Russia on the Pacific, and the Siberian railway

RUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

PRINTED BY

SPOTTISWOODE AND CO., NEW-STRKET SQUARE

LONDON

RUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

AND THE

SIBERIAN RAILWAY

BY

VLADIMIE

AUTHOR OF 'the CHINA -JAPAN WAR'

8785

' Ty4a,, rut iiapcTBOBfi.i^ Hdnrnr^ '

' There where Genghiz reigned '

(From the Verses recited in honour of Muravioff on the 9th May, 1S54)

WITH MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS

LONDON

SAMPSON LOW, MARSTON & COMPANY

(LIMITED)

Ipubltsbers to tbe 5nC>ia ©fSce
1899

00^

liOS AJiGBUHG, CAU.

TO MY EEADEES

My last book, on the events which revealed to the world
the rising young nation of the Far East, met with such
unexpected success, and was so kindly reviewed, that I
feel encouraged to publish the results of my studies on
the expansion of that European nation which has two
centuries of history in the Far East, though the fact has
only lately attracted public attention. I have treated at
some length ancient history both in Russia and Siberia,
but I thought such treatment was necessary to enable the
reader to form just notions of present conditions. Great
ignorance prevails about Russia, even in the most unex-
pected quarters, as will appear by the following extract.

In the ' Nineteenth Century ' for June 1898, No. 256,
in an article by Mr. H. M. Stanley, M.P., ' Splendid Isola-
tion or What ? ' at p. 873 there is th^following passage : —

' Is this picture far-fetched ? He who dares say so
betrays his ignorance of the rate of Russian progress over
Asia. Twenty-eight years ago she had just effected a
landing on the eastern shore of the Caspian. During this

vi BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

short interval she has stridden across the continent, and
is now at Port Arthur preparing for the locomotive from
St. Petersbm-g.'

Here we have a prominent man upbraiding people for
ignoring what is historically false. Russia has not stridden
across the continent in the last twenty-eight years ; she
did traverse Asia very rapidly — in about half a century —
but it was more than two centuries ago.

As I studied the history of Russia and of her expansion
in Northern Asia, I had gradually to discard the prejudices
and false notions which are generally entertained about
Russia in "Western Europe. It is my object, therefore, to
dispel in the minds of the public the errors which I formerly
entertained, and to give a clear idea of Russia's work in
the world. It is only at present that, as with Great
Britain, the real mission of Russia, her extra-European
and world-mission, is appearing before men's minds. For
the future history of the world, the conquest of Siberia
will be more important than most of the modern history
of European Russia.

The subject has been difficult because the Russians
themselves have not paid much attention to it, and I fear
that, like most Westerners, I have committed many
blunders. I have, however, spared no pains to perform
my work conscientiously. I have studied the language
carefully, and I spent four months in travelling across the
Empire, from Vladivostok to the frontier of Galicia. I
have also had the kind assistance of a cultured Russian
nobleman, both in my travels and in my studies, and I
have had thus the opportunity of seeing things from a

TO MY BEADEBS vii

Russian point of view — the most important when one
wishes to sketch the history of the country.

The critics of my former work paid me the flattering
compHment of supposing I was a Japanese, and I wish,
though I can hardly hope, that my assiduous study of a
little-known subject may lead them to suppose now that
I am a Eussian.

The following works will be found useful by those
who wish to improve their knowledge of the subject : —

EUSSIAN.

SoLOviEFF : History of Bitssia.

Andkievitch : History of Siberia and Siberia in the Nineteenth Century.
Saiovnikoff : Our Colonial Pioneers.

Lieut.-Col. Eagoza : Short Account of the Occupation of the Amur
Region.

Anonymous : History of the River Amur (St. Petersburg, 1859).
Baesukoff : Count Muravioff-AmursM (biographical materials).
Ministry of Finance .: Siberia and the Great Siberian Railway.
Maximoff : Oior Problems on the Pacific.
Kraefski : World Transit and the Siberian Raihvay.

FEENCH.
t

Du Hailly : Revue des Deux Mondes, August 1, September 1, 1858
(account of the war in the Pacific).

ENGLISH.

Atkinson's boob on the Amur.

Prince Wolkonski : Pictiires of Russian History and Russian Litera-
ture (Lamson, Wolflfe & Co., Boston, New York, and London).

This last work will be invaluable to persons desirous
of forming clear general views about Eussia.

CONTENTS

PAGE

INTRODUCTION v

LIST OF AUTHORS . . .• vii

CHAP.

^ I. THE EXPANSION TO THE URAL 1

\

A n. THE CONQUEST OF SIBERIA 44 \/

_ III. THE STRUGGLE FOR THE AMUR 100

■~ IV. THE HALT IN THE FAR EAST 140

, V. THE ANNEXATION OF THE AMUR REGION . . . 173

VI. THE SIBERIAN RAILWAY 270

_ VII. CONCLUSION - 314

APPENDIX—

I. Treaty of Nertchinsk, August 27, 1689, O.S. . . . 343

II. Convention of Aigun, May 16, 1858 346

III. Convention of Peking, November 2, 1860 .... 348

IV. Protocol of the Peking Convention 358

V. Lease op Port Arthur and Ta-lien-wan, March 27, 1808 . 360

INDEX 363

a

ILLUSTEATIONS

PLATES

I. YERMAK

From the Statue by Antokolski.

To face p. 64

II. VIEW ON THE AMUR

From photograph by the Author.

104

III. STATUE OF MURAVIOFF AT KHABAROFSK „ 264

From photograph by the Author.

IV. A RUSSIAN SENTINEL .... ,,300

From photograph by the Author.

V. CLIFF ON THE AMUR (where the Cossacks

CHEEBBD THE TsESARIEVITCH AS HE PASSED) .

From photograph by the Author.

340

MAPS

I. HISTORICAL MAP OF RUSSIA IN THE
FIFTEENTH CENTURY ....

30

II. GENERAL MAP FOR THE CONQUEST OF
SIBERIA

48

xii BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

III. MAP SHOWING THE COUNTRY TRAVERSED

BY YERMAK To face p. 56

This map also serves to show the present railway
connecting the basins of the Volga and Ob,
ayid the river-steamer conununications of Western
Siberia.

IV. MAP SHOWING THE COMMUNICATIONS BE-

TWEEN THE OB AND YENISSEI RIVEKS . ,, 70

It also serves to show the Ob-Yenissei canal.

V. MAP SHOWING THE COMMUNICATIONS BE-
TWEEN THE YENISSEI AND LENA RIVERS ,, 78

VI. MAP OF THE AMUR REGION . . . „ 176

VII. PLAN OF THE ATTACK ON PETROPAVLOFSK ,, 216

VIII. MAP OF THE SIBERIAN RAILWAY . . „ 272

RUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

CHAPTER I

THE EXPANSION TO THE UEAL

The northern part of the old continent forms an almost
continuous plain from the Pacific Ocean to the shores of
the Baltic and Black Sea. This striking geographical
similarity has affected the whole history of the races that
have dwelt there at different periods. The few mountain
chains such as the Ural and the Yablonoi are of such in-
considerable height that they form no permanent obstacle
to men accustomed to roam for hundreds and thousands
of miles on the boundless prairies. This absence of
natural boundaries has led the nomad races of a primitive
state of society to wander almost along the whole length
of the ancient continent, while it has facilitated the forma-
tion of huge empires when the genius of a conqueror like
Genghis Khan or the powerful political organisation of
Moscow has appeared on the field of history. The same
causes have produced these various effects, and the present
division of European and Asiatic Russia is only a modern
counterpart of the European and Asiatic Scythia of
Herodotus. The whole region offers such a sameness of
features that it forms a geographical unit, and its inhabi-
tants are bound either by identity of life and customs or
by a common political power.

B

2 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

In the early ages, when, through scarcity of population
and absence of cultivation of the soil, nomadic habits
prevailed, almost the whole region was overrun by
Asiatic races which, pressing westwards in successive
waves, constituted those terrible invaders known in
European history as the Huns, the Magyars, and the
Mongols, besides others only known to Russian history.
In modern times the process has been reversed ; a single
race, Christian and civilised, of sedentary habits, has
slowly but steadily pushed westwards, conquering as
much by its ;^olicy and culture as by the sword its former
conquerors — the Asiatic nomads which destroyed the
Boman empires of the East and West.' This has been
accomplished by the principal branch of that great Slav
race which is still so young that it may be said to have
only lately made its appearance in history.

Before examining how this long march of conquest
was accomplished, it will be necessary to briefly sketch
the origin and early vicissitudes of the race. By this
method the following events will stand in their true light,
not as accidental enterprises of bold adventurers, but as
necessary consequences of a whole series of historical
antecedents. These consequences were doubtless hastened
by the character of the men who had a hand in their
accomplishment, but their advent had already been
fatally indicated far back in the past.

Our earliest knowledge of the Slav races only goes
back to the ninth century, when they occupied a tract of
country extending from the Balkans and the Adriatic to
the Baltic, and from the Elbe to Lake Ladoga, the upper
course of the Volga and Oka, and the course of the
Dnieper. They thus occupied the greater part of Prussia,

* Though Rome was destroyed by the Germans, its fall was indirectly due
to the pressure of the Asiatic hordes and to the conquests of Attila.

THE EXPANSION TO THE UBAL 3

Austria, and the Balkan peninsula, but only a small por-
tion of modern European Kussia: the modern cities of
St. Petersburg and Moscow indicate approximately their
extreme northern and western frontiers. The Slavs are
supposed to have come from the banks of the Danube ^ ;
an origin which would show that in prehistoric times the
direction of their migrations had been north and east.
This tendency has continued in later times, as we now
find the Slavs pushed back from the Elbe on the west,
and struggling for independence on the south, while they
have extended over the whole northern part of the
continent, far away east up to the Pacific.

It will not be necessary to pay much attention to the
political development of the western and southern Slavs,
as it does not concern the subject we are treating ; and
indeed later the political power of the Poles had rather
an adverse influence. The north-eastern Slavs, or the
ancestors of the present Eussians, were at a very early
age divided into many independent tribes or races ^ who
lived in constant discord. Their mutual warfare rendered
them an easy prey to their neighbours, whom their
united strength could have easily vanquished. This fact
should be borne in mind, as therein lies, as we shall see,
the explanation of the modern political organisation of
the present Russian empire.

In the ninth century the scattered, disunited Eussian
races were subject to attacks from southern and northern
enemies. The southern invaders, the Kozari, a nomadic
race dwelling on the Don and the Volga, in that steppa
region which was the bane of early Eussia, were so suc-
cessful that they imposed a tribute ' on the southern

' Solovieff , History of Russia.

* Ilmenski, Krivichi, Polochane, Kadimichi, Viatichi, Sieveriane,
Drevliane, Poliane, Volynane, Uglichi.
^ A squirrel from each hearth.

B 2

4 BUS SI A ON THE PACIFIC

Eussians. The northern foes, called the Varaghi by the
Russians, were the Normans or Northmen of western
history. They plundered and conquered the Eussians
and also the Finnish tribes, who then occupied the whole
of North Eussia up to St. Petersburg. For a short time
the Eussians united, and drove away the Scandinavian
invaders ; but as soon as the foreign enemy had ceased to
be dangerous, the usual internal troubles broke out. The
confusion was so great that at last the Ilmenski and
Krivichi sent ambassadors to their former foes — the
Varaghi — to search for princes to govern them. The
envoys said, according to the ancient chronicles : ' Our
country is large and abundant, but there is no order ;
come over and be our princes, and govern us.' In
response to this invitation (a.d. 862) Euric and two other
Scandinavian chieftains came over ; the former reigned
in Novgorod to the south of St. Petersburg, the present
capital of Eussia ; the two others ruled the country
around Lake Onega,^ and part of the present government
of Pskof. By the early death of his fellow princes, Euric
remained sole lord of the northern Slavs, and he left the
throne to his descendants, from whom most of the noble
Eussian families claim their descent.

The route selected by Euric for effecting his conquests
was similar to that chosen by his brethren, the dreaded
sea-kings of Western Europe ; he followed the natural
water-ways, passing from the Baltic to Lake Ladoga, and
to the river Volkhof, where he halted at the town of
Novgorod. His successors extended their conquests in
the same direction, passing from Lake Ilmen to the river
Lovat, whence they crossed the water-shed and descended
by the Dnieper, taking in succession Smolensk and Kief.
This latter town, which had been already occupied by

' Then inhabited by Finnish races (Solovieff, History of Russia).

THE EXPANSION TO THE UBAL 5

some Varaghian adventurers styled usurpers by their
more powerful brethren of Novgorod, now (a.d. 882)
became the capital of the embryo Eussian state.

This change of capital was of the greatest importance
for the whole future history of the people. Novgorod
was in water communication with the Baltic, the sea of
the wild heathen Scandinavians, while Kief, by the
Dnieper, communicated with the Black Sea, at whose
outlet lay Constantinople, the only centre of civilisation
in Europe at that dark period. The immediate results
which followed in quick succession were : first piratical
attacks on the Greek empire ; then a series of wars and
treaties, which gradually established commercial and
diplomatic relations between the two states, culminating
in the marriage of a Eussian sovereign with a Greek
princess.

Oleg, the immediate successor of Euric (a.d. 879-912),
led an expedition of 2,000 boats against Constantinople.
The Eussians at that period employed canoes formed of a
single huge trunk dug out, with the sides raised by
planks. In these rude craft they boldly navigated the
Dnieper and the Black Sea, beaching their boats and
dragging them overland whenever necessary. Sviatoslav
(957-972) had a long series of wars with the Greeks in
consequence of his conquests in Bulgaria. His object
was to extend the Eussian dominions southwards, and to
transfer the capital to a city on the Danube. But the
Byzantine empire still possessed too much power, and
the Eussians, notwithstanding their reckless bravery, were
obliged to retreat. The next sovereign, Vladimir, also
warred with the Greeks until he married the Grecian
princess, Anna. This marriage brought about the most
important event in the ancient history of the country : the

6 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

conversion to Christianity (a.d. 988) of Vladimir and his
people.

In little over a centurj^ the successors of Kuric had
gradually extended their sway over the country along the
great water-ways between the Baltic and Black Sea,
which had already been used as the great commercial
route of Eastern Europe.^ Their expansion was from
north to south, and was only stopped by the Byzantine
empire. Their contact with the only poHshed people of
Europe not only brought Christianity, but a certain
degree of cultm^e : reading, writing, and a knowledge of
architecture, necessary for the construction of the
churches erected in all the towns, were derived from
the Greeks. As the Russians received Christianity from
Constantinople they adopted the Orthodox creed ; this
fact was of great consequence to their future history. The
final separation and bitter hostility of the Greek and
Latin Churches created a barrier, almost impassable in
the Dark Ages, between Eussia and the rest of Europe,
which had received its Christianity from Eome. The
isolation of Eussia was increased by later events, which
cut off her communications even with Constantinople,
and she was left to develop her national life under almost
exclusively Asiatic influences.

The united state which Euric and his successors had
created by their valour and wisdom, and which had put
an end to dissensions and the shameful tribute to the
hordes of the steppes, was mifortunately of short duration.
The kingdom declined into a form of feudalism peculiar
to Eussian history. At the death of the sovereign,
Yaroslav the Wise (A.D. 1054), his lands were divided
among his children, and this system was continued by

' Nearly along the line of the recently projected canal between the
Baltic and Black Sea.

THE EXPANSION TO THE UBAL 7

all the new princes, who at death bequeathed appanages
to their several descendants. The only check on this
indefinite subdivision of the country lay in the ambition
of the petty princes : the weaker states being often
absorbed by the stronger. These feeble attempts at
reunion of the country were dearly paid for by the evils
of incessant warfare and malevolent intriguing between
the petty feudatories.

The history of Russia went back two centuries : the
renewed dissensions brought back the old attacks from
north and south, from the Scandinavians and nomads of
the steppes. The latter had never desisted from their
pillaging raids on the Russians, inflicting severe losses
even when the country was united under the Varaghian
sovereigns ; but after long struggles they had been repulsed
and they vanished from history, never to appear again,
as was the fate of the Pechenegs. But their place was
taken by fresh hordes from Asia.

The broad plain which extends from the Ural moun-
tains to the Caspian Sea has been always the open gate
through which Asiatic invasions have poured into Europe.
In the second half of the eleventh century the Polovtsy
penetrated into Europe through this highway, over-
whelmed the Pechenegs, and spread over the whole of
Southern Russia. The vast plain which forms the
eastern part of Europe was covered by dense forests in
the north at that period, and offered considerable natural
difficulties to the raids of the nomads ; but the southern
part, the steppe, was covered only by thick vegetation of
tall grass and wild flowers (so picturesquely described by
Gogol ') which served only to hide in their ' green
embrace ' the advancing swarms of predatory horsemen.

The Polovtsy, following the custom of their prede-
' Tarass Bulba.

8 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

cessors, the Pechenegs, made annual incursions among
the Eussians, destroying, pillaging, and carrying into
captivity the unfortunate peasants. This new and
formidable enemy did not awaken the warring Kussian
princes to the dangers of their country and prompt them
to united action. Some even forgot the ties of blood, of
Christianity, and nationality, and allied themselves to the
nomads for the petty object of their personal aggrandise-
ment. The sufferings of the Russian people during this
period of internal discord and foreign invasion are
touchingly rendered in the words of an old Russian song :
' Sorrow grew on the Russian soil.'

For some time. Kief, the mother of Russian towns,
continued to be the most important political centre. The
eldest of the reigning family, recognised as lord para-
mount with the title of Grand Duke, always chose it as his
capital. But during one of the civil wars Bjef was
besieged, taken, and pillaged (a.d. 1169) ; the conqueror,
George Bogolmbski, instead of remaining in the con-
quered town, returned to his beloved residence in the
north, where he established the new capital of the dis-
ordered country. From that time the centre of political
life shifted permanently to the north-east, passing succes-
sively to Rostof, Vladimir, and later, as we shall see, to
Moscow.

This event was of great importance, greater than
could be foreseen at the time. National ambition was
no longer directed regretfully towards that Byzantine
empire, now separated by a wide zone of triumphant
nomadism, but tended eastwards to the wide unknown
lands either uninhabited or occupied by scanty, unwarlike
tribes. A slow process of colonisation began in the
region, which in its present geographical denomination
bears the trace of the historical role it has played. The

THE EXPANSION TO THE UBAL 9

Kussia of ancient times, the Eussia of Kuric, now
became Little Kussia, while the vast region slowly
colonised, which bore the same relation to the former
state that Magna Grecia bore to Hellas, now assumed
the name of Great Kussia. The expansion checked on
the south tended for some centuries eastwards, under the
immediate guidance of the new capitals situated in a
region almost surrounded and intersected by the upper
waters of the Volga and its affluents, the Oka, the
Moskva, and the Kostroma. The geographical features
of this region resemble that ' He de France ' which
about the same time constituted the kernel from which
the following centuries were to evolve the monarchy of
France.

The same causes which had necessitated a transfer of
the political centre to the north-east brought about a
change in the commercial field. Kief and the adjoining
cities, which had grown rich and flourishing with the
southern trade down the Dnieper to the Black Sea,
languished in poverty when their river trade-route was
commanded by the victorious and predatory Polovtsy.
Novgorod — the city which, by calling in Kuric and his
Scandinavians, had laid the basis of a powerful state —
now became the great emporium of trade in Kussia. The
water-way by the river Volkhof, Lake Ladoga, and river
Neva into the Gulf of Finland and the Baltic was free ;
while the regions of Northern Kussia, along the banks of
the North Dvina, Petchora, and Kama, were then rich in
rare and precious furs. The enterprising citizens of Nov-
gorod sent expeditions to the north, levying tribute of
furs from the Finnish aborigines, and distributed the
produce throughout Europe. The city became the richest
in Kussia, and was called Novgorod the Great, and, as its
republican constitution did not give it sufficient status in

10 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

an age rife with feudal notions, it received a kind of col-
lective nobility, and was officially styled ' Sir Novgorod.'

The wealth and prosperity of the inhabitants of Nov-
gorod attracted the hostility of their neighbours. The
Swedes endeavoured to drive them away from the Neva
and Ladoga, closing all free access to the Baltic. They
also tried to destroy the Greek Christianity which had
been introduced by the Russians among the Finnish
races dwelling on the Gulf of Finland. The Latin form
of Christianity adopted by the Scandinavians and Germans
formed everywhere a convenient pretext for wars of con-
quest on the Slavs of the Greek Church.

German Catholic missionaries endeavoured to convert
the pagan Livonians, but as their persuasive powers were
found insufficient to overcome the resolute opposition of
the natives, the third Bishop of Biga, Albert, founded in
1201 the Sword-bearing or Livonian Order. The osten-
sible object, the conversion of the heathen, soon gave
way to the more congenial task of conquering and en-
slaving him. The success of the knights brought them
into immediate contact with the weak Bussian princes,
the suzerains of the pagan Livonians they had been
anable to defend against the German incursions.

Thus, while Kief and the southern principalities were
exposed to the raids of the Polovtsy, Novgorod and its
territory were menaced from the north and west by
Sweden and the Livonian knights. The only states enjoy-
ing comparative security from foreign invasion were those
of the north-east. But a new and more formidable foe
now approached to deal a crushing blow on the weak and
divided Bussian people.

Nearly eight centuries had passed since Attila had
swept over Europe, spreading destruction wherever he
went. Now a similar man, Genghis Khan, had given

THE EXPANSION TO THE URAL 11

unity and strength to the scattered nomads. Having con-
quered the centre and east of Asia, he had left to his suc-
cessors the task of extending the Mongol sway to the
south and west. The first appearance in Europe of these
new terrible conquerors was in 1224, when they advanced
to impose tribute on the Polovtsy. Mongol ambassadors
were sent to the Eussian princes, explaining that the war
would not affect their cities, but was only directed against
the Polovtsy, ' the slaves and horse-grooms ' of the
Mongols. The Eussian princes unwisely resolved to
assist their former foes, the Polovtsy, and advanced under
the guidance of Mstislav of Galicia, a kind of knight-
errant who was always ready to engage in any war of a
hazardous and romantic nature. The battle took place
near the river Kalka. The Mongols, with the thorough-
ness characteristic of their warlike operations, completely
destroyed the allied forces. The captured Eussian princes
were treated with the brutal indignities usual to those
triumphant barbarians. They were bound to the ground,
planks were laid upon them, and the conquerors feasted
on the prostrate prisoners.

After their victory the Mongols soon returned to Asia,
and Eussia was left in peace for twelve years. This brief
truce was followed by a more terrible invasion. In 1236
Batu started with 300,000 men on his famous raid, which
was to bring destruction on the whole of Eastern Europe
as far as Silesia and the Adriatic. He first conquered the
Bulgars on the Volga, and the following year marched on
Eiazan, summoning the inhabitants to deliver a tenth of
their property. ' When none of us shall remain, all will
be yours,' was the heroic answer of the townsmen, and,
though a mere handful, they boldly advanced against the
overwhelming Mongol host.

They were defeated, Eiazan was pillaged and burnt.

12 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

and the few remaining inhabitants crucified or enslaved.
Batu pushed on north to Kolumna, where he met the army
of George, Grand Duke of Vladimir. The Russians were
again defeated, and the town burnt ; the Grand Duke fled
beyond the Volga to gather a new army. The Mongols
destroyed Moscow, then a very small place, and on Feb-
ruary 3, 1238, they besieged the city of Vladimir, which
was taken on February 17. The town was sacked, the
inhabitants killed, even the family of the Grand Duke
George being burnt in the cathedral, where they had fled
for refuge. The victorious Mongols spread all over the
country in various detachments, and captured fourteen
towns in the month of February, killing or enslaving all
the inhabitants. On March 4, on the river Sita, Batu
met the Grand Duke George with his new levied army,
which was completely routed, the Grand Duke himself
being killed in the battle. The Mongols now pushed on
east, took the town of Torjok, and advanced to within a
hundred versts of Novgorod ; but the forests presented
great natural difficulties, and the approach of spring
threatened them with the dangers of swollen rivers and
thawing swamps. Batu retreated southwards towards the
steppes. The small town of Kozelsk boldly resisted and
detained him for seven weeks. The Mongols, as usual,
took the town, destroying all its inhabitants.

This first campaign had destroyed the power of all the
new north-eastern principalities of Kussia ; in the follow-
ing year (1239) the Tartars issued from the steppes and
commenced the conquest of the south-western districts.
Tchernigof was taken and burnt, and the atrocities of the
Mongols spread such terror that all the inhabitants of the
villages fled into the woods, or even killed themselves,
rather than fall alive into the hands of the enemy. In
1240 Batu himself led his army against Kief, which,

THE EXPANSION TO THE UBAL 13

though no longer the political capital, still was venerated
as the old centre of Kussian Christianity. The beautiful
situation of the city, the many-coloured tiles of the princely
palaces, the gilt domes of the churches, produced an im-
pression of wonder on the rough, ignorant horsemen of
the steppes. Far different were the feelings of the un-
fortunate besieged ; the old chroniclers say that the noise
produced by the vast host, the shouting of the Tartars,
the creaking of the carts, the roaring of the camels, the
neighing of the horses, was so great that the people of
Kief could not hear each other's voices. Notwithstanding
a brave and obstinate resistance, the cit}'- was taken, and
the inhabitants massacred ; but by a singular trait of
generosity the Mongols spared the commander Demetrius,
whose heroism won recognition even from these relentless
enemies.

After the conquest of Kussia, Batu advanced further
east, ravaging Poland, Moravia, and Silesia. At Wahlstadt
he met the united forces of the Poles, Silesians, and
Teutonic knights ; but the Germans were not more suc-
cessful than the Slavs./ They were completely routed,
and Duke Henry himself was killed in the battle. Batu,
after ravaging Hungary, returned to the steppes between
the lower Danube and the river Ural, establishing his
capital near the Caspian Sea at Sarai, on one of the branches
of the Volga. This new Tartar power, under the name
of the Golden Horde, ruled Eussia with an iron hand ;
heavy tributes were levied, and the Kussian princes were
obliged to appear at the Horde, kneel before the Khan,
and suffer other humiliations. Michael of Tchernigof,
who, even in that time of national disaster, would not
submit to such indignities, was massacred with all his
boyars.

The Tartar domination oppressed Eussia for over two

14 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

centuries. The only nation in Europe that has passed
through a similar ordeal is Spain. But the conditions of
Russia were far worse. The uniform flatness of the
country offered no refuge, like the Asturian mountains,
where the remnant of the unsubdued could safely brave
the power of the conquerors and train itself by secular
wars for the final work of liberation. The Arabs wor-
shipped the same God, and their religion had a broad,
common basis with Christianity ; they cultivated the arts
and sciences, while Western Europe was plunged in intel-
lectual darkness. The Tartars were Pagans when they
entered Eussia, and the acquisition of wealth and power
never developed any taste for science or literature. Spain,
moreover, in her long struggle, was encouraged by all the
neighbouring nations, and occasionally even assisted by
the chivalry of Christendom, while Russia in her darkest
hour found in the west enemies, relentless through race
hatred and theological rancour, who readily seized the
opportunity to attempt her complete destruction.

Novgorod and its territory was the only part of Eussia
which had escaped the ravages of the Mongols, but it
sustained the attacks of other enemies on the west. We
have seen that the Sword-bearing or Livonian Order had
advanced to the Eussian borders ; in 1224, the year when
the Tartars made their first desultory attack, the Germans
took the Eussian town Yurief, which they christened
Dorpt,^ and began to threaten Novgorod. When Batu
with his campaigns, in the years 1237-40, had destroyed
the remainder of Eussia, the Swedes, the Livonian knights,
and the Lithuanians prepared to accomplish the ruin of
Novgorod. It appeared as if the Eussian race were des-
tined to be overwhelmed under these numerous enemies,
and had to disappear from history, when in the hour of

' It has been lately renamed Yurief.

THE EXPANSION TO THE UBAL 15

utmost need the nation was saved by a man gifted with
varied and exceptional qualities.

The people of Novgorod, though attached to their
republican freedom, often elected princes to govern them ;
these elections were often capriciously revoked, and the
prince who had not satisfied the unruly citizens was dis-
missed with scant ceremony, though with no personal
violence. ' We do not want you ; go where you like,' was
the usual notice to quit.

At that time Novgorod was ruled by Alexander, a son
of the Grand Duke of Vladimir. In 1240, the year when
Kief was taken by Batu, the King of Sweden, under the
pretext of converting to the Catholic faith the followers
of the Greek Church, advanced to attack Novgorod. Alex-
ander had only a small force to oppose to the invader, but
he encouraged his soldiers with words inspired by the
heroism necessary at such a moment : ' We are few, but
God sides with right, not with might.' He attacked the
Swedes on the Neva (July 15, 1240), winning a glorious
victory, and his name has gone down to posterity as
Alexander Nevski.' The Novgorodians, with the usual
fickleness of popular government, dismissed their heroic
prince, but democratic caprice had to give way to the
necessities of national existence. The Livonian knights
conquered Pskof and threatened Novgorod ; merchants
could not pass safely even at thirty versts from the city.
Alexander Nevski was recalled to face the new enemy,
drove the Germans out of Pskof, and invaded Livonia.
A terrible battle was fought on the frozen Lake Peipus,
known in Eussian history as the Battle on the Ice
(April 5, 1241). It lasted the whole day, but the superior
generalship of Alexander prevailed, and the Livonian
knights were completely routed. The Lithuanians also

' Of the Neva.

16 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

attacked the Novgorodians, but Alexander Nevski de-
feated them in three engagements. These successive
victories raised the spirit of the Eussian nation, which
had been almost crushed by the dreadful Mongol invasion.
An occasion now arose which showed that, besides the
qualities of an able general, Alexander Nevski possessed
also those of a wise statesman. Batu heard of his vic-
tories and resolved to assert his superiority ; he haughtily
summoned him to appear, declaring that ' All people
are subject to me : if thou wishest to save thy land, come
and pay homage.' Alexander sacrificed all feeling of
vanity and personal dignity for the good of his country ;
he justly realised that, though valour and skill had proved
sufficient to defeat Swedes and Germans, they were in-
adequate to cope with the overwhelming power of the
Mongols. He went to the Horde, offered his submission,
winning the esteem and favour of Batu by his wisdom.
Alexander Nevski, elected Grand Duke of Vladimir on
account of his merits, continued to display tact in his
endeavours to shield his country from the excesses of the
Mongols. He prevailed on the Novgorodians to pay
tribute to the Golden Horde. When the Eussian people
of many cities, maddened by the exactions of the Tartar
tax-collectors, rose, killing and driving them away, he
hastened with great personal danger to Sarai, and by his
intercession saved Eussia from a second invasion. On
his return from this expedition he died on November 14,
1263. To show the place he held in the hearts of his
people, it will be sufficient to quote the words of the
Metropolitan of Kief on hearing the news : * The sun of
the Eussian land is set.' The first twenty-five years of
the Tartar domination were the severest : a heavy poll-tax
was levied, and exacted so rigorously that twice within
that short period a general census was taken of the Eus-

THE EXPANSION TO THE UBAL 17

sian people. As the Tartars were unaccustomed to busi-
ness, most of the tax-collectors were Jews and Armenians,
who abused their authority by often exacting more than
the legal rate ; their extortions were enforced by detach-
ments of Tartar troops that marched through the country
committing every kind of wanton violence. The general
distress of the country, however, had no effect in calming
the animosity of the rival princes ; they continued their
wars and intrigues, invoking the decision of the Ktian of
the Golden Horde in favour of their claims.

This intestine warfare was favoured by the geographi-
cal features of the country and its social conditions. No
mountain chain divides the land into natural provinces,
offering convenient bases for separate political organisa-
tions in a feudal age ; even the huge rivers are converted
by the rigour of the climate into commodious highways.
No permanent distinction, such as the formation of
dialects,^ could exist among the people. The retainers
and feudatories of the princes, the drujina and hoyars
of Eussian history, were attached simply to the person
of their chief, and their fidelity was voluntary and tem-
porary. They were always free to change masters, and
no taint of disloyalty attended such transfer of allegiance.
These fluctuating conditions of a race exempt from terri-
torial restrictions facilitated the work of personal am-
bition ; an able prince could always attract a numerous
following and extend his dominions. These conditions,
though favourable to dissensions in the period of the
appanages, also contributed to political unity when the
men required for that work arose at the proper time.

Another fruitful source of disorder lay in the strange,
almost oriental, order of succession. At the death of the

' Throughout the greater part of the Eussian empire, from Moscow and
St. Petersburg to Vladivostok, the same language is spoken.

C

18 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

Grand Duke the eldest male of the line, generally a
brother, was the legal heir, thus stimulating the rivalry
of the younger and more restless descendants.

The Mongol invasion and the attacks from the west
increased the tendency to shift the centre of political
activity to the north-east. Kief, after its capture, was
reduced to an insignificant town with only about two
hundred houses ; the neighbouring country became a
wilderness strewn with skulls and human bones. Lithu-
ania, which had failed in its attacks on Novgorod through
the valour and skill of Alexander Nevski, thanks to a
succession of able monarchs, gradually absorbed the whole
of South-west Russia, and formed a huge state extend-
ing from the Black Sea almost to the Baltic, from which
it was separated only by a narrow coast line belonging
to the Teutonic knights. In 1386 the Lithuanian Grand
Duke, by consenting to embrace Christianity, still further
extended his power and ascended the throne of Poland.

In the north-east, in the region where the new Great
Russia was being slowly formed, Vladimir was the prin-
cipal city, where the eldest prince with the title of Grand
Duke resided. Its importance was also increased when
the Metropolitan, the head of the Russian Church, recog-
nising the altered conditions of the country, transferred
(A.D. 1299) his see from Kief to Vladimir. But a new
city began to aspire to pre-eminence in the region which
was destined to give birth to the hugest continental
empire of modern times.

The first historical mention of Moscow occurs in 1147;
according to a tradition, its site was originally occupied
by the summer residence of a small feudal lord who was
executed for some crime by George Dolgoruki. The
beautiful situation pleased the latter, who built a town
surrounded with palisades.

THE EXPANSION TO THE URAL 19

The river Moskva winds in great bends, somewhat Hke
the Seine at Paris, and passes under the steep sides of
a hill. Here now we find the Kremlin, that assemblage
of churches and palaces which with their historical asso-
ciations constitute the palladium of Russia. This small
space contained the original town of Dolgoruki. Around
this town a state gradually rose, which, from being the
smallest appanage of the Grand Dukedom of Vladimir,
has become the empire of Russia.

While still a place of very small importance, Moscow,
with the presumption of youth, displayed an ambition
not unworthy of its future fortunes. Even at the time
of Alexander Nevski the lord of Moscow had the presump-
tion to claim the grand-ducal title, although neither by
birth nor extraordinary merit could he justify his ex-
travagant pretensions. He was defeated and killed in
the attempt, but his premature aspirations were kept in
mind and slowly realised at the proper time by the princes
of another race, who succeeded in the fief of Moscow.

At the death of Alexander Nevski, Moscow, as the
pettiest appanage, was given to his youngest son Daniel.
The successors of Alexander Nevski in the Grand Duke-
dom of Vladimir were his brothers, and then his sons,
according to the law of succession prevalent in Russia,
that the eldest male of the race should reign. But this
inconvenient system gradually began to decline before the
rough and ready methods of powerful and ambitious
princes, who purchased their investiture from the Tartar
khans, the exclusive dispensers of all sovereignty at that
time in Russia.

War broke out between the two eldest sons of Alex-
ander Nevski ; the younger went to the Golden Horde,
bought his investiture, and with the assistance of a Tartar
army was installed as Grand Duke of Vladimir. But on

c 2

20 BUS SI A ON THE PACIFIC

the departure of the Tartars the elder returned with an
army of mercenaries from the Baltic. After a long
struggle he was finally obliged to renounce his claims to
the Grand Dukedom. Daniel of Moscow was very active
during all this period, siding alternately with his two
brothers, supporting always the one in distress, probably
through fear of the excessive aggrandisement of the other.
He succeeded by his successful wars in adding several
small tovTns to his dominions.

About this time the Russian appanages underwent a
transformation. Hitherto the whole state had been con-
sidered the patrimony of the reigning house, to whose
various members different towns and districts were al-
lotted temporarily, a fresh distribution taking place at
the death of the eldest member of the race, even as at
present the lands of a Russian village are distributed
periodically among the families of the villagers. Sut
gradually the petty princes began to consider themselves
as absolute sovereigns of their appanages, and to dispose
of them at pleasm^e, without consulting the other mem-
bers of the reigning race. An example of this was given
by the lord of Pereyaslav, who, dying childless, left his
lands to the lord of Moscow. Daniel of Moscow died in
1303, and was succeeded by his son George, who kept
Pereyaslav and extended his dominions, which now com-
prised the whole course of the river Moskva.

In the following year, 1304, the Grand Duke of
Vladimir died. The eldest of the race was Michael of
Tver, but George of Moscow also claimed the Grand
Dukedom. The two candidates hastened to the Horde
to obtain a fresh investiture, but Michael outbid his rival,
and was appointed Grand Duke. This rivalrj^ and the
retention of Pereyaslav by George, were the source of
continual warfare between the two princes. George

THE EXPANSION TO THE UBAL 2]

encouraged the citizens of Novgorod in their opposition
to the governors appointed by Michael, and when the
latter in 1313 w&s obliged to go to the Horde to obtain
a fresh investiture from the new Khan, George hastened
to Novgorod, where he was received with joy by the
unruly populace. But their triumph was of short duration,
as George was summoned to the Horde to justify his
disorderly conduct.

He not only succeeded in dealing himself from the
accusations of the Grand Duke, but won the favour of the
Ivhan, and even married his sister. Strengthened by this
alliance, he returned with a Tartar embassy and made war
on Michael, but was entirely routed, and obliged to fly to
Novgorod, his wife, the Tartar princess, being made a
prisoner. This success, however, was fatal to Michael,
as the princess died in captivity, and a report was spread
that she had been poisoned. He was therefore summoned
to the Horde and barbarously executed. George, who had
brought his complaints to the Khan, was now appointed
Grand Duke. But the eldest son of Michael accused
George at the Horde, and, when he appeared to defend
himself, killed him. The Khan ordered the execution of
the murderer, but granted the Grand Dukedom to another
son of Michael. Thus Moscow was again foiled in its
attempt to secure supremacy.

These disgraceful scenes are given in detail to show
the bitter hatred prevailing among the rival Eussian
princes, and the abject degradation to which they had
been reduced by the Tartar domination. George was
succeeded by his brother Ivan, surnamed Kalita, * the
Purse,' on account of his wealth. During the troubles of
the preceding reign he had been often left in charge of
Moscow, while his warlike brother proceeded to Novgorod
and to the Khan ; and on each occasion he had given

22 RUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

proof of ability. He possessed qualities rare in his time
and his countrj^; he resembled those sovereigns, Ferdi-
nand of Castile, Henry VII. of England, and Louis XI.
of France, who, two centuries later, consolidated the
monarchies of Western Europe. He was far-seeing, hard-
working, and so thrifty that with the poor revenues of
the smallest appanage he became the wealthiest prince of
Russia. His political sagacity succeeded where the wars
and intrigues of his predecessors had failed. His cool
judgment perceived the great factors of the political
history of that time. In the collapse of the Russian state,
consequent upon Batu's invasion, the Church alone had
remained unsubmerged and uncontaminated ; it consti-
tuted the only bond among the scattered inhabitants, and
the only link with the civilisation of the west which pre-
vented Russia relapsing into complete eastern barbarism.
By the side of this moral power, bearing the promise, of
the future empire, there was the hateful Tartar Horde,
whose irresistible domination also offered the opportunity
to the genius of a subtle, far-sighted politician of effecting
the long-needed unity of the nation. On these facts Ivan
Kalita based his policy, and he achieved success without
effort.

In 1299 the Metropolitan of Kief, the head of the
Russian Church, had transferred his see to Vladimir ; his
successor, Peter (a saint of the Russian Church), in the
exercise of his ministry, often visited Moscow. The
gracious reception afforded him gradually induced him to
prolong his residence, until Vladimir was almost entirely
neglected. Ivan Kalita built a stone ' church at his
instigation, and Peter chose a spot for his grave, where
shortly after he was buried. His successor would not

' stone buildings were then rare in Russia, as even now they are in
remote villages.

THE EXPANSION TO THE UBAL 23

forsake the spot hallowed by the mortal remains of the
holy Churchman, and Moscow thus became the perma-
nent see of the Metropolitan. This event not only raised
the importance of the new city as the religious centre of
Russia, but gave Ivan Kalita the means of exerting
immense influence. We have seen that, in the national
collapse consequent on the Mongol invasion, the Church
alone had preserved its power : it enjoyed an immense
advantage, due to the fact that while the princes were
many and acted independently, the authority of the
Metropolitan was unique and uncontested. Now, this
unquestioned power was skilfully, though indirectly,
wielded by Ivan Kalita.

An opportunity soon presented itself to the skilful
Prince of Moscow to enlist in his service the other im-
portant factor : the dreaded power of the Golden Horde.
In 1327 a Tartar embassy came to Tver, and committed
such outrages that it was massacred by the infuriated
inhabitants. Ivan Kalita at once started for Sarai, and
won such favour that he returned with an army of 50,000
Tartars, devastated Tver, and was named Grand Duke.
The former Grand Duke, Alexander, fled to Pskof, where
the generous inhabitants protected him. When he declared
his intention of going to the Horde to avert their threatened
danger, they said, ' Whatever may happen we shall die
together with thee.' Ivan Kalita then prevailed upon his
friend the Metropolitan to excommunicate the inhabitants
of Pskof because they sheltered Alexander.

In these events Ivan Kalita had only shown the
common ambition and rancour of the Russian feudatory
of that age, who was always ready to invoke Tartar aid
against his private enemies. In the long struggle for
supremacy between Tver and Moscow, he had secured
victory for the latter. The use he made of his authority

24 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

showed, however, that, more than his personal aggran-
disement, he had in view the permanent prosperity of his
people. Peace reigned in the country ; rich and powerful
boyars were attracted to Moscow by his just government ;
by wise economy he had always the means to bribe the
Tartars ; and he extended his dominions, not by conquest,
but by purchasing cities and villages from the extravagant
and needy princes. The tribute due to the Tartars was
no longer collected by their rapacious tax-collectors, but
paid by Ivan Kalita, who thus farmed the revenue of the
Khan. This arrangement satisfied both parties : the
Bussian princes and people were delighted in being de-
livered from the hateful intrusion of their oppressors,
and the Khan was pleased at the simple and ready
payment. Neither saw what the following centuries
showed, that they were contributing to form a power
which would conquer and rule all. Ivan Kalita - has
received the name of the First Collector of Kussian land :
he was in fact the founder of the empire, and his methods
have been curiously followed even by his remote suc-
cessors.

Ivan Kalita was succeeded by his son Simon, who
obtained the investiture from the Tartars. He followed
his father's policy ; made frequent visits to the Horde,
where he was always received with honour. The friend-
ship of the Khan was adroitly used to curb the growing
power of Lithuania, which gradually absorbed South-
west Bussia, and even threatened Moscow. This danger
from the west menaced the young Russian state for
several centuries.

Simon died in 1353 of the ' black death ; ' he left no
children, and, another brother dying about the same
time, all the territory of Moscow devolved on the remain-
ing brother, Ivan II. This circumstance was of great

THE EXPANSION TO THE UBAL 25

importance, as the rising state required that its forces
should not be scattered. Ivan II, was a quiet prince,
who secured for the exhausted Russian people a few
more years of much-needed peace.

He died in 1359. His eldest son, Demetrius, was a
child, unable to go to the Horde, and the Prince of Suzdal
seized the opportunity to obtain the investiture of Grand
Duke ; but the rich and powerful boyars of Moscow
could not suffer such a humiliation for their city ; they
took the young Demetrius to the Horde and purchased
his investiture. After a brief struggle Suzdal was
obliged to yield.

Under Demetrius the Kremlin was surrounded with
stone walls and towers. Before his time Moscow, like
all Eussian towns, with the exception of Novgorod and
Pskof, had been defended only by a stockade. The new
fortifications and the advantages of its position rendered
the Kremlin the strongest fortress in the country. This
was of great advantage to Demetrius, who sustained long
wars with Lithuania, the new rising power on the west.
When he was unable to hold the field against the over-
whelming force of the enemy he retired behind the strong
walls of the Kremlin, waited until the storm passed, and
then sallied forth to prolong the contest. Demetrius
stands forth in marked contrast to his grandfather, father,
and uncle, who had preserved and expanded their do-
minions by prudence and policy. He was the warrior
prince who gained his object by force of arms, and in this
respect he surpassed his successors as well as his pre-
decessors.

His wars with Lithuania, successful in their final
results, were of a defensive nature, and had for their
object to arrest the expansion of a state which threatened
to absorb the Eussian nation, then feebly struggling for

26 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

life. He understood the true future mission of Russia,
and was the first, after the Tartar conquest, to inaugurate
an aggressive poHcy in the east. He advanced against
the Bulgarian races beyond the Volga and against
Kazan, forcing the chieftains to pay tribute. These
aggressions provoked a conflict with the Tartars, and in
1377 the troops of Moscow, through the rashness of their
commander, were routed by the Tartars. A Russian
historian * justly remarks that this over-confident rashness
was a proof of the new spirit animating the nation at
that period. The peaceable reigns of Kalita and his
successors, the gradual disappearance of the Tartar tax-
gatherers and their marauding escorts, had formed a new
generation, who knew the foreign conquerors only by
tradition and could not understand the trembling fear
which possessed their fathers at the bare mention of the
Tartar name. Demetrius, in the full vigour of youth (he
was born in 1350), was the fit representative of this new
generation.

In 1378 a Tartar army was defeated by the Russians,
and it became evident that the small but compact state of
Moscow was a dangerous enemy to the Golden Horde,
now rent by factions and often governed by imbecile
khans. In 1380 the Khan Mamai resolved to advance
against Demetrius ; Yagaila, the King of Lithuania,
promised his assistance to defeat Moscow. Against
this formidable alliance Demetrius could only oppose a
part of the forces of the Russian nation. The Prince of
Riazan, on account of his frontier position, dared not join
Moscow in the unequal contest ; the Prince of Tver and
the popular Diet of Novgorod, through jealousy, refused
to co-operate in the struggle for freedom. Demetrius,
undismayed, gathered 150,000 men, the largest army that

' Solovieff.

\

THE EXPANSION TO THE URAL 27

Eussia had ever placed in the field, and with the blessings
of the holy Abbot St. Sergius he boldly advanced against
the Tartars. To attack was the most prudent course, as
on the defensive he would have been crushed between the
Tartars on the east and the Lithuanians on the west.

On September 8, 1380, the armies met on the plain of
Kulikovo, near the upper waters of the Don, where a
battle was fought which is celebrated in the annals of
Eussia and deserves to be chronicled as one of the most
hardly contested in universal history. The carnage was
terrific, the Eussians, it is said, losing 100,000 men, the
enemy still more. Victory was long doubtful, and then
seemed inclining to the Tartars, when the Eussian
reserve, which had been held in ambush up to the last,
rushed on the enemy and decided the day.

This great victory, which earned Demetrius the title
of Donskoi, gave very slight immediate results. The
first news of the unexpected success of the Eussia-ns
frightened Yagaila, who was advancing on Kulikovo, and
he hastened back to Lithuania. But the losses had been
very heavy ; almost all the fighting strength of Moscow
had been sacrificed to obtain the victory, and little was
left to prosecute the war. Mamai gathered another army
to revenge his defeat, but he was killed by Toktomysh, a
chief of the Tartars beyond the Ural, who now prosecuted
the war against Eussia. In 1382 he advanced so rapidly
that, before Demetrius could gather another army in the
exhausted country, he surprised and devastated Moscow.
This misfortune encouraged the Prince of Tver to
intrigue with Toktomysh for the investiture of the Grand
Dukedom of Vladimir. Demetrius was obliged to send his
son with an envoy of boyars to the Horde and consent to
pay a heavy tribute. The Tartar suzerainty was thus
re-established, and lasted for another centurv.

28 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

Though the brilHant valour of Demetrius Donskoi
had secured no immediate results, and had shown itself
inferior in practical utility to the prudent policy of his
predecessors, it bore moral consequences of a far-reaching
nature. The charm of Tartar invincibility was broken ;
the Tartars now had to employ surprise and stratagem to
insure even partial success. Confident hope in a final day
of deUverance began to rise dimly in the mind of the
oppressed Russian people ; and to this hope was attached
faith in the city of Moscow, which had boldly stood forth
among the craven, treacherous princes to battle for re-
ligion and national freedom against the enemies of the
east and west. On the field of Kulikovo Moscow won
the leadership of the Eussian people.

Demetrius Donskoi died in 1389, naming as his suc-
cessor his son Vassil, who proceeded to the Horde and
obtained the investiture. During his long reign (thirty-six
years) he continued to gather the Russian lands and to
strengthen the power of Moscow. Taking advantage of
the growing weakness of the Tartars, he discontinued the
visits to the Khan and the humiliating homage ; he even
neglected sending embassies, and retained for the use of
his treasury the tribute collected for the Horde. He had
more dangerous enemies on the west ; Yagaila was con-
stantly encroaching on Russian territory and extending
the frontiers of Lithuania. His marriage with the
heiress of the Polish throne augmented his power and
gave him the support of the civilisation of Western
Europe. In 1386 Lithuania had been converted to
Christianity, but, unfortunately for Russia, adopted the
Latin rite, thus creating an insuperable barrier between
the two peoples. Vitofit, his successor, continued the
aggressions on Russian land ; he took Smolensk, and even
coveted Novgorod the Great and Moscow. Vassil, how-

THE EXPANSION TO THE UBAL 29

ever, opposed him with a large army, and succeeded in
fixing the river Ugra as the eastern frontier of Lithuania.
It v^as dangerously near to Moscow, but it marked the
farthest eastern expansion of Lithuania. A glance at the
political map of Eastern Europe at the end of the four-
teenth century shows a vast disproportion between the
two states, and it is very remarkable that the smaller
should have expanded to its present extent and converted
the larger into a provincial dependency.

Vassil I. died in 1425, leaving an infant son, Vassil II.
Hitherto Moscow, either by the death or renunciation of
collateral heirs, or by the choice of prince and nobles, had
maintained an almost regular succession in the direct line.
But the youth of Vassil II. was the occasion for an
attempt to revive the old system of inheritance by
seniority ; the eldest male claiming the throne according
to Oriental notions. George, the brother of Vassil I. and
uncle of Vassil II., claimed the Grand Dukedom of Vladimir,
and after his death the claim was taken up by his sons.
To settle these rival claims appeals were made to the
khans, thus strengthening the vanishing Tartar suzerainty.
Vassil II. was several times obliged to fly from Moscow,
but at last, with the assistance of the clergy, succeeded in
overthrowing his enemies. This long civil war was not
entirely unfavourable to the country ; the relations of
Vassil II., by their rebellion and constant intrigues, for-
feited their right to appanages which by the then pre-
vailing Russian custom were bestowed on all members of
the reigning family ; thus the power of Moscow was in
the end strengthened. It also showed the necessity of
adopting measures to prevent the recurrence of disputes
about the succession. Demetrius Donskoi, before dying,
had named his eldest son Grand Duke of Vladimir.
Vassil II. went a step further, and towards the end of his

30 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

reign appointed his eldest son Grand Duke — all official
acts bearing the names of both princes. By this wise
and timely measure Russia was saved from a fresh relapse
into those disorders which had rendered her an easy prey
to foreign invasion.

In 1462 Vassil II. died, and was succeeded by Ivan III.,
who first assumed the title of Autocrat of all Russia.
He possessed all the qualities of the race of Kalita ; he
was thrifty, slow, prudent, averse to decisive and risky
measures, but gifted with unrelaxing perseverance in the
accomplishment of his plans. His reign, perhaps the
most important in Russian history, is a lucid example of
the methods which have formed the Russian empire.
He was faced with the same difficulties and dangers as his
predecessors : the powerful Lithuanian state on the west,
dynastically united with Poland, and the Tartars on the
east. By a series of fortunate circumstances which he
skilfully adapted to his ends he was able to achieve signal
success. The King of Poland and Grand Duke of Lithuania
was occupied by the feuds of his two states, and with the
affairs of Prussia, Bohemia, and Hungary, and could only
give passing casual attention to his eastern frontier. The
Tartars were now split up into several khanates, Kazan
and the Crimea being almost independent and hostile to
the Golden Horde of Sarai. During the two centuries of
interaction between the two races, Russia had gradually
acquired unity and peace under the strong government of
Moscow, while the Tartars were now rent by those bitter
persistent feuds which had been the ruin of Russia at the
time of Batu's raid.

Ivan III. first directed his conquests against Novgorod,
the republican town of the north-west, which had hitherto,
by occasional tribute to Moscow or by alliance with
Lithuania, escaped subjection and extended its trade and

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THE EXPANSION TO THE UBAL 31

influence over the whole of North Russia. The Grand Duke
accompHshed his purpose with the slowness and obstinacy
characteristic of his policy. In 1471 the army of Nov-
gorod was totally routed, and the citizens, abandoned by
Lithuania, were obliged to sue for peace, pay a heavy
ransom, and promise to receive their princes and arch-
bishops from Moscow and not from Lithuania. Ivan III.
seized every opportunity to tighten his hold on his prey
and, finally, in 1478 Novgorod was incorporated in the
Muscovite state. To prevent future trouble a large
number of influential families were transplanted to the
towns of Eastern Eussia, and a colony of boyars and
merchants were sent from Moscow to fill up the vacancies
in Novgorod. Thus disappeared that democratic govern-
ment which had only served to encourage the tendency
to discord and faction prevalent in ancient Eussia. The
conquest of Novgorod, besides removing a troublesome
neighbour which was always intriguing with the
dangerous Polish-Lithuanian state, increased enormously
the territory of Moscow ; it now extended over the vast
half-unknown lands of the north and east up to the
Arctic Ocean and the Ural mountains. As early as 1472
Ivan III had also advanced eastwards, conquering Perm.
Ivan III. had been left early a widower (1467), but he
soon contracted a new alliance (1472), which had im-
portant results both in the internal affairs of the state
and in foreign policy. After the capture of Constantinople
by the Turks, the brother of the emperor fled with his
family to Eome. Pope Paul II., interested in the unfor-
tunate refugees, succeeded in effecting the marriage of
the daughter, Sophia Paleologus, with the Grand Duke of
Moscow. This was a brilliant connection for a prince
hardly known in Western Europe, and it brought about a
transformation in the simple court of Moscow. Hitherto

32 RUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

the Grand Duke had hved in great familiarity with the
rough boyars, who considered themselves as his equals by
birth ; but this simplicity was repugnant to a princess
whose ancestors had occupied the throne of the Caesars.
Gradually some kind of court etiquette was established,
and Ivan III. began to assume those outward signs of
majesty which are necessary to inspire awe in the minds
of the people.^ A feeling of dynastic respect now hovered
round the house of Kalita, which had risen from such
humble origins ; nearly five centuries before, Vladimir had
married the Byzantine princess Anna and introduced
Christianity into the land. This new alliance with the
now fallen power of Constantinople seemed to evoke the
past greatness of the house of Euric. It also gave
Russia the opportunity to preserve the sequence of his-
torical tradition ; the conquest of Constantinople, the
subsequent destruction of the Christian states of the
Balkan peninsula, left her the sole unconquered represen-
tative of the Greek Church. Popular hopes throughout
Eastern Europe considered the marriage of Sophia
Paleologus as the material pledge that henceforth Russia
would stand forth as the champion of Christianity,
destined at some future day to bring back the triumph of
the Cross on the shores of the Bosphorus.

These hopes are yet unrealised, but the influence of
Sophia Paleologus contributed to bring about far more
important immediate results. Her royal pride could not
suffer that her husband should be a tributary of the
Tartar khans. Ivan III., cautious and practical, would
probably have deferred the dangers of an overt refusal of
a purely formal homage, and would have remained satis-
fied with his growing power and the increasing weakness

' He also adopted the Byzantine double-headed eagle as the arms of
Russia.

THE EXPANSION TO THE UBAL 33

of the Horde, but he had to yield to popular pressure and
the expostulations of his wife. In 1480, just a hundred
years after the battle of Kulikovo, Ivan III. finally shook
off the Tartar yoke.

The political conditions were precisely the same as in
the time of Demetrius Donskoi. The Tartars formed an
alliance with Casimir, King of Poland and Lithuania,
and their Khan Akhmat advanced with a large army to
the river Ugra on the frontier of Lithuania. Ivan III. was
forced to advance to prevent a junction of his enemies.
But the subsequent events were totally different ; though
the Russian army was more numerous, the prudent Grand
Duke would not risk a battle. Perhaps the memory of
the dreadful slaughter of Kulikovo, which had left Russia
defenceless, deterred him from risking what might prove
a dear-bought victory like that of Demetrius Donskoi.
The Tartars, inferior in numbers, and always hoping for
the arrival of their Lithuanian allies, naturally avoided an
engagement. The protracted war gave Ivan III. leisure
to leave his army and return to Moscow, where the
infuriated people openly accused him of poltroonery.
Bassian, the Archbishop of Rostof, violently expostulated
with him, saying, " Why dost thou fear death ? Art thou
immortal? Give me, dotard, thy army, and thou shalt
see if I turn my back to the Tartars ! " Ivan III.
returned to his army, but doggedly refused to engage the
enemy, notwithstanding a violent letter from the vehe-
ment Churchman, Bassian. The course of events finally
justified his prudence ; the terrible Russian winter, which
three centuries later was to save the country from the
greatest warrior of modern times, now began in grim
earnest. The lightly clad Tartars could not bear it, and,
after severe sufferings, Akhmat, on November 16,' 1480,

' On November 26, 1812, commenced the terrible passage of theBeresina,

D

34 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC ,

retired from the Bussian frontier, and with him vanished
for ever the domination of his race.

Ivan III., by judicious temporising, had delivered his
country from the hateful foreign yoke without striking a
blow. This bloodless close of a domination of 240 years,
which commenced with the terrible raids of Batu, was
almost synchronous with the expulsion of the Moors
from Spain. Grenada was taken in 1492, and Sophia
Paleologus may be said to have played in Eastern Europe
the part of Isabel of Castile. But while Spain achieved
her liberation by centuries of warfare, Kussia effected her
purpose by a quite different process ; there w^as only one >
important battle, that of Kulikovo, and it had no imme- '
diate influence on the question at issue ; the Tartars
were slowly but irresistibly crowded out by the sedentary
Slav race, which expanded and probably also absorbed
the best elements of the nomads. In this silent work
Moscow furnished the element which had been always
wanting in the Eussian nation — a strong hereditary
government and the set purpose of unifying the country.
The shrewd descendants of Kalita took to heart the
severe lessons of the Tartar invasion ; unable, with their
scanty resources, to undertake a war of deliverance, and
convinced of the impossibility of securing the sincere
co-operation of the other Russian princes, they employed
the only means left at their disposal. They quietly sup-
planted the autocratic power of the Golden Horde, and
the substitution was so gradual that the final overthrow
of the Tartar suzerainty took place without a struggle,
like a pangless death at an advanced age. The spectacle
of Ivan III. quietly waiting with his army on the banks
of the Oka for winter to disperse the powerless Tartar

which marked the final collapse of the remainder of Napoleon's ' Grande
Arm6e.'

THE EXPANSION TO THE UBAL 35

force is typical of the whole process. His obstinate
refusal to yield to the bold suggestions of his people is an
instance of the uniform conduct of the Eussian Govern-
ment, which has always acted as a moderating check on
the impetuous tendencies of the young expansive Slav
race.

Ivan III. improved his victory by extending his
authority over Kazan, Desultory war, without important
results, had been carried on since the commencement of
the reign, but a fortunate feud between two rival candi-
dates to the khanate enabled the Grand Duke to send an
army to Kazan (1487) and put on the throne a khan
who acknowledged the suzerainty of Moscow. The
expansion to the north-east continued, and in 1489
Viatka, a colony of Novgorod, was also incorporated in
the state of Moscow.

A series of wars with Sweden and Lithuania produced
unimportant results, and the death of Ivan III. in 1505
closed a long useful reign, which raised Bussia to the
rank of a nation. But, though independent, she could
hardly be considered a European power ; the long Tartar
domination had profoundly affected the whole people ;
the dress of the boyars, the seclusion of the women, were
entirely Oriental, and it required the genius of Peter the
Great, two centuries later, to remove the deep traces of
Asiatic influence, and give Russia her right place in the
world.

Vassil III., the son of Sophia Paleologus, succeeded
his father, and added slightly to his work. The vassal
khan of Kazan had rebelled towards the end of the
reign of Ivan III., and two parties were formed in
Kazan — one favourable to Moscow, the other to the
khanate of Crimea. This became an important ques-
tion for Russia, because a union between the two

D 2

36 RUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

khanates would have reconstituted the Tartar power,
which now threatened to be supported by the formidable
Turkish Sultan, who had enforced his suzerainty on the
Crimean Tartars. The Grand Duke secured victory for
the Moscow party in Kazan. To diminish the import-
ance of this Tartar town as a trade centre, in 1524 an
annual fair was established at the mouth of the Sura
(right affluent of the Volga) , to which Russian merchants
were ordered to repair instead of Kazan.' On the west,
a long war with Lithuania ended in the conquest of the
important city of Smolensk, which now returned to
Eussia. The process of unification of the country was
finally accomphshed by the incorporation of the free town
of Pskof, of the principality of Eiazan, besides minor
feudal states. Vassil III. is styled by Solovieff the Last
Collector of Eussian lands.

Vassil III. was succeeded (1533) by his infant' son
Ivan IV., known as Ivan the Terrible, the most dramatic
figure in Russian history, and one of the most extra-
ordinary men that ever occupied a throne. He was only
three years old at his father's death, and ambitious nobles
began to intrigue for the regency ; five years later his
mother died, and the poor child was left in the worst of
solitudes, that of a palace haunted by factious parties.
Eival families disputed the regency, and the jealous
holders of power inflicted exile and torture on those
who showed kindness to the infant autocrat. At last
the pent-up sufferings and vindictiveness of the boy
exploded, and at thirteen years of age he assumed power,
and his first act was to execute Prince Shinski, who,
despite his tears, had deprived him of his favourite. The

' In 1641 the fair was transported up river to Makarief, and in 1817
this celebrated fair was again transferred further up to Nijni Novgorod, with
whose name it is associated in Western minds.

I

THE EXPANSION TO THE UBAL 37

precocity developed by his stormy childhood endowed
him with a far-reaching ambition, and at his coronation
in 1547 he assumed the title of Tsar, indicating with this
corruption of the name of the Caesars the world-wide
mission which history destined to the Russian empire.

A period of domestic peace now influenced the life of
Ivan IV. He was blessed with a good wife, Anastasia
Eomanoff, and through the good counsels of a holy
Churchman, Sylvester, he acquired habits of diligence in
the despatch of business and acquisition of knowledge ;
he became the most learned man of his country, and the
greatest monarch of the house of Kalita. In 1550 a new
code of laws was compiled, more explicit in its sanctions
than the one of Ivan III. In 1552 Kazan was besieged,
taken, and incorporated in the Eussian empire. Though
this conquest was an insignificant military feat, as the
Tsar, with an army of 150,000 men and 160 guns, was
held in check for seven weeks by 30,000 Tartars and a
mere palisaded town, yet it caused great rejoicings in
Moscow. At last the House of Ruric had produced a
sovereign who, by attacking the Tartars in their strong-
holds, showed how to prevent all future recui-rence of
their invasions. It required, however, five years of desul-
tory warfare to conquer the different Finnish or Tartar
races dwelling on the banks of the lower Volga.

The conquest was facilitated by the fact that, as we
have seen, for sixty years there had been in Kazan a
party favourable to the Russians : the quieter elements,
tired of the tyranny and continued feuds of the khans,
being attracted towards the strong, just government of
Moscow. This feeling now spread. In 1553 another
Tartar prince applied for assistance against the Khan
of Astrakhan, and, in 1554, 30,000 Russians took
the town and installed their ally on the throne. The

38 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

new Khan, with barbarian fickleness, ungratefully re-
volted, but he was punished, and in 1556 Astrakhan was
incorporated into the Kussian state. Thus the whole
course of the Volga, then already a great commercial
highway, of which the Russians hitherto had only
occupied the upper waters, fell into the hands of the
Tsar. Eussia had now the way opened to the Caspian.

After Ivan IV. had extended his dominions to the
Ural and to the Caspian, all these vast territories became
gradually developed by merchants and agriculturists.
The young sovereign had raised the power of his country
to a height never before attained, when a change came
over him and altered the character of his reign. In 1553
he fell sick, and was thought to be dying ; he called his
faithful counsellors, and told them to swear fealty to his
son ; amidst the sufferings of his illness his feeble senses
caught the sound of the wrangling of the ambitious
courtiers in the next room. Eegardless of the Tsar,
whom they thought past recovery, the proud nobles, who
all claimed descent from Ruric, loudly proclaimed their
unwillingness to accept as sovereign a son of the new
family of the Romanoffs. When Ivan IV. recovered, the
vision of the posthumous treason which had been planned
so close to his sick-bed roused all the suspicion and
cruelty which had crept into his nature during the bitter
years of his childhood, and had only been kept dormant
by the good influence of Anastasia Romanoff and
Sylvester.

The Tsar gradually withdrew his confidence from his
counsellors, and they, perceiving his coldness, appeared
less frequently at Court. The Muscovite autocracy, which
had always been tempered by the influence of the boyars,
now assumed a despotic character. A partisan of the
fallen Sylvester, Prince Kurbski, one of the most learned

THE EXPANSION TO THE UBAL 39

men of the country, fled to Lithuania, where he was well
received by King Sigismund Augustus ; from his exile he
wrote a letter full of reproaches to the Tsar, who, vain of
his learning, promptly answered. A long correspondence
followed, which exhibits the strange political opinions
of Eussia at that time. Prince Kurbski sustained the
old theory that the dependence of the boyars on the Tsar
was voluntary and temporary ; they were always free to
enter the service of another sovereign. Ivan IV. had
to pay dearly for the venomous correspondence, as the
exiled prince became an active inciter of the Polish wars
against Russia.

The Tsar, growing gradually more suspicious of the
discontented boyars, at last left Moscow and shut himself
up at Alexandrof ska ; he formed a special corps of
adherents, the dreaded oprichniki, who rode with a dog's
head and a broom attached to their saddle to indicate
their mission of sweeping away treason. Abandoning
father and mother, they took an oath to obey only the
Tsar, and were ever ready to execute his worst wishes,
even those he dared not formulate in words. Special
towns and even whole streets of Moscow were allotted
for their use ; they thus formed a dominant class in the
nation, spreading terror with their ruthless crimes.

Ivan IV. had achieved the most brilliant successes in
the east, while accomplishing the true mission of his
country and following the lines of the natural expansion
of the people ; but he soon changed his policy and directed
his conquests to the west. In a century when know-
ledge was spreading rapidly in Europe, Russia, owing to
her seclusion and the Tartar invasion, was still in the
darkest ignorance. The Tsar attempted to remedy this
deficiency, and sent an envoy to Germany, who in 1547
obtained the permission of the Emperor Charles V. to

40 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

recruit learned and skilled men for the service of the
Tsar. But the Teutonic knights and the Poles, who
even then dimly foresav^ the coming power of their
neighbour, prevented the passage of the artisans engaged
for the work of civilising Russia. The Teutonic knights
even executed one who had attempted to escape to
Moscow. In 1554 and 1555 Chancellor arrived at
Moscow by the "White Sea, but the northern route was too
long and difficult, and the bold enterprise of the English
navigators only increased the Russian desire for com-
munication with the outside world without affording
practical means for obtaining it.

Ivan IV. in 1558 began a war in Livonia with the
Teutonic knights, who had not only shut him off from
the Baltic but prevented even the access of simple
artisans. The war was very successful, Livonia was
overrmi, and had to recognise the suzerainty of Poland
to escape complete destruction. The Tsar, however, still
continued to be victorious until, in 1570, a truce was
concluded for three years.

In 1569 two important events took place which
threatened the expansion and even the existence of
Russia. The Turkish power was then at its height (the
battle of Lepanto took place two years later), and the
Sultan viewed with disfavour the Christian domination of
Moscow over the Mahometans of Kazan and Astrakhan.
A bold project was conceived to overthrow the power of
the Tsar in his newly conquered eastern territories. An
expedition of 17,000 Turks with 50,000 Crimean Tartars
was to proceed to the Don where its course bends towards
the Volga, and where a ' portage ' existed, and dig a
canal between the two rivers ; then, having established
regular water communication, Astrakhan and Kazan were
to be conquered. The Turks began digging the canal.

THE EXPANSION TO THE UBAL 41

but before finishing their work they proceeded to Astra-
khan for winter quarters, where the troops mutinied and
dispersed at the approach of a Russian army.

If the Turks in the pride of their power could have
foreseen the dangers from the great northern empire, and
the future development of the fertile lands of South-east
Russia, instead of wasting their strength for centuries in
vain struggles against the nations of Southern Europe,
they might have extended their empire in the valley of the
Volga, retarding the expansion of Russia for centuries.

In 1569 also was concluded the celebrated Liublin
union. Before that event Poland and Lithuania had
been only dynastically united, the same sovereign being
King of Poland and Grand Duke of Lithuania, but the
approaching extinction of the House of Yagaila now re-
quired a closer bond. With much difficulty the Polish
nobles succeeded in effecting the complete union of Lithu-
ania to their kingdom ; the consolidation of the powerful
western neighbour became a great danger to the very
existence of Russia in the following reigns, especially as
Poland had the advantage of contact with Central and
Western Europe, whose science and civilisation she was
able to adopt without allowing it to pass on to Russia. Pro-
bably religious differences alone prevented her absorbing
Moscow as she had absorbed Lithuania.

The last years of the long reign of Ivan IV. were
marked by a series of disasters. In 1571 the Khan of
Crimea with an army of 120,000 men suddenly invaded
the Muscovite frontier, and, attacking Moscow, burnt the
whole town except the Kremlin ; it is said that 800,000
people were destroyed, and 130,000 carried into captivity.
The following year a Russian army was assembled, which
repulsed with great loss a new invasion of the Khan.
Matters were no better on the western frontier. In the

42 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

sixteenth century great progress had been made in
mihtary science in Western Europe ; the appearance
first of the Swiss and then of the Spanish infantry had
transformed tactics ; great improvements had been made
in artillery ; while professional mercenary troops every-
where supplanted the raw untrained militia of feudal
times. Eussia had only partly adopted these improve-
ments, and was no match for Sweden and Poland. In
1575 Stephan Batory, Prince of Transylvania, had been
chosen King of Poland ; with a fine army of German and
Hungarian mercenaries well provided with artillery he
vigorously prosecuted the war against the Tsar. The
Eussians were repeatedly defeated by the Swedes and
Poles, and in 1582 Ivan IV. was obliged to ask the
intervention of Pope Gregory XIII., by whose good
offices a truce of ten years was concluded.

The disasters and humiliation of his declining years-in-
creased the violence of the Tsar's evil passions ; in 1581, for
some slight offence, he struck his eldest son with his iron
staff so savagely that the unfortunate youth died. The
inhuman father did not long survive his crime ; he died
in 1584, and a few years after the House of Euric became
extinct and Eussia was a prey to the worst disorders.

The character of Ivan the Terrible resembles that of
Henry VIII. of England by its mixture of lust, cruelty,
and bigotry. This Tsar had seven wives, was always occu-
pied with the study of theology and the rigid observance
of religious practices. The political cruelty of Ivan the
Terrible must be judged by the standard of the times ; his
methods were not worse than those employed by Louis XI.
to establish the monarchy of France. The severity
of the first Tsar finally crushed that Eussian feudalism
which had ruined the country. He abolished the absurd
hereditary seniority which the feudal notions of the boyars

THE EXPANSION TO THE UBAL 43

had introduced into the army, and which forbade any
nobleman to serve under the descendants of men who at
any time had served under his ancestors.^ He organised
the first regular army — the celebrated Strielitz or archers
— and established garrisons and watch towers to guard the
frontiers against the nomads of the steppes.

The development of the power of Moscow had been
facilitated by the length of the last reigns, thus securing
continuity of purpose. Vassil I. commenced his reign in
1389, and Ivan IV. died in 1584. Nearly two centuries
were covered by only five sovereigns. After seven
centuries the House of Ruric had extended its sway over
the territory comprised in modern European Eussia, with
the exception of the shores of the Black Sea and the
Baltic and the western provinces. Ivan IV., at first,
following the historical tendency of the race, had advanced
eastwards, conquering the lower valley of the Volga and
the lands at the foot of the Ural mountains ; but at an
early date, abandoning this policy, he wasted his strength
against his powerful western neighbours. The people,
however, took up the work laid down by their sovereign,
and in 1582, the year when the proud Tsar had to invoke
the intercession of the Pope, an outlawed peasant had
commenced the conquest of Siberia.

' Special genealogical books were compiled which registered the past
military rank of different families and served for fixing the seniority of
their descendants.

44 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

CHAPTEE II

THE CONQUEST OF SIBERIA

The enterprising merchants of Novgorod, in their keen
search after furs for the European markets, pushed their
expeditions eastwards over the v^hole of Northern Eussia,
and at a very early date reached a mountain chain v^hich
seemed very high to men accustomed to the dead level of
the Eussian plains. It was called by some the Yugra
chain, by others the Stony Girdle, because it was supposed
to mark the limits of the world ; the modern name is the
Tartar equivalent of the latter, as Ural means ' girdle " in
the language of the natives. A little experience soon
showed that the chain was not difficult to cross, and
the Novgorodians reached the lands beyond, which they
called Yugra. It is said that the first knowledge of Yugra
reaches back to the eleventh century. Extravagant
accounts of the distant land were told by the rare tra-
vellers : the inhabitants were said to be speechless, and to
live close to cannibal nations, just as the Greeks of Homer
peopled with Lestrigones and Cyclopes the land which
was to become the Magna Grsecia of their descendants.
The Novgorodians never attempted to settle on either
side of the Ural, but were content to send parties to
collect tribute and barter with the natives. Even this
was sufficiently dangerous, and many of these early
pioneers were massacred.

Far different were the methods employed by the people
of Moscow. Their advance was much slower, but more

THE CONQUEST OF SIBERIA 45

permanent. In their expansion to the north-east they
did not send expeditions to collect tribute or barter, but
colonists to build log-huts and cultivate the land. The
two currents of emigration were bound to meet, and after
about a century the Muscovite settlers intercepted and
stopped the trading parties of Novgorod. This happened
during the reign of Ivan III., who, as we have seen,
shortly after conquered Novgorod, and annexed its pos-
sessions in Viatka. He had already occupied Perm some
time before.

Having reached the Ural mountains, the Muscovites,
as the Novgorodians before, were induced to cross the
chain, and send an expedition into the mysterious land of
Yugra. In 1499 an armed force was sent to conquer the
lands on the river Ob ; it returned with many prisoners,
and the name of a new province is mentioned by his-
torians which, from its name Obdorsk (Obdor in the
Zyrian language means ' mouth of the Ob '), was probably
situated far in the north, near the shores of the Arctic
Ocean. It was probably visited by Kussian ships, which,
as we shall see later, were often met by English navi-
gators in the high latitudes in the following century.

This expedition led to no practical results, as the
government did not keep a hold on its distant possessions ;
but it brought back a fresh stock of wonderful stories.
The inhabitants were said to fall asleep in autumn, and
to wake up only in spring. For bartering, they left their
goods at a fixed spot and retired, when the merchants
came and replaced them by equivalent articles. The
practice was said to lead to strife, as sometimes the goods
found were much inferior in value to those left. As the
latter story had been told of the Chinese centuries before,
it only shows the wonderful vitality of geographical
legends.

46 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

The Ostiaks and other aborigines of Yugra lived in
constant strife, and were therefore exposed to the raids of
the Tartars issuing from the southern steppes. Hard
pressed by these enemies, they appealed for aid to
Ivan III., promising to pay tribute on condition of being
defended from the southern nomads. Only the first part
of the contract was carried out ; tax-collectors were
occasionally sent, but Moscow was too far to afford effec-
tive protection. Later, when Ivan the Terrible, the
grandson of Ivan III., conquered Kazan and Astrakhan,
news of these important victories, which extended the
power of Moscow to the Ural, reached Ediger, a chieftain
in Yugra, and inspired hopes of timely assistance. Ediger
promised to pay tribute on the same condition of receiving
protection, but the power of the Tsar was still insufficient
on his new distant frontier, and the Tartars killed Ediger
and took his lands.

As tribute was always pleasant to collect, Ivan IV.
attempted to exact it from the Tartar conquerors, whose
only answer was the murder of his envoy. They also
made frequent raids across the Ural into the province of
Perm. The centralised government of Moscow, whose
object for centuries had been the gradual establishment
of order and suppression of crime, was mifitted for the
task of undertaking the adventurous conquest of unknown
regions peopled by wild races. This object could only be
achieved by men fashioned by the peculiar circumstances
of Eussian border-life, by men who had escaped from and
even revolted against the influences of autocracy.

When the Golden Horde was losing its power and
ferocity, Eussian adventurers began to roam in the southern
borderland, in those steppes overrun by the nomads.
They were mostly lawless characters ; and the distance
from Moscow, the immunity from law, the liberty of the

THE CONQUEST OF SIBERIA 47

boundless plains, the constant contact with the Tartars
converted them into marauders like their Asiatic neigh-
bours. These people without home and family were called
Cossacks to distinguish them from the settled Russian
population. History, which was probably late in record-
ing the new phenomenon, first mentions the Cossacks of
Eiazan about the middle of the fifteenth century, but the
most celebrated were the Zaporoghians,^ who lived in the
islands of the Dnieper around its rapids.

