.
[No. 60].

Czernin had been home to Vienna, and on the
I9th June sends a despatch summarizing the situa-
tion. " Bratianu was sitting between two stools;
he must not miss the opportunity of sharing in
the Entente's victory, but he must throw in his lot
as late as possible, and with the least hazard.
Generally speaking, we stand in Roumania as
we were a year ago. The evanesced hopes of
Transylvania are budding anew : the break-up of the
Monarchy is reassuming shape and form : and, as
he had said a year ago, Roumanian policy will
be decided by the fortune of war." [No. 61].

§9- — Czernin's "diagnosis of the psychology" of
Roumania, was so far accurate : the situation had
not changed materially in the course of the year.
But popular agitation was slowly sapping the
cautious prevarications of the government. Probably
Russia was offering large baits to Roumania.

120 ROUMANIA

Czernin surmised that Bratianu demanded a
progressive Russian campaign in the Bucovina,
an insurance against Bulgaria, and a certain amount
of armaments, before he would join in ; also that
Roumania should get the Bucovina, Transylvania
and the Banat, and should declare war against
Austria, not against Germany. [No. 66].119 There
was, therefore, no instant danger [24111 June; No.
62]. The munitions were to arrive, partly by
sea at Archangel and Vladivostok, partly on the
" Bistri^a " [which was torpedoed by the Germans
on or about the i6th October together with the
Roumanian vessel "M creator"] [Times, i6th Oct.,
1916, 5d]120 [No. 65] : and Roumanian officers had
been designated to receive them [i2th July; No. 71
and 72].

Bratianu is said to have stated that diplomatic
negotiations were on foot with Russia, which would
take over two months; he could therefore partially
demobilize the army.121

These negotiations were slow : in 1915 Russia
would not admit the Roumanian claim to
Czernowitz; now Russia demanded Bucovina.123

no This proviso again shows the exact similarity with the Italian
negotiations of 1914-15. Italy's declaration of war in 1915 was
only against Austria, with whom she had a lawful quarrel : on
Aug. 28, 1916, she at last formally declared war against Germany.
Germany, by declaring war on Roumania, at once destroyed the
last ceremonial shreds of the Triple Alliance.

120 This fact together with the submarine activity off the
Norwegian coast provides a partial clue to the shortage of
ammunition in Roumania.

121 Kdln. Ztg., 28. vj. 16.

122 Stcagul, i. vi). 1 6.

NEGOTIATIONS 121

Costinescu was the only minister in favour of
accepting the proposals of the Entente.138

However, Russia is said at last to have promised
the Bucovina, Transylvania, Maramaros, the
Roumanian Banat, the Theiss up to Groszwardein
(Nagyvarad), and the districts of Kahal, Bolgrad
and Izmail in Bessarabia.194 This is the first time
Russia had conceded anything in Bessarabia ; and
these offers were still considered insufficient : for
Russia did not propose sending an army
numerous enough to " aid effectively." It was
urged that Roumania must not take the final step
save to gain her national ends.125 It was also
suggested that Roumania had been guaranteed
Bulgarian territory from Ruscuk (Ruse) to Varna
in addition.120

These press accounts cannot be authoritative,
but they help to define the situation described in
a despatch from Burian to Prince Hohenlole.

At Berlin [i8th July, 1916; No. 74] Burian gives
a hint of the contents of some1 of the negotiations
with Russia: viz., a secret treaty; a promise of
certain Austro-Hungarian territories; a military
convention between Russia and Roumania; a free
passage for the Russian troops in Roumania; the
fixing of a period, as brief as might be between
the contract and the declaration of war.

123 Steagul, 9. vij. 16.

124 Steagul, 15. vij. 16 ; Rtisskoye Sl6vo, 28. vij. 16.

125 Kreutzztg, 20. vij. 15, quoting Inddpcndance Roumaine.

126 Neue Ziircher Ztg., 30. viij. 16. Something of this is probably
true but it is coloured by German propaganda.

122 ROUMANIA

The Entente intended an offensive against
Bulgaria, so as to divert the Bulgarian troops.
[i8th July, 1916; No. 74].

The King was still doubtful of the ultimate suc-
cess of the Russian offensive [24th June; No. 62] :
and denied that the last Cabinet Council had voted
any resolution to join the Entente: at any rate,
says Czernin, this intimation [25th June] was the
first from the lips of the King that " the course
of following Italy's example had been mooted in
a Cabinet Council : and the implication was clear
that Bratianu might avail himself of a further
Russian advance, to quit " neutrality." [No. 63].

Similarly Bratianu denied any such resolution
[June 27th], and declared he would endeavour to
withstand any pressure tending towards war. [No.
64].

On the ayth it is anticipated that a Crown Coun-
cil will be summoned to solve the crisis.127

Meantime munitions were passing through Rus-
sia for Roumania [No. 65]; and a very serious
explosion occurred at the State Powder Factory
at Dudesti.128

Czernin considered that Roumania would not
take the final step for six or eight weeks from
the 28th June, as the Entente had not been suc-
cessful enough, the munitions had not arrived, and
the harvest had not been reaped.

Czernin hints that Russia had declined to de-
is? Viitorul, 27. vij. 16.

128 Russkoye Sldvo, 28. vij. 16.

NEGOTIATIONS 123

liver the munitions without a binding declaration
from Bratianu.

The despatch No. 66 is one of those which
shew signs of special re-editing : it winds up with
a windy declamation : " The hesitation of a Hohen-
zollern to incur the despicable treachery of blood-
guilt to his own kin is at least observable." [No.
66].

On the 3Oth June, there was another interview
with Bratianu, who. asseverated the strain of hold-
ing back. The Russians were advancing : the Buco-
vina was his for the asking : should the Russians
penetrate into Transylvania, there would be no
holding back the people. " Roumanian policy,
like all else in Europe, is an immediate and
direct reflexion of military results; only more so
than it was last year."

Czernin repeats his expectation that the crisis will
come about in six or eight weeks. [Nos. 67 and 68].

On the yth July Czernin reports that the Powers
of the Entente have " singly " (not collectively)
intimated to Roumania that if she does not strike
now, she will have no voice in the peace negotia-
tions.

Filipescu and Take lonescu, the pro-belligerent
were not admitted to the Cabinet. [No. 69].

On the 1 2th July Czernin reports further pre-
parations, the anti-Zeppelin blackening of the
street-lamps, laying in of provisions in the larger
towns; he anticipated the crisis in four week's time.
Costinescu, the Minister of Finance, now adhered

124 ROUMANIA

to the war-party [Nos. 70 and 71] : an allegation
he denied [No. 75; i8th July].

On the i8th July Burian instructed Czernin to
approach the King, not Bratianu, and to inform
him that one of the treaty obligations was not to
entertain any alliance or obligation directed against
any of the contracting powers : a duty which the
Monarchy had scrupulously observed; when enter-
ing into new relations with other States, it had
always regarded the treaty obligations towards
Roumania. [No. 73].

Burian omits to state that Roumania was never
consulted when the first Serbian note was
despatched : and Austria therefore broke the
spirit, if not the letter of the Alliance. [C/. No.
4 antea].

Tn a despatch of the iQth July, Czernin surmises
that war may be declared in the second half of
August, when the foreign munitions were due to
arrive. [Nos. 76 and 77].

Bratianu staunchly denied having entered into
any binding agreement : he would rather resign
than enter into the war at this time (26th July).
He was waiting, until the Russians had a reverse,
which would cool the ardour of the Roumanians,
but to refuse to entertain the suggestions of the
Entente would provoke a revolution. [No. 78;
26th July]. However, should the Monarchy dis-
integrate, " la Roumanie ne peut rester a 1'ecart."

Czernin also interviewed the King separately,
who regretted he could not follow the example of

NEGOTIATIONS 125

his uncle (King Charles), who had said : " If Italy
attacked Austria, it would be an abomination
(Schiveinerei) of which a Hohenzollern could not
be guilty." The only remedy, now, was to
terrorize the Roumanian Government with the fear
of an invasion by Germans from Transylvania and
500,000 Bulgarians in the Dobrudja. [No. 81].

