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THE     ROYAL    NAVY 

A    HISTORY 

FA'OM   THE   EAKUESt   TIMES    TO    THE    MESEXT 


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INTRODUCTION   TO  VOLUME  III. 


SOME  of  the  causes  which  contributed  to  delay  the  appearance  of 
the  second  volume  of  this  History  of  the  Royal  Navy,  have 
tributed  to  delay  the  appearance  of  this,  the  third.     Thr  -- 

of  the  work  has.  as  before,  been  hampered  by  my  ill-health  an  1 
my  enforced  residence  in  the  high  Alps  during  the  greater  part 
of  the  year.  A  certain  amount  of  delay,  moreover,  has  iv~ 
indirectly  from  the  recent  war  between  the-  United  State-  and 
Spain.  Captain  A.  T.  Mahan.  whose  critical  narrative  <>:  the 
uiajor  operations  of  the  War  of  the  American  Revolt;::  n  fills 
about  a  third  of  the  present  volume,  was  employed  in  the  ~crvice 
of  his  country1  at  Washington  during  the  late  cannier,  and  wa- 
thus  prevented  for  a  time  from  devoting  his  at:*  nti  n  : 
matters.  So  much  of  the  delay  as  has  been  caused  by  i.i-  pre- 
occupation will.  I  am  sure,  be  readily  forgiven,  seeing  tha:  • 
has  now  been  able  to  revise  proofs,  etc..  which  must  otherwise 
have  been  sent  to  press  without  his  final  imprimatur.  This  book 
has  much  to  say  concerning  the  beginnings  and  the  early  exploits 
of  the  United  States"  Xavv.  which,  in  the  day»  of  Hull  and 
Decatur.  proved  itself  to  be  as  capable  and  chivalrous  an 
opponent  as  Great  Britain  ever  had  to  meet  upon  the  seas,  and 
which  since. — and  not  only  in  the  days  of  Tatnall. — has  shown 
itself  as  true  and  loyal  a  friend  to  Britain  and  her  Xavy,  in  peace 
time,  as  it  was  gallant  a  foe  in  war.  I  cannot,  therefore,  refrain 
from  expressing  here  a  sentiment  which,  in  the  course  of  the  late 
short  but  brilliant  struggle,  must  have  welled  up  often  in  the 

1  I  should  mention  that  my  other  American  collaborator,  Mr.  Theodore  Koosevelt, 
resigned  his  appointment  as  Assistant  Secretary  of  the  U.  S.  Xavy,  in  order  to  take  an 
active  part  in  the  war,  and,  having  obtained  a  commission  as  Lieut.-Colonel  of  the  now 
famous  "  Rough  Riders,"  fought  with  very  distinguished  bravery  before  Santiago- 
de  Cuba.  He  has  since  been  elected  Governor  of  the  State  of  New  York. 


vi  INTRODUCTION  TO    VOLUME  III. 

heart  of  many  a  Briton.  We  triumph  wherever  the  race  wins 
fresh  glories ;  and  we  feel  proud  in  the  thought  that  tbe  victory 
has  been  gained  by  men  speaking  our  speech,  bearing  our  names, 
sharing  our  blood,  and  inspired  by  the  traditions  bequeathed  equally 
to  both  nations  by  Howard,  Drake,  Hawkins,  Blake,  Boscawen  and 
Hawke.  Not  to  us  has  it  fallen  in  these  recent  years  to  illustrate 
those  traditions,  and  to  add  to  them  fresh  epics.  Yet,  since  our 
brothers  of  the  New  World  have  shown  themselves  at  Manilla  and 
Santiago  the  same  men  that  they  were  at  Mobile  and  New  Orleans, 
we  are  surely  justified  in  hoping  that  we,  should  the  hour  for  action 
come  again,  shall  be  able  to  prove  that  our  branch  of  the  old  stock 
retains,  in  a  similar  manner,  the  old  grit  and  the  old  sea  virtues. 

Although,  as  I  have  said,  the  progress  of  the  work  continues  to 
be  somewhat  delayed  by  my  personal  disabilities,  I  am  not  conscious 
that  the  book  suffers  in  any  other  way  in  consequence  of  my  ill- 
health.  Thanks  to  my  numerous  and  indefatigable  helpers  and 
correspondents,  I  am  not,  in  spite  of  my  necessary  absence  from 
home,  obliged  to  forego  reference  to  any  documents,  state  papers,  or 
books  which  ought  to  be  consulted.  Happily,  too,  most  of  the 
materials  for  my  part  of  the  work  were  collected,  and,  to  some 
extent,  set  in  order,  ere  I  became  a  prisoner  here  ;  and  although,  of 
course,  I  still  very  often  have  to  appeal  for  further  particulars  to  the 
public  libraries,  the  Itecord  Office,  private  muniment  rooms,  and 
other  storehouses  of  fact,  there  is,  I  find,  remarkably  little  supple- 
mentary research  of  this  kind  which  cannot  he  carried  out  for  me 
by  my  assistants.  It  is  a  longer  process,  and  a  costlier,  but  not,  I 
hope,  a  less  effective  one. 

I  make  this  explanation  because  some  friendly  critics  who  have 
been  so  good  as  to  point  out  certain  small  errors  of  omission  or 
commission  in  the  previous  volumes,  have  generously  hinted  their 
conviction  that,  were  I  not  the  invalid  I  unfortunately  am,  these 
errors  would  not  have  appeared.  If  I  really  believed  that  my  state 
of  health  were  incompatible  with  the  carrying  out  of  the  work  in 
hand,  I  should  assuredly  try  to  find  someone  else  to  take  over  my 
duties  and  responsibilities.  But  the  fact  is  that  such  errors  as  I 
have  had  brought  to  my  notice, — and  fortunately  they  are  neither 
serious  nor  numerous, — are  inevitable  imperfections  in  any  book  of 
this  nature ;  for,  paradoxical  though  it  be,  I  can  safely  assert  that 
in  nothing  is  it  so  impossible  to  attain  to  absolute  correctness  and 
finality  as  in  a  critical  record  of  historic  facts.  The  difficulty 


INTRODUCTION  TO    VOLUME  III.  vii 

would  beset  me  equally,  were  I  sound  instead  of  sick,  and  in  London 
instead  of  in  Switzerland.  There  are  conflicts  of  evidence  which 
appear  irreconcilable ;  there  are  original  authorities  which  cannot 
be  laid  hands  upon,  or  which  even  the  most  studiously  careful  will 
by  chance  overlook ;  and  there  are  many  questions,  the  discussion  of 
which  cannot  be  seriously  attempted  in  a  work  to  which  limits  have 
been  set.  I  am  sure  that  some  at  least  of  the  critics  to  whom  I 
have  alluded,  have  made  the  mistake  of  supposing  that  it  is  because 
of  my  condition  and  my  position  that  I  have  ignored  this  witness' 
testimony  on  a  court-martial,  have  seemed  to  pay  little  or  no  heed 
to  the  statements  contained  in  that  document,  or  have  failed  to 
enter  upon  such  and  such  an  interesting,  but  wide  point  of  criticism. 
I  am  obliged  to  say  that  such  shortcomings  as  are  to  be  found  in 
these  volumes  are  due,  for  the  most  part,  to  very  different  causes. 
Firstly,  I  am  restrained  by  the  space  at  my  command  from  touching 
upon  many  subjects  with  which  I  should  otherwise  like  to  deal  at 
length,  and  from  entering  upon  long  discussions  as  to  the  credibility 
of  evidence.  The  same  consideration  even  obliges  me  to  omit  many 
footnotes  and  references  which  I  should  otherwise  gladly  include. 
Secondly,  I  am  guided  by  the  conviction  that  anyone  who  aspires 
to  complete  a  book  so  voluminous  as  this  History,  must  perforce 
proceed  upon  principles  somewhat  similar  to  those  which  Dr. 
Johnson  sketched  in  a  very  famous  passage. 

"Failures,"  he  wrote,  "however  frequent,  may  admit  of  extenuation  and  apology. 
To  have  attempted  much  is  always  laudable,  even  when  the  enterprise  is  above  the 
strength  that  undertakes  it.  To  deliberate  whenever  I  doubted,  to  enquire  whenever  I 
was  ignorant,  would  have  protracted  the  undertaking  without  end,  and  perhaps  wilhout 
improvement.  I  saw  that  one  enquiry  only  gave  occasion  to  another,  that  book  referred 
to  book,  that  to  search  was  not  always  to  lind,  and  to  find  was  not  always  to  be 
informed  ;  and  that  thus  to  pursue  perfection  was,  like  the  lirst  inhabitants  of  Arcadia, 
to  chase  the  sun,  which,  when  they  had  readied  the  hill  where  he  seemed  to  rest,  was 
still  beheld  at  the  same  distance  from  them." 

If,  to  put  matters  in  other  words,  one  were  determined,  in  an 
undertaking  of  this  kind,  to  be  content  with  nothing  short  of  absolute 
completeness  and  finality,  neither  the  initiator,  nor,  after  his  death, 
any  of  his  successors,  would  live  long  enough  to  finish  the  work. 
I  make  bold  to  recommend  this  reflection  to  all  my  critics,  and 
especially  to  one  of  them,  who,  in  his  review  of  my  second  volume, 
said,  speaking  of  the  account  there  given  of  the  first  Dutch  War 
(1652-54),  that  it  v/as  "  premature."  I  do  not  doubt  that  it  will  be 
possible,  say  a  hundred  years  hence,  to  write  a  better  and  completer 


viii  INTUODUCTION  TO    VOLUME  III. 

history  of  that  war  than  can  be  written  now ;  but  to  admit  so  much 
is  surely  not  the  same  thing  as  to  agree  that  a  history,  carefully 
written  now,  and  illustrated  with  scores  of  previously  unpublished 
facts,  is  written  too  soon.  It  is  surely  not  "  premature  "  to  brush 
away  even  a  single  published  error  or  misconception  concerning  the 
course  of  our  naval  history  ;  and,  I  think,  I  may  safely  say  that  this 
volume  and  those  volumes  which  have  preceded  it,— although  they, 
too,  possibly  contain  many  errors  on  minor  points, — give,  upon  the 
whole,  a  much  fairer  and  more  accurate  version  of  that  history  than 
has  been  hitherto  presented.  One  dares  not  hope  for— much  less 
can  one  wait  for, — absolute  finality.  But,  by  means  of  an  under- 
taking planned  and  carried  out  as  this  one  is,  in  accordance  with 
the  principles  set  forth  in  my  General  Preface,  one  may  at  least  be 
instrumental  in  enlarging  general  knowledge  of  a  great  subject,  and 
in  rendering  impossible  the  future  acceptation  of  some  of  the  gross 
and  astonishing  inisstatemcnts  on  naval  matters  which  one  finds  in 
almost  every  English  history.  I  have  no  wish  to  say  here  anything 
unkind  about  any  of  my  brother  men  of  letters:  but  I  cannot 
abstain  from  citing  from  one  particular  book  a  few  misstatements  of 
the  sort  to  which  I  allude,  in  order  that  it  may  be  seen  that  the 
present  work  is  not  "  premature,"  and  that  there  does  exist  already 
a  real  necessity  for  something  of  the  kind.  I  speak  of  a  book,  dealing 
with  English  history  generally,  and  consisting  of  upwards  of  eleven 
hundred  large  pages  of  small  type.  It  bears  the  imprint  of  reputable 
publishers ;  and  upon  the  title-page  are  the  names  of  two  distin- 
guished university  men,  one  of  whom  is  described  as  a  lecturer  on 
modern  history,  and  the  other  as  a  late  professor  on  history,  in  a 
well-known  English  college.  The  second  edition  of  this  book,  dated 
IHHo,  is  responsible  for  the  following  extraordinary  statements, 
among  others. 

Of  Admiral  Edward  Vernon  (1),  it  is  said  that  he  was  a  "  rear- 
admiral  at  twenty-four,"  and  that  he  "  failed  in  his  attempt  to 
seize  Porto  Bello,  from  an  insufficiency  of  force."  The  truth  is 
that  Vernon  was  made  a  vice-admiral  in  1731),  when  he  was  fifty- 
five,  that  he  had  never  before  held  flag-rank,  and  that,  far  from 
failing  at  Puerto  Bello,  he  brilliantly  captured  that  place  on 
November  22nd,  1739,  "with  six  ships  only,"  as  may  be  seen  on 
reference  to  pp.  54-57  of  the  present  volume. 

Surely  there  is  some  unconscious  suppressio  veri  in  the  assertion 
that,  "foiled  in  his  attempt  to  catch  the  Spanish  treasure-ship, 


INTRODUCTION   TO    VOLUME  III.  ix 

Anson  sailed  westward  from  America  with  the  Centurion,  his  sole 
remaining  ship,  and  arrived  at  Spithead  in  June  1744."  The  story 
of  what  really  happened,  and  of  how  the  Manilla  galleon  was  taken, 
will  be  found  on  p.  323  of  this  volume. 

Episodes,  localities,  and  individuals  are  curiously  jumbled  and 
confused  in  the  following  passage  : — "  On  the  1st  of  June,  1794,  the 
division  of  the  Channel  fleet  commanded  by  Lord  Howe  attacked 
and  utterly  defeated  the  French  fleet  off  the  Hyeres  Islands.  In 
this  action  Hood  played  a  conspicuous  part,  and  in  the  following 
August  he  was  created  Baron  Bridport,  in  the  Irish  peerage."  It  is 
true,  of  course,  that  a  great  battle  was  fought  on  "  The  Glorious 
First  of  June,"  1794  ;  but  it  was  fought,  not  off  the  Hyeres  Islands, 
which  lie  near  Toulon,  in  the  Mediterranean,  but  off  Ushant,  near 
the  mouth  of  the  British  Channel.  The  only  important  action 
fought  off  Hyeres  during  the  war  of  1793-1802  was  fought  in  July, 
1795,  by  a  British  fleet  under  Admiral  William  Hotham  (1).  That 
force  was  not  a  division  of  the  Channel  fleet,  nor  were  the  French 
utterly  defeated  on  the  occasion.  Moreover,  Lord  Bridport  was  not 
upon  the  scene. 

Rodney  is  described  as  "the  son  of  a  naval  officer  of  some 
renown."  Henry  Rodney,  his  father,  is  usually  supposed,  neverthe- 
less, to  have  been  a  country  gentleman,  living  at  Walton -on-Thames. 
It  is  further  said  of  Eodney  that,  while  he  was  residing  in  France, 
"  offers  were  made  by  the  French  to  tempt  him  to  desert  his 
country;  but  he  rejected  the  overtures,  and  was  rewarded  in  1778 
by  being  promoted  to  be  an  admiral."  It  is  news  that  promotion  in 
the  Navy  has  ever  been  a  reward  for  a  flag-officer's  refusal  to  become 
a  traitor  :  yet,  seeing  that  when  Eodney  was  made  an  Admiral  of 
the  White,  on  January  '29th,  1782,  he  was  still  in  France,  and  that, 
according  to  the  generally  accepted  story,  he  owed  his  ability  to 
return  to  England  to  the  fact  that  a  French  gentleman  lent  him  the 
necessary  money,  it  is  difficult  to  believe  that  the  authorities  at 
Whitehall,  if  they  had  ever  suspected  him  of  treasonable  proclivities, 
could  have  felt  sure,  when  they  promoted  him,  that  their  suspicions 
were  baseless. 

Of  Sir  Charles  Napier  it  is  said  :  "in  1829  he  was  employed  off 
the  coast  of  Portugal  in  the  Galatea.  He  supported  the  Constitu- 
tionalists ;  defeated  the  fleet  of  Don  Miguel,  and  settled  Donna 
Maria  on  the  throne.  Don  Pedro  was  unbounded  in  his  gratitude  : 
created  him  Viscount  of  Cape  St.  Vincent ;  gave  him  all  the 


X  INTRODUCTION   TO    VOLUME  III. 

Portuguese  orders,  and  named  him  admiral-in-chief."  From  this  it 
would  certainly  appear  to  the  ordinary  reader  that,  while  com- 
manding H.M.S.  Galatea,  Napier  took  an  active  part  in  the  internal 
affairs  of  Portugal  and  defeated  Don  Miguel ;  and  that,  in  conse- 
quence of  his  action,  he  was  given  command  of  Don  Pedro's  fleet. 
Yet,  in  fact,  Napier  quitted  the  Galatea  early  in  1832;  succeeded 
Sartorius  in  command  of  Don  Pedro's  fleet  in  1833,  and  did  not, 
until  he  was  already  serving  in  that  capacity,  defeat  Don  Miguel. 

I  might,  if  it  were  worth  while,  cite  scores  of  other  misstate- 
ments,  equally  astonishing,  from  the  book  in  question,  and  from 
other  recent  works  dealing  with  English  history.  Surely,  when 
such  misstatements  are  being  circulated  broadcast,  it  is  not 
••  premature  "  to  put  forward  a  Naval  History  which,  though  it 
may  possibly  contain  errors  on  obscure  points  of  fact  or  criticism, 
and  though  it  make  no  pretence  to  be  absolutely  complete  and 
linal,  bus  been,  at  least,  prepared  witli  a  vast  amount  of  care, 
which  is  the  outcome  of  reference,-  not,  of  course,  to  all  existing 
original  authorities,  but  to  many  thousands  of  unpublished  docu- 
ments, private  and  public,  and  to  many  thousands  of  printed 
histories,  biographies,  othcial  papers,  Navy  lists,  pamphlets  and 
periodicals  ;  and  which  has  involved  research  in,  and,  in  some 
cases,  special  journeys  to,  not  merely  many  parts  of  England,  but 
also  France,  America,  Spain,  Holland,  Kussia,  Denmark  and  Italy. 

For  Chapters  XXVI,  XXVI I,  and  XXX,  of  the  present  volume, 
and  for  the  appendix  and  some  of  the  notes  to  Chapter  XXXI,  I  am 
directly  responsible.  Sir  Clements  Markham  contributes  Chapter 
XXIX  ;  Captain  Mahan,  Chapter  XXXI,  and  Mr.  L.  Carr  Laughton, 
Chapter  XXVIII,  and  the  appendix  thereto. 

Captain  Mahan  desires  me  to  express  here,  on  his  behalf,  very 
cordial  thanks  to  Professor  J.  K.  Laughton,  K.N.,  who  has  kindly 
assisted  him  in  many  ways  in  the  preparation  of  Chapter  XXXI,  in 
the  present  volume.1  "With  regard  to  that  chapter,  I  ought  to  point 
out  that  the  plan,  on  p.  37-3,  of  the  naval  attack  on  Fort  Moultrie, 
Charleston,  in  177(5,  will  be  found  to  differ,  in  some  small  and  un- 
important details,  from  Captain  Mahan's  description  of  the  disposi- 
tions of  the  ships  and  of  the  guns  in  the  works.  Seeing,  however, 
that  the  plan  in  question  is  based  upon  a  contemporary  drawing 

1  "  He  kiudly  jilaced  at  my  disposal  numerous  notes  made  by  him  at  the  Record 
Office.  These  have  been  of  great,  and  indeed  of  indisi>ensable  assistance  in  the 
narrative." — Letter  of  Captain  Mahan  to  \V.  L.  C. 


INTRODUCTION   TO    VOLUME  III.  xi 

made  upon  the  spot  by  a  British  naval  officer,  and  intended  to 
accompany  and  illustrate  the  dispatch  of  Commodore  Sir  Peter 
Parker  (1),  I  have  deemed  it  to  be  of  more  than  sufficient  interest 
to  warrant  its  reproduction.  For  its  inclusion,  however,  Captain 
Mahan  is  not  responsible.  Among  other  supplementary  illustrations 
which  I  have  ventured  to  add  to  his  chapter,  is  the  valuable  note  on 
p.  396.  It  is  but  a  brief  note  ;  but  it  represents  the  results  of  many 
days'  labour ;  and  we  should  not  have  been  able  to  obtain  the 
figures  contained  in  it,  had  we  not  had  the  co-operation  of  Colonel 
H.  Hozier,  Secretary  of  Lloyd's,  who  most  kindly  allowed  some  of 
the  clerks  in  his  office  to  compile  the  table  from  the  original 
documents. 

To  Lord  Yernon,  for  information  concerning  his  distinguished 
kinsman,  Admiral  Edward  Vernon  (I),  and  to  Captain  Thomas 
Suckling,  R.N.  (retd.),  I  desire  also  to  express  special  thanks. 

I  regret  that,  owing  to  the  fact  that  more  than  one  chapter 
of  the  present  volume  has  extended  to  greater  length  than  was 
originally  intended,  I  have  found  it  impossible  to  conclude  the 
history  of  the  period  1762-1793  with  Mr.  H.  W.  Wilson's  account 
of  the  minor  operations  of  the  War  of  American  Revolution.  That 
account  will  form  the  first  chapter  of  Vol.  I.Y,  which,  since  most 
of  it  is  already  in  type,  will,  I  hope,  be  in  a  condition  for  publication 
very  early  in  the  year  1899. 

\V.  L.  C. 

DAVOS-AM-PLAT/,  SWITZERLAND. 
Nov.  1898. 


E  BE  AT  A. 


The  reader  is  requested  to  correct  the  following  errors,  the  presence  of  which  was 
not  discovered  until  after  the  greater  part  of  the  volume  had  been  sent  to  press. 

P.      9,  at  end  of  the  table,  in  the  two  lower  lines,  under  Cables, 

for  Diameter  of  bower  cables,  read  Circumference  of  bower  cables. 
P.  37.°i,  line  4  from  'bottom, 

for  Captain  James  Reid,  read  Commander  James  l!rid. 
„      line  2  from  bottom, 

for  Christopher,  rend  Tobias. 
P.  380,  line  5, 

for  Admiral  Lord  Howe,  read  Vice- Admiral  T.i.nl  Ifuwc. 
P.  :',87,  If,,'-  21, 

for  Caulfield,  r.W  Caulffild. 
P.  -100,  in  table  in  not*-,  under  Vigilant, 

for  Com.  Hugh  Ck'hcrry  Christian,  r<:ad  Com.  Braba/cni  Christian 
P.  171,  line  18, 

for  Thomas  Graves  (1),  rutd  Thomas  Graves  (2). 
P.  473,  lin,-  25, 

for  Cavilficld,  r>-ad  C.iulfeild. 
„      line  20, 

for  Bonovier,  read  Bonavia. 
P. '474,  line  '2  from  bottom, 

fur  Caulfield,  read  CaultY-iM. 

P.  505,  in  '2nd  col.  of  table, 

for  Capt.  Cieorge  Murray,  rend  Capt.  Hon.  George  Murray. 

for  Capt.  Robert  Suttmi,  n-ntl  Capt.  Robert  Manners  Sutt<>n. 
P.  5:',8,  line  14, 

for  Pachard  Hughes,  Bart.  (2),  rend  Pilchard  Hughes  (:!;,  Part. 
„      in  first  foot-note, 

for  Pilchard  Hughes,  Bart.  (I),  mid  Richard  Hughes  (2),  Part. 
P.  54G,  in  3rd  col.  of  note, 

for  Heros,  read  llaros. 

P.  550,  in  line  8  of  4th  col.  of  tulle, 

for  Lapalliere,  read  Lapelliere. 

P.  554,  line  35, 

for  Batacalo,  read  Batticaloa. 

P.  557,  line  12, 

for  Batacalo,  read  Batticaloa. 


CONTENTS. 

VOLUME   III. 
CHAPTEi;    XXVI. 

PAGE 

CIVIL  HISTORY  OF  THE  ROYAL  NAVY,  \l\\-\~c\-i    ,          .  \ 

CHAPTER   XXVII. 

MILITARY  HISTORY  OF  TIIK   ROYAL  NAVY,    1714-1702: 

MAJOR  OPERATIONS        ....  L>4 

CHAPTER  XXY.ITT. 

~-vy —~- 

MILITARY  HISTORY  OF  THE  ROYAI/NAVY,  171-l-17fi°  •'    ^ 

^J 
MINOR  OPERATIONS        .          .       '   .      — "\ .  .      051; 

APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTERS  XXVII.  AND  XXV  HI.  : 

LOSSKS    OF    THE    BELLIGERENT    Po\VERS 

(«)  LOSSES  OF  H.M.  SHIPS  FKOM   17U-17G3      .          .          .      ;UO 

(b)  LOSSES  OF  THE  FRENCH  NAVY,   1714-48  AND  1755-62  .      .'ill' 

(c)  LOSSES     OF     THE    SPANISH    NAVY,     1718-19,     1739-48, 

AND  17Gi'  ...  .  .      314 

CHAPTER  XXIX. 
VOYAGES  AND  DISCOVERIES,  1714-1762.  .          .          .     31G 

CHAPTER  XXX. 
CIVIL  HISTORY  OF  THE  ROYAL  NAVY,  1763-1792    ....     325 


XVI  CONTENTS   OF   VOLUME  111. 

CHAPTER  XX XT. 

FAGK 

.MILITARY  HlSTOKY  OF  THE  KOVAL  NAVY,  1  70.'?-!  792  : 

MAJOR  OPERATIONS       ........     353 

APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  XXXI.  : 

LIST  OF  HHITISII  FLAG-OFFICERS  ON  THK  ACTIVE  LIST,  1762-1793     505 


INDEX    .  509 


LIST  OF  ILLUSTRATIONS. 

VOLUME  m. 

FULL-PAGE   PHOTOGRAVURES. 

GEORGE,  LORD  ANSON,  ADMIRAL  OF  THE  FLEET  .  .          .  Frontixpia-e 

GEORGE  BRYDGES,  LORD  RODNEY,  ADMIRAL    .  .  .    Fncimj  pmjf  21'2 

CAPTAIN  JAMES  COOK,  R.N.          .                    .  .  .'(Hi 

RICHARD,  EARL  HOWE,  ADMIRAL  OK  THE   FLEET  .  .,              4U(> 

SIR  EDWARD  HUGHES,   K.B.,  ADMIRAL  .  .  ,,              ~>~>0 

FULL-PAGE  ILLUSTR  ATK  >XS. 

H.M.S.  "  GRAFTON,"  FITTED  WITH  A  .iritv  HTDDEI:.  ETC.,  KOI; 

HER  VOYAGE  TO  ENGLAND,  AFTKH  THE  STORM    (IFF  Lofllv 

IIOTIRG,  1757.  (From  HERVEY'S  '  NAVAL  HISTORY')  .  F<«-n<ij  /«<;/<•  Hi!) 

ATTACK  ON  FORT  MOULTRIE,  177(5  .  /'";/'  :'1""1 

PART  OF  NORTH  AMERICA  AND  THE  NORTH  ATLANTIC.  AND 

THE  WEST  INDIES          .                             .  „  ^77 

NEW  YORK  HARBOUR,  AND  NEIGHBOURHOOD  .                    .       ,.  :5Sl 

MARTINIQUE        .....  ...  4S5 

INDIA  AND  CEYLON  .  .  ,,  '">44 

ILLUSTRATIONS  IN  THE  TEXT. 

[Ttie  illnntratimiK  Unix  marknl  (')  urr  tiikni  fnnii  '  A  Xnrul  Kf/nmtur'  lm  Tl*  minx  Ililnt  Hlum'lilry  : 

Jjillilull,  I'M.]   • 


THE  FRENCH  "  INVINCIBLE,"  74     .  G 

THE  SPANISH  "  GLORIOSO,"  74       ..  6 

THE  FRENCH  "  TERRIBLE,"  74 
HADLEY'S  QUADRANT  . 

b 


XV111  ILLUSTRATIONS. 

PAGE 

1  ROYAL  STANDARD,  OP  GEORGE  II.       . 

COMMEMORATIVE  MEDAL  OF  MATHEWS'S  ACTION,  1744 

SIR  JOHN  NORRIS,  KT.,  ADMIRAL  OF  THE  FLEET    . 

GEORGE  BYNG,  VISCOUNT  TORRINGTON,  ADMIRAL  OF  THE  FLEET 

COMMEMORATIVE  MEDAL  OF  BYNG'S  VICTORY,  1788 

ADMIRAL  NICHOLAS  HADDOCK       .....  .49 

ADMIRAL  EDWARD  VERNON.          .....  .53 

ATTACK  ON  PUERTO  BELLO,  1739  ...  .56 

ADMIRAL  SIR  CHARLES  KNOWLES.          ...  .60 

COMMEMORATIVE  MEDAL  OF  OPERATIONS  AT   CAHTAGUNA,   1741.          .        73 
THE  NEIGHBOURHOOD  OF  TOULON          ..... 

SIH  WILLIAM  ROWLEY,  ADMIRAL  OF  THE  FLEET      .  .       93 

MATHEWS'S  ACTION  OFF  TOULON,   1714  ....  .98 

ADMIRAL  THOMAS  MATIIEWS  .......        99 

VICE-ADMIRAL  Sin  PETER  WARREN       .  .114 

COMMEMORATIVE  MEDAL  <>F  ANSON'S  VICTORY,    1717         .          .          .      1-7 
ADMIRAL  SIR  CHARLES   KNOWLES.          ......      133 

PORT  Louis,  HISPANIOLA      .  .          .  ...      134 

BYNG'S  ACTION,   17.r>(i.  T.,  •_' P.M.   .  ...      149 

BYNG'S  ACTION.   1756.   II.,  2.30P.M.       .  .      149 

BYNG'S  ACTION,   1756.    111.,  3  P.M.  .      150 

ADMIRAL  THE  HON.  .Joiix   BYNG  ...  .      159 

VICE-ADMIRAL  CHARLES  WATSON.          .  ....      162 

CAPTAIN  MAURICE  SUCKLING,   R.N.        ......      166 

ADMIRAL  SIR  CHARLES  SAUNDEHS  .          .  ...      170 

ADMIRAL  SIR  GEORGE  POCOCK       .......      173 

REAR-ADMIRAL  RICHARD   KEMPENFELT  ......      180 

THE  HARHOUR  OF   Lorisiioi  m;      .  .  ....      184 

COMMEMORATIVE  MEDAL  OF  THE  CAPTURE  OF   LOUISIIOUKG,   1758  185 

COMMEMORATIVE  MEDAL  OF  THE  BATTLE  OF  QUIUERON,  1759  .          .     222 
SIR  PETER  PAKKEI:.  ADMIRAL  OF  THE  FLEET          .          .  .      237 

ADMIRAL  SIR  RICHARD   KING        .....  ;MO 

1  BlTTACLE,    OR    BlNN\CLE,    1750      .  .  .        255 

1  VOYAL  BLOCK  ..........     256 

'Snips'  FIRE-ENGINES,   1750          .....  309 

'Loo,  1750                                                                  .          .          .  .316 

HAND  SCREW,  OR  JACK,  1750     .....  324 

SIGNATURE  OF  RICHARD,  EARL  HOWE,  ADMIRAL  OF  THE  FLEET  325 

COMMEMORATIVE  MEDAL  OF  KEPPEL'S  ACTION,  1778  353 

LAKE  GHAMPLAIN                  ......  355 

MANOEUVRES  OF  HOWE  AND  D'ESTAING  .                   .          .  407 
ADMIRAL  AUGUSTUS  VISCOUNT  KEPPEL.          .          .          . 


ILL  USTBA  TJONS. 

PAGE 

KEPPEL'S  ACTION  OFF  USHANT,  1778,  I.,  2.30P.M..          .          .          .  419 

KEPPEL'S  ACTION  OFF  USHANT,  1778,  II.,  6  P.M.    ....  421 

ADMIRAL  THE  HON.  SAMUEL  BARKINGTON       .....  427 

NOETHEEN  PART  OF  ST.  LUCIA     ....                    .  430 

VICE-ADMIRAL  SIR  HYDE  PARKER  (1)    ......  433 

BYRON'S  ACTION  OFF  GRENADA     .......  436 

ADMIRAL  MARRIOT  ARBUTHNOT    .......  441 

ADMIRAL  SIR  CHARLES  HARDY  (2)         ......  444 

RODNEY  AND  DE  GUICHEN,  APRIL  17TH,  1780,  I.,  8  TO  9  A.M.         .  455 

RODNEY  AND  DE  GUICHEN,  APRIL  17™,  1780,  II.,  NOON  TO  1  P.M..  457 

RODNEY  AND  DE  GUICHEN,  MAY  15TH,   1780          ....  465 

CORNVVALLIS  AND  DE  TfiRNAY,  JUNE  20'HI,   1780     ....  475 

ADMIRAL  THE  HON.  SIR  WILLIAM  COUNWALLIS       ....  476 

COMMEMORATIVE  MEDAL  OF  THE  CAPTURE  OF  ST.  EUSTATIUS    .          .  480 

PART  OF  THE  WINDWARD  ISLANDS         ......  48.3 

ARBUTHNOT  AND  DBS  TOUCHES     .          .          .          .          .          .          .491 

GRAVES  AND  DE  GRASSE       ........  498 

HOOD  AND  DE  GRASSE,  JANUARY  25™,   1782,  I.     .          .          .          .  514 

HOOD  AND  DE  GRASSK,  JANUARY  25rni,   1782,  II.  .          .          .          .  515 

HOOD'S  ANCHORAGE  AT  ST.  KITT'S,   1782        .          .          .          .          .517 

RODNEY  AND  DE  GKASSE,  APRIL  9™,  1782,  I.,  9.45A.M.         .          .  522 

RODNEY  AND  DE  GKASSE,  APRIL  9™,   1782,  II.,  NOON    .          .          .  523 

COMMEMORATIVE  MEDAL  OF  RODNEY'S   VICTORY,  1782      .          .          .  524 

RODNEY  AND  DE  GRASSE,  APRIL   12™,   1782,  A.    .          .          .          .  526 

RODNEY  AND  DE  GRASSE,  APRIL  12™,  1782,    B.     ....  527 

RODNEY  AND  DE  GRASSE,  APRIL   12™,   1782,  C.     .          .          .          .  52S 

RODNEY  AND  DE  GRASSE,  APRIL  12™,   1782,  D.    .          .          .          .  529 

SUFFREN    AND    JoiINSTONE,    PoRTO    PltAYA,     1781          ....  547 

SUFFREN  AND  HUGHES,  FEBRUARY  17™,   1782        ....  551 

SUFFREN  AND  HUGHES,  APRIL  12™,  1782     .....  553 

SUFFREN  AND  HUGHES,  JULY  GTH,   1782         .....  555 

SUFFREN  AND  HUGHES,  SEPTEMBER  3ni>,   1782         .          .                    .  559 


NAVAL     HISTORY. 

CHAPTEE  XXVI. 

CIVIL    HISTOEY   OF    THE    ROYAL   NAVY,    1714-1762. 

Administration  of  the  Xavy— The  Admiralty  Board—  The  Sick  and  Wound-id  Board— 
The  Admiralty  Buildings — The  Xavy  Office- -The  Xavy  Pay  Office — First  Lords 
and  Secretaries  of  the  Admiralty,  and  Principal  Officers  of  the  Xavy,  1714-17(12 — 
Xaval  Expenditure — Increase  in  various  classes  of  ships — State  of  the  Meet  in  1714, 
1727,  1752  and  17(!0 — The  introduction  of  the  true  frigate — The  dimensions  of  ships 
— Complements — Small  arms — Anchors — Cables — Method  of  computing  tonnage 
— Service  ordnance — The  armament  of  ships-— Some  typical  men-of-war — Cost  of 
men-of-war  in  171!),  173.'!  and  1741 — Hadley's  <|uadrnnt — Harrison's  timekeeper 
— Coppering — Sail-cloth' — The  Eddystone  Light — Lighthouses — Lightships — The 
King's  Regulations  and  Admiralty  Instructions — Pilots — Smugglers — Vernon  on 
smugglers  and  their  dangers — Repression  of  piracy — The  Articles  of  War — 
Greenwich  Hospital — The  encouragement  of  seamen  —  Pri/.e  money — Bounties  to 
seamen — Pay  and  half-pay — Officers'  servants — Promotion  to  tlag-rnnk — Super- 
annuation of  Captains — The  establishment  of  uniform  for  officers — The  rough  life 
of  the  service — The  character  of  officers — Immorality  on  the  lower  deck — Health 
of  the  Xavy. 

"PvUltlNG-  the  period  1714-1 7(5'2  very  little  change 
took  place  in  the  character  of  the  machinery 
whereby  the  lioyal  Navy  was  administered.  That 
machinery  had  attained  a  certain  degree  of  perfection, 
and  was  in  fairly  good  working  order.  The  Act  of 
AVilliam  and  Mary,1  which  specified  and  defined  the 
functions  of  the  Commissioners  for  executing  the  office  of  Lord  High 
Admiral  of  England,  continued  to  be  the  authority  in  virtue  of  which 
the  Admiralty  Board  acted;  and  the  patent  granted  to  her  Admiralty 
Board  by  Queen  Anne  was  substantially  reproduced  from  time  to 
time  as  fresh  Boards  succeeded  one  another.  In  the  civil  depart- 
ment, the  most  important  alteration  was  the  appointment,  in 
1740,  of  a  Sick  and  Wounded  Board.  The  sick  and  hurt  seamen 
of  the  Navy  had  been  looked  after  by  a  Commission  in  the  reign 

1  2  W.  &  M.,  sess.  2,  c.  2. 
VOL.    III.  B 


'2  CIVIL   HISTORY,   1714-1762.  [1714-1762. 

of  William  III. ;  but  in  1692  the  business  had  been  transferred  to 
the  Commissioners  of  the  Kegister  Office,  and  thence,  in  1702,  to 
another  separate  Commission,  which  had  lasted  until  1713.  There- 
after, for  some  years,  things  remained  unsettled ;  but  in  1740,  in 
consequence  of  the  war  with  Spain,  a  Commission  was  specially 
granted  to  three  persons,  who  were  entrusted  not  only  with  the  care 
of  sick  and  wounded  seamen,  but  also  with  the  superintendence  of 
medical  stores  supplied  for  the  use  of  the  Navy,  the  management  of 
naval  hospitals  ashore  and  arloat,  the  examination  and  appointment 
of  naval  surgeons,  and  the  maintenance  and  exchange  of  prisoners 
of  war.  From  1745  to  1749,  this  Board  consisted  of  four  instead 
of  three  Commissioners  ;  from  1749  to  1755,  of  two  only  ;  from 
April  to  November,  1755,  of  three,  as  at  first;  and  from  1755  to 
1763,  of  four.  Its  offices  were  on  Tower  Hill. 

The  old  Admiralty  buildings  at  Wallingford  House  fell  into  decay 
about  the  year  1722,  when  the  office  of  the  Commissioners  was 
temporarily  transferred  to  a  house  in  St.  James's  Square.  The 
older  part  of  the  present  Admiralty  buildings  in  Whitehall,  was 
completed  and  occupied  in  1725,  though  not  until  1760  was  the 
colonnade  or  screen  built  across  the  street-side  of  the  court-yard  to 
mitigate  the  unpleasant  effect  produced  by  the  attenuated  propor- 
tions of  the  columns  on  the  western  side  of  the  square.  The  Navy 
Office  remained  during  the  period  at  the  corner  of  Seething  Lane 
and  Crutched  Friars  ;  and  the  Navy  Pay  Office  was  in  Old  Broad 
Street. 

The  succession  of  the  more  important  administrative  officers  was 
as  follows  : — 

FIRST  LOUD  OK  Tin:  ADMIRALTY. 

Oct.     14.  1714.  Edward,  Karl  of  Orford,  Admiral. 
Ap.      16,  1717.  James,  Karl  of  Berkeley,  Admiral. 
Aug.      "2,  1727.  George,  Viscount  Torrington,  Admiral. 
June    21,  1733.   Sir  Charles  Wager,  Kt.,  Admiral. 
Mar.    19,  1742.  Daniel,  Karl  of  Winchelsea. 
Dec.  1744.  John,  Duke  of  Bedford. 

Feb.    20,  174H.  John,  Karl  of  Sandwich. 
June   22,  1751.  George,  Lord  Anson,  Admiral. 
Nov.    20,  1756.  Kichard,  Earl  Temple. 
Ap.  1757.  Daniel,  Earl  of  Winchelsea. 

June   30,  1757.  George,  Lord  Anson,  Admiral. 
June   19,  1762.  George,  Earl  of  Halifax. 
Oct.    16,  1762.  George  Grenville. 


1714-1762.]          PRINCIPAL    OFFICERS   OF   THE  NAVY. 


Feb. 
Dec. 


April 
June 


SECRETARY  OF  THE  ADMIRALTY. 

Josiah  Burchett. 
1742.  Thomas  Corbett. 
1751.  John  Clevland  (with,  as  assistant  and  deputy, 

John  Milnes). 
TREASURER  OF  THE  NAVY. 

John  Aislabie. 
1718.  Richard  Hampden. 
1720.  Sir  Geo.  Byng,  Kt.,  Adm. 

1724.  Hon.  Henry  Pattee  Byng. 

1725.  William  Corbett. 
1734.  Arthur  Onslow. 
1742.  Thomas  Clutterbuck. 

1742.  Sir   Charles   Wager,  Kt., 

Admiral. 

1743.  Sir  John  Rushout,  Bart. 

1744.  George  Doddington. 
1749.  Hon.  Henry  Bilsou  Legge. 

1754.  George  Qrenville. 

1755.  George  Doddington. 

1756.  George  Grenville. 

1757.  George  Doddington. 
1757.  George  Grenville. 

1762.  William    Wildman,    Vis- 
count Harrington. 


May 

Sept. 

April 

Aug. 

July 

Jan. 

Mar. 


LI 


CONTROLLER  OF  THE  NAVY. 

Sir  Charles  Wager,  Kt., 
Rear-Admiral. 

April  1718.  Thomas  Swanton  (1), 
Captain,  R.X. 

Jan.  1722.  James  Migliells,  Viee-Ad- 

iniral. 

Mar.  1734.  Richard  Haddock  (2), 
Captain,  R.X. 

Mar.  22,  1749.  Savage  Mostyn,  Captain, 
E.N. 

Feb.  1755.  Edward  Falkinghain  (1), 
Captain,  R.N. 

Nov.  1755.  Charles  Saunders,  Cap- 
tain, R.N. 

June  1756.  Digby  Dent  (2),  Captain, 
R.X. 

Dec.  1756.  George  Cockburne,  Cap- 
tain, R.N. 

SURVEYOR  OF  THE  NAVY. 

William  Lee. 

Mar.          1715.  Jacob  Ackworth. 
June         1746.  Joseph  Allin. 
,  ..„,.  (Thomas  Slade. 

ad'\  William  Bateley 


Feb. 

Mar. 
Dec. 

Aug. 
Mar. 


1717 
1727 

17 


CLERK  OF  THE  ACTS. 
Samuel  Atkins. 

1719.  Tempest  Holmes. 

1720.  Thomas  Pearce. 
1743.  John  Clevland. 

1746.  Robert  Osborne. 

1747.  Daniel  Devert. 
1761.  Timothy  Brett. 
1761.  Edward  Mason. 

CONTROLLER  OF  TIIK  TREASURER'S 
ACCOUNTS. 

Dennis  Liddell. 
Richard  Burton. 
Sir  George  Saunders,  Kt., 
Captain  and  Rear- Adm. 
">.  George    Purvis,    Captain, 

R.N. 

1740.  John  Philipson. 
1743.  William  Corbett. 
1753.  Richard  Hall. 
1761.  Timothy  Brett. 

CONTROLLER  OF  TIIK  YiriTAi.UNO 
ACCOUNTS. 
Benjamin  Tinievvell. 
Nov.          1714.  Diehard  Burton. 
Nov.          1717.  John  Fuwlcr. 
June         1744.  Francis  Gashry. 
July         1747.  Robert  Osborne. 

CONTROLLER  OF  TIIK  STOREKEEPER'S 
ACCOUNTS. 

Thomas    Jennings,    Cap- 
tain, R.N. 

Nov.         1714.  Charles     Cornwall,    Cap- 
tain, R.N. 

July          1716.  Thomas      Swanton     (1), 
Captain,  R.X. 

April         1718.  William  Cleveland,  Cap- 
tain, R.N. 

May          1732.  Robert  Byng. 

May          1739.  John  Philipson. 

Mar.          1740.  George  Crowle. 

Mar.          1752.  Richard  Hall. 

Aug.         1753.  George  Adams. 

Mar.          1761.  Hon.   William    Bateman, 
Captain,  R.N. 

B   2 


CIVIL   HISTORY,   1714-1762. 


[1714-1762. 


Xov. 
Dec. 

Jan. 

Mav 


EXTKA  COMMISSIOXKHS.  June          1754.  Arthur     Scott,     Captain, 

Isaac  Townesend,  Captain,  R.X. 

K.N.  Xov.          1755.  Thomas  Cooper,  Captain, 

Lawrence    Wright,    Ca]>-  B.X. 

tain,  R.N.  Jftn-          1701.  Thomas    Hanway,    Cap- 

1714.  John  Fawler.  tain,  R.N. 

1717.  Thomas  Colby.  Portsmouth  : — • 

1727.  Sir  George  Saunders,  Kt.,  N(1V           im    ]S!lacTowl,eseml,  Captain, 

R.N. 


Captain,  H.X. 


1729.  Sir  Isaac  Townesend,  Kt.,      Mav          172!I.  Richard       Hughes      (1), 
Captain,  R.X.  Captain,  R.N. 

1  T'JI        !>..! .    IJ ' 


May          1731.  Robert  Byng. 
May         1732.  Lord  Yere  Beauclerk,  Cap- 
tain, H.X. 

May          1738.  George  Crowle. 

Mar.          1740.  Francis  Gasliry. 

A]iril  (1,  1743.  James  Compton,  Captain, 
R.X. 

April  (1,  1743.  Alexander  Geddes,  Cap- 
tain, R.X. 

Jan.  1744.  James  Oswald. 

May  1741!.  Kdward  Falkingham  (.1), 
Captain,  H.X. 

July  1717.  John  Russell. 

Feb.  1755.  Thomas  Cooper,  Captain, 

H.X. 

Xov.          1755.   Arthur     Scott,     Captain, 

Mar.  175(1.  Digby  Dent  (2),  Cap- 

tain, R.N. 

May  175(1.  I  Inn.  William  Mateman, 

Captain,  H.X. 

Dec.  175(1.  Dighy  Dent  (2),  Captain, 

Ii.X.  (again). 

Jan.  17(11.   Kdward  Mason. 

Mar.  17(11.  Sir  Richard  Temple. 

Mar.  1701.  Sir  John  Bentley,  Cap- 

tain, H.X. 

COMMISSION KIIS   AT  ll.M.  Do<  K- 

YAIIDS,    inv. 


1754.  Richard       Hughes      (2), 
Captain,     H.N.     (Bart. 
1773). 
Plymouth  : — 

Xov.  1714.  Sir  William  Jumper,  Kt., 
Captain,  H.X. 

Mar.  1715.  Thomas  Swanton,  Cap- 
tain, H.X. 

Julv  171(1.  Francis  Dove,  Captain, 
R.X. 

April  172(1.  Sir  Nicholas  Trevanion, 
Kt.,  Captain,  H.N. 

Dec.  !i,  1737.  Matthew  Norris,  Captain, 
H.X. 

Jan.  17:!!i.   Philip  Yanbriigh,  Captain, 

R.X. 

Oct.  1753.  Frederick  Rogers, Captain, 
H.X.  (Ban.  1773). 

flrjiffnril  unit   }\'i,cl in'rh  '  :-  - 

Henry  (ireenhill. 

May  20,  174  I.  Thomas  Whorwood,  Cap- 
tain, H.X. 

Jan.  1715.  Kdward  Falkingham  (1), 

Captain,  H.X. 

May  1740.  James  Compton,  Captain, 
R.N. 

Dec.  1717.  William  Davies,  Captain, 

R.X. 


Xov. 
Mar. 
July 

Ajiril 


171!    James    Littlet Captain  Dec.    1O,  1742.  Kdward   Falkingham   (1), 

and  Hear-Adiniral.  Captain,  H.X. 

1722.  Thomas         Kemptlu.rne,  June  2H,  1744.  Thomas  Trefusis,  Captain, 

Captain,  1!.X.  l',.\. 

173U.  Thomas    Mathews,    Caj)-  Feb.    25,  1747.  John      To  wry,     Captain, 

tain,  H.X.  K.X. 

1742.  Charles   Brown,   Captain,  June  22,  175(1.  Charles    Colby,    Captain 

1!-*-  R.N. 


after 


1  The  business  of  these  Yards  was  conducted  by  the  Commissioners  in  London, 
r  the  death  of  Captain  Davies  on  February  10th,  175'J. 


1714-1762.] 


THE  NAVY  ESTIMATES. 


The  following  statement  of  the  sums  annually  voted  by  Parlia- 
ment for  the  "  extra  "  and  for  the  "  ordinary "  expenses  of  the 
Eoyal  Navy,  and  of  the  number  of  seamen  and  Marines  authorised 
for  each  year,  is  taken  from  Derrick's  '  Memoirs  of  the  Eise  and 
Progress  of  the  Koyal  Navy.'-1  It  should  be  explained  that  the 
money  voted  under  the  head  of  "extra,"  was  almost  invariably 
used  for  building  or  repairing  ships,  for  providing  furniture  and 
stores  for  such  vessels,  or  for  improving  the  Koyal  Dockyards  ;  but 
that,  occasionally,  portions  of  the  money  were  employed  for  the 
replenishment  of  the  supplies  of  hemp,  timber,  etc.,  when  the 
quantities  in  hand  happened  to  be  low,  and  for  other  special 
services  : — 


Year. 

Extra. 

Ordinary. 

No.  of  Seamen 
and  Marines.' 

Year. 

Extra.              Ordinary 

Xu.  of  Seamen 
ami  Marines.  1 

£ 

S. 

£                         £ 

1715 

237,277 

233,47] 

(((Oio,ooo 

1(6)  16,000 

171(1 

222,1181) 
11)1).  701 

12,000 
35  ,(ioo 

1716 

230,623 

233,841) 

10,000 

1711 

184,111)1 

4(),ooO 

1717 

200,761 

226,71)1) 

10,000 

1742 

188,7511 

40,000 

1718 

165,.  ",17 

224,857 

lo,  0(  )() 

174", 

188.558 

40,000 

171!) 

88,4!)4 

212,638 

13,500 

1744 

11)2,834 

lo,ooo 

1720 

71),  72:; 

217,1118 

l:!,5(>0 

1745 

2oi),47'J 

4o  ,  (  u  ii  ) 

1721 

50,200 

2111,04!) 

10,000 

1746 

11)8,048 

4o,ooo 

1722 

218,7!!!) 

7  ,  ooo 

1747 

1!I6,25!) 

40,000 

1723 

216,388 

10,00(1 

1748 

1  18  ,  827 

40,000 

1724 

214.622 

lo,ooo 

174!) 

85  ,  878 

I7,ooo 

1725 

214,21)5 

1  u  ,  (  101  i 

1  75(  i 

1H7,  811(1      1 

1)3,1125 

lo,ooo 

1726 

212,181 

lo  'oOO 

1751 

140,257      1 

HO,  302 

8  ,  1  K)l  ) 

1727 

11111,071 

L'O  ,  1  «  K  1 

1752 

100,000       •_ 

77,718 

1  0  ,  ooo 

1728 

205,5(11 

15,000 

1753 

80,  2(1(1 

1  0  ,  (  II  K  ) 

172!) 

206,025 

1  5  ,  (  K  II  ) 

1  754 

1(111,  OOO       '_ 

1  8  ,  1  4  1 

1O,OOO 

1730 

120,  (118 

213,1(18 

1O,  III  III 

I  755 

Kill.  (II  HI         1 

81  )  .  288 

12,OOO 

1731 

212,034 

It  1,  (II  III 

1756 

LOI  ),()()()      L 

11),  021 

"it  )  ,  OOO 

1732 

60,000 

212,885 

8  ,  1  >00 

1757 

LOO,  OOO       1 

23,!i:i!) 

55,OO() 

1733 

101,003 

211,4115 

8  ,  (  K)l  ) 

1758 

LI  10  ,OOO 

21,  121 

(10,  OOO 

1734 

202,670 

20,000 

1751) 

LOO,  ooo     i 

38,41)1 

110,000 

1735 

11)8,  !)14 

30,000 

1760 

LOO,  ()!K) 

32,62!) 

70,000 

1736 

3D,  167 

217,2(111 

1  5  ,  <  K)(  ) 

17HI 

LOO,  000 

58  ,  624 

70,000 

1737 

of)  ,  OOI  ) 

2111,201 

10,000 

1762 

LOO,  ODD      L72,226 

70,000 

1738 

40,000 

222,885 

j'(V)  10,000 
\  (020,000 

i  The  cost  of  these  was  in  addition  to  the  sums  specified  in  the  "  Extra  "  and  '  •  Ordinary  "  columns, 
(a)  Number  to  Midsummer,    (d)  Number  from  Midsummer  to  December  31st.    (c)  Number  to  April  10th. 
t;ii)  Number  from  April  loth  to  December  31st. 

For  several  years  after  the  death  of  Queen  Anne,  the  number  of 
ships  belonging  to  the  Eoyal  Navy  showed  no  increase,  but  rather 
a  slight  diminution.  Nevertheless  there  was,  even  in  those  days, 
an  increase  in  the  total  tonnage.  But,  from  the  death  of  George  I. 

1  4to.     London,  1806. 


CIVIL  msTonr,  1714-1762. 


[1714-1762. 


onwards,  the  Navy  grew  enormously  There  was  no  tendency  to 
add  to  the  number  of  the  first  and  second  rates— vessels  which 
were  only  useful  for  special  purposes,  and  which,  as  late  as  the 
middle  of  the  eighteenth  century,1  it  was  customary  to  lay  up 
every  winter.  Of  the  third,  fifth,  and  sixth  rates,  and  of  the 
sloops,  on  the  other  hand,  increasingly  greater  numbers  were  built. 
The  third  rates  were  the  vessels  which  experience  showed  to  be, 
upon  the  whole,  most  serviceable  for  the  line-of-battle.  The  fifth 
and  sixth  rates  were  the  ships  with  which  the  country  found  it 
could  best  deal  with  the  enemy's  cruisers ;  and  the  sloops  were 


•nil:  i'i:i:xrn   Im'ini-H 

Tuba  I'll    l'i,-i-Ailiinr,il  Ai 


.  1717. 
it'nnn  1/jc  tlrtiu'iuijx  hi/ 


TIIK    SPANISH     (i/i)-,-iosti,    71. 
Takfn  lii/  tin   Kussell.  sil,  1747. 


the  natural  foes  of  small  privateers,  and  the  natural  agents  for 
the  general  policing  of  the  seas.  That  the  number  of  fourth  rates 
did  not  increase  is  attributable  to  the  gradual  discovery  of  the 
fact  that  fifty  and  sixty-gun  ships,  while  too  small  and  light  for 
the  line-of-battle,  were  too  large  and  heavy  for  ordinary  cruising 
purposes.  They  continued  to  be  built  in  small  numbers,  chiefly 
because  they  were  suitable  craft  for  service  in  the  colonies,  and,  as 
flagships,  on  the  less  important  stations,  in  war,  and  almost  every- 
where in  peace ;  and,  because  they  continued  to  be  built,  they 
occasionally  found  their  way  into  the  line-of-battle.  But  occupying, 

1  Vernon's  correni>ondence  with  the  Admiralty  in   1745  is  full  of  references  to  the 
danger  of  keeping  three-deckers  at  sea  during  the  winter  months. 


1714-17G2.] 


STRENGTH   OF   THE  FLEET. 


as  they  did,  an  intermediate  position  between  the  line-of-battleships 
and  the  regular  cruisers,  and  belonging  positively  to  neither,  their 
value  was  limited  in  both  directions. 

The  "  state"  of  the  fleet  at  four  different  dates  during  the  period 
now  under  review  is  given  below  : — 


Death  of 

Deatl.  of 

Death  of 

Queen  Anne. 
Aug.  12th,  1714. 

George  I. 
June  loth,  1727. 

Dec.  31st,  17E2. 

George  II. 
Dct.  25th,  1760. 

KATES  on  CLASSES. 





- 



\o 

linrthcn 

Hnrthen 

^-         Hurthen 

..         lilirthen 

Tons. 

Tons. 

TOMS. 

Tom. 

First-rates,  100  guns  . 

7 

11,703 

i 

12,945 

5  |       9,002 

5          9,958 

Second-rates,  84  to  90  puns  . 

13 

19,323 

13 

20,125 

13        21,250 

13        22.  8-25 

Third-rates,  04  to  80  guns     . 

42 

47,708 

40 

47,958 

47        05,277 

74      109,49-1 

Fourth-rates,  50  '  to  UO  guns. 

09 

51,379 

04 

50,754 

07        09,155 

;:;      07,901 

Ships  of  the  line,  or  of  50  <runs| 
and  upwards      .      .      .      .  i    ' 

130,173 

121 

131,782 

132      105,281  1 

~>5      210,177 

Fifth-rates.  30  to  44  irnns     .      42        19,830 

27 

15,1105 

39         28,813 

•4        39,173 

Sixth-rates,  10  s  to  80  guns  .     25         0,031 

•>'- 

9,700 

39          19,129 

;i         31,018 

Sloops,  8  to  20  guns    ...         7              8(19 
Bombs    I               597 

13 

1.39H 
417 

34         8,o:;o 
1   ,        1.1(14 

Vi        12,  S.V.I 
It          4,117 

Fireshij>s     ...                          1              ^O'i 

•  i 

I  057 

8          •'  3'i7 

Busses  

Storeships  1               .">I(I 

1 

540 

1              078 

''           1    Vvl 

Hospital  ships  

| 

53'' 

3          ''.791 

Yachts  ].",           1   ,r)"l 

1" 

1    37S 

Hi          1,195 

!•'           1.518 

Hoys,  lighters,  transports      .      13         1,009 

14 

1,210 

23          2,037 

!3  i       2,701 

Hulks    

8          5,774 

9 

7,719 

9  |       8,048 

12        11,957 

Ships   under  the  line,  or   of 
less  than  50  guns    .      .      .  I 

Total  ships  of  all  classes 


110  i     37,040109  ;     39,0-8(1  159 
247      107,219233      17(1,802291 


09,040257  i  110,927 
234.924412      321,101 


'  The  50-Buu  ships  were  not  counted  as  of  the  liue-nf-battlo  alter  about  1756. 

-  Most  ships  of  ninler  'JO  guns  were  conute.l  as  sloojis,  /.t'.,  Commanders'  toinmniuls,  after  almut  ITTii). 

The  Seven  Years'  War  (175G-17(i'2)  saw  the  introduction  to  the 
service  of  a  class  of  vessel  which,  for  nearly  a  hundred  years  after- 
wards, was  of  the  highest  value.  This  was  the  regular  frigate, 
built  to  cruise  at  good  speed,  and  carrying  a  reasonably  heavy 
armament  on  one  deck.  There  had  previously  been  no  vessels 
that  thoroughly  fulfilled  this  ideal.  The  forty-four,  and  even  the 
forty-gun  ships  of  an  earlier  date  were  cramped  two-deckers  ;  and 
below  them,  until  after  1745,  there  was  nothing  more  formidable 
than  the  wretched  twenty-gun  ship,  carrying  nine-pounders  as  hex- 
heaviest  weapons.  Genuine  frigates,  mounting  twenty-eight  guns, 
began  to  be  built  about  1748  ;  but  still  no  larger  gun  than  the  nine- 
pounder  found  a  place  in  them.  The  twelve-pounder  thirty-two- 
gun  frigate  appeared  at  about  the  same  time,  the  earliest  examples 


8 


CIVIL    HISTORY,    1714-17G2. 


[1714-1762. 


being  the  Adventure  (1741),  and  Diana,  Juno,  Southampton,  and 
Vestal  (1757).  Then  came  the  twelve-pounder  thirty-six-gun  frigates, 
the  best  British  fighting  cruisers  of  the  days  before  the  accession  of 
George  III.  The  first  of  these,  the  Pallas  and  the  Brilliant,  were 
built  under  the  superintendence  of  Sir  Thomas  Slade  in  1757.  Yet 
even  they  were  inferior  to  thirty-six-gun  frigates  which  were  in 
possession  of  the  French  at  about  the  same  time.  In  a  table 
given  hereafter,  the  student  will  find  materials  for  comparing  the 
British  Brilliant,  3(5,  of  1757  with  the  French  An  rare,  which  was 
captured  from  her  original  owners  in  1758,  and  added  to  the  Royal 
Navy  as  the  Aurora,  36. 


TIIK   Trrrililr  71.     TAKKN  I-MIOM  TIM-:  ri;i:M n,   1717. 
If'niui  a  ilruiriii'i  Inj  Juli/i  Clinriiiifk.t 

The  first  halt'  of  the  eighteenth  century  witnessed  repeated 
efforts  to  establish  unvarying  standards  of  si/.e,  tonnage,  and 
armament  for  each  of  the  classes  of  men-of-war  then  in  most 
general  use.  At  least  two  of  these  efforts — those  of  1719  and 
of  1745 — met  with  considerable  success  ;  and  the  rules  tentatively 
adopted  in  each  of  those  years  were  for  some  time  largely,  though 
not  exclusively,  adhered  to  in  the  construction  of  ships.  But  it  was 
probably  discovered  that  to  aim  at  rigorous  uniformity  was  to  check 
improvement ;  and,  after  about  the  year  1755,  all  efforts  in  this 
direction  were  wisely  relinquished.  Seeing,  however,  that  many 
vessels  were  built  according  to  these  successive  "establishments," 


1714-1762.] 


ESTABLISHMENTS  AND   SATES. 


it  may  not  be  deemed  improper  to  give  here  some  particulars  of 
them  : — 


°JL 

No.  of  guns  .... 

Three-deckers. 

Two-deckers. 

24         20 

93 
100  i  and      '   80 
90 

I         | 
74        70        64        60          53 

44          40 

Established  Dimensions. 

1719 

Length  on  gundeck,  ft.  ill. 
Length  of   keel   fur   ton  1 
uage,l  ft.  in               .       ] 

174  0    164     0  158     0 
140  7     132     5  128     2 

50  0      47     2    44     (i 
20  0       18  10    IS     2 
1869      1566      1350 

..     151      0     ..     144     0  134  0 
..     123     2     ..     117     7  109  8 

.  .       41      6     .  .       39     0    36  0 
17     4     ..       16     5    15  2 
1128        ..          9J1       755 

..       124  0 
101  8 

33  2 
14  0 

534 

.  .     106   0 
.  .       87   9 

.  .       28  4 
92 
.  .       374 

Breadth,  extreme,  ft.  in.  . 
Depth  in  hold.  It.  ill.   .      . 
Hurthen  in  tons 

1733 

Length  on  gundeck,  ft.  in. 
Length    of   keel  for  ton-l 
nage.  ft.  in  f 

174  0    166     0  158     0 
140  7     134     1  127     8 

50  IJ      47     9    45     5 
20  6      11)     6    18     7 
1»69   i   1623      1400 

.  .     151      0     .  .     144      0  134  0 
..     122     0     ..     llli     4108  3 

..       43      5     .  .       41      5     38   6 
17     9     ..       16  11     15  9 
1224        ..        1008       853 

124   0 
100   3 

35  8 
14   0 

678 

.  .     106  0 
.  .       85  8 

.  .       30  6 
95 

.  .       421) 

Breadth,  extreme,  ft.  in.  . 
Depth  in  hold,  ft.  in.   .     . 
Burthen  in  tuns 

1741 

Length  cm  gundeck,  ft.  in. 
Length  of   keel  for    ton-; 
nage,  ft.  in  j 

175  0    KH     0  161     0 

142   4     137      0  130   10 

..     154     0     ..     147      0  140  0 

..     125     5     ..     ll'.l     9  113  9 

44      0     ..       42     0     -10  0 
..        IK    11     ..        IS      1     17   -2i 
12'.ll        ..        1123         968 

1  20   0 

102  i; 

:iil  n 

15   5*       .. 
700 

.  .     112  0 
91    fi 

.  .       32   1) 
110 
.  .       4'JS 

Depth  in  hold,  ft.  in.   .      . 
Burthen  in  tons 

21   0       211     2     19     4 
1892       11179       1472 

1745 

1 

Length  on  giimlcck,  ft.  in. 
Length  of    keel   for    ton-, 
nage,  ft.  in  J 

178   0     1711     0  105      0 
144   f,t  138     4  131   10| 

.  .     100      0     .  .     I",!)     0  144   0 
..     131      4     ..     123   Hi  117   8j 

..       4.-J     0     ..       42     8    41   0 
..    ,    111     4     .  .        1<      0     17   8 
..    '    1411        ..        1191        1052 

133   0          ..     113  I) 
III"    HI        ..        93  4 

:{7   11          .  .       32  0 
111    II           ..         11    0 
SU          ..        5118 

Depth  in  hold,  ft.  in.   .      . 

21   (i       20     0    20     0 
2000       1730          1535 

Hurthen  in  tons 

lj 

1719 
1733 
1741 
1745 

Complement  of  men 

780       <;st>        r>2o 

sTill         750           COO 
850         7"»0           tillll 
850         7f)0            Ix'tO 

440       .  .          3115         2*0 
4MI        .  .          400         1100 
4*0        .  .          4011         3110 
tlnil       520       47(1       4211         3."iO 

lllll 
2."ill 
2"tU 
280            ..         1 

Kill 
140 
110 

( Muskets,  bayonets,  curt- 1 
1  ridge- boxes  .  .  .  .  t 

I'.iirs  of  pi>t..ls  .... 

I'ole-axes  (boanliiig-axps) 

Swords  (cutlasses)  with  i 
belts / 

Hand  gr  mules  .... 

f  Weight  of  bower  anchurs,) 

I      cwts I 

Weiglit  uf  bower  antliurs, , 
cuts | 

/Diameter  of  Ixirtcr  cables,) 

t     in / 

(Diameter  of  bower  cables,  | 


r:u 

40 


IS -5 
•2(1 


i  In  1719  tlic  method  of  determining  the  length  of  keel  for  tonnage,  ami  the  rule  for  computing  tonnage,  were 
settled  by  the  Lords  of  the  Admiralty  as  follows:— 

"  On  a  straight  Hue  with  the  lower  part  of  the  rabbit  of  the  keel  erect  a  perpendicular  or  square  line  to  the 
upper  edge  of  the  wing  transom,  at  the  afterpart  of  the  plank  ;  and,  at  the  stem,  10  the  forepart  of  the  plank  at 
;.">•  part  of  the  height  of  the  wing  transom.  The  length  between  the  saiil  perpendiculars,  adde  I  to  .,',»'  of  the 
extreme  breadth  (allowing  for  the  stern  and  stern  post  without:  the  rabbit),  from  which  subtract  ;'.'!"  of  the 
height  of  the  wing  transom  for  the  rake  abaft,  and  also  ;"'«  of  ti.e  main  breadth  for  the  rake  afore,  leaves 
the  length  of  the  keel  for  tonnage.  Multiply  this  by  thj  breadth,  ami  the  product  by  half  the  breadth,  and 
divide  by  94.  The  result  gives  the  tonnage." 

A  simpler  and  more  commonly-used  method,  both  before  and  after  the  official  adoption  of  the  above  Mghly- 
conventional  formula,  was:  to  multiply  the  length  of  the  keel  into  the  extreme  breadth  of  the  ship  within-board, 
taken  along  the  midship  beam,  and  to  multiply  the  product  by  the  depth  of  the  hold  from  the  plank  joining  to  the 
keelson  upwards  to  the  main  deck  ;  and  to  divide  the  last  product  by  94.  The  result  gave  the  burtheu  iu  tuns. 
See  Derrick;  •  Merns.  of  the  Roy.  Xavy,'301;  Falconer, '  Diet,  of  the  Marine';  Willett,  in  '  Archicologia,' ii.  154. 
The  last  erroneously  says  that  the  number  to  be  divided  by  was  96. 

The  establishments  of  1733  and  1741  were  proposed,  but  never 


10 


CIVIL   HISTORY,   1714-1762. 


[1714-170-'. 


officially  adopted.  Many  ships  were  nevertheless  built  in  accord- 
ance with  them. 

The  establishment  of  1745  was  generally  adhered  to  for  about 
ten  years.  There  was  never  afterwards  any  regular  establishment 
so  far  as  dimensions  were  concerned. 

The  mode  in  which  these  and  other  vessels  of  the  period  were 
armed  can  be  seen  at  a  glance  on  reference  to  the  tables  on  the 
following  pages. 

Although  practically  all  the  ships  of  the  Navy  were  armed  ac- 
cording to  a  regular  "establishment"  as  thus  indicated,  many  vessels 
were  built  upon  lines  which  differed  from  any  of  the  "  establish- 
ments "  for  dimensions  and  tonnage  ;  and  it  is  therefore  well  to  give 
particulars  of  a  few  craft,  both  British  built  ships  and  prix.es  taken 
from  the  enemy  and  added  to  the  service,  which  may  be  regarded 
either  as  typical  specimens  of  the  best  home  constructions  of  the 
time,  or  as  models,  the  capture  of  which  drew  the  attention  of 
British  constructors  to  points  wherein  foreign  designers  excelled 
them.  These  will  lie  found  on  page  \-2. 

The  estimated  cost  of  building  and  equipping  a  ship  of  each  of 
the  principal  classes,  and  of  storing  her  with  eight  months'  boat- 
swain's and  carpenter's  stores,  according  to  the  Navy  .Board  Regula- 
tions, was,  in  171'.),  17.'W,  and  1741  respectively: — 


I71D 

173.", 

1711 

HATE. 

Uuxa. 

(  '(  is  r 

or 

Tutal 

(osr  OF 
1  utal 

fl.ST 

OF 

Total 

ii 

Ma- 

nil. 
t-  and 

anil 

rpady 

Masts  anil       anil         /''.-uly 

Hull, 
Masts  anil 

anil 

Cost 

ready 

Yar.ls. 

M'irrs. 

fur  Spa. 

^ 

anls.         Stores.      ' 

Yards. 

Slurps. 

fur  Sea. 

£ 

£ 

£ 

£                 £ 

£ 

£ 

£ 

£ 

1 

Inn 

3'* 

7n7 

7,470 

40,183 

"i" 

,725    7,1)57    4(1,082 

•!3,lln 

8  .  1  )5(  > 

11  ,151 

II 

00 

20, 

022 

0,201 

32,880 

27 

,51)1    0,81)7 

34,488 

28,543 

7,1.  ".5 

35,078 

III 

81) 

21, 

1)37 

5  ,  400 

27,337 

99 

,750    5,1)50 

28,701) 

23,1)20 

0,250 

30,170 

7O 

IT, 

2(  )2 

4,512 

21,714 

18 

,000    5,202 

23  ,  808 

11),  087 

5,488 

25,175 

IV 

on 

14, 

027 

3,804 

17,831 

15 

,753    4,53!) 

20,2112 

10,504 

4,780 

21,350 

50 

I", 

11)2 

3,020 

13,212 

11 

,75.",    3,025 

15,14c 

13,004 

4,117 

17,185 

V 

40 

0, 

355 

2,350 

8,731 

7 

,254    2,881 

10,135 

7  ,554 

3,  on:! 

10,557 

VI 

20 

'•>, 

210 

1,41)0 

4,712 

3 

,08!l    1,823 

5,512 

4,282 

2,117 

0,31)1) 

Many  improvements  which  increased  the  material  efficiency  of 
the  Eoyal  Navy  were  made  in  the  period  1714-1762.  One  of  these 
was  the  invention  of  the  reflecting  quadrant,  an  invention  usually 
associated  with  the  name  of  Doctor  Hadley,  and  introduced  by  him 


1714-1702.] 


GUNS. 


11 


PARTICULARS  OF  SERVICE  GUNS  (ESTABLISHMENT  OF  1743).1 


NATURE.'               Length. 

Weight. 

Calibre.     - 
Proof. 

CHARGES. 
Service.       Saint 

ng- 

Scaling. 

Windage 
Allow- 
ance. 

Ft. 

In. 

Cwfc 

In.          Lb.    oz. 

I.b.    oz.       Lb. 

oz. 

Lb.     oz. 

In. 

42-pounder 

10 

0 

66 

7-  03        25     0 

17      0       11 

4 

3       4 

•35 

32-pounder 

9 

(i 

55 

(i-43    '    21     8 

14      0   |      it 

4 

2     12 

•33 

24-pounder  (a) 

9 

G 

50 

5-84        18     0 

11      1)         7 

0 

2       0 

•30 

(b) 

!) 

0 

4(5 

18-pounder  (a) 

!) 

(i 

42 

5-3         15    0 

!l"o         (i" 

0 

l"   8 

'  l/>7 

(6) 

8 

0 

30 

I'J-pounder  (a) 

9 

6 

•'10 

4-64       12"o 

60       4" 

12 

l"   0 

•24 

(6) 

9 

0 

32 

>  i 

W 

8 

6 

31 

0  -pounder  (a) 

9 

0 

28  •  5 

4:22          9"o 

4"8        4" 

0 

"l2 

•  >)*> 

(*) 

8 

c, 

27 

11 

;  »              *  * 

(c) 

8 

0 

26 

»  *               •  » 

(<*)    |     7 

i; 

24 

(0         7 

i) 

23 

6-pounder  («)        It 

it 

24  '  5 

:!-(>7         «"() 

.">      0         .", 

0 

8 

•19 

(6)        « 

i; 

'>>> 

•  > 

oo 

8 

0 

L'l 

>  '              ? 

(<0        7 

(i 

20 

,  ,              ii 

.  . 

W         7 

0 

1!) 

»  > 

(/)        'i 

6 

17 

4-pounder 

3'22         4   'o 

20         L' 

0 

(i 

•  is 

3-poumler      .        4 

6 

1 

2'!U           3     (» 

I      8         L 

S 

4 

•  14 

i-piiuiidcr3    .    !     3 

i; 

i  •:> 

1  •  1  i!  1                   S 

4 

4 

1 

i  From  Mountaine,  'Practical  Sea-Guoner's Companion,'  1747. 

-  The  reference  letters  in  this  column  refer  to  the  similar  letters  employe.  1  in  tlie  next  table  (Disposition  of  (lunsX 

3  These  were  swivels,  usually  mounU'il  on  the  bulwarks,  etc.,  ami  sometimes  rel'ci  n-il  to  as  patererues. 

DISPOSITION  OF  THE  GUNS  IN  THK  VAiuors  CLASSKS  OF  IL  ^F.  SHIPS,  17H!,  1743,  1757. 


*f  . 

Lo» 

er  Deck. 

Middle 
Deck. 

Uppe 

r  Heck. 

rr  i-—"- 

CLASSES  OF  SHIPS. 

||i 



- 

C2~ 

No 

I'rs. 

Xo. 

I'rs. 

So. 

I'rs. 

Xo. 

I'rs.      Xo. 

I'rs. 

loo 

guns. 

1710 

28 

(42    or 

1      32 

}^ 

24 

28 

12 

12 

0         4 

0 

.. 

„    

174:: 

28 

42 

28 

24  (n) 

28 

12  (.<) 

12 

0(c)    4 

6(a) 

42 

28 

24 

28 

12 

12 

0        4 

90 

„     (largo  class)  . 

1757 

28 

32 

30 

IS 

30 

12 

•_> 

:i 

„ 

(ordinary  class)  . 

1710 

20 

32 

20 

18 

20 

'.i 

10 

0        2 

o 

,, 

„              „ 

1741! 

20 

U>> 

20 

18  (a) 

20 

12  (ft) 

10 

0(«)    2 

o  <<•) 

,, 

„              „ 

]757 

20 

32 

20 

18 

20 

12 

10 

0        2 

0 

80 

,,     (large  class)  . 

1  757 

20 

32 

20 

18 

24 

11 

4 

(i 

„ 

,,     (ordinary  class)  . 

1710 

20 

32 

20 

12 

24 

0 

4 

0 

., 

'.                     n 

1741! 

20 

32 

26 

18  (ft) 

24 

9(o) 

4 

6W)    .. 

M 

»5                               1* 

1757 

20 

32 

20 

12 

24 

0 

4 

0 

74 

„     (large  class)  . 

1757 

28 

32 

30 

24 

12 

9        4 

II 

„ 

„     (ordinary  class)  . 

1757 

28 

32 

28 

18 

14 

9        4 

11 

70 

„    

1710 

20 

24 

26 

12 

14 

0        4 

i; 

,, 

„    

1757 

2S 

32 

28 

IS 

12 

9        2 

9 

(J4r 

1743 

'*(> 

32 

26 

18  (ft) 

10 

9  (<7)   2 

9  (ft) 

1757 

•"•o 

24 

26 

12 

10 

0        2 

i; 

60 

„     (largo  class)  . 

1757 

20 

24 

20 

12 

8 

0        2 

0 

„ 

„     (ordinary  class)  . 

1710 

24 

24 

26 

•I 

8 

6        2 

0 

„ 

M                           )'                        i< 

1757 

20 

21 

26 

12 

0 

0        2 

0 

,( 

„     (small  class)  . 

1757 

24 

24 

26 

9 

8 

0        2 

0 

58 

1743 

24 

24  (<0 

24 

12  (a) 

8 

Old)    2 

6  (ft) 

50 

„     (large  class)  . 

1757 

22 

—  i  yiiy 
24 

22 

12 

4 

\      S 

G       2 

6 

12 


CIVIL  HISTORY,   1714-1762. 
DISPOSITION  OF  THE  Guxs,  ETC. — continued. 


[1714-1 7C2. 


•si- 

Lower  Deik. 

Deck"        Upper  Deck.       ^^       Forecastle. 

CLASSES  OF  SHIPS. 

43g 

;-?  E 

No.      I'w. 

So.      1'rs.      No. 

1'rs.      No.      1'rs.     No.    1'rs. 

50  guns  (ordinary  class)  . 

1710 
1743 

22        18 
22    24  (I) 

..      22 
.  .       22 

9       4        G     i  2       6 
12  (c)     4      6(e)   2      0  (c) 

1757 

22         18 

.  .      22 

9        4020 

44      „     (larfie  class)  . 

1757 

20         18 

.  .      22 

9      ..         ..2        6 

„     (ordinary  class)  . 

1743 

20    18(fc) 

.  .      20 

9  (f)      4     0  (/)..- 

1757 

20        18 

.  .      20 

9      .  .         .  .      4        0 

40 

1710 

20         12 

.  .      20 

6      '      •• 

30 

1  757 

.  .      20 

12        8        0       2        0 

32      

1757 

12       4        0        2        0 

30 

1~  10 

8          9 

.  .      20 

0       2        4       .... 

28 

1757 

.  .      24 

9       4        3 

24 

1757 

''      9  l» 

.  .      20 

9(e)      2        3 

20 

—             '       \       ) 

.  .      20 

0      

1743 

.  .      20 

9       

1757 

.  .      20 

9       

14      ..     (ship-rigged) 

1757 

.  .       14 

0       

12     .. 

1757 

..       12 

4       

10       .. 

1757 

..       10 

4       

8 

1757 

8 

3       

TYPICAL 

SHIPS  OF  WAIC,  1714-1702. 

1.  flit-til  .if 

hut.  .if 
S|IM'-                       .      Launch 

X. 

I)e"k 

It. 

,111.      lii'i'ih.   i'1,"1,',',!!'"      Win-re,  iin.l  by  whom  Huill. 

It.    ill. 
Hoijal  Sovereign    loo     1728    175    o 

ft.     in.    it. 
40     7    50 

in.    ft.    in. 
3120     1      18S3     Chatham,  J.  liosewcll. 

litiyiil  George    .    loo     1750    178    o 

43     51  51 

9121     0     204 

7      Woolwich,  ,1.  Pownall. 

Hiirllair      '.      .       90      1710    103     0 

31      9    47 

3"  18     0      15() 

5      Deptford. 

Bhnhtim     .      .      911      1701    170     1 

42     3    19 

1    21      0       182 

7      Woolwich.  J.  I'ownall. 

Cornwall      .      .      so      1720    1 

•>8      0 

28     2    41 

(i    18     2       1350      Pepllord. 

Prinrett  Amelia      SO      1757    105     0 

33     II     17 

3    20     0      157 

.1       Woolwich.  .1.  I'ownall. 

Jurinriblf     .      .       71    *1747    1 

71     3 

39     0149 

3    21      3        7! 

3    Taken  from  the  French. 

Terrible.      .      .      74    *  1747    104     1 

33   if  47 

3    20     71      5! 

0    Taken  from  the  French. 

Mart      ...       74       1759    105     (J 

31     4     10 

3    19     9"       550      Woolwich.  .1.  I'ownall. 

Priucftii       .      .       70    *174()    105     1 

30     3    49 

8    22     3        71 

9    Taken  from  the  Spaniards. 

MiHuiiiiiitli    .      .       70      1742    151      0 

23     2    43 

5    17     9        22 

5      Dcptford. 

Diirnflrhirr  .      .       7(1      1757    102     0 

34     4JJ44 

10    19     8         130      Portsmouth.  K.  Allen. 

Captain.      .      .       01       1743    1 

51     o 

22     0    43 

0    17     9        230      Woolwich.  J.  Holland. 

Plymouth     .      .       00      1722    111      7 

IS     0    39 

0    10     5        954      Chatham. 

Jd'/Htn     .      .      .       00      1758    1 

55     5 

28     (1    12 

7    18     7      124 

2      Woolwich.  J.  Pownall. 

Conquistador    .      00    *17'J2    155     9 

28     0    43 

3    111     3      127 

8    Taken  from  theSpaniards. 

Orford  .      .      .      50      1727    1 

34     0 

109   10    30 

3    15     2        70"      Portsmouth. 

Roiuney  .      .      .      50      1752    110     li 

120     8130 

41  17     2      1040      Woolwich,  .J.  Harris. 

Lmllow  Cattli-  .      44      1744    120  10g 

103     8"  30 

'A    15     51      725      Thames. 

Plitx/tix  ...      44      1759    140     9 

110  10J37 

IjjlO     o"      850      Thames.  M.  liatson. 

lirilliant     .      .      30      1757    128     4 

100     2-35 

8    12     4  i     718      I'lvinonth. 

Aurora  .      .      .      30    "1758    144     o 

118     9    3S 

8J15    2       940   *  Taken  from  the  French, 

Juno      ...      32      1757    1 

27  10 

107     0434 

3"  11    10        007      ThameH,  Alexander. 

Cnsrent.      .      .      32    *175S    1 

30     5 

107     0$35 

9   11     2       731    "Taken  from  the  French. 

Corentrij      .      .       28      1757    118     4j 

97     01  34 

OJ  10     0        599      Beaulicu,  H.  Adams. 

IMltkiu.      .      .      24      1751    113     0 

93     4"  32 

1    11     0        511       Woolwich,  Fellowes. 

Gibraltar    .      .      20      175ii    107     8J 

88     0    30 

498        430      IJeanlieii,  H;  Adams. 

Scorpion      .      .      14      1740 

91     2 

74   11£20 

4    12     0        270      Jieaulieu. 

Furnace,  bomb.      14      1740 

91     0 

73  11J26 

4    11     0        27 

3      Thames. 

Terror,  bomb    .        8      1759 

91     0 

74     Ij27 

8    12     1        301       Harwich,  Barnard. 

Prineeu  Aui/ufta    vt.     1710 

73     8 

57     7J  22 

OJ    9     0        155      Deptford,  J.  Allen. 

lioyal  Charlotte      yt.     1749 

90     0 

72     2J  24 

7    11      0        2: 

2      Deptford.  J.  Holland. 

1701.] 


HARRISON'S    TIMEKEEPER. 


13 


about  1731.  But  after  Hadley's  death,  there  was  found  among  his 
papers  a  document  in  the  handwriting  of  Sir  Isaac  Newton,  con- 
taining a  drawing  and  description  of  an  instrument  somewhat 
similar  to  Hadley's  ;  so  that,  apparently,  the  credit  of  the  innova- 
tion should  be  divided  between  these  men  of  science,  if  not  given 
altogether  to  the  elder  of  them. 

The  efforts  which  had  been  made  under  Queen  Anne  to  induce 
inventors  to  turn  their  attention  to  the  perfection  of  methods  for 
discovering  the  longitude  at  sea,  were  continued  ;  and  in  1753  a  new 


IIADLKV  8  yUADBAXT. 
(Fniiil  Julill  Solnrtsun  i  '  Elr incut*  »/  Xuriiju timi.'   Linnluii,  174±> 

Act  was  passed  in  furtherance  of  the  desired  object.  In  1761  the 
Board  of  Longitude  decided  to  give  official  trial  to  the  timekeepers 
of  Mr.  Harrison,  a  watchmaker  who  had  produced  a  clock  or 
chronometer  of  unusual  accuracy  ;  and  at  the  instance  of  the  Board, 
the  Admiralty  placed  the  Deptford,  50,  Captain  Dudley  Digges,  at 
Mr.  Harrison's  disposal  for  the  purpose.  The  ship,  with  Harrison 
on  board,  sailed  from  Portsmouth  on  November  18th ;  and,  both  at 
Madeira  and  at  Jamaica,  it  was  found  that  the  timekeeper  which 
had  been  experimented  with  still  showed  the  correct  time.  From 
Jamaica,  Harrison  returned  to  England  in  the  Merlin,  14,  Captain 


14  CIVIL   HISTORY,   1714-1702.  '    [1755. 

Richard  Carteret.  On  March  '23rd,  1762,  the  Merlin  fell  in  with 
the  Essex,  64,  Captain  Alexander  Schornberg,  which  had  been  off 
Scilly  on  the  preceding  evening.  Her  reckoning  agreed  exactly  with 
that  of  the  timekeeper;  and  on  the  26th,  when  Harrison  reached 
Portsmouth,  he  found  that  his  instrument,  in  spite  of  much  shaking 
owing  to  bad  weather,  had  lost  only  1  minute  54  •  5  seconds  since  it 
had  left  England  more  than  four  months  earlier.  This  result  marked 
a  great  advance  upon  anything  that  had  been  attained  up  to  that  time. 

It  was  at  about  the  same  time  that  the  experiment  of  coppering 
ships'  bottoms  to  preserve  them  against  the  worm  was  first  officially 
tried  in  the  Navy.  In  1761,  the  Alarm,  32,  was  so  treated,  but, 
although  the  effect  was  found  to  be  satisfactory,  the  general 
introduction  of  the  improvement  was  impeded  for  several  years, 
owing  to  the  galvanic  action  which  was  set  up  between  the  copper 
and  the  iron  bolts  of  the  vessel's  hull,  and  to  the  evils  which  this 
action  wrought.  The  difficulty  was  ultimately  got  over  by  using 
only  copper  fastenings  in  the  under- water  portion  of  ships' 
hulls;  yet  it  was  not  until  1783  that  this  measure  of  precaution 
was  ordered  to  be  generally  adopted,  and,  until  then,  copper 
sheathing,  while  applied  to  specimens  of  every  class  of  ships, 
was  very  far  from  being  universal  in  the  service. 

To  encourage  home  manufactures,  it  was  enacted  in  1746  that 
every  ship  built  in  Great  Britain  or  in  the  American  colonies  should, 
when  first  prepared  for  sea,  be  provided  with  a  suit  of  sails  made  of 
cloth  woven  in  Great  Britain,  under  penalty  of  ±'50  ;  and  that  every 
sailmaker  in  Great  Britain  or  the  plantations  should,  upon  failing 
to  place  his  name  and  address  legibly  and  fully  upon  each  new  sail 
made  by  him,  be  fined  £10. 

After  the  burning  of  Kudyard's  wooden  tower  in  1755,  the 
lessees  of  the  Eddystone  Light,  by  the  advice  of  the  lioyal  Society, 
placed  the  work  of  constructing  a  new  lighthouse  in  the  hands  of 
John  Smeaton,  F.K.S.,  a  distinguished  engineer.  Smeaton  built 
his  tower  entirely  of  stone,  dovetailing  every  block  into  its  neigh- 
bours, and  so  making  the  column  practically  solid.  Operations  were 
begun  on  August  5th,  1756  ;  the  first  stone  was  formally  laid  on 
June  12th,  1757,  and  the  last  on  August  24th,  1759;  and  a  light 
from  twenty-four  candles,  weighing  five  to  two  pounds,1  was  shown 

1  Smeaton  invented  a  timepiece,  which  struck  a  single  blow  every  half  hour, 
and  so  warned  the  kee]>ers  to  snuff  these  candles.  The  original  now  belongs  to  the 
Corporation  of  Trinity  House. 


1731.]  KING'S  REGULATIONS  AND  ADMIRALTY  INSTRUCTIONS.    15 

from  the  rock  on  October  16th,  1759,  and  thenceforward  every  night 
until  1810,  when  the  candles  gave  place  to  oil  lamps  and  reflectors. 
Smeaton's  tower,  it  is  almost  needless  to  add,  remained  effective 
until,  in  1879-81,  owing  to  the  base  011  which  it  stood  having  been 
seriously  shaken  by  the  sea,  a  new  tower,  Douglass's,  had  to  be 
built  011  a  neighbouring  rock.  Part  of  Smeaton's  tower  was  there- 
upon removed,  and  reconstructed  on  Plymouth  Hoe. 

Several  other  lighthouses  which  were  in  their  day  triumphs  of 
engineering,  were  erected  during  the  first  half  of  the  eighteenth 
century.  One  of  the  best  known  towers,  that  on  the  island  of 
Skerries,  near  Holyhead,  dates  from  1730.  At  about  the  same  time, 
also,  lightships  began  to  be  placed  round  the  coasts.  The  one  first 
moored  in  English  waters  was  fitted  out  in  1731  by  Mr.  liobert 
Hamblin  for  the  Nore  Sand,  at  the  mouth  of  the  Thames  ;  the  next, 
in  1736,  by  Mr.  Daniel  Avery  for  the  Dudgeon  Shoal,  Norfolk. 

Until  1730,  every  commander-in-chief,  with  the  sanction  of  the 
Admiralty,  issued  his  own  code  of  instructions.  In  that  year  the 
volume  of  material  provided  by  the  accumulations  of  lapsed  codes 
was  in  some  measure  digested  ;  many  additional  instructions  were 
set  forth ;  the  principles  of  naval  usage  were  crystallised  ;  and 
in  1731  there  appeared  the  first  issue  of  '  The  King's  Regulations 
and  Admiralty  Instructions.'  This  book  has  since  been  revised  at 
intervals,  but  it  remains  in  substance  very  much  what  it  was  in 
1731,  and  most  of  the  important  alterations  that  have  been  made  in 
it  are  merely  such  as  have  been  necessary  to  bring  it  into  conformity 
with  modern  ideas  and  modern  conditions.1 

In  1717,  the  rate  of  pilotage  for  pilots  of  Deal,  Dover,  and 
Thanet,  taking  charge  of  ships  in  the  Thames  and  Medway,  was 
fixed  by  Act  of  Parliament  at  ten  shillings  per  foot  of  draught.  The 
Act  was  subsequently  amended  with  a  view  to  prevent  these  pilots, 
who,  of  coiirse,  possessed  exceptional  opportunities  for  smuggling, 
from  engaging  in  that  pursuit.  The  repression  of  smuggling,  indeed, 
was  a  burning  question  during  the  whole  of  the  period  now  under 
review,  and  especially  in  war  time.  The  smuggler,  besides  being  a 
professional  cheater  of  the  revenue,  was,  of  necessity,  a  man  of  lax 
patriotism  and  easy  conscience,  .and  one  whose  success  depended 
upon  his  maintenance  of  good  relations  with  both  sides  of  the 

1  '  The  King's  Regulations  and  Admiralty  Instructions '  contain,  as  it  were,  the 
civil  code  of  the  Navy.  The  penal  code  is  supplied  by  the  Naval  Discipline  Act. 
See  p.  17,  infra. 


16  CIVIL   HISTORY,   1714-1762.  [1745. 

Channel.  He  was,  consequently,  ever  available  as  a  spy.  The 
frequency  with  which  he  impeded,  and  sometimes  even  confounded, 
the  operations  of  the  Navy,  appears  in  the  correspondence  of  several 
of  the  flag-officers  of  the  time ;  and  there  is  very  little  doubt  that 
the  many  treacherous  betrayals,  which,  in  the  reigns  of  the  first  two 
Georges,  prevented  the  secret  carrying  out  of  naval  plans  and 
combinations,  were,  as  often  as  not,  attributed  to  grave  Jacobite 
and  French  sympathisers,  when  they  were  really  the  work  of 
persons  owning  no  more  serious  political  conviction  than  that  he 
who  paid  duty  was  a  fool.  There  are  several  pregnant  references 
to  this  subject  in  the  letters  of  Admiral  Edward  Vernon,  who  was 
in  command  in  the  Downs  at  the  time  of  the  young  Pretender's 
descent  in  1745.  Advocating  the  more  extensive  recruiting  of  the 
Navy  from  the  seaport  towns,  he  writes  of  men  who  "  are  now 
thought  to  be  principally  employed  in  the  ruin  of  their  country  by 
the  smuggling  trade,  and  as  daily  spies  to  give  the  enemy  intelligence 
of  our  proceedings,"  and  goes  on  to  say  : — 

•'  I  ciin't  but  think  it  a  seasonable  time  to  suggest  to  their  Lordships  that  there  are 
said  to  lie  in  this  town  of  Deal  not  less  than  two  hundred  able  young  men  and  seafaring 
people  who  are  known  to  have  no  visible  way  of  getting  a  living  but  by  the  infamous 
trade  of  smuggling,  many  keeping  a  horse  and  arms  to  be  ready  at  all  calls.  At  Dover, 
it  is  conjectured,  there  may  be  four  hundred:  at  Itamsgate  and  Folkestone,  three 
hundred  each.  And  it  is  said  that,  within  these  three  weeks,  no  less  than  nine  cutters 
at  a  time  have  gone  off  from  Folkestone  to  Boulogne;  and  it  is  conjectured  that,  from 
the  town  of  Folkestone  only,  a  thousand  pounds  a  week  is  run  over  to  Boulogne  in  the 
smuggling  way.  And,  about  six  or  seven  days  past,  a  Dover  cutter  landed  goods  in  the 
night  under  the  Castle,  that  was  carried  off  by  a  party  of  sixty  horse,  and  the  cutter 
supposed  to  have  done  it  came  into  Dover  pier  next  day;  and,  though  most  believed  it 
was  she,  no  one  proceeded  against  them  in  any  inquiry  about  it.  This  smuggling  has 
converted  those  employed  in  it,  first  from  honest,  industrious  fishermen,  to  lazy,  drunken, 
and  protligate  smugglers,  and  now  to  dangerous  spies  on  all  our  proceedings,  for  the 
enemy's  daily  information."  ' 

And  again  : — 

"Captain  Scott,  in  the  Badger,  is  just  returned  from  his  cruise  off  the  coast  of 
Sussex.  On  the  25th  of  last  month  he  was  informed  of  a  cutter  being  going  from 
Fairleigh  to  Boulogne  that  night;  but  she  was  gone  over  before  he  could  get  there. 
On  the  3rd  of  this  month,  he  got  sight  of  the  French  dogger  privateer,  and  chased  him, 
ami  neared  him  as  the  other  was  edging  down  to  get  to  leeward  of  him  ;  and,  when  he 
got  within  shot  of  him,  he  exchanged  some  guns  with  him;  but  the  other,  getting 
afore  the  wind  and  hoisting  her  studding  sails  as  the  night  was  coming  on,  he  soon  lost 
sight  of  him.  He  has  the  repute  there  of  being  a  confederate  with  the  smugglers,  and  a 
convoy  to  them.  I  send  you  enclosed  Captain  Scott's  day's  work,  when  he  seized  two 
of  the  smugglers'  boats,  in  which  you  have  the  names  of  the  two  reputed  notorious 

1  Letter  of  November  13th,  1745.     Letter  Book  in  Author's  Coll. 


1749]  THE  ARTICLES    OF   WAR.  17 

smugglers  they  belong  to  :  which  are  George  Harrison  and  Zebulon  Morphet ;  and  a 
copy  of  the  Collector  of  Customs'  certificate  that  they  are  reputed  as  such.  And  a 
little  before  that,  above  a  hundred  horse  had  been  upon  the  shore  to  carry  off  goods 
brought  by  another  cutter  ;  and,  by  all  accounts,  they  carry  on  as  great  an  intercourse 
with  the  French  now  as  they  did  in  time  of  profound  peace  with  them :  by  which  they 
are  undoubtedly  their  daily  spies  to  inform  them  of  all  our  proceedings.  I  am  informed 
there  are  lawyers  who  say,  as  the  laws  now  stand,  such  an  intercourse  with  his 
Majesty's  enemies  is  now  by  our  laws  high  treason  ;  and,  if  so,  I  should  think  we  want 
a  speedy  proclamation  to  inform  these  infamous  wretches  that  it  is  high  treason  ;  and 
they  shall  be  prosecuted  as  such ;  for,  surely,  no  nation  but  this  would  suffer  itself  to 
be  daily  betrayed  with  impunity." 

While  smuggling  and  smugglers'  treachery  at  home  engaged  the 
attention  of  the  authorities,  piracy  required,  once  more,  their 
energetic  interference  in  the  West  Indies ;  and  on  September  5th, 
1717,  a  proclamation  was  issued,  offering  a  pardon  for  piracies 
committed  before  January  5th,  1717,  to  all  such  pirates  as  should 
surrender  themselves  within  a  twelvemonth.  After  the  expiration 
of  that  period  of  grace,  a  reward  would  be  paid  to  any  of  his 
Majesty's  officers,  by  sea  or  land,  upon  the  legal  conviction  of  a 
pirate  taken  by  him.  The  rewards  promised  were  :  for  a  captain 
(master)  £100  ;  for  any  officer  from  a  lieutenant  down  to  a  gunner, 
£40 ;  for  any  inferior  officer,  £80.  Any  private  seaman  or  other  man 
who  should  deliver  up  a  pirate  captain  (master)  or  "commodore," 
would,  upon  the  offender's  conviction,  be  entitled  to  i'-200. 

In  1749,  there  was  brought  in  "a  Bill  for  amending,  explaining, 
and  reducing  into  one  Act  of  Parliament,  the  laws  relating  to  the 
Navy."  One  of  the  results  of  this  Bill,  had  it  been  passed  in  its 
original  form,  would  have  been  to  subject  officers  on  half-pay  to 
martial  law.  The  measure  was,  in  consequence,  strongly  opposed 
and  petitioned  against.  The  upshot  was  that  the  obnoxious  clauses 
were  deleted.  The  Bill  then  passed ;  all  older  laws  for  the  govern- 
ment of  the  Navy  were  repealed  ;  and,  in  place  of  them,  the  first 
regular  Articles  of  War l  were  established.  In  the  same  year,  another 
Act  authorised  the  Admiralty  for  the  first  time  to  grant  commissions 
to  flag-officers,  or  officers  commanding-in-chief,  to  assemble  courts- 
martial  in  foreign  parts. 

The  changes  and  alterations  which  more  intimately  affected  the 

1  This  was  the  Consolidation  Act  of  George  II.  22.  It  was  based  upon  the  Act  of 
13  Car.  II.  c.  9.  Being  found  to  be  too  stringent,  it  was  amended  in  19  Geo.  III. 
In  the  amended  form,  it  is  the  foundation  of  the  existing  Articles  of  War;  which,  in 
almost  exactly  their  present  guise,  date  from  1847.  The  proper  name  of  the  measure  is 
The  Naval  Discipline  Act.  It  receives  small  alterations  and  amendments  from  time 
to  time. 

VOL.    III.  c 


18  CIVIL  HISTORY,   1714-1762.  [1714-1762. 

personnel  of  the  Koyal  Navy  between  1714  and  1762,  were  numerous. 
The  more  important  of  those  relating  chiefly  or  exclusively  to  the 
seamen  may  be  first  noted. 

In  1735  an  Act l  appropriated  the  forfeited  Derwentwater  estates 
to  the  completion  and  support  of  Greenwich  Hospital,  and  extended 
the  benefits  of  the  Hospital  so  as  to  allow  maimed  merchant  seamen 
to  participate  more  fully  in  them.  A  little- later  two  naval  Acts  were 
passed.  One  was  for  procuring  a  better  supply  of  seamen  to  serve 
in  the  Navy ;  for  permitting  merchant  vessels  to  be  navigated  by 
foreign  seamen  in  a  proportion  not  exceeding  three-fourths  of  the 
crew ;  and  for  giving  the  right  of  naturalisation  to  such  foreigners, 
after  two  years'  service  in  British  ships.  The  other  was  to  prevent 
the  impressment  of  seamen  aged  fifty  and  upwards,  or  aged  less 
than  eighteen  ;  of  foreigners  serving  in  merchant  vessels  ;  of  sea 
apprentices  of  under  three  years'  service  ;  and  of  all  persons  under- 
going their  first  two  years'  service  at  sea.2  In  174U,  Mr.  Henry 
Pelham  brought  in  a  Bill  to  revive  the  system  of  registering  seamen  ; 
but,  it  being  violently  opposed,  he  withdrew  it.  In  1758,  another 
Bill,  lirought  in  by  Mr.  George  Grenville,  though  opposed  in  the 
Upper  House,  was  ultimately  carried.  It  provided  in  general  for 
the  encouragement  of  naval  seamen,  and,  in  particular,  for  the 
establishment  of  more  regular  and  frequent  payment  of  wages  ;  and 
for  enabling  seamen  to  remit  money  for  the  support  of  their  wives 
and  families  by  means  of  tickets  payable  in  cash  on  demand  by  any 
collector  of  customs  or  excise.  An  Act  of  1747  authorised  masters 
of  merchant  vessels  to  detain  from  the  wages  of  their  seamen 
sixpence  a  month,  as  a  provision  for  the  widows  and  children  of 
men  drowned. 

On  April  3rd,  1744,  a  royal  declaration  assigned  to  the  officers 
and  crews  of  men-of-war  all  property  in  prizes  taken  by  them  :  and, 
to  the  officers  and  crews  of  privateers  and  letters  of  marque,  such  a 
proportion  as  might  be  conceded  to  them  by  the  agreement  of  the 
owners.  It  also  provided  that  shares  not  claimed  within  three  years 
should  go  to  Greenwich  Hospital. 

Bounties  to  seamen  were  several  times  offered.  In  1734,  the 
rate  was  20s.  for  an  able-bodied  seaman,  and  15s.  for  an  able-bodied 
landsman.  In  1740,  it  was  42s.  for  an  able-bodied,  and  30s.  for  an 
ordinary  seaman.  In  1742,  it  rose  to  100s.  for  an  able-bodied,  and 
60s.  for  an  ordinary  seaman;  and  it  was  further  ordered  that  the 
'8060.11.0.29.  2  13Geo.  II.  c.  3. 


1740.]  OFFICERS'   PAY.  19 

widows  of  such  bounty  men  as  should  be  killed  on  service  were  to  be 
granted  a  sum  equivalent  to  a  year's  pay  of  their  late  husbands.  In 
the  same  year,  apparently  to  keep  down  rivalry,  pay  in  the  merchant 
service  was,  for  a  time,  restricted  by  Act  of  Parliament  to  a 
maximum  of  35s.  a  month. 

'-  The  pay  of  officers  remained  as  it  had  been  at  the  conclusion  of 
the  period  1660-1714 ;  but  the  position  of  officers  of  nearly  every 
rank  was  improved  in  various  ways.  Surgeons  were,  for  the  first 
time,  given  half-pay  in  1729;  and,  in  1749,  an  increased  number, 
both  of  surgeons  and  of  masters,  were  granted  half-pay.  The 
number  then  entitled  to  it  was,  in  each  case,  fifty,  of  whom  the  first 
thirty  received  2s.  6d.,  and  the  remaining  twenty,  2s.  a  day. 

The  number  of  domestics  and  servants  allowed  to  officers  had  been 
considerably  reduced  at  the  end  of  the  seventeenth,  but  was  again 
increased  in  the  first  half  of  the  eighteenth  century ;  and,  in  1740,  it 
stood  thus  : — l 

Admiral  of  the  Fleet  .  50,  of  whom  16  only  to  be  borne  as  servants  on  the  books. 

Admiral     ....  30,         „         12  „ 

Vice-Admiral  .      .      .  20,         „         10  „  ,,  „ 

Rear-Adrairal  .      .      .  15,         „.        10  „  „  „ 

Captain      ....  4  per  100  of  the  complement. 

Lieutenant,      Master, 

Second  Master  Pur-         m  hn         (;Q  ]nen  ()[.  &]M^ 

ser,  Surgeon,  Chap- 
lain and  Cook, each 

Boatswain,       Gunner,1)  2,  in  ships  having  100  men  or  upwards,  and  1  in  ships 
Carpenter,  each .      .  J       having  between  100  and  00. 

This  generous  allowance  of  servants  permitted  captains  to  take  to 
sea  with  them  young  gentlemen  who  aspired  to  the  position  of 
officer ;  and  the  better  captains  usually  benefited  the  service  by 
having  with  them  a  large  proportion  of  "servants"  of  that  kind, 
training  under  their  own  eyes.  Yet,  even  captains  who  were  heartily 
devoted  to  the  interests  of  their  profession,  took  with  them  to  sea,  in 
those  days,  many  retainers  of  a  class  that  would,  nowadays,  be 
deemed  very  superfluous  in  a  man-of-war.  Tailors,  barbers,  footmen 
and  fiddlers,  followed  their  patron.  As  late  as  1785,  Commodore 
Edward  Thompson,  who,  it  is  true,  always  had  his  quarter-deck 
crowded  with  such  young  gentlemen  as  were  destined,  a  few  years 
later,  to  shine  in  the  front  ranks  of  the  service,  had  a  painter  on 
his  personal  staff,  and  used  to  summon  the  poor  artist  on  deck  at 

1  And  so  remained  until  April,  1794. 

c  2 


20  CIVIL   HISTORY,   1714-1762.  [1718. 

strange  hours  to  record  impressions  of  sunrise  effects  or  nocturnal 
storms. 

In  1718,  it  was,  for  the  first  time,  formally  ordered  that  captains 
should,  if  duly  qualified,  be  promoted  by  seniority  to  flag-rank,  and 
so  onward  to  the  rank  of  full  admiral.  But  since,  in  those  days, 
the  entire  flag  establishment  consisted  only  of  nine  officers,  viz.,  an 
Admiral  of  the  Fleet,  an  Admiral  of  the  White,  an  Admiral  of  the 
Blue,  and  Vice  and  Kear- Admirals  of  the  Keel,  White  and  Blue 
respectively,  captains  soon  began  to  grow  very  old  ere,  in  con- 
sequence of  deaths  above  them,  they  became  eligible  for  advance- 
ment. If,  also,  the  order  had  been  loyally  carried  out — which  it 
was  not — and  had  not  been  followed  by  other  modifications,  it 
would  presently  have  resulted  in  a  flag-list  composed  exclusively 
of  officers  too  aged  to  go  afloat.  The  threatened  evil  was  fended 
off  by  the  gradual  increase  of  the  flag-list  in  174H  and  subsequent 
years,  and  by  the  provision,  in  1747,  of  arrangements  in  virtue  of 
which  senior  captains,  indisposed,  or  too  infirm,  to  accept  active 
flag-rank,  might  bo  superannuated  as  rear-admirals,  with  pay  at 
the  rate  of  17x.  («/.  a  day.  The  first  officers  to  be  superannuated 
under  this  scheme  were  captains  of  171H,  or,  to  put  it  otherwise, 
captains  of  thirty-four  years'  service  in  that  rank.  Some  of  them 
were  septuagenarians. 

The  establishment  of  a  regular  uniform  for  certain  officers  of  the 
lioyal  Navy  dates  from  1748.  Three  years  earlier,  some  officers 
appear  to  have  petitioned  the  Admiralty  for  the  boon  ;  and,  in  174(5, 
sundry  captains,  at  Alison's  wish,  prepared  tentative  coats  from 
which  a  uniform  pattern  might  be  selected.  But,  though  a  captain 
may  have  designed  the  uniforms  which  were  finally  adopted,  King 
George  II.  himself  decided  upon  the  colours  of  them.  Having 
noticed  the  Duchess  of  Bedford,  wife  of  the  First  Lord,  riding  in 
the  Park  in  a  habit  of  blue,  faced  with  white,  his  Majesty  chose 
blue  and  white  for  the  first  uniform  dress  of  his  officers.  The 
innovation  applied  only  to  admirals,  captains,  commanders,  lieu- 
tenants, and  midshipmen,  and  the  wearing  of  the  new  uniform  was 
made  compulsory,  as  regards  these  ranks,  by  an  order  dated  April 
14th,  1748.  But  there  were  difficulties  in  the  way  of  obedience. 
Patterns  were  not  sent  to  foreign  stations,  nor  were  the  regulations 
sufficiently  explicit  to  enable  officers,  by  their  aid  only,  to  instruct 
their  tailors  concerning  what  was  required.  It  is  therefore  probable 
that,  for  several  years,  the  order  was  not  fully  carried  out. 


1748.]  OFFICERS"    UNIFORM.  21 

Admiralty  patterns  of  these  uniforms  were  lodged  at  the  Navy 
Office  and  the  Dockyards,  but  they  have  not  been  preserved.  A  few 
coats,  waistcoats,  breeches  and  hats,  for  captains  and  lieutenants, 
were,  however,  found  at  Plymouth,  in  1846,  and  are  now  in  the 
Royal  United  Service  Institution. 

"  The  hats  are  three-cornered  in  shape  ;  one  is  trimmed  with  silver  or  tarnished  gold 
lace ;  and  both  bear  the  silk  cockade  instituted  by  George  I.  Lace  and  frills  being 
then  worn,  there  are  no  collars  to  the  coats.  They  are  made  of  thick  blue  cloth ;  the 
lappels,  which  button  back,  are  blue ;  but  the  cuffs  of  the  captain's  coats  are  white, 
and  the  sleeves  of  all  are  purposely  made  short  to  allow  the  laced  sleeves  of  the  white 
kerseymere  waistcoats  to  show  beyond.  There  are  two  kinds  of  buttons,  one  flat, 
bearing  a  rose  ;  the  other  round  and  plain.  Although  we  have  not  the  patterns, 
pictures  of  the  dress  of  the  admirals  and  midshipmen  have  come  down  to  us,  the 
embroidery  and  lace  on  those  of  the  flag  officers  being  must  elaborate."  ' 

Some  written  advice,  given  by  Edward  Thompson,2  in  1756,  to  a 
relative  who  was  about  to  enter  the  Navy,  throws  light  upon  the 
condition  of  young  gentlemen  in  the  men-of-war  of  the  time. 

"  Here,"  he  says,  "  are  no  back  doors  through  which  you  can  make  your  escape, 
nor  any  humane  bosoms  to  alleviate  your  feelings;  at  once  you  resign  a  good  table  for 
no  table,  and  a  good  bed  for  your  length  and  breadth ;  nay,  it  will  be  thought  an 
indulgence,  too,  to  let  you  sleep  where  day  ne'er  enters,  and  where  fresh  air  only  comes 
when  forced."  ..."  Your  light  for  day  and  night  is  a  small  candle,  which  is  often 
stuck  at  the  side  of  your  platter  at  meals,  for  want  of  a  better  convenience ;  your 
victuals  are  salt,  and  often  bad  ;  and,  if  you  vary  the  mode  of  dressing  them,  you  must 
cook  yourself.  I  would  recommend  you  always  to  have  tea  and  sugar;  the  rest  you 
must  trust  to,  for  you'll  scarce  find  room  fur  any  more  than  your  chest  and  hammock, 
and  the  latter  at  times  you  must  carry  upon  deck  to  defend  you  from  small  shot, 
unless  you  keep  one  of  the  sailors  in  fee  witli  a  little  brandy  (which  is  a  good  friend 
at  sea,  but  always  drink  it  mixed  with  water.")  ..."  Low  company  is  the  bane  of 
all  young  men;  but  in  a  man-of-war  you  have  the  collected  filths  of  jails.  Con- 
demned criminals  have  the  alternative  of  hanging,  or  entering  on  board.  There's  not 
a  vice  committed  on  shore  but  is  practised  here.  The  scenes  of  horror  and  infamy  on 
board  of  a  man-of-war  are  so  many  and  so  great  that  I  think  they  must  rather  disgust 
a  mind  than  allure  it.  I  do  not  mean,  by  this  advice,  to  have  you  appear  a  dull 
inactive  being,  that  shudders  amidst  these  horrors.  No;  I  would  wish  you  to  see  them 
in  their  own  proper  shapes,  for,  to  be  hated,  they  need  to  be  seen."  ..."  You  will 
find  some  little  outward  appearance  of  religion— and  Sunday  prayers ! — but  the  con- 
gregation is  generally  drove  together  by  the  boatswain  (like  sheep  by  the  shepherd), 
who  neither  spares  oaths  nor  blows."  " 


1  'The  British  Fleet,'   500.     The  lirst  Admiral's  uniform    is  well  shown   in   the 
portrait  of   Lord   Ausou,  forming  the  title-page  to  this  volume.     This  was   painted 
between  1748  and  1761. 

2  Died  Commodore  on  the  West  Coast  of  Africa,  January  17th,  178(5.     He  edited 
some   old   writers;    wrote   plays,   stories,  and   songs;    and   was   a   friend,   and  also 
probably  a  benefactor,  of  Dr.  Samuel  Johnson. 

3  '  Seaman's  Letters,'  i.  147. 


22  CIVIL   HISTORY,   1714-1762.  [1756. 

Concerning  subordinate  officers,  and  the  abuse  of  power  by 
superiors,  Thompson  wrote  :— 

"  The  disagreeable  circumstances  and  situations  attending  a  subaltern  officer  in  the 
Navy  are  so  many,  and  so  hard,  that,  had  not  the  first  men  in  the  service  passed  the 
dirty  road  to  preferment  to  encourage  the  rest,  they  would  renounce  it  to  a  man.  It  is 
a  most  mistaken  notion  that  a  youth  will  not  be  a  good  officer  unless  he  stoops  to  the 
most  menial  offices ;  to  be  bedded  worse  than  hogs,  and  eat  less  delicacies.  In  short, 
from  having  experienced  such  scenes  of  filth  and  infamy,  such  fatigues  and  hardships, 
they  are  sufficient  to  disgust  the  stoutest  and  the  bravest,  for,  alas!  there  is  only  a  little 
hope  of  promotion  sprinkled  in  the  cup  to  make  a  man  swallow  more  than  he  digests 
the  rest  of  his  life.  The  state  of  inferior  officers  in  his  Majesty's  service  is  a  state  of 
vassalage,  and  a  lieutenant's  preferment  the  greatest  in  it ;  tlie  change  is  at  once  from 
a  filthy  maggot  to  a  shining  butterfly.  Many  methods  might  be  introduced  to  make 
the  lower  officers  of  more  consequence  on  their  duty,  and  their  lives  more  agreeable  to 
themselves ;  for  that  power  of  reducing  them  to  sweep  the  decks,  being  lodged  in  the 
breast  of  a  captain,  is  often  abused  through  passion  or  caprice ;  besides,  it  is  too 
despotic  an  authority  to  exercise  on  a  man  who  has  the  feelings  of  an  Englishman. 

"  We  are  likewise  to  recollect  that  nil  commanders  of  men-of-war  are  not  gentle- 
men, nor  men  of  education.  1  know  a  great  part  are  brave  men,  but  a  much  greater, 
seamen.  I  allow  the  maxim  of  learning  to  obey,  before  we  command  ourselves;  but 
still  there  is  no  reason  to  be  vulgar,  for  we  are  to  consider  these  young  people  are  the 
active  machines  of  duty,  the  wheels  which  give  motion  to  the  main  body ;  and  it  is 
absolutely  necessary  to  give  them  authority  in  their  office  to  carry  on  the  duties  of  the 
ship:  but  rendering  them  low  in  the  eyes  of  the  people  creates  a  contempt  for 
midshipmen  in  general,  and  turns  that  necessary  respect  due  to  them  into  contempt. 

"  I  propose  to  warrant  this  bixly  of  officers,  and  make  them  answer  to  the  Board  of 
Admiralty  for  their  conduct.  They  should  possess  a  third  table  in  the  ship,  and  have 
the  countenance  of  their  superiors.  This  would  enliven  their  servitude,  and  make 
them  of  consequence  on  their  duty."  ' 

But  some  improvement  was  already  to  be  noticed,  for  Thompson 
continues  :• — 

"  The  last  war,  a  chaw  of  tobacco,  a  rattan,  and  a  rope  of  oaths  were  sufficient 
qualifications  to  constitute  a  lieutenant;  but  now,  education  and  good  manners  are 
the  study  of  all ;  and  so  far  from  effeminacy,  that  I  am  of  opinion  the  present  race 
of  officers  will  as  much  eclipse  the  veterans  of  KiD'J  as  the  polite  the  vulgar."  2 

There  was,  however,  as  yet  little  improvement  either  in  the  code 
of  morals,  or  in  the  sanitary  provisions  on  board  his  Majesty's  ships. 
There  is  evidence  that,  towards  the  end  of  the  seventeenth  century, 
women  were  systematically  carried  to  sea  in  the  proportion  of  so 
many  per  company  of  Marines ;  and  Thompson,  writing  in  the 
middle  of  the  eighteenth,  after  describing  the  unsavoury  persons 
and  dwellings  of  the  negroes  of  Antigua,  goes  on  :— 

"  But  bad  smells  don't  hurt  the  sailor's  appetite,  each  man  possessing  a  temporary 
lady,  whose  pride  is  her  constancy  to  the  man  she  chooses ;  and  in  this  particular  they 


1  '  Seaman's  Letters,'  i.  140.  2  Ib.  144. 


1756.] 


SOCIAL    CONDITION   OF   THE  NAVY. 


are  strictly  so.     I  have  known  350  women  sup  and  sleep  on  board1  on  a  Sunday 
evening,  and  return  at  daybreak  to  their  different  plantations."  2 

As  for  sanitation,  suffice  it  to  say,  by  way  of  example,  in  addition 
to  the  many  cases  which  will  be  cited  in  the  two  following  chapters, 
that,  in  1756,  at  the  time  of  the  outbreak  of  war  with  France,  when 
she  had  been  on  no  long  cruise,  and  had  been  exposed  only  to  the 
hardships  of  a  few  months  of  service  in  the  Channel,  the  Stirling 
Castle,  64,  Captain  Samuel  Cornish,  arrived  at  Portsmouth  with  four 
hundred  and  eighty  men,  of  whom  two  hundred  and  twenty-five 
were  the  pressed  refuse  of  gaols  and  scum  of  streets.  She  was  full 
of  fever  and  other  sickness,  and,  when  the  diseased  had  been  sent 
ashore,  but  one  hundred  and  sixty  men  remained  for  duty.  Less 
than  three  months  later,  when,  having  filled  up  her  complement  in 
England,  she  had  proceeded  to  New  York,  Edward  Thompson 
wrote  from  her  :  "  We  have  now  one  hundred  and  fifty-nine  people 
ill  in  fluxes,  scurvies,  and  fevers."  Two  months  afterwards,  ashore 
at  English  Harbour,  Antigua,  he  added— 

"  I  have  been  long  declining  with  the  white  flux,  and,  for  recovery,  am  stalled  into 
a  small  room  with  twenty-six  people ;  but  am  now  in  better  health.  I  officiate  as 
chaplain,  and  bury  eight  men  in  a  morning.  Fluxes  and  fevers  are  the  reigning 
distemper,  and  both  I  attribute  to  the  water  drunk  by  the  seamen,  which  is  taken  out 
of  tanks  or  cisterns,  built  by  Admiral  Knowles.  It  is  all  rain  water,  and  covered 
close  up,  which,  for  want  of  air,  breeds  poisonous  amraalculse,  and  becomes  foul  and 
putrid.  The  melancholy  effects  it  produces  might  be  in  a  great  manner  prevented  by 
boiling  the  water  before  it  is  issued,  or  ordering  the  people  to  do  it.  This  would 
destroy  the  vermin,  and  correct  the  putrefaction.  I  am  convinced  from  long  observa- 
tion that  most  of  the  distempers  in  southern  climates  arise  from  the  water  drunk,  as 
ship  sicknesses  do  from  the  bilge  water ;  which  is  evidently  proved  in  leaky  ships 
being  always  healthful.  I  therefore  recommend  to  all  officers,  naval  and  mercantile, 
to  let  in  salt  water  every  day,  and  boil  their  fresh,  for  the  good  of  themselves  and 
cargoes." 

1  He  speaks  of  H.M.S.  Stirling  Castle,  64,  carrying  480  men. 

2  '  Seaman's  Letters,'  ii.  24. 


CHAPTER  XXVII. 

MILITARY  HISTORY  OF  THE  KOYAL  NAVY,  1714-1762. 
MAJOR  OPERATIONS. 

Accession  of  George  1.— Trouble  with  Sweden— Xorris  to  the  Baltic— Co-operation 
with  Holland,  Denmark,  and  Russia— A  Swedish  conspiracy— Byng  to  the  Baltic 
in  1717— The  Quadruple  Alliance— Irritation  of  Spain— Byng  to  the  Mediterranean 
in  1718— Spanish  operations  in  Sicily— The  battle  off  Cape  Passaro— The  British 
and  Spanish  accounts— Mahan's  comments— War  with  Spain— Projected  invasion 
of  England— Dispersal  of  the  Spanish  licet— The  Ross-shire  fiasco — Reduction  of 
Sicily — Peace  with  Spain— Xorris  in  the  Baltic  in  1718— Alliance  with  Sweden — 
Xorris  in  the  Baltic  in  171ii,  17-!0,  and  17LM — Peace  between  Russia  and  Sweden 
—The  Treaty  of  Vienna— The  Treaty  of  Hannover — Jennings  to  the  coast  of 
Spain — Wager  to  the  Baltic — Hosier  to  the  West  Indies — Sickness  in  the  fleet — 
Death  of  Hosier,  Hnpsonn,  and  St.  Loc — Wager  relieves  Gibraltar — Xorris  in  the 
Baltic— Death  of  George  I. — The  Treaty  of  Seville— Difficulties  in  the  New 
World — Xorris  to  Lisbon — Haddock  to  the  Mediterranean — Spanish  depredations 
— Jenkins's  ears- -Reprisals  granted — War  with  Spain — Alison's  expedition — 
Kdward  Vernon — Vernon  to  the  West  Indies — Capture  of  Puerto  Hello — Enthusiasm 
in  England — Co-operation  between  France  and  Spain — Vernon  reinforced — France 
holds  her  hand — Vernon  at  Chagres — Vernon  again  reinforced — Death  of  Cath- 
cart — Beauclerk  and  de  Boisgeroult — Unsuccessful  cruises  of  Haddock,  Balcben, 
and  Xorris — Junction  of  the  French  and  Spanish  fleets  in  the  Mediterranean — 
Vernon's  difliculties  with  Wentworth — Attack  upon  Cartagena — Early  success 
— Failure  of  the  attempt — Attack  on  Santiago  de  Cuba —Abandonment  of  the 
plan — Criticism  of  the  scheme — The  commanders  censured — Projected  ex|iedition 
against  Panama — Collapse  of  the  venture — Recall  of  Vernon  and  Wentworth — 
Lestock  joins  Haddock  in  the  Mediterranean — Lestock's  character — Mathews 
Commander-in-chief  in  the  Mediterranean — Friction  between  Mathews  and  Lestock 
— Blockade  of  Toulon — Martin  at  Naples — Martin  to  Alassio— Ogle  in  the  West 
Indies — Repulse  of  the  attack  on  La  Guayra — Repulse  at  Puerto  Cahello — France 
supi>orts  Spain — Norris  in  the  Channel — Escape  of  de  Roquefeuil — War  with 
France  and  Spain — The  Dutch  join  Great  Britain — Disposition  of  the  fleets — 
Navarro  and  de  Court  leave  Toulon — Mathews's  action  off  Toulon — Suspension 
and  trial  of  Lestock — Trials  of  captains — The  court-martial  and  the  Lord  Chief 
Justice — Trial  of  Matliews — Rowley  in  the  Mediterranean — Gabaret  escapes  him — 
Hardy  blockaded— Balchen  relieves  him — Loss  of  the  Victory — Barnct  in  the 
East  Indies — Davere  at  Jamaica — French  intrigues  in  North  America — Annapolis 
summoned  in  vain — Schemes  of  the  Pretender — He  lands  in  Scotland — His  escape 
— Capture  of  Louisbourg — Townsend  to  the  West  Indies — Affairs  in  the  Mediter- 
ranean— French  failures  in  North  America — Lestock  on  the  coast  of  France 

Peyton  and  La  Bourdonnais— Fall  of  Madras — Duplicity  of  Dupleix — Lisle  and 
de  Conflans — Disgrace  of  Mitchell — Medley  in  the  Mediterranean — French  ex- 
pedition to  Cape  Breton — Auson's  action  with  de  La  Jonquiere— Hawke  defeats 
de  L'Elenduere — Trial  of  Captain  Fox-  Exhaustion  of  France — Boscawen  to  the 


1714.] 


DIFFICULTIES   IN   THE  NORTH. 


25 


East  Indies — Failure  at  Pondicherry — Peace  of  Aix-la-Chapelle — Surrender  of 
Madras — Knowles  takes  Port  Louis —Attempt  on  Santiago  de  Cuba— Knowles's 
victory  off  Havana — Trial  of  Knowles— Pocock  takes  a  French  convoy — Losses 
during  the  war — Terms  of  the  peace — French  aggressions — Keppel  to  North 
America — French  designs  on  Canada — Boscawen  to  North  America — Capture  of 
the  Alcide  and  Lys — Threatened  invasion — French  expedition  to  Minorca — 
Operations  against  Angria — Success  of  Holmes — Iteconnaissance  of  Brest — British 
weakness  in  the  Mediterranean — Byng  ordered  to  Minorca — Byng's  action  with 
de  La  Galissonniere — The  dispatches — Byng  superseded,  tried,  and  executed — 
Conclusions  on  his  case — Fall  of  Minorca — Watson  takes  Calcutta — Fall  of 
Chandernagore — D'Aehe  to  the  East  Indies — Forrest's  action  with  de  Kersaint — 
Expedition  to  Louisbourg — Misfortunes  of  the  fleet — The  expedition  abandoned — 
Escape  of  du  Eevest — Expedition  against  Hochefort — Pocock's  action  off  Cudda- 
lore — Capitulation  of  Fort  St.  David — Pocock's  action  off  Negapatam — With- 
drawal of  d'Ache — Kempenfelt  relieves  Madras — Siege  and  capture  of  Louisbourg 
— Boscawen  and  du  Chaffault — Marsh  to  West  Africa — Keppel  takes  Goree — 
Capture  of  the  Orphet  and  Fovdroyanl — Hawke  at  lie  d'Aix — Howe's  expedition 
to  the  French  coast — Capture  of  Cherbourg — Disaster  at  St.  Cas — Renewed  French 
preparations — Pocock  again  engages  d'Ache — The  Dutch  at  Chinsura — Failure  at 
Martinique — Operations  at  Guadaloupe — The  conquest  of  Canada — Saunders  in 
the  St.  Lawrence — Boscawen  to  the  Mediterranean — Boscawen  defeats  de  La  Choe 
— Rodney  off  Le  Havre — Blockade  of  Brest — Hawke  defeats  de  Contlaus — 
Blockade  of  Poudicherry — Hurricane  in  the  East  Indies — Fall  of  Pondicherry — 
Norbury's  action  in  the  West  Indies — French  attempt  against  Quebec — Montreal 
occupied — Elliot  defeats  Thurot — Boscawen  and  Jlawke  in  Quiberon  Bay — 
Further  operations  in  the  East  Indies — Keppel's  expedition  against  Belleisle — The 
Family  Compact — War  with  Spain — Capture  of  Manila — Conquest  of  Martinique 
— Conquest  of  Grenada  and  St.  Lucia — Pocock  reduces  Havana — Misfortunes  of 
Pocock's  fleet — De  Terney  at  Newfoundland — Recapture  of  St.  John's — The  raid 
on  Buenos  Ayres — Enforcement  of  the  right  of  search — The  Treaty  of  Fontaine- 
bleau — Results  of  the  Seven  Years'  War. 

ALTHOUGH,  at 
the  accession 
of  George  I., 
Great  Britain 
was  at  peace 
with  all  the 
world,  the  re- 
lations of  the 
country  with 
certain  north- 
ern powers 
were  far  from 
being  satisfac- 
tory ;  and  from 

the  first  it  was  foreseen  that   difficulties  were  likely  to  arise,  and 
to  call  for  the  active  employment  of  the  Navy  towards  their  solution. 


POPULAR  MEDAL  COMMKMOHATIVK  (IK  MATHKWS  S  ACTION  OFF  TOULON; 
FEBRUARY  llTH,  1744,  AM)  OK  THE  Fltl'STHATION  OF  TIIF 
THREATENED  INVASION  OF  ENGLAND  AT  ABOUT  THK  SAME  TIME. 


(From  an  oriijiital  kittdlf)  Ii'iit  hi/  H.S.If.  Cti^inin 
Battcnhenj,  It.X.1 


1  Ltjuin  of 


26  MA  JOS    OPERATIONS,   1714-1762.  [1716. 

Sweden  had  not  yet  allied  herself  with  Russia,  and  was,  in  fact, 
still  at  war  with  her  and  with  Denmark ;  and  Swedish  privateers 
had  seized  many  British  ships  which  were  alleged  to  contain  arms, 
ammunition,  and  -stores,  destined,  in  contravention  of  treaty,  for 
the  service  of  the  Tsar.  Eemonstrances  had  been  made  by  the 
British  minister  at  Stockholm,  but  they  had  produced  no  results. 
The  Duteh,  who  had  similar  causes  of  complaint  against  the 
government  of  Charles  XII.,  found  it  equally  difficult  to  obtain 
either  redress  or  apology  ;  and  it  was  therefore  determined  by  Great 
Britain  and  Holland  to  despatch  a  combined  fleet  to  the  Baltic  in 
1715  to  intimidate  the  Swedes,  and  to  convoy,  and  prevent  further 
undue  interference  with,  the  trade. 

The  British  contingent,  under  Admiral  Sir  John  Norris  (B.)  and 
Hear- Admiral  Sir  Thomas  Hardy  (B.),  was  made  up  of  twenty  ships 
of  the  line,  besides  a  few  small  craft.  It  sailed  from  the  Nore  on 
May  18th,  and,  reaching  the  Sound  on  June  10th,  there  joined  the 
Dutch  contingent  of  twelve  sail  under  Kear-Admiral  Lucas  de  Veth. 
The  merchantmen  were  escorted  to  their  ports,  but  nothing  of 
importance  happened  during  the  rest  of  the  year.  In  171(5,  Sir 
John,  unwilling  to  adopt  strong  measures  against  Sweden  unless 
he  had  the  gravest  reasons  for  doing  so,  sent  an  officer  to  Stockholm 
to  inquire  whether  or  not  the  practice  of  seizing  British  and  Dutch 
ships  was  to  be  persisted  in.  A  vague  and  ambiguous  reply  being 
returned,  it  was  determined  by  the  allied  commanders,  in  pursuance 
of  orders  from  home,  to  make  a  demonstration  of  an  exceptional 
nature.  A  Danish  squadron  lay  at  Copenhagen.  There  also  lay  a 
Russian  squadron  under  the  Tsar  Peter  himself.  After  the  necessary 
negotiations  had  taken  place,  it  was  agreed  that,  while  the  Dutch, 
then  under  Commodore  Hendrik  Grave,  with  five  British  men-of- 
war,  should  convoy  to  their  destinations  such  merchantmen  as  had 
followed  the  fleets,  the  British,  Russian,  and  Danish  squadrons, 
forming  for  the  moment  a  single  fleet,  should  proceed  up  the  Baltic, 
in  order  to  let  it  be  seen  that,  rather  than  permit  any  further 
meddling  with  her  trade,  Great  Britain  would  take  active  part 
against  Charles  XII.  The  Tsar  Peter  became,  for  the  nonce,  com- 
mander-in-chief ;  Norris  assumed  command  of  the  van,  and  Count 
Gyldenlove,1  the  Danish  admiral,  took  the  rear  under  his  orders. 

1  Ulrich  Christian  Gyldenlove,  known  in  England  as  Count  Gueldenlew,  was  a 
natural  brother  of  King  Frederick  IV.  of  Denmark,  and  had  commanded  the  Danish 
fleet  at  the  time  of  Rooke's  operations  against  Copenhagen  in  1700. 


1716.]  THE  EANNOVERIAN    ENTANGLEMENT.  27 

The  confederate  fleet  assembled  in  Kjb'ge  Bay,  and  thence 
proceeded  to  Bornholm,  where,  learning  that  the  Swedes  had 
retired  to  Karlskrona,  unwilling  to  hazard  an  action,  the  Tsar  gave 
directions  that  the  convoys  might  continue  their  voyages  to  their 
various  ports.  He  then,  with  his  squadron,  sailed  to  the  coast  of 
Mecklenburg.  Norris  and  Gyldenlove  took  measures  for  collecting 
the  homeward-bound  trade,  most  of  which  joined  them  at  Bornholm 
on  November  9th,  and  with  them  entered  the  roadstead  of  Copen- 
hagen on  the  day  following.  The  remaining  merchantmen,  chiefly 
Dutch,  anchored  there  on  the  12th.  Sir  John  Norris  left  behind 
him  in  the  Baltic  Captain  William  Cleveland,  with  seven  ships,  to 
act,  if  necessary,  in  concert  with  the  Danes  ;  and,  with  the  rest  of  the 
fleet,  he  returned  to  England.  On  his  voyage  he  met  with  terrible 
weather,  and,  although  he  succeeded  in  preserving  his  convoy,  he 
had  the  misfortune  to  lose  the  Auguste,  60,  and  the  Garland,  '24. 1 
The  fleet  arrived  at  the  Nore  on  November  29th,  1716. 

The  ostensible  reasons  for  this  Baltic  expedition  have  been  given 
above.  It  must  be  borne  in  mind,  however,  that  the  situation,  as 
between  Great  Britain  and  Sweden,  was  exacerbated  by  the  fact 
that  George  I.,  besides  being'  King  of  Great  Britain,  was  Elector  of 
Hannover.  In  his  latter  quality  he  had  purchased  from  Denmark 
territories  which  had  been  conquered  from  Sweden ;  and,  in  order  to 
defend  these,  he  had  declared  war  against  Sweden,  and  carried  on 
the  conflict  at  a  time  when,  in  his  quality  of  King  of  Great  Britain, 
he  was  at  peace  with  Charles  XII.  The  Swedish  monarch  did  not 
scruple  to  charge  King  George  with  having  prostituted  the  honour 
of  the  British  flag  in  order  to  serve  the  interests  of  Hannover ;  and, 
although  it  may  be  that  Charles,  in  his  natural  resentment,  failed  to 
do  exact  justice  to  his  opponent,  it  cannot  be  denied  that  the 
personal  union  of  the  crowns  of  Great  Britain  and  Hannover,  if  not 
in  1715-16,  at  least  on  many  subsequent  occasions,  led  Great  Britain 
into  ventures  which,  had  her  own  interests  only  been  consulted,  she 
would  never  have  embarked  upon. 

The  irritation  of  Sweden  was  increased  by  Norris's  demonstration 
in  the  Baltic ;  and  one  of  the  results  was  that,  soon  afterwards, 

1  So  say  all  historians,  but  no  authority  cnn  he  found  for  one  part  of  the  statement. 
The  Auguste,  Captain  Robert  Johnson,  ran  ashore,  it  is  true,  on  November  10th, 
her  captain  and  most  of  her  people  being  saved.  The  Garland,  however,  remained 
in  commission,  under  Captain  Ellis  Brand,  until  February  22nd,  1717 ;  from  which 
fact  it  may  be  concluded  that,  if  she  went  ashore,  she  did  not  at  once  become  a  total 
loss.  There  seems,  too,  to  have  been  no  court-martial.  MS.  List  in  Author's  Coll. 


28 


MAJOR    OPERATIONS,    1714-1762. 


[1717. 


certain  Swedish  diplomatists,  including  the  minister  in  London, 
associated  themselves  in  plots,  having  for  their  object  the  further- 
ance of  the  cause  of  the  Pretender.  The  discovery  of  these  intrigues 
aroused  the  liveliest  indignation  throughout  Great  Britain  ;  and  when 
Parliament  met  in  1717,  it  was  formally  resolved  by  the  House  of 
Commons  to  introduce  a  Bill  to  authorise  the  King  to  prohibit 
commerce  with  Sweden  "during  such  time  as  his  Majesty  shall 
think  it  necessary  for  the  safety  and  peace  of  his  kingdom."  On 


Sill   JOHN    XOIiltIS,    KT.,    ADMIRAL    OF   THE    FLEET. 
1 1-i'inn  Hi-   j.h'ti  re  l>u  .S'/r  fV.  Km  Hi  r,  bit  iitruiixxinn  »(  II,  ('.  ,\""/r/x,  A'sv/. ) 

March  '2nd,  the  Bill  having  in  the  meantime  been  passed,  a 
proclamation  in  accordance  with  its  provisions  was  made  public. 
To  properly  enforce  the  prohibition,  it  was  requisite  to  send  another 
fleet  to  the  Baltic  ;  and  on  March  80th,  twenty-one  ships  of  the  line, 
with  frigates  and  fireships,  sailed  for  Copenhagen  under  Admiral  Sir 
George  Byng.  A  few  days  later,  though  in  face  of  strong  opposition, 
the  Government  obtained  a  grant  of  a  quarter  of  a  million  sterling  to 
enable  the  King  "  to  concert  such  measures  with  foreign  princes  and 


1718.]  THE   QUADRUPLE  ALLIANCE.  29 

states  as  may  prevent  any  charge  and  apprehension  from  the  designs 
of  Sweden  for  the  future." 

Byng  agreed  upon  a  plan  of  united  action  with  Denmark,  and 
made  various  dispositions  to  ensure  the  carrying  out  of  the  objects 
for  which  he  had  been  sent  to  sea ;  but  his  proceedings  were,  upon 
the  whole,  uneventful,  the  Swedes  not  venturing  outside  their  ports. 
Returning  at  the  beginning  of  winter,  he  arrived  in  the  mouth 
of  the  Thames  on  November  15th.  A  note  of  such  small  services 
as  were  performed  by  the  cruisers  of  the  fleet  will  be  found  in  the 
next  chapter.  In  the  meantime,  thanks  largely  to  the  good  offices 
of  France  and  Russia,  the  difficulties  in  the  north  were  for  the 
moment  smoothed  over,  although,  for  many  years  afterwards,  they 
remained  a  source  of  much  anxiety  and  expense  to  the  Court  of 
St.  James's. 

"But  this,"  says  Campbell,  "  was  not  the  only  affair  of  consequence  that  employed 
the  thoughts  of  the  administration.  We  were  then  in  close  confederacy  with  the 
Emperor  and  France;  and,  in  conjunction  with  these  Powers,  had  undertaken  to  settle 
the  affairs  of  Europe  on  a  better  foundation  than  the  Treaty  of  Utrecht  left  them. 
With  this  view,  the  Triple  Alliance  was  concluded  on  January  4th,  1717 ;  and,  that 
not  answering  the  end  expected  from  it,  we  next  entered,  as  will  be  shown,  into  the 
famous  Quadruple  Alliance,1  which  was  intended  to  remedy  all  these  defects,  and  to 
fix  the  general  tranquillity  for  ever.  Yet,  by  unforeseen  accidents  to  which  human 
policy  will  be  always  liable,  this  alliance  proved  the  cause  of  an  immediate  war 
between  us  and  Spain,  and,  in  its  consequences,  was  the  source  of  all  the  troubles  that 
disturbed  Europe  from  the  time  of  its  conclusion 2  to  the  peace  of  Aix-la-Chapelle." 

The  terms  of  the  alliance  were  decided  upon  some  months  before 
the  treaty  was  actually  signed.  It  was  determined  that  Spain 
should  restore  Sardinia  to  the  Emperor,  and  that  the  King  of  Spain 
should  renounce  his  claim  to  succeed  to  the  French  crown,  while  the 
Emperor  was  to  renounce  his  claim  to  what  had  been  guaranteed  to 
Philip  V.  under  the  Treaty  of  Utrecht,  and  Philip  was  to  surrender 
his  claim  to  the  Netherlands  and  to  the  Italian  possessions  of  the 
Emperor.  In  return  for  Sicily,  the  Emperor  was  to  hand  over 
Sardinia  to  the  King  of  Sicily,  and  was  to  recognise  the  right  of 
the  House  of  Savoy  to  succeed  to  the  crown  of  Spain  in  the  event 
of  the  failure  of  the  heirs  of  Philip  V.  France  and  Great  Britain 
undertook  to  assist  the  Emperor  to  acquire  Sicily ;  and  France  and 
the  Empire  undertook  to  maintain  the  Protestant  succession  in 
Great  Britain.3 

1  Of  Great  Britain,  France,  Holland,  and  the  Empire. 

2  August,  1718. 

3  Koch  &  Scholl,  '  Hist,  des  Traites  de  Paix.' 


30  MAJOR    OPERATIONS,   1714-1762.  [1718. 

The  arrangement  was  excessively  displeasing  to  Spain ;  and  no 
sooner  had  the  House  of  Savoy  transferred  Sicily  to  the  Emperor 
than  Spain,  whose  policy  was  then  controlled  by  Cardinal  Alberoni, 
made  preparations  for  attacking  that  island.  Great  Britain  made 
corresponding  preparations  for  enforcing  the  provisions  of  the 
still  unsigned  treaty,  and,  early  in  1718,  commissioned  a  large 
number  of  ships.  The  Spanish  minister  in  London  remonstrated. 
George  I.  rather  bluntly  replied  that  it  was  not  his  intention  to 
conceal  the  object  of  his  armaments,  and  that  he  purposed  to  send 
Sir  George  Byng  to  the  Mediterranean  with  a  powerful  force  "  to 
maintain  the  neutrality  of  Italy  against  those  who  should  seek  to 
disturb  it." 

In  March,  1718,  Byng  was  accordingly  appointed  Commander-in- 
Chief  in  the  Mediterranean  ;  and  on  May  24th  he  received  his  written 
instructions.  They  were  not  as  explicit  as  might  have  been  wished  ; 
but  they  appear  to  have  been  explained  and  supplemented  in  the 
course  of  an  interview  which  the  Admiral,  ere  he  left  London,  had 
with  Lords  Sunderland  and  Stanhope,  and  Mr.  Secretary  Craggs.1 
He  was,  upon  his  arrival  upon  his  station,  to  inform  the  King  of 
Spain,  the  Viceroy  of  Naples,  and  the  Governor  of  Milan,  that  he  had 
been  sent  to  sea  to  promote  all  measures  that  might  best  contribute 
to  the  arrangement  of  such  differences  as  had  arisen  between  the 
two  crowns,  and  to  the  prevention  of  any  further  violation  of  the 
neutrality  of  Italy,  which  he  was  to  see  preserved.  He  was  also 
to  enjoin  both  parties  to  abstain  from  acts  of  hostility,  so  that 
negotiations  for  peace  might  be  begun  and  concluded.  But,  should 
the  Spaniards  persist,  after  all,  in  attacking  the  Emperor's  territory 
in  Italy;  or  should  they  land  in  any  part  of  Italy  for  that  purpose;  or 
should  they  endeavour  to  make  themselves  masters  of  Italy  (which 
would  be  a  step  towards  the  invasion  of  the  kingdom  of  Naples), 
Byng  was,  to  the  best  of  his  power,  to  hinder  and  obstruct  them.  If, 
however,  they  were  already  landed,  he  was  to  try  by  amicable  means 
to  induce  them  to  abandon  their  project,  and  was  to  offer  to  help 
them  to  withdraw  their  troops ;  and,  should  all  his  friendly  offices 
prove  ineffectual,  he  was  to  defend  the  territories  attacked,  by 
keeping  company  with,  or  intercepting,  Spanish  ships  and  convoys, 
and,  if  necessary,  by  openly  opposing  them. 

Sir  George  Byng  sailed  from  Spithead  011  June  15th,  1718,  with 
twenty  ships  of  the  line,  two  fireships,  two  bomb  vessels,  a  store- 
1  See  a  letter  from  Craggs  in  Campbell,  iv.  348. 


1718] 


BYNG    TO    THE  MEDITERRANEAN. 


31 


ship,  a  hospital-ship,  and  two  tenders,  and,  passing  Lisbon,  sent  the 
Eupert  in  thither  for  intelligence.  Being  off  Cadiz  on  June  30th,  he 
despatched  the  Superbe  with  a  letter  to  the  British  minister  at 
Madrid,  desiring  him  to  inform  the  King  of  Spain  of  the  presence 
of  the  British  fleet,  and  of  the  instructions  under  which  it  was  to 
act.  The  Spanish  reply,  returned  after  some  delay,  was  curtly  to 
the  effect  that  Byng  might  execute  his  sovereign's  orders.  The 


GEORGE   HYNG,    VISCOUNT   TORRIXGTON,    ADMIRAL    OK   THE   FLEET. 
(From  T.  Ho/ibmkr/t'K  engraving  after  the  imrtniit  !>//  tiir  (1.  KneUrr.) 

minister,  Colonel  Stanhope,  continued,  almost  up  to  the  very 
outbreak  of  hostilities,  to  endeavour  to  induce  Spain  to  give  way ; 
and  in  the  meantime,  foreseeing  the  probable  futility  of  his  efforts, 
he  did  his  best  to  warn  British  merchants  in  the  Spanish  ports  to 
take  such  measures  as  would  protect  their  property  against  the 
results  of  any  sudden  rupture. 

Sir  George,  who  had  to  contend  with  unfavourable  winds,  did 


32  MAJOR    OPERATIONS,    1714-1762.  [1718. 

not  make  Cape  Spartel  until  July  8th.  He  was  there  rejoined  by 
the  Rupert  and  the  Superbe,  and  learnt  that  Spain  had  been  making 
great  preparations  for  war,  and  that  a  considerable  Spanish  fleet  had 
quitted  Barcelona  on  June  18th  for  the  eastward.  Off  Gibraltar, 
the  Admiral  was  joined  by  a  small  division  of  ships  under  Vice- 
Admiral  Charles  Cornwall.  The  fleet  subsequently  watered  at 
Malaga,  and  thence  proceeded  to  Port  Mahon,  where  it  landed 
troops  and  took  off  the  soldiers  who  had  been  in  garrison  there. 
It  sailed  again  on  July  25th,  upon  receipt  of  news  that  the  Spanish 
fleet  had  been  sighted  on  June  30th  near  Naples ;  and  on  August  1st 
it  anchored  in  the  Bay  of  Naples.  Sir  George  had  previously  taken 
care  to  apprise  the  imperial  Viceroy,  and  the  governor  of  Milan,  of 
his  arrival  in  the  Mediterranean. 

The  Spaniards  had  not  been  idle.  They  had  landed  the  Marques 
de  Lede  in  Sicily ;  and,  except  the  citadel  of  Messina,  the  whole 
island  had  quickly  fallen  to  him  with  little  or  no  resistance.  The 
citadel  was  held  by  Savoyards;  and  as  Savoy,  under  the  terms  of  the 
understanding,  was  presently  to  surrender  Sicily  to  the  Emperor,  it 
could  scarcely  be  expected  that  the  fortress  would  hold  out  for  long. 
In  these  circumstances,  the  imperial  Viceroy  of  Naples  hurriedly 
embarked  two  thousand  German  troops  i  on  board  the  British  ships, 
and  requested  Sir  George  Byng  to  endeavour  to  throw  them  into 
Messina  citadel,  and  the  neighbouring  Fort  Salvatore.  The  fleet 
quitted  Naples  on  August  (>th,  and  on  August  9th  arrived  off  the 
Faro  of  Messina. 

The  Spaniards  were  besieging  the  place  which  Byng  desired  to 
relieve  ;  but  Sir  George  does  not  seem  to  have  known  how  near  their 
fleet  was  to  him.  Indeed,  he  had  some  reason  to  suppose  that  it 
was  endeavouring  to  avoid  him.  Instead,  therefore,  of  moving 
onwards  to  Messina  and  striking  at  once,  he  sent  ashore  the  Captain 
of  the  Fleet,  George  Saunders,  with  a  letter  to  the  Marques  de  Lede, 
proposing  a  cessation  for  two  months  of  the  operations  on  shore,  and 
adding  that,  unless  a  truce  were  agreed  to,  he  would  use  all  his  force 
"  to  prevent  further  attempts  to  disturb"  the  dominions  which  his 
master  stood  engaged  to  defend.  De  Lede  replied  that  he  had  no 
powers  to  treat,  and  that  he  intended  to  carry  out  his  orders.  Upon 
receiving  this  answer,  Sir  George  weighed,  with  a  view  to  place  his 
fleet  in  front  of  Messina  and  to  relieve  the  garrison  of  the  citadel. 

1  These  troops,  under  General  Wetzel,  were,  before  the  battle  off  Cape  Passaro,  set 
ashore  at  Reggio. 


1718.]  BATTLE    OF   CAPE   PASSAHO.  33 

The  story  of  what  followed  is  given  in  the  formal  relations  which 
will  be  presently  printed. 

"The  engagement  which  ensued  can,"  says  Mahan,  "scarcely  be  called  a  battle, 
and,  as  is  apt  to  happen  in  such  affairs,  when  the  parties  are  cm  the  verge  of  war,  but, 
war  has  not  actually  been  declared,  there  is  some  doubt  as  to  how  far  the  attack  was 
morally  justifiable  on  the  part  of  the  English.  It  seems  pretty  sure  that  Byng  was 
determined  beforehand  to  seize  or  destroy  the  Spanish  Meet,  and  that  as  a  military  man 
he  was  justified  by  his  orders.  The  Spanish  officers  had  not  made  up  their  minds  to 
any  line  of  conduct ;  they  were  much  inferior  in  numbers,  and,  as  must  always  be  the 
case,  Alberoni's  hastily  revived  navy  had  not  within  the  same  period  reached  nearly 
the  efficiency  of  his  army.  The  English  approached  threateningly  near :  one  or  more 
Spanish  ships  opened  fire:  whereupon  the  English,  being  to  windward,  stood  down  and 
made  an  end  of  them.  A  few  only  escaped.  .  .  ."' 

The  forces  in  face  of  one  another  were,  as  Captain  Mahan 
indicates,  as  unequal  in  numbers  as  in  discipline.  Over  leaf  is  a 
comparative  statement  of  them.  The  ships  of  the  British  fleet  are 
arranged  according  to  Sir  George  Byng's  order  of  battle,  in  which 
the  Canterbury  was  to  lead  with  the  starboard,  and  the  Rochester 
with  the  larboard  tacks  on  board.  The  exact  order  of  the  Spaniards 
cannot  be  determined. 

Sir  George  Byng,  in  his  despatches,1  thus  describes  the  events  of 
August  10th,  and  the  following  days  :  — 

FitoM  ox  ito.Mtii  •mi-:  Jim-Jlem;  OFF  OF  SYIIACTSA, 
August  <>th  (O.S.). 

"Early  in  the  morning,  on  the  thirtieth  of  July,'2  as  we  were  standing  in  for 
Messina,  we  saw  two  scouts  of  the  Spanish  licet  in  the  Faro,  very  near  us  ;  and,  at  the 
same  time,  a  felucca,  coming  off  from  the  (Jalabrian  shore,  assured  us  they  saw  from 
the  hills  tlie  Spanish  Meet  lying  by.  Upon  which  the  Admiral  stood  through  the  Fam 
after  the  scouts,  judging  they  would  lead  us  tn  their  Meet ;  which  they  did;  for,  before 
noon,  we  had  a  fair  sight  of  all  their  ships  as  they  were  drawing  into  line-of-battle. 

"On  our  approach,  they  went  from  us  large,  hut  in  their  order  of  battle,  their  Meet 
consisting  of  six  and  twenty  men-of-war,  great  and  small,  two  tireships,  four  bomb 
vessels,  seven  galleys,  and  several  ships  with  stores  and  provisions. 

"The  Admiral  ordered  the  Kent,  Superb?,  Graf  ton,  and  Orfonl,  being  the  best 
sailers  in  the  fleet,  to  make  what  sail  they  could  to  come  up  with  the  Spaniards;  and 
that  the  ships  which  could  get  headmost,  and  nearest  to  them,  should  carry  the  lights 
usually  worn  by  the  Admiral,3  that  he  might  not  lose  sight  of  them  in  the  night ; 
while  he  made  what  sail  he  could,  with  the  rest  of  the  fleet,  to  keep  up  with  them.  It 
being  little  wind,  the  Spanish  galleys  towed  their  heaviest  sailers  all  night. 

"The  thirty-first,4  in  the  morning,  as  soon  as  it  was  day,  they  finding  us  pretty 
near  up  with  their  fleet,  the  galleys  and  smaller  ships,  with  the  fireships,  bond)  vessels, 

1  Sent  home  by  his  son,  Pattee  Byng.     Gazette,  Xo.  (iliTIj. 

2  I.e.  August  10th,  N.S. 

3  An  Admiral  commanding  in  chief  carried  three  lights  on  the  poop  and  one  light 
in  the  main-top. 

4  La.  August  llth,  N.S. 

VOL.    III.  D 


34 


MAJOR    OPERATIONS,    1711-1762. 


[1718. 


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1718.]  HFXG'S  DESPATCH.  35 

and  storeships,  separated  from  the  admiral  and  bigger  ships,  and  stood  in  for  the  shore : 
after  whom  the  Admiral  sent  Captain  Walton,  in  the  Canterbury,  with  the  Argyle  and 
six  ships  moie.  As  those  ships  were  coming  up  with  them,  one  of  the  Spaniards  '  fired 
a  broadside  at  the  Argyle.  The  Admiral,  seeing  those  ships  engaged  with  the  Spanish, 
which  were  making  towards  the  shore,  sent  orders  to  Captain  Walton  to  rendezvous, 
after  the  action,  at  Syracusa  (where  the  Viceroy  for  the  King  of  Sicily  was,  with  a 
garrison).  The  like  orders  he  despatched-  to  the  flags,  and  to  as  many  ships  as  were 
within  his  reach,  that  place  being  defended  against  the  Spaniards,  and  being  the  most 
proper  port  on  that  coast  for  the  fleet  to  gather  together  again. 

"  We  held  on  our  chase  after  the  Spanish  admiral,  with  three  of  his  rear-admirals, 
and  the  biggest  ships,  which  stayed  by  their  flags  till  we  came  near  them.  The 
captains  of  the  Kent,  Saperbe,  Grafton,  and  Orford,  having  orders  to  make  what  sail 
they  could  to  place  themselves  by  the  four  headmost  ships,  were  the  first  that  came  up 
with  them.  The  Spaniards  began,  by  firing  their  stern-chase[rs]  at  them  :  but  they, 
having  orders  not  to  fire  unless  the  Spanish  ships  repeated  their  firing,  made  no  return 
at  first.  But,  the  Spaniards  firing  again,  the  Orford  attacked  the  Santa  llosa,  which, 
some  time  after,  she  took.  The  St.  diaries 2  struck  next  without  much  opposition, 
and  the  Kent  took  possession  of  her.  The  Grafton  attacked  the  Prim-,'  of  Aftin-ifia, 
formerly  called  the  Cumberland,3  in  which  was  Hear- Admiral  Chacon:  but,  the  Hml« 
and  Captain  coming  up,  she  left  that  ship  for  them  to  take,  which  they  soon  did  ;  and 
stretched  ahead  after  another  sixty-gun  ship,  which  was  on  her  starboard  while  slit- 
was  engaging  the  Prince  of  Ast  arias,  and  kept  firing  her  stern-chase  into  the  Gi-nj'l/>n. 

"About  one  o'clock,  the  Kent  and  Superie  engaged  the  Spanish  admiral,4  which, 
with  two  ships  more,  fired  on  them,  and  made  a  running  fight  until  about  three ;  when 
the  Kent,  bearing  down  upon  her,  and  under  her  stern,  gave  her  a  broadside  and  went 
away  to  leeward  of  her.  Then  the  Si/jierlir,  put  for  it,  and  laid  the  Spanish  Admiral  on 
board,  falling  on  her  weather  quarter:  "but  the  Spanish  admiral  shifting  her  helm  and 
avoiding  her,  the  Superbe  ranged  up  under  her  lee  quarter;  on  which  she  struck  to  her. 
At  the  same  time,  the  Barfleur  being  within  shot  of  the  said  Spanish  admiral  astern, 
inclining  on  her  weather  quarter,  one  ot  their  rear-admirals,"  and  another  sixty-gnu 
ship,  which  were  to  windward  of  the  Uarjleur,  bore  down  and  gave  her  their  broad- 
sides, and  then  clap'd  upon  a  wind,  standing  in  for  the  land.  The  Admiral,  in  the 
Jiarjieur,  stood  after  them  till  it  was  almost  night,  lint,  it  being  little  wind,  and  they 
galing  from  her  out  of  reach,  he  left  pursuing  them,  and  stood  away  to  the  fleet  again  ; 
which  he  joined  two  hours  after  night.  The  Ass.- a;  took  the  •luitu;  the  Muuttuju  and 
Rupert  took  the  Vohuite.  Viee- Admiral  Cornwall  followed  the  (Irufttiii  to  support 
her;  but,  it  being  very  little  wind  and  the  night  coming  on,  the  Spaniard  galed  away 
from  the  Grafton. 

"  Rear-Admiral  Delavall,  with  the  Royal  Oak,  chased  two  ships  that  went  away 
more  leewardly  than  the  rest,  (one  of  them  said  to  be  Rear-Admiral  Cammock  6)  but 
we,  not  having  seen  them  since,  know  not  the  success.  The  ship  which  suffered  most, 
with  us,  was  the  Grafton,  the  captain  of  which,  though  he  had  not  the  fortune  to  take 


1  The  San  hidoro,  46.  2  San  Carlos. 

3  The  Cumberland,  80,  Captain  Richard  Edwards  (a),  had  been  taken  by  the  French 
in  1707.     See  Vol.  II.  p.  513.     In  Spanish  hands  she  carried  a  lighter  armament  than 
she  had  been  built  for. 

4  Heal  San  Felipe.  5  Apparently  the  San  Luis. 

6  George  Cammock  had  been  a  post-captain  in  the  Royal  Navy  until  1714,  and  had 
repeatedly  distinguished  himself.  Owing  to  his  Jacobite  leanings,  he  had  been 
dismissed  the  service,  and  had  entered  that  of  Spain.  The  Pretender  afterwards 
appointed  him  Admiral  of  the  White.  He  is  said  to  have  died  in  banishment  at 
Ceuta.  Charnock,  iii.  221. 

D   2 


36  MAJOR    OPERATIONS,   1714-1762.  [1718. 

any  particular  ship,  yet  was  engaged  with  several,  behaved  himself  very  much  like  an 
officer  and  a  seaman,  and  bid  fair  for  stopping  the  way  of  those  four  ships  that  i 
pursued ;  who  escaped,  not  through  his  fault,  but  failure  of  wind ;  and  his  own 
and  rigging  were  much  shattered." 

"FltOM    ON    HOARD   THK    ISarfltUT,    AT   SKA, 

Amjust  1th  (O.S.). 

"Just  now  is  returned  one  of  the  eight  ships  which  the  Admiral  sent  with  Captain 
Walton  to  pursue  those  of  Spain  that  went  in  with  the  shore,  with  a  letter1  from  that 
Captain,  dated  the  fifth  instant,  giving  an  account  that  he,  with  the  said  ships,  had 
taken  one  Spanish  rear-admiral  of  sixty  guns,  one  man-of-war  of  four  and  fifty,  one  of 
forty,2  which  gave  the  Ar;/i/le  the  tirst  broadside,  one  of  four  and  twenty,  one  ship 
laden  witli  arms,  and  one  bomb-vessel ;  and  had  burnt  one  man-of-war  of  four  and 
fifty  guns,  two  of  forty  each,  one  of  thirty,  one  tircship,  one  bomb-vessel,  and  one 
settee?  At  the  writing  of  this  letter,  Captain  Walton  was  making  into  Syracusa. 
The  ship  which  brought  this  letter  saw  Kear-Admiial  Delavall  last  night;  who  had 
taken  the  /aiMit,  a  ship  of  sixty  guns,  with  which  he  was  standing  in  likewise  for 
Syracusa;  to  which  place  we  are  now  going;  and  hope  to  get  in  there  this  night. 

"When  the  Admiral  lias  joined  the  ships  absent  from  the  fleet,  and  which  we 
judsje  are  now  in  Syracusa  with  their  prizes,  he  designs  to  send  Vice-Admiral 
Cornwall,  in  the  .!','/.'/''>  "''''  «'Veii  or  eight  ships  more,  to  carry  the  ships  taken  to 
Port  Mahon,  to  be  secured  there  till  his  Majesty's  pleasure  lie  known.  He  will  also 
put  ash. .re,  in  Sicily,  the  Spanish  admirals  and  commanding  officers,  with  as  many  of 
the  common  prisoners  as  will  n<>t  be  nece.-sary  to  help  navigate  the  ships  taken." 

What  may  be  regarded  as  an  official  Spanish  narrative  of  the 
battle,  and  of  the  circumstances  which  led  up  to  it,  was  compiled  by 
the  Marques  de  J3eretti-Landi,  and  published  at  the  Hague.  It  is 
interesting,  as  well  as  fair,  to  append  the  following  translation  of 
part  of  it : — 

"On  August  '.ith,  in  the  morning,  the  Knglish  licet  was  discovered  off  the  tower  of 
Faro.  Towards  night  it  lay  by,  off  Cape  della  Mctcllc,  opposite  the  tower  in  question. 
The  Spanish  fleet  was  at  the  time  in  the  Strait,  but  was  without  the  detachment 
commanded  by  Hear- Admiral  Don  II.  de  Guevara,  and  some  ships  and  frigates  which 
had  been  sent  to  other  places.  As  the  intention  of  the  Knglish  Admiral  in  thus 
approaching  was  unknown,  the  Spanish  Admiral  determined  to  quit  the  Strait,  and  to 


1  The  letter  here  alluded  to  is  the  famous  one  which,  erroneously,  has  so  often  been 
cited  as  a  model  of  modest  brevity  and  sailor-like  conciseness.     As  given  by  Campbell, 
it  runs:   "  Sir,  we  have  taken  and  destroyed  all  the  Spanish   ships  and  vessels  which 
were  upon   the  coast,  the  number  as  per  margin.     L  am,  etc.,  (I.  WALTON."     Even 
Mahan,  following  Campbell  anil  Charnock,  accepts  this  docked  version  of  the  letter  as 
genuine,  and  comments  upon  its  shortness;  yet,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  the  real  letter  is 
one  of  some  little  length,  and  the  above  quotation  forms  only  the  tirst  paragraph  of  it. 
Walton's    blunt    brevity    is   as   mythical    as   certain    well-known    stories    which   are 
associated  with  Fontenoy  and  Waterloo. 

2  The  tiait  Jsidoro,  4t>. 

3  Some  of  the  vessels  here  said  to  have  been  burnt  by  Walton  were  undoubtedly  in 
reality  fired  by  Mari  to  save  them  from  capture.     It  conies,  however,  almost  to  the 
same  thing. 


1718.]  THE   SPANISH  STORY.  37 

collect  his  forces  oft'  Cape  Spartivento,  taking  with  him  his  vessels  laden  with  stores, 
his  object  being  the  better  to  prepare  against  the  designs  of  the  English,  seeing  that  an 
officer  who  had  been  sent  by  Sir  George  Byng  to  the  Marques  de  Lede  had  not 
returned.  This  officer  had  had  orders  to  suggest  to  the  Marques  a  suspension  of 
hostilities  for  two  months;  but  the  Marques  had  replied  that  he  could  do  nothing 
without  directions  from  his  Court.  And  although  it  was  believed  that  a  courier  had 
been  despatched  with  the  suggestion  to  Madrid,  the  Spaniards  were  unwilling  to  risk  a 
surprise  from  the  English  fleet,  and  a  resort  to  such  tactics  as  might  be  prompted  by 
perfidy. 

"  On  the  morning  of  the  10th,  the  English  fleet  advanced  further  into  the  Faro,  and 
was  saluted  by  all  the  Spanish  ships  and  vessels  lying  there.  It  is  to  be  here  noted 
that  although  Admiral  Byng  had  convoyed  to  Keggio  some  transports  having  on  board 
troops  *  of  the  Archduke,  the  officer  who  had  been  sent  to  the  Marques  de  Lede 
declared  that  this  was  not  for  hostile  purposes,  but  merely  to  secure  from  any  insults 
the  transports  which  were  under  his  protection. 

"The  Spanish  fleet  sent  out  two  light  frigates  to  reconnoitre  the  English  fleet  ;  and 
although  these  perceived  that  the  English,  whose  designs  were  not  understood,  made 
all  possible  sail  to  close  with  the  Spaniards,  whose  Admiral  was  ignorant  whether  the 
English  came  as  friends  or  as  enemies,  yet  the  Spaniards,  who  were  two  leagues  from 
the  strangers,  decided  to  withdraw  towards  Cape  Passaro  under  eas}'  sail,  in  order  that 
there  might  be  no  pretence  that  they  anticipated  hostilities.  Soon  afterwards  a  calm 
supervened,  and  thus  the  ships  of  both  fleets  fell  among  one  another ;  whereupon  the 
Spanish  Admiral,  witnessing  the  danger,  caused  his  ships  of  the  line  to  be  towed  away 
from  the  English  with  a  view  to  collecting  them  in  one  body.  Vet  he  did  not  permit 
the  galleys  to  commit  any  unfriendly  act,  such  as  they  might  have  committed  with 
advantage  while  it  remained  calm.  When  the  Marques  de  Mari  was  near  the  land  and 
was  separated  from  his  consorts  in  the  rear  and  from  the  frigates  and  transports  of  his 
division,  the  weather  changed,  so  that  he  strove  in  vain  to  regain  the  main  body  of  the 
Spanish  fleet.  But  the  English,  with  dissimulation,  held  on  their  way,  trimming  their 
sails  so  as  to  secure  the  wind,  and  to  cut  off  the  Marques  de  Man's  division.  When 
they  had  at  length  succeeded  in  this,  they  attacked  him  with  six  ships,  forcing  him  to 
separate  from  the  rest  of  the  fleet  and  to  retire  towards  the  shore.  As  long  as  it  was 
jiossible,  the  Marques  defended  himself  against  seven  ships  of  the  line,  and,  when  he 
was  no  longer  able  to  resist,  he  saved  his  people  by  running  his  vessels  aground. 
Some  of  them  were  burnt  under  his  own  direction :  others  were  taken  by  the  enemy. 

"  The  rest  of  the  English  fleet,  consisting  of  seventeen  sail  of  the  line,  fell  upon  the 
Real  San  J'elipe,  Principe  de  Anturian,  Km/  Fernando,  Hint  Car/on,  tianta  Isabeln, 
and  San  Pedro,  and  the  frigates  Snnt'i  Jtoxii,  I'rrlu,  Juno,  and  I'ofaitti',  which 
continued  to  make  for  Cape  Passaro;  and  as,  owing  to  their  inferiority  of  force,  they 
drew  off  in  line,  the  English  attacked  their  rearmost  ship  with  four  or  five  vessels,  and 
cut  her  off.  They  did  the  same  in  succession  with  other  ships,  which,  in  spite  of  the 
fact  that  they  made  all  the  sail  they  could,  were  unable  to  avoid  being  captured- 
Thus,  every  Spanish  vessel  being  separately  fought  by  live,  six,  or  seven  of  the  enemy, 
the  English  finally  subdued  the  Re<d  San  Felipe,2  Principe  de  Asturias,  San  Carlos, 
Santa  Isabela,  Santa  Rosa,  Volatile,  and  Juno,  though  each  offered  a  bloody  and 
determined  resistance. 

"  While  the  Real  San  Felijie  was  engaged  with  the  English,  Rear- Admiral  Don 
Balthazar  de  Guevara  returned  from  Malta  with  two  ships  of  the  line,  and,  heading  for 
the  Seal  San  Felipe,  passed  the  English  ships  which  were  then  alongside  her,  firing 
upon  each.  He  then  attacked  such  of  Admiral  Byng's  vessels  as  followed  the  Seal 


1  Under  General  Wetzel. 

2  Admiral  Castaneta  subsequently  died  of  his  wounds  at  Port  Mahon. 


38  MAJOR    OPERATIONS,    1714-1762.  [1718. 

.San  Felipe.     These,  being  very  much  damaged,  drew  off  in  ihe  night,  and,  after  the 
action,  remained  fifty  leagues  at  sea  for  three  or  four  days,  not  only  to  repair  the 
Spanish  ships  which  they  had  captured,  and  which  were  most  severely  mauled,  b< 
also  to  make  good  their  own  damages.     Admiral  Byng,  therefore,  could  not  enter 
Syracuse  until  August  16th  or  17th,  and  then  only  with  much  difficulty."1 

After  giving  some  account  of  the  services  of  individual  ships  and 
captains,  the  account  continues  : — 

"  Such  is  the  story  of  the  action  off  Abola,  or  the  Gulf  of  I'Ariga,  in  the  Malta 
Channel,  between  the  Spanish  and  English  fleets.  The  English  ships,  thanks  to  ill 
faith  and  superior  strength,  were  able  to  beat  the  Spanish  vessels  singly,  one  by  one  : 
but  it  may  be  conceived,  judging  from  the  defence  made  by  the  latter,  that,  had  they 
acted  in  unison,  the  battle  might  have  ended  more  advantageously  for  them. 

"  Immediately  after  the  action,  a  captain  of  the  English  fleet,  on  behalf  of  Admiral 
Byng,  arrived  to  make  a  complimentary  excuse  to  the  Marques  de  Lede,  and  to  assure 
him  that  the  Spaniards  had  been  the  aggressors,  and  that  the  battle  ought  not  to  be 
considered  to  constitute  a  rupture,  seeing  that  the  English  did  not  take  it  as  doing  so. 
But  it  was  replied  that  Spain,  on  the  contrary,  must  hold  it  to  constitute  a  formal 
rupture  ;  and  that  the  Spaniards  would  do  the  English  all  possible  damage  and  ill,  by 
ordering  the  commencement  of  reprisals.  In  pursuance  of  this,  several  Spanish 
vessels,  and  J)on  (iuevara's  division,  have  already  sei/.cd  certain  English  ships."2 

"It  is  dillirult,"  comments  Mahan,  "1"  understand  the  importance  attached  by  some 
writers  to  Bynu's  action  nt  this  lime  in  attacking  without  regard  to  the  linc-ol'-battle. 
He  had  before  him  a  disorderly  force,  much  inferior  both  in  numbers  and  discipline. 
His  merit  seems  t"  lie  rather  in  the  readiness  to  assume  a  responsibility  from  which  a 
more  scrupulous  man  might  have  shrunk  :  but  in  this,  and  throughout  the  campaign, 
he  rendered  good  service  to  England,  whose  sea  power  was  again  strengthened  by  the 
destruction  not  of  an  actual  but  a  possible  rival;  and  his  services  were  rewarded  by  a 
]  ice  rage."  :; 

It  will  be  well  to  conclude  the  history  of  the  major  operations  of 
the  Spanish  War  ere  turning  to  the  work  done  in  the  meantime  by 
British  fleets  in  the  Baltic,  where  a  state  of  unrest  continued  for 
several  years. 

Sir  George  Byng,  after  having  taken  measures  to  enable  the 
imperial  troops  to  attack  the  Spaniards  in  Sicily,  and  to  gradually 
make  themselves  masters  of  the  island,  proceeded  to  Malta,  and 
brought  away  some  Sicilian  galleys,  which,  under  the  Marchese  de 
Kivarole,  had  been  blockaded  there  by  Bear-Admiral  Cammock.  He 
returned  to  Naples  on  November '2nd.  In  the  interval,  Kear-Admiral 
Guevara,  as  related  in  the  narrative  of  the  Marques  de  Beretti- 
Landi,  entered  Cadiz,  and  seized  all  the  English  ships  there,  while 

1  There  are,  of  course,  discrepancies  between  the  Spanish  and  the  British  accounts 
as  here  given ;  but,  upon  the  whole,  the  two  agree  unusually  well. 

2  For  the  translation,  I  am  indebted  to  Dr.  Henry  Lopes. 

3  Not,  however,  until  September  9th,  1721,  when  he  was  made  Baron  Byng  of 
Sou  thill,  and  Viscount  Torrington. 


1719.] 


SPANISH  It  AID    ON  SCOTLAND. 


British  merchants  and  their  effects  were  laid  hands  upon  in  Malaga 
and  other  ports  of  Spain.  Reprisals  followed  immediately,  yet  war 
was  not  formally  declared  until  December  17th,  1718. 

Spain,  though  weak,  was  exasperated  and  obdurate,  and  was 
even  more  unwilling  than  at  first  to  accept  the  terms  dictated  to  her 
by  the  Quadruple  Alliance.  She  therefore  collected  a  considerable 
armament  at  Cadiz  and  Corunna,  and  boldly  projected  an  invasion  of 
the  west  of  England  by  troops  to  be  led  by  James  Butler,  the 
attainted  Duke  of  Ormonde.  A  fleet,  under  Admiral  of  the  Fleet 
James,  Earl  of  Berkeley,1  and  Admiral  Sir  John  Norris,  was  fitted 
out,  and  cruised  in  the  Channel  in  April ;  and  troops  were  con- 
centrated, especially  in  the  west  country  and  in  Ireland;  but,  long 


MKIIA1,    COMMEMORATIVE    (IK    HYMiS    VICTORY    <IKK    C.U'K    1'ASSAIid. 

(ft'vni  art  vri<jiinil  kindly  lent  tin  //>'.//.  ('ii/tlfiin  /'/•///<•<    L<i"i<  t>f  Butttiibi'ni,  li.X.) 

ere  these  preparations  had  been  completed,  the  Spanish  expedition 
had  been  dispersed  by  a  violent  and  long-continued  storm,  and  the 
scheme  had  been  rendered  abortive.  Three  frigates  and  five  trans- 
ports, however,  conveying,  among  others,  the  Earls  of  Marischal  and 
Seaforth,  and  the  Marquis  of  Tullibardine,  persisted  in  their  design, 
and,  pushing  on  to  the  coast  of  Ross-shire,  there  landed  about  four 
hundred  men.  These  were  joined  by  fifteen  or  sixteen  hundred 
Jacobite  Scots ;  but  they  had  no  success.  Their  depot  at  Donan 
Castle  was  taken  and  destroyed  by  the  Worcester,  Enterprise,  and 
Flambo rough,  and  they  themselves  were  soon  afterwards  defeated 

1  So  appointed  on  March  21st,  1719.  He  was  then  also  Vice-Admiral  of  Great 
Britain  and  First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty,  and  he  hoisted  his  flag  with  no  fewer  than 
three  captains  under  him,  viz.,  Vice-Admiral  James  Littleton  (1st) ;  Captain  Francis 
Hosier  (2nd,  or  Captain  of  the  Fleet) ;  and  the  captain  of  the  flagship. 


40  MAJOR    OPERATIONS,    1714-1762.  [1719. 

at  Glenshiel,  whereupon  the  Spanish  auxiliaries  surrendered  at 
discretion. 

Sir  George  Byng  sailed  from  Port  Mahon  for  Naples  early 
in  the  spring  of  1719,  and,  thenceforward,  co-operated  with  the 
Imperialists  in  the  complete  reduction  of  Sicily.  In  August,  when 
that  reduction  was  nearly  accomplished,  a  dispute  arose  between  the 
Admiral  and  the  allies  as  to  the  disposal  of  the  Spanish  ships  that 
still  lay  in  the  ports  of  the  island.  As  a  settlement  of  the  question, 
so  far  as  it  concerned  the  ships  at  Messina,  Sir  George  proposed  to 
General  Count  de  Merci,  the  Imperialist  commander,  that  a  battery 
should  be  erected,  and  that  the  vessels  should  be  destroyed  at  their 
anchors.  L>e  Merci  pleaded  lack  of  orders  ;  but  Byng,  insisting  that 
no  commander  needed  specific  instructions  to  destroy  the  property 
of  an  enemy,  gained  his  point,  in  spite  of  the  opposition  of  the 
Savoyards ;  and  most  of  the  ships  were  duly  bombarded  and  burnt 
or  sunk.  The  citadel  of  Messina,  and  the  remaining  vessels,  were 
handed  over  to  the  Imperialists  by  capitulation  on  October  7th,  171',). 
The  Spanish  troops  in  the  island  were  not  permitted  to  evacuate  it, 
and  were  kept,  by  the  fleet  on  the  one  hand,  and  by  the  Imperialists 
on  the  other,  in  much  discomfort ;  and  this  fact,  combined  with 
the  persuasive  force  of  an  expedition  which  was  fitted  out  against 
Vigo  under  Vice-Admiral  Mighells  and  Viscount  Cobham,  and  which 
will  be  described  in  the  next  chapter,  at  length  induced  the  King  of 
Spain  to  agree  with  the  Quadruple  Alliance.  A  cessation  of  arms 
resulted  in  February,  17'2();  and,  soon  afterwards,  both  Sicily  and 
Sardinia  were  evacuated  under  the  terms  of  a  convention,  the  former 
going  to  the  Empire,  and  the  latter  to  Savoy.1  Thus  the  objects  for 
which  Great  Britain  had  entered  into  the  war  were  attained.  The 
wisdom  of  British  interference  is  a  matter  which  it  is  unnecessary 
here  to  discuss. 

The  difficulties  with  Sweden,  suspended  for  the  moment  in  1717, 
again  became  acute  in  1718,  and  led  to  the  dispatch  of  Admiral  Sir 
John  Norris  once  more  to  the  Baltic.  He  sailed  from  the  mouth  of 
the  Thames  on  April  '28th,  and  from  Solebay  on  May  1st,  with  a 
squadron  composed  of  ten  sail  of  the  line,"  a  bomb  ketch,  and  a 

1  Authorities  fur  the  War  of  the  Quadruple  Alliance :  '  Account  of  the  Exped.  of 
the  Brit.  Fleet  to  Sicily  ' ;  '  Aunals  of  K.  George  IV.' ;  '  Historical  Register ' ;  '  Corps 
Univ.  Diplomatique,'  viii.  pt.  I. ;  Chandler's  '  Debates,'  v.  and  vi. ;  '  Merc.  Hist,  et  Pol.' 
xliv.   and   xlv. ;    '  Hem.   pour   servir   a   1'Hist.   de  1'Espagne,'  iii. ;    Letters   of   Earl 
Stanhope,  Alberoni,  Beretti-Landi,  etc. ;  London  Gazette. 

2  Cumberland,  80,  (flag),  Captain   William  Faulknor;    liuckinghvm,  70,  Captain 


1720.]  EXPEDITIONS    TO    THE  BALTIC.  41 

fireship,  with  Bear- Admiral  James  Mighells  as  second  in  command, 
and  with  a  number  of  merchantmen  in  convoy.  Upon  his  arrival  off 
Copenhagen,  he  was  joined  by  a  Danish  squadron,  with  which  he 
cruised  to  the  northward;  but  as  the  Swedes,  upon  his  approach, 
shut  themselves  up'  in  their  ports,  no  naval  action  resulted.  Sweden 
was,  however,  by  no  means  intimidated  by  the  action  of  the  Allies. 
She.  made  peace  with  the  Tsar;  and,  having  thus  freed  herself  from 
anxiety  in  one  direction,  turned  with  renewed  energy  to  prosecute 
the  land  war  with  Denmark,  whose  territories  she  invaded  with 
two  considerable  armies.  In  this  campaign,  although  it  was  upon 
the  whole  successful,  Sweden  suffered  the  loss  of  her  brave  but 
quixotic  king.  Charles  XII.  was  killed  by  a  cannon  ball  at 
the  siege  of  Frederikshald  on  December  llth,  1718.  Sir  John 
N orris,  with  the  fleet,  had  returned  to  England  in  the  month  of 
October. 

After  the  death  of  Charles  XII.  and  the  accession  of  Queen 
Ulrica  Eleanora  l  the  policy  of  Sweden  changed.  She  entered  upon 
very  friendly  relations  with  Great  Britain,  and,  on  the  other  hand, 
was  attacked  by  her  late  ally  and  Great  Britain's  old  friend,  Peter 
the  Great.  The  Russians  ravaged  the  Swedish  coasts  until,  a  fresh 
British  fleet  having  been  entrusted  to  the  command  of  Sir  John 
Norris  in  June,  and  having  joined  the  Swedish  fleet  in  September, 
1719,  the  enemy  was  obliged  to  take  refuge  in  the  harbour  of  Beval. 
A  little  later,  the  old  quarrel  between  Sweden  and  Denmark  was 
settled  by  British  mediation  :  •  but  when  Norris,  in  order  to  avoid 
being  frozen  up  there,  left  the  Baltic  in  November,  Sweden  and 
Russia  remained  unreconciled,  in  spite  of  the  efforts  which  had  been 
made  by  Lord  Carteret — afterwards  Earl  Granville — the  British 
minister  at  Stockholm,  to  pacify  them. 

In  17'20  Russia's  attitude  continued  as  before,  and  Sir  John 
Norris  went  back  to  the  Baltic  to  protect  Sweden  during  the  open 
weather.  He  sailed  on  April  16th ;  was  joined  in  May  by  a  Swedish 
squadron  under  Admiral  Baron  Wachtmeister  ;  and,  after  cruising  off 


Tudor  Trevor ;  Hampton  Court,  70,  Captain  Robert  Colemau  ;  Prince  Frederick,  70, 
Captain  Covill  Mayne :  Salisbury,  50,  Captain  John  Cockburne  (1);  Defiance,  CO, 
Captain  Joseph  Soanes  ;  Winchester,  50,  Captain  James  Campbell  (1)  ;  Guernsey,  50, 
Captain  Charles  Hardy  (1)  ;  and  Windsor,  60,  Captain  Francis  Piercy.  These  were 
afterwards  joined  by  a  few  other  vessels. 

Whose  consort,  Friedrich  of  Hessen-Cassel,  was  presently  chosen  king,  to  thy 
great  annoyance  of  Russia. 

2  Though  the  formal  treaty  of  peace  was  not  signed  until  the  summer  of  1720. 


42  MAJOR    OPERATIONS,   1714-1762.  [1725. 

Reval,  returned  to  England  in  November.1  In  1721,  Sir  John  was 
employed  in  the  same  way,  his  mission  being,  however,  not  only  to 
protect  Sweden,  but  also  to  lend  moral  support  to  the  mediatory 
efforts  of  the  British  minister  at  Stockholm.  He  sailed  from  the 
Nore  on  April  13th  with  a  fleet  of  twenty-one  ships  of  the  line,  two 
fireships,  three  bombs,  and  two  tenders,  and  with  Eear-Admiral 
Francis  Hosier  (W.),  and  Eear-Admiral  Edward  Hopsonn  (B.),  in 
command  under  him.  His  appearance  in  the  Baltic  undoubtedly 
favoured  the  conclusion  of  peace  between  the  belligerents :  and  on 
September  10th  hostilities  between  Sweden  and  Kussia  were 
formally  terminated  by  the  Treaty  of  Nystadt.  Sir  John  dropped 
anchor  at  the  Nore  on  October  20th.  During  these  various  ex- 
peditions to  the  north  he  seldom  had  occasion  to  fire  a  gun  in  anger, 
and  his  proceedings  were  throughout  of  an  uneventful  and  un- 
exciting character ;  yet,  thanks  to  his  tact,  patience,  and  diplomatic 
ability,  and  to  the  recognised  strength  and  efficiency  of  the  forces 
under  him,  he  was  able  to  exercise  a  very  weighty  influence  upon 
the  councils  of  the  northern  powers,  and  to  peaceably  bring  about 
results  which  a  less  capable  officer  might  have  failed  to  secure  even 
by  fighting  for  them. 

From  1721  onwards,  for  four  or  five  years,  the  Navy  had  no 
great  tasks  assigned  to  it ;  but  the  Treaty  of  Vienna,  concluded  on 
April  '20th,  1725,  between  Spain  and  Austria,  introduced  new 
sources  of  trouble  to  Europe.  By  a  secret  article  of  that  treaty, 
marriages  between  the  houses  of  Spain  and  Austria  were  arranged, 
and  both  countries  pledged  themselves  to  assist  the  restoration  of 
the  Stuarts,  and  to  compel,  if  necessary  by  force,  the  retrocession  of 
Gibraltar  and  Minorca  to  Spain.  To  oppose  these  schemes,  Great 
Britain,  France,  and  Prussia  entered,  on  September  3rd,  1725,  into 
the  Treaty  of  Hannover ;  whereupon,  Spain  began  to  intrigue  with 
Kussia ;  and,  as  the  Empress  Catherine,  the  successor  of  Peter  the 
Great,  was  by  no  means  amicably  disposed  towards  Great  Britain 
and  her  allies,  it  became  advisable,  in  1726,  not  only  to  send  a  fleet 
to  the  coast  of  Spain,  but  also  to  dispatch  once  more  a  strong  force 
to  the  Baltic.  In  addition  to  these  fleets  a  squadron  was  got  ready 
for  the  West  Indies. 

The  fleet  destined  to  check  the  immediate  designs  of  Spain  was 
entrusted  to  Admiral  Sir  John  Jennings  (W.),  who  was  afterwards 

1  In  a  storm  in  the  North  Sea,  the  Monck,  50,  Captain  the  Hon.  George  Clinton, 
was  driven  ashore  near  Golston  on  Nov.  24th,  and  lost ;  but  all  her  people  were  saved. 


1726.]  WAGER    TO    THE   BALTIC.  43 

joined  by  Bear-Admiral  Edward  Hopsonn  (R.).  Sir  John,  with 
nine  ships  of  the  line,  sailed  from  St.  Helen's  on  July  20th.  The 
appearance  of  the  British  so  much  disquieted  the  Spaniards  that,  for 
the  moment,  they  abandoned  their  hostile  projects  :  and  in  October, 
Jennings  was  able  to  return  'to  England,  leaving  Hopsonn,  with  a 
reduced  squadron,  as  commander-in-chief  in  the  Mediterranean. 

The  Baltic  fleet,  under  Vice- Admiral  Sir  Charles  Wager  (R.)  and 
Rear-Admiral  Sir  George  Walton  (B.),  consisted  of  twenty  ships  of 
the  line,  a  twenty-gun  ship,  two  fireships,  and  a  hospital  ship.  It 
quitted  the  Nore  on  April  17th,  and,  proceeding  to  Copenhagen  and 
Stockholm,  obtained  the  co-operation  of  Denmark  and  the  friendly 
support  of  Sweden.  A  Danish  squadron,  under  Rear-Admiral  Bille, 
joined  Sir  Charles  in  May,  and,  with  him,  proceeded  to  the  Gulf  of 
Finland.  The  Russians  had,  in  and  about  Cronstadt,  a  considerable 
force  under  the  General-Admiral  Apraxine,  Yice-Admiral  Thomas 
Gordon,1  and  a  rear-admiral  said  to  have  been  an  Englishman  :  - 
but,  although  they  were  much  inclined  to  issue  forth  and  defy  the 
allies,  Gordon  succeeded  in  dissuading  them  from  this  suicidal 
course  ;  and  eventually  the  ships  were  laid  up.  Wager  displayed 
throughout  great  tact  and  diplomatic  ability.  In  the  autumn  he, 
like  Jennings,  returned  to  England,  anchoring  off  the  Gunfleet  on 
November  1st. 

Vice-Admiral  Francis  Hosier  :i  (B.)  was  given  command  of  the 
squadron  for  the  West  Indies.  He  sailed  from  Plymouth  on 
April  (.)th  with  seven  men-of-war,  and,  after  a  tedious  passage, 
arrived  off  the  Bastimentos,  near  Puerto  Bello,  on  June  (5th.  He 
was  then  or  thereafter  joined  by  several  vessels  which  were  already 
on  the  station,  and  by  others  from  home.  These  brought  up  his 
total  force  to  a  strength  of  sixteen  ships.4 

1  Thomas  Gordon,  a  captain  of  1705,  severed  his  coiiiici-t'nn  with  the  British  Navy 
at  the  death  of  Queen  Anne,  and  entered  that  of  Russia,  in  which  lie  was  at  once  given 
Hag-rank.     Other  Jacobite  naval  officers,  notably  the  gallant  Kenneth,  Lord  Duffus, 
took  the  same  service  at  about  the  i-ame  time. 

2  Some   authorities   specify    him   as   Rear-Admiral    Sannders,   an    ex-Master   and 
Commander  in  the  British  Navy. 

3  Francis  Hosier.     Commander,  1694.     Captain,  1GOO.     Distinguished  himself  as 
captain  of  the  Salisbury,  1707-1713.     Rear-Admiral,  1720.     Second  in  command  in 
the   Baltic.      Vice-Admiral,    1723.      Died   Commander-in-Chief   in  the  West  Indies, 
August  23rd,  1727. 

4  Viz.,  three  third-rates,  the  Breda,  Berwick,  and  Lenrac ;  eight  fourth-rates,  the 
liipon,  Leopard,  Superbe,  Nottingham,  Dunkirk,  Dragon,   Tii/er,  and  Portland  ;  one 
fifth-rate,   the   Diamond;    and   three   sixth-rates,   the    Greyhound,    Winchehea,   and 
Happy. 


44  MAJOK    OPERATIONS,   1714-1762.  [1727. 

The  appearance  of  the  British  fleet  in  the  West  Indies  gave  great 
uneasiness  to  the  Spaniards;  and,  as  soon  as  it  was  reported,  the 
treasure-ships,  which  were  then  ready  to  make  their  voyage  to 
Europe,  were  unloaded,  and  their  cargo  of  pieces  of  eight  and  other 
valuables  was  placed  on  shore  in  security,  part  at  Havana  and  part 
elsewhere.  The  men-of-war  which  were  to  have  convoyed  the 
treasure-ships  were,  moreover,  laid  up  at  Puerto  Bello ;  and  it  was 
determined  that,  so  long  as  a  powerful  British  force  remained  in  the 
neighbourhood,  no  attempt  should  be  made  to  dispatch  the  annual 
flota  to  Spain  ;  although,  of  course,  the  non-arrival  of  the  usual 
supplies  would  inevitably  put  the  mother  country  to  immense 
inconvenience. 

The  governor  of  Puerto  Bello  sent  a  civil  message  to  the  Vice- 
Admiral  desiring  to  know  the  reason  for  the  unexpected  visit.  The 
real  reason  was  that  the  galleons  might  be  watched  :  but  as  there 
lay  in  Puerto  Bello  at  the  time  a  South  Sea  Company's  ship,  the 
Royal  Gcorye,  and  as  this  vessel  would  probably  have  been  detained 
if  Hosier  had  at  once  proclaimed  the  nature  of  his  mission,  the  reply 
returned  was  to  the  effect  that  the  fleet  had  come  to  convoy  the 
Jioi/al  George.  The  governor  thereupon  took  measures  to  facilitate 
the  early  departure  of  that  ship;  and,  when  she  had  joined  the  fleet, 
he  politely  requested  the  Vice- Admiral,  seeing  that  the  ostensible 
reason  for  the  presence  of  the  force  had  ceased  to  exist,  to  withdraw 
from  off  the  port.  But  Hosier  then  answered  that,  pending  the 
receipt  of  further  orders,  he  purposed  to  remain  where  he  was  ;  and, 
that  his  intentions  might  no  longer  be  in  doubt,  he  stationed  a  ship 
of  the  line  within  gun-shot  of  the  castle,  and  suffered  no  vessel  to 
enter  or  leave  the  port  without  being  strictly  examined.  He 
maintained  this  blockade  for  six  months,  his  ships  in  the  mean- 
while becoming  daily  more  and  more  distressed  by  the  ravages  of 
epidemic  and  other  diseases ;  and  when,  on  December  14th,  1726,  he 
proceeded  to  Jamaica,  his  command  was  so  completely  enfeebled 
that  he  had  the  greatest  difficulty  in  navigating  it  into  harbour. 

The  Vice-Admiral  refreshed  his  people  and,  to  the  best  of  his 
ability,  made  up  his  weakened  complements  to  their  full  strength  ; 
and  in  February,  1727,  he  stood  over  to  Cartagena,  where  some 
galleons  then  lay.  Until  August  he  cruised  upon  his  station ;  but 
his  instructions  were  of  a  nature  which  prevented  him  from  being 
of  much  use  to  his  country.  They  authorised  him  to  make  reprisals 
subject  to  certain  restrictions,  but  not  to  make  war ;  and  although 


1727-29.]  MORTALITY  IN   THE    WEST  INDIES.  45 

the  Spaniards,  after  a  time,  began  to  seize  the  property  of  British 
merchants  and  to  detain  and  condemn  British  vessels,  Hosier  was 
obliged  to  content  himself  with  demanding  a  restitution  which  the 
Spaniards  refused,  and  which  he  was  unable  to  compel.  During 
that  period  disease  was  even  more  rife  throughout  the  fleet  than  it 
had  been  in  the  previous  year ;  and,  after  thousands  of  officers  and 
men  had  perished  miserably,  the  misfortunes  of  the  expedition 
culminated  on  August  23rd,  when  Hosier  himself  died.1 

His  death  has  been  attributed  to  anxiety  and  chagrin,  but  it 
was,  in  fact,  caused  by  fever.  Nor  is  it  astonishing  that  the  fleet 
was  then  little  better  than  a  floating  charnel-house.  The  most 
elementary  prescriptions  of  sanitary  science  seem  to  have  been 
neglected,  and  there  is  perhaps  no  better  illustration  of  the  extra- 
ordinary indifference  to  the  simplest  laws  of  health  than  the  fact 
that  in  that  hot  and  pestilent  climate  the  Vice-Admiral's  body  was 
given  a  temporary  burial-place  in  the  ballast  of  his  flagship,  the 
Breda,  where  it  remained,  a  necessary  source  of  danger  to  all  on 
board,  until  it  was  despatched  to  England,  late  in  the  year,  on  board 
H.M.  snow  H«/)pi/,  Commander  Henry  Fowkes.  Hosier's  death  left 
Captain  Edward  St.  Loe,-  of  the  Siijicrl/r,  (>(),  as  senior  officer  on  the 
station. 

St.  Loe  pursued  the  same  policy  as  Hosier  had  followed,  and  pre- 
vented the  sailing  of  the  galleons,  until  he  was  superseded  by  Yice- 
Admiral  Edward  Hopsonn,  who  arrived  at  Jamaica  on  January  2(.)th, 
17'28.  Hopsonn  died  of  fever  on  board  bis  flagship  the  Leojxinl,  50, 
on  May  8th,  leaving  St.  Loe  once  more  senior  officer.  But  by  that 
time  the  difficulties  with  Spain  were  in  a  fair  way  of  adjustment. 
It  was  still,  however,  necessary  to  keep  a  large  force  in  the  West 
Indies;  and  ere  it  was  materially  reduced,  St.  Loe  also  fell  a 
sacrifice  to  the  climate  and  to  the  insanitary  condition  of  the  ships. 
He  died  on  April  '22nd,  1729. :l 

It  is  doubtful  whether  any  other  British  fleet  has  ever  suffered 
from  disease  so  severely  as  that  of  Hosier  suffered  in  1726-27.  Its 
horrible  experiences  made  a  deep  and  lasting  impression  upon  the 
nation,4  and  it  may  be  hoped  that  they  have  had  the  effect  of 

1  Hosier  had  been  promoted  on  August  llth  to  be  Vice-Adnriral  of  the  White.     At 
the  time  of  his  death,  a  commission  empowering  the  Governor  of  Jamaica  to  knight 
him  is  said  to  have  been  on  its  way  out.     Charnock,  iii.  139. 

2  St.  Loe  flew  a  broad  pennant. 

3  Having  been  promoted  on  March  4th,  17^9,  to  be  Hear- Admiral  of  the  Blue. 

4  See,  for  example,  Glover's  popular  ballad,  'Admiral  Hosier's  Ghost.' 


46  MAJOR    OPERATIONS,    1714-1762.  [1727. 

impressing  upon  all  later  British  admirals  the  supreme  importance 
of  taking  systematic  and  rigorous  measures  for  preserving  the  health 
of  their  men.  During  the  two  years  immediately  following  Hosier's 
first  arrival  off  the  Bastimentos,  the  fleet,  the  nominal  complement 
of  which  never,  roughly  speaking,  exceeded  4750  persons,1  lost,  in 
addition  to  two  flag  officers  and  seven  or  eight  captains,  about  fifty 
lieutenants,  and  four  thousand  subordinate  officers  and  men,  by 
various  forms  of  sickness. 

The  attitude  of  Great  Britain  with  regard  to  the  galleons  pro- 
voked Spain  to  make  great  preparations  for  a  siege  of  Gibraltar  ; 
and  as  that  fortress  was  neither  thoroughly  armed  nor  properly 
held,  corresponding  measures  had  to  be  taken  for  its  protection. 
A  squadron  of  six  men-of-war  and  two  sloops  -  was  fitted  out  at 
Portsmouth  towards  the  end  of  17'2(>  ;  seventeen  companies  of 
troops  and  large  quantities  of  provisions  and  ammunition  were 
embarked  ;  and  on  December  -J4tli  Vice- Admiral  Sir  Charles 
Wager  (K.)  hoisted  his  flag  in  the  Kent,  70,  and  took  command. 
He  sailed  on  January  1'Jth,  17'J7,  and  on  February  '2nd,  having 
picked  up  the  Stir/in//  Caxt/i',  70,  on  bis  way  out,  arrived  in 
Gibraltar  Bay,  where  lie  found  Rear-Admiral  Edward  Hopsonn  (It.), 
who  had  remained  upon  the  station  during  the  winter/1  As  the 
Spaniards,  fifteen  thousand  strong,  were  seen  to  be  working  hard, 
troops,  guns,  and  stores  were  landed  ;  but  no  actual  hostilities  took 
place  until  after  .February  10th,  when  the  enemy  began  a  new 
battery  within  half  gunshot  of  some  of  the.  defences  of  the  place. 
Colonel  Jasper  Clayton,  the  Lieutenant-Governor,  made  a  spirited 
remonstrance ;  but  the  Conde  de  las  Torres,  the  Spanish  commander- 
in-chief,  returned  an  unsatisfactory  and  truculent  answer;  where- 
upon fire  was  opened  from  the  Mole  Head,  and  from  Prince's 

1  During  much  of  the  time  the  total  complement  was  not  more  than  3300  officers 
ami  men.     If  there  had  not  been  at  Jamaica  plenty  of  men   whose  ships  happened 
to   be  laid  up  there  owing  to   the  difficulty   with  Spain,  the  deficiencies  could   not 
have  been  made  good,  and  the  fleet  must  literally  have  become  an  array  of  immobile 
and  impotent  hulks. 

2  Kent,   70,   Letter,   70,  lierwkk,   70,   Royal   Oak,   70,  Portland,  50,   Tiger,   50, 
Hawk,   6,   and    Cruiser,   G.      The    Torbay,   80,   and   1'oole,   fireship,   8,    followed  on 
March  !»th. 

3  Hopsoun  had  with  him  the  Burfurd,  70,  York,  60,  Winchester,  50,  Colchester,  50, 
Swallow,  60,  Dursley   Galley,   20,  and    Thunder,   bomb,   4.     A  few  days   later   the 
Solebay,  bomb,  0,  which   had  been   cruising,  joined.     The  Berwick  and  Lenox  were 
detached  to  the  West  Indies  on    February   13th,  and   the   Portland   and   Tiger   on 
April  21st.     On   the   other   hand,  several    fresh  vessels  arrived   from   England   and 
elsewhere  at  various  times. 


1727.]  SIEGE   OF  GIBRALTAR.  47 

and  Willis's  batteries ;  and  Sir  Charles  Wager,  on  the  evening  of 
the  llth,  sent  the  Tiger,  50,  Dursley  Galley,  20,  and  Solebay, 
bomb,  6,  to  throw  a  flanking  fire  upon  the  Spanish  lines  from 
the  eastward. 

From  that  day  the  Spaniards  prosecuted  the  siege  in  earnest ; 
but  as  they  had  nothing  larger  than  boats  and  small  settees  afloat 
in  the  Bay,  they  accomplished  very  little.  Sir  Charles,  while 
always  leaving  a  few  vessels  to  enfilade  the  Spanish  attack,  fre- 
quently cruised  in  the  Strait  and  off  Cadiz  ;  and  on  those  occasions 
his  vessels  made  prizes  of  several  merchantmen.  On  March  llth, 
moreover,  the  Royal  Oak,  70,  being  detached,  took  the  new  Spanish 
man-of-war,  Nuestra  Senora  del  liosario,  46,  which  was  on  her  way 
from  Santander  to  Cadiz  ;  and,  in  the  meantime,  the  small  craft 
employed  by  the  enemy  within  the  Bay  were  from  time  to  time 
nearly  all  seized.  So  matters  went  on,  until,  on  June  Kith,  Sir 
Charles  Wager,  having  heard  that  the  preliminaries  of  peace  had 
been  agreed  to,  ordered  a  cessation  of  hostilities.1 

"  But,"  says  Smollett,  '•  when  the  siege  \v;is  on  the  point  of  being  entirely  raised, 
and  the  preliminaries  ratified  in  form,  Spain  started  new  difficulties  and  urged  new 
pretensions.  The  Spaniards  insisted  that  a  temporary  suspension  of  anus  did  not 
imply  an  actual  raising  of  the  siege  of  Gibraltar.  .  .  .  Upon  this,  hostilities  began 
between  the  ships  of  the  two  nations;  and  Sir  Charles  Wager  continued  to  cruise  on 
the  coasts  of  Spain,  after  the  cessation  of  arms  at  Gibraltar.  .  .  .  However,  after  many 
cavils  and  delays,  the  preliminary  articles  were  at  last  signed  at  Madrid  on  February 
'24th,2  above  eight  months  after  the  death  of  King  George  the  First,  by  the  ministers 
of  the  Emperor,  England,  Spain,  France,  and  the  States;  which  opened  the  way  to 
the  Congress."3 

Sir  Charles  Wager,  with  part  of  his  fleet,  reached  Spithead  on 
April  9th,  on  his  return  from  the  Mediterranean.  During  his 
absence  there,  Admiral  Sir  John  Norris  (B.),  Bear-Admiral  Salmon 
Morrice  (W.),  and  Bear-Admiral  Bobert  Hughes  (1)  (B.),  with  twelve 
ships  of  the  line  and  several  smaller  ones,  made  another  demonstra- 
tion in  the  Baltic,  in  order  to  induce  the  Empress  of  Bussia  to 
refrain  from  attacking  Sweden.  The  fleet  reached  Copenhagen 
on  May  12th,  1727,  and  its  appearance  in  northern  waters  created 
so  powerful  an  impression  that  Bussia,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that 
she  had  already  threatened  Sweden  in  definite  terms,  laid  up  her 
ships  and  abandoned  her  designs.  Sir  John  returned  without  having 
had  occasion  to  fire  a  shot. 

1  Sir  Charles  utilised  the  leisure  which  this  cessation  gave  him  by  proceeding  to 
Tangier,  and  renewing  the  peace  with  Marocco. 

*  1728.  3  Begun  at  Soissons  on  June  1ft,  1728. 


48  MAJOR    OPERATIONS,    1714-1762.  [1729. 

The  death  of  George  I.,  which  had  occurred  at  Osnabriick  on 
June  llth,  1727,  made  no  difference  to  the  foreign  policy  of  Great 
Britain.  George  II.,  in  his  first  message  to  Parliament,  while 
expressing  a  hope  that  peace  would  be  re-established  as  a  result 
of  the  deliberations  then  in  progress,  pointed  out  that  it  was  still 
necessary  to  continue  the  preparations  for  war.  Eleven  ships  had 
already  been  commissioned  in  January  ;  and,  as  the  sincerity  of 
Spain  remained  in  some  doubt,  fifteen  more  were  commissioned  in 
June,  1728.  When  Parliament  re-assembled  in  January,  17'29,  the 
Congress  at  Soissons  had  failed  to  devise  terms  of  peace  that  were 
satisfactory  to  all  the  numerous  parties  concerned,  and  the  Spaniards 
in  the  West  Indies  were  more  troublesome  than  ever  to  British 
trade.  But  the  manifest  determination  of  the  King  to  stand  by 
his  allies  ;  his  plainly-expressed  intention  to  preserve  his  "  undoubted 
right  to  Gibraltar  and  the  island  of  Minorca";'  his  assurance  that 
he  would  secure  satisfaction  for  Spanish  depredations  in  the  West 
Indies  ;  and  his  orders,  issued  on  May  2~>th,  for  the  commissioning 
of  twenty  sail  of  the  line  and  five  frigates,-  were  not  without 
effect ;  the  result  being  that,  by  the  Treaty  of  Seville,  concluded 
on  November  <.)th,  172'.),  Great  Britain,  Spain,  and  France,  who 
were  subsequently  joined  by  Holland,  became  defensively  allied. 
Gibraltar  was  not  mentioned  in  the  treaty ;  and  the  fact  that 
it  was  not  mentioned  was  regarded  as  a  tacit  renunciation  of  the 
claim  of  Spain  to  the  Hock  ;  but,  in  some  other  respects,  the 
settlement  was  disadvantageous  to  Great  Britain,3  and,  upon 
the  whole,  it  was  beneficial  rather  to  France  than  to  any  other 
country. 

During  the  peace  which  followed,  Admiral  Sir  Charles  Wager,4 
in  1731,  assisted  the  Marques  de  Mari  in  convoying  a  large  body  of 
Spanish  troops  to  Leghorn,  in  order  to  place  Don  Carlos  de  Bourbon 
in  possession  of  Parma  and  Piacenza,  to  which,  under  the  terms  of 
the  treaty,  the  Prince  had  become  entitled  by  the  death  of  the 
Duke  of  Parma.  Yet,  notwithstanding  this  friendly  co-operation 
between  Great  Britain  and  Spain  in  Europe,  the  relations  between 

1  Answer  of  the  King  to  the  Commons,  March  25th,  172!). 

2  These  were  presently  joined  at  Spithead   by  fourteen  Dutch  ships  under  Vice- 
Admiral  van  Sommelsdijck. 

3  It  did  not,  for  example,  secure  satisfaction  for  the  Spanish  depredations  in  the 
West  Indies. 

*  He  had  his  flag  in  the  Numur,  90.     Rear-Admiral  Sir  John  Bnlchen.  Kt.  (W.), 
in  the  Norfolk,  80,  was  second  in  command. 


1735.] 


PORTUGAL   ASSISTED. 


49 


the  representatives  of  the  two  countries  in  the  New  World  became 
ever  more  and  more  strained.  And  even  in  Europe  very  menacing 
clouds  arose  when,  in  1733,  the  death  of  Augustus  II.,  Elector  of 
Saxony  and  King  of  Poland,  brought  about  a  hostile  combination 
of  France,  Spain,  and  Sardinia  against  the  Empire.  Great  Britain, 
as  a  necessary  measure  of  precaution,  commissioned  no  fewer  than 


ADMIRAL    NICHOLAS   HADDOCK. 

(7-Vom  Fulm'x  eiiyrttriiiu  iiftir  Ilir  paintimj  hi/  T.  llihxu/i, 
iTiirrxfnti/ii/  Hn<i<loek  it'hru  Rear-Admiral  nf  tit/1  Itrtl,  1735.) 

eighty-six1  ships  of  war  early  in  1734,  recalled  British  sailors  from 
the  service  of  foreign  powers,  and  offered  bounties  to  seamen. 

In  1735,  a  dispute  having  broken  out  between  Spain  and  Portugal, 
the  latter  power  solicited  British  aid  against  the  Spaniards  ;  and, 
in  response,  a  large  fleet,  under  Admiral  Sir  John  Norris,  with 
Vice-Admiral  Sir  John  Balchen  (K),  and  Bear-Admiral  Nicholas 

1  Bringing  up  the  total  number  in  commission  to  one  hundred  and  twenty. 
VOL.    III.  E 


50  MAJOR    OPERATIONS,   1714-1762.  [1738. 

Haddock1  (W.),  was  dispatched  to  Lisbon,  sailing  from  Spithead  on 
May  27th,  and  reaching  the  Tagus  on  June  9th.  The  demonstration 
was  made  not  only  in  the  general  interests  of  peace,  but  also  in 
the  particular  interests  of  the  many  British  merchants  whose  welfare 
was  more  or  less  dependent  upon  the  safety  of  the  then  homecoming 
Portuguese  flota  from  Brazil ;  and  it  was  so  efficacious  that  an  actual 
rupture  between  the  two  countries  was  prevented. 

Yet  Spain  was  not  to  be  permanently  intimidated.  After  France, 
going  behind  the  backs  of  her  allies,  had  patched  up,  vastly  to  her 
own  benefit,  her  differences  with  the  Empire  by  the  treaty  of 
December  28th,  1735,  Great  Britain,  awaking  to  the  fact  that  she 
had  been  neglecting  her  own  peculiar  business  in  order  to  be  ready 
to  intervene  on  behalf  of  powers  that  deserved  no  such  kindness  at 
her  hands,  once  more  turned  her  attention  to  the  outrages  which 
had  for  years  been  committed  upon  her  commerce  by  the  Spaniards 
in  the  West  Indies.  In  1737  she  sent  Rear-Admiral  Nicholas 
Haddock  to  the  Mediterranean  with  a  squadron,  the  appearance  of 
which  was  intended  to  lend  weight  to  the  demands  which  she  then 
felt  it  necessary  to  make.  Spain  haggled  and  temporised.  In  reply 
to  an  address  from  the  Commons,  King  George  II.,  on  March  6th, 
1738,  said  :  "1  am  fully  sensible  of  the  many  and  unwarrantable 
depredations  committed  by  the  Spaniards,2  and  you  may  be  assured 
I  will  make  use  of  the  most  proper  and  effectual  means  that  are  in 
my  power  to  procure  justice  and  satisfaction  to  my  injured  subjects, 
and  for  the  future  security  of  their  trade  and  navigation." 

Still,  however,  Spain  temporised.  A  paper  presented  to  Parlia- 
ment in  1738  showed  that  since  the  Treaty  of  Seville  the  loss 
caused  to  British  merchants  by  the  operations  of  the  Spaniards 
had  been  upwards  of  ,£140,000,  that  fifty-two  British  vessels  had 
been  taken  and  plundered  by  them,  and  that  British  seamen  had 
been  very  cruelly  treated.  This  caused  much  excitement.  Then 
came  the  examination  by  the  House  of  persons  who  had,  or  were 
alleged  to  have,  suffered  at  the  hands  of  the  Spaniards.  Among 
these  persons  was  Kichard  Jenkins,  sometime  master  of  the  liebecca, 
brig,  of  Glasgow.  He  declared  that  his  craft  had  been  boarded  by 
a  guarda-costa,  whose  captain  had  wantonly  cut  off  one  of  the 

1  Nicholas  Haddock.     Born,  1686.     Captain,  1707.     Rear-Admiral,  1734.     Vice- 
Admiral,  1741.     Admiral,  1744.     Died,  1746. 

2  Accounts  of  some  of  these,  and  further  notes  about  Jenkins,  will  be  found  in  the 
next  chapter. 


1739.]  JENKINS'S  EARS.  51 

deponent's  ears,  and  handed  it  to  him  with  the  insolent  remark  : 
"  Carry  this  home  to  the  King,  your  master,  whom,  if  he  were 
present,  I  would  serve  in  like  fashion."  "  The  truth  of  the  story," 
says  Mr.  Lecky,  "  is  extremely,  doubtful."  It  has  even  been  said 
that  Jenkins  lost  his  ear  at  the  pillory.  Yet  the  indignation  aroused 
by  the  man's  deposition  was  general ;  and  popular  opinion  grew 
uncontrollable  when  it  became  known  that,  upon  having  been 
asked  by  a  member  what  were  his  feelings  at  the  moment  of 
the  outrage,  Jenkins  had  replied :  "  I  recommended  my  soul  to 
God,  and  my  cause  to  my  country." 

Spain  at  length  agreed  to  make  some  reparation,  and  to  settle 
outstanding  differences.  The  convention  to  this  effect  was  sub- 
mitted to  Parliament  in  1739,  and,  after  a  most  stormy  debate, 
approved  of ;  yet,  when  the  time  came  for  it  to  be  carried  out, 
fresh  difficulties  cropped  up,  and  Spain,  possibly  because  she  had 
gained  by  negotiation  all  the  delay  which  she  deemed  necessary  to 
enable  her  to  perfect  her  preparations,  silently  declined  to  play 
her  promised  part.  At  about  the  same  time,  owing  to  the  pre- 
carious state  of  affairs,  the  'British  consuls  at  Malaga,  Alicant, 
and  other  Spanish  ports,  were  compelled  to  advise  British  merchants 
and  vessels  to  depart  thence  with  all  haste. 

Great  Britain  was  to  be  satisfied  only  by  the  adoption  of  strong 
measures ;  and  on  July  10th,  1739,  the  King  issued  a  proclamation 
in  which  he  set  forth  that  the  Spaniards  had  committed  depredations, 
and  that  they  had  promised  and  failed  to  make  reparation  ;  and  in 
which  he  authorised  general  reprisals  and  letters  of  marque  against 
the  ships,  goods,  and  subjects  of  the  King  of  Spain.  Half-hearted 
endeavours  were  made  at  the  last  moment  to  preserve  peace ;  but 
Spain  declared  that  she  regarded  the  making  of  reprisals  as  a 
hostile  act ;  France  reminded  the  world  that  she  was  bound  to 
look  upon  the  enemies  of  Spain  as  her  own  foes ;  and  Holland 
averred  that,  if  called  upon  to  do  so,  she  could  not  but  observe 
the  spirit  of  her  treaty  of  alliance  with  Great  Britain. 

The  British  minister  presently  withdrew  from  Madrid,  and  the 
Spanish  minister  from  London  ;  the  British  squadrons  abroad  were 
reinforced  ;l  numerous  ships  were  commissioned;  stringent  measures 
were  adopted  to  procure  the  necessary  number  of  seamen  for  the 

1  Information  as  to  the  state  of  affairs  was  also  sent  to  Commodore  Charles  Brown, 
who  was  senior  officer  at  Jamaica,  and  who  at  once  began  reprisals.  For  an  account  of 
them,  see  next  chapter. 

E   2 


52  MAJOR    OPERATIONS,    1714-1762.  [1739. 

fleet ;  letters  of  marque  were  announced  on  July  21st  as  ready  for 
issue  by  the  Admiralty ;  and  on  October  23rd,  1739,  war  was 
formally  declared  against  Spain,  which  put  forward  her  own 
declaration  on  November  '28th. 

The  power  of  Spain  was  then  most  vulnerable  in  the  West 
Indies  and  the  Pacific.  An  expedition  under  Captain  George  Anson, 
of  whose  proceedings  an  account  will  be  found  in  Chapter  XXIX., 
was  prepared  for  the  Pacific,  but  did  not  sail  until  the  autumn  of 
1740.  Dispatched  primarily  for  warlike  purposes,  and  originally 
intended  to  co-operate  with  another  force  under  Captain  James 
Cornwall,  Alison's  command,  owing  to  various  adventitious  circum- 
stances, gained  for  its  leader  an  even  more  brilliant  reputation  as 
a  navigator  than  as  a  fighting  officer  ;  and  the  history  of  it  falls 
naturally  among  the  chronicles  of  the  great  British  voyages.  But  an 
expedition  to  the  West  Indies,  which  was  entrusted  to  Vice-Admiral 
Kdward  Vernon  (1),  (B.),1  was,  from  beginning  to  end,  entirely  a 
fighting  venture  ;  and  as  it  was  not  without  effect  upon  the  issue 
of  the  war,  it  may  fitly  be  described  here,  although  it  led  up  to  no 
fleet  action,  and  although  it  did  not,  to  any  appreciable  extent, 
directly  strengthen  the  maritime  position  of  Great  Britain. 

Edward  Vernon  was  a  blunt,  well-intentioned,  honest,  and  very 
popular  officer,  whose  chief  service  faults  were  that  he  could  not 
always  control  either  his  tongue  or  his  pen,  and  that  he  was  too 
fond  of  vulgar  applause.  He  had  served  in  the  West  Indies  for 
several  years  after  his  first  appointment  as  a  post-captain,  and 
was  generally  believed  to  have  an  intimate  acquaintance  with  the 
whole  of  that  station  and  with  the  weak  points  of  the  Spanish 
position  there.  He  had  also  been  for  a  long  time  member  of 
Parliament  for  Ipswich  and  for  Penryn  ;  and,  in  the  course  of  one 
of  the  debates  upon  the  depredations  of  the  Spaniards,  he  had  taken 
upon  himself  to  declare  in  strong  terms  that  the  Spanish  possessions 
in  the  West  Indies  might  be  reduced  with  great  ease,  and  that 
Puerto  Bello,'  in  particular,  might  be  taken  by  a  force  of  six 

1  Edward  Vernon  was  born  in  1084,  and  became  a  Post-Captain  in  1700,  and  a 
Vice-Admiral,  without  having  ever  been  a  Ilear-Admir.il,  on  July  9th,  1739.  Having 
captured  Puerto  Bello,  etc.,  in  that  and  the  next  year,  he  led  an  attack  upon  Cartagena 
in  1741.  lu  1745  he  attained  the  rank  of  Admiral,  but,  in  the  following  year,  owing, 
among  other  things,  to  his  fondness  for  pamphleteering,  he  was  struck  off  the  list  of 
flag-officers.  See.  note  on  p.  Ill,  infra.  He  died  in  1757. 

2  Puerto  Bello  stands  on  the  north  side  of  the  Isthmus  of  Darien,  and  is  abou 
seventy  miles  from  Panama.     It  has  a  considerable  bay  and  good  anchorage. 


1739.] 


VERNON   TO    THE    WEST  INDIES. 


53 


ships  of  the  line.  He  said,  moreover,  that  he  would  gladly  venture 
his  life  and  reputation  upon  the  success  of  such  an  enterprise,  if 
only  he  were  permitted  to  attempt  it.  Vernon  was  popular  in  the 
country,  and  troublesome  to  the  ministry ;  and  the  Government, 
anxious  to  be  temporarily  rid  of  him,  and  perhaps  equally  ready 
to  take  credit  for  his  triumph  or  to  rejoice  over  his  disgrace, 
promoted  him,  and  gave  him  exactly  the  mission  and  force  which 
he  had  demanded. 


ADMIllAI.    EDWA1SD    VKIiNOX. 

(From  3[i-At'tlrirx  ciigmriHij  <iftrt'  tin-  /tortntit  ft/r  T.  Gainsborough,  B.A.') 

Vernon  sailed  from  Portsmouth  on  July  24th,  1739,1  with  four 
ships  of  seventy  guns,  three  of  sixty,  one  of  fifty,  and  one  of  forty. 
Of  these,  he  presently  detached  three  of  the  seventies,  viz.,  the 
Lenox,  Captain  Covill  Mayne,  Elizabeth,  Captain  Edward  Falking- 
ham  (1),  and  Kent,  Captain  Thomas  Durell  (1),  to  cruise  for  a  month 
off  Cape  Ortegal,  and  to  look  out  for  some  treasure-ships  which  were 
daily  expected  in  Spain.  The  vessels  were  to  return  afterwards  to 
1  He  did  not,  however,  leave  Plymouth  until  August  3rd. 


54  MAJOR    OPERATIONS,    1714-1762.  [1739. 

England.  He  also  detached  the  Pearl,  50,  Captain  the  Hon. 
Edward  Legge,  to  cruise  for  three  months  between  Lisbon  and 
Oporto.  With  the  rest  of  his  force  he  crossed  the  Atlantic,  reaching 
Jamaica  on  October  23rd.1  There  he  was  joined  by  the  senior 
officer  already  on  the  station,  Commodore  Charles  Brown,  whose 
broad  pennant  was  in  the  Hampton  Court,  70. 

On  the  voyage  out  Vernon  took  every  opportunity  of  disciplining 
his  men,  and  of  exercising  them  both  at  the  heavy  guns  and  at  small 
arms  ;  and  there  is  little  doubt  that,  under  his  direction,  his  small 
squadron  rapidly  became,  for  its  size,  the  most  efficient  that  Great 
Britain  had  sent  to  sea  for  many  years. 

The  intelligence  received  by  the  Vice-Admiral  was  to  the  effect 
that  the  Spanish  galleons  were  about  to  make  rendezvous  at 
Cartagena,  and  to  proceed  thence  to  Puerto  Bello,  where  they  would 
exchange  their  European  goods  for  the  gold  and  silver  which  had 
been  sent  for  the  purpose  from  Panama.  The  news  that  the  bullion 
was  already  at  1'uerto  Bello  determined  Vernon  to  lose  no  time  in 
attacking  that  place.  He  obtained  pilots,  embarked  two  hundred 
soldiers  under  Captain  Newton,  and,  on  November  5th,  1739,  sailed 
from  Port  lioyal.-  On  the  following  day  lie  issued  the  following 
instructions  to  his  captains  : — 

"Upon  making  the  land  at  Puerto  Bello,  ami  having  a  fair  wind  to  favour  them, 
and  daylight  for  the  attempt,  to  have  their  ships  clear  in  all  respects  for  immediate 
service;  and,  ou  the  proper  signal,  to  form  themselves  into  a  line  of  battle,  as  directed; 
and,  being  formed,  to  follow  in  the  same  order  of  battle  to  the  attack,  in  the  manner 
hereafter  directed.  And  as  the  north  shore  of  the  harbour  of  Puerto  Bello  is 
represented  to  the  Admiral  to  be  a  bold  steep  shore,  on  which,  at  the  first  entrance, 
stands  the  Castillo  de  Ferro,  or  Iron  Castle,  Commodore  Brown,  and  the  ships  that 
follow  him,  are  directed  to  pass  the  said  fort,  within  less  than  a  cable's  length  distant, 
giving  the  enemy  as  they  pass  as  warm  a  tire  as  ]>ossible,  both  from  great  guns  and 
musketry.  Then  Commodore  Brown  is  to  steer  away  for  the  Gloria  Castle,  and  anchor 
as  near  as  he  possibly  can  to  the  eastermost  part  of  it,  for  battering  down  all  the 
defences  of  it,  but  so  as  to  leave  room  for  Captain  Mayne,  in  the  Worcester,  to  anchor 
astern  of  him  against  the  westermost  bastion,  and  to  do  the  same  there;  and  to  follow 
such  orders  as  the  Commodore  may  think  proper  to  give  him  for  attacking  the  said 
castle.  Captain  Herbert,  in  the  \unricli,  after  giving  his  fire  at  the  Iron  Castle,  is  to 
push  on  for  the  castle  of  San  Jeronimo,  lying  to  the  eastward  of  the  town,  and  to 
anchor  as  near  it,  as  he  possibly  can,  and  batter  it  down  ;  and  Captain  Trevor,  in  the 
titmfford,  following  the  Admiral,  to  come  to  an  anchor  abreast  of  the  eastermost 
part  of  the  Iron  Castle,  so  as  to  leave  room  for  Captain  Waterhouse,  in  the  Princess 
Louisa,  to  anchor  astern  of  him,  for  battering  the  westermost  part  of  the  Castle;  and 

1  Having  called  in  the  meantime  at  Antigua  and  St.  Kitt's. 

2  With  the  ships  mentioned  in  the  table  infra,  and  the  Sheerness,  20,  Captain  Miles 
Stapleton.     This  vessel  was  presently  detached  to  reconnoitre  Cartagena. 


1739.]  VEEN  ON  AT  PUERTO   BELLO.  55 

continue  there  till  the  service  is  completed,  and  make  themselves  masters  of  it :  the 
youngest  officers  to  follow  the  further  orders  of  the  elder  in  the  further  prosecution  of 
the  attack :  and,  if  the  weather  be  favourable  for  it  on  their  going  in,  each  ship, 
besides  having  her  long-boat  towing  astern,  to  have  her  barge  alongside  to  tow  the 
long-boats  away  with  such  part  of  the  soldiers  as  can  conveniently  go  in  them,  and  to 
come  under  the  Admiral's  stern,  for  his  directing  a  descent  with  them,  where  he  shall 
find  it  most  proper  to  order  it.  From  the  men's  inexperience  in  service,  it  will  be 
necessary  to  be  as  cautious  as  possible  to  prevent  hurry  and  confusion,  and  a  fruitless 
waste  of  powder  and  shot.  The  captains  are  to  give  the  strictest  orders  to  their 
respective  officers  to  take  the  greatest  care  that  no  gun  is  fired  but  what  they,  or  those 
they  particularly  appoint,  first  see  levelled,  and  direct  the  firing  of;  and  that  they  shall 
strictly  prohibit  all  their  men  from  hallooing  and  making  irregular  noise  that  will  only 
serve  to  throw  them  into  confusion,  till  such  time  as  the  service  is  performed  and  when 
they  have  nothing  to  do  but  glory  in  the  victory.  Such  of  the  ships  as  have  mortars 
and  cohorns  on  board  are  ordered  to  use  them  in  the  attack." 

LINE  OF  BATTLE  AT  TIIK  ATTACK  ox  1'fKKTo  ]>KI,I,O,  XOVKMIIKI;  L'lsr,  17;!!!. 


Ships. 

Guns. 

.Men. 

Commauders. 

Hampton  Cuurt    . 

•  1      7" 

-!!!.-> 

j  Commodore  Charles  Brown. 
(Captain  Digby  Dent,  (^  . 

Xorwich     .... 

.     i         ;")(  1 

300 

,         Itic'hard  Herbert. 

Worcester  .... 

00 

400 

,        Perry  Mayne. 

Burford     .... 

70 

500 

fVic 
ICa, 

j-  Admiral  Edward  Vermm, 
tain  Thomas  Watson  (I). 

(B.). 

Stm/furd 

fill' 

4011 

,        Thomas  Trevor. 

Princess  Louisa,    . 

(ill 

400 

,       Thomas  \\  aterhouse. 

The  squadron  sighted  Puerto  Bello  in  the  night  of  November  '20th, 
and  chased  into  harbour  some  small  vessels,  which  apprised  the 
enemy  of  Yemen's  presence  on  the  eoast.  That  he  might  not  be 
driven  to  leeward,  the  Vice-Admiral  anchored  about  six  leagues  from 
the  shore.  Early  on  the  '21st  he  weighed,  and,  the  wind  being 
easterly,1  he  plied  to  windward  in  line  of  battle  ahead.  At  about 
2  P.M.,  the  Hampton  Court,  being  close  to  the  Iron  Castle,  began  the 
attack,  and  was  well  seconded  by  the  Xonrich  and  Worcester.  The 
fire  of  the  enemy,  vigorous  at  first,  gradually  lessened.  Seeing  this, 
Vernon,  who  was  rapidly  approaching,  signalled  for  the  manned 
boats  to  go  under  his  stern,  and  then  ordered  them  to  land  beneath 
the  walls  of  the  castle.  In  the  meantime,  the  Bur/ord,  which  had 
come  abreast  of  the  castle,  had  received  and  returned  a  very  heavy 
fire.  The  men  in  her  tops  forced  the  enemy  to  abandon  his  lower 
battery,  whereupon  the  landing-party  made  an  assault,  and,  by 
climbing  into  the  embrasures  upon  one  another's  shoulders,  the  men 
entered,  and  quickly  carried  the  work,  most  of  the  defenders  of 

1  This  prevented  the  attack  from  being  carried  out  in  the  prescribed  manner. 


56 


MAJOR    OPERATIONS,    1714-17G2. 


[1739. 


which  fled  to  the  town,  though  a  few  shut  themselves  up  in  the. 
keep,  whence  they  presently  shouted  appeals  for  quarter. 

By  that  time  night  had  come  on.  Owing  to  the  wind,  Commo- 
dore Brown  and  his  division  had  been  unable  to  get  up  the  bay  and 
attack  the  castles  of  Gloria  and  San  Jeronimo,  and  his  ships,  having 
fallen  to  leeward,  were  obliged  to  anchor,  ready  to  proceed  at 
daybreak  should  the  wind  permit.  The  Burford  and  Stafford, 


ATTACK  ox  PUKKTO  BEI.I.O,  XOVKMIIKU  L'ls-r.,  17.'i!>. 
(Front  a  phut  bit  Cum.  Jamex  lifnttme  kindly  It /it  bit  Lurd  Vrmim 


C.  Wormier. 

D.  Noni'iffi. 

E.  Burj'iinl. 

F.  Iltiitii/ton  Cttitrt. 
<!.  Ntraffiinl. 


II.  Pritn-t-H*  Lttttixu. 

I.  Two  tenders. 
K.  Two  Spanish  jmarda-costas. 
M.  Throe  trading  sloops. 
O.  Bouts  on  their  way  to  land  soldiers. 


which  were  just  within  reach  of  the  heaviest  guns  in  Gloria,  were 
fired  at  all  night,  but  received  little  damage  beyond  the  wounding  of 
the  former's  fore  topmast.  The  fire  was  returned  with  effect  from 
the  lower  deck  of  the  Burford.  Early  in  the  morning  of  the  22nd, 
the  Vice-Admiral  went  on  board  the  Hampton  Court,  and,  after  he 
had  consulted  with  his  officers,  directed  steps  to  be  taken  for  warping 
his  ships  up  the  harbour  during  the  night,  in  order  to  be  able  to 


1739.]  VERNON   ON   THE   SPANISH  MAIN.  57 

attack  Gloria  and  San  Jeronimo  on  the  following  day.  But  these 
measures  proved  to  be  unnecessary.  The  Spanish  governor,  Don 
Francisco  Martinez  de  Ketez,  hoisted  a  white  flag,  and  sent  out  a 
boat  with  a  flag  of  truce  to  convey  to  Vernon  the  terms  on  which 
the  place  would  be  surrendered.  These  terms  were  deemed  in- 
admissible by  the  Vice- Admiral,  who  drew  up  others  which  he  was 
prepared  to  grant.  He  allowed  the  governor  only  a  few  hours  in 
which  to  make  up  his  mind ;  yet,  well  within  the  specified  time,  the 
terms  were  accepted.  Captain  Newton,  with  two  hundred  soldiers, 
was  sent  to  take  possession  of  the  town  and  castles  ;  and  detachments 
of  seamen  boarded  the  vessels  in  port.  The  crews  of  these  had,  it 
appeared,  landed  during  the  previous  night,  and  committed  various 
outrages.  The  garrison  was  allowed  to  march  out  with  the  honours 
of  war,  and  to  carry  off  two  cannon  with  ten  charges  of  powder  for 
each.  The  inhabitants  were  permitted  either  to  remove  or  to  remain, 
and  were  promised  security  for  their  goods  and  effects.  The  ships  l 
were  surrendered  absolutely,  though  their  crews  were  permitted  to 
retire  with  their  personal  effects.  And,  contingent  upon  the  duo 
performance  of  all  the  stipulations,  the  town,  the  clergy  and  the 
churches  were  guaranteed  protection  and  immunity  in  their  privi- 
leges and  properties. - 

Public  money  to  the  amount  of  ten  thousand  dollars  was  found 
in  the  place,  and  at  once  distributed  by  Vernon  among  his  men. 
There  were  also  taken  forty  pieces  of  brass  cannon,  ten  brass  field- 
pieces,  four  brass  mortars,  and  eighteen  brass  patereroes,  besides 
iron  guns,  which  were  destroyed,  but  not  carried  off.  The  fortifica- 
tions were  then  demolished — a  work  which  needed  the  expenditure 
of  one  hundred  and  twenty-two  barrels  of  captured  Spanish  powder, 
and  which  occupied  three  weeks.3 

On  November  27th,  the  Diamond,  40,  Captain  Charles  Knowles, 
and  on  November  29th,  the  Windsor,  00,  Captain  George  Berkeley, 
and  the  Anglesey,  40,  Captain  Henry  lieddish,  joined  the  flag  from 
the  Leeward  Islands;  and  on  December  6th,  the  Sheerness,  20, 

1  One  of  them,  a  snow,  was  commissioned  as  the  Triumph,  sloop,  by  Commander 
James  Rontone,  who   was  sent  home  with  Vernon's  dispatches.     Another  prize  was 
renamed  the  Asti'fsa,  12. 

2  The  loss  on  the  British  side  during  the  attack  was  almost  incredibly  small,  the 
Burford  and  Worcester  having  each  three  killed  and  five  wounded,  and  the  Hampton 
Court  having  one  man  mortally  wounded. 

3  In  the  service  Captain  the  Hon.  Edward  Boscawen  assisted  as  a  volunteer.     His 
ship,  the  ShoreJinm,  20,  was  at  the  time  unfit  for  sea. 


58  MAJOR    OPERATIONS,    1714-1762.  [1739. 

Captain  Miles  Stapleton,  which  had  been  detached  to  reconnoitre 
Cartagena,  returned.  While  the  Vice-Admiral  still  lay  at  Puerto 
Bello,  he  sent  to  Panama  a  demand  for  the  release  of  certain  servants 
of  the  South  Sea  Company,  who  were  confined  in  that  city ;  and, 
although  Vernon,  being  on  the  wrong  side  of  the  isthmus,  was 
scarcely  in  a  position  to  'have  backed  up  his  demand  by  force,  the 
governor,  who  seems  to  have  been  greatly  impressed  by  the  easy 
capture  of  Puerto  Bello,  saw  fit  to  comply.  The  Vice-Admiral 
sailed  on  December  13th  for  Jamaica. 

The  news  of  the  success  was  hailed  with  great  joy  in  England, 
and  Vernon  was  voted  the  thanks  of  both  Houses,  and  the  freedom 
of  the  City  of  London  in  a  gold  box.  Commander  James  lientone, 
the  bearer  of  the  intelligence,  was  presented  with  two  hundred 
guineas,  and  made  a  post-captain.  The  Ministry  realised  that  it 
could  do  nothing  more  popular  than  follow  up  the  blow  already 
struck,  and  it  at  once  arranged  to  send  to  Jamaica,  if  possible  in  the 
early  autumn,  a  strong  military  force  composed  of  two  regiments  of 
infantry,  and  six  newly-raised  regiments  of  Marines — the  whole 
under  Major-General  Lord  Cathcart — to  be  employed  by  Vice- 
Admiral  Vernon  in  the  prosecution  of  further  designs  against  the 
Spaniards  in  the  West  Indies  and  Central  America.  It  was  also 
decided  to  endeavour  to  recruit  in  the  North  American  Colonies  a 
corps  of  three  thousand  men,  to  be  commanded  by  Colonel  Spottis- 
wood,1  and  to  be  sent  to  Jamaica  to  strengthen  the  hands  of  Lord 
Cathcart  upon  his  arrival. 

In  the  interval,  the  Spaniards,  thoroughly  alarmed  for  the 
security  of  their  empire  in  the  New  World,  sent  to  the  West  Indies 
a  strong  squadron,-  with  troops  and  stores,  under  Admiral  Don 
Kodrigo  de  Torres.  They  also  prevailed  upon  France  to  proclaim 
not  only  that  she  was  in  strict  alliance  with  Spain,  but  also  that  she 
could  not  suffer  Great  Britain  to  make  new  settlements  or  conquests 
in  the  West  Indies  ;  and  this  proclamation  was  succeeded  by  the 
dispatch  across  the  Atlantic  of  three  French  squadrons.  One,  of 
four  ships  of  the  line,  under  the  Chevalier  de  Nesmond,  left  Brest  on 
July  28th.  A  second,  of  eighteen  sail,  under  the  Marquis  d'Antin, 
quitted  the  same  port  towards  the  end  of  August,  and,  soon  after  its 
departure,  suffered  so  severely  in  a  storm,  that  two  or  three  of  its 

1  Tliis  officer  unfortunately  died  in  Virginia  ere  the  troops  which  he  had  collected 
cou'd  be  embarked. 

2  This  sailed  from  Spain  on  July  10th,  1740. 


1740.]  VEBNON  AT  CAHTAQENA.  59 

best  vessels  had  to  return.  The  third,  of  fifteen  sail,  under  the 
Marquis  de  La  Eoche-Allard,  weighed  from  Toulon  on  August  25th. 
When  he  had  passed  the  Strait  of  Gibraltar,  the  Marquis  opened 
his  orders,  and,  in  pursuance  of  them,  sent  back  to  port  four 
of  his  largest  ships.  Proceeding  with  the  rest,  he  made  a  junc- 
tion with  the  other  squadrons  at  Martinique  in  September  and 
October. 

But  the  force  there  assembled  was  formidable  chiefly  on  paper. 
The  vessels  were  not  in  good  condition,  and  they  were  both  ill- 
manned  and  ill-found.  Many  of  them  had  been  much  damaged  by 
bad  weather  ere  they  arrived  ;  and  when  they  essayed  to  move  in 
company  from  Martinique  to  Hispam'ola,  they  fell  in  with  another 
storm  which  caused  serious  losses,  and  reduced  them  to  a  condition 
of  impotence. 

That  they  had  been  sent  out  to  co-operate  with  Spain  is 
certain.  But  before  they  had  an  opportunity  of  co-operating, 
reinforcements  had  reached  Yernon  ;  and  the  situation  in  Europe 
had  been  changed  by  the  death  of  the  Emperor  Charles  VI.,  on 
October  20th,  and  by  the  .accession  of  the  Elector  of  Bavaria  as 
Charles  VII.  Erance  then  decided  to  hold  her  hand,  to  recall  her 
squadrons,1  and  to  postpone  her  definite  rupture  with  Great  Britain. 
It  is  not  necessary,  therefore,  to  further  follow  the  movements  of  the 
French.  As  for  the  Spanish  squadron  under  Don  liodrigo  de 
Torres,  it  reached  San  Juan  de  Puerto  Rico  in  a  sorely-damaged 
condition  in  September,  and  there  slowly  refitted.  In  course,  of  time 
it  went  on  to  Cartagena,  threw  additional  troops  into  the  town,  and, 
leaving  a  detachment  under  Don  Bias  de  Leso  in  the  roadstead, 
proceeded  to  Havana. 

Vernon's  squadron,  on  its  voyage  from  Puerto  Bello  to  Jamaica, 
was  dispersed  and  shattered  by  a  storm.  All  the  vessels,  neverthe- 
less, reached  Port  Eoyal  by  February  6th,  1740,  except  the  Triumph, 
sloop,  which  had  foundered  off  Sambala  Keys,  but  the  officers  and 
men  of  which  had  been  saved.  The  Greenwich,  50,  Captain  Charles 
Wyndham,  with  four  bombs,  some  fireships,  and  several  other 
craft,  was  found  in  harbour.  The  Vice-Admiral  did  all  that  lay  in 
his  power  to  speedily  refit  his  command,  but,  finding  that  the 
Burford  would  take  some  time  to  prepare  for  sea,  he  transferred  his 
flag  from  her  to  the  Strafford,  60,  and  sailed  on  February  25th  with 
the  greater  part  of  his  force,  leaving  the  rest  of  it,  under  Commodore 
1  Except  a  few  ships  left  at  Htspaniola  under  the  Comte  de  Roquefeuil. 


60 


MAJOR    OPERATIONS,   1714-1762. 


[1740. 


Charles  Brown,  for  the  protection  of  Jamaica.     His  determination 
was  to  bombard  Cartagena. 

On  March  1st,  the  Vice-Admiral  sighted  the  land  near  Santa 
Martha,  and,  having  detached  the  Greenwich,  50,  to  ply  to  windward 
of  that  place,  to  intercept  any  vessel  that  might  be  bound  thither,  he 
bore  away  ;  and,  on  the  evening  of  the  3rd,1  anchored  in  nine  fathoms 
off  Playa  Grande,  in  the  open  bay  before  Cartagena.  On  the  4th 


VICE-ADMIIIAL    Silt    CHARLES    KXOWLKS. 
(From  Ftilti'ijy  mezzotint  ufti'r  tin'  purtniit  hy  T.  Hudson.) 

and  5th  he  reconnoitred  the  place,  and  made  his  dispositions ;  and  on 
the  6th  he  ordered  in  the  bombs  Alderney,  8,  Commander  James 
Scott,  Terrible,  8,  Commander  Edward  Allen,  and  Cumberland,  8, 
Commander  Thomas  Brodrick.^  with  the  tenders  Pompeij  and 
Goodly,  and  other  craft  to  assist  them,  to  bombard  the  town.  This 

1  On  which   day  he   had   been  joined   by  the   Falmouth,   50,   Captain    William 
Douglas. 

2  This  officer,  who  died   a  Vice-Admiral   in   1769,  in   later   life  spelt  his  name 
Broderick  ;  but  it  was,  properly,  Brodrick. 


1740.]  VERNON  AT  CHAGRES.  61 

they  did  until  9  A.M.  on  the  7th,  receiving  no  damage  whatsoever, 
and  probably  doing  little,  although  they  terribly  frightened  the 
inhabitants.  It  is  difficult  to  understand  why  Vernon  made  this 
demonstration,  for  he  knew  well  that  the  force  which  he  had  with 
him  was  insufficient  to  take  the  city.  It  has  been  suggested  that 
his  action  was  intended  as  a  reply  to  an  insulting  letter  which  he 
had  received  from  Don  Bias  de  Leso,  and  this  is  certainly  a  plausible 
explanation,  for  the  quick-tempered  Vice-Admiral  was  ever  fully 
as  eager  to  resent  a  slight  offered  to  himself  as  he  was  to  resent 
one  offered  to  his  country.  It  does  not,  however,  appear  that  the 
bombardment  of  Cartagena  assisted,  in  the  slightest  degree,  the 
general  policy  which  Vernon  had  been  sent  westward  to  cany  out. 

From  Cartagena  he  coasted  along  the  Gulf  of  Darien,  exchanging 
shots  with  Bocca  Chica  as  he  passed,  and  making  observations 
concerning  the  defences  of  the  various  towns.  He  detached  the. 
Windsor,  60,  Captain  George  Berkeley,  and  the  Gireiuricli,  -~>0, 
Captain  Charles  Wyndham,  to  cruise  off  Cartagena  with  the  object 
of  looking  out  for  the  galleons  and  of  intercepting  three  Spanish 
ships  of  war  which,  lie  had  heard,  were  about  to  attempt  to  join 
Don  Bias  de  Leso  there.  Vernon  then  proceeded  to  Puerto  Bello 
to  refit  and  water  his  squadron.  He  was  rejoined  on  March  18th 
by  the  Diamond,  40,  Captain  Charles  Knowles,1  an  officer  in  whom 
he  appears  to  have  reposed  exceptional  confidence.  Knowles  was 
ordered  to  go  on  board  the  Success,  hreship,  10,  Commander  Daniel 
Hore,2  and,  accompanied  by  one  of  the  tenders,  to  move  round  to 
the  mouth  of  the  Kiver  Chagres,  there  to  reconnoitre  and  to  make 
soundings  with  a  view  to  reporting  on  the  manner  in  which  the 
fort  of  San  Lorenzo  and  the  town  of  Chagres  might  best  be 
attacked.  Measures  were  also  taken  to  blockade  the  estuary.  The 
Vice-Admiral  obtained  much  information  and  assistance  from  an 
English  pirate  or  buccaneer  named  Lowther,  who,  in  consequence, 
received  the  King's  pardon  and  permission  to  return  home. 

On  March  '2'2nd  the  Strafford,3  the  Noncich,  the  three  bomb 
ketches,  and  the  small  craft,  put  to  sea  from  Puerto  Bello,  instruc- 
tions being  left  for  the  other  vessels  to  follow  as  soon  as  possible. 

1  Charles   Knowles.      Born,  1702.      Captain,  17.".7.      Rear-Admiral,  1747.     Com- 
mander-in-Cliief  at   Jamaica,    1748.      Captured    Port   Louis,    Hispaniola.      Defeated 
Ileggio  off  Havana,  October  1st,  1748.     Vice-Admiral,  1755.    Admiral,  1758.    Baronet, 
1765,  and  Rear-Admiral  of  Great  Britain.     Served  Russia,  1770-1774.     Died,  1777. 

2  Or  Hoare. 

*  In  which  the  Vice-Admiral  still  Hew  his  flag. 


62  MA  JOS    OPERATIONS,    1714-1762.  [1740. 

The  Strafford  met  with  a  slight  accident  on  the  passage,  and  was 
detained  for  a  few  hours,  but  the  Norwich,  by  order,  proceeded  with 
the  remaining  craft,  and  by  3  P.M.  Captain  Richard  Herbert,  with 
the  assistance  of  Captain  Knowles,  had  not  only  placed  his  bombs 
in  position,  but  had  begun  to  bombard  Fort  San  Lorenzo.  The 
Diamond  also  opened  fire  in  the  evening ;  and,  during  the  night,  the 
Strajford,  Princess  Louisa,  and  Fal month,  arrived  and  took  up  their 
stations.1  The  ships  maintained  a  leisurely  fire  from  their  heavier 
guns  until  March  24th,  when  the  governor  of  the  place,  Don  Juan 
Carlos  Gutierrez  de  Zaviillos,  surrendered.  Captain  Knowles  took 
possession  in  the  course  of  the  afternoon. 

A  large  amount  of  booty,  including  cocoa,  Jesuit's  bark,  and 
wool,  valued  at  £70,000,  besides  plate,  etc.,  was  captured.  Two 
guarda-costas,  found  in  the  river,  were  destroyed ;  all  the  brass 
guns  and  patereroes "  in  the  defences  were  embarked  in  the 
squadron ;  and,  after  the  works  had  been  demolished,  Vernon 
quitted  the  river  on  March  30th.  He  was  rejoined  on  the  31st 
by  the  Windsor  and  Greenwich  from  before  Cartagena,  and  on 
April  '2nd  by  his  old  flagship,  the  11  it  r ford,  from  Jamaica.  After 
making  dispositions,  which  proved  to  be  vain,  for  intercepting  the 
new  Spanish  viceroy  of  Santa  Fe,  who  was  on  his  way  out  from 
Ferrol,  the  Vice-Admiral  returned  to  Jamaica,  sending  Captain 
Knowles  home  with  dispatches. 

A  little  later,  Vernon,  advised  from  Lisbon  of  the  Spanish 
preparations  for  sending  out  the  squadron  under  Don  Rodrigo 
de  Torres,  and  of  the  actual  departure  from  Cadiz  of  a  squadron, 
the  supposed  destination  of  which  was  the  West  Indies,  put  to  sea 
again,  hoping  to  fall  in  with  the  enemy;  but,  having  encountered 
bad  weather,  and  having  failed  to  get  any  news  of  his  foe,  he 
returned  to  Port  Royal  on  June  21st.  During  the  summer  his 
cruisers  were  active,  but  he  was  himself  detained  in  port  by  lack 
of  supplies.  On  September  5th,  however,  a  number  of  store-ships, 
convoyed  by  the  Defiance,  60,  Captain  John  Trevor,  and  the  Tilbury, 
60,  reached  him,  and  on  October  3rd  he  was  able  to  put  to  sea  once 
more.  On  the  19th  he  fell  in  with  eight  transports,  convoyed  by  the 

1  The   ships  engaged   in  the  attack  on  Chagres  were  the  Strafford,  60,  Princess 
Louisa,    60,    f'almouth,    50,    Norwich,   50,    Diamond,   40,   Alderncy,     Terrible,   and 
Cumberland,  bombs,  and  Pompey  and  Good!;/,  tenders.     The  commanders  of  all  these 
have  already  been  named.      In  addition,  there  were  the  fireships,  Success,  10,  Com- 
mander Daniel  Hore,  and  Eleanor,  10,  Commander  Sir  Robert  Henley,  Bart. 

2  There  were  eleven  brass  guns  and  as  many  patereroes. 


1740.]  OGLE  JOIXS    VEBNON.  63 

Wolf,  sloop,  10,  Commander  William  Dandridge,  and  laden  with 
troops  from  North  America.1  These  he  escorted  to  Jamaica.  Soon 
afterwards  he  heard  of  the  arrival  at  Cartagena  of  Don  Rodrigo  de 
Torres,  and  at  Martinique  of  the  Marquis  d'Antin ;  and  not  having 
force  sufficient  to  justify  him  in  risking  an  encounter  at  sea  with  his 
known  enemies,  even  if  they  were  not  assisted  by  his  suspected  ones, 
he  remained  at  Port  Eoyal,  anxiously  awaiting  news  of  the  promised 
reinforcements  from  England. 

These  reinforcements,  which  included  the  transports  carrying 
Lord  Cathcart's  army,  were  to  have  been  under  the  orders  of 
Vice- Admiral  Sir  John  Balchen.  But  Balchen's  division  of  men- 
of-war  consisted  only  of  one  8rd-rate,  five  4tli-ratos,  and  one 
(Jth-rate ;  and  when,  after  the  armament  had  actually  put  to  sea 
and  had  been  driven  back  to  port  by  contrary  w  oath  or  in  August, 
the  Ministry  learnt  what  powerful  squadrons  Spain  and  France  bad 
dispatched  across  the  Atlantic,  it  was  decided  to  make  new  arrange- 
ments. Balchen's  orders  were  cancelled,  and  a  very  much  larger 
and  entirely  different  squadron,  under  Sir  Chaloner  Ogle  (1).  was 
appointed  to  escort  the  trocips.  The  change  of  plan  necessarily 
involved  much  delay,  and  it  was  not  until  October  '2(>th  that  the 
fleet  at  length  sailed. 

It  cleared  the  Channel;  but  on  October  3 1st,  when  it  was  about 
seventy  leagues  to  the  westward  of  the  Start,-  it  met  with  a  heavy 
gale,  in  which  the  Buckingham,  70,  Captain  Cornelius  Mitchell, 
Prince  of  Orange,  70,  Captain  Henry  Osborn,  and  Hupcrhr,  (SO, 
Captain  the  Hon.  William  Hervey,  were  so  badly  damaged  that  the 
first  had  to  be  sent  back  to  Spithead,  and  the  others  had  to  proceed  to 
Lisbon  under  convoy  of  the  Cumberland,  80,  Captain  James  Stewart. 
In  spite  of  these  deductions  the  fleet  still  consisted  of  upwards  of 
twenty  3rd  and  4th-rates,  besides  several  frigates,  fire-ships,  bombs, 
etc.,  under  Hear- Admiral  Sir  Chaloner  Ogle  (1),  Kt.  (B.),  and 
Commodore  Richard  Lestock  ('2),  together  with  transports  carrying 
about  9000  troops, 3  under  Major-General  Lord  Cathcart,  and 
Brigadier-Generals  Thomas  Wentworth,  John  Guise,  and  William 
Blakeney.  It  anchored  011  December  19th,  1740,  in  Prince  Eupert's 

1  These  troops  had  taken  part  in  the  fruitless  attack  on  St.  Augustine,  Florida,  some 
account  of  which  will  be  found  in  the  next  chapter. 

2  In  lat.  17°  54'  W. 

3  l.e.  the  15th  and  24th  regiments  of  foot,  six  regiments  of  Marines  under  Colonels 
Fleming,  Robinson,  Lowther,  Wynyard,  Douglas  and  Moreton,  and  some  artillery  and 
miscellaneous  detachments. 


64  MAJOR    OPERATIONS,   1714-1762.  [1740. 

Bay,  Dominica ;  and,  on  the  following  day  it  had  to  lament  the 
loss,  by  dysentery,  of  the  military  coimnander-in-chief.1 

Sir  Chaloner  weighed  again  for  St.  Kitt's,  his  general  rendez- 
vous, on  December  27th,  and  thence  steered  for  Jamaica.  On  the 
passage  thither,  being  off  the  western  end  of  Hispaniola,  he  sighted 
four  large  vessels,  and  signalled  to  the  Prince  Frederick,  70,  Captain 
Lord  Aubrey  Beauclerk,  Orford,  70,  Captain  Lord  Augustus  Fitzroy, 
Lion,  (50,  Captain  Charles  Cotterell,  Wei/mouth,  GO,  Captain  Charles 
Knowles,  and  two  more  whips  of  the  line,  to  proceed  in  chase.  At 
4  I-.-M.  the  strangers  2  hoisted  French  colours  ;  but  as  they  did  not 
shorten  sail,  it  was  10  P.M.  ere  the  headmost  British  ship,  the  Prince 
Frederick,  got  up  with  them.  She  hailed  them,  first  in  English  and 
then  in  French,  and  then,  having  failed  to  get  an  answer,  fired  into 
one  of  the  ships,  which  promptly  returned  a  broadside.  The  Orford 
next  got  into  action  ;  and  she  and  the  Prince  Frederick  engaged  the 
chase  for  about  an  hour  and  a  half  before  the  remaining  ships  could 
approach  within  gunshot.  The  Weymouth  was  the  third  to  overhaul 
the  strangers  ;  and,  upon  her  arrival  on  the  scene,  Captain  Knowles 
boarded  the  Prince  l< 'rede rick,  and  expressed  his  conviction  that  the 
enemy  was  French.  Lord  Aubrey  Beauclerk  thereupon  made  the 
signal  to  desist ;  yet,  as  the  enemy  continued  firing,  the  engagement 
was  renewed  for  about  half  an  hour.  At  daybreak  Lord  Aubrey  sent 
an  officer  on  board  the  senior  ship  of  the  chase,  and  at  length  it  was 
satisfactorily  established  that  the  strangers  were  indeed  French,  and 
not,  as  Lord  Aubrey  had  at  first  believed,  Spaniards  sailing  under 
French  colours.  The  Prince  Frederick  lost  four  killed  and  nine 
wounded  ;  the  Orford,  seven  killed  and  fourteen  wounded  ;  and  the 
Weymouth,  two  killed  ;  and  all  three  vessels  were  much  damaged 
aloft, 

The  French,  who  bitterly  complained  of  the  manner  in  which 
they  had  been  treated,  suffered  much  more  severely.  They  declared 
that,  upon  being  hailed,  they  had  at  once  replied  ;  and  modern 
French  writers  seriously  contend  that  the  true  cause  of  the  action 
was  the  refusal  of  their  senior  officer  to  send  a  boat  to  Lord 
Aubrey,  when  he  called  for  one.  It  is  possible,  seeing  how  un- 
favourable to  Great  Britain  was  the  attitude  of  France  at  the  time, 

1  Lord  Cathcart  was  succeeded  in  the  command  by  General  Wentworth,  a  far  less 
exj)erienced  and  competent  officer. 

2  Ardent,  64,  Captain  d'Epinai  de  Boisgeroult ;  Mercure,  54,  Captain  des  Herbiers 
de    PEtenduere ;    Diamant,    50,    Captain    de    1'oisins ;    and    Parfaite,   46,   Captain 
d'Estournel.     Gueriii,  iv.  242.     These  vessels  formed  part  of  d'Antin's  squadron. 


1740.]  BALCHEN-S    CRUISE.  65 

that  neither  Ogle  nor  Lord  Aubrey  was  prepared  to  exercise  much 
forbearance  with  the  French,  and  that  the  action  was  the  result  of 
provocation  and  irritation  011  both  sides.  The  squadrons,  however, 
parted  with  mutual  apologies ;  and  Lord  Aubrey  proceeded  to  rejoin 
Sir  Chaloner  Ogle,  who  arrived  at  Jamaica  on  January  9th,  1741, 
and  there  placed  himself  under  the  orders  of  Vice-Admiral  Vernon. 

It  is  necessary  to  return  for  a  time  from  the  West  Indies,  and  to 
look  at  the  course  of  events  elsewhere. 

The  outbreak  of  war  had  found  Rear- Admiral  Nicholas  Haddock 
(R.)  Commander-in-chief  in  the  Mediterranean.  Under  him  was 
Eear-Admiral  Sir  Chaloner  Ogle  (1)  (B.).  At  first,  Haddock  blockaded 
the  Spaniards  in  Cadiz,  but  he  was  soon  drawn  off  by  the  foulness 
of  his  ships  and  by  the  requirements  of  Minorca,  which,  it  was 
supposed,  might  be  attacked  from  other  Spanish  ports ;  and  while 
he  and  Ogle  were  at  Port  Mahon,  such  Spanish  ships  l  as  had  been 
lying  at  Cadiz  slipped  out,  under  Don  Koderigo  de  Torres,  and  sailed 
to  Ferrol.  Not  long  afterwards,  when  it  appeared  that  Minorca  was 
in  no  danger,  and  that  the  Spaniards  in  the  Mediterranean  were 
weaker  than  had  at  first  been  believed,  Ogle,  with  a  strong  division, 
was  sent  home  by  Haddock.  He  arrived  in  England  on  July  7th, 
1740,  and,  as  had  been  shown,  went  out  later  in  the  year '-  to 
reinforce  Vice-Admiral  Vernon.  No  event  of  importance  occurred 
in  the  Mediterranean  during  the  rest  of  1740. 

Nearer  home,  much  was  designed  but  little  was  effected.  On 
April  9th,  Vice-Admiral  John  Balchen  (K.)  was  dispatched  from 
Plymouth  to  intercept  a  Spanish  treasure  fleet  which,  escorted  by 
a  squadron  under  Admiral  Pizarro,  was  011  its  way  home  from 
America.  Balchen  cruised  in  the  very  track  which  Pizarro  had 
intended  to  take ;  but  the  Spaniards,  learning  of  the  British 
Admiral's  station  and  design,  sent  out  a  fast  dispatch  vessel  which, 
warning  Pizarro,  caused  him  to  make  for  Santander  by  way  of  the 
Lizard  and  Ushant,  instead  of  for  Cadiz  by  way  of  Madeira,  as  he 
had  originally  purposed.  He  consequently  took  his  convoy  safely 
into  port.  To  defeat  Balchen,  Spain  in  the  meantime  fitted  out  and 
sent  to  sea  a  superior  force  under  Admiral  Pintado,  who,  however, 
failed  to  find  his  enemy,  and,  upon  his  return,  was  disgraced. 
Balchen,  against  whose  conduct  no  objections  were  ever  alleged, 

1  These  were  they  which  subsequently  proceeded  to  the  West  Indies,  as  has  been 
already  related. 

2  He  first,  however,  cruised  for  a  short  time  under  Sir  John  Xorris.     See  infra. 

VOL.    III.  F 


66  MAJOR    OPERATIONS,   1714-17<i±  [1741. 

went  back  to  port,  having  done  little  but  capture  the  Princesa,  70. * 
Later  in  the  year  he  commanded  a  squadron  in  the  Channel. 

The  large  concentration  of  Spanish  force  at  Ferrol,  and  the 
knowledge  that  Spain  cherished  plans  for  aiding  the  Pretender  in 
a  descent  upon  Great  Britain  or  Ireland,  led  to  the  assemblage  of  a 
large  fleet'2  at  Spithead.  It  was  entrusted  to  Admiral-of-the-Fleet 
Sir  John  N  orris,  and,  under  him,  to  Admiral  Philip  Cavendish  (B.), 
and  Hear- Admiral  Sir  Chaloner  Ogle  (1)  (B.).  Sir  John,  who  hoisted 
his  rlag  first  in  the  Victor;/,  100,  and  afterwards — the  Victory  having 
been  disabled  by  collision  with  the  Lion,''  (50 — in  the  Boyne,  80,  had 
secret  instructions  ;  but  what  they  were  is,  even  now,  not  certainly 
known.  It  is  supposed  by  some  that  he  had  orders  to  attack  Ferrol, 
but  this  is  upon  the  whole  unlikely.  It  is  more  probable  that  his 
force  was  designed  merely  to  convoy  outward-bound  merchantmen 
until  clear  of  the  Channel,  and  to  be  ready  for  any  special  service 
that  might  appear  desirable.  The  Admiral  of  the  Fleet  took  to 
sea  with  him  as  a  volunteer  Prince  William  Augustus,  Duke  of 
Cumberland/  second  son  of  George  II.  The  fleet  sailed  from 
St.  Helen's  on  July  l()th,  but  was  three  times  driven  back  into  port 
by  contrary  weather:  and  on  August  '28th,  Sir  John,  being  then  in 
Torbay,  hauled  down  his  flag  and  departed  for  London  with  the 
young  Duke. 

In  1741  the  proceedings  of  the  fleets  in  home  waters  were  equally 
uninteresting.  In  July,  and  again  in  October,  the  Admiral  of  the 
Fleet  and  Admiral  Philip  Cavendish  put  to  sea  with  a  considerable 
force  and  cruised  off  the  north  coast  of  Spain  ;  but,  beyond  picking 
up  a  few  small  prizes,  the  command  did  nothing.  It  returned  to 
Spithead  on  November  (5th. 

In  the  Mediterranean,  Vice-Admiral  Haddock,  who  was  from 
time  to  time  reinforced  from  England,  endeavoured  to  prevent  the 
junction  of  a  Spanish  squadron  which  lay  in  Cadi/  with  the  French 
fleet  which  lay  in  Toulon,  and  to  intercept  the  transport  of  Spanish 
troops  from  Barcelona  to  Italy.  But  he  failed  in  both  objects. 
While  Haddock  was  refitting  at  Gibraltar,  the  Toulon  fleet,  under 

1   For  an  account  of  her  capture,  m-i-  next  chapter. 

-  Made  up  of  one  ship  of  100  guns,  eight  ships  of  80,  five  of  70,  seven  of  60,  and 
one  of  50,  besides  smaller  craft. 

3  The  Victory  carried  away  her  head  and  bowsprit :  the  Lion  lost  her  foremast, 
and  twenty-eight  men  who  were  thrown  overboard  by  the  shock. 

*  The  victor  of  Culloden,  then  in  his  twentieth  year.     This  short  cruise  seems  to 
have  decided  him  to  adopt  a  military  instead  of  a  naval  career. 


1741.]  HADDOCK  MISSES   NAVAliRO.  07 

M.  La  Bruyere  de  Court,  weighed  and  steered  towards  the  Strait ; 
and  Don  Jose  Navarro,  from  Cadiz,  issued  forth  to  meet  and  join 
hands  with  it.  Haddock  suffered  Navarro  to  pass  by  him,1  and  only 
went  in  chase  when  it  was  too  late  to  prevent  the  accomplishment 
of  the  junction.  His  advanced  frigates  sighted  the  allies  off  Cape 
de  Gata  on  December  7th,  1741,  and  the  British  and  Spanish  fleets 
were  distantly  visible  one  from  the  other  on  the  following  morning ; 
but  at  that  time  the  junction  was  actually  being  effected.  The 
Vice-Admiral  called  a  coiincil  of  war  which,  in  view  of  the  fact  that 
French  neutrality  could  not  be  depended  upon,-  judged  it  inadvisable 
to  continue  the  pursuit.  Soon  afterwards  the  "French  and  Spanish 
fleets  proceeded  to  Barcelona  and  embarked  15,000  men,  who  were 
thence  transported  to  Orbetello,  in  Tuscany,  there  to  act  against  the 
allies  of  Great  Britain.  The  ill-success  both  of  X orris  and  of 
Haddock  was  doubtless  due  rather  to  the  nature  of  the  instructions 
given  to  these  officers  by  the  Ministry  than  to  any  fault  on  the 
part  of  either.  Popular  indignation  rose  high,  especially  when  it 
became  known  that  the  passage  of  Spanish  reinforcements  to  Italy 
had  not  been  prevented  :  and  the  general  discontent  on  this  subject 
contributed  much  to  the  fall  of  Sir  .Robert  Walpole's  administration. 
In  the  West  Indies,  as  has  been  said,  Sir  Chaloner  Ogle  joined 
Vice-Admiral  Vernon  at  Jamaica  on  January  (.)th,  1741.  A  fleet 
such  as  had  never  before  been  assembled  in  the  waters  of  the 
New  World  was  now  at  the  disposal  of  the  British  commander, 
who,  unlike  his  fellow-admirals  in  Europe,  had  very  full  powers  to 
act  as  he  might  deem  best  for  the  advantage  of  the  service. 
"Better,"  says  Beatson,  "had  it  been  for  Great  Britain  if  his 
powers  had  been  more  limited  ;  for,  had  he  been  directed  to  proceed 
immediately  against  the  Havana,  there  can  be  no  doubt  but  he 
would  have  succeeded  in  reducing  that  place  before  the  hurricane 
months  set  in.  His  instructions  pointed  strongly  at  this  as  the 
most  proper  place  to  commence  his  operations :  and  letters  from  the 
most  able  and  well  informed  of  his  friends3  in  England  strongly 
enforced  this  idea." 

1  Haddock,  who  had  left  cruisers  to  watch  Cadiz,  seems  to  have  been  very  ill-served 
by  his  scouts. 

2  The  Franco-Spanish  fleet  outnumbered  the  British  by  nearly  two  to  one. 

3  "  '  Take  and  hold,'  is  the  cry.     This  points  plainly  to  Cuba,  and  if  the  people  of 
England  were  to  give  you  instructions,  I  may  venture  to  say,  ninety-nine  in  a  hundred 
would  be  for  attacking  that  island."     Pulteney  to  Vernon,  August  17, 1740,  in  '  Letters 
to  an  Honest  Sailor.' 

F   2 


68  MAJOR    OPERATIONS,   1714-1762.  [1741. 

It  would  seem  that,  up  to  the  day  of  Ogle's  arrival,  Vernon  had 
formed  no  distinct  plans  for  the  future.  He  had  been  looking 
forward  to  talking  over  everything  with  Lord  Cathcart,  in  whom 
he  had  reason  for  placing  the  highest  confidence.  But  Cathcart 
died,  and  Wentworth,  who  took  his  place,  was  an  officer  of  very 
inferior  ability,  for  whom  Vernon,  from  the  first,  entertained  dislike 
and  distrust.  Wentworth,  it  is  fair  to  add,  did  not  deserve  this. 
He  appears  to  have  been  sensible,  if  not  very  able ;  and  he  was 
certainly  anxious  to  do  for  his  country  the  best  that  lay  in  his 
power. 

As  the  result  of  a  council  of  war  held  on  January  10th,1  it  was 
determined  to  proceed  with  the  whole  force  to  windward  to  observe 
the  motions  of  the  French  at  Port  Louis  in  Hispaniola.  Vernon 
formed  his  large  fleet  into  three  divisions,  one  under  himself,  one 
under  Ogle,  and  one  under  Commodore  Richard  Lestock.  Part  of 
the  force  got  out  of  harbour  on  January  '22nd,  but  the  whole  did  not 
make  an  offing  until  January  29th.  On  February  8th  it  was  off 
Cape  Tiburon,  the  western  point  of  Hispaniola.  There  the  Vice- 
Admiral  was  rejoined  by  the  Wolf,  10,  Commander  William 
Dandridge.  She  bad  been  sent  ahead  to  gain  intelligence,  and 
she  reported  that  there  were  in  Port  Louis  nineteen  large  ships,  one 
of  which  had  a  flag  at  the  main,  and  another  a  broad  pennant  flying  ; 
but,  when  the  fleet  arrived  off  the  place  on  the  12th,  it  was  found 
that  Dandridge  had  been  mistaken,-  and  that  there  were  in  port  only 
some  unrigged  merchantmen  and  a  large  frigate.  Three  days  later 
Vernon  obtained  permission  from  the  governor  of  Port  Louis  to 
wood  and  water  the  fleet,  and  learnt  that  the  Marquis  d'Antin 
had  returned  to  Europe.  At  another  council  of  war  it  was 
decided,  mainly  in  deference  to  Vernon's  representations,  to  attack 
Cartagena.  The  fleet,  therefore,  weighed  on  January  25th,  the 
Weymouth,  (50,  Captain  Charles  Knowles,  Experiment,  20,  Captain 
James  Eentone,  and  a  sloop,  being  sent  ahead  to  sound  the  coast 
and  to  find  a  safe  anchorage  for  the  huge  flotilla,  which  consisted, 
with  the  transports,  of  a  hundred  and  twenty-four  sail. 

