(navigation image)
Home American Libraries | Canadian Libraries | Universal Library | Community Texts | Project Gutenberg | Children's Library | Biodiversity Heritage Library | Additional Collections
Search: Advanced Search
Anonymous User (login or join us)
Upload
See other formats

Full text of "Russia and Moldova: developing relations between two countries"

DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY 

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 

MONTEREY CA 93943-5101 



Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 

Russia and Moldova: 

Developing Relations 

Between Two Countries 

by 

Robert J. Smith Jr. 

Captain, United States Air Force 

B.A., University of Maryland 

Submitted in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS 

from the 



issified 

ly Classification of this page 



REPORT DOCL MENTATION PAGE 



;port Security Classification Inclassified 


lb Restrictive Markings 


cunty Classification Authoniv 


3 Distribution/Availability of Report 


^classification, Downgrading Schedule 


Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 


■fcramg Organization Report yumber(s) 


5 Monitoring Organization Report Number(s) 


jme of Performing Organization 
j1 Postgraduate School 


6b Office Symbol 

(if applicable I 00 


7a Name of Monitoring Organization 
Naval Postgraduate School 


;dress cm, uuu- una ZIP ■.uuci 
terey CA 93943-5000 


7b Address icil\. slaie ana ZIP code) 

Monterey CA 93943-5000 


ame of Funding/ Sponsoring Organization 


6b Office Symbol 

( if appln able ) 


9 Procurement Instrument Identification Number 


;SS ■•iit\. -.laic. ana ZIP •■'idci 




10 Source of Funding Numbers 




Program Element No 


Project No 


Task No 


Work Unit Accessic 



lie I include ic.ur:,^ classificaiion I RLSSLA AND MOLDOVA: DEVELOPING RELATIONS BETWEEN TWO COUNTRIES (L) 

;rsonal Author(s) 'Smith, Robert J. Jr.. Captain, USAf 



ype of Report 
er's Thesis 



13b Time Covered 
From To 



14 Date of Report l\car. month. Uav) 

93 March 25 



15 Page Count 
80 



ipplementary Notation The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or po 
le Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 



sati Codes 


18 Subject Terms u^ntmue (>n reverse if neceisarx and identify b\ block number) 




Group 


Subgroup 


Russia, Moldova, Foreign Policy, International Relations, Dniester Confhct 



















istract U'jnltnue on reverie if necessary and identify by block number) 

breakup of the Soviet Union has created a myriad of problems not the least of which is determining where each of the 
.Iting states belongs m the world order and how each should develop international relations. Russia and Moldova are dri 
ther by economic necessity and by the continuing conflict in the Dniester Republic of Moldova. While their relationship s 
hat of two sovereign states trying to solve a mutual problem, it has not been that simple. Both states are still searchin 
ction for foreign and domestic policy. Russia is trying to balance her foreign policy emphasis between relations with tb 
the Near Abroad. Moldova's inexperienced government is struggling in attempts to formulate both domestic and foreigr 
:y. This thesis examines the Russian-Moldovan relationship at the national level, looking at how the countries are tryin 
nd national interests while developing relations. It will also examine how their bilateral relationship impacts their relat 
other countries. The conclusion reached is that Russia is not willing to treat Moldova as a sovereign state. Russia is ti 
laintain control of not just the bilateral relationship, but also relations between Moldova and other members of the 
rnational community. Russia maintains this control primarily by being uncooperative in talks designed to remove Russi 
ps from Moldova. 



stribution/Availability of Abstract 
inclassified/unlimited same as report 



_ DTIC users 



21 Abstract Security Classification 

Unclassified 



'i&me of Responsible Individual 
lail Tsypkin 



22b Telephone imclude Area Code) 

(408) 646-2218 



22c Office Symbol 



NS/TK 



3RM 1473,84 MAR 



APR edition may be used until exhausted 
All other editions are obsolete 



security classification of t 

Uncle 



ABSTRACT 

The breakup of the Soviet Union has created a myriad of problems not the 
least of which is determining where each of the resulting states belongs in the 
world order and how each should develop international relations. Russia and 
Moldova are driven together by economic necessity and by the continuing 
conflict in the Dniester Republic of Moldova. While their relationship should be 
that of two sovereign states trying to solve a mutual problem, it has not been that 
simple. Both states are still searching for a direction for foreign and domestic 
policy. Russia is trying to balance her foreign policy emphasis between relations 
with the West and the Near Abroad. Moldova's inexperienced government is 
struggling in attempts to formulate both domestic and foreign policy. This thesis 
examines the Russian-Moldovan relationship at the national level, looking at how 
the countries are trying to defend national interests while developing relations. 
It will also examine how their bilateral relationship impacts their relations with 
other countries. The conclusion reached is that Russia is not willing to treat 
Moldova as a sovereign state. Russia is trying to maintain control of not just the 
bilateral relationship, but also relations between Moldova and other members of 
the international community. Russia maintains this control primarily by being 
uncooperative in talks designed to remove Russian troops from Moldova. 



Ill 



/ A^v/'- 






TABLE OF CONTENTS 

I. INTRODUCTION 1 

A. PROPOSAL 1 

B. RESEARCH DESIGN 2 

II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE MOLDOVAN REGION 5 

A. HISTORY TO WORLD WAR II 5 

B. SOVIETIZATION 11 

III. MOLDOVAN GOVERNMENT 15 

A. INITIAL FORMATION 15 

B. PRESENT POLICIES 16 

C. THE UNinCATION ISSUE 19 

D. DEALINGS WITH THE COMMONWEALTH OF 
INDEPENDENT STATES (CIS) 21 

IV. THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT AND FORMATION OF FOREIGN 

POLICY 24 

A. NATIONAL INTEREST 24 



IV 



DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY 

r4AVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 

MONTEREY CA 93943-5101 

B. RUSSIA'S FOREIGN POLICY 27 

C. POLICY TOWARD THE NEAR ABROAD 30 

V. THE DNIESTER CONFLICT 36 

A. DEFINING THE RELATIONSHIP 36 

B. RUSSIAN SUPPORT FOR THE INSURGENTS 39 

C. THE ROLE OF THE 14TH ARMY IN THE INSURGENCY .... 42 

D. THE DNIESTER PEACE PROCESS 46 

E. TALKS ON WITHDRAWAL OF RUSSIAN TROOPS 48 

VI. THE EFFECTS OF RUSSIA ON MOLDOVA'S OTHER 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 50 

A. EFFECTS ON RELATIONS WITH ROMANIA 50 

B. EFFECTS ON RELATIONS WITH UKRAINE 52 

C. RELATIONS WITH THE CIS 55 

VII. CONCLUSION 57 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 65 

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 71 



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

Russia, while claiming successor status to the Soviet Union in many areas, 
is a new state in terms of developing international relations. The problems it 
faces in developing international relations are not the same as those faced by the 
Soviet Union. This is especially true in the relations Russia must develop with 
the "Near Abroad", the term the Russian government uses to identify those states 
which were formerly a part of the Soviet Union. The goal of this thesis is to 
examine and analyze the international relationship developing between Russia 
and one of these new countries, Moldova. 

There is discord within the Russian government on how to develop 
relations with the Near Abroad, in general, and there are particular problems in 
relations with Moldova. Moldovan relations are plagued by problems with the 
14th Army (the Russian military unit still stationed on the left bank of the 
Dniester river in Moldova), the fate of Russians in Moldova, the historic 
problems between the local people and the central government in Moscow, 
Moldovan relations with Romania, and the Moldovan position toward the 
Commonwealth of Independent States. 

The relationship between Russia and Moldova, while containing many 
peculiarities, does have many points in common with others states of the former 
Soviet Union. Most of the new Post-Soviet European States have the same basic 



VI 



types of laws pertaining to foreign nationals and their participation in society- 
These laws are of great importance in defining their relationship with Russia. 
Many of the other states are also facing problems, albeit not quite as severe, with 
Russian military troops on their soil. Strong economic ties between Russia and 
these states must also be addressed. 

Moldova does have its unique points as well. It is one of the few areas with 
Russian troops active in a peacekeeping role on its territory. It has a shared 
heritage not with Russia, but with another sovereign state, Romania. There are 
portions of the country which were actively trying to secede, one of which 
wanted unification with Russia. All of these conditions make the Moldovan- 
Russian relationship an important area for study. 

This thesis will look at the development of Moldovan-Russian relations 
through an evaluation of authorized and unauthorized policy statements from 
each government, and individuals in the governments. It will look at how the 
Moldovan government has been formed, its' present domestic policies and how 
these effect its foreign policy. It will look at the discussion taking place within 
the Russian government about what exactly are Russian national interests and 
the affects of this discussion on foreign policy. It will identify and analyze the 
options which are being discussed in the Russian foreign policy establishment. 
It will also look at how the Russian-Moldovan relationship effects Moldova's 
relations with other countries such as Romania and Ukraine. 



Vll 



The conclusion reached is that Russia is not willing to treat Moldova as a 
sovereign state. Russia is trvmg to maintain control of not just the bilateral 
relationship, but also relations between Moldova and other members of the 
international community. Russia maintains this control primarily by being 
uncooperative in talks designed to remove Russian troops from Moldova. The 
government of Moldova faces a long uphill battle to gain peace on its territory 
and to get the respect it deserves from the Russian government. 



vui 



I. INTRODUCTION 

A. PROPOSAL 

Russia, while claiming successor status to the Soviet Union in many areas, 
is a new state in terms of developing international relations. The problems it 
faces in developing international relations are not the same as those faced by the 
Soviet Union. This is especially true in the relations Russia must develop with 
the "Near Abroad", the term the Russian government uses to identify those states 
which were formerly a part of the Soviet Union. The goal of this thesis is to 
examine and analyze the international relationship developing between Russia 
and one of these new countries, Moldova. 

There is discord" within the Russian government on how to develop 
relations with the Near Abroad, in general, and there are particular problems in 
relations with Moldova. Moldovan relations are plagued by problems with the 
14th Army (the Russian military unit still stationed on the left bank of the 
Dniester river in Moldova), the fate of Russians in Moldova, the historic 
problems between the local people and the central government in Moscow, 
Moldovan relations with Romania, and the Moldovan position toward the 
Commonwealth of Independent States. 

The relationship between Russia and Moldova, while containing many 
peculiarities, does have many points in common with others states of the former 



1 



Soviet Union. Most of the new Post-Soviet European States have the same basic 
types of laws pertaining to foreign nationals and their participation in society- 
These laws are of great importance in defining their relationship with Russia. 
Many oi the other states are also facing problems, albeit not quite as severe, with 
Russian military troops on their soil. Strong economic ties between Russia and 
these states must also be addressed. 

Moldova does have its unique points as well. It is one of the few areas 
with Russian troops active in a peacekeeping role on its territorv. It has a shared 
heritage not with Russia, but with another sovereign state, Romania. There are 
portions of the country which were actively trying to secede, one of which 
wanted unification with Russia. All of these conditions make the Moldovan- 
Russian relationship an important area for study. 

B. RESEARCH DESIGN 

For this study I am analyzing the relationship from the "rational actor" level 
of analysis. This means the relationship will be the result of a rational decision- 
making process within each country pursuing its own interests. The relationship 
between the two states, as sovereign entities is the focus of this study. 

As is pointed out by Jonathan R. Adelman and Deborah Anne Palmieri in 
their book The Dynamics of Soviet Foreign Policy gathering data on foreign 
policy matters, especially Russian or Soviet foreign policy, creates interesting 
challenges. Most of the data available is secondary; that is, it is someone's 



i 



reporting or analysis rather than original information. Information in mass 
media tends to lack solid analysis and often contains political bias. By drawing 
information from articles translated from Russian (Soviet prior to January 1991), 
Moldovan, Ukrainian, and Romanian sources I hope to avoid the problem of bias 
and provide in depth analysis of my own as much as possible. 

This thesis will look at the development of Moldovan-Russian relations 
through an evaluation of authorized and unauthorized policy statements from 
each government, and individuals in the governments. It will look at how the 
Moldovan government has been formed, its' present domestic policies and how 
these effect its foreign policy. It will look at the discussion taking place within 
the Russian government about what exactly are Russian national interests and 
the affects of this discussion on foreign policy. It will identify and analyze the 
options which are being discussed in the Russian foreign policy establishment. 
It will also look at how the Russian-Moldovan relationship effects Moldova's 
relations with other countries such as Romania and Ukraine. 

