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RUSSIAN    PROJECTS 
AGAINST  INDIA 


FROM    THE    CZAR    PETER 
TO  GENERAL  SKOBELEFE 


"  A  knowledge  of  this  region  and  its  resources  leads  inevitably  to  the  conclusion 
that  our  presence  in  Turkestan,  in  pursuance  of  Russian  interests  is  justifiable 
solely  on  the  ground  of  an  endeavour  to  solve  the  Eastern  question  in  our  own 
favour  from  this  quarter.  Otherwise  the  hide  is  not  worth  the  tanning  and  all 
the  money  sunk  in  Turkestan  is  lost." 

Skobeleff's  Project  for  the  Invasion  of  India.     Page  285. 


BY 

H     SUTHERLAND     EDWARDS 


'•■•sii^t'Wjirp.fcji 


(WITH    MAP)  r,n-Tt:;  .Avj..^ 


Si:RV[CtS 


DATE. 

LONDON 

REMINGTON      &      CO      PUBLISHERS 

HENRIETTA  STREET  COVENT  GARDEN 

1885 
[All  Righlx_^  Reserved] 


uibHAKY 
* '""■■' AUG 


PREFACE. 


This  book  has  not,  as  the  title  and  lime  of  pubHcation  might 
suggest,  been  written  under  the  impression  of  recent  events  in  con- 
nection with  the  Afghan  frontier.  Much  of  it  lias  already  appeared 
in  the  form  of  articles,  published  from  time  to  time  in  newspapers, 
magazines,  and  reviews  during  the  last  eight  or  nine  years.  These 
articles  were  all  written  with  one  object ;  that  of  showing  that 
Russian  expeditions  in  Central  Asia  (supported  at  critical  moments 
by  Russian  intriguers  in  Persia  and  Afghanistan)  have  always  been 
undertaken,  not  with  a  view  to  an  improved  frontier,  the  Russian 
frontier  on  the  Central  Asian  side  having  never  been  threatened  ; 
nor  for  commercial  purposes,  the  exports  and  imports  between 
Russia  and  the  Khanates  being  of  the  most  trifling  value,  and  quite 
out  of  proportion  with  the  cost  of  occupying  and  administering  the 
Russian  possessions  in  Central  Asia  :  but  simply  in  order  to  place 
Russia  in  a  position  to  threaten  and,  on  a  fitting  opportunity, 
attack  India.  I  have  made  no  inferences.  I  have  simply  repro- 
duced what  the  Russians  themselves  have  avowed  and  proclaimed 
on  the  subject.  In  doing  so  I  have  drawn  largely  on  the  invaluable 
contributions  to  the  history  of  Russian  relations  with  Central  Asia 
made  by  INIr.  Robert  Michell,  of  the  India  Office,  whose  unre- 
mitting study  of  the  subject  extends  now  over  twenty  years. 


COxNTENTS. 


CHAP.  PAGE 

I.  Expeditions  towards  India  from  the  Reign  of  Peter 

the  Great  to  that  of  Paul         ...         ...          ...  i 

II.  Projects   and   Expeditions   under    Alexander   I., 

Paul,  and  Nicholas      ...          ...          ...         ...  32 

III.  The  First  Russian  Agent  in  Afghanistan 63 

IV.  Perof ski's  Expedition        ...          ...  74 

V.  Perofski's  Expedition  (continued)           107 

VI.  Perofski's  Expedition  (continued)            ...         ...  124 

VII.  The  Anglo-Russian  Agreement  of  1844              ...  149 

VIII.  Ignatieff's  Mission  to  Khiva  and  Bokhara           ...  157 
IX.  Ignatieff's      Mission     to     Khiva     and     Bokhara 

(continued)      ...          ...          ...          ...          ...  173 

X.  Kauffmann's  Expedition  lo  Khiva           ...          ...  212 

XI.  The    Good    and    the    Evil    done    by    Russia    in 

Central  Asia 246 

XII.  Projects  for  the  Invasion  of  India            ...          ••  260 


2  BUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

been  attacked,  or  at  least  approached  by  Russia 
through  regular  expeditions  (not  to  speak  of  desul- 
tory attacks  by  Cossacks),  no  less  than  four  times  ; 
and  those  who  hold  that  in  invading  Khiva  Russia 
had  no  aim  in  view  but  the  extension  of  her  possess- 
sions  in  Central  Asia,  will  find  their  views  contra- 
dicted somewhat  flatly  by  Captain  Mouravieff,  in  a 
striking  passage  from  a  work  which  that  officer 
published  63  years  ago. 

As  soon  as  the  Settlement  of  Vienna  In  18 14  and 
181 5  left  Russia  free  to  divert  her  attention  once 
more  from  European  affairs  and  to  direct  It  towards 
Central  Asia,  expeditions  were  at  once  equipped  for 
service  in  the  Steppes.  Diplomatic  missions,  too, 
and  commercial  caravans,  both  under  military  escort, 
were  sent  to  Khiva  and  to  Bokhara.  The  chief 
emissary  to  Khiva  was  Captain  Mouravieff ;  and  on 
his  return  to  Russia  in  1822  he  expressed,  in  a 
narrative  of  his  journey,  his  deep  regret  that  Russia 
had  not  yet  succeeded  in  annexing  the  Khanate, 
whose  capital  he  regarded  as  an  invaluable  strong- 
hold from  which  to  threaten  the  English  power  in 
India.  "  Khiva,"  he  wrote,  "  is  at  this  moment  an 
advanced  post  which  impedes  our  commerce  with 
Bokhara  and  Northern  India.  Under  our  dependence 


PERIOD— PETER  THE  GREAT  TO  PAUL.         3 

Khiva  would  have  become  a  safeguard  for  this  com- 
merce against  the  attacks  of  populations  dispersed 
in  the  Steppes  of  Southern  Asia.  This  oasis, 
situated  in  the  midst  of  an  ocean  of  sand,  would 
have  become  a  point  of  assembly  for  all  the  com- 
merce of  Asia,  and  would  have  shaken  to  the  centre 
of  India  the  enormous  superiority  enjoyed  by  the 
rulers  of  the  sea  !  " 

In  these  lines  Captain  Mouravieff  was  only  expres- 
sing what  had  been  thought  and  felt  by  Russian 
politicians  and  Russian  military  commanders  for  a 
century  and  a  half  or  a  century  and  a  quarter  pre- 
viously ;  nor,  it  need  scarcely  be  added,  have  those 
thoughts  and  feelings  been  once  abandoned  during 
the  last  50  or  60  years.  Apart  from  such  com- 
mercial importance  as  might  or  might  not  be 
claimed  for  it,  Khiva,  as  we  know  from  the  pub- 
hshed  writings  of  Russian  mihtary  commanders, 
was  regarded  as  a  post  from  which  one  of  several 
converging  forces  might  advantageously  be  directed 
against  Merv,  just  as  Merv  used  to  be  regarded 
as  a  ■  post  from  which  a  march  might  be  made 
upon  Herat.  But  when  the  first  Russian  ex- 
pedition against  Khiva  was  sent  out,  no  thought 
could  have  been  entertained  by  the  Russian  Govern- 


^  BUSSIAN-  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

ment  of  injuring  England,  which,  Hke  France, 
Portugal,  Holland,  and  Denmark,  had  possessions 
in  India,  but  was  far,  indeed,  from  exercising  exclu- 
sive sway  in  that  country.  Peter  the  Great's  sole 
object  in  connection  with  the  East  was  to  obtain  for 
Russia  a  share  of  the  riches  for  which  that  part 
of  the  world  was  famous.  He  wished  to  reach  the 
country  over  which  the  English  now  rule.  But  Khiva 
and  Bokhara  were  in  his  eyes  nothing  more  than  con- 
venient stages  towards  the  Oxus  ;  and  from  the  Oxus 
his  emissaries  were  to  make  their  way,  not  to  any 
English  possession,  but  to  Delhi,  at  that  time  the 
capital  of  the  Great  Mogul. 

A  merchant  known  as  Simon  "  Malinki,"  or  Simon 
the  Little,  was  the  chief  of  Peter's  envoys,  and  it  is 
stated  in  the  official  '"''  Narrative  of  the  Russian 
Military  Expedition  to  Khiva,  conducted  by  Prince 
Alexander  Bekovitch  Cherkaski,  in  171  7,"  translated 
for  the  India  Office  by  Mr.  John  Michell,  that  Simon 
died  at  Schmaikha  on  his  way  back ;  though  in  the 
official  "  Narrative  of  the  Russian  Military  Expe- 
dition to  Khiva  under  Perofski  in  1839,"  translated 
from  the  Russian  for  the  Foreign  Department  of  the 
Government  of  India  by  Mr.  Robert  Michell,  it  is 
set  forth  that    "  Simon  Malinki  was  despatched  to 


PERIOD— PETER  THE  GREAT  TO  PAUL.  5 

India    In    1694,    but     died    on   his   way   thither   at 
Schmaikha." 

Whether  Simon  the  Little  did  or  did  not  reach 
India,  it  is  certain  that  no  information  was  derived 
from  any  report  of  his  making;  and  when  in  17 16 
the  Russian  Senate,  at  the  command  of  Peter, 
ordered  that  an  inquiry  should  be  made  as  to  the 
contents  of  the  letter  sent  with  the  merchant  Simon 
Malinki  to  the  Mogul,  and  as  to  what  it  had  led  to, 
it  appeared  that  the  result,  if  any,  of  the  merchant's 
journey  had  remained  unknown. 

Peter  had  now,  in  the  year  17 16,  no  idea  of  send- 
ing out  a  commercial  or  quasi-commercial  mission 
alone.  A  Turcoman  chief,  Hodja  Nefes  by  name, 
had  come  to  him,  saying  that  in  the  country  border- 
ing the  river  Amu  (Oxus)  gold  sand  was  to  be  found, 
and  that  the  stream,  which  formerly  flowed  into  the 
Caspian,  and  which,  through  fear  of  the  Russians, 
had  been  diverted  by  the  Khivans  into  the  Aral 
Lake,  might,  by  destroying  the  dam,  be  made  to  run 
again  in  its  original  channel.  Some  years  before  an 
alliance  had  been  proposed  to  Peter  by  the  Khivan 
Khan,  who  even  declared  himself  willing  to  be- 
come Peter's  vassal.  The  Czar  accepted  the  prof- 
fered allegiance ;  and   when  Hodja  Nefes  inflamed 


6  RUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

his  avarice  and  his  ambition  by  telling  him  of  this 
river  whose  sands  were  gold,  and  along  whose  dried- 
up  course  he  might  reach  the  capital  of  his  Khivan 
feudatory,  he  could  not  but  entertain  the  project  of 
a  serious  military  expedition. 

Peter  was  quite  aware  that  Khiva  and  Bokhara 
were  not  commercial  cities.  ''  But,"  in  the  words  of 
the  ofhcial  historian,  ''  they  were  of  great  importance 
as  channels  of  trade  with  other  Asiatic  countries, 
famous  of  old  for  the  variety  and  abundance  of  their 
natural  wealth."  The  visit  of  Hodja  Nefes  to  St. 
Petersburg  took  place  in  1713,  just  when  Peter  had 
finally  defeated  Charles  XII.  He  had  also  brought 
his  war  against  Turkey  to  a  conclusion,  and  finding 
nothing  to  occupy  him  in  the  West,  turned  his  atten- 
tion, as  his  successors  under  like  circumstances  have 
systematically  done,  towards  the  East.  He,  perhaps, 
did  not  beheve  much  in  Hodja  Nefes's  tale  of  the 
gold  to  be  found  mingled  with  the  sands  of  the  Oxus. 
But  he  was  struck  by  the  story  of  the  ancient  bed, 
and  entered  warmly  into  the  project  of  turning  the 
Oxus  into  the  channel  along  which  it  had  at  one 
time  flowed.  This  would  make  it  run  into  the 
Caspian  Sea,  and  would  bring  the  Caspian  and 
Khiva  into  direct  water  communication. 


PERIOD— PETER  THE  GREAT  TO  PAUL.  7 

Peter  decided  then  to  send  an  expedition  against 
Khiva,  and  to  do  so  in  such  a  way  that  while  the 
envoy  should  ostensibly  be  escorted  only  by  a  guard 
of  honour  numerous  enough  to  give  dignity  to  his 
mission,  he  should,  in  fact,  be  followed  by  an 
army  sufBciently  strong  to  overcome  all  resistance 
that  might  be  opposed  by  the  Khan. 

Khivan  towns  had  previously  been  attacked  and 
occupied  by  Cossacks  making  war  on  their  own 
account.  But  these  minor  expeditions  had  not  been 
conducted  with  any  system,  nor  had  they  been 
executed  under  the  direction  of  the  Russian  Govern- 
ment. Peter's  army  of  invasion,  however,  was  to 
be  regularly  organised ;  and  the  object  of  its  march 
was  to  bring  Khiva  into  absolute  subjection. 
"  Although  Khiva  and  Bokhara,"  in  the  words  of 
the  official  historian,  "  were  of  themselves  insigni- 
ficant from  their  poverty  in  natural  products  and  the 
undeveloped  condition  of  their  trade  and  industry, 
yet  they  were  of  extreme  importance  as  channels  of 
trade  with  other  Asiatic  countries  famed  of  old  for 
the  variety  and  abundance  of  their  natural  wealth  ; 
so  that  the  acquisition  of  Khiva  as  a  first  step  must 
have  been  a  point  of  great  importance  to  the  far- 
seeing  Czar,  more  especially  since  he  was  assured 


8  EUSSIAJSf  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

of  the  possibility  of  turning  the  largest  river  of 
Central|Asia  into  the  Caspian,  and  of  thus  opening 
a  convenient  channel  of  communication  even  with 
remote  confines  of  India." 

So  anxious  was  Peter  to  obtain  information  in 
respect  to  India  that  he  had  already  invited  Ashur 
Bek,  the  Khivan  envoy  at  St.  Petersburg,  to  under- 
take a  mission  to  that  country.  Nothing,  however, 
came  of  the  proposition. 

Having  quite  made  up  his  mind  to  attack  Khiva, 
Peter  entrusted  the  command  of  the  expedition  to 
Prince  Bekovitch  Cherkaski,  of  the  Body  Guard, 
and  ordered  him  in  the  first  place,  before  adopting 
any  military  measures,  to  "congratulate  the  new 
Khan  on  his  accession  to  power." 

Prince  Bekovitch  made  a  preliminary  reconnais- 
sance and  journey  of  exploration ;  after  which  he 
was  able  to  report  to  the  Czar  that  the  Amu,  or 
Oxus,  river  had  in  ancient  times  flowed  into  the 
Caspian  Sea,  and  that  he  had  discovered  the  old  bed 
into  which  it  was  proposed  to  turn  its  course.  Peter 
gave  Prince  Bekovitch  full  instructions  as  to  the 
method  of  invading  the  Khanate  of  Khiva,  and 
placed   at   his    disposal   a   force   of   4,000   regular 


PERIOD— PETER  THE  GREAT  TO  PAUL.  9 

infantry,  2,000  Cossacks,  and  100  dragoons — troops 
who  at  that  time  acted  indifferently  on  horseback 
and  on  foot.  The  Prince  was  ordered  to  approach 
Khiva  in  the  character  of  a  friendly  envoy  ;  the 
somewhat  remarkable  strength  of  his  military  escort 
being  accounted  for,  as  before  set  forth,  by  a  polite 
desire  on  his  part,  and  on  the  part  of  the  Czar,  his 
master,  to  give  due  importance  to  the  mission  on 
which  he  was  engaged.  On  reaching  Khiva  the 
Prince  was  to  call  upon  the  Khan  to  submit  formally 
to  Russia,  on  condition  of  the  sovereignty  of  the 
Khanate  being  continued  in  his  family  ;  and  he  was 
to  guarantee  the  Khan's  personal  security — perhaps, 
also,  his  fidelity  to  Russia — by  attaching  to  him  a 
guard  of  Russians.  Once  established  in  Khiva, 
Prince  Bekovitch  was  to  despatch  two  trade  cara- 
vans— one  to  the  Khan  of  Bokhara,  the  other  to 
the  Mogul  of  India  ;  the  first  with  the  object  of 
persuading  the  Khan  of  Bokhara  to  acknowledge 
Russian  supremacy  ;  the  second  with  the  view  of 
opening  up  a  route  along  the  river  Oxus  to  India, 
where  enquiries  were  to  be  made  about  the  natural 
products  and  commodities  of  the  country. 

The  second  caravan  was  also  to  ascertain  whether 


10  RUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

there  was  not  a  more  direct  road  from  India  to  the 
Caspian,  in  which  case  it  was  to  return  by  it, 
mapping  both  routes.  The  chosen  envoy  for  India 
was  Lieutenant  Kojin,  of  the  Russian  Navy.  Several 
naval  officers  and  merchants  were  placed  under  his 
command,  and  he  received  special  instructions  from 
Peter  himself  in  these  words  :  "  He  is  to  go,  when 
the  Brigadier,  Prince  Cherkaski,  shall  be  able  to 
dispense  with  him,  by  water  as  far  up  the  Amu-Daria 
[Oxus  river]  as  possible  (or  by  others  which  may  fall 
into  it),  to  India,  in  the  guise  of  a  merchant,  the  real 
business  being  the  discovery  of  a  water-way  to  India. 
II.  To  inquire  secretly  about  the  river,  in  case  pro- 
gress by  water  be  forbidden.  III.  To  return,  if 
possible,  by  the  same  route,  unless  it  be  ascertained 
that  there  is  another  and  more  convenient  way  by 
water ;  the  water-way  as  well  as  the  land-route  to  be 
carefully  observed  and  described  in  writing,  and  to 
be  mapped.  IV.  To  notice  the  merchandise, 
particularly  aromatic  herbs  and  other  articles  that 
are  exported  from  India.  V.  To  examine  into,  and 
write  an  account  of,  all  other  matters  which,  though 
not  mentioned  here,  may  concern  the  interests  of  the 
empire." 

While  due  preparations  were  being  made  for  sub- 


PERIOD— PETER  THE  GREAT  TO  PAUL.        11 


jecting  first  Khiva,  and  afterwards  Bokhara,  the 
Court  of  Embassies  drew  up  credentials  in  the  most 
approved  form  to  the  chiefs  of  the  threatened 
Khanates  and  the  distant  Mogul. 

The  expedition  was  not  to  consist  of  soldiers 
alone.  Besides  6,000  troops,  it  was  to  include 
upwards  of  200  sailors,  who  were  to  take  with  them 
boats  of  different  sizes.  The  flotilla  was  in  the 
first  place  to  carry  over  to  Gurief,  on  the  east  coast 
of  the  Caspian,  the  infantry,  a  portion  of  the 
dragoons,  the  whole  of  the  artillery  (22  pieces),  a 
year's  provisions  for  the  whole  force,  and  the  neces- 
sary implements  for  the  construction  of  forts,  with 
timber  for  huts.  The  Cossacks,  with  the  other  half 
of  the  squadron  of  dragoons,  the  caravan,  the 
baggage  train,  and  a  certain  number  of  dragoon 
horses  were  to  proceed  by  land  ;  advancing  from 
Astrakhan  through  Gurief  towards  Khiva  ;  while  the 
larger  detachment,  starting  from  Krasnovodsk,  on  the 
east  shore  of  the  Caspian,  was  to  follow  the  ancient 
bed  of  the  river.  The  two  columns  were  to  effect 
a  junction  near  the  river,  and  make  a  combined  attack 
upon  Khiva.  The  plan  of  the  attack  was  left  to  the 
discretion  of  the  commander.  But  when  the  Khan 
had  once  been  reduced  to  subjection  and  prevailed 


12  RUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

upon,  no  matter  by  what  means,  to  acknowledge 
Russian  supremacy.  Prince  Bekovitch  Cherkaski 
was,  in  the  words  of  Peter's  decree,  as  written  by 
himself,  "  to  ask  him  for  vessels  and  to  send  a 
merchant  in  them  to  India  by  the  Amu-Daria,  order- 
ing the  same  to  ascend  the  river  as  far  as  vessels  can 
go,  and  thence  to  proceed  to  India,  recording  the 
rivers  and  lakes,  and  describing  the  way  by  land  and 
water,  and  particularly  the  water-way  to  India  by 
lake  or  river,  returning  from  India  the  same  way ;  or 
should  the  merchant  hear  in  India  of  a  still  better 
road  to  the  Caspian  Sea,  to  come  back  by  that,  and 
to  describe  it  in  writing." 

In  addition  to  the  two  columns  which,  advancing 
from  different  points,  were  to  converge  on  the  banks 
of  the  Oxus,  and  march  together  against  Khiva,  an 
expedition  on  a  smaller  scale  was  sent  out  under 
Lieutenant  Kojin,  the  so-called  "  Envoy  for  India," 
to  Astrabad  on  the  Persian  shore  of  the  Caspian. 
Here  he  was  to  request  from  the  Governor  of  the 
province  permission  for  an  officer  to  pass  through 
Persia  to  Bokhara  with  letters  from  the  Khan. 

The  Governor  of  Astrabad  would  not  allow  the 
officer  to  pass  through  Persian  territory,  by  reason,  as 
Lieutenant  Kojin  affirmed,  of  an  insurrection  in  that 


PERIOD— PETER  THE  GREAT  TO  PAUL.         13 

country.  Prince  SImonof  who,  Kojin  having  failed, 
was  despatched  to  Astrabad  to  apply  once  more  for 
permission  to  pass  through  Persia,  had  a  very 
different  tale  to  tell.  He  declared,  in  a  report  on  the 
subject  to  Prince  Bekovitch  Cherkaski,  that  on 
Lieutenant  Kojin's  arrival  in  the  harbour,  the 
Governor  of  Astrabad  had  sent  officers  to  meet  him 
and  to  bring  him  with  the  chiefs  of  his  expedition 
to  the  town.  But  Lieutenant  Kojin,  as  Prince 
Simonof  reported,  neither  went  himself  nor  suffered 
the  leading  members  of  his  mission  to  go  to 
Astrabad.  Prince  Simonof,  in  a  final  accusation, 
charged  Lieutenant  Kojin  with  having  made  an 
attack  on  a  herd  of  buffaloes  grazing  harmlessly 
near  the  sea-shore,  and  of  having,  after  this  exploit, 
put  back  forthwith  to  sea. 

That  Lieutenant  Kojin  did  not  do  his  best  at  Astra- 
bad to  procure  permission  for  the  Indian  envoy  to  ad- 
vance from  Persia  to  Bokhara  seems  probable  enough ; 
for  throughout  the  campaign  against  Khiva  he  showed 
himself  ill-disposed  towards  Prince  Bekovitch  Cher- 
kaski, the  commander-in-chief.  He  was  entrusted, 
nevertheless,  with  the  leadership  of  the  advanced 
guard.  With  the  view  of  conciliating  the  threatened 
Khan  and  of  throwing  him  off  his  guard,  and  also 


14  EUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA, 

for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  information  about  Khiva 
and  its  approaches,  Kojin  despatched  messengers, 
bearing  presents,  and  announcing  his  intention  to 
visit  Khiva  on  a  mission  from  the  Czar. 

While  Prince  Bekovitch  was  still  engaged  in 
organising  the  main  body  of  the  expedition,  news 
reached  him  from  various  sources  that  his  advance 
would  be  resisted.  But  this  information  had  no 
effect  in  checking  his  ardour.  When  complete,  his 
forces  consisted  of  3,000  fighting  men,  who  were 
accompanied  by  merchants,  with  their  servants,  and 
by  camp-followers  and  servants,  to  the  number  of 
1 ,000.  The  train  included  600  guards,  200  camels, 
and  several  hundred  horses.  The  force  was  as- 
sembled at  Astrakhan ;  and  the  advanced  guard 
was  in  the  first  place  sent  across  the  Caspian  to 
Gurief,  which  had  been  chosen  as  the  head-quarters 
of  the  army  on  the  east  coast  of  the  Caspian.  Beko- 
vitch himself  at  the  earliest  opportunity  sailed  from 
Astrakhan  to  Gurief.  Lieutenant  Kojin,  who,  as 
chief  of  the  advanced  guard,  should  have  preceded 
him,  could  not  be  induced  even  to  accompany  him. 
Declining  to  move  from  Astrakhan,  he  sent  to  St. 
Petersburg  a  report  in  which  he  accused  the  com- 
mander-in-chief   of   an  intention    "  treacherously  to 


PERIOD— PETER  THE  GREAT  TO  PAUL.         15 

deliver  the  Russian  troops  into  the  hands  of  bar- 
barians." On  receipt  of  this  despatch  he  was 
summoned  to  St.  Petersburg,  where  he  was  brought 
before  a  court-martial  and  subjected  to  a  stringent 
examination.  Thrown  into  prison,  he  would  probably 
have  been  executed  but  for  the  news  which  In  due 
time  reached  St.  Petersburg  of  the  fate  Prince 
Bekovitch  and  his  army  had  met  with. 

When  Prince  Bekovitch's  entire  force  had  arrived 
at  Gurief  it  remained  there  for  about  a  month, 
making  preparations  for  the  difficult  advance  across 
the  Steppe.  Bekovitch  now  heard  bad  news  of 
various  garrisons  which  he  had  left  in  forts  erected 
on  the  eastern  shores  of  the  Caspian,  and  espe- 
cially at  Krasnovodsk.  They  had  been  much 
enfeebled  by  sickness  ;  and  as  it  was,  moreover, 
very  difficult  to  obtain  the  necessary  supply  of 
horses  and  camels  for  the  march  of  all  the  men 
at  his  disposal,  he  determined  to  leave  the  Kras- 
novodsk contingent  In  Its  forts  and  to  advance 
to  Khiva  at  the  head  of  a  single  column.  The 
column  from  Krasnovodsk  was  to  have  made  Its 
way  along  the  dried-up  bed  of  the  Oxus.  But  it 
was  now  arranged  to  abandon  altogether  this  In- 
teresting route. 


16  EUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

Bekovitch's  first  encounter  with  the  enemy  took 
place  while  his  force  was  still  encamped  at  GurieL 
He  was  attacked  by  Karakalpaks,  who  captured  a 
portion  of  his  cattle,  and  at  the  same  time  carried 
off  60  Cossacks  under  whose  guard  they  had  been 
placed.  Bekovitch  followed  the  Karakalpaks  into 
the  Steppe,  recovered  the  oxen  and  brought  back 
six  of   the  assailants. 

When  all  the  necessary  preparations  had  been 
made,  the  troops  left  Gurief  at  the  beginning  of 
June;  in  the  worst  possible  season,  that  is  to  say,  for 
campaigning  in  the  Steppe.  After  eight  days' 
marching,  during  which  he  met  with  several  small 
streams.  Prince  Bekovitch  Cherkaski  reached  the 
Emba,  where,  before  attempting  the  passage,  he 
was  obliged  to  halt.  The  soldiers  forded  the 
river,  while  baggage  was  sent  over  on  rafts  ;  and 
the  passage  altogether  occupied  two  days.  From 
Gurief  to  the  Emba  the  troops  had  marched  25 
miles  a  day  ;  they  had  thus  accomplished  a  distance 
of  about  200  miles.  The  commander  had  hastened 
his  advance,  partly  lest  the  grass  in  the  Steppe 
should  be  burnt  up  by  the  intense  heat,  partly  with 
the  view  of  reaching  Khiva  before  the  Khan  would 
have  time   to  collect   any    considerable   nlimber   of 


PERIOD— PETER  THE  GREAT  TO  PAUL.         17 


troops  for  the  defence  of  his  capital.  The  Khan, 
however,  was  destined  to  receive  early  news  of 
Bekovitch's  progress;  for,  at  two  days'  march  from 
the  Emba,  a  certain  number  of  Turcomans  and 
Kalmuks  belonging  to  the  expedition  deserted  and 
hurried  on  to  Khiva  in  order  to  warn  the  Khan. 
Arrived  within  eight  days  of  Khiva,  the  Russian 
commander  sent  on  a  messenger  with  an  escort  of 
Cossacks,  bearing  a  letter  in  which  the  Khan  was 
assured  of  Russia's  peaceful  intentions.  The  Prince 
wished  simply  to  pay  a  visit  to  the  Khan  on  behalf 
of  his  master  the  Czar;  and  that  he  might  do  so  in 
a  becoming  style,  he  had  caused  himself  to  be  ac- 
companied by  a  numerous  retinue.  Continuing  his 
march,  Bekovitch  met  two  days  afterwards  his 
messenger  returning  with  two  Khivans.  Although 
the  Prince  had  assured  the  Khan  that  he  w^as 
advancing  simply  in  the  character  of  a  friendly 
envoy,  he  nevertheless  thought  it  advisable  to 
make  the  two  Khivans  believe  that  the  force  under 
his  command  was  composed  of  a  far  greater  number 
of  men  than  were  really  included  in  it.  The  strength 
of  the  column  had  been  much  reduced  by  forced 
marches ;  and  numbers  of  stragglers  and  tired 
horses  had  been  left  behind.     Under  these  circum- 

0 


18  EUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

stances  it  was  thought  desirable  to  inform  the 
Khivan  envoys  that  the  main  body  of  the  army  was 
nothing  more  than  the  advanced  guard.  Prince 
Bekovitch,  it  was  added,  was  with  the  principal  body 
of  the  army  in  the  rear.  They  were  made  to  wait 
two  days ;  after  which  Bekovitch,  who  was  supposed 
to  have  hurried  on  from  his  place  at  the  head  of  the 
great  bulk  of  the  troops,  received  them  in  an  audi- 
ence. The  Khivan  messengers  had  brought  with 
them  as  presents  to  the  Russian  general  a  horse, 
a  kaftan,  and  a  supply  of  fresh  fruit  and  vegetables. 
Bekovitch  informed  them,  as  he  had  already  informed 
their  sovereign,  that  he  was  not  going  to  Khiva  with 
any  hostile  intentions,  but  simply  as  the  ambassador 
of  a  friendly  power  and  with  the  view  of  paying  his 
respects  to  the  Khan.  His  embassy,  he  admitted, 
had  a  political  object  but  he  reserved  for  himself  the 
honour  of  communicating  this  to  the  Khan  per- 
sonally. 

"  Bekovitch's  force,"  writes  the  official  historian, 
"  had  marched  from  Gurief  to  the  river  Emba  (200 
miles)  in  10  days  ;  from  the  Emba  to  the  Irket  Hills 
(on  the  northern  margin  of  the  Ust-Urt — about  100 
miles)  in  five  days  ;  553  miles  of  a  hilly  country 
were  next  performed  in  49  days.     Descending  the 


PERIOD— PETER  THE  GREAT  TO  PAUL.         19 

hills  in  two  forced  marches  (67  miles  in  two  days) 
the  column  emerged  upon  the  arms  or  overflows  of 
the  Oxus,  within  100  miles  of  Khiva,  and  encamped 
there  on  the  15th  of  August,  171 7.  The  column 
consequently  traversed  in  65  days,  or  in  about  two 
months  900  miles  of  a  barren  and  arid  Steppe ;  and 
that,  too,  at  the  hottest  time  of  the  year.  Through- 
out almost  the  whole  length  of  the  march  the  water 
obtained  was  of  bad  quality ;  at  every  halt  w^ells 
w^ere  dug  to  a  depth  of  from  two  to  four  fathoms. 
From  this  alone  the  sufferings  of  the  troops  (in  a 
heat  which  sometimes  exceeded  40°  Reaumur)  may 
well  be  imagined." 

The  Khan  showed  himself  as  great  an  adept  as 
Prince  Bekovitch  himself  at  the  noble  game  of  brag. 
He  seems  in  the  first  instance  to  have  been  well  dis- 
posed towards  the  Russians,  and  to  have  believed  in 
their  assurances  of  friendship.  When,  however,  the 
Kalmuk  and  Turcoman  deserters  reached  Khiva,  he 
could  no  longer  make  any  mistake  as  to  the  purpose 
of  Bekovitch's  advance.  He  summoned  troops  from 
every  side,  and  industriously  circulated  the  report 
that  he  was  about  to  take  the  command  of  100,000 
men,  w^hen,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  he  was  not  able  to 
assemble    more    than    24,000.      Hearing   that    the 


20  SUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

Khan  was  marching  to  attack  him,  Bekovitch  re- 
solved to  fight  a  defensive  battle,  and  drew  up  his 
troops  with  their  rear  to  the  river  bank,  and  with  their 
flanks  and  front  covered  by  barricades  of  carts. 
Scarcely  had  he  completed  these  preparations  when 
the  Khivan  cavalry  made  its  appearance,  and  at  once 
swept  down  upon  the  camp.  At  night  the  Khivans 
retired  some  distance,  *'  sitting  down  before  the 
Russians,  and  enclosing  them  in  the  form  of  a 
crescent."  Bekovitch  meanwhile  dug  a  trench  and 
erected  earthworks,  which  he  fortified  with  six  guns — 
all  the  artillery  that  he  had  been  able  to  bring  for- 
ward ;  so  that  when,  next  morning,  the  attack  was 
renewed,  the  Russians  were  well  prepared  to  meet 
It.  The  whole  of  that  day  and  the  day  following  the 
fight  was  kept  up,  when  the  Khivans,  finding  that 
their  onslaught  produced  no  effect,  determined  to 
have  recourse  to  negotiations. 

The  charge  of  the  Khivan  cavalry  had  done  but 
Httle  injury  to  the  well-protected  Russians,  and  their 
fire-arms  of  primitive  make  had  killed  but  lo  of  the 
enemy.  The  Khivans  however,  had  suffered  greatly 
from  the  Russian  musketry  and  artillery  fire. 

When,  on  the  morning  of  the  fourth  day,  an  envoy 
arrived  from  the  Khan  begging  Prince  Bekovitch  to 


PERIOD— PETER  THE  GREAT  TO  PAUL.         21 

grant  him  an  audience,  the  messenger  began  by 
declaring  that  the  attack  had  been  made  without  the 
knowledge  of  the  Khan,  who  had  only  just  arrived, 
and  who  had  never  intended  that  the  Russians  should 
be  in  any  way  molested.  If  Prince  Bekovitch,  he 
continued,  had  come  to  Khiva  as  a  friendly  envoy, 
he  would  be  well  received.  The  messenger  requested 
that  some  one  belonging  to  the  Russian  force  might 
be  permitted  to  return  with  him  to  the  Khan,  so  as 
to  give  an  authentic  reply  to  his  sovereign's  words  ; 
and  Bekovitch  sent  a  Tartar,  who  was  instructed  to 
inform  the  Khan  in  his  own  language  that  the  Prince 
''  was  the  bearer  of  credentials  and  of  verbal  com- 
munications from  the  Czar."  After  being  received 
by  the  Khan,  the  Tartar  messenger  came  back  to 
the  Russian  force,  saying  that  the  Khan  meant  to 
hold  a  council  that  day,  and  that  the  day  afterwards 
he  would  send  a  formal  communication ;  meanwhile 
all  fighting  was  to  be  considered  at  an  end. 

Bekovitch,  on  his  side,  held  a  council,  at  which  it  was 
determined  not  to  refuse  offers  of  peace  if  they  seemed 
advantageous  ;  though  several  of  the  officers,  with 
Major  Frankenberg  at  their  head,  opposed  this  view. 
It  was  necessary,  however,  to  count  with  circum- 
stances.    The  troops  had  undergone  much  fatigue, 


22  BUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

and  it  was  impossible  within  the  entrenched  camp  to 
find  pasture  for  the  horses  and  camels.  While 
Bekovitch  and  his  officers  were  still  deliberating,  the 
Khivans  renewed  the  attack.  Bekovitch  replied  to 
the  onslaught,  but  at  the  same  time  sent  the  Tartar 
messenger  to  inform  the  Khan  of  what  was  taking 
place,  and  to  remonstrate  with  him  on  the  subject. 
The  Khan  recalled  the  troops,  and  declared  that,  as 
on  a  previous  occasion,  the  offenders  had  acted 
without  his  knowledge  and  against  his  wish,  and  that 
they  were  not  Khivan  troops  but  Turcomans  and 
tribes  from  the  Aral  sea.  By  way  of  proving  to 
Bekovitch  that  the  attack  had  been  made  without 
his  authority  the  Khan  ordered  two  Khivans,  who 
were  accused  of  having  instigated  it  to  be  punished 
before  Bekovitch's  messengers  in  the  following 
manner: — They  were  to  be  "led  in  front  of  the 
whole  army  by  a  thin  string  drawn  through  the 
nostril  of  the  one,  and  the  ear  of  the  other." 

To  this  droll  penalty  the  culprits  were,  in  fact, 
subjected.  Then  two  of  the  Khivan  ministers  pro- 
ceeded to  the  Russian  camp,  where  a  preliminary 
treaty  was  arranged,  and  sworn  to  on  both  sides ;  the 
Khan's  ministers  kissing  the  Koran,  and  Prince 
Bekovitch    the    cross.     The    day    following    Prince 


PERIOD— PETER  THE  GREAT  TO  PAUL.        23 

Bekovitch  paid  a  visit  to  the  Khan,  attended  by  his 
principal  officers,  his  brothers,  and  a  detatchment  of 
Cossacks  and  dragoons,  to  the  number  of  700. 
Bekovitch  exhibited  his  credentials,  and  delivered 
the  presents  he  bore  from  the  Emperor,  consisting  of 
"  cloth,  sugar,  skins  of  sable,  nine  dishes,  nine 
plates,  and  nine  silver  spoons."  The  Khan  ratified 
the  treaty,  made  personal  protestations  of  friendship, 
and  invited  the  Russian  commander  and  his  officers 
to  a  dinner,  which,  says  the  official  historian,  was 
"  enlivened  by  the  strains  of  the  Russian  military 
band." 

The  day  after  the  interview  and  banquet  the 
Khan,  with  his  entire  army,  and  accompanied  by 
Prince  Bekovitch  and  his  principal  officers  as 
honoured  guests,  marched  to  Khiva.  The  cautious 
Major  Frankenberg,  who  mistrusted  the  Khivans  et 
dona  ferenteSj  had  been  left  in  command  of  the 
Russian  troops,  with  orders  to  follow  the  Khan  and 
the  Khivan  army  as  rapidly  as  might  be  convenient. 
He  probably  believed,  what  afterwards  proved  to  be 
the  case,  that  at  the  council  held  after  the  four  days' 
attack  upon  the  Russian  entrenched  camp,  the  Khan 
had  devised  a  plan  for  disposing  of  the  Russians 
in  detail,  without  meeting  the  army  in  the  field. 


24  RUSSIAN-  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

However  this  may  have  been,  Bekovitch,  on 
arriving  at  Khiva,  was  told  that  it  would  be 
impossible  to  feed  and  quarter  the  Russians  in  that 
city ;  and  he  was  accordingly  invited  to  separate  his 
own  escort,  and  the  Russian  army  generally,  into  a 
number  of  small  parties,  so  that  accommodation 
might  be  found  for  them  in  the  towns  adjoining  the 
capital.  The  sagacious  Major  Frankenberg,  when 
Bekovitch  directed  him  to  break  up  his  force  into  a 
number  of  little  detachments,  protested  against  doing 
anything  of  the  kind.  He  replied  to  the  messenger 
who  bore  the  order  that  this  was  an  idea  of  the 
Khan's,  and  that  it  was  his  duty  to  obey  the  orders 
of  Prince  Bekovitch,  the  commander  of  the  Russian 
troops.  Although  inspired  by  the  Khan,  the  order 
had  really  proceeded  from  Bekovitch  ;  but  he  was 
obliged  to  repeat  it  twice,  and  still  could  not  make 
the  determined  Major  act  upon  it.  At  last  the  Prince 
despatched  afourth  written  order,  threatening  Franken- 
berg with  a  court-martial  if  he  refused  any  longer  to 
do  his  duty.  Then  the  acting  commander-in-chief 
divided  his  force  into  five  different  detachments, 
which  were  conducted  by  the  Khivans  in  various 
directions.  This  break-up  of  the  Russian  force  was 
all  that  the  Khan  had  desired.      Prince  Bekovitch 


PERIOD— PETER  THE  GREAT  TO  PAUL.        25 

had  no  sooner  sent  away  his  own  private  escort  than 
he  was  made  prisoner  and  killed,  while  his  brothers 
and  brother  officers  were  either  cut  down  on  the  spot, 
or  stripped  naked  to  be  hacked  to  pieces  at  leisure. 
The  comparatively  small  parties  of  Russian  troops, 
numbering  each  at  the  utmost  from  200  to  300  men, 
were  set  upon  and  massacred  ;  and  the  Khan  then 
entered  in  triumph  his  city  of  Khiva,  where  he 
exposed  on  a  gibbet  the  heads  of  two  Russian 
princes  belonging  to  Cherkaski's  escort,  stuffed  with 
hay.  The  head  of  Cherkaski  himself  was  forwarded 
as  a  gift  to  the  Khan  of  Bokhara  ;  who  returned  it 
with  expressions  of  disgust,  and  with  an  inquiry 
whether  the  Khan  of  Khiva  was  a  cannibal  ? 

It  was  not  until  September,  i  71  7,  that  news  of  the 
terrible  fate  encountered  by  Prince  Cherkaski's 
expedition  reached  the  occupants  of  the  forts  on  the 
eastern  coast  of  the  Caspian.  A  report  on  the 
subject  was  at  once  transmitted  to  the  Czar. 

The  catastrophe  did  not  unduly  affect  the  daunt- 
less Peter,  who,  far  from  abandoning  his  views  in 
respect  to  Central  Asia,  gave  orders  for  the  regi- 
ments at  the  stations  on  the  east  coast  of  the  Caspian 
to  be  at  once  raised  to  their  full  complement.  But 
the  garrisons  were  so  much  enfeebled,  and  they  were 


-26  RUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

exposed  to  such  fierce  attacks  from  the  Turcoman 
tribes,  that  their  chiefs,  in  spite  of  the  orders  they 
had  received  from  St.  Petersburg,  thought  it 
advisable  to  embark  with  them  for  Astrakhan.  The 
13  vessels  in  which  they  sailed  were  dispersed  in  a 
storm  and  for  the  most  part  wrecked.  No  less  than 
400  of  the  returning  troops  were  lost.  The  rest  con- 
trived to  reach  the  shore — still  the  eastern  shore  of 
the  Caspian ;  where  they  had  great  difficulty  in 
finding  means  of  subsistence.  In  the  spring,  how- 
ever, of  the  following  year,  those  who  had  not 
succumbed  were  picked  up  by  vessels  sent  in  search 
of  them,  and  carried  to  Astrakhan. 

Thus  ended  the  ill-fated  expedition  of  Prince 
Bekovitch  Cherkaski,  which,  after  rapid  marching 
and  energetic  fighting,  was  destroyed  through  an 
act  of  treachery  against  which  its  commander  ought 
certainly  to  have  been  on  his  guard.  It  was  pleaded 
on  his  behalf  that  he  had  recently  suffered  great  mis- 
fortunes, that  he  had  been  sorely  tried  during  the 
brief  but  arduous  campaign,  and  that  his  mind  was 
to  some  extent  unhinged.  He  received,  in  fact, 
when  on  the  point  of  marching  from  Gurief,  news 
that  his  wife  and  a  portion  of  his  family  had  been 
wrecked  and  drowned  in  the  Caspian  Sea.   He  seems, 


PERIOD^PETER  THE  GREAT  TO  PAUL.         27 

nevertheless,  to  have  been  in  full  possession  of  his 
nerve  during  the  prolonged  attack  on  the  Russian 
camp.  His  expedition  was,  in  any  case,  attended 
with  the  most  tragic  results;  and  it  has  been  seen 
that  even  the  small  column  left  behind  at  Krasnovodsk, 
on  the  east  coast  of  the  Caspian,  was  destined  to 
meet  with  a  like  fate  to  that  reserved  for  the  column 
which  had  advanced. 

The  disaster  caused  a  great  impression  in  Russia, 
when  "to  perish  like  Bekovitch"  became  a  pro- 
verbial phrase  for  expressing  utter  annihilation. 

For  the  next  14  years  Russia  left  Khiva  alone  ; 
though,  even  from  an  earlier  period  than  the  reign  of 
Peter,  the  Czars  had  made  endeavours  to  strengthen 
their  influence  in  Khiva  on  every  suitable  occasion. 
"  From  the  time  of  John  the  Terrible,"  to  quote  the 
official  historian  of  Perofski's  expedition,  "  the 
Russians  have  always  sought  means  for  opening  a 
channel  for  their  trade  through  Central  Asia  with 
India,  in  order  to  acquire  some  of  that  fabulous 
wealth  for  which  India  was  always  so  celebrated." 
Peter,  however,  was  the  first  Russian  sovereign 
to  send  out  a  regular  expedition  against  Khiva — ■ 
the  ill-fated  expedition  led  by  Prince  Bekovitch 
in  1717. 


28  RUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 


Peter  again  thought  of  Khiva  in  1731.  But 
this  time  he  contented  himself  with  sending  a 
simple  negotiator  in  the  person  of  Colonel  Herzen- 
berg.  Herzenberg,  however,  was  not  allowed  to 
enter  the  capital ;  and  in  addition  to  this  insult  he 
had  to  submit  to  the  injury  of  being  plundered  on 
his  homeward  journey. 

In  the  year  1741  Abdul  Khair,  Khan  of  the 
Lesser  Horde,  and  a  friend  of  the  Russians, 
having  had  the  throne  of  Khiva  offered  to  him 
by  Nadir  Shah,  who  had  caused  the  late  sovereign 
to  be  put  to  death.  Lieutenant  Gladysheff,  of  the 
Russian  army,  the  Russian  surveyor  Mouravin, 
and  the  Russian  engineer,  Nazimoff,  entered  Khiva 
in  company  with  the  new  prince.  But  the  inter- 
ference of  the  Russians  led  to  nothing.  Mou 
ravin  visited  Nadir  Shah  in  his  camp  to  request 
"  that  he.  Nadir  Shah,  would  give  up  the  town 
of  Khiva  for  the  sake  of  His  Imperial  Highness 
Abdul  Khair,  for  that  the  latter  was  a  good  and 
faithful  subject  of  the  Russian  Empire."  Nadir 
made  presents  to  the  envoy,  and  accepted  his  pro- 
posals. But  he  at  the  same  time  requested  Abdul 
Khair  to  seek  a  personal  interview  with  him  ;  and 
the  latter  considered  this  invitation  so  alarming  that 


PERIOD— PETER  THE  GREAT  TO  PAUL.         29 

he  left  Khiva  in  haste,  the  Russian  officers,  who 
apparently  shared  his  views,  accompanying  him.  In 
due  time,  and  after  a  brief  occupation  by  Nadir  Shah, 
the  throne  of  Khiva  was  offered  to  and  accepted  by 
Khan  Nour  AH,  Abdul  Khair's  son. 

The  Empress   Catherine  was  so   much  occupied 
with  Western  affairs,  and  especially  with  intrigues  in 
Poland  and  wars  in  the  Balkan  peninsula,  that  she 
had  no  time  to   bestow  on   Central  Asian  politics. 
Nevertheless,   when    in    1793    the    Khan    of    Khiva 
requested  the  Empress  to  send  him  a  physician  to 
cure  his  uncle  Fazil  of  ophthalmia,  Her  Majesty  at 
once  consented,  and  despatched  an  observant  oculist 
named  Blankenagel.     Arriving  at   Khiva,  the  con- 
scientious doctor  declared  the  eyes  of  the  patient  to 
be  incurable.     This   irritated  the   Khan,  and  when 
Blankenagel  proposed   at  once  to  return,  he  found 
himself  detained  until  a  Khivan  council  could  come 
to  a  determination  as  to  how  he  was  to  be  dealt  with. 
A  powerful  majority  of  notabilities  recommended  that 
he  should  be  allowed  to  start,  and  put  to  death  on 
the  road.     This  proposition  was  formally   adopted. 
But  Blankenagel  was  informed  by  some  Russians  in 
captivity  at  Khiva  of  what  awaited  him  in  case  of 
his    remaining,    and    he    succeeded    in    making   his 


so  R  US  SI  A  N  PE  OJECTS  A  GAINS  T  INDIA . 

escape.  He  in  the  first  place  took  refuge  with  a 
Turcoman  tribe,  and  afterwards,  through  their  aid, 
reached  Mangishlak,  on  the  east  coast  of  the 
Caspian,  whence  he  sailed  to  Astrakhan.  Arrived 
in  St.  Petersburg,  Blankenagel  wrote  a  description 
of  his  visit  to  Khiva,  and  in  one  passage  of  the  work 
laid  great  stress  on  the  possibility,  as  it  seemed  to 
him,  of  uniting  the  Aral  Lake  with  the  Caspian  Sea 
by  turning  the  waters  of  the  Oxus  into  its  ancient 
bed ;  a  project,  as  is  generally  known  to  all  who  pay 
the  slightest  attention  to  the  affairs  of  Central  Asia, 
which  has  occupied  the  Russians  from  the  time  of 
Peter  I.  until  that  of  Alexander  II.,  and  which,  on 
the  occasion  of  an  overflow  of  the  Oxus,  was  revived 
with  considerable  energy  only  the  other  day, 

Blankenagel  entertained  a  quite  unfounded  opinion 
of  the  wealth  of  Khiva.  "  I  have  shown,"  he  wrote, 
"  what  assurances  I  gathered  regarding  the  rich  and 
inexhaustible  gold  and  silver  mines  of  Khiva.  These 
great  treasures  will  cost  us  much  less  in  respect  of 
working  and  carriage  than  those  of  Peru  cost  Spain." 
In  regard  to  the  commercial  as  distinguished  from 
the  industrial  question,  he  expressed  himself  as 
follows  :  "  All  these  rich  branches  of  trade  depend 
on  the  possession   of    Khiva,  and  ought  to   be  so 


PERIOD— PETER  THE  GREAT  TO  PAUL.         31 


much  more  important  to  us,  in  that,  to  acquire  this 
new  Peru,  it  is  not  necessary  to  arm  fleets,  despatch 
large  bodies  of  troops,  or  expend  much  blood  and 
treasure.  In  a  word,  the  possession  of  Khiva  will 
cost  us  nothing,  and  this  nothing  will  procure  for 
Russia  great  wealth,  and  what  is  more  pleasing  tran- 
quillity and  peace  for  the  natives.  ...  I  venture 
to  say  in  all  confidence  that  5,000  men  could  with- 
out difficulty  occupy  the  whole  of  the  Khivan  terri- 
tory." 

No  other  expedition  or  mission,  military,  com- 
mercial, scientific,  or  benevolent,  was  despatched 
to  Khiva  until  the  reign  of  Paul ;  when  one  of  the 
strangest  marches  ever  conceived  was  not  only 
resolved  upon,  but  in  part  executed,  by  one  of  the 

Orloffs.  The  enterprising  chief,  at  the  head  of  a 
force  composed  entirely  of  Cossacks  and  horse 
artillery,  proposed  to  advance,  first  to  Khiva,  then 
to  Bokhara,  and  ultimately,  with  all  the  adventurous 
horsemen  of  the  Steppes  who  could  be  induced  to 
join,  to  India  itself! 


CHAPTER    II. 

PROJECTS    AND     EXPEDITIONS     UNDER    ALEXAN- 
DER   I.,  PAUL,  AND  NICHOLAS. 

It  has  been  seen  that  besides  sending  independent 
commercial  missions  to  India,  Peter  the  Great,  in 
connection  with  Prince  Bekovitch's  ill-fated  expe- 
dition, despatched  officers  who  were  to  make  their 
way  to  India  in  the  character  and  costume  of  mer- 
chants. His  successors,  too,  following  out  his 
instructions  and  views,  aimed  at  establishing  them- 
selves in  Central  Asia ;  thus,  in  the  words  of  an 
official  writer,  "  to  open  a  new  route  for  Russian 
commerce  in  the  East."  But  the  first  Russian 
sovereign  who  conceived  the  idea  of  sending  troops 
to  India  for  the  express  purpose  of  injuring  England 
and  of  destroying  her  dominion  in  Hindostan  was 
the  Emperor  Paul ;  who,  though  slightly  crazy, 
possessed  a  considerable  amount  of  political  insight. 


UNDER  ALEXANDER  /.,  PAUL  AND  NICHOLAS.     33 


In  arranging  his  attack  on  the  Enghsh  settlements 
in  India,  the  Emperor  Paul  sought  the  co-operation 
of  Napoleon  ;  and  the  French  Emperor  seemed  dis- 
posed at  one  time  to  join  in  Paul's  project,  which, 
referrine  to  it  at  St.  Helena,  he  declared  to  be  far 
from  impracticable. 

Paul,  in  fact,  proposed  nothing  more  than  what 
Nadir  Shah  not  long  before  had  really  accom- 
plished. Indeed,  a  whole  series  of  Tartar  con- 
querors had  marched  from  Central  Asia  through 
Afghanistan  into  India  ;  and  it  seemed  to  Paul  and 
to  Orloff,  whom  he  entrusted  with  the  command  of 
his  expedition  against  the  English  in  India,  that, 
after  making  his  way  to  Khiva,  as  Bekovitch  had 
done,  an  enterprising  chief  might  raise  the  Turco- 
man tribes  as  he  advanced,  and,  accompanied  by 
these  plunder-loving  nomads,  go  on  from  Khiva  to 
Bokhara,  and  from  Bokhara  to  India ;  where  it 
was  proposed  that  the  unhappy  English  should  be 
"  driven  from  their  settlements  on  the  Indus."  This 
attempt  was  to  be  made  without  any  risk  on  the 
part  of  Russia  beyond  the  possible  sacrifice  of  a 
few  regiments  of  Cossacks. 

Paul,  however,  had  two  plans  for  attacking  the 
English  in  India.     Anticipating  Russian  strategists 

D 


34  EUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

of  a  later  period,  he  proposed  to  make  his  way  to 
Afghanistan,  at  one  time  through  Persia  or  along 
the  Persian  frontier  by  the  road  to  Herat  and  Can- 
dahar ;  at  another  through  the  Khanates  of  Khiva 
and  Bokhara.  His  first  plan  was  to  march  from 
Astrabad  by  the  road  to  Herat  and  Candahar  ;  and 
in  a  despatch  to  Napoleon  on  the  subject,  he  pro- 
posed that,  with  a  combined  army  of  70,000  men, 
France  and  Russia  should  "  chase  the  English  from 
India,  liberate  that  rich  and  beautiful  country  from 
the  English  yoke,  and  open  new  roads  to  England's 
commercial  rivals,  and  especially  to  France."  Paul 
was  by  no  means  solicitous  of  confining  to  France 
and  Russia  the  honour  and  advantage  of  expelling 
the  English  from  India ;  and  in  a  memorandum  on 
the  subject  (cited  a  few  years  ago  by  the  St.  Peters- 
burg Vedomosti)  he  considered  in  the  first  place 
"  what  Powers  should  be  invited  to  take  part  in  the 
project  of   a  march  to  India." 