On the 26th or 27th Czernin had an audience of
the King, and conveyed to him the message in No.
73 (v. antea). The King for the time being would
not betray neutrality. It nevers occurs to Czernin,
that the King, in complying with Bratianu's ad-
vice, was not a mere passive agent, but positively
constitutional. [No. 80].

In the interview with Bratianu [Nos. 78 and 81]
the phrase occurs: "We (the Monarchy) would
not revive the ancient theme of treaty obligation
and political morals: but Bratianu might like to
know, we could face a declaration of war quite
coolly." Amongst the many lapsed documents,
does this refer to a formal rescission of the Treaty
of Alliance, and a formal breakdown of the nego-
tiations for the cession of territory : presumably on
the question of Transylvania ? The speculation is
not so wild : the analogy of the Italian negotiations :
the demand for Trieste, and the abrupt refusal of
Italy to continue the dilatory measures furnish a
likely analogy.

At any rate, in point of fact, whoever may have
been the real aggressor, the Austrian Embassy

126 ROUMANIA

made early preparations to leave Bucarest. These
were started on the ist August [No. 82] : the
Dutch Government was approached [Nos. 88, 94
and 100; yth August]. On the i4th Aug. con-
fidential documents were clandestinely removed.
[Nos. 94 and 101].

The declaration §!O. — The last section has scarcely
of War. carried the narrative any farther : it

has merely re-iterated and re-acer-
bated the points of difference, the vague suspicions,
the distrust and secret precautionary measures. As
Czernin forecast, whether from knowledge of what
was projected by the Central Powers, or by Rou-
mania, or by a process of intelligent anticipation,
the war came about in the latter part of August,
1916.

The Kolnische Zeitung [Times, July 28th, 1916]
had cautioned Roumania not to be enticed by
the allurements of the Entente; nor to submit to
"decisive language" from Russia and England:
" the example of Italy should be a warning to
Roumania."

It is generally safe to interpret German official
prognostication by the opposite : to read "Menacing
notes from the Central Powers" in place of "Ter-
rorism by England and Russia."

The course of the last negotiations can be briefly
traced.

On the first of August Czernin objected to the
concentrations of troops on the Hungarian fron-
tier, and Bratianu tried to explain them away, and

NEGOTIATIONS 127

denied that he was contemplating abandoning
neutrality : Czernin attributes this reluctance to the
poor success of the Russians and the military
menace of the Bulgarian troops. [Nos. 83, 84, 85;
ist, 2nd and 3rd of Aug., 1916].

As a result of this Bulgarian activity the in-
habitants of Giurgevo were in a state of feverish
excitement and moving away, [yth Aug.; No. 89].

The outlook was dubious. Czernin states on the
3rd Aug. that orders had been given a fortnight
previously with the intention of striking. [No.
85]. Burian sought for instructions at Berlin,
requesting authorization to present the following
note : —

" Confiant dans les assertions de M. Bratiano
que la Roumanie repousserait par la force toute
atteinte armEe a sa neutrality, Eventuality qui — a
1'instar de 1'incident de Mamornija — pourrait se
renouveler d'un jour a 1'autre dans des dimensions
bien autrement sErieuses, le Gouvernement
Imperial et Royal dans 1'intention d'Eclairer et de
rassurer des a present le Gouvernement Roumain,
lui fait savoir que dans le cas ou le Gouvernement
Roumain ne se trouverait, ou ne se croirait pas a
meme de s 'op poser efficacement a une invasion
de 1'armEe russe, il prendra de sa part toutes les
mesures militaires que la securitE des frontieres
austro-hongroises exigerait, et qui seraient jug^es
necessaires pour rEtablir un Etat de choses qui per-
mettrait a la Roumanie de garder sa neutrality."
[7th Aug., 1916; No. 87].

1 28 ROUMANIA

This step was approved by Prince Hohenlohe.
[8th Aug., 1916; No. 91].

On the 8th Aug. Czernin had another conversa-
tion with Bratianu. Bratianu at last made the
long-expected request for blackmail : Austria might
help him to maintain neutrality by a territorial offer
in the Bucovina. The despatch continues : " I wa's
the better able to decline, as I not only know your
[Burian's] intentions in this matter, but have
always been of the opinion that a territorial conces-
sion in return for neutrality was quite out of the
question. Roumanra would accept such a conces-
sion, but would still attack us later on, when she
thought we were beaten, thus to get more."

The conversation began with Czernin's remon-
strances at the continued movements of the troops.
Czernin said plainly: that " if Bratianu wanted to
have war, he might and should; but he must not
think me such a simpleton, as not to see through
his preparations."

Bratianu rejoined that these measures were pre-
cautionary, and a concession to the national feel-
ing. The Bulgarians might attack.

Czernin, thereupon, suggested to Bratianu that
he might demobilize, declare absolute neutrality,
and Czernin would guarantee immunity.

" Bratianu replied that we had hundreds of spies,
whilst he knew little of the Bulgarian movements :
furthermore, he could not demobilize for internal
reasons. Czernin must trust him, and he would
do all he could to maintain neutrality." [No. 90].

NEGOTIATIONS 1 2Q

The vigour and heat of this despatch make it
noteworthy.

But is it probable that Bratianu, who, whatever
his faults, as seen by his enemy, was astute and
cautious, would have blurted out a sudden request
for Austrian territory ?

For, evidently, Burian had given instructions for
this contingency: these are not published in the
Red Book.

The offer to guarantee the neutrality and in-
violability of Roumania can hardly have been
serious: if it were, Bratianu's reply is eminently
discreet; he might have said much more.

Moreover, there is no mention of the presentation
of the formula agreed upon with Prince Hohenlohe
[No. 87]. Was this strong threat never used?

The only plausible explanation of this despatch
is that it is one of a suppressed series, in which
specious offers had been made of Austrian or
Hungarian territory, as compensation for Austrian
aggrandisement in the Balkans; and Czernin's
remark that Roumania would swallow such a con-
cession, merely to fall on Austria later, is exactly
paralleled by Merey's129 observation (in the Second
Austro-Hungarian Red Book, No. 33; 5th Aug.,
1914).

" I fear that Italy is trying to force us to
continue the discussions of compensations and,
excluding other compensations, may end by de-

12» Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Rome.

130 ROUMANIA

manding the Trentino. Sooner or later Italy may
quit her neutrality. If our group win rapidly, Italy
may attach herself to it, and her demands for
compensation be more modest; in the contrary
event she might try to strengthen her moral
pressure by military threats."

Other similar parallel passages might be quoted :
the Austrians never understood their Southern
allies' point of view, and always attributed foul
motives. It was an unholy marriage in the first
instance: the contract had been violated on the
first occasion when it might have come into force.

The inconsequence of this part of the book is
the best demonstration of its special pleading, if
not, of the distortion of the documents. Until the
Roumanian Government publishes an official
account, there can be no true history.

The replies made by Czernin at the interview of
the 8th August met with Burian's full approval,
[gth August; No. 92].

It is quite possible, that, if we had the full docu-
ments, we should find that, as in the case of Italy,
Roumania had formally rescinded the Treaty of
Alliance, and was negotiating as a free agent.

On the loth August Burian reports to Czernin
that information was to hand that Roumania had
concluded a military convention with Russia: and
that a similar convention with the Quadruple
Entente was in course of settlement. The only point
of variance was said to be that Roumania stipu-

NEGOTIATIONS 131

lated for a strong offensive from Salonica. [No.

93].

It may be significant that King Constantine of
Greece was giving the Entente more trouble than
usual at this period.

These negotiations with the Entente were not
going altogether smoothly: for, on the nth
August, Czernin reports that the differences which
arose a week ago were not appeased : and that
Bratianu was averse to signing the agreement.
[No. 95]. On the other hand, Hungary professed
she would not regard Roumania as an enemy until
she opened the door to the Russians.180

Meanwhile military preparations were proceed-
ing apace : the classes 1896 to 1914 were summoned
and being equipped [nth August; No. 16] : and
trains between Braila and Gala^i went at night
darkened : the street-lamps in Bucarest had been
blackened for some time. (v. No. 75). [No. 106;
24th August].