Close to the old original Russia of Ruric's successors,
which had become Little Russia, and had fallen into
the hands of Lithuania, when emigration had formed
Great Russia, the Zaporoghians were admirably situated
for sallying forth in their marauding raids, and for collect-
ing the outcasts of the neighbouring regions. The lower
course of the Dnieper was the boundary between Lithu-
ania and the Tartar steppes, while the upper course flowed
through Little Russia. The Polish supremacy, distasteful
even in Lithuania, was more so in the conquered Russian
provinces. The boldest among the Russians were tempted
to fly from the oppression of the Polish nobles, hateful
both on account of their religion and their nationalit5^
The Zaporoghian Cossacks ofl'ered a refuge to all. No
questions were asked about the past life of the newcomers.
The only conditions for admission in the rough community
were : belief in the orthodox faith, a strong body, and a
stout heart. It is said that, as a test of courage, the can-
didates were required to swim across the rapids, buffeting
the strong current. Complete equality reigned among the
Cossacks, and all except arms and clothing was held in
common ; important measures were decided by a general
council of the whole community, and the government was
entrusted to elective at a7nans, whose orders were implicitly

' Za-porog = beyond the cataracts in Eussian.

48 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

obeyed. The remembrance of past wrongs, the general
hostility of their neighbours developed a strong feeling of
comradeship, which bound fast together the members of
this military republic.

The chief occupation of the Zaporoghians was war
against the Tartars and Turks. They built rough boats
like their ancestors centuries before, often consisting of a
single huge trunk scooped out, with the sides raised by
planking ; and with these primitive craft they descended
the Dnieper, and boldly roved in the Black Sea, attacking
and plundering the Turkish ships. The reappearance in
the Black Sea of the daring adventurous Eussian race long
smothered by the Asiatic invasions seemed like a return to
the time of Oleg, the half-legendary conqueror of Con-
stantinople. On land the Cossacks in their incessant
warfare with the Tartars adopted the desultory tactics of
their enemies, and became wild horsemen of the steppes.
They spread out like a fan on the waste borderland of
Eussia, ever advancing and driving back the nomads
refractory to civilisation, smoothing the way for the settle-
ment of a sedentary population. Their mission in the East
was similar to that of the trappers and backwoodsmen of
the West, who, struggling with the Eed Indians hundreds
of miles ahead of the American settlements, rendered pos-
sible the wonderful expansion of the United States. Like
the pioneers of the Far West, the Cossacks, through
necessity of war and frequent intercourse with an inferior
race, were obliged to conform to the rough life and half-
civilised customs of their enemies. But these defects were
useful and indispensable in a population which was to
serve as an intermediate stage between Asiatic nomadism
and European civilisation. They have been everywhere
the advance guard of Eussian conquest. From the Dnieper
they passed to the Don and the Volga, and then to the great

THE CONQUEST OF SIBERIA 49

Siberian rivers flowing into the Arctic Ocean, and now
we find them on the Amur and the Usmd, on the shores
of the Pacific. Whenever the aborigines have been con-
quered, the Cossacks have become settlers, but they have
kept the essential traits of their origin ; the members of
the village community decide on all matters of importance,
and they elect their atamans or village chiefs ; they are
only bound to military service in requital of the lands
bestowed by the Tsar.

The notion held on the continent of Europe that they
are a special body of irregular cavalry formed by a despotic
government, of whom they are the dreaded symbol, is
wrong. They started as river pirates, and only became
the wild horsemen of the steppes to meet the nomads with
their own tactics ; their home has always been on the
banks of the great northern rivers ; their military organi-
sation is only a recent development. Far from being the
willing instruments of despotism, they were the outposts
of national independence, whether against the Poles or
the Tartars. They were the vigorous offshoots of a young
race ever eager to find wider fields for the enjoyment of
their boundless individual freedom. Their frequent revolts
under Mazeppa Pugacheff prove how difficult it has been
for the government to curb their unruly character, averse
to all restraint.

The advantages derived from the individual enterprise
of the Cossacks could not escape the sovereigns of Moscow ;
and, though their object was to suppress violence and
establish order throughout Eussia, they were forced by
circumstances to encourage private enterprise in the newly
conquered northern territories, and to supplement the
weak action of the central government by delegating its
powers to private persons fit for the purpose. When, by
the conquest of Perm and Viatka, the Muscovites reached

E

50 RUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

the frontiers of the mysterious land of Yugra, among the
scanty settlers the Stroganoffs (now one of the great
families of the Russian aristocracy) acquired great wealth
and influence. It is supposed they were of Tartar origin,
being descended from a ' Murza,' or prince of that race,
probably another instance of the attraction by which the
strong orderly government of Moscow enlisted in its
service the best elements even from among the hostile
races. At the time of Ivan the Terrible they added to
their possessions 150 versts of land around the Kama
(the largest tributary of the Volga), and by a charter
of the Tsar they were authorised to cut forests, colonise
waste lands, establish salt-works, and engage workmen;
they were also granted exemption from taxes for a
period of twenty years. In exchange for these privi-
leges they were obliged to defend Eussia from the incur-
sions of the wild races beyond the Ural, and at their
own expense build block-houses, purchase guns, and keep
a sufficient armed force. The arrangement was convenient
for both parties, and during three generations the Stro-
ganoffs accumulated great wealth while defending the
border. The third Stroganoff far surpassed the modest
conditions of his contract ; he furnished the means for
commencing the greatest conquest of Eussia, and deserves,
therefore, a conspicuous place in the history of his
country.

We now must glance at three generations of another
family in far different circumstances — a family struggling
against great poverty, but destined by fortune to come
across the path of the Stroganoffs and assist them
in their great enterprise. This family was destined to
produce one of those few men who mark an epoch in the
history of the world — one who is the greatest popular
hero of Eussia, though, strange to say, he is hardly known
beyond the frontiers of his country.

THE CONQUEST OF SIBEBIA 51

The grandfather of this hero was called Athanasius
Alenin, and lived in great poverty in the suburbs of
Suzdal. Want of work obliged him to remove to Vladimir,
where he became a carter. At that time the dense forests
of Murom, situated between the Oka and its affluent, the
Kliasma, in the neighbourhood of Vladimir, were infested
by bandits, and Athanasius Alenin often transported
them with his horses, being well paid for his valuable
assistance. But this profitable business was of short
duration. The complaisant carter was arrested with a
party of brigands and put in prison, whence he, however,
soon contrived to escape, and fled to Yurievetz Povolski, a
place on the Volga about halfway between Kostroma and
Nijni Novgorod, where he died. His death plunged the
widow and children into worse poverty. They heard of
the flourishing business of the Stroganoffs on the river
Kama, of their demand for labour, and of the good earn-
ings of the new settlers, and emigrated, settling on one of
the affluents of the river Kama, the Tchusavaya, whose
upper course runs almost parallel to the Ural mountains.
The sons took the name of Povolski from that of their
last residence, married, and had children.

Among the grandsons of Athanasius, the carter of
Vladimir, the smartest was Vassil, the son of Timothy.
From his early years he was remarkable for strength and
fluent speech, and when he attained manhood, though not
tall, his thickset, broad-shouldered frame, his quick bright
eyes, pitch-black hair, and thick curly beard attracted
attention in a community where physical qualities were
the only marks of distinction. His first occupation was
that of a tracker on the Kama and Volga. ^ In that rough
life he often had to cook food for his comrades, who

' Until the introduction of steam, vessels were constantly towed up
stream by gangs of trackers.

E 2

52 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

bestowed on him the inckname of Yermak (the millstone
of a handmill), a name which he rendered famous, and by
which only he is known in history. The tame drudgery
of the tracker's life soon disgusted the bold adventurous
Yermak, and he joined the Cossacks of the Don, who,
struck by his daring, soon selected him qhief of one of
their small settlements.

This first success showed Y^'ermak that he had found
his calling, and he decided to choose a larger field for his
activity. He led his Cossacks to the Volga, where he
gathered a large band of robbers. His local knowledge
now was invaluable ; the slow, monotonous work of the
tracker had given opportunities for his keen eye and quick
intellect to reconnoitre the shores of the river, and to
learn the habits of the trading vessels ; it was, therefore,
an easy task for him — perhaps not devoid of a certain
grim pleasm'e — to plunder the ships he had towed in- his
youth. The Volga had been always a great commercial
route, and it had grown in importance since the conquest
of Kazan and Astrakhan had given to Kussia the whole
course of the river. There was, therefore, plenty of booty,
and under a clever leader like Yermak piracy flourished
to the terror and confusion of the traders. Matters grew
so bad that complaints even reached Moscow, and Ivan
the Terrible ordered the pirates should be seized and
hanged, an army being sent to carry out the order.

This unpleasant news obliged Yermak to relinquish
his profitable occupation and seek safety in some distant
region out of the reach of the law. The huge river which
offered such opportunities for plunder also afforded ready
means of escape. The pirates ascended the Volga, and
then by the river Kama reached those wild thinly peopled
districts where Yermak had passed his childhood. The
Cossacks arrived in a favourable moment.

THE CONQUEST OF SIBERIA 53

Some years before, as early as 1573, the Stroganoffs,
enriched by their possessions on the Kama, had cast
covetous eyes over the Ural to the mysterious land of
Yugra, rich in valuable furs, aspiring to extend in an
easterly direction their profitable work of colonisation.
They applied to Ivan the Terrible for a charter, similar to
the one they had already received for the land on the
Kama, authorising them to cross the Ural, to cultivate the
land, build block-houses, and purchase guns. They also
added artfully that the Ostiaks were ready to pay tribute
to the Tsar if they were protected. The latter clause was
especially agreeable to Ivan the Terrible, for, as we have
seen, repeated attempts had been made by Moscow to
collect regular tribute from Yugra, and they had persis-
tently failed, because the distant Tsar could not afford the
protection the natives required in exchange for their furs.
The proposal of the Stroganoffs solved the difficulty, and
the charter demanded was granted. Now, however, the
Stroganoffs were faced by their greatest difficulties. The
experience acquired on the Kama and the armed force at
their disposal would have sufficed to collect tribute from
the Ostiaks and other aborigines ; but lately the Tartars
from the south had pushed northwards and conquered the
country. The Stroganoffs dared not risk a war against
these fierce nomads, whose power was magnified by dis-
tance and mystery.

The daring spirit of Yermak was not deterred by
dangers either real or imaginary, and, with the directness
of genius, he saw that the slow advance of the Muscovite
settlers was inadequate for the new project of the Stro-
ganoffs— the subjection of Yugra could only be achieved
by rapid conquest.

It was a century marked by the wonderful expansion
of Western Europe. India and China had been redis-

54 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

covered by Portuguese navigators ; a new world had been
found where Spanish adventurers had conquered empires.
Though Eussia had little intercourse with the West, still
some vague report of these astonishing events must have
reached her. English navigators, in their attempts to find
a north-east passage to China,' opened commercial rela-
tions with Eussia. Less than thirty years before Yermak's
proposal, in 1553, Chancellor had traversed the whole
northern part of the country on his way to Moscow.
The consequent creation of the Muscovy Company had
given English traders the monopoly of the commerce of
the White Sea. In 1556 Burrough had met numerous
Eussian vessels near Nova Zembla. In 1557 an agent of
the Muscovy Company, starting from the White Sea, had
traversed the Dvina, the Volga, the Caspian, and had
reached Samarkhand. A year before, in 1580, Pot and
Jackman penetrated into the Kara Sea. A restless spirit
of discovery pervaded all the nations of Europe, and this
vague feeling would act powerfully on the quick intelli-
gence of a man like Yermak.

The proposal to conquer Yugra was readily approved
by the Stroganoffs, whose wealth enabled them to furnish
the necessary arms and provisions for the distant and
difficult expedition. Yermak had brought with him his
trusty lieutenants, the famous Volga pirates, Ivan Koltzo,.
lakob Mikhailowitel, Nikita Pan, Matvien Meshtcheriak,
and a body of the boldest Cossacks. Their numbers were
now swollen by a motley crowd of Eussians, Tartars,
Germans, and Lithuanians, whom the Stroganoffs had
ransomed from the Nogai Tartars of the south. The
whole force amounted to 800 men, and was well equipped
with the best arms of the period (light cannon, muskets,,
and arquebuses). A large stock of provisions was pro-

' First proposed by Robert Thorne in 1527.

THE CONQUEST OF SIBEBIA 55

vided for the long journey in an unknown and probably-
barren country. Interpreters were engaged, and even
spiritual wants were not neglected, three popes and a
runaway monk being attached to the party. Yermak
started on September 1, 1581,' amidst loud flourishes of
trumpets, as the Stroganoffs wished to mark with great
pomp the departure of the expedition.

The Stroganoffs risked paying dearly for the assistance
given to Yermak. The same day he started, the
Vogulichi, a tribe beyond the Ural, made a raid, burning
and robbing several Russian settlements. This disaster
could not be concealed from Ivan the Terrible, who also
was informed that outlawed Cossacks had been sheltered
by the Stroganoffs, and allowed to organise an armed
invasion of Yugra. The two events got mixed up in the
mind of the distant Tsar, whose only vague notion of
Yugra was that of a land whence occasionally valuable
furs could be obtained at the cheap price of a perfunctory
promise of protection. The rash act of a few pirates
seemed to imperil a profitable transaction. He wrote
severely to the Stroganoffs, upbraiding thena for harbour-
ing dangerous robbers, who, instead of being employed at
least for the protection of the settlements, were allowed to
attack tribes willing to pay tribute. The advance of the
Cossacks threatened to ruin the whole business, and
they were ordered to be recalled.

The Tsar showed himself a worthy descendant of
those first Grand Dukes of Moscow whose virtues, a
Eussian historian ^ sneeringly remarks, were less valorous
than lucrative. When we compare his reluctance to risk
the loss of a few sables with the fearlessness of Yermak,

' Up to the time of Peter the Great the Eussian year commenced on
September 1 : so Yermak started on New Year's day.
* Kuchewsky, Course of Bussiayi History.

56 RUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

ready to face death and endless privations in an unknown
land, we must recognise that the late tracker of the Volga
had a more kingly soul than the terrible Tsar, the de-
scendant of the long line of Euric.

The severe orders of the Tsar, however, produced no
effect. At that time it took more than a month for news
to travel from Moscow to the Kama, and when the
Stroganoffs received the command to recall Yermak he
was far away. He had already won his first victories.

Yermak led his men, in true Cossack fashion, by river
in a fleet of boats. At first their course was up the
Tchussavaya, on whose banks his father and uncles had
settled, and where he had passed his childhood. They
made slow progress, as they had to row against the strong
current flowing between steep rocky banks. From the
Tchussavaj^a they passed to its tributary, the Serebrianka.
The Ural mountains now appeared quite close, while the
current grew stronger and the banks steeper. At last
the water grew too shallow for the heavily laden boats,
when, it is said, Yermak dammed the stream with sails.
The increased depth obtained by the accumulation of
intercepted water allowed the flotilla to proceed a little
fm'ther. But at last all the resources of Yermak's local
knowledge, and of his varied experience acquired as a
boatman and tracker, were of no avail ; the boats had to
be taken out of the water and dragged to the next
stream.

The central part of the Urals (the Ural of Goroblahodat)
where Yermak effected his passage is of slight elevation,
only three peaks rising above 2,000 feet, and even this
slight height is attained by such a gentle slope along the
extended Russian plain that the passage from the
European to the Asiatic watershed is quite imperceptible.
On the road from Perm to Yekaterinburg a post, with the

O 0-

5 «

O f:

THE CONQUEST OF SIBERIA 57

words Europe on one side and Asia on the other, indicates
the fact to the traveller.

An easy ' portage ' therefore brought Yermak's boats
to the small stream Jaravli, on which they floated down
to the larger Taghil, and thence to the still larger river
Tura, all forming part of the basin of the Ob. On the
river Tura the Cossacks were attacked by the aborigines,
who shot arrows from the banks ; but when the Russians
discharged their firearms thej^ fled in great terror,
imagining that thunder and lightning were directed
against them. The Cossacks then landed and sacked
several villages, but were unable to capture any prisoners,
as the whole population had escaped. They were more
fortunate later when they reached the river Tavda,
where they succeeded in seizing a Tartar. Yermak, per-
ceiving the impression produced by firearms, determined
to show the terrible effects of his weapons. A musket
was fired at a coat of mail, which was pierced by the
bullet. When the terror of the Tartar had subsided, he
was questioned about the land and its inhabitants. The
whole country belonged to Kutchum, the Tartar chief
who had invaded Yugra and conquered the aborigines ;
the same who had put to death the envoy sent by Ivan
the Terrible to demand tribute. His capital, Isker, or
Sibir, was situated on the Irtysh, the largest affluent of the
Ob, and could be reached by following the Tobol. Kut-
chum, though old and blind, was full of energy, and was
assisted by a young kinsman, Makhmetkul, the most
daring warrior of the whole region. All the surrounding
tribes were tributaries to the Tartars, who were, however,
unpopular, because they tried to convert to Mahometanism
the pagan natives.

Yermak was in somewhat similar conditions to those
of Cortez when he undertook his daring conquest of

58 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

Mexico. His followers, though few, had firearms and
defensive armour, while his numerous enemies fought
with spears and bows and arrows. A rapid victory was
sure to break the power of the Tartars, as the disaffected
natives w^ere ready to change when they found a stronger
master.

The prisoner was released, and, as expected, reported
to Kutchum the arrival of strangers with wonderful bows
which shot flames and pierced iron mail. The old chief,
undismayed, hastened preparations to stop the enemy on
the Tobol. In a place where the river narrows, iron
chains were thrown across the stream to stop the boats,
and a large force was stationed on the bank to attack and
destroy the Russians. A stratagem of Yermak's fertile-
mind outwitted the simple Tartars. Bundles of sticks
and brushwood were dressed up as Cossacks and placed in
boats, with a few men to steer, while the bulk of the
expedition landed and resolutely attacked the enemy on
the banks. The Tartars, frightened by the numbers of
the Russians advancing on all sides, fled without re-
sistance.

This defeat obliged Kutchum to gather another larger
army to stop the invaders. It was divided into two corps.
Kutchum with the bulk of his force entrenched himself
at a short distance from the capital, while the cavalry,
commanded by the renowned Makhmetkul, advanced
against the Russians. The Cossacks were at first dis-
heartened by the superiority of the enemy, who was thirty
times more numerous ; but Yermak encouraged them by
his example, and a desperate engagement took place.
Despite their numbers the Tartars could not stand
against firearms and were routed ; but the victory was
dearly bought, as Yermak lost some of his bravest
followers.

THE CONQUEST OF SIBERIA 59

The Cossacks continued to descend the river Tobol,
harassed continually by parties of Tartars shooting arrows
from their hiding-places on the banks. At last the Eus-
sians landed, and, driving away the enemy, resumed their
route on the river Irtysh. Now they were near Isker,
and close to Kutchum, who had collected all his forces in
defence of his capital. Yermak halted in a Tartar village
to give his men a night's rest before the battle. The
Cossacks, in their usual fashion, assembled in a circle to
discuss and take counsel. The long fatiguing journey in
an unknown country, the hard-won victories, the expec-
tation of a doubtful battle against a still more numerous
enemy produced a feeling of despondency, and it was
proposed to return. Yermak used all his eloquence to
dissuade his followers ; he said such thoughts were un-
worthy of them, and pointed out that retreat now was
impossible — long ere they could reach their homes all the
rivers would be frozen.^ After a long consultation the
Cossacks recognised that their only chance lay in victory,
and consented to remain.

On the morning of October 23, 1581, the Eussians
boldly attacked the enemy, entrenched behind an abattis
of felled trees. A fierce struggle ensued ; the Tartars
rushed out, surrounding the assailants on all sides ; but
the Cossacks, encouraged by Yermak and his lieutenant,
Ivan Koltzo, who were everywhere in the thickest of the
fight, resolved to sell their lives dearly. A lucky shot
struck Makhmetkul, who had to be removed to the other
bank of the Irtysh, and the Tartars, now leaderless, were
put to flight. Old blind Kutchum, hearing of the defeat,
abandoned his capital in despair and fled south to the

' The Irtysh at Tobolsk freezes generally about November 7, though
sometimes as early as October 22, or as late as December 1 (Busski
Kalendar, 1899. Suvorina).

60 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

steppes of Isliim. This victory, the most important they
had won, gave the Russians the M^hole country from the
Ural to the rivers Tobol and Ob, but it cost the hves of
many Cossacks. Yermak, by successive desertions and
casualties, had now but few men left.

On October 26 Yermak reaped the firstfruits of his
victory by occupying the abandoned capital of Kutchum,
the town of Sibir. This name, applied also to the sur-
rounding country, was adopted by the Russians to denote
their possessions beyond the Ural, and as these gradu-
ally grew until they reached the Pacific, so by a common
extension of geographical terms the same w^ord was used
to indicate the dominions of the Tsar in Northern Asia.
Thus the name of a small Tartar town, the headquarters
of an obscure chieftain, has become the collective geo-
graphical designation of the largest region on the earth.

The town of Isker or Sibir was strongly protected on
two sides by the steep banks of the Irtysh and of a small
stream, the Sibirka, and on the other sides by a triple
earthen rampart and ditch. It is said the Cossacks found
rich booty in silks, furs, and even gold, which was equally
divided, but their newly acquired wealth could not pur-
chase what they wanted most. Their provisions were
almost exhausted, and no food was found in the town ;
the near approach of the rigorous northern winter ren-
dered their position very dangerous.

The news of the great victory, of the flight of Kut-
chum, of the occupation of his capital spread rapidly,
and on October 30 the Ostiaks came, as Yermak had
expected, to offer allegiance to their new masters. They
also brought presents and much-needed provisions. The
peace which now reigned over the country gave the Cos-
sacks leisure to start fishing and hunting to collect a
sufficient stock of food for the long winter. But their

THE CONQUEST OF SIBEBIA 61

enemies now appeared again, and in the beginning of
December Makhmetkul, recovered from his wound, fell
upon a party of twenty Cossacks, who were all massacred.
Yermak had to leave Sibir in pursuit of Makhmetkul,
who was again severely defeated.

The long winter, with the rigid weather of the region,
precluded all possibility of military operations ; but in
April 1582 Yermak was informed that Makhmetkul was
not far distant with a very small force. An expedition
of ten Cossacks was promptly organised, which proceeded
so rapidly and secretly that the Tartars were surprised',
dispersed, and their chief captured.

Now was the brightest period of Yermak's life. The
power of Kutchum was completely broken, as he had lost
the service of his valiant kinsman, and was attacked by
another Tartar prince whose father he had killed. The
Russians descended the Irtysh and the Ob, enforcing the
submission of the different tribes and collecting tribute.

Having completed the first part of his work, Yermak
thought the moment had come to inform the Stroganoffs
of the result of his undertaking. He probably also felt
the want of reinforcements, as in his last expedition one
of the atarnans, Nikita Pan, with several Cossacks, had
been killed, and every shght loss told heavily on the
dwindling band of adventurers. The acute mind of Yer-
mak realised the importance of his position and of the
extraordinary work he had accomplished. He not only
wrote to the Stroganoffs informing them of his victories
and of the capture of Makhmetkul, but he also wrote to
Ivan the Terrible. After asking pardon for his past mis-
deeds, Yermak added that the Russian empire had now
a new territory — the land of Sibir, which only needed
the laws and the voivodes of the Tsar. The messenger
charged with the delivery of this letter and of the prisoner

62 BUS SI A ON THE PACIFIC

Makhmetkul was the trusty lieutenant Ivan Koltzo, the
robber chief of the Volga, who had been condemned to
death by a proclamation of Ivan the Terrible.

The arrival of this strange embassy filled Moscow
with wonder and pleasure ; a handful of Cossacks had
conquered the mysterious land of Yugra, and the wealth
they had found was evinced by the valuable presents
they had sent and the rich dresses of their envoys. The
Tsar, who had shown such displeasure at the departure
of Yermak, was now soothed by the report of his success
and by the fine sables brought by Ivan Koltzo. He gave
money and presents to the Cossacks and sent Yermak a
fur mantle which had covered the imperial shoulders.
What was still more acceptable to Yermak was the des-
patch of a voivode with 500 strieletz.

The conquest of Siberia, even in the limited sense in
which the expression was understood at that time, was
far from accomplished. The forces at the disposal of
Yermak were inadequate for the purpose, as soon as the
natives began to recover from the astonishment produced
by the arrival of the strangers with their wonderful
weapons. The powerful reinforcement sent from Mos-
cow was of little use at first, because the strielitz were
less fit to endure privations than the Cossacks ; the cold
and moisture of the winter, the want of fresh food caused
a violent outbreak of scurvy. The voivode himself and
many of his soldiers fell victims to the disease, which
raged until spring brought warmth and a supply of bread.
A crafty chief, Karatcho, had won the confidence of
Yermak by a specious show of friendship, and under
pretence of seeking assistance he inveigled a party of
Russians into his power, when he treacherously murdered
them ; the famous Ivan Koltzo was killed on this occa-
sion. The news of this massacre caused a general revolt

THE CONQUEST OF SIBERIA 63

of all the subject tribes, who besieged Sibir, surrounding
the place with a long line of wagons, which prevented
the exit of the Russians and afforded protection from
their firearms.

The courage and enterprise of the Cossacks extricated
them from this perilous position. On a dark night,'
June 12, 1584, led by Matvien Meshtcheriak, they
stealthily penetrated through the line of wagons and
fiercely attacked the surprised Tartars, who were slaugh-
tered in great numbers while asleep. The desperate
struggle continued until the following midday, when
' Karatcho, finding he could not drive away the Cossacks
■ from his train of wagons, fled to Kutchum in the steppes
of Ishim.

Yermak was now indefatigable in punishing the scat-
tered rebel tribes and revenging the death of his men.
His task was now more laborious, as almost all his brother
atamans had perished ; Yakof Mikhailoff had been killed
with a scouting party, and only Meshtcheriak was left
of the old Volga pirate chiefs. Having pacified the
country, he returned to Sibir, but only for a short time ;
rest was denied to him even in the last months of his
adventurous life.

During the two years the Russians had been esta-
blished in Sibir, commercial intercourse had been opened
with distant regions of Asia, merchants coming even from
Bokhara to barter their goods. A party of these traders
had been long expected by the Russians, but now they
were informed that Kutchum, their old enemy, prevented
the passage of the Bokharians. Yermak, with his usual
prompt resolution, started with a party of fifty Cossacks
to meet the caravan, but after a day of fruitless search he

' It must have been very cloudy, because in that latitude and season
twilight lasts all night.

64 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

i

was unable to find either the merchants or Kutchum.
An encampment was chosen for the night with the deep
rapid stream of the Irtysh on one side, and a shallow ditch
filled with water on the other ; the boats were moored to
the bank, the tents were pitched, and the tired Cossacks
fell asleep ; all were so exhausted that no watch was
kept. Unfortunately, Kutchum was near.

It was August 5, 1584 ; the night was very stormy ;
the furious waves of the Irtysh tore away the boats from
their moorings and floated them down the river ; the noise
of the howling wind and pelting rain drowned the sound
of the hoofs of the advancing Tartars. Old blind Kutchum
had been informed that the Kussians were sleeping, but
would not credit the report, fearing an ambush. A scout
was sent with orders to find a ford across the ditch, to
stealthily enter the camp, and bring back proof of the
report. He returned with three muskets. The delighted
Kutchum could no longer doubt that chance had given
him at last an opportunity to have his revenge and destroy
the terrible enemy who had deprived him of his dominions.
Amid the roaring of the storm the Tartar cavalry rushed
into the camp and commenced the butchery of the slum-
bering Russians. Only two were able to get to their feet :
a Cossack, who escaped to convey the sad news, and Yer-
mak. He fought valiantly for his life, cutting down the
Tartars who approached ; but at a glance he saw he was
alone and had no chance. He rushed to the river bank
to find a boat, but the boats had all drifted away. Driven
to bay, he plunged into the deep river in the vain hope of
swimming to the boats, but the weight of his armour
dragged him to the bottom.

A few days afterwards a Tartar discovered in the river
the corpse of Yermak, conspicuous by its rich coat of mail
with a golden eagle on the breast. It is stated to have

YERMAK
(From the Statue by Antol-olski)

THE CONQUEST OF SIBERIA 65

been subject to great indignities, though finally buried
with great honours. The sword and the armour of the
renowned ataman were divided among the Tartar chiefs ;
but after seventy years, by chance, the coat of mail fell
again into the hands of the Russians.

Such was the end of the founder of the Russian Asiatic
empire. His career was one of the most remarkable in
history ; from the humblest origin, from the meanest
occupations and unlawful pursuits, he rose to a position
cf wealth and power, where he had free scope to show that
his abilities were far above those of the common free-
; booter.

r The bold raid into Siberia might have occurred to the
I mind of any daring adventurer, but the persevering struggle
against difficulties, the severe discipline he enforced, the
organisation he attempted to establish in the new coun-
try, w^ere the work of no ordinary man. It would be
wrong to consider that chance alone ; the general European
expansion of the century, the Russian conquest of Kazan
and Astrakhan, had raised him to eminence. A century
before, a Russian expedition had crossed the Ural, but
failed to realise what it had achieved. Yermak himself
created the importance of his position, and forced its
recognition by boldly writing directly to the Tsar. While,
as a loyal Russian, he asked forgiveness for his past crimes,
he clearly showed that an empire was offered as his atone-
ment : an empire whose future value was discernible to
the keen insight of his genius.

In the last glorious years of his life his pride was
gratified by high honours ; it is said he received the title
of Siberian prince ; he, the tracker and pirate of the Volga,
wore the mantle of the Tsar, sent by the imperious Ivan
the Terrible ; but the greatest consolation amid priva-
tions, fatigues, and sufferings must have been the proud

F

66 BUS SI A ON THE PACIFIC

consciousness that he had done for Kussia what no other
man ever had done. Demetrius Donskoi, at Kulikovo,
had only defended the independence of his country with
150,000 men at his back ; Ivan III. and Ivan IV. with
their powerful armies had only encroached on the decay-
ing Tartar khanates ; while he, with the scanty resources
he had been enabled to obtain in the hard struggle of his
life, with the rough companions gathered on the banks of
the Volga, had conquered the land across the Ural, which
extended far away to the east beyond the knowledge of
his time. He was the founder of that Greater Russia
which promises to be in the future to the Great Eussia of
Moscow what the latter was to the Little Eussia of Kief.
After many centuries of subjection to the Tartars, of the
prudent, shuffling policy of the Grand Dukes of Moscow,
he was the first to reveal to the Eussian race what daring
deeds it could accomplish, and to restore that feeling of
self-confidence which is the first element of national
greatness.

It is difficult to find in Eussian history men possessing
higher qualities than those of this rough peasant : we
must go back to Alexander Nevsky, who by his valour
and wisdom averted destruction from his race, or we must
look forward to Peter the Great, whose genius and inces-
sant work removed the dross left by the Tartar conquest,
and secured for his country her right place in Europe.
The memory of Yermak is revered all over Siberia ; his
name. and exploits are the subject of innumerable songs
and legends, and even in the houses of the peasants we
find rough pictures of the popular hero.

The personal influence of Yermak can be measured by
the effects that immediately followed his death. The
Cossacks, decimated by cold, sickness, and wounds, had
not the courage to continue the work of their beloved

THE CONQUEST OF SIBERIA 67

leader, and resolved to return to Eussia. They abandoned
the town of Sibir and commenced their retreat, but on
their way they met the voivode Mansuroff, who had been
sent with 100 men by Theodore, the son and successor of
Ivan the Terrible. Thus reinforced, the Russians re-
turned to Sibir, but were unable to enter the tov^na, as it
had been already occupied by the Tartars.

The work accomplished by Yermak had been of such
importance that it could not be permanently effaced even
by his untimely death. The defeated Tartars had lost
cohesion, and Kutchum, who had reoccupied his old
capital Sibir, abandoned by the Cossacks, was quickly
driven out by another chieftain. A Russian voivode,
Tchulkoff, arrived with a fresh reinforcement of 300 men,
but, deeming it unwise to attack Sibir, built another town,
Tobolsk (1587), at sixteen ' versts distance. All attempts
to live at peace with the Tartars, however, proved ineffec-
tual ; the chieftains plotted to destroy the Russians by
treachery, but were discovered and captured by Tchulkoff.
Old blind Kutchum, the relentless enemy of Yermak,
wrote to the Tsar, and for some time lived under his pro-
tection, but his pride refused to accept a dependent posi-
tion, and he fled to the Tartars in the south, where he
was murdered. His old capital, Sibir, the glorious con-
quest of Yermak, which has given a name to the whole
north of Asia, gradually vanished before the growing
importance of the neighbouring Tobolsk ; the ramparts,
ditches, and a few ruins still indicate its past glory. ^

The government of Moscow soon tried to develop the
territory it had so unexpectedly acquired through the
boldness of the Cossack adventurers. As early as 1586

' Nineteen versts according to the Guide to Siberia (W. A. Bolgorukoff).
- It is said that in May and September the local Tartars assemble here
to commemorate their ancestors of the Irtysh (W. A. Bolgorukoff).

F 2

68 BUS SI A ON THE PACIFIC

peasants were sent with horses, cows, and ploughs to
colonise and cultivate the land. But the agricultural
development of the country was very slow, for few per-
sons were willing to engage in a risky occupation in the
troubled region, with prospects of relatively small profits.
Almost all the settlers were either soldiers occupied in
collecting tribute and subduing the natives, or merchants
trafficking in furs.

The Kussians in Western Siberia found themselves in
similar conditions, and exposed to the same enemies as
their ancestors in European Eussia : on the south there
was a region of steppes which, extending through a gap
in the mountains, bounding the rest of Siberia on the
east and south, reaches to the shores of the Aral and the
Caspian ; from these plains the Tartars were always ready
to make raids northward when there were hopes of
plunder. Forts had to be constructed, and troops were
stationed in the south to stop the inroads of the nomad
horsemen. The ostrogs, or forts, built by the Cossacks,
were similar to the block-houses of the early settlers in
the United States who dwelt in the vicinity of the Ked
Indians. A rough but strong palisade of pointed beams
surrounded sufficient space for the log-huts of the soldiers
and peasants. These ostrogs were in some places merely
military outposts, while in others they formed the defence
of a settlement which often became a town when favour-
ably situated. In the latter case an inner enclosure was
formed with wooden walls and towers.

The town of Tara on the Irtysh, founded in 1594, is
an instance of these early fortified settlements, and details
are given to show their small size. The inner enclosure
of wooden walls and towers was a square of ninety-eight
yards a side, and contained the church, the residence of
the voivode, the powder magazine, and government store-

THE CONQUEST OF SIBERIA 69

houses ; around this there was the ostrog, whose pali-
sade formed a rectangle 1,400 feet long and 1,050 wide ;
the log-huts were situated in the intermediate space
between the two enclosures. Tara was a place of great
importance in the early times, and, together with Kuz-
netsk on the upper waters of the Tom, founded more than
twenty years later, formed the southern line of defence
against the nomads. But the scanty numbers of the
Russians were quite inadequate to guard the immense
Siberian plains : it is sufficient to note that at Tara a
detachment of sixty Cossacks was supposed to defend the
fertile Barabinski steppe, situated between the upper
courses of the Irtysh and Ob, which has a breadth varying
from 250 to 400 miles.

The numerical weakness of the Russians, and the
terrifying effects produced by firearms on the natives,
led to the wide use of cannon. Almost every ostrog
had several small guns, and the official documents of the
time contain full details about the serving out of ammu-
nition, and the appointment of gunners for firing and
peasants for handling the guns. The terrors of artillery,
however, were insufficient to stop the inroads of the
southern nomads, especially when the Kirghizes and
Kalmucks also joined in the raids : the outlying ostrogs
were often burnt, and Tobolsk itself, though situated so far
north, was exposed to attacks even up to sixty years after
the invasion of Yermak.

The fierce aggressive races of the south prevented the
early expansion in that direction of the few scattered
Russian adventurers, who were therefore obliged to under-
take the conquest of less warlike races in more in-
hospitable regions. These circumstances produced the
strange result that the Russians settled first in the cold
northern plains, and only slowly advanced later towards

70 BUS SI A ON THE PACIFIC

warmer regions. Thus Berezof (1593), towards the
mouth of the Ob (N. lat. 63° 55'), was founded before
Tara, Surgut, Narym, and eleven years before Tomsk.
This was also due to the hydrographical conditions of the
country, and to the means of conveyance employed by the
Cossacks. The course of the Ob and Irtysh flows from
south to north, and the Russians, who always proceeded
in boats, preferred to drift down the rivers from their head-
quarters at Tobolsk, avoiding the laborious work of
rowing and tracking against the stream. In their
navigation the Cossacks used rafts, and one-masted
decked vessels 84 feet long. These craft were of the
roughest kind, without any iron ; even the anchors were
of wood weighted with stones to make them sink. The
ropes were made of twisted strips of reindeer skins, and
the sails of tanned hides of the same animals.

The hereditary skill of the Cossacks as river sailors,
derived from the practice of their ancestors dwelling on
the banks of the Dnieper, Don, and Volga, handled these
primitive vessels with such effect that the whole central
part of the basin of the Ob and Irtysh, with their
tributaries, became a network of communications for
the scattered Russian settlements and outposts. These,
in consequence, were all situated on the rivers, either near
the confluence of two streams or where an easy portage
led from the upper waters of one river to those of another.
The inundations of the Siberian rivers, caused by the
great increase of water in the spring, were a source of
great distress to the early settlers, until they learnt to
choose appropriate places for the ostrogs on steep banks
or on elevated ground.^

The northern part of Siberia, to which the Russians

' The town of Tara, in consequence of the inundation of 1669, had to
be removed.

THE CONQUEST OF SIBERIA 71

were confined by the hostility of the warlike southern
tribes, was rich in those valuable furs which had been
abundant in European Russia in early times, and had
constituted the principal trade of Novgorod the Great.
These articles, representing a great value with slight
volume and weight, were especially adapted to the
necessities of the Cossacks, obliged to wander over
extensive tracts of country with slow, laborious means of
conveyance. The fur trade in Siberia corresponded to
the keen search for the precious metals, which attracted
the Spanish adventurers to America.

The subject tribes of Ostiaks and Samoyedes were
obliged to pay tribute, which was levied in furs, parties of
Cossacks being sent all over the country for collection.
Traders soon followed, and in some cases even boldly pre-
ceded the official expeditions, bartering with the natives
for the precious commodities. The trade increased so
enormously that in 1640 no less than 6,800 sables were
collected ; there was such abundance that even simple
Cossacks had sometimes coats lined with sables. The
search was so keen, and the Cossacks spread around
so actively from every ostrog, that often rival parties
starting from different quarters met to collect in the same
locality, causing sometimes quarrels. The ever increasing
demand, the growing numbers of the immigrants all eager
to acquire rapid affluence, together with the diminishing
numbers of the hard-pressed animals, obliged the Russians
to search constantly for new unexhausted regions.

As expansion was checked on the south, the Cossacks
had to move eastward. The advance in this direction
was also facilitated by the course of the rivers and the
configuration of the country. Though the great Siberian
rivers flow from south to north, the numerous affluents,
all considerable navigable streams, spread out east and

72 BUS SI A ON THE PACIFIC

west. The trifling elevation of the vast northern plains,
through which flow the lower courses of the rivers, offers
no obstacle to pass from one basin to another. The
Cossacks, accustomed to patient labour, were thus able to
drag their boats from the right affluents of the Ob to the
left ones of the Yenissei.^ The establishment of the
Russians on the second great river of Siberia took place
about 1620, though the first explorers must have reached
it somewhat earlier. Some give the foundation of
Yenisseisk in 1618, and of Turukhansk, further north,
even earlier (in 1607).

In this new region the Russians foui. 1 a more rigorous
climate, and extensive forests and swamps. The hardships
of the bold pioneers increased, especially as the further
they went from the Ural the more difficult it was to get
stores and to secure numerous recruits for the distant
expeditions in the unknown districts. Small parties of
soldiers and traders wandered over the country, navigating
the rivers in spring and summer, tod retiring in the cold

' At present water communication between the two rivers is thus
effected according to Strelbitski * : —

365 miles on the Ket, right tributary of tlie Ob.

36 miles on the Lomovataya, tributary of the Ket.

19 miles on the Yazevaya, tributary of the Lomovataya.

4 miles on Lake Bolshoye, whence issues the Yazevaya.

5 miles on a canal from the lake to the Little Kas, left tributary of

the Great Kas.
30 miles on the Little Kas.
100 miles on the Great Kas.

From the above itinerary it appears that only five miles separate the
nearest waters of the two rivers. There is also another portage between
the two basins of the Ob and Yenissei, somewhat lower down, to the north
of the above. The Nelemka, an affluent of the Tym (a tributary on the
right of the Ob), approaches to within three miles of the Alchim, an aflfluent
of the Sym, which falls into the Yenissei.

* The official work Siberia and the Great Siberian Railway gives a slightly different
description ; between the Ket and the Lomovataya there are nearly ten miles on the river
Ozemaya, and the distances on the Little and Great Kas are respectively 59 and 127
miles.

TEE CONQUEST OF SIBEBIA 73

season to winter quarters. These, called zimovie by the
Russians, played a great part in the early history of the
country. They were often the first kernel of an ostrog,
and then, in succession, of a town. A simple peasant's
hut of roughly squared logs, with an earthen stove, the
windows closed with panes of mica, or even of trans-
parent ice, formed the refuge of as many human beings
as could huddle together without being suffocated by the
noxious confined air. During the terrible snow-storms ^ —
the terror of the Siberian winter — the zimovie was often
completely hidden by snow-drifts, a thin cloud of smoke
alone revealing its existence on the desert white plain ; a
rough wooden cross distinguished it from the habitations
of the aborigines.

Yenisseisk became the centre of trade in the region on
the banks of the newly discovered river Yenissei : natives
and Russians congregated there to barter, and it was
chosen as the site for the central government store, where
the tribute collected among the surrounding tribes was
deposited previous to being despatched to Moscow. Re-
ports from the different expeditions in the unexplored
country were also sent to the capital, and the news of
fresh discoveries gave an impulse to emigration.

In 1630, 100 men and 150 women with girls were
forwarded to Tobolsk. Besides these large official expe-
ditions there was, of course, a constant flow of individual
emigrants, escaped serfs, and adventurers in search of
wealth in the new country. Fresh supplies of colonists
were required to prevent the old settlers from sinking into
complete barbarism.^ As they advanced eastward, the

' Called ' purgas ' in Siberia.

- Bybowskl, who visited Kamchatka in 1879-80, says that the de-
scendants of the Eussian settlers in that sequestered region have degene-
rated almost to the level of the Kamchadales, among whom they have
lived for nearly two centuries ; they can neither till, spin, nor sew, and it is

74 BUS SI A ON THE PACIFIC

distance from the mother country, the terrible privations,
and the constant intercourse with the aborigines lowered
the originally not very high moral standard of the adven-
turers. In 1662 the patriarch Philacete had written
to the A.rchbishop of Tobolsk, complaining that the
Cossacks in Siberia did not even wear the cross, and
contracted irregular unions with native women, whom
they sold and exchanged with great freedom. The
treatment of the subject tribes also was often cruel and
oppressive, far different from the humane methods of
Yermak. All the orders from Moscow concerning the
collection of tribute enjoined strict justice and humanity,
but the Tsar was too far to secure faithful execution of
his instructions.

On the Yenissei the Eussians had found a different
race of aborigines, the Tunguses, from whom they col-
lected tribute ; but as they ascended the river they found
another powerful race, the Bratskis (now called Buriats),
a branch of the Mongol race. This tribe was warlike,
with a strong love of independence, and obliged the
scanty Russian pioneers to defer all ideas of conquest,
and to turn again eastward in search of new lands.

About ten years after the discovery of the Yenissei,
reports came of the existence of a third river also flowing
north — the Lena. Another race lived on its banks — the
Yakutes. The boldest pioneers hurried to the new region,
and already, in 1630, 2,000 sables were collected. In 1632
a rough ostrog was built, which became the town of
Yakutsk. The new river, with its numerous tributaries,
became the highway of a great trade : from the ostrogs
and towns on its banks, containing the largest part of the
settlers, small parties of Cossack tribute collectors, of

amusing to watch their painful efforts in attempting to sew with thread
only twisted with the fingers.

THE CONQUEST OF SIBERIA 75

trappers and traders in search of furs, irradiated in all
directions through the swamps and dense forests. Diffi-
culties and hardships increased all the time ; the enormous
distances were no longer measured by versts, but by day's
journey ; the nearest settlers were often a hundred versts
apart, and provisions had sometimes to be brought from
an ostrog a thousand miles away. No man could venture
to advance a step in the forest without his axe ; the scanty
population,^ spread over such a vast territory, was exposed
to great dangers from the savage natives.

To show the conditions of life of the early settlers, it
will be sufficient to describe at some length an incident
which was of no uncommon occurrence.

Thedka Nedostriel and Vaski Karetin were engaged in
the fur trade on the Lena, near the Tchetchinski portage.
In autumn, deciding to make preparations for the severe
winter, they floated down the river to an old abandoned
zimovie, moored their raft, and discharged their provisions.
While they were busy storing their goods in the log-hut,
a party of six Yakutes, armed with spears and bows,
entered and sat down. Thedka, wishing to propitiate the
unwelcome guests, offered them two loaves and some fish,
but, after tasting the bread, they threw it away with disgust.
Thedka, fearing that mischief was meant, went out of the
hut to secure the provisions that were lying about. As
soon as he left, the Yakutes seized and bound his com-
panion Vaski ; then, sallying forth, they dragged in Thedka,
and tied him to a post near the stove.

Rendered utterly powerless, the Russians were tortured
and mocked by the Yakutes, Thedka being wounded in
the shoulder with a knife. Then the savages went forth
to pillage, and from their talk it seemed they were dis-

' Many years later, in 1662, it was estimated that the total Eussian
population in Siberia did not exceed 70,000 souls.

76 BUS SI A ON THE PACIFIC

cussing about killing their prisoners. They re-entered,
pulled the hair of Vaski, and cut him on the head with
an axe. Thedka had been carelessly bound, and with his
teeth he managed to free his hands. He seized a knife,
and, brandishing it wildly, rushed on the savages with the
courage of despair. They fled, and Thedka pursued them
to the door, where he perceived that they had already set
fire to the hut on the outside. He freed his companion,
but the Yakutes shot arrows through the windows, and
Vaski fell wounded on the floor. Thedka was now left
alone in the burning hut ; flames broke out in every
direction, and the roof commenced to fall through. He
rushed out, fled to the river side, unmoored the raft, and
floated down the stream. But the Yakutes ran to the
banks and showered arrows. Thedka, wounded in four
places, fainted through loss of blood, and drifted helplessly
down the Lena.

The raft with the wounded Thedka floated down past
another zimovie, where eight Bussians were preparing for
the winter. They rescued their countryman, and dragged
him into the log-hut^ But on the following day news
came that the Yakutes had pillaged one zimovie and
massacred the inmates of another. The traders had to
fly for their lives, and abandoned the still unconscious
Thedka in the hut. There he remained a whole week,
alone in the forest, until he regained consciousness and
was able to reach another zimovie, where he was taken in
and sent to the hut of a farmer, who sheltered him for
the winter.

Communications between the Yenissei and Lena were
effected principally through the Ibinski portage, where
now a road from Ilimsk ' leads to Mukskaya.^ The dis-

' On the river Ilim, right affluent of the upper Tunguska (Angara),
which falls into the Yenissei.

'^ On the river Muka, affluent of the Kuta, which falls into the Lena.

THE CONQUEST OF SIBERIA 77

tance between the two places is 56 versts (about 37
miles) by road, but there are smaller streams, probably
used by the Cossacks, which shorten the distance to
about ten miles from the waters of one basin to the
other. Lower down, further north, there was another,
the Tchetchinski portage, where the upper waters of the
lower Tunguska approach to within about ten miles of
the Lena itself. The intervening ground is of slight
elevation.

But the difficulties of these communications were
enormous. The upper Tunguska and the Ilim had
numerous rapids, which rendered tracking slow and
laborious ; the small rivers were rocky, and had often
insufficient water ; boats could not pass in the latter,
while rafts were often capsized in the former. At the
portage it required seventy or eighty men with cables to
drag a boat to the nearest stream, which sometimes was
too shallow to float it. The Cossacks had to imitate
Yermak, damming the streams with sails to collect suffi-
cient water to float their vessels. Provisions were often
dragged across the portage in sledges by the soldiers, but
each sledge could contain at most four poods.'

The Russians, in the early times, were generally dis-
inclined to attack the warlike southern races, preferring
to defer their subjugation to a time when the increasing
numbers of the settlers would render the task easier.
But the situation of the important Ilimski portage
between the basins of the Yenissei and Lena, far south,
in the vicinity of the Bratski (Buriats), obliged them to
engage these fierce tribes. Before the foundation of
Yakutsk the two important Ilimski and Bratski ostrogs
had been established, to protect this important com-
munication from the attacks of the natives ; but later,
' 144 pounds.

78 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

in 1641, an expedition under the command of Vassil
Vlasieff was sent to conquer the Buriats. It met the
most determined resistance. A chieftain, Chepchugui,
while besieged in his stronghold, answered the Russian
intimation to surrender with a dogged refusal : ' Cossacks,
you shall never take me alive.' And he kept his word,
preferring to be burnt alive with his son rather than
surrender.

The war was long and ferocious, Vassil Bugor, with
130 Cossacks, undertook another expedition, and inflicted
a severe defeat on the obstinate Buriats. In his report
he says : ' By the grace of God and the good luck of the
Emperor, the imperial soldiers stood firm, and the
Bratski (they were 500) were all destroyed to a man.'
The long contact with cruel savages produced the usual
deteriorating effects, and no quarter was given even to
the wounded.

The progress of the Russians around Lake Baikal,
near which are situated the head waters of the Yenissei
and Lena, was much retarded by the stubborn resistance
of the Buriats. Irkutsk, now the most important town
in Siberia, which has far outstripped its rivals on the
three great rivers, was founded in 1651, much later even
than Yakutsk.

The Russians had now stretched almost across the
northern part of the continent. Tobolsk, Yenisseisk, and
Yakutsk marked the main stations in the long route
traversing the three great rivers ; but there was no halt
in the rapid advance ; the sea alone could stop their
impetuous progress.

The Cossacks, who had established their head-quarters
at Yakutsk, proceeded to explore the upper tributary on
the right, the Aldan, with its affluents, the Maya and
Yudom. This brought them, about 1630, to the chain of

THE CONQUEST OF SIBERIA 79

the Stanovoi, which is considered by some as the pro-
longation of the Yablonoi, the mountains on the east of
Lake Baikal, while by others it is considered as the con-
tinuation of the Khin-gan chain, which, starting in
Manchuria, traverses the Amur river. The orography of
the region, as we shall see later, is very little known.

While the north-western part of Siberia is a vast
plain only slightly raised above the level of the sea, on
the south and east the country gradually rises to a con-
siderable elevation, and then falls abruptly to the Pacific.
This difference in the two slopes is already noticeable in
Trans-Baikalia, as we pass from the basin of the Selenga
to that of the Amur ; but it is much more marked in the
north, where the plateau, formed by the plains rising
eastward, reaches to a very short distance from the Sea
of Okhotsk. The narrow slip of land hemmed in be-
tween the sea and the plateau is thus full of natural
difficulties, intersected by rapid mountain torrents,
which have seldom space to unite and expand into navi-
gable rivers.

The Russians on the confines of Asia found them-
selves in a similar position to their ancestors when they
were stopped by the Ural, on the eastern frontier of
Europe. A gradual, almost imperceptible, ascent had led
them to a mountain chain. But the steep slope on the
other side led to a very different country. Beyond the
Ural they had found vast plains intersected by a network
of rivers, offering means of rapid extension ; while be-
yond the Stanovoi a narrow strip of laud enabled the
Cossacks to behold, for the first time in their lives, the
boundless waters of the sea — a strange spectacle for men
who had spent years in traversing an immense continent.
The uninviting character of the narrow plain was
enhanced by the difficulties of access ; the small rapid

80 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

rivers are unfit for navigation, and the mountain paths
during a great part of the year are almost impassable.^

While the Cossacks were deterred for some time from
settling on the shores of the sea of Okhotsk, they
advanced boldly in the north-east to the shores of the
Arctic Ocean. When the Russians explored the lower
course of the Lena, they found it ill adapted for their
usual methods of eastern expansion. The tributaries on
the right are inconsiderable and lead to a mountain chain
(the Verkhoyansk mountains), which, though not very
high, is covered with snow the greater part of the year,
owing to the rigour of the northern climate. The diffi-
culties of the portages requiring reindeer sledges and the
reluctance to quit their boats obliged the Cossacks to
alter their methods. Instead of passing from the middle
course of one river to that of another by adjoining tribu-
taries, they boldly adopted the plan of exploring the still
unknown rivers right from the mouth, though this
method involved the necessity of steering their rough
vessels among the ice-floes of the Arctic Ocean.

In 1636 the Cossack Elisei Buza was despatched from
Yenisseisk with orders to explore the frozen stream. He
started with only ten men, but after wintering at the
ostrog of Olekminsk, on the Lena, forty trappers joined
the expedition. They descended the Lena in two weeks,
and, passing through the western branch of the delta,
reached the sea, where, after a day's navigation, they dis-
covered the mouth of the Olenek, a river to the west of
the Lena. Here Buza started collecting tribute, and,
after wintering, found a shorter land route to the Lena.

* From September to April, when the north-west winds are prevalent,
the gusts blowing down the gullies are terrific. Men and beasts struggle
vainly for days to climb up in the teeth of the wind, which often blows
them down, hurling the pack-loads to the precipices below (see Zapiski in
the Siberian Section of Russian Geographical Society, iii. 1857).

THE CONQUEST OF SIBERIA 81

In 1638, with two vessels, Buza started from the mouth
of the Olenek, and with a favom^able wind in five days
he reached the mouth of the Yana, a large river to the
east of the Lena. For three weeks he ascended the new
river, collecting tribute from the Yakute inhabitants,
who had probably emigrated from the south. He
returned to Yakutsk, but in the following year, 1639, he
started again with instructions to explore another river
further to the east, the Indighirka. The voyage was very
successful ; he collected tribute from a new people, the
Yukaghires, built an ostrog (1640) on the Indighirka,
and spent three years in his explorations, returning to
Yakutsk in 1642.

Buza, during his long explorations, had greatly in-
creased the knowledge about North-eastern Siberia, by
the important discovery of three large rivers ; but the
reports he had heard from the natives were considered of
still greater importance. He had been informed of the
existence of another river, a week's distance by reindeer
sledge from the Indighirka, where rich silver mines were
to be found. This news caused great excitement among
the Russians, as a new source of wealth was needed by
the impatient adventurers whose reckless hunting and
trapping had already greatly diminished the numbers of
the fur animals.

The Cossacks flocked to the new region, but the
search for the silver mines was unsuccessful, so they had
to fall back on the old system of collecting tribute in furs.
Their exactions caused revolts among the Yukaghires,
who were also provided with some firearms which they
had obtained from the Russians in defiance of the strict
orders neither to give firearms nor teach their use to the
savages. The insurrection was finally subdued in 1645.

The situation of the native races in the north at that

G

82 RUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

time was very distressing. They were precluded from
escape to the south, as it was occupied by more warhke
tribes, and as they gradually retreated eastward they
reached the north-eastern corner of Asia, where the conti-
nent narrows, constituting a perfect cul de sac, and where
they were hemmed in by the advancing Russians on one
side, and by the ocean on the other. Moreover, the cruelty
and lawlessness of the Cossacks, as we have already
noticed, increased the further they advanced from the
Ural. The power of the voivodes or military authorities
in Siberia was absolute and too often harshly used ; to
obtain redress was almost impossible, as it took a year for
news to reach Moscow from Yakutsk. The Russian
proverb, ' God is too high and the Tsar too far,' had all
its terrible significance, at that time, in Eastern Siberia.
We learn incidentally what abuses were committed by a
curious report of Bugor, the Cossack who had defeated
the Buriats. He also started for the newly discovered
lands of the north-east, but carefully avoided passing
Yakutsk. He therefore felt obliged to write to the Tsar
explaining and justifying his irregular conduct. He and
his companions stated that they had not reported to their
military chief, the voivode of Yakutsk, on account of the
cruelties they had suffered from that commander. They
wrote, ' We endured from our former voivode — we
endured without cause — the " knout " and fire, and every
indignity, exposure and cold ; ' and then they give the
length and thickness of the rods and describe the savage
beatings. From the sufferings of the Cossacks we may
judge of the treatment of the natives.

In 1645 Michael Stadukhin discovered another large
river, the Kolyma, which (as he was given to exaggera-
tion) he described as equal to the Lena. This completed
the series of Siberian rivers flowing into the Arctic Ocean.

THE CONQUEST OF SIBERIA 83

Stadukhin built a zimovie and then an ostrog on the
Kolyma, and was lucky in finding huge heaps of mammoth
tusks which served to start a new profitable trade. The
communications with the new region watered by the
Yana, Indighirka, and Kolyma were maintained by the
sea-route from the mouth of the Lena. The route was
not very long, but it was very difficult for the Cossacks,
who had to launch on the Arctic Ocean the rude river
vessels with which they had traversed the greater part of
the continent. Yet with these rough boats they began a
series of daring maritime explorations.

We have an account of the dangerous navigation of
Timothy Buldakoff, who seems to have been unlucky
from the beginning of his voyage. He started from
Yakutsk in 1649, but was obliged to winter on the Lena,
and only on June 2 of the following year he reached the
mouth of the river. Here winds blowing from the sea ^
detained him for a whole month ; a change of wind
then enabled him to reach the neighbouring bay of
Omoloeva on the east. But there he was caught by the
ice, which drifted his battered boat, after eight days, on to
an unknown island. Here he lost another week, until a
fresh change in the wind brought him back to the bay of
Omoloeva, but the same difficulties with the ice obliged
him to return to the mouth of the Lena, where he found
eight Eussian vessels also bound for the east. Encouraged
by this reinforcement, Buldakoff started again, and, after
a continual struggle with the ice, reached Cape Sviatoi,
beyond the mouth of the Yana, towards the end of
August. He had employed nearly three months in

' Nordenskiold notices the fact that, when the wind blows from the
sea, ice accumulates on the shores and impedes navigation ; while, when
the wind blows from the land, the ice is driven away and the sea becomes
navigable.

84 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

traversing not much more than 200 miles in a straight
line !

Worse hardships now awaited Bnldakoff and his
companions : the channel which they navigated, owing
to the vicinity of ice-fields, began to freeze, a thin icy
crust covering the whole surface of the water ; though
with the assistance of their sails they were able to cut
their way through, the broken ice hacked and splintered
the sides of the boats. At last in one night the whole sea
froze hard around the vessels, the ice became thick, and
all hope of escape was lost. While they were preparing
to reach the land in sledges, on St. Simon's day (Sep-
tember 1, Eussian New Year at that time) the wind blew
from the land, detaching the ice-fields, which drifted away
with the ice-bound vessels. After five days the ice
stopped and the whole sea froze. Men sent out on the
ice to explore met the vessel of a Cossack, who informed
them that the land lay to the south ; but, though two
men proceeded in that direction from ixiorning until late
evening, no land was found. As it was impossible to
remain in the vessels, these had to be abandoned, a portion
being broken up and converted into sledges. In the
midst of danger and hardships Buldakoff did not relax
from that rigid sense of duty to the Emperor which
animated all the Cossacks ; his first thoughts were
directed to save the government stores. But he encoun-
tered much opposition, as his men, especially the traders
and trappers attached to the party, refused to be encum-
bered with needless articles. They said : ' We do not
know where to find the land or whether we shall live to
reach it ; we cannot carry those things without sledges
and dogs.' After much discussion the traders consented
to carry one pound of government stores per man, the
soldiers carried each three pounds, while Buldakoff himself

THE CONQUEST OF SIBEBIA 85

carried twenty pounds. They proceeded on their weary
journey, weakened by scurvy, and were obhged to drag
the sledges with ropes ; after nine days, exhausted by
cold and hunger, naked and barefooted, they reached land
near the mouth of the Indighirka. Thence they continued
their journey to a zimovie of tax collectors on one of the
affluents of the Indighirka.

The sufferings of the refugees continued, and we learn
another dark feature of Siberian life at that time : the in-
human speculation of the few provision dealers. Bulda-
koff was informed that a man who detained a stock of
500 poods of wheat and flour had secreted it to barter
privately with the natives, while he refused to sell it on
credit to the starving Cossacks, who were ready to bind
themselves as serfs in security. The grasping dealer
would only part with his goods at an exorbitant price, and
only five soldiers obtained provisions. Buldakoff and the
rest were obliged to live on larch-prickles, and on this food
they had to travel a whole month until they reached the
river Mazeya, almost perishing with hunger.

Similar trials were endured by the other Cossack
navigators, who recklessly ventured on the ocean with
their rude vessels, and who bitterly repeated the
Russian proverb, ' Who has not been at sea has not seen
trouble.'

Among the daring adventurers who chose the sea as a
new route of discovery the most glorious figure is that of
the Cossack Dejneff. The explorations of the Russians
on the rivers Yana, Indighirka, and Kol}ana brought them
to the north-eastern prolongation of the Stanovoi chain of
mountains, which had delayed their advance further south
on the sea of Okhotsk. In the north the chain was still
more barren, and the rigour of the climate rendered the
passage less inviting. Vague reports of another river on

86 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

the other side of the mountains were collected from the
natives, and the Russians directed their attention to dis-
cover a route to the new^ region. Motora and Stadukhin
(the boastful explorer of the Kolyma) were anxious to be
the pioneers in the new land, but they were preceded by
Simon Dejneff. The latter started from the mouth of the
Kolyma on June 20,' 1648, and after being separated from
his companions by storms, with a single vessel he was able
to coast round the whole north-eastern corner of Asia.
He passed through the straits of Behring eighty years
before the Danish navigator who had given them his
name, he reconnoitred the islands opposite the East Cape^
and about October reached the mouth of the Anadyr.

Dejneff found a barren country without forests : his
provisions were almost exhausted, and it was difficult to
catch fish. Twelve men (the whole party consisted of
twenty-five) were sent to explore up the river Anadyr ^
they advanced for twenty days without finding a road or
even a path, and then returned. But when only three
days' march from the camp they broke down under the
depressing effects of cold, hunger, and fatigue. They
commenced to scrape holes in the snow to sleep. A
trapper, Permiak, dissuaded them from remaining, as
their companions were not far, but only another trapper
followed his advice to proceed without halting. The rest,
weakened by hunger, could not move a step. The torpor
brought on by the cold is illustrated by the request they
sent to their chief : they wanted Dejneff to send them
bedding and old deerskins and something to eat, that
they might drag themselves to the camp. When Dejneff

' This and all the other dates are Russian, i.e. old style ; it would corre-
spond to June 30 of the current calendar — the difference then being ten days.
As Nordenskiold remarks, this slight difference is important in recording
northern navigations, which are often stopped by the ice in consequence of
a few days' delay.

THE CONQUEST OF SIBERIA 87

heard from Permiak the sad plight of the Cossacks, he
sent his last bedding and blanket, but the unfortunate
men could not be found. They had been probably buried
in a snow-drift during one of those purgas which are
the terror of winter travellers in Siberia.

Dejneff managed to struggle through the winter in a
zimovie, which afterwards became the Anadyrsk ostrog.
He thus had the honour of founding the most distant
Eussian settlement, over ten thousand versts from
Moscow. He was soon overtaken by his rivals : Motoro
and then Stadukhin reaching the Anadyr by the land
route. The newcomers, however, only added to the
distress of the forlorn party ; Stadukhin, who had de-
scended to the level of a common brigand, forcibly
deprived Dejneff of the tribute he had already collected,
and struck him on the cheek in the presence of the
natives. Later he surprised Dejneff's party and robbed
them of the provisions they were conveying to a station
of tribute collectors. He also tried to deprive Dejneff of
the glory of his discoveries, boasting that he had been the
first on the Anadyr, and had doubled the Great Cape, as
the Cossacks called the eastern extremity of Asia.
Dejneff had to take refuge further south, where for
several years '■ he was lucratively engaged in morse-
hunting.

While these explorations were taking place in the
north-east, the Russians were slowly establishing them-
selves on the shores of the sea of Okhotsk. The diffi-
culties of the country have been already noticed ; the
rivers, descending from the edge of the Asiatic plateau to
the sea, are short and rapid. The boats of the Cossacks
were therefore often damaged on the rocks, men being
drowned and provisions lost. When the narrow coast-

' Until 1654, after which date all trace of him is lost.

88 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

line was reached it could not be traversed on land, as it
was intersected by numerous water-courses of the same
torrent-like nature. The only possible communication
was by the sea, in boats ill adapted for such navigation.

An ostrog was established at Okhotsk about 1647
by Ivan Athanasieff, who, with fifty-four Cossacks, routed
more than a thousand Tunguses ; but the natives con-
tinued to resist, and made several desperate efforts to
drive out the invaders. The Tunguses, hemmed in
between the mountains and the sea, had no escape from
the extortions of the Cossacks, and the latter, degraded
by constant contact with inferior races, and too far to
feel the control of Moscow, now lost their best qualities —
the spirit of comradeship and the sense of discipline.
Savage fights among the men, and insubordination to
their chiefs, were of frequent occurrence. The struggle
with the Tunguses now assumed a savage character ;
the Cossacks, infuriated by the sight of the mutilated and
tortured corpses of their companions, who had been sur-
prised by the enemy, retaliated in the same spirit.^

In 1654 the Tunguses succeeded in burning the
ostrog at Okhotsk, and it was only rebuilt when fresh
reinforcements came from Yakutsk. The scanty numbers
of the Russians, and their distance, even from the nearest
Russian settlement, Yakutsk, rendered their position very
precarious. It was only by a long struggle and with
heavy losses they were able to subdue the natives and
secure peace for their settlements on the sea of Okhotsk.

But even worse disorders broke out among the Cossacks
in a still more distant region across the sea — in the
peninsula of Kamchatka.

' In blaming the cruelty of the Cossacks, account must be taken of the
general ferocity of past centuries. Calvin, a cultured man, the founder of a
religious sect, had Servetus burned slowly so as to prolong his agony, and
it was only for a trifling difference of opinion.

THE CONQUEST OF SIBERIA 89

The Asiatic continent, as it narrows on the north-east,
throws out a mountainous peninsula to the south ; its
existence was long ignored by the Cossacks, as it lay out
of the track of their routes, and was connected with the
mainland in a region of cold and desolation. The
rigorous climate and extensive wastes of the north-
eastern corner of Asia presented such difficulties to the
Eussians that their advance was slow and conquest in-
complete ; the Tchukchis succeeded, after many defeats,
in preserving their independence, which they have kept
to the present day. The Cossacks were content with
establishing an outpost — the Anadyrsk ostrog — and for
some time renounced all further explorations. The
magnitude of the difficulties encountered may be
measured by the fact that, while it took less than
seventy years for the Cossacks to advance from the Ural
to Behring Straits, it required nearly fifty years to reach
Kamchatka from the Anadyr.

The discovery and conquest of Kamchatka were due
to Vladimir Atlasoff. His father, Vassil, a peasant, had
been compelled by poverty to emigrate across the Ural,
and Vladimir from his early years grew up under the
wild influences of the rough life of Eastern Siberia.
After wandering about the settlements on the river Lena
he finally enrolled among the Cossacks of Yakutsk, and
rose to the rank of a commander of fifty men.^ He was
appointed to collect tribute in the distant ostrog of
Anadyrsk, and started with thirteen Cossacks from
Yakutsk in the spring of 1695. The long wearisome
journey through woods, swamps, and over mountains
was accomplished on foot, on horseback, with reindeer,
or by water, according to circumstances; only after fifteen

' The Cossacks' officers commanded detachments of ten, fifty, and a
hundred men.

90 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

weeks Vladimir Atlasoff reached Anadyrsk, towards the
end of summer.

The commander of the lonely ostrog, at such a
distance from Yakutsk, was virtually exempt from all
control, and absolute master of the whole surrounding
country and its native inhabitants. The feeling of in-
dependence, the exemption from the necessity of sub-
mitting for approval all his measures, aroused the
ambition of Atlasoff to discovei^ some new land for the
glory of the Tsar and his own profit. As early as 1654 a
native woman had stated that one of the companions of
Dejneff, separated from him by a storm, had strayed to
Kamchatka, a land rich in sables and valuable furs,
where he and his party had been subsequently massacred.
These vague reports had not been forgotten in the
Cossack camps of the north, and were confirmed by the
information which Atlasoff diligently collected from the
natives. He therefore sent, in 1696, Luke Morozko with
a party of fifteen Cossacks to explore the country.

MorQzko was very successful in his expedition ; he
advanced to within four days' march of the river Kam-
chatka, and collected tribute from a tribe of Koriaks.
He returned with rich booty and the agreeable news of
the existence of a rich land which could be easily
conquered by a stronger expedition.

In the spring of 1697 Atlasoff started from Anad5Tsk
with a force of sixty Cossacks and sixty Yukaghires. He
collected tribute from three Koriak villages without
resistance, but was opposed by the Kamchadales, whom
he defeated with the loss of five men. To celebrate his
first victory he erected, on July 13, 1697, a big wooden
cross with an inscription. As the country was intersected
by mountain chains, Atlasoff divided his forces, proceeding
with one half along the coast of the sea of Okhotsk,

THE CONQUEST OF SIBERIA 91

while Morozko with the other half advanced along the
shores of the Pacific. Sliortlj^ after the separation
Atlasoff was exposed to great danger ; his Yukaghire
allies treacherously mutinied and suddenly' commenced
cutting the throats of the Cossacks ; they succeeded in
killing three and wounding fifteen (including Atlasoff
himself) before they were overpowered. Undismayed by
their reduced numbers, the Russians continued to advance
until they were joined by Morozko. Proceeding in one
body, the Cossacks, collecting everywhere tribute, traversed
the whole peninsula until they reached Cape Lopatka at
its southern extremity. On the return route Atlasoff
built an ostrog on the river Kamchatka, which he
called Verkhre Kamchatsk (Upper Kamchatsk), and left
a garrison of sixteen Cossacks to hold possession of the
country. After the departure of Atlasoff, the small
party, discouraged by their loneliness and the general
hostility of the natives, imprudently abandoned the
ostrog and attempted to return to Anadyrsk, but were
all massacred on the way by the Koriaks.

Atlasoff now perceived the impossibility of holding
the country without a large armed force, and, leaving
twenty-eight men in Anadyrsk, he proceeded to Yakutsk,
which he reached in July 1700. Here the conquest of
Kamchatka and the reports of its wealth were considered
of such importance that Atlasoff was sent, with the
tribute he had collected, to Moscow to arouse the atten-
tion of the higher authorities. The arrival (in the year
1701) of the conqueror of Kamchatka caused some excite-
ment in the capital ; over fifty years had passed since the
conquest of Siberia, boldly undertaken by Yermak and
rapidly carried on by his successors, had ceased to reveal
new regions to the Russians. While almost every decade
of the first half of the seventeenth century had brought

92 BVSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

the discovery of new lands further east, the second half of
the century had passed without any fresh acquisition.
The adventurous voyage of Dejneff seemed indeed to
preclude the possibility of new discoveries, as it reached
the sea-bound limits of Siberia. It was therefore an
agreeable surprise for the people of Moscow to learn that,
attached to the north-eastern extremity of Asia, there was
a new land which moreover was rich in valuable furs.
The Siberian bureau (a kind of colonial office) reported
favourably that the tribute from Kamchatka was of no
indifferent quantity. In fact, Atlasoff had brought a large
collection of the rarest furs. The arrival of Atlasoff at
Moscow was somewhat similar to that of Ivan Koltzo,
the lieutenant of Yermak, when he appeared more than a
century before at the capital. Both brought reports of
new lands, and the rich tribute was a visible proof of the
importance of their conquests. In both cases they over-
looked the antecedents of the successful adventurers.
Atlasoff therefore received every encouragement for
the prosecution of his enterprise ; he was promoted,
a body of one hundred men was appointed to accom-
pany him, supplies of military stores and provisions were
provided.

After leaving Moscow Atlasoff proceeded to Tobolsk,
where he recruited a part of the force destined for Kam-
chatka, and continued his journey towards Yakutsk.
Unfortunately he forgot the new duties incumbent on his
'altered position, and yielded to the evil habits contracted
in youth and freely exercised in the wild districts of
North-eastern Siberia. On the river Tunguska he met
the merchant Loghin Dobrynin with a raftload of Chinese
goods. The temptation was too strong, and, inspired by
'his plucky spirit,' he robbed the man of all his valuable
merchandise. The plundered trader lodged a complaint

THE CONQUEST OF SIBERIA 93

in Yakutsk, and Atlasoff with ten of his Cossacks was
imprisoned.

In the meantime affairs were proceeding unfavom:-
ably with the Russians in Kamchatka. When Atlasoff
reached Yakutsk in the year 1700, Kobeleff had been
appointed to take his place in the peninsula ; this new
commander proceeded to rebuild the ostrog of Verkhne
Kamchatsk and to establish another at Bolsherietzk on
the western coast. In the year 1702 Kobeleff was fol-
lowed by Zinovieff', who built the ostrog of Nijni
(lower) Kamchatsk. In 1704 Kolesoff w^as appointed
commander of the Cossacks, and he made an expedition
in the Kurile islands. But, from the mutinies which
happened later, it seems probable that none of these
commanders were capable of holding in proper subjection
such a body of desperadoes as the Cossacks had become
on the distant shores of the Pacific. In 1706 a general
revolt of the natives commenced, and the Russians were
almost completely driven out of the country ; ostrogs
were burnt, and the hated intruders massacred wherever
they could be surprised.

In the sudden emergency the authorities of Y^akutsk
recollected that they had in their prison the first conqueror
of Kamchatka, the redoubtable Atlasoff, now sufficiently
punished for his transgressions by five years' imprison-
ment. He was therefore released and appointed com-
mander of the Cossacks in Kamchatka, with orders to
conquer and pacify the insurgent natives ; he was given
authority to punish his men with the ' knout ' and with
rods, and to inflict capital punishment on the rebels
when necessary. As he had a bad reputation for cruelty,
he was strongly cautioned to use his powers with dis-
cretion. But either the evil inclinations of his character
or the conduct of his men rendered this warning of no

94 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

effect, for even on the route to Anadyrsk the Cossacks for-
warded a complaint to Yakutsk against his inhuman
severity ; but again it must be considered that the most
ruthless cruelty was the only means to secure discipline
and prevent worse excesses.

Atlasoff, proceeding on his journey, reached Kamchatka
in 1707, occupied the ostrogs of Verkhne and Nijni
Kamchatsk, and a month after his arrival, in August, he
sent a detachment which defeated the natives near the
bay of Avacha (the bay where Petropavlofsk is now situ-
ated). This victory was soon followed by another, and
Russian authority was being solidly established in the
peninsula, when, towards the end of the year 1707, the
Cossacks, unable to bear the ferocity of Atlasoff, mutinied.
They seized their chief, confined him in prison, and con-
fiscated all his goods, which, according to the list, consisted
of 1,235 sables, 400 red foxes, 14 grey foxes, and 75 sea-
otters. As these must have been collected during a few
months, and formed only a small item in respect to the
government tribute, it shows how abundant furs were
then in Kamchatka, and how ruthlessly the Cossacks
despoiled the natives.

A fresh complaint was sent to Yakutsk, in which it
was alleged that Atlasoff did not provide his men with
food, that he hacked a man with his sabre, and that he
incited the natives against the Cossacks, stating that the
latter would deprive them of their wives, children, and
goods. From the last accusation it seems probable that
Atlasoff had attempted to institute order in the country,
and secure soi^e elementary rights for the natives against
the lawless desires of his men. The allegations of the
insubordinate Cossacks must be read with caution, and
judged according to their general conduct towards the
natives.

THE CONQUEST OF SIBERIA 95

The authorities of Yakutsk were much embarrassed
by the complaint against Atlasoff, and the consequent
revolt of the Cossacks. It was difficult to find men
adapted to govern such a difficult country, and the dis-
tance was so great that a commander starting from
Yakutsk never knew in what condition he would find his
soldiers and his native subjects. A year generally
elapsed between the outbreak of a disorder and the
arrival of the intended remedy. The indecision and
helplessness of the superior authority at Yakutsk are shown
by the quick succession of commanders appointed to
Kamchatka. In 1707 Tchirikoff is sent, in 1708
Panintin, in 1709 Lipin, in 1710 Sevastianoff, in 1711
Kolesoff. None of these could firmly assert their
authority, as on their arrival they often found the
Cossacks had already chosen a chief, and if it had not
been done, it was sure to happen when the titular from
Yakutsk attempted to enforce distasteful discipline.

The confusion reached such lengths that in 1710
there were three commanders in Kamchatka : AtlasofF,
who had escaped from prison, governing in the ostrog of
Nijni Kamchatsk ; Tchirikoff, who had not yet given
over charge ; and Lipin, just arrived to assume command.
The Cossacks, however, found ghastly means to solve the
difficulty and dispense with the authority of the three
unpopular commanders. Lipin was murdered in an
ambuscade while on his way from Nijni to Verkne
Kamchatsk ; Tchirikoff, as he was returning to Yakutsk,
was seized near the gulf of Penjina (northern extremity
of the sea of Okhotsk), bound and thrown into the sea.
It was more difficult to remove Atlasoff, for he was justly
feared as a dangerous man. A treacherous plot was
devised to achieve the object with little risk. Three bold
men were sent to bear a letter, with orders to set upon

96 BUS SI A ON THE PACIFIC

him while he was perusing it ; but the messengers sur-
prised him sleeping in his hut, and cut his throat without
resorting to the stratagem.