This will be done through a systematic review of newspapers, magazines, 
and appropriate journals. I will also conduct a review of Foreign Broadcast 
Information Service (FBIS) translations of Russian, Romanian, Ukrainian, and 
Moldovan newspaper articles and Radio and Television broadcasts. Additionally 
there will be a review and analysis of pertinent Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 
(RFE/RL) articles and research reports. Books and articles on the basics of 
establishing relations between countries will be used to provide a framework for 



the analysis of the relationship. Additional material relating to Moscow's historic 
problems in relating to nationalities will also be reviewed. The thesis will also 
provide an historic background of the relationship between the people of 
Moldova and the Soviets/Russians. However, emphasis will be on the 
development of situation in the last couple of years concentrating on the time 
since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December, 1991. 



II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE MOLDOVAN REGION 

A. HISTORY TO WORLD WAR II 

The relations between Russia and Moldova are strongly influenced by the 
history of the region. The historic area of Moldavia is comprised of three basic 
territories: Bukovina, Wallachia and Bessarabia. (See Figure 1), Throughout the 
13th and 14th centuries the land was populated by Slavic Vlachs migrating from 
Hungary, and ruled under feudal principalities. By the mid 16th century, 
Moldova had become a subject state of the Ottoman empire. It remained under 
Turkish control until about 1791, when control of some of the eastern parts of the 
area passed to Russia. 

By 1812, Russia had secured most of eastern Moldavia, the territory known 
as Bessarabia. Under the Tsar, this area was given basic autonomous self- 
government, and the Romanian governmental systems were left intact. During 
the Crimean War, Russia occupied increased portions of Moldavia. In 185b, the 
treaty of Paris established Moldavia and Wallachia as principalities under 
Turkish sovereignty and removed them from Russian control. In 1861-62, the 
two territories united to form the new country of Romania, still under Turkish 
control. In 1877-78, Romania claimed independence and was recognized by the 
Berlin Congress. (Until this time Romania was a part of the Ottoman Empire.) 



HISTORIC MOLDOVA 






''f/Jyl ^^^ ^... '^yiUlXTlA' 



'^. 










100 Ml 



160 KM 



Figure 1 

(From Nicholas Dima, From Moldavia to Moldova) 



In 1918, Romania seized the territory of Bessarabia from the Russians in an 
effort to reunite the areas of iMoldavia, Wallachia, and Bessarabia. In 1940, 
Romania was forced to return Bessarabia to the USSR by the Soviet government. 
The area was then joined with six regions of the Moldavian Autonomous 
Socialist Soviet Republic (ASSR) to form the Moldavian Socialist Soviet Republic 
(SSR). (These six regions are contained in the current major area of conflict, the 
east bank of the Dniester river.) Aside from several months in 1941, when 
Romania regained control, and when the area was under occupation during the 
war, the area remained under Soviet control from 1940 until the independence 
movement of 1991. 

In 1917, just after the Bolshevik revolution, the Russian controlled area of 
Bessarabia declared independence. Three months later, it felt forced to unite with 
Romania to defend itself against the Bolsheviks.^ The Soviets did not accept the 
unification of Romania and Bessarabia, land the Soviets considered rightly part 
of the Soviet Union. In 1924, as a part of a political ploy to try and regain 
control of the entire Bessarabian region, the Soviets created the Moldavian ASSR 
on the east bank of the Dniester river. This was an area inhabited by a large 
number of Moldavians, but it had always been a part of the Ukrainian SSR. The 
Russian hope was that Moldavians in eastern Romania would want to reunite 
with their brethren in an "independent" region inside the Soviet Union and force 



^Bohdan Nahaylo, "Ukraine and Moldova: The View from Kiev", Radio 
Liberty Research. Vol 1, 1 May 1992, Num 18, p 40. 



Romania to return the territory to the Russians." However, this never happened 
and the Soviets used plan B. 

In June of 1940, the Soviets, using the Red army, and with the blessings of 
the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, annexed all of Bessarabia. Their justification was 
that thev were liberating the Ukrainians in the area from their Romanian oppres- 
sors. The Soviets quickly took the conquered land and divided it. They attached 
parts of northern and southern Bessarabia to the Ukrainian SSR. They then took 
the remainder and attached a portion of the Moldavian ASSR (east bank of the 
Dniester, formally part of the Ukrainian SSR) and pronounced it the Moldavian 
SSR.' (See Figure 2) 

The Soviets were relentless in establishing control in the territory. All 
industrial enterprises with more than 20 workers, or 10 workers and a motor 
over 10 h.p., were nationalized. Between 100,000 and 150,000 Moldavians were 
exported to Soviet industrial sites. 13,000 specialists were brought in from 
Russia, Ukraine, and Byelorussia to assume all positions of responsibility. These 
specialists included 500 teachers to start the "russification" of the school system 
in time for the new school year. "The truth is that the Soviet authorities began 



-Paul E. Lydolph, Geography of the USSR, as referenced in Nicholas Dima, 
From Moldavia to Moldova The Soviet-Romanian Territorial dispute, (New York, 
NY: Columbia University Press, 1991), p 23. 

'Vladimir Socor, "Moldavian Lands Between Romania and Ukraine: The 
Historical and Political Geography." Report on the USSR, Vol 2, 16 November 
1991, Num 46: p 23-26. 



1., ;l--.u'i-:5^i;s.»' .•'i 









18 i»"Wiw:H;iTBttiBfe:.-Jifr'''(i. 



t'j, au:'5\iHHLiai5.?-iM'''!5i-i 




MOLDAVIA 



acftGiss 




CONfTESTED AREAS WIThlN THE MOLDAVIAN SSR 

1. LANDS cASTOF THE C)Nl657£qD£CL»S60TH6-DNi6Sr=frQ£PuBUC 

2 uNOSv^rrHaiQAuzPOouuroM 

CONTESTED AREAS OF HISTORIC MOLDAVIA 
OUTSIDE THE MOLDAVIAN SSR 



Figure 2 

(From Vladimir Socor, Moldavian Lands between Romanina and Ukraine: 
'he Historical and Political Geography) 



immediately russification of public life coupled with ruthless measures designed 
to weaken the Romanian ethnic character of Moldavia.""^ When the Romanians 
regained control of the area for a short period in 194L they found total ruin. In 
general the area was in total disarray. Industries were destroyed and the 
economy disrupted. Mass graves of the Romanians who were not deported were 
discovered. Russian atrocities abound.' 

While the Soviets were preoccupied with the German blitzkrieg, the remain- 
ing Moldavian population, in concert with the Romanian leadership, turned 
against the Russians who remained. The invading Romanians did not stop at 
Bessarabia, the area they had historic claim to, but continued on to occupy large 
areas of Ukraine. This period of oppression lasted until the Soviets regained 
control in 1944. With the defeat of the Germans, the Soviet army rolled over the 
Romanians and returned the conquered territories to the Soviet fold. The 
activities of both sides during this transitional generated strong animosity among 
all involved. This animosity is still active today.^ 



^Dima, p 43-44. 

Tbid., p 45. 

"Judith Ingram, "Behind Moldova's Ethnic Strife -- A Long History of 
Conflict." San Francisco Chronicle, 2 July 1992, A 16 cl. 



10 



B. SOVIETIZATION 

Beginning immediately after the war, the Soviets undertook an effort to 
bring the Moldavian SSR into the main stream of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics (USSR). Many of the Soviet policies used in the Moldavian SSR were 
similar to those used in many other republics. These mostly consisted of 
consolidation of Soviet/Communist rule, the restriction of social organizations, 
mass deportations, arrests, executions, and importation of ethnically Russian and 
Ukrainian advisors and political leaders. In these activities, the Moldavian SSR 
shared its suffering with the majority of the Union. However, several of Stalin's 
policies in the Moldavian SSR were unique to that area because of its Romanian 
historical background. Specifically, Stalin undertook to create a Moldavian 
nation from the peoples in the Moldavian SSR in an effort to "sever the 
connection with neighboring Romania for good."' 

In the former Bessarabia, the communists did not feel the need to put forth 
even the slightest appearance of democracy,that is insuring the local population 
had at least some representation in the government, as had been done in the 
other newly-acquired areas. They immediately formed Soviets and appointed 
executive committees, all native Russian or Ukrainian, to run the counties. 



"Jonathan Eyal, The Nationalities Question in the Soviet Union ed Graham 
Smith, (New York, NY: Longman, 1990) p 126. 



11 



districts, and towns. "^ The Moldavian language was "returned to its roots" by 
supplanting the Latin alphabet with Cyrillic. Local Romanian culture and 
customs were outlawed and the Russian culture was elevated to supremacy. 
Romanian literature was banned and emphasis was placed on Russian historic 
literature." (It is interesting to note that the Great Soviet Encyclopedia contains 
the following under the heading Moldavian, the language of the Moldavians: . 
. . first texts . . . dating from the late 15th and early 16th century . . . writing 
system was based on Cyrillic until the 19th century . . . during the Soviet period 
the language has been enriched . . .).'° 

In addition to taking away/modifying the written language, the spoken 
language was revised as well. Because the new government officials were from 
the left bank, they spoke Russian and Ukrainian, not Moldavian/Romanian. The 
average person now had virtually no say in government activities because he no 
longer spoke the requisite language. The few Moldavians brought into 
government positions were mostly from the old Moldavian ASSR. Many didn't 
speak their native (Moldavian) language well, if at all. They were usually fluent 
in Russian, however. They had been living under Soviet rule for years and had 



■^Gerhard Simon, Nationalism and Policy toward the Nationalities in the 
Soviet Union, (San Francisco, CA: Westview Press, 1991) p 176-180. 

'Eyal, p 127. 

"^ Great Soviet Encyclopedia, (New York, NY: MacMillan, 1977) Vol 16, p 422. 



12 



viewed the Russian language as their avenue for advancement. If the need arose 
to address their "fellow countrymen" they could always get a translator." 

A new history of Moldavia was written by Russian and Ukrainian scholars. 
It de-emphasized, to the point of eliminating, Romanian influences, while trying 
to create a heritage of Russian and Ukrainian roots. This had the effect of 
denying the people of the region knowledge of their true ethnic heritage while 
thrusting a fictional one into their laps. 

The Soviets had to carefully balance the policies in Moldavia. They did not 
want to engender a strong national sense of identity in the people, but at the 
same time they had to insure that all remnants of Romanian culture were 
removed and Soviet culture was adopted. Some modern scholars consider this 
an attempt at "separating the indigenous population of Soviet Moldavia spiritual- 
ly, culturally, and linguistically from the Romanian people, of which they are m 
fact a part."'- 

Soviet policy was destined to fail due to conflicting goals and the 
impossibility of "creating a nation". The inevitability of failure was masked for 
some time because of the strong hand of the Soviets, the strict control of the 
Russian political elite, and the cooperative, or at least non-confrontational. 



"Michael Bruchis, Nations-Nationalities-People: A study of the Nationalities 
Policy of the Communist Party in Soviet Moldavia, (New York, NY: Columbia 
University Press, 1984) p 33. 



•-Ibid., p 1. 

13 



attitude oi the communist regime in Romania. As each of these reasons 
dissolved, so did Soviet control of Moldavia, and under Gorbachev's glasnost' 
and perestroika, the last Soviet controls fell away.''' 



13 



Eyal p 128. 



14 



III. MOLDOVAN GOVERNMENT 

A. INITIAL FORMATION 

The independence forces in Moldavia were slower in organizing than those 
in most other republics because of the tight communist rule and lack of 
"nationalistic leadership" in the republic. While the first seeds of discontent may 
have been seen by the communist leadership in 1987, the first official indepen- 
dence group The Popular Front" was not established until May 1989.''^ It was 
at this point that the communist leadership truly realized confrontation was 
imminent. 

The rallying cry of the Popular Front was for a return to Romanian roots. 
The Romanian flag was flown and the Romanian national anthem sung at many 
of the Popular Front's rallies. The Moldavian Supreme Soviet, giving in to pres- 
sures from the newly formed political opposition, declared Moldavian(Romanian) 
the official language of the Republic in September 1989. This decree was 
tempered by inclusion of an amendment that made Russian the language of 
"inter-ethnic" communications.^'' 



'^Vladimir Socor, "Popular Front Founded in Moldavia", Report on the USSR , 
Vol 1, 9 June 1989, Num 23: p 23. 

'"^Vladimir Socor, "Moldavian Proclaimed Official Language in the Moldavian 
SSR", Report on the USSR, Vol 1, 22 September 1989, Num 38: p 13. 



15 



The elections of Spring 1990 gave the Popular Front control of about 65% 
of the Moldavian parliament. This parliament passed a series of laws m June of 
that vear mcluding: making the Romanian flag the national flag, declaring sover- 
eigntv, nationalizing the means of production, and declaring that the only Soviet 
laws valid in Moldova were those which had been ratified bv the Republic's 
parliament.'" These laws caused great concern for the people who had been in 
control — those Russians and Ukrainians living on the East bank. 