The King was still in absolute agreement with
a policy of war. On the i2th August he said he
hoped to get over this crisis [No. 97]; and on the
1 4th, Burian (who never grasped that the King,
though personally consulted, was a constitutional
Monarch and acted on advice) surmised that the
King was not cognisant of the extent of the mili-
tary preparations; that he was rushed into the
conflict in the dark by Bratianu. [No. 99]. Such

ISO Pcsti HMap, 14. viij. 16

132

ROUMANIA

conduct would have been treachery. There was
no sign of Roumanian intervention as yet in Ger-
many.131

On the 1 9th August, Czernin reported to Burian
that " according to confidential information in
Court circles" [sic]182 the King is gradually being
made to realise that a Bratianu Ministry will no
longer do, and must be replaced by a Conservative
MaTorescu group. Bratianu is going too fast; and
the King is reluctant to fight the Central Powers,
until they are finally defeated. [No. 102]. It is
curious that Czernin, according to these documents,
had no audience of the King from the 2yth July
[Nos. 80 and 81] to the 26th August [No. 108],
nor with Bratianu between the 8th August [No.
90] and the 26th Aug. [No. 109].

This gap of interviews is closely paralleled in
the Italian Book, when, after the great break and
the denunciation of the Treaty of Alliance- on May
3rd, there were no interviews between May 6th and
May i yth and i8th, when the alliance was de-
nounced. This period in Italy was occupied with
the reconstruction of the Government for war.
What was happening in Roumania between the
8th and 26th August? This time the Austrians
do not tell a full and complete story.

On the 2ist August King Ferdinand returned

131 Frankfurterztg, 17. viij. 16.

152 Cf. that in 1915 the King's physician, a German, had to be
dismissed as he was convicted of spying for Germany [Nieuwe
Cotirant, 18. viij. '15].

NEGOTIATIONS 133

to Bucarest, and Maiorescu left Gmiinden in
Austria: on what mission he was at the Austrian
Court does not appear. Russia also allowed the
munitions ordered to be sent to Roumania.133

On the 2oth August Czernin reports to Burian,
though not as a certainty, on the strength of news
from abroad, that a political convention was de-
finitely signed between Roumania and Russia, and
the remainder of the ambassadors of the Entente
at Bucarest had been instructed to adhere to it.
[No. 103].

On the 22nd August Burian requests Czernin
to draw the attention of the King and Bratianu
to the large concentrations of troops on the
Hungarian frontier and the comparative denudation
on the Russian. [No. 104].

On the 25th extraordinary military credits of
600-800 million francs were issued. [No. 107].

According to The Times of the 22nd August, it is
still evident that the course of events is doubtful;
for, in the same columns, Karl von Wiegand in
the New York World, reports that Roumania will
not enter the war; and that she has discharged all
Germans and Austrians and Jews employed in her
munition works; leaving only 900 persons working
on them. " That, with the present supply, it would
be national suicide to enter a war which might last
more than a week."

Whereas the Kreuzzeilung of the 2oth or 2ist

133 Libertatea, 21. viij. 16.

134

ROUMANIA

states that the negotiations which took place on
the 20th with the Roumanian Minister of War, in
the presence of the Russian military attache, must
be considered as a proof that Roumania has joined
the Entente.

The next day's news shows the same uncertainty.
The Bulgaro-German troops invaded Greek Mace-
donia, offering Greece full guarantees and indemn-
ities (thus rendering an advance from Salonica
hazardous and forestalling any offensive) : whilst
the Frankfurterzzeitung is informed that the
Roumanian Government has ordered diplomatic
messengers to travel via Russia and Sweden.

Yet a Zurich telegram announces that a third
contract has been signed between the Roumania
Exportation Commission and the Central Powers :
the goods to be delivered before the end of Sep-
tember.

On the 25th, according to the Berliner Tageblatt,
the temporary tranquility apparently prevailing in
Roumania must not be interpreted as meaning
that that country does not think of intervention.
" Bratianu will certainly intervene, but it appears
that the various governments have not yet come to
an understanding whether Roumania at the peace
negotiations shall have a co-decisive, or only an
advisory voice."

This daily quivering of the pendulum is reflected
in the last despatches as published by the Austrian
Government.

Czernin learned that a Crown Council was to be

NEGOTIATIONS 135

convened in about a week's time, and all parties
to be summoned, including the ministry, Filipescu
and Take lonescu, Carp, Maiorescu, Marghiloman
and Rosetti. [23rd Aug.; No. 105].

This Council was convened for the 2yth August.
[26th Aug.; No. 108]. It would decide the1 ques-
tion of peace and war.

On the 26th Czernin had an hour's audience of
the King. He argued that Roumania was no
longer, strictly speaking, neutral; whereas Austria-
Hungary desired nothing more nor less than
correct neutrality; and did not dread war, but
must consider that any further preparations would
directly involve a decisive attitude on the part of
the Monarchy.

1 The King replied in his characateristic vague
manner. He said to-morrow would decide. He
did not want war, but could not assume such a
responsibility himself: hence the Crown Council.
He hoped he might remain neutral. He believed
that his army would not be willing to oppose any
Russian invasion. He was not the master of his
own wishes."

It was possible that the Bratianu ministry might
be dismissed, and be replaced by a Conservative
one under Maiorescu, who had not a majority in
the Chamber, " although as the King affirmed,
go per cent, of the people did not want war."

' The King fully understood that we could not
tolerate any further increase in military strength,

136 ROUMANIA

and he affirmed that to-morrow would bring about
disarmament, if neutrality were the outcome."

Czernin's impression was that the King hoped
to retain his neutrality, but possibly Bratianu might
coerce him. In to-morrow's Crown Council the
favourers and opponents of war would be more or
less balanced.

Czernin was convinced that the Entente and
Bratianu were threatening the King with war; and,
in the alternative, with allowing the Russians a
passage through Roumania.

The official paper Vtitorul urged an expectant
and quiet attitude, and gave the impression that
Bratianu would waver a while yet. [No. 107].

At the interview with Czernin on the same day,
Bratianu stated most definitely he wanted neu-
trality and would and could remain neutral : the
morrow would show he was speaking the truth.
Probably Maiorescu wanted to succeed him in
office. [No. 109].

On the 27th [No. no] Roumania declared war
in the following terms : —

The Alliance concluded between Germany,
Austria-Hungary, and Italy had, according to the
declarations of the Governments themselves, only
an essentially conservative and defensive character;
its principal object was to guarantee the Allied
countries against any attack from outside and to
consolidate the state of things created by previous
treaties.

It was with the desire to harmonize her policy

NEGOTIATIONS 137

with these pacific tendencies that Roumania joined
this alliance. Devoted to the work of her internal
reconstruction, and faithful to her firm resolution
to remain, in the region of the Lower Danube, an
element of order and of equilibrium, Roumania has
not ceased to contribute to the maintenance of peace
in the Balkans.

The last Balkan wars, by destroying the status
quo, imposed upon her a new line of conduct. Her
intervention hastened peace and restored equili-
brium. For herself, she was satisfied with a recti-
fication of frontier which gave her greater security
against an aggression, and which at the same time
repaired the injustice committed to her detriment
at the Berlin Congress. But, in the pursuit of this
end, Roumania was disappointed to observe that
she did not meet from the Cabinet of Vienna the
attitude which she was entitled to expect.

When the present war broke out Roumania, like
Italy, declined to associate herself with the declara-
tion of war by Austria-Hungary, of which she had
received no previous notice from the Cabinet of
Vienna. In the spring of 1915 Italy declared war
on Austria-Hungary; the Triple Alliance no longer
existed.