"  The  French  Repubhc,"  he  wrote,  "  and  the  Em- 
peror of  Russia  must  send  a  combined  force  of  70,000 
men  to  the  borders  of  India.  But  the  Emperor  of 
Germany  {i.e.,  Austria)  must  also  join ;  for  it  would  be 
necessary  to  have  his  permission  for  the  French  army 
to  pass  through   his    territory,  and    sail    down   the 


UNDER  ALEXANDER  I.,  PAUL  AND  NICHOLAS.     35 


Danube.  ...  As  soon  as  the  plan  has  been  per- 
fectly matured,"  continued  Paul,  "  the  Russian 
Emperor  will  give  orders  for  the  assembling  at 
Astrakhan  of  an  army  of  35,000  men — 25,000 
regular  troops  of  all  arms,  and  10,000  Cossacks. 
Astrabad  will  be  the  headquarters  of  the  combined 
army.  From  the  Danube  to  the  borders  of  India 
the  advance  will  occupy  the  French  army  four 
months,  or,  avoiding  forced  marches,  five  months. 
The  armies  to  be  preceded  by  commissaries,  who 
will  establish  stations  and  halting-places  where 
necessary.  They  will  visit,  moreover,  the  khans 
and  great  landowners  through  whose  countries  the 
troops  will  pass,  in  order  to  explain  that  the  armies 
of  two  powerful  nations  have  found  it  necessary  to 
march  by  a  road  which  is  being  prepared  to  India  for 
the  purpose  of  driving  away  the  English  from  this 
beautiful  country  which  they  have  subjected ;  a 
country  formerly  so  remarkable  for  its  industry  and 
wealth,  and  which  it  is  now  proposed  to  open 
to  all  the  world,  that  the  inhabitants  may  profit 
by  the  riches  and  other  advantages  given  to 
them  by  heaven.  The  sufferings  under  which  the 
population  of  this  country  groans  have  inspired 
France  and  Russia  with  the  liveliest  interest ;  and 


36  RUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

the  two  Governments   have  resolved  to  unite  their 
forces  in  order  to  Hberate   India  from  the  tyrannical 
and   barbarous  yoke  of  the  English.     Accordingly, 
the  princes  and  populations  of  all  countries  through 
which    the    combined    armies   will    pass   need    fear 
nothing.      On  the  contrary,  it  behoves  them  to  help 
with  all  their  strength  and  means  so  benevolent  and 
glorious  an  undertaking  ;  the  object  of  this  campaign 
being  in    all   respects    as   just   as   was    unjust   the 
campaign   of  Alexander  the  Great,  who  wished  to 
conquer   the   whole   world.     The  commissaries   are 
further  to  set  forth  that  the  combined  armies  will 
not  levy  contributions,  and  will  pay  in  ready  money, 
on  terms  freely  agreed  to,  for  all  things  necessary  to 
their  sustenance  :  that  on  this  point  the  strictest  rules 
will    be    enforced.      Moreover,    that   religion,    laws, 
manners,    and    customs,    property  and  women,  will 
everywhere  be  respected  and  protected.     With  such 
announcements,   with  such   honest,   straightforward 
statements,  it  is  not  to   be  doubted  that  the  khans 
and   other   small  princes   will    allow   the  combined 
armies   to    pass   without    hindrance    through    their 
territories.       In  any  case  they  are  too  weak  and  too 
much  divided  by  dissensions  among  themselves  to 
make  any  opposition.       The  commissaries  will  hold 


UNDER  ALEXANDER  /.,  PAUL  AND  NICHOLAS.     37 

negotiations  with  the  khans,  princes,  and  private 
landowners  about  furnishing  provisions,  carts,  and 
kibitkas.  They  will  subscribe  conditions,  and  ac- 
cording to  circumstances  will  require,  or  themselves 
deposit,  caution  -  money.  Learned  and  artistic 
societies  must  take  part  in  the  glorious  expedition. 
Aeronauts  and  pyrotechnists  will  be  of  the  highest 
value  ;  and  to  inspire  the  population  with  a  high  idea 
of  France  and  Russia,  it  will  be  arranged,  before  the 
army  starts  from  Astrabad,  to  hold  grand  fetes  and 
perform  striking  evolutions  in  the  style  of  those  with 
which  great  events  and  memorable  epochs  are 
celebrated  at  Paris." 

"  How,"  asked  Napoleon  in  reply,  "  when  the 
combined  army  has  reached  Astrabad,  will  it 
penetrate  to  India,  across  a  barren  and  almost 
savage  country,  a  distance  of  300  leagues  ?" 

"  The  country,"  answered  the  Emperor  Paul,  "  Is 
not  savage  ;  it  is  not  barren.  It  has  long  been 
traversed  by  open  and  spacious  roads.  The  soil  is 
like  that  of  Arabia  and  Libya — not  covered  with  dry 
sand.  Rivers  water  it  at  almost  every  step.  There 
is  no  want  of  grass  for  fodder.  Rice  grows  in 
abundance  and  forms  the  principal  food  of  the 
inhabitants." 


38  RUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

Strangely  enough,  General  Khruleff,  recommend- 
ing fifty-seven  years  afterwards  just  such  an  advance 
against  India  as  the  Emperor  Paul,  in  his  memo- 
randum to  Napoleon  on  the  subject,  had  proposed, 
repeated  what  the  Emperor  Paul  had  set  forth  as  to 
the  fertility  of  the  country  between  the  Caspian  and 
Herat.  General  Khruleff  would  scarcely  have  trusted 
for  his  facts  to  such  a  visionary  as  Paul ;  and  pro- 
bably both  the  Emperor  Paul  and  General  Khruleff 
borrowed  their  information  from  some  official  report 
preserved  in  the  Russian  achives.  "  The  grazing 
land,"  wrote  General  Khruleff  at  the  time  of  the 
Crimean  war,  "  is  good  ;  and  water,  rice,  barley,  and 
sheep  are  procurable  in  plenty." 

The  alhance,  however,  between  France  and  Russia 
came  to  an  end,  and  all  idea  of  a  Russo-French 
expedition  to  India  was  lost  sight  of.  But  Paul  did 
not  abandon  his  project.  He  resolved  to  execute  it 
without  the  aid  of  the  French,  and,  instead  of  the 
road  to  Herat  and  Candahar,  to  adopt  the  Khiva- 
Bokhara  route.  In  the  year  1801  General  Orloff, 
Hetman  of  the  Don,  was  sent  with  a  force  of 
Cossacks  and  horse  artillery  from  the  Don  to  Oren- 
burg, and  from  Orenburg  towards  Khiva  where  on 
his  arrival  he  was  to  organise,  as  best  he  could,  an 


UNDER  ALEXANDER  I.,  PAUL  AND  NICHOLAS.     39 

expedition  to  India.  The  plan  of  campaign  was 
drawn  up,  and  the  motives  for  undertaking  it  ex- 
plained in  a  rescript  which  first  appeared  in  the 
appendix  to  General  Miliutin's  "  History  of  Sou- 
varoff's  Campaigns  "  published  in  1853,  and  brought 
out  a  few  years  afterwards  in  a  German  translation. 

"The  English,"  wrote  Paul,  "are  preparing  to 
attack  me  and  my  allies,  the  Swedes  and  Danes,  by 
sea  and  by  land.  I  am  ready  to  receive  them.  But 
it  is  necessary  also  to  attack  them  where  the  blow 
will  be  most  felt,  and  where  it  is  least  expected.  You 
will  therefore  proceed  to  India.  From  Orenburg  three 
months,  from  your  own  part  of  Russia  another  month 
— altogether  four  months.  I  entrust  this  expedition 
entirely  to  you  and  your  army.  Collect  your  troops 
in  the  furthermost  stations  and  await  orders  to 
march  to  Orenburg,  where  again  expect  orders  to 
continue  your  march.  This  enterprise  will  cover  you 
with  glory,  and  according  to  your  deserts,  you  will 
earn  my  special  good-will.  You  will  acquire  riches 
and  treasures,  and  will  affright  the  enemy  in  his 
heart.  I  send  you  maps — as  many  as  I  have — and 
remain,  your  well-wisher,  Paul. 

"  P.S. — My  maps  only  go  as  far  as  Khiva  and  the 
river  Amu  (Oxus).       Beyond  these  points  it  is  your 


40  EUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

affair  to  gain  information  about  the  possessions  of 
the  English,  and  the  condition  of  the  Indian  popula- 
tions subject  to  their  rule."  The  following  instruc- 
tions are  then  given  to  Orloff : — "  India,  your 
destination,  is  governed  by  one  chief  ruler  and  a 
great  many  small  ones.  The  English  have,  in  this 
country,  commercial  establishments — which  they 
acquired  either  with  money  or  by  arms.  Our  object 
is  to  destroy  all  these,  to  raise  up  the  small  rulers, 
and  bring  the  land  into  the  same  dependence  on 
Russia  in  which  it  now  stands  towards  England." 

Orloff  is  further  told,  in  the  name  of  his  "well- 
wisher,  Paul,"  and  apparently  by  one  of  Paul's 
secretaries,  that  his  despatch  of  the  25th  of  January 
has  been  received,  and  that  its  contents  are  approved, 
and  require,  therefore,  no  comment.  Then  in  his 
own  hand  (as  before)  the  Czar  continues,  under  date 
of  February  21st :  ''  Take  as  many  men  as  you  can. 
As  to  infantry  I  am  of  your  opinion,  that  you  had 
better  do  without  it." 

Orloff  marched  from  Orenburg  in  winter  with 
22,000  Cossacks  and  44,000  horses,  and  with  two 
companies  of  horse  artillery  ;  and  in  rather  less  than 
a  month  traversed  685  versts — upwards  of  450  miles. 
He  had  now  reached  the  heights  of  Irgiz  to  the  north 


UNDER  ALEXANDER  /.,  PAUL  AND  NICHOLAS.    41 

of  the  Aral  Lake ;  but  he  was  to  proceed  no  further. 
A  despatch  reached  him  announcing  the  death  of 
Paul ;  and  he  at  the  same  time  received  an  order 
commanding  him,  on  behalf  of  the  new  Emperor, 
Alexander  I.,  to  give  up  his  enterprise  and  return 
forthwith  to  Russia. 

Since  the  time  of  Paul,  who,  as  above  shown, 
formed  two  separate  projects  for  invading  India  and 
"  driving  the  English  from  their  settlements  on  the 
Indus,"  every  Russian  emperor  has  entertained  plans, 
or  at  least  had  plans  submitted  to  him,  either  for 
invading  India  in  a  direct  manner  with  Russian 
troops,  or  for  destroying  our  position  in  that  country 
by  indirect  means  and  chiefly  through  the  agency  of 
the  Afghans.  The  first  of  Paul's  projects  was  taken 
up  by  Alexander  I.  ;  or  rather  was  pressed  upon  the 
acceptance  of  that  sovereign  by  the  Emperor 
Napoleon.  Alexander  agreed  to  co-operate  in  a  com- 
bined Franco-Russian  expedition,  which  was  to 
march  to  India  through  Persia  and  Afghanistan. 
Nor  was  the  idea  abandoned  until  the  two  emperors 
fell  out ;  when  Napoleon  prepared,  not  for  an  expedi- 
tion with  Russia  to  India,  but  for  an  expedition  sup- 
ported by  troops  from  all  parts  of  continental  Europe 
against  Russia. 


42  RUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 


In  1837  th^  Emperor  Nicholas  despatched  an 
agent,  Lieutenant  Vitkievitch,  to  the  Ameer  of  Cabul 
with  propositions  of  support  in  arms,  ammunition, 
and  money  against  England's  ally,  Runjeet  Singh  ; 
and  finally,  in  1878,  Alexander  II.  sent  General 
Stolietoff  to  Cabul  in  order,  as  the  Tashkend  corres- 
pondent of  the  Russian  World  wrote  at  the  time, 
"  to  establish  direct  commercial  relations  with 
Afghanistan  and  India." 

Indeed  since  the  reign  of  Peter  the  Great  the 
Russian  emperors,  following  the  example  of  that 
sovereign,  have  never  found  themselves  free  from 
European  complications  but  they  have  at  once 
turned  their  attention  towards  Central  Asia.  A 
general  settlement,  so  far  as  the  West  was  con- 
cerned, having  been  effected  in  18 15,  the  Russian 
Government  lost  but  little  time  before  occupying 
itself  once  more  with  the  affairs  of  Khiva  and 
Bokhara  ;  and  in  18 19  formal  instructions  were  given 
to  General  Yermoloff,  commanding  the  army  of  the 
Caucasus,  to  Captain  Mouravieff,  of  the  General 
Staff,  and  Major  Ponomareff,  to  reconnoitre  the 
eastern  shores  of  the  Caspian,  with  the  view  of 
selecting  a  suitable  spot  for  the  construction  of  a 
fort  with  a  warehouse  for  goods,  and  afterguards  to 


UNDER  ALEXANDER  /.,  PAUL  AND  NICHOLAS.    43 

proceed  to  Khiva,  where  the  Khan  was  to  be  per- 
suaded to  direct  the  trade  of  his  dominions  towards 
the  spot  fortified.  The  two  officers  reconnoitred  all 
the  southern  portion  of  the  eastern  shores  of  the 
Caspian,  and  found  two  points  suitable  for  the  erec- 
tion of  a  fort,  one  near  the  mouth  of  the  Gurgen,  the 
other  on  the  Balkan  Gulf.  The  Yomood  Turcomans 
inhabiting  the  shores  not  only  refrained  from  annoy- 
ing the  Russian  agents  in  the  execution  of  their  duty, 
but  even  asked  to  be  taken  under  Russian  protec- 
tion. Escorted  by  a  few  Turcomans  of  this  tribe, 
Mouravieff  proceeded  to  Khiva  without  let  or  hin- 
drance. But  there  he  was  thrown  into  prison  and 
confined  for  a  space  of  forty-eight  days  ;  and, 
although  he  eventually  had  an  interview  with  the 
Khan,  he  failed  in  persuading  him  to  adopt  the  pro- 
positions of  his  Government,  and  soon  afterwards 
hurried  away. 

On  his  return  Mouravieff  described  his  travels,  and 
represented  in  the  most  vivid  colours  the  wretched 
condition  of  the  Khanate  ;  depicting,  moreover,  in 
sombre  hues,  the  painful  situation  of  the  Russian 
captives. 

More  important  than  anything  seen  by  Captain 
Mouravieff  in  Khiva  is  what  he  wrote  on  the  subject 


44  BUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

after  his  return  to  Russia.  "  Khiva,"  he  said  (in  a 
passage  previously  quoted,  but  which  may  be  here 
reproduced)  "is  at  this  moment  an  advanced  post 
which  impedes  our  commerce  with  Bokhara  and  with 
Northern  India.  Under  our  dependence,  Khiva 
would  have  been  a  safeguard  for  this  commerce 
against  the  attacks  of  populations  dispersed  in  the 
steppes  of  Southern  Asia.  This  oasis,  situated  in 
the  midst  of  an  ocean  of  sand,  would  have  become 
a  point  of  assembly  for  all  the  commerce  of  Asia, 
and  would  have  shaken  to  the  centre  of  India  the 
enormous  superiority  of  the  rulers  of  the  sea." 

Mouravieff's  narrative  is  also  remarkable  as  con- 
taining a  denial  of  the  favourite  Russian  beHef  (the 
"  great  Slavonian  sea-serpent,"  as  Kiepert,  the  Ger- 
man geographer,  has  called  it)  as  to  the  diversion  of 
the  Oxus  by  the  Khivans  and  the  possibihty  of 
turning  it  back  into  its  ancient  bed.  Whenever  an 
expedition  to  Khiva  has  been  planned — from  the  un- 
fortunate one  of  Prince  Bekovitch  in  the  reign  of 
Peter  the  Great,  to  the  highly  successful  one  of 
General  Kaufmann  under  Alexander  II. — the  possi- 
bility of  restoring  the  Oxus  to  its  ancient  bed  has 
always  been  considered.  When,  some  five-and- 
twenty  years  after  Dr.  Blankenagel,  Captain  Moura- 


UNDER  ALEXANDER  /.,  PAUL  AND  NICHOLAS.    45- 

vieff  visited  Khiva,  he  recognised  the  fact — which 
no    one   now   disputes — that  the  Oxus    had  at  one 
time  flowed  into  the  Caspian.     But  he  dechned  to 
entertain  the  idea  that  the  stream  had  been  diverted 
towards  the  Aral  Lake,  which  now  receives  it,  by  the 
Khivans.       "  It  is   probable,"   he  wrote,  "  that  the 
river  Syr  (Jaxartes)  was  connected  formerly  with  the 
Amu  Daria  (Oxus),  or,  at  least,  had  a  different  course 
from    that   which    it  now    follows.     An    earthquake, 
changing  the  entire  horizon  of    the   steppes,   would 
seem   to  have  given  quite  another  direction  to  the 
Syr,   which,  with  the  Amu,   forms    the  Aral  Lake. 
Ancient  historians  say  that  the  trade  of  India  passed 
along  the  Oxus,  which  at  that  time  threw  itself  into 
the   Caspian  Sea.     The  obscurity  which  surrounds 
the  history  of  Central  Asia,  above  all  at  the  period 
of  the  destruction  of  the  two  great  empires,  has  con- 
cealed great  natural  revolutions  which  changed  the 
face  of  a  portion  of  the   steppe  with   which   these 
regions  are  covered.  The  traces  of  these  revolutions 
are  still   visible,  and   are  above   all  recognisable  in 
the    new    course    of    the   Oxus   and   in  its    ancient 
bed. 

"  The  very  existence  of  that  river  has  often  been 
denied,  and  the  belief  in  its  non-existence  acquired 


46  RUSSIAN'  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

a  certain  consistency  when  the  expedition  sent  by 
Peter  the  Great  in  search  of  the  gold  sand  which 
was  said  to  He  on  its  shores  had  failed  disastrously. 
Prince  Bekovitch,  sent  with  a  detachment  to  Khiva, 
built  fortifications  on  the  Krasnovodsk  promontory, 
and  proceeding  to  the  northern  shore  of  Balkan  Bay, 
a  hundred  versts  to  the  east,  found  the  outlet  of  the 
river.  He  ascended  its  dried-up  bed,  but  after  a 
march  of  five  versts,  lost  all  traces  of  it.  Captain 
Kojin,  who  was  attached  to  the  Prince,  accused  him 
of  treason,  and  maintained  that  Bekovitch  had  only 
proclaimed  the  existence  of  the  river  with  the  view 
of  delivering  up  his  detachment  to  the  Khan  of 
Khiva.  The  year  following,  in  171 7,  Bekovitch 
went  once  more  in  search  of  the  dam  which  the 
Khivans  were  supposed  to  have  constructed  with  the 
view  of  directing  the  course  of  the  river  to  the  north, 
so  as  to  protect  themselves  against  the  incursions  of 
Cossacks." 

"  Bekovitch,"  continues  Mouravieff,  "  perished  in 
the  second  attempt,  and  his  sad  end  caused  all 
further  curiosity  as  to  the  course  of  the  Oxus  to 
cease.  If  the  Government  proposed  at  this  time  to 
establish  commercial  relations  with  India  by  means 
of  the   Oxus,   after  making  it   flow  once  more  into 


UNDER  ALEXANDER  I.,  PAUL  AND  NICHOLAS.   47 

Balkan  Bay,  it  must  be  presumed  that  it  had  some 
idea  of  the  vastness  of  this  river.  If  so,  how  could 
it  suppose  that  the  barbarous  Khivans  could  have 
been  capable  of  turning  the  course  of  such  a  river 
by  constructing  a  dam,  and  of  changing  the  inclina- 
tion of  the  steppe  in  order  to  direct  the  river  towards 
the  north.  The  Khivans  themselves,"  he  concludes, 
"are  astonished  at  such  a  supposition.  They  have 
preserved  traditions,  according  to  which  a  violent 
earthquake  five  hundred  years  ago  convulsed  the 
whole  surface  of  the  country,  and  caused  the  Amu 
Daria  to  flow  towards  the  north,  and  in  its  course  to 
form  for  itself  a  new  bed." 

In  1820,  in  order  on  the  one  hand  to  support 
Russian  authority,  and  on  the  other  to  render  the 
passage  of  caravans  secure,  another  mode  of  action 
was  adopted.  It  was  resolved  to  send  yearly  into 
the  steppes  detachments  of  a  strength  varying 
according  to  circumstances.  But  matters,  instead 
of  becoming  better,  became  worse.  In  1822  many 
Turcoman  tribes  acknowledged  the  authority  of  the 
Khan.  War  and  rapine  raged  between  the  Russian 
Kirghizes  and  those  who  were  still  independent. 
The  kidnapping  of  Russians  from  the  frontier 
increased  tenfold ;  piracy    on    the    Caspian    more- 


48  RUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AG  J  INST  INDIA. 

over  took  serious  proportions,  and  inflicted  great 
injury  on  Russian  fishermen. 

The  Russian  caravans,  escorted  by  considerable 
detachments,  were  pillaged  as  before.  Thus,  in 
1824,  a  caravan  under  the  protection  of  a  detach- 
ment consisting  of  625  men  and  two  guns,  was 
attacked  at  the  passage  of  the  Yani  river  by  hostile 
Kirghizes,  reinforced  by  Khivans.  For  three  days 
running  the  caravan  defended  itself,  but  finally  had 
to  throw  away  its  merchandise  and  retire,  with  a  loss 
of  something  like  half  a  million  roubles. 

The  kidnapping  of  Russians  on  the  frontier  did 
not  cease.  Every  year  some  200  Russians  were 
captured  on  the  Caspian  and  sold  in  the  Khivan 
market.  A  special  fund  was  held  in  trust  on  the 
frontier  for  their  ransom. 

In  the  year  1826,  Colonel  Berg  having  been  sent 
with  a  detachment  to  make  a  survey  of  the  territory 
between  the  Caspian  and  Aral  seas,  a  report  was 
spread  that  the  Russians  were  preparing  to  send  a 
new  expedition  to  Khiva.  A  Khivan  envoy  was 
therefore  sent  to  one  of  the  forts  on  the  Aral,  taking 
with  him  an  elephant  as  a  present  to  the  Emperor 
of  Russia.  The  envoy,  however,  was  informed  that 
he  would  be  allowed  to  proceed  to  St.  Petersburg 


UNDER  ALEXANDER  I.,  PAUL  AND  NICHOLAS.     49 

only  on  two  conditions  :  first,  that  the  Khan  of 
Khiva  should  indemnify  the  Russian  traders  for  all 
the  losses  they  had  sustained  by  the  attack  on 
their  caravan  in  1824;  and,  secondly,  that  all  the 
Russian  prisoners  detained  in  Khiva  should  be  sent 
back,  and  that  all  traffic  in  slaves  should  for  the 
future  be  prohibited.  These  conditions  were  not 
agreed  to  by  the  Khan,  and  the  envoy  was  sent  back 
to  Khiva. 

At  the  beginning  of  1830,  things  looking  quiet  and 
the  Khivans,  moreover,  being  nearly  at  war  with 
Bokhara,  the  Russian  Government  thought  the 
moment  opportune  for  sending  a  new  expedition  to 
Khiva.  An  envoy  from  Bokhara  had  reached  Oren- 
burg with  instructions  to  ask  the  Emperor  of  Russia 
to  "  put  a  limit  to  the  insolent  conduct  of  Khiva," 
and  to  offer  the  co-operation  of  the  Emir,  his 
master.  The  dissensions  between  the  governments 
of  Khiva  and  Bokhara  had  not  yet  taken  the  form 
of  open  hostilities  ;  but  the  Bokharians  at  Orenburg 
declared  positively  that  their  Emir,  even  if  he  did  not 
give  active  assistance  to  the  Russians,  would,  at  all 
events,  be  glad  to  see  their  common  enemy  restrained 
and  punished.  Khiva,  too,  was  at  this  moment 
engaged  in  open  war  with  Persia.     Animosity,  more- 

E 


50  BUSSIAN'  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

over,  existed  between  the  Khivans  and  some  of  the 
Kirghiz  chiefs.  Thus  Khiva  was  in  a  very  critical 
position,  and  everything  seemed  to  promise  success 
to  the  Russian  expedition  which  it  was  now  deter- 
mined to  organize.  But  the  French  insurrection  of 
July  in  this  year  seemed  likely  to  disturb  the  peace  of 
Europe  ;  and  it  was  in  fact  followed  by  a  formidable 
insurrection  in  Poland,  which  occupied  the  whole 
energies  of  the  Russian  Government,  and  caused 
all  idea  of  conquest  in  Central  Asia  to  be  aban- 
doned. 

In  1830  the  position  of  the  Russians  detained  in 
Khiva  was,  according  to  an  official  report  on  the 
subject,  as  follows  : — "  Incited  by  the  high  prices 
fetched  by  Russians,  the  Kirghizes  kidnapped  them 
even  on  the  line,  and  disposed  of  them  in  the  neigh- 
bouring countries  of  Central  Asia ;  particularly  at 
Khiva,  where  according  to  reliable  information,  there 
were  more  than  2,000  Russians  in  bondage.  In 
remote  times  men  were  seized  from  settlements  in 
the  interior,  even  on  the  Volga,  and  beyond  that 
river,  and  subsequently  on  the  Orenburg  line.  But 
about  the  year  1831  Russian  fishermen  alone  were 
kidnapped  by  Kirghizes  and  Turcomans  at  the  rate 
of  about  200  every  year.     Russian  prisoners  were 


UNDER  ALEXANDER  I.,  PAUL  AND  NICHOLAS.    51 

sold  at  the  Khivan  bazaars  ;  and  the  traffic  was 
participated  in,  not  only  by  the  highest  Khivan 
officials,  but  likewise  by  Khivan  traders  who  visited 
Russia  every  year,  and  who,  when  frequenting  the 
Kirghiz  encampments  for  purposes  of  trade,  incited 
the  Kirghizes  to  make  prisoners,  buying  them  up 
beforehand  and  giving  money  in  advance.  Al- 
though the  Orenburg  Frontier  Commission  had  at 
its  disposal  a  sum  of  3,000  roubles  for  the  redemp- 
tion of  Russian  prisoners,  it  was  only  able  to  procure 
the  liberation  of  a  very  small  number,  as  sentence 
of  death  was  awarded  at  Khiva  to  anyone  who  con- 
sented to  sell  his  slave  in  order  that  he  might  be 
restored  to  his  native  country." 

The  Khivans,  meanwhile,  finding  that  the  Russians, 
from  whom  they  had  expected  an  immediate  attack, 
made  no  movement  in  their  direction,  became  embol- 
dened, and  carried  on  to  a  greater  extent  than  ever 
their  practice  of  kidnapping.  The  idea  was  now  enter- 
tained of  seizing  the  Khivan  traders  visiting  Russia, 
and  keeping  them  as  hostages.  But  this,  it  was 
thought,  would  have  a  very  injurious  effect  on 
Central  Asian  trade  ;  and  all  the  Russian  Govern- 
ment deemed  it  advisable  to  do  was  to  propose  the 
formation    at  Orenburg   of   a  philanthropic  society 


52  BUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

with  the  object  of  rescuing  Russian  prisoners  from 
bondage.  Subscriptions  were  collected  from  private 
sources,  and  the  Government  granted  to  the  society 
a  secret  subsidy  of  3,000  roubles.  Apart,  however, 
from  the  question  of  means,  the  process  of  ransom- 
ing prisoners  was  a  difHcult  one  to  carry  out ;  and  it 
was  feared  that  the  tribes  of  Central  Asia  might 
learn  from  what  source  the  projected  philanthropic 
society  derived  the  greater  part  of  its  funds ;  in 
which  case  they  would  have  concluded  that  the 
Russian  Government  feared  the  Khivans  and  in  its 
dealings  with  them  was  obliged  to  use  money  pay- 
ments instead  of  force. 

The  philanthropic  society,  then,  was  abandoned  ; 
and  General  Perofski,  military  governor  of  Oren- 
burg, was  requested  to  furnish  the  Minister  of 
War  with  a  detailed  plan  of  campaign  against 
Khiva,  which  was  to  be  made  in  the  disguise 
of  a  scientific  expedition  under  military  escort. 
Delay,  however,  was  now  caused  by  local  reasons. 
There  were  disturbances  among  the  Kirghiz 
tribes  in  the  Orenburg  district  and  in  Siberia ; 
and  this  occupied  the  whole  attention  of  the  local 
administration.  In  1834,  in  order  to  strengthen 
the  influence  of  Russia  over  the  wandering  tribes. 


UNDER  ALEXANDER  L,  PAUL  AND  NICHOLAS.    53 

near  the  Caspian,  and  thus  put  an  end  to  the 
existing  state  of  insecurity,  the  fortress  of  Novo 
Alexandrovsk  was  constructed  at  the  head  of 
Kultuk  bay ;  and  to  defend  the  rest  of  what  then 
constituted  the  boundaries  of  the  empire  in  this 
direction  against  the  incursions  of  the  Kirghizes,  it 
was  decided  to  erect  a  wall  and  ditch  of  loo  versts 
(67  miles)  in  length  along  the  whole  of  that  part  of 
the  boundary  which  was  not  protected  by  any 
natural  bulwarks.  This  was  the  defence  which  was 
to  have  filled  the  gap  in  the  Orenburg  line,  from  the 
north  of  Tuguzaki  to  the  river  Ori.  A  small  portion 
of  the  wall — not  more  than  eighteen  versts — which 
was  to  have  formed  a  continuous  rampart  like  the 
Great  Wall  of  China,  was  finished  in  1836.  The 
height  of  the  wall  was  six  feet,  the  depth  of  the 
ditch  the  same.  It  was  hoped  that  the  whole  work 
would  be  finished  in  six  years  ;  and  2^  millions  of 
roubles  were  assigned  for  its  execution. 

This  Orenburg  line  marked  fifty  years  ago  the 
boundary  of  the  Russian  empire  on  the  Central 
Asian  side. 

An  expedition  under  Colonel  Mansuroff,  consist- 
ing of  some  five  or  six  hundred  Cossacks,  was  sent 
in    1836  against  a    Kirghiz    tribe   known   to  be  in 


54  RUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

alliance  with  the  Khivans,  and  which  habitually  aided 
them  in  their  depredations.  It  was  determined, 
however,  that  active  measures  must  be  taken  against 
the  Khivans  themselves  ;  and,  all  negotiations  for 
the  liberation  of  Russian  prisoners  at  Khiva  having 
failed,  a  measure  was  decided  upon  which  had  pre- 
viously been  taken  into  consideration  and  rejected. 

In  the  year  1836  all  the  Khivan  merchants  who 
were  returning  to  Orenburg  and  Astrakhan  from  the 
fair  of  Nijni  Novgorod,  were  detained  with  their 
merchandise ;  and  the  Khan  was  informed  that 
they  would  not  be  set  free  until  the  Russian 
captives  in  Khiva  were  liberated  and  all  hostile 
action  against   the    Russians    brought    to    an    end. 

"  It  became  evident,"  says  the  official  historian 
of  Perof ski's  expedition,  "  that  any  further  delay  or 
hesitation  on  the  part  of  the  Russians  would  be  looked 
upon  as  timidity  and  would  have  the  effect  of 
increasing  the  audacity  of  the  Khivans.  It  was 
therefore  resolved  to  punish  them  by  force  of  arms, 
and  General  Perofski  received  orders  to  advance  with 
a  large  force  on  Khiva." 

But  during  the  high  flooding  of  the  river  Amu  the 
whole  of  the  Khanate  is  liable  to  inundation,  and  as 
the  chief  floods  take  place  there  twice  in  the  year — 


UNDER  ALEXANDER  I.,  PAUL  AND  NICHOLAS.   55 

the  first  in  May  and  June,  and  the  second  in  July  and 
August — the  time  was  considered  most  inconvenient 
for  the  advance  of  a  military  force  towards  Khiva. 

Moreover,  the  greater  part  of  the  Khivans  could 
easily,  in  case  of  a  hostile  invasion  during  the  winter, 
collect  their  corn,  cattle,  slaves,  and  all  their  pro- 
perty, and  seek  shelter  for  a  time  In  the  neighbouring 
steppe,  or  else.  In  Perofski's  words,  "  fly  to  another 
territory  of  Khiva,  beyond  the  barren  sands,  and 
forming  another  oasis  with  Its  town  of  Merv."  Con- 
sequently the  force  destined  for  the  expedition  to 
Khiva  could  not  rely.  In  case  it  arrived  there  In 
winter,  on  finding  any  considerable  stock  of  provi- 
sions ;  and  It  was  therefore  thought  necessary  to 
reach  Khiva  while  the  corn  was  yet  standing  in  the 
fields. 

"  The  Khivans,"  according  to  our  Russian 
authority,  ''  notwithstanding  their  rapacity,  are  not 
a  warhke  race  ;  and  although  the  Khan  would  be  able, 
in  case  of  war,  to  bring  into  the  field  a  mounted 
force  of  20,000  men,  this  force  had  no  regular  forma- 
tion or  discipline,  was  badly  armed,  and  was,  therefore, 
incapable  of  offering  any  serious  resistance.  The 
Khivan  artillery  consisted  at  that  time  of  about  a 
dozen  unwieldy  guns.       Their  powder  was  of   bad 


56  RUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

quality,  the  cannon  balls  were  of  irregular  forms,  and 
as  they  did  not  fit  the  calibre  of  the  guns,  the 
Khivans  wrapped  them  in  felt  and  so  rammed  them 
down.  The  artillerymen  were  generally  Russian 
prisoners,  and  they  possessed  but  little  skill." 

Khiva,  then,  could  afford  but  scanty  means  of 
support  for  an  invading  army  ;  and  it  was  necessary 
for  the  troops  to  take  with  them  all  the  requisite 
supplies  for  the  whole  period  of  the  campaign. 
Nor  could  they  calculate  on  obtaining  fresh  horses 
and  camels  to  replace  those  which  would  be  lost  on 
the  route  from  exhaustion  and  other  causes.  Arrange- 
ments for  transport  had,  therefore,  to  be  made  on  a 
large  scale,  and  measures  adopted  for  forwarding  to 
the  Line,  in  case  of  need,  not  only  provisions,  but 
also  camels  and  horses.  These  were  the  chief 
obstacles  which  had  to  be  taken  into  account  in 
drawing  up  the  plan  of  the  campaign  ;  and  it  was 
necessary  to  keep  in  view  the  great  difference  be- 
tween campaigning  in  the  desert  steppes  and  in 
populous  Europe. 

In  European  campaigns  (putting  Turkey  aside) 
a  scarcity  of  water  is  hardly  ever  experienced,  and 
it  is  seldom  necessary  for  the  troops  to  supply 
themselves  with  water  for  the  day's  march.      Troops 


UNDER  ALEXANDER  I.,  PAUL  AND  NICHOLAS.   57 

advance  along  established  roads,  through  cultivated 
and  inhabited  districts,  in  which  not  only  quantities 
of  provisions  can  be  had  for  the  army,  but  where 
there  are  very  often  means  for  furnishing  the  force 
with  horses,  clothing,  and  ammunition. 

But  in  Central  Asia  a  scarcity  of  water  is  one  of 
the  principal  diflBculties  attending  an  expedition ; 
constituting  a  great  source  of  anxiety  to  the  com- 
mander. There  are  no  established  roads,  the  soldiers 
are  obliged  to  march  by  companies,  or  under  the  direc- 
tion of  a  guide  ;  the  wandering  natives  retreat  at  the 
approach  of  strangers  ;  and  perhaps  after  marching  a 
hundred  versts  not  a  soul  is  to  be  met  with,  nor  any 
information  to  be  obtained  as  to  the  position  of  the 
enemy.  Local  resources  for  supplying  a  force  with 
provisions  do  not  exist ;  everything  must,  conse- 
quently, follow  in  the  train  of  the  attacking  forces. 
The  boundless  and  exposed  character  of  the  steppes 
facilitate  flank  movements  ;  attacks,  therefore,  must 
be  expected  from  all  sides,  and  the  ordinary  disposi- 
tion of  the  force  must  be  in  square,  or  some  such 
order. 

A  military  expedition  in  Central  Asia  is,  in  fact, 
only  a  caravan  or  train,  following  no  regular  route, 
always  suffering  from  want  of  water  or  fuel,  and  liable 


58  SUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

at  each  halt  to  have  its  horses  and  camels  driven 

away,  and  consequently  to  be  deprived  of  its  means 

of  advancing.     The  train  of  an  expeditionary  force 

in    the    steppe,  where   everything    must   follow  the 

troops,  is  necessarily  a  large  one.     A  European  force 

of    i,ooo  men   can  be  limited  to  twenty    or   thirty 

waggons,    or    one    waggon     to    every    40    or    50 
men;  whereas,  in  the  Khivan  expedition  of  1839,  each 

soldier  had   to   be  provided  with  two  camels,  while 

to    every   two    camels    one    Kirghiz   was    attached. 

Although  the  Kirghizes  were  absolutely  indispensable 

to  the  force  on  account  of  their  knowledge  of  the 

nature   and    habits    of    the    camels,    and    of    their 

acquaintance  with  the  steppe,  the   Russians    could 

not  place  full  confidence  in  them  ;  and,  in  case  of  a 

hostile  attack,  it  would  be  necessary  to  take  measures 

to  prevent  them   not  only  from   running  away,  but 

also  from  communicating  with  the  hostile  Kirghizes 

and  Khivans,  and  assisting  them  to  drive  away  the 

horses  and  camels  of  the  Russians.     Thus  a  military 

expeditionary  force  in  the  steppes  is,  in  the  words  of 

the  Russian  historiographer,  "  only  an  escort  for  the 

protection  of  its  own  baggage  and  provision  train." 

In  reference   to  two   previous    Russian    marches 

to  Khiva,  that  of  the  Yaitsk  Cossacks  in  1610,  and 


UNDER  ALEXANDER  I.,  PAUL  AND  NICHOLAS.  59 

of  Prince  Bekovitch  in  171 7,  only  scanty  and 
incomplete  accounts,  founded  on  inquiries  and  con- 
jectures, were  in  existence  at  the  period  of  the  expedi- 
tion contemplated  by  Perofski.  Captain  Mouravieff, 
who  was  at  Khiva  in  18 19,  had  written  a  de- 
scription of  the  route  thither  from  Krasnovodsk, 
that  is,  from  the  Caspian  Sea  ;  but  being  kept  in 
confinement  at  Khiva,  and  in  danger  of  losing  his 
life,  he  could  not  collect  and  verify  native  accounts 
relating  to  Khiva  and  to  the  routes  leading  thither 
from  the  Orenburg-Uralsk  cordon-line.  The  infor- 
mation given  by  travellers  who  had  visited  Khiva, 
and  by  fugitives  from  that  country,  was  still  less 
satisfactory.  Some  accounts  carefully  gathered 
from  Russian  prisoners  released  in  1837-39  re- 
lated only  to  Khiva  itself.  Respecting  the  routes 
leading  to  Khiva,  and  with  reference  to  the 
surrounding  steppe,  they  could  of  course  give  no 
correct  data. 

Thus  in  1839  the  Russians  were  in  possession  of 
reliable  information  in  regard  only  to  the  northern, 
that  is  to  say,  the  most  accessible  and  most  explored 
part  of  the  steppe.  The  southern  portion  and  the 
routes  leading  from  it  to  Khiva,  over  a  distance  of 
700  versts,   were  only   known   by  verbal  accounts. 


«0  BUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

which  were  Inaccurate,  obscure,  and  conflicting, 
having  been  obtained  from  uncultivated  Russian 
prisoners  from  Khiva,  or  from  Asiatics  unworthy  of 
full   credit. 

In  addition  to  striking  changes  in  the  weather, 
the  grass  during  winter  is  covered  with  a  crust  of 
ice ;  and  as  the  horses,  camels,  and  cattle  are  only- 
fed  on  grass,  the  deep  snow  an-d  ice  deprive  them  of 
pasturage,  and  expose  them  to  death  from  starva- 
tion. 

It  will  be  seen  from  the  foregoing  account  that  the 
principal  difficulty  in  organising  the  expedition  lay  in 
provisioning  the  force,  and  in  providing  the  requisite 
means  for  its  transport.  The  length  of  the  route,  ex- 
tending over  i,ooo  versts,  about  500  of  which  passed 
through  a  barren  steppe,  rendered  the  conveyance  of 
all  the  stores  by  the  same  camels  impossible  for  the 
whole  distance.  It  was,  therefore,  found  necessary 
to  form  a  depot  of  provisions,  &c.  at  a  point  in  the 
interior  of  the  steppe,  as  near  Khiva  as  possible,  and 
to  provide  other  means  for  transporting  the  stores 
to  this  point;  whence  the  troops,  being  furnished  with 
the  requisite  supplies  of  food,  ammunition,  &c., 
might  push  forward  to  Khiva  on  camels.  That  is  to 
say,  as  a  preliminary  measure,  it  was  necessary  to 


UNDER  ALEXANDER  I.,  PAUL  AND  NICHOLAS.     Gl 


select,  on  the  route  fixed  upon  for  the  march  of  the 
expeditionary  force,  a  convenient  point  for  the 
erection  of  a  fortification  and  the  formation  of  a  depot, 
having  in  its  vicinity  an  abundant  supply  of  water 
and  grass. 

The  plan  of  the  campaign  was  drawn  up  on  the 
following     basis : — I.     The     principal     detachment 
against   Khiva  to   consist   of  5,000  men,  of  which 
3,000  would   be  sufficient  for  inflicting  punishment 
on    Khiva ;  the    remainder     of    the     force     to     be 
employed  in  guarding   the  depot  of    stores   at   the 
intermediate  point.     The  force  to  consist  of  troops 
of  the  Orenburg  corps.     II.  All  preparations  for  the 
expedition  to  be  made  at  Orenburg,   on  account  of 
the  greater  convenience  and  economy  of  this  arrange- 
ment, and  the  possibility  of  superintendence  by  the 
authorities  ;    the  main  body  of  the  force  to  march 
from  Orenburg.     III.  A  detachment  to  be  sent  in 
advance  for  selecting,  on  the  route  to  Khiva,  the 
most  convenient  spot  for  establishing  a  dep6t,  and 
for  fortifying  within  it  the  garrison  entrusted  with 
its  keeping.     IV.  To  transport  the  stores  gradually, 
on  carts  furnished  from  Orenburg,  to  the  point  in  the 
steppe  chosen  for  the  intermediate    depot.      V.   In 
order  to  protect  the  transport  train  despatched  from 


62  RUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

the  frontier  to  the  intermediate  depot  against  hostile 
Kirghizes  and  Khivans,  to  form  a  separate  detach- 
ment, independent  of  the  main  body  of  the  force. 
VI .  The  transport  of  all  provisions,  &c.,  for  the  main 
body  as  well  as  for  the  troops  themselves,  from  the 
depot  to  Khiva,  to  be  performed  by  camels ;  for  which 
purpose  the  requisite  number  of  these  animals  to  be 
obtained  and  collected  during  the  summer  from  the 
Kirghiz  tribes  under  Russian  subjection.  VII.  After 
the  occupation  of  Khiva,  or  any  other  town  of  the 
Khanate,  all  further  military  operations  to  be  regu- 
lated by  circumstances. 

The  conduct  of  the  campaign  was  entrusted  to 
General  Perofski,  at  that  time  military  governor  of 
Orenburg. 


CHAPTER     III. 

THE    FIRST    RUSSIAN    AGENT    IN   AFGHANISTAN. 

In  1837,  when  General  Perofski  was  already  occu- 
pied with  preparations  for  his  expedition  against 
Khiva,  a  military  and  political  agent,  Capt.  Vitkie- 
vitch  (called  by  Burnes,  Kaye,  and  other  English 
writers  "  Vickovitch  "),  was  despatched  by  the 
Russian  Government  to  Cabul,  whence  he  was  to 
proceed  to  Lahore ;  and  both  at  Cabul  and  at 
Candahar  he  offered  a  Russian  alliance,  with  sub- 
sidies and  arms,  in  view  of  an  attack  upon  Herat  and 
upon  Runjeet  Singh's  possessions  in  India. 

According  to  a  Russian  official  report  dated  Sept. 
30  (Oct.  12),  1837,  the  intelligence  received  at 
Teheran  of  the  arrival  of  Burnes  at  Cabul  had  in- 
duced Count  Simonitch  to  send  Vitkievitch  thither  ; 
and  this  may  be  perfectly  true.  But  before  Burnes's 
arrival  at  Cabul,  at  the   beginning  of  Sept.,  1837, 


64  E  USSIAN  PROJECTS  A  GAINST  INDIA . 

Count  SImonitch  had  written  to  Dost  Mahomed 
expressing  a  wish  to  befriend  him  ;  and  in  forward- 
ing to  the  Secretary  of  the  Indian  Government  a 
copy  of  the  Count's  letter,  Burnes  pointed  out 
that  the  Russian  ambassador  had  "  himself  com- 
menced the  correspondence  with  the  chief  of  Cabul, 
telling  him  that  if  the  Shah  of  Persia  would  not 
assist  him  his  court  was  ready  to  do  so." 

Dost  Mahomed's  agent  at  Teheran,  in  transmitting 
the  ambassador's  letter,  had  written  as  follows  : 
"  The  Russian  ambassador,  who  is  always  with  the 
Shah,  has  sent  you  a  letter  which  I  enclose.  The 
substance  of  his  verbal  message  is  that  if  the  Shah 
does  everything  you  want  so  much  the  better  ;  and 
if  not  the  Russian  Government  will  furnish  you  with 
everything  wanting.  The  object  of  the  Russians  is 
to  have  a  road  to  the  English  (India)  ;  and  for  this 
they  are  very  anxious." 

It  is  to  be  observed  that  in  the  original  mutilated 
and  garbled  version  of  the  "  Correspondence  Relating 
to  Cabul  and  Afghanistan/^  the  letter  from  which 
the  above  passages  are  cited  had  been  omitted.  It 
was  published  for  the  first  time  in  1859,  when  no  one 
was  thinking  of  Afghanistan  or  of  Russia.  The 
edition  of  1859,  with  the  restored  passages  printed 


FIRST  RUSSIAN  AGENT  IN  AFGHANISTAN.     65 

between  brackets,  recalls  the  words  of  Prince 
Bismarck,  who,  asked  in  the  Chamber  why  Prussia, 
unlike  the  other  European  Governments,  published 
no  collections  of  diplomatic  documents,  replied  that 
to  prepare  such  documents  for  the  use  of  the  public 
it  would  be  necessary  to  "double  the  number  of 
clerks  employed  in  the  Foreign  Office." 

The  Ameer  had,  on  his  side,  written  to  the 
Emperor  of  Russia  complaining  that  the  English 
were  supporting  Shah  Shoojah  ;  that  they  were  on 
good  terms  with  Runjeet  Singh ;  that  they  did 
not  seem  favourably  disposed  towards  him.  Dost 
Mahomed  ;  that  the  Sikhs  were  his  enemies  ;  and 
that  he  hoped  the  Emperor  would  "  arrange  matters 
in  the  Afghan  country  "  and  allow  the  Ameer  "  to 
be  received,  like  the  Persians,  under  the  govern- 
ment of  Russia." 

The  letter  from  the  Emperor  Nicholas  in  reply, 
though  it  contained  no  direct  promise  of  assistance, 
was  thought  sufficiently  compromising  by  the  English 
Foreign  Office  to  be  suppressed.  So  also  was  a 
passage  in  a  letter  from  Count  Simonitch  referring 
to  the  fact  that  Vitkievitch  had  gone  to  Cabul  as 
bearer  of  an  autograph  letter  from  the  Czar,  and 
another    passage    setting    forth    that    the    presents 

F 


66  EUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

he  was  charged  to   offer  came  from  "  the  Imperial 
store." 

The  presents  offered  by  Burnes  had  been,  in 
accordance  with  his  formal  instructions  on  the  sub- 
ject, "  of  moderate  value ;  "  and  he  felt  it  necessary 
to  apologise  for  their  poorness,  and  to  explain  that 
they  had  no  governmental  character,  but  were  his 
own  personal  gifts.  General  Hanlan,  an  American 
officer  who  commanded  Dost  Mahomed's  regular 
troops,  and  acted  as  Chief  of  the  Staff  to  the  entire 
army,  has  told  us  in  his  volume  on  Afghanistan  that 
Burnes's  offerings  were  despised,  and  that  they  were 
regarded  with  contempt  even  by  the  ladies  of  the 
harem  among  whom  they  were  distributed. 

The  arrival  of  Vitkievitch  at  Cabul,  bearing  rich 
presents,  was  to  the  Ameer  something  more  than  an- 
noying ;  and  though  he  could  neither  accept  the  sup- 
port of  England,  involving  as  it  did  his  abandonment 
of  Peshawur,  nor  that  of  Russia,  which  was  con- 
ditional on  his  recognising  the  claims  of  Persia  over 
Herat,  the  interference  of  Russia  in  his  affairs  had, 
all  the  same,  the  effect  of  bringing  about  a  war 
between  England  and  Afghanistan. 

The  Russians  were  quite  satisfied  with  the  result 
attained  ;    for  the  official  historian  of  Perofski's  ex- 


FIEST  RUSSIAN  AGENT  IN  AFGHANISTAN.    67 

pedition  writes  that  the  Russian  agent  "  contrived 
to  acquire  the  friendship  of  Dost  Mahomed  of  Cabul, 
whom  he  succeeded  in  disposing  favourably  towards 
Russia." 

Vitkievitch  had  received  only  verbal  instructions, 
and,  according  to  the  Russian  writer  just  cited, 
he  was  "  not  to  disclose  anywhere  that  he  was 
sent  by  the  Government."  But  Vitkievitch  said 
■everywhere  who  and  what  he  was,  and  wore  habitu- 
ally the  uniform  of  a  Cossack  officer.  This  strange 
demeanour  on  the  part  of  a  Russian  agent  caused  a 
certain  amount  of  mystification.  Vitkievitch  was 
described  as  a"  Russian  from  Moscow,"  an  "  Anato- 
lian," a  "  Cossack  ;  "  and  one  of  the  English  agents, 
on  being  informed  that  he  was  a  Pole,  pronounced 
this  statement  not  only  untrue  but  "disgusting;" 
since  no  one,  he  said,  could  conceive  a  Pole  entering 
the  service  of  Russia. 

Vitkievitch,  however,  was  really  a  Pole ;  and  he 
had  not  been  consulted  as  to  whether  or  not  he  would 
enter  the  Russian  service.  Convicted  in  1824,  when 
a  student  at  Wilna,  of  having  organized  a  secret 
.society  called  the  Black  Brothers,  and  of  having 
written  "  revolutionary  letters  and  verses,"  he  was 
-transported  to  Orenburg,  and  drafted  as  private  into 


68  HUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

0-ne  of  the  battalions  of  the  Orenburg  corps.  Six 
years  afterwards  he  was,  on  the  recommendation  of 
his  colonel,  and  in  consideration  of  his  praiseworthy 
conduct,  talents,  and  knowledge  of  the  Persian  and 
Kirghiz  language,  promoted  to  the  grade  of  under- 
officer,  and  attached  to  the  Orenburg  Boundary 
Commission.  In  1831  he  performed  brilliant  military 
service  in  the  Kirghiz  country,  and  his  reports  were 
declared  in  an  official  document  to  be  "  full  of 
interesting  information  and  remarks,  so  that  not  one 
of  his  predecessors  in  the  steppe  has  been  able  to 
form  so  correct  a  judgment  of  the  Kirghiz  tribes  or 
of  their  relations  to  each  other."  In  August  of  the 
same  year  the  chief  of  the  Orenburg  corps  recom- 
mended Vitkievitch  for  a  commission,  observing 
that,  with  the  exception  of  a  certain  "  secretiveness 
of  disposition,  the  natural  result  of  so  many  mis- 
fortunes," his  behaviour  was  all  that  could  be 
desired.  Vitkievitch,  however,  in  spite  of  his  ser- 
vices and  of  the  good  opinion  with  which  he  had 
inspired  his  superior  officers,  did  not  receive  his 
commission  until  1834,  when  he  is  said  to  have 
owed  it  in  some  measure  to  the  representations  of 
the  illustrious  Humbolt,  whose  acquaintance  he  had 
made  at  St.  Petersburg,  and  who  interested  himself 


FIRST  RUSSIAN  AGENT  IN  AFGHANISTAN.    69 

greatly  on  Vitkievitch's  behalf.  After  his  expedition 
to  Bokhara  he  was  advanced  one  step,  and  on  his 
return  to  St.  Petersburg  from  Cabul,  at  the  end  of 
April,  1839,  he  was  recommended  for  promotion  in 
the  Guards,  besides  being  decorated  and  having  a 
sum  of  money  allotted  to  him. 

At  Cabul,  whether  from  a  wish  to  inspire  con- 
fidence in  return,  or  with  the  direct  object  of 
alarming  the  English,  Vitkievitch  gave  freely  the 
sort  of  news  that  one  would  have  expected  him  to 
withhold.  Thus  he  told  Burnes  that  General 
Barofski  was  commanding  the  forces  before  Herat 
and  that  the  Russians  were  about  to  send  against 
Khiva  that  expedition  under  General  Perofski  (with 
whom  General  Barofski  was  naturally  confounded  in 
the  journals  of  the  period)  which  the  English 
believed  to  have  arrived  in  Khiva  long  before  it  had 
started  from  Orenburg.  The  Russians  indeed 
waited  to  make  their  attack  on  Khiva  "  until  the 
settlement  of  English  matters  in  Afghanistan ;  in 
order  that  the  influence  and  impression  of  the 
Russian  proceedings  in  Central  Asia  might  have 
more  weight,  and  that  England,  in  consequence  of 
her  own  conquests,  might  no  longer  have  any  right 
to  trouble  the  Russian  Government  for  explanations." 


70  RUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

Vitklevltch  was  a  friend  of   Count  Soltykoff,  well- 
known  by  his  travels  in  Persia  and  in  India  ;   and  he 
had  repeatedly  shown  the  Count  a  pistol  with  which 
he  intended,  he  said,    some  day   or  other  to  shoot 
himself.       Soon   after  his   return  to  St.   Petersburg 
from  the  mission  to  Cabul,  Vitkievitch  in  fact,  blew 
his  brains  out;  leaving  behind  him  a  letter  from  which 
it    appeared   that  he    suffered   from    no   one  griev- 
ance in  particular,  but  was    discontented  with  the 
world  in  general.     A  disturbance  had  recently  taken 
place  at  Wilna  in  which  he  feared  that   his  brother 
might  have  been  implicated.     But   this   affords  no 
direct  clue  to  his  suicide,  since  he  afterwards  ascer- 
tained that  his    brother  was    not  concerned  in   the 
outbreak.     The    night    before    his    suicide   he   was 
at  the    theatre  with    Prince    Soltykoff,    apparently 
in  excellent  spirits  ;  and   before   retiring  to  bed  he 
gave  orders   to  be    called    early  the  next  morning. 
He  seems  to  have  killed  himself  with  deliberation  ; 
and   before  doing  so,  he   destroyed   all  the  papers, 
including   copies   of   his    correspondence   with    the 
English  agents  in  Afghanistan,  which  he  was  to  have 
embodied  in  a  report  for  the  Asiatic   department  of 
the  Russian  Foreign  Office. 

Of   the   arguments    and    promises    employed    by 


FIRST  RUSSIAN  AGENT  IN  AFGHANISTAN.    71 

Vitkievitch  in  his  dealings  with  the  chiefs  of 
Candahar  and  with  the  Ameer  of  Cabul,  we  have 
suiBcient  knowledge  from  the  reports  transmitted  by 
Bumes  to  the  Indian  Government.  The  Russian 
agfent,  as  Lieut.  Leech  sent  word  from  Candahar  to 
Bumes  at  Cabul,  was  offering  money  for  a  war 
against  the  Sikhs,  with  a  view  to  the  reconquest  of 
Mooltan  and  Derajat  and  for  regaining  Scinde.  The 
Russians  would  send  arms,  moreover,  but  not  men ; 
and  the  Sirdars  of  Candahar  were  informed  that  "  the 
English  had  preceded  the  Russians  in  civilization  for 
some  generations,  but  that  now  the  latter  had  arisen 
from  their  sleep  and  were  seeking  for  foreign  posses- 
sions and  alliances  ;  and  that  the  English  were  not  a 
military  nation,  but  merely  the  merchants  of 
Europe." 

At  Cabul,  Vitkievitch  informed  the  Ameer  that 
"  the  Emperor  of  Russia  was  supreme  in  his 
dominions  and  could  act  of  himself  with  promptitude 
and  without  being  delayed  by  having  to  consult 
others  while  the  British  Government  transacted  its 
business  by  a  Council  which  gave  rise  to  procrastina- 
tion. This  would  show  him  the  advantage  of  allying 
himself  to  Russia,  where  no  such  inconvenience  ex- 
isted."   After  quitting  Cabul,  some  weeks   later  than 


72  RUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

Burnes,  Vitkievitch  wrote  the  Ameer  a  letter  upbraid- 
ing him  with  his  hesitancy,  and  reproaching  him, 
for  not  having  had  the  sense  to  accept  either  the 
Enghsh  or  the  Russian  aUiance.  Thus,  whatever 
his  Government  may  have  thought,  Vitkievitch  him- 
self would  seem  to  have  been  dissatisfied  with  the 
result  of  his  mission.  His  early  adventure  in  the 
character  of  Polish  patriot,  the  enterprise  he  dis- 
played in  the  steppes  and  on  his  journey  to  Bok- 
hara, his  arrival  and  virtual  proclamation,  both 
at  Bokhara  and  at  Cabul,  of  the  business  on  which 
he  was  engaged,  together  with  his  energy  and 
activity  as  a  soldier,  a  student  and  an  observer, 
prove  him  to  have  been  a  man  of  high  spirit ; 
and  he  may  have  regarded  his  mission  to  the  Ameer 
as  a  failure.  One  effect  which  in  any  case  it  pro- 
duced was  to  raise  apprehensions  on  the  part  of 
Afghanistan,  with  consequences  sufficiently  well- 
known. 