There were two geographic regions of major conflict during the formation 
oi the government. Both regions, the Gagauz^' region and the Dniester region 
declared independence in 1990. These declarations were political challenges to 
the new regime, much as the declaration of independence of the Crimea is to 
Ukraine, or the issue of Tatarstan is to Russia. There were other conflicts facing 
the new regime as well, including the Bulgarian majority in parts of Moldova, the 
issue of historic lands of Bessarabia that now belonged to Ukraine, and the large 
Ukrainian population in the country. 

B. PRESENT POLICIES 

The goal of Moldova's President Mircea Snegur has been to form an 
independent sovereign state. He has attempted to fulfill this goal despite all 



■''Dima, From Moldavia ... , p 144-147. 

'The Gaguz are a small ethnic group which is concentrated in a small 
territory in the southern portion of the country. 



16 



opposition. He has succeeded in forming a government with independent 
statehood and preservation of territorial integrity as it's prime objective.'"* This 
was accompHshed by carefully developing Moldova's foreign and domestic 
policies balancing pressures from opposition groups, both internal and external. 

In general, there has been an effort not to exclude non-Moldovans from the 
new system. The government has structured itself "al Vloldavie", i.e. of Moldavia 
rather than "Moldovenesc", i.e. Moldavian, to show a dedication to democracy 
and rights for all ethnic groups in the republic. ^^ To this end, the current policv 
of the Moldovan government is "promoting a revival of the Ukramian, Gagauz, 
and Bulgarian languages and cultures in Moldova, long subject to Russification, 
and to encouraging (sic) Russians to renounce Soviet ideology in favor of Russian 
cultural traditions. "-^ The Moldovan government is even emphasizing choice of 
ethnic language education in areas of substantial non-Moldovan populations. 

As an example, Ukrainians make up the largest minority in the countrv, 
comprising almost 14% of the population. President Snegur has introduced 
Ukrainian language instruction in schools and established Ukrainian-language 
radio and television broadcasts. Several agreements have been signed between 



"^Vladimir Socor "Moldova's New "Government of National Consensus", 
RFE/RL Research Report, Vol 1, 27 November 1992, Num 47. 

'""Socor, "Popular Front . . . ", p 24. 

-"Vladimir Socor, "Moldova Builds a New State", RFE/RL Research Report, 
Vol 1, 3 January 1992, Num 1: p 43. 



17 



Moldova and Ukraine providing for cooperation in training of Ukrainian 
instructors. In addition, Ukrainian language and culture classes are being offered 
in high schools. ". . . the Moldovan government's efforts to win over its national 
minorities bv respecting their cultural rights have been welcomed by those of 
Moldova's Ukrainians who have retained or are rediscovering their national 
identity-"'^ 

Since consolidating power in December of 1991, President Snegur has done 
everything in his power to alleviate the concerns of minorities in Moldova about 
their treatment and the possibility of unification. He has joined forces with such 
national-democratic groups as the Russian association Democratic Moldavia, the 
Society for Ukrainian Culture, and the Bulgarian Rebirth Society. He has 
committed to revitalizing the culture and national identity of minority 
communities. "- 

Moldova's new government, completed in December of 1992, has been 
designated one of "national consensus". Its major platforms include ruling out 
any political role for the communist party, support of an elected representative 
governmental system, and protection of the civil rights of all people in the state. 
All this IS in addition to the primary goal of independent statehood and 
territorial integrity. 



-'Nahaylo, "Ukraine and Moldova . . .", p 42. 
-Socor, "Moldavia Builds . . .", p 43-47. 

18 



I 



This new government has attempted to reflect the ethnic composition of the 
country- It is not exclusively Moldovan Hke the early government of 1991-92, but 
contains ethnic Ukrainians, Russians, and Bulgarians as well as Moldovans. It 
even includes ministerial posts reserved for left-bank Russians should they finally 
decide to take part in the elected government.-'' It is truly an effort to include all 
people in the political process in the country.-^ 

C THE UNIFICATION ISSUE 

One of the greatest challenges for President Snegur has been to create a 
state from a land whose titular nationality is part of a nation which already has 
a state. Due to their shared heritage, Moldova and Romania have a strong bond 
which intertwines them. The call for unification of Moldavia and Rumania was 
the driving force behind Moldova's independence movement. Fear that unific- 
ation would occur has been the cause of many of the problems in the Dniester 
and Gagauz regions of Moldova. However, not since the origination of the 
independence movement has there been much serious talk of unification. The 
Moldovan Popular Front, the leading political group endorsing unification during 
the initial push for separation from the Soviet Union, has lost much of it's sup- 



-''Vladimir Socor, "Moldova's New 'Government of National Consensus'", 
RFE/RL Research Report, Vol 1, 17 November 1992 Num 47. 

■■•For a list of the people in the new government and a more specific ethnic 
breakout see Vladimir Socor, "Moldova's New Government of National 
Consensus'", RFE/RL Research Report, Vol 1, No. 47, 27 November 1992. 



19 



port"^ It has been reported in the Russian Weekly News Magazine, New Times, 
that the last public opinion poll in Moldova showed only 9 percent of the 
population in favor of unification."'' 

Since early 1992, Snegur has espoused the doctrine of "one people, two 
states" or "two independent Romanian states cooperating with each other" to 
describe Moldova's relations with Romania."' This doctrine has been supported 
by Romania's President Ion lliescu and most of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, but has found opposition in other parts of the Romanian government. 

One of the major reasons why Moldova does not seek unification with 
Romania is political dissension within Moldova. Moldova would lose any chance 
at a reasonable settlement of the Dniester conflict, and undoubtedly tension 
would increase among other ethnic minorities if the government pursued 
unification. The stated major concern of the Russians and Ukrainians, especially 
in the Dniester region, is fear of unification with Romania. Any movement in the 
direction of unification would greatly complicate the Russian-Moldovan 



"Tor a look at the changes in political preferences of Moldova's Electorate 
from June 1991 to February 1992, see Vladimir Socor, "Opinion Polling in 
Moldova", RFE/RL Research Report, Vol 1, No. 13, 27 March 1992. 

-"Galina Kovalskaya, "Is the Right Bank Right?", New Times, Issue 45.92, 
November, 1992, p 12-13. 

-''Vladimir Socor, "Moldovan-Romanian Relations are Slow to Develop", 
RFE ^RL Research Report, Vol 1, 26 June 1992, Num 13. 



20 



relationship in light of these fears and the stated policy of the Russians that they 
will protect the Russian diaspora around the world. 

This reason is followed closely by economic issues. Because of the remnants 
of the old Soviet command economy, Moldova's economy, predominantly 
agricultural, is dependent on raw materials and fuel from the other former Soviet 
Republics. Unification with Romania would exacerbate the existing shortages. 
Presently, despite economic problems, Moldova has a higher standard of living 
than Romania. Unification would be an economic step backward, a step more 
beneficial to Romania that Moldova. 

There is also the political reality of the situation. President Snegur and his 
new government are presently in charge of a country which has been recognized 
by many nations and major international organizations. To unite with Romania 
would be to become a province in a different country. They would lose all their 
international prestige and power. 

D. DEALINGS WITH THE COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT 
STATES (CIS) 

Moldova has taken a cautious approach to relations with the CIS. Since its 

inception, the CIS has been a tenuous organization at best. The individual states 

found themselves forced together by economic necessity. However, these states 

are cautious about joining a union in which the Russians predominate. In early 

December, Interfax quoted President Snegur, in discussing the Commonwealth 

charter, as saying "with every passing day, ... the desire of certain state leaders 

21 



to return to the organization of the former USSR is becoming increasingly 
apparent. "■"' However, Moldova did sign the Alma-Ata protocol to create the 
Commonwealth in December 1991 with reservations, and became a founding 
member."'^ 

One of the major points of contention between Moldova and the CIS 
concerned military structure. Moldova was one of three republics (along with 
Ukraine and Azerbaijan) which insisted they be allowed to maintain their own 
conventional armed forces. This was a position not well received by some other 
members of the Commonwealth, most notably Russia. In addition to maintaining 
its own armed forces, Moldova refused to participate in any joint military 
command structure. This position caused great conflict in Moldovan-Russian 
relations especially regarding the Dniester conflict and the 14th Army. Moscow 
has repeatedly tied removal or disbandment of Russian troops in Moldova to 
Moldova's participation in some type of security arrangement with Russia. 

Moldova's primary interest in the CIS is economic. In the early part of 1992, 
Moldova relied almost exclusively on the members of the CIS for raw materials 
and fuel. Reliance on the ruble further tied her to the Commonwealth. Even so, 
Moldova is trying to limit her participation in the economic sector of the 



-'Vladimir Socor, "Moldova not to sign CIS Charter", RFE/RL Daily Report, 
8 December 1991. 

-"^Ann Sheehy, "Commonwealth of Independent States: An Uneasy compro- 
mise", RFE/RL Research Report, Vol 1, 10 January 1992, Num 2. 



22 



Commonwealth as well. Moldovan leaders acknowledge the Commonwealth is 
a necessary, albeit hopefully temporary, economic reality for the country. They 
have stated they will make every effort to transition from the CIS to the 
European Community as quickly as possible. "*" Moldova has established trade 
protocols with other members of the world community, Bulgaria, Kuwait, 
Romania, and the United States to name a few. 

Moldova has also used the CIS as a forum for protesting Russia activities 
in the Dniester region. They have called for the CIS military to intervene in the 
conflict as peacekeepers in concert with United Nations troops. Most recently 
Moldova has tied her membership in the CIS to Ukraine's membership. In 
November, Snegur was reported to have said that Moldova shared Ukraine's 
concern over the "new centralism" developing in CIS economic and political ac- 
tions. He stated that Moldova does not intend to sign the CIS charter if Ukraine 
does not sign."*^ 



''•^"Vladimir Socor, "Moldova", RFE/RL Research Report, Vol 1, 14 February 
1992, Num 7; p 11. 

-^^Vladimir Socor, "Moldovan President Support Ukraine's stand in the CIS ", 
RFE/RL Daily Report ., 1 December, 1992. 



23 



IV. THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT AND FORMATION OF FOREIGN 
POLICY 

A. NATIONAL INTEREST 

In the Soviet period, foreign policy of the Soviet Union was steered by 
Communist ideology. With the loss of this ideology, the Russian government 
needs to find a replacement; national interest seems a logical choice. Therefor, 
Russia's first priority in formulating a foreign policy is to determine her national 
interest. While this may sound rather simple, there is no consensus as to what 
the national interest of Russia is, or should be. 

The term national interest creates its own problems for the Russian 
government. Before you can determine the interest of a nation, the nation must 
be defined. A general definition of a nation is a grouping of people who 
consider themselves as being linked to one anther is some manner. This could 
be culturally, ethnically, or linguistically.^^" But, in Russia, there is a problem with 
defining the Russian nation. There are those like Alexander Solzhenitsyn who 



■'-Daniel S. Papp, Contemporary International Relations, 3rd ed. (New York: 
MacMillan, 1991), 27. 



24 



would include Ukrainians and Byelorussians as Russian." But Ukrainians and 
Byelorussians consider themselves to be separate and independent nations, with 
separate and independent national interests. They also have no interest in being 
part of the Russian state or in being considered part of the Russian nation. 

While defining who is actually a Russian may seem somewhat unimportant, 
it plays a vital role in Russia's relationships. One of few statements of national 
interest and foreign policy to come from the Russian Foreign Ministry is that 
Russia will protect Russian nationals, and Russian speaking people, in other parts 
of the world. In Moldova, the 14th Army is using the excuse oi protecting 
Ukrainian who are Russian speakers as well as Russian as justification for 
remaining in Moldova. "^ While this may just be a political excuse for the troops 
ongoing involvement in the fighting, it also shows that the Russian nation has 
yet to be defined, and the definition could play a critical role in Russia relations. 
By not condemning the 14th Army's renegade activity, Russian government 
seems to be nidicating tacit approval of a broader definition of 'being Russian ". 



''•'In his book Rebuilding Russia, Reflections and Tentative Reforms, 
Solzhenitsyn makes the statement "All the talk of a Separate Ukrainian people 
existing since something like the ninth century and possessing its own non- 
Russian language is a recently invented falsehood." Statements like this indicate 
a particular difficulty in defining the Russian nation, not to mention the Russian 
state. 

''"^Suzanne Crow, "Russian Moderates Walk a Tightrope on Moldova ", RFE/RL 
Research Report, Vol 1, No. 20, 15 May 1992, p 10-11. 