The mutinous Cossacks elected Antzyphor and
Kozyrefski as their chiefs, and proceeded to levy tribute
from the natives. Their oppression must have been
horrible, for insurrections broke out everywhere. In 1711
the Russians were besieged by the Kamchadales, who
were defeated only after a severe struggle. Another hard
fight took place near the river Bolshaya. The slaughter
was so great that the channel of the river was clogged
with the corpses of the natives. All open resistance was
now broken, but the hatred of the natives, kept alive by
ever-increasing outrages, resorted to treachery, and com-
passed the destruction of the murderous Antzyphor. The
particulars of his death show how terrible must have been
the crimes which could inspire such a reckless thirst for
vengeance.

In February, 1712, Antzyphor, with twenty-five Cos-
sacks, arrived at Avacha to collect tribute. He was received
with every mark of respect, and a large wooden building,
specially constructed for the purpose, was assigned for the
accommodation of the party. The Cossacks, as was their
custom all over Siberia when dwelling among the
natives, required hostages ; the principal men of the
village were delivered, and they retired with the Cossacks
to rest. The natives had already planned to set fire to
the building in the night, and to avoid the destruction of
the hostages a secret portcullis had been contrived for
their escape. But when they went to rescue them, they
found that their countrymen had been chained up. — The
hostages, however, begged their friends not to desist from
their purpose, as they were quite willing to be burned
alive provided the Cossacks were destroyed.

THE CONQUEST OF SIBEBIA 97

Order was slowly established in Kamchatka only when
communications were made easier. Already in 1708 an
ostrog had been built on the river Penjina, and in 1714
another was established at Kintorsk ; but these only
served to improve the communications between Kam-
chatka and Anadyrsk. The long journey between the
latter place and Yakutsk, across the desolate north-eastern
region, still remained to be traversed.

In 1714 the first attempt was made to find a more
direct route by traversing the sea of Okhotsk instead of the
circuitous way by land, with the long needless detour up
north to Anadyrsk. The expedition started from Yakutsk,
and by the rivers Lena, Aldan, Maya, and Yudom
reached the Stanovoi mountains ; thence by portage
they descended to the river Urak, which brought them to
the ostrog of Okhotsk. Here boats were built, and the
sea traversed to Kamchatka. The discovery of the short
sea-route led to the rapid pacification of the country, and
also brought about far more important results at a later
period.

The conquest of Kamchatka was a detached episode
of the Kussian invasion of Siberia, just as the peninsula
itself is an appendix of the great northern region. It
happened fifty years after the rapid expansion had been
stopped by the Arctic Ocean and the straits of Behring ;
even the Russians of the time recognised it as an
independent fact, treating Atlasoff as the discoverer of a
new land, and not as one of the many continuators of the
great work of Yermak.

The conquest of Kamchatka has been described in
detail because it marks the last stage of degeneration of
the Cossacks, corrupted by the constant intercourse with
inferior races during a century's march across the conti-
nent. Moreover, the dark deeds of the peninsula will

H

98 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

acquire greater importance when we describe later events,
when, by the effects of that perspective which comes
from the observation of long periods, we shall find in
them the latent cause producing results of such mag-
nitude that they will only be attributed to other
causes appearing more conspicuously at a nearer date.
It will be seen that the early possession of Kam-
chatka led insensibly to the necessary absorption of the
course of the Amur. The northern peninsula also
deserves notice because it gave Kussia her first port on
the Pacific, Petropavlofsk, and indeed her only one, if we
wish to be geographically pedantic, as both Vladivostok
and Port Arthur are situated on the shores of the closed
seas of Japan and China. ^

The conquest of Siberia is chiefly remarkable for its
extraordinary rapidity, contrasting strongly with the
general slowness of Russian expansion. Yermak crossed
the Ural towards the end of 1581, and the Cossacks
reached the sea of Okhotsk in 1636. Dejneff, in liis
remarkable voyage, doubled the East Cape, and discovered
the straits of Behring in 1648. The northern part of the
Asiatic continent was traversedinonly sixty or seventy years.
To measure adequately these facts we must bear in mind
that it took the Americans nearly two centuries to reach
the Pacific, and nearly a century for the Australians to
cross their island. The possession of firearms by the

' The conquest of Kamchatka was followed at the beginning of this
century by a further advance in North America which does not concern the
subject of this book. The Eussians not only occupied Alaska, but in their
usual rapid way pushed southwards along the coast, attempting in 1807 to
found a settlement at the mouth of the Columbia river, and in 1812 esta-
blishing a colony of trappers at Bodega not far from San Francisco, where
the fact is recorded by the name of Eussian river. They actually reached
the Pacific coast before the Americans ! Treaties with the United States in
1824, and with Great Britain in 1825, fixed the limits of the Eussian
possessions in America which were afterwards sold to the United States in
1867.

THE CONQUEST OF SIBERIA 99

Kussians was an advantage also shared by the Americans
and Australians. The rigorous climate of Siberia, on the
other hand, had presented special difficulties, stopped all
travelling at certain seasons, and rendered the transport
of provisions a necessity. If the attractions and require-
ments of the fur trade may seem to explain the rapid
advance, it must be also remembered that the Hudson's
Bay Company, formed in 1670, almost lost its privileges
in 1749 for ' non-use,' and the only facts it could adduce
against the plea were the existence of four or five forts
on the coast ?.nd a corps of 120 regular employes.

Another important reflection is that the conquest of
Siberia was but the continuation of the gradual expansion
of the Kussian people, a prolongation of its eastward
march. It is curious to notice how unswervingly the
race has advanced in the same direction to the east, with
a slight trend northwards, from the earliest times. With-
out taking into consideration the probable historical
hypothesis that assigns the banks of the Danube as the
original home of the Slavs, it will suffice to note that the
mother of Russian towns, the capital of the present Little
Russia, Kief, is situated about 50° N. lat., that the later
towns of Vladimir and Moscow on the east are about
55° N. lat. In Siberia we find the same direction ;
Tobolsk and Yenisseisk are situated about 58° N. lat.,
while Yakutsk, to the east, reaches 62° N. lat. The
Russians seem to have steered by the compass, keeping
on the same course through centuries from the shores of
the Dnieper to the straits of Behring.

H 2

100 BUS SI A ON THE PACIFIC

CHAPTER III

THE STRUGGLE FOR THE AMUR

We have now to go back to the narrative of events which
have been left out of their chronological order because
they had slight immediate importance, and retarded rather
than furthered the general conquest of Siberia. They
constituted a series of daring exploits, which produced no
apparent practical results, because the political tendencies
of Eussia, and the weak conditions of the Siberian
colonies, prevented their full development. It was only
in the middle of the nineteenth century, under altered
conditions, after a long period of inactivity of 160 years,
that the Russian Government seconded the latent aspira-
tions of its people, and carried out the old plans of the
bold Cossack pioneers. The events of the seventeenth
century on the Amur, therefore, have little connection with
the contemporary expansion in the rest of Siberia ; they
constitute the early prelude of the permanent establish-
ment on the Pacific, which forms such an important
chapter of the world's history in the present century.

When the Russians came in contact with the Buriats,
and explored the upper tributaries of the Lena, from Lake
Baikal to the mountains coasting the sea of Okhotsk,
they heard vague reports of the existence of a large river
to the south, traversing a warm fertile region. The name
of the river varied according as the informers spoke of the
main stream, or of its numerous large tributaries. On the

THE STRUGGLE FOB THE AMUR 101

west, near Lake Baikal, the Cossacks heard that beyond
the Vitim there was a river Shilka ; while in the north
they were informed about the existence of the river Dji
(the Zeya), which flowed into the Silkar, a tributary of
the Mamur river, which reached the sea. The confusion
of the reports is not surprising if we consider that even
at present opinions differ : the Russians consider the Amur
the main river, while the Manchus, and after them the
Chinese, give the preference to the Sungari. These dif-
ferences of opinion arise from the fact that the Amur,
like most Siberian rivers,' is formed by two rivers, which,
at their junction, seem of equal importance. This pe-
culiarity extends almost to the head waters, as not only
is the Amur formed by the equal rivers, the Argun and
the Shilka, but the latter in its turn is also formed by the
Onon and the Ingoda.

All the information collected by the Cossacks agreed
in describing the new region as fertile, abomiding with
cattle, and inhabited by a settled population which even
tilled the soil. Some statements asserted the existence
of silver, either extracted from mines or obtained through
barter for furs from other races further south. This was
corroborated by a Cossack, Maxim Nerphilieff, who had
noticed silver buttons and rings in the possession of some
Tunguses.

To ascertain the truth of these reports, an expedition
of thirty-six men was despatched up the Vitim, right
tributary of the Lena, in 1638, under the command of the
said Nerphilieff. From the Lena he slowly ascended the
Vitim by tracking, and, after wintering on its banks, re-

' The three great northern rivers of Siberia are formed respectively by
the junction of the Irtysh with the Ob, of the Yenissei with the Angara,
and of the Lena with the Vitim, and in each case it is difficult to decide
which is the main stream ; in fact, the tributary has generally the longer
course.

102 BUS SI A ON THE PACIFIC

sumed his journey up the Tzipa, asmall tributary on the left
of the Vitim. Here from the Tunguse natives he gathered
information about the Silkar — the present Shilka. The
inhabitants on its banks, the Daurians, had firearms as
well as bows and arrows ; they gave cattle, grain, and
silver to the Tunguses in exchange for furs, which they
bartered in their turn for the silk goods of another people
(probably the Chinese) ; they had two silver mines, one
situated among rocks, and the other near the river Ura.
If Nerphilieff, instead of going up the Tzipa, had continued
to ascend the Vitim, he would have come much nearer to
the basin of the Amur, but he probably was unable to
distinguish the main stream.^

The information brought back by Nerphilieff, especially
that about the silver mines, was considered of sufficient
importance to justify another larger expedition. The
command was confided to Vassil Poyarkoff, the secretary ^
of the voivode of Yakutsk,^ a choice probably dictated by
the desire of having a clear, intelligible account of the new
regions by a man who had the habit of writing. He was
instructed to inquire carefully about the existence of
silver, copper, and lead mines.

The party consisted of 132 men, of whom 112 were
soldiers, and, besides a sufficient supply of powder and
lead, a half-pounder gun with 100 charges was provided
for frightening hostile natives. The route chosen was to
the east of the Vitim, one adopted by Nerphilieff, as it
was intended to reach the Zeya in a direction almost due

' Anonymous History of the Amur. The river Ura is not marked in
the maps. Perhaps the river Urka is meant.

- For the official correspondence, each voivode had a man skilled in
writing, then a rare accomplishment among the rough settlers of Siberia.

^ This voivode, Peter Golovin, had met Nerphilieff on the Angara, and
had been informed of his expedition. He first sent a party up the Vitim
under Bakhteyaroff, which returned without bringing additional informa-
tion.

THE STRUGGLE FOB THE AMUB 103

south of Yakutsk. But to obtain this object a circuitous
course had to be followed, as the Cossacks, in their usual
way, proceeded along the rivers.

Poyarkoff started at the most favourable season ; he
left Yakutsk on June 15,' 1643, and descended the Lena
for two days, when he reached the mouth of the Aldan.
On this river he had laboriously to track his boats for four
weeks, until he reached the mouth of the river Utchur, a
right tributary of the Aldan. This river was more rapid,
and though the Eussians impressed in their service the
Tunguse natives as trackers, they spent ten days in
reaching the mouth of another stream, the Gonom, which
joined the Utchur on the left. Now they had reached
high ground, and the course of the Gonom was full of
dangerous rapids : they had to pass forty-two of these,
and one of the Cossack boats was smashed and its cargo
of lead lost. Five weeks were spent in overcoming these
difficulties, and winter was now very near. As this terrible
season of Siberia requires timely preparation, the Cossacks,
after six days employed in ascending another small stream,
began to fell timber and construct vnnter quarters.

Poyarkoff was impatient to advance, especially as the
fertile lands of the Shilka were reported to be at no great
distance ; so, after two weeks employed in directing the
construction of the winter quarters, he decided to divide
his party. A portion were left in charge of the boats and
stores, with instructions to follow him on the Zeya next
spring ; the remainder, ninety men, were led by him south-
ward towards the basin of the Amur.

It is difficult to give an exact description of the nature
of the country he traversed, because, as I have already
stated, the orography of this part of Asia is very little
known, even at present, the best authorities disagreeing.

' The anonymous History of the Amur states July 15.

104 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

While Schwartz states he found the sources of the Ghihni
(an affluent of the Zeya) and of the Gonom (the affluent
of the Aldan ascended by Poyarkoff) surrounded by moun-
tains 6,000 and 7,000 feet high, Kropotkine maintains
that the head waters of the two rivers flow from marshes
on the high plateau. The latter, who is a great authority
on this region, asserts that the long chain, which joins in
most maps the mountains to the east of Lake Baikal to
the mountains along the sea of Okhotsk, does not exist.
According to him, the chain along the sea of Okhotsk is
a prolongation of the Khingan mountains, which extend
northwards from Manchuria across the course of the
Amur.'

After proceeding on the frozen stream Niuemka, the
passage to the basin of the Amur was effected on snow-
shoes, with hand-sledges for the baggage, through deep
snow-drifts. After two weeks they reached the river
Briand, a tributary on the right of the Zeya. Here they
remained for the winter, building boats for the coming
spring (1644), when the rivers would be freed from ice.
Then Poyarkoff descended the Zeya, built a small ostrog
on a creek, and awaited the arrival of the rest of the expe-
dition, which he had left on the other side of the plateau
the preceding winter. Here he first met the Daurians,
of whom so many reports had reached Yakutsk, and
inquired anxiously about mines and precious stones, but
was informed that none existed in the country.

The natives received the Russians very cordially at
first, providing them with food, but gradually grew tired
of the incessant demands of the famished strangers, whose
provisions had run short. Quarrels broke out ; a Russian

' It is curious to note how Stieler in his Atlas follows both authorities ;
in the map of Asia the mountains are arranged according to one system,
and in the map of Siberia according to the other.

THE STRUGGLE FOB THE AMUR 105

detachment was attacked, and ten men killed. The situa-
tion of the isolated party in the desolate region amid
hostile barbarians was most distressing : forty men died of
hunger and disease before the arrival of their companions
with provisions.

Poyarkoff, with his whole force, now descended the
Zeya and reached the Amur, which he mistook for the
Silkar.

On the majestic waters of this river, between beauti-
ful wooded banks, amid innumerable islands, the Cossack
boats glided swiftly down the rapid stream. The Russians,
coming from the colder regions of the north, were delighted
at the sight of fruit trees, and considered the new region
a perfect Paradise. The course of the Amur is an imposing
sight even at present to the ordinary tourist, and it must
have been far more striking then, with its forests intact,
to the daring adventurers in their voyage of discovery.
The shores were inhabited by different races, subject to a
powerful Manchurian prince, who, in his turn, was a
dependent of the Khan of Kitai,^ The natives were
surprised at the tall stature, thick beards, and long hair
of the Cossacks, and frightened by their firearms, so
Poyarkoff was able to proceed without danger. He
passed through the gorges of the Amur, where the
Khingan chain, crossing the course of the river, con-
fines the stream for many miles ^ within a narrow bed,
meandering among the hills, and where the current
acquires extraordinary rapidity and violence. After three
weeks Poj^arkoff reached the mouth of the Sungari, and,
as he thought, the commencement of the Amur, which
j3owed on to the sea. Here a halt was made, and a de-

' Thfi Eussians still give China the name which was so common in
mediffival Europe.
- Over 100 versts.

106 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

tachment of twenty-five men was sent to reconnoitre the
river to its mouth. After three days' navigation, having
ascertained from the natives that the river flowed to the
sea, they returned, but on their way the whole party,
except two, was massacred in the night by natives dwelling
between the Sungari and the Ussuri. This happened at
a day's distance from their chief.

Poyarkoff decided to explore the lower course of the
river with his remaining men, and in a week he reached
the Ussuri, which, like the Sungari, also joined the Amur
on the right. Continuing his voyage, he arrived at the
mouth of the river, and the Cossacks at once commenced
the usual preparations for passing the winter, which was
fast approaching. Again the Russians suffered terribly
from want of food in the inhospitable region : during the
winter they had to subsist on the scanty produce of the
chase and by fishing, and in spring they lived on roots and
grass. When the beginning of summer (1645) freed the
river and sea from ice, Poyarkoff was able to prepare for
the voyage to Yakutsk. It was impossible to return by
the Amur, as that route was too long and difficult : it had
taken two months from the Zeya to the sea, drifting with
the stream, and it would take many months to ascend the
river against the swift current, especially in the long
gorges. The only other way was by the sea of Okhotsk,
which had been discovered a few years before (1636) by
the Cossacks from Yakutsk.

This plan was very risky. The Russians had only the
flat-bottomed boats with which they had come down the
Amur, or such craft as they had been able to build at its
mouth during the winter ; they had no nautical instru-
ments or knowledge of navigation, and it is almost certain
that none of them had ever sailed on the sea or even seen
it before in their lives. But the Cossacks were un-

THE STBUGGLE FOB THE AMUR 107

acquainted with fear, and they daringly launched their
vessels on the boundless expanse of water, so strange to
their continental experience. They kept close to the
shore because, if they had lost sight of the land, they
would not have been able to find it again. After
three months' navigation, amid incredible hardships and
dangers, their shattered boats were driven ashore, and
they landed near the mouth of the small river Ulia.
Here they found an old abandoned zimovie, which
sheltered them for the winter.

The following spring, Poyarkoff, leaving twenty men
to collect tribute from the local Tunguses, started with
the scanty remainder of his expedition, crossed the moun-
tains, and reached the upper waters of the river Maya.
The Cossacks were now on familiar ground ; they again
built boats, drifted down the Maya and the Aldan, and
thence ascended the Lena to Yakutsk, which they reached
on July 12, 1646.

This remarkable voyage, one of the most daring per-
formed by the Cossacks, lasted a little over tliree years,
during which time more than 7,000 versts were covered.
It cost the lives of eighty men, nearly two-thirds of the
whole expedition, and the sufferings endured by the sur-
vivors were terrible. The pangs of starvation had compelled
many to devour the dead bodies of the natives and
of their companions who had perished through want
of food. It was the most disastrous expedition under-
taken in Siberia, and it produced no practical results,
because at that time the Kussians were not able to establish
themselves on the Amur.

Poyarkoff brought back 480 sables, and reported that
the conquest of the Amur was not very difficult. It would
require 300 men and the construction of three ostrogs,
each garrisoned by fifty men, the remaining 150 serving

108 BUS SI A ON THE PACIFIC

to collect tribute from the surrounding natives. But even
this small force, which, as v^e shall see, would have
been insufficient, could not be spared by the voivode of
Yakutsk. The only useful results of the expedition were
the written account of all that had been seen and heard,
and the plans of the rivers that had been explored.
According to Poyarkoff, the Shilka flowed into the
Sungari, the Sungari into the Amur, and the latter into
the sea.

The failure of Poyarkoff and the sufferings of his men
did not deter others from attempting the same task, and a
new expedition was quickly organised ; but it was due to
private enterprise and it chose a different, shorter route.

Erothei Pavlof Khabaroff, a peasant of Ustiug Veliki,
in the province of Vologda,^ emigrated vdth his brother
and son to Siberia in the year 1636, and settled on the
Yenissei,^ where he busied himself with husbandry. He
was an intelligent, energetic man, and his attention was
soon directed to the reports about another river lately dis-
covered (the Lena), where the sable trade was easy and
remunerative. The Russians having reached the third
Siberian river only a few years before — Yakutsk was
founded in 1632 — the slaughter of the fur-bearing animals
had not yet diminished their numbers. Khabaroff, there-
fore, in 1638, proceeded to the river Lena. As he had
already made some money, he was able to hire a body of
twenty-seven trappers and start trading in furs. Sables
were then abundant on the Lena and its tributaries, the
Olekma and Vitim. They were collected by gangs of
trappers, consisting generally of thirty men, who pro-

' A province in North-east Russia, south of Archangel province.

- In Chap, ii., ' Conquest of Siberia,' the fact was mentioned that in
1630 500 men, besides women, were forwarded for the colonisation of
the country around the newly discovered river Yenissei. Khabaroff was
probably incited to emigrate by the news of this exodus.

THE STRUGGLE FOB THE AMUR 109

ceeded in decked boats, heavily laden with flour, salt, and
other necessary provisions, to the spots frequented by the
sables. Only bows and arrows, nets and traps were used,
as the muskets of that period were too cumbersome to be
carried about in the woods. At the approach of winter
zimovies were built, and the hunters awaited the time
when the snow on the ground and the ice on the rivers
could bear sledges ; then they dispersed in small parties,
burying their provisions in the ground along the route for
fear of being robbed by the natives. The hired trappers
were of two kinds : some received all the articles they re-
quired from their master, and were obliged to give a third
of the furs they collected, besides repaying all that had
been given except their food ; others delivered to their
master half the animals they had trapped and provided
for their own wants, receiving only five or six roubles for
the winter.

Khabaroff engaged men of the first class, and spent
two thousand roubles in providing over thirty tons of
stores for their use. His trade flourished, and he began
new speculations, acquiring land on the river Ilim, near
the important portage between the Yenissei and the
Lena. There he started another profitable business, em-
ploying his men as carters for transporting the large
trafiic between the two rivers. Constant success urered
Khabaroff 's active mind to find new sources of profit, and
in 1640 he started a salt-boilery at the mouth of the river
Kuta, which, however, was soon stopped by the authori-
ties. Undiscouraged, Khabaroff, the following year, asked
permission to cultivate fallow lands at the mouth of the
Kirenga, on condition of receiving only one year's exemp-
tion from taxes.

Khabaroff gradually acquired great wealth, and em-
ploj^ed a large number of men in his various speculations.

110 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

His position in Eastern Siberia was very similar to that
of the Stroganoffs, the patrons of Yermak, in the pre-
ceding century, on the banks of the Kama near the Ural.
He was also similarly situated — to the east beyond the
mountains (the Yablonoi) . There was an unknown region
along the banks of the river Shilka, which vague rumour
asserted was also very rich. His trappers, in their eager
search for unfrequented spots where the hunted sables
sought refuge, had probably reached the upper waters of
the Olekma and brought back valuable information of
what they had seen and heard. ^ Not content with the
safe and rapid accumulation of wealth in the lands
arduously discovered by his predecessors, Khabaroff, with
the restless adventurous spirit of a Cossack, desired to
explore new lands and subjugate unknown tribes.

In 1649 he sent a petition to the voivode of Yakutsk,
declaring that he knew a short route, by the river
Olekma, leading to the new region, and asking permis-
sion to enlist a body of about 150 men. He promfsed
to provide them with money, food, boats, arms, and
ammunition. Permission was granted, and Khabaroff
was instructed to build a small ostrog on the Shilka, to
keep a record of the tribute collected, to describe the
people he met, and to draw plans. He was stringently
cautioned not to use firearms except in extreme necessity,
and to prevent his subordinates committing violence on
the natives.

Khabaroff, with a small body of seventy men, started
in the spring of 1649. From the Lena he went up the
Olekma, where the rapid stream greatly retarded his pro-

' Gregory Vyjitzoff, at the sources of the Tughir, tributary of the
Olekma, had heard of Prince Ladkai on the Shilkar. Ivan Kvashnin with
three Tunguses had reached the Shilkar by the river Amazar, and, to avert
danger, had announced the near arrival of a Russian army to conquer
Ladkai.

THE STRUGGLE FOB THE AMUR 111

gress. Worse difficulties were encountered when he found
the usual rapids of Siberian rivers. Khabaroff was able
to write — a rare accomplishment at that time in Siberia —
so we have a forcible description of one of his misadven-
tures : ' In the rapids the rigging was broken, the rudder
smashed, the men were bruised ; but, by the help of God
and the imperial good luck, all ended happily.' It took
the whole summer to reach the mouth of the Tughir, an
affluent of the Olekma, and on its banks they stopped for
the winter. In January of the following year (1650) the
Russians, with sledges and snow-shoes, crossed the por-
tage with great difficulty, on account of the deep snow
and stormy weather. In descending from the plateau
they found the small river Urka, which led them directly
to the Amur.

On their way down the Amur the Russians found five
native towns, entirely deserted by their inhabitants ; the
first, situated at the mouth of the river Urka, was the
residence of Lafkai, a Daurian prince, well known to the
Cossacks, as all the reports about the Amur mentioned
his name. The Russians were agreeably surprised to find
the houses built of stone, with large windows * covered
with paper (an article probably purchased from the
Chinese), and greatly astonished to find the inhabitants
had fled. Their wonder increased as they proceeded to
the next towns and also found them abandoned. At the
third Khabaroff halted and succeeded in conversing,
through an interpreter, with five native horsemen, who,
however, kept at a distance and remained on horseback.
Lafkai, who was among them, inquired who they were ;
but when Khabaroff said they had come for trade, he

' The Cossacks in Northern Siberia had very small windows in the log-
huts where they dwelt in winter ; the native hostages confined in the close
suffocating air were often found dead, and they were treated, if not better,
at least as well as the Cossacks.

112 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

answered that it was useless to try deceit as he knew
their intentions. A Cossack (probably Ivan Kvashnin) ^
had threatened to come back with 500 men to kill
the natives and take their goods, wives, and children.
Khabaroff promised him the protection of the Tsar if he
paid tribute, but Lafkai only answered : ' Well, we shall
see what kind of people you are,' and galloped away with
his men.

The Russians found in the fifth town an old woman —
it is said she was the sister of Lafkai — from w^hom they
extorted the information that Lafkai, with other princes,
was waiting for the Russians at a town two weeks' march
from the residence of the rich Prince Bogdoi. This chief
had cannon to protect his town, which was a great centre
of trade, where gold, silver, and precious stones were to be
found in great abundance. These particulars were pro-
bably the embellishments of the interpreter, desirous to
please his masters, or a trick of the frightened old woman
to send away the unwelcome visitors.

The news of the warlike preparations to receive the
Russians convinced Khabaroff of the imprudence of ad-
vancing further with only seventy men. He therefore
retreated to the first city at the mouth of the river Urka,
and, leaving his men to garrison the place, returned to
Yakutsk in May 1650. Though not very important for
the moment, some useful results had been obtained by
the expedition. Khabaroff brought back information
about a part of the Amur which had not yet been visited,
as it was situated much higher than the mouth of the
Zeya, whence Poyarkoff had commenced his exploration,
and he had tested practically the advantages of his new

' The anonymous History of the Amur puts his name in the mouth of
Lafkai, though probably the latter referred to him without mentioning the
foreign name.

THE STRUGGLE FOB THE AMUR 113

route — they were indeed evident, because he had travelled
from Yakutsk to the Amur and back in about a year. He
reported to the voivode that fish v^as abundant in the
Amur, especially sturgeons, which were bigger than those
of the Volga ; indeed, all the fish were larger. The in-
habitants were Daurians ; some devoted to agriculture,
others to cattle-grazing. Besides dense forests containing
fur animals there were fields and meadows growing barley,
millet, oats, buckwheat, peas, and hemp ; stocks of grain
had been found in the towns abandoned by the natives.
These facts were important for the future plans of con-
quest on the Amur, as it became unnecessary to send
supplies of grain from Yakutsk to revictual the expedi-
tions. The time required to cover the distance was also
inconsiderable, especially returning from the Amur, as it
was only a hundred versts from Lafkai's town on the
Urka to the ostrog built by Khabaroff on the Tughir,
and thence, floating down the Olekma, in two weeks
Yakutsk could be reached.

Khabaroff, however, took a quite different view from
Poyarkoff about the military requirements of the ques-
tion, and his estimate was certainly more correct. He
said 6,000 men were required to conquer the whole
land of the Daurians, by which he probably meant the
basin of the Amur. It was quite impossible to raise
this force, as even in 1662 the whole population of
Siberia amounted to only 70,000 souls ; and much later,
in 1720, it was estimated ^ that the regular soldiers did
not much exceed 2,000 men. Khabaroff therefore con-
tented himself with enlisting about 150 volunteers, and
the voivode of Yakutsk added a detachment of twenty

' Andrievitch, History of Siberia, part li. (from 1660 to Empress Eliza-
beth).

I

114 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

Cossacks/ three guns, and a supply of powder and lead,
besides promises of assistance in case of need.

With these reinforcements Khabaroff went back to
the Amur in the autumn of the same year, 1650,^ but this
time he found no abandoned towns. The Daurians had
decided to resist, and had given much trouble during his
absence to the men left at the mouth of the Urka, who
had sustained many sieges, though with little loss, as the
natives had only bows and arrows. Khabaroff descended
the Amur and met the Daurian army near the town of
Albazin, where an obstinate battle was fought from mid-
day to evening, and ended with the rout of the natives.
This victory was obtained at the cost of only twenty
wounded men, and it gave the Russians Albazin with its
stores of grain. The town was conveniently situated,
not far from the portage employed in passing from the
Olekma to the Urka ; so Khabaroff had the fortifications
improved, and established a garrison of fifty men. Albazin
played a great part in the Russian colonisation on the
Amur in the seventeenth century, and the heroic sieges it
sustained rendered its strange Daurian name famous in
the Cossack camps of Eastern Siberia.

From the information communicated by the prisoners
Khabaroff began to have fairly accurate notions of the
political state of the country. The banks of the Amur
were inhabited by many races — they said nine — which
were all tributary to the Shamska Khan (the governor of
Manchuria was probably meant), who in his turn was
tributary to another prince with a still stranger name.

' The anonymous History of the Aimir gives only 117 volunteers with
21 strielitz.

- The same anonymous author states 1651 ; if Khabaroff returned after
September 1, 1650, it would have been in the following year, i.e. 1651 of
the old Russian calendar.

THE STRUGGLE FOB THE AMUR 115

The tribes at the mouth of the river, however, did not
pay tribute.

Khabaroff employed the winter in making an expedi-
tion on sledges, when he met and defeated a body of
natives ; and, in writing a report to the voivode of
Yakutsk,' he pointed out the importance of the Amur
which he said could become a second Siberia — the land
of the Daurians alone could support 20,000 people. His
ambition even went beyond the present frontiers of
Russia, for he wished to conquer Manchuria. Again he
came back to his favourite postulate — the necessity of a
large army. It was difficult to bring the Shamsha Khan
under the subjection of the Tsar, because he had large
towns provided with cannon ; his country was only seven
days' march from the Amur, and it abounded with silver
mines, pearls, and precious stones.

News about Khabaroff had reached Moscow, and it
was decided to assist his bold plans. Eeinforcements
were despatched, consisting of 132 soldiers, volunteers,
and trappers, under the command of Trenka Tchet-
cheghin, with a large supply of lead and gunpowder,
besides a ream of writing-paper, which was a very rare
article in Siberia, and was probably forwarded to en-
courage Khabaroff 's literary activity, which furnished such
valuable information about the new region. It was also
decided to send an embassy with a letter from the voivode
of Yakutsk to the Shamsha Khan, in which it was shown
that the Daurians had been unable to withstand the terrible
arms of the Russians, and that the Shamsha Khan himself
had better give as much gold, silver, and precious stones
as he could : ' For our Lord Tsar Alexis Mikhailovitch is
strong and great and terrible, but gracious and just, and

' He also built a town, by which it is generally understood that he re-
paired and fortified Albazin.

I 2

116 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

not bloodthirsty. And our Lord has in an empire of
Siberia a great multitude of soldiers, trained to the business
of war, and they fight desperately.' All these cunning
suggestions and covert threats were wasted, however,
because the embassy was massacred en route by the
Daurians.

In the following year (1651), as soon as the river was
free from ice, Khabaroff descended the Amur to continue
his work of conquest. On his way he found a fortified
town surrounded by a triple rampart and ditches, contain-
ing a large population, with numerous cattle, and he
decided to besiege it. When they advanced, the Russians
were astonished to behold some people in silk clothes —
probably Chinese — who, instead of flying for shelter within
the walls, retired to some distance, and with characteristic
coolness watched the operations. Khabaroff through an
interpreter summoned the besieged to submit and pay
tribute. But the natives answered that they already paid
tribute to the Bogdoi Khan (the Chinese Emperor) and
could not pay it again to the Russians. The attack then
commenced, and though the Daurians shot showers of
arrows on the besiegers, the Russian cannon soon made a
breach in the outer rampart, through which the Cossacks,
protected by their armour, were able to penetrate and
drive the besieged into the second enclosure. This, as
well as the third, was breached and stormed, the natives
slaughtered, and the town with a thousand head of cattle
fell into the hands of Khabaroff,' who had only four men
killed and fifty wounded. The next day one of the men
in silk clothes, who, the prisoners said, were tribute
collectors, came to confer with Khabaroff, but none of the
interpreters understood his language, so he was dismissed
vnth presents. The Russians rested in the conquered
town for a month and a half.

THE STRUGGLE FOB THE AMUR 117

Khabarotf learned from his prisoners that he was
only three days' distance • from the mouth of the Zeya,
the river down which had floated the boats of the first
Russian expedition under Poyarkoff. He proceeded in
that direction, and, arriving unexpectedly in a town, seized
some of the princes. Here again he was confronted by
proofs of the Chinese suzerainty : he could only collect
sixty sables, the natives offering as an excuse that they
had just paid tribute to the Shamsha Khan and had had
no time to trap more animals. Another difiiculty also
presented itself : though the princes were in his hands,
the inhabitants all fled. Hitherto, all over Siberia, it had
been sufficient to hold the chiefs as hostages to secure the
submission of their tribes. But on the Amur it was
different; the princes declared that their people acted
independently, or, as they put it very forcibly, ' If we fall
into your hands, it is better we alone should die than that
all our race should perish.' All intimidation failed before
this fact, and the Russians were forced to recognise that
the Daurians cared more for themselves and their land
than for their princes.

As it was impossible to establish winter quarters in a
country deserted by its inhabitants, Khabaroff descended
the Amur on September 7, passed through the gorges,
and reached the mouth of the Sungari about Septem-
ber 14. All the way the Cossacks lived by plundering
the natives — the Dutcheri — a quiet race unable to
resist the fierce strangers. In his search for suitable
winter quarters Khabaroff again proceeded down the
Amur to the mouth of the Ussuri, where, in the pre-
sent century, the town of Khabarofsk has been built
to record his exploits. The position is favourable, at the
confluence of two great rivers — the mighty Amur and the

' Six, according to the anonymous author.

118 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

picturesque Ussuri — and Kliabaroff, with his keen miHtary
insight, selected a spot adapted for his necessities. The
subsequent events fully justified his choice. A rocky
eminence, jutting out with almost perpendicular sides into
the river, was connected by a narrow neck with the high
banks and formed a small sheltered cove, which could
only be reached by the river.

Khabaroff anchored his boats in the cove, cut a path
in the rocks, and commenced building a fort on the chff.
As he had arrived on September 24, it was necessary
to collect provisions without delay for the approaching
winter. Game was abundant in the mountains, and fish in
the river, and a foraging expedition of 100 men was sent
up the Ussuri to find the other provisions required.
Several villages were plundered, but the alarm soon spread
over the country, especially as the Manchurian authorities
must have been already informed by their tribute collectors
of the Russian attacks on the Amur. Khabaroif therefore,
on his return, had to run the gauntlet of the Chinese
troops cantoned on the banks of the Ussuri. As he
approached a town, a fleet of boats put out, stretching
across the river to intercept him. Khabaroff' s general-
ship saved him from the imminent danger ; he ordered
his men to reserve their fire until they came to close
quarters, and then to sweep the two nearest boats. The
strong current and a stiff breeze were also in his favour,
and in the confusion caused by the concentrated volley
he was able to cut through the line and escape before the
discomfited Chinese could alter their course.^ This

' This episode on the Ussuri, as well as the description of Khabaroff's
fort, is taken from Atkinson, who never gives his authorities ; but as he had
been for many years in Siberia, and knew the Russians well, and moreover
was on the Amur at an important historical moment (at the time of
Muravioff' s expeditions) when old stories would be revived, and traditions
repeated, it is probable that he had reliable foundation for his account
(pp. 465-470 of Atkinson's work).

THE STBUGGLE FOB THE AMUR 119

perilous encounter taught the Cossacks prudence, and
they passed the other towns on the Ussuri at night-
time.

During the absence of their chief the Cossacks left in
the fort were also exposed to danger. The neighbouring
natives — of the Atchan ' race — as soon as they discovered
the departure of the large expedition up the Ussuri,
plotted to massacre the garrison ; they had, however, a just
dread of firearms, and they found difficulties in climbing
the palisades of the fort. They resolved at last to collect
a quantity of straw, and attempt to burn the enclosure.
But seventy Cossacks made a sortie and vigorously
attacked them, while others from the walls fired muskets ;
then, as Khabaroff writes, 'the fear of God fell upon the
heathen dogs, and they could not stand against the terror
of the Tsar and our weapons, and they fled, and we ran
at their backs, killing many and seizing prisoners, and the
heathens threw themselves into their boats and paddled
away on the great Amur.'

When the party returned from the Ussuri with
provisions, the Cossacks settled down for the winter,
strengthening their fortifications. In the meanwhile the
Manchurian authorities had realised the danger that
threatened their almost nominal suzerainty over the
natives dwelling on the banks of the Amur, and had made
great warlike preparations to drive out the unwelcome
strangers, despatching bodies of troops to different points
of the river. A force of 2,000 men with eight guns,
thirty gingalls, and twelve earthen petards, intended for
blowing up the walls,^ suddenly appeared before the
Eussian fort at Atchansk, under the command of Prince

' Khabaroff's fort was built on the site of one of their villages called
Atchansk.

- Khabaroff says they contained forty pounds of gunpowder.

120 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

Isinei, and commenced a vigorous artillery attack.
Luckily for the Cossacks, the Chinese gunners were very
bad marksmen and made more noise than execution.
The siege lasted for some time, but, by a bold sortie of
Khabaroff, it ended in the total defeat of the Chinese, who
lost two guns, many muskets, eight flags, and 830 horses.
Khabaroff, with his usual lively style, gives a picturesque
description of the fight.

* On March 24, at daybreak, the Bogdoi (Chinese)
army, horsemen and armoured men, came upon us Cos-
sacks in the town of Atchansk, and our Cossack esaul,^
Andrew Ivanoff, shouted in the town : " Brother Cossacks,
arise quickly, and put on your strong breastplates ! " and
the Cossacks, in their shirts only, rushed to the town wall,^
and stood to the guns and the muskets, and fired on the
Bogdoi army. And we Cossacks fought with them, the
Bogdoi people, from dawn to sunset ; and the Bogdoi
army fired on the Cossack huts, so that we Cossacks could
not go about in the town, and the Bogdoi people vnthi
their flags surrounded the town wall. The Bogdoi men
broke down the wall of our town to the ground, and then
the Bogdoi Prince Isinei and all the great Bogdoi army
shouted : " Do not burn nor strike the Cossacks, but take
them alive ! " and our interpreters repeated these words
of the Prince Isinei to me, Erothei, and hearing these words
of the Prince Isinei, we Cossacks put on our armour, and
I, Erothei, and the regular ^ and the volunteer Cossacks,
pra3dng the Saviour and our Blessed Virgin and Saint
Nicholas, took farewell of each other. And I, Erothei,
and Andrew Ivanoff, and all our Cossack army, said :
" Let us die, brother Cossacks, for the Christian faith ;

' A kind of lieutenant.
" It must have been a wooden one.

^ The regular Cossacks of Siberia were the descendants of the com-
panions of Yermak on the river Irtysh (Sadovnikoff).

THE STRUGGLE FOB THE AMUR 121

let us stand by the Saviour, the Virgin, and Saint
Nicholas ; let us serve the Emperor Alexis Mikhailovitch,
Grand Duke of all Russia ; and let us Cossacks all die to
the last man against the Tsar's enemies, but never shall
we fall alive in the hands of the Bogdoi men." And the
Bogdoi people were talking near the fallen walls, and we
Cossacks wheeled up to the breach a large brass gun, and
we began to fire cannon and muskets, while from the walls
they fired some iron guns upon the Bogdoi people. And,
by the grace of God and the imperial good luck and our
efforts, many of those dogs were killed. And as the Bogdoi
men retreated from our cannon and the breach, at that
moment 156 men, regular and volunteer Cossacks in
armour, sallied forth upon the enemy, while fifty men
remained in the town. As we sallied forth upon them,
we captured two iron guns ; and by the grace of God and
the imperial good luck we fell upon the enemy, captur-
ing the muskets of their best men. And a great fear came
upon them, our force seeming innumerable, and the
remaining Bogdoi men fled from the town and our arms.
And we counted the dead around the town of Atchansk ;
of the Bogdoi men there were 676 killed, and of our
Cossacks ten, but wounded in that battle there were
seventy-eight men.' *

' Atkinson gives a rather different account of the sortie : he says
Khabaroff was reduced to great straits and obliged to retire, but, before
leaving, resolved to give the Chinese a parting remembrance. He proposed
to burn the Chinese camp with only six men and asked for a forlorn hope ;
all the Cossacks volunteered, but on condition that their chief should not
go and expose his valuable life. An officer, therefore, was selected who
proceeded in a boat with his small party to a ravine at the back of the
Chinese camp. Then, during the night, the Cossacks fired all their guns,
and Khabaroff headed a sortie ; while the Chinese were busy repelling the
attack, the small party stealthily approached and set fire to the tents. The
sight of the flames in their camp threw the Chinese into confusion, and
they fled. Atkinson elsewhere mentions that the Cossacks of the Argun (a
river marking a part of the frontier between Manchuria and Transbaikalia)

122 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

The first encounter of the Russians with the Manchus
had resulted in a brilliant victory, but Khabaroff was too
shrewd to overestimate its importance. From the pri-
soners he learnt that the Shamsha Khan, the viceroy of
the Emperor of China, had received complaints about the
Russians from all the natives on the Amur, and was still
making great warlike preparations. Another larger army
might advance at any moment, and at Atchansk Khabaroff
was too far from his only base of supplies, the portage
between the river Olekma and the small river Urka on the
upper Amur. He prudently decided to retreat up river,
and in April 1652 he abandoned the spot which he had so
sagaciously chosen and bravely defended.

The voivode of Yakutsk, having received no news from
Khabaroff for a long time, sent a small reinforcement
under the command of Trenka Tchetcheghin. But when
they reached the upper Amur they found that Khabaroff
had gone down river the preceding year, and nothing had
been heard since. The junction with Khabaroff was
necessary for the safety of both detachments, their united
forces being barely sufficient to face the dangers that
threatened them from the Chinese. Tchetcheghin there-
fore despatched a small party under IvanNaghiba to scour
the Amur and discover Khabaroff.

The task was by no means easy. The gigantic river,
when not confined by the parallel ranges of the Khingan
mountains, which cross its course, enjoys its liberty by
spreading its waters for miles in the plains ; numerous
islands intersect the channel and hide the banks, which
are sometimes difficult to distinguish in the confused mass

had many traditions about Khabaroff, and he may have heard these details
from them. His particulars have an air of probability, as they would
explain the victory of 156 men against 2,000 with the slaughter of 676, and
as they are striking and interdependent they might have been handed
down by oral tradition through two centuries.

THE STRUGGLE FOB THE AMUR 123

of water and grassy meadows. The Cossack boats, more-
over, lying low in the water, were not easily discernible at
a distance. Naghiba steered through the intricate creeks,
occasionally leaving marks and inscriptions on the islands
to attract the notice of the strayed party. In his vain
search for Khabaroff, Naghiba descended the whole course
of the Amur and reached the sea, as Poyarkoff had done
seven years before ; but this second exploration was
fraught with greater dangers. The party was smaller,
while the natives had become more hostile, and were on
their guard at the approach of the strangers. Several
times Naghiba was completely surrounded — horsemen on
the banks and a flotilla of big boats on the river preclud-
ing all possibility of escape — and in this dangerous situa-
tion had to halt, fearing by an untimely attack to risk a
disastrous defeat. Near the mouth of the Amur the
Ghiliaks thus kept him blockaded in the river for two
weeks, until the want of provisions compelled the Cossacks
to land with the courage of despair and plunder a village.
When the sea was reached, Naghiba was faced by the
same dilemma as confronted Poyarkoff — to return up river
against the strong current amid hostile natives, or to choose
the dangerous sea-route. The latter course was similarly
selected, and Naghiba's party rowed out to sea until they
were caught by the ice, which drifted them for ten days,
and threw them on a desert coast. After endless priva-
tions they were able to cross the mountains and return to
Yakutsk by the Lena and its tributaries.

Tchetcheghin also started in search of Khabaroff, but
was more fortunate, as he met him in the gorges of the
Amur, where he probably had halted in the certainty of
not missing the boats in the narrow channel. Khabaroff
had been obliged to proceed very cautiously in his retreat
from Atchansk. At the mouth of the Sungari a Manchu

124 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

army of 6,000 men with cannon and muskets was waiting
for him, and he owed his escape to a strong breeze blow-
ing up river, which enabled him to face the swift current
and steer in the middle of the stream, crowding on all the
sail his boats could carry. Alarming rumours were cur-
rent among the natives : an army of 10,000 men — others
said more — was ready ; the Shamsha Khan, bent on driving
out the Eussians, was collecting 40,000 men for that
object. Worse misfortunes now came upon Khabaroff:
the defection of his men and the persecution of his
superiors.

On August 1, 1652, Khabaroff halted at the mouth of
the Zeya, where he proposed to build a fort ; but some of
his men, preferring a roving life of piracy, seized three
boats, which contained the government stores — cannon,
gunpowder, and armour — and fled down the Amur. The
deserters numbered 136 men, and Khabaroff was left with
only about 200 ; but the material loss was trifling in com-
parison with the moral consequences. With his forces
intact, it would have been difficult, even for the daring
resourceful mind of Khabaroff, to achieve success against
the hostile natives and the Chinese armies, but the task
became hopeless when the mutiny of his men added to
his dangers. His attempts to conciliate the natives and
induce them to submit failed ; he was held responsible for
the incoherent violence of the men who had escaped his
control. He proceeded on the Zeya for six weeks, sum-
moning the inhabitants to submit, but they answered :
* You deceive us, for, behold, your men run away and
plunder our lands.'

His power seems to have been entirely crippled by
the desertion and consequent filibustering of his men, for
he accomplished nothing remarkable after, and his last
report to Yakutsk was written on August 5, 1652, in

THE STRUGGLE FOB THE AMUR 125

which he described his difficult position and asked for
assistance.

Eeports of the daring voyage of Poyarkoff and of the
successful expeditions of Khabaroff had spread over
Siberia; the stream of adventurers which had spread over
the northern plains reaching the Lena about twenty years
before had been lately struggling with the difficulties of
the Arctic Ocean and of the inhospitable north-eastern
region. The discovery of a fourth great river was hailed
with delight, especially as it lay in the south, and was
described as fertile. The scanty settlers on the Lena
were eager to abandon their cold barren land for a
warmer region, and began to emigrate with such fre-
quency that orders were issued to stop them on the
Olekma and prevent their passage. The welcome news
had reached even Moscow, where it was resolved to des-
patch 3,000 strielitz on the Amur ; this measure was
probably suggested by the statement made in 1650 by
Khabaroff, that 6,000 men were required to conquer the
country. But even with half the number demanded, it
is very probable that the daring and skill of Khabaroff
might have firmly established the Kussian domination on
the Amur in the seventeenth century. The 3,000 strielitz,
however, never arrived ; they were either not sent or were
absorbed en route by the military necessities of the dis-
tricts through which they passed.^ The small force which
did arrive had a voivode, Zinovieff, appointed to govern
the country, who foolishly abused his power. When he
met Khabaroff at the mouth of the Zeya he scolded him,
pulled his beard, accused him of concealing treasure, and
sent him for trial to Moscow — some say even in chains.

' This often happened with convoys of provisions which never reached
their distant destination, but were detained for the urgent needs of the
nearer garrisons.

126 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

This shameful treatment of their beloved ataman, the
attempt to enforce distasteful discipline, and to oblige
them to cultivate the land, disgusted the Cossacks, w^ho
were not appeased even by the distribution of money sent
from Moscow to reward their exploits.

In the winter of 1655 Khabaroff arrived at Moscow,
where he was tried — it is not known for what crime — and
acquitted. Rewards were now given to the old man who
had been so harshly treated ; the title of ' son of a boyar '
was bestowed on him, and he was appointed chief of a
district on the Lena ; but he never returned to the Amur,
where he had been so ungratefully requited for the heroic
exertions of four years. He died on the Lena not far
from Kirensk, and it is said his descendants are still to
be found in Siberia.

After Yermak, Khabaroff is the most conspicuous
figure among the Cossack conquerors of Siberia ; he not
only possessed the daring courage and unhesitating reso-
lution to face difficulties and privations, which v\^ere
common to all the Russian pioneers, but he had the
intellectual qualities necessary for a commander. The
best proof of the clearness of his intellect is shown by
the statement he made in 1650, when he had returned
from his first raid on the Amur after he had passed but
a few months in the region, that 6,000 men were required
for conquering the country. All the disasters that fol-
lowed show the correctness of his first rough estimate.
He discovered a short route to the Amur, which rendered
possible the quick despatch of reinforcements and ammu-
nition. He was the first to meet a large Manchu army,
and inflicted a severe defeat, which raised the military
reputation of the Russians and surrounded them with a
prestige which compensated for their numerical weakness.
His keen discernment of strategical positions is evinced

THE STRUGGLE FOR THE AMUR 127

by the fact that the two spots he preferred, the mouth of
the Ussuri and the mouth of the Zeya, have been chosen
as the site of the principal Eussian towns now on the
Amur — Khabarofsk and Blagovieshensk.

In the meanwhile events were taking place in another
region which bore the most lasting consequences for the
Russian aims on the Amur. It has been shown that,
notwithstanding their preference to advance in the north-
east, and their reluctance to engage the more warlike
races of the south, the Eussians had been compelled by
special reasons to attack the Buriats dwelling around
the Lake Baikal. Their first appearance on the eastern
shores of that lake was in 1644, when Skorokhod with
thirty-six men reached the river Barguzin, which flows
into the Baikal nearly in the centre of its eastern side.
In 1647 Kolesnikoff built the ostrog of Verkhne Angarsk
on the upper Angara, a small river at the northern ex-
tremity of the lake, considered to be the upper course of
the lower Angoras, which flows past Irkutsk. In 1648
an expedition of sixty men under Ivan Galkin crossed the
Baikal and built an ostrog near the mouth of the river
Barguzin, which afterwards became the town of the same
name. The Barguzin ostrog was for a long time the base
of operations for all the expeditions engaged in the con-
quest of the lands beyond the Baikal. In the following
year, 1649, the Eussians pushed on south and built the
ostrog of Verkhne Udinsk at the confluence of the river
Selenga with its tributary, the Uda. The establishment of
the Eussians in the extensive river basin of the Selenga^

' This should be considered the principal source of the Baikal, and the
head of the Angara. It is not only much larger than any other river
of the Baikal system (a course of over 700 miles), but the researches of
Dibowsky and Godlewsky in 1876, proving the existence of a transverse
chain of mountains under the surface where the depth is only 200 feet,
while the rest of the lake has a depth never less than 800 and sometimes

128 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

led to the colonisation of the region now called Trans-
baikalia, the most picturesque and fertile province of
Siberia. In 1653 Peter Beketoff started with an expe-
dition which achieved the most important results : he
ascended the Selenga and then its right tributary, the
Khilok, and reached Lake Irghen, where he built the
Irghensk ostrog. He had thus gradually mounted the
plateau gently rising from the Baikal and was close to
the Yablonoi crest, which parts the waters falling into
the Baikal and thence into the Yenissei, from those be-
longing to the Amur river system. In the following year,
1654, he crossed the Yablonoi, which presented no great
difficulties, especially on the western side, and by the
rivers Ingoda and Shilka (formed by the junction of the
Ingoda and the Onon) he reached the mouth of the
tributary river Nertcha, where he built the Nertchinsk
ostrog.

His eastern march had brought Beketoff on the upper
waters of the Amur, thus discovering a third still more
favourable route to reach the much-coveted new region,
Poyarkoff's long disastrous voyage had shown the incon-
veniences of the route by the river Aldan, and it was
abandoned as soon as Khabaroff discovered the shorter
one by the river Olekma, which had, moreover, the ad-
vantage of leading to a point more than 500 miles higher
up the Amur. But the second route was also long and
laborious, requiring several months' tedious tracking up
the Olekma ; and the expeditions on the Amur therefore
received very slowly reinforcements and ammunition from
their distant headquarters at Yakutsk. It was, however,

over 4,000 feet, establish the fact that the Baikal is really composed of two
great depressions, and the so-called upper Angara has no connection with
the lower Angara, which is really a prolongation of the Selenga.

THE STRUGGLE FOR THE AMUR 129

the only practicable route as long as the Cossacks kept to
the northern part of Siberia.

The advance of the Kussians in Transbaikalia, in the
land where the waters part to flow either eastward to
the Pacific or westward to the Baikal and thence to the
Arctic Ocean, rendered possible the adoption of the third
still more advantageous route, which was, indeed, the
course of the Amur itself almost from its sources. The
settlements on the upper waters of the Amur, within easy-
distance of the Baikal, through the fine Selenga river and
its affluents, the Uda and the Khilok, became the natural
base of operations for the conquest of the middle and
lower courses of the Amur. The fact must have been
recognised at the time, because in 1656 Transbaikalia
was detached from the authority of Yakutsk, and Atha-
nasius Pashkoff was appointed as independent voivode in
Nertchinsk.

After the departure of Khabaroff, the task of collect-
ing tribute and subduing the natives was entrusted to
Onuphrius Stepanoff, who, notwithstanding the presence
of the Chinese armies, prosecuted the work with great
spirit. In the summer of 1654 he went up the Sungari,
where he met a large Chinese army, on shore and in
boats ; the Cossacks made a vigorous attack and drove
the Chinese out of their boats, forcing them on shore,
where they took refuge in their entrenchments. Ste-
panoff attempted to carry the position by storm, but was
repulsed, and the want of provisions obliged him to re-
treat up the Amur. He was joined by Beketoff, who,
after discovering the third route to the Amur and building
the Nertchinsk ostrog, had sailed down the Shilka.

Though reinforced, Stepanoff was aware of the dangers
that threatened him, and made the most elaborate pre-
parations to give the Chinese a warm reception. He

K

130 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

concentrated his forces at Kumarska ' and employed the
autumn in erecting formidable fortifications, which showed
considerable skill. The camp was square, and surrounded
by a rampart of double palisades filled in with sand ;
cannon were mounted at the angles ; the approaches were
defended by a ditch seven feet deep and fourteen wide,
and by caltrops strewn on the ground. In the centre
of the fort an earthen elevation with sloping sides (a
' cavalier ' of the old system of fortification) enabled the
artillery to fire over the ramparts on the surrounding
country. To extinguish fires, a well was dug and water
kept running in gutters. To prevent surprises, fires were
kept burning during the night. These works, especially
the ditches, cost immense labour, because in the Amur
region very little snow falls in winter, the ground is
frozen to a great depth, and never thaws completely even
during the high temperature of the short summers. The
Cossacks had to light huge fires to thaw the ground
before breaking it with their spades.

With the spring the expected enemy arrived. On
March 13, 1655, the Manchu army, 10,000 strong, ap-
peared before Kumarska ; their siege appliances were as
numerous and far stronger than the defences of the
Russians. Besides fifteen guns they had boat-hooks, fire-
wood, straw, wooden shields covered with felt or hides,
mounted ladders with one end on wheels and the other
provided with hooks to grapple on the walls, and long
sacks (140 feet long, it is said) filled with gunpowder,
probably intended as portable mines to blow up the
rampart. After a great deal of useless cannonading and
attempts to burn the camp with fire-arrows, the Chinese
commenced the assault on March 24, but notwithstand-
ing their abundance of appliances for scaling the walls

' At the mouth of the Kumara, a right tributary of the Amur.

THE STRUGGLE FOR THE AMUR 131

it is probable they were not eager about using them in
the face of 500 Cossacks at bay, desperately resolved to
sell their lives dearly ; it v^as found more congenial to
resume the distant cannonade, which was kept up day
and night until April 4, when, perceiving they had pro-
duced no effect, the Chinese retired.

The position of the Russians was not much improved
by the repulse of the Chinese, as scarcity of provisions
obliged them to abandon Kumarska. Stepanoff had not
the high qualities of Khabaroff, and was unable to restrain
the Cossacks, always inclined to disorder in distant regions.
Their capricious violence and wasteful plunder exhausted
the resources of the natives, who could easily have sup-
ported the Russians if the requisitions had been made
with order and intelligence. The dearth on the Amur
was also increased by order of the Chinese authorities,
who, despairing of driving away the Cossacks by force of
arms, hoped to succeed by starvation. The natives were
forbidden to cultivate the lands on the shores of the river
and enjoined to retire southwards with their families.
Stepanoff, however, was equal to the emergency ; when
he found no more grain on the deserted Amur, he went
up the Sungari and commenced his depredations on that
river. His boldness was so great that he penetrated into
the heart of Manchuria as far as the town of Ningut.
Then he descended the Amur and wintered at its mouth,
building the ostrog of Kosogorski on the Amgun.

His recklessness cost him his life and ruined the Rus-
sian power on the Amur. If the Cossacks had settled and
cultivated the land after their success at Kumarska, they
would probably have been left alone, as the Chinese had
very little interest in the Amur, and were averse to wasting
lives to drive out the formidable strangers. But they
could not tolerate the filibustering raids in the province

K 2

132 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

of Manchuria, the home of the dynasty which had lately
ascended the dragon throne of China. They were now
convinced that there was no limit to the rapacity of the
Cossacks, and determined to exterminate them.^

Stepanoff continued his daring raids up the Sungari
every spring, but the Chinese collected a large army at its
mouth and concealed a fleet of forty-seven large boats
among the islands. When the Cossack boats came down
on June 30, 1658, the Chinese fleet suddenly appeared and
surrounded them. The Kussians, thus caught in a trap,
lost heart and fled, and their chief, who had not the skill
of Khabaroff to extricate himself, perished with about 270
of his men. Only about 200 succeeded in escaping. This
disaster, the heaviest sustained by the Russians in Siberia,
ruined their domination on the Amur ; it destroyed their
reputation for invincibility which hitherto had enabled
their scanty forces to struggle against such overwhelming
numbers.

In the same year Albazin, the ostrog founded by
Khabaroff in 1651, and which had been besieged since
1657, was abandoned by the Cossacks on account of want
of provisions, and burnt by the Chinese.^ The Amur was
thus entirely freed from the Cossacks — but it did not
long remain so.

In 1638 Nikiphor Eomanoff Tchernigofski, a Polish
prisoner, had been deported to Siberia and sent to the
Yenisseisk ostrog, and thence transferred to the Ilimsk
ostrog. In 1650 he was put in charge of the Tchetchuiski
portage, which, as we have seen, served for the com-

' Besides Stepanoff there was also a band of about 300 cut-throats
under Sorokin, who, after robbing the Kussian settlers and merchants on the
Lena, spread desolation on the Amur.

- This siege is given on the authority of Atkinson, who must be correct,
because from other sources it is known that Albazin was founded in 1651
and rebuilt in 1665.

THE STRUGGLE FOB THE AMUB 133

mumcations between the Yenissei and the Lena, and in
1652 he was appointed overseer for a salt boilery at Ust-
Kutskoe. In 1665 he formed part of a convoy which
Obukhoff, the voivode of Ihmsk, led to the Kirensk fair,
and, on the return voyage, he prevailed on the men
to mutiny and murder the voivode} To avoid punish-
ment, Tchernigofski incited the accomplices of his crime
to follow him and settle on the Amur : he reached Albazin
with eighty-four men and built an ostrog on the site of
the former one burnt by the Chinese in 1658. The origin
of this second settlement at Albazin was therefore similar
to that of the Zaporoghians on the Dnieper two centuries
before — it was a refuge for outlaws. It is probable that,
even after the defeat of Stepanoff, Russian trappers and
traders continued to roam on the Amur ; all these adven-
turers now congregated at Albazin, which became in a
short time a considerable place. In 1674 it had already
a government office, a guard-house, and barracks. Before
this date, in 1669, Tchernigofski, perceiving the impossi-
bility of holding his ground without assistance, had asked
the protection of the voivode of Nertchinsk, and prof-
fered his submission to the Tsar. The offer was graciously
accepted, as, owing to the scarcity of population, the Bus-
sian authorities, in Siberia at that time could not be par-
ticular about the quality of the settlers, and a commander
was appointed in Albazin. In 1672 the sentence of death on
Tchernigofski and his companions was remitted, and they
received a reward of 2,000 roubles for their meritorious
work on the Amur.

Tchernigofski decided to restore the work of Khabaroff
and Stepanoff, and undertook the task with great energy.

' The anonymous author often quoted states that the voivode had
taken a fancy to the wife of Tchernigofski, who in revenge committed the
crime. This version explains the event and corresponds to the state of
lawless violence then prevalent in the outlying districts of Siberia.

134 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

From his headquarters at Albazin he despatched succes-
sive expeditions to rebuild the ruined ostrogs and collect
tribute from the natives. Manchuria itself was not spared
by his raids. The reconquest of the region proceeded so
quickly and thoroughly that in 1681 Tchernigofski had
surpassed his predecessors, having extended the Russian
power over the river Ussuri and part of the Sungari up to
the mountains.' 4^[ain Eussia had the chance of esta-
blishing her power on the Amur in the seventeenth century,
but again she let the precious opportunity slip away.
Instead of sending the requisite forces demanded by the
daring adventurers on the Amur, as well as by the voi-
vode of Yakutsk, the ministerial offices at Moscow
responded with insignificant measures ; they acted as they
had done with Khabaroff more than twenty years before,
and appointed a voivode — Alexis Tolbuzin. Though this
hero, who afterwards acquired everlasting fame in his
defence of Albazin, was a man far superior to Zinovieff,
he could not accomplish his arduous task with insufficient
forces. Yet there was no time for delay ; Kang-hsi, the
greatest of the emperors of the present Manchu dynasty,
and one of the most remarkable that ever sat on the
throne of China, incensed by the ravages of the Cossacks
and their audacious invasions of Manchuria, had summoned
Tolbuzin to evacuate Albazin and retire from the Amur.

As the summons of the Emperor received no answer,
the Chinese, in 1684, commenced their warlike operations
by destroying all the Eussian posts on the lower Amur,
reserving the attack on Albazin for the following year. In

' Eago^ says that, besides the fortress of Albazin, there were the
ostrogs of Kumarska, Zeiska, Kosogorska, and Atchansk on the Amur;
those of Ust-Oelinsk and Ust-Nimelensk on the Amgun (a tributary on the
left of the Amur near its mouth) ; that of Tugursk on the river Tugur (a
river flowing into the sea of Okhotsk). There were also villages along the
Amur, where peasants cultivated the land.

THE STRUGGLE FOB THE AMUR 135

the beginning ^ of June, 1685, a Chinese army of 15,000
men with 150 field and fifty siege guns appeared before
Albazin and established batteries on an island opposite
the town.

Tolbuzin had made the best preparations for defence ;
he had burned all the houses outside the fortifications and
withdrawn the inhabitants within the walls, sending to
Nertchinsk the non-combatants ; and though he was able
to collect only 450 men with three guns and 300 muskets,
he peremptorily rejected the summons to surrender.^
After the usual long preliminary cannonade, the Chinese
commenced ^ a series of assaults, which were bravely
repulsed by the small garrison. At last, however, want
of ammunition compelled Tolbuzin to capitulate on
honourable terms, the Cossacks being allowed to proceed
to Nertchinsk with their arms. The Chinese, after burning
Albazin, retired to Aigun, a town which they had lately
built near the mouth of the Zeya, to counteract the in-
fluence of the Russian fortress.

Albazin, like the much-quoted phoenix, had the faculty
•of rising from its ashes. Tolbuzin was determined to
make another attempt to hold the Amur, and as soon as
he ascertained from his scouts that the Chinese had left,
he returned with reinforcements, and on August 7, 1685,'*
began reconstructing the fort. The approach of winter
gave him leisure to finish his fortifications before another
attack was possible. Other posts were established and
tribute collected from the natives as before.

' Atkinson gives the 4th, Ragosa June 10.

'^ This was written in Polish, probably by some Polish prisoner who
had fallen into the hands of the Chinese and was used as an interpreter.

' On June 22, according to Atkinson.

■* This date is given by Atkinson. Ragosa places the return in 1686, but
this does not give sufficient time for the events following ; so I think Atkin-
son must be right. Perhaps the difference is due to the Russian calendar
of the time.

136 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

The Chinese, alarmed at the pertinacious reappearance
of the Kussians, despatched an army of 5,000 foot and
3,000 horse with forty guns to besiege Albazin. The
Chinese advanced in June 1686,^ and commenced the
attack on July 2. Tolbuzin, profiting by his experience
of the former siege, had collected a larger garrison, but
still he had only about 800 men - with eight brass guns.
The Cossacks made a gallant defence against the superior
numbers of the Chinese, harassing them by continual
sorties, but in one of these they had the misfortune to lose
their heroic voivode, who was killed by a cannon-ball.
The command then devolved on Athanasius Beiton,^ who
proved himself a worthy successor of Tolbuzin ; he de-
fended the place so vigorously that the Chinese were
obliged to retire, and the approach of winter suspended
all nailitary operations.

In the following spring the Chinese renewed their
attacks, but Beiton, with bulldog tenacity, continued to
hold out, notwithstanding the dwindling numbers of the
defenders. The long siege, the losses by the enemy, a
fearful outbreak of scurvy, diminished the small garrison
daily, sometimes hourly. The Cossacks were reduced to
sixty-six men, and their provisions and ammunition were
almost exhausted, but Beiton continued the desperate
resistance until the Chinese retired. The peace negotia-
tions between the Governments of Russia and China then
put an end to the warlike operations.

' Eagosa gives a year later, 1G87, as he gives a year later for the return
of the Cossacks to Albazin ; but Atkinson's date (1686) is also given by
Andrievitch.

- Eagosa gives 736, Andrievitch 826.

^ Atkinson says he was an Englishman — Beaton — but I do not know
what authority he had for his statement. The anonymous author says he
was a German, a term which then in Siberia might be loosely applied to
any foreigner. His name, Athanasius, does not sound English. At all
events, he was a man worth claiming by any nation. A Cossack station
38^ versts beneath Albazin now bears his name.

THE STRUGGLE FOB THE AMUR 137

By the treaty of Nertchinsk, concluded in the follow-
ing year (1689), Eussia relinquished all claims to the
Amur, and Albazin was again destroyed by the Chinese,
who then confidently imagined it would never rise again.
In fact, more than 150 years passed before the pertinacity
of the Eussians restored the town so heroically defended
hy their ancestors.

The events which took place on the Amur, so abruptly
closed by the treaty of Nertchinsk, are interesting when
considered as the prologue of the historical drama enacted
in our times. They form also a brilliant though detached
episode of Siberian history ; nowhere else do we find such
a rapid series of remarkable men. With the exception of
Yermak, no man rises into prominence ; the conquest of
Siberia was the work of numerous nameless pioneers,
all gifted with the common qualities of endurance and
fearlessness, but deprived either of the opportunity or of
the qualities to excel as leaders. Dejneff was only a
daring and successful navigator. On the Amur we find,
besides the striking figures of Khabaroff, Tolbuzin, and
Beiton, also Poyarkoff, Stepanoff, and Tchernigofski, all
conspicuous for their ability. Yet in the region where
the Cossacks had the most brilliant chiefs they failed,
were obliged to relinquish their conquests, and had to halt
for nearly two centuries before resuming their advance.

This failure was mainly due to the power of China.
In Northern Siberia the Cossacks met natives armed only
with bows and spears, who could not withstand the few
bold pioneers provided with firearms. In the south, on
the other hand, they found the Chinese as well armed as
themselves, and though the firearms were perhaps not
handled so skilfully, this deficiency was compensated by
overwhelming numbers. The Eussians were also unfortu-
nate in encountering the Chinese at a time when they

138 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

were far more warlike than they have ever been since.
The Manchus had lately conquered China, and the hardy
virtues acquired in their native mountains had infused a
short-lived vigour into the old empire. The liberal-minded
favour shown to the Jesuits also gave the Emperors of
the Manchu dynasty all the resources of the science of
Western Europe. We shall see later what important
assistance China received from her Jesuit proteges in her
relations with Russia.

The Cossacks on the Amur were also very disad-
vantageously situated in their struggle against the
Chinese ; they were, to use a military expression, at a
great distance from their base. Setting aside the long
laborious route chosen by Poyarkoff, which was quickly
abandoned, even the shorter one employed by Khabaroflf
on the Olekma was full of difficulties, especially proceeding
from Yakutsk to the Amur, when the greater part of the
journey had to be performed by tracking the boats against
the stream. The Chinese, on the contrary, had Manchuria
and a settled population reaching almost to the banks
of the Amur, with two easy routes down the Sungari and
the Ussuri. The discovery of the third and natural route
along the course of the Amur itself, starting from the
Baikal, did not profit the Russians much, because Trans-
baikalia, the proper base of operations, was a newly con-
quered region, containing a scanty reserve of soldiers and
settlers from M^hich no reinforcements could be drawn.
This third route was also discovered late, when the
Chinese had already been alarmed by the attacks of several
expeditions. The Russians at that time were so few and
so scattered all over Siberia that the real base for any
considerable operation was at an enormous distance : it
lay in European Russia.

Now while the Cossacks on the Amur were confronted

THE STRUGGLE FOB THE AMUR 139

with a power formidable to their small numbers, they
were unable to arouse the home authorities to provide the
forces indispensable for success. In Moscow they con-
tinued the traditions of Ivan the Terrible ; they were
glad to receive valuable furs, and willing to send small
parties of soldiers to collect tribute and voivodes to
govern, but they were adverse to despatch large military
expeditions. The indifference at Moscow rendered hope-
less the task of struggling against China on the Amur.

As the struggle proceeded the action of the central
authorities grew more mischievous ; not content with
neglecting the gallant adventurers bravely resisting at
Albazin, they interfered, and by the treaty of Nertchinsk
gave China all she demanded and recalled the heroic
garrison which had victoriously sustained the long siege.

140 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

\y

CHAPTER IV

THE HALT IN THE FAR EAST

It has been shown that while in the north of Siberia the
conquest of the Cossacks followed its natural course and
proceeded until it reached the ocean limits of the con-
tinent, it was abruptly and permanently stopped in the
south, on the Amur, by the action of the Government.
Before describing the negotiations which led to this result
it will be necessary to cast a hasty glance at the history
of Russia in the intervening period of over a century. It
has been consistent with clearness to abandon the chrono-
logical order of narration, because the contemporaneous
events in European Russia had slight influence on the
eastern expansion in Siberia ; but now that we have
arrived at the time when, by the treaty of Nertchinsk,
the Government of Moscow exercised direct and im-
portant influence on the destinies of Siberia, and by its
action stopped for a long period the process of expansion,
we have the opportunity for a retrospective survey of the
history of the mother-country.

The brief sketch of Russian history was broken off
when Yermak had already commenced the conquest of
Siberia, at the death of Ivan the Terrible in 1584^ The
dreaded Tsar, who had ruled with an iron hand, might
well have adopted the phrase attributed to Louis XIV.,
' Apres moi le deluge,' for the disasters which followed his
death are unparalleled in Russian history. The country

THE HALT IN THE FAB EAST 141

sank to the lowest point of degradation, and almost fell
to pieces by the giving way of all social organisation.

As Ivan the Terrible had murdered his eldest son
Ivan, the throne devolved on Theodore, who was young
and feeble-minded. A kind of regency therefore became
indispensable, and this led to trouble and intrigues
among the rival nobles competing for the supreme
influence in the government of the State. The principal
families in Moscow were the Mstislav, the Shuiski, and
the Eomanoff. The latter had given a wife to Ivan the
Terrible, the mother of Theodore. Boris Godunoff, the
brother-in-law of Theodore, was also a candidate for the
regency. Even the accession to the throne of the new
Tsar was not effected without some trouble, caused by
the partisans of a younger brother, Demetrius. They
wished to secure an appanage to the young prince, but
their object was defeated and Demetrius relegated with
his mother and relations to the town of Uglitch. The
unfortunate child is only famous on account of the
impostors who assumed his name.

The first to undertake the direction of the State and
the guidance of the weak Tsar was his uncle, Nikita
Romanoff; but he died in 1586, and then Boris Godunoff
took his place. He encountered strong opposition from
the Shuiski family, but succeeded in thwarting their
intrigues. He showed great administrative ability, and,
besides favouring intercourse with Western nations, he
effected several important changes : the institution of
serfdom ' and the creation of a Patriarch in lieu of the
Metropolitan of Moscow. The latter measure gave the
Eussian equal rank with the other Eastern Churches.

' The peasants were permanently bound to the soil to prevent their
leaving the service of poor landlords in favour of rich ones — a practice
which, owing to the scanty population of the country, caused extensive
regions to be left uncultivated.

142 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

Unfortunately a mysterious crime attributed to him
by the suspicions of his contemporaries has obscured his
fame in the eyes of posterity. In May 1591 the news
spread over Russia that Demetrius, the young brother of
the Tsar, had been assassinated by men sent by Godunoff.
Commissioners, among whom was the head of the Shuiski
family, were despatched to investigate the case, and they
reported that the young prince had killed himself in a fit
of epilepsy ; but this explanation did not satisfy the
people, who adhered to their suspicions. The murder
had the most disastrous consequences for Eussia, because
the Tsar Theodore was childless, and when he died, in
1598, the long line of Euric, w4iich had ruled the nation
for over seven centuries, came to an end.

The successor to the throne was chosen by the prin-
cipal boyars and churchmen. But Godunoff had been
practically the Tsar for twelve years ; his enemies had
been banished and his friends raised to high places ; the
Patriarch himself, the most important person in Eussia
after the Tsar, was his staunch supporter. Thus every
measure had been taken betimes to secure the coming
election. The vacant throne was therefore offered to
Godunoff, who, after declining, was forced to accept. As
titular Tsar Godunoff displayed the same qualities as
when he exercised the supreme power in the name of his
brother-in-law. He continued to cultivate relations with
"Western powers, and favoured foreigners residing in
Eussia ; he paid great attention to the education of the
nation, and sent young men abroad to study ; in fact, he
commenced the reforms which were carried out a century
later by Peter the Great. But he lacked the essential
quality for a man living in those troubled times who
wished to found a dynasty — he had no military talents.
Through indecision he neglected the opportunity of

TEE HALT IN THE FAB EAST 143

securing the Baltic coast lands for Russia when the war
between Sweden and Poland freed him from the menace
of these two formidable neighbours and rendered his
alliance, or even his neutrality, of such value that he
might have dictated his own terms. He was also
addicted to petty suspicion, and on the throne could not
forget the enmity of his rivals. A persecution of the
principal noble families commenced, and all the Ro-
manoffs were included in the list of proscription ; the
eldest, Theodore, son of Nikita Romanoff, was tonsured
and confined in a monastery under the name of Philarete,
his wife was obliged to become a nun, and all the
brothers were exiled to different towns. These unpopular
measures were followed by famine and pestilence, which
increased the general discontent and converted the
starving peasantry into bands of robbers, who even
infested the neighbourhood of Moscow.

At this critical moment there appeared on the stage
of history an extraordinary figure. George Otrepieff, the
son of a soldier, to escape poverty had become a monk ;
being clever and able to write, he was chosen as copyist
for the Patriarch ; but his reckless words that he would
be Tsar in Moscow were repeated to Godunoff, who
ordered he should be transferred to a distant monastery.
But Otrepieff fled to the Polish frontier, discarded his
monk's frock, and, after frequenting a school at Gashtch
and living among the Zaporoghian Cossacks, entered the
service of a Polish nobleman. At a favourable moment
he declared he was Demetrius, the son of Ivan the
Terrible, who had escaped from his murderers. This
extraordinary news rapidly spread among the neighbour-
ing gentry, and was generally believed. One nobleman,
Mnishek, especially patronised the false Demetrius, and
promised him his daughter in marriage. As a preliminary

144 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

step lie was secretly admitted into the Catholic Church,
and then, in 1604, Mnishek introduced the young prince
to the Papal Nuncio, who presented him to the King of
Poland. Sigismund was very desirous of aiding the young
pretender and thus weakening Moscow by civil war, but he
feared to break the truce concluded with Godunoff. He
contrived to satisfy his political jealousy without a
flagrant infraction of the law of nations by prompting
his nobles to secretly support the Russian exile.

Mnishek furnished his future son-in-law, the young
pretender to the throne of Moscow, with 1,600 adven-
turers gathered from the rabble of all Poland, and this
small force was quickly reinforced. The experience of
all countries in the dark ages has shown that the ignorant
multitude has ever refused to believe in the violent ex-
tinction of dynasties which, from their long duration,
seemed immortal as compared with the brief span of the
individual life. The followers of Perkin Warbeck, and the
lingering hope of the Portuguese that their last King
Sebastian had not perished in Africa, are conspicuous
instances. It was natural therefore that many Russians
should hastily acknowledge the runaway monk as the
descendant of the line of Ruric. Moreover, the bor-
derland between the two great Slav States of Poland
and Moscow was full of desperate adventurers and of
Zaporoghian Cossacks, who were ready to embark in any
enterprise which promised the plunder of the wealthy
settled regions. The qualities of Godunoff were also
injurious to him at such a moment. His attempts to
spread order and civilisation over the country had dis-
pleased the wild roving inhabitants of the steppes, and
the Don Cossacks declared for the false Demetrius. As
Godunoff had no military capacity, he had to trust to his
voivodes, and, though they won some victories, the im-

THE HALT IN THE FAB EAST 145

postor was able to repair his losses by the arrival of fresh
adventurers. While struggling against these difficulties,
Boris Godunoff died suddenly in a somewhat strange way
on April 13, 1605.