The reasons which had determined the adher-
ence of Roumania to this political system dis-
appeared at the same time. Instead of a grouping
of States seeking by common effort to work in
agreement in order to assure peace and the con-
servation of the situations de facto and de iure

138 ROUMANIA

created by treaties, Roumania found herself in pres-
ence of Powers making war with the very object
of transforming from top to bottom the old arrange-
ments which had served as a basis for their Treaty
of Alliance. These profound changes were for
Roumania an evident proof that the object which
she had pursued in adhering to the Triple Alliance
could no longer be attained and that she must direct
her views and her efforts towards new paths, the
more so as the work undertaken by Austria-
Hungary was assuming a character threatening the
essential interests of Roumania as well as her most
legitimate national aspirations.

In presence of so radical a modification of the
situation created between the Austro-Hungarian
Monarchy and Roumania, the latter has resumed
her liberty of action. The neutrality of the Royal
Government, imposed upon itself in consequence
of a declaration of war made without reference to
its will and contrary to its interests, had been
adopted, in the first instance, as the result of
assurances given at the outset by the Imperial and
Royal Government that the Monarchy, in declaring
war upon Serbia, had not been inspired by a spirit
of conquest and that it was in no way aiming at
territorial acquisitions.

These assurances have not been fulfilled. To-day
we find ourselves confronted by situations de facto,
from which may arise great territorial transforma-
tions and political changes of a character constitut-
ing a grave menace to the security of the future

NEGOTIATIONS 139

of Roumania. The work of peace which Roumania,
faithful to the spirit of the Triple Alliance, had
endeavoured to accomplish has thus been rendered
fruitless by those very Powers who were called
upon to support and defend it.

In adhering in 1883 to tne group of the Central
Powers Roumania, far from forgetting the ties of
blood uniting the populations of the Kingdom with
the Roumanian subjects of the Austro-Hungarian
Monarchy, had seen in the relations of friendship
and alliance which had been established between
the three Great Powers a precious pledge for her
internal tranquility, as well as for the amelioration
of the lot of the Roumanians of Austria-Hungary.
In fact, Germany and Italy, who had reconstituted
their States on the basis of the principle of na-
tionality, could not but recognize the legitimacy
of the foundation on which their own existence
rested. As for Austria-Hungary, she found in the
friendly relations established between herself and
the Kingdom of Roumania assurances for her tran-
quility, both in her interior and on our common
frontiers — for she was well aware to what an extent
the discontent of her Roumanian population found
an echo amongst us, threatening every moment to
trouble the good relations between the two States.

The hope which we had based from this point
of view upon our adhesion to the Triple Alliance
has been disappointed. For a period of more than
30 years the Roumanians of the Monarchy not only
have never seen a reform introduced of a nature

140 ROUMANIA

to give them any semblance of satisfaction, but
they have, on the contrary, been treated as an
inferior race and condemned to suffer the oppression
of a foreign element which constitutes no more
than a minority in the midst of the various na-
tionalities of which the Austro-Hungarian State
is composed. All the injustices which our brothers
were thus made to suffer have fostered between our
country and the Monarchy a continual state of
animosity, which the Governments of the Kingdom
only succeeded in appeasing at the cost of great
difficulties and of numerous sacrifices.

When the present war broke out it might have
been hoped that the Austro-Hungarian Govern-
ment, at least at the last moment, would end by
convincing itself of the urgent necessity of putting
an end to this injustice, which endangered not only
our relations of friendship but even the normal re-
lations which ought to exist between neighbouring
States.

Two years of war, during which Rou mania has
maintained neutrality, have proved that Austria-
Hungary, opposed to all internal reform which
could ameliorate the life of the peoples which she
governs, has shown herself as ready to sacrifice
them as she is powerless to defend them against
external attack.131

134 Evidence can be found to substantiate this charge. In Octo-
ber, 1915, there was a reign of terror in Transylvania [Echo de
Paris, 10, x., '15]; so severe that the military were destroying
the refugees' houses, imprisoning and deporting the population
[Adeverul, 19. xj. '15]. In March, 1916, the paper Romdnul of

NEGOTIATIONS 141

The war in which almost the whole of Europe
is taking part revives the gravest problems affect-
ing the national development and the very existence
of States. Roumania, moved by the desire to con-
tribute to hasten the end of the conflict and com-
pelled by the necessity of safeguarding her racial
interests, sees herself forced to enter into line with
those who are better able to assure the accomplish-
ment of her national unity.

For these reasons she considers herself from this
moment in a state of war with Austria-Hungary.
Bucarest, 14/27 August, 1916, 9 p.m.

EM. PORUMBARU.
What forced § i i . — The die was cast.

Roumania j j difficult to summarize this im-

mto war on

27th August? perfect collection of documents with

any preciseness.

Probably Bratianu was genuine and sincere : he
did not desire war and dreaded it : but he was
impelled by the national feeling, and could not give
way : whereas the pro-Germans, and Conservatives
and anti-Russians inclined definitely either to
collaboration with the Central Powers or benevolent
neutrality. The example of Bulgaria is not to the
point : she had no irredenta administered by
Magyars.

The King acted constitutionally. What induce-
ments were offered or extorted in the way of terri-

Arad was suspended ; and a number of writers on the paper Tribuna
of Arad were condemned to death in their absence. They had
fled to Roumania [AdevSrul, 16. ill. 16].

142

ROUMANIA

torial concessions by Russia, or by Austria-Hun-
gary, does not appear.185

One gross piece of mis-statement must yet be
added.

On the 23rd Sept., 1916, Count Hadik, Austro-
Hungarian Minister at Stockholm telegraphs
to Burian to the effect that Czernin, on his way
through Sweden sends a supplementary despatch
— that on the 24th August Russia sent an ultima-
tum : promising on the one hand large accessions
in Transylvania, the Banat and Bucovina and the
Delta of the Danube; on the other an invasion with
100,000 men : Roumania must elect if they were
to come as friends or foes.

The Crown Council had to face war as a fait
accompli. At the very time when it was assembl-
ing, the Austro-Hungarian Legation was sur-
rounded by a military cordon. " Bratianu gave
me (Czernin) his word of honour to remain neu-
tral, and put the responsibilty for any other course
on the King. [This is only partly corroborated
by the despatch No. 109 to which it refers. There
is no mention of the King]. Doubtless he would

135 Further evidence is La Tribuna, 15. viij. 15 (quoting Ixinte
to the effect that Austria-Hungary offered territorial concessions
in return for neutrality, but withdrew the offer, as it had not been
accepted within the time fixed, viz. : July ; and also, Nieuwe
Rotter dam sche Courant stated that Russia, before starting her
offensive, demanded the dismissal of the German artillery in-
structors in Roumania ; and Great Britain wanted to negotiate on
the basis of a cession of territory in Bessarabia, to include KiSinev
and Mohilev, up to the river Kogilnik.

NEGOTIATIONS 143

rather have waited : but, as I anticipated, the
Entente forced matters by a sudden action. "lsa

The members of the Legation and consulate and
colony were interned at the Legation for ten days;
and only provisioned at extortionate prices, —
Czernin does not state that the Roumanian
ministers were all sent through Russia and Sweden
and detained on the Isle of Riigen for a similar
period — and maltreatment of the Austrian Colony
was general.

This extraordinary despatch bears marks of
fabrication. There is no evidence given of this
maltreatment. The Neue Freie Presse of Vienna
[i6th Oct., 1916] corroborates and extends the
story that Czernin was forced by pangs of starva-
tion after ten days to visit Bratianu, who still tried
to be friendly : saying that Czernin must not take
it amiss that Bratianu had lied : it was for the
weal of Roumania. Czernin rejoined that the fraud
was in vain : Austria was ready, and Roumania
would soon learn this to her cost. And Czernin
loftily " refused to shake hands with Bratianu."

The question remains, what of the Russian
ultimatum. It is not mentioned in the Red Book
in its place. Burian [No. 103] merely conjectures
that a military convention has been signed with
Russia. It would be incomprehensible that Aus-
tria, having early knowledge of this, should have
failed to utilize so powerful an argument.

isa Precedents for such promptness are rare.

144 ROUMANIA

Possibly, the next document, No. in, is an after-
thought and cloaks the fact that Austria acted on
the threat contained in No. 108, that pressure
should be put on Roumania : an insistence that
Roumania should either side with the Central
Empires, or be treated as an enemy would be the
policy and interest of the Austro-German Alliance.