25 



Russia is attempting to determine it's national interest like any state would, 
through internal governmental debate which takes history and culture into 
consideration. The problems they face include the change in geographic size, 
political orientation, the rising nationalities problem, the reduced world stature, 
and reduced military strength which was the primary mstrument used to protect 
national interest in the past. The debate on national interest has been underway 
in the Russian Parliament since early 1992. 

Russian President Bois Yeltsin has stated "Like everyone [the Russian 
people] are interested in concrete guarantees of the rights and freedoms of 
citizens and human beings in accordance with international rules."'''' In more 
specific terms, Yeltsin says there is a need to develop better relations with 
western countries while having good relations with the other members of the 
Commonwealth. 

Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev has stated that national interest should be 
dealt with on a situational basis rather than by formulating abstract concepts. 
Kozyrev also is a proponent of bringing the Russian people into the national 
interest debate. He has called for "a need to form an enlightened public opinion" 
in order to help the parliament with the current debate on national interest. 



"(6 



"ITAR-TASS, 17 June 1992, as reported in "Russia Debates Its National 
Interests", Suzanne Crow, RFE/RL Research Report, Vo 1, 10 July 1992, Num 28: 
p 43. 

^''Nezavisimaya gazeta, 1 April 1992, as reported in Crow, "Russia Debates ..." 
p44. 



26 



This struggle to identify Russian national interest will be a long and 
difficult one. It is obvious that Russia cannot wait until its national interests are 
clearly defined before making foreign policy decision. By the same token, we 
in the West should expect some changes in Russian policy as national identity 
and interests become more clearly defined in the country. 

B. RUSSIA'S FOREIGN POLICY 

The breakup of the Soviet Union has forced Moscow to re-evaluate its 

position in the world. Russia is no longer a super power, but is it still a great 

power, and if not, should it strive to be? According to Yeltsm, 

Russia is rightfully a great power by virtue of its history, of its place in the 
world, and of its material and spiritual potential." (Bois Yeltsin at the Sixth 
Session of the Congress of People's Deputies) He also said that the "work 
to strengthen international position ... by no means amounts to an attempt 
to usurp the role of superpower that once claimed to decide the world's 
fate. '' 

Russia is the largest country in world in land area and sixth largest in 

population. It still has nuclear weapons. Russia is blessed with an abundance 

of key natural resources such as oil, gold, and timber which are needed on the 

international market. On all of these counts and still more Russia is a great 

power, but how does that fit in with its new place in the world and how does 

it effect its relations with the other countries of the world? 



37, 



Suzanne Crow, "Yeltsin on Foreign Policy", FBIS Daily Report, 8 April 1992. 



27 



Russia is no longer a premier European power, controlling the East bloc 
with an iron fist and secure in geographic separation from its enemies. Russia 
is now trvmg to integrate into a European community it is geographically 
separated from. And Russia now has borders with eight new countries, some of 
which view Russia as hostile to their sovereignty. In the past the borders around 
the Soviet Union were closed and closely guarded. Now, mainly due to econom- 
ic considerations, the leadership must attempt to develop borders which are 
"transparent" and "penetrable" with the former Union republics. These new 
states and border also physically separate Russia from Western Europe which 
reduces her role in European affairs.^* 

The Theses for the Report of the Foreign and Defense Policy Council 
(FDPC) in Russia released in August 1992 recognizes that "A reduced resource, 
power, and geo-political base in defense and foreign policy drastically curtails 
possibilities of influencing the outside world and all other countries."^" This is 
a major discovery for the state which claims successor rights to a country whose 
leaders previous controlled a major portion of the globe. 



-^*^Sergei Rakovsky, "New Neighbors, New Problems", New Times, August 
1992, p 19. 

'^"Report: "Some Theses for the Report of the Foreign and Defense Policy 
Council", Nezavisimaya Gazeta, in Russian 19 August 1992, p 4,5 as reported in 
"Document Presents Theses of Council", FBIS-USR-92-115, 8 September 1992, p 
55. 



28 



d 



Current policy in Russia is driven by domestic necessity more than anything 
else. Internal economic reforms must come about if the present government 
hopes to remain in power. These reforms dictate, in many ways, the tone of 
Russia's foreign policy. But as German Diligenski, a political scientist puts it 
"[Russian] Foreign policy has become hostage to domestic policy, this is merely 
a temporary retreat not a surrender ...."■"' 

Foreign policy in Russia is driven not just by her relations with the states 
of the former Union, but also by a need to develop new, non-confrontational 
relations with the West. The major foreign policy discussion in Russia these days 
is more likely to be whether to put emphasis on relations with the West or the 
Near Abroad vice how to deal with specific problems in either region. 

In early 1992, because of domestic economic requirements, primary foreign 

policy emphasis seemed to be on developing relations with the West. Russian 

Foreign Minister Kozyrev defended this policy by saying 

The most important thing was to prevent Russia form dropping out of 
international relations as a result of the disintegration of the USSR, and that 
was a real danger. We know from Soviet Russia's experience after 1917 
how this could have happened.^' 



■^^^German Diligenski, "Russia Lives Cheerfully from Session to Session...", 
Literaturnaya Gazeta, 23 Sep 92, p 1-2, as reported in "Opposition Attacks on 
Foreign Policy Noted", FBIS-USR-92-128, 7 October -^92, p 58-59. 

""Andrei Kozyrev, "Soyuz ostavil Rossii plokhoe vneshne-politicheskoe 
nasledstvo" [The Union Left Russia a Bad Foreign Policy Legacy], Nezavisimaya 
Gazeta, 1 April 1992 as reported in Suzanne Crow, "Russia's Relations with 
Members of the Commonwealth" RFE/RL Research Report, Vol 1, 8 May 1992, 
Num 19: p 9. 



29 



The above could easily lead one to the conclusion that Kozyrev does not view 
relations with the countries of the former USSR as "International" relations. 

Russia is dependent on good relations with the West to insure it gets the 
needed aid. An improvement in her relations with her new neighbors, while 
essential for national security, offers little in the way of substantial return.'*- This 
is not to sav that Russia can neglect relations with the Near Abroad. While posi- 
tive relations may not appear to help Russia, negative relations could seriously 
affect not just foreign aid but international position and prestige. The Russian 
government seemed to come to this realization quickly. By late spring they 
began to try and develop improved relations with the former republics. This was 
also an effort to clear up disputes over Soviet assets and debt. Given all these 
problems, the current government of Russia is pursuing a two track foreign 
policv program -- one for the Near Abroad and one for the rest of the world. 

C POLICY TOWARD THE NEAR ABROAD 

The goal of Russian policy toward what it calls the Near Abroad has been 
under question since the break-up of the Soviet Union. Is the Russian govern- 
ment trying to maintain control over these countries through the CIS? How will 
it deal with the economic and military issues which currently tie these nations 



^-Suzanne Crow, "Russian Federations Faces Foreign Policy Dilemmas", 
RFE/RL Research Report , Vol I, 6 March 1992, Num 10: p 15. 



30 



together? Can it, or will it, treat these former "repubUcs" as independent 
sovereign countries? 

In February, Kozyrev said that while Russia respected the sovereignty of the 
newly-formed states, Russia would strictly defend its own interests. (Recall that 
Russia's interests are still in a state of flux as described in Section A of this 
chapter.) He then went on to define Russian interests as including not only 
economic ties but preservation of "a unified army, ... and the protection of the 
Russian and the Russian speaking population in other CIS states."^-' 

Ednan Agayev, advisor to the Minster of Foreign Affairs of the Russian 
Federation said, "It is in the interest of Russia to create truly mutually beneficial 
relations with all the states now belonging to the CIS and not to permit their 
deterioration. "" Additionally, in the report of the Foreign and Defense Policy 
Council (FDCP) a statement noted that "It is quite obvious that the main 
challenges to Russia's security are generated within the country, on the territory 
of the former USSR.""*^ This again points to an inclusion of all the territory of the 
former USSR as part of Russia's "country". 



'Tbid p 19. 

"""National Interests, Priorities in Foreign Policy Viewed" (text), Moskovskiye 
Novosti, in Russian, 3 May 1992, trans, by FBIS, FBIS Daily Report, (FBIS-USR-92- 
083, 3 July 1992), p 1-2. 

^^"Document Presents ..." p 55. 



31 



Moscow first attempted to deal with Russian concerns by trying to 
formulate a CIS structure which gave her pre-eminence. The Russian govern- 
ment quicklv realized that the other countries involved in the CIS, most notably 
Ukraine, were unwilling to join an organization with Russia in the prime 
leadership role. Ukraine insisted on amendments which would guarantee 
territorial integrity should they decide to leave the organization. It was only 
because oi the "looseness" of the organization that Armenia, Moldova, and 
Azerbaijan decided to join.^" 

The military structure of the Commonwealth is another area where the 
interests of Russia seem to be in conflict with many of the other countries. There 
was a perceived fear in the non-Russian republics that a "united Commonwealth 
armed forces" would be nothing more than a restructured Russian Army.^^ Some 
countries' refusal to participate in the military structure of the CIS limited its 
strength even more. 

As Moscow began to realize that it would not be able to meet its foreign 
policy goals via the watered down structure of the CIS, it started to emphasize 
bilateral ties with the countries of the Near Abroad, both those in and outside the 
CIS. In April, Foreign Minister Kozyrev made a tour to some of the countries in 



^*'Ann Sheehy, "Commonwealth of Independent States: An Uneasy Compro- 
mise", RFE/RL Research Report, Vol 1, 10 January 1992, Num 2: p 2. 

"•"Andrei Kortunov, Strategic Relations Between The Former S oviet Republics, 
(The Heritage Foundation, Washington D.C.), 18 April, 1992. 



32 



the CIS most strongly opposed to the unified armed forces. He also visited 
Georgia, which is not even a member of the Commonwealth."'^ 

Kozvrev's trip started the day after his statement that Russia would protect 
the interests of Russians in other states. His first stops were in Georgia, 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Moldova, all areas of open conflict. During this trip 
Kozyrev proposed Russian mediation of the Azeri-Armenian conflict in Nagorno- 
Karabakh and use of the 14th Army as a peacekeeping force in Moldova. ^"^ (This 
was just after it was resubordinated from CIS to Russian control.) 

In July, the Russian Security Council recommended establishing a new 
ministry to deal strictly with CIS affairs. Sergei Stankevich, an advocate of the 
new ministry claimed that "the CIS calls for a special and independent sphere of 
Russian foreign policy." Opponents claimed that the new ministry would 
suggest that Russia viewed these countries as different than the rest of the world, 
as second-class countries, less sovereign than other countries."" Even though the 



"*^It should be noted that Ukraine, the country Russia was having the most 
trouble with, was not on Kozyrev's itinerary. This was the time of some oi the 
greatest stress in Russian-Ukrainian relations. Kozyrev was no doubt trying to 
make the appearance of unity with the other countries despite problems with 
Ukraine. This was no doubt an effort to show that Russia was still the leader of 
the countries of the former Union. While Russia made have been having prob- 
lems with Ukraine it still was the greatest power in the region and had the 
support of the other countries. 



"'''Suzanne Crow, "Russia's Relations .." p 10. 

"^'^Suzanne Crow, "Russia Prepares to Take a Hard Line On 'Near Abroad' 
RFE/RL Research Report, Vol 1, 4 August 1992, Num 32: p 21-32. 



33 



new ministry was never created, the disagreement about its creation is 
symptomatic of the ongoing debate about the overall direction of Russian policy 
toward the "Near Abroad" taking place in the Russian foreign policy bureaucracy. 

The FDPC report also recommend Russia take an "enlightened post-imperial 
course" in regard to the "countries on the territory of the former USSR". The 
report points out that historically the state building process has been accom- 
panied by a series of wars and says "the main task of Russian security strategy 
will be ... to settle conflicts on the territory of the former USSR." The goal of this 
policy, according to the report, is to avoid wars and conflicts and control the 
transformation of the former USSR to include "the reintegration of a substantial 
portion of the former USSR..."."^ 

The future of Russia's policy toward the Near Abroad seems to be headed 
awav from the moderate position advocated by Kozyrev and headed toward a 
more hard line position. The power of the Foreign Ministry is being diluted by 
the attempts of Russian Security Council and the FDPC to influence foreign 
policy. Both of these organizations are gaining an increasingly important role in 
the foreign policy arena. The increasing power of the National Patriotic Forces 
in the Russian government seems to guarantee more conservative policies in all 
areas. This is especially true in foreign relations and even more so in relations, 



Mn 



Document Present Thesis ..." FBIS-USR-92-115 p 58-62. 



34 



whether defined as foreign or domestic, with the countries of the former Soviet 
Union. 