The throne devolved to Theodore, the son of Godunoff,
but he was soon abandoned even by the most strenuous
supporters of his father. A revolt broke out in Moscow,
and on June 20, 1605, the false Demetrius entered the
capital with great pomp. The head of the Shuiski family
made an attempt to persuade the people that Demetrius
was an impostor, but he was discovered and punished.
The Patriarch also was degraded for his opposition.
Demetrius, to remove all doubts, had an interview with
his alleged mother, and then was crowned with the usual
solemnity. To gain favour, he appointed the head of the
Romanoff family, Philarete, as Metropolitan of Eostof.
His reign, however, was brief and ended tragically.
Though he showed considerable ability, he was beset with
insurmountable difficulties. The assistance received from
the Poles bound him to a nation hated by the Russians,
and his marriage with the daughter of Mnishek increased
his unpopularity. The powerful Shuiski family was
actively intriguing, and at last, on May 17, 1606, roused
the people against the hateful heretic. Demetrius tried
to escape, but was killed, and his corpse exposed on the
famous Red Square outside the Kremlin.

The death of the impostor left the throne again
vacant, and on May 19, two days after the revolt, the
people of Moscow again assembled in the Red Square to
elect a Tsar. The choice naturally fell on Vassil, the
head of the Shuiski family, who had principally contri-
buted to the fall of the false Demetrius.

The new Tsar soon became unpopular. The sudden
elevation to the throne of a nobleman, however distin-

L

146 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

guished, naturally caused jealousy and discontent among
his former peers ; moreover, the election of the sovereign
was found wanting in necessary completeness. It had
been hurriedly effected by the people of Moscow without
consulting the other towns and awaiting the arrival of
their delegates for a representative election by the whole
nation. Vassil had not even the qualities to captivate
the multitude and make them forget the haste and irre-
gularity of his election. He was old and avaricious, and
soon disgusted his adherents in Moscow. He was
endured because there was no other available candidate
for the throne. But this immunity from competition was
of short duration. The attachment of the people to the
line of Ruric, which had ruled from time immemorial,
and the success of the false Demetrius encouraged the
appearance of fresh impostors. A pretended son of
Theodore,^ Peter, was supported by the Cossacks of the
Terek. A follower of the false Demetrius, who had
escaped from Moscow during the massacre, fled to the
Lithuanian frontier and spread the report that he was
Demetrius, who had falsely been reported killed at
Moscow. In those times of confusion he readily found
credence, and soon gathered followers among the tur-
bulent border population.

The appearance of the second false Demetrius alarmed
Vassil, who ordered the corpse of the true Demetrius to
be conveyed to Moscow and buried with great pomp in
the Archangel Cathedral, glorifying the innocent youth
cruelly assassinated. But as Vassil Shuiski had been in
the committee which had declared that Demetrius had
killed himself in a fit of epilepsy, this public recantation

' Theodore had only a daughter who died before him, but it was
alleged she had been substituted by Boris Godunoff in lieu of the boy
Peter.

THE HALT IN THE FAB EAST 147

of his former assertion rendered him still more con-
temptible in the eyes of the people. Bands of adventurers
began to rove about the country, arousing the serfs against
their masters and threatening even Moscow. Though
they were defeated, the confusion they spread favoured
the cause of the second false Demetrius,^ who was now
supported by the Zaporoghian and Don Cossacks. Ap-
proaching Moscow, he established himself at Tushina
(1608), and, though often defeated, he was able to repair
his losses and increase his power. To strengthen his
position he seized the person of Philarete, the head of the
Romanoff family, and wished to appoint him Patriarch.
For a time the whole country was divided into two
factions with their respective capitals at Moscow and
Tushina, with separate tsars, courts, and armies ; unscru-
pulous adventurers passed from one party to the other
whenever it seemed suitable for their unlawful interests.

The horrors of civil war were heightened by foreign
intervention. Polish soldiers of fortune and desperadoes
having powerfully assisted the false Demetrius, this served
as a pretext for Vassil to secure the aid of an army from
Sweden, the jealous enemy of Poland, A body of 5,000
Swedes, led by Prince Skopin-Shuiski, nephew of the
Tsar Vassil, a young nobleman of eminent qualities, com-
pletely defeated the partisans of the false Demetrius in
Northern Russia. This assistance, furnished by Sweden
in exchange for an alliance, awakened the suspicions of
Sigismund, King of Poland, who hitherto had refrained
from overtly assisting the false Demetrius. He now
perceived the necessity of promptly intervening in the
affairs of Russia, to prevent the formation of the powerful
coalition of his northern and eastern neighbours. He

' There were many more obscure impostors who pretended to be sons
and grandsons of Ivan the Terrible.

I- 2

148 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

hastily gathered a small army and advanced to Smolensk
(September 21, 1609), which he vainly summoned to sur-
render. The advance of King Sigismund brought on a
crisis in Russian affairs : the Poles at Tushina, w^ho
formed the backbone of the army of the false Demetrius,
were obliged to abandon him and join their sovereign who
was besieging Smolensk ; this desertion broke the power
of the impostor, who was obliged to abandon Tushina.
On the other hand Vassil became jealous of the glory and
popularity of his nephew, Skopin-Shuiski, and as the
youth died strangely after a short illness, the people
suspected foul play and hated still more their imbecile
Tsar. A defeat of the Russian army by King Sigismund
completed the misfortunes of Vassil, who was forced to
abdicate on July 17, 1610.

The vacant throne was claimed by two candidates :
Ladislaus, the son of the King of Poland, and the second
false Demetrius ; the majority of the Russian nobles and
boyars would have preferred to elect one of their own
class, either Prince Galytzyn or young Michael Romanoff,
the son of the Metropolitan Philarete, but they had not
the power to follow their ovni wishes against such for-
midable adversaries supported by the Polish army and
the rabble enlisted by the impostor. Their greatest
danger was from the false Demetrius, whose wild army of
Cossacks and lawless adventurers threatened to destroy all
order in the country ; and when they ascertained that the
impostor was preparing to secretly enter Moscow, favoured
by the lowest class of the people. Prince Mstislav, the
foremost boyar, invited the Poles to occupy the capital.

The Poles, now in possession of Moscow, skilfully
used their advantage ; some of the foremost Russians
were gained over to their cause by promises of rank and
power in the new reign ; influential men like the Metro-

THE HALT IN THE FAB EAST 149

politan Philarete were sent under pretext of an embassy
to the King of Poland and kept in honourable confinement,
which was indefinitely prolonged owing to the compli-
cated negotiations proceeding between the Russian nation
and the proposed new sovereign. The position of the
Poles at Moscow was difficult, as they were few and
generally disliked by the people, who justly considered
them as invaders ; they tried to legitimise their position
by urgently requesting their king to send his son Ladis-
laus to occupy the throne, but Sigismmid did not care to
risk the youthful prince in the capital of such a disordered
country. He expressed the intention of pacifying the
country first ; but this was repugnant even to the Russians
who favoured the candidature of his son Ladislaus ; they
feared the annexation of their country by Poland, unless
the two thrones were separated at once. But the greatest
difficulty was the theological difference of faith ; all the
Russians, as first condition, insisted on the conversion of
Ladislaus to the orthodox faith, while Sigismund was
equally inflexible in refusing the abjuration of his son.
The Poles at Moscow artfully contrived to postpone the
difficulty by delaying the communication of these irre-
concilable decisions, but they were tacitly understood by
both parties.

While these negotiations were proceeding, the diffi-
culties of the Poles were increased by the death of the
false Demetrius. The dangers threatened by that impostor
and his lawless army had alone reconciled the respectable
classes of Russia to the candidature of Ladislaus ; but when
death removed the cause of their fears, their invincible
repugnance to the heretic and the foreigner appeared in
full force. This general feeling of the population was
excited by the Patriarch Hermogen, who strenuously
insisted that Ladislaus should at once abjure his heresies

150 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

and adopt the orthodox faith. To stop his seditious
propaganda, the Poles put him in prison, where he even-
tually perished from neglect and want of food. A revolt
broke out in Moscow ; the Poles were driven into the
Kremlin and obliged to set fire to the town to keep back
the infuriated populace. Their situation was improved
only for a short time by this severe measure ; an army
of 100,000 men, composed of Cossacks and contin-
gents from the different towns, concentrated around the
Kremlin and reduced the scanty Polish garrison to great
straits for want of provisions. But Eussia had fallen into
such chaotic social disorganisation that all united action
was impossible until the stern experience of fresh disasters
should again show its necessity. The armed citizens and
Cossacks had little mutual sympathy and were suspicious
of each other ; the Poles artfully availed themselves of
this latent motive of discord. They forged a letter of the
commander of the citizen force, containing secret instruc-
tions for the Russian towns to kill all the Cossacks they
might lay their hands on. The letter was given to a
Cossack prisoner released for the purpose, who delivered
it to his chiefs. The infuriated Cossacks refused to
believe the denials of the supposed traitor and hacked him
to death with their sabres.

This hasty murder broke up the Russian army and
relieved the Poles from the dangerous siege ; the armed
citizens, disorganised by the loss of their general, were
either massacred or disbanded and retired to their towns,
while the Cossacks spread about the country, pillaging
the towns and villages. During this confusion the
Swedes, exasperated that a prince of the hostile Polish
nation had been invited to occupy the throne of Moscow,
advanced in the north-west and seized Novgorod. Another
false Demetrius also made his appearance. Though the

THE HALT IN THE FAB EAST 151

Cossacks continued to war with the Poles around Moscow,
no hope of national salvation could be based on these
lawless adventurers. In this, the most critical period of
Russian history, the nation was saved by the action of the
clergy and of a few heroic individuals.

The Patriarch had been imprisoned by the Poles, but
the celebrated Troitski Monastery at Serghievo, which
had served as a refuge for the poor and the homeless
during the long troubles, now became the centre of the
national aspiration to drive out the foreigner and re-esta-
blish the power of Moscow ; letters were sent all over the
country inciting the people to defend their faith and their
country. When this patriotic missive was read to the
people in the cathedral of Nijni Novgorod, a butcher,
Minin, addressed his fellow-townsmen, exhorting them to
sell their houses and pledge their families to obtain money
for the holy war. The proposal was readily accepted, and
when the people urged the necessity of an experienced
commander, Minin suggested Prince Pojarski, who had
been wounded in the battles aromid Moscow. The
veteran accepted the command, and chose the patriotic
butcher as his treasurer to collect the funds for the
campaign.

These two men, fit representatives of the nobility and
the people in the unanimous national struggle, diligently
set to work to accomplish their difficult task. The early
part of the year 1612 was taken up in collecting recruits
and destroying the roving bands of Cossacks which kept
the country in disorder. In August Pojarski approached
Moscow, where the Poles had received reinforcements.
At first the Cossacks refused to co-operate, but they
yielded to the entreaties of a monk of the Troitski
Monastery, and the Poles were defeated by the miited
Russian forces. A portion then retired to Poland, while

152 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

the remaining garrison in the Kremlin was reduced by
famine and obliged to surrender (November 27), and
release the captive Russians, among vs^hom was young
Michael Romanoff. King Sigismund made an attempt to
reconquer Moscow, but his insufficient forces were unable
to advance, and he was forced to relinquish his purpose.

The failure of the union of the two great Slav states
of Poland and Russia was mainly due to religious causes,
and they appear very clearly in the action of the Troitski
Monastery and in the energetic words of Minin. The
conversion to the Greek faith by the Byzantine missio-
naries bore its fruits after 600 years, creating an impassable
barrier betw^een the two nations. From a Panslavistic
point of view and in the narrow field of European history,
this failure was regrettable, but it probably furthered the
Asiatic mission of Russia. A premature union with
Poland would have permanently engaged Russia in Euro-
pean politics, and drained her strength in struggles
against the more powerful civilised nations of the West';
remaining free, she has quietly expanded eastwards, while
only desultorily engaged in the affairs of Europe.

After the expulsion of the Poles from Moscow it was
decided, by the prompt election of a Tsar, to prevent the
recurrence of foreign invasion and internal disorders. To
avoid the irregularity and unpopularity of the preceding
hasty elections, representatives from the clergy, towns,
and principal classes of the population were invited to
Moscow. It was decided to exclude all foreign candidates,
and though this at first roused innumerable private ambi-
tions, and created factions, at last all the votes gathered
around one name, which was also shouted by the people
assembled in the famous Red Square at Moscow — the
name of Romanoff. The violence of their ambition had
deprived the other great families of their popularity and

THE HALT IN THE FAB EAST 153

chances to the throne : Godunoff and Shuiski had failed,
while Philarete, the head of the Romanoffs, had been
gradually advanced in the Church to the rank of Metro-
politan by his successful rivals. The Romanoffs now
obtained the throne due to their rank, and which they
had not inordinately coveted, and on February 21, 1613,
Michael, the young son of Philarete, was elected Tsar.

To justly appreciate the debt Russia owes to the
Romanoff family, it is necessary to compare her present
prominent position in the world with her desolate con-
dition less than three centuries ago when the dynasty
ascended the throne. The Swedes were at Novgorod, the
Poles at Smolensk, Moscow had been burnt and only just
recovered from the enemy, Cossacks and marauders
ravaged the country ; the father of the Tsar, the Metro-
politan Philarete, was still at the court of King Sigismund,
whither he had been sent to persuade the Polish monarch
to bestow his son Ladislaus as Tsar to the Russian nation.
When, on March 11, 1613, the envoys from Moscow pro-
ceeded to offer the crown to Michael Romanoff, they
found him in a monastery at Kostroma living with his
mother, who had been compelled to become a nun when
her husband was tonsured. Michael, who was then only
sixteen, declined the offer, and was supported by his
mother,' who strongly exposed the weakness of the royal
authority and the dangers attending such a young
sovereign. The envoys overcame these objections only

' She said to the envoys : ' My son is not of age, and the people of the
Muscovite empire were cravens to the former sovereigns — Tsar Boris
(Godunoff), the false Demetrius, and Vassil Shuiski. They swore allegiance
and afterwards became traitors ; besides the Muscovite empire is entirely
ruined, the treasures of the former Tsars are gone, the domains lost, the
soldiers reduced to poverty, and how can the future Tsar pay his army,
maintain his court, and resist his enemies ? Moreover, the Metropolitan
Philarete is a prisoner of the Polish king, who, when he hears of the elec-
tion of the son, will wreak revenge on the father.'

154 BUS SI A ON THE PACIFIC

by the reflection that their persistent refusal would make
the Komanoffs responsible to God for the final ruin of the
Muscovite empire.

The youthful Romanoff received the blessing of his
mother and accepted the throne. The coronation took
place on Jul}^ 11, 1613, without the usual largesses to the
people, as there was no money in the treasury even to pay
the soldiers. The new Tsar was reduced to such straits
in the first years of his reign that in 1617 he borrowed
7,000 roubles from the Shah of Persia, Abbas the
Great. The Cossacks continued to revolt and had to be
subdued ; the Poles did not relinquish their pretensions
to the throne of Moscow, and war continued until
December 1, 1618, when the truce of Deulina was con-
cluded, and the Metropolitan Philarete returned to Russia.
From this moment the state of the country began to
improve. Philarete was appointed Patriarch and asso-
ciated in the government, all public acts running in the
names of both father and son. Philarete, who was a
wise experienced man, removed the favourites who had
usurped the authority of his young weak-minded son,
and by cultivating friendly relations with Sweden,
England, and Holland, favoured commerce and increased
the political influence of Russia.

When the King of Poland concluded the truce of
Deulina, he did not officially renounce his pretensions to
the throne of Russia, and the question was prudently left
in abeyance by the negotiators. This latent claim gave
rise to much petty annoyance and offence, as the Polish
frontier authorities not only refused to give Michael
Romanoff his proper imperial title, but even wrote his
name with contemptuous brevity, which roused the wrath
of the Muscovites, who then were very punctilious about
official etiquette. When Sigismund, King of Poland, died,

THE HALT IN THE FAB EAST 155

the Kussians, who had been watching for a favourable
opportunity, commenced war in the confused interregnum
which always preceded the election of a new Polish king.
At first the Eussians carried everything before them ; but
when, after eight months, Ladislaus succeeded in obtaining
his father's throne, he quickly altered the fortunes of war.
He marched to the relief of Smolensk, and, by intercept-
ing the retreat of the Muscovite besiegers, compelled them
to submit to an ignominious capitulation. The unsuc-
cessful siege of Bieloi and the advance of a Turkish army
towards their frontier disposed the Poles to peace. It
was concluded at Polianofka (May 17, 1634) ; and though
the Eussians had to give up some towns they had secured
by the truce of Deulina, and to pay 20,000 roubles, they
obtained from Ladislaus a renunciation of his claims, and
recognition of Michael Eomanoff as Tsar of Moscow.

The Cossacks living on the banks of the great rivers
of Southern Eussia never relaxed their efforts to cripple
the power of the Turks. Their frontier raids and piratical
attacks on Turkish ships in the Black Sea often brought
Poland and Eussia into difficulties with the Sultan, the
Zaporoghians on the Dnieper being considered subjects of
Poland and the Don Cossacks of Moscow. In the summer
of 1634 the Don Cossacks stormed the fortress of Azof,
and, besides destroying all the Mahometans, killed the
ambassador of the Sultan, then on his way to Moscow.
This violation of the law of nations involved Eussia in
great trouble, her frontier being ravaged by the Khan of
Crimea by order of the Sultan. The Turks made great
efforts to retake Azof, sending an army of 200,000 men,
in the year 1641 ; but the Cossacks resisted heroically,
repelling twenty-four assaults and obliging the enemy to
raise the siege. The Osmanlis, however, were too power-
ful at that time for Moscow, and Tsar Michael ordered

156 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

the Cossacks to abandon Azof. The definite conquest of
this important town was not achieved even by Peter the
Great, and was reserved for the second half of the follow-
ing century.

Michael Komanoff died on July 12, 1645, and was
succeeded by his son Alexis, who, like his father, in spite
of frequent wars, strove continually to improve the internal
conditions of the country. The most important event of
his reign was the protracted insurrection of Little Eussia.
Poland, as we have seen, by the union with Lithuania,
had incorporated many provinces originally Kussian, and
among the rest the ancient home of the race — Little
Eussia. Difference of religion rendered the Polish domi-
nation irksome, and at times even tyrannical ; while, on
the other hand, the insubordinate nature and violent
habits of the Cossacks, who formed a large part of the
population, rendered them disposed to rise against the
infidel foreigner. In 1647, Khmelnitzki, a Cossack captain
grievously injured by a Polish noble, having failed to
obtain redress from Ladislaus,^ fled to the Zaporoghians,
and then to Crimea. From these crowded haunts of
adventurers he collected a large army and returned to
Little Eussia. The defeat of the two Polish commanders
roused the suppressed hatred of the Eussian peasants, who
everywhere attacked their Polish masters and destroyed
their castles. The revolt spread all over the Ukraine, and
King Ladislaus dying about the same time, Poland was
reduced to great straits. During the usual confused inter-
regnum that followed, Khmelnitzki advanced into Poland
itself, levying contributions from towns in Galicia. The
election of John Casimir, brother of Ladislaus, restored

' The answer of the Polish king shows his appreciation of the lawless
state of the Ukraine — the wild border country on the frontiers of Eussia,
Poland, and Turkey : ' You are warriors and wear sabres — prevent any one
disturbing you.'

THE HALT IN THE FAB EAST 157

the authority of the monarchy, and Khmelnitzki was
summoned to return into the Ukraine and await the
arrival of peace envoys. But hostile operations soon re-
commenced, and the King of Poland was surrounded by a
joint force of Cossack and Crimean Tartars, and reduced
to a desperate state. John Casimir succeeded in detaching
the Khan of Crimea by a large bribe and the promise of a
yearly tribute, and then Khmelnitzki was also obliged to
come to terms. He was granted a semi-independent
position, with a registered force of 40,000 Cossacks. The
royal army was forbidden to enter Cossack territory,
where also no Jews or Jesuits were allowed to reside.

These favourable terms, so humiliating to the proud
Polish nobility, were still insufficient for the Cossacks,
now accustomed to the freedom and plunder of a successful
war. After much squabbling about mutual non-fulfilment
of the conditions of the treaty, a second revolt broke out,
and Khmelnitzki again advanced with the Khan of
Crimea, who once more abandoned the Cossacks at the
critical moment. This defection caused a disastrous rout,
and led to a new treaty with the Poles, much less favour-
able to the Cossacks, whose registered army was reduced
to 20,000 men.

The harder terms imposed by the Poles rendered the
Little Kussians still more averse to the foreign yoke,
while experience had now taught them twice that they
were not strong enough to shake it off single-handed.
They naturally looked for assistance eastwards, where
men of their race had founded an orthodox state which
had absorbed all Great Kussia. In 1653 negotiations
commenced, and in the beginning of 1654 the Little
Russians transferred their allegiance to Moscow on con-
dition of preserving all their ancient rights, of keeping an
army of 60,000 men, and of being allowed to elect their

158 BUS SI A ON THE PACIFIC

Hetman, who could even receive embassies from all
foreign countries except Poland and Turkey.

To support the Little Russians operating on the south-
west, Alexis advanced against Poland from the east, while
Sweden, seizing the favourable opportunity, attacked on
the north. All these three invasions were successful, and
Poland seemed threatened with destruction, when she was
saved by dissension among her enemies. Sweden having
tried to forestall Russia in her conquests, and having even
attempted to intrigue with the Little Russians, Alexis was
obliged to stop the war with Poland, and commenced a
war with Sweden in 1656, which lasted until 1658.
Poland, freed from the joint invasions of her enemies,
gradually succeeded in recovering almost all her lost
territory, while in Little Russia jealousy and quarrels
among the Cossack chiefs, especially after the death of
Khmelnitzki, weakened the national cause. Russia re-
commenced the war with Poland, but not with the same
success, and in 1667 a treaty of peace was concluded -at
Andrusof. Though Alexis was obliged to renounce his
claims to that part of Little Russia which lies on the right
bank of the Dnieper, he acquired all the part on the left,
and, by this first successful step, showed his successors the
way to gradually reconquer the old country on the west.

At this important epoch in Russian history, when the
first serious attempt at expansion on the west commenced,
it will be interesting to glance at the contemporaneous
events in the Far East. Khabaroff started on his first
expedition to the Amur in 1649, when the first revolt in
the Ukraine was at its highest ; his first report of 1650,
asking for 6,000 men to accomplish the conquest of the
Amur, must have reached Moscow some time before
Russia decided to interfere in favour of the Little Russians
and wage war with Poland. The destruction of Stepanoff

THE HALT IN THE FAB EAST 159

and his force, which ended the first Eussian occupation of
the Amur, took place in 1658, when a truce had just been
conckided with Sweden and the second war with Poland
was raging.

Alexis employed the rest of his reign in settling-
internal religious questions. His death in 1676 left the
throne to three young sons ; the eldest, Theodore, was
very sickly and reigned only six years ; his death in 1682,
without children, left the succession to the two young
princes, John and Peter. The former was also very sickly,
and the people, discouraged by the prospect of a rapid
succession of weak sovereigns, clamoured to have Peter
elected as Tsar, and though the younger he was consecrated
by the Patriarch. This election was displeasing to his
step-sister, Sophia, an energetic woman, who intrigued in
favour of her own brother, John, and by means of a
mutiny of the strielets she achieved her purpose — the
maternal relations and partisans of Peter being either
murdered or exiled. Then the two princes were elected
joint sovereigns, and the real authority entrusted to Sophia
as regent, jit was after this period of palace intrigues and
crimes, after a disastrous expedition against the Crimean
Tartars, that the Government of Moscow undertook to
interfere directly in the affairs of furthest Siberia and
settle the Amur question with the Emperor of China.

The Siberian frontier authorities had entered into
diplomatic relations with China some time before. In
1667 a Tunguse chieftain, Gantimur, subject to China, had
emigrated and settled with his followers on Eussian terri-
tory. As the Chinese authorities made persistent de-
mands to have the exile delivered into their hands, the
voivode of Nertchinsk, Arshinski, had sent to Peking in
1670 a Cossack embassy. The instructions given to these
rude envoys treated the ' Son of Heaven ' in a very

160 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

cavalier fashion, for he was to be invited to submit under
the lofty hand of his Majesty the Tsar. If this frank
proposal could have been communicated to the conceited
Mandarins, it v^^ould have startled their quiet assumption
of universal superiority.

The trouble caused by Tchemigofski, v^hen he rebuilt
Albazin, urged the authorities of Moscow to send an
embassy, and in 1675 Spaphari was instructed to proceed
to Peking and, besides other matters, to obtain free trade
between the two countries. The Chinese answer was
limited to three points : the delivery of Gantimur, the
despatch of another envoy to settle their demands, and the
inquiry whether the frontier Russians would live peace-
fully. The embassy was very long on its journey, as it
left Moscow on February 25, 1675, reached Peking on
May 15, 1676, and only returned on January 5, 1678.

The attacks of the Chinese on the Eussian posts on
the Amur alarmed the Government in Moscow, and the
Tsars, John and Peter, sent two messengers, Veniuko;ff
and Tkavoroff, to announce in Peking the early arrival of
a special ambassador, Golovin, with powers to settle all
frontier questions. They reached Peking on October 31,
1686, and left on November 14, with two despatches from
the Chinese Emperor stating his grievances : the free-
booting expeditions from Albazin, and the non-delivery of
Gantimur. The Emperor declared that all offensive
operations of the Chinese armies would be stopped pending
the result of the negotiations with the coming pleni-
potentiary, Golovin.

The despatch of the two messengers had been decided
in view of the urgent military requirements on the Amur,
and in anticipation of the length of time required by
a numerous mission to traverse the enormous distance
between Moscow and Peking. The plenipotentiary.

THE HALT IN THE FAB EAST 161

Oolovin, besides a becoming suite, was accompanied by a
body of over 500 Moscow strielitz, which was to be
reinforced by 1,400 soldiers drawn from different Siberian
towns. This large force was intended to impress the
Chinese with an idea of the military power of Kussia and
to guard against surprises, but, as we shall see, it was
insufficient.

The slow advance of this mission through the waste
plains of Siberia, separated by vast distances from its
points of departure and arrival, with intermittent instruc-
tions from the home Government, and scanty information
from the seat of the war which it was sent to terminate,
is very curious and throws much light on the treaty which
followed.

The embassy left Moscow on January 26, 1686, and by
September 28 it had only reached the Kybenski ostrog
near the mouth of the upper Tunguska or Angara, where
a halt had to be made for the winter. Here couriers
brought the news of the end of the siege of Albazin and
the withdrawal of the garrison to Nertchinsk.^ On
May 15, 1687, the advance was resumed by boats on the
Angara to the Bratski ostrog, which was reached in July,
and where news was received of the repulse of the Chinese
at Albazin with a loss of 1,500 men.^ In September 1687
Golovin reached the ostrog of Verkhne-Udinsk in Trans-
baikaha, and received new instructions from Moscow
ordering him to require :

1. The frontier between the two empires to be the
river Amur, or, in an extreme case, the river Zeya.

2. If it proved impossible to obtain the above frontier,
to require permission to carry on trade in those regions.

3. If consent were refused to the above, to insist that

' This must have been the first siege of 1685.

- This must have referred to the beginning of the second siege of 1686.

M

162 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

the settlement of the business should be deferred to an-
other time.

On October 25 Golovin left Verkhne-Udinsk, and
approached the Chinese frontier, stopping at Selenghinsk,
where he despatched a messenger to Peking. In the first
act of his mission he unfortunately committed a mistake,
which, readily seized upon by the Chinese, became irre-
parable, and bore its consequences up to the end of the nego-
tiations. Besides informing the Chinese of his arrival, he
proposed to treat about the selection of a place for the
conference of the plenipotentiaries. The messenger
returned in June 1688 with a despatch, choosing Selen-
ghinsk for the seat of the conference ; the negotiators were
to be guarded by a force of 500 men.

In July 1688 an official arrived from Moscow with the
following fresh instructions :

1. To proceed at once to Albazin with great haste.

2. On arrival at that place, to interview the Chinese
envoys, and to treat about the frontier, as instructed before.

3. If, by the persistent demands about the frontier and
the freedom to trade on the Amur, it were impossible to
agree, to renounce the claim of the Russians to free trade
on the Amur.

4. If the Chinese envoys had already left for China, to
write about the above to China.

5. To ask Kutukhtu to mediate and stop the trouble
with the Chinese in the Daurian land.

When Golovin received these instructions he had
returned to Verkhne-Udinsk, where he was met by a
Chinese colonel, Kuluphunzillu, with a despatch from
the Chinese plenipotentiaries, informing him that they
had been prevented from advancing through Mongolia on
account of an outbreak of hostilities between Kalmucks
and Mongols. They proposed, as autumn was already

THE HALT IN THE FAB EAST 163

near, to postpone their meeting to next summer. It was
now the opportunity as well as the duty of Golovin to
appoint Albazin as the future seat of the conference, but
he contented himself with again leaving to the Chinese
the choice of the place, and frittered away precious time
by employing his armed escort in petty border warfare
with the nomads. It is impossible to justify his inactivity
and flagrant disobedience of the categorical orders from
Moscow to proceed to Albazin.

Golovin, in January 1689, sent a messenger to Peking
with a draft of a proposed frontier, but he only received
the answer that the Bogdoi Khan had chosen Nertchinsk
for the seat of the conference of the plenipotentiaries, who
were to be guarded by an escort of 1,000 men. Golovin
now hastened towards Nertchinsk, but on the way received
the disagreeable news that the Chinese envoys had already
reached the town on July 21, and that, under pretext of
conveying their provisions, a large army ' had also arrived,
and had encamped in close vicinity to the town. Golovin
now tardily recognised his fatal mistake in leaving the
choice of place to the Chinese, and neglecting to proceed
to Albazin. Instead of meeting the Chinese at that out-
post, under the walls of the fortress which had just
repulsed their attacks, he allowed them, under pretence of
negotiations, to advance without opposition into the heart
of the Russian territory, and encamp within sight of the
provincial capital at Nertchinsk. The result of the
negotiations was now clearly foreshadowed, especially as
the Chinese plenipotentiaries had been instructed by the
Emperor K'ang-hsi : ' In case of necessity, to corroborate
their demands with arms, and to skilfully avail themselves
of a suitable opportunity.'

The Chinese possessed, besides their military, also a
' Ten thousand men, according to Kagosa.

M 2

164 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

diplomatic superiority. Golovin, a man of weak will and
"understanding, was ignorant of the comitry with which
he was treating, while the Chinese were assisted by
two Jesuits, who, by their education in Europe and
by the information derived from Polish prisoners and
deserters on the Amur, must have had a clear knowledge
of the condition of Eussia. Another advantage was also
scored in the choice of the language for the negotiations —
the Latin. Though Golovin knew that tongue, and one
of his suite is stated to have been a fluent speaker, they
were probably far inferior to the Jesuits.

In the first sitting Golovin proposed as frontier the
river Amur — the left bank to belong to Muscovy, and the
right to China. The Chinese plenipotentiaries, on the
other hand, proposed Lake Baikal or, according to a
Chinese author,^ even the river Lena, which they stated
had belonged to Genghiz Khan. In the following sitting
the Chinese consented to extend the frontier as far as
Nertchinsk ; but when they found Golovin bent on exact-
ing fresh concessions, they remembered the instructions of
their sovereign, and threatened a siege, commencing to
surround the town with their troops. Golovin was also
privately informed by the Jesuits that the Emperor K'ang-
hsi would never consent to relinquish the Amur, as he
drew a rich tribute of furs from that region. At the same
time news arrived that a body of nearly 3,000 Buriats,
lately tributary to Russia, had deserted to the Chinese.
In this critical situation Golovin had no choice but to
accept the terms of the Chinese, and on August 27, 1689,
the treaty of Nertchinsk was signed, which fixed as the
frontier of the two empires the river Gorbitza, the line of
mountains bounding on the north the basin of the Amur
up to the river Uda, and the river Argun. After the sig-
' Quoted by the anonymous author of the History of the Amur River.

THE HALT IN THE FAB EAST 165

nature of the treaty Golovin issued orders to Beiton and
the heroic garrison of Albazin to evacuate the place and
abandon the Amur.

The events that compelled Golovin to yield could not
have happened if he had followed his instructions, and
chosen Albazin as the seat of the conference. The threats
of a siege could then have been treated in a derisory
manner, for where Beiton with a few hundred men had
resisted successfully, the Chinese could not have enter-
tained hopes when the garrison had been reinforced by
the 2,000 men escorting Golovin. Even the desertion of
the Buriats was probably caused by the advance of the
Chinese army to Nertchinsk, which appeared as a military
success to the tribesmen ignorant of the diplomatic
incompetence of Golovin.

The treaty was inglorious and disadvantageous for
Eussia, as she not only gave up her best seaboard on the
Pacific and the course of the Amur, indispensable for the
development of the lands around the Baikal, but she
abruptly stopped the eastern expansion, which had been
going on steadily for two hundred years since she threw
off the Tartar yoke. Russia weakly renounced the his-
toric mission which had led her race for centuries from
the banks of the Danube to found successively Little
Kussia on the Dnieper, Great Eussia on the upper waters
of the Volga and Don, and lately the Cossack settlements
on the great rivers of Siberia up to the shores of the
Pacific.

The treaty of Nertchinsk is remarkable as being the
first concluded by China with a Western Power, and it is
also the most glorious. In her successive relations with
other nations, China has been obliged constantly to sub-
mit to disadvantageous conditions and suffer loss. Nert-
chinsk and Shimonoseki are the extreme terms of the

166 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

series marking the gradual decline of the empire in the
last two centuries.

A little over two weeks after the signature of the treaty
of Nertchinsk, on September 12, 1689, Peter the Great
assumed the government of the State, and his sister, the
self-constituted regent Sophia, was relegated to a monas-
tery. The chi^f amusement of the young Tsar had been
boating on Lake Pereyaslav, the only navigation he could
enjoy in his dominions. By the loss of the Amur and the
territory around its mouth, Russia was deprived of access
to an ice-free sea. Though the empire at that time was
relatively not much inferior to its present extension, it only
faced the sea on the Arctic Ocean and the Northern
Pacific. The huge continental area, similar to the
dominions of Genghiz Khan before his successors con-
quered China, was entirely deprived of outlets on the sea.
The boyish enthusiasm of Peter the Great for shipping and
navigation expressed the unconscious want of the whole
nation. The pastimes of the boy prepared the work of
the man, and the whole reign was employed in obtaining
access to the neighbouring seas. J The first campaign, the
conquest of Azof, secured an outlet on the Black Sea ;
and though this was lost at the end of the reign, in
consequence of the unsuccessful war with Turkey, Peter
the Great had in the meanwhile, by his persevering
struggle against Charles XII. in the great northern war,
secured permanent access to the Baltic. To bind irre-
vocably the nation to the new policy, and prevent any
relapse, he undertook the bold plan of transferring the
capital to the shores of the newly conquered sea, on the
Finnish frontier of Sweden. He thus also secured the
permanence of his social reforms : the transformation of
the half-Oriental state of Muscovy into the fully recognised
European empire of Russia. To use the picturesque

THE HALT IN THE FAB EAST 167

expression of Algarotti : ' he opened a window into
Europe.' ^ By directing the activity of the nation to the
sea and to commerce, and by establishing the capital at
St. Petersburg, he returned to the early times of the mon-
archy, to those of Kuric, when the political centre of
Russia was in the north, at the great commercial em-
porium of Novgorod. A man of extraordinary genius like
Peter the Great must be judged by his peers, and his work
is placed in its true light by Napoleon : ' People have not
rightly understood the true genius of Peter the Great.
They have not seen that he won for himself what is want-
ing to the greatest man born on a throne : the glory of
the self-made man, and the trials which that glory
requires.'

The work of Peter the Great was continued by his
successors, and under Catherine II. Russia obtained the
coast on the Black Sea with the Crimea (1783), and,
through the last partition of Poland (1795),. an extension
of the Baltic littoral. Thus, in little over a century
after the accession of Peter the Great, Russia had re-
covered possession of the sea-coast on the west and south.
The maritime programme of the great sovereign had been
carried out in Europe, and the time had come to resume
the natural eastward expansion of the empire. Tradition
avers that Peter the Great, in his unquestionable thirst for
the sea, had directed his attention also to the Pacific, and,
besides recognising the necessity of securing the mouths
of the Neva and Don, had intended to conquer the mouth
of the Amur ; but the great wars in Europe prevented the
execution of this vast plan. In the last year of his life he
is reported to have expressed the wish to go to Siberia,
and then further and further to the land of the Tunguses,

' ' Petersbouig est la fenetre par laquelle la Kussie regarcle en Europe .'
Algarotti quoted by Pushkin.

168 RUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

and to the Great Wall of China. ^ Catherine II., who had
carried out his views in Europe, also took up his plans in
the Far East, and sagaciously remarked : ' If the Amur
were useful only as a convenient way to supply our pos-
sessions in Kamchatka and on the sea of Okhotsk, its pos-
session would be important."^ But these plans received
no execution, and the action of the Russian Government
was confined to the conclusion of a series of conventions
regulating frontier questions and the overland trade through
Kiakhta.i7

The French Eevolution and the general war it pro-
duced in Europe diverted Russia from her true purpose.
Instead of profiting by the dissensions in the West to
prosecute her natural expansion in the East, she chose to
engage in the general crusade against France. The
transfer of the seat of government to St. Petersburg, the
long wars with Western neighbours, had permanently
fixed the attention of Russian statesmen on Europe, and
they had forgotten the old traditional policy of Moscow.
Napoleon, with the keen insight of genius, had seen that
the true mission of Russia lay in the East. He vainly
attempted to convince the Russians of the wrong course
they were pursuing. For a moment he hoped to succeed
by securing the friendship of the Emperor Paul, a man in
advance of his times, who had even studied the question
of the emancipation of the serfs ; but the prejudices con-
tracted during a century of interference m Western
politics, the blind adherence to views that had -become
obsolete when the plans of Peter the Great had been
carried out, proved too powerful to be controlled, and the
Tsar was assassinated.

' Quoted from Eagosa.
- Also from Eagosa.

^ Treaties of Buria and Kiakhta, 1727, 1728 ; supplementary articles in
1768 and International Act of 1792.

THE HALT IN THE FAB EAST 169

The new Tsar Alexander also for a time fell under the
fascination of Napoleon ; but he was young and vain-
glorious, and preferred to parade his handsome person over
the Continent as the saviour of Europe, and to earn the
barren glory of destroying the greatest man of the century.
He thus neglected the most favourable opportunity for the
permanent aggrandisement of his country. B}^ favouring
the realisation of Napoleon's dream of the reconstruction
of the empire of Charlemagne, he might not only have
secured then the present Asiatic expansion of Kussia, but
also the heritage of the Byzantines, and have extended his
empire to the shores of the Bosphorus. The Crimean
War, the indifference of Prussia, and the covert hostility
of Austria revealed half a century later the fatal mistake.'
Besides neglecting her true interests, Russia, by enga-
ging deeply in European politics, remained subject to the
influence of Western diplomacy : she bound herself to the
principle of statu quo so dear to Metternich and his
school, but unnatural and harmful to a young race irre-
sistibly impelled to expansion. This pernicious doctrine
corrupted the atmosphere of the Foreign Office, and
became a plausible pretext for senseless inactivity and
obstructiveness. While in this torpid state Russia was not
disposed to take much interest in her distant possessions
in Siberia, but a series of events gradually arose which
recalled her unwilling attention.

\ In consequence of a conspiracy at the accession of
Nicholas I. in 1825, many prominent members of the
Russian aristocracy were exiled to Siberia, and remained
there with their families until the death of the Tsar in
1855. The long residence of these intelligent, cultivated

' It is strange that Napoleon was destroyed by England and Russia,
the two great colonising powers, whose interests, lying outside Europe,
ought to have induced them to allow him a free hand on the Continent.

170 RUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

persons contributed to the development of the country by-
attracting the attention of the higher classes, while some
of the exiles and their children were of great service later
in the colonisation of the Amur. The gradually increas-
ing importance of the Eussian settlements in Kamchatka,
the fur trade of the Eussian-American Company in
Alaska, the frequent appearance of whalers in the seas of
Okhotsk and Behring, showed the necessity of finding a
short convenient line of communications with the eastern
extremity of the empire. Great labour had been spent in
inproving the only route to Kamchatka — that by land from
Yakutsk — but very little had been effected. The great
natural difficulties presented by the steep transverse
valleys leading down to the sea of Okhotsk had prevented
the construction of anything better than paths, only
accessible to pack-animals during a short period of the
year. Even these rude paths it had been impossible to
extend along the shore to Kamchatka, owing to the
mountains and extensive wastes and tundras. The road
being thus incomplete, the journey had to be prosecuted
by sea, and this gave a momentary importance to the
little town of Okhotsk, which was much frequented by
shipping, though inconveniently situated near the mouths
of shallow, difficult rivers.

The deplorable consequences of the treaty of
Nertchinsk, which had reduced the Pacific coast of Siberia
to the narrow strip of land confined between the Stanovoi
chain and the sea of Okhotsk, now began to be felt, when
the important settlements of Kamchatka were almost
completely cut off from the rest of the empire. After a
long interval of more than 150 years, the cession of the
Amur was clearly recognised as an irreparable loss for
Siberia, and Nicholas I. resumed the idea of its recovery
laid aside by Peter the Great and Catherine II. The

THE HALT IN THE FAB EAST 171

question was fraught with many difficulties. The geo-
graphy of the coast was httle known, even after the
explorations of La Perouse, Broughton, and Krusenstern.
The island of Saghalien was supposed to be joined to the
continent, precluding all access to the Amur from the
south, while the river itself was stated to be unfit for
navigation at the mouth. The Kussian Foreign Minister
at the time, Count Nesselrode, a humble and zealous fol-
lower of Metternich, either through indolence or ignorance,
was averse to all expansion in the Far East, consider-
ing Siberia as a land only useful for the banishment of
criminals, and fearing China as a formidable enemy. He
employed all his obstructive resources to dissuade the Tsar
from his purpose, but in vain. An expedition was fitted
out in 1846 to explore the mouth of the Amur. Lieutenant
Gavriloff was sent in command of the brig ' Grand Duke
Constantine ' with instructions to proceed in the strictest
incognito as a foreigner, because it was reported that
numbers of escaped convicts had settled around the mouth
of the Amur. Gavriloff reached the estuary, and in a boat
proceeded twelve miles up the river ; but, through want of
time and means, he soon returned, bringing back frag-
mentary and erroneous information. Count Nesselrode,
in his report to the Emperor about Gavriloff's expedition,
complacently wrote : ' The mouth of the river Amur has
been found inaccessible to sea-going vessels, as its depth
varies from one and a half to three feet, while Saghalien
is a peninsula : therefore the Amur has no importance for
Russia.'

"With these words the Minister for Foreign Affairs
confidently expected to bury the Amur question and to
comfortably enjoy his routine work undisturbed by
difficulties in distant unknown lands. But Tsar Nicholas
was gifted with an iron will which seldom relaxed its hold
from the plans it had once taken up. The superficial,

/

172 BUSSIA ON TEE PACIFIC

perfunctory nature of Gavriloff's explorations was so
apparent that it was insufficient for hastily deciding such
an important question : the report required to be supple-
mented and confirmed by fresh information. At the same
time, events in the Far East drew the attention of the
Russian Government in that quarter. For over a century
and a half, Eussia w^as the only European nation which
had concluded international engagements with China : she
had secured later even the official permission to trade
overland. Though the profits were not extraordinary and
were purchased at the cost of some humiliation, the
treaties constituted a monopoly which the imagination,
aided by distance, supposed might lead to great future
benefits. This privileged position of Eussia came to an
end when, by the first China war. Great Britain obtained
the opening of five ports and the legal right for her
merchants to trade. The activity of England in the
Pacific stimulated the Eussian Government to advance in
the north, especially as exaggerated suspicions circulated
about probable British conquests in the Far East. The
Eussians had always coveted, the Amur, and by a natural
aberration of judgment they supposed that others were
equally eager to acquire possession of the region ; they
were now in constant dread of being forestalled by
England, whose occupation of the mouth of the Amur
would destroy for ever the prospects of Siberia and per-
manently arrest the eastern expansion on the Pacific.

A series of circumstances were thus working together
about the middle of the present century to push Eussia
towards the Amur. A superior man was only wanted to
grasp the complicated factors of the situation and skil-
fully direct them to the accomplishment of the work of
Yermak, of that eastern expansion which had been sus-
pended for 160 years. Tsar Nicholas took care to find
the right man at the proper moment.

173

CHAPTEE V

THE ANNEXATION OF THE AMUR REGION

On September 6, 1847, Tsar Nicholas passed through
Tula in the night, and ordered the Governor, General
Muravioff, to meet him at the neighbouring station of
Sergiefska. In the interview, which took place at seven
o'clock in the morning, the Emperor informed the young
Governor that he had been appointed Governor-General
of Eastern Siberia. He must proceed quickly to St.
Petersburg to study the principal Siberian questions :
the development of the production of gold, the correction
of abuses, the Kiakhta trade relations with China and the
Amur region. Nicholas added that the last question
would be discussed more fully later.

The nomination of Muravioff, which had been known
a few days before, caused great sensation in Eussian
official circles. The new Governor-General was only
thirty-eight years of age, and had been raised to the
governorship of Tula the preceding year; his dis-
tinguished services in the Turkish war and in the
Caucasus were forgotten by his detractors. The choice
had been made by the Emperor himself, who appreciated
the administrative abilities of Muravioff, and wanted as
Governor-General of Eastern Siberia a firm, energetic
man. Muravioff, as we shall see, fully justified the
Emperor's expectations. Siberia never had a better
official ; his untiring energy and rapidity in the despatch

174 RUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

of business never slackened amid the torpid influences
by which he was surrounded. During his tenure of
office the principal questions affecting the region received
their solution, and his far-seeing intellect foresaw future
difficulties, and indicated the measures required for their
removal.

By the end of September Muravioff was already in
St. Petersburg, and with his usual alertness began study-
ing the questions relating to his new office. He at once
recognised that to secure the use of the water-way of the
Amur, indispensable for the future development of Eastern
Siberia, it was necessary to hold not only the sources of
the river, but also the territory adjacent to its mouth.
This object could only be effected by the co-operation of
the navy ; his own task being confined to strengthening
the position on the upper course of the river.

At the capital he became acquainted with Captain
Nevelskoy, who, at the end of 1847, had been appointed
commander of the brig ' Baikal,' destined for service on
the coasts of Kamchatka and in the Okhotsk sea, and was
awaiting the launch of his vessel then in construction at
Helsingfors. Muravioff expressed his opinion about the
necessity of a more thorough exploration of the mouth of
the Amur, and converted the enterprising naval officer to
his views. Nevelskoy became his zealous cooperator, and
contributed most effectively to the execution of his plans.
The territory to be governed by Muravioff stretched
IX from the Yenissei to Behring Straits. This enormous tract
of the continent had been deprived by the treaty of
Nertchinsk of the only easy means of communications
between its south-eastern and north-eastern extremities-
Transbaikalia and Kamchatka. Therefore, when Muravioff
was granted a farewell audience on January 8, 1848, Tsar
Nicholas remarked that probably he would be unable to

THE ANNEXATION OF THE AMUR BEGION 175

visit Kamchatka owing to the difficulties of the voyage
and the loss of time it entailed. To point out the distance
he added : ' Thus, if they take Kamchatka, you will only
know it half a year later.' The young Governor-General
modestly answered that he would try to visit the
peninsula. The promise was kept, and had important
results for Russia.

Muravioff left for his provincial capital, Irkutsk, at
the beginning of 1848 ; Nevelskoy sailed from Cronstadt
on August 21, 1848 ; their next meeting was at the other
end of the continent in the following year. Important
work was done by both during that interval.

Shortly after his arrival at Irkutsk, Muravioff was
asked by the Naval Ministry to give his opinion about a
new port which it was intended to establish in the bay
of Tugur at the southern extremity of the sea of Okhotsk.
This projected port, Constantinofsk, was to take the place
of Okhotsk, found to be unserviceable both on account
of being ice-bound the greater part of the year, and
surrounded by dangerous sand-banks. It was also pro-
posed to connect this new port by a land route with
Transbaikalia. Muravioff showed the impracticability of
the land route, and suggested that Nevelskoy should
explore the coast from Tugur bay to the mouth of the
Amur in search of a more suitable port. On January 20,
1849, the Tsar appointed a special committee to study
the Amur question, and on February 8 he confirmed its
proposal to send a maritime expedition to explore the
mouth of the river. Nevelskoy, who would reach Kam-
chatka in a few months, was appointed to command the
expedition, and Muravioff was ordered to communicate
to him these instructions. As the winter post from
Okhotsk to Petropavlofsk, the port of Kamchatka, had
already left (there was only one in the season), Muravioff

176 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

sent Staff-Captain Korsakoff to Okhotsk to wait for the
opening of that port, and bear the instructions to
Nevelskoy at Petropavlofsk. Korsakoff, however, was
detained by the ice in Okhotsk until June, when, know-
ing that Nevelskoy must have already left Petropavlofsk,
he sailed for the north coast of Saghalien, and cruised
about in the hopes of intercepting Nevelskoy and his
transport * Baikal.' The search was fruitless, and Korsakoff
was obliged to return to Ay an with the instructions
undelivered.

Muravioff, in over a year's residence at Irkutsk, had
acquired clearer views of the growing importance of the
Pacific Ocean, due to the naval activity of England.
Though at such a distance inland, by the decline of the
overland trade through Ejakhta, he was able to measure
the effects of the opening of China to maritime commerce.
He therefore hastened to fulfil his promise to the Tsar to
visit Kamchatka and its port, Petropavlofsk, the only
possible Russian naval base on the Eastern Ocean. No
governor-general had ever visited the distant peninsula, as
the voyage was long, difficult, and supposed to lead to no
useful results. Muravioff thought otherwise ; the frequent
visits of whalers on the coast had given the place a certain
commercial importance, and he foresaw that, in the event
of war, Russia must have a safe port on the Pacific.

Muravioff left Irkutsk on May 15, 1849, and reached
Okhotsk on June 25, whence he sailed on July 4, arriving
at Petropavlosk on July 25, after two months and ten
days. He was charmed at the sight of the bay of
Avacha, where Petropavlofsk is situated. This beautiful
bay, which is said ' to surpass in beauty and grandeur the
celebrated harbours of Rio Janeiro and Sydney, with its
numerous inlets protected on the north, west, and south
' Dr. Guillemard.

A

I

'V

THE ANNEXATION OF THE AMUB REGION 177

by high volcanic mountains, with depth of water sufficient
to allow vessels to unload on the quays, offered such
advantages that Muravioff decided to transfer from
Okhotsk the seat of the Eussian naval forces on the
Pacific. His enthusiasm is shown in his letters, where
he declares that among the many ports he had seen in
Europe and Eussia none was comparable to the bay
of Avacha.

He was there in the most favourable season, during
that short summer when, if the weather be fine, the
Siberian ports look so beautiful with their smiling sea,
that one readily overlooks the long winter months and
the frozen coast. Muravioff only a few weeks before had
personally verified the irreparable defects of Okhotsk, and
expressed his views by the forcible remark that he
wondered the place had not ceased to exist a century
before. At Petropavlofsk he fancied he had found the
suitable place for establishing Eussian naval power in
the Pacific, and he resolved it should be the principal
military port.

With his usual activity he projected a grand plan
of fortifications, defended by 300 heavy guns to render
the place impregnable to any attack from the sea. His
practical mind was not led away by the visions of the
future to overlook the modest possibilities of the present.
He personally inspected the defences of the place, and
found them to be of the most insignificant character ;
ten guns of small calibre, 200 Cossacks, and 500
sailors was the whole force ready to repel any sudden
attack from the sea. Muravioff at once indicated to
the commander of the garrison the best sites for the
batteries, which could be erected in a short time, and
pictured to himself so vividly the possible attacks of the
enemy and the contingencies of the defence that, on

N

178 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

choosing the site for battery No. 6 (called the lake
battery)/ he said: 'In case the enemy lands, when he
conies round Mount Nicholski you can welcome him
with grape-shot from this place.'

In his visit Muravioff received false impressions and
committed the mistake, perhaps the only noticeable one
in his life, of choosing Petropavlofsk as the future great
military port of Eussia on the Pacific. Time and the
opportunity to choose on the coast south of the Amur
showed the justness of the view of Nevelskoy, who
wished for a port in a lower latitude. But his diligent
observation and keen foresight saved Russia from a naval
disaster, and perhaps worse, during the military operations
on the Pacific in 1854.

Muravioff left Petropavlofsk on August 2, but instead
of returning to Okhotsk he proceeded to the north of the
island of Saghalien, hoping to find there Nevelskoy, who
had sailed from Petropavlofsk in that direction since
May 30. After a fruitless cruise he proceeded to the
island of Shantar, and thence to Ayan on August 22,
as he wished to inspect that port and the road connecting
it with the interior. No news was heard about Nevelskoy
in Ayan, and Karsakoff reported his unsuccessful attempt
to deliver the instructions. Serious apprehensions were
now entertained about the safety of the ' Baikal,' and it
was feared she had been lost either on the way from
Petropavlofsk or on the sand-banks reported to exist in
the estuary of the Amur. At last, on the morning of
September 3, the ' Baikal ' appeared in the bay of
Ayan. Muravioff could not restrain his impatience, and
went to meet the vessel in a boat ; he was hailed by
Nevelskoy through a speaking-trumpet with the follow-

' It played, as we shall see, an important part five years later, during the
attack of 1854.

THE ANNEXATION OF THE AMUR REGION 179

ing words : ' God has assisted us . . , the main question
is happily solved. . . . Saghalien is an island, and sea-
going ships can penetrate into the estuary of the Amur
both from north and south. An ancient error is com-
pletely dissipated. I now report to you that the truth
has been discovered.'

Nevelskoy had left Cronstadt on August 21, 1848, and
after a navigation of eight months and twenty-three days
he reached Petropavlofsk on May 12, 1849, three days
before Muravioff's departure from Irkutsk for Kamchatka.
He found no instructions, but only a letter from Mm^avioff
explaining the probable explorations to be undertaken
around the mouth of the Amur, and stating that official
instructions would follow quickly. Nevelskoy boldly de-
cided not to lose precious time, and to proceed on his own
responsibility. Having discharged all his stores by May 30,
he sailed for the north of Saghalien and thence towards
the Amur. After difficult navigation through shoals and
sand-banks, being often obliged to anchor and send boats
to sound for a navigable channel, he reached the gulf of
the Amur on June 28. Here the * Baikal ' anchored, and
boats were sent to explore the coasts of Saghalien and of
the continent ; the mouth of the Amur was discovered,
and the river navigated for some distance. Then Nevelskoy
decided to steer south, and continue his explorations
between the continent and Saghalien.

This island extends for nearly ten degrees of latitude
almost in a straight line along the meridian, forming with
the curve of the continent two gulfs connected by narrow
straits, where the Asiatic coast protrudes towards the
island. This channel is only about four miles broad, and
so difficult to discern by navigators coming from the
broader waters of the bell-mouthed gulfs on the north
and south, that all the maritime explorers who visited the

N 2

180 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

coast at the end of the last and beginning of the present
century — La Perouse, Broughton, Krusenstern — imagined
at this point a narrow isthmus separating the two gulfs
and connecting Saghalien with the continent. Nevelskoy,
steering south from the Amur, found instead of this
isthmus a channel with thirty-five feet of water, and
proceeding further south reached the parallel where
Broughton in the last century had terminated his
explorations, stopped by the imaginary isthmus. Having
thus connected the results of his explorations with those
of his predecessors, Nevelskoy recognised the insular posi-
tion of Saghalien and returned north with his boat to the
* Baikal,' which had remained at anchor during the
thirty days employed in making this important discovery.
He then proceeded, as we have seen, to Ay an to meet
Muravioff.

The geographical discoveries of Nevelskoy also brought
practical results. As long as Saghalien was considered
a peninsula, the Amur was accessible to sea-going vessels
only from the north through the sea of Okhotsk, where
the inclement winter keeps the coasts ice-bound for
many months ; the mouth of the Amur was therefore
almost in the same conditions as the other ports of that
sea, Okhotsk and Ayan. Now it was known that vessels
drawing fifteen feet of water could proceed from the
gulf of Tartary, where the sea is never frozen.

While Muravioff and Nevelskoy were undertaking
long laborious voyages and collecting valuable informa-
tion under the bureaucratic influence of Nesselrode and
his school, a fantastic expedition was being organised at
St. Petersburg. Some years before, in 1844-45, the
academician Middendorf had made a scientific voyage
on the Amur, and had seen in the country around the
river Uda four posts, which he imagined had been erected

THE ANNEXATION OF THE AMUR BEGION 181

by the Chinese to mark the frontier. These posts were
the subject of much discussion, as it was alleged they
did not correspond to the frontier fixed by the treaties.
On this vague information it was decided in St. Peters-
burg, towards the end of 1848, to send an expedition by
land to explore the whole frontier from the river Gorbitza
to the sea of Okhotsk, and to especially verify the frontier
posts between the river Uda and the sea. The matter
was kept secret from Muravioff, and in February 1849
the authorisation of the Tsar was obtained for the
despatch of this expedition. It was commanded by
Lieutenant-Colonel Akhte, who was stringently ordered
to avoid all collision with the Chinese and keep away
from the Amur.

When, therefore, Muravioff returned to Irkutsk on
November 20, 1849, he found Lieutenant-Colonel Akhte
preparing for his expedition. He tried to persuade him
to extend his explorations to the Amur and its estuary,
but Akhte declined to depart from his instructions. The
clear practical mind of Muravioff could not perceive the
object of seeking for a frontier where it had never been
marked by the treaties. This expedition was only the
commencement of a long series of difficulties put forward
by Nesselrode, and served as a pretext for a foolish des-
patch to the Chinese Government, which almost ruined
the able plans of Muravioff. As we shall see later, on
every occasion the occupation of the Amur was the
result of a struggle between Muravioff and Nesselrode,
rather than of negotiations between Kussia and China.
The worst enemies of Muravioff were not at Peking
but at St. Petersburg.

The active Governor-General of Eastern Siberia was
indefatigable in combating the opposition of his enemies
and in arousing the attention of the Kussian Government

182 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

to the importance of the Far East. He had also influential
friends in St. Petersburg — the Grand Duke Constantine
and Perofski, the Home Minister — and in his corre-
spondence with them he constantly pointed out the ques-
tions of the future. From Irkutsk, almost in the centre
of Asia, his thoughts were directed down the Amur to the
Pacific Ocean, which he perceived was destined to play a
great part in the coming history of the world. Besides
the immediate questions affecting Siberia, the growth of
English influence in China, and the consequent develop-
ment of maritime trade to the detriment of the overland
trade of Kiakhta, he considered the whole colonial ex-
pansion of Russia. He referred to the early Eussian
settlements on the Californian coast, and their abandon-
ment without any compensation.

By his perseverance he obtained the imperial approval
for two measures — the transfer of the military port from
Okhotsk to Petropavlofsk, with the creation of a Siberian
flotilla, and the establishment of winter quarters at a
place indicated by Nevelskoy in the gulf of Shtchastia to
the north of the Amur.

In obedience to the latter orders, Nevelskoy sailed
with the ' Baikal ' to the bay of Shtchastia and founded
the winter station of Petrofskoe ' on June 29, 1850. This
was the first Russian settlement near the mouth of the
Amur, and it was established with the goodwill and
satisfaction of the native Ghiliacks.^ The place was,
however, unfit for harbouring ships, because, like Okhotsk,
Ayan, and other ports of the sea of Okhotsk, it was ice-

' This place was afterwards abandoned, and no traces of its existence
are now visible (Ragosa).

- These poor savages received much bureaucratic attention at St.
Petersburg, a special Ghiliack committee being created in their honour.
Some years before, the academician, Middendorf, who was supposed to
know their language, was almost sent to them on a diplomatic mission.

THE ANNEXATION OF THE AMUB BEGION 183

bound until June. Nevelskoy therefore decided on a
bolder step than he had taken the preceding year, when
he had acted in advance of his instructions, exploring the
mouth of the Amur and the Saghalien coast. He now
acted without instructions, and on his own responsibility.
With a sloop, six armed sailors, and a one-pounder, he
proceeded up the forbidden Amur itself, and at twenty-
five versts from the mouth established a post, which, in
honour of the Emperor, he called Nikolaiefsk. Here, on
August 6, in presence of the Ghiliack natives, the Kussian
military flag was hoisted, and saluted by the one-pounder
and rifles of the small party. It was the beginning of the
occupation of the Amur, and Nevelskoy, leaving five
men to guard the first Kussian post on the long-coveted
river, hastened to report personally to Muravioff.

On his arrival at Irkutsk, Nevelskoy met Korsakoff,
who had just returned from Kamchatka, where he had
superintended the transfer of the military post from
Okhotsk. Both officers found instructions to follow
Muravioff, who had left for St. Petersburg.

Muravioff always preferred to meet his adversaries, as
he found their opposition most formidable when he was
4,000 miles away in the heart of Siberia. His arrival at
St. Petersburg in November 1850 was most opportune.
The creation of the post of Nikolaiefsk at the mouth of
the Amur was severely criticised by Nesselrode and his
party, who insisted that Nevelskoy should be severely
punished for his arbitrary conduct. The question of the
occupation of the mouth of the Amur was referred to the
Ghiliack committee. This had been carefully formed
with a strong majority of Nesselrode's partisans, who, it
was hoped, would overpower all the efforts of Muravioff.
also appointed on the committee. Nesselrode, who was
the president, strongly opposed the occupation of the

184 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

moutli of the Amur, and expressed the opinion that the bay
of Shtchastia was sufficient as long as the river itself was
free. He decided that all settlements among the Ghiliacks
were dangerous and premature, and that the solemn foun-
dation of Nikolaiefsk was sure to attract the attention of
the Chinese, and lead them to send a strong force. The
consequent destruction of the post, and insult to the
national flag, would diminish the prestige of Russia in the
eyes of the Ghiliacks. He advised an immediate with-
drawal, without awaiting the complaints of the Chinese,
thus avoiding 'extreme danger.' Muravioff strongly
opposed these views, but found little support among the
members of the committee, one of whom, Tchernysheff,
the Minister of War, went so far as to reproach him
with ' the desire of building for himself a monument.' ^

In the course of a few days the minutes of the dis-
cussion held by the committee were sent round for the"
signature of the members present. The messenger had
instructions from Nesselrode to tell Muravioff to sign the
minutes and return them at once. Muravioff's vigilance
rarely slumbered, and on carefully perusing the minutes
he found, at the end of Nesselrode's speech advocating the
retreat from the mouth of the Amur, and showing the
dangers of collision with the Manchus, the following
words : ' Governor-General Muravioff, present at the
meeting, agreed with these views.' Muravioff offered the
messenger a tumbler ^ of tea, and, while he was drinking,
wrote a few short but energetic phrases, expressing his
decided disagreement with the contents of the minutes.

The action of Muravioff caused much discontent, and
Tchernysheff expressed his displeasure to him ; but the

' These words had a prophetic meaning which escaped the narrow-
minded Minister (Life of Muravioff).

^ In Kussia tea is generally taken in tumblers, and very hot.

THE ANNEXATION OF THE AMUR BEGION 185

minutes with the important additions had to be pre-
sented to the Emperor Nicholas. Nessehode had hoped,
with his diplomatic ruse, to outwit Muravioff, whom he
probably considered an impetuous, hot-headed soldier ;
but the mean trick, having been coolly detected and
trenchantly exposed, produced an opposite effect. Nessel-
rode was removed from the presidency, which was given
to the Tsesarievitch (afterwards Emperor Alexander II.),
who, after an interview with Muravioff, convoked again,
on January 19, 1851, the Ghiliack committee. Not-
withstanding the renewed opposition of Nesselrode and his
party, the Emperor Nicholas, after reading the discussion,
ordered that the post of Nikolaief sk should be maintained,
and even guarded by a vessel during the summer months.
It was, however, to be considered as belonging to the
Russian-American Company. On this occasion the Tsar
pronounced the memorable words : ' "Where the Russian
flag has once been hoisted it must not be lowered,' which
are remembered and often quoted by the Russians on i/'
the Pacific to this day.

The Chinese Government was to be informed at the
same time that a post on the Amur had been established
by the Russian-American Company, and that a cruiser
was attached to prevent any encroachments of foreign
powers and warn their men-of-war that all such pro-
ceedings must be authorised by Russia and China.

Muravioff had won his first battle, and secured the
first footing on his beloved Amur. With his usual per-
severance he determined to push his success further, and
obtain the approval of another measure indispensable for
the execution of the plans he prepared for the future.
Being always possessed by the thought of the future
occupation of the Amur, whenever favourable opportunities
put an end to the wavering uncertainty of the Russian

186 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

Government, he perceived, like Khabaroff 200 years before,
that the enterprise could not be carried out w^ithout a large
military force. When he arrived in Siberia in 1848 he
was struck by the insufficiency of the forces at his
disposal. Over the immense territory of Eastern Siberia
there were only four battalions of the line, without any
field artillery. He now proposed a considerable increase
of the military forces in his province. He met, as he had
expected, the most determined opposition. Nesselrode
brought forth his usual bugbear of China, and represented
that any increase in the frontier army would alarm the
Chinese. There were also more serious objections, on
account of the state of Eussian finances, which then did
not allow any heavy charges for such an object. The
resourceful mind of Muravioff succeeded in overcoming
all these difficulties. He showed that the Chinese were
accustomed to the sight of Eussian officers and soldiers,
and paid no attention to their numbers ; that if Eussia
became stronger in the East she might even act as the
protector of China, ^ and he suggested an adroit plan by
which his forces would be greatly increased without
drawing soldiers from Europe.

His plan consisted in converting the peasants registered
at Nertchinsk into Cossacks. Those unfortmiate peasants
were subject to a kind of corvee for the working of the
mines at Nertchinsk. The work was very hard ; they
were insufficiently remunerated, especially as they had to
provide their own carts, wood, and coal ; moreover, they
had no means to free either themselves or their children
from this endless bondage. In this last respect they
were in far worse conditions than the convicts, whose
maximum period of work at the mines was for twenty-

' Muravioff may therefore be considered as the originator of the recent
Eussian policy in the Far East.

THE ANNEXATION OF THE AMUR BEGION 187

five years, after which term they and their descendants
were no longer Hable to be called. This unjust treatment
of the Nertchinsk peasants, which had no parallel in the
whole empire, Muravioff was determined to abolish,
though at the same time he intended that the reform
should further the accomplishment of the plans he secretly
cherished.

His scheme for the reorganisation of his army divided
it into the following divisions : —

1. All the frontier Cossacks.

2. The Cossack regiment of the Transbaikalian towns.

3. All the native regiments — Tunguses and Buriats.

4. All the village Cossacks of Transbaikalia.

5. All the peasants of the mines in the Nertchinsk
district.

The first four divisions, which already existed, were
to form the cavalry of his force ; the fifth, which consti-
tuted the projected increase, was to form the infantry.
Out of a population of 29,000 males he intended to form
twelve battalions (each 1,000 strong) of Cossack infantry.

The plan was so logical, removing a great injustice
while increasing the frontier forces, that on April 27, 1851,
Emperor Nicholas approved the conversion of the peasants
into Cossacks. Later, on June 27, orders to that effect
were issued, and the infantry battalions of the Trans-
baikalian army were created.

After nearly eight months' residence in St. Petersburg,
spent in assiduous work at the different Ministries to
obtain the full adoption of his measures, Muravioff returned
to Irkutsk on August 12, 1851. Shortly afterwards,
impelled by his constant desire of personal inspection, he
proceeded to Transbaikalia to watch the arrangements
for the conversion into Cossacks of the peasants registered
at Nertchinsk. He had thus the pleasure of verifying

188 BUS SI A ON THE PACIFIC

the beneficent effects of his reform, and of witnessing the
joy of the peasants at last freed from their ancient
bondage.

Nevelskoy, who had so narrowly escaped degradation
for his patriotic boldness, had returned to the Far East
before Muravioff, with instructions to organise another
expedition on the Amur. As soon as navigation was
opened, he started from Okhotsk with his now renowned
' Baikal,' and the Kussian-American Company's vessel,
' Shelekhof.' The latter leaked, and was only saved by
running on a sand-bank in sight of Petrofskoe, while the
* Baikal ' itself ran aground at the entrance of the bay.
These slight disasters entailed a considerable loss of time,
owing to the scanty crews at his disposal. Nevelskoy,
even when reinforced by the people on shore (there were
only three huts), and by the crew of the broken-down
transport, ' Okhotsk,' had only fifty men under his coni-
mand to unload the leaking vessel.

On August 5, 1851, Nevelskoy started with Lieutenant
Boshniack and twenty-five men, in boats, for the mouth of
the Amur. On August 9 he reached the post he had
established the preceding year, and proceeded to choose
the definite site for the town of Nikolaief sk. He appointed
Lieutenant Boshniack in command, and gave him twenty-
five men, including the original small garrison. The
Russians had much difficulty in obtaining provisions,
being obliged to apply to the neighbouring Ghiliacks.
They, however, lost no time in preparing for the long
severe winter, and built the national bath-house, which
is such an indispensable part of the Russian village.

The appearance of the Russians at the mouth of the
Amur, and their activity during the last two years, had
not roused the suspicion of either the Chinese or the
natives, and the nice distinction drav^m between the

THE ANNEXATION OF THE AMUR REGION 189

Russian-American Company and the Government by the
committee at St. Petersburg when it authorised the esta-
blishment of Nikolaiefsk had entirely escaped their notice.
Friendly relations with the Chinese rather increased during
the period.

The rigorous winter in the desolate, sparsely inhabited
region did not prevent the Russians from continuing their
explorations, and emulating the exploits of their ancestors
on the Arctic Ocean two centuries before. In February
1852 Nevelskoy despatched by sledge Lieutenant Bosh-
niack with a Ghiliack guide to explore Saghalien, ordering
him to cross the island, as reports affirmed the existence
of a good haven on the eastern coast of the sea of
Okhotsk. Boshniack proceeded to Cape Lazareff,' and
crossed the gulf of Tartary at its narrowest point. ^
Despite the exhaustion of his dogs and the scarcity of
provisions, he traversed the island, meeting the river
Tymi, which he explored down to its mouth. Suffering
from ulcers in the legs, cold, and frost-bitten, with the
dogs unable to run through want of food, the return
voyage was most trying. Some fish, purchased from a
Ghiliack, enabled him to reach Nikolaiefsk on April 3,
1852. Shortly after his return, on April 18, 1852, Nevel-
skoy sent an expedition up the Amur, which explored the
river for some months.

From the information obtained by these expeditions
on the coasts of the gulf of Tartary, and on the Amur,
Nevelskoy reported the necessity of occupying the bay of
De Castries, and of establishing a post on Lake Kizi.
The Amur, in its great sweep to the north, when it

' When Nevelskoy discovered the insular character of Saghalien, he
named the opposite capes, at the narrowest point, Lazareff and Muravioff.

■^ As we have seen here, the sea is only seven versts, or a little over
four miles, broad, so that the channel long remained undetected, and was
considered a bay limited by an isthmus.

190 RUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

passes the 51st parallel, begins to approach the shores of
the gulf of Tartary, which also curve inwards about the
same point. The proximity to the sea, maintained for
the remainder of its course up to its mouth, is increased
about 51° 30' N. lat. by the fact that an eastern branch
of the river forms a spacious lake (Lake Kizi), which
extends almost to the shores of the gulf of Tartary. A
narrow mountain-chain alone separates the waters of the
lake from those of the gulf.^ At this point the gulf of
Tartary forms the bay of De Castries, five miles broad, with
an area of over twenty square miles. Its peculiar situation,
close to the Lake Kizi, which communicates with the
Amur, and forms part of that river system, gives the bay
great importance ; in fact, it may be considered as con-
stituting strategically a second mouth of the Amur.
Nevelskoy at once recognised, when these facts had been
reported by the different expeditions, that an enemy in
possession of the bay of De Castries could command the
whole lower course of the Amur. To forestall this
danger he proposed that this important point should be
immediately occupied by Eussia.

Nevelskoy feared his proposal would meet with oppo-
sition and procrastination at St. Petersburg, and as he
had acted successfully on his own responsibility already on
two occasions, he determined to follow the same course.
In the summer of 1852 he therefore intrusted Lieutenant
Boshniack to build winter quarters at De Castries. This
was promptly done, and Boshniack, having wintered in
the important bay, on March 4 of the following year,
1853, established there the post of Alexandrofsk. On
the same day an employe of the Eussian-American Com-
pany founded the post of Mariinsk, near Lake Kizi, thus

' It has even been proposed, by cutting the mountains or piercing a
tunnel, to give the river a nearer access to the sea.

THE ANNEXATION OF THE AMUR BEGION 191

completing the occupation of the important natm^al line
of communications between the Amur and the gulf of
Tartary.

Boshniack continued his explorations of the coast, and,
starting on May 2 with only three men in a Ghiliack
boat, steered southwards until on May 23, in 49° N.
lat., he discovered a fine bay, which he named Emperor
Nicholas I. bay, in honour of the Tsar, and which now is
more briefly designated as Imperatorski bay. Eecognising
the importance of this fine harbour, situated on the south
route to the Corean frontier, he explored all the inlets and
gave them names. From the natives he collected infor-
mation about another large bay, twelve days to the south,
with sheltered harbours at the entrance, and another bay
still further south ; they also added that a large river in
the vicinity led up to the watershed of the Ussuri. All
this probably referred to the gulf of Peter the Great near
Vladivostok, but Boshniack could not verify the reports of
the natives, being obliged, from scarcity of provisions, to
return to De Castries, whence he reported all his dis-
coveries to Nevelskoy.

Shortly after the return of this expedition, on July 12,
1853, the ' Baikal ' from Ayan arrived at Petrofskoe,
bringing despatches from Muravioff, informing Nevelskoy
that the Emperor had sanctioned the occupation of De
Castries, Kizi, and the island of Saghalien. The first
part of these instructions had already been carried out ;
it was therefore only necessary to attend to Saghalien.

The annexation of this island was necessary for the
defence of the mouth of the Amur, as its possession by a
European nation would have exposed to attack the
passages both from the north through the sea of
Okhotsk, and from the south through the gulf of
Tartary. The Kussian-American Company was appointed

192 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

to effect the occupation, receiving for the purpose an
adequate sum from the Government. Nevelskoy was
ordered to survey the coast, and choose convenient places
for occupation.

Nevelskoy, from Petrofskoe, sailed for the northern
extremity of Saghalien, coasted the whole eastern side of
the island, and then, having reached its southern ex-
tremity, passed through the straits of La Perouse. He
again sailed northwards into the gulf of Tartary, along
the western coast of Saghalien, and found a suitable
place at the mouth of the river Kusunai, where the
island shrinks to its narrowest point. Here, on July 21,
he established the post of Ilinsk with a garrison of six
men. Crossing over to the opposite shores of the gulf of
Tartary, he visited the places on the mainland lately
occupied by Boshniack. At Imperatorski bay he founded
the post of Constantinofsk, and hoisted the Russian mili-
tary flag on August 1. Sailing northwards, he reached
De Castries on August 5, founded the post of Alexandrofsk,
and also hoisted the military flag. The same formal
occupation was carried out at Mariinsk on August 7.

These occupations were a consequence of the explora-
tions which had revealed to the Russians the importance
of the coast south of the mouth of the Amur. We have
already seen that the lower course of this river, when it
turns northwards, runs almost parallel to the sea. This
peculiar configuration of the country, bounded on the
west by the river and on the east by the sea, is continued
southwards by the course of the Ussuri. This important
aflluent of the Amur flows almost due north, also parallel
to the sea, cutting off a broad band of territory, which is
also bounded on the west by Lake Khanka and the river
Sui-phun further south. This territory, which now forms
part of the maritime province, was thus early recognised

THE ANNEXATION OF THE AMUR REGION 193

as indispensable for securing the free navigation of the
Amur, the simple possession of the left bank being justly
considered insufficient for the purpose.

Muravioff, with his usual vigilance, carefully followed
all these movements, and provided for future contin-
gencies. When Nevelskoy returned to Petrofskoe, after
having again passed through the straits of La Perouse
and circumnavigated Saghalien, there awaited him orders
to proceed in the ' Baikal ' to Ayan and thence to Petro-
pavlofsk to load provisions for De Castries, as in the spring
of the following year, 1854, a body of 250 men would be sent
down the Amur to guard the places occupied on the coast.
The transport ' Irtysh ' also took cargo at Ayan for the
bay of Aniva at the southern extremity of Saghalien.
Major Busse, specially sent by Muravioff, after loading
provisions at Petropavlofsk and Ayan in the Russian-
American Company's ship ' Nikolai,' proceeded also to
the bay of Aniva, landed with eighty men, and built the
post of Muravioffsk.

The winter sorely tried the scattered Eussian vessels
and expeditions. The transports ' Nikolai ' and ' Irtysh '
were obliged to seek refuge at the newly founded post of
Constantinofsk in Imperatorski bay. Sub-lieutenant
Orloff, who had been left with eight men at the Ilinsk
post, after a month spent in exploring the neighbouring
country, was obliged to start in search of the other
Russian parties. He crossed over the narrow part of the
island, bought a native boat, and sailed south towards the
bay of Aniva, which is formed by the crescent-shaped
southern extremity of Saghalien. Instead of doubling
Cape Aniva, he dragged his boat overland from the bay of
Mordvinova across one of the horns of the crescent, and
reached the post of Muravioffsk on September 30. The
' Irtysh ' took him over to Imperatorski bay, whence by

194 RUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

dog-sledges he was able to proceed to Mariinsk on Lake
Kizi.