Bratianu was not ready for war : it was expedient
to force war on to Roumania before her time and
put the obloquy of treachery on to her. Such any-
how was the German precedent in creating war
between Germany and Russia in 1914, the
Austrian in enforcing hostilities between herself
and Serbia in 1914, not to go back to the precedents
of 1864, and l%7°> when the same manoeuvre was
adopted.

Anyhow this despatch is so inconsistent and so
unreasonable, that it cannot be regarded as truth-
ful.

The question, however, of the responsibility for
the ultimatum that made Roumania declare war
on the 27th August, 1916, is very doubtful. But
since then there has been a revolution in Russia,
and some of the veil of darkness has been lifted.

General Iliescu in an interview in the Matin [3
iv. 17] states that Roumania was not ready in
August, 1916, 137 and that " towards this period a

137 Cf. Frankfurterztg (3. viij. '16) to the effect that Russia
intended annexing Roumania up to the Sereth. This allegation
corresponds with the Russo-German bargain suggested by Iliescu.
So, too, Le Genevois (cit. Gazzetta Ticinese, 17. iii. 17) learns
from a very respectable source that by Stiirmer's Russo-German

NEGOTIATIONS 145

sort of summons from Russia reached us. ' Now
or never,' said this document, the text of which I
can put at your disposal."

General Iliescu proceeds to show that the Rus-
sians proposed a plan of campaign for their con-
venience: and then withheld any support. "The
defeat of Roumania was foreseen and organized
by M. Stiirmer, who wished to finish the war by
this striking fact. ... In my opinion, this was
M. Stiirmer's plan, when he forced our hand and
organised our campaign : — to allow Roumania to
be invaded as far as the Sereth, to allow the
triumph of the military power of the Central
Empires, to conclude a separate peace in conse-
quence of the defeat, which would not be a
Russian defeat, and consequently would not shake
either his power, or that of the Tsar at all."

In the Gazette de Lausanne [7 iv. 17] N. P.
Comneanu confirms this, adding that all Roumania
knew of this betrayal; that he himself had seen the

peace, Roumania was to be divided between Russia and Austria.
Russia was to annex Moldavia, while Austria-Hungary took
Wallachia, and that was why the armies of Falkenhayn and
Mackcnsen came to a stop at the Sereth.

For further confirmation cf. Berner Tagwacht (6. x. 16) ; that
Roumania was the price of the Russo-German peace, and Berner
Tagblatt, 20. x. 16.

Mr. Dillon in the House of Commons [Hansard, 20. 5i. 17, p.
198 . . .] also corroborates the theory that Russia presented a
premature ultimatum, when Roumania was unwilling and un-
ready ; and when Sarrail had no men available to relieve the
pressure. Cf. also the Hannoverscher Kurier (18. iii. 17) quoting
from the German-controlled paper Gazeta Bucure$tilor an article
bv Alexandru Boldiman.

146 ROUMANIA

French material of war held up by order on the
Russian railways.

If so, the statement in the Austrian Red Book
[No. in; dated from Stockholm, 23 ix. 16] is
borne out : but there still remains the curious fact
that there is no mention in the text of the book,
on the date specified, viz., August 24, 1916, of
any report to this effect — nothing that could be
" supplemented."138 This disparity is still un-
explained.

Either, such a report exists anti has been sup-
pressed; or the arrangement of Sturmer and
Protopopov with Berlin was negotiated, at any
rate, over the head of Czernin at Bucarest. The
object was to force Roumania into war to her own
undoing and the easy victory of the Central
Powers.

The dismissal of Sturmer soon followed, and
Milyukov denounced his treachery in the Duma.
[BirSevyya V£domosti, 29 ix./i2 xij. 16]. That
monstrous act of ill-faith has contributed towards
the downfall of institutions older and greater than
that ministry.

But, to return to the question of this missing
link; if this evidence were available, it would have
been to the interest of the Austrians to proclaim
it aloud in their Red Book : and therefore it is
quite possible that the matter was engineered at
Berlin, and Czernin himself was innocent and

1*8 Zur Erganzung meiner Berichterstattung aus Bukarest.

NEGOTIATIONS 147

honestly surprised at the rapid and unexpected
development.

In the fearful story of Roumania's disaster, there
may yet be this two-fold consolation : first, it was
the result of an incalculable and wicked intrigue;
and, secondly, that Germany, as ever, reckoned
amiss; for the stout and desperate resistence of the
Roumanian forces weakened the Central Empires
beyond their estimate : whilst the Russian people
revolted against the perfidy of the Court, and, a
few months later, overthrew the system of govern-
ment that rendered it possible. As usual, Germany
with all the laborious ingenuity of her forecast was
never able to understand the minds of those with
whom she intended dealing, possibly in self-
conscious disregard of any such factors.

Summary. §I2< — It may be useful in conclusion to
summarize these despatches which seem
to throw some light on the course of events.

First. Roumania was inclined to enter on the
war in August or September, 1914, when hostilities
between Turkey and Greece were anticipated over
the questions of the islands fronting the coast of
Asia Minor. Roumania was not assured of the
benevolent neutrality of Bulgaria and was deterred.
But she was rigidly neutral, and as far as she
could, stopped the passage of munitions to Turkey.
The doubt as to Bulgaria, prevented from engag-
ing herself when Turkey entered the field.

Second. The interval was apparently occupied

148 ROUMANIA

with bids from both sets of belligerents. Italy had
failed to obtain compensations from Austria for
the breach of Article VII. of the Triple Alliance,
and there was evety expectation that Roumania
would strike in May with Italy. The danger was
averted by the quasi-ultimatum of the 23rd May,
1915 [No. 31] : but the decision was no doubt in-
fluenced by the ill-success of the Russian arms.

Roumania could not be munitioned by sea and
land, like Italy. The route to Archangel and
Alexandrovsk was long and unreliable : supplies
from Vladivostok were slow. The Quadruple
Entente was bent on conciliating Bulgaria, and was
niggardly in their offers in the Banat and Buco-
vina.139 They were insistent that the Treaty of
Bucarest, 1913, should be revised.140 This was
eminently just; but injudicious : Bulgaria did not
deserve such punctilio. On the other hand the
Central Powers were offering Roumania a rectifica-
tion of the Transylvanian frontier.141

Third. Bulgaria entered the field against the
Entente in October, 1915, and an effective invasion
of Serbia was possible on two sides. On the 22nd
Sept., 1915, Roumania was intimidated, and the
third imminent risk of Roumanian participation
passed away.

Fourth. Roumania armed herself anew, and in

139 Corriere delta Sera, 10. vj. 15 ; Berliner Morgenport, 22.
VJ- IS-

l*o Echo de Bulgarie, 23. vj. 15 ; Mir (Sofia), 23. vj. 15.
1*1 La Tribuna, 27. vj. 15.

NEGOTIATIONS 149

August, 1916, joined the Allies. The circumstances
are obscure. The Russian promises, as far as can
be gathered, were more generous and included
part of Bessarabia, besides Transylvania, the
Roumanian Banat and the Bucovina.142 Possibly
the Central Powers forced the pace with a summary
ultimatum, knowing that Roumania was still in-
sufficiently armed, and that the submarines off the
Norwegian Coast were intercepting her supplies:
or the Russians did present a demand for a free
passage : but it was in collusion with the enemy.

There was only one root and primal cause for
the hagglings and bogglings during these two
years, viz. : the injustice of the Treaty of Bucarest,
1913. Lord Grey, at the Conference of London,
laboriously assigned just frontiers to Bulgaria and
Greece and Serbia and Montenegro; he had modi-
fied them justly, when the Central Powers insisted
on creating Albania. He had defeated Austria by
giving the Balkan League no excuse to dissolve.

Austria instigated Bulgaria to attack her allies;
miscalculated the result : and Bulgaria, crushed,
was despoiled by Roumania, Serbia and Greece:
and forfeited to Turkey Aclrianople and the Enos-
Midia frontier-line. On these rights Bulgaria
properly stood firm, before October, 1915 — on
the restoration of her share. It was the impossi-
bility of getting all of the other States to relinquish
their portions of the Bulgarian boundaries (as

1*9 Steagul, 15. vij. 16.