35 



V. THE DNIESTER CONFLICT 

A. DEFINING THE RELATIONSHIP 

The relationship between the Russian government and the Moldovan 
government has several facets, but it generally revolves around the conflict in the 
Dniester region of Moldova. The Dniester region is an area of land on the East 
Bank of the Dniester River whose government is rebelling against the elected 
Moldovan government of President Snegur. 

The people in the Dniester region, although they call themselves Moldavian, 
do not share the Romanian historical culture with the rest of the country. They 
have Slavic, Russian and/or Ukrainian roots. The Moldovans on the east bank 
generally do not speak Moldovan. It can also be said that a great many of the 
Ukrainians on the left bank do not speak Ukrainian. The Russian speaking 
majority in the major cities on the east bank is almost 50% Ukrainian.'- 

The current government in what they call the Dniester Republic is 
comprised mostly of the people who controlled the Moldavian SSR under the 
Soviet regime. It is comprised from the remnants of the communist party in 
Moldova. The communist party in present day Moldova is virtually non-existent, 
not for political reasons, but rather because no one west of the Dniester supports 



"^-Nahaylo, "Ukraine and Moldova . . ." p 4T 

36 



it. It was declared illegal after the communist government in the Dniester voiced 
strong support for the August 1991 coup in the Soviet Union. This was mostly 
just an administrative move. Its only proponents are those on the east bank. 
These people are some of the most hard core communists anywhere. How hard 
core are these people? "... there are two strongholds of socialism left in the world 
~ Cuba and the Dniester area.'"' There are some questions whether those in the 
Dniester area are really that strongly communist or if they are using communism 
as a cover for their Russian nationalism. 

Of roughly 750,000 people in the Transdniester, \7% of the population of 
Moldova, the population is approximately 56% Slavic""*, split about equally 
between Russian and Ukrainian. Moldovans are still in the majority, but, as 
explained earlier, this statistic is misleading because many of these people who 
call themselves Moldovan are ancestral Russian or Ukrainian. These people on 
the east bank are the people who suffered the most under the three years oi 
Romanian leadership of Moldavia (1941-1944). They are very fearful of what 
would happen to them if Moldova unites with Romania. 

The area east of the Dniester River is also the industrial heart of Moldova. 
The region, in the typical Soviet fashion of centralized control and production, 



''Tgor Rotar, "There are Two Socialist Strongholds in the World: Cuba and the 
Dniester Area. The Political Situation in Moldova Remains Explosive." 
Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 6 June 91, p 3, as translated and reprinted in "Political 
Unrest Divides Republic", FBIS-USR-91-015, 19 July 1991, p 57. 

''Ibid, p 58. 



37 



produces 34 "^^^ of the vegetables, 33% of the industrial products, and 56% of the 
consumer products. It also contains the power plant, major transportation links 
and major means of transporting energy/^ Finally, it is home to the 14th Army 
of the Russian military. 

The conflict in the region originated as a result of non-Moldovans' fear that 
Moldova would unify with Romanian. Given the history of violent conflict 
between Russians and Romanians in the region the Russians felt there was an 
excellent chance they would be oppressed under Romanian rule.''" The conflict 
between the rebels and the Moldovan government escalated in August 1991 
when the leaders of the Dniester region supported those attempting the coup in 
the Soviet Union. Sporadically throughout 1992, armed conflict was waged 
between the Russian supported rebels and the Moldovan government. It is 
through this conflict that the tone of Russian-Moldovan relations has been set. 

The leadership of the Dniester Republic had hoped to get help in their 
uprising from the hard-liners in the Soviet government. With the failed coup in 
1991, and the rise of a more moderate Yeltsin government their uprising 



'Tbid, p 58. 

'*'In an interview in an Ukrainian newspaper in May 1992 Snegur said that 
the Dniester separatism was conceived by the Kremlin. He stated that when 
Moldova refused to sign the Union treaty Gorbachev said Moldova will never be 
able to solve its problems with the Dniester and Gagauz Republics. Uilnu 
Ukrayinu, in Ukrainian, 2 May, 1992 as reported in "Snegur Interviewed on 
Dniester Conflict", FBIS Daily Report, Central Eurasia, FBIS-USR-92-073, 17 June 
1992, p 67-71. 



38 



appeared in trouble. In fact, it was after the failed coup that the leaders of a 
similar stvie conflict in the Gagauz region of Moldova reached agreement with 
the Moldovan government on terms for resolution of their uprising. They did 
seeminglv find friends in the Yeltsin government however, and the conflict 
intensified."'^ The relationship between Moldova and Russia in this matter 
developed along three major axes; Russian support for the insurgents, the role 
of the 14th Army in the uprising, and the peace process. 

B. RUSSIAN SUPPORT FOR THE INSURGENTS 

The Moldovan government strongly believes the insurgency is getting the 
full support of the Russian government.'''' The Russian government officially 
denied sending mercenaries to Moldova in April 1992.'''' At the same time, it 
reaffirmed Russia's right to protect "the rights of Russians in other states of the 
[CIS] ... using powerful methods if needed.""" While this may not have been a 
statem^ent of support, it did nothing to ease the tensions in the region. Throug- 



"A complete review of the Dniester problem would be a paper in and of 
itself. For information on the details of the early part of the conflict itself I 
recommend "Creeping Putsch in Eastern Moldova", RFE/RL Research Report, Vol 
1, 17 January 1992, Num 3. 

'''^See Moldovan President Snegur's comments in footnote 54. 

"''Suzanne Crow, "Russia Denies it sent Mercenaries to Moldova", FBIS Daily 
Report, 15 April 1992. 

"'^Andrea Kozyrev in Nezavisimaya gazeta, as reported by Suzanne Crow, 
"Russia will protect the rights of Russians" FBIS Daily Report, 2 April 1992. 



39 



hout the spring and summer President Snegur called for official Russian 
government pressure on the Dniester authorities, but none was forthcoming. 
Despite Russia's denial of sending mercenaries, large numbers of Cossacks and 
other former Soviet military personnel were reported in the Dniester region and 
other Russian mercenaries headed from Russia to Moldova had been 
apprehended by Ukrainian authorities. Additionally, the Russian government 
has officially granted the Dniester republic several billion rubles in aid and 
quantities of materials and foodstuffs throughout 1992 despite shortages at home. 
Russian involvement in the Dniester region was widely debated both in and 
out of government circles. The view of the hard-liners was expressed by Russian 
Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoi. Rutskoi stressed the independent existence 
of the Dniester republic, and recommended the Russian Congress vote to support 
the population on the left bank, which it did on 8 April 1992. The view of the 
moderates was set forth by Foreign Minister Kozyrev who called for Moldova's 
territorial integrity, and agreed to meetings with Moldova, Romanian, Ukraine 
and Russia to try and solve the situation. Both moderates and hard-liners did 
agree that the 14th Army should be used as a peacekeeping force in the region, 
something no one else approved of. 



61 



"'Suzanne Crow, "Russian Moderates Walk a Tightrope on Moldova", RFE/RL 
Research Report, Vol 1 15 May 1992, Num 20: p 11. 



40 



While Russia is giving no overt military aid to the Dniester insurgents, there 

is a report in an August issue of the Moscow journal Sobesedinik which describes 

aid to the region. 

... Aid is being given behind the scenes. Employees of Russia's Ministry of 
Internal Affairs are serving in the Dniester Battalion, the OMON's equiv- 
alent in the Dniester republic. The Russian government pretends not to see 
when Russian factories sell to Tiraspol firearms and military vehicles 
written off as part of conversion. The Dniester banks are connected to the 
outside through accounts in the Russian Central Bank. Volunteers from 
Russia and not only Cossacks are fighting in various armed formations [of 
the "Dniester" forces] without the Russian procuracy charging them with 
crimes."" 

Even if Russia, as they claim, has not been providing direct military aid to 

the insurgency, they have been resupplying the 14th Army, which has apparently 

been supplying the insurgents. The Russians have undeniably provided moral 

and political support to the insurgents. Russia's unwillingness to apply pressure 

on the insurgents, her continued calls for use of the Russian army as a 

peacekeeping force, and statements by Russian government official all provide 

support for the insurgents. Foreign Minister Kozyrev, who had previously 

supported a moderate view, when asked in June about potential outcomes for the 

region said he would not rule out the Dniester area some day becoming a part 

of Russia."- 



""Vladimir Socor, "Russian aid to "Dniester" Insurgency Described", FBIS Daily 
Report, 4 September 1992. 

^"^Vladimir Socor, "Kozyrev's Territorial Claims Protested By Moldova ' FIBS 
Daily Report, 16 June 1992. 



41 



C THE ROLE OF THE 14TH ARMY IN THE INSURGENCY 

The fact that the 14th Army has an important role in the conflict in the 
Dniester is beyond question. There are those who claim that the insurgency in 
the area would have been inconceivable without the support of the 14th Army.'^ 
The question remains: is the 14th Army, in their support of the government of 
the Dniester region, acting with the advice and consent of the Russian govern- 
ment? 

Since the beginning oi the independent government of Moldova, the 14th 
Army has been politically and militarily in opposition to it. As early as 
December 1991 the commanding general of the 14th Army, Lieutenant General 
Gennadii Yakovlev, accepted the position of Chief of Defense for the "Dniester 
Republic" and placed 14th Army troops and equipment at the disposal of that 
government."' This was at least partially in response to the Moldovan governm- 
ent's attempts to reduce the privileged status and preferential treatment the 
military had received under the communists. The 14th Army leadership, along 
with the rest of the leadership of the Dniester region, supported the August 1991 
coup attempt. In addition to being against the government of Moldova, the 14th 
Army leadership has had disagreement with the Yeltsin government. It is the 



^Vladimir Socor, "Russia's Fourteenth Army and the Insurgency in Eastern 
Moldova", RFE/RL Research Report, Vol 1, 11 September 1992, Num 36: p 41. 

"^Vladimir Socor, 'Creeping Putsch in Eastern Moldova", RFE/RL Research 
Report, Vol 1, 17 January 1992, Num 3: p 9. 



42 



armv leadership's somewhat antagonistic attitude for the moderate pohcies of the 
Yeltsin government that bring into question whether the army's actions are 
sanctioned bv the Russian government. 

In April 1^92, Russian President Bois Yeltsin placed the 14th Army under 
Russian jurisdiction rather than under CIS jurisdiction in an effort to trv ana 
regain control over the unraveling military situation in the region."" Yeltsin 
replaced Gen. Yakovlev with Major General Aleksandr Lebed in June in a further 
effort to maintain control. However, Gen. Lebed has been even more outspoken 
that Gen. Yakovlev in opposition to most of Yeltsin's democratization policies 
since being appointed. There are reports that Lebed's appointment was pushed 
through channels by the Russian Security Council, against Yeltsin's wishes. ''' 

Lebed has done nothing to calm the situation, and many of his comments 
have even aggravated it. In July, he was outspokenlv critical of Yeltsin's policies 
toward Moldova and claimed Moldovan President Snegur was "negotiating with 
Yeltsin only in order to mislead public opinion, while in reality preparing for 
war."*''' Lebed has been warned against making political statements on a 
recurring basis since his appointment but he has slowed his rhetoric little. In late 



'"Celestine Bohlen, "Russian Takes Over Command of Army in Moldova", NY 
Times, April 2 1992, p A 7. 

"■ Alexander Rahr, "The Power of the Russian Security Council" RFE/RL Daily 
Report , 5 August 1992. 

^''^Bohdan Nahaylo, "National Ferment In Moldavia", Radio Liberty Research 
Report, Vol 32, 24 January 1988: p 4. 



43 



August Gen. Lebed was again reprimanded for his attacks on the elected 
Moldovan government, claiming that it was fascist and criminal. According to 
reports he was told this type of comment undermines Yeltsin's policy and fuels 
"an explosive situation" in the area.*''' 

14th Army military support for the insurgency is one of the more 
complicated issues in the area. Originally, when Moldova did not join the 
militarv structure of the CIS, Snegur called for all of the former Soviet military 
forces and equipment in the country to be transferred to Moldova. In March, 
after negotiations with the CIS, Moldova was given control of non-strategic forces 
on the right side of the Dniester, but the forces on the left bank were left for 
future negotiations.'" These future negotiations with the CIS were never held 
because Moscow took control of the major forces on the left bank, the 14th Army, 
in April. 

There is no official Russian documentation showing any arms transfers from 
the 14th Army to the Dniester rebels, however it is almost inconceivable that a 
government which did not previously exist could arm its troops with tanks, 
APCs, and mortars in addition to small arms and heavy machine guns so quickly 
without help. President Yeltsin denied that the 14th Army was giving equipment 



"^Vladimir Socor, "Lebed Again Cautioned Against Political Statements", 
RFE/RL Daily Report, 1 September 1992. 