While  Vitkievitch  was  pursuing  his  intrigues  at 
Cabul  and  Perofski  was  preparing  for  his  expedition 
to  Khiva,  Herat  was  being  besieged  by  a  Persian 
force  strengthened  by  a  regiment  of  so-called 
Russian  deserters,  under  the  leadership  of  General 
Samson   himself  a   Russian  ;    the    siege   operations 


FIRST  RUSSIAN  AGENT  IN  AFGHANISTAN.     73 

Toeing  under  the  general  direction  of  the  before-men- 
tioned General  Barofski.  Count  Simonitch,  too, 
Russian  Ambassador  at  Teheran,  took  an  active 
part  in  the  siege,  and  distributed  large  sums  of  money 
among  the  Persian  troops,  to  whom  arrears  of  pay 
were  due. 

Thanks  to  the  energy  of  a  young  English  ofhcer, 
Lieut.  Pottinger,  of  the  Bombay  Artillery,  the  de- 
fence was  prolonged  for  a  period  of  nine  months. 
Meanwhile  England  had  made  diplomatic  repre- 
sentations at  Teheran,  and  what  was  probably  more 
effective  had  sent  an  expedition  to  the  Persian  Gulf ; 
and  according  to  the  Shah  of  Persia,  who  made 
a  public  declaration  on  the  subject,  it  was  owing  to 
pressure  from  England  that  in  Sept.,  1838,  the  siege 
was  raised. 


CHAPTER     IV. 

PEROFSKl'S       EXPEDITION. 

"  From  the  times  of  John  the  Terrible,"  says  the 
official  historian  of  Perof  ski's  expedition,  "the 
Russians  have  always  sought  means  for  opening 
a  channel  for  their  trade  through  Central  Asia  with 
India,  in  order  to  acquire  some  of  that  fabulous 
wealth  for  which  India  was  always  so  famous ;  but  it 
was  Peter  the  Great  who  was  first  enabled  to  take 
energetic  measures  in  this  direction." 

The  successors  of  Peter  the  Great,  following  out 
his  views,  cherished  the  idea  of  establishing  them- 
selves in  Central  Asia,  and  thus  opening  a  new  route 
for  Russian  commerce  to  the  East.  We  have  seen 
that  in  furtherance  of  these  views,  Aboul- Hair-Khan, 
Sultan  of  the  Lesser  Horde,  with  the  Kaisaks  under 
his  rule,  was  received,  in  1 730,  under  the  protection 
of  Russia,   and    a   commencement  was  then  made  — 


PEROF SKI'S  EXPEDITION.  75 


towards  the  subjugation  of  the  Kirghiz  steppes, 
which  also  led  to  the  establishment  of  intercourse 
with  the  neighbouring  Khanates  of  Khiva  and  Bok- 
hara. 

At  this  period  the  Russian  Government  had,  in  the 
words  of  the  official  historian,  "  become  acquainted 
with  the  extreme  difficulty  of  penetrating  into  Central 
Asia  and  further  into  India."  It  therefore  turned 
its  attention  exclusively  to  the  organization  of  the 
south-eastern  boundaries  of  the  empire,  which,  for  a 
long  time,  during  the  whole  of  the  eighteenth  century 
were  the  scenes  of  disturbances  between  the  various 
tribes  established  there.  Thus,  first  the  disorders  in 
the  Kirghiz  steppes,  the  insurrections  of  the  Bashkirs, 
and  the  flight  of  the  Kalmucks  into  Chinese  terri- 
tories ;  and,  lastly,  in  1773  and  1774,  the  Pugacheff, 
rebellion,  absorbed  the  attention  of  the  Government, 
and  diverted  its  views  from  all  projects  in  the  east. 

It  has  been  mentioned  in  a  previous  chapter  that 
in  1793,  at  the  request  of  the  Khan,  the  Empress 
Catherine  II.  sent  her  oculist  Blankenagel  to  Khiva. 
The  Khan  determined  to  keep  him  under  sur\^eillance 
as  long  as  any  necessity  for  his  medical  skill  existed; 
after  which  he  was  to  be  sent  back  to  Russia,  but 
before  arriving  at  his   destination  was   to   be  mur- 


76  EUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 


dered,  in  order  that  he  should  not  relate  anything  he 
had  seen.  Blankenagel  hearing  of  this  sought  safety 
in  flight,  and  he  contrived  to  gain  over  several  Tur- 
comans, who  got  him  safely  to  Mangishlak,  whence 
he  made  his  way  by  sea  to  Astrakhan. 

In  1 8 19  a  mission  was  sent  to  Khiva,  under  the 
command  of  Captain  Mouravief.  But  this  Embassy 
was  also  received  with  distrust,  and  we  have  seen 
that  it  led  to  nothing. 

The  Russian  Government,  recognizing  the  ad- 
vantages of  the  trade  with  Bokhara,  and  seeing 
that  this  trade  was  rendered  very  precarious  by 
the  rapacity  of  the  Kirghizes  and  Khivans,  and  that 
the  passage  of  caravans  was  attended  every  year 
with  great  danger,  despatched  an  Embassy  to 
Bokhara  in  18 19  (simultaneously  with  the  mis- 
sion of  Mouravief  to  Khiva)  in  order  to  concert 
measures  with  the  Khan  of  Bokhara  for  ensuring 
and  strengthening  commercial  relations  ;  but  the 
Emir,  or  Khan,  of  Bokhara,  though  promising  a 
friendly  reception  for  the  caravans,  would  not  under- 
take to  protect  their  passage  through  the  Kirghiz 
steppes,  but  left  that  duty  entirely  to  Russian 
escorts.  It  was  consequently  considered  most 
advantageous    to     establish    a    trading     company, 


PEROFSKI'S  EXPEDITION.  77 

which  should  enjoy  the  exclusive  right  of  trade  with 
Central  Asia  ;  the  company  was  to  have  a  working 
capital  of  6,000,000  roubles,  and  to  possess  its  own 
camels,  so  as  to  avoid  any  obstacles  and  delays  in 
the  transport  of  goods.     To  convey  the  caravans  of 
the  company,  it  was  proposed  to  give  an   escort  of 
280  men,  with  two  guns,  who  were  to  be  maintained 
at  the  cost  of  the  company,  and  who  were  also  to  be 
allowed  to  erect  a  caravan-sarai  and  fortifications  on 
the    Syr-Daria   and    on    the  points  of    the  caravan 
route.     But  as  it  was  impossible   to  create  such  a 
company   in  a  short  time,  and  as  it  was  uncertain 
whether  it  could  ever  be  formed  by  Russian  mer- 
chants, it  was  proposed  in  the  meantime  to  furnish 
the  ordinary  caravans  with  an  escort  at  the  expense 
of  the  Government,  and  to  charge  the  outlay  under 
this  head  to  the  Custom  House  dues  of  the  Oren- 
burg region.     A  caravan  was  accordingly  despatched 
to    Bokhara   in    1824,  under   the   protection  of   500 
men  ;  it  was,  however,  encountered  by  the  Khivans, 
who  plundered  part  of  it.     The  other  part  returned. 
On    this     occasion    the    loss     suffered    by    private 
individuals  amounted  to  547,000  roubles  ;  while  the 
expense  to  the  Government  in  furnishing  the  convoy 
was  224,000  roubles.     Thus  the  attempt  failed,  and 


78  EUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

naturally  in  such  a  state  of  affairs  the  company- 
could  not  be  formed. 

In  addition  to  crippling  Russian  trade  in  the  East 
by  the  constant  plunder  of  caravans  and  inciting  the 
Kirghizes  to  commit  these  depredations,  the  Govern- 
ment of  Khiva  had  long  encouraged  the  pirates  of 
the  Caspian,  who  kidnapped  Russian  fishermen  on 
that  sea  in  great  numbers  every  year,  and  sold  them 
in  all  the  markets  of  the  East,  and  particularly  in 
Khiva.  These  unfortunate  prisoners  were  doomed 
to  pass  their  lives  in  hard  toil,  suffering  every  priva- 
tion ;  and  they  usually  ended  their  insupportable 
lives  under  the  blows  of  their  task-masters,  whose 
Mahommedan  creed  freed  them  from  all  considera- 
tions of  humanity  with  respect  to  "  Kafirs  "  or  un- 
believers, while  the  civil  law  gave  them  irresponsible 
power  over  the  lives  of  their  slaves. 

Already  in  the  eighteenth  century  the  Russian 
Government  had  tried  to  devise  means  for  the 
liberation  of  Russian  prisoners  in  the  East.  Thus 
by  an  ukaz  of  the  28th  January,  1767,  hostages 
were  ordered  to  be  seized  for  the  purpose  of  com- 
pelling the  Asiatics  to  exchange  them  for  Russian 
prisoners.  This  measure  was  quite  justifiable  ; 
seeing,   as    the    official    writer    puts    it,   that    "  the 


PEROFSKFS  EXPEDITION.  79 


Khivans  and  Bokharians  traded  and  lived  in 
safety  along  the  Orenburg  and  Siberian  lines  and 
at  Astrakhan,  while  Russian  merchants  could  not 
enter  Central  Asiatic  territory  without  running  a  risk 
of  falling  into  life-long  bondage.  The  distance  and 
inaccessibility  of  the  Khanates  of  Central  Asia 
proved,  and  still  prove,  a  serious  obstacle  to  adopt- 
ing more  effectual  measures  for  the  liberation  of 
prisoners." 

The  attempts  of  the  Russian  Government  to 
obtain  the  release  of  prisoners  by  negotiation  were 
not  attended  with  success,  and  everything  showed 
that  it  was  quite  useless  to  treat  with  the  Govern- 
ments of  Khiva  and  Bokhara.  Correspondence  and 
negotiations  led  to  nothing.  The  best  proof  of  this 
is  said  to  have  been  afforded  by  Negri's  mission 
to  Bokhara  in  1820,  and  that  of  Demaison  in  1833, 
which  did  not  mend  matters  in  the  least.  The 
Bokharians  from  that  time  forward  always  tried 
to  evade  the  question  of  Russian  prisoners,  never 
thought  of  surrendering  them,  and  continued  pur- 
chasing them  in  spite  of  their  formal  agreement 
with  M.  Negri,  and  in  defiance  of  all  the  rights 
of  humanity.  And  if  this  was  the  practice  of  the 
Emir    of    Bokhara,    who    had    striven  to    maintain 


80.  RUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

friendly  relations  with  Russia,  the  Khan  of  Khiva 
who  had  always  been  at  enmity  with  Russia,  did 
not,  even  for  the  sake  of  appearances,  attempt  to 
disguise  his  dealings.  His  territories  were  equally 
inaccessible  to  all  Christians. 

The  Government  at  last  assigned  3,000  roubles 
for  the  redemption  of  Russian  prisoners.  This, 
however,  Hkewise  led  to  nothing.  The  slave-holders 
refused  to  accept  any  ransom,  as  they  found  it  more 
profitable  to  retain  their  hard-working  bondsmen. 
There  was  extreme  difficulty,  moreover,  in  liberating 
the  prisoners  by  other  means  than  through  inter- 
mediate agents,  who,  if  caught,  were  Hable  to  be 
put  to  death  or  made  slaves.  In  1830  the  posi- 
tion of  the  question  of  Russian  prisoners  in  Central 
Asia  was,  according  to  authentic  accounts  as 
follows  : — 

"  Incited  by  the  high  prices  obtained  by  Russian 
prisoners,  the  Kirghizes  kidnapped  them  even  on 
the  Line,  and  disposed  of  them  in  the  neighbouring 
countries  of  Central  Asia,  principally  at  Khiva, 
where,  according  to  reliable  information  received 
at  the  time,  there  were  more  than  2,000  Russians 
in  bondage.  In  remote  times  men  were  seized  from 
settlements  in  the  interior,  even  on  the  Volga  and 


PEROFSKFS  EXPEDITION.  81 

beyond  that  river,  and  subsequently  on  the  Line. 
But  about  the  year  1830,  Russian  fishermen  on  the 
Caspian  used  alone  to  be  kidnapped  by  Kirghizes  and 
Turcomans  at  the  rate  of  200  every  year,  Russian 
prisoners  were  sold  at  Khiva,  in  the  bazaars,  and 
this  traffic  was  participated  in  not  only  by  the 
highest  Khivan  officials,  but  also  by  Khivan 
traders  who  visited  Russia,  and  who,  when  frequent- 
ing the  Kirghiz  encampments  for  the  purposes  of 
trade,  incited  the  Kirghizes  to  make  prisoners,  buy- 
ing them  up  beforehand,  and  giving  money  in  ad- 
vance. Although  the  Orenburg  Frontier  Commission 
had  at  its  disposal  the  sum  of  3,000  roubles  for  the 
redemption  of  Russian  prisoners,  it  was  able  only  to 
procure  the  liberation  of  a  very  small  number,  as 
sentence  of  death  was  awarded  at  Khiva  to  anyone 
who  consented  to  sell  his  slave  in  order  that  he 
might  be   restored    to    his    native    country." 

The  Russian  prisoners,  while  sinking  under  hard 
labour  and  suffering  under  privations  of  every  de- 
scription, were  carefully  guarded ;  and  for  a  first 
attempt'  to  escape  they  were  deprived  of  their 
nose  and  ears,  a  second  attempt  being  punished 
by  torture  and  death.  Very  few,  therefore,  ventured 
to  fiy,  knowing  the  severe   punishment  that  awaited 

G 


82  HUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

them  In  case  they  were  retaken.  To  deter  slaves  as 
much  as  possible  from  attempting  to  escape,  many 
were  forced  to  marry  native  women,  and  different 
expedients  were  employed  to  convert  them  to  the 
Mahommedan  faith.  In  order  to  diminish  this 
system  of  man-stealing,  efforts  were  made  to  detain 
Kirghizes  belonging  to  the  same  tribe  as  the  kid- 
nappers. But  even  this  failed  ;  and  it  was  felt  to 
be  unjust  to  make  a  whole  tribe  answerable  for  the 
delinquencies  of  some  of  its  members.  The  pri- 
soners, meanwhile,  took  advantage  of  every  oppor- 
tunity to  implore  succour ;  and  their  helpless  families 
assailed  the  local  authorities  with  their  prayers,  and 
even  accused  them  of  intentionally  allowing  their 
relatives  to  remain  in  captivity. 

Under  such  circumstances  it  was  "  necessary  to 
have  recourse  to  decided  and  final  measures."  These 
were  to  "  lay  an  embargo  on  all  the  persons  and  pro- 
perty of  the  subjects  of  Khiva  in  Russian  territory 
until  the  liberation  of  Russian  prisoners,  and  if  this 
should  not  have  the  desired  effect  to  compel  restitu- 
tion by  force  of  arms,"  the  adoption  of  this  latter 
alternative  being  repeatedly  urged  on  the  Govern- 
ment by  the  local  Russian  authorities.  The  events 
of  1830  to  1832,  and  especially  the  Polish  insurrec- 


PEROFSKVS  EXPEDITION.  88 


tion  diverted  all  the  attention  of  the  Government 
towards  the  west.  But  a  few  years  later  Russia 
determined  to  adopt  strong  measures  against  Khiva, 
and  the  recommendations  of  a  Special  Committee, 
approved  by  his  Imperial  Majesty  on  the  24th 
March,  1839,  were  as  follows: — 

I  St.  To  commence  at  once  the  organisation  of 
an  expedition  against  Khiva,  and  to  establish  the 
necessary  depots  and  stations  on  the  route  without 
delay. 

2nd.  To  conceal  the  real  object  of  the  expedition, 
which  was  to  be  given  out  as  a  scientific  expedition 
to  the  Aral  sea. 

3rd.  To  postpone  the  departure  of  the  expedition 
until  the  settlement  of  English  matters  in  Afghanis- 
tan, in  order  that  the  influence  and  impression  of  the 
Russian  proceedings  in  Central  Asia  might  have 
more  weight,  and  that  England,  in  consequence  of 
her  own  conquests,  might  no  longer  have  any  right 
to  trouble  the  Russian  Government  for  explana- 
tions ;  on  no  account,  however,  to  delay  the  expedi- 
tion later  than  the  spring  of  1840. 

4th.  In  the  event  of  the  expedition  terminating 
successfully,  to  replace  the  Khan  of  Khiva  by  a 
trustworthy  Kaisak   Sultan,  to   establish  order  and 


84  BUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

security  as  far  as  possible,  and  to  give  full  freedom 
to  the  Russian  trade. 

5th,  To  assign  425,000  silver  roubles  and  12,000 
gold  ducats,  for  the  estimated  cost  of  the  expedition, 
and  to  supply  the  detachment  with  arms  and  the 
indispensable  material,  and  to  allow  the  Governor- 
General  of  Orenburg  to  avail  himself  of  the  assist- 
ance of  the  local  artillery  and  engineer  force. 

Soon  after  (on  the  loth  October,  1839),  final 
dispositions  were  issued  for  the  Russian  operations 
after  the  occupation  of  Khiva ;  and  a  formal  instru- 
ment was  drawn  up  for  the  guidance  of  the  future 
Khan  of  Khiva,  defining  his  relations  towards. 
Russia,  and  guaranteeing  peace  between  the  two 
countries. 

Thus  at  the  outside  of  the  limit  of  the  time  pro- 
posed for  the  expedition,  that  is  from  the  spring  of 
1839  to  the  spring  of  1840,  there  remained  only  a 
year  for  making  the  necessary  preparations.  Cir- 
cumstances, however,  compelled  the  departure  of  the 
expedition  eight  months  earlier  than  had  been  origin- 
ally contemplated.  The  reasons  for  hastening  the 
expedition  were,  "  First,  the  important  consideration 
that  if  the  detachment  were  to  leave  Orenburg  early  in 
the  spring  of  1840,  it  would  have  to  traverse  the  arid 


PEROFSKFS  EXPEDITION.  85 

saline  steppes,  while  on  the  other  hand  the  lateness 
of  the  autumn  and  winter  of  1839  were  considered 
particularly  favourable  for  the  march  of  the  troops, 
inasmuch  as  a  sufficient  supply  of  cold  water  could 
be  obtained  on  the  route ;  and,  secondly,  the  efforts 
of  the  English  at  this  period  to  penetrate  into  Central 
Asia  with  the  object  of  establishing  their  influence 
there  and  inciting  the  Khivans  to  offer  an  obstinate 
resistance  to  Russia. 

"  No  one,"  continues  the  official  historian,  "  can 
seriously  affirm  that  the  English  are  not  anxious  for 
the  welfare  of  these  nations  ;  but  all,  we  trust,  will 
agree  with  us  when  we  say  that,  nevertheless,  the 
interests  of  England  are  held  by  them  paramount  to 
everything.  It  is  also  generally  known  that  the 
English  have  from  remote  times  diligently  watched 
the  progress  of  events  in  the  whole  world  (in  the 
interests  of  Great  Britain,  be  it  observed),  and  that 
they  are  always  troubled  and  dissatisfied  if  fate  allows 
any  other  nation  to  have  influence  over  the  progress 
of  mankind.  This  is  the  policy  of  the  ancient 
Phoenicians  and  Carthaginians,  and  of  the  modern 
Venetians,  Genoese,  Spaniards,  and  Dutch — in  one 
word,  this  is  the  policy  of  maritime  and  commercial 
powers." 


86  BUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

It  is  not  astonishing,  therefore,  that  the  EngUsh, 
not  being  thoroughly  acquainted  with  the  existing 
state  of  affairs  in  Central  Asia,  should  have  been 
considerably  alarmed  at  the  Russian  proceedings  in 
the  Kirghiz  steppe;  nor  that  they  should  have  at- 
tributed the  measures  adopted  by  the  Russian 
Government  for  securing  the  boundaries  and  trade 
of  the  empire  to  aggressive  projects,  and  even  to 
the  old  project  of  penetrating  into  India.  Hence 
arose  a  natural  desire  on  the  part  of  the  English 
to  ascertain  the  real  importance,  in  a  political 
respect,  of  the  possession  of  the  Central  Asiatic 
steppes  by  Russia,  and  the  probability  of  her  pene- 
trating thence  into  Indian  territory. 

From  1824,  therefore,  a  succession  of  English 
agents,  regardless  of  all  obstacles,  penetrated  into 
Central  Asia,  and  some  of  them  even  returned  to 
their  native  country  through  Russia.  At  first,  in 
the  year  1830,  many  Englishmen,  "  under  motives 
entirely  evangelical,"  says  the  Russian  historian, 
settled  in  the  town  of  Orenburg.  "But  when  it  was 
perceived  that  these  missionaries  turned  their  atten- 
tion to  other  matters,  they  were  requested  to  leave. 
Losing  all  hope  of  extending  their  interest  in  Central 
Asia  from  the    side    of    Russia,  the  English   com- 


FEEOFSKI'S  EXPEDITION.  87 

menced  penetrating  thither  principally  from  India 
and  through  Persia.  Thus  from  1824  Central  Asia 
was  visited  by  Moorcroft,  Conolly,  Wolf,  Burnes,  and 
Strange,  and  later  by  Stoddart,  Abbott,  Shakespear, 
and  again  by  Burnes  near  the  time  of  the  Russian 
Khiva  expedition,  or  during  the  very  period." 

All  the  persons  here  enumerated,  with  the  excep- 
tion of  Wolf — the  brave  missionary  who  travelled 
to  Bokhara  without  escort  or  protection  of  any  kind 
to  save  the  Jewish  inhabitants  from  the  terrible 
persecution  to  which  they  had  lately  been  subjected 
— were  in  the  service  of  the  East  India  Company ; 
and  of  course  it  was  not,  in  the  words  of  the  official 
historian,  "  curiosity  alone  and  their  own  affairs  that 
allured  them  into  Central  Asia."  While  these  English 
agents  were  collecting  every  possible  information  on 
the  spot,  the  Russians  had  no  means  of  following 
their  example,  and  were  even  unacquainted  with  their 
movements.  The  visits  of  the  EnHish  ajjents  to 
the  various  Khanates,  and  the  details  of  their 
journeys,  became  only  known  to  Russia  incidentally 
through  their  published  works  ;  which,  of  course,  did 
not  contain  all  the  results  of  their  investigations. 
All  the  direct  information  that  the  Russians  could 
procure  was  meagre  and  obscure,  and  was  suppHed 


88  RUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

to  them  by  Asiatics,  who,  either  through  ignorance  or 
timidity,  were  not  ahvays  able  to  furnish  important 
and  trustworthy  accounts.  Owing  to  a  want  of  offi- 
cials well  acquainted  with  the  Oriental  languages, 
it  was  found  necessary  to  confide  in  uneducated 
Asiatics,  or  to  employ  agents  who,  being  ignorant 
of  the  Oriental  languages,  were  obliged  to  have 
interpreters  attached  to  them.  "  The  principal  pur- 
veyors of  intelligence  to  the  Russians  were  con- 
sequently almost  always  Mahommedans,  who,  being 
involuntarily  under  the  influence  of  the  rulers  of 
Central  Asia,  in  whom,  under  the  regime  of 
Mahommedanism,  was  also  centred  the  highest 
ecclesiastical  power,  did  not  discharge  their  duties 
very  willingly,  nor  in  a  reliable  manner  ;  they  were 
not  always  able  to  disclose  all  they  knew,  and 
were  altogether  very  uncertain  media  of  communi- 
cation, notwithstanding  that,  as  Mahommedans, 
they  had  in  every  respect  much  greater  facilities 
than  Christians  for  gaining  access  to  the  different 
countries  of  Central  Asia.'' 

As  early  as  1828  Alexander  Burnes  had  com- 
menced his  survey  of  the  Indus  river  ;  and  having 
become  convinced  in  1830  of  the  navigability  of  the 
Indus  over  its  whole  course  of  about  700  miles,  he 


PEROFSKFS  EXPEDITION.  89 

represented  to  the  English  Government  all  the  im- 
portance of  this  stream,  both  in  political  and  com- 
mercial respects.  At  the  same  time  some  Russian 
goods  which  had  by  accident  found  their  way  to  the 
banks  of  the  Indus,  led  him  to  the  conclusion  that  the 
rivalry  between  British  and  English  manufacturers 
had  already  commenced  at  this  point,  and  !he  not 
only  succeeded  in  convincing  his  Government  as  to 
this,  but  also  induced  it  to  believe  in  the  possibility 
of  the  appearance  of  Russian  political  agents  on  the 
river  Indus,  and  even  of  a  Russian  force. 

"  Here,  then,"  says  the  official  writer,  "  we  have  an 
explanation  of  the  repeated  attempts  made  by  English 
agents  to  penetrate  from  India  through  the  whole  of 
Central  Asia  as  far  as  the  Russian  boundaries,  in 
order  to  assure  themselves  of  the  justness  or  other- 
wise of  their  apprehensions;  and  these  movements  on 
the  part  of  the  English  were  at  the  same  time  a 
source  of  serious  alarm  to  the  Russian  Govern- 
ment." 

The  Russians  had  reliable  information  that  the 
agents  of  the  East  India  Company  were  continually 
appearing  either  at  Khiva  or  Bokhara  ;  they  also 
believed  that  this  enterprising  Company,  having 
-enormous  means  at  its  command,  was  endeavouring 


90  EUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

not  only  to  establish  its  influence  throughout  the 
whole  of  Asia,  but  was  also  desirous  of  extending 
the  limits  of  its  Asiatic  possessions.  The  power  of 
England,  the  industry  and  wealth  of  its  people,  the 
tendency  of  the  English  to  act  together  in  com- 
mercial associations,  and  lastly  the  cupidity  of  the 
Asiatic  rulers  —  all  these  gave  to  the  English 
great  facilities  for  strengthening  their  influence  in 
Central  Asia,  and  for  doing  Russia  "  serious 
damage  "  by  establishing  regular  commercial  rela- 
tions with  Central  Asia.  It  was  only  necessary  to  allow 
the  possibility  of  the  English  supplying  the  Khivans 
and  Turcomans,  the  nearest  and  most  hostile  neigh- 
bours of  Russia,  and  likewise  the  Kirghizes,  with 
arms  and  ammunition,  in  order  to  become  convinced 
of  the  necessity  of  counteracting  the  schemes  of 
England,  "  whose  agents  did  not  even  try  to  conceal 
their  hopes,  in  their  published  accounts,  of  becoming 
masters,  not  only  of  the  whole  trade  between  the 
river  Indus  and  the  Hindoo  Kush,  but  likewise  of 
the  market  of  Bokhara,  the  most  important  in 
Central  Asia." 

It  was  accordingly  decided  in  1835,  in  order  to 
watch  the  English  agents  and  counteract  their 
efforts,  to   send   Russian  agents  into  Central  Asia^ 


PEROFSRPS  EXPEDITION.  91 

also  to  establish  a  Russian  company,  so  as  to  enable 
Russia  to  compete  with  the  English  in  trade.    But 
although  a  small  trading  company  was  formed  after 
the  Khivan  expedition,  when  the  steppes  had  been 
rendered  comparatively  safe,  even  this  company  soon 
suspended  operations.    Meanwhile,  in  order  to  watch 
the   march   of  events   in   Central  Asia,   the   before- 
mentioned     Captain     Vitkevitch     was     despatched 
thither   in    the    capacity    of   agent.     In    the  winter 
of   1835  he  had  accidentally    got    to  Bokhara,    ac- 
companied by  some  Kirghizes  ;    and  without   con- 
cealing the    fact    of   his    being    a    Russian   officer, 
he   spent  several   months  at  Bokhara,  and  returned 
safely   to  Orenburg,   proving  his  aptitude  for  such 
missions.     "  This    officer,"    we   are  told   "  travelled 
several  years  in  Persia  and  Cabul  during  the  most 
interesting    period    of    the    English    expedition   to 
Afghanistan,   contrived  to  acquire  the  friendship  of 
Dost  Mahomed  of   Cabul,  whom  he   succeeded  in 
disposing  favourably  towards   Russia ;  and  returned 
to  St.   Petersburg  in    1839.     Unfortunately,   in  the 
same  year  he  committed  suicide,  destroying,  before 
his  death,  all  the  materials  he  had  collected." 

Meanwhile    the   intelligence    which    reached    the 
Russians  from    Central  Asia  in    1839  gave  rise   to 


92  RUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

further  apprehensions.  TuHa-Bergan,  a  caravan 
leader,  on  his  return  from  Bokhara  in  the  same  year 
reported,  "  that  twenty-five  EngHsh  had  arrived  at 
Khiva  from  Cabul  with  offers  to  the  Khan  of  troops 
and  money  against  the  Russians."  The  reports  of 
the  appearance  of  English  agents,  and  of  their  per- 
sistent interference  in  the  relations  between  Khiva 
and  Russia  received  confirmation  at  later  periods; 
and  as,  at  this  time,  the  English  forces  had  pene- 
trated into  Cabul,  whence  they  had  expelled  Dost 
Mahomed,  who  was  favourable  to  Russia,  and 
were  only  divided  from  the  territory  of  Bokhara  by 
the  Hindoo  Kush,  it  w-as  to  these  circumstances 
that  the  vacillation  of  the  Khan  of  Khiva  in  the 
matter  of  the  surrender  of  the  Russian  prisoners  was 
attributed  at  Orenburg.  It  was,  therefore,  of  the 
greatest  importance  to  hasten  the  expedition  for  the 
punishment  of  Khiva,  "  so  as  to  prevent  the  English 
from  supporting  the  resistance  of  this  Khanate 
against  Russia,  and  to  anticipate  the  possibility  of 
any  other  Central  Asiatic  rulers  being  induced  to 
join  Khiva  by  means  of  any  threats  and  promises  of 
reward  that  might  be  employed  by  the  English 
agents." 

The   English  agents  who  were   in    Central   Asia 


PEROF SKI'S  EXPEDITION.  9a 


during  the  years  1839  and  1840  were  Abbott  and 
Shakespear.  In  May,  1840,  Captain  Abbott,  of  the 
East  India  Company's  service,  reached  Novo- 
Alexandrofsk  fortress  from  Khiva,  and  proceeded 
thence  to  Orenburg.  "  Whether,"  says  the  Russian 
historiographers  "  Abbott  had  the  intention  to  re- 
turn home  through  Russia,  or  whether,  Hke  Burnes, 
he  selected  this  route  for  the  purpose  of  making 
a  sur\'ey  of  the  Caspian,  and  of  the  Russian 
fortresses  on  it,  is  subject  to  much  doubt.  In  his 
communications,  however,  he  styled  himself  EngHsh 
Charge  d'Affaires  to  the  Russian  Court.  By  the  order 
of  the  Khan  he  was  robbed  and  wounded,  on  his  route 
to  the  Caspian,  by  a  gang  of  Turcomans  (who  had 
even  been  instructed  by  their  chiefs  to  kill  him),  and 
from  Orenburg  he  was  sent  in  a  suitable  manner  to 
St.  Petersburg,  whilst  the  Afghans  that  had  accom- 
panied him  were  sent  back  to  their  native  country." 
Shakespear,  the  other  English  officer,  reached  Oren- 
burg via  Novo-Alexandrofsk  with  the  Russian  pri- 
soners who  had  been  released  from  Khiva  ;  he  was 
likewise  immediately  sent  on  to  St.  Petersburg. 
Both  these  agents  wished  to  take  an  active  part  in 
the  Russian  negotiations  with  Khiva,  especially 
Shakespear,    who    desired    to    take    credit    for    the 


94  EUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

release  of  the  Russian  prisoners.  These,  how- 
ever, had  "prior  to  his  arrival  at  Khiva,  been 
collected  and  registered  by  the  Russian  Cornet, 
Aitof."  Shakespear,  according  to  the  Russian  offi- 
cial historian,  even  quarrelled  on  the  road  with  the 
Khivan  envoy  Ataniaz,  in  charge  of  the  Russian 
prisoners,  alleging  that  their  delivery  had  been  en- 
trusted to  him.  During  his  stay  at  Orenburg  he 
attempted  to  interfere  in  "  local  political  matters," 
but  was  told  that  everything  of  a  political-  nature 
was  decided  at  St.  Petersburg,  whither  he  was 
despatched. 

The  objects  of  the  expedition  Perofski  was  about 
to  undertake  were,  as  set  forth  by  the  Russian 
official  historian, — faj  To  secure  the  south-eastern 
boundaries  of  the  empire  by  the  subjugation  of  the 
Kirghiz  horde,  which  could  not  be  effected  without 
the  punishment  of  Khiva,  the  chief  author  of  all 
disturbances  in  the  Kirghiz  steppes  ;  fbj  to  secure 
the  Russian  trade  with  Central  Asia  by  putting  a 
stop  to  the  plundering  of  caravans,  which  also 
could  not  be  carried  out  without  the  punishment  of 
Khiva ;  fcj  to  release  several  thousands  of  Russians 
from  cruel  bondage  ;  fdj  to  establish,  not  the 
dominion,  but  the  strong  influence  of  Russia  on  the 


PEROFSKI'S  EXPEDITION.  95 

neighbouring  Khanates  for  the  reciprocal  advantages 
of  trade,  and  to  prevent  the  influence  of  the  East 
India  Company,  so  dangerous  to  Russia,  from  taking 
root  in  Central  Asia  ;  and  lastly  fej  to  take  advantage 
of  this  favourable  opportunity  for  the  scientific  ex- 
ploration of  Central  Asia,  by  making  a  survey  of  the 
shores  of  the  sea  of  Aral,  and  of  the  mouth  of  the 
river  Amu,  and  settling  the  long-disputed  question 
of  the  original  course  of  this  river  to  the  Caspian. 

The  force  with  which  General  Perofski  had  been 
ordered  to  Khiva  was  to  be  taken  from  the  Orenburg 
corps,  which  had  never  been  in  action,  had  never 
seen  service  of  any  kind  in  the  field,  and  had  never 
even  assembled  in  camp.  It  was,  in  short,  accord- 
ing to  the  official  historian  of  the  Perofski  expedition 
(possibly  General  Perofski  himself),  altogether  in- 
sufficient for  military  purposes.  To  improve  the 
condition  of  the  troops.  General  Perofski  transferred 
all  the  battalions  to  new  quarters  and  assembled 
them  periodically  in  camps.  "  Although,"  says  the 
official  historian,  "  this  could  not  make  the  infantry 
more- martial,  yet  it  had  the  effect  of  improving  its 
discipline  and  drill." 

The  very  composition  of  the  Orenburg  corps  was 
likely  to  tell  against  it  in  a  military  point  of  view. 


96  BUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

The  seven  battalions  numbered,  in  April  1839,  8,999 
men,  of  whom  4,403  were  recruits  ;  while  of  these 
recruits  2,527  were  Polish  exiles,  and  1,694  either 
exiles  or  criminals. 

The  force  ultimately  despatched  against  Khiva 
consisted  of  5,325  men  with  twenty-two  guns  and 
four  rocket-stands.  It  carried  with  it  mining  tools, 
canvas  pontoons,  and  two  portable  boats. 

In  the  way  of  provisions,  biscuits,  buck-wheat, 
meat,  salt,  and  corn-brandy  (vodka)  were  carried  ; 
and  in  addition  to  this,  cabbage,  cucumbers,  cheese, 
sheeps'  fat,  lard,  onions,  pepper,  vinegar,  and 
money. 

Former  experience  in  the  steppe  had  proved  that 
horses  soon  became  worn  out  when  fed  on  grass 
alone.  It  was  therefore  necessary,  on  the  long 
march  to  Khiva,  to  carry  a  supply  of  forage  ;  15,828 
poods  of  oats  for  the  horses  and  3,793  poods  of 
flour,  and  1,925  poods  of  salt  for  the  camels  were 
accordingly  ordered  to  be  provided;  10,000  poods 
of  hay  were  obtained  from  the  cordon  posts,  and 
hydraulically  compressed  for  greater  portability  into 
bundles  of  6  or  7  poods  each,  which  were  to  be 
carried  along  with  the  force.  Along  the  route  to 
Khiva   20,000   poods   of  hay  were  stored  at  Bish 


PEROFSKVS  EXPEDITION.  97 


Tamok,    25,000   on  the  river    Emba  and    at   Aby- 
Yaksh,  and  25,000  near  Ak-Bulak. 

Owing  to  the  absence  of  any  roads  in  the  southern 
steppe,  and  because  it  was  anticipated  that  the  force 
would  be  obhged  to  march  through  heavy  snows,  it 
was  deemed  advisable  to  provide  a  larger  quantity  of 
spades,  pick-axes,  &c.  The  portable  flat-bottomed 
boats,  which  w^ere  to  be  transported  in  separate  parts, 
were  to  be  employed  for  navigation  on  the  Oxus,  and 
for  surveying  the  shores  of  the  sea  of  Aral ;  each 
boat  was  armed  with  a  swivel  gun  or  falconet. 
Eighty  arabas  were  prepared  for  transporting  the 
sick,  and  each  battalion  was  provided  with  the  re- 
gulated quantity  of  hospital  stores  and  drugs.  In 
addition  to  these  stores  a  large  quantity  of  articles 
in  Asiatic  taste  were  bought  at  Nijni  Novgorod  for 
distribution  as  presents  to  the  Kirghizes  and  Turco- 
mans. 

The  principal  difficulties  that  the  expedition  to 
Khiva  was  expected  to  encounter  would  be  in  the 
waterless  steppes  that  surrounded  the  Khanate. 
It  was  known  that  there  were  wells  along  the  Ust- 
Urt  of  a  depth  varying  from  fifteen  to  twenty  and 
thirty  fathoms.  According  to  Kirghiz  accounts,  these 
wells   were   paved   round  with  stone  and  protected 

H 


98  BUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

from  the  drifting  sand  and  straying  cattle,  by  large 
stone  slabs  pierced  with  a  small  hole  through  which 
buckets  could  be  lowered.  A  stone  trough  for  water- 
ing cattle  was  generally  attached  to  each  well.  Small 
caravans  could  consequently  traverse  these  steppes 
with  facility.  But  large  caravans  had  been  unable, 
in  former  years,  to  perform  the  journey  through  the 
Ust-Urt  without  dividing  themselves  into  sections  or 
echelons  ;  because,  in  addition  to  the  scarcity  of 
water,  the  great  depth  of  the  wells  presented  serious 
obstacles,  as,  out  of  these,  only  ten  or  fifteen  buckets 
of  water  could  be  raised  in  one  hour,  and  conse- 
quently only  200  or  300  camels  or  horses  watered  in 
the  course  of  twenty-four  hours.  The  expeditionary 
force  could  not  be  divided  up  into  small  parties  with- 
out great  danger,  and  the  various  detachments 
would  have  been  obliged  to  wait  several  days  at  the 
wells  for  water,  while  it  was  drawn  up  in  ordinary 
buckets.  A  special  portable  water-lifting  apparatus 
was  devised,  by  means  of  which  the  water  could  be 
rapidly  drawn  from  the  wells  and  distributed  through 
india-rubber  conduits,  either  into  the  boats  or  into 
leather  and  canvas  waterproof  reservoirs  fixed  on 
wooden  frames. 

It  was   proposed   to   transport  all  the  stores    on 


PEROFSKVS  EXPEDITION.  99 

camels,  with  the  exception  of  the  pontoon  boats, 
arabas,  and  sledges,  which,  on  account  of  their 
weight,  could  not  be  carried  by  these  animals.  The 
falconets,  however,  were  to  be  carried  on  the  backs 
of  camels,  and  so  disposed  as  to  be  capable  of  being 
mounted  and  brought  to  bear  on  the  enemy  in  a 
quarter  of  an  hour.  In  order  to  spare  the  artillery 
horses  as  much  fatigue  as  possible,  the  gun  caissons 
that  could  not  be  carried  on  the  backs  of  camels 
were  yoked  to  camels,  which  were  harnessed  like 
oxen. 

In  order,  also,  to  husband  the  strength  of  the  in- 
fantry soldiers  (so  that  in  case  of  need  they  might 
be  despatched  like  dragoons  in  flying  detachments), 
it  was  resolved  to  transport  a  portion  of  the  infantry 
on  the  spare  camels,  two  men  on  each  camel,  chang- 
ing the  men  by  turns  on  the  march. 

Then  this  new  difficulty  presented  itself — that  of 
obtaining  a  great  number  of  camels,  the  required 
quantity  being  provisionally  estimated  at  10,000. 

As  the  stores  and  provisions  were  gradually  pur- 
chased and  prepared,  it  was  necessary  to  transport 
them  to  Orenburg,  and  thence  into  the  interior  of 
the  steppe  to  the  intermediate  depots.  For  this 
purpose   7,750  three-horse  carts,  with  their  drivers, 


100         EUSSIAN-  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

were  supplied  by  the  Bashkirs,  with  the  requisite 
number  of  officers  and  non-commissioned  officers  to 
superintend;  the  operation. 

On  the  1 8th  (30th)   June  the  march  of  the  expe- 
ditionary force  was  commenced    by   Colonel   Heke 
being  sent  forward  with   a  flying  column,  consisting 
of  a  platoon  of  infantry   transported   in  carts,   and 
400  mounted  Bashkirs  with  two  howitzers,  to  Donguz- 
Tan ;  which  had  been  selected  as  a  convenient  spot 
for  a  store  depot.     Colonel  Heke  described  his  ad- 
vance in  a  series  of   letters  addressed   to  General 
Perofski.     In  one  of  these  he  gives  a  droll  account  of 
the  means  he  took  for  testing  the  martial  character 
of    the  troops    under  his  command.      Having   con- 
cealed himself  behind   Bakgir  Hill,  he  awaited  the 
arrival  of  the  train  of  stores,  which  advanced  to  the 
hill  in   two    divisions  ;    when,  as   soon    as    the   first 
echelon    appeared    in    sight,    he    suddenly    showed 
himself   with  his   Bashkirs    on   the    hill,    "  in    order 
to    cause   an   alarm  among  the  train   of   followers, 
and  to  watch  the  result."     It  appears  that  the  men 
conveying  the  stores  took  the  Bashkirs  for  Khivans, 
and   immediately  despatched    a    messenger   to    the 
second  division  of  the  train  with  intellisfence  that   a 
body  of  Khivan  troops,  to  the  number  of  8,000,  had 


PEROFSKPS  EXPEDITION.  101 

been  discovered  on  Bakgir  Hill.  In  the  meantime 
Captain  Simbuigin  formed  square  with  the  carts  and 
waggons,  and  posting  his  guns  at  intervals  on  the 
sides  of  the  square,  awaited  the  attack  of  the  sup- 
posed enemy.  Very  different  was  the  effect  pro- 
duced by  the  reported  appearance  of  the  foe  on  the 
rear  division  of  the  train.  A  general  panic  ensued 
and  it  w^as  with  difficulty  that  the  men  were  prevented 
from  running  away. 

The  rugged  character  of  the  country,  intersected 
with  gullies  and  in  parts  covered  with  deep  sands  and 
stagnant  salines,  added  to  the  great  heats  which  had 
set  in,  impeded  the  progress  of  the  train  of  stores, 
which  was  only  enabled  to  join  Colonel  Heke 
at  Bakgir  Hill  by  the  5th  (17th)  July.  On  the 
1 7th  (29th)  July  the  train  advanced  a  stage  of 
seventeen  versts  to  Aly  mountain,  on  which  journey 
fifty  waggons  had  to  be  abandoned  on  the  road  in 
consequence  of  the  horses  breaking  down  with 
fatigue,  and  of  the  cart-wheels  splitting  from  the 
heat.  A  halt  was  ordered  to  collect  the  carts  left 
behind,  to  rest  the  horses,  and  to  muster  fresh  strength 
for  performing  the  tedious  passage  of  forty  versts 
which  still  remained  to  be  done  before  reaching 
the  depot  point  on  the  Ak-Bulak   river.       As    for 


102        EUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

the  whole  distance  of  the  intermediate  stage  ta 
Chushka-Kul,  no  water  or  grass  could  be  found, 
the  Bashkirs  supplied  themselves  with  grass  and 
water  in  leather  bags.  The  march  was  resumed 
at  5  o'clock  in  the  morning,  and  by  1 1 
o'clock  1 7^  versts  having  been  traversed,  a  halt  was 
made.  At  3  o'clock  the  march  was  resumed.  The 
day  was  sultry,  and  there  being  no  wind,  stifling 
clouds  of  dust  enveloped  the  column.  The  heat  of 
the  sun  was  as  powerful  as  in  the  deserts  of  Africa, 
the  thermometer  showing  from  32°  to  38°  Reaumur 
in  the  shade,  and  42°  to  45°  Reaumur  in  the  sun. 
After  passing  six  versts  the  men  began  to  suffer  from 
thirst.  All  the  water  that  still  remained  was  mixed 
with  vinegar  and  distributed  among  the  troops,  the 
officers  considerately  sharing  their  stock  with  the  men. 
But  even  this  was  not  sufficient.  Men  and  horses 
fell  down  exhausted  in  numbers,  and  were  only  saved 
from  death  by  being  immediately  bled.  Messengers 
were  despatched  on  the  best  horses  to  Chushka-Kul 
for  water,  and  the  detachment  moving  slowly  forward 
discovered  soon  afterwards  a  small  well  at  the  side 
of  the  road  with  brackish  water,  and  some  muddy 
pools.  These  were  soon  drained  dry.  At  length, 
about  midnight,  a  portion  of  the  train  reached  the 


PEROFSKFS  EXPEDITION.  103 

Chushka-Kul  wells,  and  sent  a  supply  of  water  to 
those  who  had  been  left  behind.  It  was  only  on  the 
15th  (27th)  July  that  the  whole  caravan  was  gathered 
together  on  the  banks  of  the  Ak-Bulak,  when  the 
erection  of  the  advanced  Chushka-Kul  fortification 
was  at  once  commenced. 

To  save  great  expense  it  was  determined  to  obtain 
camels  by  hire  instead  of  purchase.  Although  the 
Kirghiz  elders  assembled  at  the  first  gathering  re- 
ceived the  intimation  respecting  the  supply  of  camels 
with  proper  submission,  nevertheless  the  demand,  on 
account  of  its  novelty,  gave  rise  to  many  rumours. 
Hence  at  the  second  gathering,  which  was  attended 
by  the  representatives  of  all  the  branches  of  the 
Bagulinsk,  Kitinsk,  and  Churinoosk  tribes.  General 
Genz  announced  that  what  the  Government  expected 
from  the  Kaisaks  was  not  idle  discussion,  but  obedi- 
ence to  the  wishes  of  the  Emperor.  He  also  in- 
formed them  that  in  case  they  did  not  carry  out  the 
behests  of  His  Majesty,  these  might  possibly  be 
executed  without  their  consent  and  without  any  in- 
demnification. To  this  all  present  unanimously  re- 
plied that  they  were  quite  ready  to  fulfil  the  orders 
of  the  Government,  and  seven  volunteered  "  to  arrest 
and  bring   before  the  Sultan  ruler  all  those  evilly- 


104        RUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

disposed  Kirghizes  who,  at  the  instigation  of  Khiva, 
purposed  creating  disturbances  in  the  steppe  by 
spreading  false  rumours  respecting  the  Russian  move- 
ments." A  hst  of  the  quantity  of  camels  to  be  sup- 
phed  by  each  tribe  was  at  once  drawn  up,  and  written 
instructions  respecting  their  dehvery  were  distributed 
to  the  different  elders. 

Some  of  the  tribes,  however,  had  not  furnished 
their  quota  of  camels  by  the  time  fixed,  i.e.,  the  first 
of  November ;  in  consequence  of  which  the  expedi- 
tionary force  started  with  only  9,500  camels,  though 
about  900  more  joined  it  on  the  first  stages  of  the 
march.  The  whole  number  collected  was  10,400. 
Camel-drivers  were  furnished  by  the  Kirghizes,  at 
the  rate  of  one  man  to  every  four  or  five  camels. 

The  unfavourable  condition  of  the  atmosphere, 
combined  with  the  scarcity  of  fodder  and  the  great 
prevalence  of  disease,  occasioned  considerable  loss 
among  the  men  and  cattle  belonging  to  the  different 
trains.  The  mortality  among  the  Bashkirs  attached  to 
the  five  trains  amounted  to  199  men,  while  the  number 
of  horses  lost  on  the  journey  through  disease  and  ex- 
haustion was  8,869,  or  a  third  of  the  whole  number 
employed.  At  the  same  time,  the  dampness  of  the 
turf-huts,  the  rapid  change  from  the  sultry  heat  of 


PEROFSXrS  EXPEDITION.  105 

the  day  to  the  cold  temperature  at  night,  and  the  bad 
quahty  of  the  water  at  Ak-Bulak,  had  a  pernicious 
effect  on  the  health  of  the  garrisons  of  the  advanced 
fortified  points,  where,  towards  the  end  of  October, 
the  number  of  invalids  amounted  to  no,  sick  and 
infirm.  The  prevailing  diseases  were  scurvy, 
nervous  fever,  dysentery,  and  ague. 

With  the  approach  of  cold  weather  the  sickness 
increased  considerably ;  thus,  by  the  middle  of 
December  there  were  i68  men  under  medical  treat- 
ment at  the  Emba,  and  164  at  Ak-Bulak.  The  num- 
ber of  deaths  at  this  period  in  the  two  forts  from 
fevers,  dysentery,  dropsy,  and  chiefly  scurvy, 
reached  93. 

As  soon  as  the  greater  portion  of  the  stores  for  the 
expedition  had  been  conveyed  to  the  advanced  depots 
by  the  first  five  trains,  and  the  success  of  the  ar- 
rangements made  the  possibility  of  commencing  the 
campaign  in  October  a  matter  of  certainty,  a  store 
and  provision  train,  or  camel  caravan,  was  despatched 
by  way  of  experiment  under  Colonel  Danilevski,  who 
received  instructions  to  direct  his  attention  to  every- 
thing relating  to  the  caravan,  such  as  the  loading  of 
the  camels,  the  order  to  be  observed  in  marching 
and  halting,  &c.     This  caravan,  consisting  of  1,128 


106         RUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

camels,  left  Orenburg  on  the  21st  October  (ist 
November)  under  convoy  of  one  company  of  infantry 
(234  men),  one  sotnia  of  Cossacks  (116  men),  and 
twenty-five  artillerymen,  with  four  light  howitzers  and 
sixteen  camel-borne  ammunition  boxes,  and  pro- 
ceeded to  the  Emba,  where  they  were  to  await  the 
main  detachment.  There  was  no  snow  then  on  the 
ground,  but  the  progress  of  the  caravan  was  con- 
siderably impeded  by  the  slippery  surface  of  the 
ground  produced  by  the  frost  after  a  fall  of  rain.  In 
spite  of  this  the  caravan  reached  the  Emba  by  the 
1 2th  (24th)  November,  having  travelled  500  versts,  or 
one-third  of  the  whole  distance  between  Orenburg 
and  Khiva,  in  twenty-three  days. 


CHAPTER  V. 

PEROFSKl'S  EXPEDITION   (continued). 

From  the  foregoing  it  was  concluded  that  the 
journey  to  Khiva  could  be  performed  in  sixty,  or,  at 
most,  in  sixty-five  days  but  for  the  existence  of  a 
barren  steppe  which  stretched  ahead  for  800  versts, 
necessitating  the  transport  with  the  expedition  of 
large  supplies  of  fodder  for  the  camels  and  horses 
which  formed  nearly  half  the  train.  While  the 
stores  were  in  course  of  conveyance  from  Orenburg 
into  the  interior  of  the  steppe,  experiments  were 
tried  with  the  galvanic  battery  and  rockets ;  the 
pioneers  were  exercised  in  the  construction  of  pon- 
toon bridges  ;  special  boats  to  carry  six  pieces 
were  built  under  the  superintendence  of  Captain 
Bodisko ;  Kircrhizes  and  camels  were  concentrated 
in  the  steppe  ;  the  regimental  bands  practised  new 
marching  airs  in  the  public  square  at  Orenburg ;  while 


108        BUS  SI  AN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 


companies  of  soldier-choristers  mastered  the  diffi- 
cuhies  of  a  martial  song  composed  purposely  for 
the  expedition. 

All  the  preparations  for  the  campaign  were  made 
under  the  pretence  of  a  scientific  expedition  to  the 
sea  of  Aral  ;  but  the  large  quantity  of  stores  that 
was  being  collected,  the  unusual  activity  displayed, 
the  preparation  of  winter  clothing  for  the  troops,  and 
the  concentration  of  an  extraordinarily  large  body  of 
soldiers  and  camels,  roused  general  suspicion  at 
Orenburg  respecting  the  professed  objects  of  the 
expedition,  and  gave  rise  to  all  manner  of  rumours 
and  surmises.  As  the  preparations  approached 
maturity  the  curiosity  of  the  uninitiated  public 
became  more  acute.  The  secret,  however,  was  soon 
disclosed.  The  troops  destined  for  the  expedi- 
tion were  mustered  in  the  town  square  a  few  days 
before  their  departure,  and  the  following  address 
from  the  commander  of  the  Orenburg  corps  was 
read  : — 

"  By  order  of  His  Majesty  the  Emperor,  I  am 
going  to  march  with  a  portion  of  the  troops  under 
my  command  against  Khiva.  Khiva  has  for  many 
years  tried  the  long-suffering  patience  of  a  strong 
and  magnanimous  Power,  and  has  at  length  brought 


PEROFSKPS  EXPEDITION.  109 

down  upon  herself  the  wrath  which  her  hostile  con- 
duct has  provoked. 

"  Honour  and  glory  to  those  who,  by  God's  mercy, 
have  been  called  upon  to  march  to  the  rescue  of 
their  brethren  languishing  in  slavery. 

"  Comrades  !  frost  and  snow-storms  await  us,  and 
all  the  inevitable  and  harassing  diflficulties  of  a  dis- 
tant march  in  the  steppe  during  winter.  But  all  the 
necessary  preparations  have  been  carefully  made,  and 
your  requirements  anticipated  as  far  as  possible ; 
your  zeal,  ardour,  and  bravery  will  ensure  success, 
and  victory.  The  troops  of  the  Orenburg  corps  are, 
for  the  first  time,  marching  in  great  force  against  the 
enemy.  Russia  is  determined  to  punish  Khiva,  our 
insolent  and  faithless  neighbour.  In  two  months, 
with  God's  help,  we  shall  be  in  Khiva;  and  there,  for 
the  first  time  in  the  capital  of  the  Khanate,  will  the 
Russians,  before  the  Cross  and  Bible,  offer  up  fer- 
vent prayers  for  their  Czar  and  country. 

"  I  now  address  those  troops  who  will  remain  to 
guard  and  protect  the  Orenburg  frontier  and  their 
own  homesteads.  Fortune  has  not  decreed  that  you 
should  share  with  us  the  dangers  and  difficulties  of 
the  approaching  campaign  ;  but  you,  nevertheless, 
deserve  the  grace  and  favour  of  the  Emperor.    Men 


110         RUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

of  every  grade,  both  high  and  low,  after  taking  leave 
of  your  comrades,  who  will  march  forth  to  seek  the 
enemy,  you  will  sacredly  bear  in  mind  your  duty  and 
your  oath,  and  cheerfully  do  service  for  yourselves 
and  your  absent  comrades,  to  whom  you  will  accord 
a  joyful  and  hearty  welcome  on  their  return  from  the 
distant  and  difficult  journey  they  are  now  about  to 
undertake." 

After  this  address  had  been  read,  and  divine  service 
performed,  the  troops  defiled  past  their  commander, 
and  were  then  formed  into  columns. 

All  the  heavy  stores  which  could  not  be  despatched 
in  the  Bashkir  trains,  and  with  the  caravans,  were 
transported  beyond  the  river  Ural,  and  equally 
distributed  among  the  columns. 

The  detachment,  for  greater  facility  of  movement, 
provisionment,  and  pasturage,  was  divided  into  four 
columns  in  the  following  manner  : — 

The  first  column  was  formed  of  two  companies  of 
the  2nd  Battalion  of  the  Line,  one  sotnia  of  Ural 
Cossacks,  two  small  howitzers,  and  360  Kirghiz 
camel-drivers  with  i  ,800  loaded  camels. 

The  commander  of  the  column  was  Lieutenant- 
General  Tolmachef,  who  was,  at  the  same  time,  in 
command  of  all  the  infantry  of  the  detachment. 


PEROFSKFS  EXPEDITION.  Ill 

The  second  column  consisted  of  two  companies 
of  No.  5  Battalion,  fifty  Bashkirs,  fifty  Orenburg 
Cossacks,  two  mountain  howitzers,  and  400  Kirghizes 
as  drivers  to  2,000  camels  carrying  heavy  stores  ; 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Kurminski,  chief  of  all  the 
artillery,  was  at  the  head  of  this  detachment. 