1^0 ROUMANIA

established at the Conference of London) that
wrecked the schemes of the Entente: despite the
allurement of compensation elsewhere. The wrong
of the Treaty of Bucarest has exacted a frightful
retribution.

Since the ink was wasted on these despatches,
the big guns have spoken. Roumania, taken
unawares before her times ; with the diplomacy
possibly mishandled by the Powers of the Entente,
has suffered and lost. Very likely, too, she was
hot-headed and plunged into a Transylvanian
campaign instead of acting in concert with the
Allies in Bulgaria.

Essentially, the fight is for Transylvania. Pos-
sibly— unless this is too Utopian — the time may
come, when the wisdom of humanity may suffice
to settle border disputes of neighbouring States by
the wishes of these frontier-folk, by a kind of local
option, or give-and-take, and not by the high rules
of strategy, which scarcely seem to apply or meet
the case.

For this is the crux of the matter : the inherent
right of peoples to govern themselves in freedom.

APPENDIX

THE DECLARATIONS OF WAR

July 28th, 1914, Austria against Serbia.
Aug. ist, ,, Germany against Russia.
,, 3rd, ,, Germany against France.
,, 4th, ,, Great Britain against Ger-
many.

,, loth, ,, France against Austria.

,, 1 2th, ,, Great Britain against Austria.
Nov. 5th, ,, Great Britain, France, and

Russia against Turkey.

May 23rd, 1915, Italy against Austria.

Aug. 2oth, ,, Italy against Turkey.
Oct. 6th, ,, Ultimatum, Bulgaria to Serbia.
,, 6th, ,, France against Bulgaria.

,, 6th, ,, Russia against Bulgaria.

,, i5th, ,, Great Britain against Bulgaria.

,, 1 9th, ,, Italy against Bulgaria.

Aug. 27th, 1916, Roumania against Austria.

,, syth, ,, Germany against Roumania.

,, 28th, ,, Italy against Germany.

,, 3ist, ,, Turkey against Roumania.

Sept. 3rd, ,, Bulgaria against Roumania.

SOME USEFUL DATES.

These dates are generally chosen to illustrate
Balkan history in relation to Turkish : they record
in the main how these countries were conquered
and redeemed. The authority is the Historian's
History.

SOME USEFUL DATES IN BALKAN HISTORY.

1258. Birth of Osman, the founder of the Osmanti

or Turkish Empire.
1326. Capture of Brusa.
1330. Capture of Nicaea.
1336. Capture of Pergamum in Mysia.
1358. First Ottoman stronghold in Europe

(Tzympe) captured.
1364. Murad I defeats King of Hungary and

Poland and Princes of Bosnia Serbia and

Wallachia on banks of Maritia.
1389. Battle of Kosovo. Murad defeats united

forces of Serbia, Bosnia, Hungary,

Albania and Wallachia.

1392. Mircea, of Wallachia, submits to the Turks.
1396. Battle of Nicopolis. Defeat of Sigismund,

of Hungary, by Sultan Bayazid.
1402. Bayazid defeated and taken captive by

Timur; in Mongol invasion.
153

154 ROUMANIA

1403-1413. Civil war in Turkey. Mohammed I
wins.

1442. Hunyady defeats a Turkish Army at

Hermannstadt.

1443. Hunyady routs the Turks at the Battle of

1444. Murad defeats the Christians at Varna.
1453. Mohammed II takes Constantinople.
1456. Siege of Belgrade. Mohammed II defeated

by Hunyady and Giovanni di Capistrano.

1460. Mohammed conquers Morea and Athens.

1461. Scanderbeg wins independence as Prince

of Albania and Epirus.
1475. Turks take the Crimea.
1492. Bayazid II repulsed at Belgrade.
1500. Turks take Lepanto, Modon, Corson and

Durazzo from Venice.

1520. Accession of Suleiman the Magnificent.

1521. Conquest of Belgrade.

1526. Battle of Mohacs, and subjugation of Hun-
gary.

1529. Siege of Vienna and repulse of Turks.

1569. Turks repulsed by Russians at Astrakhan.

1571. Turks take Cyprus, but easily defeated at
Lepanto.

1596. Battle of Kereszte"s. Allied forces of
Austria and Transylvania defeated.

1606. Peace of Zsitvatorok between Turkey and
Austria. Half of Transylvania redeemed ;
and Hungary relieved of tribute, though
still subject to Turkey.

SOME USEFUL DATES 155

1664. Turks defeated by Austrians. Treaty of
Vasvar, Transylvania evacuated. Apafi
recognised as Prince, under Turkish
suzerainty.

Of the seven Hungarian Counties between the
borders of Transylvania and the Theiss,
three ceded to the Emperor, four remained
Ottoman, as well as Novigrad and
Neuhausel.

1669. Candia (Crete) conquered by Turks. The
Phanariots officially installed at Con-
stantinople.

1672. Podolia and the Ukraine surrendered to

Turkey.

1673. Poles, under Sobieski, defeat Turks at

Choczym. Ukraine and Podolia remain
Turkfsh.

1683. The second siege of Vienna: which is
relieved by Sobieski of Poland.

1686. Austrians recapture Budapest.

1689. Austrians capture Belgrade.

1697. Battle of Zenta on Theiss. Turks defeated
by Eugene of Savoy.

1699. Peace of Karlowitz. Turkey ceded Hun-
gary and Transylvania to Austria, pre-
serving the Banat. Poland recovered
Podolia, Kamenec-Podolski and the
Ukraine. Russia kept Azov.

1711. Turkish war with Russia. Turks recapture
Azov.

1715. Turkey recaptures Morea from Venice.

156 ROUMANIA

1716. Beginning of Phanariot rule in Wallachia.

1718. Treaty of Passarowitz (Pozarevac). Cap-
ture of Belgrade. Belgrade, Banat of
Temesvdr, Wallachia to the Alt, and part
of Serbia ceded to Austria. Sultan retains
the Morea.

1739. Treaty of Belgrade. Austria ceded to
Turkey, Belgrade, Shabats, Serbia,
Austrian Wallachia, Orsova. Russia
ceded Azov and the right of navigating
in the Black Sea, or Sea of Azov.

1761. First treaty between Prussia and Turkey;
war projected against Austria.

1767. War between Russia and Turkey.

1770-71. Russians conquer Moldavia, Wallachia
and Crimea.

1774. Treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji. Turkey
ceded to Russia fortresses on Delta of
Danube, and in Crimea.

1788. Russo-Turkish War.

1798. Napoleon invades Egypt.

1804. Successful revolt of Serbia.

1809. Russo-Turkish War.

1812. Treaty of Bucarest. Bessarabia ceded to
Russia.

1821. Greek War of Independence.

1829. Treaty of Adrianople. Russia secured
Delta of Danube, and a Protectorate over
the Roumanian principalities, which she
occupied for six years.

1832. Greece declared independent.

SOME USEFUL DATES 157

1848. Revolt in Moldavia and Wallachia, which

were occupied by Russia up to 1850.
Revolt of Hungary against Austria.

1853. Russo-Turkish War and Crimean War.

1856. Treaty of Paris. Independence and in-
tegrity of Turkey recognised. Bessarabia
was restored to the Roumanian Princi-
palities, over which the Russian protec-
torate was abolished and replaced by the
Collective Guarantee of the Great Powers.

1866. German dynasty established in Roumania

under Prince Charles zu Hohenzollern-
Sigmaringen.

1867. Transylvania ceded by Austria to Hungary.
1870. Russia repudiates neutrality of Black Sea,

and England acquiesces.

1875. Bosnia and Hercegovina revolt.

1876. Bulgaria revolts. Serbia and Montenegro

in arms.

1877. Russo-Turkish War.

1878. Treaty of San Stefano. Bulgaria created;

Roumania made independent : Bessarabia
re-ceded to Russia ; Roumania, Dobrudja
and Delta.