^°Vladimir Socor, "Russian Forces in Moldova", RFE/RL Research Report, Vol 
1, 28 August 1992, Num 34: p 39. 



44 



to the insurgents but he did admit "Unquestionably, there are supporters of the 
Dniester region among the 14th Army's officer corps, and they are beginning to 
switch over, sometimes with equipment, to the side of the Dniester people.""' 

Vloldo va's Ministry of National Security released data showing that the 14th 
Army was being resupplied with types and quantities of equipment which seem 
to reflect the losses in battle of the insurgent forces. This resupply of equipment 
is even more interesting when taken in conjunction with the 14th Army's 
manning status. According to sources in Russia's Ministry of Defense and in the 
CIS, referring to the 14th Army, "Its armament and [armored] vehicles are those 
of a full-fledged army, ... its officers and NCOs would barely suffice for a regular 
motorized rifle division."- The plan had been for the forces to be augmented by 
the large number of military retirees living on the left bank. 

Despite the standing claim of the Russian government that the 14th Armv 
is a neutral force there have been reports from Russian Defense Vlinistry 
spokesmen, Yeltsin's advisor on nationalities, and Sergei Stankevich that units of 
the 14th Army have participated in the fighting. These reports are often 
minimized by accompanying statements that the actions were in self-defence, or 



interview with Yeltsin in Komsomolskaya pravda, 27 May 1992, as cited in 
Vladimir Socor, "Russia's 14th Army ...", p 45. 

''' Izvestiya, 29 May 1992, as cited by Socor "Russian Forces ..." p 40. 



45 



unauthorized, or actions of individual units. No disciplinary action has been 
taken against any officer of the army because of these unauthorized activities/'' 
There is some question as to how much control the government in Moscow 
has over the 14th Army. The army appears to be supporting the Dniester 
Republic government in every possible way, providing equipment and men 
where needed. They are allowing those who are leaving the armv to join the 
official Dniester Republican Guard to take their weapons, large and small, with 
them. The leadership of the army is actively supportive of the insurgent 
government and actively antagonistic toward the elected government of 
Moldova. There are those who would say it has, in all but name, become the 
Dniester Republican Guard. 

D. THE DNIESTER PEACE PROCESS 

The majority of the diplomatic relations between Russia and Moldova in the 
past several months have revolved around finding a peaceful solution to the 
Dniester problem. Both governments have made peace in the region a major 
policy objective. The original proposal was for a quadripartite, Russian- 
Ukrainian-Moldovan-Romanian, organization to look at the problem, but quickly 
Russia decided they were only interested in bipartite, Russian-Moldovan talks. "' 



^''Socor "Russia's 14th Army ..." p 47. 

^"'Bohdan Nahaylo "Russia Seeking to Keep Ukraine and Romania out of 
Negotiations on Moldovan Conflict" RFE/RL Daily Report, 3 June 1992. 



46 



There have been a series of agreements between the two proclaiming cease- 
fires and attempting to estabhsh peacekeeping forces. A major stumbhng block 
is the composition of the peacekeeping forces. Moldova prefers that the 
peacekeeping force be made up of CIS, CSCE or UN troops, Russia insists that 
the peacekeepers be Russian troops. If not the 14th Army, which is unacceptable 
to everyone except Russia and the Dniester government, then other Russian 
troops should be brought in. Ultimately, this is what happened. Moldova agreed 
to allow additional Russian troops in the country as peacekeepers in a desperate 
effort to end the fighting. The Russians were the Moldovan's last choice but 
neither the UN nor CSCE were willing to send troop while the fighting was 
ongoing. ^^ 

In July, the first peacemaking forces comprised of 3,800 Russian, 1,200 
Moldovan, and 1,200 "Dniester" troops began to take up positions in the conflict 
zone.'*' However, only 3 days later. President Snegur was calling for UN 
observers because of "profound concern and raising doubts about the other side's 
sincerity." " The peacekeeping force did result in a decline m armed confron- 
tation between Moldovan and Dniesterian forces, but at the same time it allowed 



'"^Suzanne Crow "The theory and Practice of Peacekeeping in the Former 
USSR" RFE/RL Research Report. Vol 1, 18 September 1992, Num 37: p 35. 

"Crow "The Theory ..." p 35. and Vladimir Socor, "Peacemaking Forces De- 
ployed in Moldova" RFE/RL Daily Report, Vol 1, 30 July 1992, Num 30. 

^Vladimir Socor "Moldovan President appeals to UN", RFE/RL Daily Report , 
3 August 1992. 



47 



the Dniester government to consolidate its governmental power and create 
official government ministries. Moldova has continuously registered complaints 
with the Russian government about the actions of the Dniester government under 
the protection of the peacekeepers but the protests have fallen on deaf ears. 

Russian officials say that the peacekeeping effort in Moldova falls under the 
auspices of a CIS force despite the fact that no CIS peacekeeping force exists. 
Additionallv, the forces seem to ignore basic principles established in the CIS 
peacekeeping guidelines agreed to in March 1992. These guidelines dictate forces 
will not be introduced into areas were there is active conflict and the states 
contributing the forces should not represent states involved in the conflict.'^ 

E. TALKS ON WITHDRAWAL OF RUSSIAN TROOPS 

Russia's activities in the Dniester peacekeeping process seem to indicate a 
country which is unwilling to give up her hope for empire and is willing to use 
any excuse to place and keep troops in the former republics. Moldova's efforts 
to negotiate the withdrawal of Russian troops from her soil have suffered a set 
back because of her unwillingness to bow to Russian demands. Now, not only 
is the 14th Army in place, but 3,800 additional Russian troops have been brought 
in as peacekeepers. Russia has used the peacekeeping process to increase her 
hold on Moldova and is stifling Moldova's efforts to internationalize the 



-Crow "The Theory ..." p 36. 



48 



peacekeeping process. Additionally, Russia is linking the issue of troop 
withdrawal to Moldova's participation in the CIS structure. 

During the round of talks on the future of Russian troops in Moldova held 
in August, Russia's position was that the troops were needed for defense of areas 
of the former USSR as long as there was no formal agreement on the prospect of 
military cooperation between the two states. This ties the issue of Russian troops 
directly to Moldova's unwillingness to be a part of the military structure of the 
CIS. Additionally, the Russians have called for a disbanding, rather than a 
withdrawal, of troops. This would allow the troops mustered out of the Russian 
Army not to be transferred back to Russia but to stay in the area and join the 
Dniester forces if they choose. This latest disagreement has stalled the bilateral 
talks and Russia is unwilling to support moderation by any other countrv or 
organization insisting this issue is solely between Russian and Moldova. "'' 



"^Vladimir Socor, " Moldova Facing Russian Pressure", RFE/RL Research 
Report, Vol 1, 15 December 1992, Num 52. 



49 



VI. THE EFFECTS OF RUSSIA ON MOLDOVA'S OTHER 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

A. EFFECTS ON RELATIONS WITH ROMANIA 

Despite their shared heritage, Moldova seems to have made an effort to put 
distance between herself and Romania. This is in part due to Moldova's wish for 
an independent sovereign state, as discussed in chapter III. It is also in part due 
to Russian pressure on Moldova not to develop close ties with Romania. Russia's 
goal seems to be to keep Moldova from developing overly close ties with 
Romania. As chapter II pointed out, there is great animosity between Romanians 
and Russians, especially in regard to this region. Additionally, Russia wants to 
keep her relations with Moldova strictly between her and Moldova with no 
outside interference. 

In the summer, Russia seemed willing to have Romania, and even Ukraine, 
take part in the talks designed to promote peace in the Dniester area. During the 
initial talks in July, Romania offered to "financially back the withdrawal of the 
14th Army from the republic of Moldova" and to help with the cost of housing 
the displaced soldiers in Russia.*'^ This was not the solution the Russians were 
looking for, even though the expense of moving the troops was one of the 



*°Michael Shafir, "Iliescu: EBRD would back Russian Withdrawal from 
Moldova." RFE/RL Daily Report, 17 July 1992. 



50 



reasons for leaving them in place. Shortly after declining this offer, Russia 
insisted Romania be excluded from any future peace negotiations. 

Moldova still seeks some assistance from Romania in dealing with the 
problems in the Dniester region, as well as in gaining international recognition 
and support. Romania has been Moldova's greatest champion in the internation- 
al arena, constantly trying to focus world attention on Russian activities in the 
Dniester Region. The relationship developing between Romania and Moldova 
in response to the conflict is in some ways beginning to resemble a security 
relationship. **' In fact, Moldova and Rumania signed a bilateral military agree- 
ment in December 1992. The agreement provides for Romanian help to train and 
arm Moldovan forces as well as promoting cultural and scientific contacts 
between the two countries' armed forces.^" 

Romanian Foreign Minister Adrian Nastase has said that Romania will 
strive to keep Moldova in its sphere of influence if unification does not happen. 
However, in October 1992, Secretary of State at the Romanian Foreign Affairs 
Ministry told corespondents that formal Moldovan entry into the CIS would 
make it very difficult to maintain the type of relationship that Bucharest hoped 



S3 



^^^Vladimir Socor, "Moldovan-Romanian Relations ..." p 42. 

^-Dan lonescu, "Romania, Moldova Sign Military Agreement ", RFE/RL Daily 
Report, 16 December 1992. 

""^Vladimir Socor, "Romanian foreign Minister On 'Lack of Signals' from 
Moldova", RFE/RL Daily Report, 15 September 1992. 



51 



would result from the existence of "two independent Romanian-speaking states".** 
Russia's insistence that Moldova increase involvement m the CIS before any 
substantive troop withdrawal talks take place is an attempt to isolate Moldova 
from her neighbor and natural supporter, Romania. 

B. EFFECTS ON RELATIONS WITH UKRAINE 

Initial Ukrainian reaction to the problems in Moldova was one which 
showed a lack of concern. Moldova had advanced some claims against 
Ukrainian territory which did cause some concern in Ukraine but little was done 
about the issue. Despite the large number of Ukrainians at risk in the Dniester 
region Ukraine did not take a strong stance on either side. Until Ukraine had 
stabilized its own situation it could not afford to offend Russia to any great 
extent because of the large number of Russian troops still in Ukraine. Ukraine 
was already involved in a number of disputes with Russia and had to deal with 
the secessionist movement in the Crimea. These issues occupied most of the time 
of the fledgling Ukrainian government. It didn't have time for Moldova's 
problems, problems which only effected it indirectly. 

However, by March, the situation in the Dniester republic began to draw 
serious attention from Ukraine. Russian troops and mercenaries were traversing 
Ukraine to get to access the conflict. The 14th Army was using the excuse of 



**Michael Shafir, "Romanian Official on Relations with Moldova.", RFE/RL 
Daily Report, October 14, 1992. 



52 



defending the rights of Ukrainians in the region as justification for their actions. 
Ukraine began to issue statements condemning Russian activity in the Dniester 
region. Thev also reserved the right to take actions to protect Ukrainians in the 
area."'" Despite Russia's wish to keep the problem in the Dniester between her 
and Moldova, Ukraine offered to act as a moderator in the peace talks. It was 
one of the group of four countries Russia originally agreed to allow to participate 
in the peace process, but was later excluded. 

As Ukrainian officials talked to the Ukrainians in the Dniester, they found 
these people would be willing to live under Moldovan rule. Since the develop- 
ment of the "two state" policy between Romania and Moldova, the Ukrainians in 
the Dniester had more trouble with the Russians than with the Moldovans. 
There are even Radio Kiev reports that Ukrainians in the Dniester region have 
claimed that the tension there was "artificially" created and that the Ukrainians 
are being used by "outside forces" in a struggle to obstruct "Moldova's national 
revival and the establishment of its independence".'**' 

Despite earlier troubled times over the treatment of Ukrainians in the 
Dniester region, the relationship between Moldova and Ukraine has developed 
as one between two equals. In October, the presidents of the two countries 
signed a "treaty of good neighborliness, friendship and cooperation." This treaty 



*"Nahaylo, "Moldovan conflict ..." p 2-3. 

^''Radio Kiev, 31 March 1992, as reported by Bohdan Nahaylo, "Ukraine and 
Moldova ... ", p 45. 



53 



included agreements for transit routes for trade, observance of the rights of 
Moldovans in Ukraine and Ukrainians in Moldova, as well as restrictions on the 
transit of armed groups hostile to one side on the territory of the other. '^" This 
last item is especially important to restrict the resupply of the 14th Army and to 
limit mercenaries crossing Ukraine to fight in Moldova. There was an additional 
agreement to respect the territorial integrity of the two states and not to raise 
territorial issues resulting from the second world war. 