The  third  column  comprised  the  4th  Battalion,  a 
division  of  the  Orenburg  regiment  of  Cossacks,  a 
sotnia  of  Ural  Cossacks,  two  12-pounder  guns,  two 
6-pounders,  and  six  small  mortars  ;  rocket,  mortar, 
artillery,  boat,  and  pontoon  attendants  and  trains  ; 
camp  hospital,  the  Staff  of  the  detachment,  and  600 
Kirghizes,  with  3,000  camels.  This  column  was 
entrusted  to  Colonel  Mansurof,  a  cavalry  ofhcer. 

The  fourth  column  consisted  of  two  companies  of 
No.  5  Battalion,  one  sotnia  of  Bashkirs,  two  howitzers, 
and  300  Kirghizes  with  1,800  camels  and  stores,  and 
was  under  the  charge  of  Major-General  Tsiolkovski, 
at  that  time  also  in  command  of  all  the  Bashkir  and 
Mescheriak  forces. 

Besides  these  four  columns,  two  regiments  of 
Ural  Cossacks,  with  1,800  camels,  marched  on  the 
19th  November  from  the  Lower  Orenburg  Line, 
under  the  command  of  Colonel  Bizianoff,  to  join  the 
main  detachment.    This  contingent  also  entered  into 


112         EUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

the  constitution  of  the  main  force  of  the  expedition  ; 
but  in  order  to  save  unnecessary  marches,  it  was 
despatched  from  the  Kalmykovski  fortress  direct  to 
the  River  Emba. 

The  first  and  second  columns  left  Orenburg  on 
the  14th  (26th)  and  15th  (27th)  November,  by  the 
Berdiano-Kuralinsk  Line ;  and  the  third  and  fourth 
marched  on  the  i6th  and  17th  November  in  the 
direction  of  the  Iletskaya  Zachita.  All  these  columns 
were  to  unite  near  Caravan  Lake  in  the  right  bank 
of  the  Ilek  river  (a  left  affluent  of  the  Ural  river), 
and  about  seventeen  versts  from  Grigorievsk  Post 
on  the  Line.  Here,  before  crossing  the  frontier, 
an  order  of  the  day  was  read  to  the  troops, 
informing  them  that  His  Imperial  Majesty  the 
Emperor  had  been  graciously  pleased  to  invest 
General  Perofski  with  the  powers  and  privileges  of  a 
commander  of  a  separate  corps  in  the  field. 

Before  the  commencement  of  the  march  the 
whole  detachment  was  so  organized  as  to  meet  the 
special  exigences  of  a  winter  and  steppe  campaign  ; 
separate  instructions  were  issued  for  the  discharge 
of  camp  and  other  military  duties  during  the  expedi- 
tion ;  and  a  system  of  signalling  between  the  different 
columns  was  adopted. 


PEROFSKFS  EXPEDITION.  113 

The  columns,  as  independent  parts  of  the  whole 
detachment,  were  formed  of  infantry,  cavalry,  and 
artillery,  with  a  proportionate  number  of  load-camels. 

Two  hours  before  sunrise  a  general  reveille  was 
sounded.  The  men  then  got  up,  breakfasted,  took 
down  their  tents,  and  packed  their  luggage.  At 
about  5  or  6  o'clock  men  were  mustered  for  loading 
the  camels  ;  the  convoying  Cossacks  proceeded  to 
their  posts,  and  made  the  Kirghizes  lead  the  camels 
to  the  packs,  while  the  other  men  of  the  column 
were  told  off  in  parties  of  six  to  load  the  camels. 
The  order  of  loading,  and  the  proper  distribution  of 
the  stores  on  the  backs  of  the  camels,  was  superin- 
tended by  officers.  After  the  camels  had  been 
laden,  the  men  proceeded  to  equip  and  arm  them- 
selves ;  some  of  them  then  mounted  camels.  When 
the  Cossacks  had  mounted  their  horses,  the  advance 
guard  started  forward  at  a  trot,  the  whole  body 
following  in  several  caravan  lines.  Camels  loaded 
with  the  same  description  of  stores  followed  each 
other  in  a  line  or  a  file. 

Two  Kirghizes  were  attached  to  every  ten  camels. 
One  rode  in  front,  and  the  other  walked  at  the  side, 
urging  on  the  flagging  animals  and  adjusting  their 
loads.    Whenever  it  was  necessary  to  stop  a  camel 

I 


114        RUSSIAN  PBOJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

for  this  latter  purpose,  it  was  taken  out  of  the  file, 
so  as  not  to  hinder  the  camels  following  behind,  and 
afterwards  placed  at  the  end  of  its  file.  Or  if  left  be- 
hind too  great  a  distance,  it  would  proceed  with  the 
rear-guard  until  the  night  halt. 

Each  file  of  camels  was  placed  in  charge  of  six 
Cossacks,  who  maintained  order  and  assisted  the 
camel-drivers.  A  Cossack  rode  in  front  of  each  file 
to  show  the  way  ;  these  leading  Cossacks  endeavour- 
ing, as  far  as  they  could,  to  ride  abreast. 

The  other  troops  marched  with  the  advance  and 
rear-guards  and  at  the  sides  of  the  column.  The 
rear-guard  received  all  stragglers,  and  consisted  of  a 
body  of  Cossacks,  a  portion  of  the  camp  patrol,  and 
the  camels  destined  to  carry  the  troops. 

In  order  to  allow  the  camels  sufficient  time  for 
grazing,  the  columns  always  halted  one  or  two 
hours  before  sunset.  The  camels  were  led  to  pas- 
turage under  a  guard,  consisting  of  a  fourth  of  the 
whole  number  of  Kirghizes  and  Cossacks  in  the 
column ;  the  latter  also  did  picket  duty  round  the 
camp.  Two  or  three  sentries  were  stationed  in 
front  of  each  line  of  piled  luggage,  to  prevent 
the  Kirghizes  opening  the  bales,  which  these  "  sons 
of   the   desert"   were   rather   inclined   to  do.    The 


PEROFSKrS  EXPEDITION.  115 

Cossack  pickets,  three  men  to  each,  were  posted 
at  the  distance  of  a  verst  round  the  camp,  to  see 
that  nobody  stole  in  or  out. 

Towards  dusk  the  camels  were  brought  back  from 
their  pastures,  and  fastened  up  for  the  night  in  the 
camp.  The  officers  called  over  their  muster  rolls  of 
men  and  camels,  and  made  their  report  to  the  com- 
mander of  the  column. 

The  first  two  days  were  very  fine,  almost  without 
wind,  and  with  4°  (R.)  of  frost  ;  but  on  the  19th 
(31st)  November  a  north-easterly  wind  began  to 
blo\Y,  and  the  thermometer  sank  to  10°  (R.).  On  the 
2 1  St  December  (2nd  January)  there  was  a  slight  fall 
of  snow ;  and  on  the  following  day,  when  the 
columns  reached  Iletsk  Zachita,  there  were  18°  of 
frost  in  the  morning  and  29°  towards  evening. 

Henceforward  frosts  and  snowstorms  accompanied 
the  columns  without  intermission  on  the  whole  march. 
For  those  who  had  always  lived  in  warm  houses,  and 
but  rarely  ventured  out  of  doors  in  winter,  except 
when  hunting  or  performing  short  journeys,  the  frost 
during  the  first  few  days  was  intolerable  ;  for  it  was, 
of  course,  impossible  to  dress  as  warmly  when  out 
campaigning  on  horseback  as  when  travelling.  At 
night  the  frost  generally  increased ;    "  and  sleeping  on 


116        EUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

the  frozen  ground  spread  over  with  felt,  under  a  felt 
tent,  and  even  when  rolled  up  in  a  sheepskin,  is 
rather  cold  work."  The  men  generally  covered  them- 
selves from  head  to  foot,  to  prevent  their  noses 
getting  frost-bitten  ;  but  during  the  night,  from  the 
breathing  and  perspiration  of  the  sleepers,  the  sheep- 
skins froze  to  the  hair  of  their  heads  and  their  mous- 
taches, so  that  on  getting  up  in  the  morning  it  took 
them  considerable  time  to  disentangle  their  hair  from 
the  sheepskin.  During  the  first  nights  nobody  could 
sleep  because  of  the  great  frosts,  but  afterwards 
habit  and  nature  triumphed.  Frosts  of  15°  and  20° 
R.  were  at  last  regarded  as  comparative  thaws, 
and,  in  spite  of  the  cold,  all  slept  soundly  after  a 
fatiguing  day's  march. 

Fortunately,  some  of  the  men  provided  themselves 
on  the  halt  at  Iletz  Zachita  with  iron  stoves  ;  and 
tents  furnished  with  these  proved  of  great  service. 

If  it  were  possible  to  advance  in  the  steppe  with- 
out being  exposed  to  chances  of  attack  or  loss  of 
cattle  from  marauding  Kirghizes,  the  most  con- 
venient and  rapid  mode  of  performing  the  march 
would  be  to  adopt  the  order  observed  by  the  trade 
caravans.  These  advance  in  two  or  three  lines,  the 
detachment  being  divided  into  several  small  columns. 


PEROFSKI'S  EXPEDITION.  117 

each  consisting  of  800  or  i  ,000  camels,  so  as  to  allow 
each  party,  without  preserving  any  particular  order, 
to  start  in  the  morning  as  soon  as  the  camels  have 
been  packed,  and  halt  for  the  night  at  any  point 
they  may  find  most  convenient.  But  in  such  a  case 
it  would  be  impossible  to  exercise  any  command 
over  the  whole  detachment,  and  all  military  rules 
and  precautions  would  necessarily  have  to  be 
neglected. 

It  is  evident  that  this  manner  of  marching  cannot 
be  adopted  by  an  expeditionary  force  despatched 
with  military  objects,  which  should  be  ready  at  any 
moment  to  repel  an  attack  of  the  enemy  from  what- 
ever quarter  it  might  come,  and  which  must  there- 
fore advance  in  such  order  as  to  be  able  to  form  a 
defensive  encampment  without  loss  of  time. 

It  was  necessary  to  plan  an  order  of  marching 
which  should  satisfy  military  requirements,  and  be 
at  the  same  time  of  a  simple  character.  Such  a 
mode  of  advance  was  devised  by  the  officers  of  the 
Staff  of  the  Orenburg  Corps.  It  was  based  on 
the  consideration  that  the  detachment  consisted  of 
troops  who  had  never  seen  warfare,  and  who  were 
accompanied  by  an  enormous  train,  including  more 
than  2,000  Kirghiz  camel-drivers  of  doubtful  loyalty, 


118        HUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

requiring  strict  supervision,  unaccustomed  to  order 
and  discipline,  and  ignorant  of  the  Russian  lan- 
guage ;  and  that  it  was  necessary  to  instruct  the 
detachment  in  the  order  of  march  which  would  have 
to  be  observed  on  entering  the  dominion  of  Khiva. 
A  campaign,  therefore,  at  a  short  distance  from  the 
"  Line"  would  have  to  serve  as  an  experiment  and 
as  a  model  for  the  subsequent  advance  and  deploy- 
ment of  the  troops  in  the  steppe. 

In  order  to  command  the  detachment  with  greater 
efficiency  it  would  have  been  preferable  to  have 
allowed  it  to  march  in  one  body ;  but  the  ad- 
vance and  disposition  in  the  steppe  of  a  force  con- 
sisting of  more  than  2,000  men  and  9,000  camels 
presented  the  following  drawbacks  : — 

I  St.  Large  and  good  pasturage  for  the  cattle  and 
fuel  for  the  men  could  not  always  be  found  at  the 
halting-places.  2ndly.  It  would  be  necessary  to  graze 
the  camels  at  a  great  distance  from  the  camp,  and 
consequently  it  would  be  more  difficult  and  occupy 
more  time  to  collect  them.  Moreover,  as,  during 
the  winter  days,  only  two  or  three  hours  were  avail- 
able for  grazing,  the  cattle  could  not  be  driven  far 
from  camp.  3rdly.  There  were  no  established  roads 
across  the  steppe.     When  crossing  ravines,  gullies, 


PEROF SKI'S  EXPEDITION.  119 

rivulets,  and  rivers  it  would  not  be  always  possible 
to  advance  with  an  extended  front ;  all  the  columns 
would  have  to  be  contracted  and  drawn  out  into 
a  long  line,  which  would  arrest  the  progress  of 
each  column  for  several  hours.  These  delays,  as 
it  proved  afterwards,  would  have  been  still  greater 
had  the  force  not  been  divided  into  columns  ;  and 
consequently  the  horses  and  camels  would  have 
endured  greater  fatigue  by  standing  for  many  hours 
with  their  loads  on  their  backs.  It  was  for  these 
reasons,  therefore,  that  the  expeditionary  force  was 
divided  Into  separate  columns  ;  and  as  it  was  known 
that  the  enemy  was  not  distinguished  for  bravery, 
discipline,  or  knowledge  of  the  military  art,  no 
serious  danger  was  apprehended  from  such  a 
division. 

The  detachment,  as  it  was  organised,  resembled 
a  large  caravan  or  train,  carrying  with  it  a  supply  of 
material  for  the  whole  campaign,  provisions  for  two 
months,  and  a  large  quantity  of  miscellaneous  stores; 
which  entailed  the  necessity  of  adapting  its  military 
organisation  and  campaigning  arrangements  to  the 
order  of  march  and  of  night  halts  observed  by  trains 
following  the  rear  of  armies. 

The   Russian   expeditionary  force  being  accom- 


120        E  US  SI  AN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 


panied  by  a  train  so  large  as  to  include  two 
camels  to  every  combatant,  could  not  advance  in 
the  same  manner  as,  for  instance,  Bonaparte  did  in 
Egypt,  where  his  trains  were  protected  by  being 
placed  in  the  centre  of  squares,  and  where  he  was 
able  to  bring  up  his  supplies  along  the  Nile.  Nor 
could  the  Russians  adopt  the  plan  pursued  by  the 
French  in  Algeria,  where  the  troops  are  seldom 
moved  more  than  150  or  200  miles  from  the  depots, 
and  where,  consequently,  no  necessity  existed  for 
taking  large  supplies  for  an  expedition.  Thus 
Bugeaud,  in  his  celebrated  movement  preceding  the 
battle  of  I  sly,  pushed  forward  only  two  short  stages 
from  the  entrenched  camp  at  Lalla-Magramia,  where 
his  depot  of  stores  was  concentrated.  The  supplies 
for  10,000  French  troops,  occupying  a  space  of  only 
150  fathoms  in  length  and  twenty-five  in  breadth, 
could  be  easily  protected  by  troops  formed  into 
battalion  squares  placed  at  short  distances  from 
each  other. 

The  main  column  started  from  Bish  Tamak  on  the 
7th  (19th)  December  In  30°  (R.)  of  frost.  The 
snow,  owing  to  the  cold,  was  crisp  under  foot.  No 
bushes  were  now  to  be  seen,  and  in  the  dis- 
tance the  summits   of  hillocks,  covered  with  snow 


PEROFSKI'S  EXPEDITION.  121 


and  brilliantly  illuminated  by  the  sun,  could  alone 
be  distinguished.  This  brilliant  reflection  and  the 
whiteness  of  the  snow  began  to  affect  the  sight  of 
the  men.  The  columns  had  scarcely  gone  seven  or 
eight  versts  when,  about  noon,  the  sky  became 
hidden  in  dense  clouds,  and  a  north-easterly  wind 
sprang  up,  scattering  clouds  of  snow,  and  soon 
attained  the  force  of  a  "  buran." 

Beyond  a  distance  of  twenty  yards  no  object 
could  be  seen  through  the  clouds  of  snow  which 
were  whirled  about  in  every  direction.  The  fury  of 
the  storm  was  so  great  that  it  was  impossible  to 
draw  breath  when  facing  the  wind,  and  the  intense 
cold  penetrated  to  the  bones.  The  order  of  the  ad- 
vance could  not  be  observed,  and  so  as  not  to  get  lost 
in  this  fog  of  snow,  the  column  was  rapidly  halted. 

The  "  buran  "  lasted  the  whole  night  and  subsided 
towards  noon  the  next  day.  The  Kirghizes  said  that 
if  the  snow  had  not  been  hardened  previously  by  the 
frost,  the  tents  would  have  been  buried  by  the  fall. 
There  was  a  perceptible  increase  in  the  depth  of  the 
snow  in  the  steppe  after  the  storm  ;  and  it  was  then, 
when  it  had  to  cross  ravines  and  hollows  drifted  over 
with  snow,  that  the  detachment  experienced  all  the 
hardships  and  fatigues  of  a  winter  steppe  campaign. 


122        BUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

Directly  the  reveille  sounded,  preparations  were 
set  on  foot  for  the  resumption  of  the  march.  The 
piteous  cries  of  the  numerous  camels  upon  being 
forced  to  rise  on  their  feet,  the  neighing  of  horses, 
the  babel  of  tongues — Kirghiz,  Bashkir,  Uralian  and 
Russian  all  intermixed — blended  into  one  wild  dis- 
cordant sound,  which  echoed  far  and  wide  over  the 
steppe. 

On  the  march  from  Iletz-Zachita  to  Fort  Emba, 
that  is  from  22nd  November  (4th  December)  to  the 
2 1  St  December  (2nd  January),  only  once  did  the 
glass  rise  to  9°  (R.),  and  this  was  by  comparison 
considered  a  thaw.  For  eight  days  the  frost  ranged 
from  10°  to  15°  (R.),  for  six  days  from  25°  to  30° 
(R.),  while  for  three  days  it  exceeded  30°  (R.)- 
These  frosts  were  not  unfrequently  accompanied  by 
a  biting  wind,  which  sometimes  assumed  the  fury  of 
a  "  buran." 

The  depth  of  the  snow  was  Increased  by  the 
snow-drifts,  which  daily  augmented  the  difficulties 
of  the  march.  The  transport  of  the  sick  and  of 
the  six  and  twelve-pounder  guns  was  attended  with 
particular  difficulty,  as  the  wheels  of  the  hospital 
carts  and  gun-carriages  cut  deep  into  the  snow. 
.   The     wheels     were,    however,    taken     off,    and 


PEROFSKFS  EXPEDITION.  123 

wooden  slides  fixed  to  the  body  of  the  carriage, 
by  which  means  the  difficulty  was  partially  over- 
come. Along  the  whole  distance,  from  the  Oren- 
burg Line  to  the  River  Emba,  the  columns  did  not  see 
a  single  Kirghiz  aul,  and  it  was  only  on  the  stage  to 
Fort  Emba  that  they  passed  some  tents  of  Kirghizes 
of  the  Nazar  tribe,  near  which  were  grazing  large 
numbers  of  horses  and  sheep. 

Taking  advantage  of  this  opportunity,  i  ,000  sheep 
were  bought  from  the  Kirghizes  for  the  provision- 
ment  of  the  column,  and  a  few  fresh  camels  pro- 
cured in  lieu  of  those  which  had  become  exhausted. 

At  last,  after  a  very  tedious  and  fatiguing  march 
down  the  valley  of  the  Emba,  along  which  only  six 
or  eight  rows  of  camels  could  advance  abreast,  the 
column  reached  Fort  Emba  on  the  19th  (31st) 
December,  where  it  found  the  detachment  of 
Colonel  Bizianov,  who  had  already  arrived  from 
the  Nijni  Urulsk  Line  on  the  9th  (21st)  December. 

The  whole  march  from  Orenburg  to  Fort  Emba,  a 
distance  of  472  versts,  was  performed  by  the  detach- 
ment in  thirty-two  days.  Not  a  single  man  had  died 
from  cold,  although  there  were  numerous  cases  of 
frost-bite. 


CHAPTER    VI. 

PEROFSKi's  EXPEDITION  (continued). 

The  four  columns  were  disposed  in  four  separate 
camps  around  the  fortification,  at  a  distance  of  from 
a  half  to  one  verst.  As  all  the  herbage  about  the 
fort  was  consumed,  it  became  necessary  to  drive  the 
camels  to  new  pasture-grounds,  at  a  distance  of 
twenty-five  versts.  It  was,  moreover,  desirable  that 
the  detachment  should  remain  for  a  few  days  at  the 
Emba  fortification,  to  recruit  its  strength  before 
encountering  still  greater  fatigue,  and  in  order  that 
the  weak  and  unserviceable  camels  might  be  picked 
out,  and  the  packs  of  the  stronger  animals  reduced  to 
four  or  five  poods  each.  The  original  packs  of  six  or 
seven  poods  formed  together  a  load  of  twelve  to  four- 
teen poods  per  camel,  which  was  now  too  heavy  for  the 
exhausted  beasts.  It  was  also  necessary  to  await 
the  arrival  of  fresh  camels,  on  their  way  to  the  Emba, 


PEROFSKrS  EXPEDITION.  125 

and  to  prepare  means  of  transport  for  the  sick  along 
the  remaining  distance  to  Khiva  ;  a  matter  of  no 
ordinary  difficulty.  The  men  disabled  by  sickness 
and  disease  had  hitherto  been  transported  partly  in 
waggons  and  partly  in  sledges.  Beyond  the  Emba, 
however,  the  great  depth  of  the  snow,  the  uneven 
character  of  the  ground — holes  and  hollows  occurr- 
ing at  almost  every  step — and  the  steep  ascent  to 
the  Ust-Urt,  involved  the  necessity  of  transporting 
the  invalids  on  camels. 

In  Egypt  and  Algeria,  where  the  only  difficulty 
to  contend  with  is  the  sultry  heat,  the  arrange- 
ment of  these  invalid-packs  is,  according  to  the 
official  writer,  "  comparatively  easy."  In  the 
Egyptian  campaign  of  Bonaparte  boxes  of  five  feet 
long  were  fixed  to  the  packs,  one  end  of  the  box 
opening  on  hinges,  to  allow  the  sick  man  to  stretch 
out  his  legs  when  he  wished.  In  Algeria,  the  French, 
during  their  expeditions  into  the  desert,  carry  their 
sick  on  the  backs  of  mules,  in  a  kind  of  chair  in 
which  the  sick  man  is  strapped.  The  Russians 
could  not  adopt  either  of  these  methods,  as  the  sick 
men  might  get  frozen  to  death  in  severe  weather. 
There  remained  only  one  method  of  conveying  them  : 
by  means,  that  is  to  say,  of  a  species  of  hammock, 


126  RUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

about  six  feet  in  length,  filled  with  hay  and  wool,  in 
which  the  sick  were  placed,  wrapped  warmly  in  felt. 
Although  the  hammocks  thus  prepared  were  not, 
perhaps,  very  comfortable  to  lie  in,  none  of  the  sick 
were  injured  by  frost.  The  strongest  camels  were 
selected  for  carrying  them,  and  two  hammocks  were 
slung  on  each  camel.  Fortunately  there  was  a  person 
attached  to  the  force  who  voluntarily  assumed  the 
duties  of  looking  after  the  sick,  and  moving  them 
to  and  from  their  hammocks.  This  benevolent  man 
was  Chichachef,  the  celebrated  Russian  traveller,  who 
had  received  permission  from  the  authorities  to  join 
the  expedition  as  a  looker-on.  He  intended,  after 
reaching  Khiva,  to  survey  the  sources  of  the  Oxus 
and  Jaxartes  and  the  Pamir  mountains  ;  whence  he 
proposed  to  return  to  Russia  by  way  of  Thibet  and 
India. 

During  the  whole  progress  of  the  march  from  the 
Line  to  the  Emba  fortification,  the  column  had  not 
been  attacked  either  by  the  Kaisaks  or  by  the 
Khivans.  It  had  met  no  enemy.  Reports  had,  it  is 
true,  been  received  of  the  collection  of  a  considerable 
force  of  Khivans  on  the  Syr-Daria  (Jaxartes),  at 
Karatamack  (a  bay  on  the  north-western  shore  of 
the  sea  of  Aral)  ;  but  as  these  rumours  had  been  in 


PEROFSKI'S  EXPEDITION.  127 


circulation  for  nearly  six  months,  they  were  at  last 
discredited  altogether.  Suddenly  the  commander  of 
the  Ak-Bulak  fort  reported  that  he  had  been  attacked 
by  the  Khivans. 

They  had  appeared  near  Fort  Ak-Bulak  on  the 
1 8th  (30th)  December,  2,000  or  3,000  strong, 
approaching  at  a  brisk  trot,  and  halting  within  one 
and  a  half  versts  of  the  fort.  A  body  of  their  picked 
horsemen  dashed  off  to  attack  the  picket  stationed 
at  a  short  distance,  but  the  soldiers  had  had  time  to 
retreat  to  the  fort.  At  the  same  time  the  mounted 
Khivans  divided  themselves  into  several  bodies,  and 
made  a  simultaneous  attack  on  the  fortification  from 
the  eastern  and  northern  sides.  Fortunately  a  false 
alarm  had  been  sounded  the  night  before,  when 
the  men  had  been  told  off  to  their  several  quarters, 
and  the  officers  appointed  to  their  respective  posts ; 
consequently  no  confusion  arose  on  the  unexpected 
attack  from  the  Khivans.  Inside  the  fortress  there 
were  only  130  able-bodied  men ;  but  at  the  moment 
of  danger  164  sick  soldiers  rose  from  their  beds, 
seized  their  arms,  and  joined  their  comrades  on  the 
walls.  The  musketry  and  artillery  fire,  skilfully 
directed  by  two  officers  of  Mining  Engineers, 
repulsed  the  enemy  with  considerable  loss. 


128        EUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

Notwithstanding  this,  however,  they  continued 
their  unsuccessful  attacks  until  nightfall,  forming, 
when  out  of  gunshot,  into  new  bodies,  and  then 
rushing  forward  to  attack  again,  and  harmlessly 
discharging  their  muskets  at  the  garrison.  Ob- 
serving that  some  haystacks  stood  in  front  of  the 
entrance  to  the  fort  on  the  western  side,  the  Khivans 
repeatedly  endeavoured  to  approach  them,  evidently 
with  the  intention  of  forcing  their  way  into  the  fort 
under  cover.  They  were,  however,  each  time  foiled 
in  their  attempts  by  the  Cossacks  and  infantry 
soldiers  who  sallied  out  against  them.  In  the  night 
they  attempted  to  set  fire  to  the  ricks,  but  in  this 
they  likewise  failed. 

The  next  day  the  enemy,  having  previously  ob- 
served that  there  were  no  guns  on  one  face  of  the 
fort,  attacked  it  from  that  side  ;  but  overnight  a 
barbette  had  been  erected  there,  on  which,  during 
the  attack,  guns  were  hastily  mounted,  so  that  the 
Khivans,  on  making  the  attack,  were  dispersed  with 
grape.  After  this  failure  they  retired  about  three 
versts,  and  formed  themselves  into  one  body,  ranged 
under  their  several  banners.  Hearing  that  a  small 
Russian  detachment  was  encamped  at  a  short  dis- 
tance from  the  fort,  the  Khivans  resolved  to  destroy 


PEROFSKFS  EXPEDITION.  129 

it.  This  was  the  transport  train  that  had  been  des- 
patched for  the  removal  of  the  sick  and  superfluous 
heavy  articles  from  the  Ak-Bulak  to  the  River 
Emba,  and  which  was  at  that  time  only  one  stage 
distant  from  the  fortification.  Being  unaware  of  the 
proximity  of  the  enemy,  this  detachment,  under  the 
command  of  Erofeyef,  had  halted  at  seventeen  versts 
from  Ak-Bulak.  The  camels  and  horses  had  been  let 
loose  to  graze,  and  the  men  were  employed  in  digging 
roots  for  fuel  and  in  erecting  the  tents.  While  they 
were  thus  engaged  the  Khivan  horsemen  made  a 
sudden  appearance,  but  instead  of  immediately 
attacking  the  detachment,  commenced  driving  away 
its  horses  and  camels.  This  gave  the  Russians  time 
to  make  a  hasty  entrenchment.  Carts,  sledges,  and 
boxes  were  immediately  formed  into  a  temporary 
rampart,  behind  which  the  soldiers  were  placed  to 
receive  the  enemy  with  discharges  of  musketry. 
The  cavalry  and  infantry  of  the  Khivans  soon  made 
successive  charges  on  the  camp,  but  were  each 
time  repulsed.  At  night  the  Khivans  attempted 
to  crawl  up  and  take  the  Russians  by  surprise, 
but  were  driven  off  at  the  point  of  the  bayonet  and 
with  musket  shots.  During  the  darkness,  how- 
ever,  the    Khivans    succeeded   in   digging   rifle-pits 

K 


130        EUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

and  throwing  up  earthworks  at  a  distance  of  fifty 
yards  on  the  four  faces  of  the  Russian  camp  ;  and 
they  opened  fire  from  these  in  the  morning.  From 
this  position,  however,  they  were  soon  dislodged ; 
and  seeing  the  futility  of  continuing  their  open 
attacks,  they  collected  the  horses  and  camels  they 
had  seized  and  drove  them  straight  before  them  on 
to  the  Russian  encampment,  in  the  hope  of  being 
able  to  approach  the  camp  safely  under  shelter  of 
the  animals.  But  Captain  Erofeyef,  divining  their 
intention,  detached  twenty-five  riflemen  with  orders 
to  take  up  a  position  which  would  deprive  the 
assailants  of  protection  behind  the  horses  and 
camels.  This  was  skilfully  executed,  and  the  well- 
directed  fire  of  the  riflemen  created  confusion  among 
the  enemy.  A  sally  was  at  the  same  time  made 
from  the  camp,  and  the  Khivans  were  beaten  off 
with  loss,  leaving  their  dead  behind,  and  losing  a 
portion  of  the  camels  and  horses  previously  seized 
from  the  Russians.  Seeing  the  great  loss  they  had 
sustained  in  men,  and  the  utter  failure  of  their  attacks 
against  the  camp,  the  Khivans  had  now  recourse  to 
another  stratagem.  Two  of  their  horsemen  galloped 
up  within  gunshot  and  endeavoured  to  induce  the 
Tartars  and  Kirghizes  in  the  Russian  service  to  join 


PEROFSKFS  EXPEDITION.  131 

them,  promising  them  favours  and  rewards  if  they 
did  so,  and  threatening  dire  vengeance  if  they  re- 
fused. "A  few  shots,"  we  are  told,  "soon  put  an 
end  to  their  persuasive  eloquence." 

The  whole  Khivan  forces  retired  soon  afterwards 
and  were  not  seen  or  heard  of  again  for  a  long  while. 
The  Russians  subsequently  ascertained  that  they  had 
lost  the  greater  part  of  their  horses  from  the  frost, 
many  of  the  riders  also  faUing  victims  to  the  severity 
of  the  winter.  Out  of  the  whole  of  this  mass  of 
2,000  or  3,000  men — which  had  been  commanded 
by  the  Kush  Begi,  or  Minister  of  War — scarcely 
half  returned  to  Khiva,  and  those  were  in  a  very 
sorry  plight. 

The  exhortations  and  threats  of  the  Khivans  did 
not  at  the  time  produce  the  slightest  effect  on  the 
Kirghizes,  who  were  witnesses  of  their  cowardice 
and  defeat.  But  later  on  the  exaggerated  reports 
disseminated  among  the  Kirghizes  of  the  steppe  by 
the  Khivans  respecting  the  strength  of  their  forces 
and  their  reinforcement  by  an  army  of  Kokandians, 
the  threats  of  the  Khan  of  Khiva,  and  religious 
fanaticism,  stimulated  and  inflamed  by  Khivan 
emissaries,  excited  the  Kirghiz  camel-drivers  to 
such  an  extent  that  on  one  occasion  they  collected 


132         RUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

together  to  the  number  of  about  200,  and  refused 
to  proceed  any  further.  This  disorderly  crowd, 
in  spite  of  all  entreaties,  refused  to  disperse,  and, 
increasing  in  numbers,  "  disturbed  the  camp  with 
their  wild  shouts  and  violent  behaviour."  It  was 
necessary  to  adopt  severe  measures  so  as  to  save 
the  detachment  from  being  left  in  the  heart 
of  the  frozen  steppe,  at  a  distance  of  500  versts 
from  the  Line,  without  any  means  of  locomotion. 
The  crowd  was  surrounded  by  troops,  and  after  two 
of  the  ringleaders  had  been  shot,  the  malcontents 
dispersed,  and  resumed  their  duties. 

■■  While  the  main  detachment  lay  encamped  at  the 
Emba,  a  report  was  received  that,  the  supplies  of 
provisions  despatched  in  vessels  to  Novo-Alexan- 
drofsk  having  been  delayed  at  sea  by  contrary  winds 
until  late  in  the  autumn,  ten  of  the  ships  had  become 
fixed  in  the  ice,  some  in  sight  of  Fort  Alexandrofsk,. 
and  some  within  100  versts  of  Gurief,  near  the 
Prorvinsk  islands.  It  was  further  stated  that  only 
two  of  the  vessels  had  succeeded  in  returning  to 
Astrakhan,  after  sustaining  considerable  injury  and 
losing  part  of  their  cargoes,  which  the  crew  were 
compelled  to  throw  overboard. 

Owing   to    the  exertions   of   the   commandant   of 


PEROFSKrS  EXPEDITION.  133 

Novo-Alexandrofsk,  the  vessels  frozen  in  the  ice 
near  that  fort  were  saved,  and  their  cargoes  brought 
on  shore.  Those  transports,  however,  which  were 
wedged  in  the  ice  near  Prorvinsk  Post  were  burnt  by 
Turcomans  and  Kirghizes  sent  thither  for  the  purpose 
by  the  Khivans. 

While  at  Emba  some  of  the  soldiers  were  exercised 
in  making  night  signals  by  the  ignition  of  gun- 
powder— in  which  manner  all  communications  were 
correctly  maintained  between  the  columns — others 
practised  firing  with  shot  and  shell ;  and  experi- 
ments were  successfully  made  in  exploding  mines 
under  the  ice  by  means  of  a  galvanic  battery. 

The  distance  between  the  Emba  fortification  and 
Ak-Bulak  by  the  direct  winter  route  did  not  exceed 
1 60  versts,  and  it  was  traversed  by  the  columns  in 
fifteen  days.  Notwithstanding  this,  however,  the 
loss  in  camels  was  very  great,  and  continued  to 
increase  daily.  The  detachment,  when  it  crossed  the 
Line,  had  about  10,000  camels.  But  after  passing 
Fort  Emba,  it  could  with  difficulty  muster  8,900 
camels  for  transporting  provisions  and  provender  for 
two  months ;  while  at  Ak-Bulak,  a  point  not  even 
half-way  to  Khiva,  the  number  of  serviceable  camels 
had    been    reduced    to    5,188.       The    number   that 


134         EUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

actually  died  between  the  Emba  and  Ak-Bulak  was 
only  1,200 ;  the  rest  being  abandoned  on  the  road 
on  account  of  their  complete  exhaustion. 

To  render  the  march  of  the  unloaded  camels  less 
fatiguing,  the  infantry  columns  advanced  in  front  of 
them,  in  four  files,  forming  beaten  tracks  in  the 
snow;  the  advance  of  the  loaded  camels  being 
assisted  in  the  same  way  by  the  cavalry.  Where 
the  snow  was  very  deep,  the  cavalry  passed  and 
repassed  several  times  over  the  ground,  to  enable 
the  camels  to  proceed  without  any  difficulty.  In 
some  parts  the  snow  was  even  shovelled  away  by 
the  soldiers  ;  but  in  spite  of  all  this  the  camels  con- 
tinued to  fall  in  great  numbers,  thus  obstructing  the 
advance  of  the  columns.  When  a  camel  succumbed 
it  was  necessary  to  remove  its  load  ;  and  the  men 
sinking  to  their  knees,  and  sometimes  to  their  waists, 
in  snow,  exhausted  their  strength  in  this  labour. 
When  a  camel  fell  it  rarely  rose  again,  so  that  new 
paths  had  to  be  made  round  this  obstruction  for  the 
passage  of  camels  following  in  the  rear. 

The  guns  had  to  be  drawn  by  horses,  and  occa- 
sionally to  be  pulled  out  of  the  snow  by  the  men.  In 
some  places  the  surface  of  the  snow  was  quite  soft, 
while  in  others  it  was  nearly  as  hard  as  ice,  and  sup- 


PEROFSKFS  EXPEDTTION.  135 


ported  the  horses,  camels,  and  even  the  12-pounder 
guns.    At  times,  when  it  gave  way,  the  extrication  of 
the  camels,  sledges,  artillery,  and  so  on,  was  attended 
with  great  fatigue  and  diflBculty.     The  camels  and 
horses  got  cut  about  the  legs,  and  on  some  days 
only  short  stages  of  four  versts  were  made  in  conse- 
quence  of   these    delays.     In    "  burans,"    or  snow- 
storms,  it  was    altogether  impossible    to    advance. 
Thus   the   first    column,  which    marched    during   a 
snow-storm,  was  only  able  to  traverse  twenty  versts 
in  four  days;  and  it  abandoned  on  the  road  a  large 
number  of  sledges   and  carts,  which  the  following 
three  columns  converted  into  fuel  for  cooking  pur- 
poses. 

After  such  severe  frost  and  such  fatiguing  stages, 
the  strength  of  the  camels  should  have  been  recruited 
with  plentiful  food.  But  the  surface  of  the  steppe — 
poor  at  any  time — was  now  completely  covered  with 
snow.  It  was,  however,  still  possible  to  give  each 
horse  a  measure  of  oats  and  about  five  pounds  of 
hay  per  diem;  although  to  feed  8,000  camels  on  hay 
was,  of  course,  not  feasible.  The  latter,  however, 
were  each  apportioned  about  five  pounds  of  hay  a 
day;  which  was  little  enough. 

It  must  be  added  that  the  frost,  during  this  time, 


136        RUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

was  15°  and  20°  R. ;  and,  although  the  men  had  to 
a  certain  extent  become  acchmatised,  the  great  cold 
benumbed  their  limbs,  in  spite  of  their  warm  clothing, 
and  incapacitated  them  for  all  work.  "At  the  same 
time,"  says  the  ofhcial  writer,  "hard  work — producing 
perspiration,  exhaustion,  and  sound  sleep — exposed 
the  men  to  the  liability  of  catching  cold." 

For  the  first  eighty  versts  the  columns  marched 
along  the  left  banks  of  the  Arty  Takshi,  and  then 
followed  the  course  of  the  Talysai  rivulet,  proceed- 
ing afterwards  across  saline  marshes,  which  the  frost 
rendered  firm  ground  in  winter,  thus  enabling  the 
camels,  horses,  and  artillery  to  cross  without  any 
difficulty.  During  summer,  draught  horses  sink  here 
up  to  their  fetlocks  in  the  oozy  mud,  and  the  wheels 
of  carts  laden  with  goods  become  embedded  a  foot 
deep.  After  a  fall  of  rain,  however,  or  during  spring, 
it  is  altogether  impossible  to  cross  these  saline-marsh 
tracts,  which  extend  to  Chushka-Kul,  over  a  dis- 
tance of  eighty  versts.  They  are  intersected  by  two 
ranges  of  hills — the  Bakzir  and  Ali  —  over  which 
there  are  convenient  ascents  and  descents  for 
vehicles.  But  along  the  whole  of  this  marshy 
tract  a  plentiful  supply  of  good  water  is  only  to 
be  found  on  the  slope  of  the  Ali  hills  ;   the  pastur- 


PEROFSKFS  EXPEDITION.  137 

age  for  cattle  throughout  the  distance  being,  more- 
over, poor  and  scanty.  In  consequence  of  frost 
and  snow,  and  scarcity  of  fuel,  it  took  the  column 
six  or  seven  days  to  traverse  these  salines,  and  it  was 
on  these  stages  that  they  encountered  the  difficulties 
described  above. 

General  Perofski,  who  had  remained  with  a  light 
detachment  at  Fort  Emba  to  superintend  the  depar- 
ture of  the  last  column,  and  to  make  proper  arrange- 
ments for  the  safety  and  requirements  of  the  sick 
left  behind,  quitted  the  Fort  on  the  17th  (29th) 
January,  and  after  inspecting  the  column  which  he 
overtook  on  the  march,  went  forward  to  Ak-Bulak 
to  make  arrangements  for  the  further  advance 
of  the  troops.  On  reaching  Ak-Bulak,  he  imme- 
diately despatched  Colonel  Bizianof  and  Captain 
Rechenberg,  with  150  Ural  Cossacks  and  one  light 
field  gun,  to  reconnoitre  the  route  ahead,  and  to  find 
a  convenient  point  of  ascent  to  the  Ust-Urt.  This 
detachment,  after  going  150  versts  in  the  direction 
of  Khiva,  returned  eight  days  later,  reporting  that 
the  depth  of  snow  for  100  versts,  as  far  as  the  Ust- 
Urt,  was  still  greater  than  that  on  the  steppe  already 
traversed  ;  that  the  grass  and  bushes  were  buried  in 
snow,   and    that  some    parts   of   the  route  were   so 


138         EUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

blocked  with  snow  that  they  could  with  difficulty  be 
passed  even  by  horses.  On  the  Ust-Urt,  along 
which  Colonel  Bizianof  advanced  twenty  versts, 
there  was  less  snow  than  below;  but  even  there 
the  quantity  was  unusually  great.  No  traces  of 
the  enemy  were  to  be  discovered  anywhere,  from 
which  it  was  justly  concluded  that  the  Khivans  had 
marched  homewards  in  consequence  of  the  extra- 
ordinary severity  of  the  winter. 

Some  account  of  their  partial  operations  against 
the  Russians  is  given  by  Captain  Abbott  in  the 
narrative  of  his  mission  to  Khiva,  which  he  reached 
from  Herat,  by  way  of  Merv,  at  the  very  time  when 
Perofski  was  advancing  towards  Khiva  from  Oren- 
burg. The  Khivan  horsemen  complained  that,  in 
consequence  of  the  severe  cold,  they  were  unable 
to  handle  their  matchlocks  with  effect ;  while  the 
Russians,  they  said,  kept  their  hands  warm  by 
means  of  their  camp-fires. 

Meanwhile  the  third,  or  main  column,  of  the 
Russian  force,  comprising  the  park  of  artillery, 
reached  Ak-Bulak  on  the  25th  February  (6th 
March),  1840 ;  sixteen  days  after  its  departure 
from  Fort  Emba.  Although  this  column  had  been 
preceded    by  the  two  foremost    columns,  and    had 


PEROFSKPS  EXPEDITION.  13^ 

left  only  six  days  after  the  second  one,  it  was, 
in  some  places,  obliged  to  clear  a  new  route  for 
itself,  the  tracks  and  trodden  paths  of  the  columns  in 
advance  having  become  drifted  over  with  snow. 
Only  now  and  then  could  the  route  taken  by  the 
columns  in  front  be  ascertained  through  the  pillars 
of  snow  erected  at  some  distance  from  each  other  by 
the  Ural  Cossacks,  through  the  snow-heaps  which 
marked  the  night  camps,  and  through  the  camels, 
living  and  dead,  some  frozen  and  partly  devoured  by 
wild  beasts,  that  lay  along  the  line  of  march. 

If  the  passage  of  Macdonald's  corps,  12,000 
strong,  in  1800,  over  the  Simplon,  be  justly  con- 
sidered a  wonderful  feat  on  account  of  the  extra- 
ordinary exertions  of  the  French,  and  the  great 
hardships  to  which  they  were  exposed,  how  much 
higher,  asks  the  official  historian,  must  we  place  the 
endurance  and  discipline  of  the  Russian  troops,  who 
encountered  difficulties  immeasurably  greater  on 
their  march  through  the  deep  snows  from  Emba  to 
Ak-Bulak,  during  frosts,  storms,  and  hurricanes  of 
unprecedented  severity,  and  over  a  desert  and  frozen 
tract  of  160  versts  (107  miles),  the  advance  lasting 
a  period  of  half  a  month  ? 

After  marching  in  hard  frosts  a  distance  of  500 


140        EUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

versts  through  an  inhospitable  steppe  covered  with 
deep  snow,  and  after  a  short  haU  at  Fort  Emba, 
which  did  not,  however,  afford  the  men  any  rest 
owing  to  the  heavy  labour  they  had  to  perform  there, 
the  troops  had  further  to  advance  across  a  steppe 
still  more  barren  and  inhospitable.  It  was  found 
necessary  to  clear  the  way  for  the  6,000  camels 
through  the  deep  snow-drifts  ;  and  the  men  had 
very  often  to  work  up  to  their  waists  in  snow 
during  a  frost  of  20°  R.,  adjusting  the  packs,  load- 
ing and  unloading  them,  and  so  on.  The  unfortunate 
camels  had  become  so  weak  from  fatigue,  insufficient 
food,  and  cold,  that  even  the  Kirghiz  drivers,  who 
rarely  walk,  did  not  mount  them  for  several  stages 
before  Ak-Bulak,  but  proceeded  on  foot.  A  new 
source  of  anxiety  appeared  on  the  march  to  Ak- 
Bulak.  The  famished  camels  gnawed  the  bark 
boxes  and  matting  sacks,  in  order  to  get  at  the 
biscuits,  flour,  and  corn  they  contained ;  and  pulled 
the  compressed  hay  out  of  the  bundles.  In  this 
manner  more  of  the  stores  were  wasted  than  eaten 
by  the  camels,  and  it  was  consequently  necessary  to 
keep  a  strict  watch  over  them,  and  at  once  repair 
any  damage  done  to  the  packs.  At  each  halting- 
place  19,000  packages  had  to  be  unloaded  and  again 


PEROFSKrS  EXPEDITION.  141 

loaded.  Before  a  fire  could  be  lit,  the  materials  for 
it,  consisting  usually  of  small  roots  of  shrubs,  had  to 
be  picked  out  of  the  hard  and  frozen  ground. 
Spaces  had  to  be  cleared  of  snow  for  the  tents, 
camels,  &c.  ;  and  it  was  only  towards  8  or  9  o'clock 
in  the  evening  that  the  soldier  or  Cossack  could 
obtain  a  little  repose,  while  by  2  or  3  o'clock  the 
next  morning  he  was  obliged  to  rise  and  go  through 
the  same  round  of  heavy  duties. 

When  the  detachment  arrived  at  Ak-Bulak  the 
frost  had  increased  to  30°  R. 

During  this  cold  weather,  on  clear  days,  columns 
of  the  colours  of  the  rainbow  were  often  visible  at 
sunrise  in  the  sky;  and  on  other  occasions  "two  suns 
appeared  shining  at  the  sides  of  the  true  luminary 
with  almost  equal  brilliancy." 

In  such  frost  it  was  impossible  to  wash  linen  or 
observe  personal  cleanliness.  Many  of  the  men 
during  the  whole  campaign  not  only  did  not  change 
their  linen,  but  did  not  even  take  off  their 
clothes.  They  were  of  course  covered  with  vermin, 
and  their  bodies  became  ingrained  with  dirt  and  pre- 
disposed to  disease. 

General  Perofski  left  the  Emba  fortification  on  the 
17th  (29th)  Jan.  with  a  small  Cossack  detachment, 


142         BUS  SI  AN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

and  having  overtaken  the  last  two  columns  on  the 
route  to  Ak-Bulak,  was  personally  an  eye-witness  of 
the  hardships  endured  by  the  troops  on  the  march. 
He  saw,  too,  the  complete  exhaustion  of  the  camels. 
Observing  the  position  in  which  the  expeditionary 
force  was  placed,  the  General  sought  the  opinion  of 
the  commanders  of  the  columns  as  to  the  possibility 
of  their  camels  reaching  Khiva.  The  commanders 
reported  that,  owing  to  the  wearied  condition  of  these 
animals,  the  scantiness  of  herbage,  and  the  great 
depth  of  snow  on  the  ground,  any  further  advance 
towards  Khiva  was  impossible.  The  same  opinion 
was  confirmed  by  the  ruler  of  the  western  horde,  the 
Sultan  Aichuvakof,  who,  as  a  Kirghiz,  was  well 
acquainted  both  with  the  powers  of  endurance  of  the 
camel,  and  the  condition  of  the  steppe.  Besides 
procuring  the  opinion  of  the  commanders  of  the 
columns  and  of  the  Sultan  Aichuvakof,  General 
Perofski,  on  reaching  Ak-Bulak,  despatched  Colonel 
Bizianof  to  the  Ust-Urt,  as  already  stated,  with 
the  Ural  Cossacks,  to  examine  the  route  in  front. 
Then,  having  found  that  the  depth  of  the  snow 
became  greater  and  greater,  that  all  herbage  and 
fuel  were  completely  buried  under  it,  and  that  the 
weakness   of  the   camels,  which   were  beginning  to 


FEROFSKrS  EXPEDITION.  143 


fall  at  the  rate  of  a  hundred  daily,  increased  from 
hour  to  hour,  he  became  convinced  that  it  was 
impossible,  under  the  circumstances  to  reach 
Khiva. 

The  Orenburg  infantry  soldiers,  not  being  accus- 
tomed to  the  fatigues  of  a  campaign,  suffered 
severely  from  disease.  On  the  completion  of  half 
the  journey  only  1,856  effective  men  could  be 
mustered  out  of  a  force  of  2,750  which  had  left 
Orenburg.  Of  the  number  on  the  sick  list,  236  had 
already  died,  528  remained  under  treatment,  and 
130  were  invalided  and  left  behind  at  Fort  Emba. 
On  reaching  Khiva  the  number  of  sick  would  in  all 
probability  be  still  greater. 

"  If,"  says  the  official  writer,  "  the  mortality 
and  exhaustion  among  the  camels  were  to  go 
on  increasing  at  the  same  rate,  which  in  all  pro- 
bability it  would  do,  the  detachment  would  be 
obliged  to  return  to  Fort  Emba  before  reaching 
Khiva,  after  abandoning  its  provisions  and  stores  on 
the  route,  and  encountering  still  greater  difficulties 
than  those  already  experienced.  And,  furthermore, 
if  the  enemy  were  at  this  juncture  to  commence 
marching  to  meet  the  Russians,  might  not  the 
return  of  the  latter  be  interpreted  as  a  flight  from 


144        RUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

the  advancing  enemy  ?  In  every  case,  therefore,  it 
was  preferable  to  succumb  to  the  insurmountable 
obstacles  of  nature,  and  to  retreat  at  once,  than  to 
give  the  miserable  enemies  of  the  Russians  any 
pretext  for  exultation  over  an  imaginary  victory." 

All  these  reasons  convinced  General  Perofski  of 
the  impossibility  of  continuing  the  march  to  Khiva^ 
and  reconciled  him  to  the  sad  necessity  of  re- 
turning to  Fort  Emba,  where  there  was  a  stock  of 
provisions  calculated  to  last  the  detachment  until 
spring. 

On  the  I  St  of  February  General  Perofski  issued  the 
following  order  to  the  troops  : — 

"  Comrades  !  It  will  soon  be  three  months  since 
we  commenced  our  march  with  a  sincere  trust  in 
God  and  a  firm  resolution  to  fulfil  the  orders  of  our 
Emperor.  Ever  since  we  started  we  have  had  to 
struggle  against  obstacles  of  the  most  formidable  cha- 
racter, and  a  winter  of  unprecedented  severity.  These 
difficulties  we  have  successfully  overcome  ;  but  we 
have  not  had  the  satisfaction  of  meeting  the  enemy, 
and  the  only  slight  coUision  we  had  with  him  showed 
his  contemptible  inferiority.  In  spite  of  all  the 
fatigue  you  have  endured,  you  are  still  full  of  energy 
and  vigour.      The  horses  are  in  good  condition,  and 


PEROFSKFS  EXPEDITION.  145 

our  supplies  are  plentiful.  In  one  thing  only  have 
we  been  unfortunate  ;  we  have  lost  a  large  proportion 
of  our  camels,  and  those  remaining  are  exhausted  by 
hunger  and  fatigue.  We  are  thus  deprived  of  the 
means  of  transporting  our  stores  of  provisions  for 
the  remaining  distance  along  the  route.  However 
painful  it  may  be  to  forego  the  victory  that  awaited 
us,  we  must  on  this  occasion  retrace  our  steps 
towards  the  frontier.  There  we  shall  await  the 
further  orders  of  the  Emperor.  Our  next  expedition 
will  be  more  fortunate.  It  is  a  source  of  consolation 
for  me  to  be  able  to  thank  you  for  the  unflagging 
devotion  and  energy  which  you  have  displayed 
under  all  the  difficulties  encountered  on  the  march. 
Our  gracious  Sovereign  and  Father  shall  know  it 
all." 

According  to  calculations  made  aftenvards,  it 
appeared  that  from  the  day  of  the  departure  of  the 
detachment  to  the  20th  February,  the  number  of 
sick  cases,  both  in  the  marching  columns  and  fort 
garrisons,  amounted  to  3,124,  out  of  which  608  were 
fatal.  • 

The  following  was  the  ratio  of  sickness  and  deaths 
among  the  different  branches  of  the  expeditionary 
force  : — 

L 


Ratio  of  Deaths. 

I 

to 

H 

I 

to 

26 

I 

to 

34 

I 

to 

200 

146        EUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

Ratio  of  Sickness. 

Orenburg  Infantry  .     .    i  to  2 
Detachment  of  ist  Oren- 
burg Regiment    .     .    i  to  2  and  3 
Orenburg  Cossacks.     .     i  to  4  and  5 
Ural  Cossacks    .     .     .    i  to  27 

These  figures  show  that  the  Orenburg  infantry 
troops  were  the  worst,  and  the  Ural  Cossacks  the 
best  qualified  for  campaigning  in  the  steppe. 

Of  the  10,500  camels  with  which  the  expeditionary 
force  had  been  supplied  at  starting,  only  1,500 
remained  alive  on  the  13th  April.  At  the  same  date 
the  number  of  sick  in  the  camps  amounted  to  7  civil 
officials  and  853  soldiers.  The  number  of  deaths 
up  to  the  14th  March  was  761,  comprising  three 
civil  officials  and  758  officers  and  men.  The  numerical 
strength  of  the  force  encamped  on  the  Saga-Temir 
river  consisted  of  S6  superior  and  subaltern  officers, 
and  2,895  men.  From  the  commencement  of  the 
campaign  to  the  4th  May,  the  total  mortality  in 
the  expeditionary  force  amounted  to  80  officers  of 
various  kinds  and  800  soldiers. 

In  the  summer  expedition  to  Khiva  of  Prince 
Bekovitch  in  171 7,  a  quarter  of  the  men  died  on  the 
march  •  while  in  the   winter    campaign  of    General 


PEROFSKrS  EXPEDITION.  147 

PerofskI  In  1839,  the  mortality  among  the  whole 
force  employed  reached  about  one-third.  These 
two  experiments  would  seem  to  testify  in  favour 
of  summer  expeditions  in  the  steppe.  Seeing 
that  the  country  traversed  by  General  Perofski 
yielded  an  abundant  supply  of  water,  the  com- 
mencement of  the  campaign  in  winter  was  de- 
cidedly unadvisable.  The  whole  force  might  have 
been  collected  on  the  Ust-Urt  before  winter  set  in. 

There  were  many  officers  who  condemned  the  plan 
of  a  winter  campaign  when  it  was  in  contemplation  ; 
but  the  opinions  of  those  who  supported  their  argu- 
ments to  the  contrary  by  quoting  Lord  Wellington's 
saying,  that  "  Sandy  wastes  can  only  be  traversed 
by  troops  in  winter,"  preponderated. 

As  soon  as  it  became  known  that  the  first  ex- 
peditionary force  would  not  be  able  to  reach  Khiva, 
orders  were  issued  for  strengthening  the  Orenburg 
Corps  with  six  battalions.  Admiral  Rimski  Korsa- 
kof  was  sent  to  ascertain  the  number  of  vessels  on 
the  Volga  and  Caspian  capable  of  transporting  these 
troops  to  the  eastern  coast  of  the  Caspian,  in  order 
that  Khiva  might  be  reached  by  the  route  taken  by 
Prince  Bekovitch.  When  it  was  found  that  there 
were  not  sufficient  vessels  available,  it  was  decided 


148        R  USSIAN  PROJECTS  A  GAINST  INDIA . 

t<y  follow  the  same  route  as  that  which  had  already 
proved  so  disastrous  to  the  recent  expedition  ;  but 
with  this  difference,  that  the  troops  should  be  con- 
centrated in  the  steppe  early  in  the  autumn,  so  that 
they  might  only  have  the  Ust-Urt  to  march  across 
during  the  winter. 