After nearly two centuries the Eussians now recom-
menced the occupation of the Amur, choosing, however,
for this purpose again a different route. Their ancestors,
in the seventeenth century, had already tried three
different routes. Poyarkoff first discovered the one by
the river Aldan, which was discarded when Khabaroff
showed the advantages of the route by the Olekma ; the
latter was also superseded by the natural one chosen by
Beketoff, who started from the head-waters in Trans-
baikalia, and followed the course of the river. The fourth
route, now adopted, was in the opposite direction to the
last, ascending the river from its mouth. The sea-route,
only possible after Peter the Great had created the
Russian navy, had the advantage of presenting at first
few political difficulties, the mouth of the Amur and
adjacent sea-coast being entirely neglected by the Chinese,
who were only interested in the middle course of the
river, which lies in a lower latitude.

Brilliant results had been achieved in a few years bj''
a handful of men cast on the wild wastes of the eastern
shores of Northern Asia at an immense distance from the
civilised world. In 1850 peitoiission had been granted
grudgingly to erect a zimovie at Petrofskoe ; in 1853 the
most important harbours in the gulf of Tartary had
been occupied, posts had been established in Saghalien,
Nikolaiefsk had been founded at the mouth of the Amur,
and the river navigated for 300 versts.

This had been accomplished amid all the difficulties
of the inclement climate, and with scanty resources.
Nevelskoy started from Cronstadt in 1848 on the
' Baikal ' with only thirty men and six officers, and he had
received only slight reinforcements, ft is amusing to

THE ANNEXATION OF THE AMUB REGION 195

note the first garrisons of the early settlements. Mariinsk
was held by eight men ; Boshniack founded Alexandrofsk
(at De Castries bay) with three Cossacks, afterwards
reinforced to seven ; Nevelskoy left eight men at Con-
stantinofsk in Imperatorski bay ; Orloff at Ilinsk had at
first only six men, afterwards increased to eight.

The material at their disposal was equally scanty. In
the spring of 1852 the expedition had only five boats,
native and foreign, most of them small, so that in April
Nevelskoy was obhged to commence building at Petrof skoe
a decked boat 28 feet long and 7 broad. The boldness
and endurance of fatigue and hardship exhibited by the
small expedition of Nevelskoy recall to mind the exploits
of Poyarkoff and Khabaroff , but it is gratifying to observe
the difference in their conduct to the natives. While the
unscrupulous Cossack adventurers plundered and often
ill-treated the aborigines, the distinguished officers of the
Kussian navy showed them the utmost kindness ; indeed
they were the victims of the greedy impositions of the
Ghiliacks, who unconsciously retaliated for the losses of
their ancestors. Nevelskoy remarked that after the
Kussians had been two years on the Amur the price of
articles had increased tenfold.

Besides local hardships, Nevelskoy and his companions
had to endure the dangerous secret hostility of a powerful
party at St. Petersburg. Vice-Admiral Putiatin,^ prompted
by Nesselrode, declared his strong opposition to any
occupation of the Amur or of the continent, and expressed
his fears that the occupation of Saghalien ^ would create
difficulties with Japan.

Muravioff, while Nevelskoy was occupying strategical

' Then appointed to negotiate with Japan.

- At that time Japan claimed rights over Saghalien, which she ceded to
Eussia later, in exchange for the Kurile islands.

196 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

points in the gulf of Tartary, had been busy at St. Peters-
burg engaging his enemies at close quarters. Since his
return in 1851 he had devoted his activity to carrying out
the measures already approved by the Government, and to
the preparation of further plans which he hoped would be
sanctioned. In the summer of 1852 he had again visited
Transbaikalia to inspect the formation of the new Cossack
army at Nertchinsk, and had been surprised at the progress
achieved. He found twelve battalions of infantry well
drilled and able to manoeuvre with ease, and instead of the
300 cavalry which he expected, a brigade of 2,000 horse
was already organised. The preparations for the future
navigation of the Amur, an undertaking of which he was
constantly urging the necessity at St. Petersburg, and
anxiously awaiting the sanction, were progressing satis-
factorily. After careful soundings on the Shilka had
shown the possibility of steam navigation, a small
steamer, the 'Argun,' had been laid on the stocks and
the work was proceeding rapidly.

The results achieved by Muravioff at St. Petersburg
had not been so rapid. He had not succeeded in obtain-
ing the imperial sanction for the occupation of Kizi and De
Castries, and he justly suspected that Nesselrode was the
cause of the delay. The retirement of his zealous friend,
Perofski, had alarmed Muravioff, who wrote a strong
appeal for support to Grand Duke Constantine, who had
expressed his readiness to further any scheme for the
welfare of Siberia. Fortmiately about this time Colonel
Akhte, who, as we have seen, had been sent, without
reference to Muravioff, to explore the left bank of the
Amur down to its mouth, reported that the lower parts of
the river, as well as the neighbouring sea-coast, were not
occupied by the Chinese. This statement was important,
as independent confirmation of the views repeatedly

THE ANNEXATION OF THE AMUR REGION 197

expressed by Muravioff. But it conveyed no fresh infor-
mation, because Muraviotf had already known three years
before, from the reports of Nevelskoy, that the mouth of
the Amur did not belong to China. Moreover, the
presence and movements of Eussian vessels had attracted
no notice, friendly intercourse being kept up with Chinese
and Manchurians. Muravioff, indeed, might have claimed
far more ancient proofs of his statement, as Khabaroff,
two centuries before, had been informed that the natives
at the mouth of the Amur were independent.

At the beginning of 1853 the political situation of
Europe was full of difficulties, which threatened to engage
Kussia in a war with the Western Powers. Muravioff
therefore proceeded to St. Petersburg in March, in order
to arrange measures for the defence of Eastern Siberia in
case of hostilities. He presented a report to the Emperor,
and in his usual comprehensive way examined exhaustively
all the questions affecting Eastern Asia. He showed the
increasing power of England in the Pacific, and the
weakness of China requiring the protection of Russia.
Distance alone had prevented the latter from exercising
that influence which was due to her early expansion in the
East. He deplored the lethargy which had come over
Eussia since 1812 in all matters concerning the further
parts of Asia, and urged that all diplomatic communications
with China should pass through the Governor-General of
Eastern Siberia, the man most capable, by his position,
of giving the necessary advice to the Foreign Office. By
this plan a great deal of time would be saved, as the
despatches from Peking could be at once examined at
Irkutsk and commented on according to the necessities of
the frontier provinces. Turning to the Pacific Ocean, he
forcibly pointed out the important questions arising in
the future in consequence of the eastern expansion of

198 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

England. He denounced the sloth and ignorance of
the Foreign Office, which twenty-five years before had
ridiculed the prevision of the Kussian-American Company
when the latter urged the necessity of occupying Cali-
fornia at once, as otherwise it would soon be annexed
by the United States. The Foreign Office then imagined
that such an unlikely event could not happen for a
hundred years, but Muravioff now pointed out that these
previsions had been already realised. He added sagaciously
that the occupation of California would have been only
a temporary measure, as the United States were destined
to rule all North America, and that even Alaska ^ must in
time be ceded by Russia ; but these concessions would
serve to enhance the value of Russia's friendship with the
United States. Russia's legitimate ambition was to rule
the Pacific shores of Eastern Asia.

The immediate result of MuraviofTs report was tEe
imperial order of April 11 for the occupation of Saghalien
by the Russian- American Company. This first success
was soon followed by another. On April 22 a conference
was held in presence of Tsar Nicholas ; all the maps com-
piled by Colonel Akhte and the Staff of Eastern Siberia
were exhibited, and Muravioff produced an able report on
the necessity of the occupation of De Castries bay and
the neighbouring Lake Kizi. Emperor Nicholas, after
carefully examining the maps and comparing them with
the text of the treaty of Nertchinsk, pointed to that
part of the Amur region which lies between the river
Bureya and the sea, and exclaimed, ' So this should be
ours ! ' Then, turning to the War Minister, he added,
* We must arrange about this with the Chinese.' ^ He

' It was, indeed, ceded to the United States in 1867, according to
Muravioff' s previsions.

* The treaty of Nertchinsk only determined the frontier of Eastern
Siberia around the rivers Gorbitza and Ai-gun ; the frontier in the regions

THE ANNEXATION OF THE AMUR BEGION 199

then examined Muravioff's general map of the Amur and
said to him :

' All this is very fine, but consider that I must defend
it from Cronstadt.'

Muravioff promptly rejoined, ' It is not necessary to go
so far, sire; it can be defended much nearer.'

And with his hand following up the course of the Amur,
he pointed to Transbaikalia.

Tsar Nicholas, putting his hand on Muravioff's head,
said :

* 0 Muravioff, really some day you will lose your
wits with the Amur.'

Muravioff exclaimed : ' Sire ! events point out this
route.' But the Emperor, slapping him on the shoulder,
concluded :

' Well, let us wait until events lead us thither.'

Within less than a year events led to the adoption of
the course advocated by Muravioff.

Two important results were obtained by the confer-
ence : the issue of orders for the occupation of De Castries
and Kizi, which, as we have seen, were duly received after
they had been carried out by Nevelskoy ; and the decision
of the Emperor to treat with the Chinese about the region
between the river Bureya and the sea. The latter measure,
which Muravioff justly considered as an important step for
the acquisition of the left bank of the Amur, was per-
versely distorted by the Asiatic Department of the Foreign
Office, and converted into a dangerous stumbling-block
for Muravioff's future plans. The despatch to Peking on
the subject was purposely delayed until Muravioff had
left Eussia for Marienbad, where he was obliged to go to

near the sea was left undetermined because neither the plenipotentiaries of
the two nations, nor anybody else at the time, knew the exact geographical
features of the country.

200 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

recuperate his health, much impaired by the many years
he had passed in the rigorous cHmate of Siberia and by hard
work. Then the Asiatic Department forwarded a note to
Peking, conceived in terms so injurious to the interests of
Russia on the Amur, that a Chinese mandarin might
have proudly claimed its authorship.

When Muravioff returned to Eussia in October of the
same year (1853), he hastened to inquire of the chief of
the Asiatic Department whether it were necessary to return
soon to Siberia on account of the diplomatic negotiations
with China. On receiving the answer that there were no
special communications with China, he gladly delayed his
departure, as there were still many important questions he
wished to settle personally at St. Petersburg. He was
greatly surprised when, towards the end of December, a
courier from Irkutsk arrived with the information that
Chinese plenipotentiaries were coming shortly to Kiakhta
to discuss the Amur question in answer to a note of the
Russian Government. Muravioff immediately demanded
explanations from the Director of the Asiatic Department,
who was then compelled to acknowledge not only the
note, but to admit that the answer from Peking had
already arrived. The note, which could no longer be con-
cealed from Muravioff, was intended to convince the
Chinese of the necessity for establishing frontier pillars '
on the left bank of the Amur. This foolish document
sacrificed the whole question at issue, as it had been
Muravioff 's persistent purpose to slowly induce the Chinese
to acknowledge that the left bank of the river belonged to
Eussia.

The Chinese Government readily availed itself of the
opportunity afforded by this note of June 16, 1853, and

' Since the supposed discovery of Middendorf, frontier pillars exercised
a mesmerising influence on the Foreign Office.

THE ANNEXATION OF THE AMUR REGION 201

declared its willingness to send officials to establish
frontier pillars on the Gorbitza river, the only part of
the left bank which had been clearly defined by the
treaty of Nertchinsk. But after the purposeless de-
mand of the Russian Government, as the question was
supposed to refer to the whole left bank, the Gorbitza
could be easily converted into a barrier shutting off the
Russians from the Amur. Difficulties increased in con-
sequence of the inconsiderate action of one of Muravioff's
subordinates. When, in November 1853, the Chinese
commission arrived at Urga, Rebinder, the town governor
at Kiakhta, probably flattered at the prospect of acting a
diplomatic part, took up the question, gathered all the
documents and plans on the frontier question, and even
went so far as to issue orders to the chief of the staff at
Irkutsk and to communicate directly with Nesselrode.

Muravioff promptly reprimanded his subordinate for
his rash zeal, reminding him that frontier questions could
not be settled without imperial orders.

The end of the year 1853 left Muravioff in great diffi-
culties ; the decision of the Emperor to treat with the
Chinese about the left bank of the lower course of the
Amur, which he had joyfully considered as the first step
towards the recovery of the long-lost river, had become a
fresh obstacle through the foolish or criminal action of
the Asiatic Department. The question, miless treated
with great tact and. firmness, threatened to destroy all
hopes of realising his plans. Fortunately, at the same
time, Muravioff received statements from Irkutsk showing
that the yearly output of gold had exceeded the estimates
by nearly a ton.^ This new proof of his administrative
ability and activity came opportunely to silence the
opposition of his enemies.

' 55 poods 27 pounds, or 11 zolotnihs.

202 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

The political events of 1854, which threatened to divert
all attention from Siberia, were turned to the final accom-
plishment of his plans by Muravioff. Russia had become
engaged in a war with Turkey which involved her also in
a destructive war with England, France, and Sardinia,
During two centuries Eussia had neglected the Far East
in order to concentrate her forces against her Western
enemies. A continuation of this policy would have ap-
peared necessary to most statesmen, to face the formi-
dable coalition formed in Europe. But Muravioff, with
singular boldness, saw the opportunity for achieving his
plans, for satisfying his secret aspirations to acquire the
whole of Siberia ; and, thanks to his genius, the war
which crushed the power of Russia in Europe secured
her a lasting triumph on the Pacific.

His duties as commander of the military forces in
Eastern Siberia had compelled Muravioff to prepare plans
for the defence of the Pacific coast in the probable event
of an attack by the allied fleets. In a lucid confidential
report ' to Grand Duke Constantine, Admiral-in-Chief, he
set forth the requirements of the military situation.

After enumerating the forces at his disposal — 16,000
infantry and 5,000 cavalry, out of which a total of 13,000,
with twenty guns, could be sent across the borders — he
showed the vast frontier, from Kamchatka to Kharazaya
(10,000 versts by sea and land), which had to be de-
fended. While in Europe the Western Powers could not
inflict any serious loss on Eussia, they might easily deprive
her of Kamchatka and of the mouth of the Amur in the
Far East. The empire of China, now insignificant on
account of its militar}^ weakness, might become dangerous
under the influence and guidance of England and France
— Siberia might even cease to be Russian. The loss of

' November 29, 1853.

THE ANNEXATION OF THE AMUR REGION 203

this vast region, capable of absorbing the excess of the
rural population of European Russia for a whole century,
could not be compensated by any victories or conquests in
the West.^ It was therefore necessary to guard Kam-
chatka, Saghalien, and the mouth of the Amur, thus also
acquiring enduring influence on China, This was possible
with the means now disposable in Eastern Siberia,
prepared during the last five years, provided full powers
were given to the Governor-General to settle all questions
without the loss of time entailed by reference to St. Peters-
burg.

Rapid communications must also be provided, as the
enemy's fleet could be informed by sea of the declaration
of war and commence hostilities before the news could be
forwarded overland through the vast plains of Siberia.
The fleet of Admiral Putiatin should be recalled from its
dangerous station in Japan and sheltered in the new port
occupied by Nevelskoy ; the steamer ' Vostok,' belonging
to the fleet, could then be used for keeping up communica-
tions with Petropavlofsk in Kamchatka. At the same
time troops, provisions, and artillery must be sent down
the Amur ; the steamer ' Argun,' now completed, serving
to maintain communications between Nertchinsk and the
mouth of the river. By this means there would be almost
uninterrupted steam communications between Nertchinsk
in Transbaikalia and Petropavlofsk in Kamchatka. It
would not be necessary to send a large force down the
Amur, as the Enghsh in their war with China had never
been able to land more than 3,000 men. Besides, the
coasts of Kamchatka, being little known, would present
great difflculties for a descent. The navigation on the

' Muravioff here clearly pointed out the true policy of Russia. He was
far ahead of his contemporaries, nobody then on the continent of Europe
understanding those ideas of colonial expansion which have lately become
fashionable in most countries.

204 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

Amur would not meet with mucli opposition from the
Chinese, as three years' experience at the mouth of the
river had shown they cared little about the question.
Moreover, it was easy to explain that the measure was
necessary for the defence not only of the sea-coast but of
Manchuria itself, which would be exposed to great danger
by the neighbouring conquests of the Western Powers.
It was also necessary to bear in mind that the Chinese
Government was fully occupied by its domestic troubles,
half the empire being in the hands of the rebels.

The views of Muravioff were so sound, and the new con-
ditions produced by the gigantic struggle in which Russia
was engaged were so urgent, that the whole question was
referred to a special committee under the presidency of
the Heir-Apparent. Its opinion was favourable, and on
January 11, 1854, the Emperor ordered that all questions
relating to the frontier in the Far East should be settled
directly by Muravioff with the Peking Foreign Office.
The Chinese were informed of the change by a despatch
of February 6, and a diplomatic secretary and interpreters
in the Chinese and Manchu languages were attached to
Muravioff. After long discussions it was also decided to
start navigation on the Amur, even if the consent of the
Chinese were not obtained, and to send reinforcements to
Kamchatka by that river.

At last the hour had come for which Russia had
waited over 150 j''ears. In the opinion of Muravioff 's
biographer ^ it is doubtful whether all the efforts of his
activity and energy would have achieved this object with-
out the outbreak of the war in Europe. Thus the only
enduring result of the Crimean war, unperceived at the
time, was the opening of the Pacific to Russia.

Muravioff had achieved even more brilliant success in

' Barsukoff.

THE ANNEXATION OF THE AMUR REGION 205

his second visit to the capital than in his first, and he
hastened his return to Siberia to carry out the plans which
had been sanctioned by the Tsar. He left St, Petersburg
on February 10, and before the middle of March reached
Irkutsk, where he at once commenced issuing orders for
the approaching navigation on the Amur. He was not
alarmed by the prospects of war on the Pacific coast,
because, besides the enemy's ignorance of the country, he
reckoned to be stronger than the allies, especially as by
the new route of fluvial navigation he was now nearer to
the ports exposed to attack.

While relying principally on the Amur to maintain
his communications with the coast and Kamchatka,
Muravioff also paid attention to the older routes. On his
return from Kamchatka in 1849 he had passed through
Ayan to inspect the road leading thence to Yakutsk ;
finding that regular communications were interrupted
during several months, he obtained authorisation from
St. Petersburg to establish settlers along the line in
order to insure communications in winter. In 1851, 102
families had been transferred from Transbaikalia and the
Irkutsk province, but the settlers complained of their
condition in a country unfit for cultivation. As these
accounts were not confirmed by official reports, Muravioff
decided to have the matter verified by a reliable person.
For this purpose he chose the son of Prince Volkonski, one
of the Decembrists, or political exiles relegated to Siberia
since 1825 by Tsar Nicholas. The young nobleman, like
most of the persons selected by Muravioff, showed himself
on every occasion fit for the duties he had to fulfil.
Volkonski found the settlers in great distress ; typhus
and scurvy had prevailed, their cattle had mostly perished
through scarcity of fodder, and they had been able to sub-
sist only through loans of Government money ; he also

206 RUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

reported that the road required considerable improvements.
To show the absohite necessity of the Amur route, it will
suffice to mention that it took Volkonski, travelling alone,
almost two months to accomplish the voyage ' by the old
route, amid incredible difficulties, travelling by boat, on
horseback, and, at last, on foot over the mountains.

Muravioff, in the meanwhile, had commenced his first
memorable expedition. When the news of the intended
navigation of the Amur spread through Siberia, it was
received with general enthusiasm. The daring exploits of
the Cossacks on that river in the seventeenth century
were still fresh in the memory of the people of Trans-
baikalia, who had never abandoned the hope of recovering
the lost region and of rebuilding Albazin, endeared by its
heroic sieges. The Amur was the direct route to the
ocean, necessary for the future prosperity of Siberia, and
the merchants of Irkutsk expressed their desire to subscribe
funds for the expenses of the expedition. A banquet was
offered to Muravioff by the same merchants before his
departure from Irkutsk, and along the whole route he was
received with wild joy amid feasts and recitals of verses.

A despatch had been sent to Peking stating that, on
account of war with other Powers, the Governor-General
had been ordered to forward officials and troops down the
Amur for the defence of the Russian possessions on the
littoral ; the Chinese Government was also requested to
appoint time and place for a conference of plenipoten-
tiaries to settle frontier questions. Muravioff left Irkutsk
on April 19, and reached Kiakhta on the 24th by the
road around Lake Baikal ; here, after obtaining infor-
mation from Urga that Colonel Zaborinski ^ had not been
allowed to proceed to Peking, he decided not to wait for

' He left Irkutsk at the end of April and reached Ayan on June 22.
* He was bearer of the despatch to Peking.

THE ANNEXATION OF THE AMUR REGION 207

the answer from Peking, as the habitual procrastination
of the Chinese would waste precious time. On May 7
Muravioff was on the Shilka, at a point seventy versts
above the frontier, where the preparations for the navi-
gation of the Amur had been actively proceeding under
the direction of the Captain of the Navy, Kasakievitch,
one of the ablest assistants of the Governor-General.

The Shilka then presented a very lively appearance,
unusual in the quiet rivers of Siberia. Cossacks and sol-
diers of the line were hurrying along on the banks, while
the stream was crowded with boats, barges, and rafts
loaded with military stores and provisions. In the middle
of the river was anchored the 'Argun,' the pioneer steamer
on the Amur, built by orders of Muravioff with the
generous gift of 100,000 roubles offered by Kuznetzoff, a
rich merchant engaged in gold-washing. Great enthu-
siasm animated all classes at the arrival of the Governor-
General, in whose honour a solemn fete was organised on
May 9, his name-day. He was entertained at a banquet
where appropriate verses were recited, and he was pro-
claimed the accomplisher of the ideas of Peter the Great.
There was a display of fireworks and illuminations with
transparent inscriptions recording the results of Muravioff's
activity during the last four years ; the reforms in Trans-
baikalia ; the organisation of the Cossack army in the
same province ; the increase in the production of gold ;
the construction of a flotilla for the navigation of the
Amur.

Muravioff neglected no opportunity to increase the
popular appreciation of the historical importance of the
event ; an old image of the Blessed Virgin, which tradition
asserted had been brought from Albazin when the fortress
was evacuated by the Russians, accompanied the expedi-
tion and served to impart a solemn blessing. Religion,

208 RUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

which had contributed to establish the power of Moscow
and had saved Kussia from the Tartars and the Poles,
now lent its powerful influence in the distant expedition
towards the shores of the Pacific. Muravioff addressed
the troops with a few impressive words : ' Children,^ the
time has come to advance ; let us pray to the Lord and
ask His blessing on our journey.' ' We will do our best ! '
was the unanimous shout of the soldiers.

The expedition started on May 14, 1854, amid firing
of guns and hurrahs. It consisted of a line battalion
about 800 strong, a sotnia of Cossacks, and a division
of mountain artillery ; besides the s.s. ' Argun ' there
were seventy-five barges and rafts, the whole flotilla
extending for two versts down the river. The boats
were all heavily laden with provisions, some up to
1,500 poods,^ destined either for the use of the expedition
or for transhipment to Kamchatka. In the evening of
May 17 the flotilla had reached Ust-Strielka, where the
junction of the Argun with the Shilka forms the Amur,
The night was passed at anchor, and on the following
day. May 18, there was the solemn entrance in the for-
bidden river, closed to Kussia since the treaty of Nert-
chinsk. The Governor's band played ' God save the
Tsar,' the soldiers crossed themselves, waved their caps,
and hurrahed, while Muravioff, filling a tumbler with the
water of the Amur, drank to the success of the expedition.

On May 20 the flotilla passed the site of the old
fortress of Albazin ; the soldiers stood up and took off
their caps while the band played hymns. Muravioff, with
many others, landed to inspect the ruins,^ and knelt reve-

' The common term used by Eussian commanders addressing their
men.

- Nearly 25 tons.

' Albazin is now a Cossack settlement on the Amur, but traces of the
old rampart can be still discerned.

THE ANNEXATION OF THE AMUR BEGION 209

rently in prayer on the ground which contained the dust
of their heroic ancestors.

The expedition having reached, on May 28, the mouth
of the Zeya, at only twenty versts' distance from the
Chinese fortified town, Aigun, Muravioff sent officers to
inquire whether its Governor had received instructions
from Peking. No answer had come to Muravioff's des-
patch about the navigation of the Amur, and the Gover-
nor of the isolated town was greatly embarrassed to find a
solution to the unprecedented question suddenly forced
upon him. He attempted to maintain the impossibility
of allowing such navigation, but he was so scared by
the sight of the numerous flotilla, and especially of the
steamer, a kind of vessel entirely new to him, that he
preferred to get rid of his unwelcome guests and hurry
them away from his town.

The remainder of the journey was uneventful ; the
Sungari was reached on June 2, the Ussuri on Jmie 5. At
the confluence with the latter river Muravioff, admiring the
beautiful situation, exclaimed, ' Here there shall be a
town.' ^ At that time there were no charts of the Amur
river, and distances were reckoned on the general map of
Asia ; therefore, when on June 9 a point had been reached
200 versts below the Ussuri, it was supposed that Lake
Kizi must be in the neighbourhood. The mistake was
not discovered until the evening of June 10, when a boat
commanded by a Kussian officer was seen sailing up the
river. As it approached the banks Muravioff shouted out :

' How far is it to Mariinsk ? '

* Five hundred versts,' was the unexpected answer.

On discovering the distance which still remained to

' At present there is the town of Khabarofsk, the residence of the
Governor-General of the Amur and Maritime Provinces, and of Trans-
Baikalia.

210 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

be covered, Muravioff decided to proceed alone in the
* Argun,' and reached Mariinsk on June 12 ; the rest of
the expedition, with the assistance of native pilots en-
gaged by Nevelskoy, arrived on June 14, a month after
its departure. The greater part of the navigation had
been accomplished with great difficulties, as the course of
the river was almost totally unknown. The lower part
of the Amur presented a pleasant contrast, as the natives
were very friendly, and offered every assistance. Mura-
vioff, astonished at the order which prevailed, remarked
that the region seemed to have always belonged to Bussia.
He was glad to verify the correctness of his inductions,
that the lower course of the Amur had never been occu-
pied by the Chinese, and that the independent natives
were willing to accept the sovereignty of the Tsar.

Nevelskoy, who was at De Castries bay, came at once
to Mariinsk to meet Muravioff and to behold the realisa-
tion of the plans they had discussed in St. Petersburg
seven years before, and for which they had strenuously
worked during all the intervening time.

Muravioff, with his usual activity, commenced his
tour of personal inspection ; he proceeded on foot, through
a cutting in the forest, to De Castries, and thence on
board the schooner ' Vostok ' to Imperatorski bay to meet
Admiral Putiatin. With the same vessel, he then sailed
northwards through the straits of the gulf of Tartary to
Petrofskoe, where he sent forward a part of his staff to
Ay an by the ' Vostok,' and proceeded himself by land to
Nikolaiefsk. At this post he found the answer of the
Chinese Foreign Office, which had been forwarded after
him down river ; it stated that the Chinese were ready to
appoint officials to inspect the places on the frontier.
On the return of the ' Vostok ' to Nikolaiefsk, Muravioff

THE ANNEXATION OF THE AMUR BEGION 211

proceeded to Ayan on August 9, leaving that port on the
20th for Irkutsk.

During nearly two months spent in the region along
the coast, Muravioff had been chiefly occupied in military
preparations. He found, as was to be expected, the de-
fences of the few scattered posts in wretched conditions ;
at Petrofskoe there were only twenty-five men with flint
muskets ; at Nikolaiefsk thirty men with the same
weapons and two guns, of which only one could be fired ;
at Mariinsk eight men ; at Alexandrofsk (in De Castries
bay) ten men with one gun ; at Imperatorski bay ten
men ; all these soldiers were armed with the same old-
fashioned muskets. There were only sixty pounds of
gunpowder and twenty-five charges for each of the three
guns. The naval forces were equally insignificant ; at
De Castries there were the transports ' Irtysh,' ' Dvina,'
' Baikal,' and the schooner * Vostok ; ' at Imperatorski
bay the frigate * Pallada ' and the vessels of the Eussian-
American Company 'Nikolai' and 'Prince Menshtchikoff.'
The frigate ' Pallada ' and schooner ' Vostok ' had formed
part of the squadron of Vice-Admiral Putiatin, sent to
Japan to conclude a treaty of commerce, but these vessels
had been hastily recalled from Nagasaki when war ap-
peared imminent. The corvette ' Olivutza,' also forming
part of that squadron, had been sent to assist in the
defence of Petropavlofsk. The Russian detachments
stationed in the island of Saghalien had been withdrawn
by order of Admiral Putiatin and concentrated in Im-
peratorski bay. This measure had been strongly opposed
by Nevelskoy, who, instead of concentrating the Russian
forces, proposed dispersing them along the whole coast,
thereby inducing the enemy to declare a blockade, thus
implicitly recognising Russia's occupation of the region.
He argued that political considerations were of higher

V 2

212 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

importance than the purely military requirements of the
situation.

The much-needed reinforcements brought down the
Amur by Muravioff were distributed as follows : —

The sotnia of Cossacks with four mountain guns was
stationed at Mariinsk.

Two hundred men were destined for the defence of
Nikolaiefsk.

Another force of 200 men was stationed on Lake Kizi
with orders to cut a road through the forest to De
Castries, as it was highly important to insure easy com-
munications between that bay and the post of Mariinsk.

The remaining 400 men were sent on the transport
* Dvina ' to Petropavlofsk.

The vessels of Admiral Putiatin, the frigate ' Pallada '
and schooner 'Vostok,' were to winter at Nikolaiefsk,
while the forces withdrawn from Saghalien were des~-
patched to Alaska.

The detachment on Lake Kizi suffered great hard-
ships, which it will be useful to describe in detail to
show the endurance displayed by the Russian soldiers
in the desolate, sparsely peopled region. The work of
cutting a road through the virgin forest was attended
with great difficulties ; besides felling the huge trees,
the soldiers had often to pave the way with fascines
and to build bridges across the numerous streams which
intersected the country. The mosquitoes and small flies •
which infest the Siberian forests allowed the men no rest,
tormenting them day and night, especially in the damp
foggy weather. The food, principally consisting of salt
meat, was spoilt and had to be thrown away, compelling

' The sting of these insects is such an unbearable torment, that all
the gold-seekers and other frequenters of the ' taigas ' or Siberian forests
are obliged to wear veils to protect their necks and faces.

THE ANNEXATION OF THE AMUB BEGION 213

the soldiers to subsist on gruel and sugar. These provisions
also soon came to an end, while still ten versts of the
road remained unfinished. As the work could not be
abandoned, the commander Glen sent back a portion of
his men to Mariinsk to fetch provisions, but these did
not arrive for many days, and the unfortunate men con-
fined in the dismal forest were reduced to subsisting on roots
and game. Sickness broke out, and perhaps the whole
detachment might have perished if it had not been acci-
dentally discovered by some officers of the Russian frigate
' Diana,' lately arrived at De Castries, who were hunting
in the forest. Provisions and a doctor were sent from
the ship, and the soldiers, recovering their strength, were
able to finish the road.

On the return of the detachment to Mariinsk it re-
ceived orders to proceed to Nikolaiefsk ; but even here
no rest was granted, for it was ordered on to Petrofskoe.
Embarking on the old boats on which they had de-
scended the Amur, with an escort of thirty sailors from
the 'Pallada,' the soldiers sailed down the Amur; but on
entering the sea of Okhotsk they were caught by a storm
which smashed the flotilla on a sandy beach. The ship-
wrecked detachment had to proceed along the roadless
coast to Petrofskoe, where, after a week, the transport
' Irtysh ' conveyed them to Ayan. Here they were em-
barked, with four guns, on board the transport ' Kam-
chatka,' of the Eussian-American Company, and sent on
a cruise to capture English whalers ; the search proving
fruitless, after a few days they returned to Ayan. They
remained encamped for four weeks, during which time
they constructed two batteries for the defence of the port.
At last, in the middle of September, Glen and his men
were embarked again on the * Kamchatka ' and sent to
Alaska. In about three months the detachment had

214 RUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

built a road through a virgin forest, had sailed down the
Amur, had been shipwrecked, had cruised about the sea
of Okhotsk, and had built two batteries !

The other detachment which had been sent to Kam-
chatka was more fortunate : it had the honour of con-
tributing to the most brilliant success achieved by the
Russian arms during the war. When Muravioff visited
Petropavlofsk in 1849, he was charmed by the beauty of
Avacha bay, and projected a vast plan of defences ; but
foreseeing that it could not be speedily carried out, he had
given some useful advice for improving the fortifications of
the place he had chosen for the principal naval station on
the Pacific.

On receiving news of the war in Europe, the defences
of the port were hurriedly strengthened ; and when the
reinforcements sent from the Amur arrived, the men were
employed in constructing batteries. These fears of naval
attack were not exaggerated ; England and France had
formed a powerful squadron in the Pacific with the in-
tention of dealing a crushing blow at the principal Rus-
sian military port, thus freeing their merchant vessels
from all danger of the Russian fleet. The allies, however,
as Muravioff had justly foreseen, were handicapped by
their scanty knowledge of the coast on which they had
to land, and by the indecision which such ignorance
invariably engenders. This will appear clearly in what
follows.

Avacha bay is a large, almost circular, expanse of
water with a narrow entrance, forming along its contour
a series of minor bays or harbours. Petropavlofsk lies in
one of these, formed by a narrow hilly peninsula running
from north to south almost parallel to the coast of the
mainland, enclosing an oblong sheet of water which is
almost divided in equal portions by a long sandy spit

THE ANNEXATION OF THE AMUR REGION 215

jutting out from the mainland nearly right across to the
peninsula. The northern part of the harbour is thus
completely sheltered, being only accessible through a
narrow entrance between the side of the hilly peninsula
and the point of the sandy spit. The peninsula is formed
by a long narrow hill, the Signal hill ; to the north of which
there is a ^ similar mountain, Nikolski hill ; still further
to the north there is a lake. On the other side of the
bay — on the mainland — there is another long hill parallel
to the two former, called Krasny Yar (red cliff). The
town of Petropavlofsk lies at the northern extremity of
the bay, between Nikolski hill and Krasny Yar.

The defences of the harbour against a naval attack or
descent were as follows : —

Battery No. 1, situated at the extremity of Signal
hill (Shakoff point), defended the entrance of the harbour
on the left (west) side. It mounted five guns.

Battery No. 2 was situated on the sandy spit which
intersected the harbour, and defended the entrance on the
right (east) side. This was the strongest battery and
mounted ten guns.

Battery No. 3 was situated on the isthmus between
Signal and Nikolski hills, and defended the town and
harbour in its rear (to the east). It mounted five guns,^
and was very much exposed.

Battery No. 4 was situated on the slope of Krasny
Yar at its southern extremity, where the harbour of
Petropavlofsk merges into the larger Avacha bay. It
mounted three guns.

Battery No. 6 was situated on the shore of the lake, and
could only fire when the enemy's landing parties turned
round Nikolski hill. It mounted four guns taken from the
' Dvina,' and six almost useless old guns of small calibre.

' These guns had been landed from the frigate ' Aurora.'

216 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

Battery No. 7 was situated at the foot of the northern
extremity of Nikolski hill. It mounted six guns.'

Petropavlofsk was therefore defended only by a total
of thirty-nine guns ; moreover, owing to the peculiar
situation of the town and the necessity for defending it on
several sides, either against an attempt to force the
entrance, or against a descent on the peninsula and
Nikolski hill, the batteries were scattered about and their
fire could not be concentrated ; there were only thirty-seven
rounds for each gun. To increase the defences of the
entrance, the 44-gun frigate, ' Aurora,' and the transport
'Dvina,' presenting a broadside of twenty-one guns, were
anchored near it, behind the sandy spit which protected
their hulls, leaving the guns free to fire as over a parapet.
The total force under arms consisted of about 1,000 men,^
including the reinforcements sent by Muravioff, a few
natives, and some volunteers recruited amongst the
officials and merchants of the town. In the event of the
enemy landing he was to be repulsed by small detach-
ments provided with a 3-pounder field-piece.

The Anglo-French squadron destined for the attack
was composed of the following vessels : the English
52-gun frigate, ' President,' 44-gun corvette, ' Pique,'
24-gun corvette, ' Amphitrite,'^ and steamer, 'Virago,' of
six guns, 300 horse-power; the French 60-gun frigate,

* La Forte,' 32-gun corvette, ' Eurydice,' and 18-gun brig,

* Obligado.' The allied fleet had a total of 236 guns.

A few months before, the frigates ' President ' and ' La
Forte,' flying the flags of Admirals Price and Febvrier-
Despointes, were anchored at the other extremity of the

' These guns had been landed from the frigate ' Aurora.'

- Barsukoff gives a total of 42 officers and 879 men ; Ragoza, 1,016

officers and men.

'■' This vessel is not mentioned by Du Hailly as taking part in the

attack.

THE ANNEXATION OF THE AMUR REGION 217

Pacific, in the Peruvian port of Callao, and on April 26,
1854, they had saluted the departure of the Russian frigate
' Amora,' which had come all the way from Cronstadt.
Though war had been declared in Europe, the news had
not yet reached the South American Pacific coast, and
the three frigates h^-d to postpone warlike operations
until their next meeting in Kamchatka.

The first news of the war was brought by the s.s.
' Virago ' on May 7, and Admiral Price, as senior, took
command of the allied squadron in the Pacific. He had
a very difficult task to accomplish. The French and
English vessels were scattered about the immense ocean,
and there were no ready means — steamers or telegraphs —
to recall them ; there was no precise information about
the number and position of the Russian vessels, nor exact
knowledge of the Siberian coast. The number of British
vessels trading in the Pacific justified the fear that the
Russians might imitate Captain David Porter ^ and start
destroying merchant shipping.

Admiral Price felt keenly the responsibility suddenly
thrust upon him, and his anxiety to provide against all
possible emergencies caused much delay. He left Callao
only on May 17, stopped at the Marquesas until July 3,
reached the Sandwich Islands on July 17, and, having at
last brought together all his vessels, started for Kam-
chatka on July 25. At the Sandwich Islands he heard
that the Russian frigate ' Dvina ' had left at the end of
June, bearing the news of the outbreak of war ; she had
therefore a clear month's start over him, and the con-
sciousness that his procrastination had lost much precious
time preyed upon his mind. On July 30, five days after

' This bold American seaman, during the war of 1812-1'J, cruised
about the Pacific committing sucli depredations on commerce that British
vessels crowded the ports, not daring to venture to sea.

218 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

the departure from the Sandwich Islands, two vessels
were ordered to San Francisco for the protection of mer-
chant shipping.^ As the squadron approached Kamchatka
it met thick fogs and drizzling rain, which made it very
difficult to keep the vessels together. It was not till the
evening of August 25 that land was dimly seen.

On the morning of August 17 ^ (29), 1854, the light-
house at the entrance of Avacha bay signalled that
a squadron of men-of-war was in sight. Shortly after, a
three-masted steamer flying the American flag entered
the bay, and approached to within three miles of the
Signal hill at the entrance of the harbour of Petropavlof sk,
and appeared to be taking soundings. But when a boat
put off from the shore, the steamer, finding that a ruse had
been suspected, retired, joining the rest of the squadron
outside the larger bay of Avacha, Admiral Price himself
had reconnoitred the position, acquiring a sufficient know-
ledge of the defences. In the afternoon of August 18
(30) the allied squadron entered the bay, and, after
exchanging a few harmless shots with the batteries of
Petropavlof sk, anchored out of range. In the evening a
council of war was held on board the ' President,' when it
was decided to attack the following morning : the two
flagships were to destroy the battery at Sharkoff point
(battery No. 1), and the ' Pique ' was to destroy battery
No. 4 on the opposite side.

Everything was ready for commencing the attack on

' Such anxiety was felt on this account that in the following year, 1855,
the frigate ' Pique,' at San Francisco, alarmed at the presence of two small
vessels of the Eussian-American Company in that neutral harbour, sent
her boats to watch them every night. The Eussians, who were quite unable
to attempt privateering, amused at these exaggerated precautions, humor-
ously retaliated by also sending their boats to watch the frigate at night.

- Du Hailly gives August 28, and the same difference of a day occurs in
all his dates ; probably in his notebook he still kept the time of the
American Pacific coast, and had not taken into account the change in
longitude.

THE ANNEXATION OF THE AMUR REGION 219

the morning of August 19 (31), when the news that
Admiral Price had shot himself spread through the
squadron. The exaggerated sense of responsibility which
had been preying upon his mind for months, at last drove
him to commit suicide in what must have been a fit of
temporary insanity, as his religious sentiments and his
usually calm character would have rendered impossible
such an act while in a sound state of mind. He considered
himself in fault for the delay in reaching Petropavlofsk,
and his rapid but clear reconnaissance of the natural
strength of the enemy's position probably rendered him
doubtful of the success of the approaching engagement.
He must have had a foresight of the disaster awaiting the
allies, and he shot himself just before the attack he
had prepared and ordered was to take place. This
extraordinary event caused great confusion in the allied
squadron ; the tact and uniform courtesy of Admiral Price
were invaluable qualities for the commander of a mixed
force. His death caused great changes. The supreme
command of the squadron passed to the French admiral,
while the English vessels were under the orders of the
captain of the ' Pique ; ' and divergencies of opinion soon
arose between these two officials.

On the morning of August 20 (September 1), a clear
sunny day — a rare event in Kamchatka — the activity dis-
played in the squadron indicated the approaching attack
of the allies. The steamer advanced, slowly towing the
three largest vessels of the squadron, and placed them in
a position to attack batteries Nos. 1 and 4. While the
four men-of-war were slowly forming in a line, battery
No. 4 on Krasny Yar, probably foreseeing it would not be
able to resist long, boldly opened fire, which was promptly
answered. A sharp engagement took place between the
eight guns of the batteries and the eighty broadside guns

220 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

of the ships, which ended naturally in the former being
silenced after an obstinate resistance. Battery No. 1 was
much damaged, because it was uncovered and backed by
the rocky sides of the Signal hill, which, struck by shot,
fell down in showers of splinters on the platform, wound-
ing the men and hampering the working of the guns.
When battery No. 4 was silenced the French landed a
party and hoisted their flag ; but Midshipman Popoff,
who, after nailing the three guns, had retired with his
twenty-eight gunners, promptly returned with reinforce-
ments and attacked them with great bravery. The French,
notwithstanding their numerical superiority, were thrown
into disorder and retreated to their boats. ^

After this successful attack on the east, in the after-
noon the larger vessels of the squadron advanced a little,
taking up a position where they were sheltered by the
Signal hill from the fire of the Russian vessels ' Aurora '
and ' Dvina,' and commenced the attack on the battery
No. 2. Though they had only ten guns against eighty,
Prince Maxutoff, the commander of the battery, coolly
directed his men not to waste powder, and to make
up for their inferiority by the accuracy of their aim. The
allies were much struck by the fearless indifference of a
Russian sentinel, who continued on his measured beat
throughout the whole cannonade. The engagement lasted
almost until evening, but without decisive results. The
allies at the same time made an attempt to land on the
side of the Signal hill facing Avacha bay, near battery
No. 3, at the isthmus of the peninsula ; but as it failed,
they retired to their anchorage after nine hours' fighting.
' La Forte ' alone fired 869 rounds.

' Du Hailly says that the allies spiked the guns and then retreated ; but
this is not probable, as a descent to spike the guns of a silenced battery seems
useless.

THE ANNEXATION OF THE AMUR REGION 221

The whole night was spent by the Russians in repairing
their batteries, with such activity, that on the following
morning, with the exception of a few guns rendered un-
serviceable, the defences were almost in the same condition
as on the preceding day. The loss of the Russians was
six killed and thirteen wounded.

The night was spent by the allies in a stormy council
of war, in which it was proposed to retreat ; but this
pusillanimous proposal was abandoned the next day. The
men who had been sent ashore to bury Admiral Price had
found two Americans, who furnished information about
the land approaches of Petropavlofsk. They reported the
existence of a good road to the north of Nikolski hill
leading straight from the sea to the town. On this infor-
mation Sir Frederick Nicholson, the captain of the ' Pique,'
proposed to land near Nikolski hill, after destroying the
shore batteries, and to march straight for the assault on
the town. This plan had the defect of not utilising the
chief strength of the allies — the guns of their ships — and
of exposing the sailors to a disadvantageous land engage-
ment with regular infantry ; but it was adopted with
enthusiasm by the officers and men, eager to fight and
confident of victory. An attempt to force the entrance
of the harbour, only protected by a battery and the two
Russian vessels at anchor, though deemed risky by the
captain of the ' Pique,' would certainly have had less fatal
results than the course adopted.

In the early morning of August 24 (September 5) the
allies commenced their preparations for the second attack.
This was not directed, as the former one, against the
defences of the entrance to the harbour, but against the
batteries on the peninsula and Nikolski hill, which pro-
tected the harbour and the town on the west from a fleet
operating in the broad waters of Avacha bay. The

222 RUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

destruction of these batteries and a successful landing
would enable the allies to occupy the hills, deliver a plunging
fire on theBussian vessels anchored belov^in the harbour,
and march towards the town. The Signal and Nikolski
hills which shelter Petropavlofsk on the side towards
Avacha bay are covered with low brushwood, and descend
almost perpendicularly to the sea. They form a natural
rampart covering the town and harbour, and only through
the gap between them can the houses and ships be seen
from the bay. Nikolski hill slopes less abruptly towards
the town and has some steep paths towards the lake,
while at the foot of its northern extremity there is a fairly
good road — the one mentioned by the Americans — situated
between the lake and the hill, leading straight towards the
town through battery No. 6, an earthen fort well palisaded
and protected by a ditch.

The weather was foggy when at 7.30 a.m. the steamer
slowly advanced, towing the frigates ' President ' and
' La Forte,' which took up a position in front of battery
No. 3, at the isthmus of the peninsula, where a gap exists
between the two hills. The Eussians at once opened fire,
which was answered by a broadside from the English
frigate while she was still in tow ; at the same time the
French frigate anchored close inshore, and the engage-
ment became so hot that in less than half an hour the
battery was completely destroyed. The English frigate
then was towed in front of battery No. 7, which, after
an hour's fierce cannonade, was also destroyed. The
Russians fought their guns with skill and bravery, inflict-
ing some damage on the ships, and only retired when the
commanders of both batteries were wounded.

The first part of the attack — the destruction of the
batteries — having been accomplished successfully, it was
possible to undertake the second part — the landing of a

THE ANNEXATION OF THE AMUR BEGION 223

force for the captui'e of the town. In about half an hour
twenty-five boats landed nearly a thousand men ^ com-
manded by the French admiral. A portion of the advanced
guard formed on the beach, and marching round the
northern extremity of Nikolski hill advanced on the road
near the lake towards battery No. 6. Here they were
received with grape-shot, according to the instructions
given by Muravioff five years before, when he chose the
site for this battery in 1849, and were obliged to retreat
in disorder. A second attack was also unsuccessful. This
first repulse compelled the allies to climb the hill, whence
they commenced firing down on the soldiers in the battery
No. 6, and on the crews of the ' Aurora ' and ' Dvina,'
anchored below in the bay. Another landing was also
effected at the isthmus lying between Nikolski and Signal
hills.

Admiral Zavoiko, the Governor of Kamchatka, per-
ceiving that battery No. 6 was in no danger, gathered all
the men he had at hand, a little over three hundred,- and
sent them forward to Nikolski hill with orders to drive the
enemy into the sea at the point of the bayonet. When
the Russians advanced they found the allies already in
possession of the crest of Nikolski hill and commencing
to descend the slope towards the town. Hiding behind
the bushes, and in the ditch of the battery, the Russians
opened an effective fire on the sailors, while the small
field-piece swept them with grape-shot ; then suddenly
rushing forwards they charged with the bayonet. After
a desperate hand-to-hand engagement the allies retreated

' Barsukoff estimates their number at 700, while Eagoza gives more
than 1,000 ; these figures may be reconciled if we suppose the former
estimates only the number landed in the first descent. Eagoza does not
mention the second descent on the isthmus. Du Hailly, who must have
known the exact numbers, gives 700.

^ Barsukoff gives 312, Eagoza states not over 300.

224 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

in disorder up the hill, where a dreadful fate awaited them.
The steep side of the hill towards the sea almost precluded
retreat, and the sailors were either bayonetted down into
the sea, or dashed to pieces on the rocks in attempting to
jump down. The party which had landed near the isthmus
now also retreated and joined the detachment which had
been driven from the northern extremity of the hill ;
crowding on the beach they embarked in confusion, under
an incessant fire from the Eussians on the hill. Many
were killed in the water or in the boats, and others
drowned. The total loss of the allies was estimated by
the Eussians at over 300 ^ men ; thirty-eight dead bodies
were found on shore, besides which four officers, a flag,
seven officers' swords, fifty-six rifles, and four prisoners
were captured. The Eussians lost thirty-one killed and
sixty-five wounded, among whom were two officers.

The allies, after landing to bury the dead on the fol-
lowing day, the 25th, sailed away on the evening of
August 27.

The gallant defence of Petropavlofsk, a detached
little-known episode of the Crimean war, was an event of
great importance in the Far East. It occurred at the most
opportune moment and under the most favourable circum-
stances to further the far-reaching plans of Muravioff:
it happened immediately after the first navigation on the
Amur, and victory was won through the reinforcements
sent down that river ; the unlooked-for success in a remote
region contrasted forcibly with the uniform misfortunes
attending the Eussian arms in the other military operations
at home.

' Barsukoff states 350, Eagoza 300 ; these figures must be near the
truth, as Du Hailly confesses the allies lost a third of the landing party —
700 men.

THE ANNEXATION OF THE AMUR REGION 225

The news of the victory spread rapidly through Siberia,
arousing the greatest enthusiasm. The cause of the suc-
cess was so plain that it appeared evident to all. Bishop
Innocent, writing to congratulate Muravioff, said that
without the men and provisions sent via the Amur ' now
Petropavlofsk would be in ashes. Therefore it is doubtful
whether you have more cause for joy on account of the
timely opening of the Amur or on account of the saving
of Kamchatka, which has so clearly shown the utility of
the opening of that river.'

It had always been very difficult for Muravioff to arouse
public interest in the Amur, as all were indifferent to that
remote region. When he was in St. Petersburg, out of regard
for his earnest patriotism they good-naturedly consented
to listen to his plans, but as soon as he left for Irkutsk
the subject was generally forgotten. The events of the
war now directed the attention of public-spirited persons to
the Far East. When Major Korsakoff, sent by Mm-avioff to
report the first successful navigation of the Amur, arrived
at the railway station of St. Petersburg, he was ordered
at once, without being allowed to change his travelling
uniform, to the War Office, and thence to the Tsesarie-
vitch,^ and to Grand Duke Constantine. The minutest
inquiries were made about the expedition. The Tsesarie-
vitch read Muravioff' s report, in which he declared that
Russia had gained ' firm footing on the Amur,' and
modestly added that success was entirely •' due to Nevel-
skoy, Kasakievitch, and Korsakoff.' ' Muravioff forgets
to mention himself,' remarked the Prince. On the follow-
ing day Korsakoff was presented to the Tsar Nicholas,
who embraced him, and announced the promotion of all
the officers of the expedition.

' The proper Russian name of the Heu'-apparent — not Tsarwitch, as
is usually written in the newspapers of Western Europe.

Q

226 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

The news of the victory of Petropavlofsk coming
shortly afterwards increased the general interest in the
Far East, and convinced the most sceptical that Muravioff
was not a visionary, and that his plans to defend Kam-
chatka via the Amur were of practical utility. His
foresight and activity had spared Kussia a disaster in the
Pacific at the time she was suffering misfortunes in the
Black Sea.

We have seen that Muravioff left Ay an on August 20,
1854 — the same day the allies made their first attack on
Petropavlofsk — eii route for Irkutsk, which he reached on
September 20 ; here he met Yolkonski, who had been
charged with the inspection of the settlements along the
postal road to Ayan. The young nobleman had fulfilled
his duties so satisfactorily that he was intrusted with the
execution of a more important project : the settlement of
peasants on the banks of the Lower Amur.

Muravioff was not unduly elated by the victory at
Petropavlofsk, and wisely foresaw the necessity of pre-
paring for a more serious attack during the continuance
of the war, which promised to be a long one. The mili-
tary operations in the Far East were carried on under
exceptional circumstances of a very curious nature, which
gave rise to many strange incidents. The Russian forces
concentrated in Transbaikalia were at a great distance
from the points liable to be attacked : Kamchatka and
the coasts of the sea of Okhotsk, and the gulf of Tartary.
On the other hand, the more rapid sea communications
of the allies were rendered useless by the fact that, owing
to the severity of the climate, navigation is impossible
along these coasts for many months. We have thus the
curious spectacle of Muravioff, at Irkutsk, almost in the
centre of Asia, studying the preparations of the allied
fleet, and leisurely providing measures for baffling their

THE ANNEXATION OF THE AMUR REGION 227

attacks. He is first warned from St. Petersburg that the
allies have decided to revenge their repulse at Petropav-
lofsk by renewing the attack in great force next summer ;
then later (in a letter of February 25, 1855), he remarks
that the papers report the preparations for the attack, and
the appointment of a new French admiral who was still
at Brest on January 15 ; he therefore calculates that the
fleet probably will not appear on the coast before the end
of June or beginning of July. These circumstances, skil-
fully utilised by Muravioff's activity and prompt decision,
together with the enemy's ignorance of the coast, rendered
the naval operations of 1855 as inglorious for the allied
squadron as those of the preceding year.

The winter suspension of hostile operations allowed
Muravioff to attend to the principal objects which required
his attention : the safety of Petropavlofsk and of the
Russian squadron ; the preparations for a second and
larger expedition down the Amur, able to repulse any
landing of the allies ; the selection and equipment of a
body of peasants willing to settle on the banks of the
Amur between Mariinsk and Nikolaiefsk.

As soon as Muravioff was informed from St. Petersburg
of the preparations for a more formidable attack on Petro-
pavlofsk, he recognised the impossibility of a successful
defence before the arrival of powerful reinforcements,
which unfortunately could not be despatched in time. He
therefore took a decision, heroic in his case, as it entailed
the sacrifice of his cherished plan — one of the first he had
conceived when he arrived as Governor-General in Siberia ;
he ordered the abandonment of the naval port in the bay
of Avacha, He readily judged that as Petropavlofsk could
not be successfully defended, the garrison being also short
of provisions, it must be forthwith abandoned. The
decision, promptly taken, had to be rapidly executed, as

Q. 2

228 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

the delay, even of a day, might cause the destruction of
the Eussian squadron. There was no time to consult
St. Petersburg, and Muravioff assumed the heavy respon-
sibility of issuing orders, on his own authority, to Admiral
Zavoiko to evacuate Petropavlofsk and remove the garrison
and even the civil population. The order was given to
Martynojff, his aide-de-camp, who, starting in the beginning
of December, travelled the most inhospitable region of
Siberia in the depth of winter.

On October 30, 1854, Muravioff had addressed a
despatch to the Chinese Foreign Office, in which, after
drawing attention to the fact that Colonel Zaborinski had
not been allowed to proceed to Peking, he requested that a
place should be appointed for the plenipotentiaries to meet
and settle the frontier question. He also announced his
intention of descending the Amur next summer, with an
armed force for protecting the sea-coast against the attacks
of England and France.

Great preparations were made during the winter for
the second expedition down the Amur, which was to be
on a far larger scale than the first. The military force alone
was to consist of about 3,000 men, besides the settlers and
their families, recruited by Volkonski. A thousand men
were employed on the Shilka in building about 130 barges,
capable of transporting over 7,000 tons of cargo. For the
defence of the coast and the mouth of the Amur, Muravioff
intended to bring down fortress artillery with a large
supply of ammunition. The transport of this heavy
material illustrates the natural capacity of the Eussians
in coping with the difficulties of land carriage across im-
mense distances. The artillery was brought all the way
from Tobolsk and Yekaterinburg, a distance of 4,000
versts, as many as sixty horses being harnessed to the

THE ANNEXATION OF THE AMUR BEGION 229

guns, the roads, especially in the hilly country of Trans-
baikalia, presenting great difficulties.

Volkonski, in the meanwhile, was busy in choosing
peasants and providing for their comfortable settlement in
the desolate region of the lower Amur. At last fifty-one
families, consisting of 481 individuals, were selected,
and, besides a large supply of provisions, they were pro-
vided with cattle, seed, and agricultural implements : the
Buriats generously offered 500 head of horned cattle to
these pioneer settlers on the Amur.

Martynoff, who had left Irkutsk in the beginning of
December, 1854, proceeded by Yakutsk, Okhotsk, and the
wild coast land of the Okhotsk sea in dog sledges, reached
Petropavlofsk on March 3, 1855, having covered the dis-
tance of 8,000 versts in the unprecedentedly quick time of
three months. The defenders of Petropavlofsk, though
they had only a scanty stock of provisions, were prepared
to die at their posts ; they were, therefore, greatly surprised
at the unexpected order to evacuate the place, arm the
ships, and remove the inhabitants and all movable pro-
perty. Admiral Zavoiko carried out the orders with great
alacrity, and by March 30 he had shipped over 1,400 tons
of various goods, and had his seven vessels armed and
ready for sea. As the harbour of Petropavlofsk was not
yet free, a passage w^as sawn through the ice into the
larger Avacha bay, and on April 5 the whole fleet sailed
for De Castries. The English vessels ' Encounter ' and
* Barracouta ' were cruising about, watching the entrance
of the bay ; but a fog enabled the Russians to elude their
vigilance. The small force left at Petropavlofsk was
placed under the command of Martynoff, with orders to
retreat inland at the approach of the allied squadron. To
preserve communications with Kamchatka, a small vessel

230 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

was stationed at Bolsherietzk ^ with a chain of Cossack
pickets extending up to Petropavlofsk.

The allied squadron in the Pacific was as unsuccessful
in 1855 as in the preceding year : the French admiral had
died and had been succeeded by Admiral Fourichon ; the
supreme command, however, devolved on the English
admiral, Bruce, who decided to collect a powerful force
for the destruction of Petropavlofsk and the Russian fleet.
The rendezvous of the scattered vessels was fixed at the
southern extremity of Kamchatka, and there was a steeple-
chase in the Pacific, all the English and French ships
converging to the appointed spot. The combined squadron
consisted of five French and nine English vessels, with a
total of 450 guns ; a force quite sufficient to achieve its
object. Unfortunately, a great mistake had been com-
mitted in choosing a point too far from Petropavlofsk for
the concentration of the fleet, which thus could not observe
closely the movements of the enemy.

Two vessels, as we have seen, had been sent to
watch Avacha bay on April 2 (14), but three days later
the Russians succeeded in slipping away in a fog. A
month later, on May 2 (14), Admiral Bruce arrived
at the rendezvous and immediately sailed with the
whole squadron to Petropavlofsk, but when he arrived
on May 8 (20), the Russians had left more than
a month before, and he found the place deserted, the
American flag flying over the houses of a few foreign
traders.

Admiral Bruce started in search of the Russian fleet,
and as vessels from the China squadron had been ordered
to search in the gulf of Tartary, he sailed for Alaska,
reaching Sitka on July 1 (13), 1855. Again he was

' On the opposite (west) coast of the peninsula, almost on the same
parallel as Petropavlofsk.

THE ANNEXATION OF THE AMUR REGION 231

disappointed, as the Russian fleet was not there and
the settlement was not worth destroying, because the few
traders demanded to be taken on board in case their
defences against the natives were dismantled. We must
now return to the Russian squadron, which by the rapid
execution of Muravioif's orders had escaped destruction.

Admiral Zavoiko's squadron transporting the garrison
and refugees from Petropavlofsk, consisted of the following
vessels : the frigate ' Aurora ; ' the corvette ' Olivutza,'
which arriving too late to take part in the defence of
Petropavlofsk had remained there for the winter ; the
transports ' Dvina,' ' Irtysh,' ' Baikal,' and a boat. The
navigation was difficult and tedious along the coasts of
Kamchatka and in the sea of Okhotsk, taking up the
greater part of the month : the frigate * Aurora ' arrived
at Imperatorski bay on April 25, and on the follow-
ing day was joined by the corvette ' Olivutza.' They
found at anchor the frigate ' Pallada,' which had not been
able to get over the bar of the Amur, and had been obliged
to winter at Imperatorski bay : as she was old and unfit
for active service, an officer and ten men had been left on
board with orders to set fire to the ship if the enemy
approached.

The commander of the ' Olivutza,' on his way from
Petropavlofsk, had met an American whaler and was
informed that an allied fleet of seven sailing vessels
and a steamer had left Honolulu for San Francisco
on January 26, to purchase stores and prepare for
an early attack on Petropavlofsk. This was very serious
news, because, unless unexpectedly delayed, the allies
ought to have already reached the coast of Kamchatka,
and on finding the Russian fleet had escaped, they must
have sailed in pursuit with the indications they were sure
to obtain from the whalers in the sea of Okhotsk. Admiral

232 BUS SI A ON THE PACIFIC

Zavoiko therefore held a council of war, which decided it
was unsafe to remain at Imperatorski bay, and urged the
necessity of retiring further north. The * Aurora ' and
' Olivutza ' sailed at once, and on May 1 anchored in
De Castries bay, where they found the transports ' Dvina '
and 'Irtysh.'

The small Russian squadron was still in a very
dangerous situation. Nevelskoy came to De Castries over-
land, and announced that the mouth of the Amur would
not be free from ice before the end of May or beginning
of June. On the other hand it was known that a portion
of the English China squadron had been detached to
blockade the sea of Okhotsk and the gulf of Tartary.
An overpowering allied force might therefore arrive at any
time from the broad southern entrance of the gulf of
Tartary, before escape was possible through the narrow
northern part of the gulf, where the sea, owing to the^
proximity of the coasts and the cold currents from the sea
of Okhotsk, remains ice-bound much later.

The Russians, in constant expectation of being attacked,
cleared their ships for action and kept a vigilant watch.
They had not long to wait, for on May 8,^ the same
day that Admiral Bruce arrived at Petropavlofsk, an
English squadron composed of a frigate, a steam corvette,
and a brig, hove in sight. Towards evening the steam
corvette entered the bay, took soundings, and, after ex-
changing a few shots with the Russian vessels at anchor,
withdrew, joining the rest of the squadron outside the bay.
Admiral Zavoiko expected to be attacked on the following
morning, but the English squadron retired to some
distance, and on May 11 was no longer visible from
De Castries. The rest of the naval operations were so

' Here Du Hailly gives the same date, May 20 (May 8, Russian style) ;
probably after cruising on the coast of Japan he had found the true date.

THE ANNEXATION OF THE AMUB BEGION 233

curious, and the English commander was so severely
blamed for the measures he adopted, that a circumstantial
explanation is necessary.

The Russian force consisted of the ' Aurora,' 16 guns,
the ' Olivutza,' 16 guns, besides the transport 'Dvina,' with
probably a few more guns, and three other transports. The
English commander. Sir Charles Elliott, had the 40-gun
frigate ' Sybille,' the 17-gun screw-corvette ' Hornet,' and
the 12-gun brig ' Bittern ; ' he was therefore blamed for not
having attacked at once the Eussian squadron with his
three vessels. But it must be borne in mind that at that
time the discoveries of Nevelskoy about the geography of
Eastern Asia were unknown out of Bussia : it was gene-
rally supposed that Saghalien was a peninsula with an
isthmus joining it to the mainland, south of the mouth of
the Amur, where now the straits of Cape Lazareff are
known to exist. Commodore Elliott therefore judged
that, as the Bussians could not retreat further, being con-
fined in the narrow extremity of the gulf of Tartary, it
would be sufficient to watch them at a distance, to prevent
all escape southwards until reinforcements arrived. He
preferred this safer course to the risk of attacking with
his small squadron the six Bussian vessels, anchored in a
little-known bay where an accident on a shoal or rock
might have disabled one of his ships. He could not know
at the time that, owing to the necessity'- for transporting
the whole garrison and inhabitants of Petropavlofsk,
besides a large cargo, even the guns of the ' Aurora ' were
unserviceable. He despatched the brig ' Bittern ' to
Admiral Stirling on May 11, and remained with his
other two vessels to prevent the escape of the Bussian
fleet.

A council of war was held by Admiral Zavoiko with
Nevelskoy and the commanders of the other vessels, in

234 BUS SI A ON THE PACIFIC

which it was decided to fight to the last in case of attack.
But on May 14 an officer sent to reconnoitre came back
with the welcome news that the ice had broken up and
the sea was free up to Cape Lazareff. On May 15, under
cover of a fog, the whole squadron sailed out of De
Castries and steered north. On the 18th Zavoiko met
the American brig '"William Penn,' with a part of the
crew of the Eussian frigate ' Dvina,' which had been
destroyed by a seismic wave on the coast of Japan,
These shipwrecked men had first come to Petropavlofsk,
and finding it abandoned had returned to De Castries in
time to meet the Eussian fleet. Fogs, fresh winds, and
the strong current in the narrow channel, rendered the
progress of the Eussians very slow, and not till May 24
did they reach Cape Lazareff. Here, according to the
arrangements made by Muravioff, they began to fortify
their advantageous position. The straits are only four
miles broad, and the navigable channel still narrower.
On shore there were 200 men, formerly belonging to the
' Pallada,' working hard to erect fortifications, and on
May 28 they had eight guns mounted ready for service.
Telegraph stations were also established on all the head-
lands. But on the morning of May 27 a messenger
arrived from Muravioff, who had come down the Amur,
with orders for the fleet to retreat further north and take
shelter in the Amur.

In the meanwhile Commodore Elliott, anxious to keep
watch on the Eussian vessels, returned to De Castries on
May 16, and was amazed to find they had disappeared.
Landing parties ^ were sent ashore, but they only found
the personal effects of a Kamchatka apothecary. As the

' Even this landing would not have been possible if Muravioff's orders
had been strictly carried out, as the commander of the Kizi post should
have proceeded to defend De Castries ; but he was sick, and had not been
informed by Zavoiko or Nevelskoy of the approach of the English.

THE ANNEXATION OF THE AMUR BEGION 235

imaginary isthmus precluded all possibility of escape to
the north, the English vessels immediately sailed south,
in the opposite direction to Cape Lazareff, where Zavoiko
was preparing his defence, and carefully explored the
whole gulf of Tartary, in the vain hope of finding the
Russians concealed in some bay. The French vessels in
the China Sea were not able to give much assistance, as
they had been damaged by running aground and their
crews were suffering from scurvy ; only one was able to
join Commodore Elliott. After a long, fruitless search in
the gulf of Tartary, the allies concluded that the Eussian
squadron must have passed unperceived in the fog, have
circumnavigated SaghaUen, and sought refuge in the sea
of Okhotsk. This was also a very little known region,
but some vague reports mentioned Ayan as the new
naval station in that sea, and it was chosen for the next
attack.

Muravioff, as early as February 18, 1855, had for-
warded another despatch to Peking. After describing the
unsuccessful attack of the allies on Petropavlofsk, he
declared his intention, in accordance with instructions
from his sovereign, to proceed down the Amur as soon
as the river was open for navigation, and lead a second
expedition vnth artillery and provisions to the mouth of
the Amur to repulse the probable attacks of the allied
fleet. This second expedition, which was much larger
than the first, was unable to start as early as Muravioff
had intended. He had fixed April 16 for the day of
departure, in order to be at Kizi on May 6, even before
the mouth of the Amur would be free from ice. The
arrival of the squadron of Commodore Elliott at De
Castries bay on May 8 shows with what careful foresight
Muravioff timed his arrangements. Muravioff, with his
usual alacrity, was at Nertchinsk on April 6, but he found

236 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

the preparations for the coming embarkation in a very
backward state, and he blamed his subordinates for
their slowness. In his anxiety to inspect the prepa-
rations lower down the river, he proceeded on horse-
back by dangerous mountain paths with a single Cossack
guide.

To avoid the confusion which had been experienced in
the first expedition, the second was divided into three
sections. They were to start separately, some days after
each other. The first was to consist of twenty-six barges,
carrying half a battalion of Cossacks, under the command
of Muravioff himself ; the second, of fifty-two ^ barges,
was to convey the 15th line battalion ; and the third, of
thirty-five barges, half of the 14th line battalion ; about
8,000 men in all. Most minute instructions were issued
in advance, ordering the men to become acquainted not
only with their several boats, but with all the cargo
which was to be embarked. Notwithstanding Muravioff's
foresight and activity, there was some confusion, and he
was able to start only at the beginning of May with
thirteen barges, leaving some of his staff to bring down
the remainder of the boats of the first section.

In the meanwhile the Chinese had sent a despatch
proposing that the Bussian and Chinese plenipotentiaries
should meet at Urga, and proceed to Gorbitza and settle
the frontier question. Muravioff, while descending the
Amur, sent an answer on May 8, stating that, as he had
amiounced on February 18, he was at present engaged in
leading reinforcements to the mouth of the Amur. He
would remain there until September and be ready to
treat this important question with the plenipotentiaries
that should be sent for the purpose. A few days later,
on May 12, Muravioff met four junks with Chinese

' Barsukoff states 64 barges.

THE ANNEXATION OF THE AMUR BEGION 237

officials proceeding to Gorbitza to erect posts and delimit
the frontier. He repeated to them the same arguments,
requesting that they should return to Aigun and wait
further instructions from Peking. The mandarins dared
not disobey the orders they had received, and continued
their voyage up river provided v^ith passports from the
Eussian authorities.

When Muravioff reached Aigun he forwarded a
despatch to the Chinese governor, informing him that
he was proceeding to the mouth of the Amur to protect
it against the English ; that 104 large boats, including a
steamer, were to follow, transporting 300 horses, 300
cattle, and over 8,000 persons of both sexes, besides
cannon, rifles, and war material. He requested that the
vessels should not be detained. This information greatly
surprised the Chinese, as from the numbers of the expe-
dition and the presence of cattle they perceived that the
Russians intended to establish permanent settlements on
the Amur.

When Muravioff reached the lower Amur he at once
issued orders that Admiral Zavoiko should take command
of the vessels and men which had been serving under
Nevelskoy, while the latter was appointed chief of the
staff of Muravioff, who as commander-in-chief of all the
land and sea forces established his headquarters at the
post of Mariinsk, which by the convenient waterways of
the Amur and Lake Kizi could communicate readily with
Nikolaiefsk and De Castries. As we have seen, the vessels
composing the squadron from Petropavlofsk, men-of-war
and transports, had been ordered to retire at once into
the Amur at Nikolaiefsk, whither fortress artillery had been
brought for their protection. The defence of De Castries,
abandoned by the fleet, was intrusted to a detachment of
500 Cossack infantry.

238 BUSSIA ON TEE PACIFIC

During these active military preparations to repulse
the possible attacks of a formidable enemy, Prince
Volkonski was quietly occupied in establishing his
settlers on the banks of the lower Amur, as if the pro-
foundest peace reigned in the country. The settlers, on
twelve barges, formed part of the second section of the
expedition, and started on May 14, 1855. They suffered
much during the voyage, some boats running aground in
the shallow rapid Shilka ; the cattle dying from want of
food, which could not be obtained from the other boats
that had continued their course. On the Amur naviga-
tion was more pleasant, as the great increase of water
enabled them to float over islands and their submerged
trees ; but typhus broke out and spread rapidly. The
disease, however, was not of a very serious character, as
only two deaths occurred, and this loss was more than
compensated by the four births that took place during
the voyage.

When the settlers reached Mariinsk on June 13, they
were informed that places for their future villages had
already been chosen by Nevelskoy ; but Prince Vol-
konski sagaciously surmised that the choice had been
dictated by purely military considerations, without taking
into account the necessities of men obliged to cultivate
the soil for their sustenance. He therefore persuaded
Muravioff to allow a committee of the oldest peasants to
survey the banks of the lower Amur and select the most
appropriate places for establishing agricultural settle-
ments. The results of their exploration fully justified the
measure proposed by Prince Volkonski, for only one of
the places indicated by Nevelskoy was found fit for the
purpose for which it was intended. Four settlements
were thus formed on the right bank ^ and one on the left

' Irkutskoe, Bogorodskoe, Mikhailofskoe, Novo Mikhailofskoe.

THE ANNEXATION OF THE AMUR BEGION 239

bank ^ of the Amur. A colony of Cossacks was also esta-
blished on an island opposite to the post of Mariinsk.

While the Russians had withdrawn their vessels to
Nikolaiefsk and were busy fortifying and colonising the
lower Amur, the allied fleet was cruising about in the
fruitless search for the Eussian squadron which had so
mysteriously disappeared from Petropavlofsk and De
Castries. On June 27 an English frigate appeared at
Ayan, and found it in the same condition as Petro-
pavlofsk and De Castries — no ships in harbour and the
inhabitants withdrawn into the interior ; she therefore
left on July 9,

On the same day Archbishop Innocent, the friend of
Muravioff and the strenuous supporter of his schemes for
the development of Eastern Siberia, arrived at Ayan.
He immediately commenced comforting the inhabitants,
who had retired to the woods at twelve versts from the
town, christening their infants and celebrating divine
service. On July 21 an English frigate again appeared,
and was followed by another on the 22nd, when the
officers landed. A curious incident then took place. The
English officers, being informed of the presence of an
Archbishop, proceeded to his house, but found he had
gone to church. On their arrival there they found Inno-
cent, in the imposing dress of the Orthodox Church, on
his knees, earnestly praying for the success of the Tsar
against his enemies. The officers patiently waited until
the end of the service, when they informed the Arch-
bishop (probably as a joke) that they were compelled to
take him prisoner. Innocent, however, entered into the
humour of the situation, declaring that he was not a
military man and could be of no use, and added, 'You
see, you will have to feed me.' The English officers then

' Serghiefskoe.

240 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

invited the Archbishop on board, drank his health with
champagne, and released a Kussian pope who had been
made prisoner when the allied squadron had captm-ed on
July 22 (Aug. 3) a Bremen ship with 300 ilussian sailors,
the remainder of the crew of the ' Dvina.'

The English made another attempt to capture
Zavoiko's vessels in October, when Admiral Stirling
ordered Commodore Elliott to sail up the gulf of Tartary.
Hopes were entertained that at this advanced period of
the year the Russians would be obliged to retire to their
winter quarters, and could be surprised taking shelter at
De Castries bay. The commander of the 500 Cossacks
who had been stationed for the defence of this place by
Muravioff, having waited in vain to be attacked until the
beginning of October, had in the meanwhile retired to
Mariinsk, leaving only a detachment of seventy men,' with
two mountain guns. On October 3 (15) a frigate and two
screw-corvettes appeared at De Castries, to the great
surprise of the small garrison ; a courier was sent at once
to Mariinsk for reinforcements, while the Cossacks occu-
pied an advantageous position on the skirts of the wood
which fringes the bay. The English landed about 400
men, who were at once exposed to a heavy fire from the
Russians concealed in the forest. The English replied
with grape-shot, but as they could not discover the force
of the enemy, and the experience of Petropavlofsk had
taught the danger of venturing rashly into an unknown
country, they retired to their boats.

During the afternoon the vessels shelled the shore,
doing, however, little damage, as the Russians had only
one man killed and one wounded. The shelling from
the ships continued for several days, but the slender

' Barsukoff states 120 men.

THE ANNEXATION OF THE AMUB BEGION 241

chances of success the English might have had on the
first day were rapidly diminishing as reinforcements
successively arrived. On October 4 the Russian com-
mander came back from Mariinsk ; on the 6th a company
of Cossacks arrived, and was followed by 200 more
on the following day. On October 17 the Enghsh
squadron set sail, thus putting an end to all warlike
operations for 1855. In the following year Commander
Elliott, resuming his cruise in the gulf of Tartary, acci-
dentally discovered Imperatorski bay, till then unknown
to all except the Russians, and found there the burnt hull
of the ' Pallada.'

The naval operations of the allies in the Far East were
uniformly unsuccessful owing to their ignorance of the
country and to the rapid measures of defence taken by
Muravioff. The operations in 1854 were terminated by
the disaster of Petropavlofsk, and the following year was
spent in long fruitless cruises around the supposed penin-
sula of Saghalien in search of the Russian fleet, which had
quietly retired through the straits, where the imagination
of geographers had placed an isthmus.

Muravioff, besides superintending the defence of the
coast, had in the meantime commenced negotiations with
the Chinese about the frontier question. In compliance
with his request, Chinese plenipotentiaries had been sent
down the Amur, and on September 8 they reached his
headquarters at Mariinsk.

The first conference was held on September 9. Mura-
vioff, being sick, w^as represented by Admiral Zavoiko,
who, after repeating the usual arguments about the
necessity of protecting the mouth of the Amur against
the aggression of foreign powers, made the following
proposals :

1. That all the places which had been occupied for

R

242 RUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

the above purpose, as well as all the coast, should defi-
nitely belong to Eussia.

2. That to secure uninterrupted communications, both
in winter and summer, between the troops and fortresses
at the mouth of the Amur and the inland provinces (as
communications by land over the mountains had been
found practically impossible) , it was necessary to have a
chain of settlements on the left bank of the Amur, which
would thus constitute the best natural frontier between
the two empires. By this means Eastern Siberia would
be protected from naval attack, and all cause of future
disagreement between Eussia and China would be
removed.

The Chinese plenipotentiaries asked that the proposal
should be made in writing, and at the second meeting,
which took place on September 11, they read to Mura-
vioff, who had recovered from his illness, the note of the
Eussian Senate of June 16, 1853 — the foolish document
by which Nesselrode had compromised the whole question
of the Amur. Muravioff, however, skilfully eluded the
effects of the weak despatch by remarking that the
earnest desire of the Eussian Government was the per-
manent maintenance of peaceful relations between the
two great neighbouring empires of China and Eussia.
He then requested the plenipotentiaries to communicate
to the authorities of Peking his intention of sending
another expedition down the Amur, and of establishing
permanent communications between the troops and
fortresses at the mouth of the river and the inland
provinces.