1878. Congress of Berlin. Austria "occupies
provisionally " Bosnia-Hercegovina.

1881. Roumania a Kingdom, under King
Charles.

1883. Great Britain administers Egypt.

1883. Alliance of Roumania with Central Powers.

1885. Eastern Rounelia revolts and joins Bul-
garia.

158 ROUMANIA

1887. Bulgaro-Serbian War. Serbs defeated.

1894. Armenian massacres.

1896. Cretan revolt.

1897. Greco-Turkish War. Greeks defeated.

1898. Prince George of Greece, High Com-

missioner of Crete, which is redeemed from
Turkey.

1902-3. Macedonian Massacre.

1904. Macedonia placed under international
control.

1908. Prince Ferdinand of Bulgaria declares
himself independent, and King. Austria-
Hungary annex Bosnia-Hercegovina.

1911-12. Turco-Italian War. Italy annexes Tripoli.

1912-13. First Balkan War. Turkey surrenders
all of Macedonia and Balkans down to
Enos-Midia line.

Second Balkan War. Turkey recovers
Adrianople. Treaty of Bucarest. Rou-
mania extends her frontier in Dobrudja.

1914. European War.

1915. Armenian massacres.

August, 1916 — Roumania enters the war.

LIST OF SOME OF THE BOOKS REFERRED TO IN THE
TEXT UNDER SHORT TlTLES

BIBLIOGRAPHY.

Die Sprachen und Nationalitatsfragen in Osterreich. von einem

Romanen. Vienna, 1866.
La Rumenia innanzi la Conferenza del 1876. per un antico

diplomatico. 1876.

Ronier und Romanen. von Julius Jung. Innsbruck, 1877.
Deutsche Antwort auf die orientalische Frage. Constantin

Gustaf Adolf Frantz. Leipzig, 1877.
Siebenbiirgen — Reisebeobachturgen und Studien. Gerhard von

Rath. 1879.
Die Rumanen in Ungarn, Siebenbiirgen und der Bukowina. von

Joan Slavic!. Vienna, 1881.
La Politique Etrangere de la Roumanie. Take lonescu. Bucarest,

1891.
Les roumains hongrois et la nation hongroise. Re'ponse an

me'moire des atudie'nts universitaires de Roumanie.

Budapest, 1891.
The Roumanian Question in Transylvania [being the Roumanian

Reply to the last]. Vienna, 1892.

Mannal de istoria Romanilor. G. Tocilescu. Bucaresci, 1900.
Venizelos. Crawfurd Price. 1917.
Le Trait6 de paix de Bucarest du 28 juillet, 1913. Ministerul

afacerilor straine. Bucarest, 1913.

EeccapaCin 1812-1912. H. B. JlamKosa

Poccin Ha ^yna-fe. JI. A. Kacco 1913.

La Roumanie Contemporaine. Constantin D. Mavrodin. Paris,

I9i5-

Osterreich-Ungarisches Rotbuch — Diplomatische Aktenstiicke
betreffend die Beziehungen Osterreich-Ungarns zu
Rumanien in der Zeit von 22 Juli 1914, bis 27 August
1916. Vienna, 1916.

159

INDEX

Adalbert, Bishop, 3.

Adrianople, Treaty of, 6, 51.

Agriculture, n.

Akkerman, 7.

Albania, 10, 98, 149.

Alexis, Emperor of Russia, 5.

Alliance of France and Sweden,

21.

Alliance with Austria, 9.
Antwerp, 13.
Apafi, 21.
Austria, 6 ; ultimatum to Rou-

mania, 103 ; broke spirit of

alliance, 124; exerts pressure,

144.
Austrian Red Books, 59.

Balcik, 14.

Balkan League, 9, 149.

Balkan States, Federation of, 9,

33-

Balta Limani, Treaty of, 7.
Banffy, Baron, 45.
Banks, n.

Barbarian migrations, 15
Bathori, Andrew, 20.
Bathori, Stephen, 20.
Basil the Wolf, 5.
Battenberg, Prince of, 9.
Belgrade, Treaty of, 22.
Berchtold, Count, 74.
Berlin, Conference of, 8, 61.
Berlin, Treaty of, 52.

161

Bessaraba, 5.

Bessarabia, 6, 8, 142 (note) ;
annexation of, 30; history, 51 ;
population, 51 ; ceded to Rus-
sia, 51, 52 ; education and
language, 54 ; Russification,
57 ; promised to Roumania,
92, 94, 101, 114, 121.

Bibliography, 152.

Bocskay, Stephen, 20.

Bogdan, 4.

Bolgars, The, 2.

Bosnia-Hercegovina, 49.

Brass6, 107.

Bratianu, 65, 71, 75 to 91, 105 to
109, 114 to 136, 143.

Brusilov, 118.

Bucarest, Treaty of, 6, 10, 51,
67. 77. 85, 148.

Bucovina, 6, 45, 46, 92, 94,
121, 128.

Budget, ii.

Bulgaria, 2, 4, 8, 9, 14 ; com
mitted to Germany, 78 ; con-
ceals her intentions, 78 ; mu-
nitions, 92 ; promised Mace-
donia, etc., 92 ; reconciled to
Turkey, 96 ; Treaty with Cen-
tral Powers, 97 ; to invade
Serbia, 97 ; Treaty with
Greece, 98 ; enters the field,
106, boundaries, 149.

Bulgarian Church, 2.

Bulgarian language, 2.

Burian, Baron, 89, 109, no, 115,
121, 127, 128, 131.

1 62

INDEX

Calais, 13.

Carp, 117.

Carpathians, 107, 113, 117.

Central Ejurope, 23.

Charles, King of Roumania, 9,

66; death, 83.
Church, Uniate, Greek, 45.

Orthodox Greek, 45.

Church polity, 42.

Closca, 22.

Colonizations, 30.

Comneanu, 145.

Constantine, King, 85, 87, 131.

Constantinople, 51, 96, 114.

Co-operative Societies, n.

Costinescu, 121, 123.

Crown Councils, 73, 122, 134,

142.

Cuza, Alexander loan, 7.
Cyprus, 97.
Czernin, Count, n, 65 to 143 ;

" Roumania was justified," 69.
Czernowitz, 94, 118, 120.

Dacia, i, 2, 15, 51.
Daco-Roumanians, 2.
Dalmatia, 62.

Danube, Delta of, 7, 8, 52.
Dardanelles, The, 94, in.
Declarations of War, 126, 136,

IS'-

Delcass^, 100.
Democracy, 12.
Dillon, Dr. E. J., 69, 106.
Dobrudja, 8, 10, 52, 93, 102,

~"3'

Drama, 87.

Dudefti explosion, 122.

Education, 37, 41, 42, 54.

Electoral disabilities, 39.
Elliot, Sir Francis, 87.
Erdely (see Transylvania).

Espionage at Bucarest, 86.
Ethnological Boundaries, 18.

Fasciotti, Baron, 71.
Federated Europe, 12, 14.
Ferdinand, Archduke, 67.
Ferdinand, King, 10, 66, 82, 133

accession, 83.

Filipescu, 90, 105, 114, 119.
Finance, n.
Fonton, F. N., 30.
Foreign trade, 1 1.
Frantz, Constantin, 29.
Friedjung trial, 65.
Fiirstenberg, Prince, 67.

Galicia, 80, 89.

Galip, Effendi, 56.

Geographical position, i.

Germans, The, 44.

Germany — looking for allies, 78 ;
ultimatum to Roumania, 84 ;
contradictory engagements with
Greece and Bulgaria, 97 ;
propaganda in Roumania, 105.

Ghenadiev, 93.

Glurgievo, no, 127.

Gocben and Breslau, 78, 80.

Gounaris, 87.

Greece, 4 ; to oppose Bulgaria,
77 ; anxious to intervene, 78 ;
offered concessions in Asia
Minor, 87 ; treaty with Bul-
garia, 98.

Greek Revolution, 6.

Grey, Sir Edward, 78.

Hadik Count, 142.
Hermannstadt, 16.
Hohenlohe, Prince, 128, 129.
Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, Karl

Ludwig zu, 8.
Horia, 22.
Hungarians, The, 3.