Vernon    dropped    anchor    in    the    Bay   of    Playa   Grande3   on 
March  4th,  and  at  once  made  such  a  disposition  of  his  small  craft 

1  There  were  present,  in  addition   to  Vernon  and  Ogle,  Governor  Trelawney  of 
Jamaica,  and  Generals  Wentworth  and  Guise. 

2  He  was  misled  by  a  haze  which  prevailed  when  he  made  his  reconnaissance. 

3  It  is  to  the  windward  of  Cartagena,  between  it  and  Point  Canoa. 


1741.]  CARTAGENA.  69 

as  to  suggest  that  he  intended  them  to  cover  a  disembarkation  of 
the  army.  This  had  the  desired  effect.  It  drew  a  large  part  of  the 
enemy's  troops  down  to  the  shore  in  that  neighbourhood,  and 
induced  them  to  begin  throwing  up  intrenchments  there. 

But  no  actual  attack  was  made  until  March  9th,  and  in  the 
meantime  the  Spanish  garrison  of  four  thousand  men,  besides 
negroes  and  Indians,  and  the  naval  force  under  Don  Bias  de  Leso, 
perfected  its  preparations  for  defence. 

The  following  description  of  Cartagena,  as  it  then  was,  is  mainly 
from  Beatson  : — l 

The  city  is  in  a  great  measure  surrounded  by  water.  It  is  divided  into  t\vti 
unequal  parts,  the  city  of  Cartagena,  and  its  suburb,  called  Xiinani.  The  walls  of  the 
former  are  washed  by  the  waves  of  the  Bay  of  Mexico ;  but,  on  account  of  some  rocks, 
and  perpetual  surf,  there  is  no  approaching  it  on  that  side.  The  water  on  the  outside 
of  the  harbour  is  seldom  smooth,  so  that  landing  is  at  must  times  diflicult.  The  only 
entrance  to  the  harbour  is  upwards  of  two  leagues  to  the  westward  of  the  city,  between 
two  narrow  peninsulas,  the  one  called  Tierra  Bomba,  the!  other  railed  the  Uaradera. 
This  entry  is  called  Boca  (,'hica,  or  the  Little  Mouth,  and  is  so  narrow  that  only  one 
ship  can  enter  at  a  time.  It  was  defended,  on  the  Tierra  Bomba  side,  bv  a  foil  called 
San  Luis,  a  regular  square,  with  four  bastions,  mounted  with  eighty-two  pieces  of 
cannon  and  three  mortars;  but  the  counterscarp  and  glace*  were  not  completed.  To 
this  were  added  Fort  San  l-'clipe,  mounted  with  seven  guns,  and  Fort  Santiago,  of 
fifteen  guns,  and  a  small  fort  of  four  guns  called  Battery  de  Chamba.  These  served  as 
outworks  to  Fort  San  Luis.  On  the  other  side  of  the  harbour's  monthlies  a  fascine 
battery,'2  called  the  Baradera :  and,  in  a  small  bay  at  the  back  of  that,  another  battery 
of  four  guns.  And,  facing  the  entrance  of  the  harbour,  on  a  small,  Hat  island,  stood 
Fort  San  Jose,  of  twenty-one  guns.  From  this  fort  to  Foil  San  Luis,  a  strong  boom, 
made  of  logs  and  cables,  was  laid  across,  fastened  with  three  large  anchors  at  each  end; 
and  just  behind  the  boom  were  moored  four  ships  of  the  line.  IJeyond  this  passage  lies 
the  great  lake  or  outer  harbour  of  Cartagena,  several  leagues  in  circumference,  and 
land-locked  on  all  sides.  About  mid-way  to  the  town,  it  grows  narrower;  and,  within 
less  than  a  league  of  it,  two  points  project  into  the  lake  from  the  inner  harbour.  On 
the  northmost  of  these  was  a  strong  fort  called  Castillo  (irande,  being  a  regular  square 
with  four  bastions,  defended  to  the  land  by  a  wet  ditch  and  glacis  proper.  The  face  ol 
the  curtain,  towards  the  sea,  was  covered  by  a  ravelin,  and  a  double  line  of  heavy 
cannon.  The  number  of  guns  in  this  fort  was  fifty-nine,  though  there  were  embrasures 
for  sixty-one.  On  the  opposite  point  was  a  horseshoe  battery  of  twelve  guns,  called 
Fort  Mancinilla.  In  the  middle,  between  these  two  forts,  is  a  large  shoal  with  only  a 
few  feet  of  water  on  it.  On  each  side  of  this  were  sunk  large  ships.  At  the  end  of  the 
inner  harbour  stands  the  city  of  Cartagena,  on  two  flat  sandy  keys  or  islands,  well 
fortified  to  the  land,  and  with  lakes  and  morasses  running  round  it.  On  the  fortifica- 
tion of  the  city  are  mounted  one  hundred  and  sixty  guns,  and  on  those  of  the  suburbs, 
one  hundred  and  forty.  South  of  the  city,  about  a  quarter  of  a  mile  from  the  Xitnani 
gate,  stands  Fort  San  Lazar,  on  an  eminence  about  fifty  or  sixty  feet  high.  It  is 
composed  of  a  square  of  fifty  feet,  having  three  demi-bastions,  and  two  guns  in  each 


1  '  Nav.  and  Mil.  Menu.'  iii.  24. 

2  It  was  for  fifteen  24-pounders ;  but  these  seem  not  to  have  been  mounted  until 
after  operations  had  been  begun. 


70  MAJOR    OPERATIONS,   17H-1762.  [1741. 

face,  one  in  each  flank,  and  three  in  each  curtain.  It  completely  commands  the  town ; 
but  there  is  a  hill  about  four  hundred  yards  from  it  which  overlooks  and  commands  it 
entirely. 

Early  in  the  morning  of  March  9th,  Sir  Chaloner  Ogle,  who  had 
shifted  his  flag  from  the  Russell,  80,  to  the  Jersey,  60,  Captain  Peter 
Lawrence,  and  who  had  General  Wentworth  with  him,  moved  with 
his  division,1  towards  the  mouth  of  the  harbour.  He  was  presently 
followed  by  Vice-Admiral  Yernon  and  his  division,-  convoying  the 
transports  full  of  troops.  The  third  division,3  under  Commodore 
Lestock,  was  left  at  anchor,  so  as  to  distract  the  attention  of  the 
enemy. 

The  Prince.™  Amelia,  80,  was  specially  told  off  to  attack  Battery 
de  Chamba,  and  the  Norfolk,  80,  Httsxell,  80.  and  Hhreicsbunj,  80, 
were  similarly  told  off  to  batter  forts  Santiago  and  San  Felipe.  As 
the  division  of  Ogle  approached,  Chamba  opened  fire,  but  was  soon 
silenced  by  the  Princess  Amelia,  Captain  John  Hemmington.  At 
about  noon  the  Norfolk,  Captain  Thomas  Graves  (1),  Russell,  Captain 
Harry  Norris,  and  the  Shrewsbury,  Captain  Isaac  Townsend, 
anchored  in  their  assigned  positions  and  tired  so  vigorously  that 
both  the  forts  opposed  to  them  were  rendered  untenable  within  an 
hour.  They  were  then  taken  possession  of  by  landing  parties. 
Generals  Wentworth  and  Guise,  and  Colonel  Wolfe  also  landed  soon 
afterwards,  and  on  that  day  and  the  10th,  most  of  the  troops  were 
put  ashore.  These  initial  successes  were  gained  at  little  cost.  Only 
six  men  were  killed  on  board  the  Norfolk  and  liiisxcll,  and  although 
the  Shrewsbury  had  her  cable  shot  away  and  fell  into  a  position 
where  she  lay  for  seven  hours  under  a  most  infernal  fire  from  two  or 
three  hundred  guns  she  had  but  twenty  killed  and  forty  wounded. 
She  received,  however,  two  hundred  and  forty  shot  in  her  hull,  and 
of  these  sixteen  were  between  wind  and  water. 

The  following  days  were  employed  in  landing  guns  and  stores  ;  in 
forming  a  camp  in  a  somewhat  ill-chosen  position,  before  Fort  San 

1  Princes*  Amelia,  80,    Windsor,  CO,    York,  60,  Norfolk,  80,  Russell,  80,  fihn-n-s- 
litrtj,  80,  Ripon,  60,  Liehfield,  50,  Jersey,  GO,    Tilbury,  60,  Experiment,  20,  Sheer- 
ness,  20,  Vesuvius,  fireship,  TerriUe,  bomb,  Phaeton,  iireslii]i,  and  OoodJy,  tender. 

2  Orford,  70,  Princess  Louisa,  60,  Worcester,  CO,  Chichester,  80,  Princess   Caroline 
(nag),  80,    Tnrbay,  80,    Stra/ord,  60,    Weymouth,   GO,   Deptford,   60,    Burford,    70, 
Hijuirrel,  20,  Shoreham,  20,  Eleanor,  10,  Seahorse,  20,  the  fireships  Stromloto,  Surrms, 
Vulcan  and  Cumberland,  the  tender  Pompey,  and  a  brig. 

3  Defiance,  60,  Dunkirk,  60,  Lion,  60,  Prince  Frederick,  70,  Boyne,  80,  Hampton 
Court,  70,  Falmouth,  50,  Montagu,  GO,  Suffolk,  70,  Astrcea,  12,  Wolf,  10,  the  fireships 
*Ktn<i  and  Firebrand,  and  the  Virf/in  Queen,  tender. 


1741.]  ATTACK   ON   CARTAGENA.  71 

Luis ;  and  in  quarrels  between  Wentworth  and  Vernon,  who  was 
dissatisfied  with  the  manner  in  which  the  engineers  did  their  work, 
and  who  used  unbecoming  language  to  the  military  commander-in- 
chief.  As  the  camp  was  exposed  to  the  fire  of  the  Spanish  fascine 
battery  on  the  Baradera  side,  an  attack  upon  this  was  made  on  the 
night  of  March  19th,  when  the  boats  of  the  fleet,  under  Captain 
Thomas  Watson  (1),  of  the  Princess  Caroline,  Captain  Harry  Korris, 
of  the  Russell,  and  Captain  Charles  Colby,  of  the  Boijne,  landed  a 
party  of  five  hundred  seamen  and  soldiers  commanded  by  Captains 
the  Hon.  Edward  Boscawen,  of  the  Shoreham,  "William  Laws,  and 
Thomas  Cotes,1  li.N.  The  party  was  put  ashore  about  a  mile  to 
leeward  of  the  Baradera  Battery,  under  the  very  muzzles  of  a 
masked  battery  of  five  guns  that  had  been  thrown  up  on  the  beach  : 
but,  although  a  little  confused  at  first  by  the  hot  tire  which  was 
opened  from  this,  the  men  promptly  rushed  it,  and  then,  pushing  on, 
carried  the  Baradera  Battery  itself,  and,  suffering  very  little  loss, 
spiked  the  guns,  and  set  the  carnages,  fascines,  platforms,  magazines 
and  guard-houses,  on  fire. 

This  well-managed  exploit  relieved  the  army  before  San  Luis  ; 
but  there  was  much  sickness  in  the  camp,  the  works  did  not  progress 
with  the  expected  rapidity,  and  Yice-Admiral  Vernon  grew  daily 
more  impatient  and  irritable.  To  add  to  his  annoyance,  the 
Spaniards  partially  refitted  the  abandoned  Baradera  Battery,  and 
again  began  to  fire  upon  the  camp  from  it.  They  were  driven  out 
by  the  Ripon,  (50,  Captain  Thomas  Jolly,  which  later  prevented  any 
further  attempts  from  being  made  to  mount  guns  there.  The  main 
British  battery  opened  against  Fort  San  Luis  on  the  morning  of  the 
21st;  and  on  that  and  the  next  day  a  furious  fire  was  maintained  on 
both  sides. 

On  the  morning  of  March  23rd,  a  general  attack  upon  all  the 
forts  and  batteries  was  begun.  Commodore  Lestock,  with  the 
Boyne,  80,  Captain  Charles  Colby,  Princess  Amelia,  80,  Captain 
John  Hemmington,  Prince  Frederick,  70,  Captain  Lord  Aubrey 
Beauclerk,  Hampton  Court,  70,  Captain  Digby  Dent  (2),  Suffolk, 
70,  Captain  Thomas  Davers,  and  Tilbury,  00,  Captain  Eobert  Long, 
engaged  the  Spanish  forts,  batteries  and  ships,"  there  not  being  room 
to  bring  more  vessels  to  bear  upon  the  enemy's  defences.  The 

1  The  military  officers  were  Captains  James  Murray  and  Washington. 

2  Oalicia,   70,   flag   of    Don   Bias   de   Leso ;    Sun    Carlos,    66,   Africa,   CO,   and- 
San  Felipe,  60. 


72  MAJOR    OPERATIONS,   1714-1762.  [1741. 

Boijne  suffered  so  severely  that  she  had  to  be  called  off  at  night ;  the 
Prince  Frederick,  which  lost  her  captain,1  and  the  Hampton  Court, 
very  much  shattered,  had  to  be  recalled  on  the  following  morning. 
The  other  ships  did  excellent  service,  and  were  less  injured ;  yet  it 
was  found  expedient  to  withdraw  even  these  on  the  24th.  During 
this  attack,  the  chief  engineer  was  mortally  wounded  :  on  the  other 
hand,  Fort  San  Luis  was  breached,  and  General  Wentworth,  who 
went  in  person  to  view  the  effect  of  the  bombardment,  determined  to 
assault  the  place  on  the  night  of  March  25th. 

Vernon  undertook  to  make  a  diversion  on  the  Baradera  side, 
and,  in  the  afternoon  of  the  25th,  landed  Captain  Charles  Knowles 
and  some  seamen  near  the  remains  of  the  fascine  battery.  The 
assault  was  then  made  with  complete  success,  and  with  the  loss  of 
but  a  single  man.  Owing  to  the  fall  of  Fort  Han  Luis,  the  Spaniards 
had  to  scuttle  or  burn  the  Africa,  Nun  Carlos,  and  Nan  Felipe,  and 
they  were  thrown  into  so  much  confusion  that  Captain  Knowles, 
taking  advantage  of  it,  apparently  upon  his  own  authority,  pulled 
across  to  Fort  San  Jose,  on  the  island,  and  stormed  it  without  the 
slightest  difficulty.  Still  unwilling  to  let  slip  what  seemed  to  be  so 
splendid  an  opportunity  for  dealing  serious  blows,  lie,  with  Captain 
Thomas  Watson,  forced  a  way  within  the  boom,  and  boarded  and 
took  the  (idlicid,  70."  They  also  destroyed  the  boom,  so  that  on  the 
morning  of  the  2(>th  part  of  the  -British  iieet  entered  the  lake.  A 
few  days  later,  it  passed  up  to  the  narrow  entrance  leading  to  the 
harbour  proper/1  and,  upon  its  approach,  the  enemy  abandoned 
Castillo  Grande,  sank  two  line-of-battleships4  which  had  been  moored 
in  the  channel,  and  blew  up  Fort  Mancinilla.  Such  was  the  general 
situation  on  March  31st.5 

All  would,  doubtless,  have  continued  to  go  well,  but  for  the 
unhappy  dissensions  between  the  Vice-Admiral  and  the  General.  The 
siege  had  caused  much  disease,  especially  among  the  troops,  which, 
on  March  25th,  had  lost  about  five  hundred  men,  and  had  about  one 
thousand  five  hundred  more  sick  on  board  the  hospital-ships  Princess 
Itoyal  and  Scarborough.  The  fleet  was  considerably  less  unhealthy  ; 
yet,  while  the  fleet  had  plenty  of  water,  and,  very  often,  fresh  meat 

1  Whose  place  was  taken  by  Captain  the  Hon.  Edward  Boscawen. 

2  She  was  towed  out. 

3  Called  the  Surgidero,  or  Anchorage. 

4  Conquistador,  66,  and  Dragon,  60. 

8  On  April  1st  Vernon  sent  home  a  sanguine  dispatch  which  reached  the  Duke  of 
Newcastle  on  May  17th,  and  caused  general  exultation. 


1741.] 


ATTACK    ON   CARTAGENA. 


73 


and  turtle,  the  army  sometimes  suffered  from  absolute  want. 
Vernon  seems  to  have  forgotten  that  troops  and  seamen  alike  served 
a  common  sovereign  and  a  common  cause.  He  took  no  measures 
for  supplying  water  to  the  army  ;  he  refused  Wentworth's  reasonable 
request  that  two  or  three  small  craft  should  be  told  off  to  catch 
turtle  for  the  use  of  the  sick ;  and,  speaking  generally,  his  relations 
with  his  military  colleague  were  unaccommodating,  boisterous,  and 
overbearing.  Wentworth,  in  consequence,  became  disgusted,  and, 
rather  than  seek  the  co-operation  of  so  bearish  and  dictatorial  a  man 
as  Vernon,  he  sometimes  stood  sullenly  aloof,  regardless  of  the 
magnitude  of  the  public  interests  involved. 

On  April  1st  the  Vice-Admiral  moved  his  bomb-ketches,  covered 


MKDAI;    COMMKMOltATlVK    OK    TIIK    DKSTHUCTIOS    OF    SOMK    OF    T11K    DKFKXCKS    OF 
CAItT.MiKXA    J!V    VU'K-ADMIli AL    KDWAltl)    VKHXOX,  MAHCII,     L7U. 

(I'ruM  mi  nriijliKil  kiiidlii  Intl  liii  //.N.7/.  ('»;;/<»'«  Vriin-i    Lmix  nf  lintti iihcnj.  Jt.X.l 

by  the  Experiment,  20,  Captain  James  Itentone,  and  the  Shoirhuni, 
20,  Captain  Thomas  Brodrick,1  into  the  Surgidero ;  and  Commodore 
Lestock,  who  had  re-embarked  the  troops  from  Tierra  Bomba,  joined 
Vernon  off  Castillo  Grande.  On  the  '2nd,  three  rireships  took  up 
their  station  within  the  Surgidero  in  order  to  protect  a  projected 
landing  of  troops  at  a  place  called  La  Quinta.  On  the  3rd,  the 
Weymouth,  (50,  Captain  Charles  Knowles,  also  passed  the  narrows ; 
and,  early  on  the  morning  of  the  5th,  General  Blakeney,  with  about 
one  thousand  five  hundred  men,  was  set  ashore,  and  presently 
pushed  forward  towards  Fort  San  Lazar,  the  only  remaining 
outwork  of  Cartagena.  Some  resistance  was  encountered,  but  the 
enemy  eventually  retired.  On  the  Gth,  more  of  the  army  dis- 

1  Who  had  succeeded  Captain  the  Hon.  E.  Boscawen. 


74  MAJOR    OPERATIONS,    1714-1702.  [1741. 

embarked,  and,  having  joined  Blakeney's  brigade,  encamped  with  it 
on  a  plain  about  a  mile  from  San  Lazar. 

On  the  7th,  a  military  council  of  war  came  to  the  conclusion  that 
Fort  San  Lazar  ought  not  to  be  attempted  until  a  battery  should  be 
raised  against  it,  and  that  the  reduction  of  the  work  would  be  greatly 
facilitated  by  the  co-operation  of  the  bomb-ketches  and  a  ship  of  the 
line  with  the  army.  Vernon,  on  being  informed  of  this,  testily 
replied  that  he  strongly  disapproved  of  waiting  for  the  erection  of  a 
battery,  and  that,  if  a  battery  should  be  erected  against  so  paltry  a 
fort,  he  felt  sure  that  the  enemy  would  not  wait  for  it  to  be  made 
ready  for  action  ;  but,  in  bis  answer,  he  paid  no  attention  to  the 
council's  suggestion  as  to  the  co-operation  of  the  ships  ;  nor  could 
Wentworth  induce  the  Vice-Admiral  to  order  his  vessels  to  cover  a 
detachment  of  troops  which  had  been  posted  with  a  view  to  cutting 
off  communication  between  Cartagena  and  the  country  at  its  back. 
In  short,  it  appears  that  Vernon  believed  that  the  army  could  do, 
and  ought  to  do,  all  that  remained  to  be  done,  and  that  Vv'entworth, 
with  wiser  intuition,  knew  that  only  by  co-operation  could  the 
desired  results  be  attained.  But  sickness  increased  ashore,  water 
grew  daily  scarcer,  and  the  Spanish  defences  became  hourly  more 
formidable;  and,  in  an  evil  moment,  at  the  pressing  instance  of 
Vernon.  and  against  the  better  judgment  of  some  of  the  land  officers, 
the  storming  of  San  Lazar  was  ordered,  and  was  attempted  before 
daybreak  on  April  Dth.  Things  were  mismanaged  ;  officers  were 
confused  by  lack  of  detailed  instructions,  and  the  assault  was  repulsed 
with  heavy  loss.1 

Operations  were  continued  for  two  days  longer;  but  on  the  llth 
a  council  of  land  officers  decided  that,  "  without  a  considerable 
reinforcement  from  the  fleet,  it  would  not  be  possible  to  go  on  with 
the  enterprise."  Vernon  still  shut  his  ears  to  the  suggestions  of  his 
military  colleagues;  and  when  the  council,  having  received  from  him 
a  very  non-pertinent  answer,  reassembled,  it  desired  that  the  Vice- 
Admiral  would  make  arrangements  for  re-embarking  the  forces  and 
stores,  since  it  appeared,  from  his  silence  concerning  the  material 
point,  that  no  reinforcement  was  to  he  looked  for.  On  the  14th, 
after  some  further  interchange  of  messages,  a  general  council  of  war, 
consisting  of  the  sea  as  well  as  of  the  land  officers,  met  on  hoard  the 
flagship.  The  conference  was  stormy ;  and,  in  the  course  of  it, 
Vernon  quitted  his  cabin  in  a  passion.  After  his  departure,  Sir 
1  The  loss  was  1711  killed  ;  459  wounded,  many  mortally;  and  1G  taken  prisoners. 


1741.]  WITHDRAWAL    FROM    CARTAGENA.  75 

Chaloner  Ogle  gave  reasons  for  objecting  to  disembark  the  seamen 
from  the  fleet ;  and  Vernon,  who  sat  in  his  stern-walk  within  hearing, 
interjected  a  remark  to  the  effect  that,  if  the  men  were  set  ashore, 
some  of  them  would  infallibly  desert  to  the  enemy.  The  Vice- 
Admiral  then  returned  to  his  cabin,  and  the  council  unanimously 
determined  that  the  troops  and  guns  should  be  re-embarked.  In 
pursuance  of  this  decision,  the  guns,  stores,  and  baggage  were 
reshipped  on  the  15th,  and  the  troops,  only  35(59  of  whom  remained 
fit  for  duty,  on  the  16th. 

Vernon,  who  may,  by  that  time,  have  begun  to  feel  uneasy 
concerning  the  effect  which  so  signal  a  miscarriage  would  have  upon 
his  reputation,1  made  a  last,  but  quite  useless  effort,  against  the 
town.  Having  fitted  up  his  prize,  the  (laliciu,  as  a  floating  battery 
of  sixteen  guns,  and  having  fortified  her  with  earth  or  sand,  he 
caused  her  to  be  warped  in  as  near  as  possible  to  the  town.  During 
the  morning  of  the  Kith,  under  the  command  of  Captain  Daniel 
Hore,  she  fired  into  the  place  continuously  for  seven  hours.  She 
was  then  so  damaged  that  she  was  ordered  to  cut  her  cables  and 
drift  out  of  gunshot,  but  she  grounded  on  a  shoal,  and  had  to  be 
abandoned.-  She  lost  six  killed  and  fifty-six  wounded.  But  for 
the  happy  chance  that  she  grounded,  she  would  probably  have  sunk 
with  all  hands,  for  she;  had  received  twenty  shot  between  wind  and 
water. 

As  soon  as  the  works  which  had  been  already  taken  had  been 
dismantled  and  destroyed,  the  wretched  remains  of  the  expedition 
sailed  for  Jamaica,  where  the  fleet  arrived  on  May  19th,  and  where 
it  found  a  welcome  convoy  from  England  awaiting  it.  Commodore 
Lestock,  with  many  of  the  heavier  ships3  and  five  frigates,  was  soon 
afterwards  sent  home  in  charge  of  the  trade.  Vernon,  chiefly  in 
consequence  of  his  dislike  to  be  further  associated  with  Wentworth, 
wished  to  go  home  also  ;  but  the  ministry,  which  adroitly  flattered 
him,  persuaded  him  to  remain. 

1  It  is  also  suggested  that  Vernon  desired  to  convince  General   Wentworth,  by 
actual  experiment,  that  ships  could  not  operate  with  success  against  the  town.     But,  if 
so,  the  experiment  was  not  a  fair  one.     The  Galicia  did  not  get  near  the  walls  because 
she  approached  them   at  the  wrong  point.     Elsewhere  there  was  deep  water  within 
pistol-shot  of  the  ramparts.     Smollett,  vii.  287. 

2  She  was  subsequently  burnt  by  the  British. 

3  Princess  Caroline,  80,  Russell,  80,  Norfolk,  80,  Shrewsbury,^,  Princess  Amelia, 
80,  Torbay,  80,   Chichester,  80,  Hampton  Court,  70,  Burfoid,  70,   Windsor,  60,  and 
Falmouth,  50.     Vernon  transferred  his  flag  to  the  Jioyne,  80. 


76  MAJOR    OPERATIONS,   1714-1762.  [1741. 

The  next  attempt  of  the  fleet  in  the  West  Indies  was  against 
Santiago  de  Cuba.  The  home  Government  would  have  preferred 
to  see  Havana  attacked,  but  the  place  was  strong,  and  the  squadron 
of  Don  Kodrigo  de  Torres  lay  in  the  port.  Governor  Trelawney, 
of  Jamaica,  urged  an  expedition,  across  the  Isthmus  of  Darien, 
against  Panama,  but  gave  way  to  the  representations  of  Vernon, 
Ogle,  Wentworth,  and  Guise,  all  of  whom  voted  for  Santiago  de 
Cuba  as  the  town  which,  upon  the  whole,  offered  the  brightest 
prospects  of  success.  On  June  '25th,  therefore,  Captain  James 
lientone,  in  the  Ripon,  GO,1  was  dispatched  to  reconnoitre  the 
harbour  and  its  defences,  and  on  June  30th  the  fleet  ~  put  to  sea. 
The  Vice-Admiral  left  at  Jamaica  the  Suffolk,  70,  titrafford,  GO, 
Dunkirk,  GO,  Bristol,  50,  Lichfield,  50,  and  Vulcan,  8,  under 
Captain  Thomas  Davers,  to  protect  the  island  and  its  trade,  and 
ordered  the  York,  GO,  Aiii/usta,  (50,  and  Dcptford,  GO,  which  were 
refitting  at  Port  lioyal,  to  be  completed  for  sea,  and  to  be  sent  after 
him,  as  soon  as  possible. 

A  spacious  harbour  lying  near  the  south-east  end  of  Cuba,  and 
then  known  as  Walthenham  P>ay,:l  was  selected  as  the  general 
rendezvous;  and  there  the  expedition  dropped  anchor  on  July  18th. 
This  harbour  is  about  sixty-five  miles  to  the  eastward  of  Santiago, 
which  occupies  the  head  of  a  much  smaller  bay,  and  which  has 
a  well-defended  narrow  entrance,  closed  at  that  time  by  means  of 
a  substantial  boom.  Santiago  was  supposed  to  be  impregnable  from 
seaward,  and  the  leaders  of  the  fleet  and  army  decided  to  attack  it 
overland  from  Cumberland  Harbour.  To  facilitate  this  operation, 
Vernon  despatched  some  cruisers  to  watch  twelve  Spanish  sail 
of  the  line  which  lay  at  Havana,  and  which  constituted  a  "  potential  " 
fleet  of  decidedly  dangerous  strength.  He  also  sent  other  vessels 
to  blockade  Santiago ;  and  across  the  mouth  of  Cumberland  Harbour 
he  stationed  six  of  his  largest  ships,  so  that,  should  any  enemy 
approach,  the  transports  within  could  not  be  reached  without  a 

1  Captain  Thomas  Jolly  had  died  in  May.     Lord  Augustus  Fitzroy,  of  the   Orford, 
70,  had  also  fallen  a  victim  to  the  climate  soon  after  the  arrival  of  the  fleet  at  Jamaica. 

2  Boyne,  80,  flag  of  Veruon,  Cumberland,  80,  flag  of  Ogle,  Oraftoii,  70,  Kent,  70, 
Worcester,  60,  Tilbury,  GO,  Montagu,  60,  Chester,  50,  Tiger,  50,  Shore/tarn,  20,  Experi- 
ment, 20,  Sheerness,  20,  Alderney,  bomb,  Strombolo,  Phaeton,  and   Vesuvius,  fireships, 
JSonetta  and    Triton,  sloops,  Princess   lioyal  and    Scarborough,   hospital   ships,  and 
Pompey,  tender,  besides  about  40  transports  carrying  3400  troops. 

3  Re-named  Cumberland  Harbour  by  Vernou.     It  is  the  bay  between  Punto  de 
Guantananio  and  Caimamera. 


1741.]  THE  FIASCO   IN   CUBA.  77 

severe  struggle.  But  in  the  meantime  Wentworth  lost  heart.  He 
landed,  but  he  did  not  go  far.  The  country  before  him  was  thickly 
wooded ;  his  men  had  rapidly  become  sickly ;  he  found  great 
difficulty  in  dragging  his  guns  along  with  him ;  and,  although 
Vernon  assured  him  that,  if  he  pressed  on,  he  should  find  ships 
before  Santiago  ready  to  co-operate  with  him,  the  General  declined 
to  advance  any  further.  The  Vice-Admiral  in  person  went  round 
to  Santiago  with  a  view  to  seeing  whether,  after  all,  he  could  not 
devise  some  method  of  capturing  it  from  the  sea ;  but  he  was  obliged 
to  agree  that  the  venture  offered  no  chances  of  success.  The  whole 
scheme,  therefore,  was  abandoned,  the  troops  being  re-embarked  on 
November  20th,  and  the  fleet  quitting  Cumberland  Harbour  for 
Jamaica  on  November  '28th. 

This  abortive  enterprise  was  as  ill-conceived  as  it  was  pusillani- 
mously  attempted.  It  was  the  professed  desire  of  the  ministry  in 
England,  and  of  the  naval  and  military  chiefs  on  the  spot,  to 
conquer  Cuba.1  Havana  was  then,  as  it  is  now,  the  capital  and  heart 
of  the  island  ;  and  Santiago  was  a  comparatively  insignificant  place 
of  less  strategic  and  commercial  importance  than  to-day.  Yet  it  was 
determined  to  avoid  Havana,  and  to  attack  Santiago,  in  spite  of  the 
fact  that  at  Havana  lay  the  strong  squadron  of  Don  Kodrigo  do 
Torres.  Sane  strategy  would  have  dictated  firstly  the  annihilation 
or  neutralisation  of  that  formidable  "  potential  "  fleet,  and  secondly 
the  dealing  of  a  blow  at  the  heart  instead  of  at  the  extremities  of  the 
island.  That  Don  Kodrigo  lay  fast,  and  did  not  come  out,  affords  no 
justification  of  the  British  action.  He  might  have  elected  to  come 
out ;  and,  had  he  done  so,  he  might,  with  his  superior  force,  have 
crushed  Vernon,  who  would  have  been  hampered  by  the  presence 
of  his  transports  and  by  the  necessity  of  looking  to  their  safety.  As 
for  the  pusillanimity  with  which  the  descent  was  attempted,  it  is 
sufficient  to  say  that  Wentworth  lay  for  about  three  months,  almost 
inactive,  within  three  or  four  days'  march  of  Santiago ;  that  there 
was  at  no  time  any  considerable  body  of  Spanish  troops  between  him 
and  that  city ;  that  the  landward  defences  of  Santiago  were  known 
to  be  contemptible  ;  and  that  the  delay  involved  the  sacrifice  of 
more  men  than  would  have  perished  in  any  active  operations  that 
could  have  been  necessary  to  secure  the  fall  of  the  place. 

1  Settlers  were  actually  invited  to  cross  from  North  America,  and  were  promised 
grants  of  land  in  the  island.— Speech  of  Gov.  Shirley  at  Boston,  Sept.  23rd,  1741.  The 
re-naming  of  places  by  the  British  leaders  was  also  significant. 


78  MAJOR    OPERATIONS,    1714-1762.  [1741. 

The  Ministry  censured  both  Vernon  and  Wentworth,  yet  only 
with  mildness,  and  chiefly  on  account  of  the  personal  quarrels  which 
had  been  allowed  to  spring  up  between  them.  The  Duke  of 
Newcastle,  on  October  31st,  wrote  to  Vernon  : — 

"  His  Majesty  has  commanded  me  to  acquaint  you  and  General  Wentworth  that 
he  sees  with  great  concern  the  heats  and  animosities  that  have  arisen  between  his 
officers  by  sea  and  land,  contrary  to  his  orders,  whereby  the  service  cannot  but  greatly 
suffer ;  and  I  am  ordered  to  recommend  to  you  in  the  strongest  manner  carefully  to 
iivnid  the  like  for  the  future,  and  that,  in  case'  of  any  difference  of  opinion,  all  acrimony 
and  warmth  of  expression  should  be  avoided." 

After  the  collapse  of  the  undertaking  had  become  known  in  England, 
neither  Admiral  nor  General  received  from  the  Government  any 
much  stronger  blame  than  this.  Yet  one,  if  not  both,  should  have 
been  recalled.  It  was  obvious,  even  to  their  best  friends,1  that  they 
could  not  work  satisfactorily  one  with  the  other.  Unhappily,  they 
were  allowed  to  embark  together  upon  further  adventures. 

The  transports  from  Santiago  reached  Jamaica  in  safety,  while 
the  fleet  cruised  for  a  time  off  Hispaniola  in  order  to  protect  the 
arrival  of  an  expected  convoy  "  from  England.  After  a  time,  the 
Vice-Admiral  left  part  of  his  force,  under  C'aptaiu  Cornelius  Mitchell, 
of  the  Kent,  70,  to  look  for  the  convoy,  and  proceeded  to  Jamaica, 
where  a  council  of  war  was  held  on  January  8th,  174'2.  The  council 
eventually  decided  to  adopt  a  plan  which  had  been  submitted  to  it 
by  Lowther,  the  ex-buccaneer,  who  knew  the  country  well.  This 
involved  a  landing  at  Puerto  Bello,  and  a  march  across  the  isthmus 
to  Panama,  with  three  thousand  soldiers,  five  hundred  negroes,  and 
four  hundred  friendly  Mosquito  Indians.  But  many  delays  occurred. 
In  the  interval,  Lowther,  in  the  Triton,  sloop,  convoyed  by 
Captain  Henry  Dennis  in  the  Experiment,  went  to  the  Mosquito 
coast  to  procure  information  and  to  make  arrangements  with  the 
natives.  The  Triton  was  for  this  service  disguised  as  a  trader.  As 
for  Vernon,  who  was  terribly  impatient  at  the  slowness  with  which 
the  land  forces  were  being  got  ready,  and  who  had  learnt  that 
Spanish  reinforcements  were  on  their  way  to  Cartagena,  he  occupied 
some  of  his  spare  time  in  making  a  cruise  off  Cartagena,  with  the 

1  Pulteney's  amiable  appeals  to  Vernon  to  control  his  temper  were  almost  pathetic. 
See  especially  Pulteney's  letter  of  Xov.  17th,  1741,  in  'Letters  to  an  Honest  Sailor.' 

2  The  convoy,  consisting  of  the  Greenwich,  50,  St.  Allans,  50,  and  Fox,  20,  with 
transports  containing  about  two  thousand  troops,  reached  Jamaica  on  January  15th, 
without  having  sighted  Mitchell's  squadron. 


1742.]  FAILURES    OF    VERNON  AND    WENTWORTH.  79 

object  of  suggesting  to  the  enemy  that  he  was  contemplating  a  new 
attack  upon  that  place.  Sir  Chaloner  Ogle,  who  had  been  left  behind 
at  Jamaica  to  bring  on  the  main  body  of  the  expeditionary  forces, 
was  not  able  to  sail  until  the  middle  of  March,  1742.  On  the  '25th 
of  that  month,  he  rejoined  the  Vice-Admiral,  and  the  fleet1  then 
made  the  best  of  its  way  to  its  destination. 

The  Experiment  and  Triton  had  been  directed  to  make  rendezvous 
with  the  fleet  off  the  Bastimentos  Islands,  in  what  is  now  called  the 
Gulf  of  San  Bias.  On  March  -2(>th,  Yernon  detached  the  Mont/ti/ii, 
Captain  William  Chambers,  to  look  for  those  vessels,  and  to  order 
them,  in  case  they  should  be  I'allen  in  with,  to  join  a  detachment 
which  was  to  land  a  body  of  troops  at  Xombre  de  ])ios,  at  the 
head  of  the  gulf  of  Sun  Bias.-  The  fleet  sighted  land  near  the 
Bastimentos  on  March  -JStli,  but.  seeing  nothing  of  the  K.rpi'rimciit 
and  Triton,  passed  on  to  Puerto  Hello,  and,  entering  the  harbour 
in  line  of  battle,  dropped  anchor  there  before  nightfall,  without  any 
opposition  on  the  part  of  the  Spanish  Governor,  who  tied  with  such 
troops  as  he  had. 

Lowther's  report,  received  when  the  fleet  was  at  Puerto  .Hello,  had 
the  effect  of  convincing  General  AYentworth  that  the  design  against 
Panama  was  impracticable  :  yet  \Ventworth  was  so  lacking  in  tact 
that,  instead  of  communicating  his  decision  directly  to  Yernon,  lie 
mentioned  it  casually  to  Governor  Trelawney,  the  result  being  that 
Vernon's  first  intimation  that  the  expedition  was  destined  to  be  a 
failure  was  conveyed  to  him  in  the  form  of  a  private  request  from 
Trelawney  for  a  passage  back  to  Jamaica.  Wentworth's  views  were 
formally  adopted  at  a  council  of  war  at  which  seven  military  officers 
were  present,  and  were  ratified  at  a  general  council  composed  of 
three  military  and  two  naval  officers.  Yernon  and  Ogle  formed  the 
minority,  and  could  do  nothing  but  acquiesce,  although  the  Yice- 
Admiral  was  strongly  of  opinion  that,  seeing  that  Panama  had  in 
earlier  years  been  taken  from  across  the  isthmus  by  Sir  Henry 
Morgan  with  five  hundred  buccaneers,  it  might  be  taken  again  by 
the  much  larger  forces  which  were  at  the  disposal  of  the  British 


1  Boijne,  80,  flag  of  Vernon,  Cumberland,  80,  Hag  of  Ogle,  Kent,  70,  Orfortl,  70, 
Worcester,  60,  Defiance,  60,  York,  CO,  Montagu,  GO,  St.  Albans,  50,  and  Given  irich,  50, 

with   three   flreships,   two    hospital    ships,   and   about    forty   transports.      Governor 
Trelawney,  as  a  colonel,  was  with  the  troops. 

2  This  landing  was  never  effected.     The  Experiment  and   Triton  rejoined  the  fleet 
at  Puerto  Bello. 


80  MAJOR    OPERATIONS,   1714-1762.  [1742. 

leaders  in  1742.  The  fleet,  therefore,  quitted  Puerto  Bello  for 
Jamaica  on  April  3rd,  having  effected  nothing.1 

Indeed,  the  only  important  advance  made  in  the  West  Indies  in 
the  course  of  the  year  was  the  annexation  and  settlement  of  Roatan 
Island,  in  the  bay  of  Honduras,  hy  an  expedition 2  from  Jamaica 
convoyed  by  the  Lich field,  50,  Captain  James  Cusack,  and  the 
Bonetta,  sloop,  Commander  William  Lea.  Nor  is  it  astonishing 
that  so  little  was  done.  The  Admiral  and  the  General  were  on 
worse  terms  than  ever,  and  their  quarrels  were  taken  up  by  all 
around  them.  Even  Ogle  and  Trelawney  fell  out.  So  scandalous 
a  state  of  things  was  terminated,  after  it  had  endured  far  too  long, 
by  the  iirrival  at  Jamaica  on  September  '23rd  of  the  Gibraltar,  20, 
Captain  Thorpe  Fowke,  with  orders  for  both  Vernon  and  Went- 
worth  to  return  to  England.  Vernon  sailed  in  the  Boyne,  80,  on 
October  18th,  leaving  Sir  Chaloner  Ogle  in  command  of  the  station  ; 
and  Wentworth,  with  the  remnants  of  the  army,  departed  soon 
afterwards,  under  convoy  of  the  Defiance,  (>0,  Captain  Daniel  Hore, 
and  the  Worcester,  00,  Captain  William  Cleland. 

In  the  Mediterranean,  where  there  had  been  scarcely  a  large 
enough  naval  force  for  the  due  protection  of  trade,  and  for  the  due 
observation  of  the  declared  and  the  suspected  enemies  of  Great 
Britain,  Vice-Admiral  Nicholas  Haddock  had  been  joined,  in 
February,  1742,  by  a  considerable  reinforcement  under  Commodore 
Richard  Lestock  (2),  who,  on  March  13th  following,  was  promoted 
to  be  Rear-Admiral  of  the  White.'1  According  to  Charnock,  Lestock, 
during  this  period,  "exhibited  some  proofs  of  that  impatient  temper 
and  improper  professional  pride  which,  afterwards  becoming  infinitely 
more  apparent,  cannot  but  be  condemned  even  by  those  who  are  so 
warmly  attached  to  him  as  to  insist  that  no  part  of  his  conduct  was 
ever  injurious  or  prejudicial  to  the  cause  and  interests  of  his  native 
country."'  Haddock,  owing  to  ill-health,  had  to  resign  his 
command  and  return  to  England ; 5  and,  pending  the  arrival  in  the 
Mediterranean  of  his  successor,  Lestock  officiated  as  commander-in- 
chief.  Lestock  acted  with  some  energy  against  the  enemy,  whom 

1  The  British  cruisers  were,  however,  very  successful,  as  will  be  seeu  in  the  next 
chapter. 

2  Which  reached  Roatan  on  August  23rd. 

3  He  was  further  advanced  to  be  Rear  of  the  Red,  on  August  9th,  1743,  and  Vice 
of  the  White,  on  December  7th,  1743. 

<  '  Biog.  Nav.'  iii.  340. 

6  Which  he  reached  in  the  Roebuck,  40,  on  May  26th,  1742. 


1"42.]  LESTOCK'S   CHARACTER.  81 

he  obliged  to  postpone  an  intended  embarkation  of  troops ;  but,  on 
the  other  hand,  he  again  allowed  his  unfortunate  temper  to  get  the 
better  of  him.  In  view  of  what  happened  at  a  later  date,  it  is 
desirable  to  reprint  here  from  Charnock l  an  order  and  certain  letters 
which  will  explain  not  only  Lestock's  peremptory  methods,  but  also 
his  interpretation,  at  that  time,  of  some  of  the  duties  of  subordinate 
commanders  when  in  face  of  the  enemy. 

REAR-ADMIRAL  LESTOCK  TO  COMMANDER  JAMKS  HODSELL,  OF  TIIK 
Ann  Galley,  FIRESIIIP. 

"Captain  Hodsell:  Go  to  the  Lenox,  Nassau,  Royal  Oak,  Romney,  and  Dniyon.1 
Tell  them  I  am  the  centre  from  whence  the  line  of  battle  is  to  be  formed,  and,  if  any 
ship  or  ships  cannot  get  into  their  stations,  I  am  to  find  remedy  for  that;  lint  those 
who  can,  and  do  not,  get  into  their  stations  are  blameable  ;  and  a  line  of  battle  is  not 
to  be.  trifled  with  nor  misunderstood.  Go  with  this  yourself  to  the  several  captains, 
from,  Sir,  your  most  humble  servant,  Richard  Lestock.  Xrptunc,  at  sea.  April  14th, 
1742.  P.S. — An  enemy  in  sight  would  not  admit  of  this  deliberation." 

CAPTAIN  CURTIS  B.VRNKT,  OF  THE  Drayon,  TO  REAR-AQUIRAL  LESTOCK. 

"I  thought  that  all  the  ships  of  a  ileet  or  squadron  were  to  sail  in  their  proper 
divisions.  1  have  heard  and  read  of  divisions  geiting  late  into  the  line,  not  in  time 
to  have  any  part  in  the  action  ;  but  never  knew  till  now  that  it  was  my  duty  to  leave 
the  flag,  or  officer  representing  one,  in  whose  division  I  am,  without  a  particular  order 
or  signal.  I  therefore  kept  my  station  in  the  division,  not  with  a  design  to  trifle  with 
the  line  of  battle.  I  am,  etc.,  C.  Barnet." 

REAR-ADMIRAL  LESTOCK  TO  CAPTAIN  CURTIS  BARXET. 

"I  have  your  letter  of  the  15th  inst.,  in  answer  to  mine  I  sent  you  and  several 
other  captains  by  Captain  Hodsell  on  the  14th  inst.,  at  the  time  the  signal  was  out  for 
the  line  of  battle  abreast  of  each  other.  Your  not  getting  into  line  when  you  could 
have  done  it,  gave  me  that  occasion  by  the  fireship. 

"You  say  you  thought  that  the  ships  of  a  fleet  or  squadron  were  to  sail  in  their 
proper  divisions ;  and  you  have  heard  and  read  of  divisions  getting  late  into  the  line, 
not  in  time  to  have  any  part  of  the  action ;  but  never  till  now  knew  that  it  was  your 
duty  to  leave  the  flag,  or  officer  representing  one,  in  whose  division  you  are,  without  a 
particular  order  or  signal. 

"Let  us  suppose  that  you  are  in  a  division,  and  that  a  signal  for  the  line  of  battle 
is  made;  and  that  the  commanding  ship  of  that  division,  by  bad  sailing,  could  not 
get  into  the  line,  though  all  the  rest  of  the  squadron  could  have  got  into  the  line,  but 
did  not.  That  division  makes  one-third  of  the  squadron. 

"Now:  is  it  your  duty  to  see  two-thirds  of  the  squadron  sacrificed  to  the  enemy, 
when  you  could,  but  did  not,  join  in  the  battle?  An  admiral,  in  such  a  case,  would 
either  leave  the  bad  sailing  ship  for  one  that  could  get  into  the  action,  or  would  send 


1  '  Biog.  Nav.'  iv.   213  et  seq.     Charnock   says :    "  Mr.  Lestock    appears   in    his 
vehemence  of  rage  to  have  been  guilty  of  a  few  literary  omissions  and  mistakes,  which 
we  have  supplied  and  corrected."     The  present  editor  has  adopted  some  of  Charnock's 
emendations  and  made  others,  chiefly  with  respect  to  punctuation. 

2  The  Dragon,  60,  Captain  Curtis  Barnet. 

VOL.   III.  G 


82  MAJOR    OPERATIONS,    1714-1762.  [1742. 

you  such  orders  as  should  justify  you  at  a  court-martial  for  not  coming  into  the  action 
when  you  could  have  done  it.  Captain  Bowley,1  indeed,  has  not  the  power  either  to 
shift  his  ship,  or  to  stop  you  with  him. 

"  Such  an  account  would  tell  but  ill  to  our  country  after  the  loss  of  a  battle.  But 
I  hope  such  a  thing  can  never  happen  to  an  Englishman  ;  and  the  punishment  inflicted 
on  a  breach  of  the  12th  article  of  the  Statute  of  Charles  the  Second  upon  those  who 
withdraw,  or  keep  back,  or  do  nut  come  into  the  fight  and  engage,  would  be  what 
must  follow  in  such  a  case. 

"So  I  will  say  no  more  of  trifling  nor  misunderstanding  of  a  line  of  battle ;  as 
these  are,  and  must  be,  the  consequences  of  a  not  trilling  want  of  duty  in  the  weighing 
of  circumstances  in  regard  to  battle:  for  that  is  the  cause  why  lines  are  formed.2 

"  The  l.'itli  article  of  the  Fighting  Instructions3  leans  that  way  also.  So,  having,  I 
think,  answered  your  letter,  1  am,  Sir,  your  most  humble  servant,  Richard  Lestock. 
Neptune,  at  sea.  April  Kith,  17-42." 

CATTAIN  C'nrris  BAKXKT  TO   lir.AK-Ai'MiiiAi,  LKSTOCK. 

••Dragon,  April  16th,  1742. 

"Sir, — As  yon  have  given  yourself  the  trouble  to  answer  the  letter  I  thought 
necessary  to  write  in  excuse  for  my  continuing  in  my  station  in  the  division  of  which 
I  am,  when  you  made  the  signal  for  the  line  of  battle  abreast,  and  in  it  are  pleased  to 
say  :  '  Is  it  your  duty  to  see  two-thirds  of  the  squadron  sacrificed  to  the  enemy,  when 
you  could,  and  did  not,  join  in  the  battle?'  I  answer  that  I  should  readily  concur 
in  punishing  rigidly  any  man  who  could,  and  did  not,  join  in  the  battle.  But,  as  the 
commanders  of  divisions  will,  1  imagine,  always  expert  that  the  captains,  in  their 
respective  divisions,  should,  in  anything  like  the  late  case,  take  directions  from  them, 
and,  as  we  arc  to  suppose  every  officer  of  that  distinction  neither  wanting  in  zeal  or 
capacity,  I  can  make  no  doubt  that  such  orders  would  be  immediately  given  as  would 
be  most  essential  for  his  Majesty's  service:  and  that  a  signal  or  order  might  be 
expected  for  the  ships  to  make  sail  into  the  line  if  the  commander  of  the  division 
could  not  get  up  with  his  own  ship,  and  did  not  think  proper  to  remove  into  another. 
Without  such  an  order  or  a  proper  signal,  I  could  not  in  my  conscience  condemn  any 
man  for  remaining  with  his  division,  or  think  that  he  frll  under  the  12th  article  of  the 
Statute  of  Charles  the  Second,  or  the  l.'ith  of  the  Fighting  Instructions  ;  for  a  man  in 
his  station  cannot  be  said  to  withdraw,  keep  back,  or  not  use  his  endeavours  to  engage 
the  enemy  in  the  order  the  admiral  has  prescribed.  In  this  manner  I  should  judge, 
were  I  to  sit  at  a  court-martial  on  such  an  occasion  :  but  in  this  manner  shall  no 
longer  act,  since  you  have  been  jileased  to  tell  me  Captain  Kowley  has  not  the  power 
to  shift  his  ship  or  stop  me. 

"  I  presume  there  are  instances  both  of  whole  divisions  going  down  to  the  enemy 
too  soon,  and  of  coming  in  so  late  as  to  have  no  part  in  the  action  ;  but  1  never  heard 
that  the  private  captains  who  kept  their  stations  in  those  divisions  fell  under  the  least 
censure;  and,  as  I  was  neither  called  nor  sent  from  the  division  by  order  or  signal,  I 
had  no  apprehension  of  being  blameable. 


1  Afterwards  Admiral  of  the  Fleet,  Sir   William   Kowley ;  then   senior  officer  of 
Barnet's  division.     Lestock  meant  that,  as  there  was  no  flag-officer  of  the  division, 
there  was  no  possible  question  as  to  what  was  Barnet's  duty. 

2  I.e.,  "  After  all,  I  will  not  speak  of  this  as  trifling,  for  it  is  far  too  light  a  word  to 
apply  to  so  serious  a  subject." 

*  "As  soon  as  the  Admiral  shall  hoist  a  red  flag  on  the  flagstaff  at  the  fore-topmast 
head,  and  fire  a  gun,  every  ship  in  the  fleet  is  to  use  their  utmost  endeavour  to  engage 
the  enemy,  in  the  order  the  Admiral  has  prescribed  unto  them." 


1742.]  MATHEWS    TO    THE  MEDITERRANEAN.  83 

"  With  regard  to  what  you  are  pleased  to  say  of  seeing  the  squadron  sacrificed  to 
the  enemy,  that  cannot  happen  while  you,  Sir,  command  it,  who  will  never  go  down 
to  the  enemy  in  an  improper  manner,  with  more  sail  than  the  principal  ships  of  the 
line  can  keep  you  company.  .  .  ." 

Lestock  had,  undoubtedly,  hoped  to  be  continued  as  commander- 
in-chief  in  the  Mediterranean  ;  but  Vice-Admiral  Thomas  Mathews 
(E.) l  was  appointed  to  that  post  on  March  '25th,  1742,  and,  having 
hoisted  his  flag  in  the  Nainur,  90,  sailed  on  April  Kith,-  and  arrived 
at  Gibraltar  on  May  7th.  Lestock  was  hurt,  and  he  is  said  to  have 
foolishly  showed  his  resentment  by  neglecting  to  obey  instructions 
to  send  a  frigate  to  meet  Mathews.  For  this  supposed  omission 
Mathews  publicly  reprimanded  Lestock  as  soon  as  the  two  flag- 
officers  met.3  From  that  moment  the  junior  seems  to  have  regarded 
his  senior  with  scarcely-disguised  hostility. 

Mathews  was  a  good  officer,  as  strict  in  obeying  as  he  was  in 
enforcing  discipline,  and  a  jealous,  yet  not  intemperate,  believer  in 
the  dignity  of  the  great  position  to  which  he  had  been  called  by  his 
country.  He  was,  moreover,  a  highly  honourable  man,  of  con- 
spicuous gallantry.  Lestock,  on  the  other  hand,  was  ever  more 
ready  to  enforce  than  to  obey  the  laws  of  discipline.  In  his  eyes, 
his  own  person  was  fully  as  dignified  as  any  rank  or  place  with 
which  his  country  could  invest  him.  "  Unconciliating  in  his 
manners,  austere  when  in  command,  restless  when  in  a  subordinate 
station,  he  had,"  says  Charnock,  "  fewer  friends  than  fell  to  the  lot 
of  most  men,  and  that  number,  which  was  gradually  diminishing, 
his  behaviour  never  appeared  of  a  nature  to  recruit."  His  courage 
has  not  been  questioned,  but  his  abilities,  which  were  considerable, 
were  contracted  and  neutralised  by  a  petty  meanness  of  spirit  and 
smallness  of  view  that  prevented  him  from  ever  commanding  either 
confidence  or  respect.  That  Mathews  disliked  Lestock  cannot  be 
gainsaid.4  Almost  every  naval  officer  of  the  day  disliked  Lestock. 

1  Thomas  Mathews;  bom,  liiTli ;  captain,  1703;  took  the  JJifit  Aim:'',  L'G,  in  17O7, 
and  the   QlorieiKK,  44,  in  1709  ;    commanded  the  Kent  at  Cape  Passaro,   in  1718  ; 
Commissioner    at   Chatham,    1736 ;    Vice-Admiral   and  Commander-in-Chief  in   the 
Mediterranean,  1742  ;  Admiral,  1743  ;  fought  a  spirited  but  partial  action  off  Toulon, 
1744;  dismissed  the  service,  1746;  died,  1751. 

2  In  company  with  the  Princess  Caroline,  80,  Norfolk,  80,  and  liedford,  70. 

3  Lestock  alleged  that  he  had  sent  a  frigate,  which  had  failed  to  fall  in  with 
Mathews.     It  is  admitted  that,  in  this  instance,  no  matter  what  were  the  facts  as  to 
the  frigate,  the  Vice-Admiral  behaved  with  somewhat  unnecessary  warmth. 

*  When  he  accepted  his  appointment,  he  stipulated  that  Lestock  should  be  speedily 
recalled,  but  the  stipulation  was  afterwards  either  forgotten  or  misunderstood. — 
Beatson,  i.  153. 

G   2 


84  MAJOll    OPERATIONS,    1714-1762.  [1742. 

But  Mathews  was  the  last  man  in  the  world  to  allow  his  private 
dislikes  to  interfere  with  his  duty. 

The  Vice-Admiral  met  the  Bear-Admiral  and  part  of  the  fleet  at 
Villa  Franca  on  May  27th.  He  at  once  instituted  a  strict  watching 
blockade  of  Toulon,  where  a  Spanish,  as  well  as  a  French  force,  lay. 
This  blockade  was  maintained  chiefly  by  the  division  of  Lestock, 
whose  headquarters  were  off  Hyeres,  while  Mathews  himself 
remained  in  reserve  at  Villa  Franca,  ready  to  sail  upon  the  receipt 
of  news  that  the  enemy  was  at  sea.  In  June,  five  Spanish  galleys, 
which  were  to  have  escorted  some  Spanish  troops  to  Italy,  and 
which  were  laden  with  ammunition  and  stores,  ventured  to  quit  the 
shelter  of  Fort  Ste.  Marguerite,  and  crept  round  under  the  coast  as 
far  as  the  Gulf  of  St.  Trope/.  Captain  Harry  N  orris,  of  the 
Kiiujxton,  GO,  with  a  small  detachment,  blockaded  them  there,  and 
when,  although  they  were  in  a  neutral  port,  they  fired  on  him,  he 
effected  their  destruction.1  Other  Spanish  vessels  were  destroyed  at 
Palamos,  Mataro,  and  elsewhere. 

In  July,  1742,  the  Vice-Admiral,  who  had  intelligence  that  the 
King  of  Sicily  had  dispatched  a  body  of  troops  to  the  assistance  of 
the  Spaniards  in  Italy,  ordered  Commodoi'e  William  Martin,  with  a 
small  squadron,'2  to  Naples,  to  endeavour  to  induce  the  King  to 
withdraw  his  forces,  and  to  adhere  to  a  declaration  of  neutrality. 
Should  the  King  refuse,  Martin  was  to  bombard  the  city.  The 
squadron  arrived,  and  anchored  in  the  Bay  on  August  19th ;  and 
Martin  sent  ashore  Commander  de  I'Angle  with  an  ultimatum,  and 
a  demand  for  an  answer  in  half-an-hour,  unless,  indeed,  the  King 
could  not  be  reached  within  that  time.  After  very  little  delay,  the 
required  assurance  was  given  on  the  20th,  and  the  squadron  there- 
upon departed,  to  the  great  relief  of  the  Neapolitans.  The  incident, 
most  creditably  managed  by  Martin,  would,  perhaps,  have  had 
comparatively  little  importance,  had  not  the  same  prince  who,  in 
1742,  was  King  of  Sicily,  become,  in  1759,  King  Carlos  III.  of 
Spain.  He  then  remembered  against  Great  Britain  the  coercion 
which  had  been  employed  against  him  by  the  Commodore,  and, 
towards  the  end  of  the  Seven  Years'  War,  and  during  the  War  of 

1  For  details  of  this,  see  next  chapter. 

!  Ipswich,  70,  Commodore  William  Martin,  Panther,  50,  Captain  Solomon  Gideon, 
Oxford,  50,  Captain  Lord  Harry  Powlett,  Feuersham,  40,  Captain  Richard  Hughes  (2), 
Dursley  Galley,  20,  Commander  Merrick  de  I'Angle;  and  the  bombs,  Carcass,  8, 
Lieut.  John  Bowdler,  Salamander,  8,  Lieut.  John  Phillipson,  and  Terrible,  8,  Lieut, 
the  Hon.  George  Edgcumlre ;  besides  four  tenders. 


1743.]  ATTACK   ON  LA   QUAYS  A.  85 

American  Eevolution,  never  ceased  to  do  all  that  lay  in  his  power  to 
ruin  the  naval  might  which  had  thus  humiliated  him. 

Commodore  Martin  rejoined  the  flag,  and  was  soon  afterwards 
again  detached  to  destroy  certain  storehouses  and  magazines  at 
Alassio,  in  the  territory  of  the  republic  of  Genoa.  These,  which 
were  known  to  he  destined  for  the  use  of  the  Spaniards,  were  all  set 
on  fire  by  a  landing-party  from  the  ships. 

In  1743,  the  blockade  of  Toulon  was  continued,  and  Admiral 
Mathews,  as  before,  exerted  himself  to  the  utmost  to  hinder  the 
operations  of  the  Spaniards  in  the  Italian  peninsula,  and  the  trans- 
mission thither  of  stores  and  reinforcements  from  Spain.  But  the 
transactions  on  the  station  were  not  of  sufficient  importance  to 
deserve  description  in  this  chapter.  They  are,  therefore,  relegated 
to  the  next. 

One  of  the  first  actions  of  Sir  Chaloner  Ogle  (1) 1  after  he  had,  as 
has  been  seen,  been  left  as  commander-in-chief  in  the  West  Indies, 
upon  Vernon's  recall,  was  to  organise  an  expedition  against  the 
Spanish  settlements  at  La  Guayra  and  Puerto  Cabello,  011  the  coast 
of  Caracas,  in  what  is  now'  Venezuela.  These  were  reported  to  be 
almost  defenceless,  and  to  be  at  the  mercy  of  the  fleet.  Ogle 
entrusted  the  conduct  of  the  expedition  to  Captain  Charles  Knowles, 
in  the  Suffolk,  70,  and  gave  him  directions  to  proceed  first  to 
Antigua,  there  to  take  under  his  orders  such  additional  vessels  as 
could  be  spared,  and  to  embark  a  certain  number  of  troops. 
Knowles  carried  out  these  instructions,  and  on  February  12th,  1743, 
sailed  for  La  Guayra.  After  touching  at  St.  Christopher,  he  arrived 
off  his  port  of  destination  on  the  18th. 

It  is  quite  true  that  when  Ogle  first  contemplated  the  descent 
upon  the  coast  of  Caracas,  La  Guayra  was  almost  defenceless. 
Unfortunately,  the  Admiral  suffered  his  projects  to  become  known, 
and  the  Spanish  governor  of  the  place,  with  great  promptitude  and 
vigour,  thereupon  set  himself  to  work  to  repair  the  fortifications,  to 
build  new  ones,  to  raise  extra  forces,  and  to  obtain  fresh  supplies  of 
ammunition.2 

When,  consequently,  on  February  18th,  the  squadron  began  the 
attack  at  about  midday,  a  warm  and  formidable  opposition  was  met 

1  Promoted  to  be  Vice-Admiral  of  the  Red  on  August  9th,  and  Vice- Admiral  of  the 
White  on  December  7th,  1743. 

2  Some  of  this  ammunition  was  obtained  from  the  Dutch  Governor  of  Curacoa, 
who,  by  handing  it  over,  committed  an  unwarrantable  breach  of  the  Dutch  under- 
standing with  Great  Britain. 


86 


MAJOR    OPERATIONS,    1714-1762. 


[17-13. 


with.  There  was  a  swell  which  prevented  the  vessels  from 
approaching  within  about  a  mile  from  the  forts,  and  the  landing  of 
the  troops  was  found  to  be  impracticable.  Yet,  although  an  attempt 
to  burn  the  shipping  in  harbour,  by  means  of  armed  boats,  failed  as 
a  result  of  confusion  of  orders,  and  although  the  ships  suffered  badly, 
it  looked,  at  4  o'clock  P.M.,  as  if  the  fire  of  the  batteries  was  about 
to  be  silenced.  But  at  that  hour,  a  chance  shot  cut  the  cable  of  the 
liurford,  which  was  anchored  at  the  head  of  the  British  line.  The 
liurford  drove  on  board  the  Norwich,  and  forced  both  her  and  the 
Eltliuin  out  of  station,  the  three  vessels  drifting  almost  helplessly  to 
leeward.  This  re-encouraged  the  enemy,  and  although,  up  to 
nightfall,  the  attack  was  pluckily  continued,  the  British,  after  the 
accident,  had  much  the  worse  of  the  encounter,  and  were  ultimately 
obliged  to  draw  oil'.  La  Guayra  was  severely  damaged  ;  a  magazine 
was  blown  up  by  a  shell  from  the  Co/art,  and  about  seven  hundred 
Spaniards  were  killed  and  wounded.  Vet,  in  spite  of  the  gallantry 
of  the  assailants,  the  day  ended  with  their  decisive  repulse.  The 
composition  of  Knowles's  squadron,  and  the  damage  and  loss 
sustained  by  each  ship,  arc  shown  in  the  following  table:  — 


M.i|». 

i 

£ 

f  'unmiandi-r*. 

Shot 

receiver!. 

if 

£ 

| 

* 

Sn/,,1/.-.      . 

70 

(  ';  |>t.  (Juries  Kimwles     . 

!i7 

380 

30 

80 

liiirfu  •«/      . 

To 

Franklin  [jushingtun    . 

t  .'! 

380 

24 

50 

.\orn-  i-li 

50 

Thomas  Gregory  (\  )     . 

7 

250 

1 

11 

Ad^ic   . 

."id 

Klliot  Smith      .... 

In 

250 

1 

15 

Asuint  inn    . 

"in 

Smith  Callis       .... 

•11 

250 

12 

71 

I'.llhn   , 

40 

Iiirhard  Walkins  (acting;. 

44 

2111 

14 

55 

l.iri'l//  . 

20 

Henry  Stewart  (artin<_') 

10 

120 

7 

24 

Stxirltoronff/t 

•jo 

Commander  Lachlin  Leslie  . 

,'! 

120 

•> 

Ottrr     .    '  , 

H 

„            John  Gage   . 

V 

45 

Conirf,]>in\\\i 

g 

Richard  Tyrrell  ,      . 

V 

40 

I  Shot  in  the  luili  ..lily  are  ini  liuleil. 


Captain  Lushington,  of  the  liurford,  a  most  excellent  officer,  was 
mortally  wounded  by  a  chain-shot,  which  carried  off  one  of  his  legs 
at  the  thigh.  He  died  at  Curacoa  on  February  23rd,  two  hours 
after  he  had  been  landed  there.  The  liurford,  ElUintn,  and 
Assistance,  were  almost  completely  disabled;  the  flagship  had 
fourteen  guns  dismounted;  and  the  squadron,  as  a  whole,  was,  for 
the  moment,  unserviceable.  It,  therefore,  proceeded  to  Curacoa 
to  refit. 


1743.]  REPULSE  AT  PUERTO    CABELLO.  87 

As  soon  as  he  had  refitted,  and  had  supplemented  his  rather 
reduced  forces  by  taking  on  board  a  few  Dutch  volunteers,  Captain 
Knowles,  in  pursuance  of  the  Commander-in-Chief  s  design,  turned 
his  attention  to  Puerto  Cabello.  He  sailed  on  March  20th,  but, 
owing  to  a  strong  lee  current,  could  not  anchor  in  the  neighbourhood 
of  his  destination  until  April  15th. 

Puerto  Cabello  was  even  better  prepared  to  receive  him  than  La 
Guayra  had  been.  There  were  in  the  place  three  hundred  regular 
troops,  twelve  hundred  seamen  belonging  to  the  vessels  in  port,  and 
a  large  body  of  negroes  and  Indians.  The  Spaniards  had  hauled  all 
their  smaller  craft  up  to  the  head  of  the  harbour  out  of  gunshot,  and 
had  moored  a  ship  of  sixty,  and  another  of  forty  guns,  in  good 
defensive  positions,  while  they  bad  placed  a  large  vessel  ready  for 
sinking  in  the  mouth  of  the  harbour.  Newly-erected  fascine 
batteries  flanked  the  entrance,  and  two  more,  one  mounting  twelve, 
and  the  other  seven  guns,  occupied  a  low  point  called  Punta  Brava. 
These  last,  in  the  opinion  of  Knowles,  were  ill-placed,  and  might  be 
easily  taken,  and  then  employed  against  the  fortress  itself.  He 
therefore,  after  having  bold  a  council  of  war,  ordered  in  the  Licrlij 
and  Eltliam,  on  the  afternoon  of  the  Kith,  to  cannonade  the  Puuta 
Brava  works,  and  prepared  a  landing-party,  consisting  of  Dal/ell's 
regiment,  all  the  Marines  of  the  squadron,  and  four  hundred  seamen,1 
which,  as  soon  as  the  batteries  should  be  silenced,  was  to  storm 
them,  while  the  Assistance  lay  anchored  within  pistol-shot  of  the 
shore  to  cover  a  retreat,  should  one  be  necessary. 

The  Lii-ely  and  Elthani  effected  their  part  of  the  work  by  about 
sunset.  All  firing  then  ceased.  As  it  grew  dark  the  storming-party 
landed,  and  began  to  march  along  the  beach  towards  the  batteries, 
Knowles  accompanying  the  advance  in  his  galley.  Just  before 
11  P.M.  the  foremost  troop  seixed  one  of  the  batteries;  but,  at  that 
moment,  the  Spaniards,  being  alarmed,  began  to  fire  from  the  other 
works,  and,  to  the  mortification  of  the  British  leaders,  so  blind  a 
panic  seized  the  men  that  they  retired  pell-mell  in  the  most  absolute 
confusion,  and  did  not  regain  their  self-possession  until  they  were 
once  more  on  board  the  ships. 

After  this  disgraceful  repulse,  another  council  of  war  was  held  on 

April  21st,  and,  in   pursuance  of    the  resolutions   then  come   to,  a 

general    attack    from    seaward    was   made    upon    the   place   on    the 

morning    of    the    24th.      The    Assistance,    Burford,    Suffolk,   and 

1  The  whole  being  under  Major  Lucas,  of  Dalzell's  Kegiment. 


88  MAJOR    OPERATIONS,    1714-1762.  [1743. 

Norwich  were  told  off  to  batter  the  main  work,  and  the  Scar- 
borough, Lively,  and  Eltham,  to  attack  the  fascine  batteries  at  the 
entrance  of  the  harbour.  Fire  was  opened  at  about  11  A.M.,  all  the 
ships  taking  up  their  stations1  as  well  as  they  possibly  could,  except 
the  Norwich,  which  apparently  hesitated  to  get  into  close  action. 
Seeing  this,  Knowles  very  promptly  sent  Captain  Henry  Stewart 
(acting),  of  the  Lively,  to  supersede  Captain  Thomas  Gregory,  who 
was  put  under  arrest.2  Thenceforward,  the  engagement  was  hotly 
maintained  until  the  close  of  day,  when  the  enemy's  fire  slackened, 
and  it  became  evident  that  his  batteries  had  suffered  severely.  He 
reopened  fire,  however,  after  dark,  and  so  badly  mauled  the  ships — 
some  of  which  had,  by  that  time,  expended  nearly  all  their  ammuni- 
tion— that,  soon  after  (.)  P.M.,  Knowles  made  the  signal  to  cut  cables, 
and  drew  off  his  shattered  vessels. 

The  ships  actually  engaged  in  this  disastrous  affair  were,  saving 
the  Adrice,  Otter,  and  Comet,  the  same  as  had  been  engaged  at  La 
Guayra,  but  some  of  them  were  differently  commanded.  Captain 
Richard  Watkins  had  been  promoted  from  the  EUham  to  the 
liitrford,  rice  Lushington,  killed  ;  Captain  Philip  Durell  (1)  had  suc- 
ceeded Captain  Watkins  in  the  Elthtim  ;  and,  after  the  supersession 
of  Captain  Gregory,  Commander  John  Gage,  of  the  Otter,  assumed 
command  of  the  Lireli/.  The  loss  of  the  squadron  was  about  two 
hundred  men  killed  and  wounded.  The  ships  refitted  under  shelter 
of  the  Keys  of  Barbarat,  and  were  there  rejoined  by  the  Adrice, 
which  had  been  detached  on  scouting  duty  on  March  23rd.  On 
April  %28th  it  was  determined  that  the  force  was  no  longer  in  a  con- 
dition to  attempt  anything  more  against  the  enemy  ;  and,  after  an 
exchange  of  prisoners  had  been  carried  out,  the  ships  belonging  to 
the  Leeward  Islands'  station 3  returned  thither,  and  the  rest  of  the 
squadron  proceeded  to  Jamaica.  Captain  Knowles,  in  the  autumn, 
cruised  off  Martinique,  and,  soon  afterwards,  went  home  to 
England. 

Late  in  1743,  the  excited  condition  of  parties  in  England,  and 

1  In  this  they  were  impeded  by  the  sinking  of  the  Spanish  vessel  in  the  harbour's 
mouth. 

2  He  was  later  sent  to  England  and  conrt-martialled  at  Spithead  for  misbehaviour. 
(C.  M.  Sept.  17th,  1743.)    The  court  dismissed  him  from  the  service  ;  but,  after  distin- 
guishing himself  as  a  volunteer,  he  was  restored  to  his  rank  as  from  Nov.  12th,  1745. 
He  ended  his  life  in  a  duel. 

3  Where  Commodore  (later  Vice-Admiral  Sir)  Peter  Warren  commanded,  with  his 
broad  pennant  in  the  Superbe,  GO. 


1744.]  HOSTILITY   OF  FRANCE.  89 

the  widespread  dissatisfaction  there  at  the  manner  in  which  the 
interests  of  Great  Britain  had,  according  to  the  views  of  many,  been 
sacrificed  to  those  of  Hannover,  encouraged  France  to  take  up  an 
active,  instead  of  a  merely  benevolent  attitude,  with  reference  to  the 
cause  of  Spain.1  France  was  further  encouraged  in  the  same 
direction  by  the  growing  jealousy  with  which  the  Emperor,  the 
King  of  Prussia,  and  their  allies,  regarded  the  pretensions  of  Maria 
Theresia,  Queen  of  Hungary,  and  by  the  results  of  the  secret 
negotiations  which  were  set  011  foot  at  Frankfurt-oii-Main  with  the 
object  of  checking  the  alleged  ambitions  of  that  very  able  princess. 
France,  therefore,  concluded  at  Fontainebleau  an  offensive  and 
defensive  family  alliance  with  Spain,  each  party  guaranteeing  the 
possessions  and  claims  of  the  other,  and  agreeing  that  no  peace 
should  be  concluded  until  the  restoration  of  Gibraltar  by  Great 
Britain.  France  also  despatched  reinforcements  to  the  aid  of  Philip 
in  Savoy;  directed  M.  La  Bruyere  de  Court,  Lieutenant-General  of 
the  French  squadron  in  Toulon,  to  co-operate  with  the  Spanish 
squadron  which,  under  Don  Jose  Navarro,  had  so  long  lain  blockaded 
there  by  Admiral  Mathews ;  and,  early  in  1744,  sent  forth  from 
Brest  Lieutenant-General  de  Boquefeuil,  with  nineteen  men-of-war," 
to  cruise  in  the  Channel. 

The  objects  of  France  were  manifold.  She  desired,  firstly,  to 
expel  Great  Britain  from  the  Mediterranean,  and  then,  by  sending 
her  own  Mediterranean  fleet  to  join  her  squadrons  in  the  Channel, 
to  annihilate  British  superiority  in  those  waters  as  well :  she  hoped, 
next,  to  oblige  Great  Britain  to  recall  her  troops  from  the  Continent, 
and  to  desist  from  supporting  on  shore  the  cause  of  Maria  Theresia  : 
and,  finally,  she  looked  forward  to  fomenting  revolution  in  England, 
and  to  restoring  to  the  throne  the  exiled  family  of  Stuart,  by  means 
of  an  invasion  from  Dunquerque. 

The  assumption  by  France  of  this  actively  hostile  attitude  had 
the  happy  effect  of  partially  calming  the  violence  of  party  rage  in 
Great  Britain.  The  command  of  the  Channel  Fleet3  was  given  to 
Admiral  of  the  Fleet  Sir  John  Norm,  with  Vice-Admiral  Sir 
Charles  Hardy  (1)  (B),  and  Bear-Admiral  William  Martin  (B),  as  his 

1  The  Treaty  of  Worms,  September  1743,  leagued  together  Great  Britain,  Holland, 
Austria,  Saxony,  and  Sardinia.      This  was  met,  in  October  1743,  by  the  Treaty  of 
Frankfurt,  which  banded  together  France,  Prussia,  Hessen  Cassel,  and  the  Pfalz. 

2  These  were  presently  joined  by  some  from  Rochefort. 

3  This  presently  included  twenty-five  ships  of  50  guns  and  upwards,  and  twenty- 
four  frigates  and  small  craft. 


90  MAJOR    OPERATIONS,    1714-1762.  [1744. 

immediate  subordinates.  Norris  wished  to  go  in  search  of  M.  de 
lioquefeuil,  but,  it  being  feared  that  the  latter  might  possibly  pass 
the  British  fleet  at  night,  or  in  thick  weather,  and  so  get  to 
Dunquerque,  where  a  French  army  was  awaiting  his  escort,  the 
Commander-in-Chief  was  ordered  to  proceed  with  his  whole  strength 
to  the  Downs.  De  lioquefeuil  was  sighted  off  the  Eddystone  on 
February  3rd,  with,  it  would  appear,  sixteen  ships  of  fifty  guns  and 
upwards,  and  seven  frigates  and  smaller  craft.  A  little  later, 
believing  Norris  to  have  taken  refuge  in  Portsmouth,  he  detached 
five  vessels,  under  M.  de  Barrailh,  to  Dunquerque,  and  himself 
anchored  off  Dungeness  on  February  24th. 

De  Barrailh  seems  to  have  passed  Norris  in  the  night.  The 
latter,  learning  of  Do  Eoquefeuil'a  presence  to  the  westward, 
weighed,  and,  although  the  wind  was  contrary,  worked  up  towards 
him.  At  that  moment  the  position  of  the  French  was  extremely 
precarious.  But,  when  lie  was  not  much  more  than  six  miles  from 
the  enemy,  Norris  was  obliged  by  the  tide,  which  made  strongly 
against  him,  to  anchor.  De  Boquefeuil  thereupon  got  all  his  anchors 
apeak,  and,  as  soon  as  the  tide  set  in  his  favour,  ordered  his  ships 
to  weigh,  and  make  independently  for  Brest.  Many  of  the  captains 
were  too  apprehensive  to  literally  obey  the  command.  Most  of  them 
cut  or  slipped,  in  order  to  lose  as  little  time  as  possible ;  and,  a 
strong  north-westerly  gale  springing  up,  they  went  off  at  a  great 
rate.  The  gale  increased  to  a  storm,  and  a  fog  supervened.  The 
French  readied  Brest,  ship  by  ship,  in  a  more  or  less  crippled 
condition,  and  Norris,  hopeless  of  being  able  to  overtake  them,  and 
having  himself  suffered  considerably,  returned  to  the  Downs,  and 
thence  despatched  his  three-decked  ships  to  Spithead,  where  they 
could  lie  in  greater  safety  from  the  weather.1 

In  the  meantime,  the  French  flotilla  before'  Dunquerque  had 
experienced  the  full  effects  of  the  storm  ;  and  several  transports  with 
troops  and  stores  on  board  had  foundered,  or  had  been  driven  ashore. 
When  news  arrived  of  the  flight  of  de  lioquefeuil,  de  Barrailh  also 
returned  to  Brest ;  and,  there  being  no  longer  any  prospect  of  a 
successful  invasion  of  the  United  Kingdom,  the  rest  of  the  French 
troops  were  disembarked,  and  the  Young  Pretender,  who  had  been 
with  them,  returned  to  Paris.  De  lioquefeuil  died  on  board  his 
flagship,  the  Superbe,  70,  on  March  8th,  and  was  succeeded  in  the 

1  Sir  John  Norris  soon  afterwards  hauled  down  his  flag  for  the  last  time.  He  was 
succeeded  in  command  of  the  Channel  Fleet  by  Sir  John  Balchen. 


1744.]  CO-OPERATION    OF  HOLLAND.  91 

command  by  the  Chef  d'Escadre,  later  Vice-Admiral,  Blouet  de 
Camilly,  who  was  directed  to  guard  the  French  coasts  and  to  detach 
de  Barrailh  to  cruise  off  the  Scilly  Islands.  In  spite  of  the  nature 
of  these  events,  war  was  not  formally  declared  by  France  until 
March  20th.1  A  counter-declaration  was  returned  by  Great  Britain 
on  the  31st'2  of  the  same  month. 

The  outbreak  of  formal  hostilities  enabled  the  British  Government 
to  request  Holland,  under  the  stipulations  of  the  treaty,  to  supply  a 
naval  force  to  co-operate  with  the  British  fleets.  The  States-General 
had  already,  in  view  of  war,  equipped  some  ships  of  forty-four  guns 
and  upwards ;  and  they  presently  sent  these  and  others,  a  few  at 
a  time,  to  the  Downs,  under  Lieutenant-Admiral  Hendrik  Grave,3  in 
the  Haarlem,  74,  Vice-Admiral  AVillem  T  Hooft,  in  the  Dordrecht, 
54,  Vice-Admiral  Cornelis  Schrijver,  in  the  Damiaten,  04,  and 
Kear-Admiral  Jacob  Eeijnst,  in  the  Lceuicenlwrst,  54.  As  the 
names  and  force  of  the  ships  are  wrongly  given  in  all  English 
histories,  they  are  here  copied  from  De  Jonge : — 

Haarlem,  72,  Dordrecht,  54,-  Damiaten,  lit,  Li-cmrci/lmrft,  54,  llelj'l,  f.4,  Asseii- 
del/t,  54,  Edam,  54,  JJeekrliet,  54,  Gorcum,  4 1,  (hid  Tijlimjrn,  44,  Mitlilelln<r<i,  -1 4, 
Oouderak,  44,  ]!  ride  rode,  54,6  T/toJen,  M,!l  Zierikzee,  u'4,5  (foex,  (>4/'  Runted  run 
Medemblik,  54,°  Ramhortt,  54,°  Pi-ins  Friso,  54, 5  IYiV.s7'.:W,  (>4.5 

Vice-Admiral  Sir  Charles  Hardy  (1)  (K)  was  sent  southward  with 
a  squadron  to  escort  the  trade  to  Lisbon  and  some  storeships  to 
Gibraltar ;  Admiral  Sir  John  Balchen  and  Vice-Admiral  William 
Martin  (B)  cruised  with  a  fleet  in  the  Channel ;  and  Sir  John 
Balchen  subsequently  sailed  with  Martin  and  Vice-Admiral  James 
Stewart  (li) b  to  release  Hardy's  convoy,  which  was  reported  to  have 
been  blocked  up  in  the  Tagus  by  a  French  squadron.  A  small  force, 
under  Commodore  Curtis  Barnet,  was  also  despatched  to  the  East 
Indies  ;  and  Vice-Admiral  Thomas  Davers  proceeded  to  the  West 
Indies  to  relieve  Sir  Chaloner  Ogle.  The  operations  of  these  officers 
will  be  followed  later.  First,  however,  some  attention  must  be 

1  By  ordinance  dated  March  15th. 

2  By  proclamation  dated  March  29th. 

3  Both  licatson,  i.  184,  and  Hervey,  iv.  257,  for  sonic  unexplained  reason,  call  this 
officer  "  Admiral  Baccarest,  or  Baccherest."     The  contingent  was  officially  styled  the 
Auxiliary  Squadron. 

4  '  Nederl.  Zeewezen,'  iv.  182. 

5  These  did  not  join  until  late  in  the  year. 

8  Stewart,  Hardy,  and  Martin  were  not  promoted  to  the  ranks  here  given  until 
June  23rd. 


92 


MAJOR    OPERATIONS,    1714-1762. 


[1744. 


paid  to  the  work   of   the   Navy  in  the   Mediterranean,  where   the 
earliest  fleet  action  of  the  war  was  fought. 

Admiral  Thomas  Mathews,1  being  then  at  Turin,2  was  informed 
on  December  30th,  1743,  that  de  Eoquefeuil  had  sailed  from  Brest. 
The  intelligence  was  incorrect,  but  it  induced  him  to  suspect  that 
co-operation  between  the  Brest  and  Toulon  squadrons  was  intended. 
He  therefore  sent  orders  to  Minorca  that  all  ships  there  were  to  put 
to  sea  at  once.  A  little  later,  he  heard  that  M.  La  Bruyere  de 
Court  and  Don  Jose  Navarro  purposed  to  quit  Toulon  together  on 
January  20th  ;  and,  hastening  to  Villa  Franca,  he  embarked  to  join 
Vice-Admiral  Lestock,  off  Hyeres.  Upon  arriving  there  early  in 


January,  1744,  he  found  himself  at  the  head  of  only  twenty  sail 
of  the  line,  four  of  which  mounted  but  fifty  guns  apiece ;  but  on 
the  llth  he  was  reinforced  by  the  Elizabetli,  70,  Berwick,  70, 
Princesa,  70,  and  Marlborough,  90;  on  February  3rd,  by  the 
Somerset,  80,  Warwick,  60,  and  Dragon,  GO;  on  February  10th,  by 
the  Boyne,  80,  and  Chichester,  80,  which  had  been  sent  out  from 
England ;  and  on  the  llth,  on  the  very  eve  of  the  battle,  by  the 
lloyal  Oak,  70.  In  the  interval,  he  kept  himself  admirably  informed, 
by  means  of  his  frigates,  of  the  motions  and  designs  of  the  enemy. 

1  He  was  promoted  to  be  Admiral  of  the  White  by  the  Gazette  uf  February  18th,  1744. 
4  Where  he  had  been  concerting  measures  with  the  Sardinian  Government  for  the 
defence  of  the  Italian  coasts. 


1744.] 


MAT  HEWS   AND    THE  ALLIES. 


93 


On  February  9th,  the  combined  fleet  appeared  under  sail  in  the 
outer  road  of  Toulon,  and  there  formed  a  line  of  battle.  Mathews 
had  already  unmoored  and  shortened  in  cable,  and  at  10  A.M.  he 
weighed,  the  wind  being  westerly.  Half  an  hour  afterwards,  he 
formed  his  line  of  battle  ahead,  and  then  plied  to  windward  between 
the  islands  and  the  mainland,  as  if  inviting  the  enemy  to  bear  down 
on  him.  At  night,  having  stationed  cruisers  to  watch  the  foe,  he 


SIR    WILLIAM    ROWLEY,    K.B.,    APJIIKAL    OF    THE    FLEET. 

anchored  in  Hyeres  Bay.  That  evening,  when  Vice-Admiral 
Lestock  visited  his  chief  011  board  the  Namur,  Mathews  seems  to 
have  received  him  coldly,  and  to  have  presently  desired  him  to 
return  to  his  own  ship. 

At  dawn  on   February  10th,  the   British  weighed  with  a  land 
breeze  ;  and  at  7  A.M.,  the  wind  being  from  B.  or  E.S.E.,1  Mathews 

1  At  that  time  the  allies  had,  or  appeared  to  have,  a  westerly  wind. 


94  MAJOR    OPERATIONS,    1714-1762.  [1744. 

signalled  for  his  fleet  to  draw  into  line  of  battle  ahead  with  the  wind 
large,  and  for  Lestock's  division  to  lead  with  the  starboard  tacks 
on  board.  Both  Vice-Admiral  Lestock  and  Rear-Admiral  William 
Eowley  repeated  the  signal,  but,  as  the  wind  was  very  light,  and 
there  was  a  heavy  swell  from  the  westward,  there  was  much 
difficulty  in  getting  out  of  the  bay  in  anything  like  the  prescribed 
order  ;  and  for  some  hours  many  of  the  ships  had  to  tow  with  their 
boats  in  order  to  keep  clear  of  one  another.  The  enemy  was  seen 
at  a  distance  of  twelve  or  fifteen  miles  to  the  S.W.  At  1  P.M. 
Mathews  again  signalled  for  the  line  of  battle  ahead  ;  and  at  '2  P.M. 
he  hoisted  a  blue  nag  at  the  mi/./.en-topmast  head,  and  fired  a  gun.1 
He  brought  to  ;  the  junior  flag-officers  repeated  the  signal;  and  the 
whole  fleet  brought  to  with  the  larboard  tacks  on  board.  The  wind 
was  then  so  light  as  to  be  almost  imperceptible,  and  the  swell  drove 
the  ships  nearer  and  nearer  to  the  island  of  Porquerolles.  But  at 
.'5  P.M.,  when  there  was  a  nearly  easterly  bree/.e,  Mathews  signalled 
for  the  line  of  battle  abreast,"  and  then  stretched  with  his  division  to 
the  south-west,  Vice-Admiral  Lestock  stretching  to  the  west,  and 
Rear-Admiral  Rowley  making  all  possible  sail  with  a  view  to 
extending  the  fleet  and  forming  line  of  battle.  Yet,  towards  evening, 
most  of  the  ships  were  still  out  of  station;  Rowley's  division  was 
scattered,  and  was  far  astern  of  Mathews's  ;  and  neither  Mathews 's 
nor  Lestock's  division  was  in  line.  The  allies,  on  the  contrary,  were 
in  admirable  order,  at  a  distance  of  between  four  and  five  miles, 
M.  de  Court  being  in  the  centre,  M.  (labaret  in  the  van,  and 
Don  Jose  Xavarro  in  the  rear. 

Soon  after  nightfall,  Mathews  signalled  to  bring  to,  the  most 
windwardly  ships  to  do  so  first  and  to  lie  by  with  their  larboard 
tacks  on  board.  The  fleet  accordingly  brought  to  close  to  the  allies, 
and,  during  the  night,  lay  well  in  sight  of  them,  the  wind  varying 
in  the  eastern  quarter.  The  Ew.r,  70,  and  Winchelsea,  20,  were 
told  off  to  watch  the  enemy,  and  to  signal  intelligence  as  to  any 
movement  on  his  part ;  but  these  ships  do  not  appear  to  have 
observed  that,  after  the  moon  had  set,  the  allies  made  sail,  and  thus 

1  "When  the  fleet  is  sailing;  lie  fore  the  wind,  and  the  Admiral  would  have  them 
bring  to  with  the  starboard  tacks  on  board,  he  will  hoist  a  red  flag  at  the  flagstaff  on 
the  mizzen-toprnast  head,  and  fire  a  gun;  if  to  bring  to  with  the  larboard  tack,  a  blue 
flag  at  the  same  place,  and  fire  a  gun ;  and  every  ship  is  to  answer  with  the  same 
signal." — '  Sailing  Instruction,'  ix. 

2  Hoisting   the   Union  and  a  pennant  at  the  mizzen-peak,  and  firing  a  gun. — 
'  Fighting  lust.'  ii. 


1744.]  THE  BATTLE   OFF   TOULON.  (?5 

increased  their  distance  from  the  British,  who,  in  the  meantime,  had 
drifted  between  the  enemy  and  Toulon,  and  lay  with  Cape  Sicie 
about  twelve  miles  to  the  N.N.W.  At  dawn,  at  least  nine  miles 
intervened  between  the  headmost  and  the  sternmost  ships  of 
Mathews's  command  ;  and  the  various  divisions  were  not  in  close 
order.  Neither  were  the  allies  as  well  stationed  as  M.  de  Court 
must  have  desired.  Not  more  than  six  miles,  however,  represented 
the  extreme  length  of  their  line. 

As  soon  as  he  realised  how  far  he  was  from  the  Admiral,  Lestock 
on  his  own  responsibility  made  sail;  but  when,  at  G.ttO  A.M., 
Mathews  ordered  the  fleet  as  a  whole  to  do  the  like,  Lestock  was 
still  five  miles  astern.  M.  de  Court  had  already  signalled  for  the 
line  of  battle  upon  a  wind;  and  the  allies  at  that  time,  now  with 
their  topsails  and  now  with  their  foresails  set,  were  stretching  in 
fairly  good  order  to  the  southward.  The  British  followed,  but,  says 
Beatson  :— 

"As  the  rear  division  was  at  so  great  a  distance  from  the  centre,  and  the  van  not  so 
close  as  it  should  have  been,  the  .Admiral,  at  7.30  A.M.,  made  the  signal  for  Rear- 
Admiral  Rowley  and  his  division  to  make  more  sail — which  signal  the  Vice-Admiral 
repeated;  and,  soon  after,  the  like  signal  was  made  for  the  Vice-Admiral  and  his 
division.  At  8  A.M.  the  Admiral  made  the  signal  for  the  tleet  to  draw  into  a  line  nf 
battle,  one  ship  abreast  of  the  other,  with  a  large  wind  ;  and,  half  an  hour  after,  he 
made  the  signal  for  the  tleet  to  draw  into  a  line  of  battle,  one  ship  ahead  of  another. 
These  signals  were  repeated  by  the  junior  flags." 

Yet  it  took  some  time  to  form  the  line  ;  and,  in  the  meanwhile, 
M.  de  Court  seemed  inclined  to  avoid  a  general  action,  and  to 
endeavour  to  draw  the  British  towards  the  Strait.  Mathews  divined 
his  opponent's  intention  to  be  either  to  escape  altogether,  or  to 
proceed  without  fighting  until,  reinforced  by  the  squadron  from 
Brest,  he  should  be  in  a  condition  to  go  into  battle  with  superior 
forces  in  his  favour.  Mathews  was,  of  course,  unwilling  to  allow 
either  object  to  be  attained ;  and  it  was  for  that  reason  that,  at 
about  11.30  A.M.,  when,  as  has  been  hinted,  the  order  of  battle  was 
still  very  incompletely  formed,  the  Admiral  hoisted  the  signal  to 
engage. 

The  fleets  which  were  about  to  be  opposed  one  to  another  were 
constituted  as  follows  : — * 

1  The  lists  are  taken,  with  slight  alterations,  from  those  in  Beatson  and  Schomberg, 
and  from  the  evidence  in  the  courts-martial.  It  would  appear,  however,  that  some  of 
the  Spanish  ships  practically  formed  part  of  the  allied  centre. 


96 


MAJOR    OPERATIONS,   1714-1762. 


[1744. 


Ships. 

g       g                  Commanders. 

Ships. 

g               Commanders. 

CD        > 

O 

a 

Stirling  Castle  . 

70   480     Thomas  Cooper. 

Borr'e  ...             64 

65o   M.  de  Damaquart. 

H'arui'cA:  . 

60   400     Temple  West. 

Ttttdouse  .     .            60 

600 

A'assau     . 

70    4HO      James  Lloyd. 

Jtuc  d'  Orleans          74 

800   M.  d'Orves. 

Barfleur  ,     .     .     . 

|Kear-Adm.  William  Rowley, 
90    763    {     (R.) 

!  Espe'rance     .           74 
Trident    '.      .             64 

820    M.  Cabaret  (Chef  d'Esc.). 
,  650    M.  de  Caylns. 

(Merricfc  del1  Angle. 

Alcion       .      .             54 

i  500    M.  de  Vaudreuil. 

a  ;  Princess  Caroline    . 

80    600     Henry  Osborn. 

Aquilon    .      .             4H 

500 

;>  "   Berwick  . 

70    480      Eiiward  Hawke. 

£tile     ...            64 

650  M.  d'  Albert. 

('hichester 

80   600  '  William  1  dikes. 

Mutants,  20 

Boy  tie 

80   6oif     Rowland  Kroginore. 

A  fireship,  8 

Kingston  . 

Go    4UO      John  Lovet. 

Oxford,  50 

..    3uo     Lord  Harry  Powlett. 

\      fTeverfham,  40 

..    2oO     .Jnhn  Watkins  (2). 

*      Wincfie'sea,  20     . 

..    125      William  Marsh. 

Itrntjim 

60    4oi)      Charles  Watson  . 

Furienx    .      .     .      (>0 

6uo    M.  de  Gravier. 

Bedford    .      .      .      . 

70    4-*0      linn,  ileorge  Townshend. 

S>:rieux     ...      64 

i  650  ' 

Somerset   . 

80    600      George  Sclater. 

/Vrine  ....       74 

800    M.  de  Pesorqua't. 

74    550      Koljeit  1'ctt. 

Tigre                             50 

550    M.  de  Saiirins-Miirat. 

Jfurfolfc     .      .      .      . 

80    600      Hon.  John  Fortes. 

Terrible     ...       74 

H50   Adm.  de  Court. 

lAdrn.      Thomas     Mathows, 

Saint  Esprit  .     .     74 

800 

,V«  7/1  ur      . 

90    780    •'     (It.). 

IHnmant  .      .     .      50 

sr.O    M.  de  Marrilart. 

t-Iolm  Rtissel. 

Sididc  ....       64 

650    AI.  de  Chateauneuf. 

«j      Marlbornnifh  . 

00    750      James  ('<  -rii  wall. 

f'leur.  '20     .      . 

•5       Dor  set*)!  ire    . 

HO   otJO     (Jeor^e  Hurrish. 

Hi'pliifr,  20.      .    i 

,K      /Txscz  

70    480      Kit-hard  X  orris. 

A  flreship,  R    . 

Rupert      .      .      .      . 

60    40U      John  Ambrot*1. 

A  tiieMiip,  H    . 

Royal  Oak     .      .      . 

7o    48U      Edmund  Williams. 

(,'ui'nifeii   50 

Salisbury,  50  . 

..    ;i(JO      Peter  Osborn. 

i>iirale\i  Gatt?t/t2l 

..    1*25     (iilcs  Uichard  Vanbrugh. 

Anne  Galley  f.n,,  8 

..      45      -  Mac-kio,  (i'<mi.). 

Sutherland     h.s., 

1              ._    (Alexander      Lord    Cnlvillp, 
)    '•    ll10    i.     (Com.). 

/  Dunkirk  .... 

60    40H      Charle<  Wager  Purvis. 

Oriitite     .     .     .60 

600   Don  M.  de  Vilena. 

f  'nmbridyn     , 

HO   600     Charles  Drummond. 

America   .      .      .    |  6fi 

6oo    l>on  A.  I'etrurlie. 

Turbay      .      ,      .     . 

no   6UO     John  GascoiKiie. 

Ifi'ptniHj    .      .      .       60 

600    Don  II.  Olivares. 

r 

on   —  n   /Vice-Adm.  K.  Lestock,  (W.). 

1'oder  ....      6(i 

c.oo   Don  II.  Krrutia. 

Aepeufle   . 

90    7l°    {fieorge  Stepney. 

Constant''.      ,      .       70 

750   Don.  A.  Etnriago. 

^  I  7iu*«H      .      .      .      . 
J  (  Buckingham  . 

80    600      Robert  Long. 
7o    4*<t      John  To  wry. 

Real  Ftlipc    .      .    114 

,.„..  f  Adra.  Don  Jose  Navarro. 
'•'"(DouN.  Oeraldine.i 

~     Elizabeth.     .     .     . 

70    4^0      Joseph  Lingen. 

Hercules    ...       64 

650    I'onC.  Alvario. 

Rerenae    . 

7o  4  so     George  Berkeley. 

Alcitin-     ...       58 

600   Don  J.  Hentorin. 

AuH.fHf/i,  5u 

.  .    300      Kdmund  Strange. 

Jtrillantc  ...      t:0 

600    I)on  H.  <ie  la  Marrida. 

Romnei/,  50     . 

..    3ito     Henry  G«Ii*alve. 

AUrt  fbrnindv     .      64 

650   Conde  de  \'ega  Florida. 

Diamond,  40   . 

.  .    250      James  llodsell. 

Onbiero      ...       60 

600    Don  J.  B.  Castro. 

\     Mercury  f.8.,  8     . 

..      45      M.  Peadle,  (Com.)- 

Jsabela      ...      80 

900    Don  I.  Dntabil. 

lo'age,  20  .      .   j 

A  fireship,  8    . 

NOTE.—  The    Bnrford, 

70,    Captain    Richard     Watkins,    and 

i  A  French   officer, 

Captain    I.ace  de    Cueilli,   also 

several  vessels  not  of  the 

ine,  were  absent  from  the  fleet. 

exercised  some  executive  authority  on  board. 

2  Some  lists  omit  thi 

vessel,  and  substitute  for  her  the 

Kttiro,  54. 

Captain  Mahan's  account  of  this  action  1  is  far  too  brief  to  be 
of  much  value  to  the  student.  What  he  writes  should,  however, 
be  here  quoted,  since  it  describes  in  a  few  words  the  general 
lines  upon  which  the  battle,  such  as  it  was,  was  fought.  After 
mentioning  the  issue  of  the  allied  fleets  from  the  port  of  Toulon, 
he  continues  :— 

"The  English  fleet,  which  had  been  cruising  off  Hyeres  in  observation,  chased,  and 
on  the  llth  its  van  and  centre  came  up  with  the  allies ;  but  the  rear  division  was  then 
several  miles  to  windward  and  astern,  quite  out  of  supporting  distance.  The  wind 
was  easterly,  both  fleets  heading  to  the  southward ;  and  the  English  had  the  weather- 


'  Infl.  of  Sea  Power,'  265. 


1744.]  THE  BATTLE   OFF   TOULON.  97 

gage.  The  numbers  were  nearly  equal,  the  English  having  twenty-nine  to  the  allied 
twenty-seven ; ]  but  this  advantage  was  reversed  by  the  failure  of  the  English  rear  to 
join.  The  course  of  the  Rear-Admiral  has  been  generally  attributed  to  ill-will  towards 
Mathews ;  for,  although  he  proved  that  in  his  separated  position  he  made  all  sail  to 
join,  he  did  not  attack  later  on  when  he  could,  on  the  plea  that  the  signal  for  the  line 
of  battle  was  flying  at  the  same  time  as  the  signal  to  engage ;  meaning  that  he  could 
not  leave  the  line  to  fight  without  disobeying  the  order  to  form  line.  This  technical 
excuse  was,  however,  accepted  by  the  subsequent  court-martial.  Under  the  actual 
condition,  Mathews,  mortified  and  harassed  by  the  inaction  of  his  lieutenant,  and 
fearing  that  the  enemy  would  escape  if  he  delayed  longer,  made  the  signal  to  engage 
when  his  own  van  was  abreast  the  enemy's  centre,  and  at  once  bore  down  himself 
out  of  the  line  and  attacked  with  his  flagship  of  ninety  guns  the  largest  ship  in  the 
enemy's  line,  the  Royal  Philip  of  one  hundred  and  ten  guns,  carrying  the  flag  of  the 
Spanish  admiral.  In  doing  this  he  was  bravely  supported  by  his  next  ahead  and 
astern.  The  moment  of  attack  seems  to  have  been  judiciously  chosen ;  five  Spanish 
ships  had  straggled  far  to  the  rear,  leaving  their  admiral  with  the  support  only  of  his 
next  ahead  and  astern,  while  three2  other  Spaniards  continued  on  with  the  French. 
The  English  van  stood  on,  engaging  the  allied  centre,  while  the  allied  van  was  without 
antagonists.  Being  thus  disengaged,  the  latter  was  desirous  of  tacking  to  windward  of 
the  head  of  the  English  line,  thus  putting  it  between  two  tires,  but  was  checked  by 
the  intelligent  action  of  the  three  leading  English  captains,  who,  disregarding  the 
signal  to  bear  down,  kept  their  commanding  position  and  stopped  the  enemy's  attempts 
to  double.  For  this  they  were  cashiered  by  the  court-martial,  but  afterwards  restored. 
This  circumspect  but  justifiable  regard  of  signals  was  imitated  without  any  justifica- 
tion by  all  the  English  captains  of  the  centre,  save  the  Admiral's  seconds  already 
mentioned,  as  well  as  by  some  of  those  in  the  van,  who  kept  up  a  cannonade  at  long 
range  while  their  Conimander-in-Chief  was  closely  and  even  furiously  engaged.  The 
one  marked  exception  was  Captain  Hawke,  afterwards  the  distinguished  admiral,  who 
imitated  the  example  of  his  chief,  and,  after  driving  his  first  antagonist  out  of  action, 
quitted  his  place  in  the  van,  brought  to  close  quarters  a  fine  Spanish  ship  that  had 
kept  at  bay  five  other  English  ships,  and  took  her — the  only  prize  made  that  day. 
The  commander  of  the  English  van,  with  his  seconds,  also  behaved  with  spirit  and 
came  to  close  action.  It  is  unnecessary  to  describe  the  battle  further.  .  .  ." 

After  having,  at  11.30  A.M.,  hoisted  the  signal3  to  engage, 
Mathews  stood  on,  but  overhauled  the  enemy  only  very  gradually. 
At  1  P.M.,  the  Namitr  was  abreast  of  the  Real  Felipe,  and  the 
Barfleur,  of  the  Terrible.  Half-an-hour  later,  the  Namur  bore 
down  within  pistol-shot  of  the  Real  Felipe,  and  began  to  engage  her 
furiously,  and  the  Barfleur  presently  did  the  same  with  the  Terrible. 
Lestock's  division  was  still  far  astern,  and  to  windward,  and, 
according  to  the  evidence  at  the  court-martial,  could  not  have  then 
been  up  with  the  centre,  unless  Mathews  had  shortened  sail  and 
waited  for  it. 

1  This  statement  seems  to  be  a  little  misleading.     According  to  the  lists  already 
given,  the  British  had  in  line  twenty-eight  ships,  and  the  allies  the  same  number.     But, 
in  addition,  the  British  had  five  50  and  two  40-gun  ships,  for  which  the  allies  had  no 
equivalents.     The  guns  in  line  on  each  side  were :  British,  2080 ;  Allies,  1822. 

2  Qy.  "  four." 

3  This  was  repeated  by  Kowley,  but  not  by  Lestock,  who  was  at  a  great  distance. 

VOL.    III.  H 


98 


MAJOR    OPERATIONS,    1714-1762. 


[1744. 


'•; 

99 

&    t 

^ 


t 
I 


0   I 

C'  t 

0* 


The  Namur  was  well  supported  by  the  Marlborough,  which 
attacked  the  Isabela,1  and  by  the  Norfolk,  which  attacked  the 
Constitute.  The  Princesa,  Bedford,  Dragon,  and  Kingston  fired  into 
the  Poder,  and  the  Neptuno*  America,  and  Orients,  after  exchanging 
rather  distant  broadsides  with  the  same  British  ships,  passed  on 
with  the  rear  of  the  French  part  of  the  allied  fleet.  The  remaining 

Spanish  ships  were,  at 
first,  considerably  astern 
of  their  station,  but,  as 
the  breeze  freshened,  they 
came  up,  and,  towards  the 
(Mid  of  the  action,  assisted 
the  Ural  J-'i'lijx'.  Lestock 
made  some  effort  to  pre- 
vent this,  but  the  wind 
was  still  very  light  with 
him,  and  lie  was  also  im- 
peded by  the  swell,  so  that, 
although  he  had  all  sail 
set,  his  efforts  were  vain. 

The  Ji(irfli-iir:>  got  to 
close  quarters  with  the 
Tcrrihli',  and  was  much 
assisted  by  the  Princess 
(Caroline4  and  the  lier- 
irick.  The  ChicJiester  and 
Jloync  also  threw  in  their 
fire,  but  they  were  not 
close  enough  to  the  enemy 
to  do  much  execution.  As 

for  the  leading  ships  of  the  van — the  Stirling  Castle,  Warwick  and 
Nassau — they  did  not  bear  down  to  the  enemy  at  all,  although  the 
signal  for  them  to  do  so  was  flying.  They  chose  to  disregard  it, 
and  to  keep  their  wind,  in  order,  as  was  afterwards  explained  or 
suggested,  to  prevent  the  French  from  doubling  upon  the  head  of 
the  British  column. 

'  The  Isabela,  which  lost  nearly  three  hundred  killed  and  wounded,  had  by  that 
time  moved  up  to  the  position  next  astern  of  the  Real  Felipe. 

2  The  Neptuno  lost  nearly  two  hundred  killed  and  wounded. 

3  The  Batflear  had  twenty-five  killed,  and  twenty  wounded. 

*  The  Princess  Caroline  had  eight  killed,  and  twenty  wounded. 


MATHEWSS    ACTION    OFF   TOULON", 
FK1IUUAHY    llTir,    17-1-1. 

liritish.  hltii'k  :  French,  it'hitf  :  Spanish,  tlui'lfl. 

[Mathews's  lla(.'ship.the  \innnr.  is  the  centre  one  ol'  the 
three  rearmost  liritish  ships  that  are  closely  engaged. 
Ilawke's  ship,  the  llcr'irifk,  is  the  rearmost  one  of  the 
laiyer  closely  entra^ed  ^roup.  She  has  already  silenced 
the  I'udcr,  which  lies  head  to  wind  astern  of  he'1.] 


1744.] 


THE  BATTLE   OFF   TOULON. 


99 


The  hottest  part  of  the  action  was,  in  the  meantime,  being 
waged  by  the  ships  immediately  about  Mathews.  The  Norfolk l 
drove  the  Constante  out  of  the  line,  a  shattered  wreck,  but  was 
herself  too  much  damaged  to  pursue  her.  The  Namur  and  Marl- 
borough  were,  at  one  moment,  so  close  to  one  another  that  Mathews, 
to  avoid  being  fallen  on  board  of  by  his  eager  second,  was  obliged  to 
fill  his  sails,  and  draw  a  little  ahead.  The  Namur  was  then  scarcely 


ADMIRAL   THOMAS   MATHEWS. 
(From  T.  Fuln-rx  engraving  after  tlie  portrait  Inj  Arniiltilii  (1743).) 

under  control,  owing  to  the  rough  handling  which  she  had  received , 
and  could  give  little  help  to  the  Marlboroitgh,  which,  fought  by  her 
captain,  and  afterwards  by  his  nephew,  Lieutenant  Frederick 
Cornwall,  in  the  most  magnificent  manner,  was  very  sorely 
pressed.  None  of  the  vessels  immediately  astern  of  her  volunteered 
to  assist  her  in  the  least,  but,  keeping  their  wind,  fired  fruitlessly  at 
an  enemy  who  was  beyond  the  reach  of  their  shot ;  and,  in  spite  of 


1  The  Norfolk  had  nine  killed,  and  thirteen  wounded. 


H    2 


100  MAJOR    OPERATIONS,   1714-1762.  [1744. 

the  fact  that  the  Spaniards  betrayed  every  desire  to  meet  them  in 
the  most  handsome  manner,  few  British  captains  properly  took  up 
the  challenge.  The  most  brilliant  exception  was  Captain  Edward 
Hawke,  of  the  Berwick,  who,  noticing  how  the  Poder  had  vainly 
endeavoured  to  draw  on  some  of  his  reluctant  colleagues,  quitted  his 
station,  and  bore  down  upon  her.  His  first  broadside  did  her  an 
immense  amount  of  damage,  and,  in  twenty  minutes,  when  she  had 
lost  all  her  masts,  she  was  glad  to  strike. 

The  Heal  Felipe  l  was  disabled,  but  the  Spanish  ships  of  the  rear 
were  crowding  up  to  her  assistance,  and  Lestock  remained  afar  off, 
so  that  it  looked  as  if  the  British  strength  about  the  Spanish  admiral 
would  not  suffice  to  compel  her  to  haul  down  her  colours.  In  these 
circumstances,  Mathews  ordered  the  Anne  Galley,  fireship,  to  go 
down  and  burn  the  Heal  Felipe,  and,  seeing  that  the  Marlborough  2 
was  in  no  condition  to  help  herself,  he  further  signalled  for  the  boats 
of  the  British  centre  to  tow  her  out  of  the  line. 

The  A niic  Galley  was  handled  with  great  ability  and  gallantry. 
As  she  bore  down  on  the  Heal  Felipe  she  was  received  with  a  well- 
directed  fire  from  such  guns  as  that  crippled  ship  could  bring  to 
bear,  and  with  a  more  distant  cannonade  from  the  Spanish  vessels 
astern  of  the  flagship.  Commander  Mackie,  match  in  hand,  stood 
alone  upon  the  deck  of  his  little  craft,  ready  to  fire  her  at  the  proper 
moment.  Most  of  his  crew  were  alongside  in  a  boat,  which  was 
waiting  to  take  him  on  board.  The  rest,  by  his  orders,  had  taken 
shelter  from  the  storm  of  shot  that  hurtled  across  the  fireship.  But 
the  A  line  Galley,  struck  repeatedly  between  wind  and  water,  was 
already  sinking.  Moreover,  a  Spanish  launch,  crowded  with  men, 
was  approaching  to  board  her,  and  tow  her  clear.  Mackie  felt  that, 
at  all  hazards,  lie  must  endeavour  to  destroy  the  launch,  and,  in 
spite  of  the  fact  that  his  decks  were  littered  with  loose  powder,  that 
his  hatches  and  scuttles  were  open,  and  that  his  funnels3  were 
uncapped,  he  fired  his  waist  guns  at  the  boat.  This  was  fatal. 
The  blast  from  the  guns  set  fire  to  the  loose  powder  ;  and,  while  the 
Anne  Galley  was  still  too  far  from  the  Real  Felijie  to  seriously 
damage  her,  she  prematurely  blew  up,  and  then  sank,  carrying  down 

1  The  Real  Felipe  had  about  five  hundred  mm  killed  and  wounded. 

2  The  Afarlboroiigh   lost  Captain   Cornwall,   and  forty-two  men  killed   and   one 
hundred  and  twenty  wounded. 

3  Funnels:  in  a  fireship,  tubes  leading  from  the  deck  to  the  main  body  of  explosives 
in  the  hold. 


1744.]  THE   BATTLE   OFF   TOULON.  101 

Commander  Mackie,  a  lieutenant,  a  mate,  a  gunner,  and  two 
quartermasters. 

In  the  meantime,  M.  de  Court,  who,  owing  to  the  confusion  and 
smoke,  seems  to  have  supposed  -that  the  Spaniards  were  much  more 
closely  pressed  than  was  actually  the  case,  tacked  to  their  assistance. 
Rear-Admiral  Rowley  tacked  too,  and  followed  the  allied  centre. 
Very  soon  afterwards,  Mathews,  to  quote  the  words  of  Beatson — 

"  hauled  down  the  signal  to  engage  the  enemy,  and  also  the  signal  for  the  line  of 
battle  ;  making  the  signal  to  give  over  chase  ;  but,  at  half-past  five  o'clock,  he  made 
the  signal  for  the  fleet  to  draw  into  a  line  of  battle  ahead.  There  was  then  but  little 
wind,  and  so  great  a  swell  that  the  ships  could  only  wear.  The  Admiral  wore,  and 
formed  the  line  of  battle  on  the  larboard  tack.  This  last  manoeuvre  of  the  Admiral's 
appears  to  have  been  made  with  a  design  to  collect  his  fleet,  draw  them  out  of  the 
confusion  they  were  in,  and  arrange  them  in  a  proper  order  for  battle,  which  he  had 
every  reason  to  think  woidd  be  speedily  renewed ;  the  French  squadron  being  now  at 
hand,  and  in  an  extremely  well-formed  line.  They  crowded,  however,  to  the  assistance 
of  the  Spaniards.  The  Poder,  prize,  being  dismasted,  and  being  unable  to  follow  the 
British  fleet  when  they  wore,  was  retaken  by  the  French  squadron,  she  having  on 
board  a  lieutenant  and  twenty-three  men  belonging  to  the  licni-ick.  The  Doi-xi't/thiri; 
J'issex,  Rupert,  and  Royal  Oak,  wearing  at  the  time  the  Admiral  did,  brought  them 
nearer  to  the  sternmost  ships  of  the  Spanish  squadron,  which  had  by  this  time  joined 
their  admiral  in  a  close  line.  In  passing  each  other,  being  on  contrary  tacks,  a  short 
action  took  place,  in  which  the  Namur,  Dunkirk,  and  (J'tiulri'lijc  joined,  but  with 
little  execution  on  either  side.  Daylight  was  almost  gone,  and  the  British  fleet  passed 
on,  leaving  the  confederate  fleet  astern."' 

Owing  to  the  condition  of  the  Namur's1  masts,  Mathews,  at 
about  8  P.M.,  shifted  his  flag  from  her  to  the  Itusscll,  and  intimated 
the  fact  of  the  change  to  Lestock  and  Rowley.  On  the  morning  of 
the  12th,  when  the  wind  was  E.N.E.,  the  enemy  was  seen  about 
twelve  miles  to  the  S.W.  At  about  7  A.M.,  the  Somerset,  which 
had  become  separated  from  her  consorts  in  the  night,  fell  in  with, 
and  for  half-an-hour  engaged,  the  Hercules,  which  had  likewise 
straggled  from  her  friends ;  but,  the  Hercules  being  assisted  by  some 
French  ships,  the  Somerset  had  to  draw  off  and  rejoin  her  division. 
At  9  A.M.  Lestock  ordered  his  squadron  to  chase  to  the  SAY.,  and 
crowded  sail  ahead  of  the  fleet.  At  11  P.M.,  Mathews  signalled  for 
the  fleet  to  draw  into  line  of  battle  abreast,  and  then  brought  to  on 
the  starboard  tack  in  order  to  collect  his  command.  In  the  after- 
noon, the  British  fleet,  in  admirable  order,  was  going  down  on  {he 
enemy,  which  was  retreating  in  some  confusion  before  the  wind,  the 
Spaniards  being  ahead  of,  and  to  leeward  of  the  French,  and  the 

1  The  Kamur  had  eight  killed  and  twelve  wounded.  Among  the  latter  was 
Captain  Russel,  who  lost  his  left  arm,  and  who  subsequently  died  at  Port  Mahon. 


102  MAJOR    OPERATIONS,   1714-1762.  [1744. 

Real  Felipe  still  bearing  Navarro's  flag,  although  she  was  in  tow  of 
another  vessel.  As  for  the  Poder,  she  fell  so  far  astern  that  the 
enemy  fired  her  to  prevent  her  from  again  falling  into  British  hands ; 
and,  in  the  course  of  the  following  night,  she  blew  up.  But,  in  the 
meantime,  Mathews,  at  about  5.30  P.M.  on  the  l'2th,  had  ordered  his 
fleet  to  bring  to,  there  being  no  more  than  a  light  wind  from  the 
N.E.,  and  by  10  P.M.  that  night  the  enemy  was  out  of  sight. 

On  the  13th,  Mathews  again  chased  to  the  W.  and  W.S.W. ;  but 
at  9  A.M.  he  ordered  the  pursuit  to  be  relinquished,  his  reasons,  as 
afterwards  explained,  being,  that  he  saw  no  prospect  of  bringing  the 
allies  to  action  ;  that,  if  lie  had  continued  to  follow  them,  he  would 
have  been  drawn  towards  the  Strait's  mouth,  and  would  have  left 
Italy  entirely  unprotected ;  and  that,  as  his  instructions  were 
stringent  as  to  the  protection  of  Italy,  he  was  iimvilling  to  risk 
leaving  the  way  clear  for  the  transport  thither  of  a  large  number  of 
troops  which  he  had  reason  to  believe  had  been  collected  for  that 
purpose  in  the  ports  of  Spain.  Yet  it  was  unfortunate  that  the 
Admiral  did  not  persist.  Had  he  pressed  the  chase,  he  must 
inevitably  either  have  picked  up  several  of  the  crippled  ships  l  of  the 
allies,  or  have  obliged  do  Court  and  Xavarro  to  accept  action  on 
disadvantageous  terms  in  order  to  cover  their  lame  ducks. 

After  having  relinquished  the  chase,  Mathews  tried  to  beat  back 
in  the  face  of  strong  contrary  winds,  but  failed  ;  so,  first  showing 
himself  in  liosas  Bay,  with  a  view  to  letting  the  Spaniards  know 
that  he  was  observing  their  motions,  he  ran  for  Port  Mahon.  Upon 
reaching  that  harbour,  he  suspended  Vice-Admiral  Lestock,  and  sent 
him  to  England. 

Both  in  France  and  Spain,  as  well  as  in  Great  Britain,  there 
was  great  disgust  at  the  result  of  the  battle  off  Toulon.  In  France, 
Admiral  de  Court,  in  consequence  of  Navarro's  representations,  was 
superseded.  De  Court  in  a  letter  to  the  Bishop  of  Kennes,  who 
was  then  Ambassador  from  France  to  the  Court  of  Madrid,  said, 
"  It  was  not  I,  my  lord,  who  forced  M.  Navarro  to  fight  against  all 
laws  of  war  and  prudence ;  it  was  not  I  who  separated  his  ships 
from  him  and  drove  him  into  danger  ;  but  when  he  had  taken  so 
much  pains,  after  all  I  could  do,  to  get  himself  beaten,  it  was  I  who 
came  to  his  assistance  and  gave  him  the  opportunity  to  get  away, 
which  otherwise  he  never  could  have  had."  De  Court  was  at  the 
time  an  officer  of  nearly  eighty  years  of  age. 

1  Four,  at  least,  and  probably  more,  were  seriously  disabled  aloft. 


1745.]  THE    COURTS-MARTIAL.  ]03 

Iii  Great  Britain,  Lestock's  unwillingness  to  sit  quietly  under 
his  suspension  led  to  a  succession  of  courts-martial.  These  were 
preceded  by  an  enquiry  by  the  House  of  Commons,  which  began  on 
March  12th,  1745,  and  lasted  until  the  middle  of  April.  The  King 
was  then  addressed  to  order  a  court-martial  into  the  conduct  of 
Admiral  Mathews,  Vice-Admiral  Lestock,  the  captains  of  a  number 
of  ships,  which  had  been  engaged  in  the  battle  off  Toulon,  and  the 
lieutenants  of  the  Dorsetshire.  In  his  reply  his  Majesty  said, 
"I  am  sensible  how  much  depends  on  preserving  an  exact 
discipline  in  the  fleet,  and  of  the  necessity  there  is  of  bringing 
to  justice  such  as  have  failed  in  their  duty  on  this  important 
occasion."  In  the  meantime,  Mathews,  in  pursuance  of  orders 
from  England,  had  resigned  his  command  and  returned  home. 
leaving  the  fleet  under  the  orders  of  Vice-Admiral  William  Kowley. 

The  court-martial  first  assembled  on  board  the  London  at 
Chatham  on  September  23rd,  1745,  under  the  presidency  of  Sir 
Chaloner  Ogle  (1),  Kt.,  Admiral  of  the  Blue.  The  officers  brought 
before  it  were  the  lieutenants  of  the  Dorsetshire,  who  were  charged 
with  having  advised  their  Captain,  Burrish,  not  to  bear  down  upon 
the  enemy.  They  were  all  acquitted.  On  September  25th  Burrish's 
trial  began,  and  sentence  was  delivered  on  October  Oth.  The  court 
declared,  "  That  by  reason  of  Captain  Burrish  lying  inactive  for 
half-an-hour  when  he  might  have  assisted  the  Marlborough,  and 
not  being  in  line  with  the  Admiral  when  he  first  brought  to,  he  is 
guilty  of  a  part  of  the  charge  exhibited  against  him,  as  he  did  not 
do  his  utmost  to  burn,  sink,  or  destroy  the  enemy,  nor  give  the 
proper  assistance  to  the  Marlborough  till  after  the  message  he 
received  from  the  Admiral  :  that  he  is  guilty  011  the  12th  and 
13th  Articles  of  the  Fighting  Instructions,  and  that  therefore  the 
court  adjudge  him  to  be  cashiered  and  forever  rendered  incapable 
of  being  an  officer  in  his  Majesty's  Navy."  Captain  Edmund 
Williams,  of  the  lioyal  Oak,  was  next  tried  on  four  charges.  The 
court  found  that  Captain  Williams  had  failed  in  his  duty  by  not 
being  in  line  with  the  Admiral,  and  by  keeping  to  the  windward  of 
the  line  during  the  greater  part  of  the  action,  and  not  within  proper 
distance  to  engage  with  any  effect  during  the  most  part  of  the  time 
he  was  engaged  :  but,  in  regard  of  his  long  service  and  his  eyesight 
being  very  defective  and  other  favourable  considerations,  the  court 
was  unanimously  of  the  opinion  that  all  this  greatly  weighed  in 
mitigation  of  the  punishment  due,  and  therefore  only  adjudged 


104  MA  JOS    OPERATIONS,   1714-1 7G2.  [1745. 

him  unfit  to  be  employed  any  more  at  sea,  but  recommended  him 
to  the  Lords  Commissioners  of  the  Admiralty  to  be  continued 
on  half-pay  according  to  his  seniority.  This  recommendation  their 
Lordships  complied  with.1 

Captain  John  Ambrose,  of  the  Rupert,  was  tried  on  October  18th. 
In  his  case  the  court  found  that  he  had  failed  in  his  duty  in  not 
engaging  closer  while  he  was  engaged,  when  he  had  it  in  his  power  : 
but  in  regard  that  both  before  and  since  the  action  he  had  borne 
the  character  of  a  vigilant  officer,  and  that  his  failure  in  action 
seemed  to  have  resulted  from  mistaken  judgment,  the  court  only 
sentenced  him  to  be  cashiered  during  His  Majesty's  pleasure,  and 
mulcted  of  one  year's  pay  for  the  use  of  the  Chest  at  Chatham.  He 
was  presently  restored  to  his  rank,  and  was  in  1750  superannuated 
as  a  rear-admiral,  dying  in  1771.  Captain  William  Dilkes,  of  the 
Chichcster,  had  to  answer  the  charge  of  not  bearing  down  and 
engaging  the  enemy  closer  when  he  had  it  in  his  power  so  to  do. 
The  court  found  the  charge  proven,  and  dismissed  him  from  the 
command  (if  his  ship,  but  he  also  was  afterwards  restored  to  his 
rank,  though  relegated  to  the  half-pay  list.2  Captain  Frogmore,  of 
the  Boync,  who  was  to  have  been  tried  with  these  officers,  had  died 
on  November  8th,  1744,  while  still  abroad. 

At  a  rather  earlier  date,  Captain  Norris,  of  the  Essex,  who  had 
been  accused  by  his  own  officers  of  bad  behaviour  during  the  battle, 
had  demanded  and  obtained  a  court-martial  at  Port  Mahon,  but,  as 
be  had  previously  resigned  his  command  and  was  on  half-pay,  the 
court,  after  much  debate,  considered  that  it  had  no  jurisdiction. 
The  account  of  the  proceedings,  and  a  strongly-worded  protest  from 
the  accusing  officers,  having  been  sent  to  England,  the  Admiralty 
ordered  Norris  to  come  home  to  stand  his  trial ;  but  on  his  way  he 
seized  the  opportunity  to  abscond  at  Gibraltar,  thus,  it  must  be 
feared,  admitting  his  guilt.  He  died  in  deserved  obscurity. 

Vice-Admiral  Lestock  had  brought  charges  of  his  own  against 
Captains  Kobert  Pett,  George  Sclater,3  Temple  West,  Thomas 
Cooper,  and  James  Lloyd.  In  consequence  of  his  complaints  of 
their  misconduct,  these  five  captains  were  tried  in  due  course.  The 
first  two  were  acquitted,  the  last  three  cashiered ;  but  as  the 
offences  of  which  the  latter  had  been  convicted  did  not  reflect 

1  Edmund  Williams,  who  was  a  captain  of  1734,  subsequently  became  a  super- 
annuated rear-admiral,  and  died  in  1752. 

2  Captain  Dilkes  died  in  1756.  s  Or  Slaughter. 


1745.]  LESTOCK  ACQUITTED.  105 

upon  their  professional  honour  or  capacity,,  and  as  their  case  was 
considered  a  hard  one,  the  King  at  once  restored  them  to  their 
former  rank  in  the  service.  After  an  adjournment  of  the  court, 
the  trial  of  Vice-Admiral  Lestock  himself  began  at  Deptford  on 
board  the  Prince  of  Orange,  and,  Sir  Chaloner  Ogle  being  in  ill- 
health,  Bear-Admiral  Perry  Mayne  officiated  as  president.  The 
other  flag-officer  in  attendance  was  Rear-Admiral  the  Hon.  John 
Byng,  who,  a  few  years  later,  was  shot  for  his  behaviour  in  the 
action  off  Minorca.  Lestock  urged  in  his  defence  that  he  could 
not  have  engaged  without  breaking  the  line,  and  that  he  was  not 
authorised  to  do  this  because,  though  the  signal  for  engaging  had 
been  made,  that  for  the  line-of-battle  was  still  flying.  He  was 
unanimously  acquitted.  The  truth  is,  that  he  took  shelter  through- 
out behind  purely  technical  excuses,  which  availed  him,  although  he 
had  acted  in  opposition  to  the  spirit  of  his  earlier  correspondence 
with  Barnet,  that  a  subordinate  should  go  to  the  length  of  quitting 
his  station,  even  without  orders,  for  the  sake  of  joining  and 
supporting  the  main  body  of  the  fleet  in  action.  In  short,  for 
reasons  of  his  own — and  they  are  not  hard  to  formulate — he  chose 
to  forget  his  broad  duty  to  his  country,  and  his  comrades  in  arms, 
rather  than  depart  from  the  narrow  letter  of  his  instructions. 

During  Lestock's  trial  a  very  remarkable  occurrence  happened. 
On  May  loth  the  president  of  the  court  was  arrested  by  virtue  of 
a  writ  of  capias,  issued  by  Sir  John  AVilles,  Lord  Chief  Justice  of 
the  Common  Pleas,  in  consequence  of  a  verdict  which  had  been 
obtained  by  Lieutenant  George  Frye,  of  the  Marines,  against 
Sir  Chaloner  Ogle,  Bear-Admiral  Perry  Mayne  and  others,  for 
false  imprisonment  and  maltreatment  in  the  West  Indies,  resulting 
from  an  illegal  sentence  passed  upon  him  by  a  court-martial. 
The  arrest  of  their  president  so  incensed  the  members  of  the 
court  that,  oblivious  of  the  fact  that  the  civil  law  must  always 
of  necessity  take  precedence  of  the  military,  they  passed  resolutions 
in  which  they  spoke  of  the  Lord  Chief  Justice  of  the  Common 
Pleas  with  violent  disrespect.  These  resolutions  they  forwarded 
to  the  Lords  Commissioners  of  the  Admiralty,  who  laid  them  before 
the  King.  His  Majesty  was  somewhat  hastily  advised  to  express 
his  displeasure  at  the  insult  which  had  been  offered  to  the  court- 
martial  ;  but  he,  like  the  Lords  Commissioners  of  the  Admiralty, 
had  little  idea  of  the  great  authority  vested  in  the  Lord  Chief 
Justice  of  the  Common  Pleas,  who,  as  soon  as  he  heard  of  the 


106  MAJOR    OPERATIONS,   1714-1762.  [1745. 

resolutions  of  the  court-martial,  promptly  ordered  each  member 
of  it  to  be  taken  into  custody.  He  was  beginning  to  adopt  further 
measures  to  vindicate  his  office,  when  the  episode  was  happily  put 
an  end  to  by  the  submission  of  the  offending  officers. 

The  trial  of  Admiral  Mathews  began  on  June  16th,  1746,  Eear- 
Admiral  Perry  Mayne,  as  before,  being  president,  and  Rear-Admiral 
the  Hon.  John  Byng  being  of  the  court.  Lestock  exhibited  fifteen 
charges  against  his  superior.  Once  more  the  advocates  of  a  broader 
interpretation  of  the  instructions  were  defeated  by  the  advocates 
of  the  strict  letter.  It  is  perhaps  well  that  in  those  days  it  was  so, 
for,  for  several  years  previously,  naval  discipline  had  been  none  too 
good.  Mathews,  whose  anxiety  to  do  his  best  against  the  enemies 
of  his  country  cannot  be  denied,  though  his  wisdom  may  be,  heard 
bis  fate  on  October  '2'2nd,  when  the  following  sentence  was  passed 
upon  him  : — 

"Tin-  court  having  examined  the  witnesses  produced,  as  well  in  support  of  the 
charge  as  in  behalf  of  the  prisoner,  and  having  thoroughly  considered  their  evidence, 
do  unanimously  resolve  that  it  appears  thereby  that  Thomas  Mathews  Esq.,  by  divers 
breaches  of  duty,  was  a  principal  cause  of  the  miscarriage  of  his  Majesty's  fleet  in  the 
Mediterranean  in  the  month  of  February  171 1,  and  that  he  falls  under  the  14th  Article 
of  an  Act  of  the  l:!th  of  Charles  II.,  for  establishing  articles  and  orders  for  the  better 
government  of  his  Majesty's  Xavy,  ships  of  war  ami  forces  by  sea:  and  the  court  do 
unanimously  think  tit  to  adjudge  the  said  Thomas  Mathews  to  be  cashiered  and 
rendered  incapable  of  any  employ  in  his  Majesty's  service." 

There  is  no  question  that,  from  a  purely  legal  point  of  view, 
Mathews  deserved  his  punishment,  but  it  is  equally  undoubted  that 
Lestock's  conduct  throughout  was  really  far  more  reprehensible 
than  that  of  the  superior  officer.  Mathews  blundered,  but  his 
intentions  were  good.  Lestock  clung  tightly  to  the  dead  letter  of 
his  duty ;  but  his  intentions  were  contemptible,  for,  in  effect,  he  said 
to  himself,  "  My  superior  is  making  a  mess  of  this  affair.  I  will 
stick  fast  to  my  instructions  and  let  him,  and  even  the  fleet  and 
country,  go  to  ruin  before  I  will  strike  a  blow  to  help  him.  I  shall 
then  be  safe,  and  he,  whom  I  happen  to  regard  as  my  private  enemy, 
will  pay  the  penalty." 

1  The  minutes  of  these  courts-martial  are  enormously  voluminous,  and  the 
pamphlets  called  forth  by  the  action  off  Toulon  are  extremely  numerous.  Sec 
especially :  '  A  Partic.  Account  of  the  late  Action  ...  by  an  officer  in  the  Fleet,'  8vo, 
1744;  'Captain  Gascoigne's  Answer,'  etc.,  8vo,  1746;  'Admiral  Mathews's  Itemarks 
on  the  Evidence,'  etc. ;  '  Defence  made  by  J.  Ambrose,'  etc.,  8vo,  1745 ;  '  Case  of 
Captain  G.  Burrish,'  etc.,  8vo,  1747 ;  '  A  Narrative  of  the  Proceedings  of  H.M.  Fleet,' 
etc.,  8vo,  1745  ;  '  Vice- Admiral  L — st — k's  Account,'  etc.,  1745  ;  '  Vice- Admiral 
Lestock's  Itecapitulation,'  etc.,  1745. 


1744.]  BALCHEN'S  LAST  SERVICE.  107 

Mathews,  after  the  fight  off  Toulon,  had  refitted  at  Port  Mahon, 
and  had  then  detached  Captain  Eobert  Long,  with  a  small  division, 
to  cruise  off  the  Italian  coast  and  to  intercept  supplies  for  the 
Spanish  army  there.  Mathews  himself  put  to  sea  as  soon  as 
possible,  and  on  June  14th,  1744,  drove  ashore  and  destroyed  a 
number  of  French  transports  near  Marseilles.  In  fact  he  and  his 
cruisers  were  very  active  until  his  return  to  England  in  September. 

His  successor,  Vice-Admiral  William  Eowley,  had  many  objects 
which  he  was  compelled  to  keep  in  view.  He  had  to  guard  Italy 
from  the  French  and  Spaniards,  coming  by  way  of  the  sea  ;  he  had 
to  observe  a  French  squadron  from  Brest,  which  lay  at  Cadiz  ;  lie 
had  to  watch  a  French  fleet  at  Toulon  ;  he  had  to  keep  his  eye  on  the 
Spanish  squadron  at  Cartagena ;  above  all,  he  had  to  protect  British 
trade.  At  that  time  Admiral  de  Torres  was  expected  in  Spain  with 
a  valuable  convoy  of  treasure  ships  from  Havana  ;  and  on  the  other 
hand,  as  has  been  mentioned,  Vice-Admiral  Sir  Charles  Hardy  (1)  had 
gone  southward  with  a  convoy  bound  for  Lisbon  and  Gibraltar. 
The  French  and  Spaniards,  anxious  to  facilitate  the  safe  arrival 
of  de  Torres,  and,  if  possible,  to  intercept  Hardy,  arranged  that  the 
Toulon  squadron  should  put  to  sea,  and  join  with  the  Spanish  at 
Cartagena,  and  with  the  French  at  Cadi/.  Admiral  Gabaret, 
therefore,  left  Toulon  on  September  '20th  with  sixteen  sail  of  the 
line  and  four  frigates.  Eowley,  who  was  then  at  Minorca,  with 
only  a  part  of  his  forces,  did  not  hear  of  this  till  October  7th.  He 
at  once  put  to  sea  in  chase  ;  and,  as  soon  as  he  realised  that  the 
enemy's  plan  involved  an  attempt  upon  a  division  of  Hardy's  convoy, 
which  had  reached  Gibraltar,  liowley  made  for  Spain.  Although 
he  ultimately  found  the  merchantmen  safely  under  the  Eock,  he 
thereby  managed  to  miss  the  enemy. 

Hardy  had  sailed  in  April  1744,  and,  having  sent  his  main  convoy 
into  the  Tagus,  whence  it  was  to  proceed  by  divisions  to  points 
further  south,  he  returned,  and  re-anchored  at  St.  Helen's  on 
May  20th.  But  scarcely  had  he  quitted  Lisbon  when  the  transports 
and  store-ships,  which  he  had  left  there,  were  blockaded  in  the 
river  by  the  French  squadron,  under  M.  de  Eochambeau,  from 
Brest.  As  the  stores  were  much  needed  by  the  Mediterranean  fleet, 
Admiral  Sir  John  Balchen,  with  his  flag  in  the  Victory,  and  with 
a  considerable  force,  was  detached  from  the  Channel  to  relieve  the 
blockade.  He  sailed  on  July  28th,  made  several  prizes,  compelled 
de  Eochambeau  to  return  to  Cadiz,  and  then  escorted  to  Gibraltar 


108  MAJOR    OPERATIONS,    1714-1762.  [1744. 

that  part  of  the  convoy  which  was  subsequently  found  there  by 
Rowley. 

Balchen  returned ;  but  on  October  3rd  his  command  was  over- 
taken by  a  violent  storm  and  was  dispersed.  Several  ships  were 
much  damaged  and  were  at  times  in  great  danger ;  but  all  of  them, 
except  the  Victory,  safely  reached  Plymouth  on  October  10th. 
The  Victory,  which  was  at  that  time  considered  the  finest  ship  in 
the  world,  had  become  separated  from  her  consorts  on  October  4th, 
and  was  never  again  seen.  It  is  supposed  that  she  struck  on  the 
ridge  of  rocks  called  the  Caskets,  near  the  island  of  Alderney,  seeing 
that  on  the  night  between  the  4th  and  5th  of  October  the  booming 
of  guns  was  heard,  both  by  the  people  in  charge  of  the  Casket  Light 
and  by  the  inhabitants  of  Alderney.  The  wind,  however,  was  so 
strong  that  no  boat  could  venture  in  the  direction  whence  the 
sounds  proceeded.  The  Victory's  crew,  including  her  Admiral,1  her 
Captain,  Samuel  Faulknor,8  her  officers,  and  about  fifty  young 
gentlemen  volunteers,  amounted  to  upwards  of  one  thousand  souls, 
all  of  whom  perished.  The  loss  of  the  ship  was  at  that  time 
imputed  to  some  defects  in  her  construction,  but  it  is  probable  that 
this  really  had  nothing  to  do  with  it,  and  that  the  disaster  must 
be  attributed  solely  to  the  storm  and  thick  weather  which  prevailed 
at  the  time. 

Owing  to  the  situation  of  affairs  with  France,  a  small  squadron 
of  four  ships,  under  Commodore  Curtis  Barnet,  sent  at  the  request 
of  the  directors  of  the  East  India  Company  to  the  East  Indies,  had 
sailed  on  May  5th,  1744,  from  Spithead.  In  January  following, 
after  having  taken  measures  to  intercept  home-coming  French  ships 
from  China,  and  after  having  disguised  his  own  vessel,  the  Deptford, 
(50,  Captain  John  Phillipson,  and  the  Preston,  50,  Captain  the  Earl 
of  Northesk  (1),  Barnet  was  so  fortunate  as  to  take  in  the  Strait  of 
Banca  the  French  Indiamen  Dauphin,  Hercule,  and  Jason,  each  of 
30  guns. 

The  Commodore  had  not  long  left  England  when  the  successful 
return  of  Commodore  Anson  suggested  to  the  British  Ministry  that 
it  might  be  easy  to  capture  the  next  treasure-ships  bound  from 
Acapulco  to  Manilla ;  and  a  despatch  to  that  effect  was  sent  to 
Barnet  by  the  Lively,  20,  Captain  Elliot  Elliot.  But  the  activity 

1  Sir  John  Balchen  was  then  in  his  seventy-sixth  year. 

2  A  captain  of  1736,  and  a  member  of  one  of  the  most  distinguished  of  British 
naval  families. 


1744.]  THE  FRENCH  IN  NORTH  AMERICA.  109 

and  threatening  attitude  of  the  French  in  India  prevented  the 
scheme  from  being  carried  out ;  and,  after  his  squadron  had  taken 
a  few  other  French  ships,  Barnet  went  to  Madras  and  confined 
himself  mainly  to  observing- and  harassing  the  enemy  in  the  Bay 
of  Bengal. 

Vice-Admiral  Thomas  Davers  was  sent  with  reinforcements  to 
Jamaica  to  relieve  Sir  Chaloner  Ogle  in  1744 ;  but  the  French  and 
Spaniards  were  so  strong  on  that  station,  and  so  many  battleships 
were  carried  home  with  him  by  Ogle,  that  Davers  had  to  restrict 
himself  to  the  defensive.  His  cruisers,  however,  made  several  prizes 
and  the  French  failed  in  their  only  important  enterprise,  an  attack 
on  Anguilla. 

The  war  which  broke  oat  in  1744  was  destined  to  have  an 
important  influence  on  the  fate  of  the  British  and  French  empires 
in  North  America.  At  first  the  French  there  were  very  active,  and 
the  British  were  extremely  indifferent  to  their  own  interests.  In 
consequence  of  this,  the  French  territories,  which  had  been  handed 
over  to  Great  Britain  by  the  Treaty  of  Utrecht,  were  neglected  and 
were  badly  affected  to  the  new  government.  They  were,  indeed,  full 
of  active  French  sympathisers.  The  natural  outcome  was  a  scheme, 
hatched  by  the  French,  to  take  advantage  of  the  dissatisfaction, 
and  to  deprive  Great  Britain  of  part  at  least  of  her  new  possessions. 
M.  de  Quenel,  who  was  then  Governor  of  Cape  Breton,  fitted  out 
a  small  armament  from  Louisbourg  and  put  it  under  the  command 
of  Captain  Duvivier.  The  native  Indians  gave,  or  at  least  promised 
to  give  him  some  assistance.  The  armament  made  first  for  Canso, 
where  the  French  arrived  on  May  llth.  They  were  joined  by 
two  hundred  Indians,  and  by  many  disaffected  inhabitants.  The 
place  was  held  by  a  company  of  the  40th  Regiment,  but,  as  it  was 
indefensible,  it  presently  surrendered.  The  French  demolished 
such  fortifications  as  existed,  and  set  the  place  on  fire.  M.  Duvivier, 
who,  in  the  meantime,  had  been  reinforced  by  five  hundred  Indians, 
proceeded  with  all  his  forces  to  Annapolis  Koyal.  This  important 
position,  like  Canso,  was  in  a  very  neglected  state ;  but  it  was  saved 
by  the  activity  and  patriotism  of  the  New  Englanders. 

Governor  Shirley  and  the  Assembly  of  Massachusetts,  well 
knowing  the  consequence  of  Nova  Scotia  to  Great  Britain,  en- 
couraged the  raising  in  New  England  of  a  body  of  volunteers, 
which,  promptly  dispatched  to  Annapolis,  arrived  before  the  French 
made  their  appearance.  When,  therefore,  M.  Duvivier,  who  landed 


110  MAJOR    OPERATIONS,   1714-1762.  [1745. 

on  June  '2nd,  summoned  the  town,  he  was  informed  that  it  would 
be  defended  to  the  last  extremity ;  and,  although  he  made  some 
preparations  for  an  assault,  the  strength  of  the  defenders  so  deeply 
impressed  him  that  he  finally  returned  to  Louisbourg  without 
attempting  anything  further. 

This  activity  of  the  French  suggested  to  the  Governor  and 
Assembly  of  New  England  a  project  for  the  conquest  of  Louisbourg, 
which  was  then  the  chief  French  base  in  North  America.  A  re- 
quest was  made  to  the  home  Government  to  the  effect  that,  as  the 
necessary  naval  forces  could  be  sent  more  quickly  from  the  West 
Indies  than  from  England,  Commodore  Peter  Warren  might  be 
detached  from  the  former  station  to  co-operate  with  a  colonial 
expedition.  To  this  the  Government  agreed,  and  orders  were  issued 
accordingly.  The  Assembly  of  Massachusetts  raised  .£'27,000  for  the 
service.  Troops  were  collected  and  confided  to  the  command  of 
Mr.  William  Pepperel,  of  Kittery,  Maine  ;  and,  though  no  fewer 
than  3850  volunteers  were  assembled  and  sufficient  transports  and 
stores  for  their  accommodation  were  provided,  all  was  done  with  so 
great  secrecy  that  the  enemy  seems  to  have  suspected  nothing.  But 
as  this  expedition  did  not  sail  till  174."),  the  history  of  its  proceedings 
must  be  for  the  present  deferred. 

While  Great  Britain  was  fully  occupied  with  her  foreign  foes  she 
had  to  contend  with  not  less  dangerous  enemies  at  home,  for  France 
in  174."),  at  a  time  when  the  greater  part  of  the  British  army  was  on 
the  Continent,  engaged  in  supporting  the  schemes  of  the  House  of 
Austria,  suddenly  transported  the  Young  Pretender  to  Scotland. 
France  did  not  believe  that  Prince  Charles  Edward  would  be 
successful,  nor  did  she  ever  mean  to  assist  him  very  actively ;  but 
she  realised  that  he  might  cause  a  most  useful  diversion.  With  a 
slender  retinue  the  Prince  embarked  at  St.  Nazaire  on  board  a  small 
vessel,  the  Dentcllc,  which  was  lent  him  by  a  Mr.  Walsh,  who  was 
a  merchant  of  Nantes  but  was  of  Irish  extraction.  He  had  arms  for 
about  2000  men  and  about  t'2000  in  money,  and  he  sailed  on 
July  7th.  When  off  Belle  Isle  he  was  joined  by  the  Elisabeth,  64, 
which  had  orders  to  escort  Prince  Charles  Edward  round  Ireland  to 
the  Hebrides.  On  July  9th,  in  lat.  47°  57'  N.,  the  little  expedition 
was  discovered  by  the  Lion,  58,  Captain  Piercy  Brett  (1),  which 
immediately  gave  chase.  At  5  o'clock  the  Lion  ran  alongside  and 
poured  a  broadside  into  the  Elisabeth  at  short  range.  The  two  vessels 
continued  warmly  engaged  until  10  o'clock,  when  the  Lion  had 


1745.]  FRANCE  AND    THE   YOUNG   PRETENDER.  Ill 

suffered  so  severely  in  her  rigging  that  she  was  incapable  of  making 
sail.  The  Elisabeth,  on  the  contrary,  had  suffered  chiefly  in  her 
hull ;  and,  although  it  is  reported  that  several  of  her  gun-ports  were 
knocked  into  one,  she  was  able,  to  get  away.  The  smaller  vessel  at 
the  beginning  of  the  action  had  endeavoured  to  assist  her  consort, 
but  had  soon  been  beaten  off  by  the  Lion's  stern -chasers ;  and, 
when  she  saw  that  the  Elisabeth  had  failed  of  success,  she  crowded 
sail  and  made  her  escape.  The  Lion,  whose  complement  was  440 
men,  lost  55  killed  and  107  wounded,  of  whom  seven  ultimately 
died.  The  French  lost  65  killed  and  136  dangerously  wounded. 

Prince  Charles  pursued  his  voyage  and  reached  the  coast  of 
Lochaber  at  the  end  of  July.  The  Young  Pretender,  on  landing, 
was  dissuaded  by  his  best  friends  from  pursuing  his  adventure;  but 
he  persisted,  and  they  then  gave  way  and  joined  him.  For  a  time 
he  had  some  success,  but  he  was  too  fond  of  pleasure  to  act  with  the 
necessary  energy,  and  presently  the  British  Government  began  to 
recover  from  its  first  amazement.  A  regular  plan  of  defence  was 
elaborated.  Admiral  Edward  Yernon  (I),1  with  a  squadron,  was  sent 

1  It  should  here  be  mentioned  that  Vcrnon's  ultimate  disgrace  arose  out  of  this 
appointment  of  his  to  the  command  in  the  Downs.  He  had  with  him  Imt  very  low 
ships,  and  in  a  letter  of  November  IGth,  1745,  to  the  Earl  of  Sandwich,  he  said:  "k 
must  have  made  an  odd  appearance  in  the  Eye  of  the  World  to  have  seen  two  Flag- 
Officers  lye  so  long  in  the  Downs  with  but  one  forty-gun  ship  to  form  a  line  of  battle 
with."  This  paucity  of  command,  combined  with  the  fact  that  he  had  no  commission 
as  a  Commander-in-chief,  was  the  origin  of  his  discontent.  He  was  also  irritated  by 
the  conduct  of  the  Admiralty  which,  in  the  same  letter,  he  stigmatises  in  rather  strong 
language.  Things  came  to  a  head  when,  on  December  1st,  Yernon  wrote  to  the 
Admiral'}' :  "I  have  read,  with  great  surprise,  the  long  paragraph  in  your  letter 
informing  me  their  Lordships  don't  approve  of  my  having  appointed  a  Gunner  to  the 
Poole  when  the  necessity  of  the  Service  required  it,  and  his  Millie's  Service  must  have 
suffered  for  the  want  of  it;  and  acquainting  me,  it  is  their  Lordships'  directions  I 
should  withdraw  the  Warrants  that  I  gave  to  them  for  his  Majesty's  Service.  I  must 
say  with  concern,  in  answer  to  it,  that  I  did  not  expect  to  have  been  treated  in  such  a 
contemptuous  manner,  and  that  1  can  hardly  conceive  it  to  be  their  directions  till  1  see 
it  from  under  their  hands  in  an  Order  for  me  to  do  it,  and  shall  now  entreat  the  favour 
of  their  Lordships  that,  if  they  think  it  deserves  an  Order,  they  will  please  to  direct  it 
to  my  Successor  to  put  in  Execution,  as  I  must,  in  such  case,  intreat  the  favour  of 
their  Lordships  to  procure  me  His  Majesty's  leave  to  quit  a  Command  I  have  long 
thought  too  contemptibly  treated  in  regard  to  the  rank  I  hold  for  His  Majesty's  honour 
and  service,  and  I  should  rather  chuse  to  serve  His  Majesty  in  the  capacity  of  a  private 
man  in  the  Militia,  than  to  permit  the  rank  1  hold  in  His  Majesty's  Service  to  be  treated 
with  contempt,  which  I  conceive  to  be  neither  for  our  Royal  Master's  honour  or  Service. 
A  private  Captain  over  two  ships  on  any  foreign  service  exercises  the  power  of  filling  up 
all  vacancies  under  him,  and  it  is  for  his  Matie's  Service  he  should  be  empowered  to  do  so. 
When  I  attended  the  Hegency,  I  was  spoke  to  as  a  person  of  confidence  that  was  to  have 
had  the  Chief  Command  at  home.  Their  Lordships'  Orders  of  the  7th  August  seem'd  to 
design  me  for  such,  tho'  that  was  speedily  altered  by  those  of  the  1 4th,  and  I  always 


112  MAJOR    OPERATIONS,    1714-1762.  [1745. 

to  the  Downs  to  watch  the  motions  of  the  French  at  Dunquerque 
and  Calais,  and  he  from  time  to  time  detached  squadrons  under  the 
command  of  Commodores  Thomas  Smith  and  Charles  Knowles, 
who  intercepted  many  small  vessels  destined  for  the  rebels.  At  the 

suspected  there  was  something  lurking  under  the  avoiding  to  call  rne-Commander-in- 
Chief  anywhere,  but  only  Admiral  of  the  White,  tho',  at  the  same  time,  Letters  had 
passed  thro'  my  hands,  directed  to  Vice-Admiral  Martin  (whom,  by  my  first  orders,  I 
was  to  take  under  my  Command),  stiling  him  Commander-in-Chief  of  His  Majesty's 
Ships  in  the  Soundings.  But  your  letter,  Sir,  has  now  explained  the  whole  to  me." 
The  controversy  led  the  Admiralty  to  quote  what  it  believed  to  be  a  precedent  for  its 
action,  whereupon,  in  a  letter  of  December  6th,  Vernon  wrote:  "I  am  now  come  to  the 
last  part  of  your  letter  in  answer  to  mine  of  the  first,  and  was  pleased  to  rind  you  had 
quoted  the  precedent  of  Sir  John  NiTris's  case  in  the  year  1740.  Sir  John  Norris 
thought  it  right  to  appoint  two  officers  on  a  vacancy  that  happened  under  his  command, 
and,  I  dare  answer  for  him,  would  not  have  thought  it  right ;  but,  as  he  judged  it  for 
his  Majesty's  Service,  and  that  his  predecessors  had  done  it  before  him,  and  I  don't 
think  anyone  will  say  that  Lord  Orford,  Sir  George  Kooke,  Sir  Clowdisley  Shovell,  Lord 
Aylmer,  Lord  Berkeley,  Lord  Torrington,  and  Sir  Charles  Wager,  have  not  done  the 
same.  Sir  John  Norris  thought  it  so  much  a  right  in  him,  that,  when  a  person  was 
sent  down  by  the  Board  to  supersede  a  warrant  granted  by  him,  he  sent  the  person 
back  with  his  warrant,  and  he  was  not  received  wh  le  he  commanded,  but  when  the 
service  was  over,  and  he  returned  to  town,  their  Lordships  superseded  him,  so  that  his 
acquiescence  was  necessity,  not  approbation.  And  1  hope  the  haughty  temper  of  the 
noble  Lord  that  presided  at  the  Board  at  that  time,  will  not  be  thought  a  tit  precedent 
to  be  followed  by  their  Lordships."  Again,  on  December  13th  :  "  As  to  what  I  am  so 
politi  ly  acquainted  with,  that  their  Lordships  have  appointed  a  gunner  to  the  1'oole 
after  my  having  informed  their  Lordships  that  1  had  warranted  the  gunner  of  the 
Slieemess  to  that  ship,  I  must  acquaint  you  in  answer — it  was  what  I  little  expected — 
and  that  I  am  determined  to  follow  the  example  of  Sir  John  Norris,  and  not  permit  that 
indignity  to  be  put  on  me  while  I  remain  in  command  here,  but  when  he  arrives,  shall 
civilly  send  him  back  again.  That  officer  that  don't  pique  himself  on  supporting  his 
own  honour,  and  the  dignity  of  the  commission  he  holds  under  his  Majesty,  may  not 
be  the  likeliest  to  defend  the  honour  of  his  Prince  and  the  Security  of  his  Country 
against  the  face  of  his  enemies,  and  I  will,  therefore,  never  take  the  fa'al  step  of 
abandoning  my  own  honour."  And  on  December  14th :  "  A  private  Colonel  in  the 
Army,  who  has  no  command  but  his  regiment,  shall  be  allowed  to  fill  up  most  of  the 
vacancies  for  ensigns  in  his  regiment,  and  the  poor  slighted  admiral  bearing  his 
Majesty's  flag  at  main-topmast  head,  and  in  actual  command,  shall  be  denied  the 
filling  up  the  low  vacancy  of  a  gunner  !  "  The  only  result  of  this  condition  of  things 
was  Vernon's  supersession,  on  December  26th.  He  was  succeeded  by  Vice-Adm.  Wm. 
Martin  (1).  Immediately  after  his  supersession,  he  engaged  in  controversial  pamphlet- 
eering, and,  according  to  general  belief,  was  responsible  for  two  somewhat  plain-spoken 
pamphlets,  respectively  entitled,  '  A  Specimen  of  Naked  Truth  from  a  British  Sailor,' 
and  'Some  Sensible  Adi  ice  from  a  Common  Sailor,  to  whom  it  might  have  Concerned, 
for  the  Service  of  the  Crown  and  Country.'  He  was  summoned  to  the  Admiralty  to 
deny  the  authorship  of  these  productions,  but  as  he  did  not  choose  to  do  so,  he  was 
informed,  on  April  llth,  1746,  that  the  King  had  been  pleased  to  direct  their  Lordships 
to  strike  his  name  from  the  list  of  flag-officers.  Thus  ended  the  service  career  of  a 
great  and  honourable  officer,  who  owed  his  fall  to  his  petulance  and  pugnacity. — Letter- 
book  in  Author's  Coll. ;  the  pamphlets  above  mentioned ;  and  '  Original  Letters  to  an 
Honest  Sailor'  (published  by  Vernon  after  his  dismissal  from  the  service). 


1745.]  ESCAPE   OF   THE   TOUNG   PRETENDEB.  113 

Nore  Captain  the  Hon.  Edward  Boscawen  commanded :  at  Ply- 
mouth, Captain  Savage  Mostyn.  A  further  squadron  cruised  in  the 
Channel  under  Vice-Admiral  William  Martin  (1) ;  and  Bear-Admiral 
the  Hon.  John  Byng  went  northward,  and,  by  means  of  his  cruisers, 
greatly  annoyed  the  rebels  on  the  Scots  coast. 

The  Young  Pretender  reached  Derby,  but  then  lost  heart  and 
retreated  to  await  reinforcements.  In  Scotland  for  a  time  he  won 
more  successes,  but  the  assured  British  command  of  the  sea  really 
made  his  enterprise  almost  hopeless  from  the  first ;  for  even  his 
private  sympathisers  in  France  could  not  aid  him  with  supplies, 
such  vessels  as  they  dispatched  being  almost  invariably  snapped  up 
by  British  cruisers.  Yet  individual  loyalty,  after  the  disaster  at 
Culloden,  saved  the  Prince  from  capture,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that 
the  Government  had  set  a  price  of  i'30,000  upon  his  head.  He 
reached  the  Hebrides,  and,  after  suffering  great  distresses,  was  taken 
on  board  a  French  privateer,  the  Bellonc,  011  September  '20th,  1746. 
This  vessel  had  been  sent  on  purpose  from  St.  Malo  by  some  of  his 
French  friends.  She  reached  Roscoff,  a  small  port  in  Brittam",  on 
September  29th,  not,  however,  without  having  very  narrowly 
escaped  capture  by  a  British  cruiser  in  the  Channel.  It  is  worth 
mentioning  that  she  was  at  least  the  third  vessel  which  had  been 
sent  to  Scotland  to  rescue  him.  Two  large  French  privateers,  one 
of  34  and  the  other  of  32  guns,  had  anchored  off  the  coast  of 
Lochaber  in  the  previous  April,  with  the  object  of  picking  up 
fugitives  from  the  rebel  army.  They  had  been  there  discovered  by 
Captain  Thomas  Noel  of  the  Greyhound,  20 ;  but,  though  he  had 
been  joined  by  the  Baltimore  and  Terror  sloops,  and  had  then 
attacked  them,  they  had  succeeded  in  beating  him  off  and  in 
carrying  away  several  of  the  rebel  chiefs. 

The  expedition  against  Louisbourg  assembled  at  Boston,  Massa- 
chusetts, and  the  troops  were  there  embarked,  with  all  the  necessary 
stores,  on  board  eighty  transports.  It  was  convoyed  by  eight 
privateers  of  twenty  guns,  and  ten  small  vessels ;  and  it  sailed  on 
March  20th,  1745,  arriving  at  Canso  on  April  4th.  This  was 
immediately  after  it  had  become  known  in  New  England  that 
Commodore  Warren  had  received  orders  to  co-operate  in  the  under- 
taking. The  expedition  reached  Canso  before  the  Commodore, 
and  Mr.  Pepperel  wisely  employed  his  time  in  exercising  and 
drilling  his  troops.  Meanwhile  Mr.  John  Ecus,  master  of  the 
Shirley  Galley,  the  largest  of  the  privateers,  proceeded  off  the 
VOL.  III.  I 


114  MAJOR    OPERATIONS,   1714-1762.  [1745. 

harbour  of  Louisbourg  to  intercept  supplies  intended  for  the  place. 
That  he  did  so  was  fortunate,  for  the  French  Government,  hearing 
of  the  projected  attack,  had  hastily  despatched  the  Benommte,  32, 
one  of  its  fastest  frigates,  commanded  by  the  celebrated  Kersaint, l 
with  dispatches  for  Louisbourg.  On  April  18th,  she  sighted  Eous's 
blockading  squadron,  which  very  pluckily  attacked  her  and  forced 


VICE-ADMIHAL    Silt    PETER    WARREN,   K.B. 
(Front  a  lithograph  by  Ridley  in  the  '  Naral  Chronicle,'  1804.) 

her  ;to  fly,  greatly  disabled.  In  her  flight  she  encountered  some 
transports,  which,  escorted  by  a  privateer,  were  on  their  way  to  join 
Pepperel.  These  she  attacked,  but  the  privateer  defended  them  so 
well  that  once  more  she  made  sail  and  got  away.  The  Renommee 
had  finally  to  return  to  France  without  having  effected  her  purpose. 
Commodore  Warren's  squadron  from  the  West  Indies  reached 

1  A  biographical  note  concerning  this  gallant  officer  will  be  found  on  pp.  219,  220  of 
the  present  volume. 


1745.]  CAPTURE   OF  LOUISBOUBO.  115 

Canso  on  April  22nd  and  23rd,  and  consisted  of  His  Majesty's  ships 
Superb,  60,  Captain  Thomas  Somers,  bearing  the  Commodore's  broad 
pennant;  Eltham,  40,  Captain  Philip  Durell  (1) ;  Launceston,  40, 
Captain  "Warwick  Calmady ;  and  Mermaid,  40,  Captain  James 
Douglas  (1).  In  the  course  of  the  subsequent  operations,  it  was 
joined  by  several  other  vessels.  Warren  lost  no  time  in  landing 
and  in  conferring  with  Mr.  Pepperel.  Returning  on  board,  he  sailed 
again,  and  effectually  blockaded  the  harbour  of  Louisbourg.  The 
troops  at  Canso  were  re-embarked  on  April  29th,  conveyed  to  Gabarus 
Bay,  near  Louisbourg,  and  landed  on  the  morning  of  the  30th.  The 
French  garrison  was  discontented  and  mutinous,  and  its  officers 
were  tyrannical  and  corrupt,  so  that  M.  de  Charnbon,  the  Governor, 
feared  to  attack  the  invaders  after  they  had  inflicted  one  small  check 
upon  him.  Thus,  the  expedition  had  leisure  to  establish  itself 
ashore  and  to  rapidly  become  disciplined  and  formidable.  In  the 
meantime,  the  Henommee  had  returned  to  France  with  the  news 
of  what  was  going  on,  whereupon  the  French  Government  hastily 
despatched  the  Vigilante,  64,  with  stores  for  the  threatened  fortress. 
She  was,  however,  intercepted  and  captured  by  "Warren's  squadron 
on  May  19th.  A  general  attack  by  land  and  sea  upon  Louisbourg 
was  imminent,  when  on  June  28th  the  place  surrendered.  The 
British  lost  during  the  operations  only  101  killed,  while  the  French 
loss  was  300. 

With  Louisbourg  fell  the  whole  of  Cape  Breton.  The  conquest 
was  of  immense  importance.  It  not  only  destroyed  a  nest  of  French 
privateers,  but  it  also  relieved  the  British  fishermen  on  the  banks 
of  Newfoundland  from  much  dangerous  rivalry.  Moreover,  it  had 
a  great  moral  effect  upon  the  Indians  throughout  North  America. 
Those  who  had  taken  part  in  it  were  fittingly  and  liberally  rewarded. 
Warren  was  promoted  to  be  Rear-Admiral  of  the  Blue,  Governor 
Shirley,  of  Massachusetts,  was  made  a  colonel,  and  Mr.  William 
Pepperel,  besides  also  being  made  a  colonel,  was  created  a  baronet  of 
Great  Britain.  Nor  were  the  sailors  neglected.  The  Shirley  Galley 
was  purchased  by  the  Government,  and  added  to  the  Navy  as  a 
post  ship  ;  and  her  late  master,  Mr.  John  Rous,  was  presented  with 
a  post-captain's  commission  and  appointed  to  her.  Finally,  the 
Colonists  were  reimbursed  by  Parliament  for  all  the  expenses  which 
they  had  incurred  in  connection  with  the  expedition. 

The  despatch  of  Vice-Admiral  Thomas  Davers  with  reinforce- 
ments to  the  West  Indies  has  already  been  mentioned.  Upon 

I  2 


116  MAJOR    OPERATIONS,   1714-1762.  [1745. 

the  French  Ministry  hearing  of  it,  it  also  sent  thither  a  strong 
reinforcement,  under  the  Chevalier  de  Caylus,  who  arrived  at 
Martinique  on  March  28th,  1745.  No  sooner  was  the  British 
Ministry  advised  of  its  departure,  than  it  ordered  Vice-Admiral 
William  Eowley,  then  in  command  in  the  Mediterranean,  to  detach 
to  the  West  Indies  a  considerable  division  under  Vice-Admiral 
Isaac  Townsend  (2),  who  left  Gibraltar  on  August  '2nd,  and  arrived 
off  Martinique  on  October  3rd.  He  fell  in,  on  October  31st,  with  a 
squadron  of  ships  of  war  and  store  ships,  destined  to  further 
reinforce  the  French ;  and,  chasing  it,  ultimately  took  or  destroyed 
upwards  of  thirty  out  of  about  forty  sail. 

In  the  Mediterranean,  Vice- Admiral  William  Eowley  blockaded 
the  Spaniards  in  Cartagena,  while  Bear-Admiral  Henry  Medley 
watched  the  coasts  of  Italy  and  prevented  supplies  from  reaching 
the  Spanish  Army  there.  Commodore  Henry  Osborn  observed  the 
French  Brest  squadron,  which  lay  at  Cadiz.  When  Genoa  threw 
in  her  lot  with  the  House  of  Bourbon,  Commodore  Thomas  Cooper 
was  detached  to  bombard  the  ports  of  that  Eepublic,  and  he  caused 
several  of  them  to  suffer  very  severely.  The  difficulties  of  Genoa 
induced  the  Corsicans  to  make  an  effort  to  throw  off  the  Genoese 
yoke  and  to  seek  British  and  Sardinian  assistance ;  whereupon 
Commodore  Cooper  went  to  Corsica,  and  on  November  17th,  1745, 
anchored  off  Bastia.  The  place  was  bombarded  until  the  19th, 
when  the  ships  relinquished  the  attack,  and  withdrew,  Cooper 
despairing  of  the  arrival  of  the  promised  Corsicaii  assistance.  But 
his  action  was  a  little  premature ;  for  one  of  the  rebel  chiefs,  the 
Marchese  de  Kivarole,  had  already  arrived,  and,  just  after  the 
disappearance  of  the  British,  threatened  the  town  with  such  good 
effect,  that  the  Chevalier  de  Mari,  the  representative  of  Genoese 
authority,  rinding  the  defences  untenable  in  consequence  of  the 
damage  that  had  already  been  received  by  them  from  the  British 
squadron,  carried  off  his  garrison  by  sea.  A  little  later  Commodore 
Cooper  sent  to  Corsica  Captain  the  Hon.  George  Townshend,  who 
discovered  that  the  Genoese  held  only  a  few  towns,  and  that  the 
island  was  in  a  fair  way  of  falling  into  the  hands  of  the  patriots. 

The  success  at  Louisbourg  directed  attention  to  the  importance 
of  British  interests  in  North  America,  and  in  1746  suggested  fresh 
undertakings  in  that  quarter.  An  attack  on  Quebec  was  projected, 
and  it  was  proposed  to  utilise  for  the  purpose  the  colonial  troops, 
which  had  done  so  well  at  Cape  Breton  in  the  previous  year, 


1746.]  THE  FRENCH  IN  NORTH  AMERICA.  117 

strengthening  them  of  course  by  means  of  large  detachments  from 
England.  Preparations  were  made,  and  troops  were  assembled  at 
Portsmouth  and  even  embarked ;  but  various  causes  detained  the 
fleet  at  Spithead  until  too  late  in  the  season,  and  the  enterprise  was, 
for  a  time,  abandoned.  Rumours  of  the  intentions  of  the  Govern- 
ment had,  as  was  usual  in  those  days,  promptly  reached  the  ears  of 
the  French  Ministry,  which  decided  to  retaliate  for  the  threatened 
British  invasion  of  Canada  by  a  descent  upon  Nova  Scotia.  In 
pursuance  of  this  determination  a  large  force  was  sent  across  the 
Atlantic  under  the  Due  d'Anville. 

British  public  opinion  had  been  much  attracted  by  the  Quebec 
idea,  and  was  greatly  disgusted  by  the  failure  of  the  expedition  to 
sail.  To  pacify  the  people,  it  was  hinted  that  the  troops  which 
had  been  assembled  were  not  to  remain  unemployed ;  and,  a 
little  later,  as  will  be  seen,  they  were  directed  upon  the  coast 
of  France. 

The  French  fleet  of  eleven  sail  of  the  line  and  fifty-gun  ships, 
three  frigates,  three  fireships  and  two  bomb-vessels,  under  the  Due 
d'Anville,  with  transports  and  storeships  containing  3500  troops, 
sailed  from  Brest  on  June  22iid,  1746,  and  arrived  off  the  coast  of 
Nova  Scotia  on  September  10th.  But  on  its  passage  it  was  much 
damaged  and  weakened  by  a  violent  storm.  Vice-Admiral  Isaac 
Townsend,  who  was  then  at  Louisbourg,  had  with  him  an  inferior 
force,  but  had  the  advantage  of  assistance  from  New  England,  and 
of  a  well  fortified  base.  The  sudden  death  of  d'Anville  depressed  the 
spirits  of  the  French  expedition,  and  although  the  enemy  did  land,  he 
soon  decided  not  to  prosecute  the  object  for  which  he  had  crossed  the 
Atlantic.  D'Anville's  successor,  M.  Tournel,  a  man  of  impetuous 
temper,  could  not  agree  with  the  resolutions  of  the  majority  of  his 
officers ;  and,  considering  that  if  he  retreated  he  would  be  dis- 
honoured, he  solved  his  own  difficulties  by  committing  suicide,  while 
at  the  same  time  he  complicated  the  confusion  into  which  his  un- 
fortunate command  had  fallen.  M.  de  La  Jonquiere  succeeded  him  ; 
but  by  that  time,'  owing  to  delay  and  neglect,  the  troops  had  been 
almost  exterminated  by  scurvy  and  by  a  small-pox  epidemic.  Some 
succour  was  therefore  sent  to  Quebec,  and  the  rest  of  the  expedition, 
in  a  very  bad  case,  returned  to  Europe.  On  the  voyage  several  of 
the  vessels  composing  it  were  snapped  up  by  British  cruisers. 

The  troops  which  had  been  assembled  at  Portsmouth  for  the 
undertaking  against  Quebec  were,  as  has  been  said  transported  to 


118  MAJOR    OPERATIONS,   1714-1762.  [1746. 

the  coast  of  France.  Command  of  them  had  been  given  to  Lieut.  - 
General  the  Hon.  James  St.  Glair,  chiefly  for  the  reason  that, 
besides  being  an  excellent  officer,  he  had  made  a  special  study  of 
the  military  position  in  Canada.  When  the  destination  of  the 
expedition  was  altered,  the  command,  perhaps  unwisely,  was  not 
changed.  The  fleet  destined  to  convoy  the  army  was  entrusted  to 
Admiral  Richard  Lestock  (B.)  The  idea  of  the  Government  was 
that  a  descent  upon  the  coast  of  Brittany  might  induce  the  French, 
who  were  very  powerful  in  Flanders,  to  detach  part  of  the  army 
which  was  operating  there  under  Marshal  Saxe.  But  the  affair 
was  wretchedly  managed.  The  General  had  no  special  knowledge  ; 
the  troops  were  unprepared  for  the  service  ;  and  no  maps  of  the 
country  to  be  attacked  were  provided.  St.  Glair  asked  for  a  map  of 
Brittany,  and  the  Government  sent  him,  by  express,  a  map  of 
Gascony.  Xor  had  the  coast  been  properly  reconnoitred.  It  was 
little  known  to  any  of  the  British  naval  officers  of  the  time,  and 
the  charts  of  those  days  were  very  indifferent. 

Lestock  detached  Commodore  Thomas  Cotes  to  look  in  at  Port 
Louis  and  neighbouring  places,  and  to  find  some  convenient  spot 
for  landing  near  Lorieiit.  With  the  main  body  of  the  fleet  he 
himself  sailed  from  St.  Helen's  on  August  5th,  but  did  not  clear 
the  coast  of  England  until  September  14th,  nor  reach  that  of  France 
till  September  19th,  when  Cotes  rejoined  him.  A  landing  was  in 
time  effected,  and  the  troops  began  to  advance  upon  Lorient ;  but 
the  country  was  a  close  one,  and  greatly  facilitated  the  guerilla 
operations  of  the  French.  Lorient,  nevertheless,  appeared  to  be 
disposed  to  treat ;  and  it  would  no  doubt  have  surrendered  to  the 
British  commander  if  he  had  been  inclined  to  deal  leniently.  Yet 
as  he  would  accept  all  or  nothing,  the  place  sturdily  prepared  to 
defend  itself.  The  siege  was  begun  in  a  partial  and  ineffectual  way ; 
but  so  many  necessary  supplies  were  wanting  that  progress  was 
very  slow,  and,  though  the  sailors  from  the  fleet  co-operated  with 
marvellous  energy,  the  enterprise  was  at  last  concluded  to  be 
impracticable  and  the  troops  were  re-embarked,  very  sickly  from 
the  consequences  of  exposure,  on  September  30th.  At  a  council  of 
war  the  project  of  a  landing  in  Quiberon  Bay  was  discussed  and 
rejected,  but  on  October  1st,  Lestock  received  so  favourable  a  report 
from  Captain  Thomas  Lake  of  the  Exeter,  of  the  anchorage  there, 
that  he  and  General  St.  Clair  decided,  in  spite  of  the  resolutions  of 
the  council  of  war,  to  proceed  and  there  await  reinforcements  from 


1746.]  LA    BOURDONNAIS   TO   INDIA.  llf) 

England,  meanwhile  harassing  the  enemy  whenever  possible.  The 
fleet  sailed,  and  some  troops  were  landed  and  works  erected  ;  but, 
after  hesitation  and  paltering,  the  forces  were  re-embarked.  Mean- 
time the  isles  of  Houat  and  Hoedic  had  been  reduced  and  the 
fortifications  upon  them  destroyed.  The  troops  were  ultimately 
sent  under  convoy  to  Ireland,  and  Lestock,  with  the  bulk  of  the 
fleet,  returned  to  England.  No  glory  was  won,  but  the  expedition 
partially  attained  its  original  object,  for  orders  were  actually  sent  to 
Marshal  Saxe  from  Paris,  directing  him  to  despatch  troops  to 
Brittany.  These  did  not,  however,  reach  him  until  he  had  so  well 
established  his  position  in  Flanders  as  to  be  well  able  to  afford  to 
weaken  himself. 

At  the  time  of  the  commencement  of  the  active  alliance  between 
the  French  and  Spaniards,  M.  La  Bourdounais,  governor  of  the  Isle 
of  France,  happened  to  be  at  Versailles.  He  was  a  most  far-sighted 
administrator  and  capable  soldier,  and,  had  his  advice  been  followed, 
the  fate  of  India  might  have  been  very  different  from  what  it  has 
been.  He  advised  his  Government  to  send  a  strong  squadron  to  the 
Indian  seas,  so  as  to  be  ready  for  all  eventualities.  A  squadron  of 
five  sail  of  the  line  was  accordingly  collected,  and  command  of  it 
was  entrusted  to  La  Bourdonnais  himself.  He  was  given  great 
powers  over  the  officers  of  the  French  East  India  Company  in 
India  ;  and  the  Company  became  anxious  concerning  its  rights  and 
privileges  as  soon  as  he  had  sailed.  The  directors  persuaded  the 
French  Ministry  that  hostilities  in  India  were  not  likely,  and  that, 
the  representatives  of  the  two  countries  there  being  exclusively 
traders,  it  was  unwise  in  the  highest  degree  to  provoke  ill-will  where 
neutrality  would,  in  all  probability,  be  observed  if  no  aggressive 
measures  were  taken.  The  squadron  was  accordingly  recalled  ;  but 
La  Bourdonnais  himself  proceeded,  and,  with  the  slender  resources 
he  possessed,  he  assembled  a  motley  squadron,  which  included  only 
one  king's  ship,  the  Achille,  70.  With  her  and  seven  other  vessels, 
armed  merchantmen,  he  sailed  for  the  coast  of  Coromandel. 

Commodore  Curtis  Barnet,  who  had  gone  to  Madras  in  the 
beginning  of  1746,  would  have  been  a  worthy  opponent  even  for  so 
great  a  man  as  La  Bourdonnais ;  and  he  was  preparing  to  take 
active  measures  against  the  French,  when,  on  April  29th,  he  died. 
His  successor,  Commodore  Edward  Peyton,  was  apparently  a  less 
energetic  and  capable  officer.  He  was  cruising  between  Fort  St. 
David  and  Negapatam  when,  on  June  25th,  he  sighted  the  French 


120 


MAJOR    OPERATIONS,   1714-1762. 


[1746. 


squadron.1  M.  La  Bourdoimais,  though  conscious  that  his  ships  in 
strength  of  armament  and  in  discipline  were  very  inferior  to  the 
British,  decided  to  utilise  the  only  superiority  which  he  possessed, 
the  superiority  in  men,  and  to  attempt  to  board.  During  the  earlier 
part  of  the  day  there  was  little  breeze ;  and  Peyton,  who  probably 
grasped  the  idea  of  the  French  admiral,  kept  as  near  the  wind 
as  possible,  so  that  the  two  fleets  were  unable  to  come  to  close 
action.  Not  until  four  in  the  afternoon  did  they  begin  to  engage ; 
and  even  then  the  firing  was  maintained  at  such  a  distance  that 
little  damage  was  done  to  either  side.  Peyton  might  have  an- 
nihilated his  foe  had  he  ventured  sufficiently  close  to  take  full 
advantage  of  the  stouter  scantling  of  his  ships,  and  of  the  heavier 
guns  which  they  carried.  But  he  did  not  attack  with  dash  ;  and  at 
dusk  the  action  ceased,  the  British  having  lost  fourteen  men  killed 
and  forty-six  wounded,  and  the  enemy  twenty-seven  killed  and  fifty- 
three  wounded.  The  British  vessel  which  suffered  chiefly  was  the 
Medway's  Prize.  On  the  other  side,  the  Inmduirc  was  so  badly 
mauled  that,  immediately  after  the  action,  La  Bourdomiais  had  to 
order  her  away  to  repair.  Peyton's  behaviour  gave  great  umbrage 
to  the  East  India  Company  ;  but  no  one  ever  brought  any  specific 
charge  against  the  commodore.  Commodore  Thomas  Griffin  (1) 
afterwards  superseded  him,  put  him  under  arrest,  and  sent  him 
home ;  but  the  matter  went  no  further. 

1  SQUADRONS  OF  COMMODORE  PKYTOX  ANI>  M.  LA  BOURDOXITAIS  IN 
THE  ACTION  OK  JUNE  2orni,  1746. 


BRITISH. 

FRENCH 

Ships.                  ciuns. 

Giiuman 

li-rs. 

Ships                 piercptl 
for. 

Giuis 
mounted. 

Medico  y       .      .60 

(Commod.  Edward  Peyton. 
\Capt.  Hi'iirv  Rosewell. 

Adi  Hie      .      . 
l>uc  <P  Orleans 

74 
56 

60 
26 

Preston  ...      50 

George,  Earl  of  Xorthesk. 

Bourbon  . 

56 

36 

Winchester  .      .      50 

Lord  Thomas  Bertie. 

Neptune  . 

54 

34 

Harwich       .      .      50 

Philip  Carteret(l). 

Phenix 

54 

34 

Medway's  Prize       40 

Thomas  G 

rifliu(2),  actg. 

St.  Louis.      . 

44 

30 

Lively    ...      20 

(           Nathaniel 
I               actg. 

Stephens, 

Lys     . 
InsuJaire 

40 
30 

34 
28 

'270 

282 

Some  French  accounts  mention  another  armed  vessel,  the  Itenominee,  28,  as  having 
been  with  La  Bourdonnais,  in  addition  to  the  ships  named  above.  The  British  official 
account  also  mentions  a  ninth  ship,  name  unknown,  mounting,  however,  20  guns  only. 
All  the  French  ships,  however,  except  the  Achille,  were  merely  improvised  men-of-war, 
and  were,  in  that  respect,  greatly  inferior  to  the  British. 


1746.]  PEYTON'S  INEFFICIENCY.  121 

The  activity  of  La  Bourdonnais  was  hampered  by  the  jealousy 
of  M.  Dupleix,  Governor  in  India  for  the  French  East  India 
Company.  Dissensions  continually  arose  owing  to  the  natural 
complications  of  authority ;  and  the  naval  commander  could  obtain 
scarcely  any  help  from  the  civil  one.  La  Bourdonuais,  neverthe- 
less, made  shift  to  refit,  and  on  July  24th  sailed  again  from 
Pondicherry  and  worked  to  the  southward.  On  August  6th  he 
sighted  the  British  squadron,  which  was  returning  from  Trincomale, 
where  it  had  refitted.  Peyton  avoided  action,  and,  after  three  days 
of  futile  manoeuvres,  made  sail  and  disappeared.  This  conduct 
encouraged  La  Bourdonnais  to  plan  an  attack  upon  Madras.  He 
was  taken  ill  and  had  to  remain  at  Pondicherry  ;  but  his  squadron 
appeared  before  the  place  on  August  15th l  and  bombarded  it.  The 
guns,  however,  produced  little  effect  upon  the  town ;  nor  did  the 
French  succeed  in  an  attempt  to  capture  the  Princess  Mary,  East 
Indiaman,  which  lay  in  the  road. 

One  of  the  objects  of  the  British  squadron  in  the  East  Indies 
was  of  course  to  be  a  protection  to  British  settlements  and  British 
trade;  yet  it  did  not  proceed  to  the  succour  of  Madras.  Peyton, 
lying  in  Pulicat  Koad,  thirty  miles  to  the  northward,  heard,  on 
August  25th,  of  what  had  happened  in  the  previous  week ;  but, 
instead  of  going  to  the  rescue  of  the  threatened  town,  he  went 
to  Bengal,  his  excuse  being  that  the  Medway's  Prize  was  very  leaky 
and  needed  repairs.  La  Bourdonnais  was  thus  induced  to  proceed. 
On  September  3rd  his  squadron  disembarked  troops,  and  on  the 
7th  a  bombardment  of  Madras  by  land  and  sea  was  begun.  On 
the  10th  the  place  capitulated,  upon  the  understanding  that  it 
should  subsequently  be  ransomed.  On  September  27th,  while  still 
before  Madras,  La  Bourdonnais  was  reinforced  by  three  ships  of 
the  line  from  Europe,  the  Centaure,  74,  Mars,  56,  and  BriUant,  50. 
His  operations  were  still  hampered  by  the  interference  of  Dupleix ; 
but,  on  October  1st,  he  was  able  to  send  off  two  of  his  vessels  with 
booty,  etc.,  to  Pondicherry.  It  was  fortunate  that  he  did  so,  for 
otherwise  he  would  probably  have  lost  almost  all  his  squadron.  On 
the  night  of  October  2nd  there  was  a  great  storm  ;  and,  in  the  course 
of  it,  the  Due  d' Orleans,  Plienix,  and  Lys  foundered,  and  about 
twelve  hundred  men  were  lost  with  them.  Two  prizes,  the  Mermaid 
and  the  Advice,  shared  the  same  fate,  and  the  flagship,  Acliille,  and 

1  An  account  issued  by  the  Hon.  E.  I.  C.  says  that  the  enemy  appeared  at  Madras 
on  August  10th. 


122  MAJOR    OPERATIONS,   1714-1762.  [1746. 

two  other  vessels  were  dismasted.  In  fact,  every  craft  in  the  road- 
stead either  sank  or  suffered  most  severely. 

In  regard  to  the  promised  ransom  of  the  town,  La  Bourdonnais 
behaved  throughout  like  a  man  of  honour ;  but  Dupleix  seems 
never  to  have  intended  that  the  conditions  should  be  carried  out ; 
and  when  La  Bourdonnais  had  gone  to  Mauritius,  on  his  way  home 
to  France,  Dupleix,  to  the  astonishment  of  many  even  of  his  own 
officers,  caused  the  treaty  to  be  declared  void.  The  arrival  of 
Commodore  Thomas  Griffin  (1)  from  England  soon  afterwards,  com- 
pelled the  French  to  desist  from  a  projected  attack  011  Fort  St. 
David,  and  to  withdraw  nearly  all  their  forces  to  Pondicherry. 

On  the  Leeward  Islands'  station,  Vice-Admiral  Isaac  Townsend 
commanded  at  the  beginning  of  174(5 ;  but  very  early  in  the  year 
he  was  ordered  to  proceed  with  the  greater  part  of  his  squadron 
to  Louislxmrg.  He  sailed  from  St.  Kitt's  in  January,  and,  on  his 
way,  met  with  so  violent  a  storm  that  all  his  ships  except  two, 
the  Princcua  and  Ipsicich,  were  obliged  to  return,  and  those  two, 
terribly  disabled,  had  to  bear  away  for  England.  The  Ipswich, 
which  reached  Plymouth  on  April  ±1\\A,  was  only  saved  by  a 
most  brilliant  display  of  seamanship,  after  her  crew  had  suffered 
great  hardships. 

When  Vice-Admiral  Townsend  had  refitted,  he  again  sailed  for 
Louisbourg,  leaving  Commodore  the  Hon.  Fitzroy  Henry  Lee  in 
command  in  the  West  Indies.  Lee  was  ultimately  superseded  by 
Commodore  the  Hon.  Edward  Legge.  Both  Lee  and  Legge  were 
unfortunate  in  their  attempts  to  intercept  French  convoys,  several 
of  which,  under  the  care  of  M.  de  Connans,  escaped  them.  On 
one  occasion,  as  will  be  seen,  Conflans  would  have  come  off  badly 
but  for  the  cowardice  of  Commodore  Cornelius  Mitchell.  On 
another  occasion,  he  fell  in  with  the  British  Leeward  Islands' 
convoy,  escorted  by  the  Severn,  50,  Captain  William  Lisle,  and 
the  Woolwich,  50,  Captain  Joseph  Lingen.  Lisle,  who  was  the 
senior  officer,  ordered  the  convoy  to  disperse  and  each  vessel  to 
shift  for  herself.  Conflans,  in  the  Terrible,  74,  with  another  ship 
of  the  line,  chased  him,  and  after  three  hours'  action,  obliged  the 
Severn  to  strike  ;  but  the  Woolwich  got  away,  and  none  of  the 
convoy  were  taken.  Lisle's  action  was  considered  so  creditable 
tbat,  after  his  exchange,  he  was  at  once  given  the  command  of 
a  larger  ship,  the  Vigilant,  64. 

At  Jamaica,  Vice-Admiral  Davers  commanded  until  his  death ; 


1746.]  MITCHELL'S  INEFFICIENCY.  123 

but,  being  very  ill  with  gout,  had  to  depute  Captain  Cornelius 
Mitchell  to  go  in  search  of  M.  de  Conflans,  who  was  expected  with 
a  convoy  of  ninety  merchantmen  at  Cape  Francois.  Mitchell  had 
four  sail  of  the  line,  a  frigate,  and  a  sloop 1 ;  Conflans  had  but  four 
vessels  in  all 2 ;  and  Mitchell's  superiority,  though  small,  should, 
perhaps,  have  sufficed.  Mitchell  sighted  the  convoy  on  August  3rd 
off  Cape  St.  Nicolas  ;  but,  as  promptly  as  possible,  he  ordered  his 
ships  to  close,  and  held  a  council  of  war.  It  was  thereupon  resolved 
to  wait  till  daylight  before  bearing  down  upon  the  enemy ;  but,  on 
the  following  morning,  Mitchell  was  so  backward  in  bringing  on 
an  engagement,  in  spite  of  the  evident  willingness  of  Conflans,  that 
at  4  P.M.  the  squadrons  had  not  exchanged  a  shot.  At  that  hour 
everything  was  in  his  favour,  and  the  breeze  was  fair ;  but  he 
hauled  to  the  wind  and  shortened  sail.  The  enemy,  after  he  had 
recovered  from  his  astonishment,  gave  chase ;  and  his  headmost 
ship  overhauled  the  Lcno.r,  (54,  at  about  8  P.M.,  and  fought  her, 
without  result,  for  an  hour  and  a  half.  Mitchell  that  night  ordered 
his  ships  to  proceed  without  lights,  and  laid  his  course  for  Jamaica, 
where,  on  October  16th,  owing  to  the  death  of  Yice-Admiral  Davi-rs, 
the  command  devolved  upon  him.  His  behaviour  having  been 
represented  to  the  Admiralty,  he  was  superseded,  and  was  tried 
at  Jamaica  by  court-martial  on  January  28th  following.  The  court 
convicted  him  of  cowardice  and  neglect  of  duty ;  but  less  severe 
than  many  of  the  naval  courts  of  that  period,  sentenced  him  only 
to  be  mulcted  of  five  years'  pay,  adjudging  him  at  the  same  time 
to  be  incapable  of  again  serving  in  the  Navy. 

In  the  Mediterranean  during  1746  a  large  fleet,  under  Yice- 
Admiral  Henry  Medley  and  Kear-Admiral  the  Hon.  John  Byng, 
offered  much  assistance  to  the  Austrians  and  their  allies,  and  co- 
operated with  success  with  the  army  which,  under  General  Browne, 
crossed  the  Var  on  December  1st.  A  detachment  of  small  vessels 
under  Captain  Hugh  Forbes,  of  the  Plia-nix,  20,  and  Commander 
William  Martin  (2),  of  the  Terrible,  6,  lent  valuable  aid  to  the 
troops.  Medley  also  blockaded  Antibes,  assisted  in  the  capture  of 
Ste.  Marguerite,  and  lent  help  to  the  insurgents  in  Corsica. 

The  year  1747  was  upon  the  whole  very  successful  for  Great 

Straford,    60,   Capt.   Cornelius    Mitchell;    Lenox,   64,   Capt,   Peter   Lawrence; 
Plymouth,  60,  Capt.  Digby   Dent   (2) ;    Worcester,  60,  Capt,  Thomas   Andrews  (2) ; 
Mi/ford,  44,  Capt.  Edward  Rich;  and  Drake,  14,  Commander  Edward  Clark  (1). 
2  Terrible,  74 ;  Neptune,  74 ;  Alcion,  50  ;  and  Gloire,  40. 


124  MAJOR    OPERATIONS,   1714-1762.  [1747. 

Britain,  although  it  witnessed  some  check  to  the  cause  of  Britain's 
allies  in  the  Mediterranean.  The  Austrians  were  obliged,  by 
Marshal  Belleisle,  to  recross  the  Var;  and  the  Genoese  succeeded 
in  defeating  the  patriots  in  Corsica,  and  in  driving  them  to  the 
interior  of  the  island.  On  the  other  hand,  Vice-Admiral  Medley 
not  only  maintained  the  blockade  of  Cartagena,  but  also  intercepted 
a  French  expedition  from  Toulon  to  Genoa.  Medley  died  in  Vado 
Bay  on  August  5th,  when  Eear-Admiral  the  Hon.  John  Byng 
succeeded  to  the  command. 

In  the  East  Indies,  Eear-Admiral  Thomas  Griffin  kept  M. 
Dupleix  on  the  defensive,  and,  at  Madras,  took  and  burnt  the 
Neptune,  34,  which  had  been  left  there  by  M.  La  Bourdonnais. 
At  Jamaica,  Captain  Digby  Dent  (2)  commanded  until  the  arrival  of 
Eear-Admiral  Charles  Knowles.  On  the  Leeward  Islands'  station, 
Commodore  the  Hon.  Edward  Legge  commanded  until  his  death 
on  September  9th,  1747,  and  was  succeeded  by  Captain  George 
Pocock.  On  each  of  these  stations  the  cruisers  were  successful  as 
well  as  active,  but  all  the  great  naval  transactions  of  the  year 
happened  on  the  Atlantic  coasts  of  Europe. 

France  fitted  out  two  considerable  squadrons ;  one  under  the 
Marquis  de  La  Jonquiere,  intended  for  the  recovery  of  Cape  Breton, 
and  the  other  under  M.  Grou  de  St.  Georges,  of  the  French  East 
India  Company's  service,  for  co-operation  in  the  conquest  of  British 
settlements  on  the  coast  of  Coromandel.  It  was  arranged  that,  in 
order  the  more  surely  to  escape  the  dangers  presented  by  British 
naval  superiority  in  the  home  seas,  the  two  squadrons  should  depart 
from  France  together  and  proceed  for  some  distance  in  company. 

The  projects  of  the  French  were  known  in  England ;  and  a 
squadron,  under  Vice-Admiral  George  Alison  and  Eear-Admiral  Peter 
Warren,  was  specially  fitted  out  to  checkmate  them.  The  forces 
which  were  ultimately  opposed  one  to  the  other  are  set  forth  in  the 
note1  (p.  125).  The  French  had  with  them  a  convoy,  which  brought 
the  total  number  of  their  sail  up  to  thirty-eight.  M.  de  St.  Georges 
left  Groix  in  March,  but,  after  suffering  some  losses  from  British 
cruisers  and  from  very  bad  weather,  had  to  put  into  the  road  of 
Isle  d'Aix.  La  Jonquiere  there  joined  him.  and  the  two  finally  sailed 
on  April  29th.  Anson  and  Warren  had  left  England  on  April  9th 
and  had  proceeded  off  Cape  Finisterre,  where,  on  May  3rd,  the  Cape 
bearing  S.E.,  distant  twenty-four  leagues,  they  sighted  the  French. 
La  Jonquiere  thereupon  caused  twelve  of  his  best  ships  to  shorten 


1747.] 


ANSON  AND    DE  LA   JONQUIERE. 


125 


sail  and  form  a  line  of  battle  ahead,  while  the  rest  stretched  to  the 
westward  and  crowded  every  possible  stitch  of  canvas.  Anson  also 
made  signal  for  a  line  of  battle,  believing  apparently  that  he  was  in 
the  presence  of  a  more  formidable  squadron  than  was  really  before 
him ;  but,  at  Warren's  instance,  he  substituted  the  signal  for  a 
general  chase.  La  Jonquiere  was  but  ill-supported.  Several  of  the 
French  East  India  ships,  especially  the  Vigilant  and  Modeste,  and 
later  the  Thetis  and  Apollon,  looked  to  nothing  but  the  idea  of  saving 
themselves.  It  is  useless  to  examine  the  tactical  details  of  an  action 
of  this  kind.  Suffice  to  say,  that,  after  a  running  fight  lasting  from 
4  to  7  P.M.,  in  which  several  of  the  French  captains  behaved  with 
great  courage  and  others  conducted  themselves  with  equal  cowardice, 
all  the  ships  which  had  remained  in  the  French  line  struck.  At 
7  P.M.  Anson  brought  to,  and  detached  the  Monmouth,  Yarmouth 
and  Nottingham  in  pursuit  of  the  convoy,  which  then  bore  W.  by 
S.W.,  distant  about  five  leagues,  and  which  had  been  followed  and 
observed  during  the  action  by  the  Falcon.  These  ships  captured  the 
Vigilant,  the  Modeste  and  the  Dartmouth,  once  a  British  privateer, 
together  with  six  of  the  convoy.  Night  saved  the  rest. 


1   ACTION    BETWEEN    YtCE-AllMIK.U,    AXSOX    ANIl    M.    DE    L.V    JoXyUlEHE, 

MAY  .'{KIJ,   1747. 

The  account  of  the  action,  as  well  us  the  following  list,  is  based  upon  the  British  and 
French  dispatches,  and  especially  upon  the  papers  of  La  Jonquiere  in  the  Archives 
de  la  Marine,  and  upon  the  report  of  La  Galernerie. 


BRITISH. 

ships. 

FKKSCH. 

Guns.              Commanders. 

Ships.              1  G 

uus.              Commanders. 

Prince  George  . 

i  Vice-  Admiral      George 
90      J     Anson. 
fCapt.  John  Bentley. 

niamant  -    . 
\'igilant-z  .      . 

30        Capt.  dc  Hwquart. 
30                 Larr. 
'20                  \'auneulon. 

I  Rear-  Admiral         Peter 

Chtmi'tie  3     . 

36                            ? 

Devonshire  1 

66      <.     Warren. 

Jtubis  -  (en  Miit--) 

52                  Mat-artv. 

leapt.  Temple  West. 

Jason  2    .      .      . 

50                  Beccart. 

JVamur  1. 

-,      (     „     Hon.  Edward  Bos- 
'      {              cawen. 

Svrieux  - 

f  ,       (M    le  La  Jonquiere, 
:      (     d'Aubigny. 

Capt. 

Monmouth    . 

64            ,,     Ht-nry  Harrison. 

Invincible-  . 

74        Capt.  Cirou  de  St.  Georges. 

Prince  Frederick 

64           „     Harry  Norris. 

Apollon  23.      . 

30                  Nogl. 

Yarmouth  1 

64           „    Piercy  Brett  (1). 

Tit<>'tis23       .      . 

22                  Massou. 

Princess  Louisa 

60           „     Charles  Watson. 

Mrn1efte  "  3    . 

1%                 Thiercelin. 

Nottingham 

60           „    Philip  de  Saumarez. 

Gloirc-  . 

40                de  Saliez. 

Defiance  1     . 

6U           ,,     Thomas  Grenville. 

Pembroke  '  . 
Windsor  1    . 

60           „     Tbomas  Fincher. 
60           ,,     Thomas  Han  way. 

Emeraude*  . 

.      (     ,,     de  la  Joiinuiere  dc 
Taffanel. 

Centurion*  . 

50           ,.    Peter  Deuis. 

Dartmouth?  *    . 

18           „             ? 

Falkland     .     .     . 

.      (    „     Hloomfleld  Barra- 
dell. 

Hristoli       ... 

,n      (    „    Hon.         William 
1     \             Montagu. 

Ambuscade  .     .     . 

40           „    John  Montagu. 

falcon    .... 

I0      (Commander       Richard 

(1     Gwynn. 

Vulcan  (flreship)   . 

/Commander       William 
I     Pettigrew. 

1  These  ships  only  were  engaged. 

2  Taien. 


3  These  ships  belonged  to  the  French  East  India  Company. 
«  With  the  convoy  but  not  in  line  of  battle. 


126  MAJOR    OPERATIONS,    1714-1762.  [1747. 

The  battle,  considering  its  nature,  was  a  costly  one.  The  French 
lost  about  700  killed  and  wounded,  and  the  British,  520.  Among  the 
French  officers  killed  was  Captain  de  Saliez,  and  among  those 
wounded  were  La  Jonquiere  himself  and  d'Aubigny,  his  flag  captain. 
On  the  British  side  Captain  Thomas  Grenville,  of  the  Defiance, 
was  killed,  and  Captain  Boscawen,  of  the  Namur,  wounded.  The 
victors  found  specie  to  the  value  of  £300,000  on  board  the  prizes. 
For  this  service  Anson  was  created  a  peer,  and  Warren,  a  K.B.  All 
the  men-of-war  taken,  and  also  the  East  Indiamaii  Thetis,  were 
purchased  into  the  Koyal  Navy.  The  name  of  the  Serieux  was 
changed  to  Intrepid,  and  that  of  the  Diamant  to  Isis. 

The  victory  was  valuable  if  not  exactly  brilliant.  Commenting 
upon  it,  and  upon  the  other  great  action  of  the  year,  Captain  Mahan 
says : 

"Two  encounters  between  English  and  French  squadrons  happened  during  the  year 
1747,  completing  the  destruction  of  the  French  righting  navy.  In  hoth  cases  the 
English  were  decidedly  superior,  and  though  there  was  given  opportunity  for  some 
brilliant  fighting  by  particular  captains,  and  for  the  display  of  heroic  endurance  on  the 
part  of  the  French,  greatly  outnumbered,  but  resisting  to  the  last,  only  one  tactical 
lesson  is  afforded.  This  lesson  is  that,  when  the  enemy,  either  as  the  result  of  battle, 
or  from  original  inequality,  is  greatly  inferior  in  force,  obliged  to  rly  without  standing 
on  the  order  of  his  Hying,  the  regard  otherwise  due  to  order  must  be,  in  a  measure  at 
least,  dismissed,  and  a  general  chase  ordered."  .  ..."  In  both  cases,  the  signal  was 
made  for  a  general  chase,  and  the  action  which  resulted  was  a  melee.  There  was  no 
opportunity  for  anything  else ;  the  one  thing  necessary  was  to  overtake  the  running 
enemy,  and  that  could  only  certainly  be  done  by  letting  the  fastest  or  best-situated 
ships  get  ahead,  sure  that  the  speed  of  the  fattest  pursuers  is  better  than  that  of  the 
slowest  of  the  pursued,  and  that,  therefore,  either  the  latter  must  be  abandoned,  or  the 
whole  force  brought  to  bay." 

It  would  appear  that  in  1747  the  Admiralty  had  begun  to  be 
better  served  by  its  intelligence  officers  than  it  had  been  earlier  in 
the  war ;  and  it  is  not  the  least  merit  of  the  administration  that,  on 
several  important  occasions,  it  was  able  to  bring  superior  forces  to 
bear  upon  its  enemies.  Alison's  success  was  one  result  of  this  fore- 
knowledge ;  the  success  of  Captain  Thomas  Fox,  to  be  noted  in  the 
next  chapter,  was  another ;  that  of  Bear-Admiral  Edward  Hawke, 
now  to  be  recounted,  was  a  third. 

Information  was  received  in  England  that  France  was  collecting 
in  Basque  Road  a  huge  convoy  for  the  West  Indies,  and  that  a 
squadron  of  men-of-war  had  sailed  from  Brest  to  pick  it  up  and 
escort  it  to  its  destination.  Thereupon  a  squadron,  under  Hawke, 
was  despatched  from  Plymouth  to  intercept  it.  It  left  Plymouth 
Sound  on  August  9th.  The  French  left  Isle  d'Aix  on  October  6th  ; 


1747.] 


HAWKE  AND   DE  UETENDUERE. 


127 


and,  on  October  14th  at  7  A.M.,  were  sighted  in  lat.  47°  49'  N.  and 
long.  1°  2'  W.,  off  Finisterre.  Hawke  made  signal  to  chase,  but  at 
8  A.M.,  seeing  the  enemy's  ships  to  be  very  numerous,  many  of  them 
being  large,  he,  as  a  measure  of  prudence,  formed  a  line  of  battle 


COMMEMORATIVE    MEDAL    OK    AXSOX's    VICTORY,    1747,    AND    OF    HIS 
CIRCUMNAVIGATION    OF    THE    WORLD,    1740-44. 

(From  an  original  kindly  lent  bij  H.S.H.  Ciqitain  Prince  Lwiix  «/  Sattfiiberii,  ll.X.i 

ahead.1  There  were  in  fact  no  fewer  than  252  merchantmen  with 
the  French  squadron.  Commodore  de  1'Etenduere,  who  at  first 
mistook  the  British  for  part  of  his  own  convoy,  no  sooner  discovered 
his  mistake  than  he  ordered  the  merchantmen  to  make  the  best  of 
their  way  under  the  care  of  the  Content,  64,  and  himself  also  formed 
a  line  of  battle  ahead.  These  manoeuvres  informed  Hawke  as  to 

1  ACTION  BETWEEN  REAR-ADMIRAL  HAWKE  AND  M.  DE  L'ETENDUEHE, 
OCTOBER  14™,  1747. 


BRITISH. 

FRENCH. 

Ships. 

G  uns,             Commaui  lets. 

Ships.                Guiis.              Commanders. 

i  Rear-  Admiral    Edward 

!M.     des     Herbiers    d«- 

Devonshire  . 

66     {    Hawke. 
(Capt.  John  Moore  (l). 

Tvnnant. 

; 

'Etendtiere,         Cliet" 
'Escadre. 

Edinburgh,  . 

70 

,    Thomas  Cotes. 

Intrepide 

.      .        74 

de  Vaudreuil. 

Yarmouth    . 

64 

.    Charles  Saunders. 

Trident  i. 

.      .         64 

U'AmbUmont. 

Afonmouth    . 

64 

,     Heiiry  Harrison. 

Terrible  1 

.      .         74 

du  Guay. 

Princess  Louisa 
Windsor.     .     . 

60 
60 

,     Charles  Watson. 
,    Thomas  Han  way. 

Monarque  l 
Severji  ^  . 

.      .         74 
.      .         56 

de  La  Bedoyere. 
du  Kouret. 

t-0 

,    Arthur  Scott. 

.      .         64 

de  Vifruault. 

Tilbury  . 

60 

,     Robert  Harlaiid(  2). 

Neptune  l 

.      .         74 

de  Fromentieres. 

Nottingham 
Defiance 

60 
60 

,     Philip  de  Saumarez. 
,     John  Beutley. 

Castor  t  . 

.      .         26 

d'Ossonville. 

Eagle      .     .     . 

60      { 

,    George      Brydges 
Rodiiey. 

Content? 

.      .         64 

? 

Gloucester    . 

50 

,    Philip  Imrell(l). 

Portland     .     . 

.60 

,    Charles  Stevens. 

and  some  frigates. 

1  Takeu.                                                              2  With  the  convoy. 

128  MAJOR    OPERATIONS,   1714-1762.  [1747. 

the  nature  of  the  force  before  him,  and  induced  him  to  haul  down 
the  signal  for  the  line  and  to  again  make  that  for  a  general  chase, 
following  it  half-an-hour  later  with  the  signal  to  engage.  A  running 
fight  resulted.  The  French  behaved  with  great  spirit  but  were  over- 
powered by  sheer  weight  of  numbers.  They  had  in  line  but  eight 
ships  and  of  these  six  were  taken.  .Towards  night  the  Intrepide  and 
Tonnant,  finding  that  the  day  was  lost,  set  all  sail  with  a  view 
to  escaping.  Their  intention  was  perceived  by  the  Yarmouth, 
Nottingham  and  Eagle,  which,  at  the  instance  of  Captain  Saunders 
of  the  Yarmouth,  and  on  their  own  responsibility,  followed.  These 
ships  engaged  the  fugitives  for  an  hour,  in  the  course  of  which 
Captain  Saumarez  :  of  the  Nottingham  fell.  The  two  French  ships, 
though  very  badly  damaged,  succeeded  in  getting  into  Brest.  At 
dark  Hawke  brought  his  ships  to  ;  and  in  the  morning,  at  a  council 
of  war,  it  was  decided,  in  view  of  the  mauled  condition  of  the  British 
squadron,  not  to  pursue  the  convoy.  The  Weazel,  sloop,  was, 
however,  despatched  to  the  West  Indies,  to  apprise  Commodore 
Pocock  of  the  approach  of  the  French  ;  and  thanks  to  this  precaution, 
manj*  of  their  ships  were  ultimately  taken.2 

The  French  loss  in  the  action  was  about  KOO  killed  and  wounded, 
among  the  former  being  Captain  de  Fromentieres  of  the  Neptune. 
The  British  lost  154  killed,  including  Captain  Saumarez,  and  558 
wounded.  As  nearly  all  the  vessels  captured  had  been  dismasted, 
it  took  some  time  to  refit  them ;  but  011  October  31st,  Hawke  had 
the  satisfaction  of  carrying  them  and  his  squadron  into  Portsmouth. 
A  little  later  he  was  made  a  K.B.  for  his  services.  All  the  prizes, 
except  the  Neptune,  were  purchased  into  the  lioyal  Navy. 

Hawke  in  his  despatch  had  occasion  to  complain  of  Captain 
Thomas  Fox  of  the  Kent,  who,  in  the  action,  when  ordered  by 
signal  to  make  sail  ahead  after  the  Tonnant  and  to  engage  her,  had 
failed  to  obey.  Captain  Fox  was  consequently  tried  by  court-martial 
at  Portsmouth  on  November  '25th  upon  the  charge  that  "  he  did  not 
come  properly  into  the  fight,  nor  do  his  utmost  to  distress  and 
damage  the  enemy,  nor  assist  his  Majesty's  ships  which  did." 
Fox's  personal  courage  was  not  impeached ;  and  there  is  no  doubt 

1  Philip  Saumarez,  or  de  Saumarez.      Born,  1710.      Commander,  1741.     Captain, 
1743.    Killed,  as  above,  October  14th,  1747.     He  had  served  with  Anson  in  his  voyage 
round  the  world,  and  had  distinguished  himself  greatly,  when  already  commanding 
the  Nottingham,  by  his  capture  of  the  Mars,  64,  in  1746.     A  monument  to  him  is  in 
Westminster  Abbey. 

2  See  next  chapter. 


1747.]  CRITICISM   OF   THE  ACTION.  129 

that  his  failure  to  obey  orders  was  chiefly  due  to  the  faulty  system 
of  signals  then  in  use.  Both  his  first  lieutenant  and  his  master 
mistook  the  signal  for  close  action  for  one  to  proceed  to  the  assist- 
ance of  the  Admiral ;  and  he  acted  accordingly.  The  trial  lasted 
until  December  22nd,  when  the  court  came  to  the  conclusion  that 
"  he  had  been  guilty  of  backing  his  mizeii-top-sail  and  leaving  the 
Tonnant,  contrary  to  the  10th  and  llth  Articles  of  War."  He  was 
acquitted  of  cowardice,  but,  because  he  had  paid  too  much  regard  to 
the  advice  of  his  officers,  contrary  to  his  own  better  judgment,  he  was 
sentenced  to  be  dismissed  from  the  command  of  the  Kent.  Captain 
Pox,  whose  post-captain's  commission  dated  from  August  6th,  1737, 
and  who  always  had  been  a  good  officer,  was  never  again  employed, 
but  was  superannuated  as  a  Rear-Admiral  in  1749.  He  died 
in  1763. 

Criticising  the  battle,  Captain  Mahan  l  says  : 

"If  ...  Hawke  showed  in  his  attack  the  judgment  and  dash  which  always 
distinguished  that  remarkable  officer,  it  may  be  claimed  for  Commodore  I'Etenduere  that 
fortune,  in  assigning  him  the  glorious  disadvantage  of  numbers,  gave  him  also  the 
leading  part  in  the  drama,  and  that  he  failed  nobly." 

Troude,  the  French  naval  critic,  remarks  -  of  de  1'Etenduere  that : 

"  he  defended  his  convoy  as  on  shore  a  position  is  defended,  when  the  aim  is  to  save 
an  army  corps,  or  to  assure  an  evolution.  He  gave  himself  to  be  crushed.  After  an 
action  that  lasted  from  midday  to  8  P.M.,  the  convoy  was  saved,  thanks  to  the  obstinacy 
of  the  defence,  and  250  ships  were  secured  to  their  owners  by  the  devotion  of  1'Eten- 
duere, and  of  the  captains  under  his  orders.  This  devotion  cannot  be  questioned,  for 
elzht  ships  had  but  few  chances  of  surviving  an  action  with  fourteen ;  and  not  only  did 
tlie  commander  of  the  eight  accept  an  action  which  he  might  possibly  have  avoided, 
but  also  he  knew  how  to  inspire  his  lieutenants  with  trust  in  himself,  for  all  supported 
the  fight  with  honour,  and  yielded  at  last,  showing  the  most  indisputable  proofs  of  their 
fine  and  energetic  defence." 

"The  whole  affair,"  concludes  Mahan,  "as  conducted  on  both  fides,  affords  an 
admirable  study  of  how  to  follow  up  an  advantage,  original  or  secured,  and  of  the 
results  that  may  be  obtained  by  a  gallant,  even  hopeless  defence,  for  the  furtherance  of 
a  particular  object." 

The  squadron  of  Anson  and  Warren,  as  well  as  that  of  Hawke, 
cruised  in  the  Channel  and  Bay  after  the  actions  above  narrated, 
and  took  numerous  prizes ;  but  an  account  of  such  smaller  engage- 
ments as  were  fought  in  the  course  of  the  year  may  be  reserved  for 
the  next  chapter. 

The  war  had  been  very  costly  to  France.     The  French  Navy  had 

1  '  Influence  of  Sea  Power,'  272. 

2  '  Bats.  Xav.  de  la  France.' 

VOL.    III.  K 


130  MAJOR    OPERATIONS,   1714-1762.  [1748. 

been  almost  crushed,  and  French  maritime  trade  had  heen  almost 
ruined,  though  the  armies  of  France  had  been  successful  on  land. 
But  all  the  Powers  engaged  were  to  some  extent  weary  of  the 
conflict ;  and  it  was  therefore  felt,  when  a  Congress  met  at  Aix-la- 
Chapelle  to  consider  the  terms  of  an  arrangement,  that  there  was 
every  prospect  of  the  conclusion  of  a  satisfactory  peace.  In  the 
meantime,  Great  Britain  did  not  relinquish,  nor  even  diminish,  her 
preparations  to  continue  the  struggle.  In  1748,  as  in  previous  years, 
all  ships,  as  they  became  ready  for  sea,  were  put  into  commission. 
Squadrons  were  sent  to  cruise  at  various  times  in  home  waters, 
under  Vice-Admirals  Sir  Peter  Warren  and  Sir  Edward  Hawke,  and 
Rear-Admiral  William  Chambers.  Commodore  the  Hon.  George 
Townshend  watched  the  coast  of  Flanders  ;  Vice- Admiral  the  Hon. 
John  Byng  remained  in  the  Mediterranean  ;  and  in  the  West  Indies 
Rear-Admiral  Charles  Knowles  and  Commodore  George  Pocock,  let 
slip  no  opportunity  of  annoying  the  enemy. 

Rear-Admiral  the  Hon.  Edward  Boscawen  had  been  sent  out  in 
1747,  as  Commander-iii-Chief,  to  the  East  Indies,  and  had  taken 
with  him  reinforcements  to  the  station.  Before  his  arrival,  Rear- 
Admiral  Thomas  Griffin  (1)  had  received  three  additional  ships  from 
England,  so  that  his  squadron  consisted  of  three  (JO's,  three  50's, 
three  40's,  and  one  '20,  and  was  considerably  superior  to  the  French 
force  in  the  same  seas.  But  Mr.  Griffin  had  been  outwitted  and 
out-manoeuvred  by  the  French  comrnander-in-chief,  M.  Bouvet, 
who,  in  spite  of  him,  had  thrown  troops  into  Madras. 

The  French  ministry  was  warned  of  Boscawen's  departure  from 
England ;  and  M.  Dupleix,  being  advised  from  home,  took  such 
measures  as  he  could  to  meet  the  Bear-Admiral,  who  had  with  him 
six  ships  of  the  line  or  50's,  and  four  smaller  craft,  and  who 
convoyed  eleven  ships  of  the  East  India  Company  with  1500 
soldiers  on  board.  Boscawen  reached  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope  in 
March,  1748,  and  was  there  joined  by  six  Dutch  East  Indiamen, 
having  on  board  400  troops.  On  May  18th  he  sailed  again,  and  on 
June  23rd,  after  a  troublesome  voyage,  sighted  Mauritius,  which  he 
had  decided  to  make  an  attempt  upon.  The  island  had  been 
informed  by  Dupleix  of  its  danger,  and  was  to  some  extent  prepared, 
though  it  was  but  ill  garrisoned.  On  the  25th,  after  having 
reconnoitred  the  coast,  Boscawen  decided  to  abandon  the  project 
and  to  proceed  to  Coromandel.  Had  he  known  how  few  troops  were 
in  the  island,  he  would  certainly  have  persisted,  and  would  probably 


1748.] 


BOSCAWEN  IN   THE  EAST  INDIES. 


131 


have  been  successful ;  for  the  works,  though  strong,  could  not  be 
properly  manned.1 

The  Dutch  convoy  parted  company  at  Mauritius,  and  proceeded 
for  Batavia  ;  and  Boscawen,  on  June  27th,  sailed  for  Fort  St.  David 
(Cuddalore),  where  he  arrived  on  July  29th.  There  he  met  Eear- 
Admiral  Griffin,  who,  in  the  meantime,  had  been  promoted  to  be 
Vice- Admiral,  and  who  soon  afterwards  returned  to  England  by  way 
of  Trincomale  with  part  of  his  command. 

Besides  the  naval  force,  Boscawen  had  under  him  many 
armed  East  Indiamen,  and  3240  troops,  including  sepoys  but  not 
including  Marines.  Indeed,  he  was  m  a  position  to  dispose  of 
5220  men  to  act  on  shore  ;  and,  in  addition,  2000  native  auxiliary 
cavalry  were  placed  at  his  service  for  the  contemplated  siege  of 
Pondicherry,  whither  Boscawen  presently  proceeded.  Leaving 
Captain  William  Lisle  in  command  of  the  squadron,  he  landed  to 
direct  the  operations  on  shore.  Early  in  August  the  army  closed 
round  the  town,  which  was  closely  blockaded  from  seaward  by 
the  Exeter,  Chester,  Pembroke  and  Sicalloic.  An  assault  upon  one 
of  the  outlying  works  was  repulsed  with  loss  on  August  12th,  but  the 
siege  was  formally  begun  and  some  successes  were  gained.  The 
engineers  upon  whom  Boscawen  was  obliged  to  depend  were,  how- 

1  REAR-ADMIRAL  THK  HON.  EDWARD  BOSCAWKN'S  SQUADRON,  WHICH  ARRIVED 
OFF  MAURITIUS  IN  JUNK,  1748. 


Ships. 


<  'omnuuiders. 


Namur  . 

Vigilant 

Deptford 

Pembroke 

Ruby      . 

Chester   . 

Deal  Castle 

Stvallow 

Basilisk  (bomb) 

Apollo  (hospital  ship) 


-,  f Rear- Admiral  Hon.  Kdward  Boscawen. 

\Captain  Samuel  Marshall  (1). 

Ii4  ,         William  Lisle. 

liO  ,         Thomas  Lake. 

f!0  ,         Thomas  Fincher. 

50  ,         Joseph  Knight. 

50  ,         Richard  Spry. 

24  ,         John  Lloyd  (2). 

16  Commander  John  liowzier. 

8  „            William  Preston. 

20  i  Lieutenant  Robert  Wilson. 


The  above,  proceeding,  found  on  the  East  Indies  Station,  the  following : — 


60 
60 
50 
50 
20 


Car 


Exeter    .... 

York      .... 

Harwich 

Preston  .... 

Lively    .... 

in  addition  to  the  other  vessels,  which,  upon  Boscawen's  arrival,  returned  home  or  went 
elsewhere. 


tain  Lord  Harry  I'owlett. 
Timothy  Nucella. 
Philip  Carteret  (1). 
William  Adams  (1). 
Nathaniel  Stephens,  actj 


K   2 


132  MAJOR    OPERATIONS,   1714-1762.  [1748. 

ever,  incompetent ;  and  little  progress  was  made,  though  the  Basilisk, 
bomb,  threw  some  shells  into  the  place.  In  the  operations  Ensign 
Clive,  afterwards  Lord  Clive,  gained  his  first  military  distinction. 
As  the  siege  threatened  to  be  a  protracted  one,  Boscawen  ordered 
Captain  Lisle  to  begin  a  general  bombardment  from  the  ships  of 
the  squadron  ;  but,  owing  to  the  shallows,  these  could  not  approach 
near  enough  to  do  much  damage.  The  business,  however,  cost  the 
life  of  Captain  William  Adams  (1),  then  commanding  the  Harwich. 
In  the  meantime  the  weather  was  bad,  and  the  troops  were  sickly; 
and,  as  the  neighbourhood  of  the  town  was  liable  to  be  completely 
flooded  at  the  beginning  of  the  rainy  season,  the  siege  was  raised 
at  the  beginning  of  October,  the  sick  being  removed  to  the  ships, 
and  the  army  retiring  overland  to  Fort  St.  David.  The  expedition 
cost  the  lives  of  IOCS  British,  and  of  only  about  '200  French.  The 
fiasco  reflected  no  disgrace  upon  Boscawen,  and  was  entirely  due 
to  the  incapacity  of  the  engineers  and  some  of  the  military  leaders. 
Nevertheless,  it  greatly  lowered  British  prestige  with  the  natives, 
and  led  to  some  serious  defections. 

Boscawen  learned  in  November  of  the  cessation  of  hostilities 
between  Great  Britain  and  France,  but  was  ordered  to  remain  on 
bis  station  until  advised  of  the  final  conclusion  of  peace.  Part  of 
the  squadron  went  to  Acheen,  and  part  to  Trincomale,  to  avoid  the 
monsoon,  and  the  whole  returned  in  January,  1749,  to  Fort  St. 
David,  where  it  lay  maintaining  an  observant  attitude,  while 
M.  Bouvet,  with  the  French  forces,  lay  at  Madras,  or  as  it  was 
then  often  called,  Fort  St.  George,  120  miles  to  the  northward. 
But  the  British  did  not  remain  wholly  idle,  and  in  April  ships 
were  detached  to  assist  the  East  India  Company  in  a  war  with  the 
King  of  Tanjore.  While  this  service  was  being  performed,  a  violent 
hurricane  wrecked  the  Pembroke  and  Nainur.  The  former  lost  her 
captain,1  and  all  hands  except  fourteen,  IWO  in  all;  the  latter  lost 
.520  souls,  though  the  admiral,  captain,  and  a  few  officers,  being  on 
shore,  fortunately  escaped.  Two  Fast  Indiamen  were  also  wrecked. 
In  August,  in  pursuance  of  the  treaty  of  Aix-la-Chapelle,  which 
had  been  concluded  on  April  18th,  1748,  Madras,  in  a  dismantled 
condition,  was  surrendered  to  the  British. 

In  the  West  Indies,  in  February,  1748,  Bear-Admiral  Charles 
Knowles,  with  a  squadron  and  detachment  of  troops,  left  Port 

1  This  was  on  April  13th.  Captain  Thomas  Fincher's  post-commission  dated  from 
December  6th,  1745. 


1748.] 


KNOWLES   AT  POUT  LOUIS. 


133 


Koyal  to  make  an  attack  on  Santiago  de  Cuba;  but,  the  winds 
blowing  persistently  from  the  north,  the  ships  could  not  make  that 
place.  Knowles  therefore  determined  to  attack  Port  Louis,  on 
the  south  side  of  Hispaniola.'  The  squadron1  arrived  there  on 


ADMIRAL    Silt    CH.UtLKS    KNOWI.ES,    HAKT. 
(/V«m  flit  t'lnjrnviny  by  Itiillt'if.') 

BRITISH  SQUADRON  AT  THE  CAPTURE  OF  Poirr  Louis,  HISPAXIOT.A,  1748. 


Ships. 

Guns. 

Men. 

(  'I'limmiHiers. 

Cornwall. 

80 

GOO 

/Rear-Admiral  Charles  Knowles  (B.). 
\Captain  Richard  Chndwick. 

Plymouth 

GO 

400 

Disby  Dent  (2). 

Elizabeth.     . 

70 

480 

Polycnrpus  Taylor. 

Canterbury    . 

(10 

400 

David  Brodie. 

Straff  ord  , 

00 

400 

James  Kentone. 

Warwick  . 

60 

400 

Thomas  Inncs. 

Worcester 

GO 

400 

Thomas  Andrews  (2). 

Oxford     .      . 

50 

300 

Edmond  Toll. 

Weazel     . 

6 

102 

Merlin 

6 

100 

134 


MAJOR    OPERATIONS,   1714-1762. 


[1748. 


March  8th,  and  was  at  once  ordered  by  signal  to  cannonade  the 
fort,  which  mounted  seventy-eight  guns,  and  was  garrisoned  by 
(500  men.  A  warm  engagement  resulted,  and  in  the  height  of  it 
the  enemy  sent  out  a  fireship,  which  was  designed  to  fall  on  board 
the  Cornwall  or  the  Elizabeth.  She  was  towed  off  by  the  boats 
of  the  fleet,  and  left  to  burn  out  and  explode  innocuously.  The 
British  boats  then  boarded  and  brought  away  two  other  craft, 

which  had  been  prepared  as 
fireships.  The  action  con- 
tinuing, the  Spanish  fire  after 
a  time  languished,  and  the 
Bear-Admiral  sent  a  summons 
to  the  governor,  who,  first 
taking  some  time  for  reflection, 
surrendered  upon  terms.  The 
place  was  then  taken  posses- 
sion of.  The  squadron  lost 
only  70  killed  and  wounded, 
but  among  these  was  Captain 
Eentone,1  of  the  Straffurd,  and 
Captain  William  Gust,2  of  the 
Huston,  who,  with  the  Itear- 
Admiral's  permission,  was 
serving  as  a  volunteer  on  board 
the  Elizabeth.  The  enemy 
lost  1(50  killed  and  wounded. 
With  the  place  were  captured 
three  ships,  a  snow,  and  three 
privateer  sloops.  The  fort  was 
burnt,  it  not  being  advisable 
to  retain  it  ;  and,  the  conditions 

of  wind  being  at  length  more  favourable,  the  Eear-Admiral  decided 
to  prosecute  his  scheme  against  Santiago  de  Cuba. 

The   place    had 

Vernon's  attack  upon  it  ;  and,  as  the  appearance  of  the  British  had 
been  anticipated,  all  possible  precautions  had  been  taken.  Knowles 
arrived  before  the  town  on  April  5th,  and,  the  mode  of  procedure 
having  been  determined,  Captain  Dent  of  the  Plymouth,  as  senior 


been    much    strengthened    since    the    time    of 


1  James  llentone  ;  commander,  1739  ;  captain,  1740. 

2  William  Cuet  ;  commander,  1746  ;  captain,  1747. 


1748.]  KNOWLES' 8  ACTION   OFF  HAVANA.  135 

captain,  claimed  and  obtained  the  honour  of  leading  in.  He  was 
seconded  by  the  flagship.  When  the  Plymouth  had  approached 
close  to  the  harbour's  mouth  it  was  seen  that  the  passage  was 
obstructed  by  a  boom,  backed  by  vessels  held  ready  to  be  used  as 
fireships.  The  nearest  forts  were  cannonaded  and  the  fire  was 
returned ;  but  Dent,  having  taken  the  opinion  of  his  officers,  came 
to  the  conclusion  that  it  was  impracticable  to  proceed,  and  so 
reported  to  the  Rear-Admiral,  who  thereupon  drew  off  and  went 
back  to  Jamaica. 

Dent's  apparent  hesitation  on  this  occasion  was  taken  exception 
to  by  Knowles ;  and,  in  consequence,  the  captain  of  the  Plymouth 
was  court-martialled  on  his  return  to  England,  but  lie  was  honour- 
ably acquitted. 

Later  in  the  year  Knowles  was  informed  that  the.  Spanish  Plate 
fleet  was  expected  at  Havana  from  Yera  Crux.  He  therefore 
detached  Captain  Charles  Holmes,  in  the  Lnio.r,  to  convoy  a  groat 
body  of  trade,  which  had  been  collecting  to  sail  for  England  ;  and 
himself  went  to  cruise  off  the  Tortuga  Banks  in  search  of  the  enemy. 
The  convoy  under  Holmes  sailed  from  Jamaica  on  August  '25th  ; 
and,  being  prevented  from  getting  through  the  Windward  Passage, 
had  to  bear  away  for  the  Gulf  of  Florida.  On  September  '29th  it 
sighted  seven  large  ships,  which  were  presently  recognised  to  be 
Spanish  men-of-war.1  Holmes  signalled  the  convoy  to  disperse 
and  to  look  to  its  own  safety,  while  he  endeavoured  to  draw  the 
attention  of  the  enemy  to  his  own  ship;  and,  knowing  where  the 
Bear-Admiral  was  cruising  at  the  time,  he  succeeded,  under  press  of 
sail,  in  joining  him  on  the  following  morning,  when  he  reported  what 
had  occurred.  Knowles  instantly  went  in  quest  of  the  Spaniards, 

1  ORDER  OF  BATTLF.  OF  TIIK  BRITISH  AND  SPANISH  SQUADRONS  IN  TIII: 
ACTIOX  OFF  HAVANA,  OCTOUKK   IST,  17-18. 

UniTISH. 


Ships.  Guns.  Commanders. 


Ships.  'Gims.  Commanders. 


Tilbury  . 

.     .        60 

Capt.  Charles  Powlett. 

Invencible    , 

.     .       74 

Hear-Admiral  Spiuola. 

Utraffurd     . 

.     .        60 

{Rear 

David  Brodie. 
-  Admiral    Charles 

Conguittader 

Africa    .     . 

.     .       64 

74 

Don  de  San  Justo. 
Vice-  Admiral  Reggki. 

Cornwall 

.     .        80 

Kuowles. 

Dragon  . 

64 

Don  de  La  Paz. 

Lenox 

.     .        70 

Capt.  Polycarpus  Taylor. 
,,    Charles  Holmes. 

Nueva  ExjMtin 
Keal  Familia 

.       .          64 
.       .          64 

Don  Barrella. 
Don  Forrestal. 

60 

Thomas  Innes. 

Canterbury  . 

60 

.. 

Edward  Clark  (1). 

Galga  '    .     . 

•       •          30 

Don  Garrecocha. 

Oxford  '  .     . 

.       .          50 

" 

Edmund.  Toll. 

i  Not  in  the  Hue. 


136  MAJOR    OPERATIONS,    1714-1762.  [1748. 

and  sighted  them  early  in  the  morning  of  October  1st  between 
Tortuga  and  Havana.  The  Spaniards  at  once  formed  a  line ;  yet 
the  British,  though  they  had  the  advantage  of  the  wind,  edged  down 
only  very  gradually,  and  it  was  2  o'clock  before  either  side  fired. 
The  distance  was  then  too  great  for  much  damage  to  be  done,  but 
at  about  2.30  P.M.,  the  two  squadrons  being  nearer,  a  brisk  action 
was  begun.  The  Spaniards  seem  to  have  been  in  good  order  and 
close  together,  but  the  Warwick  and  Canterbury  were  far  astern 
of  station,  so  that  for  nearly  two  hours  the  British  had  but  four 
ships  opposed  to  six  of  the  Spanish.  During  this  time  the  Cornwall 
engaged  the  Africa  at  pistol  range,  and  was  so  gallantly  received 
that  in  half  an  hour  she  was  obliged  to  fall  astern  and  quit  the  line, 
having  lost  her  main-topmast  and  received  other  damage  to  her 
rigging.  Soon  afterwards  the  Conquistador,  also  much  damaged 
aloft,  dropped  astern  of  her  consorts  and  fell  nearly  where  the 
Cornwall  lay  refitting.  Knowles  lost  no  time  in  attacking  her,  and 
quickly  killed  her  captain  ;  but  that  officer's  successor  fought  the 
ship  bravely  until  she  had  thrice  been  set  on  fire  by  shells  from 
the  eight  cohorns,1  which  the  ConnraH,  unlike  most  of  her  class, 
carried.  Not  until  then  did  he  surrender.  The  Lenox  had  taken 
the  Corn  trail's  place  and  had  warmly  engaged  the  Africa ;  but 
other  Spanish  ships  succoured  their  admiral,  and  Captain  Holmes 
was  hard  pressed  for  about  an  hour  until  he  was  relieved  by  the 
Warwick  and  Canterbury.  The  action  then  became  general  and 
fierce,  and  so  continued  until  about  8  P.M.,  when  the  Spanish  drew 
off  towards  Havana,  closely  pursued.  All,  however,  escaped  except 
the  Conquistador.  The  Africa,  owing  to  her  damaged  condition, 
had  to  anchor  before  she  reached  port ;  and,  being  discovered  by 
the  British  two  days  after  the  action,  was  burnt  by  the  Spaniards 
to  save  her  from  capture.  The  enemy  lost  8(5  killed  and  197 
wounded  ;  the  British  had  59  killed  and  120  wounded.  But  whilst 
the  Spaniards  had  several  officers  of  rank  included  in  each  category 
the  British  had  none  in  either. 

Knowles  continued  to  look  out  for  the  Plate  fleet,  but  in  vain. 
In  the  course  of  time  he  learnt  from  a  prize  that  the  preliminaries 
of  peace  had  been  concluded  and  that  hostilities  were  to  cease, 
whereupon  he  returned  to  Jamaica.  When  he  went  home  to 
England  he  complained  of  Holmes  for  having  left  the  convoy, 

1  Coliorn,  a  small  mortar,  so  named  from  its  inventor,  Merino  van  Coehoorn,  the 
Dutch  military  engineer  (born  1641  ;  died  1704). 


1748.]  KNOWLES'S    COURT-MARTIAL.  137 

oblivious  of  the  fact  that,  had  Holmes  not  rejoined  the  flag,  the 
victory  off  Havana  could  not  have  been  gained.  Holmes  was  most 
honourably  acquitted.  On  the  other  hand,  some  of  the  captains 
of  the  squadron  complained  of  the  conduct  of  the  Bear-Admiral,  who 
was  in  consequence  tried  on  board  the  Charlotte  yacht,  at  Deptford,  by 
a  court-martial  which  sat  from  the  llth  to  the  '20th  December,  1749. 
It  appeared  that  while  Rear-Admiral  Knowles  was  standing  for  the 
Spanish  fleet  he  might,  by  a  different  disposition  of  his  squadron, 
have  begun  the  attack  simultaneously  with  six  ships,  and  might 
have  begun  it  earlier  in  the  day.  It  appeared  too,  that,  owing  to 
the  method  which  he  pursued,  he  had  begun  to  attack  with  only 
four  ships.  Upon  these  points  the  court  condemned  him  ;  and  it 
was  also  of  the  opinion  that,  in  order  properly  to  conduct  and  direct 
the  operations  of  his  command,  he  ought  to  have  shifted  his  flag 
from  the  Cornwall  to  some  other  vessel,  after  the  former  bad 
been  disabled.  For  the  rest,  the  proceedings  amply  vindicated  the 
Bear-Admiral's  personal  courage.  The  sentence  was  thus  worded  : 

"  The  court  unanimously  agree  that  Rear-Admiral  Knowles  falls  under  part  of  the 
1-ith  Article  of  War,  being  guilty  of  negligence,  and  also  under  the  '-'3rd  Article.  The 
court  therefore  unanimously  adjudge  him  to  be  reprimanded  for  not  bringing  up 
the  squadron  in  closer  order  than  he  did,  and  for  not  beginning  the  attack  with  so 
great  a  force  as  he  might  have  done;  and  also  for  not  shifting  his  Hag,  on  the  CoruwalTs 
being  disabled." 

On  the  Leeward  Islands'  Station,  Commodore  1'ocock  learned 
by  the  arrival  of  the  Wca.-cl,  sloop,  despatched  to  him  by  Hawke, 
of  the  approach  of  the  large  convoy,  which  had  been  under  the 
escort  of  M.  de  I'Etencluere ;  and,  although  he  had  not  time  to 
collect  the  whole  of  his  squadron  to  intercept  it,  his  ships,  and  the 
privateers  on  the  station,  succeeded  in  capturing  no  fewer  than 
thirty-five  sail  of  it. 

In  the  Mediterranean,  where  Bear- Admiral  the  Hon.  John  Byng 
commanded,  the  British  fleet  was  too  strong  for  the  French  and 
Spanish  to  attempt  at  sea  anything  of  importance  before  the 
conclusion  of  the  peace.  The  British  hampered  the  passage  of 
reinforcements  to  the  allied  armies  at  Genoa,  by  arming  a  number  of 
small  craft  and  entrusting  them  to  lieutenants,  who  cruised  with 
great  success  inshore,  and  intercepted  many  transports.  On  the 
peace  being  concluded,  Byng  returned  to  England  with  most  of  the 
larger  ships  of  his  fleet. 

In  the  home  seas   Rear-Adrniral   Sir  Edward  Hawke  went   on 


138  MAJOR    OPERATIONS,   1714-1762.  [1749. 

a  cruise  with  a  considerable  squadron  in  the  month  of  January ; 
and,  ere  he  returned  to  port,  made  several  prizes,  including  the 
Magnanime,  74,  an  account  of  the  capture  of  which  will  be  found  in 
the  next  chapter.  Kear-Admiral  Sir  Peter  Warren,  in  April,  also 
went  on  a  cruise ;  but  in  May  both  he  and  Hawke  were  recalled  to 
England  upon  the  settlement  of  the  preliminaries  of  peace. 

"  In  the  course  of  the  war,"  says  Beatson,1  "  the  British  captured 
from  the  Spaniards  1249  ships,  and  from  the  French  2185,  making 
in  all  3434.  The  Spaniards  captured  from  the  British  1360,  and  the 
French  1878,  making  together  3238,  being  196  fewer  than  what  had 
been  taken  by  the  British."  Yet,  in  spite  of  this,  the  general  balance 
was  in  favour  of  Great  Britain,  for  not  only  were  several  of  the 
Spanish  prizes  extraordinarily  valuable,  but  also  the  British  mer- 
chant marine,  on  account  of  its  superior  strength,  was  far  better 
able  than  either  the  French  or  Spanish  to  suffer  great  losses  without 
being  seriously  crippled.  The  main  gain  to  Great  Britain  by  the 
war  was  the  reduction  of  the  French  navy  to  proportions  which,  for 
the  time,  were  no  longer  formidable.  The  peace  itself  benefited 
her  but  little,  for,  in  accordance  with  it,  all  conquests  made  by  any 
of  the  combatants  were  to  be  restored.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
point  which  had  been  the  chief  occasion  of  the  war — the  right  of 
British  ships  to  navigate  the  American  seas  without  being  searched 
— was  not  touched  upon,  and  remained  unsettled.  The  right  to  the 
province  of  Nova  Scotia,  or  Acadia,  was  to  be  left  to  be  discussed  by 
commissioners  appointed  for  the  purpose.  This  last  matter,  never 
having  been  properly  arranged,  was,  as  will  soon  be  shown,  pro- 
ductive of  another  bloody  and  expensive  war. 

The  first  care  of  France  after  the  conclusion  of  peace  was  to 
reorganise  and  revive  her  navy.  Great  numbers  of  ships  were  laid 
down  at  home ;  and  contracts  were  placed  abroad,  especially  in 
Sweden,  for  the  construction  of  others.  None  of  the  ambitious 
projects  of  King  Louis  were  surrendered.  He  had  merely  accepted 
peace  in  order  the  better  to  prepare  for  the  realisation  of  his  designs. 
Nor  did  the  French  agents  invariably  take  the  trouble  to  obey  the 
spirit  of  the  treaty.  As  early  as  1749  the  French  Governor  of 
Martinique  seized  and  fortified  the  neutral  island  of  Tobago ;  and 
the  place  was  not  evacuated  until  grave  international  complications 
threatened  to  arise  out  of  the  matter.  Again,  in  1751,  the  French 
contemplated  aggressions  on  the  West  African  coast,  and  only 
1  '  Nav.  and  Milit.  Mems.,'  i.  414. 


1754.]  OPERATIONS  DURING    THE  PEACE.  139 

desisted  when  Captain  Matthew  Buckle  (1),  of  the  Assistance,  50, 
informed  M.  Perrier  de  Salvert,  the  French  commodore,  that  if  he 
persisted  in  his  designs  of  building  a  fort  at  Annamaboe,  the  British 
wfWld  look  upon  it  as  a  breach  of  the  peace  and  would  repel  force  by 
force. 

French  aggression  in  other  quarters  was  not  always  checked 
with  equal  promptitude.  M.  de  La  Jonquiere,  the  French  com- 
mander-in-chief  in  North  America,  and  M.  de  La  Galissonniere, 
Governor  of  Canada,  hatched  between  them  a  project  for  tampering 
with  the  Indians  of  North  America  and  for  gradually  driving  British 
settlers  out  of  that  continent ;  and  French  officers  occupied  British 
territory  in  Nova  Scotia  and  built  forts  there.  Remonstrances  were 
made,  and  in  1750  commissioners  were  appointed  to  adjust  the 
disputes;  but  nothing  came  of  their  conferences.  Still,  while  Great 
Britain  herself  remained  almost  indifferent,  the  Colonists  at  lust 
took  up  the  question.  Virginia  raised  400  men  and  I' 10, 000  for  the 
defence  of  its  inland  borders,  and  confided  the  command  of  its 
troops  to  Major  George  .Washington.1  The  French  Canadians, 
however,  in  spite  of  the  heroism  of  the  Americans,  captured  them 
and  their  commander  on  July  Hrd.  Thereupon  the  colonial 
governors  held  a  congress  and  agreed  upon  a  common  plan  of 
defence  ;  and  the  Ministry  at  home,  shamed  into  action,  sent  troops 
under  General  Braddock  to  the  assistance  of  the  Colonists.  These 
were  convoyed  to  America  in  1754  by  two  50-guii  ships  -  under 
Commodore  the  Hon.  Augustus  Keppel.  Such  signs  assured  the 
French  that,  if  they  persisted  in  their  policy,  an  open  rupture  could 
not  but  result ;  and  they  therefore  endeavoured  to  associate  Spain 
with  them  in  the  coming  quarrel ;  but  their  schemes  were  foiled  by 
the  watchfulness  of  Sir  Benjamin  Keene,  the  British  ambassador  at 
Madrid. 

In  India,  where  M.  Uupleix  still  governed  Pondicherry,  the 
French  were  as  aggressive  as  elsewhere ;  and,  in  consequence, 
hostilities  between  the  two  East  India  Companies  were  almost 
unceasing,  so  that  the  peace  in  that  quarter  was  a  merely  nominal 
one.  Clive  in  this  contest  won  great  successes  and  opened  up  to 

1  This  was  the  beginning  of  the  great  Washington's  military  career.     See  Walpole  : 
'  Mems.  of  George  II.,'  i.  347 ;  and  '  Corresp.,'  iii.  73. 

2  Centuriun,  Capt.  the  Hon.  Aug.  Keppel;   and  Norwich,  Capt.  the  Hon.  Samuel 
Harrington.     In  the  latter,  Adam  Duncan,  afterwards  Lord  Duncan,  served  as  acting 
lieutenant. — Keppel:  'Life  of  Keppel,'  i.  201. 


HO  MAJOR    OPERATIONS,   1714-1762.  [1755. 

the  British  East  India  Company  such  a  vision  of  future  wealth  and 
glory  as  induced  it  to  beg  the  Ministry  at  home  to  assist  it  in  pre- 
serving its  rapidly  growing  superiority  over  its  French  rival.  In 
response  the  Government  in  1754  despatched  Bear-Admiral  Charles 
Watson  with  a  force  which,  as  ultimately  constituted,  consisted  of 
the  Kent,  70,  Cumberland,  66,  Tiger,  60,  Salisbury,  50,  Bridge- 
water,  24,  and  Kingfisher,  16.  France  at  the  same  time  sent  out 
a  squadron  of  nearly  equal  strength ;  but,  before  the  ships  arrived, 
Dupleix  had  been  recalled,  and  the  French  in  India  had  adopted 
a  more  peaceable  policy,  which  might  have  led  to  permanent 
harmony  between  the  two  Companies  had  not  the  outbreak  of  war 
elsewhere  precluded  such  a  consummation. 

The  despatch  of  General  Brnddock  to  America  led  France  to 
throw  oft'  her  mask  and  to  assemble  a  large  expedition  at  Brest  and 
Kochefort,  destined  for  Canada.  Great  Britain  in  reply  prepared 
for  war;  and  on  March  llth,  1755,  a  proclamation  was  issued 
offering  bounties  for  seamen  and  able-bodied  landsmen.  On 
March  14th  thirty-five  sail  of  the  line  and  numerous  small  craft 
were  commissioned ;  a  hot  press  for  men  was  instituted  in  each  of 
the  chief  ports,  and  fifty  companies  of  Marines  were  ordered  to  be 
raised. 

The  French  expedition  left  Brest  under  the  convoy  of  twenty- 
five  sail  of  the  line,  commanded  by  M.  de  Macnamara,  who,  after 
seeing  it  fairly  to  sea,  returned  with  nine  sail,  leaving  the  rest  of  the 
command  to  M.  Dubois  de  La  Motte,  who  later  detached  four  sail  of 
the  line  and  two  frigates  to  Louisbourg,  and  proceeded  with  the  rest 
of  the  fleet  to  Quebec.  The  British  Ministry  was  only  vaguely 
informed  as  to  these  movements,  and  sent  to  North  America  Vice- 
Admiral  the  Hon.  Edward  Boscawen  with  but  eleven  sail  of  the  line, 
a  frigate,  and  a  sloop,  convoying  two  regiments.  He  sailed  from 
Plymouth  on  April  '27th,  1755,  with  instructions  to  protect  the 
British  colonies  and  to  attack  the  French  squadron  wheresoever  he 
should  find  it.  An  intimation  of  what  instructions  had  been  given 
was,  at  the  same  time,  communicated  to  the  French  ambassador, 
who  replied  that  the  king  his  master  would  consider  the  first  gun 
fired  at  sea  in  a  hostile  manner  to  be  a  declaration  of  war.  When 
it  became  known  how  greatly  superior  a  French  force  had  gone  to 
America,  a  reinforcement  of  six  sail  of  the  line  and  a  frigate,  under 
Kear-Admiral  Francis  Holburne,  was  sent  to  Boscawen ;  and  the 
necessary  arrangements  were  so  quickly  made  that  Holburne  sailed 


1755.]  CRUISE   OF  BOSOAWEN.  141 

on  May  llth  and  joined  Boscawen  off  the  Banks  of  Newfoundland 
on  June  21st. 

The  military  operations  in  North  America  of  the  force  under 
General  Braddock  need  not  'be  followed  in  detail.  Suffice  it  to  say 
that  an  American  expedition  against  Niagara  Fort  miscarried  ;  that 
Colonel  William  Johnson,  a  colonial  officer,  011  his  way  to  occupy 
Crown  Point,  defeated  a  considerable  French  force  which  had 
attacked  him ;  and  that  Braddock  himself,  while  leading  an  ex- 
pedition against  Fort  Duquesne,1  was  routed  and  killed.  A  com- 
bined naval  and  military  expedition  under  Captain  John  Kous,  H.N., 
and  Lieut. -Colonel  Monckton,  against  French  forts  in  Nova  Scotia, 
took  Fort  Beau  Sejour,  which  was  renamed  Fort  Cumberland,  and 
several  other  works ;  and  was  completely  successful  with  but  little 
loss. 

The  fleets  of  Boscawen  and  Dubois  de  la  Motte  did  not 
meet,  although  four  French  line-of-battle  ships,  which  had  become 
separated  from  their  consorts,  were  chased  by  the  British  on 
June  6th.  For  a  time  they  escaped  in  a  fog;  but  on  June  ytb, 
when  the  weather  cleared,  three  of  the  French  vessels  were  again 
visible  and  a  general  chase  was  ordered.  The  Dunkirk,  (50,  Captain 
the  Hon.  liichard  Howe,  assisted  by  the  Torliui/,  74  (Boscawen's 
flagship),  Captain  Charles  Colby,  after  a  brisk  action  took  the 
Alcifle,  Captain  de  Hocquart ;  and  the  Definiin',  (50,  Captain  Thomas 
Andrews  ('2),  and  Fuugneitx,  (54,  Captain  liichard  Spry,  took  the  LIJX. 
which,  though  pierced  for  (54  guns,  had  only  22  mounted.  The  third 
ship  got  away  owing  to  the  return  of  the  fog. 

When  Boscawen  discovered  that  the  French  had  safely  reached 
Quebec,  and  that  his  own  fleet  was  very  sickly,  he  left  Bear-Admiral 
Holburne  with  a  small  squadron  to  blockade  Louisbourg,  and  went 
to  Halifax  to  refresh  his  men.  But  the  epidemic  of  putrid  fever 
could  not  be  checked;  and,  before  Boscawen,  with  the  main  part  of 
his  squadron,  got  home  to  England,  the  ships  had  lost  2000  people. 
Captain  Spry,  with  a  few  vessels,  was  left  to  winter  at  Halifax. 
Boscawen  and  the  rest  of  the  fleet  anchored  at  Spithead  on 
November  4th.  It  should  be  added  that  M.  Dubois  de  la  Motte 
returned  to  France  without  adventure,  and  that  the  vessels  which 
he  had  sent  into  Louisbourg  escaped  and  rejoined  him  at  the  time 
when  the  British  blockading  squadron  had  been  driven  from  its 
station  by  bad  weather. 

1  On  the  site  of  what  is  now  Pittsburg. 


142  MAJOR    OPERATIONS,    1714-1762.  [1756. 

The  capture  of  the  Alcide  and  Li/s  produced  great  excitement  in 
France,  and  fanned  the  flame  of  war  in  England ;  but  although 
hostilities  thereupon  began,  formal  war  between  Great  Britain  and 
France  was  not  declared  until  May  18th,  1756,  upon  the  receipt  in 
London  of  the  news  of  the  French  invasion  of  Minorca. 

In  the  summer  of  1755,  Rear-Admiral  Sir  Edward  Hawke  and 
Rear-Admiral  Temple  West,  with  a  strong  squadron,  put  to  sea  in 
hopes  of  intercepting  the  Comte  du  Quay,  who  was  expected  back 
from  the  West  Indies  after  having  carried  reinforcements  to  the 
Leeward  Islands.  But  the  enemy  avoided  them,  and  re-entered 
Brest  without  loss ;  whereupon  Hawke  returned  to  Spithead.  The 
fleet  soon  afterwards  sailed  again  under  Vice- Admiral  the  Hon. 
John  Byng  and  Rear-Admiral  Temple  West,  but  re-anchored  at 
Spithead  on  November  21st.  When  Parliament  met  in  November, 
the  addresses  in  reply  to  the  speech  from  the  throne  were  very 
warlike,  and  France,  which  had  previously  believed  that  the  great 
body  of  Englishmen  was  averse  to  hostilities,  made  efforts  to 
negotiate  :  but  too  late. 

Early  in  the  new  year,  troops  were  assembled  on  the  French 
coast  as  if  for  an  invasion  of  Great  Britain  ;  and  a  fleet  was  collected 
at  Brest.  The  threat  of  invasion  produced  almost  a  panic  in 
England,  and  in  February  the  Ministry  increased  the  alarm  by 
issuing  a  foolish  proclamation,  ordering  the  proper  officers,  in  case 
the  French  should  land,  to  cause  all  horses,  oxen  and  other  cattle, 
which  were  fit  for  draft  or  burden  and  not  actually  used  in  the 
interest  and  defence  of  the  country,  and  all  other  cattle  as  far  as  was 
practicable,  and  all  provisions,  to  be  driven  or  removed  at  least 
twenty  miles  from  the  point  at  which  such  an  attempt  should  be 
made.  The  Government  also  unwisely  detained  at  home  a  large 
fleet,  while  it  left  America  and  the  West  Indies  and  the  Mediter- 
ranean very  insufficiently  guarded.  It  did  not  realise  that  Great 
Britain  is  best  protected  from  invasion  by  the  activity  and  efficiency 
of  her  Navy  at  sea.  France  took  advantage  of  the  alarm  and  con- 
fusion to  quietly  embark  at  Toulon  about  16,000  men,  under  the  Due 
de  Richelieu,  and  to  send  them  to  Minorca,  convoyed  by  a  strong 
squadron  under  M.  de  La  Galissonniere.  The  expedition  landed  at 
Ciudadella  on  April  19th. 

Before  proceeding  to  give  an  account  of  the  operations  of  the 
war,  it  may  be  well  to  say  something  of  an  expedition,  which,  under 
Rear- Admiral  Charles  Watson,  rendered  valuable  service  to  commerce 


1756.]  OPERATIONS  AGAINST  ANGRIA.  143 

by  destroying  the  power  of  a  most  dangerous  pirate  in  the  East 
Indies.  This  pirate,  Tulagee  Angria  by  name,  was  the  representative 
of  a  family  which  for  about  a  hundred  years  had  committed  outrages 
on  the  Mahratta  coast,  and  had  acquired  both  wealth  and  territory. 
Angria  was  feared  not  only  by  the  natives  of  India,  but  also  by 
European  traders,  and  even  by  the  East  India  Company ;  and  he 
had  extended  his  authority  from  the  small  island  stronghold  of 
Severndroog  over  a  large  stretch  of  coast,  which  included  the  town 
and  port  of  Geriah.  In  1734  Angria  had  taken  the  East  Indiaman, 
Derby,  richly  laden,  and  later  the  Restoration,  20,  armed  ship,  and 
the  French  Jupiter,  40.  He  had  also  ventured  to  attack  Commodore 
William  Lisle,  who  had  two  ships  of  the  line  and  several  other 
vessels  in  company ;  and  he  had  wrought  much  damage  to  the 
Dutch  trade.  He  was  by  origin  a  Mahratta,  but  he  had  thrown  off 
his  allegiance ;  and  the  Mahrattas  had  long  urged  the  East  India 
Company  to  assist  in  effecting  his  downfall.  More  than  one  attempt 
had  been  made  to  destroy  him,  but  in  vain;  when,  in  1755,  an 
agreement  of  the  East  India  Company,  the  British  Government  and 
the  Mahrattas  led  to  the  fitting  out  against  the  pirate  of  a  force, 
which  finally  secured  the  desired  object.  Mr.  James,  Commodore 
of  the  East  India  Company's  ships  in  India,  sailed  in  March  with 
the  Company's  ships  Protector,  Swallow,  Viper,  and  Triumph,  and 
attacked  and  captured  Severndroog,  afterwards  delivering  it  up  to  the 
Mahrattas.  He  also  took  Bencote  (Fort  Victoria),  the  most  northerly 
port  in  Angria's  dominions. 

In  November  Rear-Admiral  Watson  reached  Bombay,  and  further 
operations  were  begun.  James,  with  the  Protector,  Revenge,  and 
Bombay,  went  to  reconnoitre  Geriah,  Angria's  chief  stronghold ; 
and,  upon  his  return  on  December  31st,  the  Bear-Admiral  sent  His 
Majesty's  ships  Bridgewater  and  Kingfisher,  with  some  of  the 
Company's  armed  vessels,  to  cruise  off  the  port.  James  joined  them 
on  January  27th,  1756,  with  the  Protector,  and  Guardian  ;  and  the 
Rear-Admiral,  with  Rear-Admiral  George  Pocock  as  second  in 
command,  and  with  Lieut. -Colonel  Clive  in  command  of  the  troops, 
followed  with  his  squadron,  arriving  on  February  12th.  In  addition 
to  the  King's  and  Company's  ships,  there  was  a  contingent  of  Mahratta 
craft,  which,  however,  did  little  or  nothing.  Angria,  terrified  at  the 
force  arrayed  against  him,  fled  to  the  Mahrattas  to  try  to  make 
terms,  and  left  Geriah  under  the  orders  of  one  of  his  brothers-in-law. 
His  offers  and  promises  induced  the  Mahrattas  to  withdraw  their 


144  MAJOR    OPERATIONS,    1714-1762.  [175C. 

active  co-operation,  in  return  for  an  undertaking  to  put  them  in 
possession  of  the  place ;  and  the  brother-in-law  would  have  carried 
out  this  arrangement  but  that  Watson  refused  to  be  satisfied  with 
anything  short  of  the  destruction  of  the  pirate's  stronghold. 

In  the  afternoon  of  February  12th,  the  garrison  having  refused 
to  surrender,  the  squadron  weighed  and  stood  in  in  two  divisions : 
one  to  attack  the  fort  and  the  other  to  attack  Angria's  fleet  and 
dockyard.  A  brisk  cannonade  resulted.  The  shipping  was  soon 
burnt,  and  part  of  the  town  was  set  on  fire.  After  about  three 
hours,  the  enemy's  guns  were  nearly  silenced,  and  the  British  guns 
in  consequence  ceased  also  ;  but,  soon  afterwards,  firing  was  re- 
commenced, and  not  until  (5.30  P.M.,  the  engagement  having  begun 
at  about  1.30  P.M.,  did  the  pirates  cease  to  make  further  resistance. 
Troops  were  then  disembarked  under  Clive,  ready  to  take  possession  ; 
and  during  the  night,  lest  the  enemy  might  again  take  heart,  the 
bombs  occasionally  shelled  the  fort.  In  the  morning  Watson 
summoned  the  garrison  and  was  refused  ;  whereupon  the  bombard- 
ment was  again  recommenced.  At  length  a  flag  of  truce  was  hung 
out,  and  an  offer  of  submission  was  made  ;  but,  as  it  was  not  com- 
plete and  unconditional,  fire  was  renewed.  The  governor  then 
surrendered  unconditionally.  On  the  morning  of  the  14th,  Clive 
marched  into  the  place.  Not  more  than  twenty  men  were  killed 
and  wounded  on  the  British  side  in  the  affair.  The  victors  found 
in  the  fortress  two  hundred  and  fifty  pieces  of  cannon,  six  brass 
mortars,  and  a  large  quantity  of  stores  and  ammunition,  besides 
about  t'100,000  sterling  in  rupees  and  £30,000  worth  of  valuables. 
Ten  Englishmen  and  three  Dutchmen,  who  had  been  enslaved  by 
Angria,  were  released.  The  pirate  fleet  which  was  burnt  at  Geriah 
consisted  of  one  ship,  eight  grabs  or  galleys,  and  a  large  number  of 
armed  row-boats  called  gallivats.  At  the  end  of  April  Watson  left 
the  coast  of  Malabar,  and  on  May  14th  arrived  off  Fort  St.  David. 

In  North  America  the  Earl  of  Loudoun  commanded  the  British 
land  forces,  but,  before  he  could  take  the  field,  the  French  had  won 
several  successes  and  had  made  themselves  masters  of  the  British 
armed  vessels  on  Lake  Ontario. 

It  has  been  mentioned  that  Commodore  Spry  had  remained  at 
Nova  Scotia  after  the  return  of  Boscawen  to  England  in  1755. 
Commodore  Charles  Holmes,  convoying  some  troops  from  Cork,  was 
sent  out  with  a  reinforcing  squadron,  and  assumed  command.  With 
the  Graf  ton,  Nottingham,  Hornet  and  Jamaica  he  cruised  off 


1756.]  THREATS   OF  INVASION.  145 

Louisbourg  in  July,  and  nearly  succeeded  in  cutting  off  a  small 
French  force ;  and  on  the  following  day  he  fought  another  French 
force,  which,  however,  also  got  away. 

On  the  Leeward  Islands'  station  Commodore  Thomas  Frankland 
commanded ;  and,  although  he  fought  no  action,  and  rendered  himself 
very  unpopular,  his  cruisers  greatly  annoyed  the  enemy.  On  the 
Jamaica  station,  the  squadron  was  under  the  orders  of  Bear-Admiral 
the  Hon.  George  Townshend ;  but  it  was  so  small  that  he  had  to 
remain  almost  entirely  on  the  defensive.  It,  however,  prevented  the 
French  from  carrying  out  an  intended  attack  on  Jamaica. 

At  home,  the  threat  of  invasion  continued  to  cause  popular 
uneasiness,  and  in  January,  175(5,  Vice-Admiral  Henry  Osborn 
was  sent  to  sea  with  a  large  squadron  to  convoy  outward-bound 
merchantmen,  and,  on  his  return,  to  reconnoitre  Brest.  He  would 
have  been  better  employed  in  reinforcing  the  fleet  in  the  Mediter- 
ranean, for,  although  the  enemy  had  sixteen  ships  of  the  line  in 
Brest  and  Rochefort,  it  was  discovered  that  these  could  not  be 
ready  before  May  ;  and  in  the  meanwhile,  Great  Britain  had  eight 
ships  of  the  line  and  twenty-three  frigates  quite  ready,  and  thirty- 
two  ships  of  the  line  and  five  frigates  nearly  ready  for  sea  in  the 
home  ports. 

Nor  was  the  threat  of  invasion  ever  a  serious  one.  The  French 
knew  too  well  that  the  project  at  that  time  was  hopeless.  Upon  the 
return  of  Osborn,  Vice-Admiral  Sir  Edward  Hawke  was  sent  with  a 
squadron  to  cruise  off  Brest,  and  was  reinforced  in  April  by  additional 
ships  under  Eear-Admiral  Francis  Holburne.  But  these  precautions 
were  taken  too  late,  for  Vice-Admiral  d'Aubigny  had  left  Brest  for 
Martinique  on  January  30th,  and  M.  de  Beaussier  had  sailed  on 
February  19th  for  San  Domingo.  Yet  Hawke,  ere  he  came  back 
to  England  in  May,  made  many  valuable  prizes.  He  left  Holburne 
to  cruise  before  Brest ;  and  Holburne  was  presently  joined  by  Vice- 
Admiral  the  Hon.  Edward  Boscawen,  who  assumed  command  of  the 
united  fleet  of  eighteen  ships  of  the  line,  six  50-gun  ships  and  two 
frigates. 

This  demonstration  naturally  induced  the  French  squadron  to 
keep  within  its  harbour;  but  some  of  Boscawen's  vessels  engaged 
straggling  French  ships.  The  invasion  scare  still  continuing,  the 
Vice-Admiral  took  effectual  means  to  put  an  end  to  it.  He  sent 
the  Hunter,  cutter,  Lieutenant  -  -  Cockburn,  to  reconnoitre  Brest. 
Mr.  Cockburn  ran  close  into  the  harbour's  mouth,  and  then  with 
VOL.  III.  L 


146  MAJOR    OPERATIONS,   1714-1762.  [1756. 

five  companions,  got  into  a  boat  and  rowed  into  the  port  in  the 
dark.  He  reported  that  he  had  found  there  only  nine  ships  of  war 
of  50-guns  or  under  and  six  large  merchantmen.  Boscawen  and 
Holburne  returned  to  England  in  November,  leaving  Eear-Admirals 
Savage  Mostyn  and  Harry  Norris  before  Brest,  chiefly  to  intercept 
such  of  the  enemy's  ships  as  might  be  coining  home  from  abroad. 
The  blockading  force  was  afterwards  entrusted  to  Vice-Admiral 
Charles  Knowles,  who  came  back  to  port  with  most  of  it  in 
December.  His  departure  was  somewhat  premature,  in  that  it 
enabled  M.  de  Kersaint  to  get  out  with  a  small  force  for  the  coast 
of  Africa,  and  M.  de  Beauffremont  to  escape  with  another  small 
force  bound  for  the  West  Indies.  It  also  allowed  some  small 
cruising  squadrons  to  proceed  to  sea  in  safety, 

Tin;  British  Ministry  was  very  negligent  in  the  matter  of 
Minorca.  It  is  quite  clear  that  as  early  as  October,  1755,  it  had 
received  intelligence  that  the  expedition  preparing  at  Toulon  was 
destined  for  that  island  ;  and  that  French  reports  to  the  same  effect 
reached  it  in  November  and  December,  as  well  as  later.1  Yet  it 
took  no  proper  measures  for  the  defence  of  the  place,  the  reason 
apparently  being  that,  at  that  time,  it  undervalued  the  importance  of 
the  position.  The  military  command  of  the  island  was  in  the  hands 
of  General  William  Blakeney,  an  office)'  in  his  eighty-second  year, 
who  was  so  infirm  that  when  Port  Mahon  was  besieged  by  the  Due 
de  Richelieu,  he,  though  mentally  very  active,  was  obliged  to  spend 
great  part  of  his  time  in  lied.  The  garrison  also  was  very  weak, 
and  most  of  the  officers  belonging  to  it  were  on  leave  until  some 
time  after  the  French  expedition  had  sailed  from  Toulon.  More- 
over, the  British  squadron  in  the  Mediterranean,  including  as  it  did 
only  three  ships  of  the  line  and  a  few  small  craft,  was  a  serious 
danger  rather  than  a  source  of  strength. 

Yet  at  length  public  opinion  in  England  insisted  that  something 
must  be  done;  and  on  March  llth,  175(5,  Vice-Admiral  the  Hon. 
John  Byng  was  appointed  to  the  command  of  a  fleet,  which  was 
then  ordered  to  proceed  to  Minorca.  The  position  of  second  in 
command  was  given  to  Bear-Admiral  Temple  West.  But  this  fleet, 
which  should  have  been  a  large  and  powerful  one,  was  by  no  means 
of  formidable  proportions.  It  consisted  only  of  ten  sail  of  the  line  ; 
and  even  those  few  ships  were  not  fitted  out  without  the  greatest 
difficulty  and  friction.  At  that  late  date  the  Ministry  seems  to  have 
1  Resols.  of  Ho.  of  Coming.,  May  3rd,  1757. 


1750.]  BTNG    TO    THE  MEDITERRANEAN.  147 

been  still  blind  to  the  importance  of  Minorca.  There  were  at  the 
moment  twenty-seven  ships  of  the  line  cruising  in  the  Channel  and 
Bay  of  Biscay,  twenty-eight  ships  of  the  line  in  commission  at 
home,  and  many  small  craft,  which  might  have  been  detailed  for 
the  service.  But  Byng  was  not  permitted  to  utilise  any  of  these, 
or  to  draw  crews  from  them ;  and  his  mission  was  evidently 
regarded  as  a  wholly  subsidiary  one.  He  was  directed  to  take  on 
board  the  absent  officers  of  the  Minorca  garrison  and  a  reinforce- 
ment of  troops,  consisting  of  the  lioyal  Eegiment  of  Fusiliers, 
under  the  command  of  Colonel  Lord  Kobert  Bertie.  To  make 
room  for  these  men,  all  the  Marines  belonging  to  the  squadron  were 
sent  on  shore,  with  the  result  that,  had  Byng  been  successful  in 
throwing  troops  into  Port  Mahon,  he  would,  owing  to  the  absence 
of  Marines  from  his  ships,  have  been  in  a  condition  unlit  for  sub- 
sequently fighting  an  action  at  sea. 

The  Vice-Admiral  prepared  his  fleet  with  as  much  dispatch  as 
possible,  and  sailed  from  St.  Helen's  on  April  Oth,  arriving  at 
Gibraltar  on  May  '2nd.  He  was  there  joined  by  some  of  the  ships, 
which,  under  Captain  the  Hon.  George  Edgcumbe,  were  already  in 
the  Mediterranean  ;  and  he  received  intelligence  that  the  Toulon 
squadron  had  landed  a  French  army  in  Minorca,  and  that  the  enemy 
was  already  in  possession  of  almost  every  strong  position  in  the  island. 
Byng  communicated  to  General  Fowke,  the  Governor  of  Gibraltar, 
an  order  from  home  to  the  effect  that,  subject  to  certain  conditions, 
a  detachment  from  the  garrison,  equal  to  a  battalion  of  men,  was 
to  be  embarked  on  board  the  fleet.  But  General  Fowke  and  his 
advisers  came  to  the  conclusion,  firstly,  that  it  would  be  extremely 
dangerous,  if  not  impracticable,  to  throw  succour  into  Port  Mahon  ; 
and  secondly,  that  the  garrison  of  Gibraltar  was  already  too  weak  to 
spare  the  specified  detachment  without  danger  to  itself.  Yet  as  the 
fleet  was  in  great  want  of  men,  and  as  Edgcumbe's  ships  had  left 
their  Marines,  and  some  of  their  seamen,  in  Minorca  to  assist  in  the 
work  of  defence,  the  Governor  permitted  1  captain,  6  subalterns, 
9  sergeants,  11  corporals,  5  drummers  and  '200  privates  to  embark, 
it  being  represented  to  him  that,  without  such  reinforcement, 
several  of  the  ships  would  be  absolutely  unable  to  go  into  action. 