After giving instructions for the construction of three
powerful forts, mounting fifty-three guns, to defend
Nikolaiefsk, which had now become the centre of the
Eussian forces and the shelter of the fleet, Muravioff

THE ANNEXATION OF THE AMUR BEGION 243

started for Irkutsk, choosing, as on former occasions, the
route by Ayan. He embarked on the American vessel
' Palmetto,' the first foreign ship to reach the Amur by
the southern passage discovered by Nevelskoy. Leaving
Nikolaiefsk on October 1 he narrowly escaped capture by
an enemy's ship, and after a very rough passage reached
Ayan on October 18. He arrived at Irkutsk towards
the end of December, nearly three months after his
departure from Nikolaiefsk.

From Irkutsk Muravioff issued instructions for a third
expedition down the Amur in the following summer.
The Chinese merchants trading on the frontier then
spread the report that their Government intended to
prevent any further navigation on the Amur, a large armj^
being concentrated for this purpose in Southern Mongolia.
Though such rumours deserved little credit, it was neces-
sary to obtain accurate information on a subject of such
importance, and on January 12, 1856, Volkonski was sent
in the severe Mongolian winter with forty-one degrees of
frost to Urga. After a very friendly conversation with
the Amban, or Mongolian official, it was discovered that
the Chinese were making no military preparations for
sending an army to the Amur.

Freed from all apprehensions on this account, Muravioff -
saw the expediency of proceeding to St. Petersburg to
communicate directly with his Government, especially as
great administrative changes were probable in the new
reign of Alexander II., who had succeeded his father
Nicholas at the beginning of 1855. A number of expe-^
rienced officials had now been chosen and trained during
several years for the special work on the Amur, and they
could be trusted to carry out their instructions during
their chief's absence. Colonel Korsakoff and Lieut. -
Colonel Busse were appointed to superintend the

E 2

244 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

preparations and command the coming expedition down
the river.

The conditions of the Eussian forces on the lower
Amur during the winter were satisfactory, thanks to the
extraordinary activity and intelligence displayed by the
commanders. It is necessary to bear in mind that in the
spring of 1854 the posts of Nikolaiefsk and Mariinsk con-
tained lodgings only for thirty-eight men, and that by the
arrival of the successive expeditions down the Amur in
1854 and 1855, by the sudden evacuation of Petropavlofsk,
and by the retreat of the fleet in the Amur, about 7,000
people of both sexes were concentrated in those places.
Warm houses and provisions were provided for all this
large population, notwithstanding that the whole coast
was blockaded by the allied fleet, and that through the
absence of Eussian posts on the Amur all communica-
tions with the interior were impossible.

As Muravioff had foreseen, his presence in St. Peters-
burg was much needed. The Chinese Government had
complained about his occupation of places on the Amur,
and the Eussian Foreign Oflice, with the self-satisfied
consciousness of scoring a diplomatic success of the highest
order, intended to demand the right of navigation on that
river, and permission to establish on its banks certain
stations for storage of provisions and fuel. But Muravioif,
who had now become fully aware of the visionary nature
of the Chinese claims to sovereignty on the left bank of
the AiTiur, justly considered these demands insufficient
and dangerous to the true interests of Eussia in the Far
East. He therefore applied for and obtained his appoint-
ment as plenipotentiary for the negotiation of a new
'- treaty with China.

Having secured this important appointment, which
gave him the means of settling the future interests of that

THE ANNEXATION OF THE AMUR REGION 245

Eastern Siberia w hich he loved so well, Muravioff was able
to attend to his health again, much impaired by hard work
and the severity of the climate. After sending minute
instructions to Korsakoff about the next navigation on
the Amur, advising him to avoid all collision with the
Chinese, and even to bear threats with patience, he retired
to his favourite German health resort.

The war in Europe had been concluded by the treaty —
of Paris, but as the third military expedition was already
organised, it started down the Amur in the middle of
May 1856. It was composed of 110 boats and rafts con- "^
veying 1,636 men and 24 officers of the 13th and 14th
line battalions ; on May 21 it had reached Aigun, and —
Korsakoff went ashore to confer with the Chinese man-
darins. He explained that a large number of vessels
would proceed up and down river during the summer, and
that provisions and garrisons would be stationed on the
left bank of the Amur. The Chinese answered that,
although they had received no instructions about the
navigation of the river, still they would not restrict the
free movements of the Russian vessels ; but they objected
to the establishment of garrisons and storehouses on the
left bank. Korsakoff answered that he was obliged to
carry out the instructions of the Governor-General Mura-
vioff, and requested the mandarins of Aigun to report the
matter to Peking. The Chinese were very anxious to
know the number of Russian troops at the mouth of the
river, and Korsakoff told them there were about 10,000,
and 5,000 more were expected. They were still more
disagreeably surprised when they heard that 500 men
were going to be stationed at the mouth of the Zeya
opposite to Aigun. -|-

In consequence of the negotiations of Korsakoff, ""
Lieut. -Colonel Busse was able to proceed down river with

246 RUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

the third expedition without any opposition, and to found
four posts on the left bank : Kumarski, opposite the
mouth of the Kumara, with 25 men ; Ust-Zeiski, at the
mouth of the Zeya, with 50 men ; Khinganski, at the
commencement of the mountain-chain of the Little
Khingan, with 24 men ; and Sungariiski, opposite the
-mouth of the Sungari, also with 24 men. Thus, a few
months after the treaty of Paris, the Eussians were
already established on the whole course of the Amur, with
a series of well-chosen posts on the left bank. The Amur
had virtually become a Russian river, and it was only
necessary to obtain the sanction of the Chinese to what
had already been accomplished. This was a question
which required only a little time and patience, and it
was settled by Muravioff with his usual tact and
firmness.

The brilliant achievements of the period 1854-56, the
successful defence against the allied fleet, the three expe-
ditions down the Amur, the occupation of the Pacific
Coast, and the establishment of posts on the left bank of
the Amur had been effected with very little loss of life,
even the victory of Petropavlofsk having been cheaply
won. But a blind adherence to orders given conditionally,
and intended to be interpreted with discretion, marked the
end of 1856 with a sad catastrophe, the terrible details of
which are still remembered on the Amur. Muravioff,
from St. Petersburg, had given instructions that on the
conclusion of peace the greater part of the troops stationed
on the lower Amur should return to Transbaikalia.
General Korsakoff, who was Military Governor in the
absence of Muravioff, issued orders to this effect about
the middle of April, and at the same time made prepara-
tions for forwarding provisions to all the newly established
posts on the Amur to revictual the troops as they jour-

THE ANNEXATION OF THE AMUR REGION 247

neyed up the river. Three transports started successively
on June 4, 9, and 12, carrying provisions for 2,700 men
to be distributed in the following order : — five days'
rations at Ust-Strielk and Kutomanda,^ ten days' rations
at Kumarska and Ust-Zeya, and twenty days' rations at
Ust-Sungari.

These prudent measures were absolutely necessary,
because the distance to be traversed by the homeward-
bound troops from Mariinsk to Ust-Strielk, over 2,300
versts, was at that time a barren waste, where it was
difficult and in many places impossible to obtain even a
scanty supply of food. The navigation against the
stream, and in a late season of the year, was also difficult ;
the current of the Amur is very swift, and, unless favour-
able winds allow the use of sails, vessels can only slowly
advance by tracking when the banks are suitable ; if these
are swampy or rocky, rowing becomes the only means of
propulsion, and progress is still slower. When the
waters of the Amur are low and the current less im-
petuous, it is possible always to keep in the main stream,
but it becomes extremely difficult even to distinguish it
when the waters rise. From its mouth up to the con-
fluence of the Zeya, a distance of 2,000 versts, with the
exception of the rapids of the Little Khingan, where for
over 100 versts the bed is confined between hilly banks,
the Amur has often a width of 30 versts, and it is hard
to discover the main course of the river in the immense
expanse of surging waters. In the long toilsome journey,
rowing and tracking among islands and along the
sinuous banks, mistakes were often made — an affluent
being taken for the main river ; thus a whole day was
spent in tracking up the Kumara until its direction due

' This name is not found on the maps ; it must have been near Albazin,
judging by the distances from Kumarska and Ust-Strielk.

248 RUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

south revealed that it could not be the Amur. The Cossacks
and soldiers were unaccustomed to these difficulties, as in
their navigations dovi^n the Amur the current itself infal-
libly indicated the course to the sea.

The troops ordered to return to Transbaikalia were
composed of Cossacks and infantry ; the former, stationed
among the Ghiliacks, were able to purchase native boats
and were soon ready to start ; the latter encountered
greater difficulties, having to wait for the arrival of vessels,
or even being obliged to build boats themselves. The
homeward-bound expedition was divided into three detach-
ments.

The first, commanded by Colonel Seslavin, numbering
about 1,000 men, started about the middle of June, only
a few weeks after the official notification of the conclusion
of peace had reached the lower Amur. After surmounting
great difficulties it reached the Russian borders in good
condition at the commencement of winter, the different
parties arriving at Ust-Strielk between September 25 and
October 8.

The second detachment, commanded by Major Yazykoff,
numbering over 800 men, started somewhat later, about
the end of June, and was less fortunate ; many of the
men had contracted fever in the lower Amur, and were
too weak to withstand the continuous hard work. Heavy
mortality broke out among the troops, especially between
the stations of Kumarska and Kutomanda, a distance of
400 versts, which should have been covered in ten days, but
which took up fifteen, and in some cases twenty, days. The
men, having received only ten days' rations at Kumarska,
suffered great distress for want of food, and many perhaps
would have died of starvation if they had not luckily found,
at 50 versts from Kutomanda, a barge laden with provisions,
which had run aground during the preceding summer.

THE ANNEXATION OF THE AMUR REGION 249

The third detachment, commanded by Colonel Oblen-
khoff, numbering nearlj'^ 400 men, started very late, as it
received orders while conveying cargo on the river, and had
to proceed first to Mariinsk, and then prepare for the long,
fatiguing homeward journey. Notwithstanding the utmost
despatch, their preparations could not be finished before
the end of July, a month after the departure of the second
detachment. Admiral Kazakievitch strongly dissuaded
Oblenkhoff from starting so late in the summer, advising
him to postpone his departure to next year and to winter
at Nikolaiefsk. The orders given by Karsakoff were con-
ditional, Oblenkhoff being instructed to start only in case
he were able to do so early ; but the latter was anxious to
return to Transbaikalia, and he hoped to distinguish him-
self by accomplishing the arduous journey even under the
most unfavourable conditions.

The ill-fated detachment left Mariinsk on July 27, and
arrived at the appointed time on October 8 at Kumarska
without having suffered from scarcity of provisions ; but
on resuming the journey, at only five versts from that
post, ice appeared on the river in such quantities as to
render it impossible to proceed in boats. The troops had
to return to Kumarska and wait, in roughly built huts,
nearly three weeks until the ice on the river was suffi-
ciently thick. On October 28, as soon as the river was
frozen hard, without the slightest delay, the troops hurried
on their march with the terrible consciousness that death
was at their heels and that their only safety lay in a swift
advance over the long distance before them.

Unfortunately long marches were impossible for the
attenuated men with worn-out shoes and threadbare coats.
The 400 versts to Kutomanda, reckoned as a ten days'
march, was only covered in twenty-two days. The winter
days were short, and at night the soldiers were obliged to

250 EUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

huddle together around the fires. The cold was intense,
twenty degrees (Eeaumur) below zero,' and was felt more
severely as the daily allowance of food was reduced in the
vain attempt to make ten days' rations suffice for the
whole distance. From November 3 only half the usual
quantity of sugar was issued, and on November 6, all the
supply of tea having been exhausted, the men were reduced
to boil straw and the bark of trees. On November 9
stragglers from the advanced guard began to lag behind.
They had the appearance of walking skeletons, and were
obliged to gnaw the leather straps of their knapsacks to
prolong their wretched existence. Death by starvation
with all its terrible accompaniments now seemed to be
the doom awaiting the small exhausted column slowly
dragging itself forward on the frozen Amur. It was
known that a barge laden with provisions had been aban-
doned near Kutomanda, and the hope of reaching it in
time raised the drooping spirits of the men. Many days
were passed in alternate hope and fear lest the provisions
had been devoured by the preceding detachments. Star-
vation began to claim its victims, and terrible scenes were
enacted among the survivors. At last, on November 15,
Cossacks arrived with six horses laden with provisions
sent from Kutomanda ; the starving men recovered a little
strength, and on the 19th were able to reach their destina-
tion.

After a few days' rest at Kutomanda the march was
resumed. Though no longer menaced by actual starva-
tion, provisions were not abundant, and the intense cold
caused even worse sufferings to the ill-clad soldiers, whose
worn-out shoes and clothing hardly covered their bodies.
On December 12 twenty-four men with frozen feet were
abandoned on the way, most of them to die on the icy

' Equal to 13° Fahrenheit below zero.

THE ANNEXATION OF THE AMUB REGION 251

expanse of the Amur amid the whiter silence of its desolate
banks. At last, on December 16, the unfortunate detach-
ment reached Ust-Strielk after a journey of 143 days, in
which it lost 102 men — nearly a third of its force.

The terrible experience undergone by this detachment
recalls the sufferings of the expeditions under Buza,
Dejneff, and Poyarkoft in the seventeenth century, and
shows the indomitable energy displayed by the Kus-
sians in their struggle against the inhospitable climate
of those northern regions which they have chosen for the
expansion of their race.

Muravioff remained in Eussia until the beginning of —
December, and, as on his former visits, he obtained the
imperial sanction for important measures affecting the
welfare of Eastern Siberia. The important posts occu-
pied on the gulf of Tartary and the mouth of the Amur
were officially recognised as Bussian by the administrative
creation of a new province — the Primorskaya, or Coast
Province — comprising, besides Kamchatka and the shores
of the sea of Okhotsk, also the coast around the mouth
of the Amur. Muravioff had already ordered that com- -V
munications should be kept up during the winter between
the posts on the lower Amur, and postal stations had been
built between Mariinsk and Nikolaiefsk, with four horses
attached to each station. Besides these regular postal
communications, the first journey from Nikolaiefsk to
Transbaikalia on the frozen Amur with horses and dog-
sledges was accomplished during this winter.

In the beginning of 1857 Muravioff began his usual"
preparations for an expedition down the Amur, which had
now become a yearly habit ; this time he intended to
settle Cossacks with their families on the left bank. As
the establishment of these military colonies required the

-V-

252 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

sanction of the Tsar, he forwarded a report to the War
Office, and obtained the necessary authorisation.^

In the meanwhile events in China attracted the atten-
tion of the Russian Government. It was known that
England and France were preparing a powerful force for
service in the China seas, and intended to send diplomatic
residents to Peking. Russia, which had inaugurated
official relations with the Celestial Empire nearly two
centuries before by the treaty of Nertchinsk, was resolved
to participate in the new movement. Admiral Putiatin,
already favourably known by the Foreign Office for his
successful conclusion of a treaty of commerce with Japan,
was appointed Minister at Peking, with instructions also
to settle the frontier question.

This nomination at first alarmed Muravioff, as he
feared that Russian interests on the left bank of the Amur
might be sacrificed in imprudent negotiations with the
subtle mandarins of Peking. But after an interview with
Putiatin on his arrival at Irkutsk on March 21, 1857, he
became convinced that his alarm was unfounded, and that
the interests of Russia on the Pacific were in safe hands.
In fact he had soon to assume the unwonted and uncon-
genial part of moderator, and to curb the impetuosity of
the bluff sailor.

Putiatin left Irkutsk on March 29, and in April arrived
at Irkutsk, where he informed the Chinese frontier authori-
ties of his arrival, and asked permission to proceed to
Peking through Mongolia. Muravioff had taken great
care to impress the Chinese with the special importance
of the embassy ; he had sent his band to Kiakhta, had
ordered that the town should be illuminated, and the

' Muravioff's energy and activity had introduced such rapid communi-
cations between Irkutsk and St. Petersburg that the report was forwarded
on February 28. and the imperial sanction followed on March 19.

THE ANNEXATION OF THE AMUR REGION 253

troops paraded to receive Putiatin with noise and pomp.
But the Chinese, pastmasters in such arts, were not
dazzled bj'^ the display. With their usual dilatoriness —
they delayed answering until May, when they informed
Putiatin, with covert sarcasm, that as they had no special
business to discuss with Russia, it was not necessary that
a person of such importance should undertake the long
fatiguing journey to Peking. 4.

Putiatin, incensed at the treatment he had received, -
wrote to the Foreign Office proposing the occupation of
Aigun, and on May 15 left Kiakhta to join Muravioff, who,
with two battalions of infantry and some field artillery,
was proceeding down the Amur. They reached Aigun on
June 5, and Putiatin proposed — without waiting for in-
structions from St. Petersburg — to occupy the town until
he obtained permission to go to Peking through Man-
churia. But Muravioff was averse from taking such an im-
portant step without the authorisation of his Government.
He was faithful to the traditional Russian policy of pacific
absorption without unnecessary violence. The occupa-
tion of the mouth of the Amur and the establishment of
posts on the left bank had been effected in territory where
China had never exercised any real sovereignty, and her
opposition was purely formal. The occupation of Aigun,
on the other hand, would have been a manifest act of
aggression, arousing just fears for the safety of the whole
of Manchuria. ^

The objections of Muravioff were not based on military
motives ; he was quite ready for war, had formed his plan
of campaign even for an advance on Peking if necessary ;
and on June 4, at Ust-Zeya, opposite to Aigun, had given
Putiatin a statement of the forces disposable on the fron-
tiers of Manchuria and Mongolia, He had ready 16,000
infantry, 5,000 cavalry, 1,000 artillery with forty pieces,

254 RUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

besides a reinforcement of 1,000 men which could be sent
over the frontier from Irkutsk and Yenisseisk ; a force
sufficient at that time, when China was desolated by the
Tai-ping rebellion and threatened by England and France,
to take Peking and dictate terms of peace. But Muravioff
had no desire for a war of conquest ; he only wished to
secure for Russia an outlet to the sea through territory
which had never been occupied by the Chinese, and which
they had thus tacitly recognised as useless.

— Putiatin asked the Chinese authorities at Aigun for
permission to proceed to Peking through Manchuria ; but
it could not be granted, as no instructions had been sent
from the capital. Finding it therefore impossible to reach
his destination by land, he resolved to make an attempt by
sea, and, leaving Muravioff at Ust-Zeya, he descended the
Amur. Putiatin started from Nikolaiefsk on July 1, and,
after inspecting some new harbours on the gulf of Tar-
tary, on July 24 reached the mouth of the Peiho.

The Chinese had been informed of his intended visit
by sea, and had forwarded a despatch stating that Tientsiij,
near the mouth of the Peiho, was not a fit place for
negotiations. This despatch in due course of time was
answered from St. Petersburg by a fresh request that the
Russian Minister should be received in the capital. In
the meanwhile Putiatin was engaged in a fruitless diplo-
matic contest with the obstinate Chinese mandarins at
Tientsin. At first they refused even to receive his des-
patches ; but, though they finally yielded on this point,
they would not allow him to proceed to the capital, and
complained to St. Petersburg about his pertinacity, stating
that only foreign envoys, bearers of tribute to the Emperor,
were admitted in Peking.

Putiatin, after remaining some time at the mouth of

the Peiho, went to Shanghai, where he attentively followed

THE ANNEXATION OF THE AMUR REGION 255

the military operations of the French and English, who
were then preparing to attack Canton. He communicated '^
much valuable information to his Government about the
internal conditions of China, and the terror pervading the
maritime provinces at the arrival of the Kussian vessels in
the gulf of Pechili. The local knowledge acquired on the
coast enabled him to suggest the most effective plan for
overcoming Chinese obduracy. He proposed to blockade
the mouth of the Peiho and prevent the junks carrying
grain to Peking from discharging their cargo. As his —
diplomatic mission had failed, at the end of December
1857 he was appointed admiral of the detached squadron
in the China seas, and Imperial Commissioner, with in-
structions to watch the operations of the Western Powers
during the war. ■+-

After Putiatin had left Ust-Zeya, Muravioff remained —
on the Amur the whole summer, attending to administra-
tive and diplomatic business with his usual activity. A
series of Cossack villages, comprising 450 families, were
established on the left bank of the river from Ust-Strielk
to the rapids of the Little Kliingan, and a camp was
formed at Ust-Zeya for the 14th line battalion and a
detachment of artillery. Strict orders were given to live
on friendly terms both with the aborigines and Chinese ;
but, on the other hand, in case of unfriendliness or con-
centration of troops at Aigun, the Kussians were instructed
to cross the river and disarm the Chinese, and even to
occupy the town.

The Chinese commander at Aigun addressed a protest -
to Muravioff against the constant navigation of the Amur
and the permanent settlement of troops and colonists on
the left bank of the river, declaring this conduct to be
injurious to the continued friendship of the two countries,
and insinuating that it had not been authorised by the

256 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

Eiussian Government. But the protest came too late —
the Russians had discovered the imaginary nature of
the Chinese sovereignty, and the little value attached to
the region ; besides, the Chinese, through excessive fear
and obstinacy, had recently given just cause for offence.
Muravioff quickly availed himself of these facts ; in
his answer he referred to the previous correspondence
between the two Governments, and declared that as a
Eussian envoy had been appointed for Peking, and was at
present in the gulf of Pechili, all questions should be
settled with him ; he therefore returned the despatch to

4- Aigun.

On his return from the Amur, Muravioff left Irkutsk
for St. Petersburg, but, after a short residence there, was
obliged to go abroad on account of his health.

In the meanwhile the newly settled Amur region was
progressing rapidly. During the summer of 1857 seven
foreign vessels entered the river, and the following winter
a road for postal communications between Nikolaiefsk and
Ust-Strielk was completed.

-^ In the spring of 1858 Muravioff, after having restored
his health in Europe, had returned to Irkutsk, and was
preparing for his usual yearly expedition down the Amur.
He had intended it should have been far larger than any
of the preceding, a whole brigade of Cossacks with their
families — about 12,000 persons of both sexes — being
destined as colonists in the new region. But the outstand-
ing questions with China rendered it necessary to postpone
this great exodus.

^ Putiatin had vainly tried to persuade the Chinese to
send plenipotentiaries to Shanghai to treat with him, and
it now became evident that Muravioff, who had already
occupied the Amur, was the man best qualified to obtain
the official recognition of the accomplished annexation.

THE ANNEXATION OF THE AMUR REGION 257

The Chinese Government, at that time, was engaged in a —
dangerous struggle with the Taiping rebellion, and with
England and France. It could not consent to treat
either at Peking or at Shanghai about the alienation of
territory or the renunciation of sovereign rights, without
losing prestige in the eyes of its own subjects and of the
foreign enemy. It preferred to relegate such negotiations
to a little-known region, on the unfrequented banks of the
great northern river of the Black Dragon.^

Muravioff, having decided to start as soon as the ice —
broke up on the river, sent in advance a courier to Ust-
Zeya with instructions to communicate to the Chinese
authorities at Aigun his speedy arrival, but to add that he
would stop only a short time, as he was in haste to reach
the mouth of the Amur. Therefore, if the Chinese wished
to confer with Muravioff, they had better put off the meet-
ing until his return voyage. Muravioff was really anxious
to reach Nikolaiefsk, as he hoped to receive there news
from Putiatin ; but he also wished to convince the Chinese
that he had no special desire to enter into negotiations.
The ruse produced the expected effect.

On April 26, Muravioff left Strietensk, and on May 6 -"
he reached Ust-Zeya ; but at eighty versts before that
place he had been met by Chinese mandarins, requesting
him to delay his departure and confer with Prince T-shan,
the commander-in-chief of the forces on the Amur.
Muravioff had at last brought the Chinese to the point he
wished, and the negotiations were forthwith commenced,
and pushed on with his usual alertness. ^

On May 11 the first conference was held at Aigun.
Muravioff proposed that the river Amur should be the
frontier between the two empires, and showed its ne-
cessity— especially at a time when England, being at

' The Chinese name for the Amur.

S

258 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

war with China, might seize the mouth of the Amur
and the coast to the south by right of conquest. The
Chinese general repeated the arguments, already often
adduced by the Peking Government, that all the preceding
treaties had settled the frontier along the rivers Gorbitza,
Uda, and through an undetermined region along the coast.
After a very long discussion Muravioff ended the sitting by
producing the draft of a treaty already prepared, and on
which he demanded the views of the Chinese plenipoten-
tiary on the following day. It consisted of the following
articles :

1. The frontier of the two empires to be : (1) the river
Amur, the left bank to the mouth to belong to Kussia,
the right bank up to the river Ussuri to belong to China.
(2) The course of the Ussuri to its sources, and thence the
frontier was to go south to the peninsula of Corea.

2. Navigation on the rivers marking the frontier to be
allowed only to vessels of the two empires.

3. Free trade to be allowed on the above rivers.

4. Chinese subjects living on the left bank to remove
to the right bank within a period of three years.

5. The revision (by persons specially appointed for that
object by the two empires) of preceding treaties, in order
to fix new rules for all matters concerning the profit and
glory of both empires.

6. The present convention to be considered as supple-
mentary to preceding treaties.

■=- The first conference had shovni that the Chinese were
very anxious to preserve friendly relations with Eussia,
but they seemed also obstinately bent on adhering to their
own views about the frontier. The negotiations, there-
fore, promised to be long and difficult. Muravioff was
determined, on the other hand, that they should be
brief. To attain this object, he again concealed his

THE ANNEXATION OF THE AMUR REGION 259

impatience, and, alleging sickness, on May 12 he sent his
interpreter Pero to continue the negotiations.

As after several long sittings the obstinate Chinese —
showed no signs of yielding, Muravioff again changed his
tactics, assuming a more resolute tone. Pero was
instructed to inform the Chinese that only the magna-
nimity of the Russian Tsar had preserved peace between
the two countries after the late unjustifiable affronts ; that
they had no right to quote on every occasion the treaty of
Nertchinsk concluded in 1689, because on that occasion
they had acted vdth bad faith, sending their envoys with
an army, and threatening offensive operations, while the
Russian plenipotentiary had come only with a simple
escort. Besides, the Chinese had been the first to violate
that treaty by levying tribute in places not within their
frontier. They had also lately given serious offence by
refusing to receive Putiatin, and by burning a Russian
factory. This energetic remonstrance produced a great
impression on the Chinese, who at last consented to con-
elude the convention.

On May 16, 1858, the convention of Aigmi was signed ; —
it had been concluded with Muravioff' s usual rapidity, the
negotiations lasting only six days. A few concessions
were made to the Chinese. The Manchu inhabitants on
the left bank of the Amur near the river Zeya were allowed
to remain under the Chinese authorities, and the region
between the Ussuri and the sea was declared to belong in
common to Russia and China until the frontier should be
permanently fixed. In granting the last point, Muravioff
probably had in mind the treaty of Nertchinsk, which
likewise left undetermined the territory adjacent to the sea.
Russia had waited 170 years to settle the vague frontier of
Golovin. It took only two years to complete the frontier
of the convention of Aigun.

s2

260 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

-- The terms exacted by Muravioff were very moderate,
considering the military power at his disposal and the con-
ditions of the Chinese Empire at that time. Nevelskoy
had m-ged the necessity of claiming the whole basin of
the Ussnri, advancing the frontier to the mountain chain
of the Little lOiingan, which runs between that river and
the Sungari.

^ On his return to Ust-Zeya, Muravioff was received with
great enthusiasm, and a few days later, on May 21, a
solemn religious service was celebrated by Archbishop
Innocent in a church which had been specially constructed
and consecrated in the name of the Holy Annunciation.

At the church parade Muravioff addressed the troops
with a few impressive words such as he knew so well how
to choose on all important occasions : ' Comrades, I con-
gratulate you ! We have not laboured in vain ; the Amur
now belongs to Russia ! The prayers of the holy Ortho-
dox Church and the thanks of Eussia are for you ! Long
life to Emperor Alexander II., and may the newly
acquired country flourish under his protection ! Hurrah ! '
The post of Ust-Zeya was also at the same time
re-christened with the name of Blagoveshtchensk,^ the
Annunciation.

The final solution of the question of the eastern frontier
of Siberia caused great satisfaction in St. Petersburg, and
Muravioff received the title of Count Amurski.

After this brilliant diplomatic success Muravioff did
not relax his unremitting exertions ; he prosecuted his
voyage down the Amur to Nikolaiefsk, settling Cossacks
and troops in the most convenient places.

^ At the mouth of the Ussuri, near the place where
Khabaroff repulsed the attacks of the Manchus, an

' It is now the most flourishing city on the Amur.

THE ANNEXATION OF THE AMUB BEGION 261

important post was established and named Khabarofsk ^
in honour of the bold Cossack explorer. On his return
voyage, in the steamer ' Amur,' he ascended the Sungari,
and inaugurated Russian navigation on the river, assert-
ing the rights granted by the convention of Aigun.'-v

It was the third time that Muravioff descended the — -
whole course of the Amur to its mouth, and it is remark-
able that on each occasion important results were
achieved.

In 1854 he opened the Amur and saved Petropavlofsk ,*^
in 1855 he saved the Russian fleet ; and in 1858 the Amur
was confirmed to Russia. On his return to Irkutsk his
attention was directed to the Ussuri country. He planned
the settlement of Cossacks on that river, and urged the
necessit}^ of light-draught steamers.

He resolved to visit the coast next year, and ascertain
the requirements of the new frontier. From a conversa-
tion with the Chinese officials at Aigun, on his return
voyage, Muravioff had ascertained that mandarins had been
sent on the river Sui-fun to mark the frontier. But this
was incompatible with Russian interests on the Pacific,
which required the coast a hundred versts to the south,
as far as Possiet bay on the Corean frontier. -V

The convention of Aigun had been followed at a week's —

' It is now the seat of the Governor-General of the three provinces of
Transbaikaha, Priamurskaya, and Primorskaya.

- The First Article granted the Eussians the right of navigation on the
Sungari river, and it was confirmed by the Fourth Article of the Treaty of
Peking and the Eighteenth Article of the Treaty of 1881. Notwithstanding
these repeated sanctions the Eussians have been unable to practically
enforce their rights. In 1859 Maximoff went up the Sungari as far as the
town of San-Sin, but was obliged to return ; in 1864, steamers sent to
explore the Sungari reached Ghirin, but met with great difficulties, the
mandarins forbidding the inhabitants to sell provisions to the Eussians ; in
1866 the Eussian Government sent an expedition to buy grain, but the
mandarins prevented the inhabitants from trading ; in 1869 other unsuc-
cessful attempt to open trade was made by Eussian merchants.

262 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

interval by the treaty of commerce concluded at Tientsin
on June 1, 1858, by Putiatin, whose perseverance had been
at last crowned with success. Perceiving that the Chinese
were beginning to yield to foreign pressure, and allow
approach to the capital, the Eussian Government in
January 1859 decided to appoint General Ignatieff political
agent at Peking, with instructions to settle the frontier
question on the Ussuri. Muravioff approved the measure,
and suggested that Ignatieff should be appointed full
Minister in order to be of equal rank with his British col-
-t- league. Minister Bruce. On the arrival of Ignatieff,
Muravioff accompanied him to Kiakhta on April 17, 1859,
but the Chinese delayed granting permission to proceed to
Peking, and Muravioff was obliged to leave him on May 2,
in order to attend to affairs on the Amur.

^ Shortly after Muravioff's, departure, General Ignatieff

received instructions to proceed to Peking, where, however,

his desire for a speedy arrangement of the frontier in the

Ussuri region met with the usual obstructive dilatoriness

, on the part of the Chinese.

Muravioff, in the meanwhile, was busy collecting
information about the region which was to be delimitated.

-A party was sent to reconnoitre the country and draw
up maps, and Muravioff, after his arrival at Nikolaiefsk
at the end of May, started for a long cruise on the
Pacific coast. He visited Japan, arrived at the mouth
of the Pei-ho shortly after the unsuccessful attack of the
Taku forts by the English and French fleets, and then
went to Wei-hai-wei, where he remained some time.
..^ But the most important result of this expedition was the
survey of the coast of the Ussuri region ; Muravioff care-
fully examined the vast gulf near the Corean frontier,
giving it the name of Peter the Great bay (Victoria
bay), and selected the harbour of Vladivostok and Possiet

THE ANNEXATION OF THE AMUB REGION 263

bay as sites for future settlements. His mind was always —
ready to grasp new facts, and to modify his views as his
knowledge expanded and circumstances altered. His
fixed plan of extending Russian influence in the Pacific
had led him, on his first arrival as Governor-General of
Eastern Siberia, to select Petropavlofsk in 1849 as the
future site of the great Bussian naval station ; later the
discoveries of Nevelskoy and the experience of the war
with the allies had shown the superior advantages of
Nikolaiefsk and De Castries ; now the convention of
Aigun, and the troubles of China with the Tai-ping rebels
and the Western Powers, gave Russia the opportunity of
securing more southerly ports, and Muravioff recognised
that the bay of Peter the Great was destined to become
the centre of Eussian naval power in the Pacific. -^

The preliminary steps for the execution of this plan —
were carried out in the following year, when a party of
forty men occupied Vladivostok on July 20, 1860, and a
company of infantry about the same time occupied Possiet
bay. The effective occupation of the region soon received
diplomatic sanction by the Treaty of Peking, concluded on
November 2 by General Ignatieff ; the Chinese were forced
to abandon their procrastination and to yield to the persis-
tent demands of Russia, when they were humbled by the
Western Powers. The frontier desired by Muravioff was
granted, and Manchuria lost all access to the sea on the east.-\-

By the annexation of the whole Ussuri region Russia
acquired a fertile territory with • a relatively mild climate
and several fine harbours. The measures adopted for the
colonisation of the left bank of the Amur were now
employed on the right bank of the Ussuri and on the
sea-coast ; Cossack settlements and peasant colonies were
established in the most appropriate places for practising
agriculture and maintaining communications with the

264 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

Amur. In the first years, however, Eussia suffered from the
same troubles which have more recently afflicted France and
Japan in Tonkin and Formosa ; bands of Chinese outlaws
overran the country lightly ceded by their Government,
and persistently harassed the new foreign masters. In
1868 these brigands increased in numbers and boldness ;
they formed bands 1,000 strong, attacking and burning
the Russian settlements ; the scanty Russian forces,
scattered in small detachments over the extensive region,
were in several cases surprised and defeated. But the
arrival of reinforcements from the Amur, and the rapid
concentration of the small garrisons in the Ussuri region,
soon enabled the Russians to take the offensive, disperse
the brigands, and restore tranquillity in the country.

The last plans of Muravioff were carried out eleven
years after his departure, in 1872, when the Russian
naval station in the East was transferred from Nikolaiefsk
to Vladivostok. This port, situated at the south-eastern
extremity of the Russian Asiatic dominions, near the
Corean frontier, is more favourably situated than its
predecessors — Petropavlofsk and Nikolaiefsk ; it is closed
by ice only during a few months, and even then, owing to
the latest improvements in ice-breakers, it can be artifi-
cially kept open for navigation during the whole winter.
-The aspiration for an outlet on the open sea, which had
become part of the national policy since the time of Peter
the Great, had at last been realised on the Pacific at the
terminus of the great eastward expansion, which had
been proceeding intermittently for nearly three centuries.

This new naval station in the Far East, securing
access to the ocean, offered compensation for the long
enforced exclusion from the land-locked Black Sea. The
Russians, probably influenced by this reflection, were led
to notice the resemblance of the natural features of their

STATUE OF MURAVIOFF AT KHABAROFSK

THE ANNEXATION OF THE AMUR BEGION 265

new port to those of Constantinople. The city of the
Byzantine Caesars had fascinated the mind of the race
from the time of Oleg's famous raid, and the marriage of
Ivan III. with Sophia Paleologus had strengthened this
feeling by raising dynastic claims to the inheritance of
the fallen Greek Empire. These thoughts recurred to
the Russians at the end of their long eastward advance,
when they named the sinuous channels of the sea at
Vladivostok, and thus on the former shores of Manchuria
we now find the eastern Bosphorus and the Golden
Horn.

The possession of the Amur and of the sea-coast up to —
the frontier of Corea completed the Russian expansion in
Northern Asia ; Muravioff finished the work commenced S
by Yermak. The Cossack ataman had shown the way
across the Ural, and the impulse given by his powerful
individuality sufficed to bring the Russians to the Straits
of Behring by the middle of the seventeenth century, but
the want of support from Moscow had rendered fruitless
the daring exploits on the Amur.. While in the north a
natural frontier had been found on the shores of the
Pacific, in the south cramped boundaries had been
accepted through fear of the military power of China.
This abrupt and unnatural termination of the glorious
process of conquest which had given Russia the northern
part of the continent, had been acquiesced in for 160
years, until the energy and activity of Muravioff over-
came the obstacles raised by bureaucratic indolence and
diplomatic timidity.

This long period of inactivity need not seem strange if
we reflect on the general slow advance of the Russian
race, originally weak in numbers, expanding over the
enormous extent of the northern plains ; it can be
paralleled in the European history of the nation. The

266 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

heroic but premature victory of Kulikovo in 1380 required
a century to unfold its consequences in the overthrow of
the Tartar domination. On the banks of the Amur, in
the Far East, the daring exploits of Khabaroff and
Tolbuzin effected no permanent results in the seventeenth
century ; they bore fruit only in the nineteenth century,
when the Kussian race, grown more numerous, had
already established settlements beyond the Baikal.

The parallel can be carried further. As the over-
throw of the Tartars was due to a double process, the
gradual increase of the power of Moscow and their
slow decline through misgovemment and internecine
warfare, so in the Far East we have similar factors
working to bring about a reversal of conditions. In
the period following the Treaty of Nertchinsk the
Russian Empire had grown enormously in power, tha
population in Siberia had increased considerably, and
numerous settlements had been founded in Transbaikalia,
forming a convenient base of operations on the Amur.
On the other hand, events of an opposite nature had taken
place in the Great Empire of Eastern Asia. The warlike
Manchus, scattered among the enormous population of
China, had gradually lost their military virtues ; their
warlike reputation, become a mere tradition, was dispelled
by the rude attack of the English in the first China war ;
the Tai-ping rebellion which followed threatened to
overthrow the Government.

Besides this general weakness the local conditions on
the Amur were still more unfavourable ; Manchuria, the
original seat of the dynasty, had gradually become a
neglected province in the distant north ; a part of its hardy
population had emigrated to gather the fruits of victory
in the fertile regions of the south, and had been replaced
by Chinese immigrants of a quiet, peaceful character. To

THE ANNEXATION OF THE AMUR REGION 267

secure Eussian supremacy and recover the long-lost Amur
it was sufficient to recognise the altered conditions and to
utilise the forces accumulated during two centuries.
Muravioff had the merit of discarding preconceived
opinions founded on historical precedents obliterated by
time, and of resolutely carrying out the clear views formed
by personal observation. As soon as he had ascertained —
the weakness of the Chinese on the Amur, and had
organised the Cossack army in Transbaikalia, the annexa-
tion of the new provinces depended simply on the time
necessary for overcoming the sluggishness and timidity of
the Russian Foreign Office. +

Muravioff had also the merit of imparting a new —
direction to Russian expansion in Eastern Asia. The -^
general north-eastern tendency of the race has been
sufficiently shown ; the sea alone stopped the Cossacks in
the seventeenth century, and even this obstacle was
insufficient at the beginning of the present century, when
the Russians continued their advance, crossing to the
American continent and occupying Alaska. Muravioff^
considered that the American possessions should be ceded
to the United States under favourable conditions, and his
advice was followed, and Alaska was sold. He thought
that Russia should limit her activity to the old continent.
Here, however, the sea, which had been already reached
during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, pre-
cluded all expansion to the east. It became, therefore,
necessary to follow the shores and expand in an opposite
direction to the south-west. The places successively
chosen for naval stations in the brief period of Muravioff's
administration, Petropavlofsk, Nikolaiefsk, Vladivostok,^
clearly indicate the new direction. .

' The naval station was transferred to Vladivostok some years after
Muravioii had left Siberia, but he had already indicated the advantage of
its position.

268 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

The annexation of the Amur having been effected to
obtain access to the Pacific, the possession of open ports
now became a necessary consequence of that pohcy.
Each successive port chosen, though superior to its pre-
decessors, raised the desire for another further to the
south, freer from ice during the winter. After the transfer
of the naval station from Nikolaiefsk to Vladivostok, close
to the frontier of Corea, the south-western expansion of
Eussia along the coasts of Asia was checked for a con-
siderable time. Though the disordered internal conditions
of the Corean peninsula, a prey to party intrigues and
civil war, invited intervention and offered a good field for
the administrative ability of the Russians, which has
established order in so many regions of Asia, the rival
interests of China, Japan, and Great Britain rendered any
advance in that direction extremely dangerous.

For a long time Eussia was suspected of having
designs on a Corean port, but these fears were exaggerated
and could only refer to a remote contingency. Eussia -
has been uniformly cautious, and has only absorbed
countries neglected by owners and neighbours. Besides,
her maritime requirements always have been moderate ;
Vladivostok sufficed as a naval station in the Pacific, and
it remained the most southern port of Asiatic Eussia for
thirty years. When a further advance was made it was
not due to Eussian initiative, but was brought about by a
rapid succession of unexpected events, and by the necessity
of counterbalancing the acquisitions of other Powers.

The wants of Eussia in the Far East, after the
annexation of the Amur province and the Ussuri region,
though less urgent, were similar to those felt at the time
when Muravioff began his brilliant administration in
Eastern Siberia. An outlying part of the Empire, now in
the south instead of the north, required to be connected

THE ANNEXATION OF THE AMUR BEGION 269

by a more direct route ; Vladivostok, the centre of naval
power in the Pacific, could only be reached by a long
detour by the Amur and Ussuri rivers. Far more im —
portant than the acquisition of a port further south was
the question of securing rapid and easy communication
with Vladivostok. As long as steam navigation on the V
rivers was the most rapid available means of communica-
tion in the Amur region, the circuitous route presented no
inconvenience, but its disadvantages became evident when
the Russian Government conceived the gigantic project
of extending the Siberian railway to the shores of the
Pacific.

270 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

CHAPTEK VI

THE SIBEEIAN EAILWAY

The great rivers of Siberia and their numerous affluents,
which faciHtafced the work of conquest, served also as the
readiest means of communication for commerce and news
in the early period of the Eussian occupation. But these
natural highways soon required to be supplemented,
especially when the Eussians, increasing in numbers,
were able to extend southward and conquer the warlike
natives of the more fertile regions. The climate and the
nature of the soil in the south are favourable to the
establishment of a large settled population, while the
affluents of the great rivers do not approach so closely as
in the north, where in several cases a portage of a few
miles is sufficient to connect two river-basins. The
Eussian colonists therefore settled principally in the
south, forming in time a chain of towns and villages,
which it was found necessary to connect by roads.

The sovereigns of Moscow continued in northern Asia
the mission they had pursued in Eussia : the suppression
of disorder and violence, and the establishment of a strong
peaceful government, in regions hitherto desolated by
tribal feuds, and by raids of the nomads of the steppes.
They knew the violent, undisciplined character of the
Cossack founders of the Asiatic Empire, and recognised
the necessity of exercising control by a system of
regular communications. The opening of postal roads.

THE SIBERIAN BAIL WAY 271

the construction of stations, the settlement of postilions
in the distant region, were among the first cares of the
Government.

As early as 1601, yamshtchiks or postilions were settled
at Timnen, a frontier town of Siberia, and their number
increased steadily ; in the year 1710 it was reckoned that
they amounted (with their families) to about 7,000, out of
a total population of 250,000 souls. The distances between
the principal towns were also carefully measured, and
mile-posts erected : in 1715 this work was accomplished
between Yakutsk and Okhotsk, and in 1721 it was
carried out between Krasnoyarsk and Irkutsk. In the
year 1712 orders had been issued to widen the roads in
Western Siberia to a breadth of twenty-one feet.

All these measures were necessary for the work of the
Government, for the rapid conveyance of despatches and
officials, and were similar to the methods adopted by
founders of empires in extensive thinly peopled regions
in all ages. Cyrus in Western Asia, and Charlemagne in
Central Europe, had recognised in remote times the
necessity of building roads, and of organising a special
service of government couriers. But as soon as the
Bussian domination was established in Siberia, the
Tsars of Moscow adopted also measures for the general
benefit of their distant possession and its inhabitants :
their enlightened policy was far in advance of the age.

The postal roads, and their regular succession of
stations with relays of horses and postilions, served for
the general use of the public, as well for the conveyance
of travellers as for the transmission of letters. The rates
charged for these services were extremely moderate.
The price charged for post-horses in Western Siberia at
the beginning of the eighteenth century was from two- to
three-tenths of a kopeck per verst. In Scotland, in 1603,

272 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

the charge for post-horses was Q^^d. for a mile. The
charge for letters was also very moderate ; it was reckoned
per zolotnik (about a sixth of an ounce) , and from Moscow
to Verkhatur, Tobolsk, and Tiumen, an average distance
of over 2,100 versts, the tariff was 18 kopecks per
zolotnik. From Moscow to Berezof, Surgut, Tomsk,
Yenisseisk, and Krasnoj^arsk, an average distance of over
3,700 versts, the rate was 30 kopecks. From Moscow
to Ilimsk, Yakutsk, Irkutsk, and Nertchinsk, an average
distance of over 6,500 versts,' 40 kopecks were charged.
This tariff prevailed in 1682 and in 1696.

These charges will appear wonderfully low if we
compare them with those levied nearly a century and a
half later — in the first half of this century — in the most
advanced nations of Western Europe. In England as
much as 14(Z. could be charged on a letter, and in France
for 7^ grammes (less than two zolotniks) 1 franc 20 cen-
times were charged for a maximum distance of 900 kilo-
metres, about a ninth of the Eussian maximum distance
to Yakutsk. In the United States up to 1846, 10 cents
were charged for distances over 300 miles. In the con-
vention of 1836 between France and England the postage
across the frontier was fixed at V)d. or 1 franc. It is,
indeed, very strange that while even in England (the
nation most advanced commercially) up to the beginning
of this century the postal system was based on the most
narrow-minded fiscalism, and had for its sole object the
extortion of money from the public, in Siberia more than
half a century before, the Kussian Government was in-
spired by the enlightened views inaugurated by Palmer,
and now prevailing throughout Western Europe, that the

' All these distances have been given according to the Ttussky Kalcndar,
where there is a table of the distances of all Eussian towns from Moscow.

THE SIBERIAN RAILWAY 273

primary object of the postal service should be the con-
venience and advantage of the public.

The postal communications in Siberia were rare and
slow in the early times. In 1724 there was only a
monthly service to Tobolsk from Moscow; later, in 1731,
it became fortnightly ; but from Tobolsk to Yenisseisk
and Yakutsk it was only monthly, and from Yakutsk to
Okhotsk only once every two months. It required half a
year for news to travel from Kamchatka to Moscow in
the eighteenth century. These slow, interrupted services
appear strange now, but they cease to cause surprise when
we compare them with the old postal communications of
the most advanced nations of the West. Before 1633
there was only a weekly mail between London and
Antwerp and Brussels ; in 1667 there were only two
posts a week between Edinburgh and Aberdeen, and
one to Inverness ; in 1702 there was only a fortnightly
service between New York and Boston. The delivery of
letters in the British Isles was also very slow. Before 1635
letters were carried on foot, and two months were re-
quired for an answer to a letter from London to Scotland
or Ireland. Before Palmer's plan (1784) the average
speed of the post was only three and a half miles an hour.

These comparative figures show that Siberia was not
very backward in postal communications in the early
period ; and when we consider the extent of the country,
its rigorous climate, scanty population, and the peculiar
conditions of Kussian history, which up to the time of
Peter the Great prevented all influence of the pro-
gressive nations of the West, we must give full credit to
the Government of Moscow for the attention it paid to
its distant possessions.

In Western Siberia, on the flat uniform plains, the
construction and maintenance of the roads offered no

T

)<

274 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

] difficulties except at the crossing of the rivers and water-
j courses, where, however, by an ingenious system of ferry-
/ boats,' the traffic suffered Httle interruption. But in
'■ Eastern Siberia the natural conditions of the country
were not so favourable ; the huge Lake Baikal, stretching
from north to south for over 400 miles, and surrounded
by lofty mountains, presented great difficulties ; further
east the Yablonoi, with their steep slope on the Pacific,
offered great obstacles to the construction of the road to
Okhotsk indispensable for easy communications with
Kamchatka. The Baikal at favourable times was easily
crossed, and its waters became the highway for the trans-
port of goods and travellers into Transbaikalia. But
when traffic increased, especiall}^ with the development of
the China trade through Kiakhta, the inconveniences of
the route across the lake became evident. The Baikal is
subject to violent storms, and as it is frozen for several
months in winter, there are intervals in spring and
autumn when it is impossible to cross, as the ice, though
too weak to bear sledges, is sufficient to impede naviga- [_
tion. These various causes often stopped all traffic, and
goods accumulated on the shores without means of trans-
port.

Towards the end of the eighteenth century these facts

M were brought to the knowledge of the Eussian Govern-

I ment, which authorised the expenditure necessary for the

( construction of a road around the southern extremity of

Lake Baikal for alternate use whenever the direct passage

across the lake, either by sledges or ships, was impossible.

By this means uninterrupted communications were

secured along the great postal road traversing the Eussian

' The samoliots which, fixed by long cables to anchors in the middle of
the stream, swing across from bank to bank like a pendulum under the
influence of the current.

THE SIBEBIAN. RAILWAY 275

possessions in Asia from west to east. The road stretched
as far as the Russian dominions up to the boundaries
fixed by the treaty of Nertchinsk ; but when Muravioff's
bold action advanced the frontier to the Pacific Ocean,
the road was extended along the course of the Amur and
the Ussuri up to Vladivostok. Then a portal was erected
at Irkutsk, at the commencement of the eastern extension
of the great highway, some thousand miles from the sea,
bearing the simple inscription, * Road to the Pacific Ocean.'
These appropriate words briefly summarise the object of
Muravioff's pohcy in the Far East.

The road along the Amur and Ussuri was supple-
mentary, and only used when the winter frosts rendered
impossible the steam navigation which Muravioff had
introduced from the beginning of the Russian occupa-
tion.

About the middle of the present century the most
important applications of science to the wants of life
began to penetrate Siberia and profoundly influence its
economical development. The first steamer appeared on
the» Ob as early as 1843,' and another, the ' Constantin,'
entered the mouth of the Amur in 1846 ; and in 1863
steam navigation commenced on the Yenissei. At pre-
sent steamers are running on all the Siberian rivers and
their more important affluents, and the traffic is increasing
yearly.

The introduction and development of steam naviga-
tion in Siberia many years before the construction of
railways forms a curious parallel to the ancient expedi- /
tions of the Cossacks in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries, when they advanced on the northern rivers
long before using the roads to the south. Steam has

' After several failures, the first successful steamer appeared on the
Volga only in 1842.

T 2

276 RUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

penetrated and spread througli Siberia almost in the
footsteps of Yermak and his successors.

Before examining the construction and future of the
Siberian railway, it will be useful to cast a hasty glance
on the development and present state of steam navigation
on the rivers, as both systems of communication are bound
to interact mutually.
1^ The navigation on the splendid water-ways of Siberia
is handicapped not only by the climate, but also by the
fact that the great rivers flow into unfrequented seas and
through thinly peopled districts. The Ob, Yenissei, and
Lena flow northward into the Arctic Ocean, until lately
considered ill adapted for regular navigation ; and though
the general com'se of the Amur is eastward, as soon as it
receives its full complement of waters from the Sungari
and Ussuri, it also runs northward for 5 degrees of lati-
tude and debouches into the bleak inhospitable sea of
Okhotsk. The population throughout Siberia is still so
scanty that in many regions there is only a fraction of an
inhabitant per square mile.

Among the great rivers in the north, the Ob, lying
further to the west, is most favourably situated ; it flows
into the Arctic Ocean at a lower latitude than either the
Yenissei or the Lena, and the districts through which it
passes are more populous. Western Siberia, containing
the greater part of the Ob basin, has three million inhabi-
tants on about one million square miles — quite a dense
population for Siberia. Moreover, the vicinity to Euro-
pean Russia offers a great transit trade — exports of raw
produce and imports of manufactured goods.

In consequence of these favourable conditions steam
navigation on the Ob and its affluents has progressed
\y rapidly. The following table, compiled from two inde-
pendent sources, Dolgorukoff and ' Siberia and the Siberian

THE SIBERIAN RAILWAY

271

Eailway,' which agree in the main, will show at a glance
the steady increase in the number of steamers dm-ing
half a centmry :

Year

Number of Steamers, according to

Dolgorukoff

' Siberia,' &o.

1846
1854
1859
1860
1864
1866
1870
1875
1880
1883
1885
1887
1889
1890
1891
1892
1893
1895

2

5
12
16
26

36
50

65

120

3
10

22
32
37

57
60
64
65
69
90
102

As early as 1846 the first voyage from Tomsk to
Tiumen, now the principal line, was accomplished, and
in 1853 regular trips between those towns were established.
In 1860 a monthly line was inaugurated between Tobolsk
and Tiumen, and the first voyage to Berezof on the lower
Ob accomplished. In the following year steamers went
up the Irtysh as far as Semipalatinsk, and next year
(1862) steam navigation commenced on the Tavda and
its affluents, the Sosva and Lozva. In 1865 the first
steamer went up the Tchulym to Atchinsk.

In the river system of the Ob, covering over three
and a half million square versts (more than one and a
half million square miles), with a length of 5,300 versts
and with regular navigation for 15,000 versts (10,000
English miles), there are at present ' four principal lines
of steamers :

' According to the Guide to Siberia of 1897.

278 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

1. Tiumen — Tobolsk— Tomsk ;

2. Tiumen — Tobolsk — Omsk — Semipalatinsk ;

3. Tomsk^Barnaul — Biisk ;

4. Tomsk — Tchulym.

The first and most important line is 2,178 versts
long (over 1,400 miles), and runs on the rivers Tura,
Tobol, Irtysh, Ob, and Tom ; the steamers cover the dis-
tance in about eight or ten days. The second is 2,684
versts long (about 1,780 miles), and runs on the rivers
Tura, Tobol, and Irtysh. The third and fourth are simply
branch lines from Tomsk, running in the first case for
over 1,000 versts on the upper Ob and river Bii, and in
the second for about the same distance on the Ob and
river Tchulym.

To understand the functions performed by these lines
it is necessary to examine the economical condition of
Siberia, especially of its western part and the pre-existing,
trade-routes. Owing to the scanty population and absence
of manufacturing centres there is little local trade^jn,
Siberia. Commerce is represented by the exchange of
the mineral and agricultural produce of Northern Asia
with the manufactured goods of European Kussia. This
traffic has been carried on principally along the route
first traced by Yermak and the early conquerors of Siberia
by the rivers Volga, Kama, Tchussovoya, Serebrianka,
Taghil, Tura, Tobol, Irtysh, and Ob, passing from the
eastern water-ways of Russia to the western ones of
Siberia.^

The introduction of steamers has simply developed
trade on the old routes : the line from Tiumen to Semi-
palatinsk serving for the trade of the region watered by
the Irtysh, and the line from Tiumen to Tomsk for that

' The lines of steamers and railways follow so closely the old routes of
the Cossacks that the small maps of Chap. ii. serve also for this chapter.

THE SIBERIAN RAILWAY 279

watered by the Ob. The third and fourth lines bring to
the important commercial centre of Tomsk the traffic of
the upper affluents of the Ob. The common terminus,
therefore, of all the lines is Tiumen, a town on the river
Tura not far from the ancient portage, now rendered
obsolete by a short railway, leading to the basin of the
Kama and thence to the great Volga.

The distribution of trade along the rivers is accom-
plished in the following order and proportion. European
goods coming from Tiumen descend the Tura and Tobol,
a small quantity branching off up the Tavda and Sosva.
At the mouth of the Tobol an important division takes
place : 25 per cent, of the goods go up the Irtysh (by the
second line of steamers) to Omsk and Semipalatinsk ; the
remaining 75 per cent, descend the Irtysh to its confluence
with the Ob, where a small quantity is sent down the
lower Ob to Berezof and Obdorsk, while the greater part
go up the Ob to Surgut, Narym, and Tomsk, even branch-
ing off by the Tchulym and Bii. From the above it is
clear that in the transit of European goods the Ob plays
a more important part than the Irtysh. Siberian pro-
duce follows the same routes, but in an opposite direction.

The lower courses of the Tura and Tobol are of the
highest commercial importance, forming a junction of the
small and large water-ways bringing goods from Eussia
and Siberia.

The navigation on the Ob is subject to many diffi-
culties arising from climatic causes and want of proper
appliances. The rivers are frozen for many months, and
at low water steamers cannot reach even such important
places as Tomsk and Tiumen ; judging from the time-
tables the navigation lasts only about four months.
Want of beacons, of proper observations on the rise and
fall of the rivers, and of telegraphs to rapidly communicate

280 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

these observations, increases the dangers and difficulties of
navigation. All these inconveniences will disappear when
the increase in the volume of trade will pay for the
employment of dredgers and the establishment of a tele-
graph line along the banks of the Irtysh and Ob to signal
the variations in the level of the waters.

Trade is steadily increasing, especially since the open-
ing in 1884 of the railway from Perm to Tinmen, which
joins the basins of the Volga and Ob in lieu of the old
portage. The movement of the traffic in goods on the
rivers Tura and Tobol, which forms, as we have mentioned,
the junction of all the water-ways, has increased as
follows :

In the year 1886 3 million poods (about 50,000 tons).
1888 7 „ (about 115,000 tons).
„ 1890 8 „ (about 133,000 tons).
„ 1895 16 „ (about 266,000 tons).'

The second great river of Siberia, the Yenissei, is less
favourably situated ; its mouth on the Arctic Ocean is
further north ; the population on its banks is much
scantier, 950,000 inhabitants on about 1,500,000 square
miles contained by the governments of Yennisseisk and
Irkutsk, and there is little transit trade from and to
Europe. Steam navigation consequently commenced
later and has developed more slowly. Steamers began to
run in 1863, and in 1888 there were only four, transporting
a total cargo of 129,000 poods (little over 2,000 tons) ; in
1890 the steamers had increased to six with a cargo of
260,000 poods (httle over 4,000 tons). The important
affluent of the Yenissei, the Angara, flowing from Lake
Baikal and joined by that sheet of water with the Selenga,
unfortunately presents great difficulties to regular naviga-

' The book Siberia and tlie Siberian Raibvay, 2nd edition, 1896, says
oiow, and probably refers to the figures of the preceding year.

THE SIBEBIAN RAILWAY 281

tion ; on a total course of 1,705 versts from the Baikal
to its confluence with the Yenissei, only the upper 600
versts to the Bratski ostrog are navigated by steamers ;
below the latter point, for over 1,000 versts, a series of
rapids presents great difficulties. Sibiriakoff obtained, in
1885, a monopoly of the navigation for five years, and
built steamers for the purpose, but his attempt in 1888
was unsuccessful, and the lower course of the Angara
will probably remain closed to steam navigation still for
many years to come.

The obstacles to navigation on the Angara greatly
lessen the value of the water-way of the Yenissei,
depriving it of all the traffic from Irkutsk, Transbaikalia,
and even Mongolia. The lines of navigation are therefore
few and short : from Krasnoyarsk to Yenisseisk and
Minusinsk on the Yenissei, and from the Baikal to
Balagansk on the Angara.

The idea of uniting the two river basins of the Ob and
Yenissei by a canal attracted the attention of the Russian
Government at an early period. At the end of the last
century a project was presented to Paul I. to connect the
Tym affluent of the Ob with the Sym affluent of the
Yenissei ; other projects were presented later, proposing
canals joining other affluents of the two rivers ; the flat
nature of the country, and the numerous streams intersect-
ing it, offering a variety of solutions to the problem. These
projects were not taken up at the time, and the ques-
tion has only lately been practically settled. In 1875
Phuntusoff, a Siberian merchant, conceived the idea of
joining the Ket (affluent of the Ob) with the Great Kas
(affluent of the Yenissei), and undertook at his own
expense local investigations which proved the feasibility
of the project. The attention of the Government was
then drawn to the work, and a canal 7^ versts long and

282 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

42 feet wide at the bottom was finished ; it is very favour-
ably situated, because the Great Kas flows into the Yenissei
near the mouth of the Angara.

At present only light-draught vessels, during a short
period, can traverse the Ob-Yenissei canal, which, how-
ever, can be much improved whenever the increase of
trade may render it necessary. Steam navigation on the
Yenissei is still insufficient to justify a considerable
outlay for that purpose, and its development, as we have
seen, greatly depends on the successful solution of the
problem of the navigation of the Angara ; therefore
the future of the Ob-Yenissei canal ultimately rests on
the steam navigation of the Angara. When these
problems shall have been solved, there will be an immense
water-way of 5,000 versts from Irkutsk to Tiumen, from
the Baikal almost to the Ural.

The third great river, the Lena, is even more unfavour-_
ably situated ; near its mouth, far in the north, it forms
an enormous delta difficult of access. The population in
the adjacent regions is very scanty ; the Yakutsk province
has only 272,000 inhabitants on an area of over 1,700,000
square miles. It lies remote from European Kussia, and
is not connected with the Yenissei by canals. Steam
navigation exists between Tarasofskaya and Yakutsk, a
distance of 2,160 versts (1,440 miles), but only one trip
a year is made to Yakutsk.

The Amur, of all the great rivers of Siberia, is the
most favoured by natm-e ; its course lies in lower latitudes,
and it debouches into a sea which has always been
frequented b}' ships ; its permanent occupation by Eussia
commenced in fact from the sea. Notwithstanding the
scanty population of the neighbouring country, and the
brevity of the Russian occupation, steam navigation has
developed rapidly. It commenced under the direction of
the Government : the first steamer, * Constantine,' pene-

THE SIBERIAN RAILWAY 283

trating into the estuary in 1846 on an official expedition.
The second steamer, the famous ' Argun,' proceeded in
an opposite direction, having been built by Muravioff on
the Shilka, and formed part of his first famous navigation
of the river in 1854. At first only Government steamers
navigated the Amur, and they had increased to twelve in
1870, w^hen the first private company started conveying
mails and passengers on the river. In 1885 the private
steamers had increased to forty- four, belonging to a
variety of companies and private undertakings.^

There is a regular mail line almost along the w^hole
course of the Amur, from Strietemsk to Nikolaiefsk, 3,074
versts (over 2,000 miles), with a branch line up the Ussuri
of 820 versts (about 540 miles). Another line of steamers
also performs the same service, without, however, carrying
the mails, and there are besides many other steamers
running up the Zeya (for 1,000 versts) and the Bureya,
principally for the gold-washing camps on those rivers.

Steam navigation will increase steadily on the Amur
as the population increases in the adjacent regions, and
as the general internal communications of Siberia improve.
The Amur is the only river which flows into a sea never
entirely frozen, and the growing importance of the Pacific
as an international highway of trade will also raise its
importance in the future.

This brief sketch of the navigable condition of the
Siberian rivers will suffice to show their defects. The
Amur alone has of late years, thanks to its eastward
direction, been entirely available for rapid steam com-
munication, and has served as a part of the great highway
traversmg from west to east the northern part of Siberia.
All the other great rivers are only utilised in their middle
course ; a zone bounded by the 50th and 60th parallels of
north latitude comprises almost all the portions of their

' In 1897 two companies alone had forty steamers running on the river.

284 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

courses traversed by regular steamers. In this region
the pecuhar conformation of the Siberian rivers, formed by
the junction of two considerable streams, one of which
has an extensive lateral deviation, constitutes a series of
river communications from east to west which serve to
convey the traffic to and from European Kussia. The
lower courses of the rivers, running almost due north
into the unfrequented Arctic Ocean, are at present little
used, and serve simply for the insignificant local trade.
Persevering attempts have been made to remedy these
defects, and to open the splendid river systems of Siberia
to ocean steamers ; but the lack of commercial advantages
has counterbalanced the scientific success of a series of
daring navigators.

Although in the sixteenth century Russian vessels
frequented the Kara Sea, and were met there by the early
English navigators,' in the present century an opinion,
supported by some scientific authorities, had prevailed
which maintained the impossibility of maritime com-
munication between Europe and Siberia through the
Arctic Ocean. This opinion was first challenged in 1853
by Sidoroff, an enterprising Siberian, zealous for the
progress of his country. His arguments, based on the
constant intercourse of the inhabitants of the mouths of
the Petchora and Ob, received no attention ; but, not dis-
couraged, he continued to urge his views and succeeded,
after many 3^ears, in demonstrating practically their
correctness. The series of bold navigations in the Arctic
Ocean, culminating with the famous voyage of the
' Vega,' were ultimately due to the initiative and self-
sacrifice of Sidoroff.^

' See Chap. ii.

* In this century Siberia has been lucky in possessing many pubh'c-
spirited citizens, such as Sibiriakoff, Sukacheff, &c., who have spared no
efforts in developing all the resources of their country.

TRE SIBERIAN BAILWAY 285

Only after many years, in 1862, did Sidoroff succeed in
giving practical execution to his plans, and prevailed on
Kruzenshtern to undertake a voyage to the northern
coasts of Siberia. The voyage was unsuccessful, but it
proved that the Kara Sea was free from ice, Sidoroff,
finding no supporters in Russia, went to Sweden, where
he became acquainted with Nordenskjold and converted
him to his ideas of the possibility of a sea route to
Siberia. In 1869 Sidoroff started with the steamer
' Georgii,' but he lost valuable time at the mouth of the
Petchora in saving the English steamer ' Norfolk,' and
was obliged to return without having effected his purpose.
He then published in 'Petermann's Journal ' the offer of a
reward of 2,000Z. sterling to any vessel reaching the
mouth of the Yenissei from Europe. This offer attracted
the notice of Captain Wiggins, who, in 1874, reached the
mouths of the Ob and Yenissei, and returned to England.

This first practical proof of Sidoroff's theory gave an
impulse to northern navigation, and in 1875 the mouth
of the Yenissei was reached by Wiggins and Nordenskjold.
Sidoroff himself was not so lucky, because the vessel he
sent in 1876 was shipwrecked ; his perseverance, how-
ever, finally triumphed in 1877, when a vessel built to
his order at Yenisseisk sailed down the river and reached
St. Petersburg. The same year a steamer went up the
Ob and Irtysh, discharging her cargo at Tobolsk, and
another arrived at the mouth of the Yenissei.

The year 1878 was the most remarkable in the history
of Siberian navigation. Two steamers arrived at the Ob ;
the s.s. ' Tzaritza ' and the ' Moskva ' reached the
Yenissei, the latter proceeding up as far as Yenisseisk ;
and Nordenskjold also started with the ' Vega,' ' Lena,'
'Eraser,! and 'Express.' The two last ascended the
Yenissei ; the ' Lena ' went up the river of the same

286 EUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

name for 2,700 versts (about 1,800 miles) to Yakutsk,
and the famous ' Vega ' almost reached Behring straits
before she was stopped by the ice. The following summer
the ' Vega ' reached the Pacific, and Nordenskjold had
the glory of effecting that north-eastern passage which
English and Dutch navigators had striven to accomplish
in the sixteenth century.

This famous voyage conclusively proved the possibility
of reaching all the great northern rivers of Siberia by sea,
and in the following years two English companies were
successively formed for developing the sea trade of
Siberia, but both failed. The commercial advantages of
the sea route depend on the increase of population and
improvement of the internal communications of Siberia,
as well as on a better choice of steamers and goods re-
quired for the trade, and greater facilities for discharging
and loading cargo. In the meantime attempts are con-
tinually made to provide Siberian buyers by sea with the
few articles in general request. In 1897 a cargo of brick-
tea was shipped at Shanghai for London for transhipment
to Siberia. The opening of a portion of the Siberian
railway has already increased the sea traffic of the
northern rivers.

The imperfect communications afforded by the
Siberian rivers and the difficulty of finding a common
outlet for them in the sea naturally directed public atten-
tion to the necessity for railways, both as an independent
system of communications and as supplementary to the
existing water-ways. This double object is important, and
T must be borne well in mind in what follows.
— The first projects of railways in Siberia appeared at
the time when Muravioff's activity infused a new life in
the hitherto neglected region. The occupation of the
Amur and the study of its lower course had revealed the

THE SIBERIAN RAILWAY 287

advantages of De Castries bay, only separated by a narrow
strip of land from Lake Kizi, which communicates with
the river. . In 1857 Colonel Romanoff drafted the project
of a carriage road, to be transformed later into a railway,
between Sophiisk and De Castries ; it was thus intended
that traffic should proceed direct to the gulf of Tartary,
avoiding the detour north and the difficult entrance
to the Amur estuary, "Want of funds prevented the
execution of this project, but Muravioff appreciated its
importance, and later, in a letter to his brother, on
April 3, 1858, he alluded to the necessity of railways for
facilitating the communications to the coast ports near
the mouth of the Amur.

In the same year, 1857, an English engineer proposed ^"
a horse railway from Nijni-Novgorod, via Kazan and
Perm, to one of the ports on the Pacific Ocean. Though
the idea of this gigantic tramway seems strange at present,
it must be remembered that rapid transit is only a want
of advanced commercial conditions and of thickly peopled
countries, and that the first trains in Siberia have been
very slow. Considering also that there are four million
horses in Siberia, and that very little coal has been
extracted, the project had a practical character and was
perhaps the only one possible at that time for such a long
line. The proposal, however, was not accompanied by
estimates, and therefore received no attention from the
Government.

An American, Collins, presented at the same time a —
less ambitious scheme for the construction of a short
railway line from Irkutsk to Chita, thus joining the
capital of Eastern Siberia with the upper waters of the
Amur. He proposed to found a company and raise the
necessary funds in Siberia. Muravioff favoured the
project, probably because it facilitated communications

288 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

with the newly acquired territory, but it was rejected by
the Government as premature.
!Asr> In 1858 the idea of a gigantic railway traversing the
whole region again came up with the project of Morrison,
Horn, and Sleigh, who proposed to join Moscow with the
Pacific. No assistance was asked from the Government,
but such important privileges were required that they
constituted a real foreign monopoly, for a prolonged
period, of the whole trade of Siberia. This project was
therefore also discarded, especially as the Government
at the time had no intentions to favour such extensive
schemes.

In 1858 another project, on the same vast scale, was
presented by Sophronoff, who proposed to build a railway
from Saratof through the Kirghize Steppe to Semipala-
tinsk, Minusinsk, Selenghinsk to the Amur and Peking.
This project had also the fate of its predecessors, but it
attracted considerable public notice, and in the polemical
literature which appeared on the subject an important
opinion gained strength : the necessity for following the
direction of the already existing great postal road from
Nijni-Novgorod to Kiakhta ' in the construction of the
Siberian railway. This theory also deserves to be
remembered in what follows.

All the above projects were compiled by men working
at their desks, trusting to their imagination rather than
to practical knowledge of the country, its configuration
--and requirements. The next ten years brought fewer
projects on more moderate lines, but based on local
knowledge and inspired by practical views. It was no
longer sought to connect Eussia with the Pacific, but to
-t- build a line for the use of existing commerce.

' At that time the prolongation to Vladivostok did not exist ; the
construction commenced that very year.

THE SIBERIAN RAILWAY 289

In 1862 Kokoreff & Co. proposed a line joining the -
basins of the Volga and Ob, based on the project
of Kashet, an engineer intimately acquainted with the
intervening Ural country, where he had been employed
for many years. The railway was to start from Perm
and proceed via Nijni-Taghil to Tiumen, a distance of
678 versts (about 450 miles) with a short branch of
13 versts to Irbit. This project naturally enlisted the
support of the owners of the mining and metallurgical
establishments in the Ural country, through which the
proposed line was to pass. This popularity encouraged -
Colonel Bogdanovitch, in 1866, to propose another similar
line from Perm, through Yekaterinburg to Tiumen, which,
he added, might be prolonged to the Chinese frontier for
strategical and commercial purposes. All Siberia now —
became interested in the question, and a third line was
proposed by the merchant Liubimoff in 1869, which,
starting also from Perm and passing through Yekaterin-
burg, was to reach the river Tobol at a point 49
versts (about 32 miles) north of Kurgan.^ The total
length was to be 711 versts (about 472 miles), and
a branch line from Yekaterinburg of 131 versts (about
87 miles) was to traverse the Ural country.

All these three projected lines had for common starting-—
point Perm on the Karna : the first two had for terminus
Tiumen on the river Tara, and the third a point on the
river Tobol, 49 versts below Kurgan. They thus termi-
nated on the lower courses of the Tura and Tobol, which
play, as we have seen, such an important part in the river
navigation of Western Siberia. These short lines had'
therefore the great practical advantage of joining the
river Kama with the most frequented affluents of the
Irtysh, of connecting by the most direct route the basins

' Where the Great Siberian Railway now crosses the Tobol.

U

290 RUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

of the Volga and Ob, the most important navigable rivers
of Eussia and Siberia. The lines also follovi^ed an old
well-knov^n route w^hich had served for Yermak's conquest,
for the early Eussian immigration of the first centuries,
and for the growing trade between Europe and Northern
Asia in later times.

The attention of railway projectors was next directed
to connecting these lines with the general network of
Eussian railways, and in the years 1872-74 several plans
to that effect were proposed.^ The line from Perm to
Tiumen thus assumed a new aspect, as it became part of
the general railway system of the empire, and would
serve for the future transit of goods from and to Siberia,
-i- when railways should be extended far into the region.
But at that time the local interests of the flourishing
mining industry in the Ural were far more important
than considerations affecting the great line intended to be
- built across Siberia. ' Therefore, in 1875, the Government
decided to adopt the line of Bogdanovitch, without any
connection with the general system of Eussian railways,
to serve for the local wants of the Ural, and for connecting
the river traffic of the Volga and Ob.

The work commenced at once, and in ]878 the line
from Perm had reached Yekaterinburg, and in 1884 it
was finished as far as Tiumen.

The adoption and early construction of this line gave
rise to other projects on a larger scale, but similarlj^
utilising the Siberian rivers. In 1880 the engineer
Ostrofski proclaimed the theory that to develop the
resources of Siberia and its commercial relations with

' Three lines were proposed : 1st, Kineshma-Viatka-Perm-Yekaterin-
burg, 933 versts ; 2nd, Nijni-Kazan-Krasnouphimsk-Yekaterinburg, 1,172
Tersts; 3rd, Alatyr-Ufa-Tchelabinsk, 1,173 versts. This last line has
been adopted and connects with the Siberian railway.

THE SIBERIAN RAILWAY 291

Eussia, it was advisable to improve the internal com-
munications of Siberia before prolonging the Russian
railways beyond the Ural. He thought it was premature
to build a continuous railway through Siberia, and sug-
gested the following partial lines :

1. A line of 800 versts from Perm to Tobolsk, joining ■
the rivers Kama and Irtysh. This was an improvement
on the line then in construction, as it had its terminus on
the Irtysh, always navigable, while Tiumen on the river
Tura is inaccessible to steamers during the low-water
season.^

2. A line of 560 versts from Tomsk to Krasnoyarsk,
joining the rivers Ob and Yenissei. With these two lines
and with the existing river navigation he secured com-
munications between the Baikal and the Volga.

3. A line from Omsk to Barnaul, joining the Irtysh
and the Ob to shorten the long river route to Tobolsk for
the products of the rich Altai district. This line might
also be extended to the Chinese frontier.

Ostrofski maintained that the only practicable plan of-
joining Irkutsk, the centre of Siberia, with Moscow, the
centre of Russia, was by largely employing the existing
steam communications on the rivers. The construction
of an uninterrupted railway was a later question depending
on the more or less rapid development of Siberia. This
future line he, however, roughly sketched out, remarking
that it must pass through ' Riazan, Spask, Ufa, and thence
further to Zlatoust, Tchelabinsk, Petropavlofsk, Omsk,
Kainsk, Tomsk, Mariinsk, Atchinsk, Krasnoyarsk, Kansk,
Nijni-Udinsk, Balagansk, up to Irkutsk, meeting the
most important administrative and commercial towns of
Siberia, never leaving the zone of maximum population,

' The steamers were obliged to stop at Yevleva, distant 246 versts from
Tiumen.

V 2

292 RUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

and traversing almost exclusively the fertile black earth
~f zone from the Volga to the Yenissei.' This line, traced
out by Ostrofski, has been almost entirely followed in the
construction of the present Siberian railway.

Engineer Sidensner, who had been a member of the
expedition to study the construction of the Ob-Yenissei
canal, and who was probably biased by his special
studies, evolved another project in which the railway
played a still less important part. He showed that the
completion of the Ob-Yenissei canal, and the artificial
improvement of the lower course of the river Angara,
opened a vast water-way of 5,000 versts from Tiumen to
the Baikal. Moreover, this system of river communica-
tion was separated from the course of the Amur, leading
to the Pacific, only by a distance of 950 versts. Even
this distance, from the Baikal to Strietensk, could be
traversed in great part by water, leaving but a very short
portage. He reduced the land tract in the following
way. On the west, 150 versts could be traversed on the
Baikal and river Selenga, on the east 350 versts could be
performed on the rivers Shilka and Ingoda. The remain-
ing 450 versts were still further shortened by improving
the navigation of various minor streams, until the distance
by land dwindled down to 18 versts necessary for cross-
ing the crest of the Yablonoi. This portage was to be
effected bj^ railway, a short line thus sufficing to secure
easy communications throughout the whole length of
Siberia, from the Pacific to the Ural, where the line in
construction would extend them to the Volga and the
Caspian. The project, though favourably received, was
not carried out for want of funds.

Many other projects were presented by private persons,
and several Governors in Siberia proposed partial lines of
railway for their provinces, but the time was not yet ripe :

THE SIBERIAN RAILWAY 293

it was a work reserved for the last decade of the
century.

In the year 1890 the Kussian railways had stretched —
eastward in three lines, abruptly stopping near the Ural.
In the north there was the so-called Ural railway with
its terminus at Tinmen ; in the centre there was the
Zlatoust-Mias railway with its terminus at the last-named
station ; and further south there was the Orenburg rail-
way terminating at the town of that name.