INDEX

163

Hungary, 4 ; province of Tur-
key, 17.

Ia§i, Treaty of, 55.

Iliescu, General, 108, 144.

Industries, n.

Infant Asylums, 43.

Infant education, 44.

lonescu, Take, 9, 32, 56, 67, 77,
83, 9i» !05, 117, 119.

Islam converts, 44.

Ismail, 7.

Italy, 59, 60 ; war with Turkey,
61 ; declares for neutrality, 73 ;
declares war, 89. (See also
Negotiations).

Janissaries, Recruitment of, 43.
Jung, Julius, 29.
Justice, administration of, 47, 48.

Kaiser, The, 97 ; telegram to

Queen Sofia, 97.
Kalka, Battle of the, 16.
Karlowitz, Peace of, 4, 21.
Kasso, A. A., 53.
Kavala, 10, 87, 97.
Keleti, Karoly, 35, 36.
Kilia, 7.

Kosovo, Battle of, 3.
Kossiith, 38, 49.
Kramaf trial, 65.
Kronstadt, 16.
Kutchuk-Kainarji, Peace of, 6-

Land tenure, 47.

Languages, i, 2, 29, 32, 37, 40,

44. 45. 46> 47, 53, 54, "5-
LaSkov, 54.
Law of the Nationalities. (v.

The Nationalities).
League of the People, 102.
Lehovary, 91.
Little Wallachia, 3.

Local Government, 45.

London, Conference of, 93, 150.

Macedonia, 87, 92 ; invaded,

!34-

Magyar justice, 48.
Magyar policy, 33.
Magyarism, 28, 33, 36, 46, 58.
Magyars, The, 3, 16, 24, 31, 42 ;

concessions to Roumania, 68.
Malorescu, T., 10, 117, 133.
Mangra, Bishop, 45.
Map of Roumania, Frontispiece.
Maramures, 3.
Mdramarossziget, 3.
Marghiloman, 83, 91, 116.
Mavrocordato, Nicholas, 6.
Mavrodin, 41, 53.
MeVey, 129.

Michael the Brave, 4, 20.
Military credits, 133.
Milos, 20.
Milyukov, 146.
Ministers detained, 143.
Mohacs, Battle of, 4, 17.
Moldavia, 3, 4, 6, 7 ; tributary

to Turkey, 17; ravaged, 51.
Moldavians, The, 53.
Monastir, in.
Mongols, The, 3, 16.
Montenegro, 10.
Moruzi Dimitri, 56.
Moruzi, Panalot, 56.
Munitions, passage of, 85, 88, 89,

91, 95, 101, 103, 114, 122, 133.
Muntenia, 3.

Names transformed, 43, 49.
Napoleon III, 12.
Napoleonic campaigns, 56.
National colours, 48.
,, dances, 48.
Nationalism, 12.

Nationalities, The, 27, 32, 37, 39,
40.

INDEX

164

Naumann, Friedrich, 27, 44.
Negotiations between Austria and

Italy, 59, 62, 86, 88, 120 (note).
Negotiations between Austria and

Roumania, 59, 74, 107.
Neutrality of Greece, 115.
Neutrality of Roumania, 74, 81,

89, 90, 92, 102, 115, 125, 12%,

reasons for, 138, 142.
Neutrality undesirable, 33.
Nicholas, Tsar, 10.
Nikussis, Paniotachos, 5.

Odessa bombarded, 84.
Oil wells, n.
Oltenia, 3.
Or§ova, 107.

Paniotachos Nikussis, 5.

Panslavism, no.

Pan-Turanianism, no.

Paris, Treaty of, 7, 8, 51.

PaSi<5, 77.

Peace Terms and Rumours, 12,

14. 93, 102, 105, 145 (note).
Peasant Co-operative Societies,

ii.

Pefenegs, The, 3.
Penalties, 49.
People's Banks, n.
Persecutions, 47.
Peter the Great, 5.
Petrol, n, 103, 104.
Phanar, 5.

Phanariote Greeks, The, 5.
Plevna, Battle of, 8.
Poland, 6, 14, 16, 55.
Policy, Foreign, 32.
P61ovtsy, The, 3.
Population, 11, 34, 46, 52.
Porumbaru, Em., 116, 141.
Pozarevats, Treaty of, 22.
Preparations for war, 131.
Press, The, 47, 102, 109, 116, 140

(note).
Printing introduced, 5.

Protopopov, 146.
Prussia, 12.
Prussian methods, 55.
Pruth, The, 118.

Racial frontiers, 52.

Racova, 4.

Radoslavov, 95, 1 15.

Ragusa, 4.

Railways, n.

Rak6czy, Fracins, 21.

Rak6czy, I, George, 20.

Rdk6czy, Sigismund, 20.

Rebellion against Russia, 7.

Reformation, The, 17.

Religions, 34, 37, 42, 45.

Reni, 7.

Riga, in.

Roman Church, 3.

Rotterdam, 13.

Roumanian army, 113.

Roumanian cereals, in, 118.

Roumanian wine, 113.

Russia, 51 ; takes Bessarabia,
56 ; advance in Galicia, 80 ;
holds, Lemberg, etc., 86 ; mili-
tary convention with Rou-
mania, 130, 133 ; a reported
ultimatum, 142.

Russo-Turkish War, 8.

Sanguna, 32, 38.

Salonica, 98, 117, 131.

San Stefano, Treaty of, 8.

Saxons, The, 16.

Schools, 37.

Serbia, 4, 14, 49 ; ultimatum to,
74 ; invaded by Austria, 84 ;
gave up Macedonia, 106 ; over-
run, in.

Serbians, The, 20.

Siebenbiirgen, 15.

Sigismond, John, 19.

Silistria, 14.

Skoloudis, 115.

INDEX

165

Skutari, 10.
SlavicI, loan, 31, 42.
Sleswig Schools, 55.
Slovaks, The, 40, 44.
Sobieski, Jan, 21.
Stephen the Great, 4.
Stephen the Saint, 3
Strypa, The, 118.
Stiirmer, 145, 146.
Suffrage in Hungary, 39.
Suppressed communiques, 91.
Szathmar, 22, 49.

Talaat Bey, 78.

Tatars, The, 3.

Temesvar, 4, 22, 45, 94.

Teutonic Knights, Order of, 16.

Thun, Count, 65.

Tisza, 115.

Tocilescu, 5, 55.

Town names, derivation of, 15,
116, 148, 150.

Transylvania, i, 4, 7, 15 ;
separated from Hungary, 20 ;
civil war, 21 ; independence,
21 ; re-attached to Hungary,
21 ; created Grand Duchy, 22 ;
petition to Austria, 23 ; new
charter, 24 ; grievances, 27 ;
population, 34 ; wanted by
Roumania, 80 ; promised to
Roumania, 92, 94 ; terrorism,
140 (note).

Treason Trial, 48.

Trentino, The, 130.

Triple Alliance, 60, 87, 137, 148.

Tripoli, 61.

Tunis, 61.

Turkey, 4 ; cedes Bessarabia, 56 ;
war with Italy, 61 ; proceeds
to war, 78 ; treaty with Central
Powers, 97.

Turkish fleet, 78.

Turkish suzerainty, 8.

Turks, The, 3, 7, 16.

Tyrol, 62.

Universities, 43.

Venizelos, 77, 84 ; resignation,

85, 87.

Vienna, Peace of, 20.
Vlakhs, The, 3.

Waldthausen, von, 86.
Wallachia, 3, 4, 7 ; tributary to

Turkey, 17.
Wallachs, The, 3.
Warsaw, attacked, 88.
Wiegand, Karl von, 133.
Witte, Count de, 82.

Printed in Great Britain by Ebenezer Baylis # Son, Worcetter.

J£. SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY

A 000119750 8

Internet Archive Audio

Featured

Top

Images

Featured

Top

Software

Featured

Top

Books

Featured

Top

Video

Featured

Top

Mobile Apps

Browser Extensions

Archive-It Subscription

Save Page Now

Full text of "Roumania's cause & ideals"

See other formats