No  fresh  expedition,  however,  was  undertaken ; 
and  the  pretext  on  which  General  Perofski  had 
based  his  meditated  attack  upon  Khiva  no  longer 
existed.  As  if  to  deprive  the  Russians  of  all  excuse 
for  making  war  upon  the  Khan,  two  English  officers. 
Captain  Abbott  and  Captain  Shakespear,  sent  from 
India  on  a  mission  to  Khiva,  had,  at  the  very  time 
General  Perofski  was  advancing,  procured  the 
Hberation  of  the  Russian  prisoners  ;  who,  after  terms 
had  been  arranged  by  Abbott,  were  escorted  by 
Shakespear  to  their  native  land. 

The  Russians  now  left  Khiva  alone,  until  the  year 
1858,  when  Colonel,  now  General,  Ignatieff,  formerly 
ambassador  at  Constantinople,  afterwards  Minister 
of  the  Interior  at  St.  Petersburg,  undertook  a  diplo- 
matic mission  on  so  large  a  scale  that  it  had  almost 
the  character  of  a  military  expedition.  Meanwhile, 
however,  a  definite  arrangement  in  regard  to  the 
Central  Asian  question  had  been  come  to  between 
England  and  Russia. 


■k 


CHAPTER  VII. 

THE   ANGLO-RUSSIAN    AGREEMENT   OF    1844. 

When,  In  1844,  the  Emperor  Nicholas  started  for 
England  in  order  to  visit  Queen  Victoria  he  was 
convinced  that  the  only  stumbling-block  between 
England  and  Russia  was  the  apprehension  caused  to 
the  former  by  the  ambitious  views  attributed  to  the 
latter  in  the  East.  He  resolved  then  to  see  the 
English  Sovereign  and  the  English  Ministers  on  this 
subject ;  ready  to  give,  in  regard  not  only  to  Turkey, 
but  also  Central  Asia,  all  needful  explanations  and 
all  possible  guarantees.  Perofski's  expedition  to 
Khiva  in  1839,  following  Immediately  after  the  siege 
of  Herat,  which  had  been  conducted  by  Russian 
engineers  under  the  direction  of  a  Russian  general, 
had,  in  spite  of  its  disastrous  result,  caused  much 
speculation,  some  apprehension,  and,  among  a  small 
party,  downright  alarm.     Every  Russian  sovereign. 


150         BUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

from  Peter  the  Great  to  Paul,  and,  in  our  own  cen- 
tury, from  Paul  to  Alexander  I.,  and  from  Alexander 
I.  to  Nicholas,  was  known  to  have  entertained  de- 
signs against  India ;  and  the  notion  that  Russia  at 
Khiva  would  be  a  menace  to  India  was  entertained 
in  England  by  a  select  party  of  "  alarmists  " — among 
whom  Her  Majesty's  Ministers  were  included — as 
long  ago  as  1840 ;  immediately,  that  is  to  say, 
after  the  news  of  Perofski's  expedition  against  Khiva 
reached  England.  In  regard  to  Central  Asia,  as  in 
regard  to  Turkey,  the  Emperor  Nicholas  was  ready 
to  give  assurances  of  his  friendly  intentions  towards 
England,  all  that  he  demanded  in  return  being  a 
loyal  adherence  to  the  status  quo  in  Europe  ;  which 
of  course  implied  abandonment  of  the  French  alliance 
and  a  friendly  agreement  with  Russia. 
,  In  1844,  then,  the  Emperor  Nicholas  went  to  Eng- 
land, visited  Queen  Victoria,  and  had  numerous 
interviews  with  Lord  Aberdeen,  who  was  at  that 
time  Foreign  Minister.  As  to  the  future,  he  was  pre- 
pared to  give  the  most  distinct  pledges  ;  and  on  his 
return  to  St.  Petersburg  he  directed  Count  Nessel- 
rode,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  to  draw  up  a 
memorandum  based  on  what  had  passed  between 
him  and  Lord  Aberdeen  during  his  stay  in  London. 


THE  ANGLO-RUSSIAN  AGREEMENT  OF  1844.     151 


The  memorandum  is  given  at  length  in  the 
"  Diplomatic  Study  on  the  Crimean  War,"  issued  by 
the  Russian  Foreign  Office  ;  and  it  is  probably  to 
this  document  that  Mr.  Thornton  refers  in  his  "Lives 
of  English  Foreign  Secretaries/'  as  one  which, 
without  having  been  placed  in  the  archives  of  our 
Foreiofn  Office,  was  handed  from  minister  to  minister 
at  each  change  of  Government.  However  that  may 
be,  the  memorandum  must  be  accepted  as  repro- 
ducing in  substance  the  agreement  come  to  between 
the  Emperor  Nicholas  and  the  Government  of 
England  in  the  year  1844;  and  it  throws  a  new 
light,  to  the  advantage  of  the  Emperor  Nicholas, 
on  the  celebrated  conversation  which  he  held  nine 
years  aftenvards  with  Sir  Hamilton  Seymour  on  the 
subject  of  the  "  Sick  Man."  The  objects  with 
which,  in  case  of  "anything  happening"  to  the 
Sick  Man,  Russia  and  England  would  have  to  come 
to  an  understanding,  were  set  forth  as  follows  : — 

"  I.  Maintenance  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  for  so 
long  a  time  as  this  political  combination  may  be 
possible. 

"  2.  If  we  see  beforehand  that  it  is  breaking  up,  a 
preliminary  understanding  to  be  arrived  at  as  to  the 
establishment  of  a  new  order  of  things  destined  to 


152         JRUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

replace  that  which  now  exists  ;  and  precautions  to 
be  taken  in  common,  so  that  no  change  occurring  in 
the  internal  situation  of  that  empire  may  threaten 
the  security  of  our  own  states,  or  the  maintenance  of 
the  European  equilibrium. 

"  In  view  of  the  objects  thus  formulated,  the 
policy  of  Russia  and  that  of  Austria  are  clearly 
bound  together  by  the  principle  of  complete  soH- 
darity.  If  England,  as  the  chief  naval  power,  acts 
in  concert  with  them,  there  is  reason  to  believe  that 
France  will  find  herself  obliged  to  follow  the  course 
decided  upon  between  St.  Petersburg,  London,  and 
Vienna.  All  possibility  of  conflict  between  the 
Great  Powers  being  thus  averted,  it  may  be  hoped 
that  the  peace  of  Europe  will  be  maintained,  even 
in  the  midst  of  such  grave  circumstances. 

*'  It  is  with  the  view  of  assuring  this  result  in  the 
interests  of  all,  that  Russia  and  England  should  first 
come  to  a  preliminary  understanding  between  them- 
selves, as  agreed  upon  by  the  Emperor  with  the 
Ministers  of  her  Britannic  Majesty  during  his  stay 
in  England." 

Viewed  in  connection  with  this  memorandum,  ad- 
dressed in  1844  by  the  Russian  Government  to  the 
Government  of  England,  and  accepted  by  the  latter, 


THE  ANGLO-RUSSIAN  AGREEMENT  OF  1844.     153 

the  conversation  of  the  Emperor  Nicholas  with  Sir 
Hamilton  Seymour  in  1853  acquires  a  new  character. 
The  **  Sick  Man,"  whose  introduction  to  the  world 
through  the  published  despatches  of  Sir  Hamilton 
Seymour  caused  so  much  scandal  at  the  time  of  the 
Crimean  war,   was    but   a   revival.     He  is  at  least 

foreshadowed,  with  the  mortal  character  of  his 
malady  already  indicated,  in  those  clauses  of  the 
Nesselrode  Memorandum  which  consider  the  pro- 
bability of  "something  happening"  to  Turkey,  and 
which  stipulate  that  on  the  occurrence  of  the  un- 
happy event,  England  and  Russia  shall  come  to  an 
understanding,  with  a  view  to  action  in  common. 

But  England  in  1844  mistrusted  Russia,  in  con- 
nection not  only  with  Turkey  but  also  with  Central 
Asia.  Apart  from  Perofski's  expedition  to  Khiva, 
of  which  the  immediate  effect,  even  in  case  of 
success,  could  only  have  told  indirectly  and  re- 
motely upon  India,  Russia  had  helped  the  Persians 
during  the  siege  of  Herat  with  money,  arms  and 
men,  and  she  had  been  intriguing  against  us  In 
Afghanistan ;  a  fact  better  known  to  the  English 
Government,  who  had  received  particulars  on  the 
subject  from  its  agents  at  Cabul,  than  to  the  English 
public,  to  whom  the  despatches  from  these  agents 


154        HUSSIAiV  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

were  presented  in  a  mutilated  form,  with  almost 
everything  that  compromised  Russia  cut  out.  The 
Emperor  Nicholas,  however,  must  have  been  aware 
that  the  offers  of  arms  and  money  made  on  his  part 
by  the  Pohsh  agent.  Captain  Vitkievitch,  to  Dost 
Mohamed,  had  become  known  to  us  through  the 
reports  of  Burnes  and  others.  It  was  a  matter  of 
European  notoriety,  moreover,  that  the  Persian  force 
which  had  laid  siege  to  Herat  had  been  commanded 
by  a  Russian,  General  Barofsky — confounded  by  some 
of  our  agents  in  Cabul  with  the  Perofski  of  the 
Khivan  expedition  ;  and  to  leave  nothing  unsettled 
between  the  two  countries,  the  Emperor  Nicholas 
proposed  an  agreement  on  the  subject  of  Central 
Asia  as  well  as  Turkey. 

Already  the  idea  of  a  "  neutral  zone  "  was  enter- 
tained ;  a  geographical  and  political  idea,  which,  far 
from  remaining  fixed,  shifts  its  ground  constantly, 
and  always  to  move  in  the  direction  of  India.  In 
1844,  ^or  example,  Russia  agreed  "to  leave  the 
Khanates  of  Central  Asia  as  a  neutral  zone  inter- 
posed between  the  two  empires,  so  as  to  preserve 
them  from  dangerous  contact."  In  1869  the  zone 
which  by  the  agreement  of  that  year  was  to  be 
regarded  as  "  beyond  the  interference  of  Russia,"' 


THE  ANGLO-RUSSIAN  AGREEMENT  OF  1844.     155 

consisted  of  Afghanistan  proper  and  the  little  states 
of  Afghan  Turkestan,  between  the  Hindu- Kush  and 
the  Oxus.  The  possibility  of  leaving  Afghan  Turke- 
stan untouched,  and  the  propriety  of  advancing  the 
Russian  frontier  to  the  Hindu-Kush  is  now,  both 
by  Russian  officers  and  Russian  publicists,  being 
actively  discussed.  By  the  secret  convention,  or 
interchanged  memorandum,  however,  of  1844,  not 
only  did  Russia  engage  to  leave  independent  the 
Khanates  of  Khiva,  Bokhara,  and  Khokand,  but 
she  also  agreed  with  England  to  take  general 
measures  for  assuring  the  peace  of  Persia,  and  in 
particular  "  for  forestalling  the  dangers  of  a  con- 
tested succession  and  for  regulating  in  common 
the  frontier  relations  on  the  one  side  with  Turkey, 
on  the  other  with  Afghanistan." 

The  remarks  made  by  the  author  of  the  official 
"Diplomatic  Study  on  the  Crimean  War,""  in  re- 
gard to  Central  Asia  and  Persia,  are  very  strange. 
"  Faithfully  observed  by  Russia,  this  programme," 
he  says,  "  preserved  the  tranquillity  of  Asia  for 
twenty  years  ;  "  that  is  to  say,  until  1864,  in  which 
year  General  Tchernaieff  interfered  rudely  enough 
both  with  Khokand  and  with  Bokhara.  But  Lord 
Palmerston,  we  are  told,   "  had   broken  the  agree- 


156         RUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

ment  on  the  subject,  just  as  he  had  broken  the  one 
relating  to  Turkey  " — for  the  Russian  Foreign  Office 
persists  in  its  belief  that  Lord  Palmerston  was  the 
true  author  of  the  Crimean  war.  Immediately  after 
the  Treaty  of  1856  he  "  profited  by  circumstances 
to  wage  war  against  Persia,  in  order  to  make  that 
country  feel  the  power  of  Great  Britain,  and  to  take 
from  it  definitively  Herat,  which  was  then  annexed 
to  Afghanistan."  "  Thence,"  it  is  added,  "  resulted 
the  progress  since  accomplished  in  Central  Asia  by 
Russia  restored  to  her  full  liberty  of  action,  and  free 
from  all  illusions  as  to  the  utility  of  subordinating 
her  interests  to  the  idea  of  an  impossible  solidarity." 
Whatever,  then,  English  writers  and  English  poli- 
ticians may  say  on  the  subject,  the  Russians  them- 
selves have  always  regarded  their  movement  towards 
Afghanistan  as  injurious  to  the  interests  of  England. 
It  is  not  astonishing  that  they  should  do  so  now, 
considering  that  the  Emperor  Nicholas  took  the 
same  view  in  1844,  when  not  one  successful  step  in 
that  direction  had  as  yet  been  made. 


CHAPTER   VIII. 

IGNATIEFF'S   mission   to  KHIVA  AND    BOKHARA. 

Count  Nicholas  Pavlovitch  Ignatieff,  who 
first  owed  his  European  fame  to  his  restless  activity 
as  Ambassador  of  Russia  at  Constantinople,  during 
and  immediately  before  the  recent  Russo-Turkish 
war,  is  the  son  of  the  General  Ignatieff  who  was  for 
many  years  Governor-General  of  St.  Petersburg,  and 
who  was  afterwards  President  of  the  Committee  of 
Ministers.  Nicholas  Pavlovitch  Ignatieff  was  edu- 
cated at  the  Institute  of  Pages,  and,  according  to 
custom,  quitted  that  select  establishment  to  enter 
the  Guards.  The  so-called  "  Crimean  War"  found 
the  young  Ignatieff,  at  the  age  of  22,  serving  with 
his  regiment  at  Revel,  in  the  Baltic  provinces, 
under  Count  Berg,  to  whose  staff  he  was  attached. 
In  spite  of  the  exertions  she  was  compelled  to  make 
in  the  Crimea,  Russia,  throughout  the  war  of   1854 


158         RUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

and  1855,  kept  her  best  troops  in  the  neighbourhood 
of  the  capital,  or  else  along  the  coast  from  which 
the  capital  might  have  been  approached.  The 
object,  then,  of  the  force  stationed  at  Revel  was  to 
prevent  the  enemy  from  landing ;  and  as  the  enemy 
did  not  land,  it  might  be  argued  that  this  object  was 
attained.  Towards  the  end  of  the  war  Ignatieff 
followed  his  general  to  Finland,  where  Count  Berg 
was  soon  afterwards  appointed  to  the  Governorship ; 
a  post  he  retained  until  1863,  when,  at  the  height  of 
the  insurrection,  he  was  sent  as  Governor  to  Poland. 

Meanwhile,  Captain  Ignatieff  had  passed  from  the 
military  to  the  diplomatic  service,  finding  his  point 
of  transition  in  the  post  of  Mihtary  Attache  to  the 
Embassy  at  London. 

His  chief  performance  as  Military  Attache  to  the 
Embassy  of  Baron  Brunow  was  a  careful  report  on 
England's  military  position  in  India,  which  so  pleased 
the  Emperor  that  His  Majesty  called  the  writer  to 
Warsaw  for  a  personal  interview.  It  would  be  in- 
teresting to  know  whether  Captain  Ignatieff  already 
foresaw  the  probabiHty  of  the  mutiny  so  soon  after- 
wards to  break  out ;  and  whether  it  was  the  method 
and  style  of  the  report,  or  its  substance  and  the 
views   enunciated  therein,  which  commended  it  to 


IGNATIEFF'S  MISSION  TO  KHIVA,  ETC.       159 

the  attention  of  Alexander  II.  Doubtless  the  latter. 
But  Russian  diplomacy  keeps  its  secrets  ;  and  in  no 
Russian  Blue-book  has  Captain  Ignatieff' s  report  on 
England's  military  position  in  India  been  published. 

In  1858  Ignatieff,  now  a  Colonel,  was  sent  on  a 
special  mission  to  Khiva  and  Bokhara.  The  mission 
might  equally  have  been  called  a  reconnoissance ; 
and  it  was  not  without  reason  that  its  direction  was 
entrusted  to  a  diplomatist  who  had  been  a  soldier. 

In  the  year  1857  the  Khans  of  Khiva  and  Bokhara 
had  sent  envoys  to  congratulate  Alexander  II.  on  his 
accession  to  the  throne ;  and  the  Russian  Govern- 
ment resolved  to  profit  by  the  opportunity  thus 
naturally  presenting  itself  to  renew  communications 
with  its  ferocious  neighbours,  hitherto  so  difficult  of 
access  and  so  inhospitable  when  approached.  Only 
sixteen  years  before.  Colonel  Stoddard  and  Captain 
Conolly,  accredited  agents  of  the  British  Govern- 
ment, had  been  executed  at  Bokhara ;  and  seven 
years  later  Mr.  Struve",  a  diplomatic  agent  sent  by 
General  Tchernaieff  to  Bokhara,  was  thrown  into 
prison  by  the  Ameer,  subjected  to  a  variety  of 
cruelties,  and  detained  in  captivity  for  six  months  ; 
and  that  almost  within  sight  of  the  Russian  troops. 

The  journey,  moreover,  to  Khiva  presented  diffi- 


160         EUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

culties  which,  in  the  case  of  a  large  force,  had 
hitherto  been  found  insurmountable.  General  Perofski 
in  his  expedition  to  Khiva  of  the  year  1839  lost,  as 
has  been  told  at  length,  the  greater  part  of  his  army- 
through  frost  and  snow ;  yet  he  had  deliberately  re- 
solved to  run  all  the  hazards  of  a  merciless  winter 
season  rather  than  attempt  to  march  troops  across 
the  Ust-Urt  desert  in  summer. 

Ignatieff,  however  (now  Colonel  and  Aide-de-camp 
to  the  Emperor),  who  had  been  entrusted  with  the 
leadership  and  direction  of  the  mission,  determined 
to  start  from  Orenburg  in  summer ;  and,  as  he  re- 
turned in  the  depth  of  winter,  he  is  the  one  com- 
mander on  whom  the  winds  of  the  Ust-Urt  desert 
have  blown  both  hot  and  cold. 

Ignatieff  after  his  mission  to  Khiva  was  sent  to 
China,  where  he  concluded  a  very  important  treaty, 
by  which  the  extensive  and  valuable  province  of 
Ussuri  was  ceded  to  Russia.  During  the  occupation 
of  Pekin  by  the  French  and  English,  he  is  said  to 
have  shown  great  tact  in  bringing  to  bear  upon  the 
Chinese  his  influence  with  the  allies,  and  upon  the 
allies  his  influence  with  the  Chinese. 

Returning  to  Russia,  he  was  made  Director  of 
the  Asiatic  Department  in  the  Ministry  of  Foreign 


IGNATIEFF'S  MISSION  TO  KHIVA,  ETC.      161 

Affairs  ;  a  department  in  which,  for  no  visible  reason, 
Slavonic  questions  are  treated.  Here  he  drew  up 
a  plan  for  uniting  the  Orenburg  and  Siberian  lines ; 
afterwards  executed  by  Colonel  Verevkin,  marching 
from  Orenburg,  and  Colonel  (now  General)  Tcher- 
naieff  marching  from  Semipalatinsk.  He  had  pre- 
viously urged  upon  the  Government  the  necessity 
of  occupying  Tashkend,  when  he  received  the  same 
answer  which  was  aftenvards  given  to  Tchernaieff — 
that  the  Russian  Government  did  not  wish  to  extend 
its  possessions  in  Central  Asia,  and  that  Tashkend 
was  not  to  be  taken. 

It  was  thought  that  General  Ignatieff  would  be 
made  Governor-General  of  the  Russian  possessions 
in  Central  Asia.  But  in  1865  he  was  appointed 
minister  at  Constantinople,  where  his  legation  was 
subsequently  raised  to  the  rank  of  an  embassy. 

From  London  his  report  on  the  government  of 
India  seems  to  have  taken  him  to  Central  Asia  ;  his 
successes  in  Central  Asia  took  him  to  China;  his 
success  in  China  to  the  direction  of  the  Asiatic 
department  where  Slavonic  affairs  are  treated. 
From  the  Asiatic  department  he  was  moved  to 
Constantinople  —  the  one  point  at  which  a  true 
Russian  of  the  orthodox  faith  is  always  stationed  ; 

M 


162        BUS  SI  AN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 


to  the  exclusion  of  the  Baltic  and  other  Germans 
who  would  not,  it  seems  to  be  held,  sympathise 
sufficiently  with  the  oppressed  Christians  of  the 
orthodox  faith. 

To  speak  now  in  detail  of  Ignatieff's  Central  Asian 
mission ;  which,  as  has  already  been  seen,  assumed 
the  character  of  a  return  visit  to  visits  made,  on  the 
occasion  of  the  Emperor  Alexander's  accession  to 
the  throne,  by  ambassadors  from  the  Khans  of  Khiva 
and  Bokhara.  The  envoy  from  Khiva  made  his 
appearance  at  Orenburg  on  the  20th  of  July,  1857, 
bringing  two  argamaks  as  a  gift  to  the  Imperial 
Court,  and  attended  by  a  suite  of  sixteen  men.  A 
house  was  hired  for  the  accommodation  of  the 
mission.  The  envoy  himself  was  allowed  two 
roubles  a  day,  while  the  other  distinguished  Khivans 
were  paid  seventy-five  copecks  (100  copecks  to  the 
rouble),  and  the  rest  twenty-five  copecks. 

The  sensation  created  in  Orenburg  by  the  arrival 
of  the  Khivan  Mission  had  not  yet  subsided,  when 
a  report  from  Orsk  acquainted  the  authorities  with 
the  arrival  at  that  fort,  on  the  loth  (22nd)  of  August, 
of  an  envoy  from  Bokhara,  with  four  argamaks  and 
a  suite  of  forty  men.  This  suite  represented  a  variety 
of  offices  and  grades.     There  was  the  Commandant 


IGNATIEFF'S  MISSION  TO  KHIVA,  ETC.       163 

of  the  Bokharian  Court  ;  there  were  councillors  and 
secretaries  of  embassy;  adjutants,  provosts,  a  guard 
of  honour,  grooms,  a  piper,  a  drummer,  a  doorkeeper, 
and  four  valets,  the  whole  constituting  a  complete 
retinue.  This  company  was  likewise  conveyed  to 
Orenburg,  Houses  were  hired,  and  another  allow- 
ance of  money  was  provided  :  two  roubles  to  the 
envoy,  one  rouble  twenty-five  copecks  to  the  com- 
mandant, and  as  much  to  the  councillor ;  fifty 
copecks  per  man  to  eight  "distinguished  men,"  and 
twenty-five  copecks  to  each  of  the  rest.  For  every 
one  of  their  horses  they  were  furnished  daily  with 
two  garnetz  of  oats  and  sixteen  pounds  of  hay. 

Having  rested  from  the  fatigues  of  their  long 
journeys,  the  envoys,  according  to  custom,  asked  to 
be  allowed  to  proceed  to  the  Imperial  Court,  in 
order  to  deliver  the  letters  from  the  rulers  of  Khiva 
and  Bokhara,  and  from  their  different  ministers  ; 
declaring  that  the  object  of  their  missions  was  to 
offer  congratulations  to  the  Emperor  on  his  happy 
accession  to  the  throne  of  his  forefathers. 

In  the  letter  from  the  Khan  of  Khiva  there  was, 
indeed,  no  mention  of  anything  besides  this  ;  but  in 
the  letters  from  the  Khivan  ministers  a  unanimous 
desire   was   expressed    to    make    the    Jaxartes    the 


164        RUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

boundary  line  between  the  territories  of  Khiva  and 
the  empire  of  Russia. 

The  contents  of  the  letter  from  the  ruler  of  Bok- 
hara were  of  a  different  kind.  Commencing  with 
condolence  on  the  death  of  the  Emperor  Nicholas, 
and  congratulating  his  successor  on  his  accession  to 
the  throne,  the  Ameer  held  it  to  be  indispensably 
necessary  at  the  same  time  to  announce  his  victories 
in  Shahr-i-Suby,  and  with  the  solemnity  of  a  great 
monarch  to  make  known  his  occupation  of  the  little 
towns  in  that  province,  which  lie  within  an  area  of 
from  ten  to  twelve  square  versts.  In  conclusion, 
the  Ameer  expressed  a  desire  to  see  a  Russian  envoy 
at  Bokhara.  "  The  intelligence,"  he  wrote,  "  con- 
cerning the  removal  of  the  great  sovereign  from  this 
perishable  world  to  an  eternal  life,  and  the  succession 
of  the  great  monarch  to  the  imperial  throne  reached 
our  ears  at  the  time  w^hen  our  most  sacred  person 
was  engaged  in  the  conquest  of  the  Shahr-Kish  do- 
minions. Thanks  to  the  Almighty  and  to  His  mercy, 
and  owing  to  the  efhcacy  of  the  prayers  of  the  holy 
of  the  famous  kingdom,  the  zephyr  of  victory  and 
glory  blew,  and  by  the  inexhaustible  grace  and  lavish 
munificence  of  the  Creator,  the  dominion  of  Shahr- 
Kish,  Kital,   Utra-kirgan,    and    Shamatan,    with  all 


IGNATIEFF'S  MISSION  TO  KIIIVA,  ETC.      165 

their  surrounding  districts,  have  been  overcome  and 
subjected  to  the  authority  of  the  all-conquering 
kingdom. 

"  Owing  to  these  causes,  it  has  been  made  a  matter 
of  obligation  to  send  an  embassy  to  pray  for  the  soul 
of  the  renowned  Sovereign,  to  congratulate  the 
monarch  whose  merits  are  equal  to  those  of  Dyemo- 
hidi,  on  his  accession  to  the  throne,  and  to  make 
joyful  communication  of  the  conquest  of  the  above- 
mentioned  dominions.  It  is  also  despatched  for  the 
purpose  of  strengthening  those  bonds  which  have 
existed  since  the  times  of  our  ancestors,  and  of  con- 
solidating the  mutual  relations  between  two  great 
sovereigns.  We  have,  therefore,  commanded  the 
departure,  as  ambassador,  of  our  respected  and 
esteemed  Mirakhur  Mulladjan,  a  well-wisher  to  your 
Majesty,  who  is  reputed  among  our  nobles  for  his 
straightforwardness  and  justice.  When  vouchsafed 
a  gracious  reception  we  hope  he  will  receive  various 
imperial  favours,  and  that  his  assurances  will  be 
kindly  listened  to  ;  after  which  we  trust  he  will  be 
granted  permission  to  depart.  May  the  precious 
and  bright  intelligence  of  the  Sovereign  be  then 
directed  towards  the  sending  of  an  embassy  from 
himself. 


166  RUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

"  Nothing  is  desired  besides  this  ;  and  so  may  the 
road  to  friendship  and  to  mutual  relations  between 
the  two  great  empires  be  open,  enabling  the  caravans 
and  traders  of  the  two  countries  to  come  and  go 
freely.  As  a  token  of  remembrance  we  send  a  carpet 
of  Cashmere  manufacture,  two  Rezai-meshkin  shawls, 
and  a  pair  of  black  and  piebald  horses. 

**  May  the  sun  of  majesty  eternally  shine  within 
the  confines  of  the  empire. 

"  Furthermore,  greeting  to  him  who  follows  the 
truth." 

There  Is  very  little  said  of  the  Khivan  envoy  In 
the  records  of  the  period.  All  that  can  be  gathered 
about  him  personally  Is  that  he  was  sparing  of  his 
words.  But  as  regards  the  envoy  from  Bokhara,  the 
following  account  was  given  by  Mr.  Gregorleff,  the 
eminent  Orientalist  of  the  Asiatic  Department  of  the 
Russian  Foreign  Office: — "  Mulladjan  AshurdjanofT, 
who  Is  styled  Mir  Akhur,  i.e.,  Master  of  the 
Horse,  in  the  Ameer's  letter  to  his  Imperial 
Majesty,  and  In  the  letter  from  the  Bokharlan 
Ministers,  did  not  fill  that  distinguished  office  at  the 
Court  of  the  Ameer,  and  must  have  received  the  title 
only  on  his  appointment  as  Ambassador  to  the  Court 
of  Russia.     Up  to  then  he  had  held  the  post  of  Mir 


IGNATIEFF'S  MISSION  TO  KHIVA,  ETC.      167 

Sheb,  or  night-policeman  in  the  city  of  Bokhara,  and 
in  no  way  enjoyed  the  confidence  of  the  Ameer  Nasr 
Ullah.  The  councillor  and  the  secretary  of  embassy 
are  likewise  persons  who  do  not  perform  the  duties 
which  in  Europe  belong  to  those  offices.  The  envoy 
treats  them  more  like  servants  than  like  officials  of  a 
certain  standing.  A  few  days  ago,  finding  them 
asleep  when  he  awoke,  he  became  furious,  and  with 
his  own  hand  thrashed  them  with  a  nagaika  (the 
Cossack  horse-whip),  and  also  laid  it  over  the  back 
of  his  son,  the  Commandant  of  the  Bokharian 
Court." 

Explaining  further  that  the  envoy  was  inquisitive, 
and  that  he  readily  entered  into  conversation  about 
his  own  country,  Mr.  Gregorieff  adds : — "  He  is 
very  miserly,  and  consequently  must  be  covetous, 
like  all  Asiatics.  In  proof  of  this,  he  refuses  to 
provide  his  suite,  at  his  own  cost,  with  the  warm 
clothing  they  require  for  their  journey  to  St.  Peters- 
burg at  this  late  season  of  the  year ;  in  consequence 
of  which,  by  command  of  the  Governor-General,  the 
councillor  and  the  secretary  of  the  embassy  have 
been  supplied  with  pelisses,  and  the  servants  with 
tulups  (sheep-skin  coats),  at  the  expense  of  our 
Government." 


168        EUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

Such  were  the  personages  who,  at  that  time, 
appeared  in  Russia  as  the  representatives  of  Khiva 
and  Bokhara. 

On  news  being  received  at  St,  Petersburg  of  the 
arrival  of  the  envoys,  the  imperial  sanction  was 
given  for  their  admission  to  Court.  On  the  9th  of 
September  the  Khivan  envoy  started  for  St.  Peters- 
burg, followed  on  the  23rd  of  October  by  the  Bok- 
harian  envoy,  accompanied  by  a  limited  suite. 

Their  stay  in  St.  Petersburg  was  not  long. 
Having  been  favoured  with  audiences,  they  re- 
ceived answers  to  the  letters  from  their  Khans  and 
ministers  ;  and  after  seeing  ballets  and  other  sights, 
and  having,  in  particular,  accumulated  a  good 
supply  of  presents,  they  returned  to  Orenburg  in  the 
month  of  January,  1858.  From  there  they  started 
for  their  respective  countries  ;  the  Khivan  envoy  on 
the  28th  of  February,  and  the  Bokharian  envoy  on 
the  24th  of  May. 

The  response  to  these  missions  was  the  equip- 
ment of  a  special  mission,  in  the  spring  of  1858,  to 
the  Khanates  of  Khiva  and  Bokhara,  under  Colonel 
Ignatieff. 

The  Supreme-Governor,  and  the  Governor-General 
of  Orenburg,  had  become  convinced  of  the  necessity 


IGNATIEFF'S  MISSION  TO  KHIVA,  ETC.       169 

of  sending  an  agent  to  Turan  before  the  arrival  of 
the  Asiatic  envoys  at  St.  Petersburg.  Since  the 
year  1842  the  Russians  had  had  no  relations,  hostile 
or  friendly,  with  the  Central  Asian  Khanates.  "  The 
information,"  says  Mr.  Zalesoff,  as  translated  by 
Mr.  Robert  Michell,  in  one  of  his  valuable  con- 
tributions to  the  history  of  the  relations  of  Russia 
with  the  Khanates  of  Central  Asia,  "  which  had  been 
acquired  through  previous  missions,  was  out  of  date, 
and  in  respect  to  the  topography  of  the  country,  it 
bore  only  on  localities  in  proximity  with  Bokhara  and 
Khiva,  without  any  reference  whatever  to  the  main 
artery  of  Central  Asia — the  Oxus — which,  as  regards 
commercial  as  well  as  political  relations,  is  of  such 
immense  importance.  Moreover,  while  in  1853  we 
had  brought  our  line  of  forts  down  to  the  Jaxartes, 
and  so  placed  ourselves  in  immediate  relations  with 
the  Khanate  of  Khiva,  we  not  only  wanted  correct 
information  concerning  the  condition  of  the  Central 
Asian  states,  their  mutual  relations,  the  territories  of 
Bokhara,  and  other  territories  along  the  Oxus  ;  we 
had,  moreover,  unfortunately  only  a  very  vague  idea 
of  the  localities  on  this  (the  Russian)  side  of  the 
Jaxartes.  These  circumstances  were  sufficient  of 
themselves  to  call  our  attention  to  the  study  of   the 


170        BUSSIAN-  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

country  on  our  borders,  and  to  the  conterminous 
portion  of  Central  Asia.  In  addition  to  this,  the 
hampering  of  our  trade  by  the  Asiatics  with  enor- 
mous duties,  the  solution  of  the  question  as  to  the 
possibility  of  conveying  our  merchandise  by  river 
(Oxus),  the  detention  of  captives,  &c.,  involuntarily 
compelled  us  to  make  one  more  effort  to  persuade 
the  rulers  of  Turan  to  be  more  reasonable  in  their 
behaviour  towards  Russia,  and  to  adopt  conduct 
which  would  be  more  advantageous  to  themselves. 
Entertaining  these  ideas,  our  Government  deter- 
mined all  the  sooner  to  follow  them  up,  since  it  had 
received  the  verbal  assurance  of  the  Khivan  envoy, 
and  that  of  the  Ameer,  of  their  wish  to  see  an  agent 
of  ours  In  their  respective  Khanates." 

On  the  receipt  of  imperial  commands  relative  to 
the  despatch  of  an  agent  to  the  Khanates,  prepara- 
tions were  at  once  commenced  at  Orenburg  for  the 
equipment  of  a  mission.  The  road  selected  for  the 
march  of  the  mission  was  the  one  which  passes  by 
the  former  site  of  Fort  Emba,  along  the  west  coast 
of  the  Aral,  and  so  on  to  Khiva  and  Bokhara,  the 
return  being  again  through  Khiva.  A  detachment 
of  Cossacks  was  ordered  to  escort  the  mission  along 
the  shores  of  the  Aral,  while,  for  the  better  examina- 


IGNATTEFF'S  MISSION  TO  KHIVA,  ETC.       171 

tion  of  the  course  of  the  Oxus,  a  portion  of  the  Aral 
flotilla  was  placed  at  the  orders  of  the  agent. 

At  that  time  the  steppe  under  the  Orenburg  juris- 
diction, and  more  particularly  the  western  half  of  it, 
across  which  the  path  of  the  mission  lay,  was  in  a 
state  of  agitation.  For  two  consecutive  years 
Russian  detachments  had  been  unceasingly  pur- 
suing the  band  of  a  notorious  Kirghiz  batyr,  or 
freebooter,  I  set  Kutebar  ;  but  to  no  purpose.  This 
son  of  the  steppes,  each  time  that  the  Russians  got 
upon  his  track,  decamped  to  the  centre  of  the  Ust- 
Urt,  into  which,  owing  to  the  complete  exhaustion  of 
their  horses,  and  to  the  scarcity  of  fodder  and  water, 
the  pursuing  detachments  could  not  follow  them. 
This  was  the  condition  of  affairs  even  in  the  year 
1858  ;  so  that  in  order  to  guard  the  mission  against 
an  attack  from  Kutebar,  it  was  necessary  to  give  it 
the  protection  of  a  convoy.  The  agent  was  pro- 
vided with  a  guard  of  honour,  consisting  of  fifty- 
seven  men,  who  were  to  attend  him  in  the  Khanates. 
In  addition  to  these  the  Governor-General  of  Oren- 
burg, proceeding  as  far  as  the  Emba  with  the 
mission,  was  to  detach  seventy-five  men  from  his 
own  convoy,  sending  them  on  with  the  mission  as 
far    as    the    first    Khivan    settlement.     Moreover, 


172        EUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 


Lieutenant  Skriabin,  of  the  Corps  of  Topographers, 
under  orders  to  execute  a  reconnoissance  during  the 
summer  along  the  western  limits  of  the  Ust-Urt,  was 
directed  to  send  across  the  Ust-Urt  a  flying  party  of 
150  Cossacks  to  afford  assistance,  if  it  should  be 
necessary,  to  the  mission  in  its  progress  along  the 
west  coast  of  the  Aral. 


CHAPTER    IX. 

IGNATIEFF'S  mission   to    KHIVA   AND    BOKHARA 

(continued). 

No  expense  was  spared  in  the  equipment  of  the 
embassy.  The  staff  of  the  mission  consisted  of  the 
agent,  Colonel  Ignatieff,  the  secretary,  two  inter- 
preters, two  officers  of  the  general  staff,  two  officers 
of  the  Corps  of  Topographers,  two  doctors,  one 
naval  officer  who  was  an  astronomer,  a  photographer, 
a  civil  official  of  the  Governor-General's  staff,  and 
three  topographic  clerks.  There  were  also  an  official 
from  the  Academy  of  Sciences,  sent  for  the  purpose 
of  studying  the  Eastern  dialects,  a  priest  proceeding 
to  join  the  Aral  flotilla,  and  a  student  of  the  Univer- 
sity of  St.  Petersburg,  attached  at  his  own  request, 
and  desirous  of  going  as  far  as  Khiva,  in  order  to 
study  the  nature  of  the  steppes.  The  convoy  was 
composed  of  picked  men,  consisting  of  twenty-three 


174        BUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

mounted  Fusiliers,  seventeen  Orenburg  Cossacks, 
seventeen  Ural  Cossacks,  and  nine  Cossacks  un- 
attached, with  an  excellent  rifled  piece  of  ordnance, 
and  seven  officers. 

Besides  a  variety  of  articles  for  use,  the  mission 
was  supplied  with  astronomical,  photographic,  and 
geodesical  instruments,  and  with  sketching  materials, 
as  well  as  with  the  results  of  steppe  surveys,  and  of 
surveys  made  in  the  Khanates  on  previous  occasions. 

For  the  carriage  of  two  months'  supply  of  pro- 
visions and  forage,  220  camels  were  hired  at  six 
roubles  per  month  each,  and  for  the  transport  of  the 
baggage  belonging  to  the  members  of  the  mission, 
1 10  camels  were  engaged,  at  the  rate  of  fifteen 
roubles  each  from  Orenburg  to  Khiva.  These  were 
attended  by  a  regular  number  of  servants  under  a 
caravan  bashi  ;  the  full  strength  further  comprising 
four  Kirghiz  messengers  and  two  guides. 

The  mission  started  to  traverse  the  Barsuk  sands 
and  the  barren  and  arid  Ust-Urt  desert,  with  twenty- 
three  carriages,  ambulance  waggons,  and  carts,  and 
nearly  200  horses,  exclusive  of  the  supplementary 
convoy  of  seventy-five  men  from  General  Katenin's 
detachment. 

The  vessels  of  the  Aral  flotilla  were   being  pre- 


IGNATIEFF'S  MISSION  TO  KHIVA,  ETC.       175 

pared  for  this  service  simultaneously  with  the  equip- 
ment of  the  mission. 

In  despatching  the  agent  to  the  Khanates,  the 
War  Ministry  directed  him  to  obtain  as  much  infor- 
mation as  he  possibly  could  respecting  the  topo- 
graphy of  these  little-known  countries,  as  well  as 
the  Kirghiz  steppes,  of  which  the  official  survey  was 
to  be  verified.  He  was  instructed  to  keep  a  topo- 
graphical diary  during  the  journey,  to  write  geo- 
graphical and  statistical  descriptions  of  the  countries 
passed  through  ;  to  collect  information  concerning 
the  ancient  bed  of  the  Oxus,  the  Turcomans,  their 
military  force  and  their  relations  towards  their  neigh- 
bours, the  roads  passing  through  the  Khanates  to 
neighbouring  Asiatic  states,  the  military  resources 
of  the  Khanates  and  conterminous  countries,  and, 
above  all,  the  course  of  the  River  Oxus,  of  which  a 
careful  study  was  to  be  made. 

Towards  the  end  of  April  the  officers  composing 
the  mission  assembled  at  Orenburg,  Colonel  Ignatieff 
arriving  there  on  the  ist  May  (1858).  Preparations 
for  their  departure  were  being  made  night  and  day. 
"  It  is  almost  impossible,"  writes  Mr.  Zalesoff  (Mr. 
Robert  Michell's  translation),  "  for  those  who  have 
served  only   in  the  interior  of  Russia,  and  who  are 


176         RUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

accustomed  only  to  European  modes  of  conveyance, 
to  realise  the  great  difficulty  of  equipping  troops 
for  the  steppes.  The  equipment  and  despatch  of 
little  more  than  loo  men  demanded  a  great  deal  of 
minute  consideration  concerning  dress,  supply,  and 
transport.  With  all  the  assistance  of  the  local  de- 
partments and  of  various  individuals,  and  after  six 
months'  persevering  labour,  General  Katenin  could 
only  just  arrange  for  the  departure  of  the  mission  by 
the  middle  of  May.  The  15th  of  May  opened  with 
a  fine  spring  morning;  and  at  8  o'clock  all  the 
members  of  the  mission  were  attending  prayers  on 
the  wide  plain  beyond  the  Ural  river.  The  final 
benediction  was  pronounced,  the  command  was 
given,  and  the  mission  filed  away  into  the  vague 
distance,  ignorant  of  the  fate  that  awaited  it." 

The  spring  of  1858  was  exceptionally  favourable 
for  movements  in  the  steppe.  The  fodder  under  foot 
was  everywhere  good,  and  over  the  first  stages  of  its 
march  the  mission  was  accompanied  by  rains  and  a 
cool  atmosphere. 

Carefully  considering  the  eventualities  of  his  posi- 
tion in  the  Khanates,  and  bearing  in  mind  the 
wiliness  displayed  by  Asiatics  in  negotiation.  Colonel 
Ignatieff   wrote    as    follows  to  the  director    of   the 


IGNATIEFF'S  MISSION  TO  KHIVA,  ETC.      177 

Asiatic  Department,  General  Kavalewski,  from  the 
bivouac  at  Bish-Tawak,  on  the  24th  May : — 

"  While  wending  my  way  across  the  steppe  I  have 
been  thinking  over  the  business  which  is  before  me 
in  Khiva  and  Bokhara,  and  have  determined  to  tell 
you  some  of  the  ideas  which  have  occurred  to  me 
in  trying  to  reconcile  the  information  on  Central 
Asia  obtainable  at  Orenburg  with  the  instructions 
which  have  been  given  to  me.  I  beg  your  Excel- 
lency will  treat  these  lines  as  candid  gossip,  to  which 
you  repeatedly  challenged  me  before  I  left  St.  Peters- 
burg, and  not  as  the  expression  of  any  misgivings. 

"  Making  a  sacrifice  of  myself  for  the  benefit  of 
the  ser\dce,  I  am  not  afraid  of  my  candour. 

"  When  the  time  comes  for  negotiating  with  the 
Khans,  I  shall  be  entirely  guided  by  what,  to  the 
best  of  my  judgment,  will  be  most  advantageous  to 
us  and  most  compatible  with  the  general  views  of 
the  Ministry,  in  the  event  of  any  doubts,  or  of  any 
disaccordance  of  local  circumstances  with  my  in- 
structions ;  and  I  have  considered  it  my  duty  to 
acquaint  you  beforehand  with  my  view  of  the  com- 
mission entrusted  to  me  by  order  of  His  Imperial 
Majesty,  seeing  that  there  is  even  yet  time  to  send 

N 


178        RUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

me  positive  ministerial  orders   in  case  it  should  be 
found  that  I  am  in  error. 

"  It  is  said  in  my  instructions,  that  in  case  the 
Government  of  Bokhara  consents  to  all  our 
demands,  I  am  to  promise  compliance  with  the 
requests  preferred  by  the  envoy,  Mir-Akhur  Mullad- 
jan.  The  first  of  these  requests  was  that 
Bokharian  merchants  should  be  allowed  to  visit 
all  towns  and  fairs,  without  any  exception,  within 
the  Russian  Empire ;  and  the  second,  that 
separate  shops  should  be  assigned  to  Bokharian 
traders  at  the  Nijni  Fair,  at  a  permanent  charge, 
whether  they  be  occupied  or  not.  The  Orenburg 
authorities  have  endeavoured  to  convince  me  that 
for  many  years  past  Bokharians  have  been  in  the 
habit  of  visiting  all  the  towns  and  fairs  in  the  Russian 
Empire,  and  that,  by  authority  long  ago  granted,  nine- 
teen shops  at  Nijni  Fair  were  assigned  to  them  on 
payment  in  advance  of  a  fixed  charge ;  and,  more- 
over, that  the  Bokharians,  having  ceased  to  pay  for 
these  shops  in  advance,  the  Court  of  Management 
let  them  to  other  tradesmen.  In  November  last 
(1857)  they  paid  into  the  hands  of  the  Frontier 
Commission  the  sum  of  810  roubles  for  nine  shops, 
for    the    present     year,     1858.       The     Commission 


IGNATIEFF'S  MISSION  TO  KHIVA,  ETC.     179 

forwarded  the  money   to   the  Mihtary  Governor  of 
Nijni  Novgorod,  and  the  shops  will  be  at  the  dis- 
posal of  the  Bokharians.     As  far  as  I  can  make  out, 
from  conversations  with  the  Bokharian  envoy,   the 
Bokharians  desire  a  certain  number  of  shops  to  be 
definitively  assigned  to  them,  as  in  the  case  of  the 
Chinese.    In  regard  to  the  privilege  which  is  sought, 
of  trading  throughout  Russia  without  hindrance,  it 
seems  to  me  that  the  Bokharians  mean  thereby,  that 
they    wish    .to    be     freed    from     the    obligation    of 
taking  out  trade  certificates,  and  to  replace  them  by 
a  permanent  charge,  as   has   hitherto  been   done  in 
their  case  only  at  Nijni,  Irbit,  Tiumen,  and  Korennoi 
fairs.     I  do  not  know  whether  this  interpretation  of 
the  Bokharian  demand  falls  in  with  the  views  of  the 
Ministry.    In  order  not  to  promise  too  much,  I  shall, 
in  drawing  up  the  *  Obligatory  Act'  which  I  have  to 
submit  to  the  Ameer,  endeavour  to  employ  the  same 
words  as  those  in  which  the  promises  to  be  made 
are  expressed  in  my  instructions  ;  but  I  fear  that  the 
Bokharians  will  not  appreciate  these  privileges,  and 
that  the  Ameer  will  not  consider  himself  sufficiently 
compensated  for  his  signature  to  the  Act. 

"It  is  doubtful  whether  the   Khans  of   Bokhara 
and   Khiva  will  consent  to  admit  resident  Russian 


180        BUS  SI  AN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

commercial  agents  in  their  capitals  ;  but  it  may  be 
that  their  consent  to  our  demands  will  be  made  con- 
ditional upon  the  admission  of  their  own  agents  to 
our  fairs.  Shall  I  agree  to  this  or  not  ?  I  imagine 
that  the  first  would  prove  of  advantage  to  us  ;  and  I 
not  only  believe  that  the  *  Act '  should  include  pro- 
visions for  the  residence  of  Bokharian  and  Khivan 
agents  in  Orenburg,  but  I  intend  to  hint  to  the 
Khans,  in  the  course  of  negotiation,  that  in  the  event 
of  our  demands  being  acceded  to,  there  shall  be 
reciprocity  in  the  matter  of  the  agencies  ;  and  I 
shall  endeavour  to  prove  to  them  all  they  might  gain 
through  permanent  agencies  at  Orenburg. 

"  As  the  promises  which  we  shall  make  in  return 
for  what  we  demand  from  the  Rulers  of  Bokhara  and 
Khiva  will  in  reality  be  insignificant,  and  will  mainly 
consist  of  loud  and  empty  phrases,*  would  it  not 
be  better  to  convince  the  Khans  of  the  necessity  of 
accepting  and  signing  the  terms  proposed  to 
them  by  means  of  a  threat,  to  the  effect 
that  in  case  of  refusal  we  shall  withhold  all 
the  privileges  hitherto  extended  to  Asiatics  in  matters 
of  trade,  telling  them  at  the  same  time  that  we  can 
do  very  well  without  Asiatic  merchandise  ?    Will  the 

*  These  remarkable  words  are  literally  translated  from  the  Russian  original. 


/ 


IGNATIEFF'S  MISSION  TO  KHIVA,  ETC.      181 

Ministry  approve  of  my  conduct,  and  will  it  support 
my  threats  in  case  of  need  ?  At  all  events  I  intend, 
as  a  last  resource,  to  try  my  method  of  persuasion. 

"  I  am  also  instructed  to  give  the  Ameer  no  positive 
answer  if  he  should  ask  our  assistance  in  his  war  with 
Kokand,  and  to  be  circumspect  in  my  dealings  with 
envoys,  and  with  others  from  Tashkend.  According 
to  the  latest  intelligence,  the  Kokandians  continue  to 
be  secretly  and  openly  hostile  to  us.  It  appears  to 
me  that  the  dignity  of  Russia  requires  that  we  should 
treat  the  Kokandians  as  people  who  have  merited 
chastisement,  and  that  we  should  not  only  avoid  all 
dealings  with  them,  but  also  speak  of  them  in  Bokhara, 
where  their  acts  of  hostihty  against  us  are  well- 
known,  as  robbers,  with  whom  it  is  not  worth  our 
while  to  transact  any  business,  and  upon  whom  we 
mean  to  inflict  punishment  at  the  first  opportunity. 

"It  would  hardly  be  advantageous  to  us  to  refuse 
aid  to  the  Ameer  of  Bokhara  in  his  war  with  Kokand, 
in  the  event  of  his  applying  to  us  for  it,  and  thereby 
to  lose  the  opportunity  of  connecting  the  Syr-Daria 
(Jaxartes)  lines  by  occupying  Turkestan  and  Tash- 
kend. 

"  Even  if  the  Khanate  of  Bokhara  were  to  gain 
strength   at   the   expense   of    Kokand,  it  could   not 

\ 
\ 


182         RUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

become  formidable  to  us,  owing  to  the  effeminate 
character  of  its  people,  and  also  because  it  would  be 
difficult  for  the  Ameer — as  has  been  proved  on 
former  occasions — to  keep  the  conquered  provinces 
of  Kokand  in  due  subjection.  To  co-operate,  even 
morally,  with  the  Kokandians  against  the  Bokharians, 
would  be  directly  in  opposition  to  our  interests.  A 
reliance  on  our  aid  from  this  side  would  make  the 
Ameer  more  willing  to  comply  with  all  our  demands. 
While,  on  the  other  hand,  seeing  no  direct  advantage 
in  an  alliance  with  Russia,  the  cunning  and  experienced 
Ameer  would  probably  treat  me  in  the  same  manner 
as  he  treated  our  Mission  in  1841,  which  was  very 
badly  received,  and  completely  unsuccessful,  not  only 
failing  to  make  the  Ameer  agree  to  any  one  of  our 
demands,  but  being  moreover  subjected  to  various 
indignities. 

"  In  order  to  induce  the  Khan  of  Khiva  to  permit 
Russian  vessels  to  ply  freely  on  the  Oxus,  it  will  be 
necessary  to  promise  him  some  pecuniary  advantage. 
He  might  be  told  that  the  caravans  which  now  pro- 
ceed by  way  of  Bokhara  to  Russia  bring  him  no 
profit,  but  that  the  commercial  navigation  of  the 
Oxus  would  divert  all  the  traffic  through  Khiva,  and 
that  Russia  would  consent  to  a  transit  duty  of  two- 


/ 


IGNATIEFF'S  MISSION  TO  KHIVA,  ETC.      183 

and-a-half  per  cent,  on  all  goods  passing  up  and 
down  the  river  in  vessels  through  the  Khivan 
dominions,  which  would  plainly  tend  to  increase  the 
Khan's  revenues.  This  rate  of  duty  would  not  be 
burdensome  to  us. 

**  It  will,  in  any  case,  be  necessary  to  consent  to 
the  imposition  of  this  duty  for  the  first  two  or  three 
years,  after  which,  on  the  extension  of  navigation  on 
the  Aral  sea  and  on  the  river  Oxus,  it  will  be 
easier  for  us  to  demand  its  aboHtion  in  respect  to 
cargoes  which  are  not  discharged  within  the  Khivan 
dominions." 

From  the  Bish  Tamak  bivouac  Colonel  Ignatieff 
despatched  a  special  messenger  to  Captain  Butakoff, 
commanding  the  Aral  flotilla,  requesting  him  to  com- 
municate with  the  Mission  on  its  reaching  Chernisheff 
bay,  explaining  that  "  the  necessity  of  clearly  indicat- 
ing the  respective  operations  of  the  Mission  entrusted 
to  me  and  the  Aral  flotilla,  in  their  farther  progress  to 
the  confines  ^:  Khiva,  and  of  coming  to  an  under- 
standing concerning  the  difficulties  which  the  flotilla 
may  encounter  upon  entering  the  mouth  of  the  Oxus, 
make  it  imperative  that  we  should  meet  as  speedily 
as  possible  before  determining  our  future  course  of 
action." 


184        BUS  SI  AN-  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

On  31st  May  the  Mission  safely  reached  the  Emba, 
travelHng  438  verts  (292  miles)  in  seventeen  days, 
with  its  enormous  transport. 

The  marauding  excursions  of  the  robber  Iset 
Kutebar  have  already  been  referred  to.  After  the 
employment  of  every  means  for  the  pacification  of 
the  nomads,  the  Governor-General  of  Orenburg 
thought  proper  to  proclaim  an  amnesty  to  the 
rebel  Kirghizes,  and  towards  that  end  entered 
indirectly  into  communication  with  Iset  himself,  in 
order  to  induce  him  to  present  himself  with  a 
petition  for  pardon.  In  spite  of  the  strong  persua- 
sions of  those  who  acted  on  behalf  of  the  Governor- 
General,  Iset — advised,  it  was  said,  by  his  mother — 
at  first  positively  declined  to  have  any  dealings  with 
the  authorities  at  Orenburg,  and  was  preparing  to 
migrate  to  the  Ust-Urt,  when  he  suddenly  heard  of 
the  advance  of  the  Mission  under  the  Emperor's 
Aide-de-camp,  and  changed  his  mind.  He  resolved, 
before  proceeding  to  an  interview  with  the  Governor- 
General,  to  give  himself  up  to  the  Envoy,  as  one 
who  might  be  considered  in  the  confidence  of  His 
Majesty  the  Czar.  On  the  4th  of  June,  Iset,  with 
some  of  his  companions,  stood  unarmed  in  the  tent 
of  Colonel  Ignatieff. 


IGNATIEFF'S  MISSION  TO  KIIIVA,  ETC.       185 

"  After  the  first  compliments,"  wrote  the  agent, 
^*  Iset  professed  a  complete  submission  to  the 
Government,  begging  me,  as  the  Envoy  of  His 
Imperial  Majesty,  to  assure  the  Emperor  of  his 
submission,  and  his  desire  to  atone  for  former 
misdeeds  by  zealous  and  faithful  services.  He,  at 
the  same  time,  explained  that,  owing  to  the  dis- 
honest and  unscrupulous  behaviour  of  the  subordi- 
nate and  commanding  officers  hitherto  sent  into  the 
steppe,  from  whom  he  had  suffered  persecution,  he 
could  not  treat  with  them  in  any  way,  but  had  waited 
for  the  appearance  in  the  steppe  of  a  man  who  would 
personally  assure  His  Imperial  Majesty  of  his 
obedience,  and  vouch  for  his  security  if  he  went 
to  present  himself  to  the  Governor-General." 