Captain  Edgcumbe,  with  his  little  squadron,  had  been  obliged  to 
retire  from  off  Minorca  upon  the  appearance  of  the  French.  He 
had  left  behind  him  Captain  Carr  Scrope  of  the  Dolphin,  who 
commanded  the  naval  detachment  on  shore,  and  who  was  to 

L  2 


148 


MAJOR    OPERATIONS,   1714-1762. 


[1756. 


act  as  signal  officer  in  the  event  of  the  appearance  of  a  British 
squadron  before  the  island.  Ere  Byng,  with  an  easterly  wind, 
sailed  from  Gibraltar  on  May  8th,  he  had  been  joined  by  the  whole 
of  Captain  Edgcumbe's  little  force,  excepting  the  Phoenix,  which 
had  been  blockaded  at  Palma,  Majorca,  by  two  French  frigates, 
and  which  was  only  able  to  get  out  upon  the  appearance  of  the 
British  fleet  off  that  island.  The  wind  was  for  the  most  part 
easterly  until  9  P.M.  on  the  18th,  when  a  brisk  northerly  breeze 
sprang  up ;  and  the  squadron,  having  sailed  large  all  night,  sighted 
Minorca  at  daybreak  next  morning.  Byng  at  once  sent  ahead  the 
Phoenix,  Chesterfield  and  Dolphin  to  reconnoitre  the  mouth  of 
Mahon  Harbour,  to  pick  up  intelligence,  and  to  endeavour  to  send 
ashore  a  letter  to  General  Blakeney.  Captain  the  Hon.  Augustus 
John  Hervey,  the  senior  officer  of  the  advanced  squadron,  drew  in 
with  the  shore  and  endeavoured  to  communicate  with  the  castle  of 
St.  Philip  ;  but,  before  be  could  effect  anything,  the  enemy's  fleet 
appeared  in  the  S.E.,  and  the  detachment  had  to  be  recalled. 

Vice-Admiral  Byng  then  stood  towards  the   foe   and  made  the 
signal  for  a  general  chase.     Both  squadrons J  made  sail  towards  one 


1  THE  Bin 


AMI  FRKXCH  FLEETS  is  THE  ACTION-  OFF  MINORCA,  MAY  20Tii,  175G. 


Ships. 


Commanders. 


ships. 


I-'laK-Ofncers. 


fiefance       ...       60 

(Capt.  Thomas  Andrews 

I           W- 

OrphS'f     ....         04 
//  ij/popotamc     .      .        50 

Portland*    ...        50 

,,     Patrick  1'aird. 

,          ,  . 

(M.  de  Glandevez  (Chef 

Lancaster    ...       66 

I"    ,,     Hon.  George  Edg- 

i     tl'Kscailre). 

tllear-Ailmiral     Temple 

(,'tttrrier      .     .      .74 

Huckinnham     .     .       €8 
Captain  ....        64 

\    \Vest(H). 
(Capt.  Michael  Everitt. 
,,    Charles  Catford. 

Fier  ...            . 

50 
(M.  do  La  Galissonuiere 
:      (     (Lieut.-GeiH-ral). 

Foudroyant. 

Intrepid       ...        64 

„    James  Young  (1). 

Ti'mi-raire    ...        74 

(     ,,     Frederick      Coni- 

Content   ....         64 

Revenge  ....        64 

1               wall. 

Lion  j     64 

Princess  Louisa  !  .        6C 
Trident  ....       64 

„     Thomas  Xoel. 
„    Philip  Durell(!V 

Couronne 

..      /M.  de    La   Clue  (Chef 
'4      t     U'K^adre). 

iVice-Adm.   Hon.   John 

Triton     .... 

64 

llamillies     ...        90 

Byng(B). 

Culloden      ...        74 

Capt.  Arthur  Gardiner. 
,,     Henn,"  M'ani. 

FRIGATES.  KTC.* 

Kingston      ...       60 

„     William  I'arrj^'j). 

Junon     ,                         46 

/tose  .     .           . 

26 

FHIGATES,  r.rr. 

dracieuse 

26 

Deptford^.     .     .       60 
Chesterfield!     .     .        40 

,,    John  Amherst. 
„     John  Lloyd  (-2). 

Trtpaze     . 
A'ympke  , 

24 
26 

f     ,.     Hon.        Augustus 
rto.n,xi      ...       20     {              JohnHervey. 

.fortune  1      ...        14 

j  Com.  Jervis  Maplesdeu. 

Experiment  '     .      .   1     20 

Capt.  James  Gilchrist. 

Dolphin'      ...        20 

Com.  Henjamin  Marluw.3 

1  Were  in  the  Mediterranean  under  Capt.  the  Hon.  6.  Edgcnmbe,  before  Admiral  Byng's  arrival. 

2  The  Deptford,  having  been  originally  placed  In  the  line  between  the  Culloden  and  the  Kingston,  and  then 
removed  from  It,  was  later  ordered  to  take  the  place  of  the  disabled  Intrepid. 

'  Capt.  Can  Scrope  being  on  service  ashore  at  Port  Mahon. 

•  La  Galissouniere  mentions  only  four  French  frigates  as  having  been  present. 


1756.] 


SYNO'S  ACTION  OFF  MINORCA. 


149 


another;  and  at  2  P.M.  the  British  Commander-in-Chief  made  the 

signal  for  a  line  of  battle   ahead.     But,  the  wind   dropping,    this 

order   could   not    be  properly  carried 

out.     In   the  meantime  he  took   the    , 

precaution  of  reinforcing  such  of  the 

ships  as  were  most  weakly  manned, 

by  means  of  drafts  from  the  frigates  ; 

and    he   directed    that   the    Phoenix, 

which  had  been  reported  as  unfit  for 

general  service,  should  be  made  ready 

to  act  as  a  fireship  in  case  of  necessity. 
At  about  six  o'clock  in  the  evening 
the  enemy  advanced  in  order,  with 
twelve  ships  of  the  line  and  five 
frigates ;  the  van  being  commanded 
by  M.  Grlandevez,  the  centre  by  M.  de 
La  Galissonniere,  and  the  rear  by  M. 
de  La  Clue.  An  hour  later  the  French 
tacked,  and  went  away  a  distance  of 
about  six  miles,  with  a  view  to  gainincr 

o  o 

the  weather-gage ;  and  Byng,  to  pre- 
serve that  advantage,  tacked  likewise 
On  the  following  morning  two  tartans, 
which  had  been  sent  out  by  M.  de 
Eichelieu  with  soldiers  to  reinforce 
M.  de  La  Galissonniere,  were  chased 
by  the  British  ships,  one  of  them 
being  taken  by  the  Defiance,  and  the 
other  escaping.  That  morning  at 
daybreak,  the  weather  was  hazy,  and 
the  enemy  was  not  at  once  seen  ;  but, 
a  little  later,  he  came  in  sight  in 
the  S.E. 

Captain  Mahan's  account  of  the 
action  which  followed  may  be  here 
quoted,  as  it  admirably  summarises  {.intrepid  should  be  flying  up  into  the 

wind.    She  is  here  represented  as  before 

what  occurred.  the  wind.] 


BYNQ'S  ACTIOX,  MAY  20™,  1756. 
I— At  2  P.M. 

British,  black;  French,  wlii/f. 

[The  angle  of  approach  was  somewhat 
greater  than  as  shown. in  the  plans.] 


BYNG'S  ACTION,  MAY  20rn,  1756. 

II.— At  2.30  P.M. 
British,  blank  ;  French,  white. 


"  The  two  fleets,"  he  writes,  "  having  sighted  each  other  on  the  morning  of 
May  20th,  were  found  after  a  series  of  manoeuvres  both  on  the  port  tack,  with  an 
easterly  wind,  heading  southerly,  the  French  to  leeward,  between  the  English  and  the 


150 


MAJOR    OPERATIONS,   1714-1762. 


[1756. 


\    0 


harbour.     Byng  ran  down  in  line  ahead  oft'  the  wind,  the  French  remaining  by  it,  so 
that  when  the  former  made  the  signal  to  engage,  the  fleets  were  not  parallel,  but 
formed  an  angle  of  from  H0°  to  40°  (PI.  I.).    The  attack  which  Byng  by  his  own  account 
meant  to  make,  each  ship  against  its  opposite  in  the  enemy's  line,  difficult  to  carry  out 
under  any  circumstances,  was  here  further  impeded  by  the  distance  between  the  two 
rears  being  much  greater  than  that  between  the  vans  ;  so  that  his  whole  line  could  not 
come  into  action  at  the  same  moment.     When  the  signal  was  made,  the  van  ships  kept 
away  in  obedience  to  it,  and  ran  down  for  the  French  so  nearly  head  on  as  to  sacrifice 
their  artillery  fire  in  great  measure  (PI.  II.).     They  received  three  raking  broadsides 

and  were  seriously  dismantled  aloft.     The  sixth 
_      _^_______^        English  ship''  (Intrepid)   "counting  from  the 

van,  had  her  foretopmast  shot  away,  flew  up 
into  the  wind,  and  came  abacK,  stopping  and 
doubling  up  the  rear  of  the  line  (PI.  III.).  Then 
undoubtedly  was  the  time  for  Byng,  having 
committed  himself  to  the  fight,  to  have  set  the 
example  and  borne  down,  just  as  Farragut  did 
at  Mobile  when  his  line  was  confused  by  the 
stopping  of  tlic  next  ahead  ;  but  according  to 
the  testimony  of  the  flag-captain,  Mathews's 
sentence  deterred  him.  'You  see,  Captain 
(iardiner,  that  the  signal  for  the  line  is  out,  and 
that  1  am  ahead  of  the  ships  J.nuisa  and 
Trident'  (which  in  the  order  should  have  been 
ahead  of  him).  '  You  would  not  have  me,  as 
admiral  of  the  licet,  run  clown  as  if  I  were  going 
to  engage  a  single  ship.  It  was  Mr.  Mathews's 
misfortune  to  be  prejudiced  by  not  carrying 
down  his  force  together,  which  I  shall  endeavour 
to  avoid.'  The  affair  thus  became  indecisive; 
the  English  van  was  separated  from  the  rear 

and  got  the  brunt  of  the  tight.  One  French  authority  blames  Galissonniere  for  not 
tacking  to  windward  of  the  enemy's  van  and  crushing  it.  Another  says  he  ordered  the 
movement,  but  that  it  could  not  be  made  from  the  damage  to  the  rigging  ;  but  this  seems 
improbable,  as  the  only  injury  the  French  squadron  underwent  aloft  was  the  loss  of 
one  topsail-yard,  whereas  the  English  suffered  very  badly.  The  true  reason  is  probably 
that  given  and  approved  by  one  of  the  French  authorities  on  naval  warfare.  Galisson- 
niere considered  the  support  of  the  land  attack  on  Port  Mahon  paramount  to  any 
destruction  of  the  English  fleet,  though  he  thereby  exposed  his  own.  '  The  French 
navy  has  always  preferred  the  glory  of  assuring  or  preserving  a  conquest  to  that, 
more  brilliant  perhaps,  but  actually  less  real,  of  taking  some  ships ;  and  therein 
it  has  approached  more  nearly  the  true  end  that  has  been  proposed  in  war.'  The 
justice  of  this  conclusion  dejiends  upon  the  view  that  is  taken  of  the  true  end 
of  naval  war." ' 


0       >/ 


1   t 


BYXCi's    ACTION,    MAY    20TII,    175G. 

in.—:!  P.M. 


The  losses  (see  following  page ')  in  killed  and  wounded  were 
nearly  equal ;  but  the  French  lost  no  officers  of  rank,  whereas  in 
Byng's  fleet  Captain  Andrews,  of  the  Defiance,  was  killed,  and 
Captain  Noel,  of  the  Princess  Louisa,  was  mortally  wounded. 
The  British  ships  also  suffered  much  more  than  the  French  in 


1  '  Jufl.  of  Sea  Power  upon  Hist.,'  286,  287. 


1756.] 


SYNG'S  ACTION   OFF  MINORCA. 


151 


their  masts,  yards  and  rigging ;  so  much  so,  in  fact,  that  Byng 
deemed  it  right,  before  venturing  to  do  anything  further,  to  call  a 
council  of  war  on  board  the  HamiUies,  and  to  summon  to  it  not 
only  the  naval  officers,  but  also  several  of  the  land  officers  who 
were  on  board  the  ships.  The  questions  debated  in  this  council, 
and  the  conclusions  arrived  at,  were  as  follows  : — 

1.  Whether  an  attack  on  the  French  fleet  nave  any  prospect  of  relieving  Mahon  ? 

Resolved  :  It  did  not. 

2.  Whether,  if  there  were  no  French  fleet  cruising  at  Minorca,  the  British  lkjct 

could  raise  the  siege?     Resolved:  It  could  not. 

'it.  Whether  Gibraltar  would  not  be  in  danger,  should  any  accident  befall  Byng's 
fleet?     Resolved  :  It  would  be  in  danger. 

4.  Whether  an  attack  by  the  British  fleet  in   its   present  state  upon  that  of  the 

French  would  nut  endanger  Gibraltar,  and  expose  the  trade  in  the  Mediter- 
ranean to  great  hazards?     Resolved:   It  would. 

5.  Whether  it  is  not  rather  for  His  Majesty's  service  that  the  fleet  should  proceed 

immediately  to  Gibraltar?     Resolved:  It  should  proceed  to  Gibraltar. 

As  a  result,  the  squadron  sailed  for  Gibraltar,  and,  on  the  way, 
occupied   itself   in  repairing  such  damages  as  could  be  repaired  at 


1  The  losses  in  killed  and  wounded  in  the  two  fleets  were  as  follows: — 


BBIIISH. 

FlIEXC 

i. 

Ships.                           Killerl. 

WoimdiM. 

Ships. 

Killed.         Wmm.lpil. 

Defiance  .      .      .      .           11 

45 

0,-tJ.A, 

1O                    0 

Portland        ...            (1 

20 

Hippopotinnt 

2                   10 

Lancaster       ...              1 

1  1 

I/edoutable 

u              :! 

Buckingham  ...           3 

7 

Sai/e   

0                   ,S 

(,'aptain    ....             o' 

30 

(iuerrier  .... 

0                13 

36 

Fier 

O                  4 

Princess  Louisa  .      .            3 

L3 

Foudroyant   . 

2                10 

T/'mrraire 

0               15 

Content     .... 

5               1!» 

lAou   

2                 7 

Couronne 

0                3 

Triton      .... 

5              14 

Totals  .      .          42 

Itfo 

Totals  .      . 

20            l.'iii 

London  Gazette  of  June  26th,  1750.  Lists  in  Beatson,  iii.  118,  put  the  total  losses 
at— British,  43  killed,  168  wounded  ;  French,  38  killed,  181  wounded.  La  Galissonniere 
puts  the  French  loss  at  38  killed,  and  11.5  wounded.  It  may  be  that  20  French  were 
killed  outright,  and  that  12  more  died  of  their  wounds.  No  two  accounts  of  the 
number  of  wounded  can  be  expected  to  agree  exactly,  some  enumerators  naturally 
including  among  the  wounded  men  with  only  slight  injuries. 


152  MA  JOE    OPERATIONS,   1714-1762.  [1756. 

sea.  At  the  Eock  the  Admiral l  found  reinforcements,2  which  had 
been  sent  out  to  him  under  Commodore  Thomas  Broderick,3  the 
Ministry,  after  Byng's  departure  from  England,  having  apparently 
realised  for  the  first  time  the  full  extent  of  the  danger  in  the 
Mediterranean. 

It  was  unfortunate  for  Byng  that  the  first  detailed  news  of  what 
had  happened  off  Minorca  reached  the  Government  through  French 
channels.  M.  de  La  Galissonniere's  dispatch  cannot  now  be  found 
in  the  Archives  de  la  Marine  in  Paris,  and  possibly  it  no  longer 
exists  ;  but  a  copy  of  it,  or  a  translation,  reached  the  Secretary 
of  the  Admiralty  some  time  before  Byng's  own  dispatch  arrived 
in  England  ;  and  upon  the  former  the  Government  took  action, 
recalling  Byng  and  West,  and  sending  out  Vice-Admiral  Sir 
Edward  Hawke  and  Bear-Admiral  Charles  Saunders  to  supersede 
them.  The  important  part  of  this  dispatch  of  La  Galissonniere's  4 
is  as  follows  :— 

"At  half-past  two  in  the  afternoon  the  two  squadrons  were  in  line  of  battle  and 
began  the  engagement.  The  English  consisted  of  eighteen  sail,  of  which  thirteen  were 
of  the  line,  and  ours,  of  twelve  sail  of  the  line  and  four  frigates.  The  action  lasted 
almost  three  hours  and  a  half,  but  was  not  general  during  the  whole  of  the  time.  The 
English  ships  that  had  suffered  most  from  our  broadsides  got  away  to  the  windward, 
out  of  gunshot.  They  continually  preserved  this  advantage  that  they  might  keep 
clear  of  us  as  they  pleased.  After  having  made  their  greatest  efforts  against  our  rear 
division,  which  they  found  so  close  and  from  which  they  received  so  hot  a  fire  that 
they  could  not  break  in  upon  it,  they  made  up  their  minds  to  sheer  off,  and  did  not 
appear  again  during  the  whole  of  the  next  day,  the  21st.  Speaking  generally,  none  of 
their  ships  long  withstood  the  fire  of  ours.  Our  vessels  suffered  but  little.  They  were 
repaired  in  the  night,  and  on  the  following  morning  were  fit  for  action."  ..."  Our 
total  killed  was  thirty-eight,  and  wounded  one  hundred  and  fifteen." 


1  On  June  4th,  1756,  Byng  was  promoted  to  be  Admiral  of  the  Blue. 

2  Reinforcement  despatched  to  Admiral  the  Hon.  John  Byng  under  Commodore 
Broderick : — 


Ships. 

Guns. 

Commanders. 

Prince  Georye. 

80 

/Commod.  Thomas  Broderick. 
\Capt.  Abraham  North. 

Ipswich 

64 

„     Kichard  Tyrrell. 

Nassau 

64 

„     James  Sayer. 

Hampton  Court    . 

64 

„     James  Webb. 

Isis  . 

50 

„     Edward  Wheeler 

3  This  officer,  who  was  born  in  1704,  and  died  a  Vice-Admiral  in  1769,  usually 
spelt  his  name  Broderick.     It  was,  however,  properly  spelt  Brodrick. 

4  As  published  in  the  journals  of  the  time. 


1756.]  BYNQ'S  DISPATCH.  153 

It  may  here  be  pointed  out,  in  passing,  that  this  report  makes 
the  British  fleet  to  have  been  considerably  superior  to  the  French, 
whereas  if  there  were  any  real  difference  between  them  it  was  only 
a  very  slight  one ;  and  that  it  does  not  agree,  in  other  respects,  with 
the  facts  as  they  are  now  accepted. 

Before  going  further,  it  is  right  to  print  the  dispatch  which  Byng 
addressed  to  the  Admiralty  on  May  25th,  and  in  which  he  gave  his 
version  of  what  had  happened.  It  is  right  also  to  say  that  the 
Admiralty,  after  receiving  this  dispatch,  kept  it  for  some  time 
before  making  it  public,  and  that,  when  it  did  publish  it,  gave 
it  to  the  world  in  a  mutilated  condition.  The  complete  dispatch 
was  printed  by  Byng  after  his  return  to  England,  and  ran  as 
follows  :— 

Ram  lilies,  OFF  MINORCA,  May  '25th,  1756. 

"  SIR, — I  have  the  pleasure  to  desire  that  you  will  acquaint  their  Lordships  that, 
having  sailed  from  Gibraltar  the  8th,  I  got  oft'  Mahon  the]  19th,  having  been  joined  by 
bis  Majesty's  ship  PHCENIX  oft'  Majorca  two  days  before,  by  whom  I  had  confirmed  the 
•intelligence  1  had  received  at  Gibraltar,  of  the  strength  of  the  French,  fleet,  and  of  their 
being  off  Mahon.  His  Majesty's  colours  u'ere  still  flying  at  the  castle  of  St.  Philip  ; 
and  I  could  perceive  several  bomb-batteries  playing  on  it  from  different  parts.  French 
colours  I  saw  flying  on  the  icest  part  of  Kt.  Philip.  I  dispatched  the  Phoenix, 
Cliesterfield,  and  Dolphin  ahead,  to  reconnoitre  the  harbour's  mouth;  and  Captain 
Harvey  to  endeavour  to  land  a  letter  for  General  Blakeney,  to  let  him  know  the  fleet 
was  here  to  his  assistance  ;  though  every  one  was  of  the  opinion  we  could  be  of  no  use 
to  him  ;  as,  by  all  accounts,  no  place  was  secured  for  covering  a  landing,  could  we  have 
spared  the  people.  The  Phoenix  was  also  to  make  the  private  signal  between  Captain 
Ilervey  and  Captain  Scrape,  as  this  latter  u-ould  undoubtedly  come  off,  if  it  were 
practicable,  having  ktpt  the  Dolphin's  barge  with  him  :  but  the  enemy's  fleet  appearing 
to  the  south-east,  and  the  wind  at  the  same  time  coming  strong  off  the  land,  obliged  me 
to  call  these  ships  in,  before  they  could  get  quite  so  near  the  entrance  of  the  harbour 
as  to  make  sure  what  batteries  or  guns  miyht  be  placed  to  prevent  our  having  any 
communication  with  the  castle.  Falling  little  wind,  it  was  five  before  I  could  form 
my  line,  or  distinguish  any  of  the  enemy's  motions ;  and  could  not  judge  at  all  of  their 
force,  more  than  by  numbers,  which  were  seventeen,  and  thirteen  appeared  large. 
They  at  first  stood  towards  us  in  regular  line ;  and  tacked  about  seven ;  which  I 
judged  was  to  endeavour  to  gain  the  wind  of  us  in  the  night ;  so  that,  being  late, 
I  tacked  in  order  to  keep  the  weather-gage  of  them,  as  well  as  to  make  sure  of  the 
land  wind  in  the  morning,  being  very  hazy,  and  not  above  five  leagues  from  Cape 
Mola.  We  tacked  off  towards  the  enemy  at  eleven ;  and  at  daylight  had  no  sight  of 
them.  But  two  tartans,  with  the  French  private  signal,  being  close  in  with  the  rear 
of  our  fleet,  I  sent  the  PRINCESS  LOUISA  to  cbace  one,  and  made  signal  for  the  Rear- 
Admiral,  who  was  nearest  the  other,  to  send  ships  to  chase  her.  The  PRINCESS  LOUISA, 
DEFIANCE,  and  CAPTAIN,  became  at  a  great  distance ;  but  the  DEFIANCE  took  hers,  which 
had  two  captains,  two  lieutenants,  and  one  hundred  and  two  private  soldiers,  who  were 
sent  out  the  day  before  with  six  hundred  men  on  board  tartans,  to  reinforce  the 
French  fleet  on  our  appearing  off  that  place.  The  PHCENIX,  on  Captain  Hervey's  offer, 
prepared  to  serve  as  a  fire-ship,  but  without  damaging  her  as  a  frigate  ;  till  the  signal 
was  made  to  prime,  when  she  was  then  to  scuttle  her  decks,  everything  else  prepared, 
as  the  time  and  place  allowed  of. 


154  MAJOR    OPERATIONS,   1714-1762.  [1750. 

"  The  enemy  now  began  to  appear  from  the  mast-head.  I  called  in  the  cruisers  ; 
and,  when  they  had  joined  me,  I  tacked  towards  the  enemy,  and  formed  the  line  ahead. 
I  found  the  French  I  were  preparing  theirs  to  leeward,  having  unsuccessfully  endeavoured 
to  weather  me.  They  were  twelve  large  ships  of  the  line,  and  five  frigates. 

"As  soon  as  I  judged  the  rear  of  our  fleet  the  length  of  their  van,  we  tacked 
altogether,  and  immediately  made  the  signal  for  the  ships  that  led  to  lead  large,  and 
for  the  PEPTFORD  to  quit  the  line,  that  ours  might  become  equal  to  theirs.  At  two 
I  made  the  signal  to  engage :  1  found  it  was  the  surest  method  of  ordering  every  ship 
to  close  down  on  the  one  that  fell  to  their  lot.  And  here  I  must  express  my  great 
satisfaction  at  the  very  gallant  manner  in  which  the  Rear-Admiral  set  the  van  the 
example,  by  instantly  bearing  down  on  the  ships  he  was  to  engage,  with  his  second, 
and  who  occasioned  one  of  the  French  ships  to  begin  the  engagement,  which  they  did 
by  raking  ours  as  they  went  down.  The  INTREPID,  unfortunately,  in  the  very  begin- 
ning, had  her  foretopmast  shot  away  ;  and  as  that  hung  on  her  foretopsail,  and  backed 
it, .he  had  no  command  of  his  ship,  his  fore-tack  and  all  his  braces  being  cut  at  the 
same  time;  so  that  lie  drove  on  the  next  ship  to  him,  and  obliged  that  and  the  ships 
ahead  of  mo  to  throw  all  back.  This  obliged  me  to  do  also  for  some  minutes,  to  avoid 
their  falling  on  board  me,  though  not  before  we  had  drove  our  adversary  out  of  the 
line,  who  put  before  the  wind,  and  had  several  shots  fired  at  him  by  his  own  admiral. 
This  not  only  caused  the  enemy's  centre  to  be  unattacked,  but  the  Dear-Admiral's 
division  rather  uncovered  for  some  little  time.  1  sent  and  called  to  the  ships  ahead  of 
me  to  make  sail,  and  go  down  on  the  enemy  :  and  ordered  the  CHESTERFIELD  to  lay  by 
the  INTRKPID,  and  the  DEPTFOHH  to  supply  the  JXTRRPIII'S  place.  I  found  the  enemy 
edged  away  constantly;  and  as  they  went  three  feet  to  our  one,  they  would  never 
permit  our  closing  with  them,  but  took  advantage  of  destroying  our  rigging;  for 
though  I  closed  the  Rear-Admiral  fast,  T  found  that  I  could  not  gain  close  to  the  enemy, 
whose  van  was  fairly  drove  from  their  line;  but  their  admiral  was  joining  them,  by 
bearing  away. 

"l!y  this  time  it  was  past  six,  and  the  enemy's  van  and  ours  were  at  too  great  a 
distance  to  engage,  I  perceived  some  of  their  ships  stretching  to  the  northward;  and 
I  imagined  they  were  ;;oing  to  form  a  new  line.  I  made  the  signal  for  the  headmost 
ships  to  tack,  and  those  that  led  before  with  the  larboard  tacks  to  lead  with  the 
starboard,  that  I  might,  by  the  first,  keep  (if  possible)  the  wind  of  the  enemy,  and,  by 
the  second,  between  the  Rear-Admiral's  division  and  the  enemy,  as  lie  had  suffered 
most;  as  also  to  cover  the  INTREPID,  which  I  ]ierceived  to  be  in  very  bad  condition, 
and  whose  loss  would  give  the  balance  very  greatly  against  vis,  if  they  attacked  us 
next  morning  as  I  expected.  I  brought  to  about  eight  that  night  to  join  the  INTREPID, 
and  to  refit  our  ships  as  fast  as  possible,  and  continued  doing  so  all  night.  The  next 
morning  we  saw  nothing  of  the  enemy,  though  we  were  still  lying  to.  Mahon  was 
K.X.W.  about  ten  or  eleven  leagues.  1  sent  cruisers  to  look  out  for  the  Intrepid  and 
CHESTERFIELD,  who  joined  me  next  day.  And  having,  from  a  state  and  condition  of  the 
squadron  brought  me  in,  found,  that  the  CAPTAIN,  INTREPID,  and  DEFIANCE  (which  latter 
has  lost  her  captain),  were  much  damaged  in  their  masts,  so  that  they  were  in  danger 
of  not  being  able  to  secure  their  masts  properly  at  sea  ;  and  also,  th'it  the  squadron  in 
general  were  very  sickly,  many  killed  and  U'ounded,  and  nowhere  to  put  a  third  of 
their  number  if  1  made  an  hospital  of  the  forty-gun  ship,  which  was  not  easy  at  sea  ; 
I  thought  it  projier  in  this  situation  to  call  a  council  of  war,  before  I  went  again  to 
look  for  the  enemy.  I  desired  the  attendance  of  General  Stuart,  Lord  Eftingham,  and 
Lord  Robert  Bertie,  and  Colonel  Cornwallis,  that  I  might  collect  their  opinions  upon 
the  present  situation  of  Minorca  and  Gibraltar,  and  make  sure  of  protecting  the  latter, 
since  it  was  found  impracticable  either  to  succour  or  relieve  the  former  with  the 
force  we  had.  So,  though  we  may  justly  claim  the  victory,  yet  we  are  much  inferior 
to  the  weight  of  their  strips,  though  the  numbers  are  equal ;  and  they  have  the  advantage 
of  sending  to  Minorca  their  wounded,  and  getting  reinforcements  of  seamen  from  their 


1756.]  FALL    OF  PORT  MAHON.  155 

transports,  and  soldiers  from  their  camp ;  all  which  undoubtedly  has  been  done  in  this 
time  that  we  have  been  lying  to  to  refit,  and  often  in  sight  of  Minorca ;  and  their  ships 
have  more  than  once  appeared  in  a  line  from  our  mast-heads. 

"  I  send  their  Lordships  the  resolutions  of  the  council  of  war,  in  which  there  was 
not  the  least  contention,  or  doubt  arose.  1  hope,  indeed,  we  shall  find  stores  to  refit  nn 
at  Gibraltar ;  and,  if  I  have  any  reinforcement,  will  not  lose  a  moment  of  time  to 
seek  the  enemy  again,  and  once  more  ijive  them  battle,  though  they  have  a  great 
advantage  in  being  clean  ships  that  go  three  feet  to  our  on/',  and  therefore  h'ive  their 
choice  how  they  will  engage  us,  ur  if  they  v:ill  nt  all ;  and  will  never  let  us  dose  them, 
as  their  sole  view  is  the  disabling  our  ships,  in  which  they  have  but  too  icell  succeeded, 
though  we  obliged  them  to  bear  up. 

"I  do  hot  send  their  Lordships  the  particulars  of  our  losses  and  damages  l>y  this, 
as  it  would  take  me  much  time ;  and  I  am  willing  none  should  he  lost  in  letting  them 
know  an  event  of  such  consequence. 

"  I  cannot  help  urging  their  Lordships  for  a  reinforcement,  if  none  are  >/ef  sailed 
on  their  knowledge  of  the  enemy's  strength  in  th'-se  seim,  and  which,  by  very  good  intelli- 
gence, will  in  a,  few  days  be  strengthened  by  fonr  more  large  ships  from  Toulon,  almost 
ready  to  sail,  if  not  sailed,  to  join  these. 

"  I  dispatch  this  to  Sir  Benjamin  Kcene,  liy  way  of  Barcelona;  and  am  making 
the  best  of  my  way  to  cover  Gibraltar,  from  which  place  I  propose  sending  their 
Lordships  a  more  particular  account.  I  remain,  Sir,  your  most  humble  servant, — 

".I.    J',YN(i. 

"Hon.  JOHN-  CI.KVLAXD,  ESQ." 

The  above  dispatch  appears  to  have  arrived  in  England  on 
June  16th;  but  it  was  not  published  in  the  London  Cldi-rttc  until 
June  '26th,  and  then  only  with  the  omission  of  those  passages  which 
are  now  printed  in  italics.  The  omissions,  it  is  clear,  were  some- 
what unfair,  and,  being  calculated  to  prejudice  Byng,  they  show  the 
bias  of  the  Ministry,  which,  previously  inclined  to  underrate  the 
importance  of  Minorca,  at  length  seemed  disposed  to  attach  the 
utmost  significance  to  it.  The  dispatch  is,  however,  an  unsatis- 
factory one,  even  as  it  stands.  It  is  too  full  of  excuses,  too 
apologetic,  to  be  the  work  of  a  strong  and  self-reliant  man.  It 
smacks,  indeed,  more  of  a  Persano  than  of  a  Nelson  or  a  Saumarex. 

To  avoid  a  break  in  the  narrative,  it  may  here  be  said  that  the 
town  of  Port  Mahon  defended  itself  gallantly,  but  had  to  capitu- 
late, on  June  29th,  on  honourable  terms.  The  garrison  was  sent  to 
England. 

Commodore  Broderick,  with  the  reinforcement,  had  reached 
Gibraltar  on  June  15th,  and  was  there  found  by  Byiig  on  his  arrival 
there  on  June  19th.  The  Admiral  at  once  began  preparations  to 
return  to  Minorca ;  but,  while  he  was  still  engaged  in  these,  on 
July  3rd,  the  Antelope,  50,  came  in  with  Vice-Admiral  Sir  Edward 
Hawke,  Bear-Admiral  Charles  Saunders,  and  the  order  for  the 
supersession  of  the  Commander-in-Chief  and  Bear-Admiral  West. 


156  MAJOR    OPERATIONS,    1714-1762.  [1757. 

She  had  sailed  from  home  on  June  16th.  Captains  Gardiner  and 
Everitt,  Captain  William  Gough  (who  had  been  a  lieutenant  of  the 
Ramillies,  and  who  had  since  been  appointed  captain  of  the  Experi- 
ment), and  Commander  Christopher  Basset  (who  had  also  been  a 
lieutenant  of  the  Bamillies  and  had  been  appointed  after  the  action 
to  the  command  of  the  Fortune},  were  also  recalled,  besides  other 
officers,  who  were  required  as  witnesses  in  England.  The  original 
order  to  Hawke  directed  only  the  supersession  of  Byng ;  but  after 
Hawke's  departure  from  England  and  the  receipt  of  Byng's  dispatch 
of  May  25th,  the  Admiralty  decided  to  go  further  and  to  make 
prisoner  of  the  late  Commander-in-Chief.  He  sailed  for  England 
in  the  Antelope,  on  July  9th,  and,  upon  arriving  at  Spithead  on 
July  26th,  he  was  put  under  arrest.  He  was  landed  on  August  19th 
and  sent  to  Greenwich.  There  he  remained  in  confinement  until 
December  23rd,  when  he  was  removed  to  Portsmouth.  His  trial 
began  on  board  the  St.  George  in  Portsmouth  Harbour  on 
December  27th,  and  continued  until  January  27th,  1757.  On  that 
day  sentence  was  pronounced,  and  the  Admiral  was  transferred  to 
the  Monarch,  then  in  harbour. 

The  court-martial,  summoned  to  try  Byng,  consisted  of  Vice- 
Admiral  Thomas  Smith  (4),  who  was  president,  Rear-Admirals 
Francis  Holbume,  Harry  Norris  and  Thomas  Broderick,  and  nine 
captains.  After  hearing  the  evidence,  the  court  agreed  to  thirty- 
seven  resolutions  or  conclusions,  which  embodied,  among  others, 
the  following : — 

That  when  the  British  fleet,  on  the  starboard  tack,  was  stretched  abreast,  or  was 
about  abeam,  of  the  enemy's  line,  Admiral  Byng  should  have  caused  his 
ships  to  tack  together,  and  should  have  immediately  borne  right  down  on 
the  enemy ;  his  van  steering  for  the  enemy's  van,  his  rear  for  its  rear,  each 
ship  making  for  the  one  opposite  to  her  in  the  enemy's  line,  under  such  sail 
as  would  have  enabled  the  worst  sailer  to  preserve  her  station  in  the  line  of 
battle. 

That  the  Admiral  retarded  the  rear  division  of  the  British  fleet  from  closing  with 
and  engaging  the  enemy,  by  shortening  sail,  in  order  that  the  Trident  and 
Princess  Louisa  might  regain  their  stations  ahead  of  the  llamillies ;  whereas 
he  should  have  made  signals  to  those  ships  to  make  more  sail,  and  should 
have  made  so  much  sail  himself  as  would  enable  the  Culloden,  the  worst 
sailing  ship  in  the  Admiral's  division,  to  keep  her  station  with  all  her  plain 
sails  set,  in  order  to  get  down  to  the  enemy  with  as  much  expedition  as 
possible,  and  thereby  properly  support  the  division  of  Rear- Admiral  West. 

That  the  Admiral  did  wrong  in  ordering  the  fire  of  the  llamillies  to  be  continued 
before  he  had  placed  her  at  proper  distance  from  the  enemy,  inasmuch  as  he 
thereby  not  only  threw  away  his  shot,  but  also  occasioned  a  smoke,  which 
prevented  his  seeing  the  motions  of  the  enemy  and  the  positions  of  the  ships 
immediately  ahead  of  the  Ramillies. 


1757.]  SYNO'S    COURT-MARTIAL.  157 

That  after  the  ships  which  had  received  damage  in  the  action  had  been  refitted  as 
circumstances  would  permit,  the  Admiral  ought  to  have  returned  with  his 
squadron  off  Port  Mahon,  and  endeavoured  to  open  communication  with  the 
castle,  and  to  have  used  every  means  in  his  power  for  its  relief,  before 
returning  to  Gibraltar. 

In  short,  the  court  considered  that  Byng  had  not  done  his 
utmost  to  relieve  St.  Philip's  Castle.  It  also  considered  that 
during  the  engagement  he  had  not  done  his  utmost  to  take,  sink, 
burn,  and  destroy  the  ships  of  the  enemy,  and  to  assist  such  of 
his  own  ships  as  were  engaged ;  and  it  resolved  that  the  Admiral 
had  fallen  under  the  12th  Article  of  War  '  ;  and  the  court  decided 
that,  as  the  12th  Article  of  AVar  positively  prescribed  death,  without 
leaving  any  alternative  to  the  discretion  of  the  court  under  any 
variation  of  circumstances,  Admiral  Byng  should  be  shot  to  death, 
at  such  time  and  on  board  such  ship  as  the  Lords  Commissioners 
of  the  Admiralty  should  direct. 

" But,"  concludes  the  thirty-seventh  resolution,  "as  it  appears  by  the  evidence  nf 
Lord  Robert  Bertie,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Smith,  Captain  Gardiner  and  other  officers 
of  the  ship,  who  were  near  the  person  of  the  Admiral,  that  they  did  not  perceive  any 
backwardness  in  him  during  the  action,  or  any  marks  of  fear  or  confusion,  either  from 
his  countenance  or  behaviour,  but  that  he  seemed  to  give  his  orders  coolly  and  dis- 
tinctly, and  did  not  seem  wanting  in  personal  courage,  and  from  other  circumstances, 
the  court  do  not  believe  that  his  misconduct  arose  either  from  cowardice  or  disaffection  ; 
and  do  therefore  unanimously  think  it  their  duty  most  earnestly  to  recommend  him  as 
a  proper  object  of  mercy." 

The  court  forwarded  the  sentence  to  the  Admiralty,  with  an 
accompanying  letter  signed  by  all  the  members.  In  this  the 
officers  represented  the  distress  of  mind  which  had  been  occasioned 
to  them  by  being  obliged  to  condemn  to  death,  under  the  12th 
Article  of  War,  a  man  who  might  have  been  guilty  of  an  error  of 
judgment  only ;  and,  for  the  sake  of  their  consciences,  as  well 
as  for  Byng's  sake,  they  warmly  pleaded  for  an  exercise  of 
clemency. 

In  consequence  of   this   letter,  and  of   the  recommendation  to 

1  "  Every  person  in  the  fleet,  who,  through  cowardice,  negligence,  or  disaffection, 
shall,  in  time  of  action,  withdraw,  or  keep  back,  or  not  come  into  fight,  or  engagement, 
or  shall  not  do  his  utmost  to  take  or  destroy  every  ship  which  it  sliall  be  his  duty  to 
engage  ;  and  to  assist  all  and  every  of  his  Majesty's  ships,  or  those  of  his  allies,  which 
it  shall  be  his  duty  to  assist  and  relieve ;  every  such  person,  so  offending,  and  being 
convicted  thereof  by  the  sentence  of  a  court-martial,  shall  suffer  death." — Act  of 
22  George  II.,  Art.  12. 

This  article  superseded  one  in  the  Act  of  13  Car.  II.,  which,  after  the  word 
"  death,"  had  the  words,  "  or  such  other  punishment  as  the  circumstances  of  the  offence 
shall  deserve,  and  the  court-martial  shall  judge  fit." 


158  MAJOR    OPERATIONS,    1714-1762.  [1757. 

mercy,  the  opinion  of  the  twelve  Judges  was  asked  for  as  to  the 
legality  of  the  sentence  which  had  been  pronounced.  The  decision 
was  given  on  February  14th,  1757,  and  was  to  the  effect  that  the 
sentence  was  legal.  Some  of  the  members  of  the  court  then  made 
an  effort  to  save  Byng  by  applying  to  Parliament  to  release  them 
from  the  oath  of  secrecy,  by  which  they  were  bound  not  to  reveal 
the  votes  or  opinions  of  individual  members,  upon  the  allegation 
that  they  had  something  vital  to  disclose  relative  to  the  sentence. 
Byng  was  respited,  and  a  Bill  for  the  desired  purpose  passed  the 
Commons,  but  was  thrown  out  by  the  Lords,  it  not  appearing  to 
that  House  that  there  was  anything  material  to  be  divulged.  The 
fact  is,  that  certain  members  simply  desired  to  be  able  to  make 
public  the  fact  that,  had  they  realised  that  the  result  of  their 
sentence  would  be  the  infliction  of  the  death  penalty,  their  sentence 
would  have  been  other  than  it  was.  The  severity  of  the  punishment 
caused  A'ice- Admiral  the  Hon.  John  Forbes,  one  of  the  Lords  of 
the  Admiralty,  to  refuse  to  sign  the  sentence,  and  it  also  induced 
Bear-Admiral  West,  who  had  been  offered  a  command,  to  decline 
it,  on  the  plea  that  although  he  could  answer  for  his  loyalty  and 
good  intentions,  he  could  not  undertake  to  be  held  capitally 
responsible  on  all  occasions  for  the  correctness  of  his  judgment. 

Byng,  both  during  his  trial  and  after  his  sentence,  behaved  like 
a  brave  man.  It  was  at  first  ordered  that  he  should  be  executed  on 
the  forecastle  of  the  Monarch.  This  ignominy  was,  however,  spared 
him  at  the  solicitation  of  his  friends.  On  March  14th,  1757,  the 
day  appointed  for  the  carrying  out  of  the  sentence,  the  Marines  of 
the  Monarch  were  drawn  up  under  arms  upon  the  poop,  along 
the  gangways,  in  the  waist,  and  on  one  side  of  the  quarterdeck. 
On  the  other  side  of  the  quarterdeck  was  spread  some  saw-dust, 
on  which  was  placed  a  cushion ;  and  in  the  middle  of  the  quarter- 
deck, upon  the  gratings,  a  platoon  of  nine  Marines  was  drawn  up 
in  three  lines  of  three.  The  front  and  middle  lines  had  their 
bayonets  fixed,  as  was  customary  on  such  occasions.  The  captains 
of  all  the  ships  in  Portsmouth  Harbour  and  at  Spithead  had  been 
ordered  to  attend  with  their  boats ;  but,  to  avoid  crowding,  they 
were  directed  to  lie  abreast  upon  their  oars,  without  coming  on 
board.  A  little  before  twelve  o'clock,  the  Admiral  retired  to  his 
inner  cabin  for  about  three  minutes,  after  which  the  doors  of  the 
outer  cabin  were  thrown  open,  and  the  Admiral  walked  from  his 
after  cabin  with  a  dignified  pace  and  unmoved  countenance.  As 


1757.] 


BYNG'S   EXECUTION. 


159 


he  passed  through  the  fore  cabin,  he  bowed  to  his  acquaintances 
there,  and,  saying  to  the  Marshal  of  the  Admiralty  "  Come  along, 
my  friend,"  went  out  upon  the  quarterdeck.  There,  turning  to 
the  Marshal,  he  politely  bowed  and  gave  him  a  paper  containing 
a  sober  vindication  of  his  position,  adding:  "Remember,  sir,  what 
I  have  told  you  relative  to  this  paper."  He  next  went  to  the 
cushion  and  knelt  down.  One  of  his  friends,  following  him,  offered 


ADMIRAL   THE    IIOX.   JOHN    I1YXO. 

(From  It.  Houston's  ciifjrtn'imj  uflcr  the  jiortniit  hii 


to  tie  the  bandage  over  his  eyes,  but  Byng  declined  the  service  and 
blindfolded  himself.  The  Marines,  in  the  meantime,  advanced  two 
paces  and  presented  their  muskets,  waiting  for  the  Admiral  to  give 
them  the  signal  to  fire.  He  remained  upon  his  knees  for  about 
a  minute,  apparently  praying,  and  then  dropped  a  handkerchief, 
the  signal  agreed  upon.  Six  of  the  Marines  fired.  One  bullet 
missed  ;  one  passed  through  the  heart  ;  and  four  others  struck 
different  parts  of  the  body.  The  Admiral  sank  to  the  deck,  dead. 


160  MAJOR    OPERATIONS,   1714-1762.  [1756. 

A  little  later  the  corpse  was  put  into  a  coffin  ;  and  in  the  evening 
it  was  sent  on  shore  to  the  dockyard,  whence  it  was  forwarded  to 
the  family  burial  place  at  Southill,  in  Bedfordshire.  His  monument 
bears  this  inscription :  "To  the  Perpetual  Disgrace  of  Public 
Justice,  the  Hon.  John  Byng,  Esq.,  Admiral  of  the  Blue,  fell  a 
Martyr  to  Political  Persecution,  March  14th,  in  the  year  MDCCLVII  ; 
when  Bravery  and  Loyalty  were  insufficient  Securities  for  the  Life 
and  Honour  of  a  Naval  Officer." 

The  tragedy,  viewed  from  nearly  every  aspect,  is  to  be  most 
heartily  regretted.  Byng  was  neither  traitor  nor  coward ;  but  he 
was  not  an  original  genius,  and,  having  seen  Mathews  punished  for 
doing  a  certain  thing,  he  believed  that  under  no  circumstances  was 
it  his  duty  to  do  anything  even  remotely  of  the  same  kind.  His 
chief  fault  was  that  he  was  not  independent  enough,  where  a  great 
object  was  to  be  gained,  to  shake  himself  loose  from  formulae  and 
precedents,  and  to  dash  in  when  occasion  allowed  him.  Yet,  in 
one  way,  the  sentence  may  have  been  productive  of  good.  It  may 
have  taught  the  admirals  who  followed  the  unfortunate  Byng,  that 
they  must  pay  more  attention  to  victory  than  to  red  tape,  and 
that  not  even  the  most  honest  devotion  to  conventional  methods 
is  so  great  a  merit  in  a  naval  officer  as  success  against  the  enemies 
of  his  country. 

Sir  Edward  Hawke,  soon  after  his  arrival  at  Gibraltar,  sailed 
with  the  fleet  to  Minorca,  but  found  that  the  island  had  fallen,  and 
that  the  French  army  and  fleet  had  returned  to  Toulon.  The 
enemy  had  no  longer  any  squadron  at  sea  in  the  Mediterranean, 
and  the  Vice-Admiral  therefore  had  to  confine  himself  to  protecting 
British  trade  and  preserving  British  prestige.  This  he  did  with 
conspicuous  energy  and  success.  On  December  3rd,  175G,  he  set 
out  writh  part  of  his  fleet  for  home,  leaving  Bear-Admiral  Charles 
Saunders  in  command. 

It  has  been  said  that  Vice-Admiral  Charles  Watson,  Commander- 
in-Chief  in  the  East  Indies,  arrived  off  Fort  St.  David  in  the  middle 
of  May,  1756.  He  had  not  been  there  long  ere  he  received  an 
important  piece  of  news,  to  the  effect  that  six  large  French  East 
Indiamen,  full  of  troops,  were  expected  in  India,  where  they  were 
to  be  fitted  as  men-of-war.  Thereupon,  in  response  to  an  urgent 
summons,  he  went  to  Madras,  where  he  learnt  that  the  Nawab  of 
Bengal,  Surajah  Dowleh,  had  seized  Cassimbazar  and  Calcutta. 
Almost  at  the  same  moment  Watson  received  orders  from  the 


1757.] 


WATSON    TAKES   CALCUTTA. 


161 


Admiralty  to  return  with  his  squadron l  to  England.  He  had, 
however,  sufficient  strength  of  character  to  disregard  orders  which 
he  knew  had  been  sent  to  him  under  misconception  of  the  position 
in  India ;  and  he  proceeded  at  once  to  the  mouth  of  the  Ganges, 
with  a  detachment  of  troops  under  Lieut. -Colonel  Clive.  In  spite  of 
great  difficulties  he  assembled  at  Fulta,  on  December  15th,  a  force 
consisting  of  fheKent,  Tiger,  Bridgewatcr,  Salisbury,  and  Kingfisher, 
with  some  ships  belonging  to  the  East  India  Company.  He  there 
found  Governor  Blake  and  other  fugitives  from  Calcutta,  and  learnt 
of  the  horrible  fate  of  those  Europeans  who  had  been  less  fortunate, 
and  who  had  been  confined  in  the  infamous  Black  Hole.  "Watson 
reinforced  his  command  by  the  purchase  of  a  craft,  which  he  named 
the  Thunder,  and  fitted  as  a  bomb  under  the  command  of  Lieutenant 
Thomas  Warwick.  The  squadron  sailed  on  December  '27th  ;  and 
on  the  29th  the  force  was  landed,  and  Fort  Bougee-Bougee  was 
attacked.  This  place  was  captured  by  an  impromptu  assault, 
brought  on  by  an  incursion  into  the  works  of  a  drunken  British 
seaman  named  Strachan ;  and  on  December  30th  the  white  troops 
were  re-embarked,  and  the  squadron  proceeded  up  the  river,  the 
sepoys  of  the  Company's  service  marching  parallel  with  it  along 
the  shore. 

On  January  1st,  when  the  ships  entered  the  channel  between 
Fort  Tanna  and  the  battery  opposite  to  it,  the  enemy  abandoned 
both.  The  Salisbury  was  left  there  to  bring  oft'  the  guns  from  the 
works,  and  to  demolish  the  defences,  and  at  night  the  Vice-Admiral 
manned  and  armed  the  boats  of  his  squadron  and  sent  them  a  few 

1  THE  SQUADRON  UXDKU  VICE-ADMIRAL  WATSON  IN  TIIK  EAST  I\nn;s,  17~>t>-1757. 


Ships. 

Guns.                               Commander;*. 

Kent     .... 

_-.      /Vice-Adm.  Charles  Watson  (]'.). 
iCupt.  Henry  Spoke. 

Cumberland     . 

/Kear-Adm.  George  Pocock  (I!). 
\Capt.  John  Harrison. 

Tii/e.r    .... 

60 

„     Thomas  Latham. 

Salisbury  . 

50 

„     William  Martin  (2). 

Bridyewater    . 

24 

,,     Henry  Smith. 

Triton  1      .      .      . 

24 

„     Edmund  Townley. 

Kingfisher. 

14 

Com.  Richard  Toby. 

Thunder,  bomb  2  . 

,,     Thomas  Warwick. 

Blaze,  fireship2  3  . 

•• 

Lieut.                 ? 

'  Arrived  from  England,  after  the  rest  of  the  squadron  had  gone  to  B,-ugal. 

2  Purchased  and  armi'd  by  the  Vice-Admiral  iu  India. 

»  Could  not  make  the  Ganges,  and  had  to  bear  away  for  Bombay. 


VOL.    III. 


M 


162 


MAJOR    OPERATIONS,   1714-1762. 


[1757. 


miles  up  the  river,  where  they  boarded  and  burnt  some  fireships, 
which  had  been  collected  there.  Early  on  the  2nd,  Colonel  Clive, 
with  the  troops,  landed  and  began  the  march  towards  Calcutta ;  the 
Kent,  Tiger,  Bridgewatcr,  and  Kingfisher  proceeding  as  the  army 
advanced.  At  9.40  A.M.  the  enemy  opened  upon  the  Tiger  from 
their  batteries  below  Calcutta,  but  abandoned  them  as  the  ships 
drew  near.  At  10.20  the  Tiger  and  Kent  began  a  hot  cannonade 


VICE-ADMIRAL    CHARLES    WATSON". 
(From  E.  Fisher fi  cntjrtii'tnij  (tftcr  the  purtruit  by  Hutlson.) 

of  Fort  William,  and  after  two  hours  drove  the  defenders  out  of  it. 
In  this  action  the  British  lost  only  nine  seamen  and  three  soldiers 
killed,  and  twenty-six  seamen  and  five  soldiers  wounded.  Calcutta 
was  at  once  occupied. 

The  Vice-Admiral  later  detached  an  expedition,  the  naval  part 
of  which  was  under  Captain  Eichard  King  (1),  who  was  serving  as  a 
volunteer  in  the  squadron,  to  seize  the  town  of  Hugli,  thirty  miles 
above  Calcutta.  Another  expedition,  under  Captain  Speke,  burnt 


1757.]  WATSON    TAKES    CHA.NDERNAGORE.  103 

the  enemy's  granaries  at  Gongee,  and,  assisted  by  the  troops, 
defeated  a  body  of  natives  which  had  attacked  them.  This  action 
provoked  Surajah  Dowleh  to  send  a  large  army  against  Calcutta. 
Clive  obtained  from  the  Vice-Admiral  the  aid  of  a  detachment  of 
seamen,  under  Commander  Warwick,  and  tried  to  bar  the  way  to 
the  city  ;  but,  being  misled  by  his  guides  in  a  fog,  he  had  to  retreat 
upon  Calcutta.  In  this  affair  Lieutenant  Lutwidge  of  the  Salisbury 
was  mortally  wounded,  and  seventeen  seamen  were  killed  and 
fifteen  wounded.  Clive,  however,  quickly  regained  his  former 
advanced  position,  and  so  disconcerted  his  opponent  that  the  latter 
sued  for  a  peace,  which  was  concluded  on  February  9th.  The 
British  might  undoubtedly  have  obtained  more  favourable  terms 
than  they  did,  had  they  not  been  anxious  to  patch  up  all  their 
differences  with  the  native  princes,  in  order  to  be  able  to  concentrate 
the  whole  of  their  resources  in  opposition  to  the  French  in  India. 

These  matters  having  been  settled,  the  Vice-Admiral  made 
preparations  for  at  once  attacking  Chandernagore ;  but  the  French 
made  overtures  for  the  neutrality  of  the  place,  and  thus  to  some 
extent  delayed  him.  Failing  in  their  efforts  in  this  direction,  the 
French  began  to  tamper  with  Surajah  Dowleh.  In  the  mean- 
time, however,  Watson  and  Clive  invested  Chandernagore.  On 
March  19th,  the  British  boats  destroyed  some  French  fireships 
which  were  collected  near  the  town.  On  the  21st,  Bear-Admiral 
Pocock  joined  the  flag ;  but  he  had  been  obliged  to  leave  his  own 
flagship  at  Ballasore,  as  she  drew  too  much  water  to  come  up  the 
river ;  and  he  arrived  in  a  boat.  On  the  '22nd  he  hoisted  his  flag  in 
the  Tiger.  On  the  23rd  there  was  a  general  bombardment  of  the 
fort  from  land  and  water ;  and,  after  three  hours'  hot  tiring,  the 
French  capitulated.  The  Salisbury,  owing  to  an  accident,  was 
unable  to  get  into  action.  The  Kent  lost  19  killed  and  49  wounded ; 
the  Tiger,  13  killed  and  50  wounded.  Among  those  hurt  was  liear- 
Admiral  Pocock. 

The  fugitives  from  Chandernagore  were  received  and  sheltered 
by  the  Nawab,  who  acted  throughout  with  great  duplicity ;  and,  as 
the  British  soon  afterwards  learnt  of  a  plan  of  his  own  discontented 
subjects  to  depose  him,  they  determined  to  aid  and  abet  it.  It 
cannot  be  pretended  that  the  negotiations  to  this  end  were  altogether 
honourable  to  those  Englishmen  who  were  concerned  in  it ;  and 
Vice-Admiral  Watson  declined  to  be  a  party  to  certain  questionable 
undertakings,  which,  in  pursuance  of  the  resolution,  were  entered 

At    2 


164  MAJOR    OPERATIONS,    1714-1762.  [1757. 

into  by  Clive  and  the  council ;  but  his  name  was,  without  his 
privity,  affixed  to  the  treaty  with  the  malcontents.  Clive  then 
attacked  the  Nawab,  and  on  June  23rd,  1757,  defeated  him  at 
Plassey.  This  victory  eventually  led  to  the  fall  and  death  of 
Surajah  Dowleh,  and  to  the  establishment  in  his  place  of  Meer 
Jaffier,  a  nominee  of  the  British.  The  settlement  was  barely  con- 
cluded when,  on  August  16th,  Vice-Admiral  Watson  died.  His  part 
in  the  foundation  of  the  British  Empire  in  India  has  scarcely  been 
done  justice  to,  and  his  loss,  just  then  a  serious  one,  would  have 
been  much  more  severely  felt  than  it  was,  had  he  not  had  as  his 
successor  so  capable  an  officer  as  Rear-Admiral  Pocock. 

Commodore  James,  of  the  East  India  Company's  service,  in 
the  Ecvcncjc,  22,  had  been  stationed  off  Pondicherry  to  watch 
the  motions  of  the  enemy,  and  had  been  joined  there  by  H.M.S. 
Triton,  24.  But  these  vessels  were  driven  off  in  September  by 
a  strong  French  squadron  ;  and,  since  Pocock's  ships  were  in  a  rather 
bad  condition,  and  some  of  them  temporarily  unfit  for  action,  the 
situation  began  to  look  threatening,  especially  seeing  that  an 
expected  British  reinforcement,  under  Commodore  Charles  Stevens, 
had  been  detained  at  Bombay,  and  did  not  actually  sail  thence  for 
the  coast  of  Coromandel  until  January  '20th,  1758. 

Indeed,  the  French  were  making  great  efforts  to  defend  their 
challenged  possessions  in  India.  They  had  already  fitted  out  an 
expedition,  the  naval  command  of  which  was  given  to  the  Comte 
d'Ache,  and  the  military,  to  General  Comte  de  Lally.  The  squadron 
consisted  of  three  king's  ships,  and  one  ship  and  a  frigate  belonging 
to  the  French  East  India  Company,  with  about  1200  troops  on 
board.  D'Ache  sailed  on  March  (Jth,  1757,  but  was  driven  back  to 
Brest  by  a  storm,  and,  while  there,  was  deprived  of  two  of  the 
king's  ships,  in  order  that  they  might  be  despatched  to  Canada. 
Instead  of  them  he  received  five  more  East  Indiamen.  He  sailed 
on  May  4th,  and  on  December  18th  reached  Isle  de  France,  where 
he  found  four  additional  armed  East  Indiamen.  Choosing  the  best 
vessels  at  his  disposal,  he  put  to  sea  with  them  on  January  27th, 
1758.  The  further  movements  of  d'Ache  and  of  Pocock  will  be 
referred  to  later.  Operations  in  other  quarters  during  1757  must 
first  be  followed. 

On  the  Leeward  Islands'  station,  Commodore  John  Moore  (1) 
relieved  Eear-Admiral  Thomas  Frankland  and  rendered  valuable 
service  in  protecting  trade.  On  the  Jamaica  station,  Eear-Admiral 


1757.] 


FORREST S  ACTION    WITH  DE  KERSAINT. 


165 


Thomas  Cotes  was  in  command,  and  was  not  less  successful.  In 
the  autumn,  learning  that  the  French  were  assembling,  at  Cape 
Fra^ois,  a  convoy  for  Europe,  he  sent  the  Augusta,  Edinburgh 
and  Dreadnought  to  cruise  off  that  place  to  intercept  it.  This 
convoy  was  to  be  escorted  by  M.  de  Kersaint,  with  a  small  squadron, 
which  Cotes  believed  would  be  little,  if  at  all,  superior  to  that  under 
Captain  Arthur  Forrest  of  the  Augusta.  But  de  Kersaint  was 
reinforced  at  Cape  Fran£ois,  and  had  in  consequence  a  considerably 
more  powerful  command J  than  the  British  officer.  On  October  21st,2 
de  Kersaint  issued  forth,  hoping  by  his  very  appearance  in  such 
force  to  drive  Forrest  away.  The  latter,  upon  the  French  being 
signalled,  summoned  his  brother  captains  011  board  the  Ai/;/nsta, 
and,  when  they  met  him  on  his  quarterdeck,  said,  "Well,  gentle- 
men, you  see  they  are  come  out  to  engage  us."  Upon  which 
Captain  Suckling  answered,  "  I  think  it  would  be  a  pity  to  dis- 
appoint them."  Captain  Langdon  was  of  the  same  opinion. 
"Very  well,"  replied  Captain  Forrest;  "go  on  board  your  ships 
again";  and  he  at  once  made  the  signal  to  bear  down  and  engage 
the  enemy.  The  French  had  seven  vessels  to  the  British  three. 
Captain  Suckling  took  the  van,  Captain  Forrest  the  centre,  and 
Captain  Langdon  the  rear.  The  action  began  at  about  3.20  P.M., 
and  continued  very  briskly  for  two  hours  and  a  half,  when  the 
French  commodore  ordered  one  of  his  frigates  to  come  and  tow 
him  out  of  the  line.  Others  of  his  squadron  soon  followed  his 
example ;  and  eventually  the  French  made  off.  The  British  ships 
were  all  much  cut  up  aloft.  The  Augusta  lost  9  killed  and 
29  wounded;  the  Dreadnought,  9  killed  and  30  wounded;  and  the 
Edinburgh,  5  killed  and  30  wounded.  The  loss  of  the  French  is  said 


1  THE  BRITISH  ASD  FRENCH  SQUADRONS  KXOAGKD  o\  OCTOBER  21sT,  1757. 


BKIIISH. 


Ships. 

Guns. 

Commamlers. 

Ships. 

G  uiis.              Commamlers. 

Augusta. 
Dreadnought     . 
Edinburgh  . 

60 
60 
61 

Capt.  Arthur  Forrest. 
,,     Maurice  Suckling. 
„     William  Laiigdou. 

Intri-pide 
Xceptrc    .... 
OpinMtri!    . 

74       M.  de  Kersaint. 
74 
64 

Greenwich,  . 

50 

Outanle  . 

44 

Sauvage  . 

3-2 

Licornt   . 

3-2 

2  On  the  same  day,  forty-eight  years  later,  was  fought  the  battle  of  Trafalgar. 
Nelson,  before  going  into  action,  recalled  the  fact  that  the  day  was  the  anniversary  of 
his  uncle's  gallant  behaviour,  and  regarded  it  as  of  good  omen. 


1(56 


MAJOR    OPERATIONS,    1714-1762. 


[1757. 


to  have  exceeded  500  in  killed  and  wounded.  Few  pluckier  or  more 
creditable  actions  have  ever  been  fought ;  and  it  is  worth  noting 
that  among  the  British  captains,  all  of  whom  greatly  distinguished 
themselves,  one,  Maurice  Suckling,  was  a  maternal  uncle  of  Lord 
Nelson,  and  Nelson's  earliest  patron.  Forrest  had  to  bear  up  for 
Jamaica,  in  order  to  get  his  ships  refitted.  De  Kersaint,  in  the 
meantime,  picked  up  his  convoy  and  sailed  for  France.  But,  at  the 


CAPTAIN'    MAUHICE   SUCKI.ISH,    H.X.,    COXTKOLI.KH   OF   THK    XAVY,    1775-78. 
(By  permission,  from  the  portrait  by  Bartlrrell,  in  the,  puxxex.t/on  tit  ('apt.  Thomas  Suckling,  R.N.~) 


very  end  of  his  voyage,  he  met  with  a  severe  storm,  in  which 
the  Opinlcltre,  Greenwich,  and  Outarde  drove  ashore  and  were 
wrecked. 

On  the  North  American  station  Lord  Loudoun,  the  new  military 
commander-in-chief,  had  formulated  in  the  autumn  of  1756,  a  plan 
for  the  conquest  of  Cape  Breton  ;  and,  in  the  winter,  the  Ministry 
at  home  approved  his  scheme.  On  January  3rd,  1757,  he  laid 
a  general  embargo  on  all  outward-bound  ships  in  American  colonial 


1757.]  PLANS    OF  LOUD   LOUDOUN.  167 

ports.  His  objects  were,  firstly,  to  prevent  the  communication  of 
intelligence  to  the  enemy  ;  secondly,  to  obtain  the  necessary  trans- 
ports ;  and  thirdly,  to  secure  additional  seamen  for  his  Majesty's 
ships.  The  measure,  though  perhaps  it  was  wise,  produced  strong 
dissatisfaction  both  in  America  and  at  home ;  and,  in  spite  of  the 
precaution,  the  French  heard  of  the  project.  In  the  early  spring, 
therefore,  they  sent  a  fleet  and  strong  reinforcements  to  Louisbourg. 

Loudoun  assembled  at  New  York  ninety  transports ;  and, 
presently,  Sir  Charles  Hardy  (2),  Governor  of  New  York,  received  a 
commission  as  Bear-Admiral,  with  orders  to  hoist  his  flag  and  co- 
operate with  the  military  commander-in-chief.  He  first  hoisted  his 
flag  in  the  Nightingale,  20,  but  removed  it  later  to  the  Sutherland,  50, 
Captain  Edward  Falkingham  (2).  The  army,  consisting  of  3500 
men,  was  all  embarked  by  the  25th ;  but,  just  as  the  fleet  was  ready 
to  sail,  news  arrived  that  a  French  squadron,  of  five  ships  of  the 
line  and  a  frigate,  was  cruising  off  Halifax.  This  delayed  the 
departure  of  the  expedition  until  the  Kear-Admiral  had  sent  two 
sloops  to  reconnoitre.  As  they  saw  no  enemy,  Hardy  sailed  on 
June  5th,  and  a  few  days'  afterwards  disembarked  his  forces  for 
refreshment  and  exercise  at  Halifax,  where  were  found  three 
infantry  regiments  and  a  company  of  artillery,  bringing  the  total 
force  up  to  about  11,000  men. 

Loudoun  would  scarcely  have  left  New  Yrork  with  so  feeble 
a  convoy l  as  that  which  was  available  under  Hardy,  had  he  not 
had  reason  to  expect  to  meet  at  Halifax  Vice-Admiral  Francis 
Holburne,  with  a  fleet  from  England,  to  support  him.  But,  owing 
to  mismanagement  at  home,  Holburne  did  not  leave  St.  Helen's  for 
Ireland,  where  he  was  to  pick  up  troops,  until  April  16th ;  and 
sailing  from  Cork  on  May  27th,  he  did  not  reach  Halifax  until 
July  7th,  when  the  season  was  almost  too  far  advanced  for  the  safe 
commencement  of  an  enterprise  which  could  not  but  be  met  with 
the  most  vigorous  opposition.  Moreover,  the  French  had  been 
beforehand,  and  had  despatched  from  Brest  a  fleet,  which,  under 
M.  de  Beauffremont,  went  first  to  the  West  Indies,  and,  proceeding, 
entered  Louisbourg  on  June  5th,  finding  there  four  sail  of  the  line 
which  a  few  days  earlier  had  arrived  from  Toulon  under  M.  du 
Eevest.  A  further  reinforcement  from  Brest,  under  M.  Dubois 

1  Sutherland,  50,  Captain  Edward  Falkingham  (2);  Nightingale,  20,  Captain 
James  Campbell  (2)  ;  Kenninyton,  20,  Captain  Dudley  Digges  ;  Vulture,  16,  Commander 
Sampson  Salt ;  and  Ferret,  14,  Commander  Arthur  Upton. 


168  MAJOR    OPERATIONS,   1714-1762.  [1757. 

de  la  Motte,  sailed  on  May  3rd,  and,  evading  the  British  blockade, 
reached  Louisbourg  on  June  29th,  when  the  united  French 
squadrons  included  eighteen  sail  of  the  line  and  five  frigates,  a 
force  much  superior  to  that  which  Holburne  and  Hardy  were  able 
to  dispose  of.  The  town  also  contained  7000  regular  troops. 
Dubois  de  la  Motte  had  been  expressly  ordered  to  protect  Louis- 
bourg, and  on  no  account  to  hazard  an  engagement  with  the 
British  fleet  unless  he  should  be  in  such  overwhelming  force  as  to 
place  the  question  of  his  success  beyond  a  doubt.  It  is  right  to 
point  this  out  in  order  to  excuse  him  for  having  neither  annihilated 
Holburne,  nor  blockaded  the  British  in  Halifax. 

Vice-Admiral  Holburne  sent  the  Winchekca,  20,  Captain  John 
Ecus,  and  other  frigates,  to  look  into  Louisbourg.  Ecus  returned, 
and,  in  consequence  of  bis  report,  the  army  was  re-embarked  on 
August  1st  and  2nd,  and  a  rendezvous  was  appointed  in  Gabarus 
Bay,  six  miles  west  of  Louisbourg.  Eons  seems  to  have  underrated 
the  strength  of  the  French  forces  ;  but  truer  information  concerning 
it  was  presently  received  from  some  papers  which  had  been  dis- 
covered in  a  prize.  This  led  to  the  abandonment  of  the  project. 
Some  regiments  remained  in  Halifax ;  others,  under  convoy,  went 
to  the  Bay  of  Fundy,  to  Fort  Cumberland,  and  to  Annapolis  Eoyal ; 
and  the  rest,  with  Loudoun,  against  whom  there  was  a  great  outcry, 
returned  to  New  York. 

Holburne,  however,  was  not  satisfied,  and  resolved  to  reconnoitre 
Louisbourg  for  himself.  Leaving,  therefore,  a  few  vessels  for  the 
defence  of  Halifax,  he  sailed  on  August  10th,  and  arrived  before  the 
place  on  August  20th.  Near  the  harbour's  mouth  some  of  his  ships 
got  close  enough  in  to  draw  the  fire  from  the  island  battery.  The 
Vice-Admiral  was  thus  able  to  satisfy  himself  that  the  strength  of 
the  enemy  had  not  been  exaggerated.  Dubois  de  la  Motte  signalled 
his  fleet  to  unmoor,  whereupon  the  British  tacked,  stood  off,  and  at 
nightfall  bore  away.  On  September  llth,  Holburne  was  again  at 
Halifax,  where  he  found  reinforcements  of  four  sail  of  the  line  from 
England,  under  Captain  Francis  Geary. 

The  original  project  could  not  then  be  persisted  in,  but  Holburne, 
after  watering  and  rewooding  his  fleet,  which  by  that  time  consisted 
of  nineteen  sail  of  the  line,  two  fifty-gun  ships,  and  several  frigates, 
sailed  for  Louisbourg  with  the  intention  of  blockading  the  French, 
until  the  approach  of  winter  and  shortness  of  supplies  should  oblige 
them  to  come  out  and  fight  him.  On  September  24th,  he  was  only 


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1757.]  STORM   OFF  LOUISBOURG.  169 

about  sixty  miles  south  of  Louisbourg,  when  a  fresh  easterly  gale 
sprang  up.  In  the  night  it  veered  to  the  southward  and  blew  an 
awful  hurricane  until  about  11  A.M.  on  the  25th.  Then,  fortunately, 
it  again  veered  to  the  north,  otherwise  the  fleet  could  scarcely  have 
been  saved  from  destruction.  The  Tilbury,  60,  Captain  Henry 
Barnsley,1  who,  with  nearly  all  the  crew,  was  lost,  struck  and  went 
to  pieces.  The  Grafton,2  70,  Captain  Thomas  Cornewall,  bearing 
the  broad  pennant  of  Commodore  Charles  Holmes,  also  struck,  but 
was  got  off.  The  Ferret,  14,  Commander  Arthur  Upton,  foundered 
with  all  hands.  All  the  other  ships  of  the  fleet  were  seriously 
damaged,  110  fewer  than  twelve  being  dismasted  either  wholly  or  in 
part.  It  was  the  fiercest  hurricane  ever  experienced  by  anyone  then 
on  the  station  ;  and  it  naturally  put  an  end  to  Holburne's  plan.  The 
Vice-Admiral  sent  his  most  damaged  ships  direct  to  England,  under 
Sir  Charles  Hardy  ('2)  and  Commodore  Charles  Holmes,  and  went 
with  the  rest  to  Halifax,  whence,  having  refitted,  he  too  sailed  for 
England,  leaving  a  few  ships  under  Captain  Lord  Colville,  of  the 
Northumberland,  70,  to  winter  at  Halifax.  Lord  Colville  had 
orders  to  endeavour,  when  the  season  should  permit,  to  prevent 
supplies  from  getting  into  Louisbourg.  The  French  force  there, 
however,  put  to  sea  at  the  end  of  October,  and,  after  suffering  from 
very  bad  weather  during  the  voyage,  reached  Brest  at  the  end  of 
November. 

The  proceedings  of  M.  de  Kersaint  on  the  Jamaica  station  have 
already  been  described.  Previous  to  going  thither  he  had  cruised 
on  the  coast  of  Guinea ;  and,  in  the  absence  of  any  sufficient  British 
squadron  there  to  oppose  him,  had  taken  many  prizes.  He  had  also 
attempted  Cape  Coast  Castle,  but  had  been  beaten  off  by  the  resource 
and  courage  of  Mr.  Bell,  the  Governor. 

In  the  Mediterranean,  Bear-Admiral  Charles  Saunders,  who  had 
been  left  in  command  after  the  return  to  England  of  Sir  Edward 
Hawke,  heard  at  the  end  of  March  that  four  sail  of  the  line — the 
same  which  later  reached  Louisbourg — and  one  frigate,  under 
M.  du  Revest,  had  quitted  Toulon.  He  therefore  left  Gibraltar  on 
April  2,  1757,  to  intercept  them  with  the  Culloden,  74,  Berwick,  64, 
Princess  Louisa,  60,  Guernsey,  50,  and  Portland,  50.  On  April  5th, 

1  In  some  Navy  Lists  of  the  period  this  officer  appears  as  Barnsby.     He  was  a 
captain  of  1748. 

2  She  lost  her  mainmast,  foretopmast,  and  rudder ;  but  the  ship  was  safely  steered 
to  England  by  means  of  a  jury-rudder  devised  by  Commodore.  Holmes.     (See  plate.) 


170  MAJOR    OPERATIONS,   1714-1762.  [1757. 

at  5  P.M.,  he  sighted  the  enemy  and,  being  to  leeward,  formed  his 
line.  At  sunset  the  French  did  the  same,  and  began  to  fire  at  very 
long  range.  The  British  chased,  and  gained  so  much  on  them  that 
the  Guernsey  and  Princess  Louisa  were  able  to  engage ;  but  in  the 
night  the  French  got  away.  Vice-Admiral  Henry  Osborn  arrived 
with  reinforcements  in  May,  and  assumed  the  command ;  but, 
though  the  trade  was  well  protected  and  many  prizes  were  taken, 


ADMIRAL    SIR   CHARLES    SAUXnERS,    K.E. 
(From  a  portrait  in  the  '  Xaval  Chronicle'  ISOi.) 

no  further  fleet  operations  of   any  importance  took   place  on   the 
station  during  the  year. 

It  has  been  said  that  M.  Dubois  de  la  Motte  escaped  from  Brest 
in  May  1757,  with  nine  sail  of  the  line  and  four  frigates,  and 
reached  Louisbourg.  He  was  enabled  to  escape  by  the  fact  that 
the  blockading  squadron  before  the  place,  under  Vice-Admiral 
Temple  West,  had  been  driven  from  its  station  by  bad  weather. 
West  was  afterwards  relieved  by  Rear-Admiral  Thomas  Broderick, 


1757.]  EXPEDITION  AGAINST  BOCHEFORT.  171 

who  remained  cruising  till  June,  when  Vice-Admiral  the  Hon. 
Edward  Boscawen  took  the  command  of  the  squadron  for  about  a 
month.  Prizes  were  made,  but  there  was  no  meeting  between  the 
fleets  of  the  two  countries. 

As  the  French  still  notoriously  cherished  the  design  of  an  in- 
vasion of  England,  the  Ministry  determined  if  possible  to  be  before- 
hand and  to  deal  a  blow  on  the  French  coasts.  A  military  officer, 
who  had  made  a  short  stay  at  Kochefort  before  the  outbreak  of  the 
war,  gave  information  concerning  the  condition  of  the  defences  of 
that  port,  which,  though  supposed  to  be  weak,  contained  a  most 
valuable  dockyard,  arsenal,  and  foundry.  The  representations  of 
this  officer,  Captain  Clarke  by  name,  induced  the  authorities  to 
undertake  an  expedition  against  the  town,  and  they  were  the  more 
readily  inclined  to  adopt  this  course  seeing  that  nearly  the  whole  of 
the  French  army  was  believed  to  be  employed  in  Germany,  and  that 
but  few  troops  were  supposed  to  be  available  on  the  Atlantic  seaboard. 
The  scheme  was  kept  secret ;  but  a  large  squadron  was  prepared 
and  entrusted  to  Admiral  Sir  Edward  Hawke  (Rumillics,  90), 
Vice-Admiral  Charles  Knowles  (Neptune,  90),  and  liear-Admiral 
Broderick  (Princess  Amelia,  80) ;  and  troops  were  collected  and  em- 
barked under  Lieut. -General  Sir  John  Mordaunt  and  Major-Generals 
Con  way  and  Cornwallis.  The  instructions  to  Sir  Edward  Hawke 
were  "  to  attempt,  as  far  as  it  shall  be  found  practicable,  a  descent 
on  the  coast  of  France,  at  or  near  Kochefort,  in  order  to  attack  and, 
by  vigorous  impression,  force  that  place ;  and  to  burn  and  destroy  to 
the  utmost  of  his  power  all  such  docks,  magazines,  arsenals  and 
shipping  as  shall  be  found  there." 

The  fleet  consisted  of  sixteen  sail  of  the  line,  besides  numerous 
frigates,  small  craft,  and  transports ;  and  it  sailed  on  September  8th  ; 
but  its  destination  was  not  known,  nor  even  suspected,  by  any  with 
it,  except  the  chiefs,  until  September  14th,  when  the  alteration  of 
course  revealed  it. 

On  the  20th  Sir  Edward  Hawke  issued  orders  to  Vice-Admiral 
Knowles,  directing  him  to  attack  Isle  d'Aix  ;  and  at  noon  the  Vice- 
Admiral  proceeded  to  execute  these  directions ;  but,  in  doing  so,  he 
chased  a  two-decked  French  ship,  which  escaped  into  the  Garonne 
and  gave  the  alarm.  Early  on  the  23rd  the  Vice-Admiral,  with  the 
Neptune,  90,  Captain  James  Galbraith;  Magnanime,  74,  Captain 
the  Hon.  Eichard  Howe ;  Barfleur,  90,  Captain  Samuel  Graves  (1) ; 
Torbay,  74,  Captain  the  Hon.  Augustus  Keppel ;  Eoyal  William,  84, 


172  MAJOR    OPERATIONS,   1714-1762.  [1758. 

Captain  Wittewronge  Taylor,  and  two  bombs,  the  Firedrake  and 
Infernal,  attacked  the  works  on  Aix.  The  Magnanime  got  into 
action  within  forty  yards  of  the  fort,  and,  she  being  well  seconded 
by  the  Barfleur,  in  half  an  hour  the  position  surrendered.  It  was 
taken  possession  of,  and  the  defences  were  later  destroyed.  In  the 
meantime  vessels  were  sent  to  reconnoitre,  and  to  sound  for  a 
suitable  place  of  disembarkation  on  the  mainland ;  but  it  was 
discovered  that  a  landing  in  any  case  would  be  difficult,  and  that, 
if  opposed,  it  could  scarcely  be  effected.  At  a  council  of  war,  held 
on  the  25th  in  the  Neptune,  it  was  therefore  decided  not  to  proceed ; 
but  at  another  council  of  war,  on  the  28th,  this  decision  was  re- 
versed, and  it  was  determined  to  attempt  an  attack,  in  spite  of  the 
fact  that  the  enemy,  who  had  been  very  active,  was  then  better  than 
ever  prepared.  Yet  when,  in  the  early  morning  of  the  29th,  all  was 
ready,  the  wind  blew  off  shore,  and  the  scheme  had  finally  to  be 
abandoned.  On  October  1st  the  fleet  sailed  for  England,  and  on  the 
Gth  arrived  at  Spithead.  The  collapse  of  the  expedition,  and  the 
waste  of  money,  which  its  mismanagement  by  the  Government  had 
entailed,  caused  grave  public  dissatisfaction. 

Almost  immediately  afterwards  a  fleet  of  fifteen  sail  of  the  line 
and  several  frigates,  under  Admiral  Sir  Edward  Hawke  and  Vice- 
Admiral  the  Hon.  Edward  Boscawen,  was  sent  to  sea  with  a  view 
to  intercept  the  home-coming  French  squadron  from  Louisbourg. 
It  sailed  from  Spithead  on  October  22nd,  but,  when  on  its  station, 
was  dispersed  by  a  gale ;  and,  before  it  could  regain  its  assigned 
position,  M.  Dubois  de  la  Motte  got  into  Brest  unperceived,  except 
by  the  Vanguard,  Captain  Eobert  Swanton,  which  sighted  it  on 
November  23rd,  and  which  was  engaged  by  some  of  the  enemy. 
M.  Dubois  de  la  Motte  finally  called  off  his  chasers  for  fear  of 
attracting  the  attention  of  the  British  fleet.  Hawke  and  Boscawen, 
therefore,  returned  to  Spithead  on  December  15th. 

The  Earl  of  Loudoun  was  in  1758  succeeded  as  military  corn- 
mander-in-chief  in  North  America  by  Major-General  Abercrombie ; 
and  it  was  determined  to  begin  operations  for  the  year  with  the 
siege  of  Louisbourg.  Admiral  Boscawen,  Bear-Admiral  Sir  Charles 
Hardy  (2),  and  Commodore  Philip  Durell  (1),  were  nominated  to  the 
command  of  the  fleet  which  was  designed  for  the  service ;  and,  in 
January,  Hardy  sailed  in  the  Captain,  64,  for  Halifax,  to  assume 
charge  of  the  ships  already  there,  and  with  them  to  blockade 
Louisbourg  as  soon  as  the  season  should  permit.  Early  in  February, 


1758.] 


DISTRIBUTION    OF   THE    NAVY. 


173 


Durell  followed  him  in  the  Diana,  36,  to  make  the  necessary  local 
preparations ;  and  on  February  19th  Boscawen  himself  sailed  with 
the  fleet.  After  Boscawen's  departure,  Sir  Edward  Hawke  was 
despatched  to  blockade  the  French  Channel  ports,  while  Commodore 
Charles  Holmes  cruised  off  the  north  coast  of  Holland,  and  assisted 
in  obliging  the  French  and  their  allies  to  evacuate  Emden.  At 
the  same  time,  troops  were  assembled  in  the  Isle  of  Wight  for  1111 


ADMIHAI,   SIR    GEOUGK    I'OCOCK,    K.H. 
(From  mi  cntjrartmj  by  R'ulleij,  aftrr  the  pvrtruit  ln.i  Ilmlmii.) 

intended  incursion  upon  the  coast  of  France,  and  Admiral  Lord 
Anson  assumed  the  command  of  the  blockading  fleet  before  Brest, 
while  a  squadron  for  the  descent  upon  the  French  coast  was  collected 
under  Commodore  the  Hon.  Eicharcl  Howe.  It  should  bo  added 
that  reinforcements  were  sent  to  India,  under  Captain  Richard 
Tiddeman ;  that  a  small  force  under  Captain  Henry  Marsh  went  to 
the  west  coast  of  Africa ;  and  that  an  expedition,  ultimately  en- 
trusted to  Commodore  John  Moore,  sailed  later  for  the  West  Indies. 


174 


MAJOR    OPERATIONS,    1714-1762. 


[1758. 


Having  thus  summarised  some  of  the  chief  naval  movements  of 
1758,  we  may  proceed  to  give  accounts  of  the  squadrons  and  their 
principal  doings. 

In  the  East  Indies  Vice-Admiral  Pocock  was  joined  in  Madras 
Road,  on  March  24th,  by  Commodore  Charles  Stevens,  and,  on 
April  17th,  sailed,  with  the  object  of  getting  to  windward  of  Fort 
St.  David,  to  intercept  the  French  squadron  which  was  expected  on 
the  coast.  Comte  d'Ache  had  reached  Mauritius  on  December  17th, 
1757,  and  had  there  joined  the  small  squadron  under  M.  Bouvet, 
with  whom  he  sailed  on  January  27th,  1758,  and  made  for  the  coast 
of  Coromandel ;  but,  owing  to  the  monsoon,  he  did  not  anchor  off 
Fort  St.  David  until  April  28th.  Having  eleven  vessels,  the  French 
cut  off  the  escape  of  H.M.S.  Briclgcicatcr,  24,  Captain  John  Stanton, 
and  Triton,  24,  Captain  Thomas  Manning,  which  were  lying  there, 
and  which,  to  save  them  from  capture,  were  run  ashore  and  burnt. 
D'Ache  detached  thence  the  Comte  de  Provence,  74,  and  the  Dili- 
cjente,  24,  to  carry  to  Pondicherry  M.  de  Lally,  the  new  governor  of 
the  French  East  India  possessions.  On  the  29th,  at  9  A.M.,  ere  the 
detachment  had  disappeared,  Pocock  sighted  the  French  squadron 
which  then  consisted  of  eight l  ships  fit  for  the  line,  whereas  the 
British  consisted  of  only  seven.2  Pocock  signalled  for  a  general 
chase ;  upon  which  the  French  weighed  and  stood  out  to  sea 
E.  by  N.,  with  the  wind  from  the  S.E.  At  12.30  P.M.  Pocock  got 
within  three  miles  of  the  enemy,  who  waited  for  him  in  line  of  battle 
ahead.  He  then  hauled  down  the  signal  for  a  general  chase  and 

1  Xine  were  actually  put  into  line  by  the  French. 

2  BRITISH  AND  FRENCH  SQUADRONS  is  THE  ACTION  OFF  CUDDALOUE 

ox  APRIL  2'.lTH,  1758. 


BRITISH. 


1'llENCH. 


Ships. 

Guns. 

Commanders. 

Ships.               Guns.             Commanders. 

60 

Salisbury     . 

50 

(    „    John          Stukley 
\             Somerset. 

Vrngeur  .     . 
conde     .     . 

541 
441 

Itouvet  (2). 

<1e  Rosbau. 

Elizabeth     .     .     . 

64 

{Commod.  Charles  Stevens. 
Capt.  Richard  Kemp',-n- 
felt. 

Due  d'Orli-'ans 
Zodiaque 

56' 

14      /Co 
'4      ICa 

de  Hurville  (2). 
lite  d'Ache. 
t.  Gotho. 

!  Vice-  Admiral      George 

St.  Louis      . 

501 

Joaunls. 

Yarmouth    . 

64 

Pocock. 

Moras 

441 

Bee  de  Lievre. 

Capt.  John  Harrison. 

Sylphide. 

3li 

Mahe. 

f'ttntberland 

86 

„    William  Brereton. 

Due  de  Bourgo-jne 

60 

d'Apret. 

Weymouth  . 

60 

„    Nicholas  Vincent. 

Comte  de  Provence 

T4          „    de  La  Chaise. 

Queenborough  . 

24 

„    Hon.  JaniesColville. 

Protector,  storeship 

i  Guns  actually  imumte  J.    Each  of  these  ships  could,  and  later  did,  carry  more. 


1758.]  POGOGK  AND   D'ACHE    OFF    CUDDALORE.  175 

made  that  for  line  of  battle  ahead,  with  the  ships  at  a  distance  of 
half  a  cable  apart.  The  Cumberland  and  Tiger,  sailing  badly,  did 
not  get  into  their  positions  until  2.15,  when  Pocock  bore  down  on 
the  Zodiaque,  d'Ache's  flagship,  which  occupied  the  centre  of  the 
French  line.  The  captains  of  the  Newcastle  and  Weymouth  un- 
fortunately mistook  the  signal  for  the  line,  and  did  not  close  up  to 
the  ships  ahead  of  them  ;  and,  when  the  Vice- Admiral  signalled  for 
closer  action,  these  ships  did  not  obey.  The  enemy  opened  fire  as 
the  British  approached.  The  Cumberland  was  so  long  in  getting  up 
that  the  Vice- Admiral,  and  the  three  ships  ahead  of  him,  had,  for 
some  time,  had  to  sustain  the  whole  fire  of  the  Erench.  Yet,  Pocock 
did  not  return  a  shot  until  his  ship  had  hauled  up  exactly  abreast  of 
the  Zodiaque,  and  then,  at  3.55  P.M.,  he  made  the  signal  to  engage. 

Commodore  Stevens,  with  the  ships  ahead  of  the  Vice-Admiral, 
behaved  magnificently,  but  the  three  ships  astern  did  not  properly 
support  the  van.  This  might  have  been  serious,  and  even  fatal,  if 
there  had  not  been  corresponding  mistakes  and  derelictions  of  duty 
on  the  French  side.  The  captain  of  the  Due  dc  Bourgogne  took  up 
a  post  behind  the  French  line,  and,  in  the  most  cowardly  manner, 
fired  across  it  at  the  British;  and  the  Sylphide,  30,  a  weak  ship, 
which  seems  to  have  improperly  found  a  place  in  the  line,  was 
driven  out  of  it  at  the  first  broadside  The  Conde  lost  her  rudder, 
and  was  also  obliged  to  fall  out.  In  the  van  and  centre,  however,  the 
action  was  for  the  most  part  fought  with  the  greatest  determination 
on  both  sides.  In  her  somewhat  belated  attempts  to  get  into  action, 
the  Cumberland  nearly  fouled  the  Yarmouth,  and  forced  her  to  back 
her  topsails,  thus  obliging  the  Newcastle  and  the  Weymouth  to  back 
theirs  likewise.  But  when  the  Cumberland  had  at  length  gained 
her  station,  the  Newcastle  held  back,  in  spite  of  signals  from  the 
Vice-Admiral,  and  in  spite  of  the  We y mouth's  hailing  her  to  close 
up ;  whereupon  the  Wei/mouth  hauled  her  wind  and,  passing  to  wind- 
ward of  the  Newcastle,  got  into  line  ahead  of  her  and  quickly  obliged 
the  Moras  to  bear  away.  The  Cumberland  in  the  meanwhile  en- 
gaged the  St.  Louis,  so  materially  relieving  the  Yarmouth. 

In  the  height  of  the  engagement  explosions  of  powder  on  board 
both  the  Zodiaque  and  the  Bien  Aime  caused  some  confusion. 
D'Ache  signalled  for  those  of  his  ships  which  had  withdrawn  to 
return  to  the  action ;  but  they  paid  no  attention.  Still  the  fight  was 
hot,  and  the  Tiger  was  very  hard  pressed  until  she  was  assisted 
by  the  Salisbury  and  Elizabeth.  As  the  battle  neared  its  termina- 


176  MAJOR    OPERATIONS,    1714-1762.  [1758. 

tion,  the  ship  and  frigate  which  had  been  detached  by  d'Ache  to 
Pondicherry,  and  which  M.  de  Lally  had  refused  to  allow  to 
return  at  once,  although  d'Ache  had  signalled  for  them,  were  coming 
up ;  but,  the  British  rear  then  closing  somewhat,  and  the  fugitive 
French  vessels  not  rejoining,  d'Ache  at  about  6  P.M.  bore  down  to 
his  friends,  and  then,  hauling  his  wind,  made  for  Pondicherry.  His 
final  movement,  which  seems  to  be  thus  rightly  interpreted,  appeared 
to  Pocock  to  have  a  different  significance ;  for  he  wrote  : — 

"  At  half-past  four  P.M.  the  rear  of  the  French  line  had  drawn  pretty  close  up  to 
thi-ir  flagship.  Our  three  rear  ships  were  signalled  to  engage  closer.  Soon  after, 
il.  d'Ache  broke  the  line  and  put  before  the  wind.  His  second  astern,  who  had  kept 
on  the  Yarmouth's  quarter  most  part  of  the  action,  then  came  up  alongside,  gave  his 
fire,  and  then  bore  away;  and  a  few  minutes  after  the  enemy's  van  bore  away  also." 

From  this,  as  Captain  Mahan  points  out,  it  would  appear  that 
the  French  deliberately,  before  leaving  the  scene  of  the  action, 
effected  upon  the  principal  English  ship  a  movement  of  concentra- 
tion, defiling  past  her.1 

Pocock  hauled  down  the  signal  to  engage,  and  rehoisted  that  for 
a  general  chase ;  but  such  of  his  ships  as  had  fought  well  were  too 
disabled  to  come  up  with  the  enemy,  and,  night  approaching,  he 
stood  to  the  southward  with  a  view  of  keeping  to  the  windward  of 
the  enemy,  and  of  being  able  to  engage  him  in  the  morning,  if  the 
French  did  not  weather  the  British.  With  this  object  he  ordered 
the  Queenborough,  24,  ahead  to  observe  the  enemy;  and  he  con- 
tinued to  endeavour  to  work  up  after  the  French  until  6  A.M.  on 
May  1st,  when,  as  he  lost  ground  and  pursuit  appeared  to  be  useless, 
he  anchored  three  miles  south  of  Sadras. 

In  this  battle,  which  was  fought  about  twenty-one  miles  from 
Lampraavy,  the  British  had  lost  '29  killed  and  89  wounded.  At 
10  P.M.  on  the  day  of  the  action,  the  French  anchored  off  Lam- 
praavy. There,  owing  to  the  loss  of  her  anchors  and  to  damage  to 
her  cables,  the  Hien  Aime  drove  ashore  and  was  wrecked;  all  her 
crew,  however,  being  saved.  In  the  engagement  the  French  had 
suffered  far  more  severely  than  the  British,  having  lost  162  killed, 
and  360  wounded  ;  for  the  ships  had  been  full  of  troops  and  the 
English  fire  had  been  directed,  as  usual,  against  the  hulls  rather 
than  against  the  rigging.  D'Ache  afterwards  proceeded  to  Pondi- 
cherry, where  he  landed  1200  sick,  and  superseded  M.  d'Apret, 
captain  of  the  Due  de  Bourgogne,  by  M.  Bouvet.  It  seems  to  have 

1  '  Infl.  of  Sea  Power,'  308. 


1758.]  D'ACBE  AT  PONDICHEBBY.  177 

been  chiefly  owing  to  the  backwardness  of  the  captains  in  the 
British  rear  that  the  French  were  not  completely  defeated. 

At  about  the  time  of  the  action,  the  French  on  land  had  taken 
Cuddalore,  the  garrison  of  which  was  allowed  to  retire  to  Fort 
St.  David.  That  place  was  soon  'afterwards  besieged  by  M.  de  Lally. 
Pocock  received  some  additional  men  from  Madras,  including  eighty 
lascars,  and,  having  repaired  the  worst  damages  of  his  ships,  tried  in 
vain  to  work  up  along  the  coast.  Pie  then  stood  to  sea,  and  on 
May  10th  had  stretched  as  far  south  as  lat.  9°  30',  whence  he 
endeavoured  to  fetch  to  the  windward  of  Fort  St.  David ;  but, 
standing  in,  he  met  with  a  strong  west  wind,  and,  being  unable  to 
get  higher  than  Lampraavy,  he  anchored  there  on  May  26th.  On 
the  30th  he  sighted  Pondicherry,  and  saw  the  French  squadron  in 
the  road. 

D'Ache,  upon  descrying  the  British,  called  a  council  of  war, 
which  decided  that  the  ships  should  remain  moored  close  under  the 
batteries  to  await  attack;  but  M.  de  Lally,  arriving  from  before 
Fort  St.  David,  insisted  that  the  British  should  be  met  at  sea,  and 
sent  out  to  the  fleet  400  lascars  as  a  reinforcement.  As  de  Lally 
had  the  supreme  command  in  India,  d'Ache  weighed  with  eight  ships 
of  the  line  and  a  frigate ;  yet,  instead  of  bearing  down  on  Pocock, 
who  could  not  work  up  to  him,  he  kept  his  wind  and  plied  for  Fort 
St.  David,  whither  de  Lally  returned  by  land  to  prosecute  the  siege. 
But  no  sooner  had  de  Lally  departed  than  the  governor  and  council 
of  Pondicherry,  who  had  full  powers  during  de  Lally's  absence, 
recalled  d'Ache  to  protect  their  town.  This  order  was  most  service- 
able to  the  British ;  for,  soon  after  the  return  of  the  French  squadron, 
three  valuable  East  India  Company's  ships,  which  must  otherwise 
have  been  taken,  got  safely  into  Madras. 

Chiefly  owing  to  the  bad  sailing  of  the  Cumberland,  Pocock  failed 
to  get  up  with  the  French  squadron.  On  the  6th  he  heard  that 
Fort  St.  George  was  likely  to  be  invested  ;  and,  realizing  that  should 
this  be  so,  his  ships  would  be  unable  to  re-water  on  the  coast,  he 
made  for  Madras,  where  he  brought  his  defaulting  captains  to  court- 
martial.  Captain  George  Legge,  of  the  Newcastle,  was  dismissed 
the  service ;  Captain  Nicholas  Vincent,  of  the  Weijmouth,  was  dis- 
missed his  ship ;  and  Captain  William  Brereton,  of  the  Cumberland, 
was  sentenced  to  the  loss  of  one  year's  seniority  as  a  post-captain. 

Fort  St.  David  capitulated  on  June  2nd,  and  M.  de  Lally  destroyed 
the  place.  Had  he  then  gone  at  once  to  Madras,  he  could  have 
VOL.  III.  y 


178  MAJOR    OPERATIONS,   1714-1762.  [1758. 

taken  it  easily ;  but  he  delayed,  and,  in  the  interval,  Fort  St.  George 
was  considerably  strengthened.  Instead  of  going  to  Madras,  he 
attacked  Tan j  ore,  in  order  to  obtain  payment  of  some  money  which 
had  been  promised  by  the  king  to  M.  Dupleix  in  1749.  Before 
Tanjore,  his  army,  weakened  by  sickness  and  want  of  provisions, 
was  defeated ;  and,  being  obliged  to  raise  the  siege  and  to  retire, 
closely  pursued  by  his  native  opponents,  he  had  some  difficulty  in 
reaching  Carical.  On  his  retreat  thither  he  learnt  that  d'Ache, 
then  off  Pondicherry,  had  intimated  his  intention  of  proceeding  to 
Mauritius.  He  therefore  sent  to  remonstrate  with  the  French 
commodore,  and  was  thus  able  to  induce  him  to  postpone  his 
departure. 

Vice-Admiral  Pocock  refitted,  and,  on  July  '25th,  sailed  with  a 
favourable  wind  southward  along  the  shore  to  seek  the  enemy.  On 
the  26th  he  anchored  off  Lampraavy,  where  he  took  or  burnt  some 
small  craft  of  the  enemy.  On  the  evening  of  the  -27th  he  got  within 
nine  miles  of  Pondicherry,  and  saw  the  French  fleet  at  anchor  in 
the  road.  On  the  28th,  at  10  A.M.,  the  French  got  under  sail  and 
stood  to  the  southward  with  a  land  breeze ;  on  which  Pocock 
signalled  for  a  general  chase ;  but  the  enemy  kept  to  windward  and 
anchored  early  next  morning  off  Porto  Xovo.  When  the  land  breeze 
arose,  the  French  weighed  and  stood  to  windward ;  and  at  about 
8  A.M.  were  out  of  sight.  In  the  afternoon  Pocock  burnt  the  French 
ship  Restitution,  a  British  prize,  off  Porto  Xovo.  At  10  A.M.  on 
August  1st  he  again  sighted  d'Ache,  who  was  getting  under  sail  off 
Tranquebar,  and  who  soon  afterwards  formed  his  line  of  battle 
ahead  with  starboard  tacks  on  board,  and  seemed  to  edge  down 
towards  the  British.  But  when  Pocock  made  sail  and  stood  for  the 
French,  they  hauled  on  a  wind.  At  about  1  P.M.,  however,  they 
formed  line  of  battle  abreast  and  bore  down  on  Pocock  under  easy 
sail.  He,  at  1.30,  signalled  for  a  line  of  battle  ahead  with  the 
starboard  tacks  on  board,  and  stood  to  the  eastward  under  topsails, 
or  with  the  maintopsails  square  so  as  to  allow  his  ships  to  take 
station,  in  waiting  for  the  enemy.  At  5  P.M.  the  French  van  was 
abreast  of  the  British  centre  at  a  distance  of  about  two  miles.  The 
enemy  stood  on  till  his  van  was  abreast  of  the  British  van,  and  then 
kept  at  about  that  distance  until  6.30,  when  he  hoisted  his  topsails, 
set  his  courses,  and  stood  to  the  south-east.  Admiral  Pocock 
signalled  to  his  van  to  fill  and  stand  on,  and  made  sail  to  the  south- 
ward, keeping  his  line  until  midnight,  when  he  judged  the  French 


1758.] 


POCOCK  AND   D'ACHE   OFF  NEGAPATAM. 


179 


to  have  tacked.  He  then  signalled  the  fleet  to  wear,  and  stood  after 
the  enemy  to  the  westward.  But,  at  daylight  on  the  2nd,  the  enemy 
was  not  to  be  seen.  In  the  evening,  however,  four  sails  were  sighted 
inshore  to  the  north-west;  and  on  the  3rd,  at  5  A.M.,  the  British 
sighted  the  French  fleet  off  Negapatam,  about  three  miles  to  wind- 
ward, formed  in  line  of  battle  ahead,  with  the  starboard  tacks  on 
board.1 

Pocock  also  formed  his  line  of  battle  ahead  on  the  starboard  tack, 
and  stood  towards  the  French;  and,  seeing  that  the  Comte  de 
Provence,  74,  led  their  van,  he  ordered  the  Elizabeth,  64,  to  take  the 
place  of  the  Tiger,  60,  an  inferior  ship,  as  the  leader  of  his  own  line. 
At  11  A.M.,  the  wind  dying  away,  the  British  were  becalmed  ;  though 
the  enemy  still  had  a  light  breeze  from  off  the  land,  and,  with  it, 
stood  on,  their  line  stretching  from  east  to  west.  On  that  course  the 
French  passed  at  right  angles  so  close  to  the  rear  of  the  British  that 
they  might  almost  have  cut  off  the  Cumberland  and  Newcastle,  the 
sternmost  ships.  At  noon  a  sea  breeze  sprang  up,  and  gave  Pocock 
the  weather-gage.  Both  fleets  thereupon  formed  line  afresh  ;  and  at 
12.20  P.M.  Pocock  signalled  to  bear  down  and  engage. 

The  Elizabeth  and  Comte  de  Provence  began  the  action  ;  but,  the 
latter's  mizen  catching  fire,  she  had  to  quit  the  line  and  cut  away 
the  mast.  The  French  charge  Pocock  with  throwing  inflammables 
on  board  of  them ;  but  the  Vice-Admiral  does  not  seem  to  have  taken 
any  special  measures  for  setting  his  opponents  on  fire,  though 
certainly  in  this  battle  they  were  unusually  unfortunate  in  that 
respect.  The  Elizabeth's  next  opponent  was  the  Due  de  Bourgogne, 
which,  being  hardly  pressed,  would  have  been  assisted  by  the 

1  LIST  OF  THE  BRITISH  AND  FRENCH  SQUADRONS  ix  THE  ACTION*  OFF 
XEGAPATAM,  ON  AUGUST  MRD,  1758. 


Sbips. 

Guns. 

Commanders. 

Ships. 

Gims. 

Commanders. 

(Vice-Adm.   George   IV 

Zodiaque 

!4 

Comte  d'Aclie. 

Yarmouth    .     .     . 

64 

{     cock. 

Comte  de  Provence 

74 

Capt.  de  La  Chaise. 

(Capt.  John  Harrison. 

St.  Louis      . 

64 

{(  'ommod.  Charles  Stevens. 

Vengettr. 

64 

„    de  La  Palliere. 

Elizabeth     .     .     . 

64 

Capt.  Richard  Kempeu- 

Due  d'Orle'ans 

60 

„    de  Surville  (2). 

felt. 

Due  de  Bourgogm 

60 

,,    Bouvet  (2). 

60 

Weymouth   .     .     . 

60 

f          John         Stukley  • 
(             Somerset. 

Moras     .     . 
Diligenie 

50 
24 

,,    Bee  de  Lievre. 

Cumberland 
Salisbury    .     .     . 

56 
50 

William  Martin  (2). 
William  Brereton.   | 

Newcastle    .     .     . 

50 

Hon.  James  t'olville. 

Queeriborouyh  . 

24 

„    DlgbyDent(3) 

N   2 


180 


MAJOR    OPERATIONS,    1714-1762. 


[1758. 


Zodiaque,  had  not  the  latter  had  her  wheel  carried  away  by  a  shot 
from  the  Yarmouth,  her  first  antagonist.  To  repair  it,  she  went 
under  the  lee  of  the  D*uc  d' Orleans;  but,  as  soon  as  she  returned  to 
the  line,  one  of  her  lower-deck  guns  burst,  and  a  fire  broke  out  near 
her  powder  room.  In  the  consequent  confusion,  her  new  steering 
gear  gave  way,  so  causing  the  ship  to  fall  on  board  the  Due 
d' Orleans ;  and,  while  the  two  ships  were  entangled  together,  both 


BEAR-ADMIRAL    HICHAltD    KKMI'KNFELT. 


(From  a  Jitfiotiraphcd  ptHjruvitiij  Ijtj  Ridley.) 


were  heavily  cannonaded  with  impunity  by  the  Yarmouth  and  Tiger. 
By  that  time  the  Conde  and  Moras  had  been  driven  out  of  the  line ; 
and,  at  2.8  P.M.,  the  Zodiaque  being  free,  M.  d'Ache  bore  away.  He 
was  followed  in  about  a  quarter  of  an  hour  by  the  rest  of  his  ships. 

Pocock  signalled  for  closer  action ;  and  the  retiring  enemy  was 
badly  mauled  as  he  went  off  under  all  possible  sail.  The  signal  for 
a  general  chase  followed ;  whereupon  the  French  cut  away  the  boats 
which  most  of  them  had  towing  astern  ;  and  crowded  to  the  N.N.W. 


1758.]  If  ACHE  RETIRES   TO  MAURITIUS.  181 

A  running  fight  was  maintained  till  about  3  P.M.,  when  the  French 
were  out  of  range.  Pocock,  however,  pursued  until  dark,  and,  at 
about  8  P.M.,  anchored  three  miles  off  Carical,  while  the  French 
pursued  their  course  to  Pondicherry. 

The  fight,  considering  its  indecisive  character,  was  a  very  bloody 
one,  especially  on  the  side  of  the  French,  who  lost  250  killed  and 
600  wounded.  The  Zodiaque  alone  lost  183  killed  or  dangerously 
wounded.  On  the  British  side,  however,  only  31  were  killed  and 
166  wounded.  Both  d'Ache  and  Pocock  received  slight  injuries ; 
and  Commodore  Stevens  had  a  musket  wound  in  his  shoulder. 
Aloft  the  British  suffered  more  than  the  French  ;  and,  had  the 
weather  not  been  fine,  many  of  them  must  have  lost  their  masts. 

D'Ache  refitted  at  Pondicherry ;  and,  being  apprehensive  of  an 
attack  there,  anchored  his  ships  close  under  the  town  and  forts. 
Feeling  also  that  he  could  not,  in  his  then  state,  again  fight  the 
British,  and  that  his  remaining  on  the  coast  might  lead  to  disaster, 
he  again  announced  his  intention  of  proceeding  to  Mauritius.  M.  de 
Lally  and  the  French  military  and  civil  officers  were  astounded  at 
this  new  determination,  and  endeavoured  to  dissuade  him ;  but  he 
was  supported  by  his  captains,  and,  having  landed  500  marines  and 
seamen  to  reinforce  the  army  on  shore,  he  sailed  for  his  destination 
on  September  3rd.  Pocock  could  not  believe  that  d'Ache  had  any 
idea  of  withdrawing  from  the  scene  of  operations,  and  supposed  that 
he  would  presently  set  out  on  a  cruise.  The  Queenborough,  24,  was 
therefore  despatched  to  get  news  of  the  French ;  but  she  failed  to 
obtain  any.  The  British  sailed  from  Madras  on  August  20th  for 
Bombay,  calling  at  Trincomale  for  water.  The  Admiral  ordered  the 
Revenge,  a  Company's  ship,  to  cruise  off  that  port ;  and  she  actually 
sighted,  and  was  chased  by,  d'Ache  on  his  way  to  Mauritius ;  but, 
though  the  British  put  to  sea,  they  could  not  come  up  with  the 
enemy.  Pocock  afterwards  continued  his  voyage  to  Bombay. 

In  spite  of  the  withdrawal  of  d'Ache,  between  whom  and 
M.  de  Lally  the  worst  possible  relations  existed,  the  latter  continued 
his  activity,  and  on  December  14th  laid  siege  to  Madras.  The  town 
was  hard  pressed,  when,  on  February  16th,  1759,  Captain  Richard 
Kempenfelt,  with  two  twenty-gun  ships  and  six  other  vessels, 
containing  men  and  stores,  arrived.  Early  on  the  17th  de  Lally 
raised  the  siege,  retiring  in  such  haste  that  he  left  behind  him  much 
of  his  siege  artillery,  and  large  quantities  of  stores  and  ammunition. 
It  was  a  remarkable  and  dramatic  instance  of  the  influence  of  sea 


182  MAJOR    OPERATIONS,   1714-1762.  [1758. 

power  upon  history.  Had  d'Ache  held  the  sea,  and  had  he  been  in 
a  position  to  prevent  the  arrival  of  reinforcements  and  stores,  the 
place  must  have  fallen.  The  raising  of  the  siege  of  Madras  may  he 
said  to  mark  the  beginning  of  the  end  of  French  dreams  of  empire 
in  India. 

On  the  Leeward  Islands'  station,  where  Commodore  John 
Moore  (1)  commanded  in  1758,  no  fleet  action  or  engagement  of 
much  moment  happened  during  the  year ;  but  there  was  great  and 
commendable  activity ;  and  more  than  one  of  the  transactions  in 
those  seas  will  be  found  noticed  in  the  next  chapter. 

On  the  Jamaica  station,  likewise,  there  were  very  few  events  of 
importance,  though  the  enemy's  trade  suffered  severely,  thanks  to 
the  excellent  dispositions  of  Yice-Admiral  Thomas  Cotes  and  to  the 
vigilance  of  his  cruisers. 

It  has  been  seen  that  in  North  America  preparations  had  been 
made  for  a  new  attack  on  Louisbourg.  Hear-Admiral  Sir  Charles 
Hardy  (2)  placed  himself  off  that  port  as  soon  as  the  season  permitted  ; 
but,  owing  to  fog  and  gales,  he  was  unable  to  prevent  the  entry  into 
the  harbour  of  M.  du  Chatfault,  who  took  out  a  strong  squadron 
from  Brest.  Du  Chaffault,  however,  fearing  to  be  blockaded,  left 
there  six  ships  of  the  line  and  some  frigates  under  M.  de  Beaussier 
to  assist  in  the  defence,  and  himself  went  to  Quebec.  Hardy  only 
succeeded  in  intercepting  the  Foitdroyant,  22,  and  a  few  other 
French  craft  bound  up  the  St.  Lawrence.  The  Fotidroyant  pluckily 
stood  a  short  action  with  the  Captain,  04,  ere  she  surrendered.  She 
had  on  board  a  large  amount  of  very  valuable  stores. 

Admiral  the  Hon.  Edward  Boscawen,  who  had  been  appointed 
to  the  command  of  the  expedition  against  Louisbourg,  sailed  from 
Portsmouth  in  February.  At  the  very  commencement  of  his  voyage 
he  lost  the  Invincible,  74,  Captain  John  Bentley,  which,  missing 
stays,  ran  on  a  shoal  east  of  St.  Helen's  and  became  a  total  loss. 
But  the  Dublin,  74,  was  as  quickly  as  possible  substituted  for 
her  by  the  Admiralty ;  and  she  carried  out  Major-General  Jeffrey 
Amherst,  who  was  to  command  the  military  forces.  The  Dublin 
met  Boscawen  on  May  28th,  as  he  was  coming  out  of  Halifax  with 
his  fleet;  but,  being  very  sickly,  she  went  on  into  port,  while 
Boscawen  with  his  whole  force,  numbering  in  all  one  hundred  and 
sixty-seven  sail  of  various  kinds,  made  for  Gabarus  Bay.  The  fleet 
was  dispersed  by  bad  weather,  and  the  main  part  of  it  did  not  reach 
the  rendezvous  until  June  2nd.  Among  the  celebrated  men  who 


1758.]  CAPTURE  OF  LOUISBOUBG.  183 

shared  in  this  expedition  were  George  Brydges  Eodney,  Edward 
Hughes,  later  the  opponent  of  Suffren,  and  James  Wolfe,  the  hero 
of  Quebec. 

The  French  were  found  to  be  well  prepared,  Louisbourg  being 
very  thoroughly  fortified,  especially  on  the  sea  face.     Between  the 
day  of  his  arrival  and  January  8th,  General  Amherst  several  times 
caused  the  troops  to  be  put  into  the  boats,  ready  for  landing ;  but 
on  each  occasion  he  was  compelled  by  the  state  of  the  surf  to  desist 
and  to  re-embark  them.     In  the  interval  the  enemy  was  busy  on 
his   defences,  and  never   omitted  to  fire   on   the   ships  when  they 
ventured  within  range.     On  the  8th  the  army  was  again  put  into 
the  boats ;    and   it  was   decided   to   make   three   separate   attacks. 
Those  on  the  centre  and  right  were  intended  as  feints  or  diversions, 
and  were  to  be  made   in  Freshwater   Cove   and   on   White   Point 
respectively.     That  on  the  left  was  to  be  the  real  attack.     It  was 
made  under  Brigadier-General  Wolfe,  under  cover  of  the  Ken n ing- 
ton,  28,  Captain  Dudley  Digges,  and  Halifax,  12.     The  Diana,  3(>, 
Captain   Alexander   Schomberg,    Gramont,    18,    Commander    John 
Stott,  and  Shannon,  36,  Captain  Charles  Meadows,1  covered  the  feint 
in  the  centre;  and   the  Sutherland,  50,   Captain  John  Eous,  and 
Squirrel,  20,  Commander  John  Cleland  (1),  the  feint  on  the  right. 

These  ships,  as  soon  as  they  had  taken  up  their  stations,  began 
a  hot  cannonade ;  and,  a  quarter  of  an  hour  later,  Wolfe's  division 
landed  in  the  steadiest  manner  through  the  surf  under  a  heavy  fire. 
Many  men  were  unavoidably  drowned  through  the  oversetting  of 
boats,  and  much  ammunition  was  wetted  ;  but  the  troops,  fixing  their 
bayonets,  drove  the  defenders  from  their  position  near  the  beach  ; 
and,  before  night,  all  the  other  troops  had  been  landed.  Almosi 
immediately  afterwards  the  wind  arose,  and  communication  with  the 
fleet  was  cut  off  for  several  days.  Siege  operations  were  begun  on 
June  13th,  the  troops  being  at  first  much  annoyed  by  the  fire  of 
the  French  ships  in  the  harbour.  The  Admiral  landed  his  Marines 
to  assist.  On  the  28th  the  enemy  sank  the  Apollon,  50,  Fidele,  30, 
Biche,  16,  and  Chevre,  16,  in  the  mouth  of  the  harbour  to  blockade 
the  entrance ;  and  on  July  9th  he  made  a  vigorous  but  ineffectual 
night  sortie.  On  July  21st  the  Entreprenant,  74,  one  of  the  largest 
French  ships  in  the  harbour,  took  fire,  blew  up  and  set  in  flames  two 

1  Properly  Medows,  but  the  Navy  List  spelling  is  Meadows.  This  gentleman, 
afterwards  known  as  Charles  Pierrepont,  became  Viscount  Newark  and  Earl  Mauvers. 
He  resigned  while  yet  a  captain,  and  died  in  1816. 


184 


MAJOR    OPERATIONS,   1714-1762. 


[1758. 


more  ships  of  the  line,  the  CeUbre,  64,  and  the  Capricieux,  64. 
All  three  eventually  become  total  losses.  The  fire  from  the  two 
remaining  ships  of  the  line  being  still  troublesome,  Boscawen,  on 
the  night  of  the  25th,  sent  into  the  harbour  in  boats  600  seamen, 
under  Captains  John  Laforey  and  George  Balfour ;  and  these,  in 
spite  of  a  very  fierce  fire  from  the  vessels  and  batteries,  executed 
their  mission.  Laforey  took  the  Prudent,  74,  which,  being  aground, 
he  burnt.  Balfour  carried  the  Bienfaisant,  64,  and  towed  her  into 
the  north-east  harbour.  This  decided  the  issue.  Boscawen  was 
making  preparations  to  send  in  six  ships  of  the  line,  when  the 


governor  proposed  terms  ;  and,  after  a  brief  correspondence,  the 
place  was  surrendered  on  the  '20th.  About  3600  combatants 
became  prisoners  of  war ;  and  216  guns,  besides  mortars,  were 
taken.  With  Louisbourg  was  surrendered,  not  only  the  island  of 
Cape  Breton,  but  also  that  of  St.  John.1  Boscawen  sent  home 
Captain  the  Hon.  George  Edgcumbe  with  the  naval  dispatches. 
The  colours  which  were  captured  were  placed  in  St.  Paul's 
Cathedral. 

Immediately  after  the  fall  of  the  place,  Boscawen  sent  Eear- 
Admiral  Sir  Charles  Hardy  (2),  with  seven  ships  of  the  line,  to  destroy 
the  French  settlements  at  Miramichi,  Gaspee,  etc.,  General  Wolfe 

1  The  island  of  St.  John  was  renamed  Prince  Edward's  Island  in  1799,  in  honour 
of  Prince  Edward,  Duke  of  Kent,  and  father  of  H.M.  Queen  \7ictoria. 


1758.]  BOSCAWEN  AND   DU   CHAFt'AULT.  185 

accompanying  him.  Some  ships  were  also  sent  to  the  island  of 
St.  John,  with  a  garrison  for  it.  General  Amherst,  who  heard  at 
about  that  time  of  the  repulse  of  Abercrombie  at  Ticonderoga, 
embarked  six  battalions  under,  convoy  of  the  Captain,  64,  for 
Boston,  and  then  marched  for  Lake  George.  Boscawen  left  Mr. 
Durell,  who  in  the  meantime  had  been  promoted  to  be  a  Rear- 
Admiral,  with  a  part  of  the  squadron,  to  winter  in  America,  and 
himself  sailed  for  England.  On  his  passage,  his  squadron  became 
separated,  so  that  when,  on  October  27th,  as  he  was  entering 
the  Soundings,  he  sighted  the  French  squadron  returning  from 
Quebec  under  M.  du  Chaffault,  he  had  with  him  in  company  only  the 
Namur,  90,  (flag),  Captain  Matthew  Buckle  (1),  Royal  William,  84, 


COMMEMORATIVE    MEDAI,    OF   THK    CAPTURE   OF   LOUISBOCRO,    1/58. 
(From  an  (/riifuifil  kindly  lent  Inj  H.S.H.  Cujrftiiii  Priwc  Louis  itf  Bnttfnl>fi->[.  It.X.) 

Captain  Thomas  Evans,  Somerset,  64,  Captain  Edward  Hughes, 
Bienfaisant,  64,  Captain  George  Balfour,  Boreas,  '28,  Captain  the 
Hon.  Robert  Boyle  Walsingham,  Trent,  '28,  Captain  John  Lindsay, 
Echo,  '28,  Captain  John  Laforey,  with  two  fireships ;  and  tb.9 
Bienfaisant  was  useless,  having  but  a  few  rounds  of  powder  on 
board.  The  French  squadron  consisted  of  the  Ton// ant,  80, 
Intrepidc,  74,  Hems,  74,  Protec,  64,  and  Bclliqucux,  64,  besides  a 
frigate,  and  the  Carnarvon,  a  captured  British  East  Indiaman.  The 
enemy,  being  on  the  contrary  tack,  passed  the  British  squadron,  very 
near,  to  leeward ;  and,  in  passing,  discharged  his  broadsides. 
Some  of  the  British  ships  returned  the  fire  ;  but,  the  wind  blowing 
hard,  most  of  the  vessels  could  not  open  their  lower  ports ;  and 
thus,  in  this  partial  action,  very  little  damage  was  done.  Boscawen, 
in  spite  of  the  superiority  of  the  French,  changed  his  course  and 


MAJOR   OPERATIONS,   1714-1762.  [1758. 

stood  after  them.  The  night  was  very  stormy  ;  but,  on  the  follow- 
ing morning,  the  enemy  was  again  discovered,  though  his  force 
then  consisted  of  only  four  ships  of  the  line  and  a  frigate,  one 
ship  of  the  line  having  evidently  lost  company  in  the  darkness. 
Boscawen  also  had  lost  sight  of  all  his  frigates.  He  nevertheless 
renewed  the  chase ;  yet,  although  there  was  at  first  no  great 
distance  between  the  squadrons,  the  British  did  not  gain  ground. 
The  only  prize  made  was  the  Carnarvon.  The  rest  of  the  French 
ships  got  away.  One  of  them,  the  Belliqueux,  was  afterwards  taken 
off  Ilfracombe  by  the  Antelope,  50.  Boscawen  arrived  at  Spithead 
on  November  1st. 

For  their  services  in  North  America  both  Boscawen  and  Amherst 
received  the  thanks  of  the  House  of  Commons.  The  conquest 
which  had  been  effected,  besides  being  very  important  in  itself,  had 
involved  a  loss  to  the  enemy  of  six  ships  of  the  line  and  five  frigates,1 
and  had  deprived  France  of  one  of  her  best  fisheries,  and  of  a 
valuable  station  for  the  privateers  which  long  had  preyed  on  the 
coast  commerce  of  the  American  colonies.  It  paved  the  way  for 
future  British  successes  on  the  North  American  continent,  and 
sounded  the  death  knell  of  the  French  dominion  there.  In  fact, 
just  as  the  raising  of  the  siege  of  Madras  was  the  turning  point  of 
the  struggle  in  India,  so  the  capture  of  Louisbourg  was  the  turning 
point  of  the  struggle  in  North  America ;  and  both  results  were 
brought  about  by  the  force  of  sea  power. 

It  has  been  said  that  in  1758  a  small  squadron  under  Captain 
Henry  Marsh  was  despatched  against  the  French  settlements  in 
West  Africa.  It  is  curious  to  note  that  this  belligerent  expedition 
was  first  suggested  by  a  Quaker,  Mr.  Thomas  Gumming,  who  had 
been  on  the  coast,  and  who  knew  some  of  the  native  princes.  One 
of  these  had  promised  his  co-operation  against  Goree  and  Senegal, 
and  had  undertaken,  in  case  of  the  success  of  the  adventure,  to 
grant  exclusive  trading  privileges  to  British  subjects.  Gumming 
represented  that  a  force  of  a  certain  strength  would  be  required  for 
the  service  ;  but  the  administration  unwisely  cut  down  his  estimates, 
and  repeatedly  deferred  action,  until  Mr.  Samuel  Touchet,  an 
influential  London  merchant,  warmly  seconded  the  project.  The 
force  finally  assigned  for  the  service  consisted  of  the  Harwich,  50, 

1  In  addition  to  the  three  frigates  sunk  iu  the  mouth  of  the  harbour  by  the  enemy, 
the  Diane  (renamed  Diana),  36,  had  been  taken  by  Sir  Charles  Hardy  (2),  and  the 
Echo,  28,  had  been  captured  by  the  Juno  and  Scarborough. 


1758.]  CAPTURE   OF  SENEGAL.  187 

Commodore  Henry  Marsh,  the  Nassau,  64,  Captain  James  Sayer, 
the  Eye,  20,  Commander  Daniel  Dering,  the  Swan,  16,  Commander 
Jacob  Lobb,  and  the  two  eight-gun  busses,  London  and  Portsmouth, 
Commanders  Archibald  Millar  and  James  Orrok,  together  with  five 
small  hired  vessels  carrying  from  four  to  eight  guns  apiece.  The 
troops  included  200  Marines  under  Major  Mason,  and  a  detachment 
of  artillery  with  ten  guns  and  eight  mortars.  Mr.  Gumming 
accompanied  the  expedition,  which  sailed  from  Plymouth  on 
March  9,  1758. 

From  Tenerife,  where  the  squadron  called  for  wine  and  water, 
Mr.  Gumming,  in  the  Su-an,  went  on  in  advance  to  arrange  for 
assistance  from  the  natives ;  but,  before  he  could  conclude  matters, 
the  squadron  itself  arrived  on  the  coast.  Marsh  decided  not  to 
wait  for  negotiations,  but  at  once  to  proceed  ;  and  on  April  iWrd, 
he  reached  the  mouth  of  the  river  Senegal,  and  sighted  the 
French  flag  flying  on  Fort  Louis  in  midstream,  twelve  miles 
above  the  bar. 

The  enemy  had  armed  a  brig  and  six  sloops,  and  had  placed  them 
above  the  bar  to  defend  the  channel  through  it.  These  much 
annoyed  the  British  boats,  which  went  in  to  sound.  In  the  mean- 
time troops  were  put  into  the  small  craft.  On  the  20th  the  Siran, 
with  the  busses  and  armed  vessels,  weighed  and  made  up  the  river 
with  a  fair  wind.  The  London,  and  some  of  the  small  craft,  were 
wrecked  on  the  bar ;  but  no  lives  were  lost ;  and  most  of  the  rest  of 
the  vessels  got  in  safely,  and  made  for  the  enemy's  ships,  which 
promptly  retired  under  the  guns  of  the  fort.  On  May  1st  the  work 
surrendered  ;  but  the  actual  handing  over  of  the  place  was  delayed, 
owing  to  the  action  of  the  natives,  who,  not  thinking  that  their 
interests  had  been  sufficiently  secured,  blockaded  the  French.  The 
difficulty  being  got  over,  the  fort  was  occupied.  In  it  ninety-two 
guns  were  found  ;  and,  with  it,  sixteen  craft  of  various  sizes  were 
given  up.  The  entire  estimated  value  of  the  capture  was  about 
£200,000.  Podor,  and  other  stations  further  up  the  river,  were 
included  in  the  capitulation.  For  his  services  Mr.  Gumming  was 
granted  a  pension  during  his  lifetime.  These  possessions  had  long 
supplied  negro  slaves  to  the  French  settlements  in  the  AVest  Indies  ; 
and  for  that  reason  their  loss  was  soon  severely  felt. 

Commodore  Marsh,  leaving  a  few  small  vessels  on  the  spot, 
sailed  next  to  attack  Goree,  about  ninety  miles  to  the  southward. 
He  arrived  off  the  island  on  May  24tb,  and  at  once  began  a  hot 


188  MAJOR    OPERATIONS,   1714-1762.  [1758. 

cannonade,  having  anchored  his  ships  with  springs  on  their  cables. 
But  he  had  miscalculated  the  strength  of  the  defence ;  and  in  about 
two  hours  and  a  half  he  had  to  signal  his  little  squadron  to  cut,  as 
the  rigging  and  spars,  as  well  as  the  hulls,  were  badly  mauled,  and 
about  twenty  men  were  killed,  and  forty  wounded.  This  check  was 
owing  purely  to  the  inadequacy  of  the  force  employed;  and  towards 
the  end  of  the  year,  the  Government  sent  out  a  stronger  squadron 
to  complete  Commodore  Marsh's  work.  In  the  meantime  the 
Nassau,  Swan  and  Portsmouth  returned  to  England,  with  such 
trade  as  was  bound  thither ;  and,  later,  the  Rye  sailed  with  a  convoy 
for  the  Leeward  Islands.  Marsh  himself  escorted  the  trade  which 
was  bound  for  Jamaica. 

The  new  expedition  was  entrusted  to  Commodore  the  Hon. 
Augustus  Keppel,  who  hoisted  his  broad  pennant  in  the  Torbay,  74, 
Captain  Thomas  Owen,  and  who  had  under  him  the  Nassau,  64, 
Captain  James  Sayer,  the  Fougiicux,  Captain  Joseph  Knight,  the 
Dunkirk,  60,  Captain  the  Hon.  Kobert  Digby,  the  Liclifield,  50, 
Captain  Matthew  Barton,  the  Prince  Edward,  44,  Captain  William 
Fortescue,  the  Experiment,  20,  Captain  John  Carter  Allen,  the 
Roman  Emperor,  20,  Commander  William  Newsom,  the  Sattash,  14, 
Commander  Walter  Stirling,  and  the  two  bombs,  Firedrake, 
Commander  James  Orrok,  and  Furnace,  Commander  Jonathan 
Faulknor  (1).  At  Cork  he  picked  up  troops,  under  Lieut. -Colonel 
Worge,  who  had  been  appointed  governor  of  Senegal ;  and,  after 
some  delay,  he  finally  sailed  thence  on  November  llth,  1758. 

In  the  early  morning  of  November  29th,  owing  to  an  error  in 
reckoning  caused  by  bad  weather,  the  Lich field  ran  ashore  on  the 
coast  of  Marocco,  and  became  a  total  loss.1  On  the  same  occasion 
a  transport  also  went  to  pieces.  On  December  28th,  after  having 
made  a  short  stay  at  Santa  Cruz,  in  the  Canaries,  the  squadron 
sighted  Goree,  and  at  3  P.M.  anchored  in  the  road  in  eighteen 
fathoms  of  water,  the  island  bearing  S.W.  by  S.  distant  about  four 
miles.  The  Saltasli  and  the  transports  containing  the  troops  were 
sent  into  the  bay  between  Point  Goree  and  Point  Barrabas ;  and, 
early  on  the  29th,  the  troops  from  them  were  disembarked  in  boats 
in  readiness  to  land  on  the  island  upon  signal  being  made  by  the 
Commodore.  Most  of  the  ships  gradually  took  up  their  assigned 

1  There  was  unfortunately  some  loss  of  life.  The  survivors  were  detained  by  the 
Sultan  of  Marocco  until  ransomed,  with  other  British  subjects,  for  170,000  dollars. 
Captain  Barton  was  tried  for  the  loss  of  his  ship,  and  honourably  acquitted. 


1758.]  CAPTURE   OF  GOREE.  189 

positions  on  the  west  or  leeward  side  of  Goree,  and  moored  head 
and  stern  under  a  heavy  fire.  At  9  A.M.  the  attack  was  begun  by 
the  Prince  Edivard ;  but  the  cannonade  was  not  general  until  about 
noon,  some  of  the  vessels  experiencing  difficulty  in  taking  up  their 
stations.  The  bombardment  was  then  rapidly  effective ;  for,  after 
a  brief  parley,  followed  by  an  almost  equally  short  renewal  of  the 
action,  the  enemy  surrendered;  whereupon  Keppel  landed  his  Marines 
to  take  possession.  About  three  hundred  French,  and  many  negroes, 
became  prisoners  of  war.  The  British  loss  was  inconsiderable. 
After  escorting  Colonel  Worge  to  Senegal,  and  cruising  for  a  short 
time  off  the  coast,  the  Commodore  returned  to  England. 

In  the  Mediterranean  Admiral  Henry  Osborn  and  Bear-Admiral 
Charles  Saunders  commanded.  The  French  had  on  several  occasions 
discovered  the  wisdom  and  advantage  of  despatching  in  winter 
their  reinforcements  of  ships  and  troops  for  abroad,  since  they 
found  that  the  British  blockading  squadrons  and  squadrons  of 
observation  were  frequently  prevented  at  that  season  by  fogs  or 
bad  weather  from  obtaining  touch  of  the  outward-bound  detach- 
ments. But  one  of  their  divisions  which,  under  M.  cle  La  Clue, 
left  Toulon  in  December,  1757,  for  North  America  and  the  West 
Indies,  was  forced  by  the  vigilance  of  Admiral  Osborn  into  Cartagena, 
and  was  there  blockaded.  The  French  Government,  in  response 
to  M.  de  La  Clue's  representations,  sent  five  ships  of  the  line  and 
a  frigate,  under  M.  Duquesne,  to  endeavour  to  join  him  there,  and 
then  to  assist  him  in  breaking  the  blockade.  Two  of  the  line-of- 
battleships  succeeded  in  getting  in,  but  the  rest  of  the  force  was 
not  so  fortunate.  On  February  28th,  off  Cape  de  Gata,  Osborn 
at  daybreak  sighted  four  strange  sail  near  his  fleet,  and  ordered 
them  to  be  chased.  The  French  ships  separated,  but  each  was 
pursued.  At  7  P.M.  the  Revenge,  64,  Captain  John  Storr,  brought 
the  Orphee,  64,  to  action;  and,  on  the  Berwick,  64,  coming  up, 
the  enemy  struck.  In  the  Revenge,  thirty-three  were  killed  and  fifty- 
four  wounded,  among  the  latter  being  Captain  Storr.  The  Orphce 
was  but  six  miles  from  Cartagena  when  she  hauled  down.  Meanwhile 
the  Monmouth,  64,  Captain  Arthur  Gardiner,  the  Sioiftsure,  70, 
Captain  Thomas  Stanhope,  and  the  Hampton  Court,  64,  Captain  the 
Hon.  Augustus  John  Hervey,  chased  the  largest  of  the  enemy,  the 
Foudroyant,  84,  flag  ship  of  Duquesne.  The  Monmouth,  being 
far  ahead  of  her  consorts,  got  up  with  and  engaged  the  enemy 
at  8  P.M.  and  fought  her  gallantly.  When  Gardiner  fell  his  place 


190  MAJOR    OPERATIONS,   1714-17G2.  [1758. 

was  taken  by  Lieutenant  Eobert  Carkett,1  till  12.30  A.M.,  when 
the  Frenchman's  guns  were  reduced  to  silence.  Not  until  then 
was  the  Swiftsure  able  to  get  up.  Captain  Stanhope  hailed  the 
foe  to  know  whether  she  had  surrendered,  but  was  answered  with 
a  few  guns  and  a  volley  of  small  arms,  whereupon  he  poured  in 
a  broadside  and  part  of  a  second,  and  the  enemy  promptly  sur- 
rendered. She  had  100  killed  and  90  wounded,  while  the  Non-mouth 
lost  only  28  killed  and  79  wounded.  It  was  a  magnificently  con- 
ducted action,  and  Lieutenant  Carkett  was  deservedly  rewarded 
with  the  command  of  the  prize.  When  measured,  at  Gibraltar, 
she  was  found  to  be  185  feet  3  inches  in  length  from  stem  to 
taffrail,  and  to  have  a  length  of  keel  of  155  feet.  She  was  thus 
about  12  feet  longer  than  the  large  British  first-rates  of  her  day. 
Moreover  she  carried  24  and  4'2-pounders,  whereas  the  Monmouth 
was  armed  only  with  12  and  24-pounders. 

As  for  the  other  French  vessels,  one,  the  Oriflamme,  50,  was 
driven  ashore  by  the  Monarch,  74,  Captain  John  Montagu,  and 
the  Montagu,  04,  Captain  Joshua  Eowley.  The  last,  the  Pleiade,  26, 
escaped  by  superior  sailing. 

Kear-Admiral  Saunders  was  relieved  in  the  spring  by  Eear- 
Admiral  Thomas  Broderick  (W.),  who  went  out  in  the  Prince 
George,  80,  Captain  Joseph  Peyton  (1),  which  was  unhappily  burnt 
by  accident  on  April  13th  with  a  loss  of  485  lives.  Osborn  con- 
tinued to  blockade  the  French  in  Cartagena  until  he  was  obliged 
to  go  to  Gibraltar  to  refit,  leaving  only  some  frigates  to  look  out 
off  the  port.  M.  de  La  Clue  then  escaped  and  returned  to  Toulon. 
A  little  later  Osborn,  being  in  bad  health,  had  to  resign  his 
command.  He  was  succeeded  by  Kear-Admiral  Broderick. 

The  part  borne  by  H.M.S.  Seahorse  and  Stombolo,  under 
Commodore  Charles  Holmes,  in  obliging  the  French  and  Austrians 
to  evacuate  Emden  in  March,  1758,  scarcely  merits  detailed  descrip- 
tion here.  Suffice  it  to  say  that  the  service  was  creditably  performed. 
Other  events  in  waters  near  home  must,  however,  be  described  at 
some  length. 

Learning  in  the  spring  of  the  year  that  the  French  were  fitting 
out  a  considerable  squadron  to  escort  a  convoy  to  America  from 
Isle  d'Aix,  the  Admiralty  ordered  Admiral  Sir  Edward  Hawke  to 

1  Lieutenant,  1745.  Captain,  for  this  service,  March  12th,  1758.  Commanded 
Stirling  Castle,  64,  in  Byron's  action,  1770,  and  in  Hodney's  action  in  the  West  Indies, 
1780,  and  was  lost  in  her  in  the  hurricane  of  October  10th,  1780. 


1758.]  HAWKE    OFF  ISLE    D'AIX.  191 

endeavour  to  intercept  it.  He  sailed  from  Spithead  on  March  llth 
with  seven  ships  of  the  line  and  three  frigates,  and  on  the  night 
of  April  3rd  arrived  off  the  island.  At  3  o'clock  next  morning  he 
steered  for  Basque  Eoad,  and  at  daylight  sighted  a  number  of 
vessels,  escorted  by  three  frigates,  some  miles  to  windward.  He 
gave  chase  but  they  got  into  St.  Martin,  Ehe,  except  one  brig, 
which  was  driven  ashore  and  burnt  by  the  Hussar,  28,  Captain 
John  Elliot.  At  about  4  P.M.  Hawke  discovered,  lying  off  Aix, 
the  French  men-of-war  Florissant,  74,  Sphinx,  64,  Hardi,  64, 
Dragon,  64,  and  Warwick,  60,  besides  six  or  seven  frigates,  and 
about  forty  merchantman,  which  had  on  board  3000  troops.  At 
4.30  the  Admiral  signalled  for  a  general  chase,  and  at  five  the 
enemy  began  to  slip  or  cut  in  great  confusion,  and  to  run.  At  six 
the  British  headmost  ships  were  little  more  than  a  gunshot  from  the 
rearmost  of  the  French ;  but,  by  that  time,  when  many  of  the 
merchantmen  were  already  aground  on  the  mud,  the  pursuers 
were  in  very  shoal  water;  and,  further  pursuit  being  dangerous, 
and  night  coming  on,  Hawke  anchored  abreast  of  the  island.  On 
the  morning  of  the  5th  nearly  all  the  French  flotilla  were  seen 
aground  four  or  five  miles  away,  several  being  on  their  broadsides. 
When  the  flood  made  the  Admiral  sent  in  the  Intrepid,  64,  Captain 
Edward  Pratten,  and  the  Medway,  60,  Captain  Charles  Proby, 
with  his  best  pilots,  as  far  as  the  water  would  serve  ;  and  ordered 
them  to  anchor  there.  They  did  so  in  about  five  fathoms,  of  which 
three  fathoms  were  due  to  the  rise  of  the  tide.  The  enemy  was 
very  busy  in  lightening  his  ships,  and  in  hauling  and  towing  such  of 
them  as  could  be  moved  towards  the  mouth  of  the  Eiver  Charente  ; 
and  by  evening  some  of  the  French  men-of-war  had  been  got  thither. 
The  British  frigates  did  what  they  could,  by  destroying  the  buoys 
which  they  had  laid  down  over  their  jettisoned  guns  and  gear, 
to  prevent  the  ultimate  salving  of  the  merchant  vessels.  That  day 
150  Marines  were  put  ashore  on  Isle  d'Aix ;  and,  under  Captain 
Ewer,  they  destroyed  the  works  there  and  safely  re-embarked. 
Hawke  sailed  on  the  6th,  having  effectually  prevented  the  despatch 
of  supplies  to  America,  and,  it  may  be,  so  facilitated  the  conquest 
of  Cape  Breton  and  its  dependencies. 

A  greater  continental  expedition,  consisting  of  two  squadrons 
of  men-of-war,  and  about  14,000  troops,  under  Lieut. -General  the 
Duke  of  Marlborough,  was  prepared  somewhat  later  in  the  year. 
One  naval  squadron,  which  was  designed  to  directly  co-operate 


192  MAJOR    OPERATIONS,   1714-1762.  [1758. 

with  the  army,  was  entrusted  to  Commodore  the  Hon.  Eichard 
Howe.  The  other  squadron,  composed  of  upwards  of  twenty  sail 
of  the  line,  was  commanded  by  Admiral  Lord  Anson,  having  under 
him  Admiral  Sir  Edward  Hawke.  This  force  was  intended  to 
cruise  off  Brest  and  to  prevent  any  French  squadron  from  inter- 
fering with  the  operations  of  Howe  and  Marlhorough.  As  on  some 
previous  occasions,  the  main  object  of  the  projected  demonstration 
on  the  coast  of  France  was  to  divert  French  attention,  and,  by 
calling  off  troops  from  elsewhere,  to  assist  the  King  of  Prussia  and 
other  British  allies  on  shore ;  but  the  precise  destination  of  the 
armament  was  kept  very  secret. 

Howe's  squadron  consisted  of  one  ship  of  the  line,  four  50's, 
ten  frigates,  five  sloops,  two  fireships,  and  two  bombs,  convoying 
one  hundred  transports,  twenty  tenders,  ten  storeships  and  ten 
cutters ;  together  with  a  number  of  flat-bottomed  boats,  which 
were  carried  on  board  the  ships,  and  which  were  to  be  used  for 
the  landing  of  troops.  On  May  '27th  the  whole  armament  was 
assembled  at  Spithead.  On  June  1st  Anson  weighed  and  sailed 
to  the  westward ;  and  Howe  soon  afterwards  made  sail  and  steered 
straight  across  the  Channel. 

At  8  A.M.  on  June  '2nd,  after  a  stormy  but  not  unfavourable 
night,  Howe  sighted  Cape  La  Hougue.  The  French  were  quickly 
alarmed,  and,  from  his  course,  probably  formed  a  shrewd  guess  as 
to  his  destination.  The  tides,  and  the  frequent  calms  which  super- 
vened, compelled  the  British  to  anchor  repeatedly,  but  on  June  5th 
the  entire  force  stood  into  Cancale  Bay,  six  miles  east  of  St.  Malo. 
At  11  A.M.  the  Duke  of  Marlborough  went  in  shore  in  a  cutter  to 
reconnoitre  and  was  fired  at.  By  '2  P.M.  all  the  fleet  was  at  anchor, 
and  the  signal  was  made  for  the  flat-bottomed  boats  to  be  hoisted 
out.  Howe  shifted  his  broad  pennant  to  the  Success,  24,  Captain 
Paul  Henry  Ourry,  and  stood  in  with  the  Hose,  24,  Captain  Benjamin 
Clive,  Flamborough,  28,  Captain  Edward  Jekyll,  and  Diligence,  16, 
Commander  Joseph  Eastwood,  to  silence  the  batteries,  clear  the 
beach,  and  cover  the  landing.  This  he  did,  and  then  signalled  for 
part  of  the  troops  to  disembark.  The  landing  was  effected  in  good 
order  and  without  loss,  in  spite  of  some  musketry  fire  from  the 
enemy  posted  on  a  hill  behind  Cancale.  These  sharpshooters,  how- 
ever, soon  fled  as  the  troops  advanced.  More  soldiers  were  after- 
wards landed,  and  before  dark  a  large  force  was  ashore.  It  lay  on  its 
arms  for  the  night.  The  rest  of  the  army,  with  the  guns  and  stores, 


1753.]  EXPEDITION   TO    CHESS  OUfiQ.  193 

was  landed  on  the  Gth ;  and,  at  dawn  on  the  7th,  the  whole  of 
it  except  one  brigade,  that  of  Major-General  the  Hon.  George 
Boscawen,  inarched  away  in  two  columns.  It  is  not  intended 
here  to  follow  the  military  movements  on  shore :  it  is  only  necessary 
to  say  that  it  was  ultimately  considered  impracticable  to  attempt 
St.  Malo,  and  that,  after  doing  a  great  deal  of  damage,  the  army 
returned  and  re-embarked  on  the  llth  and  12th.  The  loss  up  to 
that  time  had  not  been  more  than  thirty  killed  and  wounded. 

Owing  to  adverse  winds,  the  fleet  did  not  leave  Cancale  Bay  till 
June  21st;  and,  after  crossing  and  recrossing  the  Channel,  it  was 
on  the  26th  close  in  with  Le  Havre.  It  was  intended  to  effect  a 
landing  near  that  town ;  but  the  enemy  was  found  to  be  well 
prepared.  On  the  29th,  therefore,  the  fleet  bore  away  before 
the  wind  for  Cherbourg  and  anchored  two  miles  from  it.  The 
batteries  011  shore  fired,  doing,  however,  no  harm.  Preparations 
were  made  for  a  descent;  but,  a  gale  springing  up  and  blowing  on 
shore,  there  was  a  very  great  surf,  and,  when  the  weather  grew 
worse,  the  fleet  was  in  considerable  danger.  The  crowded  condition 
of  the  ships  had  begun  to  breed  sickness  ;  the  horses  on  board  were 
almost  starving  for  want  of  fodder;  and,  as  nothing  was  to  be  gained 
by  waiting,  Howe  weighed  and  re-anchored  at  Spithead  on  .July  1st. 
The  army  was  immediately  landed  in  the  Isle  of  Wight  to  refresh 
itself.  In  the  course  of  this  expedition  the  French  frigate  (!i<ii'/«>K/r, 
22,  was  taken  by  the  Itaioini,  32,  Captain  George  Mackenxie,  assisted 
at  the  last  moment  by  the  lioclicstcr,  50,  Captain  liobert  Duff. 

Some  of  the  troops  in  the  Isle  of  Wight  were  sent  to  reinforce 
the  allied  army  in  Germany  ;  and  the  remaining  part  of  the  military 
force  was  then  entrusted  to  Lieut. -General  Thomas  Bligh,  an  officer 
who,  though  he  had  rendered  good  service,  was  then  too  old  for 
the  command.  The  squadron,  having  refitted  and  been  strengthened 
by  the  arrival  of  the  Montagu,  60,  Captain  Joshua  liowley,  again 
sailed  on  August  1st,  when  it  had  re-embarked  the  troops  ;  and  on 
August  6th  it  anchored  in  Cherbourg  lioad  and  was  again  fired  at 
from  the  shore.  The  defences  had  been  improved  since  the  previous 
visit  of  the  fleet,  and  many  troops  were  in  the  town.  Howe,  who 
had  with  him  Prince  Edward,1  second  son  of  the  Prince  of  Wales, 

1  H.K.H.  Edward  Augustus.  Born,  1731);  went  to  sea,  1758;  Captain,  June  14th, 
1759;  created  Duke  of  York  and  Albany,  1760;  Rear- Admiral  of  the  Blue,  1701; 
second  in  command  in  the  Channel,  with  Howe  as  his  flag-captain ;  Vice-Admiral 
of  the  Blue,  1762 ;  Commander-in-Chief  in  the  Mediterranean,  1763 ;  died  at  Monaco, 
September  14th,  1767 ;  buried  in  Henry  the  Seventh's  Chapel  at  Westminster. 
VOL.  III.  O 


194  MAJOR    OPERATIONS,   1714-1V62.  [1758. 

serving  as  a  midshipman,  accompanied  General  Bligh  to  reconnoitre ; 
and  arrangements  were  made  for  a  landing.  The  fleet  moved  to 
Marais  Bay  early  on  the  7th,  leaving  only  a  frigate  and  a  bomb 
before  the  town.  Howe,  whose  broad  pennant  was  then  in  the 
Pallas,  36,  Captain  Archibald  Cleveland,  signalled  to  the  frigates 
and  small  craft  to  cover  the  disembarkation.  These  drove  off  the 
enemy,  and  the  troops  were  put  ashore  with  little  opposition.  All 
the  infantry  had  been  disembarked  by  the  evening.  On  the  8th 
the  cavalry  and  artillery  followed,  and  a  march  was  begun  on 
Cherbourg,  six  miles  to  the  eastward.  The  place  was  entered 
without  any  fighting,  the  enemy  retiring  from  the  forts  as  well 
as  from  the  town  at  the  approach  of  the  British.  By  the  15th,  the 
pier,  works,  magazines,  etc.,  had  been  destroyed,  and  the  various 
vessels  in  harbour  had  been  sunk,  burnt,  or  carried  off.  On  the 
10th  the  army  re-embarked,  having  lost  but  twenty  killed  and 
thirty  wounded,  although  there  had  been  frequent  small  skirmishes. 
Cherbourg  was  not  then  an  important  naval  station,  and  the 
destruction  of  its  harbour  was  a  blow  more  mortifying  than  serious 
to  the  French. 

The  fleet  sailed  on  August  17th,  and  on  tho  19th  anchored  in 
Portland  lioad.  But  the  authorities  were  not  satisfied  with  what 
had  been  done,  and  a  continuation  of  the  operations  was  ordered. 
The  fleet,  therefore,  put  to  sea  again  on  August  31st,  and  on 
September  3rd  anchored  in  the  Bay  of  St.  Lunaire,  about  six  miles 
west  of  St.  Malo.  On  the  following  day  the  army  landed  and 
encamped.  On  the  5th,  Bligh  detached  a  small  force  to  burn  some 
shipping  at  St.  Brieuc  ;  and,  on  the  same  day,  the  Commodore  and 
General  reconnoitred  the  bank  of  the  Kiver  Itance  to  see  if  St.  Malo 
could  be  attacked  on  that  side.  As  the  west  bank  was  found  to  be 
well  fortified  and  held,  the  design  against  the  town  was  abandoned. 
On  the  day  following,  at  a  council  of  war,  the  Commodore  stated 
that  he  did  not  consider  it  safe  to  re-embark  the  troops  in  the  Bay 
of  St.  Lunaire,  as  the  bottom  was  rocky  and  the  weather  threatened 
to  be  not  good  ;  and  he  expressed  his  desire  to  remove  the  fleet  to 
the  Bay  of  St.  Cas,  and  to  embark  the  army  there. 

The  troops  therefore  marched  off  on  the  7th  ;  but,  unfortunately, 
they  wasted  their  time  and  did  not  make  the  best  of  their  way. 
They  were  much  harassed  by  small  parties  of  the  enemy  in  woods 
and  hedges,  and  had  frequent  encounters  with  organised  bodies  of 
soldiers,  losing  men  continually.  On  the  night  of  the  9th,  the 


1758.]  THE  DISASTER   AT  ST.    CAS.  195 

General,  whose  intelligence  service  seems  to  have  been  almost 
non-existent,  learnt,  to  his  surprise,  of  the  presence,  only  three  miles 
from  him,  of  a  large  force  under  the  Due  d'Aiguillon.  The  Bay 
of  St.  Cas  was  then  only  four  and  a  half  miles  off;  and  an  officer 
was  sent  in  haste  to  Howe  to  inform  him  that  the  army  would 
proceed  thither  as  quickly  as  possible.  The  Commodore,  in  the 
early  morning,  made  as  good  a  disposition  of  his  ships  as  time 
permitted,  in  order  to  cover  the  re-embarkation.  In  the  meanwhile, 
the  retreat  had  begun,  but  it  was  9  P.M.  ere  the  heights  above  the 
Bay  were  gained.  The  strange  error  was  committed  of  re-embarking 
all  the  guns  and  horses  before  the  infantry.  Nevertheless,  by 
11  A.M.,  two-thirds  of  the  army  were  on  board.  At  about  that  time 
the  enemy's  cavalry  and  infantry  appeared,  and  opened  a  battery  of 
guns  on  those  who  remained  on  the  beach,  doing  great  execution 
there  and  in  the  boats.  Gradually  the  French  descended  from  the 
hills ;  and  at  last,  after  a  desperate  struggle,  they  seized  the  village 
of  St.  Cas.  There  were  then  on  shore  only  about  seven  hundred 
British  under  Major-General  Dury,  whose  dispositions  and  move- 
ments were  excessively  rash.  At  length  the  French  got  close  up  to 
the  retiring  British,  whose  ammunition  was  then  exhausted  ;  and  a 
rout  followed.  Part  plunged  into  the  sea,  part  seized  and  held  a  rock 
on  the  right  of  the  Bay,  whence  many  were  taken  off  by  the  boats  ; 
but  the  majority  had  to  surrender.  The  arm)'  lost,  in  killed, 
wounded,  or  taken  prisoners,  eight  hundred  and  twenty-two  officers 
and  men.  Of  the  naval  officers  who  were  superintending  the 
embarkation,  Captains  Joshua  Kowley,  Jervis  Maplesden,  and 
William  Paston,  and  Commander  John  Elphinstone  (1),  we're  taken. 
The  further  naval  loss,  however,  was  but  eight  killed  and  seventeen 
wounded. 

The  fleet  which,  under  Lord  An  son,  was  intended  to  cover  the 
operations  under  the  Hon.  Eichard  Howe  and  General  Bligh,  con- 
sisted of  twenty-two  sail  of  the  line  and  eight  frigates.  It  blockaded 
Brest  and  annoyed  the  enemy's  trade,  but  returned  to  Plymouth  on 
July  19th,  without  having  encountered  the  French.  Sir  Edward 
Hawke  being  ill,  his  place  was  taken  by  Bear-Admiral  Charles 
Holmes.  The  fleet  went  back  to  its  station  on  July  22nd,  and 
in  August  it  was  joined  by  a  contingent  under  Vice-Admiral  Charles 
Saunders.  The  three  admirals  continued  to  cruise  until  the  middle 
of  September,  by  which  time  the  operations  against  the  French 
Channel  ports  had  been  concluded.  Anson  and  Holmes  returned 

o  2 


196  MA  JOB    OPERATIONS,    1714-1762.  [1759. 

to  England,  leaving  Saunders  to  blockade  Brest  and  to  endeavour 
to  intercept  the  French  squadron  which  was  expected  from  Quehec  ; 
but  he  did  not  fall  in  with  it,  and  himself  went  back  into  port  in 
the  middle  of  December. 

In  1759  the  French  made  extraordinary  efforts  to  retrieve  their 
position  at  sea,  and  once  more  resorted  to  the  old  expedient  of 
threatening  an  invasion,  chiefly  with  a  view  to  crippling  British 
activity  in  distant  parts  of  the  world.  But  the  situation  of  Great 
Britain  was  then  in  every  respect  much  stronger  than  in  1756, 
when  similar  tactics  had  been  tried ;  and  the  scheme  did  not  produce 
the  desired  results.  British  troops  were  sent  from  England  to  the 
Continent,  to  North  America,  and  to  the  West  Indies ;  and  a  most 
formidable  expedition  was  organised  against  Canada ;  while,  on  the 
other  hand,  the  French  paid  so  much  attention  to  menacing  the 
British  in  the  home  seas  that  they  almost  entirely  overlooked 
the  business  of  protecting  their  own  dominions  abroad. 

In  the  course  of  the  year  France  assembled  three  expeditionary 
forces :  one  at  Vannes,  in  Brittany,  under  the  Due  d'Aiguilloii, 
which  was  to  be  convoyed  to  Ireland  by  a  fleet  under  M.  de  Conflans 
and  M.  dc  La  Clue ;  one  on  the  coast  of  Normandy,  which  was  to  be 
despatched  from  Lc  Havre  against  England  ;  and  the  smallest  of 
the  three,  at  Dunquerque,  to  be  convoyed  to  Scotland  or  Ireland 
by  M.  Thurot  and  six  frigates  and  corvettes.  To  meet  these  and 
other  preparations  the  militia  was  embodied,  and  the  following  dis- 
positions of  ships  were  made.  Commodore  William  Boys  watched 
Dunquerque;  Admiral  Thomas  Smith  (4)1  and  Commodore  Sir  Piercy 
Brett  (1)  commanded  a  force  in  the  Downs  ;  Rear-Admiral  George 
Brydges  Rodney  cruised  in  the  Channel,  and  kept  an  eye  on  the 
ports  of  Normandy ;  and  Sir  Edward  Hawke  blockaded  Brest. 
Elsewhere,  Boscawen  commanded  in  the  Mediterranean ;  Rear- 
Admiral  Samuel  Cornish  went  with  reinforcements  to  the  East 
Indies  ;  the  squadron  on  the  Leeward  Islands'  station  was 
strengthened  by  a  division  under  Captain  Robert  Hughes  (2),  and 
by  troops  under  Major-General  Hopson  ;  and  Vice- Admiral  Charles 
Saunders  and  Major-General  Wolfe  were  despatched  against  the 

1  Thomas  Smith  was  called  by  the  seamen  of  his  day  "Tom  o'  Ten  Thousand," 
because,  while  first  lieutenant  of  the  Oosport,  in  the  absence  of  the  captain,  he  compelled 
a  French  frigate  in  Plymouth  Sound  to  lower  her  topsails  by  way  of  salute.  For  this 
act  Lieutenant  Smith  was  court-martialled  and  dismissed  the  service,  but,  on  the 
following  day,  both  restored  and  posted.  Captain,  1730;  Rear- Admiral,  1747;  Vice- 
Admiral,  1748 ;  president  of  the  court-martial  on  Byng ;  Admiral,  1757 ;  died,  1762. 


1759.]  POCOCK  AND   D'ACEK  197 

French  in  Canada.  The  operations  of  this  important  and  successful 
year  in  the  various  parts  of  the  world  may  now  be  followed  in 
greater  detail. 

In  the  East  Indies,  Vice-Admiral  Pocock,  who  had  refitted  his 
squadron  at  Bombay,  sailed  for  the  coast  of  Coromandel  on 
April  7th,  endeavouring  to  get  thither  in  advance  of  the  French 
fleet,  which  was  expected  back  from  Mauritius.  He  succeeded  in 
this  object,  and  then  cruised  to  intercept  the  enemy.  On  June  30th 
he  was  joined  by  the  Graf  ton,  G8,  and  Siinderland,  00,  with  five 
East  Indiamen  full  of  stores,  of  which  he  was  greatly  in  need.  On 
August  3rd  he  sailed  for  Pondicherry,  and,  during  the  rest  of  the 
month,  cruised  off  that  port,  but  could  learn  nothing  of  the  enemy, 
and  was  at  length  obliged  by  lack  of  provisions  and  water  to 
proceed  to  Trincomale.  He  sailed  again  thence  on  September  1st, 
having  a  few  days  earlier  sent  the  East  India  Company's  frigate, 
Revenge,  to  cruise  off  Ceylon  and  to  keep  a  look-out  for  the  French. 

M.  d'Ache  had  reached  Mauritius  in  September,  17oS,  and  hud 
there  found  a  reinforcement  of  three  sail  of  the  line  and  several 
French  East  India  Company's  ships.  But  provisions  were  so 
scarce  that  he  had  to  send  one  of  the  men-of-war  and  eight  of  the 
Indiamen  to  South  Africa  to  purchase  supplies.  These  reached 
Cape  Town  in  January,  1759,  and  returned  to  Mauritius  in  April 
and  May.  M.  d'Ache  was  thus  enabled  to  sail  on  July  17th  for 
Bourbon  and  Madagascar,  to  pick  up  further  stores,  and  thence 
for  India.  He  reached  Batticaloa  in  Ceylon  on  August  30th,  and, 
having  there  learnt  something  of  the  movements  of  the  British 
squadron,  sighted  it  off  Point  Pedara 1  on  September  '2nd.  His  force 
consisted  of  eleven  sail  of  the  line,  besides  two  frigates  ;  that  of 
Vice-Admiral  Pocock,  of  only  nine  sail  of  the  line  and  one  frigate. 

On  that  same  day,  at  about  10  A.M.,  the  Itcpeiige  signalled  to  the 
Vice-Admiral  that  she  saw  fifteen  ~  sail  in  the  south-east,  standing 
to  the  north-east.  These  were  the  enemy.  Pocock  signalled  for 
a  general  chase,  and  stood  towards  the  French  under  all  possible 
sail ;  but,  the  wind  failing,  the  British  were  unable  to  get  up.  In 
spite  of  his  great  superiority,  d'Ache  apparently  did  all  that  lay  in 
his  power  to  avoid  an  action,  although  Pocock  was  equally  anxious 
to  provoke  one.  After  much  fruitless  manoeuvring  the  French  were 
lost  sight  of,  and  Pocock  then  stood  to  the  north  for  Pondicherry, 

1  Called  also  Point  Palmyra.     It  is  the  Js.E.  point  of  Ceylon. 

2  It  does  not  appear  that  there  were  really  more  than  thirteen. 


198 


MAJOR    OPERATIONS,   1714-1762. 


[1759. 


where  he  expected  to  find  his  foe.  He  arrived  off  that  place  in  the 
early  morning  of  the  8th,  but  saw  no  ships  in  the  roadstead.  At 
1  P.M.,  nevertheless,  he  sighted  the  enemy's  fleet  to  the  south- 
east. He  was  then  standing  to  the  northward  with  a  sea  breeze. 
On  the  morning  of  the  9th,  the  French  were  again  visible ;  and 
at  2  P.M.,  the  wind  springing  up,  the  Vice-Admiral  once  more 
signalled  for  a  general  chase.  Two  hours  later  the  enemy  appeared 
to  have  formed  a  line  of  battle  abreast,  and  in  that  formation  bore 
down.  But  no  action  resulted. 

At  6  A.M.,  however,  on  September  10th,  the  French  bore  S.E. 
by  S.,  distant  eight  or  nine  miles,  sailing  in  line  of  battle  ahead  on 
the  starboard  tack.  Pocock,1  in  line  of  battle  abreast,  bore  down 
on  them  with  the  wind  about  N.W.  by  W.  At  10  A.M.  the  enemy 
wore,  and  formed  a  line  of  battle  ahead  011  the  larboard  tack ;  and 
an  hour  afterwards  Pocock  did  the  same,  the  Elizabeth  leading. 
The  action  was  begun  on  the  British  side  by  Rear-Admiral  Stevens, 
who,  in  the  Graf  ton,  attacked  the  Zodiaque.  The  tactics  of  the 
day  present  no  features  of  special  interest ;  and  the  action  is 
chiefly  remarkable  for  the  fury  with  which  it  was  fought ;  for  the 
fact  that,  owing  to  various  defects,  two  of  the  British  ships  were 
able  to  take  only  a  very  insignificant  part  in  the  engagement ;  and 
because,  in  the  evening,  the  whole  of  the  superior  French  squadron 
bore  away  and  stood  to  the  S.S.E.  under  a  crowd  of  sail.  Most 
of  the  British  ships  were  far  too  damaged  to  be  able  to  pursue ; 

1  Order  of  battle  (on  the  starboard  tack)  of  the  British  and  French  squadrons  in  the 
East  Indies  in  the  action  of  September  10th,  17")!):— 


I5i;rnsM. 


FUJCNCH. 


Ships.                Gu 

is.              Cuinmanilers. 

Ships. 

Guns 

Commanders. 

JClizabeth     ...       6 

i         dipt.  Ilichanl  TiiMoiuan.      Art  if       .... 

0( 

Xetixastle     ...        5 

)            ,,     Colin  ^lidiie.                Minotaure    . 

71 

JYijFgj1                                            (i 

)           ,,     AVillitiui  -Brerotoii.      intc  d'Orlt.'ciitx  . 

tin 

Capt.  do  Surville  (2). 

liear-Admiral     Charles       AY.  Louis 

6U 

Grafton  ....        6 

^           Stevens  (,H).                      Vengeitr 
Capt.  Richard  Kern  pen-  i 

U4 

,,    de  La  Falllcre. 
ILieat.-General      Comte 

felt. 

Zoaiagve 

74 

{     d'Aclie. 

,  i  Vice-  Admiral      Georpe 

1 

Yarmouth    ...        66     '{     Pocock  (]{)• 

Comfede  Provence. 

i      74 

Capt.  de  La  Chaise. 

i  If  apt.  John  Harrison. 
'(     ,,     John          Stuklcv 
Cumberland  l   .            68    ij             Somerset 

Due  de  BounjoijUe. 
Jtlitstre  . 
Fortune  . 

S2 

61 

,,    I)ouvet(2). 

Salisbury     ...        50     i       ,,     I>igl>y  I'ent  (:',). 

t'tntaure 

"U 

„    de  Surville  (1). 

(     ,,     Hun.    James   Col- 
Sunderlana.     .     .       60     j    '        \\\\e. 

Sylphidf, 

36 

If    „    Sir  William  Baird, 
\\eymoitth    ...        60      j               Bart 

Diligente 

24 

Queeniioroiigh         .   <     2 

„     Robert  Kirk. 

i  Had  been  a  GG-guu  ship,  but  was  reduced  to  a  58  to  ease  her. 


1759.]  D'ACHE   QUITS   THE  FIELD.  199 

and,  having  ordered  the  Sevcnge  to  observe  the  motions  of  the 
French,  Pocock  lay  to  on  the  larboard  tack  to  enable  his  most 
shattered  vessels  to  repair  damages.  At  dawn  on  September  llth 
the  French  were  seen  in  the  S.S.E.,  about  twelve  miles  away, 
lying  to  on  the  larboard  tack,  the  wind  being  about  west.  On 
perceiving  the  British,  they  at  once  wore  and  brought  to  on.  the 
other  tack,  and  so  continued  until  evening,  when  they  were  so  far 
off  that  they  were  almost  out  of  sight.  At  that  time,  the  wind 
veering  to  the  east,  Pocock  signalled  his  ships  to  wear,  and  stood 
under  easy  sail  to  the  south-west ;  the  Runde.rland  towing  the  New- 
castle, the  WeijmoutJi  the  Tiger,  and  the  Elizabeth  the  Cumberland. 

The  loss  sustained  by  the  French  in  the  engagement  was,  all 
things  considered,  enormous,  amounting,  as  it  did,  to  nearly  1500 
killed  and  wounded.  Among  the  killed  were  the  captains  of  the 
Zodiaque  and  Centaurc,  and  among  the  wounded  was  d'Ache  himself. 
The  French  made  for  Pondicherry.  The  loss  on  the  British  side 
was  also  very  heavy,  being  o(>(.)  killed  and  wounded,  including  1H4 
who  were  either  killed  outright  or  died  of  their  wounds.  Among 
the  killed  was  Captain  Colin  Micliie  of  the  Xcircaxtle,  and  among 
the  wounded  were  Captain  Somerset  of  the  Cumberland  and  Captain 
Brereton  of  the  Tiijcr. 

On  September  loth  the  British  anchored  in  the  lioad  of 
Negapatam;  and,  having  hastily  completed  their  refitting,  Pocock 
sailed  with  his  ships  again  on  the  '20th.  On  his  way  to  Madras  lie 
had  to  pass  Pondicherry,  where  the  French  were  lying  ;  and,  un- 
willing to  pass  it  by  night,  or  to  do  anything  to  prevent  M.  d'Ache 
from  fighting  another  action,  he  so  arranged  matters  as  to  appear  off 
the  town  at  daybreak  on  September  "27th.  There  he  lay  with  the 
wind  about  W.S.W.,  with  his  maintopsails  to  the  mast,  and  with 
but  just  sufficient  steerage  way  on  his  ships  for  the  proper  main- 
tenance of  the  line.  Thus  the  British  drifted  slowly  to  leeward,  yet 
not  unt.il  Pocock  had  given  d'Ache  the  fullest  possible  opportunity 
to  come  out  and  fight.  But  the  latter  had  no  such  intention  ;  and, 
after  weighing  and  making  a  few  meaningless  demonstrations,  he 
returned  to  port  and  there  announced  his  intention  of  sailing 
immediately  for  Mauritius.  He  carried  out  this  determination  on 
September  30th,  in  spite  of  the  anxious  remonstrances  of  the  shore 
authorities,  and  especially  of  M.  de  Lally.  His  principal  motive  for 
thus  acting  seems  to  have  been  his  knowledge  that  Pocock  was 
about  to  be  reinforced  by  four  ships  of  the  line  from  England. 


200  MAJOR    OPERATIONS,   1714-1762.  [1759. 

Pocock,  being  short  of  water  and  stores,  and  with  ships  in 
bad  condition,  returned  to  Madras,  where  he  anchored  on  Sep- 
tember 28th.  Thence  he  sailed  on  October  16th  for  Bombay, 
and  on  the  17th  fell  in  with  Bear-Admiral  Samuel  Cornish,  with 
three  ships  of  the  line,  one  50-gun  ship,1  and  three  East  Indiainen, 
which  last,  and  the  troops  which  had  been  brought  out  as  reinforce- 
ments, were  sent  on  to  Madras  escorted  by  the  Qiieenborough.  They 
reached  that  place  on  October  '27th.  Pocock  proceeded  to  Bombay, 
and,  after  making  various  dispositions,  sailed  on  April  7th,  1760,  for 
England  with  a  very  valuable  convoy,  arriving  in  the  Downs  on 
September  '22nd  following.  He  left  behind  him  Bear-Admirals 
Stevens  and  Cornish. 

Alluding  to  this  last  action,  Mahan,  after  referring  to  the 
numerical  superiority  of  the  French,  says  : 

"The  1'niits  of  victory,  however,  were  with  the  weaker  licet,  t'nr  d'Ache  returned  to 
Pondicherry  and  thence  sailed  on  the  1st  of  the  next  month  for  the  islands,  leaving 
India  to  its  fate.  I'Yom  that  time  the  result  was  certain.  The  English  continued  to 
receive  reinforcements  from  home,  while  the  French  did  not  ;  the  men  opposed  to  Lally 
were  superior  in  ability;  place  after  place  fell,  and  in  .lanuary,  17'il,  I'ondiclierry 
itself  surrendered,  surrounded  hv  land  and  cut  off  from  the  sea.  This  was  the  end  of 
French  power  in  India;  for  though  Pondicherry  and  other  possessions  were  restored  at 
the  peace,  the  English  tenure  there  was  never  again  shaken,  even  under  the  attacks  of 
the  skilful  and  hold  Snfl'ren,  who  twenty  years  later  met  difficulties  as  great  as  d'Achu's 
with  a  vigour  and  conduct  which  the  latter  at  a  more  hopeful  moment  failed  to  show."2 

Vice-Adiniral  Pocock  wits  deservedly  made  a  K.B.  for  his  services 
and  promoted  to  be  Admiral  of  the  Blue. 

Such  naval  successes  as  the  French  won  in  the  East  after  the 
departure  of  Pocock  were  confined  to  the  capture  of  the  East  India 
Company's  factory  at  Gombroon  in  the  Persian  Giilf,  and  the 
reduction  of  certain  British  settlements  in  Sumatra.  These  successes 

'  Reinforcement  which  reached  Vicc-Admiral  I'ocork  in  the  Kast  Indies  in 
October,  175!l: — 


J.enox   .           .           .           . 

74 

i  liear-A, 
\Captain 

imiral  Samuel  Cornish 
Robert  Jocelyn. 

(I!.). 

Due  cFAquitaine 

04 

„ 

Sir  William  Hewitt,  I 

'.art. 

York     .          .          .          . 

00 

., 

Vincent  Pcarce  (2). 

50 

?> 

Kichard  Hughes  (:!). 

2  '  Inn.  of  Sea  Power,'  310. 


1759.] 


FIASCO   AT  MARTINIQUE. 


201 


were  merely  raids,  without  influence  on  the  course  of  the  war  or  on 
the  future  of  Franco-British  commercial  rivalry.  The  Dutch,  seeking 
to  profit  hy  the  temporary  difficulties  of  the  British,  attempted,  with 
seven  East  Indiamen  and  some  troops  from  Batavia,  to  seize  Chinsura 
on  the  Ganges,  but  were  checkmated  by  the  energy  of  Colonel  Clive, 
Governor  of  Bengal,  and  by  the  gallantry  of  the  masters  of  several 
British  East  Indiamen,  who,  under  Wilson  of  the  Calcutta,  took  or 
drove  off  the  enemy  on  November  '24th,  1759,  after  a  sharp  action. 
The  captured  Dutch  vessels  were  afterwards  returned  to  their  owners, 
on  security  being  given  for  the  payment  of  £100,000  damages. 

The  British  force  on  the  Leeward  Islands'  station,  under  Commo- 
dore John  Moore,  was  strengthened  by  eight  ships  of  the  lino  under 
Captain  liobert  Hughes  (-2),  and  by  troops  under  Major-General 
Hopson,  in  order  that  the  force  might  reduce  some  of  the  French 
Caribbee  Islands,  which  were  supposed  to  be  weakly  garrisoned.1 
The  troops  left  England  in  November,  17">S,  under  convoy  of  Captain 
Hughes,  and  reached  Carlisle  Bay,  Barbados,  in  January,  1751). 
There  Commodore  Moore  was  met  with.  On  the  18th  of  that  month 
the  whole  force  sailed  for  Martinique,  and  on  the  afternoon  of  the 
15th  entered  Fort  Royal  Bay.  On  the  morning  of  the  llith  the 
Bristol,  50,  Captain  Leslie,  and  the  l/i/xui,  (SO,  Captain  Jekyll, 
silenced  and  occupied  a,  fort  on  Negro  Point.  The  Winchester,  5(1, 
Captain  Le  Cras,  Woohrk'h,  44,  Captain  Peter  Parker  (1),  and 
Eoebucli,  44,  Captain  Thomas  Lynn,  cannonaded  the  batteries  in  the 
Bay  of  Cas  des  Navires,  where  it  was  intended  to  disembark  troops. 

1   List  of  the  British   tieet  »n   the  Leeward  Island*'  station   under  Commodore  John 
Moore  in  \~~\\\: — 


Gnus. 


C  nil  m  ;imler>. 


Commanders. 


Cambridge  • 

80 

I  o  iimm  >dore  John  Mm  >re. 
'.(apt.  Thomas  Humeit. 

Jtoebuck.     '.     '. 

-14        Ca 

44 

it.  1'eter  Parker  (I).3 

St.  George    .      . 

fio 

,,     Chirke  (lay  tun. 

/.Hilton'  {.'uttii-  . 

4U 

Kiluavd  Clark  (1  1.1* 

Norfolk  .      .      . 

74 

,,     Itobert  Hughes  i/.i). 

Jienmi-H  .     .      . 

3  a 

George  Mackenzie. 

Buckingham 

TO 

„     Kichavd  Tyrrell.' 

Amttznii  . 

20 

William  Nnrtuii. 

Surford      .     . 

To 

,,     James  Gambler  (1). 

/,'(/(•    .... 

2H 

Daniel  lierhi^. 

Berwick. 

64 

,,     William  llarman. 

JiOIK'tt'l    .        .        . 

14 

Kichard  Kim;  (1). 

Linn 

60 

(     ,,     William           Tre- 

Wwx-l    .      .      . 

14         Ci 

i.  Jnlni  Boles. 

60 

{              la  \vm-v. 
,,    Edward  Jekjll. 

N/"/'1''.""  .    !    ! 

lit 

lu     . 

We>ton  Varl". 
^V'illiam  Hayne. 

Panther 

00 

(     .,     Molyneux    Shuld- 
\             hani. 

Falcon,  boinb    . 

H      ! 

Sabine  Meacoii. 
Mark  UolmiwuiM). 

Winchester  . 

50 

,,     Edward  Le  Cras. 

Grenada,  Immb 

8           ,,     Samnei  U  vedale. 

Bristol    .     .      . 

50 

,,     Lachlin  Leslie.* 

Infernal,  bomb 

8            .,     James  Mackenzie. 

Later,  Capt.  Lachlin  I.eslio.  =  Later,  Capt.  I'cter  Parker  (1).  3  Later,  Capt.  Daniel  Bering. 

•  Brought  out  the  second  battalion  of  the  Koyal  Higlilaiulers  from  Scotland. 


The  above  were  eventually  joined  by  the  Lancaster,  06,  Captain  Kobert  Mann  (2), 
the  Emerald,  28,  and  the  Griffon,  28. 


202  MAJOR    OPERATIONS,    1714-1762.  [1759. 

A  landing  was  effected  at  about  4  P.M.  under  Captains  Molyneux 
Shuldham,  James  Gambier  (1),  and  Thomas  Burnett;  and,  by  the 
following  morning,  nearly  the  whole  army  was  ashore.  But  against 
4400  British,  available  for  the  service,  there  were  at  least  10,000 
French,  including  their  militia;  and,  after  some  small  operations 
had  been  attempted,  General  Hopson,  despairing  of  success,  with- 
drew his  troops  to  the  transports. 

The  expedition  then  proceeded  to  St.  Pierre,  the  capital  of  the 
island.  But,  on  his  arrival  off  that  place  on  the  19th,  the  Commodore 
did  nothing  except  send  in  the  HipoH,  60,  Captain  Jekyll,  to  attack 
some  batteries,  the  reduction  of  which  would  not  in  the  least  have 
influenced  the  general  fate  of  the  island.  Jekyll  was  quite  un- 
supported;  and,  having  fought  from  '1  till  4. HO  P.M.  with  great 
gallantry  and  silenced  one  battery,  he  was  obliged  to  cut  his  cable 
and  tow  off.  The  position  of  the  Hipon  was  for  some  time  not 
unlike  that  of  the  Formidable  under  Captain  de  St.  lion  at  the 
attack  on  Lissa  in  1N(>(5.  She  narrowly  escaped  grounding,  and 
could  not  entirely  get  clear  till  6  P.M.  Jekyll  behaved  magnificently. 

It  was  then  decided  to  abandon  the  attempt  on  Martinique,  and 
to  attack  Guadeloupe  ;  and  on  the  morning  of  the  '20th  the  squadron 
sailed  to  the  northward.  By  noon  on  the  '2'2nd  it  was  off  Basse 
Terrc.  After  the  town  had  been  reconnoitred  and  a  council  of  war 
held,  it  was  determined  that  on  the  morning  of  January  '23rd  the 
citadel  and  various  batteries  of  Basse  Terre  should  be  cannonaded 
and,  if  possible,  silenced,  by  the  Lion,  (50,  Captain  William 
Trelawnev,  St.  Georr/e,  90,  Captain  Clarke  Gay  ton,  Norfolk,  74,  Cap- 
tain Itobert  Hughes  (-2),  Cambridge,  80,  Captain  Thomas  Burnett, 
bearing  the  broad  pennant  of  Commodore  Moore,  Panther,  60, 
Captain  Molyneux  Shuldham,  Burford,  70,  Captain  James  Gam- 
bier  (1),  Berwick,  (54,  Captain  William  Harman,  and  Hipon,  60, 
Captain  Edward  Jekyll.  The  last  named  got  aground,  and  was 
again  in  the  greatest  danger,  until  relieved  by  the  Bristol  and 
Roebuck.  At  about  5  P.M.  the  enemy's  fire  was  silenced.  Neverthe- 
less, the  town  was  rather  wantonly  destroyed  on  the  following  day 
by  the  fire  of  the  four  bomb  ketches.  Indeed,  Commodore  Moore 
exerted  from  the  first  much  unnecessary  force.  He  might  have 
landed  his  troops  a  little  to  the  north  of  the  town,  and  so  captured 
the  place,  which  was  open  on  the  land  side ;  but  he  preferred  the 
useless  and  risky  expedient  of  opposing  his  ships  to  forts.  In  the 
action,  however,  only  about  thirty  men  were  killed  and  about  sixty 


1759.]  CAPTURE    OF   GUADELOUPE.  203 

wounded,  among  the  latter  being  Captain  Trelawney,  of  the  Lion. 
Commodore  Moore,  of  course,  gained  his  object ;  and  on  the  24th 
the  army  was  put  ashore  and  Basse  Terre  and  Port  Royal  were 
occupied.  The  advantage  was,  unfortunately,  not  pressed  ;  and  the 
French  governor  retired  to  the  mountainous  interior  of  the  island, 
and  was  there  able  to  make  a  most  courageous  stand  for  upwards  of 
three  months. 

During  the  interval,  the  Commodore  detached  the  liocbitck,  44, 
Captain  Lynn,  the  Winchester,  50,  Captain  Le  Cras,  the  Berwick,  (>4, 
Captain  Harmari,  the   Panther,  GO,  Captain   Shuklham,  the   Wool- 
wich, 44,  Captain  Dering,  and  the  Henoicn,  32,  Captain  Mackenzie, 
under  Captain  Harman ;  and  this   force,  on  February   13th,  made 
itself  master  of  Port  Louis  on  the  Grande  Terre  side  of  the  island. 
But  the  guerilla  warfare   and  comparative  inactivity  played  havoc 
with  the  troops.     There  were  great  numbers  of  sick;  and  many  of 
them  had  to  be  sent  to  Antigua.     On  February  27th  General  Ho]><i>n 
died,  and  was  succeeded  in  the  chief  military  command  by  Major- 
General  the  Hon.  John  Barriiigton.     This  officer  was  beginning  to 
take  somewhat  more  energetic  measures  than  had  previously  been 
displayed,  when  the  army  was  partially  deprived  of  the  assistance 
of  the  fleet  in  consequence  of    the  arrival    in    the  West    Indies    of 
M.  de  Bompart,  with  five  ships  of  the  line  and  three  large  frigates, 
containing    troops    intended    for   the    relief   of    the    French  islands. 
Commodore  Moore  felt  it  necessary  to  proceed  to  Prince  Rupert's 
Bay  in  the  Island  of  Dominica,  so  that  lie  might  be  in  a  position  to 
watch  and  promptly  follow  the  motions  of  the  enemy,  who  lay  in 
Great  Bay,  Fort  Royal,  Martinique.     The  operations  on  shore  were 
thereafter  conducted  chiefly  by  the  army.     The  inevitable  capitula- 
tion was  signed  on  May  1st,  M.  de  Bompart  not  having  interfered. 
Nevertheless,  after  Guadeloupe  had   surrendered,  he  made    a    brief 
descent  upon  the  island,  and  then,  learning  the  truth,  returned  to 
Martinique.    Moore  heard  of  this  movement  of  the  French  squadron, 
and  put  to  sea  in  search  of  the  enemy ;  but  he  failed  to  find  him, 
and  once  more  anchored  in  Prince  Rupert's  Bay.     After  the  capture 
of  Guadeloupe,  General   Barriiigton   summoned,   and   received   the 
surrender  of,  Marie  Galante,  the   Saintes,  La  Desirade  and  Petite 
Terre.     A  little  later  Moore,  reinforced  by  the  Raisonnable,  64,  and 
the  Nassau,  64,  proceeded  to  Basse  Terre  Road,  and,  on  June  25th, 
despatched   part   of   the   army   to   England   under   convoy   of    the 
Roebuck. 


204  MAJOR    OPERATIONS,   1714-1762.  [1759. 

Their  inferiority  of  force  prevented  the  French  from  attempting 
anything  of  importance  against  either  the  British  fleet  or  the  British 
garrisons  in  the  West  Indies ;  and,  as  no  French  fleet  put  to 
sea,  Moore  had  subsequently  to  confine  himself  to  repressing  the 
enemy's  privateers  and  to  protecting  British  trade.  On  the  Jamaica 
station,  where  Vice-Admiral  Cotes  still  commanded,  the  situation 
was  very  similar ;  and,  though  useful  work  was  done  by  the  cruisers, 
no  event  of  importance  happened. 

In  North  America  the  plans  which  had  been  formulated  by  the 
Earl  of  Loudoun  during  his  commandership-in-chief  continued  to 
be  carried  out  after  his  supersession  ;  and,  in  pursuance  of  these, 
four  considerable  expeditions  were  entered  upon  in  1759,  the  object 
of  all  being  the  ending  of  French  rule  in  Canada.  Three  of  these 
expeditions,  one  against  Fort  Niagara,  under  Brigadier-General 
Prideaux  ;  one  against  the  French  settlements  on  Lake  Erie,  under 
Brigadier-General  Htanwix  ;  and  one  under  Major-General  Amherst 
against  Crown  Point  and  Ticonderoga,  were  mainly  military.  The 
fourth,  under  Vice-Admiral  Charles  Satmders  and  Major-General 
Wolfe,  against  Quebec,  was  fully  as  much  naval  as  military.  All, 
however,  were  parts  of  a  single  scheme,  which  was  designed  to 
occupy  the  French  in  several  quarters  simultaneously,  and  so  to 
prevent  them  from  concentrating  their  full  strength  at  any  one 
point.  The  various  expeditions  were  intended  ultimately  to  assist 
one  another ;  but  that  all  the  schemes  did  not  accurately  dovetail 
as  originally  intended  is  only  natural.  That  mistakes  should  be 
committed  and  that  there  should  be  in  some  cases  lack  of  fore- 
sight and  of  due  preparation,  were  matters  of  course.  Yet,  in 
spite  of  local  insuccesses,  the  great  combined  undertaking  was 
in  its  results  triumphant,  thanks  largely  to  Saunders  and,  above 
all,  to  Wolfe. 

Prideaux's  force  of  about  5000  men  started  on  May  20th  from 
Schenactady  up  the  Mohawk  Kiver,  and  so,  amid  great  difficulties, 
to  Oswego  on  Lake  Ontario  ;  whence,  leaving  there  a  detachment, 
it  crossed  the  lake  and  reached  Niagara  on  July  6th.  In  the 
operations  General  Prideaux  was  killed  by  accident,  and  the  com- 
mand devolved  upon  the  Colonial  colonel,  Sir  William  Johnson, 
Bart.,  who,  after  defeating  a  relieving  force  of  the  enemy,  received 
the  surrender  of  the  fort  on  July  25th.  Johnson,  being  short  of 
ammunition  and  supplies,  then  returned  to  Oswego,  where  he 
relinquished  his  command  to  Brigadier-General  Gage,  who  built  a 


1759.]  INVASION   OF   CANADA.  205 

fort  there,  while  Captain  Joshua  Loring,  R.N.,  superintended  the 
construction  of  two  large  vessels  for  the  navigation  and  command 
of  Lake  Ontario  and  the  River  St.  Lawrence. 

The  expedition  under  General  Stanwix  was  completely  success- 
ful, but  it  was  so  purely  a  military  one  that  there  is  no  need  to 
describe  its  operations  here. 

The  expedition  under  General  Ainherst  against  Crown  Point  and 
Ticonderoga  was  in  many  respects  a  large  and  powerful  one  ;  yet  it 
should  have  included  a  great  number  of  ship's  carpenters,  and 
quantities  of  supplies  for  the  creation  of  a  naval  force  on  Lake 
Champlain.  This  provision  was,  however,  overlooked.  About 
June  1st,  the  army  was  assembled  at  Fort  Edward,  and  on 
June  llth  it  marched  to  the  banks  of  Lake  George.  Such  boats 
and  radeaux  as  could  be  built  were  of  an  unsatisfactory  nature ; 
but  at  length  a  motley  flotilla  was  collected,  and  the  army  embarked 
and  proceeded  down  the  Lake.  On  June  22nd  the  troops  were  landed 
near  the  Second  Narrows  and  advanced  against  Ticonderoga,  which 
on  the  25th  was  evacuated  and  blown  up,  the  enemy  retiring  on 
Crown  Point.  The  boats  .and  radeaux  were  then  laboriously  got 
into  Lake  Champlain.  On  August  1st,  Amherst  learnt  that  Crown 
Point  had  been  abandoned  ;  and  on  the  4th  he  occupied  it.  He  at 
once  set  to  work  to  endeavour  to  put  a  suitable  naval  force  on  Lake 
Champlain,  so  that  he  might  be  able  to  press  on  and  effect  a 
junction  with  the  force  under  Wolfe.  But,  owing  to  the  lack  of 
preparations,  there  were  delays  ;  and,  although  the  French  force  on 
the  Lake  was  in  part  taken  or  destroyed,  the  approach  of  winter 
obliged  Amherst  at  the  end  of  October  to  cut  short  his  advance  and 
to  return  to  Crown  Point.  Thus,  both  Prideaux  and  Amherst,  who 
were  to  have  held  forth  helping  hands  to  Wolfe,  failed,  perhaps 
through  no  fault  of  their  own.  Only  Stanwix,  whose  object  was 
rather  diversion  than  actual  and  immediate  co-operation,  completely 
gained  his  end.  It  is  not  the  least  of  Wolfe's  merits  that,  in  spite 
of  the  lack  of  expected  help,  but  with  the  cordial  co-operation  of  the 
Navy,  he  brought  to  a  triumphant  conclusion  the  most  important 
and  difficult  expedition  of  the  four. 

Wolfe  had  with  him  ten  battalions  of  infantry,  three  companies 
of  grenadiers  and  some  companies  of  artillery  and  rangers,  about 
9200  men  in  all.  The  fleet,  which  was  to  convoy  and  support  the 
force,  was  under  Vice-Admiral  Charles  Saunders  and  Rear-Admirals 
Philip  Durell  (1)  and  Charles  Holmes,  and  consisted  of  twenty  sail  of 


206 


MAJOR    OPERATIONS,    1714-1762. 


[1759. 


the  line,  two  fifty-gun  ships  and  numerous  frigates  and  small  craft.1 
Part  of  this  fleet  was  already  on  the  North  American  station  under 
Durell,  and  had  wintered  at  Halifax.  As  soon  as  the  season  per- 
mitted, Durell  had  entered  the  Kiver  St.  Lawrence,  and  011  May  23rd 
got  up  as  far  as  Isle  Bic.  Holmes  went  out  from  England  to 
Halifax  early  in  the  year  1759  to  forward  preparations ;  and  on 
February  17th  Baunders  and  Wolfe  sailed  from  Spithead.  The 
main  body  of  the  expedition  was  gradually  assembled  at  Louisbourg 
in  the  island  of  Cape  Breton  ;  and  there  it  was  joined  by  the  troops 
in  garrison.  On  June  1st  it  began  to  leave  the  harbour  ;  and  on  the 
'23rd  the  fleet  found  Rear-Admiral  Durell  near  Isle  Coudres,  and 
obtained  from  him  some  French  pilots  whom  he  had  secured  by  a 
ruse.  Durell,  reinforced,  was  left  off  Isle  Coudres  to  bar  the  river, 
and  Saunders,  hoisting  his  flag  in  the  Stirlinr/  Custlc,  64,  Captain 
Michael  Everitt,  proceeded,  and  on  June  '2(")th  anchored  off  Isle 
d'Orleans,  a  few  miles  below  Quebec. 

The  Marquis  de  Montcalm,  who  defended  the  city,  had  taken  all 
possible  precautions,  and  had  removed  the  buoys  and  marks.  His 
main  army  was  about  14,000  strong,  and  lay  at  Beauport,  to  the 
immediate  north-east  of  Quebec.  Detachments  of  it  were  posted 
down  the  river  at  points  whence  it  was  expected  that  the  advancing 

1   List  nl'  the  British  fleet  employed  mi  the  expedition  to  (Jiu-lu 


sbips.               Guns. 

Commanders. 

Miijis.                <  Jims.              Commanders. 

l\ 

tee-  Admiral      Charles 

Ti-t-Ht      ....        -2»       Capt.  John  Lindsay. 

Xijitune       •     •     •       :m 

Saunders  (If). 

Lizard    ....        2s            ,,     James  l»(.ak.-. 

ICant.  Hroilrirk  HarUvdl. 

AV/io  2«            ,,     John  Laforev. 

.l.Viir-Ailluirul        I'liilip 
Princess  Amelia    .80      <     Durell  (1)  (I!). 

Lou-estttft     ...        .'8           „    Joseph  Deaiie. 
Seahorse.      ...        24           „     James  Smith. 

tf 

apt.  John  Bray. 

Scarborough      .     .        24           .,    John  Stoit. 

lUriir-Atluiiral      Charles 
Dublin    ....        74     •      Holmes  (W). 

Flir  us                              -'it     'f     "     J°'m   Eljthiiistone 
(              (,1). 

(C'«]it.  William  (ioostrer. 
Jt'ii/nl  William.             «4           „     Hugh  Plgot  (I). 

yiuhtiHgv?.:     .      .        -20      f     "     Jamee     C'ampbeU 

Terrible  .     .     . 

74 

,,    Richard  IbmnaCl). 

Kind  l!0           „     Robert  Bond. 

.sVtrews/<wri/ 

74 

„    IIughPalli>or. 

Squirrel  ....        20          „    (Jeorge  Hamilton. 

V    II  umberlani 

70      f 

„     Alex.    Lord    Col- 

Fowev     .                         "0      i     "     G001"*?6     Anthony 

I 

ville. 

Tonvn. 

Vanguard    . 
Devonshire  . 

70 
66 

„     Roltert  Swanton. 
,,     William  (iordon. 

Scorpion,     ...       .4 

Porcupine    ...         14 

Com.  John  Cleland  (1). 
,     John  Jervis. 

lirford          .     . 
,*onier*(t 

66 
64 

,,     Ricliard  Spry. 
„     Edward  Hughes. 

Hunter  ....        10     {    "     M'i]liam     Adams 

Ah-itle           .      . 
Hertford        .     . 

64 
64 

,     James  Jtouglas  1,1). 
,    Tborj*  Fowke. 

Zephyr    ....        10     j     »    u^Iiam      Green- 

f'afitain 
Trident 

64 
64 

,     John  Amherst. 
,    Julian  Legge. 

r.aUimnre,  bomb    .          8 
Pelican,  Ixunb  .      .          8 

.,     Robert  C'arpenter. 
,,     Edward  Mount  ford. 

Stirling  Castle. 

64 

,     Michael  Everitt. 

Jtacchorst1,  bomb    .          8 

„    Francis  Richards. 

Prince  Frederick 

64 

,     P.obert  l.'uiitli. 

\'f.*uriuf,  i.*.    .     .        16 

,,    James  Chads, 

,Vcf  iu'ai/  . 

60 

,    Charles  Prubv, 

Cormorant,  f.s.       .        16 

,,     Patiick  Mount. 

Pembroke     . 

60 

,    John  Wbeelock. 

tftrombfjfo,  f.s.   .               16 

Lieut.  Kichard  Smith. 

Prince  of  Orange 
Centurion    . 

60 
50 

,    Samuel  Wallis. 
,    AVilliam  Mamell. 

Jfoscawtii,  a.s.  .      .        16 
Halifax,  a.s.     .      .    |     la 

Com.  Charles  Donglas. 
Lieut.  — 

Sutherland  . 

DO 

00            t 

,     John  Rons. 
,     Alexander  Schom- 

Rodney,  cutter  .      .          4 

(Lieut.  Hon.  Philip  Tufton 
1     Perceval. 

Itiana,     .... 

32      { 

berg. 

Crown  t  et.s.       .      .        18 

Com.  Josenh  Mead. 

00         If 

,,    Thomas    Hanker- 

Richmond    . 

32     ,{ 

BOD. 

besides  transports,  etr. 

1759.J  ATTACK   ON   QUEBEC.  207 

British  could  be  annoyed.  He  had  also  thrown  up  strong  works  on 
the  north  side  of  the  river,  between  the  Eiver  St.  Charles  and  the 
Falls  of  Montmorency,  and  had  armed  two  hulks  in  the  Eiver 
St.  Charles  to  defend  the  communications  with  the  army  and 
Quebec.  The  Governor  of  the  Province,  Captain  de  Vaudreuil, 
was,  however,  a  naval  officer,  while  the  Marquis  de  Montcalm  was 
a  soldier ;  and  there  was  not  a  good  understanding  between  them. 
Montcalm  prudently  desired  to  make  his  preparations  with  a  view 
to  the  necessity  of  a  retreat ;  but  de  Vaudreuil  maintained  that 
such  precautions  were  needless,  and  that  if  the  whole  French  force 
were  concentrated  on  the  north  side  of  the  river,  the  worst  the 
British  could  do  would  be  to  demolish  some  of  the  houses  in 
the  city. 

On  June  27th,  the  British  army  landed  on  Isle  d'Orleans  and  the 
French  defences  were  reconnoitred.  Towards  night  the  ships  were 
disposed  to  the  best  advantage,  and  measures  were  taken  to  prevent 
damage  from  the  enemy's  fireships,  which  wore  known  to  be  in 
readiness  higher  up.  A  certain  number  of  Marines  had  been  taken 
from  those  ships  which  had. been  left  at  Isle  Coudres  under  Durell, 
and  these  were  distributed  throughout  the  fleet.  At  midnight  on 
June  28th,  the  French  sent  down  seven  fireships  and  two  fire  rafts ; 
but  they  were  grappled  and  towed  clear  by  the  activity  and  good 
conduct  of  the  seamen.  Vice- Admiral  Saunders  then  decided  to 
move  some  of  his  vessels  into  the  open  space  of  water  immediately 
below  the  town,  known  as  the  Basin  of  Quebec ;  and,  to  afford  them 
some  protection,  he  induced  General  Wolfe  to  order  the  occupation 
of  Point  Levis  by  Brigadier-General  Monckton.  The  enemy  tried 
to  dislodge  this  force  on  July  1st  by  means  of  floating  batteries,  but 
in  vain.  The  batteries  were  driven  back  by  the  fire  of  the  Trent,  28, 
Captain  John  Lindsay.  Ultimately  some  large  ships  were  stationed 
a  little  higher  up  the  river.  Above  these  were  frigates ;  and  again 
above  them  armed  boats  rowed  guard  every  night.  The  enemy 
thereupon  ordered  such  ships  as  he  had  up  to  Batiscan,  sixty  miles 
above  Quebec,  but  kept  most  of  their  crews  in  the  city  to  assist  in 
working  the  guns.  Batteries  were  erected  on  Point  Levis  to 
bombard  Quebec,  and,  the  works  on  Isle  d'Orleans  having  been  com- 
pleted, Wolfe,  on  July  9th,  embarked  his  troops,  and  under  convoy 
of  the  Porcupine,  14,  Commander  John  Jervis,  and  the  Boscaiven, 
armed  ship,  16,  Commander  Charles  Douglas,  effected  a  landing  on 
the  north  shore  of  the  river  below  the  falls  of  Montmorency. 


208  MA  JOS    OPERATIONS,    1714-1762.  [1759. 

On  July  18th  the  Sutherland,  50,  Captain  John  Ecus,  the 
Squirrel,  20,  Captain  George  Hamilton,  two  armed  sloops,  and  two 
transports,  passed  the  town  without  loss,  and  gained  the  upper  river. 
On  July  31st,  supported  by  the  fire  of  the  Centurion,  50,  Captain 
William  Mantell,  an  attempt  was  made  to  land  troops  below  the 
enemy's  entrenchments ;  but  the  force  had  to  be  drawn  off  to  the 
beach.  Some  efforts  were  then  made  to  destroy  the  French  ships 
above  the  town  and  to  open  communication  with  General  Amherst, 
who  was  supposed  to  be  advancing  from  Crown  Point.  The  Lowes- 
toft,  2iS,  Captain  Joseph  Deane,  the  Hunter,  10,  Commander 
William  Adams  (2),  two  armed  sloops,  and  two  storeships,  passed 
up  to  co-operate  ;  but  it  was  found  that  the  force  could  not  be  got 
further  than  about  thirty  miles  above  Quebec. 

On  August  '29th,  the  Seahorse,  24,  Captain  James  Smith,  two 
more  armed  sloops,  and  two  more  storeships,  were  sent  past  the 
town  in  preparation  for  a  projected  attack  on  Quebec  from  the  west. 
Rear-Admiral  Holmes  took  command  of  the  flotilla  011  the  upper 
river.  On  the  night  of  September  4th,  all  the  flat-bottomed  boats 
and  many  vessels  passed  the  town  ;  and  as  many  troops  as  could  be 
spared  were  sent  up  with  them.  On  the  evening  of  the  12th,  all  the 
boats  remaining  below  the  town  were;  filled  with  Marines;  and  on 
the  following  morning  at  break  of  day  they  made  a  feint  of  landing 
on  the  northern  shore  below  the  city,  under  cover  of  the  fire  of  the 
frigates  and  sloops.  Troops  had  been  already  got  into  the  boats  on 
the  upper  river,  where  Wolfe  himself  then  was  ;  and  in  the  starlight 
they  moved  still  further  up,  a  French  corps  under  M.  de  Bougain- 
ville :  inarching  parallel  with  them  along  the  north  bank.  An  hour 
before  daylight  the  boats  turned  and  rowed  down  at  great  speed, 
current  and  ebbing  tide  being  both  in  their  favour,  and  were  followed 
by  the  ships.  The  whole  force  quite  outstripped  the  French,  who 
attempted  to  keep  up  with  it.  Just  as  day  was  breaking  the  boats 
arrived  eastward  of  Sillery,  a  short  distance  above  Cape  Diamond, 
those  containing  the  light  infantry  falling  a  little  lower  down. 
There  the  attacking  force  disembarked  at  the  foot  of  a  woody 
precipice,  scaled  the  height,  and  dispersed  the  guard  on  the  summit ; 

1  Louis  Antoine  de  Bougainville.  Bom,  1729;  began  life  as  a  lawyer;  secretary 
to  the  French  embassy  in  London,  1755;  had  previously,  in  1752,  been  elected  a 
Fellow  of  the  Royal  Society  for  a  treatise  on  the  integral  calculus ;  aide-de-camp  to 
Moutcalm  in  Canada;  founded  a  French  colony  in  the  Falkland  Islands,  1763;  circum- 
navigated the  globe,  17GO-C8;  commanded  at  sea  during  the  war  of  American  Revolu- 
tion; vice-admiral,  1791;  made  a  senator  by  Napoleon;  died,  1811. 


1759.]  CAPTURE   OF   QUEBEC.  209 

and  presently  the  whole  army  was  pouring  up  the  steep  slopes,  and 
forming  on  the  top,  to  await  the  approach  of  the  main  body  of  the 
French,  who,  under  Montcalm,  were  seen  to  be  in  motion. 

The  action  began  early.  At  8  A.M.  the  sailors  dragged  up  a  gun, 
which  was  most  useful.  By  10  the  battle  had  become  very  general, 
the  enemy  advancing  with  courage  to  within  thirty  yards,  but  then 
wavering  under  the  British  fire,  and  being  followed  up  with  the 
bayonet.  It  was  at  that  time  that  Wolfe,  at  the  head  of  the  Louis- 
bourg  Grenadiers,  received  a  second  wound,  which  proved  mortal. 
The  Marquis  de  Montcalm  was  also  fatally  wounded.  After  some 
further  fighting,  the  French  retreated  to  the  city.  General  the 
Hon.  George  Towiishend,  who  succeeded  to  the  command,  fortified 
the  position  which  had  been  won.  Additional  ships  were  brought 
up ;  and  batteries  were  being  erected  to  bombard  Quebec,  when,  on 
the  17th,  the  enemy  offered  to  surrender.  The  Vice-Admiral  and 
General,  and  the  French  commandant,  signed  the  capitulation  on  the 
morning  of  the  18th.  Later  in  the  day  the  upper  town  was  taken 
possession  of  by  troops  under  Lieut. -Colonel  Murray,  and  the  lower 
town  by  seamen,  under  Captain  Hugh  Palliser,  R.N.  The  Vice- 
Admiral's  dispatches  were  sent  to  England  by  Captain  James 
Douglas  (1),  of  the  Alcidc,  who  was  knighted  by  the  King,  and 
presented  with  £500  wherewith  to  buy  a  sword.  Throughout  the 
British  dominions  a  public  thanksgiving  was  ordered.  Wolfe's 
body  was  sent  home  in  the  lioijal  William,  84,  and  a  monument  to 
his  memory  was  erected .  at  the  national  expense  in  Westminster 
Abbey. 

Saunders  sent  back  to  England  his  larger  ships  under  Holmes 
and  Durell,  and  followed  in  October,  leaving  Captain  Lord  Colville 
in  command,  with  his  own  ship  (the  Northumberland,  70),  the 
Alcide,  64,  the  Trident,  64,  the  Pembroke,  60,  the  Prince  of 
Orange,  60,  and  several  frigates,  in  North  America.  The  Race- 
horse, bomb,  Commander  George  Miller  (1),  and  Porcupine,  14,  Com- 
mander John  Macartney,  were  left  to  winter  at  Quebec. 

After  the  British  fleet  had  retired,  the  French  ships  at  Batiscan 
also  fell  down  the  river,  waiting  at  Cape  Eouge  for  a  fair  wind  to 
carry  them  past  the  batteries  of  Quebec.  On  November  22nd,  three 
of  them,  the  merchantmen  Soleil  Royal,  24,  Senecterre,  24,  and  Due 
de  Fronsac,  24,  drove  ashore  in  a  gale  and  were  lost.  On  the  24th, 
in  the  night  and  on  the  ebb,  the  rest  came  down  with  a  favourable 
breeze ;  and,  although  the  garrison  was  ready  for  them,  and  every 

VOL.    III.  P 


210  MAJOR    OPERATIONS,   1714-1762.  [1759. 

possible  gun  was  fired  at  them,  they  all  got  past  safely  except  one, 
another  merchantman,  the  Elisabeth,  which  took  the  ground  on  the 
south  side  of  the  river.  Her  crew  made  preparations  for  blowing 
her  up,  and  then  with  the  assistance  of  the  crews  of  the  merchant- 
men Machault,  24,  and  Chezine,  22,  boarded  and  carried  a  British 
schooner  in  which  they  escaped.  On  the  following  morning  Com- 
mander Miller,  of  the  Racehorse,  went  on  board  the  Elisabeth,  and 
ordering  a  light  to  be  struck,  inadvertently  blew  up  the  ship  and 
destroyed  most  of  his  party.  He  and  his  lieutenant  survived  to 
be  removed,  but  were  so  fearfully  injured  that  they  died  within  a 
few  days. 

The  campaign  was  a  most  successful  one,  chiefly  because  the 
French  had  made  but  faint  efforts  to  divert  British  attention  from 
the  main  objects  which  were  kept  in  view  by  Mr.  Pitt.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  British  would  not  allow  their  attention  to  be 
diverted  in  the  slightest  degree.  Beatson  rightly  observes  that  :— 

"  had  M.  de  Bompart,  when  he  found  lie  could  not  prevent  the  island  of  Guadeloupe 
from  falling  into  our  hands,  steered  for  New  York  with  his  squadron,  he  might  have 
made  such  an  impression  there  as  would  have  obliged  General  Amherst  either  to  come 
himself,  or  at  least  to  make  such  a  detachment  from  his  army  as  would  perhaps  have 
disabled  him  from  acting  on  the  offensive  for  the  remainder  of  the  campaign.  From 
New  York,  M.  de  Kompart  might  have  gone  to  Halifax,  or  St.  John's,  Newfoundland, 
or  both.  An  attack  on  either  of  these  places  would  have  obliged  Admiral  Saunders  to 
make  such  a  detachment  from  his  fleet  as  might  have  greatly  diminished  our  efforts 
before  Quebec,  and,  perhaps  in  the  end,  would  have  proved  the  ruin  of  the  enterprise; 
while  before  Mich  detachment  could  have  been  able  to  overtake  M.  de  Bompart,  he 
might  have  done  his  business,  and  sailed  tor  Kurope." 

It  was  of  course  inevitable,  when  France  was  straining  all  her 
resources  in  order  to  invade  Great  Britain  and  Ireland,  and  when 
there  were  no  considerable  British  forces  in  the  Mediterranean,  that 
she  should  endeavour  to  collect  as  large  a  naval  force  as  possible  at 
Toulon,  and  then  to  send  it  round  to  join  her  main  fleet  at  Brest. 
Vice-Admiral  Broderick  commanded  in  the  Mediterranean.  Early 
in  the  spring  of  1759  his  small  squadron  was  reinforced  by  several 
ships  from  England,  and  he  received,  and  was  able  to  carry  out, 
orders  to  watch  Toulon.  But  Pitt  was  not  content  with  merely 
reinforcing  the  Mediterranean  fleet.  On  April  14th,  Admiral  the 
Hon.  Edward  Boscawen,  with  three  more  sail  of  the  line  and  some 
frigates,  left  Spithead  to  take  over  for  a  time  the  chief  command  on 
the  station,  and  on  April  27th  he  arrived  at  Gibraltar.  There  he 
made  arrangements  as  to  the  dispositions  of  cruisers  and  convoys ; 


1759.]  BOSCAWEN  AND   DE  LA    CLUE.  211 

and,  sailing  on  May  3rd,  joined  Vice-Admiral  Broderick  off  Cape 
Sicie  on  May  16th,  and  assumed  the  command. 

The  French  squadron  prepared  at  Toulon  was  in  charge  of 
M.  de  La  Clue ;  and,  when  the  British  arrived  off  the  port,  it  was 
almost  ready  for  sea.  The  French  were  carefully  blockaded,  or 
rather,  watched  with  a  view  to  preventing  them  from  leaving 
without  being  detected  and  followed.  On  June  7th,  before  they 
attempted  to  come  out,  Boscawen  chased  two  French  frigates,  and 
drove  them  into  a  fortified  bay  near  Toulon,  whither  on  the  8th,  he 
ordered  the  Culloden,  Conqueror  and  Jersey,  under  the  orders  of 
Captain  Smith  Callis,  to  proceed,  and,  if  possible,  destroy  them. 
The  ships  were  gallantly  taken  in  ;  but,  when  under  the  batteries, 
they  were  becalmed ;  and,  after  a  sharp  two  hours'  engagement,  they 
had  to  be  recalled  without  having  accomplished  their  object.  The 
Culloden  lost  16  killed  and  26  wounded  :  the  Conqueror,  2  killed  and 
4  wounded :  and  the  Jersey,  8  killed  and  15  wounded  ;  and  all  the 
vessels  were  badly  damaged  aloft. 

The  Admiral  continued  on  his  station  until  he  was  compelled,  at 
the  beginning  of  July,  to  go  to  Gibraltar  for  provisions  and  repairs. 
Preferring  Salou1  for  watering  purposes,  he  put  in  there  on  the  8th, 
remaining  until  the  24th  ;  and  thus  he  only  reached  Gibraltar  on 
August  4th.  Meanwhile  he  ordered  the  L/jme,  24,  Captain  James 
Baker,  to  cruise  off  Malaga,  and  the  Gibraltar,  24,  Captain 
William  M'Cleverty,  to  cruise  between  Estepona  and  Ceuta  to  keep 
watch  for  the  enemy.  On  August  17th  the  latter  descried  the 
French  fleet,  consisting  of  ten  sail  of  the  line,  two  fifty-gun  ships 
and  three  frigates,  close  in  under  the  Barbary  shore.  Captain 
M'Cleverty  made  at  once  for  Gibraltar,  and  arrived  off  Europa  Point 
at  7.30  P.M.,  when  he  signalled  the  force  and  situation  of  the  enemy 
to  the  Admiral,  who  sent  off  an  officer  to  the  Gibraltar,  ordering 
her  to  keep  sight  of  the  foe  and  from  time  to  time  to  signal  to  him 
accordingly.  The  British  squadron  was  not  quite  ready  for  sea,  and 
Boscawen's  flag-ship,  the  Namur,  in  particular,  had  not  so  much  as 
a  single  sail  bent.  Still,  a  little  before  10  P.M.,  the  whole  fleet,  of 
thirteen  sail  of  the  line  and  two  fifty-gun  ships  besides  frigates,  was 
out  of  the  bay. 

Owing   to   the  haste  in  which  they  had  gone  out,  and  to  the 
Admiral,    after  leaving  harbour,    carrying   a   press   of   sail   to   the 
westward,  the   ships  were,  on  the  following  morning,  in  two  well 
1  A  few  miles  south-west  of  Tarragona.   • 

p  2 


212 


MAJOR    OPERATIONS,    1714-1762. 


[1759. 


defined  divisions.  The  War  spite,  Culloden,  Swiftsure,  Intrepid, 
America,  Portland,  and  Guernsey,  which  had  lain  at  anchor  near  the 
Namur  and  had  put  to  sea  along  with  her,  were  still  with  her. 
Vice-Admiral  Broderick,  in  the  Prince,  with  the  rest  of  the 
squadron,  was  many  miles  astern.  At  7  A.M.  on  the  18th,1  the 
advanced  division  sighted  the  enemy  to  the  westward.  There  were 
then  visible  only  seven  sail,  and  it  afterwards  proved  that  the  rest 
had  gone,  without  orders,  into  Cadiz  during  the  night.  De  La  Clue 
first  thought  that  the  ships  coming  up  behind  him  we're  his  own 
missing  vessels ;  but  he  was  disabused  when  Boscawen  signalled  a 
general  chase  to  the  N.W.  At  9  A.M.  the  British  Admiral  ordered 
his  sternmost  ships  to  make  more  sail.  This  soon  had  the  effect  of 
bringing  up  the  Vice-Admiral's  division,  which  enjoyed  a  fine  easterly 

1  British  and  French  fleets  off  Gibraltar  in  August,  IT.V.i:  indicating,  the  order  in 
which  the  advanced  British  ships  sot  into  action  on  August  li-Hh;  the  loss  sufl'ered  by 
each  in  the  action  ;  and  the  fate  of  the  French  ships. 


KuiTiBH.                                                                                 ! 

'itKNCir 

ships. 

Guns. 

Commanders.           'Killed.  Wounded.             Ships. 

Guns. 

Fate. 

0.  Ifinnur  . 

110 

I  Admiral    Hon.    Edward)                                       t/c-'an-. 
Boscawen  (H).                    13            44            Iteiiuutable 

80 
74 

[Burnt. 

(Capt.MatIhewBnckle(l)|                                 f'mtaure 

74 

[Vice-Admiral     Thomas                                        T-'tti>:raire 

74 

>Taken. 

1'riwe  . 

'.HI 

I     Bruclerkk  (B).                                                     Modes  te. 

.  1 

ICupt.  Joseph  IVytun  (1).                                     fyntvcrain 

74 

(Escaped,   Aug. 

Newark. 

SO 

<     ,,     William          Hnl-|                         c             Gtterrier 
[              bourne.                 j      '  '                             Ft'ntasque 

74 
64 

j     18-19. 

6.  Warspite    . 

74 

„    John  Bcntley.             11            411           Lion 

04 

1.   Culloden     . 
t'vnfiiiei'ui'  . 
7.  Svitftsure   . 

74 
70 
70 

,,     Smith  Callis.             ,       4              ir>            Triton  . 
„     Williaml.loyd(I).i       -j              i;            Fier.     . 
„     Thomas  Stanhope.          r»              :;^             ^rijlamme 
(           !•  ranri^      \\'illiam 

64 
50 
50 

Parted  oimpany, 
Aug.     17-18; 
and      entered 

Edgar    .      . 

Cl 

I               l)rake.                                                         Chimcre 

26 

Cadiz. 

St.  Mlxtns  . 

64 

,,     Etiward  Yernnn  ('-).        fi               '2            Min<'i've 

24 

8.  /ntrejiul 

60 

,,     Edward  I'ratteti.             n              10             Vracielise 

24 

2.  America 

eo 

,,     James  Kirke.                  3              1C 

J'  r  in  cess] 
Louisa     .  ] 

60 

,,  Robert  IIai-l»nil(2).i 

Jersey    . 

60 

,,    John  Barker  (1). 

4.  Guernsey    . 

50 

fl.ient.  Jliehael  Kearnvi 
I     (acting).                       /      '• 

3.  Portland    . 

50 

Capt.  Jervis  llaplesden.          6             1'2 

Amlmscaiie. 

40 

,,    Richard  Gwynn. 

Jlaiiibow 

40 

,,    Christopher  llasset. 

Shannon     . 

36 

,,     Charles  Meadows. 

Active    . 

36 

,,     Herbert  Sawyer(l). 

Tlutis    .     . 

32 

,,    John  Moutray. 

I.yme     .     . 

24 

,,    James  Ilaker. 

Gibraltar   . 

24 

f     „     William      M'Cle- 

\             verty. 

Glasgow 

24 

„    Andrew  Wilkinson. 

xheerness    . 

24 

„     John  Clark  (1). 

Tartar's) 
Prize.     .} 

24 

„    Thomas  liaillie(l). 

fhvntrite   . 

16 

Com.  Timothy  Edward?. 

Gramont     . 

16 

„    Philip  Affleck. 

jKtna,  f.B.  . 

8 

„    Richard  Bi^  kerton. 

Salamander,) 

(    „    Hon.  John  Leve- 

f.s.     .     .1 

8 

i             son  Gower. 

1  Exchanged  ships. 

2  Flag  of  M.  de  La  Clue.     Suffren,  who  was  iu  her,  thus  became  for  the  second  time  a  prisoner  to  the  British. 


1759.]  THE  ACTION  OFF  LAGOS.  213 

breeze,  while  the  enemy  had  barely  enough  wind  to  give  them 
steerage  way.  Thus  the  British  gained  on  the  chase  till,  at  about 
1.25  P.M.,  Boscawen  signalled  to  engage. 

At  1.30  P.M.  the  enemy  began  to  fire  at  the  headmost  British 
ships  as  they  came  up ;  and  since  Admiral  Boscawen  perceived  that 
the  French  intended  to  make  off  as  soon  as  the  breeze  should  reach 
them,  he  naturally  desired  that  the  most  advanced  ships  of  his  fleet 
should  push  on  and  attack  the  enemy's  van,  to  stop  their  flight  until 
his  remaining  ships  could  get  up.  He  therefore  ordered  the  America 
and  Guernsey  to  make  more  sail.  At  about  2.30  P.M.  the  Cnlloden 
began  to  fire  on  the  Centaur e,  the  rear  ship  of  the  enemy ;  and,  very 
soon  afterwards,  the  America,  Portland,  Guernsey  and  Warspite  got 
into  action.  The  wind  had  by  that  time  dropped  altogether,  so  far 
as  the  ships  which  were  in  action  were  concerned.  The  British  rear 
division,  however,  still  had  a  breeze,  and  was  thus  able  to  get  up  in 
time  to  have  a  share  in  the  victory. 

Boscawen,  himself,  in  the  Namur,  was  in  action  with  the  stern- 
most  ships  of  the  enemy  at  about  4  o'clock.  The  Swiftsiirc-  and 
Intrepid  were  at  that  time  to  windward  of  him ;  and,  hailing  the 
former,  he  ordered  her  to  push  on  for  the  enemy's  van  ship.  By 
about  4.30  P.M.,  the  Namiir  was  close  alongside  the  Ocean  ;  and, 
when  the  two  had  been  engaged  for  about  half-an-hour,  the  Namiir, 
having  lost  her  mizenmast  and  both  topsail  yards,  was  disabled,  and 
fell  astern.  De  La  Clue  made  every  effort  to  take  full  advantage  of 
this  misfortune  to  the  British  flagship.  Each  of  his  vessels,  except 
the  Centaure,  set  all  possible  sail  to  get  away;  but  the  Centaure  had 
been  engaged  by  every  ship  as  she  came  up,  and  had  stood  the  brunt 
of  the  fight.  At  last,  her  fore  and  main  topmasts  had  fallen ;  and 
she  was  so  greatly  damaged  in  every  respect  that  she  had  no  alter- 
native but  to  strike. 

The  misfortune  to  the  British  flagship  did  not  affect  the  energy 
and  activity  of  the  British  Admiral,  who  ordered  out  his  barge  and 
was  rowed  at  once  to  the  Newark,  and  there  hoisted  his  flag.  But, 
by  that  time,  the  battle  proper  had  almost  ceased,  and  the  pursuit 
had  begun.  Boscawen  continued  it  during  the  whole  night.  Though 
there  was  a  fine  breeze,  there  was  also  a  slight  haze ;  and,  under 
cover  of  this,  two  of  the  French  ships,  the  Souverain  and  Giierrier, 
altered  their  course  in  the  darkness  and  so  escaped.  Thus,  at  day- 
light on  the  19th  only  four  sail  of  the  enemy  were  to  be  seen.  The 
British  were  about  three  miles  astern  of  them,  and  about  fifteen 


214  MAJOR    OPERATIONS,    1714-1762.  [1759. 

miles  from  Lagos.  Once  more  the  wind  had  almost  died  away.  At 
about  9  o'clock  the  Ocean  ran  among  the  breakers,  and  the  three 
other  ships  anchored  under  the  Portuguese  batteries.  Boscawen 
thereupon  sent  the  Intrepid  and  America  to  destroy  the  Ocean, 
which,  in  taking  the  ground,  had  carried  away  all  her  masts. 
Captain  Pratten  had  anchored ;  and  he  failed  to  carry  out  the  order ; 
but  Captain  Kirke,  taking  in  the  America  very  close,  discharged  a 
few  guns  into  the  enemy  at  point-blank  range,  and  obliged  her  to 
strike.  M.  de  La  Clue,  who  had  one  leg  broken  and  the  other 
injured,  and  who  eventually  died  of  his  wounds  at  Lagos,  had  been 
landed  about  half-an-hour  previously.  Captain  Kirke  took  possession 
of  the  French  flagship  ;  and  having  removed  such  officers  and  men  as 
were  found  in  her,  he  set  her  on  fire,  deeming  it  impossible  to  bring 
her  off.  The  Warspite  was  ordered  in  against  the  Temeraire,  74, 
and  succeeded  in  bringing  her  out  very  little  damaged.  Vice-Admiral 
Broderick's  division  went  against  the  remaining  two  ships,  and, 
after  about  half-an-hour's  action,  captured  the  Nodeste,  64.  The 
Eedoutable,  74,  having  been  abandoned,  and  being  found  to  be 
bulged,  was  burnt.  In  this  action  the  enemy's  loss  was  very  severe 
in  killed  and  wounded.  In  the  Centaure  alone,  about  '200  were 
killed.  The  loss  of  the  British,  on  the  other  hand,  was  very  small, 
amounting  only  to  5(5  killed  and  19G  wounded.1 

"The  British,"  says  Beatson,  "as  well  as  the  French  Admiral,  was  not  quite  well 
pleased  with  the  behaviour  of  his  captains,  some  of  whom,  he  thought,  did  not  make 
sail  enough  to  get  up  with  the  van  of  the  enemy's  lleet,  which  the  Admiral  wished  they 
should  attack,  in  order  to  retard  their  (light  until  the  rest  of  the  squadron  should  be 
able  to  join  in  the  action.  ( ithers,  through  mismanagement,  he  thought,  had  allowed 
their  ships  to  fall  to  leeward,  after  they  had  engaged  the  enemy  some  time,  and  there- 
fore could  not  properly  get  into  action  again.  ]5ut  great  allowance  ought  to  be  made 
for  this,  for  just  as  the  British  ships  came  up  with  the  enemy's  rear,  the  wind  died 
away.  They  attacked  the  enemy  on  the  lee  side,  in  order  that  they  might  be  able  to 
open  their  lower  ]>orts,  some  of  the  ships  carrying  them  very  low.  Another  reason  why 
some  of  the  British  ships  fell  so  much  to  leeward  was  that  the  French  Admiral,  on 
perceiving  Admiral  Boscawen  in  the  Niimnr,  and  some  ships  along  with  him,  pressing 
forward  to  attack  his  van  and  centre,  made  his  lleet  lull"  up  as  much  as  they  possibly 
could,  so  as  to  form  a  sort  of  crescent;  by  which  jiosition  the  whole  of  his  ships  in 
their  van  and  centre  were  enabled  by  their  tire,  not  only  to  assist  the  rear,  but  each 
other,  in  their  endeavours  to  rejiel  the  attack,  which  they  looked  for  every  moment 
from  the  British  Admiral.  By  this  manoeuvre  of  M.  de  La  Clue's,  such  of  our  ships  as 
first  got  up  with  the  enemy's  rear,  and  to  leeward  of  their  line,  were  thrown  out  of 
action ;  while,  for  want  of  sufficient  breeze  of  wind,  they  could  not  get  into  it  again. 
The  Portland,  having  lost  her  foretopmast,  dropped  astern.  The  Intrepid  was  to  wind- 
ward of  the  Namur ;  she  did  not  bear  down  close  enough,  but  kept  aloof,  and  fired  at 
the  enemy  across  the  other  ships."  2 


Boscaweu's  Disp.     See  table  p.  212,  antea.        2  '  Nav.  and  Mil.  Mems.,'  ii.  318. 


1759.]  BLOCKADE   OF  CADIZ.  215 

Boscawen,  who  said  of  the  battle,  "It  is  well  but  it  might  have 
been  a  great  deal  better,"  presently  rehoisted  his  flag  in  the  Namur, 
and  despatched  Captain  Matthew  Buckle,  in  the  Gibraltar,  to 
England  with  dispatches.  Buckle  was  graciously  received  by  the 
King,  and  presented  with  £500  to  buy  a  sword.  The  Admiral 
himself,  as  soon  as  his  fleet  had  repaired  damages,  returned,  in 
accordance  with  his  instructions,  to  England,  taking  with  him  the 
Namur,  Warspite,  Swiftsure,  Intrepid,  America  and  Portland,  the 
Salamander  and  JEtna  fire-ships,  and  the  prizes  Temeraire  and 
Modeste.  These  were  afterwards  followed  by  the  Edgar,  Princess 
Louisa,  and  the  prize  Centaurc.  Vice-Admiral  Broderick,  who 
remained  in  the  Straits,  blockaded  Cadiz,  in  which  still  lay  that  part 
of  the  French  squadron  which  had  taken  refuge  there. 

Boscawen's  rewards  were  a  membership  of  the  Privy  Council 
and  a  generalship  in  the  Marines.  Captains  Bentley,  of  the  War- 
spite,  and  Stanhope,  of  the  Swiften  re,  were  knighted  for  their  share 
in  the  action ;  and  the  three  prizes  were  purchased,  and  added  to 
the  Navy  under  their  French  names. 

Broderick  blockaded  Cadiz  very  closely;  but,  011  November  9th, 
he  was  driven  from  his  station  by  a  storm,  and  was  obliged  to  send 
his  flagship  to  Gibraltar  to  refit,  and  to  hoist  his  flag  011  board  the 
Conqueror.  The  Newark  and  Culloden  had  to  cut  away  all  their 
masts,  and  run  for  port.  Beturning  off  Cadiz,  Broderick  continued 
the  blockade  as  before ;  but  the  enemy,  though  by  that  time  superior 
in  strength,  declined  to  come  out  and  offer  him  battle.  The  Vice- 
Aduiiral  being  a  second  time  driven  from  his  station  by  a  storm,  the 
French  at  length  ventured  forth,  and  were  happy  enough  to  get 
safely  back  to  Toulon. 

Bear-Admiral  George  Brydges  Rodney  was  sent  in  the  summer 
with  a  light  squadron,1  consisting  of  one  ship  of  the  line,  four  fifty- 
gun  ships,  five  frigates,  a  sloop  and  six  bomb  ketches,  to  endeavour 
to  destroy  the  flat-bottomed  boats,  and  the  supplies  which  had  been 

1  Squadron  under  Rear-Admiral  Rodney  in  the  Channel,  1750 :  Achilles,  (>0,  Rear- 
Admiral  George  Brydges  Rodney,  Captain  the  Hon.  Samuel  Harrington ;  Chatham,  50, 
Captain  John  Lockhart;  Deptford,  50,  Captain  John  Holhvell;  Ms,  50,  Captain 
Edward  Wheeler;  Norwich,  50,  Captain  George  Darby;  Brilliant,  36,  Captain  Hyde 
Parker(l) ;  Juno,  36,  Captain  Henry  John  Philips  ;  Vestal,  32,  Captain  Samuel  Hood  (1)  ; 
Boreas,  28,  Captain  Hon.  Robert  Boyle;  Unicorn,  28,  Captain  Thomas  Graves  (2); 
Wolf,  16,  Commander  Hugh  Bromedge ;  Furnace,  bomb,  Commander  Jonathan 
Faulknor  (1);  Firedrnke,  bomb,  Commander  James  Orrok;  Basilisk,  bomb,  Com- 
mander John  Clarke  (1) ;  Mortar,  bomb,  Commander  Joseph  Hunt ;  Carcass,  bomb, 
Commander  Charles  Inglis  (1) ;  and  Blast,  bomb,  Commander  Thomas  Willis. 


216  MAJOR    OPEBATIONS,   1714-1762.  [1759. 

collected  at  Le  Havre  for  the  projected  invasion  of  England.  Sailing 
from  St.  Helen's  on  July  2nd,  1759,  he  anchored  on  the  3rd  in  the 
Eoad  of  Le  Havre,  and  stationed  his  bombs  in  the  channel  leading 
to  Honfleur.  These  threw  shells  into  the  town,  magazines,  and 
boats  for  fifty  consecutive  hours,  and  did  immense  damage,  without 
receiving  any  injury  worth  mentioning.  Rodney,  with  some  of  his 
frigates,  remained  off  the  port  for  the  rest  of  the  year,  and  captured 
numerous  prizes. 

Admiral  Sir  Edward  Hawke  sailed  in  June,  with  a  fleet  of 
twenty-five  sail  of  the  line  and  many  frigates,  to  blockade  or,  more 
strictly,  to  observe  the  enemy  in  Brest.  He  cruised  some  leagues  at 
sea,  leaving  an  inshore  squadron  of  his  lighter  ships,  under  Captain 
the  Hon.  Augustus  John  Hervey,  of  the  Monmouth,  64,  close  off  the 
port.  He  also  detached  Commodore  John  Reynolds  (1),  in  the 
Finn,  50,  with  a  small  squadron,  to  watch  the  French  transports 
which  had  assembled  in  the  river  Morbihan  in  preparation  for  the 
invasion  of  Ireland.  When  at  length  the  Firm  became  very  foul  and 
had  to  go  home  to  refit,  she  was  relieved  by  the  llocliester,  Commo- 
dore Robert  Duff.  In  the  course  of  the  blockade  the  Achilles,  60, 
Captain  the  Hon.  Samuel  Barrington,  also  had  to  go  home,  having 
run  on  a  rock  when  in  pursuit  of  some  French  vessels.  It  may  be 
mentioned  that,  during  part  of  the  summer,  Prince  Edward 
Augustus,  afterwards  Duke  of  York,  again  served  as  a  midshipman, 
with  Captain  Lord  Howe,  in  the  Marjnunime,  74. 

Numerous  brushes  with  the  enemy  relieved  the  tedium  of  the 
blockade.  On  one  occasion  the  French  sent  out  four  ships  of  the 
line  to  attack  the  inshore  squadron  ;  but  Hervey,  instead  of  retiring, 
went  to  meet  them ;  and,  the  fleet  making  as  if  to  support  him,  the 
French  withdrew.  The  intention  had  been  that,  if  Hervey  had 
drawn  off  and  left  the  coast  clear,  the  four  ships  of  the  line  should 
have  gained  the  mouth  of  the  Morbihan,  crushed  Duff,  and  then 
escorted  the  French  invasion  of  Ireland.  Hervey  and  the  inshore 
squadron  continued  very  active,  and  greatly  annoyed  the  enemy, 
until  in  October  the  Monmouth,  which  had  become  very  leaky,  had 
to  return  to  England. 

The  approach  of  the  season  of  bad  weather  seemed  to  afford  the 
French  better  opportunities  for  putting  into  execution  their  scheme 
of  invasion,  it  being  impossible,  in  those  days,  for  a  blockading 
squadron,  no  matter  how  strong  or  how  ably  commanded,  to  always 
maintain  its  position  during  the  autumn  and  winter.  A  violent  gale 


1759.]  HAWKE  AND   DE   CONFLANS.  217 

of  wind,  in  fact,  forced  Hawke  from  his  station  on  November  9th, 
and  obliged  him  to  put  into  Torbay.  This  storm  proved  the  salva- 
tion of  M.  de  Bompart,  who,  with  his  squadron,  was  returning  from 
the  West  Indies,  and  who  must  otherwise  have  been  snapped  up  by 
the  British  fleet.  Most  of  the  men  of  his  ships  were  turned  over  to 
the  fleet  under  M.  de  Conflans,  who  learnt  by  the  arrival  of  M.  de 
Bompart  that  the  British  had  been  driven  from  off  the  port. 

With  the  hope  of  being  able  to  effect  something  against  Commo- 
dore Duff,  de  Conflans  put  to  sea  on  November  14th.  Hawke  on  the 
same  day  got  under  way  from  Torbay,  and  on  the  15th  was  in- 
formed by  Captain  William  M'Cleverty,  of  the  Gibraltar  (the  same 
who  three  months  earlier  had  warned  Boscawen  of  the  approach  of 
M.  de  La  Clue),  that  the  Brest  fleet  had  sailed,  and  that  it  had  been 
seen  twenty-four  leagues  N.W.  of  Belle  Isle,  steering  S.E.  Hawke, 
with  strategical  intuition,  made  for  Quiberon  Bay  with  all  possible 
sail,  rightly  judging  that  the  French  would  take  advantage  of  their 
brief  liberty  in  order  to  make  for  that  neighbourhood,  so  as  to  free 
the  transports  which  were  blockaded  by  Duff  in  the  Morbihan.  But 
he  was  unable  to  proceed  with  the  speed  he  desired.  Wind  from 
the  S.  by  E.  and  S.  drove  him  considerably  to  the  westward  and 
delayed  him.  On  the  19th,  however,  the  wind  became  fair  ;  and,  on 
that  day,  Hawke  ordered  the  frigates  Maitl.itonc  and  Corcntrij  ahead 
of  the  fleet,  one  on  the  starboard  and  the  other  011  the  larboard  bow. 
Early  in  the  morning  of  the  20th  he  also  ordered  the  Mayiianitne 
ahead  to  make  the  land. 

The  contrary  wind  which  had  baffled  Hawke  also  retarded 
de  Conflans,  and  was  instrumental  in  saving  Duff,  who  received  his 
first  news  that  the  Brest  fleet  had  put  to  sea  by  Captain  Gamaliel 
Nightingale,  of  the  Vengeance,  on  the  morning  of  the  20th.  Night- 
ingale on  entering  the  bay  had  fired  guns  to  alarm  the  Commodore. 
Duff  realised  at  once  the  danger  that  was  upon  him,  and  immediately 
made  the  signal  for  his  ships  to  cut  their  cables.  In  a  few  minutes 
they  were  all  under  way.  He  attempted  to  take  them  out  to  sea 
round  the  north  end  of  Belle  Isle,  but,  the  wind  shifting,  the 
Belliqueux,  64,  Captain  Thomas  Saumarez,  was  the  only  one  which 
escaped  by  that  passage.  She  was  not  able  to  rejoin  until  three 
days  after  the  battle.  Duff  then  tried  to  escape  by  the  south  end  of 
the  island ;  and,  in  doing  so,  he  was  observed  by  de  Conflans,  who 
made  the  signal  to  chase.  The  Chatham,  50,  which  sailed  very  badly, 
was  almost  within  gunshot  of  a  French  seventy-four,  when  a  man 


218 


MAJOR    OPERATIONS,    1714-1762. 


[1759. 


on  the  main-top-gallant  yard  of  the  Eochester  hailed  that  he  saw  a 
sail,  and,  presently,  that  he  saw  a  fleet.  The  Commodore  quickly 
made  out  what  the  fleet  was,  and  at  once  ordered  his  little  squadron 
to  tack  and  chase  the  enemy.  At  first  the  French  were  puzzled  by 
this  change  of  policy;  but,  as  soon  as  de  Conflans  discovered  the 
cause,  he  recalled  his  chasers  ;  and  Duff's  squadron  was  thus  enabled 
in  the  course  of  the  day  to  join  Sir  Edward  Hawke. 

At  about  8.30  A.M.  the  Maidstone  signalled  that  she  had  sighted 
a  fleet ;  and  at  9.45  the  Magnanime  announced  that  the  strangers 
were  enemies.  The  French  were  at  that  time  relinquishing  the  chase 
of  the  Commodore's  squadron,  and  Belle  Isle  bore  E.  by  N.  j  N.1 

Hawke  instantly  made  the  signal  for  a  line  of  battle  abreast,  in 
order  to  draw  up  his  ships  ;  and  he  followed  it  soon  afterwards  with 
the  signal  for  the  seven  ships  which  were  nearest  the  enemy  to 

1  Lint  of  the  Hritish  and  French  lleets  in  the  action  in  Quiberon  Bay,  November 
20th,  175<> :— 


BRITISH. 

Ships.                <  I  uns.                  (  'omniaiulers. 

FBESCH. 

Ships.                (luns.                  Fate. 

]  i  Admiral  Sir  Edward  Hawke, 

,  ..  ,,(  ,    .                     Q02    /Beached  ami   burnt 

Hot/tit  Ge»-<j,:    .     .      loo     \<     K.It. 

I     bv  the  French. 

M  'apt.  John  Campltell(l).             Ti'itumtt  .      .      .      .        80  3      To  the  Charente. 

!Viro-  Admiral    Sir     (  'liarlcs       > 

ormi'lnhlt  ...       8u  i     Taken. 

''"'""  •  •  •  •    "" 

ra!:;:t,^vau,        »,.-  :       ?!  {»th.ch««* 

Jtukf  '.HI 

,,     Thomas  (iraves  ('2).            f 

fnrit'itx       .      .               74               ,,      VUfllne. 

A'auiiir   ....        <H> 

,,     Matthew  Huckli-(l).           7 

Iwe      ...              74        Foundered. 

Mary        .                   .74 

'  'oiiiinod.  .  James  VouilE  CO- 

/  TuL-iiM             \vi-(icL-pil 

War.tjnte      ...         74 

Capt.  Sir  John  llentl'-v*  Kt.         >'"'"*      -      -      •              <4      t     an.l  bunit. 

Jlerctdig.      ...        74            ,.     William  Foriescue.             / 

i  tint  at  i-  ...              74        To  the  Vilalne. 

Torbay    ....        H    ]{     "     "™j_   A"^lstus   KpP-       ;) 

fnnniliijne  .      .              74              „      Charente. 
ui-tf       ...              7o        Wiecked. 

Maynanim*'       .     .       74     ;       „     Viscount  Howe.                 ,s 

ifjti'i-hf  ...               7(1         Foundered. 

ttesolutivn  '.                      74 
Iff  i'ii                                    74 

,,     HearySpekc.                    / 

f     ,,     Hon.      lieorge      Kilg-       / 

y"      h'o  the  Charente. 

"ortftumberland           61      i 

Xwtftsure     ...        70 

i     „     Sir  Tlinmas  St.mhope,       ,v 
I               Kt.                                      ,S 

fihinx    ...             64      I      „      Vilaiut-. 
ilittiire       ,                   04      ( 

Dorsetshire  ...        70 

,,     ]'<'t<-r  Dmis.                         jj 

rillfint  ...             64             „     Cliarente. 

Jiltrford        ...         70 

,,     James  (tamnier  (U.            / 

vtillf    .                       64              ,      ViUine. 

t'hifhtster    ...        "0 

„     William  Saltrcu  \Villett.     nizarrv  ...              64              „     Charente. 

Temple    ....        70 

f     „     Hon.  Washington  shir-      inflexible     .      .              64              „      VilaiiiL*. 
1               ley.                                                

Revenue  ....        64 

„     John  Storr.                            Vestale    ...              34      ) 

i^a;  i    ....        64 
Kingston     ...       60 

,,     Lucius  O'Hripn.                   AifirHte  .                         36      1               ....   . 
„    Thomas  Shirley.                 Calwto  ...             16      \      »     Vilalne. 

Intrepid.     ...       60 

„    Jervis  Maplesden.          1    / 

'rince  Aoir      .                       J 

Montngu,       ...        60 

.,     Joshua  Rowley. 

Dunkirk      ...        60 

„     Hon.  Hubert  IMghv. 

Dejianct      ...       60 

„     Patrick  liainl. 

Rochester     ...        50 

„     Kol«rt  Ouflf. 

Portland      ...        50 

,,     Marriot  Arlmthuot. 

Falkland      ...        50 

,,     Francis  Samuel  Drake. 

Chatham      ...       50 

„     Jolm  Lockhart. 

Minerva       ...        32 

„     Al»xaml  r  Arthur  Hoo,l. 

Venus            ...         36 

,,     Thomas  Harrison  (2). 

Vengeance   ...       28 

„     Gamaliel  Nightingale. 

Coventry      ...        28 

„     Francis  Hurslem. 

Maidstone    ...        28 

„     Dudley  Digges. 

Sapphire      .     .     .32 

,,    John  Strachau. 

1  Wrecked. 

2  Flag  of  M.  de  Conflans,  Vice-Admiral. 


'  Flag  of  the  Prince  de  liauffrernuiH-Listenois,  -CUef  d'Escadre. 
•  Flag  of  M.  St.  Andre  du  Verger,  Chef  d'Escadre. 


1759.]  THE  BATTLE   OF   QUIBERON  BAY.  219 

chase,  draw  into  line  of  battle  ahead  of  him,  and  endeavour  to  arrest 
the  French  until  the  remainder  of  the  fleet  could  get  up  and  bring 
about  a  general  engagement. 

Upon  realising  that  they  were  in  the  presence  of  the  British,  the 
enemy  fell  into  some  confusion,  but,  in  the  course  of  a  short  time, 
seemed  to  arrive  at  a  determination  to  fight,  and  endeavoured  to 
form  a  line.  While  they  were  executing  this  manoeuvre,  the  British 
approached  very  rapidly,  the  wind  being  then  nearly  west.  De  Con- 
flans  then  suddenly  altered  his  mind,  and,  instead  of  waiting  to 
engage,  made  off.  He  was  near  his  own  coasts,  with  the  difficulties 
and  dangers  of  which  he  was  fully  acquainted  and  presumably  knew 
well  how  to  avoid,  while  the  British  were  on  a  lee  shore,  with  which 
they  were  unfamiliar.  The  weather  was  tempestuous  and  was 
rapidly  growing  worse ;  and  the  November  day  would  soon  end. 
De  Conflans  therefore  endeavoured  to  keep  his  fleet  together,  and 
steered  right  before  the  wind  for  the  land,  which  was  not  more  than 
about  twelve  miles  distant.1 

The  wind,  as  the  short  afternoon  drew  to  its  close,  was  variable 
between  N.W.  and  W.N.W.,  and  blew  in  heavy  squalls.  Yet  both 
fleets  crowded  sail,  the  French  to  escape,  and  the  British  to  overtake 
them.  At  '2  P.M.  the  enemy  began  to  fire  at  the  leading  ships  of 
the  British  fleet ;  and,  half-an-hour  later,  when  the  Warspitc  and 
Dorsetshire  were  close  up  with  the  enemy's  rear,  Hawke  made  the 
signal  to  engage.  The  British  fleet  was  then  to  the  south  of 
Belle  Isle.  A  little  later  the  Revenyc,  Magnanime,  Torbay,  Montdf/u, 
Resolution,  Swifts  urn  and  Defiance  got  into  action,  and  hotly 
engaged  the  French  rear.  Yet  this  fact  did  not  prevent  the 
French  admiral,  who  was  in  the  van,  from  leading  round  the 
Cardinals.  The  Formidable,  carrying  the  flag  of  Rear- Admiral 
du  Verger,  was  attacked  by  the  Resolution,  and,  in  addition, 
received  a  broadside  or  two  from  every  other  British  ship  that 
passed  her ;  and,  having  been  severely  treated,  she  struck  about 
4  o'clock.  The  loss  on  board  of  her  was  terrible,  M.  du  Verger 
and  upwards  of  two  hundred  others  being  killed.  The  Formidable 
was  taken  possession  of  by  the  Resolution.  In  the  meantime,  the 
ships  of  the  British  rear  were  straining  to  get  into  action.  The 
Thesee,  Captain  de  Kersaint 2  was  hotly  engaged  by  the  Magnanime, 

1  For  Quiberon  Bay  and  its  neighbourhood,  see  chart  facing  p.  488,  in  Vol.  II. 

2  Guy  Simon  de  Caetnampreu,  Comte  de  Kersaint;  born,  170!);  entered  the  navy 
as  a  seaman,  1722;  lieutenant,  1742;  captain,  1745.     In  Smommee  captured  Prince 


220  MAJOR    OPERATIONS,   1714-1762.  [1759. 

but  was  relieved  by  the  disablement  of  the  British  ship,  which, 
being  fouled  by  one  of  her  consorts,  fell  astern.  Very  soon  after- 
wards the  Thesee  was  tackled  by  the  Torbay ;  and,  in  the  contest 
which  resulted,  she  capsized  and  foundered,  chiefly  owing  to  the 
fact  that  her  captain,  from  motives  of  self-pride,  persisted  in  fighting 
his  lower  deck  guns,  regardless  of  the  stormy  state  of  the  weather. 
All  her  crew  of  about  eight  hundred  men,  except  twenty,  were  lost. 
The  Torbai/,  owing  to  similar  causes,  was  at  one  time  in  danger  of  a 
like  fate  ;  but  Captain  Keppel  closed  his  ports  in  time,  and  saved 
her.  Another  French  ship,  the  Supcrbe,  foundered  at  about  the 
same  time. 

Owing  to  the  gale,  the  lee  shore,  and  the  gathering  darkness, 
there  was  at  that  time  great  confusion ;  and  it  is  almost  impossible 
to  tell  exactly  what  happened.  But  it  would  appear  that  after 
having  engaged  the  Thence,  and  having  been  fouled  first  by  the 
Warspitc  and  then  by  the  Montagu,  Lord  Howe,  in  the  Magnanime, 
observed  the  French  Heron  somewhat  disabled  to  leeward,  and, 
bearing  down  and  ranging  alongside,  quickly  obliged  her  to  strike. 
The  Heron  anchored,  but,  owing  to  the  weather,  no  boat  could  be 
sent  to  take  possession  of  her  ;  and,  later,  her  captain  ran  her  ashore 
and  landed  his  crew.  As  night  fell,  the  enemy's  fleet  divided  ;  part, 
under  M.  de  Beauffremont,  the  vice-admiral,  making  to  the  south- 
ward within  the  Four  Bank,  and  probably  designing  to  attract  the 
British  into  danger. 

But  Hawke  would  not  be  tempted  to  pursue  them.  Night  was 
come  ;  islands,  rocks,  and  shoals  were  all  around  ;  no  pilots  were  on 
board ;  the  charts  were  indifferent,  and  the  weather  was  terrible. 
Hawke,  therefore,  made  the  signal  to  anchor,  and  came  to  in  fifteen 
fathoms  of  water,  the  Isle  de  Dumet  bearing  E.  by  N.  two  or  three 
miles  distant,  the  Cardinals  W.  ^  S.,  and  the  steeples  of  Le  Croisic 
S.E.,  as  was  discovered  in  the  morning.  Unfortunately,  the  signal 
was  not  taken  in,  and,  consequently,  was  not  obeyed,  by  many  ships 
of  the  British  fleet.  According  to  the  code  then  in  use,  the  signal  to 
anchor  by  night  was  made  by  firing  two  guns  from  the  flagship, 


of  Orange.  Commanded  the  Alcide  in  the  East  Indies.  Some  French  accounts  state 
that  the  Thesee  was  sunk  at  Quiberon  owing  to  being  run  down  by  Hawke's  flagship 
while  de  Kersaint  was  going  to  the  assistance  of  the  Koleil  Royal;  but  these  are 
clearly  incorrect.  The  Count's  son,  who  saw  his  father  sink  at  Quiberon,  was  later  a 
distinguished  naval  officer,  but,  meddling  with  politics,  was  guillotined  in  1793.  He 
was  then  a  vice-admiral. 


1759.]  THE  BATTLE   OF   QUIBEEON  BAY.  221 

without  using  lights  or  any  other  indications  to  distinguish  the 
particular  purpose  for  which  the  guns  were  fired.  At  a  moment 
when  there  was  still  a  certain  amount  of  firing  going  on  on  all  sides, 
the  discharge  of  two  guns  from  the  flagship  could  of  course  not  be 
recognised  as  a  signal  except  hy  the  few  vessels  which  chanced  to  be 
so  near  the  Admiral  as  to  be  aware  that  he  had  anchored.  The 
others  either  stood  out  to  sea  or  anchored,  as  prudence  suggested. 
Had  the  French  only  known  the  dangerous  position  in  which  the 
unsatisfactory  nature  of  the  signal  book  had  left  their  enemy  during 
that  stormy  night,  they  might,  in  the  morning  of  the  21st,  have 
attacked  the  small  body  remaining  at  anchor  near  Hawke,  and 
perhaps  have  won  a  decided  and  complete  victory  by  the  mere 
strength  of  superior  forces. 

The  night  was  dark,  and  even  more  boisterous  than  the  evening 
had  been ;  but,  though  guns  of  distress  were  heard  from  all  sides,  it 
was  not  possible  to  send  assistance  to  anyone.  On  the  morning  of 
the  21st  the  Resolution  was  seen  to  be  ashore,  and  the  French  ][<:>•<>* 
was  on  the  Four  Bank.  De  Conflans's  flagship,  the  Soldi  lioyul,  in 
the  obscurity  overnight,  had  come  to  anchor  in  the  very  midst  of  the 
British ;  and,  when  at  daylight  she  perceived  her  situation,  she 
slipped  her  cable  and  tried  to  get  away,  but  presently  went  ashore 
near  the  town- of  Le  Croisic.  No  sooner  was  she  observed  to  be  in 
motion  than  Hawke  signalled  the  Essex  to  slip  and  pursue  her ;  but 
in  the  ardour  of  the  chase  the  Essex  unfortunately  got  on  the  Four 
Bank  and  was  also  wrecked.  It  was  seen  that,  while  the  French 
vice-admiral  had  gone  to  the  southward  with  part  of  the  fleet,  the 
remainder  had  stood  to  the  N.  and  was  engaged  in  the  mouth  of  the 
river  Vilaine  in  getting  out  guns,  stores,  etc.,  and  endeavouring  to 
find  a  haven  up  the  river.  On  the  21st  and  22nd,  by  taking  ad- 
vantage of  the  flood  tide  and  of  what  wind  there  was  under  the  land, 
all  of  them  got  into  the  river,  whence  several  of  them  could  never  be 
brought  out  again.  On  the  22nd  Hawke  ordered  the  Soleil  Royal 
and  Heros  to  be  set  on  fire.  The  French,  however,  anticipated  him 
hy  themselves  burning  the  former. 

On  the  British  side  the  number  of  men  killed  in  the  action  did 
not  exceed  fifty,  and  only  about  two  hundred  and  fifty  were 
wounded.1 

As  soon  as  it  became  known  in  England  that  the  French  had 
sailed  from  Brest,  the  excitement  was  great,  and  every  effort  was 
1  Hawke's  Disp.  of  November  24th. 


222 


MAJOR    OPERATIONS,   1714-1762. 


[1759. 


made  to  meet  the  situation.  Bear-Admiral  Geary  was  detached 
with  a  reinforcement  of  ships l  for  Hawke ;  and  other  vessels  capable 
of  putting  to  sea  were  ordered  to  be  in  readiness  at  a  moment's 
notice.  Vice-Admiral  Charles  Saunders,  returning  from  the  con- 
quest of  Quebec,  learnt  in  the  chops  of  the  Channel  that  the  French 
were  out  and  that  Hawke  had  gone  in  chase  of  them.  Though  he 
had  with  him  but  three  ships  of  the  line,2  he  realised  so  fully  that  no 
addition  of  forces  was  to  he  despised,  and  he  had  so  strong  a  sense 
of  his  duty,  that,  on  his  own  responsibility,  he  steered  for  Quiberon 
Bay  with  all  the  sail  he  could  set.  But  neither  Geary  nor  Saunders 
joined  Hawke  ere  the  battle.  Geary  arrived  several  days  too  late, 


(OMMKMOKATIVK    MEDAL    OF    IIAWKK's    VICTORY    IN   QUIHKHOX    BAY,    1751). 
(Fnini  an  uriijinal  kimlli/  lent  hij  J/..S'.//.  Captinll  I'rina'  Lunix  iif  Biitli'Hhiy,  li.X.) 

and  Saunders,  hearing  of  the  issue  of  the  action,3  altered  his  course 
and  steered  again  for  England. 

Hawke  sent  home  his  dispatches  by  Captain  John  Campbell  (1), 
who,  as  Captain  Matthew  Buckle  had  been,  was  graciously  received 
by  the  King,  and  presented  with  .£500  to  purchase  a  sword.  Hawke 
himself  received  the  thanks  of  the  House  of  Commons  and  a  pension 
of  £2000  a  year.  Nor  were  other  officers  who  had  distinguished 
themselves  during  the  campaign  forgotten.  Boscawen,  as  has 
already  been  mentioned,  was  made  General  of  Marines ;  Vice- 

1  Sandwich,  90,  Rear- Admiral  Francis  Geary,  Captain  Richard  Xorbury ;    Foud- 
royant,    84,   Captain    Richard   Tyrrell;    Bienfaisant,    64,   Captain    George    Balfour; 
America,  60,  Captain  James  Kirke;  Anson,  60,  Captain  Matthew  Whitwell;  Firm,  60, 
Captain  John  Reynolds  (1) ;  and  Juno,  32,  Captain  Henry1  John  Philips. 

2  Somerset,  64,  Vice- Admiral  Charles  Saunders,  Captain   Edward   Hughes ;    Van- 
guard, 70,  Captain  Robert  Swanton ;  and  Devonshire,  66,  Captain  William  Gordon. 

3  Mahan   calls   this   action  "the  Trafalgar"  of  the  Seven  Years'  War.     Guerin 
exclaims :  "  C'etait  La  Hougue,  moins  la  gloire  et  1'honneur  francais  sauves." 


1759.]  PRECAUTIONS  AGAINST   THIRST.  223 

Admiral  Saunders  was  made  Lieut. -General  of  Marines,  and  Cap- 
tains Sir  Piercy  Brett  (1),  Kt.,  the  Hon.  Augustus  Keppel,  and  Lord 
Howe,  were  made  Colonels  of  Marines. 

On  the  26th  Hawke  sent  Commodore  James  Young  (1),  with  a 
squadron,  to  anchor  in  Quiberon  Bay,  and  on  the  27th  detached 
Captain  the  Hon.  Augustus  Keppel,  with  a  squadron,  to  Basque 
Road,  to  attack  such  of  the  enemy  as  might  be  found  there.  But 
before  the  latter  reached  his  destination,  M.  de  Beauffremont  had 
lightened  his  ships  and  retired  up  the  river  Charente,  whither  the 
British  vessels  were  unable  to  follow  him.  Neither  in  the  Charente 
nor  in  the  Vilaine  could  the  fugitive  ships  be  reached.  Time,  how- 
ever, effected  what  force  could  not ;  for  few  of  the  vessels  were  ever 
again  fit  for  active  service.  Hawke  was  relieved  by  Boscawen,  and 
returned  to  England  after  an  absence  of  ten  months. 

During  the  blockade  it  was  notorious  that  no  fleet  employed 
on  similar  service  had  ever  before  been  so  amply  supplied  with 
beer,  provisions,  and  vegetables ;  but,  after  the  defeat  of  de  C'onflans, 
in  consequence  chiefly  of  the  adverse  state  of  the  weather,  supplies 
failed,  and  the  men  were  obliged  to  be  put  upon  short  allowance. 
This  gave  rise  to  the  well-known  satirical  lines  :— 

"Ere  Hawke  did  bun- 

Monsieur  Condans, 
You  sent  us  beef  and  beer. 

Now  Monsieur's  beat, 

We've  naught  to  eat, 
Since  you  have  nought  to  fear." 

The  small  French  expedition  which  had  been  assembled  at 
Dunquerque  for  a  descent  upon  Scotland  or  Ireland,  and  which 
was  to  be  convoyed  by  Thurot,  was  blockaded  throughout  the 
summer  and  early  autumn  of  1759  by  a  squadron l  under  Commodore 
William  Boys,  who,  however,  was  driven  from  his  station  by  a  gale 
in  October.  Thurot  then  slipped  out  and  made  to  the  northward, 
Boys  following  as  soon  as  possible,  but  not  being  able  to  overtake 
the  enemy,  and  ultimately  having  to  content  himself  with  cruising 

1  Squadron  under  Commodore  William  Boys,  engaged  in  the  blockade  of  Dun- 
querque, etc.,  1759:  Preston,  50,  Commodore  William  Boys,  Captain  John  Evans; 
Antelope,  50,  Captain  James  Webb;  Phcenix,  44,  Captain  Christopher  Codrington 
Bethell ;  Danae,  40,  Captain  Henry  Martin  (2)  ;  Liverpool,  32,  Captain  Kichard  Knight ; 
Stag,  32,  Captain  Henry  Augell ;  Argo,  28,  Captain  John  Bladon  Tinker ;  Tweed,  28, 
Captain  William  Paston ;  Hussar,  28,  Captain  Robert  Carkett ;  Surprise,  24,  Captain 
Charles  Antrobus;  Badger,  14,  Commander  Basil  Keith;  Alderney,  12,  Commander 
John  Peighin. 


224  MAJOR    OPEBATIONS,    1714-1762.  [1760. 

off  the  coast  of  Scotland  with  the  object  of  preventing  any  sudden 
raid  there.  As  Thurot's  destination  was  unknown,  and  as  there 
were  rumours  that  he  contemplated  a  blow  on  some  port  on  the 
east  coast  of  England,  the  squadron  in  the  Downs,1  under  Com- 
modore Sir  Piercy  Brett  (1),  was  ordered  to  Yarmouth.  But 
Thurot's  operations  in  the  British  seas  did  not  begin  till  the  following 
year,  and  an  account  of  them  may  for  the  present  be  deferred. 

During  the  year  1700  the  British  squadrons  on  active  service 
were  disposed  as  follows.  Commodore  Sir  Piercy  Brett  commanded 
in  the  Downs  and  North  Sea ;  Bear-Admiral  George  Brydges 
Rodney  cruised  in  the  Channel  and  blockaded  Le  Havre ;  Admirals 
Sir  Edward  Hawke  and  the  Hon.  Edward  Boscawen  relieved  one 
another  in  Quiberon  Bay,  and  watched  the  French  vessels  in  the 
Vilaine  and  Charente,  at  Brest,  Lorient,  and  Rochfort ;  Commodore 
Robert  Swanton  was  despatched  with  reinforcements  to  Commodore 
Lord  Colville  in  North  America ;  Captain  the  Hon.  John  Byron 
was  sent  with  a  squadron  to  destroy  the  fortifications  at  Louis- 
bourg ;  Commodore  Sir  James  Douglas  (1)  relieved  Commodore  John 
Moore  (1)  on  the  Leeward  Islands'  station  ;  Rear-Admiral  Charles 
Holmes  relieved  Vice- Admiral  Thomas  Cotes  at  Jamaica ;  and 
five  additional  ships  were  sent  to  the  East  Indies  to  reinforce  Rear- 
Admirals  Charles  Stevens  and  Samuel  Cornish.  In  the  Mediter- 
ranean Vice-Admiral  Charles  Saunclers  succeeded  to  the  command. 

In  the  East  Indies,  Arcot  and  Carical,  with  many  other  places, 
were  taken  from  the  French,  the  Marines  serving  in  several 
instances  011  shore,  and  the  ships  co-operating  with  the  land  forces 
whenever  possible.  Pondicherry  was  besieged  and  blockaded,  and 
in  October  the  boats  of  the  fleet,  under  Commander  AVilliam 
Newsom,  acting  captain  of  the  Southsea  Castle,  40,  and  Lieu- 
tenant Isaac  Florimond  Ourry,  brilliantly  cut  out  from  under  the 
forts  the  Hermione,  36,  and  Baleine,  32,  which  were  afterwards 
purchased  into  the  Royal  Navy.  The  rainy  season  approaching, 
Rear-Admiral  Stevens  left  five  ships  of  the  line,  under  Captain 
Robert  Haldane,  of  the  America,  60,  to  continue  the  blockade, 
and  himself  sailed  on  October  23rd  for  Trincomale.  In  the  mean- 

1  Squadron  under  Commodore  Sir  Piercy  Brett  (1),  Kt.,  in  the  Downs  and  North 
Sea,  1759:  his,  50,  Commodore  Sir  Piercy  Brett,  Kt.,  Captain  Edward  Wheeler; 
Woolwich,  40,  Captain  Daniel  Dering ;  Aurora,  36,  Captain  Samuel  Scott ;  Alarm,  32, 
Captain  John  Bushworth ;  Aquilon,  28,  Captain  Chaloner  Ogle  (2) ;  Tartar,  28,  Captain 
John  Knight  (1) ;  Sohlay,  24,  Captain  John  Dalrymple ;  and  Deal  Castle,  24,  Captain 
George  Tindall. 


1760-61.]  REDUCTION  OF  PONDICHERRT.  225 

time  the   siege  was   actively  carried   on    by  Lieut. -Colonel    Eyre 
Coote. 

On  December  25th,  Stevens  returned  with  four  of  his  ships  of 
the  line,  and  resumed  command  off  the  port.     On  January  1st,  1761, 
a  violent  hurricane  burst  upon  the  shipping.     Stevens,  whose  flag 
was  in  the  Norfolk,  74,  Captain  Richard  Kempenfelt,  cut  his  cable, 
and  by  gun-signals  ordered  his  captains  to  do  the  same ;  but,  owing 
to  the  violence  of  the  gale  and  the  amount  of  spray  in  the  air,  the 
signals  were   neither   heard   nor   seen.     The   Panther,  60,  Captain 
Philip    Affleck,    the   America,    60,    Captain    Robert    Haldane,    the 
Medway,  60,  Captain  John  Bladon  Tinker,  and  the  Falmouth,  50, 
Captain  William   Brereton,  were   dismasted,   yet  managed  to  ride 
out  the  storm.     A  worse  fate  overtook  the  Newcastle,  50,  Captain 
Digby  Dent  (3),  the  Quee>iboroiigh,  20,  and  the  Protector,  fireship,  all 
of  which   drove   ashore   and  were  wrecked   about  two   miles   from 
Pondicherry,  though   they  lost   only  seven    of   their  crews.     Other 
vessels  were   even   more   unfortunate.     The   Due   d'Aquitaine,   64, 
Captain   Sir  William   Hewitt,    Bart.,    the  Sunderland,  60,  Captain 
the  Hon.  James  Colville,  and  the  Drake,  storeship,  foundered  with 
all  hands,  except   seven  Europeans   and  seven  lascars.     The  total 
sacrifice  of  life  was  about  eleven  hundred  souls.     Stevens,  however, 
resumed   his   position,  and  renewed    the   blockade  on  January  3rd, 
and  was  next  day  joined  by  Rear-Admiral  Cornish  with  additional 
ships   from   Trincomale.      Pondicherry   was   gradually   reduced   by 
famine,  until  on  January  15th  it  surrendered,  and  was  occupied  on 
the  16th  by  the  Navy  and  army.     Thus  ended  the  French  power 
on  the  coast  of  Coromandel. 

On  the  Leeward  Islands'  and  Jamaica  stations  the  enemy  was 
in  force  too  feeble  to  attempt  anything  of  moment.  Indeed,  only 
one  action  that  was  fought  in  the  West  Indies  in  1760  calls  for 
mention  here.  In  the  autumn  Rear-Admiral  Holmes  learnt  that 
a  French  convoy,  escorted  by  five  frigates,  was  about  to  sail  from 
Cape  Francois  for  Europe  and  he  despatched  the  Hampshire,  50, 
Captain  Coningsby  Norbury  (2),  the  Boreas,  28,  Captain  Samuel 
Uvedale,  and  the  Lively,  20,  Captain  the  Hon.  Frederick  Lewis 
Maitland  (1),  to  intercept  them.  On  October  16th  the  French 
put  to  sea,  the  escort  consisting  of  the  vessels  mentioned  in  the 
note.1  Next  morning  at  dawn  the  British  ships  sighted  and 

1  Sirene,  32 ;  Due  de  ChoisetH,  32 ;  Prince  Edward,  32 ;  Fleur  de  Lys,  32 ;  and 
Valeur,  20. 

VOL.   III.  Q 


226  MAJOR    OPERATIONS,   1714-1762.  [1160. 

chased  them,  but  closed  very  slowly  until  evening,  when  the  breeze 
freshened.  At  midnight  the  Boreas  engaged  the  Sir&ne,  but,  being 
disabled  aloft,  fell  astern,  and  could  not  come  up  with  her  again  till 
2  P.M.  on  October  18th,  off  the  east  end  of  Cuba.  A  hot  action 
then  began,  and  at  4.40  P.M.  the  Sirbne  struck,  having  lost  80  killed 
and  wounded.  The  Boreas  had  lost  but  one  killed  and  one  wounded. 
In  the  meanwhile  the  Hampshire  and  Lively  had  been  in  chase  of 
the  other  frigates.  Soon  after  daybreak  on  the  18th,  the  Lively, 
by  using  her  sweeps,  got  alongside  of  the  Valeur,  and,  after  an  hour 
and  a  half,  forced  her  to  surrender,  she  having  lost  38  killed  and 
25  wounded,  and  the  Lively  but  two  wounded.  Both  the  Sirene 
and  Valeur  were  added  to  the  Navy  under  their  own  names.  The 
Hampshire  at  3.30  P.M.  got  between  the  Due  de  Choiseul  and  the 
Prince  Edward,  but  the  former,  having  the  advantage  of  the  wind, 
got  into  Port  an  Paix.  The  latter  ran  ashore  and  struck,  but  was, 
nevertheless,  subsequently  burnt  by  her  crew.  On  the  19th  the 
Hampshire  and  Lively  were  about  to  attack  the  Fleur  de  Lys, 
which  lay  in  the  bay  to  leeward  of  Port  au  Paix,  when  the  enemy 
saved  them  the  trouble  by  abandoning  and  burning  the  ship. 

The  conquest  of  Canada  had  not  been  completed  when  Quebec 
fell,  and  the  French  still  cherished  hopes  of  ousting  the  British 
and  of  regaining  command  of  the  country.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  British  were  determined  to  make  good  their  possession.  In 
the  winter  of  1759-60,  a  naval  force  consisting  of  the  Onondaga,  18, 
Mohairk,  1(5,  and  several  row-galleys  and  gunboats,  was  established 
on  Lake  Ontario,  with  a  view  to  transporting  an  army  down  the 
St.  Lawrence  to  Montreal.  This  army,  of  about  11,000  men 
under  General  Amherst,  consisted  half  of  regulars  and  half  of 
provincial  levies,  besides  Indians,  commanded  by  Sir  William 
Johnson,  Bart.  It  was  to  be  aided  by  another,  of  5000  men, 
under  Colonel  Haviland,  advancing  from  Lake  Champlain,  and  by 
a  third,  under  Brigadier-General  Murray,  advancing  from  Quebec 
up  the  St.  Lawrence. 