The old project of a railway traversing the whole —
length of Siberia now again attracting attention, the
question arose which of the three existing lines on the
Ural should be used as the western terminus of the
immense railway destined to have its eastern terminus at
Vladivostok on the Pacific. By adopting the first line, -^
that from Perm to Tiumen, the Siberian railway would
proceed by Yalutorofsk, Kainsk, Mariinsk, Krasnoyarsk,
Nijni-Udinsk. This plan was exposed to many objections.
Owing to its northerly course it was forced to leave aside the
important town of Omsk ; and its length was 3,474 versts.
Moreover, as the Perm-Tiumen line was a detached,
independent one, serving exclusively for the use of the
Ural mining district, and for joining the rivers Kama and
Tura, it would be useless for the transit between Siberia
and Europe, unless another 1,000 versts of railway were
constructed from Perm to Nijni-Novgorod connecting
with the general network of Russian railways. The line— 7.
from Mias could be prolonged through Kurgan, Kainsk,
Mariinsk, Krasnoyarsk, to Nijni-Udinsk, with a total
length of 2,683 versts — 791 versts shorter than the
former. The third line would have to be prolonged from—
Orenburg through Omsk, Atbassar, Akmolinsk, Pavlodar,
Biisk, Minusinsk to Nijni-Udinsk, a total length of 3,400
versts. Besides being also long, this third route presented

►ii^

294 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

serious difficulties : the western part passed through
steppes without water, and exposed to violent winds and
snowstorms in winter, and the eastern part passed
through a mountainous country offering serious technical
difficulties.

These reasons naturally led to the adoption of the
second line as the western terminus of the Siberian rail-
way. On February 21, 1891, the Government decided
that the Zlatoust-Mias line should be extended to Tchela-
binsk, which was to become the first station of the future
Siberian railway. The views expressed by Ostrofski
eleven years before had now triumphed ; the direction of
the new line had for its primary object the development
of the resources of Siberia ; strategical considerations and
the desire to open new markets for Russian goods became
secondary objects.

The construction of the Siberian railway was finally
decided by an imperial rescript of March 17, 1891. This
measure was made known to the public with the solemnity
befitting its importance. It was promulgated on the
shores of the Pacific, at Vladivostok, the future eastern
terminus of the immense line, on May 12, 1891, by the
Tsesarievitch, now Tsar Nicholas II., who on May 19 laid
the first stone of the gigantic work.

-=- For the smooth working of this great undertaking it
became necessary to cut up the great line into a variety
of sections corresponding to natural divisions. This plan
allowed the work to be carried on simultaneously at
different points, securing administrative independence for
each ; it was moreover useful on account of the great
difference in the work dependent on geographical condi-
tions. These sections, seven in all, which it will be
necessary to bear in mind, are the following, proceeding
from west to east :

y

THE SIBERIAN RAILWAY 295

1st Section. — Western Siberian line, from Tchelabinsk
to the river Ob, 1,328 versts (880 miles).

2nd Section. — Central Siberian line, from the river Ob
to Irkutsk, 1,754 versts (1,162^ miles).

3rd Section. — Circumbaikalian line, from Irkutsk to
Mysovaya (around the lake), 292 versts (194 miles).

4th Section. — -Transbaikalian line, from Mysovaya to
Strietensk, 1,009 versts (669 miles).

^5th Section. — Amur line, from Strietensk to Khaba-
rofsk, about 2,000 versts (1,326 miles).

6th Section. — North Ussurian line, from Khabarofsk
to Graphska, 347 versts (230 miles).

"7th Section. — South Ussurian line, from Graphska to
Vladivostok, 382 versts (253 miles).

Total : 7,112 versts (4,714^ miles).

The first section, the Western Siberian, is of the easiest
construction ; it passes through a flat country, and the
only obstacles are the rivers : the Tobol, Ishim, Irtysh,
and Ob, especially the two latter, which require respectively
bridges spanning 700 and 840 yards. The country through
which it passes, especially the Ishim and Barabinsk
steppes, is fertile.

The Central Siberian encounters greater natural diffi-
culties ; the country, at first hilly, gradually becomes
mountainous ; the inclination of the road, never exceeding
0-0074 ( = -j-i-5-) in the Western Siberian, now reaches
0-015 (=-gV) beyond Nijni-Udinsk. Many rivers have to
be crossed — some, such as the Yenissei and Uda, requiring
bridges with a span of 930 and 350 yards. This part of
the line, starting from the Ob in about 55° N. lat.,
runs north-east to Mariinsk aijd Kansk in 57° N. lat.,
and then turns to the south-east up to Irkutsk in 53° N.
lat.
f, The Circumbaikalian line offers enormous difficulties;

296 RUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

it has to run along the shore between the lake and
mountains, often steep and rocky ; numerous torrents have
to be crossed by strong bridges ; and when the country
becomes flat, it is often marshy. Great detours have to
be taken, as may be perceived by the fact that in one case
the road could be shortened 30 versts by cutting a proposed
tunnel of 4,170 yards. But Russian engineers are not
familiar with tunnel-making, and avoid the task if possible.
— The Transbaikalian line, though to a less extent, also
offers great difficulties. After crossing the Selenga on a
bridge 700 yards long, it has to go up the valleys of
various rivers — the Uda, Briana, &c. — until it reaches the
Yablonoi crest at a height of 3,412 feet above sea-level.
Then it descends the Pacific slope down the valleys of
the rivers Chita and Nertcha, The latter also requires a
bridge of 350 yards. The climatic conditions are also
most unfavourable ; on the Yablonoi crest in June and
July, while the temperature rises to 77° Fahr. by day, it
falls to 23° Fahr. by night. Owing to the almost complete
absence of snow, the ground is frozen to a great depth.
From a series of experiments made in the valley of the
Chita, at a height of 2,380 feet above sea-level, it has
been found that in winter the ground is frozen to an
average depth of 24 feet 6 inches, and though during
summer it thaws to a depth of 12 feet 10 inches, there
remains a stratum of 11 feet 8 inches continually frozen.

\j — The Amur line has been imperfectly surveyed, but
enough is known to show that it will present enormous
difficulties. It will require numerous long bridges on the
tributary rivers and a gigantic one of 2,000 yards across
the Amur itself. The climatic conditions, through want
of snow, are about as bad as in Transbaikalia, but there
will be additional difficulties owing to the scanty popula-

. tion residing only along the banks. Whenever the line

\

THE SIBEBIAN BAILWAY 297

recedes from the river, it crosses an uninhabited region,
thickly wooded, where, owing to want of communications,
it is impossible to get the necessaries of life and to trans-
port railway materials.

^ The North and South Ussurian sections are much less ^
difficult, but the route, running up the narrow valley of
the Ussuri, meets numerous tributaries intersected by the
spurs of a mountain chain. The rivers Khor, Bikin, and
Iman require bridges spanning from 180 to 460 yards, and
the Ussuri one of 280 yards. After passing Lake Khanka,
the line descends into the valley of the Sui-phun down to
the Golden Horn at Vladivostok. _Y

This rapid sketch suffices to show the difficulties
existing in the eastern part of the Great Siberian Kailway,
between Irkutsk and Khabarofsk, a distance of over 3,000
versts. It is, however, necessary to remark that the—
greatest difficulties are to be found around Lake Baikal ^^
and along the Amur, where steam navigation for many
years has afforded a rapid means of transit. This fact
had an important influence in the distribution of the
work necessary for the completion of the entire line.
Though the ultimate object of the undertaking was to
secure continuous railway communication from the Ural
to the Pacific, from Tchelabinsk to Vladivostok, it could
not be ignored that the entire accomplishment of this
object involved the labour of many years. In the mean- •
time it was highly desirable to achieve as early as possible
such a railway development that, together with the exist-
ing river navigation, a system of rapid steam communica-
tions could be attained.

For this purpose the seven sections of the work were
distributed in three groups, to be undertaken successively,
the most important naturally preceding. The following
order was adopted :

298 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

Geoup I

1st Section, Western Siberian.
2nd „ Central Siberian.
7th ,, Southern Ussurian.

A supplementary line from Tchelabinsk to Yekaterinburg
was also to be constructed to join the Great Siberian with
the Ural railway.

Group II

6th Section, North Ussurian.
4th ,, Transbaikalian.

Group III
3rd Section, Circumbaikalian.
5th ,, Amur line.

The first group was to be commenced at once, and
finished not later than the year 1900. The work was to
commence at both ends, and to gradually converge to--
wards the centre. The gaps in the line were more
apparent than real, and corresponded with the plan pro-
posed of securing rapid communications as early as
possible. With the completion of the first and second
groups, the only parts of the line left unfinished would
be those around Lake Baikal and along the Amur, where
steamers ply incessantly and fulfil the functions of a
railway for the time. This temporary plan of securing
continuous steam communications, either by river-boats
or railway across the whole length of Siberia, received
further support in 1895,' when it was decided to push on
simultaneously the work of both the first and second
groups, which were to be finished by 1898.

This acceleration of the programme has been carried

' It is not irrelevant to note that it was the year marking the end of the
war between China and Japan which produced such important changes in
the Far East.

THE SIBERIAN BAILWAY 299

out almost entirely ; in August 1898 the first train
reached Irkutsk, and in the same year the railway was
also opened to Khabarofsk. The work in the Trans-
baikalian section was retarded by exceptional meteoro-
logical conditions ; unusual rains in the summer of 1897
caused an extraordinary rise in the upper waters of the
Amur, the Chita, and Shilka, such as had not been
recorded for over a century. Besides devastating many
villages on the banks, the floods destroyed the railway
which had been completed for about 80 versts from
Strietensk. Along the banks of the Shilka, where service
trains had been running, a deplorable scene was presented
in 1897 — engines overturned, rails torn up, embankments
washed away.

The third group was left in abeyance even in 1895,
when such haste was displayed for the early completion
of the other groups. The causes of this neglect were
twofold : the existence of steamer communications and
difficulties of construction. Postal and commercial com-
munication between Irkutsk and Transbaikalia are gene-
rally carried on across the lake on steamers in summer
and on sledges in winter ; only when the water is freezing
or the ice thawing, the postal road around the southern
extremity of the lake comes into requisition. The con-
struction of the Circumbaikalian section along this latter
route entails, as we have seen, great difficulties, especially
for Russian engineers who never have had occasion to
construct lines in a rough mountainous country. Even
the construction of the postal road was only accomplished
at the end of the last century. On the other hand, the
old method of carrying goods, passengers, and their
carriages, across the Baikal in steamers from Listvinitza
to Mysovaya, was not practicable in the case of the passen-
gers and goods of the Siberian railway ; the expense and

300 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

loss of time in shipping and landing at the two ends would
remove the advantages of the long continuous railway.
The Baikal was therefore the first serious difficulty met
by the Siberian railway.

The solution proposed for this difficulty was the em-
ployment of steam ferries, similar to those used on Lake
Michigan, capable of carrying a whole train and of break-
ing the ice in winter. This plan presented the advantages
of shortening the distance— 66 versts from Listvinitza to
Mysovaya instead of over 200 around the southern end of
the lake — and of diminishing the expenses : 15,000,000
roubles were estimated sufficient for the steamers, instead
of 24,000,000 for the Circumbaikalian line. The proposal
was so plausible that a steamer has been purchased, and
in 1897 a wharf was in construction at Mysovaya to
enable the steam ferry to come alongside and land the
train.

Lately, however, serious objections have been raised
to this plan, and the Circumbaikalian line is again
coming into favour. Lake Baikal is subject to violent
storms and thick fogs, which stop navigation ; such events
and the consequent accumulation of trains on both shores
would disorganise the traffic of the whole line. It is
doubtful whether the ice-breaking steamers will be able
to cut a way through the thick ice formed during the
severe Siberian winter. Moreover, the reduction in the
expenditure is called in question and rendered doubtful by
appropriate arguments. The saving was evident when
the cost of only a few steamers was reckoned ; but to carry
across five trains daily from each end, it is calculated that
seven or even eight steamers (keeping one in reserve) will
be required. Seven steamers will cost about 17,500,000
roubles, and wharves, docks, &c., will require 8,000,000
more. The saving has already disappeared, while the

THE SIBERIAN RAILWAY 301

cost of working the seven steamers is reckoned to be
slightly in excess of the working expenses of the Circum-
baikalian line. Of course any increase in the number of
the daily trains would require additional steamers, turning
the balance still more in favour of the railway. Sanguine
supporters of the Siberian railway trust in a great deve-
lopment of trade, and expect that even twenty trains a day
at both ends will be required.

It is therefore probable that the Circumbaikalian line
will be constructed, at least for alternate use, together
with the steam ferries.

The other section of the third group — the Amur line —
presents still greater difficulties. It has not even the com-
pensation of being short like the Circumbaikalian, which
is only 292 versts. Here we have about 2,000 versts to
be constructed through dense forests, across big rivers,
often away from all population, under rigorous climatic
conditions, with a frozen soil requiring to be laboriously
broken up. Moreover, the local conditions do not warrant
the heavy expenses necessary for the work ; the popula-
tion of the Amur province amounts only to 115,000
inhabitants, and the country is mostly uncultivated ; many
years must pass before the trade of the people, all living
on the banks of the river, and already provided with
regular steamer service, will require a railway. The only
use of the Amur line is, therefore, to connect the railway
from Moscow arriving at Strietensk with the railway
from Vladivostok at Khabarofsk. And to achieve this
purpose 2,000 versts of railway have to be constructed
on a circuitous line following the irregularities of the
course of the river Amur.

To understand the circumstances of the case and the -
events which ensued, it is necessary to bear in mind the
geographical position of the Eussian possessions in the

302 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

Far East. By the treaty of Peking, Eussia had acquired
the Ussuri territory, a long tract of country stretching
south of the Amur to the frontier of Corea ; her eastern
frontier thus became an irregular curve sweeping right
round Manchuria on the north and east. Almost at the
extremity of this curve Vladivostok had been chosen as
the naval stronghold of Eussia in the Pacific, and now it
was destined to become the terminus of the Siberian
railway. To reach it the railway must follow the long
frontier on a useless detour wliich increased the distance
by about 1,000 versts.

At the end of the century Eussia was confronted with
similar difficulties to those she had met nearly fifty years
before. Her naval base on the Pacific, Vladivostok, was
situated at the southern extremity of a detached portion
of the empire, which could only be reached by a long
circuitous route. Muravioff, when he assumed the
Governor-Generalship of Eastern Siberia, had found the
Pacific naval base of that time, Petropavlof sk, cut off from
the rest of Siberia, the only communication lying far in
the north by a circuitous route leading to the detached
peninsula of Kamchatka. The conditions at present were
not so unfavourable ; the loss of time entailed by the
detour did not require weeks, but, thanks to the railway,
only about a couple of days ; yet, with the changed condi-
tions of modern life, even this delay was important. The
former difficulties had been overcome by Muravioff during
his brilliant administration, profiting sagaciously by the
- political events of the time. 1 The Crimean war secured
the right of navigation on the Amur ; the little value
attached to the country on the north of that river by the
Chinese Government, its internal trouble with the T'ai-
p'ings, and the war with England and France had suc-
cessively secured the Amur and Ussuri regions. Political

THE SIBERIAN RAILWAY 303

events of a similar nature furnished the opportunity to
Eussia of removing the difficulties encountered in the
eastern part of the Siberian railway.

The war which broke out between China and Japan
in 1894, and continued for the first months of 1895, deeply
interested Eussia ; the military operations were mostly
carried on in Corea and Manchuria, regions relatively near
to the eastern terminus of the Siberian railway ; the
results of the war, it was feared, might injure her future
interests. When, by the treaty of Shimonoseki, China
was obliged to cede a portion of Manchuria, Eussia felt
the necessity of interfering and of preventing the esta-
blishment on that continent of a new political factor, which
might hinder her free development on the Pacific ; the
successful intervention also afforded the basis for a future
demand of compensation. This followed rapidly, and
Eussia obtained the permission from China to extend her
railway through Manchuria to Vladivostok. The detour
along the Amur now became unnecessary, except for local
requirements which, as we have seen, are not urgent.
The increased influence acquired by Eussia in Peking, the
activity of her surveying parties in Manchuria, and the
fact that Vladivostok is only artificially kept open by ice-
breakers during the winter months, favoured the suspicion
that her ultimate aims were directed to Port Arthur, which
is free from ice during the whole winter. At any rate,
there was no haste or abruptness in carrying out these
plans ; Eussia waited until the German occupation of
Kiao-chou forced her to claim some equivalent compensa-
tion. The lease of Port Arthur and Ta-lien-wan, and the
right to connect these ports by branch lines with the
main Siberian railway, secured another nearer outlet on
the Pacific. It is even probable that the commercial
terminus of the railway will be closer, at Newchwang, or,

304 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

as the Kussians more accurately call it, the port of
Ying-tzu.
1^' These important concessions obtained from China
' profoundly affected the construction of the eastern part of
the Siberian railway. The permission to extend the line
straight through Manchuria to Vladivostok rendered
superfluous the Amur section and even portions of the
Transbaikalian and Ussurian sections, which were not
required for the continuous communication with the
Pacific. The problem to be solved by the Russian
engineers was now to find from which point of the Trans-
baikalian section the Manchurian line should commence,
and on which point of the Ussurian section it should
terminate. Surveys for this purpose were undertaken in
1897, and, after several routes were rejected, it was decided
that the line should start from Kaidalovo on the Trans-
baikalian section and terminate at Nikolskoe on the
South Ussurian section. By this means 806 versts of
the first section and 100 of the second would be utilised
for the great trunk line, i.e. the greater part of the one
and only a small portion of the other. This projected
Manchurian line, officially designated as the East Chinese
section, has to overcome serious difficulties ; its route is
intersected by two chains of mountains, the Great and
Little Khinghan, which further north cross the course of
the Amur. A convenient passage has been found over
the Great Khinghan, but the Little Khinghan presents
more serious obstacles and requires fresh surveys. These
technical considerations suggested a different direction
and terminus to the Siberian railway ; a southerly direc-
tion towards the gulf of Liao-Tung to Newchwang or
Port Arthur was advocated instead of the easterly direc-
tion to Vladivostok in the sea of Japan.

THE SIBERIAN RAILWAY 305

The route now projected starting from Kaidalovo '
passes south of the Adun-Tchelon chain, through the
valley of an affluent of the Mutnaya (south of Abaguitui),
and then, crossing the Great Khinghan by the portage
between the rivers Tchin-ho and Jol-Tchol in a country
offering slight difficulties, reaches the watershed between
the rivers Sungari and Lao-ho, where a cart road leads
from the basin of one river to the other. This part of
the country is so easy that the Emperor K'ang-hsi
projected a canal of fifty versts for joining the two
rivers. The valley of the Lao-ho then leads to the sea,
where Newchwang offers an excellent commercial centre
open to navigation for the greater part of the year. A
branch line to Port Arthur would secure uninterrupted
access to the sea even in winter. This line would be
shorter than the East-Chinese section.

Other projects have appeared, and it is even proposed
to shift the origin of the East-Chinese section further
west on the other side of the Yablonoi, at Taidut, a station
on the river Khilok. This route would bring a further
reduction in the total distance of 160 versts. As this
line would leave the Transbaikalian section before the
latter crosses the Yablonoi, another passage over that
chain would have to be made, but even this is alleged to
be an advantage, for while the Transbaikalian section
accomplishes it in thirty-nine versts, this last project
would effect the passage from the valley of the Khilok to
that of the river Ingoda in 104 versts, allowing gentler
slopes across the mountain ridge.

The routes, either from Kaidalovo or Taidut to
Newchwang, would have the merit of considerably
shortening the total distance. It is interesting to notice
the persistent and successful efforts to diminish the

' Between Chita and Nertchinsk, nearer to the former.

X

RUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

enormous distance ; according to the original plan
including the Amur section, more than 9,000 versts of
railway separated Moscow from Vladivostok; by sub-
stituting the East-Chinese section through Manchuria the
distance was reduced to 8,000 versts ; and by rectifying
some short lines in Eussia, and by choosing Newchwang
as the terminus on the Pacific, it is further reduced to
7,280 versts. In a commercial sense Newchwang is
preferable to Vladivostok as a terminus, being nearer to
China with its rich markets, but it is probable that the
line to Vladivostok will also be pushed on rapidly, as it
will be useful for the Japan trade.

The great railway shortly to be completed, joining the
Atlantic and Pacific eastwards, as the American and
Canadian railways do westwards, fulfils two great
purposes. It will develop the resources of Siberia — the
/ object for which it was constructed — and it will constitute,
a new commercial route for rapid travel and for exchange
of the products of East and West. The second object,
far more dazzling, especially on account of the great
decrease in the time necessary for reaching the Far East,
thus apparently bringing those distant regions closer, has
attracted far more public attention.
I The first and most important result following the
completion of the Siberian railway will be the more rapid
conveyance of mails and passengers to the Far East.
Passenger trains in Western Siberia at present run at the
average rate of twenty-two versts an hour, including
stoppages ; at this moderate speed it will take about
fifteen days to reach Vladivostok from Moscow, and four-
teen to reach Newchwang. If we take as starting-point
London, the great commercial centre of the world, we
must add about two days' journey to Moscow.' Then to

' At present there is no rapid train from London to Moscow as there is

THE SIBERIAN RAILWAY 307

reach Shanghai, we must add five days from Vladivostok,
and about three from Newchwang, giving a total of twenty-
two days via the first port, and nineteen via the second.
There is a considerable saving of time over the sea route
through the Suez Canal, which takes over a month ; if we
choose Hong Kong for comparison, we must add three
days for the Siberian route and deduct the same for the sea
route, still leaving a balance in favour of the former. Even
to Japan there will be a saving of time, as compared
with the Canadian route, if a proper service of rapid
steamers be established between Vladivostok and one
of the nearest Japanese ports.

We have assumed for our comparisons the minimum
speed, such as is used at present on the lines of "Western
Siberia, which are purely for the local use of thinly
peopled districts ; but when the whole line is com-
pleted to the Pacific, its importance for international
transit will require higher speeds. It is confidently
expected that there will be passenger trains running at
the rate of 35 versts an hour, and perhaps express trains
at the rate of 45 versts. The latter would save a week
on the whole journey, reducing the time from London
to Shanghai and Hong Kong to about twelve and fifteen
days respectively. To show the future possibilities of the
Siberian railway, it will be sufficient to state that a
train travelling at the rate of the Nord express — 90
versts an hour — would employ less than four days to
cover the distance from Moscow to Newchwang or Vladi-
vostok, reducing the time from London to Shanghai to
about nine days. Of course such trains will not be
required and will not run for a long time, but the rate of
travelling is increasing so fast at present that young and

to St. Petersburg, but there will certainly be one as soon as the Siberian
railway is completed.

X 2

308 RUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

perhaps middle-aged persons may live to see such trains
running to the Pacific, at least weekly.

The Siberian railway will compete favourably with the
sea route also in cheapness. The Russian Government,
faithful to the broad-minded policy pursued for centuries,
in securing cheap conveyance of mails and travellers
through Siberia, will reduce the fares on the railway to
figures which seem ridiculous in other countries. Tickets
from Moscow to Vladivostok, including sleeping accom-
modation, will cost by first, second, or third class 100, 60,
or 40 roubles respectively. If we add the fare from
London to Moscow 125 roubles, from Vladivostok to
Shanghai 80 roubles, and food expenses for seventeen days
at 85 roubles, we get a total of 390 roubles from London to
Shanghai, instead of 772 roubles via Brindisi by the sea
route. ^

The difference in price is so considerable that there is-
room for other incidental expenses, which might occur on
the journey.

The Siberian railway, like the Canadian-Pacific, would
offer, especially in summer, better climatic conditions than
the Suez route, which traverses the Indian Ocean and
the Red Sea. These several advantages acting conjointly
will render the Siberian route the most convenient for
passengers to the Far East.

Only a few of the most evident facts have been
moderately stated in favour of the Siberian railway, but
the sanguine supporters of the route claim far more.

' In these calculations it is generally overlooked that most of the
passengers from London to Shanghai are either residents of the Far East
or persons on business that will detain them for a considerable time ; they
therefore generally carry a quantity of luggage, which is liberally treated
and seldom charged by the steamer companies. We must therefore add
about a hundred roubles to the cost via Siberia : this amount would allow
each passenger over 3 cwt. of luggage besides 36 pounds free and hand-
luggage, a total of nearly 4 cwt., sufficient for average requirements. This
addition would still leave a large balance in favour of the Siberian route.

THE SIBERIAN RAILWAY ' 309

They contend that passengers from Europe for the Dutch
Indies will prefer this route, and that passengers from
New York and the Eastern States will find it cheaper and
quicker to reach China and Japan by crossing the Atlantic
and traversing the old continent by railway. The
calculations on which these assertions are founded are
rather nicely poised, but they will be based on more
practical foundations as soon as the speed of the Siberian
railway has been considerably increased.

It will be more difficult for the Siberian railway to
compete for the conveyance of goods from and to the Far
East : the low freights prevalent at present by the Suez
route will render it preferable for the trade between the
seaports of Europe and those of China and Japan. The
only goods to and from the Far East which will be able
to bear the tariff of the Siberian railway are those that
are liable from their value to high freights by steamer, or
are apt to be damaged by heat and moisture on the long
sea-voyage. The Siberian railway may also absorb the
trade coming from the interior of Russia. It is calculated
that the total cost from Moscow to Vladivostok by rail-
way and steamer, via Odessa and Suez Canal, is slightly
in excess of what will be charged by the Siberian railway,
travelling direct to the same destination. The conditions
will be still more favourable for the districts in the east of
Russia, further removed from the sea and nearer by rail
to Vladivostok.

\ The principal object of the Siberian railway, and from
which it will derive its largest profits, will be the develop-
ment of the country it traverses : a country possessing
much natural wealth, hitherto little available owing to the
want of easy communication. Not only will it supply
this want, but it will contribute powerfully to increase
the steamer traffic on the Siberian rivers ; already the

310 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

short line from Perm to Tiumen has given a great
impetus to navigation on the Ob, and the completed
sections of the Siberian railway have attracted a larger
number of ocean steamers to the Arctic Ocean. While
the railway is proceeding, the Government is undertaking
works for the improvement of the navigation of the
Tchulym and the Angara, the most important eastern
affluents of the Ob and the Yenissei. Success in this
work will extend eastward the network of fluvial com-
munications as far as Transbaikalia, almost within reach
of the navigation of the Amur. European Eussia
possesses a system of canals affording uninterrupted
water-communication between the Caspian, the White
Sea, and the Baltic, and the problem of endowing Siberia
with a similar system will probably be solved when the
new railway has quickened the life of the immense
region.

The Siberian railway will be the last and most im-
portant measure in the great work of slow pacific con-
quest, which has been proceeding for many centuries, as
it will afford the readiest means for the eastward expan-
sion of the race. Of late years the eastward drift of the
population has been very remarkable in European Eussia,
eastern towns like Samara and Saratof having developed
with extraordinary rapidity. Emigration to Siberia is
steadily increasing : while it amounted to about 5,000 a
year from 1860 to 1880 (110,000 for the whole period),
it increased to nearly 10,000 yearly between 1879-85
(55,000 for the six years). In 1892, owing to famine in
Eussia, emigration rose to 90,000.^ The southern part
of Siberia offers a fertile soil, similar to the best of
European Eussia, which is much sought after by the

' Kraefski gives 600,000 for the year 1894, but I suspect this high
figure must be a misprint for 60,000.

TEE SIBERIAN RAILWAY 311

peasants. The railway will enormously increase the
European emigration, attracting labourers and facilitating
the journey of the peasants desirous of settling on un-
occupied lands.

It will act in a far higher degree than can be conceived
in other countries, owing to the special tariffs on Kussian
railways which favour long journeys, the charges for long
distances being relatively much lower than those for
short ones.^ Thus, taking for instance the third class,
the most generally used, and the most adapted for peasant
emigrants : the passenger fare

for 100 versts is roubles 1"44
„ 500 „ it is „ 5-20
,,1,000 „ „ „ 8-40
„ 2,000 „ „ „ 12-80
„ 4,000 „ „ „ 20-80

It will be seen from the above figures that 4,000 versts,
a distance of over 2,640 English miles, can be travelled
for about 20 roubles, or less than 42s. : the cost is only a
little over a fifth of a penny per mile. '.

Russian railways are administered for the convenience
of the public and not for private speculation : every
comfort is provided, and unless the carriages are over-

' The price of tickets on Eussian railways is charged per verst only
up to a distance of 300 versts ; greater distances are charged according to
zones

of 25 versts for distances from 301 to 500 versts
,, 30 „ „ „ 501 „ 710

„ 35 „ „ „ 711 „ 990

„ 40 „ „ „ 991 „ 1,510

For distances above 1,510 versts, the zones are of 50 versts. Above 325
versts the price of each zone is 20 kopecks third class, 30 kopecks second,
50 kopecks first class. As the zones increase, the cost therefore relatively
decreases: thus to travel 1,000 versts (over 660 English miles), from
1,510 to 2,510 versts in first, second, and third class costs respectively 10, 6,
and 4 roubles.

312 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

crowded, passengers of all classes, without any extra
charge, have suitable sleeping accommodation. The tariffs
are inspired by principles similar to those with which
Rowland Hill revolutionised the postal service : though it
IS impossible, at least at present, to adopt a uniform
charge, it diminishes relatively for great distances.

The cheap travelling afforded over the whole breadth
of Northern Asia will open the country to all classes of
Russians : as soon as the railway is completed, Siberia
will cease to be considered the land of convicts ^ and exiles ;
it will become effectively a part of the empire, con-
tributing to the maintenance of the population and to the
development of manufactures.

The cost of the Siberian railway has been estimated
at 350,000,000 roubles (nearly 40,000,000/.), and though it
is hoped to reduce this sum by the abandonment of the
expensive Amur section, it is probable that, as in most
cases, the actual expenses will surpass the estimates. To
appreciate fully the extent of the sacrifices incurred by
the Government, it must be remembered that in late
years 20,000,000 roubles have been spent yearly in Eastern
Siberia, while the revenue only amounts to 6,000,000 :
even the revenue of all Siberia is inferior to the expendi-
ture of recent times. The large sums continually spent
by Russia for the improvement of her distant possessions
have been heavily felt by the thickly peopled central
provinces. But the Government was actuated by
motives of a broad far-seeing policy ; it has definitely
adopted the view of Muravioff that Siberia is destined
to absorb the surplus population of Russia for over a

' Already in the towns and more populous districts there is strong
opposition to the deportation of convicts, and whilst this page is passing
through the press there comes the news that the Tsar has appointed a com-
mission to devise other means of dealing with convicted persons.

THE SIBEEIAN RAILWAY 313

century, and it has rejected the narrow view of Nesselrode,
who valued the country only as a convenient land for the
deportation of criminals. The Siberian railway, which is
responsible for the heaviest expenses, will probably bring
the reward of these prolonged sacrifices. The immense
country it traverses will become, what is indicated by its
geographical position, an extension of Russia, where
population will flow gradually, shifting eastward the
centre of the empire and developing a new civilising
power of unknown possibilities in the old continent of
Asia, in regions of unexplored wealth. It will complete
pacifically the work undertaken amidst hardships and
difficulties by Yermak and the Cossacks.

314 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

CHAPTEE VII

CONCLUSION

The Russian Empire, extending from the Baltic to the
Pacific, resembles by its size and geographical position the
huge empire formed by Genghiz Khan and his successors.
It is situated further north, the Mongols hardly touching
the forest regions of northern Eussia and Siberia, but this
fact may be considered as a particular case of a general
historical law — the centre of political power shifting
steadily northward from the banks of the Euphrates and
Nile to Greece and Eome, and thence later to the higher
latitudes of Europe. There is, however, a striking
difference in the means and time employed in the forma-
tion of the two empires, as well as the direction of the
expansion. The Mongols achieved their conquests with
unexampled rapidity and great ferocity, advancing west-
wards in a few years to the frontier of Germany, marking
their triumphs with the indiscriminate slaughter of the
vanquished. The Eussian Empire has been the slow,
regular growth of many centuries ; the race has gradually
expanded eastwards, employing probably ten centuries to
cover the distance from the Danube to the Ural, and three
more to secure firm footing on the Pacific. The move-
ment has been so regular that centuries serve to mark its
rhythmus. After the Mongol conquest had crushed the
nation for nearly a century and a half, Demetrius Donskoi
destroyed the prestige of the conquerors at the battle of

CONCLUSION 315

Kulikovo in 1380 ; a century later, in 1480, the Tartar
yoke was finally thrown off. After another century, the
Tartar states of Kazan and Astrakhan having been con-
quered, and the Ural reached, Yermak started in 1581 for
the conquest of Siberia. The eastward expansion in Asia
continued for another hundred years, until it was stopped
by the treaty of Nertchinsk in 1689. A long halt of over
a century and a half then followed, when the movement
was again taken up by Muravioff and is now steadily
proceeding.

The process, except in rare cases, has been eminently
pacific, the aboriginal races being either absorbed, or
isolated into sporadic groups by the surging mass of the
expanding Slav race. The principal object desired and
achieved by Eussia has been the establishment of order ;
when a struggle has been necessary for this object, the
vanquished have generally recognised the advantages of
the conquest.

The Grand Dukes of Moscow gradually displaced
the khans of the Golden Horde, and secured for Kussia
a strong government and the abolition of wrangling
feudahsm. The Tsars of Eussia now propose to offer
rapid and secure transit across Asia, such as prevailed in
the most flourishing period of the Mongol empire.

The rich countries of Eastern Asia have been accessible
at various historical periods either by sea or by land : '
the latter route was especially preferred in the thirteenth
century, when the strong government of the Mongols
secured a safe passage throughout their vast empire.
Then merchants from the Mediterranean could reach the
Yellow Sea through Sarai, Central Asia, and MongoHa.
In a few years merchants from the North Sea and the

' This is shown by Colonel Yule in his usual lucid way.

316 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

Baltic will be able to reach the Yellow Sea through
Moscow and Siberia. The great railway, now fast com-
pleting, may therefore be considered the commercial
concomitant of Kussian expansion on the Pacific : the
consolidation of the empire of the Tsars reopens the land
route across Asia abandoned for nearly six centuries, since
the break-up of the Mongol power produced disorder and
lawlessness throughout the continent. The movement
commenced by Yermak and completed by Muravioff has
led irresistibly to the land route, which in the nineteenth
century has become a railway.

The expansion on the Pacific of the vast empire now
steadily progressing in internal development, and the open-
ing of a new commercial route, are events which will pro-
duce great and lasting consequences on the neighbouring
countries of the Far East, and it will be necessary to
examine their probable nature in the future.

China is the country most directly affected, on account
of the long common frontier with Russia, and because the
eastern part of the Siberian railway runs through the
northern province of Manchuria. If the experience of
the past is the surest foundation on which to base pre-
visions for the future, China has little to fear from her
northern neighbour ; the two empires have been in
contact for over three centuries, and notwithstanding
frequent frontier trouble there has never been war. It is
difficult to find elsewhere such a peaceful record.

After the treaty of Nertchinsk, the Chinese, inflated by
their success, subjected the Russians to numerous humilia-
tions, often capriciously stopping the trade at Kiakhta
which had been sanctioned by treaty. These annoyances
were quietly endured, and Russian patience cannot be
ascribed to prudence, because even in later years, when
China was no longer considered formidable, similar

CONCLUSION 317

annoyances ^ have been inflicted and have not provoked
retaliation. The annexation of the Amur and Ussuri
regions was achieved pacifically, and acknowledged by the
Chinese in the convention of Aigun. This quiet transfer
was due more to the internal troubles and foreign wars
of China than to the shadowy nature of the sovereignty
in the disputed territory.

After the treaty of Nertchinsk the Chinese had taken
no measures to secure effectual possession of the recon-
quered territory; they were content it should remain a
kind of ' no man's land.' This fatal omission led them
to relinquish it as soon as the Kussians were willing and
able to advance. The real cause of their loss was so
apparent to the Chinese themselves, that after the treaty
of Aigun they began to colonise Manchuria and to increase
its garrisons. Even after these measures, the right bank
of the Amur, which has belonged to China for centuries,
remains almost uninhabited, except in a few places ; pre-
senting a striking contrast with the left bank, thickly
studded with towns and villages, though it has been
occupied by Eussia less than half a century.

The Russians have had the greatest toleration for the
customs of the Chinese and for their local self-government,
even when it was prejudicial to their legal sovereignty.
Russian annexation therefore has been favourable to the
Chinese people, opening new fields for their trading enter-
prise : all the Russian towns from Vladivostok to Chita
have Chinese quarters, with a numerous population of
shopkeepers and workmen ; there are far more Chinese
living on the Russian banks of the Ussuri and Amur
than on their own. Away from the river, in the interior of
the Ussuri region, Chinese villages are governedby their own
elders and headmen. The relations between the Chinese

' The obstacles to Russian navigation on the Sungari river.

318 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

traders and the aborigines have continued as they were
before the treaty of Aigun : the former artfully supply-
ing the hunters with tobacco, spirits, etc., hold them
always in debt, which passes from father to son,
constituting a veritable commercial bondage. Besides
swindling the natives with their commercial ability, the
Chinese in outlying districts even collect tribute, as in the
time of their domination.^ The toleration of the
Russians, extended even to such flagrant acts, gives the
Chinese far greater advantages than in the pre-Eussian
period : this is evinced by their growing numbers in
regions where before they scarcely appeared.

Russia has never entertained ideas of conquest of
China : this would be contrary to the ancient traditions
of her policy, which has always aimed at occupying thinly
peopled lands affording room for her surplus population.
The conquest of a thickly peopled country like China
would be a new departure for which Russia is not pre-
pared. The spirit of the government and the character
of the people are averse from pride of race : the only feeling
on which to base such conquests. The sentiment of race-
equality has succeeded well in the Russian Empire, because
the ever-increasing number of the prolific Slav race has
rendered it possible to neglect heterogeneous elements
gradually and irresistibly absorbed or smothered. But
this principle would be fatal in the government of the
millions of China.

For many years there was mutual distrust and suspicion
between the two countries. China, after the cession of
the Amur and Ussuri regions, feared further encroach-

' This happened in the unfrequented Daban district, situated at the
portage between the upper waters of the Khor and Bikina (right tributaries
of the Ussuri), where the Kussians were not allowed to approach by the
jealous Chinese traders.

CONCLUSION 319

merits and made considerable military preparations in
Manchm-ia. The latter measures alarmed Kussia, who
feared a reconquest of the Amur she had already lost
two centuries before. These fantastic apprehensions went
so far as to lend foundation to the theory that China was
the ally of Great Britain in a possible war with Kussia,
the pivot of her Eastern policy. The Japanese war dis-
pelled these visionary schemes — it showed the military
inefficiency of China and changed the position of Kussia.
The latter stepped into the place of Great Britain, and,
after the intervention to recover the Liao-tung penin-
sula, assumed the role of protector of the tottering empire.
For her valuable services Kussia only obtained the per-
mission to prolong her railway through Manchuria.

The reluctance of the Kussian Government to hasten
expansion in the Far East, and a certain superstitious
respect for the mysterious Chinese Empire which still
lingered in the European Foreign Offices, would probably
have prevented all occupation of Chinese territory for an
indefinite period had not unforeseen events precipitated
matters. The bold action of Germany at Kiao-chao
forced Kussia to occupy Port Arthur : her ancient rela-
tions with China and the future interests of the Siberian
railway compelled her to seek some equivalent for the
new acquisition of the upstart rival.

The lease of Port Arthur and Ta-lien-wan, and the
Siberian railway through Manchuria, will probably lead to
further annexation, but the condition of China at present
is so critical, that a slight shrinking of the frontiers is
a question of relatively little importance. The feeble
empire, threatened by external enemies and by internal
dissolution, may well consider with indifference the entire
loss of the surrounding subject territories, provided the
eighteen provinces of China proper can be saved from

320 RUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

impending disintegration. Never in the whole course of
her long history has China been confronted by such
terrible dangers as at present : the crisis requires great
sacrifices, which should not be grudged if they avert
complete ruin. Though Kussia certainly needs further
annexation in Manchuria, she is as much interested as
Great Britain, if not more, in the independence of China.

Kussia became a neighbour of Corea in 1860, when
after the treaty of Aigun Muravioff ordered the occupa-
tion of Vladivostok and Possiet bay. Though the dis-
tracted condition of the country, with its bitter political
parties, offered frequent occasions for intervention, and
though the southern position of the peninsula with its
fine coasts offered ice-free ports for the future needs of
her navy, Eussia has, during forty years, abstained from
continuing that southern expansion down the eastern
coasts of Asia inaugurated by Muravioff. She was, how-
ever, always suspected of aiming at the occupation of
a Corean port. These suspicions were based on the fact
that her surveying parties had been active on the eastern
coast of the peninsula, and that suitable ports were to be
fomid in that locality. These facts, however, were only
sufficient to indicate the wishes and future wants of
Eussia, not the practical bent of her policy, averse to
violence and consistently pacific.

Eussia for over twenty years paid no attention to her
new neighbour. Though crowds of Corean immigrants
flowed across the border to escape the extortions of the
officials and the horrors of civil war and of famine, the
Eussians made no attempt to encourage this movement
and to acquire influence in the peninsula. They even
went so far as to negotiate by letter with the Corean
frontier authorities to obtain a full pardon for those
Coreans who by leaving their country had become

CONCLUSION 321

amenable to capital punishment. The hopes of the return
of the emigrants to their mother-country were frustrated,
because the Corean exiles had no faith in the promises of
their vindictive officials and preferred to remain under
the protection of the White Tsar. It was only after
Japan, the United States, Great Britain, and even Italy,
had concluded treaties, and Corea had been opened to
the whole world, that Eussia entered into relations with
her southern neighbour in the Far East.

To understand the true nature of Russia's policy in
the early times, it is necessary to bear in mind that for
over fifteen years Russia was the only nation in contact
with Corea. Up to 1876 China was separated by a broad
belt of uncultivated land known as the Neutral Zone, and
Japan was too busy with the great internal questions
preceding and following the Restoration, the great political
transformation which brought back the Mikado and
created modern Japan.

Russia, in the brief period mentioned, was in the same
position as regards Corea as she had been for over a
hundred and fifty years, from the treaty of Nertchinsk to
the treaty of Nanking with respect to China — the only
country with a common frontier. In both cases Russia
took no advantage of her exceptional position to forestall
other nations.

Russia has been equally indifferent to the nominal
sovereignty claimed by China and to the practical control
of the country assumed by Japan at the time of the war :
she was satisfied with the voluntary guarantee of the
independence of Corea frankly offered by Japan. Only
after the collapse of the Japanese regime, consequent on
the assassination of the Queen of Corea, Russian influence
became paramount in the country, and there seemed some
foundation for a future policy of gradual absorption. But

Y

322 RUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

the Russians soon recognised what had been dearly learnt by
their predecessors — the Japanese — the irreducible charac-
ter of the Corean problem : a nation plunged into the
deepest degradation and unwilling and unfit to free itself
from the miserable bloody feuds which distract it.
Luckily, about the time the Eussians perceived their false
position, in which they risked the implacable enmity of
Japan for the sake of the momentary favour of a paltry
party unable to steer the same course even for a few
months, the German occupation of Kiao-chou gave the
long-wished-for opportunity for securing a port free from
ice during the winter. The occupation of a Corean port,
which had never been a practical object, ceased even to be
a desideratum of Eussian policy in the Far East.

The southward expansion, inaugurated by Muravioff,
had taken a sweep westward, clearing at a bound the
Corean peninsula, which ceases, as it deserves it should
do, to be of any importance in the Far East.

The Siberian railway, with its two termini at
Vladivostok and Port Arthur, by its enormous commercial
and political consequences, would be of incalculable benefit
to Corea if its degrading internal condition did not render
it incapable of all progress.

The Eussians came in contact with the Japanese at an
early date, when they occupied Kamchatka and the Kuiile
islands, which form a chain between Japan and the
continent. At the time of Peter the Great a school of
Japanese was founded in St. Petersburg, and later in 1739
a Eussian expedition for commercial purposes was sent to
Japan. At the beginning of this century another attempt
was made to conclude a treaty of commerce, but it also
failed. These disconnected events led to no lasting conse-
quences. It was only about the middle of the present
century that relations between Eussia and Japan grew

CONCLUSION 323

more important and became permanent. Russia had not
only to follow the example of other European nations who
were hastening to conclude treaties of commerce with
Japan, opened to the world by Commodore Perry, but
she had also to settle frontier questions. In 1853
Nevelskoy had founded several posts in Saghalien, and as
the Japanese also claimed rights over that island, it
became necessary to delimit the possessions of the two
countries. The treaties of 1855 and 1858 left the question
undecided, as it was only stipulated that Saghalien should
belong to both empires. The local authorities of both
nations repaired this omission, and by tacit agreement the
river Kusunai was chosen as the common frontier : a
Russian post being established on one bank and a Japanese
post on the other. The Russians had already attempted
in 1858 to obtain entire possession of the island, and in
1865 they renewed the attempt, offering in exchange
for the southern part of Saghalien the group of the Kurile
islands. This proposal was not accepted, and on March
18, 1867, a convention was concluded to explain the joint
ownership of the island : it was defined as ' the common
right of Russians and Japanese to occupy unoccupied
places all over the island.'

This strange definition gave rise to a colonising steeple-
chase, in which the Russians were no match for the alert
Japanese, who, in their usual systematic way, began
organising the settlement of the country. The populous
Japanese islands were near, and readily furnished colonists,
while the Russians had to draw settlers from Europe
with the inducement of great privileges, or to found settle-
ments of unmarried soldiers, utterly valueless for peopling
the country. The Russians crossed the Kusunai and went
south to found a port at Aniva, and the Japanese in their
turn went north of the Kusunai, hunting for unoccupied

Y 2

324 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

places. As the Russians had not sufficient soldiers to
occupy all desirable places, they erected posts with inscrip-
tions to denote that an occupation had taken place. This
ingenious scheme was quickly adopted bj^ the Japanese.

This keen competition occasioned many disputes
between the local officials of the two countries, but it is
remarkable that the confusion caused by the extraordinary
diplomatic definition gave rise to no collision between
rival detachments. This mutual forbearance was probably
due to the good temper of the two races. The good
relations of the two peoples went further than mere
politeness, as on two occasions outlying Russian posts
were saved from starvation by the assistance of the
Japanese. It is useful to bring to light the grateful
Russian record of the generous deeds performed over
thirty years ago amid the snows of Saghalien, as it will
show that the humane treatment of the Chinese prisoners
during the late war arose not from the wish to pose
favourably in the eyes of the world, but from the chivalrous
character of the Japanese nation.

The Saghalien question became of great importance
to Russia when she established penal settlements and
commenced developing the coal mines of the island. The
entire control of Saghalien had now become a necessity, and,
after prolonged negotiations, on April 25, 1875, a treaty was
concluded by which the desired exchange of the Japanese
part of Saghalien for the Kuriles was effected.

Twenty years passed in friendly relations when the
war with China again brought Japan in conflict with
Russian interests. At the outbreak of hostilities Russia
was alarmed for the independence of Corea, which had
been rapidly occupied by the Japanese troops ; but these
fears were removed bj'^ the spontaneous declaration of
Japan that she was striving to secure the eJffective in-

CONCLUSION 325

dependence of the peninsula. The brilliant military
successes of Japan, her determination to humble China,
but, above all, the prudent secrecy maintained regarding
the conditions of peace aroused the watchfulness of Kussia,
who had to guard the interests of her great future railway
and secure a convenient terminus on the Pacific. When
the conditions of the peace imposed at Shimonoseki became
known, Eussia felt obliged to interfere and prevent the
cession of the Liao-tung peninsula. There were many
reasons to suggest this action: Japan was at that time
already in virtual possession of Corea, and a further
extension by the occupation of the strategical position of
Port Arthur would render her the dominant power in the
eastern part of the Asiatic continent. The future Siberian
railway, flanked by the continental possessions of the new
formidable power, would lose much of its importance, and
would be deprived of a short route to the sea. On the
other hand the intervention would establish claims for
compensation from China — the extension of the Siberian
railway through Manchuria, perhaps even the terminus to
a Chinese port on the Yellow Sea, were already foreseen.
But it is doubtful whether the most sanguine Russian
statesman even dreamt that in less than three years they
would be in possession of Port Arthur.

The Japanese statesmen who had negotiated the
treaty of Shimonoseki probably foresaw they would have
to reduce their claims, and purposely exacted the double
cession of the Liao-tung peninsula and the island of
Formosa, either of which could be relinquished according
as the pressure of rival nations was stronger in the north
or south. But the great body of the nation, innocent of
these diplomatic tactics and flushed by success, felt
annoyed and mortified at the sudden and unexpected loss
of the fruits of victory. Dreams of future vengeance

326 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

haunted the minds of the people and led them to approve
unhesitatingly the expensive schemes for the increase of
the army and navy proposed by the Government.

On the other hand, in Russia mistaken notions pre-
vailed both in official circles and in the public mind ;
Japan was suddenly and without any justification consi-
dered as the natural enemy of Russia ; all her movements
were watched suspiciously, as it was considered necessary
to stop her dangerous rapid expansion. An unfortunate
incident increased these sentiments of mutual distrust
and dislike.

After the conclusion of peace with China, Japan con-
tinued to exercise effective control in Corea for the lau-
dable purpose of establishing order and progress in the
country. But the task soon proved to be beyond even the
subtlety and patience of the Japanese ; they became
entangled in the ceaseless intrigues of the wretched
parties of the peninsula, and, far worse, they were de-
graded to the low level of the Corean factions. Through
the fatal negligence or connivance of a Japanese official
the Queen of Corea was assassinated, and this dark deed,
though quite in unison with a long series of crimes per-
petrated by the various Corean parties, deprived the
Japanese of the moral authority to continue their self-
imposed task. The weak imbecile king had at last
sufficient intelligence to apprehend possible danger to his
insignificant person, and fled for protection to the Russian
Legation.

From this moment Russian influence became para-
mount in Corea, and the Japanese were quietly supplanted.
The Russian party, unfavourable to Japan, now enjoyed
its triumph and emphasised the fact by a series of
measures calculated to diminish Japanese influence in
the peninsula ; military instructors were sent to train

CONCLUSION 327

Corean soldiers, and a financial adviser was appointed to
Seoul. It seemed for a moment as if the Japanese were
destined to fail in the object for which they had under-
taken the war — the neighbouring peninsula rescued from
China was falling under the protection of Russia. It is
probable that the Japanese felt more deeply this second
intervention than the first, which had deprived them of
Port Arthur. The great mass of the Japanese people
attach an exaggerated importance to Corea, not so much
based on strategical considerations of vicinity as on
historical reminiscences of former wars and conquests in
the country. Until lately Corea represented the whole
foreign policy of the nation. There are, besides, practical
reasons which justify their interest in the country : large
Japanese settlements exist in all the Corean ports, and
most of the trade is in their hands.

The action of Eussia was also unprovoked and not
required for the protection of her interests. Japanese
statesmen had recognised the motives which obliged
Russia to interfere in Liao-tung, but her success there
should have prevented all further intervention in questions
not directly concerning her. If Russia had continued in
her forward policy in Corea, it is probable that war with
Japan could not have been indefinitely averted. But the
mistake was gradually recognised and rectified ; the
Russians perceived they were playing China's game,
unconsciously revenging her vanished suzerainty. More-
over, as soon as the Japanese had been supplanted, the
Russians, now no longer necessary instruments for the
intrigues of the Corean factions, began to encounter the
difficulties, vexations, and disappointments which had
fallen to the lot of all who have attempted the hopeless
task of reforming Corea.

The occupation of Port Arthur, which has completely

328 BUS SI A ON THE PACIFIC

diverted the attention of Russia from Corea, has removed
the greatest cause of dissension between Japan and
Russia ; the latest conventions between the two empires
have settled all outstanding difficulties. But though the
principal cause of conflict has ceased to act, it will take
some time to allay national feeling, which has run very
high, and has driven the two countries in the last few
years to make incessant military preparations for what
was generally considered an inevitable struggle.

A war between the two great military powers of the
Far East would be a great misfortune. The struggle
between the vast continental empire with its base of
operations far away in Europe, and the compact island
empire close to the field of conflict, would be highly
interesting to the military student, but it would be most
barren of results. The most complete success on either
side, highly improbable if we take into account the triei
bravery of the two armies and their different conditions,
would achieve very little. The triumph of Russia could
never bring her armies on the soil of Japan, untrodden by
conquerors since the advent of the race : it was a task
beyond the power of the Mongols when their empire was
at its zenith. The victory of Japan would not enable her
to conquer the Russian possessions on the Pacific, pro-
tected by their rigid climate and present barrenness. The
country cannot support its scanty population, and the
invading army would have to be provisioned from Japan ;
the inhabitants could not be conquered, as they consist
mostly of garrisons and military colonists. The failure of
the allies during the Crimean war showed conclusively
the natural strength of the Russian position on the Pacific
at a time when her forces were much less numerous.

The only object attainable by a successful war might
be the conquest of Corea, a poor country torn by factions,

CONCLUSION 329

utterly insufficient to requite the loss of blood and treasure
entailed by such a desperate conflict. The only stake
worthy of such a gigantic struggle would be the crum-
bling empire of China ; but at present Russia and Japan
could only claim a small portion, as there are many
candidates for the eventual partition. It might have
been different only a few years ago.

If Russian diplomatists had been more alert and
enterprising, they might have secured a secret under-
standing with Japan at the time of the war in 1894-95
for the joint partition of the Far East ; no other com-
bination of powers could have been formed at the time
sufficiently interested to exert the force necessary to with-
- stand the formidable coalition of the only two nations
who possess considerable military force in that region. At
the end of the century Russia missed her chance in the
East as she had missed it in the West at the beginning
of the same period. The failure to understand the true
consequences of the French Revolution and to accept the
frank offer of Napoleon prevented the conquest of Con-
stantinople and retarded the expansion in Central Asia.
The revolution brought about by Japan in the Far East,
an event transcending the limits of routine diplomacy,
was equally misunderstood, and Russia failed to secure
the aid of this unexpected political factor in her own
interests. In both cases, instead of bargaining separately
for a satisfactory compromise, she preferred to become
entangled with the shrewder European diplomacy and to
work more for the interests of others than for her own.
The enmity of Japan, incurred through hasty action in
Corea, rendered Russia's position in the Far East ex-
tremely precarious.

The dangers arising from the tension of popular feeling
are luckily diminished by the intense sentiments of loyalty

330 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

prevalent in both countries : the word of the sovereign is
a law joyfully accepted by the whole nation. If the Tsar
and Mikado desire peace and friendship, no conflict can
arise between Russia and Japan, and the decisions of
enlightened rulers are more far-seeing .than those of an
impulsive, irresponsible people.

The Japanese are remarkable for their self-control
and reticence, even when their passions are most excited,
and it is therefore difficult to judge the motives that will
inspire their future policy. But they are also very intelli-
gent, and they will probably abandon idle thoughts of
revenge and adopt the policy most beneficial to their
growing interests. The expansion of Russia in the Far
East, the completion of the Siberian railway, its com-
mercial complement, will be found to confer the greatest
benefits on the island empire. Count Okuma, one of
the most broad-minded statesmen of Japan, speculating-
on the future of his country, remarked that the growing
wealth and population of Canada and Siberia would increase
its importance as the centre of the new world activity
arising in the Pacific.

Cyiewed in this light, Russia will be one of the most
powerful factors of Japan's future greatness : the opening
of Siberia and Manchuria by the new railway, the
development of their natural resources, and the consequent
increase of population, will give rise to an enormous trade
with Japan, so near, yet subject to such different natural
conditionsT} The northern island of Yesso, hitherto so
scantily colonised by the Japanese, will probably rapidly
increase in importance, thanks to the development of the
neighbouring mainland.

The war with China must have taught Japan that her
strength by sea is even greater than by land. If she
wishes to become the Great Britain of the Pacific, she

CONCLUSION 331

must borrow a lesson from English history, and abandon
the continent and take to the ocean. She must forsake
the mediasval policy limited to Corea and act on a wider
field, directing her efforts to become the centre of maritime
commerce between the new countries fast arising on the
shores of the Pacific. She has no time to lose in altering
her course, as the rate of historic change is increasing
fast, and already by irreflective adherence to traditional
policy and prejudiced attachment to questions which have
lost their significance, she has neglected a precious, per-
haps irrecoverable, opportunity to assert her power in a
new direction, and to keep open the way for her future
expansion.

England is not a neighbour of Eussia in the Far East,
all her colonial possessions are far away, yet she may be
considered the nation most affected by the impending
changes. Her empire is essentially on the sea, and every
country that has a coast may consider she has England
for her neighbour. She is, besides, the greatest com-
mercial power, owning the majority of shipping on the
ocean, and she has preponderating interests in the trade
of China. The near inauguration of a new trade-route,
especially one exclusively by land, must attract the attention
of a people whose best activity for several centuries has
been devoted to commercial exploration all over the world,
of the people that now commands the great highways of
the sea.

Above all, England is a great world power, keenly
observant of the expansion of other nations, especially of
Kussia, the only other great world power.

English interests in China are essentially commercial,
and they are in no danger, either from Kussian expansion
or the new land route. As long as Great Britain possesses
the largest share of the shipping and capital of the world,

332 EUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

and business intelligence and enterprise to utilise these
powerful factors, her trade cannot be in danger anywhere.
It cannot be affected even by protective tariffs, as they
exist in most countries of Europe where British trade
flourishes. It is a mistake to suppose that Russian influ-
ence is fatal to the trade of foreigners, as in Vladivostok
and other Russian towns of Eastern Siberia there are
many flourishing German firms. It has been shown that
the Siberian railway cannot compete for the carriage of
goods from Europe to Eastern Asia, therefore it will only
affect shipping beneficially, opening up new markets
hitherto inaccessible, and English merchants and ship-
owners with their usual alertness will be sure to profit by
the new trade. The new railway which will confer such
benefits on Japan, situated at its eastern terminus, will con-
fer still greater ones on Great Britain, for she has interests
everywhere, both in the East and in the West.

The present expansion of Russia on the Pacific affects
Great Britain as a world power, and the question in China
is only a particular instance of the general rivalry pre-
vailing between the two countries for the last half-century.
This antagonism produced the Crimean war, and has often
since threatened to bring about another conflict. A
struggle between the two great expansive races of Europe,
the Slav and the Anglo-Saxon, would be a misfortune,
especially as it could produce no lasting results.

The hostility between the two races is mainly founded
on errors and misconceptions. The conditions of Russia
and England are so different that most writers who have
not thoroughly studied the subject fail to grasp the main
facts. They judge Russia by the aspirations of Peter the
Great, who first brought her to European notice, and
they ignore the natural tendencies existing before, and
which are ever resuming their influence in directing the

CONCLUSION 333

development of the country. Englishmen, naturally-
biased bj^ the influence of sea power in their own history,
are led to attach too much importance to the dazzling
projects of Peter the Great, the creator of the Eussian
navy. They are apt to suspect that the possession of a
port or a coast is only preliminary to the development of
a navy for challenging the command of the sea. They
overlook the fact that Russia is a vast continental empire
and that her maritime wants are moderate. In her huee
territory she contains a large part of what geographers
call continental drainage, and is almost a world to herself
with the large inland seas and lakes like the Caspian and
Aral. For her internal commerce she has means pro-
portionate to her size. "While the sea shipping of Russia
is inconsiderable, there is an enormous tonnage on her
rivers unknown to the outer world ; ^ this immense
disproportion is a clear proof of the continental aims of
the nation. Russia only needs a few outlets to the sea,
just as England requires coaling stations all over the
globe, as subsidiary aid for the real power which the
former wields on land and the latter on the sea.

There are also widespread prejudices in England
against Russia on account of the autocratic form of
government, which is supposed to be constantly bent
on aggression, proceeding steadily on a secret fixed
plan of universal conquest. Englishmen are so satisfied
with their constitution, and have derived such advantages
from it, that they are convinced it is the only good form
of government. But the merits of a political constitution
are not absolute ; they depend on times and circumstances.
Representative government, which has succeeded so well

' According to the Ritsski Kalendar, 1899 (Suvorina),the tonnage of the
river vessels amounts to 8,850,000 tons, a third of the tonnage of the whole
ocean shipping of the world !

334 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

in England because it is the slow indigenous growth of
centuries, has been a miserable failure on the continent,
where it has been violently transplanted to nations not
historically prepared for the advent of such radical
changes. The violent scenes in the Austrian Parliament,
and the scandalous agitation of rival parties about Dreyfus
in France, are instances of the evils of liberty conferred
on peoples not trained to self-control. Bussia has shown
singular good sense in not blindly following the universal
fashion prevalent in Europe, and in adhering to the form
of government evolved historically on her own soil.

The terrible Mongol invasion finally showed the evils
of disunion which had afflicted the race for so many
centuries. Later the dangers of popular government in
Novgorod, and of an elective monarchy in Poland, con-
vinced the Russians that the despotism of Moscow was
necessary for their future greatness. In the long
struggle against Asiatic nomadism, on the shelterless
plains without defensive hills, with the broad rivers
bridged over by the winter frost, the solitary Russian
race, abandoned — nay, even attacked — by the Christian
brothers of the West, had to take to heart the stern
military duty of discipline. The leader of this vast camp,
of this nation of soldiers, the Tsar of later times, was the
true Roman Imperator, the absolute military chief charged
with the defence of his country, of Europe, of Christen-
dom, against the Asiatic hordes. That the form of
government was required by historical conditions is
proved by the fact that the small fief of Moscow, the
appanage of the junior son of Alexander Nevski, now
extends to the straits of Behring and to the Pamir.
That it is not incompatible with social progress is evinced
by the fact that the great reform measure — the emancipa-
tion of the serfs — was effected without bloodshed and

CONCLUSION 335

even without friction. The absolute power of the Tsar
is essentially military in its character, as is shown by the
easy familiarity it allows : the Emperor greets his soldiers
at the reviews and embraces Tolstoi.

The supposed aggressive policy of Eussia is also not
borne out by facts, at least as far as her European neigh-
bours are concerned. She has never been at war with
Austria, seldom with Prussia : the conquest of Poland
was undertaken in accord with her neighbours, and was
provoked by the disorders of the corrupt Polish aristocracy.
The Slav race has retreated rather than advanced in
Europe, abandoning the country on the Elbe and Danube.

Prussia, the kernel of the modern German empire, was
originally Slav, and Berlin and Vienna were anciently
also Slav towns. Rather than engage in long wars for
small territories, the Slavs have preferred to advance in
the north-east to lands neglected by all on account of the
rigid climate ; they have preferred to undertake a struggle
against nature rather than against their neighbouring
European races.

This expansion in the north-east has been the irresis-
tible tendency of the nation, and not the execution of a
plan of the rulers. The Government has uniformly
checked and retarded the advance of the people ; Yermak
was recalled by Ivan the Terrible, and Muravioff was
constantly hampered by Nesselrode.

These few facts ought to be considered by a section of
the British public, always ready to suspect dark schemes
of the Russian Government, and equally ready to counsel
violent means to thwart them. They will find that Russian
expansion is a far more serious phenomenon than they
lightly suppose, and that opposition is far more difficult.
They then may pause and ascertain whether opposition is
at all necessary or desirable.

336 RUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

To measure accurately the difficulty of arresting the
natural irresistible expansion of a nation of 130,000,000
increasing at the rate of considerably over a million a year,
we can refer to history. The most serious attempt to
check Eussian advance in the East culminated in the
Crimean war, when a formidable coalition was formed for
the purpose by England, France, Turkey, and Sardinia :
Austria also lending indirect support. It is generally
known that the results of the long victorious war waged
by the allies were not lasting ; in less than twenty years
Eussia had recovered her position in the Black Sea. But
long before that event she had found compensation in
Asia for her losses in Europe : the Crimean war itself had
given Muravioff the opportunity of opening the way to
the Pacific, and the years of European peace which
followed enabled Eussia to annex the Caucasus and
Central Asia.

When Gortchakoff expressed the policy of his Govern-
ment by the memorable expression, ' La Eussie se re-
cueille,' he unconsciously coined a plausible phrase for
the ignorant Western public ; it only expressed the rest
of diplomacy, not the true state of the nation which had
resumed its work in Asia.

The negative results of the Crimean war are slight
encouragement for a repetition of the attempt, especially
as the relative power of Eussia has increased, and
promises to steadily increase in the future. At the time
of the Crimean war the total population of the allied
powers exceeded that of Eussia : it is the reverse at present.
Moreover, a coalition against Eussia is improbable, as
most of the continental nations are averse from the measure.
France is her ally ; Germany, on account of the tradition
of the House of Hohenzollern and the advice of Bismarck,
wishes to preserve friendly relations with her powerful

CONCLUSION 337

neighbour, while Austria, weakened by the internal war of
races, could not lightly embark in a war against the
champion of that Slav race which forms the majority of
her population.

England, thanks to her insular position and command
of the sea, possesses greater independence and can lightly
risk an adventurous policy, but she could achieve nothing
in a war with Kussia. Her matchless navy, perhaps
more relatively powerful than at any former period, is a
formidable weapon against every nation that has a coast
subject to attack and shipping to be destroyed ; but it is
powerless against Kussia, wanting in these weak points.
The continental character of the Kussian Empire now
comes out in full force : its defects become a safeguard.
During the Crimean war the fleet was unable to effect
anything, and it would be in a worse position now,
as the experience of Japanese and Americans in the late
wars has shown that the progress of artillery has given
the superiority to land defences. A general blockade of
the Kussian ports suggested by some would also be
ineffectual, as, owing to the increase of the traffic on the
rivers and railways, the country is becoming less depen-
dent on the sea, and a blockade might even act as a
stimulus to internal trade.

The forces of Kussia and England are, to use an apt
mathematical expression, incommensurate — there is no
common term to express their relative value — and thus
they should remain. All attempts on either side to meet
the other on its own ground are doomed to failure, as they
do not correspond with national conditions. Kussia can
never launch a fleet able to meet the squadrons of
England, and the latter can never put in the field an
army able to stand against the huge forces of Kussia.
The two great races of Europe are separated by the

z

338 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

nature of their empires. The Anglo-Saxons have taken
for their dominion the ocean, its islands, favoured
coasts, and shipping ; the Slavs have conquered the
continent, with its great rivers and inland seas. A
conflict under these conditions is objectless. Bismarck, in
his usual trenchant way, put the question in a popular
form by saying that it was a struggle between the
elephant and the whale.

There is besides no adequate motive for hostility
between the two races. Eussia is not a rival of Great
Britain for the dominion of the sea or commercial
supremacy — the foundations of her greatness. In the
next fifty years England has far more to fear from Germany
and the United States, and if ever she incurs loss from
their competition she will regret the years wasted in vain
hostility born of foolish prejudice. Eussia has never
annexed any territory. England intended to occupy all
that was fit for her colonisation. The latest acquisitions,
Ta-lien-wan and Port Arthur, are situated in a region
that has never been coveted by England, and, though it
may sound strange, it is an undoubted fact that their
possession by Eussia is an advantage to Great Britain.
In English hands they would only be an insignificant
addition to the numerous British naval stations all over
the world, while in Eussian hands they become the
terminus of the great railway, and the centre of a
great coming trade which certainly will benefit British
shipping.

The progress of Eussia need not awaken the jealousy
of Great Britain. It is a narrow-minded policy to imagine
that the depression of other countries is indispensable to
national prosperity. Of coarse there are cases when the
ruin of one country is necessary even for the existence
of another, but luckily they seldom occur ; in most

CONCLUSION 339

instances the prosperity of each nation contributes to the
general welfare. The vast colonial empire of Great
Britain is certainly a benefit to France, as the wealth
accumulated renders the former the best customer of the
latter.

England above every other country in the world, on
account of her great commercial and shipping interests,
on account of her continuing want of new markets for her
goods, should welcome the progress of Eussia and en-
courage her in the task of developing regions hitherto
neglected, and which, perhaps, no other nation would have
been able to colonise. The Siberian railway is the most
important factor in this work, as it will bring to the sea
the produce of regions hitherto entirely closed to the
world, and the convenient terminus selected at Ta-lien-
wan should meet with universal approval.

Eussia needs peace and the friendly co-operation of
the world in the great task of completing the work of
Yermak and Muravioff, by the development of her great
Asiatic dominion. The terrible climate has been hitherto
the great obstacle to the progress of Siberia, but it will
probably be overcome in the future; the experience of
history has shown that a greater dominion over the forces
of nature has enabled man to extend civilisation further
north, in regions which seemed almost uninhabitable to
the ancients. It is therefore a legitimate induction to
suppose that in time even the most northern and desolate
parts of Siberia may become the residence of a population
able to develop its resources.

Siberia is now starting into a new life. She has
gradually increased in importance and in general estima-
tion : conquered by a few Volga pirates, for centuries she
remained the land of convicts and exiles ; then she
attracted the attention of Muravioff, who foresaw her

340 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

future value for Russia. But now Siberia has won the
favour and interest of the sovereign ; Nicholas II. has
traversed the country and has learnt its wants and its
future possibilities.

It was a great event for Siberia when the young prince,
after inaugurating the work of the Siberian railway at
Vladivostok, started on his homeward voyage across the
country which Yermak had given to Ivan the Terrible, the
last sovereign of the house of Ruric. The future will
probably show that it is the most important event of
modern Siberian history. The Siberians thoroughly
realised its consequences. No sovereign of that house of
Romanoff which had formed the greatness of Russia had
ever visited the lone forsaken land, and the indifference of
the Tsars had encouraged the neglect of officials.

The Siberians, though one in language, race, and
customs with the great Russians, have acquired, like the
Anglo-Saxons in America, some slight differences sufficient
to base a conscious local pride, and they felt deeply this
continued neglect. At last a young prince destined to
ascend the throne was coming to visit Siberia, and he
brought with him the promise of the great railway.

The whole country was thrilled by the news, as it had
been over thirty years before when Muravioff announced
his first navigation down the Amur. It is no exaggera-
tion to state that never was the advent of a man hailed
with such deep universal enthusiasm as the arrival of
the young Tsesarievitch, now Nicholas II., in Siberia.
Every town he passed through erected a triumphal arch
to commemorate the occasion ; Cossacks crowded on the
cliffs of the Amur to shout hurrah as he passed. Lama
monasteries have erected gigantic statues of Buddha to
commemorate the auspicious event ; in the single town
of Chita there is a brass plate in the governor's palace to

CONCLUSION 341

mark the spot where he slept, another in the school
indicating where he received the children, and on a hill
outside the town, a rough pillar erected by the Cossacks
says, with its simple inscription : ' Here our chief ^ deigned
to accept bread and salt.' ^

These universal manifestations in a country so vast
and barren, with such a scanty population, must have
produced a deep impression on the young mind of the
Tsesarievitch, for he has consistently made great sacrifices
for the development of Siberia. Nicholas II. is the first
Tsar that has had the opportunity of realising the vastness
of his empire, of learning its real wants, and of under-
standing the true mission of his race.

His proposal to restrict the ever-growing armaments
of Europe, which has puzzled public opinion, is probably
ascribable to these motives acting unconsciously for years
and unexpectedly bringing fruit. In his long monotonous
voyage across the desert plains of Siberia, where, except
in the few towns, it was impossible to gather a crowd
even to see a future emperor, he must have perceived the
great pacific work destined for Russia : the peopling of a
vast territory, the cultivation of lands exposed to a rigo-
rous climate, the transport of the hard-earned produce to
an unfrozen sea. The thoughts of Tolstoi must then
have hovered in his mind, and he must have felt, like his
ancestors over a thousand years before, when they started
from the Danube for the north-east, away from the war
of races, that the mission of the Slavs is to struggle
against the forces of nature and not against their fellow
man.

' The heir-apparent is ex officio ataman or chief of all the Cossacks.
* The Eussian symbols of welcome offered at the entrance of towns on
official occasions.

y

APPENDIX

TKEATY OP NERTCHINSK

August 27, 1689, O.S.

Sancti Sinai'um Imperatoris mandate missi ad determinaados
limites Magnates.

Som Go Tu Praetorianorum militum praefectus interioris
palatii Palatinus, Imperii consiliarius etc.

Turn Que Cam interioris palatii palatinus, primi ordinis
comes, Imperialis vexilli dominus, Imperatoris avunculus etc.

Lam Tan vnius etiam vexilli dominus

Pam Tarcha item vnius vexilli dominus

Sap so circa Sagalien Via aliasque terras generalis exer-
cituum praefectus

Ma La vnius vexilli praefectus

Wen Ta exterorum tribunalis alter praeses et caeteri una
cum missis.

Dei gi'atia magnorum dominatorum Tzarum Magnorumque
Ducum loannis Alexiewicz, Petri Alexiewicz totius magnae
ac parvae, nee non albae Eussiae Monarcharum, multorum-
que dominiorum ac terrarum Orientalium, Occidentalium ac
Septemtrionalium, Prognatorum Haeredum, ac Successorum,
dominatorum ac possessorum

Magnis ac plenipotentibus Suae Tzareae Majestatis Legatis
Proximo Okolnitio ac locitenente Branski Theodoro Alexiewicz
Golovin dapifero ac locitenente I^latomski, loanne Eustahievicz
Wlasoph Cancellario Simeone Cornitski

Anno Cam Hi 28° crocei serpentis dicto l'^^ Lunae die 24
props oppidum Nipehou congregati tum ad coercendam et
reprimendam insolentiam eorum inferioris notae venatorum
hominum, qui extra proprios limites, sive venabundi, sive se
mutuo occidentes, sive depraedantes, sive perturbationes aut
tumultus quoscumque commoventes pro suo arbitrio excurrunt,

344 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

turn ad limites inter utrumque Imperium Sinicum videlicet et
Euthenicum clare ac perspicu6 determinandos ac constituendos,
turn denique ad pacem perpetuam stabiliendam aeternumque
foedus percutiendum, sequentia puncta ex mutuo consensu
statuimus ac determinavimus.

Eivulus nomine Kerbichi, qui rivo Chorna Tartarice Vrum
dicto proximus adiacet et fiuvium Sagalien Via influit, limites
inter utrumque Imperium constituet. Item a vertice rupis seu
montis lapidei, qui est supra dicti rivuli Kerbichi fontem et
originem et per ipsa huius montis cacumina usque ad mare,
utriusque Imperii ditionem ita dividet, ut omnes terrae et
fluvii sive parvi sive magni qui a meridionali huius montis parte
in fiuvium Sagalien Via infiuunt sint sub Imperii Sinici dominio,
omnes terrae vero et omnes rivi qui ex altera montis parte ad
Borealem plagam vergunt sub Euthenici Imperii dominio
remaneant, ita tamen, ut quicunque fluvii in mare influunt et
quaecumque terrae sunt intermediae inter fiuvium Vdi et
seriem montium pro limitibus designatam prointerim indeter-
minatae rehnquantur. De his autem post uniuscuiusque Imperii
legatorum in proprium regnum reditum rite examinatis et clare
cognitis vel per legatos vel per Utteras postea determinabitur.
Item fiuvius nomine Ergon qui etiam supra dictum fiuvium
Sagalien Via influit, limites ita constituet, ut omnes terrae quae
sunt ex parte meridionali ad Sinicum, quae vero sunt ex parte
boreali, ad Euthenicum Imperium pertineant : et omnes aedes
quae ex parte dicti fluminis meridionali in faucibus fluvii
nomine Meyrelke extructae sunt ad httus boreale transferentur.

II

Arx seu fortalitia in loco nomine Yagsa a Eussis extructa
funditus eruetur ac destruetur. Omnesque illam incolentes
Eutheni Imperii subditi cum omnibus suis cuiuscumque generis
rebus in Eussi Imperii terras deducentur.

Atque extra hos limites determinatos nuUam ob causam
utriusque Imperii venatores transibunt.

Quod si unus aut duo inferioris notae homines extra hos
statutos limites vel venabundi, vel latrocinaturi divagabuntur,
statim in vincula coniecti ad iUarum terrarum constitutos in
utroque Imperio Praefectos deducentur, qui cognitam illorum

APPENDIX 345

culpam debita poena muletabunt : Si vero ad decern aut
quindecim simul congregati et armis instruct!, aut venabuntur,
aut alterius Imperii homines Occident, aut depraedabuntur de
hoc ad uniuscuiusque Imperii Imperatores referetur, omnesque
huius criminis rei capitah poena mulctabuntur, nee bellum
propter quoscumque particularium hominum excessus suscita-
bitur, aut sanguinis effusio procurabitur.

Ill

Quaecumque prius acta sunt, cuiuscumque generis sint,
aeterna obhvione sopiantur. Ab eo die quo inter utrumque
Imperium haec aeterna pax iurata fuerit, nuUi in posterum ex
altero Imperio transfugae in alteram Imperium admittentiir :
sed in vincula coniecti statim reducentur.

IV

Quicumque vero Rutheni Imperii subditi in Sinico et
quicumque Sinici Imperii in Euthenico nunc sunt, in eodem
statu rehnquantur.

V

Propter nunc contractam amicitiam atque aeternum foedus
stabihtum, cuiuscumque generis homines litteras patentes
iteneris sui afferentes, hcit6 accedent ad regna utriusque
dominii, ibique vendent et ement quaecumque ipsis videbuntur
necessaria mutuo commercio.

VI

Conciho inter utriusque Imperii legatos celebrato, et omnibus
utrivisque Regni hmitum contentionibus diremptis, paceque
stabiHta, et aeterno amicitiae foedere percusso, si hae omnes
determinatae conditiones rit6 observabuntur, nullus erit am-
plius perturbation! locus.

Ex utraque parte hujus foederis conditiones scripto manda-
buntur, duplexque exemplar huic conform e sigillo munitum
sibi invicem tradent magni utriusque Imperii legati.

Demum et iuxta hoc idem exemplar eaedem conditiones
Sinico Euthenico et latino idiomate lapidibus incidentui", qui
lapides in utriusque Imperii limitibus in perpetuum ac aeternum
monumentum erigentur.