Four  days  after  his  submission,  Iset  led  the 
embassy  through  his  auls,  gave  trusty  guides  to 
conduct  the  Mission  over  the  Barsuk  sands,  and 
made  his  favourite  son  accompany  the  Agent  to 
Khiva,  to  show  the  Khivans  how  thoroughly  devoted 
he  was  to  the  Russian  Government.  Immediately 
upon  reaching  the  Chegan  river,  on  7th  June,  the 
Agent,  in  accordance  with  his  previous  letter  to 
Captain  Butakoff,  sent  off  a  topographer,  with  two 
guides,  to  Chernisheff  bay,  in  order  to   open  com- 


186         RUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

munications  with  the  flotilla ;  and,  directing  the 
caravan  to  proceed  somewhat  more  slowly  across 
the  sand,  he  himself  emerged  upon  the  shores  of 
the  Aral  on  12th  June,  waiting  impatiently  for  the 
appearance  of  the  vessels.  But  it  was  found  im- 
possible to  remain  any  longer  at  Chernisheff  bay, 
owing  to  the  utter  absence  of  fodder  and  insufficiency 
of  fresh  water.  The  detachment  was  obliged  to 
resume  the  march,  and  to  perform  a  long  and  tedious 
night  journey  to  the  nearest  wells. 

The  dilatory  despatch  of  various  stores  from 
Orenburg  had  detained  Captain  Butakoff  at  Fort 
No.  I  longer  than  he  had  anticipated,  so  that  he  was 
not  able  to  keep  his  appointment  with  the  Agent  at 
Chernisheff  bay.  On  14th  May  the  Mission  en- 
camped at  Cape  Bai-Gubet,  whence  they  beheld  the 
black  figure  of  the  steamer  Per  of  ski  passing  by  them 
without  noticing  the  signals  from  the  shore.  On  the 
19th,  however,  after  many  efforts  to  open  communi- 
cations with  Colonel  Ignatieff,  Captain  Butakoff  had 
the  satisfaction  of  meeting  the  head  of  the  Mission 
on  the  barren  shores  of  the  Aral. 

After  the  interview  with  Butakoff,  the  Agent  wrote 
as  follows :  "I  have  shown  Captain  Butakoff  the 
resolution  of    the   Committee  forwarded  with    your 


IGNATIEFF'S  MISSION  TO  KHIVA,  ETC.       187 

Excellency's  letter  of  the  15th  April,  and  have 
advised  him  not  to  make  the  preliminary  survey  of 
the  Oxus  up  to  Kungrad,  which  he  holds  to  be 
necessary.  It  appears,  according  to  the  information 
received  by  Captain  Butakoff  as  to  the  present  con- 
dition of  the  mouths  of  the  Oxus,  that  the  Taldyk 
has  become  shallow,  and  that  the  main  body  of 
water  flows  into  the  old  or  eastern  channel.  The 
mouth  of  the  Taldyk  has  been  mentioned  by  Captain 
Butakoff  as  the  point  of  rendezvous  for  the  flotilla, 
which,  composed  of  the  steamers  Perofski  and 
Ohrucheff,  and  of  the  three  barges,  will  assemble 
there  on  the  23rd.  Taking  two  of  these  vessels, 
laden  with  presents,  Captain  Butakoff  will  proceed 
to  the  mouth  of  the  Oxus,  and  ascend  to  Kungrad, 
acting  upon  instructions  contained  in  a  letter  which 
I  this  day  despatched  by  messenger  to  the  Com- 
mandant of  Kungrad.  I  have  requested  Captain 
Butakoff  to  pay  no  attention  to  any  act  of  hostility 
on  the  part  of  individual  Khivans,  or  any  attempts 
to  stop  the  steamers  ;  to  communicate  with  me  as 
often  as  possible ;  and,  in  particular,  to  inform  me 
without  delay  of  any  stoppage  that  may  occur  ; 
desiring  him,  moreover,  to  be  at  Kungrad  by  the 
25th.     In   the  event  of  any  unforeseen   hindrances 


188         EUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

to  the  passage  of  our  boats,  the  presents  will  be 
transferred  to  Khivan  barges,  in  charge  of  Mojaisky 
(a  naval  officer)  and  Lalatzky  (staff  officer),  with 
two  of  our  soldiers." 

Having  determined  upon  this,  merely  with  the 
object  of  effecting  a  survey  of  the  river,  Colonel 
Ignatieff  at  the  same  time  resolved  to  change  the 
route  of  the  Mission  itself,  which  he  now  directed 
towards  Kungrad  instead  of  Kuna-Urgendj.  For 
the  double  purpose  of  acquainting  the  Khivan 
authorities  with  the  reason  for  the  entry  of  the 
vessels  into  the  Oxus  and  for  the  change  of  route, 
and  of  ascertaining  the  impression  produced  on  the 
Khivan  Government  by  these  proceedings,  the  Agent 
sent  on  ahead  a  man  named  Panfiloff,  a  clerk  of  the 
merchant  Zaichikoff,  in  charge  of  the  latter' s  mercan- 
tile venture. 

This  man,  who  had  before  been  in  Central  Asia,  is 
described  by  the  historian  of  Ignatieff's  expedition 
as  "  one  of  those  many  Russians  who  are  so  clever 
at  finding  out  everything,  and  whose  sound  common- 
sense  enables  them  to  emerge  from  every  difficulty." 

After  arranging  accordingly  and  directing  the 
course  of  the  Mission  to  Urga,  on  Aibugir  bay, 
Colonel  Ignatieff  considered  it  necessary  to  furnish 


IGNATIEFF'S  MISSION  TO  KHIVA,  ETC.       18^ 

the  commander  of  the  flotilla  with  special  written 
instructions,  in  addition  to  verbal  explanations,  from 
which  the  following  extract  may  be  made,  in  order 
to  throw  more  light  on  the  proceedings  of  the 
Mission  : — 

"  The  preliminary  survey  of  the  estuary  of  the 
river,  of  which  the  necessity  is  recognised,  could  be 
permitted  only  on  the  condition  of  your  employing 
great  caution  in  its  performance  and  of  its  not  en- 
tailing any  evil  consequence  on  the  Mission  and  on 
the  flotilla  in  the  furtherance  of  their  object — the 
securing  of  a  free  passage  up  the  Oxus." 

Parting  from  the  flotilla,  and  performing  two  more 
marches  along  the  west  coast  of  the  Aral,  the 
Mission  came  to  a  halt  at  Urga,  by  Aibugir  lake, 
an  arm  of  the  sea  now  completely  choked  with 
reeds. 

During  this  movement,  the  reconnoitring  detach- 
ment under  Lieutenant  Skriabin  traversed  the  Ust- 
Urt  and  entered  into  communication  with  the 
Mission ;  but  Colonel  Ignatieff,  having  no  occasion 
for  its  services,  directed  Lieutenant  Skriabin  to  pro- 
ceed to  fulfil  the  duties  with  which  he  was  charged. 

On  the  road  to  Urga  the  Mission  was  met  by 
Kirghiz  messengers,  who  had  been  sent  to  Khiva  by 


190         EUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

the  Governor- General  of  Orenburg,  with  a  notifica- 
tion of  the  despatch  of  the  Mission.  These  Kir- 
ghizes having  interviewed  the  Mehtar  and  the  Khan 
himself,  were  the  first  to  inform  the  Agent  that  the 
Khivans  were  very  much  alarmed  by  the  Governor- 
General's  progress  through  the  steppe  and  by  the 
movements  of  the  various  detachments,  as  well  as 
by  the  numerous  escort  attending  the  Mission. 
They  feared  that  the  Russians  would  form  an 
alliance  against  them  with  the  Turcomans,  and 
the  Kirghizes  inhabiting  the  southern  portion  of  the 
Khanates,  whose  chief,  Asbergen,  was  a  near  relative 
and  confederate  of  Iset.  In  apprehension  of  such 
an  the  alliance  with  the  Turcomans,  the  Khan, 
through  these  Kirghiz  messengers,  requested  the 
Mission  to  proceed  to  Kungrad  instead  of  Kunia 
Urgendj.  In  this  the  desire  of  the  Khan  thoroughly 
conformed  with  the  intentions  of  the  Agent  himself. 
The  Governor  of  Kungrad,  with  a  convoy  of  loo 
horsemen,  under  the  command  of  the  Kungrad 
officials,  was  instructed  to  meet  the  Mission  ;  and 
the  Divan  Baba,  the  brother  of  the  Divan  Begi,  or 
secretary  and  treasurer  of  the  Khan,  was  appointed 
as  permanent  attendant  upon  it.  When  within  four 
miles  of    Urga,  the  Mission  was  met  by  the   com- 


IGNA  TIEFrS  MISSION  TO  KHIVA,  ETC.      191 

manding  officers  of  the  Khivan  convoy,  who 
secretly  endeavoured,  in  the  course  of  conversation, 
to  ascertain  the  objects  of  the  Mission  and  its 
relation  with   the  Turcomans. 

Four  days  were  employed  in  the  tedious  passage 
of  the  Aibugir  in  Khivan  boats.  Eight  consecutive 
hours  passed  in  the  reeds  during  sultry  heat, 
afforded  the  first  experience  of  the  tortures  which 
were  subsequently  to  be  endured  in  the  navigation 
of  the  Oxus. 

The  supplementary  convoy  was  sent  back  to  the 
Uralsk  fort  from  Urga,  and  here,  in  view  of  the 
impossibility  of  conducting  the  heavy  transport 
through  a  country  offering  constant  impediments, 
the  officers'  and  other  carriages  were  burned.  The 
four  carriages  sent  back  with  the  supplementary 
convoy  left  only  two  light  carts  for  invalids  to  follow 
with  the  Mission.  At  this  place  the  number  of  non- 
combatants  was  reduced,  the  feeble-bodied  men  were 
eliminated  from  the  escort,  and  the  complement  was 
filled  up  with  ten  Aral  Cossacks  from  the  supple- 
mentary escort. 

Marching  from  the  Aibugir  to  the  place  of  resi- 
dence of  Iset  Kutebar's  relative,  Asbergen,  who 
appeared    before    Colonel    Ignatieff   with    offers    of 


192         RUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

submission,  the  Mission  entered  Kungrad  the  next 
day  (28th  July).  It  passed  through  an  immense 
crowd  of  people,  and,  wending  its  way  along  dirty 
streets,  reached  the  Khan's  palace,  which  strongly 
resembled  a  prison  and  which  was  intended  for  the 
accommodation  of  the  Mission.  The  information 
received  from  the  Kirghiz  messengers  concerning 
the  apprehensions  at  Khiva  was  found  at  Kungrad  to 
be  correct ;  and  the  fear  and  mistrust  which  filled 
the  minds  of  the  Khivan  officials  became  evident  in 
their  relations  with  the  Mission  and  in  their  refer- 
ences to  its  possible  objects.  In  a  cyphered  des- 
patch from  Kungrad,  the  Russian  Agent  reported 
to  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  as  follows  : — 

"  We  arrived  safe  and  well  at  Kungrad  on  the 
28th.  Our  reception  was  good  ;  but  our  position 
is  becoming  embarrassing.  The  friendly  letter  sent 
by  General  Katenin  to  the  Turcomans  has  been  in- 
tercepted by  the  Khivans,  who  regard  it  as  evidence 
of  our  duplicity."  (The  letter  in  question  gave 
intimation  of  the  progress  of  the  Russian  Mission.) 
"  Of  the  four  Kirghiz  couriers  carrying  letters,  three 
were  seized  and  conveyed  to  Khiva ;  the  fourth 
came  to  meet  me  with  a  complaint.  Our  detach- 
ment  and    the   progress    of    the    Governor-General 


IGNATIEFF'S  MISSION  TO  KIIIVA,  ETC.      193 

threw  the  Khanate  into  agitation  ;  the  militia  were 
called  out  everywhere.  Matters  were  aggravated 
by  the  steamer.  I  am  being  hurried  to  Khiva ;  but 
I  am  endeavouring  to  gain  time.  I  was  first  tem- 
porising on  account  of  the  steamer ;  now  it  is  with  a 
desire  to  clear  up  matters.  The  steamer  attempted  a 
passage  up  several  mouths,  causing  great  alarm  by 
firing  guns  and  by  its  efforts  to  ascend  the  river. 
From  the  22nd  up  to  the  28th  it  failed  in  these 
efforts,  so  that  I  was  obliged  to  agree  to  the  per- 
sistent demands  of  the  Khivans  that  the  presents 
should  be  transferred  to  Khivan  boats.  I  am  loiter- 
ing to  gain  time,  but  I  am  going  forward.  In  Kun- 
grad  I  take  to  Khivan  boats." 

Everything,  indeed,  tended  to  increase  the  terror 
of  the  mistrustful  Khivans.  The  Khivan  Govern- 
ment, having  received  information  from  the  Jaxartes 
concerning  the  preparations  for  the  despatch  of  the 
flotilla,  determined  forthwith,  at  all  hazards,  to 
prevent  its  entry  into  the  Oxus  ;  and  the  Governor 
of  Kungrad,  under  the  penalty  of  losing  his  head, 
began  on  the  24th  of  June  to  urge  Colonel  Ignatieff 
to  order  the  vessels  not  to  enter  the  river.  Having 
already  given  instructions  for  the  ascent,  the  Agent 

O 


194        RUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

was  obliged  to  make  some  delay,  both  in  his  own 
movements  and  in  the  issue  of  instructions  to 
stop  the  flotilla,  which  naturally  did  not  serve  to 
pacify  the  Khivans.  Failing  to  find  a  passage  from 
the  22nd  to  the  28th  of  June,  Captain  Butakoff,  by 
his  persevering  efforts,  necessarily  attracted  the 
attention  of  the  Khivan  officials,  who  had  stringent 
orders  from  the  Khan  to  stop  him ;  and  he  at  last 
drove  them  to  despair  when,  on  the  29th  of  June, 
the  Perofski,  with  a  barge,  discovering  a  new  arm 
of  the  Oxus,  the  Ulkun-Daria,  passed  the  bar  and 
steamed  up  towards  Kungrad.  The  barge,  saluting 
Captain  Butakoff' s  cutter  with  a  fire  from  its  guns, 
convinced  the  Khivans  of  the  sinister  object  of  the 
Russian  enterprise. 

Considering  the  movements  of  the  Russian  troops 
on  the  Ust-Urt ;  the  visit  of  the  Governor-General 
to  the  Jaxartes  with  an  enormous  suite,  previous  to 
the  arrival  of  the  Russian  Mission  in  the  Khivan 
dominions  ;  and  the  interception  of  the  letters  ad- 
dressed at  General  Katenin's  direction  by  the  Sultan 
Ruler  to  the  Turcomans,  one  can  comprehend  the 
Khivan  apprehensions  in  regard  to  the  Russian 
aUiance  with  the  Turcomans,  Khiva's  most  deter- 
mined enemies.     In  these  circumstances,  regarded 


IGNATIEFF'S  MISSION  TO  KHIVA,  ETC.      195 

with  suspicion  and  ill-feeling  by  the  authorities  at 
Kungrad,  and  learning  that  his  letters  to  Russia  were 
being  intercepted  on  their  way,  Colonel  Ignatieff, 
in  response  to  the  pressing  requests  made  by  the 
Khivan  officials  in  the  Khan's  name  that  he  should 
hasten  to  Khiva,  resolved,  without  waiting  longer  for 
Butakoff  at  Kungrad,  to  embark  in  Khivan  boats, 
and  proceed  to  the  capital.  He  considered,  too, 
that  he  would  thus  have  an  opportunity  of  examin- 
ing the  greater  portion  of  the  river's  course.  The 
horses  belonging  to  the  Russians,  with  a  portion  of 
the  escort,  were,  at  the  request  of  the  Khivans, 
conducted  to  Khiva  by  land  on  the  right  bank  of 
the  river,  under  the  charge  of  Captain  Borodin, 
of  the  Ural  Cossacks,  and  accompanied  by  a  tele- 
graphist named  Zelenin. 

At  the  same  time  the  Agent  despatched  Lieu- 
tenant Mojaiski  to  Captain  Butakoff,  "  under  the 
plausible  pretext  of  obtaining  the  presents  from  the 
steamer,  but  really  with  the  object  of  enabling  that 
officer  to  examine  the  Taldyk  arm,  of  entering 
into  communication  with  the  flotilla,  of  ascertain- 
ing what  had  happened  to  it,  and  of  acquainting 
Captain  Butakoff  with  the  state  of  affairs."  Mojaiski 
descended    the    Taldyk,    but   passing   into   another 


196         RUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 


arm  was  obliged  to  return  to  Kungrad,  where  he 
found  the  Russian  steamers  at  anchor. 

The  Mission,  accompanied  by  the  Divan-Baba, 
then  proceeded  up  the  Oxus,  in  Khivan  boats,  on 
the  ist  of  July,  both  banks  of  the  river  being  exten- 
sively flooded.  The  Mission  suffered  much  during 
this  passage,  in  a  temperature  of  36°  Reaumur 
(113°  Fahrenheit),  without  a  breath  of  wind,  almost 
motionless,  under  a  broiling  sun  by  day,  and  in  dense 
vapours.  They  were  at  night  towed  along,  accord- 
ing to  one  of  the  officers  with  Colonel  Ignatieff,  "  at 
the  rate  of  speed  of  the  crayfish." 

The  following  extract  is  from  a  private  letter  sent 
home  by  this  officer : — 

"  We  were  at  first  interested  in  the  novelty  of  pro- 
ceeding up  the  river  in  Khivan  boats.  As  the  Oxus 
is  entirely  unknown,  we  prepared  ourselves,  as  it 
were,  for  discoveries  in  the  new  world  ;  but,  alas ! 
our  illusions  were  soon  dispelled.  The  boats,  four 
persons  in  each,  followed  one  another  at  the  rate  of 
from  two  to  three  versts  an  hour.  Under  any  cir- 
cumstances to  be  rowed  is  not  a  lively  mode  of 
navigation,  but  with  the  Khivan  boatmen  it  is 
simply  torture.  The  Khivans  are  terribly  afraid  of 
the  sail,  so  when  our  men  stretched  out  the  canvas 


i 


IGNATIEFF'S  MISSION  TO  KIIIVA,  ETC.       197 

the  Khlvans  were  Impatient  until  what  they  call  the 
shaitau,  or  devil,  was  taken  down.  Our  passage 
from  Kungrad  to  Urgendj  lay  past  the  towns  of 
Hodjeili  and  Kipchak,  up  the  main  stream,  along 
narrow  channels  forced  by  the  water  through  dense 
masses  of  reeds,  and  by  the  artificial  drains  which, 
owing  to  a  superabundance  of  water,  had  been 
converted  into  large  canals.  This  year  the  river 
is  exceedingly  full,  and  the  natives  say  they  have 
not  had  such  extensive  floods  for  a  very  long 
time.  In  many  places  the  inundation  spreads  over 
some  four  or  five  versts  of  country,  submerging 
gardens  and  habitations.  We  passed  most  of  the 
night  in  the  reeds,  which  are  taller  than  a  man. 
Our  sufferings  were  intolerable.  During  the  day 
we  lay  almost  motionless,  stripped  to  our  under- 
clothing, the  perspiration  streaming  from  us.  At 
sunset  myriads  of  gnats  came  forth,  and  so  dis- 
figured our  bodies  and  our  faces  during  the  night, 
stinging  us  through  linen  vestments  and  coats,  that 
we  were  not  to  be  recognised.  Under  the  canvas 
stretchers  it  was  suffocating,  yet  it  was  impossible  to 
expose  one's  self.  So  it  was  by  day.  Even  the 
boatmen,  who  were  used  to  all  this,  sheltered  them- 
selves under  awnings.     We  crossed  from  one  side  of 


198         BUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

the  river  to  the  other  at  haphazard  ;  the  Khivans 
giving  the  boats  up  to  the  mercy  of  the  stream,  and 
not  caring  where  they  might  be  stranded.  We  got 
into  two  dreadful  whirlpools,  and  if  we  did  not  sink 
to  the  bottom  of  the  Oxus,  it  was  only  because  it 
was  not  God's  will  that  we  should  do  so.  Yet  the 
river  is  undoubtedly  grand,  being  nearly  at  all  points 
from  4,000  to  6,000  fathoms  wide." 

When  the  Russian  vessels  had  forced  their  way 
to  Kungrad,  the  Mission  was  being  drawn  up  the 
stream,  and  the  Agent  was  in  utter  ignorance  of  the 
proceedings  of  the  flotilla,  the  Khivans  in  his  com- 
pany being  all  the  while  fully  cognizant  of  them,  as 
they  were  informed  of  events  at  each  point  of  com- 
munication with  the  shores.  It  was  only  on  the  15th 
of  July,  when  Urgendj  was  being  approached,  that 
letters  were  received  by  Colonel  Ignatieff,  through 
Iset's  son  and  a  Khivan  courier,  from  Captain  Buta- 
koff,  at  Kungrad,  and  from  the  officers  accompanying 
the  horses.  These  letters  fully  disclosed  the  evil 
designs  of  the  Governor  of  Kungrad,  Esaul-Bashi, 
under  whose  directions  all  letters  were  taken  from  the 
Russian  messengers  and  read.  It  was  due  to  the 
dignity  of  the  Russian  Agent  that  such  conduct 
should   not   be   overlooked,    and    Colonel    Ignatieff 


IGNATIEFF'S  MISSION  TO  KIIIVA,  ETC.      199 

accordingly  expressed  his  dissatisfaction  to  the 
Khivans  around  him,  with  regard  to  the  conduct  of 
Esaul-Bashi,  the  Governor  of  Kungrad.  Colonel 
Ignatieff  reported  home  as  follows  : — 

"  Deeming  it  advisable  to  give  some  of  the 
Khivans  a  lesson,  and  to  show  them  that  I  was  not 
inclined  to  suffer  such  indignities,  I  stopped  the 
boats  before  reaching  Urgendj,  summoned  the 
Divan-Baba,  and  explaining  to  him  the  impropriety 
and  unpardonable  nature  of  his  countrymen's  pro- 
ceedings, declared  that  if  my  dissatisfaction  with 
the  Esaul-Bashi  were  not  immediately  reported  to 
the  Khan,  coupled  with  a  request  that  arrangements 
be  instantly  made  to  facilitate  the  advance  of  the 
horses  and  half  of  the  escort  to  Khiva,  I  should  not 
only  discontinue  my  ascent  of  the  river,  but  should 
forthwith  return  to  Kungrad.  The  Divan-Baba 
entered  with  excuses,  begging  me  at  any  rate  to 
proceed  as  far  as  the  Urgendj  wharf.  He  said  that 
my  return  to  Kungrad  would  bring  him  to  the 
scaffold.  He  despatched  a  report  to  the  Khivans, 
and  guaranteed  the  fulfilment  of  all  my  demands." 

"  While  yet  on  the  Ust-Urt,"  Colonel  Ignatieff 
wrote,  "  I  discussed  with  Captain  Butakoff  the 
question  of  navigating  the  Oxus  this  year,  and  that 


200        EUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

officer  explained  to  me  that  the  steamer  Obruchef 
was  to  be  left  out  of  all  consideration,  because  she 
could  go  to  sea  only  in  fair  weather,  and  was  wholly- 
incapable  of  making  way  against  the  current  of  so 
wide  and  rapid  a  river  as  the  Oxus.  He  furthur  said 
that  it  was  doubtful  whether  the  steamer  Perofski 
could  ascend  the  river  any  distance,  for,  should 
the  water  fall,  she  might  be  shut  in  there  for  the 
winter.  Captain  Butakoff  thought  it  undesirable  to 
run  the  risk  of  wintering  with  the  flotilla  in  that 
river.  Taking  the  above  into  consideration,  and 
seeing  no  use  for  a  steamer  in  the  river  with  an 
insufficient  supply  of  fuel,  and  not  feeling  authorised 
to  take  upon  myself  the  responsibility  in  opposition 
to  the  opinion  of  the  Commander  of  the  flotilla,  of 
incurring  the  danger  to  which  the  Perofski,  with 
a  barge,  might  be  exposed  at  Kungrad,  and  in 
steaming  up  to  Chardjui  and  to  Balkh  late  in  the 
autumn,  I  concurred  in  Captain  Butakoff's  sugges- 
tion. I  was  the  more  inclined  to  do  so  because  it 
was  not  to  be  expected  that  the  negotiations  in 
Khiva  would  be  concluded  in  less  than  a  month — 
not,  that  is  to  say,  before  the  end  of  August.  It 
was,  moreover,  ascertained  that  the  autumnal  rise  of 


IGNATIEFF'S  MISSION  TO  KHIVA,  ETC.       201 

water  Is  neither  great  nor  prolonged,  and  the  Com- 
mander of  the  flotilla  considered  that  the  navigation 
of  the  Aral  after  the  ist  October  would  be  attended 
with  extreme  danger.   ...   I  thought  it  premature  to 
send  the  steamer  back  to  the  Jaxartes,  for  the  pre- 
sence of  our  vessels  in  the  estuary  of  the  Oxus  might 
be  a  great  advantage  should  we  be  unable  to  pass 
straight  on  to  Bokhara.     Subsequently,  on  the  2nd 
of  August,  I  received  a  communication  from  Captain 
Butakoff  to  the  effect  that,  although  by  the  'arrival 
of  the  second   barge  at  Kungrad  he  was  provided 
with  a  sufficient  store  of  anthracite  to  ascend  even 
beyond  Chardjui,  he  still  deemed  it  more  prudent  to 
return  to  the  mouth  of  the  river,  fearing  lest,  during 
the  continuance  of  the  negotiations  at   Khiva,  the 
water,  which  had  already  fallen  two  inches,  should 
become  so  low  as  to  render  it  extremely  difficult  for 
the  vessels  to  leave  the  Oxus." 

On  the  17th  of  July  the  mission  proceeded  up  the 
stream,  and  passing  through  several  canals,  entered 
the  Polovan-Ata,  and  on  the  i8th  approached  the 
suburban  palace  allotted  to  them  as  their  residence 
during  their  stay  in  Khiva.  Here  they  remained 
eight  days,  "  revelling  in  fruit    and  Khivan  sweet- 


202         BUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

meats,"  before  their  horses  arrived.  At  length 
the  28th  July  was  appointed  for  presentation  to 
the  Khan,  and  at  5  p.m.  the  Mission  was  re- 
ceived. 

The  Russians  found  themselves  in  Khiva  under 
circumstances  unfavourable  to  negotiation.  The 
suspicions  of  the  Khivans  had  been  aroused  by  the 
military  evolutions  in  the  steppes,  as  well  as  by  the 
operations  of  the  flotilla ;  and  the  Khan's  suspicions 
increased  to  such  a  degree  that  he  prohibited  all 
communication  with  the  Mission  during  the  first 
period  of  their  stay  in  Khiva,  under  a  penalty  of 
death  ;  caused  the  Agent's  couriers  to  be  seized, 
lodged  them  in  prison,  took  all  letters,  and  came 
almost  to  the  conclusion  that  Colonel  Ignatieff  in- 
tended to  deal  by  him  as  the  Turcoman  Envoy  had 
dealt  with  Kullu-Murad ;  in  other  words,  to  kill 
him  at  the  audience. 

The  position  of  the  officers  of  the  Russian  Mission 
had  become  exceedingly  embarrassing,  when  intelli- 
gence was  received  in  Khiva  concerning  the  appear- 
ance of  the  third  Russian  vessel  (Kolokoltsoff's)  in 
the  river  ;  and  the  Khan  sent  an  oilficer  to  ask  Colonel 
Ignatieff  "  whether  he  was  to  be  considered  as  a 
peaceful  Envoy,  coming  with  friendly   intentions,  or 


IGNATIEFF'S  MISSION  TO  KHIVA,  ETC.      203 

whether  he  brought  war?  "  The  answer  given  to  the 
Khan,  that  the  third  vessel  had  come  with  letters, 
in  consequence  of  the  non-receipt  in  Russia  of  in- 
telligence from  the  Mission ;  a  firm  protest  on  the 
part  of  the  Agent  himself  against  the  arrest  of  his 
couriers  ;  and  the  despatch  of  an  officer  (Galkin)  on 
the  26th  of  July  to  the  steamer  to  fetch  the  post,  at 
last  pacified  Said  Mahomed,  who  allowed  the  steamer 
to  anchor  in  the  Ulkun  Daria,  and  became  generally 
more  courteous  in  his  behaviour  towards  the 
Russians.  The  Khan's  request  that  the  Envoy 
should  be  presented  to  him  without  his  sword  was 
not  consented  to  ,-  and  not  only  the  Agent  himself, 
but  all  his  suite,  constantly  paraded  the  town  with 
their  side-arms,  and  in  their  European  dress  ;  a  most 
unusual  sight  in  the  Khanates  of  Central  Asia.  The 
Khan's  suspicions  were  not,  however,  entirely  lulled; 
and  he  informed  the  Agent  that  he  would  negotiate 
with  him  personally,  while  requesting  him,  out  of 
regard  for  his  ambassadorial  dignity,  to  let  the 
Secretary  and  the  dragoman  of  the  Mission  see 
the    ministers. 

On  the  2nd  of  August  the  Agent  informed  the  Khan 
Russia's  demands,  and  then  commenced  "  the  inter- 
minable Asiatic  negotiations."   On  the  same  day  the 


204         BUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

Agent  despatched  a  special  Kirghiz  courier  to  the 
Vizier  of  Bokhara,  to  announce  the  arrival  of  the 
Mission.  On  15th  of  August,  the  Kush  Begi,  in 
the  name  of  the  Khan,  invited  the  members  of 
the  Mission  to  a  drive,  at  the  end  of  which  a  confer- 
ence was  held  by  them  with  five  of  the  ministers.  The 
Khivans  were  afraid  of  giving  offence  to  Russia  by 
refusing  to  agree  to  the  Russian  proposals,  yet  they 
also  feared  from  Bokhara  the  consequences  of  acceed- 
ing  to  them — more  especially  as  regarded  the  naviga- 
tion of  the  Oxus,  since  the  Ameer  of  Bokhara  had, 
through  his  Envoys,  repeatedly  urged  the  Khan  not 
to  allow  Russian  vessels,  under  any  pretext,  to  as- 
cend the  river.  Nevertheless,  the  Khivans,  "moved 
by  impotent  malice  towards  the  Ameer,"  strove  all 
the  while  to  set  the  Agent's  mind  against  him,  and 
to  persuade  him  not  to  go  to  Bokhara. 

While  agreeing  to  all  propositions  with  respect  to 
abstention  from  brigandage,  protection  to  caravans, 
&c.,  the  Khivans  refused  point-blank  to  accept  a 
clause  relative  to  the  navigation  of  the  Oxus. 

The  Khivan  traders  were  equally  opposed  to  this 
clause,  being  fully  assured  that  the  transport  of  mer- 
chandise in  vessels  would  throw  the  whole  trade  into 
Russian  hands.       This  idea  frightened  them  very 


IGNATIEFF'S  MISSION  TO  KHIVA,  ETC.       205 

much,  and  "  the  most  convincing  arguments  of  the 
Agent  "  failed  to  assure  them. 

The  negotiations  were  protracted ;  and  it  seemed 
that  Colonel  Ignatieff's  persistent  demands,  even  in- 
cluding the  one  referring  to  the  navigation  of  the 
Oxus,  were  likely  to  be  favourably  accepted,  when 
suddenly  a  fresh  report  from  the  Governor  of  Kungrad 
dashed  all  the  expectations  of  the  Mission,  and  put 
an  end  to  the  negotiations. 

On  2ist  August  a  communication  was  received  in 
Khiva  to  the  effect  that  boats  were  being  sent  from 
the  steamer  Perofski  to  execute  surveys  and  take 
soundings,  and  that  a  Persian  captive,  escaping  from 
Kungrad,  had  taken  refuge  on  board  a  Russian  boat, 
whose  surrender  the  Khivan  officers  had  failed  to 
obtain  at  the  hands  of  the  Russian  commander. 
The  Khan  assembled  a  Council,  at  which  it  was  de- 
cided positively  to  prohibit  the  entry  of  the  Russian 
vessels  into  the  river.  It  was  feared  that,  after 
exploring  the  country,  the  Russians  might  suddenly 
take  possession  of  the  Khanate,  and  that  if  they 
were  allowed  to  carry  away  captives  with  impunity 
Khiva  would  be  ruined.  It  was,  at  the  same  time, 
thought  that  the  Russians  might  be  moved  to  such 
a  proceeding  by  their  friendship  with  Persia,  which, 


206         RUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

in  the  opinion  of  the  Khivans,  went  so  far  that  in 
Persia  "  money  was  being  coined  in  the  name  of  the 
Emperor,  and  the  Shah  was  surrounded  by  a  Russian 
force  instead  of  his  own." 

"  If,"  writes  Mr.  Zalesoff,  "  one  reflects  how  valu- 
able the  Persian  slaves  were  to  the  idling  Khivans, 
the  ruin  which  threatened  the  latter  on  the  Hberation 
of  these  slaves —  the  only  labourers  in  the  Khanate — 
will  then  become  apparent.  Acting  upon  a  resolu- 
tion come  to  in  Council,  the  Khan  demanded  (but 
in  vain)  the  surrender  of  the  Persian  fugitive  slave, 
and  the  cessation  of  the  taking  of  soundings;  to 
which  the  Agent  replied  that  he  had  received  no 
report  from  the  Commander  of  the  steamer,  and 
promised  to  despatch  a  letter  with  the  sick  officers 
who  were  about  to  take  their  departure. 

At  the  same  time  Colonel  Ignatieff  received  infor- 
mation to  the  effect  that  Mr.  Galkin,  whom  he  had 
previously  sent  to  the  flotilla,  had  found  himself 
obliged  to  quarrel  with  the  Khivan  who  accompanied 
him,  on  account  of  the  above-mentioned  Persian 
slave,  and  was  therefore  compelled  to  remain  on 
board  the  steamer. 

Ignatieff  did  not  succeed  in  the  main  object  of 
his  mission.     He  could  not,  that  is  to  say,  gain  per- 


IGNATIEFF'S  MISSION  TO  KHIVA,  ETC.        207 


mission  to  navigate  the  Oxus.  But  he  afterwards 
obtained  this  right  from  the  Emir  of  Bokhara,  whom 
he  visited  in  his  capital. 

The  following  extract  from  a  private  letter  from 
one  of  the  officers  of  the  Mission  conveys  an  idea  of 
their  mode  of  life  in  Bokhara  : — 

"  We  are  in  Bokhara,  the  great  seat  of  wisdom  in 
Central  Asia.  What  can  I  tell  you  of  this  capital, 
with  its  sixty  or  seventy  thousand  inhabitants  ?  Read 
the  descriptions  of  it  by  Meyendorf,  Burnes,  and 
Khanikof,  written  some  scores  of  years  ago,  and  you 
will  form  a  correct  idea  of  the  place.  Everywhere 
clay  and  dirt,  everything  stagnant,  and  so,  most  pro- 
bably, things  will  remain  until  some  power  shakes  up 
these  Bokharians.  The  Ameer  is  a  despot  in  the 
fullest  sense  of  the  word ;  nobody's  life  is  valued  by 
him  at  a  single  farthing.  The  merchants  trading 
with  Russia  do  not  dare  even  to  imagine  that  any 
place  is  better  to  live  in  than  Bokhara,  and,  when 
appearing  before  the  Ameer,  they  tell  him  that  Mos- 
cow, St.  Petersburg,  or  London  are  not  fit  to  be  the 
soles  of  Bokhara's  boots ;  that  there  is  nowhere  to  be 
found  such  equity,  trade,  or  wealth  as  in  their  own 
country  ;  and  as  for  cultivation  of  the  mind,  I  need 
not  say  a  word.     In  short,  at  every  step  you  find 


208         RUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

self-infatuation,  against  which   diplomacy   is  utterly 
powerless,  and  if  the  Ameer  does  indeed  make  any 
concessions,  believe   me,  it  will   only  be  matter  of 
form.     There  is  a  host  of  so-called  learned  men  (in 
the  Mussulman  sense) here;  Mullahs  and  Medressehs 
are  to  be  seen  everywhere,  and  this  is,  perhaps,  the 
chief  reason  of  the  complete  stagnation  in  the  life  of 
the  people.    What  am  I  to  tell  you  of  our  situation  ? 
They  give  us  food  and  drink,  and  we  walk  about  the 
town  in  our   own   costumes,   yet,  while  we  are  not 
unfrequently  called  dogs  by  the  boys  in  the  streets, 
we  are  comparatively  better  off  than  was  Butenef  s 
Mission.     The  other  day  the  Ameer  diverted  us  with 
his  troop  of  eight  musicians  and  with  several  actors, 
who  performed  some  of  the  impossible  feats  which 
are  to  be  held  in  our  Easter  holiday  barns.     It  is 
said  that  the  principal  performer  is  a  fugitive  Tartar 
from  Kazan,  that  he  had  the  felicity  to  make  his  first 
performance  before  the  Ameer,  and  that,  although  he 
was  rewarded  for  it  with  seventy-five  blows  with  a 
stick  on  the  soles  of  his  feet,  he  was  nevertheless 
attached  to  the  Court.  The  servants  of  the  Governor- 
General  of  Bokhara  committed  themselves  in  some 
way  or  other,  and  they  all  had  their  throats   cut ; 
the  Governor-General  himself  was  deprived  of  all  his 


IGNATIEFF'S  MISSION  TO  KHIVA,  ETC.       209 

property,  which  was  sold  by  auction  ;  he  himself  was 
treated    to    forty  blows   with   a  stick  and   put  into 
prison.     In  all  probability  his  head  will  be  shortly 
chopped    off.     This  is  the  kind  of  justice  which  is 
administered  here.       How  can  one  discuss  here  on 
international    law,   on  the  power   and    greatness   of 
Russia,  on  the  development  of  trade  ?     To  begin 
with,   everything  must    be  done  here  by   means  of 
sheer  force,   and  we   do  not  yet  wield  that ;    with 
simple    phrases   we    shall    not   get   very  far.    .    .    . 
Colonel  Ignatieff  is  cheerful  and  contented  ;   he  has 
obtained  all  he  wanted  from  the  Ameer,  and,  perhaps, 
more  than  he  expected.     The  rest  is  the  business  of 
the  Government." 

Colonel  Ignatieff  started,  like  Bekovitch,  in  the 
hot  weather,  and  came  back,  like  Perofski,  in  the 
cold.  He  went  through  many  hardships,  encountered 
many  dangers,  reached  both  the  distant  points  for 
which  he  had  started,  and,  after  a  narrow  escape  of 
being  frozen  to  death,  returned  in  safety  to  Oren- 
burg. 

"  December,"    says  the   official  narrative,  "  set  in 

with  a  terrible  snow-storm.       The  snow-fall   became 

heavy,  and  the  north  wind  swept  over  the  steppe  with 

all  its  fury.     Colonel  Ignatieff  was  dragging  slowly 

P 


210        RUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

along  towards  Uralsk  Fort  with  a  couple  of  camels, 

and  his  guides  informed  him  one  night  that  they  had 

lost  the  track,  and  had  strayed  to  some  inlet  of  the 

Aral    sea ;  telling  him   that  shaitan  himself    could 

not  find  any  road  in  such  weather,  they  left  him  and 

disappeared  in  the  snowy  maze.     The  storm  became 

more  and  more  severe,  and  the  cold  increased  to  20° 

Reaumur  (13°  below  zero  Fahrenheit),  with  a  piercing 

wind.     The  Agent's  servants  were  freezing.      They 

moaned  in  their  distress,  but  there  was  no  means  of 

rendering  assistance  to  them.     Towards  the  evening 

the  cold  was  still  greater.    Colonel  Ignatieff  and  the 

officers  with  him  perceived  with  terror  that  the  frost 

was  seizing  upon  them.    After  fulfilling  with  success 

an  important  commission,  after  suffering  every  kind  of 

hardship  and  privation,  they  were  about  to  freeze  to 

death  in  the  steppe,  to  perish  at  the  very  threshold 

of   their  home,  without  being  able  to  make  an  effort 

to  save  themselves."     It  must  have  been  a  prayer 

uttered  somewhere  for  them  that  in  the  end  saved 

them  ;  for  the  guides,  remembering  them,  returned, 

and  with  fresh  camels.     The  servants  rubbed   their 

frozen  faces  and  hands  with  snow,  while  the  Agent 

and  his  companion  jostled  each  other  all   night  to 

keep  up  the  circulation.      We  mention  this  in  order 


IGNATIEFF'S  MISSION  TO  KHIVA,  ETC.      211 

to  show  what  travelling  or  campaigning  in  Asia 
involves,  and  what  stamina,  manhood,  and  health 
are  necessary  for  service  in  the  steppes.  The  further 
progress  of  the  agent,  as  well  as  the  march  of  the 
men  behind  him,  were  performed  under  still  more 
trying  circumstances  on  account  of  the  great  depth 
of  snow.  The  storm  pursued  them  all  the  way  to 
Orenburg,  where  the  Agent  arrived  on  the  night  of 
the  fourth  of  December,  the  convoy  of  the  Mission 
marching  in  at  the  beginning  of  February.  The 
journey  was  begun  in  a  temperature  of  30  or  35°  R. 
of  heat,  and  was  ended  in  35°  R,  of  frost,  with  con- 
stant snow-drifts. 

Ignatieff's  mission  might  also  be  regarded  as  a 
miHtary  reconnoissance.  He  made  the  expedition 
under  conditions  which  were  in  many  respects  new ; 
and  the  information  he  brought  back  as  to  routes, 
distances,  state  of  the  country,  disposition  of  the 
tribes,  and  so  on,  must  have  been  of  great  service  to 
General  Kauffman  when  the  time  came  for  that  Com- 
mander to  organize  the  expedition  which  ended  in 
the  subjection  of  Khiva  and  its  virtual  annexation  to 
the  Russian  dominions. 


CHAPTER   X. 

KAUFFMANN'S    expedition   to    KHIVA. 

When  the  expedition  of  Prince  Bekovitch  Tcher- 
kaski  was  despatched  to  Khiva  by  Peter  the  Great ; 
when  Orloff,  at  the  orders  of  the  Emperor  Paul, 
marched  cowards  Khiva,  with  intentions  to  continue 
his  course  through  Bokhara  to  India  ;  when  Mou- 
ravieff  was  sent  on  a  mission  to  Khiva  under  the 
Emperor  Alexander  I.  in  1822 — the  ultimate  and 
avowed  object  was  in  each  case  either  to  reach  or,  as 
Mouravieff  put  it,  to  "  shake  "  India.  Even  in  1839, 
when  General  Perofski  undertook  operations  against 
Khiva,  the  object  of  the  invasion,  as  aftenvards  set 
forth  by  its  appointed  historian,  was  to  weaken  the 
influence  and  counteract  the  designs  of  the  East 
India  Company.  Five  years  afterwards,  when  in 
1844  the  Emperor  Nicholas  was  endeavouring  in 
London   to   establish   a  complete  understanding  be- 


KAUFFM ANN'S  EXPEDITION  TO  KHIVA.      213 

tween  Russia  and  England,  the  importance  to  Eng- 
land that  Khiva,  Bokhara  and  Kokhand  should  be 
allowed  to  retain  their  independence  was  fully  re- 
cognized on  the  part  of  Czar.  But  when,  a  dozen 
years  ago,  the  time,  not  merely  for  attacking  Khiva, 
but  for  taking  it,  had  arrived,  the  new  expedition 
possessed,  we  were  assured,  no  significance  what- 
ever in  connection  with  India  ! 

As,  however,  Russia's  unsuccessful  expeditions 
against  Khiva  have  been  related  at  length,  it  may 
be  as  well  to  co  mplete  the  history  by  giving  a  brief 
account  of  the  expedition  which  in  the  year  1873 
was  attended  with  perfect  success.  This  account 
will  be  borrowed  in  much  abridged  form  from  the 
narrative  published  by  Lieutenant  Stumm,  who  ac- 
companied one  of  the  columns  of  the  expeditionary 
force  as  Prussian  Commissioner.* 

In  the  year  1872  the  Russian  Government  deter- 
mined to  send  another  expedition  to  Khiva ;  and  the 
question  as  to  the  best  mode  of  conducting  it 
occupied  the  attention  of  both  Adjutant-General  von 
Kauffmann  and  Adjutant-General  Krijanoffsky.  The 
reasons  for  this  step,  as    officially  proclaimed,  were 

*  "  Russia's  Advance  Eastward."  Containing  the  despatches  (translated)  of 
the  German  Military  Commissioner,  Hugo  Stumm,  and  other  information  on 
the  subject.— -By  C.  E.   H.   Vincent. 


214        BUSSIAN-  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

the  acts  of  hostility  committed  by  the  Khan  upon  the 
subjects  of  Russia,  which  called  for  punishment  on 
the  part  of  the  Czar.  In  1871,  Colonel  Markosoff 
of  the  Krasnovodsk  detachment  had  set  out  with  a 
force  in  the  view  of  opening  up  a  route  to  Khiva. 
On  the  way  he  had  been  attacked  by  500  Khivan 
horsemen,  who  captured  some  150  of  his  camels  at 
a  point  where  the  sandy  nature  of  the  ground  made 
it  impossible  for  the  Russian  cavalry  to  fight  with 
any  effect.  Soon  afterwards,  at  the  persuasion  of 
the  Khan,  a  body  of  about  300  Tekkes  endeavoured 
to  take  the  rest  of  the  camels  and  thus  oblige  the 
Russians  to  retreat.  An  engagement  took  place  in 
which  the  enemy,  who  took  to  flight,  lost  23  men  and 
the  Russians  two.  Written  apologies  were  soon 
afterwards  brought  to  the  expedition  from  the  Khan 
himself,  who  pleaded  that  the  Russian  troops  had 
been  mistaken  for  Persians.  The  professions  of 
goodwill  made  by  the  Khivan  monarch  had,  however, 
no  effect  on  the  Russian  Government,  which  was  in- 
formed of  all  that  had  occurred.  The  Khan  un- 
doubtedly possessed  great  influence  over  the  sur- 
rounding nations,  and  the  roving  tribes  of  the 
steppes ;  and  this  influence  was  always  exerted 
against  the  interests  of  Russia.     Russian  authorities 


KAUFFMANN'S  EXPEDITION  TO  KHIVA.      215 

agreed  in  regarding  Khiva  as  the  source  of  the 
hostility  which  had  so  long  hindered  the  execution  of 
their  eastern  projects. 

But  the  Khan  of  Khiva  was  most  anxious  to  con- 
vince Russia  of  his  friendly  disposition ;  and  he 
accordingly  despatched  an  embassy  to  the  Emperor 
bearing  a  letter  in  which  he  declared  that  in  spite  of 
appearances  to  the  contrary  he  had  always  been 
actuated  towards  Russia  by  feelings  of  friendship 
and  love ;  offering  to  give  up  the  Russian  prisoners 
in  his  power  if  a  treaty  were  signed  between  the  two 
Powers  that  each  should  be  content  with  its  existing 
frontiers.  "But  if,"  continued  the  Khan,  "you 
make  these  captives  a  pretext  for  hostilities  against 
us  in  order  to  extend  your  dominion,  a  decree  will 
descend  from  Providence  whose  purposes  we  cannot 
alter." 

No  attention,  however,  was  paid  to  the  Khan's 
assurances ;  and  the  Khivan  envoys  were  told  by 
the  Russian  officials  who  received  them  that  they 
could  not  have  access  to  the  Emperor  until  all  the 
Russian  captives  in  Khivan  territory  had  been  re- 
leased, and  the  Khan  had  satisfactorily  explained  in 
writing  his  insolent  treatment  of  the  two  friendly 
Missions   which  had  been  despatched    by    General 


216         RUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

Kauffmann.  The  Khan,  on  learning  this  decision, 
repHed  that  he  could  say  nothing  further  before 
receiving  an  answer  to  the  questions  he  had  put  in 
his  communication  to  the  Emperor.  Consequently 
negotiations  fell  through. 

The  Khan  now  sought  in  various  quarters  pro- 
tection against  Russia,  who  alarmed  him  from  time 
to  time  by  sending  reconnoitring  parties  towards 
his  dominions.  He  despatched  ambassadors  to 
England,  India,  and  Turkey,  praying  assistance  in 
case  of  need.  "  The  matter,"  says  Lieut.  Stumm, 
"  was  one  in  which  England  could  hardly  act  in  total 
disregard  of  Russia  ;  and  in  the  end  an  agreement 
was  come  to  between  the  two  great  Powers  by  which 
Russia  recognised  the  right  of  the  Ameer  of  Cabul 
to  the  provinces  between  the  Hindu-Kush  and  the 
Oxus,  known  as  Afghan  Turkestan  (on  which 
Russia's  feudatory,  the  Khan  of  Bokhara,  had 
claims),  and  on  the  other  hand  was  allowed  free 
action  by  England  as  far  as  the  Afghan  border." 

Meanwhile  the  Khan  gave  "  repeated  indications  of 
his  ill-will  towards  the  Emperor;"  and  early  in  1872 
an  expedition  to  Khiva  was,  as  before  mentioned, 
firmly  resolved  upon.  Before  the  necessary  pre- 
parations   were    commenced,     Colonel     Markosoff, 


KAUFFMANN'S  EXPEDITION  TO  KHIVA.      217 

was  instructed  to  make  reconnoissances  towards 
the  Khanate  ;  and  these  were  not  completed 
until  the  end  of  the  year.  Then  a  conference  of 
high  officials  was  held  at  St.  Petersburg  to  decide 
as  to  the  best  means  of  conducting  operations.  It 
was  determined  that  forces  should  start  from  three 
points  :  the  Caucasus,  Orenburg,  and  Turkestan. 
Preparations  were  now  at  once  set  on  foot,  to  be 
completed  by  March,  1873.  The  mode  of  opera- 
tion decided  upon  was  as  follows  : — 

"  The  proposed  attack  to  be  made  from  two  sides, 
from  the  east  by  the  forces  from  the  Turkestan  dis- 
trict, and  from  the  west  by  those  from  the  Orenburg 
and  Caucasus  districts  together.  The  destination  of 
the  expedition  to  be  the  capital  of  the  Khanate;  the 
punishment  of  which,  and  the  dispersion  of  the  Khivan 
troops,  to  be  the  first  care  of  the  Russians. 

"  The  column  from  Tashkend  to  be  commanded 
by  Adjutant-General  von  Kauffmann,  commanding 
the  Turkestan  district,  and  to  be  made  up  of  eleven 
companies  of  infantry,  200  sappers,  550  Cossacks, 
14  guns  and  a  rocket  detachment.  The  column 
to  proceed  by  way  of  Djisak,  on  the  road  running 
along  the  Bokharian  frontier  to  Temer-koudour, 
Tamol,    and    Elden-Ata,    to    join    another     column 


218         BUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA, 

from  the  Turkestan  district,  consisting  of  nine 
companies  of  infantry,  150  Cossacks,  a  rocket 
detachment,  and  a  detachment  of  mountain  artillery, 
somewhere  near  Daou-Kara,  or  Min-Boulak,  which- 
ever may  be  most  convenient.  The  entire  strength 
of  the  united  Turkestan  columns  will  then  amount 
to  20  companies,  each  about  140  strong,  with 
12  to  14  non-commissioned  officers,  and  11  non- 
combatants  ;  or  2,800  infantry,  700  Cossacks,  and  18 
guns.  The  whole  force  then  to  proceed  directly 
towards  Khiva,  crossing  the  Amu-Daria  above  Min 
Boulak,  where  it  will  join  the  columns  from  Orenburg 
and  the  Caucasus,  who  ought  by  that  time  (begin- 
ning of  May)  to  reach  the  left  bank  of  the  Amu- 
Daria.  Adjutant-General  von  Kauffmann  will  then 
take  the  supreme  command. 

"  The  Orenburg  column,  made  up  of  companies 
of  Infantry  (five  of  the  2nd  Orenburg  line  battalion, 
and  four  of  the  ist),  600  Orenburg  and  300  Ural 
Cossacks,  six  guns  of  Cossack  Horse  Artillery,  six 
rocket  parties,  and  six  mortars,  to  concentrate  at  a 
spot  on  the  Emba  under  Lieut. -General  Vereffkin, 
Then  to  march  by  way  of  Karatamak  along  the 
western  coast  of  the  Aral  to  Kasarm  and  Ourg, 
where   it   will  join  the  column  from  the  Caucasus. 


KAUFFMANN'S  EXPEDITION  TO  Kill V A.      219 

General  Verffkin  then  taking  the  command,  will,  if 
possible,  aid  the  Turkestan  column  in  crossing  the 
Oxus." 

Much  activity  was  displayed  in  getting  everything 
ready  for  the  various  columns.  Great  difficulties 
were  experienced  by  some  of  the  contingents  on  the 
march  to  their  respective  rendezvous  whence  the 
columns  were  to  start.  Thus  the  4th  Turkestan 
Rifle  Battalion,  stationed  at  Orenburg  when  orders 
arrived  for  it  to  form  part  of  the  Tashkend  column  at 
Kazalinsk,  was  severely  tried  on  its  way  to  the  place 
of  assembly ;  although  nothing  had  been  omitted 
which  could  facilitate  the  march.  Well  provided  with 
sledges,  the  first  detachment  set  out  on  the  ist  of 
February,  followed  by  the  other  three  on  the  3rd,  5th, 
and  7th  respectively.  The  daily  stage  was  40  miles, 
and  at  each  station  a  relay  of  horses  was  in  readiness. 
After  passing  Orsk,  however,  the  men  proceeded  on 
foot,  because  of  the  excessive  cold,  which  on  horse- 
back was  unbearable  ;  and  for  three  or  four  days 
violent  storms  accompanied  them.  They  showed 
great  perseverance  throughout  the  trying  time,  and  at 
length,  on  the  2nd  of  March,  reached  Kazalinsk,  with 
only  three  cases  of  sickness,  and  after  having  travelled 
a  distance  of  670  miles  across  the  steppes  in  the  depth 


220        EUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 


of  winter — a  feat  which,  according  to  a  writer  on  the 
subject,  "  proves  that  Russian  soldiers  may  overcome 
the  utmost  difficulties,  and  surmount  every  possible 
impediment." 

The  constituent  parts  of  the  Orenburg  column, 
too,  were  put  to  rather  a  severe  test  in  their  march 
to  the  appointed  place  of  assembly  on  the  Emba. 
The  first  Orenburg  line  battalion,  split  up  into  four 
companies,  proceeded  from  that  town  by  Iletzk  and 
Ak-Toub,  while  two  sotnias  of  Cossacks  went  along 
the  river  Xobd ;  and  on  March  8th  the  2nd  Orenburg 
line  battalion,  composed  of  five  companies,  with  four 
sotnias  of  Cossacks,  left  Orsk  for  the  rendezvous. 

The  daily  stage  was  27  miles,  and  at  night  the 
men  slept  in  the  Kirghiz  waggons  accompanying  the 
various  companies.  The  temperature  was  made 
tolerable  by  camel  dung  fires  which  were  kept  up 
throughout  the  night,  and  a  snow  rampart  raised 
round  each  waggon  served  as  shelter  from  the 
piercing  winds.  Through  frosts,  snows  and  gales 
progress  was  steadily  made,  and  the  whole  force  had 
at  length  arrived  safely  at  the  Emba  Post,  only  45 
men  being  on  the  sick  list. 