To  help   these  various  expeditions,   Commodore  Lord  Colville  * 

1  yorthumberland,  70,  Commodore  Lord  Colville,  Captain  William  Adams  (2); 
Akidc,  64,  Captain  Thomas  Hankerson;  Trident,  64,  Captain  Julian  Legge;  Pem- 
broke, 60,  Captain  John  Wheelook;  Prince  of  Orange,  60,  Captain  Samuel  Wallis ; 
Richmond,  32,  Captain  John  Elphinstone  (1) ;  Eurus,  20,  Captain  Nathaniel  Bateman ; 
Porcupine,  16,  Commander  John  Macartney ;  and  Racehorse,  bomb,  which  was  already 
at  Quebec.  The  above  wintered  in  America,  and  were  joined  at  various  times  by  the 
Devonshire,  66,  Captain  George  Darby;  Norwich,  50,  Captain  William  M'Cleverty; 
Oreyhourtd,  24,  Captain  Thomas  Francis;  and  Lizard,  28,  Captain  James Doake. 


1760.]  FRENCH  ATTEMPTS  AGAINST   QUEBEC.  227 

was  directed  to  enter  the  St.  Lawrence  as  soon  as  the  season  should 
allow  ;  and  a  reinforcement l  under  Commodore  S  wanton,  consisting 
of  two  sail  of  the  line,  three  fifty-gun  ships,  and  four  frigates,  sailed 
from  England  early  in  the  spring. 

Knowing  of  some,  at  least,  of  these  preparations,  the  French 
made  gallant  attempts  to  seize  Quebec  before  the  river  should  be  clear 
of  ice.  They  sent  down  the  St.  Lawrence  an  army  of  about  14,000 
men  under  M.  de  Levis.  General  Murray,  underrating  the  force 
of  the  enemy,  marched  out  and  attacked  him,  but  was  defeated  at 
Sillery  on  April  28th.  Tf  the  French  had  at  once  followed  up 
their  advantage,  they  could  probably  have  taken  the  place,  but 
they  let  slip  their  chance.  Murray  was  very  active  in  the  defence, 
and  sent  the  Racehorse  down  the  river  to  look  for  the  fleet  and 
hasten  its  arrival.  On  May  9th  the  Lowestoft,  28,  Captain  Joseph 
Deane,  anchored  in  the  Basin,  and  brought  news  of  the  near 
approach  of  Commodore  Swanton,  who,  on  the  evening  of  the 
15th,  arrived  in  the  Vanguard,  70,  with  the  Diana,  36,  Captain 
Alexander  Schomberg.  On  the  16th,  in  response  to  the  expressed 
wishes  of  General  Murray,  the  Vanguard,  Diana  and  Lowestoft 
worked  up  towards  the  enemy's  flotilla  in  the  upper  river,  and  soon 
obliged  it  to  retire  with  the  loss  of  the  Ponwne,  36,  which  grounded 
and  was  burnt  near  Cape  Diamond,  the  Atalante,  32,  which  grounded 
and  was  burnt  thirty  miles  higher  up,  and  all  the  other  craft  except 
a  sloop.  The  active  part  of  this  work  was  clone  exclusively  by  the 
Diana  and  Lowestoft,  wyhile  the  Vanguard,  dropping  down  abreast 
of  Sillery,  enfiladed  the  enemy's  trenches  there,  and  compelled  their 
abandonment.  Indeed,  this  attack  induced  M.  de  Levis  to  raise 
the  siege  on  the  night  of  the  16th,  leaving  behind  him  44  guns, 
10  mortars,  and  various  stores.  Unfortunately,  the  Lowestoft, 
in  returning,  struck  on  a  sunken  rock  and  foundered,  but  without 
loss  of  life.  Lord  Colville,  with  his  squadron,  reached  Quebec  on 
the  18th. 

All  was  then  in  readiness  for  the  projected  advance  against 
Montreal.  General  Murray's  army  was  escorted  up  the  river  by 
the  Penzance,  40,  Captain  William  Gough,  the  Diana,  32,  Captain 
Joseph  Deane,  the  Porcupine,  16,  Commander  John  Macartney, 

1  Vanguard,  70,  Commodore  Robert  Swanton;  Kingston,  60,  Captain  William 
Parry  (2i;  Rochester,  50,  Captain  Thomas  Burnett;  Falkland,  50,  Captain  Francis 
Samuel  Drake ;  Sutherland,  50,  Captain  Benjamin  Clive ;  Penzance,  44,  Captain  William 
Gough ;  Diana,  36,  Captain  Alexander  Schomberg ;  Vengeance,  28,  Captain  Gamaliel 
Nightingale ;  and  Lowestoft,  28,  Captain  Joseph  Deane. 

Q  2 


228  MAJOR    OPERATIONS,   1714-1762.  [1760. 

the  Gaspte,  schooner,  8,  and  a  flotilla  of  thirty-five  small  craft,  it 
having  embarked  in  forty  transports  on  June  13th.  Progress  was  on 
several  occasions  challenged  by  French  batteries ;  but  the  various 
difficulties  were  slowly  overcome.  Behind  the  main  force  followed 
some  troops  from  Louisbourg  under  Lord  Bollo.  In  the  interval, 
General  Arnherst  was  advancing  down  the  St.  Lawrence  under  the 
conduct  of  Captain  Joshua  Loring,  E.N.1  In  the  course  of  the 
advance  the  Onondaga  was  taken  by  the  enemy,  and,  though 
retaken,  had  to  be  abandoned.  Many  boats  and  some  small  craft 
were  also  lost  by  the  way,  owing  to  the  great  difficulties  of  naviga- 
tion. On  September  Oth,  however,  the  Commander-in-Chief's  army 
landed  on  the  upper  end  of  the  Island  of  Montreal,  nine  miles  above 
the  city.  The  enemy  fled,  and  Montreal  was  quickly  invested. 

As  for  Colonel  Haviland's  force,  it  embarked  at  Crown  Point 
on  August  llth,  and,  gradually  driving  the  enemy  before  it,  niaue 
its  way,  partly  by  water  and  partly  by  land,  to  Isle  Ste.  Therese 
near  Montreal,  appearing  there  within  a  few  hours  of  the  arrival 
of  Amherst  and  Murray  in  the  same  neighbourhood.  The  co-opera- 
tion could  not  have  been  more  exactly  timed. 

On  September  7tli  a  cessation  of  hostilities  was  agreed  to ;  and 
on  September  8th  M.  de  Vaudreuil  capitulated  and  Canada  became 
British.  The  final  conquest  had  been  prefaced  by  the  capture  or 
destruction  by  Lord  Colville  of  a  large  number  of  French  privateers 
on  the  St.  Lawrence,  and  by  the  destruction  by  Commodore  the 
Hon.  John  Byron  in  Chaleur  Bay,  on  July  8th,  of  the  Machault,  32, 
Bienfaisant,  22,  Marquis  de  Marlozc,  16,  and  several  French  small 
craft  which  had  taken  refuge  there  in  expectation  of  chance  offering 
them  some  opportunity  for  slipping  up  the  river. 

Captain  Joseph  Deane,  E.N.,  and  Major  Barre  carried  home 
the  dispatches  announcing  the  great  success.  Each  was  presented 
with  £500  wherewith  to  buy  a  sword.  Byron,  who  had  proceeded 
on  his  own  responsibility  to  Chaleur  Bay  on  the  service  above  noted, 
and  who  had  interrupted  for  the  purpose  the  business  of  razing  to 
the  ground  the  fortifications  of  Louisbourg,  subsequently  returned 
and  completed  that  work. 

In  the  Mediterranean,  whither  Vice-Admiral  Charles    Saunders 

1  Joshua  Loring  came  of  a  family  which  had  been  for  some  time  settled  in  North 
America.  Lieutenant,  1745 ;  Commander,  1756 ;  Captain,  1757 ;  chief  director  of  the 
Naval  Department  in  the  Interior,  and  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Lake  Flotilla,  1759- 
1762;  died,  1781. 


1700.]  CRUISE   OF  M.    THUEOT.  229 

went  as  Commander-in-Chief  in  April,  1760,  little  of  importance 
happened,  owing  to  the  overwhelming  superiority  of  the  British 
naval  forces.  A  French  division  slipped  out  of  Toulon  in  June; 
but  the  greater  part  of  it  was  driven  by  a  squadron,  under  Captain 
Hugh  Palliser,  of  the  Shrewsbury,  74,  into  a  port  in  the  island  of 
Candia,  and  was  blockaded  there  until  the  British  vessels  had  to 
withdraw  for  supplies  and  repairs,  whereupon  the  enemy  got  back 
to  Toulon. 

The  fortunes  of  M.  Thurot  must  now  be  followed.  Evading 
Commodore  Boys,  he  left  Dunquerque  on  October  loth,  1759.  In 
his  little  squadron  of  six  frigates  and  corvettes,  he  had  thirteen 
hundred  troops  under  Brigadier-General  de  Flobert.1  He  first 
went  to  Gothenburg  in  Sweden,  partly  to  procure  stores,  and  partly, 
no  doubt,  to  baffle  pursuit  or  observation.  There  he  remained  for 
nineteen  days,  going  next  to  Bergen  in  Norway.  On  his  way 
thither,  one  of  his  ships,  the  Ber/on,  was  so  damaged  in  a  gale  as 
to  be  obliged  to  return  to  France.  The  Faucoii  also  parted  company 
early  in  the  voyage.  Thurot  quitted  Bergen  on  December  5th,  and 
proceeded,  by  way  of  Stromo,  in  the  Faroe  Islands,  reaching  the 
neighbourhood  of  the  Irish  coast  on  January  25th,  J760.  The 
weather  confounded  an  intended  descent  near  Londonderry,  and 
scattered  his  squadron,  so  much  so  that  the  Amaranthc2  never 
rejoined,  and  returned  in  some  distress  to  St.  Malo.  As  the 
ships  were  by  that  time  all  in  a  sorry  plight,  and  more  than  one  of 
them  was  almost  mutinous,  the  captains  implored  Thurot  to  abandon 
the  descent.  But  he  refused,  and  put  into  Claigeann  Bay,  in  the 
island  of  Islay,  on  February  15th,  to  refresh. 

Thurot  left  the  island  on  February  19th,  and  next  day  anchored 
in  Belfast  Lough,  opposite  Kilroot  Point.  The  town  of  Carrick- 
fergus  was  garrisoned  by  four  newly-raised  and  weakly  companies 
of  the  62nd  Eegiment  under  Lieut. -Colonel  Jennings.  Thurot 
landed  about  six  hundred  men  on  February  21st,  and  M.  de  Flobert, 
after  comparatively  little  fighting,  obliged  Colonel  Jennings  to 
surrender  the  castle.  The  French  requisitioned  provisions  from 

1  De  Flobert,  from  the  first,  threw  difficulties  in  Thurot's  way,  regarding  him  with 
contempt  and  jealousy.     Thurot,  as  a  seaman,  probably  had  no  high  opinion  of  the 
soldier ;   for,  as  Laughton  points  out  ('  Studs,  in  Nav.  Hist.,'  346),  even  until  quite 
recent  times  there  was  a  saying  on  board  ship,  "  a  messmate  before  a  shipmate ;  a  ship- 
mate before  a  stranger ;  a  stranger  before  a  dog ;  but — a  dog  before  a  soldier." 

2  It  is  tolerably  certain,  nevertheless,  that  the  Amaranthe  could  have  rejoined,  had 
her  captain  desired  to  do  so. 


230  MAJOR    OPERATIONS,   1714-1762.  [1760. 

the  town,  and  made  several  small  prizes  in  the  Lough,  rifling 
and  afterwards  burning  them ;  but  de  Flobert  resisted  Thurot's 
entreaties  to  advance  and  seize  Belfast.  The  whole  adventure 
cost  the  French  about  thirty  killed  and  sixty  wounded.  The  mayor 
and  some  gentlemen  were  carried  on  board  as  hostages,  and  at 
midnight  on  February  27th,  the  enemy,  having  re-embarked,  set 
sail  to  return  to  France. 

The  Duke  of  Bedford,  Lord  Lieutenant  of  Ireland,  upon  getting 
news  of  the  descent,  sent  expresses  to  all   the  principal   ports  to 
inform  the  captains  of  any  of  H.  M.  ships  that  might  be  there  of 
what   had   happened.     At   Kingsale   one  of   these   expresses  found 
the  frigates  JEolus,  Pallas,  and  Brilliant?  which  had  been  driven 
from   their   station   with   Hawke's   fleet   on   the   coast   of   France. 
These  at  once  put  to  sea  and  went  north.     At  Dublin,  on  the  26th, 
the  senior  officer,  Captain  John  Elliot,  learnt  that  the  enemy  was 
still  at  Carrickfergus.     That  same  evening,  he  found  himself  off  the 
mouth  of  Belfast  Lough,  but,  the  wind  being  contrary,  he  could 
not  get  in.     On  the  28th,  at  4  A.M.,  he  caught  sight  of  the  French 
as  they  rounded  Copeland  Island,  and  gave  chase.     "  About  nine," 
continues  Captain  Elliot,  in  his  dispatch  of  February  29th  to  the 
Duke  of  Bedford,   "I    got  alongside   their   commodore;    and,  in  a 
few  minutes,  the  action  became  general,  and  continued  very  briskly 
for  an  hour  and  a  half,  when  they  all  three  struck  their  colours." 
The   Marechal    de   BeUcinle   alone   fought   well  ;    the   Blonde    and 
Terpsichore  struck  almost  as  soon  as  they  were  engaged.     Elliot, 
with  the  prizes,   subsequently  put   into  Ramsay,  Isle   of   Man,  to 
refit.     All  the  vessels  were  greatly  disabled  aloft,  and  the  Marechal 
ile   Bclleislc,  which  had    suffered   most   of  all,  was   with    difficulty 
prevented  from  sinking. 

1  Squadron  which,  under  M.  Thurot,  esca]ied  from  Dunquerque  in  175SI ;  and 
squadron  which,  under  Captain  John  Elliot,  met  and  captured  part  of  it  on 
February  28th,  1760:— 


FitENCH. 

BRITISH. 

Ships.                     ,  Gnus. 

Ships.                Guns.              Commanders. 

Losses. 

Jfattfe&ol  de  Belleislc     .     .       44 

-«W«*     ....        32       ('apt.  John  Elliot. 
Pallas    ....       36           ,,    Michael  Clements. 
Brilliant      .     .     .       ;i(j           ,,    James  Loggie. 

Killed.'  Wounded. 
4             15 
1                 5 
0               11 

Jfaucon  i    is 

Had  parted  company  before  the  action. 


1760]  £OSOAWEN'S  LAST  SERVICE.  231 

The  gallant  Thurot,1  who  fell  on  this  occasion,  was  an  opponent 
who,  in  his  method  of  carrying  on  the  war,  had  never  shut  his  eyes 
to  the  principles  of  honour,  generosity,  and  humanity,  and  who 
was  scarcely  less  lamented  by  his  British  foes  than  by  his  own 
countrymen.  The  three  victorious  captains  were  unanimously 
voted  the  thanks  of  the  Irish  House  of  Commons,  and  the  Blonde 
and  Terpsichore  were  purchased  into  the  Royal  Navy. 

Admiral  Boscawen,  after  the  return  of  Sir  Edward  Hawke, 
sailed  to  command  the  fleet  in  Quiberon  Bay,  with  his  flag  in  the 
Eoyal  William,  and  with  Rear-Admiral  Francis  Geary,  in  the 
Sandwich,  as  second  in  command.  While  he  was  going  to  his 
station,  the  Eamillies,  90,  Captain  Wittewronge  Taylor,  of  his 
squadron,  went  ashore  011  Bolt  Head  in  a  gale  and  was  lost,  the 
crew  all  perishing  except  one  midshipman  and  twenty-five  men. 
Boscawen,  who  was  obliged  by  the  heavy  weather  to  return,  sub- 
sequently shifted  his  flag  to  the  Namiir,  and  proceeded.  His 
cruisers  took  several  prizes  ;  but  the  enemy's  fleet  did  not — indeed, 
could  not — come  out.  The  blockade  prevented  the  French  from 
sending  supplies  across  the  Atlantic,  and  from  interfering  with 
British  trade.  In  August,  Sir  Edward  Hawke,  in  the  Eoyal 
George,  relieved  Boscawen,  who  returned  to  England  on  Sep- 
tember 1st.  This  was  Boscawen's  last  service.  He  died  at  his 
house,  Hatchlands,  near  Guildford,  on  January  10th,  1701. 2  Hawke 
pursued  his  predecessor's  policy,  and  was  equally  successful.  Rear- 
Admiral  Rodney,  cruising  off  Le  Havre,  was  not  less  energetic. 

An  expedition,  to  be  commanded  by  Commodore  the  Hon. 
Augustus  Keppel,  and  to  be  directed  either  against  Mauritius  and 
Bourbon  or  against  the  coast  of  France,  was  in  preparation  when, 
on  October  27th,  George  II.  died.  This  important  event  led  to  so 
much  delay,  that  on  December  13th  orders  were  given  for  the 
fleet  to  return  from  St.  Helen's,  where  it  lay  ready  for  sea,  to 
Spithead,  and  for  the  troops  on  board  to  be  disembarked.  For 
that  season  the  enterprise  was  given  up. 

1  Fran9ois  Thurot,  born  at  Nuits,  1726.     Son  of  a  small  innkeeper ;  educated  by 
the  Jesuits  at  Dijon;  apprenticed  to  a  druggist;  surgeon  in  a  privateer,  1744;  captured 
by  the  British;    escaped;    devoted   himself  to  privateering;   lived   for  some  time  in 
London ;    given  a  commission  in  the  French  navy ;   commanded  the  Friponne,  and, 
from  1757,  the  Marechal  da  Helleisle.     His  actions  with  the  Southampton,  the  Seahorse, 
etc.,  will  be  found  noticed  in  the  next  chapter.    He  was  one  of  the  boldest  of  the  French 
corsairs. 

2  Boscawen  was,  however,  buried  in  the  church  of  St.  Michael,  Peukevel,  Cornwall, 
where  there  is  a  monument  by  Eijsbraak  to  his  memory. 


232  MAJOR    OPERATIONS,   1711-1762.  [1761. 

By  1760  the  enemy's  navy  had  been  so  nearly  annihilated  that 
but  two  or  three  of  His  Majesty's  ships  were  taken  by  the  French  ; 
and  French  trade  had  been  so  diminished  that  the  British  cruisers 
made  but  comparatively  few  captures — only  one  hundred  and  ten 
vessels  in  all.  But  the  British  mercantile  losses  by  the  ravages 
of  small  privateers  were  enormous.  As  many  as  three  hundred 
and  thirty  trading  vessels  were  taken.  Few  of  them,  however, 
were  of  any  considerable  size  ;  and,  in  spite  of  the  loss,  British 
trade  flourished  exceedingly.  It  was,  no  doubt,  chiefly  owing  to  its 
healthy  condition  that  the  commercial  marine  experienced  so  many 
losses. 

In  1761  Vice-Admiral  Francis  Holburne  commanded  at  Ports- 
mouth ;  Commodore  Sir  Piercy  Brett  (1)  in  the  Downs ;  Commodore 
Kobert  Swanton  in  the  Channel ;  Sir  Edward  Hawke  and  Sir 
Charles  Hardy  (2)  in  Quiberon  Bay  till  March,  when  Commodore 
Keppel  took  charge  of  the  squadron  in  the  Bay  of  Biscay ;  Vice- 
Admiral  Charles  Saunders  in  the  Mediterranean  ;  Commodore  Lord 
Colville  in  North  America ;  Kear-Admiral  Charles  Holmes  at 
Jamaica ;  Commodore  Sir  James  Douglas  (1),  and,  at  the  end  of  the 
year,  Kear-Admiral  Kodney,  on  the  Leeward  Islands'  station ;  and 
Kear-Admiral  Stevens  in  the  East  Indies,  until  his  death,  when 
the  command  devolved  on  Kear-Admiral  Cornish. 

After  the  capture  of  Pondicherry,  Mahe  was  reduced  by  the 
troops  under  Major  Hector  Munro,  supported  by  four  sail  of  the 
line  under  Kear-Admiral  Cornish.  The  place  surrendered  on 
February  10th.  In  May  Kear-Admiral  Charles  Stevens  fell  a 
victim  to  the  unhealthiness  of  the  climate.  The  French  on  the 
station  were  by  that  time  practically  helpless,  and  Cornish  soon 
afterwards  went  to  Bombay  to  refit.  He  then  proceeded  southward 
to  meet  an  expedition  which  he  had  reason  to  believe  was  on  its 
way  out,  under  Commodore  Keppel,  to  attack  Bourbon  and 
Mauritius  ;  but  all  idea  of  this  expedition  had,  in  the  meantime, 
been  abandoned.  The  means  taken,  however,  to  apprise  Cornish 
of  the  change  of  plans  were  not  efficacious ;  and  the  Kear-Admiral 
was  actually  obliged,  by  scarcity  of  supplies,  to  go  back  to 
Madras  without  hearing  any  news  from  home.  Two  of  his  ships, 
however,  the  York,  60,  Captain  Henry  Cowell,  and  the  Chatham,  54, 
Captain  Thomas  Lynn,  being  unable  to  keep  with  the  fleet,  had 
to  bear  up  for  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope.  There  they  learned  from 
the  Terpsichore,  26,  Captain  Sir  Thomas  Adams,  Bart.,  that  Keppel 


1761.]  CAPTURE   OF  DOMINICA.  233 

was  no  longer  to  be  expected ;  and  in  due  course  they  carried  the 
intelligence  to  the  Rear-x\dmiral  in  India. 

On  the  Leeward  Islands'  station,  Commodore  Sir  James 
Douglas  (1),  who  was  reinforced  by  four  sail  of  the  line  and  three 
frigates,1  with  troops  from  North  America  under  Lord  Eollo, 
attacked,  and,  on  June  8th,  captured,  the  Island  of  Dominica. 
During  the  rest  of  the  summer,  operations  were  chiefly  confined  to 
the  protection  of  trade,  and  the  repression  of  privateering.  Towards 
the  end  of  the  year,  it  having  been  determined  to  prosecute  a  more 
active  and  offensive  policy,  and  to  largely  increase  the  force  among 
the  AVest  India  Islands,  Rear-Admiral  Rodney  was  appointed  to 
the  command ;  and  on  November  22nd  he  arrived  at  Carlisle  Bay, 
Barbados,  where  he  was  presently  joined  by  the  Temcraire  and 
Acteeon,  with  troops  from  Belle  Isle,  and  by  a  military  force  from 
North  America  under  Major-General  Monckton. 

On  the  Jamaica  station  there  were  several  single-ship  encounters, 
but  110  occurrences  of  first-rate  importance.  Bear-Admiral  Charles 
Holmes,  dying  011  November  21st,  was  succeeded  in  the  command 
by  the  senior  officer,  Captain  Arthur  Forrest,  of  the  Ccntiinr, 
pending  the  arrival  of  Sir  James  Douglas.  In  North  America, 
likewise,  little  of  moment  happened,  the  chief  business  of  the  fleet 
being  to  convoy  troops  to  the  West  Indies.  Nor  were  there  any 
transactions  on  a  large  scale  in  the  Mediterranean,  although  the 
force  there  was,  towards  the  end  of  the  year,  greatly  strengthened 
by  the  arrival  of  a  detachment  from  home  under  Sir  1'iercy  Brett  (1). 
The  French  scarcely  ventured  to  put  to  sea ;  and,  when  any  of 
their  ships  did  issue  from  port,  they  were  almost  invariably 
captured. 

Admiral  Sir  Edward  Hawke  and  Vice-Admiral  Sir  Charles 
Hardy  (2)  remained  in  the  Bay  of  Biscay,  watching  the  French  ships 
in  the  Vilaine  and  Charente  ;  and,  to  better  effect  their  purpose, 
stationed  an  inshore  squadron,  under  Captain  James  Gambier  (1), 
quite  close  to  the  mouth  of  the  Vilaine.  Yet,  in  spite  of  this 
precaution,  011  January  2nd,  the  night  being  dark  and  the  breeze 
fresh,  several  of  the  French  vessels  slipped  out  thence,  and,  though 
chased  by  Gambier,  escaped  into  Brest.  After  this  evasion,  the 

1  Stirling  Castle,  64,  Captain  Michael  Everitt ;  Norwich,  50,  Captain  William 
M'C'leverty;  Falkland,  50,  Captain  Francis  Samuel  Drake;  Sutherland,  50,  Captain 
Julian  Legge;  Penzance,  44,  Captain  John  Boyd  (acting);  Repulse,  32,  Captain 
John  Carter  Allen ;  and  Lizard,  28,  Captain  James  Doake. 


234 


MA  JOS    OPERATIONS,   1714-1762. 


[1761. 


blockading  force  was  needlessly  large  for  the  work  remaining  to 
be  done,  and  in  March  Hawke  returned  to  England,  leaving  behind 
him  enough  ships  to  observe  the  enemy's  motions. 

The  expedition,  which  had  been  prepared  during  the  previous 
year,  and  had  been  destined  at  one  time  for  Bourbon  and  Mauritius, 
and  later  for  the  coast  of  France,  was  again  brought  forward  in 
1761,  Commodore  Hon.  Augustus  Keppel  being  appointed  to 
command  the  sea,  and  Major-General  Studholm  Hodgson1  the 
land  forces.  The  squadron  at  first  included  ten  sail  of  the  line, 
eight  frigates,  three  sloops,  three  bombs,  and  two  fireships,  but 
was  eventually  reinforced  with  five  more  sail  of  the  line.2  The 
army  originally  consisted  of  about  seven  thousand  men,3  but  about 
three  thousand  more  were  subsequently  sent  to  the  scene  of 
operations. 

The  expedition4  sailed  from  St.  Helen's  on  March  29th,  and 
sighted  Belle  Isle,5  which  it  was  designed  to  attack,  011  April  6th. 
That  evening  Keppel  detached  six  frigates  to  cruise  between  the 
island  and  the  mainland,  in  order  to  sever  communications.  A 
squadron  under  Captain  Matthew  Buckle  (1),  consisting  of  thirteen 

1  Later  a  field-marshal. 

2  British  squadron  employed  under  Commodore  the  Hon.  Augustus  Keppel  in  the 
expedition  against  Belle  Isle,  17G1 : — 


'  Ships. 

Guns.             Commandi-rs. 

Ships. 

Guns.             Commanders. 

{Cummod.  Hon.  August  is 

Jf</n  mouth  i 

G4        Taj  t.  John  St-.rr. 

Valiant  .     .     .     . 

Keppel. 

Lynn 

44 

Walter  Stirling. 

Capt.  Adam  Dnurau. 

I.auncetton  . 

44 

E'lmund  Affleck. 

Sandwich 

90 

Richard  Norbury. 

Southampton     . 

36 

Charles  Antrobus. 

Dragon  .     .     ,     . 

74      { 

Hon.   Aug.    John 
Hervey. 

Mtlampe.     .     , 

36       { 

William  Huthaut 

Teintirtiirt    , 

74 

Matthew  Barton. 

Adrenture    . 

32 

Matthew  Moore. 

Torbay    . 

74 

William  Brett. 

ACtVMTl     . 

28 

Paul  Henry  Ourry. 

Swiftsttrc     .      .      . 

70      { 

Sir  Thomas  Stan- 
hop*1,  Kt. 

Flamborouyh     . 
Aldborough 

-4 
24 

Samuel  Thompson. 
Mitchell  Graham. 

Jfainpton  Court 

64 

Carr  Scrope. 

Escort     ,      .      . 

14        O 

H.  Charles  Ellys. 

„ 

64      ( 

Alexander  Schum- 

Fly    .     .     .     . 

10 

Gt'orge  Gayton. 

• 

I 

berg. 

•  7 

o        1 

Hon.    John    Lnt- 

Prince  of  Orange  . 

60 

Samuel  Waltls. 

Drum 

8       I 

trell. 

Achilles  .     .     .     . 

60      { 

Hon.  Samuel  Bar- 
rinrton. 

Fircdrake,  b. 
infernal,  b. 

8 
8 

James  Orrok. 
James  Mackenzie. 

Hero  i      .     .     .     . 

74 

William  Fnrtescne. 

Furnace,  b.  . 

8 

James  Chaplen. 

Buckingham  1   . 

70 

Peter  I'arker  (1).     . 

Vesuvius,  f.s.    . 

16 

James  Chads. 

Burford  1      .      ,      . 

70 

-dimes  Gambier(l). 

_         ,, 

11]      I 

ilichael        Henry 

Chichester  1  . 

70      { 

,     William     Saltren 
Willett. 

{             Pascal. 

Followed  the  fleet  as  reinforcements. 


3  Its  nominal  force  was  9000,  but  the  regiments  were  incomplete.  Hodgson  to 
Albemarle,  March  28th,  1761. 

*  For  Keppel's  secret  instructions,  see  '  Life,'  by  Hon.  and  Rev.  T.  Keppel,  i.  302. 
That  biography,  however,  appears  to  contain  numerous  errors. 

6  For  Belle  Isle  and  neighbourhood,  see  chart  facing  p.  488  of  Vol.  II. 


1761.]  THE  EXPEDITION  TO   BELLE  ISLE.  235 

sail  of  the  line  and  three  frigates,1  was  presently  sent  to  cruise 
off  Brest  to  prevent  the  possibility  of  interference  from  that  quarter. 
Early  on  April  7th  the  fleet  passed  the  south  end  of  the  island  close 
in,  so  as  to  enable  the  Commodore  and  General  to  reconnoitre, 
and  at  noon  it  anchored  in  the  Road  of  Palais.  The  Commodore 
and  General  then  reconnoitred  more  closely  in  a  cutter,  having 
first  ordered  the  boats  to  be  hoisted  out,  and  the  troops  to  be 
made  ready  to  land.  They  found  no  place  more  suitable  for  a 
disembarkation  than  a  bay  near  Point  de  Locmaria,  which  they 
had  remarked  in  the  morning.  To  distract  the  enemy,  a  feint  of 
landing  was  made  near  Sauzon  by  a  detachment  under  Captain 
Sir  Thomas  Stanhope ;  and,  on  the  morning  of  the  8th,  the  wind 
being  north-east,  the  real  landing  in  force  was  made  near  Port 
Andro,  after  the  Prince  of  Orange,  Dragon,  and  Achilles,  with  two 
bombs,  had  silenced  a  four-gun  battery  at  the  entrance  of  the  bay. 
Commodore  Keppel  gave  the  signal  for  the  disembarkation  from  the 
Prince  of  Orange,  to  which  he  had  shifted  his  broad  pennant  from 
the  Valiant.  The  boats  were  led  by  Captain  Matthew  Barton, 
and,  although  the  enemy  offered  a  most  vigorous  resistance,  the 
landing  was  effected  at  three  different  places.  But  the  troops  found 
it  impossible  to  hold  their  ground  or  to  mount  the  well-defended 
slopes  in  front  of  them,  and,  after  a  hot  contest,  had  to  retreat  with 
very  considerable  loss.  The  retiring  boats  were  covered  by  the  fire 
from  the  ships. 

Bad  weather  for  several  days  prevented  any  renewal  of  the 
attempt ;  but  on  the  2'2nd,  while  two  feints  were  made  elsewhere, 
a  new  landing  was  prepared  under  Major-General  John  Craufurd 
at  Fort  d'Arsic,  under  cover  of  the  Sandwich,  Dragon,  Prince  of 
Orange,  two  bombs,  and  two  armed  transports ;  Captain  Barton, 
as  before,  leading  in  the  boats.  The  feints  were  ordered  to  be 
made  by  Brigadier-General  Hamilton  Lambart,  one  near  St.  Foy 
and  the  other  at  Sauzon.  Lambart  was  directed,  if  he  saw  any 
probability  of  success,  to  actually  land,  and  to  endeavour  to  hold 

1  Namur,  90,  Captain  Matthew  Buckle  (1) ;  Union,  90,  Captain  Thomas  Evans  ; 
Royal  William,  84,  Captain  Hugh  Pigot  (1);  Princess  Amelia,  80,  Captain  John 
Montagu;  Hero,  74,  Captain  William  Fortescue ;  Fame,  74,  Captain  the  Hon.  John 
Byron ;  Cornwall,  74,  Captain  Bobert  Man  (2)  ;  Mars,  74,  Captain  Richard  Spry ; 
Bedford,  64,  Captain  Joseph  Deane ;  Prince  Frederick,  64,  Captain  Jervis  Maplesden ; 
Lion,  60,  Captain  Edward  Le  Cras  ;  Bipon,  60,  Captain  Edward  Jekyll ;  Unicorn,  28, 
Captain  Charles  Douglas ;  Tweed,  28,  Captain  William  Paston ;  Aquilon,  28,  Captain 
Chaloner  Ogle  (2). 


236  MAJOR    OPERATIONS,   1714-1762.  [1761. 

his  own.  This,  in  fact,  he  did  under  cover  of  the  Siviftsure, 
Hampton  Court,  Essex,  and  Lynn,  and  with  the  assistance  of 
Marines  under  Lieut. -Colonel  Mackenzie  and  Captain  Murray.  As 
he  effected  his  object  before  the  intended  landing  at  d'Arsic  had 
begun,  the  division  intended  to  attack  that  place  rowed  promptly 
to  Lambart's  support,  and  enabled  him  to  maintain  his  position 
and  to  drive  back  the  enemy.  All  the  troops  were  disembarked 
by  5  P.M.,  and  the  French  retired  before  them  to  Palais.  Batteries 
were  erected  against  the  town  on  May  2nd,  and  in  the  preliminary 
operations  before  the  place,  some  Marines,  under  Captain  David 
Hepburn,  greatly  distinguished  themselves.  On  May  13th  several 
advanced  redoubts  were  carried,  and  the  enemy  was  driven  from 
the  town  to  the  citadel,  which,  from  the  16th  onwards,  was  subjected 
to  a  furious  bombardment.  On  June  7th,  a  large  breach  had  been 
formed  ;  and  preparations  were  being  made  for  storming  it,  when 
the  Chevalier  de  St.  Croix,  the  governor,  offered  to  surrender. 
Possession  was  taken  on  the  8th.  The  British  in  these  operations 
lost  about  three  hundred  and  ten  killed  and  five  hundred  wounded, 
besides  many  men  who  died  oi'  disease.  During  the  whole  pro- 
ceedings the  most  perfect  harmony  prevailed  between  the  naval 
and  the  military  chiefs.1  The  naval  dispatches  were  sent  home 
by  Captain  the  Hon.  Samuel  Barrington,  who,  upon  his  arrival,  was, 
as  was  then  usual  in  such  cases,  presented  by  the  King  with  £500. 
The  island  was  held  during  the  remainder  of  the  war. 

After  the  landing  on  Belle  Isle,  Keppel,  who  had  been  again 
reinforced,  despatched  Sir  Thomas  Stanhope  with  a  squadron  2  to 
attack  such  French  ships  as  might  be  lying  in  Basque  Road,  and 
to  destroy  the  works  on  Isle  d'Aix.  No  ships  were  discovered,  but 
the  destruction  of  the  works  was  satisfactorily  accomplished  by 
Captain  Peter  Parker  (1)  of  the  Buckingham,  in  company  with  the 
'Monmouth  and  Nassau,  assisted  later  by  the  Actccon,  Fly  and  Blast, 

1  "  I  hear  some  scoundrels  have  spread  a  report  that  the  Commodore  and  I  have 
disagreed.     I  believe  there  never  was  more  friendship  and  more  harmony  between  two 
persons  since  the  creation  of  the  world  than  has  subsisted  between  us.  ...  The  two 
services  have  acted  as  one  corps  ever  since  we  left  England."     Hodgson  to  Albemarle, 
June  8th,  1761. 

2  Swiftsure,  70,  Captain  Sir  Thomas   Stanhope;    Sandwich,  'JO,  Captain  Richard 
Xorbury;    Trident,   64,   Captain   Benjamin   Clive;    Buckingham,   64,   Captain   Peter 
Parker (1);  Monmouth,  64,  Captain  John  Storr;  Nassau, 64,  Captain  Maurice  Suckling; 
Prince  of  Orange,  60,  Captain  Samuel  Wallis;  Actason,  28,  Captain  Paul  Henry  Ourry ; 

Fly,  14,  Commander  George  Gayton ;  Blast,  bomb,  8,  Commander ;  Furnace, 

bomb,  8,  Commander  James  Chaplen. 


1761.] 


Q  UEEN    OH  A  BL  0  TTE'  S  ESCORT. 


237 


and  by  the  boats  of  the  squadron.  The  French  prames  from  the 
mouth  of  the  Charente  endeavoured  to  interfere  with  the  operations ; 
but  the  work  was  completed  with  very  little  loss  on  June  21st 
and  22nd.  Sir  Thomas  Stanhope  continued  on  the  station  during 
the  rest  of  the  year,  his  ships  being  occasionally  relieved.  In 
December,  the  enemy  made  an  ineffectual  attempt  to  destroy  them 
by  means  of  fireships.  Soon  afterwards  Lord  Howe  succeeded 
Stanhope  in  the  command. 

It  may  here  be  mentioned,  although  the  matter  has  nothing  to 


SIR    PETER   PARKER    (1),   BART.,    ADMIRAL    OF   THE    FLEET. 
(From  an  engraving  by  Ridley  after  a  iH/rtrait  once  in  the  possession  of  3Ir.  Valentine  Green.) 

do  with  the  military  operations  of  the  Navy,  that,  in  August,  Lord 
Anson,  as  Admiral  of  the  Fleet,  hoisted  his  flag  on  board  the  Royal 
Charlotte  (ex-Royal  Caroline),  yacht,  in  order  to  escort  to  England 
the  Princess  Charlotte  of  Mecklenburg-Strelitz,  who  had  been 
promised  in  marriage  to  George  III.,  and  who  landed  at  Harwich 
on  September  6th.  Alison's  flag-captain  on  that  occasion  was 
Captain  Peter  Denis,  and  the  royal  yacht  was  convoyed  by  the 


238  MAJOR    OPERATIONS,   1714-1762.  [1701. 

Nottingham,  60,  Captain  Samuel  Marshall  (1),  the  Winchester,  50, 
Captain  John  Hale,  the  Minerva,  32,  Captain  Alexander  Arthur 
Hood,  the  Tartar,  28,  Captain  John  Knight  (1),  the  Hazard,  14, 
Commander  the  Hon.  Henry  St.  John  (1),  the  Lynx,  14,  Commander 
the  Hon.  Keith  Stewart  (1),  and  a  number  of  small  yachts. 

During  the  year  there  was  a  disposition,  on  the  part  of  both 
belligerents,  to  treat  for  peace ;  but  the  negotiations  broke  down, 
and  the  prospects  of  an  amicable  arrangement  were  seriously 
diminished  by  the  signature,  on  August  15th,  1761,  of  what  is 
known  as  the  Family  Compact,  between  the  rulers  of  France  and 
Spain.  As  soon  as  news  of  this  was  received  in  England,  Pitt 
desired  at  once  to  declare  war  against  Spain,  which  had  for  some 
time  previously  behaved  in  a  manner  not  altogether  becoming  a 
neutral ;  but,  being  overborne,  he  resigned.  Had  war  been  declared 
when  Pitt  wished,  the  very  rich  home-coming  Spanish  treasure- 
ships  from  America  might  have  been  seized.  As  soon  as  they  were 
safely  in  port,  Spain  took  no  more  pains  to  disguise  her  hostility, 
the  consequence  being  that,  by  proclamation  dated  January  2nd, 
1702,  war  was  declared  by  Great  Britain,  and,  by  proclamation  of 
January  16th,  by  Spain.  The  Spanish  court  at  once  endeavoured 
to  coerce  Portugal  into  joining  Spain  and  France  ;  but  Portugal  was 
loyal  to  her  ancient  ally,  and  manfully  stood  out,  although  war 
was  very  quickly  declared  against  her  as  a  penalty  for  her  non- 
compliance.  Substantial  British  military  support  was  promptly 
given  her,  numerous  British  officers  joined  her  army,  and  Com- 
manders Joseph  Norwood,  Thomas  Lee  (1),  and  Michael  Henry 
Pascal l  took  service  in  her  Navy. 

It  was  early  resolved  to  deal  with  Spain  in  the  most  vigorous 
and  uncompromising  manner.  It  has  been  stated  that  a  large  body 
of  troops  had  been  ordered  from  North  America  to  the  West  Indies 
with  a  view  to  the  reduction  of  the  French  Caribbee  Islands.  The 
Ministry  determined  that  these  troops  should  be  reinforced  from 
England,  and  that,  after  the  newly  conquered  islands  should  have 
been  properly  garrisoned,  an  expedition  should  proceed  to  the 
attack  of  Havana.  The  command  of  the  army  assigned  for  this 
service  was  given  to  Lieut. -General  the  Earl  of  Albemarle.  The 
command  of  the  squadron  was  given  to  Admiral  Sir  George 
Pocock,  K.B.,  with,  as  his  second,  Commodore  the  Hon.  A.  Keppel, 
the  Earl  of  Albemarle's  brother. 

1  All  these  officers,  upon  their  return  to  England  after  the  peace,  were  posted. 


1761.]  THE  EXPEDITION  AGAINST  MANILLA.  239 

Another  movement  induced  by  the  rupture  with  Spain,  was  the 
despatch  of  Commodore  Sir  Piercy  Brett  (1) ,  with  a  strong  reinforce- 
ment, to  Sir  Charles  Saunders,  K.B.,1  in  the  Mediterranean.  Sir 
Edward  Hawke,  with  Bear-Admiral  the  Duke  of  York,  cruised  off  the 
coasts  of  Spain  and  Portugal ;  and  later,  the  same  squadron,  under 
command  of  Sir  Charles  Hardy  (2)  and  the  Duke  of  York,  left  port  a 
second  time  on  the  same  errand.  While  arrangements  were  thus 
made  to  attack  Spain  in  the  West  Indies,  and,  at  the  same  moment, 
to  distract  her  attention  at  home,  a  small  expedition,  under  command 
of  Brigadier-General  Draper,  was  despatched  from  India  against  the 
Philippine  Islands. 

On  the  death  of  Bear-Admiral  Holmes,  Sir  James  Douglas  (1)  was 
appointed  to  the  command  at  Jamaica  ;  Bear-Admiral  Bodney  still 
commanded  on  the  Leeward  Islands'  station ;  and  Commodore 
Lord  Colville  remained  in  North  America.  Commodore  Spry 
cruised  with  a  squadron  of  observation  off  Brest,  until  he  was 
relieved  by  Commodore  Bobert  Man  (2) ;  and  Commodore  Lord 
Howe  lay  in  Basque  Boad  until  he  was  relieved  by  Commodore 
Peter  Denis.  Admiral  Holburne  commanded  at  Portsmouth ; 
Commodore  John  Moore  (1),  in  the  Downs,  and  Commodore  James 
Young  (1),  in  the  Channel. 

Bear-Admiral  Cornish  continued  to  command  iiithe  East  Indies  ; 
but,  as  the  French  had  neither  settlement  nor  trade  there,  he  had 
little  to  do  against  them.  When,  therefore,  war  broke  out  with 
Spain,  he  was  able  to  devote  almost  his  undivided  attention  to  the 
new  enemy.  Colonel  Draper,  afterwards  Sir  William  Draper,  K.B., 
an  officer  who  had  distinguished  himself  at  the  siege  of  Madras  in 
1759,  had  devoted  part  of  a  period  of  sick  leave  to  inquiring  into  the 
condition  of  the  Spanish  settlements  in  the  Philippine  Islands  ;  and 
he  had  discovered  that  the  defences  had  been  much  neglected,  and 
that  the  Spaniards  there  trusted  rather  to  their  remoteness  than  to 
their  strength  for  their  protection.2  Upon  the  commencement  of 
hostilities,  Colonel  Draper  laid  his  information  before  the  Ministry, 
and  measures  were  taken  accordingly.  He  was  at  once  sent  to 
India  in  the  Argo,  28,  Captain  Bichard  King  (1),  with  instructions  for 
fitting  out  an  expedition  against  Manilla,  and  with  an  appointment 
as  commander-in-chief  of  the  troops  to  be  employed.  The  ex- 
pedition ultimately  consisted  of  the  79th  Begiment,  a  company  of 

1  Vice- Admiral  Saunders  was  so  installed,  by  proxy,  on  May  26th,  1761. 

2  As  they  appear  to  have  done  again  in  1898. 


240 


MAJOR    OPERATIONS,    1714-1762. 


[1761. 


Eoyal  Artillery  and  miscellaneous  bodies,  which,  with  630  seamen 
and  270  Marines  from  the  fleet,  brought  the  total  of  the  available 
field  army  up  to  about  2300  men,  who  were  embarked  in  Rear- 
Admiral  Cornish's  squadron  and  in  two  East  Indiamen.  The 
preparations  were  begun  and  completed  within  three  weeks.  The 
Seahorse,  20,  Captain  Charles  Cathcart  Grant,  was  sent  in  advance 
to  intercept  any  vessels  that  might  be  bound  for  Manilla.  A 


ADMIRAL    S1K    KICHAItD    KING    (1),    1SA11T. 
(From  a  lithograph  by  Ridley,  after  a  miniature.') 

division  of  the  fleet,  under  Commodore  Richard  Tiddeman,  sailed 
on  July  29th ;  and  the  rest,  with  the  exception  of  the  Falmoutli,  60, 
which  was  left  to  convoy  an  Indiaman,  followed  under  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief  on  August  1st.  On  August  19th  the  fleet1  reached 

1  List  of  H.M.  ships  engaged  iu  the  expedition  against  Manilla: — Norfolk,  74,  Rear- 
Admiral  Samuel  Cornish  (Vice-Admiral,  October  21st,  1762),  Captain  Eichard  Kernpen- 
felt;  Elizabeth,  64,  Commodore  Richard  Tiddeman,  Captain  Isaac  Florimond  Ourry; 
Lenox,  74,  Captain  Robert  Jocelyn;  Graf  ton,  68,  Captain  Hyde  Parker  (1);  Wey- 
mouth,  60,  Captain  Richard  Collins  (2) ;  America,  60,  Captain  Samuel  Pitchford ; 
Panther,  60,  Commander  George  Ourry  (acting  for  Captain  William  Newsom) ; 


1761.]  CAPTURE   OF  MANILLA.  241 

Malacca,  and  there  watered  and  took  on  board  various  supplies. 
On  the  27th  it  sailed  again ;  and  on  September  23rd,  to  the  great 
surprise  of  the  Spaniards,  who  had  not  heard  of  the  outbreak  of 
war,  it  anchored  off  Manilla.  On  the  24th  the  town  was  summoned, 
but  without  result ;  and,  in  the  afternoon,  under  cover  of  the  Arcjo, 
Seahorse,  and  Seaford,  some  troops  were  landed,  in  spite  of  a  heavy 
surf  which  caused  much  loss  of,  and  damage  to,  material.  The 
boats  on  this  occasion  were  under  the  direction  of  Captains  Hyde 
Parker  (1),  Richard  Kempenfelt  and  William  Brereton.  There  was 
but  slight  opposition.  The  rest  of  the  troops  and  the  Marines  were 
disembarked  on  the  25th  ;  and  on  the  2Gth  a  brigade  of  seamen, 
under  Captains  Collins,  Pitchford  and  Gurry,  reinforced  them.  On 
the  following  days  batteries  were  erected  and  opened  ;  and  on  the 
29th  the  Elizabeth  and  Falmouih  were  ordered  to  co-operate  as  best 
they  could  with  the  army,  by  enfilading  the  enemy's  front.  By 
October  5th  a  practicable  breach  had  been  made  in  the  works. 
Early  in  the  morning  of  that  day  this  was  stormed  with  success, 
and  the  governor  and  officers  were  driven  to  the  citadel,  which  they 
presently  surrendered  at  discretion.  Not  only  Manilla,  but  with 
it  also  Luzon,  and  all  the  Spanish  islands,  were  handed  over  by  the 
terms  of  the  capitulation.  It  was  arranged  that  Manilla  should  be 
ransomed  for  four  millions  of  dollars  to  save  it  from  pillage.  Owing, 
however,  to  the  bad  faith  of  the  Spaniards,  only  half  of  this  amount 
was  ever 'paid.  The  conquest,  together  with  most  of  the  pn/e 
money,  was  handed  over  to  the  East  India  Company. 

During  the  operations,  Cornish  obtained  news  that  a  galleon 
from  Acapulco  was  on  her  way  to  Manilla.  Accordingly,  on 
October  4th,  he  despatched  the  Panther  and  A  ran  to  intercept  her. 
These  failed  to  do  so  ;  but  they  succeeded  in  taking,  on  October  'ttst, 
the  Santisima  Trinidad,  which  had  left  Manilla  for  Acapulco  on 
August  1st,  having  on  board  treasure  worth  about  three  million 
dollars.  In  the  meantime,  the  galleon  from  Acapulco  had  arrived 
at  Palapa,  in  Samar.  It  was  agreed  that,  subject  to  certain 
conditions,  she  was  to  be  surrendered  to  the  British ;  but  the 
arrangement  was  never  carried  out,  and  it  is  probable  that  much  of 
her  rich  cargo  eventually  passed  into  the  hands  of  private  persons, 
who  had  no  right  to  it. 


Falmouth,  50,  Captain  William  Brereton;  Arr/o,  28,  Captain  Richard  King(l);  Sni- 
horse,  20,  Captain  Charles  Cathcart  Grant;  Seaford,  20,  Captain  John  Peighin;  and 
Southsei  Castle,  store-ship. 

VOL.    III.  E 


242 


MAJOR    OPERATIONS,   1714-1762. 


[1762. 


The  operations  before  Manilla  were  less  costly  than  might  have 
been  expected.  The  army  lost  but  115  killed,  drowned  and 
wounded,  and  the  Navy  but  35.  The  only  naval  officer  who  was 
killed  was  Lieutenant  Porter,  of  the  Norfolk,  but,  unfortunately, 
Commodore  Tiddeman  was  accidentally  drowned  on  the  day  of  the 
surrender.  Captain  Eichard  Kempenfelt  was  sent  home  with  the 
naval  dispatches.  As  a  reward  for  the  service,  Cornish  was  made 
a  baronet,  and  Draper  a  K.B.,  and  each  received  the  thanks  of  both 
Houses.  The  colours  taken  at  Manilla  were  hung  in  the  chapel 
of  King's  College,  Cambridge,  of  which  Draper  had  been  a  member. 

The  French  empire  in  North  America  had  ceased  to  exist ;  and 
its  disappearance  had  rendered  unnecessary  the  presence  on  the  spot 
of  part  of  the  large  body  of  troops  which  had  been  concerned  in  the 
conquest  of  Canada.  As  has  already  been  mentioned,  it  had  been 
decided  to  employ  some  of  them  against  the  French  islands  in  the 
West  Indies.  Eear-Admiral  Rodney  had  left  England  in  October, 
1761,  and  had  arrived  in  Carlisle  Bay,  Barbados,  on  November  22nd. 
He  there  found  part  of  the  squadron  under  Commodore  Sir  James 
Douglas  (1),  which  he  speedily  detached  to  blockade  Martinique. 
Troops  and  transports  were  in  the  meantime  assembled  at  Bar- 
bados ;  and  an  improvised  force  of  armed  hired  sloops  was  sent  to 
cruise  off  St.  Eustatia  to  prevent  the  Dutch  from  assisting  the  French 
with  supplies  and  provisions.  At  length,  on  January  5th,  1762,  the 
fleet,1  having  on  board  nearly  14,000  troops  from  England,  Belle  Isle, 

1   liritisli  fleet  employed  in  the  expedition  against  Martinique,  etc.,  170'-!: — 


Ships. 

Gum. 

<'<>mmaii'le:s. 

Ships, 

'Jims.             <  'omnianiiers. 

,  Uear-Aihniral      G.      B. 

Wwlieich     ,      .      . 

44       (apt.  William  Bayne. 

UarHarvutjIi.     . 

70 

\     K.Hlupy  (H). 

J'ttizutice  '   . 

44           „    Jnlm  Hiiyd. 

(('apt.  Jehu  llolhvell. 

Duvcr  l    . 

4o          ,,    Chaloner  Ogle  (3). 

iCuinmoil.      Sir     J;imes 

Echo  

;i'J           ,,     .Inhn  Laforey. 

Jfuifiin 

74 

<     JioiiK)as(l). 

Stag 

;j_;                  llenrv  Aniiell. 

(Capt.  lul  wan  Hiasroigue. 

tiepuhe  .... 

:u           ,,    Jnlm  Carter  Allen. 

fbudroyiinti 

84 

,,     Hubert  UufT. 

Actaon    .... 

'M            „     Paul  Henry  Ourry. 

Dragon  l  . 

74 

f     ,,     lion.    Aug.    Jobn 
(              llervey. 

Crescent 

.,        (     ,,    Thomas     Colling- 
\              wood. 

T':meraire    . 

74 

,t     Matthew  Hartnii. 

Lizard    .... 

'2B          ,,    .fames  l>oake. 

Temjilt    . 

70 

,,     Lucius  O'Brien. 

tevant    .... 

•28           ,,     \Villiam  Tuckor. 

Vaiiytiard    . 
JloJeste  .     .     . 

70 
64 

,,     Hubert  Swantmi. 
f     „     linn.   Kobt.  Hoyle 
I               \Valsiugham. 

Nightingale      .     . 
Fn'ce;/      .... 

.      (     ,,     James     Campljell 
I                (2). 
^0           „     Joseph  Mead. 

Stirling  Castle  . 

64 

„     Miciiael  Everitt. 

(ri'tyhoujid  . 

2u           ,,    '1  homas  Francis. 

Uti'oyisliire  •      . 

64 

,,     (.ieorge  l)arbv. 

Rui-e 

Itaisonnable 

64 

(     ,,     MulyuiMix    iShuU- 
l              ham. 

Ant  i  ij  it  a  .... 

.      /     ,,    John  Neale  1'ley- 
1     \             dell  >*i.tt. 

Akide     .     .     . 

64 

„    Thomas  Hankerson 

Karlxidos 

10       t'oiu.  Stair  Douglas  (1). 

Nottingham. 
Rochester      .     . 

60 
50 

„   Samuel  Marshall(l). 
,,     Thomas  Buim-U. 

Ferret     .... 
Virgin    .... 

l*>           ,,    James  Alms  (1). 
12       Capt. 

Xutlvrland  .     . 

50 

„    .lu  ian  Leggc. 

Zephyr    .... 

12       Com.  John  Itotterell. 

• 

'           C 

(     „     WillUm      M'Cle- 

Iiasil.sk,  Iwmbi     . 

8    '      „     liobert  Brlce. 

iV/ncic/i  '     . 

50 

\             veity. 

Tltuu'ler,  Ixanb 

8       Lieut.  Hubert  Haswell. 

Rilkland     ,     . 

50 

/     ,,    Francis       Samuel 
1             Urake. 

Grenado,  bomb 
JnJ'c'  na't  bumb 

8            ,,     James  Hawker. 
8    |  Com.  James  Mackenzie. 

l  Detached,  under  Cupt.  the  HDU.  Augustus  Jobn  llervey,  against  M.  l.ucia. 


1762.]  CAPTURE   OF   MARTINIQUE.  243 

North  America  and  the  West  India  Islands,  under  Major-General 
the  Hon.  Eobert  Monckton,  sailed,  and,  on  the  7th,  joined  Douglas 
off  Martinique.  The  coasts  of  the  island  had  not  been  properly 
reconnoitred,  nor  had  the  ships  adequate  charts  on  board.  The 
configuration  of  the  island  and  the  nature  of  its  defences  rendered 
it  desirable  to  land  the  troops  as  close  as  possible  to  the  places  at 
which  they  were  to  be  employed.  But,  at  first,  this  fact  was  not 
realised  ;  and  Rodney,  while  detaching  only  a  small  squadron  to  the 
Great  Bay  of  Fort  Eoyal,  detached  another  to  La  Trinite  to  make 
a  feint,  and  himself  anchored  with  the  bulk  of  his  force  in  St.  Anne's 
Bay.  A  division,  under  Sir  James  Douglas,  silenced  the  batteries 
there,  and  landed  the  troops,  losing,  however,  the  It(iiso)tnable, 
owing  to  the  ignorance  of  her  pilot.  But  it  was  soon  found  that 
the  march  across  to  Fort  Eoyal  from  St.  Anne's  Bay  would  be  an 
undertaking  too  difficult  to  be  entered  upon.  The  works  which 
had  been  erected  at  St.  Anne's  were  therefore  blown  up,  the 
troops  were  re-embarked,  and  the  whole  force  proceeded  to  Fort 
Eoyal  Bay. 

The  order  of  the  attack  having  been  arranged,  the  ships  went  to 
their  stations  early  on  the  morning  of  the  Kith,  opening  fire  upon 
the  batteries  and  silencing  them  by  noon,  soon  after  which  the 
troops  were  landed  in  three  divisions  in  Cas  des  Xavires  Bay,  under 
conduct  of  Captains  Molyneux  Shuldham,  Eobert  Swanton  and 
the  Hon.  Augustus  John  Hervey.  By  sunset  two-thirds  of  the 
army  were  on  shore  ;  and  the  rest,  with  (.)00  Marines,  followed  next 
morning.  The  distance  to  Fort  Eoyal  was  not  great,  only  about 
five  or  six  miles ;  but  the  country  was  terribly  difficult,  and  the 
defenders  fought  well  from  behind  every  rock  and  tree,  as  well  as 
within  artificial  works  of  all  kinds.  The  necessary  guns  were, 
however,  dragged  to  the  front,  thanks  mainly  to  the  energy  of  the 
seamen  of  the  fleet ;  and  on  January  '24th,  a  preliminary  attack  was 
made  by  a  body  of  troops  advancing  along  the  coast  parallel  with  a 
detachment  of  a  1000  seamen  in  boats ;  and  the  enemy  was  driven 
back.  On  the  25th,  the  batteries  began  to  bombard  the  citadel ; 
and  on  the  27th  the  key  to  the  whole  position  was  taken.  Yet 
the  citadel  did  not  surrender  until  February  4th,  and  not  until 
February  16th  was  the  whole  island  in  possession  of  the  British. 
Captain  Darby,  of  the  Devonshire,  and  Major  Gates,  later  a  general 
in  the  army  of  the  revolting  American  Colonists,  carried  home  the 
dispatches  announcing  the  capture  of  Fort  Eoyal ;  and  each 

E  2 


244  MAJOR    OPERATIONS,    1714-1762.  [1762. 

received  from  the  King  the  usual  compliment  of  ^6500.  The 
British  loss  during  the  operations  amounted  to  about  500  killed 
and  wounded. 

Even  before  the  conquest  had  been  completed,  Bodney  detached 
Captain  Swanton  to  blockade  Grenada ;  and,  when  Martinique 
had  surrendered,  Swanton  was  reinforced  by  vessels  conveying 
troops.  These  reached  Grenada  on  March  3rd ;  and  on  the  fol- 
lowing day  the  island  was  summoned ;  but  the  governor  refused  to 
comply.  The  inhabitants,  however,  ignored  him,  and  capitulated 
on  the  4th ;  and  the  governor  himself  was  obliged  to  surrender  at 
discretion  on  the  5th.  With  Grenada  fell  the  Grenadines.  Swan- 
ton,  leaving  a  garrison,  returned  to  Martinique. 

On  February  -24th  Captain  the  Hon.  Augustus  John  Hervey  had 
been  similarly  detached  against  St.  Lucia.  But  he  could  not  satisfy 
himself  as  to  the  enemy's  strength  ;  and,  to  discover  it,  he  disguised 
himself  as  a  midshipman,  and,  in  the  capacity  of  an  interpreter, 
accompanied  the  officer  whom  he  sent  to  summon  the  governor, 
M.  de  Longueville.  That  gentleman  refused  to  surrender;  yet 
Hervey  learnt  so  much  during  his  visit  that,  on  the  following  day, 
he  made  preparations  for  taking  his  ships  into  the  harbour.  No 
sooner  did  the  governor  notice  signs  of  their  intention  to  approach 
than  he  capitulated. 

Hervey  was  next  about  to  proceed  to  St.  Vincent  to  assure  the 
Carihs  that  their  neutrality  would  bo  maintained,  and  that  the 
French  would  be  no  longer  suffered  to  interfere  with  them,  when  he 
was  recalled  by  liodney,  in  consequence  of  news  having  been  received 
that  a  French  squadron  of  seven  sail  of  the  line  and  four  frigates,1 
under  M.  de  Blcnac,  with  seven  battalions  of  troops,  had  escaped 
from  Brest,  owing  to  Commodore  Spry  having  been  driven  from  his 
station  off  that  port ;  and  that  it  was  on  its  way  to  relieve  the 
French  West  India  Islands.  Spry  had  detached  the  Aquilon,  28, 
Captain  Chaloner  Ogle  ('!},  with  this  intelligence  to  Eodney.  But, 
before  the  arrival  of  Spry's  dispatch,  the  French  squadron  had  been 
sighted  on  March  8th,  on  the  windward  side  of  Martinique.  It  lay 
to  off  the  coast  until  the  10th,  when  it  stood  for  Dominica. 

Eodney  summoned  his  detached  division  to  a  rendezvous  off  the 
Salines,  and,  with  Sir  James  Douglas  (1),  went  in  search  of  the  enemy  ; 
but  without  result.  When  he  had  collected  his  whole  force  and  had 

1  Due  de  Bouryogne,  80;  Defenseur,  74;  Ih-ctor,  74;   fliuiieme,  74;  Protee,  64; 
Dragon,  64  ;  Brillant,  64;  Zi'phyr,  32  ;  DiHijen 'e,  32  ;   Opale,  26  ;   Ca7ypso,  16. 


1762.]  THE  EXPEDITION  AGAINST  HAVANA.  245 

been  assured  that  the  French  had  gone  to  Cape  Francis,  he  returned 
to  Martinique  to  water.  He  there  found  the  Aquilon,  from  which 
he  learnt  trustworthy  details  of  M.  de  Blenac's  strength.  He 
already  knew,  thanks  to  early  information  sent  him  by  Commander 
George  Johnstone,  commanding  the  Hornet  on  the  Lisbon  station, 
of  the  rupture  with  Spain ;  and  he  was  thus  enabled  to  attack  the 
Spanish  trade  in  the  West  Indies  before  the  Spaniards  themselves 
knew  that  war  had  broken  out.  This  important  intelligence  had 
been  brought  to  him  by  a  small  French  privateer  prize,  which 
Johnstone  had  entrusted  to  the  Hornet's  master,  Mr.,  afterwards 
Captain,  John  M'Laurin.  At  Martinique  Kodney  also  heard  that 
a  strong  Spanish  squadron  had  arrived  at  Havana  and  that  Jamaica 
was  believed  to  be  threatened.  He  therefore  sent  a  frigate  to  warn 
Captain  Arthur  Forrest,  who,  as  senior  officer,  had  succeeded  Kear- 
Admiral  Holmes  on  the  Jamaica  station,  and  to  desire  him  to  join 
the  main  fleet  off  Cape  St.  Nicolas,  whither  he  himself  intended  to 
proceed. 

He  was,  however,  not  quite  ready  to  sail  when,  on  March  2(ith, 
the  Richmond,  Captain  John  Elphinstone  (1),  arrived  from  England 
with  orders  for  him  and  General  Monckton  to  postpone  further 
operations  pending  the  appearance  of  Admiral  Sir  (.leorge  Pouock, 
who  had  been  commissioned  to  conduct  a  secret  expedition  on  an 
important  scale.  This  did  not  prevent  Kodney  from  sending  Sir 
James  Douglas  (I),1  with  ten  sail  of  the  line,  to  the  Jamaica  station 
with  directions  to  bring  Forrest's  squadron  thence  as  soon  as 
possible,  and  to  join  Pocock.  He  also  sent  Captain  S wanton, 
with  a  division,  to  cruise  off  the  Spanish  Main,  and  himself  went 
to  St.  Pierre,  Martinique,  sending  a  frigate  to  meet  Pocock  at  I>nr- 
bados,  where  Sir  George  arrived  on  board  the  Naiii/ir  on  April  '20th. 
Pocock  sailed  again  on  the  24th,  joined  Kodney  at  Cas  des  Xavhvs 
on  the  26th,  and,  with  the  greater  part  of  the  fleet,  proceeded  on 
May  6th  for  Havana,  leaving  Kodney  in  charge  of  the  Leeward 
Islands. 

On  the  Jamaica  station  Captain  Forrest  was,  of  course,  super- 

1  Dublin,  74,  Commodore  Sir  James  Douglas  (1),  Captain  Edward  Oaspuigne:  CW- 
loden,  74,  Captain  John  Barker  (1);  Dratjon ,  74,  Captain  Hon.  Aug.  John  Hervey  ; 
Temeraire,  74,  Captain  Matthew  Barton;  Temple,  70,  Captain  Julian  Legge;  Druon- 
shire,  64,  Captain  Samuel  Marshall  (1) ;  Alcide,  64,  Captain  Thomas  Hankerson  ;  Stirling 
Castle,  64,  Captain  James  Campbell  (2);  Nottingham,  00,  Captain  Thomas  Colling- 
wood ;  Sutherland,  50,  Captain  Michael  Everitt ;  Dover,  40,  Captain  Chaloner  Ogle  (3)  ; 
Thunder,  bomb,  Commander  Robert  Haswell ;  and  Grenada,  bomb. 


246 


MAJOR    OPERATIONS,    1714-1762. 


[1762. 


seded  by  the  arrival  of  Sir  James  Douglas  (1),  who  despatched  a 
squadron  under  Captain  Hon.  Augustus  John  Hervey l  to  blockade 
M.  de  Blenac  at  Cape  Fran£ois,  until  the  whole  Jamaica  squadron 
should  be  ready  to  join  Pocock  at  Cape  St.  Nicolas. 

The  Havana  expedition,  when  complete,  included  about  15,500 
men,  the  whole  commanded  by  George,  Earl  of  Albemarle.  The 
strength  of  the  fleet  will  be  found  set  forth  in  the  note.2  After 
leaving  Martinique  the. expedition  was  joined  in  the  Mona  passage 
on  May  8th  by  Captain  Hon.  Augustus  John  Hervey,  and,  having 
arrived  off  Cape  St.  Nicolas  on  the  18th,  was  there  reinforced  on 
the  23rd  by  Sir  James  Douglas  from  Jamaica. 

It  was  open  to  Pocock  either  to  sail  by  the  south  side  of  Cuba, 
along  the  track  of  the  galleons,  round  the  west  end  of  the  island  and 

1  lli'iti/on,  74,  Captain  Hon.  A.  J.  Hervey  ;  Trnu'raire,  74.  ( 'aptain  Matthew  Barton  ; 
Mil-Hut/  I'as/Ii;  04,  Captain  James  Campbell  ('J);  Alciite,  04,  Captain  Thomas  Hanker- 
son:    Iti-Jiuuce,   60,   Captain    (ieorge   Mackenzie;    XoUinr/Jiam,    60,    Captain   Thomas 
Collingwood ;   Pembroke,  00,  Captain  John  \VheeIock;    Doi'fi',  40,  Captain  Chaloner 
Ogle  ('•>)•,   Trent,  28,  Captain  John  Lindsay;  and  Port  Jla/iun,  20,  Captain  Thomas 
Lempriere. 

2  Fleet  under  Sir  George  Pocock  at  the  reduction  of  Havana,  and  on  the  Jamaica 
station,  1702: — 


Ship-, 

GUU8. 

Commanders, 

Ships. 

t  ;  mis. 

Commanders. 

<|Q 

(Admiral      Sir      George 
Pocock,  K.lt.  (HX 

!*»•<>,•       .... 

40 
40 

Capt.  Chaloner  Ogle  (3). 

Ii  apt.  John  Harrison. 

Jiicltutond 

/     .,     John  Klphinstone 

ii  'onmi'jd.  Hon.  Augustus 

1              CO- 

falianl  . 

74 

Keppcl. 

i  o 

(     ,,     James    Alms  (1) 

(Ca.pt  Adam  Duncan. 

m 

" 

{             (acting). 

Cambridge  * 

80 

,,     William  <  ioostrev. 

Echo  

1!? 

,,     John  Lendrick. 

Ciitludeit  .      .      .      . 

74 

,,     .Mm  Barker. 

Lizard-  .... 

'J* 

„     Francis  Hanks  (1). 

Tt'ttifi'iiire     . 

4 

„     Matthew  Harton. 

Trent       .... 

!i8 

„     John  IJndsay. 

i     ,,     Hon.        Augustus 

Cerberus  '     . 

2ii 

„     Charles  \\'eblwr. 

Dragon  .     .     .     . 

t.              John  Hervey. 

ftureas    .... 

28 

„    Samuel  Uvedalc. 

Cent'tHi'i      .      .      . 

4 

,,     Thomas  Lemprirre. 

(     „     Samuel    Granstun 

ItulAin  3  .      .      .      . 

4 

„     Kd\vard  liascoignc. 

mercury 

'24 

I              Goodall. 

MarlbtruHgh      .     . 

0 

,,     Thomas  Hurneti. 

,, 

'20 

i     ,,     John    Neule    Plcy- 

Tempi'     .      .      .      . 

U 

.,     Julian  Legge. 

l             dell  Nott. 

Orford    .      .      .      . 

66 

,,     Marnot  Avbutlmot. 

Port  Mahon       .      , 

•20 

,,     liiehard  Hickertou. 

Derontlilre   . 

64 

,,    Samuel  Marshall(l). 

Fou'ttf      .... 

'20 

,,    Joseph  Mead. 

Btlltislt  .      .     .     . 

64 

.,    Joseph  Knight. 

Glasgow       .     .     . 

'2(1 

„     Kichanl  Carteret. 

Edgar     , 

64 

(     ,,     Franris     \\  illiam 
1               Drake. 

Itonetta  .... 

16 

Com.  Lancelot  Holmes, 
f     ,,     Hon.            Charles 

A1cide\   .      .      .      . 

64 

,,     TliomasHankersoii. 

*  ygna   .... 

16 

(              Napier  (I). 

Hampton  Court 
Stirling  Castlr  .      . 

64 

64 

,,     Alexander  Jnnes. 
/     ,,     James     Campbell 

Merlin    .... 
Porcupine- 

16 

16 

(     „    William     Francis 
<              llonrke. 
,,     James  Harmood. 

Pembroke     . 

60 

„    John  \Vheelock. 

Barbados 

14 

„    James  Hawker. 

llipon 

GO 

„     Kdward  Jekyll. 

Viper       .... 

14 

„     .loliu  Urry. 

Nottingham 

00 

|     ,,     Thomas     Colling- 
l               wood. 

,   Port  Jiinjal  .      .      . 
,  Ferret      .... 

14 
14 

,,     Stair  Douglas  (1). 
Lieut.  Peter  Clarke. 

Dejianc?  .     .     .     . 

60 

.,    Oeoriif  Mackenzie. 

Lurcher,  cutter 

14 

„     Walker. 

Intrepid-     . 

bU 

,,     John  Hale. 

Thunder,  bomb 

8 

Cum.  Hubert  Haswell. 

Ctnturiim  3  * 

50 

,,     James  (ialbraith. 

Urenado.  bomb 

8 

IXptfurd      .     .     . 

60 

,,     Dudlev  Digges. 

Hasilisk,  bomb. 

8 

..     Lowfield. 

Sutherland  1 

60 

„     Michael  Kveritt. 

Hampshire  . 

60 

,.     Arthur  Usber. 

besides  storeships, 

hospital  ships,  and  transport?. 

Penza  net  *  .      .     . 

4U 

„     Philip  Itoteler. 

i  Joined  nfter  the  siege  had  begun.  2  Escorted  troops  from  North  America. 

Some  time  with  the  broad  pennant  of  Commodore  Sir  James  Douglas. 
Escorted  amvoys  from  Jamaica  to  England. 


1762.] 


TIJE  EXPEDITION  AGAINST  I] A  V ANA. 


247 


so  beat  down  to  Havana,  or  to  steer  along  the  north  side  of  Cuba 
through  the  Old  Strait  of  Bahama.  The  former  was  the  easier, 
though  the  longer,  course  ;  the  latter  was  the  shorter,  though  it  was 
somewhat  difficult  and  even  hazardous,  the  channel  being  narrow 
and  intricate.  But  the  Admiral  chose  it,  since  time  was  precious, 
and  since  it  was  important  as  early  as  possible  to  secure  the  only 
passage  by  which  the  French  could  send  supplies  to  Havana. 
Pocock  despatched  Sir  James  Douglas  in  the  Centurion  to  Jamaica 
to  bring  stores  thence,  and  to  hasten  forward  such  ships  as  were 
still  there ;  and  on  the  27th,  with  his  huge  fleet  of  about  two 
hundred  sail,  the  Admiral  bore  away  for  the  Old  Strait  of  Bahama. 
The  precautions  which  he  took  are  described  in  a  letter  which,  on 
June  14th,  he  addressed  to  the  secretary  of  the  Admiralty.  He 
placed  boats  on  the  most  dangerous  shoals  on  each  hand  to  act  as 
marks ;  and  he  records  that  he  was  greatly  assisted  in  the  navigation 
by  Anson's  chart,  which  he  found  very  correct.  During  the  passage, 
two  Spanish  vessels,  the  Thetis,  22,  and  Feni.r,  storeship,  were 
captured  by  the  Alarm,  Captain  James  Alms  (1). 

The  Strait  was  passed  on  June  5th ;  and  on  the  morning  of  the 
6th  the  fleet  was  brought  to  about  fifteen  miles  east  of  Havana,  so 
that  directions  might  be  given  to  the  captains  as  to  the  landing. 
The  conduct  of  this  operation  was  entrusted  to  Commodore  the 
Hon.  Augustus  Keppel,  who  had  under  him  six  sail  of  the  line  and 
some  frigates.  At  2  P.M.  the  Admiral  bore  away  with  thirteen  sail 
of  the  line,  two  frigates,  the  bombs,  and  thirty-six  victuallers  and 
storeships,  and  ran  down  towards  the  harbour,  in  which  he  saw 
twelve  Spanish  sail  of  the  line L  and  several  merchantmen.  On  the 

1  Spanish  men-of-war  taken  or  destroyed  during  the  expedition  against   Havana, 
1762:— 


Ships. 

Guus. 

Commanders. 

Fate. 

70 

f  Marques  del  Real  Traspurle.  | 

) 

IDun  J.  Y.  Ma.lariag;i.            / 

Jteina. 

70 

,,    [..  do  Velftsco. 

(Surrendered  with  the  citv. 

Sober  ano 

70 

,,    J.  del  Postigo. 

Infante  .     . 

70 

,,    F.  dc  Me<lina. 

y?ptu)io  . 

70 

,,    P.  Rermudez. 

S  ink  at  mouth  of  harbour. 

p 
• 

Aquilvii  . 

70 

Marques  Gonzales. 

S  irrcndered  with  tlio  ciiv. 

a 

64 

America 

60 

,,    J.  Antonio. 

S  irrt'iidered  with  the  titv.     it 

cnanipd  Mnro. 

JSuropj,  . 

60 

,,    J.  Vincente. 

S  in1;  at  nmuth  of  harbour. 

Conquistador 

60 

„    P.  Castejun. 

San  Genaro 
San  Antonio 

60 
60 

i\Lt  in  Commission. 

Surrendered  with  the  city. 

Venganza    . 

26 

Don  D.  Argote. 

Taken  by  /e  fiance  at  Mariel, 

Mav  2S. 

Thetis     .     . 

22 

„    J.  Porlier. 

,,         Alarm  in  the  Str.iii 

,  June  3. 

Marie     .      . 

in 

,,    I).  Bouechea. 

„          Defiance  at  Mariel. 

May  28. 

Ftftiix,  st.s.  . 

„         Alarm  in  the  Strait 

,  May  28. 

Two  unfinished  ships  upon  the  stocks  were  destroyed. 


248  MAJOR    OPERATIONS,    1714-1762.  [17<>2. 

following  morning,  the  7th,  he  made  a  feint  of  landing  the  Marines 
about  four  miles  to  the  west  of  Havana,  while  the  Earl  of  Albemarle, 
with  the  whole  army,  landed  without  opposition  between  the  rivers 
Boca  Tsao  and  Coximar,  six  miles  east  of  Moro  Castle,  under  the 
conduct  of  Captains  Hervey,  Barton,  Drake,  Arbuthnot,  Jekyll,  and 
Wheelock,  B.N.  After  it  had  landed,  the  enemy  made  some  show 
of  fight,  especially  when  the  troops  were  about  to  cross  the  river 
Coximar ;  but  the  foe  was  dispersed  by  the  fire  of  the  Mercury, 
Bonctta,  and  Dragon.  A  detachment  of  seamen  and  900  Marines 
were  landed  to  co-operate. 

On  July  1st,  after  some  progress  had  been  made  with  the  siege, 
the  Cambridge,  Dragon,  and  Madborougli  were  ordered  to  cannonade 
Moro;  and  at  about  8  A.M.  they  began  a  heavy  fire,  which  was  well 
returned  till  2  IMI.  The  vessels  were  all  so  much  damaged  that, 
one  after  another,  they  had  to  be  called  off.  The  Cambridge  lost 
•24  killed  and  95  wounded;  the  Dragon,  1(5  killed  and  37  wounded; 
and  the  Marlboroutjh,  '2  killed  and  8  wounded.  Among  the  killed  in 
the  Cambridge  was  Captain  Goostrey,  whose  place  was  afterwards 
taken  by  Captain  Lindsay  of  the  Trent.  As  this  mode  of  procedure 
was  found  to  be  too  costly,  the  further  bombardment  of  the  defences 
was  left  mainly  to  the  shore  batteries,  which,  aided  by  mines,  made 
a  practicable  breach  in  the  Moro  by  July  30th.  On  that  day  the 
castle  was  carried  by  storm.  In  the  struggle  the  commandant,  the 
gallant  Don  Luis  de  Velasco,  was  mortally  wounded.  In  honour  of 
his  defence,  there  has  ever  since  been  a  ship  named  the  Velasco  in 
the  Spanish  navy.  The  vessels  in  the  harbour  took  part  in  the 
operations,  but  were  of  little  avail. 

Upon  the  fall  of  Moro  the  siege  was  pressed,  and,  on  August  llth, 
after  a  particularly  heavy  bombardment,  ilags  of  trace  were  hung 
out  on  shore  and  in  the  Spanish  flagship.  A  little  later  another  flag 
was  sent  to  the  British  headquarters ;  negotiations  were  entered 
upon  ;  and,  after  some  delay,  the  capitulation  was  signed  on  the 
13th,  and  part  of  the  works  was  taken  possession  of  by  the  British 
on  the  14th. 

The  specie,  stores,  and  valuables  found  in  the  place  were  worth 
about  £3,000,000  sterling ;  and  with  the  city  were  also  taken  nine 
sail  of  the  line.  Two  others  lying  on  the  stocks  had  been  burnt, 
and  three  more,  besides  a  large  galleon,  had  been  sunk  in  the  mouth 
of  the  harbour.1  On  the  other  hand,  the  British  killed,  wounded, 
1  For  the  names  and  force  of  these,  see  note  p.  247. 


1762.]  CAPTURE   OF  HAVANA.  249 

and  missing  numbered  no  fewer  than  1790 ;  and  many  other  lives 
were  lost  owing  to  the  unwholesomeness  of  the  climate  and  the 
hardships  of  the  siege.  The  naval  dispatches  were  sent  home  by 
Captain  the  Hon.  Augustus  John  Hervey,  in  the  Dragon,  which  on 
her  passage  had  the  good  fortune  to  capture  a  French  ship  valued 
at  £30,000. 

During  the  siege  several  Spanish  vessels  were  taken  on  the  coast. 
On  July  24th  the  Chesterfield,  40,  and  four  transports  with  reinforce- 
ments of  troops  from  North  America,  were  lost  at  Cayo  Confite, 
but  the  people  were  saved.  Lieutenant  Walker,  commanding  the 
Lurcher,  cutter,  going  on  June  13th  up  the  Chorera  liiver  out  of 
mere  curiosity,  had  the  misfortune  to  be  killed.  The  prize  money 
divided  amounted  to  about  .£730,000.  Its  division  caused  much 
heart-burning,  the  shares  of  the  Admiral  and  general  being  each 
£122,097  lO.s.  Gd. ;  while  the  share  of  a  captain  H.N.  was  but 
£1000  lO.s.  10(7.,  of  a  petty  officer  only  £17  o.s.  3<L,  and  of  a  seaman 
or  Marine  not  more  than  £3  14.s.  l.)\d.  It  was  felt,  and  perhaps 
with  reason,  that  the  administration  permitted  the  commanding 
officers  to  appropriate  far  too  large  a  share  of  the  spoils  to  them- 
selves. 

The  fall  of  Havana,  apart  from  its  intrinsic  significance,  had 
almost  the  importance  of  a  great  naval  victory,  owing  to  the  large 
number  of  Spanish  sail  of  the  line  which  shared  the  fate  of  the  city. 
The  military  conduct  of  the  siege  by  the  Earl  of  Albemarle  has  been 
blamed,  chiefly  because,  instead  of  attacking  the  city  where  it  was 
weak,  he  attacked  Moro  and  Punta  Fort,  which  were  strong,  but 
which,  nevertheless,  must  have  quickly  fallen  had  the  city  itself 
been  taken.  But  although  there  may  be  justice  in  this  criticism,  it 
does  not  appear  that  anything  can  be  urged  against  1'ocock's  conduct 
of  his  part  of  the  business  ;  unless  indeed,  it  be  admitted  that  he  was 
wrong  to  oppose  his  ships  to  the  Moro  on  July  1st.  For  the  rest, 
the  co-operation  between  the  Navy  and  army  was  thoroughly  loyal 
and  smooth  ;  and  the  behaviour  of  both  was  admirable. 

Sir  George  Pocock  delivered  up  the  command  of  the  Meet  to  the 
Hon.  Augustus  Keppel,  who  by  that  time  had  been  promoted  to  be  a 
Eear- Admiral  of  the  Blue  ;  and,  with  the  Namur,  Culloden,  Temple, 
Devonshire,  Marlborough,  In/ante,  San  Genaro,  Asuncion,''  and 
several  other  Spanish  prizes  and  about  fifty  transports,  sailed  for 
England  on  November  3rd.  About  six  hundred  miles  west  of  Land's 

1  A  prize  merchantman. 


250  MAJOR    OPERATIONS,   1714-1762.  [1762. 

End,  the  squadron  was  dispersed  by  a  very  violent  gale  from  the 
eastward.  Twelve  of  the  transports  foundered,  though  their  crews 
were  happily  saved.  The  Temple  came  to  a  similar  end.  The 
Culloden  and  Devonshire  would  probably  have  fared  likewise,  had 
they  not  thrown  overboard  many  of  their  guns.  Part  of  the  fleet 
made  Kingsale.  The  other  part,  which  kept  the  sea,  suffered 
terrible  privations  from  famine,  thirst  and  sickness.  So  anxious  did 
the  Admiralty  become,  that  it  sent  out  several  frigates  to  search  for 
Sir  George  ;  who,  however,  safely  reached  Spithead  on  January  13th, 
1763.  The  San  Geiiaro,  one  of  the  ships  which  had  put  into 
Kingsale,  came  to  grief  when  at  length  she  anchored  in  the  Downs. 
She  was  overtaken  by  another  storm,  and  was  cast  away.  The 
Murlbomiiyh  lost  company  with  the  Admiral  early  on  the  voyage  ; 
but  she,  too,  met  with  very  heavy  weather,  and,  owing  to  leaks,  was 
obliged  to  put  before  the  wind,  throw  her  guns  overboard,  and  keep 
her  crew  at  the  pumps  until  November  20th,  when  her  people  were 
taken  off  by  the  Antelope,  50,  Captain  Thomas  Graves  (2),  which  was 
on  her  voyage  home  from  Newfoundland.  The  Marlborough,  after 
having  been  abandoned,  was  destroyed.  Bear-Admiral  Keppel  sent 
home  the  rest  of  the  Spanish  prizes  under  Captain  Arbuthnot  of  the 
Or  ford,  together  with  the  Centaur,  Dublin,  Alcide,  Hampton  Court, 
Edgar  and  some  frigates;  and,  after  having  acted  with  energy  upon 
the  station  until  the  peace,  he  remained  to  deliver  up  Havana  on 
July  7th,  17(53,  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  the  treaty. 
Some  of  his  vessels  then  proceeded  to  Florida  to  take  over  that 
province :  and  Keppel  himself  went  to  Jamaica,  where  he  was 
presently  relieved  by  Bear-Admiral  Sir  William  Burnaby. 

In  the  meantime,  the  French,  taking  advantage  of  the  large 
withdrawal  of  troops  to  the  West  Indies,  of  the  defenceless  condition 
of  Newfoundland,  and  of  a  fog  in  the  Channel,  despatched  from 
Brest,  under  M.  de  Ternay,  a  squadron,  which,  with  1500  troops 
under  Comte  d'Haussonville,  evaded  Sir  Edward  Hawke,  crossed 
the  Atlantic,  entered  the  harbour  of  St.  John's  on  June  24th  and 
quickly  took  the  town.  On  its  way,  this  fleet  fell  in  with  three 
combined  convoys  of  great  value,  which  it  might  easily  have  taken 
had  it  not  preferred  the  ulterior  object  of  the  expedition,  and  had  it 
not  been  deterred  by  the  bold  front  offered  to  it  by  Captain  Joshua 
Bowley,  of  the  Superb,  74,  who  had  with  him  the  Gosport,  44, 
Captain  John  Jervis,  and  the  Danae,  38,  Captain  Henry  Martin  (2). 
The  capture  of  this  convoy  would  have  done  Great  Britain  far 


1762.]  RE-CAPTURE   OF  NEWFOUNDLAND.  251 

more  damage  at  that  moment  than  the  capture  of  Newfoundland. 
Captain  Thomas  Graves  (2),  governor  of  the  island,  who  lay  at 
Placentia  in  the  Antelope,  50,  at  once  sent  news  of  the  French 
descent  to  Commodore  Lord  Colville,  at  Halifax.  Colville  sailed  to 
the  relief  of  the  island,  and- joined  Graves;  and  on  August  25th, 
M.  de  Ternay  found  himself  blockaded  in  St.  John's.  On 
September  llth,  troops  arrived  from  Louisbourg,  and  were  landed ; 
and  the  enemy  was  driven  back ;  but  on  the  16th,  the  blockading 
ships  being  driven  from  their  station  by  a  westerly  gale,  M.  cle 
Ternay  slipped  his  cables  and  got  away.  A  relieving  squadron  had 
been  sent  from  England  in  the  meantime  under  Captain  Hugh 
Palliser,  but  de  Ternay  managed  to  avoid  this  force  also.  After  his 
departure,  the  condition  of  the  French  was,  of  course,  hopeless ; 
and  on  September  18th  Comte  d'Haussonville  capitulated. 

A  little  expedition  of  1762  deserves  some  mention  here  in  spite 
of  the  fact  that  the  Boyal  Navy  had  very  little  part  in  it,  and  that 
it  had  no  important  results.  It  was  an  adventure  which,  in  a 
degree,  recalls  some  of  the  exploits  of  the  Elizabethan  era,  in  that 
it  was  a  warlike  undertaking  by  private  persons,  countenanced, 
however,  by  the  administration,  and  that  it  was  aimed  against  the 
Spanish  power  in  America.  A  company  of  British  noblemen  and 
merchants  came  to  the  conclusion  that  an  attack  upon  the  province 
of  Buenos  Ayres  might  be  both  useful  to  the  nation  and  lucrative 
to  the  adventurers.  They  purchased  from  the  Admiralty  H.M.  ships 
Kingston,  50  (which  they  renamed  Lord  dice),  and  Ambuscade,  28  ; 
and  they  placed  these  under  the  orders  of  Mr.  Macnamara,  an 
officer  of  the  East  India  Company's  marine.  They  further  obtained 
the  co-operation  of  two  Portuguese  vessels,  in  which  were  embarked 
five  hundred  soldiers.  The  little  squadron,  which  also  included 
five  store  ships,  sailed  for  Rio  de  Janeiro,  where  the  final  pre- 
parations were  made,  and,  proceeding,  entered  the  Kiver  Plate  on 
November  2nd.  Macnamara  found  that  the  Spaniards  were  better 
situated  for  defence  than  he  had  expected.  An  attempt  was  made 
on  Nova  Colonia,  which  had  been  captured  by  the  Spaniards  from 
the  Portuguese :  but  it  was  not  successful.  In  a  second  attack,  on 
January  6th,  1763,  the  Lord  dive  took  fire  and  burnt  to  the  water's 
edge,  her  people,  however,  fighting  her  to  the  very  last.  Of  her  crew 
of  three  hundred  and  fifty,  two  hundred  and  seventy-two,  including 
Macnamara,  perished.  The  Ambuscade,  though  terribly  mauled, 
managed  to  get  back  to  Eio.  It  should  be  added  that  the  gallant 


252  MAJOR    OPERATIONS,   1714-1762.  [1762. 

Spaniards  treated  with  the  greatest  generosity  those  survivors  of 
the  Lord  Clive  who  fell  into  their  hands,  and,  instead  of  regarding 
them  as  enemies,  treated  them  as  guests  whom  misfortune  had  cast 
upon  their  shores. 

The  year  witnessed  no  events  of  great  importance  in  the 
Mediterranean ;  where  Sir  Charles  Saunders  was  strongly  rein- 
forced by  a  aquadron  under  Sir  Piercy  Brett  (1).  Some  exceedingly 
valuable  prizes  were  made  on  the  station  ;  but  the  fleets  of  the 
belligerents  did  not  meet.  Sir  Charles  Saunders,  and  most  of  the 
ships  returned  to  England  at  the  peace,  leaving  liear-Admiral  Sir 
Piercy  Brett  to  take  possession  of  Minorca.  Brett  was  subsequently 
relieved  by  Commodore  Thomas  Harrison  (-2). 

It  has  been  already  mentioned  that  M.  de  Blenac  got  out  of 
Brest,  and  sailed  for  Martinique  during  a  temporary  absence  from 
his  station  of  Commodore  Spry,  owing  to  heavy  weather.  Spry 
chased  ;  but,  his  provisions  threatening  to  give  out,  he  had  to  return 
to  England,  having  first  sent  the  A</uiluii  to  warn  liodney  of  what 
had  happened.  During  the  year  the  other  occurrences  in  waters 
near  hoijie  were  mainly  confined  to  the  monotonous  blockading  of 
the  enemy's  ports,  and  to  the  capture  of  their  cruisers.  Commodore 
Lord  Howe  lay  in  Basque  Road,  watching  liochefort  and  the  mouth 
of  the  Charente,  until  he  was  relieved  by  Commodore  Peter  Denis. 
When  M.  do  Ternay  escaped  from  Brest,  the  Meet  under  Sir 
Edward  Hawke  and  the  Duke  of  York  went  in  pursuit,  but  missed 
him.  This  fleet,  then  under  Sir  Charles  Hardy  (•!),  cruised  again  in 
September  and  October,  and  once  more  in  November,  but  accom- 
plished nothing.  The  cruisers  of  Commodore  Robert  Man  (2),  who 
succeeded  Spry  off  Brest ;  of  Commodore  James  Young  (1),  who 
commanded  in  the  Channel;  and  of  Commodore  John  Moore  (1), 
who  commanded  in  the  Downs,  made  various  prizes ;  but  the  details 
of  these,  and  of  other  minor  captures,  will  be  fittingly  given  in  the 
next  chapter.  One  episode,  in  which  the  force  under  Commodore 
Moore  was  concerned,  may,  however,  be  noticed  here. 

The  Dutch  had  for  some  time  been  supplying  the  enemies  of 
Great  Britain  with  provisions  and  stores ;  and  the  British  cruisers, 
in  consequence,  vigilantly  searched  their  merchantmen.  The  States 
General,  resenting  this,  commissioned  some  men-of-war  to  protect 
the  illicit  trade ;  and,  in  September,  a  Dutch  flotilla  of  four  merchant- 
men, convoyed  by  a  36-gun  frigate,  was  fallen  in  with  by  the 
Hunter,  sloop;  which,  being  refused  permission  to  search,  and  being 


1762.]  THE    WAR   AND    TRADE.  253 

too  weak  to  enforce  her  demands,  returned  to  Moore.  He  sent  the 
Diana,  32,  Captain  William  Adams  (2),  the  Chester,  50,  Captain 
William  Hay,  the  Hunter,  14,  Commander  James  Ferguson,  and 
the  Trial,  14,  Commander  James  Cunningham,  with  orders  to  do 
what  was  necessary.  Adams  found  the  Dutchmen,  and  demanded 
to  know  what  the  convoy  had  on  board.  The  Dutch  captain  again 
refused  to  allow  a  search,  and  declared  that  he  would  fight  rather 
than  permit  it ;  whereupon  Adams  sent  boats  to  board  each 
merchantman.  The  Dutch  fired  a  gun  at  the  leading  boat,  and 
wounded  a  man  in  her.  Adams  retaliated  by  firing  a  gun  at  the 
frigate,  which  replied  with  a  broadside.  This  brought  about  an 
action,  which,  in  fifteen  minutes,  resulted  in  all  the  Dutch  ships 
submitting.  They  were  taken  into  the  Downs.  The  merchantmen, 
being  found  to  have  on  board  stores  for  the  French  navy,  were 
detained ;  but  the  frigate,  which  had  lost  four  killed  and  five 
wounded,  was  dismissed. 

During  this  last  year  of  the  contest  the  enemy  took  but  two 
British  men-of-war,  a  sloop  and  a  bomb  ketch.  The  list  of  the 
men-of-war  taken  by  the  British  will  bo  found  in  the  appendix. 
The  French  merchantmen  and  privateers  taken  numbered  120;  and, 
as  in  previous  years,  their  value  was  greatly  in  excess  of  that  of  the 
British  privateers  and  merchantmen  captured,  though  the  number 
of  the  latter  was  considerably  greater.  Towards  the  close  of  the 
campaign  the  French  had  very  few  vessels  at  sea  ;  and  their  trade 
was  ruined.  The  Spanish  power  ailoat  was  never  great  enough  to 
be  a  serious  menace. 

The  first  overtures  for  peace  came  from  France  to  Great  Britain 
through  the  Sardinian  envoy  in  London.  In  consequence  of  them, 
the  Duke  of  Bedford  was  sent  to  l.Vris,  and  the  Due  de  Niveruois 
came  to  England,  with  full  powers  ;  and  on  November  3rd,  17152, 
the  preliminaries  of  peace,  between  Great  Britain  on  the  one  side 
and  France  and  Spain  on  the  other,  were  signed  at  Fontainebleau. 
The  terms  were  scarcely  proportionate  to  the  measure  of  the  suc- 
cesses which  had  been  gained  by  Great  Britain  during  the  war.  She 
acquired  Canada,  St.  John's,  Cape  Breton,  and  that  part  of  what  was 
then  called  Louisiana,  east  of  the  Mississippi,  except  New  Orleans, 
together  with  the  right  of  free  navigation  of  the  Mississippi.  France 
received  permission,  subject  to  certain  conditions,  to  fish  on  the 
banks  of  Newfoundland,  and  was  given  the  islands  of  St.  Pierre  and 
Miquelon  as  fish-curing  stations.  Spain  relinquished  her  claim  to 


i>54  MA  JOS    OPERATIONS,    1714-1762.  [1762. 

fish  on  the  banks  of  Newfoundland ;  and  undertook  to  restore  to 
Portugal  any  places  which  she  might  have  conquered  from  that 
power,  and  to  cede  Florida  to  Great  Britain.  But  Great  Britain 
was  to  restore  Havana  and  its  dependencies.  Martinique,  Guade- 
loupe, and  Marie  Galante  also,  were  to  be  given  back  to  France, 
which,  in  addition,  obtained  St.  Lucia,  previously  a  neutral  island. 
Great  Britain  retained  Grenada  and  the  Grenadines,  and  received 
the  formerly  neutral  islands  of  Dominica,  St.  Vincent  and  Tobago. 
She  also  had  Minorca  restored  to  her  and  kept  Senegal ;  but  she 
restored  Belle  Isle  and  Goree  to  France.  The  fortifications  of 
Dunquerque,  should,  it  was  agreed,  be  demolished.  In  Asia,  Great 
Britain  had  to  restore  the  conquests  made  from  France ;  but  France 
was  to  erect  no  fortifications  in  her  possessions  within  the  province 
of  Bengal.  Louisiana  west  of  the  Mississippi  was  ceded  by  France 
to  Spain. 

The  terms  of  the  treaty,  though  honourable,  could  not  be  con- 
sidered as  particularly  advantageous  to  Great  Britain,  seeing  that 
her  maritime  superiority  in  17(i'2  was  such  that  she  might  have 
seized,  and  kept,  almost  what  she  would.  The  definitive  treaty  was 
signed  at  Paris  on  February  10th,  17(W;  and  so  ended  the  Seven 
Years'  "War. 

Commenting  upon  the  settlement,  Mahan  writes  :— 

"The  nation  at  largo  and  Pitt,  the  favourite  of  the  nation,  were  bitterly  opposed  to 
the  terms  of  the  treaty.  'France,'  said  Pitt,  Ms  chiefly  formidable  to  us  as  a  maritime 
and  commercial  power.  What  we  gui'i  in  this  respect  is  valuable  to  us  above  all 
through  the  injury  to  her  which  results  from  it.  You  leave  to  France  the  possibility 
of  reviving  her  navy.'  In  truth,  from  the  point  of  view  of  sea-power  and  of  the 
national  jealousies  which  the  spirit  of  that  age  sanctioned,  these  words,  though 
illiberal,  were  strictly  justifiable.  The  restoration  to  France  of  her  colonies  in  the 
West  Indies  and  her  stations  in  India,  together  with  the  valuable  right  of  fishery  in 
her  former  American  ]x>ssessions,  put  before  her  the  possibility  and  inducement  to 
restore  her  shipping,  her  commerce,  and  her  navy,  and  thus  tended  to  recall  her  from 
the  path  of  continental  ambition  which  had  been  so  fatal  to  her  interests,  and  in  the 
same  proportion  favourable  to  the  unprecedented  growth  of  England's  power  upon  the 
ocean.  The  opposition,  and  indeed  some  of  the  ministry,  also  thought  that  so  com- 
manding and  important  a  position  as  Havana  was  poorly  paid  for  by  the  cession  of  the 
then  desolate  and  unproductive  region  called  Florida.  Puerto  Kico  was  suggested, 
Florida  accepted.  There  were  other  minor  points  of  difference,  into  which  it  is 
unnecessary  to  enter.  It  can  scarcely  be  denied  that  with  the  commanding  military 
control  of  the  sea  held  by  England,  grasping  as  she  now  did  so  many  important 
positions,  with  her  navy  overwhelmingly  superior  in  numbers,  and  her  commercial 
and  internal  condition  very  thriving,  more  rigorous  terms  might  easily  have  been 
exacted  and  would  have  been  prudent.  Ihe  ministry  defended  their  eagerness  and 
spirit  of  concession  on  the  ground  of  the  enormous  growth  of  the  debt,  which  then 
amounted  to  £122,000,000,  a  sum  from  every  point  of  view  much  greater  then  than 
now;  but  while  this  draft  upon  the  future  was  fully  justified  by  the  success  of  the 


1762.] 


THE  END    OF   THE    WAR. 


255 


war,  it  also  imperatively  demanded  that  the  utmost  advantages  which  the  military 
situation  made  obtainable,  should  be  exacted.  This  the  ministry  failed  to  do.  . 
Nevertheless,  the  gains  of  England  were  very  great,  not  only  in  territorial  increase, 
nor  yet  in  maritime  preponderance,  but  in  the  prestige  and  position  achieved  in  the 
eyes  of  the  nations,  now  fully  opened  to  her  great  resources  and  mighty  power.  To 
these  results,  won  by  the  sea,  the  issue  of  the  continental  war  offered  a  singular  and 
suggestive  contrast.  France  had  already  withdrawn,  along  with  England,  from  all 
share  in  that  strife,  and  peace  between  the  other  parties  to  it  was  signed  five  days  after 
the  Peace  of  Paris.  The  terms  of  the  peace  were  simply  the  status  quo  ante  bellum. 
By  the  estimate  of  the  King  of  Prussia,  one  hundred  and  eighty  thousand  of  his 
soldiers  had  fallen  or  died  in  this  war,  out  of  a  kingdom  of  five  million  souls;  while 
the  losses  of  Prussia,  Austria,  and  France  aggregated  four  hundred  and  sixty  thousand 
men.  The  result  was  simply  that  things  remained  as  they  were." 


(     256      ) 


CHAPTER  XXVIII. 

MILITARY    HISTOKY    OF    THK    ROYAL    NAVY,   1714-1762. 


MINOR    OPERATIONS. 

L.  CAIil!  LAt'GIITOX. 

Richard  Lestock — "  The  Fifteen  " — Moorish  Pirates — Exploits  of  the  Hind  and  the 
JSrii/i/emi/er — Piracy  in  the  West — Edward  Thatch,  alias  "  Blackbeard  "- 
Bartholomew  Roberts — Chaloner  Ogle  oil'  Cape  Lopez — Mighells  at  Vigo — 
Smugglers  and  giuirda-costas — The  right  of  search — Salt  gathering  at  the  Tortugas 
— Stuart  and  illicit  trading — Fandino — Reprisals — The  /ilioreltam's  prizes — The 
1'ihicisa  taken — Pearce  and  Oglethorpe  at  St.  Augustine — Barnet  and  de  Caylus 
— The  West  Indies — Loss  of  the  '/'///(-/-—Loss  of  the  Tilbury — Callis  at  St.  Tropez 
— Martin  at  Ajaccio — Naval  disasters — The  Xortliuinlii-rJiin/!  taken — The  hurricane 
at  Jamaica — Mostyn's  liasco — Cajiture  of  the  K/i'-jihunl — The  Anytime;/  taken — 
Lieut.  Baker  Phillips — The  privateers — Successes  of  "  The  Royal  Family" — The 
JiTfi-y  and  the  <S7.  Kf/irit — M.  de  Lage — The  Nottingham  and  the  Mars — The 
A/'.iiiinl'i'  and  the  Siiti-liat/ — The  J'm-t/itin/  and  the  Auijuste — Fox  and  de  La 
M"tte — Captures  and  losses — Commodore  Pocork's  successes — George  Walker — 
Capture  of  the  Mai/>nihii/n — The  Chesterfield — Piracy — The  Jiliindfurd — Capture 
of  the  Ksjivraiiri — The  IlV/nriW.1  taken — The  Chausey  Islands — Fortunatus 
\Vriglit — A  repulse  at  Algeciras — Captain  .lohn  Lockhart — "  Error  of  Judgmer.t" 
— Loss  of  the  Greenwich  and  the  Mn'/iit — Destruction  of  the  A'/uilon  and  the 
.  I  Irian — ( 'aptures — Privateers — Thurot — Capture  >  'f  the  Kmeramle — Disasters — 
Piurning  of  the  Priiirc  Gmnji — ('aj)ture  of  the  Baisonnable — Captain  Brodrick 
Ilartwell — The  Winchehea  taken — The  JSiickinylirtiH  and  the  Florissant — The 
Vestal  and  the  Hellene — Capture  of  the  Dana!: — The  AcJtiUrs  and  the  Comte  de 
St.  Fluri-ntini — The  An'thasi'  taken — Indecisive  actions — Convoys — Adventures 
of  the  Diatlrmi — Sinking  of  the  Cumlertand — The  Unicorn  and  the  restate — The 
Iii''hrnond  and  the  FeNcite — The  Minerva  and  the  Warwick — The  Ilijion  and  the 
Aclilli — Cajitures — Capture  of  the  Acldllc  and  Jiuuft'oinic — The  Sellona  and  the 
x — Last  captures  of  the  war. 


F 


several    years    after  1715,    the 
sending  of   a   fleet   to   the  Baltic 
became,  as  has  been  already  shown,  a 
species  of   annual   exercise.     All   these 
expeditions     were     barren     of     serious 
fighting,  and   there   is   little   to   be   said  of  them  here.     In  1717, 


1716.]  THE  NAVY  AND    THE  PRETENDER.  257 

however,  when  the  fleet  was  under  Sir  George  Byng,  it  was  found 
that,  although  the  Swedish  men-of-war  still  kept  in  port,  consider- 
able annoyance  was  occasioned  to  British  trade  by  the  numerous 
privateers.  Against  these  Sir  George  detached  various  cruisers,  of 
which  none  was  so  successful  as  the  Panther,  50,  Captain  Richard 
Lestock  (2) .  Many  privateers  were  sent  home ;  but  none  of  them 
was  of  any  great  force,  the  average  scarcely  running  to  ten  small 
guns  and  sixty  men  per  ship.  The  matter,  indeed,  is  chiefly  worth 
noticing  because  it  was  in  this  way  that  Lestock,  a  man  whose  sub- 
sequent behaviour  rendered  him  notorious,  began  to  come  to  the 
front.  His  activity  on  these  cruises  attracted  Byng's  attention, 
and  gained  him  the  name  of  a  zealous  officer.  Sir  George,  in  con- 
sequence, chose  him  to  command  his  flagship  in  the  Mediterranean 
campaign  of  the  following  year.  The  subsequent  Baltic  campaigns 
were  less  active  even  than  the  campaign  of  1717. 

Nearer  home,  and  on  the  Barbary  coasts,  meanwhile,  the  Navy 
was  finding  work  to  do  ;  in  the  one  case  in  connection  with  the 
pro-Stuart  rising,  in  the  other,  with  the  recrudescence  of  piracy. 
The  Pretender  landed  in  December,  1715,  and  in  the  middle  of 
January,  1716,  Sir  John  Jennings,  Admiral  of  the  White,  was 
appointed  to  the  command  of  a  squadron  of  ten  ships  wherewith 
to  cruise  on  the  east  coast  and  in  the  Firth  of  Forth.  Other  ships 
cruised  on  the  west  coast,  also  for  the  suppression  of  the  rebels, 
while  others  again  were  kept  in  the  Channel  to  restrain  sympathetic 
Frenchmen.  A  body  of  French  officers,  trying  to  escape  from 
Peterhead,  was  driven  back  ;  but  in  spite  of  all  precautions,  the 
Pretender  himself  contrived  to  get  away  safely.  Some  imputation 
of  negligence  not  unnaturally  fell  upon  the  Navy  ;  but  the  Govern- 
ment was  satisfied  that  reasonable  diligence  had  been  shown,  and 
published  in  the  Gazette  the  following  : — 

"  The  Royal  Anne,  galley,  Pearl,  Port  Mahon,  Deal  Castle  and  Phoenix  are 
returned  from  cruising,  it  appears  by  the  journal  of  Captain  Stuart,1  that  he  had  early 
intelligence  of  the  Pretender  having  put  to  sea,  in  a  clean-tallowed  French  snow,  which 
rowed  out  of  the  harbour  and  close  in  along  shore  a  good  way  with  her  sails  furled. 
The  Port  Mahon  lay  all  that  night  within  two  leagues  of  the  harbour's  mouth,  but 
'twas  so  dark  there  was  no  seeing  a  ship  a  quarter  of  a  mile  distant."  2 

Every  precaution,  indeed,  seems  to  have  been  taken  by  the 
refugees ;  and  it  may  be  added  that  they  appear  to  have  been 

1  The  Hon.  Charles   Stuart;   born,  1681;    Captain,  1704;    Rear- Admiral,  1729; 
Vice- Admiral,  1733  ;  died,  1740. 

2  Quoted  in  Lediard,  867. 

VOL.    III.  S 


258  MINOR    OPERATIONS,   1714-176:2.  [1716. 

aware  of  the  disposition  of  the  various  cruisers.  Leaving  Montrose, 
the  snow  stretched  across  to  the  coast  of  Norway,  whence  she 
coasted  southward  and  made  Gravelines  in  safety.  The  Chevalier 
de  St.  George  testified  his  gratitude  and  appreciation  by  knighting 
Mark  Forrester,  her  master.  In  spite  of  their  failure  to  intercept 
this  snow,  the  English  ships  did  good,  if  unostentatious,  work  in 
helping  to  stamp  out  the  embers  of  the  revolt,  chiefly,  of  course, 
by  co-operating  with  the  troops  when  they  chanced  to  touch 
the  shore. 

Piracy  in  the  Mediterranean  continued  to  demand  considerable 
attention,  but  was  at  length  dealt  with  by  the  Admiralty  on  some- 
thing like  a  rational  system.  In  other  words,  there  were  ships 
constantly  cruising  against  the  Barbary  pirates  ;  and  there  was 
thus  avoided  the  great  and  often  bootless  expense  incurred  by  the 
fitting  out  of  occasional  expeditions  on  a  large  scale.  The  reign  is 
marked  by  no  such  fight  as  that  of  Captain  Kempthorne  of  the 
Mary  liuxc  in  10(59 ;  but  cruisers  detached,  first  by  John  Baker 
and  after  him  by  Charles  Cornwall,  the  officers  in  command  on 
the  station,  did  efficient  service.  Of  these  the  Hind,  20,  Captain 
Arthur  Delgarno,  in  May,  171(5,  took  one  Bailee  rover,  and,  in 
October  following,  another,  of  '24  guns.  This  latter  ship  resisted 
for  two  and  a  half  hours  before  she  struck,  and  then  promptly  sank, 
taking  down  with  her  all  but  thirty-eight  of  her  men.  The  Bridge- 
water,  also,  in  the  same  year,  drove  two  Sallee  ships,  each  of 
1(5  guns,  ashore  near  their  own  port.  The  Barbary  pirates,  how- 
ever, though  a  real  nuisance,  were  not  the  only  one  of  the  kind, 
nor,  indeed,  were  they  so  serious  an  obstacle  to  commerce  as  they 
had  been  in  the  seventeenth  century.  This  was,  as  has  been 
mentioned,  partly  due  to  the  constant  watch  kept  upon  their  move- 
ments. A  more  formidable  species  of  piracy,  the  piracy  of  romance, 
flourished  on  the  Spanish  Main,  and  spread  thence  over  the  high 
seas.  The  doings  of  the  notorious  Kidd  have  been  recorded ; 
the  history  of  William  Dampier  shows  with  what  ease  British 
seamen  drifted  into  this  evil  course  of  life ;  and  it  will  be  easily 
understood  that  the  Sir  Francis  Verneys  and  the  Wards  of  the 
era  preferred  to  join  the  successors  of  Sawkins,  primarily  to  plunder 
the  Spaniard,  rather  than  to  turn  renegade  and  prey  on  their  own 
countrymen  in  the  Mediterranean.  But  though  piracy  in  the 
West  was  a  growing  source  of  anxiety,  the  bulk  of  its  exponents 
confined  their  attentions  with  some  strictness  to  foreign  flags,  and 


1718.]  "  SLACKS  BAUD,"    THE  PIRATE.  259 

some  of  them,  notably  Sir  Henry  Morgan,  compared  not  unfavour- 
ably with  the  gentleman  adventurers  of  the  Elizabethan  age.  Kidd, 
it  has  been  shown,  was  a  decided  exception ;  Avery  was  another ; 
and  so  also  was  Edward  Thatch,  commonly  called  Teach,  or,  more 
commonly  still,  from  his  appearance,  "  Blackbeard." 1  Born  in 
Bristol  about  1675,  he  had,  through  the  War  of  the  Spanish 
Succession,  served  in  privateers,  and  he  did  not  turn  his  hand 
to  piracy  till  the  end  of  1716.  It  is  notorious  that  the  pirates 
of  fact  enjoyed,  to  an  even  greater  degree  than  their  brethren  of 
fiction,  the  short  life  and  merry  one  supposed  to  belong  to  men 
of  their  calling ;  and  for  his  enjoyment  of  existence,  as  well  as 
for  his  egregious  brutality,  Thatch  stands  forth  from  among  many 
short-lived  contemporaries.  About  the  end  of  1717,  he  took  a 
large  Guineaman,  which  he  named  the  Queen  Anne's  Revenge,  and 
in  which  he  went  cruising,  after  having  mounted  her  with  forty 
guns.  One  of  the  first  incidents  of  his  cruise  was  the  falling  in 
with  H.M.S.  Scarborough,  20,  which  he  beat  off  after  a  fight 
lasting  for  some  hours.  The  governor  of  Carolina  entered  into 
a  league  with  him,  and  he  chose  the  coasts  of  that  colony  and 
of  Virginia  as  his  scene  of  operations,  and  continued  haunting  their 
creeks  and  preying  on  the  merchants,  whether  at  sea  or  ashore, 
till  they  petitioned  the  governor  of  Virginia  to  rid  them  of  the 
pest.  The  governor  took  counsel  with  the  captains  of  the  Lijme,  20, 
and  Pearl,  40,  and  concerted  a  scheme  by  which  Lieut,  liobcrt 
Maynard,2  of  the  Pearl,  was  to  command  two  small  sloops  against 
Blackbeard,  who  had  got  rid  of  his  great  ships,  and  was  lurking 
in  a  sloop  in  Ocracoke  Inlet,  one  of  the  entrances  to  Pamlico 
Sound.  The  sloops  under  Maynard's  command  mounted  no  heavy 
guns,  while  the  pirates  were  known  to  be  well  armed  in  that 
respect ;  but,  on  the  other  hand,  the  sloops  had  sweeps,  which 
their  enemy  had  not.  Maynard  rowed  into  the  passage  on 
November  21st,  1718,  and  with  great  difficulty,  after  lightening 
his  vessel,  got  close  to  Thatch,  who  had  run  aground.  Meanwhile, 
the  pirate  sloop  floated,  and  by  a  broadside  of  langridge,  did  great 
damage  among  Maynard's  men,  who  were  much  exposed  by  the 
lowness  in  the  waist  of  their  ship.  Maynard  thereupon  kept  his 
men  below  as  much  as  possible ;  upon  which  Blackbeard,  thinking 

1  In  Johnson's  '  Lives  of  the  most  Notorious  Pirates,'  he  appears  as  Teach.     In 
official  papers  he  is  Thatch. 

2  Died,  a  captain  of  1740,  in  1750. 

s  2 


260  MINOR    OPERATIONS,   1711-1762.  [1718-22. 

that  there  were  few  left  to  deal  with,  boarded  at  the  head  of  fifteen 
men.  The  rival  commanders  engaged  hand  to  hand,  and  the  fight 
went  stubbornly  on,  as  usual  in  such  cases,  till  the  pirate's  death. 
Besides  those  killed,  fifteen  pirates  were  taken,  and  of  them  thirteen 
were  hanged.1  That  Thatch  had  so  few  men  with  him  was  owing 
to  his  having  marooned  or  otherwise  got  rid  of  the  bulk  of  his 
company  shortly  before  in  consequence  of  a  dispute  as  to  the 
distribution  of  prize-money. 

There  was  no  lack  of  men  to  carry  on  the  abominable  work  ; 
but  even  of  the  best  known  of  these  desperadoes,  such  as  Stede 
Bonnet,  Edward  England,  John  Eackam,  and  Howel  Davis,  none 
arrests  the  attention  in  such  a  degree  as  Bartholomew  Roberts.' 
lioberts  was,  in  1718,  mate  of  a  ship  which  was  plundered  by 
pirates  on  the  Guinea  coast,  and,  joining  his  captors,  was  elected 
to  the  command  on  the  death  of  Howel  Davis,  their  captain.  He 
cruised  with  considerable  success  from  Brazil  to  Newfoundland, 
and,  in  1721,  crossed  over  to  the  African  coast,  where,  amongst 
other  prizes,  he  took  a  large  ship  belonging  to  the  Royal  Africa 
Company.  To  this  ship  he  turned  over,  named  her  the  Royal 
Fortune,  mounted  forty  guns  in  her,  and  with  a  32-gun  ship,  under 
a  man  named  Skyrni,  and  a  '24,  continued  his  cruise.  His  luck 
continued  good  till  on  February  21st,  1722,  when  he  and  Skyrni 
laj'  anchored  under  Cape  Lopez,  there  came  down  on  him 
H.M.S.  StraUoir,  (JO,  Captain  Chaloner  Ogle  (1),  which,  since  the 
preceding  year,  had  been  on  that  coast.  Ogle  knew  with  whom 
he  had  to  deal ;  and  when  Skyrm,  taking  him  for  a  merchantman, 
slipped  in  chase,  he  bore  away  out  of  earshot  of  the  lioijal  Fortune. 
He  then  turned  upon  Skyrm,  and,  after  a  sharp  encounter,  took 
him.  Returning  to  Cape  Lopez  and  hoisting  the  French  flag,  he 
lured  Roberts  into  attacking  him.  Roberts,  overmatched  and  taken 
by  surprise,  made  a  desperate  fight,  which  did  not  cease  till  he 
himself  had  been  killed.  Of  202  prisoners  taken  it  is  well  to 

1  Of  the  two  who  escaped  the  gallows  one  was  Israel  Hands,  the  master,  who  at  the 
time  of  the  action  was  ashore  recovering  from  a  wound  received  from  Thatch,  who  had 
a  trick  of  blowing  out  his  cabin   lights  and   firing  cross-handed    under   the   table. 
Another  practice  of  Blackboard's  was  to  light  sulphur  in  the  ship's  hold,  and  to  try 
who  could  longest  withstand  the  fumes.     This  was  by  way  of  enlivening  a  dull  cruise. 

2  Roberts  is  said  to  have  been  the  original  of  Scott's  Cleveland  in  '  The  Pirate,'  but 
the  career  of  the  real  does  not  agree  with  that  of  the  ideal.     The  doings  of  Roberts,  as 
chronicled  in  Charles  Johnson's  '  General  History  of  the  Most  Notorious  Pirates,'  are, 
so  far  as  can  be  ascertained,  substantially  correct. 


1719.]  MIGHELLS  AT   VIGO.  261 

notice  that  52  were  hanged,  and  that  only  77  were  acquitted  on  trial. 
The  captured  ships  were  taken  to  England,  where  they  were 
bestowed  on  Ogle,1  who  also  for  this  good  piece  of  work  received 
the  honour  of  knighthood. 

In  the  latter  end  of  July,  1719,  preparations  were  making  in 
England  for  a  secret  expedition  against  Spain.  About  fifty  trans- 
ports were  got  together  to  convey  a  force  of  four  thousand  men 
under  Viscount  Cobham  ;  and,  meanwhile,  a  small  squadron  was 
sent  ahead  under  Commodore  Sir  liobert  Johnson,  in  the  Weymouth, 
to  co-operate  with  the  French  who  were  then  engaged  in  the  siege 
of  San  Sebastian.  In  the  beginning  of  August,  some  French  troops 
and  two  hundred  seamen  were  landed  by  the  squadron  at  Fort  San 
Antonio.  Owing  to  the  strength  of  the  batteries  at  the  entrance 
to  the  harbour,  the  force  was  landed  some  distance  to  the  westward, 
advancing  from  which  direction,  it  destroyed  the  fortifications  and 
spiked  the  guns  in  the  harbour.  On  September  15th,  Johnson, 
in  the  Weymouth,  having  the  Winchester  and  Dnrslcij  Galley  in 
company,  heard  that  there  were  two  Spanish  men-of-war  and  a 
large  merchantman  lying  in  Rivadeo.  Accordingly  the  Weymouth 
and  Winchester  appeared  off  the  port  on  the  following  day ;  boats 
were  sent  in  to  take  soundings;  and  the  two  ships  anchored  alongside 
the  enemy  and  abreast  of  a  battery  of  eight  guns.  The  battery 
was  taken,  the  men-of-war  were  destroyed,  and  the  merchantman 
was  brought  off.  In  the  meantime,  the  main  expedition  had  sailed 
and  was  looking  for  Johnson  off  the  Spanish  coast,  in  hopes  of 
gaining  information  from  him.  This  force  was  commanded  by 
Vice-Admiral  James  Mighells,  who,  detached  by  Berkeley  in  the 
spring,  had  learnt  of  the  dispersal  of  the  Spanish  fleet  intended  for 
the  invasion  of  Scotland.  The  object  now  before  Mighells,  and 
the  soldiers  under  Cobham  whom  he  convoyed,  was  to  proceed  to 
Vigo  and  retaliate  for  this  intended  insult.  Sailing  from  St.  Helen's 
on  September  21st,  1719,  the  expedition  made  Vigo  on  the  '29th 
without  being  joined  by  Johnson.  The  fleet  at  once  entered  the 
harbour  and  landed  the  troops  about  three  miles  from  the  town. 
On  October  1st,  the  army  occupied  a  strong  position  under  the 
walls ;  whereupon  the  enemy  spiked  the  guns  in  their  batteries 
and  withdrew  to  the  citadel.  A  bomb  ketch  was  brought  up  on 
the  3rd ;  but  as  she  could  do  little,  owing  to  the  greatness  of  the 
range,  some  forty  odd  mortars  were  put  ashore ;  and  on  the  4th, 

1  Captains'  Letters,  0  2. 


262  MINOR    OPERATIONS,   1714-1762.  [1720. 

Fort  San  Sebastian,  which  had  been  occupied,  was  armed  with 
heavy  guns  from  the  fleet.  The  citadel,  upon  that,  surrendered, 
its  garrison  of  four  hundred  and  sixty-nine  officers  and  men 
marching  out  on  the  10th.  The  town,  it  was  decided,  could  not 
be  held  ;  but  a  large  quantity  of  guns,  small  arms,  and  ammunition, 
which  had  been  collected  for  the  invasion  of  England,  was  taken 
and  brought  home.  Seven  ships,  also,  were  seized  in  the  harbour, 
of  which  three  were  fitting  out  for  privateers.  On  the  14th,  the 
ships  reduced  Ponte  Vedra,  at  the  upper  end  of  the  harbour. 
There,  too,  many  guns  were  found ;  so  that  the  total  number 
brought  home  was  one  hundred  and  ninety  iron  and  thirty  brass 
heavy  guns,  with  ten  thousand  stand  of  small  arms,  two  thousand 
barrels  of  powder,  and  other  warlike  stores.  On  November  llth, 
Vice-Admiral  Mighells  put  into  Fahnouth  with  the  Enterprize, 
Kini/Mtle,  and  liiddcfonl,  and  with  most  of  the  transports.  The 
expedition  had  been  prompt  and  successful  :  it  had  fully  attained  its 
object  ;  and  by  sickness,  desertion,  and  the  sword  it  had  lost  no 
more  than  three  hundred  men. 

The  difficulties  experienced  by  British  merchants  in  the  Spanish 
settlements  of  the  west  were  a  heritage  of  the  days  of  Elizabeth,  and 
were  by  no  means  smoothed  away  by  the  many  treaties  which  had 
been  entered  into  between  the  two  nations.1  It  is  not  possible  here 
to  enter  into  an  examination  of  these  treaties ;  let  it  suffice  to  say 
that,  by  forbidding,  save  under  the  harshest  restrictions,  all  traffic, 
except,  of  course,  that  in  negroes,  which  had  been  granted  by  the 
Assiento,  the}'  put  a  premium  on  smuggling.  We  know  the  tra- 
ditional attitude  of  English  and  Spaniards  to  one  another  in  the 
New  World,  and  we  have  noticed  the  growth  of  piracy,  testifying  to 
the  existence  of  a  considerable  proportion  of  unsettled  spirits  among 
the  British  inhabitants  of  the  American  colonies.  When  we  con- 
sider both  the  evergreen  national  hatred,  and  the  bitterness  with 
which  the  guarda  costas  must  have  regarded  the  enterprising  and 
unscrupulous  smugglers,  we  cannot  wonder  at  the  tales  of  brutality 
on  the  part  of  the  Spaniards ;  but  we  must  also  be  prepared  to 
believe  that  the  Spaniards  spoke  the  truth  when  they  insisted  that 
the  British  traders  of  the  islands  were  not  always  the  lambs 
they  professed  to  be,  and  were,  in  many  cases,  but  little  removed 
from  pirates.  There  always  has  been  ill-feeling  about  the  right  of 

1  The  texts  of  these  treaties  will  be  found  at  length  in  Rousset  de  Missy,  '  Recueil 
Historique ' ;  and  in  Jean  Dumont,  '  Corps  Universel  Diplomatique,'  vol.  viii. 


1728-33.]  DIFFICULTIES    WITH  SPAIN.  263 

search — probably  there  always  will  be — nor  are  we  to  believe  that  a 
guarda  costa,  boarding  a  Jamaica  smuggler  in  1720,  acted  with  such 
civility  as  we  expect  from  the  Customs'  House  nowadays.  On  the 
contrary,  as  he  often  had  considerable  difficulty  in  catching  his 
suspect,  he  was  prone  to  try  to  catch  him  where  he  could,  and  to 
scruple  little  whether  he  caught  him  in  Spanish  waters  or  on  the 
high  seas.  Such  was  the  state  of  affairs,  and  it  is  clear  that  it  was 
bound,  sooner  or  later,  to  lead  to  war.  Before  passing  on  to  the 
war  itself,  it  will  be  interesting  to  examine  in  some  detail  one  or  two 
of  the  incidents  that  thus  led  up  to  it. 

In  the  latter  part  of  1728,  a  Spanish  guarda  costa  sighted  and 
bore  down  on  the  Dursley  Galley,  20,  mistaking  her  for  a  merchant- 
man, and  with  the  intention  of  searching  her.  Naturally,  the 
Dursley  Galley  did  not  bring  to,  and  the  Spaniard  opened  fire,  which 
the  British  ship  warmly  returned.  After  a  short  fight,  in  which  the 
guarda  costa  lost  five  men  killed  and  twenty  wounded,  the  Spaniard 
surrendered.  That  she  was  shortly  afterwards  released  was  due 
simply  to  the  fact  that  there  was  no  reason  for  keeping  her,  and 
Lediard  '  is  undoubtedly  wrong  when  he  points  to  this  as  illustrative 
of  the  difference  between  Spanish  and  English  methods.  As  will 
presently  be  shown,  British  ships  that  were  detained  were,  at  any 
rate  in  most  cases,  legally  detained  as  being  smugglers.  The  next 
incident  to  be  mentioned  was  connected  with  the  vexed  question  of 
the  gathering  of  salt  at  the  Tortugas.  It  must  be  remembered  that 
the  right  to  gather  salt,2  like  the  right  to  cut  logwood  at  Campeche, 
was  denied  to  the  English  by  the  Spaniards,  although,  in  point  of 
fact,  it  had  actual!}"  been  acknowledged  by  the  Convention  of 
Madrid.  Early  in  1733,  a  fleet  of  British  ships  under  escort  of  the 
Scarborough,  20,  Captain  Thomas  Durell  (I),3  was  loading  salt  at 
the  Tortugas,  when  there  came  down  on  it  two  Spanish  men-of- 
war,  one  of  sixty,  and  the  other  of  seventy  guns.4  Four  of  the 
merchantmen,  viz.;  the  Catherine,  Two  Sisters,  Hopewell,  and  Three 
Brothers,  were  taken  at  the  outset  before  the  Scarborough  could 
cover  her  convoy ;  but  after  that  she  managed  to  engage  the  atten- 
tion of  the  Spaniards  so  well  that  the  rest  of  the  salt  ships  made 
good  their  escape. 

A  point  that  is  apt  to  be  passed  over  in  such  an  account  as  this  is 
that  two  Spanish  ships  of  the  line  were  quite  equal  to  making  mince- 

1  Lediard,  913.  3  Captains'  Letters,  D  4. 

2  Rousset  de  Missy,  i.  4-1-1.  *  Beatson,  i.  22. 


264  MINOR    OPERATIONS,   1714-1762.  [17.31. 

meat  of  the  Scarborough  first  and  of  her  convoy  afterwards,  had  they 
been  so  inclined.  It  would  appear,  then,  that  the  Spaniards,  whose 
force  seems  to  be  exaggerated,  and  who  were  probably  heavy  coast- 
guard cruisers,  believed  themselves  to  be  engaging  merely  in  the 
reprisals  customary  in  those  parts,  and  that,  when  they  found  that 
they  had  before  them  a  King's  ship,  they  refused  to  fight  her  for  fear 
of  involving  themselves  in  serious  diplomatic  entanglements. 

Whether  the  guarda  costas  are  to  be  regarded  as  privateers  or 
not,  there  is  interest  in  a  letter  written  from  Jamaica  by  Commodore 
Edward  St.  Loe,  to  Burchett,  at  the  Admiralty,  in  May,  1728. l 
Complaining  that  Spanish  privateers  infested  the  Jamaican  coasts, 
he  said  :— 

"  It's  my  opinion  1  could  go  in  and  destroy  most  of  them  had  I  but  His  Majesty's 
permission.  They,  according  to  my  notion,  are  no  hetter  than  pirates,  having  no 
commission  for  what  they  do,  save  from  the  governor  of  the  place." 

This  is  the  opinion  of  a  man  qualified  to  judge.  It  may  be 
tempered  by  that  of  another  naval  officer  who  commanded  on  that 
station,  and  who  certainly  held  no  brief  for  the  Spaniards.  This 
was  Rear-Admiral  the  Hon.  Charles  Stuart,  who  was  sent  out  to 
Jamaica  in  the  Lion  on  December  9th,  1729,  to  take  over  the 
command  of  the  station  in  succession  to  St.  Loe.  Stuart  seems  to 
have  begun  his  commission  with  the  prevailing  belief  that  the  fault 
lay  with  the  Spaniards,  but  his  attitude  changed  somewhat  as  time 
went  on,  and  as  his  knowledge  of  the  British  merchants  increased. 
Writing  on  October  12th,  1731,  to  the  Duke  of  Newcastle,  he 
admitted  that  the  British  carried  on  the  trade  at  their  own  risk,  and 
that  the  ships  were  good  prize  if  taken.  This,  he  said,  led  them  to 
retaliate  by  robbing  such  Spaniards  as  they  could  overpower,  and  he 
added : — 

"  1  can  assure  you  that  the  sloops  that  sail  from  this  island  manned  and  armed  on 
that  illicit  trade,  have  more  than  once  bragged  to  me  of  having  murdered  seven  or  eight 
Spaniards  on  their  own  shore.  I  can't  help  observing  that  I  believe  1  am  the  first 
military  person  who  has  stood  up  in  the  defence  of  peace  and  quietness,  and  for 
delivering  up  vessels,  against  a  parcel  of  men  who  call  themselves  merchants,  but  they 
are  no  better  than  pedlars,  and  one  of  them  formerly  in  jail  for  piracy." 

His  plea  for  peace  and  quietness  may  have  been  merely  the  outcome 
of  his  knowledge  that,  as  the  British  had  by  far  the  greater  number 
of  ships  in  those  seas,  reprisals  would  be  a  losing  game.  That  truth 
was  abundantly  evidenced  when  war  broke  out ;  for  from  September, 

1  Home  Office  Records,  Admiralty,  Xo.  06,  quoted  in  '  Eng.  Hist.  Hev.,'  iv.  741. 


1731.]  BRITISH  AND   SPANISH  CRUELTIES.  265 

1739,  to  November,  1741,  the  Spaniards  took  331  British  ships  as 
against  only  231  of  their  own  which  they  lost.1 

On  September  12th,  1731,  Stuart  wrote  to  the  governor  of 
Havana  a  strong  letter  of  complaint.  It  had  been  hoped  that  a 
better  condition  of  affairs  was  about  to  begin,  as  the  King  of  Spain, 
in  response  to  pressure  from  England,  had  sent  instructions  to  his 
colonial  governors  to  mitigate  their  harshness  to  British  traders. 
But  this  proclamation  was  bound  to  be  without  effect,  for  it  ex- 
empted from  its  protection  all  such  ships  as  were  engaged  in  the 
illicit  trade,  while  leaving  it  to  the  governors  concerned  to  draw  the 
necessary  distinction  between  legal  and  illegal  traffic.2  So  it  was 
that  Stuart  never  lacked  cause  of  complaint,  and,  in  the  instance 
cited,3  made  mention  "particularly  of  one  Fandino,  and  others  who 
have  committed  the  most  cruel  piratical  outrages  .  .  .  particularly 
about  the  20th  April  last,  sailed  out  of  your  harbour  in  one  of  those 
guarda  costas,  and  met  a  ship  of  this  island,4  bound  for  England  .  .  ." 
and  so  forth,  giving  the  well-known  traditional  details  of  the  no- 
torious Jenkins  case.  He  ended  this  letter  with,  "  The  king,  my 
master,  having  reason  to  believe  that  these  repeated  insults  on  his 
subjects  could  never  be  continued  but  by  the  connivance  of  the 
several  Spanish  governors  in  these  parts,  is  determined  to  endeavour 
to  put  a  stop  to  these  piratical  proceedings."  But  at  the  same  time 
he  was  much  attacked  by  the  merchants,  who  objected  strongly  to 
his  saying  that  they  exaggerated  their  case,  and  who  resented  his 
interference  with  their  illicit  trade,  and  his  endeavours  to  repress 
their  cruelties. 

Juan  de  Leon  Eandino,  probably  more  from  the  accident  of  his 
having  handled  Jenkins  than  for  any  other  reason,  stands  out  from 
among  the  guarda  costa  officers.  On  September  9th,  1731,  he  de- 
tained and  plundered  the  Prince  William,  William  Joy,  master,  but 
this  ship  was  released  a  month  later.  Not  so  the  Dolphin,  Benjamin 
Carkett,  master,  which  was  taken  by  Fandino  in  July,  and  sent  into 
Havana.  She  was  adjudged  legal  prize,  as  the  governor  wrote  to 
Stuart ;  but  he  added  that  he  intended  to  chastise  Spanish  privateers, 

1  Lists  in  Gent.  May.  1741,  pp.  689-698. 

2  Beatson,  i.  15.  • 

3  This  letter,  taken  from  Home  Office  Records,  Admiralty,  Xo.  6'J,  is  printed  in 
'  Eng.  Hist.  Rev.,'  vol.  iv. 

*  Jenkins's  ship,  the  Rebecca,  is  not  here  mentioned  by  name,  but  is  identified  with 
this  vessel  by  a  list  of  ships  taken  or  plundered  by  the  Spaniards  down  to  December, 
1737.  The  Rebecca  was  taken  on  April  9th,  which  in  the  new  style  would  be  the  20th. 


266  MINOR    OPERATIONS,   1714-1762.  [1731-42. 

who  were  now  no  longer  necessary;  and  whose  commissions  he  had 
revoked.  Stuart,  however,  must  stop  ships  coming  from  Jamaica  to 
Cuba,  where  British  and  Dutch  ships  were  then  to  be  found  all 
through  the  year. 

What  ultimately  became  of  Fandino  falls  into  its  place  here, 
though  chronologically  the  story  should  be  postponed.  On  June  4th, 
1742,  among  the  Bahamas,  Captain  Thomas  Fraukland,  of  the  Rose, 
fell  in  with,  and  chased,  four  ships,  which  showed  British  colours. 
He  chased  under  the  same,  and,  overhauling  them,  fired  a  gun.1 
The  chase  then  hoisted  the  Spanish  flag,  and  fought  him  furiously, 
using  all  sorts  of  missiles,  from  broadsides  of  shot  to  poisoned  arrows. 
Frankland,  however,  held  his  fire  for  the  fourth  ship,  a  snow,  which 
seemed  the  strongest,  giving  the  others  only  a  few  guns  as  they 
chanced  to  bear.  The  first  three  sheered  off  badly  hulled. 

"I  then  endeavoured,"  says  Frankland,  "to  lay  the  simw  aboard,  which  she 
shunned  with  the  utmost  caution,  maintaining  a  warm  fire  till  1  had  torn  her  almost  to 
rags,  the  commander  having  determined  rather  to  sink  than  strike,  for  reasons  you'll 
hereafter  lie  sensible  of:  but  in  about  four  hours  the  people,  in  opposition  to  the  captain, 
hauled  down  the  colours." 

The  prize  mounted  ten  carriage'  guns,  as  many  swivels,  and  had  a 
crew  of  over  eighty  men. 

"The  captain  is  Juan  de  Leon  Fandino.  .  .  .  He  is  the  man  that  commanded  the 
guard  of  coast  out  of  the  Havana  that  took  Jenkins  when  his  ears  were  cut  oft'.  .  .  . 
Not  but  such  a  desperado  with  his  crew  of  Indians,  Mulattoes  and  Xegroes  could  have 
acted  as  he  did,  for  we  were  at  least  two  hours  within  pistol  shot  of  him  keeping  a 
constant  tire.'' 

So  much  for  a  story  which  has  long  been  accounted  a  myth,  both 
from  its  intrinsic  improbability,  and  from  the  circumstance  that 
Jenkins,  like  other  merchant  skippers  who  gave  evidence  before  the 
House  of  Commons  in  1738,  was  not  on  oath." 

In  1739,  as  has  been  seen,  reprisals  were  ordered,  and  instructions 
to  that  effect  were  sent  out  to  Commodore  Charles  Brown  at  Jamaica, 
whose  broad  pennant  was  then  flying  in  the  Hampton  Court.3  The 
bearer  of  this  dispatch  was  the  Hon.  Edward  Boscawen,  of  the 
Shorcham,  who  joined  Brown  at  Port  Itoyal  on  August  6th,  and, 

1  Captains'  Letters,  F. 

2  Mr.  Leeky's  opinion  of  the  truth  of  the  story  is  given  on  page  51  of  this  volume; 
and  neither  Stuart's  nor  Frankland's  letter  really  goes  far  towards  contradicting  that 
opinion. — W.  L.  C. 

3  The  Hampton  Court's  log  is  of  little  value ;  details  of  the  cruise  will  be  found  in 
the  Commodore's  log,  bound  up  with  his  dispatches   in  Admirals'  Dispatches  1738- 
1742,  Jamaica,  in  the  Public  Record  Office. 


1739.]  WAS    WITH   SPAIN.  267 

after  whose  accession,  the  squadron  consisted,  besides  the  two  ships 
named,  of  the  Falmouth,  Diamond,  Torrington,  Windsor  and  Drake. 
Brown  at  once  proceeded  to  carry  out  his  orders,  and  on  the  following 
day  the  Drake  and  the  Hampton  Court's  barge  brought  in  a  schooner. 
On  the  14th  the  whole  squadron  left  Port  Eoyal,  and  proceeded 
round  Cuba  on  a  cruise,  during  which,  owing  to  the  scarcity  of 
Spanish  ships,  they  did  no  great  amount  of  damage,  but  managed  to 
collect  reliable  information  as  to  the  strength  and  distribution  of 
Spanish  men-of-war  in  those  seas.  On  September  3rd,  Captain 
Charles  Knowles,  of  the  Diamond,  was  detached  in  pursuit  of  a 
strange  sail,  and  did  not  rejoin.  The  Shoreham  was  the  most 
successful  ship  of  the  squadron.  In  her,  Boscawen  reconnoitred 
Havana,  and,  near  that  port,  destroyed  two  sloops  and  took  another, 
while  a  little  later,  about  September  15th,  he  landed  at  Porto  Maria, 
and  burnt  a  large  quantity  of  timber  and  other  stores.  He  was  there 
attacked  by  two  half  galleys  and  a  sloop,  but  they  kept  in  such  shoal 
water  that  the  S/iorcham,  though  hulled  more  than  once,  could  not 
get  close  enough  to  harm  them.  Meanwhile,  a  small  fort  between 
Matanzas  and  Havana  was  destroyed.  Brown,  having  stayed  for 
twelve  days  off  Havana  in  hopes  of  falling  in  with  a  Spanish 
squadron,  learnt  that  none  was  expected,  and,  leaving  the  Windsor 
and  Falmouth  to  cruise  there  till  the  end  of  the  month,  proceeded 
round  the  western  end  of  the  island,  and,  on  October  28th,  anchored 
in  Port  Royal.  There  he  found  the  Diamond,  which  had  made  two 
captures — a  ship  and  a  brigantine,  said  to  be  worth  i'30,000.  These, 
with  two  other  small  sloops  taken,  and  a  few  large  canoes,  represent 
the  total  damage  done.  In  Port  lioyal  lay  Vernon's  squadron,  to 
which  Brown  had  by  that  time  become  attached. 

Active  warfare  was  at  first  entirely  confined  to  the  West  Indies  ; 
and  in  European  seas  the  first  action  of  importance  took  place  when 
the  Princesa,  64,  six  hundred  men,  of  the  Spanish  Ferrol  squadron, 
fell  in  with  the  Lenox,  Kent,  and  Orford,  which  had  been  detached 
from  Vice-Admiral  John  Balchen's  squadron.  These  three  ships, 
with  the  St.  Allans  and  liipon,  had  been  cruising  to  intercept  a 
convoy  of  treasure  ships  under  Pizarro,  but  saw  nothing  of  them. 
Pizarro,  for  his  success  on  this  service,  was  appointed  immediately 
to  command  the  expedition  which  was  sent  out  to  round  Cape  Horn 
and  to  act  as  a  check  on  Anson.  The  Princesa  was  sighted  at 
9  A.M.  on  April  8th,  1740,  and  was  at  once  chased  by  the  three  ships, 
viz.,  Lenox,  70,  Captain  Covill  Mayne,  Kent,  70,  Captain  Thomas 


268  MINOR    OPERATIONS,   1714-1762.  [1740. 

Durell  (1),  and  Orford,  70,  Captain  Lord  Augustus  Fitzroy  (I).1 
The  chase  was  then  under  French  colours ;  but,  when  the  Orford 
drew  up  soon  after  half-past  ten,  she  hoisted  Spanish.  About  eleven 
the  Lenox  also  drew  close  up.  and  opened  fire  with  her  chaserguns, 
being  soon  followed  by  the  Orford.  All  three  ships  came  into  close 
action  and  gave  her  many  broadsides,  for  the  most  part  within  pistol 
shot ;  but  she  made  a  most  stubborn  defence,  and,  though  she  became 
ungovernable,  owing  to  the  loss  of  her  foretopmast,  early  in  the  en- 
gagement, she  proved  capable  of  a  great  deal  of  passive  resistance.  In 
explanation  of  this  it  was  pointed  out  at  the  time  that  she  was  more 
heavily  armed  than  the  British  70's.  The  Spanish  establishment  was, 
24-prs.  on  the  lower  deck,  18-prs.  on  the  upper  deck,  and  8-prs.  on  the 
quarter  deck  and  forecastle,  as  against  24, 12,  and  6-prs.  in  the  British 
Xavy  ;  but  it  is  possible  that  the  Princena  may  have  had  heavier  guns 
mounted.  She  was  moreover  of  very  stout  scantling,  and,  having  small 
portholes,  was,  defensively  at  any  rate,  a  most  powerful  ship.  It  has 
also  been  suggested  that,  as  a  fresh  breeze  was  blowing,  the  British 
ships  could  not  use  their  lower  deck  guns.  This  was  not  so.  Covill 
Miirne  makes  special  mention  of  sending  the  enemy  broadsides  from 
his  lower,  upper,  and  quarter-deck  guns.  The  reports  clash  some- 
what ;  but,  roughly,  the  middle  part  of  the  action  seems  to  have 
been  fought  with  the  Priiice.<i<i  out  of  hand,  the  Kent  on  her  larboard 
beam,  and  the  Lenox,  or  Orford  on  her  starboard  side,  and  the  third 
ship  always  under  her  stern,  raking  her  fore  and  aft.  In  the  after- 
noon the  Orford  had  her  fore  rigging  so  much  disabled  that  she 
dropped  astern  and  had  to  lie  to  to  knot  and  splice ;  but  meanwhile 
the  raking  fire  from  the  Lenox  had  carried  away  the  Princesa's  main 
and  mi/en  masts.  The  Orford,  having  repaired  damages,  drew  up 
again  ;  and  thereupon  the  enemy  struck  her  colours,  having  main- 
tained an  almost  hopeless  struggle  with  the  utmost  gallantry  for 
close  on  seven  hours.  Not  unnaturally  Lord  Augustus  Fitzroy 
claimed  that  she  had  struck  to  him,  and  sent  the  first  boat  on  board, 
following  closely  himself.  To  Covill  Mayne's  indignation  he 
received  the  sword  of  her  commander,  Don  Pablo  Agustin  de 
Aguirre,  and  took  charge  of  her  papers.  There  was  some  angry 
protest,  but  the  matter  seems  to  have  blown  over.  The  prize,  rated 
as  a  70,  continued  for  some  years  as  one  of  the  best  two-deckers  in 
the  British  Navy. 

The  next  operation  that  falls  within  the  scheme  of  this  chapter 
1  Captains'  Letters,  vols.  M  II,  and  F  5. 


1740.]  THE  FLORIDA   EXPEDITION.  269 

was  not  so  satisfactory  to  British  pride.  General  Oglethorpe, 
commanding  the  troops  on  the  North  American  station,  conceived 
the  notion  that  it  would  be  to  His  Majesty's  service  to  take 
St.  Augustine,  in  Florida.1  Accordingly  he  consulted  with  the 
General  Assembly  of  Carolina,  asking  what  troops  could  be  spared 
to  him ;  and  he  also  gained  the  adherence  to  his  plan  of  Captain 
Vincent  Pearce  (1),  of  the  Flamborougk,  the  Commodore  on  the 
station.  The  project  was  first  suggested  to  Pearce  in  January,  1740  ; 
but  the  general  found  some  difficulty  in  putting  it  on  a  working 
basis,  and  it  was  not  till  April  that  he  renewed  his  request  for  the 
co-operation  of  his  ships.  These  were  : — 


Ships. 

Guus.                                         Commamlers. 

Flairiborough 

Hector 

20        Cai 

.   1     4-t 

tain  Vinceut  Pearce  (1). 
Sir  Yelverton  Pevton,  Bart. 

Squirrel 
Phoenix 

20 
20 

Peter  Warren. 
Charles  Fanshaw. 

Tartar 

99 

the  Hon.  George  Townsliend. 

Spencc 
Woff. 
Hawk, 

i>> 

8        foil 
62 

\Villiain  Laws, 
maiitlcr  William  Dandridge. 

and  a  schooner. 

8 

1  ami  ten  swivels.  -  ami  fmir  swivfls. 

When  Oglethorpe's  request  was  finall}"  made  the  squadron  was 
just  on  the  point  of  starting  on  a  cruise,  and  was  therefore  in 
perfect  readiness  for  immediate  action.  The  Squirrel  was  sent  oft' 
St.  Augustine  pending  the  arrival  of  the  rest  of  the  force  ;  and 
she  was  annoyed  by  six  half-galleys  that  lay  there,  and  which,  during 
calms  and  light  winds,  proved  of  considerable  service  to  the 
Spaniards.  The  Wolf  was  sent  on  to  join  Warren  towards  the 
end  of  April,  and  on  the  28th  the  Squirrel  took  a  sloop  belonging 
to  the  king  of  Spain.  This  prize  mounted  eight  4-prs.  and  six 
swivels,  and  had  eight  thousand  pieces  of  eight  on  board.  In  May 
the  Hector  and  Spence  joined  the  ships  off  the  bar  of  St.  Augustine, 
Pearce  meanwhile  lying  in  St.  John's  River  co-operating  with  the 
troops  then  on  the  advance  from  the  northward.  Two  small  forts, 
St.  Francis  de  Pupa  and  Fort  Diego,  were  taken  by  Oglethorpe, 
who  then  returned  to  the  mouth  of  the  St.  John's  River,  whence 
on  May  31st  a  general  advance  was  made.  On  June  1st  Pearce 
proceeded  off  St.  Augustine,  and  found  the  Spaniards  getting  away 
their  guns  from  a  battery  on  the  Island  of  St.  Eustatia.  He 
1  Captains'  Letters,  vol.  P  8. 


^70  MINOR    OPERATIONS,   17] 4-1762.  [1740. 

promptly  sent  in  his  boats,  ordering  the  Wolf  and  Spence  to  cover 
the  attack;  but  the  enemy  gave  no  trouble,  making  off  into  the 
harbour  on  the  approach  of  the  boats.  On  June  5th  it  was  decided 
at  a  council  of  war  that  the  ships  could  remain  on  that  coast 
till  July  5th ;  on  the  7th  there  was  another  skirmish  with  the 
galleys ;  and  on  the  13th  the  island  was  occupied  by  two  hundred 
seamen  and  as  many  soldiers.  Two  days  later  Colonel  Palmer  was 
killed  at  Fort  Moosa  and  his  party  driven  back ;  a  serious  reverse 
which  gave  the  enemy  free  communication  to  the  landward. 
Meanwhile  guns  were  brought  into  position  on  the  island,  and 
two  small  craft  were  fitted  to  serve  against  the  galleys,  there  being 
so  little  water  on  the  bar  that  the  ships  could  not  get  in.  On 
June  '20th  the  governor  was  summoned  to  surrender,  but  promptly 
refused.  Deserters  soon  afterwards  came  into  the  British  camp 
with  news  that  the  galleys  were  very  badly  manned  and  could  easily 
be  taken.  As  it  had  been  discovered  that  the  range  was  so  great 
that  the  guns  on  the  island  could  have  little  effect,  a  council  of  war 
was  held  with  the  view  of  seeing  whether  this  information  should 
be  acted  upon.  Pearce,  however,  was  averse  from  taking  the  risk  : 
possibly  he  had  doubts  of  the  deserters ;  and  he  persisted  in  his 
refusal  though  the  land  officers  offered  to  put  one  hundred  soldiers 
into  the  boats  to  take  the  places  of  those  seamen  who  were  absent 
in  the  batteries  ashore.  On  this  Colonel  Vanderdussen  pointed  out 
how  badly  off  the  troops  would  be  when  the  ships  left  the  coast ; 
for  the  galleys  would  cut  their  communications.  Pearce  found  that 
there  was  no  port  near  where  he  could  lay  his  ships  up  for  the 
hurricane  season ;  and,  not  being  too  well  manned,  he  had  to  refuse 
a  request  that  he  would  leave  two  hundred  seamen  to  reinforce  the 
troops.  It  was  by  that  time  July  ;  and  the  moment  had  come 
when,  in  accordance  with  the  council  of  war  of  June  5th,  the  ships 
were  to  leave  the  coast.  Without  any  friction,  therefore,  between 
Oglethorpe  and  Pearce,  it  was  decided  that  nothing  further  could  be 
done,1  and  on  the  5th  the  whole  force  withdrew,  the  ships  covering 
it  from  any  attempt  on  the  part  of  the  galleys. 

In  July,  1741,  Captain  Curtis  Barnet,  of  the  Dragon,  GO,  was 
detached  from  Vice-Admiral  Nicolas  Haddock's  squadron  with  the 
two  44-gun  ships,  Fecersham  and  Folkestone,  and  with  orders  to 
cruise  in  the  neighbourhood  of  the  Strait  of  Gibraltar.  Being  off 

1  Bound  up  with  Pearce's  letters  are  his  log  for  three  months,  the  minutes  of  the 
councils  of  war,  and  letters  from  Oglethorpe,  Yanderdussen,  Peyton  and  others. 


1741.]  BABNET  AND   DE   GAYLUS.  271 

Cape  Spartel  on  the  25th  of  the  month  he  chased  and  came  up  with 
three   ships,  which   he  had   reason   to   believe   were   two    Spanish 
register  ships  under  convoy  of  a  frigate.     The  Feversham  had  fallen 
astern,  and  the  other  two  ships  did  not  come  up  with  the  strangers 
till  after  dark.      Barnet  hailed  to  know  what  they  were,  and  was 
answered  that  they  were  Frenchmen  from  Martinique.    He  explained 
that  he  was   an  English  man-of-war,  and  that  it  was  his  duty  to 
satisfy  himself  that  they  were  not  Spaniards  ;  but,  to  his  demand 
that  his  boat  should  be  allowed   to  board   them,    he   received   no 
response  save  incivilities.      Finding  that   he  could  do  nothing   by 
talking,  and  being  confirmed  in  his  belief  that  the  ships  were  really 
Spanish,  he  opened  fire,  after  due  warning.     The  ships  were,  how- 
ever, really  French,  being  the  Buree,  (52,  the  Aquihn,  46,  and  the 
Flore,  26,1  under  the  command  of  Captain  de  Caylus,  in  the  first 
named.     A  brisk  action  ensued,  and  the  British  ships,  as  the  Fcrer- 
sham  was  still  far  astern,  being  somewhat  at  a  disadvantage,  soon 
found  themselves  obliged  to  lie  to  for  half  an  hour  to  knot  and  splice. 
In  the  morning,  they  and  their  consort  again  came  up  with  the 
Frenchman,  and  a  boat  was  sent  on  board  the  Borce  under  a  flag  of 
truce.     The  truth  at  once  appeared  ;  but  it  also  appeared  that  the 
ships,  being  on  their  way  from  the  West  Indies,  and  knowing  the 
state  of  relations  between  the  two  countries,  were  under  the  convic- 
tion that  war  had  broken  out.     Barnet's  lieutenant  was  requested  to 
swear  before  the  French  officers  whether  this  were  the  case  or  not, 
and  was  able  to  satisfy  them  that  the  two  monarchies  were  still  at 
peace.     It  is  hard  to  say  that  either  Barnet  or  De  Caylus  was  to 
blame ;    but    the   trouble   might    have   been    avoided    had    M.    de 
Pardaillan,  the  captain  of   the  Aquilon,  been  less  suspicious  of  a 
British  ship  ranging  alongside  cleared  for  action.     The  blame  really 
lay  with   the   government  which,  though   knowing   that  war  was 
inevitable,  hesitated  to  declare  it.     As  it  was,  the  ships  parted  with 
mutual  apologies,  and  with  a  loss  in  killed  of  eleven  men  on  the 
British   side,   and   of   about   thirty-five,    among  whom  was    M.  de 
Pardaillan,  on  board  the  French  ships.     All  the  vessels,  moreover, 
had  their  masts  and  rigging  much  cut. 

Meanwhile,  in  the  West  Indies,   several  of  the  cruisers  which 

were  detached  by  Vernon  had  better  fortune  than  the  main  fleet. 

Some  fell  in  with  register  ships  of  considerable  value,  and  others  did 

good   service   by  capturing  dispatch  vessels.      Of   these   latter  the 

1  Froude,  i.  289.  2  Barnet's  letter  in  Beatson,  iii.  31. 


272  MINOR    OPERATIONS,    17U-1762.  [1742. 

Worcester,  60,  took  a  Spanish  24-gun  ship  bearing  dispatches  to  the 
viceroy  of  Mexico,  and  the  Squirrel,  20,  Captain  Peter  Warren, 
captured  a  large  privateer  belonging  to  Santiago  de  Cuba.  It  is 
said  that  the  importance  of  this  prize  lay  in  information  gained  from 
her  papers  that  the  French  squadron,  under  M.  d'Antin  at  Port 
Louis,  was  intended  to  join  with  the  Spaniards  at  Havana.1  Be  that 
as  it  may,  M.  d'Antin's  squadron  was  rendered  ineffective  by  putrid 
fever,2  and  the  breach  with  France  was  postponed.  Captures  in  the 
West  Indies,  as  in  home  waters,  were  frequent ;  but  so  great  was 
the  number  of  the  enemy's  privateers,  and  so  large  the  number  of 
British  merchantmen,  that  the  balance  was  not  in  favour  of  Great 
Britain ;  and  the  London  merchants,  dissatisfied  with  the  conduct 
of  the  war,  fell  to  petitioning  Parliament  for  a  redress  of  grievances.3 

Early  in  the  next  year  the  Tiger,  50,  Captain  Edward 
Herbert  (1),  was  lost  on  a  key  near  Tortuga.  The  crew  got 
safely  ashore  with  a  quantity  of  stores  and  provisions,  and  raised 
on  the  island  a  fortification,  in  which  they  mounted  twenty  of  the 
ship's  guns.  It  was  well  that  they  did  so,  for  the  Spaniards,  hearing 
of  the  misadventure,  sent  the  Fuerte,  00,  to  capture  them.  She  was, 
however,  lost  in  the  attempt,  and  the  Tiger's  men,  after  two  months 
on  the  island,  managed  in  their  boats  to  take  a  sloop,  in  which  they 
reached  Jamaica.  Though  several  prizes  of  value  were  made  during 
the  year,  1742,  there  was  only  one  that  calls  for  note.  This  was 
the  guarda  costa  already  mentioned,  commanded  by  Fandino,  the 
man  who  is  alleged  to  have  ill-treated  Jenkins,  and  whose  capture 
has  been  described  as  a  fitting  conclusion  to  the  Jenkins  episode.4 

The  Spaniards  at  that  time  sent  out  a  new  governor  to  Cartagena, 
and  with  him  a  reinforcement  of  over  a  thousand  men.  The  troops 
were  in  five  ships  of  the  Caracas  company,  of  which  two  mounted 
40,  two  30,  and  the  fifth  12  guns.  The  squadron  was  dispersed  by  a 
hurricane,  and  two  of  the  ships  were  lost,  while  the  others,  one  of 
the  40's  and  both  the  30's,  fell  in  on  April  12th,  1742,  with  the 
Eltham,  40,  Captain  Edward  Smith,  and  the  Lively,  20,  Com- 
mander Henry  Stewart.  After  some  hours'  hard  fighting,  night 
ended  the  engagement,  and  the  Spaniards  bore  up  for  Puerto  Eico. 
As  they  had  lost  in  killed  and  wounded  some  six  hundred  men, 

1  Beatson,  i.  115. 

2  Poissounier  Desperrieres,  'Maladies  des  gens  de  Mcr,'  p.  2'Jo, 
8  Beatson,  i.  121-25.     See  also  Gent.  May.  1741,  pp.  680-698. 
4  See  above,  pp.  51  and  260. 


1743.]  MATHEWS  IN   THE  MEDITERRANEAN.  273 

including  the  new  governor  among  the  former,  it1  may  be  said  that 
the  reinforcement  had  heen  practically  annihilated. 

On  September  21st,  1742,  the  Navy  sustained  a  heavy  loss  in  the 
destruction  of  the  Tilbury,  60,  Captain  Peter  Lawrence,  by  fire,  off 
Hispaniola.  The  cause  of  the  accident  was  a  drunken  scuffle ;  and 
the  whole  of  the  story,  down  to'the  loss  of  one  hundred  men,  corre- 
sponds almost  exactly  with  that  of  the  destruction  of  the  Paragon 
during  Penn's  return  from  the  West  Indies  in  June,  1655. 2 

The  destruction  of  five  Spanish  galleys  at  St.  Tropez  in  June, 
1742,  was  a  spirited  piece  of  service.  Captain  Kichard  Norris,  of 
the  Kingston,  60,  had  been  detached,  with  the  Oxford,  50,  and  Duke, 
fireship,  in  company,  to  blockade  them;  but  as  St.  Tropez,  being  a 
French  port,  was  neutral,  there  would  have  been  no  attack  had  not  the 
galleys  been  so  ill-advised  as  to  fire  upon  the  British.  On  June  13th, 
therefore,  Norris  gave  orders  to  Commander  Smith  Callis,  of  the 
Duke,  to  go  in  and  do  his  utmost  to  destroy  the  galleys  at  the  mole. 
Callis  went  in  on  the  14th,  and  fired  his  ship  with  such  good  effect, 
that  the  whole  of  the  five  were  destroyed.  So  rapidly  did  he  carry 
out  his  orders  that  nothing  was  saved  from  the  Duke,  not  even  the 
ship's  or  officers'  papers.3  For  his  success,  Callis  was  posted  to  the 
Assistance. 

Early  in  1743,  Vice-Admiral  Thomas  Mathews,  hearing  that  the 
Spanish  ship  San  Isidoro,  70,  was  lying  in  the  Bay  of  Ajaccio,  sent 
in  the  Ipswich,  70,  Captain  "William  Martin  (1),  Revenge,  70,  Captain 
George  Berkeley,  and  the  Anne  Galley,  fireship,  to  bring  her  out. 
Her  captain  refused  to  yield  to  the  odds  arrayed  against  him,  and 
opened  fire,  but  finding  it  impossible  to  hold  the  ship,  he  ordered  her 
to  be  burnt.  She  blew  up  before  all  her  people  had  been  taken  out 
of  her,  and  a  considerable  number  of  men  perished. 

Apart  from  this  piece  of  work,  there  was  little  done  in  the 
Mediterranean,  though  the  cruisers  continued  to  send  in  prizes,  and 
to  annoy  the  enemy's  coast.  In  June,  however,  the  enemy  contrived 
so  far  to  avoid  the  blockading  squadron  as  to  carry  fifteen  shiploads 
of  warlike  stores  from  Majorca  to  Genoa  for  the  use  of  the  army  in 
Italy.  Mathews  at  once  appeared  off  that  port  with  six  sail  of  the 
line,  and  overawed  the  Genoese  into  sending  the  supplies  back  to 
Corsica,  there  to  lie  till  the  conclusion  of  the  war. 

1  Beatson,  i.  149. 

2  See  above,  Vol.  II.  p.  208. 

3  Captains'  Letters,  C  14.     Callis  to  Thomas  Corbett,  August  llth,  1742. 

VOL.    III.  T 


274  MINOR    OPERATIONS,    1714-1762.  [1744. 

The  following  year,  1744,  was  very  far  from  being  a  fortunate 
one  for  the  British  navy.  The  fiasco  off  Toulon  was  supplemented 
by  the  capture  of  the  Seaford,  20,  Solebay,  20,  and  Grampus,  14,  by 
de  Rochambeau,  by  the  throwing  away  of  the  Northumberland,  70, 
and  by  the  loss,  through  stress  of  weather,  of  the  Victory,  100, * 
Orford,  70,  Colchester,  50,  St.  Allans,  50,  Greenwich,  50,  and  other 
ships  of  less  value.  Against  this  tale  of  disaster  we  could  oppose 
merely  the  capture  of  the  Medee,  26,  on  April  27th,  by  the  Dread- 
nought, 50,  Captain  the  Hon.  Edward  Boscawen,"  and  Grampus,  14, 
which  formed  part  of  the  fleet  of  Vice-Admiral  Sir  Charles  Hardy  (1) , 
off  the  coast  of  Portugal. 

Of  these  misfortunes  that  requiring  most  particular  notice  here  is 
the  loss  of  the  Northumberland.  This  ship,  commanded  by  Captain 
Thomas  Watson  (1),  was  detached  in  chase  of  a  strange  sail  on 
May  8th  by  the  Vice-Admiral,  who  was  then  homeward  bound  from 
the  Tagus.  In  view  of  the  sequel,  it  is  worth  remembering  that 
Watson  was  a  good  and  brave  officer,  favourably  known  in  the 
service  for  his  work  as  Yernon's  flag-captain  at  Puerto  Bello  and 
Cartagena.  But  his  skull  had  been  fractured,  and  his  mind  im- 
paired, so  that  "a  small  matter  of  liquor  rendered  him  quite  out  of 
order,  which  was  his  unhappy  fate  that  day."  3  The  weather  grew 
thick,  the  chase  was  lost  sight  of,  and  the  signal  was  made  for  the 
Northumberland's  recall  ;  but  Watson  held  on.  Soon  three  sail 
were  made  out  to  leeward,  and  as  he  bore  down  on  them  under  a 
press  of  sail,  it  was  seen  that  they  were  two  two-decked  ships  and  a 
frigate.  They  were,  in  point  of  fact,  the 


Content  .  .         1)4        (,'aptaiu  de  Contlaiis 

Mars     ....        <>•!  „        <lu  Terrier. 

V/'nua    .  •_!!>  d'Ache. 


The  French  ships  lay  to  under  topsails,  while  the  Northumberland 
bore  down  on  them.     Properly  handled,  the  British  ship  would  have 

1  See  the  previous  chapter. 

2  Boscawen's  nickname  in  the  service  dates  from  this  time.    The  seamen  transferred 
the  name  of  the  ship  to  the  man  ;  and  lie  went  through  life  as  "  Old  Dreadnought." 

:1  'A  true  and  authentic  Narrative  of  the  action  between  the  Northumberland  and 
three  French  men  of  war'  ....  By  an  Eye  Witness.     8vo,  1745. 


1744.]  CAPTURE   OF   THE  NORTHUMBERLAND.  275 

had  them  at  a  disadvantage,  for  they  were  widely  separated,  and  the 
Content,  a  mile  to  windward  of  her  consorts,  made  no  attempt  to 
rejoin  them.  Watson,  therefore,  had  the  option  of  disabling  her 
before  the  others  could  interfere,  or  of  following  the  counsel  of  his 
master,  Dixon,  who  advised  him  to  stand  close-hauled  to  the  north- 
ward l  under  a  press  of  sail,  and  so  to  lead  the  enemy  across  the 
course  of  the'  British  fleet.  This  advice  was  disregarded,  and  no 
reasonable  nor  customary  measures  were  taken  to  put  the  ship  into  a 
fit  state  for  action. 

"We  bore  down  so  precipitately  that  our  small  sails  were  not  stowed,  nor  top- 
gallant sails  furled,  before  the  enemy  began  to  fire  on  us,  and  at  the  same  time  we  hud 
the  cabins  to  clear  away;  the  hammocks  were  nut  stowed  as  they  should  be;  in  short, 
we  had  nothing  in  order." 

Instead  of  engaging  the  weathermost  ship,  the  Content,  Watson  ran 
down  to  leeward  without  answering  her  fire,  and  so  had  to  deal  at 
once  with  his  three  enemies.  Even  then,  then;  was  no  real  reason 
why  the  ship  should  be  taken,  for  the  French  gunnery  was  so 
extremely  bad  that  she  was  little  hurt,  and  had  but  few  men  killed. 
But  Watson  fell  early  in  the  action,  none  of  the  lieutenants  were  on 
deck  to  take  command,  and  the  Master  ordered  the  colours  to  be 
struck,  though  there  was  fight  enough  left  both  in  the  ship  and  in 
her  crew.  The  Northumberland  was  taken  into  Brest,  and  till  the 
1st  of  June,  1794,  for  fifty  years,  the  trophy  name  found  a  place  on 
French  navy  lists.  When  the  officers  returned  to  England  from 
their  captivity,  a  court-martial  was  held.  The  first  lieutenant, 
Thomas  Craven,  was  honourably  acquitted,  but  Dixon,  the  master, 
was  condemned  for  surrendering  the  ship.  The  court  took  into 
consideration  the  good  advice  which  he  had  given  his  captain  before 
the  action,  and  sentenced  him  only  to  be  imprisoned  for  life  in  the 
Marshalsea.  The  court  found  also  "  that  Captain  Watson  had 
behaved  very  rashly  and  inconsiderately,  to  which  was  owing  chiefly 
the  loss  of  her"  ;  but  death  had  settled  his  account.2 

The  hurricane  that  devastated  Jamaica  on  October  '20th  was  one 
of  the  most  violent  upon  record.  Admiral  Sir  Chaloner  Ogle  (1)  was 
at  sea  with  a  great  part  of  the  fleet,  and  so  escaped  its  fury ;  but 
eight  ships  of  the  Eoyal  Navy,  besides  a  great  number  of  merchant- 
men, were  either  wrecked  or  driven  ashore.  The  Greenwich,  50, 

1  The  wind  was  westerly. 

2  Minutes  of  Court  Martial  held  at  Portsmouth  on  February  1st,  1744-5.     R.  0. 
vol.  27. 

T   2 


276  MINOR    OPERATIONS,    1714-1762.  [1745. 

Captain  Edward  Allen,  was  sunk,  with  the  loss  of  her  captain,  a 
lieutenant,  and  seventy  men  ;  the  Lark,  hulk,1  sank,  and  one  hundred 
and  ten  men  with  her;  and  the  St.  Allans,  50,  Captain  William 
Knight,  Bonetta,  sloop,  Commander  William  Lea,  and  Thunder, 
bomb,  were  also  total  losses.  The  Prince  of  Orange,  60,  Montagu, 
60,  and  Experiment,  20,  went  ashore,  but  were  got  off  again.2  The 
history  of  the  year  at  sea  was  about  as  disheartening  as  possible ;  and 
1745  saw  no  marked  improvement. 

On  January  6th,  1745,  four  sail  of  the  line,  the  Hampton  Court,  70, 
Captain  Savage  Mostyn  ;  Captain,  70,  Captain  Thomas  Griffin  (1) ; 
Sunderland,  60,  Captain  John  Brett ;  and  Dreadnought,  60,  Captain 
Thorpe  Fowke,  cruising  off  Usharit,  sighted  and  gave  chase  to  three 
French  ships  to  the  north-east.  These  were  the  Neptune,  74,  and 
Fleuron,  64,  homeward  bound  from  Martinique,  with  a  vast  quantity 
of  specie  on  board,  worth  four  millions  sterling,  it  is  said,  and  in 
company  with  the  privateer  Mars,  George  Walker,  master,  which 
they  had  captured  two  days  before.  As  the  captain  of  the  Fleuron 
told  Walker,  who  was  a  prisoner  on  board  his  ship,  the  French 
commodore  had  made  a  great  mistake  in  interrupting  his  journey  to 
Brest  for  so  trifling  an  object  as  the  Mars.  This  was  hardly  compli- 
mentary to  Walker,  who  at  that  time,  with  Fortunatus  Wright,  did 
as  much  to  uphold  British  prestige  at  sea  as  any  captains  of  the 
lioyal  Navy ;  but  it  was  true,  and,  bad  the  two  French  ships  fallen, 
they  would  richly  have  deserved  their  fate.  As  it  was,  they  were  not 
captured  ;  and  the  story,  as  disclosed  in  the  subsequent  court-martial,3 
and  in  an  able  comment  thereon  addressed  to  the  House  of  Commons,* 
is  very  unpleasant  reading. 

It  is  desirable  here  to  enter  into  the  matter  in  some  detail, 
for  it  shows  the  alarming  state  to  which  British  naval  prestige 
had  fallen,  and  it  explains  the  necessity  for  the  new  Naval  Discipline 
Act  of  1749. 

The  French  ships,  after  their  long  passage,  were  both  sickly  and 
foul,  and  the  English,  with  a  fresh  southerly  breeze,  gradually  crept 
up.  The  Captain,  the  leading  ship,  kept  away  after  the  Mars,  and 
took  possession  of  her  at  dusk,  leaving  the  others  to  continue  the 

1  Formerly  a  44-gun  ship. 

2  Beatson,  i.  193. 

3  Minutes  of  the  Court  Martial,  etc.     1745,  8vo. 

4  '  An  Enquiry  into  the  Conduct  of  Captain  Mostyu,  being  remarks  on  the  Minutes 
of  the  Court  Martial,  etc.     Humbly  addressed  to  the  Hon.  House  of  Commons  by  a 
Sea  Officer.'     1745,  8vo. 


1745.]  BEHAVIOUR    OF   CAPTAIN  MOSTYN.  Ill 

chase.  The  Sunderland  carried  away  her  main  topmast,  and  dropped 
astern ;  but  at  sunset  the  Hampton  Court  was  close  up  with  the 
enemy.  The  Dreadnought,  sailing  very  badly,  could  not  quite  get 
up,  and  Mostyn  shortened  sail  to  wait  for  her.  All  through  the 
night  and  during  the  next  day,  the  position  continued  the  same, 
the  Dreadnought  sailing  no  faster  than  the  chase  and  the  Hampton 
Court  not  engaging  without  her.  At  last,  after  ranging  abreast  of 
the  Neptune,  but  out  of  gunshot  to  windward,  Mostyn  decided  that 
nothing  could  be  done,  and  left  the  French  to  carry  their  valuable 
cargo  into  Brest.1  Of  course  the  two  ships  ought  to  have  been 
taken.  Griffin,  who  was  senior  officer,  had  no  business  to  bear 
away  after  the  Mars ;  yet,  apart  from  that,  it  was  Mostyn's  duty 
to  have  engaged  as  soon  as  he  came  up,  and  to  have  detained  the 
enemy  till  the  Dreadnought  could  get  into  action.  Griffin,  at  the 
court-martial,  stated  that  when  he  bore  away  he  believed  the  Mars 
alone  to  be  a  ship  of  war  and  the  other  two  to  be  merchantmen 
under  her  convoy.  He  was  accordingly  acquitted ;  but,  as  the 
other  three  ships  had  no  doubt  whatever  as  to  the  nature  of  the 
Neptune  and  Fleuron,  and  as  the  Captain  was  nearest  to  them,  the 
opinion  of  the  service  was  unfavourable  to  the  commanding  officer 
of  the  ship  last  named.  As  for  Mostyn,  the  evidence  went  that,  in 
the  fresh  breeze  that  was  blowing,  the  Hampton  Court's  lower  deck 
ports  could  not  be  opened,  while  both  the  enemy's  ships  could  fight 
all  their  guns,  to  leeward  as  well  as  to  windward.  It  was  further 
stated  that  the  Hampton  Court  lay  along  so  much  that  shot  from 
her  upper  deck  guns,  at  extreme  elevation,  would  have  struck  the 
water  fifty  yards  from  their  muzzles.  This,  however,  was  mere 
conjecture,  and  does  not  explain  why  not  a  shot  was  tried.  It 
might  have  been  possible  to  knock  away  a  spar,  and  to  give  the 
Dreadnought  a  chance  of  coming  into  action.  As  to  the  French- 
man's lower  deck  guns  being  run  out  to  leeward,  the  writer  of  the 
appeal  to  the  House  of  Commons  2  points  out  that  the  witness  who 
swore  to  this  fact  proved  too  much.  Those  on  board  the  Hampton 
Court,  in  her  position  to  windward,  were  not  in  a  condition  to  see 
whether  the  enemy's  lee  ports  were  open  or  not.  There  was  no 
cross-examination ;  and  the  Court  decided  that  Mostyn  "  had  done 
his  duty  as  an  experienced  good  officer,  and  as  a  man  of  courage 

1  The  Fleuron  was,  however,  blown  up  in  Brest  harbour  before  her  treasure  could 
be  taken  out  of  her. 

2  Believed  to  be  Vernon. 


278  MINOR    OPERATIONS,    1714-1762.  [1745. 

and  conduct."  It  is  difficult  to  believe  that  this  decision  was  come 
to  without  bias.  At  any  rate,  it  by  no  means  satisfied  public 
opinion ;  and,  a  year  later,  the  Hampton  Court,  with  Mostyn  still  in 
command,  went  out  of  Portsmouth  Harbour  to  the  cry  of  "  All's 
well !  there's  no  Frenchman  in  the  way." 

On  February  20th  following,  the  Cheater,  50,  Captain  Francis 
Geary,  and  Sunderland,  60,  Captain  John  Brett,  fell  in  in 
the  Soundings  with  the  Elephant,  20,  then  on  her  way  home 
from  the  Mississippi,  and  having  twenty-four  thousand  pieces 
of  eight  on  board.  They  chased,  shot  away  her  main  topmast, 
and  captured  her.  This  was  but  a  mere  nicker  of  success,  closely 
to  be  followed  by  another  loss  and  by  another  unsatisfactory 
court-martial. 

On  March  2JSth,  the  Aiiylcxcy,  44,  Captain  Jacob  Elton,  one  of 
the  ships  cruising  to  command  the  entrance  of  the  Channel,  put 
out  of  Kingsale,  whither  she  had  been  to  land  some  sick,  amongst 
whom  was  her  first  lieutenant.  On  the  following  day,  a  fresh 
westerly  breeze  blowing,  a  large  sail  was  sighted  to  windward. 
Elton,  making  sure  that  she  was  his  consort  the  Augusta,  piped  to 
dinner,  and  paid  no  further  heed.  Meanwhile,  the  stranger  came 
down  fast  ;  but  it  was  not  till  she  was  close  to  the  Anglesey  that, 
yawing  slightly,  she  showed  French  ornamentation  on  her  quarter. 
Then  all  was  hurry  and  confusion.  Elton,  to  gain  time,  ordered  the 
foresail  to  be  set ;  but  the  only  effect  of  this  manoeuvre  was  to  bury 
the  lee  lower  deck  ports  in  the  sea  and  almost  to  swamp  the  ship. 
The  enemy,  which  proved  to  be  the  Ajwllon,  50,  belonging  to  the 
French  navy,  but  fitted  out  by  private  adventurers,  ran  close  under 
the  stern  of  the  Aiif/lexey  and  roumled-to  on  her  lee  quarter,  pouring 
in  a  heavy  fire.  Elton  and  the  Master  fell  at  _ the  first  discharge, 
and  the  command  devolved  on  the  second  lieutenant,  Baker  Phillips. 
The  decks  were  not  cleared ;  the  ship  was  half-full  of  water ;  and 
sixty  men  were  dead  or  wounded.  Phillips  could  not  order  the 
helm  to  be  put  up  without  falling  aboard  a  ship  as  full  of  men  as 
his  was  of  water  ;  so,  taking  hasty  counsel  with  Taafe,  the  third 
lieutenant,  he  decided  that  no  effective  resistance  could  be  offered, 
and  ordered  the  colours  to  be  struck.  It  is  difficult  to  see  what  else 
Phillips  could  have  done.  William  Hutchinson,  "  the  Mariner,"  laid 
down  that  a  ship  attacked  as  the  Anglesey  was  ought  to  be  box- 
hauled,  and  to  pass  under  the  enemy's  stern  raking  him,  as  the 

1  Charnock,  iv.  431. 


1745.]  CASE   OF  LIEUT.    BAKER   PHILLIPS.  279 

Serapis  subsequently  did  in  the  course  of  her  action  with  the 
Bonhomme  Richard.  But  in  1745  Phillips  could  not  have  had 
the  advantage  of  a  study  of  Hutchinson's  '  Treatise  on  Practical 
Seamanship  ' ;  and,  being  a  young  man  and  inexperienced,  he  acted 
as  most  other  men  in  his  position  would  have  done.  The  ship 
was  lost  by  being  engaged  to  leeward.  The  subsequent  court- 
martial  l — 

"  was  unanimously  of  opinion  that  Captain  Elton,  deceased,  did  not  give  timely 
directions  for  getting  his  ship  clear  or  in  a  proper  posture  of  defence,  nor  did  he 
afterwards  behave  like  an  officer  or  a  seaman,  which  was  the  cause  of  the  ship  being 
left  to  Lieutenant  Phillips  in  such  distress  and  confusion.  And  that  Lieutenant  Raker 
Phillips,  late  second  lieutenant  of  the  said  ship,  by  not  endeavouring  to  the  utmost 
of  his  jiower  after  Captain  Elton's  death  to  put  the  ship  in  order  of  righting,  not 
encouraging  the  inferior  officers  and  common  men  to  tinht  courageously,  and  by 
yielding  to  the  enemy,  falls  under  part  of  the  tenth  article.  Thev  do  sentence  him  tn 
death,  to  be  shot  by  a  platoon  of  nmsqueteers  on  the  forecastle,  .  .  .  but  .  .  .  having 
regard  to  the  distress  and  confusion  the  ship  was  in  when  he  came  to  the  command, 
and  being  a  young  man  and  unexperienced,  they  beg  leave  to  recommend  him  for 
mercy." 

The  recommendation  was  ignored,  and  the  sentence  was  duly 
carried  into  effect.  It  is  difficult  to  say  what  was  the  reason  of  this, 
and  it  has  been  suggested  in  explanation  that  there  was  a  suspicion 
that  Phillips  was  in  the  pay  of  the  Young  Pretender.  Xo  hint  of 
this  appears  in  the  minutes  of  the  court-martial ;  but  it  must  be 
remembered  that  the  terror  of  an  invasion  was  at  that  time  very 
great,  and  that  men  may  be  swayed  by  motives  which  they  do  not 
acknowledge  even  to  themselves.  Whether  as  a  result  of  this  court- 
martial  or  not,  it  remains  to  be  recorded  that  not  a  ship  wavered  in 
her  allegiance,  though  there  were  undoubted  Jacobites  in  the  fleet. - 
The  one  action  of  the  year  that  had  a  direct  bearing  on  the  result, 
the  engagement  between  the  Lion  and  the  French  ship  Elixdhcth, 
has  already  been  described.3 

A  number  of  valuable  prizes  continued  to  be  made,  chiefly  in  the 
West  Indies.  The  greatest  success  fell  to  the  privateers  ;  but  in 
December,  1744,  the  Rose,  20,  Captain  Thomas  Frankland,  had  fallen 
in  with  and  taken  the  treasure-ship  Coiiccpcion,  bound  from  Cartagena 
to  Havana.  The  prize  mounted  twenty  guns  and  had  a  large  crew  ; 
but  her  value  lay  in  the  enormously  rich  cargo  which,  after  a  stubborn 
fight,  became  the  property  of  the  British.  As  she  was  not  condemned 

1  25th  and  26th  June,  1745.     P.  It.  (.).,  vol  28. 

2  Vide  e.g.,  P.  R.  O.  Courts-martial,  vol.  29.     Lieutenant  William  Johnston,  for 
treason,  July  15th,  1745. 

3  Supra,  Chap.  XXVII.,  p.  110. 


280  MINOR    OPERATIONS,   1714-1762.  [1745. 

by  legal  process,  the  exact  value  of  her  lading  is  unknown.  It  will 
be  enough,  however,  to  say  that  it  consisted  chiefly  of  gold,  silver, 
and  jewels,  and  that  such  additional  finds  as  20,000  and  30,000 
pistoles,  made  after  the  ship  had  been  cleared,  were  looked  on  by 
comparison  as  trifles.  The  privateers  which  harmed  the  enemy 
most  at  that  time  were  the  Prince  Frederick,  Duke,  and  Prince 
George,  fitted  out  by  a  London  firm  in  the  summer  of  1745,  and 
cruising  under  one  James  Talbot,  master  of  the  first-named, 
as  commodore.1  The  profit  resulting  from  this  single  cruise, 
i'700,000,  was  so  enormous  as  to  tempt  the  merchants  to  repeat 
their  scheme  ;  and  the  ships  were  sent  to  sea  again  in  the  following 
year  under  George  Walker.  Subsequently  to  his  capture  by  the 
Fleurun,  Walker  had  commanded  the  privateer  Boscaicen,  which, 
as  the  French  royal  frigate  Medec,  had  been  the  first  prize  of  the 
war,  and  had  been  renamed  in  honour  of  her  captor. 

The  French  West  India  trade  of  1745  went  out  under  the  convoy 
of  the  Ma(/)iani>ne,  74,  and  other  ships  of  war.  Vice-Admiral  Isaac 
Townsend  had,  however,  received  news  concerning  the  convoy,  and, 
on  October  31st,  intercepted  it  off  Martinique.  Townsend,  in  the 
LCIWJL-,  together  with  the  Dreadnought  and  Ipmcich,  engaged  the 
men-of-war,  while  the  smaller  ships  were  sent  off  in  chase  of 
the  flying  merchantmen.  Several  of  these  latter  were  picked  up 
to  leeward  or  were  driven  ashore,  but  the  men-of-war  escaped  by 
taking  refuge  under  the  batteries." 

In  the  Mediterranean,  meanwhile,  the  only  action  of  import- 
ance was  that  between  the  Jersey,  (JO,  Captain  Charles  Hardy  (2), 
detached  from  Captain  Henry  Osborn's  squadron,  and  the  St. 
Esprit,  74.  The  action  was  very  severe,  lasting  for  two  hours  and 
a  half,  at  the  end  of  which  time  both  ships  were  crippled.  The 
St.  Esprit  returned  to  Cadiz  with  the  loss  of  her  foremast  and 
bowsprit,  and  with  twenty  men  killed. 

It  has  been  said  that  the  Apollon  was  a  royal  ship  in  private 
employ.  This  hiring  out  of  the  State's  ships  was  by  no  means  an 
uncommon  practice  with  the  French ;  and,  on  the  break  up  of  their 
main  fleet  subsequent  to  the  battle  off  Toulon,  it  was  carried  out 
on  a  considerable  scale.  M.  de  Lage,  a  man  whose  chief  merit  lay 
in  his  self-assertiveness,  succeeded  in  obtaining  from  the  Admiral 
of  France  an  acting  commission  as  commodore,  with  authority  to  fit 

1  Beatson,  i.  294  ;  J.  K.  Laugh  ton :  '  Studies  in  Naval  History,'  p.  237. 
-  Beatson,  i.  286. 


1745.]  CRUISE   OF  M.   DE  LAGE,  281 

out  a  squadron  at  his  own  expense.  The  crews  were  to  be  raised 
from  the  government  lists  of  seamen  and  marines,  but  were  to  be 
paid  by  de  Lage.  But  the  men  had  a  peculiar  dislike  to  the 
adventurer,  and  would  not  volunteer  ;  and  it  was  with  the  greatest 
difficulty  that,  after  a  hot  press,  two  ships  of  the  line  and  two 
frigates  got  to  sea  in  April, '1745.  These  were  the  Ferine,  74, 
Oriflamme,  54,  Diane,  30,  and  Volage,  30.  Three  times  did 
de  Lage  put  to  sea,  and  three  times  was  he  driven  in  by  bad 
weather.  On  each  return  to  port  numbers  of  men  deserted,  and 
finally  he  had  to  pay  off  the  Ferme.  With  the  three  ships  that  were 
left,  he  put  to  sea  for  the  last  attempt  at  the  end  of  March,  1746. 
On  the  29th  he  was  sighted  by  Commodore  the  Hon.  George 
Townshend,  who  had  with  him  at  that  time  the  Bedford,  70,  and 
Essex,  70,  and  two  bombs,  but  who,  contenting  himself  with  a 
distant  view,  chose  to  believe  that  the  enemy  was  of  superior  force, 
and  declined  to  engage.1  De  Lage  stood  over  to  the  coast  of  Spain 
where,  on  April  4th,  off  Cape  St.  Martin,  the  Volarjc,  which  had 
chased  out  of  sight  of  the  squadron,  was  taken,  after  an  obstinate 
resistance,  by  Captain  John  Fawler,  of  the  Stirling  Castle,  70.  On 
the  following  morning  her  consorts  hove  in  sight ;  and  Fawler, 
believing  himself  to  be  in  no  fit  condition  to  engage  them,  cut  adrift 
the  prize,  which  he  had  taken  in  tow.  She  was  therefore  retaken, 
and  with  her,  a  lieutenant  and  twenty-five  men.  Fawler  was  tried 
by  court-martial  at  Gibraltar  on  October  (5th  and  7th  following ;  and 
the  court,  though  it  acquitted  him  for  not  engaging  de  Lage, 
condemned  him  for  not  destroying  the  prize,  which,  as  he  had  had 
possession  of  her  all  night  and  had  learnt  from  the  prisoners  that 
her  consorts  were  in  the  neighbourhood,  he  should  and  could 
have  done. 

When  de  La  Jonquiere,  driven  out  of  America  by  putrid  fever  and 
small-pox,  was  on  his  way  back  to  Europe,  he  had  a  narrow  escape 
from  falling  in  with  Anson,  then  in  command  in  the  Channel. 
Indeed,  so  near  were  the  fleets  to  one  another  that  the  French  ship, 
Mercure,  56,  doing  duty  as  a  hospital,  was  taken,  when  but  a  little 
separated  from  the  main  body.  Two  other  ships  failed  to  reach 
France ;  the  Ferme,  54,  which  had  been  sent  to  Quebec  with 
military  stores,  and  which  had  fallen  in  with  the  British  blockading 
squadron,  and  the  Mars,  64,  which  had  been  driven  by  stress  of 
weather  to  Martinique.  Thence,  after  refitting,  she  had  sailed  for 
1  Court-martial  on  Townshend,  February  9th,  1746-47.  P.  R.  0.,  vol.  30. 


282  MINOR    OPERATIONS,    1714-1762.  [1746. 

home ;  but  she  was  seventy-five  men  short  of  her  complement  and 
very  sickly,  so  that,  when  she  fell  in,  on  October  llth,  1746,  with 
the  Nottingham,  60,  Captain  Philip  de  Saumarez,  cruising  to  the 
south-west  of  Cape  Clear,  she  was  not  in  a  condition  to  make  effective 
resistance.  The  fight  was,  nevertheless,  maintained  for  two  hours, 
ere  the  Marx,  reduced  to  a  wreck,  with  twelve  men  killed  and 
forty  wounded,  as  against  three  killed  and  sixteen  wounded  in  the 
Nottingham,  struck.  But  for  the  fineness  of  the  weather  it  would 
have  been  impossible  to  send  her  in.  She  was  added  to  the  Navy. 

In  174(>,  the  privateers  on  both  sides  continued  to  have  a  good 
share  in  the  hard  knocks,  and  from  time  to  time  did  excellent 
service.  There  are  two  of  their  exploits  which  specially  claim 
mention.  On  April  10th  the  Alexander  privateer,  one  hundred  and 
forty  men,  Phillips  master,  was  cruising  oft'  lihe,  when  she  saw 
a  frigate,  with  a  store  ship  in  company,  standing  into  St.  Martin. 
This  was  the  ^olelxuj,  '10  guns  and  two  hundred  and  thirty  men, 
which  had  been  taken  by  de  Rochambeau  on  the  Portuguese  coast 
nearly  two  years  before.  Phillips  boarded  her  athwart  the  bowsprit, 
at  the  very  entrance  to  the  road,  and  carried  her,  killing  fifteen  of 
her  men.  Phillips,  like  Walker,  was  kept  out  of  the  King's  service, 
which  he  was  desirous  of  entering,  by  the  stringency  of  the  regula- 
tions, and  had  to  be  content  with  an  acknowledgment  of  five  hundred 
guineas  and  a  gold  medal.  The  second  instance  occurred  on  May  1st, 
when,  as  has  been  briefly  noted  in  the  previous  chapter,  H.M.S. 
Greyhound,  20,  with  the  sloops  Jialtimort-  and  Terror,  fell  in  off  the 
west  coast  of  Scotland  with  two  heavy  French  privateers  of  82  and 
84  guns  respectively.  The  British  were  severely  handled  and  beaten 
oft',  and  Commander  the  Hon.  Richard  Howe  (afterwards  Earl  Howe), 
then  of  the  Baltimore,  was  badly  wounded. 

On  February  9th,  174(i,  the  Portland,  50,  Captain  Charles 
Stevens,  cruising  in  the  Soundings,  fell  in  with  and  engaged  the 
French  Angustc,  50,  four  hundred  and  seventy  men. 

"  After  two-and-a-half  hours'  close  action,"  wrote  Stevens,  "  she  struck,  having 
fifty  killed,  ninety-four  wounded,  all  her  masts  so  shattered  that  they  went  by  the 
board,  and  so  many  shot  in  the  hull,  that,  with  the  late  hard  easterly  wind,  I  was 
obliged  to  put  away  with  her  before  it  a  hundred  leagues  to  the  westward,  and  am  now 
towing  her  for  Plymouth."  ' 

The  Portland  had  five  men  killed  and  thirteen  wounded,  and  lost 
her  main  yard.2     The  Auguste  was  bought  into  the  service,  and, 
1  J.  K.  Laughton  :  'Studies  in  Naval  History,'  ]>.  255.          2  Charnock,  v.  229. 


1747.]  CRUISE   OF   CAPTAIN  THOMAS   FOX.  283 

as  the  Portland's  Prize,  cruised  with  success.  On  November  19th  of 
the  same  year,  in  company  with  the  Winchelsea,  20,  the  Portland 
sighted  the  Subtile,  '26.  The  Winchelsea,  in  which  Samuel  (after- 
wards Viscount)  Hood  was  then  a  lieutenant,  outsailed  her  consort, 
and,  after  a  very  severe  action,  fought  the  chase  to  a  standstill,  so 
that,  on  the  Portland's  coming  up,  the  Frenchman  struck  im- 
mediately.1 The  rest  of  the  doings  of  single  ships  and  light 
squadrons  in  European  waters  during  the  year  may  be  dismissed 
with  a  mere  reference  to  the  destruction  of  the  Ardent,  (54,  which  was 
chased  ashore  in  Quiberon  Bay  in  November  by  Lestock's  squadron 
when  returning  from  its  fruitless  descent  on  Lorient. 

Before  Anson's  victory  of  May  3rd,  there  was  little  done  at  sea 
in  1747  ;  and,  after  it,  the  enemy  began  to  show  great  signs  of  that 
exhaustion  which,  consequent  on  their  second  defeat  in  October,  put 
an  end  to  the  war.  Anson's  work  was  well  supplemented  when 
Captain  Thomas  Fox,  of  the  Kent,  74,  having  put  to  sea  with 
a  small  squadron  in  April,  fell  in,  to  the  westward  of  the  Bay  of 
Biscay,  on  June  20th,  with  the  large  fleet  of  French  West  Indiamen 
which  he  had  long  been  anxiously  awaiting.  The  merchantmen  were 
under  the  convoy  of  M.  Dubois  de  La  Motte,  whose  force  consisted 
of  three  sail  of  the  line  and  a  frigate,  a  force  inferior  indeed  to  tin- 
six  ships  -  of  Fox's  squadron  but  not  so  far  inferior  as  to  justify  tin- 
flight  which  followed.  M.  de  La  Jonquiere,  in  his  encounter  with 
Anson,  had  earned  the  gratitude  of  bis  country  by  deliberately  giving 
himself  to  be  crushed  that  he  might  save  his  convoy  ;  de  La  Motte 
shrank  from  the  sacrifice,  and  took  his  men-of-war  unscathed  into 
Brest,  while,  of  the  West  Indiamen,  about  fifty,  to  the  value  of 
upwards  of  a  million,  were  picked  up  either  by  Fox  himself  or  by 
Rear-Admiral  Sir  Peter  Warren's  squadron  to  leeward. 

On  the  following  day  the  Etoilc,  4(5,  escorting  five  merchantmen, 
was  driven  ashore  at  Cape  Finisterre  by  Sir  Peter  Warren,  and 
was  burnt.3  A  few  days  later,  an  attempt  to  execute  a  somewhat 
similar  exploit  ended  in  disaster.  The  Maidstone,  GO,  Captain  the 
Hon.  Augustus  Keppel,  which  had  been  cruising  in  the  Soundings 
and  in  the  Bay  of  Biscay,  chased  an  enemy's  ship  inshore  at  Belle 

1  The  Subtile  was  added  to  the  Royal  Navy  as  the  Amazon. 

2  Kent,  74,  Captain  Thomas  Fox ;  Hampton   Court,  70,  Captain  Savage  Mostyn  : 
Eagle,    60,   Captain    George    Brydges    Rodney ;    Lion,    60,    Captain    Arthur   Scott  ; 
Chester,  50,  Captain  Philip  Durell  (1);  Hector,  44,  Captain  Thomas  Stanhope  ;  with 
the  fireships  Pluto  and  Dolphin. 

3  Troude,  i.  318 ;  Beatson,  i.  372  ;  Charnock,  iv.  187. 


284  MINOR    OPERATIONS,   1714-1762.  [1747. 

Isle  on  June  27th.  Venturing  too  close  in,  the  Maidstone  ran 
aground  and  became  a  total  wreck ;  and  Keppel  and  his  men  were 
made  prisoners  of  war. 

Other  captures  of  note  made  during  the  course  of  the  summer 
in  European  waters  were  those  of  the  Bellone,  Loup,  and  Renommee. 
The  Bellone,  a  36-gun  frigate  bound  from  Nantes  to  the  East 
Indies,  was  taken  by  the  Edinburgh,  Eagle,  and  Nottingham,  was 
bought  into  the  service  as  the  Bella na,  and  was  at  once  sent  out 
to  cruise,  with  Captain  the  Hon.  Samuel  Barrington  in  command. 
The  Loup  had  been  the  British  sloop  Wolf,  taken  by  the  French 
two  years  earlier.  It  is  interesting  to  notice  that  she  was  captured 
by  the  Amazon,  '26,  which,  as  has  been  mentioned,  was  originally  the 
French  Subtile.  The  Wolf,  in  French  hands,  had  been  used  as  a 
privateer,  but  resumed  her  duties  as  a  14-gun  sloop  in  the  British 
Navy,  curiously  enough,  under  the  orders  of  Commander  George 
Vachell,  who  had  had  her  before  her  capture  in  1745. *  The 
Amazon,  whose  captain  was  Samuel  Faulknor  (2),  son  of  that 
Samuel  Faulknor  (1)  who  had  perished  with  Balchen  in  the  Victory 
in  1744,  continuing  her  cruise,  fell  in,  on  September  12th,  with  the 
Renommee,  32.  A  severe  but  indecisive  action  followed,  and  left 
both  ships  badly  crippled.  They  parted  company  in  the  night, 
but,  next  day,  the  Rcnomnwc,  having  the  further  misfortune  to  fall 
in  with  the  Dover,  50,  Captain  the  Hon.  Washington  Shirley,  was 
taken,  and,  with  her,  M.  de  Conilans,  who  was  going  out  in  her 
to  take  over  the  government  of  San  Domingo. 

The  French  force  under  M.  de  1'Etenduere,  which  suffered 
defeat  on  October  14th,  1747,  at  the  hands  of  Hawke,  had  under 
its  convoy  a  large  fleet  of  merchantmen  for  the  West  Indies. 
Hawke,  after  the  battle,  was  not  in  a  fit  state  to  pursue  the  convoy, 
but,  with  admirable  promptness,  at  once  victualled  the  Weazel, 
sloop,  and  despatched  her  to  warn  Captain  George  Pocock,  who 
had  succeeded  Captain  the  Hon.  Edward  Legge  as  commodore  on 
the  West  India  station,  of  its  approach.  Thanks  to  this  prompt- 
ness, Pocock,  though  his  squadron  was  scattered  when  the  news 
reached  him,  was  able  to  capture  many  of  the  merchantmen.  The 
Captain  took  eight,  the  Dreadnought  six,  the  Dragon  five,  the 
Ludloiv  Castle  another,  and  the  privateers  on  the  station  ten  more. 
The  twenty  taken  by  Pocock  were  valued  at  £100,000." 

1  He  was  lost  with  her  oft'  the  Irish  coast  in  January,  1741). 

2  Beatson,  i.  368  and  408. 


1747.]  THE  ADVENTURES    OF   THE   OLOBIOSO.  "285 

It  still  remains  to  describe  the  most  noteworthy  of  the  minor 
actions  of  the  year  1747. l  Mention  has  already  been  made  of 
George  Walker,  a  man  who  would  have  done  credit  to  any  service, 
and  who  was  kept  out  of  the  Navy  only  by  the  regulations  which 
made  it  impossible  to  offer  him  therein  any  command  which  he 
would  be  likely  to  accept.  His  fortune  on  two  or  three  occasions 
brought  him  into  close  contact  with  the  Royal  Navy,  but  never  more 
closely  than  in  the  present  instance.  AValker,  it  has  been  seen, 
took  over  Talbot's  squadron  of  privateers  on  the  latter's  retirement. 
He  enlarged  it,  and,  like  his  predecessor,  cruised  with  great  success 
against  the  enenry's  commerce.  On  October  6th,  1747,  the  "  Ro3-al 
Family,"  so  called  because  all  the  ships  composing  it  were  named 
after  members  of  the  reigning  house,  were  standing  out  of  Lagos 
Bay  when  a  large  ship  was  sighted  coming  in  towards  Cape 
St.  Vincent.  They  immediately  gave  chase ;  and  the  stranger  bore 
away  to  the  westward,  being,  like  the  British  ships,  in  some  doubt 
as  to  the  enemy's  force.  She  was,  in  fact,  the  Glorioso,  a  Spanish 
74,  which  had  previously  landed  at  Ferrol  about  three  millions  of 
treasure  from  the  Spanish  Main,  and  was  then  bound  to  Cadiz. 
She  was  a  fine  powerful  ship,  though,  as  was  general  in  that 
service,  she  carried  no  heavier  guns  than  24-poumlers.  This  was 
not  her  first  hostile  meeting  during  the  voyage,  for  on  July  14th 
she  had  fallen  in  at  the  Azores  with  the  Lark,  40,  Captain  John 
Crookshanks,  and  Warwick,  (JO,  Captain  Robert  Erskine.  The 
Warwick  had  attacked  but,  left  unsupported,  had  been  beaten  to 
a  standstill ;  and  the  Gloriow  had  made  off.  For  this  fiasco, 
Crookshanks,  who  was  the  senior  officer,  was  cashiered.  A  few 
days  later  the  Spaniard  had  met  with  the  Oxford,  50,  with  the 
Shoreham,  24,  and  Falcon,  14,  in  company;  but  they  had  made 
room  for  her  as  being  of  superior  force. 

It  was  now  for  Walker  to  try  his  hand.  He  believed  that  there 
was  treasure  still  on  board ;  but  when,  at  about  noon  on  the  6th, 
he  overhauled  the  chase,  his  frigate,  the  K Ing  George,  32,  was  alone. 
It  had  fallen  flat  calm,  and  the  rest  of  the  "Royal  Family"  had 
not  been  able  to  get  up,  so  that  the  King  George  and  the  Glorioso 
lay  looking  at  one  another,  each  uncertain  as  to  what  the  other 
was.  In  the  evening  a  breeze  arose,  and  the  Glorioso  headed  in- 

1  J.  K.  Laughton :  '  Studies  in  Naval  History,'  pp.  239  sqy.  P.  K.  0.  Courts- 
martial,  vol.  32,  December  28th,  1747,  on  Smith  Callis  of  the  Oxford,  and, 
February  1st,  1748,  on  Crookshanks  of  the  Lark. 


286  MINOR    OPERATIONS,   1714-1762.  [1747. 

shore,  followed  by  the  privateer  which,  on  closing,  hailed  for 
information.  The  Spaniard  answered  with  a  cross-question,  and, 
on  finding  that  the  ship  alongside  was  British,  poured  in  a  broad- 
side, which  was  returned  at  once ;  and  the  ships  ran  slowly  in  to  the 
land,  engaged  yard-arm  to  yard-arm.  There  have  been  instances 
enough  of  frigates  attacking  ships  of  the  line  ;  the  capture  of  the 
Guillaume  Tell  in  1800  was  directly  due  to  the  embarrassing  atten- 
tions of  the  Penelope ;  and  no  small  share  of  Edward  Pellew's  great 
name  is  due  to  the  manner  in  which,  in  the  Indefatigable,  44,  he 
hung  on  to  the  ])roits  de  I'Hominc  in  a  gale  of  wind  on  a  lee  shore, 
till  he  left  her  a  hopeless  wreck.  But  this  is  the  only  instance  in 
which  a  frigate,  in  a  smooth  sea  and  fine  weather,  voluntarily 
placed  herself,  yard-arm  to  yard-arm,  with  a  ship  of  the  line ;  and 
not  the  least  wonder  of  it  is  that  the  frigate  was  only  a  privateer. 
Fortunately  for  the  Kin;/  Georije,  many  of  the  enemy's  shot  either 
went  over  her  or  took  effect  in  her  spars  ;  yet,  in  spite  of  that, 
after  some  hours  her  position  began  to  be  critical.  On  one  of  her 
consorts,  the  Prince  Frederick,  coming  up,  however,  the  Glorioso 
took  to  flight.  On  the  morning  of  the  Nth,  the  Kiny  George  was 
too  disabled  to  pursue,  and  the  Prince  Frederick,  with  two  other 
ships  of  the  squadron,  was  making  sail  after  the  chase  when  a  large 
vessel  was  seen  coming  up  from  the  eastward.  She  was  made  out 
to  be  British,  and  Walker  at  once  sent  to  explain  the  situation  to 
her  captain.  She  was  the  Russell,  80,  Captain  Matthew  Buckle  (1), 
homeward  bound  from  the  Mediterranean,  but  with  only  half  a  crew 
on  board  ;  and,  even  of  these,  some  were  sick.  As  the  Russell  crowded 
sail  in  pursuit  the  chase  was  seen  to  be  sharply  engaged  with  some 
vessel  unknown  which  presently  blew  up.  It  was  thought  at  first 
that  she  was  the  Prince  Frederick,  but  she  was  in  reality  .the 
Dartmouth,  50,  Captain  James  Hamilton  (2),  which  had  been  drawn 
to  the  scene  of  action  by  the  firinfg  of  the  previous  night.  Out  of 
her  crew  of  three  hundred  only  fourteen,  including  a  lieutenant, 
were  saved.  Shortly  afterwards  the  Russell  in  her  turn  came  up, 
and  began  a  hot  action  which  lasted  for  five  hours,  at  the  end  of 
which  time  the  enemy's  main-top  mast  went  overboard  and  she 
struck.  So  short-handed  was  the  Russell  that  the  number  of  the 
prisoners  was  a  serious  embarrassment,  and  many  of  them  had  to  be 
sent  away  in  the  privateers. 

Towards  the  end  of    1747   Captain  Dubois  de  La  Motte  went 
out  to  San  Domingo  with  a  convoy  of  merchantmen.      His  force 


1748.]  THE  MAGNANIME   TAKEN.  287 

consisted  of  the  Magnanime,  64,  and  a  new  Etoile,  42.  On 
November  18th  four  British  men-of-war  were  seen,1  of  which  one 
mounted  60  and  another  50  guns.  From  these  M.  de  La  Motte 
protected  his  convoy.  There  was  some  desultory  firing,  and  the 
merchantmen,  with  the  exception  of  six,  got  safely  away.  No 
sooner  was  the  Magnanime  back  in  France,  than  she  was  ordered 
to  the  East  Indies,  bearing  the  broad  pennant  of  Commodore  the 
Marquis  d'Albert.2  On  January  81st,  1748,  she  was  sighted  in  the 
north-west  by  the  fleet  then  cruising  under  Hawke  to  the  westward 
of  Ushant.  The  Magnanime  had  been  partially  dismasted  in  a  gale 
a  few  days  previously,  and  was  then  on  her  way  back  to  Brest 
to  refit.  Directly  she  was  sighted,  the  Nottingham,  (JO,  Captain 
Eobert  Harland  (2),  was  detached  in  chase;  but,  immediately 
afterwards,  it  became  apparent  that  the  enemy  was  a  ship  of  force, 
and  the  Portland,  50,  Captain  Charles  Stevens,  was  also  ordered 
to  follow  her.  The  Nottingham  was  engaged  for  nearly  an  hour 
before  Stevens  could  come  up,  and  suffered  somewhat  severely, 
losing  in  all  sixteen  men  killed  and  eighteen  wounded.  The  loss 
of  the  Portland  was  only  four  men  wounded,  its  smallness  being  due 
to  the  disabled  condition  of  the  French  ship,  which  allowed  the 
Portland  to  keep  on  her  quarter  and  rake  her  at  will.  After 
a  stubborn  resistance,  lasting  for  six  hours,  the  enemy  struck, 
having  lost,  out  of  a  crew  of  six  hundred  and  eighty-six  men, 
forty-five  killed  and  one  hundred  and  five  wounded.  The  prize 
was  a  very  fine  ship,  and  was  added  to  the  British  Navy  under 
her  old  name.  Her  capture  was  the  last  one  of  importance  in 
the  war. 

The  10th  of  October,  1748,  was  marked  by  the  mutiny  of  the 
Chesterfield,  40,  which  was  stationed  011  the  coast  of  Africa.  On 
the  date  named,  while  the  ship  lay  off  Cape  Coast  Castle,  and 
the  captain,  O'Brien  Dudley,  and  others  were  ashore,  Lieutenant 
Samuel  Couchman  organised  a  rising,  and,  persuading  the  lieutenant 
of  Marines,  the  carpenter,  and  thirty  men  to  join  him,  got  possession 
of  the  ship.  The  boatswain,  Mr.  Gastrien,  was  of  those  on  board 
the  most  zealous  in  his  attempts  first  to  dissuade,  and  afterwards  to 


1  This  is  on  the  authority  of  Troude,  i.  31!).  Beatsou  makes  no  mention  of  it,  and 
as  Troude  gives  no  English  names  it  is  hard  to  say  what  the  ships  were. 

-  Troude,  i.  321.  There  is  some  doubt  as  to  the  date  of  the  capture  of  the 
Magnanime,  but  as  she  had  been  in  the  West  Indies  in  December,  January  31st,  the 
latest  date  given,  seems  the  most  probable.  Cf.  Beatsou,  i.  409. 


288  MINOR    OPERATIONS,   1714-1762.  [1748-51. 

overpower,  the  mutineers ;  but  had  Couchman  and  his  party  been 
men  in  any  way  equal  to  the  risky  part  which  they  had  set  them- 
selves to  play,  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  it  would  have  gone  very 
hard  indeed  with  the  boatswain  and  the  loyal  party.  The  mutineers, 
however,  having  first  tried  to  reason  a  few  more  into  joining  them, 
and  having  failed,  left  the  well-disposed  members  of  the  crew  to 
roam  about  the  ship  and  concert  plans  at  their  leisure.  On  the 
12th,  therefore,  the  boatswain  took  counsel  with  the  gunner,  who 
was  ill  in  his  cabin,  and,  thus  getting  hold  of  twenty  pistols,  armed 
a  few  resolute  men  and  recovered  the  ship.  A  court-martial  was 
held  on  board  the  Invincible  at  Portsmouth  on  June  26th,  1749,  to 
inquire  into  alleged  neglect  of  duty  on  the  part  of  Captain  O'Brien 
Dudley,  and  to  examine  into  the  reasons  for  his  being  ashore  with  so 
many  of  his  officers  to  the  detriment  of  the  service.  Captain  Dudley 
proved  that  there  had  been  no  cause  to  suspect  latent  mutiny,  and 
that  he  and  his  officers  were  ashore  on  duty.  He  and  they  were, 
accordingly,  acquitted  of  all  blame.  As  for  Couchman  and  John 
Morgan,  the  lieutenant  of  Marines,  they  were  tried  on  the  28th  and 
80th  respectively,  and  both  were  condemned  to  be  shot.  On  the 
]  Oth  July  six  men  were  tried  for  the  same  offence,  and  of  them  two 
were  acquitted  and  the  rest  hanged.1 

Till  the  outbreak  of  the  next  war  the  Navy  had  little  to  do,  and, 
as  was  usually  the  case  in  a  time  of  comparative  quiet,  it  turned  its 
attention  to  the  Mediterranean  pirates.  A  small  squadron  was  sent 
out,  with  Captain  the  Hon.  Augustus  Keppcl  in  the  Centurion,  50,  as 
Commodore.  Keppel  had  a  special  mission  to  the  Dey  of  Algier,  to 
treat  with  him,  or,  if  necessary,  to  force  him  to  restrain  his  piratical 
cruisers  ;  and  the  story  told  -  is  that  the  Dey  professed  astonishment 
that  the  King  of  England  should  have  sent  a  beardless  boy  to  treat 
with  him.  Keppel,  who  was  twenty-six,  was,  no  doubt,  nettled,  and 
is  said  to  have  answered :  "  Had  my  master  supposed  that  wisdom 
was  measured  by  length  of  beard,  he  would  have  sent  your  Dey- 
ship  a  he-goat."  When  the  angry  Dey  threatened  his  visitor  with 
death,  Keppel,  pointing  to  his  squadron,  is  said  to  have  explained 
that  there  were  enough  of  his  countrymen  there  to  honour  him  with 
a  glorious  funeral  pyre.  Whether  there  be  truth  in  the  story  or  not, 

1  P.  R.  0.  Courts-martial,  vol.  33.     See  also  Beatson,  iii.  89. 

-  A  suspiciously  similar  story  is  told  of  the  behaviour  of  the  Bey  of  Tripoli  to 
Shovell  m  1675.  There  is  no  reference  to  the  afi'air  iu  the  Hon.  and  Rev.  Thomas 
Keppel's  'Life'  of  his  relative. — W.  L.  C. 


1755.]  THE  SEVEN   YEARS"    WAR.  289 

the  fact  stands  that  in  June,  1751,  the  difficulties  were  smoothed 
over,  and  that  Keppel  returned  to  England  in  the  following  month 
and  paid  off. 

It  was  not  until  after  some  months  of  unofficial  hostilities  in 
North  America,  and  until  after  the  receipt  in  England  of  Boscaweu's 
dispatch  relative  to  the  capture  of  the  Alcide  and  Lyx,  that  the 
Seven  Years'  War  was  fairly  set  on  foot. 

Thus  far  the  British  had  been  the  gainers  in  the  struggle  that 
still  awaited  a  formal  initiation.  The}'  had  taken  two  ships,  and  they 
had  lost  but  one,  the  Mars,  64,  which  had  grounded  while  going  into 
harbour  at  Halifax  on  the  return  thither  of  Boscawen's  squadron  at 
the  end  of  June;  and  which  it  had  been  impossible  to  get  off  again. 
Soon  afterwards,  on  the  night  of  August  13th,  1755,  the  Bland  ford, 
20,  Captain  liichard  Watkiiis,  when  on  her  way  to  South  Carolina, 
fell  in  off  Brest  with  a  French  squadron  homeward  bound  from  the 
West  Indies  under  M.  du  Quay.  She  did  what  she  could  to  get 
away,  and,  even  when  surrounded,  attempted  some  resistance  ;  but 
the  British  20-gun  frigate  of  that  period  was  "  a  pigmy  with  a  pop- 
gun armament;"  and  she  was  easily  taken  possession  of  and  sent 
into  Nantes.1  The  sequel  is  curious  as  testifying  to  a  tardy  /eal  on 
the  part  of  the  French  to  avert  the  consequences  of  their  aggressions. 
With  a  parade  of  regard  for  legality,  the  Slandford  was  restored  by 
the  French  Government  ;  but  Great  Britain  was  not  thus  readily 
appeased,  and  she  quickly  retaliated  by  capturing  the  K.yx'riuici-, 
commanded  by  Comte  de  Bouvet.  That  ship,  nominally  a  74,  but 
having  only  twenty-four  guns  mounted,  was  on  her  way  home  from 
Louisbourg,  when  on  November  13th,  1755,  she  fell  in  with  Byng's 
fleet,  which  had  sailed  from  Spithead  a  month  before.  The  Orfonl, 
64,  Captain  Charles  Stevens,  was  ordered  to  chase,  and  soon  began 
a  close  action,  in  which  the  RCVOKJC,  (J4,  Captain  Frederick  Corn- 
wall, presently  joined.  The  Esperance,  however,  made  a  stout 
resistance,  and  did  not  strike  till  the  squadron  began  to  draw  up. 
She  was  an  old  ship,  and  had  been  so  severely  handled  that,  con- 
sidering the  badness  of  the  weather,  it  was  judged  useless  to  try  to 
keep  her  afloat.  She  had  lost  ninety  killed  and  wounded  out  of  a  total 
of  three  hundred.  Her  surviving  people  were,  therefore,  taken  out 
of  her,  and  she  was  set  on  fire.  This  was  on  the  15th,  when  it  was 
first  possible  to  send  a  boat  on  board  her,  although  she  had  been 

1  P.  R.  0.  Court-martial  on  Watkins,  October  fith,  1755.    Vol.  36. 
VOL.    III.  U 


290  MINOR    OPERATIONS,   1714-1762.  [1756. 

making  signals  of  distress  ever  since  her  capture  on  the  13th.    Byng 
wrote  l  concerning  her  : — 

"  She  was  in  the  most  distressed  condition  I  ever  saw  a  ship,  extremely  leaky  and 
not  able  to  carry  any  sail,  having  only  her  lower  masts  standing  and  foretopmast,  and 
not  one  yard  across  except  the  spritsail  yard." 

On  March  llth,  1756,  still  prior  to  the  declaration  of  war, 
the  Warwick,  60,  was  taken  by  the  French  near  Martinique.  Seeing 
that,  according  to  a  French  acccrant,2  this  ship  was  taken  by  a  frigate, 
it  is  interesting  to  turn  to  the  story  of  the  affair  as  given  by  her 
commander,  Captain  Molyneux  Shuldham,  at  the  subsequent  court- 
martial.3  The  Warwick  had  been  detached  on  December  21st, 
1755,  by  Commodore  Thomas  Frankland,  to  cruise  in  the  neigh- 
bourhood of  Martinique ;  and  shortly  after  reaching  her  station 
she  began  to  be  very  sickly.  As,  however,  the  sickness  began  to 
decrease,  and  as  there  was  no  information  of  any  French  ships  of 
force  being  in  those  waters,  Shuldham  resolved  to  continue  his 
cruise. 

On  March  llth,  at  daybreak,  three  sail  were  sighted,  and,  they 
being  obviously  of  superior  force,  and  the  private  signal  being 
unanswered,  the  Warwick  bore  away  under  a  press  of  sail.  The 
strangers  were,  in  fact,  the  French  74-gun  ship  Prudent,  and  the 
two  frigates  Atalanti-  and  Zephyr,  then  on  their  way  out  from 
France  under  the  command  of  Captain  d'Aubigny  of  the  Prudent. 
The  Warwick  was  one  of  the  smallest  of  her  class,  was  a  dull  sailer, 
had  less  than  three  hundred  men  fit  for  service,  and  was  so  crank 
that  she  could  rarely  use  her  lower  deck  guns.  As  there  was  a 
heavy  sea  running,  she  was  unable  to  use  them  on  the  occasion  in 
question  ;  and  she  had  to  rely  almost  entirely  on  the  9-pounders  of 
her  upper  deck  and  quarter-deck.  The  Atalantc,  34,  Captain  du 
Chaffault,  was  the  first  to  come  up  with  the  chase,  and,  hanging  on 
her  quarter,  out  of  reach  of  her  weather  broadside,  kept  up  a  galling 
fire.  The  wind  shifted  in  a  hard  squall ;  both  ships  were  taken 
aback  ;  and  before  the  Warwick,  whose  rigging  was  much  cut,  could 
pay  off  her  head,  the  Prudent  drew  close  up  and  opened  fire.  Shuld- 
ham ordered  the  great  guns  to  play  upon  the  commodore  only,  and 
the  small-arm  men  to  keep  up  their  fire  on  the  Atalante ;  but  it  was 

1  Admiral's  Dispatches,  Channel  Fleet,  vol.  2.     Byng,  November  19th,  1755. 

•  Troude,  i.  338. 

3  P.  R.  0.  Courts-martial,  vol.  38,  March  27th,  1758. 


1756.]  HOWE   TO    THE   CHAUSEY  ISLANDS.  291 

still  impossible  to  use  the  lower  deck  guns,  the  ship  being  half 
swamped ;  and  after  half  an  hour  more,  being  defenceless  and  un- 
manageable, she  struck  her  flag.  Shuldham  remained  a  prisoner  of 
war  for  two  years,  and  on  his  release  was  adjudged  by  the  court- 
martial,  held  to  inquire  into  the  loss,  to  have  done  his  duty. 

An  indecisive  action  was  fought  on  May  17th,  1756,  between  the 
Colchester,  50,  and  Lyrne,  28,  Captains  Lucius  O'Brien  and  Edward 
Vernon  (2),  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  French  ships  Aquilun,  50,  and 
Fidele,1  26,  on  the  other.  The  French  ships  were  standing  in  for 
Rochefort  in  charge  of  a  convoy,  when,  quite  near  the  forts,  they 
were  sighted  by  the  British  and  chased.  The  convoy  was  ordered 
to  make  the  best  of  its  way,  and  the  men-of-war  gave  battle  to 
cover  its  retreat.  The  ships  paired  off,  the  Colchester  engaging  the 
Aquilon,  while  the  frigates  fought  it  out  together;  but  so  equal  were 
the  forces  on  both  sides,  that,  when  they  parted  by  mutual  consent, 
and  with  heavy  loss,  no  definite  result  had  been  arrived  at  as  the 
outcome  of  seven  hours'  hard  pounding. 

A  small  expedition,  planned  and  carried  into  effect  during  the 
summer  of  1756,  deserves  mention  on  account  of  the  relief  which 
it  afforded  to  British  trade  in  the  Channel.  The  enemy  was  busy 
fortifying  the  Chausey  Islands,  which  lie  off  Granville,  being  influ- 
enced thereto  by  the  fact  that  the  islands  afforded  a  -refuge  to  the 
St.  Malo  privateers,  and  were  also  close  to  the  Channel  Islands,  upon 
which  the  French  had  designs.  It  was  desirable  that  the  fortifica- 
tions should  not  be  proceeded  with,  and  Captain  the  Hon.  Richard 
Howe,  of  the  Dunkirk,  60,  was  sent  with  a  small  squadron,  consisting 
of  a  '20-gun  frigate  and  some  small  craft,  to  put  a  stop  to  the  work. 
With  Howe  went  three  hundred  men  of  the  Jersey  garrison  ;  but 
there  was  no  fighting,  for  the  French  commandant,  after  some 
dispute  about  terms,  was  content  to  respect  the  force  arrayed  against 
him,  and  to  surrender  on  the  conditions  offered.  The  fortifications 
were  immediately  destroyed.  The  conquest,  small  though  it  was, 
would  not  have  been  so  easily  effected,  had  all  the  works  been 
completed,  for  the  situation  was  strong  ;  and  the  approach  to  it  was 
difficult,  and  wholly  exposed  to  the  fire  of  the  fort,  which  was 
designed  to  mount  thirty  guns." 

1  Troude,  i.  339,  calls  her  Cybile,  but  there  was  no  ship  of  the  name  in  the  French 
Navy  List.      O'Brien,  in  his  report  to    Biscawen  (Admiral's  Dispatches,  Channel  Fleet 
vol.  -t),  called  her  Lajidddle. 

2  Beatson,  i.  520. 

u  2 


292  MINOR    OPERATIONS,    1714-1762.  [1756. 

Consequent  upon  Byng's  action,  there  was  a  lull  in  the  Medi- 
terranean. The  French  had  no  fleet  at  sea  there  ;  and  Hawke's 
command  was  for  the  most  part  uneventful.  Its  most  interesting 
episode  was  one  which  brought  him  into  contact  with  Fortunatus 
Wright,1  the  most  noteworthy  of  all  the  British  privateers  who  ever 
plied  in  the  Mediterranean.  At  the  outbreak  of  the  war  Wright  was 
at  Leghorn,  where  he  had  been  building  a  small  vessel  in  readiness 
for  emergencies.  But  Tuscan  sympathies  were  so  entirely  French 
that  Wright,  when  on  the  point  of  sailing,  found  himself  strictly 
limited  as  to  the  force  he  might  embark.  However,  he  got  outside 
the  port,  took  on  board  more  guns  and  men  from  ships  which  had 
sailed  under  his  convoy,  and  at  once  beat  off  a  large  French  privateer 
which  was  cruising  in  readiness  to  intercept  him.  Following  this, 
he  put  back  to  Leghorn  to  refit,  but  was  at  once  ordered,  or  rather 
forced,  to  bring  his  ship  inside  the  mole,  where  she  was  detained  on 
a  charge  of  having  violated  the  neutrality  of  the  port.  A  diplomatic 
squabble  began,  and  was  continued  until  Captain  Sir  William 
Burnaby  appeared  on  the  scene.  Wright  had  contrived  to  let 
Hawke  know  how  matters  stood ;  and  Hawke  had  immediately 
despatched  Burnaby,  in  the  Jrwy,  (>0,  together  with  the  Iris,  50, 
to  set  matters  straight.  The  mission  of  Sir  William  was  to  convoy 
the  trade  from  Leghorn,  and  to  see  the  >S7.  George,  Wright's  ship, 
safe  out  of  that  port.  To  the  representations  of  the  governor  and 
the  Austrian  or  French  sympathies  of  that  officer,  Burnaby  had 
nothing  to  say ;  but  lie  made  it  abundantly  clear  that  he  was 
authori/.ed,  and  in  a  position,  to  repel  force  by  force,  should  any 
resistance  be  offered  ;  and  the  Jersey,  the  Jrix,  the  St.  George,  and 
the  merchantmen  went  out  of  Leghorn  in  peace. 

Another  somewhat  invidious  piece  of  service  that  fell  to  the  lot 
of  Sir  Edward  Hawke  was  the  cutting  out,  from  under  the  guns  of 
the  Spanish  port  of  Algeciras,  of  a  British  merchantman  which  had 
been  carried  thither  by  a  French  privateer.  The  Spaniards  were, 
like  the  Tuscans,  strongly  French  in  their  sympathies ;  and,  after 
refusing  to  order  the  French  ship  and  her  prize  out  of  their  port, 
they  helped  the  privateer  to  pour  a  murderous  fire  into  the  attack- 
ing boats.  The  boats  lost  one  hundred  and  fifty  men  killed  and 
wounded,  but  the  ship  went  back  to  Gibraltar  with  them,  and  the 
memory  of  the  affair  stood  over  until  1762. 

1  Goiner  Williams :  '  Liverpool  Privateers.'  J.  K.  Laughton :  '  Studies  in  Naval 
History.' 


1756-57.]  LOCKHART  IN   THE    TARTAR.  293 

The  only  other  captures  of  men-of-war  made  during  1756,  were, 
on  the  one  hand  those  of  the  Arc  en  del,  50,  and  Chariot  Royal,  36, 
in  July  and  March  respectively,  the  vessels  being  at  the  tirae 
engaged  in  carrying  stores  to  Louisbourg,  and  on  the  other,  that  of 
the  small  brig  Adventure,  mounting  six  3-pounders.  After  a  stout 
resistance,  she  struck  to  the  privateer  Infernal  of  Havre.  But 
many  privateers  of  force  were  taken ;  and  in  that  kind  of  service 
Captain  John  Lockhart,1  of  the  Tartar,  made  a  great  name  both 
for  energy  and  for  success.  The  Tartar  was  a  frigate  of  28  guns  and 
180  men,  and  Lockhart,  who  was  appointed  to  her  in  March,  175(5, 
continued  cruising  in  her  for  two  years,  during  which  time  he  took 
many  large  privateers  of  equal  or  superior  force.  Among  these  were 
the  Cerf  of  22  guns  and  211  men,  the  Grand  Gideon  of  26  guns  and 
190  men,  and  the  Mont  Ozicr,  of  La  Kochelle,  of  20  guns  and  170  men. 
In  engaging  the  last  named,  Lockhart  was  severely  wounded,  but 
no  sooner  had  he  rejoined  his  ship,  after  an  absence  of  two  months, 
than  he  took  off  Dmmose  the  Due  d'Aii/iiillon  of  St.  Malo,  of 
26  guns  and  254  men.  These  are  but  some  of  the  many  large  prizes 
made  by  the  Tartar. 

In  February,  1757,  while  Lockhart  was  ashore  wounded,  the 
ship  went  out  under  the  command  of  her  first  lieutenant,  Thomas 
Baillie  (1),  and  took  the  Victoirc,  privateer,  of  Le  Havre,  of  26  guns 
and  230  men,  which  was  bought  into  the  .Royal  Navy  under  the 
name  of  the  Tartar'*  Prize.  The  Gnanont,  18,  taken  in  the 
following  October,  was  bought  in  under  her  own  name,  as  also  was 
the  Melainpf,  the  finest  of  all  the  Tartar'*  priy.es.  This  ship  was 
taken,  after  a  long  chase  and  a  stubborn  action,  early  in  November. 
She  was  of  700  tons,  mounted  36  guns,  and  had  a  crew  of  320  men." 
Her  capture  proved  to  be  the  last  of  the  achievements  of  Lockhart 
while  a  frigate  captain,  for  the  Admiralty  testified  its  appreciation  of 
his  successful  cruising  by  moving  him  into  a  fifty-gun  ship,  and  so 
limited  his  activity. 

At  the  very  end  of  1756  there  occurred  an  incident,  which, 
though  of  no  great  importance  in  itself,  throws  some  light  on  the 
interpretation  of  the  Naval  Discipline  Act,  and  has  in  consequence 
some  bearing  on  the  fate  of  Byng.  It  is  an  instance  of  what  a 
court-martial  accepted  as  an  "  error  of  judgment,"  and  as  such  is 
recommended  to  the  attention  of  those  who  have  been  led  to  believe 
that  it  was  merely  for  an  "  error  of  judgment  "  that  Byng  suffered.  On 
1  Afterwards  Sir  John  Lockhart  Rosa,  Bart.  -  BeatKon,  ii.  77. 


294  MINOR    OPERATIONS,   1714-1762.  [1757. 

the  morning  of  December  27th,  Captain  Thomas  Graves  (2)1  in 
the  Sheerness,  frigate,  discovered  a  large  ship  making  for  Brest. 
There  was  some  doubt  as  to  what  the  stranger  was ;  for  it  was 
known  that  French  ships  of  the  line  were  in  the  neighbourhood,  and 
the  vessel  in  question  looked  as  if  she  might  be  one  of  them.  The 
weight  of  opinion  on  board  the  Sheerness  was  to  the  effect  that  the 
enemy  was  a  sixty-gun  ship,  and  it  was  well  seen  that  she  was  just 
ending  a  long  voyage  and  was  very  foul.  The  Frenchman  tried  to 
get  away  before  dawn,  but,  when  she  discovered  the  Sheerness's  force, 
she  shortened  sail  to  wait  for  her.  In  point  of  fact,  the  enemy  was 
only  an  East  Indiaman,  and  the  court,  satisfied  on  that  point, 
decided  that  Graves,  who  kept  away,  ought  to  have  gone  down  and 
discovered  her  force  by  engaging  her.  His  holding  aloof  was  not 
attributed  to  negligence,  disaffection,  or  cowardice.  It  was  agreed, 
however,  that  he  had  laid  too  great  a  stress  on  his  orders,  to  carry 
intelligence  to  Vice- Admiral  Sir  Charles  Knowles ;  that  his  fault 
was  an  "  error  of  judgment ;  "  and  that  his  case  fell  under  the  thirty- 
sixth  article.  He  was,  in  consequence,  publicly  reprimanded  by  the 
president  of  the  court. 

On  March  Kith,  1757,  being  then  off  Cape  Cabron,  San  Domingo, 
the  Grtnnricli,  50,  Captain  liobert  lioddam,  saw  to  windward  eight 
large  vessels.  She  made  sail  from  them,  and  they  gave  chase;  and 
eventually,  on  the  ISth,  the  three  leading  ships  came  up  with  her 
and  opened  fire.  These  were  the  Didditinc,  74,  EreiJh:,  04,  and  a 
frigate.  The  Greenwich  was  quite  hemmed  in,  and  at  length,  seeing 
that  her  position  was  hopeless,  she  struck.2  The  prize  was  fitted  out 
against  us,  and  fought  against  Forrest  on  October  "21st  of  the  same 
year,  but,  being  sent  back  to  France  after  the  action,  was  lost  near 
Brest.  Another  vessel  captured  from  the  lioyal  Navy  during  the 
year  was  the  Merlin,  10,  which  struck  to  the  French  privateer 
Machault,  30,  on  April  19th.  Commander  John  Cleland  (1),  of  the 
Merlin,  was  endeavouring  to  rejoin  a  convoy  from  which  he  had 
been  separated,  when  the  privateer  bore  down  upon  him."  It  had 
been,  and  was  still  blowing  hard ;  and  the  Merlin,  as  was  usual  with 
ships  of  her  class,  had  her  decks  full  of  water,  and  had  quite  enough 
to  do  to  look  after  herself.  The  guns  were  all  secured  fore  and  aft ; 
and,  save  with  small  arms,  it  was  impossible  to  make  any  resistance. 

1  Afterwards  Admiral  Lord  Graves. 

2  P.  R.  O.  Courts-martial,  vol.  37,  July  14th,  1757. 

3  11,.,  vol.  37,  July  5th,  1757. 


1757.]  CAPTURE   OF   THE  DUO  D'AQUITAINE.  295 

The  prize  did  not  remain  long  with  the  French,  being  retaken  in  the 
autumn  by  the  Lancaster  and  Dunkirk. 

During  the  whole  of  the  year  1757,  though  British  squadrons 
were  constantly  cruising  on  the  enemy's  coast,  there  was  no  meeting 
of  fleets.  The  captures  of  armed  ships  by  our  cruisers  were 
numerous  enough,  but  the  vessels  taken  were,  in  almost  ever}' 
instance,  privateers.  There  were  exceptions  however.  The  Aquilon 
and  Alcion  were  destroyed,  and  the  Emeraude,  Hennione,  Bien 
Acquise  and  the  French  East  India  Company's  ship  Due  d'Aquitaine, 
manned  and  armed  as  a  ship  of  war,  were  taken.  The  Aquilon,  50, 
was  met,  on  May  14th,  by  the  Antelope,  50,  Captain  Alexander 
Arthur  Hood,  which  was  cruising  off  Brest.  After  a  short  action 
the  Aquilon  was  run  on  the  rocks  of  Audierne  Bay,  where  she 
became  a  total  wreck.  The  Due  d'Aqiiitainc,  for  a  Company's 
ship,  was  most  powerful,  mounting  as  she  did  fifty  18-pounders  on 
two  decks  and  having  a  crew  of  nearly  five  hundred  men.  On  the 
night  of  May  30th  the  Eagle,  60,  Captain  Hugh  Palliser,  and  the 
Medicay,  60,  Captain  Charles  Proby,  sighted  her  in  the  Bay  of 
Biscay.  She  had  landed  her  cargo  at  Lisbon,  and  was  then  on  her 
way  round  to  Lorient.  At  daylight  the  Medicay  shortened  sail  to 
clear  ship,  and  the  Eui/lc,  passing  ahead  of  her,  engaged  at  close 
range.  The  Medicay  was  foul  and  could  not  get  up  at  once,  the 
result  being  that,  when  she  did  reach  the  scene  of  action,  she  was 
too  late.  The  enemy  had  been  beaten  to  a  standstill,  and  had  lost 
her  main  and  mizen  masts  together  with  fifty  men  killed  ;  and  she 
struck  her  flag  as  the  Medicay  came  up.  Charnock  1  says  that  she 
had  ninety-seven  shot  holes  through  both  sides,  which  would  seem 
to  imply  that,  in  the  thickness  of  her  planking,  she  differed  con- 
siderably from  a  ship  built  exclusively  for  war  purposes  ;  but  the 
Admiralty  thought  her  stout  enough,  and  ordered  her  to  be  bought 
into  the  service.  Another  French  man-of-war  destroyed  during  the 
year  was  the  Nymplie,  36,  which  was  driven  ashore  at  Majorca  by 
the  Hampton  Court. 

In  the  account  given  of  the  captures  of  privateers  during  1756  it 
will  have  been  noticed  that  the  majority  of  the  prizes  were  vessels 
of  considerable  force.  In  fact,  it  may  be  said  that  the  beginning 
of  the  Seven  Years'  War  saw  a  great  increase  in  the  size  of  the 
average  French  privateer.  During  the  remainder  of  the  struggle, 
this  increase  in  size  was  maintained :  for,  as  the  French  navy  grew 

1  Biog.  Nav.,  v.  487. 


296  MINOR    OPERATIONS,   1714-1762.  •    [1757. 

more  and  more  exhausted,  there  was  ever  more  and  more  work  for 
private  venture,  seeing  that  the  growing  British  commerce  proved 
an  ever  more  and  more  tempting  bait.  France,  in  short,  sought 
to  use  the  authorised  and  officially  encouraged  privateer,  instead 
of  the  national  vessel,  as  the  cheapest  weapon  for  a  guerre  de  course. 
This  Great  Britain  never  did.  Her  privateer  was  always  a  supple- 
mentary, and  often  a  much-suspected,  cruiser.  Of  the  privateers 
taken  during  the  year  1757,  there  were  many  representatives  of  the 
large  class.  For  instance,  the  Invincible  of  St.  Malo,  which  fell 
to  the  Unicorn,  2(5,  Captain  John  Bawling,1  after  a  stubborn  fight, 
was  a  24-gun  frigate,  and  had  been  cruising  with  a  consort  mounting 
eighteen  guns.  Again,  the  Comic  de  Gramont,  not  to  be  confounded 
with  the  ship  taken  in  the  previous  year,  was  a  frigate  of  thirty-six 
guns  and  three  hundred  and  seventy  men.  She  was  taken  by  the 
Lancaster,  Captain  the  Hon.  George  Edgcumbe,  and  the  Dunkirk, 
Captain  the  Hon.  Kichard  Howe.  If  it  be  needful  to  multiply 
instances  of  the  strength  of  these  privateers,  mention  may  be  made 
of  the  TelciiKK/uc,  2<>,  taken  by  the  Experiment,  '24,  Captain  John 
Strachan ;  of  the  \'<iinqucur,  24,  taken  \)y  the  Ambuscade,  32, 
Captain  Ixichard  Gwynrt ;  and  of  another  20-gun  ship,  taken  by  the 
Fortune,  sloop,  Commander  William  Hotham  (1). 

The  most  interesting  of  the  French  privateers  at  sea  at  that  date 
was  Fram:ois  Thurot.2  Thurot  was  appointed  to  the  command 
of  a  regularly  constituted  squadron,  and  sailed  from  St.  Malo  on 
July  Kith,  1757,  with  two  3(5-guii  frigates,  the  Marechal  de  Belleisle 
and  Chaiireltii,  both  with  a  main-deck  armament  of  12-prs.,  and 
with  two  sloops.  On  July  25th  lie  fell  in,  off  Portland,  with  the 
Southampton,  32,  Captain  James  Gilchrist,  then  on  her  way  to 
'Plymouth  with  stores  and  money,  and,  after  a  brisk  action,  was 
beaten  off. 

"As  the  action  is  one  which  Thurot's  French  biographer  considers  especially 
glorious,  it  is  well  to  point  out  that  the  French  frigates  were  each  of  them  more  than 
a  nominal  match  for  the  Southampton.  The  point  is  that  Thurot,  with  two  frigates 
against  one,  each  larger,  heavier,  and  with  a  more  numerous  crew,  did  not  capture  the 
'ine ;  and,  with  the  best  will  in  the  world,  it  is  difficult  to  see  the  great  glory  which, 
from  this  non-capture,  redounds  to  the  French  Navy.  It  looks  indeed  as  if  M.  Thurot 
had  conceived  his  special  work  to  be  plundering  comparatively  helpless  merchant- 
ships,  rather  than  fighting  sturdily  defended  men-of-war  ;  and  that,  when  he  found  the 
Southampton  no  easy  capture,  he  stomached  his  loss — amounting,  on  board  the 
Belhisle  alone,  to  fourteen  killed,  twenty-six  wounded — and  hauled  to  the  wind.  That 


1  Captain  Rawling  was  mortally  wounded,  and  died  on  May  18th,  1757. 

2  See  pp.  196,  223,  224,  229-231  antea. 


1757.]    '  CAPTURE   OF   THE   EMEBAUDE.  297 

this  is  the  correct  view  to  take  of  Thurot's  conduct  seems  confirmed  by  the  facts  of 
another  action  which  he  fought  off  Flushing  on  1st  August,  with  the  Seahorse,  a 
24-gun  frigate,  carrying  9-pounders.  After  an  engagement  lasting  three  hours  and  a 
half,  the  Seahorse  was  almost  dismantled  and  had  eight  men  killed,  and  seventeen  badly 
wounded.  She  was  of  much  smaller  force  than  either  the  Jielleisle  or  the  CliiuveHn, 
and  ought  to  have  been  captured.  That  she  was  not,  was  due  not  so  much  to  her 
material  strength  as  to  the  moral  weakness  of  her  opponents." ' 

The  Southampton  was  afterwards  attached  to  the  grand  fleet 
under  Hawke's  orders,  and  was  sent  to  look  into  Brest.  On 
September  21st,  Gilchrist  saw  a  ship  in  chase  of  him,  and  promptly 
made  sail  towards  her.  The  wind  fell  light,  and  it  was  not  till  the 
afternoon  that  the  ships  drew  close  together.  The  action  which 
then  took  place  was  very  bloody.  The  enemy  lost  sixt}*  men  killed 
and  wounded,  chiefly  in  an  unavailing  attempt  to  board,  and  the 
loss  in  the  Southampton  was  twenty  killed  and  thirty  wounded. 
The  Frenchman,  having  lost  both  her  first  and  second  captains, 
hauled  down  her  colours,  and  was  found  to  be  the  royal  frigate 
Ememude,  28.  She  was  bought  into  the  British  Xavy  under 
the  name  of  the  Emerald.  On  November  23rd  a  night  action  was 
fought  by  the  Husxar,  2<S,  Captain  John  Elliot,  and  Dolplii/i,  24, 
Captain  Benjamin  Marlow,  with  a  French  two-decked  ship.  \Vho 
the  stranger  was  did  not  appear  at  the  time,  but  the  frigates  so 
handled  her  that  at  the  end  of  two  hours  she  sank.  None  of  her 
crew  could  be  picked  up.  It  was  learned  afterwards  that  she  was 
the  Alcion,  50. 

It  has  already  been  stated  that  Hawke  and  Boscawen  cruised 
during  the  year  to  intercept  M.  Dubois  de  La  INIotte  s  squadron 
on  its  way  home  from  Louisbourg,2  and  that  they  failed  to  meet 
with  it.  Two  only  of  the  French  ships,  the  frigates  Jiirn  A<-t/itixr,  3(>, 
and  Hermione,  2S,  fell  in  with  the  British  cruisers  ;  and  they  were 
taken  possession  of  without  difficulty. 

If  1758  was  a  year  of  great  successes  ior  the  British  Navy,  it 
was  nevertheless  not  without  its  disasters.  The  earliest  of  these,  the 
loss  of  the  Invincible,  needs  110  further  notice  than  it  has  already 
received,3  but  the  burning  of  the  Prince  Clcan/c,  1)0,  in  the  Bay 
of  Biscay  on  April  13th,  merits  some  detail  of  description.4  A  letter 
from  the  ship's  chaplain  gives  a  good  account  of  the  mishap,  though 

1  J.  K.  Laughton  :  'Studies  in  Xaval  History,'  pp.  03.')-05. 

2  See  p.  172  antea. 

3  See  p.  182  anti-it. 

4  P.  R.  ().  Minutes  of  Courts-martial,  vol.  38,  May  10th,  1758. 


298  MINOR    OPERATIONS,   1714-1762.  [1758. 

it  does  not  suggest  its  cause.  At  half -past  one  in  the  afternoon 
word  was  passed  that  the  fore  part  of  the  ship  was  on  fire.  The 
people  assembled  on  the  quarter  deck ;  it  was  ascertained  that  the  fire 
had  begun  in  the  boatswain's  storeroom,  buckets  were  passed,  and 
all  possible  measures  were  taken  to  get  the  flames  under,  but  without 
effect.  A  considerable  sea  was  running,  and  it  was  hoped  that  the 
opening  of  the  lower  deck  ports  would  be  of  avail ;  but  even  this 
was  useless.  Presently,  although  the  magazine  had  been  flooded, 
it  appeared  that  there  was  no  possible  chance  of  saving  the  ship. 
The  barge  was,  therefore,  ordered  to  be  got  out,  to  put  the  Bear- 
Admiral,  Thomas  Broderick,  in  a  place  of  safety.  But  he,  seeing 
forty  men  in  her,  preferred  to  trust  himself  to  the  waves,  and,  after 
swimming  about  for  an  hour,  was  saved  by  a  boat  from  one  of  the 
convoy.  The  captain,  Joseph  Peyton  (1),  was  also  picked  up,  as 
were  most  of  the  officers ;  but,  either  by  the  over-setting  of  boats, 
or  in  the  flames,  no  fewer  than  four  hundred  and  eighty-five  men 
perished  as  against  two  hundred  and  sixty  who  were  saved.  The 
merchantmen)  it  was  complained,  held  aloof  to  windward  ;  and  their 
boats  were  busier  in  salving  gear  than  in  saving  lives. 

There  were  many  prizes  made  during  the  year  1758,  and,  while  as 
before  a  large  proportion  were  heavily  armed  privateers,  many  were 
ships  of  war.  On  the  North  American  station,  the  Koreas,  Captain 
the  Hon.  Bobert  Boyle,  took  the  Diane,  :S(> ;  and  in  European  waters 
the  Loire,  M,  was  taken  by  the  ,S7.  Allxtns  and  Favourite,  and  the 
Hose,  HG,  was  driven  ashore  at  Malta  by  the  Sfonmouth  and  Lyme, 
and  was  burnt  where  she  lay.  One  of  the  most  interesting  of  the 
actions  was  a  brush  between  the  Solebay,  '28,  Captain  Bobert  Craig, 
and  J)olpliin,  '24,  Captain  Benjamin  Marlow,  and  Thurot's  ship, 
the  Mar&chal  dc  Uelleisle,  the  armament  of  which  he  had 
increased  to  44  guns  by  cutting  a  few  extra  ports  on  the  lower 
deck.  The  vessel  was  thus  no  longer  a  frigate  proper  ;  on  the  other 
hand  she  was  not  a  two-decked  ship  at  all  comparable  to  the 
English  44's.  Perhaps  the  only  other  instance  of  a  ship  being 
similarly  armed  is  that  of  Paul  Jones's  Bonlwmme  Richard.  In  the 
Hell e isle's  case,  however,  the  change  seems  to  have  been  beneficial, 
and  Thurot  is  credited  with  having  made  a  number  of  prizes  before 
he  was  brought  to  action  by  the  Dolphin  and  Solebay  on  May  26th. 
The  Dolphin  was  first  in  action  ;  but,  having  the  slings  of  her 
main-yard  shot  away,  she  dropped  astern  ;  and  the  Solebay  came 
up  and  in  her  turn  occupied  the  Frenchman's  attention  while  the 


1758.]  CAPTURE   OF    THE  SAISONNASLE.  299 

Dolphin  was  getting  her  main-yard  up.  In  due  time  the  Dolphin 
again  got  close ;  but,  about  three  and  a  half  hours  from  the 
beginning  of  the  action,  the  Belleisle  wore  and  made  sail  away. 
Both  the  British  frigates  were  much  damaged  aloft,  and,  probably, 
even  if  they  had  not  been  they  would  have  stood  no  chance  against 
Thurot  in  sailing.  The  story  of  Thurot's  final  cruise  ha's  been 
already  told.1 

On  May  29th  the  Baisonnablc,  64,  then  on  her  way  to  Louis- 
bourg,  was  sighted  by  Captain  Edward  Pratten,  who,  in  the 
Intrepid,  was  cruising  off  the  French  coast  with  a  small  squadron. 
He  detached  the  Dorsetshire,  70,  Captain  Peter  Denis,  and  the 
Achilles,  60,  Captain  the  Hon.  Samuel  Barrington,  in  chase.  The 
Dorsetshire  had  beaten  the  enemy  to  a  standstill  before  the  Achillex 
came  up,  and  had  killed  sixty-one  Frenchmen  and  wounded  one 
hundred  more,  while  she  herself  had  lost  but  fifteen  killed  and 
twenty  wounded.  The  arrival  of  the  Achilles  settled  the  matter; 
and  the  prize,  being  a  fine  ship,  was  bought  into  the  Eoyal  Navy. 

In  July  the  Shrewsbury,  74,  Captain  Hugh  Palliser,  was  detached 
by  Anson,  together  with  the  Unicorn,  20,  and  I/iznrd,  28,  to  cruise 
as  near  Brest  as  possible  and  watch  the  French  fleet  in  the  road. 
On  September  12th  the  British  vessels  sighted  a  fleet  of  coasters, 
which,  under  convoy  of  the  Thetis  and  Calypso  frigates,  were  . 
working  so  close  in  shore  that  it  was  a  matter  of  great  difficulty 
to  cut  them  off.  Captain  Brodrick  Hartwell,  in  the  Lizard,  managed. 
nevertheless,  to  get  between  the  frigates  and  part  of  the  convoy. 
the  result  being  that  the  Calypso  was  driven  ashore  and  destroyed 
at  the  entrance  to  Audierne  Bay,  and  that  of  the  coasters  many 
were  either  taken  or  destroyed.  On  October  2nd  the  Lizard  did  a 
further  piece  of  service  by  capturing  the  Due  d'llnnorre,  privateer, 
14;  and,  a  little  later,  the  Torlxty,  Captain  the  Hon.  Augustus 
Keppel,  took  the  liostan,  a  privateer  of  twenty-six  guns  and  three 
hundred  and  twenty  men.  This  prize  was  bought  into  the  Royal 
Navy  under  the  name  of  the  Crescent.  Beatson  says2  that  the 
French  concealed  ninety  men  in  her  hold  in  the  hopes  of  recapturing 
her  from  her  prize  crew,  but  that  the  people  below  betrayed  them- 
selves too  soon  and  were  overpowered. 

In   extra-European  waters,   the    Winchelsea,   20,    Captain   John 
Hale,    while    on    her    way    home    from   Carolina,    was   taken    on 
October   llth   by   the   Bizarre,    60.     The    Winchelsea   attacked    in 
1  See  pp.  2211-231  antea.  2  Beatson,  ii.  101. 


300  MINOR    OPERATIONS,   1714-1762.  [1758-59. 

order  to  cover  her  convoy,  and,  till  the  Bizarre  ran  out  her  lower 
deck  guns,  did  not  realise  the  immense  superiority  of  the  enemy's 
force.  When  she  did  so,  she  hauled  her  wind  and  tried  to 
get  away ;  but,  as  she  was  under  a  jury  mainmast,  she  stood  no 
chance  of  accomplishing  her  purpose,  and,  after  a  little  firing, 
hauled  down  her  colours. 

On  the  Jamaica  station,  in  1758,  there  was  little  for  British 
cruisers  to  do  save  to  cut  up  the  enemy's  commerce,  and  to  capture 
his  small  privateers.  The  only  action  of  any  note  was  between  the 
Dread  notiijht,  60,  Captain  Maurice  Suckling,  and  the  Assistance,  50, 
Captain  Eobert  Wellard,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  Palmier,  74, 
which  had  previously  taken  the  Stork,  10,  on  the  other.  On  the 
morning  of  September  '2nd,  the  British  ships  came  iTp  with  the 
Frenchman  off  Port  au  Prince  ;  but,  unfortunately,  a  calm  prevented 
the  Assistance  from  seconding  her  consort;  and  the  Palmier,  having 
disabled  the  Drnulnoni/lit,  made  sail  and  escaped.  On  the  Leeward 
Islands'  station  much  the  same  state  of  affairs  prevailed  ;  but,  on 
November  .'ird,  Captain  Eichard  Tyrrell,  in  the  liucliiiHjham,  70, ' 
cruising  off  St.  Fustatia  to  intercept  a  French  convoy  from 
Martinique,  was  sharply  engaged  with  the  Florissant,  74,  which, 
with  two  frigates,-  had  charge  of  the  merchantmen.  The  frigates 
took  some  part  in  the  action,  but  were  soon  beaten  off;  and  the 
ships  of  the  line  fought  on  from  about  three  o'clock  till  dark.  It 
was  claimed  that  the  Florissant  struck  ;  and  it  is  possible  that  she 
did  so  ;  but  the  iJitrl.-hir/Jiiaii  was  much  disabled;5  and  the  French- 
man, taking  advantage  of  the  fact,  made  sail  away  from  her. 

The  interest  of  175'.)  was  almost  entirely  confined  to  the  actions 
of  the  main  fleets  ;  and,  although  it  was  the  decisive  year  of  the  war, 
there  were  few  actions  by  detached  cruisers.  The  first  and  most 
stubborn  of  these  was  fought  between  the  Vestal,  82,  Captain 
Samuel  Hood  (1),  and  the  BeUone  of  equal  force.  The  Vestal  had 
been  cruising  for  a  year,  chiefly  in  the  Soundings,  but,  on 
February  12th,  had  sailed  with  Eear-Admiral  Holmes  for  North 
America.  On  the  21st,  being  then  in  advance  of  the  squadron, 
she  sighted  a  sail  ahead.  It  was  soon  seen  that  the  stranger  was 
an  enemy ;  and,  signalling  this  fact  to  Holmes,  Hood  made  sail 

1  The  TlYdze?,  14,  being  in  company. 
-  Aigrette,  38,  anil  Atalante,  28. 

3  She  lost  seven  killed  and  forty-six  wounded,  among  the  latter  being  Captain 
Tyrrell 


1759.]  CAPTURE   OF  THE  DANAE.  301 

in  chase.  The  Bear-Admiral  detached  the  Trent,  28,  reputed  to 
be  a  fine  sailer,  to  support  the  Vestal ;  but  it  may  here  be  said  that 
the  Trent  had  no  share  at  all  in  the  engagement,  she  being  still  four 
miles  astern  when  the  enemy  struck.  The  action  lasted  from  two 
in  the  afternoon  until  six,  when  the  Bellone  had  lost  forty  men 
in  killed  alone,  and  was  totally  dismasted.  The  Vestal1  had  only 
her  lower  masts  standing.  She  returned  to  Spithead  with  her  prize, 
which  was  bought  into  the  Navy  and  renamed  Hepuhe. 

On  March  19th,  the  Isis,  50,  Captain  Edward  Wheeler,  and 
Molus,  32,  Captain  John  Elliot,  cruising  off  Isle  Dieu,  fought  an 
engagement  with  four  French  frigates  which  were  employed  on 
convoy  service.  Only  two  of  the  enemy  were  closely  engaged, 
and  of  these  one,  the  Blonde,  32,  escaped  ;  but  the  other,  the 
Miynonne,  20,  lost  fifty-five  killed  and  wounded  out  of  a  crew  of 
one  hundred  and  fifty,  and  was  taken  possession  of.  On  the 
27th,  the  Windsor,  60,  Captain  Samuel  Faulknor  (2),  took,  off 
Lisbon,  the  French  East  Indiaman  Due  <le  C  hart  res,  mounting 
twenty-four  12-prs.,  but  pierced  for  sixty  guns.  There  were  four 
East  India  ships  in  company,  but  the  other  three  made  off. 

On  the  following  day  there  was  fought  a  much  more  interesting 
little  action.  The  Southampton,  32,  Captain  James  Gilchrist,  and 
Mvlampe,  24,  Captain  William  Hotham  (1),  cruising  in  the  North 
Sea,  fell  in  with  and  engaged  two  Krench  frigates.  The  Mchiinpe 
fought  them  both  for  three-quarters  of  an  hour  before  the 
Southampton  could  come  up  ;  and  she  suffered  so  much  aloft  that 
she  dropped  astern.  One  of  the  French  ships  made  sail  away  while 
the  Southampton  was  engaging  the  other,  and  while  the  Melampe 
was  refitting.  When  Hotham  drew  up  again,  the  French  ship 
struck.  She  proved  to  be  the  J)«n«e,  40 ;  and  she  had  lost  her 
captain,  second  captain,  and  about  thirty  men  killed,  besides  a  great 
number  wounded.  She  was  added  to  the  Koyal  Navy  as  the  Danae. 
Gilchrist  was  himself  severely  wounded  by  a  grape  shot,  and  lost 
the  use  of  an  arm.  He  was  given  a  pension  of  £'300  a  year  for  life, 
and  could  not  be  employed  again  ;  but,  a  generation  later,  the  martial 
ardour  of  his  family  again  showed  itself  in  the  career  of  Thomas 
Cochrane,  tenth  Earl  of  Dundonald,  a  son  of  Gilchrist's  sister. 

On    April    4th,  Captain  the    Hon.    Samuel    Barrington,  in    the 
Achilles,  60,  took,  to  the  westward  of  Cape  Finisterre,  the  very  large 
privateer,  Comte  de  St.  Florentine,  also  mounting  sixty  guns.     This 
1  Which  lost  five  killed  and  twentv  wounded. 


302  MINOR    OPERATIONS,    1714-1762.  [1759-60. 

prize,  too,  was  bought  into  the  Navy,  as  also  was  the  Arethuse,  36, 
which  was  taken  by  the  Venus,  36,  Captain  Thomas  Harrison  (2), 
on  the  coast  of  Brittany  on  May  18th. 

When  M.  de  La  Clue's  fleet  had  been  shattered  and  dispersed, 
the  Soucerain,  74,  made  for  the  Canaries,  whence  she  returned  to 
Kochefort.  On  her  way  thither  she  fell  in  on  October  10th  with  the 
Hercules,  74,  Captain  Jervis  Henry  Porter,  which  engaged  her  in 
a  running  fight  till  the  British  ship  fell  astern  owing  to  the  loss 
of  her  maintopmast.  Another  French  ship  of  the  line,  which  was 
met  with  and  brought  to  action  during  the  year  1759,  was  the 
Palmier,  74,  which,  having  a  frigate  in  company,  fell  in,  when  on 
her  way  home  from  the  West  Indies,  with  the  Thames,  32,  and 
Curentrt/,  '2<S.  The  British  frigates  attacked  her  ;  and  as  the  sea 
was  rough  and  she  could  not  use  her  lower  deck  guns,  they  had  her 
somewhat  at  a  disadvantage.  They  shot  away  her  foretopmast 
and  did  her  other  considerable  damage,  and,  but  for  the  assistance 
which  her  frigate  was  able  to  give  her,  would  have  stood  some  chance 
of  taking  her.1  As  it  was,  they  hung  on  to  her  in  the  hope  of  falling 
in  witli  some  other  British  cruiser,  keeping  out  of  gun-shot  by  day, 
and  pouring  in  broadsides  by  night.  They  had  not,  however,  the 
fortune  to  meet  with  a  friend  ;  and,  after  a  long  chase,  they  had  the 
mortification  of  seeing  the  Palmier  run  into  Brest. 

In  March,  1760,  the  French  fitted  out  the  'Malicieuse,  32,  and 
Opulr,  32,  in  order  to  intercept  the  Portuguese  trade,  which,  they  had 
heard,  was  to  be  convoyed  by  a  single  sloop,  Xear  the  Bayona 
Islands'"  they  fell  in  with  the  Peiir/uin,  '20,  Captain  William  Harris, 
which  tried  to  get  away,  but  which  they  overhauled  and  took. 
They  judged  her  not  worth  keeping,  set  fire  to  her,  and  continued 
their  cruise,  till  it  was  spoilt  on  April  4th  by  the  Flamborough,  20, 
Captain  Archibald  Kennedy,3  and  Biddc/ord,  '20,  Captain  Lancelot 
Skynner  (1),  which,  though  not  powerful  enough  to  take  them, 
hung  on  to  them  in  a  most  dogged  manner  and  eventually  put  them 
to  flight.4  Meanwhile  the  convoy  reached  Lisbon  in  safety.  Of 
other  little  successes  in  European  waters,  perhaps  not  the  least 
complete  was  that  of  Captain  the  Hon.  Augustus  John  Hervey 
of  the  Dragon,  74,  who,  while  attached  to  Boscawen's  fleet,  on 

1  Beatsuii,  ii.  351. 

2  P.  K.  O.  Courts-martial,  vol.  40. 

3  Later  Earl  of  Cassilis. 

4  lu  tliis  gallant  action,  both  Captain  Skynner  and  his  lieutenant  were  mortally 
wounded,  the  latter  surviving,  however,  until  April  tOth. 


1760.]  ADVENTURES    OF   THE  DIADEME.  303 

July  12th,  being  then  close  in  shore  off  Isle  Groix,  was  fired  on 
by  a  small  fort.  That  evening  he  went  ashore  with  his  boats, 
surprised  the  guard,  dismounted  the  guns  of  the  battery,  tumbled 
the  pieces  over  the  rocks,  and  eventually  went  off  to  his  ship  with 
the  whole  of  the  guard  and  with  not  a  single  man  hurt.1 

Of  Boscawen's  cruisers,  the  Centaur,  74,  which  had  been  taken 
the  year  before  in  the  action  with  M.  de  La  Clue,  fell  in  off  Cape 
Finisterre  with  the  Vaillant,  64,  and  Amethyst,  32,  homeward 
bound  from  the  West  Indies.  Deceived  by  her  appearance  they 
let  her  come  close  up ;  and  it  was  not  till  they  saw  that  she  was 
clearing  for  battle  that  they  realised  that  she  was  no  longer  a 
French  ship.  They  made  all  possible  sail,  and  got  away  by  night 
into  Corunna.  Another  of  Boscawen's  cruisers,  the  Niyer,  82; 
Captain  John  Albert  Bentinck,  fell  in  with  the  Diadcme,  74, 
escorting  store-ships  to  Martinique.  For  some  days  the  frigate 
hung  on  to  the  Frenchman,  both  in  the  hope  of  cutting  off  some 
of  the  convoy,  and  of  meeting  a  ship  of  the  line  that  could  deal 
with  the  seventy-four.  In  the  course  of  her  attempts  on  the 
convoy,  she  ventured  close  enough  to  be  severely  mauled,  and  so 
had  to  leave  the  enemy  in  order  to  make  good  her  damages.  A  few 
days  afterwards,  the  Diademe  was  sighted  and  chased  by  the 
Shrewsbury,  74,  Pallas,  86,  and  Anjo,  28.  The  Shrewsbury  sailed 
very  badly,  the  Arr/o  was  busy  with  the  convoy,  and  it  was  left 
to  the  Pallas,  Captain  Michael  Clements,  to  attack  single  handed. 
She  was  but  a  frigate,  and  fought  only  in  the  hope  of  knockin 
away  a  spar  or  two  and  enabling  the  Shrewsbury  to  come  up. 
Unfortunately  she  exposed  herself  to  the  enemy's  broadside,  and 
very  soon  had  to  be  content  to  leave  the  big  ship  alone.  This 
voyage  of  the  Diademe  bears  a  certain  resemblance  to  the  last  cruise 
of  the  Glorioso.  She  was  annoyed  by  frigates  all  along  her  route, 
and  she  ended  with  an  affair  with  a  heavy  ship  of  the  line.  The 
Glorioso,  of  course,  had  been  harder  put  to  it,  and  was  ultimately 
taken.  The  French  ship  was  more  fortunate.  The  Royal 
William,  80,  which  chased  her  at  the  conclusion  of  her  voyage, 
had  not  time  to  come  up  with  her  before  she  found  safety  in 
Corunna. 

The  loss  of  the  Cumberland,  56,  Captain   Robert  Kirk,   which 
sank  at  her  anchors  near  Goa,  on  the  night  of  November  2nd,  1760, 
was  adjudged  to  have  "  proceeded  from  her  being  entirely  decayed, 
1  P.  R.  0.  Admiral's  Dispatches,  Channel,  vol.  4,  July  27th,  1700. 


cr 


304  MINOR    OPERATIONS,   1714-1762.  [1761. 

and  not  in  a  condition  to  have  proceeded  to  sea."  There  was. 
nothing  extraordinary  in  the  loss  of  the  ship,  save  that  it  resulted 
from  the  fact  that  she  was  one  of  the  rather  numerous  vessels  which 
were  at  the  time  kept  on  service  when  they  ought  to  have  been 
in  the  ship-breaker's  yard.  In  many  cases,  no  doubt,  the  fault  lay 
with  the  Admiralty ;  but  it  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  ships  were 
not  then  built  under  cover,  and  that  the  decay  of  vessels  built 
in  the  open  was  often  so  irregular  as  to  baffle  calculation. 

On  January  8th,  1761,  the  Unicorn,  28,  Captain  Joseph  Hunt, 
cruising  off  Penmarck,  fought  a  sharp  action  with,  and  captured, 
the  Voitali-,  32,  which  later  became  the  Flora  in  the  British  Navy. 
The  captains  of  both  ships  were  mortally  wounded.  On  the 
following  day  the  Unicorn  chased,  but  could  not  come  up  with, 
the  Aii/rrttr,  32,  and,  on  the  10th,  saw  her  engage  the  Seahorse,  20, 
Captain  James  Smith,  then  carrying  out  astronomers  to  India 
to  observe  the  transit  of  Venus.  Again  she  tried  to  come  up, 
but  could  not;  and  the  Aiyrrttr,  having  mauled  the  Seahorse  - 
considerably,  refused  to  be  further  detained  and  forced  to  fight 
at  a  disadvantage. 

In  January,  the  Felicite,  32,  left  Cherbourg  for  Martinique  ; 
but  no  sooner  was  she  outside  than  she  met  the  Richmond,  32, 
Captain  John  Elphinstone  (1).  The  ships  sighted  one  another 
in  the  evening,  but  the  action  did  not  begin  till  half-past  ten  the 
next  morning  (January  '24th),  when  they  engaged  broadside  to 
broadside,  standing  in  for  the  land.  Still  close  together,  they  both 
ran  ashore  near  Scheveningen,  and  continued  serving  their  guns 
in  that  position.  Presently  the  Richmond  floated,  and  was  set 
to  leeward  by  the  tide.  The  Frenchmen  seized  their  opportunity 
and  escaped  to  the  shore.  They  had  lost  very  heavily,  and  their 
captain  had  been  killed ;  but  the  casualties  on  board  the  Richmond 
amounted  only  to  three  killed  and  thirteen  wounded.  Next  da}', 
when  the  Felicite  was  boarded,  the  dispatches  which  she  had  been 
carrying  to  Martinique  were  found  to  be  still  in  her.  They  were 
taken  out,  and  the  ship  was  set  on  fire. 

On  the  same  day,  but  in  the  Mediterranean,  the  Warwick,  the 
ex-British  60-gun  ship,  with,  however,  only  thirty-four  guns  mounted, 
was  attacked,  while  on  her  way  to  the  East  Indies,  by  Captain 

1  P.  I!.  O.  Courts-martial,  vol.  41. 

2  Which  was,  in  consequence,  obliged  to  return  to  port.    When  she  sailed  again  she 
was   commanded   by   Charles   Cathcart   Grant,   Captain   James    Smith   having    been 
api>ointed  to  the  Guernsey,  50. 


1761.]  CAPTURE   OF   THE   WARWICK.  305 

Alexander  Arthur  Hood  in  the  Minerva,  32.  The  wind  was  fresh 
from  the  east,  and  the  sea  was  heavy.  The  enemy  lost  her  mainmast 
and  foretopmast,  but  Hood  waited  for  her  to  come  up  again,  and 
presently  the  ships  fell  foul  of  one  another.  The  Minerva  in  turn 
lost  her  foremast  and  bowsprit,  and  fell  astern  ;  but  she  cleared 
away  the  wreck  very  promptly,  stood  off  to  the  Warwick  and  forced 
her  to  strike.  The  loss  was  curiously  even,  fourteen  killed  and 
thirty-two  wounded  in  the  Warwick  as  against  fourteen  killed  and 
thirty-four  wounded  in  the  Minerva.  No  sooner  had  the  Warwick 
struck,  than  the  Minerva  rolled  away  her  remaining  masts.  The 
capture  of  the  Brune,  36,  a  week  later,  in  the  Soundings,  by  the 
Venus  and  Juno,  presented  no  unusual  feature.  She  was  added  to 
the  Navy. 

On  March  9th,  the  Hipon,  60,  Captain  Edward  Jekyll,  one  of 
Commodore  Buckle's  squadron  off  Brest,  chased  a  French  sixty-four 
and  a  frigate.  They  bore  away  from  him,  and  during  the  night 
he  lost  sight  of  them ;  but,  on  the  following  day,  with  a  fresh  breeze 
aft  and  a  heavy  sea,  he  overhauled  a  sixty-four,  which  proved  to 
be  the  Achille.  The  ships  engaged  at  half-past  nine  at  night  yard- 
arm  to  yard-arm,  running  before  the  wind  at  a  great  rate ;  and  the 
Hipon  was  half  swamped  by  the  water  that  came  on  board  through 
her  lower-deck  ports,  which  could  only  be  opened  from  time  to  time. 
To  make  matters  worse,  one  of  her  lower-deck  guns  burst,  killing 
and  wounding  many  men  and  throwing  the  whole  deck  into 
confusion.  After  this  all  her  mid-ship  and  forward  ports  on  that 
deck  were  kept  shut,  yet  she  managed  to  shoot  away  the  enemy's 
foreyard  and  foretopmast.  The  Hipon  then  came  to  the  wind  to 
wait  for  the  Frenchman,  and  the  enemy  ran  down  under  the  stern 
of  the  British  ship.  Fortunately  the  Achille  was  in  such  great 
confusion  that  she  missed  the  opportunity  of  raking  the  Hipon.  As 
soon  as  the  Frenchman  had  passed  to  leeward,  Jekyll  gave  orders 
to  wear  ship  and  follow  her,  but  his  rigging  was  so  much  cut  that 
the  manoeuvre  took  a  long  time,  and  when  it  was  complete  the 
enemy's  lights  were  no  longer  visible. 