Datum apud Nipchou anno Cam Hi 28° 1'^^ Lunae die 24.

346 RUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

CONVENTION OF AIGUN

May 16, 1858

Le grand empire de Eussie, et de sa part le gouverneur g^n^ral
de la Siberia orientale, I'aide de camp general de S. M.
I'Empereur Alexandre Nicolai6vitch, le lieutenant general
Nicolas Mouraview, — et le grand empire Ta-Tsing, et de sa
part I'aide de camp general prince I-Chan, grand de la com-,
commandant en chef sur TAmour, — voulant 6tablir une 6ternelle
et plus intime amitie entre les deux empires, et dans I'int^ret
des sujets respectifs, ont arrets d'un commun accord :

La rive gauche du fleuve Amour, a partir de la riviere
Argoun jusqu'a I'embouchure de I'Amour, appartiendra k
I'empire de Eussie, et sa rive droite, en aval jusqu'a la riviere
Oussouri, appartiendi'a a I'empire Ta-Tsing ; les territoires et
endroits situes entre la riviere Oussouri et la mer, comme
jusqu'a present, seront possed6s en commun par I'empire Ta-
Tsing et I'empire de Eussie, en attendant que la frontiere entre
les deux Etats y soit regl6e. La navigation de I'Amour, du
Soungari et de I'Oussouri n'est permise qu'aux batiments des
empires Ta-Tsing et de la Eussie ; la navigation de ces rivieres
sera interdite aux batiments de tout autre Etat. Les habitants
mantchous 6tablis sur la rive gauche de I'Amour, depuis la
rivifere Z6ia jusqu'au village de Hormoldzin au sud, conser-
veront a perp6tuite les lieux de leurs anciens domiciles sous
I'administration du gouvernement mantchou, et les habitants
russes ne pourront leur faire aucune offense ni vexation.

II

Dans I'int^ret de la bonne intelligence mutuelle des sujets
respectifs, il est permis aux habitants riverains de I'Oussouri,
de I'Amour et du Soungari, sujets de I'un et de I'autre empire,
de trafiquer entre eux, et les autorit6s doivent r^ciproquement
prot6ger les commer^ants sur les deux rives.

APPENDIX 347

III

Les stipulations arr^t^es d'un commun accord par le pl6ni-
potentiaire de I'empire de Eussie, le gouverneur general Moura-
view, et le commandant en chef sur I'Amour, I-Chan, at
pl6nipotentiaire de I'empire Ta-Tsing, seront exactement et
inviolablement ex6cut6es h. perp6tuit6 ; k cet effet, le gouverneur
g6n6ral Mouraview, pour I'empire de Eussie, a remis un ex-
emplaire du present traits, 6crit en langues russe et mantchoue,
entre les mains du commandant en chef prince I-Chan pour
I'empire Ta-Tsing, et le commandant en chef prince I-Chan,
pour I'empire Ta-Tsing, a remis un exemplaire du present
traite en langues mantchoue et mongole, au gouverneur general
Mouraview pour I'empire de Eussie. Toutes les stipulations
consignees dans la pr^sente seront publiees pour I'information
des habitants limitrophes des deux empires.

Le 16 mai 1858, ville d'Aighoun.

L'original est signe ainsi qu'il suit :

Nicolas Mouraview, aide de camp general de I'Empereur
et autocrate de Eussie, mon tres gracieux souverain, lieutenant
g6n6ral, gouverneur g^n^ral de la Siberie orientale et chevalier
de plusieurs ordres ;

Pierre Peroffsky, conseiller d'Etat du ministere des affaires
etrangeres, au service de S. M. I. I'Empereur et autocrate de
toutes les Eussies ;

I-Chan, commandant en chef sur I'Amour ;
Dziraminga, adjoint du chef de division.

Contre-sign6 :

J. Schischmareff, secretaire de gouvernment, interprete
attache au gouverneur general de la Siberie orientale ;

Aijindai, chef de compagnie.

348 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

PEKING CONVENTION

November 2, 1860

A LA suite d'une revision et d'un examen attentifs des
traites existants entre la Eussie et la Chine, S. M. I'Empereur
et Autocrate de toutes les Eussies, et S. M. le Bogdokhan de
I'empire Ta-Tsing, voulant resserrer encore davantage les liens
d'amiti6 r^ciproque entre les deux empires, d^velopper les
relations commerciales et pr^venir tout mesentendu, ont resoki
de stipuler quelques articles additionnels, et, k cet effet, ont
nomme pour leurs pl^nipotentiaires :

Pour I'empire de Eussie, le general-major Nicolas Ignatiew,
de la suite de Sa Majesty Imperiale, et chevalier de plusieurs
ordres ;

Pour I'empire Ta-Tsing, le prince Kong, prince de premiere
classe, qui porte le nom d'Y-Sing.

Lesdits pl6nipotentiaires, apres s'etre communique leurS
pleins-pouvoirs, trouv^s suffisants, sont convenus de ce qui suit.

Article I

Pour corroborer et elucider I'article 1^' du traits conclu dans
la ville d'xAigoun, le 16 mai 1858 (VIII® ann6e de Hien-Fong,
21® jour de la IV® lune), et en execution de I'article 9 du traits
conclu le 1®"" juin de la meme annee (3® jour de la V® lune) dans
la ville de Tien-Tsin, il est 6tabli :

Desormais la frontiere orientale entre les deux empires, a
commencer du confluent des rivieres Chilka et Argoun, descendra
le cours de la riviere Amour jusqu'au confluent de la riviere
Ousouri avec cette derniere. Les terres situ6es sur la inve
gauche (au nord) de la riviere Amour appartiennent a I'empire
de Eussie, et les terres situ6es sur la rive droits (au sud),
jusqu'au confluent de la riviere Ousouri, appartiennent a
I'empire de Chine. Plus loin, depuis le confluent de la riviere
Ousouri jusqu'au lac Hinkai, la ligne frontiere suit les rivieres
Ousouri et Son'gatcha. Les terres situ6es sur la rive orientale
(droite) de ces rivieres appartiennent a I'empire de Eussie, et
sur la rive occidentale (gauche) ^ I'empire de Chine. Plus loin,

APPENDIX 349

la ligne frontiere entre les deux empires, depuis le point de
sortie de la riviere Son'gatcha, coupe le lac Hinkai, et se dirige
sur la riviere B61en-ho (Tour) ; depuis I'embouchure de cette
riviere elle suit la crete des montagnes jusqu'4 I'embouchure de
la riviere Houpitou (Houptou), et de 1^, les montagnes situ^es
entre la riviere Khoun-tchoun et la mer jusqu'a la riviere
Thou-men-kiang. Le long de cette ligne, egalement, les terres
situ^es a Test appartiennent a I'empire de Eussie et celles a
k I'ouest a I'empire de Chine. La ligne frontiere s'appuie a la
riviere Thou-men-kiang, a vingt verstes chinoises (ii) au-dessus
de son embouchure dans la mer.

De plus, en execution du meme article 9 du traite de Tien-
Tsin est confirmee la carte dress^e a cet effet, et sur laquelle, pour
plus de clarte, la ligne frontiere est trac^e par un trait rouge et
indiqu6e par les lettres de I'alphabet russe A. I), B. F. 4- E. Wx.
.^. II. I. K. .1. M. H. 0. II. P. C. T. y. Cette carte est sign6e par
les pl6nipotentiaires des deux empires et scell^e de leurs sceaux.

Dans le cas ou il existerait dans les lieux sus-indiques des
terrains colonises par des sujets chinois, le gouvernement russe
s'engage a y laisser les habitants et a leur permettre de se livi'er
comme par le pass6 a la chasse et a la peche.

Apres que les bornes-frontieres auront 6te posees, la ligne
de demarcation de la frontiere devra rester a jamais invariable.

Article II

La ligne frontiere a I'ouest, indeterminee jusqu'ici, doit
desormais suivre la direction des montagnes, le cours des grandes
rivieres et la ligne actuellement existante des piquets chinois.
A partir du dernier phare, nomm6 Chabin-dabaga, 6tabli en
1728 (VI® ann^e de Young-Tching), apres la conclusion du
traits de Kiakhta, elle se dirigera vers le sud-ouest jusqu'au lac
Dsai-sang, et de la jusqu'aux montagnes situ6es au sud du lac
Issyk-koul, et nommees Tengri-chan, ou Alatau des Kirghises,
autrement dites encore Thian-chan-nan-lou (branches m6ridio-
nales des montagnes Celestes), et le long de ces montagnes
jusqu'aux possessions du Kokand.

Abticle III

Desormais toutes les questions de fronti^res qui pourront
surgir ult^rieurement seront r6gl6es d'apr^s les stipulations des
articles 1®" et 2 du present traits, et, pour la pose des bornes-

350 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

frontieres, a I'orient, depuis le lac Hinkai jusqu'a la riviere
Thou-men-kiang ; et a I'occident, depuis le phare Chabin-dabaga
jusqu'aux possessions du Kokand, les gouvernements russe et
chinois nommeront des hommes de confiance (commissaires).
Pour I'inspection des frontieres orientales, les commissaires
devront se r^unir au confluent de la riviere Ousouri dans le
courant du mois d'avril prochain (XI® ann^e de Hien-Fong,
troisieme lune). Pour I'inspection de la frontiere occidentale,
la reunion des commissaires aura lieu a Tarbagatai, mais I'epoque
n'en est pas determinee.

Sur les bases fixees par les articles 1^" et 2 du present traite,
les fonctionnaires fond6s de pouvoirs (commissaires) dresseront
des cartes et des descriptions d6taill6es de la ligne frontiere, en
quatre exemplaires, dont deux en langue russe et deux en langue
chinoise ou mantchoue. Ces cartes et descriptions seront
sign^es et scell^es par les commissaires, apres quoi deux
exemplaires, un en russe et I'autre en langue chinoise ou
mantchoue, seront remis au gouvernement russe, et deux
exemplaires semblables au gouvernement chinois, pour etre
conserves par eux.

Pour la remise des cartes et descriptions de la ligne frontiere,
il sera dresse un protocole corrobore par la signature et
I'apposition des sceaux des commissaires, et qui sera consid^r^
comme article additionnel au present traite.

Article IV

Sur toute la ligne frontiere etablie par I'article l®"" du present
traits, un commerce d'echange libre et franc de droits est
autorise entre les sujets des deux Etats. Les chefs loeaux des
frontieres doivent accorder une protection particuliere a ce
commerce et a ceux qui I'exercent.

Sont en meme temps confirmees par le present les dis-
positions relatives au commerce etablies par I'article 2 du
trait6 d'Aigoun.

Abticle V

Outre le commerce existant a Kiakhta, les marchands russes
jouiront de leur ancien droit de se rendre de Kiakhta a Pekin
pour affaires commerciales. Sur la route, il leur est 6galement
permis de commercer a Ourga et a Kalgan, sans etre obliges
toutefois d'y etablir de commerce en gros. Le gouvernement
russe aura le droit d'avoir a Ourga un consul (lin-tchi-khouan)

APPENDIX 351

accompagnS de quelques personnes, et d'y constvuire a ses frais
une habitation pour ce fonctionnaire. Quant a la concession
d'un terrain pour cat Edifice, au r^glement des dimensions de ce
dernier, comme aussi a la concession d'un paturage, on devra
s'entendre avec les gouverneurs d'Ourga.

Les marchands chinois sont egalement autorises a se rendre
en Eussie pour y commercer, s'ils le desirent.

Les marchands russes ont le droit de voyager en Chine, en
tout temps, pour affaires de commerce ; seulement, il leur est
interdit de se r^unir simultan^ment en nombre de plus de deux
cents dans le meme Heu ; de plus, ils doivent etre munis de
billets de I'autorit^ russe a la frontiere, indiquant le nom du
chef de la caravane, le nombre des hommes dont elle se compose
et le lieu de sa destination. Pendant le voyage, ces marchands
ont la facult6 d'acheter et de vendre tout ce qui lem' convient.
Tous les frais de leur voyage sont a leur charge.

Article VI

A titre d'essai, le commerce est ouvert a Kachgar, sur les
memes bases qu'a Hi et k Tarbagatai. A Kachgar, le gouverne-
ment chinois cede un terrain suffisant pour la construction d'une
factorerie avec tous les edifices n^cessaires, tels que maisons
d'habitation, magasins pour le d6p6t des marchandises, 6glise,
etc., etc., ainsi qu'un terrain pour le cimetiere et un paturage,
comme a Hi et k Tarbagatai. Les ordres seront donnas
imm^diatement au gouverneur du pays de Kachgar pour la
concession desdits terrains.

Le gouvernement chinois ne repond pas du pillage des
marchands russes commer9ant h, Kachgar, dans le cas oil ce
pillage aurait 6t6 commis par des gens venus d'au-dela des lignes
des postes de garde chinois.

Article VII

Dans les lieux ouverts au commerce, les Eusses en Chine,
comme les sujets chinois en Eussie, peuvent se livrer en pleine
liberty aux affaires commerciales, sans aucune vexation de la
part des autorit^s locales ; frequenter avec la meme liberty et en
tout temps les marches, les boutiques, les maisons des marchands
du pays ; vendre et acheter diverses marchandises en gros et en
detail, au comptant ou par ^changes ; les livrer et recevoir k
credit, selon leur confiance reciproque.

352 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

La dur^e du sejour des marchands dans les lieux ou se fait
le commerce n'est pas d^terminee et d6pend de leur libre arbitre.

Article VIII

Les marchands russes en Chine et les Chinois en Eussie
sont places sous la protection speciale des deux gouvernements.
Pour surveiller les marchands et prevenir les malentendus qui
pourraient survenir entre eux et les habitants du pays, il est
loisible au gouvernement russe de nommer des a present des
consuls a Kachgar et a Ourga, sur la base des regies adoptees
pour Hi et Tarbagatai. Le gouvernement chinois peut 6gale-
ment, s'il le desire, nommer des consuls dans les capitales et
autres villes de I'empire de Eussie.

Les consuls de I'une et de I'autre puissance sont log^s dans
des Edifices construits aux frais de leurs gouvernements
respectifs. Toutefois, il ne leur est pas d^fendu de louer, si
cela leur convient, des logements chez les habitants du pays.

Dans leurs relations avec les autorit^s locales, les consuls des
deux puissances observent une 6galit6 parfaite, en execution de
I'article 2 du traite de Tien-Tsin. Toutes les affaires concer-
nant les marchands de I'un et de I'autre empire sont examinees
par eux de gre a gre ; les crimes et delits doivent etre jug^s,
comme il est regl6 par I'article 7 du traite de Tien-Tsin, d'apres
les lois de I'empire dont le coupable est sujet.

Les litiges, revendications et autres malentendus de meme
nature, survenant entre marchands a propos d'affaires com-
naerciales, seront regies par les marchands eux-memes, au
moyen d'arl)itres choisis parmi eux ; les consuls et les auto-
rit6s locales doivent se borner a cooperer a I'arrangement a
I'amiable, sans prendre aueune responsabilit^ relativement aux
revendications.

Dans les lieux ou le commerce est autorise, les marchands
de I'un et de I'autre empire peuvent contracter des engagements
par 6crit pour des commandes de marchandises, la location de
boutiques, maisons, etc., etc., et les presenter a la legalisation
du consulat et de I'administration locale. En cas de nonex6cution
d'un engagement ecrit, le consul et le chef local prennent des
mesures pour amener les parties a remplir exactement leurs
obligations.

Les contestations qui ne se rapportent point a des affaires
de commerce entre marchands, telles que litiges, plaintes, etc.,

APPENDIX 353

etc., sont jug^es de consentement mutuel par le consul et le
chef local, et les d6linquants sont punis d'apres les lois de
leur pays.

En cas de recel d'un sujet russe parmi les Chinois, ou de sa
fuite dans I'int^rieur du pays, I'autorit^ locale, aussitot apres en
avoir 6t6 informee par le consul russe, prend imm^diatement
des mesures pour faire rechercher le fugitif, et aussitot apres
I'avoir d^couvert le remet au consulat russe. La m^me marche
doit 6galement 6tre observ6e relativement a tout sujet Chinois
qui se cacherait chez des Eusses ou se serait enfui en Eussie.

Dans les cas de crimes graves, tels que meurtre, brigandage
avec de graves blessures, attentat contre la vie, incendie pr6-
m^dite, etc. ; apr^s enquete, si le coupable est Eusse, il est
envoys en Eussie pour etre traits selon les lois de son pays, et
s'il est Chinois, sa punition lui est inflig^e par rautorit6 du lieu
ou le crime a et6 commis, ou bien, si les lois de I'Etat I'exigent,
le coupable est envoy6 dans une autre ville ou une autre pro-
vince pour y recevoir son ch^timent.

En cas de crime, quelle qu'en soit la gravity, le consul et le
chef local ne peuvent prendre les mesures n6cessaires que rela-
tivement au coupable appartenant a leur pays, et ni I'un ni
I'autre n'a le droit d'incarcerer ni de juger s^par^ment, et
encore moins de chatier un individu non-sujet de son gouverne-
ment.

Article IX

L'^tendue que prennent actuellement les relations com-
merciales entre les sujets des deux puissances, et la fixation de
la nouvelle ligne des fronti^res rendent d^sormais inapplicables
les anciennes regies etablies par les trait^s conclus k Nertchinsk
et a Kiakhta, et par les conventions qui leur ont servi de comple-
ments ; les relations des autorit^s des frontieres entre elles et
les regies etablies pour I'examen des affaires de frontieres ne
r^pondent ^galement plus aux circonstances actuelles. En
consequence, en remplacement de ces regies, il est etabli ce
qui suit :

D6sormais, outre les relations qui existent a la frontiere
orientale, par Ourga et Kiakhta, entre le gouverneur de Kiakhta
et les autorit^s d' Ourga, et a la frontiere occidentale, entre le
gouverneur g^n^ral de la Siberie occidentale et I'administration
d'lli, il y aura encore des relations de frontieres entre les

AA

354 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

gouverneurs militaires de la province de I'Amour et de la pro-
vince maritime et les tsiang-kiun (commandants en chef) de
H6-lonng-kiang et de Kirin, et entre le commissaire des
frontieres de Kiakhta et le dzargoutchei (pou-youen), d'apres
le sens de I'article 8 du present traite.

Conform6ment a I'article 2 du traite de Tien-Tsin, les
gouvernemrs militaires et commandants en chef (tsiang-kiun)
ci-dessus nommes doivent observer une 6galit6 parfaite dans
leurs relations, et sont tenus de ne les entretenir que pour
les affaires dans lesquelles leur administration est directement
interessee.

En cas d'affaires d'une importance particuliere, le gouverneur
general de la Siberie orientale a le droit d'entretenir des rela-
tions par ecrit, soit avec le conseil supreme (kiun-ki-tchou), soit
avec la cour des relations exterieures (li-fan-youen), comme
principale autorite administrative dirigeant les relations et
I'administration des frontieres.

Article X

Dans I'instruction et la decision des affaires de frontieres,
de qu Ique importance qu'elles soient, les chefs des frontieres
se conformeront aux regies enoncees en I'article 8 du present
traits ; quant aux enquetes concernant les sujets de Fun et de
I'autre empire, et aux chatiments a leur infliger, ils s'effectue-
ront, ainsi qu'il est dit en I'article 7 du traits de Tien-Tsin,
d'apres les lois du pays auquel appartient le coupable.

En cas de passage, detournement ou enlevement de b^tail
au-dela de la frontiere, les autorites locales, aussitot qu'elles en
am'ont 6t6 inform6es et que les traces auront ete indiqu^es au
gardien du poste frontiere le plus proche, enverront des hommes
charges de faire des recherches. Le b6tail retrouve sera imm6-
diatement restitue, et s'il en manque quelques pieces, la r6p6-
tition en sera exercee conform6ment aux lois ; mais dans ce cas
I'indemnit^ a payer ne doit pas etre 61ev6e k plusieurs fois la
valeur du betail manquant (ainsi que cela se pratiquait aupara-
vant).

En cas de fuite d'un individu au-dela des frontieres, a la
premiere nouvelle, des mesures sont imm^diatement prises
pour rechercher le transfuge. Le fugitif saisi est livr6 sans
delai, avec tous les objets qui lui appartiennent, a I'autorit^ de
la frontiere ; I'examen des motifs de la fuite et le jugement de

APPENDIX 355

I'affaire elle-roeme s'effectuent par I'autorite locale du pays
auquel appartient le transfuge, la plus rapproch^e des fron-
tieres. Pendant tout le temps de son s6jour au del^ des
frontieres, depuis son arrestation jusqu'a son extradition, le
transfuge est convenablement nourri et, en cas de besoin, vetu ;
la garde qui I'accompagne doit le traiter avec humanite et ne
doit pas se permettre d'actes arbitraires a son 6gard. On devra
en agir de meme a I'^gard du transfuge au sujet duquel il
n'aurait et6 donne aucun avis.

Article XI

Les communications par ecrit entre les autorit^s sup6rieures
des frontieres de I'un et de I'autre empire ont lieu par I'en-
tremise des fonctionnaires les plus voisins de la frontiere, a qui
les depeches exp6diees sont remises contre r^c^pisses.

Le gouverneur g6n6ral de la Siberie orientale et le gou-
verneur de Kiakhta envoient leurs depeches au commissaire des
frontieres k Kiakhta, qui les remet au dzargoutchei (pou-
youen) ; les gouverneurs d'Ourga expedient les leurs au dzar-
goutchei (pou-youen), qui les remet au commissaire des
frontieres a Kiakhta.

Le gouverneur militaire de la province de I'Amour envoie
ses d^pdches par I'adjoint (foudou-toun) du commandant en
chef (tsiang-kiun) dans la ville d'Aigoun, par I'entremise duquel
les commandants en chef (tsiang-kiun) de H61oung-kiang et de
Kirin transmettent les leurs au gouverneur militaire de la pro-
vince de I'Amour.

Le gouverneur militaire de la province maritime et le com-
mandant en chef (tsiang-kiun) de Kirin se transmettent r6cipro-
quement leurs depeches par I'entremise de leurs chefs de postes
frontieres sur les rivieres Ousouri et Khountchoun.

La transmission des correspondances entre le gouverneur
general de la Sib6rie occidentale et I'administration sup6rieure
ou le commandant en chef (tsiang-kiun) d'lli s'effectue par
I'entremise du consul de Eussie dans la ville d'lli (Kouldja).

En cas d'affaire d'une importance particuliere exigeant des
explications verbales, les autorites sup6rieures des frontieres de
I'un et de I'autre empire peuvent s'exp6dier r^ciproquement
leurs depeches par des fonctionnaires russes de confiance.

A a2

356 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

Aeticle XII

Conformemeiit aux dispositions de I'article 11 du traits de
Tien-Tsin, les postes aux lettres et aux colis exp^diees pour
affaires de service de Kiakhta a P6kin, et retour, partiront aux
6poques ci-dessous, savoir : les postes aux lettres, unefois chaque
inois de chacun des deux points, et les pastes aux colis, unefois
tous les deux mois de Kiakhta pour Pekin, et une fois tous les
trois mois de Pekin pour Kiakhta.

Les postes aux lettres doivent arriver a leur destination en
vingt jours au plus, et les postes aux colis en quarante jours
au plus.

A chaque voyage, la poste aux colis ne doit pas etre charg6e
de plus de vingt caisses ne pesant pas plus de cent vingt livres
chinoises (ghin) ou quatre poucls chacune.

Les postes aux lettres doivent etre expedites le jour meme
ou elles ont ete remises, en cas de retard, il y aura une enquete
et une punition severe.

Le postilion expedie avec les postes aux lettres et aux colis
doit se presenter au consulat de Eussie a Ourga, y remettre les
lettres et colis adresses aux personnes r6sidant en cette ville,
et recevoir d'elles les lettres et colis qu'elles auraient a
exp6dier.

A I'expedition des postes aux colis, les caisses dont elles sont
chargees doivent etre accompagn^es de lettres de voiture (tsin-
tan). De Kiakhta, les lettres de voiture, accompagnees d'un
office, sont adress6s au gouverneur d'Ourga, et de Pekin,
6galement avec un office, a la cour des relations ext^rieures
(li-fan-youen).

Les lettres de voiture indiquent exactement la date de
I'expedition, le nombre des caisses et leur poids total. Le poids
special de chaque caisse doit etre inscrit sur I'enveloppe meme
de la caisse, en chiffres russes, avec leur traduction en poids
mongol ou chinois.

Si les marchands russes jugent n^cessaire, pour les besoins
de leurs affaires de commerce, d'etablir a leurs frais un service
de poste pour le transport de leurs lettres ou de lem-s mar-
chandises, la faculty leur en sera accord^e, afin d'alleger le
service de la poste de I'Etat. En cas d'^tablissement d'une
communication postale, les marchands doivent simplement en
pr6venir Fautorit^ locale pour obtenir son assentiment.

APPENDIX 367

Article XIII

Les correspondances ordinaires du ministre des affaires
etrangeres de Eussie pour le conseil supreme (kiun-ki-tchou)
de Fempire Ta-Tsing, et celles du gouverneur g6n6ral de la
Sib6rie orientale pour le m^me conseil ou pour la cour des
relations ext6rieures (li-fan-youen) sont exp^di^es de la maniere
ordinaire par la poste, mais sans etre astreintes aux 6poques
fix6es pour le depart de celle-ci ; en cas d'affaires d'une impor-
tance particuliere, ces correspondances peuvent 6tre exp6di6es
par un courrier russe.

Pendant le s^jour des envoyes russes i Pekin, les d6peches
d'une importance speciale peuvent ^galement etre exp6diees par
un fonctionnaire russe express6ment design^ a cet effet.

Les courriers russes ne doivent etre retenus nulle part en
route ; ni par qui que ce soit.

Le courrier charge de transporter des depeches doit absolu-
ment etre sujet russe.

L'expedition d'un courrier est annoncee vingt-quatre hem^es
d'avance, a Kiakhta par le commissaire au dzargoutchei
(pou-youen), et ^ P6kin par la mission russe a la cour militaire
(ping-poiT).

Article XIV

Si, ulterieurement, quelqu'une des stipulations relatives au
commerce de terre arretees par le present trait6 offre des
inconvenients a I'une ou a I'autre partie, le gouverneur g6n6ral
de la Siberie orientale est autoris6 a s 'entendre avec les
autorit6s sup6rieures des frontieres de I'empire Ta-Tsing et k
conclure avec elles des conventions additionnelles, en se con-
formant dans tous les cas aux principes pos6s ci-dessus.

L'article 12 du traite de Tien-Tsin est en meme temps
confirm6 et ne doit subir aucune alteration.

Article XV

Ayant arrets d'un commun accord les dispositions ci-dessus,
les plenipotentiaires des empires de Eussie et de Chine ont
signe de leur main et scell6 de leur sceau deux exemplaires du
texte russe du traite et deux exemplaires de sa traduction en
langue chinoise, et se sont reciproquement remis I'un k I'autre
un exemplaire de I'un et de I'autre

358 RUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

Les articles du present traite ont force legale k dater du
jour de leur echange entre les plenipotentiaires de Fun et de
I'autre empire, comme s'ils 6taient insures mot pour mot dans
le traite de Tien-Tsin, et doivent etre a tou jours ex6cut6s fidele-
ment et inviolablement.

Apres avoir 6te ratifi6 par les souverains des deux empires,
ce traite sera promulgu6 dans chacun des deux Etats, pour la
connaissance et la gouverne de qui il appartiendra.

Conclu et sign6 dans la ville capitale de Pekin le deuxieme
(quatorzieme) jour de novembre de I'an mil huit cent soixante
de I'ere chr^tienne, et la sixieme annee du regne de I'Empereur
Alexandre II, et le deuxieme jour de la dixieme lune de la
dixieme annee de Hien-Pong.

Sign6 :

Nicolas Ignatiew.
Kong.

PROTOCOL OF THE PEKING CONVENTION

Le 2 (14) novembre de I'an 1860, les hauts plenipotentiaires :
pour I'empire de Eussie, le general-major Ignatiew, de la suite
de Sa Majeste Imp6riale et chevalier de plusieurs ordres ; —
pour I'empire Ta-Tsing, le prince Kong, prince de premiere
classe, suivis de leurs secretaires et interpretes, se sont r^unis
a quatre heures apres midi, dans une des salles du college
ecciesiastique russe, situ^ vers le sud, a I'effet de proceder a la
signature et a I'echange du traite conclu aujourd'hui et devant
servir de complement au traite de Tien-Tsin de I'annee 1858.

En premier lieu il a ete fait lecture de I'edit du Bogdokhan,
dans lequel il est declare que Sa Majeste confirme mot pour
mot le projet de traite additionnel, en quinze articles, soumis k
sa ratijQcation ; qu'elle promet de I'executer fidelement et inviol-
ablement, et ordonne k Kong-tsin-wang d'apposer le sceau et de
signer le traite additionnel qui a ete conclu. Kong-tsin-wang
ayant ensuite declare qui cet edit sufiQt en tout point pour que
la delimitation des deux empires et les autres articles du traite
soient consideres comme definitivement ratifies par le Bogdo-
khan, le pienipotentiaire de Eussie a declare que, de son cote,
il consentait a considdrer le traite comme ratifie par le Bog-
dokhan, et qu'il etait pret a signer immediatement le traite et a

APPENDIX' 359

effectuer I'^change des exemplaires. En consequence, les deux
pl6nipotentiaires ont sign6 deux exemplaires du trait6 en langue
russe et deux exemplaires en langue chinoise, et y ont fait
apposer leurs sceaux. A la suite de quoi le g6n6ral-major
Ignatiew a remis entre les mains du prince de premiere classe
Kong I'instrument du traits, transcrit dans les deux langues,
et le prince de premiere classe Kong, ayant regu le traite, a
remis a son tour au pl6nipotentiaire de Eussie I'instrument du
traite 6galement transcrit dans les deux langues.

L'^change des exemplaires du trait6 ayant 6t6 effectu6, les
pl^nipotentiaires ont sign6 le present proces-verbal, en deux
exemplaires, a Pekin, dans une des salles du college eccle-
siastique russe, situe vers le sud.

Signe :

Kong.

Nicolas Ignatiew.

360 RUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

LEASE OF POET AETHUE AND TA-LIEN-WAN.

His Majesty the Empekor of China, on the sixth day of the
thhd moon of the twenty-fourth year of Kuang Hsii (March 27,
1898), appointed the Grand Secretary, Li Hung-chang, and the
Senior Vice-President of the Board of Eevenue, Chang Yin-
husn, as Plenipotentiaries to arrange with M. Pavloff, Charg6
d'Affaires and Plenipotentiary for Eussia, all matters connected
with the leasing and use by Eussia of Port Arthur and Ta-lien-
wan.

The treaty arranged between them in this connection is as
follows : —

Article I

It being necessary for the due protection of her navy in the
waters of North China that Eussia should possess a station
she can defend, the Emperor of China agrees to lease to Eussia
Port Arthur and Ta-lien-wan, together with the adjacent seas,
but on the understanding that such lease shall not prejudice
China's sovereignty over this territory.

Article II

The limits of the territory thus leased for the reasons above
stated, as well as the extent of territory north of Ta-lien-wan
necessary for the defence of that now leased, and what shall
be allowed to be leased, shall be strictly defined, and all
details necessary to the carrying out of this treaty be arranged
at St. Petersburg with Hsii Ta-j^n so soon as possible for the
signature of the present treaty, and embodied in a separate
treaty. Once these limits have been determined, all land held
by Chinese within such limits, as well as the adjacent waters,
shall be held by Eussia alone on lease.

Article III

The duration of the lease shall be twenty-five years from
the day this treaty is signed, but may be extended by mutual
.agreement between Eussia and China.

APPENDIX 361

Article IV

The control of all military forces in the territory eased
by Eussia, and of all naval forces in the adjacent seas, as
well as of the civil officials in it, shall be vested in one high
Eussian official, who shall, however, be designated by some
title other than Governor-General (Tsung-tu), or Governor
(Hslin-fu). All Chinese military forces shall, without exception,
be withdrawn from the territory, but it shall remain optional
with the ordinary Chinese inhabitants either to remain or to
go ; and no coercion shall be used towards them in this matter.
Should they remain, any Chinese charged with a criminal
offence shall be handed over to the nearest Chinese official to
be dealt with according to Article VIII. of the Eusso-Chinese
treaty of 1860.

Article V

To the north of the territory leased shall be a zone, the
extent of which shall be arranged at St. Petersburg between
Hsii Ta-jen and the Eussian Foreign Office. Jurisdiction over
this zone shall be vested in China, but China may not quarter
troops in it except with the previous consent of Eussia.

Article VI

The two nations agree that Port Arthur shall be a naval
port for the sole use of Eussian and Chinese men-of-war, and
be considered as an unopened port so far as the naval and
mercantile vessels of other nations are concerned. As regards
Ta-lien-wan, one portion of the harbour shall be reserved
exclusively for Eussian and Chinese men-of-war, just like Port
Arthur, but the remainder shall be a commercial port freely
open to the merchant vessels of all countries.

Article VII

Port Arthur and Ta-lien-wan are the points in the territory
leased most important for Eussian military purposes. Eussia
shall, therefore, be at liberty to erect, at her own expense, forts,
and build barracks and provide defences, at such places as she
desires.

362 BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

Article VIII

China agrees that the procedure sanctioned in 1896
regarding the construction of raiboads by the Board of the
Eastern China Railway shall, from the date of the signature
of this treaty, be extended so as to include the construction of
a branch line to Ta-lien-wan, or, if necessary, in view of the
interests involved, of a branch line to the most suitable
point on the coast betw^een Newchwang and the Yalu river.
Fm'ther, the agreement entered into in September 1896 between
the Chinese Government and the Eusso-Chinese Bank shall
apply with equal strength to this branch line. The direction
of this branch and the places it shall touch shall be arranged
between Hsii Ta-j6n and the Board of the Eastern Raih'oads.
The construction of this line shall never, however, be made a
ground for encroaching on the sovereignty or integrity of
China.

Aeticle IX

This treaty shall take full force and effect from the date
it is signed, but the ratifications shall be exchanged in Str
Petersburg.

Signed March 27, 1898.

INDEX

Abbas the Great, Shah of Persia,
154

Aigun, Chinese fortified town, 209 ;
military expedition at, 245 ;
Chinese commander at, sends a
protest to Muravioff, 255 ; first
conference with Chinese at, 257 ;
convention of, 259, 346

Akhmat, Tartar army of, 33

Akhte, Lieut6nant-Colonel, expedi-
tion of, 181 ; explores the left
bank of the Amur, 196

Alaska, 98, 198, 267

Albazin, abandoned by Cossacks,
132 ; defence of, by Tolbuzin,
135-6 ; Muravioff at, 208

Aldan, Poyarkoff expedition on the,
103

Alexander I., 169

Alexander II., 243

Alexander Nevski, victory over
Swedes on the Neva, 15 ; battle on
frozen Lake Peipus, known as the
Battle on the Ice, 15 ; defeats the
Lithuanians, 16 ; submission to
Horde, 16 ; elected Grand Duke of
Vladimir, 16 ; goes to Sarai, 16 ;
death of, 16

Alexandrofsk at De Castries Bay,
190

Alexandrofska, Ivan the Terrible at,
39

Alexis Mikhailovitch, rebellion of
Little Kussia, 156

America, North, Eussians in, 98

America, Russian possessions in,
sold to the United States, 98

' Amphitrite ' corvette, 216

Amur, struggle for the, 100; formed
by two rivers, 101 ; Poyarkoff, ex-
pedition to, 102-7 ; exploration
of, by Khabarotf , 108-26 ; by Peter
Beketoff, 128 ; Tchernigofski's
work on the, 133 ; Treaty of

Nertchinsk, 137 ; Cossacks on the,
138; cession of the, by the Treaty
of Nertchinsk. 165, 170 ; expe-
dition of Gavriloff, 171 ; annexa-
tion of the Amur region, 173 ;
Russians established on the, 183 ;
occupation of Russians after
nearly two centuries, 194 ; navi-
gation of, 206, 283 ; defence of
Petropavlofsk, 224 ; third military
expedition, 245 ; virtually becomes
a Russian river, 246 ; terrible ex-
periences of Russian troops, 249-
51 ; Muravioff's conference with
Chinese at Aigun, 257 ; first
steamer on, 275 ; steam naviga-
tion on, 282-3

Amur section of Siberian railway,
296

Anadyr, the, exploration of, by
Dejneff, 86

Anadyrsk, the most distant Russian
settlement, 87

Anastasia Romanoff, married to Ivan
the Terrible, 37 ; good influence
of, 38

Angara, the, navigation on, 281

Anglo-French squadron attacks
Petropavlofsk, 216-24.

Anglo - Russian - Chinese - Japanese
view of the situation, 314, et seq.

Aniva Bay, 323

Aniva Cape, 193

Anna, Princess, marriage to Vla-
dimir, 5

Antzyphor, elected chief of Cossacks,
96

Arctic Ocean, 80

Argun, river, 101

' Argun,' the pioneer steamer on the
Amur, 207

Armenians as tax-collectors, 17

Asia, Russia in, sameness of its
geographical features, 1

364

RUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

Asiatic influences left by Tartar
domination, 35

Asiatic nomads give place to Chris-
tianity and civilisation, 2

Astrakhan, Khan of, 37 ; town taken
by Kussians, 37 ; Turkish troops
mutiny, and disperse at approach
of Eussians, 41

Atchan, natives of, 119

Athanasieff, Ivan, at Okhotsk, 88

Athanasius Alenin, 51

Atlasoff, Vladimir, discovers Kam-
chatka, 89-94 ; murdered by Cos-
sacks, 96

Attila, 10

' Aurora ' frigate, 216

Avacha, Bay of, 176, 214-5

Ayan, 178

Azof, taken by Cossacks, 155 ; Turks
recover, 156

' Baikal,' the brig, 174 ; at the Gulf
of the Amur, 179 ; Bay of Shtchas-
tia, 182 ; at Petrofskoe, 191

Baikal, Lake, 78, 127, 274 ; circum-
Baikalian section of the Siberian
railway, 295, 299, 300

Baltic, the, sea of the wild heathen
Scandinavians, 5

Barguzin, ostrog, 127

Barguzin, river, 127

Bassian, Archbishop of Rostof, 33

Batory, King of Poland, repels Eus-
sians, 42

Batu, invades Eussia with 300,000
men, 11 ; defeats Grand Duke
Vladimir, 12; Kief taken and in-
habitants massacred, 13 ; ravages
Poland, Moravia, and Silesia, 18 ;
Alexander Nevski summoned to
appear before him, 16

Behring Sea, 170

Behring Straits, ' discovered ' by
Simon Dejneff, 16 ; Eussians at, in
the middle of the 17th century, 265

Beiton, Athanasius, defence of Al-
bazin, 136

Beketoff, Peter, expedition of, 128

Bieloi, unsuccessful siege of, 155

Black Dragon, river, Chinese name
for the Amur, 257

Black Sea, Cossacks attack Turkish
ships in the, 155

Blagoveshensk, on the Amur, 127

Blagoveshtchensk, 260

Bodega, near San Francisco, Eus-
sians at, 98

Bogdoi (Chinese) army, conflict with

Cossacks, 120
Bogdoi, Khan, 112
Bogolinbski, George, the conqueror

of Kief, 8
Bonaparte (Napoleon I.) wins over

Paul I., 168 ; Alexander I., 169 ;

and see 329
Boris, see Godunotf
Boshniack, Lieutenant, 188
Bratskis of the Yenissei, 74
Bruce, Admiral, 230
Buldakotf, Timothy, explorations of,

83-5
Bulgaria, invaded by Sviatoslav, 5
Bulgars, defeated by Batu, 11
Buriates, 100
Buza expedition, 80
Byzantine armorial bearings adopted

by Eussia, 32
Byzantine Empire defeats the Eus-
sians, 5

California and Eussian American
Company, 198

Callao, 217

Casimir, John, brother of Ladislaus,
elected King of Poland, 156-7

Caspian, the, 38

Catherine XL, 167-8

Central Siberian section of Siberian
railway, 295

Chancellor, commander of English
expedition to Northern Eussia,
40, 54

Charles XII., 166

China, North-east passage to, first
proposed by Eobert Thorne in
1527, 54 ; Russian treaty with,
165 ; Eussia interested in the
independence of, 320 ; England's
trade interests with, 331

China- Japan war, 303, 319

China war, 172

Chinese, on the Amur, 116-22 ; at-
tacked by Cossacks, 129 ; army
before Kumarska, 130 ; besiege
Albazin, 135-6 ; negotiations with,
about the frontier question, 241 ;
Eussian toleration for the customs
of the, 317 ; as traders in Eus-.
sian towns, 317

Christian, Eussia becomes, 6

Christianity, conversion to, of Vla-
dimir and his people, 6

Circum-Baikalian section of Siberian
railway, 295

INDEX

365

Columbia, river, Eussians found a
settlement at the mouth of the, 98

Constantine, Grand Duke, 182, 202

Constantinofsk, 192

Constantinople, Oleg leads an expe-
dition against, 5 ; Eussians receive
Christianity at, 6

Corea,268 ; Eussia's policy in, 320-1 ;
Japan in possession of, 325 ; Eus-
sia paramount in, 326 ; Queen of,
assassinated, 326 ; hopeless task
of reforming Corea, 327

Cossacks, method of warfare with
the Tartars, 48 ; institutions of
the, 49 ; as river sailors, 70 ;
as tribute collectors, 71; head-
quarters at Yakutsk, 78 ; as navi-
gators, 83-5 ; cruelty of, 88 ;
degeneration of, 97 ; expedition
to the Amur, 103-7 ; ravage the
Amur, 118

Cossacks of the Don storm the
fortress of Azof. 155

Crimea, hostile to the Golden Horde,
30 ; Khan of, sacks Moscow, 41

Crimean Tartars, 40

Crimean War : result, opening of the
Pacific to Eussia, 204, 336

Cronstadt, 217

Daniel of Moscow, son of Alexander
Nevski, 19 ; installed as Grand
Duke of Vladimir, 19-20; death
of, 20
Daurians, 104

De Castries, Bay of, 189, 190 ; English
squadron attacks Eussian ships,
232
Dejneff, a Cossack navigator, 85-7
Demetrius, commander of Kief, 13
Demetrius Donskoi, his investiture
purchased from the Horde, 25 ;
wars with Lithuania, 25 ; against
Bulgarian races and Kazan, 26 ;
conflict with Tartars, 26 ; defeat
of Tartars at Kulikovo, 27 ; de-
feated by Toktomysh, 27 ; death
of, 28
Demetrius the False, his early hfe
and adventures, 143 ; crosses the
frontier, 143 ; enters Moscow,
145 ; murdered, 145
Demetrius, the second False, 146
Demetrius, the third False, 150
Deulina, truce of, concluded by the

King of Poland, 154
' Diana ' frigate, 211

Dji, river, 101

Dnieper, the, path of Slavs to the
south, 5

Dolgorouki, 19

Dolgoruki, George, 18

Don, the, and the Volga, project to
dig a canal between, 40 ; Cossacks
of the, subjects of JIoscow, 155

Dorpt, now renamed Yurief, 14

' Dvina ' transport, 216

Ediger, a chieftain in Yugra, 46

Elliott, Sir Charles, 233, 234, 240,
241

England, and China, 203 ; trade in-
terests in China, 331-2

England and Eussia, war between
discussed, 337-8

English navigators, early, 54, 284 ;
Captain Wiggins, 285

English ships at Petropavlofsk,
229-30

' Eurydice ' corvette, 216

Expedition of 2,000 boats against
Constantinople, 5

Far East, halt in the, 140 ; military
operations in the, 226 ; naval
operations in the, 241

Febvrier-Despointes, 216

Ferdinand of Castile, 22

Finns, plundered and conquered by
the Varaghi, 4 ; at Lake Onega,
4 ; tribute of furs levied from
Finnish aborigines, 9 ; on the
Lower Volga, 37

Formosa, 325

French Eevolution, failure to under-
stand the true consequences of,
329

Galkin, Ivan, crosses the Baikal,

127
Gantimur, a Chinese exile, 159
Genghis Khan, 1, 10, 314
Geographical similarity of Asiatic

Eussia, 1
George of Moscow, claimant to

Grand Dukedom of Vladimir, 20
George, Grand Duke of Vladimir,

killed by the eldest son of Michael,

21
Ghiliacks, 184
Ghirin, 261

366

BUS SI A ON THE PACIFIC

Godunoff, Boris, brother-in-law of
Theodore, 141 ; accused of mur-
dering Demetrius, 142 ; ascends
the throne, 142

Golden Horde, 13, 16, 17, 19, 30, 34,
46

Golovin, mission to Peking, 160-5 ;
Treaty of Nertchinsk signed, 164

Gorbitza, river, 181

Great Britain and Eussia, rivalry
between, on the Pacific, 331-2

Great Eussia, 9

Great Siberian Eailway, 297, 306

Greek Church, 6 ; pretext for wars
of conquest on Slavs, 10

Greek Empire, attacked by Slavs, 5 ;
marriage of a Eussian sovereign
with a Greek princess, 5 ; which
brings about the conversion to
Christianity of Vladimir and his
people, 6

Greek, influence of, on Eussian civi-
lisation, 6

Gregory XIII., Pope, effects a truce
for Ivan IV., 42

Henky VII., 22

Henry VIII., character of, resembles
that of Ivan the Terrible, 42

Herodotus, Scythia of, 1

Horde, the Great, Eussian princes
at, 13 ; Alexander Nevski, submis-
sion to, 16 ; Khan of, 17 ; appeal
to, by Daniel of Moscow, 19 ;
Michael of Tver at, 21 ; George of
Moscow summoned to, 21 ; Ivan
Kalita at Sarai, 23 ; Demetrius
taken to the Horde, 25 ; yoke of,
shaken off, 33

Huns, the, 2

Ignatieff, General, political agent
at Peking, 262

Ilinsk, 192

Ilmen, Lake, 4

Ilmenski and Krivishi send ambas-
sadors to the Varaghi, 4

Imperatorski Bay, Emperor Nicholas
I. Bay, 192

Indighirka, explorations on the, 81

Innocent, Archbishop, 239, 260

Irkutsk, founded in 1651, 78

' Irtysh ' transport, 193, 211

Isabel of Castile, 34

Ivan Kalita, 21; his policy, 21-4;
builds a stone church at Moscow,

22 ; goes to Sarai, and returns
with 50,000 Tartars, 23 ; the
founder of the Empire, 24

Ivan II.. 24-5

Ivan III., the Great, first assumed
the title of ' Autocrat of all Eussia,'
30 ; defeats the Novgorodians, 31 ;
marries Sophia Paleologus, 31 ;
modifies Eussian armorial bear-
ings, 32 ; Court etiquette, 32 ;
Tartar yoke shaken off, 33 ; his
reluctance to fight, 33 ; extends
his authority over Kazan, 35 ;
wars with Sweden and Lithuania,
35

Ivan IV., the Terrible, asserts his
power and has Prince Shinski
executed, 36 ; takes title of Tsar,
37 ; marries Anastasia Eomanoff,

37 ; new code of laws, 37 ; takes
Kazan, 37 ; annexes Astrakhan,

38 ; extends his dominions to the
Ural and to the Caspian, 38 ;
illness of, and change of character,
38 ; correspondence with Prince
Kurbski, 39 ; shuts himself up at
Alexandrofska, 39 ; sends an envoy
to Germany, 39 ; Moscow burned
by the Khan of Crimea, 41 ; de- "
feated by the Swedes and Poles,
42 ; slays his son, 42 ; his many
wives, 42 ; a student of theology
and observer of religious practices,
42 ; his political cruelty must be
judged by the standard of the
times, 42 ; points of resemblance
to Henry VIII., 42 ; dealings with
Gregory XIIL, 42

Japan, war with China, 303, 319,

330
Japanese, self-control and reticence

of, 330
Jesuits assist China against Russia,

138
Jews as tax-collectors, 17

Kaidalovo, 305

Kama, tributary of the Volga, 50

Kamchatka, discovery and conquest,
89, 97 ; Cossacks, degeneration of,
97 ; importance of Eussian settle-
ments in, 170 ; Muravioff's visit
to, 176

Kamchatka, river, 202, 203

INDEX

367

Kamtchadales oppose Atlasoff, the
explorer, 90

Kara Sea, 54, 284-5

Karatcho, treachery of, 62

Kazakievitch, 207

Kazan, and Golden Horde, 30 ; Ivan
III. extends his authority over, 35;
taken by Ivan the Terrible, 37

Ket, great Kas canal, 281

Khabaroff, celebrated Cossack ex-
plorer, 108-26

Khabarofsk, on the Amur, 127 ;
residence of the Governor-General,
209

Kharazaya, 202

Khingan, Great, 304-5

Khingan, Little, 304-5

Khingan Mountains, 79, 105

Khmelnitzki and the King of Po-
land, 157

Kiakhta, 200

Kiao-chao, German occupation of,
303 ; forces Eussia to occupy Port
Arthur, 319

Kief, on the Dnieper, 4 ; in 882 the
capital of the embryo Russian
State, 5 ; pillaged in 1169 by
Bogolinbski, 8 ; the mother of
Russian cities, 8 ; loses its river
trade- route, 9 ; assaulted by Batu,
18 ; reduced to an insignificant
town, 18

Kitai, Khan of, 105

Kizi, Lake, 189

Kokoreff & Co. propose a line of
railway through the Ural country,
289

Koltzo, Ivan, robber-chief of the
Volga, 59, 62

Kolumna, Batu defeats the Russians
at, 12

Kolyma, the, discovery of, 82

Korsakoff, Major, 225

Kostrouma, 9

Kozari, the, a nomadic race, impose
a tribute on the Russians, 3

Kozelskjtown, destroyed by Mongols,
12

Krasnoyarsk, 281

Krasny Yar, 215

Kremlin, surrounded with stone
walls and towers, 25 ; strongest
fortress, 25

Kropotkine, on the sources of the
Ghilini, 104

Kumara, tributary of the Amur,
130

Kumarska, Manchu army attack

Russians, 130; repulse of the

Chinese, 131
Kurbski, Prince, 38-9
Kurile Islands, 195, 324
Kusunai, river, 192 ; frontier between

Russians and Japanese, 323
Kutchum, 58, 59, 60 ; destroys the

Russians, 64
Kutomanda, 247-8
Kuznetzoff, 207

Ladislaus, son of the King of Poland,
aspires to the throne of Russia,148 ;
relief of Smolensk, 155 ; renounces
his pretensions to the Russian
throne, 155

Ladoga, Ruric at, 4

Lafkai, a Daurian prince, 111-2

' La Forte ' frigate, 216

La Perouse, 171

Latin Church, see Rome

Lazareff, Cape, 234

Lena, the, discovery of, 74 ; life of
the early settlers, 75 ; fur trade,
108 ; steam navigation on, 282

' Lena ' s.s., 285

Lestrigones, 44

Liao-tung Peninsula, Russia's inter-
vention, 319, 325

Lipin murdered on his way to
Verkne Kamchatsk, 95

Lithuania, 18 ; Grand Duke of, em-
braces Christianity and ascends
the Polish throne, 18 ; adopts the
Latin rite, 28 ; union with Poland,
41

Lithuanians, 14 ; defeated by Alex-
ander Nevski, 16 ; wars of Demet-
rius, 25

Little Russia, 9 ; part of Polo-Lithu-
ania, 47, 156 ; Kief, capital of the
present, 99 ; rebellions in, 156 ;
places itself under the Tsar, 157

Liublin Union, concluded in 1569, 41

Livonia, 15 ; ceded to Poland, 40

Livonian knights, 10, 14 ; routed by
Alexander Nevski, 15

Louis XI. of France, 22, 42

Lovat, river, 4

Magna Gr.ecia, 44
Magyars, the, 2
Makarieff, fair at, 36
Makhmetkul, 59, 61
Mamai, Khan, 26 ; killed by Tok-
tomysh, 27

368

BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

Manchuria, by the Treaty of Peking
loses all access to the sea on the
east, 263 ; and Treaty of Shimo-
noseki, 303 ; Kussia extends her
railway through to Vladivostok,
303 ; Chinese military prepara-
tions in, 319

Manchus, 259

Mariinsk, Western Siberia, 190, 210

Martynoff, 229

Maxutoff, Prince, 220

Mazeppa Pugacheff, 49

Meshtcheriak, Jacob, 63

Metropolitan of the Russian Church,
authority of, unique and uncon-
tested, 23

Michael of Tver, appointed Grand
Duke, 20 ; defeats George of Mos-
cow, 21 ; his martyrdom, 21

Midden dorf, scientific voyage of, on
the Amur, 180

Minin, liberator of Russia, 151

Mnishek and false Demetrius, 143-4

Mongols, the, 2 ; urst appearance
in Europe, 11 ; war against the
Polovtsy, 11 ; famous raid of
300,000 men, 11 ; atrocities of, 12

Morozko, Luke, 90

Moscow, 8 ; destroyed by Tartars, 12 ;
first mentioned in 1147, 18; while
still a place of small importance,
19 ; capital of Ivan Kalita, 22 ;
see of the Metropolitan, 23 ; burned
by Tartars, 27 ; Novgorod incor-
porated, 31 ; sacked by the Khan
of Crimea, 41 ; Poles in posses-
sion of, 148 ; railway from, to
Vladivostok, 306

Moskva, river, 9, 19

' Moskva ' s.s., 285

Mosquitoes, Siberian, 212

Motoro reaches the Anadyr, 87

Muravioff, appointed Governor-
General of Eastern Siberia, 173 ;
at Petropavlofsk, 177 ; Chinese
commander at Aigun sends a
protest to, 255 ; receives the title
of Count Amurski, 260 ; finishes
the work commenced by Yermak,
265 ; policy of, 267

Muscovites' expedition to Ugra, 45

Muscovy Company, 54

Napoleon I., 168, 169, 329 _

Navy, Russian, on the Pacific, 211 ;

defence of Petropavlofsk, 216 ;

elude the English, 229-34

Nerphilieff, Maxim, expedition up

the Vitim, 101
Nertchinsk, Treaty of, 137, 164-5,

344 ; Cossack army at, 196 ; mines

at, 186
Nesselrode, Count, 171
Nevelskoy, Captain, 174-180
Newchwang, probable terminus of

the Siberian railway, 303-4, 306 ;

sixteen days' journey by rail from

London, 307
Nicholas I., 169, 173-98, 225
Nicholas II., inaugurates the work of

the Siberian railway, 294, 340 ;

vastness of his empire, 341 ; peace

proposals of, 341
Nijni Novgorod, 36
' Nikolai,' ship, 193
Nikolaiefsk, on the Amur, 183,

194
Nikolski Hill, 215
Nordenskjold, 285, 286
North Ussurian section of Siberian

railway, 297
Novgorod, great emporium of trade,

9 ; called Novgorod the Great, 9 ;
officially styled ' Sir Novgorod,'

10 ; escapes Tartar ravages, 14 ;
attacked by Swedes, 15 ; subjection _
to Ivan III., 31 ; incorporated in
the Muscovite State, 31

Novgorod the Great, fur trade of, 71
Novgorodians as enterprising mer-
chants, 44

Ob, the, 45 ; first steamer on, 275 ;
steam navigation on, 276-9

Ob-Yenissei Canal, 281-2

Obdorsk, inhabitants said to fall
asleep in autumn, 45

Oblenkhoff, Colonel, 249

' Obligado ' s.s., 216

Oka, 9 ; Ivan III., campaign on, 34

Okhotsk, Sea of, 79, 170, 226 ; Cos-
sacks at, 80 ; town of, 170

Okuma, Count, 330

Oleg, successor of Ruric, leads an
expedition against Constanti-
nople, 5

Olenek, river, discovered by Buza,
80

' Olivutza ' corvette, 211

Onega, Lake, 4

Ostiaks, 46, 53

Ostrofski, engineer, 290-2

Otrepieii", George ; see Demetrius the
False I.

INDEX

369

Pacific, first port on the, 98, 214 ;
Eussians reach the coast before
the Americans, 98 ; Great Britain
and Kussia on the, 332

Pacific Ocean to the Baltic an
almost continuous plain, 1

♦ Pallada ' frigate, 211

Paris, Treaty of, 245

Patriarch, the first, 141

Paul I., 168

Paul III., Pope, 31

Pechenegs, fate of the, 7

Pei-ho, 262

Peking, Convention of, 348 ; Proto-
col of, 358 ; Muraviofi's despatch
to, 235 ; Treaty of, 263

Pereyaslav, Lord of, 20 ; retention
of Pereyaslav by George of Mos-
cow causes trouble, 20

Perm, 31 ; railway to Tiumen, 280

Perofski, 182

Perry, Commodore, 323

Persia, Shah of, Abbas the Great,
154

Peter, Metropolitan of Vladimir, 22 ;
dies at Moscow, 22

Peter, pretended son of Theodore,
146

Peter the Great, childhood, 166 ; his
sister Sophia relegated to a monas-
try, 166 ; fond of boating, 166 ;
attacks Azof, 166 ; foundation of
St. Petersburg, 167 ; true genius
of, 167

Peter the Great Bay (Victoria Bay),
262-3

Petropavlofsk, first port on the
Pacific, 98, 176-8 ; defence of,
211, 215 ; Anglo-French squadron
attacks, 218-24 ; gallant defence
of, 224 ; second attack, 230

Philarete, father of Michael Eoman-
off, 153 ; returns to Eussia, 154

Pojarski the Liberator, 151

Poland, and Lithuania united, 18 ;
Livonia ceded to, 40 ; Liublin
Union, 41 ; Poland and Eussia,
failure of the union due to reli-
gious causes, 152 ; second war
with, 159

Poles defeat the Eussians, 42 ; enter
Moscow, 148 ; capitulate, and
leave Kremlin, 150 ; defeated by
Cossacks, 150 ; expulsion from
Moscow, 152

Polovtsy and the Pechenegs, 7 ;
plunder the Eussians, 8 ; destroy
the river trade-route of Kief on

the Dnieper, 9 ; encounter Mon-
gols, 11

Port Arthur, 98, 303-4, 338; and
Ta-lien-Wan, lease of, 360

Possiet, Bay of, 263

Postal rates in 1682, 272 ; postal
communication to Siberia, 273

Poyarkotf, Vassil, expedition to the
Amur, 102-7

Price, Admiral, 217 ; suicide, 219

Pskof, Scandinavian chieftains rule
at, 4 ; Alexander Nevski drives the
Germans out of, 15 ; inhabitants
excommunicated, 23; subjugation
of, by Vassil III., 36

Putiatin, Vice-Admiral, 195, 203 ;
appointed Minister to Peking, 252

Eailway tariffs, Eussian, 308, 311
Eiazan, destroyed by Tartars, 11 ;
Prince of, 26 ; Cossacks of, 47 ;
their early history, 47
Elvers of Eussia , 276-83
Roads, postal, opening of, 270-1
Romanoff, Michel, 148 ; prisoner of
Poles in Kremlin, 152 ; elected
Tsar, 153
Eomanoff, Nikiti, brother-in-law of
Ivan the Terrible, Eegent de facto,
141
Eomanoffs exiled by Godunoff, 143
Rome, hostility to the Greek Church
creates a barrier between Russia
and the rest of Europe, 6 ; Paul
II. arranges marriage for Ivan,
31 ; Gregory XIII. asked to medi-
ate by Ivan the Terrible, 42
Rostof , 8 ; Bassian, Archbishop of,

33
Ruric, at Novgorod, 4 ; becomes sole
lord of the Northern Slavs, 4 ; his
conquests, 4 ; successors, 4-6 ;
house of, 43
Russia, ignorance about, in unex-
pected quarters, v ; false notions
generally entertained of her ex-
pansion in Northern Asia, vi ;
books to consult, vii ; absence of
natural boundaries in Asia, 1 ;
unity of its people, 1 ; subject to
invasion in the ninth century, 8 ;
the Greek Church a barrier be-
tween Russia and the rest of
Europe, 6 ; isolation of, 6 ; in-
vaded by Mongols in 1224, 11 ; in
1236 by Bafcu, 11 ; intestine war-
fare, 17 ; same language spoken
BB

370

BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

throughout the greater part of the
Empire, 17 ; change in her armo-
rial bearings, 32 ;conquest of Sibe-
ria, 44-99 ; first port on the Pacific,
98 ; expansion of its eastward
march, 99 ; struggle for the Amur,
100-136 ; all claims to the Amur
relinquished, 137 ; the halt in the
Far East, 140 ; gains a ' firm foot-
ing on the Amur,' 225 ; progress,
policy and projects of, 267 ; ob-
tains permission to extend her
railway through Manchuria to
Vladivostok, 303 ; as a factor of
Japan's future greatness, 330 ;
river shipping a third of the ton-
nage of the whole ocean shipping
of the world, 333 ; English preju-
dice against Eussia's autocratic
form of Government, 333 ; her
policy not aggressive, 335 ; needs
peace, 339

Kussia and England, view of the
situation, 337 et scq.

Eussia and Japan, war between,
would be a great misfortune, 328

Eussian - American Company in
Alaska, 170 ; at Nikolaiefsk, 185 ;
at Saghalien, 191, 198, 218

Eussian Empire, its growth, 314

Eussians plundered by Northmen,
4 ; Varaghians invited to govern
Slavs, 4

Saghalien, Island of, 171, 179 ;

ceded to Eussia in exchange for the

Kurile Islands, 195, 324 ; Eussians

and Japanese in, 323
St. Petersburg, foundation of, 167 ;

transfer of the seat of Government

to, 168 ; school of Japanese

founded in, 322
St. Sergius, abbot, 27
San Francisco, 218
San-sin, 261
Sandwich Islands, 217
Sarai, Batu establishes his capital

at, 13 ; Alexander Nevski at, 16 ;

Ivan Kalita at, 23
Scythians of Herodotus, 1
Sea route to Siberia, 286
Selenga, source of the Baikal, 127
Shan^ai, Admiral Putiatin at, 254 ;

three weeks' journey from London

by the Siberian railway, 307 ;

future possibilities of the Siberian

railway, 307 ; advantages of rail-
way over sea route to, 308

Sharkoff Point, 218

Shilka, river, 101, 103

Shimonoseki, Treaty of, 303, 325

Shtchastia, Gulf of, 182

Siberia, conquest of, 44 ; conquest
of, by Yermak, 62 ; North-western,
a vast plain, 79 ; exploration of
North-eastern, 81 ; Dejneff, the
navigator, 85-7 ; rapidity of its
conquest, 98 ; eastward movement
of Eussia, 99 ; rivers of, 101 ;
exploration by Khabaroff, 108-
126 ; population in 1662, 113 ;
makers of Siberian history: De-
jneff, 85-7 ; Poyarkoff, 102-7 ;
Stepanoff, 129-32 ; Tchernigof-
ski, 132-3; Tolbuzin, 134-5 ;
Beiton, 136 ; question of the eastern
frontier settled, 260 ; rivers of,
facilitated the work of conquest,
270 ; postal communication to,
273 ; steam navigation on the
rivers of, 276-83 ; emigration to,
310 ; cheap railway fares to, 311 ;
Siberian railway, its effect on
the country, 312 ; will cease to be
considered the land of convictSy
312 ; resume of its history, 315 ;
starting into a new life, 339 ;
Nicholas II. in, 340

Siberian railways : necessity for,
286 ; first projected, 287 ; pro-
posal to build a railway from
Saratof to Peking, 288 ; other
railway schemes, 289 ; the line
from Perm to Tinmen commenced,
290 ; Engineer Ostrofski pro-
posed railway construction, 290 ;
a proposed railway the whole
length of Siberia, 293 ; finally
decided by an Imperial Ee-
script in 1891, 294 ; Nicholas
II., the then Tsesarievitch, lays
the first stone, 294, 340 ; the work
to be done in seven sections, 295 ;
great natural difficulties of con-
struction, 295 ; Western and Cen-
tral Siberian sections, 295 ; Cir-
cumbaikalian line, 295, 299, 301 ;
Transbaikalian line, 296, 300 ;
Amur line, 296, 301 ; North and
South Ussurian sections, 297 ;
through Manchuria to Vla-
divostok, 303-4 ; the terminus
Newchwang or Port Arthur, 304-5 ;
prospective meaning and impor-

INDEX

371

tance, 306-9 ; London to Shanghai
in three weeks, 307 ; future possi-
bilities, 307 ; advantages over sea
route to the Far East, 308 ; cheap-
ness of railway fares, 308 ; will
contribute to the increase of
steamer traffic on the rivers, 309
great factor in the eastward ex
pansion of the race, 310, 313
cheap fares for long distances
311 ; cost of the Siberian railway
312 ; cannot compete for the car
riage of goods, 332
Siberian rivers, steam navigation on,

276-86
Sibir, 60 ; decay of, 67
Sibiriakoi5, 281, 284
Sidensner, engineer, 292
Sidoroff, 284 ; and sea route to

Siberia, 285
Sigismund, Augustus, King of Po-
land, flight of Prince Kurbski to,
39 ; and the false Demetrius, 147 ;
attempt to reconquer Moscow, 152
Signal Hill, 215
Simon of Moscow, 24 ; died in 1353

of the ' black death,' 24
Sita, river, Batu defeats the Grand

Duke George at, 12
Slav and the Anglo-Saxon, struggle
between, would be a misfortune,
332
Slavs, earliest knowledge of, 2 ;
supposed to have come from the
banks of the Danube, 3 ; north-
eastern Slavs the ancestors of the
present Eussians, 3 ; constant dis-
cord of, 3 ; southern and northern
invaders of the ninth century, 3 ;
ask Varaghians to govern them, 4 ;
in Europe, 335
Smolensk, 4 ; taken by Vitofit, 28 ;
taken by Vassil, iii, 36 ; threatened
by Poles, 148 ; taken by Sigis-
mund, 148 ; relief of, by Ladis-
laus, 155
Sophia, daughter of Alexis, her am-
bition, 159 ; raises the strielets, 159
Sophia Paleologus, married to Ivan
III., 31 ; compared with Isabel of
Castile, 34
Sophronoff, project to build a rail-
way to Peking, 288
Spain, Moors in, compared to the
Tartars in P.ussia, 14 ; Tartar ex-
pulsion almost synchronous, 34
Spanish infantry, 42
Spapari sent to Peking, 160

Stadukhin, Michel, discovers the
river Kolyma, 82 ; on the Anadyr,
87

Stanley, H. M., article in the ' Nine-
teenth Century : ' ' Splendid Isola-
tion, or what ? ' v

Stanovoi, 79

Steam navigation on Siberian rivers,
275-86

Stepanoff, Onuphrius, 129 ; at Ku-
marska, 130; defeated by Chinese,
132

Steppes, nomads of the, 43

Stirling, Admiral, 233

Strielitz, or archers, to guard the
frontiers, 43

Strogonoffs, 50 ; wealth of, 50 ; apply
to Ivan the Terrible for a charter,
53 ; Ivan the Terrible orders the
recall of Yermak, 56

Succession, Slavonic law of, 18, 19

Sui-phun, river, 192

Sukacheff, 284

Sungari, river, 101, 105, 317

Suzdal, Prince of, 25

Sviatoslav, series of wars with the
Greeks, 5

Sweden, wars with, 35, 158

Swedes, attack Novgorod, 10 ; and
Greek Christianity, 10 ; defeat the
Eussians, 42

Swiss, military science of, 42

Sylvester, councillor of Ivan the
Terrible, 37, 38

Taiping Eebellion, 257

Taku Forts, attack by the English

and French fleets, 262
Ta-lien-Wan, 338 ; and Port Arthur,

338 ; lease of, 303, 360
Tara, town of, on the Irtysh, 68
Tartar conquest, 11-13, 314-5
Tartar Khans, the dispensers of sove-

I'eignty, 19
Tartar power. Golden Horde, 13
Tartar races on the Lower Volga, 37
Tartars, compared to the Arabs in
Spain, 14 ; employ -Jews and Ar-
menians as tax-collectors, 17 ;
defeated at Kulikovo, 27 ; charm of
their invincibility broken, 28 ;
final overthrow of suzerainty, 34 ;
effect of the long Tartar domina-
tion, 35
Taxes, Tartar, 26
Tchernigof burned by Tartars, 12
Tchernigofski, Nikiphor Eomanoff,
132-3

372

BUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC

Tchernysheff, 184

Tchetcheghin in search of Khaba-
roff, 123

Tchirikoff, sent to Kamchatka, 95 ;
bound and thrown into the sea, 95

Theodore, Boris Godunoff, 145

Tientsin, 254 ; treaty of commerce
conch;ded at, 262

Tinmen, railway to Perm, 280

Tobol, river, 279 ; trade on the, 280

Tobolsk, 67, 69, 73

Toktomysh, a Tartar chief, 27 ; de-
vastates Moscow, 27

Tolbuzin, Alexis, 134 ; defends Al-
bazin, 135

Tolstoi, 335

Torjok, town of, captured by Mon-
gols, 12

Trade, distribution of, along the
rivers, 279

Trans-Baikalia, 79 ; advance of the
Eussians, 129

Transbaikalian section of Siberian
railway, 296 ; floods destroy the
railway, 299

Troitski monastery at Serghievo, 151

Tsar, title of, first assumed by Ivan
the Terrible, 87

Tsesarievitch, Heir - apparent, not
Tsarwitch, as usually written, 225

Tunguses, 74, 101

Tura, river, 279 ; trade on the, 280

Turkey, wrong policy of, 41 ; war
with Kussia, 202

Turks appear in Eussian history, 5 ;
bold project to overthrow the
power of Ivan the Terrible, 40 ;
eiiorts to retake Azof, 155 ; re-
cover Azof, 156

Tver and Moscow, struggle for supre-
macy, 23

Tver, Tartar embassy massacred at,
23 ; 50,000 Tartars devastate, 23

' Tzaritza,' s.s., 285

Tzipa, 102

Uda, Trans-Baikalia river, 181 ; sea

of Okhotsk, 180
Ugra, river, 29

Ukraine, a bulwark of Poland, 156
Ulia, 107

Unity of Eussia, 1
Ural, expansion to the, 1 ; Yermak,

expedition of, 56 ; vast plains

intersected by rivers, 79 ; to the

Pacific by rail, 297
Ural mountains, 1

Ural, the, Ivan IV. extends his

dominions to, 38
Urka, river. 111
Ussuri, 106 ; Khabaroff on the,

118-9 ; Muravioff surveys the

coast region of, 262 ; annexation

of, 263
Ust-Strielk, 247
Ust-Zeya re-christened with the

name of Blagoveshtchensk, 260

Vaeaghians, origin of, 4 ; invited to
govern Slavs, 4 ; at Kief, 5

Vassil I., son of Demetrius Donskoi,
28 ; revolts against the Horde, 28

Vassil II., claim to the throne dis-
puted, 29 ; obliged to fly from
Moscow, 29 ; appoints his eldest
son Grand Duke, 30

Vassil III., son of Ivan III. and
Sophia Paleologus, father of Ivan
the Terrible, 35 ; takes Smolensk,
36 ; subdues Pskof , 36

Vassil Shuiski ascends the throne,
145 ; appearance of the second
false Demetrius, 146 ; civil war,
147 ; abdication, 148

Vassil, son of Timothy, nicknamed-
Yei'mak, early years, 51 ; joins the
Cossacks of the Don, 52 ; becomes
a pirate, 52

Vassil Vlasieff, expedition of, 78

' Vega,' voyage of the, 284, 286

Verkhoyansk Mountains, 80

Viatka incorporated in the Musco-
vite State, 35

' Virago ' s.s., 216

Vitim, expedition of Nerphilieff up
the, 101

Vitofit, 28

Vladimir, city of, 8 ; sacked by
Mongols, 12 ; residence of Grand
Duke, 18 ; Metropolitan transfers
his see from Kief, 18, 22

Vladimir, marries Grecian Princess
Anna, 5 ; conversion to Chris-
tianity, 6

Vladimir, George, Grand Duke of,
defeated at Koiumna by Batu, 12 ;
killed in battle, 12

Vladimir, Grand Dukedom, dispute
as to succession, 19 ; death of
Grand Duke, 20

Vladivostok, 98 ; harbour of, selected
by Muraviofl", 262 ; becomes the
Eussian naval station, 264; re-
semblance of the new port to

INDEX

373

Constantinople, 2C5 ; by rail from
Moscow to, 306 ; Nicholas II. at,
340

Vogulichi, 55

Volga, the, 9, 37 ; pirates of, 54

Volkhof, river, 9

Volouski, son of prince, 205, 226

' Vostok ' S.S., 210

Wei-hai-Wbi, 262

Western section of Siberian railway,

295
White Sea, monopoly of, given to

English traders, 54
Wiggins, Captain, 285

Yaelonoi Mountains, 1, 79
Yagaila, King of Lithuania, 26, 27,

28
Yakutes, town of, 74
Yakutsk, on the Lena, 74 ; Cossacks

and the ' knout,' 82
Yana, the, Buza at, 81
Yaroslav the Wise, death of, 6

Yellow Sea, Russian port on the, 325

Yenissei, the, Russians on the, 72 ;
steam navigation' and trade of,
280 ; Captain Wiggins first reaches
the mouth of the, 285

Yenisseisk, 73, 281

Yermak Vassil, son of Timothy,
occupation of, 51 ; becomes a
pirate, 52 ; sets out to conquer
Yugra, 53-62 ; presents from Ivan
the Terrible to, 62 ; loses his life,
64

Yesso, 330

Ying-tzu, 304

Yugra, the Stony Girdle, 44 ; expe-
dition of Yermak to, 53

Yurief, 14

Zaborinski, Colonel, 206

Zaporoghian Cossacks, their early
history, 47; plunder Turkish ships,
48 ; false Demetrius a pupil of,
143

Zavoiko, Admiral, 229, 231

Zeya, the,Khabaroff on, 104-5,124-5

Zinovieff insults Khabaroff, 125

PRINTED BY

SPOmSWOODE AND CO., NEW-STOKET SQUARE

LONDON

BY THE SAME AUTHOR.

THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. Compiled from Japanese,

Chinese, and Foreign Sources. With Maps and. numerous Illustra-
tions. Demy 8vo. 400 pages, cloth, 16s.

' From the sources here indicated, many of which are, of course,
only accessible to a writer well acquainted with the Japanese and Chinese
languages, "Vladimir" compiles a narrative not, perhaps, altogether
impartial nor altogether authoritative — for the latter quality belongs only
to the official narratives and despatches emanating from each side, and the
former to a judicial collation of these with each other, and with inde-
pendent sources of trustworthy information — but full of copious and well-
attested information, and written in the dispassionate temper of a well-
informed and disinterested observer. Of the battle of the Yalu in
particular " Vladimir " gives a fuller and more coherent account than we
have come across elsewhere, and he illustrates it with some very instruc-
tive diagi'ams, while his accounts of other important operations, both by
sea and land, are written with the same painstaking endeavour to get at
the truth.' — Times.

' The volume is fully illustrated with maps, diagrams of engagements,
views and portraits, and a number of sketches from the seat of war by
Japanese artists. It is altogetlier a work of the highest importance.'

Bookseller.

THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: an Historical, Geo-

graphical, Ethnogi-aphical, Social, and Commercial Sketch of the
Philippine Archipelago. By John Foreman, F.E.G.S. New
Edition, re-written, with 100 pages of additional matter, bringing
the book up to date of American Occupation. With 20 full-page
Illustrations. 8vo. cloth, 21s.

' Mr. Foreman knows his Philippines and Filipinos intimately and
personally, and anything not to be found about them in his book is
scarcely worth knowing. . . . This is the book upon the Philippines, as
good as it is big, which is much to say.' — PALL Mall Gazette.

' A better book to read on the subject could scarcely be imagined, and
its value is enhanced by excellent maps, which are likewise brought down
to date.' — World.

London :
SAMPSON LOW, MARSTON & COMPANY, Limited,

St. Dunstan's House, Fetter Lane, Fleet Street, E.C.

Captain Mahan's Works on Sea Power.

' Captain Maliaa has been recognised by all competent judges, not
merely as the most distinguished living writer on naval strategy, but as
the originator and first exponent of what may be called the philosophy of
naval history.' — Times.

THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON

HISTORY. 1660-1783. With 2.5 Charts of Great Naval Battles.
Demy 8vo. cloth extra, gilt top, 18s.

THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER ON THE

FRENCH REVOLUTION AND EMPIRE. With 13 Maps and
Battle Plans. 2 vols, demy Svo. cloth extra, gilt top, 30s.

THE INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES

IN SEA POWER, PRESENT AND FUTURE. By Captain
A. T. Mahan. Crown Svo. cloth extra, IO5. 6^. net.

THE UNITED STATES NAVY IN THE CIVIL

WAR. THE GULF AND INLAND WATERS. By Captain
A, T. Mahan, U.S.N. With Maps. New Edition. With Steel"
Engraving, 5s.

Over Six Thousand Copies of Captain Mahan's ' Nelson ' have already been

sold in this country alone. The most important and successful

Naval Biography ever published.

CAPTAIN MAHAN'S 'LIFE OF NELSON.' The

Embodiment of the Sea Power of Great Britain. With 12 Battle
Plans, 8 Maps, and about 20 Full-page Photogravure Plates,
including Unpublished Portraits of Lady Nelson, Horatia, &c.
2 vols, demy 8vo. cloth extra, gilt top, 36s. net.

*^* Also a Popular Edition, in One Volume of about l^^])ages, carefully
revised throughout by the Author. With Illustrations, Maps, and Battle
Plans, in a compact small %vo. form, handsomely bound in cloth extra, cut
edges, price 12s. Qd. net.

THE LIFE OF ADMIRAL FARRAGUT. By

Captain A. T. MAHAJsr, With Steel Engraved Portrait, also a
General Map and Plans. Crown Svo. cloth, 6s.

London :

SAMPSON LOW, MARSTON & COMPANY, Limited,

St. Dunstan's House, Fetter Lane, Fleet Street, E.G.

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