Information  had  meanwhile  come  to  hand  that 
Kaphar-Karadjigetoff,  a  Mangishlak  chief,  was  stay- 


KAUFFM ANN'S  EXPEDITION  TO  KIIIVA.      221 

ing  at  Khiva  as  the  guest  of  the  Khan,  who  intended^ 
with  his  aid,   to  incite  the  whole  Mangishlak  Penin- 
sula agfainst  Russia.      A  short  time  before   Kaphar 
had  assured  the  Kirghizes  that  the  Russians  intended 
to  requisition  a  large  portion  of  their  cattle,  and  had 
advised  them,    as    their   only    means  of    safety,    to 
emigrate  to  Khiva,  where  protection  would  be  found. 
This  counsel  had  been  accompanied  with  a  threat  that 
if  they  did  not  act  upon  it  he   (the  Kaphar)   would 
himself   put    them     to    the    sword.       Terrified,    the 
Kirghizes  had  hastily  commenced  to  shift  with  their 
cattle;  and  it  was  now  Russia's  interest  to  prevent 
the  exodus  and  keep  the  commotion  from  spreading. 
Apprised  of  events,  Colonel  Lamakin,  who  was  recon- 
noitring from   Fort   Alexander,    at    once    made    for 
Bouzach,  where  the    emigrants   were   said   to  have 
halted.      At   the    Kara-Kech    Gulf    he    overtook   a 
number  of  nomadic   tribes  with  some  10,000   head 
of  cattle    on    their  way    to    the    Ust-Urt.      Colonel 
Lamakin  endeavoured  to  calm  their  fears  and  to  per- 
suade them  to  return  ;   but  the  incredulous  Kirghizes 
suddenly    attacked    the    Cossacks  with    lance   and 
axe.      The  latter,  however,  although  greatly  inferior 
in    numbers,    quickly    beat    them    off,    and    Colonel 
Lamakin    marched   on   to   Bouzach,  where   he   was 


222        BUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 


joined  by  a  sotnia  of  cavalry  from  another  regiment. 
Recent  occurrences  proved  beyond  doubt  the  evil 
influence  exerted  by  the  Khan  of  Khiva  against 
Russia,  In  spite  of  all  the  measures  taken  by  the 
local  administration,  the  Kirghizes  scarcely  ever 
failed  to  be  affected  by  the  counsels  which  came 
from  Khiva.  The  Khan's  hostility  would  doubt- 
less, too,  find  expression  through  the  plundering 
hordes  from  the  Ust-Urt,  who,  in  their  turn,  might, 
unless  great  precautions  were  taken  by  Russia,  stir 
up  the  Kirghizes  to  the  Khivan  monarch's  entire 
satisfaction.  It  was  resolved,  therefore,  to  station 
columns  of  observation  between  the  Caspian  and  the 
sea  of  Aral.  A  body  of  150  Cossacks  went  from 
the  steppe  forts  to  take  up  its  position  with  a  few 
companies  of  infantry,  at  Sam,  the  most  suitable 
point  for  observations  and  for  securing  communica- 
tions between  General  Vereffkin's  column  and  the 
army  of  the  Caucasus  ;  one  sotnia  took  up  its 
position  at  Djebisk  to  keep  off  the  hordes  from  the 
Orsk-Kazalin  tract ;  and  one  sotnia  watched  the 
Mogodjarsk  mountains   and  watercourses. 

The  conduct  of  the  entire  expedition  was,  as  before 
mentioned,  placed  in  the  hands  of  General  Kauffmann, 
who    intended    to    approach    the    Khanate   on   the 


KAUFFMANN'S  EXPEDITION  TO  Kill V A.      223 

northern  side,  taking  care  in  the  first  place  to 
assure  himself  as  to  the  tranquillity  of  Bokhara  and 
other  towns  whose  attitude  towards  Russia  was 
doubtful.  The  General  attached  himself  to  one  of 
the  Turkestan  columns,  that  which  was  divided 
into  two  detachments,  the  first  composed  of 
twelve  companies  of  infantry,  fourteen  breech- 
loading  guns,  two  mortars,  one  rocket,  five  sotnias 
of  Cossacks,  and  6,700  camels;  the  second  of 
eight  companies  of  infantry,  two  old  ten-pounder 
cannon,  four  rifled  guns,  two  mitrailleuses,  one 
rocket  division,  two  sotnias  of  Cossacks,  and  2,800 
camels.  The  other  Turkestan  column  from  Tash- 
kend,  called  the  Krasnovdsk,  was  commanded  by 
Colonel  Markosoff.  It  comprised  eight  companies 
of  infantry,  four  sotnias  of  Cossacks,  four  3-pounder 
guns  drawn  by  horses,  four  4-pounders  drawn  by 
horses,  eight  3-pounders  carried  by  camels,  and 
3,000  camels.  The  Orenburg  column,  under  Lieut. - 
General  Vereffkin,  was  made  up  of  nine  companies 
of  infantry,  nine  sotnias  of  Ural  and  Orenburg 
Cossacks,  eight  field  pieces,  four  mortars,  six  rocket 
detachments,  and  500  camels.  Finally,  the  Kinderli 
column,  made  up  of  troops  from  the  Caucasus,  com- 
manded  by    Colonel   Lamakin,   of  which   a  portion 


224        HUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

were  to  be  employed  in  establishing  and  protecting 
the  communications,  consisted  of  twelve  companies 
of  infantry,  one  sotnia  of  Cossacks,  two  sotnias  of 
Tartars,  ten  guns  of  various  kinds,  one  rocket 
division,  and  1,300  camels.  Thus  the  total  force  at 
the  disposal  of  General  Kauffmann  was  53  companies 
of  infantry,  25  sotnias  of  Cossacks,  54  guns,  six 
mortars,  two  mitrailleuses,  five  rocket  divisions, 
19,200  camels. 

Upon  being  informed  of  all  the  preparations  which 
had  been  going  on,  the  Khan  of  Khiva  was  in  great 
alarm.  He  sent  his  Russian  captives  to  the  Kaza- 
linsk  column  and  implored  that  negotiations  might 
be  opened,  declaring  that  he  desired  to  live  at  peace 
with  Russia.  But  the  commanders  of  the  several 
columns  had  been  specially  instructed  on  no  account 
to  treat  with  the  Khivan  monarch.  General  Vereff- 
kin's  column  departed  from  Kungrad  and  marched  in  a 
southerly  direction,  having  the  day  previous  sent  on  an 
advance  guard  under  Colonel  Leontscheff.  At  about 
4  a.m.  a  large  party  of  Khivan s  swept  down  upon 
the  Colonel's  force,  but  were  repulsed  with  the  loss 
of  several  killed.  General  Vereffkin  saw  nothing  of  the 
enemy  either  on  the  24th  or  25th  of  May,  and  con- 
sequently continued  his  progress  southward,  leaving 


KAUFFMANN'S  EXPEDITION  TO  KHIVA.      225 

Colonel  Lamakin  behind  to  await  a  detachment  of 
his  column  which  had  not  yet  arrived.  When  this 
had  come  up  he  was  to  follow  after  and  overtake  the 
General,  so  that  a  united  attack  might  be  made  on 
the  fortified  town  of  Khodjeili.  Every  precaution 
was  taken  to  prevent  a  surprise,  for  there  could  be 
no  doubt  that  the  Khivan  cavalry  was  hovering 
about  ready  to  snatch  the  slightest  opportunity.  At 
5  a.m.  on  the  28th  the  march  was  continued  towards 
Kara-Baili.  At  noon  Colonel  Leontscheff's  troops 
halted  by  the  side  of  the  stream  to  breakfast  ;  but 
before  cooking  operations  were  commenced  firing 
was  heard  about  a  mile  distant.  Information  soon 
arrived  that  an  officer  of  the  topographical  depart- 
ment, reconnoitring  with  half-a-dozen  Cossacks,  had 
been  borne  down  upon  by  a  very  numerous  body  of 
the  enemy.  On  reaching  the  scene  of  the  attack 
with  two  sotnias  of  men,  Colonel  Leontscheff  found 
that  after  killing  one  Cossack,  wounding  two  others, 
and  capturing  several  horses,  the  Kirghizes,  as  they 
proved  to  be,  had  made  off.  Chase  was  at  once 
given  ;  but  after  going  some  five  miles  over  boggy 
ground  covered  with  reeds  higher  than  the  horse- 
men's heads,  the  pursuit  was  given  up,  none  of  the 
foe  having  been  overtaken.     The  fruitless  result  was 

9 


226  EUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

shortly  explained.  The  fugitives  had  taken  another 
direction,  and  next  attacked  the  Russian  rear-guard. 
Colonel  Leontscheff  again  went  to  give  assistance, 
and  this  time  drove  the  enemy  to  bay  at  a  dense  forest 
some  distance  off.  Many  of  the  Kirghizes  were 
killed,  and  a  considerable  number  of  those  who 
escaped  lost  their  horses.  A  Kirghiz,  who  had 
been  made  prisoner,  gave  information  about  the  two 
late  attacks.  They  had  been  made  by  the  same 
party  of  between  400  and  500  men,  detached  from 
an  army  6,000  strong,  sent  by  the  Khan,  under  the 
command  of  his  brother  to  defend  Khodjeili.  It 
was  made  up  principally  of  cavalry,  and  lay  in  wait 
north  of  the  town.  The  Khan  had  no  knowledge  of 
the  columns  advancing  under  Kauffmann  and  Mar- 
kosoff ;  but  he  was  determined  in  any  case  to  hold 
out  to  the  last. 

A  large  fortified  Khivan  camp  was  now  discovered 
on  an  arm  of  the  Oxus.  It  was  875  paces  long  and 
450  broad,  surrounded  by  a  deep  ditch,  with  a  rampart 
seven  feet  high,  and  generally  well-constructed. 
It  had  been  abandoned  on  the  morning  of  the 
same  day  (26th  May),  and  consequently  the  enemy 
could  not  be  far  off.  In  the  evening  Colonel  Lamakin 
came  up   with  his  column,  and  joined  it  to  that  of 


KAUFFMANN'S  EXPEDITION  TO  KHIVA.       227 

General  Vereffkin.  He  had  seen  nothing  of  the 
enemy.  Nothing  occurred  during  the  night.  Early 
on  the  27th  the  advance  was  continued.  Soon  after 
the  start  information  arrived  that  a  large  body  of 
troops,  made  up  of  infantry,  cavalry,  and  artillery, 
awaited  the  invaders  before  Khodjeili  ;  that  the  town 
itself  was  fortified  ;  and,  in  short,  that  everything 
was  ready  to  resist  the   Russian  attack. 

The  order  in  which  the  entire  column  marched 
was  as  follows  : — The  Orenburg  force  kept  on  the 
left,  that  from  the  Caucasus  on  the  right  of  the  road, 
while  General  Vereffkin,  with  his  staff,  led  the  van. 
Just  behind  him  were  three  guns.  The  camels  and  bag- 
gage were  protected  by  the  rear  guard,  consisting  of 
two  companies  of  infantry,  two  sotnias  of  Cossacks, 
and  two  field  guns.  At  about  10  o'clock  a  part  of  the 
enemy's  forces  was  espied  on  the  other  side  of  the 
river,  with  a  number  of  boats.  On  the  approach  of 
the  Russian  artillery,  a  deputation  was  sent  by  the 
Khivans,  who  offered  to  surrender  with  their  pro- 
visions and  boats ;  but  meanwhile  they  got  away 
with  their  belongings  before  the  column  came  within 
gun-shot. 

A  quarter  of  an  hour  afterwards  the  enemy  was 
observed  proceeding  eastward  along  the  Oxus.  After 


228         RUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

moving  some  distance  they  stopped,  as  though 
awaiting  the  Russian  advance.  The  Russian  cavalry 
was  sent  forward  at  1 1  a.m.,  with  two  rocket  detach- 
ments, who  fired  ten  rounds,  with  some  success,  on 
the  Khivans,  the  latter  retiring  so  quickly  that  the 
Cossacks  could  not  come  to  close  quarters.  Now 
the  column  went  on  without  the  least  show  of  oppo- 
sition. But  what  had  already  taken  place  proved 
that  the  Khivans,  instead  of  being  content  to  wait 
until  the  Russians  reached  Khiva,  and  then  fight 
behind  entrenchments,  had  resolved  to  do  all  in  their 
power  to  hinder  the  march.  Consequently,  General 
Vereffkin  issued  the  following  order  to  his  officers  : — 
"  The  right  column  will  be  led  by  the  Caucasus 
cavalry  to  the  westward  of  the  Khodjeili  road,  ac- 
companied by  two  rocket  detachments  and  a  sotnia 
of  Ural  Cossacks.  Col.  Lamakin  with  his  staff  and 
the  rest  of  his  column  will  follow.  The  left  wing 
will  be  composed  of  troops  commanded  by  Col. 
Leontscheff.  The  head-quarter  staff,  escorted  by 
the  remainder  of  the  Orenburg  Cossacks,  will  march 
in  the  centre  along  the  bank  of  the  Amu.  The 
Cossack  horse  artillery,  with  four  guns,  will  remain 
in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  the  head-quarter  staffs, 
and  behind  the  same  the  infantry  of  the  Orenburg 


KAVFFMANN'S  EXPEDITION  TO  KHIVA.      229 

column  will  march  to  the  eastward  of  the  Khodjeili 
road.  The  train  and  the  camels  will  bring  up  the 
rear,  escorted  by  two  companies  of  infantry,  two 
sotnias  of  Cossacks,  and  two  field  guns."  * 

Towards  noon  the  enemy  was  observed  to  advance 
in  line ;  but  when  about  2,500  yards  off,  retired 
slowly  towards  the  town  of  Khodjeili.  A  squadron 
of  the  Russian  right  wing  charged  with  success  some 
skirmishers  on  the  left  of  the  Khivan  line,  and  a  few 
shells  were  fired  from  the  centre  battery.  These 
prevented  the  Khivans  from  turning  face,  and  they 
retired  to  the  east  and  west  of  the  town.  At  about 
half-past  two  the  advance  was  continued,  Lamakin 
and  Leontscheff  both  attacking  from  their  respective 
positions.  In  an  hour  and  a  half  the  suburbs  were 
reached,  and  skirmishing  co  mpanies  sent  forward  from 
each  of  the  detachments.  A  numerous  deputation, 
selected  from  among  the  elders  of  the  town,  came 
towards  the  staff  when  the  Russians  were  about  500 
paces  off  the  gates,  saying  it  was  desired  to  capitu- 
late, and  imploring  that  mercy  might  be  shown.  The 
Khivan  troops  had  evacuated  the  place,  and  its  in- 
habitants now  came  forward  and  stood  bareheaded 
outside  the  walls.     At  the  same  time,  a  Kirghiz  was 

*  Translated  by  C.  E.  Howard  Vincent,   in  "  Russia's  Advance  Eastward." 


230         BUS  SI  AS  PROJECTS  AGAIS'ST  IXDIA. 

given  up  whom  General  Kauftmann  had  sent  on  a 
month  before  wiih  despatches,  but  who  had  been 
made  prisoner  and  maltreated  by  the  Khan. 

A:  5  o'clock  the  Russians  passed  through  the 
town  of  KhodjeiH,  and  took  up  a  position  three- 
quaners  of  a  mile  distant  to  the  south.  Repre- 
sentatives from  several  Kirghiz  tribes  now  came 
into  the  camp,  complaining  of  the  treatment  they 
had  received  a:  the  Khan's  hands,  and  asking  that 
they  might  be  looked  upon  as  Russian  subjects. 
Meanwhile,  no  information  had  reached  General 
Vereftkin  concerning  the  columns  under  General 
Kauffmann  and  Colonel  Markosoff. 

On  the  30th  of  May  the  camp  was  shifted  from 
Khodjeili  to  a  wood  ten  miles  nearer  the  Khanate. 
Early  the  next  morning  an  attack  was  made  on  the 
outposts  by  a  large  body  of  Yomuds  ;  but  they 
retreated  after  a  few  shells  had  been  fired,  followed 
by  two  sotnias  of  Cossacks.  The  latter  when  they 
returned,  after  giving  over  the  pursuit,  reported  that 
the  Sausan  canal,  on  the  way  to  Mangit,  was 
swollen,  and  impassable  for  the  infantr}-.  An 
engineer  detachment  was  thereupon  sent  forward 
with  casks  and  other  materials  for  constructing  a 
bridge   across.     On   arriving   at  the   canal,  the  de- 


i 


EAUFFMAXXS  EXPEDITIOX  TO  KHIVA.       231 

tachment  was  fired  upon  heavily  from  the  under- 
wood on  the  opposite  bank  ;  but  the  cavalry  swam 
over  to  the  other  side,  drove  the  enemy  away,  and 
then  returned  to  protect  the  workmen  while  engaged 
in  making  the  bridge,  which  was  soon  completed. 
The  entire  forces  passed  over  at  830  a.m.,  and 
encamped  on  the  Oxus.  The  river  here  was  three- 
quarters  of  a  mile  wide. 

According  to  information  brought  by  Russian 
spies,  the  Khivans  intended  to  make  a  severe  attack 
during  the  night ;  but  nothing  at  all  occurred.  Next 
morning  two  shells  fired  from  a  great  distance  by 
the  Khivans  fell  into  the  river  near  the  camp.  It 
was  now  reported  that  a  large  body  of  cavalr}'  and 
infantr}'  had  taken  up  their  position  on  a  hill  near 
the  road  to  Mangit,  and  purposed  to  prevent,  if 
possible,  anv  further  advance.  The  to"«Ti  of  ]\Iangit, 
too,  was  well-fortified  and  garrisoned. 

Careful  arrangements  were  made  in  view  of  such 
an  engagement ;  and  the  column  marched  towards 
Mangit.  A  little  before  seven  o'clock  the  enemy 
was  obser\'ed  at  a  distance  of  about  three-quarters 
of  a  mile  southward,  occupying  a  plain,  covered  with 
high  grass,  and  mounds  near  the  town.  Almost 
immediately   the  Khivan    cavalr}'  galloped  towards 


i 


232         RUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

the  Russians,  as  if  to  attack  the  centre  ;  but  soon 
they  ahered  their  course,  and  went  round  the  flank, 
intending  apparently  to  commence  operations  on  the 
train  and  rear  guard.  In  less  than  a  quarter  of  an 
hour  they  had  formed  an  arc  round  the  column  on 
the  south,  east,  and  north-east.  A  heavy  fire  was  at 
once  begun  by  four  of  the  centre  guns,  while  the 
other  three  were  taken  to  the  left  flank  for  the  same 
purpose.  Nevertheless,  the  enemy  made  repeated 
charges,  and  once  pressed  the  cavalry  under  Leont- 
schefl  so  hard  that  not  until  the  men  got  off  their 
horses  and  fought  on  foot  could  the  Khivans  be 
beaten  off.  Meanwhile  the  foe  had  reached  the  rear 
guard  and  attacked  it  with  fury.  But  the  artillery 
did  much  execution ;  and  the  assailants,  seeing 
that  their  fellows  in  front  were  falling  back,  retired 
towards  the  Mangit  heights  with  considerable  losses. 
A  pursuit  was  now  commenced  ;  but  with  wonderful 
rapidity  the  Khivans  vanished  behind  the  hills.  A 
quarter  of  an  hour  later  they  reappeared,  and  began 
to  form  for  another  onslaught.  This  time  they  did 
not  come  far,  for  the  Russian  skirmishers  had  been 
sent  forward,  and  these,  working  in  co-operation  with 
the  rocket  division  on  the  right  flank,  soon  com- 
pelled them  to  retreat  towards  the  town.      On  their 


KAUFFM ANN'S  EXPEDITION  TO  KHIVA.       233 


way,  however,  the  Khivans  set  fire  to  the  village, 
which  was  with  difficulty  extinguished  ;  and  at  the 
same  time,  by  some  means  or  other,  the  steppe 
behind  the  Russian  forces  caught  fire,  though  fortu- 
nately, thanks  to  a  favourable  wind,  the  latter  confla- 
gration did  not  approach  the  Russians.  The  Russian 
losses  were  one  captain  and  eight  soldiers  killed,  ten 
severely  and  a  large  number  slightly  wounded.  The 
losses  on  the  Khivan  side  were  much  greater.  After 
a  short  rest,  Mangit  was  marched  on  and  occupied 
by  the  column  without  opposition.  It  was  now  about 
three  o'clock  ;  and  an  hour  later  the  column  advanced 
to  a  position  on  the  Arna  canal,  three-quarters  of  a 
mile  southward. 

On  the  2nd  of  June,  after  numerous  minor  engage- 
ments of  no  importance,  the  column  left  Mangit, 
Lieut. -Col.  Skobeleff  having  been  sent  on  ahead  with 
a  body  of  200  men  to  burn  Kutebara,  a  village  whose 
inhabitants  had  taken  a  promnient  part  in  recent 
hostilities  as  well  as  in  the  marauding  excursions  into 
Russian  territory  made  some  time  previously.  After 
continued  skirmishing,  the  Attualick  canal  was 
reached  towards  evening ;  and  here  the  column 
passed  the  night.  Next  morning  the  canal  was 
crossed  by  the  wooden  bridge  stretching  over  at  this 


234         E  US  SI  A  N  PR  OJECTS  A  GAINST  INDIA. 

point,  which  the  Khivans  had  not  had  the  foresight  to- 
destroy.  The  enemy  now  opened  a  heavy  fire  from 
behind,  but  only  succeeded  in  kilHng  a  few  camels. 
Later  in  the  day  a  Khivan  messenger  fell  into  the 
hands  of  some  Cossack  scouts.  He  was  on  his  way 
to  the  enemy's  column,  and  declared,  on  being 
brought  into  the  camp,  that  General  Kauffmann  had 
arrived  at  the  right  bank  of  the  Oxus,  and  was  try- 
ing to  get  his  troops  over  to  the  other  side  of  the 
stream.  The  Khan,  he  said,  looked  for  a  decisive 
battle  on  the  morrow,  when,  under  his  personal  com- 
mand, all  his  forces  would  fight  together.  The  in- 
formation respecting  the  Khan  proved  afterwards  to 
be  false ;  for  during  the  engagement  the  Khivan 
monarch  kept  in  his  harem. 

The  camp  was  pitched  on  the  canal  at  6'45  a.m., 
after  every  precaution  had  been  taken.  The  camels 
and  two  waggon-trains  were  formed  into  a  square 
and  protected  by  a  very  strong  rear  guard.  Soon 
the  enemy  commenced  an  attack,  and  at  first  the 
Russian  position  was  much  endangered  ;  but,  thanks 
chiefly  to  the  infantry,  the  assailants  were  kept  off. 
They  made,  however,  repeated  onslaughts,  and  it 
was  not  until  1 1  a.m.  that  hostilities  had  ceased. 
The  camp  was  now  moved,  and  at  about  four  o'clock 


KAUFFMANN'S  EXPEDITION  TO  KIIIVA.       235 

pitched  a  few  miles  south  of  the  village  of  Udott. 
The  natives  here  came  to  the  Russians,  begging 
protection  against  their  fellow-countrymen,  who, 
they  said,  had  robbed  and  maltreated  them.  They 
further  declared  that  the  Khan's  forces  amounted  to 
about  7,000  men,  whereas  the  day  before  the  Khivan 
army  had  been  represented  by  other  informants  as 
20,000  strong.  The  Khan,  it  seemed  from  these 
fuofitives.  had  grlven  orders  that  efforts  were  above 
all  to  be  made  to  destroy  the  Russian  camel  train, 
in  order  to  prevent  the  invaders  from  reaching  the 
capital. 

A  letter  was  now  received  from  General  Kauff- 
mann,  addressed  to  Colonel  Markosoff,  whose  column 
the  messenger  bearing  it  had  been  unable  to  find. 
The  General  said  in  the  letter  that  he  was  on  the 
right  bank  of  the  Amu,  and  was  preparing  to  cross 
the  stream,  now  much  swollen.  He  hoped  to  arrive 
at  Khiva  on  the  5th  or  6th  of  June,  and  instructed 
Colonel  Markosoff  to  await  his  arrival. 

During  the  afternoon  of  the  6th  the  Khan,  who 
was  in  Khiva  getting  everything  ready  for  the  final 
conflict,  sent  an  envoy  to  General  Vereffkin  pro- 
posing an  armistice.  In  his  letter  the  Khivan 
monarch  invited  the  Russian   Commander  as  guest 


236         RUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

to  his  capital,  declaring  that,  always  cordially 
friendly  disposed  towards  Russia,  he  should  now 
take  the  sincerest  pleasure  in  entertaining  person- 
ages of  such  distinction  from  her  dominions.  He 
wanted  three  or  four  days'  time  to  make  prepara- 
tions for  a  befitting  reception,  and  asserted  that  the 
men  who  had  recently  been  attacking  the  column 
were  Turcoman  robbers  with  whom  he  was  in  no  way 
connected ;  he  regarded  them,  in  fact,  as  his  bitterest 
enemies.  General  Vereffkin  was,  however,  not  to  be 
deceived  by  such  soft  words  as  these.  Probably 
he  remembered  the  end  of  Prince  Bekovitch,  who 
committed  the  fatal  error  of  accepting  an  invitation 
to  dine  with  a  previous  Khan  of  Khiva,  and  thereby 
lost  his  head.  In  any  case,  General  Vereffkin  had  no 
inclination  to  partake  of  the  present  monarch's  hos- 
pitality.    He  made  no  reply  to  the  letter. 

Next  day  the  Russians  had  to  halt  at  a  canal 
where  the  bridge  had  been  burnt  by  the  enemy. 
Here  the  camp  was  pitched,  and  the  construction  of 
another  bridge  commenced.  Colonel  Leontscheff 
was  now  sent  on  with  all  the  cavalry  to  clear  the 
way  in  front.  They  swam  the  river  safely,  and  went 
forward,  returning  towards  evening  with  several  Tur- 
.comans  whom,   with    their   horses,  they  had   found 


KAUFFMANJSrS  EXPEDITION^  TO  KHIVA.      237 

unarmed  and  anxious  to  give  themselves  up  to  the 
Russians,  as  they  were  determined  to  fight  no  more 
for  the  Khan,  who  would  not,  they  said,  give  them 
the  promised  pay.  Colonel  Leontscheff  had  mean- 
while heard  it  confirmed  that  the  Khan  had  retired 
to  the  capital  for  the  final  struggle. 

Passing  on  the  evening  of  June  5th  through  the 
abandoned  town  of  Kyat  Kungrad,  the  Russian 
column  arrived  towards  the  close  of  the  next  day  at 
Kossk-Kupir.  Meanwhile  a  letter  had  been  received 
from  General  Kauffmann,  who  said  that,  after  a 
successful  engagement  with  the  united  Khivan  forces 
and  the  destruction  of  a  battery  on  the  left  bank, 
his  staff  and  six  companies  with  eight  guns  had 
crossed  the  Oxus,  but  that  the  rocket  detachment, 
accompanied  by  five  companies,  had  gone  to  the 
town  of  Schuraschana.  General  von  Kauffmann 
knew,  he  said,  that  General  Vereffkin  had  taken 
Khodjeili  ;  but  beyond  that  had  no  knowledge  of  his 
movements. 

On  June  7th,  Vereffkin's  column  arrived  at  the 
gardens  of  the  Khan's  summer  palace,  within  three 
miles  of  the  northern  gates  of  Khiva.  Two  days 
were  spent  here,  but  in  no  pleasant  manner ;  for 
throughout  the  time  the    Khivans  were  incessantly 


238        BUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

harassing  the  Russians,  and  in  particular  trying  to 
destroy  Skobeleff's  advance  guard,  which  was  at 
times  very  hard  pressed.  The  guns  on  the  walls  of 
the  town  moreover  were  now  used  against  the  in- 
vaders. The  continued  fighting  was  not  without 
fatiguing  effect  on  the  Russian  forces ;  and  the 
anxiety  felt  by  Vereffkin  was  increased  by  the  ignor- 
ance in  which  he  was  kept  concerning  General  von 
Kauffmann.  A  rumour  had,  it  is  true,  arrived  that 
the  General  had  for  want  of  provisions  been  obliged 
to  retire  to  the  Oxus  ;  but  this  by  no  means  tended 
to  improve  the  situation. 

After  careful  consideration,  General  Vereffkin  de- 
cided to  attack  the  capital  without  further  delay,  not 
waiting  for  the  arrival  of  the  Commander-in-Chief. 
Accordingly,  on  the  the  evening  of  June  the  8th, 
arrangements  were  made  for  a  strong  reconnoissance 
on  the  morrow  up  to  the  walls  of  the  town,  in  order 
to  set  batteries  which  were  to  commence  the  bom- 
bardment. 

At  1 1  a.m.  on  the  9th,  a  party  of  400  Cossacks, 
with  a  rocket  section  and  eight  guns,  went  forward, 
accompanied  by  the  staff  with  four  guns.  Skobe- 
leff's advance  posts  were  soon  reached  and  sent  back 
to  protect  the   baggage.     At   i  o'clock  the  enemy 


KAUFFM ANN'S  EXPEDITION  TO  Kill V A.      239 


was  observed  i6o  yards  off  in  the  gardens  of  the 
suburbs,  which  were  apparently  occupied  by  infantry 
drawn  up  in  hne.  When  the  Russian  cavalry  and 
infantry  advanced  the  Khivans  retreated  amid  a 
number  of  shells  which  were  fired  at  them.  A 
quarter  of  a  mile  further  on  a  narrow  defile,  sur- 
rounded by  houses,  canals,  and  walls,  had  to  be 
passed ;  and  here,  under  a  fire  from  the  walls  of  Khiva, 
the  reconnoitring  body  found  itself  in  considerable 
danger.  Promptly,  however,  they  took  shelter  be- 
hind a  wall,  and  when  the  guns  were  brought  up  a 
well-directed  fire  was  opened  upon  the  north  gate. 

The  Caucasus  and  Orenburg  infantry  were  now 
advancing  to  the  right  and  left  of  the  road  preceded 
by  skirmishers,  who  maintained  a  steady  fire.  In 
half  an  hour  a  good  many  of  the  Khivan  guns  had 
been  silenced,  and  the  Russians  marched  forward  to 
a  brick  building  in  front  of  the  canal  bridge  leading 
to  the  town  gate.  A  well-built  barricade  here  hin- 
dered further  progress.  Meanwhile  the  Russian 
battery  was  shifted  to  a  position  on  the  canal  to  the 
left  of  the  road,  about  200  yards  from  the  wall,  and 
at  once  recommenced  firing.  The  Orenburg  in- 
fantry occupied  the  left  canal,  and  three  companies 
of  the  Caucasus  infantry  the  right.     As  soon  as  this 


240        RUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

order  had  been  taken  two  companies  of  the  Samursk 
and  two  of  the  Abscheronsk  regiment,  under  Major 
Bourovzoff,  charged  across  the  bridge,  gained  pos- 
session of  three  of  the  Khivan  guns,  and  took  up  a 
position  50  paces  from  the  gate. 

At  this  juncture  the  city  could,  according  to  Lieut. 
Stumm,  who  saw  all  that  went  on,  have  been 
captured.  But  at  the  last  moment  General  Vereff- 
kin  regretted  the  independent  step  he  had  taken. 
Previously,  not  knowing  anything  certain  concerning 
Kauffmann,  the  Commander-in-Chief,  who,  he  had  re- 
flected might  possibly  be  unable  to  reach  the  capital 
at  all,  he  had  thought  himself  justified  in  acting 
directly  against  Khiva  on  his  own  account ;  more  es- 
pecially as  to  encamp  for  any  length  of  time  within  a 
few  miles  of  the  place,  was  to  remain  exposed  to  the 
attacks  from  the  .  Khivan  troops  without  doing  any- 
thing towards  the  reduction  of  Khiva.  This  seemed 
all  quite  logical ;  and  General  Vereffkin  was  doubt- 
less actuated  solely  by  a  desire  to  do  his  duty  under 
the  circumstances.  But  when  the  time  came  at 
which  he  could  have  made  the  capital  of  the  Khanate 
his  own,  it  occurred  to  him  that  after  all  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief's orders  had  been  to  await  his 
arrival.      Perhaps  he  took  into  account  the  proba- 


KAUFFMANN'S  EXPEDITION  TO  KHIVA.      241 

bility  jealousy  on  the  part  of  Kauffmann,  his  superior. 
However  this  may  be,  he  now,  at  the  critical  point, 
determined  not  to  strike  the  decisive  blow,  but,  re- 
tracing his  steps,  to  do  nothing  more  than  bombard 
until  Kauffmann  came  up. 

To  Lieut. -Col.  Pajoroff's  request  for  ladders,  with 
which,  he  said,  he  could  take  the  town,  Vereffkin 
answered,  "  You  can  have  none,"  merely  adding,  on 
a  protest  from  the  Colonel,  "  We  are  going  back." 
Then  the  four  storming  companies  returned  across 
the  bridge,  after  suffering  a  loss  of  four  killed  and 
22  wounded,  including  a  Lieutenant  and  Major 
Bourovzoff,  wounded  by  three  shots  in  the  arm. 

A  breaching  battery  was  now  employed  against  the 
walls  ;  the  Khivan  shot  meanwhile  faUing  thickly 
amongst  the  Russians.  Shortly  after  2  o'clock 
General  Vereffkin  was  severely  wounded  in  his  right 
eye  and  had  to  entrust  the  command  to  the  chief  of 
his  staff,  Colonel  Sarantschoff.  All  idea  of  direct 
attack  had  been  given  up,  and  the  cavalry  was 
ordered  to  retreat.  When  the  breaching  and  dis- 
mounting batteries  had  been  completed  the  infantry 
protecting  the  work  also  withdrew,  leaving  General 
Skobeleff  with  a  detachment  to  keep  watch  on  the 
town. 

R 


242         BUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 


At  2.30  the  staff  went  back  towards  the  summer 
palace,  arriving  there  an  hour  afterwards.  The 
General's  wound  meanwhile  had  been  attended  to, 
and  the  formation  of  a  field  hospital  begun. 

At  4  p.m.  an  envoy  from  the  Khan,  whose  artillery 
had  ceased  firing,  came  into  the  camp  asking  for 
peace  and  a  cessation  of  the  cannon  fire,  and  saying 
that  within  an  hour  a  plenipotentiary  would  be  sent 
to  agree  on  conditions  of  surrender.  Colonels 
Lamakin  and  Sarantschoff,  who  received  the 
messenger,  informed  him  that  the  Russians  would 
only  cease  firing  if  not  another  shot  came  from 
the  walls,  if  all  the  armed  men  left  the  city,  and  the 
Khan  formally  tendered  submission.  In  this  case  an 
armistice  would  be  consented  to,  and  General  Kauff- 
mann  could  on  his  arrival  treat  with  the  Khivans. 
The  envoy  was  further  told  that  should  the  Khan  re- 
commence firing  the  bombardment  would  at  once  be 
resumed  and  the  city  destroyed. 

The  Russian  artillery  accordingly  ceased  firing  at 
4.30,  but  very  shortly  artillery  and  small-arm  fire  re- 
opened from  the  walls.  The  Khan  now  despatched 
a  second  messenger  declaring  that  he  was  not  re- 
sponsible for  the  proceeding,  as  the  men  firing  were 
Yomuds,  over  whom  he  had  no  control.     The  Khan, 


KAUFFM ANN'S  EXPEDITION  TO  KHIVA.      243 


who  had  taken  to  flight,  and  left  his  uncle  Emir-Omra 
to  administer  affairs,  desired  peace,  and  so  did  the 
whole  city.  But  the  messenger  was  informed  that 
it  was  not  for  the  Russians  to  consider  any  question 
as  to  who  was  firing.  It  sufficed  that  shots  were 
beinsf  fired ;  and  the  bombardment  would  im- 
mediately  be  recommenced.  At  5  a.m.  this  was 
done  ;  and  both  sides  continued  operations  until 
10  o'clock,  when  the  town  was  burning  in  several 
places. 

An  hour  later  a  letter  from  General  Kauffmann 
arrived,  saying  that  the  Tashkend  column  was  about 
seven  miles  from  Khiva,  on  the  eastern  road,  and 
directing  Vereffkin  to  meet  him  next  morning  at  a 
bridge  two-and-a-half  miles  off  the  east  gate,  where 
Emir-Omra,  the  Khan's  uncle,  would  be,  to  arrange 
terms  of  surrender.  The  wounded  General,  how- 
ever was  too  unwell  to  repair  to  the  rendezvous ;  and 
Colonels  Lamakin  and  Sarantschoff  went  in  his  stead 
with  three  companies,  two  sotnias,  and  two  guns. 
About  9  a.m.  General  Kauffmann,  the  Commander- 
in-Chief,  made  his  appearance  at  the  place  he  had 
appointed. 

A  long  negotiation  followed  with  Emir-Omra,  and 
a  treaty  of  peace  drawn  up,  whose  chief  conditions, 


244        BUS  SI  AN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

as  given  by  Mr.  Howard  Vincent  in  '^  Russians 
Advance  Eastward,"  were  as  follows  : — 

"  I.  That  the  Khivan  territory  on  the  right  bank  of 
the  Oxus,  and  the  delta  of  that  river  up  to  the  Taldik 
branch,  be  annexed  to  Russia. 

"  2.  That  from  the  mouth  of  that  stream  the  frontier 
run  to  the  headland  and  thence,  following  the 
southern  slopes  of  the  Ust-Urt  to  the  Uzboc  or 
former  bed  of  the  Oxus. 

"  3.  That  Khiva  pay  to  Russia  an  indemnity  of 
2,200,000  silver  roubles  (about  ;^293,888)  towards 
the  expenses  of  the  expedition ;  but,  out  of  considera- 
tion for  the  poverty  of  the  Khivan  treasury,  the  pay- 
ment may  extend  over  20  years,  the  balance  remain- 
ing unpaid  at  the  end  of  each  year  bearing  interest 
at  the  rate  of  5  per  cent,  per  annum. 

"  4.  That  Russians  trading  with  Khiva  be  exempt 
from  the  '  Ziaheta  '  or  customs  dues. 

"5.  That  the  Khanate  of  Khiva  consider  itself  as  a 
dependency  of  the  Russian  empire." 

The  Tashkend  column,  accompanied  by  the  Khan's 
uncle  and  his  suite,  then  marched  towards  Khiva. 
The  east  gate  was  reached  at  half-past  one ;  and 
forthwith  General  Kauffmann  entered  the  town.  At 
four  o'clock  Khiva  was  occupied  in   every  part  by 


KAUFFM ANN'S  EXPEDITION  TO  KHIVA.      245 

Russian  troops.  The  same  evening  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief visited  General  Vereffkin  In  his 
camp,  and  inspected  the  wounded  lying  there. 

Having  formally  occupied  the  town,  the  troops 
went  back  to  camp.  Two  or  three  days  afterwards 
the  bazaars  were  reopened,  and  business  went  on  as 
usual ;  the  Russian  soldiers  spending  a  short  time  in 
sight-seeing  and  making  purchases. 

On  the  29th  of  June  General  Vereffkin,  with  a 
number  of  officers,  left  Khiva,  to  return  to  Russia. 
Meanwhile  they  had  learned  that  Colonel  Markosoff 
with  the  Krasnovodsk  column,  of  which  they  knew 
nothing,  had  been  obliged  to  return  by  reason  of  the 
extraordinary  difficulties  he  had  met  with  on  his  way. 


CHAPTER     XI. 

THE    GOOD   AND   THE    EVIL    DONE    BY   RUSSIA    IN 

CENTRAL  ASIA. 

The  progress  of  Russia  towards  India  has  by  a 
certain  class  of  politicians  and  writers  in  England 
been  regarded  with  marked  approval,  while  those  who 
watched  it  with  concern  have  been  stigmatized  by 
these  approvers  both  as  "  alarmists  "  and  as  selfish 
opponents  of  Russia's  civilizing  mission.  That  the 
type  of  civilization  introduced  by  Russia  into  her 
Central  Asian  possessions  is  much  higher  than  that 
which  it  displaces  can  scarcely  be  denied.  But  the 
positive  good  effected  in  this  way  by  Russia  bears 
no  comparison  to  the  evil  she  would  do  could  she 
only  carry  out  the  projects  harboured  by  her  against 
our  Indian  empire.  The  disorganization  of  India 
would  be  a  calamity  before  which  the  benefits  con- 


RUSSIA  IN  CENTRAL  ASIA.  247 

ferred    by   Russia    on   her    Central    Asian    subjects 
would  not  deserve  to  be  mentioned. 

Russia's  first  appearance  among  the  populations 
of  Turkestan  has  been  usually  signalized  by  whole- 
sale massacre.  But  after  a  time  slaves  are  set  free, 
the  cruelties  of  Eastern  punishment  are  put  a  stop 
to,  and  government,  not  perhaps  of  the  best  kind, 
but  more  or  less  of  European  pattern,  is  established. 

Mr,  Macgahan,  in  his  spirited  and  picturesque 
account  of  the  fall  of  Khiva,  has  described  a 
massacre  of  unoffending  Turcomans,  executed,  after 
the  capture  of  Khiva,  upon  the  Turcomans  of  the 
Yomud  tribe  who  were  hurrying  away  with  their 
families,  their  flocks,  and  their  herds  to  the  desert ; 
and  General  Skobeleff,  in  his  report  of  the  capture  of 
Geok  Tepe  describes  a  worse  massacre  than  even 
the  one  which  was  witnessed  by  Mr.  Macgahan. 

"  Six  sotnias  of  Cossacks,"  writes  Mr.  Macgahan, 
"were  selected  to  pursue  the  enemy" — who,  be  it  ob- 
served, had  not  struck  one  blow  at  the  Russians,  but 
were  simply  flying  from  them.  "Riding  along  in 
front  of  their  line,"  he  continues,  "  I  catch  sight  of 
Prince  Eugene,  who  welcomes  me  to  the  front  with  a 
hearty  shake  of  the  hand,  and  kindly  puts  me  in 
one  of  his  squadrons  as  a  good  point  of  observation. 


248         BUS  SI  AN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

The  order  to  advance  is  passed  along  the  line, 
and  in  another  moment  we  are  dashing  over  the 
desert  at  a  gallop.  Ten  minutes  brings  us  to  the 
summit  of  the  hill,  over  which  we  had  seen  the  fugi- 
tives disappear;  and  we  perceive  them  a  mile  further 
on  crossing  another  low  ridge.  Already  the  body- 
has  ceased  to  be  compact,  sheep  and  goats  scatter 
themselves  unheeded  in  every  direction ;  the  ground 
is  strewed  with  the  effects  that  have  been  abandoned 
in  the  hurried  flight,  bundles  thrown  from  the  backs 
of  camels,  carts  from  which  the  horses  have  been  cut 
loose,  and  crowds  of  stragglers  struggling  wearily 
along,  separated  from  friends  and  rapidly  closed  in 
upon  by  foes. 

"  Down  a  little  descent  we  plunge,  our  horses 
sinking  to  their  knees  in  the  yielding  sand,  and  across 
the  plain  we  sweep  like  a  tornado. 

"  There  are  shouts  and  cries,  a  scattering  dis- 
charge of  firearms,  and  our  lines  are  broken  by  the 
abandoned  carts,  and  our  progress  impeded  by  the 
cattle  and  sheep  that  are  running  wildly  about  over 
the  plain.  It  is  a  scene  of  the  wildest  commotion. 
I  halt  a  moment  to  look  about  me.  Here  is  a  Turco- 
man lying  in  the  sand  with  a  bullet  through  his 
head  ;  a  little  further  on  a  Cossack  stretched  out  on 


RUSSIA  IN  CENTRAL  ASIA.  249 

the  ground  with  a  horrible  sabre  cut  on  his  face  ; 
then  two  women,  with  three  or  four  children,  sitting 
down  in  the  sand,  crying  and  sobbing  piteously  and 
begging  for  their  lives;  to  these  I  shout  '  Ama7i  ! 
Aman  ! '  ('Peace,  Peace,')  as  I  gallop  by,  to  allay 
their  fears. 

"  A  little  further  on  more  arhas,  or  carts,  carpets 
and  bed  coverlets  scattered  about  with  sacks  full  of 
com,  and  huge  bags  and  bundles,  cooking  utensils 
and  all  kinds  of  household  goods. 

"  Then  more  women  toiling  wearily  forward,  carry- 
ing infants  and  weeping  bitterly ;  and  one  very  fat 
woman,  scarcely  able  to  carry  herself,  with  a  child  in 
her  arms,  which  I  somehow  take  for  her  grandchild. 
Then  camels,  sheep,  goats,  cattle,  donkeys,  cows, 
calves  and  dogs,  each,  after  its  fashion,  contributing 
to  the  wild  scene  of  terror. 

*'  I  am  at  first  shocked  by  the  number  of  Turco- 
mans I  see  lying  motionless.  I  cannot  help  thinking 
that  if  all  these  be  killed  there  are  no  such  deadly 
marks  as  the  Cossacks.  After  a  while,  however,  the 
mystery  is  explained,  for  I  perceive  one  of  the  ap- 
parently dead  Turcomans  cautiously  lift  up  his  head 
and  a  moment  after  resume  his  perfectly  lifeless 
position.     Many  of  them  are   feigning  death  j  and 


250         RUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

well  it  is  for  them  the  Cossacks  have  not  discovered 
the  trick. 

"  Delayed  somewhat  by  the  contemplation  of  these 
scenes  I  perceive  that  I  am  left  behind,  and  again 
hurry  forward.  Crossing  a  little  ridge  I  behold  my 
sotnia  galloping  along  the  edge  of  a  narrow  marsh 
and  discharging  their  arms  at  the  Turcomans,  who 
are  already  on  the  other  side,  hurriedly  ascending 
another  gentle  slope.  I  follow  down  to  the  marsh, 
passing  two  or  three  dead  bodies  on  the  way.  In 
the  marsh  are  20  or  30  women  and  children  up  to 
their  necks  in  water,  trying  to  hide  among  the  weeds 
and  grass,  begging  for  their  lives  and  screaming  in 
the  most  pitiful  manner.  The  Cossacks  have  already 
passed,  paying  no  attention  to  them.  One  villanous- 
looking  brute,  however,  had  dropped  out  of  the  ranks 
and  levelling  his  piece  as  he  sat  on  his  horse,  deli- 
berately took  aim  at  the  screaming  group,  and  before 
I  could  stop  him  pulled  the  trigger.  Fortunately 
the  gun  misfired,  and  before  he  could  renew  the  cap 
I  rode  up  and,  cutting  him  across  the  face  with  my 
riding  whip,  ordered  him  to  his  sotnia.  He  obeyed 
instantly  without  a  murmur;  and  shouting  ' Aman^ 
to  the  poor  demented  creatures  in  the  water,  I 
followed  him. 


RUSSIA  IN  CENTRAL  ASIA.  251 

"A  few  yards  further  on  there  are  four  Cossacks 
around  a  Turcoman.  He  has  already  been  beaten 
on  his  knees,  and  weapon  he  has  none.  To  the  four 
sabres  that  are  hacking  at  him  he  can  offer  only  the 
resistance  of  his  arms  ;  but  he  utters  no  word  of 
entreaty.  It  is  terrible.  Blow  after  blow  they 
shower  down  on  his  head  without  avail,  as  though 
their  sabres  were  tin.  Will  they  never  have  done  ! 
Is  there  no  pith  in  their  arms  ?  At  last,  after  what 
seems  an  age  to  me,  he  falls  prone  into  the  water 
with  a  terrible  wound  in  the  neck,  and  the  Cossacks 
gallop  on.  A  moment  later  I  come  upon  a  woman 
sitting  by  the  side  of  the  water,  weeping  over  the 
dead  body  of  her  husband.  Suddenly  my  horse  gives 
a  leap  that  almost  unseats  me,  my  ears  are  stunned 
with  a  sharp,  shrieking,  rushing  noise,  and,  looking 
up,  I  behold  a  streak  of  fire  darting  across  the  sky 
which  explodes  at  last  among  the  fugitives.  It  is 
only  a  rocket,  but  it  is  followed  by  another  and 
another ;  and,  mingled  with  the  shrieks  of  women 
and  children,  the  hoarse  shout  of  the  Cossacks,  the 
bleating  of  sheep  and  goats,  and  the  howling  of 
cattle  running  wildly  over  the  plain,  made  up  a  very 
pandemonium  of  terror.     This  lasted  a  few  minutes. 

"  Then    the    Turcomans    gradually     disappeared 


252         EUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

over  another  ridge,  some  in  this  direction  and  some 
in  that,  and  bugle-call  sounds  the  signal  for  the 
reassembling  of  the  troops.  As  we  withdrew  I 
looked  in  vain  for  the  women  and  children  I  had 
seen  in  the  water.  They  had  all  disappeared ;  and 
as  I  saw  them  nowhere  in  the  vicinity,  I  am  afraid 
that,  frightened  by  the  rockets,  they  threw  them- 
selves into  the  water  and  were  drowned.  It  was  all 
the  more  pitiable,"  adds  Mr.  Macgahan,  "  as,  with 
the  exception  of  the  case  I  have  mentioned,  there 
was  no  violence  offered  to  the  women  and  children. 
I  even  saw  a  young  Cossack  officer,  Baron  Krudner, 
punishing  one  of  his  own  men  with  his  sword  for 
having  tried  to  kill  a  woman." 

Further  on  he  writes:  "  I  must  say,  however,  that 
cases  of  violence  towards  women  were  very  rare  ; 
and  although  the  Russians  were  fighting  barbarians 
who  commit  all  sorts  of  atrocities  upon  their  pri- 
soners, which  fact  might  have  excused  a  great  deal 
of  cruelty  on  the  part  of  the  soldiers,  their  conduct 
was  infinitely  better  than  that  of  European  troops  In 
European  campaigns." 

Mr.  Macgahan' s  verdict  as  to  the  general 
humanity  of  the  Russians  does  not  quite  agree 
with   the  account  he  gives  of  acts  of  cruelty  per- 


RUSSIA  IN  CENTRAL  ASIA.  253 

petrated  beneath  his  eyes.  But  he  Hked  the 
Russians,  he  was  well  received  by  them,  and  he 
was  not  the  man  to  commit  the  fault  of  telling 
tales  out  of  school.  General  Skobeleff,  in  his  report 
of  the  taking  of  Geok  Tepe,  wrote  plainly  on  the 
subject  of  a  massacre,  by  which  the  capture  of  the 
place  was  followed,  and,  when  Mr.  Marvin  reminded 
him  at  St.  Petersburg  of  what  he  had  said  about 
the  slaughtering  of  women,  replied  with  praise- 
worthy candour  that  he  had  set  down  the  exact 
truth. 

"  When  the  dead  were  counted,"  he  said,  "  women 
were  found  among  them.  It  is  my  nature  to  conceal 
nothing.  I  therefore  wrote,  in  making  the  report, 
'  of  both  sexes.' "  In  the  report  the  following 
passage  occurs  : — 

"  The  pursuit  of  the  enemy  flying  from  the  fortress 
was  continued  by  the  infantry  for  lo  versts  (6| 
miles),  and  by  the  cavalry  six  versts  (4  miles) 
further,  and  only  complete  darkness  and  the 
thorough  dispersion  of  the  enemy  caused  the 
chase  to  be  abandoned,  and  the  troops  to  return 
to  camp.  In  this  pursuit  by  the  dragoons  and 
Cossacks,  supported  by  a  division  of  mountain 
horse  artillery,   the   killed  of   both  sexes  amounted 


254         HUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

to  8,000  persons  ....  The  enemy's  losses  were 
enormous.  After  the  capture  of  the  fortress  6,500 
bodies  were  buried  inside  it.  During  the  pursuit 
8,000  were  killed." — "General  Skobeleff's  Report 
of  the  Siege  and  Assault  of  Dengeel  Tepe  (Geok 
Tepe)  " — VoenniShornik,  April  1881,  quoted  by  Mr. 
Marvin,  in  his  "  Russia^i  Advance  Towards  India/' 
General  Grodekoff  said  to  Mr.  Marvin  on  this 
subject:  "Many  women  were  killed.  The  troops 
cut  down  everybody.  Skobeleff  gave  orders  to  his 
own  division  to  spare  the  women  and  children,  and 
none  were  killed  before  his  eye ;  but  the  other 
divisions  spared  none.  The  troops  used  their  sabres 
like  a  machine,  and  mowed  down  all  they  met." 

As  to  the  good  done  by  Russia  in  Central  Asia, 
"  the  Persian  and  other  slaves,"  writes  Mr.  Mac- 
gahan,  "  hailed  with  delight  the  approach  of  the 
Russians  ;  for  the  emancipation  of  the  slaves  has 
always  followed  the  occupation  of  any  place  in 
Central  Asia  by  the  Russians." 

According,  however,  to  a  Russian  General  who  had 
had  thirty  years'  experience  in  Central  Asia,  the 
alleged  man-stealing  on  the  part  of  the  Turcoman 
tribes  was  either  an  invention,  or,  at  the  very  least, 
a  gross  exaggeration.    The  real  marauders  and  man- 


RUSSIA  IN  CENTRAL  ASIA.  255 

Stealers  were,  he  said,  the  Russians  themselves  ;  and 
he  distinctly  charges  the  Cossacks  quartered  in  the 
territory,  governed  by  Prince  Gortschakoff  (1854) 
with  provoking  the  peaceful  Kirghizes  to  rebellion 
and  with  capturing  Kirghiz  children  to  sell  them 
into  slavery. 

Here,  again,  is  evidence  in  favour  of  the  Russians 
by  a  truthful  writer,  Arminius  Vambery  ;  who,  ap- 
parently because  he  is  our  friend,  is  looked  upon 
as  their  enemy.  Readers  of  Vambery  will  not  forget 
the  ghastly  account  he  gives  of  the  open  pit  kept  by 
the  Emir  of  Bokhun  for  the  reception  of  his  enemies  ; 
who  were  cast  into  it  alive,  to  be  tortured  and  de- 
voured by  swarms  of  vermin  generated  from  the 
putrefying  carcases  of  sheep  and  of  other  prisoners. 
"The  moment,"  writes  Vambery,  in  his  "History 
of  Bokhara/'  "  that  the  Russian  flag  was  hoisted 
on  the  citadel  of  Samarkand,  the  ancient  and 
distant  country  of  Asia  entered  on  the  path  of 
the  modern  world  and  of  modern  ideas.  Towns 
and  countries,  hitherto  unknown  to  the  denizens 
of  the  western  world,  have  been  thrown  open, 
and  places  where  the  European  traveller  could 
only  venture  in  disguise  and  at  the  peril  of  his  life, 
are  now  not  only  free  and  safe,  but  actually  governed 


256         PRUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

and  administered  by  Christians.  Churches  and  clubs 
have  been  opened  at  Tashkend,  Khodjend,  and 
Samarcand  ;  in  the  first-named  city  there  is  even 
a  newspaper  {Turkestanskia  Viedomosti — 'Turke- 
stan News'),  and  the  melancholy  monotony  of  the 
Muezzin's  chant  is  broken  by  the  cheerful  sounds 
of  the  bells  of  the  Greek  churches,  more  terrible  to 
Mahomedan  ears  than  the  roar  of  artillery.  Popes, 
soldiers  and  merchants  now  move  with  the  proud 
steps  of  conquerors  through  the  very  streets  of 
Bokhara,  where  a  few  years  ago  the  author  of  this 
work  only  dared  to  venture  about  chanting  Moslem 
hymns.  A  Russian  hospital  and  storehouse  Is  estab- 
lished In  the  once  splendid  Palace  of  Timour,  whither 
in  the  olden  times  embassies  from  all  the  Princes  of 
Asia  came  to  do  homage  and  bring  offerings  ;  whither 
the  pround  King  of  Castile  himself  sent  his  ambassa- 
dors humbly  to  sue  for  friendship,  and  where  the 
descendants  of  the  Turanians  came  with  pious 
reverence  to  touch  with  their  foreheads  the  '  blue 
stone,'  the  pedestal  of  Timour's  throne."  Who,  after 
reading  Vambery's  account  of  the  brutal  cruelties 
practised  by  the  Emir  of  Bokhara,  can  wish  that  In  a 
contest  between  Bokhara  and  Russia  Bokhara  should 
have  prevailed  ? 