There  were  other  single-ship  actions  at  about  the  same  time. 
On  March  13th,  1761,  the  Vengeance,  26,  Captain  Gamaliel  Nightin- 
gale, took  the  Entreprenant,  an  armed  ship  of  force  equal  if  not 
superior  to  her  own.  On  March  16th,  the  Bedford,  64,  took  the 
frigate  Comete,  32,  off  Ushant ;  and  on  April  3rd,  the  Hem  and 
Venus  took  the  Bertin,  an  East  India  ship  pierced  for  sixty-four 
VOL.  in.  x 


306  MINOR    OPERATIONS,   1714-1762.  [1761. 

guns,  but  then  armed  en  flute  and  outward  bound  with  soldiers  on 
board.  On  April  1st,  the  Oriflamme,  40,  really  a  50-gun  ship, 
was  taken  in  the  Mediterranean,  after  a  short  action,  by  the  Isis,  50, 
whose  captain,  Edward  Wheeler,  was  killed  in  the  fight.  Another 
easy  capture  was  that  of  the  Ste.  Anne,  a  heavily-armed  merchant- 
man, which  was  taken  on  the  Jamaica  station  by  the  Centaur,  74, 
Captain  Arthur  Forrest,  on  June  5th.  She  was  pierced  for  sixty- 
four  guns,  but  had  at  the  time  only  forty  on  board.  When, 
however,  she  was  added  to  our  Navy,  her  full  number  of  guns 
was  mounted. 

On  July  14th,  the  Thunderer,  74,  Captain  Charles  Proby,  cruising 
with  the  Modeste,  64,  Captain  the  Hon.  Robert  Boyle  Walsingham, 
Thetis,  32,  Captain  John  Moutray,  and  Favourite,  sloop,  Commander 
Philemon  Pownall,  for  the  purpose  of  intercepting  the  Acliille,  64, 
and  Bouffonne,  'S'2,  which  it  was  believed  were  ready  to  sail  from 
Cadiz,  discovered  that  those  ships  had  slipped  out  of  port.  The 
squadron  fell  in  with  them,  however,  on  the  16th,  brought  them 
to  action  on  the  17th,  and  in  duo  course  took  them  both,1  the 
AchiUe  being  carried  by  a  boarding  party  from  the  Thunderer,  which 
had  had  a  great  part  of  her  poop  blown  up  by  the  bursting  of  an 
upper-deck  gun.  The  Bouffonnr  struck  to  the  Tlietis.  The  Thunderer 
lost  seventeen  killed,  and  one  hundred  and  fourteen,  including 
Captain  Proby,  wounded,  most  of  the  casualties  being  due,  however, 
to  the  accident  to  the  gun. 

The  most  brilliant  of  the  actions  fought  between  cruising  ships 
in  1761  remains  to  be  described.  On  August  13th,  the  BeUona,  74, 
Captain  Robert  Faulknor  ('2),  and  the  Brilliant,  36,  Captain  James 
Loggie,  met  the  Courageux,  74,  and  the  two  32-gun  frigates,  Malicieuse 
and  Hermione,  off  Vigo.  The  meeting  took  place  in  the  evening; 
but  it  was  bright  moonlight,  and  the  ships  kept  sight  of  each  other 
till  morning,  when  the  enemy,  who  up  to  that  time  had  been  trying 
to  escape,  decided  to  engage.  On  the  13th,  it  had  been  believed  that 
the  British  vessels  were  both  ships  of  the  line ;  on  the  14th,  how- 
ever, the  French  commodore  fell  into  the  opposite  error  of  taking 
the  BeUona  for  a  50-gun  ship.  He  signalled  to  the  frigates  to 
engage  the  Brilliant,  while  he  himself  closed  with  the  BeUona.  The 
Brilliant  accepted  her  share  with  alacrity,  and  gave  the  frigates 
so  much  to  do  that  they  were  unable  to  interfere  in  the  combat 
between  the  seventy-fours.  The  duel  between  the  BeUona  and 

1  Troude  denies  it,  i.  427. 


1761.]  THE  DELLONA   AND    THE   COURAGEUX.  307 

Courageux  was  fought  out  in  a  fine  breeze  and  a  smooth  sea.  The 
first  broadside  was  fired  from  the  Frenchman  when  the  ships  were 
within  musket-shot ;  and  so  good  was  the  gunnery  under  the  favour- 
able conditions  that  prevailed,  that,  in  nine  minutes  from  the  start, 
the  Bellona's  mizen-mast  went  over  the  side  and  the  rigging  was 
so  much  cut  that  the  ship  became  unmanageable.  Faulknor  was 
afraid  that  the  enemy  might  get  away,  and  promptly  called  for 
boarders ;  but  the  Courageux  sheered  off,  and  the  attempt  had  to 
be  abandoned.  With  great  difficiilty,  Faulknor  managed  to  wear 
ship,  a  manoeuvre  which  brought  him  up  on  the  Frenchman's 
starboard  quarter.  A  few  broadsides  fired  from  his  new  position 
settled  the  fate  of  the  day.  The  Courageux,  much  damaged,  and 
with  about  two  hundred  men  killed  and  another  hundred  wounded, 
struck,  and  was  taken  possession  of.  The  frigates  made  sail  away. 
The  total  duration  of  the  action  was  no  more  than  forty  minutes. 
It  was  much  the  fashion  to  speak  of  the  French  as  always  firing 
at  the  rigging,  and  as  seizing  the  earliest  opportunity  to  escape. 
Certainly  this  is  stated  to  have  been  the  procedure  in  many 
instances  where  the  facts  will  not  support  such  an  assertion  ;  but 
in  this  case  something  of  the  sort  does  seem  to  have  happened, 
owing  partly  no  doubt  to  the  enemy's  having  accepted  battle 
through  a  misunderstanding  of  the  force  he  had  before  him.  It 
is  not  easy  to  suggest  any  other  explanation  for  the  condition  of 
the  Bellona,  and  for  the  Courageux,  which  lost  more  than  three 
hundred  men,  having  killed  and  wounded  only  four-and-thirty. 

The  new  year,  1762,  opened  with  affairs  in  a  peculiar  condition. 
Great  Britain  was  paramount  at  sea,  whereas  France  was  exhausted. 
There  was,  indeed,  nothing  new  in  this  ;  it  had  been  the  prevailing 
state  of  things  since  the  action  in  Quiberori  Bay.  What  was  strange 
was  that  France,  having  received  a  new  ally  in  virtue  of  the 
Family  Compact,  gained  no  real  accession  of  force,  although  the 
Spaniards  entered  upon  the  war  with  a  considerable  number  of 
ships.  Why  this  happened  was  because,  as  has  been  already 
noticed,  the  French  ports  were  so  closely  watched  that  nothing 
could  get  out  without  running  the  risk  of  immediate  capture,  and 
because  the  Spaniards  concentrated  all  their  naval  forces  for  the 
protection  of  their  colonies  and  lost  them,  en  masse,  in  distant  seas. 
The  result,  as  far  as  Spain  was  concerned,  was,  that  she  was 
hopelessly  beaten  without  anything  worthy  the  name  of  a  naval 
battle  having  taken  place  in  European  waters.  The  French,  too, 

x  2 


308  MINOR    OPERATIONS,    1714-1762.  [1762- 

were  so  utterly  exhausted  that  there  was  not  only  no  fleet  action 
fought  but  also  not  even  a  ship  of  the  line  to  be  taken. 

Short  accounts  of  a  few  frigate  actions  will,  therefore,  finish  the 
story.  Captain  Thomas  Harrison  (2),  in  the  Venus,  36,  had  a  large 
share  of  good  fortune.  On  January  6th,  he  took,  after  a  short  action, 
the  Boulogne,  20,  on  her  homeward  journey  from  the  Isle  of  France, 
with  a  valuable  cargo  on  board,  and,  amongst  other  passengers,  the 
Comte  d'Estaing.  On  March  17th,  he  took  a  14-gun  privateer  out 
of  San  Sebastian  ;  on  May  6th,  he  captured  another  privateer  of  the 
same  force  out  of  Bayonne ;  and  on  June  4th,  a  large  Spanish 
privateer  of  sixteen  guns,  twenty  swivels,  from  Bilbao,  struck  to  him. 
These  were  by  no  means  all  the  privateers  he  took,  either  Spanish 
or  French,  but  the  cases  supply  typical  instances  of  the  force  of 
the  ships  he  had  to  deal  with.  Another  somewhat  notable  capture 
of  a  privateer  was  made  on  the  night  of  March  7th.  The 
Mil  ford,  '28,  Captain  Itobert  Mann,  fell  in  with  the  Gloire,  a  French 
letter  of  marque,  mounting  sixteen  6-prs.,  besides  swivels,  and  bound 
to  Han  Domingo,  and  took  her  after  a  sharp  action.  The  Milford 
lost  only  four  killed  and  thirteen  wounded,  but  among  the  former 
were  Captain  liobert  Mann,1  and  his  first  lieutenant.  The  richest 
capture  of  the  war  was  made  by  the  Active,  Captain  Herbert 
Sawyer  (1),  and  the  Fdcoitritc,  sloop,  Commander  Philemon 
Fownall,  two  of  Sir  Fiercy  Brett's  cruisers,  which,  on  May  21st, 
intercepted  the  register-ship  Hcrmionc,  bound  from  Lima  for  Cadiz. 
The  summons  to  surrender  was  the  first  intimation  to  the  Spaniards 
that  war  had  broken  out ;  there  was  no  resistance  whatsoever  ;  and 
in  this  easy  manner  did  treasure  to  the  value  of  about  half  a  million 
pass  into  British  hands.  On  the  Jamaica  station,  the  Fowey,  24, 
(9-prs.),  Captain  Joseph  Mead,  fell  in,  off  Cape  Tiberon,  with  the 
Spanish  royal  frigate  Ventura,  26  (12-prs.),  and  fought  her  for  an 
hour  and  a  half,  when  the  ships  separated,  much  damaged.  On  the 
following  morning  the  action  was  resumed  with  vigour,  and 
continued  till  the  Ventura  struck.  The  Fowey  lost  ten  killed 
and  twenty-four  wounded,  and  the  Ventura,  forty  in  killed  alone. 

On  August  18th,  the  Eocliester,  cruising  in  the  Channel,  in 
company  with  the  Maidstone  and  Benommee,  took  the  Guirlande,  26, 
a  French  frigate ;  and  on  September  1st,  the  Lion,  60,  one  of  a  small 

1  Commander,  1756  ;  Captain,  1757.  His  name  is  very  consistently  spelt  Mann  in  the 
Navy  Lists  of  the  period,  whereas  that  of  his  contemporary  Robert  Man  (2),  presently 
to  be  mentioned,  who  died  an  Admiral  in  1783,  is  spelt  with  one  n  only. — W.  L.  C. 


1762.] 


CONCLUSION   OF   THE  SEVEN   YEARS'    WAS. 


309 


squadron  detached,  under  Commodore  Eobert  Man  (2),  by  Hawke 
to  cruise  off  Brest,  took  the  Zephyr,  32,  which  had,  however,  only 
twenty-six  guns  mounted,  and  which  was  then  carrying  troops  and 
stores  to  Newfoundland.  The  last  capture  made  from  the  French 
during  the  war  was  that  of  the  Oiseau,  26,  which  struck  to  the 
Brune,  32,  Captain  George  Anthony  Tonyn,  in  the  Mediterranean, 
on  October  23rd. 


APPENDIX   TO   CHAPTERS   XXVII.   AND   XXVIII. 


LOSSES   OF   THE  BELLIGERENT  POWERS. 
L.  CARK  LAUGHTOX. 


NOTK.— These  lists,  like  tuose  on  p.  535  et  serf,  of  Vol.  II.,  are  tentative ;  but  they  are  not  so  meagre  a«  the  lUts  given  by 
tlie  best-known  historians  uf  the  period,  t</..  Charnock,  Peatson,  and  Tronde.  Those  authorities  liave  been 
largely  checkei  by  reference  to  Captains'  Letters,  Muster  Hooks,  .Minutes  of  Courts-Martial,  and  tther  papers 
«  f  like  nature ,  but  it  Is  an  almost  impossible  tn-k  to  ensure  completeness. 


(i/.)  LOSSES 

OF    11 

M.    SHIPS    KIIOM    17 

1-1     TO    170M. 

Commander. 

Year. 

1  lat  i 

Ships, 

linns 

[*  Lost  his  life  on  the 

Fate. 

occasion.] 

1716 

Nov. 

10 

Aurjufte    .... 

CO 

Capt.  Hubert  Julmsm. 

^Vmked  in  the  Maltic. 

Ilitzd  nliiiis 

Lot  at  sta. 

1717 

Xorlin'13 

•J'.! 

Lost, 

17  111 

.Tan. 

29 

Crown       .... 

r»o 

,,      Julin  Uolerts. 

Ijost  at  entrance  of  Tagns. 

Keb. 

14 

Httrford    ... 

7U 

.,      Charles  Vanbrugh. 

Lo.st  In  the  Mediterranean. 

.Mar. 

28 

Itlandfard     .     .     . 

"Capt.  Erasmus  I  liillips. 

KonmlereJ  in  the  May. 

1721) 

Nov. 

24 

J/unrV       .... 

5(1 

.,      Hun.  (Jeorgp  Clinton.   | 

Lost  in  \armonth  Hoad?. 
Crew  saved. 

}f,ifo'-d 

•^il 

Lost, 

1721 

li'vyl  Anne  . 

-:o 

Lott. 

Dec. 

1 

Hind   

*Ci-pt.  John  Fnrzcr. 

Wrecked  off  Guernsey, 

1722 

April 

15 

(ireyhomtil     , 

'_MI 

Taken  by  gnarda  costa^  :  restor* 

L 

't 

tt&ifm-d    .      .      . 

'JO 

"'link. 

1724 

* 

rr«i«r(prlz?)        . 

12 

Lost. 

1729 

Nov. 

10 

Hoyal  Anne,  galley. 

*C«pt.  Francis  Willis. 

t'omi''orcd  off  the  Lizard. 

173l> 

Dec. 

J'rincess  TjOuiw. 

•Ml 

Lost  (ex-Launcexton\ 

1740 

Jan. 

? 

Triumph  (  prize  1. 

1H 

1-omiiiered  off  Sambala  Keys. 

1741 

J»n. 

13 

Otter   

8 

Cum.  John  (jage. 

\\  recked  in  the  South  Seas. 

Mar 

Wolf 

f!4 

Apr. 

16 

(•'alicia  (prizcl   . 

"U 

Capt.  lianiel  Hoare. 

Hnrnt  as  useless  at  Cartagena. 

May 

14 

II  afjer      .... 

'^s 

,,      David  Cheap. 

\\  recked  in  the  South  Seas. 

Aug. 

Anna  (pink)  . 

(     St. 

'      t    sli. 

] 
j 

Broken  up  at  Juan  Fernandez. 

Oct. 

4 

Tryal  (.brig-sloop  1    . 

11 

Com.  Charles  Saumli'rs. 

Skittled  by  order. 

1742 

Jan. 

12 

Tiger  

SO 

Cajit.  Kdw.  Uerbeit(l). 

\\'  recke,t  on  a  kev  near  Tortuga. 

June 

1  1 

Itnke  (f.s.  ) 

s 

Com.  Smith  Callis. 

Kvpended  at  M.  Tropez. 

Aug. 

15 

<;Ifiucestt'r 

5U 

(^'ui»t.  Matthew  Michell. 

Knrnt  by  order  in  the  South  Sfa> 

Sept. 

21 

Tilt'Urif     .... 

CO 

,,     1'eter  Lawieiue. 

Accldf  ntallv  burnt  in  W.  Indie? 

lh  akc  .      . 

fll 

Lost. 

f!4 

Com.  1'eter  Turns. 

Lost  in  the  W.  Indies. 

1743 

<  'apt.  Ashbv  L'ttiug 

1744 

Jan. 

Astnra,  s.s.   . 
ftrford      .... 

70 

Com.  K>  belt  Suanton. 
Capt.  Perry  Mavne. 

Accident;!  11  v  burnt  at  Piscataqun. 
Wrecked  in  Gulf  of  Mexico. 

Keb. 

11 

.l««e  (,'allt'y,  i  s. 

8 

*i'om.  Mackie. 

Expended  off  Toulon. 

May 

8 

.\orthu  inberliin'i 

7ii 

*Capt.  Thomas  Wat-cm  (l). 

Taken  bv  tlie  French. 

,,     'I  bomas  liurv  (1) 

Seaford    .      .      .      . 
(•'rampus  .... 

20 
1(J 

,,     Thomas  Pye. 
Com.  Kichanl  Collins  (1). 

Taken  by  the  French. 

Oct. 

5 

Victor;/     .... 

.       IfO 

f*Aii.  Sir  John  Balcheu. 
l*Capt>"anmelFatilknor(l). 

Lost  in  tl  e  Channel. 

,, 

20 

."Y.  ^W-ans      .      .      . 

50 

*C  pt.  William  Knight. 

tl 

M 

Greenwich     . 

50 

*Capt.  Kdwar.1  Allen. 

*Com.  WilILm  Leu 

(1 

lf 

Thunder,  l«mib  . 

8 

Com.  Thomas  Gregory  (2). 

M 

Aorfc(liuik'  .      .      . 

Colchester      .     .     . 

.    !     50 

Capt.  Sir  Win.  Hewett,  lit- 

Wrecked  on  tlie  Kentish  Knotk. 

14 

Taken  by  the  French  ;  retaken. 

t  These  sloops  are  usually  spoken  of  as  carrying  14  guns.  Sometimes,  however,  they  are  credited  with  20,  sometimes 
with  only  9.  Ihe  explanation  seems  to  be  tha'  they  often  carried  8  guns  and  12  swivels  or  patercroes  j  thus  the  14  would 
be  arrived  at  by  rating  a  swivel  conventionally  as  half  a  gun.  But  in  reality  their  armament  was  rather  haphazard. 


LOSSES    OF  H.M.    SHIPS  FROM  1714    TO   1763. 


311 


Year.       Date. 

Ships. 

1 
Gnus. 

Commander. 
[*  Lost  his  life  on  the 
occasion.] 

Fate. 

1744 

1Y45      Feb.    16 
Mar.    28 
.Time 
Nov.   14 

1746      Oct       19 

Swallow  

16 
50 
60 
44 
20 
20 
20 
14 
14 
14 
14 
12 
10 
8 
8 
8 
50 
14 
14 
14 
8 
8 
50 
14 
50 
20 
14 
14 

74 

18 
CO 
l!4 
20 

to 

6 
sloop 

Capt.  Warwick  Calmaily. 
*    „     Jacob  Elton. 
„     Edward  Dodd. 
*   ,,     Edmund  Beavor. 

Com.  George  Vadiell. 

Capt.  William  LUlc. 
Com.  Stephen  Colby. 
„     William  Martin  (2). 

Capt.  Hon.  AuKiistusKeppel 
Com.  Carr  Scrope. 
*Capt.  James  Hamilton  (2). 
,,     Francis  William  Drake 

"Cum.  George  Vachell. 
|l{.-Ail.  Hou.  Edward  Dos- 
-     cawen. 
[Capt.  Samuel  Marshall  (1). 

*    .,     Thomas  Fincrer. 
,,     John  Amherst. 
„     Hicliard  Watkins. 
,,      Molyneux  Shnldham. 
Lieut.  James  Orrok. 

Capt.  Robert  Roddani. 
Com.  John  Cleland  (1). 
*Capt.  Henry  Barns'ey. 
*Com.  Arthm-  Upton. 
Cjpt.  John  Bentley. 
iH.-Ad.  Thomas  Biodirick. 
(Capt.  Joseph  Peyton  (1). 
,,     John  Stanton. 
,,     Thomas  Manning. 

Wrecked. 
Taken  by  the  French  ;  retaken. 
Wrecked  in  Leeward  Islauds. 
Taken  by  Apollon,  50. 
Taken  by  French  in  W.  Indies. 
Foundered  off  Duubar  ;  all  lost. 
Foundered  in  the  Atlantic. 
Taken  by  the  French. 
Taken  by  the  French  ;  retaken. 
Foundered. 
Wrecked. 
Taken  by  the  reljels  ;  velaken. 
Sunk. 

iTaken  by  two  Spaniards  near  .Jamaica. 

Taken  by  the  French. 
Taken  by  M.  de  Conflans  ;  retaken  1747. 
Taken  by  the  French. 
Taken  by  the  French. 
Wrecked  in  the  channel. 
Capsized  near  Leghorn  ;  45  drowned. 
Taken  by  the  t-rench. 
Wrecked  on  Belle  Isle. 
Burnt  by  accident  off  Irish  coast. 
Blown  tip  in  action  with  ','loriofo. 
Wrecked  in  G.  of  Floiida. 
Wrecked  on  the  Lizard. 
Wrecked  off  Ireland. 

(.Wrecked  in  E.  Indies  ;  600  lost. 

W  recked  in  E.  Indies. 
Wrecked  in  E.  Indies  ;  330  lost. 
Wrecked  at  Halifax. 
Taken  off  Brest  ;  restored. 
Taken  at  Martinique. 
Taken  by  privateer  f»f<>rnal. 

^Surrendered  at  Oswego. 

Taken  in  W.  Indies. 
Taken  off  Brest;  retaken. 

U.ost  in  a  hurricane  off  Luuisbourg. 
Lost  near  St.  Helen's. 
1  Burnt  at  sea;  485  l»t. 

(Destroyed  in  the  E.  Indies. 

Weymoutk  .... 

Blandford  .... 
Fox 

Wolf  .  . 

Sapphire's  Prize 

hlast,  bomb  .... 
Achilles  .  . 

Dec. 

1747      July      7 
Sept. 
Oct.       8 
1748 

1749     Jan. 
April  12 

,',        13 
1755      June 
Aug.    13 
1756      Mar.    11 

1757      Mar.    18 
April  19 
Sept.   24 

1758      Feb.    19 
April  13 

,,      28 

Albany  

Lightning,  bomb     .     . 
Louisbourg,  f.s.  . 
Maidstone,      .... 
Whitehaven,  armed  sp. 
Dartmouth     .... 

Wolf  . 

.Yamwr  

Apollo,  hosp.  f-h. 
Pembroke       .... 
.Mar*    
Blandford     .     .     .     . 

Adrentute  . 

Greenwich  .... 
Merlin 

50 
10 

611 
10 
74 

00 
24 

Tilbury  
Ferret 

Invincible  .  .  .  . 
Prince  Ge»r;,e  , 

Triton  
ttriilgewater. 

1759 


29 
Aug. 

Oct.  11 

Nov.  29 
May 

Nov.  20 

„  21 


Feb.  15 

liar.  28 

May  17 

Oct.  4 

Nov.  2 


Jan.      1 


Mar. 
Apiil    4 


London  (bites) 
Stork  .     .     . 
Winchelsect    . 
Lichjield  .      . 
Tartar's  Prize 
Retolittio» 
Efgex  ,      .      . 
Mermaid  . 
ffawke 

Falcon  (bombl 
Ramillica. 
Penguin   . 
Is.westoft . 
Virgin 
Harwich   . 
Griffin      .      . 
Cumberland  . 
Lyme  .      .      . 
Eurun. 


yeu-caitle.     .     . 
Queenborough     . 
Protector,  f.s. 
Due  a'Aquitaitie 
Xunderland  . 
Duke  (store-ship^ 

Pheasant  (cutter) 


1762 


Dec. 
Feb. 


311 


Hiddeford      . 
Raiscnnable  . 
E^reuve    . 
ravage 


74 
64 
20 
12 
8 

90 
20 
28 
1'J 
50 
20 
56 
28 
20 


64 

60 
10 

1C 

10 
20 
64 
14 
9 


,,  Williiim  Tucker. 

,,  Jnlm  Hale. 

,,  .Matthew  I'artfiii. 

„  'Ilidiiias  Itaillie  (1). 

,,  Hi  nry  Spekc. 

„  Lucius  O'Brien. 

,,  Jati.es  Hue  km  n. 

Com.  Mark  KobiiiH>n  (1). 
*C»pt.  AVittewnmge  Tajlur. 

,,     William  Harris. 

,,     Joseph  Ueaiie. 
Com.  Edward  St.  L<*  (2). 
Capt.  William  Marsh. 

,,     Thomas  Taylor  (l). 

„     Robert  Kirk. 

,,     Sir  Edward  Vfrnon  (2) 

,,     Jubu  Jilpliinrtone  (1) 

„     Diyby  I  ent  (3). 

*    „    Sir  William  Hewitt.  lit. 
,,     Hou.  James  Colville. 

(*Com.  Bartholomew  (?)  Nel- 

sou. 

T^ieut.  James  Alleu. 
*Capt.  Thomas  Gordon  (2). 

,,     Molyneux  Shukihnm. 
Com.  Peter  Blake. 


Taken  in  W.  Indies. 
Taken  by  French;  rftakdi. 
Wrecked  on  African  coast ;   130  lost. 
Sprang  a  plank  in  ^Mediterranean. 
U\" recked  on  Four  Bank  in  QuilKTon  Bay. 

Wrecked  among  the  Bahamas. 

Taken  off  C.  Clear;  retaki  n  1761. 

\Vre;  kfd  on  the  Saintcs.  Guadeloupe. 

Wrecked  on  ISolt  Head. 

Taken  and  burnt. 

u  recked  in  the  St.  Lawrence. 

Taken  by  French  ;  retaken,  Sept. 

Wrecked  on  the  Isle  of  Pines. 

W  recked  mar  Barbuda. 

Fonndei'e.1  near  Goa. 

Wrecked  in  North  Sea. 

\\  recked  in  St.  I^wrence. 

W  re  eked  on  St.  Nicholas  Island. 

\  Lost  in  a  hurricane  off  Pondii  berry  ; 
(    crews  saved. 

I  Lost  in  a  hurricane  off  Pondicherry  ; 
f    crews  lost. 

(Foundered  in  the  Channel. 

Taken  at  Vigo  by  Achilla 
Wr&ked  near  Flamborough  Head. 
Lost  at  Martinique. 
Lost  in  returning  from  South  Carolina. 
Lost  in  Torbay. 


312 


APPENDIX. 


Year.       Date. 

1 
Ships,                   Gu 

Commander, 
us.       [*  Lo?t  his  life  on  tlie 
occasion.] 

Fate. 

1762  |  May 
July    2( 
Nov.    '29 
Dec.     18 

i:ti3     .Ian. 

(.'apt.  Hubert  Carkett. 
1 
„     Thomas  Burnett. 
,,      Thomas  Collingwooil. 
„     "William  Newsom. 
,,      llicliard  Onslow. 
Com.  Patrick  Monat. 

*Com.  Edward  Kuowles. 
Com.  Low  field. 

Lost  iu  the  AV.  Indies. 
Lost  in  Old  Strait  of  Bahama. 
(Foundcn-d  on  passage  home  from 
I     Havana. 
Lost  at  Manilla. 
Ix>st  on  Hazeboro*  Sands. 
Taken  at  St..Jolmfs,Xewfotindlaml. 
Lost  in  Irish  Sea. 
Foundered  on  way  to  AV.  Indies. 
Wrecked  in  the  Downs. 
Taken  by  Audacieux,  privateer. 

Chesterfield    ....        4( 

Marlfjoruugh  .     .     .     .   .     7i 
Temftle      .....   i     7( 
s-'outh&ea  Castle       .     .       41 
Jluntljer    4( 
(fratnont  .                       .        If 
&orjtiini    .....        1( 
1'ereifritte      .      .     ,             H 
>'<m  Kenaro  ....        61 
Basilisk  (bomb).      .                fc 

LOSSES   OF   THE    FUEXCH    XAYV,  1744-48,  1755-02. 


K. — French  Kast  Iinliamen,  if  serving  with,  or  in  lieu  of  ships  of,  the  French  Navy,  are,  in  a  few  Instances, 

itirliL'l.  >1  below. 


17-14 
Hio 


Apr.  -I 

.Ian.  1U 

Feb.  'Jo 

Mar.  -J« 

May  ]y 

K.b.  ;i 

Apr.  4 

AUK-     " 

4 

Oft.        II 
14 

Nov.    in 


.June    i!i 

Sept.     i;i 

Oct.       II 

1  I 

H 

i»  I' 
11 
11 

n 


Jan.    31 
June      w 

Nov.  13 
Mar. 

July  12 

.May  14 

.»"  30 

Sept.  '21 

Nov.  23 


.Vwfc-e  .     . 

Kli-plmnt. 


Yiijilante. 
Aw/uste    . 
Voltifje, 
Mercurt  (•  n  (bite) 


'  'asuuboti. 

Parfait    .      .      . 

Fine  .... 
Flon  .... 
Mnlitfiie^sl  op). 
InoiucilAe  .  . 


Ktuil.' .  . 
Ifi-nuinmte 
J/wHtiiv^te 
Terrible  . 

Ffiitiftti'iix 
Trident  . 


LffS 

Magnanime  . 

/,)/$  (en  liute) 

Etpi-mnve  (en  HTite) 
Cliariot  lioi/al     . 
Arc  en  Cifl    . 
Aquilon     .... 
Due  d'Aquttaine 
Emeraude 
Alcioii       .... 
Hien  Acffuise. 


Autumn      Merlin 


'2<>  Taken  by  Dreadnought  and  t; rumpus. 

til  Accidentally  burnt  at  Brest. 

•JU  Taken  by  Cheater  and  Sttitderlttiid. 

-i'>          Taken  by  V.-Adni.  Martin  in  the  Channel. 

iil  Taken  by  Commodore  Warren  at  Ijonisbourg. 

f.n  'Taken  by  Portland.    Renamed  Portland's  Prize. 

'.'.'1          Taken;  retaken  next  day. 

fir,  'Taken  by  y«ntnr. 

d-l  Taken  by  Pembroke. 

i,i  'Taken  by  X«ttii><iltain. 

:tit          Wrecked  in  K.  Iiuliea. 

lit;  Taken  by  Pm-tltutd.     Renamed  Amazon. 

ill  Captured  and  !>unit. 

V"  JAccidentally  burnt  at  Chebncto. 

•ID  'Taken  by  Dt'timx'f. 

;in         U' recked  at  Slontrose. 

21  'Taken  by  '>'r'>fh»uitd,  privateer. 

'Taken.  ' 

7  I  Taken  by  Alison. 

i)l  'Taken  by  Alison.      Renamed  Iiitrtpiil. 

.vj  Taken  by  Ansun.     Renamed  7.si,\', 

."iO  'Taken  by  Alison. 

•In  'Taken  by  ADMHI. 

lin  'Taken  by  AIIM.M. 
u;          1 'e>t roved  by  \Vanx*n. 

:>'2  'Taken  by  f>i>i'cr. 

71  'Taken  by  lla\\  ke. 

7l  Taken  by  llauke. 

7n  'Taken  by  llauke. 

U  I  'Taken  by  Hawk*1, 

n-i  'Taken  by  Mawke. 

fiO  'Taken  by  Hauke. 

•JH  'Taken  by  Hauke. 

:tii  'Taken. 

•jti  Taken. 

7-1  Taken  by  .\<ttti>i<jhatn.  and  Portland. 

«-!  {T^euoin-um^rn.-!!. 

7-1  'I'aken  and  burnt. 

;di  i  Takcii  by  Lichjield  and  Xu notch. 

5U  Taken  by  Tor  bay. 

50  1'e^trnyed  by  Antelti^. 

TiU  Taken  by  J-.Kf/lf.  and  M&lway. 

'2*  'Taken  by  Southampton. 

;"iO  Sunk  by  Hussar  and  Mphin. 

Taken. 

Taken. 

Retaken  by  Janmster  and  Dunkirk. 


Really  a  ship  of  the  Kast  India  Company,  but  was  serving  with  the  fiei.'t. 


LOSSES    OF   THE  FRENCH  NAVY,   174-1-1762. 


313 


Year. 

Date. 

.Ships. 

Guus. 

1757 

36 

16 

1758 

Feb.    28 

BO 

.,     •  2S 
.,       2K 

Oriflamme  

00 
64 

Apr.     7 

Galate'c  

22 

„       30 
May    29 

Bien  Aimi1  
Itiane  

-     58 
36 

Apollon  
Cherre 

50 

16 

„       29 
j 

Uiche  ...  .... 

Fidtle  
fi'uirlande  .... 

16 
26 

% 

July    2U 

,,       25 

t4 
64 
74 

Sept. 

liienfaisant  

64 

12 
OU.         2 
31 

Calyjtsu  
Ifuc  d'Hanovre  

14 

04 

Dec. 

t>4 

" 

(Greenwich  
Kttbuste  (eu  flute)  .... 

50 

74 

44 

1750 

Feb.    21 
Mar.    19 

Jitllone  

,,       27 

i»       2s 
May    is 

Jtitc  dt  Chartres  
liana»:  

fcO 
40 
36 

,,    ?  10 

Oci-an  

i;t>u 

Is 
Nov.  2(1-  / 

\ 

.May     IG|" 

Tcmi-ruire  
f'entaure  
Jlndeate  
Sob'U  Royal  .  .... 
/•'ormiaalile  
Ifi-ros  
Tkesev  

Junte  
I'tniionn  . 

74 
74 

04 
80 
HU 

74 
74 
70 

7U 

36 
::•' 

July 
Sept. 
.  Oct.      IK 


1761      Jan. 


Mar. 
Apr. 


Jtine      5 

July     17; 
Aug.     13 


Aug.  18 
Sept.  1 
Oct.  15 


Mtwhault       .     .     . 
Bienfaisant  . 
Jfari[i(is  de  Marliw 

Vitrije  (ex  Virgin)  . 
Virtue.  ... 

Prince  Ednuard 

Vdlcur 

Fleur-dK-Lys 
Jlcrwiime 

Baleine 

Eprnuve 

Vatale 

Ft-licitr    .... 

Warwick  (en  flute  34)  . 

Jirune 

Cmnete 

(triflanime  (eu  flute)     . 
Bertin  (eu  flute  '2«) 
Faisan 


Ste.  Anne  (en  flute  40)  . 

Bo'iffonne      .      .      .      . 

Achille 

(.'ouratieux    .      .     .     . 

Anemone 

Sardoine 

Leopard  

Guirlande     .      .      .      . 

Zephyr     

f'rozon  (schooner)    . 


16 

12 
32 

32 


64 
16 

64 

32 
62 
74 

14 

14 


Fate. 


Destroyed  at  Majorca. 

Takeu  by  Isis. 

Taken  by  1'hwnix,  privateer. 

'I'aken  by  Monmoutlt. 

Destroyed  by  Monarch  and  Montagu. 

Takeu  by  Htvenge  aud  /tenvick. 

Tii kin  by  Ei-scx  and  Pluto. 

Wrecked  in  K.  Indies. 

Taken  by  ftvrcas. 

Taken  by  Dorsetshire  &ud  Achilles. 

Takeu  by  Juno. 

vSuuk  by  French  at  Louisbourg. 

Taken  by  Rochester  aud  Renotm. 
iBunit  by  accident  at  Lonisbourii. 

'Cut  out  by  Iwjats  at  Louisl»ourg. 

'I'aken  and  burnt  by  isix. 

Driven  ashore  and  destroyed  in  Andierne  Bay. 

T«k«nby  Lizard  off  Brest. 

Takeu  by  Antebiye  off  llfracouibc. 

Uvivcked  near  Bre>t. 

Taken  l>y  Alci-ic  and  A<-t(i-vn. 
Taken  by  >Y.  Allixim  in  Mediterranean. 
Destroyed  at  Malta  by  Muimwuth. 
[lurned  at  St.  Servand. 
I'aken  by   I'-  xtal. 
Taken  by  .Eotux  and  Jsis. 
Taken  hy  \\'intt.«,r. 
'I'aken  liy  Sunth<nni't<jn  and  Mi  l«, ,</„_. 
'I'aken  by  <'ltatli«m,   I't/iHA'and  Thunms. 
Taken  by  Crescent. 
Taken  by  Cotes  at  Jamaica. 

} Destroyed  by  Buscawen. 

J  Taken  by  Buscauen. 

Di-stn.yed  l).v  It'Mauen. 
Burnt  by  I!a\\  ke. 

Taken  and  burnt  by  llau  ke. 
Sunk  by  Hawm-. 

Sunk  by  lla\\  ke. 

\Vrerked  at  niciitb  of  Loire. 

\\'r.  cki^l  in  Vilaini-. 


De&troyeil  at  <  'balour  Fay  by  Hyv..n. 


( 

Uetaken  by  Tini^l'-  and  tli'ifi'.n 
'I'aken  by  I!",-  u*. 
Destroyed  by  Holmes. 
Taken  by  Livlij. 
DetJtroyeJ  by  llulme-. 

[Cut  out  at  I'uii'lidierry. 

Taken  by  _VtV/ir. 

Takeu  bv  L'ni'-oni. 

Taken  and  destroyed  by  Jiicftnwml. 

'I'aken  by  Minerva. 

Taken  by   Venus  and  Juno. 

Taken  by  Bedford. 

Taken  by  Isis. 

Taken  by  Jfero  and   IV«(fs. 

Taken  by  AUmm/. 

jTakfii    by    Admiral    Holmes'a    squadron    on 
(     Jamaica  station. 

Taken  by  Thetis  and  3fo,:i>$tr.. 

Takeu  by  Thunderer. 
1  Taken  by  Jiellvna. 
JTaken  by  Mars  aud  Oxford  in  Bay  of  Biscay. 

Burnt  at  <^uel>ec  with  plague  on  Jiuard. 

Takeu. 

Taken  by  Lion. 

Taken  by  Venus. 


314 


APPENDIX. 


Year.        Date. 

Ships,                          Gar 

s.                                          Fate. 

1762 

Oct.      23 

Oiseau     36 

Opale                  .                               2  H 

Taken  by  hrune. 
Takeii  by  Phoenix. 
Taken  by  Fame  and  Lion. 
Lost  at  Cape  Francois. 
Ixfflt  off  Mahoii. 
Lost  coming  out  of  Dunquerque. 
Ix)st  off  Port  land. 
Lost  on  the  Doggersbauk. 
Lett  near  Villa  Franca. 
Lost  in  Strait  of  Belle  Isle. 

Dragon    .......         64 

Zenobie    .   I      2t 
Mutine     .   j       24 

Aigle  60 

(c.)   LOSSES   OF   THE   SPANISH    NAVY,  17UM9,    1739-48,    17G2. 


NOT i-;. — It  is  possible  that  a  few  of  the  small  craft  mentioned  may  have  belonged  to  the  Caraccns  Company. 


'    Jleal  San  FtHpr. 

71 

Principe  d?  Ayt  arias   ...          70 

Xaw  Cailox    . 

tiO 

171* 

..-.„•    •• 

Xan/a  Isaltla    . 

GO 

-Taken  by  Byng  in  the  battle  offC'..]!*  1'assaro. 

1 

.Santa  Rosa    .      . 

CO 

I'ulante 

.       .       .       .            44 

Ju  no   . 

3G 

Real          ... 

60 

Aug.     1  1 

Xan  Isidoro 

40 

f  Takeii  bv  \\'altnn's  division. 

Aifnila 

A  4th  rate      . 

.       .            .14 

liunit  ai'tor  c.il'tui'f. 

Aug.     11 

J£s].eranfa 

.       .                   46 

Htlrnt  by  Mari. 

A  4th  rate     .     . 

44 

llnrnt. 

Aug. 

X.  Juan  Me  nor   . 

.       .       .                   20 

Taken. 

M 

Jlermi'/ne 

41 

Hunit  at  Messina. 

,  ( 

Conde  de  Toulouse 

.       .            30 

Taken  at  Messina. 

lt 

San  Fernando    . 

.  -                til 

funk  at  Messina. 

Tiijre  .      .      . 

2(i 

Taken. 

2  bombs    . 

.       .       .       .             10 

liurnt  by  Mari. 

1  bomb     .      .      . 

.       .       .       .              10 

Taken  bv  Walton's  division. 

An^.    11 

1  fireship  .      . 

Bui  nt  bv  Mari. 

4  stureships  . 

Taken. 

1  settee 

Burnt. 

1719 

l-l 

Driven  i>  shore. 

y<in  Pedro 

bo 

Lost  in  1'ay  of  Turanto. 

Jan.     '.  tj 

\  frigate  .      .      . 

Taken  by  Royal  Oak, 

1727 

Mar.     11 

.V.  X.  del  Itoyario 

4G 

Takeii  by  Royal  Oak. 

17:19 

1  ll'C.          li 

'2  storeships   . 

Taken  by  Shttn'waa. 

Nov.    2:1 

Astrwt 
Tri  unfit    .      .      . 

.       .       .       .            20 
.       .       .       .            2(1 

Takeii  at  Puerto  1'ello. 

1710 

Apr.      : 

Princestt 

.       .            (14 

Taken  by  Kent,  Lenox  and  Orfor-L 

I  sloop*     .      . 

S 

Taken  near  St.  Augustine  by  Jtyuirnl. 

Oct.      23 

2  stmvships   . 

Takeii  bv  Itiamond. 

1741 

l-'eli. 

(rUipUSCOCt 

.       .       '.       .            74 

Lost  off  SanU  .Martha. 

Mar.   ?  U 

Her  in  tone. 

;"i4 

Foundered  at  sea. 

1  putache 

20 

Hritken  up  nt  St.  Catherine's. 

(tulicin 

71* 

'[  akm  at  Cartag'  na  ;  afterwards  burnt. 

,.        25 

San  Car  bat 

70 

Scuttled  at  CarUigeni  by  Spaniards. 

etc. 

Africa      .      . 

HO 

Scuttled  at  Cartagena  by  Spaniards. 

Conquistador 

t;o 

Scuttled  at  Cartagena  by  Spaniards. 

Xa?)  Fdipe     . 

so 

liunit  at  Cartagena  by  Spaniards, 

,,     :to 

Draijoh     . 

.       .       .       .            GO 

JUmit  at  Cart;  gena  by  Spaniards. 

Aug. 

1  frigate*  .     .     . 

.       .       .       .            21 

Takeii  by  11  nwati  'i: 

174J 

Feb. 

Fucrte 

GO 

Wrecked  while  trying  to  take  the  chip's  company 
of  the  Tiyer. 

Xan  JIKDI 

Xanta  Teresa 

June    14 

.*  led<i<f              gal 

leys.     .     . 

Hurnt  at  St.  'I  ropex. 

Xan  Felipe 

X.  Gtnaro 

Invencibite 

70 

llumt  at  Havana. 

?  1142 

X.  Juan  Eautistn  (3">  meu)t  . 

?  1742 
?  1742 

Xan  Joaquin  (110 
Xan  Ji.se  (32  men) 

ru)t:  .     :: 

•Taken  or  destroyed. 

*  'I  hese  may  perhaps  be  identified  with  some  of  the  ships  1 11  which  head-money  was  paid  in  1746,  and 
which  are  given  at  the  end  of  the  losses  for  1742. 

t  Ihe  only  record  of  these  ships  is  that  they  were  meu-uf-war  taken  or  destroyed,  but  not  at  Puerto  liello  or 
Cartagena.  Head-money  was  being  paid  for  them  in  1746,  at  the  same  time  a4*  for  the  Princesa  and  other  ships 
taken  before  1742;  hence  it  may  be  inferred  that  their  loss  was  prior  to  the  earlier  date.  See  note  *  above. 


LOSSES    OF   THE   SPANISH  NAVY,   1718-1762. 


315 


Year. 

Date.                            Ships. 

Guns. 

Fate. 

1743 

June   20 

N.  S.  de  Catrndtnia"    . 

56 

'J'aken  by  Centurion. 

S  IsidOTO      ... 

70 

Burnt  at  Ajaccio. 

1744 

Feb.    11     Poder                       ... 

to 

Taken  by  Berwick;  afterwards  burnt. 

Conde  de  Chincan  . 

24 

Taken  by  Ripon  in  W.  Indies. 

1745 

CblKtfcttn  (treasiu-e  ship) 

Taken  by  Jtv?e. 

1746 

t\»te  de  .\antz  (?)        .     . 

32 

Taken. 

1747 

Oct.       9 

filorioso               . 

74 

Taken  by  liussell. 

1748 

Oct.        1 

,.         3 

ttnnHtsttnlor 

64 

70 

Taken  by  Knowles  in  W,  Indies. 
Burnt  by  Knowles  in  W.  Indies. 

Africa      

1762 

May    28 

[•'{•  ft  ix    f  s.                       . 

18 

Taktii  by  Al&iin. 

M             2& 

Vrnnfinzfi 

24 

Taken  by  Defiance. 

„       28      Marie  

1H 

Taken  by  Defiance. 

June     3      Thetis 

22 

Tai-  en  by  Alarm. 

Neptunrj  

70 

" 

Asia    

64 
«0 

•Sunk  at  the  entrat  cc  to  Ifavaua. 

Tiijic  

70 

\ 

Jteina  

70 

*>i/tter(jno 

70 

Infante 

TO 

Aug.  13 

70 

Surrendered  with  Havana. 

America  

(iu 

Ctiiifrttistti'lir 

CO 

yan  Genaro  

6U 

>"a»  Antitnio  . 

i',0 

Aug.            2  ships  (building)    . 
Oct.      31      yanlislma  Trinidad     . 

2'!' 

De^troved  nt  Havau.i. 
Tai-en  nt  Manilla. 

Ventura  

'.iti 

Taken  by  the  /'"i<-c,v. 

}s"<>t  a  man-of-war. 


(     816     ) 


CHAPTER  XXIX. 

VOYAGES   AND   DISCOVERIES,    1 714-1 76'2. 

SIR  CLEMENTS  MAKKHAM,  K.C.B. 

Clippertuii  an<l  Shelvncke  to  the  Pacific— Voyages  to  Hudson's  Bay  -Expeditions  of 
Barlow,  Yaughan,  Serous,  and  Middleton— The  search  for  a  North-West  Passage 
—Henry  Kills'*  Voyage— Coats's  l»»>k  on  Hudson's  Bay— Anson's  Voyage— The 
value  of  naval  Exploration. 

TN  171K  there  was  war  between  the  German 
Emperor  and  Spain  ;  and  some  London 
adventurers  obtained  a  commission  from  the 
government  at  Vienna  to  cruise  against  the 
Spaniards  in  the  Pacific.  The  commission 
was  received  from  the  authorities  at  Ostend ; 

and  the  ships,  fitted  out  in  the  Thames,  were  named  the  Prince 
EiKjcnc  and  the  Starhemberg.  A  retired  naval  lieutenant  named 
Shelvocke  was  to  have  had  the  former,  a  ship  with  thirty-six  guns 
and  a  complement  of  one  hundred  and  eighty  men';  while  the  Starhem- 
lienj,  mounting  twenty-four  guns,  was  to  have  been  entrusted  to 
John  Clipperton,  the  man  who  had  deserted  Captain  Dampier.  But 
the  owners  were  displeased  with  Shelvocke  for  his  extravagance 
when  he  went  to  Ostend  for  the  commissions,  so  they  disrated 
him,  giving  Clipperton  the  chief  command  in  the  Prince.  Eugene, 
and  transferring  Shelvocke  to  the  Starhemberg.  Meanwhile  war 
broke  out  with  Spain,  so  the  names  of  the  ships  were  changed  to 
Success  and  Speedwell,  the  Ostend  commissions  were  returned  with 
thanks,  and  the  expedition  sailed  under  British  colours.  Shelvocke 
for  the  time  stifled  his  resentment  at  having  been  superseded ;  and 
the  ships  sailed  from  Plymouth  on  February  13th,  1719.  Soon 
afterwards  a  gale  of  wind  gave  Shelvocke  an  opportunity  of  parting 
company  with  his  superior  officer,  with  all  the  wine  and  brandy  on 
board  his  ship.  His  chief  mate  was  Simon  Hatley,  who  had  been 
with  Woodes  Rogers,  and  William  Betagh  was  his  "  captain  of 


1719-22.]      VOYAGES   OF   CLIPPEBTON  AND    SHELVOOKE.  317 

marines."  With  both  these  officers  Shelvocke,  who  was  a  free 
drinker,  had  constant  quarrels.  In  rounding  Cape  Horn  the  ship 
•was  driven  down  to  61°  30'  S.,  where  the  cold  was  intense.  "  We 
had  continued  squalls  of  sleet,  snow,  and  rain,"  says  Shelvocke  ; 
and  the  only  sea  bird  was  a  disconsolate  black  albatross.  Simon 
Hatley  thought  it  was  a  bird,  of  ill-omen  which  brought  the  snow 
and  mist ;  and  he  shot  the  albatross.  He  believed  that  this  act 
would  bring  a  fair  wind  :  but,  on  the  contrary,  it  continued  foul 
and  tempestuous  for  another  month.  Shelvocke  touched  at  the 
island  of  Chiloe,  plundered  and  burnt  the  town  of  Payta,  on 
the  Peruvian  coast,  and  arrived  at  Juan  Fernandez  on  May 
4th,  1720.  There  the  Speedwell  parted  her  cable,  was  driven  on 
shore,  and  became  a  total  wreck.  The  crew  worked  hard  at  a 
new  vessel,  of  20  tons,  which  was  launched  011  the  5th  of  October 
and  named  the  Recovery.  Shelvocke  embarked  with  forty-six  men, 
leaving  eleven  Englishmen  on  the  island.  He  shaped  a  course 
to  the  Peruvian  coast  and  captured  a  fine  vessel  of  200  tons  at 
Pisco,  leaving  his  own  little  craft  for  the  Spanish  crew.  Sailing 
northward,  they  encountered  the  Success  off  Quibo,  but  they  parted 
company  almost  immediately.  The  two  vessels  met  again  three  times 
on  the  coast  of  Mexico,  but  without  exchanging  a  word.  Shelvocke 
named  his  prize  the  Happy  Return.  Clipperton  sailed  for  China  in 
May,  1721,  and  sold  the  Success  at  Macao  on  account  of  the  owners, 
returning  home  with  his  crew  in  June,  1722.  Shelvocke  captured 
a  rich  prize  called  the  Conception,  with  108,03(5  dollars  on  board,  and 
then  steered  for  California,  anchoring  in  Puerto  Seguro,  near  Cape 
San  Lucas,  for  which  port  he  gives  some  sailing  directions.  Having 
left  California  for  China  in  August,  1721,  Shelvocke  states  that  on 
the  21st  he  sighted  an  island  one  hundred  and  ten  leagues  from 
Cape  San  Lucas,  at  a  distance  of  two  leagues.  This  he  judged  to  lie 
seven  or  eight  leagues  in  circumference.  It  was  named  Shelvocke 
Island.  Burney  thinks  that  it  is  the  lioca  Purtida  seen  by  Villa- 
lobos,  and  afterwards  by  Spilbergen  in  about  20°  N.  When  the 
present  writer  was  serving  as  a  midshipman  on  board  the  flagship  of 
Sir  George  Francis  Seymour  in  the  Pacific,  the  Cottingwood  sailed 
over  the  position  of  Shelvocke  Island  on  the  old  chart ;  and  we  had 
orders  to  enter  the  visibility  of  distant  objects  in  the  log  at  each  bell, 
so  as  to  judge  the  space  our  eyes  covered  on  either  side  of  our  track. 
But  no  Shelvocke's  Island  was  ever  seen.  That  worthy  made  the 
best  of  his  way  across  the  Pacific  to  China,  where  he  sold  his 


318  VOYAGES  AKD   DISCOVERIES,   1714-1762.  [1719. 

ship.  He  reached  England  in  July,  1722,  and  was  prosecuted  for 
piracy  and  other  misdemeanours  ;  but  the  evidence  was  insufficient. 
Shelvocke  published  his  account  of  the  voyage  in  1726,  and  two  years 
afterwards  his  "  captain  of  marines,"  William  Betagh,  published  a 
refutation  of  Shelvocke's  statements.  The  unfortunate  English- 
men who  were  left  by  Shelvocke  at  Juan  Fernandez  were  captured 
by  a  certain  Captain  Salavarria,  who  was  given  the  command  of  a 
ship  fitted  out  by  two  wealthy  Lima  merchants  in  consequence  of 
the  arrival  of  Clipperton  and  Shelvocke  on  the  coast.  Their  fate  is 
unknown. 

The  British  vessels  which  cruised  in  the  Pacific  Ocean  during 
the  forty  years  from  1680  to  1720  were  all  employed  either  for 
piratical  or  for  warlike  purposes.  Yet  they  are  properly  noticed  in 
a  chapter  on  discovery  and  exploration,  because  they  made  the  west 
coast  of  South  America  and  the  Pacific  Ocean  known  to  English 
seamen,  and  familiarised  them  with  the  navigation.  Surveys  were 
executed,  especially  of  the  Galapagos  and  Bashee  Islands,  and  some 
few  discoveries  were  made.  Above  all,  they  kept  alive  that  spirit  of 
maritime  enterprise  which  has  ever  been  the  mainstay  of  our  Navy. 

The  Arctic  voyages  to  Hudson's  Bay  were  of  practical  importance, 
for  they  led  to  the  formation  of  a  company  to  trade  for  furs  and  skins, 
with  a  charter,  granted  in  1669,  which  conferred  rights  and  privileges 
over  all  the  lands  in  that  direction.  In  the  previous  year  one 
Gillam,  in  the  Nonsuch,  had  been  sent  on  a  voyage  of  discovery,  and 
had  reached  a  latitude  of  75°  up  Davis  Strait,  then  passing  through 
Hudson's  Strait,  and  wintering  in  the  southern  extreme  of  Hudson's 
Bay.  Gillam  had  there  formed  a  settlement  called  Fort  Charles. 
The  French  were  at  Fort  Bourbon,  on  the  western  side  of  the  bay, 
from  1697  to  1714 ;  but  after  the  peace  of  Utrecht  they  departed  and 
their  settlement  became  Fort  York  on  the  Hayes  River.  The 
Company's  most  northern  fort  was  on  the  Churchill  River.  Ships 
were  sent  out  every  year,  returning  with  valuable  cargoes  of  furs 
and  skins  ;  but  a  strict  monopoly  was  maintained,  and  discovery 
was  discouraged.  Nevertheless,  it  could  not  be  altogether  sup- 
pressed, especially  as  a  general  belief  prevailed  that  the  north-west 
passage  was  to  be  discovered  by  following  up  the  opening  named 
Sir  Thomas  Roe's  Welcome  by  Button. 

In  1719  two  vessels  named  the  Albany  and  Discovery  sailed  from 
the  Thames,  under  masters  Barlow  and  Vaughan,  to  discover  a 
passage,  but  they  never  returned.  A  man  named  Scroggs,  in  a  ship 


1719-1745.]       MIDDLETON  AND    THE  NORTH-WEST  PASSAGE.      319 

called  the  Whalebone,  was  sent  from  Fort  Churchill  in  search  of  them 
in  1722.  He  went  up  the  "  Welcome  "  as  far  as  64°  15',  heard  news 
from  the  Eskimos  of  a  very  rich  copper  mine,  and  named  a  point  of 
land  after  his  ship — Whalebone  Point.  Then  followed  an  expedition, 
the  despatch  of  which  was  due  to  the  representations  of  Mr.  Arthur 
Dobbs,  who  had  studied  the  subject  with  great  care.  He  spoke  to 
Sir  Eobert  Walpole,  and  eventually  he  induced  Admiral  Sir  Charles 
Wager,  the  First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty,  to  supply  two  vessels  for 
the  discovery  of  the  north-west  passage,  the  Furnace,  sloop,  and 
Discovery,  pink.  Christopher  Middleton,  who  had  commanded  ships 
of  the  Hudson's  Bay  Company,  was  induced  by  Mr.  Dobbs  to  take 
command,  and  he  had  good  officers  under  him,  but  a  rascally  crew, 
consisting  of  the  sweepings  of  the  jails.  There  were  not  three 
seamen  amongst  them. 

Middleton  did  his  work  well.  Starting  from  England  late  in 
the  season  of  1741,  it  was  necessary  to  winter  at  the  Churchill 
Eiver.  In  1742  Middleton  left  Churchill  on  the  1st  of  July, 
and  proceeded  up  Sir  Thomas  Eoe's  Welcome.  He  reached  a 
headland  in  65°  10'  N.,  which  he  named  Cape  Dobbs,  and  on  the 
northern  side  of  which  there  was  a  wide  opening.  But,  after  a 
careful  examination,  Middleton  came  to  the  conclusion  that  it  was 
merely  an  estuary,  and  gave  it  the  name  of  the  Wager  Eiver,  after 
the  First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty.  Pressing  onwards  he  came  to 
another  headland,  which  he  named  Cape  Hope,  anticipating  that 
the  passage  was  on  the  other  side  of  it.  But  there  was  again 
disappointment.  Eepulse  Bay  showed  no  opening.  The  Frozen 
Strait  then  turns  south-east.  As  there  was  much  scurvy  on  board 
the  ship,  Middleton  resolved  to  return.  In  the  circumstances  he 
had  done  excellently,  but  Mr.  Dobbs  was  so  bitterly  disappointed 
that  he  made  a  violent  and  unjustifiable  attack  on  the  commander 
of  the  expedition.  The  Admiralty  called  upon  Middleton  for  a 
detailed  reply  to  the  accusations  against  him  ;  and  he  made  it  to 
the  satisfaction  of  their  lordships. 

In  1745  an  Act  was  passed  for  giving  "  a  public  reward  of 
£20,000  to  such  person  or  persons  as  shall  discover  a  north-west 
passage  through  Hudson's  Strait  to  the  western  and  southern 
ocean  of  America."  Subscribers  came  forward  to  fit  out  an 
expedition.  A  sum  of  £10,000  was  raised,  and  a  North-West 
Committee  was  formed,  and  purchased  the  Dobbs,  galley,  of 
100  tons,  and  the  Caliofrnia  of  160  tons.  They  were  well  equipped, 


320  VOYAGES  AND   DISCOVERIES,   1714-1762.  [1740. 

William  Moor  commanding  the  Dobbs  and  Francis  White  the 
California.  Mr.  Henry  Ellis,  an  able  and  experienced  seaman,  also 
went  out  as  the  Committee's  agent,  with  instructions  to  make  charts, 
to  record  bearings,  distances,  soundings,  and  variations,  to  collect 
specimens,  and  to  keep  a  journal.  The  .expedition  left  Gravesend 
on  May  20th,  1746,  was  off  Cape  Digges  on  August  2nd,  and 
wintered  at  York  Factory.  On  Jane  24th,  .  1747,  it  left  its 
winter  quarters,  entered  the  Welcome,  and  sent  northward  a  boat, 
which  rounded  Cape  Dobbs.  The  conclusion  of  Ellis  was  in 
agreement  with  that  of  Middleton,  that  the  Wager  Eiver  was  not 
a  strait ;  but  that  the  passage  would  probably  be  found  through 
Frozen  Strait.  Ellis  returned  home  in  October ;  and  this  con- 
cluded the  attempts  to  find  a  passage  by  Hudson's  Bay  during 
the  eighteenth  century.  But  William  Coats,  a  master  in  the 
Hudson's  Bay  Company's  service,  who  had  made  many  voyages, 
acquired  an  intimate  knowledge  of  the  great  inland  sea,  and  wrote 
in  1750  "  The  Geography  of  Hudson's  Bay,"  a  very  useful  treatise, 
which  was  first  printed  for  the  Hakluyt  Society  in  1852. 

The  expedition  of  Commodore  George  Anson  was  despatched 
for  belligerent  purposes  when  the  war  with  Spain  broke  out  in 
1739.  It  is,  however,  properly  looked  upon  as  a  voyage  of  discover}', 
so  far  as  the  Navy  is  concerned,  because  Alison's  was  the  first  naval 
expedition  which  ever  crossed  the  Pacific  Ocean.  Anson  received 
his  orders  in  June,  1740;  but  the  ships  were  manned  with  great 
difficulty,  and  at  last  the  complement  was  made  up  by  five  hundred 
superannuated  invalids,  out-pensioners  of  Chelsea  Hospital,  who 
all  died  during  the  voyage.  The  Commodore  was  on  board  the 
Centurion,  (50  ;  and  the  other  vessels  were  the  Gloucester,  50,  Captain 
Richard  X orris  ;  the  Severn,  50,  Captain  the  Hon.  Edward  Legge  ;  the 
Pearl,  40,  Captain  Matthew  Michell ;  the  Waf/cr,  28,  Captain  Dandy 
Kidd ;  the  Trijul,  sloop,  Commander  the  Honourable  George 
Murray;  and  two  store  ships,  the  Anna  and  Industry.  Anson's 
expedition  finally  sailed  from  St.  Helen's  on  September  18th,  1740. 
At  Madeira  the  captain  of  the  Gloucester  was  invalided,  and  was 
succeeded  by  Captain  Michell,  whose  place  in  the  Pearl  was  given 
to  Captain  Kidd ;  and  Lieutenant  David  Cheap,  of  the  Centurion, 
received  command  of  the  Tryal.  At  Port  St.  Julian,  the  captain 
of  the  Pearl  having  died,  the  Honourable  Captain  Murray  succeeded 
him,  and  Captain  Cheap  was  given  the  Wager,  and  Lieutenant 
Charles  Saunders,  the  Tryal.  Running  through  the  Strait  of  Le 


1741.]  AN  SON'S    VOYAGE.  321 

Maire  in  March,  1741,  the  squadron  encountered  a  succession  of 
furious  gales  off  the  Horn,  and  the  Pearl  and  Severn  returned 
home.  The  scurvy  broke  out  in  a  most  malignant  form,  so  that 
the  Centurion  alone  buried  forty-three  men,  the  mortality  in  the 
other  ships  being  equally  serious.  Driven  down  to  6CP  5'  S.,  the 
remaining  ships  were  dispersed. 

The  Centurion  did  not  reach  Juan  Fernandez  until  June 
10th,  1741,  having  one  hundred  and  thirty  men  in  the  sick-list, 
and  having  buried  two  hundred  during  the  voyage.  She  was 
anchored  in  Cumberland  Bay ;  and  the  Tryul  arrived  on  the 
same  afternoon.  On  the  '21st,  the  Gloucester  came  in  sight,  having 
lost  two-thirds  of  her  crew  from  scurvy.  The  sick  were  landed 
and  placed  in  tents,  twelve  dying  while  they  were  being  carried 
from  the  ship  to  the  shore.  The  fresh  vegetables  of  the  island, 
and  the  healthier  surroundings,  soon  began  to  restore  the  survivors. 
A  prize  named  the  Monte  Cannelo  was  captured,  and  equipped  as  a 
cruiser;  and,  in  September,  the  Centurion,  Tryal,  and  prize,  the  last 
commanded  by  Lieutenant  Philip  de  Saumarez,  sailed  for  the  South 
American  coast.  The  Gloucester,  not  being  read}-,  was  to  join  them 
at  Payta.  Soon  afterwards  another  fine  prize  was  captured  ;  and, 
the  Tryal  having  become  unseaworthy,  her  crew  was  turned  over 
to  the  new  vessel,  which  was  armed  and  received  the  name  of  the 
Tryal' s  Prize.  After  cruising  along  the  coasts  of  Chile  and  Peru, 
and  capturing  some  other  prizes,  Commodore  Anson  anchored 
on  November  fSth  in  Payta  Bay  and  surprised  the  town.  The: 
plunder  amounted  in  value  to  ,£3-2,000,  besides  stores  of  wine  and 
brandy,  fresh  provisions,  and  live  stock.  The  town  was  set  on 
fire,  and  six  vessels  in  the  bay  were  sunk.  Two  days  after  leaving 
Payta  the  Gloucester  joined,  with  prizes  containing  specie  and  plate 
worth  £18,000  ;  and  in  December  the  squadron  arrived  safely  off  the 
island  of  Quibo. 

Meanwhile  misfortune  had  attended  the  voyage  of  the  remaining 
vessel.  The  Wager,  commanded  by  Captain  David  Cheap,  had  parted 
company  with  the  Commodore  in  a  gale  off  Cape  Horn  on  April  23rd, 
1741.  Out  of  one  hundred  and  thirty  men  on  board,  only  thirteen 
officers  and  men  were  fit  for  duty.  The  rest  were  down  with  scurvy, 
and  the  captain  had  dislocated  his  shoulder.  Being  off  the  southern 
coast  of  Chile,  on  May  15th,  the  ship  struck  on  a  rock ;  and 
she  was  wrecked  within  musket-shot  of  the  land.  Captain  Cheap 
was  navigating  by  Narbrough's  chart,  which  had  been  supplemented 

VOL.    III.  Y 


322  VOYAGES   AND   DISCOVERIES,   1714-1762.  [1741-42. 

from  faulty  Spanish  surveys.  In  reality  this  part  of  the  coast  of 
Patagonia  was  unknown.  The  Wager  was  deeply  embayed  in  the 
Gulf  of  Peiias,  and  was  lost  off  the  south  coast  of  the  peninsula 
of  Tres  Montes.  Masts  were  cut  away,  boats  were  got  out,  and 
the  sick  were  landed.  The  land  was  precipitous,  but  well  wooded. 
The  men  declared  that  as  soon  as  the  ship  was  lost  their  pay  ceased, 
and  that  they  were  no  longer  amenable  to  naval  discipline.  A  few, 
however,  remained  loyal,  provisions  were  landed,  and  a  guard  was 
placed  over  them.  The  captain  shot  a  midshipman  named  Cozens, 
who  was  in  open  mutiny  ;  but  this  increased  the  discontent,  and  an 
insubordinate  feeling  was  aroused.  The  long  boat  was  lengthened 
and  rigged  as  a  schooner.  The  mutineers  insisted  upon  being 
taken  back  to  England  by  Magellan's  Strait;  and,  when  Captain 
Cheap  refused,  they  surprised  him  at  night,  tied  his  hands,  and 
deposed  him,  as  they  .said,  for  having  killed  Cozens.  They  then 
prepared  to  depart  in  the  long  boat,  barge,  and  cutter,  altogether 
eighty-one  men,  leaving  the  Captain  behind.  Lieutenant  Hamilton, 
of  the  Marines,  and  the  surgeon,  with  seven  men,  remained  faithful, 
the  mutineers  leaving  the  yawl  and  some  provisions  for  them. 
Soon  after  the  departure  of  the  boats  the  barge  returned  with 
two  midshipmen,  the  Honourable  John  Byron  and  Alexander 
Campbell,  and  eight  more  men,  who  were  also  true  to  the  Captain. 

On  December  15th,  the  forlorn  party  embarked  in  the  barge 
and  yawl.  After  enduring  fearful  hardships  and  sufferings,  they 
were  obliged  to  give  up  the  voyage,  and,  in  'February,  1742,  they 
returned  to  the  place  where  the  Wayrr  was  wrecked,  which  had 
been  called  "  Cheap's  Bay."  At  last  some  natives  arrived  in  two 
canoes,  and  undertook  to  pilot  the  fourteen  survivors  in  the  barge 
to  the  Island  of  Chiloe.  They  started  ;  but,  soon  afterwards,  the 
men  deserted  with  the  barge  and  were  never  heard  of  again,  leaving 
behind  Captain  Cheap,  Lieutenant  Hamilton,  the  surgeon,  and 
the  two  midshipmen.  The  surgeon  died,  and  the  rest  were  taken 
by  the  natives  in  canoes.  After  the  most  terrible  privations  they 
reached  Chiloe,  and  were  kindly  received  by  the  Spanish  governor, 
who  sent  them  as  prisoners  of  war  to  Valparaiso.  They  were 
eventually  embarked  on  board  a  French  ship,  arrived  in  France, 
and  were  released  in  April,  1746.  Campbell  and  Byron  both 
wrote  narratives  of  their  wonderful  adventures.  The  mutineers 
made  their  way  through  Magellan's  Strait  to  the  Portuguese  settle- 
ment of  Rio  Grande,  whence  they  got  passages  to  Lisbon. 


1742-43.]  ANSON' 8    VOYAGE.  323 

The  Commodore  had,  of  course,  given  the  Wager  up  as  lost. 
Leaving  Quibo,  he  cruised  off  Acapulco  to  intercept  the  return 
galleon  from  that  port  to  Manilla.  The  squadron  consisted  of 
the  Centurion,  Gloucester,  and  three  armed  prizes.  Anson  released 
all  his  prisoners,  giving  them  the  prizes,  and  made  sail  for  China, 
with  the  Gloucester  in  company,  on  May  5th,  1742.  In  August 
it  was  found  necessary  to  abandon  the  Gloucester,  owing  to  her 
leaky  condition.  She  was  set  on  fire,  and  her  officers  and  crew  were 
taken  on  board  the  Centurion.  During  the  voyage  the  scurvy 
broke  out  afresh,  and  for  a  long  time  several  men  died  every  day. 
On  August  27th,  the  Centurion  anchored  in  Tinian  Koad,  in 
one  of  the  Ladrone  Islands,  after  an  unusually  prolonged  voyage. 
The  sick  were  landed  to  the  number  of  one  hundred  and  twenty- 
eight,  and  placed  in  a  large  thatched  building  on  shore.  Live-stock 
and  vegetables  were  obtained  in  abundance.  About  thirty  of  the 
sick  died,  but  the  rest  rapidly  recovered,  and  were  soon  convalescent. 
The  ship  was  repaired,  and  on  October  21st  Commodore  Anson 
sailed  for  China,  anchoring  off  Macao  in  November.  There  the 
Centurion  wintered;  and  on  April  29th,  1743,  Anson  put  to  sea, 
announcing  to  his  people  that  he  intended  to  make  another  attempt  to 
intercept  the  Manilla  galleon.  Although  officers  and  men  had  been 
so  long  away,  and  had  gone  through  such  fearful  sufferings,  they  all 
cheerfully  concurred.  On  May  5th,  they  sighted  the  Bashec  Islands 
of  Dampier,  and  for  a  month  Anson  cruised  off  the  island  of  Kamar 
without  sighting  any  vessel.  At  length,  on  June  20th,  a  midshipman 
named  Charles  Proby  '  shouted  from  his  station  at  the  top-masthead, 
"  A  sail  to  windward  !  "  She  was  soon  seen  from  the  deck, 
coining  down  before  the  wind  towards  the  Centurion.  It  was  the 
long-sought  galleon,  N.  8.  dc  Cavadonga.  Both  ships  cleared  for 
the  action,  which  lasted  an  hour  and  twenty  minutes,  at  the  end  of 
which  the  Spaniard  struck  her  colours.  Anson  lost  only  two  men 
killed  and  seventeen  wounded ;  but  the  loss  of  the  Spaniards  was 
sixty-seven  killed  and  eighty-four  wounded.  The  cargo  of  the  galleon 
included  $1,313,843,  besides  35,682  ounces  of  silver,  and  merchandise. 
The  prize  was  commissioned  and  entrusted  to  the  command  of 
Lieutenant  Philip  de  Saumarez.  Next  day  they  again  made  the 
Bashee  Islands,  and  on  July  10th  they  entered  the  river  of  Canton. 
In  December  the  prize  was  sold  at  Macao,  and  the  Centurion 

1  Brother  of  the  first  Lord  Carysfort.  Afterwards  Commissioner  at  Chatham 
Dockyard. 

Y   2 


324  VOYAGES  AND   DISCOVERIES,    1714-1762. 

was  homeward  bound  on  December  15th,  1743.     She  anchored  at 
Spithead,  after  an  absence  of  nearly  four  years,  on  June  15th,  1744. 

Commodore  George  Alison's  expedition  is  correctly  looked  upon 
as  an  exploring  expedition,  although  with  warlike  objects.  It 
was  the  first  purely  naval  exploring  expedition  of  modern  times  ; 
and  it  is  memorable  for  having  been — quite  as  much,  if  not 
more,  than  those  which  succeeded  it — a  most  successful  nursery  of 
valuable  naval  officers.  Many  of  the  best  men  in  the  Navy,  during 
the  Seven  Years'  War,  had  learnt  their  first  lessons,  and  gained 
invaluable  experience,  during  their  hard  service  in  Anson's  exploring 
squadron.  There  were  Piercy  Brett  (I),1  and  John  Campbell,2 
who  was  Lord  Hawke's  flag-captain  at  the  battle  of  Quiberon 
Bay  ;  there  were  Charles  Saunders,3  Charles  Proby,  de  Keppel,4 
Philip  de  Saumarez,5  Peter  Denis,"  the  Hon.  John  Byron,7  and 
Hyde  Parker  (1).  No  doubt,  the  voyage  of  Anson,  remarkable 
as  it  was  for  its  early  misfortunes,  for  the  thrilling  stories  of 
suffering  and  shipwreck  connected  with  it,  and  yet  notable  for  the 
way  in  which  the  patience  and  resolution  of  its  commander  were 
rewarded  with  final  success,  was  the  incentive  for  the  despatch  of 
the  expeditions  which,  in  due  time,  followed  in  its  wake.  It  is  still 
more  noteworthy  that  Anson's  expedition  was,  perhaps,  the  best 
example  of  a  naval  exploring  voyage,  forming  a  splendid  and 
prolific  nursery  for  training  the  best  and  most  valuable  class  of 
naval  officers. 

1   LieuU'iKiiit  iii  the  ('i-nturion.  ~  A  petty  officer  in  the  Centurion. 

'•'   first  lieutenant  of  the  Centurion.  4  Midshipman  in  the  Centurion. 

•'  Third  lieutenant  of  the  Centitrinn.  '''  Lieutenant  in  the  Centurion. 
7  Midshipman  in  the  Wager. 


4 


(     325     ) 


CHAPTEE  XXX. 

THE    CIVIL    HISTORY   OF    THE    ROYAL   NAVY,    1763-1792. 

Administration  of  the  Navy — First  Lords — Secretaries  of  the  Admiralty — Navy  Board 
officials,  etc. — Naval  Expenditure — Seamen  and  Marines-  Strength  of  the  Fleet — 
Rigging  of  a  First-Rate — New  classes  of  men-of-war — The  carronade — Establish- 
ments of  guns — Gun-locks — Typical  ships  of  the  period — Condition  of  the 
Dockyards — Ships  in  ordinary — Coppering — Pumps — Distillation  of  water — 
Sanitation — Lighting  and  buoying — Lightning  conductors — The  longitude — 
Harrison's  time-keepers  —  The  Nautical  Almanac  —  Desertion  —  Discontent  — 
Mutiny — Bounties  to  seamen — Officers'  halfpay — Officers  in  peace-time — Prize- 
money — The  Marine  Society — The  Hibernian  Marine  Society — The  Marine  School 
at  Hull — Dockyard  artificers — The  King  ami  the  Navy — Promotion  to  the  fiag — 
Superannuation — Naval  uniform — Naval  law — Colon's  case — The  right  i>f  search 
—The  right  of  the  fiag — International  courtesies. 


N' 


"0   changes   of   great   importance  were 
made  in  the  administrative  machinery 
of    the    Navy    during    the    compara- 
tively   short   period    which    is    covered    by 

the   present    chapter.      Even   the   lessons 

SIGNATURE      OF     RICHARD,        ..  -.,T  ...          .  T    -,  , 

EAKL     HOWE     ADMIRAL     °*    the    War    or    American     Independence 

OF  THK  FLEET,  produced  few  reforms,  save  in  the  manage- 

ment  of   the  Dockyards.     The  succession  of   the  more  important 
administrative  officers  was  as  follows  :— 

FIRST  LOUD  OF  THK  ADMIRALTY. 

George  Grenville. 

Apr.   10,  1763.  John,  Earl  of  Egmont. 

Apr.   23,  1763.  John,  Earl  of  Sandwich. 

Sept.  10,  1763.  John,  Earl  of  Egmont. 

Sept.  16,  1766.  Sir  Charles  Saumlers,  K.P..,  Vice-Admiral. 

Dec.          1766.  Sir  Edward  Hawke,  K.B.,  Admiral. 

Jan.   12,  1771.  John,  Earl  of  Sandwich. 

Mar.  30,  1782.  Hon.  Augustus  Keppel,  Admiral. 

Jan.   30,  1783.  Richard,  Viscount  Howe,  Admiral. 

Apr.  10,  1783.  Augustus,  Viscount  Keppel,  Admiral. 

Dec.  31,  1783.  Richard,  Viscount  Howe,  Admiral. 

July         1788.  John,  Earl  of  Chatham. 


326       CIVIL   HISTORY   OF   THE  ROYAL   NAVY,    1763-1792.     [1763-92. 


SECRETARY  OF  THE  ADMIRALTY. 

John  Clevland. 

1763.     Philip  Stephens  (later,  Sir  P.  Stephens,  Bart.). 
1785.     (As  Assistant)  John  Ibbetson. 


TREASURER   OF   THE    NAVY. 

William  Wildman,  Vis- 
count Harrington. 

1065.     Richard,  Viscount  Howe,      -Tun 

Captain,  R.X. 
IfiTO.     Sir  Gilbert  Elliot,  Bart.,   \   Oct. 

later  Lord  Minto. 

1777.     Welhorc  Kills.  Oct. 

Apr.          1782.     Isaac  Barn'.  July 

July         1782.     Hunry  Duudas. 
Apr.     5,  178.'!.     Charles  Towrisend.  Aug 

Dec.  30,  1783.     Henry  Dundas.1 


Aug. 
Apr. 
July 

Mar. 


CONTROLLER    OF    THE    \.\yv. 

George  Cockburne,  Cap- 
tain, 1!..\. 

1770.  Hugh  1'allisur,  Captain, 
11.  X. 

1775.  Maurice  Suckling,  Cap- 
tain, R.X. 

177S.  Sir  Cliarles  Middlcton, 
Captain  and  Rear- 
Admiral. " 

171)0.  Sir  Henry  Martin  (2), 
Bart.,  Captain,  R.N. 

SURVEYOR  OF  TIIK  XAVV. 
I  Thomas  Slade. 
I  William  Bateley. 
1765    /Sir  r'''lollms  Slade,  K't. 


Mar. 


Ijobn  Williams. 
1771.     Sir  John  Williams,  Kt. 
1778. 

178; 


Sir  . 

Edward  Hunt. 

Edward  Hunt. 


July 


fEdward  Hunt. 
I  John  Henslow. 


C'l.EKK    OK    THE    Ac.T.S. 

Edward  Mason. 
1773.    Greorge  Marsh. 


CONTROLLER  OF  THE  THEASUHKH'S 

ACCOUNTS. 

Timothy  Brett. 
1782.     George  Rogers. 


CONTROLLER  OF  THE  VICTUALLING 

ACCOUNTS. 

Robert  Osborne. 

1771.     Charles   Proby,  Captain, 
R.X. 

1771.  Thomas    Hanway,   Ca]i- 

tain,  R.X. 

1772.  George  Marsh. 

177.'i.     James  Gambler  (1),  Cap- 
tain, R.X. 
177'!.     William  Palmer. 


C'OKTHOLLEH  OF  THE  STOREKEEPER'S 

ACCOUNTS. 

Hon.  William    Bateman, 

Captain,  R.X. 
178:1.     William  Campbell. 
in.          17!K).      William  Bellingham. 

I'".\TI;A  COMMISSIONERS. 

Sir  Richard  Temple. 
Sir   John   Bentley,    Kt., 

Captain,      R.N.      (till 

L763), 

1778.  Edward  Le  Cras,  Cap- 
tain, R.N.  (till  1783). 

1782.  Samuel  Wallis,  Captain, 
R.X.  (till  1783). 

1787.  Samuel  Wallis,  Captain, 
R.X.  (again). 

CoMMi>sioNr,us  AT  H.M.  DOCKYARDS,  ETC. 
Clifitliam. 

Thomas    Hanway,    Ca]t- 

taiu,  R.X. 

"ct.          1771.     Cliarles   Proby,   Captain, 
R.X. 

Portsmouth. 

Richard  Hughes  (2),  Cap- 
tain, R.X.  (Bart.  1773). 
Aug.        1773.    James  Gambier  (1),  Cap- 
tain, R.N. 

1778.  Sir  Samuel  Hood,  Bart.. 
Captain,  R.X.3 


.Ian. 


1  Created  Viscount  Melville,  1802.  «  Created  Lord  Barbara,  1805. 

s  Created  Lord  Hood,  1782. 


1763-92.] 

Oct. 
Mar. 


EXPENDITURE   ON   THE  NAVY. 


327 


1780.  Henry  Martin  (2),  Captain, 

R.N.  (later  a  Baronet).      jujy 

171)1.     Sir  Charles  Saxton,  Kt., 

Captain,  R.N.  (a  Bart.      pi 
1794), 


Plymouth. 

Frederick  Rogers,  Cap- 
tain, R.N.  (a  Baronet, 
1773). 

Jan.          1775.     Paul  Henry  Ourry,  Cap- 
tain, R.N. 

1783.     Edward    Le   Cras,   Cap- 
tain, R.X. 
Apr.          1784.     John     Latbrey,   Captain, 

R.N. 

1781).     Robert      Fanshawe     (1), 
Captain,  R.X. 

Gibraltar  and  Minorca. 

Charles  Colby,  Captain, 
R.N.  (retired,  17(5:!). 


Sept. 
Apr. 


Halifax,  Nova  Scotia. 

1775.  Marriot  Arbuthnot,  Cap- 
tain, R.N. 

1778.  Mr  Richard  Hughes  (2), 
Bart.,  Captain,  R.X. 

1780.  Sir  Andrew  Snape  Ha- 
inond,  Bart.,  Captain, 
R.X. 

1784.  Henry  Duncan  (1),  Cap- 
tain, R.N. 

Leeiran/  Islands. 
177!).     John    Laforey,   Captain, 

R.X.  (till  1783). 
1784.     John  Moutray,  Ca]itain, 

R.X.  (till  1785). 

Jamaica. 

17^2.  Roliert  Alexander  L;ini- 
l>cTt,  Captain,  1!.X. 
(till  1784). 


The  "  extra  "  and  "  ordinary  "  expenditure,  as  voted  by  Par- 
liament from  year  to  year,  and  the  number  of  seamen  and  Marines 
authorised,  are  shown  below  in  a  table  which  is  a  continuation  of 
the  one  on  p.  5  of  the  present  volume  :— 


Year. 

"  Extra." 

"  Ordinary.'' 

No.  of  Son- 
men  anil 
Marities.i 

Year. 

"Extra." 

'•  Ordinary." 

.N...  of  M-a- 
IIHMI  anil 
Marini-B." 

£ 

£ 

£ 

£ 

1763 

100,000 

380,661 

30,000 

1778 

488,695 

389,200 

60,000 

1764 

200,000 

398,568 

16,000 

1779 

5711,187 

369,882 

7o,00o 

1765 

200,000 

407,734 

16,000 

1780 

697,903 

385,-'!8l 

85,000 

1766 

277,300 

412,983 

16,000 

1781 

670,  OK; 

286,261 

110,000 

17(57 

328,141 

409,177 

16,000 

L782 

95.'!,  51!) 

4011,766 

100,000 

1768 

274,954 

416,403 

16,000 

1783 

311,  8432 

I51,!I8H 

110,000 

176!) 

282,413 

410,255 

16,000 

1784 

1,100,000 

701,869 

26,oiiii 

1770 

283,687 

406,380 

16,000 

L785 

940,000 

675,.  ">07 

18,000 

1771 

423,747 

378,752 

40,000 

1786 

800,000 

l>92,326 

18,000 

1772 

375,93!i 

394,725 

25,000 

1787 

650,000 

700,000 

18,  000 

1773 

421,554 

424,019 

20.000 

1788 

600,000 

700,000 

IS,  000 

1774 

420,7211 

444,188 

20,000 

1789 

575,570 

713,000 

20,000 

1775 

297,379 

444,680 

18,000 

1790 

490,360 

703,270 

20,000 

177(5 

339,151 

426,904 

28,000 

17!!' 

506,010 

689,395 

24,000 

1777 

465,500 

400,805 

45,000 

171:2 

350,  000  3 

672,482  | 

16,000 

1  The  cost  of  these  was  in  addition  tu  the  sums  specified  in  the  "  Extra  "  and  "  Ordinary"  columns. 

2  This  was  £1,000,000  short  of  the  estimated  expense  :  hut  it  was  considered  that  tin-  deficiency  would  be 
balanced  by  the  number  of  men  to  be  discharged  owing  to  the  peace. 

3  For  work  iu  the  Royal  Yards  only.     No  money  was  voted  for  work  in  private  yards,  the  estimate  fur  which, 
with  fittings  and  stores  fur  the  ships,  was  £81,820. 

The  fluctuations  in  the  strength  of  the  fleet  are  indicated  in  the 


328        CIVIL   HISTORY   OF   THE  EOYAL   NAVY,    1763-1792.    [1763-92. 

appended  table,  which,  though  it  goes  into  less  detail,  and  omits  to 
notice  vessels  possessed  of  no  distinct  fighting  value,  is,  in  effect,  a 
continuation  of  the  table  on  p.  7. 

ABSTRACT  OF  THE  FIGHTING  SHIPS  OF  THE  KOYAL  NAVY  AT  FOUR  DIFFERENT 

DATES,  1762-1792. 

(From  Derrick,  ]>p.  148-197,  with  corrections.) 


Mate. 


,  -, 
'" 


Xov.  3rd,  1762.        Jan.  1st.  1775.       Jail.  20th,  1783.         Dec.  1st,  1792. 
(End  of  War.)       (End  of  1'eace.)       (End  of  War.)    |  (End  of  Peace.) 


First ' 
Second 


Guns. 

100 

!)8  and  !IO 

84 

80 

70 

74 

70 
08  and  00 

04 

00 


TOT.MJ  OK  THE  LINK: — 

Fourth  5fi 


Fifth 


50 

44 
40 


Sixtli 


Sloups 
Bombs 
Firesliips 


30 

28 

20 
24 

22  and  20 
18  to  8 


0. 

No. 

No. 

No. 

5 

4 

5 

5 

5 

16 

1!) 

10 

1 

1 

1 

7 

3 

4 

1 

1 

1 

7 

57 

81                      06 

1 

7 

4 

;{ 

2 

0 

32 

4!)                      39 

- 

.11 

K                          1 

141- 


24 
21 


32 

1 
1 


21 
13 

57 
14 
11 


131 


12 

4 


24 

7 

13 
38 


174:) 

2 
1 

20 

28 

7 
17 

1 
5!) 

1 


33 

1 

11 
14 
85 

4 
17 


129  4 


1 

10 

21 

1 

7 

14 

47 


28 

"G 

42 
9 


(JKNERAL    TOT.U, 


468 


330" 


i  It  bavins  bi-en  suggested,  m  the  course  »tf  tlie  progress  of  tliis  work,  that  some  description  of  the  rigging  o 
a  man-of-war  iu  the  heroic  age  of  the  British  Navy  would  be  useful  to  the  reader,  a  plate,  showing  the  rigging, 
etc.,  of  a  first-rate  in  1775  is  here  inserted.  Explanatory  references  to  it  will  be  found  011  the  page  opposite. 

-  Be>iiles  7  prizes  which,  though  taken,  had  not  then  been  purchased  fur  the  Navy. 
3  Besides  4  prizes  which,  though  taken,  had  not  then  been  purchased  for  the  Navy. 

*  Including  47  needing  repair. 

s  Besides  18  building  or  ordered. 

The  50-gun  ship  had  ceased  about  the  year  1756  to  rank  as  of 
the  line.     Another  class  of  ship  ranking  between  the  ship  of  the  line 


(     329     ) 


REFERENCES  TO   THE   PLATE, 

Showing  the  Rigging,  etc.,  of  <i  First-rate  of  1775. 


l  BOWSPRIT. 

6H  Crosstrees. 

130  Backstays. 

2  Yard  and  sail. 

69  Cap. 

131  Stay. 

3  Gammoning. 

132  Stay  sail  and  haliards. 

4  Horse. 

70       FORE       TOP'  1  ALL  ANT  - 

133  Lifts. 

5  Bobstay. 

MAST. 

134  Braces  and  pendants. 

6  Spritsail  sheets. 

71  Shrouds  and  lanyards. 

135  Bowlines  and  bridles. 

7  Pendants. 

72  Yard  ami  sail. 

13ti  Clewlines. 

8  Braces  and  pendants. 

73  Backstays. 

137  Flagstaff. 

9  Haliards. 

74  Stay. 

L;JS  Truck. 

10  Lifts. 

75  Lifts. 

139  Flagstaff  stay. 

11  Clewlines. 

76  Clewlines. 

140  Royal  Standard. 

12  Spritsail  horses. 

77  Braces  aud  pendants. 

13  Buutlines. 

7M  Bowlines  and  bridles. 

14  Standing  lifts. 

79  Flag  staff. 

Ill   MIZKN  MAST. 

15  Spritsail  top. 

WO  Truck. 

142  Shrouds  and  lanyar 

Is. 

16  Flying  jib-boom. 

si  Flag  staff  'stay. 

143  Pendants  and  burtons. 

17  Flying  jib  stay  aud  sails. 

s2  Flag  of   Lord    Higl>     Ad- 

144 Yard  and  sail. 

is  Haliards. 

miral. 

145  Crowfoot. 

19  Sheets. 

146  Sheet. 

20  Horses. 

x;t  MAIN  MAST. 

147  Pendant  lines. 

x4  Shrouds. 

Us  Peakbrails. 

21  SPRITSAIL  TOPMAST. 

-s5  Lanyards. 

149  Staysail. 

22  Shrouds. 

*6  Runner  and  tackle. 

150  Stay. 

23  Yard  and  sail. 

x7  Pendant  of  the  gornet. 

51   Derrick  aud  span. 

24  Sheets. 

KM  Guv  of  ditto. 

152  Top. 

25  Lifts. 

w9  Fail  of  ditto. 

I5:i  Cr»>iark  yard. 

2*>  Braces  and  pendants. 

90  Stay. 

154  Crossjark  lifts. 

27  Cap. 

91    Previ  uter  stay. 

155  Crossjack  braces. 

2*  Jack  staff. 

92  Stay  tackle. 

156  Crossja<  k  slinks. 

29  Truck. 

it:i  U'miMiug  of  tli*1  mast. 

30  Jack  flag. 

94  Jeers. 

95  Yard  tackles. 

157  MIZEN  TOPMAM'. 

31  FORE  MAST. 

<M;  Lifts. 

fix  Shrouds  and  lanyar 

Is. 

32  Runner  and  tackle. 

97  Braces  and  pendants. 

159  Yard  and  sail. 

33  Shrouds. 

1»S  Horses. 

160  Backstays. 

3t  Lanyards. 

<I9  Sheets. 

61    Stay. 

:i5  Stay  ami  lanyard. 

100  Tacks. 

62  Haliards. 

36  Preventer  stay  and  lanyard. 

101    Bowlines  and  bridles. 

<>3  Lifts. 

37  Wooldings  of  the  mast. 

102  Crowfoot. 

til   Braces  ami  pendant 

as  Yard  and  sail. 

lo;t  Top-rope. 

ii5  Bowlines  ami  bridle 

s. 

39  Horses. 

104   Top. 

(Jfi  Sheets. 

40  Top. 

10.")  Buntlines. 

67  Clewlines. 

41  Crowfoot. 

I0t>  Leechlines. 

(i.s  Staysail. 

42  Jeers. 

107   Yard  and  sail. 

t.y  Cn>sstree>. 

43  Yard  tackles. 

7(1  Cap. 

44  Lifts. 

10*  MAIN  TOPMAST. 

71    Flagstaff. 

45  Braces  ami  pendauts. 

IU9  Shrouds  and  lanyards. 

-1  Flagstaff  stav. 

46  Sheet*. 

110  Yard  and  sail. 

73  '['ruck. 

47  Fore  tacks. 

1  11  Fut  tot  -k  .shrouds. 

17  i   I'nion  Flag. 

4H  Bowlines  and  bridles. 

112  Backstays. 

175   KnsiL'ii  staff. 

4J»  Fore  buntlines. 

113  Stay. 

I7i>  Truck. 

50  Fore  leechliue^. 

114  Staysail      and      >tay     and 

177    Knsipn. 

51  Fore  top-rope. 

ha  Hard. 

17s  p(,Mp  ladder. 

52  Futtock  shrouds. 

115  Runners. 

1711  Bower  cable. 

116  Haliards. 

53  FORE  TOPMAST. 

117  Lifts. 

54  Shrouds  aud  lanyards. 

118  Clewlines. 

55  Yard  aud  sail. 

119  Braces  and  pendants. 

56  Stay  and  sail. 

120  Horse*. 

HULL. 

57  Runner. 

121  Sheets. 

AS  Backstays. 

122  Bowlines  and  bridles. 

A  Cat  head. 

59  Haliards. 

123  Buntlines. 

B  Fore  channels. 

60  Lifts. 

124  Reef-  tackles. 

C  Main  channels. 

til  Braces  and  pendants. 

1  25  Crosstrees. 

I)  Mizen  channels. 

62  Horses. 

126  Cap. 

K  Entering  port. 

63  Clewlines. 

F  Hawse  holes. 

64  Bowlines  and  bridles. 

127       MAIN       TOPGALLANT  - 

<i  Poop  lanterns. 

65  Reef-tackles. 

MAST. 

H  Chesstree. 

66  Sheets. 

128  Shrouds  and  lanyards. 

I     Head. 

67  Buutliues. 

129  Yard  aud  sail. 

K  Stem. 

330        CIVIL   HISTORY   OF   THE  ROYAL   NAVY,    1763-1792.    [1763-92. 

and  the  frigate  proper  was  the  two-decked  44-gun  class.  When 
these  vessels  had  nearly  all  died  out,  a  new  class,  the  38-gun  frigate, 
appeared  in  1780.  Of  this  class  the  Minerva,  launched  on  June  3rd, 
1780,  was  the  first.  She  originally  carried,  on  her  main  deck, 
twenty-eight  18-pounders,  and  on  her  quarterdeck  and  forecastle  ten 
9-pounders,  eight  18-pounder  carronades  and  fourteen  swivels ;  but 
slight  modifications  were  afterwards  made  and  the  swivels  were 
omitted.  In  1780,  also,  the  3(5-gun  frigate  was  revived,  with,  how- 
ever, 18  and  9-pounders  in  lieu  of  the  12  and  6-pounders  of  the  older 
ships  of  the  same  class.  In  1775  a  new  so-called  24-gun  class  was 
introduced,  carrying  twenty-two  9-pounders  on  the  main  deck  and 
four  3-poimders,  later  two  (i-pounders,  on  the  quarterdeck.  Thence- 
forward there  were  no  proper  frigates  of  less  than  24  guns,  though 
post  ships  of  22  and  even  20  guns  continued  to  be  commissioned. 
These  corresponded  roughly  with  the  vessels  which,  in  the  French 
navy,  were  called  corvettes.  Below  them  came  the  sloops,  which, 
with  bombs,  fireships,  armed  ships  and  store  ships,  were  commanded 
by  Masters  and  Commanders.1  Below  these  again  came  cutters, 
schooners,  brigs,  armed  vessels,  armed  transports,  armed  store-ships 
and  surveying  sloops,  which  were  commanded  by  Lieutenants.  All 
yachts  were  commanded  by  Post  Captains,  and  the  larger  of  them 
were  sometimes  entrusted  to  Captains  of  long  standing  who,  in 
consideration  of  the  honour,  either  temporarily  or  permanently 
surrendered  their  right  co  promotion  to  nag-rank,  when  'it  fell  to 
them  in  the  ordinary  course  of  seniority." 

The  introduction  of  the  carronade  was  by  far  the  most  important 
development  of  naval  ordnance  during  the  period  under  review. 

"  So  long,''  says  Mr.  William  James,  "  as  that  species  of  ordnance,  called  gun  by  the 
English  and  amou  by  the  French,  continued  in  exclusive  possession  of  the  decks  of  a 
lighting  ship,  no  difference  existed  between  the  number  of  carriage  pieces  she  actually 
mounted  and  the  number  which  stood  as  a  sign  of  her  class  in  the  published  lists.  In 
process  of  time,  however,  the  nominal,  or  rated,  and  the  real  force  of  a  ship  lost  their 
synonymous  signification,  and  that  in  a  manner,  and  to  an  extent,  too  important,  in 
every  point  uf  view,  to  be  slightly  passed  over. 

"  In  the  early  part  of  177S),  a  piece  of  carriage  ordnance,  the  invention,  by  all 
accounts,  of  the  late  scientific  General  Robert  Melville,  was  cast,  for  the  first  time,  at 
the  ironworks  of  the  Carron  Company,  situated  on  the  banks  of  the  river  Carron,  in 


1  The  "  Master-and-Commander "  was  equivalent  to  the  modern  Commander,  and 
is,  in  fact,  usually  called  Commander  in  these  pages,  for  the  sake  of  brevity. 

2  E.g.,  Captain  Sir  Alexander  Schomberg,  Kt.,  who,  posted  in  1757,  would,  in  the 
ordinary  course,  have   obtained   his    flag   in  1787,  but  who,  accepting  in   1771   the 
command  of  the  Irish  Viceroy's  yacht,  retained  it  until  his  death  in  180-1. 


1779.J 


INTRODUCTION   OF   THE   CAEBONADE. 


331 


Scotland.  Although  shorter  than  the  navy  4-pounder,  and  lighter,  by  a  trifle,  than  the 
navy  12-pounder,  this  gun  equalled,  in  its  cylinder,  the  8-inch  howitzer.  Its 
destructive  effects,  when  tried  against  timber,  induced  its  ingenious  inventor  to  give  it 
the  name  of  smasher. 

"  As  the  smasher  was  calculated  chiefly,  if  not  wholly,  for  a  ship-gun,  the  Carrou 
Company  made  early  application  to  have  it  employed  in  the  British  Navy,  but,  owing 
to  some  not  well-explained  cause,  were  unsuccessful.  Upon  the  supposition  that  the 
size  and  weight  of  the  smasher,  particularly  of  its  shot,  would  operate  against  its 
general  employment  as  a  sea-service  gun,  the  proprietors  of  the  foundry  ordered  the 
casting  of  several  smaller  pieces,  corresponding  in  their  calibre  with  the  24,  18,  and 
12-pounder  guns  in  use,  or  rather,  being  of  a  trifle  less  bore,  on  account  of  the  reduced 
windage  very  judiciously  adopted  in  carronades,  and  which  might  be  extended  to  long 
guns  with  considerable  advantage.  These  new  pieces  became  readily  disposed  of  among 
the  captains  and  others,  employed  in  fitting  out  private  armed  ships  to  cruise  against 
America,  and  were  introduced,  about  the  same  time,  on  board  a  few  frigates  and  smaller 
vessels  belonging  to  the  Koyal  Navy. 

"  The  new  gun  had  now  taken  the  name  of  rnrroMtdi;  and  its  several  varieties 
became  distinguished,  like  those  of  the  old  gun,  by  the  weight  of  their  respective  shot. 
This  occasioned  the  smasher  to  be  called,  irrevocably,  a  68-pounder,  whereas,  repeated 
experiments  had  shown  that  a  hollow,  or  cored  shot,  weighing  50  nr  even  10  His., 
would  range  further  in  the  first  graze,  or  that  at  which  the  shot  lirst  strikes  the 
surface  of  the  water,  and  the  only  range  worth  attending  to  in  naval  gunnery.  The 
hollow  shot  would,  also,  owing  to  its  diminished  velocity  in  passing  through  a  ship's 
side,  and  the  consequent  enlargement  of  the  hole  and  increased  splintering  of  tin- 
timbers,  produce  more  destructive  effects  than  the  shot  in  its  solid  form,  one  of  the 
principal  objections  against  which,  was,  and  still  continues  to  be,  its  being  so  cumbrous 
to  handle. 

"Before  half  the  expiration  of  the  year  in  which  the  lirst  carronade  had  been  cast, 
a  scale  was  drawn  up  by  the  Navy  Board  and  sanctioned  by  the  Lords  of  the  Ad- 
miralty,1 for  arming  the  different  rates  in  the  service  with  the  IS  and  12-pounder 

1  Carronades  assigned  to  each  class  of  ship  in  the  l!<>yal  Navy,  by  Admiralty  Order 
of  July  13th,  177H:— 


1  Class  of          Quarterdeck. 
Kate.                Slli''- 
<;tms.           So.      :         1'rs. 

^"•castle.                          ''""I1-                    Actual  number 
So.               ITs.              So.               Irs.                  mourn.,!. 

First 

100                                                2              12                8              12                  110 

Second 

<I8                                             4 

12               6             12                 10S 

i)0                           ..                4 

12               6             12                 100 

Third 

74 

2 

12               6             12                   82 

64           ..               ..                2             12               6             12                   72 

Fourth 

50             2             24               2             24               6             12                   (iO 

Fifth 

44            8            18 

2 

18             ..              ..                   54 

J) 

38            6            18 

4 

18             ..              ..                   48 

36            4            18              4 

18             ..             .                    -11 

32            6            18 

2 

18                          ..                  -10 

Sixth 

28            4            18              2 

18              ..               ..                    34 

24            6            12              4 

12             ..             ..                   34 

20            6            12              2 

12              ..               ..                    28 

Sloops  J 

18            6            12              2 

12             ..              ..                    26 

16            6            12 

2 

12                              ..                    24 

M 

14            G            12 

2 

12                                                   22 

Ship-rigged. 


332          CIVIL   HISTORY   OF  THE   ROYAL    3AVY,   1763-1792.        [1779. 

calibres.  In  consequence  of  the  first,  second,  and  third-rate  ships  having  their  quarter- 
decks as  fully  supplied  with  guns  as  there  was  room  for  ports  on  each  side,  no 
additional  pieces  could  be  placed  there ;  but  it  was  found  that  the  forecastle  would 
generally  admit  the  opening  of  a  pair  of  extra  ports,  and  that  the  poop,  which  for 
nearly  a  century  past  had  served  chiefly  as  a  roof  to  the  captain's  cabin,  would  if 
timbered  up  on  each  side,  afford  space  for  three  pairs  of  ports,  making,  in  the  whole,  eight 
additional  ports  for  the  reception  of  carronades.  The  50-gun  ship  was  found  to  have 
room  for  a  pair  of  additional  ports  on  her  quarterdeck,  besides  a  pair  on  her  forecastle, 
and  three  pairs  on  her  poop,  when  the  latter  was  barricaded,  making  altogether  ten 
ports.  The  44-gun  ship  had  |no  poop,  and  no  armament  on  the  quarterdeck.  By 
furnishing  the  latter  with  a  barricade,  and  cutting  through  it  four  pairs  of  ports, 
besides  an  extra  pair  on  the  forecastle,  this  ship  might  mount  the  same  additional 
number  of  pieces  as  the  50.  The  three  remaining  classes  of  the  fifth,  and  the  first  two 
classes  of  the  sixth  rate,  would  also  admit  of  additional  ports  being  cut  through  the 
sides  of  their  forecastles  and  quarterdecks.  The  third  class  of  the  sixth  rate,  and  the 
quarterdecked  ship-sloop  class,  being,  in  respect  to  their  quarterdecks  and  forecastles, 
in  a  similar  state  to  the  44,  would  require  to  be  similarly  built  up  before  they  could 
mount  the  eight  carronades  assigned  to  them.1 

"  Several  captains  complained  of  the  carronade ;  some,  of  its  upsetting  after  being 
heated  by  successive  discharges ;  others,  that,  owing  to  its  shortness,  its  fire  scarcely 
passed  clear  of  the  ship's  side,  and  that  its  range  was  too  confined  to  be  useful.  The 
captains  of  some  of  the  32-guu  frigates,  in  particular,  represented  that  one  pair  of  their 
quarterdeck  carronades  was  so  much  in  the  way  of  the  rigging  as  to  endanger  the 
lanyards  of  the  shrouds,  and  begged  to  have  their  established  number  reduced  from  six 
to  four.  As  the  principal  objection  to  carronades  appeared  to  have  arisen  from  defects 
in  the  manner  of  mounting  them,  some  additional  instructions  on  that  head  were 
prepared  and  forwarded  by  Mr.  Gascoigne,  the  chief  proprietor  of  the  Carrou  foundry. 
Some  alterations  were  also  made  in  the  piece  itself.2  Still  the  Board  of  Ordnance,  in 
repeated  conferences  with  the  Navy  Board,  maintained  the  superiority  of  the  old  gun, 
resting  their  arguments  chiefly  on  the  comparative  length  of  its  range  ;  while  the  Navy 
Board  urged  that  a  vessel,  able  to  carry  4-pounders  of  the  common  construction, 
might,  with  equal  ease,  bear  18-pounders  of  the  now;  that  its  shot  was  far  more 
formidable  and  destructive;  and  that  its  range  was  quite  sufficient  for  the  purpose 
required.  .  .  . 

"According  to  an  official  list,  dated  on  the  !lth  of  January,  1781,  there  were  then 
42!)  ships  in  the  Navy  mounting  carrouades,  among  which  the  32-pounder  carrouade 
appears,  and  was  the  first  of  that  calibre  which  had  been. used.  The  total  of  the 
carronades  employed  was  604,  namely,  eight  32-pounders,  four  24-pounders,  three 
hundred  and  six  18-pounders,  and  two  hundred  and  eighty-six  12-pounders.  In 
December  of  this  year,  a  recommendation  to  use  C8-pounder  carronades  on  the  fore- 
castle of  large  ships,  and  42  and  32-pounders  on  the  same  deck  of  some  of  the  smaller 
rates,  induced  the  Navy  Board  to  order  the  old  Rainboiu,  44,  to  be  fitted,  by  way  of 
experiment,  wholly  with  carrouades  of  the  largest  description.  Sir  John  Dalrymple 
proposed  the  casting  of  some  that  should  carry  a  ball  of  100  or  130  Ibs.  weight; 
but  the  Board  resolved  to  confine  themselves  to  the  heaviest  of  the  pieces  already  cast, 
the  68-pounder. 

"  The  necessary  carronades  were  ordered  from  the  foundry,  and  some  of  the 
foremen  belonging  to  the  works  attended  to  see  them  properly  fitted.  It  was  not, 
however,  until  February  or  March,  1782,  that  the  Rainbow  could  be  completed  in  her 


Establishment  of  1762. 

E.g.,  increasing  its  length  by  two  calibres. 


1782.] 


CARBONADE  V.   LONG    GUN. 


333 


equipment.     What  additional  force  she  acquired  by  this  change  in  her  armament  the 
following  table  will  show  : — 


Old  Armament. 


New  Armament. 


Long  Guns.  Carronados. 

.        !  Broadside  weight  _  _     Broadside  weight 


No. 

of  metal. 
Prs.                                          No. 

of  melal. 
I'rs. 

I,1)S. 

Lbs. 

First  deck        ....        20 

18 

20 

68 

Second  deck     ...              22 
Quarterdeck     .... 

12 

O*> 

318              -- 

42 
32 

1238 

Forecastle  2 

6 

2 

32 

44 

48 

"In  the  beginning  of  April,  the  Itainliow,  thus  armed,  and  commanded  liy 
Captain  .  .  .  Henry  Trollope,  who,  with  Captain  Keith  Elphinstone  (the  late  Admiral 
Lord  Keith)  and  the  late  Rear-Admiral  Macbride,  was  among  the  earliest  patrons  of  the 
carronade,  sailed  on  a  cruise.  All  the  well-known  skill  and  enterprise  of  her  captain 
failed,  however,  to  bring  him  within  gunshot  uf  a  foe  worth  contending  with  until  the 
4th  of  the  succeeding  September,  when,  being  off  Isle  de  Bas,  he  came  suddenly  upon 
a  large  French  frigate.  Owing  to  the  latter's  peculiar  bearing,  one  of  the  Rainlun's 
forecastle  32-pouuders  was  first  discharged  at  her.  Several  of  the  shot  fell  on  board, 
and  discovered  their  size.  The  French  captain,  rationally  concluding  that,  if  such 
large  shot  came  from  the  forecastle  of  the  enemy's  ship,  much  larger  ones  would  follow 
from  her  lower  batteries,  lired  his  broadside  '  pour  1'honneur  du  pavilion,'  and  sur- 
rendered to  the  Rainbow.  .  .  . 

''  In  the  course  of  1782,  a  few  of  the  larger  sorts  of  the  carronade  were  mounted  on 
board  some  of  the  receiving  ships  in  order  that  the  seamen  of  such  vessels  as  were  in  port 
refuting  might  be  exercised  at  handling  and  firing  this,  to  them,  novel  piece  of  ordnance. 
As  one  proof  of  many  that  carrouades  were  gaining  ground  in  the  Xavy,  the  captains  of 
the  few  38  and  3G-guu  frigates  in  commission  applied  for  and  obtained  24-pounder 
carronades,  in  lieu  of  the  18s  with  which  their  ships  had  been  established.  The 
termination  of  the  war  in  January,  1783,  put  a  stop  to  any  further  experiments  with 
the  carronade ;  but  its  merits  were  now  too  generally  acknowledged  to  admit  a  doubt  of 
its  becoming  a  permanent  favourite  :  in  the  British  Navy,  at  least,  where  a  short  range- 
is  ever  the  chosen  distance." 


It  does  not,  however,  appear  that  foreign  powers  adopted  the 
carronade  until  after  1783.1 

The  establishment  of  long  guns  underwent  various  modifications, 
the  most  important  of  which  may  be  shown  thus  :  — 

1  Xor  is  it  quite  certain  that  the  innovation  was  altogether  beneficial.  Mr.  Henry 
Carey  Baird,  of  Philadelphia,  has  laid  before  the  author  reasons  for  attributing  some  al 
least  of  the  British  failures  during  the  War  of  1812-15  to  an  excessive  confidence  in 
the  value  of  the  carronade. 


334       CIVIL   HISTORY  OF   THE  ROYAL   NAVY,   1763-1792.   [1763-92. 

ESTABLISHMENT  OF  GUNS  (other  than  Carrunades  in  1792,  and  half-pounder  Swivels 
in  1762)  CARRIED  by  some  of  the  PRINCIPAL  CLASSKS  OF  SHIPS  of  the  ROYAL 
NAVY  in  1762  and  1792  respectively  : — 


Classes  of  Ships. 


100  guns  (large). 
100    „          „      .     . 

100     ..      (smaller)   . 
100     , 


90  . 

80  ., 

(3-decker)  . 

80  „ 

(2-decker). 

T4  „ 

(larger)   . 

74  " 

(smaller)  . 

64  ,', 

50  " 

50  „ 

44 

28     .,  . 

28     ,,  . 

24      „  . 

2 !      „  . 
21 )      ,, 

20     „  . 

14-nun  si. 
14-gun 


Lower  Deck.       Middle  Deck. 

Upper  Deck. 

(Quarter- 
deck. 

Forecastle. 

Date. 

No. 

1-rs.           No. 

Prs. 

No. 

Prs. 

No.      Prs. 

No. 

P™. 

1762     30 

42           28 

24 

30 

12 

10 

6 

2 

6 

1792     30 

32  or  42     28 

24 

30 

18 

10 

12 

2 

12 

1762     28 

42         28 

24 

28 

12 

12 

6 

4 

6 

1792     28 

32  or  42     28 

24 

28 

12 

12 

12 

4 

12 

1762     26 

:!2          26 

18 

26 

12 

10 

6 

2 

6 

1792     26 

:!2          26 

18 

26 

12 

10 

12 

2 

12 

1762      26 

.",2          26 

18 

24 

9 

4 

6 

.  . 

1792     .",0 

oo 

32 

24 

14 

12 

4 

12 

1762      28 

'-\'l 

30 

24 

12 

9 

4 

!( 

17  12      28 

•>•> 

30 

24 

14 

9       2 

9 

1762      28 

•>•> 

28 

18 

14       9  i     4 

9 

17  12      28 

1:2      !  . 

30 

18 

12       9 

4 

9 

17  ;L 

26 

24 

f* 

18 

10       9 

•; 

9 

7  11 

26 

24 

5 

i 

18 

10 

<i 

•) 

!» 

t  il 

>>•> 

24 

'_ 

•^ 

12 

4 

6 

2 

6 

7  11 

»',» 

24 

•_ 

^ 

12 

4 

6 

2 

6 

i   1 

20 

18 

^ 

;i 

g 

.  . 

2 

6 

i   1 

20 

18 

'„ 

12 

2 

6 

-  . 

c 

12 

8 

6 

>> 

6 

t    1 

t 

18 

8 

!i 

•,> 

12 

i   1 

i 

12 

4 

6 

o 

(j 

i    1 

( 

18 

4        6 

<> 

r, 

/   1 

-± 

11 

4        3 

7  1 

•i 

!) 

4        6 

i    1 

2 

II 

0 

'.! 

2        3. 

i   1 

t> 

9 

2        6 

i    1 

0 

;i 

7  11 

0 

'    !l 

762      .. 

14 

6 

7  12      .. 

14 

6 



Gun-locks  and  tin  firing-tubes  had  been  used  in  a  few  ships 
during  the  latter  part  of  the  Seven  Years'  War ;  but,  the  general 
feeling  of  the  service  being  against  them,  the  old  match  was 
reverted  to  until  after  1780,  when  the  flint  lock,  with  an  improved 
tube,  became  common,  though  the  match-tub  was  retained  for  use 
in  case  of  breakdown. 

As  in  Chap.  XXVI.,  particulars  of  some  typical  ships  of  war  of 
the  period  under  review  are  given  :— 


1763-92.] 


SOME    TYPICAL   MEN-OF-WAR. 


335 


TYPICAL  BRITISH  SHIPS  OF  WAR,  1763-92,  INCLUDING  BOTH  PRIZES  ASH 
BRITISH-BUILT  VESSELS  ;— 


Ship. 

a 

a 

Date  of 
I  amich. 

Leng 

Gun 
Deck. 

thof 

Beam. 

Depth. 

|| 

Where,  and  by  whom  Built. 

Ft.     in. 

Ft.      in. 

Ft.      in. 

Ft.      in. 

Victory  100      1765 

186      0 

151       33 

52       0 

21        6 

2162 

/Chatham,    E.   Allen,  after  Sir 
I     T.  Slade. 

Villede  Paris      .     .    104    *1782 

185      71  153      0 

53      81 

22       2 

2347 

•Taken  from  th«  French. 

(jneen  Charlotte   .      .100 

1789 

190        0 

156       5 

52       4 

22       4 

2279 

Chatham. 

llnrjleur    ....      98 

1768 

177       8 

144       01 

50       5 

21       0 

1947 

Chatham,  J.  Harris. 

t'ibraltar  (ex  F,  nix)      80 

•1780 

178     10} 

141     '  6 

53      3} 

22        4       2184 

•Taken  from  the  Spaniards. 

l.'asar  so 

1793 

181       0 

148       3} 

51       3 

22       4      1991 

Plymouth. 

Rnmillies  ....      74 

1763 

168       6 

13S       2 

46     111 

19       9  !   1619 

Chatham,  E.  Allen. 

HatniUies  ....      74 

1785 

170      0 

140       1J 

47        2 

19     11       1669 

Thames,  liandall  ^  Co. 

Hrunswick      ...      74 

1790 

176       21  145       3 

48        SI 

19       6  i   1836 

Deptford.  M.  Ware. 

Aiu/iisUl     ....      64 

1763 

159       0 

13D       6J 

44       71 

18      10      1381 

Thames,  Wells  \  Co. 

l-rotfe   64    M7SO 

164       1 

140       01 

44        7 

19       0      1480 

•Taken  from  the  French. 

Prince  William  .     .      64    «1780 

153       21 

130       3i 

44        1 

19       91    1346 

•Taken  from  the  Spaniards. 

Ari/onaut  .      .      .      .      (>4    *1782 

163       0 

136        0 

45        4 

18        1      1521 

•Taken  from  the  French. 

Warwick   ....      50      1765 

151        0 

122        9 

40        2 

18       3 

1053 

Portsmouth,  J.  Bueknall. 

Itoebuck      ....       14      1774 

140       0 

110        4j 

37     10} 

16       4 

886 

Chatham. 

Princess  Caroline     .      44    *1781 

129        1 

107        5 

33     10 

15       6 

862 

•Taken  from  the  Hutch. 

I'ritdente                           3s    *1779 

136       0 

113     11 

37       9} 

111     10 

897 

•Taken  from  the  French. 

Minerva     ....      3s      1780 

141       0 

117       33 

38     10 

13       9 

940 

Woolwich,  J.  .Tenner, 

llebr       38     *1782 

150       1  i 

125       41 

39     11 

12     10 

1  062 

•Taken  from  the  French. 

'Hxeau  36    *1779 

146        3 

126       91 

34        1 

9      10}       783 

•Taken  from  the  Frem  h. 

Tlvilia  36  '    1782 

137        1 

113        3} 

38        3 

13       3 

881 

Bursledon,  H.  Parsons. 

.Ifdamuus  ....      36     1786 

141        3 

117        03 

33     10 

13       9 

939 

Bristol. 

Illari/     32      1763 

125        0 

103        4 

35      2 

11       (11      679 

Hull,  J.  Hudson. 

Iris  (later  lln  ncuck)  .      32    *1777 

137        1 

116        6 

34       3} 

10     11         730 

•Taken  from  the  Americans. 

i:lintbn(eyi  Ksperance)   32   *1780 

134        0 

113        0 

35       0 

13       9         736 

•Taken  from  the  Fren;  h. 

Heroine       ....       32      1783 

1311      111 

107    10; 

36       111 

13       3 

779 

Bucklersharti. 

Castor  32      1786 

126       0 

101        0 

35       (1 

12      2        678 

Harwich. 

Hussar       ....      28      1763 

114       4 

102        s{ 

33      10J 

11        0        627 

Thames,  I!.  In«"<.l. 

Xartine  2S    *1778 

1  32        6 

118        0 

35        9 

15       3 

802 

•Taken  from  tlie  French. 

Virginia    ....      28    *1778 

132        6 

108        0 

34       6 

10       7    i     802 

•Taken  from  the  Americans. 

Hose      28  i  1785 

120       6 

>I9        6 

33        0 

11       0        594 

Sandgate. 

Amphitrite      ...      24      1776 

114        3 

94        31 

32        0 

10       31      513 

Deptford,  A.  Hayes. 

Xifuii'ret      ....      24      17s5 

119        0 

99        0 

32        5 

111       3        553 

Liverpool. 

.4riaii»e      ....       20       177G 

108       0 

89        8 

311        II 

<J        8    .      429 

Chatham,  J.  Powuall. 

Charleston              (exi    .       »i7so 

114       3 

94       31 

32        U 

10       3        514 

•Taken  from  the  Americans. 

Boston)   .      .      .      .  I    " 

l'i/i/iiet  18      1776 

110      11 

90       9} 

2S       3( 

9       0 

385 

Zebra,    is 

1780 

98        0} 

80         (I 

27       51 

13       4 

320 

(iraveseml,  Cleverly. 

Brisk    16 

1774 

101        4 

S3       4 

27        7 

12      10 

337 

Saudgate. 

Swift     14 

1763 

91        6 

74       3J 

26       21 

13       31!     27  1 

Thames,  II.  Bird. 

Xen.ent  14 

17S9 

100     o 

82       9} 

27        0 

13       0        321 

Plymouth. 

l.liilders,  brig  ...      14 

1778 

7S       7 

60       3 

2:',        0 

11        0        202 

'Thames. 

Ferret,  cutter  ...        6 

1763 

50        0 

39       0 

20       0 

7      10          83 

Chatham,  E.  AIL  n. 

Cockatrice,  cutter      .      10 

1781 

69       4 

52       0 

25       7 

10       9 

131 

Dover. 

Alecto,  fireship     .     .      12 

1781 

108        9 

ill)      61 

29       71      9       0        423 

Dover. 

.h'tnii,  bomb    ...        8 

1776 

91       91 

74       5 

27        s       12       1         3113 

Thames. 

Augusta,  yacht     .     .        8J    ^Q 

JSO        6 

64      11; 

23       I)     10      1.1         ls4 

Deptford. 

During  the  peace  which  preceded  the  war  with  the  American 
Colonies,  the  condition  of  the  dockyards,  and  of  the  ships  in  ordinary, 
was  much  neglected;  and  when,  in  1771,  the  First  Lord  of  the 
Admiralty  had  occasion  to  demand  of  the  Surveyor  of  the  Navy  a 
return  of  the  number  of  vessels  fit  for  service,  he  received  a  reply 
which,  he  presently  found,  conveyed  an  entirely  misleading  impres- 
sion. The  store  of  oak  timber  was  also  discovered  to  be  at  a 
dangerously  low  ebb.  Upon  this,  it  was  ordered  in  Council  that  for 
the  future  His  Majesty's  Navy  and  Yards  throughout  the  kingdom 
should  be  inspected  by  the  Board  of  Admiralty  every  two  years.  A 


336        CIVIL    HISTORY   OF   THE  ROYAL   NAVY,   1763-1792.   [1763-92. 

little  later,  in  1775,  the  practice  of  paying  by  piece-work  was  intro- 
duced in  the  dockyards.  After  the  war,  the  Admiralty,  on  July  10th, 
1783,  appointed  twenty-four  Masters l  from  the  half-pay  list  to 
superintend  the  ships  in  ordinary ;  eight  at  Portsmouth ,  six  at 
Plymouth,  eight  at  Chatham  and  Sheerness,  and  two  at  Woolwich. 
To  each  Master  a  division  of  ships  was  entrusted ;  and  to  every  ship 
was  assigned  a  proportion  of  men,  besides  warrant  officers  and 
servants,  as  follows  :  ships  of  100  guns  and  upwards,  36  men  ;  ships 
of  90  or  98  guns,  32  men  ;  ships  of  70  or  74  guns,  26  men  ;  ships  of 
64  guns,  20  men  ;  ships  of  50  guns,  14  men  ;  ships  of  44  guns, 
12  men  ;  ships  of  28  or  38  guns,  10  men  ;  ships  of  24  guns,  8  men  ; 
sloops,  (')  men  ;  and  cutters,  4  men. 

Ships  fit  for  service  were  ordered  to  have  their  lower  masts  in ; 
their  bowsprits,  lower  yards,  topmasts  and  topsail  yards  on  board ; 
and  a  roof  over  their  upper  decks  to  protect  them  from  the  weather. 
In  1784,  revised  rules  were  issued  for  the  appropriation  and  laying 
aside  of  gear  and  stores  for  ships  under  construction,  with  a  view  to 
ensuring  that  the  former  should  be  ready  as  soon  as  the  latter ; 
and  better  arrangements  were  made  for  the  accumulation  of  reserve 
and  spare  stores  at  the  dockyards  and  the  naval  stations  abroad. 
It  has  been  mentioned  in  a  previous  chapter  that  the  first 
British  man-of-war  to  be  coppered  was  the  Alarm,  32.  This  was 
in  1701.  A  second  ship  was  not  similarly  treated  till  1764,  when 
the  Dolpliin,  '24,  was  coppered.  Then  followed  the  Jason,  32,  and 
in  1776,  the  DapJine,  20.  Between  that  tim.e  and  1784  or  1785 
nearly  every  vessel  in  the  Navy  was  dealt  with  in  the  same  way.  It 
was  still  asserted  that  the  ships  in  ordinary  deteriorated  very  rapidly 
in  consequence  of  the  action  set  up  between  the  copper  on  their 
bottoms  and  the  iron  on  their  bolts.  An  inquiry  into  the  matter 
was  instituted  in  1780  ;  but  it  did  not  result  in  the  condemnation  of 
the  practice  of  laying  up  ships  with  their  copper  on.  An  improved 
method  of  copper  fastening  had  been,  however,  introduced  a  little 
before  that  time  ; 2  and  this,  doubtless,  had  the  effect  of  diminishing, 
if  not  of  altogether  preventing,  the  galvanic  action  which  had  been 
complained  of. 

About  the  year  1764  some  improvements  in  ships'  pumps  were 

1  The  Master,  it   need   scarcely  be  explained,   was   then   only  a  warrant   officer, 
although    lie   was   nearly  equivalent  to   the   Navigating  Lieutenant   of  a  later   date. 
He  was  totally  distinct   from  the  commissioned    Master-and-Commander, — the  Com- 
mander of  to-day. 

2  In  November,  1783. 


1763-92.]  PROVISION   OF  FRESH    WATER.  337 

introduced  by  a  Mr.  Coles ;  and  in  that  year  the  Admiralty  ordered 
a  60-gun  ship  to  be  experimentally  fitted  with  pumps  of  Mr.  Coles's 
pattern.  In  the  following  year  a  similar  pump  was  fitted  on  board 
the  Seaford,  20,  at  Portsmouth ;  and  it  was  then  found  that, 
whereas  the  old  pump  required  seven  men  to  pump  out  a  ton  of 
water  in  76  seconds,  the  new  pump,  with  but  four  men,  would  pump 
out  a  ton  of  water  in  43£  seconds  ;  and  that,  whereas  two  men  could 
not  move  the  old  pump  at  all,  two  men  could  with  the  new  pump 
pump  out  a  ton  of  water  in  55  seconds.  It  was  also  found  that, 
when  choked  with  single  ballast,  the  new  pump  could  be  cleared  in 
four  minutes,  while  the  old  could  not  be  cleared  at  all  so  long  as 
water  remained  in  the  ship's  hold.  Experiments  continued  ;  and  it 
would  appear  that,  for  some  years,  Coles's  pump  was  largely  used  in 
the  Navy;  but  it  was  from  time  to  time  improved,  notably  in  1787, 
and,  in  1791,  by  a  Mr.  Hill,  a  carpenter  B.N.,  who  was  also  the 
inventor  of  a  machine  for  drawing  bolts  out  of  ships'  sides,  and  of 
an  apparatus  for  stopping  shot-holes  below  the  water-line. 

The  distillation  of  fresh  water  from  salt  was  not  usually  practised 
on  shipboard  during  the  period  ;  but  it  was  carried  out  occasionally. 
In  1772  the  Admiralty  directed  all  ships  of  war  to  be  fitted  with  a 
still  and  other  necessary  apparatus.  The  process  appears  to  have 
been  the  invention  of  one  Dr.  Lynn ;  but  a  Frenchman,  M.  de 
St.  Poissonniere,  devised  a  somewhat  similar  process  at  about  the 
same  time.  It  was,  however,  impossible  in  those  days  to  distil 
sufficient  water  for  the  whole  ordinary  consumption  of  a  ship's  crew. 
At  best  only  relatively  small  quantities  could  be  prepared ;  and, 
looking  to  the  invariable  foulness  of  shore  water  after  it  has  been  for 
some  time  in  a  ship's  casks  or  tanks,  it  is  astonishing  that  it  was 
ever  possible  for  even  the  most  careful  captains  to  keep  their  crews 
in  fair  health  during  long  voyages.  Yet  some  at  least  of  them 
certainly  managed  to  do  so.  In  the  course  of  Cook's  second  voyage, 
with  the  Resolution  and  Adventure,  between  April,  1772,  and  July, 
1774,  only  four  men,  exclusive  of  a  boat's  crew  who  were  murdered 
in  New  Zealand  by  the  natives,  died ;  and  of  these  but  one  died  of 
sickness.  In  Cook's  last  voyage  the  Resolution  lost  but  five  by 
sickness,  three  of  these  having  been  in  ill-health  when  they  left 
England  ;  and  the  Adventure  lost  not  so  much  as  a  single  man  in 
the  four  years  and  two  months  during  which  she  was  absent  from 
home. 

Progress,  but  not  very  rapid  progress,  was  made  between  1763 
VOL.  in.  z 


338        CIVIL  HISTORY  OF  THE  EOYAL  NAVY,  1763-1792.        [1763-92. 

and  1792  in  lighting  and  buoying  the  coasts  of  the  United  Kingdom. 
The  Smalls  Eock  light  was  first  shown  from  a  wooden  structure 
which  was  built  by  Mr.  Henry  Whiteside  in  1778,  and  which  was 
not  removed  until  1861.  The  Needles'  and  St.  Catherine's  light- 
houses were  established  in  1780.  The  Longships'  lighthouse,  off 
Land's  End,  was  begun  in  September,  1791.  A  21-inch  aperture 
facet  reflector,  used  at  Liverpool  in  1763 ;  a  facet  parabolic  reflector, 
used  in  the  Scots  lighthouses  about  the  year  1787 ;  and  a  plano- 
convex lens,  used  at  Portland  in  1789,  were  shown  at  the  Eoyal 
Naval  Exhibition,  1891. 

Lightning  conductors  were,  at  Anson's  instance,  supplied  to 
ships  soon  after  that  officer's  death  in  1762;  but  they  were  not 
permanently  fitted,  and  were  merely  directed  to  be  set  up  when  a 
storm  threatened.  In  consequence,  they  were  often  not  used  at  all, 
and  many  accidents  resulted. 

Efforts  to  arrive  at  some  satisfactory  method  of  discovering  the 
longitude  at  sea  continued  to  be  made.  In  1764,  Mr.  William 
Harrison,  with  one  of  his  timekeepers,  was  received  on  board  the 
Tartar,  28,  Captain  John  Lindsay.  She  sailed  from  Spithead  on 
March  28th,  and  arrived  at  Madeira  on  April  19th.  Captain 
Lindsay  made  Porto  Santo  exactly  as  he  had  been  led  to  believe 
that  he  would  make  it  by  Mr.  Harrison,  who  had  taken  two  alti- 
tudes of  the  sun  on  the  18th.  The  ship  proceeded  ;  and  on  May  12th, 
Harrison  was  able  accurately  to  discover  her  distance  from  Barbados, 
which  was  sighted  on  the  13th.  Harrison  returned  to  England  in  a 
merchantman,  arriving  in  London  on  July  18th.  The  timekeeper 
was  then  only  fifteen  seconds  slow,  allowing  for  the  variations  of  the 
thermometer,  as  chronicled  in  the  inventor's  journal.  In  1765  the 
Board  of  Longitude  approved  a  scheme  of  marine  tables,  designed 
by  Mr.  Witchell,  for  finding  the  longitude  at  sea  by  the  lunar 
method  ;  and  it  awarded  the  inventor  .i'1000  to  enable  him  to  carry 
out  his  plans.  In  consequence,  with  Mr.  Isaac  Lyons,  junior, 
Mr.  Wales,  of  Greenwich,  and  Mr.  Mapson,  Mr.  Witchell  became 
responsible,  under  the  direction  of  the  Astronomer  Eoyal,  Neville 
Maskelyne,  for  the  compilation  of  a  nautical  ephemeris  for  the  use 
of  navigators  and  astronomers.  This  was  the  origin  of  the  '  Nautical 
Almanac,'  a  publication  which  has  since  remained  at  the  head  of  all 
works  of  the  kind. 

In  the  course  of  the  war  which  ended  in  1763  the  number  of 
seamen  and  Marines  employed  in  the  Navy  was  184,893.  Of  these 


1763-92.]  MORTALITY  AND   DESERTION.  339 

only  1512  were  returned  as  having  been  killed  in  action  or  by 
accident :  yet,  at  the  conclusion  of  the  war,  no  more  than  49,673 
remained  on  the  books  of  the  Navy  Office.  The  number,  therefore, 
of  those  who  had  died  by  sickness  or  were  missing  reached  the 
extraordinarily  large  total  of  133,708.  These  figures  incline  one  to 
believe  that  there  must  have  been  an  enormous  amount  of  desertion. 

Another  return,  issued  in  1780,  shows  the  number  of  men  raised 
for  H.M.  Navy  between  September  29th,  1774,  and  September  29th, 
1780,  and  the  number  killed  in  action,  and  who  died  or  deserted, 
between  January  1st,  1776,  and  September  29th,  1780.  This  casts 
much  light  upon  the  discontent  which  in  those  days  must  have 
prevailed  upon  the  lower  deck  of  the  Navy.  The  number  of  men 
raised  in  the  six  years  was  175,990.  Of  these,  in  the  four  years 
covered  by  the  second  part  of  the  return,  only  1243  had  been  killed, 
and  no  more  than  18,541  had  perished  from  sickness  or  disease  ;  but 
as  many  as  42,069  had  run.  The  discontent  thus  indicated  did  not 
lead  during  the  period,  as  it  did  later,  to  any  general  outbreak,  but  it 
produced  several  isolated  disturbances.  For  instance,  at  the  peace 
in  1783,  when  the  Channel  fleet  was  ordered  into  port  to  be  reduced 
and  paid  off,  the  men  in  many  ships  became  riotous  and  even 
mutinous,  owing  to  their  intolerance  of  delay  in  liberating  them. 
On  that  occasion  the  discontent  in  the  Raisonnable,  64,  was  quashed 
by  the  captain.  Lord  Hervey,  who,  having  appealed  in  vain  to  his 
crew  to  behave  themselves,  went  forward  armed,  with  his  officers, 
and,  having  seized  the  ringleaders,  soon  compelled  the  rest  to  obey. 
When  the  ship  arrived  at  Sheerness  several  men  were  tried  by 
court-martial,  and  four  of  them  were  condemned  to  death.  Three 
of  them  were  executed  on  August  llth,  on  board  the  Carnatic, 
Scipio,  and  Dictator  respectively.  The  fourth,  who  was  to  have 
suffered  on  board  the  Thetis,  was  reprieved  immediately  before  the 
moment  fixed  for  his  execution.  The  mutiny  of  the  Bounty  is 
described  elsewhere.  There  were  also  mutinous  outbreaks  in  the 
Narcissus,  20,  Captain  Edward  Edwards,  in  1782,  and,  at  different 
times,  in  other  vessels. 

During  this  period  it  was  on  several  occasions  found  necessary 
to  offer  government  bounties  to  seamen  ;  and,  as  often,  special 
bounties  were  also  offered  to  them  by  corporations  and  cities. 
In  1770,  at  the  time  of  the  Falkland  Islands'  scare,  the  King, 
by  proclamation,  offered  a  bounty  of  30s.  to  every  able  seaman  ;  and 
the  following  cities  offered  additional  bounties :  i.e.,  London,  40s.  to 

z  2 


340        CIVIL  HISTORY  OF  THE  ROYAL  NAVY,  1763-1792.       [1763-92. 

every  able  seaman ;  Bristol,  20s.  to  every  able  seaman ;  Montrose 
and  Edinburgh,  each  2  guineas  to  every  able,  and  1  guinea  to  every 
ordinary  seaman ;  Aberdeen,  1  guinea  to  every  able,  and  15s.  to 
every  ordinary  seaman ;  and  Lynn,  1  guinea  to  every  able  seaman. 
In  1773,  again,  the  King  offered  to  every  able  seaman  £3,  to  every 
ordinary  seaman  £2,  and  to  every  landsman  £1.  In  1779  the  East 
India  Company,  besides  building  at  its  own  expense  three  74-guii 
ships,  the  Ganges,  Carnatic,  and  Bombay  Castle,  provided  the 
necessary  bounty  for  the  raising  of  6000  seamen.  In  1791  bounties 
were  offered  on  the  same  scale  as  in  1773. 

The  position  of  the  seamen  of  the  Navy  was  but  little  improved, 
and  the  failure  of  the  authorities  to  care  sufficiently  for  the  lower 
deck  led  a  little  later  to  mutinies  which,  at  one  time,  threatened  to 
be  extremely  serious.  The  status  of  many  of  the  officers  was, 
however,  from  time  to  time  considerably  bettered.  For  example, 
in  1773,  in  consequence  of  a  petition  presented  to  Parliament  by 
Lord  Howe,  Captains  were  granted  an  addition  of  2s.  a  day  to  their 
half-pay,  so  that,  thereafter,  the  first  thirty  Captains  on  the  list 
received  10s.,  the  next  8.s.,  and  the  rest  6s.  per  day.  In  the  same 
year  the  number  of  Surgeons  entitled  to  half-pay  was  increased  from 
fifty  to  a  hundred,  half  to  receive  2s.  6r7.  and  half  2s.  The  number 
of  Masters  entitled  to  half-pay  was  increased  to  the  same  extent,  the 
half-pay  being  the  same  as  in  the  case  of  the  Surgeons.  In  1779  the 
twenty  senior  Masters,  if  qualified  for  first  or  second-rate  ships,  were 
given  half-pay  at  the  rate  of  3s.  (ul.  a  clay,  and  the  next  seventy-five 
at  the  rate  of  3s.  a  day.  In  1781,  the  list  of  Surgeons  entitled  to 
half-pay  was  increased  to  one  hundred  and  twenty-five,  they  being 
Surgeons  of  not  less  than  five  years'  actual  service.  The  first  fifty 
on  the  list  received  2s.  (kZ.,  and  the  next  seventy-five  2s.  a  day. 

But  the  attractions  of  the  Navy  in  peace  time  were  never  great 
enough  to  induce  anything  like  the  whole  body  of  officers  to  rest 
content  with  their  position,  which  was  indeed  then  a  very  unsatis- 
factory one.  In  1771,  Admiral  Sir  Charles  Knowles  solicited  and 
obtained  the  King's  permission  to  enter  the  Russian  navy,  in  which 
he  remained  until  1774,  when,  upon  his  return  to  England,  he  was 
reinstated  in  his  rank.  During  the  next  peace  many  officers  of 
inferior  position  also  lent  their  services  to  Eussia ;  and  in  the  battles 
of  1788-90,  between  the  Eussians  and  the  Swedes,  British  captains, 
some  of  whom  had  been  only  lieutenants  or  masters  in  their  own 
service,  commanded  ships  on  both  sides.  Indeed,  Admiral  Samuel 


1781.]  THK   STATUS    OF   CAPTAIN  OF   THE  FLEET.  341 

Grieg,1  who  was  at  one  time  commander-in-chief  of  the  Eussian 
fleet,  was  a  Scot.  Among  the  captains,  Trevenen,2  Denison,  and 
Marshall,  who  were  killed,  and  Elphinstone,3  Miller,  and  Aiken, 
deserve  to  be  remembered.  Sir  William  Sidney  Smith,  then  a 
captain,  R.N.,  served  as  a  volunteer  with  the  Swedes.  In  wartime, 
adventures  and  the  prospect  of  prize-money  seem  to  have  satisfied 
British  naval  officers  as  a  body :  and  there  was  very  little  agitation 
in  favour  of  increased  pay,  although  the  pay,  all  things  considered, 
was  miserably  small.  But  in  peace,  many  officers  either  found  work 
for  their  swords  in  the  service  of  foreign  states,  or  accepted  employ- 
ment in  command  of  merchant  vessels.4 

It  may  be  mentioned  in  connection  with  the  subject  of  prize- 
money  that  in  1781  an  old  dispute  between  Vice-Admiral  John 
Campbell,  who  had  been  Keppel's  Captain  of  the  Fleet  in  1778,  and 
Sir  Hugh  Palliser,  who  had  been  Keppel's  third  in  command,  was 
decided.  Campbell  claimed  a  flag-officer's  share  of  the  prize-money 
arising  from  captures  made  by  the  fleet :  Palliser  resisted  the  claim  ; 
and  the  matter  was  referred  to  arbitration.  The  arbitrator  decided 
against  Campbell,  and,  incidentally,  against  Kempenfelt,  upon  whose 
behalf  there  was  a  similar  claim ;  and  this  in  spite  of  the  fact  that 
as  early  as  1672  an  order  of  the  Duke  of  York  had  directed  that  the 
First  Captain  to  the  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Fleet  should  rank  as 
a  flag-officer.  But,  although  the  decision  was  thus  adverse,  the  King, 
on  January  9th,  1782,  by  proclamation,  ordered  that  for  the  future 
the  First  Captain  to  the  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Fleet  or  to  any 
flag-officer  commanding  twenty  ships  in  the  line  of  battle,  whether 
British  only,  or  British  and  their  allies,  should  rank  as  a  flag-officer, 
and  should  be  entitled  to  share  prize-money  on  the  same  scale  as 
the  junior  flag-officer  in  the  fleet.  It  was  at  the  same  time  ordered 
that  the  Physician  of  the  Fleet  should  share  prize-money  011  the 
same  scale  as  the  lieutenants.  A  seaman's  share  of  prize-money 

1  Samuel  Grieg,  born,  1736;  served  with  the  British  fleet  at  Quiberon,  1759;  joined 
the  Russian  navy,  1764.     Mainly  responsible  for  the  victory  off  Tchesme,  July,  1770. 
Commanded  in  the  action  off  Gogland.     Died,  1788.     A  Russian  man-of-war  still  bears 
his  name. 

2  Had  been  a  midshipman  and  lieutenant  in  the  Resolution  in  Cook's  last  voyage. 
Mortally  wounded  at  Wyborg,  licit. 

3  Samuel  Williams  Elphinstone,  second  son  of  Captain  John  Elphinstone  (1),  R.N., 
who  entered   the  Russian  service  in  1769,  and  became  an  admiral.     He  returned  to 
active  service  in  the  British  Xavy  in  1775,  and  died  in  1785.     Captain  S.  W.  Elphin- 
stone married  a  daughter  of  Admiral  Cruse,  a  Scotsman  in  the  Russian  service. 

*  Among  those  who  commanded  merchant  ships  was  Sir  Home  Riggs  Popham. 


342        CIVIL  HISTORY  OF  THE  ROYAL  NAVY,  1763-1792.        [1763-92. 

was  of  course  always  very  small ;  but  a  slight  concession  to  the 
lower  deck  was  made  in  1771,  when  an  Act  of  Parliament  authorised 
Greenwich  Hospital,  in  certain  specified  cases,  to  refund  unclaimed 
shares  of  prize-money  or  bounty-money  within  a  limited  time  after 
payment  of  such  into  the  funds  of  the  hospital. 

Indirectly,  something  more  was  done  for  the  seamen  by  the 
action  of  the  Marine  Society,  which,  in  1763,  immediately  after  the 
peace,  resolved  to  receive,  and  make  provision  for,  all  boys  under 
sixteen  years  of  age,  who  had  been,  or  might  be,  discharged  from 
the  service,  by  putting  them  as  apprentices  into  the  mercantile 
marine,  on  their  presenting  certificates  of  good  behaviour  from  their 
former  officers,  or  by  apprenticing  them  into  some  trade.  Thus  295 
boys  were  at  once  benefited.  Again,  in  1775  the  Hibernian  Marine 
Society  in  Dublin  was  incorporated  under  letters  patent,  for  the 
maintenance,  education,  and  apprenticing  of  orphans  and  children 
of  decayed  mariners  ;  and  in  1787  a  Marine  School  at  Hull  was 
opened  by  the  Corporation  of  Trinity  House,  for  the  education  and 
clothing  of  boys  intended  for  the  sea  service. 

A  little  more  was  done  for  the  artificers  in  the  Dockyards.  In 
1764  one  man  out  of  every  fifty  of  those  who  had  served  with  good 
character  for  thirty  years,  was  made  entitled  to  a  pension  of  £20  per 
year.  In  1771  this  privilege  was  extended  to  one  in  forty,  instead 
of  one  in  fifty ;  and  the  men,  for  pension  purposes,  were  divided  into 
three  classes,  i.e.,  joiners,  shipwrights,1  blockmakers,  plumbers, 
braziers,  blacksmiths,  and  armourers,  ,£'20  a  year  ;  house  carpenters, 
sailrnakers,  smiths,  and  bricklayers,  £15  ;  pitch-heaters,  bricklayers' 
labourers,  riggers,  and  riggers'  labourers,  £10  a  year.  When  the 
King  was  at  Portsmouth  in  1773  lie,  moreover,  ordered  £1500  to 

1  X umber  of  shipwrights  borne  in  II. M.  Dockyards  on  January  14th  of  each  year, 
1763-1792:— 


Year. 

NIL 

Year. 

So. 

Year.       X... 

1763 

2941 

17  :; 

3195 

1783    32GO 

1764 

2723 

17 

4 

3260 

1784    3141 

1760 

3060 

17 

5 

3236 

1785    8130 

1766 

3143 

1  - 

6 

3145 

1786    3125 

1767 

3155 

1  I 

7 

3140 

1787    3082 

1768 

3003 

17 

8 

3126 

1788 

3059 

1769 

2974 

17 

9 

3246 

1789 

3023 

1770 

2928 

1780 

3260 

17HO 

2965 

1771 

5383 

1781 

32110 

17!>1 

3082 

1772 

3202 

1782 

3248 

1792 

3060 

1763-92.]  NAVAL   REVIEWS.  343 

be  distributed  among  the  artificers,  workmen,  and  labourers  of  the 
Dockyard,  Victualling  Office,  and  Gunwharf. 

The  King's  visit  on  that  occasion  took  place  in  order  that  His 
Majesty  might  review  the  fleet  then  lying  at  Spithead.  On  June 
22nd,  the  King  went  on  board  the  Barjieur,  flagship  of  Vice-Admiral 
Thomas  Pye,  dined  there,  and,  in  the  evening,  knighted  the  Vice- 
Admiral,  Bear-Admiral  Bichard  Spry,  Captain  Joseph  Knight,  senior 
captain  in  the  fleet,  Captain  Edward  Vernon  (2),  of  the  Barfleur,  and 
Captain  Eichard  Bickerton,  of  the  Augusta,  yacht.  He  also  con- 
ferred baronetcies  on  Captain  Hugh  Palliser,  Controller  of  the 
Navy,  and  Captain  Eichard  Hughes  (2),  Commissioner  of  the  Dock- 
yard. He  directed  the  promotion  of  such  commanders  of  sloops, 
first  lieutenants  of  flagships,  and  lieutenants  commanding  cutters, 
as  were  present,  as  well  as  of  the  lieutenant  of  the  Augusta,  yacht, 
and  of  two  midshipmen  from  each  of  certain  ships.  He  further 
gave  £350  to  the  crews  of  the  Barjieur,  of  the  Augusta,  yacht,  and 
of  the  royal  barge. 

This  was  not  the  only  time  when  George  III.  visited  his  Navy 
in  the  earlier  part  of  his  reign.  In  1781  he  reviewed  Vice-Admiral 
Sir  Hyde  Parker's  fleet  at  the  Nore,  after  its  return  from  the  battle 
of  the  Doggersbank,  and  went  on  board  the  Fortitude.  In  1789, 
the  King  and  Queen,  with  some  of  the  princes,  reviewed  such 
ships  as  were  in  Portland  Eoad  ;  and,  during  their  residence  at 
Weymouth,  they  went  for  several  short  sea  cruises  in  the  tiuittli- 
ampton,  32,  Captain  Andrew  Snape  Hamond,  and  the  Magnifi- 
cent, 74,  Captain  Eichard  Onslow.  Later  in  the  same  summer 
they  proceeded  to  Plymouth  and  visited  the  Impregnable,  90, 
Bear-Admiral  Sir  Eichard  Bickerton.  Indeed,  King  George  III. 
always  took  a  great  personal  interest  in  the  Navy,  in  which  served 
two  of  his  brothers l  and  one  of  his  sons.2 

The  subject  of  promotion  to  the  flag,  which  had  for  some  time 
previously  been  a  little  unsystematic,  attracted  much  attention  in 
1787.  Early  in  the  eighteenth  century  it  had  been  the  custom 
for  the  Crown  to  promote  to  the  flag  by  selection,  tempered 
by  seniority.  In  the  middle  of  the  century,  seniority  gradually 
strengthened  its  claim ;  and  soon  after  the  conclusion  of  the 
American  War,  when  a  captain,  upon  reaching  the  top  of  the 
captains'  list,  instead  of  being  given  a  flag  was  put  upon  the  list 

1  Edward  Augustus,  Duke  of  York,  and  Henry  Frederick,  Duke  of  Cumberland. 

2  William  Henry,  Duke  of  Clarence,  afterwards  William  IV. 


344  CIVIL   HISTORY   OF  THE  ROYAL   NAVY,  1763-1792.       [1787. 

of  Superannuated  Bear- Admirals,  or  was  altogether  passed  over,  he 
thought  himself  aggrieved.  Things  came  to  a  crisis  in  1787.  On 
March  5th  of  that  year,  Sir  Matthew  White  Eidley  moved  in  the 
House  of  Commons  an  address  to  the  King  on  behalf  of  Captain 
David  Brodie,1  who  had  been  several  times  passed  over.  The 
motion,  being  strongly  opposed  by  the  Ministry,  was  defeated  by 
a  majority  of  seventeen  in  a  house  of  one  hundred  and  eighty- 
three.  But  the  subject  was  not  left  there.  On  February  20th, 
1788,  Lord  Rawdon  took  up  the  matter  in  the  House  of  Lords. 

It  should  be  explained  that  by  an  Order  in  Council,  dated  in 
1718  and  addressed  to  the  Lords  Commissioners  of  the  Admiralty,  it 
was  directed  that  their  Lordships,  in  the  advancement  of  officers  to 
the  rank  of  rear-admiral,  should  promote  according  to  the  seniority 
of  the  captains  on  the  list,  regard  only  being  had  to  the  officers 
being  qualified  for  the  rank  to  which  they  were  otherwise  eligible 
for  promotion.-  By  a  subsequent  order  of  1747,  the  Lords  of  the 
Admiralty  were  authorised  to  superannuate  such  captains  of  long 
and  meritorious  service  as,  in  their  Lordships'  opinion,  should  be 
disqualified  by  age  or  infirmity  from  serving  as  flag-officers,  and  that 
such  officers  should  have  the  title  of  Superannuated  Rear- Admirals. 
In  the  vulgar  speech  of  the  day  these  were  usually  called  "  Yellow 
Admirals."  In  a  promotion  made  by  the  Board  of  Admiralty  on 
September  24th,  1787,  sixteen  captains  had  been  advanced  to  the 
flag,  while  upwards  of  forty  had  been  passed  over.  The  greater 
number  of  these  last  had  been  offered  transfer  to  the  superannuated 
list ;  but,  believing  themselves  fully  competent  to  serve  as  active 
flag-officers  ;  and  believing,  also,  that  their  past  services  fully  entitled 
them  to  promotion  on  the  active  list,  they  refused  the  retirement 
that  was  offered  them,  and  sought  to  be  reinstated  in  the  line 
of  active  promotion.  The  policy  which  had  been  pursued  by  the 
Admiralty  occasioned  great  dissatisfaction  amongst  naval  officers, 
who  discovered  with  misgiving  that  their  expectations  of  rank,  as 
a  reward  for  long  and  meritorious  service,  might  be  altogether 
dependent  upon  the  caprice  of  a  First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty.  It 
was  for  this  reason  that  Lord  Rawdon  brought  the  case  before 
the  House  of  Lords. 

He  moved  "  that  a  humble  address  be  presented  to  His  Majesty, 

1  A  captain  of  March  9th,  1748,  who,  in  the  ordinary  course,  would  have  become 
a  Kear-Adrairal  in  1778  or  1779 ;  yet,  though  he  had  lost  an  arm  in  action,  he  was 
neither  promoted  nor  superannuated.  He  appears  to  have  died  in  1788. 


1787.]  PROMOTION   TO   FLAG-BANK.  345 

praying  that  he  will  be  graciously  pleased  to  take  into  his  royal 
consideration  the  services  of  such  captains  of  His  Majesty's  Navy 
as  were  passed  over  in  the  last  promotion  of  admirals."  Lord 
Howe,  as  First  Lord,  rose  at  once  to  oppose  the  motion,  and  to  justify 
his  own  action.  He  pointed  out  that  there  were  several  reasons, 
which  might  reasonably  excuse  an  official  in  his  position  for  passing 
over  a  number  of  captains.  Those  who  were  likely  to  be  entrusted 
with  the  care  of  our  fleets  ought  to  be  men  sound  in  mind  and 
body,  and  capable  of  enduring  the  hard  service  which  would  lie 
before  them  in  war  time.  It  did  not  necessarily  follow  that  an 
officer,  who  had  served  ably  and  meritoriously  in  a  subordinate 
position,  was  fit  to  be  entrusted  with  the  care  of  a  fleet.  A  sergeant 
of  grenadiers,  though  an  able  and  excellent  soldier,  might  not  be 
qualified  to  command  a  body  of  troops  on  a  forlorn  hope.  The 
First  Lord  was  responsible  for  the  good  conduct  and  well-being 
of  the  service ;  and,  having  such  responsibility,  he  was  necessarily 
justified  in  exercising  his  judgment  and  discretion  in  the  appoint- 
ment of  officers  by  whom  the  fleet  was  to  be  led.  At  the  same 
time  he  could  not,  in  any  public  assembly,  state  the  particular 
reasons  which  had  influenced  his  judgment  in  coming  to  a  con- 
clusion on  each  case.  He  could  only  say  that  he  had  acted  with 
the  strictest  impartiality.  Had  the  officers  who  had  been  passed 
over  been  advanced,  as  was  suggested,  and  had  they  been  called 
into  active  service,  as  would  probably  have  been  the  case,  they 
must  have  gone  on  being  promoted  from  time  to  time,  subject  only 
to  the  contingency  of  death  ;  and  they  might  thus  have  stood  in 
the  way  of  many  officers  from  whose  services  the  country  would 
have  derived  the  highest  degree  of  advantage.  Finally,  he  pointed 
out  that  the  principles  which  had  governed  the  late  promotion  were 
not  without  precedent.1 

The  Earl  of  Sandwich  also  opposed  the  motion.  It  had  been 
found,  he  said,  at  different  periods  extremely  inconvenient  and 
detrimental  to  the  service  that  promotions  to  the  flag  should  be 
governed  merely  by  seniority.  In  the  year  1747  a  promotion  had 
been  necessary ;  and  those  then  on  the  Board  of  Admiralty  had 
been  aware  that  there  were  then  on  the  list  of  captains  several 
officers  who  were  in  an  eminent  degree  qualified  for  the  command 
of  fleets  ;  but  they  had  not,  at  first,  known  how  to  get  at  them 
without  loading  the  public  with  unjustifiable  expense.  They  had 

1  Instancing  a  promotion  made  in  1770,  when  Lord  Hawke  had  been  First  Lord. 


346  CIVIL    HISTORY    OF   THE  ROYAL    NAVY,    1763-1792.       [1787. 

therefore  planned  the  superannuation  list,  the  object  of  which  was 
to  provide  an  income  for  such  captains  as  the  Board  of  Admiralty, 
not  meaning  to  call  them  out  for  further  service,  omitted  to  appoint 
to  the  flag  in  the  rota  of  seniority.  At  the  time  of  instituting  the 
establishment  the  object  was  to  make  eight  flag-officers  only  ;  and,  in 
order  to  do  that,  nineteen  captains  were  passed  over.  Yet  the 
matter  had  not  been  taken  notice  of  in  the  House  of  Commons, 
nor  had  there  been  any  complaint  of  injustice  or  partiality.  Those 
captains  who  had  been  put  upon  the  superannuation  list  were  not 
in  any  wise  disgraced  nor  even  stigmatised  ;  they  merely  entered 
what  was  an  honourable  retirement  from  service. 

Lord  Rawdon's  motion  was  negatived  without  a  division.  But 
on  April  l'2th  the  subject  was  again  brought  forward  in  the  House 
of  Commons  by  Mr.  Bastard,  who  particularly  devoted  himself  to 
the  cases  of  Captains  Balfour1  and  Thompson,-  who,  although 
they  had  received  the  thanks  of  the  House  for  their  behaviour 
on  April  l'2th,  1782,  had,  when  they  reached  the  top  of  the 
captains'  list,  been  passed  over.  Naval  opinion  in  the  House  was 
divided,  Captain  Sir  George  Collier  and  Captain  John  Macbride 
contending  that  such  a  principle  as  had  been  followed  by  Lord 
Howe  in  1787  must  inevitably  lead  to  the  ruin  of  the  service,  and 
Captain  Lord  Mulgrave  and  Vice-Admiral  Lord  Hood  being  of 
opinion  that  any  interference  on  the  part  of  the  House  might 
eventually  prove  more  detrimental  than  advantageous  to  the  Navy. 
At  the  same  time  it  seemed  to  be  admitted  on  all  sides  that  several 
officers  who  had  been  passed  over  did  not  appear  to  be  in  any 
respect  disqualified  for  the  rank  to  which,  in  the  ordinary  course 
of  advancement,  they  were  entitled.  Finding,  however,  that  the 
wording  of  his  motion  did  not  meet  with  favour,  Mr.  Bastard 
withdrew  it,  promising  to  bring  forward  the  subject  later  in  some 
other  shape. 

Accordingly,  on  April  18th  he  moved  "  that  the  House  resolve 
itself  into  a  committee  of  the  whole  House  to  inquire  into  the 
conduct  of  the  Board  of  Admiralty  touching  the  late  promotion 
to  the  flag."  In  support  of  his  motion  Mr.  Bastard  cited  the 
cases  not  only  of  Captains  Balfour  and  Thompson,  but  also  those 

1  George  Balfour,  Captain,  July  26th,  1758  ;  superaund.  Rear- Admiral,  1787  ;  died, 
June  28th,  1714. 

2  Samuel   Thompson,   Captain,   November  4th,   1760 ;    superannd.  Rear-Admiral, 
1788 ;  died,  August  13th,  1813. 


%»,«>  X 


1787.]  SENIORITY  v.    SELECTION.  347 

of  Captains  Samuel  Uvedale,  Thomas  Shirley,  John  Bray,  and 
John  Laforey,  most  of  whom  had  served  with  distinction  in  war ; 
and  he  pointed  out  that,  although  it  might  be  alleged  that  Captain 
Bray  had  not  been  promoted  because,  during  the  last  war,  he 
had  been  employed  011  shore  in  the  impress  service,  and  that 
Captain  Laforey *  had  been  set  aside  because  he  had  previously 
accepted  the  post  of  Commissioner  of  the  Navy  at  Antigua,  and, 
later,  at  Plymouth,  Sir  Charles  Middleton,  even  while  actually 
serving  in  a  civil  capacity,2  had  been  promoted,  apparently,  as 
a  matter  of  course.  Both  Pitt  and  Fox  took  part  in  the  debate. 
The  latter,  who  supported  the  motion,  urged  that  the  rank  of 
flag-officer  ought  to  be  considered  from  two  points  of  view.  The 
principal  view  was  undoubtedly  prospective,  and  looked  to  future 
service  ;  and,  from  that  point  of  view,  selection  was  proper  and 
justifiable.  But  the  rank  might  also  be  looked  upon  as  an  honour 
and  reward  for  past  services  ;  and,  from  that  point  of  view,  the 
promotion  of  1787  could  not  be  defended  for  a  moment,  and  was 
most  scandalously  partial  and  unjust.  And,  he  said,  as  proof  that 
the  Admiralty,  at  least  in  some  cases,  considered  promotion  as  a 
reward  for  past  services,  he  might  cite  the  advancement  of  Sir 
John  Lindsay,  who,  though  an  officer  of  first-rate  reputation,  was 
well  known  to  be  in  so  bad  a  state  of  health  that  there  was  no 
hope  of  his  ever  being  able  to  resume  an  active  career.3  Upon 
the  question  being  put,  the  House  divided,  and  the  motion  was 
lost  by  sixteen  votes  in  a  House  of  two  hundred  and  eighty- 
four. 

The  smallness  of  the  majority  encouraged  Mr.  Bastard  to  make 
a  third  attempt  ;  and  on  April  '29th  he  moved  "  that  it  is  highly 
injurious  to  the  service,  and  unjust,  to  set  aside  from  promotion 
to  the  flag  meritorious  officers  of  approved  services,  who  are  not 
precluded  by  the  orders  of  His  Majesty  in  Council."  On  that 
occasion  the  motion  was  defeated  by  a  majority  of  fifty-one  in  a 
House  of  three  hundred  and  eighty-nine. 

The  institution  of  a  naval  uniform  for  certain  officers  has  been 
noticed  in  a  previous  chapter.  As  early  as  1767,  within  twenty 

1  Laforey  was  eventually  promoted,  his  commission  as  a  flag-officer  being  ante-dated 
so  as  not  to  deprive  him  of  any  seniority. 

2  i.e.,  as  Controller.     Sir  Charles  was  afterwards  created  Lord  Barham. 

3  In   point  of  fact,  he  died   on  June  4th,  1788,  having   been  promoted  only  on 
September  24th,  1787. 


348        CIVIL  HISTORY  OF  THE  ROYAL  NAVY,  1763-1792.        [1763-92. 

years  of   that   institution,  alterations  were  made  by  an  Admiralty 
order  of  July  18th  of  that  year,  worded  as  follows  :— 

It  is  His  Majesty's  pleasure  that  the  embroidered  uniform  clothing  of  flag  officers, 
and  the  full  dress  uniform  of  Captains,  Commanders,  and  Lieutenants  of  His  Majesty's 
fleet,  bo  discontinued,  and  that  the  frock  uniform  clothing  of  the  said  officers  be  likewise 
altered  and  worn  as  follows :  The  Admiral's  frock  to  have  narrow  lappels  down  to  the 
waist;  small  boot  cuffs  ;  a  single  lace  instead  of  treble  lace  down  to  the  skirts — a  plain 
nmsquetaire  lace;  but  in  all  other  respects  the  same  as  now  worn.  The  Captains'  and 
Commanders'  frocks  to  have  narrow  lappelx  down  to  the  waist,  and  in  all  other  respects 
as  they  are  now  won).  The  Lieutenants'  frocks  to  have  narrow  lappels  down  to  the 
waist,  flash  cuffs  like  the  commanders',  without  lace,  instead  of  roll  cuffs,  and  in  all 
ether  respects  as  now  worn. 

Another  modification  was  made  in  January,  1768,  when  the 
King  signified  his  pleasure  that  the  lappels  and  cuffs  of  the  military 
uniform  frocks  appointed  to  be  worn  by  the  Lieutenants  should  be 
thenceforth  of  white,  instead  of  blue  cloth,  and  the  waistcoat,  etc., 
of  plain  white  cloth,  with  gilt  buttons  of  the  pattern  previously 
worn,  without  any  lace.  In  1774  another  alteration  was  made  in 
the  uniform  of  Captains  and  Commanders ;  and  it  was  directed  that 
the  uniforms  so  altered  should  be  considered  as  full  dress,  and 
that  a  blue  frock  with  embroidered  button-holes,  conformable  to 
a  pattern  lodged  at  the  Navy  Office,  might  be  worn  upon  common 
occasions.  The  altered  uniform  was  thus  described  : — 

The  lace  on  the  coat  to  rfcturn  round  the  pockets  and  sleeves;  the  lappels  and 
cuffs  to  be  two  inches  and  a  half  broad  ;  the  lace  upon  the  upper  part  of  the  lappels  to 
run  even  with  the  bottom  lace  of  the  collar;  the  buttons  to  be  Mat,  with  an  anchor 
and  cable  engraved  thereon,  according  to  the  pattern  lodged  at  the  Navy  Office  ;  the 
waistcoat  to  be  plain  instead  of  hired  :  the  breeches  to  be  of  the  same  colour  as  the 
waistcoat,  instead  of  blue,  and  both  to  have  buttons  of  the  same  pattern  as  those  on 
the  coat.  The  undress  uniform  was  to  have  blue  frock  lappels,  and  collar  and  cuffs  of 
the  same ;  but  the  collar  was  to  button  on  to  the  lappels  and  lap  over  behind;  the 
lining  to  be  of  white  shalloon  ;  the  buttons  to  be  the  same  as  on  the  dress  coat,  and  the 
buttonholes  to  be  gold  embroidered  according  to  the  following  scheme :  for  Captains 
who  had  taken  post  three  years  or  upwards,  twelve  holes  in  the  lappels,  by  threes, 
three  on  the  flaps,  and  three  on  the  sleeves ;  for  Post  Captains  of  less  than  three  years' 
standing,  twelve  holes  in  the  lappels,  by  twos,  four  holes  on  the  flaps,  and  three  on  the 
sleeves ;  and  for  Commanders,  twelve  holes  in  the  lappels  disposed  regularly,  with  three 
holes  on  the  flaps  and  three  on  the  sleeves ;  and  waistcoat  and  breeches  to  be  the  same 
as  for  the  dress  uniform. 

In  1783  there  was  another  alteration,  the  uniforms  then  being  — 

For  Admirals,  blue  cloth  coat,  with  white  cuffs,  white  waistcoat  and  breeches.  The 
coat  and  waistcoat  to  be  embroidered  with  gold,  in  pattern  and  description  the  same  as 
that  worn  by  generals  in  the  army,  with  three  rows  of  embroidery  on  the  cuffs.  For 
Vice-Admirals  the  same,  but  with  embroidery  the  same  as  worn  by  lieutenant-generals 
in  the  army,  and  with  two  rows  of  embroidery  on  the  cuffs.  For  Rear-Admirals  the 


1763-92.]  NAVAL    UNIFORMS.  349 

same,  but  with  embroidery  similar  to  that  worn  by  major-generals  in  the  army,  and 
with  one  row  of  embroidery  on  the  cuffs.     The  buttons  were  to  remain  as  before. 

The  above  were  the  full  dress  uniforms.  The  undress  uniforms 
were — 

For  Admirals,  a  blue  cloth  frock  with  blue  cuffs  and  blue  lappels ;  embroidered 
buttonholes,  like  those  previously  hi  use,  from  the  top  to  the  bottom  of  the  lappels, 
and  three  holes  on  the  cuffs;  for  Vice- Admirals,  the  same,  with  buttonhok's  arranged 
three  and  three ;  for  Rear-Admirals,  the  same,  with  buttonholes  arranged  two  and  two. 
All  to  wear  plain  white  waistcoat  and  breeches. 

On  November  17th,  1787,  more  extensive  changes  were  made, 
in  accordance  with  the  following  instructions  : — 

Admirals'  frocks ;  blue  cloth,  with  blue  lappels  and  cuffs ;  gold-lace  holes,  three, 
pointing  at  the  end,  with  the  same  distinction  in  the  disposition  for  the  different  ranks 
as  before;  stand-up  collar,  with  one  hole  on  each  side;  three  holes  in  the  flaps,  three 
on  the  outside  cuffs,  and  three  behind;  white  lining,  and  new  anchor  buttons  with 
laurel. 

Post  Captains  of  three  years'  standing  ;  full  dress  :  blue  cloth  coat  with  white  lappels 
and  cuffs,  laced  with  gold  lace;  the  pockets  double  luced  ;  round  cuffs  with  two  laces; 
three  buttons  to  the  pockets  and  cuffs  ;  blue  stand-up  collar,  double  laced  ;  white 
lining;  new  buttons  with  anchor  in  an  oval;  white  cloth  waistcoat,  and  breeches 
plain.  Frocks:  blue  cloth  coat  with  blue  lappels  and  round  cuffs;  fall-down  collar; 
gold  laced  holes  square  at  both  ends,  regular  in  the  lappels ;  two  to  the  pockets  and  two 
to  the  cuffs;  none  behind;  white  lining;  buttons  the  same  as  in  full  dress;  white  cloth 
waistcoat,  and  breeches  plain. 

Post  Captains  of  under  three  years'  standing;  full  dress:  blue  coat  with  white 
lappels  and  cuffs,  laced  with  gold  lace;  pockets  with  one  lace;  round  cuffs  with  one 
lace;  three  buttons  to  the  pockets  and  cuffs ;  blue  stand-up  collar  double  laced;  white 
lining;  buttons  as  before-mentioned;  white  cloth  waistcoat,  and  breeches  plain. 
Frocks:  blue  cloth  coat ;  blue  lappels  ;  blue  round  cull's;  tall-down  collar;  gold  laced 
holes  square  at  both  ends;  nine  holes  in  the  lappel  by  threes,  two  to  the  pockets,  and 
two  to  the  cuffs  ;  none  behind  ;  white  lining  ;  buttons  the  same  as  in  full  dress  ;  white 
cloth  waistcoat,  and  breeches  plain. 

Masters  and  Commanders  ;  full  dress  :  blue  cloth  coat  with  blue  lappcls  and  round 
cuffs,  laced  with  gold  lace;  the  pockets  once  laced,  with  one  lace  on  the  cuffs ;  thre;' 
buttons  to  each;  stand-up  collar,  double  laced;  white  lining;  buttons  as  before; 
white  cloth  waistcoat,  and  breeches  plain.  Frocks :  blue  coat,  with  blue  lappels ; 
round  cuffs  and  fall-down  collar;  gold  laced  holes,  square  at  each  end;  ten  holes  in 
the  lappels  by  two  and  two;  two  to  the  pockets,  and  two  to  the  cuffs ;  none  behind: 
white  lining;  buttons  as  before;  white  cloth  waistcoat,  and  breeches  plain. 

Lieutenants;  full  dress:  blue  cloth  coat,  with  white  lappels;  blue  round  cuffs; 
holes  regular  in  the  lappels;  three  buttons  to  the  pockets,  and  three  to  the  cuff's; 
stand-up  collar ;  white  lining;  buttons  as  for  the  Captains;  white  cloth  waistcoat,  and 
breeches  plain.  Undress:  blue  cloth  coat,  edged  with  white  cloth ;  blue  lappels,  and 
blue  round  cuff's;  three  buttons  to  the  pockets  and  cuffs;  stand-up  collar;  buttons  as 
above ;  white  cloth  waistcoat,  and  breeches  plain. 

Warrant  officers :  blue  cloth  coat,  with  blue  lappels  and  round  cuffs ;  fall-down 
collar;  three  buttons  to  the  pockets  and  cuffs;  white  lining,  but  not  edged  with  white; 
buttons  with  an  anchor,  like  the  buttons  previously  worn  by  Captains ;  white  cloth 
waistcoat  and  breeches. 


350         CIVIL  HISTORY  OF  THE  EOYAL  NAVY,  1763-1792.        [1781-88. 

Masters'  Mates :  blue  cloth  coat,  edged  with  white ;  no  iappels ;  blue  round  cuff's, 
with  three  buttons ;  three  to  the  pockets ;  fall-down  collar ;  white  lining ;  buttons  as 
for  the  warrant  officers  ;  white  cloth  waistcoat  and  breeches. 

Midshipmen  :  blue  cloth  coat ;  no  lappcls ;  blue  round  cuff's,  with  three  buttons, 
and  three  to  the  pockets ;  stand-up  collar,  with  small  white  turn  back  as  before ;  white 
lining,  but  not  edged  ;  buttons  as  for  the  warrant  officers;  white  cloth  waistcoat  and 
breeches. 

The  expedition  of  Commodore  Johnstone  in  1781  led  up  to 
some  interesting  problems  in  naval  law.  Johnstone  caused  Captain 
Evelyn  Button,  of  the  Isis,  to  be  tried  by  court-martial  on  a  charge 
of  misconduct  during  the  action  in  Porto  Praya  Bay.  Sutton,  being 
honourably  acqxiitted,  brought  a  civil  action  for  damages  against 
Johnstone  in  the  Court  of  Exchequer,  and  obtained  a  verdict  for 
£5000.  A  new  trial  was  demanded  and  Sutton  thereupon  secured 
a  verdict  for  £6000.  Johustone  procured  a  reversal  of  the  judgment 
on  a  writ  of  error ;  and  Sutton  ultimately  took  the  case  to  the 
House  of  Lords,  which,  in  May,  1787,  affirmed  the  reversal  of 
the  judgment,  Lord  Howe  declaring  that  to  establish  the  verdict 
would  be  to  subvert  the  good  order  and  discipline  of  the  Navy. 
Sutton  in  consequence  lost  his  case. 

Another  problem,  arising  out  of  the  captures  made  by  Johnstone 
in  Saldanha  Bay,  was  determined  in  June,  1786,  when,  on  an  appeal 
from  the  Court  of  Admiralty  to  the  Lords  of  the  Council,  it  was 
decided  that,  since  the  destination  of  Johnstone's  force  had  been 
the  Cape  of  Good  Hope,  and,  seeing  that  a  considerable  land  force, 
under  General  Meadows,  had  been  on  board  and  had  shared  in  the 
action,  the  capture  did  not  come  under  the  provisions  of  the  Prize 
Act.  The  whole  of  the  property  was  claimed  by,  and  would  go 
to,  the  Crown  ;  and  the  captors  must  relinquish  all  hope  of  prize- 
money  in  respect  of  it,  and  look  merely  to  the  royal  bounty  for  any 
compensation  which  they  might  eventually  obtain. 

Yet  another  interesting  and  rather  celebrated  point  in  naval 
law  was  threshed  out  in  1788.  In  May  of  that  year  Captain  Isaac 
Coffin,  of  the  TJiisbe,  had  been  tried  by  court-martial  at  Halifax,  N.S., 
on  a  charge  of  making  false  musters,  in  that  he  had  kept  on  his 
ship's  books  one  of  his  own  nephews  and  two  sons  of  Lord  Dor- 
chester, who  had,  it  appeared,  not  been  actually  on  board,  conform- 
ably with  the  rules  of  the  Navy.  The  charge  had  been  proved  ; 
but  as  it  had  seemed  to  the  court  that  it  had  been  brought  forward 
mainly  in  consequence  of  private  pique  and  resentment,  and  that 
the  accused  officer  had  not  intended  to  defraud  His  Majesty,  Coffin 


1788.]  ADMIRALTY  REVISION   OF  SENTENCES.  351 

had  been  sentenced  only  to  be  dismissed  from  the  command  of  the 
Thisbe.  When  the  officer  arrived  in  England,  Earl  Howe,  who 
was  then  First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty,  so  strongly  disapproved  of 
the  sentence,  which  he  believed  to  be  not  in  accordance  with  the 
spirit  of  the  31st  Article  of  War,  that  he  induced  the  Board  to 
strike  Coffin's  name  off  the  list  of  post  captains.  The  Article  in 
question  declared,  "  Every  officer,  or  other  person  in  the  fleet, 
who  shall  knowingly  make  or  sign  a  false  muster,  or  muster-book, 
etc.,  upon  proof  of  any  such  offence  being  made  before  a  court- 
martial,  shall  be  cashiered  and  rendered  incapable  of  further  employ- 
ment in  his  Majesty's  naval  service."  Coffin  laid  his  case  before 
the  King,  w!io,  with  the  assent  of  the  Privy  Council,  directed  the 
twelve  judges  to  give  their  opinion  as  to  whether  the  Admiralty 
had  the  power  to  set  aside  the  judgment  of  the  court-martial.  The 
judges  decided  that  the  Admiralty's  sentence  was  not  legal,  and  that 
the  punishment  directed  to  be  inflicted  by  the  Act  of  22  George  II., 
cap.  33,  upon  persons  convicted  of  the  offence  set  forth  in  the  31st 
Article  of  War  established  by  the  said  Act,  could  not  be  inflicted, 
nor  judgment  thereon  be  pronounced  or  supplied,  by  any  other 
authority  than  that  of  the  court-martial  which  tried  the  offender. 
Coffin  was  thereupon  reinstated  in  his  rank,  and  after  having  served 
as  Commissioner  in  Corsica,  at  Sheerness,  etc.,  died  an  Admiral  and 
a  Baronet  in  1839,  in  his  eighty-first  year. 

Questions  concerning  the  right  of  search  and  the  honour  of  the 
flag  cropped  up  as  in  previous  periods.  In  1780,  a  squadron 
which,  under  Captain  Charles  Feilding  (1),  had  been  despatched 
for  the  purpose,  intercepted,  west  of  the  Isle  of  Wight,  a  Dutch 
convoy  escorted  by  two  sail  of  the  line  and  two  frigates,  under  liear- 
Admiral  Count  Lodewijk  van  Bylandt.  Feilding  demanded  to 
examine  the  merchantmen,  which  were  suspected  of  having  on  board 
naval  stores  for  France.  Van  Bylandt  resisted,  and  fired  at  some 
boats  which  had  been  sent  to  board  the  convoy.  Feilding  thereupon 
fired  a  shot  ahead  of  the  Dutch  rear-admiral,  who  replied  by  dis- 
charging a  broadside  at  the  Naniur,  and,  when  it  was  returned, 
struck.  Seven  of  the  merchantmen  were  detained. 

In  1791,  Commodore  the  Hon.  William  Cornwallis,  having 
received  intelligence  that  some  neutral  ships  under  French  colours 
were  expected  on  the  Malabar  coast,  with  supplies  for  Tippoo  Sultan, 
found  two  of  them  in  Mahe  Eoad.  They  refused  to  be  examined, 
pleading  in  particular  that  they  were  then  in  their  own  port ;  but 


352         CIVIL  HISTORY  OF  THE  ROYAL  NAVY,  1763-1792.        [1763-92. 

Commander  Edward  James  Foote,  of  the  Atalanta,  14,  sent  a  party, 
which  broke  open  the  hatchways.  The  examination,  however,  seems 
to  have  been  considered  by  the  Commodore  to  be  inconclusive ;  and, 
a  little  later,  when  the  two  French  vessels  sailed  in  company  with 
the  French  frigate  Resolu,  32,  they  were  followed  by  the  Phoenix,  36, 
and  Perseverance,  36.  The  former  got  up  with  the  French  frigate 
off  Mangalore,  and  was  hailed  to  know  what  she  wanted.  Captain 
Sir  Richard  John  Strachan  replied  that  he  had  orders  to  board  the 
merchantmen.  While  his  boats  were  occupied  on  that  service 
they  were  fired  at  by  the  Eesolu,  which  presently  also  discharged 
a  broadside  at  the  Phoenix.  An  action  resulted  ;  and  in  twenty- 
five  minutes  the  Frenchman  struck,  having  lost  25  killed  and 
40  wounded.  The  Plicenix  lost  only  6  killed  and  11  wounded.  A 
renewed  examination  of  the  merchantmen  showed  that  they  had  no 
contraband  of  war  on  board  ;  and  they  were  suffered  to  proceed  on 
their  voyage. 

A  noteworthy  case  of  the  insistance  of  the  right  of  the  flag 
happened  in  1769,  when  a  French  frigate  anchored  in  the  Downs 
and  neglected  to  pay  the  usual  compliment.  Captain  John  Hollwell 
sent  a  lieutenant  to  demand  the  salute.  The  French  captain  refused 
compliance,  whereupon  Hollwell  ordered  the  Hawke,  10,  to  fire  two 
shots  over  her.  This  induced  her  to  concede  the  point  without 
further  dispute. 

Though  the  British  Navy  was  thus  jealous  of  its  privileges,  the 
relations  between  it  and  other  countries  upon  the  high  seas  were  in 
some  respects  courteous  and  pleasant.  In  1779,  the  French  court 
chivalrously  issued  orders  that  the  British  circumnavigators,  James 
Cook  and  Charles  Clark,  were  on  no  account  to  be  molested, 
although  a  state  of  war  existed  at  the  time.  In  1785,  when  La 
Perouse l  set  out  from  Brest  on  his  great  voyage  of  discovery,  the 
Admiralty  and  lioyal  Society  furnished  him  with  copies  of  all  such 
observations  and  charts  as  could  be  of  use  to  him,  and  gave  him  also 
Cook's  timekeeper  and  azimuth  compass. 

1  Jean  Francois  <le  Galaup,  Comte  cle  La  Perouse.  Born,  1741.  Attacked  British 
settlements  in  Hudson's  Bay,  1782.  Perished  off  Vanicoro  Island,  1788.  His  fate  was 
not  ascertained  until  1827,  l>y  Dumont  d'Urville. 


CHAPTER   XXXI. 

MAJOR   OPERATIONS   OF   THE   ROYAL   NAVY,    1762-1783.* 

Decisive  Influence  of  Control  of  the  Water  in  the  American  Revolution — The  Lake 
Campaign  of  1776 — Attack  upon  Charleston,  S.  C. — Combined  Military  and  Naval 
Operations  about  New  York  and  Philadelphia,  1776-1778 — Howe  and  d'Estaing, 
1778 — Battle  of  Ushant,  July,  1778 — Barrington  at  St.  Lucia,  December,  1778 
— Byron  off  Grenada,  July,  1779 — Franco-Spanish  Fleet  in  the  Channel,  1779 — 
Rodney  and  Langara,  January,  1780 — Rodney  at  Gibraltar,  and  in  the  West 
Indies,  1780 — Combined  Naval  and  Military  Operations  in  Southern  States, 
1779-1781 — Arbuthnot  and  des  Touches  off  the  Chesapeake,  March,  1781 — Hood 
and  de  Grasse  off  Martinique,  April,  1781 — Graves  and  de  Grasse  off  the  Chesa- 
peake, September,  1781,  and  Capitulation  of  Yorktown — Relief  of  Gibraltar,  and 
Allied  Fleet  in  the  Channel,  1781— Hyde  Parker's  Action  with  the  Dutch  Fleet, 
August,  1781 — Kempenfelt  and  de  Guichen,  December,  1781 — Hood  and  de 
Grasse  at  St.  Kitts,  January,  1782 — Rodney's  Victory  over  de  Grasse,  April, 
1782— Howe's  Relief  of  Gibraltar,  October,  1782— Military  and  Naval  Operations 
in  India,  1778-1783 — Suffren's  Campaign  in  India,  and  Actions  with  Johnstone 
and  Hughes,  1781-1783. 


COMMEMORATIVE   MEDAL   OP   KEPPEL  S   ACTION   OFF 
USHANT,  1778. 

(From  an  original  lent  by  Cfrpt.  If.  S.  //.  Prince  Louis 
of  Bnllenberg,  R.  jV.) 


T  the  time  when  hostilities 
began  between  Great 
Britain  and  her  American 
Colonies,  the  fact  was  realised 
generally,  being  evident  to 
reason  and  taught  by  experi- 
ence, that  control  of  the  water. 
both  ocean  and  inland,  would 
have  a  preponderant  effect 
upon  the  contest.  It  was  clear  to  reason,  for  there  was  a  long 
seaboard  with  numerous  interior  navigable  watercourses,  and  at  the 
same  time  scanty  and  indifferent  communications  by  land.  Critical 
portions  of  the  territory  involved  were  yet  an  unimproved  wilderness. 
Experience,  the  rude  but  efficient  schoolmaster  of  that  large  portion 
of  mankind  which  gains  knowledge  only  by  hard  knocks,  had  con- 
firmed through  the  preceding  French  wars  the  inferences  of  the 
thoughtful.  Therefore,  conscious  of  the  great  superiority  of  the 

»  Copyright,  1898,  BY  A.  T.  MAHAN. 
VOL.  in  —  23 


354  MAJOR  OPERATIONS.     1762-1783.  [1775. 

British  Navy,  which,  however,  had  not  then  attained  the  unchal- 
lenged supremacy  of  a  later  day,  the  American  leaders  early  sought 
the  alliance  of  the  Bourbon  kingdoms,  the  hereditary  enemies  of 
Great  Britain.  There  alone  could  be  found  the  counterpoise  to  a 
power  which,  if  unchecked,  must  ultimately  prevail. 

Nearly  three  years  elapsed  before  the  Colonists  accomplished  this 
object,  by  giving  a  demonstration  of  their  strength  in  the  enforced 
surrender  of  Burgoyne's  army  at  Saratoga.  This  event  has  merited 
the  epithet  "  decisive,"  because,  and  only  because,  it  decided  the  in- 
tervention of  France.  It  may  be  affirmed,  with  little  hesitation,  that 
it  was  at  once  the  result  of  naval  force,  and  the  cause  that  naval 
force,  entering  further  into  the  contest,  transformed  it  from  a  local 
to  a  universal  war,  and  assured  the  independence  of  the  Colonies. 
That  the  Americans  were  strong  enough  to  impose  the  capitula- 
tion of  Saratoga,  was  due  to  the  invaluable  year  of  delay,  secured 
to  them  by  their  little  navy  on  Lake  Champlain,  created  by  the 
indomitable  energy,  and  handled  with  the  indomitable  courage,  of 
the  traitor,  Benedict  Arnold.  That  the  war  spread  from  America 
to  Europe,  from  the  English  Channel  to  the  Baltic,  from  the  Bay 
of  Biscay  to  the  Mediterranean,  from  the  West  Indies  to  the  Missis- 
sippi, and  ultimately  involved  the  waters  of  the  remote  peninsula  of 
Hindostan,  is  traceable,  through  Saratoga,  to  the  rude  flotilla  which 
in  1770  anticipated  its  enemy  in  the  possession  of  Lake  Champlain. 
The  events  which  thus  culminated  merit  therefore  a  clearer  under- 
standing, and  a  fuller  treatment,  than  their  intrinsic  importance  and 
petty  scale  would  justify  otherwise. 

In  1775,  only  fifteen  years  had  elapsed  since  the  expulsion  of  the 
French  from  the  North  American  continent.  The  concentration  of 
their  power,  during  its  continuance,  in  the  valley  of  the  St.  Law- 
rence, had  given  direction  to  the  local  conflict,  and  had  impressed 
upon  men's  minds  the  importance  of  Lake  Champlain,  of  its  tribu- 
tary Lake  George,  and  of  the  Hudson  River,  as  forming  a  consecu- 
tive, though  not  continuous,  water  line  of  communications  from  the 
St.  Lawrence  to  New  York.  The  strength  of  Canada  against  attack 
by  land  lay  in  its  remoteness,  in  the  wilderness  to  be  traversed  be- 
fore it  was  reached,  and  in  the  strength  of  the  line  of  the  St.  Law- 
rence, with  the  fortified  posts  of  Montreal  and  Quebec  on  its  northern 
bank.  The  wilderness,  it  is  true,  interposed  its  passive  resistance  to 
attacks  from  Canada,  as  well  as  to  attacks  upon  it ;  but  when  it  had 
been  traversed,  there  were  to  the  southward  no  such  strong  natural 


1775.] 


THE  MILITARY  CONDITIONS  OF  THE  NORTH. 


355 


positions  confronting  the  assail- 
ant. Attacks  from  the  south 
fell  upon  the  front,  or  at  best 
upon  the  flank,  of  the  line  of 
the  St.  Lawrence.  Attacks  from 
Canada  took  New  York  and  its 
dependencies  in  the  rear. 

These  elements  of  natural 
strength,  in  the  military  con- 
ditions of  the  North,  were  im- 
pressed upon  the  minds  of  the 
Americans  by  the  prolonged  re- 
sistance of  Canada  to  the  greatly 
superior  numbers  of  the  British 
Colonists  in  the  previous  wars. 
Regarded,  therefore,  as  a  base 
for  attacks,  of  a  kind  with  which 
they  were  painfully  familiar,  but 
to  be  undergone  now  under 
disadvantages  of  numbers  and 
power  never  before  experienced, 
it  was  desirable  to  gain  posses- 
sion of  the  St.  Lawrence  and  its 
posts  before  they  were  strength- 
ened and  garrisoned.  At  this 
outset  of  hostilities,  the  Ameri- 
can insurgents,  knowing  clearly 
their  own  minds,  possessed  the 
advantage  of  the  initiative  over 
the  British  government,  which 
still  hesitated  to  use  against 
those  whom  it  styled  rebels  the 
preventive  measures  it  would 
have  taken  at  once  against  a 
recognised  enemy. 

Under  these  circumstances, 
in  May,  1775,  a  body  of  two  hun- 
dred and  seventy  Americans,  led 
by  Ethan  Allen  and  Benedict 
Arnold,  seized  the  posts  of  Ti- 


356  MAJOR  OPERATIONS.     1762-1783.  [1775. 

conderoga  and  Crown  Point,  which  were  inadequately  garrisoned. 
These  are  on  the  upper  waters  of  Lake  Champlain,  where  it  is  less 
than  a  third  of  a  mile  wide ;  Ticonderoga  being  on  a  peninsula 
formed  by  the  lake  and  the  inlet  from  Lake  George,  Crown  Point 
on  a  promontory  twelve  miles  lower  down.  They  were  recognised 
positions  of  importance,  and  advanced  posts  of  the  British  in  pre- 
vious wars.  A  schooner  being  found  there,  Arnold,  who  had  been 
a  seaman,  embarked  in  her  and  hurried  to  the  foot  of  the  lake. 
The  wind  failed  him  when  still  thirty  miles  from  St.  John's,  another 
fortified  post  on  the  lower  narrows,  where  the  lake  gradually  tapers 
down  to  the  Richelieu  River,  its  outlet  to  the  St.  Lawrence.  Unable 
to  advance  otherwise,  Arnold  took  to  his  boats  with  thirty  men,  pulled 
throughout  the  night,  and  at  six  o'clock  on  the  following  morning 
surprised  the  post,  in  which  were  only  a  sergeant  and  a  dozen  men. 
He  reaped  the  rewards  of  celerity.  The  prisoners  informed  him  that 
a  considerable  body  of  troops  was  expected  from  Canada,  on  its  way 
to  Ticonderoga;  and  this  force  in  fact  reached  St.  John's  on  the 
next  day.  When  it  arrived,  Arnold  was  gone,  having  carried  off  a 
sloop  which  he  found  there  and  destroyed  everything  else  that  could 
float.  By  such  trilling  means  t\vo  active  oflicers  had  secured  the 
temporary  control  of  the  lake  and  of  its  southern  approaches.  There 
being  no  roads,  the  British,  debarred  from  the  water  line,  were  unable 
to  advance.  Sir  GuyCarleton,  Governor  and  Commandor-in-Chief  in 
Canada,  strengthened  the  works  at  St.  John's,  and  built  a  schooner; 
but  his  force  was  inadequate  to  meet  that  of  the  Americans. 

The  seizure  of  the  two  posts,  being  an  act  of  offensive  war,  was 
not  at  once  pleasing  to  the  American  Congress,  which  still  clung 
to  the  hope  of  reconciliation;  but  events  were  inarching  rapidly, 
and  ere  summer  was  over  the  invasion  of  Canada  was  ordered.  On 
September  4th,  General  Montgomery,  appointed  to  that  enterprise, 
embarked  at  Crown  Point  with  two  thousand  men,  and  soon  after- 
wards appeared  before  St.  John's,  which,  after  prolonged  operations, 
capitulated  on  the  3rd  of  November.  On  the  13th  Montgomery  en- 
tered Montreal,  and  thence  pressed  down  the  St.  Lawrence  to  Pointe 
aux  Trembles,  twenty  miles  above  Quebec.  There  he  joined  Arnold, 
who  in  the  month  of  October  had  crossed  the  northern  wilderness, 
between  the  head  waters  of  the  Kennebec  River  and  the  St.  Law- 
rence. On  the  way  he  had  endured  immense  privations,  losing  five 
hundred  men  of  the  twelve  hundred  with  whom  he  started ;  and 
upon  arriving  opposite  Quebec,  on  the  10th  of  November,  three 


1776.]  THE  BLOCKADE  OF  QUEBEC.  357 

days  had  been  unavoidably  spent  in  collecting  boats  to  pass  the 
river.  Crossing  on  the  night  of  the  13th,  this  adventurous  soldier 
and  his  little  command  climbed  the  Heights  of  Abraham  by  the 
same  path  that  had  served  Wolfe  so  well  sixteen  years  before. 
With  characteristic  audacity  he  summoned  the  place.  The  demand 
of  course  was  refused ;  but  that  Carleton  did  not  fall  at  once  upon 
the  little  band  of  seven  hundred  that  bearded  him  shows  by  how 
feeble  a  tenure  Great  Britain  then  held  Canada.  Immediately  after 
the  junction  Montgomery  advanced  on  Quebec,  where  he  appeared 
on  the  5th  of  December.  Winter  having  already  begun,  and  neither 
his  numbers  nor  his  equipments  being  adequate  to  regular  siege 
operations,  he  very  properly  decided  to  try  the  desperate  chance  of 
an  assault  upon  the  strongest  fortress  in  America.  This  was  made 
on  the  night  of  December  31st,  1775.  Whatever  possibility  of  suc- 
cess there  may  have  been,  vanished  with  the  death  of  Montgomery, 
who  fell  at  the  head  of  his  men. 

The  American  army  retired  three  miles  up  the  river,  went  into 
winter-quarters,  and  established  a  land  blockade  of  Quebec,  which 
was  cut  off  from  the  sea  by  the  ice.  "  For  five  months,"  wrote 
Carleton  to  the  Secretary  for  War,  on  the  14th  of  May,  1776,  "  this 
town  has  been  closely  invested  by  the  rebels."  From  this  unpleasant 
position  it  was  relieved  on  the  6th  of  May,  when  signals  were  ex- 
changed between  it  and  the  Surprise,  the  advance  ship  of  a  squadron 
under  Captain  Charles  Douglas,1  which  had  sailed  from  England  on 
the  llth  of  March.  Arriving  off  the  mouth  of  the  St.  Lawrence, 
on  the  morning  of  April  12th,  Douglas  found  ice  extending  nearly 
twenty  miles  to  sea,  and  packed  too  closely  to  admit  of  working 
through  it  by  dexterous  steering.  The  urgency  of  the  case  not  ad- 
mitting delay,  he  ran  his  ship,  the  Isis,  50,  with  a  speed  of  five  knots, 
against  a  large  piece  of  ice  about  ten  or  twelve  feet  thick,  to  test  the 
effect.  The  ice,  probably  softened  b}^  salt  water  and  salt  air,  went 
to  pieces.  "  Encouraged  by  this  experiment,"  continues  Douglas, 
somewhat  magnificently,  "we  thought  it  an  enterprise  worthy  an 
English  ship  of  the  line  in  our  King  and  country's  sacred  cause,  and 
an  effort  due  to  the  gallant  defenders  of  Quebec,  to  make  the  attempt 
of  pressing  her  by  force  of  sail,  through  the  thick,  broad,  and  closely 
connected  fields  of  ice,  to  which  we  saw  no  bounds  towards  the  west- 
ern part  of  our  horizon.  Before  night  (when  blowing  a  snow-storm, 

1  Father  of  the  late  Sir  Howard  Douglas.  He  died  a  Rear-Admiral  and 
Baronet  in  1789. 


358  MAJOR  OPERATIONS.    1762-1783.  [1776. 

we  brought-to,  or  rather  stopped),  we  had  penetrated  about  eight 
leagues  into  it,  describing  our  path  all  the  way  with  bits  of  the 
sheathing  of  the  ship's  bottom,  and  sometimes  pieces  of  the  cutwater, 
but  none  of  the  oak  plank ;  and  it  was  pleasant  enough  at  times, 
when  we  stuck  fast,  to  see  Lord  Petersham  exercising  his  troops  on 
the  crusted  surface  of  that  fluid  through  which  the  ship  had  so 
recently  sailed."  It  took  nine  days  of  this  work  to  reach  Anticosti 
Island,  after  which  the  ice  seems  to  have  given  no  more  trouble ; 
but  further  delay  was  occasioned  by  fogs,  calms,  and  head  winds. 

Upon  the  arrival  of  the  ships  of  war  the  Americans  at  once 
retreated.  During  the  winter,  though  reinforcements  must  have 
been  received  from  time  to  time,  they  had  wasted  from  exposure, 
and  from  small-pox,  which  ravaged  the  camp.  On  the  1st  of  May 
the  returns  showed  nineteen  hundred  men  present,  of  whom  only  a 
thousand  were  fit  for  duty.  There  were  then  on  hand  but  three 
days'  provisions,  and  none  other  nearer  than  St.  John's.  The  in- 
habitants would  of  course  render  no  further  assistance  to  the  Ameri- 
cans after  the  ships  arrived.  The  Navy  had  again  decided  the  fate 
of  Canada,  and  was  soon  also  to  determine  that  of  Lake  Champlain. 

When  two  hundred  troops  had  landed  from  the  ships,  Carleton 
marched  out,  "  to  see,"  he  said,  u  what  these  mighty  boasters  were 
about."  The  sneer  was  unworthy  a  man  of  his  generous  character, 
for  the  boasters  had  endured  much  for  faint  chances  of  success  ;  and 
the  smallness  of  the  reinforcement  which  encouraged  him  to  act 
shows  either  an  extreme  prudence  on  his  part,  or  the  narrow  margin 
by  which  Quebec  escaped.  He  found  the  enemy  busy  with  prepara- 
tions for  retreat,  and  upon  his  appearance  they  abandoned  their 
camp.  Their  forces  on  the  two  sides  of  the  river  being  now  sepa- 
rated by  the  enemy's  shipping,  the  Americans  retired  first  to  Sorel, 
where  the  Richelieu  enters  the  St.  Lawrence,  and  thence  continued 
to  fall  back  by  gradual  stages.  It  was  not  until  June  l;~>th  that 
Arnold  quitted  Montreal ;  and  at  the  end  of  June  the  united  force 
was  still  on  the  Canadian  side  of  the  present  border  line.  On  the  3rd 
of  July  it  reached  Crown  Point,  in  a  pitiable  state  from  small-pox 
and  destitution. 

Both  parties  began  at  once  to  prepare  for  a  contest  upon  Lake 
Champlain.  The  Americans,  small  as  their  flotilla  was,  still  kept  the 
superiority  obtained  for  them  by  Arnold's  promptitude  a  year  before. 
On  the  25th  of  June  the  American  General  Schuyler,  commanding 
the  Northern  Department,  wrote :  "  We  have  happily  such  a  naval 


1776.]  THE  LAKE  CAMPAIGN.  359. 

superiority  on  Lake  Champlain,  that  I  have  a  confident  hope  the 
enemy  will  not  appear  upon  it  this  campaign,  especially  as  our  force 
is  increasing  by  the  addition  of  gondolas,  two  nearly  finished.  Arnold, 
however,"  —  whose  technical  knowledge  caused  him  to  be  intrusted 
with  the  naval  preparations,  —  "  says  that  800  carpenters  should  be 
employed  and  a  large  number  of  gondolas,  row-galleys,  etc.,  be  built, 
twenty  or  thirty  at  least.  There  is  great  difficulty  in  getting  the 
carpenters  needed."  Arnold's  ideas  were  indeed  on  a  scale  worthy 
of  the  momentous  issues  at  stake.  "  To  augment  our  navy  on  the 
lake  appears  to  me  of  the  utmost  importance.  There  is  water  be- 
tween Crown  Point  and  Pointe  au  For  for  vessels  of  the  largest  size. 
I  am  of  opinion  that  row-galleys  are  the  best  construction  and  cheaj>- 
est  for  this  lake.  Perhaps  it  may  be  well  to  have  one  frigate  of  30 
guns.  She  may  carry  18-pounders  on  the  Lake,  and  be  superior  to 
any  vessel  that  can  be  built  or  floated  from  St.  John's." 

Unfortunately  for  the  Americans,  their  resources  in  men  and 
means  were  far  inferior  to  those  of  their  opponents,  who  were  able 
eventually  to  carry  out,  though  on  a  somewhat  smaller  scale,  Arnold's 
idea  of  a  sailing  ship,  strictly  so  called,  of  force  as  yet  unknown  in 
inland  waters.  Such  a  ship,  aided  as  she  was  by  two  consorts  of 
somewhat  similar  character,  dominated  the  Lake  as  soon  as  she  was 
afloat,  reversing  all  the  conditions.  To  place  and  equip  her,  however, 
required  time,  invaluable  time,  during  which  Arnold's  two  schooners 
exercised  control.  "If  we  could  have  begun  our  expedition  four 
weeks  earlier,"  wrote  Baron  Riedesel,  the  commander  of  the  German 
contingent  with  Carleton,  after  examining  the  American  position  at 
Ticonderoga,  "  I  am  satisfied  that  everything  would  have  been  ended 
this  year  (177G) ;  but,  not  having  shelter  nor  other  necessary  things, 
we  were  unable  to  remain  at  the  other  [southern]  end  of  Champlain." 
So  delay  favours  the  defence,  and  changes  issues.  What  would  have 
been  the  effect  upon  the  American  cause  if,  simultaneously  with  the 
loss  of  New  York,  August  20th— September  loth,  had  come  the  news 
that  Ticonderoga,  whose  repute  for  strength  stood  high,  had  also 
fallen  ?  Nor  was  this  all ;  for  in  that  event,  the  plan  which  was 
wrecked  in  1777  by  Sir  William  Howe's  ill-conceived  expedition  to 
the  Chesapeake,  would  doubtless  have  been  carried  out  in  1776.  In 
a  contemporary  English  paper  occurs  the  following  significant  item  : 
"  London,  September  26th,  1776.  Advices  have  been  received  here 
from  Canada,  dated  August  12th,  that  General  Burgoyne's  army  has 
found  it  impracticable  to  get  across  the  lakes  this  season.  The  naval 


360  MAJOR   OPERATIONS.     1762-1783.  [1776. 

force  of  the  Provincials  is  too  great  for  them  to  contend  with  at 
present.  They  must  build  larger  vessels  for  this  purpose,  and  these 
cannot  be  ready  before  next  summer.  The  design  was 1  that  the  two 
armies  commanded  by  Generals  Howe  and  Burgoyne  should  co- 
operate ;  that  they  should  both  be  on  the  Hudson  River  at  the  same 
time ;  that  they  should  join  about  Albany,  and  thereby  cut  off  all 
communication  between  the  northern  and  southern  Colonies."  2 

As  Arnold's  more  ambitious  scheme  could  not  be  realised,  he  had 
to  content  himself  with  gondolas  and  galleys,  for  the  force  he  was 
to  command  as  well  as  to  build.  The  precise  difference  between  the 
two  kinds  of  rowing  vessels  thus  distinguished  by  name,  the  writer 
has  not  been  able  to  ascertain.  The  gondola  was  a  flat-bottomed  boat, 
and  inferior  in  nautical  qualities  —  speed,  handiness,  and  seaworthi- 
ness —  to  the  galleys,  which  probably  were  keeled.  The  latter  cer- 
tainly carried  sails,  and  may  have  been  capable  of  beating  to  windward. 
Arnold  preferred  them,  and  stopped  the  building  of  gondolas.  "The 
galleys,''  he  wrote,  "  are  quick  moving,  which  will  give  us  a  great 
advantage  in  the  open  lake."  The  complements  of  the  galleys  were 
eighty  men,  of  the  gondolas  forty-live ;  from  which,  and  from  their 
batteries,  it  may  be  inferred  that  the  latter  were  between  one  third 
and  one  half  the  size  of  the  former.  The  armaments  of  the  two  were 
alike  in  character,  but  those  of  the  gondolas  much  lighter.  American 
accounts  agree  with  Captain  Douglas's  report  of  one  galley  captured 
by  the  British.  In  the  bows,  an  18  and  a  12-pounder  ;  in  the  stern, 
2  nines  ;  in  broadside,  from  4  to  6  sixes.  There  is  in  this  a  some- 
what droll  reminder  of  the  disputed  merits  of  bow,  stern,  and 
broadside  fire,  in  a  modern  iron-clad ;  and  the  practical  conclusion 
is  much  the  same.  The  gondolas  had  one  12-pounder  and  2  sixes. 
All  the  vessels  of  both  parties  carried  a  number  of  swivel  guns. 

Amid  the  many  difficulties  which  lack  of  resources  imposed  upon 
all  American  undertakings,  Arnold  succeeded  in  getting  afloat  with 
three  schooners,  a  sloop,  and  five  gondolas,  on  the  20th  of  August. 
He  cruised  at  the  upper  end  of  Champlaiii  till  the  1st  of  September, 
when  he  moved  rapidly  north,  and  on  the  3rd  anchored  in  the  lower 
narrows,  twenty-five  miles  above  St.  John's,  stretching  his  line  from 
shore  to  shore.  Scouts  had  kept  him  informed  of  the  progress  of 
the  British  naval  preparations,  so  that  he  knew  that  there  was  no 
immediate  danger;  while  an  advanced  position,  maintained  with  a 
bold  front,  would  certainly  prevent  reconnoissances  by  water,  and 

1  Author's  italics.  2  Remembrancer,  iv.  291. ' 


1776.J  THE  LAKE  CAMPAIGN.  361 

possibly  might  impose  somewhat  upon  the  enemy.  The  latter,  how- 
ever,  erected  batteries  on  each  side  of  the  anchorage,  compelling 
Arnold  to  fall  back  to  the  broader  Lake.  He  then  had  soundings 
taken  about  Valcour  Island,  and  between  it  and  the  western  shore  ; 
that  being  the  position  in  which  he  intended  to  make  a  stand.  He 
retired  thither  on  the  23rd  of  September. 

The  British  on  their  side  had  contended  with  no  less  obstacles 
than  their  adversaries,  though  of  a  somewhat  different  character. 
To  get  carpenters  and  materials  to  build,  and  seamen  to  man,  were 
the  chief  difficulties  of  the  Americans,  the  necessities  of  the  sea- 
board conceding  but  partially  the  demands  made  upon  it ;  but  their 
vessels  were  built  upon  the  shores  of  the  Lake,  and  launched  into 
navigable  waters.  A  large  fleet  of  transports  and  ships  of  war  in 
the  St.  Lawrence  supplied  the  British  with  adequate  resources,  which 
were  utilised  judiciously  and  energetically  by  Captain  Douglas  ;  but 
to  get  these  to  the  Lake  was  a  long  and  arduous  task.  A  great 
part  of  the  Richelieu  River  was  shoal,  and  obstructed  by  rapids. 
The  point  where  Lake  navigation  began  was  at  St.  John's,  to  which 
the  nearest  approach,  by  a  hundred-ton  schooner,  from  the  St.  Law- 
rence, was  Chambly,  ten  miles  below.  Flat-boats  and  long-boats 
could  be  dragged  up  stream,  but  vessels  of  any  size  had  to  be  trans- 
ported by  land ;  and  the  engineers  found  the  roadbed  too  soft  in 
places  to  bear  the  weight  of  a  hundred  tons.  Under  Douglas's  direc- 
tions, the  planking  and  frames  of  two  schooners  were  taken  down 
at  Chambly,  and  carried  round  by  road  to  St.  John's,  where  they 
were  again  put  together.  At  Quebec  he  found  building  a  new  hull, 
of  one  hundred  and  eighty  tons.  This  he  took  apart  nearly  to  the 
keel,  shipping  the  frames  in  thirty  long-boats,  which  the  transport 
captains  consented  to  surrender,  together  with  their  carpenters,  for 
service  on  the  Lake.  Drafts  from  the  ships  of  war,  and  volunteers 
from  the  transports,  furnished  a  body  of  seven  hundred  seamen  for 
the  same  employment,  —  a  force  to  which  the  Americans  could  op- 
pose nothing  equal,  commanded  as  it  was  by  regular  naval  officers. 
The  largest  vessel  was  ship-rigged,  and  had  a  battery  of  eighteen 
12-pouriders  ;  she  was  called  the  Inflexible,  and  was  commanded  by 
Lieutenant  John  Schanck.  The  two  schooners,  Maria,  Lieutenant 
Starke,  and  Carleton,  Lieutenant  James  Richard  Dacres,  carried  re- 
spectively fourteen  and  twelve  6-pounders.  These  were  the  backbone 
of  the  British  flotilla.  There  were  also  a  radeau,  the  TJiunderer,  and 
a  large  gondola,  the  Loyal  Convert,  both  heavily  armed;  but,  being 


362  MAJOR   OPERATIONS.    1762-1783.  [1770. 

equally  heavy  of  movement,  they  do  not  appear  to  have  played  any  im- 
portant part.  Besides  these,  when  the  expedition  started,  there  were 
twenty  gunboats,  each  carrying  one  fieldpiece,  from  twenty-fours  to 
9-pounders ;  or,  in  some  cases,  howitzers.1 

"  By  all  these  means,"  wrote  Douglas  on  July  21st,  "our  acquir- 
ing an  absolute  dominion  over  Lake  Champlain  is  not  doubted  of." 
The  expectation  was  perfectly  sound.  With  a  working  breeze,  the 
Inflexible  alone  could  sweep  the  Lake  clear  of  all  that  floated  on  it. 
But  the  element  of  time  remained.  From  the  day  of  this  writing 
till  that  on  which  he  saw  the  Inflexible  leave  St.  John's,  October 
4th,  was  over  ten  weeks  ;  and  it  was  not  until  the  9th  that  Carleton 
was  ready  to  advance  with  the  squadron.  By  that  time  the  Ameri- 
can troops  at  the  head  of  the  Lake  had  increased  to  eight  or  ten 
thousand.  The  British  land  force  is  reported  2  as  thirteen  thousand, 
of  which  six  thousand  were  in  garrison  at  St.  John's  and  else- 
where. 

Arnold's  last  reinforcements  reached  him  at  Valcour  on  the  6th 
of  October.  On  that  day,  and  in  the  action  of  the  llth,  he  had  with 
him  all  the  American  vessels  on  the  Lake,  except  one  schooner  and 
one  galley.  His  force,  thus,  was  two  schooners  and  a  sloop,  broad- 
side vessels,  besides  four  galleys  and  eight  gondolas,  which  may  be 
assumed  reasonably  to  have  depended  on  their  bow  guns ;  there,  at 
least,  was  their  heaviest  fire.  Thus  reckoned,  his  flotilla,  disposed  to 
the  best  advantage,  could  bring  into  action  at  one  time,  2  eighteens, 
18  twelves,  1  nine,  2  sixes,  12  fours,  and  2  2-pounders,  independent 
of  swivels ;  total,  32  guns,  out  of  eighty-four  that  were  mounted  in 
fifteen  vessels.  To  this  the  British  had  to  oppose,  in  three  broadside 
vessels,  9  twelves  and  13  sixes,  and  in  twenty  gunboats,  20  other 
brass  guns,  "  from  twenty-fours  to  nines,  some  with  howitzers  ; "  3 
total,  42  guns.  In  this  statement  the  radeau  and  gondola  have  not 
been  included,  because  of  their  unmanageableness.  Included  as 
broadside  vessels,  they  would  raise  the  British  armament  —  by  3 
twenty-fours,  3  twelves,  4  nines,  and  a  howitzer  —  to  a  total  of  53 
guns.  Actually,  they  could  be  brought  into  action  only  under  ex- 
ceptional circumstances,  and  are  more  properly  omitted. 

1  The  radeau  had  six  24-pounders,  six  12's,  and  two  howitzers;   the  gondola, 
seven  9-pounders.     The  particulars  of  armament  are  from  Douglas's  letters. 

2  By  American  reports.     Beatson  gives  the  force  sent  out,  in  the  spring  of  1776, 
as  13,357.     ('  Mil.  and  Nav.  Memoirs,'  vi.  44.) 

8  Douglas's  letters. 


1776.]  THE  LAKE  CAMPAIGN. 

These  minutiae  are  necessary  for  the  proper  appreciation  of  what 
Captain  Douglas  justly  called  "  a  momentous  event."  It  was  a  strife 
of  pigmies  for  the  prize  of  a  continent,  and  the  leaders  are  entitled 
to  full  credit  both  for  their  antecedent  energy  and  for  their  dispo- 
sitions in  the  contest ;  not  least  the  unhappy  man  who,  having  done 
so  much  to  save  his  country,  afterwards  blasted  his  name  by  a  trea- 
son unsurpassed  in  modern  war.  Energy  and  audacity  had  so  far 
preserved  the  Lake  to  the  Americans ;  Arnold  determined  to  have 
one  more  try  of  the  chances.  He  did  not  know  the  full  force  of 
the  enemy,  but  he  expected  that  "  it  would  be  very  formidable,  if 
not  equal  to  ours."  l  The  season,  however,  was  so  near  its  end  that 
a  severe  check  would  equal  a  defeat,  and  would  postpone  Carleton's 
further  advance  to  the  next  spring.  Besides,  what  was  the  worth  of 
such  a  force  as  the  American,  such  a  flotilla,  under  the  guns  of  Ticon- 
deroga,  the  Lake  being  lost?  It  was  eminently  a  case  for  taking 
chances,  even  if  the  detachment  should  be  sacrificed,  as  it  was. 

Arnold's  original  purpose  had  been  to  light  under  way ;  and  it 
was  from  this  point  of  view  that  he  valued  the  galleys,  because  of 
their  mobility.  It  is  uncertain  when  he  first  learned  of  the  rig  and 
battery  of  the  Inflexible ; l  but  a  good  look-out  was  kept,  and  the 
British  squadron  was  sighted  from  Valcour  when  it  quitted  the  nar- 
rows. It  may  have  been  seen  even  earlier;  for  Carleton  had  been 
informed,  erroneously,  that  the  Americans  were  near  Grand  Island. 
which  led  him  to  incline  to  that  side,  and  so  open  out  Valcour 
sooner.  The  British  anchored  for  the  night  of  October  10th,  be- 
tween Grand  and  Long2  Islands.  Getting  under  way  next  morning, 
they  stood  up  the  Lake  with  a  strong  north-east  wind,  keeping  along 
Grand  Island,  upon  which  their  attention  doubtless  was  fastened  by 
the  intelligence  which  they  had  received  ;  but  it  was  a  singular  negli- 
gence thus  to  run  to  leeward  with  a  fair  wind,  without  thorough 
scouting  on  both  hands.  The  consequence  was  that  the  American 
flotilla  was  not  discovered  until  Valcour  Island,  which  is  from  one 
hundred  and  twenty  to  one  hundred  and  eighty  feet  high  through- 
out its  two  miles  of  length,  was  so  far  passed  that  the  attack  had 
to  be  made  from  the  south,  —  from  leeward. 

1  Douglas  thought  that  the  appearance  of  the  Inflexible  was  a  complete  surprise; 
but  Arnold  had  been  informed  that  a  third  vessel,  larger  than  the  schooners,  was 
being  set  up.     With  a  man  of  his  character,  it  is  impossible  to  be  sure,  from  his 
letters  to  his  superior,  how  much  he  knew,  or  what  he  withheld. 

2  Now  called  North  Hero. 


364  MAJOR  OPERATIONS.    1762-1783.  [1776. 

When  the  British  were  first  made  out,  Arnold's  second  in  com- 
mand, Waterbury,  urged  that  in  view  of  the  enemy's  superiority  the 
flotilla  should  get  under  way  at  once,  and  fight  them  "  on  a  retreat 
in  the  main  Lake  ;  "  the  harbor  heing  disadvantageous  "  to  fight  a 
number  so  much  superior,  and  the  enemy  being  able  to  surround  us 
on  every  side,  we  lying  between  an  island  and  the  main."  With 
sounder  judgment,  Arnold  decided  to  hold  on.  A  retreat  before 
square-rigged  sailing  vessels  having  a  fair  wind,  by  a  heterogeneous 
force  like  his  own,  of  unequal  speeds  and  batteries,  could  result 
only  in  disaster.  Concerted  fire  and  successful  escape  were  alike 
improbable  ;  and  besides,  escape,  if  feasible,  was  but  throwing  up  the 
game.  Better  trust  to  a  steady,  well-ordered  position,  developing 
the  utmost  fire.  If  the  enemy  discovered  him,  and  came  in  by  the 
northern  entrance,  there  was  a  five-foot  knoll  in  mid-channel  which 
might  fetch  the  biggest  of  them  up;  if,  as  proved  to  be  the  case, 
the  island  should  be  passed,  and  the  attack  should  be  made  from 
leeward,  it  probably  would  be  partial  and  in  disorder,  as  also  hap- 
pened. The  correctness  of  Arnold's  decision  not  to  chance  a  retreat 
was  shown  in  the  retreat  of  two  days  later. 

Valeour  is  on  the  west  side  of  the  Lake,  about  three  quarters 
of  a  mile  from  the  main  ;  but  a  peninsula  projecting  from  the  island 
at  mid-length  narrows  this  interval  to  a  half-mile.  From  the  ac- 
counts, it  is  clear  that  the  American  flotilla  lay  south  of  this  penin- 
sula. Arnold  had,  therefore,  a  reasonable  hope  that  it  might  be 
passed  undetected.  Writing  to  Gates,  the  commander-in-chief  at 
Ticonderoga,  he  said :  "  There  is  a  good  harbor,  and  if  the  enemy 
venture  up  the  Lake  it  will  be  impossible  for  them  to  take  advan- 
tage of  our  situation,  if  we  succeed  in  our  attack  upon  them,  it 
will  be  impossible  for  any  to  escape.  If  we  are  worsted,  our  retreat 
is  open  and  free.  In  case  of  wind,  which  generally  blows  fresh  at 
this  season,  our  craft  will  make  good  weather,  while  the  ire  cannot 
keep  the  Lake."  It  is  apparent  from  this,  written  three  weeks  be- 
fore the  battle,  that  he  then  was  not  expecting  a  force  materially 
different  from  his  own.  Later,  he  describes  his  position  as  being 
"  in  a  small  bay  on  the  west  side  of  the  island,  as  near  together  as 
possible,  and  in  such  a  form  that  few  vessels  can  attack  us  at  the 
same  time,  and  those  will  be  exposed  to  the  fire  of  the  whole 
fleet."  Though  he  unfortunately  gives  no  details,  he  evidently  had 
sound  tactical  ideas.  The  formation  of  the  anchored  vessels  is  de- 
scribed by  the  British  officers  as  a  half-moon. 


1776.]  THE  LAKE  CAMPAIGN.  365 

When  the  British  discovered  the  enemy,  they  hauled  up  for 
them.  Arnold  ordered  one  of  his  schooners,  the  Royal  Savage,  and 
the  four  galleys,  to  get  under  way;  the  two  other  schooners  and 
the  eight  gondolas  remaining  at  their  anchors.  The  Royal  Savage^ 
dropping  to  leeward,  —  by  bad  management,  Arnold  says,  —  came, 
apparently  unsupported,  under  the  distant  fire  of  the  Inflexible,  as 
she  drew  under  the  lee  of  Valcour  at  11  A.M.,  followed  by  the 
Carleton,  and  at  greater  distance  by  the  Maria  and  the  gunboats. 
Three  shots  from  the  ship's  12-pounders  struck  the  Royal  Savage, 
which  then  ran  ashore  on  the  southern  point  of  the  island.  The 
Inflexible,  followed  closely  by  the  Carleton,  continued  on,  but  fired 
only  occasionally ;  showing  that  Arnold  was  keeping  his  galleys  in 
hand,  at  long  bowls,  —  as  small  vessels  with  one  eighteen  should  be 
kept,  when  confronted  with  a  broadside  of  nine  guns.  Between 
the  island  and  the  main  the  north-east  wind  doubtless  drew  more 
northerly,  adverse  to  the  ships'  approach  ;  but,  a  flaw  off  the  c- lift's 
taking  the  fore  and  aft  sails  of  the  Carlcton,  she  fetched  "nearly  into 
the  middle  of  the  rebel  half-moon,  where  Lieutenant  J.  H.  Dacres  in- 
trepidly anchored  with  a  spring  on  her  cable.1'  The  J/V«/vV,  on  board 
which  was  Carleton,  together  with  Commander  Thomas  Pringle, 
commanding  the  flotilla,  was  to  leeward  when  the  chase  began,  and 
could  not  get  into  close  action  that  day.  By  this  time,  seventeen 
of  the  twenty  gunboats  had  come  up,  and,  after  silencing  the  Roi/nl 
Savage,  pulled  up  to  within  point-blank  range  of  the  American  flotilla. 
"  The  cannonade  was  tremendous,"  wrote  Baron  Uiedesel.  Lieutenant 
Edward  Longcroft,  of  the  radeau  Thunderer,  not  being  able  to  get  his 
raft  into  action,  went  with  a  boat's  crew  on  board  the  Royal  Surayc, 
and  for  a  time  turned  her  guns  upon  her  former  friends  ;  but  the  fire 
of  the  latter  forced  him  again  to  abandon  her;  and  it  seemed  so  likely 
that  she  might  be  retaken  that  she  was  set  on  fire  by  Lieutenant 
Starke  of  the  Maria,  when  already  "  two  rebel  boats  were  very  near 
her.  She  soon  after  blew  up."  The  American  guns  converging  on 
the  Carleton  in  her  central  position,  she  suffered  severely.  Her  com- 
mander, Lieutenant  Dacres,  was  knocked  senseless  ;  another  officer 
lost  an  arm;  only  Mr.  Edward  Pellew,  afterwards  Lord  Exmouth, 
remained  fit  for  duty.  The  spring  being  shot  away,  she  swung  bows 
on  to  the  enemy,  and  her  fire  was  thus  silenced.  Captain  Pringle 
signalled  to  her  to  withdraw ;  but  she  was  unable  to  obey.  To  pay 
her  head  off  the  right  way,  Pellew  himself  had  to  get  out  on  the 
bowsprit  under  a  heavy  fire  of  musketry,  to  bear  the  jib  over  to 


366  MAJOR  OPERATIONS.     1762-1783.  [1776. 

windward ;  but  to  make  sail  seems  to  have  been  impossible.  Two 
artillery  boats  were  sent  to  her  assistance,  "  which  towed  her  off 
through  a  very  thick  fire,  until  out  of  farther  reach,  much  to  the 
honour  of  Mr.  John  Curling  and  Mr.  Patrick  Carnegy,  master's  mate 
and  midshipman  of  the  Isis,  who  conducted  them ;  and  of  Mr. 
Edward  Pellew,  mate  of  the  Blonde,  who  threw  the  tow-rope  from 
the  Carleton's  bowsprit."  :  This  service  on  board  the  Carleton  started 
Pellew  on  his  road  to  fortune ;  but,  singularly  enough,  the  lieutenancy 
promised  him  in  consequence,  by  both  the  First  Lord  and  Lord  Howe, 
was  delayed  by  the  fact  that  he  stayed  at  the  front,  instead  of  going 
to  the  rear,  where  he  would  have  been  "  within  their  jurisdiction."  2 
The  Carleton  had  two  feet  of  water  in  the  hold,  and  had  lost  eight 
killed  and  six  wounded,  —  about  half  her  crew,  — when  she  anchored 
out  of  fire.  In  this  small  but  stirring  business,  the  Americans,  in 
addition  to  the  Royal  Savage,  had  lost  one  gondola.  Besides  the 
injuries  to  the  Oarleton,  a  British  artillery  boat,  commanded  by  a 
German  lieutenant,  was  sunk.  Towards  evening  the  Inflexible  got 
within  point-blank  shot  of  the  Americans,  '•  when  five  broadsides," 
wrote  Douglas,  "  silenced  their  whole  line."  One  fresh  ship,  with 
scantling  for  sea-going,  and  a  concentrated  battery,  has  an  unques- 
tioned advantage  over  a  dozen  light-built  craft,  carrying  one  or  two 
guns  each,  and  already  several  hours  engaged. 

At  nightfall  the  Inflexible  dropped  out  of  range,  and  the  Britisli 
squadron  anchored  in  line  of  battle  across  the  southern  end  of  the 
passage  between  the  island  and  the  main ;  some  vessels  were  ex- 
tended also  to  the  eastward,  into  the  open  Lake.  "The  best  part 
of  my  intelligence,"  wrote  Burgoyne  next  day  from  St.  John's,  to 
Douglas  at  Quebec,  "  is  that  our  whole  fleet  was  formed  in  line 
above  the  enemy,  and  consequently  they  must  have  surrendered  this 
morning,  or  given  us  battle  on  our  own  terms.  The  Indians  and 
light  troops  are  abreast  with  the  fleet ;  they  cannot,  therefore,  escape 
by  land."  The  British  squadron  sharing  this  confidence,  a  proper 
look-out  was  not  kept.  The  American  leader  immediately  held  a 
conference  with  his  officers,  and  decided  to  attempt  a  retreat,  "  which 
was  done  with  such  secrecy,"  writes  Waterbury,  "  that  we  went 
through  them  entirely  undiscovered."  The  movement  began  at 
7  P.M.,  a  galley  leading,  the  gondolas  and  schooners  following,  and 
Arnold  and  his  second  bringing  up  the  rear  in  the  two  heaviest  gal- 
leys. This  delicate  operation  was  favoured  by  a  heavy  fog,  which 

1  Douglas's  letter.  '2  Sandwich  to  Pellew. 


1776.]  THE  LAKE  CAMPAIGN.  367 

did  not  clear  till  next  morning  at  eight.  As  the  Americans  stole 
by,  they  could  not  see  any  of  the  hostile  ships.  By  daylight  they 
were  out  of  sight  of  the  British.  Riedesel,  speaking  of  this  event, 
says,  "  The  ships  anchored,  secure  of  the  enemy,  who  stole  off 
during  the  night,  and  sailing  round  the  left  wing,  aided  by  a 
favourable  wind,  escaped  under  darkness."  The  astonishment  next 
morning,  he  continues,  was  great,  as  was  Carleton's  rage.  The  lat- 
ter started  to  pursue  in  such  a  hurry  that  he  forgot  to  leave  orders 
for  the  troops  which  had  been  landed ;  but,  failing  to  discover  the 
fugitives,  he  returned  and  remained  at  Valcour  till  nightfall,  when 
scouts  brought  word  that  the  enemy  were  at  Schuyler's  Island,  eight 
miles  above. 

The  retreat  of  the  Americans  had  been  embarrassed  by  their 
injuries,  and  by  the  wind  coming  out  ahead.  They  were  obliged  to 
anchor  on  the  12th  to  repair  damages,  both  hulls  and  sails  having 
suffered  severely.  Arnold  took  the  precaution  to  write  to  Crown 
Point  for  bateaux,  to  tow  in  case  of  a  southerly  wind ;  but  time  was 
not  allowed  for  these  to  arrive.  Two  gondolas  had  to  be  sunk  on 
account  of  their  injuries,  making  three  of  that  class  so  far  lost.  The 
retreat  was  resumed  at  2  P.M.,  but  the  breeze  was  fresh  from  the 
southward,  and  the  gondolas  made  very  little  way.  At  evening  the: 
British  chased  again.  That  night  the  wind  moderated,  and  at  day- 
break the  American  flotilla  was  twenty-eight  miles  from  Crown 
Point,  —  fourteen  from  Valcour,  —  having  still  five  miles'  start. 
Later,  however,  by  Arnold's  report,  "  the  wind  again  breezed  up  to 
the  southward,  so  that  we  gained  very  little  either  by  beating  or  row- 
ing. At  the  same  time  the  enemy  took  a  fresh  breeze  from  north- 
east, and,  by  the  time  we  had  readied  Split  Rock,  were  alongside  of 
us."  The  galleys  of  Arnold  and  Waterbury,  the  Congress  and  the 
Washington,  had  throughout  kept  in  the  rear,  and  now  received  the 
brunt  of  the  attack,  made  by  the  Inflexible  and  the  two  schooners, 
which  had  entirely  distanced  their  sluggish  consorts.  This  fight  was 
in  the  upper  narrows,  where  the  Lake  is  from  one  to  three  miles 
wide ;  and  it  lasted,  by  Arnold's  report,  for  five  glasses  (two  hours 
and  a  half),1  the  Americans  continually  retreating,  until  about  ten 
miles  from  Crown  Point.  There,  the  Washington  having  struck 
some  time  before,  and  final  escape  being  impossible,  Arnold  ran  his 
own  galley  and  four  gondolas  ashore  in  a  small  creek  on  the  east 
side;  pulling  to  windward,  with  the  cool  judgment  that  had  marked 
1  Beatson,  '  Nav.  and  Mil.  Memoirs,'  says  two  hours. 


368  MAJOR  OPERATIONS.    1762-1783.  [1776. 

all  his  conduct,  so  that  the  enemy  could  not  follow  him  —  except  in 
small  boats  with  which  he  could  deal.  There  he  set  his  vessels  on 
fire,  and  stood  by  them  until  assured  that  they  would  blow  up  with 
their  flags  flying.  He  then  retreated  to  Crown  Point  through  the 
woods,  "  despite  the  savages  ;  "  a  phrase  which  concludes  this  singu- 
lar aquatic  contest  with  a  quaint  touch  of  local  colour. 

In  three  days  of  fighting  and  retreating  the  Americans  had  lost 
one  schooner,  two  galleys,  and  seven  gondolas,  —  in  all,  ten  vessels 
out  of  fifteen.  The  killed  and  wounded  amounted  to  over  eighty, 
twenty  odd  of  whom  were  in  Arnold's  galley.  The  original  force, 
numbering  seven  hundred,  had  been  decimated.  Considering  its  raw 
material  and  the  recency  of  its  organisation,  words  can  scarcely  exag- 
gerate the  heroism  of  the  resistance,  which  undoubtedly  depended 
chiefly  upon  the  personal  military  qualities  of  the  leader.  The  Brit- 
ish loss  in  killed  and  wounded  did  not  exceed  forty. 

The  little  American  navy  on  Champlain  was  wiped  out;  but 
never  had  any  force,  big  or  small,  lived  to  better  purpose  or  died 
more  gloriously  ;  for  it  had  saved  the  Lake  for  that  year.  Whatever 
deductions  may  be  made  for  blunders,  and  for  circumstances  of  every 
character,  which  made  the;  British  campaign  of  1777  abortive  and 
disastrous,  and  so  led  directly  to  the  American  alliance  with  France 
in  1778,  the  delay,  with  all  that  it  involved,  was  obtained  by  the 
Lake  campaign  of  1770.  On  October  lf>th,  two  days  after  Arnold's 
final  defeat,  Carleton  dated  a  letter  to  Douglas  from  before  Crown 
Point,  whence  the  American  garrison  was  withdrawn.  A  week  later 
Riedesel  arrived,  and  wrote  that,  "  were  our  whole  army  here  it 
would  be  an  easy  matter  to  drive  the  enemy  from  their  entrench- 
ments," at  Ticonderoga,  and  —  as  has  been  quoted  already  —  four 
weeks  sooner  would  have  insured  its  fall.  It  is  but  a  coincidence 
that  just  four  weeks  had  been  required  to  set  up  the  1 nJJ.c.cible  at  St. 
John's;  but  it  typifies  the  whole  story.  Save  for  Arnold's  flotilla, 
the  two  British  schooners  would  have  settled  the  business.  "  Upon 
the  whole,  Sir,"  wrote  Douglas  in  his  final  letter  from  Quebec  before 
sailing  for  England,  "  I  scruple  not  to  say,  that  had  not  General  Car- 
leton authorised  me  to  take  the  extraordinary  measure  of  sending  up 
the  Inflexible  from  Quebec,  things  could  not  this  year  have  been 
brought  to  so  glorious  a  conclusion  on  Lake  Champlain."  Douglas 
further  showed  the  importance  attached  to  this  success  by  men  of 
that  day,  by  sending  a  special  message  to  the  British  ambassador  at 
Madrid,  "  presuming  that  the  early  knowledge  of  this  great  event 


1776.]  THE  LAKE  CAMPAIGN.  369 

in  the  southern  parts  of  Europe  may  be  of  advantage  to  His  Majes- 
ty's service."  That  the  opinion  of  the  government  was  similar  may 
be  inferred  from  the  numerous  rewards  bestowed.  Carleton  was 
made  a  Knight  of  the  Bath,  and  Douglas  a  baronet. 

In  no  case  where  the  British  and  the  Americans  have  met  upon 
the  water,  has  a  serious  charge  of  personal  misconduct  been  proved 
against  any  individual ;  and  the  gallantry  shown  upon  occasion  by 
both  sides  upon  Lake  Champlain  in  1770,  is  evident  from  the  fore- 
going narrative.  With  regard  to  the  direction  of  movements,  —  the 
skill  of  the  two  leaders,  —  the  same  equal  credit  cannot  be  assigned. 
It  was  a  very  serious  blunder,  on  October  llth,  to  run  to  leeward, 
passing  a  concealed  enemy,  undetected,  upon  waters  so  perfectly  well 
known  as  those  of  Champlain  were ;  it  having  been  the  scene  of  fre- 
quent British  operations  in  previous  wars.  Owing  to  this,  "  the 
Maria,  because  of  her  distant  situation  (from  which  the  Inflexible 
and  Carleton  had  chased  by  signal)  when  the  rebels  were  first  dis- 
covered, and  baffling  winds,  could  not  get  into  close  action."  J  For 
the  same  reason  the  Inflexible  could  not  support  the  Carleton.  The 
Americans,  in  the  aggregate  distinctly  inferior,  were  thus  permitted 
a  concentration  of  superior  force  upon  part  of  their  enemies.  It  is 
needless  to  enlarge  upon  the  mortifying  incident  of  Arnold's  escape 
that  evening.  To  liken  small  things  to  great,  —  alwaj's  profitable 
in  military  analysis,  —  it  resembled  Hood's  slipping  away  from  de 
Grasse  at  St.  Kitts. 

In  conduct  and  courage,  Arnold's  behaviour  was  excellent  through- 
out. Without  enlarging  upon  the  energy  which  created  the  flotilla, 
and  the  breadth  of  view  which  suggested  preparations  that  lie  could 
not  enforce,  admiration  is  due  to  his  recognition  of  the  fact — im- 
plicit in  deed,  if  unexpressed  in  word  —  that  the  one  use  of  the 
navy  was  to  contest  the  control  of  the  water ;  to  impose  delay,  even 
if  it  could  not  secure  ultimate  victory.  No  words  could  say  more 
clearly  than  do  his  actions  that,  under  the  existing  conditions,  the 
navy  was  useless,  except  as  it  contributed  to  that  end ;  valueless,  if 
buried  in  port.  Upon  this  rests  the  merit  of  his  bold  advance  into 
the  lower  narrows ;  upon  this  his  choice  of  the  strong  defensive 
position  of  Valcour ;  upon  this  his  refusal  to  retreat,  as  urged  by 
Waterbury,  when  the  full  force  of  the  enemy  was  disclosed,  —  a 

1  Douglas's  letters.     The  sentence  is  awkward,  but  carefully  compared  with  the 
copy  in  the  author's  hands.     Douglas  says,  of  the  details  he  gives,  that  "  they  have 
been  collected  with  the  most  scrupulous  circumspection." 
VOL   in  — 24 


370  MAJOR   OPERATIONS.     1762-1783.  [1776, 

decision  justified,  or  rather,  illustrated,  by  the  advantages  which  the 
accidents  of  the  day  threw  into  his  hands.  His  personal  gallantry 
was  conspicuous  there  as  at  all  times  of  his  life.  "  His  countrymen," 
said  a  generous  enemy  of  that  day,  "  chiefly  gloried  in  the  dangerous 
attention  which  he  paid  to  a  nice  point  of  honour,  in  keeping  his  flag 
flying,  and  not  quitting  his  galley  till  she  was  in  flames,  lest  the 
enemy  should  have  boarded,  and  struck  it."  It  is  not  the  least  of 
the  injuries  done  to  his  nation  in  after  years,  that  he  should  have 
silenced  this  boast  and  effaced  tins  glorious  record  by  so  black  an 
infamy. 

With  the  destruction  of  the  flotilla  ends  the  naval  story  of  the 
Lakes  during  the  War  of  the  American  Revolution.  Satisfied  that 
it  was  too  late  to  proceed  against  Ticonderoga  that  year,  Carleton 
withdrew  to  St.  John's  and  went  into  winter-quarters.  The  follow- 
ing year  the  enterprise  was  resumed  under  General  Burgoyne ;  but 
Sir  William  Howe,  instead  of  co-operating  by  an  advance  up  the 
Hudson,  which  was  the  plan  of  1770,  carried  his  army  to  Chesapeake 
Bay,  to  act  thence  against  Philadelphia.  Burgoyne  took  Ticonde- 
roga and  forced  his  way  as  far  as  Saratoga,  sixty  miles  from  Ticon- 
deroga and  thirty  from  Albany,  where  Howe  should  have  met  him. 
There  he  was  brought  to  a  stand  by  the  army  which  the  Americans 
had  collected,  found  himself  unable  to  advance  or  to  retreat,  and  was 
forced  to  lay  down  his  arms  on  October  17th,  1777.  The  garrisons  left 
by  him  at  Ticonderoga  and  Crown  Point  retired  to  Canada,  and  the 
posts  were  re-occupied  by  the  Americans.  No  further  contest  took 
place  on  the  Lake,  though  the  British  vessels  remained  in  control  of 
it,  and  showed  themselves  from  time  to  time  up  to  1781.  With  the 
outbreak  of  war  between  Great  Britain  and  France,  in  1778,  the  scene 
of  interest  shifted  to  salt  water,  and  there  remained  till  the  end. 

The  opening  conflict  between  Great  Britain  and  her  North  Ameri- 
can Colonies  teaches  clearly  the  necessity,  too  rarely  recognised  in 
practice,  that  when  a  state  has  decided  to  use  force,  the  force  pro- 
vided should  be  adequate  from  the  first.  It  is  better  to  be  much  too 
strong  than  a  little  too  weak.  Seeing  the  evident  temper  of  the 
Massachusetts  Colonists,  force  would  be  needed  to  execute  the  Boston 
Port  Bill  and  its  companion  measures  of  1774 ;  for  the  Port  Bill 
especially,  naval  force.  The  supplies  for  1775  granted  only  18,000 
seamen,  —  2,000  less  than  for  the  previous  year.  For  1776,  28,000 
seamen  were  voted,  and  the  total  appropriations  rose  from  £5,556,000 


1776.]  THE  EVACUATION  OF  BOSTON.  371 

to  £10,154,000  ;  but  it  was  then  too  late.  Boston  was  evacuated  by 
the  British  army,  8,000  strong,  on  the  17th  of  March,  1776  ;  but 
already,  for  more  than  half  a  year,  the  spreading  spirit  of  revolt  in 
the  thirteen  Colonies  had  been  encouraged  by  the  sight  of  the  British 
army  cooped  up  in  the  town,  suffering  from  want  of  necessaries,  while 
the  colonial  army  blockading  it  was  able  to  maintain  its  position, 
because  ships  laden  with  stores  for  the  one  were  captured,  and  the 
cargoes  diverted  to  the  use  of  the  other.  To  secure  free  and  ample 
communications  for  one's  self,  and  to  interrupt  those  of  the  opponent, 
are  among  the  first  requirements  of  war.  To  carry  out  the  measures 
of  the  British  government  a  naval  force  was  needed,  which  should  not 
only  protect  the  approach  of  its  own  transports  to  Boston  Bay,  but 
should  prevent  access  to  all  coast  ports  whence  supplies  could  be 
carried  to  the  blockading  army.  So  far  from  this,  the  squadron  was 
not  equal,  in  either  number  or  quality,  to  the  work  to  be  done  about 
Boston  ;  and  it  was  not  until  October,  177-">,  that  the  Admiral  was 
authorised  to  capture  colonial  merchant  vessels,  which  therefore  went 
and  came  unmolested,  outside  of  Boston,  carrying  often  provisions 
which  found  their  way  to  Washington's  army. 

After  evacuating  Boston,  General  Howe  retired  to  Halifax,  there 
to  await  the  coming  of  reinforcements,  botli  military  and  naval,  and 
of  his  brother  Vice- Admiral  Lord  Howe,  appointed  to  command  the 
North  American  Station.  General  Howe  was  commander-in-chief  of 
the  forces  throughout  the  territory  extending  from  Nova  Scotia  to 
West  Florida ;  from  Halifax  to  Pensacola,  The  first  operation  of 
the  campaign  was  to  be  the  reduction  of  New  York. 

The  British  government,  however,  had  several  objects  in  view, 
and  permitted  itself  to  be  distracted  from  the  single-minded  prosecu- 
tion of  one  great  undertaking  to  other  subsidiary,  and  not  always 
concentric,  operations.  Whether  the  control  of  the  line  of  the  Hud- 
son and  Lake  Champlain  ought  to  have  been  sought  through  opera- 
tions beginning  at  both  ends,  is  open  to  argument;  the  facts  that  the 
Americans  were  back  in  Crown  Point  in  the  beginning  of  July,  and 
that  Carleton's  13,000  men  got  no  farther  than  St.  John's  that  year, 
suggest  that  the  greater  part  of  the  latter  force  would  have  been 
better  employed  in  New  York  and  New  Jersey  than  about  Cham- 
plain.  However  that  may  be,  the  diversion  of  a  third  body,  respect- 
able in  point  of  numbers,  to  the  Carolinas,  is  scarcely  to  be  defended 
on  military  grounds.  The  government  was  induced  to  it  by  the 
expectation  of  local  support  from  royalists.  That  there  were  con- 


372  MAJOR   OPERATIONS.     1702-1783.  [1776. 

siderable  numbers  of  these  in  both  Colonies  is  certain ;  but  while 
military  operations  must  take  account  of  political  conditions,  the 
latter  should  not  be  allowed  to  overbalance  elementary  principles 
of  the  military  art.  It  is  said  that  General  Howe  disapproved  of 
this  ex-centric  movement. 

The  force  destined  for  the  Southern  coasts  assembled  at  Cork 
towards  the  end  of  1775,  and  sailed  thence  in  January,  1776.  The 
troops  were  commanded  by  Lord  Cornwallis,  the  squadron  by  Nel- 
son's early  patron,  Commodore  Sir  Peter  Parker,  whose  broad  pen- 
nant was  hoisted  on  board  the  Bristol,  50,  Captain  John  Morris. 
After  a  boisterous  passage,  the  expedition  arrived  in  May  off  Cape 
Fear  in  North  Carolina,  where  it  was  joined  by  2,000  men  under  Sir 
Henry  Clinton,  Cornwallis's  senior,  whom  Howe  had  detached  to  the 
southward  in  January,  by  the  government's  orders.  Upon  his  appear- 
ance, the  royalists  in  North  Carolina  had  risen,  headed  by  the  hus- 
band of  Flora  Macdonald,  whose  name  thirty  years  before  had  been 
associated  romantically  with  the  escape  of  the  young  Pretender,  but 
who  had  afterwards  emigrated  to  America.  The  rising,  however, 
had  been  put  down,  and  Clinton  had  not  thought  it  expedient  to  try 
a  serious  invasion,  in  face  of  the  large  force  assembled  to  resist  him. 
Upon  Parker's  coming,  it  was  decided  to  make  an  attempt  upon 
Charleston,  South  Carolina.  The  fleet  therefore  sailed  from  Cape 
Fear  on  the  1st  of  June,  and  on  the  4th  anchored  off  Charleston  Bar. 

Charleston  Harbour  opens  between  two  of  the  Sea-Islands  which 
fringe  the  coasts  of  South  Carolina  and  Georgia.  On  the  north  is 
Sullivan's  Island,  on  the  south  James  Island.  The  bar  of  the  main 
entrance  was  not  abreast  the  mouth  of  the  port,  but  some  distance 
south  of  it.  Inside  the  bar,  the  channel  turned  to  the  northward, 
and  thence  led  near  Sullivan's  Island,  the  southern  end  of  which 
was  therefore  chosen  as  the  site  of  the  rude  fort  hastily  thrown  up 
to  meet  this  attack,  and  afterwards  called  Fort  Moultrie,  from  the 
name  of  the  commander.  From  these  conditions,  a  southerly  wind 
was  needed  to  bring  ships  into  action.  After  sounding  and  buoying 
the  bar,  the  transports  and  frigates  crossed  on  the  7th  and  anchored 
inside  ;  but  as  it  was  necessary  to  remove  some  of  the  Bristol's  guns, 
she  could  not  follow  until  the  10th.  On  the  9th  Clinton  had  landed 
in  person  with  five  hundred  men,  and  by  the  15th  all  the  troops  had 
disembarked  upon  Long  Island,  next  north  of  Sullivan's.  It  was 
understood  that  the  inlet  between  the  two  was  fordable,  allowing  the 
troops  to  co-operate  with  the  naval  attack,  by  diversion  or  otherwise  ; 


1776.]  THE  ATTACK  UPON  CHARLESTON,   S.  C.  373 

but  this  proved  to  be  a  mistake.  The  passage  was  seven  feet  deep 
at  low  water,  and  there  were  no  means  for  crossing ;  consequently  a 
small  American  detachment  in  the  scrub  wood  of  the  island  was  suf- 
ficient to  check  any  movement  in  that  quarter.  The  fighting  there- 
fore was  confined  to  the  cannonading  of  the  fort  by  the  ships. 

Circumstances  not  fully  explained  caused  the  attack  to  be  fixed 
for  the  23rd ;  an  inopportune  delay,  during  which  the  Americans 
were  strengthening  their  still  very  imperfect  defences.  On  the  23rd 
the  wind  was  unfavourable.  On  the  25th  the  Experiment,  50,  Cap- 
tain Alexander  Scott,  arrived,  crossed  the  bar,  and,  after  taking  in 
her  guns  again,  was  ready  to  join  in  the  assault.  On  the  27th,  at 
10  A.M.,  the  ships  got  under  way  with  a  south-east  breeze,  but  this 
shifted  soon  afterwards  to  north-west,  and  they  had  to  anchor  again, 
about  a  mile  nearer  to  Sullivan's  Island.  On  the  following  day  the 
wind  served,  and  the  attack  was  made. 

In  plan,  Fort  Moultiie  was  square,  with  a  bastion  at  each  angle. 
In  construction,  the  sides  were  palmetto  logs,  dovetailed  and  bolted 
together,  laid  in  parallel  rows,  sixteen  feet  apart,  and  the  interspace 
filled  with  sand.  At  the  time  of  the  engagement,  the  south  and  west 
fronts  were  finished ;  the  other  fronts  were  only  seven  feet  high,  but 
surmounted  by  thick  planks,  to  be  tenable  against  escalade.  Thirty- 
one  guns  were  in  place,  eighteen  and  nine  pounders,  of  which  twenty- 
one  were  on  the  south  face,  commanding  the  channel.  Within  was 
a  traverse  running  east  and  west,  protecting  the  gunners  from  shots 
from  the  rear;  but  there  was  no  such  cover  against  enfilading  fire, 
in  case  an  enemy's  ship  passed  the  fort  and  anchored  above  it.  "  The 
general  opinion  before  the  action,"  Moultrie  says,  "  and  especially 
among  sailors,  was  that  two  frigates  would  be  sufficient  to  knock  the 
town  about  our  ears,  notwithstanding  our  batteries.''  Parker  may 
have  shared  this  impression,  and  it  may  account  for  his  leisure- 
liness.  When  the  action  began,  the  garrison  had  but  twenty-eight 
rounds  for  twenty-six  cannon,  but  this  deficiency  was  unknown  to 
the  British. 

Parker's  plan  was  that  the  two  50's,  Bristol  and  Experiment,  and 
two  28-gun  frigates,  the  Active,  Captain  William  Williams,  and  the 
Solcbay,  Captain  Thomas  Symonds,  accompanied  by  a  bomb-vessel,  the 
Thunder,  8,  Captain  James  Reid,  should  engage  the  main  front; 
while  two  frigates  of  the  same  class,  the  Actccon,  Captain  Christopher 
Atkins,  and  the  Syren,  Captain  Christopher  Furneaux,  with  a  20-gun 
corvette,  the  Sphinx,  Captain  Anthony  Hunt,  should  pass  the  fort, 


374  MAJOR   OPERATIONS.     1762-1783.  [1776. 

anchoring  to  the  westward,  up-channel,  to  protect  the  heavy  vessels- 
against  fire-ships,  as  well  as  to  enfilade  the  main  battery.  The  order 
to  weigh  was  given  at  10.30  A.M.,  when  the  flood-tide  had  fairly 
made ;  and  at  11.15  the  Active,  Bristol,  and  Experiment,  anchored  in 
line  ahead,  in  the  order  named,  the  Active,  to  the  eastward.  The 
Solebay  lay  outside  the  others,  abreast  the  interval  between  the  50's. 
The  ships  seem  to  have  taken  their  places  skilfully  and  without  con- 
fusion, and  their  fire,  which  opened  at  once,  was  rapid,  well-sustained, 
and  well-directed  ;  but  their  disposition  suffered  under  the  radical 
defect  that,  whether  from  actual  lack  of  water,  or  only  from  fear  of 
grounding,  they  were  too  far  from  the  works  to  use  grape  effectively. 
The  sides  of  ships  being  much  weaker  than  those  of  shore  works, 
while  their  guns  were  much  more  numerous,  the  secret  of  success 
was  to  get  near  enough  to  beat  down  the  hostile  fire  by  a  multitude 
of  projectiles.  The  boml>- vessel  Thunder  anchored  ahead,  and  out- 
side, of  the  Active,  south-east  by  south  from  the  east  bastion  of  the 
engaged  front.  Her  shells,  though  well  aimed,  were  ineffective. 
"  Most  of  them  fell  within  the  fort,"  Moultrie  reported,  "but  we  had 
a  morass  in  the  middle,  which  swallowed  them  instantly,  and  those 
that  fell  in  the  sand  were  immediately  buried."  During  the  action, 
the  mortar  bed  broke,  disabling  the  piece. 

Owing  to  the  scarcity  of  powder,  the  garrison  had  positive  orders 
not  to  engage  at  ranges  exceeding  four  hundred  yards.  Four  or  five 
shots  were  thrown  at  the  Active,  while  still  under  sail,  but  with  this 
exception  the  fort  kept  silence  until  the  ships  anchored,  at  a  distance 
estimated  by  the  Americans  to  be  350  yards.  The  word  was  then 
passed  along  the  platform,  "  Mind  the  Commodore ;  mind  the  two 
50-gun  ships,"  •  —  an  order  which  was  strictly  obeyed,  as  the  losses 
show.  The  protection  of  the  work  proved  to  be  almost  perfect,  —  a 
fact  which  doubtless  contributed  to  the  coolness  and  precision  of  fire 
vitally  essential  with  such  deficient  resources.  The  texture  of  the 
palmetto  wood  suffered  the  balls  to  sink  smoothly  into  it  without 
splintering,  so  that  the  facing  of  the  work  held  well.  At  times, 
when  three  or  four  broadsides  struck  together,  the  merlons  shook  so 
that  Moultrie  feared  they  would  come  bodily  in ;  but  they  withstood, 
and  the  small  loss  inflicted  was  chiefly  through  the  embrasures.  The 
flagstaff  was  shot  away,  falling  outside  into  the  ditch,  but  a  young 
sergeant,  named  Jasper,  distinguished  himself  by  jumping  after  it, 
fetching  back  and  rehoisting  the  colours  under  a  heavy  fire. 

In  the  squadron  an  equal  gallantry  was  shown  under  circum- 


1770.] 


FORT  MOULTRIE. 


375 


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376  MAJOR   OPERATIONS.     1762-1783.  [1770. 

stances  which  made  severe  demands  upon  endurance.  Whatever 
Parker's  estimate  of  the  worth  of  the  defences,  no  trace  of  vain-con- 
fidence appears  in  his  dispositions,  which  were  thorough  and  careful, 
as  the  execution  of  the  main  attack  was  skilful  and  vigorous.  But 
the  ships'  companies  had  expected  an  easy  victory,  and  they  found 
themselves  confronted  with  a  resistance  and  a  punishment  as  severe 
as  were  endured  by  the  leaders  at  Trafalgar,  and  far  more  prolonged. 
Such  conditions  impose  upon  men's  tenacity  the  additional  test  of 
surprise  and  discomfiture.  The  Experiment,  though  very  small  for 
a  ship  of  the  line,  lost  23  killed  and  56  wounded,  out  of  a  total  prob- 
ably not  much  exceeding  300,  while  the  Bristol,  having  the  spring 
shot  away,  swung  with  her  head  to  the  southward  and  her  stern  to 
the  fort,  undergoing  for  a  long  time  a  raking  lire  to  which  she  could 
make  little  reply.  Three  several  attempts  to  replace  the  spring 
were  made  by  Mr.  James  Samnarex,  —  afterwards  the  distinguished 
admiral,  then  a  midshipman,  —  before  the  ship  was  relieved  from  this 
grave  disadvantage.  Her  loss  was  40  killed  and  71  wounded  ;  not  a 
man  escaping  of  those  stationed  on  tin-  quarter-deck  at  the  beginning 
of  the  action.  Among  the  injured  was  the  Commodore  himself, 
whose  cool  heroism  must  have  been  singularly  conspicuous,  from  the 
notice  it  attracted  in  a  service  where  such  bearing  was  not  rare.  At 
one  time  when  the  quarter-deck  was  cleared  and  he  stood  alone  upon 
the  poop-ladder,  Saumarex  suggested  to  him  to  come  down  ;  but  he 
replied,  smiling,  '•  You  want  to  get  rid  of  me,  do  you?"  and  refused 
to  move.  The  captain  of  the  ship.  John  Morris,  was  mortally 
wounded.  With  commendable  modesty  Parker  only  reported  him- 
self as  slightly  bruised  ;  but  deserters  stated  that  for  some  days  he 
needed  the  assistance  of  two  men  to  walk,  and  that  his  trousers  had 
been  torn  off  him  by  shot  or  splinters.  The  loss  in  the  other  ships 
was  only  one  killed,  14  wounded.  The  Americans  had  37  killed  and 
wounded. 

The  three  ves.sels  assigned  to  enfilade  the  main  front  of  the  fort 
did  not  get  into  position.  They  ran  on  the  middle  ground,  owing, 
Parker  reported,  to  the  ignorance  of  the  pilots.  Two  had  fouled 
each  other  before  striking.  Having  taken  the  bottom  on  a  rising 
tide,  two  floated  in  a  few  hours,  and  retreated ;  but  the  third,  the 
Actccon,  28,  sticking  fast,  was  set  on  fire  and  abandoned  by  her  offi- 
cers. Before  she  blew  up,  the  Americans  boarded  her,  securing  her 
colours,  bell,  and  some  other  trophies.  "  Had  these  ships  effected 
their  purpose,"  Moultrie  reported,  "  they  would  have  driven  us  from 
our.  guns." 


1776.] 


NORTH  AMERICA  AND  THE  WEST  INDIES. 


377 


or-  NORTH  AMERICA    &.   THE.  NORTH  ATLANTIC 
WELST   INDIEIS 


/I  r  L  A  w  T  i  c 


PART   OF  NORTH   AMERICA   AND   THE    NORTH  ATLANTIC   AND   THE   WEST  INDIES. 


378  MAJOR   OPERATIONS.     1702-1783.  [1776. 

The  main  division  held  its  ground  until  long  after  nightfall, 
firing  much  of  the  time,  but  stopping  at  intervals.  After  two  hours 
it  had  been  noted  that  the  fort  replied  veiy  slowly,  which  was  attrib- 
uted to  its  being  overborne,  instead  of  to  the  real  cause,  the  neces- 
sity for  sparing  ammunition.  For  the  same  reason  it  was  entirely 
silent  from  3.30  P.M.  to  6,  when  fire  was  resumed  from  only  two  or 
three  guns,  whence  Parker  surmised  that  the  rest  had  been  dis- 
mounted.  The  Americans  were  restrained  throughout  the  engage- 
ment by  the  fear  of  exhausting  entirely  their  scanty  store. 

"  About  9  P.M.,"  Parker  reported,  "  being  very  dark,  great  part 
of  our  ammunition  expended,  the  people  fatigued,  the  tide  of  ebb 
almost  done,  no  prospect  from  the  eastward  (that  is,  from  the  army), 
and  no  possibility  of  our  being  of  any  further  service,  I  ordered  the 
ships  to  withdraw  to  their  former  moorings."  Besides  the  casualties 
among  the  crew,  and  severe  damage  to  the  hull,  the  Bristol's  main- 
mast, with  nine  cannon-balls  in  it,  had  to  be  shortened,  while  the 
mizzen-mast  was  condemned.  The  loss  of  the  frigates  was  imma- 
terial, owing  to  the  garrison's  neglecting  them. 

The   ficht  in    Charleston    Harbour,   the    first   serious    contest    in 

o 

which  ships  took  part  in  this  war,  resembles  generically  the  battle  of 
Bunker's  Hill,  with  which  the  regular  laud  warfare  had  opened  a 
year  before.  Both  illustrate  the  difficulty  and  danger  of  a  front 
attack,  without  cover,  upon  a  fortified  position,  and  the  advantage 
conferred  even  upon  untrained  men.  if  naturally  cool,  resolute,  and 
intelligent,  not  only  by  the  protection  of  a  work,  but  also,  it  may  be 
urged,  by  the  recognition  of  a  tangible  line  up  to  which  to  hold,  and 
to  abandon  which  means  defeat,  dishonour,  and  disaster.  It  is  much 
for  untried  men  to  recognise  in  their  surroundings  something  which 
gives  the  unity  of  a  common  purpose,  and  thus  the  coherence  which 
discipline  imparts.  Although  there  was  in  Parker's  dispositions 
nothing  open  to  serious  criticism,  —  nothing  that  can  be  ascribed  to 
undervaluing  his  opponent.  —  and  although,  also,  he  had  good  reason 
to  expect  from  the  army  active  co-operation  which  he  did  not  get,  it 
is  probable  that  he  was  very  much  surprised,  not  only  at  the  tenacity 
of  the  Americans'  resistance,  but  at  the  efficacy  of  their  fire.  He 
felt,  doubtless,  the  traditional  and  natural  distrust  —  and,  for  the 
most  part,  the  justified  distrust  —  with  which  experience  and  prac- 
tice regard  inexperience.  Some  seamen  of  American  birth,  who  had 
been  serving  in  the  Bristol,  deserted  after  the  fight.  Her  crew, 
they  reported,  said,  "  We  were  told  the  Yankees  would  not  stand 


1776.]  THE  OCCUPATION   OF  NEW  YORK  HARBOUR.  379 

two  tires,  but  we  never  saw  better  fellows;  "  and  when  the  fire  of 
the  fort  slackened  and  some  cried,  "  They  have  done  fighting,"  others 
replied,  "  By  God,  we  are  glad  of  it,  for  we  never  had  such  a  drub- 
bing in  our  lives."  "  All  the  common  men  of  the  fleet  spoke  loudly 
in  praise  of  the  garrison,"  —  a  note  of  admiration  so  frequent  in 
generous  enemies  that  we  may  be  assured  that  it  was  echoed  on  the 
quarter-deck  also.  They  could  afford  it  well,  for  beyond  the  natural 
mortification  of  defeat,  there  was  no  stain  upon  their  own  record,  no 
flinching  under  the  severity  of  their  losses,  although  a  number  of 
their  own  men  were  comparatively  raw,  volunteers  from  the  trans- 
ports, whose  crews  had  come  forward  almost  as  one  man  when  they 
knew  that  the  complements  of  the  ships  were  short  through  sickness. 
Burke,  a  friend  to  both  sides,  was  justified  in  saying  that  "  never  did 
British  valour  shine  more  conspicuously,  nor  did  our  ships  in  an 
engagement  of  the  same  nature  experience  so  serious  an  encounter." 
There  were  several  death-vacancies  for  lieutenants  ;  and,  as  the  battle 
of  Lake  Champlain  gave  Pellew  his  first  commission,  so  did  that  of 
Charleston  Harbour  give  his  to  Saumarez,  who  was  made  lieutenant 
of  the  Bristol  by  Parker.  Two  years  later,  when  the  ship  had  gone 
to  Jamaica,  he  was  followed  on  her  quarter-deck  by  Nelson  and  Col- 
lingwood,  who  also  received  promotion  in  her  from  the  same  hand. 

The  attack  on  Fort  Moultrie  was  not  resumed.  After  necessary 
repairs,  the  ships  of  war  with  the  troops  went  to  New  York,  where 
they  arrived  on  the  4th  of  August,  and  took  part  in  the  operations 
for  the  reduction  of  that  place  under  the  direction  of  the  two  Howes. 

The  occupation  of  New  York  Harbour,  and  the  capture  of  the 
city  were  the  most  conspicuous  British  successes  of  the  summer  and 
fall  of  1776.  While  Parker  and  Clinton  were  meeting  with  defeat 
at  Charleston,  and  Arnold  was  hurrying  the  preparation  of  his  flotilla 
on  Champlain,  the  two  brothers,  General  Howe  and  the  Admiral, 
were  arriving  in  New  York  Bay,  invested  not  only  with  the  powers 
proper  to  the  commanders  of  great  fleets  and  armies,  but  also  with 
authority  as  peace  commissioners,  to  negotiate  an  amicable  arrange- 
ment with  the  revolted  Colonies. 

General  Howe  had  awaited  for  some  time  at  Halifax  the  arrival 
of  the  expected  reinforcements,  but  wearying  at  last  he  sailed  thence 
on  the  10th  of  June,  1776,  with  the  army  then  in  hand.  On  the 
25th  he  himself  reached  Sandy  Hook,  the  entrance  to  New  York 
Bay,  having  preceded  the  transports  in  a  frigate.  On  the  29th,  the 


380  MAJOR   OPERATIONS.     1762-1783.  [1778. 

day  after  Parker's  repulse  at  Fort  Moultrie,  the  troops  arrived  ;  arid 
on  July  3rd,  the  date  oil  which  the  Americans,  retreating  from  Can- 
ada, reached  Crown  Point,  the  British  landed  on  Staten  Island,  which 
is  on  the  west  side  of  the  lower  Bay.  On  the  12th  of  July  the  Eagle, 
04,  came  in,  carrying  the  flag  of  Admiral  Lord  Howe.  This  officer 
was  much  esteemed  by  the  Americans  for  his  own  personal  qualities, 
and  for  his  attitude  towards  them  in  the  present  dispute,  as  well  as 
for  the  memory  of  his  brother,  who  had  endeared  himself  greatly  to 
them  in  the  campaign  of  1758,  when  he  had  fallen  near  Lake  Cham- 
plain ;  but  the  decisive  step  of  declaring  their  independence  had 
been  taken  already,  on  July  4th,  eight  days  before  the  Admiral's 
arrival.  A  month  was  spent  in  fruitless  attempts  to  negotiate  with 
the  new  government,  without  recognising  any  official  character  in  its 
representatives.  During  that  time,  however,  while  abstaining  from 
decisive  operations,  cruisers  were  kept  at  sea  to  intercept  American 
traders,  and  the  Admiral,  immediately  upon  arriving,  sent  four  ves- 
sels of  war  twentv-tive  miles  up  the  Hudson  River,  as  far  as  Tarry- 
town.  This  squadron  was  commanded  by  Hyde  Parker,  afterwards, 
in  1*01,  Nelson's  commander-in-chief  at  Copenhagen.  The  service 
was  performed  under  a  tremendous  cannonade  from  all  the  batteries 
on  Ixjth  shores,  from  the  lower  Bav  to  far  above  the  city,  but  the  ships 
could  not  l>e  stopped.  Towards  the  middle  of  August  it  was  evident 
that  the  Americans  would  not  accept  any  terms  in  the  power  of  the 
Howes  to  offer,  and  it  became  necessary  to  attempt  coercion  by  arms. 
In  the  reduction  of  New  York  in  177(!.  the  part  played  by  the 
British  Navy,  owing  to  the  nature  of  the  campaign  in  general  and  of 
the  enemv's  force  in  particular,  was  of  that  inconspicuous  character 
which  obscures  the  fact  that  without  the  Navy  the  operations  could 
not  have  l>een  undertaken  at  all,  and  that  the  Navy  played  to  them 
the  part  of  the  base  of  operations  and  line  of  communications.  Like 
the  foundations  of  a  building,  these  lie  outside  the  range  of  super- 
ficial attention,  and  therefore  are  less  generally  appreciated  than  the 
brilliant  fighting  that  goes  on  at  the  front,  to  the  maintenance  of 
which  they  are  indispensable.  Consequently,  whatever  of  interest 
may  attach  to  any,  or  to  all,  of  the  minor  affaire,  which  in  the  aggre- 
gate constitute  the  action  of  the  naval  force  in  such  circumstances, 
the  historian  of  the  major  operations  is  confined  perforce  to  indi- 
cating the  broad  general  effect  of  naval  power  upon  the  issue.  This 
will  l>e  done  best  by  tracing  in  outline  the  scene  of  action,  the  com- 
bined movements,  and  the  Navv's  influence  in  both. 


1778.] 


NEW  1'ORK  HARBOUR  AXD  XE1GU£OURUOOD. 


381 


382  MAJOR   OPERATIONS.     1762-1783.  [1776. 

The  harbour  of  New  York  divides  into  two  parts  —  the  upper 
nnd  lower  Bays — connected  by  a  passage  called  the  Narrows,  between 
Long  and  Staten  Islands,  upon  the  latter  of  which  the  British  troops 
were  encamped.  Long  Island,  which  forms  the  eastern  shore  of  the 
Narrows,  extends  to  the  east-north-east  a  hundred  and  ten  miles, 
enclosing  between  itself  and  the  continent  a  broad  sheet  of  water 
called  Long  Island  Sound,  that  reaches  nearly  to  Narragansett  Bay. 
The  latter,  being  a  fine  anchorage,  entered  also  into  the  present  plan 
of  operations,  as  an  essential  feature  in  a  coastwise  maritime  cam- 
paign. Long  Island  Sound  and  the  upper  Bay  of  New  York  are 
•connected  by  a  passage,  known  as  the  East  Kiver,  eight  or  ten  miles 
in  length,  and  at  that  time  nearly  a  mile  wide  1  abreast  the  city  of 
New  York.  At  the  point  where  the  East  River  joins  New  York  Bay, 
the  Hudson  River,  an  estuary  there  nearly  two  miles  wide,  also  enters 
from  the  north,  —  a  circumstance  which  has  procured  for  it  the  alter- 
native name  of  the  North  River.  Near  their  confluence,  and  half  a 
mile  below  the  town,  is  Governor's  Island,  centrally  situated  to  com- 
mand the  entrances  to  both.  Between  the  East  and  North  rivers, 
with  their  general  directions  from  north  and  east-north-east,  is  em- 
braced a  long  strip  of  land  gradually  narrowing  to  the  southward. 
The  end  of  this  peninsula,  as  it  would  otherwise  be,  is  converted 
into  an  island,  of  a  mean  length  of  about  eight  miles,  by  the  Harlem 
River,  —  a  narrow  and  partially  navigable  stream  connecting  the  East 
and  North  rivers.  To  the  southern  extreme  of  this  island,  called 
Manhattan,  the  city  of  New  York  was  then  confined. 

As  both  the  East  and  North  rivers  were  navigable  for  large 
ships,  the  former  throughout,  the  latter  for  over  a  hundred  miles 
above  its  mouth,  it  was  evident  that  control  of  the  water  must 
play  a  large  part  in  warlike  operations  throughout  the  district 
described.  With  the  limited  force  at  Washington's  disposal,  he  had 
been  unable  to  push  the  defences  of  the  city  as  far  to  the  front  as 
was  desirable.  The  lower  Bay  was  held  by  the  British  Navy,  and 
Staten  Island  had  been  abandoned,  necessarily,  without  resistance, 
thus  surrendering  the  strong  defensive  position  of  the  Narrows. 
The  lines  were  contracted  thus  to  the  immediate  neighbourhood  of 
New  York  itself.  Small  detached  works  skirted  the  shores  of  Man- 
hattan Island,  and  a  line  of  redoubts  extended  across  it,  following 
the  course  of  a  small  stream  which  then  partly  divided  it,  a  mile 
from  the  southern  end.  Governor's  Island  was  also  occupied  as  an 
1  At  the  present  <lay  reduced  by  reclaimed  land. 


1776.]  THE  OPERATIONS  ABOUT  NEW  YORK.  383 

outpost.  Of  more  intrinsic  strength,  but  not  at  first  concerned, 
strong  works  had  been  thrown  up  on  either  side  of  the  North  River, 
upon  commanding  heights  eight  miles  above  New  York,  to  dispute 
the  passage  of  ships. 