Ukraine's interest in the Dniester conflict goes beyond the surface. Ukraine 
must be careful not to let Russia gain a base for its forces along Ukraine's 
Southwest border. Should Russian-Ukrainian relations sour, the 14th Army 
could cause a major problem for Ukraine if the army remains in Moldova. It 
may be better for Ukraine to stop the 14th Army now, while it is turned toward 
Moldova, rather than wait to see what the future holds. 

Moldov.^ and Ukraine have the potential for strained relations because of 
the possibility of territorial disputes resulting from the creation of the Moldavian 
SSR as explained in chapter II. Additionally, if the government of Moldova were 
to have a restrictive ethnic policy, it would effect Ukraine tremendously because 
Ukrainians are the largest non-Moldovan ethnic group in the country. However, 
differences between the two have been set aside as they united in fighting a 
common enemy - Russia. 



'"Vladimir Socor, "Moldovan-Ukrainian Treaty", RFE/RL Daily Report, 17 
October 1992. 



54 



C RELATIONS WITH THE CIS 

The Russian-Moldovan relationship has had a large impact on Moldova's 
relations with the CIS. As pointed out in Chapter III, Moldova would prefer a 
limited association with the CIS. Snegur's government has attempted to limit its 
involvement with the Commonwealth, especially in the military areas, despite 
pressure from Russia. For example, in April, Ruslan Khasbulatov, Chairman of 
Russia's Parliament, said that Russia's position on Moldova's borders and on the 
Dniester area in general would hinge on whether Moldova remains a member of 
the CIS."" This came only nine months after Russian Soviet Federated Socialist 
Republic (RSFSR) Prime Minister Ivan Silaev told Moldovapres that the RSFSR's 
cooperation with Moldavia "is considerably more successful that is the case with 
other republics" and that Moldavia's nonparticipation in the union treaty will not 
have any ill effects on relations between the two republics. '^'^ 

In June, President Snegur openly identified the differences he perceived in 
the type of CIS Russia wanted and the type Moldova preferred. He said 
Moldova "regarded the CIS as a means for discarding the former Soviet Empire 
in a peaceful and civilized way, Moscow seeks to use the CIS as a new form of 



'^'^Vladimir Socor, "Russian Parliament Chairman Conditions Moldova's 
Territorial Integrity on CIS Membership", RFE/RL Daily Report , 24 April 1992. 

^^Vladimir Socor, "More on Moldavia-RSFSR Agreement ", RFE/RL Daily 
Report, 14 August 1991. 



55 



the USSR ...""'^ Moldova is unwilling to join a strong centrally governed CIS, and 
that is what Russia is trying to create. Russia is using Moldova's economic 
dependence on the countries of the Commonwealth to force concessions on 
military issues. In June, Russia's State Secretary Gennadii Burbulis was cited by 
Reuters as saying Russia was prepared to apply "economic sanctions" to force 
Moldova to recognize the Dniester Republic. "^^ 

In yet another move to get Moldova to increase her involvement in the CIS 
in the summer of 1992, the CIS leadership decided that those countries which 
had not ratified the CIS treaty, most notable Moldova and Azerbaijan, would not 
participate as full members and their status would be decided prior to the 
opening of each meeting. ""- These are just a few of the examples of how the 
Russian-Moldovan relationship has a direct effect on Moldova's relations with the 
CIS in general. 



""Vladimir Socor, "Moldovan President Accuses Moscow of Misuse of CIS", 
RFE/RL Daily Report, 3 June 1992. 

^'Vladimir Socor, "Moldova Under 'Economic Blockade' by Russia", RFE/RL 
Daily Report, 30 June 1992. 

^-Ann Sheehy, "Status of Moldova and Azerbaijan in CIS", RFE/RL Dailv 
Report, 29 June 1992. 



56 



VII. CONCLUSION 

The breakup of the Soviet Union has created many problems for the nascent 
countries. One of the foremost problems is how to develop relations among 
themselves, and with the outside world. Previously, the central government in 
Moscow defined the relationship between the republics and Russia, and even the 
relationship among differing republics. Now these governments, Russia 
included, must learn to deal with each others independent governments. 

In learning how to establish these new relationships each countrv must first 
decide what its goals are, near-term and long-term, and how to meet them. But 
the resulting relationship will be bilateral, each countrv trying to meet its goals 
with little regard for the goals of the other. This is the serious problem which 
is facing the governments of Russia and Moldova as they try to find their place 
in the world. 

Russia's government is dealing with the loss of an empire. Granted there 
are new people in the government but there is still a strong feeling among the 
people of Russia, and much of the leadership that the disintegration of the USSR 
has not been a good thing for Russia herself. Feelings such as this create the call 
for a strong CIS with Russia at the center. This view is expressed by Yurii 



57 



Burtin, a literary critic, "We cannot separate the Russian Republic from the center. 
We look back in history, and the center is somehow ourselves. '"^'^ 

This push for unity from the Russians would seem to be more of a problem 
for the Slavic states, Ukraine and Belarus. However, because Moldova is strongly 
asserting her right to independent government and military structures free from 
"foreign" oppression, Russia is using her as a proving ground in an effort to 
maintain control of foreign policy in the former Soviet Union. ""^ But even within 
the Russian government, there are questions as to what the direction of foreign 
policy should be and if control of the former republics is the best answer for 
Russia. 

Russia is facing the task of determining whether it is still a European 
power, especially now that it has lost control over Eastern Europe and most of 
the European territory of the former USSR. Yeltsin's government has made 
statements which indicate that the overall policy of the government is to remain 
a major player in Europe, possibly with a smaller role at present while 
restructuring its economy. But in order to maintain access to Europe, Russia 



"'Vera Tolz and Elizabeth league, "Russian Intellectuals Adjust to Loss of 
Empire", RFE/RL Research Report, Vol 1, 21 February 1992, N'um 8: p 4. 

^^In April Moldovan Parliament Chairman Alexandru Mosanu was quoted by 
Moldovapres as saying "pro-imperial forces in Moscow had chosen Moldova as 
an example of what can be done to the newly-independent states which take 
their independence seriously." This was just prior to the announcement by 
Khasbulatov that the Russian parliaments position on the Dniester area and the 
inviolability of Moldova's borders hinged on Moldova's involvement in the CIS. 



58 



I. 



must maintain good relations with the countries which now He between Russia 
and the West. 

The only compromises Russia appears to be reaching with the Near Abroad 
are those which are necessitated by requirements for Western aid to stimulate the 
economy. But the economy is not turning around as fast as anyone had hoped. 
This has increased speculation that the reformist policies of the Yeltsin 
government may face ever-growing opposition. 

Russia's somewhat moderate foreign policy stance, developed under Foreign 
Minister Kozyrev, is facing greater and greater challenges from the hard-liners 
in the Russian government. It is this pressure that will be instrumental in 
shaping the policy relationships between Russia and all states, but especially 
those between Russia and the Near Abroad. This pressure many cause Russian 
policy to move in directions counter to those which the other states may hope 
for. 

This change is not just the result of pressure from confirmed hard-liners, 
but is also coming from former moderates, such as Sergei Stankevich, who are 
now taking a much more conservative and Russocentric position. How far to the 
right the policy will shift will be in large part determined by how much power 
Bois Yeltsin can maintain. The battle for political power in Russia is far from 
over. Despite the loss of some of his key ministers during the 1992 Russian 
Congress, Yeltsin has managed to maintain overall control of the government. 



59 



Despite Moldova's slow start in striving for independence, Moldova now 
has a government which is moving very quickly to carve itself a niche in the 
world. President Snegur's government has established working foreign relations 
with many states of the West as well as states of the former Soviet Union. The 
internal problems of the state, with the exception of the Dniester region, are 
being managed effectivelv. The Moldovan government has established a sound 
domestic policy, most notably with regard to foreign nationals, which is one of 
the most inclusive of any of the new states. 

Her efforts to include all nationalities in her government, to establish 
schools for Ukrainians, Bulgarians, and others, to peacefully settle the dispute in 
the Gagauz region, and to make every effort to bring the Dniester conflict to a 
peaceful conclusion, are examples for others to follow. 

President Snegur has found only one government he is unable to deal with 
in an equitable manner, the Russian government. Dealings with the Russian 
government are perhaps the most important that Moldova will have in the near 
term. If the past is any indicator of the future, conditions do not augur well for 
developing smooth relations. Until Moldova can get Russian troops which are 
currently occupying its territory to leave it is, to a large extent, at the mercy of 
the Russian government. 

Moldova's relations with the rest of the world are going to be directly 
influenced by its relations with Russia. The relations with Russia are most 
impacted by the issue of Russian troops in Moldova. Moldova has made many 

60 



good faith attempts to solve this problem. These have been stymied at every 
turn by Russian unwillingness to withdraw, or even to bring in neutral third 
parties to help in mediation. Russia constantly ties the troop withdrawal issue 
to other issues, such as Moldova's relations with Romania and Moldova's 
participation in the CIS. In fact, Russia, under the guise of installing peacekeep- 
ing forces, has actually increased the number of Russian troops in the area since 
Moldova began asking for a withdrawal. 

Russia's continued resupply of the insurgents both directly and through 
resupply of the 14th Army is an affront that cannot be ignored. But unless the 
Moldovan government wishes additional deaths in the region, there is little 
which they can do. Moldova has offered limited autonomy for the region and 
has relented in to almost every demand except allowing Dniester secession. The 
Dniester Republic leaders continue to consolidate their government and in 
October they tied their willingness to be a part of Moldova to Moldova's 
remaining in the CIS and remaining a part of the ruble zone, both prior Russian 
requirements. '^^ 

The longer Russia manages to stalemate the Dniester Peace talks and troop 
withdrawal talks the more power they seem to think they will have. However 
as Russia's stance in these issues becomes more hard-line, other republics, espe- 
cially Ukraine, seem to be growing more concerned about Russia and are 



'^-'Vladimir Socor, "Dniester Leader Escalates Demands on Moldova", RFE/RL 
Daily Report, 30 October 1992. 



61 



supporting Moldova. There are also Western countries which are beginning to 
increasingly call for removal of Russian troops from the other countries of the 
former Soviet Union, including Moldova. 

This international support, by countries other than Romania, is how 
Moldova mav be able to end the negotiation gridlock with Russia. Because of 
massive economic need, Russia cannot afford to alienate any Western nation 
capable of providing help. Xor can Russia alienate members of the CIS if the 
government hopes to maintain any type of leadership role. 

Russia's continued use oi its waning military power to control the Russian- 
Moldovan relationship is being watched by the rest of the world. There are 
numerous articles which discuss whether Russian foreign policy will differ from 
Soviet foreign policy in any significant way or if the new Russian government 
can adjust to the fact that it is no longer one of two great superpowers."^" 

The Russian-Moldovan relationship provides a good opportunity for study 
of how foreign relations develop between a strong well established state and a 
new state which was formerly a territory. Russia is still trying to assert 
superiority over the smaller weaker state. It has the advantage of having troops 
on the soil of the other country, and of still being strong enough that many are 
still wary of her might. 



''"See for example Jeff Checkel, "Russian Foreign Policy: Back to the Future", 
RFE/RL Research Report, Vol 1, 16 October 1992, Num 4T 



62 



As the situation continues, however, the world is seeing that Russia is not 
as strong as it used to be. Countries it used to control, such as Ukraine, while 
still in many ways dependent on her due to the residual effects of the Soviet 
command economy, are becoming more willing to stand up for their own rights 
as well as the rights of others such as Moldova. This could create a dangerous 
situation where Russia becomes unwilling to back down because it does not want 
to appear weak. 

This would create a no-win situation for the government in Moscow. They 
couldn't back down or the nationalistic right wingers may gain control. Nor 
could they afford to maintain the present situation because of international 
pressure. It is this dilemma which will force the hand of the current moderate 
government in regard to the present situation with Moldova. Moldova's easing 
position on troop withdrawal, willingness to allow the Dniester officials a place 
in the government and their rather liberal nationalism policies all work in the 
direction of reducing the conflict in the Russian-Moldovan relationship. 

If the Yeltsin government takes a continued hard-line stance on relations 
with Moldova there is the risk that the West will perceive the government as too 
hard-line and economic aid could dry up. If she loses any ground due to the 
involvement of other countries, she risks a backlash from the right-wingers in 
Russia claiming she is unable to protect Russian outside her borders. Either way 
the Yeltsin government is finished. The obvious answer is to quickly finish 
present negotiations which will enable the Russian government to show that it 

63 



is will to treat the government of the former republics as sovereign entities, if not 
equals, and that it still is able to protect Russians outside her borders. While 
treating the governments of the states of the former Union does not seem to be 
the direction Russian Foreign policy is headed, it may be a short term necessity- 
If it is It will enable the Moldovan government to get peace within its borders 
and finally be able to concentrate on the other matters facing this new 
government. 