RUSSIA  IS  CENTRAL  ASIA.  257 


I     I 


Had  the  Khan  of  Bokhara  been  only  a  little  less 
barbarous  than  he  actually  was,  the  influence  of 
England  might,  nearly  half  a  century  ago,  have  been 
brought  to  bear  upon  the  Khanates  of  Bokhara,  Kho- 
kand,  and  Khiva.  The  Emperor  Nicholas  proposed 
in  1844  that  these  Khanates  should  be  left  inde- 
pendent and  untouched  by  the  Russians  on  the 
understanding  that  Russia  and  England  worked 
together  in  the  Eastern  question.  Six  years  earlier 
the  English  project  in  connection  with  these  States 
had  been  that  they  should  be  induced  to  form  an 
alliance  in  order  to  resist  ah  attacks  from  Russia. 
With  this  view  Captain  Abbott  and  Captain 
Shakespear  were  sent  to  Khiva,  Colonel  Stoddart 
to  Bokhara,  and  Captain  Conolly  to  Kokhand. 
"  Eagerly,"  writes  Sir  John  Kaye,  in  his  admirable 
"  Histojy  of  the  JVar  in  Afghanistan,"  "  did  Arthur 
Conolly  grasp  the  idea  of  this  Kokhand  mission.  He 
was  a  man  of  an  earnest,  impulsive  nature,  running 
over  with  the  purest  feelings  of  benevolence,  and 
glowing  with  the  most  intense  longings  after  the 
civilization  and  evanefelization  of  the  human  race. 
He  believed  that  the  great  Central  Asia  movement 
was  designed  by  Providence  to  break  down  the  huge 
walls  which  begirt  the  shining  East,  and  to  substitute 

S 


258         EUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

civilization,  liberty,  and  peace  for  barbarism,  slavery 
and  strife.     He  was  a  visionary,  but  one  of  the  noblest 
order ;   and  when  he  looked   out   beyond  the  great 
barrier   of    the   Hindu- Kush,  traversed  in   imagina- 
tion the  deserts  of  Merv,  and  visited  the  barbarous 
courts  of  the  Khans  of  Khiva,  Khokand,  and  Bok- 
hara, he  never  doubted  for  a  moment  that  the  mission 
which  he  was  about  to  undertake  was  one  of  the 
highest  with  which  a  Christian  officer  could  be  en- 
trusted.    '  I  feel  very  confident,'  he  wrote  to  a  friend, 
*  about  all  our  policy  in  Central  Asia  ;  for  I  think  that 
the  designs  of  our  Government  here  are  honest,  and 
that  they  will  work  with  a  blessing  from   God,  who 
seems   now  to  be  breaking  up   all  the  barriers  of  the 
long-closed   East,   for  the  introduction  of  Christian 
knowledge  and    peace.     It  is   deeply  interesting  to 
watch   the  effects   that  are  being  produced  by  the 
exertions  of  the  European  powers,  some  selfish  and 
contrary ;  others  still  selfish,  but  qualified  with  peace 
and  generosity  ;  all  made  instrumental  to  good.     See 
the  French  in  Africa ;   the   English,  Austrians,  and 
Russians  on  the  Bosphorous,  forcing  the  Turks  to  be 
European   under  a  shadow  of  Mahomedanism,  and 
providing  for  the  peaceful  settlement  of  the  fairest 
and  most  sacred  countries  in  the  world.'  " 


I 


i 


EUSSIA  TN  CENTRAL  ASIA.  259 

Abbott  and  Shakespear  succeeded  in  at  least  one 
part  of  their  mission ;  they  procured  the  liberation 
of  the  Russians  kept  captive  at  Khiva,  who  were 
conducted  to  Orenburg  under  Captain  Shakespear's 
care.  Stoddart,  however,  at  Bokhara,  after  being 
insulted  and  tortured  in  every  possible  manner,  was 
put  to  death  ;  and  the  enthusiastic  Conolly,  on 
reaching  Bokhara,  met  with  the  same  fate. 

It  must  be  added  that,  Butenef,  a  Russian  who 
arrived  at  Bokhara  towards  the  close  of  Stoddart's 
captivity,  did  his  best  to  save  both  the  Englishmen. 
His  efforts  were  all  in  vain. 


CHAPTER  XII. 

PROJECTS    FOR    THE    INVASION    OF    INDIA. 

As  long  as  Russia  was  occupied  with  operations 
against  the  Khanates,  the  possibility  of  a  Russian 
advance  to  India  through  Balkh  and  Cabul  seems 
alone  to  have  been  thought  of.  Such  was  the  case 
when  the  Earl  of  Clarendon,  at  his  interview  with 
Prince  Gortschakoff,  at  Heidelberg  in  1869,  com- 
menced the  negotiations  which,  four  years  afterwards, 
ended  in  what  at  the  time  was  considered  a  satisfac- 
tory (though  incomplete)  arrangement  in  regard  to  the 
Afghan  boundary.  The  Russians,  he  observed,  already 
in  possession  of  Samarcand,  with  Bokhara  in  their 
power,  and  constantly  advancing  in  the  direction  of 
Afghanistan,  might  soon  be  expected  in  the  vicinity 
of  the  Hindu-Kush,  whence  "the  British  posses- 
sions might  be  viewed  as  a  traveller  on  the  summit  of 
Simplon  might  survey  the  plains  of  Italy  j  "  so  that 


PROJECTS  FOR  THE  INVASION  OF  INDIA.     261 

^*  measures  for  our  own  protection  might  then  become 
necessary."  Thus,  in  the  now  historical  conversation 
between  the  two  Ministers,  an  EngHsh  statesman  saw 
danger  where  danger  is  no  longer  seen — not  because 
it  has  ceased  to  exist,  but  because  it  has  been  over- 
shadowed by  a  greater  peril. 

After  the  subjection  of  the  three  Khanates  of  Kho- 
kand,  Bokhara,  and  Khiva,  Russia  began  to  deal 
seriously  with  the  Turcoman  tribes,  in  occupation  of 
the  deserts  which  barred  her  way  from  the  Caspian 
to  Herat ;  and  the  Russian  route  of  progress  towards 
India  to  which  attention  is  now  chiefly  directed  is 
the  one  through  Herat  and  Candahar. 

But  there  is  a  third  route  of  invasion  which  may  one 
day  be  employed  in  conjunction  with  the  two  others. 
The  late  Lieutenant  Hayward  was  convinced  that 
India  might,  without  much  difficulty,  be  entered 
from  Eastern  Turkestan.  "  An  army,"  he  wrote, 
"  attempting  a  passage  across  the  mountains  from 
Eastern  Turkestan  to  India  would  have  no  great 
impediment   to   encounter  until  it   had    entered    the 

deeper  defiles    of   the  lower  Himalayas A 

portion  of  the  line  intervening  between  the  crest  of 
the  Karakorum  range  and  the  plains  of  Turkestan  is 
quite  practicable  ;  and  as,  in  all  human  probability, 


262         EUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

it  is  here  that  the  Russian  and  the  Indian  Empires 
will  first  come  into  contact,  and  the  frontiers  run 
conterminous,  this  fact  is  deserving  of  special  con- 
sideration." 

Meanwhile  it  should  not  be  forgotten  that  the 
great  historical  route  for  invaders  advancing  towards 
India  from  Central  Asia  has  been  the  one  through 
Herat  and  Candahar.  This  was  the  actual  route  of 
Gerighis  Khan,  Timour,  Baber,  and,  in  the  last 
century,  Nadir  Shah ;  the  proposed  route  of  the 
Emperors  Paul  and  Alexander  I.  This,  too,  was  the 
route  recommended  by  General  Khruleff  and  General 
Duhamel  at  the  time  of  the  Crimean  war,  and  by 
General  Skobeleff — conjointly  with  an  advance 
through  the  Bamian  pass  and  Cabul — when  the  last 
war  waged  by  Russia  against  Turkey  was  on  the 
point  of  breaking  out. 

GENERAL  KHRULEFF'S  PROJECT  (1855). 
"  The  important  question  of  shaking  the  rule  of  the 
English  to  its  foundations,  and  of  inciting  the  subject 
races  to  an  attempt  to  gain  their  freedom,  may  be 
determined,"  wrote  General  KhrulefT  in  1855, 
just  before  the  termination  of  the  war  in  the 
Crimea,  "  by  the  despatch  of  a  corps  of  thirty 
thousand    men    to   Candahar,      The  essential   con- 


^ 


PROJECTS  FOR  THE  INVASION  OF  INDIA.     263 

ditions,  however,  are,  in  the  first  place,  the  perfect 
neutrahty  of  Persia  and  the  co-operation  of  Afghan- 
istan in  the  war."  After  showing  how  the  friendship 
of  Persia  may  be  secured,  he  continues  as  follows  : — 

"  The  Afghans  applied  to  Russia  in  1837  and 
1838  for  protection  against  the  English;  they  will 
be  gratified  at  our  endeavour  to  overthrow  the 
English  rule  ;  their  detestation  of  the  English  is  yet 
alive.  If  the  English  anticipate  us  and  invade 
Afghanistan  to  check  our  influence,  our  plan  can  be 
carried  into  effect  all  the  sooner.  There  will  then  be 
a  popular  outbreak  before  our  appearance.  The 
English  cannot  introduce  a  large  army  into  that 
mountainous  country.  Death  will  face  them  in  every 
defile,  as  was  the  case  in  their  war  with  the  Afghans. 
If  the  English  resolve  upon  a  defensive  war  in  their 
Indian  dominions,  then  our  presence  in  Afghanistan 
will  promote  the  rising  of  the  Indians  against  the 
hated  English  rule.  A  movement  of  troops  will  be 
difficult  for  the  English." 

The  precautions  which  General  Khruleff  recom- 
mends in  view  of  possible  attacks  from  the  Khivans 
and  from  the  Turcoman  tribes  would  now  no  longer 
be  necessary ;  and  all  that  he  says  on  that  head 
may  be  passed  over. 


264        BUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 


As  to  the  line  of  march  and  the  feeding  of  the 
troops,  he  writes  : — 

"The  road  from  Ak-Kala  to  Candahar  offers  no 
difificukies.  It  is  practicable  for  artillery  and  for  a 
commissariat  train  ;  water,  rice,  barley,  and  sheep  can 
be  procured  in  plenty.  The  grazing  land  is  good. 
The  expeditions  of  Shah  Mahomed  have  shown 
that  some  tens  of  thousands  of  soldiers  totally  un- 
provided for  have  found  provisions  on  the  road 
through  Bujnurd,  Kuchan,  Meshed,  and  Herat. 
Captain  Blaremberg,  of  our  own  service,  participated 
in  one  of  these  campaigns,  and  in  the  siege  of  Herat, 
when  it  was  defended  by  Lieut.  Pottinger,  of  the 
English  Army.  The  siege  of  Herat  was  in  1838. 
From  Meshed  to  Herat  we  should  find  easy  means  of 
transport,  on  account  of  the  great  concentration  of 
caravans  at  Meshed.  The  country  around  Herat  is 
famous  for  its  fertility.  From  Ak-  Kala  the  troops  would 
reach  Herat  in  thirty-five  days,  marching  twenty-five 
versts  [from  sixteen  to  seventeen  miles]  per  day. 
The  march  of  the  English  troops  into  Afghanis- 
tan showed  that,  whilst  coming  as  enemies,  their 
army  was  supplied  with  forage  by  the  natives.  We 
may  be  perfectly  sure  that  we  should  encounter  no 
difficulty  in  the  matter  of  supplies.      The  road  from 


PROJECTS  FOR  THE  INVASION  OF  INDIA.     265 

Herat  to  Candahar,  the  gate  of  India,  Is  known  to 
us.  Captain  Vitklevitch  was  sent  to  Cabul  by 
General  Simonitch,  our  envoy  in  Persia.  Having 
secured  the  neutrahty  of  Persia,  and  having  made 
ourselves  secure  on  the  side  of  Khiva,  Bokhara, 
and  Khokand  [Russia,  by  the  subjection  of  Khiva, 
Bokhara,  and  Khokand,  has  made  herself  quite 
secure  on  this  side]  we  could  at  once  march  a  force 
of  30,000  men  to  Candahar,  sending  an  embassy 
from  thence  to  Cabul,  which  would  finally  dispose 
the  natives  in  our  favour,  and  raise  our  influence 
over  that  of  the  English. 

"  While  stating  my  plan "  (continues  General 
Khruleff)  "  I  am  deeply  penetrated  with  a  conviction 
of  the  possibility  of  carrying  it  into  execution  ;  and 
of  this  the  English  are  better  assured  than  we  are. 
A  numerous  force  would  be  embarrassing  ;  we  should 
endeavour  to  raise  a  native  force  ;  our  own  shoul  d 
form  the  reserve.  We  are  bound  to  instruct  the 
population  in  our  methods  of  offering  opposition  to 
the  oppression  of  the  English,  whose  force  in  India 
consists  of  only  twenty-live  thousand  European 
troops.  The  army  of  India,  according  to  Major 
Everest,  consisting  of  three  hundred  thousand  men, 
is    dispersed    over   an    extent    of    one    million    and 


266         EUSSIAN  PEOJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

seventy-six  thousand,  five  hundred  and  ninety 
EngHsh  miles,  and  is  called  upon  to  guard  a  frontier 
of  seven  hundred  and  seven  geographical  miles, 
being  at  the  same  time  commanded  by  only  seven 
thousand  three  hundred  and  forty-three  European 
officers,  which  was  the  estabhshment  in  1847. 
There  have  been  many  instances  in  which  these 
troops  have  fled  before  compact  masses  of  England's 
native  foes,  when  the  officers  were  killed.  The 
entrance  of  a  long-desired  corps  of  thirty  thousand 
men  into  Afghanistan  will  excite  the  national  antipathy 
of  the  Afghans  to  the  English,  and  will  shake  the 
power  of   the  English  in  India. 

''  We  may  make  compromises  "  (concludes 
General  Khruleff)  "  with  our  other  foes ;  but 
England's  bearing  towards  us,  which  tends  to  the 
weakening  of  our  power,  does  not  justify  us  in 
leaving  her  at  peace.  We  must  free  the  people 
who  are  the  sources  of  her  wealth,  and  prove  to 
the  world  the  might  of   the  Russian  Czar." 

GENERAL    DUHAMEL'S    PROJECT. 

This  project  was  drawn  up  and  submitted  to  the 
Emperor  Nicholas  in  1854,  at  the  beginning  of  the 
Crimean  War,  by  General  Duhamel,  who  succeeded 
Count  Simonitch  as  Minister  in  Persia,  when  the 


PROJECTS  FOR  THE  INVASION  OF  INDIA.     267 


latter,  after  the  failure  of  the  Russo-Persian  siege 
of  Herat,  had  been  withdrawn.  It  is  the  same,  in 
principle,  as  the  project  by  General  Khruleff,  which 
was  laid  before  the  Emperor  Nicholas  when  the  war 
was  drawing  to  a  conclusion. 

"  When,  towards  the  close  of  the  last  century,  an 
army  corps  was  quartered   on  the  Eastern  frontiers 
by  order  of  the   Emperor  Paul,  with    a   design    on 
India,   the  English   nation,  although  not  certain  of 
the   fact,  was  greatly   startled  by  the    intelligence. 
Since    then   English  WTiters  have   never  ceased   to 
point  out  in  different  ways  the  danger  of  a  Russian 
invasion  of  India,   and  their   Parliament   has   often 
discussed  the  question.     The   present  war,  which  is 
declared  to  the  knife,  imposes  upon  Russia  the  duty 
of  showing  how  she  can  attack  England  in  her  only 
vulnerable  point,   in   India,    and    thus    force   her  to 
assemble  so  great  a  force  in  Asia  as  to  weaken  her 
action  in  Europe.     History  teaches  us  that  nearly  all 
the  Powers  which   conquered   India  found  their  way 
to  it  through  Central  Asia  and  Persia,  and  that  the 
roads  by  which  Alexander  the  Great,  Genghis  Khan, 
Amerlane,   Sultan   Baber,  and,    lastly.   Nadir  Shah, 
broke  into    India   are    now    also    open  ;     they  pass 
through  Khorassan  and  Afghanistan,  whether  they 


268        HUSSIAN"  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

lead  from  Persia  or  from  the  Oxus.     The  towns  of 
Candahar  and  Cabul  are  the  gates  of  the  Indies. 

"  I.  The  first  road  leads  from  Orenburg  over  the 
table  land  of  Ursturt  to  Khiva,  and  further  on 
through  Merv,  Herat,  Candahar  to  Cabul. 

"2.  The  second  route  goes  from  Orsk  or  Oren- 
burg to  the  fortress  of  Aralsk,  and  thence  to  the 
cities  of  Bokhara,  Balkh  Kalum,  and  Cabul. 

"3.  The  third  starts  from  Orsk  or  Troitzk,  goes 
through  Aralsk  and  Ak-Meshed  to  Tashkend,  or 
leads  direct  through  to  Petropawlowsk,  and,  further, 
to  Kokhand,  Kalum,  Bamian,  and  Cabul. 

"  4.  The  fourth  is  from  Astrakhan  by  water 
to  Astrabad,  and  thence  through  Redushan,  or 
Shahnid  to  Meshed,  Herat,  Candahar,  and  Cabul. 

"  5.  The  fifth,  and  last  road,  leads  from  Dshuelfa, 
on  the  river  Araxes,  to  Tabris,  Teheran,  Meshed, 
Herat,  Candahar,  and  Cabul. 

"  The  three  first  roads  lead  through  the  desert 
in  its  fullest  width ;  and  here,  even  if  the  oasis 
of  Khiva  and  that  of  Bokhara  were  made  use 
of,  it  would  need  thousands  of  camels  to  trans- 
port provisions  for  the  troops.  The  fourth  and 
fifth  roads  lead  through  a  country  which  is  not 
crossed    by    deserts,   and   which   is    in    some   parts 


I 


PROJECTS  FOR  THE  INVASION  OF  INDIA.     2G9 

very  fertile  and  inhabited  by  energetic  tribes.  They 
do  not  lead  over  any  such  inaccessible  points  as  those 
in  the  Hindu- Kush  mountains ;  neither  is  one  stopped 
on  the  way  by  an  impassable  river,  as,  for  instance, 
the  Oxus,  between  Bokhara  and  Balkh.  When  once 
the  necessary  transports  are  on  the  Caspian  Sea  and 
ready  for  use,  then  the  road  from  Astrakhan  to 
Astrabad  is  preferable  to  all  others,  for  the  distance 
is  the  shortest.  Once  in  Astrabad,  a  footing  in  Khor- 
assan  would  be  easy,  and  the  remaining  distance  to 
Cabul  is  only  1870  versts.  The  infantry,  artillery,  and 
ammunition  would  be  shipped  over  the  Caspian  Sea, 
whilst  the  cavalry  and  ammunition  train  would  travel 
from  Circassia  through  Persia.  For  it  would  be  a 
dangerous  march  through  Turkestan,  having  to 
combat  the  Khans  and  their  tribes,  who,  when 
repulsed,  would  again  attack  in  the  rear,  and  thus 
cut  off  communication.  Comparatively  easy,  how- 
ever, would  be  the  march  throue^h  half-civilized 
Persia,  which  is  already  so  bound  by  treaties  that  it 
is  incapable  of  any  serious  resistance,  and  is,  more- 
over, threatened  from  all  sides  (especially  from 
Circassia),  and  so  rendered  powerless.  What  more 
then  remains  to  be  desired  ?  Any  active  co-opera- 
tion on   the    part    of   the   Persians    involves    active 


270        BUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

co-operation  on  the  part  of  Afghanistan  on  account 
of  the  deadly  animosity  which  exists  between  the 
two  ;  and  this  is  just  the  conditio  sine  qua  non  of  an 
attack  upon  India.  Of  course,  England  would  not 
be  behindhand  in  taking  steps  to  prevent  all  this  ; 
but,  even  had  she  time  and  means  for  sending  an 
expedition  to  the  Persian  gulf,  taking  possession 
of  Karak  and  Binder-Bushirs,  or  inciting  the  South 
Persian  tribes  to  rebellion,  it  would  be  of  little  avail 
should  Russia  guarantee  to  the  Shah  his  throne 
and  possessions  ;  still  less,  should  she  promise  the 
restoration  of  the  Turkish  districts  of  Bagdad, 
Kerseldi,  and  a  part  of  Kurdistan,  and  thereby 
kindle  a  war  between  Persia  and  Turkey,  The  road 
through  Persia  is,  therefore,  for  many  reasons  pre- 
ferable to  those  through  Turkestan. 

"  There  are  three  roads  leading  from  Afghanistan 
to  India. 

"  I.  From  Cabul,  through  Jellahabad  and  Pesha- 
wur  to  Attok. 

*'  2.   From  Ghazna  to  Dera  Ismael  Khan. 

"  3.  From  Candahar,  through  Quetta  and  Dadur 
to  Shikarpur. 

"These  three  roads  lead  through  passes  which 
are  easy    to  defend,  but  which   are    all    more    ex- 


PROJECTS  FOR  THE  INVASION  OF  INDIA.     271 

posed  to  a  successful  attack  from  the  west  than 
from  the  east.  The  best,  shortest,  and  healthiest 
route  is  the  first,  although  in  1839  the  English  chose 
the  third.  From  Attok  lies  an  easier  road  to  Lahore 
and  Delhi,  the  main  points  of  attack.  The  choice 
of  this  route  would  create  a  rebellion  in  the  very 
heart  of  England's  possessions,  and  cause  all  the 
Mahomedan  tribes  to  rise  against  her.  In  this 
direction  lies,  for  the  Afghans,  the  most  tempting 
prospect  of  booty  and  acquisition  of  territory. 
Should  this  be  the  means  also  of  winning  over  the 
Sikhs,  so  much  the  better  ;  but  the  Afghan  alliance 
is  of  the  greatest  importance.  This  once  accom- 
plished, all  is  won ;  for  we  do  not  invade  India  with 
a  view  to  making  conquests,  but  to  overthrow  the 
English  rule — or  at  least  to  weaken  English  power. 
In  order  to  effect  this  only  a  small  army  is  needed, 
to  form  the  kernel  of  the  invasion  round  which 
all  the  conquered  tribes  would  cluster,  and  which 
might  be  gradually  reduced  as  a  general  rising 
caused  the  attacking  forces  to  swell." 

GENERAL    SKOBELEFF'S    PROJECT    (1877). 
The  following  project  by  the  late  General  Skobeleff 
was  published   in  the  Russian  ''  Monthly  Historical 
Revie-vi"  for  December,  1883.     It  was  addressed  by 


272        RUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

General  Skobeleff,  in  January,  1877,  from  Khokand, 
to  an  intimate  friend  ;  and  it  was  afterwards  found 
among  the  papers  of  the  late  Prince  Cherkaski : —  . 

"  I  am  thoroughly  convinced  that  we  need  not 
anticipate  anything  of  a  serious  nature  from  the 
natives  of  Turkestan  in  the  event  of  a  war  with 
Turkey.  Therefore  if  we  wage  war  with  Turkey 
alone,  and  if  the  idea  of  the  aggressive  attitude  which 
would  determine  the  importance  of  Turkestan,  in  case 
of  a  war  with  England,  has  not  yet  ripened  in  our 
higher  spheres,  it  would  be  insufferable  to  remain 
here  in  time  of  war. 

"  One  of  the  objects  of  this  letter  is  to  remind 
you  of  my  recent  independent  action  in  warfare. 
But  its  main  purport  is  to  express  to  you  candidly 
my  opinion  that  it  is  proper,  as  it  is  possible,  to 
launch  an  expedition  from  Turkestan  in  the  event  of 
a  breach  with  England,  in  order  to  promote  the 
triumph  and  greatness  of  Russia. 

"  The  aim  I  here  indicate  is  one  of  world  wide 
significance.  No  Russian  patriot,  recognizing  the 
possibility  of  a  successful  achievement  of  the  purpose, 
and  placed  by  destiny  in  a  position  to  guide  the 
operation,  can  hesitate  to  point  out  the  immense  re- 
sources   which,    I    will    permit    myself    to    say,   our 


PROJECTS  FOR  THE  INVASION  OF  INDIA,     273 


Government  has  accidentally  accumulated  on  this 
frontier,  and  by  means  of  which,  with  adequate 
resolution  and  with  timely  preparation,  it  is  pos- 
sible, not  only  to  strike  an  effective  blow  at  England 
in  India,  but  also  to  crush  her  in  Europe.  All  this, 
I  repeat,  can  be  done  while  we  retain  full  possession 
of  the  Turkestan  province,  rendering  it  perfectly 
secure  as  a  base  of  operations.  In  this  I  most 
firmly  believe,  having  abundant  proofs  of  our  power 
and  influence,  so  long  as  we  act  in  Asia  more  than 
anywhere  else  up  to  this  maxim  :  *  Waste  no  words 
where  you  may  exercise  your  authority.' 

"  Fortified  by  an  obligation  to  do  my  duty  at  a 
most  trying  time  for  Russia,  I  submitted  a  Note  on 
the  27th  December  1876  to  the  Governor-General, 
and  I  wrote  to  my  uncle  Alexander  ;  now  I  address 
you,  fearless  of  the  consequences  to  myself,  and 
praying  to  God  that  due  attention,  in  proper  quarters,, 
may  be  given  to  that  powerful  aggressive  force  which 

I  we  wield  in  Central  Asia. 

I  "I  was  appointed  to  the  command  of  the  forces 

in  the  Namangan  district  in  the  month  of  September 
1875,  pending  the  arrival  of  reinforcements  which 
were   expected   from    Russia  in  the  spring  of  1876. 

i  The  condition  of  affairs  on  our  frontier  was  at  that 

T 


274         EUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 


time  exceedingly  serious  and  very  unfavourable  to 
us ;  so  much  so  that  the  force  entrusted  with  the 
defence  of  the  district  was  composed  of  i8  com- 
panies, and  8  sotnias  of  Cossacks,  with  14  field 
guns,  irrespective  of  ordnance  for  defensive  works. 
The  gravity  of  the  situation  under  which  the  troops 
under  my  command  were  placed  became  at  once 
obvious  on  the  withdrawal  of  the  main  body  to 
Hodjend  on  the   i6th  November   1875. 

"  The  enemy  hurled  themselves  en  masse  on  the 
23rd  October  against  the  unfinished  fortifications  at 
Namangan,  and  from  that  time  we  had  incessant 
engagements  with  them.  The  result  of  this  was  the 
storming  of  Namangan,  and  the  clearing  of  the  dis- 
trict of  all  insurgents.  Supplies  being  then  secured, 
we  assumed  the  offensive,  and  routed  the  whole 
of  the  Khokand  army  of  40,000  men  at  Balykchi  on 
the  1 2th  November,  1875.  After  a  series  of  more 
or  less  sanguinary  actions,  the  Namangan  detach- 
ment stormed  Andijan  for  the  second  time  on  the  8th 
of  January  1876,  scattered  the  remaining  forces  of 
the  war  party  at  Assake,  compelled  the  leader  Abdur 
Rahman  Avtobachi,  to  surrender  himself,  and  after 
a  six  months'  campaign  laid  the  entire  Khanate  of 
Khokand  at  the  feet  of  His  Imperial  Majesty. 


PliOJECTS  FOR  THE  IN  VASION  OF  INDIA.     275 

"This  happened  one  year  ago,  and  about  that  time 
I  was  appointed  Mihtary-Governor  of  the  Ferghana 
region. 

"  The  region  abounded  with  disturbing  elements. 
With  a  view  to  its  pacification  I  marched  the  troops 
to  the  Alai,  where,  being  animated  by  pacific  objects, 
I  acted  accordingly.  The  Alai  campaign  did  not 
cost  Russia  a  single  drop  of  blood,  the  rebels  being 
forced  to  abandon  their  inaccessible  strongholds  by 
purely  strategic  marches.  Thus,  I  imagine,  I  fulfilled 
in  the  highest  degree  the  desire  of  His  Majesty  who 
cherishes  the  blood  of  his  subjects. 

"  You  yourself  have  had  occasion  to  see  what 
was  effected  administratively  from  the  general  order 
issued  by  the  Governor-General. 

"  It  is  not  for  me  at  such  a  period  to  dispose  of 
my  own  self.  The  authorities  are  better  able  to  say 
where  I  can  be  most  advantageously  employed.  In 
every  case  I  now  unbosom  myself  to  you,  and  make 
known  to  you  my  desire  to  join  the  army  in  the  field 
at  any  moment  and  in  any  capacity.  I  am  all  the 
less  in  a  position  to  apply  for  leave  to  quit  this 
region,  because  I  firmly  believe  in  its  aggressive 
power  as  an  agent  for  the  solution  of  the  Eastern  / 
question. 


i. 


ne      Eus-siAS  project  <-  agaix^t  ixdia. 

«..*'  It  has   been  frequently  said  that  from  Central 

Asia  Russia  can  threaien  the  Bri:ish  rule  in  India, 
and  that  ii  is  thererrrr  absolu:ely  necessar)'  for 
Y.T.^.2::.i  ai  this  --"cv^rr  :j  check  the  advance  of 
the  Russian  troops  in  Turkes:an. 

"If  v.e  look  around  us,  v^-e  shall  find  that  our 
posi:ion  in  Tuikesian  is  indeed  most  formidable,  and 
that  the  apprehensions  of  the  English  are  not  ground- 
less. We  have  established  a  strong  base  in  Central 
Asii,  "viih  an  arm."  ;f  ab;u:  40.300  men,  from  which 
we  shall  alwavs  be  able  to  detach  a  force  of  not  less 
than  10,000  or  12,000  men  for  operations  outside  the 
Hmits  of  the  province  ;  at  the  same  time  we  may 
trust  implicitly  in  the  fidelity  of  our  subjects,  for 
even  n:7.-  there  is  not  the  slightest  indication  of  any 
combine:: :n  of  the  ]Mahomedans  of  Turkey  with 
those  of  Central  Asia. 

"  By  reinforcing  the  troops  In  Turkestan,  say  with 
six  con.:. on: es  inni  Western  Siberia,  with  as  many 
Siberian  Ccssacks  as  CDuld  be  spared,  vdth  one 
batter}-,  and  vsith  three  regiments  of  Cossacks  from 
Orenburg,  we  might  organize  a  column  of  about 
14,000   or    15,000   men. 

"  Such  a  column  thriv/n  across  the  Hindu-Kush 
could  effect  a  great  deal. 


PROJECTS  FOR  THE  IXVASIOX  OF  INDIA.     277 

"  The  position  of  the  English  in  India  has  been 
said  to  be  precarious  by  every  one  who  has  studied 
the  question.  It  has  been  stated  that  the  English 
tenure  of  India  is  by  the  sword  alone  ;  that  the 
number  of  European  troops  in  India  is  not  more 
than  sufficient  to  keep  order  in  the  country',  and  that 
the  Native  armv  is  not  to  be  trusted. 

"  Every  one  referring  to  the  question  of  a  Russian 
invasion  of  India  has  declared  that  an  approach  to 
the  frontier  would  be  enough  to  raise  a  rebellion. 

"  It  may  be  said  that  an  enterprise  against  the 
English  in  India  is  a  matter  of  great  risk ;  that  it 
might  end  disastrously  for  the  Russian  force.  I  do 
consider,  and  we  should  not  close  our  eyes  to  the 
fact,  that  the  enterprise  would  indeed  be  a  risky  one. 
We  should,  however,  bear  in  mind  that  if  we  were 
successful  we  should  entirely  demolish  the  British 
Empire  in  India  ;  and  the  effect  of  this  in  England 
cannot  be  calculated  beforehand.  Competent  English 
authorities  admit  that  an  overthrow  on  the  frontiers 
of  India  might  even  produce  a  social  revolution  in 
England,  because  for  the  last  20  years  England  has 
been  tied  closer  than  ever  to  her  Indian  possessions 
by  reasons  and  phenomena  (including  an  incapacity 
for  war)  identical  with  those  of  France.     In  a  word, 


278         BUS  SI  AN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 


the  downfall  of  the  British  supremacy  in  India  would' 
be  the  beginning  of  the  downfall  of  England. 

"  Should  our  venture  not  result  in  complete  success,. 
i.e.,  should  a  rebellion  fail  to  break  out  in  India  ;  and 
should  we  fail  to  cross  the  frontier,  we  should  at  all 
events  compel  the  English  to  keep  the  whole  of  their 
Indian  Army  in  Hindustan  and  render  it  impossible 
for  them  to  spare  any  portion  of  it  for  service  in 
Europe ;  they  would  indeed  find  themselves  obliged 
to  transport  some  of  their  forces  from  Europe  to 
India.  In  short  we  could,  to  a  great  extent,  paralyse 
the  land  forces  of  England  as  regards  either  a  Euro- 
pean war  or  the  selection  of  a  new  theatre  of  war,  from 
the  Persian  Gulf  by  Tabriz  to  Tiflis  in  connection 
with  the  armies  of  Turkey  and  Persia:  an  idea  which 
has  been  entertained  by  English  Officers  since  the 
Crimean  war. 

"  The  necessity  of  making  Turkestan  participate  in 
forthcoming  events  is  rendered  necessary  by  the  cir- 
cumstance that  in  the  event  of  the  terminarion  of  a. 
war  in  any  way  unfavourable  to  us,  we  should  most 
certainly  have  to  evacuate  the  Turkestan  province  or 
limit  our  authority  in  that  region.  But  should  we  be 
beaten  both  in  Europe  and  Asia,  we  should  have 
proved  even  by  our  disastrous  enterprise  the  formid- 


PROJECTS  FOR  THE  INVASION  OF  INDIA.     279 

able  nature  of  our  position  in  Central  Asia  ;  and, 
being  reduced  by  necessity  to  conclude  a  humi- 
liating treaty,  Russia  might  get  off  at  the  price  of 
Turkestan,  which  would  have  risen  in  value. 

"  There  can  be  no  comparison  between  the  risk  we 
run  in  making  a  demonstration  against  British  India 
and  the  enormous  advantages  which  we  should  gain 
in  the  event  of  the  success  of  such  a  demonstration. 

"  The  gigantic  difference  in  the  results  of  a  suc- 
cessful issue  to  us  and  to  our  enemies  is  of  itself 
enough  to  urge  us  boldly  onwards. 

"  On  the  proclamation  ot  war  with  England,  we 
should  begin  at  once  in  Turkestan  by  despatching  a 
Mission  to  Cabul  and  form  a  column  in  Samarcand 
(which,  for  effect,  I  should  call  an  army),  composed 
of  lo  battalions,  14  sotnias,  and  40  guns,  making  a 
total  of  10,000  to  12,000  men ;  this  should  positively 
be  the  minimum  of  our  aggressive  force. 

"  The  object  of  the  Mission  should  be  to  draw  Shir 
Ali  into  an  alliance  with  us,  and  to  open  relations 
with  the  disaffected  natives  of  India  ;  and  in  order  to 
secure  the  success  of  these  negotiations,  the  column 
should  be  pushed  through  Bamian  to  Cabul.  If  it 
be  found  that  Shir  Ali  adheres  to  the  English  (which 
is  not  very  probable,   because  he  did  not  accept  the 


280  RUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

invitation  to  be  present  among  other  vassals  on  the 
occasion  of  the  proclamation  of  the  title  of  Empress 
of  India  and  Delhi,  and  even  expressed  his  annoy- 
ance at  the  receipt  of  the  invitation),  a  claimant  to 
the  throne  should  be  put  forward  in  the  person  of 
Abdur-Rahman-Khan,  who  is  residing  in  Samarcand; 
by  which  means  internal  dissensions  might  be  brought 
about  in  Afghanistan,  while  on  the  other  hand  Persia 
might  be  conveniently  urged  to  renew  her  claims  to 
Herat.  By  turning  Persia's  attention  to  Afghanistan, 
we  should  divert  her  military  forces  from  the  Cau- 
casus. The  march  of  the  Persian  troops  to  Herat 
would  call  into  requisition  all  the  supplies  and  means 
of  transport  of  the  country,  and  this  would  most 
effectually  paralyse  any  English  plan  of  an  advance 
from  the  Persian  gulf  to  Tiflis. 

"  The  invading  column  having  left  Samarcand, 
another  should  be  at  once  formed  in  that  place  of 
two  battalions  of  infantry,  and  i6  sotnias  of  Cossacks, 
with  one  battery  of  artillery  for  the  purpose  of  oc- 
cupying points  along  our  line  of  communication  and 
for  general  service  in  the  rear. 

"  Without  entering  into  details,  I  would  divide  the 
campaign  into  two  periods.  The  first  period  should 
be    one    of   extremely    rapid    action,    of   diplomatic 


PliOJECTS  FOR  THE  INVASION  OF  INDIA.    281 

negotiation  with  Afghanistan,  supported  by  an 
advance  of  the  column  to  Cabul.  The  second  period, 
commencing  with  the  occupation  of  Cabul,  should 
be  a  waiting  period,  during  which  we  should  main- 
tain relations  with  the  disaffected  elements  in  India, 
giving  them  the  means  to  express  themselves  in  the 
way  best  calculated  to  serve  our  interests  (the 
principle  reason  of  the  failure  of  the  Mutiny  in  1857 
was  want  of  organization  on  the  part  of  the  rebels), 
and  finally- — as  also  chiefly — to  organize  masses  of 
Asiatic  cavalry  which,  to  a  cry  of  blood  and  booty, 
might  be  launched  into  India,  as  the  vanguard  ;  thus 
renewing  the  times  of  Timur. 

"  The  further  operations  of  the  Russian  column 
from  Cabul  cannot  be  sketched  in  this  plan  of  cam- 
paign. At  best  the  operations  might  terminate  in 
the  presence  of  the  Russian  banners  at  Benares ; 
at  worst,  the  column  would  retire  with  honour  to 
Herat,  meeting  a  force  despatched  from  the  Cau- 
casus, which  should  consist  of  several  battalions, 
with  6  guns  to  every  i  ,000  men.  An  Asiatic  force, 
especially  the  Turcomans,  are  not  formidable  in  the 
open  field ;  and  even  the  invincible  English  army 
would  thaw  away*  very  considerably  in  marching  to 

*  "  The  acclimatized  Russian  troops  are  undoubtedly  better  qualified  than 
English  soldiers  to  endure  the  hardship  of  a  Central  Asian  campaign." — 
"  History  of  the  ITar  in  A/ghariistau,"  by  J.  W.  Kaye. 


282         RUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

Herat.  Nor  are  the  English  in  a  position  to  march  a 
body  of  more  than  25,000  men  beyond  the  frontier 
of  India,  and  of  these  a  large  number  would  have  to 
be  told  off  along  the  line  of  communication.  It  is 
at  the  same  time  not  to  be  forgotten  that  the 
Turkestan  province  would  be  on  the  flank  of  the 
enemv's  line  of  communication,  and  that  our  re- 
sources  would  increase  as  we  drew  nearer  to  the 
Caspian. 

"  I  have  already  said  that  this  enterprise  would  be 
attended  with  risk.  But  it  would  be  justified  by  the 
greatness  of  the  object  in  view  and  by  the  immea- 
surable vastness  of  its  possible  results.  From  the 
standpoint  of  these  results  there  can  be  for  Russia 
no  question  as  to  risk,  and,  as  to  Turkestan,  it  is 
not  worth  mentioning. 

"  From  the  troops  who  should  be  so  fortunate  as  to 
be  selected  for  this  campaign,  we  should  expect 
something  even  more  than  self-sacrifice  in  the 
highest  sense  of  the  word  as  it  is  understood  by 
military  men. 

"  Upon  crossing  the  Hindu-Kush  the  column 
should,  in  my  opinion,  be  so  managed  that  every 
man  might  feel  that  he  had  come  to  Afghanistan  to 
conquer  or  to  die  ;  that  each  man  might  know  that 


PROJECTS  FOR  THE  INVASION  OF  INDIA.     283 

the  Emperor  required  even  his  death.  We  should 
not  be  reproached  for  leaving  our  standards  in  the 
hands  of  the  enemy  if  not  a  single  Russian 
warrior  remained  alive  beyond  the  Hindu-Kush. 

"  Such  a  feeling  and  such  a  determination  can,  in 
my  opinion,  be  based  only  on  the  sentiment  com- 
monly cherished  by  every  soldier  in  the  army,  of  an 
unswerving  and  boundless  love  for  and  devotion  to 
his  monarch.  The  difficulty  of  exalting  the  spirit 
of  the  column  to  a  pitch  corresponding  with  the 
nature  of  the  enterprise,  could  best  be  met  by 
attaching  one  of  the  Emperor's  sons,  who  at  the 
proper  time  might  tell  the  troops  what  was  expected 
of  them  by  the  Czar  and  by  their  country.  I  am 
perfectly  assured  that  this  column,  favoured  by  the 
presence  of  one  of  His  Majesty's  sons,  would  do 
wonders,  and  would  in  no  case  disgrace  the  Russian 
name. 

"  During  the  course  of  their  lo  years'  experience  in 
this  region,  the  Turkestan  troops  have  become 
trained  to  a  systematic  mode  of  military  operations 
founded  on  a  knowledge  of  local  conditions,  of  the 
nature  of  their  opponents,  but  principally  on  a  con- 
sciousness of  their  readiness  at  any  time  to  take  the 
field.     All  this  enables  them   to  plan  operations  in 


284        EUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

the  future  in  accordance  with  the  military  resources 
of  Turkestan.  If  we  continue  to  handle  our  troops 
as  they  have  hitherto  been  handled  we  shall  not 
meet  with  any  insurmountable  obstacles  in  Central 
Asia. 

"  Asiatic  crowds  may  inconvenience  us,  but  they 
cannot  hinder  us  in  the  accomplishment  of  our  de- 
signs. We  have  reached  the  stage  in  which,  with 
judicious  and  systematic  action, — possessing  artillery 
and  ammunition  beyond  the  proportions  needed  in 
European  warfare, — we  can  strike  with  effect  in  the 
open  field  and  in  the  mountains.  We  can  now  do 
this,  I  repeat,  without  sustaining  any  loss,  being 
thoroughly  versed  in  military  operations.  In  a  word, 
with  our  present  experience,  with  our  excellent,  and, 
in  my  opinion,  sufficiently  numerous  troops,  and  with 
the  resources  which  we  command,  there  is  no  Asia 
capable  of  preventing  us  from  carrying  out  the 
broadest  strategical  designs  which  we  might  con- 
ceive. 

"  Our  policy  of  the  last  ten  years  has  raised  the 
significance  of  Russia  in  the  world.  In  the  opinion 
of  the  English,  as  also  of  the  Asiatics,  there  are  no 
limits  to  the  grand  operations  of  our  Government. 
The  security  of  our  position  rests  mainly  upon  the 


PROJECTS  FOR  THE  INVASION  OF  INDIA.     285 

effect  of  this  belief.  I  was  greatly  struck  by  an  ob- 
servation by  Colonel  Cory,  in  his  '  Shadows  of 
Coming  Events ;  or,  the  Eastern  Menace/  to  the 
effect  that  he  could  not  picture  to  his  imagination  a 
power  in  Turkestan  othenvise  than  in  connection 
with  Russia  by  a  direct  line  of  rail  between  Chardjui, 
on  the  Oxus,  and  Moscow.  The  Asiatics  believe, 
up  to  the  present  moment,  that  the  Russians  spit 
fire  when  they  make  a  rush  with  a  cheer. 

"  A  knowledge  of  this  region,  and  of  its  re- 
sources, leads  inevitably  to  the  conclusion  that  our 
presence  in  Turkestan,  in  pursuance  of  Russian 
interests,  is  justifiable  solely  on  the  ground  of  an 
endeavour  to  solve  the  Eastern  question  in  our  own 
favour  from  this  quarter.  Otherwise  the  hide  is  not 
worth  the  tanning,  and  all  the  money  sunk  in 
Turkestan  is  lost.  We  should  beware  lest  we 
prove  to  our  enemies,  by  inaction  in  Asia  at  a 
critical  moment  in  the  West,  how  aimless  have  been 
our  annexations ;  this,  too,  would  most  certainly 
involve  a  loss  of  influence,  and  would  necessitate  in 
the  future  a  still  larger  unproductive  outlay.  I  re- 
peat that,  with  a  force  of  40,000  men  as  a  minimum^ 
dexterously  handled,  we  might  not  only  keep  in 
restraint  all  Turkestan,  Kashgar,  and  Bokhara  com- 


286         RUSSIAN-  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 


bined  in  hostilities  against  us,  but  even — and  I 
say  it  boldly — evacuate  Turkestan  and  re-conquer 
it. 

"  In  case  of  need  we  could  increase  our  forces 
here  by  6  regiments  of  mounted  Siberian  Cossacks 
{:^6  sotnias),  several  companies  from  Western 
Siberia  (6  sotnias),  i  battery  (8  guns)  of  artillery, 
and  perhaps  3  regiments  (18  sotnias)  from  Oren- 
burg. 

*'  We  must  bear  in  mind  that  in  despatching  say 
from  16,000  to  20,000  men  across  the  Hindu-Kush 
with  a  corresponding  force  of  artillery,  of  which  we 
have  no  lack  in  Turkestan,  being  reinforced  as 
above,  we  should  still  have  31,000  men  left  to 
garrison  the  province  ;  and  this,  too,  without  drawing 
on  the  Oxus  detachment  (2  battalions,  4  sotnias, 
and  2  field  guns),  and  without  taking  into  account 
the  troops  in  the  Trans-Caspian  region. 

"We  have  doubtless  a  great  deal  more  to  go 
through  in  the  future  in  Central  Asia.  But  the 
present  generation  of  Mahomedans  born  under  the 
aegis  of  Russian  law  has  first  to  grow  up  into  man- 
hood ;  ere  that  time  an  entire  class  of  influential 
natives  well  acquainted  with  us,  and  recognising  the 
causes  of  our  power  and  of  our  success,  will  spring 


PROJECTS  FOR  THE  INVASION  OF  INDIA.     287 

up.  The  notorious  Nana  Sahib  was  educated  among 
Europeans  and  was  received  in  the  best  EngHsh 
society,  and  it  was  only  on  that  account  that  he  was 
such  a  terror  to  the  EngHsh.  We  have  as  yet  no 
such  elements  in  our  midst,  and  in  this  circumstance 
lies  one  of  our  positive  advantages  over  the  English. 
When  political  events  in  the  West  are  coming  to  a 
crisis  this  important  consideration,  coupled  with 
many  others,  should  urge  us  to  derive  all  the  benefit 
out  of  Turkestan  which  that  province  is  capable  of 
yielding  us. 

"  '  In  Asia,  when  triumphs  cease  difficulties  com- 
mence.' * 

"  This  is  undoubtedly  true.  In  a  political  sense  we 
are  now  living  in  a  period  of  triumphs.  Let  us  profit 
by  it. 

"  You  see  how  much  I  expect  from  our  might  in 
Central  Asia.  Having  for  some  considerable  time 
shared  with  the  Turkestan  forces  in  the  hardships  of 
campaigning,  I  do  not  wish  to  exchange  active 
service  here  for  any  other  elsewhere.  I  could  not, 
however,  remain  inactive  in  this  place  while  the 
greater  part  of  our  army  was  shedding  its  blood  in 
the  country's   cause  in  the   West.     That  is  why  I 

*  Correspondence  of  the  Duke  of  Wellington  with  Lord  Auckland,  1839. 


288        BUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

beg  you  again  to  bear  me  in  mind  in  the  event  of  a 

declaration  of  war. 

"  Michael   Skobeleff. 

"  P.S. — I  enclose  some  general  orders  to  our  troops 
in  Ferghana,  in  illustration  of  our  mode  of  life  here. 
Peruse  them,  and  give  me  your  opinion  upon  them. 

"  I  have  just  received  the  Golos  of  the  29th 
December  1876,  and  I  observe  from  the  leading 
article  in  it  that  '  a  declaration  of  war  by  Russia 
against  the  Ottoman  Porte  is  a  desideratum  of  our 
enemies,'  that  *  Europe  has  entangled  the  question, 
and  trusts  to  Russia's  impatience,'  and  further,  that 
'  the  circumstances  are  such  that  a  thorough  and 
quick  solution  of  the  question  is  perfectly  impos- 
sible.' 

"  To  us,  who  are  acquainted  with  our  own  military 
resources  in  Asia,  the  Eastern  question,  of  which 
the  solution  should  be  fearful  only  to  the  foes  of 
Russia,  presents  itself  otherwise. 

"  So  long  ago  as  in  the  third  decade  of  the  present 
century.  General  Field  Marshal  Count  Moltke  dwelt 
on  the  impossibility  of  achieving  rapid  results  in 
European  Turkey,  and  considered  that  it  would  be  a 
matter  of  great  difficulty  to  conduct  a  war  in  that 
country  without  the  aid  of  a  powerful  fleet  and  an 


PROJECTS  FOR  THE  INVASION  OF  INDIA.    289 

absolute  mastery  of  the  Black  Sea.  Field  Marshal 
Prince  Varshafski  gave  it  as  his  opinion  in  1829  that 
aggressive  operations  in  Asia  would  be  of  but  little 
importance,  seeing  that  there  was  no  great  and  all- 
determining  point  of  attack,  although  he  considered 
the  trade  routes  connecting  Bagdad  with  Scutari 
the  best  objectives  in  this  respect.  The  construction 
of  the  Suez  Canal  has,  however,  deprived  even  this 
line  of  all  significance. 

"  One  might  for  this  reason  positively  assert  that, 
however  successfully  we  might  conduct  a  campaign 
in  European  and  in  Asiatic  Turkey,  yet  we  should 
vainly  seek  there  for  a  solution  of  the  Eastern  ques- 
tion. A  sincere  behaviour  on  the  part  of  England, 
in  conformity  with  the  interests  of  our  Government, 
in  so  far  as  I  comprehend  the  question,  might, 
indeed,  lead  to  the  satisfaction  of  our  legitimate 
demands.  Therefore  I  imagine  we  should  not  have 
two  opinions  on  the  matter  of  a  war  with  England. 
Without  a  formal  declaration  of  war,  England  might 
still  be  at  war  with  us  by  sending  oflficers  to  the 
Turkish  army  and  by  helping  Turkey  with  supplies, 
I  "  Would  it  not   be  best  to  avail  ourselves  of  our 

strong  strategical  position   in   Central  Asia,  of  our 
better  acquaintance  with  the  communications  in  and 

W 


'I 


290        RUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

resources  of  Central  Asia,  in  order  to  strike  a  deadly 
blow  at  our  real  enemies  in  the  doubtful  event  of  the 
evidence  of  our  determination  to  operate  against 
their  most  vulnerable  point  being  alone  insufficient 
to  make  them  pliant  ? 

"  The  condition  of  affairs  is  apparently  grave  ; 
therefore,  while  resolving  to  maintain  only  a  de- 
fensive attitude  on  the  Danube  and  in  Asiatic 
Turkey,  we  might  satisfy  ourselves  with  landing 
30,000  men  at  Astrabad  to  march  to  Cabul,  in  con- 
junction with  the  Turkestan  troops.  By  this  means 
we  should  free  the  Russian  army  in  Europe  and  in 
Asia  Minor  from  those  embarrassments  against 
which  it  fights,  periodically,  without  success,  several 
times  in  the  course  of  every  century. 

"  It  is  not  for  me  to  say  how  we  are  to  defend  the 
Caucasus  against  a  Turkish  invasion,  nor  how  long 
the  army  of  the  Danube  might  remain  in  a  purely 
defensive  attitude  in  the  midst  of  the  helpless 
Christian  population  of  Turkey,  but  it  is  my  positive 
opinion  that, — 

"  I.  If  under  the  existing  circumstances  of  the 
extent  of  the  British  authority  in  India  the  invasion 
of  India  with  a  corps  of  18,000  men  is  a  possibility 
and  a  desirabihty,   although  attended  with  risk^  an 


PROJECTS  FOR  THE  INVASION  OF  IXDIA.     291 

invasion  with  a  force  of  50,000  men  is  perfectly  free 
from  all  risk. 

"  2.  We  command  on  the  Caspian  from  the  early 
spring  the  means  to  concentrate  with  rapidity  a 
force  of  30,000  men  at  Astrabad  fully  provided 
for. 

"  3.  A  large  force  can  easily  march  from  Astrabad 
to  Herat  and  to  Cabul.  By  exercising  a  political 
pressure  on  Persia,  we  might  draw  all  our  supplies 
from  Khorassan. 

"4.  The  Turkestan  military  district,  reinforced  with 
six  regiments  of  Siberian  CoLsacks,  three  regiments 
or  Orenburg  Cossacks,  six  companies  of  infantry, 
and  one  battery  of  artillery  from  Western  Siberia 
(these  troops  might  reach  Taskhend  by  springtime), 
could  send  a  body  of  18,000  men  with  artillery  to 
Cabul. 

"5.  The  troops  can  be  marched  from  Samarcand 
to  the  Hindu-Kush,  and  can  be  further  marched  from 
Khullum  through  Haibuk,  Kurram,  and  Bamian  and 
across  the  Kora-Kotul,  Dendan-Shiken,  Ak-Robat, 
Kalui,  Hadjikhak,  and  Unai  passes,  into  the  valley 
of  Cabul-Daria.  Although  artillery  has  been  taken 
over  the  above-named  passes  without  extra  appli- 
ances,   I   have  nevertheless  given    my  attention  to 


292         RUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGAINST  INDIA. 

this  subject  with  the  view  of  faclhtating  the  passage 
of  guns. 

"  I  am  now  in  a  position  to  state  that  we  have  an 
easy  method  of  transporting  guns ;  yesterday  a 
4-pounder  was  slung  under  a  newly-contrived  cart, 
and  a  trial  with  it  was  successfully  made.  On  the 
merits  of  this  mode  of  transport  we  can  pronounce 
only  in  February  next  after  practical  experience  ;  a 
trial  is  to  be  made  with  two  guns  over  the  snow- 
covered  mountains  in  this  region. 

"6.  Shir-Ali,  the  successor  of  Dost  Mahommed, 
must  necessarily  contemplate  the  recovery  of 
Peshawer,  and  it  is  not  difficult  to  raise  all  Asia 
against  India  to  a  cry  of  '  blood  and  booty.' 

''  7.  Shir-AH  is  at  present  dissatisfied  with  the 
English. 

"8.  There  are  barely  more  than  60,000  British 
soldiers  in  India  at  present,  with  a  corresponding 
force  of  artillery,  and  the  Native  army  is  more  a 
menace  than  a  support  to  the  rulers  of  India. 

"  9.  The  very  appearance  of  even  a  small  force  on 
the  Indian  frontier  is  enough  to  raise  a  rebellion  in 
India,  and  to  ensure  the  overthrow  of  the  British 
dominion. 


PROJECTS  FOR  THE  INVASION  OF  INDIA.     293 

"All  this  should,  in  my  mind,  betaken  into  serious 
consideration  at  the  present  moment. 
"  Khokand,  27th  January,  1877." 

The  following  comments  on  the  late  General 
Skobeleff's  Letter  are  made  by  the  Editor  of  the 
"Historical  Review" : — 

*'  Six  years  have  rolled  away  since  the  above  words 
rang  out,  since  the  patriot  wrote  that  when  it  is  a 
question  of  the  welfare  of  Russia  there  can  be  no 
question  of  risk,  for  Russian  soldiers  beyond  the 
Hindu-Kush  will  know,  if  needs  be,  how  to  die  to 
the  last  man.  Six  years  have  elapsed,  years  preg- 
nant with  so  much  !  The  war  in  which  the  late 
General  so  modestly  begged  to  be  allowed  to  par- 
ticipate was  declared  :  the  campaign  was  brilliantly 
gained  by  the  army,  but  lost  by  diplomacy.  An 
embassy  under  General  Stolietoff  was  sent  to  Shir- 
Ali,  and  it  returned,  we  know  how  from  Dr. 
Yavorski's  book.  The  brilliant  Akhal-Teke  cam- 
paign improved  the  condition  of  our  Turkestan 
frontier.  Much  else  has  changed  during  the  last 
six  years.  Many  actors  in  the  political  arena  have 
disappeared,  together  with  Skobeleff  himself.  And 
the  operations  of  the  English  in  Egypt,  with  their 


294        RUSSIAN  PROJECTS  AGANIST  INDIA. 

practical  sovereignty  over  that  country,  have 
materially  altered  the  aspect  of  the  Eastern  ques- 
tion, and  in  military  respects  have  changed  its 
character.  Nor  have  the  EngHsh  successes  in 
Afghanistan  failed  to  affect  the  problems  of  our 
future  policy  in  Turkestan.  All  this  has  tended  to 
change  the  historical  significance  of  the  intermin- 
able Eastern  question,  both  from  the  EngHsh  and 
Russian  points  of  view. 

''  We  cannot  tell  whether  the  author  of  the  above 
letter  would  have  held  to  his  opinions  if  he  had  lived 
till  now  ;  whether  he  would  still  have  considered  that 
the  Achilles'  heel  of  the  British  power  is  in  India, 
that  the  Gordian  knot  of  the  Eastern  question  is  to 
be  cut  there  after  the  fashion  of  Timur,  in  order  that 
Russia  may  gain  possession  of  the  gateway  to  her 
own  Black  Sea.  We  can  receive  no  direct  answer 
to  these  inquiries  ;  the  heart  of  the  patriot  has 
,  ceased  to  beat ;  his  great  mind  works  for  us  no 
more.  One  thing,  however,  is  certain,  that  others 
equally  large-minded  and  penetrating  will  ever  find 
a  simple  and  ready  solution  for  every  question  at 
the  time  of  necessary  action.  They  will  not,  of 
course,  refer  to  historical  characters  like  Skobeleff 
for  guidance  in  matters  of  detail,  which   must  be 


PROJECTS  FOR  THE  INVASION  OF  INDIA.     295 

governed  by  changing  circumstances,  but  they  will 
nevertheless  find  much  that  is  worthy  of  emulation 
in  his  manner  of  acting  with  boldness,  in  the  strength 
of  his  convictions,  in  the  soundness  and  fearless- 
ness of  his  deductions.  It  is  in  this  sense  that  the 
document  which  we  publish  here  is  historically 
instructive." 


THE    END. 


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