The  crucial  weakness  in  this  scheme  of  defence  was  that  the 
shore  of  Long  Island  opposite  the  city  was  much  higher  than  that 
of  Manhattan.  If  this  height  were  seized,  the  city,  and  all  below  it, 
became  untenable.  Here,  therefore,  was  the  key  of  the  position  and 
the  chief  station  for  the  American  troops.  For  its  protection  a  line 
of  works  was  thrown  up,  the  flanks  of  which  rested  upon  Wallabout 
Bay  and  Gowanus  Cove,  two  indentations  in  the  shores  of  Long 
Island.  These  Washington  manned  with  9,000  of  the  18,000  men 
under  his  command.  By  the  arrival  of  three  divisions  of  Hessian 
troops,  Howe's  army  now  numbered  over  34,000  men,  to  which 
Clinton  brought  3,000  more  from  before  Charleston.1 

On  the  22nd  of  August  the  British  crossed  from  Staten  Island  to 
Gravesend  Bay,  on  the  Long  Island  shore  of  the  Narrows.  The 
Navy  covered  the  landing,  and  the  transportation  of  the  troops  was 
under  the  charge  of  Commodore  William  Hotliam,  who,  nineteen 
years  later,  was  Nelson's  Commander-in-chief  in  the  Mediterranean. 
By  noon  15,000  men  and  forty  field-guns  had  been  carried  over  and 
placed  on  shore.  The  force  of  the  Americans  permitted  little  oppo- 
sition to  the  British  advance ;  but  General  Howe  was  cautious  and 
easy-going,  and  it  was  not  till  the  27th  that  the  army,  now  increased 
to  25,000,  was  fairly  in  front  of  the  American  lines,  having  killed, 
wounded,  and  taken  about  1,500  men.  Hoping  that  Howe  would  be 
tempted  to  storm  the  position,  Washington  replaced  these  with  2,000 
drawn  from  his  meagre  numbers ;  but  his  opponent  held  back  his 
troops,  who  were  eager  for  the  assault.  The  Americans  now  stood 
with  their  backs  to  a  swift  river,  nearly  a  mile  wide,  with  only  a 
feeble  line  of  works  interposing  between  them  and  an  enemy  more 
than  double  their  number. 

On  the  morning  of  the  27th,  Sir  Peter  Parker,  with  a  64,  two 
50's,  and  two  frigates,  attempted  to  work  up  to  New  York,  with  a 
view  of  supporting  the  left  flank  of  the  army ;  but  the  wind  came 
out  from  the  north,  and,  the  ebb-tide  making,  the  ships  got  no  nearer 
than  three  miles  from  the  city.  Fortunately  for  the  Americans,  they 
either  could  not  or  would  not  go  farther  on  the  following  two  days. 

1  Beatson's  '  Military  and  Naval  Memoirs,'  vi.  44,  give  34,614  as  the  strength  of 
Howe's  army.  Clinton's  division  is  not  included  in  this.  vi.  45. 


384  MAJOR   OPERATIONS.     1762-1783.  [1776. 

After  dark  of  the  28th,  Howe  broke  ground  for  regular  approaches. 
Washington,  seeing  this,  and  knowing  that  there  could  be  but  one 
result  to  a  siege  under  his  condition  of  inferiority,  resolved  to  with- 
draw. During  the  night  of  the  29th  ten  thousand  men  silently 
quitted  their  positions,  embarked,  and  crossed  to  Manhattan  Island, 
carrying  with  them  all  their  belongings,  arms,  and  ammunition.  The 
enemy's  trenches  were  but  six  hundred  yards  distant,  yet  no  suspicion 
was  aroused,  nor  did  a  single  deserter  give  treacherous  warning. 
The  night  was  clear  and  moonlit,  although  a  heavy  fog  towards  day- 
break prolonged  the  period  of  secrecy  which  shrouded  the  retreat. 
When  the  fog  rose,  the  last  detachment  was  discovered  crossing,  but 
a  few  ineffectual  cannon  shot  at  it  were  the  only  harassment  experi- 
enced in  the  course  of  this  rapid  and  dexterous  retirement.  The 
garrison  of  Governor's  Island  was  withdrawn  at  the  same  time. 

The  unmolested  use  of  the  water,  and  the  nautical  skill  of  the 
fishermen  who  composed  one  of  the  American  regiments,  were  essen- 
tial to  this  escape;  for  admirable  as  the  movement  was  in  conception 
and  execution,  no  word  less  strong  than  escape  applies  to  it.  By  it 
Washington  rescued  over  half  his  army  from  sure  destruction,  and, 
not  improbably,  the  cause  of  his  people  from  immediate  collapse. 
An  opportunity  thus  seized  implies  necessarily  an  opportunity  lost  on 
the  other  side.  For  that  failure  both  army  and  Navy  must  bear  their 
share  of  the  blame.  It  is  obvious  that  when  an  enemy  is  cornered, 
his  line  of  retreat  should  be  watched.  This  was  the  business  of  both 
commanders-in-chief,  the  execution  of  it  being  primarily  the  duty  of 
the  Navy,  as  retreat  from  the  American  position  could  be  only  by 
water.  It  was  a  simple  question  of  look-out,  of  detection,  of  molesta- 
tion by  that  means  ;  not  of  arresting  the  retreat.  To  the  latter,  sail- 
ing ships  were  inadequate,  for  they  could  not  have  remained  at  anchor 
under  the  guns  of  Manhattan  Island,  either  by  day  or  night ;  but  a 
few  boats  with  muffled  oars  could  have  watched,  could  have  given  the 
alarm,  precipitating  a  British  attack,  and  such  a  movement  inter- 
rupted in  mid-course  brings  irretrievable  disaster. 

Washington  now  withdrew  the  bulk  of  his  army  to  the  line  of 
the  Harlem.  On  his  right,  south  of  that  river  and  commanding  the 
Hudson,  was  a  fort  called  by  his  name ;  opposite  to  it  on  the  Jersey 
shore  was  Fort  Lee.  A  garrison  of  four  thousand  men  occupied 
New  York.  After  amusing  himself  with  some  further  peace  nego- 
tiations, Howe  determined  to  possess  the  city.  As  a  diversion  from 
the  main  effort,  and  to  cover  the  crossing  of  the  troops,  two  detach- 


1770.]  FORT  WASHINGTON  EVACUATED.  385 

ments  of  ships  were  ordered  to  pass  the  batteries  on  the  Hudson  and 
East  rivers.  This  was  done  on  the  13th  and  the  15th  of  September, 
the  North  River  division  commanded  by  Captain  Francis  Banks,  the 
East  River  by  Captain  Hyde  Parker.  The  latter  suffered  severely, 
especially  in  spars  and  rigging ; J  but  the  success  of  both,  following 
upon  that  of  Hyde  Parker  a 'few  weeks  earlier,  in  his  expedition  to 
Tarrytown,  confirmed  Washington  in  the  opinion  which  he  expressed 
five  years  later  to  de  Grasse,  that  batteries  alone  could  not  stop  ships 
having  a  fair  wind.  This  is  now  a  commonplace  of  naval  warfare. 
On  the  15th  Howe's  army  crossed  under  cover  of  Parker's  ships, 
Hotham  again  superintending  the  boat  work.  The  garrison  of  New 
York  slipped  along  the  west  shore  of  the  island  and  joined  the  main 
body  on  the  Harlem ;  favoured  again,  apparently,  in  this  flank  move- 
ment a  mile  from  the  enemy's  front,  by  Howe's  inertness,  and  fond- 
ness for  a  good  meal,  to  which  a  shrewd  American  woman  invited 
him  at  the  critical  moment. 

Despite  these  various  losses  of  position,  important  as  they  were, 
the  American  army  continued  to  elude  the  British  general,  who 
apparently  did  not  hold  very  strongly  the  opinion  that  the  most 
decisive  factor  in  war  is  the  enemy's  organised  force.  As  control  of 
the  valley  of  the  Hudson,  in  connection  with  Lake  Champlain,  was, 
very  properly,  the  chief  object  of  the  British  government,  Howe's 
next  aim  was  to  loosen  Washington's  grip  on  the  peninsula  north  of 
the  Harlem.  The  position  seeming  to  him  too  strong  for  a  front 
attack,  he  decided  to  strike  for  its  left  flank  and  rear  by  way  of  Long 
Island  Sound.  In  this,  which  involved  the  passage  of  the  tortuous 
and  dangerous  channel  called  Hell  Gate,  with  its  swift  conflicting 
currents,  the  Navy  again  bore  an  essential  part.  The  movement 
began  on  October  12th,  the  day  after  Arnold  was  defeated  at  Yal- 
cour.  So  far  as  its  leading  object  went  it  was  successful,  Washington 
feeling  obliged  to  let  go  the  line  of  the  Harlem,  and  change  front  to 
the  left.  As  the  result  of  the  various  movements  and  encounters  of 
the  two  armies,  he  fell  back  across  the  Hudson  into  New  Jersey, 
ordering  the  evacuation  of  Fort  Washington,  and  deciding  to  rest  his 
control  of  the  Hudson  Valley  upon  West  Point,  fifty  miles  above 
New  York,  a  position  of  peculiar  natural  strength,  on  the  west  bank 
of  the  river.  To  these  decisions  he  was  compelled  by  his  inferiority 
in  numbers,  and  also  by  the  very  isolated  and  hazardous  situation 
in  which  he  was  operating,  between  two  navigable  waters,  abso- 

1  Admiral  James's  Journal,  p.  30.     (Navy  Records  Society.) 
•VOL.  in.  —  25 


386  MAJOR   OPERATIONS.     1762-1783.  [1770. 

lutely  controlled  by  the  enemy's  shipping.  This  conclusion  was. 
further  forced  upon  him  by  another  successful  passage  before  the 
guns  of  Forts  Washington  and  Lee  by  Hyde  Parker,  with  three 
ships,  the  Phoenix,  44,  Roebuck,  44,  and  Tartar,  28,  on  the  9th  of 
October.  On  this  occasion  the  vessels,  two  of  which  were  frigates 
of  the  heaviest  class,  suffered  very  severely,  losing  nine  killed  and 
eighteen  wounded;  but  the  menace  to  the  communications  of  the 
Americans,  whose  supplies  came  mostly  from  the  west  of  the  Hud- 
son, could  not  be  disregarded. 

It  was  early  in  November  that  Washington  crossed  into  New 
Jersey  with  five  thousand  men ;  and  soon  afterwards  he  directed  the 
remainder  of  his  force  to  follow.  At  that  moment  the  blunder  of 
one  subordinate,  and  the  disobedience  of  another,  brought  upon  him 
t\vo  serious  blows.  Fort  Washington  not  being  evacuated  when 
ordered,  Howe  carried  it  by  storm,  capturing  not  only  it  but  it:; 
garrison  of  2,700  men,  a  very  heavy  loss  to  the  Americans.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  most  explicit  orders  failed  to  bring  the  officer  left 
in  command  on  the  east  of  the  Hudson  to  rejoin  the  Commander- 
in-chief.  This  criminal  perverseness  left  Washington  with  only  6,000 
men  in  New  Jersey,  7,000  being  in  New  York.  Tinier  these  condi- 
tions nothing  remained  but  to  put  the  Delaware  also  between  himself 
and  the  enemy.  lie  therefore  retreated  rapidly  through  New  Jersey, 
and  on  the  Hth  of  December  crossed  into  Pennsylvania  with  an  army 
reduced  to  3,000  by  expiry  of  enlistments.  The  detachment  beyond 
the  Hudson,  diminishing  daily  by  the  same  cause,  gradually  worked 
its  way  to  him,  its  commander  luckily  being  captured  on  the  road. 
At  the  time  it  joined,  a  few  battalions  also  arrived  from  Ticonderoga, 
released  by  Carleton's  retirement  to  the  foot  of  Champlain.  Wash- 
ington's force  on  the  west  bank  of  the  Delaware  was  thus  increased 
to  6,000  men. 

In  this  series  of  operations,  extending  from  August  22nd  to  De- 
cember 14th,  when  Howe  went  into  winter-quarters  in  New  Jersey, 
the  British  had  met  with  no  serious  mishaps,  beyond  the  inevitable 
losses  undergone  by  the  assailants  of  well-chosen  positions.  Never- 
theless, having  in  view  the  superiority  of  numbers,  of  equipment,  and 
of  discipline,  and  the  command  of  the  water,  the  mere  existence  of 
the  enemy's  army  as  an  organised  body,  its  mere  escape,  deprives  the 
campaign  of  the  claim  to  be  considered  successful.  The  red  ribbon 
of  the  Bath  probably  never  was  earned  more  cheaply  than  by  Sir 
William  Howe  that  year.  Had  he  displayed  anything  like  the  energy 


1770.]  THE  EVACUATION  OF  RHODE  ISLAND.  387 

of  his  two  elder  brothers,  Washington,  with  all  his  vigilance,  firmness, 
and  enterprise,  could  scarcely  have  brought  off  the  force,  vastly 
diminished  but  still  a  living  organism,  around  which  American  resist- 
ance again  crystallised  and  hardened.  As  it  was,  within  a  month  he 
took  the  offensive,  and  recovered  a  great  part  of  New  Jersey. 

Whatever  verdict  may  be  passed  upon  the  merit  of  the  military 
conduct  of  affairs,  there  is  no  doubt  of  the  value,  or  of  the  unflag- 
ging energy,  of  the  naval  support  given.  General  Howe  alludes  to  it 
frequently,  both  in  general  and  specifically  ;  while  the  Admiral  sums 
up  his  always  guarded  and  often  cumbrous  expressions  of  opinion  in 
these  words :  "  It  is  incumbent  upon  me  to  represent  to  your  Lord- 
ships, and  I  cannot  too  pointedly  express,  the  unabating  perseverance} 
and  alacrity  with  which  the  several  classes  of  officers  and  seamen 
have  supported  a  long  attendance  and  unusual  degree  of  fatigue, 
consequent  of  these  different  movements  of  the  army." 

The  final  achievement  of  the  campaign,  and  a  very  important 
one,  was  the  occupation  of  Rhode  Island  and  Narragansett  Bay  by  a 
combined  expedition,  which  left  New  York  on  the  1st  of  December, 
and  on  the  8th  landed  at  Newport  without  opposition.  The  naval 
force,  consisting  of  five  50-gun  ships,  —  the  Chatham  (broad  pennant). 
Captain  Toby  Caulfield ;  Preston  (Commodore  W.  Hotliam),  Captain 
Samuel  Uppleby ;  Centurion,  Captain  Richard  Brathwaite;  .Renown* 
Captain  Francis  Banks ;  and  Experiment,  Captain  James  Wallace, 
and  eight  smaller  vessels,  —  was  commanded  by  Sir  Peter  Parker ;  th;> 
troops,  seven  thousand  in  number,  by  Lieutenant-General  Sir  Ileiiry 
Clinton.  The  immediate  effect  was  to  close  a  haven  of  privateers, 
which  centred  in  great  numbers  around  an  anchorage  that  flanked 
the  route  of  all  vessels  bound  from  Europe  to  New  York.  The  pos- 
session of  the  bay  facilitated  the  control  of  the  neighbouring  waters 
by  British  ships  of  war,  besides  giving  them  a  base,  central  for  coast- 
wise operations,  and  independent  of  tidal  considerations  for  entrance 
or  exit.  The  position  was  abandoned  somewhat  precipitately  three 
years  later,  and  Rodney  then  deplored  its  loss  in  the  following 
terms :  "  The  evacuating  Rhode  Island  was  the  most  fatal  measure 
that  could  possibly  have  been  adopted.  It  gave  up  the  best  and 
noblest  harbour  in  America,  capable  of  containing  the  whole  Navy  of 
Britain,  and  where  they  could  in  all  seasons  lie  in  perfect  security ; 
and  from  whence  squadrons,  in  forty-eight  hours,  could  blockade  the 
three  capital  cities  of  America ;  namely,  Boston,  New  York,  and 
Philadelphia." 


388  MAJOR  OPERATIONS.    1762-1783.  [1777. 

At  the  end  of  1776  began  the  series  of  British  reverses  which 
characterised  the  year  1777,  and  made  it  the  decisive  period  of  the 
Avar,  because  of  the  effect  thus  produced  upon  general  public  opinion 
abroad,  and  especially  upon  the  governments  of  France  and  Spain. 
On  the  20th  of  December,  Howe,  announcing  to  the  Ministry  that 
he  had  gone  into  winter-quarters,  wrote :  "  The  chain,  I  own,  is 
rather  too  extensive,  but  I  was  induced  to  occupy  Burlington  to 
cover  the  county  of  Monmouth ;  and  trusting  to  the  loyalty  of  the 
inhabitants,  and  the  strength  of  the  corps  placed  in  the  advanced 
posts,  I  conclude  the  troops  will  be  in  perfect  security."  Of  this 
unwarranted  security  Washington  took  prompt  advantage.  On 
Christmas  night  a  sudden  descent,  in  a  blinding  snow-storm,  upon 
a  British  outpost  at  Trenton,  swept  off  a  thousand  prisoners ;  and 
although  for  the  moment  the  American  leader  again  retired  behind 
the  Delaware,  it  was  but  to  resume  the  offensive  four  days  later. 
Cornwallis,  who  was  in  Kew  York  on  the  point  of  sailing  for  Eng- 
land, hurried  buck  to  the  front,  but  in  vain.  A  series  of  quick  and 
well-directed  movements  recovered  the  State  of  New  Jersey ;  and  by 
the  5th  of  January  the  American  headquarters,  and  main  body  of  the 
army,  were  established  at  Morristown  in  the  Jersey  hills,  the  left 
resting  upon  the  Hudson,  thus  recovering  touch  with  the  strategic 
centre  of  interest.  This  menacing  position  of  the  Americans,  upon 
the  Hank  of  the  line  of  communications  from  New  York  to  the  Dela- 
ware, compelled  Howe  to  contract  abruptly  the  lines  he  had  extended 
so  lightly;  and  the  campaign  he  was  forced  thus  reluctantly  to  reopen 
closed  under  a  gloom  of  retreat  and  disaster,  which  profoundly  and 
justly  impressed  not  only  the  opinion  of  the  public,  but  that  of  mili- 
tary critics  as  well.  "  Of  all  the  great  conquests  which  his  Majesty's 
troops  had  made  in  the  Jersies,"  writes  Beatson,  "  Brunswick  and 
Amboy  were  the  only  two  places  of  any  note  which  they  retained ; 
and  however  brilliant  their  successes  had  been  in  the  beginning  of 
the  campaign,  they  reaped  little  advantage  from  them  when  the 
winter  advanced,  and  the  contiguity  of  so  vigilant  an  enemy  forced 
them  to  perform  the  severest  duty."  With  deliberate  or  unconscious 
humour  he  then  immediately  concludes  the  chronicle  of  the  year 
with  this  announcement :  "  His  Majesty  was  so  well  pleased  with 
the  abilities  and  activity  which  General  Howe  had  displayed  this 
campaign,  that  on  the  25th  of  October  he  conferred  upon  him  the 
Most  Honourable  Order  of  the  Bath." 


1777.]  BUBGOYNE  BEACHES  FORT  EDWARD.  3S& 

The  leading  purpose  of  the  British  government  in  the  campaign 
of  1777  was  the  same  as  that  with  which  it  had  begun  in  1776,  —  the 
control  of  the  line  of  the  Hudson  and  Lake  Champlain,  to  be  mastered 
by  two  expeditions,  one  starting  from  each  end,  and  both  working 
towards  a  common  centre  at  Albany,  near  the  head  of  navigation  of 
the  River.  Preliminary  difficulties  had  been  cleared  away  in  the 
previous  year,  by  the  destruction  of  the  American  flotilla  on  the  Lake, 
and  by  the  reduction  of  New  York.  To  both  these  objects  the  Navy 
had  contributed  conspicuously.  It  remained  to  complete  the  work 
by  resuming  the  advance  from  the  two  bases  of  operations  secured. 
In  1777  the  fortifications  on  the  Hudson  were  inadequate  to  stop  the 
progress  of  a  combined  naval  and  military  expedition,  as  was  shown 
in  the  course  of  the  campaign. 

The  northern  enterprise  was  intrusted  to  General  Burgoyne.  The 
impossibility  of  creating  a  naval  force  able  to  contend  with  that  put 
afloat  by  Caiieton  had  prevented  the  Americans  from  further  building. 
Burgoyne  therefore  crossed  the  Lake  without  opposition  to  Ticon- 
deroga,  before  which  he  appeared  on  the  '2nd  of  July.  A  position 
commanding  the  works  was  discovered,  and  this  the  Americans  had 
neglected  to  occupy.  It  being  seized,  and  a  battery  established,  the 
fort  had  to  be  evacuated.  The  retreat  being  made  by  water,  the  British 
Lake  Navy,  under  Captain  Skeffington  Lutwidge,  with  whom  Nelson 
had  served  a  few  years  before  in  the  Arctic  seas,  had  a  conspicuous 
part  in  the  pursuit;  severing  the  boom  blockading  the  river,  and  join- 
ing impetuously  in  an  attack  upon  the  floating  material,  the  flat-boat 
transports,  and  the  few  relics  of  Arnold's  flotilla  which  had  escaped 
the  destruction  of  the  previous  year.  This  affair  took  place  on  the 
6th  of  July.  From  that  time  forward  the  progress  of  the  army  was 
mainly  by  land.  The  Navy,  however,  found  occupation  upon  Lake 
George,  where  Burgoyne  established  a  depot  of  supplies,  although  he 
did  not  utilise  its  waterway  for  the  march  of  the  army.  A  party  of 
seamen  under  Edward  Pellew,  still  a  midshipman,  accompanied  the 
advance,  and  shared  the  misfortunes  of  the  expedition.  It  is  told 
that  Burgoyne  used  afterwards  to  chaff  the  young  naval  officer  with 
being  the  cause  of  their  disaster,  because  he  and  his  men,  by  rebuild- 
ing a  bridge  at  a  critical  moment,  had  made  it  possible  to  cross  the 
Hudson.  Impeded  in  its  progress  by  immense  difficulties,  both 
natural  and  imposed  by  the  enemy,  the  army  took  twenty  clays  to 
make  twenty  miles.  On  the  30th  of  July  it  reached  Fort  Edward, 
forty  miles  from  Albany,  and  there  was  compelled  to  stay  till  the 
middle  of  September. 


393  MAJOR  OPERATIONS.    1762-1783.  [1777. 

Owing  to  neglect  at  the  War  Office,  the  peremptory  orders  to  Sir 
"William  Howe,  to  move  up  the  Hudson  and  make  a  junction  with 
Burgoyne,  were  not  sent  forward.  Consequently,  Howe,  acting  upon 
the  discretionary  powers  which  he  possessed  already,  and  swayed 
by  political  reasons  into  which  it  is  not  necessary  to  enter,  determined 
to  renew  his  attempt  upon  Philadelphia.  A  tentative  advance  into 
New  Jersey,  and  the  consequent  manoeuvres  of  Washington,  satisfied 
him  that  the  enterprise  by  this  route  was  too  hazardous.  He  therefore 
embarked  14,000  men,  leaving  8,000  with  Sir  Henry  Clinton  to  hold 
New  York  and  make  diversions  in  favour  of  Burgoyne  ;  and  on  the 
23rd  of  July  sailed  from  Sandy  Hook,  escorted  by  five  64-gun  ships, 
a  50,  and  ten  smaller  vessels,  under  Lord  Howe's  immediate  command. 
The  entire  expedition  numbered  about  280  sail.  Elaborate  pains  were 
taken  to  deceive  Washington  as  to  the  destination  of  the  armament ; 
but  little  was  needed  to  prevent  a  competent  soldier  from  supposing 
a  design  so  contrary  to  sound  military  principle,  having  regard  to 
Burgoyne's  movements  and  to  the  well-understood  general  purpose 
of  the  British  ministry.  "Howe  's  in  a  manner  abandoning  Burgoyne 
is  so  unaccountable  a  matter,"  wrote  the  American  general,  "  that 
till  I  am  fully  assured  of  it,  I  cannot  help  casting  my  eyes  continually 
behind  me."  He  suspected  an  intention  to  return  upon  New  York. 

On  the  31st  of  July,  just  as  Burgoyne  reached  Fort  Edward,  where 
he  stuck  fast  for  six  weeks,  Howe's  armament  was  off  the  Capes  of 
the  Delaware.  The  prevailing  summer  Avind  on  the  American  coast 
is  south-south-west,  fair  for  ascending  the  river;  but  information  was 
received  that  the  enemy  had  obstructed  the  channel,  which,  for  some 
distance  below  Philadelphia,  lends  itself  to  such  defences.  Therefore, 
although  the  free  navigation  of  the  river,  to  the  sea,  was  essential  to 
maintaining  a  position  at  Philadelphia,  —  for  trial  had  shown  that  the 
whole  army  could  not  assure  communications  by  land  with  New  York, 
the  other  sea  base,  —  Howe  decided  to  prosecute  his  enterprise  by  way 
of  the  Chesapeake,  the  ascent  of  which,  under  all  the  conditions,  could 
not  l)e  seriously  impeded.  A  fortnight  more  was  consumed  in  contend- 
ing against  the  south-west  winds  and  calms,  before  the  fleet  anchored 
on  the  15th  of  August  within  the  Capes  of  the  Chesapeake  ;  and  yet 
another  week  passed  before  the  head  of  the  Bay  was  reached.  On  the 
25th  the  troops  landed.  Washington,  though  so  long  in  doubt,  was 
on  hand  to  dispute  the  road,  but  in  inferior  force  ;  and  Howe  had  no 
great  difficulty  in  fighting  his  way  to  Philadelphia,  which  was  occupied 
•on  the  26th  of  September.  A  week  earlier  Burgoyne  had  reached 


1777.]  HOWE  ADVANCES  TOWARDS  PHILADELPHIA.  391 

Stillwater,  on  the  west  bank  of  the  Hudson,  the  utmost  point  of  his 
progress,  where  he  was  still  twenty  miles  from  Albany.  Three  weeks 
later,  surrounded  by  overwhelming  numbers,  he  was  forced  to  capitu- 
late at  Saratoga,  whither  he  had  retreated. 

Lord  Howe  held  on  at  the  head  of  the  Chesapeake  until  satisfied 
that  his  brother  no  longer  needed  him.  On  the  14th  of  September  he 
started  down  the  Bay  Avith  the  squadron  and  convoy,  sending  ahead  to 
the  Delaware  a  small  division,  under  Captain  Andrew  Snape  Hamond, 
to  aid  the  army,  if  necessary.  The  winds  holding  southerly,  ten  days 
were  required  to  get  to  sea ;  and  outside  further  delay  was  caused  by 
very  heavy  weather.  The  Admiral  there  quitted  the  convoy  and 
hastened  up  river.  On  the  Gth  of  October  he  was  off  Chester,  ten 
miles  below  Philadelphia.  Hamond  had  already  been  at  work  for  a 
week,  clearing  away  obstructions,  of  which  there  were  two  lines,  both 
commanded  by  batteries  on  the  farther,  or  Jersey,  shore  of  the  Dela- 
ware. The  lower  battery  had  been  carried  by  troops;  and  when 
Howe  arrived,  Hamond,  though  meeting  lively  opposition  from  the 
American  galleys  and  fire-rafts,  had  freed  the  channel  for  large  ships 
to  approach  the  upper  obstructions.  These  were  defended  not  only 
by  a  work  at  Red  Bank  on  the  Jersey  shore,  but  also,  on  the  other 
side  of  the  stream,  by  a  fort  called  Fort  Mifflin,  on  Mud  Island.1 
As  the  channel  at  this  point,  for  a  distance  of  half  a  mile,  was  only 
two  hundred  yards  wide,  and  troops  could  not  reach  the  island, 
the  position  was  very  strong,  and  it  detained  the  British  for  six 
weeks.  Fort  Mifflin  was  supported  by  two  floating  batteries  and  a 
number  of  galleys.  The  latter  not  only  fought,  offensively  and 
defensively,  but  maintained  the  supplies  and  ammunition  of  the 
garrison. 

On  the  22nd  of  October,  a  concerted  attack,  by  the  army  on  the 
works  at  Red  Bank,  and  by  the  Navy  on  Fort  Mifflin,  resulted  dis- 
astrously. The  former  was  repulsed  with  considerable  loss,  the 
officer  commanding  being  killed.  The  squadron,  consisting  of  a 
64,  the  Augusta,  Captain  Francis  Reynolds,  later  Earl  of  Ducie, 
three  frigates,  and  a  sloop,  the  Merlin,  16,  Commander  Samuel 
Reeve,  went  into  action  with  Mud  Island  at  the  same  time;  but, 
the  channel  having  shifted,  owing  possibly  to  the  obstructions,  the 
Augusta  and  the  sloop  grounded,  and  could  not  be  floated  that 
day.  On  the  23rd  the  Americans  concentrated  upon  the  two  their 
batteries,  galleys,  and  fire-rafts  ;  but,  in  the  midst  of  the  preparations 

1  .Sometimes  called  Fort  Island  ;  it  was  just  below  the  mouth  of  the  Schuylkill. 


392  MAJOR  OPERATIONS.    1762-1783.  [1777. 

for  lightening  her,  the  Augusta  took  fire  and  ble\v  up.  The  Merlin 
was  then  set  on  fire  and  abandoned. 

So  long  as  this  obstacle  remained,  all  supplies  for  the  army  had  to 
be  carried  by  boats  to  the  shore,  and  transported  considerable  dis- 
tances by  land.  As  direct  attacks  had  proved  unavailing,  more 
deliberate  measures  were  adopted.  The  army  built  batteries,  and  the 
Navy  sent  ashore  guns  to  mount  in  them ;  but  the  decisive  blow  to 
Mud  Island  was  given  by  a  small  armed  ship,  the  Vigilant,  20, 
Lieutenant  Hugh  Cloberry  Christian,  which  was  successfully 
piloted  through  a  channel  on  the  west  side  of  the  river,  and 
reached  the  rear  of  the  work,  towing  with  her  a  floating  battery 
with  three  24-potmders.  This  was  on  the  15th  of  November.  That 
same  night  the  Americans  abandoned  Fort  Mifflin.  Their  loss, 
Beatson  says,  amounted  to  near  400  killed  and  wounded;  that  of 
the  British  to  43.  If  this  be  correct,  it  should  have  established 
the  invincibility  of  men  who  under  such  prodigious  disparity  of 
suffering  could  maintain  their  position  so  tenacious!}'.  After  tlie 
loss  of  Mud  Island,  lied  Bank  could  not  be  held  to  advantage, 
and  it  was  evacuated  on  the  21st,  when  an  attack  was  imminent. 
The  American  vessels  retreated  up  the  river;  but  they  were  cor- 
nered, and  of  course  ultimately  were  destroyed.  The  obstructions 
were  thus  removed,  and  the  British  communications  by  the  line 
of  the  Delaware  were  established. 

While  these  tilings  were  passing,  Howe's  triumph  was  marred 
by  the  news  of  Burgoyne's  surrender  on  the  17th  of  October. 
For  this  lie  could  not  but  feel  that  the  home  government  must 
consider  him  largely  responsible  ;  for  in  the  Chesapeake,  too  late 
to  retrieve  his  false  step,  he  had  received  a  letter  from  the  Minister, 
saying  that,  whatever  else  he  undertook,  support  to  Burgoyne  was 
the  great  object  to  be  kept  in  view. 

During  the  operations  round  Philadelphia,  Sir  Henry  Clinton 
in  New  York  had  done  enough  to  show  what  strong  probabilities 
of  success  would  have  attended  an  advance  up  the  Hudson,  by  the 
20,000  men  whom  Howe  could  have  taken  with  him.  Starting 
on  the  3rd  of  October  with  3,000  troops,  accompanied  by  a  small 
naval  division  of  frigates,  Clinton  in  a  week  had  reached  West 
Point,  fifty  miles  up  the  river.  The  American  fortifications  along 
the  way  were  captured,  defences  levelled,  stores  and  shipping  burned ; 
while  an  insignificant  detachment,  with  the  light  vessels,  went 
fifty  miles  further  up,  and  there  destroyed  more  military  stores 


1777.]  NEW  YORK  AND  PHILADELPHIA.  393 

without  encountering  any  resistance  worth  mentioning.  Certainly, 
had  Howe  taken  the  same  line  of  operations,  he  would  have  had 
to  reckon  with  Washington's  ten  thousand  men  which  confronted 
him  on  the  march  to  Philadelphia ;  but  his  flank  would  have  been 
covered,  up  to  Albany,  by  a  navigable  stream,  on  either  side  of 
which  he  could  operate  by  that  flying  bridge  which  the  presence 
and  control  of  the  Navy  continually  constituted.  Save  the  fortifi- 
cations, which  Clinton  easily  carried,  there  was  no  threat  to  his  com- 
munications or  to  his  flank,  such  as  the  hill  country  of  New  Jersey 
had  offered  and  Washington  had  skilfully  utilised. 

The  campaign  of  1777  thus  ended  for  the  British  with  a  conspicu- 
ous disaster,  and  with  an  apparent  success  Avhich  was  as  disastrous 
as  a  failure.  At  its  close  they  held  Narragansett  Bay,  the  city  and 
harbour  of  New  York,  and  the  city  of  Philadelphia.  The  first  was 
an  admirable  naval  base,  especially  for  sailing  ships,  for  the  reasons 
given  by  Rodney.  The  second  was  then,  as  it  is  now,  the  greatest 
military  position  on  the  Atlantic  coast  of  the  United  States  ;  and 
although  the  two  could  not  communicate  by  land,  they  did  support 
each  other  as  naval  stations  in  a  war  essentially  dependent  upon 
maritime  power.  Philadelphia  served  no  purpose  but  to  divide  and 
distract  British  enterprise.  Absolutely  dependent  for  maintenance 
upon  the  sea,  the  forces  in  it  and  in  New  York  could  not  co-operate  ; 
they  could  not  even  unite  except  by  sea.  When  Clinton  relieved 
Howe  as  commander-in-chief,  though  less  than  a  hundred  miles  away 
by  land,  he  had  to  take  a  voyage  of  over  two  hundred  miles,  half  of 
it  up  a  difficult  river,  to  reach  his  station ;  and  troops  were  trans- 
ferred by  the  same  tedious  process.  In  consequence  of  these  condi- 
tions, the  place  had  to  be  abandoned  the  instant  that  war  with 
France  made  control  of  the  sea  even  doubtful.  The  British  held 
it  for  less  than  nine  months. 

During  1777  a  number  of  raids  were  made  by  combined  British 
land  and  sea  forces,  for  the  purpose  of  destroying  American  depots 
and  other  resources.  Taken  together,  such  operations  are  subsidiary 
to,  and  aid,  the  great  object  of  interrupting  or  harassing  the  commu- 
nications of  an  enemy.  In.  so  far,  they  have  a  standing  place  among 
the  major  operations  of  war ;  but  taken  singly  they  cannot  be  so 
reckoned,  and  the  fact,  therefore,  is  simply  noted,  without  going  into 
details.  It  may  be  remarked,  however,  that  in  them,  although  the 
scale  was  smaller,  the  Navy  played  the  same  part  that  it  now  does  in 
the  many  expeditions  and  small  wars  undertaken  by  Great  Britain  in 


394  MAJOR  OPERATIONS.    1762-1733.  [1778. 

various  parts  of  the  world ;  the  same  that  it  did  in  the  Peninsular 
War.  The  land  force  depended  upon  the  water,  and  the  water  was 
controlled  by  the  Navy. 

The  events  of  1777  satisfied  the  French  government  that  the 
Americans  had  strength  and  skill  sufficient  seriously  to  embarrass 
Oreat  Britain,  and  that  the  moment,  therefore,  was  opportune  for 
taking  steps  which  scarcely  could  fail  to  cause  war.  On  the  6th  of 
February,  1778,  France  concluded  with  the  United  States  an  open 
treaty  of  amity  and  commerce ;  and  at  the  same  time  a  second  secret 
treaty,  acknowledging  the  independence  of  the  late  Colonies,  and 
contracting  with  them  a  defensive  alliance.  On  the  13th  of  March, 
the  French  Ambassador  in  London  communicated  the  open  treaty  to 
the  British  government,  with  the  remark  that  "  the  United  States 
were  in  full  possession  of  the  independence  proclaimed  by  their 
•declaration  of  July  4th.  1770."  Great  Britain  at  once  recalled  her 
Ambassador,  and  both  countries  prepared  for  war,  although  no  decla- 
ration was  issued.  On  the  1'Uh  of  April,  a  French  fleet  of  twelve 
ship-;  of  the  line  and  five  frigates,  under  the  command  of  the  Count 
d'Kstaing,1  sailed  from  Toulon  for  the  American  coast.  It  was 
destined  to  Delaware  Bay,  hoping  to  intercept  Howe's  squadron. 
D'Kstaing  was  directed  to  begin  hostilities  when  forty  leagues  west 
of  Gibraltar. 

The  British  ministry  was  not  insensible  of  the  danger,  the  im- 
minence of  which  had  been  felt  during  the  previous  year;  but  it 
had  not  got  ready  betimes,  owing  possibly  to  confident  expectations 
of  success  from  the  campaign  of  1777.  The  ships,  in  point  of  num- 
bers and  equipment,  were  not  as  far  forward  as  the  Admiralty  had 
represented;  and  difficulty,  amounting  for  the  moment  to  impos- 
sibility, was  experienced  in  manning  them.  The  vessels  of  the 
Channel  fleet  had  to  be  robbed  of  both  crews  and  stores  to  compose 
a  proper  reinforcement  for  America.  Moreover,  the  destination  of 
the  Toulon  squadron  was  unknown,  the  French  government  having 
given  out  that  it  was  bound  to  Brest,  where  over  twenty  other  ships 
of  the  line  were  in  an  advanced  state  of  preparation.  Not  until  the 
5th  of  June,  when  d'Estaing  was  already  eight  weeks  out,  was  cer- 
tain news  brought  by  a  frigate,  which  had  watched  his  fleet  after  it 

i  Charles  H.,  Comte  d'Estaing.  Born,  1729.  Served  in  India  under  Lally  Tollen- 
<lal,  1758.  After  having  been  taken  prisoner  ut  Madras  in  1759,  exchanged  into  the 
navy.  Commanded  in  North  America,  1778-80.  Guillotined,  1794. 


1778.]  HYRON'S  FLEET.  395 

had  passed  Gibraltar,  and  which  had  accompanied  it  into  the  Atlantic 
ninety  leagues  west  of  the  Straits.  The  reinforcement  for  America 
was  then  permitted  to  depart.  On  the  9th  of  June,  thirteen  ships  of 
the  line  sailed  for  New  York  under  the  command  of  Vice-Admiral 
the  Hon.  John  Byron.1 

These  delays  occasioned  a  singular  and  striking  illustration  of 
the  ill  effects  upon  commerce  of  inadequate  preparation  for  manning 
the  fleet.  A  considerable  number  of  West  India  ships,  with  stores 
absolutely  necessary  for  the  preservation  of  the  islands,  waited  at 
Portsmouth  for  convoy  for  upwards  of  three  months,  while  the 
whole  fleet,  of  eighty  sail,  was  detained  for  five  weeks  after  it  had 
assembled;  "and,  although  the  wind  came  fair  on  the  19th  of  May, 
it  did  not  sail  till  the  20th,  owing  to  the  convoying  ships,  the  Jioi/ne 
and  the  Hilly,  not  being  ready."  Forty-five  owners  and  masters 
signed  a  letter  to  the  Admiralty,  stating  these  facts.  '•  The  convoy," 
they  said,  "was  appointed  to  sail  April  10th."  Many  ships  had 
been  ready  as  early  as  February.  ';  Is  not  this  shameful  usage,  my 
Lords,  thus  to  deceive  the  public  in  general  ?  There  are  two  hun- 
dred ships  loaded  with  provisions,  etc.,  waiting  at  Spithead  these 
three  months.  The  average  expense  of  each  ship  amounts  to  £150 
monthly,  so  that  the  expense  of  the  whole  West  India  fleet  since 
February  amounts  to  <£9i».<ii)0.'' 

The  West  Indies  before  the  war  had  depended  chiefly  upon  their 
fellow  Colonies  on  the  American  continent  for  provision-;,  as  well  as 

1  List  of  the  fleet  sent  to  Xorth  America  under  Vice-Admiral  Byron:  — 

„  .  ,,,  (  Vice-Admiral  the  Hon.  J.  Bvron  (15.). 

Princes*  Hoy.d        O.i  - 

(  Captain  William  Blair. 

,  ..  j  .  .  (  Hear- Admiral  Hvde  Parker  H5.). 

Ocuc  ,  4  - 

(  Captain  Henry  Francis  Lvans. 

r     •     •,,  „,  f  Commodore  John  Evans. 

Invincible  i4< 

(  Captain  Anthony  Parrey. 

Btdfurd  74  Captain  Edmund  Affleck. 

Albion  74  Captain  George  Bowyer. 

Conqueror  74  Captain  Thomas  Graves. 

Cornwall  74  Captain  Timothy  Edwards. 

Cullnden  74  Captain  George  Balfnur. 

Fame  74  Captain  Stephen  Colby. 

Grafton  74  Captain  Thomas  Wilkinson. 

Russell  74  Captain  Francis  Samuel  Drake. 

Sultan  74  Captain  John  Wheelock. 

Alonmouth  04  Captain  Thomas  Collingwood, 

Guadaloupe  28  Captain  Hugh  Robinson. 

Beatson,  vi.  106  (corrected).     W.  L.  C. 


396 


MAJOR   OPERATIONS.    1702-1783. 


[1778. 


for  other  prime  necessaries.  Not  only  were  these  cut  off  as  an  inci- 
dent of  the  war,  entailing  great  embarrassment  and  suffering,  which 
elicited  vehement  appeals  from  the  planter  community  to  the  home 
government,  but  the  American  privateers  preyed  heavily  upon  the 
commerce  of  the  islands,  whose  industries  were  thus  smitten  root 
and  branch,  import  and  export.  In  1776,  salt  food  for  whites  and 
negroes  had  risen  from  50  to  100  per  cent,  and  corn,  the  chief  sup- 
port of  the  slaves,  —  the  labouring  class,  —  by  400  per  cent.  At  the 
same  time  sugar  had  fallen  from  25  to  40  per  cent  in  price,  rum  over 
37  per  cent.  The  words  "  starvation  "  and  "  famine  "  were  freely 
used  in  these  representations,  which  were  repeated  in  1778.  Insur- 
ance rose  to  23  per  cent ;  and  this,  with  actual  losses  by  capture,1 
and  by  cessation  of  American  trade,  with  consequent  fall  of  prices, 
was  estimated  to  give  a  total  loss  of  £66  upon  every  £100  earned 
before  the  war.  Yet,  with  all  this,  the  outward  West  India  fleet 
in  1778  waited  six  weeks,  April  lOth-May  20th,  for  convoy.  Imme- 
diately after  it  got  away,  a  rigorous  embargo  was  laid  upon  all  ship- 
ping in  British  ports,  that  their  crews  might  be  impressed  to  man  the 
Channel  fleet.  Market-boats,  even,  were  not  allowed  to  pass  be- 
tween Portsmouth  and  the  Isle  of  Wight. 

Three  days  after  Byron  had  sailed,  Admiral  the  lion.  Augustus 
Keppel  also  put  to  sea  with  twenty-one  ships  of  the  line,  to  cruise 
off  Brest.  His  instructions  were  to  prevent  the  junction  of  the 

1  The  Secretary  of  Lloyd's,  for  the  purposes  of  this  work,  lias  been  so  good  as  to 
cause  to  be  specially  compiled  a  summary  of  the  losses  and  captures  during  the  period 
1775-1783.  This,  so  far  as  it  deals  with  merchantmen  and  privateers,  gives  the  fol- 
lowin''  results. 


BRITISH  VESSELS. 

ENEMY'S  VESSELS. 

Merchantmen. 

Privateers. 

Merchantmen. 

Privateers. 

Taken.* 

Re-taken  or 
Ransomed. 

Taken.* 

Re-taken  or 
Ransomed. 

Taken.* 

He-taken  or 
Ransomed. 

Taken.* 

Re-taken  or 
Ransomed. 

177f.  .  . 

— 













_ 

1776  .  . 

229 

51 

— 

— 

19 

— 

6 



1777  .  . 

331 

52 

— 

— 

51 

1 

18 

—  . 

1778  .  . 

359 

87 

5 

— 

232 

5 

16 



1779  .  . 

487 

106 

29 

5 

238 

5 

31 



1780  .  . 

581 

260 

15 

2 

203 

3 

34 

1 

1781  .  . 

587 

211 

38 

6 

277 

10 

40 

— 

1782  .  . 

415 

99 

1 

— 

104 

1 

68 

— 

1783  .  . 

98 

13 

1 

1 

11 

2 

3 

— 

Including  those  re-taken  or  ransomed. 


w.  L.  a 


1778.]  BYRON  ARRIVES  AT  HALIFAX.  397 

Toulon  and  Brest  divisions,  attacking  either  that  he  might  meet. 
On  the  17th  of  June,  two  French  frigates  were  sighted.  In  order 
that  they  might  not  report  his  force  or  his  movements,  the  British 
Admiral  sent  two  of  his  own  frigates,  with  the  request  that  they 
would  speak  him.  One,  the  Belle  Poule,  36,  refused ;  and  an  engage- 
ment followed  between  her  and  the  British  ship,  the  Arethusa,  32, 
Captain  Samuel  Marshall.1  Although  both  Keppel's  and  d'Estaing's 
orders  prescribed  acts  of  hostility,  no  formal  war  yet  existed.  The 
King  of  France  subsequently  declared  that  this  occurrence  fixed 
the  date  of  the  war's  beginning. 

Byron  had  a  very  tempestuous  passage,  with  adverse  winds,  by 
which  his  vessels  were  scattered  and  damaged.  On  the  18th  of 
August,  sixty-seven  days  from  Plymouth,  the  flagship  arrived  off  the 
south  coast  of  Long  Island,  ninety  miles  east  of  New  York,  without 
one  of  the  fleet  in  company.  There  twelve  ships  were  seen  at  anchor 
to  leeward  (north),  nine  or  ten  miles  distant,  having  jury  masts,  and 
showing  other  signs  of  disability.  The  British  vessel  approached 
near  enough  to  recognise  them  as  French.  They  were  d'Estaing  s 
•squadron,  crippled  by  a  very  heavy  gale,  in  which  Howe's  force  had 
also  suffered,  though  to  a  less  extent.  As  he  was  alone,  and  ignorant 
of  existing  conditions,  Byron  thought  it  inexpedient  to  continue  on 
for  either  New  York  or  Narragansett  Bay.  The  wind  being  south- 
erly, he  steered  for  Halifax,  which  he  reached  August  26th.  Some 
of  his  ships  also  entered  there.  A  very  few  had  already  succeeded 
in  joining  Howe  in  New  York,  being  fortunate  enough  to  escape  tin- 
enemy. 

So  far  as  help  from  England  went,  Lord  Howe  would  have  been 
crushed  long  before  this.  He  owed  his  safety  partly  to  his  own  celer- 
ity, partly  to  the  delays  of  his  opponent.  Early  in  May  he  received 
advices  from  home,  which  convinced  him  that  a  sudden  and  rapid 
abandonment  of  Philadelphia  and  of  Delaware  Bay  might  become 
necessary.  He  therefore  concentrated  his  ships  of  the  line  from  New 
York  and  Narragansett  at  the  mouth  of  the  Bay,  while  the  transports 
embarked  all  stores,  except  those  needed  for  a  fortnight's  supply  of 
the  army  in  a  hostile  country.  The  threatening  contingency  of  a 
superior  enemy's  appearing  off  the  coast  might,  and  did,  make  it 
imperative  not  to  risk  the  troops  at  sea,  but  to  choose  instead  the 
alternative  of  a  ninety-mile  march  through  New  Jersey,  which  a  year 
before  had  been  rejected  as  too  hazardous  for  an  even  larger  force. 
1  For  an  account  of  the  single-ship  actions  of  the  war,  see  Chap.  XXXII. 


398  MAJOR  OPEKATIOXS.    1762-178!.  [1778. 

Thus  prepared,  no  time  was  lost  when  the  evacuation  became  neces- 
sary. Sir  William  Howe,  who  had  been  relieved  on  the  24th  of  May 
by  Sir  Henry  Clinton,  escaped  the  humiliation  of  giving  up  his 
dearly  bought  conquest.  On  the  18th  of  June  the  British  troops, 
12,000  in  number,  were  ferried  across  the  Delaware,  under  the  super- 
vision of  the  Navy,  and  began  their  hazardous  march  to  New  York. 
The  next  day  the  transports  began  to  move  down  the  river;  but, 
owing  to  the  difficult  navigation,  head  winds,  and  calms,  they  did  not 
get  to  sea  until  the  28th  of  June.  ( >n  the  8th  of  July,  ten  days  too 
late,  d'Estaing  anchored  in  the  mouth  of  the  Delaware.  "Had  a 
passage  of  even  ordinary  length  taken  place,"  wrote  Washington, 
"Lord  Howe  with  the  British  ships  of  war  and  all  the  transports  in 
the  river  Delaware  must  inevitably  have  fallen;  and  Sir  Henry 
Clinton  must  have  had  better  luck  than  is  commonly  dispensed  to 
men  of  his  profession  under  such  circumstances,  if  he  and  his  troops 
had  not  shared  at  least  the  fate  of  IJurgoyne." 

Had  Howe's  fleet  been  intercepted,  there  would  have  been  no 
naval  defence  for  New  York  ;  the  French  fleet  would  have  sur- 
mounted the  difficulties  of  the  harbour  bar  at  its  ease;  and  Clinton, 
caught  between  it  and  the  American  army,  must  have  surrendered. 
Howe's  arrival  obviated  this  immediate  danger;  but  much  still 
needed  to  be  done,  or  the  end  would  be  postponed  only,  not  averted. 
A  fair  wind  carried  the  fleet  and  the  A\  hole  convoy  from  the  Dela- 
ware to  Sandy  Hook  in  forty-eight  hours.  On  the  morning  of  the 
29th,  as  Howe  was  approaching  his  port,  lie  spoke  a  packet  from 
England,  which  not  only  brought  definite  news  of  d'Estaing's  sailing, 
but  also  reported  that  she  heiself  had  fallen  iu  with  him  to  the  south- 
ward, not  very  far  from  the  American  coast,  and  had  been  chased  by 
his  ships.  His  appearance  off  New  York,  therefore,  was  imminent. 

Howe's  measures  were  prompt  and  thorough,  as  became  his  great 
reputation.  To  watch  for  d'Estaing's  approach,  a  body  of  cruisers 
was  despatched,  numerous  enough  for  some  to  bring  frequent  word 
of  his  movements,  while  others  kept  touch  with  him.  The  ships  at 
New  York  were  ordered  down  to  Sandy  Hook,  where  the  defence  of 
the  entrance  was  to  bo  made.  Clinton,  who  had  been  hard  pressed 
by  Washington  throughout  his  march,  arrived  on  the  30th  of  June — 
the  day  after  Howe  himself  —  on  the  heights  of  Navesink,  on  the  sea- 
coast,  just  south  of  Sandy  Hook.  During  the  previous  winter  the 
sea  had  made  a  breach  between  the  heights  and  the  Hook,  convert- 
ing the  latter  into  an  island.  Across  this  inlet  the  Navy  threw  a 


1778.  j  VESTJING  OFF  SANDY  HOOK.  399. 

bridge  of  boats,  by  which  the  army  on  the  5th  of  July  passed  to  the 
Hook,  and  thence  was  conveyed  to  the  city. 

On  the  same  day  the  French  fleet  was  sighted  off  the  coast  of" 
Virginia  by  a  cruiser,  which  reached  Howe  on  the  7th  ;  and  two  days 
later  another  brought  word  that  the  enemy  had  anchored  on  the  8th 
off  the  Delaware.  There  d'Estaing  again  tarried  for  two  days,  which 
were  diligently  improved  by  the  British  Admiral,  who  at  the  same 
time  sent  off  despatches  to  warn  Byron,  of  whose  coming  he  now  had 
heard.  Despite  all  his  energy,  his  preparations  still  were  far  from 
complete,  when  on  the  morning  of  the  llth  a  third  vessel  arrived, 
announcing  that  the  French  were  approaching.  That  evening  they 
anchored  outside,  four  miles  south  of  Sandy  Hook.  Howe,  who 
during  all  those  days  was  indefatigable,  not  only  in  planning  but  also 
in  personal  supervision  of  details,  hastened  at  once  to  place  his  ves- 
sels according  to  the  disposition  which  he  had  determined,  and  which 
he  had  carefully  explained  to  his  captains,  thus  insuring  an  intel- 
ligent co-operation  on.  their  part. 

The  narrow  arm  of  land  called  Sandy  Hook  projects  in  a  nor- 
therly direction  from  the  New  Jersey  coast,  and  covers  the  lower  bay 
of  New  York  on  the  south  side.  The  main  ship-channel,  then  as 
now,  ran  nearly  east  and  west,  at  right  angles  to  the  Hook  and  close 
to  its  northern  end.  Bevond  the  channel,  to  the  north,  there  was  no 
solid  ground  for  fortification  within  the  cannon  range  of  that  day. 
Therefore  such  guns  as  could  bo  mounted  on  shore,  five  in  number, 
were  placed  in  battery  at  the  end  of  the  Hook.  These  formed  the 
right  flank  of  the  defence,  which  was  continued  thence  to  the  west- 
ward by  a  line  of  seven  ships,  skirting  the  southern  edge  of  the 
channel.  As  the  approach  of  the  French,  if  they  attacked,  must  be 
with  an  easterly  wind  and  a  rising  tide,  the  ships  were  placed  with 
that  expectation;  and  in  such  wise  that,  riding  with  their  heads  to 
the  eastward,  each  successive  one,  from  van  to  rear,  lay  a  little  out- 
aide— north —  of  her  next  ahead.  The  object  of  this  indented  for- 
mation was  that  each  ship  might  bring  her  broadside  to  bear  east,  and 
yet  fire  clear  of  those  to  the  east  of  her.  In  order  to  effect  this  con- 
centration of  all  the  batteries  in  an  easterly  direction,  which  would 
rake  the  approach  of  the  enemy,  a  spring  was  run  from  the  outer,  or 
port  quarter  of  every  ship,  except  the  leader. l  These  springs  were 

1  The  leader,  the  Leviathan,  Commander  Joseph  Tatluvell,  was  excepted,  evidently 
because  she  lay  under  the  Hook,  and  her  guns  could  not  bear  down  channel.  She 
was  not  a  fighting  ship  of  the  squadron,  but  an  armed  storesliip,  although  originally 


400          .  MAJOR  OPERATIONS.     1762-1783.  [1778. 

not  taken  to  the  bow  cable  or  anchor,  as  was  often  clone,  but  to 
anchors  of  their  own,  placed  broad  off  the  port  bows.  If,  then,  the 
enemy  attacked,  the  ships,  by  simply  keeping  fast  the  springs  and 
veering  the  cables,  would  swing  with  their  broadsides  to  the  east.  If 
the  enemy,  which  had  no  bow  fire,  survived  his  punishment,  and  suc- 
ceeded in  advancing  abreast  the  line,  it  was  necessary  only  to  keep 
fast  the  cables  and  let  go  the  springs ;  the  ships  would  swing  head 
again  to  the  east,  and  the  broadsides  would  once  more  bear  across 
the  channel,  instead  of  along  it.  These  careful  arrangements  were 
subject,  of  course,  to  the  mischance  of  shot  cutting  away  cables  or 
springs ;  but  this  was  more  than  offset  by  the  probable  injury  to 
the  enemy's  spars  and  rigging,  before  he  could  use  his  batteries  at  all. 
Such  was  the  main  defence  arranged  by  Howe  ;  with  which  New 
York  stood  or  fell.  In  the  line  were  five  sixty-fours,  one  fifty,  and 
an  armed  storeship.  An  advanced  line,  of  one  fifty  with  two  smaller 
vessels,  was  placed  just  inside  the  bar  —  two  or  three  miles  outside 
the  Hook  —  to  rake  the  enemy  as  he  crossed,  retiring  as  he  ap- 
proached ;  and  four  galleys,  forming  a  second  line,  were  also  stationed 
for  the  same  purpose,  across  the  channel,  abreast  of  the  Hook.  The 
retreat  of  these  was  secure  into  the  shoal  water,  where  they  could  not 
l>e  followed.  One  sixty-four  and  some  frigates  were  held  as  a  reserve, 
inside  the  main  line,  to  act  as  occasion  might  require.  The  total 
available  force  was,  six  sixty-fours,1  three  fifties,  and  six  frigates.  D'Es- 
taing's  fleet,  in  detail,  consisted  of  one  ninety-gun  ship,  one  eighty, 
six  seventy-fours,  three  sixty-fours,  and  one  fifty.  Great  as  was  this 
discrepancy  between  the  opponents,  it  was  counterbalanced  largely 
by  Howe's  skilful  dispositions,  which  his  enemy  could  not  eircum- 

a  ship  of  wur,  and  therefore  by  her  thickness  of  side  better  fitted  for  defence  than  an 
ordinary  merchant  vessel.  Placing  her  seems  to  have  been  au  afterthought,  to  close 
the  gap  in  the  line,  and  prevent  even  the  possibility  of  the  enemy's  ships  turning  in 
there  and  doubling  on  the  van.  Thus  Howe  avoided  the  fatal  oversight  made  bv 
Brueys  twenty  years  later,  in  Aboukir  Bay. 

1  These  were  :  — 

(  Vice- Admiral  Lord  Howe  (R.). 
Eagle  64      -j  Captain  Henry  Duncan  (1st). 

(  Captain  Roger  Curtis  (2nd). 
T  id  nt  64      5  Commodore  John  Elliot. 

t  Captain  Anthony  James  Pye  Molloy. 
Somerset          64        Captain  George  Ourry. 
Nonsuch          64        Captain  Walter  Griffith. 
Ardmt  64        Captain  George  Keppel. 

St.  Albans      64        Captain  Richard  Onslow. 

W.  L.  C. 


1778.]  HOWE  AND  D'ESTAING.  401 

vent.  If  the  latter  once  got  alongside,  there  was  little  hope  for  the 
British ;  but  it  was  impossible  to  evade  the  primary  necessity  of 
undergoing  a  raking  fire,  without  reply,  from  the  extreme  range  of 
their  cannon  up  to  the  moment  of  closing.  The  stake,  however,  was 
great,  and  the  apparent  odds  stirred  to  the  bottom  the  fighting  blood 
of  the  British  seamen.  The  ships  of  war  being  short-handed,  Howe 
called  for  volunteers  from  the  transports.  Such  numbers  came  forward 
that  the  agents  of  the  vessels  scarcely  could  keep  a  watch  on  board ; 
and  many  whose  names  were  not  on  the  lists  concealed  themselves  in 
the  boats  which  carried  their  companions  to  the  fightirg  ships.  The 
masters  and  mates  of  merchantmen  in  the  harbour  in  like  manner 
offered  their  services,  taking  their  stations  at  the  guns.  Others 
cruised  off  the  coast  in  small  boats,  to  warn  off  approaching  vessels; 
many  of  which  nevertheless  fell  into  the  enemy's  hands. 

Meanwhile  d'Estaing  was  in  communication  with  Washington, 
one  of  whose  aides-de-camp  visited  his  flagship.  A  number  of  New 
York  pilots  also  were  sent.  When  these  learned  the  draught  of  the 
heavier  French  ships,  they  declared  that  it  was  impossible  to  take 
them  in  ;  that  there  was  on  the  bar  only  twenty-three  feet  at  high- 
water.  Had  that  been  really  the  case,  Howe  would  not  have  needed 
to  make  the  preparations  for  defence  that  were  visible  to  thousands 
of  eyes  on  sea  and  on  shore  ;  but  d'Fstaing,  though  personally  brave 
as  a  lion,  was  timid  in  his  profession,  which  he  had  entered  very  late 
and  without  serving  in  the  lower  grades.  The  assurances  of  tin- 
pilots  were  accepted  after  an  examination  by  a  lieutenant  of  the 
flagship,  who  could  find  nothing  deeper  than  twentv-two  feet.1  For- 
tune's favours  are  thrown  away,  as  though  in  mockery,  on  the  incom- 
petent or  the  irresolute.  On  the  22nd  of  .July  a  fresh  north-east 
wind  concurred  with  a  spring  tide  to  give  the  highest  possible  water 
on  tiie  bar. 

"At  eight  o'clock,"  wrote  an  eye-witness  in  tho  ISritish  fleet,  "d'Kstaing  with 
all  his  squadron  appeared  underway.  He  kept  working  to  windward,  as  if  to  gain 
a  proper  position  for  crossing  the  bar  by  the  time  the  title  should  serve.  The  wind 
could  not  be  more  favourable  for  such  a  design  ;  it  blew  from  the  exact  point  from 
which  he  could  attack  us  to  the  greatest  advantage.  Tin;  spring  tides  \\ere  at  the 
highest,  and  that  afternoon  thirty  feet  on  the  bar.  We  consequently  expected  the 
hottest  day  that  had  ever  been  fought  between  the  two  nations.  On  our  side  ail 
was  at  stake.  Had  the  men-of-war  been  defeated,  the  fleet  of  transports  and 


1  A  letter  to  the  Admiralty,  dated  October  8th,  1779,  from  Vice- Admiral  Murriot 
Arbuthnot,  then  commander-in-chief  at  New  York,  states  that  "  at  spring  tides  there 
is  generally  thirty  feet  of  water  on  the  bar  at  high  water." 
VOL.  in.  —  26 


402  MAJOR  OPERATIONS.    1762-1783.  [1778. 

victuallers  must  have  been  destroyed,  and  the  army,  of  course,  have  fallen  with  us. 
D'Kstaing,  however,  had  not  spirit  equal  to  the  risk ;  at  three  o'clock  we  saw  him 
bear  off  to  the  southward,  and  in  a  few  hours  he  was  out  of  sight." 

Four  days  later,  Howe,  reporting  these  occurrences,  wrote  :  "  The 
weather  having  been  favourable  the  last  three  days  for  forcing  en- 
trance to  this  port,  I  conclude  the  French  commander  has  desisted." 
It  is  clear  that  the  experienced  British  admiral  did  not  recognise  the 
impossibility  of  success  for  the  enemy. 

After  the  demonstration  of  the  22nd,  d'Estaing  stood  to  the 
southward,  with  the  wind  at  east.  The  British  advice-boats  brought 
back  word  that  they  had  kept  company  with  him  as  far  south  as  the 
Capes  of  the  Delaware,  and  there  had  left  him  ninety  miles  from 
land.  When  their  departure  freed  him  from  observation,  he  turned, 
and  made  for  Narragansett  Bay,  an  attack  on  which,  in  support  of  an 
American  land  force,  had  been  concerted  between  him  and  Washing- 
ton. On  the  2!)th  he  anchored  three  miles  south  of  Rhode  Island, 
and  there  awaited  a  suitable  moment  for  forcing  the  entrance. 

Narragansett  Bay  contains  several  islands.  The  two  largest, 
near  the  sea,  are  Rhode  Island  and  Couanicut,  the  latter  being  the 
more  westerly.  Their  general  direction,  as  that  of  the  Bay  itself, 
is  north  and  south  ;  and  by  them  the  entrance  is  divided  into  three 
passages.  Of  these,  the  eastern,  called  Seakonnet,  is  not  navigable 
above  Rhode  Island.  The  central,  which  is  the  main  channel,  is 
joined  by  the  western  above  Conanicnt,  and  thus  the  two  lead  to  the 
upper  Bay.  The  town  of  Newport  is  on  the  west  side  of  Rhode 
Island,  four  miles  from  the  main  entrance. 

On  the  80th  of  July,  the  day  after  the  French  fleet  had  arrived, 
two  of  its  ships  of  the  line,  under  command  of  the  afterwards  cele- 
brated Suffren,  went  up  the  western  channel,  anchoring  within  it 
near  the  south  cud  of  Conanicut.  One  of  them,  as  she  passed,  was 
hulled  twice  by  the  British  batteries.  At  the  same  time,  two  frio-- 
ates  and  a  corvette  entered  Seakonnet ;  whereupon  the  British 
abandoned  and  burned  a  sloop  of  war,  the  Kingfisher,  16,  and  some 
galleys  there  stationed.  The  British  general,  Sir  Robert  Pigot,  now 
withdrew  his  detachments  from  Conanicut,  disabling  the  guns,  and 
concentrated  the  bulk  of  his  force  in  the  southern  part  of  Rhode 
Island  and  about  Newport.  Goat  Island,  which  covers  the  inner 
harbour  of  the  town,  was  still  occupied,  the  main  channel  being 
commanded  by  its  batteries,  as  well  as  by  those  to  the  north  and 
south  of  it  upon  Rhode  Island.  On  the  5th  of  August,  Suffren's 


1778. J  HOWE  AND  D'ESTAING.  403 

two  ships  got  under  way,  sailed  through  the  western  passage,  and 
anchored  in  the  main  channel,  north  of  Conanicut;  their  former 
positions  being  taken  by  two  other  ships  of  the  line.1  The  senior 
British  naval  officer,  Captain  John  Brisbane,  seeing  retreat  cut  off 
in  both  directions,  now  destroyed  those  ships  of  war 2  which  could 
not  enter  the  inner  harbour,  sinking  two  between  Goat  and  Rhode 
Islands,  to  prevent  any  enemy  passing  there.  Five  transports  also 
were  sunk  north  of  Goat  Island,  between  it  and  Coaster's  Harbour, 
to  protect  the  inside  anchorage  in  that  direction.  These  preliminary 
operations  thus  cost  the  British  five  frigates  and  two  sloops,  besides 
some  galleys.  Guns  and  ammunition  taken  from  them  went  to 
increase  the  defences ;  and  their  officers  and  crews,  over  a  thousand 
in  number,  served  in  the  fortifications. 

On  the  8th  of  August  the  eight  remaining  French  ships  of  the 
line  ran  the  batteries  on  Rhode  and  (Joat  Islands,  anchoring  above 
the  latter,  between  it  and  Conanicut,  and  were  rejoined  there  by 
the  four  previously  detached  to  the  western  passage.  Ten  thousand 
American  troops  having  by  this  time  crossed  from  the  mainland  to 
the  northern  part  of  Rhode  Island,  d'Kstaing  immediately  landed 
four  thousand  soldiers  and  seamen  from  the  fleet  upon  Conanicut, 
for  a  preliminary  organisation ;  after  which  they  also  were  to  pass  to 
Rhode  Island  and  join  in  the  operations.  For  the  moment,  there- 
fore, the  British  garrison,  numbering  probably  six  thousand  men,3 
was  hemmed  in  by  vastly  superior  forces,  by  land  and  by  water. 
Its  embarrassment,  however,  did  not  last  long.  On  the  following 
morning  Lord  Howe  appeared,  and  anchored  off  Point  Judith,  seven 
miles  from  the  entrance  to  the  Bay,  and  twelve  from  the  position 
then  occupied  by  the  French  fleet.  He  brought  a  stronger  force 
than  he  had.  been  able  to  gather  for  the  defence  of  New  York,  having 
now  one  seventy-four,  seven  sixty-fours,  and  five  fifties,  besides 
several  smaller  vessels ;  but  he  still  was  greatly  inferior  to  his 
opponent,  by  any  rational  mode  of  naval  reckoning. 

Howe's  energies  in  New  York  had  not  been  confined  to  prepara- 
tions for  resisting  the  entrance  of  the  enemy,  nor  did  they  cease 
with  the  latter's  departure.  When  he  first  arrived  there  from  Phila- 

1  These  four  ships  were  among  the  smallest  of  the  fleet,  being  one  74,  two  04V, 
and  a  50.     D'Estaing  very  properly  reserved  his  heaviest  ships  to  force  the  main 
channel. 

2  Flora,  32  ;  Juno,  32  ;  Lark,  32 ;  Orpheus,  32;  Falcon,  16. 

8  I  have  not  been  able  to  find  an  exact  statement  of  the  number  ;  Beatson  gives 
eight  regiments,  with  a  reinforcement  of  five  battalions. 


404  MAJOR  OPERATIONS.    1762-1783.  [1778. 

delphia,  he  had  hastened  to  get  his  ships  ready  for  sea,  a  pre- 
occupation which  somewhat,  but  not  unduly,  delayed  their  taking 
their  positions  at  Sandy  Hook.  Two,  for  instance,  had  been  at  the 
watering-place  when  the  approach  of  the  French  was  signalled. 
Owing  to  this  diligence,  no  time  was  lost  by  his  fault  when  the  new 
destination  of  the  enemy  was  made  known  to  him,  on  the  28th  or 
29th  of  July,  by  the  arrival  of  the  RaisonnaUc,  04,1  Captain  Thomas 
Fitzherbert,  from  Halifax.  This  ship  narrowly  escaped  the  French 
fleet,  having  passed  it  on  the  evening  of  the  27th,  steering  for  Rhode 
Island.  The  Renown,  50,  Captain  George  Dawson  (Act'g),  which  on 
the  20th  had  reached  New  York  from  the  West  Indies,  had  a 
similar  close  shave,  having  passe:l  unnoticed  through  the  rear  of  the 
enemy  the  night  before.  I'.esides  these  two,  Howe  was  joined  also 
by  the  ('ciitnrinn,  ">0,  Captain  Richard  Hrathwaite,  from  Halifax, 
and  by  the  Cornwall,  74,  Captain  Timothy  Edwards;  the  latter, 
which  crossed  the  bar  on  the  oOtli.  being  the  first  of  Byron's  fleet  to 
reach  New  York.  The  three  others  belonged  to  Howe's  own 
squadron.  For  the  two  Halifax  ships  which  helped  to  make  this 
most  welcome  reinforcement,  the  Admiral  was  indebted  to  the  dili- 
gence of  the  ollicer  there  commanding,  who  hurried  them  away  as 
soon  as  he  learned  of  d'Kstaing's  appearance  on  the  coast.  The 
opportuneness  of  their  arrival  attracted  notice.  "  Had  they  appeared 
a  few  days  sooner,''  says  a  contemporary  narrative,  "either  they 
must  have  been  prevented  from  forming  a  junction  with  our  squad- 
ron, and  forced  again  to  sea,  or  we  should  have  had  the  mortifica- 
tion to  see  them  increase  the  triumph  of  our  enemy." 

On  the  1st  of  August,  forty-eight  hours  after  the  Cornwall  had 
come  in  from  a  stormy  passage  of  iiftv-two  days,  the  squadron  was 
ready  for  sea,  and  1 1  owe  attempted  to  sail:  but  the  wind  hauled  foul 
immediately  after  the  signal  to  weigh  had  been  made.  It  did  not 
become  fair  at  the  hour  of  high  water,  when  alone  heavy  ships  could 
cross  the  bar,  until  the  morning  of  the  (5th.  "Rhode  Island  was  of 
such  importance,"  says  the  narrator  already  quoted,  "  and  the  fate  of 
so  large  a  portion  of  the.  Ilritixl,  urmi/  an  formed  the  garrison  was  of 
such  infinite  consequence,  to  tie  genernl  cause,  that  it  was  imagined  the 
Admiral  would  not  lose  a  moment  in  making  some  attempt  for  their 
relief."  He  had  learned  of  the  detachments  made  from  the  French 
fleet,  and  hoped  that  some  advantage  might  be  taken  of  this  division. 

:  It  may  he  interesting  to  recall  that  tins  was  the  ship  on  the  books  of  which 
Nelson's  name  first  was  borne  in  the  navy,  in  1771. 


1778.]  HOWE  AND  D'ESTAING.  405 

In  short,  he  went,  as  was  proper  and  incumbent  on  him  in  such 
critical  circumstances,  to  take  a  great  risk,  in  hope  of  a  favourable 
chance  offering.  On  the  9th,  as  before  stated,  he  anchored  off  Point 
Judith,  and  opened  communications  with  the  garrison,  from  which 
he  learned  the  events  that  had  so  far  occurred,  and  also  that  the 
enemy  was  well  provided  with  craft  of  all  kinds  to  make  a  descent 
upon  any  part  of  the  Island. 

As  de  Grasse  at  Yorktown,  when  rumour  announced  the  ap- 
proach of  a  British  fleet,  was  deterred  only  by  the  most  urgent  appeals 
of  Washington  from  abandoning  his  control  of  the  Chesapeake, 
essential  to  the  capture  of  Cornwallis,  so  now  d'Kstaing,  in  Xarra- 
gansett  Bay,  was  unwilling  to  keep  his  place,  in  face  of  Howe's 
greatly  inferior  squadron.1  The  influence  exerted  upon  tlu-se  two 
admirals  by  the  mere  approach  of  a  hostile  fleet,  when  decisive 
advantages  depended  upon  their  holding  their  ground,  may  In- 
cited plausibly  in  support  of  the  most  extreme  view  of  the  effect  of 
a  "fleet  in  being;"  but  the  instances  also,  when  the  conditions  are 
analysed,  will  suggest  the  question :  Is  such  effect  always  legitimate, 
inherent  in  the  existence  of  the  fleet  itself,  or  does  it  not  depend 
often  upon  the  characteristics  of  the  man  affected?  The  contem- 
porary British  narrative  of  these  events  in  Narragansett  Bav,  after 
reciting  the  various  obstacles  and  the  inferiority  of  the  British 
squadron,  says:  "The  most  skilful  officers  were  therefore  of  opinion 
that  the  Vice-Admiral  could  not  risk  an  attack  ;  and  it  appears  bv 
his  Lordship's  public  letter  that  this  was  also  his  own  opinion  : 
under  such  circumstances,  he  judged  it  was  impracticable  to  afford 
the  General  any  essential  relief."  In  both  these  instances,  the 
admirals  concerned  were  impelled  to  sacrifice  the  almost  certain 
capture,  not  of  a  mere  position,  but  of  a  decisive  part  of  the  enemy's 
organised  forces,  by  the  mere  contingency  of  action,  the  moral  effect, 
of  a  fleet  greatly  inferior  to  their  own,  and  which  in  neither  case 
would  have  attacked,  as  things  stood.  What  does  this  prove? 

Immediately  upon  Howe's  appearance,  the  French  seamen  who 
had  landed  the  day  before  on  Conanicut  were  recalled  to  their  ships. 
The  next  morning,  at  7  A.M.,  the  wind  came  out  strong  at  north- 
east, which  is  exceptional  at  that  season.  D'Estaing  at  once  put  to 
sea,  cutting  the  cables  in  his  haste.  In  two  hours  he  was  outside, 

1  Troude  attributes  d'Estaing's  sortie  to  a  sense  of  the  insecurity  of  his  position; 
Lapeyrouse  Bonfils,  to  a  desire  for  contest.  Chevalier  dwells  upon  the  exposure 
of  the  situation. 


406 


MAJOR  OPERATIVES.     1762-1783. 


[1778. 


steering  for  the  enemy.  Howe,  of  course,  retired  at  once;  his 
inferiority  l  did  not  permit  an  engagement  except  on  his  own  terms. 
To  insure  these,  he  needed  the  weather-gage,  the  offensive  position 
of  that  day,  which  he  expected,  by  keeping  south,  to  gain,  when  the 
usual  wind  from  that  quarter  should  set  in.  The  French  Admiral 
had  the  same  object,  hoping  to  crush  his  agile  opponent ;  and,  as  the 
sea  breeze  did  not  make  that  day,  he  succeeded  in  keeping  the 
advantage  with  which  he  had  started,  despite  Howe's  skill.  At 
nightfall,  and  during  the  night,  both  fleets  steered  to  the  .southward, 

1   Howe's  lleet  consisted  of :  — 


SHIPS. 

GUNS. 

MEJC. 

COMMANDERS. 

64 

52° 

/  Vice-Adni.  Lord  Howe  (1!.). 
<Ciipt.  llciirv  Duncan  (1st). 

Ti-  ill  fiit          

6-1 

517 

'  dipt.  lioger  Curtis  (2nd). 
(  Coin.  John  Klliot. 

Preston 

50 

367 

1  Ciipt.  Anthony  James  I've  Jlolloy. 
(  Coin.  William  Ilotham. 

74 

600 

(  Capt.  Sainnel  Upplebv 

04 

500 

('apt.  Waller  Grillith. 

Raisoiinnblc       .... 

(14 
64 

500 
500 

(.'apt.  Thomas  Fitzliorliert. 
(  'apt.  (ti-or"e  (^urrv. 

,Sy     .Hfatut 

64 

500 

('apt    Kieiiard  (Jnslo\\ 

(il 

500 

Catit.  (icoi'ire  Keiiiicd. 

50 

350 

L'ajit.  llicliard  Brathwaite 

E.rpfrii))'  it/  

50 
50 

350 

ufiii 

(.'apt.  Sir  .lames  Wallace. 
(  'apt.  .Inhn  liavner. 

J!eiit>u'ti    

5d 
44 

350 

"Ml 

Capt.  (Icorgi!  Dawson  (Act'g). 
Capt    Hvile  Parker  (2) 

Rnflttck     

44 
36 

280 
240 

('apt.  Andruw  Snaps  Hamontl. 
Capt.  AVilliam  Peere  Williams. 

Richmond     

Pt'ttrl  

O»J 

32 

220 

•'•'il 

C'a[>t.  John  Lewis  Gidoin. 
(  'a[>t.  John  Linzee. 

32 

220 

Capt.  Philemon  Pownall 

20 

160 

16 

1  -25 

Vigilant  (a.  s.)       ... 
Strombolo  (f.  s.) 
Sulphur  (f.  s.)  .     . 
Volcano  (f.  s.)  . 
Thunder  (binb.)      .     .     . 
Carcass  (bmb.)  .... 
Philadelphia  *  .... 

20 

8 

8 

150 
45 
45 
45 
80 
80 

Coin.  Hugh  Clobeny  Christian. 
Com.  Peter  A]ilin. 
Com.  James  Watt. 
Com.  William  Henry  King  O'Hara. 
Com.  James  Gambler  (2). 
Lieut.  Edward  Edwards.  (Aet'g). 
Lieut.  -  —  Paterson. 
Lieut.  Sir  James  Barclay    Bart 

Ferret  *   

Lieut.  Edward  (')  O'Bryen. 

CortHcallw  •     .     .     .     . 

Lieut.  Spry. 

*  Galleys. 


1778.] 


HOWE  AND  D'ESTAING. 


407 


on  the  port  tack,  with  the  wind  variable  at  east.  At  daybreak  of 
the  llth  they  occupied  nearly  the  same  relative  positions,  —  the 
French  north-east  to  north  from  the  British,  but  somewhat  more 
distant  than  the  night  before,  having  apparently  kept  closer  to  the 
wind,  which  by  this  had  steadied  at  east-north-east.  (See  Plan :  aa, 
aa.) 

Howe  now  shifted  his  flag  from  the  Earjlc,  G4,  to  the  Apollo,  32, 
and  placed  himself  between  the  two  fleets,  the  better  to  decide  the 
movements  of  his  own.  Finding  it  impossible  to  gain  the  weather- 
gage,  and  unwilling,  probably,  to  be  drawn  too  far  from  Rhode 
Island,  he  formed  his  line  on  the  other  tack,  heads  to  the  northward. 


Jtfclto       1 


MANOEUVRES    OF    HOWE     AND     DEiTAiNO. 
//?"  Jvc       J77&. 


MANIEUVKES    OK    IIOAVE    AND    Ji'llsTAIXG. 

The  French  continued  on  the  port  tack,  under  short  canvas,  heading 
to  the  southward  and  eastward,  so  that  their  bearing  changed  from 
east-north-east  —  directly  to  windward  —  at  G  A.M.,  to  south-south-east 
at  4  P.M.,  which  would  be  nearly  astern  of  the  British.  (See  Plan : 
bh,  bb.)  At  this  time  their  van  was  estimated  by  Howe  to  be  two 
or  three  miles  from  the  British  rear,  and,  according  to  his  reading  of 


408  MAJOR  OPERATIONS.     1762-1783.  [1778. 

their  manoeuvres,  d'Estaing  began  to  form  his  line  for  the  same  tack 
as  the  British,  with  a  view  of  "engaging  the  British  squadron  to 
leeward,"  whereby  he  would  obtain  over  it  the  advantage  of  using 
the  lower-deck  guns,  the  wind  and  sea  having  become  much  heavier. 
As  the  French  admiral,  in  this  new  disposition,  had  put  his  heaviest 
ships  in  the  van,  and  his  line  was  nearly  in  the  wake  of  the  British, 
Howe  inferred  an  attack  upon  his  rear.  (See  Plan:  bb.)  He  there- 
fore ordered  his  heaviest  ship,  the  Cornwall,  74,  to  go  there  from  the 
centre,  exchanging  places  with  the  Centurion,  50,  and  at  the  same 
time  signalled  the  fleet  to  close  to  the  centre,  —  a  detail  worth  remem- 
bering in  view  of  Rodney's  frustrated  manonivre  of  April  17th,  1780. 
It  now  remained  simply  to  await  firmly  the  moment  when  the 
French  should  have  covered  the  intervening  ground,  and  brought 
to  action  so  much  of  his  rear  as  d'Estaing  saw  fit  to  engage ;  the 
conditions  of  the  sea  favouring  the  speed  of  the  bulkier  ships  that 
composed  the  hostile  fleet.  The  latter,  however,  soon  abandoned 
the  attempt,  and  "bore  awav  to  the  southward,  apparently  from  the 
state  of  the  weather,  which,  by  the  wind  freshening  much,  with 
frequent  rain,  was  now  rendered  verv  unfavourable  for  engaging." 
It  may  be  added  that  the  hour  was  very  late  for  beginning  an 
action.  At  sundown  the  British  were  under  close-reefed  topsails, 
and  the  sea  such  that  Howe  was  unable  to  return  to  the  Eagle. 
The  wind  now  increased  to  "Teat  violence,  and  a  severe  storm 

O 

raged  on  the  coast  until  the  evening  of  the  13th,  throwing  the  two 
fleets  into  confusion,  scattering  the  ships,  and  causing  numerous 
disasters.  The  Apollo  lost,  her  foremast,  and  sprung  the  mainmast, 
on  the  night  of  the  12th.  The  next  day  only  two  ships  of  the  line  and 
three  smaller  vessels  were  in  sight  of  the  Admiral.  The  latter, 
when  the  weather  moderated,  went  on  board  the  Phoenix,  44,  and 
thence  to  the  Centurion,  ~>0,  with  which  he  "  proceeded  to  the  south- 
ward, and  on  the  loth  discovered  ten  sail  of  the  French  squad- 
ron, some  at  anchor  in  the  sea,  about  twenty-five  leagues  east  from 
Cape  May."1  Leaving  there  the  Centurion,  to  direct  to  New  York 
any  of  Byron's  ships  that  might  come  on  the  coast,  he  departed 
thither  himself  also,  and  on  the  evening  of  the  17th  rejoined  the 
squadron  off  Sandy  Hook,  the  appointed  rendezvous.  Many  injuries 
had  been  received  by  the  various  ships,  but  they  were  mostly  of  a 
minor  character ;  and  on  the  22nd  the  fleet  again  put  to  sea  in 
search  of  the  enemy. 

1  At  the  mouth  of  Delaware  Bay. 


177S.J  HOWE  AXD  WESTAIXG.  409 

The  French  had  suffered  much  more  severely.  The  flagship 
Languedoc,  90,  had  carried  away  her  bowsprit,  all  her  lower  masts 
followed  it  overboard,  and  her  tiller  also  was  broken,  rendering  the 
rudder  unserviceable.  The  Marseillais,  74,  lost  her  foremast  and 
bowsprit.  In  the  dispersal  of  the  two  fleets  that  followed  the  gale, 
each  of  these  crippled  vessels,  on  the  evening  of  the  13th,  encoun- 
tered singly  a  British  50-gun  ship  ;  the  Languedoc  being  attacked  by 
the  Renown,  Captain  George  Dawson  (Act'g),  and  the  Marseillais  by 
the  Preston,  Commodore  W.  Ilotham,  Captain  Samuel  Uppleby. 
The  conditions  in  each  instance  were  distinctly  favourable  to  the 
smaller  combatant;  but  both  unfortunately  withdrew  at  nightfall, 
making  the  mistake  of  postponing  to  the  morrow  a  chance  which 
they  had  no  certainty  would  exist  after  to-day.  When  morning 
dawned,  other  French  ships  appeared,  and  the  opportunity  passed  away. 
The  Isis,  50,  Captain  John  Rayner,  also  was  chased  and  overtaken 
by  the  Cesar,  74.  In  the  action  which  ensued,  the  French  ship's 
wheel  was  shot  away,  and  she  retired;  —  two  other  British  vessels, 
one  of  the  line,  being  in  sight.  The  latter  are  not  mentioned  in  the 
British  accounts,  and  both  sides  claimed  the  advantage  in  this  drawn 
action.  The  French  captain  lost  an  arm. 

After  making  temporary  repairs,  at  the  anchorage  where  Howe 
saw  them  on  the  loth  of  August,  the  French  fleet  had  proceeded 
again  towards  Newport.  It  was  in  the  course  of  this  passage  that 
they  were  seen  by  Byron's  flagship1  on  the  1Sth,  to  the  southward 
of  Long  Island.  The  Experiment,  /"><),  Captain  Sir  James  Wallace, 
which  Howe  had  sent  to  reconnoitre  Narragansett  Bay,  was  chased 
by  them  into  Long  Island  Sound,  and  only  reached  Xew  York  by 
the  East  River;  being  the  first  ship  of  the  line  or  oO-gun  ship  that 
ever  passed  through  Hell  (iate.  On  the  20th  d'Kstaing  communi- 
cated with  General  Sullivan,  the  commander  of  the  American  land 
forces  on  Rhode  Island  ;  but  it  was  only  to  tell  him  that  in  his  own 
opinion,  and  in  that  of  a  council  of  war.  the  condition  of  the  squad- 
ron necessitated  going  to  Boston  to  refit.  Whatever  may  be  thought 
of  the  propriety  of  this  decision,  its  seriousness  can  be  best  under- 
stood from  the  report  sent  by  Pigot  to  Howe.  '-The  rebels  had 
advanced  their  batteries  within  fifteen  hundred  yards  of  the  British 
works.  He  was  under  no  apprehensions  from  any  of  their  attempts 
in  front ;  but,  should  the  French  fleet  come  in,  it  would  make  an 
alarming  change.  Troops  might  be  landed  and  advanced  in  his 

1  Antp,  p.  397. 


410  MAJOR   OPERATIONS.     1762-1783.  [1778. 

rear ;  and  in  that  case  he  could  not  answer  for  the  consequences." 
Disregarding  Sullivan's  entreaties  that  he  would  remain,  d'Estaing 
sailed  next  day  for  Boston,  and  reached  it  on  August  28th.  On  the 
81st  the  indefatigable  Howe  came  in  sight;  but  the  French  had 
worked  actively  in  the  three  days.  Forty-nine  guns,  18  and  24- 
pounders,  with  six  mortars,  were  already  in  position  covering  the 
anchorage ;  and  "  the  French  squadron,  far  from  fearing  an  attack, 
desired  it  eagerly."  1  The  withdrawal  of  the  fleet  was  followed  by 
that  of  the  American  troops  before  Newport. 

Howe  had  quitted  New  York  the  instant  he  heard  of  d'Estaing's 
reappearance  off  Rhode  Island.  He  took  with  him  the  same  number 
of  vessels  as  before, — thirteen  of  the  line, — the  Monmouth,  64, 
Captain  Thomas  Collingwood,  of  Byron's  squadron,  having  arrived 
and  taken  the  place  of  the  /sis,  crippled  in  her  late  action.  Before 
reaching  Newport,  lie  learned  that  the  French  had  started  for  Boston. 
He  hoped  that  they  would  find  it  necessary  to  go  outside  George's 
Bank,  and  that  he  might  intercept  them  by  following  the  shorter 
road  inside.  In  this  lie  was  disappointed,  as  lias  been  seen,  and  the 
enemy's  position  was  now  too  strong  for  attack.  The  French  retreat 
to  Boston  closed  the  naval  campaign  of  177H  in  North  American 
waters. 

The  inabilitv  or  unwillingness  of  d'Estaing  to  renew  the  enter- 
prise against  Rhode  Island  accords  the  indisputable  triumph  in  this 
campaign  to  Howe,  —  an  honor  he  must  share,  and  doubtless  gladly 
would  have  shared,  with  his  supporters  in  general.  That  the  British 
fleet,  for  the  most  part  two  years  from  home,  in  a  country  without 
dockyards,  should  have  been  able  to  take  the  sea  within  ten  days 
after  the  gale,  while  their  opponents,  just  from  France,  yet  with  three 
months'  sea  practice,  were  so  damaged  that  they  had  to  abandon  the 
iield  and  all  the  splendid  prospects  of  Rhode  Island,  —  as  they  already 
had  allowed  to  slip  the  chance  at  New  York,  —  shows  a  decisive 
superiority  in  the  officers  and  crews  of  the  former.  The  incontest- 
able merits  of  the  rank  and  file,  however,  must  not  be  permitted  to 
divert  attention  from  the  great  qualities  of  the  leader,  but  for 
which  the  best  material  would  have  been  unavailing.  The  condi- 
tions were  such  as  to  elicit  to  the  utmost  Howe's  strongest  qualities, 
—  firmness,  endurance,  uninterrupted  persistence  rather  than  celerity, 
great  professional  skill,  ripened  by  constant  reflection  and  ready  at 
an  instant's  call.  Not  brilliant,  perhaps,  but  absolutely  clear,  and 
1  Chevalier  :  '  Marine  Fran^uise,"  1778. 


1778.]  HOWE  AND  WESTAING.  411 

with  mind  replete  with  expedients  to  meet  every  probable  con- 
tingency, Howe  exhibited  an  equable,  unflagging  energy,  which  was 
his  greatest  characteristic,  and  which  eminently  fitted  him  for  the 
task  of  checkmating  an  enemy's  every  move  —  for  a  purely  defensive 
campaign.  He  was  always  on  hand  and  always  ready ;  for  he  never 
wearied,  and  he  knew  his  business.  To  great  combinations  he  was 
perhaps  unequal.  At  all  events,  such  are  not  associated  with  his 
name.  The  distant  scene  he  did  not  see;  but  step  by  step  he  saw 
his  way  with  absolute  precision,  and  followed  it  with  unhesitating 
resolution.  With  a  force  inferior  throughout,  to  have  saved,  in  one 
campaign,  the  British  fleet,  New  York,  and  Rhode  Island,  with  tho 
entire  British  army,  which  was  divided  between  those  two  stations 
and  dependent  upon  the  sea,  is  an  achievement  unsurpassed  in  the 
annals  of  naval  defensive  warfare. 

Howe's  squadron  had  been  constituted  in  1776  with  reference  to 
the  colonial  struggle  only,  and  to  shallow  water,  and  therefore  was 
composed,  very  properly,  of  cruisers,  and  of  ships  of  the  lino  of  the 
smaller  classes ;  there  being  several  fifties,  and  nothing  larger  than 
a  sixty-four.  When  war  with  France  threatened,  the  Ministry,  hav- 
ing long  warning,  committed  an  unpardonable  fault  in  allowing  such 
a  force  to  be  confronted  by  one  so  superior  as  that  which  sailed  from 
Toulon,  in  April,  1778.  This  should  have  been  stopped  on  its  way, 
or,  failing  that,  its  arrival  in  America  should  have  been  preceded 
by  a  British  reinforcement.  As  it  was,  the  government  was  saved 
from  a  tremendous  disaster  only  by  the  efficiency  of  its  Admiral.  As 
is  not  too  uncommon,  gratitude  was  swamped  by  the  instinct  of  self- 
preservation  from  the  national  wrath,  excited  by  this,  and  by  other 
simultaneous  evidences  of  neglect.  An  attempt  was  made  to  dis- 
parage Howe's  conduct,  and  to  prove  that  his  force  was  even  supe- 
rior to  that  of  the  French,  by  adding  together  the  guns  in  all  his 
ships,  disregarding  their  classes,  or  by  combining  groups  of  his  small 
vessels  against  d'Estaiug's  larger  units.  The  instrument  of  the 
attack  was  a  naval  officer,  of  some  rank  but  slender  professional 
credit,  who  at  this  most  opportune  moment  underwent  a  political 
conversion,  which  earned  him  employment  on  the  one  hand,  and  the 
charge  of  apostasy  on  the  other.  For  this  kind  of  professional  arith- 
metic, Howe  felt  and  expressed  just  and  utter  contempt.  Two  and 
two  make  four  in  a  primer,  but  in  the  field  they  may  make  three,  or 
they  may  make  five.  Not  to  speak  of  the  greater  defensive  power 
of  heavy  ships,  nor  of  the  concentration  of  their  (ire,  the  unity  of 


412  MAJOR  OPERATIONS.     1762-1783.  [1778. 

direction  under  one  captain  possesses  here  also  that  importance 
which  has  caused  unity  of  command  and  of  effort  to  be  recognised 
as  the  prime  element  in  military  efficiency,  from  the  greatest  things 
to  the  smallest.  Taken  together,  the  three  elements  —  greater  defen- 
sive power,  concentration  of  fire,  and  unity  of  direction  — •  constitute 
a  decisive  and  permanent  argument  in  favour  of  big  ships,  in  Howe's 
days  as  in  our  own.  Doubtless,  now,  as  then,  there  is  a  limit ;  most 
arguments  can  be  pushed  to  an  absurdum,  intellectual  or  practical. 
To  draw  a  line  is  always  hard;  but,  if  we  cannot  tell  just  where  the 
line  has  been  passed,  we  can  recognise  that  one  ship  is  much  too  big, 
while  another  certainly  is  not:  and  between  the  two  we  can  make 
an  approximation  to  an  exact  result. 

On  his  return  to  New  York  on  September  llth,  Howe  found  there 
Rear-Admiral  Hyde  Parker1  with  six  ships  of  the  line  of  Byron's 
squadron.  Considering  his  task  now  accomplished,  Howe  decided 
to  return  to  Kngland,  in  virtue  of  a  permission  granted  some  time 
before  at  his  own  request.  The  duty  against  the  Americans,  lately 
his  fellow-countrymen,  had  been  always  distasteful  to  him,  although 
he  did  not  absolutely  refuse  to  undertake  it,  as  did  Admiral  Keppel. 
The  entrance  of  France  into  the  quarrel,  and  the  coming  of  d'Kstaing, 
refreshed  the  spirits  of  the  veteran,  who  moreover  scorned  to 
abandon  his  command  in  the  face  of  such  odds.  ^Now,  with  the 
British  positions  secure,  and  superiority  of  force  insured  for  the  time 
being,  lie  gladly  turned  over  his  charge  and  sailed  for  home,  burn- 
ing against  the  Admiralty  with  a  wrath  common  to  most  of  the 
distinguished  seamen  of  that  war.  He  was  not  employed  afloat  again 
until  a  change  of  Ministry  took  place,  in  1782. 

During  the  same  two  months  that  saw  the  contest  between 
d'Kstaing  and  Howe  in  America,  the  only  encounter  between  nearly 
equal  fleets  in  1778  took  place  in  European  waters.  Admiral  the 
Hon.  Augustus  Keppel,  having  returned  to  Spithead  after  the  affair 
between  the  JJelle  Poule  and  the  Arethusa,  again  put  to  sea  on  the 
9th  of  July,  witli  a  force  now  increased  to  thirty  ships  of  the  line, 
lie  had  been  mortified  by  the  necessity  of  avoiding  action,  and  of 
even  retiring  into  port,  with  the  inadequate  numbers  before  under 

1  Later  Vice-Admiral  Sir  Hyde  Parker,  Bart.,  who  perished  in  the  Cato  in  1783. 
He  was  father  of  that  Admiral  Sir  Hyde  Parker,  who,  in  1801,  was  Nelson's  com- 
mander-in-chief  at  Copenhagen,  and  who  in  1778  commanded  the  Pluxnix,  44,  in 
Howe's  fleet. 


1778.]  THE  BATTLE   OF   USIIANT.  413 

his  command,  and  his  mind  was  fixed  now  to  compel  an  engagement, 
if  he  met  the  French. 

The  Brest  fleet  also  put  to  sea,  the  day  before  Keppel,  under  the 
command  of  Admiral  the  Comte  d'Orvilliers.  It  contained  thirty- 
two  ships  of  the  line.  Of  these,  three  — •  a  sixty-four,  a  sixty,  and  a 
fifty  — were  not  considered  fit  for  the  line  of  battle,  which  was  thus 
reduced  to  twenty-nine  sail,  carrying  2,098  guns.  To  these  the 
British  opposed  an  aggregate  of  2,278 ;  but  comparison  by  this  means 
only  is  very  rough.  Not  only  the  sizes  of  the  guns,  but  the  classes 
and  weight  of  the  vessels  need  to  be  considered.  In  the  particular 
instance  the  matter  is  of  little  importance  ;  the  action  being  inde- 
cisive, and  credit  depending  upon  mameuvres  rather  than  upon 
fighting. 

The  French  admiral  was  hampered  by  vacillating  instructions, 
reflections  of  the  unstable  impulses  which  swayed  the  Ministry. 
Whatever  his  personal  wishes,  he  felt  that  lie  must  avoid  action, 
unless  under  very  favourable  circumstances.  At  the  moment  of 
sailing  he  wrote;:  "Since  you  leave  me  free  to  continue  my  cruise,  I 
will  not  bring  the  fleet  back  to  Brest,  unless  bv  positive  orders,  until 
I  have  fulfilled  the  month  at  sea  mentioned  in  my  instructions,  and 
known  to  all  the  captains.  Till  then  I  will  not  llv  before  Admiral 
Keppel,  whatever  his  strength  ;  only,  if  !  know  him  to  be  too 
superior,  I  will  avoid  a  disproportionate  action  as  well  as  I  can;  but 
if  the  enemy  really  seeks  to  force  it,  it  will  be  very  hard  to  -him." 
These  words  explain  his  conduct  throughout  the  next  few  days. 

On  the  afternoon  of  July  2ord  the  two  fleets  sighted  each  other, 
about  a  hundred  miles  west  of  Ushant,  the  French  being  then  to 
leeward.  Towards  sunset,  the  latter  were  standing  south-west,  with 
the  wind  at  west-north-west,  and  bore  north-east  from  the  British, 
who  were  lying-to,  heads  to  the  northward.  The  latter  remaining 
nearly  motionless  throughout  the  night,  and  the  wind  shifting, 
d'Orvilliers  availed  himself  of  the  conditions  to  press  to  windward, 
and  in  the  morning  was  found  to  bear  north-west  from  his  opponent.1 
Their  relative  positions  satisfied  for  the  moment  both  admirals; 
for  Keppel  found  himself  interposed  between  Brest  and  the  French, 
while  d'Orvilliers,  though  surrendering  the  advantage  of  open 
retreat  to  his  port,  had  made  it  possible,  by  getting  the  weather-gage, 
to  fulfil  his  promise  to  keep  the  sea  and  yet  to  avoid  action.  Two  of 

1  Testimony  of  Captains  Hood,  Robinson,  and  Macbride,  and  of  Rfiar-Admiv.il 
Campbell,  captain  of  the  fleet  to  Keppel. 


414  MAJOR  OPERATIONS.     1762-17S3.  L'778. 

his  ships,  however,  the  Due  de  Bourgogne,  80,  and  a  seventy-four, 
were  still  to  leeward,  not  only  of  their  own  main  body,  but  also  of 
the  British.  Keppel  sent  chasers  after  them,  for  the  expressed  pur- 
pose of  compelling  d'Orvilliers  to  action  in  their  support,1  and  it  was 
believed  by  the  British  that  they  were  forced  to  return  to  Brest,  to 
avoid  being  cut  off.  They  certainly  quitted  their  fleet,  which  was 
thus  reduced  to  twenty-seven  effective  sail.  From  this  time  until 
July  27th  the  wind  continued  to  the  westward,  and  the  wariness  of 
the  French  admiral  baffled  all  Keppel's  efforts  to  get  within  range. 
The  latter,  having  no  doubts  as  to  what  was  expected  of  him,  pur- 
sued vigorously,  watching  his  chance. 

On  the  morning  of  the  27th  the  two  fleets  were  from  six  to  ten 
miles  apart,  wind  west-south-west,  both  on  the  port  tack,  steering 
north-west,  the  French  dead  to  windward.  The  latter  were  in  line 
ahead,  the  British  in  bow-aud-quarter  line  ;  that  is,  nearly  abreast 
each  other,  but  so  ranged  that,  it'  they  went  about  together,  they 
should  have  been  in  line  ahead.  Moth  fleets  were  irregularly  formed, 
the  British  especially  so;  for  Keppel  rightly  considered  that  he 
would  not  accomplish  his  purpose,  it'  he  were  pedantic  concerning 
the  order  of  his  going.  He  had  therefore  signalled  a  "General 
Chase,"  which,  bv  permitting  much  individual  freedom  of  movement, 
facilitated  the  progress  of  the  whole.  At  daylight,  the  division  com- 
manded by  Sir  Hugh  Palliser  —  the  right  wing,  as  then  heading  - 
had  dropped  astern  ;  and  at  f>.30  A.  M.  the  signal  was  made  to  seven 
of  its  fastest  sailers  to  chase  to  windward,  the  object  being  so  to 
place  them,  relatively  to  the  main  body,  as  to  support  the  latter,  if 
an  opportunity  for  action  should  offer. 

At  l»  A.  M.  the  French  admiral,  wishing  to  approach  the  enemy 
and  to  see  more  clearly,  ordered  his  fleet  to  wear  in  succession.  —  to 
countermarch.  As  the  van  ships  went  round  under  this  signal,  they 
had  to  steer  off  the  wind,  parallel  to  their  former  line,  on  which 
those  following  them  still  were,  until  they  reached  the  rear  ship, 
when  they  could  again  haul  to  the  wind.  This  caused  a  loss  of 
ground  to  leeward,  but  not  more  than  d'Orvilliers  could  afford,  as 
tilings  stood.  Just  after  he  had  fairly  committed  himself  to  the 
mano-uvre,  the  wind  hauled  to  the  southward  two  points,2  which 
favoured  the  British,  allowing  them  to  head  more  nearly  towards  the 
enemy.  Keppel  therefore  continued  on  the  port  tack,  until  all  the 
French  were  on  the  starboard,  and  at  10.15,  being  nearly  in  their 

1  See  note  on  preceding  page.  •  Twenty-two  degrees. 


1778.] 


THE  BATTLE   OF   USHANT. 


415 


List  of  the  British  and  French  Fleets  in  the  action  off  Ushant,  July  27th,  1778,  chielly 
from  Beatson,  vi.  129-132,  and  Guerin,  v.  24,  25  ;  corrected  from  the  Navy  List,  the  Gazette 
de  France,  the  dispatches  of  d'Orvilliers  to  Sartine  (Arch,  de  la  Marine),  and  the  Proceedings 
of  the  C.  M.,  7  Jan.  to  11  Feb.,  1779,  and  April  12  to  May  5,  1779.  —  W.  L.  C. 


SHIPS. 

• 

B 

COMMANDERS.- 

SHIPS. 

COMMANDERS. 

O 

O 

Monarch. 

74 

Capt.  Joshua  Rowley. 

i  Lieut.  -Gen.    Comtu    DuchaJ- 

Hector. 

71 

Capt.  Sir  John  Hamilton,  Bart. 

Couroimr. 

SI) 

j     fault. 

Centaur. 

74 

Capt.  Phillips  Cosby. 

(  Capt.  Baron  de  Kermadec. 

Exeter. 

04 

Capt.  John  Neale  Pleydell  Nott. 

Due  de  Buuryoyne. 

Nil 

Vicomte  de  Rochechouart  (chef 

Duke. 

yn 

Capt.  William  Brereton. 

d'esc.). 

1  Vice-Admiral  Sir  Robert  Har- 

Glorieur. 

74 

Capt.  de  Beauues  (chef  d'esc.). 

Queen. 

90 

land  (R.). 

Palmier. 

74 

Capt.  de  Reals. 

Capt.  Isaac  Prescott. 

Jlien-Aiinf. 

74 

Capt.  d'Aubenton. 

Shrewsbury. 

74 

Capt.  Sir  John  Lockhart  Ross, 

Dauphin  Hut/ill. 

711 

Capt.  de  Nieuil. 

Bart. 

Ventieitr  . 

T4  Capt.  d'Amblimont. 

Cumberland. 

74  Capt.  Joseph  Peyton  (1). 

Alerintflri'. 

)>4   Capt.  de  Treniigon  (1). 

Berwick. 

74  Capt.  the  Hon.  Keith  Stewart. 

Indien. 

(H 

Capt.  de  la  Grandiere. 

Stirling  Castle. 

(U 

Capt.  Sir  Charles  Douglas,  Bart. 

Sainl  Mielirl. 

GO 

Capt.  Million  de  Genouilli. 

Antpltioit. 

SO 

Capt.  de  Trobriand. 

Couragenx. 

74  Capt.  Lord  Mulgrave. 

!Lieut.-Gen.    Comte    d'Orvil- 

Thunderer. 

74  Capt.   the   Hon.   Robert   Boyle 

Bretagne, 

Ml 

liers. 

Wal.singlmm. 

Capt.  Duplessis  Perscault. 

Sandwich. 

IK)  Capt.  Richard  Edwards  ((J). 

ntfr  <le  Paris. 

10 

Comte  de  Guichen  (chef  d'esc.). 

Valiant, 

74  Capt.   Die   Hon.  John  Leveson 

L'Orient. 

71 

Capt.  Hector  (chef  d'esc.). 

Gower, 

Pendant. 

71 

Capt.  de  Vaudreuil. 

BienJaiM;ttt. 

04  Capt.  John  Macbride.                     \MtifiHijiiftc. 

71 

Capt.  de  Brach. 

Adm.the  Hon.  A.  KeppcKBX   '  Art  if. 

74 

Capt.  Thomas  d'Orves. 

Kear-Admiral  John  Campbell!  '  llt/feefii. 

CA 

Capt.  Cillart  de  Snville. 

'  Victory. 

100  K    .  (1st  Capt.).                              |AY*/fW. 

M   Capt.  de  Bot-Dern. 

Capt.  Jonathan  Faulknor  (1  ) 

Arlfxien. 

04  Oapt.  des  Touches. 

'-     (lind). 

Acliwinuii'r. 

04  Capt.  de  Proissi. 

Fondi'Oi/diif.         80  Capt.  John  Jervis. 

Prince  George.   1K>  Capt.  Sir  John  Lindsay,  K.  B. 

Vigilant, 

Ii4  Capt.  Robert  Kingsmill. 

Terrible. 

74  Oapt.    Sir   Richard   Bickerton, 

Bart. 

Vengeance. 

74  Capt.  Michael  Clements. 

Worcester. 

04  Capt.  Mark  Rouiuson  (1). 

i  Lieut-Geiil.  Due  de  Clnrtre*. 

Elizabeth. 

74  Capt.    the  Hon.    Fredk.   Lewis 

tin  hit  Esprit.            \  SO 

!  Capt.  La  Motte-Pici|iift  (l.-ti. 

Maitlaml. 

'  Capt.  de  Monperoux. 

Robust. 

74  Capt.  Alexander  Arthur  Hood. 

Jliibustf. 

74  Capt.  de  Grasse-Tilli  (i-hcf  d'esf.). 

(  Vice-Admiral  Sir  Hugh  Palli- 

Conquirant. 

74  Capt.  de  Monteil  (chef  d\-s,-.|. 

Formidable. 

!K)     !      ser(B). 

Intrfji/ile. 

74  'Capt.  de  Beanmier. 

(Capt.  John  liazely  (1). 

Zodiaque. 

74  Capt.  de  la  Porte-  Vezim. 

Ocean. 

0<t  Capt.  John  Laforey. 

Diadlme. 

74  Capt.  de  la  Cardonnie. 

America. 

(14  Capt.  Lord  Longford. 

Solitaire. 

(14  Capt.  de  Bricqueville. 

Defiance. 

114  ,Capt.  S.imnel  Granston  Goodall. 

Roland. 

(14 

Capt.  de  1'Archaatel. 

Egmont. 

74  Capt.  John  Carter  Allen. 

Spftinj-. 

114 

Capt.  de  Soulaiiges. 

Itaniillies. 

74  Capt.  Robert  lligby. 

Triton. 

IV!  Capt.  de  Ligondes. 

Fier. 

BO 

Capt.  de  Turpin. 

Arethusa 

32  [Capt.  Samuel  Marshall. 

Sensible. 

32 

Proserpine. 

28  Capt.  Evelyn  Button. 

AlKlfOlllft'lllf. 

:)2 

Milford. 

28  Capt.  Sir  William  Burnaby,  Bt. 

Shicrrp. 

:;-j 

Capt.  de  la  Clocheterie. 

Fox. 

28  Capt.  the  Hon.  Thos.  Windsor. 

Junon. 

.;•' 

Andromeda. 

28 

Capt.  Henry  Bryne. 

Iphigenie. 

32 

Capt.  Comte  de  Kersaint  (2). 

Lively. 

20  Capt.  Robert  Biggs. 

-\'l/M>]llll'. 

82 

Pluto  (i.   8.). 

8  Com.  James  Bradby  (1). 

Sitrreilliutte. 

18 

Vulcan  (f.  s.) 

8  !Com.  Lloyd. 

Perlf. 

1C 

Alert  (cutter). 

12 

Com.  William  George  Fairfax. 

Ecumrit. 

14 

Ifiromlelle. 

1G 

Serin 

14 

Capt.  de  la  Pi5rouse. 

" 

Curieutf. 

10 

Lunette. 

4 

Favorite. 

10 

416  MAJOR  OPERATIONS.    1702-1783.  [1778. 

wake,  he  ordered  his  own  ships  to  tack  together.  At  this  moment  a 
thick  rain-squall  came  up,  concealing  the  fleets  one  from  another  for 
three  quarters  of  an  hour.  With  the  squall  the  wind  shifted  back, 
favouring  the  British  on  this  tack,  as  it  had  on  the  other,  and  en- 
abling them  to  lay  up  for  the  enenry's  rear.  When  the  weather  cleared, 
at  11,  the  French  were  seen  to  have  gone  about  again,  and  were  still 
in  the  confusion  of  a  partly  executed  manoeuvre.  Their  admiral  had 
doubtless  recognised,  from  the  change  of  wind,  and  from  the  direction 
of  the  enemy  when  last  visible,  that  an  encounter  could  not  be 
avoided.  If  lie  continued  on  the  starboard  tack,  the  van  of  the 
pursuing  enemy,  whose  resolve  to  force  battle  could  not  be  misun- 
derstood, would  overtake  his  ivar  ships,  engaging  as  many  of  them 
as  he  might  choose.  By  resuming  the  port  tack,  the  heads  of  the 
columns  would  meet,  and  the  Heels  pass  in  opposite  directions,  on 
equal  terms  as  regarded  position.  Therefore  he  had  ordered  his 
ships  to  go  about,  all  at  the  same  time;  thus  forming  column  again 
rapidly,  but  reversing  the  order  so  that  the  rear  became  the  van. 

Keppel  so  far  had  made  no  signal  for  the  line  of  battle,  nor  did 
he  now.  Recognising  from  the  four  (lavs'  chase  that  his  enemy  was 
avoiding  action,  he  judged  correctly  that  lie  should  force  it,  even  at 
some  risk.  It  was  not  the  time  for  a  drill-master,  nor  a  parade. 
Besides,  thanks  to  the  morning  signal  for  the  leewardly  ships  to 
chase,  these,  forming  the  rear  of  the  disorderly  column  in  which  he 
was  advancing,  were  now  well  to  windward,  able  therefore  to  sup- 
port their  comrades,  if  needful,  as  well  as  to  attack  the  enemy.  In 
short,  practically  the  whole  force  was  coming  into  action,  although 
much  less  regularly  than  might  have  been  desired.  What  was  to 
follow  was  a  rough-and-ready  fight,  but  it  was  all  that  could  be  had, 
and  better  than  nothing.  Keppel  therefore  simply  made  the  signal 
for  battle,  and  that  just  as  the  liring  began.  The  collision  was  so 
sudden  that  the  ships  at  lirst  had  not  their  colours  flying. 

The  French  also,  although  their  mamruvres  had  been  more 
methodical,  were  in  some  confusion.  It  is  not  given  to  a  body  of 
thirty  ships,  of  varying  qualities,  to  attain  perfection  of  movement 
in  a  fortnight  of  sea  practice.  The  change  of  wind  had  precipitated 
f.n  action,  which  one  admiral  had  been  seeking,  and  the  other  shun- 
ning; but  each  had  to  meet  it  with  such  shift  as  he  could.  The 
British  being  close-hauled,  the  French,  advancing  on  a  parallel  line, 
were  four  points l  off  the  wind.  Most  of  their  ships,  therefore,  could 

1  Fortv-five  iletjrecs. 


1778.]  THE  BATTLE   OF   USHANT.  417 

have  gone  clear  to  windward  of  their  opponents,  but  the  fact  that 
the  latter  could  reach  some  of  the  leaders  compelled  the  others  to 
support  them.  As  d'Orvilliers  had  said,  it  was  hard  to  avoid  an 
enemy  resolute  to  fight.  The  leading  three  French  vessels l  hauled 
their  wind,  in  obedience  to  the  admiral's  signal  to  form  the  line  of 
battle,  which  means  a  close-hauled  line.  The  effect  of  this  was  to 
draw  them  gradually  away  from  the  British,  and,  if  imitated  by  their 
followers,  to  render  the  affair  a  mere  touch  at  a  single  point  —  inde- 
cisive. The  fourth  French  ship  began  the  action,  opening  fire  soon 
after  eleven.  The  vessels  of  the  opposing  fleets  surged  by  under 
short  canvas,  firing  as  opportunity  offered,  but  necessarily  much 
handicapped  by  smoke,  which  prevented  the  clear  sight  of  an  enemy, 
and  caused  anxiety  lest  an  unseen  friend  might  receive  a  broadside. 
"  The  distance  between  the  Formidable,  90,  and  the  Ecjinont,  74,  was 
so  short,"  testified  Captain  John  Laforey,  whose  three-decker,  the 
Ocean,  90,  was  abreast  and  outside  this  interval,  "•  that  it  was  witli 
difficulty  I  could  keep  betwixt  them  to  engage,  without  firing  upon 
them,  and  I  was  once  very  near  on  board  the  Egmont."  The  Formid- 
able, Palliser's  flagship,  kept  her  mizzen  topsail  aback  much  of  the 
time,  to  deaden  her  way,  to  make  room  for  the  Ocean,  and  to  allow 
the  ships  behind  her  to  close.  "At  a  quarter  past  one,"  testified 
Captain  Maitland  of  the  Elizabeth,  74,  "  we  were  very  close  behind 
the  Formidable,  and  a  midshipman  upon  the  poop  called  out  that  there 
was  a  ship  coming  on  board  on  the  weather  bow.  I  put  the  helm 
up,  .  .  .  and  found,  when  the  smoke  cleared  away,  I  was  shot  up 
under  the  Formidable  &  lee.  She  was  then  engaged  with  the  two 
last  ships  in  the  French  fleet,  and,  as  I  could  not  fire  at  them  without 
firing  through  the  Formidable,  I  was  obliged  to  shoot  on."!  Captain 
Bazely,  of  the  Formidable,  says  of  the  same  incident,  "The  Fcr/n/i/- 
able  did  at  the  time  of  action  bear  up  to  one  of  the  enemy's  ships,  to 
avoid  being  aboard  of  her,  whose  jib  boom  nearly  touched  the  main 
topsail  weather  leech  of  the  Formidable.  I  thought  we  could  not 
avoid  being  on  board." 

Contrary  to   the   usual  result,  the   loss   of  the   rear  division,   in 
killed  and  wounded,  was  heaviest,  nearly  equalling  the  aggregate  of 

1  Chevalier  says,  p.  89,  "  The  English  passed  out  of  range  "  of  these  ships.     As 
these  ships  had  the  wind,  they  had  the  choice  of  range,  barring   signals  from  their 
own  admiral.     In  truth,  they  were  obeying  his  order. 

2  This  evidence  of  the  captains  of  the  Ocean  and  the  Elizabeth  contradicts  Palliser's 
.charge  that  his  ship  was  not  adequately  supported. 

VOL.  in.  — 27 


418 


MAJOR   OPERATIONS.     1762-1783. 


[1778. 


the  other  two.1  This  was  due  to  the  morning  signal  to  chase  to 
windward,  which  brought  these  ships  closer  than  their  leaders.  As 
soon  as  the  British  van,  ten  ships,  had  passed  the  French  rear,  its 
commander,  Vice-Admiral  Sir  Robert  Harland,  anticipating  Keppel's 
wishes,  signalled  it  to  go  about  and  follow  the  enemy  (Fig.  1,  V). 
As  the  French  column  was  running  free,  these  ships,  when  about, 
fetched  to  windward  of  its  wake.  As  the  Victory  drew  out  of  the 
fire,  at  1  P.M.,  Keppel  made  a  similar  signal,  and  attempted  to  wear, 


ADMIUAL   AUGUSTUS,    VISCOUNT   KEPPEL. 
(From  FJillrifx  ciifjrariiiff,  (tjter  the  portrait  by  G.  Romney.) 

the  injuries  to  his  rigging  not  permitting  tacking ;  but  caution  was 
needed  in  manoeuvring  across  the  bows  of  the  following  ships,  and  it 
was  not  till  2  P.M.,  that  the  Victory  was  about  on  the  other  tack, 
heading  after  the  French.  At  this  time,  2  P.M.,  just  before  or  just 
after  wearing,  the  signal  for  battle  was  hauled  down,  and  that  for 

1  It  was  actually  quite  equal,   but  this  was  due  to  an  accidental   explosion   on 
board  the  Fnrmiilnble. 


1778.] 


THE   BATTLE   OF   US  HA  XT. 


419 


the  line  of  battle  was  hoisted.  The  object  of  the  latter  was  to 
re-form  the  order,  and  the  first  was  discontinued,  partly  because  no 
longer  needed,  chiefly  that  it  might  not  seem  to  contradict  the  urgent 
call  for  a  re-formation.1 

At  this  time  six  or  seven  of  Ilarland's  division  were  on  the 
weather  bow  of  the  Victory,  to  windward  (westward),  but  a  little 
ahead,  and  standing  like  her  after  the  French ;  all  on  the  port  tack 
(Fig.  1).  None  of  the  centre  division  succeeded  in  joining  the  flag- 
ship at  once  (Fig.  1,  C).  At  2.80  Palliser's  ship,  the  Formidable, 


BATTLE     OF    USHANT 
27r"  JUL  v    /778 .    ^  3O  PAt 

fie  I. 


&         <y 

O  Ci 


30  (. 

7    °  P 

0 

0 

0 


R 


\    ^,f, 


BATTLE    OF    USirAXT. 


on  the  starboard  tack  passed  her  to  leeward,  the  last  of  the  fleet 
apparently  out  of  action  (Fig.  1,  R).  A  half-hour  after  this  the 
Victory  had  been  joined  by  three  of  the  centre,  which  were  following 
her  in  close  order,  the  van  remaining  in  the  same  relative  position. 
Astern  of  these  two  groups  were  a  number  of  other  ships  in  various 
degrees  of  confusion,  —  some  going  about,  some  trying  to  come  up, 

1  Naval  officers  will  observe  the  strong  analogy  to  the  speculative  naval  tactics  of 
to-day,  —  a  charge  through  (or  by),  and  a  re-Formation  afterwards. 


420  MAJOR  OPERATIONS.    1762-1783.  [1778. 

others  completely  disabled.  Especially,  there  was  in  the  south-south- 
east, therefore  well  to  leeward,  a  cluster  of  four  or  five  British  vessels, 
evidently  temporarily  incapable  of  manoeuvring. 

This  was  the  situation  which  met  the  eye  of  the  French  admiral, 
scanning  the  field  as  the  smoke  drove  away.  The  disorder  of  the 
British,  which  originated  in  the  general  chase,  had  increased  through 
the  hurry  of  the  manoeuvres  succeeding  the  squall,  and  culminated 
in  the  conditions  just  described.  It  was  an  inevitable  result  of  a 
military  exigency  confronted  by  a  fleet  only  recently  equipped. 
The  French,  starting  from  a  better  formation,  had  come  out  in  better 
shape.  But,  after  all,  it  seems  difficult  wholly  to  remedy  the  dis- 
advantage of  a  policy  essentially  defensive  ;  and  d'Orvilliers'  next 
order,  though  well  conceived,  was  resultless.  At  1  P.M.  J  he  sig- 
nalled his  fleet  to  wear  in  succession,  and  form  the  line  of  battle  on 
the  starboard  tack  (Fig.  1,  F).  This  signal  was  not  seen  by  the 
leading  ship,  which  should  have  begun  the  movement.  The  junior 
French  admiral,  in  the  fourth  ship  from  the  van,  at  length  went 
about,  and  spoke  the  Brettcr/iir,  to  know  what  was  the  commander- 
in-chief's  desire.  D'Orvilliers  explained  that  he  wished  to  pass  along 
the  enemv's  fleet  from  end  to  end.  tn  li'cicnrd,  because  in  its  dis- 
ordered state  there  was  a  fair  promise  of  advantage,  and  by  going 
to  leeward — presenting  his  weather  side  to  the  enemy — he  could 
use  the  weather  lower-deck  guns,  whereas,  in  the  then  state  of  the 
sea,  the  let'  ports  could  not  be  opened.  Tims  explained,  the  move- 
ment was  executed,  but  the  favourable  moment  had  passed.  It  was 
not  till  2.30  that  the  mano'uvre  was  evident  to  the  British. 

As  soon  as  Keppel  recognised  his  opponent's  intention,  he  wore 
the  Victory  again,  a  few  minutes  after  3  P.M.,  and  stood  slowly 
down,  on  the  starboard  tack  off  the  icunf,  towards  his  crippled  ships 
in  the  south-south-east,  keeping  aloft  the  signal  for  the  line  of  battle, 
which  commanded  every  manageable  ship  to  get  to  her  .station  (Fig. 
2,  C).  As  tliis  deliberate  movement  was  away  from  the  enemy,  Palli- 
ser  tried  afterwards  to  fix  upon  it  the  stigma  of  flight,  —  a  preposter- 
ous extravagancy.  Harland  put  his  division  about  at  once  and  joined 
the  Admiral.  On  this  tack  his  station  was  ahead  of  the  Victory,  but 
in  consequence  of  a  message  from  Keppel  he  fell  in  behind  her,  to 
cover  the  rear  until  Palliser's  division  could  repair  damage  and  take 
their  places.  At  4  P.M.  Ilarland's  division  was  in  the  line.  Palli- 
ser's ships,  as  they  completed  refitting,  ranged  themselves  in  rear 
1  Chevalier.  Probably  later  by  the  other  times  used  in  this  account. 


1778.] 


THE  BATTLE  OF   USE  ANT. 


421 


of  the  Formidable,  their  captains  considering,  as  they  testified,  that 
they  took  station  from  their  divisional  commander,  and  not  from 
the  ship  of  the  commander-in-chief.  There  was  formed  thus,  on  the 
weather  quarter  of  the  Victory,  and  a  mile  or  two  distant,  a  separate 
line  of  ships,  constituting  on  this  tack  the  proper  rear  of  the  fleet, 
and  dependent  for  initiative  on  Palliser's  flagship  (Fig.  2,  R).  At 
5  P.M.  Keppel  sent  word  by  a  frigate  to  Palliser  to  hasten  into 
the  line,  as  he  was  only  waiting  for  him  to  renew  the  action,  the 


BATTLE,    or    USHAMT 
27  r-~  Jui.  <r.S77e     G-O  FM 
FlG.  II. 


X 
X  ' 


BATTLE   OF   USHANT. 


French  now  having  completed  their  manoeuvre.  They  had  not  at- 
tacked, as  they  might  have  done,  but  had  drawn  up  under  the  lee 
of  the  British,  their  van  abreast  the  latter's  centre.  At  the  same 
time  Harland  was  directed  to  move  to  his  proper  position  in  the  van, 
which  he  at  once  did  (Fig.  2,  V).  Palliser  made  no  movement,  and 
Keppel  with  extraordinary  —  if  not  culpable  —  forbearance,  refrained 
from  summoning  the  rear  ships  into  line  by  their  individual  pennants. 
This  he  at  last  did  about  7  P.M.,  signalling  specifically  to  each  of  the 
vessels  then  grouped  witli  Palliser  (except  the  Formidable),  to  leave 


422  MAJOR  OPERATIONS.    1702-1783.  [1778. 

the  latter  and  take  their  posts  in  the  line.  This  was  accordingly 
done,  but  it  was  thought  then  to  be  too  late  to  renew  the  action. 
At  daylight  the  next  morning,  only  three  French  ships  were  in  sight 
from  the  decks ;  but  the  main  body  could  be  seen  in  the  south-east 
from  some  of  the  mastheads,  and  was  thought  to  be  from  fifteen  to 
twenty  miles  distant. 

Though  absolutely  indecisive,  this  was  a  pretty  smart  skirmish  ; 
the  British  loss  being  133  killed  and  373  wounded,  that  of  the 
French  161  killed  and  513  wounded.  The  general  result  would 
appear  to  indicate  that  the  French,  in  accordance  with  their  usual 
policy,  had  fired  to  cripple  their  enemy's  spars  and  rigging,  the 
motive-power.  This  would  be  consistent  with  d'Orvilliers'  avowed 
purpose  of  avoiding  action  except  under  favourable  circumstances. 
As  the  smoke  thickened  and  confusion  increased,  the  fleets  had  got 
closer  together,  and,  whatever  the  intention,  many  shot  found  their 
way  to  the  British  hulls.  Nevertheless,  as  the  returns  show,  the 
French  hit  were  to  the  British  nearly  as  7  to  5.  On  the  other  hand, 
it  is  certain  that  the  manoeuvring  power  of  the  French  after  the 
action  was  greater  than  that  of  the  British. 

Both  sides  claimed  the  advantage.  This  was  simply  a  point  of 
honour,  or  (if  credit,  for  material  advantage  accrued  to  neither. 
Keppel  had  succeeded  in  forcing  d'Orvilliers  to  action  against  his 
will;  d'Orvilliers,  by  a  well-judged  evolution,  had  retained  a  superi- 
ority of  manoeuvring  power  after  the  engagement.  Had  his  next 
signal  been  promptly  obeyed,  he  might  have  passed  again  by  the 
British  fleet,  in  fairly  good  order,  before  it  re-formed,  and  concen- 
trated his  fire  on  the  more  leewardly  of  its  vessels.  Even  under  the 
delay,  it  was  distinctly  in  his  power  to  renew  the  fight ;  and  that 
he  did  not  do  so  forfeits  all  claim  to  victory.  Not  to  speak  of 
the  better  condition  of  the  French  ships,  Keppel,  by  running  off 
the  wind,  had  given  his  opponent  full  opportunity  to  reach  his  fleet 
and  to  attack.  Instead  of  so  doing,  d'Orvilliers  drew  up  under  the 
British  lee,  out  of  range,  and  offered  battle  ;  a  gallant  defiance,  but 
to  a  crippled  foe. 

Time  was  thus  given  to  the  British  to  refit  their  ships  sufficiently 
to  bear  down  again.  This  the  French  admiral  should  not  have  per- 
mitted. He  should  have  attacked  promptly,  or  else  have  retreated ; 
to  windward,  or  to  leeward,  as  seemed  most  expedient.  Under  the 
conditions,  it  was  not  good  generalship  to  give  the  enemy  time,  and 
to  await  his  pleasure.  Keppel,  on  the  other  hand,  being  granted 


1778.]  PALLISEKS  CHARGES  AGAINST  KEPPEL.  423 

this  chance,  should  have  renewed  the  fight ;  and  here  arose  the  con- 
troversy which  set  all  England  by  the  ears,  and  may  be  said  to  have 
immortalised  this  otherwise  trivial  incident.  Palliser's  division  was 
to  windward  from  4  to  7  P.M.,  while  the  signals  were  flying  to  form 
line  of  battle,  and  to  bear  do.wn  in  the  Admiral's  wake ;  and  Keppel 
alleged  that,  had  these  been  obeyed  by  6  P.M.,  he  would  have  re- 
newed the  battle,  having  still  over  two  hours  of  daylight.  It  has 
been  stated  already  that,  besides  the  signals,  a  frigate  brought  Palli- 
ser  word  that  the  Admiral  was  waiting  only  for  him. 

The  immediate  dispute  is  of  slight  present  interest,  except  as  an 
historical  link  in  the  fighting  development  of  the  British  Navy;  and 
only  this  historical  significance  justifies  more  than  a  passing  mention. 
In  1778  men's  minds  were  still  full  of  Byng's  execution  in  1757,  and 
of  the  Mathews  and  Lestock  affair  in  1744,  which  had  materially  in- 
fluenced Byng's  action  off  Minorca.  Keppel  repeatedly  spoke  of  him- 
self as  on  trial  for  his  life  ;  and  he  had  been  a  member  of  Byng's 
court-martial.  The  gist  of  the  charges  against  him,  preferred  by 
Palliser,  was  that  he  attacked  in  the  first  instance  without  properly 
forming  his  line,  for  which  Mathews  had  been  cashiered :  and,  sec- 
ondly, that  by  not  renewing  the  action  after  the  first  pass-by,  and  by 
wearing  away  from  the  French  fleet,  lie  had  not  done  his  utmost  to 
''take,  sink,  burn,  and  destroy" — the  latter,  the  charge  on  which 
Byng  was  shot.  Keppel,  besides  his  justifying  reasons  for  his  course 
in  general,  alleged  and  proved  his  full  intention  to  attack  again,  had 
not  Palliser  failed  to  come  into  line,  a  delinquency  the  same  as  that 
of  Lestock,  which  caused  JMathews's  ruin. 

In  other  words,  men's  minds  were  breaking  away  from,  but  had 
not  thrown  off  completely,  the  tyranny  of  the  Order  of  Battle,  —  one 
of  the  worst  of  tyrannies,  because  founded  on  truth.  Absolute  error, 
like  a  whole  lie,  is  open  to  speedy  detection  ;  half-truths  are  trouble- 
some. The  Order  of  Battle  was  an  admirable  servant  and  a  most 
objectionable  despot.  Mathews,  in  despair  over  a  recalcitrant  second, 
cast  off  the  yoke,  engaged  with  part  of  his  force,  was  ill  supported, 
and  cashiered ;  Lestock  escaping.  Byng,  considering  this,  and  being 
a  pedant  by  nature,  would  not  break  his  line ;  the  enemy  slipped 
away,  Minorca  surrendered,  and  he  was  shot.  In  Keppel's  court- 
martial,  twenty-eight  out  of  the  thirty  captains  who  had  been  in 
the  line  were  summoned  as  witnesses.  Most  01  them  swore  that  if 
Keppel  had  chased  in  line  of  battle  that  day,  there  could  have  been 
no  action,  and  the  majority  of  them  cordially  approved ;  but  there 


424  MAJOR  OPERATIONS.     1762-1783.  [1778. 

was  evidently  an  undercurrent  still  of  dissent,  and  especially  in  the 
rear  ships,  where  there  had  been  some  of  the  straggling  inevitable  in 
such  movements,  and  whose  commanders  therefore  had  uncomfortable 
experience  of  the  lack  of  mutual  support,  which  the  line  of  battle  was- 
meant  to  insure. 

Another  indication  of  still  surviving  pedantry  was  the  obligation 
felt  in  the  rear  ships  to  take  post  behind  their  own  admiral,  and  to 
remain  there  when  the  signals  for  the  line  of  battle,  and  to  bear  down 
in  the  admiral's  wake,  were  flying.  Thus  Palliser's  own  inaction,  to 
whatever  cause  due,  paralysed  the  six  or  eight  sail  with  him ;  but  it 
appears  to  the  writer  that  Keppel  was  seriously  remiss  in  not  sum- 
moning those  ships  by  their  own  pennants,  as  soon  as  he  began  to 
distrust  the  purposes  of  the  Vice-Admiral,  instead  of  delaying  doing 
so  till  7  P.  M.,  as  lie  did.  It  is  a  curious  picture  presented  to  us  by 
the  evidence.  Tlie  Commander-in-Chief,  with  his  staff  and  the  cap- 
tain of  the  ship,  fretting  and  fuming  on  the  Victory's  quarter-deck ; 
the  signals  flying  which  have  been  mentioned ;  Harland's  division 
getting  into  line  ahead ;  and  four  points  on  the  weather  quarter,  only 
two  miles  distant,  so  that  "every  gun  and  port  could  be  counted,"  a 
group  of  seven  or  eight  sail,  among  them  the  flag  of  the  third  in  com- 
mand, apparently  indifferent  spectators.  The  Formidable1  &  only  sign 
of  disability  was  the  foretopsail  unbent  for  four  hours,  —  a  delay  which, 
being  unexplained,  rather  increased  than  relieved  suspicion,  rife  then 
throughout  the  Navy.  Palliser  was  a  Tory,  and  had  left  the  Board 
of  Admiralty  to  take  his  command.  Keppel  was  so  strong  a  Whig 
that  he  would  not  serve  against  the  Americans ;  and  he  evidently 
feared  that  he  was  to  be  betrayed  to  his  ruin. 

Palliser's  defence  rested  upon  three  principal  points  :  (1),  that  the 
signal  for  the  line  of  battle  was  not  seen  on  board  the  formidable  ; 
(2),  that  the  signal  to  get  into  the  Admiral's  wake  was  repeated  by 
himself ;  (3),  that  his  foremast  was  wounded,  and.  moreover,  found  to 
be  in  such  bad  condition  that  he  feared  to  carry  sail  on  it.  As  re- 
gards the  first,  the  signal  was  seen  on  board  the  Ocam,  next  astern 
of  and  "not  far  from"  :  the  Formidable ;  for  the  second,  the  Admiral 
should  have  been  informed  of  a  disability  by  which  a  single  ship  was 
neutralising  a  division.  The  frigate  that  brought  Keppel's  message 
could  have  carried  back  this.  Thirdly,  the  most  damaging  feature  to 
Palliser's  case  was  that  he  asserted  that,  after  coming  out  from  under 
fire,  be  wore  at  once  towards  the  enemy ;  afterwards  he  wore  back 
1  Evidence  of  Captain  John  Laforey.  of  the  Ocean. 


1778.] 


KEPPEL  ACQUITTED. 


425 


again.  A  ship  that  thus  wore  twice  before  three  o'clock,  might  have 
displayed  zeal  and  efficiency  enough  to  run  two  miles,  off  the  wind,1 
at  five,  to  support  a  fight.  Deliberate  treachery  is  impossible.  To  the 
writer  the  Vice-Admiral's  behaviour  seems  that  of  a  man  in  a  sulk, 
who  will  do  only  that  which  he  can  find  no  excuses  for  neglecting. 
In  such  cases  of  sailing  close,  men  generally  slip  over  the  line  into 
grievous  wrong. 

Keppel  was  cleared  of  all  the  charges  preferred  against  him  ;  the 
accuser  had  not  thought  best  to  embody  among  them  the  delay  to 
recall  the  ships  which  lie  himself  was  detaining.  Against  Palliser 
no  specific  charge  was  preferred,  but  the  Admiralty  directed  a  gen- 
eral inquiry  into  his  course  on  the  27th  of  July.  The  court  found 
his  conduct  "  in  many  instances  highly  exemplary  and  meritorious," 
—  he  had  fought  well,  —  "  but  reprehensible  in  not  having  acquainted 
the  Commander-in-Chief  of  his  distress,  which  he  might  have  done 
either  by  the  Fox,  or  other  means  which  he  had  in  his  power." 
Public  opinion  running  strongly  for  Keppel,  his  acquittal  was  cele- 
brated with  bonfires  and  illuminations  in  London;  the  mob  got 
drunk,  smashed  the  windows  of  Palliser's  friends,  wrecked  Palliser' s 
own  house,  and  came  near  to  killing  Palliser  himself.  The  Admiralty, 
in  1780,  made  him  Governor  of  Greenwich  Hospital. 

On  the  28th  of  July,  the  British  and  French  being  no  longer  in 
sight  of  each  other,  Keppel,  considering  his  fleet  too  injured  aloft  to 
cruise  near  the  French  coast,  kept  away  for  Plymouth,  where  ho 
arrived  on  the  31st.  Before  putting  to  sea  again,  he  provided  against 
a  recurrence  of  the  misdemeanour  of  the  27th  by  a  general  order,  that 
"  in  future  the  Line  is  always  to  be  taken  from  the  Centre."  Had 
this  been  in  force  before,  Palliser's  captains  would  have  taken  station 
by  the  Commander-in-Chief,  and  the  Formidable  would  have  been  left 
to  windward  by  herself.  At  the  same  time  Howe  was  closing  his 
squadron  upon  the  centre  in  America ;  and  Rodney,  two  years  later, 
experienced  the  ill-effects  of  distance  taken  from  the  next  ahead,  when 
the  leading  ship  of  a  fleet  disregarded  an  order. 

Although  privately  censuring  Palliser's  conduct,  the  Commander- 
in-Chief  made  no  official  complaint,  and  it  was  not  until  the  matter  got 
into  the  papers,  through  the  talk  of  the  fleet,  that  the  difficulty  began 
which  resulted  in  the  trial  of  both  officers,  early  in  the  following  year. 

1  "  1  do  not  recollect  how  many  points  I  went  from  the  wind  ;  1  must  have  bore 
down  a  pretty  large  course."  Testimony  of  Captain  J.  Laforey,  of  the  Ocean,  on  this 
point. 


426  MAJOR  OPERATIONS.    1762-1783.  [1778. 

After  this,  Keppel,  being  dissatisfied  with  the  Admiralty's  treatment, 
intimated  his  wish  to  give  up  the  command.  The  order  to  strike  his 
flag  was  dated  March  18th,  1779.  He  was  not  employed  afloat  again, 
but  upon  the  change  of  administration  in  1782  he  became  First  Lord 
of  the  Admiralty,  and  so  remained,  with  a  brief  intermission,  until 
December,  1783. 

It  is  perhaps  necessary,  to  mention  that  both  British  and  French 
asserted,  and  assert  to  this  day,  that  the  other  party  abandoned  the 
field.1  The  point  is  too  trivial,  in  the  author's  opinion,  to  warrant 
further  discussion  of  an  episode  whose  historical  interest  is  very 
slight,  though  its  professional  lessons  are  valuable.  The  British  case 
has  the  advantage  —  through  the  courts-martial  —  of  the  sworn  testi- 
mony of  twenty  to  thirty  captains,  who  agreed  that  the  British  kept 
on  the  same  tack  under  short  sail  throughout  the  night,  and  that 
in  the  morning  only  three  French  ships  were  visible.  As  far  as 
known  to  the  author,  the  French  contention  rests  only  on  the  usual 
reports. 

Conditions  of  weather  exerted  great  influence  upon  the  time  and 
place  of  hostilities  during  the  maritime  war  of  1778,  the  opening 
scenes  of  which,  in  Europe  and  in  North  America,  have  just  been 
narrated.  In  European  seas  it  was  realised  that  naval  enterprises  by 
fleets,  requiring  evolutions  by  masses  of  large  vessels,  were  possible 
onlv  in  summer.  Winter  gales  scattered  ships  and  impeded  ma- 
nanivres.  The  same  consideration  prevailed  to  limit  activity  in  North 
American  waters  to  the  summer ;  and  complementary  to  this  was  the 
fact  that  in  the  West  Indies  hurricanes  of  excessive  violence  occurred 
from  July  to  October.  The  practice  therefore  was  to  transfer  effort 
from  one  quarter  to  the  other  in  the  Western  Hemisphere,  according 
to  the  season. 

In  the  recent  treaty  with  the  United  States,  the  King  of  France 
had  formally  renounced  all  claim  to  acquire  for  himself  any  part  of 
the  American  continent  then  in  possession  of  Great  Britain.  On  the 
other  hand,  he  had  reserved  the  express  right  to  conquer  any  of  her 
islands  south  of  Bermuda.  The  West  Indies  were  then,  in  the  value 
of  their  products,  the  richest  commercial  region  on  the  globe ;  and 

1  li  During  the  night  (of  the  27th)  Admiral  Keppel  kept  away  (fit  route)  for 
Portsmouth."  Chevalier,  '  Marine  Fran^aise,'  p.  90.  Paris,  1877.  Oddly  enough,  he 
adds  that  "  on  the  evening  of  the  28th  the  French  squadron,  carried  eastward  by  the 
currents,  sighted  Ushant." 


1778.] 


DOMINICA  SEIZED   BY  THE  FRENCH. 


427 


France  wished  not  only  to  increase  her  already  large  possessions 
there,  but  also  to  establish  more  solidly  her  political  and  military 
tenure. 

In  September,  1778,  the  British  Island  of  Dominica  was  seized  by 
an  expedition  from  the  adjacent  French  colony  of  Martinique.  The 
affair  was  a  surprise,  and  possesses  no  special  military  interest ;  but 
it  is  instructive  to  observe  that  Great  Britain  was  unprepared,  in  the 
West  Indies  as  elsewhere,  when  the  war  began.  A  change  had  been 


•t 


ADMIRAL   THK   HOX.    SAMVET,    TUKKIXGTOX 
(From  Hie  lithograph  ly  EMley,  nfler  the  portrait  by  J.  8.  Copley,  R.  A.) 

made  shortly  before  in  the  command  of  the  Leeward  Islands  Station, 
as  it  was  called,  which  extended  from  Antigua  southward  over  the 
Lesser  Antilles  with  headquarters  at  Barbados.  Rear-Admiral  the 
Hon.  Samuel  Barrinoton,  the  new-comer,  leaving  home  before  war 
had  been  declared,  had  orders  not  to  quit  Barbados  till  further 
instructions  should  arrive.  These  had  not  reached  him  when  he 
learned  of  the  loss  of  Dominica.  The  French  had  received  their 


428  MAJOR  OPERATIONS.     1762-1783.  [1778. 

orders  on  the  17th  of  August.  The  blow  was  intrinsically  somewhat 
serious,  so  far  as  the  mere  capture  of  a  position  can  be,  for  the  forti- 
fications were  strong,  though  they  had  been  inadequately  garrisoned. 
It  is  a  mistake  to  build  works  and  not  man  them,  for  their  fall  trans- 
fers to  the  enemy  strength  which  he  otherwise  would  need  time  to 
create.  To  the  French  the  conquest  was  useful  beyond  its  commer- 
cial value,  because  it  closed  a  gap  in  their  possessions.  They  now 
held  four  consecutive  islands,  from  north  to  south,  Guadeloupe, 
Dominica,  Martinique,  and  St.  Lucia. 

Harrington  had  two  ships  of  the  line,  his  flagship,  the  Prince  of 
Wales,  74,  Captain  Benjamin  Hill,  and  the  Boync,  70,  Captain  Herbert 
Sawyer,  which,  had  he  been  cruising,  would  probably  have  deterred 
(he  French.  Upon  receiving  the  news,  he  put  to  sea,  going  as  far  as 
Antigua;  but  he  did  not  venture  to  stay  away  because  his  expected 
instructions  had  not  come  yet,  and,  like  Keppel,  lie  feared  an  ungener- 
ous construction  of  his  actions.  He  remained  in  Barbados,  patiently 
watching  for  an  opportunity  to  act. 

The  departure  of  Howe  and  the  approach  of  winter  determined 
the  transference  of  British  troops  and  ships  to  the  Leeward  Islands. 
Reinforcements  had  given  the  British  fleet  a  numerical  superiority, 
which  for  the  time  imposed  a  check  upon  d'Estaing;  but  Byron, 
proverbially  unlucky  in  weather,  was  driven  crippled  to  Newport, 
leaving  the  French  free  to  quit  Boston.  The  difficulty  of  provision- 
ing so  large  a  force  as  twelve  ships  of  the  line  at  first  threatened  to 
prevent  the  movement,  supplies  being  then  extremely  scarce  in  the 
port ;  but  at  the  critical  moment  American  privateers  brought  in  large 
numbers  oi  prizes,  laden  with  provisions  from  Europe  for  the  British 
army.  Thus  d'Estaing  was  enabled  to  sail  for  Martinique  on  the  4th 
of  November.  On  the  same  day  there  left  Xcw  York  for  Barbados 
a  British  squadron, !  •  —  2  sixty-fours,  3  fifties,  and  three  smaller  craft, 
—  under  the  command  of  Commodore  William  Hotham,  convoying 
5,000  troops  for  service  in  the  West  Indies. 

\  prcston  50      J  (''"'''"mWu  William  Hutham. 

<  Captain  Samuel  Uppleby. 

St..  Allans  04         Captain  Richard  Onslow. 

Nonsuch  64         Captain  Walter  Gritlith. 

Isis  50         Captain  John  Rayncr. 

Centurion  50         Captain  Richard  Brathwaite. 

Venus  3(i         Captain  James  Ferguson. 

Pearl  32         Captain  Alexander  Grseme. 

Carcass  (bomb)  8         Commander  Edward  Edwards. 

Beatson.  vi.  116.  —  W.  L.  C 


1778.]  BARRINGTON  AT  ST.  LUCIA.  429 

Being  bound  for  nearly  the  same  point,  the  two  hostile  bodies 
steered  parallel  courses,  each  ignorant  of  the  other's  nearness.  In 
the  latitude  of  Bermuda  both  suffered  from  a  violent  gale,  but  the 
French  most;  the  flagship  Lanyuedoc  losing  her  main  and  inizzen 
topmasts.  On  the  25th  of  November  one 1  of  Hotham's  convoy  fell 
into  the  hands  of  d'Estaing,  who  then  first  learned  of  the  British 
sailing.  Doubtful  whether  their  destination  was  Barbados  or 
Antigua, — their  two  chief  stations,  —  he  decided  for  the  latter. 
Arriving  off  it  on  the  Gth  of  December,  he  cruised  for  forty-eight 
hours,  and  then  bore  away  for  Fort  Royal,  Martinique,  the  principal 
French  de"pot  in  the  West  Indies,  where  he  anchored  on  the  9th.  On 
the  10th  Hotliam  joined  Barrington  at  Barbados. 

Barrington  knew  already  what  he  wanted  to  do,  and  therefore 
lost  not  a  moment  in  deliberation.  The  troops  were  kept  on  board, 
Hotham's  convoy  arrangements  being  left  as  they  were ;  and  on  the 
morning  of  December  12th  the  entire  force  sailed  again,  the  main 
change  being  in  the  chief  command,  and  in  the  addition  of  Barrington'a 
two  ships  of  the  line.  In  the  afternoon  of  the  loth  the  slapping 
anchored  in  the  Grand  Cul  de  Sac,  an  inlet  on  the  west  side  of  St. 
Lucia,  which  is  seventy  miles  east-north-east  from  Barbados.  Part 
of  the  troops  landed  at  once,  and  seized  the  batteries  and  heights 
on  the  north  side  of  the  bay.  The  remainder  were  put  on  shore  the 
next  morning.  The  French  forces  were  inadequate  to  defend  their 
works  •  but  it  is  to  be  observed  that  they  were  driven  with  unremit- 
ting energy,  and  that  to  this  promptness  the  British  owed  their 
ability  to  hold  the  position. 

Three  miles  north  of  the  Cul  de  Sac  is  a  bay  then  called  the 
Care"nage;  now  Port  Castries.  At  its  northern  extremity  is  a  pre- 
cipitous promontory,  La  Vigie,  then  fortified,  upon  the  tenure  of 
which  depended  not  only  control  of  that  anchorage,  but  also  access 
to  the  rear  of  the  works  which  commanded  the  Cul  de  Sac.  If 
those  works  fell,  the  squadron  must  abandon  its  position  and  put  to 
sea,  where  d'Estaing's  fleet  would  be  in  waiting.  On  the  other  hand, 
if  the  squadron  were  crushed  at  its  anchors,  the  troops  were  isolated 
and  must  ultimately  capitulate.  Therefore  La  Vigie  and  the  squad- 
ron were  the  two  keys  to  the  situation,  and  the  loss  of  either  would 
be  decisive. 

By  the  evening  of  the  14th  the  British  held  the  shore  line  from 
La  Vigie  to  the  southern  point  of  the  Cul  de  Sac,  as  well  as  Morne 
1  The  French  accounts  say  three. 


430 


MAJOR  OPERATIONS.     176'2-17S3. 


[1778. 


Fortund  (Fort  Charlotte),  the  capital  of  the  island.  The  feeble 
French  garrison  retired  to  the  interior,  leaving  its  guns  unspiked, 
and  its  ammunition  and  stores  untouched,  — •  another  instance  of  the 
danger  of  works  turning  to  one's  own  disadvantage.  It  was  Bar- 
rington's  purpose  now  to  remove  the  transports  to  the  Cardnage,  as 
a  more  commodious  harbour,  probably  also  better  defended;  but  he 
was  prevented  by  the  arrival  of  d'Estaing  that  afternoon.  "  Just  as 
all  the  important  stations  were  secured,  the  French  colours  struck, 


TIIK   NORTHERN  PART  OF  TUT:   TST.ANT)   OF  ST.   LUCIA. 

and  General  Grant's  headquarters  established  at  the  Governor's 
house,  the  Ariadne  frigate  came  in  sight  with  the  signal  abroad  for 
the  approach  of  an  enemy."  ]  The  French  fleet  was  seen  soon  after- 
wards from  the  heights  above  the  squadron. 

The  British  had  gained  much  so  far  by  celerity,  but  they  still 
spared  no  time  to  take  breath.     The  night  was  passed  by  the  soldiers 
in  strengthening  their  positions,  and  by  the  Rear-Admiral  in  rectify- 
ing his  order  to  meet  the  expected  attack.     The  transports,  between 
:  Beatson  :  '  Military  and  Naval  Memoirs,'  iv.  390. 


1778.]  D'ESTAING  ARRIVES  AT  ST.  LUCIA.  431 

fifty  and  sixty  in  number,  were  warped  inside  the  ships  of  war,  and 
the  latter  were  most  carefully  disposed  across  the  mouth  of  the  bay. 
At  the  northern  (windward)  end  was  placed  the  Isis,  50,  Captain 
John  Rayner,  well  under  the  point  to  prevent  anything  from  passing 
round  her ;  but  for  further-  security  she  was  supported  by  three 
frigates  ;  the  Venus,  36,  Captain  William  Peere  Williams,  the  Ariadne, 
20,  Captain  Thomas  Pringle,  and  the  Aurora,  28,  Captain  James 
Gumming,  anchored  abreast  of  the  interval  between  her  and  the  shore. 
From  the  Isis  the  line  extended  to  the  southward,  inclining  slightly 
outward ;  the  Prince  of  Wales,  74,  Harrington's  flagship,  taking  the 
southern  flank,  as  the  most  exposed  position.  Between  her  and  the 
Isis  were  five  other  ships,  —  the  Boync,  70,  Nonsuch,  64,  St.  Allans,  64, 
Preston,  50,  and  Centurion,  50.  The  works  left  by  the  French  at  the 
north  and  south  points  of  the  bay  may  have  been  used  to  support 
the  flanks,  but  Harrington  in  his  report  does  not  say  so. 

D'Estaing  had  twelve  ships  of  the  line,  and  was  able  to  land,  two 
days  after  this,  7,000  troops.  With  such  a  superiority  it  is  evident 
that,  had  he  arrived  twenty-four  hours  sooner,  the  British  would 
have  been  stopped  in  the  midst  of  their  operation.  To  gain  time, 
Harrington  had  sought  to  prevent  intelligence  reaching  Fort  Royal, 
less  than  fifty  miles  distant,  by  sending  cruisers  in  advance  of  his 
squadron,  to  cover  the  approaches  to  St.  Lucia ;  but,  despite  his  care, 
d'Estaing  had  the  news  on  the  14th.  He  sailed  at  once,  and,  as  has 
been  said,  was  off  St.  Lucia  that  evening.  At  daybreak  of  the  loth 
he  stood  in  for  the  Cardnage ;  but  when  he  came  within  range, 
a  lively  cannonade  told  him  that  the  enemy  were  already  in  posses- 
sion. He  decided  therefore  to  attack  the  squadron,  and  at  11.30 
the  French  passed  along  it  from  ninth  to  south,  firing,  but  without 
effect.  A  second  attempt  was  made  in  the  afternoon,  directed  upon 
the  lee  flank,  but  it  was  equally  unavailing.  The  British  had  three 
men  killed ;  the  French  loss  is  not  given,  but  is  said  to  have  been 
slight.  It  is  stated  that  the  sea  breeze  did  not  penetrate  far  enough 
into  the  bay,  that  day,  to  admit  closing.  This  frequently  happens, 
but  it  does  not  alter  the  fact  that  the  squadron  was  the  proper  point 
of  attack,  and  that,  especially  in  the  winter  season,  an  opportunity 
to  close  must  offer  soon.  D'Estaing,  governed  probably  by  the  sol- 
dierly bias  he  more  than  once  betrayed,  decided  now  to  assault  the 
works  on  shore.  Anchoring  in  a  small  bay  north  of  the  Carriage, 
he  landed  seven  thousand  men,  and  on  the  18th  attempted  to  storm 
the  British  lines  at  La  Vigie.  The  neck  of  land  connecting  the 


432  MAJOR  OPERATIONS.    1762-1783.  [1778,1779. 

promontory  with  the  island  is  veiy  flat,  and  the  French  therefore 
laboured  under  great  disadvantage  from  the  commanding  position  of 
their  enemy.  It  was  a  repetition  of  Bunker  Hill,  and  of  many  other 
ill-judged  and  precipitate  attacks.  After  three  gallant  but  ineffectual 
charges,  led  by  d'Estaing  in  person,  the  assailants  retired,  with  the 
loss  of  41  officers  and  800  rank  and  file,  killed  and  wounded. 

D'Estaing  re-embarked  his  men,  and  stood  ready  again  to  attack 
Barrington,  a  frigate  being  stationed  off  the  Cul  de  Sac,  to  give 
notice  when  the  wind  should  serve.  On  the  24th  she  signalled,  and 
the  fleet  weighed ;  but  Barrington,  who  had  taken  a  very  great  risk 
for  an  adequate  object,  ran  no  unnecessary  risks  through  presump- 
tion. He  had  employed  his  respite  to  warp  the  ships  of  war  farther 
in,  where  the  breeze  reached  less  certainly,  and  where  narrower 
waters  gave  better  support  to  the  flanks.  He  had  strengthened  the 
latter  also  by  new  works,  in  which  he  had  placed  heavy  guns 
from  the  ships,  manned  by  seamen.  For  these  or  other  reasons 
d'Estaing  did  not  attack.  On  the  29th  he  quitted  the  island,  and 
on  the  30th  the  French  governor,  the  Chev.  de  Micoud,  formally 
capitulated. 

This  achievement  of  Barrington,  and  of  Major-General  James 
Grant,  who  was  associated  with  him,  was  greeted  at  the  time  with  an 
applause  which  will  be  echoed  by  the  military  judgment  of  a  later 
age.  There  is  a  particular  pleasure  in  finding  the  willingness  to 
incur  a  great  danger,  conjoined  with  a  care  that  chances  nothing 
against  which  the  utmost  diligence  and  skill  can  provide.  The 
celerity,  forethought,  wariness,  and  daring  of  the  lion.  Samuel 
Harrington  have  inscribed  upon  the  records  of  the  British  Navy  a 
success  whose  distinction  should  be  measured,  not  by  the  greatness 
of  the  scale,  but  by  the  perfection  of  the  workmanship,  and  by  the 
energy  of  the  execution  in  the  face  of  great  odds. 

St.  Lucia  remained  in  the  hands  of  the  British  throughout  the 
war.  It  was  an  important  acquisition,  because  at  its  north-west 
extremity  was  a  good  and  defensible  anchorage,  Gros  Ilet  Bay,  only 
thirty  miles  from  Fort  Royal.  In  it  the  British  fleet  could  lie, 
when  desirable  to  close-watch  the  enemy,  yet  not  be  worried  for  its 
safety  when  away ;  for  it  was  but  an  outpost,  not  a  base  of  opera- 
tions, as  Fort  Royal  was.  It  was  thus  used  continually,  and  from 
it  Rodney  issued  for  his  great  victory  in  April,  1782. 

During  the  first  six  months  of  1779  no  important  incident 
occurred  in  the  West  Indies.  On  the  Gth  of  January,  Vice-Admiral 


1779.] 


D'ESTAING    TAKES  ST.    VINCENT. 


433 


the  Hon.  John  Byron,  with  ten  ships  of  the  line  from  Narragansett 
Bay,  reached  St.  Lucia,  and  relieved  Barrington  of  the  chief  com- 
mand. Both  the  British  and  the  French  fleets  were  reinforced  in 
the  course  of  the  spring,  but  the  relative  strength  remained  nearly 
as  before,  until  the  27th  of  June,  when  the  arrival  of  a  division 
from  Brest  made  the  French  numbers  somewhat  superior. 


VICK-AnMIHAL   SIR    1IYDK    PARKER  I IX    HART. 
(From  a  lithograph  by  If.  R.  Cook,  after  the  par/rail  Inj  J.  .\nrllirolr,  K.  A.) 

Shortly  before  this,  Byron  had  been  constrained  by  one  of  the 
commercial  exigencies  that  constantly  embarrassed  the  military 
action  of  the  British  admirals.  A  large  convoy  of  trading  ships, 
bound  to  England,  was  collecting  at  St.  Kitts.  and  he  thought 
necessary  to  accompany  it  part  of  the  homeward  way,  until  well 
clear  of  the  enemy's  West  India  cruisers.  For  this  purpose  he  left 
St.  Lucia  early  in  June.  As  soon  as  the  coast  was  clear,  d'Estaing, 
informed  of  his  object,  sent  a  small  combined  expedition  against 
St.  Vincent,  which  was  surrendered  on  the  18th  of  the  month.  On 
the  30th  the  French  admiral  himself  quitted  Fort  Royal  with  his 

VOL.  in.  —  28 


434 


MAJOR  OPERATIONS.     17G2-1783. 


[1779. 


whole  fleet,  —  twenty-five  ships  of  the  line  and  several  frigates,  — 
directing  his  course  for  the  British  Island  of  Grenada,  before  which 
he  anchored  on  the  2nd  of  July.  With  commendable  promptitude, 
he  landed  his  troops  that  evening,  and  on  the  4th  the  island  capitu- 
lated. Except  as  represented  by  one  small  armed  sloop,  the  York, 
12,  Lieutenant  Daniel  Dobrde,  which  was  taken,  the  British  Navy 
had  no  part  in  this  transaction.  Thirty  richly  laden  merchant  ships 
were  captured  in  the  port. 

At  daybreak  of  July  Cth,  Byron  appeared  with  twenty-one  sail  of 
the  line,  one  frigate,1  and  a  convoy  of  twenty-eight  vessels,  carrying 
troops  and  equipments.  lie  had  returned  to  St.  Lucia  on  the  1st, 
and  there  had  heard  of  the  loss  of  St.  Arincent,  with  a  rumour  that 
the  French  had  gone  against  Grenada.  lie  consequently  had  put 
to  sea  on  the  3rd,  with  the  force  mentioned. 


1  List   of  the  British  Fleet  in  the  action  off  Grenada,  July  Cth,  1779. 
IVatson,  vi.   Hid  (corrected). — \Y.  L.  C. 


From 


SUIT'S. 

Y. 
D 

o 

'd 

M 

COMMANDERS. 

LOS 

1 
£ 

Wounded,  j  y,  1 

T  1 

\  licar-Ailm.  .lo.slma  Kuwlcv.            ) 

74 

017 

7 

25 

(  Capt.  Hugli  Cloherry  Christian.  ) 

Ititynr       .... 

70 

520 

('apt.  Herbert  Sawyer. 

12 

30 

llnynl  flu/.-  .     .     . 

74 

GiiO 

('apt.   Thomas  Fit/herbert. 

4 

12 

Prince  ff  Wales    . 

74 

GOO 

\  Vice-Admiral  the  Hon.  Samuel  Harrington. 

20 

46 

(  Capt.  Benjamin  Hill. 

Magnificent       .     .        74 

000 

Capt.  John  Klphinstnnc. 

8 

11 

Triilent  ....        64 

500 

Capt.  Anthony  James  1'ye  Jlolloy. 

3 

6 

Mcdicai/       ....  GO 

420 

Capt.  William  Allleek. 

— 

4 

Finite      .... 

71 

GOO 

('apt.  John  Butt-hurt. 

4 

9 

Kon.iuch 

04 

500 

Capt.  AValter  Grillith. 

— 

— 

Kill/nil    .... 

74 

GOO 

Capt.  Alan  Gardner. 

10 

39 

Princess  Royal 

90 

770 

j  A'ice-Adm.  the  ]Ion.  John  Byron.  ) 
1  Capt.  William  Blair.                        1 

3 

6 

J  77    • 

71 

600 

dipt.  Goorrrc  Howvcr. 

Stirliny  Castle 

64 

500 

Capt.  Robert  Carkctt. 

2 

6 

Elhalelh     .     .     . 

74 

600 

('apt.    AVilliam  Truscott. 

1 

2 

Yarmouth  .     .     . 

04 

500 

Capt.  Nathaniel  Bateman. 

— 

— 

64 

500 

Capt.  the  Hon  AVilliam  Cornwallis. 

21 

in 

Vigilant      .     .     . 

64 

500 

Capt.  Sir  Digby  Dent,  Kt. 

ovy 

Conqueror  . 

74 

617 

\  Uear-Adm.  Hyde  Parker  (1).  ) 
(  Capt.  Harry  Harmood.            ) 

— 

— 

Cornwall     . 

74 

600 

Capt.  Timothy  Edwards. 

10 

27 

Monmnulh  . 

64 

500 

Capt.  Robert  Fanshawe. 

25 

28 

Grafton  .... 

74 

600 

Capt.  Thomas  Collingwood. 

35 

63 

Ariadne      .     .     . 

20 

160 

Capt.  Thomas  Pringle. 

— 

— 

1779.]  BYRON  OFF  GRENADA.  435 

The  British  approach  was  reported  to  d'Estaing  during  the  night 
of  the  5th.  Most  of  his  fleet  was  then  lying  at  anchor  off  George- 
town, at  the  south-west  of  the  island ;  some  vessels,  which  had  been 
under  way  on  look-out  duty,  had  fallen  to  leeward.1  At  4  A.M.  the 
French  began  to  lift  their  anchors,  with  orders  to  form  line  of  battle 
on  the  starboard  tack,  in  order  of  speed;  that  is,  as  rapidly  as 
possible  without  regard  to  usual  stations.  When  daylight  had  fully 
made,  the  British  fleet  was  seen  standing  down  from  the  northward, 
close  inshore,  on  the  port  tack,  with  the  wind  free  at  north-east  by 
east.  It  was  not  in  order,  as  is  evident  from  the  fact  that  the  ships 
nearest  the  enemy,  and  therefore  first  to  close,  ought  to  have  bueu 
in  the  rear  on  the  then  tack.  For  this  condition  there  is  no  evident 
excuse ;  for  a  fleet  having  a  convoy  necessarily  proceeds  so  slowly 
that  the  war-ships  can  keep  reasonable  order  for  mutual  support. 
Moreover,  irregularities  that  are  permissible  in  case  of  emergency, 
or  when  no  enemy  can  be  encountered  suddenly,  cease  to  be  so 
when  the  probability  of  an  imminent  meeting  exists.  The  worst 
results  of  the  day  are  to  be  attributed  to  this  fault.  Being  short  of 
frigates,  Byron  assigned  three  ships  of  the  line  (a),  under  Rear- 
Admiral  Rowley,  to  the  convoy,  which  of  course  was  on  the  off  hand 
from  the  enemy,  and  somewhat  in  the  rear.  It  was  understood, 
however,  that  these  would  be  called  into  the  line,  if  needful. 

When  the  French  were  first  perceived  by  Byron,  their  line  was 
forming;  the  long  thin  column  lengthening  out  gradually  to  the 
north-north-west,  from  the  confused  cluster 2  still  to  be  seen  at  the 
anchorage  (A).  Hoping  to  profit  by  their  disorder,  he  signalled  "a 
general  chase  in  that  quarter,3  as  well  as  for  Rear-Admiral  Rowley 
to  leave  the  convoy;  and  as  not  more  than  fourteen  or  fifteen  of 
the  enemy's  ships  appeared  to  be  in  line,  the  signal  was  made  for 
the  ships  to  engage,  and  form  as  they  could  yet  up" 4  It  is  clear 
from  this  not  only  that  the  ships  were  not  in  order,  but  also  that 

1  To  the  westward.     These  islands  lie  in  the  trade-winds,  which  are  constant  in 
general  direction  from  north-east. 

2  Admiral  Keppel,  in  his  evidence  before  the  Palliser  Court,  gave  an  interesting 
description  of  a  similar  scene,  although  the  present  writer  is  persuaded  that  he  was 
narrating  things  as  they  seemed,  rather  than  — as  at  Grenada  —  as  they  were.     "  The 
French   were   forming  their  line   exactly   in   the   manner   M.  Conflans   did  when 
attacked  by  Admiral  Hawke."     (Keppel  had  been  in  that  action.)     "  It  is  a  manner 
peculiar  to  themselves,  and  to  those  who  do  not  understand  it,  it  appears  like  con- 
fusion ;  they  draw  out  ship  by  ship  from  a  cluster." 

8  That  is,  towards  the  ships  at  anchor,  —  the  enemy's  rear  as  matters  then  were. 
4  Byron's  Report.     The  italics  are  the  author's. 


436 


MAJOR  OPERATIONS.     1702-1783. 


[1779. 


they  were  to  form  under  fire.  Three  ships,  the  Sultan,  74,  the 
Prince  of  Wales,  74,  and  the  £oyne,  70,  in  the  order  named,  —  the 
second  carrying  the  flag  of  Barrington,  now  a  Vice-Admiral,  —  were 
well  ahead  of  the  fleet  (b).  The  direction  prescribed  for  the  attack, 
that  of  the  clustered  ships  in  the  French  rear,  carried  the  British 


BYRON'S    ACTION   OFF   GRENADA 

6  T-"\/UL.\ 
XtAICM      "=.  ZS3»,f&. 


BYRON'S   ACTION  OFF   OKI'XAIIA. 


down  on  a  south-south-west,  or  south  by  west,  course ;  and  as  the 
enemy's  van  and  centre  were  drawing  out  to  the  north-north-west, 
the  two  lines  at  that  time  resembled  the  legs  of  a  "  V,"  the  point  of 
which  was  the  anchorage  off  Georgetown.  Barrington's  three 
ships  therefore  neared  the  French  order  gradually,  and  had  to 
receive  its  fire  for  some  time  before  they  could  reply,  unless,  by 
hauling  to  the  wind,  they  diverged  from  tlio  set  course.  This,  and 
their  isolation,  made  their  loss  very  heavy.  When  they  reached  the 
rear  of  the  French,  the  latter's  column  was  tolerably  formed,  and 
Barrington's  ships  wore  in  succession,  —  just  as  Harland's  had 
done  in  Keppel's  action,  —  to  follow  on  the  other  tack.  In  doing 
this,  the  Sultan  kept  away  under  the  stern  of  the  enemy's  rearmost 


1779.] 


THE  ACTION  OFF  GRENADA. 


437 


ship,  to  rake  her ;  to  avoid  which  the  latter  bore  up.  The  Sultan 
thus  lost  time  and  ground,  and  Barrington  took  the  lead,  standing 
along  the  French  line,  from  rear  to  van,  and  to  windward. 

Meanwhile,  the  forming  of  the  enemy  had  revealed  to  Byron  for 
the  first  time,  and  to  his  dismay,  that  he  had  been  deceived  in  think- 
ing the  French  force  inferior  to  his  own.  "However,  the  genera] 
chase  was  continued,  and  the  signal  made  for  close  engagement."  * 
The  remainder  of  the  ships  stood  down  on  the  port  tack,  as  the  first 
three  had  done,  and  wore  in  the  wake  of  the  latter,  whom  they  fol- 
lowed ;  but  before  reaching  the  point  of  wearing,  three  ships  (c), 
"the  Graf  ton,  74,  the  Cornwall,  74,  and  the  Lion,  64,  happening  to  lie 
to  leeivard,1  sustained  the  fire  of  the  enemy's  whole  line,  as  it  passed 
on  the  starboard  tack."  It  seems  clear  that,  having  had  the  wind, 
during  the  night  and  now,  and  being  in  search  of  an  enemy,  it  should 
not  have  "  happened  "  that  any  ships  should  have  been  so  far  to  lee- 
ward as  to  be  unsupported.  Captain  Thomas  White,  R.N.,  writing 
as  an  advocate  of  Hyron,  says,2  "  while  the  van  was  wearing  .  .  .  the 
sternmost  ships  were  coming  up  under  Rear-Admiral  Hyde  Parker. 
.  .  .  Among  these  ships,  the  Cornwall  and  Lion,  from  being  nearer 
the  enemy  than  those  about  them  (for  the  rear  division  had  not  then 
formed  into  line),  drew  upon  themselves  almost  the  whole  of  the 
enemy's  fire.''  No  words  can  show  more  clearly  the  disastrous,  pre- 
cipitate disorder  in  which  this  attack  was  conducted.  The  Graf  ton, 
White  says,  was  similarly  situated.  In  consequence,  these  three  were 
so  crippled,  besides  a  tremendous  loss  in  men,  that  they  dropped  far 
to  leeward  and  astern  on  the  other  tack. 

When  the  British  ships  in  general  had  got  round,  and  were  in 
line  ahead  on  the  starboard  tack, — the  same  as  the  French, — ran- 
ging from  rear  to  van  of  the  enemy  (B),  Byron  signalled  for  the  eight 
leading  ships  to  close  together,  for  mutual  support,  and  to  engage 
close.  This,  which  should  have  been  done  —  not  with  finikin  preci- 
sion, but  with  military  adequacy  —  before  engaging,  was  less  easy 
now,  in  the  din  of  battle  and  with  crippled  ships.  A  quick-eyed 
subordinate,  however,  did  something  to  remedy  the  error  of  his  chief. 
Rear-Admiral  Rowley  had  been  left  considerably  astern,  having  to 
make  up  the  distance  between  the  convoy  and  the  fleet,  As  he  fol- 
lowed the  latter,  he  saw  Barrington's  three  ships  unduly  separated, 
and  doubtless  visibly  much  mauled.  Instead,  therefore,  of  blindly 


1  Byron's  Report.    Author's  italics. 
*  '  Naval  Researches.'    London,  1830. 


p.  22. 


438  MAJOR  OPERATIONS.     1762-1783.  [1779. 

following  his  leader,  he  cut  straight  across  (a  a')  to  the  head  of  the 
column  to  support  the  van,  —  an  act  almost  absolutely  identical  with 
that  which  won  Nelson  renown  at  Cape  St.  Vincent.  In  this  he  was 
followed  by  the  Monmouth,  64,  the  brilliancy  of  whose  bearing  was  so 
conspicuous  to  the  two  fleets  that  it  is  said  the  French  officers  after 
the  battle  toasted  "  the  little  black  ship."  She  and  the  Suffolk,  74, 
Rowley's  flagship,  also  suffered  severely  in  this  gallant  feat. 

It  was  imperative  with  Byron  now  to  keep  his  van  well  up  with 
the  enemy,  lest  he  should  uncover  the  convoy,  broad  on  the  weather 
bow  of  the  two  fleets.  "  They  seemed  much  inclined  to  cut  off  the 
convoy,  and  had  it  much  in  their  power  by  means  of  their  large 
frigates,  independent  of  ships  of  the  line."  l  On  the  other  hand,  the 
Cornwall,  Graf  tun,  and  Lion,  though  they  got  their  heads  round,  could 
not  keep  up  with  the  licet  (c'),  and  were  dropping  also  to  leeward  — 
towards  the  enemy.  At  noon,  or  soon  after,  d'Estaing  bore  up  with 
the  body  of  his  force  to  join  some  of  his  vessels  that  had  fallen  to 
leeward.  Byron  very  properly  —  under  his  conditions  of  inferiority 
—  kept  his  wind;  and  the  separation  of  the  two  fleets,  thus  produced, 
caused  firing  to  cuase  at  1  r..M. 

The  enemies  were  now  ranged  on  parallel  lines,  some  distance 
apart;  still  on  the  starboard  tack,  heading  north-north-west.  Between 
the  two,  but  far  astern,  the  Cornwall,  Graf  ton,  Lion,  and  a  fourth 
British  ship,  the  Fame,  were  toiling  along,  greatly  crippled.  At  3  P.M., 
the  French,  now  in  good  order,  tacked  together,  which  caused  them 
to  head  towards  these  disabled  vessels.  Byron  at  once  imitated  the 
movement,  and  the  eyes  of  all  in  the  two  fleets  anxiously  watched 
the  result.  Captain  Corn  wall  is  of  the  Lion,  measuring  the  situation 
accurately,  saw  that,  if  he  continued  ahead,  lie  would  be  in  the  midst 
of  the  French  by  the  time  he  got  cibreast  them.  Having  only  his 
foremast  standing,  he  put  his  helm  up,  and  stood  broad  off  before 
the  wind  (c"),  across  the  enemy's  bows,  for  Jamaica.  He  was  not 
pursued.  The  other  three,  unable  to  tack  and  afraid  to  wear,  which 
would  put  them  also  in  the  enemy's  power,  stood  on,  passed  to  wind- 
ward of  the  latter,  receiving  several  broadsides,  and  so  escaped  to  the 
northward.  The  Mbnmouth  was  equally  maltreated;  in  fact,  she  had 
not  been  able  to  tack  to  the  southward  with  the  fleet.  Continuing 
north  (a'),  she  was  now  much  separated.  D'Estaing  afterwards  re- 
formed his  fleet  on  its  leewardmost  ship  (BC). 

Byron's  action  off  Grenada  was  the  most  disastrous,  viewed  as  an 
1  Byron's  Report. 


1779.] 


BYRON'S  DISASTER. 


439 


isolated  event,  that  the  British  Navy  had  encountered  since  Beachy 
Head,  in  1690.  That  the  Cornwall,  Grafton,  and  Lion  were  not  cap- 
tured was  due  simply  to  the  strained  and  cautious  inaptitude  of  the 
French  admiral.  This  Byron  virtually  admitted.  "To  my  great 
surprise  no  ship  of  the  enemy  was  detached  after  the  Lion.  The 
Grafton  and  Cornwall  might  have  been  weathered  by  the  French,  if 
they  had  kept  their  wind,  .  .  .  but  they  persevered  so  strictly  in  de- 
clining every  chance  of  close  action  that  they  contented  themselves 
with  firing  upon  these  ships  when  passing  barely  within  gunshot, 
and  suffered  them  to  rejoin  the  squadron,  without  one  effort  to  cut 
them  off."  Suffren,1  who  led  the  French  on  the  starboard  tack,  and 
whose  ship,  the  Fantasquc,  G4,  lost  22  killed  and  43  wounded,  wrote  : 
"  Had  our  admiral's  seamanship  equalled  his  courage,  we  would  not 
have  allowed  four  dismasted  ships  to  escape."  That  the  Jfuinitoxt/i, 
and  Fame  could  also  have  been  secured  is  extremely  probable ;  and 
had  Byron,  in  order  to  save  them,  borne  down  to  renew  the  action, 
the  disaster  might  have  become  a  catastrophe. 

That  nothing  resulted  to  the  French  from  their  great  advantage  is 
a  matter  for  French  naval  history,  not  for  British.  It  is  otherwise  as 
regards  the  causes  of  such  a  grave  calamity,  when  twenty  ships  met 
twenty-four,2 — a  sensible  but  not  overwhelming  superiority.  These 
facts  have  been  shown  sufficiently.  Byron's  disaster  was  due  to  attack- 
ing with  needless  precipitation,  and  in  needless  disorder.  lie  had  the 
weather-gage,  it  was  early  morning,  and  the  east  wind,  already  a 
working  breeze,  must  freshen  as  the  day  advanced.  The  French  were 
tied  to  their  new  conquest,  which  they  could  not  abandon  without 
humiliation,  not  to  speak  of  their  troops  ashore;  but  even  had  they 
wished  to  retreat,  they  could  not  have  done  so  before  a  general  chase, 
unless  prepared  to  sacrifice  their  slower  ships.  If  twenty-four  ships 
could  reconcile  themselves  to  running  from  twenty,  it  was  scarcely 
possible  but  that  the  fastest  of  these  would  overtake  the  slowest  of 
those.  There  were  time  for  fighting,  an  opportunity  for  forcing  action 

1  Pierre  A.  de  Suffren  de  Saint  Tropez,  a  Bailli  of  the  Order  of  Knights  of  Malta. 
Born  1726.  Present  at  two  naval  actions  before  he  was  twenty.  Participated  in 
1750  in  the  attack  on  Port  Million,  and  in  1759  in  the  action  off  Lagos.  Chef 
d'escadre  in  1779.  Dispatched  to  the  East  Indies.  Fought  a  British  squadron  in 
the  Bay  of  Praya,  and  a  succession  of  brilliant  actions  with  Sir  Edward  Hughes. 
Vice-Admiral,  1783.  Killed  in  a  duel,  1788.  One  of  the  greatest  of  French  naval 
officers.  — W.  L.  C. 

3  Troude  says  that  one  French  seventy-four,  having  touched  in  leaving  port,  was 
not  in  the  engagement. 


440  MAJOR  OPERATIONS.    1702-1783.  [1779. 

which  could  not  be  evaded,  and  time  also  for  the  British  to  form  in 
reasonable  order. 

It  is  important  to  consider  this,  because,  while  Keppel  must  be 
approved  for  attacking  in  partial  disorder,  Byron  must  be  blamed  for 
attacking  in  utter  disorder.  Keppel  had  to  snatch  opportunity  from 
an  unwilling  foe.  Having  himself  the  lee-gage,  he  could  not  pick  and 
choose,  nor  yet  manoeuvre ;  yet  he  brought  his  fleet  into  action,  giving 
mutual  support  throughout  nearly,  if  not  quite,  the  whole  line.  What 
Byron  did  has  been  set  forth  ;  the  sting  is  that  his  bungling  tactics  can 
find  no  extenuation  in  any  urgency  of  the  case. 

The  loss  of  the  two  fleets,  as  given  by  the  authorities  of  either 
nation,  were:  British,  183  killed,  346  wounded;  French,  190  killed, 
75U  wounded.  Of  the  British  total,  120  killed  and  235  wounded,  or 
two  thirds,  fell  to  the  two  groups  of  three  ships  each,  which  by  the 
Vice-Admiral's  mismanagement  were  successively  exposed  to  be  cut 
up  in  detail  by  the  concentrated  fire  of  the  enemy.  The  British  loss 
in  spars  and  sails — in  motive-power  —  also  exceeded  greatly  that  of 
the  French. 

After  the  action  d'Estaing  returned  quietly  to  Grenada.  Byron 
went  to  St.  Kitts  to  reiit;  but  repairs  were  most  difficult,  owing  to  the 
dearth  of  stores  in  which  the  Admiralty  had  left  the  West  Indies. 
With  all  the  skill  of  the  seamen  of  that  day  in  making  good  damages, 
the  ships  remained  long  unserviceable,  causing  great  apprehension  for 
the  other  islands.  This  state  of  tilings  d'Estaing  left  unimproved, 
as  he  had  his  advantage  in  the  battle.  lie  did,  indeed,  parade  his 
superior  force  before  Bvron's  fleet  as  it  lay  at  anchor;  but,  beyond 
the  humiliation  natural! v  felt  by  u  Navy  which  prided  itself  on  ruling 
the  sea,  no  further  injurv  was  done. 

In  August  Byron  sailed  for  England.  Vice-Admiral  Harrington 
had  already  gone  home,  wounded.  The  station  therefore  was  left  in 
command  of  Rear-Admiral  Hyde  Parker  (1),  and  so  remained  until 
the  following  March,  when  Admiral  Sir  George  Brydges  Rodney, 
K.  B.,  arrived  as  Commander-in-Chief  on  the  Leeward  Islands  Station. 
The  North  American  Station  was  given  to  Vice-Admiral  Harriot 
Arbuthnot,  who  had  under  him  a  half-dozen  ships  of  the  line,  with 
headquarters  at  New  York.  His  command  was  generally  indepen- 
dent of  Rodney's,  but  the  latter  had  no  hesitation  in  going  to  New 
York  on  emergency  and  taking  charge  there  ;  in  doing  which  he  had 
the  approval  of  the  Admiralty. 

The  approach  of  winter  in  1778  had  determined  the  cessation  of 


1779.]  THE  BRITISH  AT  SAVANNAH.  441 

operations,  both  naval  and  military,  in  the  northern  part  of  the  Ameri- 
can continent,  and  had  led  to  the  transfer  of  5,000  troops  to  the  West 
Indies,  already  noted.  At  the  same  time,  an  unjustifiable  extension 
of  British  effort,  having  regard  to  the  disposable  means,  was  undertaken 
in  the  Southern  States  of  Georgia  and  South  Carolina.  On  the  27th 
of  November  a  small  detachment  of  troops  under  Lieutenant-Colonel 
Archibald  Campbell,  sailed  from  Sandy  Hook,  convoyed  by  a  division 


ADMIHAL   MAKKIOT  AUBUTIIXOT. 
(From  a  lithograph  by  11.  21.  Cook,  after  Itic  jiorlruit  by  Rising.) 

of  frigates  commanded  by  Captain  Hyde  Parker  (2),1  in  the  Phcenix, 
44.  It  entered  the  Savannah  River  four  weeks  later,  and  soon  after- 
wards occupied  the  city  of  the  same  name.  Simultaneously  with  this, 
by  Clinton's  orders,  General  Prevost  moved  from  Florida,  then  a 
British  colony,  with  all  the  men  he  could  spare  from  the  defence  of 
St.  Augustine.  Upon  his  arrival  in  Savannah,  he  took  command  of 
the  whole  force  thus  assembled. 

i  Sir  Hyde  Parker,  Kt.    Born,  1739.    Captain,  1763.    Rear- Admiral,  1793.    Vice- 
Admiral,  1794.    Admiral,  1799.    Died,  1807.    Nelson's  chief  at  Copenhagen,  in  1801. 


442  MAJOR  OPERATIONS.    1762-1783.  [1779. 

These  operations,  which  during  1779  extended  as  far  as  the 
neighbourhood  of  Charleston,  depended  upon  the  control  of  the 
water,  and  are  a  conspicuous  example  of  misapplication  of  power  to 
the  JHMIU  of  ultimate  self-destruction.  They  were  in  1778-79  essen- 
tially of  a  minor  character,  especially  the  maritime  part,  and  will 
therefore  be  dismissed  with  the  remark  that  the  Navy,  by  small  ves- 
sels, accompanied  ever}-  movement  in  a  country  cut  up  in  all  direc- 
tions bv  water-courses,  large  and  small.  "  The  defence  of  this 
province,"  wrote  Parker,  -must  greatly  depend  on  the  naval  force 
upon  the  different  inland  creeks.  I  am  therefore  forming  some  gal- 
levs  covered  f:\nn  musketry,  \\hioh  I  believe  will  have  a  good  effect." 
Those  were  precursors  of  the  "  tiu-elads  "  of  the  American  Civil  War, 
a  century  later.  Not  even  an  armoured  ship  is  a  new  thing  under 
the  sun. 

In  the  Southern  Start's.  from  Georgia  :o  Virginia,  the  part  of  the 
N.i\  v  from  first  ;o  '..is:  w.vs  subsidi.irv.  uvuch  important.  It  is  there- 
forv  unnecessary  :o  c1  into  vlcrai'.s.  bu:  m-.\s:  necessary  to  note  that 
here,  bv  mi.sdirec::.o-:i  of  eft*:1::  .ir.o.  .»vu*e  of  means,  was  initiated  the 
:\i:a'.  movemen:  which  hencef  r:l:  .  I  .  the  small  British  ;vrmy  in 
Nor:;;  America  :u:o  ;wo  <<•.:;  r.<,  wh  .".".v  our  of  mutual  support. 
lU-rv  w.-»s  revrvv:uox\i  on  .1  '..irc-.-r.  .:.;i  i  riiertf.Te  more  fatal,  scale. 
Howe's  crr-T  o:  1777.  T:.:s  U-.l  •.l:rt--::Iv.  bv  the  inevitable  logic  of 
A  filse  y«.ts:.:io:i,  :o  C-:rv.w-.il".;s'>  r-ur;h  rhri.v.^:.  North  Canr-Iina 
iv.:o  Vir^iniA.  :o  Y.-rk:.1^:-.  ir.  17S1.  wu:.l  :o  ::.e  s:^r..il  dercoEstra- 
:iov.  of  s^\i  ivwer  off  C'r.-fsar<jike  Iviy.  '.vLich.  aexoniplished  with  a 
orish  rbe  iiKlejvtKlencr?  of  :L.~  l":u:t-.i  S:j.;e-s.  N:  h-;t>rile  scrate-^ist 
v.vr.".'.l  h*\t'  st-vtfrv.l  rhe  British  .ir-uy  nx:rv  L;:'trlcaslv  than  did 
sh«-  Brirish.  ^vtrtuti^ii:  :  no  f,i:e  C'-'v^.i  hive  b«frr.  more  inexorable 
:hj.n  w-jts  ::s  own  vtrv^rse  '.v-...  Tr.-e  vers:n.i.  alienation  and 
odivriil  ^viirrvl  K:vv-.^::  Sir  H-.r.ry  Clin:.:n  i^l  L.-rl  Comw-jtUIs. 
raeir  (.Uvivievl  courssiels  iiv.i  '.uvvr-^n;  ocdoc.  wen*  bat  the  nauirjl 
the  rvckvruoa.  of  A  <;:uji:ion.  esseniilly  stlf-cc-ntradictorv 


As  tae  aurriciEw  seiisoi!  of  ITTy  juiY-iac^.L  d'Esciiaj,  who 

brirtr  back  to  Fran.-.'*?  tae  *hij«  of  the  Line  with  which  be 
from  Tooloa  in  17T>.  Ksolv^i  to  i?>  rLrs-t  ujxxi  the  AoMn- 
cvosft.  off  Svach  Car.'ana  or  G^.ir;ui.     Arttvitcj  with  Li>  whole 
A;  the  mc>atk  of  «ke  Savannah.  A-i^i>:  -51st.  be  decided  to 
so  wrvst  tbe  «rr  o£  Savrtnrrith  twin,  the  British.    Tfcis  wvald 
hrna  of  Kill  sernce  BO  the  latter.  ha«i  it  oiycW  ta 


:::.  SPMX  natffEs  r^K  JGJTCST  XXGLJSD.  443 

their  ex-centric  undertaking ;  bat.  after  three  weeks  of  opened  trenches, 
an  assault  upon  die  plane  failed.  IVEstaing  then  sailed  for  Europe 
with  the  ships  designated  to  accompany  him.  the  others  returning  to 
the  West  Indies  in  two  squadrons,  under  De  Grasse  and  La  Motte- 
Picqnet.  Though  fruitless  in  its  main  object,  this  enterprise  of 
d'Estainij  had  the  important  indirect  effect  of  causing  the  British  to 
abandon  Xarragansett  Bay.  Upon  the  news  of  his  appearance,  Sir 
Henry  Clinton  had  felt  that,  with  his  greatly  diminished  annv.  Le 
could  not  hold  both  Rhode  Island  and  New  York.  He  therefore 
ordered  the  evacuation  of  the  former,  thus  surrendering,  to  use  again 
Rodney's  words,  ~  the  best  and  noblest  harl«:>ur  in  America."  TLr 
foil  owing  summer  it  was  occupied  in  force  by  the  Frer. ;":.. 

P'Estainij  was   succeeded  in  the  chief   comma:.  1.  in  the   V-~-  -: 
Indies  and  North  America,  by  Rear- Admiral  •.;•_-  Guichen,3 
rived  on  the  station  in  March.  17>".  aim.*:  a:  the  same  :.. 
Rodney. 

In  Jtme,  1779.  the  maritinie  situ..',  n     :  firr.-.:  Brii  .  "•  - 

come   much  more  serious  by  Spain  s  .       .:.     A:   :_.-_•   - 

moment   that  d'Estaing  with  twei.:y-r.vv    shi   -     :   :        li :.- 

frontt-d  Byron's  twenty-cine,  the  <  ::.:-....- 

<ratLerinsr  against  it  a  host  of  sixty-six.     <  ':'  this  great  nun.1^:  :J 
six  were  Sjianish. 

The  c«pen  declaration  of  Sjair. 

anc-e  with  France,  signed  on  tLe   1-  April.     F     :     .         :  :,..- 

British  gcivemment  would  take  ••          -   ~  .          -  .  .  •  :   ~-r 

step  of  bl'X-kading  the  Brest  nee:     f  thin         th  i  '.  :     - 

thus  assumimr  a  central  position  with  reference  :     it>  •.:-.- 
anticijiatinir  the   jolicy  of    Lord  St.  'X  in:-ei;t.  the   F:ri.._   M;:    • 
hurried  its  ships  to  sea  on  the  4th  of  June:   Admiral    l'r':- .11.  :-. 
Kej -pel's  oppc-nent.  still  in  command.     His  orders  werr  :     :-mi-«     r 
the  island  of  Cizarga,  where  the  Spaniards  were  t»  ;  — •     ( '-  "--- 
llth  he  was  at  his  station,  but  not  till  the  23rd  of  J-.il y  i  1  tl-  :  -ilk 
of  the  Spanish  force  appear.     During  tins  time-,  the  Frenc-L.  ias-or:- 
ciently  equippe*!  from  the  first,  owing  v>  the  haste  of  tLrir  drictrmrr. 
were  consuming  provisions  and  water,  not  to  speak  of  wasting  pleas- 
ant summer  weather.     Their  shijs  also  were  ravaged  by  an  epidemic- 

1  Looif  Urlain  de  Boocftk,  Comle  de  GuicLea.    Bon.  1712.     Ez^sred  i*  U.TT. 
173ft.     Cwnsaded  tke  lUvetn  »iiL  smcoes  in  X<?ni  Aiaeri'ji  za  175«.     &et:md  is 
ia  UK  aetknoff  Utfamt  ID  17TS.     Tfcriot  fonskl  Rodi>tT  in  dit  "VTesr 

l.    Died,  17»x  —  W.  L.  C. 


444  MAJOR  OPERATIONS.    1702-1783.  [1779. 

fever.  Upon  the  junction,  d'Orvilliers  found  that  the  Spaniards  had 
not  been  furnished  Avith  the  French  system  of  signals,  although  by 
the  treaty  the  French  admiral  was  to  be  in  chief  command.  The 
rectification  of  this  oversight  caused  further  delay,  but  on  the  llth 
of  August  the  combined  fleet  sighted  Usliant,  and  on  the  14th  was 
off  the  Lizard.  On  the  16th  it  appeared  before  Plymouth,  and  there 
on  the  17th  captured  the  Ardent,  64,  Captain  Philip  Boteler. 


AI>MII:AL  KIH  CHARLES  IIAKDY  (2),  KT. 

(From  the  lUhogrnjili   Inj  11.  11.  Cook,  after  the  portrait  by  G.  Romney.) 

Thirty-five  ships  of  the  Channel  fleet  had  gone  to  sea  on  the 
16th  of  June,  and  were  now  cruising  outside,  under  the  command 
of  Admiral  Sir  Charles  Hardy  (2).1  His  station  was  from  ten  to 

i  Admiral  Sir  Charles  Hardy  (2),  Kt.  Son  of  Vice- Admiral  Sir  Charles  Hardy 
(1),  who  died  in  1744.  Born  about  171(>.  Entered  the  Xavy,  1731.  Lieutenant, 
1737.  Commander,  1741.  Captain,  1741.  Knighted,  and  Governor  of  New  York, 
1755.  Bear-Admiral,  1756.  Employed  under  Boscaweii  and  Hawke.  Vice-Admiral, 
1762.  Admiral,  1770.  Governor  of  Greenwich  Hospital,  1771.  Commander-in- 
Chief  in  the  Channel,  1779.  Died,  1780.  —  W.  L.  C. 


1779.]  FRANCO-SPANISH  FLEET  IN   THE   CHANNEL.  445 

twenty  leagues  south-west  of  Scilly ;  consequently  he  had  not  been 
seen  by  the  enemy,  who  from  Ushant  had  stood  up  the  Channel. 
The  allies,  however,  now  nearly  double  the  numbers  of  the  British, 
were  between  them  and  their  ports, — a  serious  situation  doubtless, 
but  by  no  means  desperate';  not  so  dangerous  for  sailing  ships  as  it 
probably  will  be  for  steamers  to  have  an  enemy  between  them  and 
their  coal. 

The  alarm  in  England  was  very  great,  and  especially  in  the  south. 
On-the  9th  of  July  a  royal  proclamation  had  commanded  all  horses 
and  cattle  to  be  driven  from  the  coasts,  in  case  of  invasion.  Booms 
had  been  placed  across  the  entrance  to  Plymouth  Harbour,  and  orders 
were  sent  from  the  Admiralty  to  sink  vessels  across  the  harbour's 
mouth.  Many  who  had  the  means  withdrew  into  the  interior,  which 
increased  the  panic.  Great  merchant  fleets  were  then  on  the  sea, 
homeward  bound.  If  d'Orvilliers  were  gone  to  cruise  in  the  ap- 
proaches to  the  Channel,  instead  of  to  the  Spanish  coast,  these  might 
be  taken;  and  for  some  time  his  whereabouts  were  unknown.  As  it 
was,  the  Jamaica  convoy,  over  two  hundred  sail,  got  in  a  few  days 
before  the  allies  appeared,  and  the  Leeward  Islands  licet  had  similar 
good  fortune.  Eight  homeward  bound  East  Indiamen  were  less 
lucky,  but,  being  warned  of  their  danger,  took  refuge  in  the  Shannon, 
and  there  remained  till  the  trouble  blew  over.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  stock  market  stood  linn.  Nevertheless,  it  was  justly  felt  that 
such  a  state  of  things  as  a  vastly  superior  hostile  licet  in  the  Channel 
should  not  have  been.  "What  a  humiliating  state  is  our  country 
reduced  to!"  wrote  Jervis,  who  was  with  the  tlcet,  to  his  sister;  but 
he  added  that  he  laughed  at  the  idea  of  invasion. 

The  French  had  placed  a  force  of  iifty  thousand  men  at  Le  Havre 
and  St.  Malo,  and  collected  four  hundred  vessels  for  their  transport. 
Their  plans  were  not  certainly  known,  but  enough  had  transpired  to 
cause  reasonable  anxiety;  and  the  crisis,  on  its  face,  was  very  serious. 
Not  their  own  preparations,  but  the  inefficiency  of  their  enemies,  in 
counsel  and  in  preparation,  saved  the  British  Islands  from  invasion. 
What  the  results  of  this  would  have  been  is  another  question,  —  a 
question  of  land  warfare.  The  original  scheme  of  the  French  Min- 
istry was  to  seize  the  Isle  of  Wight,  securing  Spithead  as  an  anchor- 
age for  the  fleet,  and  to  prosecute  their  enterprise  from  this  near  and 
reasonably  secure  base.  Referring  to  this  tirst  project,  d'Orvilliers 
wrote  :  "  We  will  seek  the  enemy  at  St.  1  Iclen's,  and  then,  if  I  find 
that  roadstead  unoccupied,  or  make  myself  master  of  it,  I  will  send 


446  MAJOR   OPERATIONS.     1702-1783.  [1779. 

word  to  Marshal  De  Vaux,  at  Le  Havre,  and  inform  him  of  the 
measures  I  will  take  to  insure  his  passage,  which  [measures]  will 
depend  upon  the  position  of  the  English  main  fleet  [ddpendront 
des  forces  supeMeures  dcs  Anglais].  That  is  to  say,  I  myself  will 
lead  the  combined  fleet  on  that  side,  to  contain  the  enemy,  and 
I  will  send,  on  the  other  side,  a  light  squadron,  with  a  sufficient 
number  of  ships  of  the  line  and  frigates ;  or  I  will  propose  to  M.  de 
Cordova  to  take  this  latter  station,  in  order  that  the  passage  of  the 
arm}-  may  be  free  and  sure.  I  assume  that  then,  either  by  the 
engagement  I  shall  have  fought  witli  the  enemy,  or  by  their  retreat 
info  their  ports,  I  shall  be  certain  of  their  situation  and  of  the  success 
of  the  operation."1  It  will  be  observed  that  d'Orvilliers,  accounted 
then  and  now  one  of  the  best  officers  of  his  day  in  the  French  navy, 
takes  here  into  full  account  the  British  "fleet  in  being."2  The  main 
body  of  the  allies,  fifty  ships,  was  to  hold  this  in  check,  while  a 
smaller  force  —  Cordova  had  command  of  a  special  "squadron  of 
observation,"  of  sixteen  ships  of  the  line  —  was  to  convoy  the 
crossing. 

These  projects  all  fell  to  pieces  before  a  strong  east  wind,  and  a 
change  of  mind  in  the  French  government.  On  the  10th  of  August, 
before  Plymouth,  d'Orvilliers  was  notified  that  not  the  Isle  of 
Wight,  but  the  coast  of  Cornwall,  near  Falmouth,  was  to  be  the  scene 
of  landing.  The  effect  of  this  was  to  deprive  the  huge  fleet  of  any 
anchorage,  —  a  resource  necessary  even  to  steamers,  and  far  more 
to  sailing  vessels  aiming  to  remain  in  a  position.  As  a  point  to 
begin  shore  operations,  too,  as  well  as  to  sustain  them,  such  a  remote 
corner  of  the  country  to  be  invaded  was  absurd.  D'Orvilliers  duly 
represented  all  this,  but  could  not  stay  where  he  was  long  enough  to 
get  a  reply.  An  easterly  gale  came  on,  which  blew  hard  for  several 
days  and  drove  the  allies  out  of  the  Channel.  On  the  25th  of  August 
word  was  received  that  the  British  fleet  was  near  Scilly.  A  council 
of  war  was  then  held,  which  decided  that,  in  view  of  the  terrible 
increase  of  disease  in  the  shipping,  and  of  the  shortness  of  provisions, 
it  was  expedient  not  to  re-enter  the  Channel,  but  to  seek  the  enemy, 
and  bring  him  to  battle.  This  was  done.  On  the  29th  Hardy  was 
sighted,  being  then  on  his  return  up  Channel.  With  the  disparity 
of  force  he  could  not  but  avoid  action,  and  the  allies  were  unable  to 

1  Chevalier,  '  Marine  Francaise,'  1778.     i>.  165.     Author's  italics. 

2  But  it  was  not  merely  a  "  fleet  in  being."     It  was  also,  in  all  senses,  a  "  potential 
flett."  —  W.  L.  C. 


1779.]  THE  OBJECTS  OF  THE  WAR.  447 

compel  it.  On  the  3rd  of  September  he  reached  Spithead.  D'Or- 
villiers  soon  afterwards  received  orders  to  return  to  Brest,  and  on 
the  14th  the  combined  fleet  anchored  there. 

The  criticism  to  be  passed  on  the  conduct  of  this  summer  cam- 
paign by  the  British  Ministry  is  twofold.  In  the  first  place,  it  was 
not  ready,  according  to  the  reasonable  standard  of  the  day,  which 
recognised  in  the  probable  co-operation  of  the  two  Bourbon  king- 
doms, France  and  Spain,  the  measure  of  the  minimum  naval  force 
permissible  to  Great  Britain.  Secondly,  the  entrance  of  Spain  into  the 
war  had  been  foreseen  months  before.  For  the  inferior  force,  therefore, 
it  was  essential  to  prevent  a  junction,  —  to  take  an  interior  position. 
The  Channel  fleet  ought  to  have  been  off  Brest  before  the  French 
sailed.  After  they  were  gone,  there  was  still  fair  ground  for  the 
contention  of  the  Opposition,  that  they  should  have  been  followed, 
and  attacked,  off  the  coast  of  Spain.  During  the  six  weeks  they 
waited  there,  they  were  inferior  to  Hardy's  force.  Allowance  here 
must  be  made,  however,  for  the  inability  of  a  representative  govern- 
ment to  disregard  popular  outcry,  and  uncover  the  main  approach  to 
its  own  ports.  This,  indeed,  does  but  magnify  the  error  made  in  not 
watching  Brest  betimes,  for  a  fleet  before  Brest  covered  also  the 
Channel. 

With  regard  to  the  objects  of  the  war  in  which  they  had  become 
partners,  the  views  of  France  and  Spain  accorded  in  but  one  point,  — 
the  desirability  of  injuring  Great  Britain.  Each  had  its  own  special 
aim  for  its  own  advantage.  This  necessarily  introduced  divergence 
of  effort;  but  France,  having  first  embarked  in  the  contest  and  then 
sought  the  aid  of  an  ally,  the  particular  objects  of  the  latter  naturally 
obtained  from  the  beginning  a  certain  precedence.  Until  near  the 
close  of  the  war,  it  may  be  said  that  the  chief  ambitions  of  France 
were  in  the  West  Indies ;  those  of  Spain,  in  Europe,  —  to  regain 
Minorca  and  Gibraltar. 

In  this  way  Gibraltar  became  a  leading  factor  in  the  contest,  and 
affected,  directly  or  indirectly,  the  major  operations  throughout  the 
world,  by  the  amount  of  force  absorbed  in  attacking  and  preserving 
it.  After  the  futile  effort  in  the  Channel,  in  1779,  Spain  recalled 
her  vessels  from  Brest.  "The  project  of  a  descent  upon  England 
was  abandoned  provisionally.  To  blockade  Gibraltar,  to  have  in 
America  and  Asia  force  sufficient  to  hold  the  British  in  check, 
and  to  take  the  offensive  in  the  West  Indies,  —  such,"  wrote  the 
French  government  to  its  ambassador  in  Madrid,  "  was  the  plan  of 


448  MAJOR  OPERATIONS.    1762-1783.  [1780. 

campaign  adopted  for  1780."  Immediately  upon  the  declaration  of 
war,  intercourse  between  Gibraltar  and  the  Spanish  mainland  was 
stopped ;  and  soon  afterwards  a  blockade  by  sea  was  instituted, 
fifteen  cruisers  being  stationed  at  the  entrance  of  the  Bay,  where 
they  seized  and  sent  into  Spanish  ports  all  vessels,  neutral  or  British, 
bound  to  the  Rock.  This  blockade  was  effectively  supported  from 
Cadiz,  but  a  Spanish  force  of  some  ships  of  the  line  and  many  small 
vessels  also  maintained  it  more  directly  from  Algeciras,  on  the  opposite 
side  of  the  Bay  of  Gibraltar.  The  British  Mediterranean  squadron, 
then  consisting  only  of  one  GO-gun  ship,  three  frigates,  and  a  sloop, 
was  wholly  unable  to  afford  relief.  At  the  close  of  the  year  1779, 
flour  was  fourteen  guineas  the  barrel,  and  other  provisions  in  propor- 
tion. It  became  therefore  imminently  necessary  to  throw  in  supplies 
of  all  kinds,  as  well  as  to  reinforce  the  garrison.  To  this  service 
Rodney  was  assigned  ;  and  witli  it  he  began  the  brilliant  career,  the 
chief  scene  of  which  was  to  be  in  the  West  Indies. 

Rodney  was  appointed  to  command  the  Leeward  Islands  Station 
on  the  1st  of  October,  1779.  He  was  to  be  accompanied  there  imme- 
diately by  only  four  or  five  ships  of  the  line ;  but  advantage  was 
taken  of  his  sailing,  to  place  under  the  charge  of  an  officer  of  his 
approved  reputation  a  great  force,  composed  of  his  small  division 
and  a  large  fraction  of  the  Channel  fleet,  to  convoy  supplies  and 
reinforcements  to  Gibraltar  and  Minorca.  On  the  29th  of  December 
the  whole  body,  after  many  delays  in  getting  down  Channel,  put  to 
sea  from  Plymouth :  twenty-two  ships  of  the  line,  fourteen  frigates 
and  smaller  vessels,  besides  a  huge  collection  of  store-ships,  victuallers, 
ordnance  vessels,  troop-ships,  and  merchantmen,  —  the  "  trade  "  for 
the  West  Indies  and  Portugal. 

On  the  7th  of  January,  a  hundred  leagues  west  of  Cape  Finisterre, 
the  West  India  ships  parted,  under  convoy  of  a  ship  of  the  line  and 
three  frigates.  At  daylight  on  the  8th,  twenty-two  sail  were  seen  to 
the  north-east,  the  squadron  apparently  having  passed  them  in  the 
night.  Chase  was  at  once  given,  and  the  whole  were  taken  in  a  few 
hours.  Seven 1  were  ships  of  war,  chiefly  frigates ;  the  remainder 
merchant  vessels,  laden  with  naval  stores  and  provisions  for  the 
Spanish  fleet  at  Cadiz.  The  provision  ships,  twelve  in  number,  were 
diverted  at  once  to  the  relief  of  Gibraltar,  under  charge  of  the  Span- 

1  Guipuscoana,  64  (added  to  the  Royal  Navy  as  Prince  William) ;  San  Carloi, 
32;  San  Rafael,  30;  San  Bruno,  26;  Santa  Teresa,  24;  San  Fmnin,  16;  San  Vincente, 
14.  Steel's  '  Navy  List ':  Beatson,  vi.  233.  —  W.  L.  C. 


1780.]  RODNEY  AT  GIBRALTAR.  449 

ish  sixty-four,  which  had  been  one  of  their  convoy  before  capture, 
and  had  now  received  a  British  crew.  Continuing  on,  intelligence 
was  received  from  time  to  time  by  passing  vessels  that  a  Spanish 
squadron  was  cruising  off  Cape  St.  Vincent.  Thus  forewarned,  orders 
were  given  to  all  captains  "to  be  prepared  for  battle  as  the  Cape  was 
neared.  On  the  16th  it  was  passed,  and  at  1  I'.M.  sails  in  the  south- 
east were  signalled.  These  were  a  Spanish  squadron  of  eleven  ships 
of  the  line,  and  two  26-gun  frigates.  Rodney  at  once  bore  down  for 
them  under  a  press  of  canvas,  making  signal  for  the  line  abreast. 
Seeing,  however,  that  the  enemy  was  trying  to  form  line  of  battle 
on  the  starboard  tack,  which  with  a  westerly  wind  was  with  heads  to 
the  southward,  towards  Cadiz,  a  hundred  miles  to  the  south-east,  he 
changed  the  orders  to  a  "  General  Chase,"  the  slaps  to  engage  as 
they  came  up  ;  "  to  leeward,"  so  as  to  get  between  the  enemy  and 
his  post,  and  "  in  rotation,"  by  which  probably  was  meant  that  the 
leading  British  vessel  should  attack  the  sternmost  of  the  Spaniards, 
and  that  her  followers  should  pass  her  to  leeward,  successively  en- 
gaging from  the  enemy's  rear  towards  the  van. 

At  4  P.M.  the  signal  for  battle  was  made,  and  a  few  minutes 
later  the  four  headmost  of  the  pursuers  got  into  action.  At  4.40 
one  of  the  Spanish  ships,  the  Santo  Dominyo,  70,  blew  up  with  all  on 
board,  and  at  6  another  struck.  By  this  hour,  it  being  January, 
darkness  had  set  in.  A  night  action  therefore  followed,  which 
lasted  until  2  A.M.,  when  the  headmost  of  the  enemy  surrendered, 
and  all  firing  ceased.  Of  the  eleven  hostile  ships  of  the  line,  only 
four  escaped.  Besides  the  one  blown  up,  six  were  taken.  These 
were  the  Feniz,  80,  flag  of  the  Spanish  Admiral,  Dun  Juan  de  Lap.- 
gara,  the  Monarca,  70,  the  Princesa,  70,  the  Diliyentc,  70,  the  San 
Julian,  70,  and  the  San  Eugenia,  70.  The  two  latter  drove  ashore 
and  were  lost.1  The  remaining  four  were  brought  into  Gibraltar, 
and  were  ultimately  added  to  the  Navy.  All  retained  their  old 
names,  save  the  Fenix,  which  was  re-named  Gibraltar.  "  The 
weather  during  the  night,"  by  Rodney's  report,  "  was  at  times  very 
tempestuous,  with  a  great  sea.  It  continued  very  bad  weather  the 
next  day,  when  the  Royal  Georcje,  100,  Prince  Geonje,  90,  Sandwich. 
90  (Rodney's  flagship),  and  several  other  ships  were  in  great  danger, 
and  under  the  necessity  of  making  sail  to  avoid  the  shoals  of  San 
Lucar,  nor  did  they  get  into  deep  water  till  the  next  morning." 

1  Rodney's  Report.     Chevalier  says  that  one  of  them  was  retaken  by  her  crew 
and  carried  into  Cadiz. 
VOL.  in.  — 29 


450  MAJOR  OPERATIONS.    1762-1783.  [1780. 

It  was  in  this  danger  from  a  lee  shore,  which  was  deliberately 
though  promptly  incurred,  that  the  distinction  of  this  action  of 
Rodney's  consists.  The  enemy's  squadron,  being  only  eleven  ships 
of  the  line,  was  but  half  the  force  of  the  British,  and  it  was  taken 
by  surprise  ;  which,  to  be  sure,  is  no  excuse  for  a  body  of  war-ships 
in  war-time.  Caught  unawares,  the  Spaniards  took  to  flight  too 
late.  It  was  Rodney's  merit,  and  no  slight  one  under  the  conditions 
of  weather  and  navigation,  that  they  were  not  permitted  to  retrieve 
their  mistake.  His  action  left  nothing  to  be  desired  in  resolution 
or  readiness.  It  is  true  that  Rodney  discussed  the  matter  with  his 
flag-captain,  Walter  Young,  and  that  rumour  attributed  the  merit 
of  the  decision  to  the  latter;  but  this  sort  of  detraction  is  of  too 
common  occurrence  to  affect  opinion.  Sir  Gilbert  Blane,  Physician 
to  the  Fleet,  gives  the  following  account:  "When  it  was  close 
upon  sunset,  it  became  a  question  whether  the  chase  should  be  con- 
tinued. After  some  discussion  between  the  Admiral  and  Captain, 
at  which  1  was  present,  the  Admiral  being  confined  with  the  gout, 
it  was  decided  to  persist  in  the  same  course,  with  the  signal  to 
engage  to  leeward."  Rodney  at  that  time  was  nearly  sixty-two, 
and  a  constant  martyr  to  gout  in  both  feet  and  hands. 

The  two  successes  by  the  way  imparted  a  slightly  triumphal 
character  to  the  welcome  of  the  Admiral  by  the  garrison,  then  sorely 
in  need  of  some  good  news.  The  arrival  of  much-needed  supplies 
from  home  was  itself  a  matter  of  rejoicing  ;  but  it  was  more  inspirit- 
ing still  to  see  following  in  the  train  of  the  friendly  fleet  five  hostile 
ships  of  the  line,  one  of  them  bearing  the  flag  of  a  Commander-in- 
Chief,  and  to  hear  that,  1  it-sides  these,  three  more  had  been  sunk  or 
destroyed.  The  exultation  in  England  was  even  greater,  and  es- 
pecially at  the  Admiralty,  which  was  labouring  under  the  just 
indignation  of  the  people  for  the  nnpreparedness  of  the  Navy. 
'•  You  have  taken  more  line-of-battle  ships,"  wrote  the  First  Lord 
to  Rodnev,  "  than  had  been  captured  in  any  one  action  in  either  of 
the  two  last  preceding  wars." 

It  should  be  remembered,  too,  as  an  element  in  the  triumph,  that 
this  advantage  over  an  exposed  detachment  had  been  snatched,  as 
it  were,  in  the  teeth  of  a  main  fleet  superior  to  Rodney's  own ;  for 
twenty  Spanish  and  four  French  ships  of  the  line,  under  Admiral  de 
Cordova,  were  lying  then  in  Cadiz  Bay.  During  the  eighteen  days 
when  the  British  remained  in  and  near  the  Straits,  no  attempt  was 
made  by  Cordova  to  take  revenge  for  the  disaster,  or  to  reap  the 


1780.]  RODNEY  SAILS  FOR  THE  WEST  INDIES.  451 

benefit  of  superior  force.  The  inaction  was  due,  probably,  to  the 
poor  condition  of  the  Spanish  ships  in  point  of  efficiency  and  equip- 
ment, and  largely  to  their  having  uncoppered  bottoms.  This  ele- 
ment of  inferiority  in  the  Spanish  navy  should  be  kept  in  mind  as 
a  factor  in  the  general  war, 'although  Spanish  fleets  did  not  come 
much  into  battle.  A  French  Commodore,  then  with  the  Spanish 
fleet  in  Ferrol,  wrote  as  follows :  "  Their  ships  all  sail  so  badly  that 
they  can  neither  overtake  an  enemy  nor  escape  from  one.  The 
Glorieux  is  a  bad  sailer  in  the  French  navy,  but  better  than  the 
best  among  the  Spaniards."  He  adds:  "The  vessels  of  Langara's 
squadron  were  surprised  at  immense  distances  one  from  the  other. 
Thus  they  always  sail,  and  their  negligence  and  security  on  this 
point  are  incredible." 

On  approaching  Gibraltar,  the  continuance  of  bad  weather,  and 
the  strong  easterly  current  of  the  Straits,  set  many  of  Rodney's 
ships  and  convoy  to  leeward,  to  the  back  of  the  Rock,  and  it  was 
not  till  the  26th  that  the  flagship  herself  anchored.  The  storeships 
for  Minorca  were  sent  on  at  once,  under  charge  of  three  coppered 
ships  of  the  line.  The  practice  of  coppering,  though  then  fully 
adopted,  had  not  yet  extended  to  all  vessels.  As  an  element  of 
speed,  it  was  an  important  factor  on  an  occasion  like  this,  when 
time  pressed  to  get  to  the  "West  Indies  ;  as  it  also  was  in  an  engage- 
ment. The  action  on  the  IGth  had  been  opened  bv  the  coppered 
ships  of  the  line,  which  first  overtook  the  retreating  enemy  and 
brought  his  rear  to  battle.  In  the  French  navy  at  the  time,  Suffren 
was  urging  the  adoption  upon  an  apparently  reluctant  Minister. 
It  would  seem  to  have  been  more  general  among  the  British,  swing 

o  o  o          o 

far  to  compensate  for  the  otherwise  inferior  qualities  of  their  ships. 
"The  Spanish  men-of-war  we  have  taken,"  wrote  Rodney  to  his 
wife  concerning  these  prizes,  "  are  much  superior  to  ours.''  It  may 
be  remembered  that  Nelson,  thirteen  years  later,  said  the  same. 
"I  perceive  you  ciy  out  loudly  for  coppered  ships,"  wrote  the  First 
Lord  to  Rodney  after  this  action  ;  "  and  I  am  therefore  determined 
to  stop  your  mouth.  You  shall  have  copper  enough." 

Upon  the  return  of  the  ships  from  Minorca,  Rodney  put  to  sea 
again  on  the  13th  of  February,  for  the  West  Indies.  The  detach- 
ment from  the  Channel  fleet  accompanied  him  three  days'  sail  on  his 
way,  and  then  parted  for  England  with  the  prizes.  On  this  return 
voyage  it  fell  in  with  fifteen  French  supply  vessels,  convoyed  by  two 
sixty-fours,  bound  for  the  lie  de  France,  in  the  Indian  Ocean.  One 


452  MAJOR  OPERATIONS.    1762-1783.  [1780. 

of  the  ships  of  war,  the  Protcc,  and  three  of  the  storeships  were  taken. 
Though  trivial,  the  incident  illustrates  the  effect  of  operations  in 
Europe  upon  war  in  India.  It  may  be  mentioned  here  as  indicative 
of  the  government's  dilemmas,  that  Rodney  was  censured  for  hav- 
ing left  one  ship  of  the  line  at  the  Rock.  "  It  has  given  us  the 
trouble  and  risk  of  sending  a  frigate  on  purpose  to  order  her  home 
immediately;  and  if  yon  will  look  into  your  original  instructions,  you 
will  find  that  there  was  no  point  more  strongly  guarded  against  than 
that  of  your  leaving  any  line-of-battle  ship  behind  you."  These 
words  clearly  show  the  exigency  and  peril  of  the  general  situation, 
owing  to  the  inadequate  development  of  the  naval  force  as  compared 
with  its  foes.  Such  isolated  ships  ran  the  gauntlet  of  the  fleets  flank- 
ing their  routes  in  Cadiz,  Ferrol,  and  Brest. 

"When  Rodney  arrived  at  St.  Lucia  with  his  four  ships  of  the  line, 
on  the  27th  of  March,  he  found  there  a  force  of  sixteen  others,  com- 
posed in  about  equal  proportions  of  ships  that  had  left  England  with 
Byron  in  the  summer  of  177^.  and  of  a  reinforcement  brought  by 
Rear- Admiral  Rowley  in  the  spring  of  1779. 

During  the  temporary  command  of  Rear-Admiral  Hyde  Parker, 
a  smart  affair  had  taken  place  between  a  detachment  of  the  squadron 
and  one  from  the  French  division,  under  La  Motte-Picquet,  then 
lying  in  Fort  Royal. 

On  the  IStli  of  December,  1770,  between  8  and  9  A.M.,  the  British 
look-out  ship,  the  Preston,  50,  between  Martinique  and  St.  Lucia, 
made  signal  for  a  ileet  to  windward,  which  proved  to  be  a  body  of 
French  supply  ships,  twenty-six  in  number,  under  convoy  of  a  frigate. 
Both  the  British  and  the  French  squadrons  were  in  disarray,  sails 
unbent,  ships  on  the  heel  or  partially  disarmed,  crews  ashore  for 
wood  and  water.  In  both,  signals  flew  at  once  for  certain  ships  to 
get  under  way,  and  in  both  the  orders  were  executed  with  a  rapidity 
gratifying  to  the  two  commanders,  who  also  went  out  in  person. 
The  British,  however,  were  outside  first,  with  five  sail  of  the  line 
and  a  50-gim  ship.  Nine  of  the  merchant  vessels  were  captured 
by  them,  and  four  forced  ashore.  The  French  Rear-Admiral  had 
by  this  time  got  out  of  Fort  Royal  with  three  ships  of  the  line,  —  the 
Annibal,  74,  Vcnycur,  64,  and  Reflechi,  64,  —  and,  being  to  windward, 
covered  the  entrance  of  the  remainder  of  the  convoy.  As  the  two 
hostile  divisions  were  now  near  each  other,  with  a  fine  working 
breeze,  the  British  tried  to  beat  up  to  the  enemy  ;  the  Conqueror,  74, 
Captain  Walter  Griffith,  being  ahead  and  to  windward  of  her  consorts. 


1780.]  RODNEY  AND  DE  QUICKEN.  453 

Coming  within  range  at  5,  firing  began  between  her  and  the  French 
flagship,  Annibal,  74,  and  subsequently  between  her  and  all  the  three 
vessels  of  the  enemy.  Towards  sunset,  the  Albion,  74,  had  got  close 
up  with  the  Conqueror,  and  the  other  ships  were  within  distant  range  ; 
"  but  as  they  had  worked  not  only  well  within  the  dangers  of  the 
shoals  of  the  bay  (Fort  Royal),  but  within  reach  of  the  batteries,  I 
called  them  off  by  night  signal  at  a  quarter  before  seven."  J  In  this 
chivalrous  skirmish,  —  for  it  was  little  more,  although  the  injury 
to  the  French  in  the  loss  of  the  convoy  was  notable,  —  Parker  was 
equally  delighted  with  his  own  squadron  and  with  his  enemy.  "  The 
steadiness  and  coolness  with  which  on  every  tack  the  Conqueror 
received  the  fire  of  these  three  ships,  and  returned  her  own,  work- 
ing his  ship  with  as  much  exactness  as  if  he  had  been  turning  into 
Spithead,  and  on  every  board  gaining  on  the  enemy,  gave  me  infi- 
nite pleasure.  It  was  with  inexpressible  concern,"  he  added,  "  that 
I  heard  that  Captain  Walter  Griflith,  of  the  Conqueror,  was  killed  by 
the  last  broadside.'' 1  Having  occasion,  a  few  days  later,  to  exchange 
a  flag  of  truce  with  the  French  Rear-Admiral,  he  wrote  to  him: 
"  The  conduct  of  your  Excellency  in  the  affair  of  the  18th  of  this 
month  fully  justifies  the  reputation  which  you  enjoy  among  us,  and 
I  assure  you  that  I  could  not  witness  without  envy  the  skill  you 
showed  on  that  occasion.  Our  enmity  is  transient,  depending  upon 
our  masters  ;  but  your  merit  lias  stamped  upon  my  heart  the  greatest 
admiration  for  yourself."  This  was  the  officer  who  was  commonly 
known  in  his  time  as  "  Vinegar "  Parker ;  but  these  letters  show 
that  the  epithet  fitted  the  rind  rather  than  the  kernel. 

Shortly  after  de  Guicheii  took  command,  he  arranged  with  the 
Marquis  de  Bouille",  Governor  of  Martinique,  to  make  a  combined 
attack  upon  some  one  of  the  British  West  India  Islands.  For  this 
purpose  3,000  troops  were  embarked  in  the  fleet,  which  sailed  on  the 
night  of  the  13th  of  April,  1780,  intending  first  to  accompany  a 
convoy  for  Santo  Domingo,  until  it  was  safely  out  of  reach  of  the 
British.  Rodney,  who  was  informed  at  once  of  the  French  departure, 
put  to  sea  in  chase  with  all  his  ships,  twenty  of  the  line,  two  of  which 
were  of  90  guns,  and  on  the  IGth  came  in  sight  of  the  enemy  to  lee- 
ward of  Martinique,  beating  up  against  the  north-east  trade- winds, 
and  intending  to  pass  through  the  channel  between  that  island  and 
•Dominica.  "  A  general  chase  to  the  north-west  followed,  and  at  five 

1  Parker's  Report. 


454 


MAJOR   OPERATIONS.     1762-1783. 


[1780. 


in  the  evening  we  plainly  discovered  that  they  consisted  of  twenty- 
three  sail  of  the  line,  and  one  fifty-gun  ship."  1 

As  it  fell  dark  Rodney  formed  his  line  of  battle,2  standing  still 
to  the  north-west,  therefore  on  the  starboard  tack  ;  and  he  was  atten- 
tive to  keep  to  windward  of  the  enemy,  whom  his  frigates  watched 
diligently  during  the  night.  "  Their  manoeuvres,"  he  wrote,  "  indi- 
cated a  wish  to  avoid  battle,"  and  he  therefore  was  careful  to  coun- 

1  Rodney's  Report.     The  French  authorities  give  their  line  of  battle  as  twenty- 
two  ships  of  the  line.     There  was  no  90-gun  ship  among  them  —  no  three-decker; 
but  there  were  two  of  80  guns,  of  which  also  the  British  had  none. 

2  British  line  of  battle  on  April  17th,  1780.     The  Stirling  Castle  to  lead  with 
the  starboard,  and  the  Magnificent  with  the  larboard  tacks  on  board.     From  Beatson, 
vi.,  217,  218,  with  additions  and  corrections.  — W.  L.  C. 


SHIPS. 

COMMANDERS. 

i 

0) 

1 

H 

o 

O 

S 

M 

Stirling  CVf.sV/e 

61 

500 

Capt.  Robert  C'arkett. 

4 

34 

74 

600 

Capt.  Samuel  Uvedale. 

4 

13 

•f 

Elizabeth  .... 

74 

600 

Capt.  Hon.  Fredk.  Lewis  Maitland. 

9 

15 

> 

„  .  .           ,,ni    j 

90 

770 

Rear-  Admiral  Hyde  Parker  (R). 

5 

14 

Capt.  Harry  Harmood. 

1  Ibinn 

7-1 

600 

('apt.  George  Bowyer. 

3 

2 

Terrible     .... 

74 

600 

Capt.  John  Douglas. 

Trident     .... 

64 

500 

('apt.  Anthony  James  Pye  Molloy. 

14 

26 

Greyhound,  28  . 

Capt.  William  Dickson. 

— 

— 

fti'ftfton     .... 

74 

600 

Commod.  Thomas  Collingwood.  ) 

2 

30 

Capt.  Thomas  Xewnham. 

Yarmouth 

64 

500 

Capt.  Nathaniel  Bateman. 

5 

15 

Cornwall  .... 

74 

600 

Capt.  Timothy  Edwards. 

21 

49 

^ 

Sandwich  .... 

90 

752 

Aclin.  Sir  George  Brydges  Rodney  (W).  j 

18 

51 

- 
•- 

Capt.  Walter  Young.                                ) 

'li 

.S'»/oK;       .... 

74 

600 

('apt.  Abraham  Crespin. 

— 

12 

o 

floync 

70 

520 

Caiit.  Charles  Cotton. 

2 

Vigilant    .... 

64 

500 

Capt.  Sir  George  Home,  Bart. 

2 

Few  MS,  36    .     . 

Capt.  John  Fergusson. 

— 

— 

Pegasus,  28  .     . 

Capt.  John  Bazely  (1). 

— 

— 

ZtoZ  CMe,  24 

Capt.  William  Fooks. 

— 

— 

Vengeance  .... 

74 

617 

(  Commod.  William  Hotham.  ) 
I  Capt.  John  Holloway.             ) 

4 

6 

Mcdway     .... 

60 

420 

Capt.  William  Affleck. 

2 

3 

Montagu    .... 

74 

600 

Capt.  John  Houlton. 

9 

26 

•- 

Conqueror  .... 

74 

617 

Rear-  Admiral  Joshua  Rowley  (R).  ) 
Capt.  Thomas  Watson.                     i 

13 

3S 

Intrepid    .... 

64 

500 

Capt.  the  Hon.  Henry  St.  John. 

7 

10 

Magnificent    .     . 

74 

600 

Capt.  John  Elphinstone. 

1 

10 

Andromeda,  28 

Capt.  Henry  Bryne. 

— 

— 

Centurion,*  50 

Capt.  Richard  Brathwaite. 

— 

— 

*  To  assist  the  Rear  in  case  of  need. 


1780.] 


RODNEY  AND   DE  GUICHEN. 


455 


teract  them.  At  daylight  of  the  17th,  they  were  seen  forming  line 
of  battle,  on  the  port  tack,  four  or  five  leagues  to  leeward,  —  that  is, 
to  the  westward.  The  wind  being  east,  or  east  by  north,  the  French 
would  be  heading  soutlnsouth-east  (Fig.  1,  aa).  The  British  order 
now  was  rectified  by  signal  from  the  irregularities  of  darkness, 
the  ships  being  directed  to  keep  two  cables' 1  lengths  apart,  and 
steering  as  before  to  the  northward  and  westward  (a).  At  7  A.M., 


a    RODN  t v    AND     C 
J7  r"  ^rrii. 

TlC     I  . 
r,~s-r   Mt^cewt.     8 


^o^.^rx:  \  \  -, 


XKY   AND   PE 


considering  this  line  too  extended,  the  Admiral  closed  the  intervals 
to  one  cable.  The  two  fleets  thus  were  passing  on  nearly  parallel 
lines,  but  in  opposite  directions,  which  tended  to  bring  the  whole 
force  of  Rodney,  whose  line  was  better  and  more  compact  than  the 
enemy's,  abreast  the  latter's  rear,  upon  which  he  intended  to  concen- 
trate. At  8  A.M.  he  made  general  signal  that  this  was  his  purpose  ; 
and  at  8.30,  to  execute  it,  he  signalled  for  the  ships  to  form  line 
abreast,  bearing  from  each  other  south  by  east  and  north  by  west, 
and  stood  down  at  once  upon  the  enemy  (Fig.  1,  bb).  The  object 
1  A  cable  was  then  assumed  to  have  a  length  of  120  fathoms,  —  720  feet. 


456  MAJOR   OPERATIONS.    1762-1783.  [1780. 

of  the  British  being  evident,  tie  Guichen  made  his  fleet  wear  together 
to  the  starboard  tack  (bb).  The  French  rear  thus  became  the  van, 
and  their  former  van,  which  was  stretched  too  far  for  prompt  assist- 
ance to  the  threatened  rear,  now  headed  to  support  it. 

Rodney,  baulked  in  his  first  spring,  hauled  at  once  to  the  wind 
on  the  port  tack  (Fig.  1,  cc),  again  contrary  to  the  French,  standing 
thus  once  more  along  their  line,  for  their  new  rear.  The  intervals 
were  opened  out  again  to  two  cables.  The  fleets  thus  were  passing 
once  more  on  parallel  lines,  each  having  reversed  its  order  ;  but  the 
British  still  retained  the  advantage,  on  whatever  course,  that  they 
were  much  more  compact  than  the  French,  whose  line,  by  Rodney's 
estimate,  extended  tour  leagues  in  length.1  The  wariness  of  the  two 
combatants,  both  trained  in  the  school  of  the  eighteenth  century,  with 
its  reverence  for  the  line  of  battle,  will  appear  to  the  careful  reader. 
Rodney,  although  struggling  through  this  chrysalis  stage  to  the  later 
vigour,  and  seriously  bent  on  a  deadlv  blo\v,  still  was  constrained 

O  •  ' 

by  the  traditions  of  \vatehful  fencing.  Nor  was  his  caution  extrava- 
gant; conditions  did  not  justify  yet  the  apparent  recklessness  of 
Nelson's  tactics.  •-  The  different  movements  of  the  enemy,''  he  wrote, 
"obliged  me  to  he  very  attentive,  and  watch  every  opportunity  that 
offered  of  attacking  them  to  advantage." 

The  t\vo  fleets  continued  to  stand  on  opposite  parallel  courses  — 
the  French  north  by  west,  the  British  south  by  east — -until  the  flag- 
ship Sandwich,  '.'<),  was  abreast  the  Couronne,  80,  the  flagship  of  de 
(luichen.  Then,  at  10. lit  A.M.,  the  signal  was  made  to  wear  together, 
forming  on  the  .same  tack  as  the  enemy.  There  being  some  delay  in 
execution,  this  had  to  be  repeated,  and  further  enforced  by  the  pen- 
nant of  the  Stiiiiiuj  Castle,  which,  as  the  rear  ship,  should  begin  the 
evolution.  At  half-past  ten,  apparently,  the  fleet  was  about  (Fig.  2, 
aa),  for  an  order  was  then  given  for  rectifying  the  line,  still  at  two 
cables.  At  11  A.M.  the  Admiral  made  the  signal  to  prepare  for 
battle,  ''to  convince  the  whole  fleet  I  was  determined  to  bring  the 
enemy  to  an  engagement,"  2  and  to  this  succeeded  shortly  the  order 
to  alter  the  course  to  port  (bb),  towards  the  enemy.3  Why  he 
thought  that  any  of  the  fleet  should  have  required  such  assurance 

1  A  properly  formed  line  of  twenty  ships,  at  two  cables'  interval,  would  be  about 
five  miles  long.  Rodney  seems  to  have  been  satisfied  that  this  was  about  the  con- 
dition of  his  fleet  at  this  moment. 

1  Rodney's  Report. 

8  Testimony  of  the  signal  officer  at  the  court-martial  on  Captain  Bateman. 


1780.] 


RODNEY  AND  DE  QUICKEN. 


457 


cannot  certainly  be  said.  Possibly,  although  he  had  so  recently 
joined,  he  had  already  detected  the  ill-will,  or  the  slackness,  of  which 
he  afterwards  complained ;  possibly  he  feared  that  the  wariness  of 
his  tactics  might  lead  men  to  believe  that  he  did  not  mean  to  exceed 
the  lukewarm  and  indecisive  action  of  days  scarce  yet  passed  away, 
which  had  led  Suffren  to  stigmatise  tactics  as  a  mere  veil,  behind 
which  timidity  thinks  to  hide  its  nakedness. 


RODNEY   AND   DE    CUICHKN 

/7  r"  Jrr,  ,i_ 
., I 


S,fo~     /*.   «  ,.    *  .-^—  ~'     '     ''    t     *    *     ' 

'::~;s    J7//!1*''1 


KODSEY   AND   DE   GflCHEX. 


At  11.50  A.M.  the  decisive  signal  was  made  "for  every  ship  to 
bear  down,  and  steer  for  her  opposite  in  the  enemy's  line,  agreeable 
to  the  21st  article  of  the  Additional  Fighting  Instructions."  Five 
minutes  later,  when  the  ships,  presumably,  had  altered  their  course 
for  the  enemy,  the  signal  for  battle  was  made,  followed  by  the  mes- 
sage that  the  Admiral's  intention  was  to  engage  closely ;  he  expect- 
ing, naturally,  that  every  ship  would  follow  the  example  he  purposed 
to  set.  The  captain  of  the  leading  ship,  upon  whose  action  depended 
that  of  those  near  her,  unfortunately  understood  the  Admiral's  signal 
to  mean  that  he  was  to  attack  the  enemy's  leader,  not  the  ship  oppo- 


458  MAJOR  OPERATIONS.    1762-1783.  [1780. 

site  to  him  at  the  moment  of  bearing  away.  This  ship,  therefore, 
diverged  markedly  from  the  Admiral's  course,  drawing  after  him 
many  of  the  van.  A  few  minutes  before  1  P.M.,  one  of  the  headmost 
ships  began  to  engage  at  long  range  ;  but  it  was  not  till  some  time 
after  1  P.M.  that  the  Sandwich,  having  received  several  broadsides, 
came  into  close  action  Avith  the  second  vessel  astern  from  the  French 
Admiral,  the  Actionnairc,  G4.  The  latter  was  soon  beat  out  of  the 
line  by  the  superiority  of  the  Sandwich's  battery,  and  the  same  lot 
befell  the  ship  astern  of  her,  —  probably  the  Intrepide,  74,  —  which 
came  up  to  close  the  gap.  Towards  2.30  P.M.,  the  Sandwich,  either 
by  her  own  efforts  to  close,  or  by  her  immediate  opponents'  keeping 
away,  was  found  to  be  to  leeward  of  the  enemy's  line,  the  Couronne 
being  on  her  weather  bow.  The  fact  was  pointed  out  by  Rodney  to 
the  captain  of  the  ship,  Walter  Young,  who  was  then  in  the  lee 
gangway.  Young,  going  over  to  look  for  himself,  saw  that  it  was 
so,  and  that  the  Yarmouth,  64,  had  hauled  off  to  windward,  where 
she  lay  with  her  main  and  mizzen  topsails  aback.  Signals  were  then 
made  to  her,  and  to  the  Cornwall,  74,  to  come  to  closer  engagement, 
they  both  being  on  the  weather  bow  of  the  flagship. 

De  Guiuhen,  recognising  this  state  of  affairs,  then  or  a  little  later, 
attributed  it  to  the  deliberate  purpose  of  the  British  Admiral  to 
break  his  line.  It  does  not  appear  that  Rodney  so  intended.  His 
tactical  idea  was  to  concentrate  his  whole  fleet  on  the  French  rear 
and  centre,  but  there  is  no  indication  that  he  now  aimed  at  breaking 
the  line.  De  Guichen  so  construing  it,  however,  gave  the  signal  to 
wear  together.  The  effect  of  this,  in  any  event,  would  have  been 
to  carry  his  fleet  somewhat  to  leeward ;  but  with  ships  more  or  less 
crippled,  taking  therefore  greater  room  to  manoeuvre,  and  with  the 
exigency  of  re-forming  the  line  upon  them,  the  tendency  was  exag- 
gerated. The  movement  which  the  French  called  wearing  together 
was  therefore  differently  interpreted  by  Rodney.  "  The  action  in 
the  centre  continued  till  4.15  p.  M.,  when  M.  de  Guichen,  in  the 
Couronne,  the  Triomphant,  and  the  Fcndant,  after  engaging  the 
Sandwich  for  an  hour  and  a  half,  bore  away.  The  superiority  of  fire 
from  the  Sandivich,  and  the  gallant  behaviour  of  the  officers  and 
men,  enabled  her  to  sustain  so  unequal  a  combat ;  though  before 
attacked  by  them,  she  had  beat  three  ships  out  of  their  line  of 
battle,  had  entirely  broke  it,  and  was  to  leeward  of  the  French 
Admiral."  Possibly  the  French  accounts,  if  they  were  not  so  very 
meagre,  might  dispute  this  prowess  of  the  flagship ;  but  there  can  be 


1780.] 


RODNEY  CENSURES  PARKER  AND  ROWLEY. 


459 


no  doubt  that  Rodney  had  set  an  example,  which,  had  it  been  followed 
by  all,  would  have  made  this  engagement  memorable,  if  not  decisive. 
He  reported  that  the  captains,  with  very  few  exceptions,  had  not 
placed  their  ships  properly  (cc).  The  Sandwich  had  eighty  shot  in 
her  hull,  had  lost  her  foremast  and  mainyard,  and  had  fired  3,288 
rounds,  an  average  of  73  to  each  gun  of  the  broadside  engaged. 
Three  of  her  hits  being  below  the  water  line,  she  was  kept  afloat  with 
difficulty  during  the  next  twenty-four  hours.  With  the  wearing  of 
the  French  the  battle  ceased. 

In  the  advantage  offered  by  the  enemy,  whose  order  was  too  greatly 
extended,  and  in  his  own  plan  of  attack,  Rodney  always  considered 
tins  action  of  April  17th,  1780,  to  have  been  the  great  opportunity  of 
his  life;  and  his  wrath  was  bitter  against  those  by  whose  misconduct 
he  conceived  it  had  been  frustrated.      "The  French   admiral,  who 
appeared  to  me  to  be  a  brave  and  gallant  officer,  had  the  honour  to  be 
nobly  supported  during  the  whole  action.     It  is  with,  concern  inex- 
pressible, mixed  with  indignation,  that  the  duty  I  owe  my  sovereign 
and  my  country  obliges  me  to  acquaint  your  Lordships  that  during  the 
action  between  the  French  fleet,  on  the  17th  inst.,  and  his  Majesty's, 
the  British  flag  was  not  properly  supported."     Divided  as  the  Navy 
then  was  into  factions,  with  their  hands  at  each  other's  throats  or  at 
the  throat  of  the  Admiralty,  the  latter  thought  it  more  discreet  to 
suppress  this  paragraph,  allowing  to  appear  only  the  negative  stigma 
of  the  encomium  upon  the  French  officers,  unaccompanied  by  any  on 
his  own.     Rodney,  however,  did  not  conceal  his  feelings  in  public  or 
private  letters ;  and  the  censure  found  its  way  to  the  ears  of  those 
concerned.     Subsequently,  three  months  after  the  action,  in  a  public 
letter,  he  bore  testimony  to  the  excellent  conduct  of  five  captains, 
Walter  Young  of  the  flagship,  George  Bowyer  of  the  Albion,  John 
Douglas  of  the   Terrible,  John  Houlton  of  the  Montagu,  and  A.  J.  P. 
Molloy 1  of  the  Trident.     "  To  them  I  have  given  certificates,  under 
my  hand,"  "  free  and  unsolicited."     Beyond  these,  "  no  considera- 
tion in  life  would  induce  "  him  to  go ;  and  the  two  junior  flag-officers 
were  implicitly  condemned  in  the  words,  "  to  inattention  to  signals, 
both  in  the  van  and  rear  divisions,  is  to  be  attributed  the  loss  of  that 
glorious  opportunity  (perhaps  never  to  be  recovered)  of  terminating 
the  naval  contest  in  these  seas."     These  junior  admirals  were  Hyde 

1  Singularly  enough,  this  officer  was  afterwards  court-martiallecl  for  misbehaviour, 
on  the  1st  of  June,  1794,  of  precisely  the  same  character  as  that  from  all  share  in 
which  Rodney  now  cleared  him. 


400  MAJOR  OPERATIONS.    1762-1783.  [1780. 

Parker  and  Rowley ;  the  latter  the  same  who  had  behaved,  not  only 
so  gallantly,  but  with  such  unusual  initiative,  in  Byron's  engagement. 
A  singular  incident  in  this  case  led  him  to  a  like  independence  of 
action,  which  displeased  Rodney.  The  Montagu,  of  his  division,  when 
closing  the  French  line,  wore  against  the  helm,  and  could  only  be 
brought  into  action  on  the  wrong  (port)  tack.  Immediately  upon 
this,  part  of  the  French  rear  also  wore,  and  Rowley  followed  them  of 
his  own  motion.  Being  called  to  account  by  Rodney,  he  stated  the 
facts,  justifying  the  act  by  the  order  that  "the  greatest  impression 
was  to  be  made  on  the  enemy's  rear."  Both  parties  soon  wore  back. 
Hyde  Parker  went  home  in  a  rage  a  few  weeks  later.  The  certifi- 
cates of  Bowyer  and  Douglas,  certainly,  and  probably  of  Molloy,  all 
of  his  division,  bore  the  stinging  words  that  these  officers  "meant 
well,  and  would  have  done  their  duty  had  they  been  permitted."  It 
is  stated  that  their  ships,  which  were  the  rear  of  the  van,  were  going 
down  to  engage  close,  following  Rodney's  example,  when  Parker 
made  them  a  signal  to  keep  the  line.  If  this  be  so,  as  Parker's 
courage  was  beyond  all  doubt,  it  was  simply  a  recurrence  of  the  old 
superstition  of  the  line,  aggravated  by  a  misunderstanding  of  Rodney's 
later  signals.  These  must  be  discussed,  for  the  whole  incident  is  part 
of  the  history  of  the  British  Navy,  far  more  important  than  many  an 
indecisive  though  bloody  encounter. 

One  of  the  captains  more  expressly  blamed,  Carkett  of  the  Stir- 
ling Castle,  wrote  to  Rodney  that  lie  understood  that  his  name  had 
been  mentioned,  unfavourably  of  course,  in  the  public  letter.  Rod- 
ney's reply  makes  perfectly  apparent  the  point  at  issue,  his  own  plan, 
the  ideas  running  in  his  head  as  lie  made  his  successive  signals,  the 
misconceptions  of  the  juniors,  and  the  consequent  fiasco.  It  must  be 
said,  however,  that,  granting  the  facts  as  they  seem  certainly  to  have 
occurred,  no  misunderstanding,  no  technical  verbal  allegation,  can 
justify  a  military  stupidity  so  great  as  that  of  which  he  complained. 
There  are  occasions  in  which  not  only  is  literal  disobedience  permis- 
sible, but  literal  obedience,  flying  in  the  face  of  the  evident  conditions, 
becomes  a  crime. 

At  6.45  in  the  morning,  Rodney  had  made  a  general  signal  of  his 
purpose  to  attack  the  enemy's  rear.  This,  having  been  understood 
and  answered,  was  hauled  down ;  all  juniors  had  been  acquainted 
with  a  general  purpose,  to  which  the  subsequent  manoeuvres  were  to 
lead.  How  he  meant  to  carry  out  his  intention  was  evidenced  by 
the  consecutive  course  of  action  while  on  that  tack,  —  the  starboard ; 


1780.]  RODNETS  LETTER   TO   CARKETT.  461 

when  the  time  came,  the  fleet  bore  up  together,  in  line  abreast,  stand- 
ing for  the  French  rear.  This  attempt,  being  balked  then  by  de 
Guichen's  wearing,  was  renewed  two  hours  later;  only  in  place  of 
the  signal  to  form  line  abreast,  was  made  one  to  alter  the  course  to 
port,  —  towards  the  enemy.  As  this  followed  immediately  upon  that 
to  prepare  for  battle,  it  indicates,  almost  beyond  question,  that  Rodney 
wished,  for  reasons  of  the  moment,  to  run  down  at  iirst  in  a  slanting 
direction,  —  not  in  line  abreast,  as  before,  —  ships  taking  course  and 
interval  from  the  flagship.  Later  again,  at  11.50,  the  signal  was 
made,  "agreeable  to  the  21st  Article  of  the  Additional  Fighting 
Instructions,  for  every  ship  to  steer  for  her  opposite  in  the  enemy's 
line;  "  and  here  the  trouble  began.  Rodney  meant  the  ship  opposite 
when  the  signal  was  hauled  down.  He  had  steered  slanting,  till  he 
had  gained  as  nearly  as  possible  the  position  he  wanted,  probably  till 
within  long  range  ;  then  it  was  desirable  to  cover  the  remaining 
ground  as  rapidly  and  orderly  as  possible,  for  which  purpose  the  ship 
then  abreast  gave  each  of  his  fleet  its  convenient  point  of  direction. 
He  conceived  that  his  signalled  purpose  to  attack  the  enemy's  rear. 
never  having  been  altered,  remained  imperative ;  and  further,  that 
the  signal  for  two  cables'  length  interval  should  govern  all  ships,  and 
would  tie  them  to  him,  and  to  his  movements,  in  the  centre.  Carkett 
construed  "  opposite  "  to  mean  opposite  in  numerical  order,  British 
van  ship  against  French  van  ship,  wherever  the  latter  was.  Rodney 
states  —  in  his  letter  to  Carkett  —  that  the  French  van  was  then  two 
leagues  away.  "  You  led  to  the  van  ship,  notwithstanding  you  had 
answered  my  signals  signifying  that  it  was  my  intention  to  attack  the 
enemy's  rear ;  which  signal  I  had  never  altered.  .  .  .  Your  leading  in 
the  manner  you  did,  induced  others  to  follow  so  bad  an  example  :  and 
thereby,  forgetting  that  the  signal  for  the  line  was  only  at  two  cables' 
length  distance  from  each  other,  the  van  division  was  led  by  you  to 
more  than  two  leagues'  distance  from  the  centre  division,  which  was 
thereby  not  properly  supported." 

1  The  words  in  Rodney's  public  letter,  suppressed  at  the  time  by  the  Admiralty, 
agree  with  these,  but  are  even  more  explicit.  "  I  cannot  conclude  this  letter  with- 
out acquainting  their  Lordships  that  had  Captain  Carkett,  who  led  the  van,  properly 
obeyed  my  signal  for  attacking  the  enemy,  and  agreeable  to  the  21st  Article  of  the 
Additional  Fighting  Instructions,  bore  down  instantly  to  the  ship  at  that  time 
abreast  of  him,  instead  of  leading  as  he  did  to  the  van  ship,  the  action  had  com- 
menced much  sooner,  and  the  fleet  engaged  in  a  more  compact  manner.  .  .  ."  This 
clearly  implies  that  the  Additional  Fighting  Instructions  prescribed  the  direction 
which  Rodney  expected  Carkett  to  take.  If  these  Additional  Instructions  are  to  be 
found,  their  testimony  would  be  interesting. 


462  MAJOR  OPERATIONS.    1762-1783.  [1780. 

Carkett  was  the  oldest  captain  in  the  fleet,  his  post  commission 
being  dated  March  12th,  1758.  How  far  he  may  have  been  excus- 
able in  construing  as  he  did  Fighting  Instructions,  which  originated 
in  the  inane  conception  that  the  supreme  duty  of  a  Commander-in- 
Chief  was  to  oppose  ship  to  ship,  and  that  a  fleet  action  was  only  an 
agglomeration  of  naval  duels,  is  not  very  material,  though  histori- 
cally interesting.  There  certainly  was  that  in  the  past  history  of 
the  British  Navy  which  extenuated  the  offence  of  a  man  who  must 
have  then  been  well  on  in  middle  life.  But  since  the  Fighting 
Instructions  had  been  first  issued,  there  had  been  the  courts-martial, 
also  instructive,  on  Mathews,  Lestock,  Byng,  Keppel,  and  Palliser, 
all  of  which  turned  more  or  less  on  the  constraint  of  the  line  of 
battle,  and  the  duty  of  supporting  ships  engaged,  —  above  all,  an 
engaged  Commander-in-Chief.  Rodney  perhaps  underestimated  the 
weight  of  the  Fighting  Instructions  upon  a  dull  man;  but  he  was 
justified  in  claiming  that  his  previous  signals,  and  the  prescription  of 
distance,  created  at  the  least  a  conflict  of  orders,  a  doubt,  to  which 
there  should  have  been  but  one  solution,  namely:  to  support  the  ships 
engaged,  and  to  close  down  upon  the  enemy,  as  near  as  possible  to 
the  Commander-in-Chief.  And  in  moments  of  actual  perplexity  such 
will  always  be  the  truth.  It  is  like  marching  towards  the  sound  of 
guns,  or,  to  use  Nelson's  words,  '•  In  a  me  signals  cannot  be  understood, 
7io  captain  can  do  very  wrong  if  he  places  his  ship  alongside  that  of 
an  enemy."  The  *•  In  Case,"  however,  needs  also  to  be  kept  in  mind ; 
and  that  it  was  Nelson  who  said  it.  Utterances  of  to-day,  like 
utterances  of  all  time,  show  how  few  are  the  men  who  can  hold  both 
sides  of  a  truth  firmly,  without  exaggeration  or  defect.  Judicial 
impartiality  can  be  had,  and  positive  convictions  too;  but  their 
combination  is  rare.  A  two-sided  man  is  apt  also  to  be  double- 
minded. 

The  loss  of  men  in  this  sharp  encounter  was :  British,  killed,  120, 
wounded,  354 ; 1  French,  killed,  222,  wounded,  537.2  This  gives 
three  French  hit  for  every  two  British,  from  which,  and  from  the 
much  greater  damage  received  aloft  by  the  latter,  it  may  be  inferred 
that  both  followed  their  usual  custom  of  aiming,  the  British  at 

1  Among   the   killed  was  Captain   the   Hon.  Henry   St.  John,  of  the  Intrepid. 
Among  the  wounded  were  Captains  John  Houlton,  of  the  Montagu,  and  Thomas 
Newnham,  of  the  Grafton.  —  W.  L.  C. 

2  Lapeyrouse  Bonfils,  '  Histoire  de  la  Marine  Franchise,'  iii.  132.     Chevalier  gives 
much  smaller  numbers,  but  the  former  has  particularised  the  ships. 


1780.]  RODNEY  RETURNS  TO  ST.  LUCIA.  463 

the  hull,  the  French  at  the  spars.  To  the  latter  conduced  also  the 
lee-gage,  which  the  French  had.  The  British,  as  the  attacking  party, 
suffered  likewise  a  raking  fire  as  they  bore  down. 

Rodney  repaired  damages  at  sea,  and  pursued,  taking  care  to 
keep  between  Martinique  and  the  French.  The  latter  going  into 
Guadeloupe,  he  reconnoitred  them  there  under  the  batteries,  and 
then  took  his  station  off  Fort  Royal.  "  The  only  chance  of  bringing 
them  to  action,"  he  wrote  to  the  Admiralty  on  the  26th  of  April, 
"  was  to  be  off  that  port  before  them,  where  the  fleet  now  is,  in 
daily  expectation  of  their  arrival."  The  French  represent  that  he 
avoided  them,  but  as  they  assert  that  they  came  out  best  on  the 
17th,  and  yet  admit  that  he  appeared  off  Guadeloupe,  the  claim  is 
not  tenable.  Rodney  here  showed  thorough  tenacity  of  purpose. 
De  Guiehen's  orders  were  "  to  keep  the  sea,  so  far  as  the  force 
maintained  by  England  in  the  Windward  Islands  would  permit, 
without  too  far  compromising  the  fleet  intrusted  to  him."  J  AVith 
such  instructions,  he  naturally  and  consistently  shrunk  from  decisive 
engagement.  After  landing  his  wounded  and  refitting  in  Guade- 
loupe, he  again  put  to  sea,  with  the  intention  of  proceeding  to  St. 
Lucia,  resuming  against  that  island  the  project  which  both  he  and 
De  Bouille  continuously  entertained.  The  latter  and  his  troops 
remained  with  the  fleet. 

Rodney  meantime  had  felt  compelled  to  return  momentarily  to 
St.  Lucia.  "  The  fleet  continued  before  Fort  Royal  till  the  condi- 
tion of  many  of  the  ships  under  my  command,  and  the  lee  currents,2 
rendered  it  necessary  to  anchor  in  Cheque  Bay,  St.  Lucie,  in  order 
to  put  the  wounded  and  sick  men  on  shore,  and  to  water  and  relit 
the  fleet,  frigates  having  been  detached  both  to  leeward  and  to 
windward  of  every  island,  in  order  to  gain  intelligence  of  the  motions 
of  the  enemy,  and  timely  notice  of  their  approach  towards  Martinique, 
the  only  place  they  could  refit  at  in  these  seas."  In  this  last  clause 
is  seen  the  strategic  idea  of  the  British  Admiral :  the  French  must 
come  back  to  Martinique. 

From  the  vigilance  of  his  frigates  it  resulted,  that  when  the 
look-outs  of  de  Guichen,  who  passed  to  windward  of  Martinique  on 
the  7th  of  May,  came  in  sight  of  Gros  Ilet  on  the  9th,  it  was  simply 
to  find  the  British  getting  under  way  to  meet  the  enemy.  During 
the  five  following  days  both  fleets  were  engaged  in  constant  move- 

1  Chevalier,  '  Marine  Frangaise,'  1778,  p.  185. 

2  A  lee  current  is  one  that  sets  with  the  wind,  in  this  case  the  trade-wind. 


464  MAJOR  OPERATIONS.    1762-1783.  [1780. 

merits,  upon  the  character  of  which  the  writers  of  each  nation  put 
different  constructions.  Both  are  agreed,  however,  that  the  French 
were  to  windward  throughout,  except  for  a  brief  hour  on  the  15th, 
Avhen  a  fleeting  change  of  wind  gave  the  British  that  advantage, 
only  to  lose  it  soon  again.  They  at  once  used  it  to  force  action. 
As  the  windward  position  carries  the  power  to  attack,  and  as  the 
French  were  twenty-three  to  the  British  twenty,  it  is  probably  not  a 
strained  inference  to  say  that  the  latter  were  chasing  to  windward, 
and  the  former  avoiding  action,  in  favour,  perhaps,  of  that  ulterior 
motive,  the  conquest  of  St.  Lucia,  for  which  they  had  sailed.  Rod- 
ney states  in  his  letter  that,  when  the  two  fleets  parted  on  the  20th 
of  May,  they  were  forty  leagues  to  windward  of  Martinique,  in 
sight  of  which  they  had  been  on  the  10th. 

During  these  days  do  Guichen,  whose  fleet  sailed  the  better, 
according  to  Rodney,  and  certainly  sufficiently  well  to  preserve  the 
advantage  of  the  wind,  bore  down  more  than  once,  generally  in  the 
afternoon,  when  the  breeze  is  steadiest,  to  within  distant  range  of 
the  British.  Upon  this  movement,  the  French  base  the  statement 
that  the  British  Admiral  was  avoiding  an  encounter;  it  is  equally 
open  to  the  interpretation  that  he  would  not  throw  away  ammunition 
until  sure  of  effective  distance.  Both  admirals  showed  much  skill 
and  mastery  of  their  profession,  great  wariness  also,  and  quickness 
of  eye  ;  but  it  is  wholly  untenable  to  claim  that  a  fleet  having  the 
weather-gage  for  five  days,  in  the  trade-winds,  was  unable  to  bring 
its  enemy  to  action,  especially  when  it  is  admitted  that  the  latter 
struck  the  instant  the  wind  permitted  him  to  close. 

On  the  afternoon  of  May  15th,  about  the  usual  hour,  Rodney 
"  made  a  great  deal  of  sail  upon  the  wind."  The  French,  inferring 
that  he  was  trying  to  get  off,  which  he  meant  them  to  do,  approached 
somewhat  closer  than  on  the  previous  days.  Their  van  ship  had 
come  within  long  range,  abreast  the  centre  of  the  British,  who  were 
on  the  port  tack  standing  to  the  south-south-east,  with  the  wind  at 
east  (a,  a).  Here  the  breeze  suddenly  hauled  to  south-south-east. 
The  heads  of  all  the  ships  in  both  fleets  were  thus  knocked  off  to 
south-west,  on  the  port  tack,  but  the  shift  left  the  British  rear,  which 
on  that  tack  led  the  fleet,  to  windward  of  the  French  van.  Rodney's 
signal  flew  at  once,  to  tack  in  succession  and  keep  the  wind  of  the 
enemy ;  the  latter,  unwilling  to  yield  the  advantage,  wore  all  together, 
hauling  to  the  wind  on  the  starboard  tack,  and,  to  use  Rodney's 
words,  "  fled  with  a  crowd  of  sail "  (a',  a'). 


1780.] 


MANOEUVRES  OF  THE  FLEETS. 


465 


The  British  fleet  tacking  in  succession  after  their  leaders,  the 
immediate  result  was  that  both  were  now  standing  on  the  starboard 
tack,  —  to  the  eastward,  —  the  British  having  a  slight  advantage  of 
the  wind,  but  well  abaft  the  beam  of  the  French  (b,  b).  The  result, 
had  the  wind  held,  would  .have  been  a  trial  of  speed  and  weatherli- 
ness.  "  His  Majesty's  fleet,"  wrote  Rodney,  "  by  this  manoeuvre  had 
gained  the  wind,  and  would  have  forced  the  enemy  to  battle,  had  it 
not  at  once  changed  six  points  when  near  the  enemy,  and  enabled 


RODNE.Y    AND    DEL   CUICHEN 


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RODXET  AND   HE  GVICHEN. 

them  to  recover  that  advantage."  When  the  wind  thus  shifted  again, 
de  Guichen  tacked  his  ships  together  and  stood  across  the  bows  of 
the  advancing  British  (c,  c).  The  leader  of  the  latter  struck  the 
enemy's  line  behind  the  centre,  and  ran  along  to  leeward,  the  British 
van  exchanging  a  close  cannonade  with  the  enemy's  rear.  Such  an 
engagement,  two  lines  passing  on  opposite  tacks,  is  usually  indeci- 
sive, even  when  the  entire  fleets  are  engaged,  as  at  Ushant;  but 
where,  as  in  this  case,  the  engagement  is  but  partial,  the  result  is 
naturally  less.  The  enemy's  van  and  centre,  having  passed  the  head 

VOL.  in.  —  30 


466  MAJOR  OPERATIONS.     1762-1783.  [1780. 

of  the  British,  diverged  at  that  point  farther  and  farther  from  the 
track  of  the  on-coming  ships,  which,  from  the  centre  rearwards,  did 
not  fire.  "  As  the  enemy  were  under  a  press  of  sail,  none  but  the 
van  of  our  fleet  could  come  in  for  any  part  of  the  action  without 
wasting  his  Majesty's  powder  and  shot,  the  enemy  wantonly  expend- 
ing theirs  at  such  a  distance  as  to  have  no  effect."  Here  again  the 
French  were  evidently  taking  the  chance  of  disabling  the  distant 
enemy  in  his  spars.  The  British  loss  in  the  action  of  May  15th  was 
21  killed  and  100  wounded. 

The  fleets  continued  their  respective  movements,  each  acting  as 
before,  until  the  19th,1  when  another  encounter  took  place,  of  exactly 
the  same  character  as  the  last,  although  without  the  same  prelimi- 
nary mana'tivring.  The  British  on  that  occasion  lost  47  killed  and 
113  wounded.  The  result  was  equally  indecisive,  tactically  consid- 
ered ;  but  both  by  this  time  had  exhausted  their  staying  powers. 
The  French,  having  been  absent  from  Martinique  since  the  13th  of 
April,  had  now  but  six  days'  provisions.2  Rodney  found  the  CW- 
ijucror,  Cornwall,  and  Boync  so  shattered  that  he  sent  them  before 
the  wind  to  St.  Lucia,  while  he  himself  with  the  rest  of  the  fleet 
stood  for  Barbados,  where  he  arrived  on  the  22nd.  The  French 
anchored  on  the  same  day  at  Fort  Royal.  ''  The  English,"  says 
Chevalier,  "stood  on  upon  the  starboard  tack,  to  the  southward, 
after  the  action  of  the  19th,  and  the  next  day  were  not  to  be  seen." 
••  The  enemy,"  reported  Rodney,  "  stood  to  the  northward  with  all 
the  sail  they  could  possibly  press,  and  were  out  of  sight  the  21st 
inst.  The  condition  of  his  Majesty's  ships  was  such  as  not  to  allow 
a  longer  pursuit." 

By  their  dexterity  and  vigilance  each  of  the  two  admirals  had 
thwarted  the  other's  aims.  Rodnej',  by  a  pronounced,  if  cautious, 
offensive  effort,  had  absolutely  prevented  the  "  ulterior  object "  of  the 
French,  which  he  clearly  understood  to  be  St.  Lucia.  De  Guichen 
had  been  successful  in  avoiding  decisive  action,  and  he  had  momen- 
tarily so  crippled  a  few  of  the  British  ships  that  the  fleet  must  await 
their  repairs  before  again  taking  the  sea.  The  tactical  gain  was  his, 
the  strategic  victory  rested  with  his  opponent;  but  that  his  ships  also 
had  been  much  maltreated  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  half  a  dozen 

1  Previous  to  which  date  the  Triumph,  74,  Captain  Philip  Affleck,  and  the  Pres- 
ton, 50,  Captain  William  Truscott,  had  joined  Rodney.  In  the  action  of  the  19th, 
Captain  Thomas  Watson,  of  the  Conqueror,  was  mortally  wounded.  —  W.  L.  C. 

*  Chevalier,  p.  91. 


1780.]  SUSPICIOUS  FEELING  IN  THE  NAVY.  467 

could  not  put  to  sea  three  weeks  later.  The  French  admiral  broke 
down  under  the  strain,  to  which  was  added  the  grief  of  losing  a  son, 
killed  in  the  recent  engagements.  He  asked  for  his  recall.  "  The 
command  of  so  large  a  fleet,"  he  wrote,  "  is  infinitely  beyond  my 
capacity  in  all  respects.  My  health  cannot  endure  such  continual 
fatigue  and  anxiety."  Certainly  this  seems  a  tacit  testimony  to 
Rodney's  skill,  persistence,  and  offensive  purpose.  The  latter  wrote 
to  his  wife :  "  For  fourteen  days  and  nights  the  fleets  were  so  near 
each  other  that  neither  officers  nor  men  could  be  said  to  sleep.  Noth- 
ing but  the  goodness  of  the  weather  and  climate  would  have  enabled 
us  to  endure  so  continual  a  fatigue.  Had  it  been  in  Europe,  half  the 
people  must  have  sunk  under  it.  For  my  part,  it  did  me  good." 

Rodney  stated  also  in  his  home  letters  that  the  action  of  his  sul> 
ordinates  in  the  last  affairs  had  been  efficient;  but  he  gave  them 
little  credit  for  it.  "  As  I  had  given  public  notice  to  all  my  captains, 
etc.,  that  I  expected  implicit  obedience  to  every  signal  made,  under 
the  certain  penalty  of  being  instantly  superseded,  it  had  an  admi- 
rable effect,  as  they  were  all  convinced,  after  their  late  gross  behaviour, 
that  they  had  nothing  to  expect  at  my  hands  but  instant  punishment 
to  those  who  neglected  their  duty.  My  eye  on  them  had  more  dread 
than  the  enemy's  fire,  and  they  knew  it  would  be  fatal.  No  regard 
was  paid  to  rank :  admirals  as  well  as  captains,  if  out  of  their  sta- 
tion, were  instantly  reprimanded  by  signals,  or  messages  sent  by 
frigates  ;  and,  in  spite  of  themselves,  I  taught  them  to  be,  what  they 
had  never  been  before,  —  officers."  It  will  be  noticed  that  these 
words  convey  an  implication  of  cowardice  as  well  as  of  disaffection, 
and  hint  not  obscurely  at  Byng's  fate.  Rodney  told  his  officers  also 
that  he  would  shift  his  flag  into  a  frigate,  if  necessary,  to  watch  them 
better.  It  is  by  no  means  necessary  to  accept  these  gross  aspersions 
as  significant  of  anything  worse  than  the  suspiciousness  prevalent 
throughout  the  Navy,  traceable  ultimately  to  a  corrupt  administra- 
tion of  the  Admiralty.  The  latter,  like  the  government  of  1756, 
was  open  to  censure  through  political  maladministration  ,  every  one 
feared  that  blame  would  be  shifted  on  to  him,  as  it  had  been  on  to 
%ng'  —  who  deserved  it ;  and  not  only  so,  but  that  blame  would  be 
pushed  on  to  ruin,  as  in  his  case.  The  Navy  was  honeycombed  with 
distrust,  falling  little  short  of  panic.  In  this  state  of  apprehension 
and  doubt,  the  tradition  of  the  line  of  battle,  resting  upon  men  who 
did  not  stop  to  study  facts  or  analyse  impressions,  and  who  had  seen 
officers  censured,  cashiered,  and  shot,  for  errors  of  judgment  or  of 


408  MAJOR  OPERATIONS.    1762-1783.  [1780. 

action,  naturally  produced  hesitations  and  misunderstandings.  An 
order  of  battle  is  a  good  thing,  necessary  to  insure  mutual  support 
and  to  develop  a  plan.  The  error  of  the  century,  not  then  exploded, 
was  to  observe  it  in  the  letter  rather  than  in  the  spirit ;  to  regard  the 
order  as  an  end  rather  than  a  means ;  and  to  seek  in  it  not  merely 
efficiency,  which  admits  broad  construction  in  positions,  but  precise- 
ness,  which  is  as  narrowing  as  a  brace  of  handcuffs.  Rodney  himself, 
Tory  though  he  was,  found  fault  with  the  administration.  With  all 
his  severity  and  hauteur,  he  did  not  lose  sight  of  justice,  as  is  shown 
by  a  sentence  in  his  letter  to  Carkett.  "  Could  I  have  imagined  your 
conduct  and  inattention  to  signals  had  proceeded  from  anything  but 
error  in  judgment,  I  had  certainly  superseded  you,  but  God  forbid  1 
should  do  so  for  error  in  judgment  only,"  —  again  an  allusion,  not 
obscure,  to  Byng's  fate. 

In  Barbados,  Rodney  received  certain  information  that  a  Span- 
ish squadron  of  twelve  ships  of  the  line,  with  a  large  convoy  of 
10,000  troops,  had  sailed  from  Cadiz  on  April  28th  for  the  West 
Indies.  The  vessel  bringing  the  news  had  fallen  in  with  them  on 
the  way.  Rodney  spread  a  line  of  frigates  "  to  windward,  from  Bar- 
bados to  Barbuda,"  to  obtain  timely  warning,  and  with  the  fleet  put 
to  sea  011  the  7th  of  .June,  to  cruise  to  the  eastward  of  Martinique  to 
intercept  the  enemy.  The  latter  had  been  discovered  on  the  5th  by  a 
frigate,  fifty  leagues  east  of  the  island,  steering  for  it ;  but  the  Spanish 
admiral,  seeing  that  lie  would  be  reported,  changed  his  course,  and 
passed  north  of  Guadeloupe.  On  the  Oth  he  was  joined  in  that  neigh- 
bourhood by  de  Guichen.  who  was  able  to  bring  with  him  only  fifteen 
.sail.  —  a  fact  which  shows  that  he  had  suffered  in  the  late  brushes  quite 
as  severely  as  Rodney,  who  had  with  him  seventeen  of  his  twenty. 