64 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Allworth, Edward, ed. Soviet Nationality Problems, New York NY: Columbia 
University Press, 1971. 

Bohlen, Celestine, "Russia Takes Over Command of Army In Moldova." NY 
Times 2 April, 1992: A7. 

Bruchis, Michael, Nations-Nationalities-Peoples, Boulder CO: Columbia 
University Press, 1984. 

Checkel, Jeff, "Russian Foreign Policy: Back to the Future", RFE/RL Research 
Report, Vol 1, Num 41, 16 October 1992. 

Crow, Suzanne, "Russia Debates its National Interests", RFE/RL Research Report, 
Vol 1, Num 28, 10 July 1992: 43-46. 

— . "Russia Denies it sent Mercenaries to Moldova", RFE/RL Daily Report, 2 
April 1992. 

— . "Russia Prepares to Take a Hard Line on 'Near Abroad'" RFE/RE Research 
Report, Vol 1, Num 32, 4 August 1992: 21-32. 

— . "Russia will protect the Rights of Russians", RFE/RL Daily Report, 2 April 
1992. 

— . "Russia's Relations with Members of the Commonwealth", RFE/RE Research 
Report, Vol 1, Num 19, 8 May 1992: 8-12. 

— . "Russian Federation Faces Foreign Policy Dilemmas", RFE/RE Research 
Report, Vol 1, Num 10, 6 March 1992: 15-19. 

— . "Russian Moderates Walk a Tightrope on Moldova", RFE/RE Research 
Report, Vol 1, Num 10, 15 May 1992: 9-12. 

— . "The Theory and Practice of Peacekeeping in the Former USSR", RFE/RE 
Research Report, Vol 1, Num 37, 18 September 1992: 31-36. 

— . "Yeltsin on Foreign Policy", RFE/RL Daily Report, 8 April 1992. 



65 



Dima, Nicholas, From Moldavia to Moldova: The Soviet Romanian Territorial 
Dispute , Boulder CO: Columbia University Press, 1991. 

Great So\iet Encyclopedia , 1977 ed. S.V. "Moldavia" 

Furtado, Charles F. Jr., and Andrea Chandler, Perestroika in the Soviet Republics: 
Documents on the National Question, Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1992. 

Foreign Broadcast Information Service. Dnestr Area, Moldovan Crisis Grows, 
FBIS-USR-91-034, 27 September 1991. 

— . Document Presents Theses of Council, FBIS-USR-92-115, 8 September 1992. 

— . Opposition Attacks on Foreign Policy, FBIS-USR-92-128, 7 October 1992. 

— . Overview of Social, Political Groups, FBIS-USR-91-022-L, 14 November 1991. 

— . Political Unrest Divides Republic, FBIS-USR-91-034, 27 September 1991. 

— . Snegur Interviewed on Dniester Conflict, FBIS-USSR-92-073, 17 June 1992. 

— . Snegur on Rumanian Ties, Independence Issue, FBIS-SOV-91-131,9 July 1991. 

Fo ve, Stephen, "Armed-Forces Confront Legacy of Soviet Past." RFEXRL Research 
Report, Vol 1, Num 8, 21 February 1992: 9-13. 

— . "The Soviet Armed Forces: Things Fall Apart." RFE/RL Research Report, 
Vol 1, Num 1, 3 January 1992: 15-17. 

Hosking, Geoffrey, "The Russian National Revival", Report on the USSR, Vol 3, 
Num 44, November 1 1991. 

Huttenbach, Henry R. ed. Soviet Nationality Policies, New York, NY: Mansell 
Publishing Limited, 1990. 

Ingram, Judith, "Behind Moldova's Ethnic Strife - A Long History of Conflict." 
San Francisco Chronicle 2 July 1992: A16. 

lonescu, Dan, "Romania, Moldova Sign Military Agreement", RFE/RL Daily 
Report, 16 December 1992. 

— . "Romanian Concern over the conflict in Moldova", RFE/RL Research 
Report, Vol 1, Num 18, 1 May 1992: 46-51. 



66 



— . "Soviet Moldavia: The State Language Issue." Report on the USSR, Vol 1, 
Num 22, 2 June 1989: 19-22. 

Kaiser, Robert, National Territoriality in xMultinational, Multi-homeland States: 
A Comparative Study of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia. 
Unpublished Columbia University, 1988. 

Kortunov, Andrei, Strategic Relations Between The Former Soviet Republics, The 
Heritage Foundation, Washington D.C.: 18 April 1992. 

Kovalskaya, Galina, "Is the Right Bank Right?", New Times, Issue 45.92, 
(November 1992), 12-13. 

Kozlov Victor, The Peoples of the Soviet Union, Bloomington, IN: Indiana 
University Press, 1988. 

Kozyrev, Andrei, "Russia: A Chance for Survival", Foreign Affairs, Spring 1992: 
1-16. 

Motyl, Alexander, Thinking Theoretically About Soviet Nationalities, New York, 
NY: Columbia University Press, 1992. 

Nahaylo, Bohdan, "Moldovan Conflict Creates New Dilemmas for Ukraine ', 
RFE/RL Research Reports, Vol 1, Num 20, 15 May 1992: 1-8. 

— . "National Ferment In Moldavia", Radio Liberty Research Bulletin, Vol 32, 24 
January 1988. 

— . "Russia Seeking to Keep Ukraine and Romania out of Negotiations on 
Moldovan Conflict", RFE/RL Daily Report, 3 June 1992. 

— . "Ukraine and Moldova: The View from Kiev", RFE/RL Research Report, Vol 
1, Num 18, 1 May 1992. 

Papp, Daniel S., Contemporary International Relations, 3rd ed. New York: 
MacMillan, (1991). 

Porter, Bruce D./'A Country Instead of a Cause: Russian Foreign Policy in the 
Post-Soviet Era", The Washington Quarterly, Summer 1992: 41-56. 

Rahr, Alexander, "The Power of the Russian Security Council", Radio Liberty 
Daily Report, 5 August 1992. 



67 



Rakovsky, Sergei, "New Neighbors, New Problems", New Times, Issue 34.92, 
(August 1992), 19-21. 

Rotar Igor, "There are Two Sociahst Strongholds in the World: Cuba and the 
Dniester Area. The Political Situation in Moldova Remains Explosive", 
Nezavisimaya Gazeta 6 lune 1991. 

Shafir, Michael, "Iliescu: EBRD would Back Russian Withdrawal from Moldova", 
RFE/RL Daily Report, 17 July 1992. 

— . "Romanian Official on Relations with Moldova', RFE/RL Daily Report, 14 
October 1992. 

Sheehy, Ann, 'Commonwealth of Independent States: An Uneasy Compromise", 
RFE/RL Research Report, Vol 1, Num 2, 10 January 1992: 1-5. 

— . "Status of Moldova and Azerbaijan in CIS", RFE/RL Daily Report, 29 June 
1992. 

Simon, Gerhard, Nationalism and Policy Toward the Nationalities in the Soviet 
Union, San Francisco, CA: Westview Press, 1991. 

Smith, Graham, ed. The Nationalities Question in the Soviet Union, New York, 
NY: Longman, 1990. 

Socor, Vladimir, "14th Army Commander Criticizes Yeltsin ...." RFEXRL Daily 
Report 7 July 1992. 

— . "... And Assails Moldovan Government." RFEXRL Daily Report, 7 July 1992. 

— . "Baburin and Rumyantsev join Forces Against Moldova." RFEXRL Daily 
Report 2 July 1992.' 

— . "Creeping Putsch in Eastern Moldova." RFE/RE Research Report, Vol 1, 
Num 3, 17 January 1992: 8-13. 

— . "Dniester Leader Escalates Demands on Moldova", RFE/RL Daily Report, 30 
October 1992. 

— . "Gorbachev and Moldavia." Report on the USSR, Vol 2, Num 51, 21 Decem- 
ber 1990: 11-14. 



68 



— . "Kozvrev's Territorial Claims Protested by Moldova" RFE/RL Daily Report. 
16 June 1992. 

— . "Lebed .A.gain Cautioned Against Political Statements", Radio Liberty Daily 
Report, 1 September 1992. 

— . "Moldavian Lands Between Romania and Ukraine: The Historical and 
Political Geographv." Report on the USSR, Vol 2, Num 46, 16 November 
1991: lb-18. 

— . "Moldavian Proclaimed Official Language in the Moldavian SSR." Report on 
the USSR, Vol 1, Num 38, 22 September 1989: 13-15. 

— . "Moldova." RFE/RL Research Report, Vol 1, Num 7, 14 February 1992: 11- 
13. 

— . "Moldova Builds a New State", RFE/RE Research Report, Vol 1, Num 1, 3 
January 1992. 

— . "Moldova Facing Russian Pressure", RFE/RL Research Report, Vol 1, Num 
52, 15 December 1992. 

— . "Moldova Not to Sign CIS Charter", RFE/RL Daily Report, 8 December 1991 . 

— . "Moldova Under 'Economic Blockade' by Russia", RFE/RL Daily Report, 30 
June 1992. 

— . "Moldova's New Government of National Consensus", RFE/RE Research 
Report, Vol 1, Num 47, 27 November 1992. 

— . "Moldovan President Accuses Moscow of Misuse of CIS", RFE/RL Daily 
Report, 3 June 1992. 

-. "Moldovan President Appeals to UN", RFE/RL Daily Report, 3 August 1992. 

— . "Moldovan President Support Ukraine's stand in the CIS", RFE/RL Dailv 
Report, 1 December 1992. 

— . "Moldovan-Romanian Relations are Slow to Develop", RFE/RE Research 
Report, Vol 1, Num 26, 26 June 1992: 38-45. 

— . "Moldovan-Ukrainian Treaty", RFE/RL Daily Report, 27 October 1992. 



69 



— . "More on VIoldavia-RSFSR Agreement", RFE/RL Daily Report. 14 August 
1991. 

— . "Opinion Polling in Moldova", RFE/RE Research Report. Vol I, Num 13, 27 
March 1992. 

— . "Popular Front Founded in Moldova." Report on the USSR. Vol 1, Num 23, 
9 June 1989: 23-26. 

— . "Romanian Foreign Minister on 'Lack of Signals' from Moldova", RFE/RL 
Daily Report, 15 September 1992. 

— . "Russia's Fourteenth Army and the Insurgency in Eastern Moldova", RFE/RE 
Research Report. Vol l', iNum 36, 11 September 1992: 41-48. 

— . "Russian Aid to "Dniester" Insurgency Described'" RFE/RL Daily Report, 4 
August 1992. 

— . "Russian Forces in Moldova", RFE/RE Research Report, Vol 1, Num 34, 28 
August 1992: 38-43. 

— . "Russian Parliament Chairman Conditions Moldova's Territorial Integrity on 
CIS Membership", RFE/RL Daily Report, 24 April 1992. 

"Why Moldova does not Seek Reunifications with Romania", RFE/RL 
Research Report, Vol 1, Num 5, 31 January 1992: 27-33. 

Solzhenitsyn, Aleksandr, Rebuilding Russia, Reflections and Tentative Proposals, 
Trans. Alexis Klimoff. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1991. 

Tolz, Vera and Elizabeth Teague, "Russian Intellectuals Adjust to Loss oi 
Empire. " RFE/RL Research Report, Vol 1, Num 8, 21 February 1992: 4-8. 



70 



INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 



No. Copies 



1. Defense Technical Information Center 2 
Cameron Station 

Alexandria, Virginia 22304-6145 

2. Library, Code 52 2 
Naval Postgraduate School 

Monterey, California 93943-5100 

3. OP-60, the Pentagon, Room 4E556 1 
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations 

Washington, D.C. 20350 

4. OP-602, The Pentagon, Room 4E516 1 
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations 

Washington D.C. 20350 

5. Dr. Thomas C. Bruneau 1 
Chairman, National Security Affairs (NS/Bn) 

Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 93943 

6. Mikhail Tsypkin 1 
(Code NS/tK) 

Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey California 93943 

7. Bertrand Patenaude 1 
(Code NS/PA) 

Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey California 93943 

8. Robert J. Smith 3 
AFISA/ IN AE, The Pentagon, Room BD936 

Washington D.C. 20330 



71 



DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARV 
NAVAL POSTGRXDUATE SCh 
MONTEREY CA 93943-5101 



GAYLORD S