Having  evaded  the  British,  the  allies  anchored  at  Fort  Royal; 
but  the  Spanish  admiral  absolutely  refused  to  join  in  any  undertak- 
ing against  the  enemy's  fleet  or  possessions.  Not  only  so,  but  he 
insisted  on  being  accompanied  to  leeward.  The  Spanish  squadron 
was  ravaged  by  an  epidemic,  due  to  unsanitary  conditions  of  the 
ships  and  the  uncleanliness  of  the  crews,  and  the  disease  was  com- 
municated to  their  allies.  De  Guichen  had  already  orders  to  leave 
the  Windward  Islands  when  winter  approached.  He  decided  now 
to  anticipate  that  time,  and  on  the  5th  of  July  sailed  from  Fort 
Royal  with  the  Spaniards.  Having  accompanied  the  latter  to  the 
east  end  of  Cuba,  he  went  to  Cap  Francois,  in  Haiti,  then  a  princi- 
pal French  station.  The  Spaniards  continued  on  to  Havana. 


1780.]  DE  GVICHEN  SAILS  FOR  EUROPE.  4fi9 

At  Cap  Francois,  de  Guichen  found  urgent  entreaties  from  the 
French  Minister  to  the  United  States,  and  from  Lafayette,  to  cany 
his  fleet  to  the  continent,  where  the  clear-sighted  genius  of  Wash- 
ington had  recognised  already  that  the  issue  of  the  contest  depended 
upon  the  navies.  The  French  admiral  declined  to  comply,  us  con- 
trary to  his  instructions,  and  on  the  16th  of  August  sailed  for  Europe, 
with  nineteen  sail  of  the  line,  leaving  ten  at  Cap  Francois.  Sealed 
orders,  opened  at  sea,  directed  him  to  proceed  to  Cadiz,  where  he 
anchored  on  the  24th  of  October.  His  arrival  raised  the  allied  force 
there  assembled  to  fifty-one  sail  of  the  line,  besides  the  ninety- 
five  sugar  and  coffee  ships  which  he  had  convoyed  from  Haiti. 
It  is  significant  of  the  weakness  of  Great  Britain  then  in  the 
Mediterranean,  that  these  extremely  valuable  merchant  slaps  were 
sent  on  to  Toulon,  only  five  ships  of  the  line  accompanying  them 
past  Gibraltar.  The  French  government  had  feared  to  trust  them 
to  Brest,  even  with  de  Guichen's  nineteen  sail. 

The  allied  operations  in  the  Windward  Islands  for  the  season 
of  1780  had  thus  ended  in  nothing,  notwithstanding  an  incontest- 
able inferiority  of  the  British  to  the  French  alone,  of  which  Rodney 
strongly  complained.  It  was,  however,  contrary  to  the  intentions 
of  the  Admiralty  that  things  so  happened.  Orders  had  been  sent  to 
Vice-Admiral  Marriot  Arbuthnot,  at  New  York,  to  detach  ships 
to  Rodney ;  but  the  vessel  carrying  them  was  driven  by  weather 
to  the  Bahamas,  and  her  captain  neglected  to  notify  Arlmthnot 
of  his  whereabouts,  or  of  his  dispatches.  A  detachment  of  live 
ships  of  the  line  under  Commodore  the  Hon.  Robert  Boyle  Walsing- 
ham  was  detained  three  months  in  England,  wind-bound.  They 
consequently  did  not  join  till  July  12th.  The  dispositions  at  once 
made  by  Rodney  afford  a  very  good  illustration  of  the  kind  of  duties 
that  a  British  Admiral  had  then  to  discharge.  He  detailed  live 

O 

ships  of  the  line  to  remain  with  Hotham  at  St.  Lucia,  for  the  protec- 
tion of  the  Windward  Islands.  On  the  17th,  taking  with  him  a  large 
merchant  convoy,  he  put  to  sea  with  the  fleet  for  St.  Kitts.  where 
the  Leeward  Islands  "  trade  "  was  collecting  for  England.  On  the 
way  he  received  precise  information  as  to  the  route  and  force  of  the 
Franco-Spanish  fleet  under  de  Guichen,  of  the  sickness  on  board 
it,  and  of  the  dissension  between  the  allies.  From  St.  Kitts  the 
July  "  trade  "  was  sent  home  with  two  ships  of  the  line.  Three 
others,  he  wrote  to  the  Admiralty,  would  accompany  the  September 
fleet,  "  and  the  remainder  of  the  ships  on  this  station,  which  are  in 


470  MAJOR  OPERATIONS.    1762-1783.  [1780. 

want  of  great  repair  and  are  not  copper-bottomed,  shall  proceed  with 
them,  or  with  the  convoy  which  their  Lordships  have  been  pleased 
to  order  shall  sail  from  hence  in  October  next."  If  these  arrived 
before  winter,  he  argued,  they  would  be  available  by  spring  as  a. 
reinforcement  for  the  Channel  fleet,  and  would  enable  the  Admiralty 
to  send  him  an  equivalent  number  for  the  winter  work  on  his. 
station. 

As  de  Guichen  had  taken  from  Martinique  to  Cap  Francois  the 
whole  French  homeward  merchant  fleet,  and  as  the  height  of  the 
hurricane  season  was  near,  Rodney  reasoned  that  but  a  small  French 
force  would  remain  in  Haiti,  and  consequently  that  Jamaica  would 
not  require  all  the  British  fleet  to  save  it  from  any  possible  attack. 
He  therefore  sent  thither  ten  sail  of  the  line,  notifying  Vice-Admiral 
Sir  Peter  Parker  that  they  were  not  merely  to  defend  the  island, 
but  to  enable  him  to  send  home  its  great  trade  in  reasonable 
security. 

These  things  being  done  bv  July  31st,  considering  that  the  allies 
had  practically  abandoned  all  enterprises  in  the  West  Indies  for 
that  year,  and  that  a  hurricane  might  at  any  moment  overtake  the 
fleet  at  its  anchors,  possibly  making  for  it  a  lee  shore,  Rodney  went 
tn  sea.  to  cruise  off  Barbuda.  His  mind,  however,  was  inclined 
already  to  go  to  the  continent,  whither  he  reasoned,  correctly  but 
mistakenly,  that  the  greater  part  of  de  Guichen's  fleet  would  go, 
as  it  should.  His  purpose  was  confirmed  by  information  from  an 
American  vessel  that  a  French  squadron  of  seven  ships  of  the  line, 
convoying  (1.000  troops,  had  anchored  in  Narragansett  Bay  on  the 
1'2i\\  of  July.  He  started  at  once  for  the  coast  of  South  Carolina, 
where  he  communicated  with  the  army  in  Charleston,  and  thence, 
'•  sweeping  the  southern  coast  of  America,"  anchored  with  fourteen 
ships  of  the  line  at  Sandy  Hook,  on  the  14th  of  September,  unex- 
pected and  unwelcome  to  friends  and  foes  alike. 

Vice-Admiral  Arbutlmot,  being  junior  to  Rodney,  showed  plainly 
and  with  insubordination  his  wrath  at  this  intrusion  into  his  com- 
mand, which  superseded  his  authority  and  divided  the  prize-money  of 
a  lucrative  station.  This,  however,  was  a  detail.  To  Washington, 
Rodney's  coming  was  a  death-blow  to  the  hopes  raised  by  the  arrival 
of  the  French  division  at  Newport,  which  he  had  expected  to  see 
reinforced  by  de  Guichen.  Actual!}-,  the  departure  of  the  latter 
made  immaterial  Rodney's  appearance  on  the  scene ;  but  this  Wash- 
ington did  not  know  then.  As  it  was,  Rodney's  force  joined  to 


1780.]  RODNEY  SAILS  FOR   THE    WEST  INDIES.  471 

Arbuthnot's  constituted  a  fleet  of  over  twenty  sail  of  the  line,  before 
which,  vigorously  used,  there  can  be  little  doubt  that  the  French 
squadron  in  Newport  must  have  fallen.  But  Rodney,  though  .he 
had  shown  great  energy  in  the  West  Indies,  and  unusual  resolution 
in  quitting  his  own  station  for  a  more  remote  service,  was  sixty-two, 
and  suffered  from  gout.  "  The  sudden  change  of  climate  makes  it 
necessary  for  me  to  go  on  shore  for  some  short  time,"  he  wrote ;  and 
although  he  added  that  his  illness  was  "  not  of  such  a  nature  as  shall 
cause  one  moment's  delay  in  his  Majesty's  service,"  he  probably  lost 
a  chance  at  Rhode  Island.  He  did  not  overlook  the  matter,  it  is 
true,  but  he  decided  upon  the  information  of  Arbuthnot  and  Sir 
Henry  Clinton,  and  did  not  inspect  the  ground  himself.  Nothing 
of  consequence  came  of  his  visit;  and  on  the  10th  of  November 
he  sailed  again  for  the  West  Indies,  taking  with  him  only  nine 
sail  of  the  line. 

The  arrival  of  de  Ternay's  seven  ships  at  Newport  was  more 
than  offset  by  a  British  reinforcement  of  six  ships  of  the  line  under 
Rear-Admiral  Thomas  Graves  (I),1  which  entered  New  York  on  July 
13th,  —  only  one  day  later.  Arbuthnot's  force  was  thus  raised  to  ten 
of  the  line,  one  of  which  was  of  98  guns.  After  Rodney  had  come 
and  gone,  the  French  division  was  watched  by  cruisers,  resting  upon 
Gardiner's  Bay,  —  a  commodious  anchorage  at  the  east  end  of  Long 
Island,  between  thirty  and  forty  miles  from  Rhode  Island.  When  a 
movement  of  the  enemy  was  apprehended,  the  squadron  assembled 
there,  but  nothing  of  consequence  occurred  during  the  remainder  of 
the  year. 

The  year  1780  had  been  one  of  great  discouragement  to  the 
Americans,  but  the  injury,  except  as  the  lapse  of  time  taxed  their 
staying  power,  was  more  superficial  than  real  The  successes  of  the 
British  in  the  Southern  States,  though  undeniable,  and  seemingly 
substantial,  were  involving  them  ever  more  deeply  in  a  ruinously 
ex-centric  movement.  They  need  here  only  to  be  summarised,  as 
steps  in  the  process  leading  to  the  catastrophe  of  Yorktown.  —  a  dis- 
aster which,  as  Washington  said,  exemplified  naval  rather  than 
military  power. 

The  failure  of  d'Estaing's  attack  upon  Savannah  in  the  autumn 
of  1779  had  left  that  place  in  the  possession  of  the  British  as  a  base 

1  Thomas,  Lord  Graves.  Born,  1725.  Commaiuler,  1754.  Captain,  1755.  Rear- 
Admiral,  1779.  Vice-Admiral,  1787.  Admiral,  1794.  Raised  to  an  Irish  peerage 
for  his  share  in  the  victory  of  the  Glorious  First  of  June.  Died,  1802.  —  W.  L.  C. 


472  MAJOR  OPERATIONS.     1762-1783.'  [1780. 

for  further  advances  in  South  Carolina  and  Georgia ;  lasting  success 
in  which  was  expected  from  the  numbers  of  royalists  in  those  States. 
When  the  departure  of  the  French  fleet  was  ascertained,  Sir  Heniy 
Clinton  put  to  sea  from  New  York  in  December,  1779,  for  the  Savan- 
nah River,  escorted  by  Vice-Admiral  Arbuthnot.  The  details  of  the 
operations,  which  were  leisurely  and  methodical,  will  not  be  given 
here ;  for,  although  the  Navy  took  an  active  part  in  them,  they 
scarcely  can  be  considered  of  major  importance.  On  the  12th  of 
May,  1780,  the  city  of  Charleston  capitulated,  between  six  and  seven 
thousand  prisoners  being  taken.  Clinton  then  returned  to  New 
York,  leaving  Lord  Cornwallis  in  command  in  the  south.  The 
latter  proposed  to  remain  quiet  during  the  hot  months ;  but  the 
activity  of  the  American  partisan  troops  prevented  this,  and  in  July 
the  approach  of  a  small,  but  relatively  formidable  force,  under  Gen- 
eral Gates,  compelled  him  to  take  the  field.  On  the  IGth  of  August 
the  two  little  armies  met  at  Camden,  and  the  Americans,  who  were 
much  the  more  numerous,  but  largely  irregulars,  were  routed  deci- 
sively. This  news  reached  General  Washington  in  the  north  nearly 
at  the  same  moment  that  the  treason  of  Benedict  Arnold  became 
known.  Although  the  objects  of  his  treachery  were  frustrated,  the 
sorrowful  words,  '-Whom  now  can  we  trust?  "  show  the  deep  gloom 
which  for  the  moment  shadowed  the  constant  mind  of  the  American 
Commander-in-Chief.  It  was  just  at  this  period,  too,  that  Rodney 
arrived. 

Cornwallis,  not  content  with  his  late  success,  decided  to  push  on 
into  North  Carolina.  Thus  doing,  lie  separated  himself  from  his 
naval  base  in  Charleston,  communication  with  which  by  land  he  had 
not  force  to  maintain,  and  could  only  recover  effective  touch  with 
the  sea  in  Chesapeake  Bay.  This  conclusion  was  not  apparent  from 
the  first.  In  North  Carolina,  the  British  general,  who  had  expected 
substantial  support  by  the  inhabitants,  failed  to  secure  it,  and  found 
himself  instead  in  a  very  difficult  and  wild  country,  confronted  by 
General  Greene,  the  second  in  ability  of  all  the  American  leaders. 
Harassed  and  baffled,  lie  was  compelled  to  order  supplies  to  be  sent  by 
sea  to  Wilmington,  North  Carolina,  an  out-of-the-way  and  inferior 
port,  to  which  he  turned  aside,  arriving  exhausted  on  the  7th  of  April, 
1781.  The  question  as  to  his  future  course  remained  to  be  settled, 
To  return  to  Charleston  by  sea  was  in  his  power,  but  to  do  so  would 
be  an  open  confession  of  failure,  —  that  he  could  not  return  through 
the  country  by  which  he  had  come.  To  support  him  in  his  distress 


1780.]  THE  ACTION  OFF  MONTE   GHRISTI.  47.3 

by  a  diversion,  Sir  Henry  Clinton  had  sent  two  successive  detach- 
ments to  ravage  the  valley  of  the  James  River  in  Virginia.  These 
were  still  there,  under  the  command  of  General  Phillips  ;  and  Corn- 
wallis,  in  the  circumstances,  could  see  many  reasons  that  thither  was 
the  veiy  scene  to  carry  the  British  operations.  On  the  25th  of  April, 
1781,  he  left  Wilmington,  and  a  month  later  joined  the  division  at 
Petersburg,  Virginia,  then  commanded  by  Benedict  Arnold;  Phillips 
having  died.  There,  in  touch  now  with  his  fate,  we  must  leave  him 
for  the  moment. 

To  complete  the  naval  transactions  of  1780,  it  is  necessary  to 
mention  briefly  two  incidents,  trivial  in  themselves,  but  significant, 
not  only  as  associated  with  the  greater  movements  of  the  campaign, 
but  as  indicative  of  the  naval  policy  of  the  states  which  were  at 
war.  The  two,  though  not  otherwise  connected,  have  a  certain 
unity  of  interest,  in  that  the  same  British  officer  commanded  on  both 
occasions. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  in  Byron's  action  off  Grenada,  iu 
July,  1779,  the  G4-gun  ship  Lion  received  such  injuries  that  her  com- 
mander, Captain  the  Hon.  William  Cornwallis,  had  been  compelled 
to  run  down  before  the  trade-winds  to  Jamaica,  in  order  to  save  her 
from  capture.  Since  that  time  she  had  remained  there,  as  one  of  the 
squadron  of  Vice-Admiral  Sir  Peter  Parker.  In  March,  17^0.  still 
commanded  by  Captain  Cornwallis,  she  was  making  an  ordinary 
service  cruise  off  the  north  side  of  Haiti,  having  in  company  the 
Bristol,  50,  Captain  Toby  Caulfield,  raid  the  Ja/ius,  44,  Captain 
Bonovier  Glover.  On  the  20th  of  March,  off  Monte  Christi,  a  num- 
ber of  sail  were  sighted  to  the  eastward,  which  proved  to  be  a  French 
convoy,  on  its  way  from  Martinique  to  Cap  Frangois,  protected  by 
La  Motte-Picquet's  squadron  of  2  seventy-fours,  1  sixty-four.  1  fifty, 
and  a  frigate.  The  French  merchant  ships  were  ordered  to  crowd 
sail  for  their  port,  while  the  men-of-war  chased  to  the  north-west. 
La  Motte-Picquet's  flagship,  the  Annibal,  74,  got  within  range  at 
5  P.M.,  when  a  distant  cannonade  began,  which  lasted  till  past  mid- 
night, and  was  resumed  on  the  following  morning.  From  it  the 
Janus  was  the  chief  sufferer,  losing  her  mizzen  topmast  and  fore- 
topgallant  mast.  It  falling  nearly  calm,  the  Bristol  and  Lion  got  out 
their  boats  and  towed  to  her  support.  The  two  other  French  ships 
of  the  line  got  up  during  the  forenoon  of  the  21st,  so  that  the  action 
that  afternoon,  though  desultory,  might  be  called  general. 

The  two  opposing  commodores  differ  in  their  expressed  opinions 


474  MAJOR  OPERATIONS.     1762-1783.  [1780. 

as  to  the  power  of  the  French  to  make  the  affair  more  decisive. 
Some  of  La  Motte-Picquet's  language  seems  to  show  that  he  felt  the 
responsibility  of  his  position.  "  The  James,  being  smaller  and  more 
easily  worked,  lay  upon  our  quarter  and  under  our  stern,  where  she 
did  considerable  damage.  A  little  breeze  springing  up  enabled  us 
(the  Annibal")  to  stand  towards  our  own  ships,  which  did  everything 
possible  to  come  up  and  cover  us,  without  which  we  should  have 
been  surrounded."  It  is  easy  to  see  in  such  an  expression  the  reflection 
of  the  commands  of  the  French  Cabinet,  to  economise  the  ships.  This 
was  still  more  evident  in  La  Motte-Picquet's  action  next  day.  On 
the  morning  of  the  22nd,  "  at  daylight  we  were  within  one  and  a  half 
cannon-shot,  breeze  fresh  at  east>north-east,  and  I  expected  to  overtake 
the  British  squadron  in  an  hour,  when  we  perceived  four  ships  in 
chase  of  us.  At  0.30  A.M.  three  were  seen  to  be  men-of-war.  This 
superiority  of  force  compelled  me  to  desist,  and  to  make  signal  to 
haul  our  wind  for  Cap  Francois."  These  three  new-comers  were 
thu  Jiti.li//,  04,  and  two  frigates,  the  Pomona,  28,  and  Niger,  32.  The 
comparison  of  forces,  therefore,  would  be:  French,  2  seventy-fours, 
1  sixty-four,  1  fifty,  and  1  frigate,  opposed  to,  British,  2  sixty-fours, 
1  fifty,  and  3  frigates.  La  Motte-Picquet  evidently  did  not  wait 
to  ascertain  the  size  of  the  approaching  ships.  His  courage  was 
beyond  all  dispute,  and,  as  Hyde  Parker  had  said,  lie  was  among  the 
most  distinguished  of  French  officers ;  but,  like  his  comrades,  he  was 
dominated  by  the  faulty  theory  of  his  government. 

The  captain  of  the  Janus  died  a  natural  death  during  the  encoun- 
ter. It  may  be  interesting  to  note  that  the  ship  was  given  to  Nelson, 
who  was  recalled  for  that  purpose  from  the  Han  Juan  expedition. 
His  health,  however,  prevented  this  command  from  being  more  than 
nominal,  and  not  long  afterwards  he  returned  to  England  with  Corn- 
wallis,  in  the  Lion. 

Three  months  later,  Cornwallis  was  sent  by  Parker  to  accompany 
a  body  of  merchant  ships  for  England  as  far  as  the  neighbourhood  of 
Bermuda.  This  duty  being  fullilled,  lie  was  returning  towards  his 
station,  having  with  him  2  seventy-fours,  2  sixty-fours,  and  1  fifty,1 
when,  on  the  morning  of  June  20,  a  number  of  sail  were  seen  from 

1  Lion  04  Captain  the  Hon.  William  Cornwallis. 

Sultan  74  Captain  Alan  Gardner. 

Hector  74  Captain  Sir  John  Hamilton,  Bart. 

Ruby  64  Captain  John  Cowling. 

Bristol  50  Captain  Toby  Caulfield. 

Niger  32  Captain  John  Brown. 


1780.]  CORNWALLIS  AND  DE  TERNAY.  475 

north-east  to  east ;  the  squadron  then  steering  east,  with  the  wind  at 
south-south-east.  The  strangers  were  a  body  of  French  transports, 
carrying  the  6,000  troops  destined  for  Rhode  Island,  and  convoyed 
by  a  division  of  seven  ships  of  the  line  —  1  eighty,  "2  seventy-fours, 
and  4  sixty-fours  —  under  the  command  of  Commodore  de  Ternay. 
Two  of  the  ships  of  war  were  with  the  convoy,  the  remainder  very 
properly  to  windward.  The  latter  therefore  stood  on,  across  the  bows 
of  the  British,  to  rejoin  their  consorts  (aa),  and  then  all  hauled  their 


CoRNWAUt-1  S        AND        D  E      TERNAY 

T" 


Pi* 


~ 


•ZZ*f 


>t       0  0 

' 


CORNWALLIS  AXD   DE  TEHNAY. 


wind  to  the  south-west,  standing  in  column  towards  the  enemy. 
Cornwallis  on  his  part  had  kept  on  to  reconnoitre  the  force  opposed 
to  him  (a) ;  but  one  of  his  ships,  the  Ruly,  64,  was  so  far  to  leeward 
that  the  enemy,  by  keeping  near  the  wind,  could  pass  between  her  and 
him  (b,  b,  b').  She  therefore  went  about  and  steered  south-west,  on 
the  port  tack,  close  to  the  wind.  The  French,  who  were  already  head- 
ing the  same  way,  were  thus  brought  on  her  weather  quarter  in  chase. 
Cornwallis  then  wore  his  division,  formed  line  of  battle  on  the  same 
tack  as  the  others,  and  edged  down  towards  tho  Ruby  (c).  If  the 


476 


MAJOR  OPERATIONS.    1762-1783. 


[1780. 


French  now  kept  their  wind,  either  the  Ruly  (c')  must  be  cut  off,  or 
Cornwallis,  to  save  her,  must  fight  the  large  odds  against  him.  De 
Ternay,  however,  did  not  keep  his  wind  (c).  "  The  enemy,"  wrote 
Cornwallis,  "  kept  edging  off  and  forming  line,  though  within  gun- 
shot. At  5.30  P.M.,  seeing  we  had  pushed  the  French  ships  to  lee- 
ward sufficiently  to  enable  the  fiuly,  on  our  lee  bow,  to  join  us,  I 
made  the  signal  to  tack."  As  the  British  squadron  went  about  to 


•'•• 


ADMIRAL  TUB   HOJf.    SIU   WILLIAM   COI'.NWALI.IS,  G.  C.  B. 

(Frvm  the  litf«igr<i]>ft  hy  Ri'lley,  lifter  the  portrait  ftif  />.  flfinliier,  painted  in  1775,  when  Comicallis  was  a 

Post-C'lptain,  (Ft.  :U.) 

stand  east  again,  the  French,  heading  west-south-west,  hoisted  their 
colours  and  opened  fire  in  passing.  The  lluby  kept  on  till  she 
fetched  the  wake  of  the  British  column,  when  she  too  tacked.  The 
French  then  tacked  also,  in  succession,  and  the  two  columns  stood  on 
for  awhile  in  parallel  lines,  exchanging  shots  at  long  range,  the  British 
to  windward.  Cornwallis  very  properly  declined  further  engagement 
with  so  superior  a  force.  He  had  already  done  much  in  saving  a  ship 
so  greatly  exposed. 


1780.]  CAPTURE   OF  A   BRITISH  CONVOY.  477 

The  account  above  followed  is  that  of  the  British  commander,  but 
it  does  not  differ  in  essentials  from  the  French,  whose  captains  were 
greatly  incensed  at  the  cautious  action  of  their  chief.  A  French  com- 
missaire  in  the  squadron,  who  afterwards  published  his  journal,  tells 
that  de  Ternay  a  few  days  later  asked  the  captain  of  one  of  the  ships 
what  English  admiral  he  thought  they  had  engaged,  and  received  the 
reply,  "  We  have  lost  our  opportunity  of  finding  out."  He  gives  also 
many  details  of  the  talk  that  went  on  in  the  ships,  which  need  not  be 
repeated.  Chevalier  points  out  correctly,  however,  that  de  Ternay 
had  to  consider  that  an  equal  or  even  a  superior  force  might  be  en- 
countered a's  Narragansett  Bay  was  approached,  and  that  he  should 
not  risk  crippling  his  squadron  for  such  a  contingency.  The  charge 
of  6,000  troops,  under  the  then  conditions,  was  no  light  responsibility, 
and  at  the  least  must  silence  off-hand  criticism  now.  Comment  upon 
his  action  does  not  belong  to  British  naval  history,  to  which  the  firm- 
ness and  seamanship  of  Captain  Cornwallis  added  a  lasting  glory. 
It  may  be  noted  that  fifteen  years  later,  in  the  French  Revolution, 
the  same  officer,  then  a  Vice-Admiral,  again  distinguished  himself  by 
his  bearing  in  face  of  great  odds,  bringing  live  ships  safe  off,  out  of 
the  jaws  of  a  dozen.  It  illustrates  how  luck  seems  in  many  cases  to 
characterise  a  man's  personality,  much  as  temperament  does.  Corn- 
wallis, familiarly  known  as  "  Billy  Blue  "  to  the  seamen  of  his  day, 
never  won  a  victory,  nor  had  a  chance  of  winning  one ;  but  in  com- 
mand both  of  ships  and  of  divisions,  he  repeatedly  distinguished  him- 
self by  successfully  facing  odds  which  he  could  not  overcome. 

The  year  was  uneventful  also  in  European  waters,  after  Rodney's 
relief  of  Gibraltar  in  January.  The  detachment  of  the  Channel 
Fleet  which  accompanied  him  on  that  mission  returned  safely  to 
England.  The  "  Grand  Fleet,"  as  it  still  was  styled  occasionally, 
cruised  at  sea  from  June  8th  to  August  18th,  an  imposing  force  of 
thirty-one  ships  of  the  line,  eleven  of  them  three-deckel's  of  00  guns 
and  upwards.  Admiral  Francis  Geary  was  then  Commander-in-Chief, 
but,  his  health  failing,  and  Barrington  refusing  to  take  the  position, 
through  professed  distrust  of  himself  and  actual  distrust  of  the 
Admiralty,  Vice-Admiral  George  Darby  succeeded  to  it,  and  held  it 
during  the  year  1781. 

The  most  notable  maritime  event  in  1780  in  Europe  was  the  cap- 
ture on  August  9th  of  a  large  British  convoy,  two  or  three  hundred 
miles  west  of  Cape  St.  Vincent,  by  the  allied  fleets  from  Cadiz.  As 
out  of  sixty-three  sail  only  eight  escaped,  and  as  of  those  taken  six- 


478  MAJOR   OPERATIONS.    1762-1783.  [1780. 

teen  were  carrying  troops  and  supplies  necessary  for  the  West  India 
garrisons,  such  a  disaster  claims  mention  among  the  greater  opera- 
tions of  war,  the  success  of  which  it  could  not  fail  to  influence. 
Captain  John  Moutray,  the  officer  commanding  the  convoy,  was 
brought  to  trial  and  dismissed  his  ship ;  but  there  were  not  wanting 
those  who  charged  the  misadventure  to  the  Admiralty,  and  saw  in 
the  captain  a  victim.  It  was  the  greatest  single  blow  that  British 
commerce  had  received  in  war  during  the  memory  of  men  then 
living,  and  "  a  general  inclination  prevailed  to  lay  the  blame  upon 
some  individual,  who  might  be  punished  according  to  the  magnitude 
of  the  object,  rather  than  in  proportion  to  his  demerit."  x 

During  the  year  1780  was  formed  the  League  of  the  Baltic 
Powers,  known  historically  as  the  Armed  Neutrality,  to  exact  from 
Great  Britain  the  concession  of  certain  points  thought  essential  to 
neutral  interests.  The  accession  of  Holland  to  this  combination, 
together  with  other  motives  of  dissatisfaction,  caused  Great  Britain 
to  declare  war  against  the  United  Provinces  on  the  20th  of  Decem- 
ber. Orders  were  at  once  sent  to  the  East  and  West  Indies  to  seize 
Dutch  possessions  and  ships,  but  these  did  not  issue  in  action  until 
the  following  year. 

Towards  the  end  of  1780  the  French  Government,  dissatisfied 
with  the  lack  of  results  from  the  immense  combined  force  assembled 
in  Cadiz  during  the  summer  months,  decided  to  recall  its  ships,  and 
to  refit  them  during  the  winter  for  the  more  extensive  and  aggressive 
movements  planned  for  the  campaign  of  1781.  D'Estaing  was  sent 
from  France  for  the  purpose  ;  and  under  his  command  thirty-eight 
ships  of  the  line,  in  which  were  included  those  brought  by  de  Guichen 
from  the  West  Indies,  sailed  on  the  7th  of  November  for  Brest. 
Extraordinary  as  it  may  seem,  this  fleet  did  not  reach  its  port  until 
the  3rd  of  January,  1781. 

Rodney,  returning  to  the  West  Indies  from  New  York,  readied 
Barbados  on  December  Gth,  1780.  There  he  seems  first  to  have 
learned  of  the  disastrous  effects  of  the  great  October  hurricanes  of 
that  year.  Not  only  had  several  ships  —  among  them  two  of  the 
line  —  been  wrecked,  with  the  loss  of  almost  all  on  board,  but  the 
greater  part  of  the  survivors  had  been  dismasted,  wholly  or  in  part, 
as  well  as  injured  in  the  hull.  There  were  in  the  West  Indies  no 
docking  facilities ;  under-water  damage  could  be  repaired  only  by 
careening  or  heaving-down.  Furthermore,  as  Barbados,  St.  Lucia,  and 

i  Beatson,  'Military  and  Naval  Memoirs.' 


1780.]  HOOD  ARRIVES  AT  ST.    LUCIA.  479 

Jamaica,  all  had  been  swept,  their  supplies  were  mainly  destroyed.1 
Antigua,  it  is  true,  had  escaped,  the  hurricane  passing  south  of  St. 
Kitts;  but  Rodney  wrote  home  that  no  stores  for  refitting  were 
obtainable  in  the  Caribbee  Islands.  He  was  hoping  then  that  Sir 
Peter  Parker  might  supply  his  needs  in  part ;  for  when  writing  from 
St.  Lucia  on  December  10th,  two  months  after  the  storm,  he  still  was 
ignorant  that  the  Jamaica  Station  had  suffered  to  the  full  as  severely 
as  the  eastern  islands.  The  fact  shows  not  merely  the  ordinary  slow- 
ness of  communications  in  those  days,  but  also  the  paralysis  that  fell 
upon  all  movements  in  consequence  of  that  great  disaster.  "  The 
most  beautiful  island  in  the  world,"  he  said  of  Barbados,  '•  has  the 
appearance  of  a  county  laid  waste  by  fire  and  sword." 

Hearing  that  the  fortifications  at  St.  Vincent  had  been  almost 
destroyed  by  the  hurricane,  Rodney,  in  combination  with  General 
Vaughan,  commanding  the  troops  on  the  station,  made  an  attempt  to 
reconquer  the  island,  landing  there  on  December  15th ;  but  the  intel- 
ligence proved  erroneous,  and  the  fleet  returned  to  St.  Lucia.  "  I  have 
only  nine  sail  of  the  line  now  with  me  capable  of  going  to  sea."  wrote 
the  Admiral  on  the  22nd,  "  and  not  one  of  them  has  spare  rigging  or 
sails."  In  the  course  of  January  he  was  joined  by  a  division  of  eight 
ships  of  the  line  from  England,  under  the  command  of  Rear-Admiral 
Sir  Samuel  Hood.  These,  with  four  others  refitted  during  that 
month,  not  improbably  from  stores  brought  in  Hood's  convoy  of 
over  a  hundred  sail,  raised  the  disposable  force  to  twentv-one  ships 
of  the  line :  2  nineties,  1  eighty,  15  seventy-fours,  and  3  sixty-fours. 

1  List  of  H.  II.  ships  lost  in  the  hurricane  in  the  West  Indies  in  October,  1780, 
with  the  names  of  their  commanders,  such  of  the  latter  as  perished  being  indicated 
with  an  asterisk  (*).  Chiefly  from  Steel's  '  Navy  List.'  —  W.  L.  C. 

Sinrs.  GUNS.  COMMANDEUS. 

(  Com.  the  Hon.  K.  B.  Walsinsliam.* 
i  Capt.  Robert  Boyle  Nicholas  * 

Stirling  Castle  64  Capt.  Robert  Carkett* 

Phcenix  44  Capt.  Sir  Hyde  Parker  (2). 

Blanche  42  Capt.  Samuel  Uppleby.* 

Laurel  28  Capt.  Thomas  Lloyd* 

Andromeda  28  Capt.  Henry  Bryne.* 

Deal  Castle  24  Capt.  James  Hawkins  (afterwards  Whitshed). 

Scarborough  20  Capt.  Samuel  Hood  Walker.* 

Beaver's  Prize  16  Com.  John  Auriol  Drunnnond.* 

Barbados  14  Com.  Ralph  Milbanke. 

Chameleon  14  Com.  James  Johnstone.* 

Endeavour  14  Lieut.  Francis  Wooldridge. 

Victor  10  Lieut. 


480 


MAJOR  OPERATIONS.     1702-1783. 


[1781. 


On  the  27th  of  January,  an  express  arrived  from  England,  direct- 
ing the  seizure  of  the  Dutch  possessions  in  the  Caribbean,  and 
specifying,  as  first  to  be  attacked,  St.  Eustatius  and  St.  Martin,  two 
small  islands  lying  within  fifty  miles  north  of  the  British  St.  Kitts. 
St.  Eustatius,  a  rocky  patch  six  miles  in  length  by  three  in  breadth, 
had  been  conspicuous,  since  the  war  began,  as  a  great  trade  centre, 
where  supplies  of  all  kinds  were  gathered  under  the  protection  of  its 
neutral  flag,  to  be  distributed  afterwards  in  the  belligerent  islands 
and  the  Xorth  American  continent.  The  British,  owing  to  their 
extensive  commerce  and  maritime  aptitudes,  derived  from  such  an 
intermediary  much  less  benefit  than  their  enemies ;  and  the  island 
had  been  jealously  regarded  by  Rodney  for  some  time.  He  asserted 
that  when  de  Guichen's  fleet  could  not  regain  Fort  Royal,  because  of 
its  injuries  received  in  the  action  of  April  17th,  it  was  refitted  to  meet 
him  by  mechanics  and  materials  sent  from  St.  Eustatius.  On  the  other 
hand,  when  cordage  was  to  bo  bought  for  the  British  vessels  after  the 
hurricanes  of  1780,  the  merchants  of  the  island,  he  said,  alleged  that 
there  was  none  there ;  although,  when  he  took  the  island  soon  after- 
wards, many  hundred  tons  were  found  that  had  been  long  in  stock. 

Rodney  and  Vaughan  moved  promptly.  Three  days  after  their 
orders  arrived,  they  sailed  for  St.  Eustatius.  There  being  in  Fort 
Royal  four  French  ships  of  the  line,  six  British  were  left  to  check 


COMMEMORATIVE  MEDAL  OF   THE  CAPTUKE  OF   ST.    EUSTATIUS   BY    UODNEY,    1781. 
(From  tin  original  lent  by  Capt.  II.  S.  If.  Prince  Louis  of  Batlcnberg,  R.  A'.) 

them,  and  on  the  3rd  of  February  the  fleet  reached  its  destination.  A 
peremptory  summons  from  the  commander  of  a  dozen  ships  of  the 
line  secured  immediate  submission.  Over  a  hundred  and  fifty  mer- 
chant ships  were  taken ;  and  a  convoy  of  thirty  sail,  which  had  left 
the  island  two  days  before,  was  pursued  and  brought  back.  The 
merchandise  found  was  valued  at  over  £3,000,000.  The  neighbour- 
ing islands  of  St.  Martin  and  Saba  were  seized  also  at  this  time. 


1781.]  RODNEY  AT  ST.   EUSTATIUS.  481 

Rodney's  imagination,  as  is  shown  in  his  letters,  was  greatly  im- 
pressed by  the  magnitude  of  the  prize  and  by  the  defenceless  condi- 
tion of  his  capture.  He  alleged  these  as  the  motives  for  staying  in 
person  at  St.  Eustatius,  to  settle  the  complicated  tangle  of  neutral 
and  belligerent  rights  in  the  property  involved,  and  to  provide  against 
the  enemy's  again  possessing  himself  of  a  place  now  so  equipped  for 
transactions  harmful  to  Great  Britain.  The  storehouses  and  con- 
veniences provided  for  the  particular  traffic,  if  not  properly  guarded, 
were  like  fortifications  insufficiently  garrisoned.  If  they  passed  into 
the  hands  of  the  enemy,  they  became  sources  of  injury.  The  illicit 
traffic  could  start  again  at  once  in  full  force,  with  means  which  else- 
where would  have  first  to  be  created.  There  were  a  mile  and  a  half 
of  storehouses  in  the  lower  town,  he  said,  and  at  the  least  he  must 
leave  these  roofless,  if  not  wholly  demolished. 

For  such  reasons  he  remained  at  St.  Eustatius  throughout  Feb- 
ruary, March,  and  April.  The  amount  of  money  involved,  and  the 
arbitrary  methods  pursued  by  him  and  by  Vaughan,  gave  rise  to 
much  scandal,  which  was  not  diminished  by  the  King's  relinquishing 
all  the  booty  to  the  captors,  nor  by  the  latters'  professed  disinterest- 
edness. Men  thought  they  did  protest  too  much.  Meanwhile,  other 
matters  arose  to  claim  attention.  A  week  after  the  capture,  a  vessel 
arrived  from  the  Bay  of  Biscay  announcing  that  eight  or  ten  French 
sail  of  the  line,  with  a  large  convoy,  had  been  seen  on  the  31st  of 
December  steering  for  the  West  Indies.  Rodney  at  once  detached 
Sir  Samuel  Hood  with  eleven  ships  of  the  line,  directing  him  to 
take  also  under  his  command  the  six  left  before  Fort  Royal,  and  to 
cruise  with  them  to  windward  of  Martinique,  to  intercept  the  force 
reported.  Hood  sailed  February  12th.  The  particular  intelligence 
proved  afterwards  to  be  false,  but  Hood  was  continued  on  this  duty. 
A  month  later  he  was  ordered  to  move  from  the  windward  to  the  lee- 
ward side  of  the  island,  and  to  blockade  Fort  Royal  closely.  Against 
this  change  he  remonstrated,  and  the  event  showed  him  to  be  right ; 
but  Rodney  insisted,  saying  that  from  his  experience  he  knew  that  a 
fleet  could  remain  off  Fort  Royal  for  months  without  dropping  to  lee- 
ward, and  that  there  ships  detached  to  St.  Lucia,  for  water  and 
refreshments,  could  rejoin  before  an  enemy's  fleet,  discovered  to 
windward,  could  come  up.  Hood  thought  the  Admiral's  object  was 
merely  to  shelter  his  own  doings  at  St.  Eustatius  ;  and  he  considered 
the  blockade  of  Fort  Royal  to  be  futile,  if  no  descent  upon  the  island 
were  intended.  "It  would  doubtless  have  been  fortunate  for  the 

VOL.  III. —  31 


482  MAJOR   OPERATIONS.    1702-1783.  [1781. 

public,"  he  remarked  afterwards,  "had  Sir  George  been  with  his 
fleet,  as  I  am  confident  he  would  have  been  to  windward  instead  of 
to  leeward,  when  de  Grasse  made  his  approach." 

The  preparations  of  the  French  in  Brest  were  completed  towards  the 
end  of  March,  and  on  the  22nd  of  that  month  Rear-Admiral  de  Grasse 
sailed,  having  a  large  convoy  under  the  protection  of  twenty-six  ships 
of  the  line.  A  week  later  six  of  the  latter  parted  company,  five  under 
Suffren  for  the  East  Indies,  and  one  for  North  America.  The  remain- 
ing twenty  continued  their  course  for  Martinique,  which  was  sighted 
on  the  28th  of  April.  Before  sunset,  Hood's  squadron  also  was  dis- 
covered to  leeward  of  the  island,  as  ordered  by  Rodney  to  cruise,  and 
off  the  southern  point,  —  Pointe  des  Salines.  De  Grasse  then  hove-to 
for  the  night,  but  sent  an  officer  ashore  both  to  give  and  to  obtain  intel- 
ligence, and  to  reach  an  understanding  for  concerted  action  next  day. 

The  French  fleet  consisted  of  one  ship  of  110  guns,  3  eighties,  15 
seventy-fours,  and  1  sixty-four,  in  all  20  of  the  line,  besides  three 
armed  en  jti'itc,  which  need  not  be  taken  into  account,  although  they 
served  to  cover  the  convoy.  Besides  these  there  were  the  four  in 
Fort  Royal,  1  seventy-four  and  ;>  sixty-fours,  whose  junction  with  the 
approaching  enemy  it  was  one  of  Hood's  objects  to  prevent.  The  force 
of  the  British  was  1  ninety,  1  eighty,  12  seventy-fours,  1  seventy,  and 
2  sixty-fours:  total,  17. ]  Thus  both  in  numbers  and  in  rates  of  ships 

1  List  of  the  Ik-el  under  Kuar-Admiral  Sir  S.  Hood,  Bavt.,  on  April  29th,  1781. 
Chiefly  from  Beatson,  vi.  264,  and  Steel's  '  Navy  List.'  This  includes  the  64-gnn 
ship,  whii'h  joined  from  St.  Lucia  at  9.20A.M.  —  W.  L.  C. 

Alfred  74     Captain  William  Biiyiie. 

Ilcllirjiicux  (i4     Captain  J nines  Brine. 

Aid'!''-  74     Captain  Charles  Thompson. 

Invincible  74     Captain  Sir  Richard  liickcrton,  Bart. 

Mniinn:h  74     Captain  Francis  Reynolds  (later  F.  R.  Moreton). 

-.„  (  Rear-Admiral  Sir  Samuel  Howl,  Bart.  (B). 
jj'irncur  90  ] 

(  Captain  John  Knight  (2). 

Trrriblc  74     Captain  James  Ferguson. 

I'finccsa  70     Captain  Sir  Thomas  Rich,  Bart. 

Ajux  74     Captain  John  Symons. 

Hesnlution  74     Captain  Lord  Robert  Manners. 

MmitaijH  74     Captain  John  Houlton. 

.      .  „„  (  1! car- Admiral  Francis  Samuel  Drake  (B). 

(  Captain  Charles  Knatchbnll. 

Ccnttiur  74     Captain  John  Xeale  Pleydell  Xott. 

Russell  74     Captain  Andrew  Sutherland. 

Prince  William         64     Captain  Stair  Douglas  (1). 
Tnrbay  74     Captain  John  Lewis  Gidoin. 

Intrepid  64     Captain  Anthony  James  Pye  Molloy. 

Shrewsbury  74     Captain  Mark  Robinson  (1). 

Li-anl,  28,  as  repeater.  Pucuhontaa,  14,  as  repeater. 


1781.] 


HOOD  AND  HE  GRASSE. 


483 


Hood  was  inferior  to  the  main  body  alone  of  the  French ;  but  he  had 
the  advantage  of  ships  all  coppered,  owing  to  Rodney's  insistence 
with  the  Admiralty.  He  also  had  no  convoy  to  worry  him ;  but  he 
was  to  leeward. 

Early  in  the  morning  of  the  29th,  de  Grasse  advanced  to  round 
the  southern  point  of  the  island,  which  was  the  usual  course  for  sail- 
ing ships.  Hood  was  too  far  to  leeward  to  intercept  this  movement, 


CHART   OF   PART  OF  THE   WINDWARD   ISLANDS. 

for  which  he  was  blamed  by  Kodney,  who  claimed  that  the  night  had 
not  been  properly  utilised  by  beating  to  windward  of  Pointe  des 
Salines.1  Hood,  on  the  other  hand,  said  in  a  private  letter :  "  I  never 
once  lost  sight  of  getting  to  windward,  but  it  was  totally  impossible. 
.  .  .  Had  I  fortunately  been  there,  I  must  have  brought  the  enemy 
to  close  action  upon  more  equal  terms,  or  they  must  have  given  up 

1  Rodney  said  that  Hood  "  lay-to  "  for  the  night.  This  is  antecedently  incredible 
of  an  officer  of  Hood's  character,  and  is  expressly  contradicted  by  Captain  Sutherland 
of  the  Russell.  "  At  6  P.M.  (of  the  28th)  our  fleet  tacked  to  the  north,  and  kept  mov- 
ing across  the  bay  (Fort  Royal)  for  the  right  (sic),  in  line  of  battle."  Ekins,  '  Naval 
Battles,'  p.  136.  The  word  "  right "  is  evidently  a  misprint  for  "  night."  Rodney's 
criticisms  seem  to  the  author  captious  throughout. 


484  MAJOR   OPERATIONS.    1762-1783.  [1781. 

their  transports,  trade,  etc."  Hood's  subsequent  career  places  it  be- 
yond doubt  that  had  he  been  to  windward  there  would  have  been  a 
severe  action,  whatever  the  result ;  but  it  is  not  possible  to  decide 
positively  between  his  statement  and  Rodney's,  as  to  where  the  fault 
of  being  to  leeward  lay.  The  writer  believes  that  Hood  would  have 
been  to  windward,  if  in  any  way  possible.  It  must  be  added  that  the 
British  had  no  word  that  so  great  a  force  was  coming.  On  this  point 
Hood  and  Rodney  are  agreed. 

Under  the  conditions,  the  French  passed  without  difficulty  round 
Pointe  des  Salines,  the  transports  hugging  the  coast,  and  the  ships  of 
war  being  outside  and  to  leeward  of  them.  Thus  they  headed  up  to 
the  northward  for  Fort  Royal  Bay  (Cul  de  Sac  Royal),  Hood  standing 
to  the  southward  until  after  10.  and  being  joined  at  9.20  by  a  sixty- 
four  (which  is  counted  in  the  list  above)  from  St.  Lucia,  making  his 
force  eighteen.  At  10.35  the  British  tacked  together  to  the  north- 
ward. The  two  fleets  were  now  steering  the  same  way,  the  French 
van  abreast  of  the  British  centre.  At  11  the  French  opened  their  fire, 
to  which  no  reply  was  made  then.  At  11.20,  the  British  van  being 
close  in  with  the  shore  to  the  northward  of  the  Bay,  Hood  tacked 
again  together,  and  the  enemy,  seeing  his  convoy  secure,  wore,  also 
together,  which  brought  the  two  lines  nearer,  heading  south.  At  this 
time  the  four  French  ships  in  the  Bay  got  underway  and  easily  joined 
the  rear  of  their  fleet,  it  having  the  weather-gage.  The  French  were 
thus  24  to  18.  As  their  shot  were  passing  over  the  British,  the  latter 
now  began  to  reply.  At  noon  Hood,  finding  that  he  could  not  close 
the  enemy,  shortened  sail  to  topsails  and  hove-to,  hoping  by  this  defi- 
ance to  bring  them  down  to  him.  At  12.30  the  French  admiral  was 
abreast  of  the  British  flagship,  and  the  action  became  general,  but  at 
too  long  range.  "  Never,  I  believe,"  wrote  Hood,  "  was  more  powder 
and  shot  thrown  away  in  one  day  before."  The  French  continuing 
to  stand  on.  Hood  filled  his  sails  again  at  1  P.M.,  as  their  van  had 
stretched  beyond  his. 

As  the  leading  ships,  heading  south,  opened  the  channel  between 
St.  Lucia  and  Martinique,  they  got  the  breeze  fresher,  which  caused 
them  to  draw  away  from  the  centre.  Hood,  therefore,  at  1.34  made 
the  signal  for  a  close  order,  and  immediately  afterwards  ceased  firing, 
finding  not  one  in  ten  of  the  enemy's  shot  to  reach.  The  engage- 
ment, however,  continued  somewhat  longer  between  the  southern 
ships,  where,  by  the  account  of  Captain  Sutherland,  who  was  in  that 
part  of  the  line,  four  of  the  British  were  attacked  very  smartly  by 


1781.] 


MARTINIQUE. 


485 


O-   .g1 

"if,     "tr 


486  MAJOR  OPERATIONS.    1762-1783.  [1781. 

eight  of  the  French.  The  Centaur,  Russell,  Intrepid,  and  Shrewsbury 
appear  to  have  been  the  ships  that  suffered  most  heavily,  either  in 
hull,  spars,  or  crews.  They  were  all  in  the  van  on  the  southern  tack. 
The  Russell,  having  several  shot  between  wind  and  water,  was  with 
difficulty  kept  afloat,  the  water  rising  over  the  platform  of  the  maga- 
zine. .  Hood  sent  her  off  at  nightfall  to  St.  Eustatius,  where  she 
arrived  on  the  4th  of  May,  bringing  Rodney  the  first  news  of  the 
action,  and  of  the  numbers  of  the  French  reinforcement.  During  the 
30th  Hood  held  his  ground,  still  endeavouring  to  get  to  windward 
of  the  enemy ;  but  failing  in  that  attempt,  and  finding  two  of  his 
squadron  much  disabled,  he  decided  at  sunset  to  bear  away  to  the 
northward,  because  to  the  southward  the  westerly  currents  set  so 
strong  that  the  crippled  ships  could  not  regain  St.  Lucia.  On  the 
llth  of  May,  between  St.  Kitts  and  Antigua,  he  joined  Rodney,  who, 
after  hurried  repairs  to  the  Eussdl,  had  left  St.  Eustatius  on  the  5th, 
with  that  ship,  the  Sandwich,  and  the  Triumph. 

It  is  somewhat  difficult  to  criticise  positively  the  conduct  of  Hood 
and  of  de  Grasse  in  this  affair.  It  is  clear  that  Hood  on  the  first  day 
seriously  sought  action,  though  his  force  was  but  three-fourths  that 
of  his  foe.  He  tried  first  to  take  the  offensive,  and,  failing  that,  to 
induce  his  enemy  to  attack  frankly  and  decisively.  Troude  is  doubt- 
less correct  in  saying  that  it  was  optional  with  de  Grasse  to  bring  on 
a  general  engagement ;  and  the  writer  finds  himself  in  agreement  also 
with  another  French  authority,  Captain  Chevalier,  that  "  Count  de 
Grasse  seems  to  have  been  too  much  preoccupied  with  the  safety  of 
his  convoy  on  the  29th,  Admiral  Hood  having  shown  himself  much 
less  circumspect  on  that  day  than  he  was  on  the  next.  Notwithstand- 
ing our  numerical  superiority,  Count  de  Grasse  kept  near  the  land 
until  all  the  convoy  were  safe."  He  represents  Hood  as  fencing 
cautiously  on  the  following  day,  keeping  on  the  field,  but  avoiding  a 
decisive  encounter.  This  differs  somewhat  from  the  version  of  Hood 
himself,  who  mentions  signalling  a  general  chase  to  windward  at  12.30 
v.  M.  of  the  30th.  The  two  statements  are  not  irreconcilable.  Hood, 
having  coppered  ships,  had  the  speed  of  the  French,  whose  vessels, 
being  partly  coppered  and  partly  not,  sailed  unevenly.  The  British 
commander  consequently  could  afford  to  take  risks,  and  he  therefore 
played  with  the  enemy,  watching  for  a  chance.  Hood  was  an  officer 
of  exceptional  capacity,  much  in  advance  of  his  time.  He  thoroughly 
understood  a  watching  game,  and  that  an  opportunity  might  offer  to 
seize  an  advantage  over  part  of  the  enemy,  if  the  eagerness  of  pursuit, 


1781.]  DRAKE  AND  DE  GRASSE.  487 

or  any  mishap,  caused  the  French  to  separate.  From  any  dilemma 
that  ensued,  the  reserve  of  speed  gave  him  a  power  of  withdrawal,  in 
relying  upon  which  he  was  right.  The  present  writer  adopts  here  also 
Chevalier's  conclusion :  "  Admiral  Hood  evidently  had  the  very  great 
advantage  over  his  enemy  of  commanding  a  squadron  of  coppered 
ships.  Nevertheless,  homage  is  clue  to  his  skill  and  to  the  confidence 
shown  by  him  in  his  captains.  If  some  of  his  ships  had  dropped 
behind  through  injuries  received,  he  would  have  had  to  sacrifice  them, 
or  to  fight  a  superior  force."  This  means  that  Hood,  for  an  adequate 
gain  ran  a  great  risk ;  that  he  thoroughly  understood  botli  the  advan- 
tages and  the  disadvantages  of  his  situation ;  and  that  he  acted  not 
only  with  great  skill,  but  warily  and  boldly,  —  a  rare  combination. 
The  British  loss  in  this  affair  was  39  killed,  including  Captain  Nott, 
of  the  Centaur,  and  162  wounded.  The  French  loss  is  given  by  Cheva- 
lier as  18  killed  and  56  wounded ;  by  Beatson,  as  119  killed  and  150 
wounded. 

Rodney,  having  collected  his  fleet,  proceeded  south,  and  on  the  18th 
of  May  put  into  Barbados  for  water.  Much  anxiety  had  been  felt  at 
first  for  St.  Lucia,  which  Hood's  retreat  had  uncovered.  As  was 
feared,  the  French  had  attacked  it  at  once,  their  fleet,  with  the  excep- 
tion of  one' or  two  ships,  going  there,  and  1,200  troops  landing  at  Gros 
Ilet  Bay;  but  the  batteries  on  Pigeon  Island,  which  Rodney  had 
erected  and  manned,  kept  them  at  arms'  length.  The  works  elsewhere 
being  found  too  strong,  the  attempt  was  abandoned. 

At  the  same  time,  two  ships  of  the  line  and  1,300  troops  had  sailed 
from  Martinique  against  Tobago.  When  de  Grasse  returned  from  the 
failure  at  St.  Lucia,  he  learned  that  the  British  were  at  sea,  apparently 
bound  for  Barbados.  Alarmed  for  his  detachment  before  Tobago,  he 
again  sailed  with  the  fleet  for  that  island  on  the  25th  of  May,  accom- 
panied by  3,000  more  troops.  Rodney  learned  at  Barbados  of  the 
attempt  on  Tobago,  and  on  the  29th  dispatched  a  squadron  of  six  sail 
of  the  line,  under  Rear-Admiral  Francis  Samuel  Drake,  to  support 
the  defence.  On  the  following  day  he  heard  that  the  French  main 
fleet  had  been  seen  to  windward  of  St.  Lucia,  steering  south,  evi- 
dently for  Tobago.  On  the  30th  also  Drake  and  de  Grasse  encountered 
one  another  off  the  latter  island,  the  French  being  to  leeward,  nearest 
the  land.  Drake  necessarily  retired,  and  on  the  morning  of  June  3rd 
was  again  off  Barbados,  whereupon  Rodney  at  once  sailed  for  Tobago 
with  the  whole  fleet.  On  the  4th  the  island  was  sighted,  and  next 
morning  information  was  received  that  it  had  capitulated  on  the  2nd. 


488  MAJOR  OPERATIONS.     17G2-17S3.  [1781- 

The  two  fleets  returning  north  were  in  presence  of  one  another  on 
the  9th ;  but  no  engagement  took  place.  Rodney,  who  was  to  wind- 
ward, having  twenty  sail  to  twenty-three,1  was  unwilling  to  attack 
unless  he  could  get  a  clear  sea.  The  strength  of  the  currents,  he 
said,  would  throw  his  fleet  too  far  to  leeward,  in  case  of  reverse,  into 
the  foul  ground  between  St.  Vincent  and  Grenada,  thus  exposing 
Barbados,  which  had  not  recovered  sufficiently  from  the  hurricane 
to  stand  alone.  He  put  into  Barbados,  and  de  Grasse  went  to  Mar- 
tinique to  prepare  the  expedition  to  the  American  continent,  which 
resulted  in  the  surrender  of  Cormvallis.  On  the  5th  of  July  he  sailed 
from  Fort  Royal,  taking  with  him  the  "trade"  for  France,  and  on 
the  20th  anchored  with  it  at  Cap  Francois,  where  he  found  a  division 
of  four  ships  of  the  line  which  had  been  left  the  year  before  by 
de  Guichen.  There  also  was  a  frigate,  which  had  left  Boston  on 
the  20th  of  June,  and  by  which  he  received  dispatches  from  Wash- 
ington, and  from  Rochambeau,  the  general  commanding  the  French 
troops  in  America.  These  acquainted  him  with  the  state  of  affairs 
on  the  continent,  and  requested  that  the  ileet  should  come  to  either 
the  Chesapeake  or  New  York,  to  strike  a  decisive  blow  at  the  British 
power  in  one  quarter  or  the  other. 

It  is  expedient  here  to  resume  the  thread  of  events  on  the  con- 
tinent. 

It  has  been  said  that,  to  support  the  operations  of  Cormvallis  in 
the  Carolinas,  Clinton  had  begun  a  series  of  diversions  in  the  valley 
of  the  James  River.  The  iirst  detachment  so  sent,  under  General 
Leslie,  had  been  transferred  speedily  to  South  Carolina,  to  meet  the 
exigencies  of  Cornwallis's  campaign.  The  second,  of  1,000  troops 
under  Benedict  Arnold,  left  New  York  at  the  end  of  December,  and 
began  its  work  on  the  banks  of  the  James  at  the  end  of  January,  1781. 
It  advanced  to  Richmond,  nearly  a  hundred  miles  from  the  sea,  wast- 
ing the  country  round  about,  and  finding  no  opposition  adequate  to 
check  its  freedom  of  movement.  Returning  down  stream,  on  the 
20th  it  occupied  Portsmouth,  south  of  the  James  River,  near  the  sea, 
and  valuable  as  a  naval  station. 

Washington  urged  Commodore  des  Touches,  who  by  de  Ternay's 

death  had  been  left  in  command  of  the  French  squadron  at  Newport, 

to  interrupt  these  proceedings,  by  dispatching  a  strong  detachment 

to  Chesapeake  Bay ;  and  he  asked  Rochambeau  also  to  let  some  troops 

1  One  French  ship  had  left  the  fleet,  disabled. 


1781.]  ARBUTHNOT  AND  DES  TOUCHES.  489 

accompany  the  naval  division,  to  support  the  scanty  force  which  he 
himself  could  spare  to  Virginia.  It  happened,  however,  that  a  gale 
of  wind  just  then  had  inflicted  severe  injury  upon  Arbuthnot's  squad- 
ron, three  of  which  had  gone  to  sea  from  Gardiner's  Bay  upon  a  report 
that  three  French  ships  of  the  line  had  left  Newport  to  meet  an  ex- 
pected convoy.  One  seventy-four,  the  Bedford,  was  wholly  dismasted ; 
another,  the  C'ulloden,  Captain  George  Balfour,  drove  ashore  on  Long 
Island,  and  was  wrecked.  The  French  ships  had  returned  to  port  the 
day  before  the  gale,  but  the  incident  indisposed  des  Touches  to  risk 
his  vessels  at  sea  at  that  time.  He  sent  only  a  sixty-four,  with  two 
frigates.  These  left  Newport  on  February  9th,  and  entered  the 
Chesapeake,  but  were  unable  to  reach  the  British  vessels,  which,  being 
smaller,  withdrew  up  the  Elizabeth  River.  Arbuthnot,  hearing  of  this 
expedition,  sent  orders  to  some  frigates  off  Charleston  to  go  to  the 
scene.  The  French  division,  when  leaving  the  Bay,  met  one  of  these, 
the  Romulus,  44,  Captain  George  Gayton,  off  the  Capes,  captured  her.  anil 
returned  to  Newport  on  February  25th.  On  the  8th  of  March,  A  mold 
reported  to  Clinton  that  the  Chesapeake  was  clear  of  French  vessels. 

On  the  same  day  Arbuthnot  also  was  writing  to  Clinton,  from 
Gardiner's  Bay,  that  the  French  were  evidently  preparing  to  quit 
Newport.  His  utmost  diligence  had  failed  as  yet  to  repair  entirely 
the  damage  done  his  squadron  by  the  storm,  but  on  the  9th  it  was 
ready  for  sea.  On  the  evening  of  the  8th  the  French  had  sailed. 
On  the  10th  Arbuthnot  knew  it,  and,  having  taken  the  precaution  to 
move  down  to  the  entrance  of  the  bay,  he  was  able  to  follow  at  once. 
On  the  13th  he  spoke  a  vessel  which  had  seen  the  enemy  and  gave 
him  their  course.  Favoured  by  a  strong  north-west  wind,  and  his 
ships  being  coppered,  he  outstripped  the  French,  only  three  of  which 
had  copper  on  them.  At  6  A.M.  of  the  IGth  the  latter  were  reported 
by  a  frigate  to  be  astern  — to  the  north-east —  about  a  league  distant, 
a  thick  haze  preventing  the  British  from  seeing  them  even  at  that  dis- 
tance (A  A).1  Cape  Henry,  the  southern  point  of  the  entrance  to  the 
Chesapeake,  then  bore  south-west  by  west,  distant  forty  miles.  The 
wind  as  stated  by  Arbuthnot  was  west ;  by  the  French,  south-west. 

The  British  admiral  at  once  went  about,  steering  in  the  direction 
reported,  and  the  opposing  squadrons  soon  sighted  one  another. 
The  British  being  between  them  and  their  port,  the  French  hauled 
to  the  wind,  which  shifted  between  8  and  9  to  north  by  west,  putting 
them  to  windward.  Some  preliminary  manoeuvres  then  followed,  both 

1  Reference  is  to  Mahan's  "  Influence  of  Sea  Power  Upon  History,"  Plate  XII. 


492 


MAJOR  OPERATIONS.     1762-1783. 


[1781. 


Both  sides  had  eight  ships,  besides  smaller  craft,  in  this  encounter. 
From  the  table a  given  below  it  is  evident  that  the  advantage  in  force 
was  distinctly  with  the  British.  For  this  reason,  probably,  the  action 
was  considered  particularly  discreditable  by  contemporaries,  and  the 
more  so  because  several  vessels  did  not  engage  closely,  —  a  fault  laid  to 
the  Vice-Admiral's  failure  to  make  the  signal  for  close  action,  hauling 
down  that  for  the  line.  This  criticism  is  interesting,  for  it  indicates 
how  men's  minds  were  changing  ;  and  it  shows  also  that  Arbuthnot 
had  not  changed,  but  still  lived  in  the  middle  of  the  century.  The 
French  commodore  displayed  very  considerable  tactical  skill ;  his 
squadron  was  handled  neatly,  quickly,  and  with  precision.  With 
inferior  force  he  carried  off  a  decided  advantage  by  sheer  intelligence 
and  good  management.  Unluckily,  he  failed  in  resolution  to  pursue 
his  advantage.  Had  lie  persisted,  he  doubtless  could  have  controlled 
the  Chesapeake. 

His  neglect  to  do  so  was  justified  by  Commodore  de  Barras,  who 
on  the  loth  of  May  arrived  in  Newport  from  France  to  command  the 
squadron.  This  ollicer,  after  pointing  out  the  indisputable  tactical 
success,  continued  thus  :  - 

"As  to  the  advantage  -which  the  English  obtained,  in  fulfilling  their  object, 
that  is  a  necessary  consequence  of  their  superiority,  and,  still  more,  of  their  purely 
defensive  attitude.  /(  is  a  principle  in  icar  that  om-  should  rink  much  to  defend  one's 
oii-it  positions,  and  rery  little  to  attack  those  of  the  enemy.  M.  des  Touches,  whose 
object  was  purely  offensive,  could  and  should,  when  the  enemy  opposed  to  him 


1  List  of  the  British  and  French  squadrons  in  the  action  of  March  16th,  1781. 
The  British  list  gives  Arbuthnot's  line  of  battle  ;  the  America  to  lead  with  the  star- 
board, and  the  Itubust  with  the  larboard  tacks  on  board.  Beatson,  vi.  273  (corrected). 
—  W.  L.  C. 


SHIPS. 

/. 
•~ 

COMMANDERS. 

SHIPS. 

o 

COMMANDERS. 

Ainerint  . 

r.i 

Capt.  Samuel  Thompson. 

74 

(  11.  des  Touches. 

linlfiird  .     .  74 

C'apt.  Edmund  Affleck. 

.  f]i  line,     .... 

1  Capt.  de  M(Sdine. 

Ailninant. 

SO 

Capt.  Gideon  Johnstone. 

*Duc  de  Ilfnirf/of/ne  , 

M 

Capt.  Baron  de  Durf  ort. 

London    . 

98 

j  Rear-Adm.  Thomas  Graves  (2),  (R). 

Con'/iierfint    .     .     . 

74 

Capt.  de  la  Grandiere. 

1  Capt.  David  Graves. 

Provence,   . 

(>t       ('ant.  T.nmhart 

(  Vice-Adm.  Marriot  Arbuthnot. 

Ardent  . 

64 

Capt.  de  Marigny. 

Roynl  Ouk   . 

|4 

i  Capt.  William  Swiney. 

Jtisfin     

64 

Capt.  de  la  Clocheterie. 

Prmlent  .    . 

,1 

Capt.  Thomas  Burnett. 

*£rrille  

64 

Capt.  de  Tilly. 

Europe    .     . 

64 

Capt.  Smith  Child. 

lltfjiiiulux    .... 

44 

Ciipt.  de  Villebruno. 

Kolmsl     .     . 

74 

Capt.  Phillips  Cosby. 

FRIGATES  :  — 

FRIGATES  :  — 

Guri'laliipe  . 

28 

Capt.  Hugh  Robinson. 

Iff  rit)  ion  e  . 

36 

Capt.  de  la  Touche. 

Pearl  .     .     . 

:;-_• 

Capt.  George  Montagu. 

Gentilte,     .... 

:;:' 

Iris     .    .     . 

::-J 

Capt.  George  Dawaon. 

fanliisrjiie  (en  flflte) 

64 

Capt.  de  Vaudor£. 

Medea      .    . 

Capt.  Henry  Duncan  (1). 

*  These  ships  were  coppered. 

t  Late  British.     Though  only  a  44-guu  ship,  she  was  a  two-decker. 


1781.]  CORNWALLIS  AND   CLINTON.  493 

superior  forces,  renounce  a  project  which  could  no  longer  succeed,  unless,  contrary 
to  all  probability,  it  ended  not  only  in  beating,  but  also  in  destroying  entirely,  that 
superior  squadron." 

This  exaltation  of  the  defensive  above  the  offensive,  this  despair- 
ing view  of  probabilities,  this '  aversion  from  risks,  go  far  to  explain 
the  French  want  of  success  in  this  war.  No  matter  how  badly  the 
enemy  was  thrashed,  unless  he  were  entirely  destroyed,  he  was  still  a 
fleet  "  in  being,"  a  paralysing  factor. 

The  retreat  of  des  Touches  and  the  coming  of  Arbuthnot  restored 
to  the  British  the  command  of  Chesapeake  Bay.  Clinton,  as  soon  as 
he  knew  that  the  two  squadrons  had  sailed,  had  sent  off  a  reinforce- 
ment of  2,000  troops  for  Arnold,  under  General  Phillips.  These 
arrived  on  March  26th  in  Lynnhaven  Bay,  and  thence  proceeded  at 
once  to  Portsmouth,  Virginia.  It  is  unnecessary  to  speak  of  the 
various  operations  of  this  land  force.  On  the  9th  of  May,  in  conse- 
quence of  letters  received  from  Cornwallis,  it  moved  to  Petersburg. 
There  on  the  13th  Phillips  died,  the  command  reverting  momentarily 
to  Arnold.  On  the  20th  Cornwallis  joined,  and  Arnold  soon  after 
returned  to  New  York. 

Cornwallis  now  had  with  him  about  7,000  troops,  including  the 
garrison  at  Portsmouth  ;  but  a  serious  difference  of  opinion  existed 
between  him  and  Clinton,  the  Commander-in-Chief.  The  latter  had 
begun  the  conquest  of  South  Carolina,  and  he  did  not  welcome  the 
conclusion  of  his  lieutenant  that  the  conquest  could  not  be  main- 
tained, away  from  the  seaboard,  unless  Virginia  also  were  subdued ; 
for  from  the  latter,  a  rich  and  populous  region,  men  and  supplies 
supported  the  American  cause  in  the  south.  Cornwallis  had  tested 
the  asserted  strength  of  the  Royalists  in  the  Carolinas,  and  had  found 
it  wanting.  Offensive  operations  in  Virginia  were  what  he  wished  ; 
but  Clinton  cb'd  not  approve  this  project,  nor  feel  that  he  could  spare 
troops  enough  for  the  purpose.  Between  October,  1780,  and  June, 
1781,  he  said,  7,724  effectives  had  been  sent  from  New  York  to 
the  Chesapeake ;  and  he  could  not  understand  the  failure  to  cut  off 
the  greatly  inferior  force  of  the  enemy  in  Virginia.  This  at  least  did 
not  indicate  probable  success  for  a  renewed  offensive.  The  garrison 
of  New  York  was  now  short  of  11,000,  and  could  not  be  diminished 
further,  as  he  was  threatened  with  a  siege.  In  short,  the  British 
position  in  America  had  become  essentially  false,  by  the  concurring 
effect  of  insufficient  force  and  ex-centric  —  double  —  operations.  Sent 
to  conquer,  their  numbers  now  were  so  divided  that  they  could  barely 


494  MAJOR  OPERATIONS.     1702-1783.  [1781. 

maintain  the  defensive.  Cornwallis  therefore  was  ordered  to  occupy 
a  defensive  position,  which  should  control  an  anchorage  for  ships  of 
the  line,  and  to  strengthen  himself  in  it.  After  some  discussion, 
which  revealed  further  disagreement,  he  placed  himself  at  Yorktown, 
on  the  peninsula  formed  by  the  James  and  York  rivers.  Portsmouth 
was  evacuated,  the  garrison  reaching  Yorktown  on  the  22nd  of  August. 
Cornwallis's  force  was  then  7,000  troops ;  and  there  were  with  him 
lie-sides  about  a  thousand  seamen,  belonging  to  some  half-dozen  small 
vessels,  which  hud  been  shut  up  in  the  York  by  the  coming  of  the 
French  fleet. 

On  the  2nd  of  July  Arbuthnot  sailed  for  England,  leaving  the 
command  at  New  York  to  Rear-Admiral  Thomas  Graves  (2).  The 
latter  on  the  same  day  wrote  to  Rodney,  by  the  brig  Active,  that  inter- 
cepted dispatches  of  the  enemy  had  revealed  that  a  large  division 
from  the  AVest  Indies  was  to  arrive  on  the  American  coast  during 
the  summer,  to  co-operate  with  the  force  already  in  Newport.  Rodney, 
on  the  other  hand,  dispatched  to  New  York  on  the  7th  the  Swallow 
sloop,  16,  with  word  that,  if  he  sent  reinforcements  from  the  West 
Indies,  they  would  be  ordered  to  make  the  Capes  of  the  Chesapeake,  and 
to  coast  thence  to  New  York.  He  asked,  therefore,  that  cruisers  with 
information  might  be  stationed  along  that  route.  Two  days  later, 
having  then  certain  news  that  de  Grasse  had  sailed  for  Cap  Francois, 
he  sent  the  intelligence  to  Vice-Admiral  Sir  Peter  Parker  at  Jamaica, 
and  gave  Rear- Admiral  Sir  Samuel  Hood  preparatory  orders  to  com- 
mand a  reinforcement  destined  for  the  continent.  This,  however,  was 
limited  in  numbers  to  tifteen  sail  of  the  line,  Rodney  being  misled  by 
his  intelligence,  which  gave  fourteen  ships  as  the  size  of  the  French 
division  having  the  same  destination,  and  which  reported  that  de  Grasse 
himself  woidd  convoy  the  trade  from  Cap  Francois  to  France.  On  the 
24th  instructions  were  issued  for  Hood  to  proceed  on  this  duty.  He 
was  first  to  convoy  the  Jamaica  trade  as  far  as  the  passage  between  Cuba 
and  Haiti,  and  thence  to  make  the  utmost  speed  to  the  Chesapeake. 
A  false  report,  of  French  ships  reaching  Martinique  from  Europe, 
.slightly  delayed  this  movement.  The  convoy  was  dispatched  to 
Jamaica  with  two  ships  of  the  line,  which  Sir  Peter  Parker  was 
directed  to  send  at  once  to  America,  and  requested  to  reinforce 
with  others  from  his  own  squadron.  Hood  was  detained  until  the 
report  could  be  verified.  On  the  1st  of  August  Rodney  sailed  for 
England  on  leave  of  absence.  On  the  10th  Hood  left  Antigua 
with  fourteen  ships  of  the  line,  direct  for  the  Capes.  He  had 


1781.]  DE  GRASSE  AT  CAP  FRANQOIS.  495 

already  received,  on  the  3rd,  Graves's  letter  by  the  Active,  which 
he  sent  back  on  the  6th  with  his  answer  and  with  a  notification 
of  his  speedy  departure. 

The  Swallow  and  the  Active  should  have  reached  Graves  before 
Hood;  but  neither  got  to  him  at  all.  The  Swalloiv,  Comman- 
der Thomas  Wells,  arrived  safely  in  New  York  on  the  27th  of 
July ;  but  Graves  had  sailed  with  all  his  squadron  on  the  21st,  for 
Boston  Bay,  hoping  there  to  intercept  an  expected  convoy  from 
France,  concerning  which  a  special  caution  had  been  sent  him  by  the 
Admiralty.  The  sloop  was  at  once  sent  on  by  the  senior  naval 
officer,  but  was  attacked  by  hostile  vessels,  forced  ashore  on 
Long  Island,  and  lost.  The  Active  was  captured  before  she  reached 
New  York.  Graves,  in  happy  ignorance  of  the  momentous  crisis 
approaching,  continued  cruising  until  the  10th  of  August,  when 
he  returned  to  Sandy  Hook.  There  he  found  the  duplicates  of 
the  Swallow's  letters,  but  they  only  notified  him  of  the  course  a 
reinforcement  would  take,  not  that  Hood  had  started.  On  August 
25th  the  latter,  being  then  off  the  Chesapeake,  sent  duplicates  of 
the  Active's  dispatches,  but  these  preceded  by  little  his  own  arrival 
on  the  28th.  That  evening  news  was  received  in  New  York  that 
de  Barras  had  sailed  from  Newport  on  the  25th,  with  his  whole 
division.  Hood  anchored  outside  the  Hook,  where  Graves,  who 
was  the  senior  officer,  undertook  to  join  him  at  once.  On  the  31st 
five  sail  of  the  line  and  a  fifty-gun  ship,  all  that  could  be  got 
ready  in  time,  crossed  the  bar,  and  the  entire  body  of  nineteen 
ships  of  the  line  started  at  once  for  the  Chesapeake,  whither  it 
was  now  understood  that  both  the  French  ileet  and  the  united 
armies  of  Washington  and  Rochambeau  were  hurrying. 

Count  de  Grasse  upon  his  arrival  at  Cap  Francois  had  found 
that  many  things  must  be  done  before  he  could  sail  for  the  con- 
tinent. Measures  needed  to  be  taken  for  the  security  of  Haiti : 
and  a  large  sum  of  money,  with  a  considerable  reinforcement  of 
troops,  was  required  to  insure  the  success  of  the  projected  operation, 
for  which  but  a  short  time  was  allowed,  as  it  was  now  August  and 
he  must  be  again  in  the  West  Indies  in  October.  It  was  not  the 
least  among  the  fortunate  concurrences  for  the  American  cause  at 
that  moment,  that  de  Grasse,  whose  military  capacity  was  not  con- 
spicuous, showed  then  a  remarkable  energy,  politic  tact,  and  breadth 
of  view.  He  decided  to  take  with  him  every  ship  he  could  command, 
postponing  the  sailing  of  the  convoys ;  and  by  dexterous  arrangement 


496  MAJOR   OPERATIONS.     1762-1783.  [1781. 

with  the  Spaniards  he  contrived  to  secure  both  the  funds  required 
and  an  efficient  corps  of  3,300  French  troops,  without  stripping 
Haiti  too  closely.  On  the  5th  of  August  he  left  Cap  Frangois,  with 
twenty-eight  ships  of  the  line,  taking  the  route  through  the  Old 
Bahama  Channel,1  and  anchored  in  Lynnhaven  Bay,  just  within  the 
entrance  of  the  Chesapeake,  on  the  30th,  the  day  before  Graves  sailed 
from  New  York  for  the  same  place.  The  troops  were  landed  instantly 
on  the  south  side  of  the  James  River,  and  soon  reached  La  Fayette, 
who  commanded  the  forces  so  far  opposed  to  Cornwallis,  which  were 
thus  raised  to  8,000  men.  At  the  same  time  Washington,  having 
thrown  Clinton  off  his  guard,  was  crossing  the  Delaware  on  his  way 
south,  witli  li.OOO  regular  troops,  2,000  American  and  4,000  French, 
to  join  La  Fayette.  French  cruisers  took  position  in  the  James  River, 
to  prevent  Cornwallis  from  crossing,  and  escaping  to  the  southward 
into  Carolina.  Others  were  sent  to  close  the  mouth  of  the  York. 
By  these  detachments  the  main  fleet  was  reduced  to  twenty-four  sail 
of  the  line. 

On  the  5th  of  September,  at  8  A.M.,  the  French  look-out  frigate, 
cruising  outside  Cape  1  lenrv,  made  the  signal  for  a  fleet  steering  for 
the  Bay.  It  was  hoped  at  first  that  this  was  de  Barras's  squadron 
from  Newport,  known  to  be  on  its  way,  but  it  was  soon  evident  from 
tin-  numbers  that  it  must  be  an  enemy.  The  forces  now  about  to  be 
opposed,  nineteen  British  sail  of  the  line  to  twenty-four  French,  were 
constituted  as  follows:  British,-  ninety-eights  (three-deckers);  12 
seventy-fours,  1  seventy,  4  sixty-fours,  besides  frigates;2  French,  1 
one  hundred  and  four  (three-decker),3  3  eighties,  17  seventy-fours, 
3  sixty-fours. 

The  mouth  of  the  Chesapeake  is  about  ten  miles  wide,  from  Cape 
Charles  on  the  north  to  Cape  Henry  on  the  south.  The  main  chan- 
nel is  between  the  latter  and  a  shoal,  three  miles  to  the  northward, 
called  the  Middle  Ground.  The  British  fleet,  when  the  French  were 
first  seen  from  it,  was  steering  south-west  for  the  entrance,  under 
foresails  and  topgallant  sails,  and  it  so  continued,  forming  line  as  it 
approached.  The  wind  was  north-north-east.  At  noon  the  ebb-tide 
made,  and  the  French  began  to  get  under  way,  but  many  of  their 
ships  had  to  make  several  tacks  to  clear  Cape  Henry.  Their  line  was 

1  Along  the  north  coast  of  Cuba,  between  it  and  the  Bahama  Banks. 

2  See  note  on  opposite  page. 

3  The  Ville  de  Paris,  to  which  Troude  attributes  104  guns.     She  was  considered 
the  biggest  and  finest  ship  of  her  day. 


1781.] 


GRAVES  OFF  THE  CHESAPEAKE. 


497 


consequently  late  in  forming,  and  was  by  no  means  regular  or  closed 
as  they  got  outside. 

At  1  P.M.  Graves  made  the  signal  to  form  on  an  east  and  west  line, 
which  would  be  the  closehauled  line  heading  out  to  sea,  on  the  other 
tack  from  that  on  which  his  fleet  still  was.  At  2  P.M.  the  French  van, 
three  miles  distant  by  estimate,  bore  south  from  the  London,  Graves's 
flagship,  and  was  therefore  abreast  of  the  centre  of  the  British  line. 
As  the  British  van  came  near  the  Middle  Ground,  at  2.13  P.M.,  the 
ships  wore  together.  This  put  them  on  the  same  tack  as  the  French, 
Hood's  division,  which  had  been  leading,  being  now  the  rear  in  the 
reversed  order ;  and  the  fleet  brought-to,  in  order  to  allow  the  centre 


NOTE.  — British  line  of  battle  in  the  action  of  Sept.  5, 1781.  Mainly  from  Beatson, 
vi.  284  ;  corrected  by  Steel's  '  Navy  List '  of  the  period,  and  from  MS.  notes  by  Henry 
Wise  Harvey  in  Ed's,  edition  of  Scbomberg,  iv.  377,  378.  The  Alfred  was  to  lead 
with  the  starboard,  and  the  Shrewsbury  with  the  larboard  tacks  on  board.  —  W.  L.  C. 


SHIPS. 

GUNS. 

COMMANDERS. 

Alfred                         .     .     . 

74 

64 

Capt.  James  BiliR1. 

74 

Capt.  Charles  Saxton. 

98 

I  Hear-  Admiral  Sir  Samuel  Hood  (B). 

74 

(  Capt.  Alexander  Hood. 

74 

Capt.  John  Nicholson  Inglelield. 

Santa  Margaritta,  36  . 
Richmond,  32     ... 

64 

Capt.  Elliot  Saltcr. 
Capt.  Charles  Hudson. 
Capt.  Samuel  Thompson 

74 

Bedford       

74 

Capt.  Thomas  Graves  (3). 

98 

I  Rear-  Admiral  Thomas  Graves  (2),  (R). 

74 

(  Capt.  David  Graves. 

74 

64 

Capt.  Smith  Child. 

Solcbay,  28    .... 
Nymphe,  36  .... 
Adamant,  50      ... 
Terrible           .     .          .     . 

74 

Capt.  Charles  Holmes  Everitt  (later  Calmady). 
Capt.  John  Ford. 
Capt.  Gideon  Johnstone. 

Ajax  
Princesa      

74 
70 

Capt.  Nicholas  Charrington. 
Rear-  Admiral  Francis  Samuel  Drake  (B). 

Alcide    

74 

Capt.  Charles  Knatchbull. 

64 

Shrewsbury     

74 

Salamander  (f.  s.  )  .     . 
Sibyl,  28  ... 

Commander  Edward  Bowater. 
Capt   Lord  Charles  Fitzgerald  (?) 

Fortunes,  40  . 

Capt.  Hugh  Cloberry  Christian. 

VOL.  in.  — 32 


498 


MAJOR  OPERATIONS.    1762-1783. 


[1781. 


of  the  enemy  to  come  abreast  of  the  centre  of  the  British  (a  a).  The 
two  lines  now  were  nearly  parallel,  but  the  British,  being  five  ships 
fewer,  naturally  did  not  extend  so  far  as  the  rear  of  the  French,  which 
in  fact  was  not  yet  clear  of  the  Cape.  At  2.30  Graves  made  the 
signal  for  the  van  ship  (the  Skreivslury^),  to  lead  more  to  starboard  — 
towards  the  enemy.  As  each  ship  in  succession  would  take  her  course 
to  follow  the  leader,  the  effect  of  this  was  to  put  the  British  on  a  line 


CRAVES     AMD     DE     GRASSE 
3""  ^C^T  ,'78/ 

orr      C  HE&A  f>£  A  M  z      B/tr. 


'  CftO 


(JKAVKS    AN'Il    I>K    CKASSE. 


inclined  to  that  of  the  enemy,  the  van  nearest,  and  as  the  signal  was 
renewed  three  quarters  of  an  hour  later,  —  at  8.17,  —  this  angle  became 
still  more  marked  (bb).1  This  was  the  original  and  enduring  cause 
of  a  lamentable  failure,  by  which  seven  of  the  rear  ships,  ii)  an  inferior 
force  undertaking  to  attack,  never  came  into  battle  at  all.  At  3.34 
the  van  was  ordered  again  to  keep  still  more  towards  the  enemy. 

At  3.46  the  signal  was  made  for  ships  to  close  to  one  cable,  fol- 
lowed almost  immediately  by  that  to   bear  down  and   engage  the 

1  This  reproduced  the  blunder  of  Byng,  between  whose  action  and  the  one  now 
under  discussion  there  is  a  marked  resemblance. 


1781.]  HOOD'S  CRITICISMS.  499 

enemy,  —  the  signal  for  the  line  still  flying.  Graves's  flagship,  which 
was  hove-to,  filled  and  bore  down.  Under  the  conditions,  the  van 
ships  of  course  got  first  under  fire,  and  the  action  gradually  extended 
from  them  to  the  twelfth  in  the  order,  two  ships  astern  of  the  London. 
According  to  the  log  of  the  latter,  at  4.11  the  signal  for  the  line 
ahead  was  hauled  down,  that  it  might  not  interfere  with  that  for  close 
action,  hut  at  4.22  it  was  rehoisted,  "  the  ships  not  being  sufficiently 
extended."  The  meaning  of  this  expression  may  be  inferred  from 
Beatson's  account :  — 

"  The  London,  by  taking  the  lead,  had  advanced  farther  towards  the  enemy 
than  sonic  of  the  ships  stationed  immediately  ahead  of  her  in  the  line  of  battle  ; 
and  upon  luffing  up,  to  bring  her  broadside  to  bear,  they  having  done  the  same 
thing,  her  second  ahead  was  brought  nearly  upon  her  weather  beam.  The  other 
ships  ahead  of  her  were  likewise  too  much  crowded  together." 

As  the  ship  on  the  London's  weather  beam  could  not  fire  upon  the 
enemy  unless  she  drew  ahead,  this  condition  probably  accounts  for 
the  flagship  being  again  hove-to,  while  firing,  as  Hood  says  that  she 
was.  Readers  will  remember  a  similar  incident  occurring  with  Byng's 
flagship.  The  signal  for  the  line  was  hauled  down  again  at  4.27,  by 
the  London's  log,  that  for  close  action  being  up,  and  repeated  at  5.20, 
when  Hood  at  last  bore  down  with  his  division,  but  the  French  ship ; 
bearing  up  also,  he  did  not  near  them.  Firing  ceased  .shortly  after 
sunset.  The  loss  of  the  British  was  90  killed,  246  wounded ;  that  of 
the  French  is  given  only  in  round  numbers,  as  about  200  killed  and 
wounded. 

Hood's  statement  introduces  certain  important  qualifications  into 
the  above  account :  — 

"  Our  centre  began  to  engage  at  the  same  time  as  the  van,  at  four,  but  at  a 
most  improper  distance,  and  our  rear,  being  barely  within  random  shot,  did  not  fire 
while  the  signal  for  the  line  was  flying.  The  London  had  the  signal  for  close  action 
flying,  as  well  as  the  signal  for  the  line  ahead  at  half  a  cable  was  under  her  topsails, 
with  the  main  topsail  to  the  mast,1  though  the  enemy's  ships  were  pushing  on." 

As  showing  the  improper  distance  at  which  the  London  brought-to 
to  fire,  he  says :  — 

"  The  second  ship  astern  of  her  (of  the  London)  received  but  trifling  damage, 
and  the  third  astern  of  her  received  no  damage  at  all,  which  most  clearly  proves 
[at]  how  much  too  great  a  distance  was  the  centre  division  engaged." 

The  day  after  the  action  Hood  made  a  memorandum  of  his  criti- 
cisms upon  it,  which  has  been  published.  The  gist  of  this  is  as 

1  /.  e.,  she  had  stopped. 


500  MAJOR  OPERATIONS.    170-2-1783.  [1781. 

follows.  As  the  French  stood  out,  their  line  was  not  regular  or  con- 
nected. The  van  was  much  separated  from  the  centre  and  rear,  and 
it  appears  also,  from  the  French  narratives,  that  it  was  to  windward 
of  the  rest  of  the  fleet.  From  these  causes  it  was  much  exposed  to 
be  attacked  unsupported.  There  was,  by  Hood's  estimate,  "  a  full 
hour  and  a  half  to  have  engaged  it  before  any  of  the  rear  could  have 
come  up."  The  line  of  battle  on  the  port  tack,  with  the  then  wind, 
was  east  and  west,  and  Graves  had  first  ranged  his  fleet  on  it,  as  the 
French  were  doing ;  but  afterwards,  owing  to  his  method  of  approach, 
by  the  van  bearing  down  and  the  other  ships  following  in  its  wake,  the 
two  lines,  instead  of  being  parallel,  formed  an  angle,  the  British 
centre  and  rear  being  much  more  distant  from  the  enemy  than  the 
van  was.  This  alone  would  cause  the  ships  to  come  into  battle  suc- 
cessively instead  of  together,  a  fault  of  itself ;  but  the  Commander- 
in-Chief,  according  to  Hood,  committed  the  further  mistake  that  he 
kept  the  signal  for  the  line  of  battle  flying  until  o.oO  P.M.,  near  to 
sunset.  The  line  of  battle  at  any  moment  ran,  of  course,  from  the 
van  ship  through  that  of  the  Commander-in-Chief ;  those  two  points 
determined  it  for  all  in  the  rear,  where  Hood  was.  Hence  the  latter's 
criticism,  which  is  marked  by  much  acerbity  towards  his  superior,  but 
does  not  betray  any  consciousness  that  he  himself  needed  any  justifica- 
tion for  his  division  not  having  taken  part. 

"  Had  the  centre  gone  to  the  support  of  the  van,  and  the  signal  for  the  line 
been  hauled  do\vu,  or  the  Commander-in-Chief  had  set  the  example  of  close  action, 
even  with  the  signal  for  the  line  flying,  the  van  of  the  enemy  must  have  been  cut 
to  pieces,  and  the  rear  division  of  the  British  fleet  would  have  been  opposed  to 
those  ships  the  centre  division  tired  at,  and  at  tin1  proper  distance  for  engaging,  or 
the  Hear- Admiral  who  commanded  it 1  would  have  a  great  deal  to  answer  for."  2 

So  much  for  the  tactical  failure  of  that  day.  The  question  remained 
what  next  was  to  be  done.  Graves  contemplated  renewing  the 
action,  but  early  in  the  night  was  informed  that  several  of  the  van 

1  Hood  himself. 

2  Concerning  the  crucial  fact  of  the  signal  for  the  line  of  battle  being  kept  flying 
continuously  until  5.30  P.M.,  upon  which  there  is  a  direct  contradiction  between  Hood 
and  the  log  of  the  London,  it  is  necessary  to  give  the  statement  of  Captain  Thomas 
White,  who  was  present  in  the  action  in  one  of  the  rear  ships.     "  If  the  London's  log, 
or  the  log  of  any  other  individual  ship  in  the  fleet,  confirm  this  statement,"  (that 
Hood  was  dilatory  in  obeying  the  order  for  close  action),  "  I  shall  be  induced  to  fancy 
that  what  I  that  day  saw  and  heard  was  a  mere  chimera  of  the  brain,  and  that  what 
I  believed  to  be  the  signal  for  the  line  was  not  a  union  jack,  but  an  ignis  fatuus  con- 
jured up  to  mock  me."     White  and  Hood  also  agree  that  the  signal  for  the  line  was 
rehoiated at  6.30.     (White:  'Naval  Researches,'  London,  1830.) 


1781.]  ORAFES  RETURNS  TO  NEW  YORK.  501 

ships  were  too  crippled  to  permit  this.  He  held  his  ground,  how- 
ever, in  sight  of  the  French,  until  dark  on  the  9th,  when  they  were 
seen  for  the  last  time.  They  were  then  under  a  cloud  of  sail,  and 
on  the  morning  of  the  10th  had  disappeared.  From  their  actions 
during  this  interval,  Hood  had  inferred  that  de  Grasse  meant  to  get 
back  into  the  Chesapeake  without  further  fighting;  and  lie  implies 
that  he  advised  Graves  to  anticipate  the  enemy  in  so  doing.  Though 
some  ships  were  crippled  aloft,  the  British  batteries  were  practically 
intact,  nor  had  men  enough  been  disabled  to  prevent  any  gun  in 
the  fleet  from  being  fought.  Could  but  a  single  working  day 
be  gained  in  taking  up  an  anchorage,  a  defensive  order  could  be 
assumed,  practically  impregnable  to  the  enemy,  covering  Cornwallis, 
and  not  impossibly  intercepting  the  French  ships  left  in  the  Bay.  In 
the  case  of  many  men  such  comment  might  be  dismissed  as  the  idle 
talk  of  the  captious  fault-finder,  always  to  the  fore  in  life ;  but  in  the 
case  of  Hood  it  must  be  received  with  deference,  for,  but  a  few 
months  later,  when  confronted  with  greater  odds,  he  himself  did  the 
very  thing  he  here  recommended,  for  an  object  less  vital  than  the 
relief  of  Cornwallis.  Having  regard  to  the  character  of  de  Grasse,  it 
is  reasonable  to  believe  that,  if  he  had  found  the  British  fleet  thus 
drawn  up  at  anchor  in  Chesapeake  Bay,  as  he  found  Hood  at  St. 
Kitts  in  the  following  January,  he  would  have  waited  off  the 
entrance  for  de  Barras,  and  then  have  gone  to  sea,  leaving  Washington 
and  Rochambeau  to  look  at  Cornwallis  slipping  out  of  their  grasp. 

On  the  10th  of  September  Graves  decided  to  burn  the  Terrible,  74, 
which  had  been  kept  afloat  with  difficulty  since  the  action.  This 
done,  the  fleet  stood  towards  the  Chesapeake,  a  frigate  going  ahead 
to  reconnoitre.  On  the  13th,  at  6  A.M.,  Graves  wrote  to  Hood  that 
the  look-outs  reported  the  French  at  anchor  above  the  Horse  Shoe 
(shoal)  in  the  Chesapeake,  and  desired  his  opinion  what  to  do  with 
the  fleet.  To  this  Hood  sent  the  comforting  reply  that  it  was  no 
more  than  what  he  had  expected,  as  the  press  of  sail  the  (French) 
fleet  carried  on  the  9th,  and  on  the  night  of  the  8th,  made  it  very 
clear  to  him  what  de  Grasse's  intentions  were.  He  "would  be  very 
glad  to  send  an  opinion,  but  he  really  knows  not  what  to  say  in  the 
truly  lamentable  state  [to  which]  we  have  brought  ourselves."1  On 
the  10th  de  Barras  had  reached  the  Bay,  where  he  was  joined  by  de 
Grasse  on  the  llth,  so  that  there  were  then  present  thirty-six  French 
ships  of  the  line.  Graves,  therefore,  returned  to  New  York,  reach- 
1  '  Letters  of  Lord  Hood.'  N.  R.  S.,  p.  35. 


502  MAJOR   OPERATIONS.    1762-1783.  [1781. 

ing  Sandy  Hook  on  the  19th.  On  the  14th  Washington  had  arrived 
before  Yorktown,  where  he  took  the  chief  command;  and  the  armies 
closed  in  upon  Cormvallis  by  land  as  the  French  fleets  had  done 
already  by  water.  On  the  19th  of  October  the  British  force  was 
compelled  to  surrender,  7,247  troops  and  840  seamen  laying  down 
their  arms.  During  the  siege  the  latter  had  served  in  the  works, 
the  batteries  of  which  were  largely  composed  of  ships'  guns. 

After  Graves's  return  to  New  York,  Rear- Admiral  the  Hon.  Robert 
Digby  arrived  from  England  on  the  24th  of  September,  to  take  com- 
mand of  the  station  in  Arlmthnot's  place.  He  brought  with  him 
three  ships  of  the  line;  and  the  two  which  Sir  Peter  Parker  had  been 
ordered  by  Rodney  to  send  on  at  once  had  also  reached  the  port.  It 
was  decided  by  the  land  and  sea  officers  concerned  to  attempt  the 
relief  of  Cormvallis,  and  that  it  was  expedient  for  Graves  to  remain 
in  command  until  after  this  expedition.  lie  could  not  start,  how- 
ever, until  the  18th  of  October,  by  which  time  Cornwallis's  fate  was 
decided.  Graves  then  departed  for  Jamaica  to  supersede  Sir  Peter 
Parker.  On  the  llth  of  November  Hood  sailed  from  Sandy  Hook 
with  eighteen  ships  of  the  line,  and  on  the  oth  of  December  anchored 
at  Barbados.  On  the  oth  of  November  de  Grasse  also  quitted  the 
continent  with  his  whole  fleet,  and  returned  to  the  West  Indies. 

In  Europe,  during  the  year  1781,  the  t\vo  leading  questions  which 
dominated  the  action  of  the  belligerents  were  the  protection,  or 
destruction,  of  commerce,  and  the  attack  and  defence  of  Gibraltar. 
The  British  Channel  Fleet  was  much  inferior  to  the  aggregate  sea 
forces  of  France  and  Spain  in  the  waters  of  Europe;  and  the  Dutch 
navy  also  was  now  hostile.  The  French  government  represented  to 
its  allies  that  by  concentrating  their  squadrons  near  the  entrance  of 
the  Channel  they  would  control  the  situation  in  every  point  of  view; 
but  the  Spaniards,  intent  upon  Gibraltar,  declined  to  withdraw  their 
fleet  from  Cadiz  until  late  in  the  summer,  while  the  French  persisted 
in  keeping  their  own  at  Brest.  The  Channel  Fleet  was  decisively 
superior  to  the  latter,  and  inferior  to  the  Spaniards  in  numbers 
only. 

No  relief  having  been  given  Gibraltar  since  Rodney  had  left  it  in 
February,  1780,  the  question  of  supplying  the  fortress  became  press- 
ing. For  this  purpose,  twenty-eight  ships  of  the  line,  under  Vice- 
Admiral  George  Darby,  sailed  from  St.  Helen's  on  the  13th  of  March, 
1781,  with  a  large  convoy.  Off  Cork  a  number  of  victuallers  joined, 


1781.]  RELIEF  SENT  TO   GIBRALTAR.  503 

and  the  whole  body  then  proceeded  for  Gibraltar,  accompanied  by 
five  ships  of  the  line  which  were  destined  for  the  East  Indies,  as  well 
as  by  the  West  India  and  American  "trade."  These  several  attach- 
ments parted  from  time  to  time  on  the  way,  and  on  the  llth  of  April 
the  main  expedition  sighted  Cape  Spartel.  No  attempt  to  intercept 
it  was  made  by  the  great  Spanish  fleet  in  Cadiz ;  and  on  the  12th  of 
April,  at  noon,  the  convoy  anchored  in  the  Bay  of  Gibraltar.  That 
night  thirteen  sail  of  transports,  under  the  charge  of  two  frigates, 
slipped  out  and  made  their  way  to  Minorca.  The  ships  of  war 
remained  under  way,  cruising  in  the  Bay  and  Gut  of  Gibraltar. 

As  the  convoy  entered,  the  besiegers  opened  a  tremendous  can- 
nonade, which  was  ineffectual,  however,  to  stop  the  landing  of  the 
stores.  More  annoyance  was  caused  by  a  flotilla  of  gunboats,  specially 
built  for  this  siege,  the  peculiar  fighting  power  of  which  lay  in  one 
26-pounder,  whose  great  length  gave  a  range  superior  to  the  bat- 
teries of  ships  of  the  line.  Being  moved  by  oars  as  well  as  by  sails, 
these  little  vessels  could  choose  their  own  distance  in  light  airs  and 
calms,  and  were  used  so  actively  to  harass  the  transports  at  anchor 
that  Darby  was  obliged  to  cover  them  with  three  ships  of  the  line. 
These  proved  powerless  effectually  to  injure  the  gunboats ;  but,  while 
the  latter  caused  great  annoyance  and  petty  injury,  they  did  not 
hinder  the  unloading  nor  even  greatly  delay  it.  The  experience 
illustrates  again  the  unlikelihood  that  great  results  can  be  obtained  by 
petty  means,  or  that  massed  force,  force  concentrated,  can  be  effect- 
ually counteracted  either  by  cheap  and  ingenious  expedients,  or  by 
the  co-operative  exertions  of  many  small  independent  units.  "  They 
were  only  capable  of  producing  trouble  and  vexation.  So  far  were 
they  from  preventing  the  succours  from  being  thrown  into  the  gar- 
rison, or  from  burning  the  convoy,  that  the  onlv  damage  of  any 
consequence  that  they  did  to  the  shipping  was  the  wounding  of  the 
mizen-mast  of  the  Nonsuch  so  much  that  it  required  to  be  shifted."1 
On  the  19th  of  April  —  in  one  week — the  revictualling  was  com- 
pleted, and  the  expedition  started  back  for  England.  The  fleet 
anchored  at  Spithead  on  the  22nd  of  May. 

While  Darby  was  returning,  La  Motte  Picquet  had  gone  to  sea 
from  Brest  with  six  ships  of  the  line  and  some  frigates  to  cruise  in 
the  approaches  to  the  Channel.  There,  on  the  2nd  of  May,  he  fell 
in  with  the  convoy  returning  from  the  West  Indies  with  the  spoils  of 
St.  Eustatius.  The  ships  of  war  for  the  most  part  escaped,  but  La 
1  Beatson  :  '  Military  and  Naval  Memoirs,'  v.  347. 


504  MAJOR  OPERATIONS.    1762-1783.  [1781. 

Motte  Picquet  carried  twenty-two  out  of  thirty  merchant  ships  into 
Brest  before  he  could  be  intercepted,  although  a  detachment  of  eight 
sail  sent  by  Darby  got  close  upon  his  heels. 

After  a  long  refit,  Darby  put  to  sea  again,  about  the  1st  of 
August,  to  cover  the  approach  of  the  large  convoys  then  expected  to 
arrive.  Being  greatly  delayed  by  head  winds,  he  had  got  no  further 
than  the  Lizard,  when  news  was  brought  him  that  the  Franco-Spanish 
grand  fleet,  of  forty-nine  ships  of  the  line,  was  cruising  near  the 
Scilly  Isles.  Having  himself  but  thirty  of  the  line,  he  put  into 
Torbay  on  the  24th  of  August,  and  moored  his  squadron  across  the 
entrance  to  the  Bay. 

This  appearance  of  the  allies  was  a  surprise  to  the  British  authori- 
ties, who  saw  thus  unexpectedly  renewed  the  invasion  of  the  Channel 
made  in  1779.  Spain,  mortified  justly  by  her  failure  even  to  molest 
'the  intrusion  of  succours  into  Gibraltar,  had  thought  to  retrieve  her 
honour  bv  an  attack  upon  Minorca,  for  which  she  asked  the  co-opera- 
tion of  France.  De  Guichen  was  sent  in  July  witli  nineteen  ships  of 
the  line ;  and  the  combined  fleets,  under  the  chief  command  of  the 
Spanish  admiral  Don  Luis  de  Cordova,  convoyed  the  troops  into  the 
Mediterranean  beyond  the  reach  of  Gibraltar  cruisers.  Returning 
thence  into  the  Atlantic,  de  Cordova  directed  his  course  for  the 
Channel,  keeping  far  out  to  sea  to  conceal  his  movements.  But 
though  thus  successful  in  reaching  his  ground  unheralded,  he  made 
no  attempt  to  profit  by  the  advantage  gained.  The  question  of 
attacking  Darby  at  his  anchors  was  discussed  in  a  council  of  war,  at 
which  de  Guichen  strongly  advocated  the  measure:  but  a  majority  of 
votes  decided  that  Great  Britain  would  be  less  hurt  by  ruining  her 
fleet  than  by  intercepting  the  expected  convoys.  Even  for  the  lat- 
ter purpose,  however,  de  Cordova  could  not  wait.  On  the  5th  of 
September  he  informed  de  Guichen  that  he  was  at  liberty  to  return 
to  Brest;  and  he  himself  went  back  to  Cadiz  with  thirty-nine  ships, 
nine  of  which  were  French.  "This  cruise  of  the  combined  fleet," 
says  Chevalier,  "diminished  the  consideration  of  France  and  Spain. 
These  two  powers  had  made  a  great  display  of  force,  without  produc- 
ing the  slightest  result."  It  may  be  mentioned  here  that  Minorca, 
after  a  six  months'  siege,  capitulated  in  February,  1782. 

While  Darby  was  beating  down  Channel  in  the  early  days  of 
August,  Vice-Admiral  Hyde  Parker  (1),  lately  Rodney's  second  in 
command  in  the  West  Indies,  was  returning  from  the  Baltic  to  Eng- 
land convoying  a  large  merchant  fleet.  On  the  5th  of  August,  at 


1731.] 


HYDE  PARKER  AND    THE   DUTCH  FLEET. 


505 


daylight,  a  Dutch  squadron,  also  with  a  convoy,  was  discovered  in 
the  south-west,  near  the  Doggersbank.  Heading  as  the  two  enemies 
then  were,  their  courses  must  shortly  intersect.  Parker,  therefore, 
ordered  his  convoy  to  steer  to  the  westward  for  England,  while  he 
himself  bore  down  for  the  enemy.  The  Dutch  Rear-Admiral,  Johan 
Arnold  Zoutman,  on  the  contrary,  kept  the  merchant  vessels  with 
him,  under  his  lee,  but  drew  out  the  ships  of  war  from  among  them, 
to  form  his  order  on  the  side  towards  the  enemy.  Each  opponent 
put  seven  sail  into  the  line.1  The  British  vessels,  besides  being  of 
such  different  rates,  were  chiefly  very  old  ships,2  dragged  oiit  from 
Rotten  Row  to  meet  the  pressing  emergency  caused  by  the  greatly 
superior  forces  which  were  in  coalition  against  Great  Britain. 
Owing  to  the  decayed  condition  of  some  of  them,  their  batteries 

i  Fleets  engaged  in  the  action  off  the  Doggersbank,  August  5th,  1781. 


BRITISH. 

DUTCH. 

SHIPS. 

COMMANDERS. 

SHIPS. 

M 
b 

COMMANDEUS. 

at 

- 

IN  THE  LINE  :  — 

Berwick  .... 

74 

Capt.  John  Fergusson. 

Krfprins    .... 

r,4 

Capt.  A.  IJraak. 

Dolphin.     .     .     . 

44 

Capt.  William  Blair. 

Admirnal  Gcncraal 

74 

Capt.  van  Kinsbergen. 

Buffalo  .... 

GO 

Capt.  William  Truscott. 

Ai-yo      

40 

Capt-  A.  C.  Staering. 

Fortitude    .     .    . 

74 

j  V.-Adm.  Hyde  Parker  (1) 

Batavier    .... 

54 

Capt.  W.  J.  Beiitinuk. 

Princess  Amelia  . 

80 

i  Capt.  George  Robertson. 
Capt.  John  Macartney.* 

Admiraal  <lc  Ritijter 

OS 

(  Rear-Adin.  Zoutman. 
1  Capt.  Staringli. 

Preston  .... 

50 

Capt.  Alexander  Gneine. 

Admiraal  Pict  Ifeijn 

54 

Capt.  W.  van  Braaui. 

Bicnfaisant     .     .      64 

Capt.  Richard  Brathwaite. 

Holland     ....      (is 

("apt.  S.  Dedel. 

FRIGATES  WITH  THE 

FLEET  :  — 

Surprise  (cutter). 

14 

Lieut.  P.  Rivett. 

IfrHond      .... 

30  Capt.  Haringcarspel  Decker. 

Cleopatra    .     .     . 

32 

Capt.  George  Murray. 

Dotphijn    .... 

24  Capt.  Mulder. 

Latona  .... 

38 

Capt.  Sir  Hyde  Parker  (2). 

Ajfix  (cutter)      .     . 

'20  Capt.  Grave  van  Welderen. 

Belle  Poule     .    . 

36 

Capt.  Philip  I'atton. 

Stentgesindhfit  .    , 

30  Capt.  Bouritius. 

Aftois     .... 

-in 

Capt.  John  Macbride. 

Zfphijr      , 

3*>  Capt.  Wiertz. 

Aiitpltitrife     .     . 

3G  Capt.  van  Woensel. 

WITH  THE  CONVOY  :  — 

Jp/iiyenia    .     . 

32  Capt.  Charles  Hope. 

Mrdemblik     .     .     . 

30  Capt.  van  Rijneveld. 

Tartar    .... 

28  Cant.  Robert  Button. 

'*4  Cant    P  nvp  van  R.pcrtprpn 

Cabot      .... 

1  1 

Com.  Henry  Cromwell. 

Spion          .... 

K>  Com.  Stutzer. 

Alert 

14 

Cnlll     .1   inn-      VnaliiMi 

Leith  (armed  ship). 

•20,Coin.  Peter  Ilothe. 

\JVL11.     JJUl^Ol. 

Busy  (cutter)  .     . 

14  Lieut.  William  Furnivall. 

Sprightly  (cutter) 

14  Lieut.  J.  B.  Swau. 

*  Killed. 

The  vessels  in  the  two  lines  are  given  above  in  the  respective  orders  of  battle. 
The  British  list  is  founded  on  one  in  Beatson,  vi.  315,  compared  with  the  'Navy 
Lists'  of  1781,  the  dispatches,  etc.  The  Dutch  list  is  founded  on  a  MS.  of  Capt. 
Count  van  Bylandt,  compared  with  the  dispatches,  and  with  the  plan  and  particulars 
in  De  Jonge,  iv.  508-561.  The  gun-power  of  each  ship  is  taken  from  official  papers, 
British  and  Dutch.  —W.  L.  C. 

2  The  Bienfaisant  had  been  captured  in  1758,  and  the  Buffalo  in  1748;  and  the 
Princess  Amelia  and  Preston  were  both  built  in  1757. 


506  MAJOR   OPERATIONS.     1762-1783.  [1781. 

had  been  lightened,  to  the  detriment  of  their  fighting  power.  The 
two  seventy-fours,  however,  were  good  and  new  ships.  The  Dolphin 
also  was  new.  It  is  probable  that  the  Dutch  vessels,  after  a  long 
peace,  were  not  much  better  than  their  antagonists.  In  fact,  each 
squadron  was  a  scratch  lot,  in  the  worst  sense  of  the  phrase.  The 
conduct  of  the  affair  by  the  two  admirals,  even  to  the  very  intensity 
of  their  pugnaciousness,  contributes  a  tinge  of  the  comic  to  the 
history  of  a  desperately  fought  action. 

The  breeze  was  fresh  at  north- cast,  and  the  sea  smooth.  The 
Dutch,  being  to  leeward,  awaited  attack,  forming  line  on  the  port 
tack,  heading  south-east  by  east,  a  point  off  the  wind,  under  topsails 
and  foresails,  a  cable's  length  apart.  There  is  little  room  to  doubt 
that  an  adversary  who  thus  holds  his  ground  means  to  make  a 
stand-up  fight,  but  Parker,  although  the  sun  of  a  midsummer  day 
had  scarcely  risen,  thought  advisable  to  order  a  general  chase.  Of 
course,  no  ship  spared  her  canvas  to  this,  while  the  worse  sailers  had 
to  set  their  sruddingsails  to  keep  up;  and  the  handling  of  the  sails 
took  the  men  off  from  the  preparations  for  battle.  Parker,  who  doubt- 
less was  still  sore  over  IJodney's  censure  of  the  year  before,  and  who 
moreover  had  incurred  the  Admiralty's  rebuke,  for  apparent  hesita- 
tion to  attack  the  encmv's  islands  while  temporarily  in  command  in 
the  West  Indies,  was  determined  now  to  show  the  fight  that  was  in 
him.  "It  is  related  that,  upon  being  informed  of  the  force  of  the 
Dutch  squadron  in  the  morning,  lie  replied  ([Hilling  up  his  breeches), 
'  It  matters  little  what  their  force  is;  we  must  light  them  if  they  are 
double  the  number."  At  U.10  A.M.  the  signal  was  made  for  line 
abreast,  the  ships  running  down  nearly  before  the  wind.  This  of 
course  introduced  more  regularity,  the  leading  ships  taking  in  their 
lighter  sails  to  permit  the  others  to  reach  their  places;  but  the  pace 
:;till  was  rapid.  At  G.4"j  the  order  was  closed  to  one  cable,  and  at 
7.5G  the  signal  for  battle  was  hoisted.  It  is  said  that  at  that  moment 
the  80-gun  ship  was  still  securing  a  studdingsail-boom,  which  indi- 
cates how  closely  action  trod  on  the  heels  of  preparation. 

The  Dutch  admiral  was  as  deliberate  as  Parker  was  headlong. 
An  English  witness  writes:  — 

"  They  appeared  to  be  in  great  order;  and  their  hammocks,  quarter-cloths,  etc., 
were  spread  in  as  nice  order  as  if  for  show  in  harbour.  Their  marines  also  were 
well  drawn  np,  and  stood  with  their  muskets  shouldered,  with  all  the  regularity 
and  exactness  of  a  review.  Their  politeness  ought  to  be  remembered  by  every  man 
in  our  line :  for,  as  if  certain  of  what  happened,  we  came  down  almost  end-on  upon 
their  broadsides;  yet  did  not  the  Dutch  admiral  fire  a  gun,  or  make  the  signal  to 


1781.]  HYDE  PARKER  AND   TEE  DUTCH  FLEET.  507 

engage,  till  the  red  flag  was  at  the  Fortitude's  masthead,  and  her  shot  finding  their 
way  into  his  ship.  This  was  a  manoeuvre  which  Admiral  Zutmau  should  not  be 
warmly  thanked  for  by  their  High  Mightinesses ;  as  he  had  it  in  his  power  to  have 
done  infinite  mischief  to  our  fleet,  coming  down  in  that  unofficer-like  manner. 
Having  suffered  Admiral  Parker  to  place  himself  as  he  pleased,  he  calmly  waited 
till  the  signal  was  hoisted  on  board  the  Fortitude,  and  at  the  same  time  we  saw  the 
signal  going  up  on  board  Admiral  Zutman's  ship." 

The  British,  thus  unmolested,  rounded-to  just  to  windward  of 
the  enemy.  A  pilot  who  was  on  board  their  leading  ship  was  for 
some  reason  told  to  assist  in  laying  her  close  to  her  opponent.  "  By 
close,"  he  asked,  "do  you  mean  about  a  ship's  breadth?"  "Not  a 
gun  was  fired  on  either  side,"  says  the  official  British  report,  "until 
within  the  distance  of  half  musket-shot."  Parker,  whom  an  oil-looker 
describes  as  full  of  life  and  spirits,  here  made  a  mistake,  of  a  routine 
character,  which  somewhat  dislocated  his  order.  It  was  a  matter  of 
tradition  for  flagship  to  seek  flagship,  just  as  it  was  to  signal  a 
general  chase,  and  to  bear  down  together,  each  ship  for  its  opposite, 
well  extended  with  the  enemy.  Now  Parker,  as  was  usual,  was  in 
the  centre  of  his  line,  the  fourth  ship;  but  Zoutman  was  for  sonic 
reason  in  the  fifth.  Parker  therefore  placed  his  fourth  by  the  enemy's 
fifth.  In  consequence,  the  rear  British  ship  overlapped  the  enemy, 
and  for  a  time  had  no  opponent;  while  the  second  and  third  found 
themselves  engaged  with  three  of  the  Dutch.  At  8  A.M.  the  signal 
for  the  line  was  hauled  down,  and  that  for  close  action  hoisted,  —  thus 
avoiding  a  mistake  often  made. 

All  the  vessels  were  soon  satisfactorily  and  hotly  at  work,  and  the 
action  continued  with  varying  phases  till  11.35  A.M.  The  leading 
two  ships  in  both  orders  got  well  to  leeward  of  the  lines,  and  the 
British  vessels  had  to  tack  to  regain  their  places  to  windward. 
Towards  the  middle  of  the  engagement  the  Dutch  convoy  bore  away 
for  the  Texel,  as  the  British  had  steered  for  England  before  it  began ; 
the  difference  being  that  the  voyage  was  abandoned  by  one,  and  com- 
pleted by  the  other.  At  eleven  o'clock  Parker  made  sail,  and  passed 
with  the  flagship  between  the  enemy  and  the  Buffalo,  his  next  ahead 
and  third  in  the  British  order;  the  three  rear  ships  following  close  in 
his  wake,  in  obedience  to  the  signal  for  line  ahead,  which  had  been 
rehoisted  at  10.43.1  A  heavy  cannonade  attended  this  evolution,  the 

1  Sir  John  Ross,  in  his  '  Life  of  Saumarez,'  who  was  a  lieutenant  in  the  flagship, 
says  that  the  flagship  only  passed  ahead  of  the  Buffalo,  and  that  the  rear  ships  closed 
upon  the  latter.  The  version  in  the  text  rests  upon  the  detailed  and  circumstantial 
statement  of  another  lieutenant  of  the  squadron,  in  Ekins's  '  Naval  Battles.'  As  Ekins 


508  MAJOR   OPERATIONS.     1762-1783.  [1781 

Dutch  fighting  gloriously  to  the  last.  When  it  was  completed,  the 
British  fleet  wore  and  the  action  ceased.  "  I  made  an  effort  to  form 
the  line,  in  order  to  renew  the  action,"  wrote  Parker  in  his  report, 
"  but  found  it  impracticable.  The  enemy  appeared  to  be  in  as  bad  a 
condition.  Both  squadrons  lay-to  a  considerable  time  near  each 
other,  when  the  Dutch,  with  their  convoy,  bore  away  for  the  Texel. 
We  were  not  in  a  condition  to  follow  them." 

This  was  a  most  satisfactory  exhibition  of  valour,  and  a  most 
unsatisfactory  battle;  magnificent,  but  not  war.  Except  as  regards 
the  sailings  of  the  convoys,  the  status  quo  remained  much  as  before, 
although  one  of  the  Dutch  ships  sank  next  day;  yet  the  British  loss, 
104  killed  and  :>39  wounded,  was  nearly  as  great  as  in  Keppel's 
action,  where  thirty  ships  fought  on  each  side,  or  in  Rodney's  of 
April  17th,  17NO,  where  the  British  had  twenty  sail;  greater  than  with 
Graves  off  the  Chesapeake,  and,  in  proportion,  fully  equal  to  the 
sanguinary  conflicts  between  Suffren  and  Hughes  in  the  East  Indies. 
The  Dutch  loss  is  reported  as  142  killed,  403  wounded.  Both  sides 
aimed  at  the  hull,  as  is  shown  by  the  injuries;  for  though  much  harm 
was  done  aloft,  few  spars  were  wholly  shot  away.  The  Buffalo,  a 
small  ship,  had  o'.»  shot  through  and  through  her,  and  a  very  great 
number  pierced  between  wind  and  water;  in  the  British  van  ship  as 
many  as  14,  another  proof  that  the  Dutch  fired  low. 

With  the  rudimentary  notions  of  manoeuvring  evinced,  it  is  not 
surprising  that  Parker  was  found  an  unsatisfactory  second  by  an 
enlightened  tactician  like  Rodney.  The  Vice-Admiral,  however, 
laid  his  unsuccess  to  the  indifferent  quality  of  his  ships.  George  III. 
visited  the  squadron  after  the  action,  but  Parker  was  not  open  to 
compliments.  "I  wish  your  Majesty  better  ships  and  younger 
officers,"  he  said.  "For  myself,  I  am  now  too  old  for  service."  No 
rewards  were  given,  and  it  is  asserted  that  Parker  made  no  secret 
that  none  would  be  accepted,  if  offered,  at  the  hands  of  the  then 
Admiralty.  He  voiced  the  protest  of  the  Navy  and  the  nation  against 
the  mal-administration  of  the  peace  days,  which  had  left  the  country 
unprepared  for  war.  The  gallant  veteran  was  ordered  soon  after- 
wards to  command  in  the  East  Indies.  He  sailed  for  his  station  in 
the  Cato,  and  was  never  heard  of  again. 

Though  unfruitful  in  substantial  results,  Parker's  action  merits 
commemoration,  for,  after  all,  even  where  skill  does  its  utmost, 

also  was  present  as  a  midshipman,  this  gives,  as  it  were,  the  confirmation  of  two 
witnesses. 


1781.] 


KEMPENFELT  AND  DE  GUICHEN. 


509 


staunchness  such  as  his  shows  the  sound  constitution  of  a  military 
body. 

The  year  1781  closed  with  an  incident  more  decisive  in  character 
than  most  of  the  events  that  'occurred  in  European  waters  during  its 
course ;  one  also  which  transfers  the  interest,  by  natural  transition, 
again  to  the  AVest  Indies.  The  French  government  had  felt  through- 
out the  summer  the  necessity  of  sending  de  Grasse  reinforcements 
both  of  ships  and  of  supplies,  but  the  transports  and  material  of  war 
needed  could  not  be  collected  until  December.  As  the  British  prob- 
ably would  attempt  to  intercept  a  convoy  upon  which  the  next  cam- 
paign so  much  depended,  Rear-Admiral  de  Guichen  was  ordered  to 
accompany  it  clear  of  the  Bay  of  Biscay,  with  twelve  ships  of  the 
line,  and  then  to  go  to  Cadiz.  Five  ships  of  the  line  destined  to  de 
Grasse,  and  two  going  to  the  East  Indies,  raised  to  nineteen  the  total 
force  with  which  de  Guichen  left  Brest  011  the  10th  of  December.  On 
the  afternoon  of  the  12th,  the  French  being  then  one  hundred  and 
fifty  miles  to  the  southward  and  westward  of  Ushant,  with  a  south- 
east wind,  the  weather,  which  had  been  thick  and  squally,  suddenly 
cleared  and  showed  sails  to  windward.  These  were  twelve  whips  of 
the  line,  one  50,  and  some  frigates,1  under  Rear-Admiral  Richard 
Kempenfelt  (B),  who  had  left  England  on  the  2nd  of  the  month,  to 
cruise  in  wait  for  this  expedition.  The  French  numbers  should  have 
been  amply  sufficient  to  frustrate  an}-  attack,  but  de  Guichen,  ordi- 
narily a  careful  officer,  had  allowed  his  fleet  to  be  to  leeward  and 
ahead  of  the  convoy.  The  latter  scattered  in  every  direction,  as  the 
British  swooped  down  upon  it,  but  all  could  not  escape;  and  the 
French  ships  of  war  remained  helpless  spectators,  while  the  victims 
were  hauling  down  their  flags  right  and  left.  Night  coming  on, 

1  Fleet  under  Real-Admiral  Richard  Kempenfelt,  December,  1781.  From  Beat- 
son,  vi.  317,  checked  by  Steel's  'Navy  List'  of  Dee.  31st,  1781.  —  W.  L.  C. 


SHIPS. 

| 

§ 

COMMANDERS. 

SHIPS. 

§ 

COMMANDERS. 

(  Rear-Adm.  Richard  Kempenfelt  (B). 

Courageitx 

74 

Capt.  Hon.  Chas.  Phipps(Actg.). 

Victory     . 

K.K) 

\  Capt.  Henry  Cromwell. 

Agamemnon  . 

04  Capt.  Benjamin  Caldwell. 

{Commod.  John  Elliot. 

Medn-ay    .    . 

00  Capt.  Harry  Harmood. 

Edgar  ,    . 

74 

Capt.  Thomas  Boston. 

Renown     .     . 

50 

Capt.  John  Henry. 

Uritannia 

100 

Capt.  Jamea  Bradby  (1). 

Duke   .    . 

98  Capt.  Sir  Walter  Stirling,  Kt. 

FRIGATES,  etc. 

Queen  .    . 

98  C  apt.  Hon.  Fredk.  Lewis  Maitland. 

Arethusa  .     . 

38  Capt.  Sir  Richard  Pearson,  Kt. 

Union  .     . 

90 

Capt.  John  Dalrymple. 

Monsieur  .     . 

3(1  Capt.  Hon.  Seymour  Finch. 

Ocean  .    . 

90  Capt.  George  Ourry. 

Prudente  .    . 

SeJGapt.  Hon.  William  Waldegrave, 

Alexander 

74  Cora.  Thomas  Farnham  (Actg.). 

Tartar  .     .    . 

28  Capt.  Robert  Manners  Sutton. 

Valiant    . 

74  Capt,  Samuel  Graiiston  Goodall. 

Tisiphone  (f.  s.) 

8  Com.  James  Saumarez. 

510  MAJOR  OPERATIONS.    1762-1783.  [1782. 

some  prizes  could  not  be  secured,  but  Kempenfelt  carried  off  fifteen, 
laden  with  military  and  naval  stores  of  great  money  value  and  greater 
military  importance.  A  few  days  later  a  violent  storm  dispersed  and 
shattered  the  remainder  of  the  French  body.  Two  ships  of  the  line 
only,  the  Triomphant,  84,  and  Brave,  74,  and  five  transports,  could 
pursue  their  way  to  the  West  Indies.  The  rest  went  back  to  Brest. 

Kempenfelt,  before  returning  to  England,  sent  off  express  to 
Hood  in  the  West  Indies  the  fireship  Tisiplwne,  8,  Commander  James 
Saumarez,1 —  afterwards  the  distinguished  admiral,  —  with  news  of  the 
French  approach.  Saumarez,  having  been  first  to  Barbados,  joined 
Hood  on  the  81st  of  January,  1782,  in  Basse  Torre  Roads,  on  the  lee 
side  of  St.  Kitts.  The  campaign  for  the  year  1782  had  opened 
already  with  an  attack  upon  that  island  by  the  French  army  and 
navy;  and  the  enemy's  fleet  was  even  then  cruising  close  at  hand  to 
leeward,  between  St.  Kitts  and  Nevis. 

The  original  intention  of  do  (irasse  and  de  Bouilld  had  been  to 
capture  Barbados,  the  most  important  of  the  Eastern  Antilles  still 
remaining  to  the  British;  but  the  heavy  trade-winds,  which  in  those 
days  made  a  winter  passage  to  windward  so  long  and  dreary  a  beat, 
twice  drove  him  back  to  port.  "The  whole  French  fleet,"  wrote 
Hood,  "appeared  off  St.  Lucia  on  the  17th  of  last  month,  endeavour- 
ing to  get  to  windward,  and  having  carried  away  many  topmasts  and 
yards  in  struggling  against  very  squally  weather,  returned  to  Fort 
Royal  Bay  on  the  2ord,  and  on  the  28th  came  out  again  with  forty 
transports,  manoeuvring  as  before."  On  the  2nd  of  January  it  dis- 
appeared from  St.  Lucia,  and,  after  a  short  stay  at  Martinique,  pro- 
ceeded on  the  5th  to  St.  Kitts,  anchoring  in  Basse  Terre  Roads  on 
the  llth.  The  British  garrison  retired  to  Brimstone  Hill,  a  forti- 
fied position  at  the  north-west  of  the  island,  while  the  inhabitants 
surrendered  the  government  to  the  French,  pledging  themselves  to 
neutrality.  The  adjacent  island  of  Nevis  capitulated  on  the  same 
terms  on  the  20th. 

On  the  14th  of  the  month  an  express  sent  by  General  Shirley, 
governor  of  St.  Kitts,  informed  Hood  that  a  great  fleet  approaching 
had  been  seen  from  the  heights  of  Nevis  on  the  10th.  The  Rear- 

1  James  Saumarez,  Lortl  de  Saumarez,  G.  C.  B.  Born,  1757.  Commander,  1781. 
Captain,  1782.  Captain  of  Russell  in  Rodney's  action,  1782.  Knighted  for  capture 
of  frigate  Reunion,  1793.  Captain  of  Orion  in  Bridport's  action,  at  St.  Vincent,  and 
at  the  Nile  (when  he  was  second  in  command).  Rear-Admiral  and  Baronet,  1801. 
Defeated  French  and  Spaniards  off  Algeciras,  July  12th,  1801.  Vice-Admiral,  1805. 
Vice-Admiral  of  England  and  a  peer,  1831.  Died,  1836. 


1782.]  HOOD  AND  DE  GRASSE  AT  ST.   KITTS.  511 

Admiral  at  once  put  to  sea,  though  short  of  bread  and  flour,  which 
could  not  be  had,  and  with  the  material  of  his  ships  in  wretched 
condition.  "When  the  President  joins,"  he  wrote  the  Admiralty,  "I 
shall  be  twenty-two  strong,  with  which  I  beg  you  will  assure  their 
Lordships  I  will  seek  and  give  battle  to  the  Count  cle  Grasse,  be  his 
numbers  as  they  may."  On  the  16th  a  ship  reached  him  with  word 
that  the  French  fleet  had  invested  St.  Kitts.  On  the  21st  Hood 
anchored  at  Antigua  for  repairs  and  supplies,  indispensable  for  keep- 
ing the  sea  in  the  operations  which  he  contemplated,  the  duration  of 
which  could  not  be  foreseen.  About  a  thousand  troops  also  were 
embarked,  which,  with  the  Marines  that  could  be  spared  from  the 
squadron,  would  give  a  landing  force  of  2,400  men. 

St.  Kitts  being  less  than  fifty  miles  from  Antigua,  Hood  doubt- 
less now  got  accurate  information  of  the  enemy's  dispositions,  and 
could  form  a  definite,  well-matured  plan.  This  seems  to  have  been 
carefully  imparted  to  all  his  captains,  as  was  the  practice  of  Nelson, 
who  was  the  pupil  of  Hood,  if  of  any  one.  "At  'J.15  A.M.  the  Ad- 
miral made  the  signal  for  all  flag-officers,"  says  the  log  of  the 
Canada;  "and  at  4  P.M.  the  Admirals  and  Commodore  made  the  sig- 
nals for  all  captains  of  their  divisions."  At  5  P.M.  of  the  same  day, 
January  23rd,  the  fleet  weighed  and  stood  over  for  Xevis,  round  the 
southern  point  of  which  Basse  Terre  must  be  approached;  for,  the 
channel  between  the  two  islands  being  impracticable  for  ships  of 
the  line,  they  virtually  were  one,  and,  their  common  axis  lying 
north-west  and  south-east,  the  trade-wind  is  fair  only  when  coming 
from  the  south. 

Basse  Terre,  where  de  Grasse  then  was,  is  about  fifteen  miles  from 
the  south  point  of  Nevis.  The  roadstead  lies  east  and  west,  and  the 
French  fleet,  then  twenty-four  of  the  line  and  two  fifties,  were 
anchored  without  attention  to  order,  three  or  four  deep,  the  eastern 
ships  so  placed  that  an  enemy  coming  from  the  southward  could 
reach  them  with  the  prevailing  wind,  against  which  the  western  ships 
could  not  beat  up  quickly  to  their  support.  This  being  so,  we  are 
told  that  Hood,  starting  shortly  before  sunset  with  a  fair,  and  prob- 
ably fresh  wind,  from  a  point  only  sixty  miles  distant,  hoped  to  come 
upon  the  French  by  surprise  at  early  daybreak,  to  attack  the  weather 
ships,  and  from  them  to  pass  along  the  line  so  far  as  might  seem 
expedient.  His  column,  thus  passing  in  its  entirety  by  a  certain 
exposed  fraction  of  the  enemy,  the  latter  would  be  cut  up  in  detail  by 
the  concentration  upon  it.  The  British  then,  wearing  to  the  south- 


512  MAJOR   OPERATIONS.    1762-1783.  [1782. 

ward,  would  haul  their  wind,  tack,  and  again  stand  up  to  the  assault, 
if  the  enemy  continued  to  await  it. 

This  reasonable  expectation,  and  skilful  conception,  was  thwarted 
by  a  collision,  during  the  night,  between  a  frigate,  the  Nymphe,  36, 
and  the  leading  ship  of  the  line,  the  Alfred,  74.  The  repairs  to  the 
latter  delayed  the  fleet,  the  approach  of  which  was  discovered  by 
daylight.  De  Grasse  therefore  put  to  sea.  He  imagined  Hood's 
purpose  was  to  throw  succours  into  Brimstone  Hill;  and  moreover 
the  position  of  the  enemy  now  was  between  him  and  the  four  ships 
of  the  line  momentarily  expected  from  Martinique,  one  of  which 
joined  him  on  the  same  day.  The  French  were  all  under  way  by 
sunset,  standing  to  the  southward  under  easy  sail,  towards  the  British, 
who  had  rounded  the  south  point  of  Nevis  at  1  P.M.  Towards  dark, 
Hood  went  about  and  stood  also  to  the  southward,  seemingly  in 
retreat. 

During  the  following  night  the  British  tacked  several  times,  to 
keep  their  position  to  windward.  At  daylight  of  January  25th,  the 
two  fleets  were  to  the  westward  of  Nevis;  the  British  near  the  island, 
the  French  abreast,  but  several  miles  to  leeward.  Foiled  in  his  first 
spring  by  an  unexpected  accident,  Hood  had  not  relinquished  his 
enterprise,  and  now  proposed  to  seize  the  anchorage  quitted  by  the 
French,  so  establishing  himself  there,  — as  he  had  proposed  to  Graves 
to  do  in  the  Chesapeake,  —  that  he  could  not  be  dislodged.  For  such 
a  defensive  position  St.  Kitts  offered  special  advantages.  The 
anchorage  was  on  a  narrow  ledge,  dropping  precipitately  to  very  deep 
water;  and  it  was  possible  so  to  place  the  ships  that  the  enemy  could 
not  easily  anchor  near  them. 

At  5.30  A.M.  of  the  25th  Hood  made  the  signal  to  form  line  of 
battle 1  on  the  starboard  tack,  at  one  cable  interval.2  It  is  mentioned 
in  the  log  of  the  Canada,  74,  Captain  the  Hon.  William  Cornwallis, 
that  that  ship  brought-to  in  her  station,  fourth  from  the  rear,  at  7 
o'clock.  By  10  o'clock  the  line  was  formed,  and  the  ships  hove-to 
in  it.  At  10.45  the  signal  was  made  to  fill  [to  go  ahead],  the  van 
ships  to  carry  the  same  sail  as  the  Admiral,  —  topsails  and  foresails, 
—  followed,  just  l>efore  noon,  by  the  order  to  prepare  to  anchor,  with 
springs  on  the  cables.  The  French,  who  were  steering  south,  on  the 

1  See  note  on  opposite  page. 

2  The  times  and  general  movements  are  put  together  from  Hood's  Journal  and 
the  Log  of  the  Canada,  published  by  the  Navy  Records  Society.     '  Letters  of  Lord 
Hood,'  pp.  64,  86. 


1782.] 


HOOD  AND  DE  GRASSE  AT  ST.   KITTS. 


51B 


port  tack,  while  the  British  were  hove-to,  went  about  as  soon  as  the 
latter  filled,  and  stood  towards  them  in  bow  and  quarter  line. 

At  noon  the  British  fleet  was  running  along  close  under  the  high 
land  of  Nevis ;  so  close  that  the  Solebay,  28,  Captain  Charles  Holmes 
Everitt,  one  of  the  frigates  inshore  of  the  line,  grounded  and  was 
wrecked.  No  signals  were  needed,  except  to  correct  irregularities  in 
the  order,  for  the  captains  knew  what  they  were  to  do.  The  French 
were  approaching  steadily,  but  inevitably  dropping  astern  with  refer- 
ence to  the  point  of  the  enemy's  line  for  which  they  were  heading. 
At  2  P.M.  de  Grasse's  flagship,  the  Ville  da  I'aris,  fired  several  shot 
at  the  British  rear,  which  alone  she  could  reach,  while  his  left  wing 
was  nearing  the  Barfleur,  Hood's  flagship,  and  the  vessels  astern  of 
her,  which  opened  their  fire  at  2.30.  Hood,  trusting  to  his  captains, 
disregarded  this  threat  to  the  rear  half  of  his  force.  Signals  flew  for 
the  van  to  crowd  sail  and  take  its  anchorage,  and  at  3.30  P.M.  the 
leading  ships  began  to  anchor  in  line  ahead,  covered  as  they  did  so 
by  the  broadsides  of  the  rear  and  the  rear  centre.  Upon  the  latter 
the  French  were  now  keeping  up  a  smart  fire.  Between  the  Canada 
and  her  next  astern,  the  Prudent,  64,  —  which  was  a  dull  sailer,  - 
there  was  a  considerable  interval.  Towards  it  the  French  admiral 
pressed,  aiming  to  cut  off  the  three  rear  vessels ;  but  Cornwallis  threw 


NOTE.  —  List  of  the  fleet  under  Hear- Admiral  Sir  Samuel  Hood,  1'art.,  on  Jan.  25tli, 
1782.  (Intended  line  of  battle  as  tlie  fleet  stood  in.  It -was  slightly  modified  l>y 
accidental  circumstances  ;  and  on  the  2(>th  the  ships  were  anchored  iu  the  order  indi- 
cated by  the  numbers  prefixed  to  them,  the  Bedfunl  being  nearest  to  Basse  Terre.) 


SHIPS. 

K 

p 

-- 

COMMANDERS. 

SHIPS. 

£ 

3 

COMMANDERS. 

4.  SI.  Altians    .     JG4 

Capt.  Charles  Inglis. 

22.  Alfml      .     . 

74  Capt.  William  Bayne. 

6.  Alciilf.  .    .     .     '74  Capt.  Charles  Thompson. 

1'njiimis,  23 

Capt.  John  Stanhope. 

7.  Intrepid  .     .     ^4  Capt.  Anthony  Jas.  Pye  Molloy. 

Fin-timer,  40 

Capt.  Hn^'h  Cloberry  Christian. 

8.  Tnrbuy     .     .      74  Capt.  John  Lewis  Gidoin. 

Li=nril,  2X 

Capt.  Edmund  Dod. 

|'  Rear-Admiral  Francis  Samuel 

r/i«/»j</<u),  21 

Capt.  Thomas  West. 

'J.  Princcsa  .     . 

70  -[      Drake  (B). 

('uliri-rl,  ',U 

Capt.  Henry  Harvey. 

vCapt.  Charles  Knatchbull. 

Trill,  u,  28  . 

Capt.  John  M'Laurin. 

10.  Prince  George 

98  Capt.  James  Williams. 

•2.  Knsxi-ll      .     . 

74  Capt.  Hon.  Henry  Edwyu  Stan- 

11.  Ajaz     .     .     . 

74 

Capt.  Nicholas  Cliarringtou. 

hope. 

Euryilice,  24  | 

Capt.  George  Wilson. 

19.  Kenalulion     . 

7-1  Capt.  Lord  Robert  Manner*. 

12.  Prince  William  64 

Capt.  George  Wilkinson. 

74 

)  Commod.  Ethnund  Affleck. 

13.  Shrewsbury  . 

74 

Capt.  John  Knight. 

1  Cant.  Thomas  Graves  (3). 

14.  Invincible     . 

74 

Capt.  Charles  Saxton. 

21.  Can  IK/II     .     . 

"4  Capt.  Hon.  William  Cornwallis. 

fRear-Adm.  Sir  Samuel  Hood, 

•-0    I'rmlrnl    .     . 

('4  Capt.  Andrew  Barkley. 

15.  Barfleur  .     . 

98 

Bart.  (R). 

3.  Miintnfjit  .     . 

"•*  ('apt.  George  Bowen  (1). 

VCapt.  Alexander  Hood. 

(!.  Amrrii-ii  .     . 

04 

'  'apt.  Sanuicl  Thompson. 

10.  Monarch  .     . 

71 

Capt.  Francis  Reynolds. 

x;i,iii,  28    . 

Capt.  John  Rodney  (?}. 

18.  Belliqueux    . 

C4 

Capt.  Lord  Cranstoun. 

Solebay,  28 

Capt.  Charles  Holmes  Everitt. 

17.  Centaur  .     . 

71 

Capt.  John  Nicholson  Inglefeld. 

From  a  list  in  Schomberg,  iv.  3!)(i,  as  corrected  in  SIS.  by  Henry  Wise  Harvey  ; 
checked  by  Steel's  'Navy  List'  of  Dec.  31st,  1781,  and  March  31st,  1782,  and  com- 
pared with  dispatches,  etc.  —  W.  L.  C. 
VOL.  in.  — 33 


514 


MAJOR   OPERATIONS.     1702-1783. 


[1782. 


everything  aback  and  closed  down  upon  his  consort,  —  a  stirring 
deed  in  which  he  was  imitated  by  the  Resolution  and  Bedford,  74's, 
immediately  ahead  of  him.  l)e  (irasse  was  thus  foiled,  but  so  nar- 
rowly, that  an  officer,  looking  from  one  of  the  ships  which  had 
anchored,  asserted  that  for  a  moment  he  could  perceive  the  Ville  de 
Paris' s  jib  inside  the  British  line.  As  the  rear  of  the  latter  pushed 
on  to  its  place,  it  cleared  the  broadsides  of  the  now  anchored  van  and 
centre,  and  these  opened  upon  the  enemy,  a  great  part  of  whom  were 


HOOD    AND    DE    GRASSE 
2Sr"  JA»"Y /78^. 
Fic.l  . 


llMdl)     AND    UK    CKASSK. 


strung  ont  behind  the  British  column,  without  opponents  sis  yet,  but 
hastening  up  to  get  their  share  of  the  action.  The  B«,-flnn\  which 
anchored  at  4.03,  opened  tire  again  at  4.40  P.M.  Thus  as  the 
Canada  and  her  few  companions,  who  boiv  the  brunt  of  the  dsiy 
were  shortening  sail  and  rounding-to,  still  under  a  hot  cannonade, 
the  batteries  of  their  predecessors  were  ringing  out  their  welcome, 
and  at  the  same  time  covering  their  movements  by  givino-  the  enemy 
much  else  to  think  about.  The  funmln,  fetching  up  near  the  tail 
of  the  column,  and  letting  go  in  a  hurry,  ran  out  two  cables  on  end, 


1782.] 


HOOD  AND  DE  GRASSE  AT  ST.   KITTS. 


515 


and  found  upon  sounding  that  she  had  dropped  her  anchor  in  a  hun- 
dred and  fifty  fathoms  of  water.  The  French  column  stood  on,  off 
soundings,  though  close  to,  firing  as  it  passed,  and  then,  wearing  to 
the  southward  in  succession,  stood  out  of  action  on  the  port  tack,  its 
ineffectual  broadsides  adding  to  the  grandeur  and  excitement  of  the 
scene,  and  swelling  the  glory  of  Hood's  successful  daring,  of  which 
it  is  difficult  to  speak  too  highly.  The  captain  of  the  Resolution, 
Lord  Robert  Manners,  writing  a  week  later,  passed  upon  this  acliieve- 


MOOD     AND     DE      GRASSE 

jA*,"-r 
FIG. II'. 


HOOD    AND    I)K    GKA.SSE. 


inent  a  verdict,  which  posterity  will  confirm.  "  The  taking  posses- 
sion of  this  road  was  well  judged,  well  conducted,  and  well  executed, 
though  indeed  the  French  had  an  opportunity  —  which  they  missed 
—  of  bringing  our  rear  to  a  very  severe  account.  The  van  and  centre 
divisions  brought  to  an  anchor  under  the  fire  of  the  rear,  which  was 
engaged  with  the  enemy's  centre  (Fig.  1);  and  then  the  centre,  being 
at  an  anchor  and  properly  placed,  covered  us  while  we  anchored 
(Fig.  2),  making,  I  think,  the  most  masterly  manoeuvre  I  ever  saw." 
Whether  regard  be  had  to  the  thoughtful  preparation,  the  crafty 


516  MAJOR  OPERATIONS.    1702-1783.  [1782. 

management  of  the  fleet  antecedent  to  the  final  push,  the  calculated 
audacity  of  the  latter,  or  the  firm  and  sagacious  tactical  handling 
from  the  first  moment  to  the  last,  Nelson  himself  never  did  a  more 
brilliant  deed  than  this  of  Hood's.1  All  firing  ceased  at  5.80. 

Naturally,  an  order  taken  up  under  such  conditions  needed  some 
rectifying  before  further  battle.  As  the  proper  stationing  of  the  fleet 
depended  in  great  measure  upon  the  position  of  the  van  ship,  Hood 
had  put  a  local  pilot  on  board  her;  but  when  the  action  ceased,  he 
found  that  she  was  not  as  close  to  the  shore  as  he  had  intended. 
The  rear,  on  the  other  hand,  was  naturally  in  the  most  disorder,  owing 
to  the  circumstances  attending  its  anchorage.  Three  ships  from  the 
rear  were  consequently  directed  to  place  themselves  ahead  of  the  van, 
closing  the  interval,  while  others  shifted  their  berths,  according  to 
specific  directions.  The  order  as  finally  assumed  was  as  follows. 
The  van  ship  was  anchored  so  close  to  the  shore  that  it  was  impossible 
to  pass  within  her,  or,  with  the  prevailing  wind,  even  to  reach  her, 
because  of  a  point  and  shoal  just  outside,  covering  her  position. 
From  her  the  line  extended  in  a  west-north-west  direction  to  the 
fifteenth  ship,  —  the  Uurjlcur,  98,  Hood's  flagship,  —  when  it  turned 
to  north,  the  last  six  ships  being  on  a  north  and  south  line.  These 
six,  with  their  broadsides  turned  to  the  westward,  prevented  a 
column  passing  from  south  to  north,  the  only  way  one  could  pass, 
from  enfilading  the  main  line  with  impunity.  The  latter  covered 
with  its  guns  the  approach  from  the  south. 

At  daylight  on  the  following  morning,  January  2(5th,  the  ships 
Itegan  changing  their  places,  the  French  being  then  seven  or  eight 
miles  distant  in  the  south-south-east.  At  7  A.M.  they  were  seen  to 
be  approaching  in  line  of  battle,  under  a  press  of  sail,  heading  for 
the  British  van.  The  Canada,  which  had  begun  at  5  A.M.  to  tackle 
her  200-odd  fathoms  of  cable,  was  obliged  to  cut,  whereby  "we  lost 
the  small  bower  anchor  and  two  cables  with  one  8-inch  and  one  9-inch 
hawsers,  which  were  bent  for  springs."  The  ship  had  to  work  to 
windward  to  close  with  the  fleet,  and  was  therefore  ordered  by  the 
Rear-Admiral  to  keep  engaging  under  way,  until  10.50,  when  a  mes- 
sage was  sent  her  to  anchor  in  support  of  the  rear.  The  action 
began  between  8.30  and  0  A.M.,  the  leading  French  ship  heading  for 
the  British  van,  seemingly  with  the  view  of  passing  round  and  inside 
it.  Against  this  attempt  Hood's  precautions  probably  were  suffi- 

1  Illustrations  (if  other  phases  of  this  battle  can  be  found  in  Mahau's  'Influence 
of  Sea  Po.wer  ujion  History,'  \>\>.  470,  472, 


1782.] 


HOOD'S  ORDER   OF  BATTLE. 


517 


cient;  but  as  the  enemy's  vessel  approached,  the  wind  headed  her,  so 
that  she  could  only  fetch  the  third  ship.  The  latter,  with  the  vessels 
ahead  and  astern,  sprung  their  batteries  upon  her.  "  The  crash  occa- 
sioned by  their  destructive  broadsides  was  so  tremendous  on  board 
her  that  whole  pieces  of  plank  were  seen  flying  from  her  off  side, 
ere  she  could  escape  the  cool  concentrated  fire  of  her  determined 
adversaries."1  She  put  her  helm  up,  and  ran  along  outside  the 
British  line,  receiving  the  first  fire  of  each  successive  ship.  Her 


I 

'<--\    » 


\ 


HOOD'S  ORDER  OF  BATTLE 


/IT  JfftCHOf     AT 


26  r." 


HOOD  S  ORDER  OF  BATTLE.   AT  ANCHOR  AT  ST.  KITTS. 

movement  was  imitated  by  her  followers,  some  keeping  off  sooner, 
some  later;  but  de  Grasse  in  his  flagship  not  only  came  close,  but 
pointed  his  after  yards  to  the  wind,2  to  move  the  slower.  As  he 
ported  his  helm  when  leaving  the  Barf-c.ur,  this  brought  these  sails 
aback,  keeping  him  a  still  longer  time  before  the  British  ships  thrown 
to  the  rear.  "  In  this  he  was  supported  by  those  ships  which  were 
astern,  or  immediately  ahead  of  him.  During  this  short  but  tre- 


1  White  :  '  Naval  Researches.1 

2  Sharp  up  by  the  starboard  braces,  the  wind  being  on  the  starboard  quarter. 


518  MAJOR   OPERATIONS.     1702-1783.  [1782. 

mentions  conflict  in  that  part  of  the  field  of  battle,  nothing  whatever 
could  be  seen  of  them  for  upwards  of  twenty  minutes,  save  tie 
Grasse's  white  flag  at  the  main-topgallant  masthead  of  the  Ville  de 
Paris,  gracefully  floating  above  the  immense  volumes  of  smoke  that 
enveloped  them,  or  the  pennants  of  those  ships  which  were  occa- 
sionally perceptible,  when  an  increase  of  breeze  would  waft  away  the 
smoke." 1 

Though  most  gallantly  done,  no  such  routine  manoeuvre  as  this 
could  shake  Hood's  solidly  assumed  position.  The  attempt  was 
repeated  in  the  afternoon,  but  more  feebly,  and  upon  the  centre  and 
rear  only.  This  also  was  ineffectual;  and  Hood  was  left  in  triumph- 
ant possession  of  the  tit-Id.  The  losses  in  the  several  affairs  of  the 
two  days  had  been:  British,  72  killed,  244  wounded;  French,  107 
killed,  207  wounded.  Thenceforth  the  French  fleet  continued  cruis- 
ing to  leeward  of  the  island,  approaching  almost  daily,  frequently 
threatening  attack,  and  occasionally  exchanging  distant  shots;  but 
no  serious  encounter  took  place.  Interest  was  centred  on  Brimstone 
Hill,  where  alone  on  the  island  the  British  flag  still  flew.  De  Grasse 
awaited  its  surrender,  flattering  himself  that  the  British  would  be 
forced  then  to  put  to  sea,  and  that  his  fleet,  increased  by  successive 
arrivals  to  thirty-two  of  the  line,  would  then  find  an  opportunity 
to  crush  the  man  who  had  outwitted  and  out-manoeuvred  him  on 
.January  2-Hh  and  2o'th.  In  this  hope  lie  was  deceived  by  his  own 
inaptness  and  his  adversary's  readiness.  Hood  was  unable  to  succour 
Brimstone  Hill,  for  want  of  troops;  the  French  having  landed  G, 000 
men,  against  which  the  British  2,400  could  effect  nothing,  either 
alone  or  in  co-operation  with  the  garrison,  which  was  but  1,200 
strong.  The  work  capitulated  on  the  loth  of  February.  De  Grasse, 
who  had  neglected  to  keep  his  ships  provisioned,  went  next  day  to 
Nevis  and  anchored  there  to  empty  the  store-ships.  That  evening 
Hood  called  his  captains  on  board,  explained  his  intentions,  had  them 
set  their  watches  by  his,  and  at  11  P.M.  the  cables  were  cut  one  by 
one,  lights  being  left  on  the  buoys,  and  the  fleet  silently  decamped, 
passing  round  the  north  end  of  St.  Kitts,  and  so  towards  Antigua. 
When  De  Grasse  opened  his  eyes  next  morning,  the  British  were 
no  longer  to  be  seen.  "  Nothing  could  have  been  more  fortunately 
executed,"  wrote  Lord  Ilol>ert  Manners,  "as  not  one  accident  hap- 
pened from  it.  Taking  the  whole  in  one  light,  though  not  successful 
in  the  point  we  aimed  at,  nevertheless  it  was  well  conducted,  and 
1  White  :  '  Naval  Researches.' 


1782.]  DE  GRASSES  PLAN  OF  CONQUEST.  519 

has  given  the  enemy  a  pretty  severe  check ;  and  if  you  give  him  half 
the  credit  the  enemy  does,  Sir  Samuel  Hood  will  stand  very  high  in 
the  public  estimation." 

Hood's  intention  had  teen  to  return  to  Barbados;  but  on  the 
25th  of  February  he  was  joined,  to  windward  of  Antigua,  by  Admiral 
Sir  George  Rodney,  who  had  arrived'  from  England  a  week  earlier, 
bringing  with  him  twelve  ships  of  the  lint1.  The  new  Commander-in- 
Chief  endeavoured  to  cut  off  do  Grassu  from  Martinique,  but  the 
French  fleet  got  in  there  on  the  2(ith.  Rodney  consequently  went  to 
St.  Lucia,  to  refit  Hood's  ships,  and  to  prepare  for  the  coming  cam- 
paign, in  which  it  was  understood  that  tin;  conquest  of  Jamaica  was 
to  be  the  first  object  of  the  allies.  An  important  condition  to  their 
success  was  the  arrival  of  a  great  convoy,  known  to  be  on  its  way 
from  Brest  to  repair  the  losses  which  Kempeufelt's  raid  and  subse- 
quent bad  weather  had  inflicted  in  December.  Hood  suggested  to 
Rodney  to  halve  the  fleet,  which  then  numbered  thirty-six  of  the 
line,  letting  one  part  cruise  north  of  Dominica,  between  that  island 
and  Deseada,  while  the  other  guarded  the  southern  approach,  between 
Martinique  and  St.  Lucia.  Rodney,  however,  was  unwilling  to  do 
this,  and  adopted  a  half-measure,  —  Hood's  division  being  stationed 
to  windward  of  the  north  end  of  Martinique,  reaching  only  as  far 
north  as  the  latitude  of  Dominica,  while  the  centre  and  rear  were 
abreast  of  the  centre  and  south  of  Martinique;  all  in  mutual  touch 
by  intermediate  vessels.  It  would  seem  —  reading  between  the  lines 
—  that  Hood  tried  to  stretch  his  cruising  ground  northwards,  in 
pursuance  of  his  own  ideas,  but  Rodney  recalled  him.  The  French 
convoy  consequently  passed  north  of  Deseada,  convoyed  by  two  ships 
of  the  line,  and  on  the  20th  of  .March  reached  Martinique  safely. 
De  Grasse's  force  was  thus  raised  to  thirty-live  of  the  line,  including 
two  fifty -gun  ships,  as  against  the  British  thirty-six.  At  the  end  of 
the  month  Rodney  returned  to  St.  Lucia,  and  there  remained  at 
anchor,  vigilantly  watching  the  French  fleet  in  Fort  Royal  by  means 
of  a  chain  of  frigates. 

The  problem  now  immediately  confronting  do  Grasse  —  the  first 
step  to  the  conquest  of  Jamaica  —  was  extremely  difficult.  It  was  to 
convoy  to  Cap  Francois  the  supply  vessels  essential  to  his  enterprise, 
besides  the  merchant  fleet  bound  for  France;  making  in  all  one 
hundred  and  fifty  unarmed  ships  to  be  protected  by  his  thirty-five  sail 
of  the  line,  in  face  of  the  British  thirty-six.  The  trade-wind  being 
fair,  he  purposed  to  skirt  the  inner  edge  of  the  Caribbean  Sea;  by 


520 


MAJOR  OPERATIONS.    1702-1783. 


ri782. 


which  means  he  would  keep  close  to  a  succession  of  friendly  ports, 
wherein  the  convoy  might  find  refuge  in  case  of  need. 

With  this  plan  the  French  armament  put  to  sea  on  the  8th  of 
April,  1782.  The  fact  being  reported  promptly  to  Rodney,  by  noon 
his  whole  fleet1  was  clear  of  its  anchorage  and  in  pursuit.  Then  was 
evident  the  vital  importance  of  Harrington's  conquest  of  St.  Lucia; 
for,  had  the  British  been  at  Barbados,  the  most  probable  alternative, 
the  French  movement  not  only  would  have  been  longer  unknown, 
but  pursuit  would  have  started  from  a  hundred  miles  distant,  instead 
of  thirty.  If  the  British  had  met  this  disadvantage  by  cruising  before 
Martinique,  they  would  have  encountered  the  difficulty  of  keeping 
their  ships  supplied  with  water  and  other  necessaries,  which  St.  Lucia 
afforded.  In  truth,  without  in  any  degree  minimising  the  faults  of 
the  loser,  or  the  merits  of  the  winner,  in  the  exciting  week  that  fol- 

1  British  fleet,  under  Admiral  Sir  George  Brydges  Rodney,  and  line  of  battle  on 
April  12th,  1782.  From  lists  in  Beatson,  vi.  324,  and  Schomberg  (revised  in  MS. 
of  II.  \V.  Harvey),  iv.  39!)  ;  compared  with  dispatches  and  with  Steel's  '  Navy  Lists.' 
—  \V.  L.  C. 


SHIPS. 

o 

COMMANDERS. 

SHIPS. 

I 

COMMANDERS. 

llra/al  Oak    ...     '74 

Capt.  Thomas  Burnett. 

nrailnliun     .     .     . 

74  Capt.  Lord  Robert  Manners.  t 

Alfred      ....      71  Capt.  William  liayne.t 

'  I'rnttr,       .... 

t!4  ('.apt.  Charles  Buckuer. 

M.mtaa,,  .... 

74|  Capt.  George  Bowen  (1). 

//,-,•«,/„.     .     .     . 

74  Oapt.  Henry  Savage. 

Valiant     ... 

71  (,'apt.  Samuel  Granston  Good- 

Fortun&e,*  4o 

Capt.HughCloberryChristian. 

nil. 

EHdifinidn,  -14    . 

Capt.  Edward  Tyrrel  Smith. 

/Rrar-Ailmiral    Sir    Samuel 

Finm,  ;«;  .    .    . 

Capt.  Samuel  Marshall. 

Harflnir  ....      !ix 

Hood,  Bart.  (li). 

Conrer/i*  .'12  .     . 

('apt.  Henry  Harvey. 

I  Capt.  John  Kniglit. 

AlfirntiM      .     . 

Capt.  Charles  Cotton. 

Monarch  .     .     .     .      71  ('apt.  Francis  Reynolds. 

Andromache^  32 

Capt.  George  Alison  Byron. 

Warrior  .    .    .    .     74  Capt.  Sir  James  Wallace,  Kt. 

Sibi/l,  'JS 

Capt.  John  Rodney. 

Jtffl/'/iifiir    ...      i;(  ('apt.  Andrew  Sutherland. 

Pcynnux*  'JS  .     . 

Cai  t.  John  Stanhope. 

Centaur    ....      71  Capt.  John  Nicholson   Ingle- 

-l/r/V,  14     ... 

Cum.  James  Vashon. 

Held. 

Xtil«Hifimler*(t.B.), 

Mngnifictnt  • 

71  ('apt.  Robert  Linx.ee. 

g. 

Com.  Richard  Lucas. 

I'rini-r  William      . 

Ill  Capt.  George  Wilkinson. 

i  Ruttst'll      .... 

74  Capt.  James  Saumarez. 

Xijmiilir.*  3(i      . 

Capt.  John  Ford. 

\PnifIfnt*      .     .     . 

(>4  Capt.  Andrew  Barkley. 

Lizard,*  2S    .     . 

Capt.  Edmund  Dod. 

l'"utnf   . 

-  i    ,,        J-      R     1         t    H        1 

Champion,  24     . 

('apt.  Thomas  West. 

04  Capt.  William  Blair.  ^ 

Zrhra*  II)      .     . 

Com.  John  Bonrchier. 

Tnrbny     .... 

74  Capt.  John  Lewis  Gidoin. 

Jinljonl   .... 

7-1 

1  Commod.  Edmund  Affleck. 

Prince  ficoi'fji'  . 

IIS  Capt.  James  Williams. 

I  Capt.  Thomas  Graves  (3). 

1  Rear-  Adm.  Francis  Samuel 

.t/V/r     

74  Capt.  Nicholas  Charrington. 

Princes/  1  .... 

70  •[      Drake  (B). 

firptllse     .... 

(14  Oapt.  Thomas  Dumaresq. 

!  VCapt.  Charles  Knatchbull. 

Camilla    ....      74  Oapt.  Hon.  Wm.  Cornwallis. 

.  Conqueror    .    .    , 

74  Capt.  George  Balfour. 

SI.  Allans    .     .     .      (U  (  'apt.  Charles  Inglis. 

XnHXurfi    .... 

14  Capt.  William  Truscott. 

Xamur     ....      !Hl  Capt.  Robert  Fanshawe  (1). 

'Alcitle  

74  Capt.  Charles  Thompson. 

(Adm.   Sir  George   Brydges 

Arrogant       .     ,     . 

74  Capt.  Sam.  Pitchford  Cornish. 

Formidable                 |0£ 

Rodney  (W). 

Marllx.roityh      .     . 

74  Capt.  Taylor  Penny. 

"l  Capt.  SirChas.Douglas(lst) 

Santa  ,VoHi<y/,*3G 

Capt.  John  Linzee. 

1.  Oapt.  John  Symons  (2nd). 

Triton,  'J8  .     .     . 

Capt.  John  M'Laurin. 

7>«te    .         ... 

OS  Capt.  Alan  Gardner. 
04  Capt.  Benjamin  Caldwell. 

Suryd'fce,  24 

Capt-  George  Wilson. 
Com.  Geo.  Augustus  Keppel. 

Agamemnon     .    . 

Blast  (t.  s.),*  8  . 

Com.  John  Ayliner. 

*  These  vessels  were  not  in  the  action, 
t  Killed  on  April  9th. 


t  Mortally  wounded  on  April  12th. 
§  Killed  on  April  12th. 


1782.]  FRENCH  FLEET  APPROACHES  DOMINICA.  521 

lowed,  the  opening  situation  may  be  said  to  have  represented  on  either 
side  an  accumulation  of  neglects  or  of  successes,  which  at  the  moment 
of  their  occurrence  may  have  seemed  individually  trivial.  De  Grasse 
was  tremendously  handicapped  from  the  outset  by  the  errors  of  his 
predecessors  and  of  himself.  That  the  British  had  St.  Lucia  as  their 
outpost  was  due  not  only  to  Barrington's  diligence,  but  also  to 
d'Estaing's  slackness  and  professional  timidity;  and  it  may  be  ques- 
tioned whether  de  Grasse  himself  had  shown  a  proper  understanding 
of  strategic  conditions,  when  he  neglected  that  island  in  favour  of 
Tobago  and  St.  Kitts.  Certainly,  Hood  had  feared  for  it  greatly  the 
year  before.  That  the  convoy  was  there  to  embarrass  his  movements, 
may  not  have  been  the  fault  of  the  French  admiral;  but  it  was 
greatly  and  entirely  his  fault  that,  of  the  thirty-six  ships  pursuing 
him,  twenty-one  represented  a  force  that  he  could  have  crushed  in 
detail  a  few  weeks  before,  —  not  to  mention  the  similar  failure  of 
April,  1781. 

Large  bodies  of  ships  commonly  will  move  less  rapidly  than  small. 
By  2. -30  P.M.  of  the  day  of  starting,  Rodney's  look-outs  had  sighted 
the  French  licet;  and  before  sundown  it  could  be  seen  from  the 
mastheads  of  the  main  body.  At  G  next  morning,  the  9th,  the 
enemy,  both  fleet  and  convoy,  was  visible  from  the  deck  of  the  Barfl-cur, 
the  flagship  of  Hood's  division,  then  in  the  van.  The  French  bore 
north-east,  distant  four  to  twelve  miles,  and  extending  from  abreast 
of  the  centre  of  Dominica  northwards  towards  Guadeloupe.  The 
British  therefore  had  gained  much  during  the  night,  and  were  now 
off  Dominica,  to  leeward  of  the  enemy's  rear,  which  was  becalmed 
under  the  land  (b).  Some  fourteen  or  fifteen  of  the  French  van, 
having  opened  out  the  channel  between  Dominica  and  Guadeloupe, 
felt  afresh  trade-wind,  against  which  they  were  beating;  and  their 
number  was  gradually  increased  as  individual  ships,  utilising  the 
catspaws,  stole  clear  of  the  high  land  of  Dominica  (b).  Hood's 
division  in  like  manner,  first  among  the  British,  got  the  breeze,  and, 
with  eight  ships,  the  commander  of  the  van  stood  north  in  order  of 
battle.  To  the  north-west  of  him  were  two  French  vessels,  separated 
from  their  consorts  and  threatened  to  be  cut  off(i).  These  stood 
boldly  down  and  crossed  the  head  of  Hood's  column;  one  passing  so 
close  to  the  leading  ship,  the  Alfred,  that  the  latter  had  to  bear  up 
to  let  her  pass.  Rodney  had  hoisted  a  signal  to  engage  at  6.38  A.M., 
but  had  hauled  it  down  almost  immediately,  and  Hood  would  not  fire 
without  orders.  These  ships  therefore  rejoined  the  main  body  un- 


522 


MAJOR   OPERATIONS.     176->-17S:!. 


[1782. 


harmed.     At  8.30  the  French  hoisted  their  colours,  and  shortly  after- 
wards their  whole  fleet  tacked  and  stood  south,  opposite  to  Hood. 

De  Grasse  now  had  recognised  that  he  could  not  escape  action,  if 
the  convoy  kept  company.  He  therefore  directed  the  two  fifty-gun 
ships,  Experiment  and  Sarjiltairc,  to  accompany  it  into  Guadeloupe, 
where  it  arrived  safely  that  day;  and  lie  decided  that  the  fleet  should 
ply  to  windward  through  the  channel  between  Dominica  and 
Guadeloupe,  nearly  midway  in  which  lies  a  group  of  small  islands 


RODNEY    AND    DE    GRASSE 
S>r."  *M,n.;/?8S 

POSITION  .  I.    9-  45.  AM. 


KoliXKY    AM"    UK    (iKASSE. 


called  The  Saintes,  — a  name  at  times  given  to  the  battle  of  April 
12th.  I5v  this  course  lie  hoped  not  only  to  lead  the  enemy  away 
from  the  convoy,  hut  also  to  throw  off  pursuit,  through  his  superior 
speed,  and  so  to  accomplish  his  mission  unharmed.  The  French 
ships,  larger,  deeper,  and  with  better  lines  than  their  opponents,  were 
naturally  better  sailers,  and  it  may  he  inferred  that  even  coppering 
had  not  entirely  overcome  this  original  disadvantage  of  the  British. 

At  the  very  moment  of  beginning  his  new  policy,   however,    a 
subtle  temptation  assailed  de  Grasse  irresistibly,  in  the  exposed  posi- 


1782.] 


RODNEY  AND  DE  GRASSE. 


523 


tion  of  Hood's  column;  and  he  met  it,  not  by  a  frank  and  hearty 
acceptance  of  a  great  opportunity,  but  by  a  half-measure.  Hood 
thoroughly  crushed,  the  British  fleet  became  hopelessly  inferior  to 
the  French ;  Hood  damaged,  and  it  became  somewhat  inferior :  pos- 
sibly it  would  be  deterred  froni  further  pursuit.  De  Grasse  decided 
for  this  second  course,  and  ordered  half  his  fleet  to  attack.  This 
operation  was  carried  out  under  the  orders  of  the  .Marquis  cle 
Vaudreuil,  the  second  in  command.  The  ships  engaged  in  it  bore 


Rootscv      AND     oc    CRAG: 
Po  s  i  T  i  o  rsj     II      /2  M 


KODNKV    AXI)    DE    GliASSIC. 


down  from  the  windward,  attacked  Hood's  rear  ships,  stood  along  on 
the  weather  side  of  his  column  at  long  range,  and,  having  passed 
ahead,  tacked  in  succession  and  formed  again  in  the  rear,  whence 
they  repeated  the  same  manoeuvre  (Position  I.).  Thus  a  procession 
of  fifteen  ships  kept  passing  by  eight,  describing  a  continuous  curve 
of  elliptical  form.  They  were  able  to  do  this  because  Hood  was 
condemned  to  a  low  speed,  lest  he  should  draw  too  far  away  from  the 
British  centre  (a)  and  rear  (c),  still  becalmed  under  Dominica.  The 
French,  having  choice  of  distance,  kept  at  long  gunshot,  because  they 


524 


MAJOR   OPERATIONS.     17G2-1783. 


[1782. 


were  deficient  in  carronades,  of  which  the  British  had  many.  These 
guns,  of  short  range  but  large  calibre,  were  thus  rendered  useless. 
Could  they  have  come  into  play,  the  French  rigging  and  sails  would 
have  suffered  severely.  This  first  engagement  lasted,  by  Hood's  log, 
from  'J.48  to  10.25  A.M.  It  was  resumed  in  stronger  force  at  14 
minutes  past  noon,  and  continued  till  1.45  P.M.  (Position  II.),  when 
firing  ceased  for  that  day;  Itodney  hauling  down  the  signal  for  battle 


MEDAL  COMMEMORATIVE   OF    IIDIIN  KY's    VHTIH1V,   Al'KII,  12TII,   17S12. 
(From  an  original  kindly  Irnt  tiif  Cttfit.  11.  X.  If.  Prince  Louis  of  llattenlcry,  I!.  .V.) 

at  2.  Between  the  two  affairs,  which  were  identical  in  general 
character,  Hood's  column  was  reinforced,  and  great  part  of  the 
British  centre  also  got  into  action  with  some  of  the  French  main 
bod}-,  though  at  long  range  only.  "Except  the  two  rear  ships," 
wrote  Rodney  to  Hood  that  night,  "the  others  fired  at  such  a  distance 
that  I  returned  none.'' 

The  injuries  to  the  British  ships  engaged  were  not  such  as  to  com- 
pel them  to  leave  the  fleet.  The  Royal  Oak  lost  her  main  topmast, 
and  that  of  the  Warrior  fell  two  days  later,  not  improbably  from 
wounds ;  but  in  these  was  nothing  that  the  ready  hands  of  seamen 
could  not  repair  so  as  to  continue  the  chase.  Rodney  therefore  con- 
tented himself  with  reversing  the  order,  putting  Hood  in  the  rear, 
whereby  he  was  able  to  refit,  and  yet  follow  fast  enough  not  to  be  out 
of  supporting  distance.  One  of  the  French  ships,  the  Calon,  64,  was 
so  injured  that  de  Grasse  detached  her  into  Guadeloupe.  It  must  be 
remembered  that  a  crippled  ship  in  a  chased  fleet  not  only  embar- 
rasses movement,  but  may  compromise  the  whole  body,  if  the  latter 
delay  to  protect  it;  whereas  the  chaser  keeps  between  his  lame  birds 
and  the  enemy. 

During  the  night  of  the  9th  the  British  lay-to  for  repairs.  The 
next  morning  they  resumed  the  pursuit,  turning  to  windward  after 


1782.]  RODNEY  AND  DE  QRASSE.  525 

the  enemy,  but  upon  the  whole  losing  throughout  the  10th  and  the 
llth.  At  daylight  of  the  10th  the  French,  by  the  logs  of  Hood  and 
Cormvallis,  were  "from  four  to  five  leagues  distant,"  "just  in  sight 
from  the  deck."  During  that  night,  however,  the  Zele,  74,  had 
collided  with  the  Jason,  64;  and  the  latter  was  injured  so  far  as  to 
be  compelled  to  follow  the  Caton  into  Guadeloupe.  At  sunset  of 
that  day  Rodney  signalled  a  general  chase  to  windward,  the  effect  of 
which  was  to  enable  each  ship  to  do  her  best  according  to  her  cap- 
tain's judgment  during  the  dark  hours.  Nevertheless,  on  the  morn- 
ing of  the  llth  the  French  seem  again  to  have  gained;  for  Hood, 
who,  it  will  be  remembered,  was  now  in  the  rear,  notes  that  at 
10  A.M.  twenty-two  French  sail  (not  all  the  fleet)  could  be  counted 
from  the  masthead/  Cormvallis,  further  to  windward,  could  count 
thirty-three.  Troude,  a  French  authority,  says  that  at  that  time 
nearly  all  the  French  had  doubled  The  Saintes,  and  it  looked  as 
though  de  Grasse  might  succeed  in  throwing  off  his  pursuer.  Un- 
luckily, two  ships,  the  Magnanime,  74,  and  the  Zi'lf,  74,  the  latter 
of  which  had  lost  her  main  topmast,  were  several  miles  to  leeward 
of  the  French  main  body.  It  was  necessary  to  delay,  or  to  drop 
those  vessels.  Again,  trivial  circumstances  conspired  to  further  a 
great  disaster,  and  de  Grasse  bore  down  to  cover  the  crippled  ships; 
losing  so  much  of  his  hard-won  ground,  and  entailing  a  further  mis- 
fortune that  night.  Rodney  hung  doggedly  on,  relying  on  the 
chapter  of  accidents,  as  one  who  knows  that  all  things  come  to  him 
who  endures.  To  be  sure,  there  was  not  much  else  lie  could  do; 
yet  he  deserves  credit  for  unremitting  industry  and  pluck.  During 
the  afternoon,  the  signals  noted  in  the  logs  —  to  call  in  all  cruisers 
and  for  the  fleet  to  close  —  attest  mutely  the  movement  of  de  Grasse 
in  bearing  down. 

During  the  night,  at  2  A.M.  of  April  12th,  the  Zcl(-  and  de 
Grasse's  flagship,  the  Ville  dc  Paris,  110,  crossing  on  opposite  tacks, 
came  into  collision.  The  former  lost  both  foremast  and  bowsprit.  It 
has  been  stated  by  John  Paul  Jones,  who  served  on  board  the  French 
fleet  a  few  months  later,  that  this  accident  was  due  to  the  deficiency 
of  watch-officers  in  the  French  navy ;  the  deck  of  the  ZiU,  being  in 
charge  of  a  young  ensign,  instead  of  an  experienced  lieutenant.  It 
was  necessary  to  rid  the  fleet  of  the  ZeU  at  once,  or  an  action  could 
not  be  avoided;  so  a  frigate  was  summoned  to  tow  her,  and  the  two 
were  left  to  make  their  way  to  Guadeloupe,  while  the  others  resumed 
the  beat  to  windward.  At  5  A.M.  she  and  the  frigate  were  again 


526 


MAJOR  OPERATIONS.     1762-1783. 


[1782. 


under  way,  steering  for  Guadeloupe,  to  the  north-west,  and  making 
from  five  to  six  miles  an  hour  (a) ;  hut  in  the  interval  they  had  been 
nearly  motionless,  and  consequently  when  day  broke  at  5.30  they 
were  only  two  leagues  from  the  Barfleur,  which,  still  flagship  of  the 
British  rear,  was  then  standing  south  on  the  port  tack.  The  body 
of  the  French  was  at  about  the  same  distance  as  on  the  previous 
evening,  —  ten  to  fifteen  miles,  —  but  the  Ville  dc  Paris  not  more 
than  eight  (A).  Just  before  0  A.M.  Rodney  signalled  Hood,  who  was 


RODNEY     AND    DEL.GRA»SE.. 
/2  r"  A**,! 

£  MCI.  /9  *       ^&          f*  *•  < 

A 


IIUDXF.V    AM)    I)E    ORASSE. 


nearest,  to  chase  the  Zilc  (a) ;  and  four  of  the  rearmost  ships  of  the 
line  were  detached  for  that  purpose  (b).  DC  Grasse,  seeing  this, 
signalled  his  vessels  at  G  A.M.  to  close  the  flagship,  making  all  sail; 
and  he  himself  bore  down  (c)  on  the  port  tack,  but  running  free,  to 
frighten  away  Rodney's  chasers.  The  British  Admiral  kept  them 
out  until  7  o'clock,  by  which  time  de  Grasse  was  fairly  committed  to 
his  false  step.  All  cruisers  were  then  called  in,  and  the  line  was 
rlosed  to  one  cable.  Within  an  hour  were  heard  the  opening  guns  of 


1782.J 


RODNEY  AND  DE   GRASSE. 


527 


the  great  battle,  since  known  by  the  names  of  the  12th  of  April,  or 
of  The  Saintes,  and,  in  the  French  navy,  of  Dominica. 

The  British  appear  to  have  been  standing  to  the  south  on  the  port 
tack  at  daylight;  but,  soon  after  sending  out  the  chasers,  Rodney 
had  ordered  the  line  of  bearing  (from  ship  to  ship)  to  be  north- 
north-east  to  south-south-west,  evidently  iii  preparation  for  a  close- 
hauled  line  of  battle  on  the  starboard  tack,  heading  northerly,  to  an 


RODNEY    AND     OE     GRASSE: 
/2  r"  Am,<_      /7&2. 

£  W  C.  i.   J  J  *s       ^^  f*9  f-  Kt  C  H         C^1 

B. 


. 


^>    • 

•^     -^   C3 

a  ^ 


RODNKY   AND   DE   GKASSE. 


east  wind.  Somewhat  unusually,  the  wind  that  morning  held  at 
south-east  for  some  time,  enabling  the  British  to  lie  up  as  high  as 
east-north-east  on  the  starboard  tack,  on  which  they  were  when  the 
battle  joined;  and  this  circumstance  doubtless  led  to  the  annulling 
of  the  signal  for  the  line  of  bearing,  half  an  hour  after  it  was  made, 
and  the  substitution  for  it  of  the  line  of  battle  ahead  at  one  cable. 
It  is  to  be  inferred  that  Rodney's  first  purpose  was  to  tack  together, 
thus  restoring  Hood  to  the  van,  his  natural  station  ;  but  the  accident 
of  the  wind  holding  to  the  southward  placed  the  actual  van  —  regu- 


528 


MAJOR   OPERATIONS.     1762-1783. 


[1782. 


larly  the  rear  —  most  to  windward,  and  rendered  it  expedient  to  tack 
in  succession,  preserving  to  the  full  the  opportunity  which  chance  had 
extended  for  reaching  the  enemy.  In  the  engagement,  therefore, 
Hood  commanded  in  the  rear,  and  Rear- Admiral  Drake  in  the  van. 
The  wind  with  the  French  seems  to  have  been  more  to  the  eastward 
than  with  the  British,  —  not  an  unusual  circumstance  in  the  neigh- 
bourhood of  land. 


RODNEY     AND     OE 
/2  r"  Ir-H,,. 

<T/VGt/J«     • 

c. 


CRASSE 


*  ^6 


.  d 

U 


a| 


HODNKY  AND   I>E   OI1ASSE. 


As  Rodney,  notwitlistanding  his  haste,  had  formed  line  from  time 
to  time  during  the  past  three  days,  his  fleet  was  now  in  good  order, 
and  his  signals  were  chiefly  confined  to  keeping  it  closed.  The 
French,  on  the  other  hand,  were  greatly  scattered  when  their  com- 
mander-in-chief,  in  an  impulse  of  hasty,  unbalanced  judgment, 
abandoned  his  previous  cautious  policy  and  hurried  them  into  action. 
Some  of  them  were  over  ten  iniles  to  windward  of  the  flagship. 
Though  they  crowded  sail  to  rejoin  her,  there  was  not  time  enough 
for  all  to  take  their  stations  properly,  between  daylight  and  8  A.M., 
when  the  firing  began.  "  Our  line  of  battle  was  formed  under  the 


1782.] 


RODNEY  AND  DE  GBASSE. 


529 


fire  of  musketry,"1  wrote  the  Marquis  de  Vaudreuil,2  the  second  in 
command,  who,  being  in  the  rear  of  the  fleet  on  this  occasion,  and 
consequently  among  the  last  to  be  engaged,  had  excellent  opportunity 
for  observation.  At  the  beginning  it  was  in  de  Grasse's  power  to 
postpone  action,  until  the  order  should  be  formed,  by  holding  his 
wind  under  short  canvas ;  while  the  mere  sight  of  his  vessels  hurry- 
ing down  for  action  would  have  compelled  Rodney  to  call  in  the 
ships  chasing  the  Zele,  whose  rescue  was  the  sole  motive  of  the 


ROONELV    AND    DE:    GRASSE. 
L     /782 


RODNEY   AND   DE   GRASSE. 


French  manceuvre.  Instead  of  this,  the  flagship  kept  off  the  wind : 
which  precipitated  the  collision,  while  at  the  same  time  delaying  the 
preparations  needed  to  sustain  it.  To  this  de  Grasse  added  another 
fault  by  forming  on  the  port  tack,  the  contrary  to  that  on  which  the 
British  were,  and  standing  towards  Dominica.  The  effect  of  this 
was  to  bring  his  ships  into  the  calms  and  baffling  winds  which  cling 
to  the  shore-line,  thus  depriving  them  of  their  power  of  manoauvre. 

1  Probably  not  over  one  or  two  hundred  yards. 

3  His  brother,  the  Comte  de  Vaudreuil,  was  also  with  the  fleet,  as  chef  d'escadre. 
in  the  Sceptre,  74. 

VOL.  111.  —34 


530  MAJOR   OPERATIONS.     1762-1783.  [1782. 

His  object  probably  was  to  confine  the  engagement  to  a  mere  pass-by 
on  opposite  tacks,  by  winch  in  all  previous  instances  the  French  had 
thwarted  the  decisive  action  that  Rodney  sought.  Nevertheless,  the 
blunder  was  evident  at  once  to  French  eyes.  "What  evil  genius  has 
inspired  the  admiral?"  exclaimed  du  Pavilion,  Vaudreuil's  flag- 
captain,  who  was  esteemed  one  of  the  best  tacticians  in  France,  and 
who  fell  in  the  battle. 

As  the  two  lines  drew  near  to  one  another,  standing,  the  one  south, 
and  the  other  east-north-east,  the  wind  shifted  back  to  the  east- 
ward, allowing  the  French  to  head  higher,  to  south-south-east,  and 
knocking  the  British  oil'  to  north-north-east  (B).  The  head  of  the 
French  column  thus  passed  out  of  gunshot,  across  the  bows  of 
Rodney's  leading  vessel,  the  Marlliorouijh,  which  came  within  range 
when  abreast  of  the  eighth  ship.  The  first  shots  were  fired  by  the 
Brave,  74,  ninth  in  the  French  line,  at  8  A.M.  The  British  captain 
then  put  his  helm  up  and  ran  slowly  along,  north-north-west,  under 
the  lee  of  the  French,  towards  their  rear.  The  rest  of  the  fleet 
followed  in  his  wake.  The  battle  thus  assumed  the  form  of  passing 
in  opposite  directions  on  parallel  lines;  except  that  the  French  ships, 
as  they  successively  cleared  the  point  where  the  British  column 
struck  their  line,  would  draw  out  of  fire,  their  course  diverging 
thenceforth  from  that  of  the  British  approach.  The  effect  of  this 
would  be  that  the  British  rear,  when  it  reached  that  point,  would  be 
fresh,  and  with  that  advantage  encounter  the  French  rear,  which  had 
received  already  the  fire  of  the  British  van  and  centre.  To  obviate 
this,  by  bringing  his  own  van  into  action,  do  Grasse  signalled  the 
van  ships  to  lead  south-south-west,  parallel  with  the  British  north- 
north-east  (B,  a).  The  engagement  thus  became  general  all  along  the 
lines;  but  it  is  probable  that  the  French  van  was  never  well  formed. 
Its  commander,  at  all  events,  reached  his  post  after  the  commander 
of  the  rear  did  his.1 

At  five  minutes  past  eight,  Rodney  made  a  general  signal  for 
close  action,  followed  immediately  by  another  for  the  leading  ships  to 
head  one  point  to  starboard  —  towards  the  enemy  —  which  indicates 
that  he  was  not  satisfied  with  the  distance  first  taken  by  the  Marl- 
borough.  The  Formidable,  his  flagship,  eighteenth  in  the  column, 
began  to  fire  at  8.23;2  but  the  Barflcur,  Hood's  flagship,  which  was 

1  The  position,  in  the  French  order,  of  the  ships  taken  in  the  battle,  is  shown  I  y 
the  crosses  in  Figures  B,  C,  D. 

3  Canada's  log,  8.15  ;  reduced  to  Hood's  times,  which  are  generally  followed. 


1782.]  RODNEY  AND  DE  GRASSE.  531 

thirty-first,  not  till  9.25.  This  difference  in  time  is  to  be  accounted 
for  chiefly  by  the  light  airs  near  Dominica,  contrasted  with  the  fresh 
trades  in  the  open  channel  to  the  northward,  which  the  leading 
British  vessels  felt  before  their  rear.  Ue  Grasse  now,  too  late,  had 
realised  the  disastrous  effect  which  this  would  have  upon  his  fleet. 
If  he  escaped  all  else,  his  ships,  baffled  by  calms  and  catspaws  while 
the  British  had  a  breeze,  must  lose  the  weather-gage,  and  with  it 
the  hope  of  evading  pursuit,  hitherto  his  chief  preoccupation.  Twice 
he  signalled  to  wear,  —  first,  all  together,  then  in  succession,  —  but, 
although  the  signals  were  seen,  they  could  not  be  obeyed  with  the 
enemy  close  under  the  lee.  "The  French  fleet,''  comments  Chevalier 
justly,  "  had  freedom  of  movement  no  longer.  A  fleet  cannot  wear 
with  an  enemy's  fleet  within  musket-range  to  leeward." 

The  movement  therefore  continued  as  described,  the  opposing 
ships  slowly  "sliding  by"  each  other  until  about  !.'.!">,  when  the1 
wind  suddenly  shifted  to  south-east  again.  The  necessity  of  keeping 
the  sails  full  forced  the  bows  of  each  French  vessel  towards  tin- 
enemy,  destroying  the  order  in  column,  and  throwing  the  fleet  into 
echelon,  or,  as  the  phrase  then  was,  into  bow  and  quarter  line(C). 
The  British,  on  the  contrary,  were  free  either  to  hold  their  course  or 
to  head  towards  the  enemy.  Rodney's  flagship  (C,  a)  luffed,  and 
led  through  the  French  line  just  astern  of  the  Glorieux,  74,  which 
was  the  nineteenth  in  their  order.  She  was  followed  by  live  ships; 
and  her  next  ahead  also,  the  Duke  (d),  seeing  her  chief's  movement, 
imitated  it,  breaking  through  the  lino  astern  of  the  twenty-third 
French.  The  Glorieux,  on  the  starboard  hand  of  Rodney's  little 
column,  received  its  successive  broadsides.  Her  main  and  mizzen 
masts  went  overboard  at  9.28,  when  the  Canada,  third  astern  of 
the  Formidable,  had  just  passed  her;  and  a  few  moments  later  her 
foremast  and  bowsprit  fell.  At  !).33  the  Canada  was  to  windward 
of  the  French  line.  The  Formidable  was  using  both  broadsides  as 
she  broke  through  the  enemy's  order.  On  her  port  hand,  between 
her  and  the  Duke,  were  four  French  ships  huddled  together  (c),  one 
of  which  had  paid  off  the  wrong  way ;  that  is,  after  the  shift  of  wind 
took  her  aback,  her  sails  had  filled  on  the  opposite  tack  from  that  of 
the  rest  of  her  fleet.1  These  four,  receiving  the  repeated  broadsides, 
at  close  quarters,  of  the  Formidable,  Duke,  and  Namur,  and  having 
undergone  besides  the  fire  of  the  British  van,  were  very  severely 
mauled.  While  these  things  were  happening,  the  Bedford,  the  sixth 
1  This  mishap  occurred  to  three  French  vessels. 


532  MAJOR  OPERATIONS.    1762-1783.  [1782. 

astern  of  the  Formidable,  perhaps  unable  to  see  her  next  ahead  in  the 
smoke,  had  luffed  independently  (b>  and  was  followed  by  the  twelve 
rearmost  British  ships,  whom  she  led  through  the  French  order  astern 
of  the  Cesar,  74,  twelfth  from  the  van.  This  ship  and  her  next 
ahead,  the  Hector,  74,  suffered  as  did  the  Glorieux.  The  Barfleur, 
which  was  in  the  centre  of  this  column  of  thirteen,  opened  fire  at 
9.25.  At  10.45  she  "ceased  firing,  having  passed  the  enemy's  van 
ships ; "  that  is,  she  was  well  on  the  weather  side  of  the  French  fleet. 
Some  of  the  rearmost  of  Hood's  division,  however,  were  still  engaged 
at  noon ;  but  probably  all  were  then  to  windward  of  the  enemy. 

The  British  ships  ahead  of  the  Duke,  the  van  and  part  of  the 
centre,  in  all  sixteen  sail,  had  continued  to  stand  to  the  northward. 
At  the  time  Rodney  broke  the  line,  several  of  them  must  have  passed 
beyond  the  French  rear,  and  out  of  action.  One,  the  America,  the 
twelfth  from  the  van,  wore  without  signals,  to  pursue  the  enemy,  and 
her  example  was  followed  at  once  by  the  ship  next  ahead,  the  Russell. 
No  signal  following,  the  Am'.rica  again  wore  and  followed  her  leaders, 
but  the  Russell  continued  as  she  was.  now  to  windward  of  the  French ; 
bv  which  she  was  able  to  take  a  conspicuous  share  in  the  closing 
scenes.  At  11.33  Rodney  signalled  the  van  to  tack,  but  the  delay  of 
an  hour  or  more  had  given  the  Ru&dl  a  start  towards  the  enemy 
which  could  not  be  overcome. 

The  effect  of  these  several  occurrences  had  been  to  transfer  the 
weather-gage,  the  position  for  attack,  to  the  British  from  the  French, 
and  to  divide  the  latter  also  into  three  groups,  widely  separated  and 
disordered  (D).  In  the  centre  was  the  flagship  Ville  de  Paris  with 
five  ships  (c).  To  windward  of  her.  and  two  miles  distant,  was  the 
van,  of  some  dozen  vessels  (v).  The  rear  was  four  miles  away  to 
leeward  (r).  To  restore  the  order,  and  to  connect  the  fleet  again,  it 
was  decided  to  re-form  on  the  leewardmost  ships :  and  several  signals 
to  this  effect  were  made  by  de  Gnusse.  They  received  but  imperfect 
execution.  The  manageable  vessels  succeeded  easily  enough  in  run- 
ning before  the  wind  to  leeward,  but.  when  there,  exactitude  of  posi- 
tion and  of  movement  was  unattainable  to  ships  in  various  degrees 
of  disability,  with  light  and  baffling  side  airs.  The  French  were 
never  again  in  order  after  the  wind  shifted  and  the  line  was  broken ; 
but  the  movement  to  leeward  left  the  dismasted  Glorieux,  Hector, 
and  Cesar,  motionless  between  the  hostile  lines. 

It  has  been  remarked,  disparagingly,  that  the  British  fleet  also  was 
divided  into  three  by  the  manoeuvre  of  breaking  the  line.  This  is 


1782.]  FSeXCH  ASD  BRITISH  LOSSES.  533 

true;  but  the  advantage  remained  with  it  incontestably,  in  two 
respects.  Bv  favour  of  the  wind,  each  of  the  three  groups  had  been 
able  to  maintain  its  general  formation  in  line  or  column,  instead  of 
being  thrown  entirely  out,  as  the  French  were :  and  passing  thus  in 
column  along  the  Glorinuc,  Hector,  and  CY*ar,  they  wrought  upon 
these  three  ships  a  concentration  of  injury  which  had  no  parallel 
among  the  British  vessels.  The  French  in  fact  had  lost  three  ships. 
as  well  as  the  wind.  To  these  certain  disadvantages  is  probably  to 
be  added  a  demoralisation  among  the  French  crews,  from  the  much 
heavier  losses  resultant  upon  the  British  practice  of  firing  at  the  hull. 
An  officer  present  in  the  action  told  Sir  John  Ross 1  afterwards  that 
the  French  fired  very  high  throughout;  and  he  cited  in  iilusn 
that  the  three  trucks*  of  the  Printaa  were  shot  away.  Sir  G:i  rii 
Blane,  who,  though  Physician  to  the  Fleet,  obtained  permission  to 
be  on  deck  throughout  the  action,  wrote  ten  -  Eter  it.  "I  :-an 
aver  from  my  own  observation  that  the  Frenc:.  rir-r  -.  .  .-: -.-:.-  ^.s  we 
approach,  and  is  totally  silent  when  we  are  .  -  gside."1  I:  > 

needless  to  say  that  a  marked  super:  ::'.'.'  :  fire  will  silence  th  t  : 
the  bravest  enemv;  and  the  practi:  g  spars  and  - 

however  suited  for  frustrating  an  -      -          illy   :-onc 

that  superiority  upon  which  the  issM-r    I          -  nds.     As 

illustrative  of  this  result,  the  BricL-"..  '.  -•  tte  .  ..-;-.     I:  "i~ 

but  24o  killed  and  816  wounded3  in  a  fle-r:  •;•:"  thirty-six  ---ii.     TL- 
highest  in  any  one  ship  was  that  of  :Le  D   '•:•:.  To  kille  .   ind  woun 
No  certain  account,  or  even  very  pr  -  :  the  FIT:.... 

loss  has  ever  been  given.  None  is  cited  by  Frer.:L  auth  :.:.--.  Sir 
Gilbert  Blane.  who  was  favourably  pia:- I  :  r  Lnf  rmation.  reckoned 
that  of  the  VilU  de  Paris  alone  to  be  300.  Th-r:  :'.- 

distributed  among  the  vessels  of  the  fleet,   the  II  be 

proportionately  more  numerous;  but.  even  allowing  for  ::-!•?.  there 
can  be  no  doubt  that  the  loss  of  the  French,  to  use  Chevalier's  words. 
~  was  certainly  much  more  considerable  "  than  that  reported  by  the 
British.  Six  post-captains  *  out  of  thirtv  were  killed,  against  two  * 
British  oat  of  thirty-sir. 

1  Bd»:-Lireof  Samara.' 

1  Circular  pieces  of  wood  which  op  the  top  of  the  masts. 

*  Beaton,  TU  32-L  335.     Ration's  additions  are  sUghtlr  incorrect. 

4  Captain  3e  la  Clocheterie.  of  the  HmuL; ;  Captain  de  .Saint-Cesaire.  of  the 
JIMrafcrinrf;  Captain  de  1^  YtamOt,  of  the  fleeter;  Captain  Beraazd  de  Ifarignr, 
of  the  Camr;  Captain  Comte  d'Evao,  of  the  GL.rvTtx  ;  and  Captain  dn  PteriOam,  of 
the  Triimftnt.  Bapport  da  Mafqais  de  Taa-imnL  —  W.  L  C. 

*  Captain  Wflliam  Blair,  at  the  Axtn;  and  Captain  Lord  Robert  Manners,  — 


534  MAJOR   OPERATIONS.     1762-1783.  [1782. 

Rodney  did  not  make  adequate  use  of  the  great  opportunity, 
which  accident  rather  than  design  had  given  him  at  noon  of  April 
12th.  He  did  allow  a  certain  liberty  of  manoeuvre,  by  discontinuing 
the  order  for  the  line  of  battle ;  but  the  signal  for  close  action,  hoisted 
at  1  P.M.,  was  hauled  down  a  half-hour  later.  Hood,  who  realised  the 
conditions  plainly  visible,  as  well  as  the  reasonable  inferences  there- 
from, wished  the  order  given  for  a  general  chase,  which  would  have 
applied  the  spur  of  emulation  to  every  captain  present,  without  sur- 
rendering the  hold  that  particular  signals  afford  upon  indiscreet 
movements.  He  bitterly  censured  the  Admiral's  failure  to  issue  this 
command.  Had  it  been  done,  he  said:  — 

••  I  am  very  confident  we  should  have  hud  twenty  sail  of  the  enemy's  ships 
before  dark.  Instead  of  that,  he  pursued  only  under  his  topsails  (sometimes  his 
foresail  was  set  and  at  others  his  ini/.x.eu  topsail  aback)  the  greatest  part  of  the 
afternoon,  though  the  f.i)'nuj  enemy  had  all  the  sail  set  their  very  shattered  state 
would  allow." 

To  make  signal  for  a  general  chase  was  beyond  the  competence  of 
a  junior  admiral ;  but  Hood  did  what  he  could,  by  repeated  signals  to 
individual  ships  of  his  own  division  to  make  more  sail,  by  setting  all 
he  could  OH  the  JJ«rJ/<  t/r,  and  by  getting  out  his  boats  to  tow  her 
head  round.  Sir  Gilbert  Blanc  unintentionally  gives  a  similar 
impression  of  laxity. 

"  After  cutting  the  French  line,  the  art  ion  during  the  rest  of  the  day  was  par- 
tial and  desultory,  the  enemy  never  bring  able  to  form,  and  several  of  the  [our] 
ships  being  obliged  to  lie  by  and  repair  their  damages.  As  the  signal  for  the  line 
was  now  hauled  down,  every  ship  annoyed  the  enemy  as  their  respective  comman- 
ders judged  best." 

For  this  indolent  abandonment  of  the  captains  to  their  own  devices, 
the  correctest  remedy  was,  as  Hood  indicated,  the  order  for  a  general 
chase,  supplemented  by  a  watchful  supervision,  which  should  check 
the  over-rash  and  stimulate  the  over-cautious.  If  Hood's  account  of 
the  sail  carried  by  Rodney  be  correct,  the  Commander-in-chief  did 
not  even  set  the  best  example.  In  this  languid  pursuit,  the  three 
crippled  French  ships  were  overhauled,  and  of  course  had  to  strike ; 
and  a  fourth,  the  Ardent,  64,  was  taken,  owing  to  her  indifferent 
sailing.  Towards  sunset  the  flagship  Ville  de  Paris,  110, J  the  finest 
ship  of  war  afloat,  having  been  valiantly  defended  against  a  host  of 

who,  though  mortally  wounded,  survived  for  some  days,  —  of  the  Resolution.    But 
Captain  William  Bayne,  of  the  Alfred,  had  fallen  in  the  action  of  April  9th. 

1  She  is  thus  rated  in  the  British  Navy  Lists  published  between  the  time  of  her 
capture  and  the  receipt  of  news  of  her  loss  ;  but  she  seems  to  have  carried  120  guns. 


1782.]  HOOD   CRITICISES  RODNEI.  535 

enemies  throughout  great  part  of  the  afternoon,  and  having  expended 
all  her  ammunition,  hauled  down  her  colours.  The  two  British 
vessels  then  immediately  engaged  with  her  were  the  Russell  and  the 
£arfleur,  Hood's  flagship,  to  the  latter  of  which  she  formally  sur- 
rendered; the  exact  moment,'  noted  in  Hood's  journal,  being 
6.29  P.M. 

At  6.45  Rodney  made  the  signal  for  the  fleet  to  bring-to  (form 
line  and  stop)  on  the  port  tack,  and  he  remained  lying-to  during  the 
night,  while  the  French  continued  to  retreat  under  the  orders  of  the 
Marquis  de  Vaudreuil,  who  by  de  Grasse's  capture  had  become  com- 
mander-in-chief.  For  this  easy-going  deliberation  also  Hood  had 
strong  words  of  condemnation. 

"  Why  he  should  bring  the  fleet  to  because  the  Vllle  de  Paris  was  taken,  I  can- 
not reconcile.  He  did  not  pursue  under  easy  sail,  so  as  never  to  have  lost  sight  of 
the  enemy  in  the  night,  which  would  clearly  and  most  undoubtedly  have  enabled 
him  to  have  taken  almost  every  ship  the  next  day.  .  .  .  Had  I  had  the  honour  of 
commanding  his  Majesty's  noble  fleet  on  the  12th,  I  may,  without  much  imputa- 
tion of  vanity,  say  the  flag  of  England  should  now  have  graced  the  sterns  of 
upwards  of  twenty  sail  of  the  enemy's  ships  of  the  line." 

Such  criticisms  by  those  not  responsible  are  to  !><•  received  gen- 
erally with  caution;  but  Hood  was,  in  thought  and  in  deed,  a  man 
so  much  above  the  common  that  these  cannot  be  dismissed  lightly. 
His  opinion  is  known  to  have  been  shared  by  Sir  Charles  Douglas. 
Rodney's  Captain  of  the  Fleet; 1  and  their  conclusion  is  supported  by 
the  inferences  to  be  drawn  from  Rodney's  own  assumptions  as  to  the 
condition  of  the  French,  contrasted  with  the  known  facts.  The 
enemy,  he  wrote,  in  assigning  his  reasons  for  not  pursuing,  "went 
off  in  a  close  connected  body,"  and  might  have  defeated,  by  rotation, 
the  ships  that  had  come  up  with  them."  "The  enemy  who  went  ojj' 
in  a  body  of  twenty-six  ships  of  the  line,z  might,  by  ordering  two  or 
three  of  their  best  sailing  ships  or  frigates  to  have  shown  lights  at 
times,  and  by  changing  their  course,  have  induced  the  British  fleet 
to  have  followed  them,  while  the  main  of  their  fleet,  by  hiding  their 
lights,  might  have  hauled  their  wind,  and  have  l>een  far  to  windward 
by  daylight,  and  intercepted  the  captured  ships,  and  the  most  crippled 
ships  of  the  English;"  and  he  adds  that  the  Windward  Islands  even 
might  have  been  endangered.  That  such  action  was  in  a  remote 
degree  possible  to  a  well-conditioned  fleet  may  be  guardedly  con- 

1  See  letter  of  Sir  Howard  Douglas,  son  to  Sir  Charles ;  '  United  Service  Journal,'' 
1834,  Part  II.,  p.  97. 

2  Author's  italics  ;  Mundy  :  '  Life  of  Rodney,'  ii.  248. 


536  MAJOR   OPERATIONS.    1762-1783.  [1782. 

ceded ;  but  it  was  wildly  improbable  to  a  fleet  staggering  under  such 
a  blow  as  the  day  had  seen,  which  had  changed  its  commander  just 
as  dark  came  on,  and  was  widely  scattered  and  disordered  up  to  the 
moment  when  signals  by  flags  became  invisible. 

The  facts,  however,  were  utterly  at  variance  with  these  ingenious 
suppositions.  Instead  of  being  connected,  as  Rodney  represents,  do 
Vaudreuil  had  with  him  next  morning  but  ten  ships ;  and  no  others 
during  the  whole  of  the  13th.  He  made  sail  for  Cap  Francois,  and 
was  joined  on  the  way  by  five  more,  so  that  at  no  time  were  there 
upwards  of  fifteen l  French  ships  of  the  line  together,  prior  to  his 
arrival  at  that  port  on  April  25th.  lie  there  found  four  others  of 
the  fleet.  The  tale  of  twenty-five  survivors,  from  the  thirty  engaged 
on  April  12th,  was  completed  by  six  which  had  gone  to  Curaqao,  and 
which  did  not  rejoin  until  May.  So  much  for  the  close  connected 
body  of  the  French.  It  is  clear,  therefore,  that  Rodney's  reasons 
illustrate  the  frame  of  mind  against  which  Napoleon  used  to  caution 
his  generals  as  "making  to  themselves  a  picture  "  of  possibilities;  and 
that  his  conclusion  at  best  was  based  upon  the  ruinous  idea,  which  a 
vivid  imagination  or  slothful  temper  is  prone  to  present  to  itself,  that 
war  may  be  made  decisive  without  running  risks.  That  Jamaica  even 
was  saved  was  not  due  to  this  fine,  but  indecisive  action,  but  to  the 
hesitation  of  the  allies.  When  de  Vaudreuil  reached  Cap  Francois, 
he  found  there  the  French  convoy  safely  arrived  from  Guadeloupe, 
and  also  a  body  of  fifteen  Spanish  ships  of  the  line.  The  troopu 
available  for  the  descent  upon  Jamaica  were  from  fifteen  to  twenty 
thousand.  Well  might  Hood  write:  "Had  Sir  George  Rodney's 
judgment,  after  the  enemy  had  been  so  totally  put  to  flight,  borne  any 
proportion  to  the  high  courage,  zeal  and  exertion,  so  very  manifestly 
shown  by  every  captain,  all  difficulty  would  now  have  been  at  an 
end.  We  might  have  done  just  as  we  pleased,  instead  of  being  at 
this  hour  upon  the  defensive." 

The  allies,  however,  though  superior  in  numbers,  did  not  venture 
to  assume  the  offensive.  After  the  battle,  Rodney  remained  near 
Guadeloupe  until  the  17th  of  April,  refitting,  and  searching  the 
neighbouring  islands,  in  case  the  French  fleet  might  have  entered 
some  one  of  them.  For  most  of  this  time  the  British  were  becalmed, 
but  Hood  remarks  that  there  had  been  wind  enough  to  get  twenty 
leagues  to  the  westward ;  and  there  more  wind  probably  would  have 

1  Troude.  Chevalier  say3  sixteen,  differing  with  Troude  as  to  the  whereabouts 
of  the  Brave. 


1782.]  THE  WAR  IN  NORTH  AMERICA  ENDED.  537 

been  found.  On  the  17th  Hood  was  detached  in  pursuit  with  ten  sail 
of  the  line ;  and  a  day  or  two  later  Rodney  himself  started  for  Jamaica. 
Left  to  his  own  discretion,  Hood  pushed  for  the  Mona  Passage, 
between  Puerto  Rico  and  Santo  Domingo,  carrying  studding-sails 
below  and  aloft  in  his  haste.  At  daybreak  of  the  19th  he  sighted  the 
west  end  of  Puerto  Rico ;  and  soon  afterwards  a  small  French  squad- 
ron was  seen.  A  general  chase  resulted  in  the  capture  of  the  Jason 
and  Caton,  sixty-fours,  which  had  parted  from  their  fleet  before  the 
battle  and  were  on  their  way  to  Cap  Francois.  A  frigate,  the 
Aimable,  32,  and  a  sloop,  the  Ceres,  18,  also  were  taken.  In  report- 
ing this  affair  to  Rodney,  Hood  got  a  thrust  into  his  superior.  "  It 
is  a  very  mortifying  circumstance  to  relate  to  you,  Sir,  that  the 
French  fleet  which  you  put  to  flight  on  the  12th  went  through  the 
Mona  Channel  on  the  18th,  only  the  day  before  I  was  in  it."  A 
further  proof  of  the  utility  of  pursuit,  here  hinted  at,  is  to  be  found 
in  the  fact  that  Rodney,  starting  six  days  later  than  de  Vaudreuil, 
reached  Jamaica  April  28th,  only  three  days  after  the  French  got 
into  Cap  Franqois.  He  had  therefore  gained  three  days  in  a  fort- 
night's run.  What  might  not  have  been  done  by  an  untiring  chase ! 
But  a  remark  recorded  by  Hood  summed  up  the  frame  of  mind  which 
dominated  Rodney:  "I  lamented  to  Sir  George  on  the  13th  that  .  .  . 
he  did  not  continue  to  pursue  so  as  to  keep  sight  of  the  enemy  all 
night,  to  which  he  only  answered,  '  Come,  we  have  done  very  hand- 
somely as  it  is.' ' 

Rodney  stayed  at  Jamaica  until  the  10th  of  July,  when  Admiral 
Hugh  Pigot  arrived  from  England  to  supersede  him.  This  change 
was  consequent  upon  the  fall  of  Lord  North's  ministry,  in  the 
previous  March,  and  had  been  decided  before  the  news  of  the  victory 
could  reach  England.  Rodney  sailed  for  home  from  Port  Royal  on 
the  22nd  of  July;  and  with  his  departure  the  war  in  the  West  Indies 
and  North  America  may  be  said  to  have  ended.  Pigot  started  almost 
immediately  for  New  York,  and  remained  in  North  American  waters 
until  the  end  of  October,  when  he  returned  to  Barbados,  first  having 
detached  Hood  with  thirteen  ships  of  the  line  from  the  main  fleet,  to 
cruise  off  Cap  Francois.  It  is  of  interest  to  note  that  at  this  time 
Hood  took  with  him  from  New  York  the  frigate  Albemarle,  28,  then 
commanded  by  Nelson,  who  had  been  serving  on  the  North  American 
station.  These  various  movements  were  dictated  by  those  of  the 
enemy,  either  actually  made  or  supposed  to  be  in  contemplation ;  for 
it  was  an  inevitable  part  of  the  ill-effects  of  Rodney's  most  imperfect 


538  MAJOR   OPERATIONS.     1762-1783.  [1782. 

success,  that  the  British  fleet  was  thenceforth  on  the  defensive  purely, 
with  all  the  perplexities  of  him  who  waits  upon  the  initiative  of  an 
opponent."  Nothing  came  of  them  all,  however,  for  the  war  now 
was  but  lingering  in  its  death  stupor.  The  defeat  of  de  Grasse, 
partial  though  it  was;  the  abandonment  of  the  enterprise  upon 
Jamaica;  the  failure  of  the  attack  upon  Gibraltar;  and  the  success 
of  Howe  in  re-victualling  that  fortress,  —  these  had  taken  all  heart 
out  of  the  French  and  Spaniards ;  while  the  numerical  superiority  of 
the  allies,  inelliciently  though  it  had  been  used  heretofore,  weighed 
heavily  upon  the  imagination  of  the  British  Government,  which  now 
had  abandoned  all  hope  of  subduing  its  American  Colonies.  Upon 
the  conclusion  of  peace,  in  178:],  pigot  and  Hood  returned  to  Eng- 
land, leaving  the  Leeward  Islands'  Station  under  the  command  of 
Rear-Admiral  Sir  Richard  Hughes,  Bart.,  (2)  1  an  officer  remembered 
bv  history  only  through  Nelson's  refusing  to  obey  his  orders  not  to 
enforce  the  Navigation  Acts,  in  1785. 

The  change  in  the  Ministry,  besides  occasioning  the  recall  of 
Rodnev.  drew  Lord  Howe  out  of  his  long  retirement,  to  command  the 
Channel  Fleet.  He  hoisted  his  ilag  on  the  20th  of  April,  1782,  on 
board  the  1'irtvry,  100.  Owing  to  the  various  directions  in  which 
the  efforts  of  Great  Britain  had  to  be  made,  either  to  defend  her  own 
interests  or  to  crush  the  movements  of  the  many  enemies  now  com- 
bined against  her,  the  operations  of  the  fleet  were  for  some  months 
carried  on  by  detached  squadrons.  —  in  the  North  Sea,  in  the  Bay  of 
Biscay,  and  at  the  entrance  of  the  Channel;  Howe  having  under 
him  several  distinguished  subordinates,  at  the  head  of  whom,  in 
professional  reputation,  were  Vice-Admiral  the  lion.  Samuel  Bar- 
rington  and  Rear-Admiral  Richard  Kempenfelt.  In  the  North  Sea, 
the  Dutch  were  kept  in  their  ports:  and  a  convoy  of  near  400  mer- 
chant ships  from  the  Baltic  reached  England  unmolested.  In  the 
Bay  of  Biscay,  Barrington,  having  with  him  twelve  of  the  line,  dis- 
covered and  chased  a  convoy  laden  with  stores  for  the  fleet  in  the 
East  Indies.  One  of  the  ships  of  the  line  accompanying  it,  the 
Pef/ase,  74,  surrendered,  after  a  night  action  of  three  hours  with 
the  Foudroyant,  80,  Captain  John  Jervis,2  afterwards  Earl  St. 

1  Son  of  Captain  Sir  Richard  Hughes,  Bart.  (1),  who  was  for  many  years  Com- 
missioner at  Portsmouth,  and  who  died  in  1782.     The  younger  officer  died  a  full 
Admiral  in  1812. 

2  Who  was  made  a  K.  B.  for  this  service. 


1782.]  HOWE  IN   THE  CHANNEL.  539 

Vincent.  Of  nineteen  transports,  thirteen,  one  of  which,  the  Action- 
naire,  was  a  64-gun  ship  armed  eujltitc,1  were  taken;  a  weighty  blow 
to  the  great  Suffren,  whose  chief  difficulty  in  India  was  inadequate 
material  of  war,  and  especially  of  spars,  of  which  the  Actionnairc 
carried  an  outfit  for  four  ships  of  the  line.  After  Barriugton's 
return,  Kempenfelt  made  a  similar  but  uneventful  cruise  of  a  month 
in  the  Bay. 

Howe  himself  went  first  to  the  North  Sea  in  the  month  of  May. 
Having  there  held  the  Dutch  in  cheek  during  a  critical  moment, 
he  was  directed  next  to  go  to  the  entrance  of  the  Channel,  leaving 
only  a  division  in  the  Downs.  Information  had  been  received  that 
an  allied  fleet  of  thirty-two  ships  of  the  line,  live  only  of  which  were 
French,  had  sailed  from  Cadi/,  early  in  June,  to  cruise  between 
Ushant  and  Scilly.  It  was  expected  that  they  would  be  joined  there 
by  a  reinforcement  from  Brest,  and  by  the  Dutch  squadron  in  the 
Texel,  making  a  total  of  about  fifty  of  the  line,  under  the  command 
of  the  Spanish  Admiral,  Don  Luis  de  Cordova.  The  Dutch  did  not 
appear,  owing  probably  to  Howe's  demonstration  before  their  ports ; 
but  eight  ships  from  Brest  raised  the  allied  fleet  to  forty.  To  oppose 
these  Howe  sailed  on  the  2nd  of  .July  will)  twenty-two  sail,  of  which 
eight  were  three-deckers.  Before  his  return,  on  the  7th  of  August, 
he  was  joined  by  eight  others;  mostly,  however,  sixty-fours.  With 
this  inferiority  of  numbers  the  British  Admiral  could  expect  only  to 
act  on  the  defensive,  unless  some  specially  favourable  opportunity 
should  offer.  The  matter  of  most  immediate  concern  was  the  arrival 
of  the  Jamaica  convoy,  then  daily  expected;  with  which,  it  may  be 
mentioned,  de  Grasse  also  was  returning  to  England,  a  prisoner  of 
war  on  board  the  Samhcirh. 

On  its  voyage  north,  the  combined  fleet  captured  on  June  25lh 
eighteen  ships  of  a  British  convov  bound  for  Canada.  A  few  days 
later  it  was  fixed  in  the  chops  of  the  Channel,  covering  the  ground 
from  Ushant  to  Scilly.  On  the  evening  of  July  7th  it  was  sighted 
off  Scilly  by  Howe,  who  then  had  with  him  twenty-five  sail.  The 
allies  prepared  for  action;  but  the  British  Admiral,  possessing  a 
thorough  knowledge  of  the  neighbouring  coasts,  either  in  his  own 
person  or  in  some  of  his  officers,  led  the  fleet  by  night  through  the 
passage  between  Scilly  and  Land's  End.  On  the  following  morning 
he  was  no  more  to  be  seen,  and  the  enemy,  ignorant  of  the  manner 

1  That  is,  with  a  great  part  of  her  guns  dismounted,  and  below  as  cargo. 


540  MAJOR   OPERATIONS.     1762-1783.  [1782. 

of  his  evasion,  was  thrown  wholly  off  his  track.1  A  strong  gale  of 
wind  afterwards  forcing  the  allies  to  the  southward,  both  convoy  and 
fleet  slipped  by  successfully,  and  again  reached  England. 

Howe  was  ordered  now  to  prepare  to  throw  reinforcements  and 
supplies  into  Gibraltar,  which  had  not  received  relief  since  Darby's 
visit,  in  April,  1781.  For  this  urgent  and  critical  service  it  was 
determined  to  concentrate  the  whole  Channel  Fleet  at  Spithead, 
where  also  the  transports  and  supply -ships  were  directed  to  rendez- 
vous. It  was  while  thus  assembling  for  the  relief  of  Gibraltar  that 
there  occurred  the  celebrated  incident  of  the  Royal  Georye,  a  100-gun 
ship,  while  being  heeled  for  under-water  repairs,  oversetting  and 
sinking  at  her  anchors,  carrying  down  with  her  Rear-Admiral 
Kempenfelt  and  about  900  souls,  including  many  women  and  chil- 
dren. This  was  on  the  29th  of  August,  1782.  On  the  llth  of 
September  the  expedition  started,  183  sail  in  all;  thirty-four  being 
.ships  of  the  line,  with  a  dozen  smaller  cruisers,  the  rest  unarmed 
vessels.  Of  the  latter,  31  were  destined  for  Gibraltar,  the  remainder 
being  trading  ships  for  different  parts  of  the  world.  With  so  exten- 
sive a  charge,  the  danger  to  which  had  been  emphasised  by  numerous 
captures  from  convoys  during  the  war,  Howe's  progress  was  slow. 
It  is  told  that  shortly  before  reaching  Cape  Finisterre,  but  after  a 
violent  gale  of  wind,  the  full  tally  of  183  sail  was  counted.  After 
passing  Finisterre,  the  several  "trades"  probably  parted  from  the 
grand  fleet. 

On  the  8th  of  October,  off  Cape  St.  Vincent,  a  frigate,  the 
Latona,  38,  was  sent  ahead  for  information.  It  was  known  that  a 
great  combined  force  of  ships  of  war  lay  in  Algeciras  Bay,  • — opposite 
Gibraltar,  —  and  that  an  attack  upon  the  works  was  in  contempla- 
tion; but  much  might  have  happened  meantime.  Much,  in  fact, 
had  happened.  A  violent  gale  of  wind  on  the  10th  of  September 
had  driven  some  of  the  allied  fleet  from  their  moorings,  one  vessel, 
the  San  Mii/ucI,  72,  being  forced  under  the  batteries  of  Gibraltar, 
where  she  had  to  surrender;  but  there  still  remained  the  formidable 
number  of  48  ships  of  the  line,  anchored  only  four  miles  from  the  point 
which  the  relief  ships  must  reach.  This  was  the  problem  which 
Howe  had  to  solve.  More  important  still,  though  of  less  bearing 

1  Chevalier,  following  La  Motte-Picquet's  report,  ascribes  Howe's  escape  to  greater 
speed.  ('Mar.  Fran,  en  1778':  p.  335.)  It  must  be  noted  that  Howe's  object  was 
not  merely  to  escape,  up  Channel,  by  better  sailing,  but  to  get  to  the  westward,  past 
the  allies,  a  feat  impracticable  save  by  a  stratagem  such  as  is  mentioned. 


1782.]  HOWE  AT  GIBRALTAR.  541 

upon  his  mission,  was  the  cheering  news  brought  by  the  frigate, 
when  she  rejoined  on  the  10th,  that  the  long-intended  attack  had 
been  made  on  the  13th  of  September,  and  had  been  repelled  gloriously 
and  decisively.  The  heavily  protected  Spanish  floating  batteries, 
from  which  success  had  been  .expected  confidently,  one  and  all  had 
been  set  on  fire  and  destroyed.  If  Howe  could  introduce  his  suc- 
cours, the  fortress  was  saved. 

The  admiral  at  once  summoned  his  subordinate  officers,  gave 
them  full  and  particular  instructions  for  the  momentous  undertaking, 
and  issued  at  the  same  time,  to  the  masters  of  the  supply-ships, 
precise  information  as  to  local  conditions  of  wind  and  currents  at 
Gibraltar,  to  enable  them  more  surely  to  reach  their  anchorage.  On 
the  llth  of  October,  being  now  close  to  its  destination,  the  fleet 
bore  up  for  the  Straits,  which  it  entered  at  noon  with  a  fair  westerly 
wind.  The  convoy  went  first,  —  sailing  before  the  wind  it  was  thus 
to  leeward  of  the  fleet,  in  a  position  to  be  defended,  — and  the  ships 
of  war  followed  at  some  distance  in  three  divisions,  one  of  which  was 
led  by  Howe  himself.  At  6  P.M.  the  supply-ships  were  off  the 
mouth  of  the  Bay,  with  a  wind  fair  for  the  mole;  but,  through 
neglect  of  the  instructions  given,  all  but  four  missed  the  entrance, 
and  were  swept  to  the  eastward  of  the  Rock,  whither  the  fleet  of 
course  had  to  follow  them. 

On  the  13th  the  combined  fleets  came  out,  being  induced  to  quit 
their  commanding  position  at  Algeciras  by  fears  for  two  of  their 
number,  which  shortly  before  had  been  driven  to  the  eastward. 
During  the  forenoon  of  the  same  day  the  British  were  off  the  Spanish 
coast,  fifty  miles  east  of  Gibraltar.  At  sunset  the  allies  were  seen 
approaching,  and  Howe  formed  his  fleet,  but  sent  the  supply-ships  to 
anchor  at  the  Zaffarine  Islands,  on  the  coast  of  Barbary,  to  await 
events.  Next  morning  the  enemy  was  close  to  land,  but  visible  only 
from  the  mastheads;  the  British  apparently  having  headed  south 
during  the  night.  On  the  15th  the  wind  came  to  the  eastward,  fair 
for  Gibraltar,  towards  which  all  the  British  began  cautiously  to 
move.  By  the  evening  of  the  16th,  eighteen  of  the  convoy  were 
safe  at  the  mole ;  and  on  the  18th  all  had  arrived,  besides  a  fireship 
with  1,500  barrels  of  powder,  sent  in  by  the  Admiral  upon  the  govern- 
or's requisition.  Throughout  this  critical  time,  the  combined  fleets 
seem  to  have  been  out  of  sight.  Either  intentionally  or  carelessly, 
they  had  got  to  the  eastward  and  there  remained;  having  rallied  their 
separated  ships,  but  allowed  Gibraltar  to  be  replenished  for  a  year. 


542  MAJOR  OPERATIONS.     1762-1783.  [1782. 

.On  the  morning  of  the  19th  they  appeared  in  the  north-east,  but  the 
relief  was  then  accomplished  and  Howe  put  out  to  sea.  He  was 
not  willing  to  fight  in  mid-Straits,  embarrassed  hy  currents  and  the 
land ;  but  when  outside  he  brought-to,  to  allow  the  enemy  to  attack 
if  they  would,  they  having  the  weather-gage.  On  the  following  day, 
the  20th,  towards  sunset  they  boro  down,  and  a  partial  engagement 
ensued;  but  it  was  wholly  indecisive,  and  next  day  was  not  renewed. 
The  British  loss  was  G8  killed  and  208  wounded;  that  of  the  allies 
(50  killed  and  320  wounded.  On  the  14th  of  November  the  fleet 
regained  Spithead. 

The  services  rendered  to  his  country  by  Howe  on  this  occasion 
were  eminently  characteristic  of  the  special  qualities  of  that  great 
officer,  in  whom  was  illustrated  to  the  highest  degree  the  solid 
.strength  attainable  by  a  man  not  brilliant,  but  most  able,  who  gives 
himself  heart  and  soul  to  professional  acquirement.  In  him,  pro- 
found and  extensive  professional  knowledge,  which  is  not  inborn 
hut  gained,  was  joined  to  great  natural  staving  powers;  and  the  com- 
bination eminently  titled  him  for  the  part  we  have  seen  him  play  in 
Delaware  May,  at.  Xe\v  York,  before  Rhode  Island,  in  the  Channel, 
and  now  at  (iibraltar.  The  utmost  of  skill,  the  utmost  of  patience, 
the  utmost  of  persistence,  such  had  Howe:  and  having  these,  he  was 
particularly  apt  fur  the  defensive  operations,  upon  the  conduct  of 
which  chiefly  must  rest  his  well-deserved  renown. 

A  true  and  noble  tribute  lias  been  paid  by  a  French  officer  to  this 
relief  of  (iibraltar: ]  — 

••  Tln>  qualities  displayed  by  Lord  Howe  during  tliis  short  campaign  rose  to 
the  full  height  nf  tho  mission  which  In:  had  to  fulfil.  This  operation,  one  of  the 
finest  in  the  War  of  American  Independence,  merits  a  praise  equal  to  that  of  a 
victory.  If  the  English  fleet  \vas  favoured  liy  circumstances,  — and  if  is  rare  that 
in  such  enterprises  one  can  succeed  without  the  aid  of  fortune,  —  it  was  above  all 
the  Commaiider-iii-Chief's  quickness  of  perception,  the  accuracy  of  his  judgment, 
and  the  rapidity  of  his  decisions,  that  assured  success." 

To  this  well-weighed,  yet  lofty  praise  of  the  Admiral,  the  same 
writer  has  added  words  that  the  British  Navy  may  remember  long 
with  pride,  as  sealing  the  record  of  this  war.  of  which  the  relief  of 
Gibraltar  marked  the  close  in  European  and  American  waters.  After 
according  credit  to  the  Admiralty  for  the  uniform  high  speed  of  the 
British  vessels,  and  to  Howe  for  his  comprehension  and  use  of  this 
advantage,  Captain  Chevalier  goes  on :  — • 

1  Chevalier  :  '  Mar.  Fran,  daus  la  Guerre  de  1778,'  p.  358. 


1778.]  PONDICHERRY  CAPITULATES.  543 

"  Finally,  if  we  may  judge  by  the  results,  the  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Eng- 
lish fleet  could  not  but  think  himself  most  happy  in  his  captains.  There  were 
neither  separations,  nor  collisions,  nor  casualties  ;  and  there  occurred  none  of  those 
events,  so  frequent  in  the  experiences  of  a  squadron,  which  often  oblige  admirals 
to  take  a  course  wholly  contrary  to  the  end  they  have  in  view.  In  contemplation 
of  this  unvexed  navigation  of  Admiral  Howe,  it  is  impossible  not  to  recall  the 
unhappy  incidents  which  from  the  9th- to  the  12th  of  April  befell  the  squadron  of 
the  Count  de  Grasse.  ...  If  it  is  just  to  admit  that  Lord  Howe  displayed  the 
highest  talent,  it  should  be  added  that  he  had  in  his  hands  excellent  instruments." 

To  quote  another  French  writer:  "Quantity  disappeared  before 
quality." 

The  operations  in  India,  both  naval  and  military,  stand  by  them- 
selves, without  direct  influence  upon  transactions  elsewhere,  and 
unaffected  also  by  these,  except  in  so  far  as  necessary  succours  were 
intercepted  sometimes  in  European  waters.  The  cause  of  this  isola- 
tion was  the  distance  of  India  from  Europe;  from  four  to  six  months 
being  required  by  a  fleet  for  the  voyage. 

Certain  intelligence  of  the  war  between  Great  Britain  and  France 
reached  Calcutta  July  7th,  1778.  On  the  same  day  the  (lovernor- 
General  ordered  immediate  preparations  to  attack  Pondicherry,  the 
principal  seaport  of  the  French.  The  army  arrived  before  the  place 
on  the  8th  of  August,  and  on  the  same  day  Commodore  Sir  Edward 
Vernon1  anchored  in  the  roads  to  blockade  by  sea.  A  French 
squadron,  under  Captain  Tronjolv,  soon  after  appearing  in  the  oiling, 
Vernon  gave  chase,  and  on  the  10th  an  action  ensued.  The  forces 
engaged  were  about  equal,  the  French,  if  anything,  slightly  superior; 
a  sixty-gun  ship  and  four  smaller  vessels  being  on  each  side.  As 
the  French  then  went  into  Pondicherry,  the  immediate  advantage 
may  be  conceded  to  them;  but,  Vernon  returning  on  the  20th, 
Tronjoly  soon  after  quitted  the  roads,  and  returned  to  the  lie  de 
France.2  From  that  day  the  British  squadron  blockaded  closely,  and 
on  the  17th  of  October  Pondicherry  capitulated. 

1  British  Squadron  in  the  East  Indies  under  Commodore  Sir  Edward  Vernon,  Kt, 
in  1778. 

pj  gn  g,  (  Commodore  Sir  Edward  Vernon. 

(  Capt.  Benjamin  Marlow. 

Asia 54  Capt.  George  Vandeput. 

Coventry 28  Capt.  John  Alexander  Panton. 

Seahorse 21  Commander  Alexander  M'Coy. 

Cormorant     ....         18  Commander  William  Owen.* 

*  Who,  being  killed  by  accident,  was  succeeded  by  Commander  Charles  Morice  Pole. 
—  W.  L.  C. 

2  Now  Mauritius. 


544 


MAJOR  OPERATIONS.    1762-1783. 


[1778. 


AND      CEYLON. 

MM**/»M  fit/it* 


INDIA  AND   CEYLON. 


1781.]  SUFFREN'S  CAMPAIGN  IN  INDIA.  545 

On  the  7th  of  March,  1779,  Rear-Admiral  Sir  Edward  Hughes, 
K.  B.,  sailed  for  the  East  Indies  with  a  small  squadron.1  The 
French  also  sent  out  occasional  ships;  but  in  1779  and  1780  these 
went  no  further  than  the  He  de  France,  their  naval  station  in  the 
Indian  Ocean.  Hughes's  force  remained  unopposed  during  those 
years.  The  period  was  critical,  for  the  British  were  at  war  with 
Hyder  Ali,  Sultan  of  Mysore,  and  with  the  Mahrattas;  and  all 
depended  upon  command  of  the  sea.  In  January,  1781,  when 
Hughes  was  wintering  at  Bombay,  the  French  squadron  under  Comte 
d'Orves  appeared  off  the  Coromandel  coast,  but,  despite  Hyder  All's 
entreaties,  it  refused  to  co-operate  with  him.  The  different  spirit 
of  the  two  commanders  may  be  illustrated  from  contemporary 
documents. 

"  We  have  advices  from  Fort  St.  George  of  a  French  squadron  which  appeared 
off  that  place  on  January  25,  20,  and  27,  consisting  of  1  seventy-four,  4  sixty-fours, 
and  2  fifties.  They  proceeded  south  without  making  any  attempt  on  five  Indiamen 
then  in  the  roads,  with  a  number  of  vessels  laden  witli  grain  and  provisions ;  the 
destroying  of  which  might  have  been  easily  accomplished,  and  would  have  been 
severely  felt." 

"On  December  8th,  off  Mangalore,"  -  writes  Hughes,  <;I  saw  two  ships,  a 
large  snow,  three  ketches,  and  many  smaller  vessels  at  anchor  in  the  road  with 
Ryder's  flag  flying;  and,  standing  close,  found  them  vessels  of  force  and  all  armed 
for  war.  I  anchored  as  close  as  possible,  sent  in  all  armed  boats,  under  cover  of 
three  smaller  ships  of  war,  which  anchored  in  four  fathoms  water,  close  to  tlm 
enemy's  ships.  In  two  hours  took  and  burned  the  two  ships,  one  of  28  and  one  of 
26  guns,  and  took  or  destroyed  all  the  others,  save  one  which,  by  throwing  every- 
thing overboard,  escaped  over  the  bar  into  the  port.  Lost  1  lieutenant  and  10  men 
killed,  2  lieutenants  and  51  wounded." 

D'Orves  returned  to  the  He  de  France. 

When  war  with  Holland  began,  the  British  government  decided 
to  attempt  the  capture  of  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope.  For  that  object  a 
squadron  of  1  seventy-four,  1  sixty-four,  and  3  fifties,  with  numerous 
smaller  vessels,  under  Commodore  George  Johnstone,  convoying  a 

1  Squadron  which,  under  Rear-Admiral  Sir  Edward  Hughes,  K.  B.  (B),  sailed 
for  India  from  St.  Helens  in  1779.  —  W.  L.  C. 

Suverb  74  i  Rear-Admiral  Sir  Edward  Hughes,  K.  B. 

i  Capt.  Robert  Simonton. 
Exeter.     .....         64  Capt.  Richard  King. 

Eagle 64  Capt.  Ambrose  Reddall. 

Burford 64  Capt.  Peter  Rainier  (1). 

Worcester      ....         64  Capt.  George  Talbot. 

Belle-isle 64  Capt.  John  Brooks. 

Nymph 14  Commander  John  Blankett. 

1  On  the  Malabar  —  western  —  coast. 
VOL.  in.  —  35 


546 


MAJOR  OPERATIONS.     1762-1783. 


[1781. 


considerable  body  of  troops,  sailed  from  England  on  the  13th  of 
March,  1781,  in  company  with  the  Channel  fleet  under  Vice-Admiral 
George  Darby,  then  on  its  way  to  relieve  Gibraltar.  The  French 
government,  having  timely  notice  of  the  expedition,  undertook  to 
frustrate  it;  detailing  for  that  purpose  a  division  of  2  seventy-fours, 
and  3  sixty-fours,  under  the  since  celebrated  Suffren.1  These  ships 
left  Brest  on  the  22nd  of  March,  with  the  fleet  of  de  Grasse.  They 
also  carried  some  battalions  of  troops. 

On  April  llth  the  British  squadron  reached  Porto  Praya,  Cape 
de  Verde  Islands.  This  bay  is  open  to  the  southward,  extending 
from  east  to  west  about  a  mile  and  a  half,  and  is  within  the  limits 
of  the  north-east  trade-winds.  Although  aware  that  a  French  division 
was  on  his  track,  and  conscious,  by  the  admissions  of  his  report,  that 
protection  could  not  be  expected  from  the  neutrality  of  the  place, 
Jolmstone  permitted  his  vessels  to  anchor  without  reference  to 
attack.  His  own  flagship,  the  Romney,  50,  was  so  surrounded  by 
others  that  she  could  tire  only  with  great  caution  through  intervals. 
On  the  10th  of  April,  at  9.30  A.M.,  the  Isis,  50,  which  was  the 
outermost  of  the  British  squadron,  signalled  eleven  sail  in  the 
north-east.  Fifteen  hundred  persons  were  then  ashore  engaged  in 
watering,  fishing,  embarking  cattle,  and  amusing  themselves.  The 
strangers  were  Suffren's  division.  The  meeting  was  not  expected  by 


1  Squadrons  under  Commodore  George  Jolmstone  and  M.  do  Suffren  in  the 
action  in  Porto  Praya,  on  April  ICth,  1781. 


BRITISH. 


SHIPS 


Komney    . 

Ifrro 

Mrmmonth 
Jupiter 
Ixi*  .     .     . 
Diana   .     . 


COMMANDERS. 


60 


I  Commod.  George  Jolmstone. 
I  Capt.  Roddam  Home. 
74  Capt.  Jamex  Hawker. 
G4  Capt.  James  Alms  (1). 
i.W'Capt.  Thomas  Pasley. 
M>  Capt.  Evelyn  Button. 
32  Capt.   Sir  William  Chaloner  Burn 

aby,  Bart. 

Jttxfin    ....      32  Capt.  James  Pigott. 
Ai-lirt   ....      32  Capt.  Thomas  Mackenzie. 
Rnttlfffnakf    .     .      14  Commander  Peter  Clements. 
J'orto    ....      10  Commander     the     Hon.     Thomas 

Charles  Lumley. 
Infcrn'it  (f.  s.)   .     |  8, Commander  Henry  d'Esterre  Darby 
Terror  (bomb)    .        8  Commander  Charles  Wood. 
Tapfirjeiir (cutter)    HlLieut.  Philip  d'Auvergne. 
San  f'firlos*.     .      20|Commander  John  Boyle. 
Pondicherry  t    .      20  Lieut.  Thomas  Saunders  Grove. 
Royal  Charlotte  *    20, Commander  Thomas  Stanhope  Ben- 

I     nett. 
and  ten  East  Indiamen,  each  of  26  guns. 


FRENCH. 


SHIPS. 


lleros   . 
Annihfil 


Snhinx  . 
''cnoeur 


COMMANDERS. 


74  M.  le  Bailli  de  Suffren. 
74  Capt.  de  Tremigon,  Senr.J 
04  Capt.  de  Cardaillac.t 
64  Capt.  du  Chilleau. 
64!  Capt.  deForbin. 


*  Armed  ships.    The  Royal  Charlotte  was  hired. 
t  Armed  transport 
t  Killed. 


W.  L.  C. 


1781  .J 


SUFFREN  AND  JOHNSTONS. 


547 


the  French  commander,  whose  object  in  entering  was  simply  to 
complete  the  water  of  the  ships ;  but  he  determined  at  once  to  attack, 
and  hauled  round  the  east  point  of  the  bay  in  column,  the  two 
seventy-fours  at  the  head,  his  own  ship,  the  Hews,  leading  with  the 
signal  for  battle  (line  ab).  He  luffed  to  the  wind,  and  anchored  five 
hundred  feet  from  the  starboard  beam  of  the  British  Hero,  74  (f), 
whence  he  at  once  opened  fire  from  both  broadsides.  His  next 
astern,  the  Annibal  (b),  brought  up  immediately  ahead  of  him,  but 


SoFFRCN    AND    JOHN3TONE. 
PORTO     PRAYA   . 


I  *>i  A- 

^  >••*;--..', 


8UFFREN  AND   JOIIXSTOXK.      PORTO    PRAYA. 

so  close  that  the  Heros  had  to  veer  cable  and  drop  astern  (a),  which 
brought  her  on  the  beam  of  the  Monmouth,  64. l  The  captain  of  the 
Annibal  had  thought  the  order  for  battle  merely  precautionary,  and 
had  not  cleared  for  action.  He  was  therefore  taken  unawares,  and 
his  ship  did  no  service  proportionate  to  her  force.  The  third  French 
vessel  (c)  reached  her  station,  but  her  captain  was  struck  dead  just 

1  I  infer,  from  the  accounts,  that  the  Monmouth  was  well  east  of  the  Hero,  that 
the  French  had  passed  her  first,  and  that  the  Heros  was  now  on  her  port  beam  ;  but 
this  point  is  not  certain. 


548  MAJOR   OPERATIONS.     1762-1783.  [1781. 

when  aljout  to  anchor,  and  in  the  confusion  the  anchor  was  not  let 
go.  The  ship  drifted  foul  of  a  British  East  Indiaman,  which  she 
carried  out  to  sea  (c7  c")  The  two  remaining  French  (d,  e)  simply 
cannonaded  as  they  passed  across  the  bay's  mouth,  failing  through 
mishap  or  awkwardness  to  reach  an  effective  position. 

The  attack  thus  became  a  mere  rough  and  tumble,  in  which  the 
two  seventy-fours  alone  sustained  the  French  side.  After  three 
quarters  of  an  hour,  Suffren,  seeing  that  the  attempt  had  failed, 
slipped  his  cable  and  put  to  sea.  The  Annibal  followed,  but  she  had 
lieen  so  damaged  that  all  her  masts  went  overboard;  fortunately,  not 
until  her  head  was  pointed  out  of  the  harbour.  Johnstone,  thus 
luckily  escaping  the  consequences  of  his  neglect,  now  called  his  cap- 
tains together  to  learn  the  condition  of  their  ships,  and  then  ordered 
them  to  cut  their  cables  and  pursue.  All  obeyed  except  Captain 
Suttou  of  the  I,i is,  who  represented  that  the  spars  and  rigging  of  his 
ship  could  not  bear  sail  at  once.  Johnstone  then  ordered  him  to 
come  out  anyhow,  which  he  did,  and  his  fore  topmast  shortly  went 
overboard.  The  disability  of  this  ship  so  weighed  upon  the  Commo- 
dore that  his  pursuit  was  exceedingly  sluggish;  and,  the  Annibal 
having  got  a  bit  of  canvas  on  a  jury  foremast,  the  French  kept  draw- 
ing him  away  to  leeward.  Night,  therefore,  was  falling  as  he  came 
near  them;  the  'Jai.i  and  Monmouth  were  two  or  three  miles  astern; 
the  sea  was  increasing;  if  he  got  much  further  to  leeward,  he  could 
not  get  back;  lie  had  forgotten  to  appoint  a  rendezvous  where  the 
convoy  might  rejoin;  a  night  action,  lie  considered,  was  not  to  be 
thought  of.  Yet,  if  he  let  the  enemy  go,  they  might  anticipate  him 
at  the  Cape.  In  short,  Johnstone  underwent  the  "anguish  "of  an 
undecided  man  in  a  "cruel  situation,"1  and  of  course  decided  to  run 
no  risks.  He  returned  therefore  to  Porto  Praya,  put  the  captain  of 
the  Inis  under  arrest,  and  remained  in  port  for  a  fortnight.  Suffren 
hurried  on  to  the  Cape,  got  there  first,  landed  his  troops,  and  secured 
the  colony  against  attack.  Johnstone  arrived  in  the  neighbourhood 
some  time  later,  and,  finding  himself  anticipated,  turned  aside  to 
Saldanha  Bay,  where  he  captured  five  Dutch  East  Indiamen.  He 
then  sent  the  Hero,  Monmouth,  and  /si's,  on  to  India,  to  reinforce 
Hughes,  and  himself  went  back  to  England. 

No  accusation  of  misbehaviour  lies   against  any  of   the  British 
subordinates  in  this  affair  of  Porto  Praya.     The  captain  of  the  Ms 
was  brought  to  a  court-martial,  and  honourably  acquitted  of  all  the 
1  Expressions  in  Jolmstone's  Report. 


1782.]  SUFFREN  AND  HUGHES.  549 

charges.  The  discredit  of  the  surprise  was  not  redeemed  by  any 
exhibition  of  intelligence,  energy,  or  professional  capacity,  on  the 
part  of  the  officer  in  charge.  It  has  been  said  that  he  never  had 
commanded  a  post-ship :  before  lie  was  intrusted  with  this  very 
important  mission,  and  it  is  reasonably  sure  that  his  selection  for  it 
was  due  to  attacks  made  by  him  upon  the  professional  conduct  of 
Keppel  and  Howe,  when  those  admirals  were  at  variance  with  the 
administration.  His  preposterous  mismanagement,  therefore,  was 
probably  not  wholly  bitter  to  the  Navy  at  large.  In  the  British  ships 
of  war,  the  entire  loss  in  men,  as  reported,  was  only  9  killed,  47 
wounded.  Several  casualties  from  chance  shots  occurred  on  board 
the  convoy,  bringing  up  the  total  to  36  killed  and  130  wounded.2 
The  French  admit  105  killed  and  204  wounded,  all  but  19  being  in 
the  Heros  and  Annibal.  Although  precipitated  by  Suft'ren,  the  affair 
clearly  was  as  great  a  surprise  to  his  squadron  as  to  the  British. 
Therefore,  the  latter,  being  already  at  anchor  and  more  numerous 
as  engaged,  had  a  distinct  advantage;  to  which  also  contributed 
musketry  fire  from  the  transports.  Nevertheless,  the  result  cannot 
be  deemed  creditable  to  the  French  captains  or  gunnery. 

Suffren  remained  in  the  neighbourhood  of  the  Cape  for  two 
months.  Then,  having  seen  the  colony  secure,  independent  of  his 
squadron,  he  departed  for  the  He  de  France,  arriving  there  October 
25th.  On  the  17th  of  December  the  whole  French  force,  under  the 
command  of  d'Orves,  sailed  for  the  Coromandel  coast.  On  the  way 
the  British  50-gun  ship  Hannibal,  Captain  Alexander  Christie,  was 
taken.  On  the  9th  of  February,  1782,  Comte  d'Orves  died,  and 
Suffren  found  himself  at  the  head  of  twelve  ships  of  the  line :  3 
seventy-fours,  7  sixty-fours,  and  2  fifties.3  On  the  15th  Ilughes's 
fleet  was  sighted,  under  the  guns  of  Madras.  It  numbered  nine  of 
the  line:  2  seventy-fours,  1  sixty-eight,  5  sixty-fours,  and  1  fifty. 
Suffren  stood  south  towards  Pondicherry,  which  had  passed  into  the 
power  of  Hyder  AH.  After  nightfall  Hughes  got  under  way,  and 

1  Charnock,  however,  says  that  in  1762,  immediately  after  receiving  his  post- 
commission,  he  commanded  in  succession  the  Hind,  20,  and  the  Wager,  20.     Moreover, 
before  Ids  appointment  to  the  expedition  of  1781,  he  had  been  Commodore  on  the 
Lisbon  Station.     But  he  had  spent  comparatively  little  time  at  sea  as  a  captain.  — 
W.  L.  C. 

2  Details  are  in  Schomberg,  iv.  385.  —  W.  L.  C. 

z  One  being  the  captured  British  Hannibal,  50,  which  was  commissioned  by  Cap- 
tain Morard  de  Galles,  retaining  the  English  form  of  the  name,  Hannibal,  to  distinguish 
her  from  the  Annibal,  74,  already  in  the  squadron. 


550 


MAJOR   OPERATIONS.     1702-1783. 


[1782 


also  steered  south.  He  feared  for  Trincomale,  in  Ceylon,  recently 
a  Dutch  port,  which  the  British  had  captured  on  the  5th  of  January. 
It  was  a  valuable  naval  station,  and  as  yet  most  imperfectly  defended. 
At  daylight  the  British  saw  the  French  squadron 1  twelve  miles 
east  (A,  A)  and  its  transports  nine  miles  south-west  (c).  Hughes 
chased  the  latter  and  took  six.  Suffren  pursued,  but  could  not  over- 
take before  sunset,  and  both  fleets  steered  south-east  during  the  night. 
Next  morning  there  were  light  north-north-east  airs,  and  the  French 
were  six  miles  north-east  of  the  British  (B,  B).  The  latter  formed 
line  on  the  port  tack  (a),  heading  to  seaward;  Hughes  hoping  that 
thus  the  usual  sea-breeze  would  find  him  to  windward.  The  breeze, 
however,  did  not  make  as  expected ;  and,  as  the  north-east  puffs  were 
bringing  the  enemy  down,  he  kept  off  before  the  wind  (b)  to  gain 
time  for  his  ships  to  close  their  intervals,  which  were  too  great.  At 
4  P.M.  the:  near  approach  of  the  French  compelled  him  to  form  line 
again,  on  the  port  tack,  heading  easterly.  The  rear  ship,  Exeter,  64, 
was  left  separated,  out  of  due  support  from  those  ahead  (C).  Suffren, 
leading  one  section  of  his  fleet  in  person,  passed  to  windward  of  the 

1  British  and  French  Squadrons  in  the  action  off  Sadras,  Feb.  17th,  1782. 


BRITISH. 

FRENCH. 

SHIPS. 

f, 

:— 

COMMANDERS. 

SHIPS. 

&; 

:_ 

COMMANDERS. 

O 

S3 

64 

Srrt'-re 

.V"/<  '/<""/// 

64 

Capt.  .lames  Alms  (1). 

Vengetir    . 

64 
64 

Capt.  de  Villeneuve-Cillart, 
Capt.  de  Forbin. 

Wurt-'slfr       .     .      c'rl 

Capt.  George  Talbot. 

llrillant     .     .     . 

G4 

Capt.  de  St.  Ftlix. 

Jliirfnnl     .     .     . 

W 

Capt.  Peter  Rainier  (1). 

Flam  awl   .     .     .       50 

Capt.  de  Cuverville. 

!  Vice-  Admiral      Sir      Edward 

Annilxd 

V  t 

Capt.  du  Tromeliu. 

Saprrli.     ...       74 

HugheH,  K.  B.  (B). 

Ifcros   .... 

74 

(  M.  de  Suffren,  Chef  d'Eac. 

Capt.  William  Stevens. 

\  Capt.  de  Moissac. 

Jlrro 

74 

Capt.  Charles  Wood. 

Orirnl 

71 

liis  

CO 

Capt.    the    Hon.    Thos.    Chas. 

Arfcsien    .     .     . 

in 

Capt.  Bide  de  Maurville. 

ryt 

Lumley. 

C«>tit      I  rili  ti   P.  .11 

Sfi/iinx  .... 

i;i 
G4 

Capt.  du  Chilleau. 

Ezrtrr  .... 

04 

apt.  iioiin  uroili 
|  Commod.  Richard  King. 

Hannibal  .     .     . 

50 

Capt.  Bouvet. 
Capt.  Morard  de  Galles. 

1  Capt.  Henry  Reynolds. 

Bizarre     .     .     . 

61 

Capt.  de  Lalandelle. 

Seaftorff 

24 

Capt.  Robert  Montagu. 

Pourvoyeute  . 

38 

Capt.  de  Beaulieu. 

Manilla 

14 

Lieut.  William  Robinson. 

Fine       .... 

32 

Capt.  Perrier  de  Salvert. 

Bellonc      .     .    . 

32 

Capt.  de  Ruyter. 

Subtile  .... 

22 

Capt  .  de  Galifet. 

SylpltMe    .     .     . 

16 

Diligent     .     .     . 

10 

The  British  list  is  founded  upon  that  in  Beatson,  vi.  298,  Steel's  'Navy  List' 
(1782),  and  dispatches;  the  French  list,  on  Trublet :  'Hist,  de  la  Campagne  de 
Tlnde'  (1801);  'Relation  Ddtaillde,'  etc.  (1783);  Chevalier:  'Hist,  de  la  Mar. 
Franc.'  and  Curmt :  '  Hist,  du  Bailli  de  Suffren.'  But  some  of  these  contradict  the 
others.  From  some  it  would  appear  that  the  Pourvoyeuse  was  also  in  the  line.  — 
W.  L.  C. 


1782.]  SUFFREN  AND  HUGHES.  551 

British  line,  from  the  rear,  as  far  as  Hughes's  flagship,  which  was 
fifth  from  the  van.  There  he  stopped,  and  kept  at  half  cannon-shot, 
to  prevent  the  four  van  ships  from  tacking  to  relieve  their  consorts. 
It  was  his  intention  that  the  second  half  of  his  fleet  should  attack  the 
other  side  of  the  English  (D),  but  only  two  of  them  did  so,  engag- 
ing to  leeward  the  extreme  rear  (C).  The  result  was,  to  use 
Hughes's  own  words,  that  "  the  enemy  brought  eight  of  their  best 
ships  to  the  attack  of  five  of  ours."  It  will  be  noted  with  interest 


SUFFREN    AND    HUC.HES 


«\  > 

A\*  -. 


" 


0       c 

0°Q 
0       U0 


090 


U    j  7  T}^ 


SUFFIIKX    AND    IIIT.HKS. 


that  these  were  exactly  the  numbers  engaged  in  the  first  act  of  the 
battle  of  the  Nile.  The  Exeter  (like  the  Gucrrier  at  the  Nile) 
received  the  fresh  broadsides  of  the  first  five  of  the  enemy,  and  then 
remained  in  close  action  on  both  sides,  assailed  by  two,  and  at  last  by 
three,  opponents,  —  two  fifties,  and  one  sixty-four.  When  the  third 
approached,  the  master  of  the  ship  asked  Commodore  Richard  King, 
whose  broad  pennant  flew  at  her  masthead,  "  What  is  to  be  done  ?  " 
"There  is  nothing  to  be  done,"  replied  King,  "but  to  fight  her  till 
she  sinks."  Her  loss,  10  killed  and  45  wounded,  was  not  creditable 


552  MAJOR  OPERATIONS.     1762-1783.    ,  [1782. 

under  the  circumstances  to  the  French  gunnery,  which  had  been 
poor  also  at  Porto  Praya.  At  6  P.M.  the  wind  shifted  to  south-east, 
throwing  all  on  the  other  tack,  and  enabling  the  British  van  to  come 
into  action.  Darkness  now  approaching,  Suffren  hauled  off  and 
anchored  at  Pondicherry.  Hughes  went  on  to  Trincomale  to  refit. 
The  British  loss  had  been  32  killed,  among  whom  were  Captain 
William  Stevens  of  the  flagship,  and  Captain  Henry  Reynolds,  of  the 
Exeter,  and  83  wounded.  The  French  had  30  killed ;  the  number  of 
their  wounded  is  put  by  Professor  Laughton  at  100. 

On  the  12th  of  March  Hughes  returned  to  Madras,  and  towards 
the  end  of  the  month  sailed  again  for  Trincomale,  carrying  reinforce- 
ments and  supplies.  On  the  30th  he  was  joined  at  sea  by  the  Sultan, 
74,  and  the  Magnanime,  64,  just  from  England.  Suffren  had 
remained  on  the  coast  from  reasons  of  policy,  to  encourage  Hyder 
Ali  in  his  leaning  to  the  French;  but,  after  landing  a  contingent  of 
troops  on  the  22nd  of  March,  to  assist  at  the  siege  of  the  British  port 
of  Cuddalore,  he  put  to  sea  on  the  23rd,  and  went  south,  hoping  to 
intercept  the  Sultan  and  Magnanime  off  the  south  end  of  Ceylon. 
On  the  9th  of  April  he  sighted  the  British  fleet  to  the  south  and  west 
of  him.  Hughes,  attaching  the  first  importance  to  the  strengthening 
of  Trincomale,  had  resolved  neither  to  seek  nor  to  shun  action.  He 
therefore  continued  Ids  course,  light  northerly  airs  prevailing,  until 
the  llth,  when,  being  about  fifty  miles  to  the  north-east  of  his  port,  he 
tore  away  for  it.  Next  morning,  April  12th,  finding  that  the  enemy 
could  overtake  his  rear  ships,  he  formed  line  on  the  starboard  tack,1 

1  Line  of  battle  of  the  squadron  under  Vice-Admiral  Sir  Edward  Hughes,  K.  B., 
in  the  action  off  Providien,  on  April  12th,  1782. 

P    ,  „ .       \  Commodore  Richard  King. 

I  Capt.  Charles  Hughes. 

Hero  74         Capt.  James  Hawker. 

7ms  50         Capt.  the  Hon.  Thos.  Chas.  Luraley. 

Jlurford  64         Capt.  Peter  Rainier  (1). 

Mmiarcn  68         Capt.  John  Cell. 

74      f  Vice-Admiral  Sir  Edward  Hughes,  K.B.  (B). 

I  Capt.  the  Hon.  Dnnbar  Maclellan  (Actg. ). 
G4         Capt.  James  Alms  (1). 
ll'nrccstcr  64         Capt.  George  Talbot. 

Eagle  64         Capt.  Ambrose  Reddall. 

Sultan  74        Capt.  James  Watt. 

Magnanime  64        Capt.  Charles  AVolseley. 

Seahorse  24         Capt.  Robert  Montagu. 

Combustion  (f .  s. )          14         Commander  Henry  Newcome. 

The  above  is  taken,  the  spelling  of  names  being  corrected,  from  Beatson,  vi.  298 ; 
but  the  order  of  the  line  was  slightly  modified  at  the  last  moment.  —  W.  L.  C. 


1782.] 


SUFFREN  AND  HUGHES. 


553 


at  two  cables'  intervals,  heading  to  the  westward,  towards  the  coast 
of  Ceylon,  wind  north  by  east,  and  the  French  dead  to  windward 
(A,  A).  Suffren  drew  up  his  line  on  the  same  tack,  parallel  to 
the  British  (a),  and  at  11  A.M.  gave  the  signal  to  steer  west-south- 
west all  together;  his  vessels  going  down  in  a  slanting  direction, 
each  steering  for  one  of  the  enemy.  Having  twelve  ships  to  eleven, 
the  twelfth  was  ordered  to  place  herself  on  the  off  side  of  the  rear 
British,  which  would  thus  have  two  antagonists. 


SUFFREN    AND    HUCHE.S 


B 


SUFFREN    AND    1IUGHKS. 


In  such  simultaneous  approach  it  commonly  occurred  that  the 
attacking  line  ceased  to  be  parallel  with  the  foe's,  its  van  becoming 
nearer  and  rear  more  distant.  So  it  was  here.  Further,  the  British 
opening  fire  as  soon  as  the  leading  French  were  within  range,  the 
latter  at  once  hauled  up  to  reply.  Suffren,  in  the  centre,  wishing 
closest  action,  signalled  them  to  keep  away  again,  and  himself  bore 
down  wrathfully  upon  Hughes  to  within  pistol-shot;  in  which  he 
was  supported  closely  by  his  next  ahead  and  the  two  next  astern. 
The  rear  of  the  French,  though  engaged,  remained  too  far  distant 


554  MAJOR   OPERATIONS.     1762-1783.  [1782. 

Their  line,  therefore,  resembled  a  curve,  the  middle  of  which  —  four 
or  five  ships  —  was  tangent  to  the  British  centre  (B).  At  this  point 
the  heat  of  the  attack  fell  upon  Hughes's  flagship,  the  Superb,  74 
(C,  d),  and  her  next  ahead,  the  Monmouth,  64  (c).  Suffren's  ship, 
the  Heros,  having  much  of  her  rigging  cut,  could  not  shorten  sail, 
shot  by  the  Superb,  and  brought  up  abreast  the  Monmouth.  The 
latter,  already  hotly  engaged  by  one  of  her  own  class,  and  losing  her 
main  and  rnizzen  masts  in  this  unequal  new  contest,  was  forced  at  3 
P.M.  to  bear  up  out  of  the  line.  The  place  of  the  Heros  alongside 
the  Superb  was  taken  by  the  Orient,  74,  supported  by  the  Brillant, 
64;  and  when  the  Monmouth  kept  off,  the  attack  of  these  two  ships 
was  reinforced  by  the  half-dozen  stern  chasers  of  the  Heros,  which 
had  drifted  into  the  British  line,  and  now  fired  into  the  Superb's 
bows.  The  conflict  between  these  five  ships,  two  British  and  three 
French,  was  one  of  the  bloodiest  in  naval  annals;  the  loss  of  the 
Superb,  59  killed  and  9ti  wounded,  and  of  the  Monmouth,  45  killed 
and  102  wounded,  equalling  that  of  the  much  larger  vessels  that 
bore  the  flags  of  Nelson  and  Collingwood  at  Trafalgar.  The  loss  of 
the  three  French  was  52  killed  and  142  wounded ;  but  to  this  should 
be  added  properly  that  of  the  Sphinx,  04,  the  Monmouth' 's  first  adver- 
sary: 22  killed  and  74  wounded.  At  3.40  P.M.,  fearing  that  if  he 
continued  steering  west  he  would  get  entangled  with  the  shore, 
Hughes  wore  his  ships,  forming  line  on  the  port  tack.  The  French 
also  wore,  and  Suft'ren  hoped  to  secure  the  Monmouth,  which  was  left 
between  the  two  lines;  but  the  quickness  of  a  British  captain, 
Hawker,  of  the  Jfero,  ran  a  tow-rope  to  her  in  time,  and  she  was 
thus  dragged  out  of  danger.  At  5.40  Hughes  anchored,  and  Suffren 
did  the  same  at  8  p.  M.  The  total  British  loss  in  men  on  this  occasion 
was  137  killed  and  430  wounded;  that  of  the  French  137  killed  and 
357  wounded. 

The  exhausted  enemies  remained  at  anchor  in  the  open  sea,  two 
miles  apart,  for  a  week,  repairing.  On  the  19th  of  April  the  French 
got  under  way  and  made  a  demonstration  before  the  British,  inviting 
battle,  yet  not  attacking;  but  the  condition  of  the  Monmouth  forbade 
Hughes  from  moving.  Suffren  therefore  departed  to  Batacalo,  in 
Ceylon,  south  of  Trincomale,  where  he  covered  his  own  convoys  from 
Europe,  and  flanked  the  approach  of  his  adversary's.  Hughes,  on 
the  22nd  of  April,  got  into  Trincomale,  where  he  remained  till  June 
23rd.  He  then  went  to  Negapatam,  formerly  a  Dutch  possession, 
but  then  held  by  the  British.  There  lie  learned  that  Suffren,  who 


1782.]  SUFFREN  AND  HUGHES.  555 

meanwhile  had  captured  several  British  transports,  was  a  few  miles 
north  of  him,  at  Cuddalore,  which  had  surrendered  to  Hyder  Ali  on 
April  4th.  On  the  5th  of  July,  at  1  P.M.,  the  French  squadron 
appeared.  At  3  P.M.  Hughes  put  to  sea,  and  stood  south  during 
the  night  to  gain  the  wind,  —  the  south-west  monsoon  now  blowing. 
Next  morning,  at  daylight,  the  French  were  seen  at  anchor, 
seven  or  eight  miles  to  leeward.  At  6  A.M.  they  began  to  get  under 
way.  One  of  their  sixty-fours,  the  Ajax,  had  lost  her  main  and 


FREIN       AMD        H  U  C.  H  E.  S 
6   '"    Uvi.  V        J7O2 
f~t~c~      O      // iHira 


. 

' 

-\'  y  A  ... 


SCFFKEX    AND    HUGHES. 


mizzen  topmasts  in  a  violent  squall  on  the  previous  afternoon,  and 
was  not  in  the  line.  There  were  therefore  eleven  ships  on  each  side. 
The  action,  known  as  that  of  Negapatam,  began  shortly  before  11, 
when  both  fleets  were  on  the  starboard  tack,  heading  south-south-east, 
wind  south-west.  The  British  being  to  windward,  Hughes  ordered 
his  fleet  to  bear  up  together  to  the  attack,  exactly  as  Suffren  had 
done  on  the  12th  of  April.  As  commonly  happened,  the  rear  got 
less  close  than  the  van  (Position  I.).  The  fourth  ship  in  the  French 


556  MAJOR   OPERATIONS.     1762-1783.  [1782. 

order  (a),  losing  her  mainmast  early,  dropped  to  leeward  of  the  line 
{a'),  and  astern  of  her  place  (a")-  At  half -past  noon  the  wind  flew 
suddenly  to  south-south-east,  —  the  sea-breeze,  —  taking  the  ships  a 
little  on  the  port  bow.  Most  of  them,  on  both  sides,  paid  off  from 
the  enemy,  the  British  to  starboard,  the  French  to  port ;  but  between 
the  main  lines,  which  were  in  the  momentary  confusion  consequent 
upon  such  an  incident,  were  left  six  ships  —  four  British  and  two 
French  —  that  had  turned  the  other  way  (Position  II.).  These  were 
the  Burfonl,  Sultan  (s),  Worcester,  and  Eagle,  fourth,  fifth,  eighth, 
and  tenth,  in  the  British  order ;  and  the  Severe  (b).  third  in  the 
French,  with  the  dismasted  Brillant,  towards  the  rear  of  the  fight  (a). 
Under  these  conditions,  the  Severe,  64,  underwent  a  short  but  close 
action  with  the  Sultan,  74 ;  and  with  two  other  British  ships,  accord- 
ing to  the  report  of  the  Severe1  s  captain.  The  remainder  of  the 
incident  shall  be  given  in  the  latter's  own  words. 

'•  Seeing  the  French  squadron  drawing  off,  —  for  all  the  ships  except  the 
Rrillanl  had  fallen  off  on  the  other  tack,  —  Captain  de  Cillart  thought  it  useless  to 
prolong  his  defence,  and  had  the  flag  hauled  down.  The  ships  engaged  with  him 
immediately  ceased  their  fire,  and  the  one  on  the  starboard  side  moved  away.  At 
this  moment  the  Xc'vere  fell  off  to  starboard,  and  her  sails  filled.  Captain  de  Cillart 
then  ordered  the  fire  to  be  resumed  by  his  lower-deck  guns,  the  only  ones  which 
remained  manned,  and  he  rejoined  his  squadron  "  (Position  III.). 

When  the  Severe' 's  flag  came  down,  Suffren  was  approaching  with 
his  flagship.  The  Sultan  wore  to  rejoin  her  fleet,  and  was  raked  by 
the  Screrc  in  so  doing  (Position  III.).  The  Hrillant,  whose  main- 
mast had  been  shot  away  in  conflict  with  either  the  Sultan  or  the 
Burfonl,  both  much  heavier  ships,  had  at  this  later  phase  of  the  fight 
fallen  under  the  guns  of  the  Worcester  and  the  Eagle.  Her  captain, 
de  Saint-Felix,  was  one  of  the  most  resolute  of  Suffren's  officers. 
She  was  rescued  by  the  flagship,  but  she  had  lost  47  killed  and  136 
wounded,  —  an  almost  incredible  slaughter,  being  over  a  third  of  the 
usual  complement  of  a  sixty-four;  and  Suffren's  ships  were  under- 
manned. 

These  spirited  episodes,  and  the  fact  that  his  four  separated  ships 
were  approaching  the  enemy,  and  being  approached  by  them,  caused 
Hughes  to  give  the  orders  to  wear,  and  for  a  general  chase;  the  flag 
for  the  line  being  hauled  down.  Two  of  his  fleet,  however,  made 
signals  of  disability;  so  he  annulled  the  orders,  and  at  1.30  formed 
on  the  port  tack,  recalling  the  engaged  vessels.  Both  squadrons 
now  stood  in  shore,  and  anchored  at  about  6  P.M.;  the  British  near 


1782.]  SUFFREN  AND  HUGHES.  557 

Negapatam,  the  French  some  ten  miles  north.  The  loss  in  the  action 
had  been:  British,  77  killed,  233  wounded;  French,  178  killed,  601 
wounded.  Among  the  slain  was  Captain  the  Hon.  Dunbar  Maclellan 
of  Hughes 's  flagship. 

On  the  following  day  Suffren  sailed  for  Cuddalore.  There  he 
received  word  that  two  ships  of  the  line  —  the  Ilhistrc,  74,  and  St. 
Michel,  60,  with  a  convoy  of  supplies  and  600  troops  —  were  to  he 
expected  shortly  at  Pointe  de  Galle,  then  a  Dutch  port,  on  the  south- 
west side  of  Ceylon.  It  was  essential  to  cover  these,  and  on  the  18th 
he  was  ready  for  sea;  but  the  necessity  of  an  interview  with  Hyder 
Ali  delayed  him  until  the  1st  of  August,  when  he  started  for 
Batacalo.  On  the  9th  he  arrived  there,  and  on  the  21st  the  reinforce- 
ment joined  him.  Within  forty-eight  hours  the  supply-ships  were 
cleared,  and  the  squadron  sailed  again  with  the  object  of  taking 
Trincomale.  On  the  25th  he  was  off  the  port,  and,  the  operation  being 
energetically  pushed,  the  place  capitulated  on  the  31st  of  August. 

It  is  difficult  to  resist  the  impression  that  greater  energy  on 
Hughes's  part  might  have  brought  him  up  in  time  to  prevent  this 
mishap.  He  reached  Madras  only  on  July  20th,  a  fortnight  after  the 
late  action;  and  he  did  not  sail  thence  until  the  20th  of  August, 
notwithstanding  that  he  apprehended  an  attempt  upon  Trincomale. 
Hence,  when  he  arrived  there  on  the  2nd  of  September,  not  only  had 
it  passed  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy,  but  Suffren  had  re-embarked 
already  the  men  and  the  guns  that  had  been  landed  from  his  fleet. 
When  Hughes's  approach  was  signalled,  all  preparations  for  sea  were 
hastened,  and  the  following  morning,  at  daybreak,  the  French  came 
out.  Hughes  had  been  joined  since  the  last  action  by  the  Sceptre, 
64,  Captain  Samuel  Graves,  so -that  the  respective  forces  in  the  action 
fought  off  Trincomale  on  September  3rd  were  twelve  of  the  line  to 
fourteen,  viz. :  British,  3  seventy-fours,  1  seventy,  1  sixty-eight,  <> 
sixty-fours,  1  fifty;  French,  4  seventy-fours,  7  sixty-fours,  1  sixty, 
2  fifties.  Suffren  had  also  put  into  the  line  a  36-gun  ship,  the 
Consolante.1 

While  the  French  were  getting  under  way,  the  British  fleet  was 
standing  towards  the  entrance,  closehauled  on  the  starboard  tack,  a 
fresh  south-west  monsoon  blowing.  When  Hughes  made  out  the 
hostile  flags  on  the  works,  he  kept  away  four  points,2  and  steered 
east-south-east,  still  in  column,  under  short  canvas.  Suffren  pursued, 

1  Previously  the  British  East  Indianian,  Elizabeth. 

2  Forty-five  degrees. 


558  MAJOR   OPERATIONS.     1762-1783.  [1782. 

being  to  windward  yet  astern,  with  his  fleet  on  a  line  of  bearing; 
that  is,  the  line  on  which  the  ships  were  ranged  was  not  the  same  as 
the  course  which  they  were  steering.  This  formation,  wherein  the 
advance  is  ohlique  to  the  front,  is  very  difficult  to  maintain.  Wish- 
ing to  make  the  action,  whatever  the  immediate  event,  decisive  in 
results,  by  drawing  the  French  well  to  leeward  of  the  port,  Hughes, 
\vlio  was  a  thorough  seaman  and  had  good  captains,  played  with  his 
eager  enemy.  "He  kept  avoiding  me  without  taking  flight,"  wrote 
Suft'ren;  "or  rather,  he  fled  in  good  order,  regulating  his  canvas  by 
his  worst  sailers;  and,  keeping  off  by  degrees,  lie  steered  from  first 
to  last  ten  or  twelve  different  courses."  Hughes,  on  his  part,  while 
perfectly  clear  as  to  his  own  object,  was  somewhat  perplexed  by  the 
seeming  indecision  of  an  adversary  whose  fighting  purpose  he  knew 
bv  experience.  "Sometimes  they  edged  down,"  he  wrote;  "some- 
times they  brought-to;  in  no  regular  order,  as  if  undetermined  what 
to  do."  These  apparent  vacillations  were  due  to  the  difficulty  of 
maintaining  the  line  of  bearing,  which  was  to  be  the  line  of  battle; 
and  this  difficulty  was  the  greater,  because  Hughes  was  continually 
altering  his  course  and  Suffren's  ships  were  of  unequal  speed. 

At  length,  at  '2  P.M.,  being  then  twenty-five  miles  south-east  of 
the  port,  the  French  drew  near  enough  to  bear  down.  That  this 
movement  might  be  carried  out  with  precision,  and  all  the  vessels 
come  into  action  together,  Suffren  caused  his  fleet  to  haul  to  the 
wind,  on  the  starboard  tack,  to  rectify  the  order.  This  also  being 
done  poorly  and  slowly,  he  lost  patience;  and  at  2.30,  to  spur  on 
the  laggard  ships,  he  gave  the  signal  to  attack,  specifying  pistol- 
range  (A).  Even  this  not  sufficing  to  fetch  the  delinquents  promptly 
into  line  with  the  flag-ship,  the  latter  fired  a  gun  to  enforce  obedi- 
ence. Her  own  side  being  still  turned  towards  the  British,  as  she 
waited,  the  report  was  taken  by  the  men  below  to  be  the  signal 
for  opening  fire,  and  her  whole  broadside  was  discharged.  This 
example  was  followed  by  the  other  ships,  so  that  the  engagement, 
instead  of  being  close,  was  begun  at  half  cannon-shot. 

Owing  to  his  measured  and  deliberate  retreat,  Hughes  had  his 
fleet  now  in  thoroughly  good  shape,  well  aligned  and  closed-up.  The 
French,  starting  from  a  poor  formation  to  perform  a  difficult  evolu- 
tion, under  fire,  engaged  in  utter  disorder  (B).  Seven  ships,  round- 
ing-to  too  soon  and  fore-reaching,  formed  a  confused  group,  much  to 
windward  and  somewhat  ahead  of  the  enemy's  van.  Imperfectly 
deployed,  their  fire  could  not  be  adequately  developed.  In  the 


1782.] 


SUFFBEN  AXD  HUGHES. 


559 


rear  a  somewhat  similar  condition  existed.  Suffren,  expecting  the 
bulk  of  his  line  to  fight  the  British  to  windward,  had  directed 
the  Vengeur,  64,  and  the  Consolante,  36,  to  double  to  leeward  on  the 
extreme  rear;  but  they,  finding  that  the  weather  sides  of  the  enemy 
were  not  occupied,  feared  to  go  -to  leeward,  lest  they  should  be  cut 
off.  They  attacked  the  rear  British  ship,  the  Worcester,  64,  Captain 
Charles  Wood,  to  windward;  but  the  Monmouth,  64,  Captain  James 
Alms  (1),  dropping  down  to  her  support,  and  the  Vengcur  catching 


AMD     HoOHE3. 
Scr-T"  /7&2 


CX. 


SUFFREJT  AXD   HUGHES. 


fire  in  the  mizzen  top,  they  were  compelled  to  haul  off.  Only  Suffren's 
own  ship,  the  Heros,  74  (a),  and  her  next  astern,  the  Illustrc,  74, 
came  at  once  to  close  action  with  the  British  centre ;  but  subsequently 
the  Ajax,  64,  succeeding  in  clearing  herself  from  the  snarl  in 
the  rear,  took  station  ahead  of  the  Heros.  Upon  these  three  fell  the 
brunt  of  the  fight.  They  not  only  received  the  broadsides  of  the 
ships  immediately  opposed  to  them,  but,  the  wind  having  now  become 
light  yet  free,  the  British  vessels  ahead  and  astern,  by  luffing  or 


560  MAJOR  OPERATIONS.     1762-1783.  [1782. 

keeping  off,  played  also  upon  them.  "The  enemy  formed  a  semi- 
circle around  us,"  wrote  Suffren's  chief  of  staff,  "and  raked  us  ahead 
and  astern,  as  the  ship  came  up  and  fell  off  with  the  helm  to  lee- 
ward." The  two  seventy-fours  were  crushed  under  this  fire.  Both 
lost  their  main  and  mizzen  masts  in  the  course  of  the  day,  and  the 
foretopmast  of  the  flagship  also  fell.  The  Ajax  arriving  later,  and 
prohably  drawing  less  attention,  had  only  a  topmast  shot  away. 

The  British  total  of  killed  and  wounded  was  very  evenly  dis- 
tributed throughout  the  fleet.  Only  the  rear  ship  lost  an  important 
spar,  —  the  main  topmast.  It  was  upon  her,  as  already  mentioned, 
and  upon  the  two  leading  ships,  the  Exeter  and  Isis,  that  fell  the 
heaviest  fire,  proportionately,  of  the  French.  From  the  position  of 
the  seven  van  ships  of  the  latter,  such  fire  as  they  could  make  must 
needs  be  upon  the  extreme  British  van,  and  the  Exeter  was  forced  to 
leave  the  line.  The  loss  of  the  French  that  day  was  82  killed  and 
255  wounded;  of  which  64  killed  and  178  wounded  belonged  to  the 
Hvros,  Jthtstre,  and  Ajay:  The  British  had  51  killed  and  283 
wounded;  the  greatest  number  of  casualties  in  one  ship  being  56. 
Singularly  enough,  in  such  a  small  list  of  deaths,  three  were  com- 
manding officers:  Captains  James  Watt,  of  the  Sultan,  Charles 
Wood  of  the  Worcester,  and  the  Hon.  Thomas  Charles  Lumley  of  the 
his. 

At  5.30  P.M.  the  wind  shifted  suddenly  from  south-west  to  east- 
south-east  (C).  The  British  wore  together,  formed  on  the  other  tack, 
and  continued  the  fight.  It  was  during  this  final  act,  and  at  6  P.M., 
that  the  mainmast  of  the  French  flagship  came  down.  The  van 
ships  of  the  French  had  towed  their  heads  round  with  boats  before 
4,  in  order  to  come  to  the  support  of  the  centre,  in  obedience  to  a 
signal  from  Suffren ;  but  the  light  airs  and  calms  had  retarded  them. 
With  the  shift  they  approached,  and  passed  in  column  between  their 
crippled  vessels  and  the  enemy.  This  manoeuvre,  and  the  failure  of 
daylight,  brought  the  battle  to  an  end.  According  to  Hughes's 
report,  several  of  his  fleet  "  were  making  much  water  from  shot-holes 
so  very  low  down  in  the  bottom  as  not  to  be  come  at  to  be  effectually 
stopped;  and  the  whole  had  suffered  severely  in  their  masts  and 
rigging."  Trincomale  being  in  the  enemy's  possession,  and  the  east 
coast  of  Ceylon  an  unsafe  anchorage  now,  at  the  change  of  the 
monsoon,  he  felt  compelled  to  return  to  Madras,  where  he  anchored 
on  the  9th  of  the  month.  Suffren  regained  Trincomale  on  the  7th 
of  September,  but  the  Orient,  74,  running  ashore  at  the  entrance 


1783.]  SUFFREN  AND  HUGHES.  561 

and  being  lost,  he  remained  outside  until  the  17th,  saving  material 
from  the  wreck. 

The  break-up  of  the  south-west  monsoon,  then  at  hand,  is  apt  to 
be  accompanied  by  violent  hurricanes,  and  is  succeeded  by  the  north- 
east monsoon,  during  which  the  east  coast,  of  the  peninsula  and  of 
Ceylon,  is  a  lee  shore,  .with  heavy  surf.  Naval  operations,  there- 
fore, were  suspended  for  the  winter.  During  that  season  Trincomale 
is  the  only  secure  port.  Deprived  of  it,  Hughes  determined  to 
go  to  Bombay,  and  for  that  purpose  loft  Madras  on  the  17th  of 
October.  Four  days  later  a  reinforcement  of  five  ships  of  the  line 
arrived  from  England,  under  Commodore  Sir  Richard  Biekerton,  Bart., 
who  followed  the  Commander-in-Chief  at  once  to  the  west  coast.  In 
the  course  of  December  the  entire  British  force  was  united  at  Bombay. 

In  Trincomale  Suffren  had  a  good  anchorage;  but  the  insuffi- 
ciency of  its  resources,  with  other  military  considerations,  decided 
him  to  winter  at  Acheen,  at  the  west  end  of  Sumatra.  lie  arrived 
there  on  the  2nd  of  November,  having  first  paid  a  visit  to  Cuddalore, 
where  the  Bizarre,  64,  was  wrecked  by  carelessness.  On  the  "20th  of 
December  he  left  Acheen.  for  the  Coromandel  coast,  having  shortened 
his  stay  to  the  eastward  for  reasons  of  policy.  On  the  8th  ot 
January,  1783,  he  was  off  Ganjam,  on  the  Orissa  coast,  and  thence 
reached  Trincomale  again  on  the  23rd  of  February.  There  he  was 
joined  on  the  10th  of  March  by  three  ships  of  the  line  from  Europe:  2 
seventy-foui-s  and  1  sixty-four.  Under  their  convoy  fame  General  de 
Bussy,  with  2,500  troops,  who  were  at  once  dispatched  to  Cuddalore. 

On  the  10th  of  April  Vice-Admiral  Ilught's,  returning  from 
Bombay,  passed  Trincomale  on  the  way  to  Madras.  The  various 
maritime  occurrences  since  the  battle  of  September  3rd  had  reversed 
the  naval  odds,  and  Hughes  now  had  eighteen  ships  of  the  line,  one 
of  which  was  an  eighty,  opposed  to  fifteen  under  Suffren.  Another 
important  event  in  the  affairs  of  India  was  the  death  of  Hyder  Ali, 
on  the  7th  of  December,  1782.  Although  his  policy  was  continued 
by  his  son,  the  blow  to  the  French  was  serious.  Under  all  the  con- 
ditions, the  British  authorities  were  emboldened  to  attempt  the 
reduction  of  Cuddalore.  The  army  destined  to  this  enterprise 
marched  from  Madras,  passed  round  Cuddalore,  and  encamped  south 
of  it  by  the  shore.  The  supply-ships  and  lighter  cruisers  anchored 
near,  while  the  fleet  cruised  to  the  southward,  where,  being  to  wind- 
ward, for  the  south-west  monsoon  had  then  set  in,  it  covered  the 
operations  against  disturbance  from  the  sea. 

VOL.  in. —36 


562  MAJOR   OPERATIONS.     1762-1783.  [1783. 

Towards  the  Ixjginning  of  June  the  investment  of  the  place  was 
complete  by  land  and  by  water.  Intelligence  of  this  state  of  things 
was  brought  on  the  10th  of  June  to  Suffren,  who  by  Bussy's  direc- 
tion was  keeping  his  inferior  fleet  in  Trincomale  until  its  services 
should  be  absolutely  indispensable.  Immediately  upon  receiving 
the  news  he  left  port,  and  on  the  13th  sighted  the  British  fleet,  then 
at  anchor  off  Porto  Novo,  a  little  south  of  Cuddalore.  Upon  his 
approach  Hughes  moved  off,  and  anchored  again  five  miles  from  the 
besieged  place.  For  the  next  two  days  the  French  were  baffled  by 
the  winds;  but  on  the  17th,  the  south-west  monsoon  resumed,  and 
Suffren  again  drew  near.  The  British  Vice-Admiral,  not  caring  to 
accept  action  at  anchor,  got  under  way,  and  from  that  time  till  the 
20th  remained  outside,  trying  to  obtain  the  weather-gage,  in  which 
lie  was  frustrated  by  the  variableness  of  the  winds.  Meanwhile 
Suffren  had  anchored  near  the  town,  communicated  with  the  general, 
and,  being  very  short  of  men  at  the  guns,  had  embarked  1,200  troops 
for  his  expected  kittle;  for  it  was  evident  that  the  issue  of  the  siege 
would  turn  upon  the  control  of  the  sea.  On  the  18th  he  weighed 
again,  and  the  two  fleets  maiiu'iivred  for  the  advantage,  with  light 
ballling  airs,  the  British  furthest  from  shore. 

On  the  20th  of  June,  the  wind  holding  at  west  with  unexpected 
constancy,  Hughes  decided  to  accept  the  attack  which.  Suffren  evi- 
dently intended.  The  latter,  being  distinctly  inferior  in  force,  — fif- 
teen to  eighteen, —  contemplated  probably  an  action  that  should  be 
decisive;  only  as  regarded  the  fate  of  Cuddalore;  that  is,  one  which, 
while  not  resulting  in  the  capture  or  destruction  of  ships,  should 
compel  his  opponent  to  leave  the  neighbourhood  to  repair  damages. 
The  British  formed  line  on  the  port  tack,  heading  to  the  northward. 
Suffren  ranged  his  fleet  in  the  same  manner,  parallel  to  the  enemy, 
and  was  careful  to  see  the  order  exact  before  bearing  down.1  When 
the  signal  to  attack  was  given,  the  French  kept  away  together,  and 
brought-to  again  on  the  weather  beam  of  the  British,  just  within 
point-blank  range.  The  action  lasted  from  shortly  after  4  P.M.  to 
nearly  7,  and  was  general  throughout  both  lines;  but,  as  always 
experienced,  the  rears  were  less  engaged  than  the  centres  and  vans. 
No  ship  was  taken;  no  very  important  spars  seem  to  have  been  shot 
away.  The  loss  of  the  British  was  99  killed,  434  wounded;  of  the 
French,  102  killed,  386  wounded. 

As  the  ships'  heads  were  north,  the  course  of  the  action  carried 
1  See  note  on  next  page. 


1783.] 


SUFFREN  AND  HUGHES. 


563 


them  in  that  direction.  Suffren  anchored  next  morning  twenty-five 
miles  north  of  Cuddalore.  There  he  was  sighted  on  the  22nd  by 
Hughes,  who  had  remained  lying-to  the  day  after  the  fight.  The 
British  Vice-Admiral  reported  several  ships  nrach  disabled,  a  great 
number  of  his  men  —  1,121  —  down  with  scurvy,  and  the  water  of  the 
fleet  very  short.  He  therefore  thought  it  necessary  to  go  to  Madras, 
where  he  anchored  on  the  25th.  Suffren  regained  Cuddalore  on  the 
afternoon  of  the  23rd.  His  return  and  Hughes's  departure  com- 
pletely changed  the  military  situation.  The  supply-ships,  upon 
Avhich  the  British  scheme  of  operations  depended,  had  been  forced 
to  take  flight  when  Suffren  first  approached,  and  of  course  could  not 
come  back  now.  "  My  mind  is  on  the  rack  without  a  moment's  rest 
since  the  departure  of  the  fleet,"  wrote  the  commanding  general  on  the 
25th,  "considering  the  character  of  M.  de  Suffren,  and  the  infinite  su- 
periority on  the  part  of  the  French  now  that  we  are  left  to  ourselves." 
The  battle  of  June  20th,  1783,  off  Cuddalore,  was  the  last  of  the 
maritime  war  of  1778.  It  was  fought,  actually,  exactly  five  months 


NOTE.  —  Li>t  of  the  British  and  French  fleets  in  the  action  off  Cuddalore,  on 
June  20th,  1783:  — 


BRITISH. 


SHIPS. 

X 

COMMANDERS. 

SHIPS. 

Cumberland  .     . 

74,  Capt.  William  Allen. 

lleros  .... 

Monmouth      .     . 

t;4  Capt.  James  Alms  (1). 

Fend'i   t    .     . 

Bristol 

">0  Capt.  James  Burney. 

Annib'  I    .     . 

Hero     .     .     . 

1  1  Commod.  Richard  King. 
;  1  Capt.  Theopliilus  Jones. 

Illtixfr        .     . 
Argon   it  ff 

Edfjle   .... 

04  Capt.  William  Clark. 

Veiiffc  r   . 

Mftgnanimr    .     .     ,04  Capt.  Thomas  Mackenzie. 

Sphinx     .     . 

Sceptre      .     .     •     '04  Capt.  Samuel  Graves. 

Artesien    . 

Hill-ford    .     .     . 

f!4  Capt.  Peter  Rainier  (1). 

Ajax 

Monarca    .     .     . 

OS 

Capt.  John  Gell. 

Severe  .     .     . 

(  Vice-Admiral  SirEdward  Hughes. 

Brillant    .     . 

Superb  .... 

7( 

K.  B.  (B). 

If'tnli  .     .     . 

'-Capt.  Henry  Newcome. 

St.  Michel     . 

Sultan  .          .     . 

74  Capt.  Andrew  Mitchell. 

Flamaml  .     . 

Africa  .         .     . 

04  Capt.  Robert  M'DouaU. 

Hannibal  .     . 

Worcester       .     . 

04  Capt.  Charles  Hughea. 

A  poll  on   . 

Exeter  .         .     . 

04  Capt.  John  Samuel  Smith. 

Cleopatre 

Inflexible       .     . 

04 

Capt.    the    Hon.    John   Whitmore 

Coventry 

Chetwynd. 

!  Commodore  Sir  Richard  Bicker- 

Gibraltar  .     .     . 

so 

ton,  Bart. 

Capt.  Thomas  Hicks. 

Is  is 

50 

Defence     .     .     . 

74 

Capt.  Thomas  Newnham. 

Juno  ,     .     . 

32 

Capt.  James  Montagu. 

Medea     .    , 

28 

Capt.  Erasmus  Gower. 

Seahorse  . 

-" 

FRENCH. 


COMMANDERS 


W.  I,.  C. 


564  MAJOR  OPERATIONS.    1762-1783.  [1783. 

after  the  preliminaries  of  peace  had  been  signed.1  Although  the  rela- 
tive force  of  the  two  fleets  remained  unchanged,  it  was  a  French  vic- 
tory, both  tactically  and  strategically :  tactically,  because  the  inferior 
fleet  held  its  ground,  and  remained  in  possession  of  the  field :  strate- 
gically, because  it  decided  the  object  immediately  at  stake,  the  fate 
of  Cuddalore,  and  with  it,  momentarily  at  least,  the  issue  of  the 
campaign.  It  was,  however,  the  triumph  of  one  commander-iii-chief 
over  another;  of  the  greater  man  over  the  lesser.  Hughes's  reasons 
for  quitting  the  field  involve  the  admission  of  liis  opponent's  greater 
skill.  "Short  of  water,"  —  with  eighteen  ships  to  fifteen  that  should 
not  have  happened ;  "  injury  to  spars, "  -  that  resulted  from  the  action ; 
"  1,121  men  short,"  —  Suffren  had  embarked  just  that  number — 1,200 
— .because  Hughes  let  him  communicate  with  the  port  without  fight- 
ing. Tliis  is  not  the  place,  nor  is  there  room,  for  enlargement  upon 
the  merits  of  Suffren ;  upon  the  diiliculties  lie  surmounted,  and  the 
genius  he  showed.  He  was  a  great  sea-captain,  Hughes  was  not; 
and  with  poorer  instruments,  both  in  men  and  ships,  the  former  over- 
came the  latter. 

On  the  2'.)th  of  June  a  British  frigate,  the  Medea,  bearing  a  flag  of 
truce,  readied  Cuddaloie.  She  brought  well-authenticated  intelli- 
gence of  the  conclusion  of  peace;  and  hostilities  ceased  by  common 
consent. 

1  January  20,  1783. 


APPENDIX. 


565 


APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTEE  XXXI. 

LIST  OF  Bumsu  FLAG-OFFICERS  ON  THK  ACTIVE  LIST  AT  THE  PROMOTION  OF  OCTOBER  21sT,  1762, 
and  of  all  Officers  who  were  subsequently  i>romoted  to  flag-rank  on  the  active  list,  up  to  the  eve  of  the  outbreak  of  war  with  France,  in  1793. 

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VOL.    III. 


37 


566 


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INDEX. 

VOLUME  III. 


NOTE — British  nat'al  ujficii-s  in  the  following  are  described  an  of  tin'  rank  to  whkh 
they  attained  upon  the  completion  of  their  active  servic". 


ABERCROJIBIE,  GEXEHAI.,  Ill',  185 

Aberdeen,  340 

Abola,  37 

Abraham,  Heights  <>f,  209,  •'!•">" 

Acadia:  see  Nova  Scotia 

Acapulco,  108,  241,  32:! 

Ache,    Admiral    Comte   ,\',    104,    174-182, 
197-199,  274 

Acheen,  132,  561 

Achille,  119,  120  n.,  121,  305,  306,  311,  313 

Achilles,  215  n.,  210,  234  n.,  235,  299,  301, 
311,  313 

Ackworth,  Jacob,  3 

Actseon,  233,   234  n.,   230   and    n.,    242  n., 
313,  373,  376 

Actif,  198  n.,  415 

Action  for  wrongful  trial  by  court-martial, 
350 

Actions  (principal)  :  battle  of  Cape  Passaro, 
33-38 ;  capture  of  Puerto  Bello,  54-57  : 
capture  of  Chagres,  61,  02  ;  Lord  Aubrey 
Beauclerk  and  M.  de  Boisgeroult,  04 
and  n. ;  at  Cartagena,  70-75 ;  at  La 
Guayra,  85-86 ;  at  Puerto  Cabello, 
87-88;  off  Toulon,  93-107;  Lion  and 
Elisabeth,  110,  111  ;  Peyton  and  La 
Bourdonnais,  120 ;  Ansou  and  de  La 
Jonquiere,  124-120 ;  Hawke  and  de 
L'Etenduere,  120-129;  Kuowles  at  Port 
Louis,  133,  134 ;  Knowles's  off  Havana, 
135-137;  Watson  at  Geriah,  143,  144; 
Byng  and  de  La  Galissonniere,  147-155 ;  '. 
capture  of  Calcutta,  101,  162  ;  capture  of 
Chandernagore,  163  :  Forrest  and  de  Ker- 
saint,  165,  166 ;  off  Cuddalore,  174-170  :  | 
off  Negapatam,  179-181 ;  reduction  of 
Louisbourg,  183,  184 ;  Boscawen  and 
du  Chaffault,  185,  186  ;  capture  of  Goree, 
188,  189;  Osborn  and  Duquesne,  189, 
190;  Pocock  and  d'Ache  (Sept.  10th, 
1759),  198,  199  ;  capture  of  Guadeloupe, 
202,  203 ;  capture  of  Quebec,  204-210 ; 
Boscawen  and  de  La  Clue,  211-215; 


Hawke  and  de  Conflans,  210-223  ;  Cap- 
tain Norbury  and  a  French  squadron, 
225,  220 ;  Captain  Elliot  and  M.  Thurot, 
230;  capture  of  lielle  Isle,  234-236  ;  cap- 
ture of  Manilla,  239-242 ;  capture  of 
Martinique,  243 ;  in  the  River  Plate,  251, 
252 ;  capture  of  the  Northumberland, 
274,  275;  Xuttimjlvim  and  Mars,  281, 
282;  the  Olorioto  taken,  285,  280;  the 
Magnanime  taken,  287;  Huckin<ih<iiit 
and  Florinaiit.  300  ;  Vestal  and  Hellom; 
300,  301;  the  Dunne  taken,  301;  I'ni- 
corn  and  I'estule,  304;  Minerva  and 
Warwick,  304,  305  ;  Vellona  and  Oott-ra- 
geux,  300,  307 ;  Phmiij;  and  7?<;so/«, 
352  ;  off  Valcour  Island,  303-308 ;  Parker 
at  Charleston,  373-379 ;  Keppel  and 
d'Orvilliers,  off  Ushant,  413-420;  Bar- 
rington  and  d'Estaing,  431,  432  ;  Byron 
and  d'Estuing,  off  Grenada,  434-440; 
Rodney's  action  off  St.  Vincent,  449,  450; 
Rodney's  relief  of  Gibraltar,  451 ;  Rodney 
and  de  Guichen,  453-403;  Rodney  nnd 
de  Guichen  again,  403-466  and  466"-4G8  ; 
Cornwallis  and  La  Motte-Picquet,  473, 
474 ;  Cornwallis  and  de  Teruay,  474- 
477 ;  capture  of  St.  Eustatia,  etc.,  480, 
481;  Hood  and  de  Grasse,  482-488; 
Arbuthnot  and  des  Toucb.ee,  489-493 . 
Graves  and  de  Grasse,  495-502  ;  battle 
of  the  Doggersbank,  504-509 ;  Kempen- 
felt  and  de  Gnichen,  509,  510 ;  Hood  and 
de  Grasse  at  St.  Kitts,  512-519;  Rodney 
and  de  Grasse,  April  9th,  1782.. 520- 
524;  April  12th,  1782.  .525-535  ;  Howe's 
relief  of  Gibraltar,  540-543  ;  Vemun  and 
Tronjoly,  543 ;  Johnstone  and  Suffren, 
546-549;  Hughes  and  Suffren,  off  Sadras, 
550-552  ;  Hughes  and  Suffren,  off  Pro- 
vidien,  552-554 ;  Hughes  and  Suffren, 
off  Negapatam,  555-557 ;  Hughes  and 
Suffren,  off  Trincomale,  557-560 ;  Hughes 
and  Suffren,  off  Cuddalore,  502-504 


570 


INDEX    TO    VOLUME  III. 


Adionnaire,  415,  458,  539 

Active,  212  n.,  308,   373,   374,   494,   4!)5, 

546  n. 

Atbimant,  492  n.,  497  n. 
Adams,  George,  3 
Adams,  H.,  shipbuilder,  12 
Adams,  Captain  Sir  Thomas,  Bart.,  232 
Adams,  Captain  William  (1),  131  n.,  132 
Adams,   Captain  William  (2),  206  n.,  208, 

226  n.,  25;'. 

Administration  of  the  Navy,  1,  325 
Aifmintul  De  Jluiitrr,  505  n. 
Admiraal  Gfeneraal,  505  n. 
Adininiid  Piet  Hrijn,  505  11. 
Admirals,  19,  20 

Admirals  of  the  Fleet,  19,  .",9  and  n.,  237 
Admiralty's  attempt   to  inllict   punishment 

irrespective   of  the   sentence   of  a   court- 
martial,  350,  351 
Admiralty  Board,  I,  2,  3,  .",25 
Admiralty  Buildings,  2 
Admiralty,  Court  of,  350 
Admiralty's  politeness  to  La  Pcrouse,  352 
Adventure,  H,  23-1  n.,  29.",,  311,  337 
Adi-ir,;  86,  88,  121 
.-Kolas,  230  and  n.,  .",01,  313 
.Etna  or  Etna,  Id  n.,  212  n.,  215,  231  n., 

335 
Afthvk,  ] tear-Admiral  Sir  Edmund,  Bart., 

234  n.,  395  n.,  -192  n.,  513  n.,  520  n.,  5li7 
Affleck,  Admiral  1'hilip,  212  n.,  225,  466  n., 

567 

Affleck,  Captain  William  (1),  434,  454  n. 
Afrim,   71  n.,   72,   135  n.,   130,    314,   315, 

563  n. 

Africa  Company,  The  Itoval,  260 
Ayiiiiieiuiion,  509  n.,  520  n. 
Ai/iiil<i,  34,  314 
Atruirrc,  Captain  Don  Pablo  Augustin   de. 

268 

A  ir/le,  314 

Ai'irt-tti;  218  n.,  300  n.,  304 
Aiguillon,  Due  d',  195,  196 
Aiken,  Captain,  (Russian  Navy),  341 
Aimtible,  537 
Ait-labie,  John,  3 
Aix,   Isle  ,1',   124,  12G,  171,  172,  ]90,  191, 

236 
Aix-la-Chapelle,   Treaty   of,  29,  132,   138; 

Congress  of,  l.'Jo 
Ajaccio,  273,  314 
Ajux,  254  D.,  482  n.,  497  n.,  505  n.,  513  n., 

520  n.,  550  n.,  555,  559,  560,  563  n. 
Alarm,    14,    224  n.,    246  n.,    247   and    n., 

315  (2),  336,  520  n. 
Alassio,  85 

Albany,  New  York,  360,  370,  389,  391,  393 
Albany,  311,  313,  318 
Albemarle,  537 
Albemarle,  General   George,  Earl   of,   238, 

246,  248,  249 
Alberoni,  Cardinal,  30,  33 
Albert,  Marquis  d',  96,  287  and  n. 


Albion,  395  n.,  434,  453,  454  n.,  459 

Akide,  141,  142,  206  n.,  209,  220  n.,  226  n., 
242  n.,  245  n.,  246  n.,  250,  289,  312,  313, 
482  n.,  497  n.,  513  n.,  520  n. 

Alcion,  96,  123  n.,  295,  297,  312 

Akion,  96 

Aldborouali,  234  n. 

Alderete,  Captain  Don  Gabriel,  34 

Aldirney,  60,  62  n.,  76  n.,  103,  223  n. 

Alecto,  335 

Alert,  415,  505  n.,  520  n. 

Ali-nmder,  282,  509  u. 

Alexander,  shipbuilder,  12 

AJuxandre,  415 

Alfred,  482  n.,  497  u.,  512,  513  u.,  520  u., 
521,  534 

Algeciras,  292,  448,  540,  541 

Algier  or  Algiers,  288 

Alicant,  51 

Allen,  Captain  Edward,  60,  276,  310 

Allen,  Ethan,  355 

Allen,  E.,  shipbuilder,  12,  335 

Allen,  J.,  shipbuilder,  12 

Allen,  Lieutenant  James,  311 

Allen,  Admiral  John  Carter,  188,  233  n., 
242  n.,  415,  567 

Alliance:  with  Russia,  Denmark,  and 
Holland,  26;  with  France  and  the 
Empire,  29 ;  with  France,  the  Empire, 
and  Holland,  29;  with  France  and 
Prussia,  12;  with  Denmark,  43;  with 
Spain,  France,  and  Holland,  48;  with 
Holland,  Austria,  Saxony,  and  Sardinia, 
89  n. ;  of  France  with  Prussia,  Hessen, 
and  the  Pfal/,  89  n. ;  of  France  with 
Spain,  89,  238;  with  Portugal,  238  ;  be- 
tween America  and  the  Bourbon  kin«- 
doins,  354,  368,  3b8,  394  ;  of  France  and 
Spain,  443,  447 

Alliances,  Disadvantages  of,  40 

Allin,  Josei'h,  3 

Alms,  Captain  James  (1),  242  n.,  246  n., 
247,  546  n.,  550  n.,  552  n.,  559 

Alvario,  Captain  Don  C.,  96 

Alverera,  Captain  Don  Francisco,  34 

Amaranthe,  229  and  n.,  230  n. 

Amazon,  201  n.,  283  n.,  284,  312 

Amblimont,  Captain  d',  127  n.,  415 

Amboy,  New  Jersey,  388 

Ambrose,  Captain  John,  96,  104 

Ambuscade,  125  n.,  212  n.,  251,  296 

America :  see  also  North  America,  etc.,  310 

America,  96,  98,  212  and  n.,  213,  214,  215, 
222  n.,  224,  225,  240  n.,  247  n.,  315,  415, 
492  n.,  497  n.,  513  n.,  520  n.,  532 

American  Colonies,  14,  58,  109,  113-115, 
116,  117,  166-169,  243,  262,  331,  354 

I't   SCI]. 

American  Indians,  109,  115,  139,  226,  366 

Amethyst,  303 

Amherst,   Admiral   John,   148  n.,   206   n., 

311,  566 
Amherst.  Field-Marshal  Jeffrey,  Lord  Am- 


INDEX   TO    VOLUME  III. 


571 


herst,  182,  183,  180,  204,  205,  208,  210, 

226,  228 
Amphion,  415 
Amphitrite,  3-35,  505  n. 
Anchors,  9 
Andrews,    Captain    Thomas   (2),    123    n., 

133  n.,  141,  148  n.,  150 
Andro,  Port,  235 
Andromache,  520  n. 
Andromague,  415 
Andromeda,  415,  454  n.,  479  n. 
Anemone,  313 

Angell,  Captain  Henry,  223  n.,  242  n. 
Anglesey,  57,  278,  311 
Angria,  Tulagee,  143,  144 
Anguilla,  109 
Anna,  310,  320 
Annamaboe,  139 
Annapolis  lloyal,  109,  168 
Anne  Galley,  81,  96,  100,  273,  310 
Annibal,  452,  453,  473,  474,  546  n.,  547, 

548,  549,  550  n.,  563  n. 
Anson,  Admiral  of  the  Fleet,  George,  Lord, 

2,  20,    52,    10S,    124,    125   and  n.,  126, 

128  n.,  12!),  192,  19.'-,  237,  247,  267,  281, 

283,  299,  312,  320-324,  333 
Anson,  222  n.,  520  n.,  53.'!  n. 
Antelope,  155,  156,  186,  223  n.,  250,  251, 

295,  312, 313 
Antibes,  123 
Auticosti,  358 
Antigua,  22,  23,  54  n.,  85,  203,  347,  427, 

428,  429,  479,  486,  494,  511,  518,  519 
Antigua,  201  n.,  2-42  n. 
Antilles  :  see  West  Indies 
Antin,   Admiral    the    Marquis   d',   58,   63, 

64  n.,  68,  272 

Antonio,  Captain  Don  J.,  247  n. 
Autrobus,  Captain  Charles,  223  n.,  234  n. 
Anville,  Due  d',  117 
Aplin,  Admiral  Peter,  406  n. 
Apvllo,  131  n.,  311,  406  n.,  407,  408 
Apollon,  125  and  n.,  183,   278,  280,  311, 

313,  563  n. 

Apprenticing  seamen's  children,  342 
Apraxine,  General-Admiral,  43 
Apret,  Captain  d',  174  n.,  176 
Aguilon,  96,  224  n.,  235  n.,  244,  245,  252, 

271,  291,  295,  312 
Aquilon,  247  n.,  315 
Arbuthnot,  Admiral  Harriot  (originally 

Marriott),  218  n.,  246  n.,  248,  250,  327, 

401   n.,   440,   469,   470,  471,  472,  489- 

493,  494,  502,  566 
Arc  en  del,  293,  312 
Archantel,  Captain  de  1',  415 
Arcot,  224 

Arctic,  The,  318-320,  389 
Ardent,  64  n.,  283,  312,  400,  406  n.,  444, 

492  n.,  534 

Ardesoif,  Captain  John  Plummer,  497  u. 
Arethusa,  397,  412,  415,  509  n. 
Arethuse,  302,  313 


Argo,  223  n.,  239,  241  and  n.,  303,  505  n. 

Argonaut,  335 

Arc/onautc,  563  n. 

Argote,  Captain  Don  D.,  247  n. 

Argyle,  34,  35,  36 

Ariadne,  335,  430,  431,  434 

Ariga,  Gulf  of  1',  38 

Armed  Neutrality,  The,  478 

Armed  ships,  330,  392,  546  n. 

Armourers,  342 

Arnold,   General    Benedict,   354-369,   379, 

385,  389,  472,  473,  488,  489,  493 
Arrisago,  Captain  Don  Antonio,  34 
Arror/ant,  520  n. 
Arrows,  Poisoned,  266 
Arsic,  Fort  d',  235,  236 
Artesien,  415,  546  n.,  550  n.,  563  n. 
Articles  of  War,  The,  17  and  n.,  129,  137, 

157  and  n. 
Artois,  505  n. 
Asia,  247  n.,  315,  543  n. 
AssKiiddft,  91 
Assiento  Treaty,  The,  262 
Asuistanci;  86,' 87,  139,  273,  300 
Astra-it,  57  n.,  70  n.,  310,  314 
Astronomer  lloyal,  The,  338 
Asuncion,  249  and  n. 
Atalitii/n,  352 

Atitliiuli;  !)<!,  227,  290,  300  n.,_313 
Atkins,  Captain  Christopher,  373 
Atkins,  Samuel,  3 
Atkins,  Captain  Samuel,  34 
Aubenton,  Captain  d',  415 
Aubigny,  Vice-Admiral  d',  125  n.,  126,  145, 

290 

Aitditi'ii'ii.r,  312 
Audierne  May,  295,  299,  313 
Anqusta,  76,  165  and  n.,  278,  335  (2),  343, 

391,  392 

Aur/usti;  27  and  n.,  282,  310,  312 
Augustus  II.,  Elector  of  Saxony  and  King 

of  Poland,  49 
Aurora,  8,  12,  224  n.,  431 
Auron;  8 
Austria:  (see  also  Empire,  The);  123,  124, 

190 
Auvergne,  Prince  de  Bouillon,  Vice-Admiral 

Philip  d',  546  n. 
A  very,  Daniel,  15 
A  very,  the  buccaneer,  259 
Aylmer,  Admiral  John  (I),  520  n. 
Aylmer,   Admiral   of    the   Fleet    Matthew, 

Lord,  112  n. 
Azores,  The,  285,  443  n. 

Jiadyer,  16,  223  n. 

Bahama,  Old  Strait  of,  247,  312,  496  and  n. 

Bahamas,  The,  266,  311,  469 

Baillie,   Captain   Thomas  (1),  212  n.,  293, 

311 
Baird,   Mr.  Henry  Carey,  of  Philadelphia 

cited,  333  n. 
Baird,  Captain  Patrick,  148  n.,  218  n. 


572 


INDEX   TO    VOLUME  III. 


Baird,  Captain  Sir  William,  Bart.,  198  n. 
Baker,  Captain  James,  211,  212  n. 
Baker,  Tice-Admiral  John,  258 
Balchen,  Admiral  Sir  John,  34,  49,  63,  65, 

90  n.,  91,  107,  108  and  n.,  267,  284,  310 
Bahine,  224,  313 
Balfour,  Captain  George,  184,  185,  222  n., 

346  and  n.,  395  n.,  489,  520  n. 
Ballasore,  163 
Baltic,  The,  26,  27,  28,  38,  40-43,  47,  256, 

257,  310,  478,  504,  538 
Jtaltimore,  113,  206  n.,  282 
Banca,  Strait  of,  108 
Bunks,    or    Bancks,   Captain    Francis   (1), 

242  n.,  246  n.,  385,  387 
Bar,  New  York,  401  and  n. 
Bnradera,  The,  Git,  71,  72 
Barhados,  201,  233,  242,  245,  338,  427,  428, 

429,  466,  468,  478,  479,  487,  48f,  502, 

510,  519,  520,  537 
liurlmdos,  242  n.,  246  n.,  479  n. 
Barbarat,  Keys  of,  88 
Barbary,  Coast  of,  211,  257,  258,  541 
Harbor,  Captain  Kobert,  520  n. 
Barbuda,  311,  468,  470 
Barcelona,  32,  6<i,  67,  155 
Barclay,  Captain  Sir  James,  Bart.,  406  n. 
Jiurtlrur,  12,  34,  35,  36,  96,  97,  98  and  n., 

171,  172,  335,  343,  482  n.,  497  n.,  513 

and  n.,  514,  516,  517,  520  n.,  521,  526, 

530,  532,  534,  535 
Barham,  Lord :  see  Middleton,  Admiral  Sir 

Charles 
Barker,    Rear-Admiral   John   (1),   212   n., 

245  n.,  246  n.,  566 

Barkley,  Captain  Andrew,  513  n.,  5.0  n. 

Barlow,  the  navigator,  318 

Barnard,  shipbuilder,  12 

Barnet,  Captain  Curtis,  81,  82,  91,  105,  10,-f, 

309,  119,  270,  271 

Barnsley,  Captain  Henry,  169  and  n.,  311 
Barrabas  Point,  188 
Barradell,  Captain  Bloomfield,  125  n. 
Barrailh,  M.  dc,  90,  91 
Barras,  Commodore  de,  492,  495,  496,  501 
Barre,  Isaac,  326 
Barre,  Major,  228 
Barrella,  Captain  Don,  135  n. 
Barrida,  Captain  Don  B.  de  La,  96 
Barrington,  Major-General  Hon.  John,  203 
Barrington,  Admiral  Hon.  Samuel,  139  n., 

215  n.,  21G,  234  n.,  236,  284,  299,  301, 

427-433,  434,  436,  437,  440,   477,  5^0, 

521,  538,  539,  566 
Barrington,   William    Wildman,   Viscount, 

3,  3^6 
Barton,    Admiral    Matthew,    188    and   n., 

234  n.,  235,  242  n.,  245  n.,  246  n.,  248, 

311,  566 

Bashee  Islands,  318,  323 
Jiasilisk,  34,  131  n.,  132,  215  n.,  242  n., 

246  n.,  312 

Basin  of  Quebec,  207,  227 


Basque  Road,  126,  191,  223,  236,  239,  252 

Basse  Tcrre,  St.  Kitts,  510,  511,  513  n. 

Basse  Terre,  Guadeloupe,  202,  203 

Basset,  Captnin  Christopher,  156,  212  n. 

Bastard,  M.P.,  Mr.,  346,  347 

Bastia,  116 

Bastimentos,  The,  43,  46,  79 

Batavia,  131,  201 

Hatavier,  505  n. 

Bateley,  William,  3,  326 

Bateman,  Captain   Nathaniel,  226  n.,  434, 

454  n.,  456  n. 

Bateman,  Captain  Hon.  William,  3,  4,  326 
Batiscan,  207,  209 
Batson,  M.,  shipbuilder,  12 
Batteries  v.  Ships,  Washington's  views  on, 

385 

Batticaloa,  197,  554,  £57 
Bayne,   Captain    William,   201  n.,  242  n., 

482  n.,  497  n.,  513  n.,  520  n.,  534 
Bayona  Islands,  302 
Bayonets,  9,  158,  183,  209 
Bayonne,  308 

Bazely,  Admiral  John  (1),  415,  417,  454  n. 
Beacliy  Head,  Battle  of,  439 
Beatson  quoted,  67,  69,  70,  95,  101,  138, 

151  n.,  210,  214,  388,  499,  503 
Beauclerk,  Captain  Lord  Aubrey,  64,  65,  71, 

Beauclerk,  Admiral  Lord  Vere,  later  Lord 

Vere,  4 
BeaulVremont-Listenois,      Commodore     the 

Prince  de,  218  n.,  220,  223 
Beaulfremont,  Commodore  de,  146,  167 
Beaillieu,  12 

Beaumier,  Captain  de,  415 
Beaunes,  Captain  de,  415 
Beauport,  206 

Beaussier,  Commodore  de,  145,  182 
/leaver's  Prize,  479  n. 
Beavor,  Captain  Edmund,  311 
Bee  de  Lievre,  Captain,  174  n.,  179  n. 
Beccart,  Captain,  125  n. 
Becher,  Commander  John,  400  n. 
Bedford,  John,  Duke  of,  2,  20 

Bedford, ,  Duke  of,  230,  253 

litdford,  83  n.,  96,  98,  206  n.,  235  n.,  281, 

305,  310,  313,  395  n.,  489,  492  n.,  497  n., 

513  n.,  514,  520  n.,  531 
Bedoyere,  Captain  de  La,  127  n. 
JieekMet,  91 
Jiegon,  229,  230  n. 
Belfast,  229,  230 
Bell,  Governor,  169 
Belleisle,  Mare'chal  de,  124 
lidleish,  246  n.,  545  n. 
Belle  Isle,  110,  217,  218,  219,  234-236,  242, 

254,  283,  284,  311,  314 
lielh  Poule,  397,  412,  505  n. 
Bellingham,  William,  326 
lielliqwux,   185,    186,   217,   313,   482    n., 

497  n.,  513  n.,  520  n. 
liclhna,  284,  306,  307,  313,  505  n. 


INDEX    TO    VOLUME  III. 


573 


Bellone,  113,  284,  300,  301,  312, 313,  550  n. 

Bencote,  (Fort  A^ictoria),  1 43 

Bengal,  121,  160,  161  n.,  162-164,  201,  254 

Bengal,  Bay  of,  109 

Bennett,    Commander    Thomas    Stanhope, 

546  n. 

Bentinck,  Captain  John  Albert,  303 
Bentinck,  Captain  W.  J.,  505  n. 
Bentley,   Vice-Admiral    Sir  John,   Kt.,   4, 

125  n.,  127  n.,  182,  212  n.,  215,  218  n., 

311,  326,  565 

Beretti-Landi,  Marques  de,  36,  38 
Bergen,  229 

Berkeley,  Captain  George,  57,  61,  96,  273 
Berkeley,  Admiral  of  the  Fleet  James,  Earl 

of  (earlier  Lord  Dursley),  2,  39  and  n., 

112  n.,  261 
Berkeley,  313 
Bermuda,  426,  429,  474 
Bermudez,  Captain  Don  P.,  247  n. 
Bertie,  Captain  Lord  Thomas,  120  n. 
Bertie,  Colonel  Lord  Robert,  147,  154,  157 
Bertin,  305,  313 
Berwick,  43  n.,  46  n.,  92,  96,  98,  100,  101, 

169,  189,  201  n.,  202,  203,  313,  315,  415, 

505  n. 

Betagh,  William,  310,  318 
Bethell,    Captain    Christopher    Codrington, 

223  n. 

Beverley,  Captain  Thomas,  34 
Bic,  Isle,  206 
Biche,  183,  313 
Bickerton,  Rear-Admiral  Sir  Richard,  Bart., 

212  n.,  246  n.,  343,  415,  482  n.,  561,  567 
Biddeford,  262,  302,  311 
Bien  Acquise,  295,  297,  312 
Bien  Aime,  83  n.,  174  n.,  175,  176,  313, 

415 
Bienfaisutit,  184,  185,  222  n.,  228,  313  (2), 

415,  505  n. 

Biggs,  Vice-Admiral  Robert,  415 
Bird,  H.,  shipbuilder,  335 
Biscay,   Bay   of,  129,  147,  232,  233,  283, 

295,  297,  310,  313,  481,  509,  538 
Bizarre,  218  n.,  299,  300,  550  n.,  561 
"  Blackbeard  "  :  see  Thatch,  Edward 
Black  Hole  of  Calcutta,  The,  161 
Blacksmiths,  342 
Blair  Captain  William,  395  n.,  434,  505  n., 

520  n.,  533  n. 

Blake,  Commander  Peter,  311 
Blake,  Governor,  161 
Blakeney,  General   William,   63,   74,    146, 

148, 153 
Blanche,  479  n. 
Blandford,  289,  310,  311  (2) 
Blane,  Sir  Gilbert,  450,  533,  534 
Blankett,  Rear- Admiral  John,  545  n. 
Blast,  34,  215  n.,  236  and  n.,  311,  520  n. 
Blaze,  161  n. 

Blenac,  Commodore  de,  244,  245,  246,  252 
Blenheim,  12 
Bligh,  Lieutenant^General  Thomas,  193-195 


Blockade  in  winter,  Difficulties  of,  189,  216, 
217 

Blockade:  of  Puerto  Bello,  44  ;  of  Chagres, 
61  ;  of  Santiago,  76 ;  of  Toulon  by 
Mathews,  84,  85,  89;  of  Cartagena,  lib, 
124;  of  Antibes,  123;  of  Pondicherry, 
131  ;  of  Brest,  145,  146,  170,  171,  195, 
196 ;  of  Louisbourg,  115,  141,  168,  172, 
182 ;  of  French  Channel  ports,  173 ;  of 
Cartagena,  189,  190;  of  Toulon  by  Bos- 
cawen,  211 ;  of  Cadiz,  215 ;  of  Brest  by 
Hauke,  216,  223;  of  Dunquerque,  223; 
of  Le  Havre,  224 ;  of  Pondicherry,  224, 
225;  of  Quiberon  Bay,  2.'tl,  232;  of 
Martinique,  242 ;  of  Grenada,  244 ;  of 
Cape  Francois,  246 ;  of  St.  John's,  251 ; 
of  French  ports,  252;  of  Fort  Royal, 
481 

Blockmakers,  342 

Blonde,  230  and  n.,  231,  301,  366 

Blue  uniform,  Origin  of  the,  20 

Board  of  Longitude,  13,  338 

Board  of  Ordnance,  332 

Boatswains,  19,  21 

Boca  Chica,  69 

Boca  Nao,  River,  248 

Boisgeroult,  Captain  d'Epinai  de,  64  n. 

Boles,  Commander  John,  201  n. 

Bolt-drawing  machine,  337 

Bolt  Head,  231,  311 

Bolton,  Duke  of:  see  Powlett,  Admiral  Lord 
Harry 

Bombardment :  of  Cartagena,  60,  61 ;  of 
Chagres,  62 ;  of  Bastia,  116  :  of  Madras, 
12  L  ;  of  Chandernagore,  163  ;  of  St. 
Pierre,  202  ;  of  Le  Havre,  216  ;  of  Palais, 
236  ;  of  Fort  Royal,  243  ;  of  Moro  Castle, 
248 

Bombay,  143,  161  n.,  164,  181,  197,  200, 
232,*545,  561 

Bombay,  143 

Bombay  Castle,  340 

Bombs,  12,  30,  33,  34,  40,  42,  46  n.,  47,  59, 
60,  61,  62,  70  n.,  73,  74,  76  n.,  84  n.,  86, 
117,  131  n.,  161.  and  n.,  172,  188,  192, 
201  n.,  200,  206  n.,  209,  215  and  n.,  216, 
234  and  n.,  235,  236  n.,  242  n.,  245  n., 
261,  276,  281,  314,  330,  335,  428  n., 
546  n. 

Bompart,  Commodore  de,  203,  210,  217 

Bond,  Captain  Robert,  206  n. 

Bonechea,  Captain  Don  D.,  247  n. 

Bonetta,  76  n.,  80,  201  n.,  246  n.,  248,  276, 
310 

Bonne  Homme  Richard,  279,  298 

Bonnet,  Stede,  260 

Booms,  69,  72,  76,  135,  389,  445 

Boreas,  185,  215  n.,  225,  226,  246  n.,  298, 
313  (2) 

Boree,  96,  271 

Bornholm,  27 

Boscawen,  206  n.,  207,  280 

Boscawen,   Admiral   Right    Hon.   Edward, 


574 


INDEX   TO    VOLUME  III. 


57  n.,  71,  72  n.,  73  n.,  113,  125  n.,  126, 
130-132,  140,  141,  144,  145,  146,  171, 
172,  173,  182-186,  196,  210-215,  '-'17, 
222,  223,  224,  231  and  n.,  266,  267,  274 
and  n.,  289,  291  n.,  297,  302,  303,  311, 
313,  444  u. 

Boscawen,  General  Hon.  George,  193 

Iloston,  134,  335 

Boston,  Massachusetts,  113,  185,  370,  371, 
387,  409,  410,  428,  488,  495 

Boston,  Captain  Thomas,  509  n. 

Bot-Deru,  Captain  de,  415 

Boteler,  Captain  Philip,  246  n.,  444 

Botterell,  Captain  John,  242  n. 

Boujfonne,  30(1,  313 

Bougainville,  Vice-Admiral  Louis  Antoine 
de,  208  and  n. 

Bouille,  Marquis  de,  453,  463,  510 

Boulogne,  16 

Jioulvr/nr,  308 

Bounties  to  seamen,    18,   ]!),  49,   140,  339, 

340,  342 
linit-nti/,  3:!9 

Buurlion,  or  Reunion,  197,  231,  232,  234 
Jluurbun,  120  n. 

Bourbon  assistance  to  America,  354 
Bourchier,  Captain  .lohn,  520  n. 
Boiinloiinais,  M.  Mahe  de  La,  119-122,  124 
BouritiiiK.  Captain,  505  n. 
Bourke,  Commander  William  Francis,  246  n. 
Bouvet  (2),  Commodore,   130,  132,  174  and 

n.,  176,  179  n.,  198  n. 
Bouvet,  Captain  Conite  de,  289 
Bouvet,     Rear-Admiral     Francois    Joseph, 

Baron,  550  n. 

Bow  and  quarter  line,  513,  531 
Bowater,  Admiral  Edward,  497  n. 
Bowdler,  Captain  John,  84  n. 
Bowen,  Admiral  George  (1),  497  n.  513  n., 

520  n. 
Bowyer,  Admiral  Sir  George,  Bart.,  395  n., 

434,  454  n.,  459,  460 
Boyd,  Captain  John,  233  n.,  242  n. 
Boyle,  Captain  John,  546  n. 
Boyle,  Hon.  Robert:  see  Walsingham,  Cap- 
tain Hon.  Hubert  Boyle 
llui/ite,  66,  70  n.,  71,  72,  75  n.,  76  n.,  79  n., 

80,  92,  96,  98,  104,  395,  428,  431,  434, 

436,  454  n.,  466 
Boys,  Captain   William,    196,   223  and   n., 

229 

Braak,  Captain  A.,  505  n. 
Braani,  Captain  \V.  van,  505  n. 
Brach,  Captain  de,  415 
Bradby,  Captain  James  (1),  415,  509  n. 
Braddock,  General,  139,  140,  141 
Brand,  Captain  Ellis,  27  n. 
Brathwaite,    Admiral    Richard,    387,   404, 

406  n.,  428  n.,  454  n.,  505  n.,  568 
Brave,  510,  530,  536  u. 
Bray,  Captain  John,  206  n.,  347 
Bra/.iers,  342 
Brazil,  50,  260 


lireda,  34,  35,  43  n.,  45 
Brederode,  91 

Brereton,  Captain  William,  174  n.,  177, 
179  n.,  198  n.,  199,  225,  241  and  n.,  415 

Brest,  58,  89,  90,  92,  95,  107,  117, 126,  128, 
140,  142,  145,  146,  164,  167,  169,  170, 
172,  182,  192,  195,  196,  210,  216,  217, 
221,  224,  233,  235,  239,  244,  250,  252, 
275,  276,  277  and  n.,  283,  287,  289,  294, 
295,  299,  302,  305,  308,  311,  312,  313, 
352,  394,  396,  397,  413,  414,  433,  443, 
446,  447,  452,  469,  478,  482,  502,  503, 
504,  509,  510.  519,  539,  546 

Jlretayne,  415,  420 

Brett,  Captain  John,  276,  278 

Brett,  Admiral  Sir  Piercy  (1),  Kt.,  110, 
125  n.,  196,  223,  224  and  n.,  232,  233, 
239,  252,  308,  324,  565 

Brett,  Timothy,  3,  326 

Brett,  Captain  William,  234  n. 

Brice  (later  Kingsmill),  Robert:  see  Kings- 
mill,  Admiral  Sir  Robert,  Bart. 

Bricklayers,  342 

Bricqueville,  Captain  de,  415 

JJriilf/f water,  140,  143,  161  and  n.,  162, 
174,  258,  311 

Bridport,  Lord  :  see  Hood,  Admiral  Alexander 
Arthur 

Brigs,  330 

liriUant,  121,  218  n.,  244,  550  n.,  554,  556, 
563  n. 

Jirillnnte,  96 

Hrillitint,  8,  12,  215,  230  n.,  306 

Brimstone  Hill,  St.  Kitts,  510,  512,  518 

Brine,  Admiral  James,  482  n.,  497  n. 

Brisbane,  Admiral  John,  403,  568 

lirixk,  335 

Bristol,  Earl  of:  see.  Hervey,  Hon.  Augustus 
John 

Bristol,  259,  335,  340,  563  n. 

lirixtol,  76,  125  n.,  201  and  n.,  202,  372, 
37.'!,  374,  .",76,  378,  379,  473,  474 

Jlritannia,  509  n. 

British  ollicers  in  the  Portuguese  service, 
238  and  u. 

Brittany,  113,  118,  119,  196,  302 

Broderick  (jtrojierly  Brodrick),  Vice-Ad- 
miral Thomas,  60  and  n.,  73,  152  and  n., 
155,  156,  170,  171,  190,  210,  211,  212 
and  n.,  214,  215,  298,  311,  565 

Brodie,  Captain  David,  133  n.,  135  n.,  344 
and  n. 

Bromedge,  Captain  Hugh,  215  n. 

Brooks,  Captain  John,  545  n. 

Brown,  Captain  Charles,  4,  51  n.,  54,  55, 
60,  266,  267 

Brown,  Admiral  John,  474  n. 

Browne,  Field-Marshal  Maximilian  Ulysses, 
Count,  123 

Brueys,  Vice-Admiral  Comte  de,  400  n. 

ftritne,  305,  309,  313,  314 

Brunswick,  New  Jersey,  388 

lirunsHiick,  335 


INDEX    TO    VOLUME  HI. 


575 


Bryne,  Captain  Henry,  415,  454  n.,  479  n. 

Buccaneers,  61,  79 

Buckingham,  40  n.,  63,  96,  148  n.,  151  n., 

201  n.,  234  n.,  236  and  n.,  300 
Buckle,   Admiral   Matthew  (1),   139,    185, 

212  n.,  215,  218  n.,  222,  234,  235  and  n., 

286,  305,  566 
Bucklershard,  335 
Bucknall,  J.,  shipbuilder,  335 
Buckner,  Admiral  Charles,  520  n. 
Buenos  Ayres,  251,  252 
Buffalo.  505  n.,  507  and  n.,  508 
Bunker's  Hill,  378 
Buoys,  338 

Burchett,  Josiah,  3,  264 
Burford,  34,  46  n.,  55,  56,  57  n.,  59,  62, 

70  n.,  75  n.,  86,  87,  88,  96,  201  n.,  202, 

218  n.,  234  n.,  310,  545  n.,  550  n.,  552 

n.,  556,  563  n. 
Burgoyne,    Lieutenant-General   John,   354, 

359,  360,  366,  370,  389,  390,  391,  392. 

398 

Burke,  Edmund,  quoted,  379 
Burlington,  388 
Burnaby,  Vice- Admiral  Sir  William,  Bart., 

250,  29'-',  415,  565 
Burnaby,   Captain   Sir   William    Chaloner, 

Bart.,  546  n. 
Burnett,  Captain  Thomas,  201  n.,  202,  227  n., 

242  n.,  246  n.,  312,  492  n.,  520  n. 
BurriKh,  Captain  George,  96,  103 
Bursledon,  335 

Burslem,  Captain  Francis,  218  n. 
Burton,  Richard,  3 
Bury,  Captain  Thomas  (1),  310 
Busses,  187 

Bussy,  General  de,  561,  562 
Bust/,  505  n. 

Butchart,  Captain  John,  434 
Butger,  Commander,  505  n. 
Button,  the  navigator,  318 
Bylandt,    Bear-Admiral    Count     Lodewijk 

van,  351 
Byng,  Sir  George :  see  Torrington,  Admiral 

of  the  Fleet  Sir  George  Byng,  Viscount 
Byng,  Admiral  Hon.  John,  105,  106,  113, 

123,  124,  130,  137,  142,  146-160,  196  n., 

289,  290  and  n.,  292,  293,  423,  467,  468, 

498  n.,  499 

Byng,  Hon.  Henry  Pattee.  3,  33  n. 
Byng,  Robert,  3,  4 

Byron,  Captain  George  Anson,  520  n. 
Byron,   Vice-Admiral    Hon.  John,    190  n., 

224,  228,  235  n.,  313,  322,  324,  395  and 

n.,  396,  399,  404,  408,  409,  410,  412,  428, 

433,  434-440,  443,  452,  4(iO,  473,  566 

CABLES,  9 

Cabot,  505  n. 

Cadiz,  31,  38,  39,  47,  62,  65,  66,  67,  107, 
116,  212  and  n.,  215,  280,  285,  306,  308, 
448,  449,  450,  452,  468,  469,  477,  478, 
502,  503,  504,  509,  539 


Ciesar,  335 

Caimamera,  76  n. 

Calabria,  33 

Calais,  112 

Calcutta,  201 

Calcutta,  160,  161-163,  543 

Caldwell,  Admiral  Benjamin,  509  n.,  520  n. 

California,  317 

California,  319,  320 

Callis,  Rear- Admiral  Smith,  86,  211,  212  n., 

273,  285  n.,  310 
Calmady,  Admiral  Charles  Holmes  Everitt 

(formerly  Charles  Holmes  Everitt),  497  n., 

513  and  n. 

Cal'nady,  Captain  Warwick,  115,  311 
Calypso,  218  n.,  244  n.,  299,  313 
Cambridge.,  96,  101,  201  n.,  202,  246  n.,  248 
Camden,  472 

Camilly,  Vice-Admiral  Blouet  de,  91 
Cammock,  Captain    George   (Rear-Admiral 

in  the  Spanish  Navy),  34,  35  and  n.,  38 
Campbell,  Captain  Alexander  (1),  322 
Campbell,  Colonel  Archibald,  441 
Campbell,  Captain  James  (1),  41  n. 
Campbell,  Captain  James  (2),  167  n.,  206  n., 

242  n.,  245  n.,  246  n. 
Campbell,  Vice-Admiral  John  d),  218  n. 

222,  324,  341,  413  n.,  415,  566 
Campbell,  William,  326 
Campeche,  263 
Canada,  511,  512  and  n.,  513  and  n.,  514, 

516,  520  n.,  530,  531 
Canada,  117,  118,  139,  140,  164,  196,  197, 

204-210,   226-228,   242,  253,  354,  355, 

356,  370,  380,  539 
Canary  Islands,  The,  188,  302 
Cancale  Hay,  192,  193 
Candia,  229 

Candles  in  lighthouses,  14,  15 
Canoa,  Point,  68  n. 
Canso,  109,  113,  115 

Canterbury,  33,  34,  35,  133  n.,  135  n.,  136 
Canton,  323 
Cape  Breton,  109,   115,  116,  124,  166-168, 

184,  191,  206,  25:! 
Cape  Cabron,  San  Domingo,  294 
Cape  Charles,  496 
Cai*  Clear,  282,  311 
Cape  Coast  Castle,  169,  287 
Cape  de  Gata,  189 
Cape  de  Verde  Islands,  546 
Cape  Digges,  320 
Cape  Dob'bs,  319,  320 
Cape  Fear,  372 

Cai*  Finisterre,  283,  301,  303,  448,  540 
Cape  Francois,  123,  165,  225,  245,  246,  314, 

468,  469,  470,  473,  474,  488,  492,  495, 

496,  519,  536,  537 
Cai«  Henry,  489,  496 
Cape  Hope,  319 
Cape  Horn,  267,  317,  321 
Cape  Lopez,  260 
Cape  May,  408 


576 


INDEX    TO    VOLUME   III. 


Care  Mola,  153 

Cape  of  Good  Hope,  130,  197,  232,  350,  545, 
548 

Cape  San  Lucas,  317 

Cape  Spartel,  503 

Cape  St.  Martin,  281 

Cajie  St.  Nicolas,  123,  245,  246 

Cape  St.  Vincent,  285,  477 

Cape  Tiburon,  308 

Cajiridevj;  184,  313 

Captain,  12,  34,  35,  148  n.,  151  n.,  153, 
154,  172,  182,  185,  20G  n.,  27G,  277,  284 

Captain  of  the  Fleet,  341 

Captains,  lit,  20,  22,  340 

Captures,  l.'!8,  310-315,  396  n. 

Caracas,  85,  272 

Carcass,  84  n.,  215  n.,  40G  n.,  428  n. 

Cardaillac,  Captain  de,  5-16  n. 

Cardinals,  The,  21!l,  220 

Cardonnie,  Captain  de  La,  415 

Carenage,  St.  Lucia,  429,  430,  431 

Caribbee  Islands  (.sir  also  West  Indies,  Lee- 
ward Islands,  etc.),  201,  238,  L'44,  519 

Carical,  178,  181,  224 

Carkett,  Benjamin,  265 

Carkett,  Captain  Robert,  190  and  n.,  223  n., 
312,  434,  -'54  n.,  400,  4C1  and  n.,  462, 
468,  479  n. 

Carh-ttin,  .'!<;],  ."65,  ",G6,  369 

Carleton,  Sir  Guy,  K.B.,  356,  357,  358,359, 
362,  363,  365",  367,  368,  369,  370,  371, 
386,  389 

Carlisle  Bay,  Barbados,  201,  233,  242 

Carlos  de  Bourbon,  Don,  48 
Carlos  111.,  King  of  Spain,  t'4 

Carnarvon,  185,  186 

Carnatic,  339,  340 

Carnegie,  Hon.  George  :  see  Xoi  thesk,  Earl  of 
Carnegie,  Lieutenant  Patiick,  366 
Carolina,  259,  269,  289,  299,  311,  371,  372, 

441,  442,  470,  472,  488,  493,  496 
Carpenter,  Captain  Robert,  206  n. 
Carpenters,  19,  205 

Carpenters,  American  lack  of,  359,  361 
Carrickfergus,  229,  130 
Carronades,  330-333,  524 
Carron  Foundiy,  330,  331 
Cartagena,  (S.  America),  44,  52  n.,  54,  59, 
60,  61,  62,  63,  68-75,  78,  272,  274,  279, 
314 

Cartagena  (Spain),  107,  116,  124,  189,  190 
Cartel  et,  Lord,  41 

Cartel et,  Captain  Philip  (1),  1LO  n.,  131  n. 
Carteret,  Captain  Richard,  14,  246  n. 
Cartridge  boxes,  9 
Casaitbon,  312 
Cas  de  Navires,  Bay  of,  Martinique,   201, 

243,  245 

Caskets,  The,  108 
Cassilis,    Earl    of:    see   Kennedy,   Captain 

Archibald 
Caeeimbazar,  160 
Castafieta,  Vice-Admit  al  Don  Antonio,  34, 37 


Castejon,  Captain  Don  P.,  2-17  n. 

Castilla,  34 

Castillo  de  Ferro,  54,  55 

Castillo  Grande,  Cartagena,  69,  72,  73 

Castor,  127  n.,  312,  335 

Castro,  Captain  Don  J.  B.,  96 

Catford,  Captain  Charles,  148  n. 

Cathcart,  Major-General  .Lord,  58,  63,  64 

and  n.,  68 

Catherine :  see  Katherine 
Catherine,  263 
Cato,  412  n.,  508 
C'aton,  524,  525,  537 

Caulfeild,  Captain  Toby,  387,  473,  474  n. 
Cavaigne,  Captain,  34 
Cavendisb,  Admiral  Philip,  66 
Caylufi,  Captain  Chevalier  de,  96,  116,  271 
Cayo  Confite,  249 
Celebre,  184,  313 
Centaur,  233,  246  n.,  250,  303,  306,  415, 

482  n.,  486,  487,  497  n.,  513  n.,  520  n. 
Ccntaure,  121,  198  n.,  199,  212  n.,  213,  214, 

215,  313 

Centurion,  125  n.,  139  n.,  206  n.,  208,  246 
n.,   247,   288,   315,   320-323,   387,   404 
406  n.,  408,  428  n.,  431,  454  n. 
Cerberus,  246  n. 
Ctres,  537 
Cerf,  293 

Cesar,  409,  532,  533  and  n. 
Ccuta,  35,  211 
Ceylon,  197,  550,  552,  553,  554,  557,  560, 

5(il 

Chacon,  Rear-Admiral  Don  Fernando,  34,  35 
Chads,  Captain  James,  206  n.,  234  n. 
Chadwick,  Captain  Richard,  133  n. 
Chagres,  61,  62 

Chaise,  Captain  de  La,  174  n.,  179  n.,  198  n. 
Chalay,  Captain  Principe  de,  34 
Chaleur  Bay,  228,  313 
Chaniba  battery,  Cartagena,  69,  70 
Chambers,    Rear-Admiral    William  (1)  79, 

130 

Chambly,  361 
Chambon,  Governor  of  Louisbourg,  M.  de, 

115 

CJiameleon,  479  n. 
C/iampion,  513  n.,  520  n. 
Champlain,  Lake,  205,  226,  354-370,  371, 

379,  380,  385,  386,  389 
Chandernagore,  163 

Channel,  The,  39,  66,  89,  107,  113,  129, 
147,  196,  215  n.,  222,  224,  232,  250,  252, 
257,  278,  281,  308,  310,  311,  339,  396, 
443,  445,  446,  470,  477,  502,  504,  538, 
o4o 
Channel  Islands :  (see  also  Jersey,  etc.), 

—  c'-i. 

Chaplains,  19 

Chaplen,  Commander  James,  234  n.,  236  n. 

Charente  River,  191,  218  n.,  223,  224,  233, 

237,  252 
Chariot  Royal,  293,  312 


INDEX    TO    VOLUME  III. 


577 


Charles,  34 

Charles  II.,  Act  of  the  13th  of,  82,  100 

Charles  VI.,  The  Emperor,  59 

Charles  VII.,  The  Emperor,  59 

Charles  XII.,  King  of  Sweden,  26,  27,  41 

Charles  Edward,  Prince :  see  Pretender,  The 

Young 
Charleston,   372-379,   383,   442,  470,  472, 

489 

Charleston,  335 
Charlotte,  Queen,  Princess  of  Mecklenburg- 

Strelitz,  237 
Charlotte,  137 

Charnock  quoted,  80,  81-83 
Charrington,    Captain     Nicholas,    497    n., 

513  n.,  520  n. 

Chartres,  Vice-Admiral  the  Due  de,  145 
Charts,  118,  243,  247 
Chase,  A  general,  125,  126,  128,  148,  174, 

176,  178,  180,  191,  197,  198,  212,  414, 

435,  449,  453,  486,  506,  525,  534,  537, 

556 

Chfiteauneuf,  Captain  de,  96 
Chatham,  12,  83  n.,  103,  326,  335,  336 
Chatham,  215  n.,  .217,  218  n.,  232,  313,  387 
Chatham,  John,  Earl  of,  325 
Chausey  Islands,  291 
Chaitcelin,  296,  297 
Cheap,  Captain  David,  310,  320-322 
Cheap's  Bay,  322 
Chebucto,  312 
Chelsea  Hospital,  320 
Cherbourg,  193,  194,  304 
Chesajieake,  The,  359,  370,  390,  392,  405, 

442,  472,  488,  489,  491,  492,  493,  494, 

495,  496,  501,  508,  512 
Chest  at  Chatham,  The,  104 
Cluster,  76  n.,  1-31  and  n.,  253,  278,  283  n., 

312 

Chester,  Pennsylvania,  391 
Chesterfield,  148  and  n.,  153,  154,  249,  287, 

288,  312 
Chevalier,  Captain,  quoted,  486,  487,  504, 

531,  533,  542,  543 
Chettre,  183,  313 
Cheziiie,  210 
Chichester,   70  n.,   75   n.,  92,  96,  98,  104. 

218  n.,  234  n. 

Child.  Admiral  Smith,  492  n.,  497  n. 
Childers,  335 

Children,  Provision  for  seamen's,  342 
Chile,  321 

Chilleau,  Captain  du,  546  n.,  550  n. 
Chiloe,  317,  322 
Chimere,  212  n. 
Chimeiie,  125  n. 
China,  108,  317,  323 
Chinsura,  201 
Choque  Bay,  St.  Lucia,  463 
Chorera,  Piiver,  249 

Christian,  Commander  Brabazon,  406  n. 
Christian,  Rear- Admiral  Sir  Hugh  Cloberry, 

392,  434,  497  n.,  513  n.,  520  u. 


Christie,  Captain  Alexander,  549 

Chronometers,  13,  14 

Churchill  Eiver,  318,  319 

Cillart  de  Suville,  Captain,  415 

Cillart,  Captain  de  Villeneuve,  550  n.,  556 

Ciudadella,  142 

Civil  law,  Supremacy  in  naval  affairs  of  the, 

105,  106 
Cizarga,  443 

Claigeann  Bay,  Islay,  229 
Clarence,  Duke  of  (later  William  IV.) :  see 

William  Henry,  Duke  of  Clarence,  Prince 
Clark,  Captain  Charles,  352 
Clark,  Captain  Edward  (1),  123  n.,  135  n., 

201  n. 

Clark,  Captain  John  (1),  212  n.,  215  n. 
Clarke,  Captain,  (mil.),  171 
Clarke,  Captain  Peter,  246  n. 
Clayton,  Colonel  Jasper,  46 
Cleland,  Captain  John  (1),  183,  206  n  ,  294, 

311 

Cleland,  Captain  William,  80 
Clements,  Captain  Michael,  230  n.,  303,  415 
Clements,  Commander  Peter,  546  n. 
Cleopatra,  505  n. 
Cleoitdtre,  563  n. 
Clerks  of  the  Acts,  3,  326 
|  Cleveland,  Captain  Archibald,  194 
Cleveland  (or  Cleaveland),  Captain  William, 

3,27 

Cleverly,  Gravesend  shipbuilder,  335 
Clevland,  John,  3,  ]55,  326 
Clinton,  335 
Clinton,   Admiral   of    the    Fleet   the    Hon. 

George,  42  n.,  310 
Clinton,  General  Sir  Henry,  372,  379,  38M, 

387,  390,  392,  393,  398,  441,  442,  443, 

471,  472,  473,  488,  489,  493,  496 
Clipperton,  John,  316-31S 
Clive,  Captain  Benjamin,  192,  227  n.,  236  n. 
,  Clive,  Lord,  132,  139,  14:',,  144,  161,  162, 

163,  164,  201 
Clocheterie,   Captain   de   La,    415,    492  n., 

533  n. 
Clue,  Admiral  de  La,  148  n.,  149,  189,  190, 

196,  211-214,  217,  302,  303 
Clutterbuck,  Thomas,  3 
Coist-jr's  Harbour,  Rhode  Island,  403 
Coats,  the  navigator,  William,  320 
Cobham,  Viscount,  40,  261 
Cockatrice,  335 
Cockbarn,  Lieutenant,  (of  the  Hunter'),  145, 

146 

Cockburne,  Captain  George,  3,  326 
Cockburne,  Captain  John  (1),  41  n. 
Codrington  (later  Bethell),  Christopher :  set 

Bethell,  Captain  Christopher  Codrington 
Coffin,  Admiral  Sir  Isaac,  Bart.,  350,  351 
Cohorns,  136  and  n. 
Colby  (or  Coleby),  Captain  Charles,  4,  71, 

141,327 

Colby,  Captain  Stephen,  311,  395  u. 
Colby,  Thomas,  4 


578 


INDEX    TO    VOLUME  III. 


Colchester,  46  n.,  274,  291,  310 

Coleman,  Captain  Robert,  41  n. 

Coles's  pump,  337 

Collier,  Vice-Admiral  Sir  George,  Kt,,  346 

CoUiixjwood,  317 

Collingwood,  Vice-Admiral  Cuthbert,  Lord, 

379,  554 
Collingwood,  Captain  Thomas,  242  n.,  245  n., 

246  n.,  312,  395  n.,  410,  434,  454  n. 
Collins,  Captain  Richard  (1),  206  n.,  310 
Collins,  Captain  Richard  (2),  240  n.,  241 
( 'olonels  of  Marines,  223 
Colonial  vessels,  Authority  granted  to  cap- 
ture, 371 

I  'olonies,  see.  American  Colonies 
Colours,  Captured,  242 
Colville,  Rear-Admiral  Alexander,  Lord,  06, 

109,  20(i  n.,  209,  224,  220  and  n.,  227, 

228,  232,  23!),  251,  505 
Colville,  Captain    the  lion.  James,  174  n., 

179  n.,  198  n.,  225,  311 
Combustion,  552  n. 
(\imit,  Wi,  SS 
I 'timeli;  3<>5,  313 
Commanders,  ;;0,  330  and  n.,  33li 
Commanders-in-Chief,  15,  '!(>,  ,'!:;  n.,  Ill  n., 

112  n. 

Commissioners  of  Sick  and  Wounded,  1,  2 
Commissioners  of  the  Xnvy,  3,  4,  320,  327 
Commissioners  of  the  Register  Office,  2 
Commons,  Enquiry  by  the  House  of,  103; 

Address  to  the,  270  ami  n. 
Coinptun,  Captain  James,   I 
'  'iiiitti-  tie  (irtiiiioiit,  290 
fiiiufi'  ili:  1'roi'ence,  17-1  and  n.,  179  and  n., 

1IIS  n. 

Comte  de  Kt.  Florentine,  301 
Coimnicul,  102,  -103,  -105 
Concentration,    Tactics   of,    170,   455,  450, 

-15S,  511,  551 
Conception,  279,  315,  317 
Conde,  17-1  n.,  175,  179  n.,  ISO 
Conde  de  Cliincini,  315 
Conde  de  Toulouse,  34,  314 
Conflans,  Vice-Admin;!  the  Marquis  de,  122, 

123,  196,  217-223,  274,  284,  311,  435  n. 
Congress,  307 
Congress   and  the  outbreak  of  the  war  in 

America,  351! 
Conquerant,  415,  492  n. 
Conqueror,  211,  212  n.,  215,  311,  395  n., 

434,  452,  453,  -^54  n.,  466  and  n.,  520  n. 
Conquistador,  12,  72  n.,  135  n.,  130,  247  n., 

314,  315  (2) 

Consolante,  557  and  n.,  559 
(Jon stan te,  90,  98,  99 
Contempt  of  court  by  a  court  martial,  105, 

106 

Content,  127  and  n.,  148  n.,  151  n.,  274,  275 
Contraband  of  war,  252,  253 
Controllers  of  the  Navy,  3,  4,  326,  343 
Controllers  of  the  Storekeeper's  Accounts,  3, 

326 


Controllero  of  the  Treasurer's  Accounts,  3, 

320 
Controllers  of  the  Victualling  Accounts,  3, 

326 

Convert,  513  n.,  520  n. 
Convoys,  65,  75,  78,  91,  119,  122,  123,  124, 

125,  126,  128,  129,  130,  131,  135,  136, 

137,  139,  140.  144,  165,  166,  188,  190, 

196,  203,  210,  225,  250,  252,  280,  283, 

284,  286,  291,  292,  294,  298,  299,  300, 

301,  302,  303,  351,  390,  391,  395,  396, 

433,  434,  435,  438,  445,  448,  451,  452, 

409,  470,  473,  474,  477,  478,  479,  480, 

482,  486,  489,  495,  503,  504,  509,  519, 

521,  536,  538,  539,  540-542,  549,  554, 

557 

Comvay,  Henry  Seymour,  Field-Marshal,  171 
Conway,  Hon.  Hugh  Seymour:  afterwards 

Seymour,  Vice- Admiral  Lord  Hugh  (T[.V.) 
Cook,  Captain  James,  337,  341  n.,  352 
Cooks,  19 

Cooper,  Captain  Thomas,  4,  96,  104,  116 
Coote,  General  Sir  Eyre,  225 
Copeland  Island,  230 
Copenhagen,  20  and  n.,  27,  28,  41,  43,  47, 

380,  -112  n. 
Copper  fastenings,  14 
Compering   ships,  14,   336,  451,  470,   483, 

486,  487,  489,  522 
Corbett,  Thomas,  3 
Corbett,  William,  3 
Cordova,  Admiral  Don  Luis  de,  446,  450, 

504,  539 

Cork,  1-14,  167,  188,  372,  502 
Cormorant,  200  n.,  543  n. 
Cornewall,  Captain  Thomas,  169 
Cornish,   Vice-Admiral  Sir   Samuel,  Bart., 

23,  96,  196,  200  and  n.,  224,  225,  232, 

239-242,  565 
Cornish     (formerly     Pitchford),     Admiral 

Samuel   Pitchford,  240  n  ,  241,  520  n., 

568 

Cornwall,  446 
Cornwall,  12,  133  n.,  134,  135  n.,  136,  137, 

235  n.,  395  n.,  404,  400  n.,  408,  434,  437, 

438,  439,  454  n.,  458,  466 
Cornwall,  Vice-Admiral  Charles,  3,  32,  34, 

35,  36,  258 

Cornwall,  Captain  James,  52,  96,  100  and  n. 
Cornwall,   Captain   Frederick,    99,    148  n., 

289 

Cornwall  is,  406  n. 
Cornwallis,  Charles,  1st  Marquis,  372,  388, 

405,  442,  472,  473,  488,  493,  494,  496, 

501,  502 
Cornwallis,  Admiral  the  Hon.  Sir  William, 

351,  434,  438,  473-477,  512,  513  and  n., 

520  n.,  525 

Cornwallis,  Major-General,  154,  171 
Coromandel  Coast,  The,  119,  124,  130,  164, 

174,  197,  225,  545,  549,  561 
Corsica,  116,  123,  124,  273,  351 
Corvettes,  330 


INDEX    TO    VOLUME  III. 


Corunna,  39,  303 

Cosby,  Admiral  Phillips,  415,  492  n.,  568 

Cost  of  Ships,  10 

Cotes,  Vice-Admiral  Thomas,  71, 118, 127  n., 

165,  182,  204,  224,  313,  565 
Cotterell,  Captain  Charles,  64 
Cotton,  Admiral  Sir  Charles,  Bart.,  454  n., 

520  n. 
Couchman,  the  mutineer,  Lieutenant  Samuel, 

287,  288 

Coudres,  Isle,  206,  207 
Councils  of  War,  67,  68,  74,  78,  79,  87, 118, 

123,  151,  154,  172,  177,  194,  202,  270 
Courageux,  306,  307,  313,  415,  509  n. 
Couronne,  148  n.,  151  n.,  415,  456,  458 
Court,  Admiral  La  Bruyere  de,  67,  89,  92, 

94,  95,  101,  102 
Courts  Manial,  17,  88  n.,  95  n.,  97, 103-106, 

106  n.,  J23,  128,  129,  135,  137,  156-158. 

177,  196  n.,  275  and  n.,  276  and  n.,  277, 

279  and  n.,  281  ani  n.,  288  and  n.,  289  n., 

290  and  n.,  291,  294  and  n.,  302  n.,  339, 

350,  423,  425,  426,  435  n.,  456  n.,  459  n., 

462,  478,  548 
Coventry,    12,   217,   218   n.,    3O2,   543   n., 

563  n. 

Cowardice,  123,  125 
Cowell,  Captain  Henry,  232 
Cowling,  Captain  John,  474  n. 
Coximar,  Itiver,  248 
Cozens,  Midshipman  of  the  II  u'jvr,  322 
CraggB,  Mr.  Secretary,  30 
Craig,  Captain  Robert,  298 
Cranstoun,  Captain  James,  Lord,  513  n. 
Craufurd,  Major-General  John,  235 
Craven,  Bear-Admiral  Thomas,  275,  56(i 
Crescent,  12,  242  n.,  2911,  313 
Crespin,  Captain  Abraham,  454  n. 
Criminals  in  the  Navy,  21,  23 
Croisic,  Le,  220,  221 
Cromwell,    Henry :    see    Frankland,    Vice-  , 

Admiral  Henry 

Crookshanks,  Captain  John,  285  and  n. 
Crowle,  George,  3,  4 
Crown,  206  n.,  310 
Crown  Point,  141,  204,  205,  208,  228,  356, 

358,  359,  367,  368,  370,  371,  380 
C'rozon,  313 
Cruiser,  46  n.,  310 

Cruse,  Admiral  (Russian  Navy),  341  n. 
Crutched  Friars,  2 
Cuba,   67   n.,   76,  77,   226,  2-16-249,  266, 

267,  468,  494,  496  n. 
Cuddalore  ;  see  also,  Fort   St.  David  ;  177, 

552,  555,  557,  561-564 
Cul  de  Sac  Royal :  see  Fort  Royal,  Marti- 
nique 

Culloden,  66  n.,  113 
CvJloden,  148  n.,  156,  169,  211,  2)2  and  n., 

213,  215,  245  n.,  246  n.,  249,  250,  395  n., 

489 
Cumberland,  35,  40  n.,  60,  62  n.,  63,  70  n., 

76  n.,  79  n.,  140,  161  n.,  174  n.,  175,  177, 


179  and  n.,  198  n.,  199,  303,  304  and  n. 

311,  415,  563  r. 
Cumberland  Bay,  321 
Cumberland  Harbour,  76  and  n.,  77 
Cumberland,  Duke  of:  see  William  Augustus, 

Duke  of  Cumberland,  Prince 
Cumberland,  Duke  of:  see  Henry  Frederick, 

Duke  of  Cumberland,  Prince 
Gumming,  Admiral  James,  431 
Cummin*;,  the  Quaker,  Mr.  Thomas,  186, 

187 

Cunningham,  Commander  James,  253 
Curat-oa,  85,  86,  536 
Curieuse,  415 

Curling,  Mr.  John,  master's  mate,  366 
Curtis,  Admiral  Sir  Koger,  Bart.,  400,  406  n. 
Cusack,  Captain  James,  80 
CuBt,  Captain  William,  134  and  n. 
Cutlasses,  9 
Cutters,  330 

Cutting-out  Expeditions,  224,  292 
Cuverville,  Captain  de,  550  n. 
CylMe,  291  n. 
Cygnet,  246  n.,  335 

DATRES,  Vice-Admiral  James   Richard  (1), 

361,  365 
Dalrymple,  Admiral  John,  221  n.,  509  n.. 

567 

Dalrymple,  Sir  John,  332 
Damaquart,  Captain  de,  96 
Damiaten,  91 

Dampier,  Captain  William,  258,  ;•!!(!,  323 
Danae,  223  n.,  250,  3<>l 
Dana'';  301,  .".13 

Dandridge,  Captain  William,  63,  68,  269 
Daplme,  336 
Darbv,  Vice-Admiral  George,  215  n.,  226  n.. 

242  n.,  243,  477,  502,  503,  504,  540,  546. 

566 

Darby,  Admiral  Sir  Homy  d'Ksterre,  546  n. 
Darien,  or  Panama,  Isthmus  of,  52  n.,  61,  76 
Dartmouth,  125  and  n.,  286,  .'ill 
Dauphin,  108 

Dauphin  I!oy<il,  21S  n.,  415 
Davers,  Vice-Admiral   Thomas,  71,  76,  91, 

109,  115,  122,  123 
Davis,  Howel,  260 
Davis  Strait,  318 
Dawson,  Captain  (feorue,  401,  406  n.,  409, 

492  n. 

Deacon,  Commander  Sabine,  201  n. 
Deal,  16 
Deal    Castle,   131  n.,  224  n.,  257,  454  n.,. 

479  n. 
Deane,    Captain   Joseph,    206  n.,  208,  227 

and  n.,  228,  235  n.,  311 
Death  penalty,  The,  279,  288,  339  (see  nlso- 

Byng) 

Debt,  The  National,  254 
Decay  of  ships,  303,  304 
Decker,  Captain  Haringcarspel,  505  n. 
Dedel,  Captain  S.,  505  n. 


580 


INDEX   TO    VOLUME  III. 


Defence,  563  n. 
Defenseur,  244  n. 

Defiance,  41  n.,  62,  70  n.,  79  n.,  80,  125  n., 
126,  127  n.,  141,  148  n.,  149,  150,  151  n., 

153,  154,  218  n.,  219,  246  n.,  247  n.,  312, 
315  (2),  415 

Delavall,  Vice-Admiral  George,  34,  35,  36 
Delaware,  Bay  and  Capes  of  the,  390,  394, 

397,  402,  542 
Delaware  River,  386,  388,  391,  392,  398, 

399,  496 

Do  1'Angle,  Captain  Merrick,  84  and  n.,  96 
Delfino  y  Barlande,  Captain  Don  J.,  34 
Delft,  91 

Delgarno,  Captain  Arthur,  258 
Denis,  Vice- Admiral  Sir  Peter,  Bart.,  125  n., 

218  n.,  237,  239,  252,  299,  566 
Dcnison,  Captain  (Russian  Navy),  341 
Denmark,  26  e.t  s«/.,  41-43 
Dennis,  Captain  Henry,  78 
Dent,  Captain  1  >igby  (2),  3,  4,  55,  71, 123  n., 

124,  133  n.,  134/135 
Dent,  Captain  Sir  Digby  (3),  Kt.,  179  n., 

198  n.,  225,  311,  434 
D<:nteUe,  110 

Depredations  by  Spain,  50,  51 
Deptford,  4,  12,  105,  137 
Drptford,  13,  70  n.,  76,  108,  1:11  n.,  148  n., 

154,  215  n.,  240  n. 
Derby,  113 

Di-rbi/,  143 

Dei-ing,  Captain  Daniel,   1S7,   201  n.,  203, 

224  n. 
Derrick,  'Memoirs  of  the  Rise  and  Progress 

of  the  Royal  Xavy,'  5 
Derwentwater  estates,  The,  IS 
Deseada,  519 
Desertion,  ;>.'!9,  .".78 
Desiradc,  La,  203 
Dcsorquart,  Captain  de,  96 
Devert,  Daniel,  3 
Devonshire,  125  n.,  127,  2O6  n.,  222  n.,  226 

n.,  242  n.,  245  n.,  246  n.,  249,  250 
Diademe,  244,  294,  303,  415 
DiiuiKint,  04  n.,  96,  125  n.,  126,  312 
Diamond,  43  n.,  57,  61,  62  and  n.,  96,  267, 

314 

Diamond,  Cape,  208,  227 
Diana,  8,  173,  183,  206  n.,  227  and  n.,  253, 

546  n. 

Diane,  186  n.,  281,  298,  313 
Dickson,  Admiral  William,  454  n. 
Dictator,  339 
Digby,  Admiral  Hon.  Robert,  188,  218  n., 

415,  502,  567 
Digges,   Captain   Dudley,  13,   167  n.,  183, 

218  n.,  246  n. 
Dijon,  231  n. 
Di/if/ence,  192 
Dilif/ent,  550  n. 
Dilif/ente,  174  and  n.,  179  n.,  198  n.,  244  n., 

449 
Dilkes,  Captain  William,  96,  104  and  n. 


Dimensions  of  ships,  9,  12,  190,  335 
Discontent  on  the  lower  deck,  339 
Discovery,  318,  319 
Disease:   see  Sanitation,   Mortality,  Fever, 

Scurvy,  etc. 

Disguise,  Successful,  244 
Disobedience  to  orders  justifiable,  161,  460 
Distillation  of  fresh  water  from  salt,  337 
Dixon,  Master  of  the  Northumberland,  Mr., 

275 
Doake,  Captain  James,  206  n.,  226  n.,  233  n., 

242  n. 

Dnbbs,  319,  320 
Dobbs,  Arthur,  319 
Dobree,  Captain  Daniel,  434 
Dockyards,  4,  326,  327,  335,  336,  342  and 

n.,  343 

Dod,  Admiral  Edmund,  513  n.,  520  n. 
Dodd,  Captain  Edward,  311 
Doddington,  George,  3 
Doggersbank,  The,  314,  343,  505-509 
Dolphijn,  505  n.,  506 
Dolphin,   12,   147,    148  and  n.,  153,  265, 

283  n.,  297,  298,  299,  312,  336,  505  n., 
Dominica,  64,  203,  233,  244,  254,  427,  428, 

453,  519,  521,  522,  523,  527,  529,  531 
Donan  Castle,  39 
Dorchester,  Lord,  350 
Dordrecht,  91 
Dorsetshire,    12,  34,  96,   101,  103,  218  n., 

219,  299,  313 

Douglas,  Colonel,  (Mar.),  63  n. 
Douglas,  Rear-Admiral  Sir  Charles,  Bart., 

206  n.,  207,  235  n.,  357  and  n.,  360,  361, 

.",62  and  n.,  363,  366  and  n.,  368,  369, 

415,  520  n.,  535,  568 
Douglas,  Sir  Howard,  357  n. 
Douglas,  Admiral  Sir  James  (1),  Kt.,  115, 

206  n.,  209,  224,  232,  233,  239,  242  and 

n.,  243,  244,  245  and  n.,  246,  247,  565 
Douglas,  Captain  John,  454  n.,  459,  460 
Douglas,  Captain  Stair  (1),  242  n.,  246  n., 

482  n. 

Douglas,  Captain  William,  60  n. 
Dove,  Captain  Francis,  4 
Dover,  16,  335 

Dover,  242  u.,  215  n.,  246  n.,  284,  312 
Downs,  The,  90,  111  n.,  112,  196,  200,  224 

and  n.,  232,  250,  252,  312,  352,  539 
Drar/on,  43,  72  n.,  81  and  n.,  82,  92,  96,  98, 

191,  218  n.,  234  n.,  235,  242  n.,  244,  245 

n.,  246  n.,  248,  249,  270,  284,  302,  314 
Dragim,  135  n.,  314 
Drake,  123  n.,  225,  267,  310 
Drake,  Captain  Francis,  34 
Drake,  Rear-Admiral  Sir   Francis   Samuel, 

Bart.,   218  n.,   227   n.,  233  n.,   242  n., 

395  n.,  482  n.,  487,  497  n.,  513  n.,  520  n., 

528,  567 
Drake,     Vice-Admiral     Francis     William, 

212  n.,  246  n.,  248,  311,  566 
Draper,  General    Sir    William,    K.B.,  239 

242 


INDEX    TO    VOLUME  III. 


581 


Dreadnoufflit,  34,  165  and  n.,  274  and  n., 

276,  277,  280,  284,  300,  312 
Droits  de  I'  Homme,  286 
Druid,  234  n. 

Drummond,  Captain  Charles,  96 
Drummond,  Commander  John  Auriol,  479  n. 
Drunkenness,  273,  274,  317 
Dublin,  230,  342 
Dublin,  182,  206,  242  n.,  245  n.,  246  n., 

250 
Dubois   de   La   Motte,  Vice-Admiral,    140, 

141,  167,  168,   170,  172,  283,  286,  287, 

297 

Due  d'Aiguillon,  293 
Due  d'Aquitaine,  200  n.,   225,   295,   311, 

312 

Dm  tfllanom,  299,  313 
Due  d 'Orleans,  96,  120  n.,  121,  174  n.,  179 

n.,  180,  198  n.,  312 
Due  de  Bourgogne,  174   n.,  175,  176,  179 

and  n.,  198  n'.,  244  n.,  414,  415,  492  n. 
Due  de  Chartres,  301,  313 
Due  de  Choiseul,  225  n..  226 
Due  de  Fronsac,  209 
l)u  Chaffault,  Admiral  Louis  Charles,  Comte, 

127  n.,  182,  185,  290,  415 
Ducie,  Lord :  see  Moreton,  Captain  Francis 

Reynolds 

Dudgeon  Shoal,  15 
Dudley,  Captain  O'Brien,  287,  288 
Duels,  88  n. 
Duff,  Hear- Admiral  Robert,  193,  216,  217, 

218  and  n.,  242  n.,  566 
Duffus,  Captain  Kenneth,  Lord,  43  n. 
Duke,  218  n.,  273,  280,  310,  311,  415,  509 

n.,  520  n.,  531,  532,  533 
Dumaresq,  Admiral  Thomas,  520  n. 
Dumet,  Isle  de,  220 
Dumont    d'Urville,    Rear-Admiral    T.    C., 

352  n. 

Dunbar,  311 
Duncan,  Admiral  Adam,  Viscount,  139  n., 

234  n.,  246  n.,  568 
Duncan,  Captain  Henry  (1),  327,  400  n., 

406  n.,  492  n. 

Dundas,  Henry :  see  Melville,  Viscount 
Dundonald,    Admiral     Thomas     Cochrane, 

10th  Earl  of,  301 
Dungeness,  90 
Dunkirk,  34,  43,  70  n.,  76,  96,  101,  141, 

188,  218  n.,  291,  295,  296,  312 
Dunnose,  293 
Dunquerque,  Dunkerque,  or   Dunkirk,  89, 

90,  112,  196,  223,  229,  230  n.,  254,  314 
Dupleix,  M.,  121,  122,  124,  130,  139,  140, 

178 

Duplessis  Perseault,  Captain,  415 
Duquesne,  Commodore,  189 
Durell,   Vice- Admiral   Philip  (1),  88,  115, 

127  n.,  148  n.,  172,  173,  185,  205,  206 

and  n.,  207,  209,  283  r.    565 
Durell,  Captain  Thomas  (1),  53,  263,  268 
Durfort,  Captain  Baron  de,  492  n. 

VOL.   III. 


Dursley  Galley,  46  n.,  47,  84  n.,  96,  261, 

263 

Dursley,  Lord :  see  Berkeley,  James,  Earl  of 
Dury,  Major-General,  195 
Dutabil,  Captain  Don  I.,  96 
Dutch  volunteers  in  British  ships,  87 
Duvivier,  Captain,  109 

Eayle,  127  n.,  128,  283  n.,  284,  295,  312, 

380,  400,  406  n.,  407,  408,  545  n.,  550  n., 

552  n.,  556,  563  n. 
East  India  Company,  108,  120,  121  n.,  130, 

131,  132,  139,  140,  143,  Kil,  177.  181, 

185,  197,  200,  201,  232,  240,  241,  251, 

340,  445,  545,  546  n.,  548 
East  India   Company   (Dutch),   130,   131, 

201,  548 
East  India  Company  (French),  119,    121, 

124,  125  and  n.,  126,  139,  ISO,  164,  17-1, 

1117,  294,  295,  301,  305 
East  Indies,  91,   108,   109,   119-122,   124, 

130,  139,  143,  100,  17.",,  174-182,   196, 

197-200,  224,  225,   239-242,   284,   287, 

304,  311,  312,  313,  482,  503,  508,  5()!i, 

538,  543-564 

East  River,  New  York,  382,  385,  409 
Eastwood,  Commander  Joseph,  192 
Echo,  185,  186  n.,  20(i  n.,  242  n.,  240  n., 

313 

Erurruil,  314,  415 
Kd'im,  HI 

Eddystone,  The,  14,  15,  iio 
Edgar,  212  n.,  215,  240  n.,  250,  50!t  n. 
Edgcumbe,    Admiral     Hon.    George,    Earl 

Mount  Edgcumbe,  84  n.,  147,  1-18  and  n., 

218  n.,  296,  565 
Edinburgh,  340 

Edinburgh,  127  n.,  165  and  n.,  284 
Education  of  naval  officers,  22 
Edward  Augustus,  Duke  of  York,  Admiral 

Prince,  193  and  n.,  216,  239,  252,  343  n., 

565 
Edwards,   Admiral    Edward,   339,   406   n., 

428  n. 

Edwards,  Admiral  Richard  (2),  415,  567 
Edwards,  Captain  Richard  (a),  35  n. 
Edwards,  Captain  Timothy,  212  n.,  395  n., 

404,  406  n.,  434,  454  n. ' 
Eensyezindheit,  505  n. 
Effm^hain,  Lord,  154 
Kymont,  415,  417 
Egmont,  John,  Earl  of,  325 
Eleanor,  62  n.,  70  n. 
Elephant,  278,  312 
Elibank,  Lord:  see  Murray,  Captain   Hon. 

George  (1) 

Elisabeth,  110,  111,  210,  279 
Elizabeth,  53,  92,  96,  133  n.,  134,  174  n., 

175,  179  and  n.,  198  and  n.,  199,  240  n., 

241,  415,  417,  434,  454  n.,  557  u. 
Elizabeth  River,  489 
Elliot,  Captain  Elliot,  108 
Elliot,  Sir  Gilbert,  Bart. :  see  Minto,  Lord 

38 


582 


INDEX    TO    VOLUME  III. 


Elliot,  Admiral  John,  191,  230  and  n.,  297, 

301,  400  n.,  406  n.,  509  n.,  567 
Ellis,  the  navigator,  Henry,  320 
Ellis,  Welbore,  326 
Ellys,  Captain  Charles,  234  n. 
Elphinstone,  Admiral  Hon.  George  Keith : 

Viscount  Keith,  333 
Elphinstone,  Captain  John  (1),  195,  206  n., 

226  n.,  245,  246  n.,  304,  311,  341  n.,  434, 

454  n. 
Elphinstone,  Captain  Samuel  Williams,  341 

and  n. 

Eltluim,  86,  87,  88,  115,  272 
Elton,  Captain  Jacob,  278,  279,  311 
Embargo  on  shipping,  45,  166,  107,  396 
Kmbusrade,  312 
Emden,  173,  190 
Emerald,  201  n.,  297 
Ememudr,  125  n.,  295,  297,  312 
Empire,  The  Holy  Roman,  29  and  n.,  40, 

42,  47,  49,  50,  110 
Eiidmrvur,  479  n. 
Kndymion,  520  n. 
England,  Edward,  2(10 
English  Harbour,  Antigua,  23 
Enterprise,  39,  24ti  n.,  202 
Entreprenant,  183,  305,  313 
Eoh;  96 

Epreuve,  311,  313 
Krfjii'iux,  5of>  n. 
Erie,  Lake,  204,  205 
•"Error   of  judgment,"  293,   294,  408   (see 

ii/sn  I'yng) 

Errutia,  Captain  Don  1!.,  9ti 
Erskine,  Captain  llobert,  285 
Escurboucle,  313 

Escars,  Captain  Comte  d',  533  n. 
Escort,  234  i,. 

Escudero,  Captain  Don  Antonio,  34 
Eskimos,  319 
J'-sfn-niitfa,  34,  314 
Esperann;  96,  289,  312,  335 
Essejc,  14,  34,  35,  94,  90,  101,  218  n.,  221, 

234  n.,  230,  281,  311,  313 
Establishment  for  guns,  11,  331-334 
Establishment  of  rlag-otticers,  20 
Establishments  for  ships,  8,  9,  10 
Estaing,  Vice-Admiral  Comte  d',  308,  394 

and  n.,  397,  398,  399,  400,  401,  402,  403 

and  n.,   405   and  n.,  408-412,  428-432, 

433,  435,  438,  440,  442,  443,  471,  478, 

521 

Estejxjna,  211 
Estournel,  Captain  d',  04  n. 
Etenduere,  Admiral  des  Herbiers  de  1',  64  n., 

127  and  n.,  129,  137,  284 
Etoile,  283,  286,  312 
Eturiago,  Captain  Don  A.,  96    ' 
Europa,  247  n.,  315 
Europa  Point,  211 
Europe,  492  n.,  497  n. 
Eurus,  206  n.,  226  n.,  311 
Eurydice,  513  n.,  520  n. 


Evans,  Captain  Henry  Francis,  395  n. 
Evans,  Admiral  John,  218  n.,  223  n.,  395  n., 

566 

Evans,  Captain  Thomas,  185,  235  n. 
Eveille,  218  n.,  294,  415,  492  n. 
Everitt,     Charles     Holmes:    see    Calmady, 

Charles  Holmes  Everitt 
Everitt,  Captain  Michael,  148  n.,  156,  206 

and  n.,  233  n.,  242  n.,  245  n.,  246  n. 
Ewer,  Captain,  (Mar.),  191 
Exchequer,  Captain  Button's  action  in  the 

Court  of,  350 
Execution  of  Admiral  Byng,  158-160.     See 

Death  Penalty 
Exeter,  118,  131  and  n.,  415,  545  n.,  550 

and  n.,  551,  552  and  n.,  560,  563  n. 
Exmouth,    Lord:   see  Pellew,  Admiral    Sir 

Edward 

Expenditure  on  the  Navy,  5,  327 
Experiment,  522 
Krptriinent,  68,  70  n.,  73,  76  n.,  78,  79  and 

n.,  148  n.,  156,  188,  276,  296,  373,  374, 

370,  387,  406  n.,  409 
Exploration,  Services  of,  to  the  Navy,  318, 

324 

Extra  Commissioners  of  the  Navy,  4,  326 
Eyesight,  Defective,  103 

FAIKKAX,  Vice-Admiral  Sir  William  George, 

415 

Fairleigh,  10 
Faisan,  313 
Falcon,  125  and  n.,  201  n.,  285,  311  (2), 

403  n. 
Falkiiigham,  Captain  Edward  (1),  3,  4,  34, 

53 

Falkiiigham,  Captain  Edward  (2),  167  and  n. 
Falkland,  125  n.,  218  n.,  227  n.,  233  n., 

242  n. 

Falkland  Islands,  208  n.,  339 
Falmouth,  262,  446 
Falmouth,  60  n.,  62  and  n.,  70  n.,  75  n., 

200  n.,  225,  240,  241,  267 
False  musters,  350,  351 
Fame,  235  n.,  311,  314,  395  n.,  434,  438, 

439,  520  n. 

Family  Compact,  The,  238,  307 
Fandino,  .Juan  de  Leon,  265,  266,  272 
Fanshaw,  Captain  Charles,  269 
Fanshawe,   Captain    Robert  (1),  327,   434, 

520  n. 

FuntaiKjue,  212  n.,  439,  492  n. 
Farnham,  Captain  Thomas,  509  n. 
Faro  of  Messina,  The,  32,  33,  36,  37 
Faroe  Islands,  229 
Farragut,  Admiral,  cited,  150 
Faucuii,  229,  230  n. 
Faulknor,  Admiral  Jonathan  (1),  188,  215  n., 

415,  567 

Faulknor,  Captain  Robert  (2),  306 
Faulknor,  Captain  Samuel  (1),  108  and  n., 

284,  310 
Faulkuor,  Captain  Samuel  (2),  284,  301 


INDEX    TO    VOLUME  III. 


583 


Faulknor,  Captain  William,  40  n. 

favorite,  415 

Favourite,  212  n.,  298,  306,  308 

Fawler,  John,  3,  4 

Fawler,  Captain  John,  281 

Feilding,  Captain  Charles  (1),  351 

Felicite,  304,  313 

Fellowes,  shipbuilder,  12 

Fenix,  247  and  n.,  315,  335,  449 

Pendant,  415,  458,  563  n. 

Ferguson,  Captain  James,  253,  428  n.,  482  n. 

Fergusson,  Admiral  John,  454  n.,  505  n. 

Per  me,  90,  281  (2),  312 

Ferrers,    Earl :    see    Shirley,    Vice- Admiral 

Hon.  Washington 
Ferret,  167  n.,  169,  242  n.,  246  n.,  311,  335, 

406  n. 

Ferrol,  62,  65,  66,  267,  285,  451,  452 
Fever,  23,  272 

Feversham,  84  n.,  96,  270,  271 
Fidele,  183,  291  and  n.,  313 
Field,  Captain  Arthur,  34 
Fier,  148  u.,  151  n.,  212  n.,  415 
Fighting  Instructions,  The,  82  and  n.,  94  n., 

103 

Finch,  Captain  Hon.  Seymour,  509  n. 
Finch,  Rear-Admiral  Hon.  William  Clement, 

497  n. 
Fincher,  Captain  Thomas,   125  n.,  131  u., 

132  and  n.,  311 
Fine,  312,  550  n. 
Finisterre,  Cape,  124,  127 
Finland,  Gulf  of,  43 
Fire  discipline,  55 
Fire,  Ships  destroyed  bv,  273,  277  n.,  297, 

298,  310-315 
Firebrand,  70  n. 

firedrake,  172,  188,  215  n.,  234  n. 
.  Fireships,  28,  30,  33,  34,  41,  42,  43,  46  n., 

59,  70  n.,  76  n.,  79  n.,  96,  100,  101,  117, 

125  n.,  134,  149,  161  n.,  162,  163,  185, 

192,  206  n.,  207,  212  n.,  215,  225,  234 

and  n.,  237,  273,  283  n.,  330,  335,  374, 

391,   415,  497   n.,  509   n.,  520  n.,  541, 

546  n.,  552  n. 

Firing-tubes  for  guns,  Tin,  334 
Firm,  216,  222  n. 

First  Captain  :  see  Captain  of  the  Fleet 
First  Lords  of  the  Admiralty,  2,  325 
Fishermen  in  the  American  army,  384 
.  Fishing  Industry,  The,  115,  186,  253,  254 
Fitzgerald,     Vice-Admiral    Lord     Charles : 

Lord  Lecale,  497  n. 
Kitzherbert,    Vice-Admiral    Thomas,    404, 

406  n.,  568 
.  Fitzroy,  Captain  Lord  Augustus,  64,  76  n., 

268 

.  Flag,  The  Honour  of  the,  196  n.,  351,  352 
Flag-officers,  20,  343-347 
Flamand,  550  n.,  563  n. 
Flamborough  Head,  311 
Flamborough,  39,  192,  234  n.,  269,  302 
.Flanders,  118,  119,  130 


Flecha,  34 

Fleet  at  different  periods,  Strength  of  the, 

5-7,  328 
"Fleet    in    Being"   (see  also   "Potential" 

Fleet),  405 

Fleming,  Colonel,  (Mar.),  63  n. 
Fleur,  96 

Fleur  df  Lys,  225  n.,  226,  313 
fleurun,  276,  277  and  n.,  280,  312 
Floating  batteries,  75,  207,  391,  392,  541 
Flobert,  Brigadier-General  de,  229  and  n., 

230 

Flora,  304,  403  u.,  520  n. 
Flore,  271,  312 

Florida,  63  n.,  250,  254,  269,  270,  371,  441 
Florida,  Gulf  of,  135,  311 
Florissant,  191,  300 
Flushing,  2!i7 
"  Flute,"  "  Kn,  539  n. 
fly,  234  n.,  236  and  n. 
Fog,  141,  .103,  182,  189,  250,  360,  384,  489, 

4yO 

Folkestone,  10 

Folkestone,  270 

Fontainebleau,  Treaty  of,  89 ;   Preliminaries 

of  peace  signed  at,  253 
Fooks,  Hear- Admiral  William,  454  u. 
Foote,  Vice- Admiral  Sir  Edward  James,  352 
Forbes,  Captain  Hugh,  123 
Forbes,   Admiral  of  the   Fleet   Hon.  John, 

96,  158,  505 

Forbin,  Captain  de,  540  n.,  550  n. 
Ford,  Rear-Admiral  John,  497  n.,  520  n. 
Foreign    service,   Kritish    naval   officers  in, 

340,  34  I 

Formation,  Bad,  of  Byron's  rleet,  435,  439 
Formiilaliile,  202,  313 
Formidable,  218  n.,  219,  415,  417,  418  n., 

419,  421,  424,  425,  520  n.,  530,  531,  532 
Forrest,  Captain  Arthur,  165  and  u.,  166, 

233,  245,  294,  306 
Forrestal,  Captain  Don,  135  n. 
Forrester,  Mark,  258 
Fort  Beau  Sejour,  141 
Fort  Bougee-Bougee,  161 
Fort  Bourbon,  Davis  Strait,  318 
Fort  Charles,  Davis  Strait,  318 
Fort  Charlotte,  St.  Lucia,  430 
Fort  Churchill,  319 
Fort  Cumberland,  141,  108 
Fort  Diego,  Florida,  269 
Fort  Duquesne,  141 
Fort  Edward,  205 
Fort  Edward,  New  York,  389,  390 
Fort  Lee,  384,  386 
Fort  Louis,  Senegal,  187 
Fort  Mancinilla,  Cartagena,  69,  72 
Fort  Mifflin,  Mud  Island,  391,  392 
Fort  Moosa,  270 

Fort  Moultrie,  372,  373,  379,  380 
Fort  Punta,  Havana,  249 
i  Fort  Royal,  Guadeloujie,  203 
Fort  Royal,  Martinique,  201,  203,  243,  4^9, 

38—2 


584 


INDEX   TO    VOLUME  III. 


431,  432,  433,  452,  453,  463,  466,  468, 

480,  481,  482,  483  n.,  484,  488,  510,  519 
Fort  Salvatore,  Messina,  32 
Fort  San  Antonio,  San  Sebastian,  261 
Fort  San  Felipe,  Cartagena,  69,  70 
Fort  San  Jose,  Cartagena,  6!»,  72 
Fort  San  Lazar,  Cartagena,  69,  73,  74 
Fort  San  Lorenzo,  Chagres,  61,  62 
Fort  San  Luis,  Cartagena,  69,  70,  71,  72 
Fort  Santiago,  Cartagena,  69,  70 
Fort  San  Sebastian,  Vigo,  262 
Fort   St.  David,  (Cuddalore),  119,  122,  131, 

132,  160,  174,  177  :  .«•<•  «hr>  Cuddalore 
Fort  St.  George,  (Madras):  ««•  also  Madras, 

177,  ITS,  545 
Fort  Ste.  Marguerite,  84 
Fort  Taima,  161 
Fort  Washington,  384,  385,  386 
Fort  Williain,  (Calcutta),  162 
Fort  York,  Hayes  River,  .'Us 
Fortrdf  Nantz("i),  315 
Forteticiif.  Captain  William,    1SS,    21S   n., 

234  n.,  235  n. 
Forth,  Firth  of,  257 
For!  it  n,  I.,  :;-|:;,  505  n.,  507 
Fortum:  1  IS  n.,  15(i,  19S  n.,  2'.K> 
/•'iir/itii*'',  197   ii.,  51:;  n..  52o  n. 
Foiidi-oyiiKt,  1  IS  n.,   151    n.,  1S2,  189,  190, 

222  n.,  2)2  n.,  313,  415,  538 
FOWJUI-II.I;  127  n.,  Ill,  1SS,  312 
Four  Bank.  The,  220,  221,  .".11 
Fowy,  2<'>6  n.,   212   n.    2-16   n..   308,  Mil. 

315 

Fowke,  Captain  Thorpe,  SO,  206  n.,  276 
Fowke,  General,  147 
Fowkes.  Commander  Henry,  45 
Fox,  7s  n.,  311,  415, -425 
Fox.  Itiulit  Hun.  Charles  James,  317 
Fox.    Captain    Thomas.    126,    127   n.,   128, 

129.  2S3  and  n. 
France,  29  and  n..  42,  47,  48,  49,  50,  51,  58, 

59,  sii,  108,  110,  117-119,  124,  132,  138, 

140,  1(13,  238,  261,  322,  354,  370 
France.   Isle   de  (SIT   a/no  Mauritius),  119, 

164.  308,  451.  543,  545,  549 
Francis,  Captain  Thomas,  226  n.,  242  n. 
Frankfuit,  Treaty  of,  89  n. 
Frankland,  Vice-Admiral  Henry  :  formerly 

Henry  Cromwell,  505  n.,  509  n. 
Frankland,  Admiral  Sir  Thomas,  Bart.,  145, 

164.  266  and  n.,  279,  290,  565 
Frederick  IV.,  King  of  Denmark,  26  u. 
Frederick,  King  of  Sweden,  41  n. 
Frederikshakl,  41 
French  aggressions,  138-140 
French    coasts,    Expeditions    against    the, 

171,  172,  173,  190-196,  231,  234-237 
French  men-of-war  fitted  out  as  privateers, 

280 

French  politeness  to  Captain  Cook,  352 
Freshwater  Cove,  Louisbourg,  183 
Friedrich  of  Hcssen-Cassel,  King  of  Sweden, 

41  n. 


Frigates,  7,  8,  330 

Friponne,  231  n. 

Frogmere,  Captain  Rowland,  96,  104 

Fromentieres,  Captain  de,  127  n.,  128 

Frozen  Strait,  319,  320 

Frye,  Lieutenant  George,  (Mar.),  105 

Fuertr,  272.  314 

Fulta,  161 

Fundy,  Bay  of,  168 

Funnels  of  a  fireship,  100  n. 

Furieux,  96 

Furnace,  12,  188,  215  n.,  234  n.,  236  n.,  319> 

Furneaux,  Captain  Tobias,  373 

Furnivall,  Lieutenant  William,  505  n. 

Furzer,  Captain  John,  34,  310 

GAUAKET,  Admiral,  94,  96,  107 

Gabarus  Bay,  115,  168,  182 

Gage,  Captain  John,  86,  88,  310 

Gage,  General  Thomas,  204 

Galapagos  Islands,  318 

Gahtee,  313 

Galbraith,  Captain  James,  171,  246  n. 

Galmt,  34 

(jal</(i,  135  n. 

Oalicia,  71  n.,  72  and  n.,  75  and  n.,  310,  314 

Galifet,  Captain  de,  550  n. 

Galissonniere,  Admiral  de  La,  139,  142,  148 

n.,  149,  150,  151  n.,  152 
Galle,    Vice-Admiral    Morard    de,   549   n., 

550  n. 
Galleons  (s«;  also  Treasure  ships),  44,  45, 

46,  54.61,241,246,323 
Galleys.  3.",,  34,  37,  38,  84,  269,  270,  273, 

314,  391,  400,  402,  406  n.,  442 
Galvanic  action  on  coppered  ships,  Effects 

of,  14,  336 
Gambier,  Vice-Admiral  James  (1),  201  n.,. 

202,  218  n.,  233,  234  n.,  326  (2),  566 
Gambier,  Admiral  of  the  Fleet  James  (Z\ 

Lord,  406  n. 
Ganges,  340 
Ganges,  River,  161,  201 
Ganjam,  561 
Gardiner's  Bay,  471,  489 
Gardiner,  Captain  Arthur,  148  n.,  150,  156,. 

157,  189 
Gardner,  Admiral  Sir  Alan,  Lord,  434,  474 

n.,  520  n. 

Garganta,  Captain  Don  F.,  247  n. 
Garland  or  Gitardland,  27  and  n.,  34 
Garonne,  River,  171 
Garrecocha,  Captain  Don,  135  n. 
Gascoigue,  Captain  Edward,  242  n.,  245  n.,. 

246  u. 

Gascoigne,  of  the  Carron  Foundry,  Mr.,  332 
Gascoigue,  Captain  John,  96 
Gashry,  Francis,  3,  4 
Gaspee,  184 
Gaspee,  228 
Gastrien,  boatswain  of  the  Chesterfield,  Mr., 

287,  288 
Gata,  Cape  de,  67 


INDEX    TO    VOLUME  HI. 


585 


Gates,  Major  (later  General   U.S.A.),  243, 

364,  472 

Gayton,  Admiral  Clarke,  201  n.,  202,  566 
Gayton,  Hear- Admiral  George,  234  n.,  236 

n.,  489 
Geary,  Admiral  Sir  Francis,  Bart.,  168,  222 

and  n.,  231,  278,  477,  565 
Geddes,  Captain  Alexander,  4 
Gell,  Admiral  John,  550  n.,  552  n. 
Generals  of  Marines,  215,  222,  223 
Genoa,  85,  116,  124,  137,  273 
Gentille,  492  n. 

George  I.,  King,  25,  27,  30,  47,  48 
George  II.,  King,  20,  48,  50,  51,  66,  103, 

105,  231 

George  III.,  King,  237,  342,  343,  508 
George,  Lake,  185,  205,  354,  350,  389 
George's  Bank,  410 
Georgetown,  Grenada,  435,  436 
Georgia,  372,  441,  442,  472 
Geraldine,  Captain  Don  N.,  96 
Geriah,  143,  144 
German  mercenaries  in  America.  .">59,  366, 

383 

German  troops  in  British  ships,  32. 
Germaine,  520  n. 
Gibraltar,  4,  32,  42,  46,  48,  59,  66,  89,  91, 

104,  107,  116,  147,  148,  151,  153,  154, 

155,  157,  160,  169,  190,  210,  211,  215, 

270,  281,  292,  327,  394,  395,  447,  44S, 

449,  451,  469,  477.  502,  503,  504,  540- 

543,  546 
Gibraltar,  12,  80,  83,  211,  212  n.,  215,  217, 

335,  449,  482  u.,  563  n. 
Gideon,  Captain  Solomon,  84  n. 
Gidoin,  Bear-Admiral  John  Lewis,  40G  n., 

482  n.,  513  n.,  520  n. 
Gilchrist,  Captain  James,  148  n.,  296,  297, 

301 

Gillain,  the  voyager,  318 
Glandevex,  Commodore  de,  148  n.,  149 
Glasgow,  50 
Glasgow,  212  n.,  246  n. 
"  Glasses,"  367 
Glenshiel,  40 

Gloire,  123  n.,  125  n.,  308,  312 
Gloria  Castle,  54,  56,  57 
Glorieux,  83  n.,  2L8  n.,  415,  451,  531,  532, 

533  and  n. 

Glorioso,  6,  285,  303,  311,  315 
Glory,  335 

Gloucester,  127  n.,  310,  320,  321,  323 
Glover,  Captain  Bonavia,  473,  474 
Glover's   ballad,  '  Admiral  Hosier's  Ghost,' 

45  n. 

Goa,  303,  311 

Goat  Island,  Newport,  402,  403 
Goccocea,  Captain  Don  J.,  34 
Godsalve,  Captain  Henry,  96 
Goes,  91 

Gogland,  Battle  of,  341  n. 
Golston,  42  n. 
Gombroon,  200 


"  Gondolas,"  359,  360,  362  and  n.,  365,  366, 

367,  368 
Gongee,  163 

Gonzales,  Captain  Don  Antonio,  34 
Gonzales,  Captain  the  Marque's,  247  n. 
Goodall,  Admiral  Samuel  Granston,  246  n., 

415,  509  n.,  520  n.,  568 
Goodly,  60,  62  n.,  70  n. 
Goostrey,  Captain  William,  206  n.,  246  n., 

248 

Gorcum,  91 

Gordon,  Captain  Thomas  (1)  (later  Vice- 
Admiral  in  the  Russian  service),  43  and  n. 
Gordon,  Captain  Thomas  (2),  311 
Gordon,    Rear-Admiral    William,    206    u., 

222  n.,  565 

Goree  (Goeree),  186-189,  254 
Gosport,  196  n.,  250 
Gothenburg,  2211 
Gotho,  Captain,  174  n. 
Gouderak,  91 

Gough,  Captain  William,  156,  227  and  n. 
Governor's  Island,  382,  384 
Gowanus  Cove,  383 
Gower,  Rear-Admiral  Hun.  John  Leveson, 

212  n.,  415,  567 
'/;•<"•/<•«»•,  148  n.,  212  u. 
Gramme,  Admiral  Alexander,  406  n.,  428  n., 

505  n. 
Grafton,  33,  34,  35,  76  n.,  144,    169,  197, 

liis  and  n.,  240  n.,  395  n.,  434,  437,  438, 

•l.",'.i,  45  t  n.,  462 

Graham,  Captain  Mitchell,  234  n. 
GnuiKHit,  183,  212  n.,  29:1,  312 
<  I  ni  in /ins,  274,  310  (2),  312 
Grand  Cul  dc  Sac,  St.  Lucia,  129,  432 
<lniit<[  (ridi'tiii,  293 
I  i rand  Island,  363 
Grande  Terre,  Guadeloupe,  203 
Grandicre,  Captain  de  La,  415,  492  n. 
( irant,  ( 'aptain  Charles  Cathcart,  240,  241  n., 

304  n. 

Grant,  General  James,  430,  -132 
Granville,  291 
Granville,  Karl,  41 
Grasse,  Vice-Admiral  Comte  de,  369,  385, 

405,  443,  482-488,  494,  495-502,  509- 

518,  519-535,  538,  539,  543,  546 
Grasse- Tilli,  Captain  de,  415 
Grave,  Commodore  Heudrik,  26 
Graves,  Captain  David,  492  n.,  497  n. 
Graves,  Admiral  Samuel  (1),  171,  565 
Graves,  Captain  Samuel  (2),  557 
Graves,  Rear-Admiral  Thomas  (1),  70 
Graves,  Admiral  Thomas  (2),  Lord,  215  n., 

218  n.,  250,  251,  294  n.,  471  and  n.,  492 

n.,  494,  495-502,  508,  512,  567 
Graves,  Admiral  Sir  Thomas  (3),  395  n., 

497  n.,  513  n.,  520  n. 
Gravelines,  258 
Gravesend,  320,  335 
Gravesend  Bay,  New  York,  383 
Gravier,  Captain  de,  96 


586 


INDEX    TO    VOLUME  111. 


Greene,  General,  U.S.A.,  472 

Greenhill,  Henry,  4 

Greenwich,  156,  425,  444  n. 

Greenwich,   59,   60,  61,  62,  78  n.,  79  n., 

165  n.,  166,  274,  275,  276,  294,  310,  311, 

313 

Greenwich  Hospital,  18,  342 
Greenwood,  Captain  William,  20(1  n. 
Gregory,  Captain  Thomas  (1),  86,  88  and  n. 
Gregory,  Captain  Thomas  (2),  310 
Grenada,  244,  254,  434,  435  n.,  438,  410, 

473,  488 
Grenades,  9 

Gre-nado,  201  n.,  242  n.,  245  n.,  2-1(1  n. 
Grenadines,  The,  244,  254 
Grenville,  Rt.  Hon.  George,  2,  3,  18,  325 
Grenville,  Captain  Thomas,  125  n.,  120 
Greyhound,  43  n.,  113,  221!  n.,  242  n.,  282, 

310,  312,  454  n. 
Grieg,   Admiral    Samuel,  (Russian    Navy), 

340,341  and  n. 
Griffin,  Admiral  Thomas  (1),  120,  122,  121, 

130,  131,  27li,  277.  5ii5 
Griffin,  Commander  Thomas  (2),  120  n. 
Griffin,  or  Griffon,  '-'A,  201  n.,  311,313 
Griffith,  Captain  Walter  (1),  40o  n.,  4OG  n., 

428  n.,  434,  452,  453 
Grimao,  Admiral  Don  F.  dc,  31 
Groix,  Isle,  124,  303 
Gros  llet  Bay,  St.  Lucia,  -432,  403,  -187 
Grove,  Commander  Thomas  Saunders,  540  n. 
Guadeluupe,  202,  20;!,  210,  25-1,428,463, 

468,  521,  522,  524,  525,  526 
Guadeloupe.,  or  Giiciduloupe,  395  n,,  4'J2  n., 

536 

Guantanamo,  I'unto,  70  n. 
Guarda  Costas,  202,  263,  204,  205,  310 
Guan/iini,  143 
Guay,  Commodore  C'omte  du,   127  n.,  142, 

289 

Guerin,  M.  Leon,  quoted,  222  n. 
Guernsey,  310 
Guernsey,  41   n.,  !)G,   109,  170,  212  and  n., 

213,  3r4  u. 

Guerrera,  Captain  Don  Francisco,  34 
Guerrier,  148  n.,  151  n.,  212  n.,  213,  551 
Guevara,  Rear-Admiral  Don   Balthazar  de, 

34,  30,  37,  38 
Guichen,  Rear-Admiral  Comte  de,  415,  443 

au<l  n.,  453,  456,  458,  401,  463,  464,  405, 

466,  468,  469,  470,  478,  480,  488,  504, 

509 

Guillaurne  Tdl,  286 
Guinea,  109,  259,  260 
Guipuscoa,  314 
Guipuscoana,  448  n. 
fluirlande,  193,  308,  313  (2) 
Guise,  General  John,  63,  68  n.,  70,  76 
Gunhoats,  on  the  American  lakes,  362,  305  ; 

at  Gibraltar,  503 
Gunneet,  The,  43 
Gun-locks,  334 
Gunners,  19,  111  n.,  112  n. 


Gunnery  exercise,  54,  333 

Gunnery,  Poorness  of  French,  549,  552 

Guns,  Bunting  of,  180,  305,  306 

Guns,  Naval,  11,  12,  330-334 

Gun  wharf,  Portsmouth,  343 

Gwynn,  Captain   Richard,  125   n.,  212  n.,. 

296 
Gyldenlove,  Ulrich  Christian,  26  and  n.,  27 

Haarlem,  91 

Haarlem  River :  see  Harlem  River 

Hackman,  Captain  James,  311 

Haddock,   Admiral    Nicholas,   34,   49,   50 

and  n.,  65,  66,  67,  80,  270 
Haddock,  Captain  Richard  (2),  3 
Haddock,  Captain  William,  34 
Hadley's  Quadrant,  10,  13 
Hague,  The,  30 
Haiti:  sir  San  Domingo. 
Hakluyt  Society,  The,  320 
Haldane,  Captain  Robert,  224,  225 
Hale,  Captain  John,  238,  246  n.,  299,  311 
Half-pay,  19,  104,  340 
Half-pay  officers :  proposal  to  subject  them 

to  martial  law,  17,  104 
Halifax,  Nova  Scotia,  141,  167,  168,  169, 

172,  182,  206,  210,  251,  289,  311,  327, 

350,  371,  379,  397,  404 
Halifax,  11-3,  206  n. 
Halifax,  George,  Earl  of,  2 
Hall,  Richard,  3 
Hainhlin,  Robert,  15 
Hamilton,  Captain  Archibald  (2),  34 
Hamilton,  Captain  George,  206  n.,  208 
Hamilton,  Captain  James  (2),  286,  311 
Hamilton,    Captain    Sir    John    (2),   Bart., 

415,  474  n. 

Hamilton,  Lieutenant- ,  (Mar.),  322 

Hamond,  Captain   Sir   Andrew   Snape  (1), 

Bart.,  327,  343,  391,  406  n. 
Hampden,  Kichard,  3 
Hampshire,  225,  226,  246  n. 
Hampton   Court,  41  n.,  54,  55,  56,  57  n., 

70  n.,  71,  72,  75  n.,  152  n.,  189,  234  n., 

236,  246  n.,  250,  266  and  n.,  267,  270- 

278,  283  n.,  295 
Ifaiicock,  335 
Hands,  Israel,  260 
Hankerson,  Captain  Thomas,  206  n.,  226  n., 

242  u.,  245  n.,  246  n. 
/fannibal,  549  and  n.,  550  n-.,  563  n. 
Hannover,  Evils  of  the  connection  with,  27, 

89 

Hannover,  Treaty  of,  42 
Hanway,  Captain  Thomas,  4,  125  n.,  127  n., 

320  (2) 

Happy,  43  n.,  45 
Happy  lleturri,  317 
Hardi,  191,  563  n. 
Hardships  of  naval  life,  21,  22 
Hardy,  Vice-Admiral  Sir  Charles  (1),  41  n., 

89,  91,  107,  274,  444  n. 
Hardy,  Admiral  Sir  Charles  (2),  Kt.,  167, 


INDEX    TO    VOLUME  III. 


587 


168,  169,  172,  182,  184,  186  n.,  218  n., 

232,  233,  239,  252,  280,  444,  446,  565 
Hardy,  Vice-Admiral  Sir  Thomas,  26 
Harland,   Admiral    Sir   Robert   (2),    Bart., 

127  n.,  212  n.,  287,  415,  418,  419,  420, 

421,  424,  436,  566 
Harlem  Kiver,  382,  384,  385 
Harman,  Captain  William,  201  n.,  202,  203 
Harmood,  Captain  Harry,  434,  454  n.,  509  n. 
Harmood,  Commander  James,  246  n. 
Harris,  Captain  Barrows,  34 
Harris,  Captain  William,  302,  311 
Harris,  J.,  shipbuilder,  335 
Harrison,  George,  smuggler,  1 7 
Harrison,  Vice- Admiral  Henry,  125  n.,  127  n. 
Harrison,  Captain   John,    161    n.,    174   n., 

179  n.,  198  n.,  246  n. 
Harrison,  Captain  Thomas  (2),  218  n.,  252, 

302,  308 
Harrison,   Mr.    William,    the    chronometer 

maker,  13,  14,  338 

Hartwell,  Captain  Brodrick,  206  n.,  '2!  I!) 
Harvey,   Admiral   Sir   Henry  (1),  513   n., 

520  n. 

Harwich,  12,  237,  335 
Harwich,  120  n.,  131  n.,  132,  186,  311 
Haswell,  Captain   Robert,  242    n.,  245   n., 

246  n. 

Hatchlands,  near  Guildford,  23 1 
Hatley,  Simon,  316,  317 
Haussonville,  General  Comte  d',  250,  251 
Havana,  44,  59,  67,  76,  77,  107,  135,  136, 

137,  238,  245,  246-24!),  250,  254,  265, 

266,  267,  272,  279,  312,  314,  315,  468 
Haviland,  Colonel,  226,  228 
Havre,  Le,   193,  196,   216,  224,  231,  293, 

445,  446 

Hawk,  46  n.,  269 
Hawke,  311,  352 
Hawke,  Admiral  of  the  Fleet.  Sir  Edward 

Hawke,  K.B.,  Lord,  96,  97,  100, 126-129, 

130,  137,  138,  142,  145,  152,  155,  156, 

160,  169,  171,  172,  173,  190,  191,  192, 

195,  196,  216-223,  224,  230,  231,  232, 

233,  234,  239,  250,  252,  284,  287,  292, 
297,  309,  312,  313,  325,  345  n.,  435  n., 
444  n.,  565 

Hawker,  Captain   James,   242   n.,  246   n., 

546  n.,  552  n.,  554 
Hawkins,  James :   see   Whitshed,   Admiral 

of  the  Fleet  Sir  James  Hawkins 
Hay,  Captain  William,  253 
Hayes,  A.,  shipbuilder,  335 
Hazard,  238,  311 
Hazardous,  310 
Haze,  213  :  see  also  Fog 
Hazeborough  Sand,  The,  312 
Hebe,  335 
Hebrides,  110,  113 
Hector,  244   n.,   269,   283  n.,  415,  474  n., 

532,  533  and  u. 
Hector,  Captain,  415 
Hell  Uate,  385,  409 


Hemmington,   Captain    John   (or    James), 

70,  71 
Hemp,  5 

Henley,  Commander  Sir  Robert,  Bart.,  62  n. 
Henry  the  Seventh's  Chapel,  193  n. 
Henry,  Admiral  John,  509  n. 
Henry    Frederick,   Duke    of    Cumberland, 

Admiral  Prince,  343  n.,  566 
Henslow,  Sir  John,  Kt,,  326 
Hepburn,  Captain  David,  (Mar.)  236 
Herbert,  Captain  Edward  (1),  272,  310 
Herbert,  Captain  Richard,  54,  55,  62 
Ifercule,  108,  533  n. 
Hercules,  96,  101,  218,  302,  520  n. 
Hermione,  34,  224,  295,  297,  306,  308,  312, 

313  (2),  314  (3),  492  n. 
Thro,  218  n.,  234  n.,  235  n.,  305,  313,  546 

n.,  547  and  n.,  548,  550  n.,  552  n.,  554, 

563  !>. 

Heroine,  335 
Iliros,  185,  218  n.,  220,  221,  313,  546  n., 

547  and  n.,  549,  550  n.,  554,  559,  560, 

563  n. 
Hervey,  Vice- Admiral  Hon.  Augustus  John 

(later  Earl  of  Bristol),  148  and  n.,  153, 

189,  216,  234  n.,  242  n.,  243,  244,  245  n., 

246  and  n.,  248,  249,  302,  566 
Hervey,  Captain  John  Augustus,  Lord,  339 
Hervey,  Captain  Hon.  William,  63 
Hewett,  Captain  Sir  William,  Bart.,  310 
Hewitt,  Captain  Sir  William,  Bart.,  200  n., 

225,  311 

Hibernian  Marine  Society,  342 
Hill,  Captain  Benjamin,  428,  434 
Hill,  Rear-Admiral  Christopher,  566 
Hill,  Mr.,  carpenter;  his  inventions,  337 
Hind,  206  n.,  258,  310,  549  n. 
Hippopotame,  14H  n.,  151  n. 
Hirondelle,  415 

Hispaniola,  59  and  n.,  64,  68,  78,  133,  273 
Hoare  (or  Hore),  Captain  Daniel,  61,  62  n., 

75,  80,  310 

Hocquart,  Captain  de,  125  n.,  141 
Hodgson,  General  Studholm,  234  and  n. 
Hodgson,  J.,  shipbuilder,  335 
Hodsell  (or  Hodsoll),  Captain  James,  81,  96 
Hoodie,  119 

Holbourne,  Captain  William,  212  n. 
Holburue,  Admiral  Francis,  140,  141,  145, 

146,  156,  167-169,  232,  239,  565 
Holland,  J.,  shipbuilder,  12 
Holland,  505  n. 
Holland,  26,  47,  48,  51,  91,  143,  173,  201, 

242,  252,  253,  266,  351,  478,  502,  539, 

545 

Holloway,  Admiral  John,  454  n. 
Hollwell,  Captain  John,  215  n.,  242  n.,  352 
Holmes,  Rear-Admiral  Charles,  135  and  n., 

136,  137,  144,  169  and  n.,  173,  190,  195, 

205,  206  and  n.,  208,  209,  224,  225,  232, 

233,  239,  245,  300,  313 
Holmes,  Captain  Lancelot,  246  n. 
Holmes,  Tempest,  3 


588 


INDEX    TO    VOLUME  III. 


Holyhead,  15 

Home,  Vice- Admiral  Sir  George,  Bart.,  454  n. 

Home,  Bear-Admiral  Roddam,  546  n. 

Honduras,  Bay  of,  80 

Honfleur,  216 

Hood,  Captain  Alexander,  497  n.,  513  n. 

Hood,   Admiral    Alexander   Arthur,   K.B., 

Lord   Bridport,  218  n.,   238,   295,   305, 

413  n.,  415,  567 
Hood,  Admiral    Sir  Samuel  (1),  Viscount 

Hood,  215  n.,  283,  300,  326  and  n.,  346, 

369,  479,  481-487,  482  n.,  494,  495,  497 
and   n.,   499,    500,    501,   502,   510-519, 
520  «.,  521-528,  530,  532,  534-538,  567 

Hope,  Captain  Charles  (1),  505  n. 

Hopeivell,  263 

Hopsun,  Major-General,  196,  201,  202,  203 

Hopsoun,  Vice-Admiral  Edward,  42,  43,  45, 
46  and  n. 

llore,  Captain  Daniel :  ««•  Iloare,  Captain 
Daniel 

Hornet,  144,  245,  310,  311 

Horse  Shoe  Shoal,  Chesapeake  Bay,  501 

Hosier,  Vice- Admiral  Francis,  39  u.,  42,  43 
and  n.,  44,  45  and  n. 

Hospital  ships,  31 

llcithaiii,  Admiral  William  (1),  Lord  Hot- 
IKUII,  23-1  n.,  296,  301,  383,  385,  387, 
40ii  n.,  409,  428  and  n.,  429,  454  n.,  469, 
5(17 

llouat,  1 19 

Hougue,  Cape  La,  1!I2 

lloulton,  Kear- Admiral  John,  246  n.,  454  n., 
462  n.,  482  n.,  568 

House  carpenters,  342 

Howe,  Admiral  of  the  I-'leet,  Hon.  Sir 
liichard,  Karl  Howe,  141,  171,  173,  192- 
195,  216,  218  n.,  220,  223,  237,  239,  252, 
282,  291,  296,  325,  326,  340,  345,  350, 
351,  3iili,  371,  379,  380,  390,  391,  394, 
3U7,  398,  399,  400  and  n.,  401-412,  425, 
428,  538-543,  549,  556 

Howe,  General  Sir  William,  K.B.,  359,  360, 

370,  .",71,  372,  379,  383-387,   388,   390, 
391,  392,  393,  398,  442 

Howitzers,  362  and  n. 

Hudson,  Captain  Charles,  497  n. 

Hudson  River,  354,  360,  370,  371,  380,  382, 

38  i,  385,  386,  388,  389,  391,  392 
Hudson's  Bay,  318-320,  352  n. 
Hudson's    Bay   Company,   The,   318,   319, 

320 

Hudson's  Strait,  319 
Hughes,  Captain  Charles,  552  n. 
Hughes,  Admiral    Sir   Edward,  K.B.,  183, 

185,  206   u.,  222   n.,   439   n.,  508,   545 

and  n.,  548,  549-564,  566 
Hughes,  Captain  liichard  (1),  4 
Hughes,  Captain  Sir  Richard  (2),  Bart.,  4, 

84  n.,  326,  327,  343,  538  n. 
Hughes,  Admiral   Sir   Richard   (3),   Bart., 

200  n.,  538  and  n.,  567 
Hughes,  Rear- Admiral  Robert  (1),  47 


Hughes,  Rear-Admiral  Robert  (2),  196,  201 

and  n.,  202,  566 
Hugli,  162 
Hull,  335,  342 
Number,  312 

Hunt,  Captain  Anthony  (1),  373 
Hunt,  Captain  Joseph,  215  n.,  304 
Hunt,  Edward,  326 
Hunter,  145,  206  n.,  208,  252,  253 
Hurricanes:  see  Storms 
Hussar,   191,   223  n.,   297,  312   (2),  335, 

406  n. 

Hutchinsou,  William,  quoted,  278,  279 
Hyder  Ali,  545,  549,  552,  555,  557,  561 
Hydros,  84,  92,  93,  96 

luiiETSON",  John,  326 

Ice,  357,  358 

•'Idlers"  in  men-of-war,  19 

llfracombe,  186,  313 

llliistre,   198   n.,   443   n.,   557,   559,   560, 

563  n. 

Impregndbls,  343 
Impressment,  18,  23,  140,  396 
Impress  Service,  The,  347 
Imprisonment,  275 
Improvements,  Naval,  10,  13-15,  330-334, 

336-338 

Inadequate  force,  Danger  of  employing,  370 
Indefatigable,  286 
India:  sec  East  Indies. 
Indian  auxiliaries  in  America,  366 
Indien,  415 
industry,  320 
Infante,  247,  249,  315 
Infernal,  172,  201  n.,  234  n.,  242  n.,  293, 

311,  546 

Inflammables,  Alleged  use  of,  179 
Inflexible,  218  n.,  313,  361,  362,  363  and  n., 

365-369,  563 
Inglelield,  Captain  John  Nicholson,  497  n., 

513  n.,  520  n. 
Inglis,  Rear-Admiral   Charles   (1),  215  n., 

513  n.,  520  n.,  568 

limes,  Rear-Admiral  Alexander,  246  n.,  567 
limes,  Captain  Thomas,  133  u.,  135  n. 
Inspection  of  Dockyards,  335 
Instructions,  Admirals',  .15 
Instructions,  Secret,  66 
Instructions,  Vernon's,  54 
Insurance,  Marine,  396 
hi.iuhtire,  120  and  n. 
Intelligence,  Admiralty,  126 
Intrepid,  126,  148  n.,  150,  151  n.,  154,  191, 

212  and  n.,  213,  214,  215,  218  n.,  246  u., 

299,  312,  454  n.,  462,  482  n.,  486,  497  n., 

513  n. 
Intrepide,  127  n.,  128,  165  n.,  185,  218  n., 

415, 458 
Invasion  of  England  projected  or  threatened, 

39,  89,  90,  142,  145,  196,  210,  216,  261, 

445 
Invencible,  135  n.,  314 


INDEX    TO    VOLUME  III. 


589 


Invincible,  6,  12,  125  n.,  182,  288,  296,  297, 

311,  312,  395  n.,  482  n.,  497  n.,  513  n. 
Inwood,  E.,  shipbuilder,  335 
Iphigenia,  505  n. 

Iphigenie,  415 

Ipswich,  52 

Ipswich,  84, 122,  152  n.,  273,  280 

Ireland,  39,  110,  119,  167,  196,  216,  223, 

229,  230,  311 
Iris,  292,  335,  492  n. 
Irish  Viceroy's  yacht,  The,  330  n. 
Isabela,  96,  98  and  n. 
his,  126,  152  n.,  215  n.,  224  n.,  301,  306, 

312,  313  (4),  350,  357,  366,  406  n.,  409, 
410,  428  n.,  431,  546  and  n.,  548,  550  n., 
552  n.,  560,  563  n. 

Islay  Island,  229 

Isle  Dieu,  301 

Isle  Bas,  333 

Italy,  30,  66,  84,  102,  107,  116 

JACOBITES,  The,  39,  40,  43  n.,  279  and  n. 

Jamaica,  13,  44,  45,  51  n.,  54,  58,  59,  60, 
61  n.,  62,  63,  64,  65,  67,  75,  76  and  n., 
77,  78  and  n.,  79,  80,  88,  109,  122,  123, 
124,  135,  136,  145,  164-166,  182,  1HS, 
204  224  225  232.  233  239  245  246 
247^  250,'  263,'  264,  260,'  272*  275,  300* 
306,  308,  310,  311,  313,  327,  379,  438, 
445,  470,  473,  479,  494,  502,  519,  536, 
537,  539 

Jamaica,  144 

James  Island,  372 

James  River,  Virginia,  473,  488,  494,  496 

James,  the  historian,  William,  quoted,  330, 
et  seq. 

James,  Mr.,  (Commodore  in  H.E.I.  Co.'s 
Service),  143,  144,  164 

Janus,  473,  474 

Jason,  108,  125  n.,  312,  336,  492  n.,  525, 
537,  546  n. 

Jasper,  Sergeant,  at  Fort  Moultrie,  374 

Jekyll,  Captain  Edward,  192,  201  and  n., 
202,  235  n.,  246  n.,  248,  305 

Jenkins's  ears,  Richard,  50,  51,  265  and  n., 
266,  272 

Jenner,  J.,  shipbuilder,  335 

Jennings,  Admiral  Sir  John,  42,  43,  257 

Jennings,  Captain  Thomas,  3 

Jennings,  Lieutenant-Colonel,  229 

Jersey,  291 

Jersey,  70  and  n.,  211,  212  n.,  280,  292 

Jervis,  Admiral  of  the  Fleet,  Sir  John,  K.B., 
Earl  St.  Vincent,  206  n.,  207,  250,  415, 
443,  445,  538  and  n.,  539,  567 

Jesuit's  bark,  62 

Joannis,  Captain,  174  n. 

Jocelyn,  Captain  Robert,  200  n  ,  240  n. 

Johnson,  Captain  Sir  Robert,  Kt.,  27  n., 
261,  310 

Johnson,  Dr.  Samuel,  21  n. 

Johnson,  Colonel  Sir  William,  Bart.,  141, 
204,  226 


•Johnston,  Lieutenant  William,  279  n. 

Johnstone,  Captain  Gideon,  492  n.,  497  n. 

Johnstone,  Captain  George,  245,  350,  545- 
549 

Johnstone,  Commander  James,  479  n. 

Joiners,  342 

Jolly  (or  Jolley),  Captain  Thomas,  71,  76  n. 

Jones,  Captain  John  Paul,  I'.S  N.,  21)8,  525 

Jonquiere,  Admiral  the  Marquis  de  La,  117, 
124,  125  and  n.,  126,  139,  281,  283 

Jonquiere  de  Taffanel,  Captain  de  La,  125  n. 

Joy,  William,  265 

Juan  Fernandez,  310,  317,  318,  321 

Judges,  The,  pronounce  upon  Byng's  sen- 
tence, 158  ;  upon  Coffin's  case,  351 

Jumper,  Captain  Sir  William,  Kt.,  4 

Juno,  12,  34,  35,  37,  186  n.,  215  n.,  222  n., 
305,  313  (2),  314,  403  n.,  503  n. 

Junon,  148  n.,  314,  415 

Jupiter,  143,  546  n. 

Juste,  218  n.,  313 

Karlakrona,  27 

Ranted  I'un  Medf.mblik,  91 

Katherme  J.,  Empress  of  Russia,  42,  47 

Kearny,  Commander  Michael,  212  n. 

Keene,  Sir  Benjamin,  139,  155 

Keith,  Captain  Sir  Basil,  Kt.,  2'23  n. 

Keith,  Viscount:  .see  Elphinstoue,  Hon. 
George  Keith 

Kemiienfelt,  Rear- Admiral  Richard,  174  n., 
179  n.,  181,  182,  198  n.,  225,  240  n.,  241, 
242,  341,  443  n.,  509,  510,  519,  538,  ;  39, 
540,  567 

Kempthonie,  Captain  Thomas,  4,  34 

Kcnnebec  River,  356 

Kenned}',  Captain  Archibald  (later  Earl  of 
Cassilis),  302 

Kennington,  107  n.,  183 

Kent,  H.R.H.  Prince  Edward,  Duke  of, 
184  n. 

Kent,  33,  34,  35,  46  and  n ,  53,  76  n.,  78, 
79  n.,  83  n.,  127  n.,  128,  129,  140,  1(31 
and  n.,  162,  163,  267,  268,  283  and  n., 
314 

Kentish  Knock,  The,  310 

Keppel,  Admiral  Hon.  Augustus  :  Viscount 
Keppel,  139  and  u.,  171,  188,  189,  218  n., 
220,  223,  231,  232,  234-230,  238,  246  n., 
247,  249,  250,  283,  284,  288,  289,  299, 
311,  324,  3i!5,  341,  396,  397,  412-426, 
428,  435  n.,  436.  440,  443,  508,  549,  565 

Kepptl,  Vice-Admiral  George,  400  n.,  406  n. 

Keppel,  Captain  George  Augustus,  520  n. 

Kermadec,  Captain  Baron  cie,  415 

Kersaint,  Commodore  Guy  Simon  de  Caet- 
nampreu,  Comte  de,  114  and  n.,  146,  165, 
166,  169,  219  and  n..  220  n. 

Kersaint,  Vice-Admiral  Comte  de,  415 

Kidd,  Captain  Dandy,  320 

Kidd,  the  pirate,  258,  259 

Killed  in  action  in  the  Seven  Years'  War  , 
Seamen  and  Marines,  339 


.-... 


iyi>EX   TO    VOLUME  III. 


Kilrooc  Point,  229 

King  Gtoryu,  285,  2*6 

Kins,  Admiral  Sir  Richard  (1),  Bart.,  162, 

201  n^  23&,  241  n,  545  IL,  550  n_,  551, 

552  n-,  567 

Kind's  College,  Cambridge.  Chapel  of.  242 
Kintfi»t,rr,  140,  143,  16!  ami  n,  162,  201 

0,402 
Kingsmill  ( prvmi/ntly  Brice),  Admiral  Sir 

Robert,  BarL,  242  n,  415 
Kingsale.  230,  250,  274 
Kin'/miif,  262 
Kinifatirn,  *4,  '.."5,  ','*,  14*  n.,  21*  n.,  227  n.. 

251,  273 

Kin.ibergen.  Captain  van,  505  n. 
Kirk,  Captain  Robert,  19*  n-,  303,  311 
Kirke,  Captain  James,  212  n.,  214.  222  n. 
Kittery.  11" 
KjOne  Bay.  -7 
Knatchbull,  Captain  Charles.  4*2  n..  4'.'7  n_ 

513  n..  520  n. 

Knight,  Captain  J"hn  '  I ',  224  ru  23* 
KnLzht.   A'imiral    Sir    John    '2.    4>2    n.. 

513  n..  520  t. 
Knight.    Rear  -  Admiral    Sir    Joseph.    Kt.. 

131  n..  l->.  246  n..  343.  566 
KnUhr.  t 'aptain  Richani,  223  n. 
Knirht. '  .'aptain  William.  27H,  :',  l» 
Kni^h'un.  •  .'.if tain  Franc i.-.  :;t 
Kn><»~I«-,   Admiral    Sir   t.'harles,   t>;irt.,  '!'•',. 

57.  61  and  n.,  62.  *'.4.  6>.  T'J.  73.  -.">->)>. 

112.   1-4.   l::'\    132-l:i7.   146,    171.  267. 

2V'4.  31.".  34».'.  565 
Knowleh,  i.'oiiirnari'ler  Eiiivapi,  312 

LAr.p.nNK   I-r.  vxi».  :;-;; 

Lafayette.  General,  46'..'.  41^6 

Lafurev.  Admiral  Sir  J"hn.  Bart.,  1~4,  1»5. 

-'.*)"n..  242  n,  327  •  2'.  347  and  n..  415. 

417,  4-4  n..  425  n.,  567 
Laie  de  i.'ueilli,  Giptain,  '.'6 
La^e,  the  f.rivateer,  M.  lie,  2N>,  2^1 
Laii"*,  214.  2>5.  43'.'  n. 
La  i.fnayra.  >5,  f*',.  >.^ 
Lake,  Captain  Thomas,  11?,  131  n. 
Lakes,   Campaign   on    the   American,   353 

^  *~i. 

Lalandeile,  Captain  de,  550  n. 
Lallv,  Ban  >n  de  Tollen.ial,  General  Comte  'ie, 

164,  174,  176,  177,  1*1,  lt»y,  200,  394  n. 
Lambart,  I  'aptain,  4!."2  n. 
Lam  ban,  Brigadier-General  Hamilton,  235, 

2:J6 

Lambert.  Captain  Robert  Alexander,  327 
Lampraavy,  176,  177,  17* 
Linrn.iti-T,  14*  n.,  151  n.,  201  n^  2!>5,  2V>6, 

312 

Land's  End,  241»,  25i>,  *3*,  ~>&) 
Langara,  Admiral  Don  Juan  de,  449,  451 
Langdon,  Rear- Admiral  William,  165  and  n., 

567 

Lan^rid^e,  259 
Lanyufdoc,  409,  429 


Lapeili«re,  Captain  d«,  55O  n. 

Lark,  276,  2«5  and  n.,  310,  403  n. 

Larr,  Captain,  125  n. 

Lasoars  in  the  Navy,  177,  225 

Latham,  Captain  Tnomas,  161  n^  174  n^ 

17!)  n. 

Lateral,  505  n.,  540 
Lauahton,  Professor  J.   K.,  R.y^  quoted, 

229  n^  296,  207 
Launmtvn,  115,  234  n^  310 
Laur-J.  479  n. 
Law,  Naval,  350,  351 
Lawrence,  Captain   Peter,  70,  123  n_,  273, 

310 

Laws,  Captain  William,  71,  269 
Lea,  Commander  William,  80,  276,  310 
Lecale,  Lord  :  sv>.  Fitzgerald,  Lord  Charles 
Lecky,  Mr.  W.  E.  H.,  quoted,  51 
Le  Cras.  <L'afrtain  Edward,  201  and  n.,  2tt?, 

2:i5  n^  326,  327 
Le<ie,  Marques  de,  32,  37,  3* 
Lee,  Vice-Admiral  Hon.  Fitzroy  Henry,  122 
Lee,  Captain  Thomas  (1),  23* 
Lee,  William,  3 
Lr*'t'i:*i.it.h<jr*t,  '.'1 
Leeward  Man-'.*,  57,  **,  122,  124,  137,  142, 

145.    164,   1*2,   1**,   l'.>6,  201-203,  224, 

225.  232,  233,  23',',  245,  300,  311,  327, 

427.  44' '.  445.  44*.  469,  53*. 
Lw.vard.   Reasons  for  engaging  from,  214, 

4">.  42i; :  disad vantages  of  engaging  from, 

in  narrow  waters,  363.  364,  :>69  :  engaging 

.  44'.'.  4'JO 
r.f-.-.'e,  C.if.tain  Hc.n.  Edward,  54,  122,  124, 

2>4.  :;-') 

Lev£ge.  i  aptain  George,  174  n.,  177 
Leage,  Hon.  Henry  Bilson,  3 
Leage,   Captain    .lulian,   20">    n.,   226    n., 

:...  -42  n.,  245  n^  246  n. 
Lezlioru,  4>,  292,  311 
Leith,  5'Jo  n. 

Lempriere,  C'aptain  Thomas,  246  n. 
Lendrick,  I. 'aptain  John,  246  n. 
Leui'.',  Captain  L>on  Francisco,  34 
Lfnox,  34.  43  n.,  46  n.,  53,  *1,  123  and  n^ 

135  and  n.,  136,  200  n.,  240  n.,  267,  268, 

2n),  314 

Lenses  in  lighthouses,  33* 
Lf.nyiird.  43  n.,  45 
L'iofird,  313 

Leslie,  Captain  Lachlin,  S6,  201  and  n. 
Leslie,  General,  488 

Leso,  Admiral  Don  Bias  de,  59,  61,  69,  71  n. 
Lestock,  A..huiral  Richard  (2),  34,  63,  68, 

70,  71,  73,  75,  80-84,  92-107,  118,  119, 

257,  283,  423 

Letters  of  Marque  (s<v  also  Reprisals),  52 
Levant,  242  n. 
Leviathan,  399  n. 
Levis,  M.  de,  227 
Levis,  Point,  207 

LichjieM,  70  n.,  76,  80,  188,  311,  312 
165  n. 


TO  TOLVME  III.                                   591 

,  3  Long  Wand,  Charleston,  372 

UMkHWHt-GcMnb  rf  MHMK,  2SS  Loos  Inland,  Lak«  Champlain,  363 

Liartenants.  lit,  30,  22,  103,  330,  341  Loni  Island,  Xew  York,  382, 383,  385,  397, 

Tj^rtiMin  ,  14.  15,  108,  338  409,  471,  489,  495 

Lacfcts,  S3  and  iu,  338  Longcroft.  Cajitain  Edward,  365 

LiflitiiimQ,  311  Longford,   Lord :    e«    Pakenham.  Captain 

Lightning  oonducKurs,  338  Hon.  Edward  Michael 

Lightships,  15  Longitude.  I^cor-err  of  the,  13,  14,  338 

Ligondes.  Ca.pt.ain  de,  415  Longae-riBe  M.  de,  244 

Lima.  3O8,  318  Lomsii]*"  Light,  338 

Lindsay.  Bear-Admiral  Sir  John.  KJJ,  185,  Lcae.  "4.  310 

206  n,  207,  24«  n_  24S,  338,  347  and  n_  L«rd  Wir*.  251,  252 

415,  567  Lorient,  118,  224,  2*3.  295 

Line.  Breaking  the.  531,  532  Loring.  C.ajitaiii  Josiiua,  205.  22*-  and  n. 

I^e-rf-liatde.  Fse  and  abuse  of  the.  38,  81-  Los--  of  life  in  tnt  Sever  Years-"  War.  255 

S3.  97,  105.  125.  127.  128,  136.  149,  150.  L.:***  of  shijuv  31(>-315,  396  iu 

154,  156,  174.  175,  178,  179,  198,  218,  L;.ndom_  'General   tnt   Ear]    of.  144,  166. 

219.  423.  46O-462,  467,  468,  491  167.  168,  172.  2(4 

Line  of  beariii^.  558  L-jui--  X  V_  Krrig  of  Franot.  13r 

LiTigen.  Captaiii  .T.iaej.L.  96.  122  Lc>ui«.V.mrc.  I'.i9.  110.   113-115.  11';.    117. 

Lowe.  Captain  Join,  4O6  iu  520  n.  122.  14-"'.  14L  145.  167-169.  17".   172. 

Linzee.  Admiral  Eobert.  52*.>  n.  182-184.  2(>;.   ^4.  22-.  25 L  289.  -V\. 

Lim..  64.  66.  7(>  iu  110.  11L  127  i..  14-  n_  297.  299.  311.  312.  313 

151  iu  201  n_  202.  20-3,  212  n_  235  n_  Lwifitwrp.  311 

264.  279.  283  s_  3<^8,  314,  434.  437.  438,  Louisiana.'  253,  254 

439,  473  l*wu  -'-- 

Lisbon,  3L   .Vi.   54.  'i  63.  91.   1('7.  245.  Lovett.  I'latrrai!.  .!..>'..  9»'. 

295,  30L  .''(ti.  .'22  Lvweft-uFt, -<*j  :—  2>..  227  and  ;i—  311 

Liklfc.  Captain  Wniian^   122.  131   and  i_    L:.Trfiejd.  Co*-,  .rria-jder .  24''.  i...  312 

132.  143,  311  Lowtuer.  r,  .;..,!,«-„  .  Mar  ..  63  i_ 

Liftsa.  2(*2  Ij.-.^n_ijer.  tiit  '.uc'C-'aijeer.  61.  7- 

LivJy.  86,  87.  88,  108,  120  n_  131  i_  22".  -      airmail 
226.272.  313.  415 

Lizari  The.  65.  S10.  811.  cU3.  444.  5<X. 

Lizard,  206  n_  226  IL_  2-33  i_  242  T__  24*.' 
n_  299,  482  n_  513  i.. 

Llovd.  Captain  Jan«*,  96.  104  Lurtreld.  H-ou  JOL.L  :    w    OiiLiuf,.  <.  aptaii. 

Llc'V'ix    Vioe-Adniira-    -JoliL     (2,    131    i H'.'i-  J'.'L^  Lutt~e — 

148  iu,  56(',  L'.Twi.itjt.  Ad^i-a^  Skeffinrtoiu  38.9 

Llcrrd,  Willian,  fl'j,  212  n_  56*  Luzon.  241 

Llcn-d"f  List  of  ]:*»•*  and  cajirures-,  1775-8-3.  Lymt.  21L  212  i_  259.  29L  29-.  311  <2 

3<«6  n.  L}-im.  Ca;fl.aiL  Tiiomafc.'2'.'l  and  n^  203.  232 

Lobh,  Commander  JacoK  187  LTTH^  I>r. :  Li^  t-t.iL.  .1>!7 

Lochater.  111.  113  Lvniu  ^.< 

Locknart,  John:  «»  Hot*,  &r  John  Lock-  Lyiiii,  2-"ri  i...  236 

hirt.  Ban_  Lynnlia^tt:  Bay.  493,  496 

Ixcxuaria,  Point  de,  235  Lyiu.  2-3- 

Losjrie.  Captain  Jan**.  2-;*"1  n_  3C>6  Lj.  11*-,  Mr.  Isaac.  338 

l^KwrTsiS  -Z.J*.  li"l'  L-  12L  141.  142,  286.  312  (2j 
ioi^,  298,  313 

London,  339  MA'.AO.  317,  3—3 

lao^m,  BoM^mtwo  of  jmblic  servioef  by  MaeartneT.  i  ;a}it«in  John.  209. 226,  iu.  505 11. 

the  CitT  of,  "58  Ma'jarty,  Ijajitain.  125  n. 

LamiML,  103,  187,  311,  491,  492  iu.  497  and  Macbrioe.  AdminJ  John.  333.  34«.  413  n^ 

•_..-•     '•  '  415.  505  n, 

•    -      -    .   -         •  M-CleverTT.  Ca]itahi  WiHiirju.  211.  2)2  iu, 

L^  Ctatti  Bofcnt,  7L  96,  107  217.  22<i  iu.  233  iu.  242  n. 


592 


INDEX    TO    VOLUME  III. 


M'Coy,  Captain  Alexander,  543  n. 
Macdouald,  Flora,  372 
MachauU,  210,  228,  294,  313 
Mackenzie,     Vice-Admiral     George,     193, 

201  n.,  203,  24H  n.,  566 
Mackenzie,    Commander    James,    201    n., 

234  n.,  242  n. 

Mackenzie,  Admiral  Thomas,  546  n. 
Mackenzie,  Lieutenant-Colonel,  (Mar.)  237 

Mackie,  Commander ,  90,    100,   101, 

310 

M'Laurin,  Captain  John,  245,  513  n.,  520  n. 
Maclellan,  Captain   Hon.  Duubar,  552   n., 

557 

Macnamara,  master  in  H.K.I.C.S.,  251 
Macnamara,  Commodore  de,  140 
Madagascar,  1!)7 

Madariaga,  Captain  Don  J.  Y.,  247  n. 
Madeira,  13,  Go,  320,  338 
Madras,  109,  Hit,  121  and  n.,  124,  130,  132, 
100,   174,  177,   181,  182,  186,  199,  200, 
232,  23!  i,  394  n.,  54!),  552,  557,  560,  561, 
503 

Madrid,  37,  47,  51,  139,  308,  447 
Madrid,  Convention  of,  203 
Magellan's  Strait,  322 

MuyiitiHiiHt;  138,  171,  172,  210,  217,218 
and  n.,  219,  220,  280,  287,  312,  524,  552 
and  n.,  503  n. 

Magnificent,  343,  434,  454  n.,  520  n. 
Magnijique,  218  n.,  415 
Mahan,  Captain  A.  '!'.,  U.S.X.,  quoted,  33, 
.",8,  90,  97,  126,  129,  149,  150,  176,  200, 
222  n.,  254,  255  ' 
Malic,  Captain,  174  n. 
Main.',  232,  351 
Main-alias,  The,  143,  5-15 
Maidstiiin;  217,  21is  ami  n.,  283,  284,  308, 

311 
Maitland,  Captain  Hon.  Frederick  Lewis  (1), 

225,  415,  417,  454  n.,  509  n. 
Majorca,  148,  153,  273,  295,  313 
Malabar  coast,  The,  351,  545  n. 
Malacca,  241 
Malaga,  32,  39,  51 
Mnlicieuse,  302,  300 
Maliyw,  312 
Malta,  34  n.,  38,  298,  313 
Malta  Channel,  38 
Man,  Admiral  Kobert  (2),  201  n.,  235  u., 

239,  252,  308  n.,  309,  506 
Man,  Isle  of,  230 
Mangalore,  352,  545 
Manhattan  Island,  382,  383,  384 
Manilla,  550  n. 

Manilla,  108,  239-242,  312,  315,  323 
Mann,  Captain  Kobert,  308  and  u. 
Manners,   Captain    Lord    Kobert,   482    n., 

497  n.,  513  n.,  515,  518,  520  n.,  533  n. 
Mauniug,  Captain  Thomas,  174,  311 
Manning  the  fleet :  (see  also  Bounties,  etc.), 

394,  395 
Mantel],  Captain  William,  206  n.,  208 


Manvers,     Earl :     see    Meadows,     Captain 

Charles 
Maplesden,   Captain   Jervis,    148    n.,    195, 

212  n.,  218  n.,  235  n. 
Maps,  118 
Mapson,  Mr.,  338 
Marais  Bay,  194 
Marechal  de  Belleisle,  230  and  n.,  296,  297, 

298,  299 

Mari,  Chevalier  de,  116 
Mari,  Kear- Admiral  Marques  de,  34  and  n., 

36  n.,  37,  48,  314 
Maria,  301,  365,  369 
Maria  Theresia,  the  Empress,  89 
Marie  Galante,  203,  254 
Mariel,  247  n. 

Mar'cgny,  Captain  de,  492  n.,  533  n. 
Marine  Society,  The,  342 
Marine  School  at  Hull,  342 
Marines,  The,  5,  22,  58,  63  n.,  87,  131,  140, 

147,  158,  159,  183,  187,  189,  191,  207, 

208,  215,  222,  223,  224,  236,  240,  241, 

243,  248,  281,  2s7,  322,  327,  338,  506, 

511 

"  Marines"  in  a  privateer,  316,  317 
Marischal,  Earl  of,  39 

Marlborough,  General  the  Duke  of,  191,  192 
Mitrlborouyh,  92,  96,  98,  99,  100  and   n., 

103,  242  n.,  246  n.,  248,  249,  250,  312, 

520  n.,  530 
Marlow,  Admiral    Benjamin,   148  n.,   297, 

29S,  543  n.,  567 
Marocco,  47  n.,  188  and  n. 
Marooning,  200 
Marquis  de  Marloze,  228,  313 
Manilart,  Captain  de,  96 
Mars,  12,  121,  128  u.,  218  n.,  235  n.,  274, 

270,  281,  289,  311,  312,  313 
Marseilluis,  409 
Marseilles,  107 
Marsh,  George,  326  (2) 
Marsh,  Captain  Henry,  173,  186-188 
Marsh,  Captain  William,  96,  311 
Marshal  of  the  Admiralty,  159 
Marshall,  Captain,  (Kussian  Navy),  341 
Marshall,  Captain  Samuel  (1),  131  n.,  238, 

242  n.,  245  u.,  240  n.,  311 
Marshall,  Captain  Sir  Samuel  (2),  397,  415, 

520  n. 

Marshalsea,  The,  275 
Marte,  247  n.,  315 
Martial  law,  Proposal   to  subject   half-pay 

officers  to,  17 
Martin,  Captain  Sir  Henry  (2),  Bart.,  223  n., 

250,  320,  327 
Martin,  Admiral  William  (1),  84  and  n.,  85, 

89,  91,  112  n.,  113,273,  312 
Martin,  Captain  William  (2),  123,  101  n., 

179  11.,  311 

Martinique,  59,  03,  88,  116,  138,  145,  201, 
202,  242-244,  245,  246,  252,  254,  271, 
276,  280,  281,  290,  300,  303,  304,  311, 

427,  428,  452,  453,  463,  464,  466,  468, 


INDEX    TO    VOLUME   III. 


593 


470,  473,  481,  482,  484,  487,  488,  494, 
510,  512,  519,  520 

Mn-fy  Rose,  258 

Maskelyne,  Dr.  Neville,  338 

Masnata,  Captain  Don  Lucas,  34 

Mason,  Edward,  3,  4,  326 

Mason,  Major,  (Mar.),  187 

Massachusetts,  109,  110,  113,  370 

Massou,  Captain,  125  n. 

Master,  Captain  Streynsham,  34 

Masters,  19,  336  and  n.,  340 

Masters-and-Commanders,  330  and  n.,  336  n. 

Masts,  329 

Matanzas,  Cuba,  267 

Mataro,  84 

Match-tub,  334 

Mathews,  Admiral  Thomas,  4,  34,  83  and 
n.,  84,  85,  92-107,  150,  160,  273,  423 

Mauritius,  122,  130,  131,  174,  178,  181, 
197,  199,  231,  232,  234,  543  n.  See  aho 
France,  Isle  de 

Maurville,  Captain  Bide  de,  550  n. 

Maynard,  Captain  Robert,  259  and  n.,  260 

Mayne,  Captain  Covill,  or  Colvill,  41  n..  53, 
267,  268 

Mayne,  Vice-Admiral  Perry,  54,  55,  105, 
106,  310 

Mead,  Captain  Joseph,  206  n.,  242  n.,  246 n., 
308 

Meadows  (properly  Medows),  Captain 
Charles  (later  Charles  Pierrepont,  Vis- 
count Newark,  Earl  Manvers),  183  and 
n.,  212  n. 

Meadows,  General,  350 

Medals,  282 

Medea,  492  n.,  563  n.,  564 

Maler,  274,  280,  312 

MedemWik,  505  n. 

Mediator,  311 

Medical  Stores,  2 

Medina,  Captain  Don  F.  de,  247  n. 

MeMine,  Captain  de,  492  n. 

Mediterranean,  The,  30  et  seq.,  43,  46,  47, 
50,  65,  80  et  se</.,  89  et  seq.,  92  et  stuj., 
116,  123,  124,  130,  137,  142,  145,  146- 
157,  160,  169,  170,  189,  190,  19«,  210- 
215,  224,  228,  229,  232,  233,  239,  252, 
258,  273,  280,  286,  288,  292,  304,  306, 
309,  310,  313,  448,  469 

Medley,  Vice-Admiral  Henry,  116,  123,  124 

Medway,  120  n.,  191,  206  n.,  225,  295,  312, 
434,  454  n.,  509  n. 

Medway's  Prize,  120  and  n.,  121 

Meer,  Jaffier,  164 

Melampe,  234  n.,  293,  301,  313 

Melampus,  335 

Melville,  Henry,  Viscount,  326  and  n. 

Melville,  General  Robeit,  330 

Merchant  seamen,  19 

Merchant  seamen  and  Greenwich  Hospital, 
18 

Merchants  in  Spanish  territory,  Difficulties 
of,  262 


Merci,  General  Count  de,  40 

Mercure,  64  n ,  281,  312 

Mercury,  96,  246  n.,  248,  311 

Merlin,  13,  14,  133  n.,  246  n.,  294,  311,  312, 

391  392 

Mermaid,  115,  121,  311 
Messina,  32,  33,  34,  40,  314 
Metelle.  Cape  della,  36 
Mexico,  272,  310,  317 
Michell,  Captain  Matthew,  310,  320 
Michie,  Captain  Colin,  198  n.,  199 
Micoud,  Chevalier  de,  432 
Middelbury,  91 

Middle  Ground,  Chesapeake  Bay,  496,  497 
Middleton,    Admiral     Sir    Charles ;     Lord 

Barham,  326,  347  and  n.,  567    ' 
Middleton,  the  navigator,  Christopher,  319, 

320 

Midshipmen,  20,  22 
Mighells,   Vice-Admiral   James,   3,  40,  41, 

261,  262 

Mii/itonne,  301,  313 
Milan,  30,  32 

Milbnnke,  Admiral  Mark,  566 
Milbanke,  Captain  Ralph,  479  n. 
Mi/ford,  123  n.,  308,  310,  415 
Militia  embodied,  196 
Millar,  Captain  Archibald,  187 
Miller,  Captain,  (Russian  Navy),  341 
Miller,  Commander  George  (1)",  209,  210 
Millies,  John,  3 

Minerva,  218  n.,  238,  305,  313,  330,  335 
Miner  ce,  212  n.,  314 
Minorca,  4,  42,  48,  65,  92,  105,  107,  142, 

146-157,  160,  252,  254,  327,  423,  447, 

448,  451,  503,  504 
Minotaure,  198  n. 
Minto,  Gilbert,  Lord,  326 
Miquelon,  Island  of,  253 
Miramichi,  184 
Missing  men,  339 
Mississippi,  River,  253,  278 
Mitchell,  Captain  Cornelius,  63,  78  and  n., 

122,  123  and  n. 

Million  de  Genouilli,  Captain,  415 
Mobile,  Farragut  at,  150 
Modeste,  125  and  n.,  212  n.,  214,  215,  242 

n.,  306,  313  (2) 
Mohawk,  226 
Mohawk  River,  204 
Moissac,  Captain  de,  550  n. 
Molloy,  Capiain  Anthony  James  Pye,  400  n., 

406  n.,  434,  454  n.,  459  and  n  ,  460, 482  n., 

497  n.,  513  n. 

Mona  Passage,  The,  246,  537 
Monaco,  193  n. 

Monarca,  449,  550  n.,  552  n.,  563  n. 
Monarch,  156,  158,  190,  313,  415,  482  n., 

497  n.,  513  n.,  520  n. 
Monarque,  127  n.,  312 
Monck,  or  Monk,  42  n.,  310 
Monckton,  General  Hon.  Robert,  141,  207, 

233,  243,  245 


594 


INDEX    TO    VOLUME  111. 


Monmouth,  12,  125  and  n.,  127  n.,  189,  190, 

216,  23-i  n.,  23li  ami  n.,  298,  313  (2), 

395  n.,  410,  43_4,  438,  439,  546  n.,  547 

and   n.,  548,  550  n.,  552  n.,  554,  559, 

563  n. 

Monperoux,  Captain  de,  415 
Monsieur,  509  n. 
Mont  Ozier,  293 
Montagu,   34,  35,  70  n.,  76  n.,  79  and  n., 

190,    193,  218   n.,  219,  220,   276,   313, 

454  n.,  459,  460,  462  n.,  4<2  n.,  497  n., 

513  n.,  520  n. 

Montagu,  Admiral  Sir  George,  492  n. 
Montagu    (formerly    Mountagu),    Admiral 

John,  125  n.,  190,  235  n.,  5(i6 
Montagu,  Admiral  liobert,  550  n.,  552  n. 
Montagu,  Captain  Hon.  William,  125  n. 
Montcahn,  General  the  Marquis  de,  206,  207, 

209 

Monte  CarmiJo,  321 
Monte  Christi,  47.'! 
Monteil,  Captain  de,  415 
Montgomery,  General,  356,  357 
Montmorency,  Falls  of,  207 
Montreal,  226-228,  354,  356,  358 
Montrose,  258,  312,  340 
Moor,  the  navigator,  William,  320 
Moore,  Admiral  Sir  Joan  (1),  Bart.,  127  n., 

161,  17.",,  182,  201  and  n.,  202-204,  224, 

239,  252,  253,  565 

Moore,  Rear-Admiral  Matthew,  234  n.,  567 
Morals  in  the  Navy,  22,  23 
Morns,  17)  n.,  175,  179  n.,  180 
Morbihan,  The,  21(i,  217 
Mordaunt,  General  Sir  John,  171 
Mori-ton,  Captain   Francis   Reynolds  (ttttrr 

l.i ml  Ducie),  391,  482  n.,  497  n.,  513  n., 

520  n. 

Moreton,  Colonel,  (Mar.),  63  n. 
Morgan,  Sir  Henry,  79,  259 
Morgan,  the  mutineer,  Lieutenant,  (Mar.), 

John,  287,  288 

Morne  Fortune,  St.  Lucia,  429,  430 
M,,ro,  247  n. 

Moro  Castle,  Havana,  248,  249 
Morphet,  Zebulon,  smuggler,  17 
Morrice,  or  Morris,  Vice-Admiral  Salmon, 

47 

Morris,  Captain  John,  372,  376 
Morristown,  3t>8 
Mortality  on  board  ship:  (see  also  Disease, 

etc.),  45,  46,  320,  339 
Mortar,  215  n. 
Mortars:  (see also  Bombs),  57,  184,  187,  261, 

374 

Mosquito  Indians,  The,  78 
Mostyu,  Vice-Admiral  Savage,  3,  113,  146, 

276-278,  283  n. 

Motto,  La :  see  Dubois  de  La  Motte 
Motte-Picquet,  Admiral  La,  415,  443,  4,r>2, 

473,  474,  503,  504 
Mouat,  Captain  Patrick,  206  n.,  312 
.Moultrie,  General,  373,  374,  376 


Mountaine ;  '  Practical  Sea-Gunner'b  Com- 
panion,' 11 

Mountford,  Commander  Edward,  206  n. 

Moutray,  Captain  John,  212  n.,  306,  327, 
478 

Moyana,  Captain,  Don  Pedro,  34 

Mud  Island,  391,  392 

Mulder,  Captain,  505  n. 

Mulgrave,  Lord:  see  Phipps,  Captain  Hon. 
C'onstantine  John 

Munro,  Major  Hector,  232 

Murray,  Captain,  (Mar.),  236 

Murray,  Brigadier-General,  209,  226,  227, 
228 

Murray,  Captain  Hon.  George  (1),  later  Lord 
Elibank,  320 

Murray,  Captain  James,  (mil.),  71  n. 

Murray,    Vice- Admiral    Hon.   George    (2), 

•  505  n. 

Muskets,  9 

Mtitine,  314 

Mutiny,  229,  287,  288,  322,  339,  340 

Mysore,  545 

Xaniur,  48  n.,  83,  93,  96,  97,  98,  99,  101 
and  n.,  125  n.,  126,  131  n.,  132,  185,  211, 
212  and  n.,  213,  214,  215,  218  n.,  231, 

235  n.,  245,  246  n.,  249,  311,  312,  351, 
520  n.,  531 

Nantes,  1 10,  284,  289 

Xapier,  Captain  Hon.  Cbas.  (1),  246  n. 

Naples,  .".0,  32,  38,  40,  84 

Xarbrough,  Admiral  Sir  John,  321 

Xarcissus,  339 

Narragansett  Bay,  382,  387,  393,  397,  402, 

405,  409,  433,  443,  470,  477 
Narrows,   The,    New    York    Harbour,   382, 

383 
AassHK,  81,  96,  98,  152  n.,  187,  188,  203, 

236  and  n. 

Naturalisation  of  foreign  seamen,  18 

Nautical  Almanac,  The,  338 

Nautilus,  406 

Naval  Discipline  Act,  15  n.,  17  n.,  276,  293, 

294 

Xaval  Expenditure,  5 
Naval  Hospitals,  2 
Navarro,  Admiral  Don  Jose,  67,  89,  92,  94, 

96,  102 

Navesink  Highlands,  398 
Navigating  officers,  336  n. 
Xavigation  Acts,  The,  538 
X'avy,  Early  influence  of  the  American,  354, 

359,  360 

Navy  Office,  The,  2,  21,  326,  339 
Navy  Pay  Office,  2 
Navy,  State  of  the,  7 
Needles'  Light,  338 

Xegapatam,  119,  179-181,  199,  554-557 
Negro  Point,  Martinique,  201 
Negroes,  262 

Nelson,  Commander  Bartholomew  ('),  311 
Nelson,   Vice-Admiral    Sir    Horatio,    Lord 


INDEX   TO    VOLUME   III. 


595 


Nelson,  165  n.,  166,  372,  379,  380,  383, 

389,  404  n.,  412  n.,  437,  451,  456,  462, 
474,  511,  514,  537,  538,  554 

Nepotism,  350 

Neptune,  81,  82,  96,   120  n.,  123  n.,  124, 

127   n.,    128,   171,  172,   206,   276,  277, 

492  n. 

Neptuno,  96,  98  and  n.,  247,  312,  315 
Nesmond,  Admiral  the  Chevalier,  58 
Neutrality,  Breaches  of,  252,  253,  292,  351, 

352,  480,  481,  546 
Nevis,  510,  511,  512,  513,  518 
New  England,  109,  110,  113,  117 
New  Jersey,  371,  384,  385,  386,  387,  388, 

390,  391,  393,  397,  399 
New  Orleans,  253 

New  York,  23,  167,  168,  210,  354,  355,  359, 

371,  379-386,  387,  388,  389,  390,  393, 

395,  397-401,  403,  404,  408,  409,  410, 

411,  412,  428,  440,  443,  444  n.,  469,  471, 

472, 478, 488, 493,  494,  495.  496,  501,  537 
New  Zealand,  337 
Newark,  212  n.,  213,  215 
Newark,  Viscount:    see  Meadows,  (.'a] 'tain 

Charles 
Newcastle,  174  n.,  175,  177,  179  and  n.,  198 

n.,  199,  225,  311 

Newcastle,  Duke  of,  72  n.,  78,  264 
Newcome,  Captain  Henry,  552  n. 
Newfoundland,  115,  141,  25<>,  251,  253,  254, 

260,  309 

Newnham,  Captain  Thomas,  454  n.,  462  n. 
Newi>ort,  Rhode  Island,  387,  402,  409,  410, 

428,  470,  471,  488,  489,  491,  492,  494, 

495,  496 
Newsom,  Captain  William,  188,  224,  240  n., 

312 

Newton,  Captain,  (mil.),  54,  57 
Newton,  Sir  Isaac,  13 
Niagara,  Fort,  141,  204,  205 
Nicknames  of  officers,  196  n.,  274  n.,  453, 

477 

Nicholas,  Captain  Kobert  Boyle,  479  n. 
Nieuil,  Captain  de,  415 
Niger,  303,  313,  474  and  n. 
Nightingale,  167  and  n.,  206  n.,  242  n. 
Nightingale,  Captain  Gamaliel,  217,  218  n., 

227  n.,  305 

Nile,  Battle  of  the,  551 
Nivernois,  Due  de,  253 
Noel,  Captain,  125  u. 
Noel,  Captain  Thomas,  113,  148  n.,  150 
Nombre  de  Dios,  79 
Nonsuch,  96,  318,  400,  406  n.,  428  u.,  431, 

434,  503,  520  n. 

Norbury,  Captain  Coningsby  (1),  34 
Norbury,  Captain  Coningsby  (2),  225 
Norbury,  Captain  Itichard,  222  n.,  234  n., 

236  n. 

Nore,  The,  15,  26,  27,  42,  43,  113,  343 
Norfolk,  48  n.,  70  and  n.,  75  n.,  83  n.,  96, 

98,  99  and  n.,  201  n.,  202,  225,  240  n., 

242 


Normandy,  196 

Norris,  Admiral  of  the  Fleet  Sir  John,  26, 

27,  39,  40-42,  47,  49,  65  n.,  66,  67,  89, 

90  and  n.,  112  n. 
Norris,  Captain  Matthew,  4 
Norris,  Captain  Richard,  96,  104,  273,  320 
Norris,  Vice-Admiral   Harry,  70,   71,    84, 

125  .n.,  146, 156,  365 
North  America  (see  also  American  Colonies), 

113-115,   116,  117,  139,  140,  141,  142, 

144,   16<i-169,   172,   182-186,   189,   190, 

196,   204-210,  224,  232,  233,  238,  239, 

242,  243,  246  n.,  249,  269,  270,  289,  300, 

371,  440 

North,  Captain  Abraham,  152  n. 
North  Hero,  363  n. 
North,  Lord,  537 
North    River,   382,   383 :    ,w   also    Hudson 

River 

North  Sea,  224  n.,  301,  311,  538,  539 
Northern  Powers,  Difficulties  with  the,  25 

et  set].,  41-43,  478 
Northesk(l),  Admiral  George  Carnegie,  Earl 

of,  108,  120  n.,  565 
Northumberland,    169,    206,    209,    218    n., 

226   n.,  274   and   n.,    275   and   n.,   310, 

533  n. 

North-west  Passage,  The,  319,  320 
Norton,  Captain  William,  201  n. 
Norway,  229,  258 
Nurii-icli,  54,  55,  56,   61,   62  and  n.,  80,  88, 

139  u.,  215  n.,  226  n.,  233  n.,  242  n., 

312 

Norwood,  Captain  Joseph,  238 
Nott,  Captain  John  Neale  Pleydell,  242  n., 

246  n.,  415,  482  n.,  487 
\ottinyham,  43,   125  and  n.,   127  n.,   128, 

144,  238,  242  n.,  245  n.,  246  n.,  282,  284, 

287,  312  (2) 
Nova  Colonia,  251 
Nova  Scotia,  109,  117,   138,  139,  141,  144, 

371 

Nucella,  Captain  Timothy,  131  n. 
Nuestra  Seiiora  de  Cavadonga,  315,  323 
.\itetttm  Seiiora  del  Itolariv,  47,  314 
Xttei-11  Espana,  135  n. 
NuitH,  231  n. 
-N?//»y>//,  545  n. 
Nymphe,  148  n.,  295,  313,  415,  497  n.,  512, 

520  n. 
Nystadt,  Treaty  of,  42 

O'BuiKN,  Captain  Christopher,  34 

O'Brien,  Rear  -  Admiral  Lucius,  218  n., 
242  n.,  291,  311,  566 

O'Bryen,  Rear-Admiral  Edward  (1),  406  n. 

Ocean,  212  n.,  213,  214,  313 

Ocean,  415,  417,  424  and  n.,  425  n.,  509  n. 

Ocracoke  Inlet,  259 

Officers,  Naval,  19,  21,  22,  340,  341 

Ogle,  Admiral  of  the  Fleet  Sir  Chaloner  (1), 
Kt.,  63,  64,  65,  66,  67,  68,  70,  79,  80, 
85,  91,  103,  105,,  109,  260,  261,  275 


596 


INDEX    TO    VOLUME  111. 


Ogle,  Admiral  Sir  Chaloner  (2),  Bart.,  224  n., 

235  n.,  244,  567 

Ogle,  Captain  Chaloner  (3),  242  n.,  245  n., 
246  n. 

Ogletliorpe,  General   James    Edward,  269, 

270  and  u. 

O'Hara,  Captain  William  Henry  King,  406  n. 
Oismu,  309,  314,  335 
Old  Broad  Street,  2 
Olivares,  Captain  Don  II.,  96 
Olmius,  Captain  Hon.  John  Luttrell :  earlier, 

Luttrell ;  234  n. 
Onondaga,  226,  228 
Onslow,  Admiral    Sir  Richard,  Bart.,  312, 

343,  400  n.,  406  n.,  428  n. 
Onslow,  Arthur,  ."> 
Ontario,  311 

Ontario,  Lake,  144,  204,  205,  226 
Optic,  244  n.,  302,  314 
Opinii'itrr,  165  n.,  166,  313 
Ojiorto,  54 
Orbetello,  67 

Ordinary,  Ships  in,  335,  336 
(Jrfortl,  33,  34,  35,  64,   70  n.,  76  n.,  71!  n., 

206  n.,  246  n.,  250,  267,  268,  274,  280, 

310,  314 

Orient,  218  n.,  415,  550  n.,  551,  560 
Urimlr,  "16,  !I8 

Orijlniium;  lilO,  212  n.,  281,  306,  313  (2) 
Orion,  510 
( >rissa,  561 

Orleans,  Isle  d',  2D6,  207 
Ormonde,  .lames  liutler,  Duke  of,  3',i 
Or[ilii-e,  MS  11.,  151  n.,  18! I,  313 
Orpin-its,  4n:;  n. 
Ornik,   Captain    .lames,    187,    188,  215    n., 

234  n.,  .",11 
Ortegal,  ( 'ape,  53 
Orves,  Commodore  Comte  d',  96,  415,  545, 

54!! 
Orvilliers,  Vii-e-Adiuiral  Comte  d',  413,  414, 

415,  417,  420,  422,  443,  444,  445,  446 
Osborn,  Admiral  Henry,  63,  !!6,  116,  115, 

170,  181),  1HO,  280,  565 
Osborn,  Captain  Peter,  ill! 
Osborne,  Robert,  3,  .'526 
Osnabriick,  48 

Ossonville,  Captain  d',  127  n. 
Ofiteud,  316 
Oswald,  James,  4 
Oswego,  204,  311 
Otter,  86,  88,  310 
Oud  Tijiinijeit,  ill 
Ourry,  Captain  George,  240  n.,  241,  400  n., 

406  n.,  50!  i  n. 

Ourry,  Captain  Isaac  Florimond,  224,  240  n. 
Ourry,  Captain  Paul  Henry,  11)2,  234   n., 

236  n.,  242  n.,  327 
Outarde,  165  u.,  166,  313 
Owen,  Captain  Thomas,  188 

Owen,  Commander  William  (2),  543  n. 
Oxford,  12,  84  n.,  96,  133  n.,  135  n.,  273, 
285  and  n.,  313 


PACIFIC,   THE,   or  "South  Seas,"  52,  310, 

316-318,  320-324 
Pakenham,  Captain  Hon.  Edward  Michael : 

Lord  Longford,  415 
Palais,  Belle  Isle,  235,  236 
Palamos,  84 
Palapa,  241 
Palermo,  34 

Pallas,  8,  194,  230  and  n.,  303 
Palliere,  Captain   de    La,    174   n.,  179   n., 

198  n 
Palliser  (properly    Pallisser),  Admiral    Sir 

Hugh,  Bart.,  206  n.,  209,  229,  251,  295, 

2C9,  326,  341,  343,  414,  415,  417,  419, 

420,  421,  423-425,  435  u.,  566 
Palma,  148 
Palmer,  Colonel,  270 
Palmer,  William,  326 
Palmetto  logs,  373 
Palmier,  300,  302,  415 
Palmyra  Point :  see  Pedara  Point 
Pamlico  Sound,  259 

Pamphleteering  by  naval  officers,  112  n. 
Panama,  52  n.,  54,  58,  76,  78,  79 
Panic  in  England,  142,  445 
Panther,  84  n.,  201  n.,  202, 203,  225,  240  n., 

241,  257 
Piiiitliere,  312 

Panton,  Captain  John  Alexander,  543  n. 
Papagena,  Captain  Don  Juan,  34 
Paragon,  273 

Pardaillan,  Captain  de,  271 
Pardon  to  surrendering  pirates,  17 
Parf'ait,  312 
Paris,  HO,  253,  254 
Parker,  Yice-Admiral  Sir  Hyde  (1),  Bart , 

215  n.,  240  n.,  241,  324,  343,  395  n.,  412 

and  n.,  434,  440,  452,  453,  454  n.,  459, 

460,  474,  504-509,  566 
Parker,   Admiral    Sir    Hyde  (2),  Kt.,  380, 

385,  386,  406  n.,  412  u.,  441  and  n.,  442, 

-17!)  n.,  505  n. 
Parker,  Admiral  of  the  Fleet  Sir  Peter  (1), 

Bart.,  201  and  n.,  234  n.,  236  and  n., 

372,  373,  374,  376,  378,  379,  380,  383, 

387,  470,  473,  47!),  494,  502,  566 
Parliament,   Recognition  of  public  services 

by,  58,  186,  222,  231,  242 
Parma,  48 

Parrey,  Captain  Anthony,  395  n.,  520  n. 
Parry,  Admiral  William  (2),  148  n.,  227  n., 

565 

Parsons,  H.,  shipbuilder,  335 
Pascal,  Captain  Michael  Henry,  234  n.,  238 
Pasley,  Admiral  Sir  Thomas,  Bart.,  546  n. 
Passaro,  Cape,  32  n.,  33-38,  83  n. 
Paston,  Captain  William,  195,  223  n.,  235  n. 
Patagonia,  322 
Patent,  The  Admiralty,  1 
Patereroes,  11  n.,  57,  62  and  n. 

Paterson,  Lieutenant ,  406  n. 

Patton,  Admiral  Philip,  505  u. 
Pavilion,  Captain  du,  530,  533  n. 


INDEX   TO    VOLUME  III. 


597 


Pay,  Naval  (see  also  Wages),  19.  20,  104, 

123 

Payta,  317,  321 
Paz,  Captain  de  La,  135  n. 
Peace:  with  France  and  Spain,  253-255,  564 
Peadle,  Commander  M.,  06 
Pearce,  Captain  Vincent  (1),  269,  270 
Pearce,  Captain  Vincent  (2),  200  u. 
Pearce,  Thomas,  3 
Pearl,  54,  257, 259, 320,  321,  406  u.,  428  u., 

492  n. 

Pearson,  Captain  Sir  Richard,  Kt.,  509  n. 
Pedara,  or  Palmyra,  Point,  11)7 
Pegase,  538 

Pegasus,  454  n.,  513  n.,  520  n. 
Peighiu,  Captain  John,  223  u.,  241  n. 
Pelham,  Henry,  18 
Pelican,  206  n. 
Pellew,  Admiral  Sir  Edward:  Lord  Exmouth, 

286,  365,  366,  379,  389 
Pembroke,  125  n.,  131  and  n.,  132,  206  n., 

209,  226  n.,  246  n.,  311,  312 
Penas,  Gulf  of,  322 
Penelope,  286 
Penguin,  302,  311 
Pcnkevel,  231  n. 
Penmarck,  304 
Pennsylvania,  386 
Penny,  Captain  Taylor,  520  n. 
Penryn,  52 
Pensacola,  371 
Pensions  for  wounds,  301 
Pensions  to  dockyard  artificers,  342 
Penzaitce,  227  and  n.,  233  n.,  242  n.,  24(i  n. 
Pepperel,  Sir  William,  Bart.,  110,  113-115 
Perceval,  Captain  Hon.  Philip  Tufton,  206  n. 
Peregrine,  3(2 
Perla,  34,  37 
Perle,  415 
Perouse,  Captain  J.  F.  ile  G.,  Comte  de  La, 

352  and  n.,  415 
Perrier,  Captain  du,  274 
Pemeaerance,  352 
Persian  Gulf,  The,  200 
Peru,  317,  321 

Peter  the  Great,  The  Tsar,  26,  27,  41,  42 
Peterhead,  257 

Petersburg,  Virginia,  473,  493 
Petersham,  Lord,  358 
Petit  Terre,  203 
Petruehe,  Captain  Don  A.,  96 
Pett,  Captain  Robert,  96,  104 
Pettigrew,  Captain  William,  125  u. 
Peyton,  Captain  Edward,  119,  120  and  u., 

121 
Peyton,  Admiral   Joseph  (1),  190,  212  n., 

298,  311,  415,  567 
Peyton,  Captain  Sir  Yelverton,  Bart.,  269, 

270  n. 

Phaeton,  70  n.,  76  n. 
Pheasant,  311 
Phenix,  120  n.,  121 
Philadelphia,  406  n. 


Philadelphia,  370,  387,  390,  391,  392,  393, 

397,  403,  404 
PhiUbert,  125  n. 

Philip  V.,  King  of  Spain,  29,  30,  31,  40,  89 
Philippine  Islands,  The,  239-242 
Philips,  Henry  John :    see   Towry,  Henry 

John  Philips 
Phiiipson,  John,  3 

Phillips,  Lieutenant  Baker,  278,  279 
Phillips,  Captain  Erasmus,  310 
Phillips,  General,  473,  493 
Phillips,  the  privateer,  282 
Phillipson,  Captain  John,  84  n.,  108 
Phipps,  Captain  Hon.  Charles,  509  n. 
Phipps,  Captain   Hon.   Constantino   John  ; 

Lord  Mulgrave,  346,  415 
Phcenix,    12,    123,   148   and  n.,  149,   153, 
223   n.,    257,   269,  313,  314,   352,   386, 
406  n.,  408,  412  n.,  441,  479  n. 
Physician  of  the  Fleet,  341,  450,  533 
Piaccnza,  48 

Piece-work,  Paying  by,  330 
Piercy,  or  Percy,  Captain  Francis,  41  u. 
Pierre] lout,  Charles:  see  Meadows,  Captain 

Charles 

Pigeon  Island,  St.  Lucia,  487 
Pigot,  Admiral  Uugli  (1),  206  n.,  235  n., 

537,  538,  566 

Pigot,  General  Sir  Robert,  402,  409 
Pigott,  Admiral  James,  546  u. 
Pilotage,  Rates  for,  15 
Pilots,  Incompetent,  24.'! 
Pines,  Isle  of,  311 
Pintado,  Admiral,  65 
Piracy,    17,  143,  257,  258-261,    202,    264, 

288,  318 
Piscataqua,  310 
Pisco,  317 
Pistols,  '.) 
Pitchford,    Samuel :    sec    Cornish,    Samuel 

Pitchford 
Pitch-heaters,  342 
Pitt,  Rt.  Hon.  William  (1),  later  Earl  of 

Chatham,  210,  238,  254 
Pitt,  Rt.  Hon.  William  (2),  347 
Pittslmrg.  141  n. 
Pi/carro,  Admiral,  65,  267 
Placentia,  251 
Plague,  313 :  see  also  Sickness,  Sanitation, 

etc. 

Plassey,  Battle  of,  164 
Plate,  "River  (Rio  de  la  Plata),  251 
Playa  Grande,  60,  68 
Pleiwle,  190 
Plumbers,  342 
Pluto,  283  n.,  313,  415 
Plymouth,  4,  12,  15,  21,  43,  53  n.,  65,  108, 
122,  126,  140,  187,  195,  196  n.,  282,  296, 
316,  327,  335,  336,  343,  347,  397,  425, 
445,  446,  448 

Plymouth,  12,  123  n.,  133  n.,  134,  135,  444 
Pocahontas,  482  n. 

Pocock,  Admiral  Sir  George,  K.B.,  124, 128, 

39 


598 


INDEX   TO    VOLUME  III. 


130,  137,  143,  161  n.,  163,  164,  174-182, 
197-200,  238,  245-250,  284,  565 
Poder,  96,  98,  100,  101,  102,  315 
Podor,  187 

Point  Judith,  403,  405 
Pointe  au  Fer,  359 
Pointe  aux  Trembles,  356 
Pointe  de  Galle,  557 
Poisins,  Captain  de,  64  n. 
Pole-axes,  SI 
Pole,    Admiral    of  the    Fleet    Sir   Charles 

Morice,  Bart.,  543  n. 
Politics  in  the  Navy,  424,  467,  549 
Pomona,  474  and  n. 
Pomone,  227,  313 
Pompry,  GO,  62  n.,  70  n.,  76  n. 
Pondicherry,  121,  122,  131,  139,  164,  171, 
176,  177,  178,  181,  197,  199,  200,  224, 
225,  232,  311,  543,  549,  552 
Pondicherry,  546  n. 
Ponte  Vedra,  262 
Pouli;  40  n.,  Ill  n.,  112  n. 
Popham,   Rear-Admiral    Sir    Home    ]!it;gK, 

341  n. 

Pore-epic,  3  1 
Porcupine,  206  n.,  207,  209,  226  n.,  227, 

246  n. 

Porlier,  Captain  Don  ,1.,  247  n. 
Porquerolles,  94 
Port  an  Paix,  226 
Port  an  Prince,  300 
Port  Castries,  St.  Lm-ia,  429 
Port  Louis,  France,  118 
Port  Louis,  (inadeloujie,  203 
Port  Louis,  llispaniola,  61  n.,  68,  133,  134, 

272 

Port  Mahon,  32,  34   n.,  36,  37  n.,  40,  65, 
101,  102,   101,  107,   146,  147,  148,  150, 
151,  153,  154,  155,  157,  314,  439  n. 
Port  Jlti/inn,  246  n.,  257 
J'ort  Hoyul,  216  n. 
Port    Royal,   Jamaica,  54,  59,  62,  63,   76, 

132,  266,  267,  537 
Port  St.  Julian,  320 
Porte- Ve/.ins,  Captain  de  La,  415 
Porter,  Captain  Jervis  Henry,  302 

Porter,  Lieutenant ,  242 

Portland,  194,  296,  314,  338,  343 
Portland,  43  n.,46  n.,  127  n.,  148  n.,  151  n., 
169,  212  and  n.,  213,  214,  215,  218  n., 
282,  283,  287,  312  (3) 
Portland's  1'rize,  283,  312 
Port u,  546  n. 
Porto  Maria,  Cuba,  267 
Porto  Novo,  178,  562 
Porto   Praya  Bay,   350,  439   n.,   546-549, 

552 

Porto  Santo,  338 

Portsmouth,  4,  12,  13,  14,  23,  46,  53,  90, 
117,  128,  156,  158,  182,  232,  278,  288, 
326,  335,  336,  337,  342,  396,  426  n. 
Portsmouth,  187,  188 
Portsmouth,  Virginia,  488,  493,  494 


Portugal,  50,  214,  238,  239,  251,  254,  274, 

282,  302,  448 

Postigo,  Captain  Don  J.  del,  247  n. 
"  Potential "  fleets,  76,  77,  493 
Pourooyeuse,  550  u. 
Powlett,  Captain  Charles,  135  n. 
Powlett,    Admiral   Lord    Harry :    Duke  of 

Bolton,  84  n.,  96,  131  n.,  565 
Pownall,  J.,  shipbuilder,  12,  335 
Pownall,  Captain  Philemon,  306, 308,  406  n. 
Pratten,  Captain  Edward,  191,  212  n.,  214, 

299 

Prescott,  Admiral  Isaac,  415 
President,  511 

Preston,  108,  120  n.,  131  n.,  223  n.,  387, 
406  u.,  409,  428  n.,  431,  452,  466  n., 
505  n. 

Preston,  Captain  William,  131  n. 
Pretender,  The  Young,  16,  28,  66,  90,  110- 

113,  257,  258,  279 
Prevost,  General,  441 

Prices,  in  the  West  Indies,  Effect  of  the 
American  war  upon,  396 ;  at  Gibraltar, 
448 

Prideaux,  Brigadier-General,  201 
Prince,  212  and  n. 
Prince  Edou'ird,  313 
Prince  Edward,  188,  189,  225  u.,  226 
Prince  Edward's  Island,  184  n. 
Prince  Eugene,  316 
Prince  Frederick,  41  n.,  64,  70  n.,  71,  72 

and  n.,  125  n.,  206  n.,  235  n.,  280,  286 
Prince    George,   125  n.,  152  n.,   190,  280, 

297,  298,  311,  415,  449,  513  n.,  520  n. 
Prince  Noir,  218  n. 
Prince   of   Orange,   63,  105,    206  n.,   209, 

220  n.,  226  n.,  234  u.,  235,  236  n.,  276 
Prince  of  Wales,  428,  431,  434,  436 
Prince  Rupert's  Bay,  Dominica,  63,  64,  203 
Prince   William,  265,  335,  448  n.,  482  n., 

513  n.,  520  n. 

Prince's  battery,  Gibraltar,  46 
Priticesa  (wrongly  Priiicessa),  12,  66  and  n., 
92, 96,  98, 122,  267,  268,  314,  449,  482  n., 
497  n.,  513  n.,  520  n.,  533 
Princess  Amelia,  12,  70  and  n.,  71,  75  n., 

171,  206,  235  n.,  505  u. 
Princess  Augusta,^ 
Princess   Caroline,  70  n.,  71,  75  n.,  83  n., 

96,  98  and  n.,  335 

Princess  Louisa,  54,  55,  56,  62  and  n.,  70  n., 
125  n.,  127  n.,  148  n.,  150,  151  n.,  153, 
156,  169,  170,  212  n.,  215,  310 
Princess  Mary,  121 

Princess  lioyal,  72,  76  n.,  395  n.,  434, 454  n. 
Principe  de  Asturias,  34,  35,  37,  314 
Pringle,  Vice-Admiral   Thomas,  365,  431, 

434 

Prins  Friso,  91 
Prisoners  of  War,  2,  88 
Privateers,  18,  26,  113,  115,  134,  137,  186, 
228,  231  n.,  232,  233,  245,  253,  257,  265, 
272,  278,  279,  280,  282,  284,  285,  291, 


INDEX   TO    VOLUME  III. 


59  £ 


292,  293,  294,  295,  296,  331,  337,  396, 

428 

Privy  Councillorship  as  a  naval  reward,  215 
Prize-money,  18,  241,  249,  260,  341,  342, 

350,  470 
Proby,  Captain  Charles,  191,  206  n.,  295, 

308,  323  and  n.,  324,  326  (2) 
Proissi,  Captain  de,  415 
Promotion  to  flag-rank,  20,  343-347 
Promotions  on  the  occasion  of  a  review,  343 
Proserpine,  415 
Protector,  143,  174  n.,  225,  311 
Protee,  185,  244,  335,  452,  520  n. 
Protestant  Succession,  The,  29 
Provence,  492  n. 
Providien,  Action  off,  552-554 
Prudent,  184,  290,  313,  491,  492  n.,  513 

and  n.,  520  n. 
Prudente,  335,  509  n. 
Prussia,  42,  192 
Puerto  Bello,  43,  44,  52  u..  54-57,  58,  59, 

61,  78,  79  and  n.,  80,  274,  314 
Puerto  Cabello,  85,  87,  88 
Puerto  Eico,  254,  272,  537 
Puerto  Seguro,  317 
Pulicat,  121 

Pulteney,  Mr.,  67  n.,  78  n. 
Pumps,  Ships',  336,  337 
Punta  Brava,  87 
Pursers,  19 

Purvis,  Captain  Charles  Wager,  96 
Purvis,  Captain  George,  3 
ljye,  Admiral  Sir  Thomas,  Kt.,  310,  343, 

565 

QUADRANT,  The,  3,  10 

Quadruple  Alliance  (1718),  The,  29  ami  n., 

39,40 
Quebec,  116,  117,  140,  141,  182,  196,  204- 

210,  222,  226,  227,  281,  313,  354,  356, 

357,  361,  366,  368 
Queen,  415,  509  n. 
Queen  Anne's  Prventje,  259 
Queen  Charlotte,  335 
Queenborouih,   174  n.,   176,   179   n.,  181, 

198  n.,  200,  225,  311 

Queen's  (or   King's)  Regulations   and   Ad- 
miralty Instructions,  15  and  n. 
Quenel,   Governor  of  Cape  Breton,  M.  de, 

109 
Quiberon  Bay,  118,  217-223,  224,  231,  232, 

283,  307,  311,  324,  341  n. 
Quibo,  317,  321,  323 
Quinta,  La,  73 

Racehorse,  206  n.,  209,  210,  226  n.,  227 
Rackam,  John,  260 
Radeaux,  361,  362  and  n.,  365 
Radstock,  Lord  :    see  Waldegrave,  Admiral 

Hon.  Sir  William 
Rainbow,  212  n.,  332  (2) 
Kainier,  Admiral  Peter  (1),  545  n.,  550  n., 

552  n. 


Saitonndbk,   203,   242  n.,  243,   299,  311,. 

313,  339,  404,  406  n. 
Bamhorst,  91 
Ramilliex,  148  n.,  151,  153,  156,  171,  231,, 

311,  335  C2),  415 
Ramsay,  230 
Ramsgate,  16 
'•  Ranee,  River,  194 
Randall  and  Co.,  shipbuilders,  335 
Rating  of  ships,  7,  328,  330 
Rattlesnake,  546  n. 
Rawdon,  Lord,  344,  346 
Rawling,  Captain  John,  296  and  n. 
Rayner,  Captain  John,  406  n.,  409,  428  n.,. 

431 

Seat,  34,  314 
Real  Familin,  135  n. 
Real  Felipe,  96,  117,  98  and  n.,  LOO  and  n., 

102,  314 

Peal  Sun  Felipe,  34  and  n.,  35,  37,  38 
Real   Trasporte,  Admiral  the  Marques  del,. 

247  n. 

Reals,  Captain  de,  415 
Rear-Admirals,  19,  20 
Rebecca,  50,  265  n. 
Recover//,  317 

Red  Baiik,  New  Jersey,  391,  39'.' 
Reddall,  Captain  Ambrose,  545  n.,  550  n.r 

552  n. 

Reddish,  Captain  Henry,  57 
Redoubtable,  148  n.,  151  n.,  212  n.,  214,  3l:t 
Reeve,  Vice- Admiral  Samuel,  391 
Re-embarking  in  face  of  an  enemy,  195 
Re/lechi,  415,  452 
Reflectors  in  lighthouses,  338 
Reggio,  32  n.,  37 

Reggio,  Admiral  Don  Andrea,  34,  135  n. 
Regiments:   15M,  03  n. ;  21th,  63  n. ;   Dal- 

zeffs,  87  and  n. ;  40M,  109  ;   Uoyal  Fusi- 
liers, 147  ;  Royal,  Highlanders,  201  n.  ; 

Louisbnury  Grenadiers,  209  ;  &2nd,  229  ; 

7(.Hh,  239  ;  Royal.  Artillery,  240 
Registration  of  seamen,  18 
Regtercn,  Captain  Grave  van,  505  n. 
Reid,  Captain  James,  373 
Ifeina,  247,  315 

Relief  of  Quebec,  by  Douglas,  357,  358 
Remittances  by  seamen,  18 
Rennes,  Bishop  of,  102 
Renommee,  114,  115,  120  n.,  219  n.,  284, 

308,  312 
Renown,  193,  201  n.,  203,  313,  387,  404, 

406  n.,  409,  509  n. 
Rentone,  Captain  James,  57  n.,  58,  68,  73, 

76,  133  n.,  134  and  n. 
Rentorin,  Captain  Don  J.,  96 
Reprisals,  44,  51 

Repulse,  233  n.,  242  n.,  301,  520  n. 
Repulse  Bay,  319 
'  Resolu,  352 
Resolution,   218   n.,   219,    221,    311,    337, 

341  n.,  482  n.,  497  u.,  513  n.,  514,  515, 

520  n.,  534 

39—2 


«00 


INDEX   TO    VOLUME  III. 


Restitution,  178 

Restoration,  143 

Rete/,  Don  Francisco  Martinez  de,  57 

Retirement:   see  Superannuation,  Pensions, 

etc. 

Retire,  96 
Reunion,  510  n. 
Keval,  41,  42 
Revenge,  96,  143,  148  n.,  164,  181,  189,  197, 

199,  218  n.,  219,  273,  289,  313 
Revest,  Commodore  du,  107,  169 
Review*,  Naval,  343 
Reward     for    discovery    of    a    North-west 

Passage,  319 

Rewards  for  capturing  pirates,  17 
Reynolds,    Francis    (later    Moreton) :     see 

Moreton,     Captain     Francis     Reynolds  ; 

afterwards  Lord  Ducie 
Reynolds,  Captain  Henry,  550  n.,  552 
Reynolds,  Admiral  John  (1),  216,  222  n., 

566 

I  the,  Isle  de,  191,  282 
Rhinoceros,  313 
Rhode  Island,  387,  402,  403,  404,  407,  409, 

410,  411,  443,  471,  542 
Rich,  Admiral  Sir  Thomas,  Bart.,  482  n. 
Rich,  Captain  Edward,  123  n. 
Itifhards,  Commander  Francis,  206  n. 
Richelieu,  Marshal  the  J)uc  de,  142,   146, 

149 

Richelieu  River,  356,  358,  361 
Richiifin/,  2()ii  n.,  226  n.,  245,  246  n.,  304, 

313,  406  n.,  497  n. 
Richmond,  Virginia,  4SS 
Ridley,  Sir  Matthew  White,  344 
li'iedcscl,  (ieneral  Baron,  359,  365,  367,  368 
Itiguers,  342 

Rigging  of  a  man-of-war,  329 
Hijneveld,  Ca]itain  van,  5()5  n. 
Rijsbraak,  the  sculptor,  231  n. 
Rin  ile  Janeiro,  251 
Rio  Grande  (S.  America),  322 
ft/jinn  (or  liippmi),  12,  34,  43,  70  n.,  71, 

76,  201   and  n.,  202,  235  n.,  246  n.,  267, 

305,  315,  543  n. 
Itivadt'o,  261 

Rirarole,  Marchese  de,  3S,  116 
Rivett,  Lieutenant  P.,  505  n. 
Roatan  Island,  80  and  n. 
Itoberts,  Bartholomew,  260  and  n.,  261 
Roberts,  Captain  John,  310 
Robertson,  Captain  George,  505  n. 
Robinson,  Captain  Hugh,  395  n.,  492  n. 
Robinson,  Captain  Mark  (1),  201  n.,  311, 

413  n.,  415,  482  n.,  497  n. 
Ro'jinson,  Colonel,  (Mar.),  63  n. 
Robinson,  Commander  William,  550  n. 
Robust,  415,  491,  492  n. 
Jlobustf,  218  n.,  313,  415 
Roea  Partida,  317 

Rochambeau,  Admiral  de,  107,  274,  282 
Rochambeau,  General  de,  488,  495,  501 
Roche- Allard,  Admiral  the  Marquis  de  La,  59 


Rochechouart,  Captain  Vicomte  de,  415 
Rochefort,  89  n.,  140,  145,  171-172,  224, 

252,  291,  302 
Rochelle,  La,  293 
Rochester,   33,   34,   193,   216,  218   and  n., 

227  n.,  242  n.,  308,  313 
Roddam,  Admiral  Robert,  294,  311,  566 
Rodney,  206  n. 
Rodney,  Admiral  Sir  George  Brydges :  Lord 

Rodney,  K.B.,  127  n.,  183,  190  n.,  196, 

215  and  n.,  224,  231,  232,  233,  239,  242- 

245,  252,  283  n.,  387,  393,  408,  425,  432, 

440,  443  and  n.,  448-471,  472,  477-488, 

494,  502,  504,  506,  508,  519-538,  565 
Rodney,  Captain  Hon.  John,  513  n.,  520  n. 
Roebuck,  80  n.,  201  and  n.,  202,  203,  335, 

386,  406  n. 

Rogers,  Captain  Sir  Frederick,  Bart.,  4,  327 
Rogers,  George,  326 
Rogers,  Woodes,  316 
Roland,  415 

Rollo,  Colonel  Lord,  228,  233 
Roman  Emperor,  188 
Romney,  12,  81,  96,  546  and  n. 
Romulus,  489,  492  n. 
Roofing  ships  in  ordinary,  336 
Rooke,  Admiral  of  the  Fleet  Sir   George, 

26  n.,  112  n. 
Roquefeuil,  Admiral   Comte  de,  59  n.,  89, 

90,  92 

Rosas  Bay,  102 
Rosbau,  Captain  de,  174  n. 
Roscoff,  113 
Rose,  148  n.,  192,  242  n.,  246  n.,  266,  279, 

298,  313,  315,  335 
Rosewell,  Captain  Henry,  120  n. 
Rosewell,  J.,  shipbuilder,  12 
Ross,  Captain  Sir  John,  Kt.,  C.B.,  quoted, 

533 
Ross  (previously  Lockhart),  Vice-Admiral 

Sir  John  Lockhart,  Bart.,  215  n.,  218  n., 

293  and  n.,  415,  567 
Ross-shire,  39 
Hostan,  299 

Rothe,  Commander  Peter,  505  n. 
Rouge,  Cape,  209 
liouret,  Captain  du,  127  n. 
Rons,  Captain  John,  113-115, 141, 168, 183, 

206  n.,  208 

Routh,  Captain  Robert,  206  n. 
Row-galleys,  359,  360,  363,  365 
Rowley,   Vice-Admiral    Sir    Joshua,  Bart., 

190,  193,  195,  218  n.,  250,  415,  434,  435, 

437,  438,  452,  454  n.,  460,  567 
Rowley,  Admiral  of  the  Fleet  Sir  William, 
82  and  n.,  94-97,  101,  103,  107, 108, 116, 
565 

Rowzier,  Captain  John,  131  n. 
Rowzier,  Captain  Richard,  34 
Royal  Anne,  257,  310  (2) 
Royal  Caroline,  237 
Royal  Charlotte,  12,  237,  546  n. 
"  Royal  Family,"  The,  285 


INDEX   TO    VOLUME  III. 


601 


Royal  Fortune,  260 

Royal    George,   12,  44,   218   n.,  231,  449, 

540 

Royal  Naval  Exhibition  of  1891,  338 
Royal  Oak,  34,  35,  46  n.,  47,  81,  92,  96, 

101,  103,  314  (2),  395  n.,  434,  492  n., 

497  n.,  520  n.,  524 
Royal  Savage,  365,  366 
Royal  Society,  The,  203  n.,  352 
Royal  Sovereign,  12 
Royal  United  Service  Institution,  21 
Royal   William,  171,  185,  206,  209,  231, 

235  n.,  303 
Rubis,  125  n.,  312 

Ruby,  131  n.,  395,  474  and  n.,  475,  476 
Rudyard's  Eddystone  Lighthouse,  14 
Rupert,  31,  32,  34,  35,  96,  101,  104 
Rushout,  Sir  John,  Bart.,  3 
Rushworth,  Captain  John,  224  n. 
Russel,  Captain  John,  96,  101  n. 
Russell,  70  and  n.,  71,  75  n.,  96,  101,  280, 

315,  395  n.,  482  n.,  483  n.,  486,  510  n., 

513  u.,  520  n.,  532,  535 
Russell,  Admiral  of  the  Fleet  Edward  :  Earl 

of  Orford,  2,  112  n. 
Russell,  John,  4 

Russia,  26  et  sey.,  41-43,  47,  61  n.,  340 
Ruyter,  Captain  de,  550  n. 
Rye,  187,  188,  201  n. 

SABA,  480 

Sada,  Captain  Don  Michael  de,  34 

Sadras,  176,  550-552 

Sage,  148  n.,  151  n. 

Sagittaire,  522 

Sail-cloth,  14 

Sailing  Instructions,  94  and  n. 

Sail-makers,  342 

Saint-Cesaire,  Captain  de,  533  n. 

St.  Allans,  78  n.,  79  n.,  212  n.,  267,  274, 

270,  298,  310,  313,  400,  400  n.,  428  n., 

431,  513  n  ,  520  n. 
St.  Anne's  Bay,  Martinique,  243 
St.  Augustine,"  Florida,  63  n.,  269,  270,  314, 

441 
St.  Bon,  Captain  (afterwards  Admiral)  de, 

at  Lissa,  202 
St.  Brieuc,  194 

St.  Cas,  Disaster  in  the  Bay  of,  194,  195 
St.  Catherine's,  314 
St.  Catherine's  Light,  338 
St.  Charles  River,  Quebec,  207 
St.  Christopher:  see  St.  Kitt's 
St.  Clair,  General  Hon.  James,  118 
St.  Croix,  Chevalier  de,  236 
St.  Esprit,  96,  280,  415 
St.  Eustatia,  Florida,  269 
St.  Eustatia,  or  St.  Eustatius,  West  Indies, 

242,  300,  480,  481,  486.  503 
St.  Felix,  Captain  de,  550  n.,  550 
St.  Foy,  235 

St.  Francis  de  Pupa,  Fort,  209 
St.  George,  156,  201  n.,  202,  292 


St.  George,  Chevalier  de :  see  Pretender,  The- 

Young 

St.  Georges,  M.  Grou  de,  124,  125  n. 
St.  Helen's,  43,  66,  107,  118,  147,  167,  182, 

2 16,  231,  234,  261,  311,  320,  445,  502, 

545  n. 

St.  James's  Square,  2 
St.  John,    Captain   Hon.  Henry  (1),    238, 

454  n.,  462  n. 
St.  John,  Island  of  (Prince  Edward's  Island), 

184  and  n.,  185 
St.  John's,  Lake  Champlain,  356,  358,  359, 

300,  301,  302,  300,  308,  370,  371 
St.  John's,  Newfoundland,    210,  250,  251, 

253,  312 

St.  John's  River,  Florida,  269 
St.  Kitt's  (or  St.  Christopher),  54  n.,  04,  85, 

122,  309,  433,  440,  469,  479,  480,  486, 

501,  510-519,  521 
St.  Lawrence,  River,  182,  205,  206-210,  220 

227,  228,  311,  354,  355,  356,  357,  358, 

361. 

St.  Loe,  Commander  Edward  (2),  311 
St.  Loe,  Rear-Admiral  Edward  (1),  45  and 

n.,  264 

St.  Louis,  120  11.,  174  n.,  175,  179  n.,198  n. 
St.  Lucia,  2-12  n.,  244,  254,  428,  429,  431, 

432,  433,  434,  452,  463,  404,  400,  409, 

478,  481,  482,  484,  480,  487,  510,  519, 

520 

St.  Lunairc  Bay,  194 
St.  Malo,  113,  192,  193,  194,  229,  291,  293, 

296,  445 

St.  Martin,  llhe',  191,  282 
St.  Martin,  West  Indies,  480 
St.  Michel,  415,  557,  50o  11. 
St.  Nazaire,  110 
St.  Nicholas  Island,  311 
St.  Philip's  Castle,  Minorca,  148,  153,  157 
St.  Pierre,  Island  of,  253 
St.  Pierre,  Martinique,  202,  245 
St.  Poissonniere,  M.  de  ;  his  still,  337 
St.  Servand,  313 

St.  Tropez,  Gulf  of,  84,  273,  310,  314 
St.  Vincent,  244,  254,  433,  434,  479,  488 
St.  Vincent,  Cape,  438,  449,  540 
St.  Vincent,  Earl :  see  Jervis,  Sir  John 
Ste.  Anne,  300,  313 
Ste.  Marguerite,  123 
Stc.  Therese,  Isle,  228 
Salutes,  The,  203,  311,  522,  525,  527 
Salamander,  84  n.,  212  n.,  215, 497  n.,  520  n. 
Salavarria,  Captain,  318 
Saldanha  Hay,  350,  548 
Salines,  Pointe  des,  Martinique,  482,  483, 

484 

Salie/,  Captain  de,  125  n.,  126 
Salines,  The,  244 
Salisbury,  41  u.,  43  n.,  96,  140,  161  and  n., 

163,  174  u.,  175,  179  n.,  198  n.,  311 
Sallee,  258 
Salou,  211 
Salt  at  the  Tortugas,  Right  to  collect,  263. 


<502 


INDEX   TO    VOLUME  111. 


Salt,  Commander  Sampson,  167  n. 

Saltash,  188,  310,  311 

Salter,  Captain  Elliot,  497  n. 

Salvert,  Commodore  Perrier  (1)  de,  139 

.Salvert,  Captain  Perrier  (2)  de,  550  u. 

Samar,  Island  of,  241,  323 

Sambala  Keys,  59,  310 

San  Antonio,  Z47  n.,  315 

San  Bias,  Gulf  of,  79 

San  ISruno,  448  n. 

Kan  Carlos,  34,  35,  37,  71  n.,  72,  314  (2), 

448  n.,  546  n. 
Sandgate,  335 
..San  Domingo  (see   nho   Hispaniola),  145, 

284,  286,  294,  308,  453,  468,  469,  470, 

473,  494,  495,  496,  537 
Sandwich,  222  n.,  '-'31,  234  n.,  235,  236 

aud  n.,  41 5,  449,  454  n.,  456,  458,  459, 

486,  539 
.Sandwich,  John,  Earl  of,   2,  111   n.,  325, 

345,  366  and  n. 
Sandy  Hook,  379,  390,  398,  399,  400,  404, 

408,  441,470,  495,  502 
San  Eu<n'i>io,  449 
San  Felipe,  71  n.,  72,  :J,14  (2) 
Kan  Fermin,  448  n. 
San  Fernando,  34,  37,  96,  314 
San  Fernando  Menur,  34 
San  Francisco  d'Assis,  34 
San  Genaro,  247  n.,  249,  250,  312,  314,  315 
f-an  Jmdorv,  34,  35,  36  n.,  273,  314,  315 
Sanitation,  '-3,  44-46,  337 
San  Jerunimo,  54,  56,  57 
San  Joaijuin,  314 
Sim  Jose,  314 
San  Juan,  3 14 
Sun  Jiiiin  JSirutista,  34,  •'!!  I 
San  Juan  de  Puerto  Rico,  59 
San  Juan  J\te»or,  34,  314 
San  Julian,  449 

San  Justo,  Captain  Don  do,  135  n. 
San  Lucar,  449 
San  Luis,  34,  35 
San  Mii/uel,  540 
San  Pedro,  34,  37,  314 
San  Rafael,  448  n. 
San  Sebastian,  261,  308 
Santa  Cruz.  (Canaries),  188 
Santa  Fe,  62 

S-ntta  halicla,  34,  36,  37,  314 
Santa  JUari/aritla,  497  u. 
Santa  Martha,  60,  314 
Santa  Monica,  520  u. 
Santander,  47,  65 
Santa  Jlosa,  34,  35,  37,  314 
Santa  Ilosalia,  314 
Santa  Teresa,  314,  448  n. 
Santiago  de  Cuba,  76,  77,  78,  133,  134,  135, 

272 

Santisima  Trinidad,  241,  315 
Santo  l>omingo,  449 
San  Vincente,  448  n. 
Sapphire,  218  n. 


Sapphire's  Prize,  311 

Saratoga,  354,  370,  391 

Sardinia,  29,  40,  49,  92  n.,  116,  253 

Sardoine,  313 

Sartine,  335 

Saumarez,    Admiral    Sir   James:    Lord   de 

Saumarez,  376,  379,  509  n.,  510  and  n., 

520  n. 
Saumarez,  Captain  Philip  de,  125  n.,  127  n., 

128  and  n.,  282,  321,  323,  324 
Saumarez,  Captain  Thomas,  217 
Saunders,  Admiral  Sir  (  harles,  K.B.,  3, 

127  n.,  128,  152,  155,  160,  169,  189,  190, 

195,  190,  204-209,  210,  222  and  n.,  223, 

224,  228,  232,  239  and  n.,  252,  310,  324 

325,  565 
Saunders,  Bear-Admiral  (Russian  service), 

43  n. 
Saunders,  Rear-Admiral  Sir  George,  Kt.,  3, 

4,  32,  34 

Saurins-Murat,  Captain  de,  96 
Sauvage,  165  n. 
Sau/.on,  235 

Savage,  Admiral  Henry,  520  n. 
Savni/e,  311,  312 
Savannah,  River  and  Town,  441,  442,  471, 

472 

Savoy,  29  et  seq.,  40,  89 
Sawkins,  the  buccaneer,  258 
Sawyer,  Admiral  Herbert  (1),  212  n.,  308, 

428,  434,  567 
Saxo,  Marshal,  118,  119 
Saxtou,    Captain    Sir   Charles,    Bart.,  327, 

497  n.,  513  n. 
Sayer,  Vice-Admiral   James,  152   n.,  187, 

188,  566 
Scarborough,  72,  76  n.,  86,  88,  186  n.,  206  n., 

259,  263,  264,  479  n. 
Sreptrn,  165  n.,  557,  563  n. 
Schanck,  Admiral  John,  361 
Sehuuectady,  204 
Scheveningen,  304 
Schomberg,  Captain  Sir  Alexander,  Kt.,  14, 

183,  206  n.,  227  aud  n.,  234  n.,  330  n. 
Schooners,  330 
Schuyler,  General,  358 
Schuyler's  Island,  367 
Schuylkill  River,  391  n. 
Scilly  Isles,  The,  14,  91,  445,  446,  504,  539 
Scipio,  339 
Sclater,  or  Slaughter,  Captain  George,  96, 

104 

Scorpion,  12,  206  n.,  312 
Scott,  Captain  Alexander  (1),  373 
Scott,  Captain  Arthur,  4,  127  n.,  283  n. 
Scott,  Commander  James  (1),  16,  60 
Scott,  Captain  Samuel,  224  n. 
Scotland,  110-113, 196, 201  n.,  223, 224,  261 
Scouting,  Inefficient,  67  n. 
Scroggs,  the  navigator,  318,  319 
Scrope,   Captain   Carr,   147,   148  n.,    153, 

234  n.,  311 
Scurvy,  117,  319,  321,  323,  563 


INDEX    TO    VOLUME  111. 


603 


Seaford,  241  and  n.,  274,  310,  337 

Seahorse,  70  n.,  190,  206  n.,  '.08,  231  n., 
240,  241  and  n.,  297,  304  and  n.,  543  n., 
550  n.,  552  n.,  563  n. 

Sea  Islands,  The,  372 

Seakonnet  Channel,  402 

Seamen,  Encouragement  of,  18, 19,  339,  340 

Seamen  on  the  Authorised  Establishment', 
Number  of,  5,  327 

Sea-power,  Striking  illustrations  of  the  in- 
fluence of,  181,  182,  186,  200,  358;  In- 
fluence of,  in  the  N.  American  campaign, 
353  et  seg.,  393,  394 

Search,  Right  of,  138,  252,  253,  263,  351, 352 

Secrecy  at  a  court-martial,  The  oath  of,  158 

Secretaries  of  the  Admiralty,  3,  326 

Seething  Lane,  2 

Seizure  of  British  ships,  26 

Senecterre,  209 

Senegal,  186-189,  254,  311 

Seniority,  Objections  to  promotion  to  flag- 
rank  by,  345 

Sensible,  415 

Sepoys,  131,  161 

Serapia,  279 

Serieux,  96,  125  n.,  126,  312 

Serin,  415 

Serpent,  335 

Servants,  Officers',  19 

Seven  Years'  War,  The,  7,  84,  140,  222  n., 
254,  255,  289  et  seq.,  295 

Severe,  550  n.,  556,  563  n. 

Severn  (called  Sei'erne  while  in  French 
hands),  122,  127  n.,  311,  312,  320,  :J21 

Severndroog,  143 

Seville,  Treaty  of,  48,  50 

Seymour,  Admiral  of  the  Fleet  Sir  George 
Francis,  317 

Shannon,  183,  212  n. 

Sham. on,  The,  445 

Sheerness,  54  n.,  57,  70  n.,  76  n.,  112  n., 
212  n.,  294,  314 

Sheerness,  336,  339,  351 

Shell-fire  (see  also  Bombs),  1 36,  374 

Shelvocke  Island,  317 

Shelvocke,  Lieutenant  William,  .'116-318 

Shipbuilders,  12,  335 

Ships,  Advantages  of  large,  411,  412 

Ships  captured  and  lost,  310-315 

Ships,  Cost  of,  10 

Ships,  Dimensions  of,  9,  12,  335 

Ships  on  the  strength  of  the  Navy,  7,  328 

Ships,  Superiority  of  French,  522 

Shipwrights,  342  and  n. 

Shirley,  Captain  Thomas,  218  n.,  347 

Shirley  Galley,  113,  115 

Shirley,  General,  510 

Shirley,  Governor  of  Massachusetts,  77, 109, 
10, 115 

Shirley,  Vice-Admiral  Hon.  Washington : 
later  Earl  Ferrers,  218  n.,  284,  566 

Shoreham,  57  n.,  70  n.,  71,  73,  76  n.,  266, 
267,  285 


Shot-hole  stopping  apparatus,  337 
Shovell,  Admiral   Sir  Clowdisley,   112   n., 

288  n. 
Shrewsbury,  34,  70  and  n.,  75  n.,  206,  229, 

299,  303,  415,  482   n.,  486,  497  n.,  498, 

513  R. 
Shuldham,  Admiral  Molyneux:  Lord  Shuld- 

ham,  201  n.,  202,  203,  242  n.,  243,  290 

and  n.,  291,  311  (2)  566 
Sibyl,  497  n.,  513  n.,  520  n. 
Sicic,  Cape,  95,  211 
Sicily,  29,  30,  32,  35,  36,  38,  40,  84 
Sick  and  Wounded  Board,  The,  1 
Sickness  (.tee,  also  Sanitation),   71,  72,  74, 

117,  118,  132,  141,  154,  178,  182,  193, 

203,  250,  276,  278,  281,  282,  286,  290, 

321,  322,  323,  319,  443,  444,  446,  468 
Signals,  175,  220,  221,  225,  444 
Sillery,  208,  227 

.  Simonton,  Captain  Robert,  545  n. 
Sincere,  415 
Strene,  225  n.,  226,  313 
Sir  Thomas  Roe's  Welcome,  318,  319,  320 
Skerries,  The,  15 

Skynner,  Captain  Lancelot,  302  and  n. 
Skyrm,  the  pirate,  260 
Slade,  Sir  Thomas,  Kt.,  3,  8,  326,  335 
Slaves  released,  144 
Sloops,  3:;0 
Small-pox  (see  also  Sickness,    Sanitation), 

358 

Smalls  Rock  Lighthouse,  338 
"  Smasher,"  The,  331 
Smeaton,  John,  14,  15 
Smith,  Admiral  Edward  Tyrrel,  520  n. 
Smith,  Admiral  Thomas  (4),  112,  156,  196 

andn. 

Smith,  Admiral  Sir  William  Sidney,  341 
Smith,  Captain   Edward,  272 
Smith,  Captain  Elliot,  86 
Smith,  Captain  Henry,  161  n. 
Smith,  Captain   James,  206   n.,    208,  304 

and  n. 

Smith,  Captain  Richard,  206  n. 
Smith,  Lieutenant-Colonel,  157 
Smiths,  342 
Smoke  in  action,  156 
Smollett,  quoted,  47 
Smuggling,  15,  16,  17,  262,  263 
Soanes,  Captain  Joseph,  41  n. 
Sobcrano,  247,  315 
Sobiero,  96 

Soissons,  Congress  at,  47  and  n.,  48 
Solebay,  47,  224  n.,  274,  282,  298,  310,  373, 

374,  497  n.,  513  and  n. 
Solebay,  or  Southwold  Pay,  40 
Soltil  Royal,  209,  218  n.,  220  n.,  221,  313 
Snledad,  314 
SoVde,  96 

Solitaire,  218  n.,  415 
Somers,  Captain  Thomas,  115 
Somerset,  92,  96,  101,  185,  206  n.,  222  n., 

400,  406  n. 


604 


INDEX    TO    VOLUME  III. 


Somerset,  Captain   John   Stukley,  174  n., 

179  n.,  198  n.,  199 

Sommelsdijck,  Vice- Admiral  van,  48  n. 
Sorel,  358 
Sorlings,  310 
Sorpresa,  34,  314 
Soulanges,  Captain  de,  415 
Sound,  The,  2C 
South  Africa,  197 
South  Sea  Company,  The,  44,  58 
Southampton,  8,  231  n.,  234  n.,  296,  297, 

301,  312,  313,  343 
Southill,  100 

Soitthsea  Castle,  224,  241  n.,  312 
Souverain,  212  n.,  213,  302 
Spain,  29  et  sc-/.,  39,  42,  46,  47,  48,  49-52, 

58,  05,  60,  89,  102,  139,  238,  239,  261, 

265,  292,  443 
Spanish  humanity,  322 
Spartel,  Cape,  32J  271 
Spartivento,  ('ape,  37 
Xpi-edwell,  311,  310,  .".17 
Spoke,  Captain  Henry,  161  n.,  162,  218  n., 

311 

Speitce,  209,  270 
Kj>hin.r,  191,  218  ii.,  373, 400  n.,  415,  540  n., 

550  u.,  554,  5G3  n. 
Spilbergen,  the  voyager,  317 
Spinola,  Rear- Admiral,  135  n. 
ftpioii,  505  n. 
Spitliead,  30,  47,  48  n.,  50,  0.°,,  GO,  90,  108, 

117,  141,  142,  156,  158,  172,  180,  191, 

192,  Hi;-!,  206,  210,  231,  250,  289,  301, 

324,  338,  343,  395,  412,  445,  440,  503, 

540,  5-12 
Split  Hock,  367 

Spottiswood,  Colonel,  58  and  n. 
Kprii/lith/,  505  n. 

Springs,  Use  of,  399,  -100,  512,  516 
Spry,   Rear-Admiral    Sir   Richard,   131   n., 

141,  144,  206  n.,  235  11.,  239,  244,  252, 

341!,  506 

Spry,  Lieutenant ,  406  n. 

Spy,  201  n. 

S'juirri'l,  70  n.,  183,  206  n.,  208,  269,  272, 

314,335 

Stan,  223  n.,  2^-  "• 
Staering,  Captain  A.  C.,  505  n. 
Stanhope,  Admiral  lion.  Sir  Henry  Edwyn, 

513  n. 

Stanhope,  Rear- Admiral  John,  513  n.,  520  n. 
Stanhope,  Captain    Sir  Thomas,  Kt.,  189, 

190,  212  n.,  215,  218  n.,  234  n.,  235,  230 

and  n.,  237,  283  n. 

Stanhojie,  Colonel,  Minister  to  Spain,  31 
Stanhope,  Lord,  30 
Stanton,  Captain  John,  174,  311 
Stanwix,  Brigadier-General,  204,  205 
Stapleton,  Captain  Miles,  54  n.,  58 
Starhemberg,  316 
Staringh,  Captain,  505  n. 

Starke,  Lieutenant  ,  361,  365 

Start,  The,  63 


Staten  Island,  380,  382,  383 

Stephens,  Captain  Nathaniel,  120  n.,  131  n. 

Stephens,  Sir  Philip,  Bart.,  326 

Stepney,  Captain  George,  96 

Stevens,  Rear-Admiral  Charles,  127in.,  164, 

174,  175,  179  n.,  181,  198  and  n.,  200, 

224,  225,  232,  282,  287,  289 
Stevens,  Captain  William,  550  n.,  552 
Stewart,  Captain  Henry,  86,  88,  272 
Stewart  (or  Steuart),  Admiral  of  the  Fleet 

James,  03,  91 
Stewart,  Vice- Admiral  Hon.  Keith  (1),-23S, 

415,  568 

Stills  fitted  in  men-of-war,  337 
Stillwatcr,  391 
Stirling,    Captain    Sir    Walter,    Kt.,    188, 

234  n.,  509  n. 
Stirling  Castle,  23  and  n.,  46,  96,  98, 190  n., 

206  and  u.,  233  n.,  242  n.,  245  n.,  240  n., 

281,  415,  434,  454  n.,  456,  479  n. 
Stock  market,  The,  445 
Stockholm,  20,  41,  42,  43 
Stores,  Lack  of,  440 
Stork,  300,  311 
Storms,  27,  39,  58,  59  (2),  63,  90,  108,  121,. 

122,  132,  160,  109,  172,  186,  190  n.,  193, 

209,  215,    217,  219-221,  225,  231,  250, 

272,  275,  270,  311-315,  321,  397,  404, 

408,  449,  478,  479,  489,  540 
Storr,    Rear-Admiral    John,    189,   218    n., 

234  n.,  236  u.,  567 
Stott,  Captain  John,  183,  206  n. 
Straclian,  a  seaman,  101 
Strachan,  Captain  Sir  John,  Bart.,  218  n., 

296 
Strachan,  Admiral  Sir  Richard  John,  Bart., 

352 
Strafford,  54,  55,  56, 59,  01,  02  and  n.,  70  n., 

7(5,  123  n.,  133  n.,  134,  135  n. 
Strait  of  Le  Maire,  320,  321 
Strange,  Captain  Edmund  (or  Edward),  96 
Strickland,  Vice-Admiral  Charles,  34 
Strombuli,  or  Strombolo,  70  n.,  76  n.,  190, 

206  u.,  406  n. 
Stromi'),  229 
Stuart,  General,  154 
Stuart,  Vice-Admiral  Hon.  Charles,  257  and 

n.,  264,  265,  200 
Stuarts,  The,  42,  89,  257,  258 
Stutzer,  Commander,  505  n. 
Snblile,  283  and  n.,  284,  312,  550  n. 
Success,  34,  01,  62  n.,  70  n.,  192,  316,  317 
Suckling,  Captain  Maurice,  105  and  n.,  166, 

236  n.,  300,  326 
Suffolk,  70  n.,  71,  76,  85,  86,  87,  434,  438, 

45-1  n. 
Sufl'ren,  Vice-Admiral  Pierre  Andre,  Bailli 

de,  200,  212  n.,  402,  439  and  n.,  451,  457,  - 

482,  508,  539,  546-504 
Sugar,  21 

Sullivan,  General,  (U.S.A.),  409,  410 
Sullivan's  Island,  372,  373 
Sulphur,  406  n. 


INDEX   TO    VOLUME   III.  605 


Sultan,  395  n.,  434,   436,   437,  474,   552    Tarrytown,  380,  385 


and  n.,  550,  5GO,  563  n. 
Sumatra,  200,  561 
Sunday  observances,  21,  23 


Tartar,  224  n.,  238,  26'J,  293,  338,  380, 

505  n.,  509  n. 
Tartar's  Prize,  212  n.,  293,  311 


Sunderland,  107  and  n.,  197,  198  n.,  199,    Tathwell,  Commander  Joseph,  399  n. 

200  n.,  225,  270,  277,  278,  311,  312  i  Taylor,  Captain  Polycarpus,  133  n.,  135  n. 

Sunderland,  Lord,  30  Taylor,  Captain  Thomas  (1),  311 

Superannuated  Bear-Admirals,  344,  346  •        Taylor,  Captain  Wittewronge,  172,  231,  311 
Superannuation  of  officers,  20,  344  Tchesme,  Battle  of,  341  n. 

Superb,  115,  250,  545  n..  550  n..  552  n.,    Tea,  21 

554,  563  n.  Teach,  or  Thatch,  Edward  :  see.  Thatch 

Superbe,  31,  32,  33,  34, 35,  43, 45,  03,  88  n.,     TrUnutque,  296 

90,  218  n.,  220,  313  '  Temvmin;  148  n.,  151  n.,  212  n.,  214,  215, 

Superstition,  317  233,  234  n.,  242  n.,  245  n.,  240  n.,  31:', 

Stirajah  Dowleli,  Xawabof  Bengal,  160, 163,     Temple,  218  n.,  242  n.,  245  n.,  246  n.,  249, 

164  250,  312,  313 


Surf,  183,  193,  241 

Surgeons,  2,  19,  340 

Surgidero  at  Cartagena,  The,  72  and  n.,  73 

Surprise,  223  n.,  357,  505  n. 


Temple,  liichard,  Earl,  2 

Temple,  Sir  liichard,  4,  326 

Ternay,  Commodore  de,  250,  251,  252,  471, 

475-177,488 
Tenerife,  187 


Surveillante,  415 

Surveyors  of  the  Navy,  3,  326,  335  7r/'/«iV/i»/v,  230  and  n.,  231,  232 

Surviile,  Captain  de  (1),  198  n.  Terrible,  8,  12,  (iO,  62  u.,  70  n.,  84  n.,  96, 

Surville,   Captain  de   (2),    174  n.,   179   n.,        97,  98,  122,  123  and  n.,  127  n.,  206,  312, 

198  n.  415,  45  !  n  ,  459,  482  n.,  497  n.,  501 

Sutherland,  96,    183,  208,  227  n.,  23:;  n.,  Terror,  12,  1 13,  282,  546  u. 

242  n.,  245  n.,  246  n.  Tcxcl,  The,  507,  508,  53'J 

Sutherland,  Captain  Andrew,  482  n.,  48:;  u.,  Tlinlin,  335 

484,  520  n.  T/nimi.",  :',o2,  313 

Sutton,  Captain  Evelyn,  350,  415,  546  n.,  518  Thames,  liivcr,  12,  335 

Suttou,  Captain   Robert   Manners,   505  n.,  Thatch,   Edward,  known  as  "Blackboard," 

509  u.  259,260 

Swallow,  46  n.,  131  and  n.,  143,  260,  311,  7V»V,  218  n.,  219,  220,  313 

494,  495  T/u'/ix,  125  and  n.,  126,  299 

Swan,  187,  188  T/trtii,  212  n.,  217  and  n.,  306,  313,  315, 
Swan,  Lieutenant  J.  B.,  505  n.  3311 

Swanton,  Bear-Admiral  Kobert,  172,  206  n.,  Thiercelin,  Captain,  125  n. 

222  n.,  224,  227  and  n.,  232,  242  n.,  243,  Tliixbe,  350,  351 

244,  245,  310,  313,  565  Uolei,,  91 

Swanton,  Captain  Thomas  (1),  3,  4  Thompson,   Vice-Admiral    Sir  Charles  (1), 
Sweden,  26  et  sej.,  40-42,  43,  47,  229,  257,        Bart.,  482  n.,  497  n.,  513  n.,  520  n. 

340,341  Thompson,  Captain  Edward,  19,  21  and  n., 
Sweep's,  226,  503  22,  23 

Swift,  335  Thompson,  Captain  Samuel,  234  n.,  346  and 
Sw'iftsure,  189,  190,  212  and  n.,  213.  215,         n.,  492  n.,  197  n.,  513  n.,  520  n. 

218  n.,  219,  234  n.,  236  'l'l,r«    Brother*,  263 

Swivels,  11  n.  ThuiKln;  16  n.,  161  and  n,  242  n.,  245  n., 
Swiney,'  Admiral  William,  492  n.  246  n.,  276,  310.  373,  374,  406  n. 

Sylphide,  174  n.,  175,  198  n.,  550  n.  Tlmnderer,  300,  313,  361,  365,  415,  479  n. 

Symonds,  Captain  Thomas,  373  Thurot,    Commodore    Francois,    196,    223, 
Symons,  Vice- Admiral  John,  482  n.,  520  n.         224,  229-231  and  n.,  296,  297,  298,  299 

Syracuse,  35,  36,  38  Tiburon,  Cape,  08,  308 

Suren  373  Ticonderoga,  185,  204,  205,  355,  356,  359. 

363,  364,  368.  370,  386,  389 

TAAFE,  Lieutenant ,  278  Tiddemau,  Captain   liichard,  173,  198   n., 

Tagus,  The,  50,  91,  107,  274,  310  240  and  n.,  2- 

Talbot,    Captain  George,   545   n.,   550    n.,  Tierra  Bomba,  69,  73 

552  n  Tiger,  43,  46  n.,  47,  76  n.,  140,  161  and  n., 
Talbot,  the  privateer,  James,  280,  285  162,  163,  174  n.,  175,  179  and  n.,  180, 

Tangier,  47  n.  198  n.,  199,  272,  310 

Tanfore,  132,  178  Tigre,  34,  96,  247,  314,  31o 

Tapagwf,  540  n.  Tilbury,  62,  70  n.,  71,  76  u,  12  <  n,  13o  n.v 
Tarragona,  211  n.  IG'J,  273,  310,  311 


<506 


INDEX   TO    VOLUME  III. 


Tilly,  Captain  de,  492  n. 

Timber,  5,  335 

Timekeepers,  13,  14  and  n. 

Timewell,  Benjamin,  3 

•'  Tin-clads,"   Precursors  of  tlie  American,  | 

442 

Tiudall,  Captain  George,  224  n. 
Tinian,  323 

Tinker,  Captain  John  Bladon,  223  n.,  225 
Tippoo  Sultan,  351 
Tisiphone,  509  n.,  510 
Tobago,  138,  254,  487,  521 
Toby,  Commander  Richard,  101  n. 
Toll,  Caj)tain  Kdmond,  133  n.,  135  n. 
Toms,  Captain  Peter,  310 
Tonnage,  Computation  of,  9  n. 
Tonnant,  127  n.,  128,  129,  185,  t.'18  n. 
Tonyn,  Captain  George  Anthony,  200  n., 

309 

Tojiaze,  148  n. 
Torbay,  00,  70  n.,  217,  312 
Torbiiy,  4(i  n.,   ',5  n.,  90,  14],  171,  188, 
218  n.,  211),  210,  234  n.,  299,  312,  482  n., 
504,  513  n.,  51:0  n. 
Torres,  Admiral  Don  liodrigo  dc,  34,  58,  59, 

02,  (13,  Ii5,  70,  77,  107 
Torres,  Condc  de  las,  -!0 
Turrinytun,  267 

Torrington,  Admiral  of  the  Fleet  Sir  George 
Byi.g,  Viscount,  3,  28,  29,  30,  31,  32,  33- 
38,  38  n.,  40,  112  n.,  257,  314 
Tortuga,  130,  203,  272,  310 
Tortuga  Hanks,  'J'he,  135 
Touche,  Captain  de  Ln,  492  n. 
Touches,  Commodore   des,  415,  488,  489- 

493 

Toucher,  Mr.  Samuel,  180 
Tiiulnii,  59,  Cli,  84,  t-5,  89,  92,  93,  95,  96, 
107,   124,  142,  14li,  100,  Kill,  189,  190, 
21(1,  211,  215,  229,  274,  280,  310,  394, 
397,  411,  442,  109 
Tvtt/oitse,  90 
Touruel,  M.,  117 
Tower  Hill,  2 

Townesend,  Captain  Sir  Isaac,  Kt.,  4 
Townley,  Captain  Edmund,  161  n. 
Townsend,  Admiral  Isaac  (_2),  70,  116,  117, 

122,  280,  505 
Townsend,  Charles,  326 
Townshend,  Admiral  lion.  George,  96,  116, 

130,  145,  209,  281,  505 
Townshend,  General  Hon.  George,  209 
Towry,  Captain  John,  4,  96 
Towry  (previously  Philips),  Captain  Henry 
_  John  Philips,  215  n.,  222  n. 
Trade,  Effect  of  war  on :  (sec  also  Convoys, 
Privateers,  etc.),  130,  138,  231,  232,  245, 
253,  257,  296,  478 
Trafalgar,  554 
Tranquebar,  178 
Transit  of  Venus,  Expedition  to  observe  the, 

304  and  n. 
Treachery  :  Dutch,  85  n. ;  Bengalese,  163 


Treasure   ships,  Spanish,  44,  53,  05,  135, 

136,  238,  241,  271,  279,  280,  308,  315 
Treasurers  of  the  Navy,  3,  326 
Treaty;    of   Paris   (1763),    254;    between 

Fra'nce  and  the  United  States,  394,  426 
Trefusis,  Captain  Thomas,  4- 
Trelawney,    Captain    Sir    William,    Bart., 

201  n.,  202,  203 
Trelawney,  Governor  of  Jamaica,  68  n.,  76, 

79  and  n.,  80 

Trcmigon,  Captain  de,  415,  546  n. 
Trent,  185,  206  n.,  207,  246  n.,  248,  301 
Trenton,  388 

Tres  Monies,  Peninsula  of,  322 
Trcvanion,  Captain  Sir  Nicholas,  Kt.,  4 
Treveuen,    Captain,    (Russian   Navy)   341 

and  n. 

Trevor,  Captain  John,  62 
Trevor,  Captain  Thomas,  54,  55 
Trevor,  Captain  Tudor,  41  n. 
Trial,  or  Trytil,  253,  310,  320,  321 
1'rial's  Prize,  321 

Trident,  96,  127  n.,  148  n.,  150,  156,  206 
n.,  209,  226  n.,  236  and  n.,  312,  400,  406 
n. ,  434,  454  n.,  459 
Trincomale,  121,  131,  132,  181,   197,  224, 

225,  550,  552,  554,  557-500,  561,  562 
Trim'te,  La,  243 

Trinity  House,  Corporation  of,  14  n.,  342 
Triomphant,  458,  510,  533  n. 
Triple  Alliance  (1717),  The,  29 
Tripoli,  288  n. 

Triton,  70  n.,  78,  79  and  n.,  148  n.,  151  n., 
101  n.,  104,  174,  212  n.,  311,  415,  513  n., 
520  n. 

Triumph,  57  n.,  59,  143,  310,  406  n.,  486 
Triiuifc,  314 

Trobriand,  Captain  de,  415 
Tiollopc,  Admiral  Sir  Henry,  333 
T ronielin,  Captain  du,  550  n. 
Tronjolv,  Commodore,  543 
'I  roude,  II.,  quoted,  129,  486,  525 
Truscott,    Rear-Admiral    William,  466  n., 

505  n.,  520  n. 

Tucker,  Captain  William,  242  n.,  311 
Tullibardine,  Marquis  of,  39 
Turin,  92 

Turpin,  l  aptain  de,  415 
Tuscany,  07,  292 
Tweed,  223  n.,  235  n. 
Two  Sisters,  263 
Tyranny,  Naval,  21,  22 
Tyrrell,  Rear-Admiral  Richard,  86,  152  n., 
201  n.,  222  n.,  300  and  n.,  565 

ULHICA  EI.KAXORA,  Queen  of  Sweden,  41 
Unclaimed  prize  and  bounty  money,  342 
L'ninrn,  215  n.,  235  n.,  296,  299,  304, 

313 

t'nifonn,  20,  21,  347-350 
Union,  218  n.,  235  n.,  509  n. 
Uppleby,  Captain  Samuel,  387,  406  n.,  409, 

428  n.,  479  n. 


INDEX   TO    VOLUME  III. 


607 


Upton,  Commander  Arthur,  167  n.,  1G9,  311 

Urry,  Captain  John,  2-16  n. 

Ushant,  Cape,  65,  276,  287,  413,  415,  426 

n.,  443  n.,  444,  445,  465,  509,  539 
Usher,  Captain  Arthur,  246  n. 
Utrecht,  Treaty  of,  29,  109 
Utting,  Captain  Ashby,  310 
Uvedale,  Captain  Samuel,  225,  246  n.,  347, 

454  n. 

VACHKLL,  Commander  George,  284  an  dn., 

311  (2) 

Vado  Bay,  124 
Vaillant,  303 
I  ainqueur,  296 
Vakur,  225  n.,  226,  313 
Valevale,  Captain  Don  Ignacio,  34 
Valcour  Island,  361-368,  385 
Valiant,  234  n.,  235,  246  n.,  415,  509  n., 

520  n. 

Valparaiso,  322 

Vanbrugh,  Captain  Charles,  34,  310 
Vanbrugh,  Captain  Giles  liichard,  96 
Vanbrugh,  (  aptain  Philip,  4,  34 
Vandeput,  Admiral  George,  543  n. 
Vanderdubsen,  Colonel,  270  aud  n. 
Vandore,  Captain  de,  492  n. 
Vanguard,  172,  206,  222  n.,  227  and  u., 

242  n. 

Vanicoro  Island,  352  n. 
Vannes,  196 
Var,  River,  123,  124 
Varlo,  Captain  Weston,  201  n. 
Vashon,  Admiral  James,  505  u.,  520  n. 
Vaudreuil,  Vice- Admiral   the  Marquis   de,  \ 

96,  127  n.,  207,  228,  415,  523,  529,  530,  ' 

535,  536,  537 

Vaughau,  Admiral  John,  566 
Vaughan,  General,  4^9,  480,  481 
Vaughan,  the  navigator,  318 
Vauneulun,  Captain,  125  n. 
Vaux,  Marechal  de,  446 
Vega  Florida,  Captain  Conde  de,  96 
Vdasco,  248 

Velasco,  Captain  Don  Luis  de,  247  n.,  248 
Venezuela,  85 
Venganza,  247  n.,  315 
Vengeance,  217,  218  u.,  227  n.,  305,  415, 

454  n. 
Vengeur,  174  n.,  179  n.,  198  n.,  415,  452, 

546  n.,  550  n.,  559,  563  n. 
Ventura,  308,  315 
Venus,  218  n.,  302,  305,  308,  313  (4),  406 

n.,  428  n.,  431,  454  n.,  505  u. 
Venus,  274 
Vera  Cruz,  135 
Vere,   Lord :   see  Beaucleik,  Admiral  Lord 

Vere 
Verger,  Commodore  St.  Andre  du,  218  n., 

219 
Vernon,  Admiral  Edward  (1),  6  n.,  16,  17, 

52  and  n.,  53-65,  67-80,  85,  111  and  n., 

112  n.,  134,  267,  271,  274,  277  n. 


Vernon,  Admiral  Sir  Edward  (2),  Kt.,  212  n., 

291,  311,  343,  543  and  n.,  567 
Versailles,  119 

Vestal,  8,  215  n.,  300,  301  and  n.,  313 
Vestale,  218  n.,  304,  313 
Vesuvius,  70  n.,  76  n.,  206  n.,  234  n. 
Veth,  Rear-Admiral  Lucas  de,  26 
Vice-Admirals,  19 
Vicomte,  Captain  de  La,  533  n. 
Victuire,  293 
Victor,  479  n. 
Victory,  66,  107,  108,  274  and  n.,  310,  335, 

415,  417,  419,  420,  421,  424,  509  n.,  538 
Victualling  Office,  Portsmouth,  343 
Victuals,  21 
Vienna,  316 
Vienna,  Treaty  of,  42 
Vierye,  313 

Vigie,  La,  St.  Lucia,  429,  431 
Viyilant,  122,    125   and   n.,   131   n.,   392, 

406  n.,  415,  434,  454  n. 
Vigilante,  115,  312 
Vignault,  Captain  de,  127  n. 
Vigo,  40,  261,  262,  306,  311 
Vilaine,  River,  218  u.,  221,  223,  224,  233, 

313 

Vilefia,  Captain  Don  M.  de,  96 
Villa  Franca,  84,  92,  314 
Villalobos,  the  voyager,  317 
Villuvicentia,  Captain  Dun  Manuel,  34 
Ville  de  Paris,  335,  415,  496  n.,  513,  514, 

518,  525,  526,  532,  533,  534,  535 
Villebruue,  Captain  de,  492  n. 
Vincent,  Admiral  Nicholas,  174  n.,  177,567 
Viiicente,  Captain  Don  J.,  247  n. 
Viper,  143,  246  n. 
Viryin,  242  n.,  311,  313 
Vinjin  Queen,  70  n. 
Virginia,  335 
Virginia,  139 

Virginia,  259,  399,  442,  47;!,  488,  489,  493 
Volitye,  96,  281,312 
Volante,  34,  35,  37,  314 
Volcano,  406  n. 
Vritsland,  91 

Vulcan,  70  n.,  76,  125  u.,  415 
Vulture,  167  n. 

WACHTMEISTEK,  Admiral  Baron,  41 

Wager,  310,  320,  321-323,  549  n. 

Wager,  Admiral  Sir  Charles,  Kt.,  2,  3,  43, 

46,  47,  48,  112  n.,  319 
Wager  River,  319,  320 
Wages,  Payment  of,  18 
Waldegrave,  Admiral  Hon.  Sir  William  (1) ; 

Lord  Radstock,  509  n. 
Wales,  H.R.H.  Frederick,  Prince  of,  193 
Wales,  of  Greenwich,  Mr.,  338 
Walker,  Captain  Samuel  Hood,  479  n. 

Walker,  Lieutenant ,  246  n.,  249 

Walker,  the   privateer,  George,    276,    280, 

282,  285,  286 
Wallabout  Bay,  383 


608 


INDEX   TO    VOLUME  III. 


Wallace,    Admiral    Sir    James,    Kt.,    387, 

406  n.,  409,  520  n. 
Wallingford  House,  2 
Wallis,  Captain  Samuel,  206  n.,  226  n., 

234  n.,  236  n.,  326  (2) 
Walpole,  Sir  Robert,  67,  319 
Walsh,  merchant  of  Nantes,  110 
Walsingham,  Capiain  Hon.   Robert   Boyle 

(earlier  Hon.  Robert  Boyle),  185,  215  n., 

242  n.,  298,  30G,  415,  469,  469  n. 
Walthenham  Bay,  76 
Walton,   Admiral    Sir   George,   34,  35,  36 

and  n.,  43,  314 
War   declared   with   Spain,   39,   52 ;    with 

France,  91,  142  ;  with  Spain,  238  ;  begun 

with  France,  397  ;  by  Spain  with  Britain, 

443 ;  by  Britain  against  Holland,  478 
Ward,  Captain  Henry,  148  n. 
Ware,  M.,  shipbuilder,  335 
Warrant    ofticers :    sec    Masters,    Gunners, 

Pursers,   Surgeons,   Boatswains,   Carpen- 
ters, etc. 

Warrants,  111  n.,  112  n. 
Warren,  Vice- Admiral  Sir  Peter,  K.B.,  88  n., 

110,  113-115,  124,  125  n.,  126,  129,  130, 

J38,  269,  272,  2K.1!,  I!  12 
Warrior,  520  n.,  524 
Warsjiitr,  212  and  n.,  213,  214,  215,  218  n., 

219,  220 
Warwick,  92,  96,  98,  133  n.,  135  n.,  136, 

191,  285,  290,  304,  305,  311,  313,  335 
Warwick,    Captain    Thomas,    161   and    n., 

163 

Washington,  367 

Washington,  Captain,  (mil.),  71  n. 
Washington,  General  George,  139  and  n., 

371,  382,  383,  384,  385,  386,  387,  388, 

390,  393,  :;98,  401,  402,  405,  469,  470, 

471,  472,  488,  495,  496,  501,  502 
Water,  23,  337 

Waterl.ury,  Colonel,  364,  366,  367,  369 
Waterhonse,  Captain  Thomas,  54,  55 
Watkins,  Captain  John  (2),  96 
Watkins,  Captain  Richard,  86,  88,  96,  289 

and  n.,  311 
Watson,  Vice-Admiral  Charles,  96,  125  n., 

127  n.,  140,  142-144,  160-164 
Watson,  Captain  Thomas  (1),  55,  71,  72, 

274,  275,  310 

Watson,  Captain  Thomas  (2),  454  n.,  466  n. 
Watt,  Captain  James,  406  n.,  552  n.,  560 
Weather  gage,  Advantages  of  the,  484,  486, 

531,  532 

Weazcl,  128,  133  n.,  137,  201  n.,  284,  300  n. 
Webb,  Captain  James,  152  n.,  223  n. 
Webber,  Rear-Admiral  Charles,  246  n.,  567 
Welderen,  Captain  Grave  van,  505  n. 
Wellard,  Captain  Robert,  300 
Wells  and  Co.,  shipbuilders,  335 
Wells,  Vice-Admiral  Thomas  (1),  495 
Wentworth,  General  Thomas,  63,  64  n.,  68, 

70-80 
West,  Admiral  Thomas,  513  n.,  520  n. 


West  Africa,   21   n.,  138,  139,   169,   173,. 

186-189 

West  Indiaman,  283 
West  Indies,  17,  42-46,  48,  50,  52  etc.,  58, 

62,  67-80,  85-88,  91,  105,  110,  114,  115, 

116,  126,  128,  130,  132-137,  142,  146, 

167,  173,  189,  196,  203,  204,  217,  225, 

226,  233,  238,  239,  242-250,  267,  271, 

272,  279,  284,  289,  302,  303,  310,  311, 

312,  315,  395,  426  et  seq.,  447,  448,  451, 

471,  478,  480,  509,  510 
Westminster  Abbey,  128  n.,  209 
West  Point,  385,  392 
West,  Vice-Admiral  Temple,  96, 104, 125  n., 

142,  146,  148  n.,  152,  154,  155,  156,  158, 

170 

Wetzel,  General,  32  n.,  37  n. 
Weymouth,  343 
Wei/mouth,  64,  68,  70  n.,  73,  174  n.,  175, 

177,  179  n.,  198  n.,  199,  240  n.,  261,  310 
Whalebone,  319 
Whalebone  Point,  319 
Wheeler,  Captain  Edward,  152  n.,  215  n.,. 

224  n.,  301,  306 
Wheelock,  Captain  John,   206  n,,  226  n., 

246  n.,  248,  395  n. 
White,  Captain  Thomas  (1),  quoted,  500  n., 

517,518 

White  Point,  Lonisbourg,  183 
White,  the  navigator,  Francis,  320 
Whitehall,  2 
WJdteJmcen,  311 
Whiteside,  Henry,  338 
Whitshed,  Admiral  of  the  Fleet  Sir  James 

Hawkins  (earlier  James  Hawkins),  479  n. 
Whitwell,  Captain  Matthew,  222  n. 
Whorwood,  Captain  Thomas,  4 
Widows  and  Children,  Provision  for,  18,  19 
Wiertx,  Captain,  505  n. 
Wight,  Isle  of,  173,  193,  351,  396, 445,  446 
Wilkinson,  Captain  Andrew,  212  n. 
Wilkinson,  Captain  George,  513  n.,  520  n. 
Wilkinson,  Captain  Thomas,  395  n. 
Willes,  Sir  John,  Lord  Chief  Justice  of  the 

Common  Pleas,  105,  106 
Willett,  Captain  William  Saltren,  218  n., 

234  n. 
William   Augustus,  Duke  of  Cumberland, 

Prince,  66  and  n. 
William    Henry,  Duke   of  Clarence  (later 

King  William  IV.),  Admiral  of  the  Fleet 

Prince,  343  n.,  568 
Williams,  Captain   Edmund,  96,  103,  104 

andn. 

Williams,  Captain  James,  513  n.,  520  n. 
Williams,  Sir  John,  Kt.,  326 
Williams,  Captain  William,  373 
'  Williams,  William  Peere,  afterwards  Ad- 
miral of  the  Fleet  William  Peere  Williams 

Freeman,  406  n.,  431 
Willis,  Captain  Francis,  310 
Willis,  Captain  Thomas,  215  n. 
Willis's  battery,  Gibraltar,  47 


INDEX   TO    VOLUME  III.  609 

Wilmington,  472,  473  Wyborg,  Battle  of,  341  n. 

Wilson,  Admiral  George  (1),  513  n.,  520  n.      Wyndham,  Captain  Charles,  59,  61 
Wilson,  Lieutenant  Robert,  131  n.  Wynyard,  Colonel,  (Mar.),  63  n 

Winchelsea,  43  n.,  94,  96,  168,  201  and  n. 

283,  299,  311  XIMAKI,  G9 

Winchelsea,  Daniel,  Earl  of,  2 
Winchester,  41  n.,  46  n.,  120  n.,  203,  238,  :  YACHTS,  Royal,  237,  330,  335 

261  .  Yards,  329 

Windage  allowance  in  guns,  11  Yarmouth,  125  and  n.,  127  n.,  128,  174  n., 

Winder,  Captain  Joseph,  34  175,  176,  179  n.,  180,  198  n.,  434,  458, 

Windsor,  41  n.,  57,  61,  62,  70,  75  n.,  125  n.,  '      520  n. 

127  n.,  267,  301,  313  Yarmouth,  224,  310,  454  n. 

Windsor,  Captain  Hon.  Thomas,  415  "  Yellow  Admirals,"  344 

Windward   Islands  (see  also  West   Indies,  ,  York,  46  n.,  70,  76,  79  n.,  131  n.,  200  n., 

Martinique,  etc.),  468,  469,  535  232,  434 

Windward  Passage,  The,  134  I  York,  Duke  of :  sir  Edward  Augustus,  Duke 


Winter,  Ships  laid  up  in,  6,  323 
Witchell,  Mr.,  338 


of  York,  Prince 
York  Factory,  320 
York  River,  494,  496 


Woensel,  Captain  van,  505  n. 

Wolf,  63,  68,  70  n.,  215  n.,  269,  270,  284,  Yorktown,  405,  442,  471,  494,  502 

310,  311  (2)  Young,  Admiral  James  (1),  148  n.,  218  n., 

Wolfe,  Colonel,  70  223,  239,  252,  565 

Wolfe,  General  James,  183,  184,  196,  201-  Young,  Captain  Walter,  450,  451  n.,  458, 

209, 357  459 
Wolseley,  Admiral  Charles,  552  n.,  568 

Women  on  shipboard,  22,  23,  540  XAITAUIXK  Islands,  54  L 

Wood,  Captain  Charles,  546  n.,  550  11.,  559,  /avallos,   Don   Juan   Carlos   Gutierrez   de, 

560  62 

AVooldridge,  Captain  Francis,  479  n.  /rhru,  335,  520  n. 

Woolwich,  4,  12,  335,  336  /,'•!,',  525,  520,  529 

Woolwich,  122,  201    and   n.,  20.".,  224   n.,  X,':nohi,;  314 

242  n.  Zr)>hijr,  505  n. 

Worcester,  39,  54,  55,  56,  57  n.,  70  n.,  76  n.,  Zephyr,  96,  244  n.,  290,  309,  313 

79  n.,  80,  123  u.,  133  n.,  272,  314,  415,  /.< [ihi/r,  206  n.,  242  n. 

545  n.,  550  n.,  552   n.,  556,  559,  560,  Xierikzee,  91 

563  n.  /uiliiiijin;   174    n.,   175,    179   n.,  180,   JSI, 

Worge,  Lieutenant-Colonel,  188,  189  198  and  n.,  199,  415 

Worms,  Treaty  of,  89  n.  Xoutinan,  Hear- Admiral  Johan  Arnold,  505- 

Wright,  Captain  Lawrence,  4  508 

Wright,  the  privateer,  Fortunatus,  276,  292  Zwuluw,  505  n. 


LONDON'  : 
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